Summa Theologica Plus Appendices Dom Central

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS SUMMA THEOLOGICA Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Second and Revised Edition, 1920. PROLOGUE Because the Master of Catholic Truth ought not only to teach the proficient, but also to instruct beginners (accord- ing to the Apostle: “As Unto Little Ones in Christ, I Gave You Milk to Drink, Not Meat”—1 Cor. iii. 1, 2), we pur- pose in this book to treat of whatever belongs to the Chris- tian Religion, in such a way as may tend to the instruction of beginners. We have considered that students in this Science have not seldom been hampered by what they have found written by other authors, partly on account of the multipli- cation of useless questions, articles, and arguments; partly also because those things that are needful for them to know are not taught according to the order of the subject-matter, but according as the plan of the book might require, or the occasion of the argument offer; partly, too, because frequent repetition brought weariness and confusion to the minds of the readers. Endeavoring to avoid these and other like faults, we shall try, by God’s help, to set forth whatever is included in this Sacred Science as briefly and clearly as the matter itself may allow. FIRST PART FIRST PART, QUESTION 1 The Nature and Extent of Sacred Doctrine (In Ten Articles) To place our purpose within proper limits, we first endeavor to investigate the nature and extent of this sacred doctrine. Concerning this there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is necessary? (2) Whether it is a science? (3) Whether it is one or many? (4) Whether it is speculative or practical? (5) How it is compared with other sciences? (6) Whether it is the same as wisdom? (7) Whether God is its subject-matter? (8) Whether it is a matter of argument? (9) Whether it rightly employs metaphors and similes? (10) Whether the Sacred Scripture of this doctrine may be expounded in different senses? Whether, besides philosophy, any further doctrine is required? Ia q. 1 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that, besides philosophical sci- actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for the salva- ence, we have no need of any further knowledge. For man tion of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should not seek to know what is above reason: “Seek not should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even the things that are too high for thee” (Ecclus. 3:22). But as regards those truths about God which human reason whatever is not above reason is fully treated of in philo- could have discovered, it was necessary that man should sophical science. Therefore any other knowledge besides be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about philosophical science is superfluous. God such as reason could discover, would only be known Objection 2. Further, knowledge can be concerned by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture only with being, for nothing can be known, save what of many errors. Whereas man’s whole salvation, which is is true; and all that is, is true. But everything that is, is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. There- treated of in philosophical science—even God Himself; fore, in order that the salvation of men might be brought so that there is a part of philosophy called theology, or about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that the divine science, as Aristotle has proved (Metaph. vi). they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. Therefore, besides philosophical science, there is no need It was therefore necessary that besides philosophical sci- of any further knowledge. ence built up by reason, there should be a sacred science On the contrary, It is written (2 Tim. 3:16): “All learned through revelation. Scripture, inspired of God is profitable to teach, to re- Reply to Objection 1. Although those things which prove, to correct, to instruct in justice.” Now Scripture, are beyond man’s knowledge may not be sought for by inspired of God, is no part of philosophical science, which man through his reason, nevertheless, once they are re- has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is useful vealed by God, they must be accepted by faith. Hence the that besides philosophical science, there should be other sacred text continues, “For many things are shown to thee knowledge, i.e. inspired of God. above the understanding of man” (Ecclus. 3:25). And in I answer that, It was necessary for man’s salvation this, the sacred science consists. that there should be a knowledge revealed by God besides Reply to Objection 2. Sciences are differentiated ac- philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly, cording to the various means through which knowledge is indeed, because man is directed to God, as to an end that obtained. For the astronomer and the physicist both may surpasses the grasp of his reason: “The eye hath not seen, prove the same conclusion: that the earth, for instance, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for is round: the astronomer by means of mathematics (i.e. them that wait for Thee” (Is. 66:4). But the end must first abstracting from matter), but the physicist by means of be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and matter itself. Hence there is no reason why those things 1 which may be learned from philosophical science, so far lation. Hence theology included in sacred doctrine differs as they can be known by natural reason, may not also be in kind from that theology which is part of philosophy. taught us by another science so far as they fall within reve- Whether sacred doctrine is a science? Ia q. 1 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that sacred doctrine is not a sci- principles known by the light of a higher science: thus ence. For every science proceeds from self-evident prin- the science of perspective proceeds from principles estab- ciples. But sacred doctrine proceeds from articles of faith lished by geometry, and music from principles established which are not self-evident, since their truth is not admit- by arithmetic. So it is that sacred doctrine is a science be- ted by all: “For all men have not faith” (2 Thess. 3:2). cause it proceeds from principles established by the light Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science. of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the Objection 2. Further, no science deals with individ- blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on authority ual facts. But this sacred science treats of individual facts, the principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred such as the deeds of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and such science is established on principles revealed by God. like. Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science. Reply to Objection 1. The principles of any science On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) “to are either in themselves self-evident, or reducible to the this science alone belongs that whereby saving faith is be- conclusions of a higher science; and such, as we have said, gotten, nourished, protected and strengthened.” But this are the principles of sacred doctrine. can be said of no science except sacred doctrine. There- Reply to Objection 2. Individual facts are treated of fore sacred doctrine is a science. in sacred doctrine, not because it is concerned with them I answer that, Sacred doctrine is a science. We must principally, but they are introduced rather both as exam- bear in mind that there are two kinds of sciences. There ples to be followed in our lives (as in moral sciences) and are some which proceed from a principle known by the in order to establish the authority of those men through natural light of intelligence, such as arithmetic and geom- whom the divine revelation, on which this sacred scrip- etry and the like. There are some which proceed from ture or doctrine is based, has come down to us. Whether sacred doctrine is one science? Ia q. 1 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that sacred doctrine is not one ity of the object of this science; and therefore is included science; for according to the Philosopher (Poster. i) “that under sacred doctrine as under one science. science is one which treats only of one class of subjects.” Reply to Objection 1. Sacred doctrine does not treat But the creator and the creature, both of whom are treated of God and creatures equally, but of God primarily, and of of in sacred doctrine, cannot be grouped together under creatures only so far as they are referable to God as their one class of subjects. Therefore sacred doctrine is not one beginning or end. Hence the unity of this science is not science. impaired. Objection 2. Further, in sacred doctrine we treat of Reply to Objection 2. Nothing prevents inferior fac- angels, corporeal creatures and human morality. But these ulties or habits from being differentiated by something belong to separate philosophical sciences. Therefore sa- which falls under a higher faculty or habit as well; because cred doctrine cannot be one science. the higher faculty or habit regards the object in its more On the contrary, Holy Scripture speaks of it as one universal formality, as the object of the “common sense” science: “Wisdom gave him the knowledge [scientiam] of is whatever affects the senses, including, therefore, what- holy things” (Wis. 10:10). ever is visible or audible. Hence the “common sense,” I answer that, Sacred doctrine is one science. The although one faculty, extends to all the objects of the five unity of a faculty or habit is to be gauged by its object, not senses. Similarly, objects which are the subject-matter of indeed, in its material aspect, but as regards the precise different philosophical sciences can yet be treated of by formality under which it is an object. For example, man, this one single sacred science under one aspect precisely ass, stone agree in the one precise formality of being col- so far as they can be included in revelation. So that in ored; and color is the formal object of sight. Therefore, this way, sacred doctrine bears, as it were, the stamp of because Sacred Scripture considers things precisely un- the divine science which is one and simple, yet extends to der the formality of being divinely revealed, whatever has everything. been divinely revealed possesses the one precise formal- 2 Whether sacred doctrine is a practical science? Ia q. 1 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that sacred doctrine is a prac- a speculative science. tical science; for a practical science is that which ends in I answer that, Sacred doctrine, being one, extends action according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii). But sa- to things which belong to different philosophical sci- cred doctrine is ordained to action: “Be ye doers of the ences because it considers in each the same formal aspect, word, and not hearers only” (James 1:22). Therefore sa- namely, so far as they can be known through divine reve- cred doctrine is a practical science. lation. Hence, although among the philosophical sciences Objection 2. Further, sacred doctrine is divided into one is speculative and another practical, nevertheless sa- the Old and the New Law. But law implies a moral science cred doctrine includes both; as God, by one and the same which is a practical science. Therefore sacred doctrine is science, knows both Himself and His works. Still, it is a practical science. speculative rather than practical because it is more con- On the contrary, Every practical science is concerned cerned with divine things than with human acts; though with human operations; as moral science is concerned it does treat even of these latter, inasmuch as man is or- with human acts, and architecture with buildings. But sa- dained by them to the perfect knowledge of God in which cred doctrine is chiefly concerned with God, whose hand- consists eternal bliss. This is a sufficient answer to the iwork is especially man. Therefore it is not a practical but Objections. Whether sacred doctrine is nobler than other sciences? Ia q. 1 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that sacred doctrine is not no- reason’s grasp. Of the practical sciences, that one is no- bler than other sciences; for the nobility of a science de- bler which is ordained to a further purpose, as political pends on the certitude it establishes. But other sciences, science is nobler than military science; for the good of the the principles of which cannot be doubted, seem to be army is directed to the good of the State. But the purpose more certain than sacred doctrine; for its principles— of this science, in so far as it is practical, is eternal bliss; namely, articles of faith—can be doubted. Therefore other to which as to an ultimate end the purposes of every prac- sciences seem to be nobler. tical science are directed. Hence it is clear that from every Objection 2. Further, it is the sign of a lower science standpoint, it is nobler than other sciences. to depend upon a higher; as music depends on arithmetic. Reply to Objection 1. It may well happen that what But sacred doctrine does in a sense depend upon philo- is in itself the more certain may seem to us the less certain sophical sciences; for Jerome observes, in his Epistle to on account of the weakness of our intelligence, “which Magnus, that “the ancient doctors so enriched their books is dazzled by the clearest objects of nature; as the owl with the ideas and phrases of the philosophers, that thou is dazzled by the light of the sun” (Metaph. ii, lect. i). knowest not what more to admire in them, their profane Hence the fact that some happen to doubt about articles erudition or their scriptural learning.” Therefore sacred of faith is not due to the uncertain nature of the truths, but doctrine is inferior to other sciences. to the weakness of human intelligence; yet the slenderest On the contrary, Other sciences are called the hand- knowledge that may be obtained of the highest things is maidens of this one: “Wisdom sent her maids to invite to more desirable than the most certain knowledge obtained the tower” (Prov. 9:3). of lesser things, as is said in de Animalibus xi. I answer that, Since this science is partly specula- Reply to Objection 2. This science can in a sense tive and partly practical, it transcends all others specula- depend upon the philosophical sciences, not as though it tive and practical. Now one speculative science is said stood in need of them, but only in order to make its teach- to be nobler than another, either by reason of its greater ing clearer. For it accepts its principles not from other sci- certitude, or by reason of the higher worth of its subject- ences, but immediately from God, by revelation. There- matter. In both these respects this science surpasses other fore it does not depend upon other sciences as upon the speculative sciences; in point of greater certitude, because higher, but makes use of them as of the lesser, and as other sciences derive their certitude from the natural light handmaidens: even so the master sciences make use of the of human reason, which can err; whereas this derives its sciences that supply their materials, as political of military certitude from the light of divine knowledge, which can- science. That it thus uses them is not due to its own de- not be misled: in point of the higher worth of its subject- fect or insufficiency, but to the defect of our intelligence, matter because this science treats chiefly of those things which is more easily led by what is known through natu- which by their sublimity transcend human reason; while ral reason (from which proceed the other sciences) to that other sciences consider only those things which are within which is above reason, such as are the teachings of this 3 science. Whether this doctrine is the same as wisdom? Ia q. 1 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that this doctrine is not the same can be known through creatures just as philosophers knew as wisdom. For no doctrine which borrows its principles Him—“That which is known of God is manifest in them” is worthy of the name of wisdom; seeing that the wise (Rom. 1:19)—but also as far as He is known to Himself man directs, and is not directed (Metaph. i). But this doc- alone and revealed to others. Hence sacred doctrine is es- trine borrows its principles. Therefore this science is not pecially called wisdom. wisdom. Reply to Objection 1. Sacred doctrine derives its Objection 2. Further, it is a part of wisdom to prove principles not from any human knowledge, but from the the principles of other sciences. Hence it is called the divine knowledge, through which, as through the highest chief of sciences, as is clear in Ethic. vi. But this doctrine wisdom, all our knowledge is set in order. does not prove the principles of other sciences. Therefore Reply to Objection 2. The principles of other sci- it is not the same as wisdom. ences either are evident and cannot be proved, or are Objection 3. Further, this doctrine is acquired by proved by natural reason through some other science. But study, whereas wisdom is acquired by God’s inspiration; the knowledge proper to this science comes through reve- so that it is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit lation and not through natural reason. Therefore it has no (Is. 11:2). Therefore this doctrine is not the same as wis- concern to prove the principles of other sciences, but only dom. to judge of them. Whatsoever is found in other sciences On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:6): “This is your contrary to any truth of this science must be condemned as wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations.” false: “Destroying counsels and every height that exalteth I answer that, This doctrine is wisdom above all hu- itself against the knowledge of God” (2 Cor. 10:4,5). man wisdom; not merely in any one order, but absolutely. Reply to Objection 3. Since judgment appertains For since it is the part of a wise man to arrange and to to wisdom, the twofold manner of judging produces a judge, and since lesser matters should be judged in the twofold wisdom. A man may judge in one way by incli- light of some higher principle, he is said to be wise in any nation, as whoever has the habit of a virtue judges rightly one order who considers the highest principle in that or- of what concerns that virtue by his very inclination to- der: thus in the order of building, he who plans the form wards it. Hence it is the virtuous man, as we read, who is of the house is called wise and architect, in opposition to the measure and rule of human acts. In another way, by the inferior laborers who trim the wood and make ready knowledge, just as a man learned in moral science might the stones: “As a wise architect, I have laid the founda- be able to judge rightly about virtuous acts, though he had tion” (1 Cor. 3:10). Again, in the order of all human not the virtue. The first manner of judging divine things life, the prudent man is called wise, inasmuch as he di- belongs to that wisdom which is set down among the gifts rects his acts to a fitting end: “Wisdom is prudence to a of the Holy Ghost: “The spiritual man judgeth all things” man” (Prov. 10: 23). Therefore he who considers ab- (1 Cor. 2:15). And Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): “Hi- solutely the highest cause of the whole universe, namely erotheus is taught not by mere learning, but by experience God, is most of all called wise. Hence wisdom is said to of divine things.” The second manner of judging belongs be the knowledge of divine things, as Augustine says (De to this doctrine which is acquired by study, though its prin- Trin. xii, 14). But sacred doctrine essentially treats of ciples are obtained by revelation. God viewed as the highest cause—not only so far as He Whether God is the object of this science? Ia q. 1 a. 7 Objection 1. It seems that God is not the object of the object of the science. But in Holy Writ we reach this science. For in every science, the nature of its object conclusions not only concerning God, but concerning is presupposed. But this science cannot presuppose the many other things, such as creatures and human morality. essence of God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, iv): Therefore God is not the object of this science. “It is impossible to define the essence of God.” Therefore On the contrary, The object of the science is that of God is not the object of this science. which it principally treats. But in this science, the treat- Objection 2. Further, whatever conclusions are ment is mainly about God; for it is called theology, as reached in any science must be comprehended under treating of God. Therefore God is the object of this sci- 4 ence. ence, and not to the aspect under which it is treated, have I answer that, God is the object of this science. The asserted the object of this science to be something other relation between a science and its object is the same as than God—that is, either things and signs; or the works of that between a habit or faculty and its object. Now prop- salvation; or the whole Christ, as the head and members. erly speaking, the object of a faculty or habit is the thing Of all these things, in truth, we treat in this science, but so under the aspect of which all things are referred to that far as they have reference to God. faculty or habit, as man and stone are referred to the fac- Reply to Objection 1. Although we cannot know in ulty of sight in that they are colored. Hence colored things what consists the essence of God, nevertheless in this sci- are the proper objects of sight. But in sacred science, all ence we make use of His effects, either of nature or of things are treated of under the aspect of God: either be- grace, in place of a definition, in regard to whatever is cause they are God Himself or because they refer to God treated of in this science concerning God; even as in some as their beginning and end. Hence it follows that God is philosophical sciences we demonstrate something about in very truth the object of this science. This is clear also a cause from its effect, by taking the effect in place of a from the principles of this science, namely, the articles definition of the cause. of faith, for faith is about God. The object of the prin- Reply to Objection 2. Whatever other conclusions ciples and of the whole science must be the same, since are reached in this sacred science are comprehended un- the whole science is contained virtually in its principles. der God, not as parts or species or accidents but as in some Some, however, looking to what is treated of in this sci- way related to Him. Whether sacred doctrine is a matter of argument? Ia q. 1 a. 8 Objection 1. It seems this doctrine is not a matter of pute with him, though it can answer his objections. Hence argument. For Ambrose says (De Fide 1): “Put arguments Sacred Scripture, since it has no science above itself, can aside where faith is sought.” But in this doctrine, faith es- dispute with one who denies its principles only if the op- pecially is sought: “But these things are written that you ponent admits some at least of the truths obtained through may believe” (Jn. 20:31). Therefore sacred doctrine is not divine revelation; thus we can argue with heretics from a matter of argument. texts in Holy Writ, and against those who deny one article Objection 2. Further, if it is a matter of argument, of faith, we can argue from another. If our opponent be- the argument is either from authority or from reason. If it lieves nothing of divine revelation, there is no longer any is from authority, it seems unbefitting its dignity, for the means of proving the articles of faith by reasoning, but proof from authority is the weakest form of proof. But if it only of answering his objections—if he has any—against is from reason, this is unbefitting its end, because, accord- faith. Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and since the ing to Gregory (Hom. 26), “faith has no merit in those contrary of a truth can never be demonstrated, it is clear things of which human reason brings its own experience.” that the arguments brought against faith cannot be demon- Therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument. strations, but are difficulties that can be answered. On the contrary, The Scripture says that a bishop Reply to Objection 1. Although arguments from hu- should “embrace that faithful word which is according to man reason cannot avail to prove what must be received doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine on faith, nevertheless, this doctrine argues from articles of and to convince the gainsayers” (Titus 1:9). faith to other truths. I answer that, As other sciences do not argue in Reply to Objection 2. This doctrine is especially proof of their principles, but argue from their principles based upon arguments from authority, inasmuch as its to demonstrate other truths in these sciences: so this doc- principles are obtained by revelation: thus we ought to trine does not argue in proof of its principles, which are believe on the authority of those to whom the revelation the articles of faith, but from them it goes on to prove has been made. Nor does this take away from the dignity something else; as the Apostle from the resurrection of of this doctrine, for although the argument from authority Christ argues in proof of the general resurrection (1 Cor. based on human reason is the weakest, yet the argument 15). However, it is to be borne in mind, in regard to the from authority based on divine revelation is the strongest. philosophical sciences, that the inferior sciences neither But sacred doctrine makes use even of human reason, not, prove their principles nor dispute with those who deny indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of faith would them, but leave this to a higher science; whereas the high- come to an end), but to make clear other things that are est of them, viz. metaphysics, can dispute with one who put forward in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does denies its principles, if only the opponent will make some not destroy nature but perfects it, natural reason should concession; but if he concede nothing, it can have no dis- minister to faith as the natural bent of the will ministers to 5 charity. Hence the Apostle says: “Bringing into captivity faith rests upon the revelation made to the apostles and every understanding unto the obedience of Christ” (2 Cor. prophets who wrote the canonical books, and not on the 10:5). Hence sacred doctrine makes use also of the author- revelations (if any such there are) made to other doctors. ity of philosophers in those questions in which they were Hence Augustine says (Epis. ad Hieron. xix, 1): “Only able to know the truth by natural reason, as Paul quotes a those books of Scripture which are called canonical have saying of Aratus: “As some also of your own poets said: I learned to hold in such honor as to believe their authors For we are also His offspring” (Acts 17:28). Nevertheless, have not erred in any way in writing them. But other au- sacred doctrine makes use of these authorities as extrinsic thors I so read as not to deem everything in their works and probable arguments; but properly uses the authority to be true, merely on account of their having so thought of the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible proof, and written, whatever may have been their holiness and and the authority of the doctors of the Church as one that learning.” may properly be used, yet merely as probable. For our Whether Holy Scripture should use metaphors? Ia q. 1 a. 9 Objection 1. It seems that Holy Scripture should not itual truths be expounded by means of figures taken from use metaphors. For that which is proper to the lowest sci- corporeal things, in order that thereby even the simple ence seems not to befit this science, which holds the high- who are unable by themselves to grasp intellectual things est place of all. But to proceed by the aid of various simil- may be able to understand it. itudes and figures is proper to poetry, the least of all the Reply to Objection 1. Poetry makes use of metaphors sciences. Therefore it is not fitting that this science should to produce a representation, for it is natural to man to be make use of such similitudes. pleased with representations. But sacred doctrine makes Objection 2. Further, this doctrine seems to be in- use of metaphors as both necessary and useful. tended to make truth clear. Hence a reward is held out to Reply to Objection 2. The ray of divine revelation those who manifest it: “They that explain me shall have is not extinguished by the sensible imagery wherewith life everlasting” (Ecclus. 24:31). But by such similitudes it is veiled, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i); and its truth is obscured. Therefore, to put forward divine truths truth so far remains that it does not allow the minds of by likening them to corporeal things does not befit this those to whom the revelation has been made, to rest in the science. metaphors, but raises them to the knowledge of truths; and Objection 3. Further, the higher creatures are, the through those to whom the revelation has been made oth- nearer they approach to the divine likeness. If therefore ers also may receive instruction in these matters. Hence any creature be taken to represent God, this representa- those things that are taught metaphorically in one part tion ought chiefly to be taken from the higher creatures, of Scripture, in other parts are taught more openly. The and not from the lower; yet this is often found in Scrip- very hiding of truth in figures is useful for the exercise of tures. thoughtful minds and as a defense against the ridicule of On the contrary, It is written (Osee 12:10): “I have the impious, according to the words “Give not that which multiplied visions, and I have used similitudes by the min- is holy to dogs” (Mat. 7:6). istry of the prophets.” But to put forward anything by Reply to Objection 3. As Dionysius says, (Coel. means of similitudes is to use metaphors. Therefore this Hier. i) it is more fitting that divine truths should be ex- sacred science may use metaphors. pounded under the figure of less noble than of nobler bod- I answer that, It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward ies, and this for three reasons. Firstly, because thereby divine and spiritual truths by means of comparisons with men’s minds are the better preserved from error. For then material things. For God provides for everything accord- it is clear that these things are not literal descriptions of ing to the capacity of its nature. Now it is natural to man divine truths, which might have been open to doubt had to attain to intellectual truths through sensible objects, be- they been expressed under the figure of nobler bodies, cause all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in especially for those who could think of nothing nobler Holy Writ, spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the than bodies. Secondly, because this is more befitting the likeness of material things. This is what Dionysius says knowledge of God that we have in this life. For what He is (Coel. Hier. i): “We cannot be enlightened by the divine not is clearer to us than what He is. Therefore similitudes rays except they be hidden within the covering of many drawn from things farthest away from God form within us sacred veils.” It is also befitting Holy Writ, which is pro- a truer estimate that God is above whatsoever we may say posed to all without distinction of persons—“To the wise or think of Him. Thirdly, because thereby divine truths and to the unwise I am a debtor” (Rom. 1:14)—that spir- are the better hidden from the unworthy. 6 Whether in Holy Scripture a word may have several senses? Ia q. 1 a. 10 Objection 1. It seems that in Holy Writ a word can- the moral sense. But so far as they signify what relates not have several senses, historical or literal, allegorical, to eternal glory, there is the anagogical sense. Since the tropological or moral, and anagogical. For many differ- literal sense is that which the author intends, and since the ent senses in one text produce confusion and deception author of Holy Writ is God, Who by one act comprehends and destroy all force of argument. Hence no argument, all things by His intellect, it is not unfitting, as Augustine but only fallacies, can be deduced from a multiplicity of says (Confess. xii), if, even according to the literal sense, propositions. But Holy Writ ought to be able to state the one word in Holy Writ should have several senses. truth without any fallacy. Therefore in it there cannot be Reply to Objection 1. The multiplicity of these several senses to a word. senses does not produce equivocation or any other kind Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De util. cred. of multiplicity, seeing that these senses are not multiplied iii) that “the Old Testament has a fourfold division as to because one word signifies several things, but because the history, etiology, analogy and allegory.” Now these four things signified by the words can be themselves types of seem altogether different from the four divisions men- other things. Thus in Holy Writ no confusion results, tioned in the first objection. Therefore it does not seem for all the senses are founded on one—the literal—from fitting to explain the same word of Holy Writ according which alone can any argument be drawn, and not from to the four different senses mentioned above. those intended in allegory, as Augustine says (Epis. 48). Objection 3. Further, besides these senses, there is Nevertheless, nothing of Holy Scripture perishes on ac- the parabolical, which is not one of these four. count of this, since nothing necessary to faith is contained On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xx, 1): “Holy under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere put for- Writ by the manner of its speech transcends every science, ward by the Scripture in its literal sense. because in one and the same sentence, while it describes Reply to Objection 2. These three—history, etiol- a fact, it reveals a mystery.” ogy, analogy—are grouped under the literal sense. For I answer that, The author of Holy Writ is God, in it is called history, as Augustine expounds (Epis. 48), whose power it is to signify His meaning, not by words whenever anything is simply related; it is called etiology only (as man also can do), but also by things themselves. when its cause is assigned, as when Our Lord gave the So, whereas in every other science things are signified by reason why Moses allowed the putting away of wives— words, this science has the property, that the things sig- namely, on account of the hardness of men’s hearts; it is nified by the words have themselves also a signification. called analogy whenever the truth of one text of Scripture Therefore that first signification whereby words signify is shown not to contradict the truth of another. Of these things belongs to the first sense, the historical or literal. four, allegory alone stands for the three spiritual senses. That signification whereby things signified by words have Thus Hugh of St. Victor (Sacram. iv, 4 Prolog.) includes themselves also a signification is called the spiritual sense, the anagogical under the allegorical sense, laying down which is based on the literal, and presupposes it. Now this three senses only—the historical, the allegorical, and the spiritual sense has a threefold division. For as the Apostle tropological. says (Heb. 10:1) the Old Law is a figure of the New Law, Reply to Objection 3. The parabolical sense is con- and Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) “the New Law itself is tained in the literal, for by words things are signified prop- a figure of future glory.” Again, in the New Law, what- erly and figuratively. Nor is the figure itself, but that ever our Head has done is a type of what we ought to do. which is figured, the literal sense. When Scripture speaks Therefore, so far as the things of the Old Law signify the of God’s arm, the literal sense is not that God has such things of the New Law, there is the allegorical sense; so far a member, but only what is signified by this member, as the things done in Christ, or so far as the things which namely operative power. Hence it is plain that nothing signify Christ, are types of what we ought to do, there is false can ever underlie the literal sense of Holy Writ. 7 FIRST PART, QUESTION 2 The Existence of God (In Three Articles) Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is the beginning of things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is clear from what has been already said, therefore, in our endeavor to expound this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God; (2) Of the rational creature’s advance towards God; (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to God. In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall consider: (1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence; (2) Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons; (3) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from Him. Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider: (1) Whether God exists? (2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what is NOT the manner of His existence; (3) Whatever concerns His operations—namely, His knowledge, will, power. Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the proposition “God exists” is self-evident? (2) Whether it is demonstrable? (3) Whether God exists? Whether the existence of God is self-evident? Ia q. 2 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that the existence of God is self- stration. But the opposite of the proposition “God is” can evident. Now those things are said to be self-evident to us be mentally admitted: “The fool said in his heart, There the knowledge of which is naturally implanted in us, as is no God” (Ps. 52:1). Therefore, that God exists is not we can see in regard to first principles. But as Damascene self-evident. says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), “the knowledge of God is nat- I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of urally implanted in all.” Therefore the existence of God is two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though self-evident. not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. Objection 2. Further, those things are said to be self- A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is in- evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, cluded in the essence of the subject, as “Man is an an- which the Philosopher (1 Poster. iii) says is true of the imal,” for animal is contained in the essence of man. first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstra- the signification of the word “God” is understood, it is at tion, the terms of which are common things that no one once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the that which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those as the word “God” is understood it exists mentally, it also who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says “God exists” is self-evident. (Hebdom., the title of which is: “Whether all that is, is Objection 3. Further, the existence of truth is self- good”), “that there are some mental concepts self-evident evident. For whoever denies the existence of truth grants only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not that truth does not exist: and, if truth does not exist, then in space.” Therefore I say that this proposition, “God ex- the proposition “Truth does not exist” is true: and if there ists,” of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same is anything true, there must be truth. But God is truth it-as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be self: “I am the way, the truth, and the life” (Jn. 14:6) hereafter shown (q. 3, a. 4). Now because we do not know Therefore “God exists” is self-evident. the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to On the contrary, No one can mentally admit the op- us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more posite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. known to us, though less known in their nature—namely, iv, lect. vi) states concerning the first principles of demon- by effects. 8 Reply to Objection 1. To know that God exists in a some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, everyone understands that by this word “God” is signi- inasmuch as God is man’s beatitude. For man naturally fied something than which nothing greater can be thought, desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he under- must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not stands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actu- someone is approaching is not the same as to know that ally exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is ap- something than which nothing greater can be thought; and proaching; for many there are who imagine that man’s this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and does not exist. others in pleasures, and others in something else. Reply to Objection 3. The existence of truth in gen- Reply to Objection 2. Perhaps not everyone who eral is self-evident but the existence of a Primal Truth is hears this word “God” understands it to signify something not self-evident to us. than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists? Ia q. 2 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that the existence of God cannot cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better be demonstrated. For it is an article of faith that God ex- known to us; because since every effect depends upon its ists. But what is of faith cannot be demonstrated, because cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist. Hence a demonstration produces scientific knowledge; whereas the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to faith is of the unseen (Heb. 11:1). Therefore it cannot be us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which demonstrated that God exists. are known to us. Objection 2. Further, the essence is the middle term Reply to Objection 1. The existence of God and other of demonstration. But we cannot know in what God’s like truths about God, which can be known by natural rea- essence consists, but solely in what it does not consist; son, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the ar- as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore we ticles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as cannot demonstrate that God exists. grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes some- Objection 3. Further, if the existence of God were thing that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing demonstrated, this could only be from His effects. But to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as His effects are not proportionate to Him, since He is infi- a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of nite and His effects are finite; and between the finite and being scientifically known and demonstrated. infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a cause Reply to Objection 2. When the existence of a cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place it, it seems that the existence of God cannot be demon- of the definition of the cause in proof of the cause’s ex- strated. istence. This is especially the case in regard to God, be- On the contrary, The Apostle says: “The invisible cause, in order to prove the existence of anything, it is things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the things that are made” (Rom. 1:20). But this would not word, and not its essence, for the question of its essence be unless the existence of God could be demonstrated follows on the question of its existence. Now the names through the things that are made; for the first thing we given to God are derived from His effects; consequently, must know of anything is whether it exists. in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, I answer that, Demonstration can be made in two we may take for the middle term the meaning of the word ways: One is through the cause, and is called “a priori,” “God”. and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely. The Reply to Objection 3. From effects not proportion- other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration ate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be “a posteriori”; this is to argue from what is prior relatively obtained. Yet from every effect the existence of the cause only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the the existence of God from His effects; though from them cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence. 9 Whether God exists? Ia q. 2 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that God does not exist; because indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the ef- if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be al- ficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, together destroyed. But the word “God” means that He is which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not pos- infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would sible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. following in order, the first is the cause of the interme- Therefore God does not exist. diate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ulti- Objection 2. Further, it is superfluous to suppose that mate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or what can be accounted for by a few principles has been only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the produced by many. But it seems that everything we see in effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among effi- the world can be accounted for by other principles, sup- cient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermedi- posing God did not exist. For all natural things can be re- ate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on duced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will things can be reduced to one principle which is human there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is nec- God’s existence. essary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone On the contrary, It is said in the person of God: “I gives the name of God. am Who am.” (Ex. 3:14) The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible five ways. to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, The first and more manifest way is the argument from and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to ex- world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in mo- ist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is tion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in mo- not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then tion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is at one time there could have been nothing in existence. in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something in existence, because that which does not exist only be- from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced gins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, even now nothing would be in existence—which is ab- and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possi- surd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but ble that the same thing should be at once in actuality and there must exist something the existence of which is nec- potentiality in the same respect, but only in different re- essary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity spects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in caused by another, as has been already proved in regard the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also others their necessity. This all men speak of as God. must needs be put in motion by another, and that by an- The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found other again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then in things. Among beings there are some more and some there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other less good, true, noble and the like. But “more” and “less” mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inas- are predicated of different things, according as they re- much as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the semble in their different ways something which is the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be is something which is truest, something best, something God. noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost The second way is from the nature of the efficient being; for those things that are greatest in truth are great- cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order est in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maxi- of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, mum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, 10 which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (Enchirid- Therefore there must also be something which is to all be- ion xi): “Since God is the highest good, He would not ings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipo- perfection; and this we call God. tence and goodness were such as to bring good even out The fifth way is taken from the governance of the of evil.” This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good. as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from Reply to Objection 2. Since nature works for a deter- their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so minate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not for- is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as to tuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, also be traced back to some higher cause other than hu- unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowl- man reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all edge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark things that are changeable and capable of defect must be by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first prin- whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this ciple, as was shown in the body of the Article. being we call God. 11 FIRST PART, QUESTION 3 Of the Simplicity of God (In Eight Articles) When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no means for considering how God is, but rather how He is not. Therefore, we must consider: (1) How He is not; (2) How He is known by us; (3) How He is named. Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed to the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and the like. Therefore (1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him; and because whatever is simple in material things is imperfect and a part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection; (3) His infinity; (4) His immutability; (5) His unity. Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is a body? (2) Whether He is composed of matter and form? (3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature, and subject? (4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence? (5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference? (6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident? (7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple? (8) Whether He enters into composition with other things? Whether God is a body? Ia q. 3 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that God is a body. For a body is ened” (Ps. 33:6), and as a term “wherefrom”: “All they that which has the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture that depart from Thee shall be written in the earth” (Jer. attributes the three dimensions to God, for it is written: 17:13). Therefore God is a body. “He is higher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is On the contrary, It is written in the Gospel of St. John deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure (Jn. 4:24): “God is a spirit.” of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea” I answer that, It is absolutely true that God is not a (Job 11:8,9). Therefore God is a body. body; and this can be shown in three ways. First, because Objection 2. Further, everything that has figure is a no body is in motion unless it be put in motion, as is evi- body, since figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems dent from induction. Now it has been already proved (q. 2, to have figure, for it is written: “Let us make man to our a. 3), that God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved. image and likeness” (Gn. 1:26). Now a figure is called Therefore it is clear that God is not a body. Secondly, be- an image, according to the text: “Who being the bright- cause the first being must of necessity be in act, and in ness of His glory and the figure,” i.e. the image, “of His no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing substance” (Heb. 1:3). Therefore God is a body. that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality Objection 3. Further, whatever has corporeal parts is is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely a body. Now Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is “Hast thou an arm like God?” (Job 40:4); and “The eyes in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only by some of the Lord are upon the just” (Ps. 33:16); and “The right being in actuality. Now it has been already proved that hand of the Lord hath wrought strength” (Ps. 117:16). God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in Therefore God is a body. God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in Objection 4. Further, posture belongs only to bodies. potentiality because the continuous, as such, is divisible But something which supposes posture is said of God in to infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a the Scriptures: “I saw the Lord sitting” (Is. 6:1), and “He body. Thirdly, because God is the most noble of beings. standeth up to judge” (Is. 3:13). Therefore God is a body. Now it is impossible for a body to be the most noble of Objection 5. Further, only bodies or things corporeal beings; for a body must be either animate or inanimate; can be a local term “wherefrom” or “whereto.” But in and an animate body is manifestly nobler than any inani- the Scriptures God is spoken of as a local term “whereto,” mate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely according to the words, “Come ye to Him and be enlight- as body; otherwise all bodies would be animate. There- 12 fore its animation depends upon some other thing, as our “And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea” body depends for its animation on the soul. Hence that (Gn. 1:26). Now man excels all animals by his reason by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than and intelligence; hence it is according to his intelligence the body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a and reason, which are incorporeal, that man is said to be body. according to the image of God. Reply to Objection 1. As we have said above (q. 1, Reply to Objection 3. Corporeal parts are attributed a. 9), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine things to God in Scripture on account of His actions, and this under the comparison of corporeal things. Hence, when is owing to a certain parallel. For instance the act of the it attributes to God the three dimensions under the com- eye is to see; hence the eye attributed to God signifies His parison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual quan- power of seeing intellectually, not sensibly; and so on with tity; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of knowing the other parts. hidden things; by height, the transcendence of His ex- Reply to Objection 4. Whatever pertains to posture, celling power; by length, the duration of His existence; also, is only attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He by breadth, His act of love for all. Or, as says Dionysius is spoken of as sitting, on account of His unchangeable- (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant the incom- ness and dominion; and as standing, on account of His prehensibility of His essence; by length, the procession of power of overcoming whatever withstands Him. His all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading Reply to Objection 5. We draw near to God by no all things, inasmuch as all things lie under His protection. corporeal steps, since He is everywhere, but by the af- Reply to Objection 2. Man is said to be after the im- fections of our soul, and by the actions of that same soul age of God, not as regards his body, but as regards that do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to whereby he excels other animals. Hence, when it is said, withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on the “Let us make man to our image and likeness”, it is added, metaphor of local motion. Whether God is composed of matter and form? Ia q. 3 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that God is composed of matter and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is par- and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of mat- ticipated, inasmuch as matter participates the form. Now ter and form; since the soul is the form of the body. But the first good and the best—viz. God—is not a partici- Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is mentioned in pated good, because the essential good is prior to the par- Hebrews (Heb. 10:38), where God says: “But My just ticipated good. Hence it is impossible that God should man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every not please My soul.” Therefore God is composed of mat- agent acts by its form; hence the manner in which it has ter and form. its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore Objection 2. Further, anger, joy and the like are pas- whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be pri- sions of the composite. But these are attributed to God in marily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, Scripture: “The Lord was exceeding angry with His peo- since He is the first efficient cause. He is therefore of His ple” (Ps. 105:40). Therefore God is composed of matter essence a form; and not composed of matter and form. and form. Reply to Objection 1. A soul is attributed to God be- Objection 3. Further, matter is the principle of in- cause His acts resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will dividualization. But God seems to be individual, for He anything, is due to our soul. Hence what is pleasing to His cannot be predicated of many. Therefore He is composed will is said to be pleasing to His soul. of matter and form. Reply to Objection 2. Anger and the like are at- On the contrary, Whatever is composed of matter and tributed to God on account of a similitude of effect. Thus, form is a body; for dimensive quantity is the first property because to punish is properly the act of an angry man, of matter. But God is not a body as proved in the preced- God’s punishment is metaphorically spoken of as His ing Article; therefore He is not composed of matter and anger. form. Reply to Objection 3. Forms which can be received I answer that, It is impossible that matter should ex- in matter are individualized by matter, which cannot be in ist in God. First, because matter is in potentiality. But another as in a subject since it is the first underlying sub- we have shown (q. 2, a. 3) that God is pure act, without ject; although form of itself, unless something else pre- any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should vents it, can be received by many. But that form which be composed of matter and form. Secondly, because ev- cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is in- erything composed of matter and form owes its perfection dividualized precisely because it cannot be received in a 13 subject; and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in God. Whether God is the same as His essence or nature? Ia q. 3 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that God is not the same as His thing which is man. Hence the thing which is a man has essence or nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the something more in it than has humanity. Consequently substance or nature of God—i.e. the Godhead—is said to humanity and a man are not wholly identical; but human- be in God. Therefore it seems that God is not the same as ity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the His essence or nature. principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the Objection 2. Further, the effect is assimilated to its formal constituent in regard to the individualizing mat- cause; for every agent produces its like. But in created ter. On the other hand, in things not composed of matter things the “suppositum” is not identical with its nature; and form, in which individualization is not due to indi- for a man is not the same as his humanity. Therefore God vidual matter—that is to say, to “this” matter—the very is not the same as His Godhead. forms being individualized of themselves—it is necessary On the contrary, It is said of God that He is life itself, the forms themselves should be subsisting “supposita.” and not only that He is a living thing: “I am the way, the Therefore “suppositum” and nature in them are identified. truth, and the life” (Jn. 14:6). Now the relation between Since God then is not composed of matter and form, He Godhead and God is the same as the relation between life must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever and a living thing. Therefore God is His very Godhead. else is thus predicated of Him. I answer that, God is the same as His essence or na- Reply to Objection 1. We can speak of simple things ture. To understand this, it must be noted that in things only as though they were like the composite things from composed of matter and form, the nature or essence must which we derive our knowledge. Therefore in speaking differ from the “suppositum,” because the essence or na- of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, ture connotes only what is included in the definition of the because with us only those things subsist which are com- species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the posite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are in it is this that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect man is man. Now individual matter, with all the individ- understands, but not that there is any composition in God. ualizing accidents, is not included in the definition of the Reply to Objection 2. The effects of God do not imi- species. For this particular flesh, these bones, this black- tate Him perfectly, but only as far as they are able; and the ness or whiteness, etc., are not included in the definition imitation is here defective, precisely because what is sim- of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the ac- ple and one, can only be represented by divers things; con- cidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are sequently, composition is accidental to them, and there- not included in humanity; and yet they are included in the fore, in them “suppositum” is not the same as nature. Whether essence and existence are the same in God? Ia q. 3 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that essence and existence are Therefore what subsists in God is His existence. not the same in God. For if it be so, then the divine being I answer that, God is not only His own essence, as has nothing added to it. Now being to which no addi- shown in the preceding article, but also His own exis- tion is made is universal being which is predicated of all tence. This may be shown in several ways. First, what- things. Therefore it follows that God is being in general ever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: by the constituent principles of that essence (like a prop- “For men gave the incommunicable name to stones and erty that necessarily accompanies the species—as the fac- wood” (Wis. 14:21). Therefore God’s existence is not His ulty of laughing is proper to a man—and is caused by the essence. constituent principles of the species), or by some exterior Objection 2. Further, we can know “whether” God agent—as heat is caused in water by fire. Therefore, if exists as said above (q. 2, a. 2); but we cannot know the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this exis- “what” He is. Therefore God’s existence is not the same tence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by as His essence—that is, as His quiddity or nature. its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a thing’s On the contrary, Hilary says (Trin. vii): “In God ex- existence to be caused by its essential constituent prin- istence is not an accidental quality, but subsisting truth.” ciples, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own 14 existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore that thing, Reply to Objection 1. A thing that has nothing added whose existence differs from its essence, must have its ex- to it can be of two kinds. Either its essence precludes istence caused by another. But this cannot be true of God; any addition; thus, for example, it is of the essence of an because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it irrational animal to be without reason. Or we may under- is impossible that in God His existence should differ from stand a thing to have nothing added to it, inasmuch as its His essence. Secondly, existence is that which makes ev- essence does not require that anything should be added to ery form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because it is spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as ex- not of the essence of animal in general to have reason; but isting. Therefore existence must be compared to essence, neither is it to lack reason. And so the divine being has if the latter is a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. nothing added to it in the first sense; whereas universal Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as shown being has nothing added to it in the second sense. above (a. 1), it follows that in Him essence does not differ Reply to Objection 2. “To be” can mean either of from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence. two things. It may mean the act of essence, or it may Thirdly, because, just as that which has fire, but is not it- mean the composition of a proposition effected by the self fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has exis- mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking “to be” tence but is not existence, is a being by participation. But in the first sense, we cannot understand God’s existence God is His own essence, as shown above (a. 3) if, there- nor His essence; but only in the second sense. We know fore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential, that this proposition which we form about God when we but participated being. He will not therefore be the first say “God is,” is true; and this we know from His effects being—which is absurd. Therefore God is His own exis- (q. 2, a. 2). tence, and not merely His own essence. Whether God is contained in a genus? Ia q. 3 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that God is contained in a as actuality is to potentiality. The same argument holds genus. For a substance is a being that subsists of itself. good in other things. Hence since in God actuality is not But this is especially true of God. Therefore God is in a added to potentiality, it is impossible that He should be in genus of substance. any genus as a species. Secondly, since the existence of Objection 2. Further, nothing can be measured save God is His essence, if God were in any genus, He would by something of its own genus; as length is measured by be the genus “being”, because, since genus is predicated length and numbers by number. But God is the measure as an essential it refers to the essence of a thing. But the of all substances, as the Commentator shows (Metaph. x). Philosopher has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot Therefore God is in the genus of substance. be a genus, for every genus has differences distinct from On the contrary, In the mind, genus is prior to what its generic essence. Now no difference can exist distinct it contains. But nothing is prior to God either really or from being; for non-being cannot be a difference. It fol- mentally. Therefore God is not in any genus. lows then that God is not in a genus. Thirdly, because all I answer that, A thing can be in a genus in two ways; in one genus agree in the quiddity or essence of the genus either absolutely and properly, as a species contained un- which is predicated of them as an essential, but they differ der a genus; or as being reducible to it, as principles and in their existence. For the existence of man and of horse privations. For example, a point and unity are reduced to is not the same; as also of this man and that man: thus the genus of quantity, as its principles; while blindness in every member of a genus, existence and quiddity—i.e. and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit. essence—must differ. But in God they do not differ, as But in neither way is God in a genus. That He cannot shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is plain that be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways. God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this First, because a species is constituted of genus and dif- it is also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor ference. Now that from which the difference constituting can there be any definition of Him; nor, save through His the species is derived, is always related to that from which effects, a demonstration of Him: for a definition is from the genus is derived, as actuality is related to potentiality. genus and difference; and the mean of a demonstration is For animal is derived from sensitive nature, by concretion a definition. That God is not in a genus, as reducible to as it were, for that is animal, which has a sensitive na- it as its principle, is clear from this, that a principle re- ture. Rational being, on the other hand, is derived from ducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; intellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an as, a point is the principle of continuous quantity alone; intellectual nature, and intelligence is compared to sense, and unity, of discontinuous quantity. But God is the prin- 15 ciple of all being. Therefore He is not contained in any in the genus of substance. genus as its principle. Reply to Objection 2. This objection turns upon Reply to Objection 1. The word substance signifies proportionate measure which must be homogeneous with not only what exists of itself—for existence cannot of it- what is measured. Now, God is not a measure propor- self be a genus, as shown in the body of the article; but, it tionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of all also signifies an essence that has the property of existing things, in the sense that everything has being only accord- in this way—namely, of existing of itself; this existence, ing as it resembles Him. however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God is not Whether in God there are any accidents? Ia q. 3 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that there are accidents in God. as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may For substance cannot be an accident, as Aristotle says have something superadded to it, this cannot apply to ab- (Phys. i). Therefore that which is an accident in one, solute being: thus a heated substance can have something cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus it is proved that extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless heat cannot be the substantial form of fire, because it is an absolute heat can have nothing else than heat. Thirdly, accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. which are accidents in us, are attributes of God. Therefore Whence as God is absolute primal being, there can be in in God there are accidents. Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essen- Objection 2. Further, in every genus there is a first tial accidents (as the capability of laughing is an essential principle. But there are many “genera” of accidents. If, accident of man), because such accidents are caused by therefore, the primal members of these genera are not in the constituent principles of the subject. Now there can be God, there will be many primal beings other than God— nothing caused in God, since He is the first cause. Hence which is absurd. it follows that there is no accident in God. On the contrary, Every accident is in a subject. But Reply to Objection 1. Virtue and wisdom are not God cannot be a subject, for “no simple form can be a predicated of God and of us univocally. Hence it does subject”, as Boethius says (De Trin.). Therefore in God not follow that there are accidents in God as there are in there cannot be any accident. us. I answer that, From all we have said, it is clear there Reply to Objection 2. Since substance is prior to its can be no accident in God. First, because a subject is accidents, the principles of accidents are reducible to the compared to its accidents as potentiality to actuality; for a principles of the substance as to that which is prior; al- subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. But though God is not first as if contained in the genus of sub- there can be no potentiality in God, as was shown (q. 2, stance; yet He is first in respect to all being, outside of a. 3). Secondly, because God is His own existence; and every genus. Whether God is altogether simple? Ia q. 3 a. 7 Objection 1. It seems that God is not altogether sim- shown in many ways. First, from the previous articles of ple. For whatever is from God must imitate Him. Thus this question. For there is neither composition of quan- from the first being are all beings; and from the first good titative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor com- is all good. But in the things which God has made, nothing position of matter and form; nor does His nature differ is altogether simple. Therefore neither is God altogether from His “suppositum”; nor His essence from His exis- simple. tence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and Objection 2. Further, whatever is best must be at- difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is tributed to God. But with us that which is composite clear that God is nowise composite, but is altogether sim- is better than that which is simple; thus, chemical com- ple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its pounds are better than simple elements, and animals than component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot be said first being, as shown above (q. 2, a. 3). Thirdly, because that God is altogether simple. every composite has a cause, for things in themselves dif- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): ferent cannot unite unless something causes them to unite. “God is truly and absolutely simple.” But God is uncaused, as shown above (q. 2, a. 3), since I answer that, The absolute simplicity of God may be He is the first efficient cause. Fourthly, because in every 16 composite there must be potentiality and actuality; but this does not belong to the essence of white; nevertheless in does not apply to God; for either one of the parts actuates the form itself, there is nothing besides itself. And so, another, or at least all the parts are potential to the whole. since God is absolute form, or rather absolute being, He Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this argument, any single one of its parts. And this is evident in a whole when he says (De Trin. vii): “God, Who is strength, is not made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, nor any of the parts of the foot, a foot. But in wholes composed of things that are dim.” made up of similar parts, although something which is Reply to Objection 1. Whatever is from God imitates predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part (as Him, as caused things imitate the first cause. But it is of a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water), never- the essence of a thing to be in some sort composite; be- theless certain things are predicable of the whole which cause at least its existence differs from its essence, as will cannot be predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if be shown hereafter, (q. 4, a. 3). the whole volume of water is two cubits, no part of it can Reply to Objection 2. With us composite things are be two cubits. Thus in every composite there is some- better than simple things, because the perfections of cre- thing which is not it itself. But, even if this could be said ated goodness cannot be found in one simple thing, but of whatever has a form, viz. that it has something which is in many things. But the perfection of divine goodness is not it itself, as in a white object there is something which found in one simple thing (q. 4, a. 1 and q. 6, a. 2). Whether God enters into the composition of other things? Ia q. 3 a. 8 Objection 1. It seems that God enters into the compo- primary matter. Now all these contain manifest untruth; sition of other things, for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): since it is not possible for God to enter into the compo- “The being of all things is that which is above being— sition of anything, either as a formal or a material princi- the Godhead.” But the being of all things enters into the ple. First, because God is the first efficient cause. Now composition of everything. Therefore God enters into the the efficient cause is not identical numerically with the composition of other things. form of the thing caused, but only specifically: for man Objection 2. Further, God is a form; for Augustine begets man. But primary matter can be neither numeri- says (De Verb. Dom.,∗) that, “the word of God, which is cally nor specifically identical with an efficient cause; for God, is an uncreated form.” But a form is part of a com- the former is merely potential, while the latter is actual. pound. Therefore God is part of some compound. Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient cause, Objection 3. Further, whatever things exist, in no way to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that differing from each other, are the same. But God and pri- which enters into composition with anything does not act mary matter exist, and in no way differ from each other. primarily and essentially, but rather the composite so acts; Therefore they are absolutely the same. But primary mat- for the hand does not act, but the man by his hand; and, ter enters into the composition things. Therefore also does fire warms by its heat. Hence God cannot be part of a God. Proof of the minor—whatever things differ, they dif- compound. Thirdly, because no part of a compound can fer by some differences, and therefore must be composite. be absolutely primal among beings—not even matter, nor But God and primary matter are altogether simple. There- form, though they are the primal parts of every compound. fore they nowise differ from each other. For matter is merely potential; and potentiality is abso- On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): lutely posterior to actuality, as is clear from the foregoing “There can be no touching Him,” i.e. God, “nor any other (q. 3, a. 1): while a form which is part of a compound is union with Him by mingling part with part.” a participated form; and as that which participates is pos- Further, the first cause rules all things without com- terior to that which is essential, so likewise is that which mingling with them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis). is participated; as fire in ignited objects is posterior to fire I answer that, On this point there have been three er-that is essentially such. Now it has been proved that God rors. Some have affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is is absolutely primal being (q. 2, a. 3). clear from Augustine (De Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practi- Reply to Objection 1. The Godhead is called the be- cally the same as the opinion of those who assert that God ing of all things, as their efficient and exemplar cause, but is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others have said not as being their essence. that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was Reply to Objection 2. The Word is an exemplar form; the theory of the Almaricians. The third error is that of but not a form that is part of a compound. David of Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was Reply to Objection 3. Simple things do not differ by ∗ Serm. xxxviii 17 added differences—for this is the property of compounds. x), “things which are diverse are absolutely distinct, but Thus man and horse differ by their differences, rational things which are different differ by something.” There- and irrational; which differences, however, do not differ fore, strictly speaking, primary matter and God do not dif- from each other by other differences. Hence, to be quite fer, but are by their very being, diverse. Hence it does not accurate, it is better to say that they are, not different, but follow they are the same. diverse. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. 18 FIRST PART, QUESTION 4 The Perfection of God (In Three Articles) Having considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God’s perfection. Now because everything in so far as it is perfect is called good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection; secondly of the divine goodness. Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is perfect? (2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the perfections of all things? (3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God? Whether God is perfect? Ia q. 4 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that perfection does not belong call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its to God. For we say a thing is perfect if it is completely perfection. made. But it does not befit God to be made. Therefore He Reply to Objection 1. As Gregory says (Moral. v, is not perfect. 26,29): “Though our lips can only stammer, we yet chant Objection 2. Further, God is the first beginning of the high things of God.” For that which is not made is things. But the beginnings of things seem to be imper- improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because created fect, as seed is the beginning of animal and vegetable life. things are then called perfect, when from potentiality they Therefore God is imperfect. are brought into actuality, this word “perfect” signifies Objection 3. Further, as shown above (q. 3, a. 4), whatever is not wanting in actuality, whether this be by God’s essence is existence. But existence seems most im- way of perfection or not. perfect, since it is most universal and receptive of all mod- Reply to Objection 2. The material principle which ification. Therefore God is imperfect. with us is found to be imperfect, cannot be absolutely On the contrary, It is written: “Be you perfect as also primal; but must be preceded by something perfect. For your heavenly Father is perfect” (Mat. 5:48). seed, though it be the principle of animal life reproduced I answer that, As the Philosopher relates (Metaph. through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant from xii), some ancient philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans which is came. Because, previous to that which is poten- and Leucippus, did not predicate “best” and “most per- tial, must be that which is actual; since a potential being fect” of the first principle. The reason was that the ancient can only be reduced into act by some being already actual. philosophers considered only a material principle; and a Reply to Objection 3. Existence is the most perfect of material principle is most imperfect. For since matter as all things, for it is compared to all things as that by which such is merely potential, the first material principle must they are made actual; for nothing has actuality except so be simply potential, and thus most imperfect. Now God is far as it exists. Hence existence is that which actuates all the first principle, not material, but in the order of efficient things, even their forms. Therefore it is not compared to cause, which must be most perfect. For just as matter, as other things as the receiver is to the received; but rather as such, is merely potential, an agent, as such, is in the state the received to the receiver. When therefore I speak of the of actuality. Hence, the first active principle must needs existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is be most actual, and therefore most perfect; for a thing is considered a formal principle, and as something received; perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we and not as that which exists. Whether the perfections of all things are in God? Ia q. 4 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that the perfections of all things each thing is perfected by its specific difference. But the are not in God. For God is simple, as shown above (q. 3, differences by which “genera” are divided, and “species” a. 7); whereas the perfections of things are many and di- constituted, are opposed to each other. Therefore because verse. Therefore the perfections of all things are not in opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it seems that God. the perfections of all things are not in God. Objection 2. Further, opposites cannot coexist. Now Objection 3. Further, a living thing is more perfect the perfections of things are opposed to each other, for than what merely exists; and an intelligent thing than what 19 merely lives. Therefore life is more perfect than existence; were self-subsisting, nothing of the virtue of heat would and knowledge than life. But the essence of God is exis- be wanting to it. Since therefore God is subsisting being tence itself. Therefore He has not the perfections of life, itself, nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting and knowledge, and other similar perfections. to Him. Now all created perfections are included in the On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that perfection of being; for things are perfect, precisely so far “God in His one existence prepossesses all things.” as they have being after some fashion. It follows therefore I answer that, All created perfections are in God. that the perfection of no one thing is wanting to God. This Hence He is spoken of as universally perfect, because He line of argument, too, is implied by Dionysius (Div. Nom. lacks not (says the Commentator, Metaph. v) any excel- v), when he says that, “God exists not in any single mode, lence which may be found in any genus. This may be but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely, with- seen from two considerations. First, because whatever out limitation, uniformly;” and afterwards he adds that, perfection exists in an effect must be found in the effec- “He is the very existence to subsisting things.” tive cause: either in the same formality, if it is a univocal Reply to Objection 1. Even as the sun (as Dionysius agent—as when man reproduces man; or in a more emi- remarks, (Div. Nom. v)), while remaining one and shin- nent degree, if it is an equivocal agent—thus in the sun is ing uniformly, contains within itself first and uniformly the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun’s power. the substances of sensible things, and many and diverse Now it is plain that the effect pre-exists virtually in the ef- qualities; “a fortiori” should all things in a kind of natural ficient cause: and although to pre-exist in the potentiality unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things of a material cause is to pre-exist in a more imperfect way, diverse and in themselves opposed to each other, pre-exist since matter as such is imperfect, and an agent as such is in God as one, without injury to His simplicity. This suf- perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the efficient cause is fices for the Reply to the Second Objection. to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more per- Reply to Objection 3. The same Dionysius says (Div. fect way. Since therefore God is the first effective cause Nom. v) that, although existence is more perfect than of things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in life, and life than wisdom, if they are considered as distin- God in a more eminent way. Dionysius implies the same guished in idea; nevertheless, a living thing is more per- line of argument by saying of God (Div. Nom. v): “It fect than what merely exists, because living things also is not that He is this and not that, but that He is all, as exist and intelligent things both exist and live. Although the cause of all.” Secondly, from what has been already therefore existence does not include life and wisdom, be- proved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent (q. 3, cause that which participates in existence need not partic- a. 4). Consequently, He must contain within Himself the ipate in every mode of existence; nevertheless God’s exis- whole perfection of being. For it is clear that if some hot tence includes in itself life and wisdom, because nothing thing has not the whole perfection of heat, this is because of the perfection of being can be wanting to Him who is heat is not participated in its full perfection; but if this heat subsisting being itself. Whether any creature can be like God? Ia q. 4 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that no creature can be like Objection 4. Further, among like things there is mu- God. For it is written (Ps. 85:8): “There is none among tual likeness; for like is like to like. If therefore any crea- the gods like unto Thee, O Lord.” But of all creatures ture is like God, God will be like some creature, which is the most excellent are those which are called participation against what is said by Isaias: “To whom have you likened gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be said to be God?” (Is. 40:18). like God. On the contrary, It is written: “Let us make man to Objection 2. Further, likeness implies comparison. our image and likeness” (Gn. 1:26), and: “When He shall But there can be no comparison between things in a dif- appear we shall be like to Him” (1 Jn. 3:2). ferent “genus.” Therefore neither can there be any like- I answer that, Since likeness is based upon agreement ness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like whiteness. or communication in form, it varies according to the many But no creature is in the same “genus” as God: since God modes of communication in form. Some things are said to is no “genus,” as shown above (q. 3, a. 5). Therefore no be like, which communicate in the same form according creature is like God. to the same formality, and according to the same mode; Objection 3. Further, we speak of those things as like and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their which agree in form. But nothing can agree with God in likeness; as two things equally white are said to be alike in form; for, save in God alone, essence and existence differ. whiteness; and this is the most perfect likeness. In another Therefore no creature can be like to God. way, we speak of things as alike which communicate in 20 form according to the same formality, though not accord-ix), when Holy Writ declares that nothing is like God, it ing to the same measure, but according to more or less, does not mean to deny all likeness to Him. For, “the same as something less white is said to be like another thing things can be like and unlike to God: like, according as more white; and this is imperfect likeness. In a third way they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not perfectly im- some things are said to be alike which communicate in the itable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall short same form, but not according to the same formality; as we of their cause,” not merely in intensity and remission, as see in non-univocal agents. For since every agent repro- that which is less white falls short of that which is more duces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything acts white; but because they are not in agreement, specifically according to the manner of its form, the effect must in or generically. some way resemble the form of the agent. If therefore the Reply to Objection 2. God is not related to creatures agent is contained in the same species as its effect, there as though belonging to a different “genus,” but as tran- will be a likeness in form between that which makes and scending every “genus,” and as the principle of all “gen- that which is made, according to the same formality of the era.” species; as man reproduces man. If, however, the agent Reply to Objection 3. Likeness of creatures to God is and its effect are not contained in the same species, there not affirmed on account of agreement in form according will be a likeness, but not according to the formality of the to the formality of the same genus or species, but solely same species; as things generated by the sun’s heat may according to analogy, inasmuch as God is essential being, be in some sort spoken of as like the sun, not as though whereas other things are beings by participation. they received the form of the sun in its specific likeness, Reply to Objection 4. Although it may be admitted but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is an agent that creatures are in some sort like God, it must nowise be not contained in any “genus,” its effect will still more dis- admitted that God is like creatures; because, as Dionysius tantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to says (Div. Nom. ix): “A mutual likeness may be found participate in the likeness of the agent’s form according to between things of the same order, but not between a cause the same specific or generic formality, but only according and that which is caused.” For, we say that a statue is like to some sort of analogy; as existence is common to all. In a man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be spo- this way all created things, so far as they are beings, are ken of as in some sort like God; but not that God is like a like God as the first and universal principle of all being. creature. Reply to Objection 1. As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 21 FIRST PART, QUESTION 5 Of Goodness in General (In Six Articles) We next consider goodness: First, goodness in general. Secondly, the goodness of God. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether goodness and being are the same really? (2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought? (3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good? (4) To what cause should goodness be reduced? (5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order? (6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant? Whether goodness differs really from being? Ia q. 5 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that goodness differs really being, accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from from being. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): “I perceive that which is only in potentiality; and this is precisely each that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing: thing’s substantial being. Hence by its substantial being, that they are is another.” Therefore goodness and being everything is said to have being simply; but by any fur- really differ. ther actuality it is said to have being relatively. Thus to Objection 2. Further, nothing can be its own form. be white implies relative being, for to be white does not “But that is called good which has the form of being”, take a thing out of simply potential being; because only according to the commentary on De Causis. Therefore a thing that actually has being can receive this mode of goodness differs really from being. being. But goodness signifies perfection which is desir- Objection 3. Further, goodness can be more or less. able; and consequently of ultimate perfection. Hence that But being cannot be more or less. Therefore goodness which has ultimate perfection is said to be simply good; differs really from being. but that which has not the ultimate perfection it ought to On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some i, 42) that, “inasmuch as we exist we are good.” perfection), is not said to be perfect simply nor good sim- I answer that, Goodness and being are really the ply, but only relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in same, and differ only in idea; which is clear from the fol- its primal (i.e. substantial) being a thing is said to be sim- lowing argument. The essence of goodness consists in ply, and to be good relatively (i.e. in so far as it has being) this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philoso-but viewed in its complete actuality, a thing is said to be pher says (Ethic. i): “Goodness is what all desire.” Now relatively, and to be good simply. Hence the saying of it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is Boethius (De Hebrom.), “I perceive that in nature the fact perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But every- that things are good is one thing; that they are is another,” thing is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear is to be referred to a thing’s goodness simply, and having that a thing is perfect so far as it exists; for it is existence being simply. Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a that makes all things actual, as is clear from the forego- thing simply exists; and regarded in its complete actual- ing (q. 3, a. 4; q. 4, a. 1). Hence it is clear that goodness ity, it is good simply—in such sort that even in its primal and being are the same really. But goodness presents the actuality, it is in some sort good, and even in its complete aspect of desirableness, which being does not present. actuality, it in some sort has being. Reply to Objection 1. Although goodness and be- Reply to Objection 2. Goodness is a form so far as ing are the same really, nevertheless since they differ in absolute goodness signifies complete actuality. thought, they are not predicated of a thing absolutely in Reply to Objection 3. Again, goodness is spoken of the same way. Since being properly signifies that some- as more or less according to a thing’s superadded actual- thing actually is, and actuality properly correlates to po- ity, for example, as to knowledge or virtue. tentiality; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have 22 Whether goodness is prior in idea to being? Ia q. 5 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that goodness is prior in idea to causality of which is first among causes, since an agent being. For names are arranged according to the arrange- does not act except for some end; and by an agent matter ment of the things signified by the names. But Dionysius is moved to its form. Hence the end is called the cause of (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the first place, amongst the other causes. Thus goodness, as a cause, is prior to being, as is names of God, to His goodness rather than to His being. the end to the form. Therefore among the names signify- Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being. ing the divine causality, goodness precedes being. Again, Objection 2. Further, that which is the more ex- according to the Platonists, who, through not distinguish- tensive is prior in idea. But goodness is more exten- ing primary matter from privation, said that matter was sive than being, because, as Dionysius notes (Div. Nom. non-being, goodness is more extensively participated than v), “goodness extends to things both existing and non- being; for primary matter participates in goodness as tend- existing; whereas existence extends to existing things ing to it, for all seek their like; but it does not participate alone.” Therefore goodness is in idea prior to being. in being, since it is presumed to be non-being. Therefore Objection 3. Further, what is the more universal is Dionysius says that “goodness extends to non-existence” prior in idea. But goodness seems to be more universal (Div. Nom. v). than being, since goodness has the aspect of desirable; Reply to Objection 2. The same solution is applied whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for it is said to this objection. Or it may be said that goodness extends of Judas: “It were better for him, if that man had not been to existing and non-existing things, not so far as it can born” (Mat. 26:24). Therefore in idea goodness is prior be predicated of them, but so far as it can cause them— to being. if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not simply Objection 4. Further, not only is existence desirable, those things which do not exist, but those which are po- but life, knowledge, and many other things besides. Thus tential, and not actual. For goodness has the aspect of the it seems that existence is a particular appetible, and good- end, in which not only actual things find their completion, ness a universal appetible. Therefore, absolutely, good- but also towards which tend even those things which are ness is prior in idea to being. not actual, but merely potential. Now being implies the On the contrary, It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) habitude of a formal cause only, either inherent or exem- that “the first of created things is being.” plar; and its causality does not extend save to those things I answer that, In idea being is prior to goodness. For which are actual. the meaning signified by the name of a thing is that which Reply to Objection 3. Non-being is desirable, not of the mind conceives of the thing and intends by the word itself, but only relatively—i.e. inasmuch as the removal that stands for it. Therefore, that is prior in idea, which of an evil, which can only be removed by non-being, is is first conceived by the intellect. Now the first thing desirable. Now the removal of an evil cannot be desir- conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is able, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of some be- knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality. Hence, be- ing. Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being ing is the proper object of the intellect, and is primarily only relatively, inasmuch as one seeks some mode of be- intelligible; as sound is that which is primarily audible. ing of which one cannot bear to be deprived; thus even Therefore in idea being is prior to goodness. non-being can be spoken of as relatively good. Reply to Objection 1. Dionysius discusses the Divine Reply to Objection 4. Life, wisdom, and the like, are Names (Div. Nom. i, iii) as implying some causal relation desirable only so far as they are actual. Hence, in each one in God; for we name God, as he says, from creatures, as of them some sort of being is desired. And thus nothing a cause from its effects. But goodness, since it has the can be desired except being; and consequently nothing is aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final cause, the good except being. Whether every being is good? Ia q. 5 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that not every being is good. things are called evil. Therefore not every being is good. For goodness is something superadded to being, as is clear Objection 3. Further, goodness implies desirability. from a. 1. But whatever is added to being limits it; as sub- Now primary matter does not imply desirability, but rather stance, quantity, quality, etc. Therefore goodness limits that which desires. Therefore primary matter does not being. Therefore not every being is good. contain the formality of goodness. Therefore not every Objection 2. Further, no evil is good: “Woe to you being is good. that call evil good and good evil” (Is. 5:20). But some Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher notes (Metaph. 23 iii) that “in mathematics goodness does not exist.” But ing. Thus a man is said to be evil, because he lacks some mathematics are entities; otherwise there would be no sci- virtue; and an eye is said to be evil, because it lacks the ence of mathematics. Therefore not every being is good. power to see well. On the contrary, Every being that is not God is God’s Reply to Objection 3. As primary matter has only creature. Now every creature of God is good (1 Tim. 4:4): potential being, so it is only potentially good. Although, and God is the greatest good. Therefore every being is according to the Platonists, primary matter may be said good. to be a non-being on account of the privation attaching to I answer that, Every being, as being, is good. For all it, nevertheless, it does participate to a certain extent in being, as being, has actuality and is in some way perfect; goodness, viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for, goodness. since every act implies some sort of perfection; and per- Consequently, to be desirable is not its property, but to fection implies desirability and goodness, as is clear from desire. a. 1. Hence it follows that every being as such is good. Reply to Objection 4. Mathematical entities do not Reply to Objection 1. Substance, quantity, quality, subsist as realities; because they would be in some sort and everything included in them, limit being by applying good if they subsisted; but they have only logical exis- it to some essence or nature. Now in this sense, good- tence, inasmuch as they are abstracted from motion and ness does not add anything to being beyond the aspect of matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end, which desirability and perfection, which is also proper to being, itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repug- whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does nant that there should be in some logical entity neither not limit being. goodness nor form of goodness; since the idea of being is Reply to Objection 2. No being can be spoken of prior to the idea of goodness, as was said in the preceding as evil, formally as being, but only so far as it lacks be- article. Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause? Ia q. 5 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that goodness has not the as- that which is caused the converse ought to take place, so pect of a final cause, but rather of the other causes. For, that there should be first, the form whereby it is a being; as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), “Goodness is praised secondly, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it as beauty.” But beauty has the aspect of a formal cause. is perfect in being, for a thing is perfect when it can repro- Therefore goodness has the aspect of a formal cause. duce its like, as the Philosopher says (Meteor. iv); thirdly, Objection 2. Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for there follows the formality of goodness which is the basic Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that goodness is that principle of its perfection. whereby all things subsist, and are. But to be self-giving Reply to Objection 1. Beauty and goodness in a thing implies the aspect of an efficient cause. Therefore good- are identical fundamentally; for they are based upon the ness has the aspect of an efficient cause. same thing, namely, the form; and consequently goodness Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. is praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for good- Christ. i, 31) that “we exist because God is good.” But we ness properly relates to the appetite (goodness being what owe our existence to God as the efficient cause. Therefore all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an end goodness implies the aspect of an efficient cause. (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that On the other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; “that is to be considered as the end and the good of other for beautiful things are those which please when seen. things, for the sake of which something is.” Therefore Hence beauty consists in due proportion; for the senses goodness has the aspect of a final cause. delight in things duly proportioned, as in what is after I answer that, Since goodness is that which all things their own kind—because even sense is a sort of reason, desire, and since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since knowledge that goodness implies the aspect of an end. Nevertheless, is by assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty the idea of goodness presupposes the idea of an efficient properly belongs to the nature of a formal cause. cause, and also of a formal cause. For we see that what is Reply to Objection 2. Goodness is described as self- first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e.g. heats diffusive in the sense that an end is said to move. first of all before it reproduces the form of fire; though the Reply to Objection 3. He who has a will is said to be heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in good, so far as he has a good will; because it is by our will causing, goodness and the end come first, both of which that we employ whatever powers we may have. Hence a move the agent to act; secondly, the action of the agent man is said to be good, not by his good understanding; but moving to the form; thirdly, comes the form. Hence in by his good will. Now the will relates to the end as to its 24 proper object. Thus the saying, “we exist because God is good” has reference to the final cause. Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order? Ia q. 5 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that the essence of goodness perfect and good it must have a form, together with all does not consist in mode, species and order. For good- that precedes and follows upon that form. Now the form ness and being differ logically. But mode, species and presupposes determination or commensuration of its prin- order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it is writ- ciples, whether material or efficient, and this is signified ten: “Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and num- by the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks the ber, and weight” (Wis. 11:21). And to these three can mode. But the form itself is signified by the species; for be reduced species, mode and order, as Augustine says everything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3): “Measure fixes the mode of every- number is said to give the species, for definitions signify- thing, number gives it its species, and weight gives it rest ing species are like numbers, according to the Philosopher and stability.” Therefore the essence of goodness does not (Metaph. x); for as a unit added to, or taken from a num- consist in mode, species and order. ber, changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken Objection 2. Further, mode, species and order are from a definition, changes its species. Further, upon the themselves good. Therefore if the essence of goodness form follows an inclination to the end, or to an action, consists in mode, species and order, then every mode must or something of the sort; for everything, in so far as it is have its own mode, species and order. The same would be in act, acts and tends towards that which is in accordance the case with species and order in endless succession. with its form; and this belongs to weight and order. Hence Objection 3. Further, evil is the privation of mode, the essence of goodness, so far as it consists in perfection, species and order. But evil is not the total absence of consists also in mode, species and order. goodness. Therefore the essence of goodness does not Reply to Objection 1. These three only follow upon consist in mode, species and order. being, so far as it is perfect, and according to this perfec- Objection 4. Further, that wherein consists the tion is it good. essence of goodness cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we Reply to Objection 2. Mode, species and order are can speak of an evil mode, species and order. Therefore said to be good, and to be beings, not as though they them- the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species selves were subsistences, but because it is through them and order. that other things are both beings and good. Hence they Objection 5. Further, mode, species and order are have no need of other things whereby they are good: for caused by weight, number and measure, as appears from they are spoken of as good, not as though formally con- the quotation from Augustine. But not every good thing stituted so by something else, but as formally constituting has weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says others good: thus whiteness is not said to be a being as (Hexam. i, 9): “It is of the nature of light not to have though it were by anything else; but because, by it, some- been created in number, weight and measure.” Therefore thing else has accidental being, as an object that is white. the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species Reply to Objection 3. Every being is due to some and order. form. Hence, according to every being of a thing is its On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. mode, species, order. Thus, a man has a mode, species iii): “These three—mode, species and order—as common and order as he is white, virtuous, learned and so on; ac- good things, are in everything God has made; thus, where cording to everything predicated of him. But evil deprives these three abound the things are very good; where they a thing of some sort of being, as blindness deprives us are less, the things are less good; where they do not exist of that being which is sight; yet it does not destroy every at all, there can be nothing good.” But this would not be mode, species and order, but only such as follow upon the unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. There- being of sight. fore the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and Reply to Objection 4. Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. order. xxiii), “Every mode, as mode, is good” (and the same can I answer that, Everything is said to be good so far as be said of species and order). “But an evil mode, species it is perfect; for in that way only is it desirable (as shown and order are so called as being less than they ought to above Aa. 1,3). Now a thing is said to be perfect if it be, or as not belonging to that which they ought to be- lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection. But long. Therefore they are called evil, because they are out since everything is what it is by its form (and since the of place and incongruous.” form presupposes certain things, and from the form cer- Reply to Objection 5. The nature of light is spoken of tain things necessarily follow), in order for a thing to be as being without number, weight and measure, not abso- 25 lutely, but in comparison with corporeal things, because much as it is an active quality of the first body that causes the power of light extends to all corporeal things; inas- change, i.e. the heavens. Whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous∗, the useful and the pleasant? Ia q. 5 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that goodness is not rightly Now the ultimate term of movement can be taken in two divided into the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant. ways, either as the thing itself towards which it tends, e.g. For goodness is divided by the ten predicaments, as the a place or form; or a state of rest in that thing. Thus, in Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the virtuous, the use- the movement of the appetite, the thing desired that termi- ful and the pleasant can be found under one predicament. nates the movement of the appetite relatively, as a means Therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them. by which something tends towards another, is called the Objection 2. Further, every division is made by oppo- useful; but that sought after as the last thing absolutely sites. But these three do not seem to be opposites; for the terminating the movement of the appetite, as a thing to- virtuous is pleasing, and no wickedness is useful; whereas wards which for its own sake the appetite tends, is called this ought to be the case if the division were made by op- the virtuous; for the virtuous is that which is desired for its posites, for then the virtuous and the useful would be op-own sake; but that which terminates the movement of the posed; and Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore appetite in the form of rest in the thing desired, is called this division is incorrect. the pleasant. Objection 3. Further, where one thing is on account Reply to Objection 1. Goodness, so far as it is iden- of another, there is only one thing. But the useful is tical with being, is divided by the ten predicaments. But not goodness, except so far as it is pleasing and virtu- this division belongs to it according to its proper formal- ous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided against the ity. pleasant and the virtuous. Reply to Objection 2. This division is not by oppo- On the contrary, Ambrose makes use of this division site things; but by opposite aspects. Now those things of goodness (De Offic. i, 9) are called pleasing which have no other formality under I answer that, This division properly concerns hu- which they are desirable except the pleasant, being some- man goodness. But if we consider the nature of good- times hurtful and contrary to virtue. Whereas the useful ness from a higher and more universal point of view, we applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves, shall find that this division properly concerns goodness as but are desired only as helpful to something further, as the such. For everything is good so far as it is desirable, and is taking of bitter medicine; while the virtuous is predicated a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose of such as are desirable in themselves. movement can be seen from a consideration of the move- Reply to Objection 3. Goodness is not divided into ment of a natural body. Now the movement of a natural these three as something univocal to be predicated equally body is terminated by the end absolutely; and relatively of them all; but as something analogical to be predicated by the means through which it comes to the end, where of them according to priority and posteriority. Hence it the movement ceases; so a thing is called a term of move- is predicated chiefly of the virtuous; then of the pleasant; ment, so far as it terminates any part of that movement. and lastly of the useful. ∗ “Bonum honestum” is the virtuous good considered as fitting. (cf. IIa IIae, q. 141, a. 3; IIa IIae, q. 145) 26 FIRST PART, QUESTION 6 The Goodness of God (In Four Articles) We next consider the goodness of God; under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether goodness belongs to God? (2) Whether God is the supreme good? (3) Whether He alone is essentially good? (4) Whether all things are good by the divine goodness? Whether God is good? Ia q. 6 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that to be good does not belong effective cause of all things, it is manifest that the aspect to God. For goodness consists in mode, species and or- of good and of desirableness belong to Him; and hence der. But these do not seem to belong to God; since God is Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) attributes good to God as to the immense and is not ordered to anything else. Therefore to first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good “as by be good does not belong to God. Whom all things subsist.” Objection 2. Further, the good is what all things de- Reply to Objection 1. To have mode, species and or- sire. But all things do not desire God, because all things der belongs to the essence of caused good; but good is in do not know Him; and nothing is desired unless it is God as in its cause, and hence it belongs to Him to impose known. Therefore to be good does not belong to God. mode, species and order on others; wherefore these three On the contrary, It is written (Lam. 3:25): “The Lord things are in God as in their cause. is good to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Reply to Objection 2. All things, by desiring their Him.” own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the per- I answer that, To be good belongs pre-eminently to fections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine God. For a thing is good according to its desirableness. being; as appears from what is said above (q. 4 , a. 3). And Now everything seeks after its own perfection; and the so of those things which desire God, some know Him as perfection and form of an effect consist in a certain like- He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; ness to the agent, since every agent makes its like; and others know some participation of His goodness, and this hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a natural good. For the very thing which is desirable in it is the par- desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends ticipation of its likeness. Therefore, since God is the first by a higher intelligence. Whether God is the supreme good? Ia q. 6 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that God is not the supreme But things not in the same genus are not comparable; good. For the supreme good adds something to good; as, sweetness is not properly greater or less than a line. otherwise it would belong to every good. But everything Therefore, since God is not in the same genus as other which is an addition to anything else is a compound thing: good things, as appears above (q. 3, a. 5; q. 4, a. 3) it therefore the supreme good is a compound. But God is seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in re- supremely simple; as was shown above (q. 3, a. 7). There- lation to others. fore God is not the supreme good. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that, Objection 2. Further, “Good is what all desire,” as the Trinity of the divine persons is “the supreme good, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Now what all desire is discerned by purified minds.” nothing but God, Who is the end of all things: therefore I answer that, God is the supreme good simply, and there is no other good but God. This appears also from not only as existing in any genus or order of things. For what is said (Lk. 18:19): “None is good but God alone.” good is attributed to God, as was said in the preceding ar- But we use the word supreme in comparison with others, ticle, inasmuch as all desired perfections flow from Him as e.g. supreme heat is used in comparison with all other as from the first cause. They do not, however, flow from heats. Therefore God cannot be called the supreme good. Him as from a univocal agent, as shown above (q. 4, a. 2); Objection 3. Further, supreme implies comparison. but as from an agent which does not agree with its effects 27 either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an effect in deficient in comparison with it. the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the equivo- Reply to Objection 2. When we say that good is what cal cause it is found more excellently, as, heat is in the sun all desire, it is not to be understood that every kind of good more excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in thing is desired by all; but that whatever is desired has the God as in the first, but not the univocal, cause of all things, nature of good. And when it is said, “None is good but it must be in Him in a most excellent way; and therefore God alone,” this is to be understood of essential goodness, He is called the supreme good. as will be explained in the next article. Reply to Objection 1. The supreme good does not Reply to Objection 3. Things not of the same genus add to good any absolute thing, but only a relation. Now a are in no way comparable to each other if indeed they are relation of God to creatures, is not a reality in God, but in in different genera. Now we say that God is not in the the creature; for it is in God in our idea only: as, what is same genus with other good things; not that He is any knowable is so called with relation to knowledge, not that other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is the prin- it depends on knowledge, but because knowledge depends ciple of every genus; and thus He is compared to others on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should be compo- by excess, and it is this kind of comparison the supreme sition in the supreme good, but only that other things are good implies. Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone? Ia q. 6 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that to be essentially good does in heat, lightness and dryness, and the like; its third per- not belong to God alone. For as “one” is convertible with fection is to rest in its own place. This triple perfection “being,” so is “good”; as we said above (q. 5, a. 1). But ev- belongs to no creature by its own essence; it belongs to ery being is one essentially, as appears from the Philoso- God only, in Whom alone essence is existence; in Whom pher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is good essen- there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others tially. accidentally belongs to Him essentially; as, to be power- Objection 2. Further, if good is what all things desire, ful, wise and the like, as appears from what is stated above since being itself is desired by all, then the being of each (q. 3, a. 6); and He is not directed to anything else as to thing is its good. But everything is a being essentially; an end, but is Himself the last end of all things. Hence therefore every being is good essentially. it is manifest that God alone has every kind of perfection Objection 3. Further, everything is good by its own by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is good goodness. Therefore if there is anything which is not good essentially. essentially, it is necessary to say that its goodness is not its Reply to Objection 1. “One” does not include the own essence. Therefore its goodness, since it is a being, idea of perfection, but only of indivision, which belongs must be good; and if it is good by some other goodness, to everything according to its own essence. Now the the same question applies to that goodness also; therefore essences of simple things are undivided both actually and we must either proceed to infinity, or come to some good- potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided ness which is not good by any other goodness. Therefore only actually; and therefore everything must be one es- the first supposition holds good. Therefore everything is sentially, but not good essentially, as was shown above. good essentially. Reply to Objection 2. Although everything is good in On the contrary, Boethius says (De Hebdom.), that that it has being, yet the essence of a creature is not very “all things but God are good by participation.” Therefore being; and therefore it does not follow that a creature is they are not good essentially. good essentially. I answer that, God alone is good essentially. For ev- Reply to Objection 3. The goodness of a creature is erything is called good according to its perfection. Now not its very essence, but something superadded; it is either perfection of a thing is threefold: first, according to the its existence, or some added perfection, or the order to its constitution of its own being; secondly, in respect of any end. Still, the goodness itself thus added is good, just as accidents being added as necessary for its perfect opera- it is being. But for this reason is it called being because tion; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to some- by it something has being, not because it itself has being thing else as the end. Thus, for instance, the first perfec- through something else: hence for this reason is it called tion of fire consists in its existence, which it has through good because by it something is good, and not because it its own substantial form; its secondary perfection consists itself has some other goodness whereby it is good. 28 Whether all things are good by the divine goodness? Ia q. 6 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that all things are good by the these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and divine goodness. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii), “This by participation of these, everything was called “being” and that are good; take away this and that, and see good or “one”; and what was thus absolute being and absolute itself if thou canst; and so thou shalt see God, good not one, he said was the supreme good. And because good is by any other good, but the good of every good.” But ev- convertible with being, as one is also; he called God the erything is good by its own good; therefore everything is absolute good, from whom all things are called good by good by that very good which is God. way of participation. Objection 2. Further, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in all things are called good, accordingly as they are directed affirming separate ideas of natural things as subsisting of to God, and this is by reason of the divine goodness; there- themselves—as Aristotle argues in many ways—still, it is fore all things are good by the divine goodness. absolutely true that there is first something which is essen- On the contrary, All things are good, inasmuch as tially being and essentially good, which we call God, as they have being. But they are not called beings through appears from what is shown above (q. 2, a. 3), and Aristo- the divine being, but through their own being; therefore tle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially all things are not good by the divine goodness, but by their such, and good, everything can be called good and a be- own goodness. ing, inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain I answer that, As regards relative things, we must assimilation which is far removed and defective; as ap- admit extrinsic denomination; as, a thing is denominated pears from the above (q. 4, a. 3). “placed” from “place,” and “measured” from “measure.” Everything is therefore called good from the divine But as regards absolute things opinions differ. Plato held goodness, as from the first exemplary effective and fi- the existence of separate ideas (q. 84, a. 4) of all things, nal principle of all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is and that individuals were denominated by them as partic- called good by reason of the similitude of the divine good- ipating in the separate ideas; for instance, that Socrates ness belonging to it, which is formally its own goodness, is called man according to the separate idea of man. Now whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there just as he laid down separate ideas of man and horse which is one goodness, and yet many goodnesses. he called absolute man and absolute horse, so likewise This is a sufficient Reply to the Objections. he laid down separate ideas of “being” and of “one,” and 29 FIRST PART, QUESTION 7 The Infinity of God (In Four Articles) After considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine infinity, and God’s existence in things: for God is everywhere, and in all things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite. Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is infinite? (2) Whether anything besides Him is infinite in essence? (3) Whether anything can be infinitude in magnitude? (4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist? Whether God is infinite? Ia q. 7 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that God is not infinite. For a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is made everything infinite is imperfect, as the Philosopher says; finite by matter, inasmuch as form, considered in itself, is because it has parts and matter, as is said in Phys. iii. But common to many; but when received in matter, the form God is most perfect; therefore He is not infinite. is determined to this one particular thing. Now matter is Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher perfected by the form by which it is made finite; therefore (Phys. i), finite and infinite belong to quantity. But there infinite as attributed to matter, has the nature of something is no quantity in God, for He is not a body, as was shown imperfect; for it is as it were formless matter. On the other above (q. 3, a. 1). Therefore it does not belong to Him to hand, form is not made perfect by matter, but rather is con- be infinite. tracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on the Objection 3. Further, what is here in such a way as not part of the form not determined by matter, has the nature to be elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore of something perfect. Now being is the most formal of all that which is a thing in such a way as not to be another things, as appears from what is shown above (q. 4, a. 1, thing, is finite according to substance. But God is this, obj. 3). Since therefore the divine being is not a being re- and not another; for He is not a stone or wood. Therefore ceived in anything, but He is His own subsistent being as God is not infinite in substance. was shown above (q. 3, a. 4), it is clear that God Himself On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, is infinite and perfect. 4) that “God is infinite and eternal, and boundless.” From this appears the Reply to the First Objection. I answer that, All the ancient philosophers attribute Reply to Objection 2. Quantity is terminated by its infinitude to the first principle, as is said (Phys. iii), and form, which can be seen in the fact that a figure which with reason; for they considered that things flow forth in- consists in quantity terminated, is a kind of quantitative finitely from the first principle. But because some erred form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the infinite of mat- concerning the nature of the first principle, as a conse- ter; such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed to God; as quence they erred also concerning its infinity; forasmuch was said above, in this article. as they asserted that matter was the first principle; con- Reply to Objection 3. The fact that the being of God sequently they attributed to the first principle a material is self-subsisting, not received in any other, and is thus infinity to the effect that some infinite body was the first called infinite, shows Him to be distinguished from all principle of things. other beings, and all others to be apart from Him. Even We must consider therefore that a thing is called infi- so, were there such a thing as a self-subsisting whiteness, nite because it is not finite. Now matter is in a way made the very fact that it did not exist in anything else, would finite by form, and the form by matter. Matter indeed is make it distinct from every other whiteness existing in a made finite by form, inasmuch as matter, before it receives subject. its form, is in potentiality to many forms; but on receiving 30 Whether anything but God can be essentially infinite? Ia q. 7 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that something else besides God form, it is manifest that those things, the forms of which can be essentially infinite. For the power of anything is are in matter, are absolutely finite, and in no way infinite. proportioned to its essence. Now if the essence of God If, however, any created forms are not received into mat- is infinite, His power must also be infinite. Therefore He ter, but are self-subsisting, as some think is the case with can produce an infinite effect, since the extent of a power angels, these will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such is known by its effect. kinds of forms are not terminated, nor contracted by any Objection 2. Further, whatever has infinite power, has matter. But because a created form thus subsisting has be- an infinite essence. Now the created intellect has an in- ing, and yet is not its own being, it follows that its being finite power; for it apprehends the universal, which can is received and contracted to a determinate nature. Hence extend itself to an infinitude of singular things. Therefore it cannot be absolutely infinite. every created intellectual substance is infinite. Reply to Objection 1. It is against the nature of a Objection 3. Further, primary matter is something made thing for its essence to be its existence; because sub- other than God, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 8). But pri- sisting being is not a created being; hence it is against the mary matter is infinite. Therefore something besides God nature of a made thing to be absolutely infinite. There- can be infinite. fore, as God, although He has infinite power, cannot make On the contrary, The infinite cannot have a begin- a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two con- ning, as said in Phys. iii. But everything outside God is tradictories are true at the same time), so likewise He can- from God as from its first principle. Therefore besides not make anything to be absolutely infinite. God nothing can be infinite. Reply to Objection 2. The fact that the power of the I answer that, Things other than God can be relatively intellect extends itself in a way to infinite things, is be- infinite, but not absolutely infinite. For with regard to in- cause the intellect is a form not in matter, but either wholly finite as applied to matter, it is manifest that everything separated from matter, as is the angelic substance, or at actually existing possesses a form; and thus its matter is least an intellectual power, which is not the act of any or- determined by form. But because matter, considered as gan, in the intellectual soul joined to a body. existing under some substantial form, remains in poten- Reply to Objection 3. Primary matter does not ex- tiality to many accidental forms, which is absolutely finite ist by itself in nature, since it is not actually being, but can be relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite potentially only; hence it is something concreated rather according to its own form, but still it is relatively infinite, than created. Nevertheless, primary matter even as a po-inasmuch as it is in potentiality to an infinite number of tentiality is not absolutely infinite, but relatively, because shapes. But if we speak of the infinite in reference to its potentiality extends only to natural forms. Whether an actually infinite magnitude can exist? Ia q. 7 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that there can be something ac- infinity. Therefore it is possible for magnitude to be infi- tually infinite in magnitude. For in mathematics there is nite. no error, since “there is no lie in things abstract,” as the Objection 4. Further, movement and time have quan- Philosopher says (Phys. ii). But mathematics uses the in- tity and continuity derived from the magnitude over which finite in magnitude; thus, the geometrician in his demon- movement passes, as is said in Phys. iv. But it is not strations says, “Let this line be infinite.” Therefore it is against the nature of time and movement to be infinite, not impossible for a thing to be infinite in magnitude. since every determinate indivisible in time and circular Objection 2. Further, what is not against the nature movement is both a beginning and an end. Therefore nei- of anything, can agree with it. Now to be infinite is not ther is it against the nature of magnitude to be infinite. against the nature of magnitude; but rather both the finite On the contrary, Every body has a surface. But ev- and the infinite seem to be properties of quantity. There- ery body which has a surface is finite; because surface is fore it is not impossible for some magnitude to be infinite. the term of a finite body. Therefore all bodies are finite. Objection 3. Further, magnitude is infinitely divisi- The same applies both to surface and to a line. Therefore ble, for the continuous is defined that which is infinitely nothing is infinite in magnitude. divisible, as is clear from Phys. iii. But contraries are I answer that, It is one thing to be infinite in essence, concerned about one and the same thing. Since therefore and another to be infinite in magnitude. For granted that addition is opposed to division, and increase opposed to a body exists infinite in magnitude, as fire or air, yet diminution, it appears that magnitude can be increased to this could not be infinite in essence, because its essence 31 would be terminated in a species by its form, and con-place belonging to any other. fined to individuality by matter. And so assuming from The same applies to a mathematical body. For if we these premises that no creature is infinite in essence, it still imagine a mathematical body actually existing, we must remains to inquire whether any creature can be infinite in imagine it under some form, because nothing is actual ex- magnitude. cept by its form; hence, since the form of quantity as such We must therefore observe that a body, which is a is figure, such a body must have some figure, and so would complete magnitude, can be considered in two ways; be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary. mathematically, in respect to its quantity only; and nat- Reply to Objection 1. A geometrician does not need urally, as regards its matter and form. to assume a line actually infinite, but takes some actually Now it is manifest that a natural body cannot be ac- finite line, from which he subtracts whatever he finds nec- tually infinite. For every natural body has some deter- essary; which line he calls infinite. mined substantial form. Since therefore the accidents fol- Reply to Objection 2. Although the infinite is not low upon the substantial form, it is necessary that deter- against the nature of magnitude in general, still it is minate accidents should follow upon a determinate form; against the nature of any species of it; thus, for instance, it and among these accidents is quantity. So every natural is against the nature of a bicubical or tricubical magnitude, body has a greater or smaller determinate quantity. Hence whether circular or triangular, and so on. Now what is not it is impossible for a natural body to be infinite. The same possible in any species cannot exist in the genus; hence appears from movement; because every natural body has there cannot be any infinite magnitude, since no species some natural movement; whereas an infinite body could of magnitude is infinite. not have any natural movement; neither direct, because Reply to Objection 3. The infinite in quantity, as was nothing moves naturally by a direct movement unless it shown above, belongs to matter. Now by division of the is out of its place; and this could not happen to an infi- whole we approach to matter, forasmuch as parts have the nite body, for it would occupy every place, and thus every aspect of matter; but by addition we approach to the whole place would be indifferently its own place. Neither could which has the aspect of a form. Therefore the infinite is it move circularly; forasmuch as circular motion requires not in the addition of magnitude, but only in division. that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a Reply to Objection 4. Movement and time are whole, place occupied by another part, and this could not hap- not actually but successively; hence they have potentiality pen as regards an infinite circular body: for if two lines mixed with actuality. But magnitude is an actual whole; be drawn from the centre, the farther they extend from therefore the infinite in quantity refers to matter, and does the centre, the farther they are from each other; therefore, not agree with the totality of magnitude; yet it agrees with if a body were infinite, the lines would be infinitely dis- the totality of time and movement: for it is proper to mat- tant from each other; and thus one could never occupy the ter to be in potentiality. Whether an infinite multitude can exist? Ia q. 7 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that an actually infinite multi- ject. Some, as Avicenna and Algazel, said that it was tude is possible. For it is not impossible for a potentiality impossible for an actually infinite multitude to exist ab- to be made actual. But number can be multiplied to in- solutely; but that an accidentally infinite multitude was finity. Therefore it is possible for an infinite multitude not impossible. A multitude is said to be infinite abso- actually to exist. lutely, when an infinite multitude is necessary that some- Objection 2. Further, it is possible for any individual thing may exist. Now this is impossible; because it would of any species to be made actual. But the species of fig- entail something dependent on an infinity for its existence; ures are infinite. Therefore an infinite number of actual and hence its generation could never come to be, because figures is possible. it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium. Objection 3. Further, things not opposed to each other A multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its do not obstruct each other. But supposing a multitude of existence as such is not necessary, but accidental. This can things to exist, there can still be many others not opposed be shown, for example, in the work of a carpenter requir- to them. Therefore it is not impossible for others also to ing a certain absolute multitude; namely, art in the soul, coexist with them, and so on to infinitude; therefore an the movement of the hand, and a hammer; and supposing actual infinite number of things is possible. that such things were infinitely multiplied, the carpenter- On the contrary, It is written, “Thou hast ordered all ing work would never be finished, forasmuch as it would things in measure, and number, and weight” (Wis. 11:21). depend on an infinite number of causes. But the multitude I answer that, A twofold opinion exists on this sub- of hammers, inasmuch as one may be broken and another 32 used, is an accidental multitude; for it happens by accident tentially in the division of the continuous, because we thus that many hammers are used, and it matters little whether approach matter, as was shown in the preceding article, by one or two, or many are used, or an infinite number, if the the same rule, the infinite can be also found potentially in work is carried on for an infinite time. In this way they the addition of multitude. said that there can be an accidentally infinite multitude. Reply to Objection 1. Every potentiality is made ac- This, however, is impossible; since every kind of mul- tual according to its mode of being; for instance, a day is titude must belong to a species of multitude. Now the reduced to act successively, and not all at once. Likewise species of multitude are to be reckoned by the species of the infinite in multitude is reduced to act successively, and numbers. But no species of number is infinite; for every not all at once; because every multitude can be succeeded number is multitude measured by one. Hence it is im- by another multitude to infinity. possible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, ei- Reply to Objection 2. Species of figures are infinite ther absolute or accidental. Likewise multitude in nature by infinitude of number. Now there are various species is created; and everything created is comprehended under of figures, such as trilateral, quadrilateral and so on; and some clear intention of the Creator; for no agent acts aim- as an infinitely numerable multitude is not all at once re- lessly. Hence everything created must be comprehended duced to act, so neither is the multitude of figures. in a certain number. Therefore it is impossible for an ac- Reply to Objection 3. Although the supposition of tually infinite multitude to exist, even accidentally. But a some things does not preclude the supposition of others, potentially infinite multitude is possible; because the in- still the supposition of an infinite number is opposed to crease of multitude follows upon the division of magni- any single species of multitude. Hence it is not possible tude; since the more a thing is divided, the greater number for an actually infinite multitude to exist. of things result. Hence, as the infinite is to be found po- 33 FIRST PART, QUESTION 8 The Existence of God in Things (In Four Articles) Since it evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere, and in all things, we now consider whether this belongs to God; and concerning this there arise four points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is in all things? (2) Whether God is everywhere? (3) Whether God is everywhere by essence, power, and presence? (4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone? Whether God is in all things? Ia q. 8 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that God is not in all things. preserved in being; as light is caused in the air by the sun For what is above all things is not in all things. But God is as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long above all, according to the Psalm (Ps. 112:4), “The Lord as a thing has being, God must be present to it, according is high above all nations,” etc. Therefore God is not in all to its mode of being. But being is innermost in each thing things. and most fundamentally inherent in all things since it is Objection 2. Further, what is in anything is thereby formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was contained. Now God is not contained by things, but rather shown above (q. 7, a. 1). Hence it must be that God is in does He contain them. Therefore God is not in things but all things, and innermostly. things are rather in Him. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Reply to Objection 1. God is above all things by the Tri. Quaest. qu. 20), that “in Him things are, rather than excellence of His nature; nevertheless, He is in all things He is in any place.” as the cause of the being of all things; as was shown above Objection 3. Further, the more powerful an agent is, in this article. the more extended is its action. But God is the most pow- Reply to Objection 2. Although corporeal things are erful of all agents. Therefore His action can extend to said to be in another as in that which contains them, never- things which are far removed from Him; nor is it neces- theless, spiritual things contain those things in which they sary that He should be in all things. are; as the soul contains the body. Hence also God is in Objection 4. Further, the demons are beings. But God things containing them; nevertheless, by a certain simil- is not in the demons; for there is no fellowship between itude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are in light and darkness (2 Cor. 6:14). Therefore God is not in God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him. all things. Reply to Objection 3. No action of an agent, how- On the contrary, A thing is wherever it operates. ever powerful it may be, acts at a distance, except through But God operates in all things, according to Is. 26:12, a medium. But it belongs to the great power of God that “Lord. . . Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: ‘for’] He acts immediately in all things. Hence nothing is dis- us.” Therefore God is in all things. tant from Him, as if it could be without God in itself. But I answer that, God is in all things; not, indeed, as things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent to Him in nature or grace; as also He is above all by the is present to that upon which it works. For an agent must excellence of His own nature. be joined to that wherein it acts immediately and touch Reply to Objection 4. In the demons there is their it by its power; hence it is proved in Phys. vii that the nature which is from God, and also the deformity of sin thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now which is not from Him; therefore, it is not to be absolutely since God is very being by His own essence, created be- conceded that God is in the demons, except with the ad- ing must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the proper dition, “inasmuch as they are beings.” But in things not effect of fire. Now God causes this effect in things not deformed in their nature, we must say absolutely that God only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are is. 34 Whether God is everywhere? Ia q. 8 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that God is not everywhere. For is the term of the continuous; as a point in permanent to be everywhere means to be in every place. But to be in things, and as a moment in succession; and this kind of every place does not belong to God, to Whom it does not the indivisible in permanent things, forasmuch as it has a belong to be in place at all; for “incorporeal things,” as determinate site, cannot be in many parts of place, or in Boethius says (De Hebdom.), “are not in a place.” There- many places; likewise the indivisible of action or move- fore God is not everywhere. ment, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in move- Objection 2. Further, the relation of time to succes- ment or action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another sion is the same as the relation of place to permanence. kind of the indivisible is outside of the whole genus of the But one indivisible part of action or movement cannot ex- continuous; and in this way incorporeal substances, like ist in different times; therefore neither can one indivisible God, angel and soul, are called indivisible. Such a kind part in the genus of permanent things be in every place. of indivisible does not belong to the continuous, as a part Now the divine being is not successive but permanent. of it, but as touching it by its power; hence, according as Therefore God is not in many places; and thus He is not its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small everywhere. thing, or to a great one, in this way it is in one or in many Objection 3. Further, what is wholly in any one place places, and in a small or large place. is not in part elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He Reply to Objection 3. A whole is so called with ref- is all there; for He has no parts. No part of Him then is erence to its parts. Now part is twofold: viz. a part of elsewhere; and therefore God is not everywhere. the essence, as the form and the matter are called parts On the contrary, It is written, “I fill heaven and of the composite, while genus and difference are called earth.” (Jer. 23:24). parts of species. There is also part of quantity into which I answer that, Since place is a thing, to be in place any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any can be understood in a twofold sense; either by way of place by totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that other things—i.e. as one thing is said to be in another no place, because the quantity of anything placed is com- matter how; and thus the accidents of a place are in place; mensurate to the quantity of the place; and hence there or by a way proper to place; and thus things placed are in is no totality of quantity without totality of place. But a place. Now in both these senses, in some way God is in totality of essence is not commensurate to the totality of every place; and this is to be everywhere. First, as He is in place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is whole all things giving them being, power and operation; so He by totality of essence in a thing, not to be at all outside of is in every place as giving it existence and locative power. it. This appears also in accidental forms which have acci- Again, things placed are in place, inasmuch as they fill dental quantity; as an example, whiteness is whole in each place; and God fills every place; not, indeed, like a body, part of the surface if we speak of its totality of essence; for a body is said to fill place inasmuch as it excludes the because according to the perfect idea of its species it is co-presence of another body; whereas by God being in found to exist in every part of the surface. But if its total- a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed, ity be considered according to quantity which it has acci- by the very fact that He gives being to the things that fill dentally, then it is not whole in every part of the surface. every place, He Himself fills every place. On the other hand, incorporeal substances have no totality Reply to Objection 1. Incorporeal things are in place either of themselves or accidentally, except in reference not by contact of dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by to the perfect idea of their essence. Hence, as the soul is contact of power. whole in every part of the body, so is God whole in all Reply to Objection 2. The indivisible is twofold. One things and in each one. Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence and power? Ia q. 8 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that the mode of God’s exis- not to be absent from it. Now this is the meaning of God tence in all things is not properly described by way of being in things by His essence, that He is not absent from essence, presence and power. For what is by essence in anything. Therefore the presence of God in all things by anything, is in it essentially. But God is not essentially in essence and presence means the same thing. Therefore it things; for He does not belong to the essence of anything. is superfluous to say that God is present in things by His Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by essence, presence and power. essence, presence and power. Objection 3. Further, as God by His power is the Objection 2. Further, to be present in anything means principle of all things, so He is the same likewise by His 35 knowledge and will. But it is not said that He is in things providence extended to these inferior bodies, and in the by knowledge and will. Therefore neither is He present person of these it is said, “He walketh about the poles of by His power. the heavens; and He doth not consider our things†” (Job Objection 4. Further, as grace is a perfection added 22:14). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in to the substance of a thing, so many other perfections are all things by His presence. likewise added. Therefore if God is said to be in certain Further, others said that, although all things are subject persons in a special way by grace, it seems that accord- to God’s providence, still all things are not immediately ing to every perfection there ought to be a special mode of created by God; but that He immediately created the first God’s existence in things. creatures, and these created the others. Against these it is On the contrary, A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles necessary to say that He is in all things by His essence. (5) says that, “God by a common mode is in all things by Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch His presence, power and substance; still He is said to be as all things are subject to His power; He is by His pres- present more familiarly in some by grace”∗. ence in all things, as all things are bare and open to His I answer that, God is said to be in a thing in two ways; eyes; He is in all things by His essence, inasmuch as He in one way after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus is present to all as the cause of their being. He is in all things created by Him; in another way he is in Reply to Objection 1. God is said to be in all things things as the object of operation is in the operator; and by essence, not indeed by the essence of the things them- this is proper to the operations of the soul, according as selves, as if He were of their essence; but by His own the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing essence; because His substance is present to all things as desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is the cause of their being. especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Reply to Objection 2. A thing can be said to be Him actually or habitually. And because the rational crea- present to another, when in its sight, though the thing may ture possesses this prerogative by grace, as will be shown be distant in substance, as was shown in this article; and later (q. 12). He is said to be thus in the saints by grace. therefore two modes of presence are necessary; viz. by But how He is in other things created by Him, may be essence and by presence. considered from human affairs. A king, for example, is Reply to Objection 3. Knowledge and will require said to be in the whole kingdom by his power, although he that the thing known should be in the one who knows, and is not everywhere present. Again a thing is said to be by the thing willed in the one who wills. Hence by knowl- its presence in other things which are subject to its inspec- edge and will things are more truly in God than God in tion; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, things. But power is the principle of acting on another; who nevertheless may not be in substance in every part hence by power the agent is related and applied to an ex- of the house. Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of sub- ternal thing; thus by power an agent may be said to be stance or essence in that place in which its substance may present to another. be. Now there were some (the Manichees) who said that Reply to Objection 4. No other perfection, except spiritual and incorporeal things were subject to the divine grace, added to substance, renders God present in any- power; but that visible and corporeal things were subject thing as the object known and loved; therefore only grace to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore against constitutes a special mode of God’s existence in things. these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His There is, however, another special mode of God’s exis- power. tence in man by union, which will be treated of in its own But others, though they believed that all things were place ( IIIa). subject to the divine power, still did not allow that divine Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone? Ia q. 8 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that to be everywhere does not But the whole universe is constituted in number, as ap- belong to God alone. For the universal, according to the pears from the Book of Wisdom (Wis. 11:21). Therefore Philosopher (Poster. i), is everywhere, and always; pri- there is some number which is in the whole universe, and mary matter also, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. is thus everywhere. But neither of these is God, as appears from what is said Objection 3. Further, the universe is a kind of “whole above (q. 3). Therefore to be everywhere does not belong perfect body” (Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole universe to God alone. is everywhere, because there is no place outside it. There- Objection 2. Further, number is in things numbered. fore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. ∗ The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in Ezech.) † Vulg.: ‘He doth not consider. . . and He walketh,’ etc. 36 Objection 4. Further, if any body were infinite, no except by Him. Therefore to be everywhere primarily and place would exist outside of it, and so it would be every- absolutely belongs to God and is proper to Him: because where. Therefore to be everywhere does not appear to whatever number of places be supposed to exist, God must belong to God alone. be in all of them, not as to a part of Him, but as to His very Objection 5. Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De self. Trin. vi, 6), is “whole in the whole body, and whole in Reply to Objection 1. The universal, and also pri- every one of its parts.” Therefore if there was only one mary matter are indeed everywhere; but not according to animal in the world, its soul would be everywhere; and the same mode of existence. thus to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. Reply to Objection 2. Number, since it is an accident, Objection 6. Further, as Augustine says (Ep. 137), does not, of itself, exist in place, but accidentally; neither “The soul feels where it sees, and lives where it feels, and is the whole but only part of it in each of the things num- is where it lives.” But the soul sees as it were everywhere: bered; hence it does not follow that it is primarily and for in a succession of glances it comprehends the entire absolutely everywhere. space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore the soul is Reply to Objection 3. The whole body of the uni- everywhere. verse is everywhere, but not primarily; forasmuch as it is On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): not wholly in each place, but according to its parts; nor “Who dares to call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all again is it everywhere absolutely, because, supposing that things, and everywhere, and always is, which assuredly other places existed besides itself, it would not be in them. belongs to the divinity alone?” Reply to Objection 4. If an infinite body existed, it I answer that, To be everywhere primarily and abso- would be everywhere; but according to its parts. lutely, is proper to God. Now to be everywhere primar- Reply to Objection 5. Were there one animal only, ily is said of that which in its whole self is everywhere; its soul would be everywhere primarily indeed, but only for if a thing were everywhere according to its parts in accidentally. different places, it would not be primarily everywhere, Reply to Objection 6. When it is said that the soul forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part sees anywhere, this can be taken in two senses. In one does not belong to it primarily; thus if a man has white sense the adverb “anywhere” determines the act of seeing teeth, whiteness belongs primarily not to the man but to on the part of the object; and in this sense it is true that his teeth. But a thing is everywhere absolutely when it while it sees the heavens, it sees in the heavens; and in the does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally, that same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not follow is, merely on some supposition; as a grain of millet would that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live and be everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It to exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. belongs therefore to a thing to be everywhere absolutely In another sense it can be understood according as the ad- when, on any supposition, it must be everywhere; and this verb determines the act of the seer, as proceeding from properly belongs to God alone. For whatever number of the seer; and thus it is true that where the soul feels and places be supposed, even if an infinite number be sup- sees, there it is, and there it lives according to this mode of posed besides what already exist, it would be necessary speaking; and thus it does not follow that it is everywhere. that God should be in all of them; for nothing can exist 37 FIRST PART, QUESTION 9 The Immutability of God (In Two Articles) We next consider God’s immutability, and His eternity following on His immutability. On the immutability of God there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is altogether immutable? (2) Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone? Whether God is altogether immutable? Ia q. 9 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that God is not altogether im- was not extended previously. Hence movement in no way mutable. For whatever moves itself is in some way mu- belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients, constrained, as table. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit viii, 20), it were, by the truth, decided that the first principle was “The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by time, nor immovable. by place.” Therefore God is in some way mutable. Reply to Objection 1. Augustine there speaks in a Objection 2. Further, it is said of Wisdom, that “it similar way to Plato, who said that the first mover moves is more mobile than all things active [Vulg.‘mobilior’]” Himself; calling every operation a movement, even as (Wis. 7:24). But God is wisdom itself; therefore God is the acts of understanding, and willing, and loving, are movable. called movements. Therefore because God understands Objection 3. Further, to approach and to recede sig- and loves Himself, in that respect they said that God nify movement. But these are said of God in Scripture, moves Himself, not, however, as movement and change “Draw nigh to God and He will draw nigh to you” (James belong to a thing existing in potentiality, as we now speak 4:8). Therefore God is mutable. of change and movement. On the contrary, It is written, “I am the Lord, and I Reply to Objection 2. Wisdom is called mobile by change not” (Malachi 3:6). way of similitude, according as it diffuses its likeness even I answer that, From what precedes, it is shown that to the outermost of things; for nothing can exist which God is altogether immutable. First, because it was shown does not proceed from the divine wisdom by way of some above that there is some first being, whom we call God; kind of imitation, as from the first effective and formal and that this first being must be pure act, without the ad- principle; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom mixture of any potentiality, for the reason that, absolutely, of the artist. And so in the same way, inasmuch as the potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which similitude of the divine wisdom proceeds in degrees from is in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. the highest things, which participate more fully of its like- Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in ness, to the lowest things which participate of it in a lesser any way changeable. Secondly, because everything which degree, there is said to be a kind of procession and move- is moved, remains as it was in part, and passes away in ment of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say that part; as what is moved from whiteness to blackness, re- the sun proceeds to the earth, inasmuch as the ray of light mains the same as to substance; thus in everything which touches the earth. In this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i) is moved, there is some kind of composition to be found. expounds the matter, that every procession of the divine But it has been shown above (q. 3, a. 7) that in God there manifestation comes to us from the movement of the Fa- is no composition, for He is altogether simple. Hence it is ther of light. manifest that God cannot be moved. Thirdly, because ev- Reply to Objection 3. These things are said of God erything which is moved acquires something by its move- in Scripture metaphorically. For as the sun is said to en- ment, and attains to what it had not attained previously. ter a house, or to go out, according as its rays reach the But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all house, so God is said to approach to us, or to recede from the plenitude of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire us, when we receive the influx of His goodness, or decline anything new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He from Him. 38 Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone? Ia q. 9 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that to be immutable does not dental being, supposing the subject to coexist with priva- belong to God alone. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. tion of accident; as, for example, this subject “man” can ii) that “matter is in everything which is moved.” But, ac- exist with “not-whiteness” and can therefore be changed cording to some, certain created substances, as angels and from white to not-white. But supposing the accident to be souls, have not matter. Therefore to be immutable does such as to follow on the essential principles of the subject, not belong to God alone. then the privation of such an accident cannot coexist with Objection 2. Further, everything in motion moves to the subject. Hence the subject cannot be changed as re- some end. What therefore has already attained its ultimate gards that kind of accident; as, for example, snow cannot end, is not in motion. But some creatures have already at- be made black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is not tained to their ultimate end; as all the blessed in heaven. consistent with privation of form, because the form per- Therefore some creatures are immovable. fects the whole potentiality of the matter; therefore these Objection 3. Further, everything which is mutable is bodies are not mutable as to substantial being, but only variable. But forms are invariable; for it is said (Sex Prin- as to locality, because the subject is consistent with priva- cip. i) that “form is essence consisting of the simple and tion of this or that place. On the other hand incorporeal invariable.” Therefore it does not belong to God alone to substances, being subsistent forms which, although with be immutable. respect to their own existence are as potentiality to act, are On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i), not consistent with the privation of this act; forasmuch as “God alone is immutable; and whatever things He has existence is consequent upon form, and nothing corrupts made, being from nothing, are mutable.” except it lose its form. Hence in the form itself there is no I answer that, God alone is altogether immutable; power to non-existence; and so these kinds of substances whereas every creature is in some way mutable. Be it are immutable and invariable as regards their existence. known therefore that a mutable thing can be called so in Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “intel- two ways: by a power in itself; and by a power possessed lectual created substances are pure from generation and by another. For all creatures before they existed, were from every variation, as also are incorporeal and imma- possible, not by any created power, since no creature is terial substances.” Still, there remains in them a twofold eternal, but by the divine power alone, inasmuch as God mutability: one as regards their potentiality to their end; could produce them into existence. Thus, as the produc- and in that way there is in them a mutability according to tion of a thing into existence depends on the will of God, choice from good to evil, as Damascene says (De Fide ii, so likewise it depends on His will that things should be 3,4); the other as regards place, inasmuch as by their finite preserved; for He does not preserve them otherwise than power they attain to certain fresh places—which cannot by ever giving them existence; hence if He took away His be said of God, who by His infinity fills all places, as was action from them, all things would be reduced to nothing, shown above (q. 8, a. 2). as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12). There- Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change fore as it was in the Creator’s power to produce them be- either as regards substantial being as in the case of things fore they existed in themselves, so likewise it is in the corruptible; or as regards locality only, as in the case of Creator’s power when they exist in themselves to bring the celestial bodies; or as regards the order to their end, them to nothing. In this way therefore, by the power of and the application of their powers to divers objects, as in another—namely, of God—they are mutable, inasmuch as the case with the angels; and universally all creatures gen- they are producible from nothing by Him, and are by Him erally are mutable by the power of the Creator, in Whose reducible from existence to non-existence. power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in God is in none of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him itself, thus also in some manner every creature is muta- alone to be altogether immutable. ble. For every creature has a twofold power, active and Reply to Objection 1. This objection proceeds from passive; and I call that power passive which enables any- mutability as regards substantial or accidental being; for thing to attain its perfection either in being, or in attaining philosophers treated of such movement. to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered Reply to Objection 2. The good angels, besides their according to its power for being, in that way all creatures natural endowment of immutability of being, have also are not mutable, but those only in which what is potential immutability of election by divine power; nevertheless in them is consistent with non-being. Hence, in the infe- there remains in them mutability as regards place. rior bodies there is mutability both as regards substantial Reply to Objection 3. Forms are called invariable, being, inasmuch as their matter can exist with privation forasmuch as they cannot be subjects of variation; but they of their substantial form, and also as regards their acci- are subject to variation because by them their subject is 39 variable. Hence it is clear that they vary in so far as they subject of being, but because through them something has are; for they are not called beings as though they were the being. 40 FIRST PART, QUESTION 10 The Eternity of God (In Six Articles) We must now consider the eternity of God, concerning which arise six points of inquiry: (1) What is eternity? (2) Whether God is eternal? (3) Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone? (4) Whether eternity differs from time? (5) The difference of aeviternity, as there is one time, and one eternity? Whether this is a good definition of eternity, “The simultaneously-whole and perfect Ia q. 10 a. 1 possession of interminable life”? Objection 1. It seems that the definition of eternity fore the idea of time consists in the numbering of before given by Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good one: “Eter- and after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of nity is the simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of the uniformity of what is outside of movement, consists interminable life.” For the word “interminable” is a nega- the idea of eternity. tive one. But negation only belongs to what is defective, Further, those things are said to be measured by time and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore in the defi- which have a beginning and an end in time, because in ev- nition of eternity the word “interminable” ought not to be erything which is moved there is a beginning, and there is found. an end. But as whatever is wholly immutable can have no Objection 2. Further, eternity signifies a certain kind succession, so it has no beginning, and no end. of duration. But duration regards existence rather than Thus eternity is known from two sources: first, be- life. Therefore the word “life” ought not to come into the cause what is eternal is interminable—that is, has no be- definition of eternity; but rather the word “existence.” ginning nor end (that is, no term either way); secondly, Objection 3. Further, a whole is what has parts. But because eternity has no succession, being simultaneously this is alien to eternity which is simple. Therefore it is whole. improperly said to be “whole.” Reply to Objection 1. Simple things are usually de- Objection 4. Many days cannot occur together, nor fined by way of negation; as “a point is that which has no can many times exist all at once. But in eternity, days parts.” Yet this is not to be taken as if the negation be- and times are in the plural, for it is said, “His going forth longed to their essence, but because our intellect which is from the beginning, from the days of eternity” (Micah first apprehends compound things, cannot attain to the 5:2); and also it is said, “According to the revelation of the knowledge of simple things except by removing the op- mystery hidden from eternity” (Rom. 16:25). Therefore posite. eternity is not omni-simultaneous. Reply to Objection 2. What is truly eternal, is not Objection 5. Further, the whole and the perfect are only being, but also living; and life extends to operation, the same thing. Supposing, therefore, that it is “whole,” it which is not true of being. Now the protraction of du- is superfluously described as “perfect.” ration seems to belong to operation rather than to being; Objection 6. Further, duration does not imply “pos- hence time is the numbering of movement. session.” But eternity is a kind of duration. Therefore Reply to Objection 3. Eternity is called whole, not eternity is not possession. because it has parts, but because it is wanting in nothing. I answer that, As we attain to the knowledge of sim- Reply to Objection 4. As God, although incorpo- ple things by way of compound things, so must we reach real, is named in Scripture metaphorically by corporeal to the knowledge of eternity by means of time, which is names, so eternity though simultaneously whole, is called nothing but the numbering of movement by “before” and by names implying time and succession. “after.” For since succession occurs in every movement, Reply to Objection 5. Two things are to be consid- and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon ered in time: time itself, which is successive; and the before and after in movement, makes us apprehend time, “now” of time, which is imperfect. Hence the expres- which is nothing else but the measure of before and after sion “simultaneously-whole” is used to remove the idea of in movement. Now in a thing bereft of movement, which time, and the word “perfect” is used to exclude the “now” is always the same, there is no before or after. As there- of time. 41 Reply to Objection 6. Whatever is possessed, is held ity and permanence of eternity, we use the word “posses-firmly and quietly; therefore to designate the immutabil- sion.” Whether God is eternal? Ia q. 10 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that God is not eternal. For the apprehension of time is caused in us by the fact that nothing made can be predicated of God; for Boethius says we apprehend the flow of the “now,” so the apprehension (De Trin. iv) that, “The now that flows away makes time, of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the “now” the now that stands still makes eternity;” and Augustine standing still. When Augustine says that “God is the au- says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) “that God is the author thor of eternity,” this is to be understood of participated of eternity.” Therefore God is not eternal. eternity. For God communicates His eternity to some in Objection 2. Further, what is before eternity, and af- the same way as He communicates His immutability. ter eternity, is not measured by eternity. But, as Aristotle Reply to Objection 2. From this appears the answer says (De Causis), “God is before eternity and He is af- to the Second Objection. For God is said to be before eter- ter eternity”: for it is written that “the Lord shall reign nity, according as it is shared by immaterial substances. for eternity, and beyond∗” (Ex. 15:18). Therefore to be Hence, also, in the same book, it is said that “intelligence eternal does not belong to God. is equal to eternity.” In the words of Exodus, “The Lord Objection 3. Further, eternity is a kind of measure. shall reign for eternity, and beyond,” eternity stands for But to be measured belongs not to God. Therefore it does age, as another rendering has it. Thus it is said that the not belong to Him to be eternal. Lord will reign beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures Objection 4. Further, in eternity, there is no present, beyond every age, i.e. beyond every kind of duration. For past or future, since it is simultaneously whole; as was age is nothing more than the period of each thing, as is said in the preceding article. But words denoting present, said in the book De Coelo i. Or to reign beyond eter- past and future time are applied to God in Scripture. nity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were Therefore God is not eternal. conceived to exist for ever, as the movement of the heav- On the contrary, Athanasius says in his Creed: “The ens according to some philosophers, then God would still Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eter- reign beyond, inasmuch as His reign is simultaneously nal.” whole. I answer that, The idea of eternity follows immutabil- Reply to Objection 3. Eternity is nothing else but ity, as the idea of time follows movement, as appears from God Himself. Hence God is not called eternal, as if He the preceding article. Hence, as God is supremely im- were in any way measured; but the idea of measurement mutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. Nor is there taken according to the apprehension of our mind is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity; whereas, alone. no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own Reply to Objection 4. Words denoting different times being. Now God is His own uniform being; and hence as are applied to God, because His eternity includes all He is His own essence, so He is His own eternity. times; not as if He Himself were altered through present, Reply to Objection 1. The “now” that stands still, is past and future. said to make eternity according to our apprehension. As Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone? Ia q. 10 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that it does not belong to God But there are many necessary things; as, for instance, all alone to be eternal. For it is written that “those who in- principles of demonstration and all demonstrative propo- struct many to justice,” shall be “as stars unto perpetual sitions. Therefore God is not the only eternal. eternities†” (Dan. 12:3). Now if God alone were eternal, On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum. xv) there could not be many eternities. Therefore God alone that “God is the only one who has no beginning.” Now is not the only eternal. whatever has a beginning, is not eternal. Therefore God is Objection 2. Further, it is written “Depart, ye cursed the only one eternal. into eternal [Douay: ‘everlasting’] fire” (Mat. 25:41). I answer that, Eternity truly and properly so called is Therefore God is not the only eternal. in God alone, because eternity follows on immutability; Objection 3. Further, every necessary thing is eternal. as appears from the first article. But God alone is alto- ∗ Douay: ‘for ever and ever’ † Douay: ‘for all eternity’ 42 gether immutable, as was shown above (q. 9, a. 1). Ac-may know Thee the only true God,” etc. (Jn. 17:3). cordingly, however, as some receive immutability from Reply to Objection 1. There are said to be many eter- Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive im- nities, accordingly as many share in eternity, by the con- mutability from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; templation of God. in that sense it is said of the earth, “it standeth for ever” Reply to Objection 2. The fire of hell is called eter- (Eccles. 1:4). Again, some things are called eternal in nal, only because it never ends. Still, there is change in the Scripture because of the length of their duration, although pains of the lost, according to the words “To extreme heat they are in nature corruptible; thus (Ps. 75:5) the hills are they will pass from snowy waters” (Job 24:19). Hence in called “eternal” and we read “of the fruits of the eternal hell true eternity does not exist, but rather time; according hills.” (Dt. 33:15). Some again, share more fully than to the text of the Psalm “Their time will be for ever” (Ps. others in the nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess 80:16). unchangeableness either in being or further still in opera- Reply to Objection 3. Necessary means a certain tion; like the angels, and the blessed, who enjoy the Word, mode of truth; and truth, according to the Philosopher because “as regards that vision of the Word, no changing (Metaph. vi), is in the mind. Therefore in this sense the thoughts exist in the Saints,” as Augustine says (De Trin. true and necessary are eternal, because they are in the eter- xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal nal mind, which is the divine intellect alone; hence it does life; according to that text, “This is eternal life, that they not follow that anything beside God is eternal. Whether eternity differs from time? Ia q. 10 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that eternity does not differ makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute difference from time. For two measures of duration cannot exist to- because, granted that time always was and always will be, gether, unless one is part of the other; for instance two according to the idea of those who think the movement days or two hours cannot be together; nevertheless, we of the heavens goes on for ever, there would yet remain may say that a day or an hour are together, considering a difference between eternity and time, as Boethius says hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur to- (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is si- gether, each of which imports a certain measure of du- multaneously whole; which cannot be applied to time: for ration. Since therefore eternity is not a part of time, foras- eternity is the measure of a permanent being; while time much as eternity exceeds time, and includes it, it seems is a measure of movement. Supposing, however, that the that time is a part of eternity, and is not a different thing aforesaid difference be considered on the part of the things from eternity. measured, and not as regards the measures, then there is Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured (Phys. iv), the “now” of time remains the same in the by time which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if whole of time. But the nature of eternity seems to be that the movement of the heavens lasted always, time would it is the same indivisible thing in the whole space of time. not be of its measure as regards the whole of its duration, Therefore eternity is the “now” of time. But the “now” since the infinite is not measurable; but it would be the of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning eternity is not substantially different from time. and end in time. Objection 3. Further, as the measure of the first move- Another reason for the same can be taken from these ment is the measure of every movement, as said in Phys. measures in themselves, if we consider the end and the be- iv, it thus appears that the measure of the first being is ginning as potentialities; because, granted also that time that of every being. But eternity is the measure of the always goes on, yet it is possible to note in time both the first being—that is, of the divine being. Therefore eter- beginning and the end, by considering its parts: thus we nity is the measure of every being. But the being of things speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year; corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore is either which cannot be applied to eternity. Still these differences eternity or is a part of eternity. follow upon the essential and primary differences, that On the contrary, Eternity is simultaneously whole. eternity is simultaneously whole, but that time is not so. But time has a “before” and an “after.” Therefore time Reply to Objection 1. Such a reason would be a valid and eternity are not the same thing. one if time and eternity were the same kind of measure; I answer that, It is manifest that time and eternity but this is seen not to be the case when we consider those are not the same. Some have founded this difference on things of which the respective measures are time and eter- the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor an end; nity. whereas time has a beginning and an end. This, however, Reply to Objection 2. The “now” of time is the same 43 as regards its subject in the whole course of time, but sure of permanent being, so time is the proper measure it differs in aspect; for inasmuch as time corresponds to of movement; and hence, according as any being recedes movement, its “now” corresponds to what is movable; and from permanence of being, and is subject to change, it re- the thing movable has the same one subject in all time, but cedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore the differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not is movement. Likewise the flow of the “now” as alternat- measured by eternity, but by time; for time measures not ing in aspect is time. But eternity remains the same ac- only things actually changed, but also things changeable; cording to both subject and aspect; and hence eternity is hence it not only measures movement but it also measures not the same as the “now” of time. repose, which belongs to whatever is naturally movable, Reply to Objection 3. As eternity is the proper mea- but is not actually in motion. The difference of aeviternity and time Ia q. 10 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that aeviternity is the same as veteration; and that aeviternity has “before” and “after” time. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23), that without innovation and veteration. This theory, however, “God moves the spiritual through time.” But aeviternity is involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears if in- said to be the measure of spiritual substances. Therefore novation and veteration be referred to the measure itself. time is the same as aeviternity. For since “before” and “after” of duration cannot exist Objection 2. Further, it is essential to time to have together, if aeviternity has “before” and “after,” it must “before” and “after”; but it is essential to eternity to be follow that with the receding of the first part of aevi- simultaneously whole, as was shown above in the first ar- ternity, the after part of aeviternity must newly appear; ticle. Now aeviternity is not eternity; for it is written (Ec- and thus innovation would occur in aeviternity itself, as it clus. 1:1) that eternal “Wisdom is before age.” Therefore does in time. And if they be referred to the things mea- it is not simultaneously whole but has “before” and “af- sured, even then an incongruity would follow. For a thing ter”; and thus it is the same as time. which exists in time grows old with time, because it has Objection 3. Further, if there is no “before” and “af- a changeable existence, and from the changeableness of ter” in aeviternity, it follows that in aeviternal things there a thing measured, there follows “before” and “after” in is no difference between being, having been, or going to the measure, as is clear from Phys. iv. Therefore the fact be. Since then it is impossible for aeviternal things not to that an aeviternal thing is neither inveterate, nor subject have been, it follows that it is impossible for them not to to innovation, comes from its changelessness; and con- be in the future; which is false, since God can reduce them sequently its measure does not contain “before” and “af- to nothing. ter.” We say then that since eternity is the measure of a Objection 4. Further, since the duration of aeviternal permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from per- things is infinite as to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is manence of being, it recedes from eternity. Now some simultaneously whole, it follows that some creature is ac- things recede from permanence of being, so that their be- tually infinite; which is impossible. Therefore aeviternity ing is subject to change, or consists in change; and these does not differ from time. things are measured by time, as are all movements, and On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) also the being of all things corruptible. But others recede “Who commandest time to be separate from aeviternity.” less from permanence of being, forasmuch as their being I answer that, Aeviternity differs from time, and from neither consists in change, nor is the subject of change; eternity, as the mean between them both. This difference nevertheless they have change annexed to them either ac- is explained by some to consist in the fact that eternity has tually or potentially. This appears in the heavenly bod- neither beginning nor end, aeviternity, a beginning but no ies, the substantial being of which is unchangeable; and end, and time both beginning and end. This difference, yet with unchangeable being they have changeableness of however, is but an accidental one, as was shown above, place. The same applies to the angels, who have an un- in the preceding article; because even if aeviternal things changeable being as regards their nature with changeable- had always been, and would always be, as some think, and ness as regards choice; moreover they have changeable- even if they might sometimes fail to be, which is possible ness of intelligence, of affections and of places in their to God to allow; even granted this, aeviternity would still own degree. Therefore these are measured by aeviternity be distinguished from eternity, and from time. which is a mean between eternity and time. But the be- Others assign the difference between these three to ing that is measured by eternity is not changeable, nor is consist in the fact that eternity has no “before” and “af- it annexed to change. In this way time has “before” and ter”; but that time has both, together with innovation and “after”; aeviternity in itself has no “before” and “after,” 44 which can, however, be annexed to it; while eternity has that an angel was, or is, or will be, is to be taken in a neither “before” nor “after,” nor is it compatible with such different sense according to the acceptation of our intel- at all. lect, which apprehends the angelic existence by compar- Reply to Objection 1. Spiritual creatures as regards ison with different parts of time. But when we say that successive affections and intelligences are measured by an angel is, or was, we suppose something, which being time. Hence also Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, supposed, its opposite is not subject to the divine power. 20,22,23) that to be moved through time, is to be moved Whereas when we say he will be, we do not as yet suppose by affections. But as regards their nature they are mea- anything. Hence, since the existence and non-existence sured by aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of of an angel considered absolutely is subject to the divine glory, they have a share of eternity. power, God can make the existence of an angel not future; Reply to Objection 2. Aeviternity is simultaneously but He cannot cause him not to be while he is, or not to whole; yet it is not eternity, because “before” and “after” have been, after he has been. are compatible with it. Reply to Objection 4. The duration of aeviternity is Reply to Objection 3. In the very being of an angel infinite, forasmuch as it is not finished by time. Hence, considered absolutely, there is no difference of past and there is no incongruity in saying that a creature is infinite, future, but only as regards accidental change. Now to say inasmuch as it is not ended by any other creature. Whether there is only one aeviternity? Ia q. 10 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that there is not only one aevi- because time is not a number abstracted from the thing ternity; for it is written in the apocryphal books of Esdras: numbered, but existing in the thing numbered; otherwise “Majesty and power of ages are with Thee, O Lord.” it would not be continuous; for ten ells of cloth are con- Objection 2. Further, different genera have different tinuous not by reason of the number, but by reason of the measures. But some aeviternal things belong to the corpo- thing numbered. Now number as it exists in the thing real genus, as the heavenly bodies; and others are spiritual numbered, is not the same for all; but it is different for substances, as are the angels. Therefore there is not only different things. Hence, others assert that the unity of eter- one aeviternity. nity as the principle of all duration is the cause of the unity Objection 3. Further, since aeviternity is a term of of time. Thus all durations are one in that view, in the light duration, where there is one aeviternity, there is also one of their principle, but are many in the light of the diversity duration. But not all aeviternal things have one duration, of things receiving duration from the influx of the first for some begin to exist after others; as appears in the case principle. On the other hand others assign primary mat- especially of human souls. Therefore there is not only one ter as the cause why time is one; as it is the first subject aeviternity. of movement, the measure of which is time. Neither of Objection 4. Further, things not dependent on each these reasons, however, is sufficient; forasmuch as things other do not seem to have one measure of duration; for which are one in principle, or in subject, especially if dis- there appears to be one time for all temporal things; since tant, are not one absolutely, but accidentally. Therefore the first movement, measured by time, is in some way the the true reason why time is one, is to be found in the one- cause of all movement. But aeviternal things do not de- ness of the first movement by which, since it is most sim- pend on each other, for one angel is not the cause of an- ple, all other movements are measured. Therefore time is other angel. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity. referred to that movement, not only as a measure is to the On the contrary, Aeviternity is a more simple thing thing measured, but also as accident is to subject; and thus than time, and is nearer to eternity. But time is one only. receives unity from it. Whereas to other movements it is Therefore much more is aeviternity one only. compared only as the measure is to the thing measured. I answer that, A twofold opinion exists on this sub- Hence it is not multiplied by their multitude, because by ject. Some say there is only one aeviternity; others that one separate measure many things can be measured. there are many aeviternities. Which of these is true, may This being established, we must observe that a twofold be considered from the cause why time is one; for we can opinion existed concerning spiritual substances. Some rise from corporeal things to the knowledge of spiritual said that all proceeded from God in a certain equality, as things. Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least many of them, Now some say that there is only one time for tempo- as some others thought. Others said that all spiritual sub- ral things, forasmuch as one number exists for all things stances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order; numbered; as time is a number, according to the Philoso- and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. x) seems to have thought so, pher (Phys. iv). This, however, is not a sufficient reason; when he said that among spiritual substances there are the 45 first, the middle and the last; even in one order of angels. say many aeviternities when we mean ages. Now according to the first opinion, it must be said that Reply to Objection 2. Although the heavenly bod- there are many aeviternities as there are many aeviternal ies and spiritual things differ in the genus of their nature, things of first degree. But according to the second opin- still they agree in having a changeless being, and are thus ion, it would be necessary to say that there is one aevi- measured by aeviternity. ternity only; because since each thing is measured by the Reply to Objection 3. All temporal things did not be- most simple element of its genus, it must be that the ex- gin together; nevertheless there is one time for all of them, istence of all aeviternal things should be measured by the by reason of the first measured by time; and thus all ae- existence of the first aeviternal thing, which is all the more viternal things have one aeviternity by reason of the first, simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the though all did not begin together. second opinion is truer, as will be shown later (q. 47, a. 2); Reply to Objection 4. For things to be measured by we concede at present that there is only one aeviternity. one, it is not necessary that the one should be the cause of Reply to Objection 1. Aeviternity is sometimes taken all, but that it be more simple than the rest. for age, that is, a space of a thing’s duration; and thus we 46 FIRST PART, QUESTION 11 The Unity of God (In Four Articles) After the foregoing, we consider the divine unity; concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether “one” adds anything to “being”? (2) Whether “one” and “many” are opposed to each other? (3) Whether God is one? (4) Whether He is in the highest degree one? Whether “one” adds anything to “being”? Ia q. 11 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that “one” adds something to that “one” which is the principle of number, added a re- “being.” For everything is in a determinate genus by addi- ality to the substance of “being” (otherwise number made tion to being, which penetrates all “genera.” But “one” is a of unities would not be a species of quantity), thought that determinate genus, for it is the principle of number, which the “one” convertible with “being” added a reality to the is a species of quantity. Therefore “one” adds something substance of beings; as “white” to “man.” This, however, to “being.” is manifestly false, inasmuch as each thing is “one” by its Objection 2. Further, what divides a thing common substance. For if a thing were “one” by anything else but to all, is an addition to it. But “being” is divided by “one” by its substance, since this again would be “one,” suppos- and by “many.” Therefore “one” is an addition to “being.” ing it were again “one” by another thing, we should be Objection 3. Further, if “one” is not an addition to driven on to infinity. Hence we must adhere to the former “being,” “one” and “being” must have the same mean- statement; therefore we must say that the “one” which is ing. But it would be nugatory to call “being” by the name convertible with “being,” does not add a reality to being; of “being”; therefore it would be equally so to call being but that the “one” which is the principle of number, does “one.” Now this is false. Therefore “one” is an addition add a reality to “being,” belonging to the genus of quan- to “being.” tity. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5, ult.): Reply to Objection 2. There is nothing to prevent “Nothing which exists is not in some way one,” which a thing which in one way is divided, from being another would be false if “one” were an addition to “being,” in the way undivided; as what is divided in number, may be un- sense of limiting it. Therefore “one” is not an addition to divided in species; thus it may be that a thing is in one “being.” way “one,” and in another way “many.” Still, if it is abso- I answer that, “One” does not add any reality to “be- lutely undivided, either because it is so according to what ing”; but is only a negation of division; for “one” means belongs to its essence, though it may be divided as regards undivided “being.” This is the very reason why “one” is what is outside its essence, as what is one in subject may the same as “being.” Now every being is either simple or have many accidents; or because it is undivided actually, compound. But what is simple is undivided, both actu- and divided potentially, as what is “one” in the whole, and ally and potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not is “many” in parts; in such a case a thing will be “one” being whilst its parts are divided, but after they make up absolutely and “many” accidentally. On the other hand, and compose it. Hence it is manifest that the being of any- if it be undivided accidentally, and divided absolutely, as thing consists in undivision; and hence it is that everything if it were divided in essence and undivided in idea or in guards its unity as it guards its being. principle or cause, it will be “many” absolutely and “one” Reply to Objection 1. Some, thinking that the “one” accidentally; as what are “many” in number and “one” in convertible with “being” is the same as the “one” which is species or “one” in principle. Hence in that way, being the principle of number, were divided into contrary opin- is divided by “one” and by “many”; as it were by “one” ions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the “one” convert- absolutely and by “many” accidentally. For multitude it- ible with “being” did not add any reality to “being,” but self would not be contained under “being,” unless it were signified the substance of “being” as undivided, thought in some way contained under “one.” Thus Dionysius says that the same applied to the “one” which is the princi- (Div. Nom. cap. ult.) that “there is no kind of multitude ple of number. And because number is composed of uni- that is not in a way one. But what are many in their parts, ties, they thought that numbers were the substances of all are one in their whole; and what are many in accidents, things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary, considering are one in subject; and what are many in number, are one 47 in species; and what are many in species, are one in genus; gatory to say “being” is “one”; forasmuch as “one” adds and what are many in processions, are one in principle.” an idea to “being.” Reply to Objection 3. It does not follow that it is nu- Whether “one” and “many” are opposed to each other? Ia q. 11 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that “one” and “many” are not ing. Nevertheless, opposite is not predicated of opposite; mutually opposed. For no opposite thing is predicated of forasmuch as one is absolute, and the other is relative; for its opposite. But every “multitude” is in a certain way what is relative being (as a potentiality) is non-being abso- “one,” as appears from the preceding article. Therefore lutely, i.e. actually; or what is absolute being in the genus “one” is not opposed to “multitude.” of substance is non-being relatively as regards some acci- Objection 2. Further, no opposite thing is constituted dental being. In the same way, what is relatively good is by its opposite. But “multitude” is constituted by “one.” absolutely bad, or vice versa; likewise what is absolutely Therefore it is not opposed to “multitude.” “one” is relatively “many,” and vice versa. Objection 3. Further, “one” is opposed to “one.” But Reply to Objection 2. A “whole” is twofold. In one the idea of “few” is opposed to “many.” Therefore “one” sense it is homogeneous, composed of like parts; in an- is not opposed to “many.” other sense it is heterogeneous, composed of dissimilar Objection 4. Further, if “one” is opposed to “mul- parts. Now in every homogeneous whole, the whole is titude,” it is opposed as the undivided is to the divided; made up of parts having the form of the whole; as, for and is thus opposed to it as privation is to habit. But instance, every part of water is water; and such is the con- this appears to be incongruous; because it would follow stitution of a continuous thing made up of its parts. In that “one” comes after “multitude,” and is defined by it; every heterogeneous whole, however, every part is want- whereas, on the contrary, “multitude” is defined by “one.” ing in the form belonging to the whole; as, for instance, Hence there would be a vicious circle in the definition; no part of a house is a house, nor is any part of a man a which is inadmissible. Therefore “one” and “many” are man. Now multitude is such a kind of a whole. Therefore not opposed. inasmuch as its part has not the form of the multitude, the On the contrary, Things which are opposed in idea, latter is composed of unities, as a house is composed of are themselves opposed to each other. But the idea of not houses; not, indeed, as if unities constituted multitude “one” consists in indivisibility; and the idea of “multi- so far as they are undivided, in which way they are op- tude” contains division. Therefore “one” and “many” are posed to multitude; but so far as they have being, as also opposed to each other. the parts of a house make up the house by the fact that I answer that, “One” is opposed to “many,” but in they are beings, not by the fact that they are not houses. various ways. The “one” which is the principle of number Reply to Objection 3. “Many” is taken in two ways: is opposed to “multitude” which is number, as the mea- absolutely, and in that sense it is opposed to “one”; in sure is to the thing measured. For “one” implies the idea another way as importing some kind of excess, in which of a primary measure; and number is “multitude” mea- sense it is opposed to “few”; hence in the first sense two sured by “one,” as is clear from Metaph. x. But the “one” are many but not in the second sense. which convertible with “being” is opposed to “multitude” Reply to Objection 4. “One” is opposed to “many” by way of privation; as the undivided is to the thing di- privatively, inasmuch as the idea of “many” involves di- vided. vision. Hence division must be prior to unity, not abso- Reply to Objection 1. No privation entirely takes lutely in itself, but according to our way of apprehension. away the being of a thing, inasmuch as privation means For we apprehend simple things by compound things; and “negation in the subject,” according to the Philosopher hence we define a point to be, “what has no part,” or “the (Categor. viii). Nevertheless every privation takes away beginning of a line.” “Multitude” also, in idea, follows some being; and so in being, by reason of its universality, on “one”; because we do not understand divided things the privation of being has its foundation in being; which is to convey the idea of multitude except by the fact that we not the case in privations of special forms, as of sight, or of attribute unity to every part. Hence “one” is placed in the whiteness and the like. And what applies to being applies definition of “multitude”; but “multitude” is not placed in also to one and to good, which are convertible with being, the definition of “one.” But division comes to be under- for the privation of good is founded in some good; like- stood from the very negation of being: so what first comes wise the removal of unity is founded in some one thing. to mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, Hence it happens that multitude is some one thing; and and thus we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly, evil is some good thing, and non-being is some kind of be- comes the notion of one; fourthly, the notion of multitude. 48 Whether God is one? Ia q. 11 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that God is not one. For it is is impossible for many gods to exist. Hence also the an- written “For there be many gods and many lords” (1 Cor. cient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth, when 8:5). they asserted an infinite principle, asserted likewise that Objection 2. Further, “One,” as the principle of num- there was only one such principle. ber, cannot be predicated of God, since quantity is not Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For predicated of God; likewise, neither can “one” which is all things that exist are seen to be ordered to each other convertible with “being” be predicated of God, because it since some serve others. But things that are diverse do imports privation, and every privation is an imperfection, not harmonize in the same order, unless they are ordered which cannot apply to God. Therefore God is not one. thereto by one. For many are reduced into one order by On the contrary, It is written “Hear, O Israel, the one better than by many: because one is the “per se” cause Lord our God is one Lord” (Dt. 6:4). of one, and many are only the accidental cause of one, I answer that, It can be shown from these three inasmuch as they are in some way one. Since therefore sources that God is one. First from His simplicity. For what is first is most perfect, and is so “per se” and not ac- it is manifest that the reason why any singular thing is cidentally, it must be that the first which reduces all into “this particular thing” is because it cannot be communi- one order should be only one. And this one is God. cated to many: since that whereby Socrates is a man, can Reply to Objection 1. Gods are called many by the be communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this error of some who worshipped many deities, thinking as particular man, is only communicable to one. Therefore, they did that the planets and other stars were gods, and if Socrates were a man by what makes him to be this par- also the separate parts of the world. Hence the Apostle ticular man, as there cannot be many Socrates, so there adds: “Our God is one,” etc. could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs Reply to Objection 2. “One” which is the principle to God alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as was of number is not predicated of God, but only of material shown above (q. 3, a. 3). Therefore, in the very same way things. For “one” the principle of number belongs to the God is God, and He is this God. Impossible is it therefore “genus” of mathematics, which are material in being, and that many Gods should exist. abstracted from matter only in idea. But “one” which is Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His per- convertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does fection. For it was shown above (q. 4, a. 2) that God not depend on matter in its being. And although in God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. there is no privation, still, according to the mode of our If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ apprehension, He is known to us by way only of privation from each other. Something therefore would belong to and remotion. Thus there is no reason why a certain kind one which did not belong to another. And if this were a of privation should not be predicated of God; for instance, privation, one of them would not be absolutely perfect; that He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the same way it but if a perfection, one of them would be without it. So it is said of God that He is one. Whether God is supremely one? Ia q. 11 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that God is not supremely than any other being is “one.” “one.” For “one” is so called from the privation of di- On the contrary, Bernard says (De Consid. v): vision. But privation cannot be greater or less. Therefore “Among all things called one, the unity of the Divine Trin- God is not more “one” than other things which are called ity holds the first place.” “one.” I answer that, Since “one” is an undivided being, if Objection 2. Further, nothing seems to be more in- anything is supremely “one” it must be supremely being, divisible than what is actually and potentially indivisible; and supremely undivided. Now both of these belong to such as a point and unity. But a thing is said to be more God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as His being “one” according as it is indivisible. Therefore God is not is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined; more “one” than unity is “one” and a point is “one.” since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undeter- Objection 3. Further, what is essentially good is mined. But He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He supremely good. Therefore what is essentially “one” is is divided neither actually nor potentially, by any mode supremely “one.” But every being is essentially “one,” as of division; since He is altogether simple, as was shown the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv). Therefore every being above (q. 3, a. 7). Hence it is manifest that God is “one” is supremely “one”; and therefore God is not “one” more in the supreme degree. 49 Reply to Objection 1. Although privation considered as they have being only in some subject. Hence neither in itself is not susceptive of more or less, still according as of them can be supremely “one.” For as a subject cannot its opposite is subject to more or less, privation also can be supremely “one,” because of the difference within it of be considered itself in the light of more and less. There- accident and subject, so neither can an accident. fore according as a thing is more divided, or is divisible, Reply to Objection 3. Although every being is “one” either less or not at all, in the degree it is called more, or by its substance, still every such substance is not equally less, or supremely, “one.” the cause of unity; for the substance of some things is Reply to Objection 2. A point and unity which is the compound and of others simple. principle of number, are not supremely being, inasmuch 50 FIRST PART, QUESTION 12 How God Is Known by Us (In Thirteen Articles) As hitherto we have considered God as He is in Himself, we now go on to consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of creatures; concerning which there are thirteen points of inquiry: (1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God? (2) Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any created image? (3) Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye? (4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its own natural powers to see the essence of God? (5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God? (6) Whether of those who see God, one sees Him more perfectly than another? (7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of God? (8) Whether the created intellect seeing the essence of God, knows all things in it? (9) Whether what is there known is known by any similitudes? (10) Whether the created intellect knows at once what it sees in God? (11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of God? (12) Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life? (13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace above the knowledge of natural reason? Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God? Ia q. 12 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that no created intellect can see able. But what is supremely knowable in itself, may not the essence of God. For Chrysostom (Hom. xiv. in Joan.) be knowable to a particular intellect, on account of the ex- commenting on Jn. 1:18, “No man hath seen God at any cess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for time,” says: “Not prophets only, but neither angels nor example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be archangels have seen God. For how can a creature see seen by the bat by reason of its excess of light. what is increatable?” Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), Therefore some who considered this, held that no cre- speaking of God: “Neither is there sense, nor image, nor ated intellect can see the essence of God. This opinion, opinion, nor reason, nor knowledge of Him.” however, is not tenable. For as the ultimate beatitude of Objection 2. Further, everything infinite, as such, is man consists in the use of his highest function, which is unknown. But God is infinite, as was shown above (q. 7, the operation of his intellect; if we suppose that the cre- a. 1). Therefore in Himself He is unknown. ated intellect could never see God, it would either never Objection 3. Further, the created intellect knows only attain to beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in some- existing things. For what falls first under the apprehension thing else beside God; which is opposed to faith. For the of the intellect is being. Now God is not something exist- ultimate perfection of the rational creature is to be found ing; but He is rather super-existence, as Dionysius says in that which is the principle of its being; since a thing is (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God is not intelligible; but perfect so far as it attains to its principle. Further the same above all intellect. opinion is also against reason. For there resides in every Objection 4. Further, there must be some proportion man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which between the knower and the known, since the known is he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intel- the perfection of the knower. But no proportion exists lect of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the between the created intellect and God; for there is an in- first cause of things, the natural desire would remain void. finite distance between them. Therefore the created intel- Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed lect cannot see the essence of God. see the essence of God. On the contrary, It is written: “We shall see Him as Reply to Objection 1. Both of these authorities He is” (1 Jn. 2:2). speak of the vision of comprehension. Hence Dionysius I answer that, Since everything is knowable accord- premises immediately before the words cited, “He is uni- ing as it is actual, God, Who is pure act without any ad- versally to all incomprehensible,” etc. Chrysostom like- mixture of potentiality, is in Himself supremely know- wise after the words quoted says: “He says this of the 51 most certain vision of the Father, which is such a perfect tence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot be known consideration and comprehension as the Father has of the at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge; which Son.” means that He is not comprehended. Reply to Objection 2. The infinity of matter not made Reply to Objection 4. Proportion is twofold. In one perfect by form, is unknown in itself, because all knowl- sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to an- edge comes by the form; whereas the infinity of the form other, according as double, treble and equal are species of not limited by matter, is in itself supremely known. God proportion. In another sense every relation of one thing to is Infinite in this way, and not in the first way: as appears another is called proportion. And in this sense there can from what was said above (q. 7, a. 1). be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is Reply to Objection 3. God is not said to be not ex- related to Him as the effect of its cause, and as potential- isting as if He did not exist at all, but because He exists ity to its act; and in this way the created intellect can be above all that exists; inasmuch as He is His own exis- proportioned to know God. Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an image? Ia q. 12 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that the essence of God is seen intellect power, and that He can be seen by the intellect. through an image by the created intellect. For it is written: And since the intellective power of the creature is not the “We know that when He shall appear, we shall be like to essence of God, it follows that it is some kind of partici- Him, and [Vulg.: ‘because’] we shall see Him as He is” pated likeness of Him who is the first intellect. Hence also (1 Jn. 3:2). the intellectual power of the creature is called an intelligi- Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v): ble light, as it were, derived from the first light, whether “When we know God, some likeness of God is made in this be understood of the natural power, or of some perfec- us.” tion superadded of grace or of glory. Therefore, in order Objection 3. Further, the intellect in act is the ac- to see God, there must be some similitude of God on the tual intelligible; as sense in act is the actual sensible. But part of the visual faculty, whereby the intellect is made this comes about inasmuch as sense is informed with the capable of seeing God. But on the part of the object seen, likeness of the sensible object, and the intellect with the which must necessarily be united to the seer, the essence likeness of the thing understood. Therefore, if God is seen of God cannot be seen by any created similitude. First, by the created intellect in act, it must be that He is seen by because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), “by the simili- some similitude. tudes of the inferior order of things, the superior can in no On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv) that way be known;” as by the likeness of a body the essence when the Apostle says, “We see through a glass and in of an incorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less there- an enigma∗,” “by the terms ‘glass’ and ‘enigma’ certain fore can the essence of God be seen by any created like- similitudes are signified by him, which are accommodated ness whatever. Secondly, because the essence of God is to the vision of God.” But to see the essence of God is not His own very existence, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 4), an enigmatic nor a speculative vision, but is, on the con- which cannot be said of any created form; and so no cre- trary, of an opposite kind. Therefore the divine essence is ated form can be the similitude representing the essence not seen through a similitude. of God to the seer. Thirdly, because the divine essence I answer that, Two things are required both for sen- is uncircumscribed, and contains in itself super-eminently sible and for intellectual vision—viz. power of sight, and whatever can be signified or understood by the created in- union of the thing seen with the sight. For vision is made tellect. Now this cannot in any way be represented by any actual only when the thing seen is in a certain way in the created likeness; for every created form is determined ac- seer. Now in corporeal things it is clear that the thing seen cording to some aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of be- cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its like- ing itself, or of some like thing. Hence to say that God is ness; as the similitude of a stone is in the eye, whereby the seen by some similitude, is to say that the divine essence vision is made actual; whereas the substance of the stone is not seen at all; which is false. is not there. But if the principle of the visual power and Therefore it must be said that to see the essence of the thing seen were one and the same thing, it would nec- God, there is required some similitude in the visual fac- essarily follow that the seer would receive both the visual ulty, namely, the light of glory strengthening the intellect power and the form whereby it sees, from that one same to see God, which is spoken of in the Ps. 35:10, “In Thy thing. light we shall see light.” The essence of God, however, Now it is manifest both that God is the author of the cannot be seen by any created similitude representing the ∗ Douay: ‘in a dark manner’ 52 divine essence itself as it really is. itself. Hence as other intelligible forms which are not their Reply to Objection 1. That authority speaks of the own existence are united to the intellect by means of some similitude which is caused by participation of the light of entity, whereby the intellect itself is informed, and made glory. in act; so the divine essence is united to the created intel- Reply to Objection 2. Augustine speaks of the lect, as the object actually understood, making the intel- knowledge of God here on earth. lect in act by and of itself. Reply to Objection 3. The divine essence is existence Whether the essence of God can be seen with the bodily eye? Ia q. 12 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that the essence of God can be with the eye of the flesh, but that man existing in the flesh seen by the corporeal eye. For it is written (Job 19:26): after the resurrection will see God. Likewise the words, “In my flesh I shall see. . . God,” and (Job 42:5), “With the “Now my eye seeth Thee,” are to be understood of the hearing of the ear I have heard Thee, but now my eye seeth mind’s eye, as the Apostle says: “May He give unto you Thee.” the spirit of wisdom. . . in the knowledge of Him, that the Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei eyes of your heart” may be “enlightened” (Eph. 1:17,18). xxix, 29): “Those eyes” (namely the glorified) “will there- Reply to Objection 2. Augustine speaks as one in- fore have a greater power of sight, not so much to see quiring, and conditionally. This appears from what he more keenly, as some report of the sight of serpents or of says previously: “Therefore they will have an altogether eagles (for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed by different power (viz. the glorified eyes), if they shall see these creatures, they can see only corporeal things) but to that incorporeal nature;” and afterwards he explains this, see even incorporeal things.” Now whoever can see incor- saying: “It is very credible, that we shall so see the mun- poreal things, can be raised up to see God. Therefore the dane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to glorified eye can see God. see most clearly God everywhere present, governing all Objection 3. Further, God can be seen by man corporeal things, not as we now see the invisible things through a vision of the imagination. For it is written: “I of God as understood by what is made; but as when we saw the Lord sitting upon a throne,” etc. (Is. 6:1). But an see men among whom we live, living and exercising the imaginary vision originates from sense; for the imagina- functions of human life, we do not believe they live, but tion is moved by sense to act. Therefore God can be seen see it.” Hence it is evident how the glorified eyes will see by a vision of sense. God, as now our eyes see the life of another. But life is On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. not seen with the corporeal eye, as a thing in itself visi- cxlvii): “No one has ever seen God either in this life, as ble, but as the indirect object of the sense; which indeed He is, nor in the angelic life, as visible things are seen by is not known by sense, but at once, together with sense, by corporeal vision.” some other cognitive power. But that the divine presence I answer that, It is impossible for God to be seen by is known by the intellect immediately on the sight of, and the sense of sight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the through, corporeal things, happens from two causes—viz. sensitive power. For every such kind of power is the act from the perspicuity of the intellect, and from the reful- of a corporeal organ, as will be shown later (q. 78). Now gence of the divine glory infused into the body after its act is proportional to the nature which possesses it. Hence renovation. no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things. For Reply to Objection 3. The essence of God is not God is incorporeal, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 1). Hence seen in a vision of the imagination; but the imagination He cannot be seen by the sense or the imagination, but receives some form representing God according to some only by the intellect. mode of similitude; as in the divine Scripture divine things Reply to Objection 1. The words, “In my flesh I shall are metaphorically described by means of sensible things. see God my Saviour,” do not mean that God will be seen Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the Divine essence? Ia q. 12 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that a created intellect can see seen. Therefore since an angel by his natural power un- the Divine essence by its own natural power. For Diony- derstands himself, it seems that by his own natural power sius says (Div. Nom. iv): “An angel is a pure mirror, most he understands the Divine essence. clear, receiving, if it is right to say so, the whole beauty Objection 2. Further, what is supremely visible, is of God.” But if a reflection is seen, the original thing is made less visible to us by reason of our defective cor- 53 poreal or intellectual sight. But the angelic intellect has sidering act of the intellect; hence it follows that through no such defect. Therefore, since God is supremely in- the intellect we can understand these objects as universal; telligible in Himself, it seems that in like manner He is and this is beyond the power of the sense. Now the angelic supremely so to an angel. Therefore, if he can understand intellect naturally knows natures that are not in matter; but other intelligible things by his own natural power, much this is beyond the power of the intellect of our soul in the more can he understand God. state of its present life, united as it is to the body. It fol- Objection 3. Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised lows therefore that to know self-subsistent being is natural up to understand incorporeal substance, which is above its to the divine intellect alone; and this is beyond the natu- nature. Therefore if to see the essence of God is above the ral power of any created intellect; for no creature is its nature of every created intellect, it follows that no created own existence, forasmuch as its existence is participated. intellect can reach up to see the essence of God at all. But Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of this is false, as appears from what is said above (a. 1). God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the cre- Therefore it seems that it is natural for a created intellect ated intellect, as an object made intelligible to it. to see the Divine essence. Reply to Objection 1. This mode of knowing God On the contrary, It is written: “The grace of God is is natural to an angel—namely, to know Him by His own life everlasting” (Rom. 6:23). But life everlasting con- likeness refulgent in the angel himself. But to know God sists in the vision of the Divine essence, according to the by any created similitude is not to know the essence of words: “This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the God, as was shown above (a. 2). Hence it does not follow only true God,” etc. (Jn. 17:3). Therefore to see the that an angel can know the essence of God by his own essence of God is possible to the created intellect by grace, power. and not by nature. Reply to Objection 2. The angelic intellect is not de- I answer that, It is impossible for any created intel- fective, if defect be taken to mean privation, as if it were lect to see the essence of God by its own natural power. without anything which it ought to have. But if the defect For knowledge is regulated according as the thing known be taken negatively, in that sense every creature is defec- is in the knower. But the thing known is in the knower ac- tive, when compared with God; forasmuch as it does not cording to the mode of the knower. Hence the knowledge possess the excellence which is in God. of every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If Reply to Objection 3. The sense of sight, as being therefore the mode of anything’s being exceeds the mode altogether material, cannot be raised up to immateriality. of the knower, it must result that the knowledge of the But our intellect, or the angelic intellect, inasmuch as it is object is above the nature of the knower. Now the mode elevated above matter in its own nature, can be raised up of being of things is manifold. For some things have be- above its own nature to a higher level by grace. The proof ing only in this one individual matter; as all bodies. But is, that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly what it others are subsisting natures, not residing in matter at all, knows concretely; for in no way can it perceive a nature which, however, are not their own existence, but receive it; except as this one particular nature; whereas our intellect and these are the incorporeal beings, called angels. But to is able to consider abstractedly what it knows concretely. God alone does it belong to be His own subsistent being. Now although it knows things which have a form residing Therefore what exists only in individual matter we know in matter, still it resolves the composite into both of these naturally, forasmuch as our soul, whereby we know, is the elements; and it considers the form separately by itself. form of certain matter. Now our soul possesses two cogni- Likewise, also, the intellect of an angel, although it nat- tive powers; one is the act of a corporeal organ, which nat- urally knows the concrete in any nature, still it is able to urally knows things existing in individual matter; hence separate that existence by its intellect; since it knows that sense knows only the singular. But there is another kind the thing itself is one thing, and its existence is another. of cognitive power in the soul, called the intellect; and Since therefore the created intellect is naturally capable this is not the act of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the of apprehending the concrete form, and the concrete be- intellect naturally knows natures which exist only in in- ing abstractedly, by way of a kind of resolution of parts; dividual matter; not as they are in such individual matter, it can by grace be raised up to know separate subsisting but according as they are abstracted therefrom by the con- substance, and separate subsisting existence. 54 Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of Ia q. 12 a. 5 God? Objection 1. It seems that the created intellect does sary that the power of understanding should be added by not need any created light in order to see the essence of divine grace. Now this increase of the intellectual powers God. For what is of itself lucid in sensible things does is called the illumination of the intellect, as we also call not require any other light in order to be seen. Therefore the intelligible object itself by the name of light of illumi- the same applies to intelligible things. Now God is intel- nation. And this is the light spoken of in the Apocalypse ligible light. Therefore He is not seen by means of any (Apoc. 21:23): “The glory of God hath enlightened it”— created light. viz. the society of the blessed who see God. By this light Objection 2. Further, if God is seen through a the blessed are made “deiform”—i.e. like to God, accord- medium, He is not seen in His essence. But if seen by any ing to the saying: “When He shall appear we shall be like created light, He is seen through a medium. Therefore He to Him, and [Vulg.: ‘because’] we shall see Him as He is” is not seen in His essence. (1 Jn. 2:2). Objection 3. Further, what is created can be natural Reply to Objection 1. The created light is necessary to some creature. Therefore if the essence of God is seen to see the essence of God, not in order to make the essence through any created light, such a light can be made natu- of God intelligible, which is of itself intelligible, but in orral to some other creature; and thus, that creature would der to enable the intellect to understand in the same way not need any other light to see God; which is impossible. as a habit makes a power abler to act. Even so corporeal Therefore it is not necessary that every creature should light is necessary as regards external sight, inasmuch as require a superadded light in order to see the essence of it makes the medium actually transparent, and susceptible God. of color. On the contrary, It is written: “In Thy light we shall Reply to Objection 2. This light is required to see the see light” (Ps. 35:10). divine essence, not as a similitude in which God is seen, I answer that, Everything which is raised up to what but as a perfection of the intellect, strengthening it to see exceeds its nature, must be prepared by some disposi- God. Therefore it may be said that this light is to be de- tion above its nature; as, for example, if air is to receive scribed not as a medium in which God is seen, but as one the form of fire, it must be prepared by some disposition by which He is seen; and such a medium does not take for such a form. But when any created intellect sees the away the immediate vision of God. essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the in- Reply to Objection 3. The disposition to the form of telligible form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary that fire can be natural only to the subject of that form. Hence some supernatural disposition should be added to the in- the light of glory cannot be natural to a creature unless the tellect in order that it may be raised up to such a great and creature has a divine nature; which is impossible. But by sublime height. Now since the natural power of the cre- this light the rational creature is made deiform, as is said ated intellect does not avail to enable it to see the essence in this article. of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is neces- Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than another? Ia q. 12 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that of those who see the fectly than another can happen in two ways: either on the essence of God, one does not see more perfectly than an- part of the visible object, or on the part of the visual power other. For it is written (1 Jn. 3:2): “We shall see Him as of the seer. On the part of the object, it may so happen be- He is.” But He is only in one way. Therefore He will be cause the object is received more perfectly in the seer, that seen by all in one way only; and therefore He will not be is, according to the greater perfection of the similitude; seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly by another. but this does not apply to the present question, for God is Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. present to the intellect seeing Him not by way of simili- Quaest. qu. xxxii): “One person cannot see one and tude, but by His essence. It follows then that if one sees the same thing more perfectly than another.” But all who Him more perfectly than another, this happens according see the essence of God, understand the Divine essence, to the difference of the intellectual power; thus it follows for God is seen by the intellect and not by sense, as was too that the one whose intellectual power is higher, will shown above (a. 3 ). Therefore of those who see the divine see Him the more clearly; and this is incongruous; since essence, one does not see more clearly than another. equality with angels is promised to men as their beatitude. Objection 3. Further, That anything be seen more per- On the contrary, Eternal life consists in the vision of 55 God, according to Jn. 17:3: “This is eternal life, that they Reply to Objection 1. In the words,“We shall see may know Thee the only true God,” etc. Therefore if all Him as He is,” the conjunction “as” determines the mode saw the essence of God equally in eternal life, all would of vision on the part of the object seen, so that the mean- be equal; the contrary to which is declared by the Apostle: ing is, we shall see Him to be as He is, because we shall “Star differs from star in glory” (1 Cor. 15:41). see His existence, which is His essence. But it does not I answer that, Of those who see the essence of God, determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing; one sees Him more perfectly than another. This, indeed, as if the meaning was that the mode of seeing God will be does not take place as if one had a more perfect similitude as perfect as is the perfect mode of God’s existence. of God than another, since that vision will not spring from Thus appears the answer to the Second Objection. For any similitude; but it will take place because one intel- when it is said that one intellect does not understand one lect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than and the same thing better than another, this would be true another. The faculty of seeing God, however, does not be- if referred to the mode of the thing understood, for who- long to the created intellect naturally, but is given to it by ever understands it otherwise than it really is, does not the light of glory, which establishes the intellect in a kind truly understand it, but not if referred to the mode of un- of “deiformity,” as appears from what is said above, in the derstanding, for the understanding of one is more perfect preceding article. than the understanding of another. Hence the intellect which has more of the light of Reply to Objection 3. The diversity of seeing will glory will see God the more perfectly; and he will have not arise on the part of the object seen, for the same ob- a fuller participation of the light of glory who has more ject will be presented to all—viz. the essence of God; charity; because where there is the greater charity, there nor will it arise from the diverse participation of the ob- is the more desire; and desire in a certain degree makes ject seen by different similitudes; but it will arise on the the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object de- part of the diverse faculty of the intellect, not, indeed, the sired. Hence he who possesses the more charity, will see natural faculty, but the glorified faculty. God the more perfectly, and will be the more beatified. Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him? Ia q. 12 a. 7 Objection 1. It seems that those who see the divine Great in counsel, and incomprehensible in thought” (Jer. essence, comprehend God. For the Apostle says (Phil. 32:18,19). Therefore He cannot be comprehended. 3:12): “But I follow after, if I may by any means com- I answer that, It is impossible for any created intel- prehend [Douay: ‘apprehend’].” But the Apostle did not lect to comprehend God; yet “for the mind to attain to God follow in vain; for he said (1 Cor. 9:26): “I. . . so run, not in some degree is great beatitude,” as Augustine says (De as at an uncertainty.” Therefore he comprehended; and Verb. Dim., Serm. xxxvii). in the same way, others also, whom he invites to do the In proof of this we must consider that what is compre- same, saying: “So run that you may comprehend.” hended is perfectly known; and that is perfectly known Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, which is known so far as it can be known. Thus, if any- Ep. cxlvii): “That is comprehended which is so seen as a thing which is capable of scientific demonstration is held whole, that nothing of it is hidden from the seer.” But if only by an opinion resting on a probably proof, it is not God is seen in His essence, He is seen whole, and noth- comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by sci- ing of Him is hidden from the seer, since God is simple. entific demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal Therefore whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him. to two right angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if Objection 3. Further, if we say that He is seen as a anyone accepts it as a probable opinion because wise men “whole,” but not “wholly,” it may be contrarily urged that or most men teach it, he cannot be said to comprehend “wholly” refers either to the mode of the seer, or to the the thing itself, because he does not attain to that perfect mode of the thing seen. But he who sees the essence of mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable. God, sees Him wholly, if the mode of the thing seen is But no created intellect can attain to that perfect mode of considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, like- the knowledge of the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsi- wise, he sees Him wholly if the mode of the seer is meant, cally capable. Which thus appears—Everything is know- forasmuch as the intellect will with its full power see the able according to its actuality. But God, whose being is Divine essence. Therefore all who see the essence of God infinite, as was shown above (q. 7) is infinitely knowable. see Him wholly; therefore they comprehend Him. Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the On the contrary, It is written: “O most mighty, created intellect knows the Divine essence more or less great, and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy Name. perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or lesser 56 light of glory. Since therefore the created light of glory But the blessed possess these three things in God; because received into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is they see Him, and in seeing Him, possess Him as present, clearly impossible for any created intellect to know God having the power to see Him always; and possessing Him, in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible that it should they enjoy Him as the ultimate fulfilment of desire. comprehend God. Reply to Objection 2. God is called incomprehen- Reply to Objection 1. “Comprehension” is twofold: sible not because anything of Him is not seen; but be- in one sense it is taken strictly and properly, according cause He is not seen as perfectly as He is capable of being as something is included in the one comprehending; and seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is known thus in no way is God comprehended either by intellect, by probable reason only, it does not follow that any part or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite and can- of it is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the not be included in any finite being; so that no finite being composition; but that it is not as perfectly known as it is can contain Him infinitely, in the degree of His own in- capable of being known. Hence Augustine, in his defini- finity. In this sense we now take comprehension. But in tion of comprehension, says the whole is comprehended another sense “comprehension” is taken more largely as when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden opposed to “non-attainment”; for he who attains to any- from the seer, or when its boundaries can be completely one is said to comprehend him when he attains to him. viewed or traced; for the boundaries of a thing are said to And in this sense God is comprehended by the blessed, be completely surveyed when the end of the knowledge of according to the words, “I held him, and I will not let him it is attained. go” (Cant 3:4); in this sense also are to be understood the Reply to Objection 3. The word “wholly” denotes words quoted from the Apostle concerning comprehen- a mode of the object; not that the whole object does not sion. And in this way “comprehension” is one of the three come under knowledge, but that the mode of the object is prerogatives of the soul, responding to hope, as vision re- not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore he who sponds to faith, and fruition responds to charity. For even sees God’s essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely, among ourselves not everything seen is held or possessed, and is infinitely knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode forasmuch as things either appear sometimes afar off, or does not extend to enable the knower to know infinitely; they are not in our power of attainment. Neither, again, thus, for instance, a person can have a probable opinion do we always enjoy what we possess; either because we that a proposition is demonstrable, although he himself find no pleasure in them, or because such things are not does not know it as demonstrated. the ultimate end of our desire, so as to satisfy and quell it. Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God? Ia q. 12 a. 8 Objection 1. It seems that those who see the essence On the contrary, The angels see the essence of God; of God see all things in God. For Gregory says (Dialog. and yet do not know all things. For as Dionysius says iv): “What do they not see, who see Him Who sees all (Coel. Hier. vii), “the inferior angels are cleansed from things?” But God sees all things. Therefore those who ignorance by the superior angels.” Also they are ignorant see God see all things. of future contingent things, and of secret thoughts; for this Objection 2. Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore whosoever what is reflected in the mirror. But all actual or possi- sees the essence of God, does not know all things. ble things shine forth in God as in a mirror; for He knows I answer that, The created intellect, in seeing the di- all things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees God, sees vine essence, does not see in it all that God does or can all actual things in Him, and also all possible things. do. For it is manifest that things are seen in God as they Objection 3. Further, whoever understands the are in Him. But all other things are in God as effects are greater, can understand the least, as is said in De Anima in the power of their cause. Therefore all things are seen iii. But all that God does, or can do, are less than His in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is clear essence. Therefore whoever understands God, can under- that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its stand all that God does, or can do. effects can be seen in it. For whoever has a lofty under- Objection 4. Further, the rational creature naturally standing, as soon as one demonstrative principle is put be- desires to know all things. Therefore if in seeing God it fore him can gather the knowledge of many conclusions; does not know all things, its natural desire will not rest but this is beyond one of a weaker intellect, for he needs satisfied; thus, in seeing God it will not be fully happy; things to be explained to him separately. And so an in- which is incongruous. Therefore he who sees God knows tellect can know all the effects of a cause and the reasons all things. for those effects in the cause itself, if it comprehends the 57 cause wholly. Now no created intellect can comprehend seen more or less perfectly. God wholly, as shown above (a. 7). Therefore no created Reply to Objection 4. The natural desire of the ratio- intellect in seeing God can know all that God does or can nal creature is to know everything that belongs to the per- do, for this would be to comprehend His power; but of fection of the intellect, namely, the species and the genera what God does or can do any intellect can know the more, of things and their types, and these everyone who sees the the more perfectly it sees God. Divine essence will see in God. But to know other singu- Reply to Objection 1. Gregory speaks as regards the lars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to the object being sufficient, namely, God, who in Himself suf- perfection of the created intellect nor does its natural de- ficiently contains and shows forth all things; but it does sire go out to these things; neither, again, does it desire to not follow that whoever sees God knows all things, for he know things that exist not as yet, but which God can call does not perfectly comprehend Him. into being. Yet if God alone were seen, Who is the fount Reply to Objection 2. It is not necessary that whoever and principle of all being and of all truth, He would so fill sees a mirror should see all that is in the mirror, unless his the natural desire of knowledge that nothing else would glance comprehends the mirror itself. be desired, and the seer would be completely beatified. Reply to Objection 3. Although it is more to see God Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): “Unhappy the man than to see all things else, still it is a greater thing to see who knoweth all these” (i.e. all creatures) “and knoweth Him so that all things are known in Him, than to see Him not Thee! but happy whoso knoweth Thee although he in such a way that not all things, but the fewer or the more, know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee and them are known in Him. For it has been shown in this article is not the happier for them, but for Thee alone.” that the more things are known in God according as He is Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen through any Ia q. 12 a. 9 similitude? Objection 1. It seems that what is seen in God by vine essence itself united to their intellect. For each thing those who see the Divine essence, is seen by means of is known in so far as its likeness is in the one who knows. some similitude. For every kind of knowledge comes Now this takes place in two ways. For as things which are about by the knower being assimilated to the object like one and the same thing are like to each other, the cog- known. For thus the intellect in act becomes the actual nitive faculty can be assimilated to any knowable object intelligible, and the sense in act becomes the actual sen- in two ways. In one way it is assimilated by the object sible, inasmuch as it is informed by a similitude of the itself, when it is directly informed by a similitude, and object, as the eye by the similitude of color. Therefore then the object is known in itself. In another way when if the intellect of one who sees the Divine essence under- informed by a similitude which resembles the object; and stands any creatures in God, it must be informed by their in this way, the knowledge is not of the thing in itself, but similitudes. of the thing in its likeness. For the knowledge of a man Objection 2. Further, what we have seen, we keep in himself differs from the knowledge of him in his im- in memory. But Paul, seeing the essence of God whilst age. Hence to know things thus by their likeness in the in ecstasy, when he had ceased to see the Divine essence, one who knows, is to know them in themselves or in their as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 28,34), remembered own nature; whereas to know them by their similitudes many of the things he had seen in the rapture; hence he pre-existing in God, is to see them in God. Now there is a said: “I have heard secret words which it is not granted difference between these two kinds of knowledge. Hence, to man to utter” (2 Cor. 12:4). Therefore it must be said according to the knowledge whereby things are known by that certain similitudes of what he remembered, remained those who see the essence of God, they are seen in God in his mind; and in the same way, when he actually saw Himself not by any other similitudes but by the Divine the essence of God, he had certain similitudes or ideas of essence alone present to the intellect; by which also God what he actually saw in it. Himself is seen. On the contrary, A mirror and what is in it are seen Reply to Objection 1. The created intellect of one by means of one likeness. But all things are seen in God who sees God is assimilated to what is seen in God, inas- as in an intelligible mirror. Therefore if God Himself is much as it is united to the Divine essence, in which the not seen by any similitude but by His own essence, nei- similitudes of all things pre-exist. ther are the things seen in Him seen by any similitudes or Reply to Objection 2. Some of the cognitive facul- ideas. ties form other images from those first conceived; thus the I answer that, Those who see the divine essence see imagination from the preconceived images of a mountain what they see in God not by any likeness, but by the di- and of gold can form the likeness of a golden mountain; 58 and the intellect, from the preconceived ideas of genus and is seen in the divine essence, which remained in Paul even difference, forms the idea of species; in like manner from when he had ceased to see the essence of God. Still this the similitude of an image we can form in our minds the kind of vision whereby things are seen by this likeness similitude of the original of the image. Thus Paul, or any thus conceived, is not the same as that whereby things are other person who sees God, by the very vision of the di- seen in God. vine essence, can form in himself the similitudes of what Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the same time? Ia q. 12 a. 10 Objection 1. It seems that those who see the essence ideas at the same time, so as to understand by them; as one of God do not see all they see in Him at one and the same body cannot bear different shapes simultaneously. Hence, time. For according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii): “It when many things can be understood by one idea, they may happen that many things are known, but only one is are understood at the same time; as the parts of a whole understood.” But what is seen in God, is understood; for are understood successively, and not all at the same time, God is seen by the intellect. Therefore those who see God if each one is understood by its own idea; whereas if all do not see all in Him at the same time. are understood under the one idea of the whole, they are Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. understood simultaneously. Now it was shown above that viii, 22,23), “God moves the spiritual creature according things seen in God, are not seen singly by their own simil- to time”—i.e. by intelligence and affection. But the spir- itude; but all are seen by the one essence of God. Hence itual creature is the angel who sees God. Therefore those they are seen simultaneously, and not successively. who see God understand and are affected successively; for Reply to Objection 1. We understand one thing only time means succession. when we understand by one idea; but many things under- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xvi): “Our stood by one idea are understood simultaneously, as in the thoughts will not be unstable, going to and fro from one idea of a man we understand “animal” and “rational”; and thing to another; but we shall see all we know at one in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the roof. glance.” Reply to Objection 2. As regards their natural knowl- I answer that, What is seen in the Word is seen not edge, whereby they know things by diverse ideas given successively, but at the same time. In proof whereof, we them, the angels do not know all things simultaneously, ourselves cannot know many things all at once, forasmuch and thus they are moved in the act of understanding ac- as understand many things by means of many ideas. But cording to time; but as regards what they see in God, they our intellect cannot be actually informed by many diverse see all at the same time. Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God? Ia q. 12 a. 11 Objection 1. It seems that one can in this life see the truth itself above our minds.” He also says (De Vera Relig. Divine essence. For Jacob said: “I have seen God face to xxx) that, “We judge of all things according to the divine face” (Gn. 32:30). But to see Him face to face is to see truth”; and (De Trin. xii) that, “it is the duty of reason to His essence, as appears from the words: “We see now in a judge of these corporeal things according to the incorpo- glass and in a dark manner, but then face to face” (1 Cor. real and eternal ideas; which unless they were above the 13:12). mind could not be incommutable.” Therefore even in this Objection 2. Further, the Lord said to Moses: “I speak life we see God Himself. to him mouth to mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and Objection 4. Further, according to Augustine (Gen. figures doth he see the Lord” (Num. 12:8); but this is to ad lit. xii, 24, 25), those things that are in the soul by see God in His essence. Therefore it is possible to see the their essence are seen by intellectual vision. But intellec- essence of God in this life. tual vision is of intelligible things, not by similitudes, but Objection 3. Further, that wherein we know all other by their very essences, as he also says (Gen. ad lit. xiii, things, and whereby we judge of other things, is known 24,25). Therefore since God is in our soul by His essence, in itself to us. But even now we know all things in God; it follows that He is seen by us in His essence. for Augustine says (Confess. viii): “If we both see that On the contrary, It is written, “Man shall not see Me, what you say is true, and we both see that what I say and live” (Ex. 32:20), and a gloss upon this says, “In this is true; where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, mortal life God can be seen by certain images, but not by nor thou in me; but both of us in the very incommutable the likeness itself of His own nature.” 59 I answer that, God cannot be seen in His essence by a though in an imaginary vision; as will later be explained ( mere human being, except he be separated from this mor- IIa IIae, q. 174) in treating of the degrees of prophecy. We tal life. The reason is because, as was said above (a. 4), may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate some ex- the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of alted intellectual contemplation, above the ordinary state. the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this life, Reply to Objection 2. As God works miracles in cor- has its being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows poreal things, so also He does supernatural wonders above only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by the common order, raising the minds of some living in the such a form. Now it is evident that the Divine essence flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the vision of cannot be known through the nature of material things. His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, For it was shown above (Aa. 2,9) that the knowledge of 26,27,28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, God by means of any created similitude is not the vision the teacher of the Gentiles. This will be treated more fully of His essence. Hence it is impossible for the soul of man in the question of rapture ( IIa IIae, q. 175). in this life to see the essence of God. This can be seen in Reply to Objection 3. All things are said to be seen the fact that the more our soul is abstracted from corporeal in God and all things are judged in Him, because by the things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract intelli- participation of His light, we know and judge all things; gible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of the bod- for the light of natural reason itself is a participation of ily senses divine revelations and foresight of future events the divine light; as likewise we are said to see and judge are perceived the more clearly. It is not possible, there- of sensible things in the sun, i.e., by the sun’s light. Hence fore, that the soul in this mortal life should be raised up Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), “The lessons of instruction to the supreme of intelligible objects, i.e. to the divine can only be seen as it were by their own sun,” namely essence. God. As therefore in order to see a sensible object, it is Reply to Objection 1. According to Dionysius (Coel. not necessary to see the substance of the sun, so in like Hier. iv) a man is said in the Scriptures to see God in manner to see any intelligible object, it is not necessary to the sense that certain figures are formed in the senses or see the essence of God. imagination, according to some similitude representing in Reply to Objection 4. Intellectual vision is of the part the divinity. So when Jacob says, “I have seen God things which are in the soul by their essence, as intelli- face to face,” this does not mean the Divine essence, but gible things are in the intellect. And thus God is in the some figure representing God. And this is to be referred to souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our soul, but by some high mode of prophecy, so that God seems to speak, presence, essence and power. Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason? Ia q. 12 a. 12 Objection 1. It seems that by natural reason we can- can be led by sensible things. But our mind cannot be led not know God in this life. For Boethius says (De Consol. by sense so far as to see the essence of God; because the v) that “reason does not grasp simple form.” But God is a sensible effects of God do not equal the power of God as supremely simple form, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 7 ). their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him. the whole power of God cannot be known; nor therefore Objection 2. Further, the soul understands nothing by can His essence be seen. But because they are His effects natural reason without the use of the imagination. But we and depend on their cause, we can be led from them so cannot have an imagination of God, Who is incorporeal. far as to know of God “whether He exists,” and to know Therefore we cannot know God by natural knowledge. of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first Objection 3. Further, the knowledge of natural reason cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him. belongs to both good and evil, inasmuch as they have a Hence we know that His relationship with creatures so common nature. But the knowledge of God belongs only far as to be the cause of them all; also that creatures differ to the good; for Augustine says (De Trin. i): “The weak from Him, inasmuch as He is not in any way part of what eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent light is caused by Him; and that creatures are not removed from unless purified by the justice of faith.” Therefore God can- Him by reason of any defect on His part, but because He not be known by natural reason. superexceeds them all. On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 1:19), “That Reply to Objection 1. Reason cannot reach up to which is known of God,” namely, what can be known of simple form, so as to know “what it is”; but it can know God by natural reason, “is manifest in them.” “whether it is.” I answer that, Our natural knowledge begins from Reply to Objection 2. God is known by natural sense. Hence our natural knowledge can go as far as it knowledge through the images of His effects. 60 Reply to Objection 3. As the knowledge of God’s tracting what he had said before: “I do not approve what I essence is by grace, it belongs only to the good; but the said in prayer, ‘God who willest that only the pure should knowledge of Him by natural reason can belong to both know truth.’ For it can be answered that many who are not good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract. i), re- pure can know many truths,” i.e. by natural reason. Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural reason? Ia q. 12 a. 13 Objection 1. It seems that by grace a higher knowl- by the revelation of grace. For the intellect’s natural edge of God is not obtained than by natural reason. For light is strengthened by the infusion of gratuitous light; Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol. i) that whoever is the and sometimes also the images in the human imagination more united to God in this life, is united to Him as to one are divinely formed, so as to express divine things bet- entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, who nev- ter than those do which we receive from sensible objects, ertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge as appears in prophetic visions; while sometimes sensi- conferred by grace. But to be united to God while ig- ble things, or even voices, are divinely formed to express noring of Him “what He is,” comes about also by natural some divine meaning; as in the Baptism, the Holy Ghost reason. Therefore God is not more known to us by grace was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the Fa- than by natural reason. ther was heard, “This is My beloved Son” (Mat. 3:17). Objection 2. Further, we can acquire the knowledge Reply to Objection 1. Although by the revelation of of divine things by natural reason only through the imag- grace in this life we cannot know of God “what He is,” and ination; and the same applies to the knowledge given by thus are united to Him as to one unknown; still we know grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that “it is impos- Him more fully according as many and more excellent of sible for the divine ray to shine upon us except as screened His effects are demonstrated to us, and according as we round about by the many colored sacred veils.” Therefore attribute to Him some things known by divine revelation, we cannot know God more fully by grace than by natural to which natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that reason. God is Three and One. Objection 3. Further, our intellect adheres to God by Reply to Objection 2. From the images either re- grace of faith. But faith does not seem to be knowledge; ceived from sense in the natural order, or divinely formed for Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Ev.) that “things not seen in the imagination, we have so much the more excellent are the objects of faith, and not of knowledge.” Therefore intellectual knowledge, the stronger the intelligible light there is not given to us a more excellent knowledge of God is in man; and thus through the revelation given by the by grace. images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of On the contrary, The Apostle says that “God hath re- the divine light. vealed to us His spirit,” what “none of the princes of this Reply to Objection 3. Faith is a kind of knowledge, world knew” (1 Cor. 2:10), namely, the philosophers, as inasmuch as the intellect is determined by faith to some the gloss expounds. knowable object. But this determination to one object I answer that, We have a more perfect knowledge of does not proceed from the vision of the believer, but from God by grace than by natural reason. Which is proved the vision of Him who is believed. Thus as far as faith thus. The knowledge which we have by natural reason falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which contains two things: images derived from the sensible ob- belongs to science, for science determines the intellect to jects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to ab- one object by the vision and understanding of first princi- stract from them intelligible conceptions. ples. Now in both of these, human knowledge is assisted 61 FIRST PART, QUESTION 13 The Names of God (In Twelve Articles) After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the divine names. For everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it. Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry: (1) Whether God can be named by us? (2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him substantially? (3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or are all to be taken metaphorically? (4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous? (5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally or equivocally? (6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are applied first to God or to creatures? (7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time? (8) Whether this name “God” is a name of nature, or of the operation? (9) Whether this name “God” is a communicable name? (10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God, by nature, by participation, and by opinion? (11) Whether this name, “Who is,” is the supremely appropriate name of God? (12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God? Whether a name can be given to God? Ia q. 13 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that no name can be given to cannot see the essence of God; but we know God from God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that, “Of Him creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence there is neither name, nor can one be found of Him;” and and remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by it is written: “What is His name, and what is the name of us from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies His Son, if thou knowest?” (Prov. 30:4). Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name Objection 2. Further, every name is either abstract or “man” expresses the essence of man in himself, since it concrete. But concrete names do not belong to God, since signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence; He is simple, nor do abstract names belong to Him, foras- for the idea expressed by the name is the definition. much as they do not signify any perfect subsisting thing. Reply to Objection 1. The reason why God has no Therefore no name can be said of God. name, or is said to be above being named, is because His Objection 3. Further, nouns are taken to signify sub- essence is above all that we understand about God, and stance with quality; verbs and participles signify sub- signify in word. stance with time; pronouns the same with demonstration Reply to Objection 2. Because we know and name or relation. But none of these can be applied to God, for God from creatures, the names we attribute to God signify He has no quality, nor accident, nor time; moreover, He what belongs to material creatures, of which the knowl- cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be de- edge is natural to us. And because in creatures of this kind scribed by relation, inasmuch as relations serve to recall a what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas their thing mentioned before by nouns, participles, or demon- form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that strative pronouns. Therefore God cannot in any way be whereby a thing is; hence it follows that all names used by named by us. us to signify a complete subsisting thing must have a con- On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 15:3): “The Lord crete meaning as applicable to compound things; whereas is a man of war, Almighty is His name.” names given to signify simple forms, signify a thing not as I answer that, Since according to the Philosopher subsisting, but as that whereby a thing is; as, for instance, (Peri Herm. i), words are signs of ideas, and ideas the whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And as similitude of things, it is evident that words relate to the God is simple, and subsisting, we attribute to Him abstract meaning of things signified through the medium of the in- names to signify His simplicity, and concrete names to tellectual conception. It follows therefore that we can give signify His substance and perfection, although both these a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now kinds of names fail to express His mode of being, foras- it was shown above (q. 12, Aa. 11,12) that in this life we much as our intellect does not know Him in this life as He 62 is. things, so we can understand and express simple eternity Reply to Objection 3. To signify substance with qual- only by way of temporal things, because our intellect has ity is to signify the “suppositum” with a nature or deter- a natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But mined form in which it subsists. Hence, as some things demonstrative pronouns are applied to God as describing are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify His subsis- what is understood, not what is sensed. For we can only tence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied to God describe Him as far as we understand Him. Thus, accord- signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and par- ing as nouns, participles and demonstrative pronouns are ticiples which signify time, are applied to Him because applicable to God, so far can He be signified by relative His eternity includes all time. For as we can apprehend pronouns. and signify simple subsistences only by way of compound Whether any name can be applied to God substantially? Ia q. 13 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that no name can be applied to ship towards creatures: thus in the words, “God is good,” God substantially. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, we mean, God is the cause of goodness in things; and the 9): “Everything said of God signifies not His substance, same rule applies to other names. but rather shows forth what He is not; or expresses some Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue relation, or something following from His nature or oper- for three reasons. First because in neither of them can a ation.” reason be assigned why some names more than others are Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): applied to God. For He is assuredly the cause of bodies “You will find a chorus of holy doctors addressed to the in the same way as He is the cause of good things; there- end of distinguishing clearly and praiseworthily the divine fore if the words “God is good,” signified no more than, processions in the denomination of God.” Thus the names “God is the cause of good things,” it might in like manner applied by the holy doctors in praising God are distin- be said that God is a body, inasmuch as He is the cause guished according to the divine processions themselves. of bodies. So also to say that He is a body implies that But what expresses the procession of anything, does not He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary matter. Sec- signify its essence. Therefore the names applied to God ondly, because it would follow that all names applied to are not said of Him substantially. God would be said of Him by way of being taken in a sec- Objection 3. Further, a thing is named by us accord- ondary sense, as healthy is secondarily said of medicine, ing as we understand it. But God is not understood by us forasmuch as it signifies only the cause of the health in in this life in His substance. Therefore neither is any name the animal which primarily is called healthy. Thirdly, be- we can use applied substantially to God. cause this is against the intention of those who speak of On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi): “The God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean being of God is the being strong, or the being wise, or more than to say the He is the cause of our life, or that He whatever else we may say of that simplicity whereby His differs from inanimate bodies. substance is signified.” Therefore all names of this kind Therefore we must hold a different doctrine—viz. that signify the divine substance. these names signify the divine substance, and are predi- I answer that, Negative names applied to God, or sig- cated substantially of God, although they fall short of a nifying His relation to creatures manifestly do not at all full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For signify His substance, but rather express the distance of these names express God, so far as our intellects know the creature from Him, or His relation to something else, Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, or rather, the relation of creatures to Himself. it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him. Now it But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, is shown above (q. 4, a. 2) that God prepossesses in Him- as “good,” “wise,” and the like, various and many opin- self all the perfections of creatures, being Himself simply ions have been given. For some have said that all such and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents names, although they are applied to God affirmatively, Him, and is like Him so far as it possesses some perfec- nevertheless have been brought into use more to express tion; yet it represents Him not as something of the same some remotion from God, rather than to express anything species or genus, but as the excelling principle of whose that exists positively in Him. Hence they assert that when form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind we say that God lives, we mean that God is not like an of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior bodies inanimate thing; and the same in like manner applies to represent the power of the sun. This was explained above other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses. Others (q. 4, a. 3), in treating of the divine perfection. There- say that these names applied to God signify His relation- fore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but 63 in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it im-signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a perfectly. So when we say, “God is good,” the meaning certain kind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the is not, “God is the cause of goodness,” or “God is not foot would be a stone∗. So we must say that these kinds evil”; but the meaning is, “Whatever good we attribute to of divine names are imposed from the divine processions; creatures, pre-exists in God,” and in a more excellent and for as according to the diverse processions of their perfec- higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good, be- tions, creatures are the representations of God, although cause He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He in an imperfect manner; so likewise our intellect knows causes goodness in things because He is good; according and names God according to each kind of procession; but to what Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), “Be- nevertheless these names are not imposed to signify the cause He is good, we are.” procession themselves, as if when we say “God lives,” the Reply to Objection 1. Damascene says that these sense were, “life proceeds from Him”; but to signify the names do not signify what God is, forasmuch as by none principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, of these names is perfectly expressed what He is; but each although it pre-exists in Him in a more eminent way than one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as crea- can be understood or signified. tures represent Him imperfectly. Reply to Objection 3. We cannot know the essence Reply to Objection 2. In the significance of names, of God in this life, as He really is in Himself; but we know that from which the name is derived is different some- Him accordingly as He is represented in the perfections of times from what it is intended to signify, as for instance, creatures; and thus the names imposed by us signify Him this name “stone” [lapis] is imposed from the fact that in that manner only. it hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed to Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense? Ia q. 13 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that no name is applied literally tellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, and as to God. For all names which we apply to God are taken it apprehends them it signifies them by names. There- from creatures; as was explained above (a. 1). But the fore as to the names applied to God—viz. the perfections names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically, as which they signify, such as goodness, life and the like, when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like. There- and their mode of signification. As regards what is sig- fore names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense. nified by these names, they belong properly to God, and Objection 2. Further, no name can be applied literally more properly than they belong to creatures, and are ap- to anything if it should be withheld from it rather than plied primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of sig- given to it. But all such names as “good,” “wise,” and the nification, they do not properly and strictly apply to God; like are more truly withheld from God than given to Him; for their mode of signification applies to creatures. as appears from Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii). Therefore Reply to Objection 1. There are some names which none of these names belong to God in their literal sense. signify these perfections flowing from God to creatures in Objection 3. Further, corporeal names are applied to such a way that the imperfect way in which creatures re- God in a metaphorical sense only; since He is incorpo- ceive the divine perfection is part of the very signification real. But all such names imply some kind of corporeal of the name itself as “stone” signifies a material being, condition; for their meaning is bound up with time and and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore all metaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these these names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense. perfections absolutely, without any such mode of partici- On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii), “Some pation being part of their signification as the words “be- names there are which express evidently the property of ing,” “good,” “living,” and the like, and such names can the divinity, and some which express the clear truth of the be literally applied to God. divine majesty, but others there are which are applied to Reply to Objection 2. Such names as these, as Diony- God metaphorically by way of similitude.” Therefore not sius shows, are denied of God for the reason that what all names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense, but the name signifies does not belong to Him in the ordi- there are some which are said of Him in their literal sense. nary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent way. I answer that, According to the preceding article, our Hence Dionysius says also that God is above all substance knowledge of God is derived from the perfections which and all life. flow from Him to creatures, which perfections are in God Reply to Objection 3. These names which are ap- in a more eminent way than in creatures. Now our in- plied to God literally imply corporeal conditions not in ∗ This refers to the Latin etymology of the word “lapis” which has no place in English 64 the thing signified, but as regards their mode of significa-ically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing tion; whereas those which are applied to God metaphor- signified. Whether names applied to God are synonymous? Ia q. 13 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that these names applied to God (AA 1,2) that they have diverse meanings. For the idea are synonymous names. For synonymous names are those signified by the name is the conception in the intellect of which mean exactly the same. But these names applied to the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it God mean entirely the same thing in God; for the good- knows God from creatures, in order to understand God, ness of God is His essence, and likewise it is His wisdom. forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flow- Therefore these names are entirely synonymous. ing from God to creatures, which perfections pre-exist in Objection 2. Further, if it be said these names signify God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are one and the same thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can received and divided and multiplied. As therefore, to the be objected that an idea to which no reality corresponds different perfections of creatures, there corresponds one is a vain notion. Therefore if these ideas are many, and simple principle represented by different perfections of the thing is one, it seems also that all these ideas are vain creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the notions. various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect, there Objection 3. Further, a thing which is one in real- corresponds one altogether simple principle, according to ity and in idea, is more one than what is one in reality these conceptions, imperfectly understood. Therefore al- and many in idea. But God is supremely one. Therefore though the names applied to God signify one thing, still it seems that He is not one in reality and many in idea; because they signify that under many and different as- and thus the names applied to God do not signify differ- pects, they are not synonymous. ent ideas; and thus they are synonymous. Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since On the contrary, All synonyms united with each synonymous terms signify one thing under one aspect; for other are redundant, as when we say, “vesture clothing.” words which signify different aspects of one things, do Therefore if all names applied to God are synonymous, not signify primarily and absolutely one thing; because we cannot properly say “good God” or the like, and yet it the term only signifies the thing through the medium of is written, “O most mighty, great and powerful, the Lord the intellectual conception, as was said above. of hosts is Thy name” (Jer. 32:18). Reply to Objection 2. The many aspects of these I answer that, These names spoken of God are not names are not empty and vain, for there corresponds to synonymous. This would be easy to understand, if we all of them one simple reality represented by them in a said that these names are used to remove, or to express manifold and imperfect manner. the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would follow Reply to Objection 3. The perfect unity of God re- that there are different ideas as regards the diverse things quires that what are manifold and divided in others should denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But exist in Him simply and unitedly. Thus it comes about that even according to what was said above (a. 2), that these He is one in reality, and yet multiple in idea, because our names signify the divine substance, although in an im- intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner, as things perfect manner, it is also clear from what has been said represent Him. Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of them? Ia q. 13 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that the things attributed to God agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an univo- and creatures are univocal. For every equivocal term is re- cal agent: and thus what is said of God and creatures, is duced to the univocal, as many are reduced to one; for if predicated univocally. the name “dog” be said equivocally of the barking dog, Objection 2. Further, there is no similitude among and of the dogfish, it must be said of some univocally— equivocal things. Therefore as creatures have a certain viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to infini- likeness to God, according to the word of Genesis (Gn. tude. Now there are some univocal agents which agree 1:26), “Let us make man to our image and likeness,” it with their effects in name and definition, as man gener- seems that something can be said of God and creatures ates man; and there are some agents which are equivocal, univocally. as the sun which causes heat, although the sun is hot only Objection 3. Further, measure is homogeneous with in an equivocal sense. Therefore it seems that the first the thing measured. But God is the first measure of all 65 beings. Therefore God is homogeneous with creatures; seen being understood by the things that are made” (Rom. and thus a word may be applied univocally to God and to 1:20). Therefore it must be said that these names are said creatures. of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e. according On the contrary, whatever is predicated of various to proportion. things under the same name but not in the same sense, is Now names are thus used in two ways: either accord- predicated equivocally. But no name belongs to God in ing as many things are proportionate to one, thus for ex- the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for instance, ample “healthy” predicated of medicine and urine in rela- wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God. Now tion and in proportion to health of a body, of which the for- a different genus changes an essence, since the genus is mer is the sign and the latter the cause: or according as one part of the definition; and the same applies to other things. thing is proportionate to another, thus “healthy” is said Therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is pred- of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of icated equivocally. health in the animal body. And in this way some things are Further, God is more distant from creatures than any said of God and creatures analogically, and not in a purely creatures are from each other. But the distance of some equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name creatures makes any univocal predication of them impos- God only from creatures (a. 1). Thus whatever is said of sible, as in the case of those things which are not in the God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a same genus. Therefore much less can anything be predi- creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all per- cated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equiv- fections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of ocal predication can be applied to them. community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation I answer that, Univocal predication is impossible be- and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, tween God and creatures. The reason of this is that every as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one its full degree, but in a measure that falls short, so that thing; thus “healthy” applied to urine signifies the sign of what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in animal health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for exam- of the same health. ple the sun by exercise of its one power produces mani- Reply to Objection 1. Although equivocal predica- fold and various forms in all inferior things. In the same tions must be reduced to univocal, still in actions, the way, as said in the preceding article, all perfections exist- non-univocal agent must precede the univocal agent. For ing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in God the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of the whole unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the gen- applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in eration of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term universal efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise “wise” applied to man, we signify some perfection dis- it would be the cause of itself, since it is contained in tinct from a man’s essence, and distinct from his power the species), but is a particular cause of this individual and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when which it places under the species by way of participation. we apply to it God, we do not mean to signify anything Therefore the universal cause of the whole species is not distinct from His essence, or power, or existence. Thus an univocal agent; and the universal cause comes before also this term “wise” applied to man in some degree cir- the particular cause. But this universal agent, whilst it is cumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas not univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, oth- this is not the case when it is applied to God; but it leaves erwise it could not produce its own likeness, but rather it the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding is to be called an analogical agent, as all univocal pred- the signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this ications are reduced to one first non-univocal analogical term “wise” is not applied in the same way to God and predication, which is being. to man. The same rule applies to other terms. Hence no Reply to Objection 2. The likeness of the creature name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures. to God is imperfect, for it does not represent one and the Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God same generic thing (q. 4, a. 3). and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have Reply to Objection 3. God is not the measure propor- said. Because if that were so, it follows that from creatures tioned to things measured; hence it is not necessary that nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all; God and creatures should be in the same genus. for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, indeed that these names are not predicated univocally of who proved many things about God, and also against what God and creatures; yet they do not prove that they are the Apostle says: “The invisible things of God are clearly predicated equivocally. 66 Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures? Ia q. 13 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that names are predicated pri- definition of “healthy” which is applied to urine, which marily of creatures rather than of God. For we name any- is called healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal’s thing accordingly as we know it, since “names”, as the health. Thus all names applied metaphorically to God, are Philosopher says, “are signs of ideas.” But we know crea- applied to creatures primarily rather than to God, because tures before we know God. Therefore the names imposed when said of God they mean only similitudes to such crea- by us are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of tures. For as “smiling” applied to a field means only that God. the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the beauty of Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): the human smile by proportionate likeness, so the name “We name God from creatures.” But names transferred of “lion” applied to God means only that God manifests from creatures to God, are said primarily of creatures strength in His works, as a lion in his. Thus it is clear rather than of God, as “lion,” “stone,” and the like. There- that applied to God the signification of names can be de- fore all names applied to God and creatures are applied fined only from what is said of creatures. But to other primarily to creatures rather than to God. names not applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the Objection 3. Further, all names equally applied to same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as the God and creatures, are applied to God as the cause of all cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, creatures, as Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.). But “God is good,” it would then only mean “God is the cause what is applied to anything through its cause, is applied of the creature’s goodness”; thus the term good applied to to it secondarily, for “healthy” is primarily predicated of God would included in its meaning the creature’s good- animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of ness. Hence “good” would apply primarily to creatures health. Therefore these names are said primarily of crea- rather than to God. But as was shown above (a. 2), these tures rather than of God. names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also On the contrary, It is written, “I bow my knees to the essentially. For the words, “God is good,” or “wise,” sig- Father, of our Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in nify not only that He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, heaven and earth is named” (Eph. 3:14,15); and the same but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence applies to the other names applied to God and creatures. as regards what the name signifies, these names are ap- Therefore these names are applied primarily to God rather plied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because than to creatures. these perfections flow from God to creatures; but as re- I answer that, In names predicated of many in an ana- gards the imposition of the names, they are primarily ap- logical sense, all are predicated because they have ref- plied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they erence to some one thing; and this one thing must be have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, placed in the definition of them all. And since that ex- as said above (a. 3). pressed by the name is the definition, as the Philosopher Reply to Objection 1. This objection refers to the im- says (Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primar- position of the name. ily to that which is put in the definition of such other Reply to Objection 2. The same rule does not apply things, and secondarily to these others according as they to metaphorical and to other names, as said above. approach more or less to that first. Thus, for instance, Reply to Objection 3. This objection would be valid “healthy” applied to animals comes into the definition of if these names were applied to God only as cause, and “healthy” applied to medicine, which is called healthy as not also essentially, for instance as “healthy” is applied to being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the medicine. Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God temporally? Ia q. 13 a. 7 Objection 1. It seems that names which imply rela- Objection 2. Further, that to which something applies tion to creatures are not predicated of God temporally. For temporally can be described as made; for what is white all such names signify the divine substance, as is univer- temporally is made white. But to make does no apply to sally held. Hence also Ambrose (De Fide i) that this name God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God tempo- “Lord” is the name of power, which is the divine sub- rally. stance; and “Creator” signifies the action of God, which Objection 3. Further, if any names are applied to God is His essence. Now the divine substance is not temporal, temporally as implying relation to creatures, the same rule but eternal. Therefore these names are not applied to God holds good of all things that imply relation to creatures. temporally, but eternally. But some names are spoken of God implying relation of 67 God to creatures from eternity; for from eternity He knew for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same applies and loved the creature, according to the word: “I have to relations consequent upon action and passion, as mo- loved thee with an everlasting love” (Jer. 31:3). Therefore tive power and the movable thing, father and son, and the also other names implying relation to creatures, as “Lord” like. and “Creator,” are applied to God from eternity. Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a Objection 4. Further, names of this kind signify rela- reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only; and tion. Therefore that relation must be something in God, this happens whenever two extremes are not of one order; or in the creature only. But it cannot be that it is some- as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things thing in the creature only, for in that case God would be and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they are called “Lord” from the opposite relation which is in crea- realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensi- tures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore ble and intellectual existence. Therefore in science and in the relation must be something in God also. But nothing sense a real relation exists, because they are ordered either temporal can be in God, for He is above time. Therefore to the knowledge or to the sensible perception of things; these names are not applied to God temporally. whereas the things looked at in themselves are outside this Objection 5. Further, a thing is called relative from order, and hence in them there is no real relation to sci- relation; for instance lord from lordship, as white from ence and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the intellect whiteness. Therefore if the relation of lordship is not re- apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and ally in God, but only in idea, it follows that God is not sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they really Lord, which is plainly false. are called relative, not forasmuch as they are related to Objection 6. Further, in relative things which are not other things, but as others are related to them. Likewise simultaneous in nature, one can exist without the other; as for instance, “on the right” is not applied to a column, un- a thing knowable can exist without the knowledge of it, less it stands as regards an animal on the right side; which as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). But relative things relation is not really in the column, but in the animal. which are said of God and creatures are not simultaneous Since therefore God is outside the whole order of cre- in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God ation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not con- to the creature even without the existence of the creature; versely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to and thus these names “Lord” and “Creator” are predicated God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to of God from eternity, and not temporally. creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as crea- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this tures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent relative appellation “Lord” is applied to God temporally. these names which import relation to the creature from I answer that, The names which import relation to being predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any creatures are applied to God temporally, and not from change in Him, but by reason of the change of the crea- eternity. ture; as a column is on the right of an animal, without To see this we must learn that some have said that re- change in itself, but by change in the animal. lation is not a reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly Reply to Objection 1. Some relative names are im- seen to be false from the very fact that things themselves posed to signify the relative habitudes themselves, as have a mutual natural order and habitude. Nevertheless it “master” and “servant,” “father,” and “son,” and the like, is necessary to know that since relation has two extremes, and these relatives are called predicamental [secundum it happens in three ways that a relation is real or logical. esse]. But others are imposed to signify the things from Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing mutual order or habitude can only go between things in moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and the the apprehension of reason; as when we say a thing “the like: and these relatives are called transcendental [secun- same as itself.” For reason apprehending one thing twice dum dici]. Thus, there is the same two-fold difference in regards it as two; thus it apprehends a certain habitude of a divine names. For some signify the habitude itself to the thing to itself. And the same applies to relations between creature, as “Lord,” and these do not signify the divine “being” and “non-being” formed by reason, apprehending substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they pre- “non-being” as an extreme. The same is true of relations suppose the divine substance; as dominion presupposes that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, power, which is the divine substance. Others signify the and the like. divine essence directly, and consequently the correspond- Now there are other relations which are realities as re- ing habitudes, as “Saviour,” “Creator,” and suchlike; and gards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude ex- these signify the action of God, which is His essence. Yet ists between two things according to some reality that be- both names are said of God temporarily so far as they im- longs to both; as is clear of all relations, consequent upon ply a habitude either principally or consequently, but not quantity; as great and small, double and half, and the like; as signifying the essence, either directly or indirectly. 68 Reply to Objection 2. As relations applied to God creature for the reason that the creature is related to Him: temporally are only in God in our idea, so, “to become” and since the relation of subjection is real in the creature, or “to be made” are applied to God only in idea, with no it follows that God is Lord not in idea only, but in reality; change in Him, as for instance when we say, “Lord, Thou for He is called Lord according to the manner in which art become [Douay: ‘hast been’] our refuge” (Ps. 89:1). the creature is subject to Him. Reply to Objection 3. The operation of the intellect Reply to Objection 6. To know whether relations are and the will is in the operator, therefore names signifying simultaneous by nature or otherwise, it is not necessary relations following upon the action of the intellect or will, by nature or otherwise of things to which they belong but are applied to God from eternity; whereas those follow- the meaning of the relations themselves. For if one in its ing upon the actions proceeding according to our mode of idea includes another, and vice versa, then they are simul- thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, taneous by nature: as double and half, father and son, and as “Saviour,” “Creator,” and the like. the like. But if one in its idea includes another, and not Reply to Objection 4. Relations signified by these vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This ap- names which are applied to God temporally, are in God plies to science and its object; for the object knowable is only in idea; but the opposite relations in creatures are considered as a potentiality, and the science as a habit, or real. Nor is it incongruous that God should be denom- as an act. Hence the knowable object in its mode of sig- inated from relations really existing in the thing, yet so nification exists before science, but if the same object is that the opposite relations in God should also be under- considered in act, then it is simultaneous with science in stood by us at the same time; in the sense that God is act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is spoken of relatively to the creature, inasmuch as the crea- known. Thus, though God is prior to the creature, still be- ture is related to Him: thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. cause the signification of Lord includes the idea of a ser- v) that the object is said to be knowable relatively because vant and vice versa, these two relative terms, “Lord” and knowledge relates to it. “servant,” are simultaneous by nature. Hence, God was Reply to Objection 5. Since God is related to the not “Lord” until He had a creature subject to Himself. Whether this name “God” is a name of the nature? Ia q. 13 a. 8 Objection 1. It seems that this name, “God,” is not a Because therefore God is not known to us in His na- name of the nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ture, but is made known to us from His operations or ef- 1) that “God Theos is so called from the theein [which fects, we name Him from these, as said in a. 1; hence means to care of] and to cherish all things; or from the this name “God” is a name of operation so far as relates aithein, that is to burn, for our God is a fire consuming to the source of its meaning. For this name is imposed all malice; or from theasthai, which means to consider all from His universal providence over all things; since all things.” But all these names belong to operation. There- who speak of God intend to name God as exercising provi- fore this name “God” signifies His operation and not His dence over all; hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii), “The nature. Deity watches over all with perfect providence and good- Objection 2. Further, a thing is named by us as we ness.” But taken from this operation, this name “God” is know it. But the divine nature is unknown to us. There- imposed to signify the divine nature. fore this name “God” does not signify the divine nature. Reply to Objection 1. All that Damascene says refers On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide i) that to providence; which is the source of the signification of “God” is a name of the nature. the name “God.” I answer that, Whence a name is imposed, and what Reply to Objection 2. We can name a thing according the name signifies are not always the same thing. For to the knowledge we have of its nature from its properties as we know substance from its properties and operations, and effects. Hence because we can know what stone is so we name substance sometimes for its operation, or its in itself from its property, this name “stone” signifies the property; e.g. we name the substance of a stone from its nature of the stone itself; for it signifies the definition of act, as for instance that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem]; but stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which still this name is not meant to signify the particular action, the name signifies is the definition, as is said in Metaph. but the stone’s substance. The things, on the other hand, iv. Now from the divine effects we cannot know the di- known to us in themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness vine nature in itself, so as to know what it is; but only by and the like, are not named from other things. Hence as way of eminence, and by way of causality, and of nega- regards such things the meaning of the name and its source tion as stated above (q. 12, a. 12). Thus the name “God” are the same. signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to 69 signify something existing above all things, the principle name God intend to signify all this. of all things and removed from all things; for those who Whether this name “God” is communicable? Ia q. 13 a. 9 Objection 1. It seems that this name “God” is com- idea; for the plurality of this individual thing cannot be; municable. For whosoever shares in the thing signified by nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no name signifying a name shares in the name itself. But this name “God” sig- any individual thing is properly communicable to many, nifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others, but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person according to the words, “He hath given us great [Vulg.: can be called “Achilles” metaphorically, forasmuch as he ‘most great’] and precious promises, that by these we may possess something of the properties of Achilles, such [Vulg.: ‘ye’] may be made partakers of the divine nature” as strength. On the other hand, forms which are individu- (2 Pet. 1:4). Therefore this name “God” can be commu- alized not by any “suppositum,” but by and of themselves, nicated to others. as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in Objection 2. Further, only proper names are not com- themselves, could not be communicable either in reality municable. Now this name “God” is not a proper, but an or in idea; but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was appellative noun; which appears from the fact that it has a said of individuals. Forasmuch as we are unable to un- plural, according to the text, “I have said, You are gods” derstand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are, (Ps. 81:6). Therefore this name “God” is communicable. we understand them as compound things having forms in Objection 3. Further, this name “God” comes from matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give operation, as explained. But other names given to God them concrete names signifying a nature existing in some from His operations or effects are communicable; as “suppositum.” Hence, so far as concerns images, the same “good,” “wise,” and the like. Therefore this name “God” rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of is communicable. compound things as to names given to us to signify sim- On the contrary, It is written: “They gave the incom- ple subsisting natures. municable name to wood and stones” (Wis. 14:21), in Since, then, this name “God” is given to signify the reference to the divine name. Therefore this name “God” divine nature as stated above (a. 8), and since the divine is incommunicable. nature cannot be multiplied as shown above (q. 11, a. 3), I answer that, A name is communicable in two ways: it follows that this name “God” is incommunicable in re- properly, and by similitude. It is properly communica- ality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way ble in the sense that its whole signification can be given as this name “sun” would be communicable according to to many; by similitude it is communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns. There- some part of the signification of the name. For instance fore, it is written: “You served them who by nature are not this name “lion” is properly communicable to all things gods,” (Gal. 4:8), and a gloss adds, “Gods not in nature, of the same nature as “lion”; by similitude it is commu- but in human opinion.” Nevertheless this name “God” is nicable to those who participate in the nature of a lion, as communicable, not in its whole signification, but in some for instance by courage, or strength, and those who thus part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called participate are called lions metaphorically. To know, how- gods who share in divinity by likeness, according to the ever, what names are properly communicable, we must text, “I have said, You are gods” (Ps. 81:6). consider that every form existing in the singular subject, But if any name were given to signify God not as to by which it is individualized, is common to many either His nature but as to His “suppositum,” accordingly as He in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many is considered as “this something,” that name would be in reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is absolutely incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps the not common to many in reality, but only in idea; for the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrew; and this is like giv- nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many ing a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing. subjects; and the reason is because the mind understands Reply to Objection 1. The divine nature is only com- the nature of every species by abstraction from the sin- municable according to the participation of some simili- gular. Hence to be in one singular subject or in many is tude. outside the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the Reply to Objection 2. This name “God” is an ap- idea of a species, it can be understood as existing in many. pellative name, and not a proper name, for it signifies the But the singular, from the fact that it is singular, is divided divine nature in the possessor; although God Himself in off from all others. Hence every name imposed to signify reality is neither universal nor particular. For names do any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and not follow upon the mode of being in things, but upon the 70 mode of being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incom-nature, but rather signify the perfections themselves ab- municable according to the truth of the thing, as was said solutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable to above concerning the name “sun.” many. But this name “God” is given to God from His Reply to Objection 3. These names “good,” “wise,” own proper operation, which we experience continually, and the like, are imposed from the perfections proceeding to signify the divine nature. from God to creatures; but they do not signify the divine Whether this name “God” is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, Ia q. 13 a. 10 and according to opinion? Objection 1. It seems that this name “God” is applied in the definition of being as applied to “accident”; and to God univocally by nature, by participation, and accord- “healthy” applied to animal is placed in the definition of ing to opinion. For where a diverse signification exists, healthy as applied to urine and medicine. For urine is the there is no contradiction of affirmation and negation; for sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of equivocation prevents contradiction. But a Catholic who health. says: “An idol is not God,” contradicts a pagan who says: The same applies to the question at issue. For this “An idol is God.” Therefore GOD in both senses is spoken name “God,” as signifying the true God, includes the idea of univocally. of God when it is used to denote God in opinion, or partic- Objection 2. Further, as an idol is God in opinion, ipation. For when we name anyone god by participation, and not in truth, so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is we understand by the name of god some likeness of the called happiness in opinion, and not in truth. But this true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name “beatitude” is applied univocally to this supposed name god we understand and signify something which happiness, and also to true happiness. Therefore also this men think is God; thus it is manifest that the name has name “God” is applied univocally to the true God, and to different meanings, but that one of them is comprised in God also in opinion. the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said ana- Objection 3. Further, names are called univocal be- logically. cause they contain one idea. Now when a Catholic says: Reply to Objection 1. The multiplication of names “There is one God,” he understands by the name God an does not depend on the predication of the name, but on omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while the the signification: for this name “man,” of whomsoever it heathen understands the same when he says: “An idol is is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is predicated in one God.” Therefore this name “God” is applied univocally to sense. But it would be multiplied if by the name “man” both. we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one On the contrary, The idea in the intellect is the like- meant to signify by this name “man” what man really is, ness of what is in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. and another meant to signify by the same name a stone, or But the word “animal” applied to a true animal, and to a something else. Hence it is evident that a Catholic saying picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore this name “God” that an idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting that applied to the true God and to God in opinion is applied it is God; because each of them uses this name GOD to equivocally. signify the true God. For when the pagan says an idol is Further, No one can signify what he does not know. God, he does not use this name as meaning God in opin- But the heathen does not know the divine nature. So when ion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics he says an idol is God, he does not signify the true De- sometimes use the name in the sense, as in the Psalm, “All ity. On the other hand, A Catholic signifies the true De- the gods of the Gentiles are demons” (Ps. 95:5). ity when he says that there is one God. Therefore this The same remark applies to the Second and Third Ob- name “God” is not applied univocally, but equivocally to jections. For these reasons proceed from the different the true God, and to God according to opinion. predication of the name, and not from its various signi- I answer that, This name “God” in the three aforesaid fications. significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, Reply to Objection 4. The term “animal” applied to but analogically. This is apparent from this reason: Uni- a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal; for vocal terms mean absolutely the same thing, but equivocal the Philosopher takes equivocal names in a large sense, terms absolutely different; whereas in analogical terms a including analogous names; because also being, which word taken in one signification must be placed in the def- is predicated analogically, is sometimes said to be pred- inition of the same word taken in other senses; as, for in- icated equivocally of different predicaments. stance, “being” which is applied to “substance” is placed Reply to Objection 5. Neither a Catholic nor a pagan 71 knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol is not God. one knows it according to some idea of causality, or ex- But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, cellence, or remotion (q. 12, a. 12). So a pagan can take he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use this name “God” in the same way when he says an idol names the meaning of which we know not. Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God? Ia q. 13 a. 11 Objection 1. It seems that this name HE WHO IS is itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it not the most proper name of God. For this name “God” understands about God, it falls short of the mode of what is an incommunicable name. But this name HE WHO IS, God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE names are, and the more universal and absolute they are, WHO IS is not the most proper name of God. the more properly they are applied to God. Hence Dam- Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) ascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that, “HE WHO IS, is the that “the name of good excellently manifests all the pro- principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending cessions of God.” But it especially belongs to God to be all in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and the universal principle of all things. Therefore this name indeterminate sea of substance.” Now by any other name “good” is supremely proper to God, and not this name HE some mode of substance is determined, whereas this name WHO IS. HE WHO IS, determines no mode of being, but is inde- Objection 3. Further, every divine name seems to terminate to all; and therefore it denominates the “infinite imply relation to creatures, for God is known to us only ocean of substance.” through creatures. But this name HE WHO IS imports no Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies relation to creatures. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is present existence; and this above all properly applies to not the most applicable to God. God, whose existence knows not past or future, as Augus- On the contrary, It is written that when Moses asked, tine says (De Trin. v). “If they should say to me, What is His name? what shall Reply to Objection 1. This name HE WHO IS is I say to them?” The Lord answered him, “Thus shalt the name of God more properly than this name “God,” as thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to you” (Ex. regards its source, namely, existence; and as regards the 3:13,14). Therefor this name HE WHO IS most properly mode of signification and consignification, as said above. belongs to God. But as regards the object intended by the name, this name I answer that, This name HE WHO IS is most prop- “God” is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the di- erly applied to God, for three reasons: vine nature; and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton, First, because of its signification. For it does not sig- imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommu- nify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the nicable and, if one may so speak, singular. existence of God is His essence itself, which can be said Reply to Objection 2. This name “good” is the prin- of no other (q. 3, a. 4), it is clear that among other names cipal name of God in so far as He is a cause, but not abso- this one specially denominates God, for everything is de- lutely; for existence considered absolutely comes before nominated by its form. the idea of cause. Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other Reply to Objection 3. It is not necessary that all the names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, divine names should import relation to creatures, but it add something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain suffices that they be imposed from some perfections flow- way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect can- ing from God to creatures. Among these the first is exis- not know the essence of God itself in this life, as it is in tence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS. Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God? Ia q. 13 a. 12 Objection 1. It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be a subject. But everything about which an affir- cannot be formed about God. For Dionysius says (Coel. mative proposition is made is taken as a subject. There- Hier. ii) that “negations about God are true; but affirma- fore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about tions are vague.” God. Objection 2. Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that Objection 3. Further, every intellect is false which “a simple form cannot be a subject.” But God is the most understands a thing otherwise than as it is. But God has absolutely simple form, as shown (q. 3 ): therefore He existence without any composition as shown above (q. 3, 72 a. 7). Therefore since every affirmative intellect under-object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plu- stands something as compound, it follows that a true affir- rality of predicate and subject represents the plurality of mative proposition about God cannot be made. idea; and the intellect represents the unity by composi- On the contrary, What is of faith cannot be false. But tion. some affirmative propositions are of faith; as that God is Reply to Objection 1. Dionysius says that the af- Three and One; and that He is omnipotent. Therefore true firmations about God are vague or, according to another affirmative propositions can be formed about God. translation, “incongruous,” inasmuch as no name can be I answer that, True affirmative propositions can be applied to God according to its mode of signification. formed about God. To prove this we must know that in Reply to Objection 2. Our intellect cannot compre- every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the hend simple subsisting forms, as they really are in them- subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and selves; but it apprehends them as compound things in different things in idea. And this appears to be the case which there is something taken as subject and something both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, that is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form and in those which have an essential predicate. For it is as a subject, and attributes something else to it. manifest that “man” and “white” are the same in subject, Reply to Objection 3. This proposition, “The intel- and different in idea; for the idea of man is one thing, and lect understanding anything otherwise than it is, is false,” that of whiteness is another. The same applies when I say, can be taken in two senses, accordingly as this adverb “man is an animal”; since the same thing which is man is “otherwise” determines the word “understanding” on the truly animal; for in the same “suppositum” there is sen- part of the thing understood, or on the part of the one sible nature by reason of which he is called animal, and who understands. Taken as referring to the thing under- the rational nature by reason of which he is called man; stood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any in- hence here again predicate and subject are the same as to tellect which understands that the thing is otherwise than “suppositum,” but different as to idea. But in propositions it is, is false. But this does not hold in the present case; where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule because our intellect, when forming a proposition about in some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to God, does not affirm that He is composite, but that He is the “suppositum” what it places in the subject; and what simple. But taken as referring to the one who understands, it places in the predicate it draws to the nature of the form the proposition is false. For the mode of the intellect in existing in the “suppositum”; according to the saying that understanding is different from the mode of the thing in “predicates are to be taken formally, and subjects mate- its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect understands rially.” To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not of predicate and subject, while the intellect signifies the that it understands them to be immaterial things; but its identity of the thing by the composition itself. manner of understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether it understands simple things above itself, it understands one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different them according to its own mode, which is in a composite conceptions because it cannot see Him as He is in Him- manner; yet not so as to understand them to be compos- self. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under dif- ite things. And thus our intellect is not false in forming ferent conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple composition in its ideas concerning God. 73 FIRST PART, QUESTION 14 Of God’s Knowledge (In Sixteen Articles) Having considered what belongs to the divine substance, we have now to treat of God’s operation. And since one kind of operation is immanent, and another kind of operation proceeds to the exterior effect, we treat first of knowledge and of will (for understanding abides in the intelligent agent, and will is in the one who wills); and afterwards of the power of God, the principle of the divine operation as proceeding to the exterior effect. Now because to understand is a kind of life, after treating of the divine knowledge, we consider truth and falsehood. Further, as everything known is in the knower, and the types of things as existing in the knowledge of God are called ideas, to the consideration of knowledge will be added the treatment of ideas. Concerning knowledge, there are sixteen points for inquiry: (1) Whether there is knowledge in God? (2) Whether God understands Himself? (3) Whether He comprehends Himself? (4) Whether His understanding is His substance? (5) Whether He understands other things besides Himself? (6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them? (7) Whether the knowledge of God is discursive? (8) Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things? (9) Whether God has knowledge of non-existing things? (10) Whether He has knowledge of evil? (11) Whether He has knowledge of individual things? (12) Whether He knows the infinite? (13) Whether He knows future contingent things? (14) Whether He knows enunciable things? (15) Whether the knowledge of God is variable? (16) Whether God has speculative or practical knowledge of things? Whether there is knowledge∗? Ia q. 14 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that in God there is not knowl- the knower. Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non- edge. For knowledge is a habit; and habit does not belong intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas to God, since it is the mean between potentiality and act. the nature of intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and Therefore knowledge is not in God. extension; therefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) Objection 2. Further, since science is about conclu- that “the soul is in a sense all things.” Now the contrac- sions, it is a kind of knowledge caused by something tion of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we else which is the knowledge of principles. But nothing have said above (q. 7, a. 1) forms according as they are is caused in God; therefore science is not in God. the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of Objection 3. Further, all knowledge is universal, or infinity. Therefore it is clear that the immateriality of a particular. But in God there is no universal or particular thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and according to the (q. 3, a. 5). Therefore in God there is not knowledge. mode of immateriality is the mode of knowledge. Hence On the contrary, The Apostle says, “O the depth of it is said in De Anima ii that plants do not know, because the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God” they are wholly material. But sense is cognitive because (Rom. 11:33). it can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is I answer that, In God there exists the most perfect still further cognitive, because it is more separated from knowledge. To prove this, we must note that intelligent matter and unmixed, as said in De Anima iii. Since there- beings are distinguished from non-intelligent beings in fore God is in the highest degree of immateriality as stated that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the above (q. 7, a. 1), it follows that He occupies the highest intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form place in knowledge. of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in Reply to Objection 1. Because perfections flowing ∗ Scientia 74 from God to creatures exist in a higher state in God Him-knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in self (q. 4, a. 2), whenever a name taken from any created such a way, however, that there must be removed from perfection is attributed to God, it must be separated in its each of them, so far as they enter into divine predica- signification from anything that belongs to that imperfect tion, everything that savors of imperfection; and every- mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a qual- thing that expresses perfection is to be retained in them. ity of God, nor a habit; but substance and pure act. Hence it is said, “With Him is wisdom and strength, He Reply to Objection 2. Whatever is divided and multi- hath counsel and understanding” (Job 12:13). plied in creatures exists in God simply and unitedly (q. 13, Reply to Objection 3. Knowledge is according to the a. 4). Now man has different kinds of knowledge, ac- mode of the one who knows; for the thing known is in cording to the different objects of His knowledge. He has the knower according to the mode of the knower. Now “intelligence” as regards the knowledge of principles; he since the mode of the divine essence is higher than that has “science” as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has of creatures, divine knowledge does not exist in God after “wisdom,” according as he knows the highest cause; he the mode of created knowledge, so as to be universal or has “counsel” or “prudence,” according as he knows what particular, or habitual, or potential, or existing according is to be done. But God knows all these by one simple act to any such mode. of knowledge, as will be shown (a. 7). Hence the simple Whether God understands Himself? Ia q. 14 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that God does not understand reason why we actually feel or know a thing is because Himself. For it is said by the Philosopher (De Causis), our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible “Every knower who knows his own essence, returns com- or intelligible species. And because of this only, it fol- pletely to his own essence.” But God does not go out from lows that sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or His own essence, nor is He moved at all; thus He cannot intelligible object, since both are in potentiality. return to His own essence. Therefore He does not know Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potential- His own essence. ity, but is pure act, His intellect and its object are alto- Objection 2. Further, to understand is a kind of pas- gether the same; so that He neither is without the intel- sion and movement, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ligible species, as is the case with our intellect when it iii); and knowledge also is a kind of assimilation to the understands potentially; nor does the intelligible species object known; and the thing known is the perfection of differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it dif- the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers, or is made fers in our intellect when it understands actually; but the perfect by itself, “nor,” as Hilary says (De Trin. iii), “is intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself, and a thing its own likeness.” Therefore God does not under-thus God understands Himself through Himself. stand Himself. Reply to Objection 1. Return to its own essence Objection 3. Further, we are like to God chiefly in our means only that a thing subsists in itself. Inasmuch as intellect, because we are the image of God in our mind, as the form perfects the matter by giving it existence, it is in Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi). But our intellect under- a certain way diffused in it; and it returns to itself inas- stands itself, only as it understands other things, as is said much as it has existence in itself. Therefore those cog- in De Anima iii. Therefore God understands Himself only nitive faculties which are not subsisting, but are the acts so far perchance as He understands other things. of organs, do not know themselves, as in the case of each On the contrary, It is written: “The things that are of the senses; whereas those cognitive faculties which are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God” (1 Cor. subsisting, know themselves; hence it is said in De Cau- 2:11). sis that, “whoever knows his essence returns to it.” Now I answer that, God understands Himself through it supremely belongs to God to be self-subsisting. Hence Himself. In proof whereof it must be known that although according to this mode of speaking, He supremely returns in operations which pass to an external effect, the object to His own essence, and knows Himself. of the operation, which is taken as the term, exists out- Reply to Objection 2. Movement and passion are side the operator; nevertheless in operations that remain taken equivocally, according as to understand is described in the operator, the object signified as the term of opera- as a kind of movement or passion, as stated in De Anima tion, resides in the operator; and accordingly as it is in the iii. For to understand is not a movement that is an act of operator, the operation is actual. Hence the Philosopher something imperfect passing from one to another, but it is says (De Anima iii) that “the sensible in act is sense in an act, existing in the agent itself, of something perfect. act, and the intelligible in act is intellect in act.” For the Likewise that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible 75 object, i.e. is assimilated to it, this belongs to an intel-the same relation to intelligible objects as primary matter lect which is sometimes in potentiality; because the fact has to natural things; for it is in potentiality as regards of its being in a state of potentiality makes it differ from intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural the intelligible object and assimilates it thereto through things. Hence our passive intellect can be exercised con- the intelligible species, which is the likeness of the thing cerning intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected understood, and makes it to be perfected thereby, as po- by the intelligible species of something; and in that way tentiality is perfected by act. On the other hand, the divine it understands itself by an intelligible species, as it under- intellect, which is no way in potentiality, is not perfected stands other things: for it is manifest that by knowing the by the intelligible object, nor is it assimilated thereto, but intelligible object it understands also its own act of un- is its own perfection, and its own intelligible object. derstanding, and by this act knows the intellectual faculty. Reply to Objection 3. Existence in nature does not But God is a pure act in the order of existence, as also in belong to primary matter, which is a potentiality, unless it the order of intelligible objects; therefore He understands is reduced to act by a form. Now our passive intellect has Himself through Himself. Whether God comprehends Himself? Ia q. 14 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that God does not comprehend in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing; because Himself. For Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), it is from the fact that He is in act and free from all mat- that “whatever comprehends itself is finite as regards it- ter and potentiality, that God is cognitive, as shown above self.” But God is in all ways infinite. Therefore He does (Aa. 1,2). Whence it is manifest that He knows Himself as not comprehend Himself. much as He is knowable; and for that reason He perfectly Objection 2. If it is said that God is infinite to us, and comprehends Himself. finite to Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that ev- Reply to Objection 1. The strict meaning of “com- erything in God is truer than it is in us. If therefore God is prehension” signifies that one thing holds and includes an- finite to Himself, but infinite to us, then God is more truly other; and in this sense everything comprehended is finite, finite than infinite; which is against what was laid down as also is everything included in another. But God is not above (q. 7, a. 1). Therefore God does not comprehend said to be comprehended by Himself in this sense, as if Himself. His intellect were a faculty apart from Himself, and as if On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. it held and included Himself; for these modes of speak- xv), that “Everything that understands itself, comprehends ing are to be taken by way of negation. But as God is itself.” But God understands Himself. Therefore He com- said to be in Himself, forasmuch as He is not contained prehends Himself. by anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be com- I answer that, God perfectly comprehends Himself, prehended by Himself, forasmuch as nothing in Himself is as can be thus proved. A thing is said to be comprehended hidden from Himself. For Augustine says (De Vid. Deum. when the end of the knowledge of it is attained, and this is ep. cxii), “The whole is comprehended when seen, if it is accomplished when it is known as perfectly as it is know- seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the able; as, for instance, a demonstrable proposition is com- seer.” prehended when known by demonstration, not, however, Reply to Objection 2. When it is said, “God is finite when it is known by some probable reason. Now it is to Himself,” this is to be understood according to a certain manifest that God knows Himself as perfectly as He is similitude of proportion, because He has the same relation perfectly knowable. For everything is knowable accord- in not exceeding His intellect, as anything finite has in not ing to the mode of its own actuality; since a thing is not exceeding finite intellect. But God is not to be called fi- known according as it is in potentiality, but in so far as it is nite to Himself in this sense, as if He understood Himself in actuality, as said in Metaph. ix. Now the power of God to be something finite. Whether the act of God’s intellect is His substance? Ia q. 14 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that the act of God’s intellect Objection 2. Further, to understand one’s act of un- is not His substance. For to understand is an operation. derstanding, is to understand something that is neither But an operation signifies something proceeding from the great nor chiefly understood, and but secondary and ac- operator. Therefore the act of God’s intellect is not His cessory. If therefore God be his own act of understanding, substance. His act of understanding will be as when we understand 76 our act of understanding: and thus God’s act of under-tion; as existence is the perfection of the one existing: just standing will not be something great. as existence follows on the form, so in like manner to un- Objection 3. Further, every act of understanding derstand follows on the intelligible species. Now in God means understanding something. When therefore God un- there is no form which is something other than His exis- derstands Himself, if He Himself is not distinct from this tence, as shown above (q. 3). Hence as His essence itself act of understanding, He understands that He understands is also His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that Himself; and so on to infinity. Therefore the act of God’s His act of understanding must be His essence and His ex- intellect is not His substance. istence. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii), “In Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, God to be is the same as to be wise.” But to be wise is the intellect, and the object understood, and the intelligible same thing as to understand. Therefore in God to be is the species, and His act of understanding are entirely one and same thing as to understand. But God’s existence is His the same. Hence when God is said to be understanding, substance, as shown above (q. 3, a. 4). Therefore the act no kind of multiplicity is attached to His substance. of God’s intellect is His substance. Reply to Objection 1. To understand is not an op- I answer that, It must be said that the act of God’s eration proceeding out of the operator, but remaining in intellect is His substance. For if His act of understanding him. were other than His substance, then something else, as the Reply to Objection 2. When that act of understand- Philosopher says (Metaph. xii), would be the act and per- ing which is not subsistent is understood, something not fection of the divine substance, to which the divine sub- great is understood; as when we understand our act of un- stance would be related, as potentiality is to act, which is derstanding; and so this cannot be likened to the act of the altogether impossible; because the act of understanding is divine understanding which is subsistent. the perfection and act of the one understanding. Let us Thus appears the Reply to the Third Objection. For now consider how this is. As was laid down above (a. 2), the act of divine understanding subsists in itself, and be- to understand is not an act passing to anything extrinsic; longs to its very self and is not another’s; hence it need for it remains in the operator as his own act and perfec- not proceed to infinity. Whether God knows things other than Himself? Ia q. 14 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that God does not know things its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything besides Himself. For all other things but God are outside can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power of God. But Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other xlvi) that “God does not behold anything out of Himself.” things by the very fact that it is the first effective cause of Therefore He does not know things other than Himself. all things, as is clear from the aforesaid (q. 2, a. 3), God Objection 2. Further, the object understood is the must necessarily know things other than Himself. And perfection of the one who understands. If therefore God this appears still more plainly if we add that the every ex- understands other things besides Himself, something else istence of the first effective cause—viz. God—is His own will be the perfection of God, and will be nobler than He; act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in which is impossible. God, as in the first cause, must be in His act of under- Objection 3. Further, the act of understanding is spec- standing, and all things must be in Him according to an ified by the intelligible object, as is every other act from intelligible mode: for everything which is in another, is in its own object. Hence the intellectual act is so much the it according to the mode of that in which it is. nobler, the nobler the object understood. But God is His Now in order to know how God knows things other own intellectual act. If therefore God understands any- than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in thing other than Himself, then God Himself is specified two ways: in itself, and in another. A thing is known in by something else than Himself; which cannot be. There- itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to fore He does not understand things other than Himself. the knowable object; as when the eye sees a man through On the contrary, It is written: “All things are naked the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through and open to His eyes” (Heb. 4:13). the image of that which contains it; as when a part is seen I answer that, God necessarily knows things other in the whole by the image of the whole; or when a man than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly under- is seen in a mirror by the image in the mirror, or by any stands Himself; otherwise His existence would not be per- other mode by which one thing is seen in another. fect, since His existence is His act of understanding. Now So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because if anything is perfectly known, it follows of necessity that He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other 77 things not in themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His fection in the divine intellect other than the divine essence. essence contains the similitude of things other than Him- Reply to Objection 3. The intellectual act is not spec- self. ified by what is understood in another, but by the prin- Reply to Objection 1. The passage of Augustine in cipal object understood in which other things are under- which it is said that God “sees nothing outside Himself” stood. For the intellectual act is specified by its object, is not to be taken in such a way, as if God saw nothing out- inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle of the side Himself, but in the sense that what is outside Himself intellectual operation: since every operation is specified He does not see except in Himself, as above explained. by the form which is its principle of operation; as heat- Reply to Objection 2. The object understood is a per- ing by heat. Hence the intellectual operation is specified fection of the one understanding not by its substance, but by that intelligible form which makes the intellect in act. by its image, according to which it is in the intellect, as And this is the image of the principal thing understood, its form and perfection, as is said in De Anima iii. For “a which in God is nothing but His own essence in which stone is not in the soul, but its image.” Now those things all images of things are comprehended. Hence it does not which are other than God are understood by God, inas- follow that the divine intellectual act, or rather God Him- much as the essence of God contains their images as above self, is specified by anything else than the divine essence explained; hence it does not follow that there is any per- itself. Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge? Ia q. 14 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that God does not know things sight” (Heb. 4:12,13). other than Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was I answer that, Some have erred on this point, saying shown (a. 5), God knows things other than Himself, ac- that God knows things other than Himself only in general, cording as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him that is, only as beings. For as fire, if it knew the nature of as in their common and universal cause, and are known by heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so God, God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know through knowing Himself as the principle of being, knows them by general, and not by proper knowledge. Therefore the nature of being, and all other things in so far as they God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by are beings. proper knowledge. But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general Objection 2. Further, the created essence is as distant and not in particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. from the divine essence, as the divine essence is distant Hence our intellect, when it is reduced from potentiality to from the created essence. But the divine essence cannot be act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of known by the created essence, as said above (q. 12/a. 2). things, before it knows them in particular; as proceeding Therefore neither can the created essence be known by the from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from Phys. divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His essence, i. If therefore the knowledge of God regarding things it follows that He does not know what the creature is in other than Himself is only universal and not special, it its essence, so as to know “what it is,” which is to have would follow that His understanding would not be abso- proper knowledge of it. lutely perfect; therefore neither would His being be per- Objection 3. Further, proper knowledge of a thing fect; and this is against what was said above (q. 4, a. 1). can come only through its proper ratio. But as God knows We must therefore hold that God knows things other than all things by His essence, it seems that He does not know Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as each thing by its proper ratio; for one thing cannot be the being is common to them, but in so far as one is distin- proper ratio of many and diverse things. Therefore God guished from the other. In proof thereof we may observe has not a proper knowledge of things, but a general knowl- that some wishing to show that God knows many things edge; for to know things otherwise than by their proper by one, bring forward some examples, as, for instance, ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that them. proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it would On the contrary, To have a proper knowledge of know all colors. things is to know them not only in general, but as they Now these examples although they are similar in part, are distinct from each other. Now God knows things in namely, as regards universal causality, nevertheless they that manner. Hence it is written that He reaches “even to fail in this respect, that multitude and diversity are caused the division of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also by the one universal principle, not as regards that which and the marrow, and is a discerner of thoughts and intents is the principle of distinction, but only as regards that in of the heart; neither is there any creature invisible in His which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is 78 not caused by the light only, but by the different disposi-all things with proper knowledge, in their distinction from tion of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and like- each other. wise, the diversity of the lines is caused by their different Reply to Objection 1. So to know a thing as it is in position. Hence it is that this kind of diversity and mul- the knower, may be understood in two ways. In one way titude cannot be known in its principle by proper knowl- this adverb “so” imports the mode of knowledge on the edge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it is part of the thing known; and in that sense it is false. For otherwise. For it was shown above (q. 4, a. 2) that what- the knower does not always know the object known ac- ever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists cording to the existence it has in the knower; since the eye and is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not does not know a stone according to the existence it has in only what is common to creatures–viz. being—belongs to the eye; but by the image of the stone which is in the eye, their perfection, but also what makes them distinguished the eye knows the stone according to its existence outside from each other; as living and understanding, and the like, the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the object whereby living beings are distinguished from the non- known according to the (mode of) existence it has in the living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent. Like- knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its wise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its (mode of) existence outside the knower; thus the intellect own species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist knows a stone according to the intelligible existence it has in God, not only as regards what is common to all, but also in the intellect, inasmuch as it knows that it understands; as regards what distinguishes one thing from another. And while nevertheless it knows what a stone is in its own na- therefore as God contains all perfections in Himself, the ture. If however the adverb ‘so’ be understood to import essence of God is compared to all other essences of things, the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the knower, in that not as the common to the proper, as unity is to numbers, sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of the or as the centre (of a circle) to the (radiating) lines; but as object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the animal; or six, a perfect number, to the imperfect numbers mode of knowledge. contained under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act We must say therefore that God not only knows that imperfect acts can be known not only in general, but also all things are in Himself; but by the fact that they are in by proper knowledge; thus, for example, whoever knows Him, He knows them in their own nature and all the more a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge; and who- perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him. ever knows the number six, knows the number three also Reply to Objection 2. The created essence is com- by proper knowledge. pared to the essence of God as the imperfect to the perfect As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all act. Therefore the created essence cannot sufficiently lead the perfection contained in the essence of any other be- us to the knowledge of the divine essence, but rather the ing, and far more, God can know in Himself all of them converse. with proper knowledge. For the nature proper to each Reply to Objection 3. The same thing cannot be thing consists in some degree of participation in the divine taken in an equal manner as the ratio of different things. perfection. Now God could not be said to know Him- But the divine essence excels all creatures. Hence it can self perfectly unless He knew all the ways in which His be taken as the proper ration of each thing according to own perfection can be shared by others. Neither could He the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate in, know the very nature of being perfectly, unless He knew and imitate it. all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows Whether the knowledge of God is discursive? Ia q. 14 a. 7 Objection 1. It seems that the knowledge of God know the effect through its cause. But God knows things is discursive. For the knowledge of God is not habitual through Himself; as an effect (is known) through its cause. knowledge, but actual knowledge. Now the Philosopher Therefore His knowledge is discursive. says (Topic. ii): “The habit of knowledge may regard Objection 3. Further, God knows each creature more many things at once; but actual understanding regards perfectly than we know it. But we know the effects in their only one thing at a time.” Therefore as God knows many created causes; and thus we go discursively from causes things, Himself and others, as shown above (AA 2,5), it to things caused. Therefore it seems that the same applies seems that He does not understand all at once, but dis- to God. courses from one to another. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv), “God Objection 2. Further, discursive knowledge is to does not see all things in their particularity or separately, 79 as if He saw alternately here and there; but He sees all thus is to proceed from the known to the unknown. Hence things together at once.” it is manifest that when the first is known, the second is I answer that, In the divine knowledge there is no dis- still unknown; and thus the second is known not in the cursion; the proof of which is as follows. In our knowl- first, but from the first. Now the term discursive reasoning edge there is a twofold discursion: one is according to is attained when the second is seen in the first, by resolv- succession only, as when we have actually understood ing the effects into their causes; and then the discursion anything, we turn ourselves to understand something else; ceases. Hence as God sees His effects in Himself as their while the other mode of discursion is according to causal- cause, His knowledge is not discursive. ity, as when through principles we arrive at the knowl- Reply to Objection 1. Altogether there is only one act edge of conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot of understanding in itself, nevertheless many things may belong to God. For many things, which we understand in be understood in one (medium), as shown above. succession if each is considered in itself, we understand Reply to Objection 2. God does not know by their simultaneously if we see them in some one thing; if, for cause, known, as it were previously, effects unknown; but instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see dif- He knows the effects in the cause; and hence His knowl- ferent things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one edge is not discursive, as was shown above. (thing), which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things Reply to Objection 3. God sees the effects of created together, and not successively. Likewise the second mode causes in the causes themselves, much better than we can; of discursion cannot be applied to God. First, because this but still not in such a manner that the knowledge of the second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode; for effects is caused in Him by the knowledge of the created whosoever proceeds from principles to conclusions does causes, as is the case with us; and hence His knowledge is not consider both at once; secondly, because to discourse not discursive. Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things? Ia q. 14 a. 8 Objection 1. It seems that the knowledge of God is it has an inclination to an effect; and likewise, the intelli- not the cause of things. For Origen says, on Rom. 8:30, gible form does not denote a principle of action in so far “Whom He called, them He also justified,” etc.: “A thing as it resides in the one who understands unless there is will happen not because God knows it as future; but be- added to it the inclination to an effect, which inclination cause it is future, it is on that account known by God, is through the will. For since the intelligible form has a before it exists.” relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowl- Objection 2. Further, given the cause, the effect fol- edge relates to opposites), it would not produce a determi- lows. But the knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if nate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the the knowledge of God is the cause of things created, it appetite, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. ix). Now it is seems that creatures are eternal. manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His Objection 3. Further, “The thing known is prior to being is His act of understanding; and hence His knowl- knowledge, and is its measure,” as the Philosopher says edge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is (Metaph. x). But what is posterior and measured cannot joined to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the cause of be a cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the things is usually called the “knowledge of approbation.” cause of things. Reply to Objection 1. Origen spoke in reference to On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv), “Not that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual does not belong unless the will is joined to it, as is said and temporal, but because He knows them, therefore they above. are.” But when he says the reason why God foreknows I answer that, The knowledge of God is the cause some things is because they are future, this must be un- of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures derstood according to the cause of consequence, and not what the knowledge of the artificer is to things made by according to the cause of essence. For if things are in the his art. Now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause future, it follows that God knows them; but not that the of the things made by his art from the fact that the artifi- futurity of things is the cause why God knows them. cer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect Reply to Objection 2. The knowledge of God is the must be the principle of action; as heat is the principle cause of things according as things are in His knowledge. of heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural Now that things should be eternal was not in the knowl- form, being a form that remains in that to which it gives edge of God; hence although the knowledge of God is existence, denotes a principle of action according only as eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal. 80 Reply to Objection 3. Natural things are midway be-sure, so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, tween the knowledge of God and our knowledge: for we and is the measure of them; as, for instance, a house is receive knowledge from natural things, of which God is midway between the knowledge of the builder who made the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural objects it, and the knowledge of the one who gathers his knowl- of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its mea- edge of the house from the house already built. Whether God has knowledge of things that are not? Ia q. 14 a. 9 Objection 1. It seems that God has not knowledge ation of those things that are not actual. For though some of things that are not. For the knowledge of God is of of them may not be in act now, still they were, or they will true things. But “truth” and “being” are convertible terms. be; and God is said to know all these with the knowledge Therefore the knowledge of God is not of things that are of vision: for since God’s act of understanding, which is not. His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is Objection 2. Further, knowledge requires likeness be- without succession, comprehending all time, the present tween the knower and the thing known. But those things glance of God extends over all time, and to all things that are not cannot have any likeness to God, Who is very which exist in any time, as to objects present to Him. But being. Therefore what is not, cannot be known by God. there are other things in God’s power, or the creature’s, Objection 3. Further, the knowledge of God is the which nevertheless are not, nor will be, nor were; and as cause of what is known by Him. But it is not the cause regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of vision, of things that are not, because a thing that is not, has no but of simple intelligence. This is so called because the cause. Therefore God has no knowledge of things that are things we see around us have distinct being outside the not. seer. On the contrary, The Apostle says: “Who. . . calleth Reply to Objection 1. Those things that are not actual those things that are not as those that are” (Rom. 4:17). are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true I answer that, God knows all things whatsoever that that they are in potentiality; and as such they are known in any way are. Now it is possible that things that are not by God. absolutely, should be in a certain sense. For things ab- Reply to Objection 2. Since God is very being every- solutely are which are actual; whereas things which are thing is, in so far as it participates in the likeness of God; not actual, are in the power either of God Himself or of a as everything is hot in so far as it participates in heat. So, creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in things in potentiality are known by God, although they are power of thought or of imagination, or of any other man- not in act. ner of meaning whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be Reply to Objection 3. The knowledge of God, joined made, or thought, or said by the creature, as also whatever to His will is the cause of things. Hence it is not necessary He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they that what ever God knows, is, or was, or will be; but only are not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has is this necessary as regards what He wills to be, or permits knowledge even of things that are not. to be. Further, it is in the knowledge of God not that they Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consider- be, but that they be possible. Whether God knows evil things? Ia q. 14 a. 10 Objection 1. It seems that God does not know evil Objection 3. Further, everything known is known ei- things. For the Philosopher (De Anima iii) says that the ther by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God intellect which is not in potentiality does not know pri- knows, He knows through His essence, as is clear from vation. But “evil is the privation of good,” as Augustine the foregoing (a. 5). Now the divine essence neither is the says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the intellect of God is likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to the divine never in potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from essence there is no contrary, as Augustine says (De Civ. the foregoing (a. 2 ), it seems that God does not know evil Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things. things. Objection 4. Further, what is known through another Objection 2. Further, all knowledge is either the cause and not through itself, is imperfectly known. But evil of the thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge is not known by God; for the thing known must be in of God is not the cause of evil, nor is it caused by evil. the knower. Therefore if evil is known through another, Therefore God does not know evil things. namely, through good, it would be known by Him imper- 81 fectly; which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not that a point and every indivisible thing are known by pri-imperfect. Therefore God does not know evil things. vation of division. This is because simple and indivisible On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 15:11), “Hell and forms are in our intellect not actually, but only potentially; destruction are before God [Vulg: ‘the Lord’].” for were they actually in our intellect, they would not be I answer that, Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must known by privation. It is thus that simple things are known know all that can be accidental to it. Now there are some by separate substances. God therefore knows evil, not by good things to which corruption by evil may be acciden- privation existing in Himself, but by the opposite good. tal. Hence God would not know good things perfectly, Reply to Objection 2. The knowledge of God is not unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is know- the cause of evil; but is the cause of the good whereby evil able in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the is known. essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact Reply to Objection 3. Although evil is not opposed that God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil; it by light is known darkness. Hence Dionysius says (Div. is opposed to the effects of God, which He knows by His Nom. vii): “God through Himself receives the vision of essence; and knowing them, He knows the opposite evils. darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness except through Reply to Objection 4. To know a thing by something light.” else only, belongs to imperfect knowledge, if that thing Reply to Objection 1. The saying of the Philosopher is of itself knowable; but evil is not of itself knowable, must be understood as meaning that the intellect which forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the privation is not in potentiality, does not know privation by privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined nor known existing in it; and this agrees with what he said previously, except by good. Whether God knows singular things? Ia q. 14 a. 11 Objection 1. It seems that God does not know sin- which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and gular things. For the divine intellect is more immaterial unitedly in God; hence, although by one faculty we know than the human intellect. Now the human intellect by rea- the universal and immaterial, and by another we know sin- son of its immateriality does not know singular things; gular and material things, nevertheless God knows both but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii), “reason has to by His simple intellect. do with universals, sense with singular things.” Therefore Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God does not know singular things. God knows singular things by universal causes. For noth- Objection 2. Further, in us those faculties alone know ing exists in any singular thing, that does not arise from the singular, which receive the species not abstracted from some universal cause. They give the example of an as- material conditions. But in God things are in the high- trologer who knows all the universal movements of the est degree abstracted from all materiality. Therefore God heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to does not know singular things. come. This, however, is not enough; for singular things Objection 3. Further, all knowledge comes about from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers through the medium of some likeness. But the likeness which, however they may be joined together, are not in- of singular things in so far as they are singular, does not dividualized except by individual matter. Hence he who seem to be in God; for the principle of singularity is mat- knows Socrates because he is white, or because he is the ter, which, since it is in potentiality only, is altogether un- son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that kind, like God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know would not know him in so far as he is this particular man. singular things. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 16:2), “All the know ways of a man are open to His eyes.” singular things in their singularity. I answer that, God knows singular things. For all On the other hand, others have said that God knows perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher singular things by the application of universal causes to way, as is clear from the foregoing (q. 4, a. 2). Now to particular effects. But this will not hold; forasmuch as no know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that must know singular things. Even the Philosopher consid- thing; hence the said application cannot be the reason of ers it incongruous that anything known by us should be knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues of singular things. (De Anima i and Metaph. iii) that God would be most ig- Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God norant if He did not know discord. Now the perfections is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above 82 (a. 8), His knowledge extends as far as His causality ex-intellect does not know the singular. But the intelligible tends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of to forms, which are the source of universality, but also God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself, be- to matter, as we shall prove further on (q. 44, a. 2), the ing the principle of all the principles which enter into the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which composition of things, whether principles of the species are individualized by matter. For since He knows things or principles of the individual; hence by it God knows not other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness only universal, but also singular things. of things, or as their active principle, His essence must Reply to Objection 2. Although as regards the be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by species in the divine intellect its being has no material Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. conditions like the images received in the imagination and The same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial and mate- it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the rial things. form. Reply to Objection 3. Although matter as regards its Reply to Objection 1. Our intellect abstracts the intel- potentiality recedes from likeness to God, yet, even in so ligible species from the individualizing principles; hence far as it has being in this wise, it retains a certain likeness the intelligible species in our intellect cannot be the like-to the divine being. ness of the individual principles; and on that account our Whether God can know infinite things? Ia q. 14 a. 12 Objection 1. It seems that God cannot know infinite eternal, nor that generation and movement will go on for things. For the infinite, as such, is unknown; since the ever, so that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we infinite is that which, “to those who measure it, leaves consider more attentively, we must hold that God knows always something more to be measured,” as the Philoso- infinite things even by the knowledge of vision. For God pher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine says (De Civ. knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which Dei xii) that “whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is will be multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on bounded by the comprehension of the knower.” Now in- for ever. finite things have no boundary. Therefore they cannot be The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the comprehended by the knowledge of God. knowledge of every knower is measured by the mode of Objection 2. Further, if we say that things infinite in the form which is the principle of knowledge. For the sen- themselves are finite in God’s knowledge, against this it sible image in sense is the likeness of only one individual may be urged that the essence of the infinite is that it is thing, and can give the knowledge of only one individual. untraversable, and the finite that it is traversable, as said But the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness in Phys. iii. But the infinite is not traversable either by the of the thing as regards its specific nature, which is par-finite or by the infinite, as is proved in Phys. vi. Therefore ticipable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the the infinite cannot be bounded by the finite, nor even by intelligible species of man in a certain way knows infinite the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in God’s men; not however as distinguished from each other, but as knowledge, which is infinite. communicating in the nature of the species; and the rea- Objection 3. Further, the knowledge of God is the son is because the intelligible species of our intellect is measure of what is known. But it is contrary to the the likeness of man not as to the individual principles, but essence of the infinite that it be measured. Therefore infi- as to the principles of the species. On the other hand, the nite things cannot be known by God. divine essence, whereby the divine intellect understands, On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii), is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can be, not “Although we cannot number the infinite, nevertheless it only as regards the universal principles, but also as regards can be comprehended by Him whose knowledge has no the principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence bounds.” it follows that the knowledge of God extends to infinite I answer that, Since God knows not only things ac- things, even as distinct from each other. tual but also things possible to Himself or to created Reply to Objection 1. The idea of the infinite pertains things, as shown above (a. 9), and as these must be in- to quantity, as the Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the finite, it must be held that He knows infinite things. Al- idea of quantity implies the order of parts. Therefore to though the knowledge of vision which has relation only know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite know part after part; and in this way the infinite cannot be things, as some say, for we do not say that the world is known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will 83 always remain something else outside. But God does not Reply to Objection 3. The knowledge of God is the know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated measure of things, not quantitatively, for the infinite is not part after part; since He knows all things simultaneously, subject to this kind of measure; but it is the measure of and not successively, as said above (a. 7). Hence there is the essence and truth of things. For everything has truth nothing to prevent Him from knowing infinite things. of nature according to the degree in which it imitates the Reply to Objection 2. Transition imports a certain knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees with succession of parts; and hence it is that the infinite cannot the art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number of be traversed by the finite, nor by the infinite. But equal- things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude ity suffices for comprehension, because that is said to be in continuous quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of comprehended which has nothing outside the comprehen- the ancients held; yet it is manifest that these would have der. Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be a determinate and finite being, because their being would comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite in be limited to some determinate nature. Hence they would itself can be called finite to the knowledge of God as com- be measurable as regards the knowledge of God. prehended; but not as if it were traversable. Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things? Ia q. 14 a. 13 Objection 1. It seems that the knowledge of God In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent is not of future contingent things. For from a neces- thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so sary cause proceeds a necessary effect. But the knowl- far as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered edge of God is the cause of things known, as said above as future, but as present; neither is it considered as con- (a. 8). Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what tingent (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowl- determined to one; and on account of this it can be infal- edge of God is not of contingent things. libly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to the Objection 2. Further, every conditional proposition sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have In another way a contingent thing can be considered as an absolutely necessary consequent. For the antecedent is it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as fu- to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion: and ture, and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one; from necessary principles only a necessary conclusion can forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite follow, as is proved in Poster. i. But this is a true condi- things: and in this sense a contingent thing is not subject tional proposition, “If God knew that this thing will be, it to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a con- will be,” for the knowledge of God is only of true things. tingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural Now the antecedent conditional of this is absolutely nec- knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things essary, because it is eternal, and because it is signified as not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of past. Therefore the consequent is also absolutely neces- them is actually in itself. And although contingent things sary. Therefore whatever God knows, is necessary; and become actual successively, nevertheless God knows con- so the knowledge of God is not of contingent things. tingent things not successively, as they are in their own Objection 3. Further, everything known by God must being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know, His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His be- must necessarily be; and, of course, the knowledge of God ing; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises is much more certain than ours. But no future contingent all time, as said above (q. 10, a. 2 ). Hence all things that things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent fu- are in time are present to God from eternity, not only be- ture thing is known by God. cause He has the types of things present within Him, as On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 32:15), “He Who some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity hath made the hearts of every one of them; Who under- over all things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it standeth all their works,” i.e. of men. Now the works of is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by men are contingent, being subject to free will. Therefore God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in God knows future contingent things. their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in I answer that, Since as was shown above (a. 9), God relation to their own causes. knows all things; not only things actual but also things Reply to Objection 1. Although the supreme cause is possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the future contingent to us, it follows that God knows future proximate contingent cause; just as the germination of a contingent things. plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent 84 cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first i. cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are Reply to Objection 3. Things reduced to act in time, contingent on account of their proximate causes, while the as known by us successively in time, but by God (are knowledge of God, which is the first cause, is necessary. known) in eternity, which is above time. Whence to us Reply to Objection 2. Some say that this antecedent, they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future con- “God knew this contingent to be future,” is not neces- tingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God alone, sary, but contingent; because, although it is past, still it whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he imports relation to the future. This however does not re- who goes along the road, does not see those who come move necessity from it; for whatever has had relation to after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a the future, must have had it, although the future some- height, sees at once all travelling by the way. Hence what times does not follow. On the other hand some say that is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself; this antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known of necessary and contingent; as this saying is contingent, by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary “Socrates is a white man.” But this also is to no purpose; according to the mode in which they are subject to the di- for when we say, “God knew this contingent to be future,” vine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as contingent is used here only as the matter of the word, considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposi- and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence its tion, “Everything known by God must necessarily be,” is contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or the saying. If it refers to the thing, it is divided and false; false. For it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, for the sense is, “Everything which God knows is neces- as that I said Socrates runs, or God is: and the same ap- sary.” If understood of the saying, it is composite and true; plies to necessary and contingent. Hence it must be said for the sense is, “This proposition, ‘that which is known that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nor does it by God is’ is necessary.” follow, as some say, that the consequent is absolutely nec- Now some urge an objection and say that this distinc- essary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the tion holds good with regard to forms that are separable consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proxi- from the subject; thus if I said, “It is possible for a white mate cause. But this is to no purpose. For the conditional thing to be black,” it is false as applied to the saying, and would be false were its antecedent the remote necessary true as applied to the thing: for a thing which is white, cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for ex- can become black; whereas this saying, ” a white thing ample, if I said, “if the sun moves, the grass will grow.” is black” can never be true. But in forms that are insepa- Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the an- rable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for tecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul, instance, if I said, “A black crow can be white”; for in the consequent must be taken not as it is in itself, but as both senses it is false. Now to be known by God is insep- it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is arable from the thing; for what is known by God cannot different from the existence of a thing in the soul. For be known. This objection, however, would hold if these example, when I say, “What the soul understands is im- words “that which is known” implied any disposition in- material,” this is to be understood that it is immaterial as herent to the subject; but since they import an act of the it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, “If God knew anything, it will be,” the consequent must in itself (even if it always be known), which is not at- be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. tributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; as it is in its presentiality. And thus it is necessary, as also thus material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, is the antecedent: “For everything that is, while it is, must which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known. be necessarily be,” as the Philosopher says in Peri Herm. Whether God knows enunciable things? Ia q. 14 a. 14 Objection 1. It seems that God does not know enun- ness of enunciable things, since He is altogether simple. ciable things. For to know enunciable things belongs to Therefore God does not know enunciable things. our intellect as it composes and divides. But in the divine On the contrary, It is written: “The Lord knoweth the intellect, there is no composition. Therefore God does not thoughts of men” (Ps. 93:11). But enunciable things are know enunciable things. contained in the thoughts of men. Therefore God knows Objection 2. Further, every kind of knowledge is enunciable things. made through some likeness. But in God there is no like- I answer that, Since it is in the power of our intellect 85 to form enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in is, we do not forthwith understand other things which beHis own power or in that of creatures, as said above (a. 9), long to him, but we understand them one by one, accord- it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations ing to a certain succession. On this account the things we that can be formed. understand as separated, we must reduce to one by way of Now just as He knows material things immaterially, composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enun- the species of the divine intellect, which is God’s essence, ciable things not after the manner of enunciable things, suffices to represent all things. Hence by understanding as if in His intellect there were composition or division His essence, God knows the essences of all things, and of enunciations; for He knows each thing by simple in- also whatever can be accidental to them. telligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; Reply to Objection 1. This objection would avail if as if we by the very fact that we understand what man God knew enunciable things after the manner of enuncia- is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man. ble things. This, however, does not happen in our intellect, which dis- Reply to Objection 2. Enunciatory composition sig- courses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intel- nifies some existence of a thing; and thus God by His ex- ligible species represents one thing in such a way as not to istence, which is His essence, is the similitude of all those represent another. Hence when we understand what man things which are signified by enunciation. Whether the knowledge of God is variable? Ia q. 14 a. 15 Objection 1. It seems that the knowledge of God is But “knowledge” and “love,” and the like, import rela- variable. For knowledge is related to what is knowable. tions consequent upon the acts which are understood to But whatever imports relation to the creature is applied be in God; and therefore these are predicated of God in an to God from time, and varies according to the variation invariable manner. of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of God is variable Reply to Objection 2. God knows also what He can according to the variation of creatures. make, and does not make. Hence from the fact that He Objection 2. Further, whatever God can make, He can can make more than He makes, it does not follow that He know. But God can make more than He does. Therefore can know more than He knows, unless this be referred to He can know more than He knows. Thus His knowledge the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said can vary according to increase and diminution. to know those things which are in act in some period of Objection 3. Further, God knew that Christ would be time. But from the fact that He knows some things might born. But He does not know now that Christ will be born; be which are not, or that some things might not be which because Christ is not to be born in the future. Therefore are, it does not follow that His knowledge is variable, but God does not know everything He once knew; and thus rather that He knows the variability of things. If, however, the knowledge of God is variable. anything existed which God did not previously know, and On the contrary, It is said, that in God “there is no afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. change nor shadow of alteration” (James 1:17). But this could not be; for whatever is, or can be in any pe- I answer that, Since the knowledge of God is His sub- riod of time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore stance, as is clear from the foregoing (a. 4), just as His from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time, substance is altogether immutable, as shown above (q. 9, it follows that it is known by God from eternity. There- a. 1), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether in- fore it cannot be granted that God can know more than He variable. knows; because such a proposition implies that first of all Reply to Objection 1. “Lord”, “Creator” and the like, He did not know, and then afterwards knew. import relations to creatures in so far as they are in them- Reply to Objection 3. The ancient Nominalists said selves. But the knowledge of God imports relation to crea- that it was the same thing to say “Christ is born” and “will tures in so far as they are in God; because everything is be born” and “was born”; because the same thing is sig- actually understood according as it is in the one who un- nified by these three—viz. the nativity of Christ. There- derstands. Now created things are in God in an invari- fore it follows, they said, that whatever God knew, He able manner; while they exist variably in themselves. We knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which may also say that “Lord”, “Creator” and the like, import means the same thing as that Christ will be born. This the relations consequent upon the acts which are under- opinion, however, is false; both because the diversity in stood as terminating in the creatures themselves, as they the parts of a sentence causes a diversity of enunciations; are in themselves; and thus these relations are attributed and because it would follow that a proposition which is to God variously, according to the variation of creatures. true once would be always true; which is contrary to what 86 the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he says false. The knowledge of God, however, would be vari-that this sentence, “Socrates sits,” is true when he is sit- able if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation, ting, and false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be by composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. conceded that this proposition is not true, “Whatever God Hence our knowledge varies either as regards truth and knew He knows,” if referred to enunciable propositions. falsity, for example, if when either as regards truth and But because of this, it does not follow that the knowledge falsity, for example, if when a thing suffers change we of God is variable. For as it is without variation in the di- retained the same opinion about it; or as regards diverse vine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was sitting, sometime to be, and sometime not to be, so it is with- and afterwards thought that he was not sitting; neither of out variation in the divine knowledge that God knows an which can be in God. enunciable proposition is sometime true, and sometime Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things? Ia q. 14 a. 16 Objection 1. It seems that God has not a speculative end is partly speculative and partly practical: and when it knowledge of things. For the knowledge of God is the is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical. cause of things, as shown above (a. 8). But speculative In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that knowledge is not the cause of the things known. There- God has of Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He fore the knowledge of God is not speculative. Himself is not operable. But of all other things He has Objection 2. Further, speculative knowledge comes both speculative and practical knowledge. He has specu- by abstraction from things; which does not belong to the lative knowledge as regards the mode; for whatever we divine knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of God is not know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, speculative. God knows all this much more perfectly. On the contrary, Whatever is the more excellent must Now of things which He can make, but does not make be attributed to God. But speculative knowledge is more at any time, He has not a practical knowledge, according excellent than practical knowledge, as the Philosopher as knowledge is called practical from the end. But He says in the beginning of Metaphysics. Therefore God has has a practical knowledge of what He makes in some pe- a speculative knowledge of things. riod of time. And, as regards evil things, although they I answer that, Some knowledge is speculative only; are not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practi- some is practical only; and some is partly speculative and cal knowledge, like good things, inasmuch as He permits, partly practical. In proof whereof it must be observed that or impedes, or directs them; as also sicknesses fall under knowledge can be called speculative in three ways: first, the practical knowledge of the physician, inasmuch as he on the part of the things known, which are not operable cures them by his art. by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about nat- Reply to Objection 1. The knowledge of God is the ural or divine thing. Secondly, as regards the manner of cause, not indeed of Himself, but of other things. He is knowing—as, for instance, if a builder consider a house actually the cause of some, that is, of things that come to by defining and dividing, and considering what belongs be in some period of time; and He is virtually the cause of to it in general: for this is to consider operable things in others, that is, of things which He can make, and which a speculative manner, and not as practically operable; for nevertheless are never made. operable means the application of form to matter, and not Reply to Objection 2. The fact that knowledge is de- the resolution of the composite into its universal formal rived from things known does not essentially belong to principles. Thirdly, as regards the end; “for the practi- speculative knowledge, but only accidentally in so far as cal intellect differs in its end from the speculative,” as the it is human. Philosopher says (De Anima iii). For the practical intel- In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must lect is ordered to the end of the operation; whereas the end say that perfect knowledge of operable things is obtain- of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. able only if they are known in so far as they are operable. Hence if a builder should consider how a house can be Therefore, since the knowledge of God is in every way made, not ordering this to the end of operation, but only perfect, He must know what is operable by Him, formally to know (how to do it), this would be only a speculative as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative. considerations as regards the end, although it concerns an Nevertheless this does not impair the nobility of His spec- operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is speculative ulative knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other by reason of the thing itself known, is merely speculative. than Himself in Himself, and He knows Himself specula- But that which is speculative either in its mode or as to its tively; and so in the speculative knowledge of Himself, he 87 possesses both speculative and practical knowledge of all other things. 88 FIRST PART, QUESTION 15 Of Ideas (In Three Articles) After considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas. And about this there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are ideas? (2) Whether they are many, or one only? (3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God? Whether there are ideas? Ia q. 15 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that there are no ideas. For likeness of the form is in the agent, as may happen in two Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), that God does not know ways. For in some agents the form of the thing to be made things by ideas. But ideas are for nothing else except that pre-exists according to its natural being, as in those that things may be known through them. Therefore there are act by their nature; as a man generates a man, or fire gen- no ideas. erates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing Objection 2. Further, God knows all things in Him- to be made pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as self, as has been already said (q. 14, a. 5). But He does in those that act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other house pre-exists in the mind of the builder. And this may things. be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends Objection 3. Further, an idea is considered to be to build his house like to the form conceived in his mind. the principle of knowledge and action. But the divine As then the world was not made by chance, but by God essence is a sufficient principle of knowing and effecting acting by His intellect, as will appear later (q. 46, a. 1), all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas. there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. of which the world was made. And in this the notion of qu. xlvi),“Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one an idea consists. can be wise unless they are understood.” Reply to Objection 1. God does not understand I answer that, It is necessary to suppose ideas in the things according to an idea existing outside Himself. Thus divine mind. For the Greek word Idea is in Latin “forma.” Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the opinion of Plato, who Hence by ideas are understood the forms of things, ex- held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in the intel- isting apart from the things themselves. Now the form lect. of anything existing apart from the thing itself can be for Reply to Objection 2. Although God knows Himself one of two ends: either to be the type of that of which it is and all else by His own essence, yet His essence is the called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge of operative principle of all things, except of Himself. It has that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other things; said to be in him who knows them. In either case we must though not with respect to Himself. suppose ideas, as is clear for the following reason: Reply to Objection 3. God is the similitude of all In all things not generated by chance, the form must things according to His essence; therefore an idea in God be the end of any generation whatsoever. But an agent is identical with His essence. does not act on account of the form, except in so far as the Whether ideas are many? Ia q. 15 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that ideas are not many. For an Objection 3. Further, if it be said that ideas are multi-idea in God is His essence. But God’s essence is one only. plied according to their relations to different creatures, it Therefore there is only one idea. may be argued on the contrary that the plurality of ideas Objection 2. Further, as the idea is the principle of is eternal. If, then, ideas are many, but creatures temporal, knowing and operating, so are art and wisdom. But in then the temporal must be the cause of the eternal. God there are not several arts or wisdoms. Therefore in Objection 4. Further, these relations are either real in Him there is no plurality of ideas. creatures only, or in God also. If in creatures only, since 89 creatures are not from eternity, the plurality of ideas can-by him, to the likeness of which he forms the house in not be from eternity, if ideas are multiplied only according matter. Now, it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the di- to these relations. But if they are real in God, it follows vine mind that it understand many things; though it would that there is a real plurality in God other than the plurality be repugnant to its simplicity were His understanding to of Persons: and this is against the teaching of Damascene be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas ex- (De Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one, ist in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can except “ingenerability, generation, and procession.” Ideas be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence therefore are not many. perfectly, He knows it according to every mode in which it On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in it- qu. xlvi), “Ideas are certain principal forms, or permanent self, but as it can be participated in by creatures according and immutable types of things, they themselves not be- to some degree of likeness. But every creature has its own ing formed. Thus they are eternal, and existing always in proper species, according to which it participates in some the same manner, as being contained in the divine intel- degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, ligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come as God knows His essence as capable of such imitation by into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with any creature, He knows it as the particular type and idea them everything is formed that can rise or decay, and all of that creature; and in like manner as regards other crea- that actually does so.” tures. So it is clear that God understands many particular I answer that, It must necessarily be held that ideas types of things and these are many ideas. are many. In proof of which it is to be considered that Reply to Objection 1. The divine essence is not called in every effect the ultimate end is the proper intention of an idea in so far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it the principal agent, as the order of an army (is the proper is the likeness or type of this or that thing. Hence ideas are intention) of the general. Now the highest good existing said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the through the self-same essence. Philosopher clearly teaches in Metaph. xii. Therefore the Reply to Objection 2. By wisdom and art we sig- order of the universe is properly intended by God, and is nify that by which God understands; but an idea, that not the accidental result of a succession of agents, as has which God understands. For God by one understands been supposed by those who have taught that God created many things, and that not only according to what they are only the first creature, and that this creature created the in themselves, but also according as they are understood, second creature, and so on, until this great multitude of be- and this is to understand the several types of things. In ings was produced. According to this opinion God would the same way, an architect is said to understand a house, have the idea of the first created thing alone; whereas, if when he understands the form of the house in matter. the order itself of the universe was created by Him imme- But if he understands the form of a house, as devised by diately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of himself, from the fact that he understands that he under- the order of the universe. Now there cannot be an idea of stands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of the any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts house. Now not only does God understand many things of which the whole is made; just as a builder cannot con- by His essence, but He also understands that He under- ceive the idea of a house unless he has the idea of each of stands many things by His essence. And this means that its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in the divine mind He understands the several types of things; or that many there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence Augustine ideas are in His intellect as understood by Him. says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), “that each thing was Reply to Objection 3. Such relations, whereby ideas created by God according to the idea proper to it,” from are multiplied, are caused not by the things themselves, which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. but by the divine intellect comparing its own essence with Now it can easily be seen how this is not repugnant to the these things. simplicity of God, if we consider that the idea of a work Reply to Objection 4. Relations multiplying ideas do is in the mind of the operator as that which is understood, not exist in created things, but in God. Yet they are not and not as the image whereby he understands, which is a real relations, such as those whereby the Persons are dis- form that makes the intellect in act. For the form of the tinguished, but relations understood by God. house in the mind of the builder, is something understood 90 Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows? Ia q. 15 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that there are not ideas in God speculative manner. of all things that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in Reply to Objection 1. Evil is known by God not God; since it would follow that evil was in Him. But evil through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil, things are known by God. Therefore there are not ideas of therefore, has no idea in God, neither in so far as an idea all things that God knows. is an “exemplar” nor as a “type.” Objection 2. Further, God knows things that neither Reply to Objection 2. God has no practical knowl- are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above edge, except virtually, of things which neither are, nor will (a. 9). But of such things there are no ideas, since, as be, nor have been. Hence, with respect to these there is no Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): “Acts of the divine will are idea in God in so far as idea signifies an “exemplar” but the determining and effective types of things.” Therefore only in so far as it denotes a “type.” there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him. Reply to Objection 3. Plato is said by some to have Objection 3. Further, God knows primary matter, of considered matter as not created; and therefore he postu- which there can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence lated not an idea of matter but a concause with matter. the same conclusion. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by God, Objection 4. Further, it is certain that God knows though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; not only species, but also genera, singulars, and accidents. but not apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in But there are not ideas of these, according to Plato’s teach- itself can neither exist, nor be known. ing, who first taught ideas, as Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Reply to Objection 4. Genus can have no idea apart Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore there are not ideas in God of from the idea of species, in so far as idea denotes an “ex- all things known by Him. emplar”; for genus cannot exist except in some species. On the contrary, Ideas are types existing in the divine The same is the case with those accidents that insepara- mind, as is clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. bly accompany their subject; for these come into being xlvi). But God has the proper types of all things that He along with their subject. But accidents which supervene knows; and therefore He has ideas of all things known by to the subject, have their special idea. For an architect Him. produces through the form of the house all the accidents I answer that, As ideas, according to Plato, are prin- that originally accompany it; whereas those that are su- ciples of the knowledge of things and of their generation, peradded to the house when completed, such as painting, an idea has this twofold office, as it exists in the mind or any other such thing, are produced through some other of God. So far as the idea is the principle of the mak- form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no ing of things, it may be called an “exemplar,” and belongs other idea than that of species; both because particular to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, knowledge, it is properly called a “type,” and may belong he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea; to speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, and because the intention of nature regards the species, it has respect to everything made by God in any period of and produces individuals only that in them the species time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it has respect may be preserved. However, divine providence extends to all things known by God, even though they never come not merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown to be in time; and to all things that He knows according to later (q. 22, a. 3 ). their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in a 91 FIRST PART, QUESTION 16 Of Truth (In Eight Articles) Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. About this there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect? (2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing? (3) On the comparison of the true to being. (4) On the comparison of the true to the good. (5) Whether God is truth? (6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many? (7) On the eternity of truth. (8) On the unchangeableness of truth. Whether truth resides only in the intellect? Ia q. 16 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that truth does not reside only the term of the intellect, namely true, is in the intellect it- in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (So- self. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is liloq. ii, 5) condemns this definition of truth, “That is true related to the appetite—and hence the aspect of goodness which is seen”; since it would follow that stones hidden passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since are not seen. He also condemns the following, “That is the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing object understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass and able to know,” for hence it would follow that nothing from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the would be true, unless someone could know it. Therefore thing understood is said to be true in so far as it has some he defines truth thus: “That is true which is.” It seems, relation to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be then, that truth resides in things, and not in the intellect. in relation to an intellect either essentially or accidentally. Objection 2. Further, whatever is true, is true by rea- It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends son of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing as regards its essence; but accidentally to an intellect by will be true except in so far as it is understood. But this is which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is the error of the ancient philosophers, who said that what- related essentially to the intellect of the architect, but ac- ever seems to be true is so. Consequently mutual contra- cidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend. dictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it ac- the same time. cidentally, but by what is in it essentially. Hence, every- Objection 3. Further, “that, on account of which thing is said to be true absolutely, in so far as it is related a thing is so, is itself more so,” as is evident from the to the intellect from which it depends; and thus it is that Philosopher (Poster. i). But it is from the fact that a thing artificial things are said to be true a being related to our is or is not, that our thought or word is true or false, as intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore truth likeness of the form in the architect’s mind; and words are resides rather in things than in the intellect. said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be ” The true and the false reside not in things, but in the true in so far as they express the likeness of the species intellect.” that are in the divine mind. For a stone is called true, I answer that, As the good denotes that towards which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that to- to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus, then, wards which the intellect tends. Now there is this differ- truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in ence between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowl- things according as they are related to the intellect as their edge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing principle. Consequently there are various definitions of known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the truth. Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), “Truth is desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of that whereby is made manifest that which is;” and Hilary the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and says (De Trin. v) that “Truth makes being clear and ev- 92 ident” and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect, but were produced by chance. But as they saw intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they are re- that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled lated to the intellect, we have Augustine’s definition (De to base the truth of things on their relation to our intel- Vera Relig. xxxvi), “Truth is a supreme likeness with- lect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, out any unlikeness to a principle”: also Anselm’s defini- and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such, tion (De Verit. xii), “Truth is rightness, perceptible by the however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things mind alone”; for that is right which is in accordance with consists in their relation to the divine intellect. the principle; also Avicenna’s definition (Metaph. viii, 6), Reply to Objection 3. Although the truth of our in- “The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which tellect is caused by the thing, yet it is not necessary that is immutably attached to it.” The definition that “Truth is truth should be there primarily, any more than that health the equation of thought and thing” is applicable to it under should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the animal: either aspect. for the virtue of medicine, and not its health, is the cause Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking about of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same the truth of things, and excludes from the notion of this way, the being of the thing, not its truth, is the cause of truth, relation to our intellect; for what is accidental is ex- truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a cluded from every definition. thought or a word is true “from the fact that a thing is, not Reply to Objection 2. The ancient philosophers held because a thing is true.” that the species of natural things did not proceed from any Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing? Ia q. 16 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that truth does not reside only mity is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. in the intellect composing and dividing. For the Philoso- For although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet pher says (De Anima iii) that as the senses are always true it does not know the comparison which exists between the as regards their proper sensible objects, so is the intellect thing seen and that which itself apprehends concerning it. as regards “what a thing is.” Now composition and divi- But the intellect can know its own conformity with the in- sion are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing telligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of “what a thing is.” Therefore truth does not reside only in a thing “what a thing is.” When, however, it judges that a the intellect composing and dividing. thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about Objection 2. Further, Isaac says in his book On Def- that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth. This it initions that truth is the equation of thought and thing. does by composing and dividing: for in every proposition Now just as the intellect with regard to complex things it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified can be equated to things, so also with regard to simple by the subject, some form signified by the predicate: and things; and this is true also of sense apprehending a thing this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing, as is as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect also the intellect, when it knows “what a thing is”; but it composing and dividing. does not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like man- On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) ner the case with complex or non-complex words. Truth that with regard to simple things and “what a thing is,” therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing truth is “found neither in the intellect nor in things.” “what a thing is,” as in anything that is true; yet not as I answer that, As stated before, truth resides, in its the thing known in the knower, which is implied by the primary aspect, in the intellect. Now since everything is word “truth”; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as true according as it has the form proper to its nature, the known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true, so far as intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; it has the likeness of the thing known, this being its form, nor in the intellect knowing “what a thing is.” as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the confor- And thus the Objections given are solved. mity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this confor- Whether the true and being are convertible terms? Ia q. 16 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that the true and being are not Objection 2. Further, that which extends to being and convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the in- not-being is not convertible with being. But the true ex- tellect, as stated (a. 1); but being is properly in things. tends to being and not-being; for it is true that what is, is; Therefore they are not convertible. and that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being 93 are not convertible. in the intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily Objection 3. Further, things which stand to each other in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be con- idea. vertible. But the true appears to be prior to being; for be- Reply to Objection 2. Not-being has nothing in itself ing is not understood except under the aspect of the true. whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the Therefore it seems they are not convertible. intellect renders it knowable. Hence the true is based on On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, that there is the same disposition of things in being and in apprehended, that is, by reason. truth. Reply to Objection 3. When it is said that being can- I answer that, As good has the nature of what is de- not be apprehended except under the notion of the true, sirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, this can be understood in two ways. In the one way so as in as far as it has being, so far is it knowable. Wherefore to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of it is said in De Anima iii that “the soul is in some man- the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In ner all things,” through the senses and the intellect. And the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be appre- therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. hended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended un- true adds relation to the intellect. less the idea of being be apprehended also; since being Reply to Objection 1. The true resides in things and is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same in the intellect, as said before (a. 1). But the true that is if we compare the intelligible object with being. For be- in things is convertible with being as to substance; while ing cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet the true that is in the intellect is convertible with being, being can be understood while its intelligibility is not un- as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs derstood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet to the nature of truth, as has been said already (a. 1). It the true is not understood by understanding being. may, however, be said that being also is in the things and Whether good is logically prior to the true? Ia q. 16 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that good is logically prior to being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Sec- the true. For what is more universal is logically prior, as ondly, it is evident from the fact that knowledge naturally is evident from Phys. i. But the good is more universal precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards knowl- than the true, since the true is a kind of good, namely, of edge, but the good regards the appetite, the true must be the intellect. Therefore the good is logically prior to the prior in idea to the good. true. Reply to Objection 1. The will and the intellect mu- Objection 2. Further, good is in things, but the true in tually include one another: for the intellect understands the intellect composing and dividing as said above (a. 2). the will, and the will wills the intellect to understand. So But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the then, among things directed to the object of the will, are intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true. comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and con- Objection 3. Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is versely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good clear from Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good; stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; since, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a whereas in the order of intelligible things the converse good quality of the mind. Therefore the good is prior to of the case. From the fact, then, that the true is a kind the true. of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of On the contrary, What is in more things is prior log- things desirable; but not that it is prior absolutely. ically. But the true is in some things wherein good is Reply to Objection 2. A thing is prior logically in not, as, for instance, in mathematics. Therefore the true so far as it is prior to the intellect. Now the intellect ap- is prior to good. prehends primarily being itself; secondly, it apprehends I answer that, Although the good and the true are that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first, that of logically. And in this manner the true, speaking abso- truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in lutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, things. because the true is more closely related to being than is Reply to Objection 3. The virtue which is called good. For the true regards being itself simply and imme- “truth” is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth diately; while the nature of good follows being in so far as according to which man shows himself in deed and word 94 as he really is. But truth as applied to “life” is used in a the truth of “justice” is found in man as he fulfills his duty particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in his life that to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot ar- to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has gue from these particular truths to truth in general. been said that truth exists in other things (a. 1). Whereas Whether God is truth? Ia q. 16 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that God is not truth. For truth and first truth. consists in the intellect composing and dividing. But in Reply to Objection 1. Although in the divine intellect God there is not composition and division. Therefore in there is neither composition nor division, yet in His sim- Him there is not truth. ple act of intelligence He judges of all things and knows Objection 2. Further, truth, according to Augustine all things complex; and thus there is truth in His intellect. (De Vera Relig. xxxvi) is a “likeness to the principle.” Reply to Objection 2. The truth of our intellect is ac- But in God there is no likeness to a principle. Therefore cording to its conformity with its principle, that is to say, in God there is not truth. to the things from which it receives knowledge. The truth Objection 3. Further, whatever is said of God, is said also of things is according to their conformity with their of Him as of the first cause of all things; thus the being of principle, namely, the divine intellect. Now this cannot God is the cause of all being; and His goodness the cause be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps of all good. If therefore there is truth in God, all truth will in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, Who has a be from Him. But it is true that someone sins. Therefore principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, this will be from God; which is evidently false. we cannot understand this unless the affirmative must be On the contrary, Our Lord says, “I am the Way, the resolved into the negative, as when one says: “the Father Truth, and the Life” (Jn. 14:6). is of Himself, because He is not from another.” Similarly, I answer that, As said above (a. 1), truth is found in the divine truth can be called a “likeness to the principle,” the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and inasmuch as His existence is not dissimilar to His intel- in things according as they have being conformable to an lect. intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For Reply to Objection 3. Not-being and privation have His being is not only conformed to His intellect, but it is no truth of themselves, but only in the apprehension of the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding the intellect. Now all apprehension of the intellect is from is the measure and cause of every other being and of ev- God. Hence all the truth that exists in the statement— ery other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence “that a person commits fornication is true”—is entirely and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that from God. But to argue, “Therefore that this person for- truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and the sovereign nicates is from God”, is a fallacy of Accident. Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true? Ia q. 16 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that there is only one truth, ac- are true, is one, and in another sense it is not. In proof cording to which all things are true. For according to Au- of which we must consider that when anything is pred- gustine (De Trin. xv, 1), “nothing is greater than the mind icated of many things univocally, it is found in each of of man, except God.” Now truth is greater than the mind them according to its proper nature; as animal is found of man; otherwise the mind would be the judge of truth: in each species of animal. But when anything is predi- whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and cated of many things analogically, it is found in only one not according to its own measure. Therefore God alone is of them according to its proper nature, and from this one truth. Therefore there is no other truth but God. the rest are denominated. So healthiness is predicated of Objection 2. Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only that, “as is the relation of time to temporal things, so is in the animal; but from the health of the animal, medicine that of truth to true things.” But there is only one time for is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and all temporal things. Therefore there is only one truth, by urine is called healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And which all things are true. although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet On the contrary, it is written (Ps. 11:2), “Truths are in either there is something whereby the one causes, and decayed from among the children of men.” the other indicates health. Now we have said (a. 1) that I answer that, In one sense truth, whereby all things truth resides primarily in the intellect; and secondarily in 95 things, according as they are related to the divine intel-Reply to Objection 1. The soul does not judge of lect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it exists in the in- things according to any kind of truth, but according to the tellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected in the soul, as truths in many created intellects; and even in one and the in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the under- same intellect, according to the number of things known. standing. It follows, therefore, that the primary truth is Whence a gloss on Ps. 11:2, “Truths are decayed from greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth, which among the children of men,” says: “As from one man’s resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply, face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror, so many but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even truths are reflected from the one divine truth.” But if we as science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are true by is true that nothing subsisting is greater than the rational one primary truth; to which each one is assimilated ac- soul, except God. cording to its own entity. And thus, although the essences Reply to Objection 2. The saying of Anselm is cor- or forms of things are many, yet the truth of the divine in- rect in so far as things are said to be true by their relation tellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to to the divine intellect. be true. Whether created truth is eternal? Ia q. 16 a. 7 Objection 1. It seems that created truth is eternal. For eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) “Nothing is more divine intellect is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor eternal than the nature of a circle, and that two added to does it follow from this that anything else but God is eter- three make five.” But the truth of these is a created truth. nal; since the truth of the divine intellect is God Himself, Therefore created truth is eternal. as shown already (a. 5). Objection 2. Further, that which is always, is eter- Reply to Objection 1. The nature of a circle, and the nal. But universals are always and everywhere; therefore fact that two and three make five, have eternity in the mind they are eternal. So therefore is truth, which is the most of God. universal. Reply to Objection 2. That something is always and Objection 3. Further, it was always true that what is everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way, true in the present was to be in the future. But as the truth as having in itself the power of extension to all time and of a proposition regarding the present is a created truth, to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and so is that of a proposition regarding the future. Therefore always. In the other way as not having in itself determi- some created truth is eternal. nation to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be Objection 4. Further, all that is without beginning and one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all end is eternal. But the truth of enunciables is without be- distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said ginning and end; for if their truth had a beginning, since to be everywhere and always, in so far as universals are it was not before, it was true that truth was not, and true, independent of place and time. It does not, however, fol- of course, by reason of truth; so that truth was before it low from this that they are eternal, except in an intellect, began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an if one exists that is eternal. end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to be, for it will Reply to Objection 3. That which now is, was future, still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is eternal. before it (actually) was; because it was in its cause that it On the contrary, God alone is eternal, as laid down would be. Hence, if the cause were removed, that thing’s before (q. 10, a. 3). coming to be was not future. But the first cause is alone I answer that, The truth of enunciations is no other eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was always true than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides that what now is would be, except in so far as its future in the intellect, and in speech. Now according as it is in being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such the intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in a cause. speech, it is called enunciable truth, according as it signi- Reply to Objection 4. Because our intellect is not fies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth eternal, neither is the truth of enunciable propositions residing in the enunciation, as though in a subject. Thus which are formed by us, eternal, but it had a beginning urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not true from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the manner it has been already said that things are called true divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is from the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were true now to say that that truth did not then exist: and this 96 is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our in-truth of itself, but only so far as our intellect apprehends tellect; and not by reason of any truth in the things. For it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not exist, in so far this is truth concerning not-being; and not-being has not as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its being. Whether truth is immutable? Ia q. 16 a. 8 Objection 1. It seems that truth is immutable. For Au- lect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and gustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that “Truth and mind the knowledge of which nothing can escape, in this is im- do not rank as equals, otherwise truth would be mutable, mutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear as the mind is.” from what has been said before (q. 14, a. 15). Hence the Objection 2. Further, what remains after every change truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of is immutable; as primary matter is unbegotten and incor- our intellect is mutable; not because it is itself the subject ruptible, since it remains after all generation and corrup- of change, but in so far as our intellect changes from truth tion. But truth remains after all change; for after every to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable. Whereas change it is true to say that a thing is, or is not. Therefore the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which truth is immutable. natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether Objection 3. Further, if the truth of an enunciation immutable. changes, it changes mostly with the changing of the thing. Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of di- But it does not thus change. For truth, according to vine truth. Anselm (De Verit. viii), “is a certain rightness” in so far Reply to Objection 2. The true and being are con- as a thing answers to that which is in the divine mind con- vertible terms. Hence just as being is not generated nor cerning it. But this proposition that “Socrates sits”, re- corrupted of itself, but accidentally, in so far as this be- ceives from the divine mind the signification that Socrates ing or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in Phys. i, does sit; and it has the same signification even though he so does truth change, not so as that no truth remains, but does not sit. Therefore the truth of the proposition in no because that truth does not remain which was before. way changes. Reply to Objection 3. A proposition not only has Objection 4. Further, where there is the same cause, truth, as other things are said to have it, in so far, that there is the same effect. But the same thing is the cause of is, as they correspond to that which is the design of the the truth of the three propositions, “Socrates sits, will sit, divine intellect concerning them; but it said to have truth sat.” Therefore the truth of each is the same. But one or in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth of the other of these must be the true one. Therefore the truth of intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect these propositions remains immutable; and for the same with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion reason that of any other. changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 11:2),“Truths are therefore this proposition, “Socrates sits,” is true, as long decayed from among the children of men.” as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so far I answer that, Truth, properly speaking, resides only as the expression is significative, and with the truth of sig- in the intellect, as said before (a. 1); but things are called nification, in so far as it signifies a true opinion. When true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence Socrates rises, the first truth remains, but the second is the mutability of truth must be regarded from the point changed. of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its Reply to Objection 4. The sitting of Socrates, which conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity is the cause of the truth of the proposition, “Socrates sits,” may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through has not the same meaning when Socrates sits, after he change in one of the two extremes. Hence in one way sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth which results, truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that varies, and is variously signified by these propositions a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not fol- has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is low, though one of the three propositions is true, that the changed, but not the opinion; and in either way there can same truth remains invariable. be a change from true to false. If, then, there is an intel- 97 FIRST PART, QUESTION 17 Concerning Falsity (In Four Articles) We next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise: (1) Whether falsity exists in things? (2) Whether it exists in the sense? (3) Whether it exists in the intellect? (4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false. Whether falsity exists in things? Ia q. 17 a. 1 Objection 1. It appears that falsity does not exist in withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein things. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), “If the true consists the evil of sin. Thus sins themselves are called is that which is, it will be concluded that the false exists untruths and lies in the Scriptures, according to the words nowhere; whatever reason may appear to the contrary.” of the text, “Why do you love vanity, and seek after ly- Objection 2. Further, false is derived from “fallere” ing?” (Ps. 4:3): as on the other hand virtuous deeds are [to deceive]. But things do not deceive; for, as Augustine called the “truth of life” as being obedient to the order of says (De Vera Relig. 33), they show nothing but their own the divine intellect. Thus it is said, “He that doth truth, species. Therefore the false is not found in things. cometh to the light” (Jn. 3:21). Objection 3. Further, the true is said to exist in things But in relation to our intellect, natural things which by conformity to the divine intellect, as stated above are compared thereto accidentally, can be called false; not (q. 16). But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God. simply, but relatively; and that in two ways. In one way Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity; according to the thing signified, and thus a thing is said and thus nothing is false. to be false as being signified or represented by word or On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 34): thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to “Every body is a true body and a false unity: for it imi- be false as regards any quality not possessed by it; as if we tates unity without being unity.” But everything imitates should say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, the divine unity yet falls short of it. Therefore in all things as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augus-falsity exists. tine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): “The true tragedian is a false I answer that, Since true and false are opposed, and Hector”: even as, on the contrary, anything can be called since opposites stand in relation to the same thing, we true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In another must needs seek falsity, where primarily we find truth; that way a thing can be called false, by way of cause—and is to say, in the intellect. Now, in things, neither truth nor thus a thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false falsity exists, except in relation to the intellect. And since opinion. And whereas it is innate in us to judge things by every thing is denominated simply by what belongs to it external appearances, since our knowledge takes its rise “per se,” but is denominated relatively by what belongs to from sense, which principally and naturally deals with ex- it accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply ternal accidents, therefore those external accidents, which when compared with the intellect on which it depends, resemble things other than themselves, are said to be false and to which it is compared “per se” but may be called with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and false relatively as directed to another intellect, to which tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine says (Soliloq. it is compared accidentally. Now natural things depend ii, 6): “We call those things false that appear to our appre- on the divine intellect, as artificial things on the human. hension like the true:” and the Philosopher says (Metaph. Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and v, 34): “Things are called false that are naturally apt to in themselves, in so far as they fall short of the form of the appear such as they are not, or what they are not.” In this art; whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if way a man is called false as delighting in false opinions it falls short of the proper operation of his art. or words, and not because he can invent them; for in this In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be way many wise and learned persons might be called false, found, in so far as they are compared with the divine in- as stated in Metaph. v, 34. tellect; since whatever takes place in things proceeds from Reply to Objection 1. A thing compared with the in- the ordinance of that intellect, unless perhaps in the case tellect is said to be true in respect to what it is; and false of voluntary agents only, who have it in their power to in respect to what it is not. Hence, “The true tragedian is 98 a false Hector,” as stated in Soliloq. ii, 6. As, therefore, in would be false simply, but as compared with our intellect; things that are is found a certain non-being, so in things and thus they are false only relatively. that are is found a degree of falseness. To the argument which is urged on the contrary, like- Reply to Objection 2. Things do not deceive by their ness or defective representation does not involve the idea own nature, but by accident. For they give occasion to fal- of falsity except in so far as it gives occasion to false opin- sity, by the likeness they bear to things which they actually ion. Hence a thing is not always said to be false, because are not. it resembles another thing; but only when the resemblance Reply to Objection 3. Things are said to be false, not is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not in any as compared with the divine intellect, in which case they one case, but in the majority of instances. Whether there is falsity in the senses? Ia q. 17 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that falsity is not in the senses. object to be a man. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33): “If all the bod- Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper ily senses report as they are affected, I do not know what objects, except accidentally and rarely, and then, because more we can require from them.” Thus it seems that we of the unsound organ it does not receive the sensible form are not deceived by the senses; and therefore that falsity rightly; just as other passive subjects because of their is not in them. indisposition receive defectively the impressions of the Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on account of iv, 24) that falsity is not proper to the senses, but to the an unhealthy tongue sweet seems bitter to a sick person. imagination. But as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, Objection 3. Further, in non-complex things there is even a rightly disposed sense may have a false judgment, neither true nor false, but in complex things only. But af- because it is referred to them not directly, but accidentally, firmation and negation do not belong to the senses. There- or as a consequence of being directed to other things. fore in the senses there is no falsity. Reply to Objection 1. The affection of sense is its On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6), “It sensation itself. Hence, from the fact that sense reports appears that the senses entrap us into error by their decep- as it is affected, it follows that we are not deceived in the tive similitudes.” judgment by which we judge that we experience sensa- I answer that, Falsity is not to be sought in the senses tion. Since, however, sense is sometimes affected erro-except as truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in neously of that object, it follows that it sometimes reports such a way as that the senses know truth, but in so far as erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived by they apprehend sensible things truly, as said above (q. 16, sense about the object, but not about the fact of sensation. a. 2), and this takes place through the senses apprehending Reply to Objection 2. Falsity is said not to be proper things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists to sense, since sense is not deceived as to its proper ob- in the senses through their apprehending or judging things ject. Hence in another translation it is said more plainly, to be otherwise than they really are. “Sense, about its proper object, is never false.” Falsity is The knowledge of things by the senses is in propor- attributed to the imagination, as it represents the likeness tion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone likeness of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways. In perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were the thing it- the first way, primarily and of its own nature, as in sight self, falsity results from such an apprehension; and for this there is the likeness of colors, and of other sensible ob- reason the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows, jects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not pictures, and dreams are said to be false inasmuch as they primarily; as in sight there is the likeness of shape, size, convey the likeness of things that are not present in sub- and of other sensible objects common to more than one stance. sense. Thirdly, neither primarily nor of its own nature, Reply to Objection 3. This argument proves that the but accidentally, as in sight, there is the likeness of a man, false is not in the sense, as in that which knows the true not as man, but in so far as it is accidental to the colored and the false. 99 Whether falsity is in the intellect? Ia q. 17 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. is, however, this difference, as before mentioned regard- For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), “Everyone who is ing truth (q. 16, a. 2), that falsity can exist in the intellect deceived, understands not that in which he is deceived.” not only because the intellect is conscious of that knowl- But falsity is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as edge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas in sense falsity we are deceived therein. Therefore falsity does not exist does not exist as known, as stated above (a. 2). in the intellect. But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essen- Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (De An- tially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity ima iii, 51) that the intellect is always right. Therefore occurs also accidentally in that operation of the intellect there is no falsity in the intellect. whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as com- On the contrary, It is said in De Anima iii, 21,[22] position of the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take that “where there is composition of objects understood, place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying there is truth and falsehood.” But such composition is in to one thing the definition proper to another; as that of a the intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood exist in the circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is intellect. false of another. In another way, by composing a defini- I answer that, Just as a thing has being by its proper tion of parts which are mutually exclusive. For thus the form, so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the like- definition is not only false of the thing, but false in itself. ness of the thing known. Hence, as natural things can- A definition such as ” a reasonable four-footed animal” not fall short of the being that belongs to them by their would be of this kind, and the intellect false in making form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent qual- it; for such a statement as “some reasonable animals are ities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not four-footed” is false in itself. For this reason the intellect fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences; but it in knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is either true, or it understands nothing at all. is informed; but may fail with regard to something con- Reply to Objection 1. Because the essence of a thing sequent upon that form, or accidental thereto. For it has is the proper object of the intellect, we are properly said to been said (a. 2) that sight is not deceived in its proper sen- understand a thing when we reduce it to its essence, and sible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to judge of it thereby; as takes place in demonstrations, in that object; or about accidental objects of sense. Now as which there is no falsity. In this sense Augustine’s words the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper must be understood, “that he who is deceived, understands object, so is the intellect by the likeness of the essence not that wherein he is deceived;” and not in the sense that of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect. essence of a thing, as neither the sense about its proper Reply to Objection 2. The intellect is always right as object. But in affirming and denying, the intellect may regards first principles; since it is not deceived about them be deceived, by attributing to the thing of which it un- for the same reason that it is not deceived about what a derstands the essence, something which is not consequent thing is. For self-known principles are such as are known upon it, or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in the same as soon as the terms are understood, from the fact that the position as regards judging of such things, as sense is as to predicate is contained in the definition of the subject. judging of common, or accidental, sensible objects. There Whether true and false are contraries? Ia q. 17 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that true and false are not con- Objection 3. Further, in God there is no contrariety, traries. For true and false are opposed, as that which is to for “nothing is contrary to the Divine Substance,” as Au- that which is not; for “truth,” as Augustine says (Soliloq. gustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 2). But falsity is opposed ii, 5), “is that which is.” But that which is and that which to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a lie, “They have is not are not opposed as contraries. Therefore true and laid hold on lying” (Jer. 8:5), that is to say, “an idol,” as a false are not contrary things. gloss says. Therefore false and true are not contraries. Objection 2. Further, one of two contraries is not in On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. the other. But falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine ii), that a false opinion is contrary to a true one. says, (Soliloq. ii, 10), “A tragedian would not be a false I answer that, True and false are opposed as con- Hector, if he were not a true tragedian.” Therefore true traries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and and false are not contraries. negation. In proof of which it must be considered that 100 negation neither asserts anything nor determines any sub-is good,” is, “God is not good.” ject, and can therefore be said of being as of not-being, Reply to Objection 2. Falsity is not founded in the for instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation as- truth which is contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in serts nothing, whereas it determines its subject, for it is the good which is contrary to it, but in that which is its “negation in a subject,” as stated in Metaph. iv, 4: v. 27; proper subject. This happens in either, because true and for blindness is not said except of one whose nature it is to good are universals, and convertible with being. Hence, see. Contraries, however, both assert something and deter- as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a being, mine the subject, for blackness is a species of color. Fal- so every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in sity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the Philoso- some truth. pher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch as something is said Reply to Objection 3. Because contraries, and op- or seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what posites by way of privation, are by nature about one and it really is. For as truth implies an adequate apprehension the same thing, therefore there is nothing contrary to God, of a thing, so falsity implies the contrary. Hence it is clear considered in Himself, either with respect to His goodness that true and false are contraries. or His truth, for in His intellect there can be nothing false. Reply to Objection 1. What is in things is the truth But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the of the thing; but what is apprehended, is the truth of the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. So intellect, wherein truth primarily resides. Hence the false idols are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch is that which is not as apprehended. To apprehend being, as the false opinion concerning them is contrary to the true and not-being, implies contrariety; for, as the Philosopher opinion of the divine unity. proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this statement “God 101 FIRST PART, QUESTION 18 The Life of God (In Four Articles) Since to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the divine knowledge and intellect, we must consider the divine life. About this, four points of inquiry arise: (1) To whom does it belong to live? (2) What is life? (3) Whether life is properly attributed to God? (4) Whether all things in God are life? Whether to live belongs to all natural things? Ia q. 18 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that to live belongs to all nat- movement in a more general sense, as when said of the act ural things. For the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling are called “Movement is like a kind of life possessed by all things movement. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that existing in nature.” But all natural things participate in determine themselves to movement or operation of any movement. Therefore all natural things partake of life. kind: whereas those things that cannot by their nature do Objection 2. Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch so, cannot be called living, unless by a similitude. as they in themselves a principle of movement of growth Reply to Objection 1. These words of the Philoso- and decay. But local movement is naturally more perfect pher may be understood either of the first movement, than, and prior to, movement of growth and decay, as the namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of the movement Philosopher shows (Phys. viii, 56,57). Since then, all in its general sense. In either way is movement called the natural bodies have in themselves some principle of local life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a similitude, movement, it seems that all natural bodies live. and not attributing it to them as their property. The move- Objection 3. Further, amongst natural bodies the el- ment of the heavens is in the universe of corporeal natures ements are the less perfect. Yet life is attributed to them, as the movement of the heart, whereby life is preserved, for we speak of “living waters.” Much more, therefore, is in animals. Similarly also every natural movement in have other natural bodies life. respect to natural things has a certain similitude to the op- On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1) erations of life. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe that “The last echo of life is heard in the plants,” whereby were one animal, so that its movement came from an “in- it is inferred that their life is life in its lowest degree. But trinsic moving force,” as some in fact have held, in that inanimate bodies are inferior to plants. Therefore they case movement would really be the life of all natural bod- have not life. ies. I answer that, We can gather to what things life be- Reply to Objection 2. To bodies, whether heavy or longs, and to what it does not, from such things as man- light, movement does not belong, except in so far as they ifestly possess life. Now life manifestly belongs to an- are displaced from their natural conditions, and are out of imals, for it said in De Vegetab. i∗ that in animals life their proper place; for when they are in the place that is is manifest. We must, therefore, distinguish living from proper and natural to them, then they are at rest. Plants lifeless things, by comparing them to that by reason of and other living things move with vital movement, in ac- which animals are said to live: and this it is in which life cordance with the disposition of their nature, but not by is manifested first and remains last. We say then that an approaching thereto, or by receding from it, for in so far animal begins to live when it begins to move of itself: and as they recede from such movement, so far do they recede as long as such movement appears in it, so long as it is from their natural disposition. Heavy and light bodies are considered to be alive. When it no longer has any move- moved by an extrinsic force, either generating them and ment of itself, but is only moved by another power, then giving them form, or removing obstacles from their way. its life is said to fail, and the animal to be dead. Whereby They do not therefore move themselves, as do living bod- it is clear that those things are properly called living that ies. move themselves by some kind of movement, whether it Reply to Objection 3. Waters are called living that be movement properly so called, as the act of an imperfect have a continuous current: for standing waters, that are being, i.e. of a thing in potentiality, is called movement; or not connected with a continually flowing source, are ∗ De Plantis i, 1 102 called dead, as in cisterns and ponds. This is merely a of theirs is not from themselves but from the cause that similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are seen to generates them. The same is the case with the movement possess makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this of other heavy and light bodies. is not life in them in its real sense, since this movement Whether life is an operation? Ia q. 18 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that life is an operation. For the abstract, just as the word “running” denotes “to run” nothing is divided except into parts of the same genus. in the abstract. But life is divided by certain operations, as is clear from Hence “living” is not an accidental but an essential the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 13), who distinguishes four predicate. Sometimes, however, life is used less properly kinds of life, namely, nourishment, sensation, local move- for the operations from which its name is taken, and thus ment and understanding. Therefore life is an operation. the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is princi- Objection 2. Further, the active life is said to be dif- pally to sense or to understand. ferent from the contemplative. But the contemplative is Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher here takes “to only distinguished from the active by certain operations. live” to mean an operation of life. Or it would be bet- Therefore life is an operation. ter to say that sensation and intelligence and the like, are Objection 3. Further, to know God is an operation. sometimes taken for the operations, sometimes for the ex- But this is life, as is clear from the words of Jn. 18:3, istence itself of the operator. For he says (Ethic. ix, 9) “Now this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the that to live is to sense or to understand—in other words, only true God.” Therefore life is an operation. to have a nature capable of sensation or understanding. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, Thus, then, he distinguishes life by the four operations 37), “In living things, to live is to be.” mentioned. For in this lower world there are four kinds I answer that, As is clear from what has been said of living things. It is the nature of some to be capable of (q. 17, a. 3), our intellect, which takes cognizance of the nothing more than taking nourishment, and, as a conse- essence of a thing as its proper object, gains knowledge quence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in from sense, of which the proper objects are external ac- addition, to sense, as we see in the case of shellfish and cidents. Hence from external appearances we come to other animals without movement. Others have the further the knowledge of the essence of things. And because we power of moving from place to place, as perfect animals, name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as such as quadrupeds, and birds, and so on. Others, as man, is clear from what has already been said (q. 13, a. 1), so have the still higher faculty of understanding. from external properties names are often imposed to sig- Reply to Objection 2. By vital operations are meant nify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken those whose principles are within the operator, and in strictly to denote the essence itself, the signification of virtue of which the operator produces such operations of which is their principal object; but sometimes, and less itself. It happens that there exist in men not merely such strictly, to denote the properties by reason of which they natural principles of certain operations as are their nat- are imposed. And so we see that the word “body” is used ural powers, but something over and above these, such to denote a genus of substances from the fact of their pos- as habits inclining them like a second nature to particular sessing three dimensions: and is sometimes taken to de- kinds of operations, so that the operations become sources note the dimensions themselves; in which sense body is of pleasure. Thus, as by a similitude, any kind of work in said to be a species of quantity. The same must be said which a man takes delight, so that his bent is towards it, of life. The name is given from a certain external appear- his time spent in it, and his whole life ordered with a view ance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence some are said this, but rather a substance to which self-movement and to lead to life of self-indulgence, others a life of virtue. In the application of itself to any kind of operation, belong this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the naturally. To live, accordingly, is nothing else than to ex- active, and thus to know God is said to be life eternal. ist in this or that nature; and life signifies this, though in Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear. 103 Whether life is properly attributed to God? Ia q. 18 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that life is not properly at- themselves the end of their operation, or movement; for tributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural they move themselves, as previously stated (a. 2). But instinct they are moved to any action through the form ap- movement does not belong to God. Neither therefore does prehended by sense. Hence such animals as move them- life. selves in respect to an end they themselves propose are su- Objection 2. Further, in all living things we must perior to these. This can only be done by reason and intel- needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by lect; whose province it is to know the proportion between the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4) that “the soul is the cause the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate and principle of the living body.” But God has no princi- them. Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intel- ple. Therefore life cannot be attributed to Him. ligible beings; for their power of self-movement is more Objection 3. Further, the principle of life in the living perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same things that exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this man the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers; exists only in corporeal things. Therefore life cannot be and these by their command move the organs of move- attributed to incorporeal things. ment. Thus in the arts we see that the art of using a ship, On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 83:3): “My heart and i.e. the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.” and this in its turn rules the art that is only concerned with I answer that, Life is in the highest degree properly preparing the material for the ship. in God. In proof of which it must be considered that since But although our intellect moves itself to some things, a thing is said to live in so far as it operates of itself and yet others are supplied by nature, as are first principles, not as moved by another, the more perfectly this power which it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot is found in anything, the more perfect is the life of that but will. Hence, although with respect to some things it thing. In things that move and are moved, a threefold or- moves itself, yet with regard to other things it must be der is found. In the first place, the end moves the agent: moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of and the principal agent is that which acts through its form, understanding is its very nature, and which, in what it nat- and sometimes it does so through some instrument that urally possesses, is not determined by another, must have acts by virtue not of its own form, but of the principal life in the most perfect degree. Such is God; and hence agent, and does no more than execute the action. Accord- in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher con- ingly there are things that move themselves, not in respect cludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing God to be intelli- of any form or end naturally inherent in them, but only gent, that God has life most perfect and eternal, since His in respect of the executing of the movement; the form by intellect is most perfect and always in act. which they act, and the end of the action being alike de- Reply to Objection 1. As stated in Metaph. ix, 16, termined for them by their nature. Of this kind are plants, action is twofold. Actions of one kind pass out to exter- which move themselves according to their inherent nature, nal matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst actions of the other with regard only to executing the movements of growth kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to sense and to and decay. will. The difference between them is this, that the former Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of that is, not only with regard to executing the movement, the thing moved; whereas the latter action is the perfection but even as regards to the form, the principle of move- of the agent. Hence, because movement is an act of the ment, which form they acquire of themselves. Of this kind thing in movement, the latter action, in so far as it is the are animals, in which the principle of movement is not a act of the operator, is called its movement, by this simili- naturally implanted form; but one received through sense. tude, that as movement is an act of the thing moved, so an Hence the more perfect is their sense, the more perfect act of this kind is the act of the agent, although movement is their power of self-movement. Such as have only the is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what is in potential- sense of touch, as shellfish, move only with the motion ity; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is of expansion and contraction; and thus their movement to say, of what is in act as stated in De Anima iii, 28. In hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as have the the sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only that which understands itself is said to move itself. It is in connection and touch, but also objects apart from them- this sense that Plato also taught that God moves Himself; selves, can move themselves to a distance by progressive not in the sense in which movement is an act of the imper- movement. Yet although animals of the latter kind receive fect. through sense the form that is the principle of their move- Reply to Objection 2. As God is His own very exis- ment, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to tence and understanding, so is He His own life; and there- 104 fore He so lives that He has not principle of life. dividual. For this reason life is not found here below apart Reply to Objection 3. Life in this lower world is be- from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold good with stowed on a corruptible nature, that needs generation to incorruptible natures. preserve the species, and nourishment to preserve the in- Whether all things are life in God? Ia q. 18 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that not all things are life in not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they God. For it is said (Acts 17:28), “In Him we live, and are in God are the divine essence. And since the divine move, and be.” But not all things in God are movement. essence is life and not movement, it follows that things Therefore not all things are life in Him. existing in God in this manner are not movement, but life. Objection 2. Further, all things are in God as their Reply to Objection 2. The thing modelled must be first model. But things modelled ought to conform to the like the model according to the form, not the mode of be- model. Since, then, not all things have life in themselves, ing. For sometimes the form has being of another kind in it seems that not all things are life in God. the model from that which it has in the thing modelled. Objection 3. Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Re- Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the architect lig. 29), a living substance is better than a substance that immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that ex- does not live. If, therefore, things which in themselves ists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence have not life, are life in God, it seems that things exist the ideas of things, though not existing in themselves, are more truly in God than themselves. But this appears to be life in the divine mind, as having a divine existence in that false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in God mind. potentially. Reply to Objection 3. If form only, and not mat- Objection 4. Further, just as good things and things ter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural made in time are known by God, so are bad things, and things would exist more truly in the divine mind, by the things that God can make, but never will be made. If, ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in therefore, all things are life in God, inasmuch as known fact, Plato held that the “separate” man was the true man; by Him, it seems that even bad things and things that will and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by partic- never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this ipation. But since matter enters into the being of natural appears inadmissible. things, we must say that those things have simply being On the contrary, (Jn. 1:3,4), it is said, “What was in the divine mind more truly than in themselves, because made, in Him was life.” But all things were made, except in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in them- God. Therefore all things are life in God. selves a created being: whereas this particular being, a I answer that, In God to live is to understand, as be- man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in fore stated (a. 3). In God intellect, the thing understood, its own nature than in the divine mind, because it belongs and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence to human nature to be material, which, as existing in the whatever is in God as understood is the very living or life divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has nobler being in of God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been the architect’s mind than in matter; yet a material house is made by God are in Him as things understood, it follows called a house more truly than the one which exists in the that all things in Him are the divine life itself. mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential. Reply to Objection 1. Creatures are said to be in God Reply to Objection 4. Although bad things are in in a twofold sense. In one way, so far are they are held God’s knowledge, as being comprised under that knowl- together and preserved by the divine power; even as we edge, yet they are not in God as created by Him, or pre- say that things that are in our power are in us. And crea- served by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are tures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in their known by God through the types of good things. Hence own natures. In this sense we must understand the words it cannot be said that bad things are life in God. Those of the Apostle when he says, “In Him we live, move, and things that are not in time may be called life in God in be”; since our being, living, and moving are themselves so far as life means understanding only, and inasmuch as caused by God. In another sense things are said to be in they are understood by God; but not in so far as life im- God, as in Him who knows them, in which sense they plies a principle of operation. are in God through their proper ideas, which in God are 105 FIRST PART, QUESTION 19 The Will of God (In Twelve Articles) After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is will in God? (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself? (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily? (4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things? (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will? (6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled? (7) Whether the will of God is mutable? (8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed? (9) Whether there is in God the will of evil? (10) Whether God has free will? (11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God? (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will? Whether there is will in God? Ia q. 19 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that there is not will in God. For both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every intel-the object of will is the end and the good. But we cannot lectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being assign to God any end. Therefore there is not will in God. there is animal appetite. And so there must be will in God, Objection 2. Further, will is a kind of appetite. But since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His appetite, as it is directed to things not possessed, implies own existence, so is His will. imperfection, which cannot be imputed to God. Therefore Reply to Objection 1. Although nothing apart from there is not will in God. God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher all things made by Him. And this by His essence, for by (De Anima iii, 54), the will moves, and is moved. But His essence He is good, as shown above (q. 6, a. 3): for God is the first cause of movement, and Himself is un- the end has the aspect of good. moved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is not Reply to Objection 2. Will in us belongs to the appet- will in God. itive part, which, although named from appetite, has not On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 12:2): for its only act the seeking what it does not possess; but “That you may prove what is the will of God.” also the loving and the delighting in what it does possess. I answer that, There is will in God, as there is in- In this respect will is said to be in God, as having always tellect: since will follows upon intellect. For as natural good which is its object, since, as already said, it is not things have actual existence by their form, so the intellect distinct from His essence. is actually intelligent by its intelligible form. Now every- Reply to Objection 3. A will of which the principal thing has this aptitude towards its natural form, that when object is a good outside itself, must be moved by another; it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at but the object of the divine will is His goodness, which is rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection, His essence. Hence, since the will of God is His essence, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things it is not moved by another than itself, but by itself alone, without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended be movement. This is what Plato meant when he said that through its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when the first mover moves itself. possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, 106 Whether God wills things apart from Himself? Ia q. 19 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that God does not will things inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things apart from Himself. For the divine will is the divine exis- should be partakers therein. tence. But God is not other than Himself. Therefore He Reply to Objection 1. The divine will is God’s own does not will things other than Himself. existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according Objection 2. Further, the willed moves the willer, as to the different ways of understanding them and express- the appetible the appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, 54. ing them, as is clear from what has already been said If, therefore, God wills anything apart from Himself, His (q. 13, a. 4). For when we say that God exists, no rela- will must be moved by another; which is impossible. tion to any other object is implied, as we do imply when Objection 3. Further, if what is willed suffices the we say that God wills. Therefore, although He is not any- willer, he seeks nothing beyond it. But His own goodness thing apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart suffices God, and completely satisfies His will. Therefore from Himself. God does not will anything apart from Himself. Reply to Objection 2. In things willed for the sake of Objection 4. Further, acts of will are multiplied in the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end, proportion to the number of their objects. If, therefore, and this it is that moves the will, as most clearly appears God wills Himself and things apart from Himself, it fol- in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills lows that the act of His will is manifold, and consequently to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills nothing else than His existence, which is His will. But this is impossible. health; and this alone moves his will. It is different with Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself. one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Thess. 4:3): may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for “This is the will of God, your sanctification.” its own sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from I answer that, God wills not only Himself, but other Himself only for the sake of the end, which is His own things apart from Himself. This is clear from the compar- goodness, it does not follow that anything else moves His ison which we made above (a. 1). For natural things have will, except His goodness. So, as He understands things a natural inclination not only towards their own proper apart from Himself by understanding His own essence, so good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good goodness. amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that ev- Reply to Objection 3. From the fact that His own ery agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces goodness suffices the divine will, it does not follow that it its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to wills nothing apart from itself, but rather that it wills noth- communicate as far as possible to others the good pos- ing except by reason of its goodness. Thus, too, the divine sessed; and especially does this pertain to the divine will, intellect, though its perfection consists in its very knowl- from which all perfection is derived in some kind of like- edge of the divine essence, yet in that essence knows other ness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, things. communicate their good to others, much more does it ap- Reply to Objection 4. As the divine intellect is one, pertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its as seeing the many only in the one, in the same way the own good to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He divine will is one and simple, as willing the many only wills both Himself to be, and other things to be; but Him- through the one, that is, through its own goodness. self as the end, and other things as ordained to that end; Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily? Ia q. 19 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that whatever God wills He of God is necessary, for God is of Himself necessary be- wills necessarily. For everything eternal is necessary. But ing, and the principle of all necessity, as above shown whatever God wills, He wills from eternity, for otherwise (q. 2, a. 3). But it belongs to His nature to will what- His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills, ever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and He wills necessarily. above His nature as stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore Objection 2. Further, God wills things apart from whatever He wills, He wills necessarily. Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now Objection 4. Further, being that is not necessary, and God wills His own goodness necessarily. Therefore He being that is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. wills things apart from Himself necessarily. If, therefore, God does not necessarily will a thing that He Objection 3. Further, whatever belongs to the nature wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore 107 possible for Him to will what He does not will. And so make the journey without one. The same applies to other the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is im- can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection perfect and mutable. can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing Objection 5. Further, on the part of that which is in- things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet different to one or the other of two things, no action re- it can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He sults unless it is inclined to one or the other by some other wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will power, as the Commentator∗ says in Phys. ii. If, then, cannot change. the Will of God is indifferent with regard to anything, it Reply to Objection 1. From the fact that God wills follows that His determination to act comes from another; from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that and thus He has some cause prior to Himself. He wills it necessarily; except by supposition. Objection 6. Further, whatever God knows, He knows Reply to Objection 2. Although God necessarily necessarily. But as the divine knowledge is His essence, wills His own goodness, He does not necessarily will so is the divine will. Therefore whatever God wills, He things willed on account of His goodness; for it can ex- wills necessarily. ist without other things. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 1:11): Reply to Objection 3. It is not natural to God to will “Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His any of those other things that He does not will necessar- will.” Now, what we work according to the counsel of the ily; and yet it is not unnatural or contrary to His nature, will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does not but voluntary. will necessarily whatever He wills. Reply to Objection 4. Sometimes a necessary cause I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a de- is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by suppo- ficiency in the effect, and not in the cause. Even so, the sition. We judge a thing to be absolutely necessary from sun’s power has a non-necessary relation to some contin- the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part gent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar of the definition of the subject: thus it is absolutely neces- power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from sary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessar- forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is abso- ily will some of the things that He wills, does not result lutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this from defect in the divine will, but from a defect belonging way it is not necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposi- goodness of God can be without it; and such defect ac- tion; for, granted that he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, companies all created good. as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by Reply to Objection 5. A naturally contingent cause God, we must observe that He wills something of absolute must be determined to act by some external power. The necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will, which by its nature is necessary, determines divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation. since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own Reply to Objection 6. As the divine essence is nec- goodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness essary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowl- necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation edge; but the divine knowledge has a necessary relation to to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end they exist in themselves. Since then all other things have we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it, un- necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but less they are such that the end cannot be attained without no absolute necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take in so far as they exist in themselves; it follows that God ship in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily knows necessarily whatever He wills, but does not will will things without which the end is attainable, such as a necessarily whatever He wills. horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can ∗ Averroes 108 Whether the will of God is the cause of things? Ia q. 19 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that the will of God is not the the act is according to the nature of the agent; and hence cause of things. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance “As our sun, not by reason nor by pre-election, but by its with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate very being, enlightens all things that can participate in its being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and light, so the divine good by its very essence pours the rays contains in Himself the full perfection of being, it cannot of goodness upon everything that exists.” But every vol- be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He untary agent acts by reason and pre-election. Therefore were to cause something undetermined and indefinite in God does not act by will; and so His will is not the cause being: and that this is impossible has been already shown of things. (q. 7, a. 2). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of Objection 2. Further, The first in any order is that His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own which is essentially so, thus in the order of burning things, infinite perfection according to the determination of His that comes first which is fire by its essence. But God is the will and intellect. first agent. Therefore He acts by His essence; and that is Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their His nature. He acts then by nature, and not by will. There- cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes fore the divine will is not the cause of things. them, in so far as they pre-exist in the agent; since ev- Objection 3. Further, Whatever is the cause of any- ery agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their thing, through being “such” a thing, is the cause by na- cause after the mode of the cause. Wherefore since the ture, and not by will. For fire is the cause of heat, as being Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him itself hot; whereas an architect is the cause of a house, be- after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from cause he wills to build it. Now Augustine says (De Doctr. Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed Christ. i, 32), “Because God is good, we exist.” Therefore from Him after the mode of will, for His inclination to put God is the cause of things by His nature, and not by His in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will. will. Therefore the will of God is the cause of things. Objection 4. Further, Of one thing there is one cause. Reply to Objection 1. Dionysius in these words does But the created things is the knowledge of God, as said not intend to exclude election from God absolutely; but before (q. 14, a. 8). Therefore the will of God cannot be only in a certain sense, in so far, that is, as He communi- considered the cause of things. cates His goodness not merely to certain things, but to all; On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 11:26), “How could and as election implies a certain distinction. anything endure, if Thou wouldst not?” Reply to Objection 2. Because the essence of God is I answer that, We must hold that the will of God is His intellect and will, from the fact of His acting by His the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, essence, it follows that He acts after the mode of intellect as some have supposed, by a necessity of His nature. and will. This can be shown in three ways: First, from the or- Reply to Objection 3. Good is the object of the will. der itself of active causes. Since both intellect and na- The words, therefore, “Because God is good, we exist,” ture act for an end, as proved in Phys. ii, 49, the natural are true inasmuch as His goodness is the reason of His agent must have the end and the necessary means prede- willing all other things, as said before (a. 2, ad 2). termined for it by some higher intellect; as the end and Reply to Objection 4. Even in us the cause of one and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary agent must form of the work is conceived, and will as commanding precede the agent that acts by nature. Hence, since God it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is not deter- is first in the order of agents, He must act by intellect and mined to exist or not to exist in the effect, except by the will. will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to This is shown, secondly, from the character of a nat- operation. But the power is cause, as executing the effect, ural agent, of which the property is to produce one and since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But the same effect; for nature operates in one and the same in God all these things are one. way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of 109 Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will? Ia q. 19 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that some cause can be assigned same relation to the means to the end, as do the premisses to the divine will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): to the conclusion with regard to the understanding. “Who would venture to say that God made all things ir- Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in an- rationally?” But to a voluntary agent, what is the reason other act the means to that end, his willing the end will of operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the will of be the cause of his willing the means. This cannot be the God has some cause. case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing Objection 2. Further, in things made by one who wills cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say that he to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as there can be no cause assigned except by the will of him God by one act understands all things in His essence, so who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as has been already shown (a. 4). If, then, there is no cause of in God to understand the cause is not the cause of His un- His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, derstanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His vain, since science seeks to assign causes to effects. This willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some to the end. Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; cause to the divine will. but does not will this on account of that. Objection 3. Further, what is done by the willer, on Reply to Objection 1. The will of God is reasonable, account of no cause, depends simply on his will. If, there- not because anything is to God a cause of willing, but in fore, the will of God has no cause, it follows that all things so far as He wills one thing to be on account of another. made depend simply on His will, and have no other cause. Reply to Objection 2. Since God wills effects to pro- But this also is not admissible. ceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): the universe, it is not unreasonable to seek for causes sec- “Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected.” ondary to the divine will. It would, however, be unreason- But nothing is greater than the will of God. We must not able to do so, if such were considered as primary, and not then seek for a cause of it. as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine I answer that, In no wise has the will of God a cause. says (De Trin. iii, 2): “Philosophers in their vanity have In proof of which we must consider that, since the will thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, follows from the intellect, there is cause of the will in the being utterly unable to perceive the cause that is shown person who wills, in the same way as there is a cause of above all others, the will of God.” the understanding, in the person that understands. The Reply to Objection 3. Since God wills effects to case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and come from causes, all effects that presuppose some other its conclusion are understood separately from each other, effect do not depend solely on the will of God, but on the understanding the premiss is the cause that the con- something else besides: but the first effect depends on the clusion is known. If the understanding perceive the con- divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that clusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by and the other at the same glance, in this case the knowing their work, and intellect, that he might be man; and willed of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding him to be man that he might enjoy Him, or for the comple- the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause; and tion of the universe. But this cannot be reduced to other yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It is the same simple will of God; but the others on the order of other with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the causes. Whether the will of God is always fulfilled? Ia q. 19 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that the will of God is not al- truth. Therefore He wills all good. But not all good ac- ways fulfilled. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:4): “God tually exists; for much more good might exist. Therefore will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowl- the will of God is not always fulfilled. edge of the truth.” But this does not happen. Therefore Objection 3. Further, since the will of God is the first the will of God is not always fulfilled. cause, it does not exclude intermediate causes. But the Objection 2. Further, as is the relation of knowledge effect of a first cause may be hindered by a defect of a to truth, so is that of the will to good. Now God knows all secondary cause; as the effect of the motive power may 110 be hindered by the weakness of the limb. Therefore the small, but not all of every condition. Thirdly, according effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood the secondary causes. The will of God, therefore, is not of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will. always fulfilled. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the di- On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 113:11): “God hath vine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor done all things, whatsoever He would.” consequent, but to the things willed. I answer that, The will of God must needs always be To understand this we must consider that everything, fulfilled. In proof of which we must consider that since an in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in effect is conformed to the agent according to its form, the its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes. or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are The rule in forms is this: that although a thing may fall taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the uni- changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live versal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for ex- is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, abso- ample, a man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be lutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a being. Hence the same must happen in active causes. a man is a murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him Something may fall outside the order of any particular is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said active cause, but not outside the order of the universal of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; cause; under which all particular causes are included: and but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the if any particular cause fails of its effect, this is because same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but of the hindrance of some other particular cause, which is consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice ex- included in the order of the universal cause. Therefore acts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen. For it directed to things as they are in themselves, and in them- may happen that a star is hindered from producing its ef- selves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we fects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all par- from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred ticular circumstances are considered; and this is what is through intermediate causes to the universal influence of meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a the first heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the univer- just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in sal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inas- should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems to much as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear another order; as does the sinner, who by sin falls away that whatever God simply wills takes place; although what from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls back He wills antecedently may not take place. into the order of that will, when by its justice he is pun- Reply to Objection 2. An act of the cognitive faculty ished. is according as the thing known is in the knower; while Reply to Objection 1. The words of the Apostle, an act of the appetite faculty is directed to things as they “God will have all men to be saved,” etc. can be un- exist in themselves. But all that can have the nature of derstood in three ways. First, by a restricted application, being and truth virtually exists in God, though it does not in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth; praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), “God wills all men to but does not will all good, except in so far as He wills be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom Himself, in Whom all good virtually exists. He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved Reply to Objection 3. A first cause can be hindered whose salvation He does not will.” Secondly, they can be in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause, when understood as applying to every class of individuals, not it is not the universal first cause, including within itself to every individual of each class; in which case they mean all causes; for then the effect could in no way escape its that God wills some men of every class and condition to order. And thus it is with the will of God, as said above. be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and 111 Whether the will of God is changeable? Ia q. 19 a. 7 Objection 1. It seems that the Will of God is change- changeable (q. 9, a. 1; q. 14, a. 15). Therefore His will able. For the Lord says (Gn. 6:7): “It repenteth Me that must be entirely unchangeable. I have made man.” But whoever repents of what he has Reply to Objection 1. These words of the Lord are done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has a change- to be understood metaphorically, and according to the able will. likeness of our nature. For when we repent, we destroy Objection 2. Further, it is said in the person of the what we have made; although we may even do so without Lord: “I will speak against a nation and against a king- change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at dom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it; but the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God if that nation shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our the evil that I have thought to do to them” (Jer. 18:7,8) mode of acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed Therefore God has a changeable will. from the face of the earth man whom He had made. Objection 3. Further, whatever God does, He does Reply to Objection 2. The will of God, as it is the voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate for at one time He ordered the law to be observed, and at causes that have power to produce certain effects. Since another time forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to will. the first cause, there are many things in the divine power, Objection 4. Further, God does not will of necessity knowledge and will that are not included in the order of what He wills, as said before (a. 3). Therefore He can inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: incline to either of two opposites, is changeable substan- “Lazarus will not rise again,” but looking at the divine tially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that first cause might have said: “Lazarus will rise again.” place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the in- as regards His will. ferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of On the contrary, It is said: “God is not as a man, that the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will con- He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be versely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares changed” (Num. 23:19). that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the I answer that, The will of God is entirely unchange- order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet able. On this point we must consider that to change the does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine will is one thing; to will that certain things should be and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: “Take changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live” (Is. done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will 38:1). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, be changed, if one should begin to will what before he which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. 5): “The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel”— This cannot happen, unless we presuppose change either that is to say, the counsel of His will. When therefore He in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of says, “I also will repent,” His words must be understood the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in metaphorically. For men seem to repent, when they do not two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing fulfill what they have threatened. begins to be good for him, and this does not take place Reply to Objection 3. It does not follow from this without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather argument that God has a will that changes, but that He begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was sometimes wills that things should change. not so before. In another way when he knows for the first Reply to Objection 4. Although God’s willing a thing time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by suppo- it before; hence we take counsel in order to know what sition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both will, as has been said above (a. 3). the substance of God and His knowledge are entirely un- 112 Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed? Ia q. 19 a. 8 Objection 1. It seems that the will of God im- Secondly, because if the distinction between the contin- poses necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says gent and the necessary is to be referred only to secondary (Enchiridion 103): “No one is saved, except whom God causes, this must be independent of the divine intention has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be.” say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the di- Objection 2. Further, every cause that cannot be vine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84) “Nature always works in also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it.” But the will from defect of active power in the seed it may happen of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says (Rom. that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, 9:19): “Who resisteth His will?” Therefore the will of that belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine God imposes necessity on the things willed. will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things Objection 3. Further, whatever is necessary by its an- are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they tecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some that animals should die, being compounded of contrary things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the elements. Now things created by God are related to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the uni- divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have verse. Therefore to some effects He has attached neces- necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God sary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional contingent causes, from which arise contingent effects. statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contin- God wills is necessary absolutely. gent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, On the contrary, All good things that exist God wills but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things being His will that they should happen contingently. willed, it follows that all good happens of necessity; and Reply to Objection 1. By the words of Augustine we thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such must understand a necessity in things willed by God that things. is not absolute, but conditional. For the conditional state- I answer that, The divine will imposes necessity on ment that if God wills a thing it must necessarily be, is some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some necessarily true. have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that Reply to Objection 2. From the very fact that noth- what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and ing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those what He produces by contingent causes contingent. things happen that God wills to happen, but that they hap- This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for pen necessarily or contingently according to His will. two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is Reply to Objection 3. Consequents have necessity contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the from their antecedents according to the mode of the an- fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by defi- tecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have ciency in the second cause, as the sun’s power is hindered that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are ab- cause can hinder God’s will from producing its effect. solute necessities. Whether God wills evils? Ia q. 19 a. 9 Objection 1. It seems that God wills evils. For ev- beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called ery good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good should exist. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): “Al- more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praise- though evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is worthy when contrasted with evil.” But God wills all that good that not only good things should exist, but also evil appertains to the perfection and beauty of the universe, for things.” Therefore God wills evil things. this is what God desires above all things in His creatures. Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. Therefore God wills evil. iv, 23): “Evil would conduce to the perfection of every- Objection 3. Further, that evil should exist, and thing,” i.e. the universe. And Augustine says (Enchirid- should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God ion 10,11): “Out of all things is built up the admirable does not will that evil should not exist; otherwise, since 113 various evils do exist, God’s will would not always be ful-ishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such filled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist. evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punish- On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): “No ment; and in willing the preservation of the natural order, wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. He wills some things to be naturally corrupted. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much less there- Reply to Objection 1. Some have said that although fore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it.” be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good Therefore it is not by God’s will that man becomes worse. that evil should be or be done. This they said because Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. There- things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end; fore God wills not evil things. and this order they thought was expressed in the words I answer that, Since the ratio of good is the ratio of “that evil should be or be done.” This, however, is not appetibility, as said before (q. 5, a. 1), and since evil is correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but ac- opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, cidentally. For it is beside the intention of the sinner, that should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or any good should follow from his sin; as it was beside the animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs should Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot there- accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. fore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in For a natural agent intends not privation or corruption, but the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be the form to which is annexed the privation of some other or be done, since nothing is judged of by that which ap- form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the pertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his essentially. object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is Reply to Objection 2. Evil does not operate towards only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely plea- the perfection and beauty of the universe, except acciden- sure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an ac- tally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore Dionysius in say- companiment. Now the evil that accompanies one good, ing that “evil would conduce to the perfection of the uni- is the privation of another good. Never therefore would verse,” draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity. evil be sought after, not even accidentally, unless the good Reply to Objection 3. The statements that evil exists, that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affir- good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the mative. God therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of pun- and this is a good. Whether God has free-will? Ia q. 19 a. 10 Objection 1. It seems that God has not free-will. For by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son∗; “God alone Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, other things not necessarily, as shown above (a. 3), He has as having free-will, can be inclined to either side.” free will with respect to what He does not necessarily will. Objection 2. Further, free-will is the faculty of the Reply to Objection 1. Jerome seems to deny free-will reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to God does not will evil, as has been said (a. 9). Therefore sin. there is not free-will in God. Reply to Objection 2. Since the evil of sin consists On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): “The in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, ac- wills all things, as above shown (De Fide ii, 3), it is man- cording to the free choice of the will, not in obedience to ifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He necessity.” can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He I answer that, We have free-will with respect to what can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and not will will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to nat- to sit down. ural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act ∗ Ep. 146, ad Damas. 114 Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God? Ia q. 19 a. 11 Objection 1. It seems that the will of expression is not with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphori-to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cally called will in God; just as when anyone lays down cause of things, so is His wisdom. But no expressions are a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor ought to be assigned to the divine will. the will of God, as in the words: “Thy will be done on Objection 2. Further, every expression that is not in earth, as it is in heaven” (Mat. 6:10). There is, however, agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never is false. If therefore the expressions assigned to the divine attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him prop- But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions erly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its therefore must be assigned to the divine will. proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. On the contrary, The will of God is one, since it is Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, many, as in the words of Ps. 110:2: “Great are the works inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called will. of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills.” There- Reply to Objection 1. Knowledge is not the cause of fore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will. a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not I answer that, Some things are said of God in their put into act what we know, unless we will to do so. Ac- strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has cordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to been said before (q. 13, a. 3). When certain human pas- will. sions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this Reply to Objection 2. Expressions of will are called is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing divine wills, not as being signs that God wills anything; that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphor- but because what in us is the usual expression of our will, ically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment is not us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that pun- a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called anger ishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore pun- in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger ourselves. is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will? Ia q. 19 a. 12 Objection 1. It seems that five expressions of will— of ways,” as declared by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to permission—are not rightly assigned to the divine will. assign one expression only in the case of evil—namely, For the same things that God bids us do by His precept prohibition—and two—namely, counsel and precept—in or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and the the case of good. same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes per- I answer that, By these signs we name the expression mits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as dis- of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will tinct. something. A man may show that he wills something, ei- Objection 2. Further, God works nothing unless He ther by himself or by means of another. He may show wills it, as the Scripture says (Wis. 11:26). But the will it by himself, by doing something either directly, or in- of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. directly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended in the works in his own person; in that way the expression of will of expression. his will is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by Objection 3. Further, operation and permission ap- not hindering the doing of a thing; for what removes an pertain to all creatures in common, since God works in impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect them all, and permits some action in them all. But pre- the expression is called permission. He declares his will cept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures by means of another when he orders another to perform a only. Therefore they do not come rightly under one divi- work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept, sion, not being of one order. and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which Objection 4. Further, evil happens in more ways than is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man good, since “good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds makes itself known, the same five are sometimes denom- 115 inated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of always the same as the will of good pleasure; while pre-that will. That precept, counsel, and prohibition are called cept and counsel are not; both because the former regards the will of God is clear from the words of Mat. 6:10: the present, and the two latter the future; and because the “Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven.” That per- former is of itself the effect of the will; the latter its effect mission and operation are called the will of God is clear as fulfilled by means of another. from Augustine (Enchiridion 95), who says: “Nothing is Reply to Objection 3. Rational creatures are masters done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by of their own acts; and for this reason certain special ex- permitting it, or by actually doing it.” pressions of the divine will are assigned to their acts, inas- Or it may be said that permission and operation re- much as God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily fer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, and of themselves. Other creatures act only as moved by operation with regard to good. Whilst as to future time, the divine operation; therefore only operation and permis- prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is sion are concerned with these. necessary and counsel to good that is of supererogation. Reply to Objection 4. All evil of sin, though happen- Reply to Objection 1. There is nothing to prevent ing in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the anyone declaring his will about the same matter in differ- divine will. Hence with regard to evil, only one expression ent ways; thus we find many words that mean the same is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good thing. Hence there is not reason why the same thing stands in various relations to the divine goodness, since should not be the subject of precept, operation, and coun- there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to sel; or of prohibition or permission. the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject of Reply to Objection 2. As God may by metaphor be precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills perfectly, and these are the subject of counsel. Or it may not; so He may by metaphor be said to will what He does, be said that counsel is not only concerned with the obtain- properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to pre- ing of greater good; but also with the avoiding of lesser vent the same thing being the object of the will of good evils. pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is 116 FIRST PART, QUESTION 20 God’s Love (In Four Articles) We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of God. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found in ourselves both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude and the like. Hence we shall first consider the love of God, and secondly His justice and mercy. About the first there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether love exists in God? (2) Whether He loves all things? (3) Whether He loves one thing more than another? (4) Whether He loves more the better things? Whether love exists in God? Ia q. 20 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that love does not exist in God. of hate except as opposed to the object of love. Similarly, For in God there are no passions. Now love is a passion. it is clear that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be Therefore love is not in God. referred to love as to their first principle. Hence, in whom- Objection 2. Further, love, anger, sorrow and the soever there is will and appetite, there must also be love: like, are mutually divided against one another. But sorrow since if the first is wanting, all that follows is also want- and anger are not attributed to God, unless by metaphor. ing. Now it has been shown that will is in God (q. 19, Therefore neither is love attributed to Him. a. 1), and hence we must attribute love to Him. Objection 3. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): Reply to Objection 1. The cognitive faculty does not “Love is a uniting and binding force.” But this cannot take move except through the medium of the appetitive: and place in God, since He is simple. Therefore love does not just as in ourselves the universal reason moves through exist in God. the medium of the particular reason, as stated in De An- On the contrary, It is written: “God is love” (Jn. ima iii, 58,75, so in ourselves the intellectual appetite, or 4:16). the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the I answer that, We must needs assert that in God there sensitive appetite. Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is is love: because love is the first movement of the will and the proximate motive-force of our bodies. Some bodily of every appetitive faculty. For since the acts of the will change therefore always accompanies an act of the sensi- and of every appetitive faculty tend towards good and evil, tive appetite, and this change affects especially the heart, as to their proper objects: and since good is essentially and which, as the Philosopher says (De part. animal. iii, 4), is especially the object of the will and the appetite, whereas the first principle of movement in animals. Therefore acts evil is only the object secondarily and indirectly, as op- of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as they have annexed posed to good; it follows that the acts of the will and ap- to them some bodily change, are called passions; whereas petite that regard good must naturally be prior to those that acts of the will are not so called. Love, therefore, and joy regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to sorrow, love and delight are passions; in so far as they denote acts of to hate: because what exists of itself is always prior to that the intellective appetite, they are not passions. It is in this which exists through another. Again, the more universal latter sense that they are in God. Hence the Philosopher is naturally prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is says (Ethic. vii): “God rejoices by an operation that is first directed to universal truth; and in the second place to one and simple,” and for the same reason He loves with- particular and special truths. Now there are certain acts out passion. of the will and appetite that regard good under some spe- Reply to Objection 2. In the passions of the sensi- cial condition, as joy and delight regard good present and tive appetite there may be distinguished a certain material possessed; whereas desire and hope regard good not as element—namely, the bodily change—and a certain for- yet possessed. Love, however, regards good universally, mal element, which is on the part of the appetite. Thus in whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the first anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 15,63,64), act of the will and appetite; for which reason all the other the material element is the kindling of the blood about the appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and ori- heart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as gin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything, regards the formal element of certain passions a certain except as a good that is loved: nor is anything an object imperfection is implied, as in desire, which is of the good 117 we have not, and in sorrow, which is about the evil we to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love have. This applies also to anger, which supposes sorrow. ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as possi- Certain other passions, however, as love and joy, imply ble, union with that good. So love is called the unitive no imperfection. Since therefore none of these can be at- force, even in God, yet without implying composition; for tributed to God on their material side, as has been said (ad the good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Him- 1); neither can those that even on their formal side imply self, Who is good by His essence, as above shown (q. 6, imperfection be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, Aa. 1,3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he and from likeness of effects, as already show (q. 3, a. 2 wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, , ad 2; q. 19, a. 11). Whereas, those that do not imply in the place of himself; and regards the good done to him imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predi- as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it cated of God, though without attributing passion to Him, aggregates another to ourselves, and refers his good to our as said before (q. 19, a. 11). own. And then again the divine love is a binding force, Reply to Objection 3. An act of love always tends inasmuch as God wills good to others; yet it implies no towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to the composition in God. person for whom one wills it: since to love a person is Whether God loves all things? Ia q. 20 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that God does not love all since to love anything is nothing else than to will good things. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything that love places the lover outside himself, and causes him to exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not pass, as it were, into the object of his love. But it is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it admissible to say that God is placed outside of Himself, as by its object, our love, whereby we will good to any- and passes into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible thing, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its to say that God loves things other than Himself. goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, Objection 2. Further, the love of God is eternal. But by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, things apart from God are not from eternity; except in and receive besides the good it has not, and to this end we God. Therefore God does not love anything, except as direct our actions: whereas the love of God infuses and it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it is no other creates goodness. than Himself. Therefore God does not love things other Reply to Objection 1. A lover is placed outside him- than Himself. self, and made to pass into the object of his love, inasmuch Objection 3. Further, love is twofold—the love, as he wills good to the beloved; and works for that good namely, of desire, and the love of friendship. Now God by his providence even as he works for his own. Hence does not love irrational creatures with the love of desire, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): “On behalf of the truth since He needs no creature outside Himself. Nor with the we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the love of friendship; since there can be no friendship with cause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness, irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, is placed outside Himself by His providence for all exist- 2). Therefore God does not love all things. ing things.” Objection 4. Further, it is written (Ps. 5:7): “Thou Reply to Objection 2. Although creatures have not hatest all the workers of iniquity.” Now nothing is at the existed from eternity, except in God, yet because they same time hated and loved. Therefore God does not love have been in Him from eternity, God has known them all things. eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason has On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 11:25): “Thou lovest loved them, even as we, by the images of things within all things that are, and hatest none of the things which us, know things existing in themselves. Thou hast made.” Reply to Objection 3. Friendship cannot exist except I answer that, God loves all existing things. For all towards rational creatures, who are capable of returning existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the love, and communicating one with another in the various existence of a thing is itself a good; and likewise, what- works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to ever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above the changes of fortune and happiness; even as to them is (q. 19, a. 4) that God’s will is the cause of all things. It benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any creatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To in the intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly every existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence, speaking, therefore, God does not love irrational creatures 118 with the love of friendship; but as it were with the love of same thing being loved under one aspect, while it is hated desire, in so far as He orders them to rational creatures, under another. God loves sinners in so far as they are ex- and even to Himself. Yet this is not because He stands in isting natures; for they have existence and have it from need of them; but only on account of His goodness, and Him. In so far as they are sinners, they have not existence of the services they render to us. For we can desire a thing at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from God. for others as well as for ourselves. Hence under this aspect, they are hated by Him. Reply to Objection 4. Nothing prevents one and the Whether God loves all things equally? Ia q. 20 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that God loves all things In another way on the part of the good itself that a person equally. For it is said: “He hath equally care of all” (Wis. wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that 6:8). But God’s providence over things comes from the one more than another, for whom we will a greater good, love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He loves all though our will is not more intense. In this way we must things equally. needs say that God loves some things more than others. Objection 2. Further, the love of God is His essence. For since God’s love is the cause of goodness in things, But God’s essence does not admit of degree; neither there- as has been said (a. 2), no one thing would be better than fore does His love. He does not therefore love some things another, if God did not will greater good for one than for more than others. another. Objection 3. Further, as God’s love extends to created Reply to Objection 1. God is said to have equally things, so do His knowledge and will extend. But God is care of all, not because by His care He deals out equal not said to know some things more than others; nor will good to all, but because He administers all things with a one thing more than another. Neither therefore does He like wisdom and goodness. love some things more than others. Reply to Objection 2. This argument is based on the On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cx): intensity of love on the part of the act of the will, which “God loves all things that He has made, and amongst them is the divine essence. But the good that God wills for His rational creatures more, and of these especially those who creatures, is not the divine essence. Therefore there is no are members of His only-begotten Son Himself.” reason why it may not vary in degree. I answer that, Since to love a thing is to will it good, Reply to Objection 3. To understand and to will de-in a twofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In note the act alone, and do not include in their meaning one way on the part of the act of the will itself, which is objects from the diversity of which God may be said to more or less intense. In this way God does not love some know or will more or less, as has been said with respect to things more than others, because He loves all things by an God’s love. act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. Whether God always loves more the better things? Ia q. 20 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that God does not always love this to be true, asked Peter, saying: “Simon, son of John, more the better things. For it is manifest that Christ is bet- lovest thou Me more than these?” Yet Christ loved John ter than the whole human race, being God and man. But more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says, com- God loved the human race more than He loved Christ; for menting on the words, “Simon, son of John, lovest thou it is said: “He spared not His own Son, but delivered Him Me?”: “By this very mark is John distinguished from the up for us all” (Rom. 8:32). Therefore God does not al- other disciples, not that He loved him only, but that He ways love more the better things. loved him more than the rest.” Therefore God does not Objection 2. Further, an angel is better than a man. always love more the better things. Hence it is said of man: “Thou hast made him a little less Objection 4. Further, the innocent man is better than than the angels” (Ps. 8:6). But God loved men more than the repentant, since repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 He loved the angels, for it is said: “Nowhere doth He take in Isa.), “a second plank after shipwreck.” But God loves hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh the penitent more than the innocent; since He rejoices over hold” (Heb. 2:16). Therefore God does not always love him the more. For it is said: “I say to you that there shall more the better things. be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance, Objection 3. Further, Peter was better than John, more than upon ninety-nine just who need not penance” since he loved Christ more. Hence the Lord, knowing (Lk. 15:7). Therefore God does not always love more the 119 better things. he says, loves more the contemplative life, since He pre- Objection 5. Further, the just man who is foreknown serves it longer. For it does not end, as the active life does, is better than the predestined sinner. Now God loves more with the life of the body. the predestined sinner, since He wills for him a greater Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His mem- good, life eternal. Therefore God does not always love bers, and therefore was loved more by Christ also, for more the better things. which reason He gave him the care of the Church; but On the contrary, Everything loves what is like it, as that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was loved appears from (Ecclus. 13:19): “Every beast loveth its more by Him; on which account Christ commended His like.” Now the better a thing is, the more like is it to God. mother to his care. Others say that it is uncertain which of Therefore the better things are more loved by God. them loved Christ more with the love of charity, and un- I answer that, It must needs be, according to what has certain also which of them God loved more and ordained been said before, that God loves more the better things . to a greater degree of glory in eternal life. Peter is said For it has been shown (Aa. 2,3), that God’s loving one to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and thing more than another is nothing else than His willing fervor; but John to have been more loved, with respect to for that thing a greater good: because God’s will is the certain marks of familiarity which Christ showed to him cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some rather than to others, on account of his youth and purity. things are better than others, is that God wills for them While others say that Christ loved Peter more, from his a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the more excellent gift of charity; but John more, from his better things. gifts of intellect. Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was Reply to Objection 1. God loves Christ not only more the better and more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John than He loves the whole human race, but more than He was the better, and was loved the more. However, it may loves the entire created universe: because He willed for seem presumptuous to pass judgment on these matters; Him the greater good in giving Him “a name that is above since “the Lord” and no other “is the weigher of spirits” all names,” in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything (Prov. 16:2). of His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up Reply to Objection 4. The penitent and the innocent to death for the salvation of the human race; rather did He are related as exceeding and exceeded. For whether inno- become thereby a glorious conqueror: “The government cent or penitent, those are the better and better loved who was placed upon His shoulder,” according to Is. 9:6. have most grace. Other things being equal, innocence is Reply to Objection 2. God loves the human nature the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is said to assumed by the Word of God in the person of Christ more rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, be- than He loves all the angels; for that nature is better, es- cause often penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble, pecially on the ground of the union with the Godhead. and fervent. Hence Gregory commenting on these words But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing (Hom. 34 in Ev.) says that, “In battle the general loves it with the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order the soldier who after flight returns and bravely pursues the of grace and of glory: since according to Rev 21:17, the enemy, more than him who has never fled, but has never measure of a man and of an angel is the same. Yet so done a brave deed.” that, in this respect, some angels are found nobler than Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in some men, and some men nobler than some angels. But themselves, are more as conferred on the penitent, who as to natural condition an angel is better than a man. God deserved punishment, than as conferred on the innocent, therefore did not assume human nature because He loved to whom no punishment was due; just as a hundred man, absolutely speaking, more; but because the needs of pounds [marcoe] are a greater gift to a poor man than to a man were greater; just as the master of a house may give king. some costly delicacy to a sick servant, that he does not Reply to Objection 5. Since God’s will is the cause of give to his own son in sound health. goodness in things, the goodness of one who is loved by Reply to Objection 3. This doubt concerning Peter God is to be reckoned according to the time when some and John has been solved in various ways. Augustine in- good is to be given to him by divine goodness. Accord- terprets it mystically, and says that the active life, signified ing therefore to the time, when there is to be given by the by Peter, loves God more than the contemplative signified divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the by John, because the former is more conscious of the mis- sinner is better; although according to some other time he eries of this present life, and therefore the more ardently is the worse; because even according to some time he is desires to be freed from them, and depart to God. God, neither good nor bad. 120 FIRST PART, QUESTION 21 The Justice and Mercy of God (In Four Articles) After considering the divine love, we must treat of God’s justice and mercy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is justice in God? (2) Whether His justice can be called truth? (3) Whether there is mercy in God? (4) Whether in every work of God there are justice and mercy? Whether there is justice in God? Ia q. 21 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that there is not justice in God. anger. Such virtues as these can only metaphorically be For justice is divided against temperance. But temperance attributed to God; since, as stated above (q. 20, a. 1 ), in does not exist in God: neither therefore does justice. God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which Objection 2. Further, he who does whatsoever he is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the subject of wills and pleases does not work according to justice. But, those virtues. On the other hand, certain moral virtues as the Apostle says: “God worketh all things according to are concerned with works of giving and expending; such the counsel of His will” (Eph. 1:11). Therefore justice as justice, liberality, and magnificence; and these reside cannot be attributed to Him. not in the sensitive faculty, but in the will. Hence, there Objection 3. Further, the act of justice is to pay what is nothing to prevent our attributing these virtues to God; is due. But God is no man’s debtor. Therefore justice does although not in civil matters, but in such acts as are not not belong to God. unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. Objection 4. Further, whatever is in God, is His x, 8), it would be absurd to praise God for His political essence. But justice cannot belong to this. For Boethius virtues. says (De Hebdom.): “Good regards the essence; justice Reply to Objection 2. Since good as perceived by in- the act.” Therefore justice does not belong to God. tellect is the object of the will, it is impossible for God to On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 10:8): “The Lord is will anything but what His wisdom approves. This is, as just, and hath loved justice.” it were, His law of justice, in accordance with which His I answer that, There are two kinds of justice. The one will is right and just. Hence, what He does according to consists in mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and His will He does justly: as we do justly what we do ac- selling, and other kinds of intercourse and exchange. This cording to law. But whereas law comes to us from some the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) calls commutative justice, higher power, God is a law unto Himself. that directs exchange and intercourse of business. This Reply to Objection 3. To each one is due what is his does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle says: “Who own. Now that which is directed to a man is said to be hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made his own. Thus the master owns the servant, and not con- him?” (Rom. 11:35). The other consists in distribu- versely, for that is free which is its own cause. In the word tion, and is called distributive justice; whereby a ruler or debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigence or necessity a steward gives to each what his rank deserves. As then of the thing to which it is directed. Now a twofold order the proper order displayed in ruling a family or any kind has to be considered in things: the one, whereby one cre- of multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the ated thing is directed to another, as the parts of the whole, order of the universe, which is seen both in effects of na- accident to substance, and all things whatsoever to their ture and in effects of will, shows forth the justice of God. end; the other, whereby all created things are ordered to Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii, 4): “We must God. Thus in the divine operations debt may be regarded needs see that God is truly just, in seeing how He gives to in two ways, as due either to God, or to creatures, and in all existing things what is proper to the condition of each; either way God pays what is due. It is due to God that and preserves the nature of each in the order and with the there should be fulfilled in creatures what His will and powers that properly belong to it.” wisdom require, and what manifests His goodness. In this Reply to Objection 1. Certain of the moral virtues respect, God’s justice regards what befits Him; inasmuch are concerned with the passions, as temperance with con- as He renders to Himself what is due to Himself. It is also cupiscence, fortitude with fear and daring, meekness with due to a created thing that it should possess what is or- 121 dered to it; thus it is due to man to have hands, and that 10): “When Thou dost punish the wicked, it is just, since other animals should serve him. Thus also God exercises it agrees with their deserts; and when Thou dost spare the justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by its wicked, it is also just; since it befits Thy goodness.” nature and condition. This debt however is derived from Reply to Objection 4. Although justice regards act, the former; since what is due to each thing is due to it this does not prevent its being the essence of God; since as ordered to it according to the divine wisdom. And al- even that which is of the essence of a thing may be the though God in this way pays each thing its due, yet He principle of action. But good does not always regard act; Himself is not the debtor, since He is not directed to other since a thing is called good not merely with respect to act, things, but rather other things to Him. Justice, therefore, but also as regards perfection in its essence. For this rea- in God is sometimes spoken of as the fitting accompani- son it is said (De Hebdom.) that the good is related to the ment of His goodness; sometimes as the reward of merit. just, as the general to the special. Anselm touches on either view where he says (Prosolog. Whether the justice of God is truth? Ia q. 21 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that the justice of God is not is the rule or measure of things, truth consists in the equa- truth. For justice resides in the will; since, as Anselm says tion of the thing to the mind; just as the work of an artist (Dial. Verit. 13), it is a rectitude of the will, whereas truth is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his art. resides in the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. Now as works of art are related to art, so are works of vi; Ethic. vi, 2,6). Therefore justice does not appertain to justice related to the law with which they accord. There- truth. fore God’s justice, which establishes things in the order Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher conformable to the rule of His wisdom, which is the law (Ethic. iv, 7), truth is a virtue distinct from justice. Truth of His justice, is suitably called truth. Thus we also in therefore does not appertain to the idea of justice. human affairs speak of the truth of justice. On the contrary, it is said (Ps. 84:11): “Mercy and Reply to Objection 1. Justice, as to the law that gov- truth have met each other”: where truth stands for justice. erns, resides in the reason or intellect; but as to the com- I answer that, Truth consists in the equation of mind mand whereby our actions are governed according to the and thing, as said above (q. 16, a. 1). Now the mind, that law, it resides in the will. is the cause of the thing, is related to it as its rule and Reply to Objection 2. The truth of which the Philoso- measure; whereas the converse is the case with the mind pher is speaking in this passage, is that virtue whereby a that receives its knowledge from things. When therefore man shows himself in word and deed such as he really things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth consists is. Thus it consists in the conformity of the sign with the in the equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in our- thing signified; and not in that of the effect with its cause selves. For according as a thing is, or is not, our thoughts and rule: as has been said regarding the truth of justice. or our words about it are true or false. But when the mind Whether mercy can be attributed to God? Ia q. 21 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that mercy cannot be attributed is said to be merciful [misericors], as being, so to speak, to God. For mercy is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says sorrowful at heart [miserum cor]; being affected with sor- (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But there is no sorrow in God; and row at the misery of another as though it were his own. therefore there is no mercy in Him. Hence it follows that he endeavors to dispel the misery Objection 2. Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of But God cannot remit what appertains to His justice. For mercy. To sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others it is said (2 Tim. 2:13): “If we believe not, He continueth belongs not to God; but it does most properly belong to faithful: He cannot deny Himself.” But He would deny Him to dispel that misery, whatever be the defect we call Himself, as a gloss says, if He should deny His words. by that name. Now defects are not removed, except by Therefore mercy is not becoming to God. the perfection of some kind of goodness; and the primary On the contrary, it is said (Ps. 110:4): “He is a mer- source of goodness is God, as shown above (q. 6 , a. 4). ciful and gracious Lord.” It must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections I answer that, Mercy is especially to be attributed to appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also to His God, as seen in its effect, but not as an affection of pas- justice, liberality, and mercy; yet under different aspects. sion. In proof of which it must be considered that a person The communicating of perfections, absolutely considered, 122 appertains to goodness, as shown above (q. 6, Aa. 1,4); in than justice; thus a man who pays another two hundred so far as perfections are given to things in proportion, the pieces of money, though owing him only one hundred, bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been already does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or merci- said (a. 1); in so far as God does not bestow them for His fully. The case is the same with one who pardons an of- own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs fence committed against him, for in remitting it he may be to liberality; in so far as perfections given to things by said to bestow a gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission God expel defects, it belongs to mercy. a forgiving: “Forgive one another, as Christ has forgiven Reply to Objection 1. This argument is based on you” (Eph. 4:32). Hence it is clear that mercy does not mercy, regarded as an affection of passion. destroy justice, but in a sense is the fulness thereof. And Reply to Objection 2. God acts mercifully, not indeed thus it is said: “Mercy exalteth itself above judgement” by going against His justice, but by doing something more (James 2:13). Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice? Ia q. 21 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that not in every work of God if this is due to a creature, it must be due on account of are mercy and justice. For some works of God are at- something that precedes. And since we cannot go on to tributed to mercy, as the justification of the ungodly; and infinity, we must come to something that depends only others to justice, as the damnation of the wicked. Hence on the goodness of the divine will—which is the ultimate it is said: “Judgment without mercy to him that hath not end. We may say, for instance, that to possess hands is done mercy” (James 2:13). Therefore not in every work due to man on account of his rational soul; and his rational of God do mercy and justice appear. soul is due to him that he may be man; and his being man Objection 2. Further, the Apostle attributes the con- is on account of the divine goodness. So in every work of version of the Jews to justice and truth, but that of the God, viewed at its primary source, there appears mercy. In Gentiles to mercy (Rom. 15). Therefore not in every work all that follows, the power of mercy remains, and works of God are justice and mercy. indeed with even greater force; as the influence of the first Objection 3. Further, many just persons are afflicted cause is more intense than that of second causes. For this in this world; which is unjust. Therefore not in every work reason does God out of abundance of His goodness be- of God are justice and mercy. stow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully Objection 4. Further, it is the part of justice to pay than is proportionate to their deserts: since less would suf- what is due, but of mercy to relieve misery. Thus both fice for preserving the order of justice than what the divine justice and mercy presuppose something in their works: goodness confers; because between creatures and God’s whereas creation presupposes nothing. Therefore in cre- goodness there can be no proportion. ation neither mercy nor justice is found. Reply to Objection 1. Certain works are attributed On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 24:10): “All the ways to justice, and certain others to mercy, because in some of the Lord are mercy and truth.” justice appears more forcibly and in others mercy. Even I answer that, Mercy and truth are necessarily found in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, in all God’s works, if mercy be taken to mean the removal though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates, of any kind of defect. Not every defect, however, can in punishing short of what is deserved. properly be called a misery; but only defect in a ratio- In the justification of the ungodly, justice is seen, when nal nature whose lot is to be happy; for misery is opposed God remits sins on account of love, though He Himself to happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because has mercifully infused that love. So we read of Mag- since a debt paid according to the divine justice is one due dalen: “Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath either to God, or to some creature, neither the one nor the loved much” (Lk. 7:47). other can be lacking in any work of God: because God Reply to Objection 2. God’s justice and mercy appear can do nothing that is not in accord with His wisdom and both in the conversion of the Jews and of the Gentiles. But goodness; and it is in this sense, as we have said, that an aspect of justice appears in the conversion of the Jews anything is due to God. Likewise, whatever is done by which is not seen in the conversion of the Gentiles; inas- Him in created things, is done according to proper order much as the Jews were saved on account of the promises and proportion wherein consists the idea of justice. Thus made to the fathers. justice must exist in all God’s works. Now the work of di- Reply to Objection 3. Justice and mercy appear in vine justice always presupposes the work of mercy; and is the punishment of the just in this world, since by afflic- founded thereupon. For nothing is due to creatures, except tions lesser faults are cleansed in them, and they are the for something pre-existing in them, or foreknown. Again, more raised up from earthly affections to God. As to this 123 Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 9): “The evils that press on us justice is preserved in creation; by the production of be-in this world force us to go to God.” ings in a manner that accords with the divine wisdom and Reply to Objection 4. Although creation presupposes goodness. And the idea of mercy, also, is preserved in the nothing in the universe; yet it does presuppose something change of creatures from non-existence to existence. in the knowledge of God. In this way too the idea of 124 FIRST PART, QUESTION 22 The Providence of God (In Four Articles) Having considered all that relates to the will absolutely, we must now proceed to those things which have relation to both the intellect and the will, namely providence, in respect to all created things; predestination and reprobation and all that is connected with these acts in respect especially of man as regards his eternal salvation. For in the science of morals, after the moral virtues themselves, comes the consideration of prudence, to which providence would seem to belong. Concerning God’s providence there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether providence is suitably assigned to God? (2) Whether everything comes under divine providence? (3) Whether divine providence is immediately concerned with all things? (4) Whether divine providence imposes any necessity upon things foreseen? Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God? Ia q. 22 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that providence is not becoming past, and understanding of the present; inasmuch as from to God. For providence, according to Tully (De Invent. the remembrance of what is past and the understanding of ii), is a part of prudence. But prudence, since, accord- what is present, we gather how to provide for the future. ing to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9,18), it gives good Now it belongs to prudence, according to the Philoso- counsel, cannot belong to God, Who never has any doubt pher (Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things towards an end for which He should take counsel. Therefore providence whether in regard to oneself—as for instance, a man is cannot belong to God. said to be prudent, who orders well his acts towards the Objection 2. Further, whatever is in God, is eter- end of life–or in regard to others subject to him, in a fam- nal. But providence is not anything eternal, for it is con- ily, city or kingdom; in which sense it is said (Mat. 24:45), cerned with existing things that are not eternal, according “a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29). Therefore there is over his family.” In this way prudence or providence may no providence in God. suitably be attributed to God. For in God Himself there Objection 3. Further, there is nothing composite in can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the last God. But providence seems to be something composite, end. This type of order in things towards an end is there- because it includes both the intellect and the will. There- fore in God called providence. Whence Boethius says (De fore providence is not in God. Consol. iv, 6) that “Providence is the divine type itself, On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 14:3): “But Thou, seated in the Supreme Ruler; which disposeth all things”: Father, governest all things by providence∗.” which disposition may refer either to the type of the order I answer that, It is necessary to attribute providence of things towards an end, or to the type of the order of to God. For all the good that is in created things has been parts in the whole. created by God, as was shown above (q. 6, a. 4). In cre- Reply to Objection 1. According to the Philoso- ated things good is found not only as regards their sub- pher (Ethic. vi, 9,10), “Prudence is what, strictly speak- stance, but also as regards their order towards an end and ing, commands all that ‘ebulia’ has rightly counselled and especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the ‘synesis’ rightly judged”†. Whence, though to take coun- divine goodness (q. 21, a. 4). This good of order existing sel may not be fitting to God, from the fact that counsel is in things created, is itself created by God. Since, how- an inquiry into matters that are doubtful, nevertheless to ever, God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus give a command as to the ordering of things towards an it behooves that the type of every effect should pre-exist end, the right reason of which He possesses, does belong in Him, as is clear from what has gone before (q. 19, a. 4), to God, according to Ps. 148:6: “He hath made a decree, it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards and it shall not pass away.” In this manner both prudence their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type and providence belong to God. Although at the same time of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, it may be said that the very reason of things to be done is providence. For it is the chief part of prudence, to which called counsel in God; not because of any inquiry neces- two other parts are directed—namely, remembrance of the sitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to which ∗ Vulg. But ‘Thy providence, O Father, governeth it.’ † Cf. Ia IIae, q. 57, a. 6 125 those who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is tellect; but presupposes the act of willing the end. No-said: “Who worketh all things according to the counsel of body gives a precept about things done for an end; un- His will” (Eph. 1:11). less he will that end. Hence prudence presupposes the Reply to Objection 2. Two things pertain to the care moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty of providence—namely, the “reason of order,” which is is directed towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even called providence and disposition; and the execution of if Providence has to do with the divine will and intellect order, which is termed government. Of these, the first is equally, this would not affect the divine simplicity, since eternal, and the second is temporal. in God both the will and intellect are one and the same Reply to Objection 3. Providence resides in the in- thing, as we have said above (q. 19). Whether everything is subject to the providence of God? Ia q. 22 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that everything is not subject ing (Job 22:14): “The clouds are His covert; and He doth to divine providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by not consider our things; and He walketh about the poles of chance. If then everything was foreseen by God, nothing heaven.” Rabbi Moses, however, excluded men from the would happen by chance. And thus hazard and luck would generality of things corruptible, on account of the excel- disappear; which is against common opinion. lence of the intellect which they possess, but in reference Objection 2. Further, a wise provider excludes any to all else that suffers corruption he adhered to the opinion defect or evil, as far as he can, from those over whom he of the others. has a care. But we see many evils existing. Either, then, We must say, however, that all things are subject to di- God cannot hinder these, and thus is not omnipotent; or vine providence, not only in general, but even in their own else He does not have care for everything. individual selves. This is mad evident thus. For since ev- Objection 3. Further, whatever happens of necessity ery agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects towards does not require providence or prudence. Hence, accord- that end extends as far as the causality of the first agent ing to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9, 10,11): “Prudence extends. Whence it happens that in the effects of an agent is the right reason of things contingent concerning which something takes place which has no reference towards the there is counsel and choice.” Since, then, many things end, because the effect comes from a cause other than, happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to and outside the intention of the agent. But the causality of providence. God, Who is the first agent, extends to all being, not only Objection 4. Further, whatsoever is left to itself can- as to constituent principles of species, but also as to the in- not be subject to the providence of a governor. But men dividualizing principles; not only of things incorruptible, are left to themselves by God in accordance with the but also of things corruptible. Hence all things that exist words: “God made man from the beginning, and left him in whatsoever manner are necessarily directed by God to- in the hand of his own counsel” (Ecclus. 15:14). And par- wards some end; as the Apostle says: “Those things that ticularly in reference to the wicked: “I let them go accord- are of God are well ordered†” (Rom. 13:1). Since, there- ing to the desires of their heart” (Ps. 80:13). Everything, fore, as the providence of God is nothing less than the type therefore, cannot be subject to divine providence. of the order of things towards an end, as we have said; it Objection 5. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9): necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they par- “God doth not care for oxen∗”: and we may say the same ticipate in existence, must likewise be subject to divine of other irrational creatures. Thus everything cannot be providence. It has also been shown (q. 14, Aa. 6,11) that under the care of divine providence. God knows all things, both universal and particular. And On the contrary, It is said of Divine Wisdom: “She since His knowledge may be compared to the things them- reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things selves, as the knowledge of art to the objects of art, all sweetly” (Wis. 8:1). things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all I answer that, Certain persons totally denied the ex- things wrought by art are subject to the ordering of that istence of providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans, art. maintaining that the world was made by chance. Oth- Reply to Objection 1. There is a difference between ers taught that incorruptible things only were subject to universal and particular causes. A thing can escape the providence and corruptible things not in their individual order of a particular cause; but not the order of a univer- selves, but only according to their species; for in this re- sal cause. For nothing escapes the order of a particular spect they are incorruptible. They are represented as say- cause, except through the intervention and hindrance of ∗ Vulg. ‘Doth God take care for oxen?’ † Vulg.‘Those powers that are, are ordained of God’: ‘Quae autem sunt, a Deo ordinatae sunt.’ St. Thomas often quotes this passage, and invariably reads: ‘Quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.’ 126 some other particular cause; as, for instance, wood may to that which takes place in nature from necessity; but di-be prevented from burning, by the action of water. Since vine providence extends thus far, since God is the author then, all particular causes are included under the univer- of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved sal cause, it could not be that any effect should take place those who withdrew the course of nature from the care of outside the range of that universal cause. So far then as an divine providence, attributing it rather to the necessity of effect escapes the order of a particular cause, it is said to matter, as Democritus, and others of the ancients. be casual or fortuitous in respect to that cause; but if we Reply to Objection 4. When it is said that God left regard the universal cause, outside whose range no effect man to himself, this does not mean that man is exempt can happen, it is said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, from divine providence; but merely that he has not a pre- the meeting of two servants, although to them it appears fixed operating force determined to only the one effect; as a chance circumstance, has been fully foreseen by their in the case of natural things, which are only acted upon as master, who has purposely sent to meet at the one place, though directed by another towards an end; and do not act in such a way that the one knows not about the other. of themselves, as if they directed themselves towards an Reply to Objection 2. It is otherwise with one who end, like rational creatures, through the possession of free has care of a particular thing, and one whose providence will, by which these are able to take counsel and make is universal, because a particular provider excludes all de- a choice. Hence it is significantly said: “In the hand of fects from what is subject to his care as far as he can; his own counsel.” But since the very act of free will is whereas, one who provides universally allows some lit- traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that ev- tle defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be erything happening from the exercise of free will must hindered. Hence, corruption and defects in natural things be subject to divine providence. For human providence are said to be contrary to some particular nature; yet they is included under the providence of God, as a particular are in keeping with the plan of universal nature; inasmuch under a universal cause. God, however, extends His prov- as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another, idence over the just in a certain more excellent way than or even to the universal good: for the corruption of one over the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything hap- is the generation of another, and through this it is that a pening which would impede their final salvation. For “to species is kept in existence. Since God, then, provides them that love God, all things work together unto good” universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to (Rom. 8:28). But from the fact that He does not restrain permit certain defects in particular effects, that the per- the wicked from the evil of sin, He is said to abandon fect good of the universe may not be hindered, for if all them: not that He altogether withdraws His providence evil were prevented, much good would be absent from from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they the universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were were not preserved in existence by His providence. This no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience of was the reason that had weight with Tully, who withdrew martyrs if there were no tyrannical persecution. Thus Au- from the care of divine providence human affairs concern- gustine says (Enchiridion 2): “Almighty God would in no ing which we take counsel. wise permit evil to exist in His works, unless He were so Reply to Objection 5. Since a rational creature has, almighty and so good as to produce good even from evil.” through its free will, control over its actions, as was said It would appear that it was on account of these two ar- above (q. 19, a. 10), it is subject to divine providence in guments to which we have just replied, that some were an especial manner, so that something is imputed to it as a persuaded to consider corruptible things—e.g. casual and fault, or as a merit; and there is given it accordingly some- evil things—as removed from the care of divine provi- thing by way of punishment or reward. In this way, the dence. Apostle withdraws oxen from the care of God: not, how- Reply to Objection 3. Man is not the author of na- ever, that individual irrational creatures escape the care of ture; but he uses natural things in applying art and virtue divine providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses. to his own use. Hence human providence does not reach Whether God has immediate providence over everything? Ia q. 22 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that God has not immediate providence over all things. providence over all things. For whatever is contained in Objection 2. Further, it belongs to providence to or- the notion of dignity, must be attributed to God. But it der all things to an end. Now the end of everything is its belongs to the dignity of a king, that he should have min- perfection and its good. But it appertains to every cause to isters; through whose mediation he provides for his sub- direct its effect to good; wherefore every active cause is a jects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate cause of the effect of providence. If therefore God were to 127 have immediate providence over all things, all secondary idence. First, one which belongs to the supreme Deity, causes would be withdrawn. Who first and foremost has provision over spiritual things, Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion and thus over the whole world as regards genus, species, 17) that, “It is better to be ignorant of some things than and universal causes. The second providence, which is to know them, for example, vile things”: and the Philoso- over the individuals of all that can be generated and cor- pher says the same (Metaph. xii, 51). But whatever is rupted, he attributed to the divinities who circulate in the better must be assigned to God. Therefore He has not im- heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which move mediate providence over bad and vile things. corporeal things in a circular direction. The third provi- On the contrary, It is said (Job 34:13): “What other dence, over human affairs, he assigned to demons, whom hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set the Platonic philosophers placed between us and the gods, over the world which He made?” On which passage Gre- as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei, 1, 2: viii, 14). gory says (Moral. xxiv, 20): “Himself He ruleth the world Reply to Objection 1. It pertains to a king’s dignity to which He Himself hath made.” have ministers who execute his providence. But the fact I answer that, Two things belong to providence— that he has not the plan of those things which are done by namely, the type of the order of things foreordained to- them arises from a deficiency in himself. For every oper- wards an end; and the execution of this order, which is ative science is the more perfect, the more it considers the called government. As regards the first of these, God has particular things with which its action is concerned. immediate providence over everything, because He has in Reply to Objection 2. God’s immediate provision His intellect the types of everything, even the smallest; over everything does not exclude the action of secondary and whatsoever causes He assigns to certain effects, He causes; which are the executors of His order, as was said gives them the power to produce those effects. Whence above (q. 19, Aa. 5,8). it must be that He has beforehand the type of those ef- Reply to Objection 3. It is better for us not to know fects in His mind. As to the second, there are certain in- low and vile things, because by them we are impeded in termediaries of God’s providence; for He governs things our knowledge of what is better and higher; for we can- inferior by superior, not on account of any defect in His not understand many things simultaneously; because the power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards evil. that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures. This does not hold with God, Who sees everything simul- Thus Plato’s opinion, as narrated by Gregory of Nyssa (De taneously at one glance, and whose will cannot turn in the Provid. viii, 3), is exploded. He taught a threefold prov- direction of evil. Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen? Ia q. 22 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that divine providence imposes providence does not therefore impose any necessity upon necessity upon things foreseen. For every effect that has things so as to destroy their contingency. a “per se” cause, either present or past, which it necessar- I answer that, Divine providence imposes necessity ily follows, happens from necessity; as the Philosopher upon some things; not upon all, as some formerly be- proves (Metaph. vi, 7). But the providence of God, since lieved. For to providence it belongs to order things to- it is eternal, pre-exists; and the effect flows from it of ne- wards an end. Now after the divine goodness, which cessity, for divine providence cannot be frustrated. There- is an extrinsic end to all things, the principal good in fore divine providence imposes a necessity upon things things themselves is the perfection of the universe; which foreseen. would not be, were not all grades of being found in things. Objection 2. Further, every provider makes his work Whence it pertains to divine providence to produce every as stable as he can, lest it should fail. But God is most grade of being. And thus it has prepared for some things powerful. Therefore He assigns the stability of necessity necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity; for to things provided. others contingent causes, that they may happen by contin- Objection 3. Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, gency, according to the nature of their proximate causes. 6): “Fate from the immutable source of providence binds Reply to Objection 1. The effect of divine providence together human acts and fortunes by the indissoluble con- is not only that things should happen somehow; but that nection of causes.” It seems therefore that providence im- they should happen either by necessity or by contingency. poses necessity upon things foreseen. Therefore whatsoever divine providence ordains to hap- On the contrary, Dionysius says that (Div. Nom. iv, pen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly and of 23) “to corrupt nature is not the work of providence.” But necessity; and that happens from contingency, which the it is in the nature of some things to be contingent. Divine plan of divine providence conceives to happen from con- 128 tingency. fect, and that in the way foreseen; but they do not pertain Reply to Objection 2. The order of divine providence to the necessity of the effects. We must remember that is unchangeable and certain, so far as all things foreseen properly speaking ‘necessary’ and “contingent” are con- happen as they have been foreseen, whether from neces- sequent upon being, as such. Hence the mode both of sity or from contingency. necessity and of contingency falls under the foresight of Reply to Objection 3. That indissolubility and un- God, who provides universally for all being; not under the changeableness of which Boethius speaks, pertain to the foresight of causes that provide only for some particular certainty of providence, which fails not to produce its ef- order of things. 129 FIRST PART, QUESTION 23 Of Predestination (In Eight Articles) After consideration of divine providence, we must treat of predestination and the book of life. Concerning predestination there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether predestination is suitably attributed to God? (2) What is predestination, and whether it places anything in the predestined? (3) Whether to God belongs the reprobation of some men? (4) On the comparison of predestination to election; whether, that is to say, the predestined are chosen? (5) Whether merits are the cause or reason of predestination, or reprobation, or election? (6) of the certainty of predestination; whether the predestined will infallibly be saved? (7) Whether the number of the predestined is certain? (8) Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints? Whether men are predestined by God? Ia q. 23 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that men are not predestined Aa. 1,2). The end towards which created things are di- by God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): “It rected by God is twofold; one which exceeds all propor- must be borne in mind that God foreknows but does not tion and faculty of created nature; and this end is life eter- predetermine everything, since He foreknows all that is in nal, that consists in seeing God which is above the nature us, but does not predetermine it all.” But human merit and of every creature, as shown above (q. 12, a. 4). The other demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which own acts by free will. All that pertains therefore to merit end created being can attain according to the power of its or demerit is not predestined by God; and thus man’s pre- nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the destination is done away. power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another; Objection 2. Further, all creatures are directed to thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. their end by divine providence, as was said above (q. 22, Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of Aa. 1,2). But other creatures are not said to be predestined eternal life, is led towards it, directed, as it were, by God. by God. Therefore neither are men. The reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him Objection 3. Further, the angels are capable of beat- is the type of the order of all things towards an end, which itude, as well as men. But predestination is not suitable we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the to angels, since in them there never was any unhappi- mind of the doer of something to be done, is a kind of pre- ness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine says (De existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the type praedest. sanct. 17), is the “purpose to take pity [mis- of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards the erendi]”∗. Therefore men are not predestined. end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, Objection 4. Further, the benefits God confers upon is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that predestination, as men are revealed by the Holy Ghost to holy men accord- regards its objects, is a part of providence. ing to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 2:12): “Now we Reply to Objection 1. Damascene calls predestina- have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit tion an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natu- that is of God: that we may know the things that are given ral things which are predetermined towards one end. This us from God.” Therefore if man were predestined by God, is clear from his adding: “He does not will malice, nor since predestination is a benefit from God, his predestina- does He compel virtue.” Whence predestination is not ex- tion would be made known to each predestined; which is cluded by Him. clearly false. Reply to Objection 2. Irrational creatures are not ca- On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 8:30): “Whom pable of that end which exceeds the faculty of human na- He predestined, them He also called.” ture. Whence they cannot be properly said to be predes- I answer that, It is fitting that God should predestine tined; although improperly the term is used in respect of men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was any other end. shown above (q. 22, a. 2). Now it belongs to providence Reply to Objection 3. Predestination applies to an- to direct things towards their end, as was also said (q. 22, gels, just as it does to men, although they have never been ∗ See q. 22, a. 3 130 unhappy. For movement does not take its species from the which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown previously term “wherefrom” but from the term “whereto.” Because (q. 21, Aa. 3,4). it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of making Reply to Objection 4. Even if by a special privilege white, whether he who is made white was before black, their predestination were revealed to some, it is not fit- yellow or red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of ting that it should be revealed to everyone; because, if so, the notion of predestination whether one is predestined those who were not predestined would despair; and secu- to life eternal from the state of misery or not. Although rity would beget negligence in the predestined. it may be said that every conferring of good above that Whether predestination places anything in the predestined? Ia q. 23 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that predestination does place in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. something in the predestined. For every action of itself The execution of predestination is the calling and magni- causes passion. If therefore predestination is action in fication; according to the Apostle (Rom. 8:30): “Whom God, predestination must be passion in the predestined. He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, Objection 2. Further, Origen says on the text, “He them He also magnified [Vulg. ‘justified’].” who was predestined,” etc. (Rom. 1:4): “Predestination is Reply to Objection 1. Actions passing out to external of one who is not; destination, of one who is.” And Au- matter imply of themselves passion—for example, the ac- gustine says (De Praed. Sanct.): “What is predestination tions of warming and cutting; but not so actions remaining but the destination of one who is?” Therefore predestina- in the agent, as understanding and willing, as said above tion is only of one who actually exists; and it thus places (q. 14, a. 2; q. 18, a. 3, ad 1). Predestination is an action something in the predestined. of this latter class. Wherefore, it does not put anything Objection 3. Further, preparation is something in the in the predestined. But its execution, which passes out to thing prepared. But predestination is the preparation of external things, has an effect in them. God’s benefits, as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, Reply to Objection 2. Destination sometimes denotes 14). Therefore predestination is something in the predes- a real mission of someone to a given end; thus, destination tined. can only be said of someone actually existing. It is taken, Objection 4. Further, nothing temporal enters into the however, in another sense for a mission which a person definition of eternity. But grace, which is something tem- conceives in the mind; and in this manner we are said to poral, is found in the definition of predestination. For pre- destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In destination is the preparation of grace in the present; and this latter way it is said that Eleazar “determined not to do of glory in the future. Therefore predestination is not any- any unlawful things for the love of life” (2 Macc. 6:20). thing eternal. So it must needs be that it is in the predes- Thus destination can be of a thing which does not exist. tined, and not in God; for whatever is in Him is eternal. Predestination, however, by reason of the antecedent na- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ture it implies, can be attributed to a thing which does not ii, 14) that “predestination is the foreknowledge of God’s actually exist; in whatsoever way destination is accepted. benefits.” But foreknowledge is not in the things fore- Reply to Objection 3. Preparation is twofold: of the known, but in the person who foreknows them. There- patient in respect to passion and this is in the thing pre- fore, predestination is in the one who predestines, and not pared; and of the agent to action, and this is in the agent. in the predestined. Such a preparation is predestination, and as an agent by I answer that, Predestination is not anything in the intellect is said to prepare itself to act, accordingly as it predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We preconceives the idea of what is to be done. Thus, God have said above that predestination is a part of providence. from all eternity prepared by predestination, conceiving Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; the idea of the order of some towards salvation. but is a type in the mind of the provider, as was proved Reply to Objection 4. Grace does not come into the above (q. 22, a. 1). But the execution of providence which definition of predestination, as something belonging to its is called government, is in a passive way in the thing gov- essence, but inasmuch as predestination implies a relation erned, and in an active way in the governor. Whence it to grace, as of cause to effect, and of act to its object. is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the order- Whence it does not follow that predestination is anything ing of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in temporal. the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is 131 Whether God reprobates any man? Ia q. 23 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that God reprobates no man. but also something more, as does providence, as was said For nobody reprobates what he loves. But God loves ev- above (q. 22, a. 1). Therefore, as predestination includes ery man, according to (Wis. 11:25): “Thou lovest all the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation in- things that are, and Thou hatest none of the things Thou cludes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to hast made.” Therefore God reprobates no man. impose the punishment of damnation on account of that Objection 2. Further, if God reprobates any man, it sin. would be necessary for reprobation to have the same re- Reply to Objection 1. God loves all men and all crea- lation to the reprobates as predestination has to the pre- tures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He destined. But predestination is the cause of the salvation does not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore, of the predestined. Therefore reprobation will likewise be as He does not wish this particular good—namely, eternal the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this false. For life—He is said to hate or reprobated them. it is said (Osee 13:9): “Destruction is thy own, O Israel; Reply to Objection 2. Reprobation differs in its Thy help is only in Me.” God does not, then, reprobate causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both any man. of what is expected in the future life by the predestined— Objection 3. Further, to no one ought anything be im- namely, glory—and of what is received in this life— puted which he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates any- namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of one, that one must perish. For it is said (Eccles. 7:14): what is in the present—namely, sin; but it is the cause “Consider the works of God, that no man can correct of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of whom He hath despised.” Therefore it could not be im- what is assigned in the future—namely, eternal punish- puted to any man, were he to perish. But this is false. ment. But guilt proceeds from the free-will of the person Therefore God does not reprobate anyone. who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way, the On the contrary, It is said (Malachi 1:2,3): “I have word of the prophet is true—namely, “Destruction is thy loved Jacob, but have hated Esau.” own, O Israel.” I answer that, God does reprobate some. For it was Reply to Objection 3. Reprobation by God does not said above (a. 1) that predestination is a part of provi- take anything away from the power of the person repro- dence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit cer- bated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated cannot tain defects in those things which are subject to provi- obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying ab- dence, as was said above (q. 22, a. 2). Thus, as men are solute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility: ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it as was said above (q. 19, a. 3), that the predestined must likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which away from that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as does not do away with the liberty of choice. Whence, al- predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those though anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin providence in regard to those who turn aside from that comes from the use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, imputed to him as guilt. Whether the predestined are chosen by God? ∗ Ia q. 23 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that the predestined are not cho- Objection 3. Further, election implies some discrim- sen by God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1) that as ination. Now God “wills all men to be saved” (1 Tim. the corporeal sun sends his rays upon all without selec- 2:4). Therefore, predestination which ordains men to- tion, so does God His goodness. But the goodness of God wards eternal salvation, is without election. is communicated to some in an especial manner through On the contrary, It is said (Eph. 1:4): “He chose us a participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without in Him before the foundation of the world.” any selection communicates His grace and glory; and this I answer that, Predestination presupposes election in belongs to predestination. the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The Objection 2. Further, election is of things that ex- reason of this is that predestination, as stated above (a. 1), ist. But predestination from all eternity is also of things is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, which do not exist. Therefore, some are predestined with- is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering of out election. some things towards an end; as was proved above (q. 22, ∗ “Eligantur.” 132 a. 2). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the divine goodness in general be considered, God communi-will for that end already exists. Whence the predestina- cates His goodness without election; inasmuch as there is tion of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order nothing which does not in some way share in His good- of reason, that God wills their salvation; and to this belong ness, as we said above (q. 6, a. 4). But if we consider the both election and love:—love, inasmuch as He wills them communication of this or that particular good, He does this particular good of eternal salvation; since to love is not allot it without election; since He gives certain goods to wish well to anyone, as stated above (q. 20, Aa. 2,3):— to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in prefer- the conferring of grace and glory election is implied. ence to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above Reply to Objection 2. When the will of the person (a. 3). Election and love, however, are differently ordered choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in lov- pre-existing in the object chosen, the choice must needs ing does not cause good, but we are incited to love by be of those things which already exist, as happens in our the good which already exists; and therefore we choose choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above (q. 20, someone to love, and so election in us precedes love. In a. 2). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in “Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that not err in His choice.” good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it Reply to Objection 3. God wills all men to be saved is clear that love precedes election in the order of reason, by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but rel- and election precedes predestination. Whence all the pre- atively; and not by His consequent will, which is to will destinate are objects of election and love. simply. Reply to Objection 1. If the communication of the Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination? Ia q. 23 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that foreknowledge of merits is was said above (a. 4), the reason of predestination must be the cause of predestination. For the Apostle says (Rom. sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will 8:29): “Whom He foreknew, He also predestined.” Again of God. Now it was shown above (q. 19, a. 5 ), that we a gloss of Ambrose on Rom. 9:15: “I will have mercy cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of upon whom I will have mercy” says: “I will give mercy the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the part to him who, I foresee, will turn to Me with his whole of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on heart.” Therefore it seems the foreknowledge of merits account of something else. Wherefore nobody has been is the cause of predestination. so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine pre- Objection 2. Further, Divine predestination includes destination as regards the act of the predestinator. But this the divine will, which by no means can be irrational; since is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predesti- predestination is “the purpose to have mercy,” as Augus- nation has any cause; or what comes to the same thing, tine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 17). But there can be no whether God pre-ordained that He would give the effect other reason for predestination than the foreknowledge of of predestination to anyone on account of any merits. merits. Therefore it must be the cause of reason of pre- Accordingly there were some who held that the effect destination. of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account Objection 3. Further, “There is no injustice in God” of pre-existing merits in a former life. This was the opin- (Rom. 9:14). Now it would seem unjust that unequal ion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men were things be given to equals. But all men are equal as regards created in the beginning, and according to the diversity of both nature and original sin; and inequality in them arises their works different states were assigned to them in this from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore world when united with the body. The Apostle, however, God does not prepare unequal things for men by predesti- rebuts this opinion where he says (Rom. 9:11,12): “For nating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge when they were not yet born, nor had done any good or of their merits and demerits. evil. . . not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said of On the contrary, The Apostle says (Titus 3:5): “Not her: The elder shall serve the younger.” by works of justice which we have done, but according to Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the His mercy He saved us.” But as He saved us, so He pre- reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the destined that we should be saved. Therefore, foreknowl- Pelagians taught that the beginning of doing well came edge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination. from us; and the consummation from God: so that it came I answer that, Since predestination includes will, as about that the effect of predestination was granted to one, 133 and not to another, because the one made a beginning by manner of a final cause; as was explained above. preparing, whereas the other did not. But against this we Reply to Objection 2. Predestination has its founda- have the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 3:5), that “we tion in the goodness of God as regards its effects in gen- are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of our- eral. Considered in its particular effects, however, one selves.” Now no principle of action can be imagined pre- effect is the reason of another; as already stated. vious to the act of thinking. Wherefore it cannot be said Reply to Objection 3. The reason for the predestina- that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect tion of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought of predestination. for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made And so others said that merits following the effect of all things through His goodness, so that the divine good- predestination are the reason of predestination; giving us ness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary to understand that God gives grace to a person, and pre- that God’s goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, ordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand should be manifested in many ways in His creation; be- that He will make good use of that grace, as if a king were cause creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplic- to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make ity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the uni- good use of it. But these seem to have drawn a distinc- verse there are required different grades of being; some tion between that which flows from grace, and that which of which hold a high and some a low place in the uni- flows from free will, as if the same thing cannot come verse. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace is in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things the effect of predestination; and this cannot be considered should never happen, as was said above (q. 22, a. 2). as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we notion of predestination. Therefore, if anything else in us consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His be the reason of predestination, it will outside the effect goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predes- of predestination. Now there is no distinction between tines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His as there is not distinction between what flows from a sec- justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God ondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, God produces effects through the operation of secondary saying (Rom. 9:22,23): “What if God, willing to show causes, as was above shown (q. 22, a. 3). Wherefore, that His wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We make His power known, endured [that is, permitted] with must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination may much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that be considered in a twofold light—in one way, in particu- He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of lar; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predes- mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory” and (2 Tim. tination should not be the reason or cause of another; a 2:20): “But in a great house there are not only vessels of subsequent effect being the reason of a previous effect, as gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of indeed, unto honor, but some unto dishonor.” Yet why the subsequent as its meritorious cause, which is reduced He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that reason, except the divine will. Whence Augustine says God pre-ordained to give glory on account of merit, and (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): “Why He draws one, and another that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory. In an- He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to other way, the effect of predestination may be considered err.” Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the ef- assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why fect of predestination in general should have any cause as one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, him towards salvation, is all included under the effect of that there might be a diversity of species in things of na- predestination; even the preparation for grace. For neither ture. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this does this happen otherwise than by divine help, accord- particular form, and that under another, depends upon the ing to the prophet Jeremias (Lam. 5:21): “convert us, O simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted.” Yet predesti- it depends that this stone is in part of the wall, and that nation has in this way, in regard to its effect, the goodness in another; although the plan requires that some stones of God for its reason; towards which the whole effect of should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on predestination is directed as to an end; and from which it this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He proceeds, as from its first moving principle. prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This would Reply to Objection 1. The use of grace foreknown by be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect God is not the cause of conferring grace, except after the of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratu- 134 itously. In things which are given gratuitously, a person justice. This is what the master of the house said: “Take can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he de- what is thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do prives nobody of his due), without any infringement of what I will?” (Mat. 20:14,15). Whether predestination is certain? Ia q. 23 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that predestination is not cer- q. 19, a. 4) must also be taken into consideration; since tain. Because on the words “Hold fast that which thou they do not destroy contingency in things, although they hast, that no one take thy crown,” (Rev 3:11), Augustine themselves are most certain and infallible. says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): “Another will not receive, Reply to Objection 1. The crown may be said to be- unless this one were to lose it.” Hence the crown which is long to a person in two ways; first, by God’s predestina- the effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost. tion, and thus no one loses his crown: secondly, by the Therefore predestination cannot be certain. merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain way is ours; Objection 2. Further, granted what is possible, noth- and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal sin. An- ing impossible follows. But it is possible that one other person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he predestined—e.g. Peter—may sin and then be killed. But takes the former’s place. For God does not permit some to if this were so, it would follow that the effect of predes- fall, without raising others; according to Job 34:24: “He tination would be thwarted. This then, is not impossible. shall break in pieces many and innumerable, and make Therefore predestination is not certain. others to stand in their stead.” Thus men are substituted Objection 3. Further, whatever God could do in the in the place of the fallen angels; and the Gentiles in that past, He can do now. But He could have not predestined of the Jews. He who is substituted for another in the state whom He hath predestined. Therefore now He is able not of grace, also receives the crown of the fallen in that in to predestine him. Therefore predestination is not certain. eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has done, On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 8:29: “Whom He in which life he will rejoice at all good whether done by foreknew, He also predestinated”, says: “Predestination himself or by others. is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of Reply to Objection 2. Although it is possible for one God, by which whosoever are freed will most certainly be who is predestinated considered in himself to die in mor- freed.” tal sin; yet it is not possible, supposed, as in fact it is sup-I answer that, Predestination most certainly and infal- posed. that he is predestinated. Whence it does not follow libly takes effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that predestination can fall short of its effect. that, namely, its effect should take place from necessity. Reply to Objection 3. Since predestination includes For it was said above (a. 1), that predestination is a part the divine will as stated above (a. 4): and the fact that of providence. But not all things subject to providence God wills any created thing is necessary on the supposi- are necessary; some things happening from contingency, tion that He so wills, on account of the immutability of the according to the nature of the proximate causes, which di- divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so the same vine providence has ordained for such effects. Yet the or- must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not der of providence is infallible, as was shown above (q. 22, to say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He a. 4). So also the order of predestination is certain; yet has predestinated, taking it in a composite sense, thought, free-will is not destroyed; whence the effect of predes- absolutely speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in tination has its contingency. Moreover all that has been this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed. said about the divine knowledge and will (q. 14, a. 13; Whether the number of the predestined is certain? Ia q. 23 a. 7 Objection 1. It seems that the number of the predes- Objection 2. Further, no reason can be assigned why tined is not certain. For a number to which an addition God pre-ordains to salvation one number of men more can be made is not certain. But there can be an addition than another. But nothing is arranged by God without a to the number of the predestined as it seems; for it is writ- reason. Therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained ten (Dt. 1:11): “The Lord God adds to this number many by God cannot be certain. thousands,” and a gloss adds, “fixed by God, who knows Objection 3. Further, the operations of God are more those who belong to Him.” Therefore the number of the perfect than those of nature. But in the works of nature, predestined is not certain. good is found in the majority of things; defect and evil in 135 the minority. If, then, the number of the saved were fixed much as the good of the species is preserved through by God at a certain figure, there would be more saved than them. Whence, although God knows the total number of lost. Yet the contrary follows from Mat. 7:13,14: “For individuals, the number of oxen, flies and such like, is not wide is the gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruc- pre-ordained by God “per se”; but divine providence pro- tion, and many there are who go in thereat. How narrow duces just so many as are sufficient for the preservation is the gate, and strait is the way that leadeth to life; and of the species. Now of all creatures the rational creature few there are who find it!” Therefore the number of those is chiefly ordained for the good of the universe, being as pre-ordained by God to be saved is not certain. such incorruptible; more especially those who attain to On the contrary, Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the 13): “The number of the predestined is certain, and can ultimate end. Whence the number of the predestined is neither be increased nor diminished.” certain to God; not only by way of knowledge, but also by I answer that, The number of the predestined is cer- way of a principal pre-ordination. tain. Some have said that it was formally, but not materi- It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the num- ally certain; as if we were to say that it was certain that a ber of the reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained hundred or a thousand would be saved; not however these by God for the good of the elect, in whose regard “all or those individuals. But this destroys the certainty of pre- things work together unto good” (Rom. 8:28). Concern- destination; of which we spoke above (a. 6). Therefore ing the number of all the predestined, some say that so we must say that to God the number of the predestined many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as is certain, not only formally, but also materially. It must, there were angels left; others, as many as the number of however, be observed that the number of the predestined angels created by God. It is, however, better to say that, is said to be certain to God, not by reason of His knowl- “to God alone is known the number for whom is reserved edge, because, that is to say, He knows how many will eternal happiness∗” be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and Reply to Objection 1. These words of Deuteronomy the sands of the sea are certain to God); but by reason of must be taken as applied to those who are marked out His deliberate choice and determination. For the further by God beforehand in respect to present righteousness. evidence of which we must remember that every agent For their number is increased and diminished, but not the intends to make something finite, as is clear from what number of the predestined. has been said above when we treated of the infinite (q. 7, Reply to Objection 2. The reason of the quantity of Aa. 2,3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure any one part must be judged from the proportion of that in his effect thinks out some definite number in the essen- part of the whole. Thus in God the reason why He has tial parts, which are by their very nature required for the made so many stars, or so many species of things, or pre- perfection of the whole. For of those things which are re- destined so many, is according to the proportion of the quired not principally, but only on account of something principal parts to the good of the whole universe. else, he does not select any definite number “per se”; but Reply to Objection 3. The good that is proportionate he accepts and uses them in such numbers as are neces- to the common state of nature is to be found in the major- sary on account of that other thing. For instance, a builder ity; and is wanting in the minority. The good that exceeds thinks out the definite measurements of a house, and also the common state of nature is to be found in the minority, the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is clear that the in the house; and definite measurements of the walls and majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guid- roof; he does not, however, select a definite number of ance of life; and those who have not this knowledge are stones, but accepts and uses just so many as are sufficient said to be half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a for the required measurements of the wall. So also must profound knowledge of things intelligible are a very small we consider concerning God in regard to the whole uni- minority in respect to the rest. Since their eternal happi- verse, which is His effect. For He pre-ordained the mea- ness, consisting in the vision of God, exceeds the common surements of the whole of the universe, and what number state of nature, and especially in so far as this is deprived would befit the essential parts of that universe—that is to of grace through the corruption of original sin, those who say, which have in some way been ordained in perpetuity; are saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, how many spheres, how many stars, how many elements, appears the mercy of God, that He has chosen some for and how many species. Individuals, however, which un- that salvation, from which very many in accordance with dergo corruption, are not ordained as it were chiefly for the common course and tendency of nature fall short. the good of the universe, but in a secondary way, inas- ∗ From the ‘secret’ prayer of the missal, ‘pro vivis et defunctis.’ 136 Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints? Ia q. 23 a. 8 Objection 1. It seems that predestination cannot be nation two things are to be considered—namely, the di- furthered by the prayers of the saints. For nothing eter- vine ordination; and its effect. As regards the former, in nal can be preceded by anything temporal; and in conse- no possible way can predestination be furthered by the quence nothing temporal can help towards making some- prayers of the saints. For it is not due to their prayers that thing else eternal. But predestination is eternal. There- anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, pre- fore, since the prayers of the saints are temporal, they destination is said to be helped by the prayers of the saints, cannot so help as to cause anyone to become predestined. and by other good works; because providence, of which Predestination therefore is not furthered by the prayers of predestination is a part, does not do away with secondary the saints. causes but so provides effects, that the order of secondary Objection 2. Further, as there is no need of advice causes falls also under providence. So, as natural effects except on account of defective knowledge, so there is not are provided by God in such a way that natural causes need of help except through defective power. But nei- are directed to bring about those natural effects, without ther of these things can be said of God when He predes- which those effects would not happen; so the salvation of tines. Whence it is said: “Who hath helped the Spirit of a person is predestined by God in such a way, that what- the Lord?∗ Or who hath been His counsellor?” (Rom. ever helps that person towards salvation falls under the 11:34). Therefore predestination cannot be furthered by order of predestination; whether it be one’s own prayers the prayers of the saints. or those of another; or other good works, and such like, Objection 3. Further, if a thing can be helped, it can without which one would not attain to salvation. Whence, also be hindered. But predestination cannot be hindered the predestined must strive after good works and prayer; by anything. Therefore it cannot be furthered by anything. because through these means predestination is most cer- On the contrary, It is said that “Isaac besought the tainly fulfilled. For this reason it is said: “Labor more Lord for his wife because she was barren; and He heard that by good works you may make sure your calling and him and made Rebecca to conceive” (Gn. 25:21). But election” (2 Pet. 1:10). from that conception Jacob was born, and he was predes- Reply to Objection 1. This argument shows that pre- tined. Now his predestination would not have happened if destination is not furthered by the prayers of the saints, as he had never been born. Therefore predestination can be regards the preordination. furthered by the prayers of the saints. Reply to Objection 2. One is said to be helped by I answer that, Concerning this question, there were another in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as he receives different errors. Some, regarding the certainty of divine power from him: and to be helped thus belongs to the predestination, said that prayers were superfluous, as also weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we are to anything else done to attain salvation; because whether understand, “Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord?” In these things were done or not, the predestined would at- another way one is said to be helped by a person through tain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal salva- whom he carries out his work, as a master through a ser- tion. But against this opinion are all the warnings of Holy vant. In this way God is helped by us; inasmuch as we Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works. execute His orders, according to 1 Cor. 3:9: “We are Others declared that the divine predestination was al- God’s co-adjutors.” Nor is this on account of any defect tered through prayer. This is stated to have the opinion in the power of God, but because He employs intermedi- of the Egyptians, who thought that the divine ordination, ary causes, in order that the beauty of order may be pre- which they called fate, could be frustrated by certain sac- served in the universe; and also that He may communicate rifices and prayers. Against this also is the authority of to creatures the dignity of causality. Scripture. For it is said: “But the triumpher in Israel will Reply to Objection 3. Secondary causes cannot es- not spare and will not be moved to repentance” (1 Kings cape the order of the first universal cause, as has been said 15:29); and that “the gifts and the calling of God are with- above (q. 19, a. 6), indeed, they execute that order. And out repentance” (Rom. 11:29). therefore predestination can be furthered by creatures, but Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predesti- it cannot be impeded by them. ∗ Vulg.: ‘Who hath known the mind of the Lord?’ 137 FIRST PART, QUESTION 24 The Book of Life (In Three Articles) We now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three points of inquiry: (1) What is the book of life? (2) Of what life is it the book? (3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life? Whether the book of life is the same as predestination? Ia q. 24 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that the book of life is not the My commandments,” and further on, “Write them in the same thing as pre-destination. For it is said, “All things tables of thy heart.” For things are written down in mate- are the book of life” (Ecclus. 4:32)—i.e. the Old and rial books to help the memory. Whence, the knowledge of New Testament according to a gloss. This, however, is God, by which He firmly remembers that He has predes- not predestination. Therefore the book of life is not pre- tined some to eternal life, is called the book of life. For as destination. the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done, so Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei the knowledge of God is a sign in Him of those who are to xx, 14) that “the book of life is a certain divine energy, by be brought to eternal life, according to 2 Tim. 11:19: “The which it happens that to each one his good or evil works sure foundation of God standeth firm, having this seal; the are recalled to memory.” But divine energy belongs seem- Lord knoweth who are His.” ingly, not to predestination, but rather to divine power. Reply to Objection 1. The book of life may be un- Therefore the book of life is not the same thing as predes- derstood in two senses. In one sense as the inscription tination. of those who are chosen to life; thus we now speak of Objection 3. Further, reprobation is opposed to pre- the book of life. In another sense the inscription of those destination. So, if the book of life were the same as pre- things which lead us to life may be called the book of life; destination, there should also be a book of death, as there and this also is twofold, either as of things to be done; is a book of life. and thus the Old and New Testament are called a book of On the contrary, It is said in a gloss upon Ps. 68:29, life; or of things already done, and thus that divine en- “Let them be blotted out of the book of the living. This ergy by which it happens that to each one his deeds will book is the knowledge of God, by which He hath predes- be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the book of life. tined to life those whom He foreknew.” Thus that also may be called the book of war, whether it I answer that, The book of life is in God taken in a contains the names inscribed of those chosen for military metaphorical sense, according to a comparison with hu- service; or treats of the art of warfare, or relates the deeds man affairs. For it is usual among men that they who are of soldiers. chosen for any office should be inscribed in a book; as, Hence the solution of the Second Objection. for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who formerly were Reply to Objection 3. It is the custom to inscribe, not called “conscript” fathers. Now it is clear from the pre- those who are rejected, but those who are chosen. Whence ceding (q. 23, a. 4) that all the predestined are chosen by there is no book of death corresponding to reprobation; as God to possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore, the book of life to predestination. of the predestined is called the book of life. A thing is Reply to Objection 4. Predestination and the book of said metaphorically to be written upon the mind of any- life are different aspects of the same thing. For this latter one when it is firmly held in the memory, according to implies the knowledge of predestination; as also is made Prov. 3:3: “Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep clear from the gloss quoted above. Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the predestined? Ia q. 24 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that the book of life does not life is so called in regard to divine life; and not only in only regard the life of glory of the predestined. For the regard to the life of the predestined. book of life is the knowledge of life. But God, through Objection 2. Further, as the life of glory comes from His own life, knows all other life. Therefore the book of God, so also does the life of nature. Therefore, if the 138 knowledge of the life of glory is called the book of life; directed. But the life of glory is an end exceeding hu-so also should the knowledge of the life of nature be so man nature, as said above (q. 23, a. 1). Wherefore, strictly called. speaking, the book of life regards the life of glory. Objection 3. Further, some are chosen to the life of Reply to Objection 1. The divine life, even consid- grace who are not chosen to the life of glory; as it is clear ered as a life of glory, is natural to God; whence in His from what is said: “Have not I chosen you twelve, and regard there is no election, and in consequence no book of one of you is a devil?” (Jn. 6:71). But the book of life is life: for we do not say that anyone is chosen to possess the the inscription of the divine election, as stated above (a. 1 power of sense, or any of those things that are consequent ). Therefore it applies also to the life of grace. on nature. On the contrary, The book of life is the knowledge From this we gather the Reply to the Second Objec- of predestination, as stated above (a. 1). But predestina- tion. For there is no election, nor a book of life, as regards tion does not regard the life of grace, except so far as it is the life of nature. directed to glory; for those are not predestined who have Reply to Objection 3. The life of grace has the aspect, grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book of life alto- not of an end, but of something directed towards an end. gether is only so called in regard to the life of glory. Hence nobody is said to be chosen to the life of grace, ex- I answer that, The book of life, as stated above (a. 1), cept so far as the life of grace is directed to glory. For this implies a conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to reason those who, possessing grace, fail to obtain glory, life. Now a man is chosen for something which does not are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively. Likewise belong to him by nature; and again that to which a man they are not said to be written in the book of life simply, is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a soldier is not but relatively; that is to say, that it is in the ordination and chosen or inscribed merely to put on armor, but to fight; knowledge of God that they are to have some relation to since this is the proper duty to which military service is eternal life, according to their participation in grace. Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life? Ia q. 24 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that no one may be blotted out ing.” But because not to be blotted out of the book of of the book of life. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, life is placed among the rewards of the just, according to 15): “God’s foreknowledge, which cannot be deceived, is the text, “He that shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in the book of life.” But nothing can be taken away from the white garments, and I will not blot his name out of the foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination. There- book of life” (Apoc. 3:5) (and what is promised to holy fore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of men, is not merely something in the opinion of men), it life. can therefore be said that to be blotted out, and not blot- Objection 2. Further, whatever is in a thing is in it ted out, of the book of life is not only to be referred to the according to the disposition of that thing. But the book of opinion of man, but to the reality of the fact. For the book life is something eternal and immutable. Therefore what- of life is the inscription of those ordained to eternal life, to soever is written therein, is there not in a temporary way, which one is directed from two sources; namely, from pre- but immovably, and indelibly. destination, which direction never fails, and from grace; Objection 3. Further, blotting out is the contrary to for whoever has grace, by this very fact becomes fitted inscription. But nobody can be written a second time in for eternal life. This direction fails sometimes; because the book of life. Neither therefore can he be blotted out. some are directed by possessing grace, to obtain eternal On the contrary, It is said, “Let them be blotted out life, yet they fail to obtain it through mortal sin. There- from the book of the living” (Ps. 68:29). fore those who are ordained to possess eternal life through I answer that, Some have said that none could be divine predestination are written down in the book of life blotted out of the book of life as a matter of fact, but only simply, because they are written therein to have eternal in the opinion of men. For it is customary in the Scriptures life in reality; such are never blotted out from the book of to say that something is done when it becomes known. life. Those, however, who are ordained to eternal life, not Thus some are said to be written in the book of life, inas- through divine predestination, but through grace, are said much as men think they are written therein, on account to be written in the book of life not simply, but relatively, of the present righteousness they see in them; but when it for they are written therein not to have eternal life in itself, becomes evident, either in this world or in the next, that but in its cause only. Yet though these latter can be said they have fallen from that state of righteousness, they are to be blotted out of the book of life, this blotting out must then said to be blotted out. And thus a gloss explains the not be referred to God, as if God foreknew a thing, and passage: “Let them be blotted out of the book of the liv- afterwards knew it not; but to the thing known, namely, 139 because God knows one is first ordained to eternal life, this it is that the blotting out of the book of life refers. and afterwards not ordained when he falls from grace. Reply to Objection 3. The way in which one is said Reply to Objection 1. The act of blotting out does not to be blotted out of the book of life is that in which one refer to the book of life as regards God’s foreknowledge, is said to be written therein anew; either in the opinion of as if in God there were any change; but as regards things men, or because he begins again to have relation towards foreknown, which can change. eternal life through grace; which also is included in the Reply to Objection 2. Although things are immutably knowledge of God, although not anew. in God, yet in themselves they are subject to change. To 140 FIRST PART, QUESTION 25 The Power of God (In Six Articles) After considering the divine foreknowledge and will, and other things pertaining thereto, it remains for us to consider the power of God. About this are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is power in God? (2) Whether His power is infinite? (3) Whether He is almighty? (4) Whether He could make the past not to have been? (5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does? (6) Whether what He makes He could make better? Whether there is power in God? Ia q. 25 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that power is not in God. For remains, therefore, that in God there is active power in the as primary matter is to power, so God, who is the first highest degree. agent, is to act. But primary matter, considered in itself, Reply to Objection 1. Active power is not contrary to is devoid of all act. Therefore, the first agent—namely, act, but is founded upon it, for everything acts according God—is devoid of power. as it is actual: but passive power is contrary to act; for a Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher thing is passive according as it is potential. Whence this (Metaph. vi, 19), better than every power is its act. For potentiality is not in God, but only active power. form is better than matter; and action than active power, Reply to Objection 2. Whenever act is distinct from since it is its end. But nothing is better than what is in power, act must be nobler than power. But God’s ac- God; because whatsoever is in God, is God, as was shown tion is not distinct from His power, for both are His di- above (q. 3 , a. 3). Therefore, there is no power in God. vine essence; neither is His existence distinct from His Objection 3. Further, Power is the principle of oper- essence. Hence it does not follow that there should be ation. But the divine power is God’s essence, since there anything in God nobler than His power. is nothing accidental in God: and of the essence of God Reply to Objection 3. In creatures, power is the prin- there is no principle. Therefore there is no power in God. ciple not only of action, but likewise of effect. Thus in Objection 4. Further, it was shown above (q. 14, a. 8; God the idea of power is retained, inasmuch as it is the q. 19, a. 4) that God’s knowledge and will are the cause of principle of an effect; not, however, as it is a principle of things. But the cause and principle of a thing are identical. action, for this is the divine essence itself; except, per- We ought not, therefore, to assign power to God; but only chance, after our manner of understanding, inasmuch as knowledge and will. the divine essence, which pre-contains in itself all perfec- On the contrary, It is said: “Thou art mighty, O Lord, tion that exists in created things, can be understood ei- and Thy truth is round about Thee” (Ps. 88:9). ther under the notion of action, or under that of power; I answer that, Power is twofold—namely, passive, as also it is understood under the notion of “suppositum” which exists not at all in God; and active, which we must possessing nature, and under that of nature. Accordingly assign to Him in the highest degree. For it is manifest that the notion of power is retained in God in so far as it is the everything, according as it is in act and is perfect, is the principle of an effect. active principle of something: whereas everything is pas- Reply to Objection 4. Power is predicated of God not sive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now it was as something really distinct from His knowledge and will, shown above (q. 3, a. 2; q. 4, Aa. 1, 2), that God is pure but as differing from them logically; inasmuch as power act, simply and in all ways perfect, nor in Him does any implies a notion of a principle putting into execution what imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs the will commands, and what knowledge directs, which to Him to be an active principle, and in no way whatsoever three things in God are identified. Or we may say, that to be passive. On the other hand, the notion of active prin- the knowledge or will of God, according as it is the ef- ciple is consistent with active power. For active power is fective principle, has the notion of power contained in it. the principle of acting upon something else; whereas pas- Hence the consideration of the knowledge and will of God sive power is the principle of being acted upon by some- precedes the consideration of His power, as the cause pre- thing else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 17). It cedes the operation and effect. 141 Whether the power of God is infinite? Ia q. 25 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that the power of God is not in- therefore, that it is imperfect. finite. For everything that is infinite is imperfect according Reply to Objection 2. The power of a univocal agent to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 6). But the power of God is is wholly manifested in its effect. The generative power of far from imperfect. Therefore it is not infinite. man, for example, is not able to do more than beget man. Objection 2. Further, every power is made known by But the power of a non-univocal agent does not wholly its effect; otherwise it would be ineffectual. If, then, the manifest itself in the production of its effect: as, for exam- power of God were infinite, it could produce an infinite ple, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself effect, but this is impossible. in the production of an animal generated from putrefac- Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. tion. Now it is clear that God is not a univocal agent. For viii, 79) that if the power of any corporeal thing were infi- nothing agrees with Him either in species or in genus, as nite, it would cause instantaneous movement. God, how- was shown above (q. 3, a. 5; q. 4, a. 3). Whence it follows ever, does not cause instantaneous movement, but moves that His effect is always less than His power. It is not nec- the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal creature in essary, therefore, that the infinite power of God should be place and time, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 20,22,23). manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even if Therefore, His power is not infinite. it were to produce no effect, the power of God would not On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. viii), that be ineffectual; because a thing is ineffectual which is or- “God’s power is immeasurable. He is the living mighty dained towards an end to which it does not attain. But the one.” Now everything that is immeasurable is infinite. power of God is not ordered toward its effect as towards Therefore the power of God is infinite. an end; rather, it is the end of the effect produced by it. I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), active power Reply to Objection 3. The Philosopher (Phys. viii, exists in God according to the measure in which He is ac- 79) proves that if a body had infinite power, it would cause tual. Now His existence is infinite, inasmuch as it is not a non-temporal movement. And he shows that the power limited by anything that receives it, as is clear from what of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it can move has been said, when we discussed the infinity of the divine in an infinite time. It remains, therefore, according to his essence (q. 7, a. 1). Wherefore, it is necessary that the ac- reckoning, that the infinite power of a body, if such ex- tive power in God should be infinite. For in every agent isted, would move without time; not, however, the power is it found that the more perfectly an agent has the form of an incorporeal mover. The reason of this is that one by which it acts the greater its power to act. For instance, body moving another is a univocal agent; wherefore it fol- the hotter a thing is, the greater the power has it to give lows that the whole power of the agent is made known in heat; and it would have infinite power to give heat, were its motion. Since then the greater the power of a moving its own heat infinite. Whence, since the divine essence, body, the more quickly does it move; the necessary con- through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown above clusion is that if its power were infinite, it would move be- (q. 7, a. 1) it follows that His power likewise is infinite. yond comparison faster, and this is to move without time. Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is here speak- An incorporeal mover, however, is not a univocal agent; ing of an infinity in regard to matter not limited by any whence it is not necessary that the whole of its power form; and such infinity belongs to quantity. But the di- should be manifested in motion, so as to move without vine essence is otherwise, as was shown above (q. 7, a. 1); time; and especially since it moves in accordance with the and consequently so also His power. It does not follow, disposition of its will. Whether God is omnipotent? Ia q. 25 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that God is not omnipotent. For fests His omnipotence “especially by sparing and having movement and passiveness belong to everything. But this mercy”∗. Therefore the greatest act possible to the divine is impossible with God, for He is immovable, as was said power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much above (q. 2, a. 3). Therefore He is not omnipotent. greater, however, than sparing and having mercy; for ex- Objection 2. Further, sin is an act of some kind. But ample, to create another world, and the like. Therefore God cannot sin, nor “deny Himself” as it is said in 2 Tim. God is not omnipotent. 2:13. Therefore He is not omnipotent. Objection 4. Further, upon the text, “God hath made Objection 3. Further, it is said of God that He mani- foolish the wisdom of this world” (1 Cor. 1:20), a gloss ∗ Collect, 10th Sunday after Pentecost † Vulg.: ‘Hath not God’, etc. 142 says: “God hath made the wisdom of this world foolish† limited to any genus of being; but possesses within itself by showing those things to be possible which it judges the perfection of all being. Whence, whatsoever has or to be impossible.” Whence it would seem that nothing is can have the nature of being, is numbered among the ab- to be judged possible or impossible in reference to infe- solutely possible things, in respect of which God is called rior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them; but omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being in reference to the divine power. If God, then, were om- except non-being. Therefore, that which implies being nipotent, all things would be possible; nothing, therefore and non-being at the same time is repugnant to the idea impossible. But if we take away the impossible, then we of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the destroy also the necessary; for what necessarily exists is divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under the di- impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be nothing vine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power at all that is necessary in things if God were omnipotent. of God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or But this is an impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipo- possible thing. Therefore, everything that does not imply tent. a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those pos- On the contrary, It is said: “No word shall be impos- sible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent: sible with God” (Lk. 1:37). whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come I answer that, All confess that God is omnipotent; within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that precisely consists: for there may be doubt as to the pre- such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. cise meaning of the word ‘all’ when we say that God can Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel, saying: “No do all things. If, however, we consider the matter aright, word shall be impossible with God.” For whatever implies since power is said in reference to possible things, this a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can phrase, “God can do all things,” is rightly understood to possibly conceive such a thing. mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for Reply to Objection 1. God is said to be omnipotent in this reason He is said to be omnipotent. Now according to respect to His active power, not to passive power, as was the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 17), a thing is said to be pos- shown above (a. 1). Whence the fact that He is immovable sible in two ways. First in relation to some power, thus or impassible is not repugnant to His omnipotence. whatever is subject to human power is said to be possi- Reply to Objection 2. To sin is to fall short of a per- ble to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the re- fect action; hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short lation in which the very terms stand to each other. Now in action, which is repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore God cannot be said to be omnipotent through being able it is that God cannot sin, because of His omnipotence. to do all things that are possible to created nature; for the Nevertheless, the Philosopher says (Topic. iv, 3) that God divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be under- were to say that God is omnipotent because He can do all stood either on a condition, the antecedent of which is things that are possible to His power, there would be a vi- impossible—as, for instance, if we were to say that God cious circle in explaining the nature of His power. For this can do evil things if He will. For there is no reason why would be saying nothing else but that God is omnipotent, a conditional proposition should not be true, though both because He can do all that He is able to do. the antecedent and consequent are impossible: as if one It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent be- were to say: “If man is a donkey, he has four feet.” Or he cause He can do all things that are possible absolutely; may be understood to mean that God can do some things which is the second way of saying a thing is possible. For which now seem to be evil: which, however, if He did a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, ac- them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking af- cording to the relation in which the very terms stand to one ter the common manner of the heathen, who thought that another, possible if the predicate is not incompatible with men became gods, like Jupiter or Mercury. the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely impossi- Reply to Objection 3. God’s omnipotence is particu- ble when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the larly shown in sparing and having mercy, because in this subject, as, for instance, that a man is a donkey. is it made manifest that God has supreme power, that He It must, however, be remembered that since every freely forgives sins. For it is not for one who is bound by agent produces an effect like itself, to each active power laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free will. Or, there corresponds a thing possible as its proper object ac- because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads cording to the nature of that act on which its active power them on to the participation of an infinite good; which is is founded; for instance, the power of giving warmth is re- the ultimate effect of the divine power. Or because, as was lated as to its proper object to the being capable of being said above (q. 21, a. 4), the effect of the divine mercy is warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the the foundation of all the divine works. For nothing is due nature of power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not to anyone, except on account of something already given 143 him gratuitously by God. In this way the divine omnipo-ence to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are tence is particularly made manifest, because to it pertains of such kind as to be done by inferior causes are said to the first foundation of all good things. be possible in reference to those inferior causes. For it is Reply to Objection 4. The absolute possible is not so according to the condition of the proximate cause that the called in reference either to higher causes, or to inferior effect has contingency or necessity, as was shown above causes, but in reference to itself. But the possible in refer- (q. 14, a. 1, ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the world ence to some power is named possible in reference to its is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, proximate cause. Hence those things which it belongs to it judges to be impossible to God. So it is clear that the God alone to do immediately—as, for example, to create, omnipotence of God does not take away from things their to justify, and the like—are said to be possible in refer- impossibility and necessity. Whether God can make the past not to have been? Ia q. 25 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that God can make the past not Augustine means when he says (Contra Faust. xxix, 5): to have been. For what is impossible in itself is much “Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him make what more impossible than that which is only impossible ac- is done as if it were not done, does not see that this is to cidentally. But God can do what is impossible in itself, say: If God is almighty let Him effect that what is true, as to give sight to the blind, or to raise the dead. There- by the very fact that it is true, be false”: and the Philoso- fore, and much more can He do what is only impossible pher says (Ethic. vi, 2): “Of this one thing alone is God accidentally. Now for the past not to have been is impos- deprived—namely, to make undone the things that have sible accidentally: thus for Socrates not to be running is been done.” accidentally impossible, from the fact that his running is Reply to Objection 1. Although it is impossible acci- a thing of the past. Therefore God can make the past not dentally for the past not to have been, if one considers the to have been. past thing itself, as, for instance, the running of Socrates; Objection 2. Further, what God could do, He can nevertheless, if the past thing is considered as past, that it do now, since His power is not lessened. But God could should not have been is impossible, not only in itself, but have effected, before Socrates ran, that he should not run. absolutely since it implies a contradiction. Thus, it is more Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that he did impossible than the raising of the dead; in which there is not run. nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossi- Objection 3. Further, charity is a more excellent ble in reference to some power, that is to say, some nat- virtue than virginity. But God can supply charity that is ural power; for such impossible things do come beneath lost; therefore also lost virginity. Therefore He can so ef- the scope of divine power. fect that what was corrupt should not have been corrupt. Reply to Objection 2. As God, in accordance with On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. 22 ad Eustoch.): the perfection of the divine power, can do all things, and “Although God can do all things, He cannot make a thing yet some things are not subject to His power, because they that is corrupt not to have been corrupted.” Therefore, for fall short of being possible; so, also, if we regard the im- the same reason, He cannot effect that anything else which mutability of the divine power, whatever God could do, is past should not have been. He can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in I answer that, As was said above (q. 7, a. 2), there the nature of possibility, whilst they were yet to be done, does not fall under the scope of God’s omnipotence any- which now fall short of the nature of possibility, when thing that implies a contradiction. Now that the past they have been done. So is God said not to be able to do should not have been implies a contradiction. For as it them, because they themselves cannot be done. implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and Reply to Objection 3. God can remove all corruption is not sitting, so does it to say that he sat, and did not sit. of the mind and body from a woman who has fallen; but But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the the fact that she had been corrupt cannot be removed from past. To say that he did not sit, is to say that it did not her; as also is it impossible that the fact of having sinned happen. Whence, that the past should not have been, does or having lost charity thereby can be removed from the not come under the scope of divine power. This is what sinner. 144 Whether God can do what He does not? Ia q. 25 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that God cannot do other than wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no what He does. For God cannot do what He has not fore- other course of events could happen. Wherefore we must known and pre-ordained that He would do. But He neither simply say that God can do other things than those He has foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything ex- done. cept what He does. Therefore He cannot do except what Reply to Objection 1. In ourselves, in whom power He does. and essence are distinct from will and intellect, and again Objection 2. Further, God can only do what ought to intellect from wisdom, and will from justice, there can be be done and what is right to be done. But God is not bound something in the power which is not in the just will nor to do what He does not; nor is it right that He should do in the wise intellect. But in God, power and essence, will what He does not. Therefore He cannot do except what and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. He does. Whence, there can be nothing in the divine power which Objection 3. Further, God cannot do anything that is cannot also be in His just will or in His wise intellect. not good and befitting creation. But it is not good for crea- Nevertheless, because His will cannot be determined from tures nor befitting them to be otherwise than as they are. necessity to this or that order of things, except upon sup- Therefore God cannot do except what He does. position, as was said above (q. 19, a. 3), neither are the On the contrary, It is said: “Thinkest thou that I can- wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present or- not ask My Father, and He will give Me presently more der, as was shown above; so nothing prevents there being than twelve legions of angels?” (Mat. 26:53). But He something in the divine power which He does not will, neither asked for them, nor did His Father show them to and which is not included in the order which He has place refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He does not. in things. Again, because power is considered as execut- I answer that, In this matter certain persons erred in ing, the will as commanding, and the intellect and wisdom two ways. Some laid it down that God acts from natu- as directing; what is attributed to His power considered in ral necessity in such way that as from the action of na- itself, God is said to be able to do in accordance with His ture nothing else can happen beyond what actually takes absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has place—as, for instance, from the seed of man, a man must the nature of being, as was said above (a. 3). What is, come, and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the however, attributed to the divine power, according as it divine operation there could not result other things, nor carries into execution the command of a just will, God is another order of things, than that which now is. But we said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this man- showed above (q. 19, a. 3) that God does not act from nat- ner, we must say that God can do other things by His abso- ural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all things; lute power than those He has foreknown and pre-ordained nor is that will naturally and from any necessity deter- He would do. But it could not happen that He should do mined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the anything which He had not foreknown, and had not pre- present course of events produced by God from any neces- ordained that He would do, because His actual doing is sity, so that other things could not happen. Others, how- subject to His foreknowledge and pre-ordination, though ever, said that the divine power is restricted to this present His power, which is His nature, is not so. For God does course of events through the order of the divine wisdom things because He wills so to do; yet the power to do them and justice without which God does nothing. But since does not come from His will, but from His nature. the power of God, which is His essence, is nothing else Reply to Objection 2. God is bound to nobody but but His wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly said that there Himself. Hence, when it is said that God can only do what is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order He ought, nothing else is meant by this than that God can of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes the do nothing but what is befitting to Himself, and just. But whole potency of the divine power. Yet the order placed these words “befitting” and “just” may be understood in in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion two ways: one, in direct connection with the verb “is”; of His justice consists, as said above (q. 21, a. 2), is not and thus they would be restricted to the present order of so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine wisdom things; and would concern His power. Then what is said should be restricted to this present order of things. Now in the objection is false; for the sense is that God can do it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man nothing except what is now fitting and just. If, however, puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So, they be joined directly with the verb “can” (which has when the end is proportionate to the things made for that the effect of extending the meaning), and then secondly end, the wisdom of the maker is restricted to some defi- with “is,” the present will be signified, but in a confused nite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding and general way. The sentence would then be true in this beyond all proportion things created. Whence the divine sense: “God cannot do anything except that which, if He 145 did it, would be suitable and just.” order would be suitable and good to the things which now Reply to Objection 3. Although this order of things are, yet God can do other things and impose upon them be restricted to what now exists, the divine power and wis- another order. dom are not thus restricted. Whence, although no other Whether God can do better than what He does? Ia q. 25 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that God cannot do better than of a man is to be virtuous or wise. As regards this kind of He does. For whatever God does, He does in a most pow- goodness, God can make better the things He has made. erful and wise way. But a thing is so much the better done Absolutely speaking, however, God can make something as it is more powerfully and wisely done. Therefore God else better than each thing made by Him. cannot do anything better than He does. Reply to Objection 1. When it is said that God can Objection 2. Further, Augustine thus argues (Contra make a thing better than He makes it, if “better” is taken Maximin. iii, 8): “If God could, but would not, beget substantively, this proposition is true. For He can always a Son His equal, He would have been envious.” For the make something else better than each individual thing: same reason, if God could have made better things than and He can make the same thing in one way better than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He would have it is, and in another way not; as was explained above. If, been envious. But envy is far removed from God. There- however, “better” is taken as an adverb, implying the man- fore God makes everything of the best. He cannot there- ner of the making; thus God cannot make anything better fore make anything better than He does. than He makes it, because He cannot make it from greater Objection 3. Further, what is very good and the best wisdom and goodness. But if it implies the manner of the of all cannot be bettered; because nothing is better than thing done, He can make something better; because He the best. But as Augustine says (Enchiridion 10), “each can give to things made by Him a better manner of exis- thing that God has made is good, and, taken all together tence as regards the accidents, although not as regards the they are very good; because in them all consists the won- substance. drous beauty of the universe.” Therefore the good in the Reply to Objection 2. It is of the nature of a son that universe could not be made better by God. he should be equal to his father, when he comes to matu- Objection 4. Further, Christ as man is full of grace rity. But it is not of the nature of anything created, that and truth, and has the Spirit without measure; and so He it should be better than it was made by God. Hence the cannot be better. Again created happiness is described comparison fails. as the highest good, and thus cannot be better. And the Reply to Objection 3. The universe, the present cre- Blessed Virgin Mary is raised above all the choirs of an- ation being supposed, cannot be better, on account of the gels, and so cannot be better than she is. God cannot there- most beautiful order given to things by God; in which the fore make all things better than He has made them. good of the universe consists. For if any one thing were On the contrary, It is said (Eph. 3:20): “God is able bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed; as to do all things more abundantly than we desire or under- if one string were stretched more than it ought to be, the stand.” melody of the harp would be destroyed. Yet God could I answer that, The goodness of anything is twofold; make other things, or add something to the present cre- one, which is of the essence of it—thus, for instance, to ation; and then there would be another and a better uni- be rational pertains to the essence of man. As regards this verse. good, God cannot make a thing better than it is itself; al- Reply to Objection 4. The humanity of Christ, from though He can make another thing better than it; even as the fact that it is united to the Godhead; and created hap- He cannot make the number four greater than it is; be- piness from the fact that it is the fruition of God; and the cause if it were greater it would no longer be four, but an- Blessed Virgin from the fact that she is the mother of God; other number. For the addition of a substantial difference have all a certain infinite dignity from the infinite good, in definitions is after the manner of the addition of unity which is God. And on this account there cannot be any- of numbers (Metaph. viii, 10). Another kind of goodness thing better than these; just as there cannot be anything is that which is over and above the essence; thus, the good better than God. 146 FIRST PART, QUESTION 26 Of the Divine Beatitude (In Four Articles) After considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine essence, we come to treat of the divine beatitude. Concerning this, there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether beatitude belongs to God? (2) In regard to what is God called blessed; does this regard His act of intellect? (3) Whether He is essentially the beatitude of each of the blessed? (4) Whether all other beatitude is included in the divine beatitude? Whether beatitude belongs to God? Ia q. 26 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that beatitude does not belong sufficiency of the good which it possesses, to which it is to God. For beatitude according to Boethius (De Consol. competent that good or ill may befall, and which can con- iv) “is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all good trol its own actions. All of these things belong in a most things.” But the aggregation of goods has no place in God; excellent manner to God, namely, to be perfect, and to nor has composition. Therefore beatitude does not belong possess intelligence. Whence beatitude belongs to God in to God. the highest degree. Objection 2. Further, beatitude or happiness is the re- Reply to Objection 1. Aggregation of good is in God, ward of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9). after the manner not of composition, but of simplicity; for But reward does not apply to God; as neither does merit. those things which in creatures is manifold, pre-exist in Therefore neither does beatitude. God, as was said above (q. 4, a. 2; q. 13, a. 4), in simplic- On the contrary, The Apostle says: “Which in ity and unity. His times He shall show, who is the Blessed and only Reply to Objection 2. It belongs as an accident to Almighty, the King of Kings and Lord of Lords.” (1 Tim. beatitude or happiness to be the reward of virtue, so far as 6:15). anyone attains to beatitude; even as to be the term of gen- I answer that, Beatitude belongs to God in a very spe- eration belongs accidentally to a being, so far as it passes cial manner. For nothing else is understood to be meant from potentiality to act. As, then, God has being, though by the term beatitude than the perfect good of an intel- not begotten; so He has beatitude, although not acquired lectual nature; which is capable of knowing that it has a by merit. Whether God is called blessed in respect of His intellect? Ia q. 26 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that God is not called blessed in beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His intellect. respect to His intellect. For beatitude is the highest good. I answer that, Beatitude, as stated above (a. 1), is the But good is said to be in God in regard to His essence, perfect good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as because good has reference to being which is according everything desires the perfection of its nature, intellectual to essence, according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). There- nature desires naturally to be happy. Now that which is fore beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to His most perfect in any intellectual nature is the intellectual essence, and not to His intellect. operation, by which in some sense it grasps everything. Objection 2. Further, Beatitude implies the notion of Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists end. Now the end is the object of the will, as also is the in understanding. Now in God, to be and to understand good. Therefore beatitude is said to be in God with refer- are one and the same thing; differing only in the manner ence to His will, and not with reference to His intellect. of our understanding them. Beatitude must therefore be On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxii, 7): “He assigned to God in respect of His intellect; as also to the is in glory, Who whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not blessed, who are called blesses [beati] by reason of the further praise.” To be in glory, however, is the same as to assimilation to His beatitude. be blessed. Therefore, since we enjoy God in respect to Reply to Objection 1. This argument proves that our intellect, because “vision is the whole of the reward,” beatitude belongs to God; not that beatitude pertains es- as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), it would seem that sentially to Him under the aspect of His essence; but 147 rather under the aspect of His intellect. derstanding, divine beatitude precedes the act of the will Reply to Objection 2. Since beatitude is a good, it at rest in it. This cannot be other than the act of the in- is the object of the will; now the object is understood as tellect; and thus beatitude is to be found in an act of the prior to the act of a power. Whence in our manner of un- intellect. Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed? Ia q. 26 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that God is the beatitude of stand. If, then, beatitude be considered on the side of the each of the blessed. For God is the supreme good, as was object, God is the only beatitude; for everyone is blessed said above (q. 6, Aa. 2,4). But it is quite impossible that from this sole fact, that he understands God, in accordance there should be many supreme goods, as also is clear from with the saying of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): “Blessed is what has been said above (q. 11, a. 3). Therefore, since it he who knoweth Thee, though he know nought else.” But is of the essence of beatitude that it should be the supreme as regards the act of understanding, beatitude is a created good, it seems that beatitude is nothing else but God Him- thing in beatified creatures; but in God, even in this way, self. it is an uncreated thing. Objection 2. Further, beatitude is the last end of the Reply to Objection 1. Beatitude, as regards its object, rational nature. But to be the last end of the rational na- is the supreme good absolutely, but as regards its act, in ture belongs only to God. Therefore the beatitude of every beatified creatures it is their supreme good, not absolutely, blessed is God alone. but in that kind of goods which a creature can participate. On the contrary, The beatitude of one is greater than Reply to Objection 2. End is twofold, namely, “ob- that of another, according to 1 Cor. 15:41: “Star differ- jective” and “subjective,” as the Philosopher says (Greater eth from star in glory.” But nothing is greater than God. Ethics i, 3), namely, the “thing itself” and “its use.” Thus Therefore beatitude is something different from God. to a miser the end is money, and its acquisition. Accord- I answer that, The beatitude of an intellectual nature ingly God is indeed the last end of a rational creature, as consists in an act of the intellect. In this we may con- the thing itself; but created beatitude is the end, as the use, sider two things, namely, the object of the act, which is or rather fruition, of the thing. the thing understood; and the act itself which is to under- Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God? Ia q. 26 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that the divine beatitude does whole universe. As to earthly happiness, which consists not embrace all other beatitudes. For there are some false in delight, riches, power, dignity, and fame, according to beatitudes. But nothing false can be in God. Therefore the Boethius (De Consol. iii, 10), He possesses joy in Him- divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. self and all things else for His delight; instead of riches Objection 2. Further, a certain beatitude, according to He has that complete self-sufficiency, which is promised some, consists in things corporeal; as in pleasure, riches, by riches; in place of power, He has omnipotence; for dig- and such like. Now none of these have to do with God, nities, the government of all things; and in place of fame, since He is incorporeal. Therefore His beatitude does not He possesses the admiration of all creatures. embrace all other beatitudes. Reply to Objection 1. A particular kind of beatitude On the contrary, Beatitude is a certain perfection. is false according as it falls short of the idea of true beat- But the divine perfection embraces all other perfection, itude; and thus it is not in God. But whatever semblance as was shown above (q. 4, a. 2 ). Therefore the divine it has, howsoever slight, of beatitude, the whole of it pre- beatitude embraces all other beatitudes. exists in the divine beatitude. I answer that, Whatever is desirable in whatsoever Reply to Objection 2. The good that exists in things beatitude, whether true or false, pre-exists wholly and in corporeal in a corporeal manner, is also in God, but in a a more eminent degree in the divine beatitude. As to con- spiritual manner. templative happiness, God possesses a continual and most We have now spoken enough concerning what pertains certain contemplation of Himself and of all things else; to the unity of the divine essence. and as to that which is active, He has the governance of the 148 FIRST PART, QUESTION 27 The Procession of the Divine Persons (In Five Articles) Having considered what belongs to the unity of the divine essence, it remains to treat of what belongs to the Trinity of the persons in God. And because the divine Persons are distinguished from each other according to the relations of origin, the order of the doctrine leads us to consider firstly, the question of origin or procession; secondly, the relations of origin; thirdly, the persons. Concerning procession there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is procession in God? (2) Whether any procession in God can be called generation? (3) Whether there can be any other procession in God besides generation. (4) Whether that other procession can be called generation? (5) Whether there are more than two processions in God? Whether there is procession in God? Ia q. 27 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be a meaning, when He speaks of Himself, “The Son can- any procession in God. For procession signifies outward not of Himself do anything” (Jn. 5:19); while many other movement. But in God there is nothing mobile, nor any- passages show the same, whereby we know that the Fa- thing extraneous. Therefore neither is there procession in ther is not the Son. Careful examination shows that both God. of these opinions take procession as meaning an outward Objection 2. Further, everything which proceeds dif- act; hence neither of them affirms procession as existing in fers from that whence it proceeds. But in God there is no God Himself; whereas, since procession always supposes diversity; but supreme simplicity. Therefore in God there action, and as there is an outward procession correspond- is no procession. ing to the act tending to external matter, so there must Objection 3. Further, to proceed from another seems be an inward procession corresponding to the act remain- to be against the nature of the first principle. But God is ing within the agent. This applies most conspicuously to the first principle, as shown above (q. 2, a. 3). Therefore the intellect, the action of which remains in the intelligent in God there is no procession. agent. For whenever we understand, by the very fact of On the contrary, Our Lord says, “From God I pro- understanding there proceeds something within us, which ceeded” (Jn. 8:42). is a conception of the object understood, a conception is- I answer that, Divine Scripture uses, in relation to suing from our intellectual power and proceeding from God, names which signify procession. This procession our knowledge of that object. This conception is signified has been differently understood. Some have understood it by the spoken word; and it is called the word of the heart in the sense of an effect, proceeding from its cause; so Ar- signified by the word of the voice. ius took it, saying that the Son proceeds from the Father As God is above all things, we should understand what as His primary creature, and that the Holy Ghost proceeds is said of God, not according to the mode of the lowest from the Father and the Son as the creature of both. In creatures, namely bodies, but from the similitude of the this sense neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost would be highest creatures, the intellectual substances; while even true God: and this is contrary to what is said of the Son, the similitudes derived from these fall short in the repre- “That. . . we may be in His true Son. This is true God” sentation of divine objects. Procession, therefore, is not to (1 Jn. 5:20). Of the Holy Ghost it is also said, “Know be understood from what it is in bodies, either according you not that your members are the temple of the Holy to local movement or by way of a cause proceeding forth Ghost?” (1 Cor. 6:19). Now, to have a temple is God’s to its exterior effect, as, for instance, like heat from the prerogative. Others take this procession to mean the cause agent to the thing made hot. Rather it is to be understood proceeding to the effect, as moving it, or impressing its by way of an intelligible emanation, for example, of the own likeness on it; in which sense it was understood by intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, yet re- Sabellius, who said that God the Father is called Son in mains in him. In that sense the Catholic Faith understands assuming flesh from the Virgin, and that the Father also is procession as existing in God. called Holy Ghost in sanctifying the rational creature, and Reply to Objection 1. This objection comes from the moving it to life. The words of the Lord contradict such idea of procession in the sense of local motion, or of an 149 action tending to external matter, or to an exterior effect; (q. 14, a. 2), the divine Word is of necessity perfectly one which kind of procession does not exist in God, as we with the source whence He proceeds, without any kind of have explained. diversity. Reply to Objection 2. Whatever proceeds by way of Reply to Objection 3. To proceed from a principle, outward procession is necessarily distinct from the source so as to be something outside and distinct from that prin- whence it proceeds, whereas, whatever proceeds within ciple, is irreconcilable with the idea of a first principle; by an intelligible procession is not necessarily distinct; whereas an intimate and uniform procession by way of an indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more closely intelligible act is included in the idea of a first principle. it is one with the source whence it proceeds. For it is clear For when we call the builder the principle of the house, in that the more a thing is understood, the more closely is the the idea of such a principle is included that of his art; and intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent it would be included in the idea of the first principle were agent; since the intellect by the very act of understand- the builder the first principle of the house. God, Who is ing is made one with the object understood. Thus, as the the first principle of all things, may be compared to things divine intelligence is the very supreme perfection of God created as the architect is to things designed. Whether any procession in God can be called generation? Ia q. 27 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that no procession in God from a horse. So in living things, which proceed from po- can be called generation. For generation is change from tential to actual life, such as men and animals, generation non-existence to existence, and is opposed to corruption; includes both these kinds of generation. But if there is while matter is the subject of both. Nothing of all this be- a being whose life does not proceed from potentiality to longs to God. Therefore generation cannot exist in God. act, procession (if found in such a being) excludes entirely Objection 2. Further, procession exists in God, ac- the first kind of generation; whereas it may have that kind cording to an intelligible mode, as above explained (a. 1). of generation which belongs to living things. So in this But such a process is not called generation in us; therefore manner the procession of the Word in God is generation; neither is it to be so called in God. for He proceeds by way of intelligible action, which is Objection 3. Further, anything that is generated de- a vital operation:—from a conjoined principle (as above rives existence from its generator. Therefore such exis- described):—by way of similitude, inasmuch as the con- tence is a derived existence. But no derived existence can cept of the intellect is a likeness of the object conceived:— be a self-subsistence. Therefore, since the divine exis- and exists in the same nature, because in God the act of tence is self-subsisting (q. 3, a. 4), it follows that no gen- understanding and His existence are the same, as shown erated existence can be the divine existence. Therefore above (q. 14, a. 4). Hence the procession of the Word in there is no generation in God. God is called generation; and the Word Himself proceed- On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 2:7): “This day have I ing is called the Son. begotten Thee.” Reply to Objection 1. This objection is based on the I answer that, The procession of the Word in God is idea of generation in the first sense, importing the issu- called generation. In proof whereof we must observe that ing forth from potentiality to act; in which sense it is not generation has a twofold meaning: one common to every- found in God. thing subject to generation and corruption; in which sense Reply to Objection 2. The act of human understand- generation is nothing but change from non-existence to ing in ourselves is not the substance itself of the intellect; existence. In another sense it is proper and belongs to liv- hence the word which proceeds within us by intelligible ing things; in which sense it signifies the origin of a living operation is not of the same nature as the source whence being from a conjoined living principle; and this is prop- it proceeds; so the idea of generation cannot be properly erly called birth. Not everything of that kind, however, is and fully applied to it. But the divine act of intelligence called begotten; but, strictly speaking, only what proceeds is the very substance itself of the one who understands by way of similitude. Hence a hair has not the aspect of (q. 14, a. 4). The Word proceeding therefore proceeds as generation and sonship, but only that has which proceeds subsisting in the same nature; and so is properly called by way of a similitude. Nor will any likeness suffice; for begotten, and Son. Hence Scripture employs terms which a worm which is generated from animals has not the as- denote generation of living things in order to signify the pect of generation and sonship, although it has a generic procession of the divine Wisdom, namely, conception and similitude; for this kind of generation requires that there birth; as is declared in the person of the divine Wisdom, should be a procession by way of similitude in the same “The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived; specific nature; as a man proceeds from a man, and a horse before the hills, I was brought forth.” (Prov. 8:24). In 150 our way of understanding we use the word “conception” not as though that existence were received into matter or in order to signify that in the word of our intellect is found into a subject (which would conflict with the divine self- the likeness of the thing understood, although there be no subsistence); but when we speak of His existence as re- identity of nature. ceived, we mean that He Who proceeds receives divine Reply to Objection 3. Not everything derived from existence from another; not, however, as if He were other another has existence in another subject; otherwise we from the divine nature. For in the perfection itself of the could not say that the whole substance of created be- divine existence are contained both the Word intelligibly ing comes from God, since there is no subject that could proceeding and the principle of the Word, with whatever receive the whole substance. So, then, what is gener- belongs to His perfection (q. 4, a. 2). ated in God receives its existence from the generator, Whether any other procession exists in God besides that of the Word? Ia q. 27 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that no other procession tellect, and of the will. The procession of the Word is by exists in God besides the generation of the Word. Be- way of an intelligible operation. The operation of the will cause, for whatever reason we admit another procession, within ourselves involves also another procession, that of we should be led to admit yet another, and so on to infini- love, whereby the object loved is in the lover; as, by the tude; which cannot be. Therefore we must stop at the first, conception of the word, the object spoken of or under- and hold that there exists only one procession in God. stood is in the intelligent agent. Hence, besides the pro- Objection 2. Further, every nature possesses but one cession of the Word in God, there exists in Him another mode of self-communication; because operations derive procession called the procession of love. unity and diversity from their terms. But procession in Reply to Objection 1. There is no need to go on to God is only by way of communication of the divine na- infinitude in the divine processions; for the procession ture. Therefore, as there is only one divine nature (q. 11, which is accomplished within the agent in an intellectual a. 4 ), it follows that only one procession exists in God. nature terminates in the procession of the will. Objection 3. Further, if any other procession but the Reply to Objection 2. All that exists in God, is God intelligible procession of the Word existed in God, it could (q. 3, Aa. 3,4); whereas the same does not apply to oth- only be the procession of love, which is by the operation ers. Therefore the divine nature is communicated by every of the will. But such a procession is identified with the in- procession which is not outward, and this does not apply telligible procession of the intellect, inasmuch as the will to other natures. in God is the same as His intellect (q. 19, a. 1). Therefore Reply to Objection 3. Though will and intellect are in God there is no other procession but the procession of not diverse in God, nevertheless the nature of will and in- the Word. tellect requires the processions belonging to each of them On the contrary, The Holy Ghost proceeds from the to exist in a certain order. For the procession of love oc- Father (Jn. 15:26); and He is distinct from the Son, ac- curs in due order as regards the procession of the Word; cording to the words, “I will ask My Father, and He will since nothing can be loved by the will unless it is con- give you another Paraclete” (Jn. 14:16). Therefore in ceived in the intellect. So as there exists a certain order of God another procession exists besides the procession of the Word to the principle whence He proceeds, although the Word. in God the substance of the intellect and its concept are I answer that, There are two processions in God; the the same; so, although in God the will and the intellect procession of the Word, and another. are the same, still, inasmuch as love requires by its very In evidence whereof we must observe that procession nature that it proceed only from the concept of the intel- exists in God, only according to an action which does not lect, there is a distinction of order between the procession tend to anything external, but remains in the agent itself. of love and the procession of the Word in God. Such an action in an intellectual nature is that of the in- Whether the procession of love in God is generation? Ia q. 27 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the procession of love traneous to the divine nature, and would be an external in God is generation. For what proceeds by way of like- procession. Therefore what proceeds in God by way of ness of nature among living things is said to be generated love, proceeds as generated and born. and born. But what proceeds in God by way of love pro- Objection 2. Further, as similitude is of the nature of ceeds in the likeness of nature; otherwise it would be ex- the word, so does it belong to love. Hence it is said, that 151 “every beast loves its like” (Ecclus. 13:19). Therefore if pulse, accordingly as anyone is described as moved or im-the Word is begotten and born by way of likeness, it seems pelled by love to perform an action. becoming that love should proceed by way of generation. Reply to Objection 1. All that exists in God is one Objection 3. Further, what is not in any species is not with the divine nature. Hence the proper notion of this or in the genus. So if there is a procession of love in God, that procession, by which one procession is distinguished there ought to be some special name besides this common from another, cannot be on the part of this unity: but the name of procession. But no other name is applicable but proper notion of this or that procession must be taken from generation. Therefore the procession of love in God is the order of one procession to another; which order is de- generation. rived from the nature of the will and intellect. Hence, each On the contrary, Were this true, it would follow that procession in God takes its name from the proper notion the Holy Ghost Who proceeds as love, would proceed as of will and intellect; the name being imposed to signify begotten; which is against the statement of Athanasius: what its nature really is; and so it is that the Person pro- “The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son, not ceeding as love receives the divine nature, but is not said made, nor begotten, but proceeding.” to be born. I answer that, The procession of love in God ought Reply to Objection 2. Likeness belongs in a different not to be called generation. In evidence whereof we must way to the word and to love. It belongs to the word as consider that the intellect and the will differ in this re- being the likeness of the object understood, as the thing spect, that the intellect is made actual by the object un- generated is the likeness of the generator; but it belongs derstood residing according to its own likeness in the in- to love, not as though love itself were a likeness, but be- tellect; whereas the will is made actual, not by any simil- cause likeness is the principle of loving. Thus it does not itude of the object willed within it, but by its having a follow that love is begotten, but that the one begotten is certain inclination to the thing willed. Thus the proces- the principle of love. sion of the intellect is by way of similitude, and is called Reply to Objection 3. We can name God only from generation, because every generator begets its own like; creatures (q. 13, a. 1). As in creatures generation is the whereas the procession of the will is not by way of simili- only principle of communication of nature, procession in tude, but rather by way of impulse and movement towards God has no proper or special name, except that of gener- an object. ation. Hence the procession which is not generation has So what proceeds in God by way of love, does not pro- remained without a special name; but it can be called spi- ceed as begotten, or as son, but proceeds rather as spirit; ration, as it is the procession of the Spirit. which name expresses a certain vital movement and im- Whether there are more than two processions in God? Ia q. 27 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that there are more than nature which is intellectual, and in the divine nature these two processions in God. As knowledge and will are at- actions are two, the acts of intelligence and of will. The tributed to God, so is power. Therefore, if two processions act of sensation, which also appears to be an operation exist in God, of intellect and will, it seems that there must within the agent, takes place outside the intellectual na- also be a third procession of power. ture, nor can it be reckoned as wholly removed from the Objection 2. Further, goodness seems to be the great- sphere of external actions; for the act of sensation is per- est principle of procession, since goodness is diffusive of fected by the action of the sensible object upon sense. It itself. Therefore there must be a procession of goodness follows that no other procession is possible in God but the in God. procession of the Word, and of Love. Objection 3. Further, in God there is greater power Reply to Objection 1. Power is the principle whereby of fecundity than in us. But in us there is not only one one thing acts on another. Hence it is that external action procession of the word, but there are many: for in us from points to power. Thus the divine power does not imply one word proceeds another; and also from one love pro- the procession of a divine person; but is indicated by the ceeds another. Therefore in God there are more than two procession therefrom of creatures. processions. Reply to Objection 2. As Boethius says (De Heb- On the contrary, In God there are not more than two dom.), goodness belongs to the essence and not to the op- who proceed—the Son and the Holy Ghost. Therefore eration, unless considered as the object of the will. there are in Him but two processions. Thus, as the divine processions must be denominated I answer that, The divine processions can be derived from certain actions; no other processions can be under- only from the actions which remain within the agent. In a stood in God according to goodness and the like attributes 152 except those of the Word and of love, according as God and by one act also He wills all things. Hence there can-understands and loves His own essence, truth and good- not exist in Him a procession of Word from Word, nor ness. of Love from Love: for there is in Him only one perfect Reply to Objection 3. As above explained (q. 14, a. 5; Word, and one perfect Love; thereby being manifested His q. 19, a. 5), God understands all things by one simple act; perfect fecundity. 153 FIRST PART, QUESTION 28 The Divine Relations (In Four Articles) The divine relations are next to be considered, in four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are real relations in God? (2) Whether those relations are the divine essence itself, or are extrinsic to it? (3) Whether in God there can be several relations distinct from each other? (4) The number of these relations. Whether there are real relations in God? Ia q. 28 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there are no real rela- lations; as in a heavy body is found an inclination and or- tions in God. For Boethius says (De Trin. iv), “All possi- der to the centre; and hence there exists in the heavy body ble predicaments used as regards the Godhead refer to the a certain respect in regard to the centre and the same ap- substance; for nothing can be predicated relatively.” But plies to other things. Sometimes, however, this regard to whatever really exists in God can be predicated of Him. another, signified by relation, is to be found only in the ap- Therefore no real relation exists in God. prehension of reason comparing one thing to another, and Objection 2. Further, Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, this is a logical relation only; as, for instance, when reason “Relation in the Trinity of the Father to the Son, and of compares man to animal as the species to the genus. But both to the Holy Ghost, is the relation of the same to the when something proceeds from a principle of the same same.” But a relation of this kind is only a logical one; nature, then both the one proceeding and the source of for every real relation requires and implies in reality two procession, agree in the same order; and then they have terms. Therefore the divine relations are not real relations, real relations to each other. Therefore as the divine pro- but are formed only by the mind. cessions are in the identity of the same nature, as above Objection 3. Further, the relation of paternity is the explained (q. 27, Aa. 2,4), these relations, according to relation of a principle. But to say that God is the principle the divine processions, are necessarily real relations. of creatures does not import any real relation, but only a Reply to Objection 1. Relationship is not predicated logical one. Therefore paternity in God is not a real re- of God according to its proper and formal meaning, that is lation; while the same applies for the same reason to the to say, in so far as its proper meaning denotes comparison other relations in God. to that in which relation is inherent, but only as denoting Objection 4. Further, the divine generation proceeds regard to another. Nevertheless Boethius did not wish to by way of an intelligible word. But the relations follow- exclude relation in God; but he wished to show that it was ing upon the operation of the intellect are logical relations. not to be predicated of Him as regards the mode of in- Therefore paternity and filiation in God, consequent upon herence in Himself in the strict meaning of relation; but generation, are only logical relations. rather by way of relation to another. On the contrary, The Father is denominated only Reply to Objection 2. The relation signified by the from paternity; and the Son only from filiation. Therefore, term “the same” is a logical relation only, if in regard to if no real paternity or filiation existed in God, it would fol- absolutely the same thing; because such a relation can ex- low that God is not really Father or Son, but only in our ist only in a certain order observed by reason as regards manner of understanding; and this is the Sabellian heresy. the order of anything to itself, according to some two I answer that, relations exist in God really; in proof aspects thereof. The case is otherwise, however, when whereof we may consider that in relations alone is found things are called the same, not numerically, but generi- something which is only in the apprehension and not in cally or specifically. Thus Boethius likens the divine rela- reality. This is not found in any other genus; forasmuch tions to a relation of identity, not in every respect, but only as other genera, as quantity and quality, in their strict and as regards the fact that the substance is not diversified by proper meaning, signify something inherent in a subject. these relations, as neither is it by relation of identity. But relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what Reply to Objection 3. As the creature proceeds from refers to another. Such regard to another exists sometimes God in diversity of nature, God is outside the order of the in the nature of things, as in those things which by their whole creation, nor does any relation to the creature arise own very nature are ordered to each other, and have a mu- from His nature; for He does not produce the creature by tual inclination; and such relations are necessarily real re- necessity of His nature, but by His intellect and will, as 154 is above explained (q. 14, Aa. 3,4; q. 19, a. 8). Therefore as existing between two objects perceived by the mind. there is no real relation in God to the creature; whereas Those relations, however, which follow the operation of in creatures there is a real relation to God; because crea- the intellect, and which exist between the word intellectu- tures are contained under the divine order, and their very ally proceeding and the source whence it proceeds, are not nature entails dependence on God. On the other hand, the logical relations only, but are real relations; inasmuch as divine processions are in one and the same nature. Hence the intellect and the reason are real things, and are really no parallel exists. related to that which proceeds from them intelligibly; as Reply to Objection 4. Relations which result from a corporeal thing is related to that which proceeds from it the mental operation alone in the objects understood are corporeally. Thus paternity and filiation are real relations logical relations only, inasmuch as reason observes them in God. Whether relation in God is the same as His essence? Ia q. 28 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the divine relation is the measure of substance, and quality is the disposition not the same as the divine essence. For Augustine says of substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken (De Trin. v) that “not all that is said of God is said of His from its respect to that in which it is, but from its respect substance, for we say some things relatively, as Father in to something outside. So if we consider even in creatures, respect of the Son: but such things do not refer to the sub- relations formally as such, in that aspect they are said to be stance.” Therefore the relation is not the divine essence. “assistant,” and not intrinsically affixed, for, in this way, Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii) they signify a respect which affects a thing related and that, “every relative expression is something besides the tends from that thing to something else; whereas, if rela- relation expressed, as master is a man, and slave is a man.” tion is considered as an accident, it inheres in a subject, Therefore, if relations exist in God, there must be some- and has an accidental existence in it. Gilbert de la Porree thing else besides relation in God. This can only be His considered relation in the former mode only. essence. Therefore essence differs from relation. Now whatever has an accidental existence in crea- Objection 3. Further, the essence of relation is the be- tures, when considered as transferred to God, has a sub- ing referred to another, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. stantial existence; for there is no accident in God; since all v). So if relation is the divine essence, it follows that in Him is His essence. So, in so far as relation has an ac- the divine essence is essentially itself a relation to some- cidental existence in creatures, relation really existing in thing else; whereas this is repugnant to the perfection of God has the existence of the divine essence in no way dis- the divine essence, which is supremely absolute and self- tinct therefrom. But in so far as relation implies respect to subsisting (q. 3, a. 4). Therefore relation is not the divine something else, no respect to the essence is signified, but essence. rather to its opposite term. On the contrary, Everything which is not the divine Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God essence is a creature. But relation really belongs to God; is really the same as His essence and only differs in its and if it is not the divine essence, it is a creature; and it mode of intelligibility; as in relation is meant that re- cannot claim the adoration of latria; contrary to what is gard to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of sung in the Preface: “Let us adore the distinction of the essence. Thus it is clear that in God relation and essence Persons, and the equality of their Majesty.” do not differ from each other, but are one and the same. I answer that, It is reported that Gilbert de la Porree Reply to Objection 1. These words of Augustine do erred on this point, but revoked his error later at the coun- not imply that paternity or any other relation which is in cil of Rheims. For he said that the divine relations are God is not in its very being the same as the divine essence; assistant, or externally affixed. but that it is not predicated under the mode of substance, To perceive the error here expressed, we must consider as existing in Him to Whom it is applied; but as a rela- that in each of the nine genera of accidents there are two tion. So there are said to be two predicaments only in points for remark. One is the nature belonging to each God, since other predicaments import habitude to that of one of them considered as an accident; which commonly which they are spoken, both in their generic and in their applies to each of them as inherent in a subject, for the specific nature; but nothing that exists in God can have essence of an accident is to inhere. The other point of any relation to that wherein it exists or of whom it is spo- remark is the proper nature of each one of these genera. ken, except the relation of identity; and this by reason of In the genera, apart from that of “relation,” as in quantity God’s supreme simplicity. and quality, even the true idea of the genus itself is de- Reply to Objection 2. As the relation which exists in rived from a respect to the subject; for quantity is called creatures involves not only a regard to another, but also 155 something absolute, so the same applies to God, yet not Reply to Objection 3. If the divine perfection con-in the same way. What is contained in the creature above tained only what is signified by relative names, it would and beyond what is contained in the meaning of relation, follow that it is imperfect, being thus related to something is something else besides that relation; whereas in God else; as in the same way, if nothing more were contained there is no distinction, but both are one and the same; and in it than what is signified by the word “wisdom,” it would this is not perfectly expressed by the word “relation,” as not in that case be a subsistence. But as the perfection of if it were comprehended in the ordinary meaning of that the divine essence is greater than can be included in any term. For it was above explained (q. 13, a. 2), in treating of name, it does not follow, if a relative term or any other the divine names, that more is contained in the perfection name applied to God signify something imperfect, that of the divine essence than can be signified by any name. the divine essence is in any way imperfect; for the divine Hence it does not follow that there exists in God anything essence comprehends within itself the perfection of every besides relation in reality; but only in the various names genus (q. 4, a. 2). imposed by us. Whether the relations in God are really distinguished from each other? Ia q. 28 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the divine relations also be a real opposition. The very nature of relative op- are not really distinguished from each other. For things position includes distinction. Hence, there must be real which are identified with the same, are identified with distinction in God, not, indeed, according to that which each other. But every relation in God is really the same is absolute—namely, essence, wherein there is supreme as the divine essence. Therefore the relations are not re- unity and simplicity—but according to that which is rela- ally distinguished from each other. tive. Objection 2. Further, as paternity and filiation are by Reply to Objection 1. According to the Philosopher name distinguished from the divine essence, so likewise (Phys. iii), this argument holds, that whatever things are are goodness and power. But this kind of distinction does identified with the same thing are identified with each not make any real distinction of the divine goodness and other, if the identity be real and logical; as, for instance, power. Therefore neither does it make any real distinction a tunic and a garment; but not if they differ logically. of paternity and filiation. Hence in the same place he says that although action is Objection 3. Further, in God there is no real distinc- the same as motion, and likewise passion; still it does tion but that of origin. But one relation does not seem to not follow that action and passion are the same; because arise from another. Therefore the relations are not really action implies reference as of something “from which” distinguished from each other. there is motion in the thing moved; whereas passion im- On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.) that in God plies reference as of something “which is from” another. “the substance contains the unity; and relation multiplies Likewise, although paternity, just as filiation, is really the the trinity.” Therefore, if the relations were not really dis- same as the divine essence; nevertheless these two in their tinguished from each other, there would be no real trin- own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects. ity in God, but only an ideal trinity, which is the error of Hence they are distinguished from each other. Sabellius. Reply to Objection 2. Power and goodness do not im- I answer that, The attributing of anything to another port any opposition in their respective natures; and hence involves the attribution likewise of whatever is contained there is no parallel argument. in it. So when “man” is attributed to anyone, a ratio- Reply to Objection 3. Although relations, properly nal nature is likewise attributed to him. The idea of re- speaking, do not arise or proceed from each other, nev- lation, however, necessarily means regard of one to an- ertheless they are considered as opposed according to the other, according as one is relatively opposed to another. procession of one from another. So as in God there is a real relation (a. 1), there must Whether in God there are only four real relations—paternity, filiation, spiration, and Ia q. 28 a. 4 procession? Objection 1. It would seem that in God there are not stood; and of the one willing to the object willed; which only four real relations—paternity, filiation, spiration and are real relations not comprised under those above spec- procession. For it must be observed that in God there exist ified. Therefore there are not only four real relations in the relations of the intelligent agent to the object under- God. 156 Objection 2. Further, real relations in God are un-from the principle is called filiation. But the procession of derstood as coming from the intelligible procession of the Love has no proper name of its own (q. 27, a. 4); and so Word. But intelligible relations are infinitely multiplied, neither have the ensuing relations a proper name of their as Avicenna says. Therefore in God there exists an infinite own. The relation of the principle of this procession is series of real relations. called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding Objection 3. Further, ideas in God are eternal (q. 15, is called procession: although these two names belong to a. 1); and are only distinguished from each other by rea- the processions or origins themselves, and not to the rela- son of their regard to things, as above stated. Therefore in tions. God there are many more eternal relations. Reply to Objection 1. In those things in which there Objection 4. Further, equality, and likeness, and iden- is a difference between the intellect and its object, and the tity are relations: and they are in God from eternity. will and its object, there can be a real relation, both of sci- Therefore several more relations are eternal in God than ence to its object, and of the willer to the object willed. the above named. In God, however, the intellect and its object are one and Objection 5. Further, it may also contrariwise be said the same; because by understanding Himself, God under- that there are fewer relations in God than those above stands all other things; and the same applies to His will named. For, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii text and the object that He wills. Hence it follows that in God 24), “It is the same way from Athens to Thebes, as from these kinds of relations are not real; as neither is the rela- Thebes to Athens.” By the same way of reasoning there is tion of a thing to itself. Nevertheless, the relation to the the same relation from the Father to the Son, that of pater- word is a real relation; because the word is understood as nity, and from the Son to the Father, that of filiation; and proceeding by an intelligible action; and not as a thing un- thus there are not four relations in God. derstood. For when we understand a stone; that which the I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. intellect conceives from the thing understood, is called the v), every relation is based either on quantity, as double and word. half; or on action and passion, as the doer and the deed, the Reply to Objection 2. Intelligible relations in our- father and the son, the master and the servant, and the like. selves are infinitely multiplied, because a man under- Now as there is no quantity in God, for He is great without stands a stone by one act, and by another act understands quantity, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1) it follows that that he understands the stone, and again by another, un- a real relation in God can be based only on action. Such derstands that he understands this; thus the acts of under- relations are not based on the actions of God according standing are infinitely multiplied, and consequently also to any extrinsic procession, forasmuch as the relations of the relations understood. This does not apply to God, inas- God to creatures are not real in Him (q. 13, a. 7). Hence, it much as He understands all things by one act alone. follows that real relations in God can be understood only Reply to Objection 3. Ideal relations exist as under- in regard to those actions according to which there are stood by God. Hence it does not follow from their plu- internal, and not external, processions in God. These pro- rality that there are many relations in God; but that God cessions are two only, as above explained (q. 27, a. 5), one knows these many relations. derived from the action of the intellect, the procession of Reply to Objection 4. Equality and similitude in God the Word; and the other from the action of the will, the are not real relations; but are only logical relations (q. 42, procession of love. In respect of each of these processions a. 3, ad 4). two opposite relations arise; one of which is the relation Reply to Objection 5. The way from one term to an- of the person proceeding from the principle; the other is other and conversely is the same; nevertheless the mutual the relation of the principle Himself. The procession of relations are not the same. Hence, we cannot conclude the Word is called generation in the proper sense of the that the relation of the father to the son is the same as term, whereby it is applied to living things. Now the rela- that of the son to the father; but we could conclude this of tion of the principle of generation in perfect living beings something absolute, if there were such between them. is called paternity; and the relation of the one proceeding 157 FIRST PART, QUESTION 29 The Divine Persons (In Four Articles) Having premised what have appeared necessary notions concerning the processions and the relations, we must now approach the subject of the persons. First, we shall consider the persons absolutely, and then comparatively as regards each other. We must consider the persons absolutely first in common; and then singly. The general consideration of the persons seemingly involves four points: (1) The signification of this word “person”; (2) the number of the persons; (3) what is involved in the number of persons, or is opposed thereto; as diversity, and similitude, and the like; and (4) what belongs to our knowledge of the persons. Four subjects of inquiry are comprised in the first point: (1) The definition of “person.” (2) The comparison of person to essence, subsistence, and hypostasis. (3) Whether the name of person is becoming to God? (4) What does it signify in Him? The definition of “person” Ia q. 29 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the definition of per- exist in every genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, son given by Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) is insufficient— the individual belongs to the genus of substance. For sub- that is, “a person is an individual substance of a rational stance is individualized by itself; whereas the accidents nature.” For nothing singular can be subject to definition. are individualized by the subject, which is the substance; But “person” signifies something singular. Therefore per- since this particular whiteness is called “this,” because son is improperly defined. it exists in this particular subject. And so it is reason- Objection 2. Further, substance as placed above in able that the individuals of the genus substance should the definition of person, is either first substance, or second have a special name of their own; for they are called “hy- substance. If it is the former, the word “individual” is su- postases,” or first substances. perfluous, because first substance is individual substance; Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the if it stands for second substance, the word “individual” particular and the individual are found in the rational sub- is false, for there is contradiction of terms; since second stances which have dominion over their own actions; and substances are the “genera” or “species.” Therefore this which are not only made to act, like others; but which can definition is incorrect. act of themselves; for actions belong to singulars. There- Objection 3. Further, an intentional term must not be fore also the individuals of the rational nature have a spe- included in the definition of a thing. For to define a man cial name even among other substances; and this name is as “a species of animal” would not be a correct defini- “person.” tion; since man is the name of a thing, and “species” is a Thus the term “individual substance” is placed in the name of an intention. Therefore, since person is the name definition of person, as signifying the singular in the genus of a thing (for it signifies a substance of a rational nature), of substance; and the term “rational nature” is added, as the word “individual” which is an intentional name comes signifying the singular in rational substances. improperly into the definition. Reply to Objection 1. Although this or that singu- Objection 4. Further, “Nature is the principle of mo- lar may not be definable, yet what belongs to the general tion and rest, in those things in which it is essentially, idea of singularity can be defined; and so the Philosopher and not accidentally,” as Aristotle says (Phys. ii). But (De Praedic., cap. De substantia) gives a definition of first person exists in things immovable, as in God, and in the substance; and in this way Boethius defines person. angels. Therefore the word “nature” ought not to enter Reply to Objection 2. In the opinion of some, the into the definition of person, but the word should rather term “substance” in the definition of person stands for first be “essence.” substance, which is the hypostasis; nor is the term “indi- Objection 5. Further, the separated soul is an individ- vidual” superfluously added, forasmuch as by the name of ual substance of the rational nature; but it is not a person. hypostasis or first substance the idea of universality and of Therefore person is not properly defined as above. part is excluded. For we do not say that man in general is I answer that, Although the universal and particular an hypostasis, nor that the hand is since it is only a part. 158 But where “individual” is added, the idea of assumptibil-intrinsic principle, this term is extended to signify the in- ity is excluded from person; for the human nature in Christ trinsic principle of any kind of movement. In this sense he is not a person, since it is assumed by a greater—that is, defines “nature” (Phys. ii, 3). And since this kind of prin- by the Word of God. It is, however, better to say that sub- ciple is either formal or material, both matter and form are stance is here taken in a general sense, as divided into first commonly called nature. And as the essence of anything and second, and when “individual” is added, it is restricted is completed by the form; so the essence of anything, sig- to first substance. nified by the definition, is commonly called nature. And Reply to Objection 3. Substantial differences being here nature is taken in that sense. Hence Boethius says unknown to us, or at least unnamed by us, it is sometimes (De Duab. Nat.) that, “nature is the specific difference necessary to use accidental differences in the place of sub- giving its form to each thing,” for the specific difference stantial; as, for example, we may say that fire is a simple, completes the definition, and is derived from the special hot, and dry body: for proper accidents are the effects form of a thing. So in the definition of “person,” which of substantial forms, and make them known. Likewise, means the singular in a determined “genus,” it is more terms expressive of intention can be used in defining re- correct to use the term “nature” than “essence,” because alities if used to signify things which are unnamed. And the latter is taken from being, which is most common. so the term “individual” is placed in the definition of per- Reply to Objection 5. The soul is a part of the human son to signify the mode of subsistence which belongs to species; and so, although it may exist in a separate state, particular substances. yet since it ever retains its nature of unibility, it cannot be Reply to Objection 4. According to the Philosopher called an individual substance, which is the hypostasis or (Metaph. v, 5), the word “nature” was first used to sig- first substance, as neither can the hand nor any other part nify the generation of living things, which is called nativ- of man; thus neither the definition nor the name of person ity. And because this kind of generation comes from an belongs to it. Whether “person” is the same as hypostasis, subsistence, and essence? Ia q. 29 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that “person” is the I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. same as “hypostasis,” “subsistence,” and “essence.” For v), substance is twofold. In one sense it means the quid- Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that “the Greeks called the dity of a thing, signified by its definition, and thus we individual substance of the rational nature by the name hy- say that the definition means the substance of a thing; postasis.” But this with us signifies “person.” Therefore in which sense substance is called by the Greeks ousia, “person” is altogether the same as “hypostasis.” what we may call “essence.” In another sense substance Objection 2. Further, as we say there are three per- means a subject or “suppositum,” which subsists in the sons in God, so we say there are three subsistences in genus of substance. To this, taken in a general sense, can God; which implies that “person” and “subsistence” have be applied a name expressive of an intention; and thus it the same meaning. Therefore “person” and “subsistence” is called “suppositum.” It is also called by three names mean the same. signifying a reality—that is, “a thing of nature,” “subsis- Objection 3. Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.) tence,” and “hypostasis,” according to a threefold consid- that the Greek ousia, which means essence, signifies a eration of the substance thus named. For, as it exists in being composed of matter and form. Now that which is itself and not in another, it is called “subsistence”; as we composed of matter and form is the individual substance say that those things subsist which exist in themselves, called “hypostasis” and “person.” Therefore all the afore- and not in another. As it underlies some common nature, said names seem to have the same meaning. it is called “a thing of nature”; as, for instance, this par- Objection 4. On the contrary, Boethius says (De ticular man is a human natural thing. As it underlies the Duab. Nat.) that genera and species only subsist; whereas accidents, it is called “hypostasis,” or “substance.” What individuals are not only subsistent, but also substand. But these three names signify in common to the whole genus subsistences are so called from subsisting, as substance or of substances, this name “person” signifies in the genus of hypostasis is so called from substanding. Therefore, since rational substances. genera and species are not hypostases or persons, these Reply to Objection 1. Among the Greeks the term are not the same as subsistences. “hypostasis,” taken in the strict interpretation of the word, Objection 5. Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.) signifies any individual of the genus substance; but in the that matter is called hypostasis, and form is called ousio- usual way of speaking, it means the individual of the ra- sis—that is, subsistence. But neither form nor matter can tional nature, by reason of the excellence of that nature. be called person. Therefore person differs from the others. Reply to Objection 2. As we say “three persons” plu- 159 rally in God, and “three subsistences,” so the Greeks say when treating of divine simplicity (q. 3, a. 3). “three hypostases.” But because the word “substance,” Reply to Objection 4. Boethius says that genera and which, properly speaking, corresponds in meaning to “hy- species subsist, inasmuch as it belongs to some individ- postasis,” is used among us in an equivocal sense, since ual things to subsist, from the fact that they belong to it sometimes means essence, and sometimes means hy- genera and species comprised in the predicament of sub- postasis, in order to avoid any occasion of error, it was stance, but not because the species and genera themselves thought preferable to use “subsistence” for hypostasis, subsist; except in the opinion of Plato, who asserted that rather than “substance.” the species of things subsisted separately from singular Reply to Objection 3. Strictly speaking, the essence things. To substand, however, belongs to the same indi- is what is expressed by the definition. Now, the defini- vidual things in relation to the accidents, which are out- tion comprises the principles of the species, but not the side the essence of genera and species. individual principles. Hence in things composed of mat- Reply to Objection 5. The individual composed of ter and form, the essence signifies not only the form, nor matter and form substands in relation to accident from the only the matter, but what is composed of matter and the very nature of matter. Hence Boethius says (De Trin.): “A common form, as the principles of the species. But what simple form cannot be a subject.” Its self-subsistence is is composed of this matter and this form has the nature derived from the nature of its form, which does not super- of hypostasis and person. For soul, flesh, and bone be- vene to the things subsisting, but gives actual existence to long to the nature of man; whereas this soul, this flesh the matter and makes it subsist as an individual. On this and this bone belong to the nature of this man. Therefore account, therefore, he ascribes hypostasis to matter, and hypostasis and person add the individual principles to the ousiosis, or subsistence, to the form, because the matter is idea of essence; nor are these identified with the essence the principle of substanding, and form is the principle of in things composed of matter and form, as we said above subsisting. Whether the word “person” should be said of God? Ia q. 29 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the name “person” God. Both because reason implies a discursive knowl- should not be said of God. For Dionysius says (Div. edge, which does not apply to God, as we proved above Nom.): “No one should ever dare to say or think any- (q. 14, a. 12 ); and thus God cannot be said to have “a ra- thing of the supersubstantial and hidden Divinity, beyond tional nature.” And also because God cannot be called an what has been divinely expressed to us by the oracles.” individual substance, since the principle of individuation But the name “person” is not expressed to us in the Old or is matter; while God is immaterial: nor is He the subject New Testament. Therefore “person” is not to be applied of accidents, so as to be called a substance. Therefore the to God. word “person” ought not to be attributed to God. Objection 2. Further, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.): On the contrary, In the Creed of Athanasius we say: “The word person seems to be taken from those persons “One is the person of the Father, another of the Son, an- who represented men in comedies and tragedies. For per- other of the Holy Ghost.” son comes from sounding through [personando], since a I answer that, “Person” signifies what is most perfect greater volume of sound is produced through the cavity in all nature—that is, a subsistent individual of a rational in the mask. These “persons” or masks the Greeks called nature. Hence, since everything that is perfect must be at- prosopa, as they were placed on the face and covered the tributed to God, forasmuch as His essence contains every features before the eyes.” This, however, can apply to God perfection, this name “person” is fittingly applied to God; only in a metaphorical sense. Therefore the word “per- not, however, as it is applied to creatures, but in a more son” is only applied to God metaphorically. excellent way; as other names also, which, while giv- Objection 3. Further, every person is a hypostasis. ing them to creatures, we attribute to God; as we showed But the word “hypostasis” does not apply to God, since, above when treating of the names of God (q. 13, a. 2). as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), it signifies what is the Reply to Objection 1. Although the word “person” subject of accidents, which do not exist in God. Jerome is not found applied to God in Scripture, either in the Old also says (Ep. ad Damas.) that, “in this word hyposta- or New Testament, nevertheless what the word signifies is sis, poison lurks in honey.” Therefore the word “person” found to be affirmed of God in many places of Scripture; should not be said of God. as that He is the supreme self-subsisting being, and the Objection 4. Further, if a definition is denied of any- most perfectly intelligent being. If we could speak of God thing, the thing defined is also denied of it. But the def- only in the very terms themselves of Scripture, it would inition of “person,” as given above, does not apply to follow that no one could speak about God in any but the 160 original language of the Old or New Testament. The ur-does not underlie accidents; but it applies to Him in its ob- gency of confuting heretics made it necessary to find new jective sense, for it is imposed to signify the subsistence. words to express the ancient faith about God. Nor is such Jerome said that “poison lurks in this word,” forasmuch as a kind of novelty to be shunned; since it is by no means before it was fully understood by the Latins, the heretics profane, for it does not lead us astray from the sense of used this term to deceive the simple, to make people pro- Scripture. The Apostle warns us to avoid “profane novel- fess many essences as they profess several hypostases, ties of words” (1 Tim. 6:20). inasmuch as the word “substance,” which corresponds to Reply to Objection 2. Although this name “person” hypostasis in Greek, is commonly taken amongst us to may not belong to God as regards the origin of the term, mean essence. nevertheless it excellently belongs to God in its objective Reply to Objection 4. It may be said that God has a meaning. For as famous men were represented in come- rational “nature,” if reason be taken to mean, not discur- dies and tragedies, the name “person” was given to signify sive thought, but in a general sense, an intelligent nature. those who held high dignity. Hence, those who held high But God cannot be called an “individual” in the sense that rank in the Church came to be called “persons.” Thence His individuality comes from matter; but only in the sense by some the definition of person is given as “hypostasis which implies incommunicability. “Substance” can be ap- distinct by reason of dignity.” And because subsistence in plied to God in the sense of signifying self-subsistence. a rational nature is of high dignity, therefore every indi- There are some, however, who say that the definition of vidual of the rational nature is called a “person.” Now the Boethius, quoted above (a. 1), is not a definition of per- dignity of the divine nature excels every other dignity; and son in the sense we use when speaking of persons in God. thus the name “person” pre-eminently belongs to God. Therefore Richard of St. Victor amends this definition by Reply to Objection 3. The word “hypostasis” does adding that “Person” in God is “the incommunicable ex- not apply to God as regards its source of origin, since He istence of the divine nature.” Whether this word “person” signifies relation? Ia q. 29 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that this word “person,” is predicated plurally of the Three in contrast to the nature as applied to God, does not signify relation, but substance. of the names belonging to the essence; nor does it in itself For Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6): “When we speak of refer to another, as do the words which express relation. the person of the Father, we mean nothing else but the sub- Hence some have thought that this word “person” of stance of the Father, for person is said in regard to Him- itself expresses absolutely the divine essence; as this name self, and not in regard to the Son.” “God” and this word “Wise”; but that to meet heretical at- Objection 2. Further, the interrogation “What?” tack, it was ordained by conciliar decree that it was to be refers to essence. But, as Augustine says: “When we say taken in a relative sense, and especially in the plural, or there are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the with the addition of a distinguishing adjective; as when Word, and the Holy Ghost, and it is asked, Three what? we say, “Three persons,” or, “one is the person of the Fa- the answer is, Three persons.” Therefore person signifies ther, another of the Son,” etc. Used, however, in the sin- essence. gular, it may be either absolute or relative. But this does Objection 3. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. not seem to be a satisfactory explanation; for, if this word iv), the meaning of a word is its definition. But the def- “person,” by force of its own signification, expresses the inition of “person” is this: “The individual substance of divine essence only, it follows that forasmuch as we speak the rational nature,” as above stated. Therefore “person” of “three persons,” so far from the heretics being silenced, signifies substance. they had still more reason to argue. Seeing this, others Objection 4. Further, person in men and angels does maintained that this word “person” in God signifies both not signify relation, but something absolute. Therefore, the essence and the relation. Some of these said that it sig- if in God it signified relation, it would bear an equivocal nifies directly the essence, and relation indirectly, foras- meaning in God, in man, and in angels. much as “person” means as it were “by itself one” [per se On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.) that “every una]; and unity belongs to the essence. And what is “by word that refers to the persons signifies relation.” But no itself” implies relation indirectly; for the Father is under- word belongs to person more strictly than the very word stood to exist “by Himself,” as relatively distinct from the “person” itself. Therefore this word “person” signifies re- Son. Others, however, said, on the contrary, that it signi- lation. fies relation directly; and essence indirectly; forasmuch as I answer that, A difficulty arises concerning the in the definition of “person” the term nature is mentioned meaning of this word “person” in God, from the fact that it indirectly; and these come nearer to the truth. 161 To determine the question, we must consider that we can say that this signification of the word “person” was something may be included in the meaning of a less com- not clearly perceived before it was attacked by heretics. mon term, which is not included in the more common Hence, this word “person” was used just as any other ab- term; as “rational” is included in the meaning of “man,” solute term. But afterwards it was applied to express rela- and not in the meaning of “animal.” So that it is one thing tion, as it lent itself to that signification, so that this word to ask the meaning of the word animal, and another to ask “person” means relation not only by use and custom, ac- its meaning when the animal in question is man. Also, it cording to the first opinion, but also by force of its own is one thing to ask the meaning of this word “person” in proper signification. general; and another to ask the meaning of “person” as ap- Reply to Objection 1. This word “person” is said in plied to God. For “person” in general signifies the individ- respect to itself, not to another; forasmuch as it signifies ual substance of a rational figure. The individual in itself relation not as such, but by way of a substance—which is is undivided, but is distinct from others. Therefore “per- a hypostasis. In that sense Augustine says that it signifies son” in any nature signifies what is distinct in that nature: the essence, inasmuch as in God essence is the same as thus in human nature it signifies this flesh, these bones, the hypostasis, because in God what He is, and whereby and this soul, which are the individuating principles of a He is are the same. man, and which, though not belonging to “person” in gen- Reply to Objection 2. The term “what” refers some- eral, nevertheless do belong to the meaning of a particular times to the nature expressed by the definition, as when human person. we ask; What is man? and we answer: A mortal rational Now distinction in God is only by relation of origin, animal. Sometimes it refers to the “suppositum,” as when as stated above (q. 28, Aa. 2,3), while relation in God is we ask, What swims in the sea? and answer, A fish. So to not as an accident in a subject, but is the divine essence it- those who ask, Three what? we answer, Three persons. self; and so it is subsistent, for the divine essence subsists. Reply to Objection 3. In God the individual— Therefore, as the Godhead is God so the divine paternity i.e. distinct and incommunicable substance—includes the is God the Father, Who is a divine person. Therefore a idea of relation, as above explained. divine person signifies a relation as subsisting. And this is Reply to Objection 4. The different sense of the less to signify relation by way of substance, and such a relation common term does not produce equivocation in the more is a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, although in common. Although a horse and an ass have their own truth that which subsists in the divine nature is the divine proper definitions, nevertheless they agree univocally in nature itself. Thus it is true to say that the name “person” animal, because the common definition of animal applies signifies relation directly, and the essence indirectly; not, to both. So it does not follow that, although relation is however, the relation as such, but as expressed by way of contained in the signification of divine person, but not in a hypostasis. So likewise it signifies directly the essence, that of an angelic or of a human person, the word “person” and indirectly the relation, inasmuch as the essence is the is used in an equivocal sense. Though neither is it applied same as the hypostasis: while in God the hypostasis is ex- univocally, since nothing can be said univocally of God pressed as distinct by the relation: and thus relation, as and creatures (q. 13, a. 5). such, enters into the notion of the person indirectly. Thus 162 FIRST PART, QUESTION 30 The Plurality of Persons in God (In Four Articles) We are now led to consider the plurality of the persons: about which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are several persons in God? (2) How many are they? (3) What the numeral terms signify in God? (4) The community of the term “person.” Whether there are several persons in God? Ia q. 30 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there are not several say, “Three persons,” they say “Three hypostases.” We are persons in God. For person is “the individual substance not, however, accustomed to say Three substances, lest we of a rational nature.” If then there are several persons in be understood to mean three essences or natures, by rea- God, there must be several substances; which appears to son of the equivocal signification of the term. be heretical. Reply to Objection 2. The absolute properties in Objection 2. Further, Plurality of absolute properties God, such as goodness and wisdom, are not mutually op- does not make a distinction of persons, either in God, or posed; and hence, neither are they really distinguished in ourselves. Much less therefore is this effected by a plu- from each other. Therefore, although they subsist, nev- rality of relations. But in God there is no plurality but of ertheless they are not several subsistent realities—that is, relations (q. 28, a. 3). Therefore there cannot be several several persons. But the absolute properties in creatures persons in God. do not subsist, although they are really distinguished from Objection 3. Further, Boethius says of God (De Trin. each other, as whiteness and sweetness; on the other hand, i), that “this is truly one which has no number.” But plu- the relative properties in God subsist, and are really distin- rality implies number. Therefore there are not several per- guished from each other (q. 28, a. 3). Hence the plurality sons in God. of persons in God. Objection 4. Further, where number is, there is whole Reply to Objection 3. The supreme unity and sim- and part. Thus, if in God there exist a number of persons, plicity of God exclude every kind of plurality of absolute there must be whole and part in God; which is inconsistent things, but not plurality of relations. Because relations with the divine simplicity. are predicated relatively, and thus the relations do not im- On the contrary, Athanasius says: “One is the per- port composition in that of which they are predicated, as son of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Boethius teaches in the same book. Ghost.” Therefore the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Reply to Objection 4. Number is twofold, simple or Ghost are several persons. absolute, as two and three and four; and number as exist- I answer that, It follows from what precedes that ing in things numbered, as two men and two horses. So, if there are several persons in God. For it was shown above number in God is taken absolutely or abstractedly, there is (q. 29, a. 4) that this word “person” signifies in God a nothing to prevent whole and part from being in Him, and relation as subsisting in the divine nature. It was also es- thus number in Him is only in our way of understanding; tablished (q. 28, a. 1) that there are several real relations forasmuch as number regarded apart from things num- in God; and hence it follows that there are also several bered exists only in the intellect. But if number be taken realities subsistent in the divine nature; which means that as it is in the things numbered, in that sense as existing in there are several persons in God. creatures, one is part of two, and two of three, as one man Reply to Objection 1. The definition of “person” in- is part of two men, and two of three; but this does not ap- cludes “substance,” not as meaning the essence, but the ply to God, because the Father is of the same magnitude “suppositum” which is made clear by the addition of the as the whole Trinity, as we shall show further on (q. 42, term “individual.” To signify the substance thus under- Aa. 1, 4). stood, the Greeks use the name “hypostasis.” So, as we 163 Whether there are more than three persons in God? Ia q. 30 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that there are more than the other to the other. Now, procession cannot belong to three persons in God. For the plurality of persons in God the Father and the Son, or to either of them; for thus it arises from the plurality of the relative properties as stated would follows that the procession of the intellect, which above (a. 1). But there are four relations in God as stated in God is generation, wherefrom paternity and filiation are above (q. 28, a. 4), paternity, filiation, common spiration, derived, would issue from the procession of love, whence and procession. Therefore there are four persons in God. spiration and procession are derived, if the person gener- Objection 2. The nature of God does not differ from ating and the person generated proceeded from the person His will more than from His intellect. But in God, one per- spirating; and this is against what was laid down above son proceeds from the will, as love; and another proceeds (q. 27 , Aa. 3,4). We must frequently admit that spiration from His nature, as Son. Therefore another proceeds from belongs to the person of the Father, and to the person of His intellect, as Word, besides the one Who proceeds from the Son, forasmuch as it has no relative opposition either His nature, as Son; thus again it follows that there are not to paternity or to filiation; and consequently that proces- only three persons in God. sion belongs to the other person who is called the person Objection 3. Further, the more perfect a creature is, of the Holy Ghost, who proceeds by way of love, as above the more interior operations it has; as a man has under- explained. Therefore only three persons exist in God, the standing and will beyond other animals. But God in- Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. finitely excels every creature. Therefore in God not only Reply to Objection 1. Although there are four rela- is there a person proceeding from the will, and another tions in God, one of them, spiration, is not separated from from the intellect, but also in an infinite number of ways. the person of the Father and of the Son, but belongs to Therefore there are an infinite number of persons in God. both; thus, although it is a relation, it is not called a prop- Objection 4. Further, it is from the infinite goodness erty, because it does not belong to only one person; nor of the Father that He communicates Himself infinitely in is it a personal relation—i.e. constituting a person. The the production of a divine person. But also in the Holy three relations—paternity, filiation, and procession—are Ghost is infinite goodness. Therefore the Holy Ghost pro- called personal properties, constituting as it were the per- duces a divine person; and that person another; and so to sons; for paternity is the person of the Father, filiation is infinity. the person of the Son, procession is the person of the Holy Objection 5. Further, everything within a determinate Ghost proceeding. number is measured, for number is a measure. But the Reply to Objection 2. That which proceeds by way of divine persons are immense, as we say in the Creed of intelligence, as word, proceeds according to similitude, as Athanasius: “The Father is immense, the Son is immense, also that which proceeds by way of nature; thus, as above the Holy Ghost is immense.” Therefore the persons are explained (q. 27, a. 3), the procession of the divine Word not contained within the number three. is the very same as generation by way of nature. But love, On the contrary, It is said: “There are three who as such, does not proceed as the similitude of that whence bear witness in heaven, the father, the Word, and the Holy it proceeds; although in God love is co-essential as being Ghost” (1 Jn. 5:7). To those who ask, “Three what?” we divine; and therefore the procession of love is not called answer, with Augustine (De Trin. vii, 4), “Three persons.” generation in God. Therefore there are but three persons in God. Reply to Objection 3. As man is more perfect than I answer that, As was explained above, there can be other animals, he has more intrinsic operations than other only three persons in God. For it was shown above that the animals, because his perfection is something composite. several persons are the several subsisting relations really Hence the angels, who are more perfect and more simple, distinct from each other. But a real distinction between the have fewer intrinsic operations than man, for they have no divine relations can come only from relative opposition. imagination, or feeling, or the like. In God there exists Therefore two opposite relations must needs refer to two only one real operation—that is, His essence. How there persons: and if any relations are not opposite they must are in Him two processions was above explained (q. 27, needs belong to the same person. Since then paternity and Aa. 1,4). filiation are opposite relations, they belong necessarily to Reply to Objection 4. This argument would prove if two persons. Therefore the subsisting paternity is the per- the Holy Ghost possessed another goodness apart from the son of the Father; and the subsisting filiation is the person goodness of the Father; for then if the Father produced a of the Son. The other two relations are not opposed to divine person by His goodness, the Holy Ghost also would each other; therefore these two cannot belong to one per- do so. But the Father and the Holy Ghost have one and son: hence either one of them must belong to both of the the same goodness. Nor is there any distinction between aforesaid persons; or one must belong to one person, and them except by the personal relations. So goodness be- 164 longs to the Holy Ghost, as derived from another; and it as a simple number, existing in the mind only, is measured belongs to the Father, as the principle of its communica- by one. But when we speak of a number of things as ap- tion to another. The opposition of relation does not allow plied to the persons in God, the notion of measure has no the relation of the Holy Ghost to be joined with the re- place, because the magnitude of the three persons is the lation of principle of another divine person; because He same (q. 42, Aa. 1,4), and the same is not measured by Himself proceeds from the other persons who are in God. the same. Reply to Objection 5. A determinate number, if taken Whether the numeral terms denote anything real in God? Ia q. 30 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the numeral terms de- of multitude, said that as knowledge exists in God accord- note something real in God. For the divine unity is the di- ing to the strict sense of the word, but not in the sense of vine essence. But every number is unity repeated. There- its genus (as in God there is no such thing as a quality), so fore every numeral term in God signifies the essence; and number exists in God in the proper sense of number, but therefore it denotes something real in God. not in the sense of its genus, which is quantity. Objection 2. Further, whatever is said of God and of But we say that numeral terms predicated of God are creatures, belongs to God in a more eminent manner than not derived from number, a species of quantity, for in that to creatures. But the numeral terms denote something real sense they could bear only a metaphorical sense in God, in creatures; therefore much more so in God. like other corporeal properties, such as length, breadth, Objection 3. Further, if the numeral terms do not de- and the like; but that they are taken from multitude in a note anything real in God, and are introduced simply in a transcendent sense. Now multitude so understood has re- negative and removing sense, as plurality is employed to lation to the many of which it is predicated, as “one” con- remove unity, and unity to remove plurality; it follows that vertible with “being” is related to being; which kind of a vicious circle results, confusing the mind and obscuring oneness does not add anything to being, except a negation the truth; and this ought not to be. Therefore it must be of division, as we saw when treating of the divine unity said that the numeral terms denote something real in God. (q. 11, a. 1); for “one” signifies undivided being. So, of On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): “If we ad- whatever we say “one,” we imply its undivided reality: mit companionship”—that is, plurality—“we exclude the thus, for instance, “one” applied to man signifies the un- idea of oneness and of solitude;” and Ambrose says (De divided nature or substance of a man. In the same way, Fide i): “When we say one God, unity excludes plurality when we speak of many things, multitude in this latter of gods, and does not imply quantity in God.” Hence we sense points to those things as being each undivided in see that these terms are applied to God in order to remove itself. something; and not to denote anything positive. But number, if taken as a species of quantity, denotes I answer that, The Master (Sent. i, D, 24) considers an accident added to being; as also does “one” which is that the numeral terms do not denote anything positive in the principle of that number. Therefore the numeral terms God, but have only a negative meaning. Others, however, in God signify the things of which they are said, and be- assert the contrary. yond this they add negation only, as stated (Sent. i, D, In order to resolve this point, we may observe that all 24); in which respect the Master was right (Sent. i, D, plurality is a consequence of division. Now division is 24). So when we say, the essence is one, the term “one” twofold; one is material, and is division of the continu- signifies the essence undivided; and when we say the per- ous; from this results number, which is a species of quan- son is one, it signifies the person undivided; and when we tity. Number in this sense is found only in material things say the persons are many, we signify those persons, and which have quantity. The other kind of division is called their individual undividedness; for it is of the very nature formal, and is effected by opposite or diverse forms; and of multitude that it should be composed of units. this kind of division results in a multitude, which does not Reply to Objection 1. One, as it is a transcendental, is belong to a genus, but is transcendental in the sense in wider and more general than substance and relation. And which being is divided by one and by many. This kind of so likewise is multitude; hence in God it may mean both multitude is found only in immaterial things. substance and relation, according to the context. Still, the Some, considering only that multitude which is a very signification of such names adds a negation of di- species of discrete quantity, and seeing that such kind of vision, beyond substance and relation; as was explained quantity has no place in God, asserted that the numeral above. terms do not denote anything real in God, but remove Reply to Objection 2. Multitude, which denotes something from Him. Others, considering the same kind something real in creatures, is a species of quantity, and 165 cannot be used when speaking of God: unlike transcen-unity (q. 11, a. 2). dental multitude, which adds only indivision to those of It must be observed, nevertheless, that the opposite ar- which it is predicated. Such a kind of multitude is appli- guments do not sufficiently prove the point advanced. Al- cable to God. though the idea of solitude is excluded by plurality, and Reply to Objection 3. “One” does not exclude multi- the plurality of gods by unity, it does not follow that these tude, but division, which logically precedes one or mul- terms express this signification alone. For blackness is titude. Multitude does not remove unity, but division excluded by whiteness; nevertheless, the term whiteness from each of the individuals which compose the multi- does not signify the mere exclusion of blackness. tude. This was explained when we treated of the divine Whether this term “person” can be common to the three persons? Ia q. 30 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that this term “person” excluded by the fact that “person” is not a name of exclu- cannot be common to the three persons. For nothing sion nor of intention, but the name of a reality. We must is common to the three persons but the essence. But therefore resolve that even in human affairs this name this term “person” does not signify the essence directly. “person” is common by a community of idea, not as genus Therefore it is not common to all three. or species, but as a vague individual thing. The names of Objection 2. Further, the common is the opposite to genera and species, as man or animal, are given to signify the incommunicable. But the very meaning of person is the common natures themselves, but not the intentions of that it is incommunicable; as appears from the definition those common natures, signified by the terms “genus” or given by Richard of St. Victor (q. 29, a. 3, ad 4). There- “species.” The vague individual thing, as “some man,” fore this term “person” is not common to all the three per- signifies the common nature with the determinate mode sons. of existence of singular things—that is, something self- Objection 3. Further, if the name “person” is common subsisting, as distinct from others. But the name of a des- to the three, it is common either really, or logically. But ignated singular thing signifies that which distinguishes it is not so really; otherwise the three persons would be the determinate thing; as the name Socrates signifies this one person; nor again is it so logically; otherwise person flesh and this bone. But there is this difference—that the would be a universal. But in God there is neither univer- term “some man” signifies the nature, or the individual on sal nor particular; neither genus nor species, as we proved the part of its nature, with the mode of existence of singu- above (q. 3, a. 5). Therefore this term ‘person’ is not com- lar things; while this name “person” is not given to signify mon to the three. the individual on the part of the nature, but the subsistent On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4) that reality in that nature. Now this is common in idea to the when we ask, “Three what?” we say, “Three persons,” be- divine persons, that each of them subsists distinctly from cause what a person is, is common to them. the others in the divine nature. Thus this name “person” I answer that, The very mode of expression itself is common in idea to the three divine persons. shows that this term “person” is common to the three Reply to Objection 1. This argument is founded on a when we say “three persons”; for when we say “three real community. men” we show that “man” is common to the three. Now it Reply to Objection 2. Although person is incommu- is clear that this is not community of a real thing, as if one nicable, yet the mode itself of incommunicable existence essence were common to the three; otherwise there would can be common to many. be only one person of the three, as also one essence. Reply to Objection 3. Although this community is What is meant by such a community has been vari- logical and not real, yet it does not follow that in God ously determined by those who have examined the sub- there is universal or particular, or genus, or species; both ject. Some have called it a community of exclusion, foras- because neither in human affairs is the community of per- much as the definition of “person” contains the word “in- son the same as community of genus or species; and be- communicable.” Others thought it to be a community of cause the divine persons have one being; whereas genus intention, as the definition of person contains the word and species and every other universal are predicated of “individual”; as we say that to be a “species” is common many which differ in being. to horse and ox. Both of these explanations, however, are 166 FIRST PART, QUESTION 31 Of What Belongs to the Unity or Plurality in God (In Four Articles) We now consider what belongs to the unity or plurality in God; which gives rise to four points of inquiry: (1) Concerning the word “Trinity”; (2) Whether we can say that the Son is other than the Father? (3) Whether an exclusive term, which seems to exclude otherness, can be joined to an essential name in God? (4) Whether it can be joined to a personal term? Whether there is trinity in God? Ia q. 31 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem there is not trinity in God. number of persons of one essence; and on this account we For every name in God signifies substance or relation. But cannot say that the Father is the Trinity, as He is not three this name “Trinity” does not signify the substance; other- persons. Yet it does not mean the relations themselves of wise it would be predicated of each one of the persons: the Persons, but rather the number of persons related to nor does it signify relation; for it does not express a name each other; and hence it is that the word in itself does not that refers to another. Therefore the word “Trinity” is not express regard to another. to be applied to God. Reply to Objection 2. Two things are implied in a Objection 2. Further, this word “trinity” is a collec- collective term, plurality of the “supposita,” and a unity tive term, since it signifies multitude. But such a word of some kind of order. For “people” is a multitude of men does not apply to God; as the unity of a collective name is comprehended under a certain order. In the first sense, the least of unities, whereas in God there exists the great- this word “trinity” is like other collective words; but in est possible unity. Therefore this word “trinity” does not the second sense it differs from them, because in the di- apply to God. vine Trinity not only is there unity of order, but also with Objection 3. Further, every trine is threefold. But in this there is unity of essence. God there is not triplicity; since triplicity is a kind of in- Reply to Objection 3. “Trinity” is taken in an abso- equality. Therefore neither is there trinity in God. lute sense; for it signifies the threefold number of persons. Objection 4. Further, all that exists in God exists in “Triplicity” signifies a proportion of inequality; for it is the unity of the divine essence; because God is His own a species of unequal proportion, according to Boethius essence. Therefore, if Trinity exists in God, it exists in the (Arithm. i, 23). Therefore in God there is not triplicity, unity of the divine essence; and thus in God there would but Trinity. be three essential unities; which is heresy. Reply to Objection 4. In the divine Trinity is to be Objection 5. Further, in all that is said of God, the understood both number and the persons numbered. So concrete is predicated of the abstract; for Deity is God when we say, “Trinity in Unity,” we do not place num- and paternity is the Father. But the Trinity cannot be ber in the unity of the essence, as if we meant three times called trine; otherwise there would be nine realities in one; but we place the Persons numbered in the unity of God; which, of course, is erroneous. Therefore the word nature; as the “supposita” of a nature are said to exist in trinity is not to be applied to God. that nature. On the other hand, we say “Unity in Trinity”; On the contrary, Athanasius says: “Unity in Trinity; meaning that the nature is in its “supposita.” and Trinity in Unity is to be revered.” Reply to Objection 5. When we say, “Trinity is trine,” I answer that, The name “Trinity” in God signifies by reason of the number implied, we signify the multipli- the determinate number of persons. And so the plurality cation of that number by itself; since the word trine im- of persons in God requires that we should use the word ports a distinction in the “supposita” of which it is spoken. trinity; because what is indeterminately signified by plu- Therefore it cannot be said that the Trinity is trine; other- rality, is signified by trinity in a determinate manner. wise it follows that, if the Trinity be trine, there would be Reply to Objection 1. In its etymological sense, this three “supposita” of the Trinity; as when we say, “God word “Trinity” seems to signify the one essence of the is trine,” it follows that there are three “supposita” of the three persons, according as trinity may mean trine-unity. Godhead. But in the strict meaning of the term it rather signifies the 167 Whether the Son is other than the Father? Ia q. 31 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the Son is not other quality be taken away, we avoid the use of the term “dis- than the Father. For “other” is a relative term implying parity”: and lest we remove similitude, we avoid the terms diversity of substance. If, then, the Son is other than the “alien” and “discrepant.” For Ambrose says (De Fide i) Father, He must be different from the Father; which is that “in the Father and the Son there is no discrepancy, but contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. vii), that when one Godhead”: and according to Hilary, as quoted above, we speak of three persons, “we do not mean to imply di- “in God there is nothing alien, nothing separable.” versity.” To avoid the heresy of Sabellius, we must shun the Objection 2. Further, whosoever are other from one term “singularity,” lest we take away the communicabil- another, differ in some way from one another. Therefore, ity of the divine essence. Hence Hilary says (De Trin. if the Son is other than the Father, it follows that He differs vii): “It is sacrilege to assert that the Father and the Son from the Father; which is against what Ambrose says (De are separate in Godhead.” We must avoid the adjective Fide i), that “the Father and the Son are one in Godhead; “only” [unici] lest we take away the number of persons. nor is there any difference in substance between them, nor Hence Hilary says in the same book: “We exclude from any diversity.” God the idea of singularity or uniqueness.” Nevertheless, Objection 3. Further, the term alien is taken from we say “the only Son,” for in God there is no plurality “alius” [other]. But the Son is not alien from the Father, of Sons. Yet, we do not say “the only God,” for the De- for Hilary says (De Trin. vii) that “in the divine persons ity is common to several. We avoid the word “confused,” there is nothing diverse, nothing alien, nothing separable.” lest we take away from the Persons the order of their na- Therefore the Son is not other that the Father. ture. Hence Ambrose says (De Fide i): “What is one is Objection 4. Further, the terms “other person” and not confused; and there is no multiplicity where there is “other thing” [alius et aliud] have the same meaning, dif- no difference.” The word “solitary” is also to be avoided, fering only in gender. So if the Son is another person from lest we take away the society of the three persons; for, as the Father, it follows that the Son is a thing apart from the Hilary says (De Trin. iv), “We confess neither a solitary Father. nor a diverse God.” On the contrary, Augustine∗ says: “There is one This word “other” [alius], however, in the masculine essence of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost, in which sense, means only a distinction of “suppositum”; and the Father is not one thing, the Son another, and the Holy hence we can properly say that “the Son is other than the Ghost another; although the Father is one person, the Son Father,” because He is another “suppositum” of the divine another, and the Holy Ghost another.” nature, as He is another person and another hypostasis. I answer that, Since as Jerome remarks†, a heresy Reply to Objection 1. “Other,” being like the name of arises from words wrongly used, when we speak of the a particular thing, refers to the “suppositum”; and so, there Trinity we must proceed with care and with befitting mod- is sufficient reason for using it, where there is a distinct esty; because, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3), “nowhere substance in the sense of hypostasis or person. But diver- is error more harmful, the quest more toilsome, the find- sity requires a distinct substance in the sense of essence. ing more fruitful.” Now, in treating of the Trinity, we must Thus we cannot say that the Son is diverse from the Fa- beware of two opposite errors, and proceed cautiously be- ther, although He is another. tween them—namely, the error of Arius, who placed a Reply to Objection 2. “Difference” implies distinc- Trinity of substance with the Trinity of persons; and the tion of form. There is one form in God, as appears from error of Sabellius, who placed unity of person with the the text, “Who, when He was in the form of God” (Phil. unity of essence. 2:6). Therefore the term “difference” does not properly Thus, to avoid the error of Arius we must shun the use apply to God, as appears from the authority quoted. Yet, of the terms diversity and difference in God, lest we take Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 5) employs the term “differ- away the unity of essence: we may, however, use the term ence” in the divine persons, as meaning that the relative “distinction” on account of the relative opposition. Hence property is signified by way of form. Hence he says that whenever we find terms of “diversity” or “difference” of the hypostases do not differ from each other in substance, Persons used in an authentic work, these terms of “diver- but according to determinate properties. But “difference” sity” or “difference” are taken to mean “distinction.” But is taken for “distinction,” as above stated. lest the simplicity and singleness of the divine essence be Reply to Objection 3. The term “alien” means what taken away, the terms “separation” and “division,” which is extraneous and dissimilar; which is not expressed by the belong to the parts of a whole, are to be avoided: and lest term “other” [alius]; and therefore we say that the Son is ∗ Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i. † In substance, Ep. lvii. 168 “other” than the Father, but not that He is anything “alien.” is this man? we answer, Socrates, which is the name of the Reply to Objection 4. The neuter gender is formless; “suppositum”; whereas, if we ask, What is he? we reply, whereas the masculine is formed and distinct; and so is the A rational and mortal animal. So, because in God distinc- feminine. So the common essence is properly and aptly tion is by the persons, and not by the essence, we say that expressed by the neuter gender, but by the masculine and the Father is other than the Son, but not something else; feminine is expressed the determined subject in the com- while conversely we say that they are one thing, but not mon nature. Hence also in human affairs, if we ask, Who one person. Whether the exclusive word “alone” should be added to the essential term in God? Ia q. 31 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the exclusive word vents the term “alone” being joined to any essential term “alone” [solus] is not to be added to an essential term in in God, as excluding the predicate from all things but God; God. For, according to the Philosopher (Elench. ii, 3), as if we said “God alone is eternal,” because nothing but “He is alone who is not with another.” But God is with God is eternal. the angels and the souls of the saints. Therefore we can- Reply to Objection 1. Although the angels and the not say that God is alone. souls of the saints are always with God, nevertheless, if Objection 2. Further, whatever is joined to the essen- plurality of persons did not exist in God, He would be tial term in God can be predicated of every person “per alone or solitary. For solitude is not removed by associa- se,” and of all the persons together; for, as we can prop- tion with anything that is extraneous in nature; thus any- erly say that God is wise, we can say the Father is a wise one is said to be alone in a garden, though many plants God; and the Trinity is a wise God. But Augustine says and animals are with him in the garden. Likewise, God (De Trin. vi, 9): “We must consider the opinion that the would be alone or solitary, though angels and men were Father is not true God alone.” Therefore God cannot be with Him, supposing that several persons were not within said to be alone. Him. Therefore the society of angels and of souls does not Objection 3. Further if this expression “alone” is take away absolute solitude from God; much less does it joined to an essential term, it would be so joined as re- remove respective solitude, in reference to a predicate. gards either the personal predicate or the essential predi- Reply to Objection 2. This expression “alone,” prop- cate. But it cannot be the former, as it is false to say, “God erly speaking, does not affect the predicate, which is taken alone is Father,” since man also is a father; nor, again, can formally, for it refers to the “suppositum,” as excluding it be applied as regards the latter, for, if this saying were any other suppositum from the one which it qualifies. But true, “God alone creates,” it would follow that the “Father the adverb “only,” being exclusive, can be applied either alone creates,” as whatever is said of God can be said of to subject or predicate. For we can say, “Only Socrates”— the Father; and it would be false, as the Son also creates. that is, no one else—“runs: and Socrates runs only”—that Therefore this expression “alone” cannot be joined to an is, he does nothing else. Hence it is not properly said that essential term in God. the Father is God alone, or the Trinity is God alone, un- On the contrary, It is said, “To the King of ages, im- less some implied meaning be assumed in the predicate, mortal, invisible, the only God” (1 Tim. 1:17). as, for instance, “The Trinity is God Who alone is God.” I answer that, This term “alone” can be taken as a In that sense it can be true to say that the Father is that God categorematical term, or as a syncategorematical term. Who alone is God, if the relative be referred to the pred- A categorematical term is one which ascribes absolutely icate, and not to the “suppositum.” So, when Augustine its meaning to a given “suppositum”; as, for instance, says that the Father is not God alone, but that the Trinity “white” to man, as when we say a “white man.” If the is God alone, he speaks expositively, as he might explain term “alone” is taken in this sense, it cannot in any way the words, “To the King of ages, invisible, the only God,” be joined to any term in God; for it would mean solitude as applying not to the Father, but to the Trinity alone. in the term to which it is joined; and it would follow that Reply to Objection 3. In both ways can the term God was solitary, against what is above stated (a. 2). A “alone” be joined to an essential term. For this proposi- syncategorematical term imports the order of the predi- tion, “God alone is Father,” can mean two things, because cate to the subject; as this expression “every one” or “no the word “Father” can signify the person of the Father; and one”; and likewise the term “alone,” as excluding every then it is true; for no man is that person: or it can signify other “suppositum” from the predicate. Thus, when we that relation only; and thus it is false, because the relation say, “Socrates alone writes,” we do not mean that Socrates of paternity is found also in others, though not in a uni- is solitary, but that he has no companion in writing, though vocal sense. Likewise it is true to say God alone creates; many others may be with him. In this way nothing pre- nor, does it follow, “therefore the Father alone creates,” 169 because, as logicians say, an exclusive diction so fixes the tained in that term: for instance, from the premiss, “Man term to which it is joined that what is said exclusively of alone is a mortal rational animal,” we cannot conclude, that term cannot be said exclusively of an individual con- “therefore Socrates alone is such.” Whether an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term? Ia q. 31 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that an exclusive diction Father together with Him.” This, however, is not the usual can be joined to the personal term, even though the predi- way of speaking, unless we understand another implica- cate is common. For our Lord speaking to the Father, said: tion, as though we said “He who alone is called the Father “That they may know Thee, the only true God” (Jn. 17:3). is God.” But in the strict sense the exclusion affects the Therefore the Father alone is true God. predicate. And thus the proposition is false if it excludes Objection 2. Further, He said: “No one knows the another in the masculine sense; but true if it excludes it in Son but the Father” (Mat. 11:27); which means that the the neuter sense; because the Son is another person than Father alone knows the Son. But to know the Son is com- the Father, but not another thing; and the same applies to mon (to the persons). Therefore the same conclusion fol- the Holy Ghost. But because this diction “alone,” prop- lows. erly speaking, refers to the subject, it tends to exclude an- Objection 3. Further, an exclusive diction does not other Person rather than other things. Hence such a way exclude what enters into the concept of the term to which of speaking is not to be taken too literally, but it should be it is joined. Hence it does not exclude the part, nor the piously expounded, whenever we find it in an authentic universal; for it does not follow that if we say “Socrates work. alone is white,” that therefore “his hand is not white,” or Reply to Objection 1. When we say, “Thee the only that “man is not white.” But one person is in the concept true God,” we do not understand it as referring to the per- of another; as the Father is in the concept of the Son; and son of the Father, but to the whole Trinity, as Augustine conversely. Therefore, when we say, The Father alone is expounds (De Trin. vi, 9). Or, if understood of the person God, we do not exclude the Son, nor the Holy Ghost; so of the Father, the other persons are not excluded by rea- that such a mode of speaking is true. son of the unity of essence; in so far as the word “only” Objection 4. Further, the Church sings: “Thou alone excludes another thing, as above explained. art Most High, O Jesus Christ.” The same Reply can be given to obj. 2. For an essen- On the contrary, This proposition “The Father alone tial term applied to the Father does not exclude the Son or is God” includes two assertions—namely, that the Father the Holy Ghost, by reason of the unity of essence. Hence is God, and that no other besides the Father is God. But we must understand that in the text quoted the term “no this second proposition is false, for the Son is another one”∗ is not the same as “no man,” which the word itself from the Father, and He is God. Therefore this is false, would seem to signify (for the person of the Father could The Father alone is God; and the same of the like sayings. not be excepted), but is taken according to the usual way I answer that, When we say, “The Father alone is of speaking in a distributive sense, to mean any rational God,” such a proposition can be taken in several senses. nature. If “alone” means solitude in the Father, it is false in a cat- Reply to Objection 3. The exclusive diction does not egorematical sense; but if taken in a syncategorematical exclude what enters into the concept of the term to which sense it can again be understood in several ways. For if it is adjoined, if they do not differ in “suppositum,” as part it exclude (all others) from the form of the subject, it is and universal. But the Son differs in “suppositum” from true, the sense being “the Father alone is God”—that is, the Father; and so there is no parity. “He who with no other is the Father, is God.” In this way Reply to Objection 4. We do not say absolutely that Augustine expounds when he says (De Trin. vi, 6): “We the Son alone is Most High; but that He alone is Most say the Father alone, not because He is separate from the High “with the Holy Ghost, in the glory of God the Fa- Son, or from the Holy Ghost, but because they are not the ther.” ∗ Nemo = non-homo, i.e. no man 170 FIRST PART, QUESTION 32 The Knowledge of the Divine Persons (In Four Articles) We proceed to inquire concerning the knowledge of the divine persons; and this involves four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the divine persons can be known by natural reason? (2) Whether notions are to be attributed to the divine persons? (3) The number of the notions? (4) Whether we may lawfully have various contrary opinions of these notions? Whether the trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason? Ia q. 32 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the trinity of the di- On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. i), “Let no vine persons can be known by natural reason. For philoso- man think to reach the sacred mystery of generation by phers came to the knowledge of God not otherwise than his own mind.” And Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 5), “It is by natural reason. Now we find that they said many things impossible to know the secret of generation. The mind about the trinity of persons, for Aristotle says (De Coelo fails, the voice is silent.” But the trinity of the divine per- et Mundo i, 2): “Through this number”—namely, three— sons is distinguished by origin of generation and proces- “we bring ourselves to acknowledge the greatness of one sion (q. 30, a. 2). Since, therefore, man cannot know, and God, surpassing all things created.” And Augustine says with his understanding grasp that for which no necessary (Confess. vii, 9): “I have read in their works, not in so reason can be given, it follows that the trinity of persons many words, but enforced by many and various reasons, cannot be known by reason. that in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with I answer that, It is impossible to attain to the knowl- God, and the Word was God,” and so on; in which passage edge of the Trinity by natural reason. For, as above ex- the distinction of persons is laid down. We read, more- plained (q. 12, Aa. 4,12), man cannot obtain the knowl- over, in a gloss on Rom. 1 and Ex. 8 that the magicians of edge of God by natural reason except from creatures. Now Pharaoh failed in the third sign—that is, as regards knowl- creatures lead us to the knowledge of God, as effects do to edge of a third person—i.e. of the Holy Ghost —and thus their cause. Accordingly, by natural reason we can know it is clear that they knew at least two persons. Likewise of God that only which of necessity belongs to Him as Trismegistus says: “The monad begot a monad, and re- the principle of things, and we have cited this fundamen- flected upon itself its own heat.” By which words the tal principle in treating of God as above (q. 12, a. 12). generation of the Son and procession of the Holy Ghost Now, the creative power of God is common to the whole seem to be indicated. Therefore knowledge of the divine Trinity; and hence it belongs to the unity of the essence, persons can be obtained by natural reason. and not to the distinction of the persons. Therefore, by Objection 2. Further, Richard St. Victor says (De natural reason we can know what belongs to the unity of Trin. i, 4): “I believe without doubt that probable and even the essence, but not what belongs to the distinction of the necessary arguments can be found for any explanation of persons. Whoever, then, tries to prove the trinity of per- the truth.” So even to prove the Trinity some have brought sons by natural reason, derogates from faith in two ways. forward a reason from the infinite goodness of God, who Firstly, as regards the dignity of faith itself, which consists communicates Himself infinitely in the procession of the in its being concerned with invisible things, that exceed divine persons; while some are moved by the considera- human reason; wherefore the Apostle says that “faith is of tion that “no good thing can be joyfully possessed with- things that appear not” (Heb. 11:1), and the same Apostle out partnership.” Augustine proceeds (De Trin. x, 4; x, says also, “We speak wisdom among the perfect, but not 11,12) to prove the trinity of persons by the procession of the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world; the word and of love in our own mind; and we have fol- but we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery which is lowed him in this (q. 27 , Aa. 1,3). Therefore the trinity hidden” (1 Cor. 2:6,7). Secondly, as regards the utility of persons can be known by natural reason. of drawing others to the faith. For when anyone in the en- Objection 3. Further, it seems to be superfluous to deavor to prove the faith brings forward reasons which are teach what cannot be known by natural reason. But it not cogent, he falls under the ridicule of the unbelievers: ought not to be said that the divine tradition of the Trin- since they suppose that we stand upon such reasons, and ity is superfluous. Therefore the trinity of persons can be that we believe on such grounds. known by natural reason. Therefore, we must not attempt to prove what is of 171 faith, except by authority alone, to those who receive the ral science, where sufficient proof can be brought to show authority; while as regards others it suffices to prove that that the movement of the heavens is always of uniform what faith teaches is not impossible. Hence it is said by velocity. Reason is employed in another way, not as fur- Dionysius (Div. Nom. ii): “Whoever wholly resists the nishing a sufficient proof of a principle, but as confirming word, is far off from our philosophy; whereas if he re- an already established principle, by showing the congruity gards the truth of the word”—i.e. “the sacred word, we of its results, as in astrology the theory of eccentrics and too follow this rule.” epicycles is considered as established, because thereby the Reply to Objection 1. The philosophers did not know sensible appearances of the heavenly movements can be the mystery of the trinity of the divine persons by its explained; not, however, as if this proof were sufficient, proper attributes, such as paternity, filiation, and proces- forasmuch as some other theory might explain them. In sion, according to the Apostle’s words, “We speak the the first way, we can prove that God is one; and the like. wisdom of God which none of the princes of the world”— In the second way, reasons avail to prove the Trinity; as, i.e. the philosophers—“knew” (1 Cor. 2:6). Nevertheless, when assumed to be true, such reasons confirm it. We they knew some of the essential attributes appropriated to must not, however, think that the trinity of persons is ad- the persons, as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, equately proved by such reasons. This becomes evident goodness to the Holy Ghost; as will later on appear. So, when we consider each point; for the infinite goodness when Aristotle said, “By this number,” etc., we must not of God is manifested also in creation, because to produce take it as if he affirmed a threefold number in God, but from nothing is an act of infinite power. For if God com- that he wished to say that the ancients used the threefold municates Himself by His infinite goodness, it is not nec- number in their sacrifices and prayers on account of some essary that an infinite effect should proceed from God: but perfection residing in the number three. In the Platonic that according to its own mode and capacity it should re- books also we find, “In the beginning was the word,” not ceive the divine goodness. Likewise, when it is said that as meaning the Person begotten in God, but as meaning joyous possession of good requires partnership, this holds the ideal type whereby God made all things, and which is in the case of one not having perfect goodness: hence it appropriated to the Son. And although they knew these needs to share some other’s good, in order to have the were appropriated to the three persons, yet they are said goodness of complete happiness. Nor is the image in our to have failed in the third sign—that is, in the knowl- mind an adequate proof in the case of God, forasmuch edge of the third person, because they deviated from the as the intellect is not in God and ourselves univocally. goodness appropriated to the Holy Ghost, in that know- Hence, Augustine says (Tract. xxvii. in Joan.) that by ing God “they did not glorify Him as God” (Rom. 1); faith we arrive at knowledge, and not conversely. or, because the Platonists asserted the existence of one Reply to Objection 3. There are two reason why the Primal Being whom they also declared to be the father knowledge of the divine persons was necessary for us. It of the universe, they consequently maintained the exis- was necessary for the right idea of creation. The fact of tence of another substance beneath him, which they called saying that God made all things by His Word excludes “mind” or the “paternal intellect,” containing the idea of the error of those who say that God produced things by all things, as Macrobius relates (Som. Scip. iv). They necessity. When we say that in Him there is a proces- did not, however, assert the existence of a third separate sion of love, we show that God produced creatures not be- substance which might correspond to the Holy Ghost. So cause He needed them, nor because of any other extrinsic also we do not assert that the Father and the Son differ in reason, but on account of the love of His own goodness. substance, which was the error of Origen and Arius, who So Moses, when he had said, “In the beginning God cre- in this followed the Platonists. When Trismegistus says, ated heaven and earth,” subjoined, “God said, Let there be “Monad begot monad,” etc., this does not refer to the gen- light,” to manifest the divine Word; and then said, “God eration of the Son, or to the procession of the Holy Ghost, saw the light that it was good,” to show proof of the di- but to the production of the world. For one God produced vine love. The same is also found in the other works of one world by reason of His love for Himself. creation. In another way, and chiefly, that we may think Reply to Objection 2. Reason may be employed in rightly concerning the salvation of the human race, ac- two ways to establish a point: firstly, for the purpose of complished by the Incarnate Son, and by the gift of the furnishing sufficient proof of some principle, as in natu- Holy Ghost. 172 Whether there are notions in God? Ia q. 32 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that in God there are no Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost to be one God and notions. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): “We must three persons, to those who ask: “Whereby are They one not dare to say anything of God but what is taught to us God? and whereby are They three persons?” as we an- by the Holy Scripture.” But Holy Scripture does not say swer that They are one in essence or deity; so there must anything concerning notions. Therefore there are none in also be some abstract terms whereby we may answer that God. the persons are distinguished; and these are the proper- Objection 2. Further, all that exists in God concerns ties or notions signified by an abstract term, as paternity the unity of the essence or the trinity of the persons. But and filiation. Therefore the divine essence is signified as the notions do not concern the unity of the essence, nor the “What”; and the person as “Who”; and the property as trinity of the persons; for neither can what belongs to the “Whereby.” essence be predicated of the notions: for instance, we do The second motive is because one person in God is re- not say that paternity is wise or creates; nor can what be- lated to two persons—namely, the person of the Father to longs to the persons be so predicated; for example, we do the person of the Son and the person of the Holy Ghost. not say that paternity begets, nor that filiation is begotten. This is not, however, by one relation; otherwise it would Therefore there do not exist notions in God. follow that the Son also and the Holy Ghost would be re- Objection 3. Further, we do not require to presup- lated to the Father by one and the same relation. Thus, pose any abstract notions as principles of knowing things since relation alone multiplies the Trinity, it would follow which are devoid of composition: for they are known of that the Son and the Holy Ghost would not be two persons. themselves. But the divine persons are supremely simple. Nor can it be said with Prepositivus that as God is related Therefore we are not to suppose any notions in God. in one way to creatures, while creatures are related to Him On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, in divers ways, so the Father is related by one relation to 5): “We recognize difference of hypostases [i.e. of per- the Son and to the Holy Ghost; whereas these two persons sons], in the three properties; i.e. in the paternal, the filial, are related to the Father by two relations. For, since the and the processional.” Therefore we must admit proper- very specific idea of a relation is that it refers to another, it ties and notions in God. must be said that two relations are not specifically differ- I answer that, Prepositivus, considering the simplic- ent if but one opposite relation corresponds to them. For ity of the persons, said that in God there were no prop- the relation of lord and father must differ according to the erties or notions, and wherever there were mentioned, he difference of filiation and servitude. Now, all creatures propounded the abstract for the concrete. For as we are are related to God as His creatures by one specific rela- accustomed to say, “I beseech your kindness”—i.e. you tion. But the Son and the Holy Ghost are not related to who are kind—so when we speak of paternity in God, we the Father by one and the same kind of relation. Hence mean God the Father. there is no parity. But, as shown above (q. 3, a. 3, ad 1), the use of con- Further, in God there is no need to admit any real rela- crete and abstract names in God is not in any way re- tion to the creature (q. 28, a. 1,3); while there is no reason pugnant to the divine simplicity; forasmuch as we always against our admitting in God, many logical relations. But name a thing as we understand it. Now, our intellect can- in the Father there must be a real relation to the Son and not attain to the absolute simplicity of the divine essence, to the Holy Ghost. Hence, corresponding to the two re- considered in itself, and therefore, our human intellect ap- lations of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, whereby they prehends and names divine things, according to its own are related to the Father, we must understand two rela- mode, that is in so far as they are found in sensible ob- tions in the Father, whereby He is related to the Son and jects, whence its knowledge is derived. In these things we to the Holy Ghost. Hence, since there is only one Person use abstract terms to signify simple forms; and to signify of the Father, it is necessary that the relations should be subsistent things we use concrete terms. Hence also we separately signified in the abstract; and these are what we signify divine things, as above stated, by abstract names, mean by properties and notions. to express their simplicity; whereas, to express their sub- Reply to Objection 1. Although the notions are not sistence and completeness, we use concrete names. mentioned in Holy Scripture, yet the persons are men- But not only must essential names be signified in the tioned, comprising the idea of notions, as the abstract is abstract and in the concrete, as when we say Deity and contained in the concrete. God; or wisdom and wise; but the same applies to the per- Reply to Objection 2. In God the notions have their sonal names, so that we may say paternity and Father. significance not after the manner of realities, but by way Two chief motives for this can be cited. The first arises of certain ideas whereby the persons are known; although from the obstinacy of heretics. For since we confess the in God these notions or relations are real, as stated above 173 (q. 28, a. 1). Therefore whatever has order to any essential on account of the real identity, substantive terms, whether or personal act, cannot be applied to the notions; foras- personal or essential, can be predicated of the notions; for much as this is against their mode of signification. Hence we can say that paternity is God, and that paternity is the we cannot say that paternity begets, or creates, or is wise, Father. or is intelligent. The essentials, however, which are not Reply to Objection 3. Although the persons are sim- ordered to any act, but simply remove created conditions ple, still without prejudice to their simplicity, the proper from God, can be predicated of the notions; for we can say ideas of the persons can be abstractedly signified, as above that paternity is eternal, or immense, or such like. So also explained. Whether there are five notions? Ia q. 32 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that there are not five another, He can be known in two ways, because as the Son notions. For the notions proper to the persons are the rela- is from Him, the Father is known by the notion of “pater- tions whereby they are distinguished from each other. But nity”; and as the Holy Ghost is from Him, He is known by the relations in God are only four (q. 28, a. 4). Therefore the notion of “common spiration.” The Son can be known the notions are only four in number. as begotten by another, and thus He is known by “filia- Objection 2. Further, as there is only one essence in tion”; and also by another person proceeding from Him, God, He is called one God, and because in Him there are the Holy Ghost, and thus He is known in the same way as three persons, He is called the Trine God. Therefore, if the Father is known, by “common spiration.” The Holy in God there are five notions, He may be called quinary; Ghost can be known by the fact that He is from another, which cannot be allowed. or from others; thus He is known by “procession”; but not Objection 3. Further, if there are five notions for the by the fact that another is from Him, as no divine person three persons in God, there must be in some one person proceeds from Him. two or more notions, as in the person of the Father there Therefore, there are Five notions in God: “innascibil- is innascibility and paternity, and common spiration. Ei- ity,” “paternity,” “filiation,” and “procession.” Of these ther these three notions really differ, or not. If they really only four are relations, for “innascibility” is not a relation, differ, it follows that the person of the Father is composed except by reduction, as will appear later (q. 33, a. 4, ad 3). of several things. But if they differ only logically, it fol- Four only are properties. For “common spiration” is not lows that one of them can be predicated of another, so that a property; because it belongs to two persons. Three are we can say that as the divine goodness is the same as the personal notions—i.e. constituting persons, “paternity,” divine wisdom by reason of the common reality, so com- “filiation,” and “procession.” “Common spiration” and mon spiration is paternity; which is not to be admitted. “innascibility” are called notions of Persons, but not per- Therefore there are not five notions. sonal notions, as we shall explain further on (q. 40, a. 1, Objection 4. On the contrary, It seems that there are ad 1). more; because as the Father is from no one, and there- Reply to Objection 1. Besides the four relations, an- from is derived the notion of innascibility; so from the other notion must be admitted, as above explained. Holy Ghost no other person proceeds. And in this respect Reply to Objection 2. The divine essence is signified there ought to be a sixth notion. as a reality; and likewise the persons are signified as real- Objection 5. Further, as the Father and the Son are ities; whereas the notions are signified as ideas notifying the common origin of the Holy Ghost, so it is common to the persons. Therefore, although God is one by unity of the Son and the Holy Ghost to proceed from the Father. essence, and trine by trinity of persons, nevertheless He is Therefore, as one notion is common to the Father and the not quinary by the five notions. Son, so there ought to be one notion common to the Son Reply to Objection 3. Since the real plurality in God and to the Holy Ghost. is founded only on relative opposition, the several prop- I answer that, A notion is the proper idea whereby we erties of one Person, as they are not relatively opposed to know a divine Person. Now the divine persons are multi- each other, do not really differ. Nor again are they predi- plied by reason of their origin: and origin includes the idea cated of each other, because they are different ideas of the of someone from whom another comes, and of someone persons; as we do not say that the attribute of power is the that comes from another, and by these two modes a per- attribute of knowledge, although we do say that knowl- son can be known. Therefore the Person of the Father edge is power. cannot be known by the fact that He is from another; but Reply to Objection 4. Since Person implies dignity, by the fact that He is from no one; and thus the notion that as stated above (q. 19, a. 3 ) we cannot derive a notion of belongs to Him is called “innascibility.” As the source of the Holy Spirit from the fact that no person is from Him. 174 For this does not belong to His dignity, as it belongs to the the Father; as the Father and the Son agree in one special authority of the Father that He is from no one. mode of producing the Holy Ghost. But the principle on Reply to Objection 5. The Son and the Holy Ghost do which a notion is based must be something special; thus not agree in one special mode of existence derived from no parity of reasoning exists. Whether it is lawful to have various contrary opinions of notions? Ia q. 32 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not lawful to faith; as for instance if anyone said that Samuel was not have various contrary opinions of the notions. For Augus- the son of Elcana, for it follows that the divine Scripture tine says (De Trin. i, 3): “No error is more dangerous than would be false. Concerning such things anyone may have any as regards the Trinity”: to which mystery the notions a false opinion without danger of heresy, before the matter assuredly belong. But contrary opinions must be in some has been considered or settled as involving consequences way erroneous. Therefore it is not right to have contrary against faith, and particularly if no obstinacy be shown; opinions of the notions. whereas when it is manifest, and especially if the Church Objection 2. Further, the persons are known by the has decided that consequences follow against faith, then notions. But no contrary opinion concerning the persons the error cannot be free from heresy. For this reason many is to be tolerated. Therefore neither can there be about the things are now considered as heretical which were for- notions. merly not so considered, as their consequences are now On the contrary, The notions are not articles of faith. more manifest. Therefore different opinions of the notions are permissi- So we must decide that anyone may entertain contrary ble. opinions about the notions, if he does not mean to up- I answer that, Anything is of faith in two ways; di- hold anything at variance with faith. If, however, anyone rectly, where any truth comes to us principally as divinely should entertain a false opinion of the notions, knowing or taught, as the trinity and unity of God, the Incarnation thinking that consequences against the faith would follow, of the Son, and the like; and concerning these truths a he would lapse into heresy. false opinion of itself involves heresy, especially if it be By what has been said all the objections may be held obstinately. A thing is of faith, indirectly, if the de- solved. nial of it involves as a consequence something against 175 FIRST PART, QUESTION 33 Of the Person of the Father (In Four Articles) We now consider the persons singly; and first, the Person of the Father, concerning Whom there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the Father is the Principle? (2) Whether the person of the Father is properly signified by this name “Father”? (3) Whether “Father” in God is said personally before it is said essentially? (4) Whether it belongs to the Father alone to be unbegotten? Whether it belongs to the Father to be the principle? Ia q. 33 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the Father cannot be Now the wider a term is, the more suitable it is to use as called the principle of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost. For regards God (q. 13, a. 11), because the more special terms principle and cause are the same, according to the Philoso- are, the more they determine the mode adapted to the crea- pher (Metaph. iv). But we do not say that the Father is the ture. Hence this term “cause” seems to mean diversity of cause of the Son. Therefore we must not say that He is the substance, and dependence of one from another; which is principle of the Son. not implied in the word “principle.” For in all kinds of Objection 2. Further, a principle is so called in rela- causes there is always to be found between the cause and tion to the thing principled. So if the Father is the principle the effect a distance of perfection or of power: whereas we of the Son, it follows that the Son is a person principled, use the term “principle” even in things which have no such and is therefore created; which appears false. difference, but have only a certain order to each other; as Objection 3. Further, the word principle is taken from when we say that a point is the principle of a line; or also priority. But in God there is no “before” and “after,” as when we say that the first part of a line is the principle of Athanasius says. Therefore in speaking of God we ought a line. not to used the term principle. Reply to Objection 2. It is the custom with the Greeks On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), to say that the Son and the Holy Ghost are principled. This “The Father is the Principle of the whole Deity.” is not, however, the custom with our Doctors; because, al- I answer that, The word “principle” signifies only though we attribute to the Father something of authority that whence another proceeds: since anything whence by reason of His being the principle, still we do not at- something proceeds in any way we call a principle; and tribute any kind of subjection or inferiority to the Son, or conversely. As the Father then is the one whence another to the Holy Ghost, to avoid any occasion of error. In this proceeds, it follows that the Father is a principle. way, Hilary says (De Trin. ix): “By authority of the Giver, Reply to Objection 1. The Greeks use the words the Father is the greater; nevertheless the Son is not less “cause” and “principle” indifferently, when speaking of to Whom oneness of nature is give.” God; whereas the Latin Doctors do not use the word Reply to Objection 3. Although this word principle, “cause,” but only “principle.” The reason is because “prin- as regards its derivation, seems to be taken from priority, ciple” is a wider term than “cause”; as “cause” is more still it does not signify priority, but origin. For what a term common than “element.” For the first term of a thing, as signifies, and the reason why it was imposed, are not the also the first part, is called the principle, but not the cause. same thing, as stated above (q. 13, a. 8). Whether this name “Father” is properly the name of a divine person? Ia q. 33 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that this name “Father” is But a more common term is more properly applied to God, not properly the name of a divine person. For the name as stated above (q. 13, a. 11). Therefore the more proper “Father” signifies relation. Moreover “person” is an in- name of the divine person is begetter and genitor than Fa- dividual substance. Therefore this name “Father” is not ther. properly a name signifying a Person. Objection 3. Further, a metaphorical term cannot Objection 2. Further, a begetter is more common than be the proper name of anyone. But the word is by us father; for every father begets; but it is not so conversely. metaphorically called begotten, or offspring; and conse- 176 quently, he of whom is the word, is metaphorically called its perfection, and by its end. Now generation signifies father. Therefore the principle of the Word in God is not something in process of being made, whereas paternity properly called Father. signifies the complement of generation; and therefore the Objection 4. Further, everything which is said prop- name “Father” is more expressive as regards the divine erly of God, is said of God first before creatures. But person than genitor or begettor. generation appears to apply to creatures before God; be- Reply to Objection 3. In human nature the word is cause generation seems to be truer when the one who pro- not a subsistence, and hence is not properly called begot- ceeds is distinct from the one whence it proceeds, not only ten or son. But the divine Word is something subsistent by relation but also by essence. Therefore the name “Fa- in the divine nature; and hence He is properly and not ther” taken from generation does not seem to be the proper metaphorically called Son, and His principle is called Fa- name of any divine person. ther. On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 88:27): “He shall cry Reply to Objection 4. The terms “generation” and out to me: Thou art my Father.” “paternity” like the other terms properly applied to God, I answer that, The proper name of any person sig- are said of God before creatures as regards the thing sig- nifies that whereby the person is distinguished from all nified, but not as regards the mode of signification. Hence other persons. For as body and soul belong to the nature also the Apostle says, “I bend my knee to the Father of my of man, so to the concept of this particular man belong Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all paternity in heaven and this particular soul and this particular body; and by these on earth is named” (Eph. 3:14). This is explained thus. is this particular man distinguished from all other men. It is manifest that generation receives its species from the Now it is paternity which distinguishes the person of the term which is the form of the thing generated; and the Father from all other persons. Hence this name “Father,” nearer it is to the form of the generator, the truer and more whereby paternity is signified, is the proper name of the perfect is the generation; as univocal generation is more person of the Father. perfect than non-univocal, for it belongs to the essence of Reply to Objection 1. Among us relation is not a a generator to generate what is like itself in form. Hence subsisting person. So this name “father” among us does the very fact that in the divine generation the form of the not signify a person, but the relation of a person. In God, Begetter and Begotten is numerically the same, whereas however, it is not so, as some wrongly thought; for in God in creatures it is not numerically, but only specifically, the the relation signified by the name “Father” is a subsist- same, shows that generation, and consequently paternity, ing person. Hence, as above explained (q. 29, a. 4), this is applied to God before creatures. Hence the very fact name “person” in God signifies a relation subsisting in the that in God a distinction exists of the Begotten from the divine nature. Begetter as regards relation only, belongs to the truth of Reply to Objection 2. According to the Philosopher the divine generation and paternity. (De Anima ii, text 49), a thing is denominated chiefly by Whether this name “Father” is applied to God, firstly as a personal name? Ia q. 33 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that this name “Father” things which have not a common concept. But the Son is is not applied to God, firstly as a personal name. For in compared to the creature by reason of filiation or gener- the intellect the common precedes the particular. But this ation, according to Col. 1:15: “Who is the image of the name “Father” as a personal name, belongs to the person invisible God, the first-born of every creature.” Therefore of the Father; and taken in an essential sense it is com- paternity taken in a personal sense is not prior to, but has mon to the whole Trinity; for we say “Our Father” to the the same concept as, paternity taken essentially. whole Trinity. Therefore “Father” comes first as an essen- On the contrary, The eternal comes before the tem- tial name before its personal sense. poral. But God is the Father of the Son from eternity; Objection 2. Further, in things of which the concept is while He is the Father of the creature in time. Therefore the same there is no priority of predication. But paternity paternity in God is taken in a personal sense as regards the and filiation seem to be of the same nature, according as a Son, before it is so taken as regards the creature. divine person is Father of the Son, and the whole Trinity I answer that, A name is applied to that wherein is is our Father, or the creature’s; since, according to Basil perfectly contained its whole signification, before it is ap- (Hom. xv, De Fide), to receive is common to the creature plied to that which only partially contains it; for the latter and to the Son. Therefore “Father” in God is not taken as bears the name by reason of a kind of similitude to that an essential name before it is taken personally. which answers perfectly to the signification of the name; Objection 3. Further, it is not possible to compare since all imperfect things are taken from perfect things. 177 Hence this name “lion” is applied first to the animal con-creatures. taining the whole nature of a lion, and which is properly Reply to Objection 1. Common terms taken abso- so called, before it is applied to a man who shows some- lutely, in the order of our intelligence, come before proper thing of a lion’s nature, as courage, or strength, or the like; terms; because they are included in the understanding of and of whom it is said by way of similitude. proper terms; but not conversely. For in the concept of Now it is manifest from the foregoing (q. 27, a. 2; the person of the Father, God is understood; but not con- q. 28, a. 4), that the perfect idea of paternity and filia- versely. But common terms which import relation to the tion is to be found in God the Father, and in God the Son, creature come after proper terms which import personal because one is the nature and glory of the Father and the relations; because the person proceeding in God proceeds Son. But in the creature, filiation is found in relation to as the principle of the production of creatures. For as the God, not in a perfect manner, since the Creator and the word conceived in the mind of the artist is first under- creature have not the same nature; but by way of a certain stood to proceed from the artist before the thing designed, likeness, which is the more perfect the nearer we approach which is produced in likeness to the word conceived in the to the true idea of filiation. For God is called the Father of artist’s mind; so the Son proceeds from the Father before some creatures, by reason only of a trace, for instance of the creature, to which the name of filiation is applied as it irrational creatures, according to Job 38:28: “Who is the participates in the likeness of the Son, as is clear from the father of the rain? or who begot the drops of dew?” Of words of Rom. 8:29: “Whom He foreknew and predes- some, namely, the rational creature (He is the Father), by tined to be made conformable to the image of His Son.” reason of the likeness of His image, according to Dt. 32:6: Reply to Objection 2. To “receive” is said to be com- “Is He not thy Father, who possessed, and made, and cre- mon to the creature and to the Son not in a univocal sense, ated thee?” And of others He is the Father by similitude but according to a certain remote similitude whereby He of grace, and these are also called adoptive sons, as or- is called the First Born of creatures. Hence the authority dained to the heritage of eternal glory by the gift of grace quoted subjoins: “That He may be the First Born among which they have received, according to Rom. 8:16,17: many brethren,” after saying that some were conformed “The Spirit Himself gives testimony to our spirit that we to the image of the Son of God. But the Son of God pos- are the sons of God; and if sons, heirs also.” Lastly, He sesses a position of singularity above others, in having by is the Father of others by similitude of glory, forasmuch nature what He receives, as Basil also declares (Hom. xv as they have obtained possession of the heritage of glory, De Fide); hence He is called the only begotten (Jn. 1:18): according to Rom. 5:2: “We glory in the hope of the glory “The only begotten Who is in the bosom of the Father, He of the sons of God.” Therefore it is plain that “paternity” hath declared unto us.” is applied to God first, as importing regard of one Person From this appears the Reply to the Third Objection. to another Person, before it imports the regard of God to Whether it is proper to the Father to be unbegotten? Ia q. 33 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not proper to it signifies substance; therefore unbegotten and begotten the Father to be unbegotten. For every property supposes differ in substance. But the Son, Who is begotten, does something in that of which it is the property. But “unbe- not differ from the Father in substance. Therefore the Fa- gotten” supposes nothing in the Father; it only removes ther ought not to be called unbegotten. something. Therefore it does not signify a property of the Objection 4. Further, property means what belongs to Father. one alone. Since, then, there are more than one in God Objection 2. Further, Unbegotten is taken either in a proceeding from another, there is nothing to prevent sev- privative, or in a negative sense. If in a negative sense, eral not receiving their being from another. Therefore the then whatever is not begotten can be called unbegotten. Father is not alone unbegotten. But the Holy Ghost is not begotten; neither is the divine Objection 5. Further, as the Father is the principle of essence. Therefore to be unbegotten belongs also to the the person begotten, so is He of the person proceeding. So essence; thus it is not proper to the Father. But if it be if by reason of his opposition to the person begotten, it is taken in a privative sense, as every privation signifies im- proper to the Father to be unbegotten it follows that it is perfection in the thing which is the subject of privation, it proper to Him also to be unproceeding. follows that the Person of the Father is imperfect; which On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): “One is cannot be. from one —that is, the Begotten is from the Unbegotten— Objection 3. Further, in God, “unbegotten” does not namely, by the property in each one respectively of in- signify relation, for it is not used relatively. Therefore nascibility and origin.” 178 I answer that, As in creatures there exist a first and gotten. In this sense the term “unbegotten” can be applied a secondary principle, so also in the divine Persons, in also to the Holy Ghost. Hence to consider it as a term Whom there is no before or after, is formed the principle proper to the Father alone, it must be further understood not from a principle, Who is the Father; and the principle that the name “unbegotten” belongs to a divine person as from a principle, Who is the Son. the principle of another person; so that it be understood to Now in things created a first principle is known in two imply negation in the genus of principle taken personally ways; in one way as the first “principle,” by reason of in God. Or that there be understood in the term “unbe- its having a relation to what proceeds from itself; in an- gotten” that He is not in any way derived from another; other way, inasmuch as it is a “first” principle by reason and not only that He is not from another by way only of of its not being from another. Thus therefore the Father generation. In this sense the term “unbegotten” does not is known both by paternity and by common spiration, as belong at all to the Holy Ghost, Who is from another by regards the persons proceeding from Himself. But as the procession, as a subsisting person; nor does it belong to principle, not from a principle He is known by the fact that the divine essence, of which it may be said that it is in the He is not from another; and this belongs to the property Son or in the Holy Ghost from another—namely, from the of innascibility, signified by this word “begotten.” Father. Reply to Objection 1. Some there are who say that in- Reply to Objection 3. According to Damascene (De nascibility, signified by the word “unbegotten,” as a prop- Fide Orth. ii, 9), “unbegotten” in one sense signifies the erty of the Father, is not a negative term only, but either same as “uncreated”; and thus it applies to the substance, that it means both these things together—namely, that the for thereby does the created substance differ from the un- Father is from no one, and that He is the principle of oth- created. In another sense it signifies what is not begotten, ers; or that it imports universal authority, or also His plen- and in this sense it is a relative term; just as negation is re-itude as the source of all. This, however, does not seem duced to the genus of affirmation, as “not man” is reduced true, because thus innascibility would not be a property to the genus of substance, and “not white” to the genus of distinct from paternity and spiration; but would include quality. Hence, since “begotten” implies relation in God, them as the proper is included in the common. For source “unbegotten” belongs also to relation. Thus it does not and authority signify in God nothing but the principle of follow that the Father unbegotten is substantially distin- origin. We must therefore say with Augustine (De Trin. guished from the Son begotten; but only by relation; that v, 7) that “unbegotten” imports the negation of passive is, as the relation of Son is denied of the Father. generation. For he says that “unbegotten” has the same Reply to Objection 4. In every genus there must be meaning as “not a son.” Nor does it follow that “unbegot- something first; so in the divine nature there must be some ten” is not the proper notion of the Father; for primary and one principle which is not from another, and which we simple things are notified by negations; as, for instance, a call “unbegotten.” To admit two innascibles is to sup- point is defined as what has no part. pose the existence of two Gods, and two divine natures. Reply to Objection 2. “Unbegotten” is taken some- Hence Hilary says (De Synod.): “As there is one God, so times in a negative sense only, and in that sense Jerome there cannot be two innascibles.” And this especially be- says that “the Holy Ghost is unbegotten,” that is, He is cause, did two innascibles exist, one would not be from not begotten. Otherwise “unbegotten” may be taken in a the other, and they would not be distinguished by relative kind of privation sense, but not as implying any imper- opposition: therefore they would be distinguished from fection. For privation can be taken in many ways; in one each other by diversity of nature. way when a thing has not what is naturally belongs to an- Reply to Objection 5. The property of the Father, other, even though it is not of its own nature to have it; as, whereby He is not from another, is more clearly signified for instance, if a stone be called a dead thing, as wanting by the removal of the nativity of the Son, than by the re- life, which naturally belongs to some other things. In an- moval of the procession of the Holy Ghost; both because other sense, privation is so called when something has not the procession of the Holy Ghost has no special name, as what naturally belongs to some members of its genus; as stated above (q. 27, a. 4, ad 3), and because also in the for instance when a mole is called blind. In a third sense order of nature it presupposes the generation of the Son. privation means the absence of what something ought to Hence, it being denied of the Father that He is begotten, have; in which sense, privation imports an imperfection. although He is the principle of generation, it follows, as In this sense, “unbegotten” is not attributed to the Father a consequence, that He does not proceed by the proces- as a privation, but it may be so attributed in the second sion of the Holy Ghost, because the Holy Ghost is not sense, meaning that a certain person of the divine nature is the principle of generation, but proceeds from the person not begotten, while some person of the same nature is be- begotten. 179 FIRST PART, QUESTION 34 Of the Person of the Son (In Three Articles) We next consider the person of the Son. Three names are attributed to the Son—namely, “Son,” “Word,” and “Image.” The idea of Son is gathered from the idea of Father. Hence it remains for us to consider Word and Image. Concerning Word there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether Word is an essential term in God, or a personal term? (2) Whether it is the proper name of the Son? (3) Whether in the name of Word is expressed relation to creatures? Whether Word in God is a personal name? Ia q. 34 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that Word in God is not intellect. Again the vocal sound proceeds from the sig- a personal name. For personal names are applied to God nification or the imagination, as stated in De Anima ii, in a proper sense, as Father and Son. But Word is applied text 90. The vocal sound, which has no signification can- to God metaphorically, as Origen says on (Jn. 1:1), “In not be called a word: wherefore the exterior vocal sound the beginning was the Word.” Therefore Word is not a is called a word from the fact the it signifies the interior personal name in God. concept of the mind. Therefore it follows that, first and Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine (De chiefly, the interior concept of the mind is called a word; Trin. ix, 10), “The Word is knowledge with love;” and secondarily, the vocal sound itself, signifying the interior according to Anselm (Monol. lx), “To speak is to the concept, is so called; and thirdly, the imagination of the Supreme Spirit nothing but to see by thought.” But knowl- vocal sound is called a word. Damascene mentions these edge and thought, and sight, are essential terms in God. three kinds of words (De Fide Orth. i, 17), saying that Therefore Word is not a personal term in God. “word” is called “the natural movement of the intellect, Objection 3. Further, it is essential to word to be spo- whereby it is moved, and understands, and thinks, as light ken. But, according to Anselm (Monol. lix), as the Father and splendor;” which is the first kind. “Again,” he says, is intelligent, the Son is intelligent, and the Holy Ghost “the word is what is not pronounced by a vocal word, but is intelligent, so the Father speaks, the Son speaks, and is uttered in the heart;” which is the third kind. “Again,” the Holy Ghost speaks; and likewise, each one of them is also, “the word is the angel”—that is, the messenger “of spoken. Therefore, the name Word is used as an essential intelligence;” which is the second kind. Word is also used term in God, and not in a personal sense. in a fourth way figuratively for that which is signified or Objection 4. Further, no divine person is made. But effected by a word; thus we are wont to say, “this is the the Word of God is something made. For it is said, word I have said,” or “which the king has commanded,” “Fire, hail, snow, ice, the storms which do His Word” (Ps. alluding to some deed signified by the word either by way 148:8). Therefore the Word is not a personal name in God. of assertion or of command. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11): Now word is taken strictly in God, as signifying the “As the Son is related to the Father, so also is the Word to concept of the intellect. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. Him Whose Word He is.” But the Son is a personal name, xv, 10): “Whoever can understand the word, not only be- since it is said relatively. Therefore so also is Word. fore it is sounded, but also before thought has clothed I answer that, The name of Word in God, if taken it with imaginary sound, can already see some likeness in its proper sense, is a personal name, and in no way an of that Word of Whom it is said: In the beginning was essential name. the Word.” The concept itself of the heart has of its To see how this is true, we must know that our own own nature to proceed from something other than itself— word taken in its proper sense has a threefold meaning; namely, from the knowledge of the one conceiving. Hence while in a fourth sense it is taken improperly or figura- “Word,” according as we use the term strictly of God, tively. The clearest and most common sense is when it is signifies something proceeding from another; which be- said of the word spoken by the voice; and this proceeds longs to the nature of personal terms in God, inasmuch from an interior source as regards two things found in the as the divine persons are distinguished by origin (q. 27, exterior word—that is, the vocal sound itself, and the sig- Aa. 3,4,5). Hence the term “Word,” according as we use nification of the sound. For, according to the Philosopher the term strictly of God, is to be taken as said not essen- (Peri Herm. i) vocal sound signifies the concept of the tially, but personally. 180 Reply to Objection 1. The Arians, who sprang from no place in God. But when the intellect attains to the form Origen, declared that the Son differed in substance from of truth, it does not think, but perfectly contemplates the the Father. Hence, they endeavored to maintain that when truth. Hence Anselm (Monol. lx) takes “thought” in an the Son of God is called the Word, this is not to be un- improper sense for “contemplation.” derstood in a strict sense; lest the idea of the Word pro- Reply to Objection 3. As, properly speaking, Word ceeding should compel them to confess that the Son of in God is said personally, and not essentially, so likewise God is of the same substance as the Father. For the in- is to “speak.” Hence, as the Word is not common to the terior word proceeds in such a manner from the one who Father, Son and Holy Ghost, so it is not true that the Fa- pronounces it, as to remain within him. But supposing ther, Son, and Holy Ghost are one speaker. So Augustine Word to be said metaphorically of God, we must still ad- says (De Trin. vii, 1): “He who speaks in that co-eternal mit Word in its strict sense. For if a thing be called a word Word is understood as not alone in God, but as being with metaphorically, this can only be by reason of some mani- that very Word, without which, forsooth, He would not be festation; either it makes something manifest as a word, or speaking.” On the other hand, “to be spoken” belongs to it is manifested by a word. If manifested by a word, there each Person, for not only is the word spoken, but also the must exist a word whereby it is manifested. If it is called thing understood or signified by the word. Therefore in a word because it exteriorly manifests, what it exteriorly this manner to one person alone in God does it belong to manifests cannot be called word except in as far as it sig- be spoken in the same way as a word is spoken; whereas in nifies the interior concept of the mind, which anyone may the way whereby a thing is spoken as being understood in also manifest by exterior signs. Therefore, although Word the word, it belongs to each Person to be spoken. For the may be sometimes said of God metaphorically, neverthe- Father, by understanding Himself, the Son and the Holy less we must also admit Word in the proper sense, and Ghost, and all other things comprised in this knowledge, which is said personally. conceives the Word; so that thus the whole Trinity is “spo- Reply to Objection 2. Nothing belonging to the intel- ken” in the Word; and likewise also all creatures: as the lect can be applied to God personally, except word alone; intellect of a man by the word he conceives in the act for word alone signifies that which emanates from an- of understanding a stone, speaks a stone. Anselm took other. For what the intellect forms in its conception is the the term “speak” improperly for the act of understanding; word. Now, the intellect itself, according as it is made ac- whereas they really differ from each other; for “to under- tual by the intelligible species, is considered absolutely; stand” means only the habitude of the intelligent agent to likewise the act of understanding which is to the actual the thing understood, in which habitude no trace of origin intellect what existence is to actual being; since the act is conveyed, but only a certain information of our intel- of understanding does not signify an act going out from lect; forasmuch as our intellect is made actual by the form the intelligent agent, but an act remaining in the agent. of the thing understood. In God, however, it means com- Therefore when we say that word is knowledge, the term plete identity, because in God the intellect and the thing knowledge does not mean the act of a knowing intellect, understood are altogether the same, as was proved above or any one of its habits, but stands for what the intellect (q. 14, Aa. 4,5). Whereas to “speak” means chiefly the conceives by knowing. Hence also Augustine says (De habitude to the word conceived; for “to speak” is nothing Trin. vii, 1) that the Word is “begotten wisdom;” for it but to utter a word. But by means of the word it imports is nothing but the concept of the Wise One; and in the a habitude to the thing understood which in the word ut- same way It can be called “begotten knowledge.” Thus tered is manifested to the one who understands. Thus, can also be explained how “to speak” is in God “to see only the Person who utters the Word is “speaker” in God, by thought,” forasmuch as the Word is conceived by the although each Person understands and is understood, and gaze of the divine thought. Still the term “thought” does consequently is spoken by the Word. not properly apply to the Word of God. For Augustine Reply to Objection 4. The term “word” is there taken says (De Trin. xv, 16): “Therefore do we speak of the figuratively, as the thing signified or effected by word is Word of God, and not of the Thought of God, lest we called word. For thus creatures are said to do the word of believe that in God there is something unstable, now as- God, as executing any effect, whereto they are ordained suming the form of Word, now putting off that form and from the word conceived of the divine wisdom; as anyone remaining latent and as it were formless.” For thought is said to do the word of the king when he does the work consists properly in the search after the truth, and this has to which he is appointed by the king’s word. 181 Whether “Word” is the Son’s proper name? Ia q. 34 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that “Word” is not the has a hypostatic being; but other words [as our own] are proper name of the Son. For the Son is a subsisting per- activities if the soul.” son in God. But word does not signify a subsisting thing, Reply to Objection 2. The error of Valentine was as appears in ourselves. Therefore word cannot be the condemned, not as the Arians pretended, because he as- proper name of the person of the Son. serted that the Son was born by being uttered, as Hilary Objection 2. Further, the word proceeds from the relates (De Trin. vi); but on account of the different mode speaker by being uttered. Therefore if the Son is prop- of utterance proposed by its author, as appears from Au- erly the word, He proceeds from the Father, by way only gustine (De Haeres. xi). of utterance; which is the heresy of Valentine; as appears Reply to Objection 3. In the term “Word” the same from Augustine (De Haeres. xi). property is comprised as in the name Son. Hence Augus- Objection 3. Further, every proper name of a person tine says (De Trin. vii, 11): “Word and Son express the signifies some property of that person. Therefore, if the same.” For the Son’s nativity, which is His personal prop- Word is the Son’s proper name, it signifies some property erty, is signified by different names, which are attributed of His; and thus there will be several more properties in to the Son to express His perfection in various ways. To God than those above mentioned. show that He is of the same nature as the Father, He is Objection 4. Further, whoever understands conceives called the Son; to show that He is co-eternal, He is called a word in the act of understanding. But the Son under- the Splendor; to show that He is altogether like, He is stands. Therefore some word belongs to the Son; and called the Image; to show that He is begotten immateri- consequently to be Word is not proper to the Son. ally, He is called the Word. All these truths cannot be Objection 5. Further, it is said of the Son (Heb. 1:3): expressed by only one name. “Bearing all things by the word of His power;” whence Reply to Objection 4. To be intelligent belongs to Basil infers (Cont. Eunom. v, 11) that the Holy Ghost is the Son, in the same way as it belongs to Him to be God, the Son’s Word. Therefore to be Word is not proper to the since to understand is said of God essentially, as stated Son. above (q. 14, Aa. 2,4). Now the Son is God begotten, and On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 11): not God begetting; and hence He is intelligent, not as pro- “By Word we understand the Son alone.” ducing a Word, but as the Word proceeding; forasmuch as I answer that, “Word,” said of God in its proper sense, in God the Word proceeding does not differ really from is used personally, and is the proper name of the person of the divine intellect, but is distinguished from the principle the Son. For it signifies an emanation of the intellect: and of the Word only by relation. the person Who proceeds in God, by way of emanation of Reply to Objection 5. When it is said of the Son, the intellect, is called the Son; and this procession is called “Bearing all things by the word of His power”; “word” generation, as we have shown above (q. 27, a. 2). Hence it is taken figuratively for the effect of the Word. Hence follows that the Son alone is properly called Word in God. a gloss says that “word” is here taken to mean command; Reply to Objection 1. “To be” and “to understand” inasmuch as by the effect of the power of the Word, things are not the same in us. Hence that which in us has intel- are kept in being, as also by the effect of the power of the lectual being, does not belong to our nature. But in God Word things are brought into being. Basil speaks widely “to be” and “to understand” are one and the same: hence and figuratively in applying Word to the Holy Ghost; in the Word of God is not an accident in Him, or an effect the sense perhaps that everything that makes a person of His; but belongs to His very nature. And therefore it known may be called his word, and so in that way the must needs be something subsistent; for whatever is in Holy Ghost may be called the Son’s Word, because He the nature of God subsists; and so Damascene says (De manifests the Son. Fide Orth. i, 18) that “the Word of God is substantial and Whether the name “Word” imports relation to creatures? Ia q. 34 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the name ‘Word’ does creatures is said of God in time; as “Lord” and “Creator.” not import relation to creatures. For every name that con- But Word is said of God from eternity. Therefore it does notes some effect in creatures, is said of God essentially. not import relation to the creature. But Word is not said essentially, but personally. Therefore Objection 3. Further, Word imports relation to the Word does not import relation to creatures. source whence it proceeds. Therefore, if it imports rela- Objection 2. Further, whatever imports relation to tion to the creature, it follows that the Word proceeds from 182 the creature. Son to be the Son, so it properly belongs to Him to be Objection 4. Further, ideas (in God) are many ac- God begotten, or the Creator begotten; and in this way the cording to their various relations to creatures. Therefore name Word imports relation to creatures. if Word imports relation to creatures, it follows that in Reply to Objection 2. Since the relations result from God there is not one Word only, but many. actions, some names import the relation of God to crea- Objection 5. Further, if Word imports relation to the tures, which relation follows on the action of God which creature, this can only be because creatures are known by passes into some exterior effect, as to create and to govern; God. But God does not know beings only; He knows also and the like are applied to God in time. But others import non-beings. Therefore in the Word are implied relations a relation which follows from an action which does not to non-beings; which appears to be false. pass into an exterior effect, but abides in the agent—as to On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. know and to will: such are not applied to God in time; and 63), that “the name Word signifies not only relation to the this kind of relation to creatures is implied in the name of Father, but also relation to those beings which are made the Word. Nor is it true that all names which import the through the Word, by His operative power.” relation of God to creatures are applied to Him in time; I answer that, Word implies relation to creatures. For but only those names are applied in time which import re- God by knowing Himself, knows every creature. Now the lation following on the action of God passing into exterior word conceived in the mind is representative of everything effect. that is actually understood. Hence there are in ourselves Reply to Objection 3. Creatures are known to God different words for the different things which we under- not by a knowledge derived from the creatures them- stand. But because God by one act understands Himself selves, but by His own essence. Hence it is not necessary and all things, His one only Word is expressive not only that the Word should proceed from creatures, although the of the Father, but of all creatures. Word is expressive of creatures. And as the knowledge of God is only cognitive as re- Reply to Objection 4. The name of Idea is imposed gards God, whereas as regards creatures, it is both cogni- chiefly to signify relation to creatures; and therefore it is tive and operative, so the Word of God is only expressive applied in a plural sense to God; and it is not said per- of what is in God the Father, but is both expressive and sonally. But the name of Word is imposed chiefly to sig- operative of creatures; and therefore it is said (Ps. 32:9): nify the speaker, and consequently, relation to creatures, “He spake, and they were made;” because in the Word is inasmuch as God, by understanding Himself, understands implied the operative idea of what God makes. every creature; and so there is only one Word in God, and Reply to Objection 1. The nature is also included that is a personal one. indirectly in the name of the person; for person is an indi- Reply to Objection 5. God’s knowledge of non- vidual substance of a rational nature. Therefore the name beings and God’s Word about non-beings are the same; of a divine person, as regards the personal relation, does because the Word of God contains no less than does the not imply relation to the creature, but it is implied in what knowledge of God, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 14). belongs to the nature. Yet there is nothing to prevent its Nevertheless the Word is expressive and operative of be- implying relation to creatures, so far as the essence is in- ings, but is expressive and manifestive of non-beings. cluded in its meaning: for as it properly belongs to the 183 FIRST PART, QUESTION 35 Of the Image (In Two Articles) We next inquire concerning the image: about which there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether Image in God is said personally? (2) Whether this name belongs to the Son alone? Whether image in God is said personally? Ia q. 35 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that image is not said per- wise depicted. Further, neither the similitude of species or sonally of God. For Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad of figure is enough for an image, which requires also the Petrum i) says, “The Godhead of the Holy Trinity and the idea of origin; because, as Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, Image whereunto man is made are one.” Therefore Image qu. 74): “One egg is not the image of another, because it is said of God essentially, and not personally. is not derived from it.” Therefore for a true image it is re- Objection 2. Further, Hilary says (De Synod.): “An quired that one proceeds from another like to it in species, image is a like species of that which it represents.” But or at least in specific sign. Now whatever imports proces- species or form is said of God essentially. Therefore so sion or origin in God, belongs to the persons. Hence the also is Image. name “Image” is a personal name. Objection 3. Further, Image is derived from imita- Reply to Objection 1. Image, properly speaking, tion, which implies “before” and “after.” But in the divine means whatever proceeds forth in likeness to another. persons there is no “before” and “after.” Therefore Image That to the likeness of which anything proceeds, is prop- cannot be a personal name in God. erly speaking called the exemplar, and is improperly On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1): called the image. Nevertheless Augustine (Fulgentius) “What is more absurd than to say that an image is referred uses the name of Image in this sense when he says that to itself?” Therefore the Image in God is a relation, and is the divine nature of the Holy Trinity is the Image to whom thus a personal name. man was made. I answer that, Image includes the idea of similitude. Reply to Objection 2. “Species,” as mentioned by Still, not any kind of similitude suffices for the notion of Hilary in the definition of image, means the form derived image, but only similitude of species, or at least of some from one thing to another. In this sense image is said to specific sign. In corporeal things the specific sign consists be the species of anything, as that which is assimilated to chiefly in the figure. For we see that the species of dif- anything is called its form, inasmuch as it has a like form. ferent animals are of different figures; but not of different Reply to Objection 3. Imitation in God does not sig- colors. Hence if the color of anything is depicted on a nify posteriority, but only assimilation. wall, this is not called an image unless the figure is like- Whether the name of Image is proper to the Son? Ia q. 35 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the name of Image Therefore Image is not proper to the Son. is not proper to the Son; because, as Damascene says (De On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 2): Fide Orth. i, 18), “The Holy Ghost is the Image of the “The Son alone is the Image of the Father.” Son.” Therefore Image does not belong to the Son alone. I answer that, The Greek Doctors commonly say that Objection 2. Further, similitude in expression belongs the Holy Ghost is the Image of both the Father and of the to the nature of an image, as Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, Son; but the Latin Doctors attribute the name Image to the qu. 74). But this belongs to the Holy Ghost, Who pro- Son alone. For it is not found in the canonical Scripture ceeds from another by way of similitude. Therefore the except as applied to the Son; as in the words, “Who is Holy Ghost is an Image; and so to be Image does not be- the Image of the invisible God, the firstborn of creatures” long to the Son alone. (Col. 1:15) and again: “Who being the brightness of His Objection 3. Further, man is also called the image of glory, and the figure of His substance.” (Heb. 1:3). God, according to 1 Cor. 11:7, “The man ought not to Some explain this by the fact that the Son agrees with cover his head, for he is the image and the glory of God.” the Father, not in nature only, but also in the notion of 184 principle: whereas the Holy Ghost agrees neither with the called the Image; because the Son proceeds as word, and Son, nor with the Father in any notion. This, however, it is essential to word to be like species with that whence does not seem to suffice. Because as it is not by reason of it proceeds; whereas this does not essentially belong to the relations that we consider either equality or inequality love, although it may belong to that love which is the Holy in God, as Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6), so neither (by Ghost, inasmuch as He is the divine love. reason thereof do we consider) that similitude which is Reply to Objection 1. Damascene and the other essential to image. Hence others say that the Holy Ghost Greek Doctors commonly employ the term image as cannot be called the Image of the Son, because there can- meaning a perfect similitude. not be an image of an image; nor of the Father, because Reply to Objection 2. Although the Holy Ghost is again the image must be immediately related to that which like to the Father and the Son, still it does not follow that it is the image; and the Holy Ghost is related to the Father He is the Image, as above explained. through the Son; nor again is He the Image of the Father Reply to Objection 3. The image of a thing may be and the Son, because then there would be one image of found in something in two ways. In one way it is found two; which is impossible. Hence it follows that the Holy in something of the same specific nature; as the image of Ghost is in no way an Image. But this is no proof: for the the king is found in his son. In another way it is found Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, in something of a different nature, as the king’s image on as we shall explain further on (q. 36, a. 4 ). Hence there the coin. In the first sense the Son is the Image of the Fa- is nothing to prevent there being one Image of the Father ther; in the second sense man is called the image of God; and of the Son, inasmuch as they are one; since even man and therefore in order to express the imperfect character is one image of the whole Trinity. of the divine image in man, man is not simply called the Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by image, but “to the image,” whereby is expressed a certain saying that, as the Holy Ghost, although by His proces- movement of tendency to perfection. But it cannot be said sion He receives the nature of the Father, as the Son also that the Son of God is “to the image,” because He is the receives it, nevertheless is not said to be “born”; so, al- perfect Image of the Father. though He receives the likeness of the Father, He is not 185 FIRST PART, QUESTION 36 Of the Person of the Holy Ghost (In Four Articles) We proceed to treat of what belongs to the person of the Holy Ghost, Who is called not only the Holy Ghost, but also the Love and Gift of God. Concerning the name “Holy Ghost” there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether this name, “Holy Ghost,” is the proper name of one divine Person? (2) Whether that divine person Who is called the Holy Ghost, proceeds from the Father and the Son? (3) Whether He proceeds from the Father through the Son? (4) Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost? Whether this name “Holy Ghost” is the proper name of one divine person? Ia q. 36 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that this name, “Holy name of its own, as stated above (q. 27 , a. 4, ad 3). Hence Ghost,” is not the proper name of one divine person. For the relations also which follow from this procession are no name which is common to the three persons is the without a name (q. 28, a. 4): for which reason the Per- proper name of any one person. But this name of ‘Holy son proceeding in that manner has not a proper name. But Ghost’∗ is common to the three persons; for Hilary (De as some names are accommodated by the usual mode of Trin. viii) shows that the “Spirit of God” sometimes speaking to signify the aforesaid relations, as when we means the Father, as in the words of Is. 61:1: “The Spirit use the names of procession and spiration, which in the of the Lord is upon me;” and sometimes the Son, as when strict sense more fittingly signify the notional acts than the the Son says: “In the Spirit of God I cast out devils” (Mat. relations; so to signify the divine Person, Who proceeds 12:28), showing that He cast out devils by His own nat- by way of love, this name “Holy Ghost” is by the use of ural power; and that sometimes it means the Holy Ghost, scriptural speech accommodated to Him. The appropri- as in the words of Joel 2:28: “I will pour out of My Spirit ateness of this name may be shown in two ways. Firstly, over all flesh.” Therefore this name ‘Holy Ghost’ is not from the fact that the person who is called “Holy Ghost” the proper name of a divine person. has something in common with the other Persons. For, Objection 2. Further, the names of the divine persons as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17; v, 11), “Because the are relative terms, as Boethius says (De Trin.). But this Holy Ghost is common to both, He Himself is called that name “Holy Ghost” is not a relative term. Therefore this properly which both are called in common. For the Fa- name is not the proper name of a divine Person. ther also is a spirit, and the Son is a spirit; and the Father Objection 3. Further, because the Son is the name of is holy, and the Son is holy.” Secondly, from the proper a divine Person He cannot be called the Son of this or of signification of the name. For the name spirit in things that. But the spirit is spoken of as of this or that man, as corporeal seems to signify impulse and motion; for we appears in the words, “The Lord said to Moses, I will take call the breath and the wind by the term spirit. Now it is of thy spirit and will give to them” (Num. 11:17) and also a property of love to move and impel the will of the lover “The Spirit of Elias rested upon Eliseus” (4 Kings 2:15). towards the object loved. Further, holiness is attributed to Therefore “Holy Ghost” does not seem to be the proper whatever is ordered to God. Therefore because the divine name of a divine Person. person proceeds by way of the love whereby God is loved, On the contrary, It is said (1 Jn. 5:7): “There are that person is most properly named “The Holy Ghost.” three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, Reply to Objection 1. The expression Holy Spirit, if and the Holy Ghost.” As Augustine says (De Trin. vii, taken as two words, is applicable to the whole Trinity: be- 4): “When we ask, Three what? we say, Three persons.” cause by ‘spirit’ the immateriality of the divine substance Therefore the Holy Ghost is the name of a divine person. is signified; for corporeal spirit is invisible, and has but lit-I answer that, While there are two processions in tle matter; hence we apply this term to all immaterial and God, one of these, the procession of love, has no proper invisible substances. And by adding the word “holy” we ∗ It should be borne in mind that the word “ghost” is the old English equivalent for the Latin “spiritus,” whether in the sense of “breath” or “blast,” or in the sense of “spirit,” as an immaterial substance. Thus, we read in the former sense (Hampole, Psalter x, 7), “The Gost of Storms” [spiritus procellarum], and in the latter “Trubled gost is sacrifice of God” (Prose Psalter, A.D. 1325), and “Oure wrestlynge is. . . against the spiritual wicked gostes of the ayre” (More, “Comfort against Tribulation”); and in our modern expression of “giving up the ghost.” As applied to God, and not specially to the third Holy Person, we have an example from Maunder, “Jhesu Criste was the worde and the goste of Good.”186 (See Oxford Dictionary). signify the purity of divine goodness. But if Holy Spirit understand the Holy Spirit as being breathed [spiratus]. be taken as one word, it is thus that the expression, in the Reply to Objection 3. In the name Son we understand usage of the Church, is accommodated to signify one of that relation only which is of something from a principle, the three persons, the one who proceeds by way of love, in regard to that principle: but in the name “Father” we for the reason above explained. understand the relation of principle; and likewise in the Reply to Objection 2. Although this name “Holy name of Spirit inasmuch as it implies a moving power. Ghost” does not indicate a relation, still it takes the place But to no creature does it belong to be a principle as re- of a relative term, inasmuch as it is accommodated to sig- gards a divine person; but rather the reverse. Therefore nify a Person distinct from the others by relation only. Yet we can say “our Father,” and “our Spirit”; but we cannot this name may be understood as including a relation, if we say “our Son.” Whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son? Ia q. 36 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the Holy Ghost does much less so in God. But it is possible for the Holy not proceed from the Son. For as Dionysius says (Div. Ghost to be distinguished from the Son, even if He did not Nom. i): “We must not dare to say anything concerning proceed from Him. For Anselm says (De Process. Spir. the substantial Divinity except what has been divinely ex- Sancti, ii): “The Son and the Holy Ghost have their Being pressed to us by the sacred oracles.” But in the Sacred from the Father; but each in a different way; one by Birth, Scripture we are not told that the Holy Ghost proceeds the other by Procession, so that they are thus distinct from from the Son; but only that He proceeds from the Father, one another.” And further on he says: “For even if for as appears from Jn. 15:26: “The Spirit of truth, Who pro- no other reason were the Son and the Holy Ghost distinct, ceeds from the Father.” Therefore the Holy Ghost does this alone would suffice.” Therefore the Holy Spirit is dis- not proceed from the Son. tinct from the Son, without proceeding from Him. Objection 2. Further, In the creed of the council of On the contrary, Athanasius says: “The Holy Ghost Constantinople (Can. vii) we read: “We believe in the is from the Father and the Son; not made, nor created, nor Holy Ghost, the Lord and Life-giver, who proceeds from begotten, but proceeding.” the Father; with the Father and the Son to be adored and I answer that, It must be said that the Holy Ghost is glorified.” Therefore it should not be added in our Creed from the Son. For if He were not from Him, He could that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son; and those who in no wise be personally distinguished from Him; as ap- added such a thing appear to be worthy of anathema. pears from what has been said above (q. 28, a. 3; q. 30, Objection 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. a. 2). For it cannot be said that the divine Persons are dis- i): “We say that the Holy Ghost is from the Father, and tinguished from each other in any absolute sense; for it we name Him the spirit of the Father; but we do not say would follow that there would not be one essence of the that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, yet we name Him three persons: since everything that is spoken of God in an the Spirit of the Son.” Therefore the Holy Ghost does not absolute sense, belongs to the unity of essence. Therefore proceed from the Son. it must be said that the divine persons are distinguished Objection 4. Further, Nothing proceeds from that from each other only by the relations. Now the relations wherein it rests. But the Holy Ghost rests in the Son; cannot distinguish the persons except forasmuch as they for it is said in the legend of St. Andrew: “Peace be to are opposite relations; which appears from the fact that you and to all who believe in the one God the Father, the Father has two relations, by one of which He is re- and in His only Son our Lord Jesus Christ, and in the lated to the Son, and by the other to the Holy Ghost; but one Holy Ghost proceeding from the Father, and abiding these are not opposite relations, and therefore they do not in the Son.” Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed make two persons, but belong only to the one person of from the Son. the Father. If therefore in the Son and the Holy Ghost Objection 5. Further, the Son proceeds as the Word. there were two relations only, whereby each of them were But our breath [spiritus] does not seem to proceed in our- related to the Father, these relations would not be oppo- selves from our word. Therefore the Holy Ghost does not site to each other, as neither would be the two relations proceed from the Son. whereby the Father is related to them. Hence, as the per- Objection 6. Further, the Holy Ghost proceeds per- son of the Father is one, it would follow that the person of fectly from the Father. Therefore it is superfluous to say the Son and of the Holy Ghost would be one, having two that He proceeds from the Son. relations opposed to the two relations of the Father. But Objection 7. Further “the actual and the possible do this is heretical since it destroys the Faith in the Trinity. not differ in things perpetual” (Phys. iii, text 32), and Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost must be related to 187 each other by opposite relations. Now there cannot be in verbally expressed in Holy Scripture that the Holy Ghost God any relations opposed to each other, except relations proceeds from the Son, still we do find it in the sense of of origin, as proved above (q. 28, a. 44). And opposite Scripture, especially where the Son says, speaking of the relations of origin are to be understood as of a “principle,” Holy Ghost, “He will glorify Me, because He shall receive and of what is “from the principle.” Therefore we must of Mine” (Jn. 16:14). It is also a rule of Holy Scripture conclude that it is necessary to say that either the Son is that whatever is said of the Father, applies to the Son, al- from the Holy Ghost; which no one says; or that the Holy though there be added an exclusive term; except only as Ghost is from the Son, as we confess. regards what belongs to the opposite relations, whereby Furthermore, the order of the procession of each one the Father and the Son are distinguished from each other. agrees with this conclusion. For it was said above (q. 27, For when the Lord says, “No one knoweth the Son, but Aa. 2,4; q. 28, a. 4), that the Son proceeds by the way of the Father,” the idea of the Son knowing Himself is not the intellect as Word, and the Holy Ghost by way of the excluded. So therefore when we say that the Holy Ghost will as Love. Now love must proceed from a word. For proceeds from the Father, even though it be added that He we do not love anything unless we apprehend it by a men- proceeds from the Father alone, the Son would not thereby tal conception. Hence also in this way it is manifest that be at all excluded; because as regards being the principle the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son. of the Holy Ghost, the Father and the Son are not opposed We derive a knowledge of the same truth from the very to each other, but only as regards the fact that one is the order of nature itself. For we nowhere find that several Father, and the other is the Son. things proceed from one without order except in those Reply to Objection 2. In every council of the Church which differ only by their matter; as for instance one smith a symbol of faith has been drawn up to meet some preva- produces many knives distinct from each other materially, lent error condemned in the council at that time. Hence with no order to each other; whereas in things in which subsequent councils are not to be described as making a there is not only a material distinction we always find that new symbol of faith; but what was implicitly contained in some order exists in the multitude produced. Hence also the first symbol was explained by some addition directed in the order of creatures produced, the beauty of the divine against rising heresies. Hence in the decision of the coun- wisdom is displayed. So if from the one Person of the Fa- cil of Chalcedon it is declared that those who were congre- ther, two persons proceed, the Son and the Holy Ghost, gated together in the council of Constantinople, handed there must be some order between them. Nor can any down the doctrine about the Holy Ghost, not implying other be assigned except the order of their nature, whereby that there was anything wanting in the doctrine of their one is from the other. Therefore it cannot be said that the predecessors who had gathered together at Nicaea, but ex- Son and the Holy Ghost proceed from the Father in such plaining what those fathers had understood of the matter. a way as that neither of them proceeds from the other, Therefore, because at the time of the ancient councils the unless we admit in them a material distinction; which is error of those who said that the Holy Ghost did not pro- impossible. ceed from the Son had not arisen, it was not necessary Hence also the Greeks themselves recognize that the to make any explicit declaration on that point; whereas, procession of the Holy Ghost has some order to the Son. later on, when certain errors rose up, another council∗ as- For they grant that the Holy Ghost is the Spirit “of the sembled in the west, the matter was explicitly defined by Son”; and that He is from the Father “through the Son.” the authority of the Roman Pontiff, by whose authority Some of them are said also to concede that “He is from the also the ancient councils were summoned and confirmed. Son”; or that “He flows from the Son,” but not that He pro- Nevertheless the truth was contained implicitly in the be- ceeds; which seems to come from ignorance or obstinacy. lief that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father. For a just consideration of the truth will convince anyone Reply to Objection 3. The Nestorians were the first that the word procession is the one most commonly ap- to introduce the error that the Holy Ghost did not pro- plied to all that denotes origin of any kind. For we use the ceed from the Son, as appears in a Nestorian creed con- term to describe any kind of origin; as when we say that demned in the council of Ephesus. This error was em- a line proceeds from a point, a ray from the sun, a stream braced by Theodoric the Nestorian, and several others af- from a source, and likewise in everything else. Hence, ter him, among whom was also Damascene. Hence, in granted that the Holy Ghost originates in any way from that point his opinion is not to be held. Although, too, it the Son, we can conclude that the Holy Ghost proceeds has been asserted by some that while Damascene did not from the Son. confess that the Holy Ghost was from the Son, neither do Reply to Objection 1. We ought not to say about those words of his express a denial thereof. God anything which is not found in Holy Scripture either Reply to Objection 4. When the Holy Ghost is said explicitly or implicitly. But although we do not find it to rest or abide in the Son, it does not mean that He does ∗ Council of Rome, under Pope Damasus 188 not proceed from Him; for the Son also is said to abide superfluous to say He proceeds from the Son, but rather it in the Father, although He proceeds from the Father. Also is absolutely necessary. Forasmuch as one power belongs the Holy Ghost is said to rest in the Son as the love of the to the Father and the Son; and because whatever is from lover abides in the beloved; or in reference to the human the Father, must be from the Son unless it be opposed to nature of Christ, by reason of what is written: “On whom the property of filiation; for the Son is not from Himself, thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon although He is from the Father. Him, He it is who baptizes” (Jn. 1:33). Reply to Objection 7. The Holy Ghost is distin- Reply to Objection 5. The Word in God is not taken guished from the Son, inasmuch as the origin of one is after the similitude of the vocal word, whence the breath distinguished from the origin of the other; but the differ- [spiritus] does not proceed; for it would then be only ence itself of origin comes from the fact that the Son is metaphorical; but after the similitude of the mental word, only from the Father, whereas the Holy Ghost is from the whence proceeds love. Father and the Son; for otherwise the processions would Reply to Objection 6. For the reason that the Holy not be distinguished from each other, as explained above, Ghost proceeds from the Father perfectly, not only is it not and in q. 27. Whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son? Ia q. 36 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the Holy Ghost does agent acts, whether it be a final cause or a formal cause, not proceed from the Father through the Son. For what- whether it be effective or motive. It is a final cause when ever proceeds from one through another, does not proceed we say, for instance, that the artisan works through love immediately. Therefore, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from of gain. It is a formal cause when we say that he works the Father through the Son, He does not proceed immedi- through his art. It is a motive cause when we say that he ately; which seems to be unfitting. works through the command of another. Sometimes, how- Objection 2. Further, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from ever, that which is covered by this preposition “through” the Father through the Son, He does not proceed from is the cause of the action regarded as terminated in the the Son, except on account of the Father. But “whatever thing done; as, for instance, when we say, the artisan acts causes a thing to be such is yet more so.” Therefore He through the mallet, for this does not mean that the mallet proceeds more from the Father than from the Son. is the cause why the artisan acts, but that it is the cause Objection 3. Further, the Son has His being by gen- why the thing made proceeds from the artisan, and that eration. Therefore if the Holy Ghost is from the Father it has even this effect from the artisan. This is why it is through the Son, it follows that the Son is first generated sometimes said that this preposition “through” sometimes and afterwards the Holy Ghost proceeds; and thus the pro- denotes direct authority, as when we say, the king works cession of the Holy Ghost is not eternal, which is hereti- through the bailiff; and sometimes indirect authority, as cal. when we say, the bailiff works through the king. Objection 4. Further, when anyone acts through an- Therefore, because the Son receives from the Father other, the same may be said conversely. For as we say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from Him, it can be said that the king acts through the bailiff, so it can be said con- that the Father spirates the Holy Ghost through the Son, versely that the bailiff acts through the king. But we can or that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through never say that the Son spirates the Holy Ghost through the Son, which has the same meaning. the Father. Therefore it can never be said that the Father Reply to Objection 1. In every action two things spirates the Holy Ghost through the Son. are to be considered, the “suppositum” acting, and the On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. xii): “Keep power whereby it acts; as, for instance, fire heats through me, I pray, in this expression of my faith, that I may ever heat. So if we consider in the Father and the Son the possess the Father—namely Thyself: that I may adore power whereby they spirate the Holy Ghost, there is no Thy Son together with Thee: and that I may deserve Thy mean, for this is one and the same power. But if we con- Holy Spirit, who is through Thy Only Begotten.” sider the persons themselves spirating, then, as the Holy I answer that, Whenever one is said to act through Ghost proceeds both from the Father and from the Son, another, this preposition “through” points out, in what is the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father immediately, covered by it, some cause or principle of that act. But as from Him, and mediately, as from the Son; and thus since action is a mean between the agent and the thing He is said to proceed from the Father through the Son. done, sometimes that which is covered by the preposi- So also did Abel proceed immediately from Adam, inas- tion “through” is the cause of the action, as proceeding much as Adam was his father; and mediately, as Eve was from the agent; and in that case it is the cause of why the his mother, who proceeded from Adam; although, indeed, 189 this example of a material procession is inept to signify true. For we do not say that the mallet works through the the immaterial procession of the divine persons. carpenter; whereas we can say that the bailiff acts through Reply to Objection 2. If the Son received from the the king, because it is the bailiff’s place to act, since he Father a numerically distinct power for the spiration of the is master of his own act, but it is not the mallet’s place to Holy Ghost, it would follow that He would be a secondary act, but only to be made to act, and hence it is used only as and instrumental cause; and thus the Holy Ghost would an instrument. The bailiff is, however, said to act through proceed more from the Father than from the Son; whereas, the king, although this preposition “through” denotes a on the contrary, the same spirative power belongs to the medium, for the more a “suppositum” is prior in action, so Father and to the Son; and therefore the Holy Ghost pro- much the more is its power immediate as regards the ef- ceeds equally from both, although sometimes He is said to fect, inasmuch as the power of the first cause joins the sec- proceed principally or properly from the Father, because ond cause to its effect. Hence also first principles are said the Son has this power from the Father. to be immediate in the demonstrative sciences. Therefore, Reply to Objection 3. As the begetting of the Son is so far as the bailiff is a medium according to the order of co-eternal with the begetter (and hence the Father does not the subject’s acting, the king is said to work through the exist before begetting the Son), so the procession of the bailiff; but according to the order of powers, the bailiff is Holy Ghost is co-eternal with His principle. Hence, the said to act through the king, forasmuch as the power of Son was not begotten before the Holy Ghost proceeded; the king gives the bailiff’s action its effect. Now there is but each of the operations is eternal. no order of power between Father and Son, but only order Reply to Objection 4. When anyone is said to work of ‘supposita’; and hence we say that the Father spirates through anything, the converse proposition is not always through the Son; and not conversely. Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost? Ia q. 36 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the Father and the that the Son is the Father; and if the one is not the Father, Son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost. For the Holy it follows that the Father is not the Father. Therefore we Ghost does not proceed from the Father and the Son as cannot say that the Father and the Son are one principle of they are one; not as they are one in nature, for the Holy the Holy Ghost. Ghost would in that way proceed from Himself, as He is Objection 5. Further, if the Father and the Son are one in nature with Them; nor again inasmuch as they are one principle of the Holy Ghost, it seems necessary to united in any one property, for it is clear that one prop- say, conversely, that the one principle of the Holy Ghost erty cannot belong to two subjects. Therefore the Holy is the Father and the Son. But this seems to be false; for Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as distinct this word “principle” stands either for the person of the from one another. Therefore the Father and the Son are Father, or for the person of the Son; and in either sense it not one principle of the Holy Ghost. is false. Therefore this proposition also is false, that the Objection 2. Further, in this proposition “the Father Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost. and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost,” we do Objection 6. Further, unity in substance makes iden- not designate personal unity, because in that case the Fa- tity. So if the Father and the Son are the one principle of ther and the Son would be one person; nor again do we the Holy Ghost, it follows that they are the same princi- designate the unity of property, because if one property ple; which is denied by many. Therefore we cannot grant were the reason of the Father and the Son being one prin- that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy ciple of the Holy Ghost, similarly, on account of His two Ghost. properties, the Father would be two principles of the Son Objection 7. Further, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost and of the Holy Ghost, which cannot be admitted. There- are called one Creator, because they are the one princi- fore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the ple of the creature. But the Father and the Son are not Holy Ghost. one, but two Spirators, as many assert; and this agrees Objection 3. Further, the Son is not one with the Fa- also with what Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that “the Holy ther more than is the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost and Ghost is to be confessed as proceeding from Father and the Father are not one principle as regards any other divine Son as authors.” Therefore the Father and the Son are not person. Therefore neither are the Father and the Son. one principle of the Holy Ghost. Objection 4. Further, if the Father and the Son are On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 14) that one principle of the Holy Ghost, this one is either the Fa- the Father and the Son are not two principles, but one prin- ther or it is not the Father. But we cannot assert either of ciple of the Holy Ghost. these positions because if the one is the Father, it follows I answer that, The Father and the Son are in every- 190 thing one, wherever there is no distinction between them properties that we speak of similitude or dissimilitude in of opposite relation. Hence since there is no relative op- God, but by reason of the essence. Hence, as the Father is position between them as the principle of the Holy Ghost not more like to Himself than He is to the Son; so likewise it follows that the Father and the Son are one principle of neither is the Son more like to the Father than is the Holy the Holy Ghost. Ghost. Some, however, assert that this proposition is incor- Reply to Objection 4. These two propositions, “The rect: “The Father and the Son are one principle of the Father and the Son are one principle which is the Father,” Holy Ghost,” because, they declare, since the word “prin- or, “one principle which is not the Father,” are not mutu- ciple” in the singular number does not signify “person,” ally contradictory; and hence it is not necessary to assert but “property,” it must be taken as an adjective; and foras- one or other of them. For when we say the Father and the much as an adjective cannot be modified by another adjec- Son are one principle, this word “principle” has not deter- tive, it cannot properly be said that the Father and the Son minate supposition but rather it stands indeterminately for are one principle of the Holy Ghost unless one be taken two persons together. Hence there is a fallacy of “figure as an adverb, so that the meaning should be: They are one of speech” as the argument concludes from the indetermi- principle—that is, in one and the same way. But then it nate to the determinate. might be equally right to say that the Father is two prin- Reply to Objection 5. This proposition is also true:— ciples of the Son and of the Holy Ghost—namely, in two The one principle of the Holy Ghost is the Father and the ways. Therefore, we must say that, although this word Son; because the word “principle” does not stand for one “principle” signifies a property, it does so after the man- person only, but indistinctly for the two persons as above ner of a substantive, as do the words “father” and “son” explained. even in things created. Hence it takes its number from the Reply to Objection 6. There is no reason against say- form it signifies, like other substantives. Therefore, as the ing that the Father and the Son are the same principle, Father and the Son are one God, by reason of the unity of because the word “principle” stands confusedly and in- the form that is signified by this word “God”; so they are distinctly for the two Persons together. one principle of the Holy Ghost by reason of the unity of Reply to Objection 7. Some say that although the Fa- the property that is signified in this word “principle.” ther and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, there Reply to Objection 1. If we consider the spirative are two spirators, by reason of the distinction of “sup- power, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the posita,” as also there are two spirating, because acts refer Son as they are one in the spirative power, which in a cer- to subjects. Yet this does not hold good as to the name tain way signifies the nature with the property, as we shall “Creator”; because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Fa- see later (ad 7). Nor is there any reason against one prop- ther and the Son as from two distinct persons, as above erty being in two “supposita” that possess one common explained; whereas the creature proceeds from the three nature. But if we consider the “supposita” of the spira- persons not as distinct persons, but as united in essence. tion, then we may say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from It seems, however, better to say that because spirating is the Father and the Son, as distinct; for He proceeds from an adjective, and spirator a substantive, we can say that them as the unitive love of both. the Father and the Son are two spirating, by reason of the Reply to Objection 2. In the proposition “the Father plurality of the “supposita” but not two spirators by rea- and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost,” one son of the one spiration. For adjectival words derive their property is designated which is the form signified by the number from the “supposita” but substantives from them- term. It does not thence follow that by reason of the sev- selves, according to the form signified. As to what Hilary eral properties the Father can be called several principles, says, that “the Holy ghost is from the Father and the Son for this would imply in Him a plurality of subjects. as His authors,” this is to be explained in the sense that the Reply to Objection 3. It is not by reason of relative substantive here stands for the adjective. 191 FIRST PART, QUESTION 37 Of the Name of the Holy Ghost—Love (In Two Articles) We now inquire concerning the name “Love,” on which arise two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost? (2) Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost? Whether “Love” is the proper name of the Holy Ghost? Ia q. 37 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that “Love” is not the tion,” as stated above (q. 27, a. 4, ad 3), and yet express proper name of the Holy Ghost. For Augustine says (De the origin rather than the relation in the strict sense of the Trin. xv, 17): “As the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are term. Nevertheless we must consider them in respect of called Wisdom, and are not three Wisdoms, but one; I each procession simply. For as when a thing is under- know not why the Father, Son and Holy Ghost should not stood by anyone, there results in the one who understands be called Charity, and all together one Charity.” But no a conception of the object understood, which conception name which is predicated in the singular of each person we call word; so when anyone loves an object, a certain and of all together, is a proper name of a person. There- impression results, so to speak, of the thing loved in the fore this name, “Love,” is not the proper name of the Holy affection of the lover; by reason of which the object loved Ghost. is said to be in the lover; as also the thing understood is Objection 2. Further, the Holy Ghost is a subsisting in the one who understands; so that when anyone under- person, but love is not used to signify a subsisting person, stands and loves himself he is in himself, not only by real but rather an action passing from the lover to the beloved. identity, but also as the object understood is in the one Therefore Love is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. who understands, and the thing loved is in the lover. As Objection 3. Further, Love is the bond between regards the intellect, however, words have been found to lovers, for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): “Love is describe the mutual relation of the one who understands a unitive force.” But a bond is a medium between what the object understood, as appears in the word “to under- it joins together, not something proceeding from them. stand”; and other words are used to express the proces- Therefore, since the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father sion of the intellectual conception—namely, “to speak,” and the Son, as was shown above (q. 36, a. 2), it seems and “word.” Hence in God, “to understand” is applied that He is not the Love or bond of the Father and the Son. only to the essence; because it does not import relation Objection 4. Further, Love belongs to every lover. to the Word that proceeds; whereas “Word” is said per- But the Holy Ghost is a lover: therefore He has love. So sonally, because it signifies what proceeds; and the term if the Holy Ghost is Love, He must be love of love, and “to speak” is a notional term as importing the relation of spirit from spirit; which is not admissible. the principle of the Word to the Word Himself. On the On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxx, in Pente- other hand, on the part of the will, with the exception of cost.): “The Holy Ghost Himself is Love.” the words “dilection” and “love,” which express the re- I answer that, The name Love in God can be taken lation of the lover to the object loved, there are no other essentially and personally. If taken personally it is the terms in use, which express the relation of the impression proper name of the Holy Ghost; as Word is the proper or affection of the object loved, produced in the lover by name of the Son. fact that he loves—to the principle of that impression, or To see this we must know that since as shown above “vice versa.” And therefore, on account of the poverty of (q. 27, Aa. 2,3,4,5), there are two processions in God, one our vocabulary, we express these relations by the words by way of the intellect, which is the procession of the “love” and “dilection”: just as if we were to call the Word Word, and another by way of the will, which is the proces- “intelligence conceived,” or “wisdom begotten.” sion of Love; forasmuch as the former is the more known It follows that so far as love means only the relation of to us, we have been able to apply more suitable names to the lover to the object loved, “love” and “to love” are said express our various considerations as regards that proces- of the essence, as “understanding” and “to understand”; sion, but not as regards the procession of the will. Hence, but, on the other hand, so far as these words are used to we are obliged to employ circumlocution as regards the express the relation to its principle, of what proceeds by person Who proceeds, and the relations following from way of love, and “vice versa,” so that by “love” is under- this procession which are called “procession” and “spira- stood the “love proceeding,” and by “to love” is under- 192 stood “the spiration of the love proceeding,” in that sense Reply to Objection 3. The Holy Ghost is said to be “love” is the name of the person and “to love” is a notional the bond of the Father and Son, inasmuch as He is Love; term, as “to speak” and “to beget.” because, since the Father loves Himself and the Son with Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is there speaking of one Love, and conversely, there is expressed in the Holy charity as it means the divine essence, as was said above Ghost, as Love, the relation of the Father to the Son, and (here and q. 24, a. 2, ad 4). conversely, as that of the lover to the beloved. But from Reply to Objection 2. Although to understand, and to the fact that the Father and the Son mutually love one will, and to love signify actions passing on to their objects, another, it necessarily follows that this mutual Love, the nevertheless they are actions that remain in the agents, as Holy Ghost, proceeds from both. As regards origin, there- stated above (q. 14, a. 4), yet in such a way that in the fore, the Holy Ghost is not the medium, but the third per- agent itself they import a certain relation to their object. son in the Trinity; whereas as regards the aforesaid rela- Hence, love also in ourselves is something that abides in tion He is the bond between the two persons, as proceed- the lover, and the word of the heart is something abiding ing from both. in the speaker; yet with a relation to the thing expressed Reply to Objection 4. As it does not belong to the by word, or loved. But in God, in whom there is noth- Son, though He understands, to produce a word, for it be- ing accidental, there is more than this; because both Word longs to Him to understand as the word proceeding; so in and Love are subsistent. Therefore, when we say that the like manner, although the Holy Ghost loves, taking Love Holy Ghost is the Love of the Father for the Son, or for as an essential term, still it does not belong to Him to spi- something else; we do not mean anything that passes into rate love, which is to take love as a notional term; because another, but only the relation of love to the beloved; as He loves essentially as love proceeding; but not as the one also in the Word is imported the relation of the Word to whence love proceeds. the thing expressed by the Word. Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost? Ia q. 37 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the Father and the tures, and this belongs to the essence. Therefore this also Son do not love each other by the Holy Ghost. For Augus- is false: “The Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost.” tine (De Trin. vii, 1) proves that the Father is not wise by On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 5): the Wisdom begotten. But as the Son is Wisdom begotten, “The Holy Ghost is He whereby the Begotten is loved by so the Holy Ghost is the Love proceeding, as explained the one begetting and loves His Begetter.” above (q. 27, a. 3). Therefore the Father and the Son do I answer that, A difficulty about this question is ob- not love Themselves by the Love proceeding, which is the jected to the effect that when we say, “the Father loves the Holy Ghost. Son by the Holy Ghost,” since the ablative is construed as Objection 2. Further, the proposition, “The Father denoting a cause, it seems to mean that the Holy Ghost and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost,” this word is the principle of love to the Father and the Son; which “love” is to be taken either essentially or notionally. But it cannot be admitted. cannot be true if taken essentially, because in the same In view of this difficulty some have held that it is false, way we might say that “the Father understands by the that “the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Son”; nor, again, if it is taken notionally, for then, in like Ghost”; and they add that it was retracted by Augustine manner, it might be said that “the Father and the Son spi- when he retracted its equivalent to the effect that “the Fa- rate by the Holy Ghost,” or that “the Father generates by ther is wise by the Wisdom begotten.” Others say that the the Son.” Therefore in no way is this proposition true: proposition is inaccurate and ought to be expounded, as “ ‘The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy that “the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost”—that Ghost.” is, “by His essential Love,” which is appropriated to the Objection 3. Further, by the same love the Father Holy Ghost. Others further say that this ablative should loves the Son, and Himself, and us. But the Father does be construed as importing a sign, so that it means, “the not love Himself by the Holy Ghost; for no notional act is Holy Ghost is the sign that the Father loves the Son”; reflected back on the principle of the act; since it cannot inasmuch as the Holy Ghost proceeds from them both, as be said that the “Father begets Himself,” or that “He spi- Love. Others, again, say that this ablative must be con- rates Himself.” Therefore, neither can it be said that “He strued as importing the relation of formal cause, because loves Himself by the Holy Ghost,” if “to love” is taken in the Holy Ghost is the love whereby the Father and the Son a notional sense. Again, the love wherewith He loves us is formally love each other. Others, again, say that it should not the Holy Ghost; because it imports a relation to crea- be construed as importing the relation of a formal effect; 193 and these approach nearer to the truth. Son love each other by the Holy Ghost, as was above ex- To make the matter clear, we must consider that since plained. a thing is commonly denominated from its forms, as Reply to Objection 2. When the idea of an action in- “white” from whiteness, and “man” from humanity; ev- cludes a determined effect, the principle of the action may erything whence anything is denominated, in this partic- be denominated both from the action, and from the effect; ular respect stands to that thing in the relation of form. so we can say, for instance, that a tree flowers by its flow- So when I say, “this man is clothed with a garment,” the ering and by its flower. When, however, the idea of an ablative is to be construed as having relation to the for- action does not include a determined effect, then in that mal cause, although the garment is not the form. Now it case, the principle of the action cannot be denominated may happen that a thing may be denominated from that from the effect, but only from the action. For we do not which proceeds from it, not only as an agent is from its say that the tree produces the flower by the flower, but by action, but also as from the term itself of the action—that the production of the flower. So when we say, “spirates” is, the effect, when the effect itself is included in the idea or “begets,” this imports only a notional act. Hence we of the action. For we say that fire warms by heating, al- cannot say that the Father spirates by the Holy Ghost, or though heating is not the heat which is the form of the begets by the Son. But we can say that the Father speaks fire, but is an action proceeding from the fire; and we say by the Word, as by the Person proceeding, “and speaks that a tree flowers with the flower, although the flower is by the speaking,” as by a notional act; forasmuch as “to not the tree’s form, but is the effect proceeding from the speak” imports a determinate person proceeding; since “to form. In this way, therefore, we must say that since in God speak” means to produce a word. Likewise to love, taken “to love” is taken in two ways, essentially and notionally, in a notional sense, means to produce love; and so it can when it is taken essentially, it means that the Father and be said that the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost, as the Son love each other not by the Holy Ghost, but by their by the person proceeding, and by Love itself as a notional essence. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 7): “Who act. dares to say that the Father loves neither Himself, nor the Reply to Objection 3. The Father loves not only the Son, nor the Holy Ghost, except by the Holy Ghost?” The Son, but also Himself and us, by the Holy Ghost; because, opinions first quoted are to be taken in this sense. But as above explained, to love, taken in a notional sense, not when the term Love is taken in a notional sense it means only imports the production of a divine person, but also nothing else than “to spirate love”; just as to speak is to the person produced, by way of love, which has relation produce a word, and to flower is to produce flowers. As to the object loved. Hence, as the Father speaks Himself therefore we say that a tree flowers by its flower, so do we and every creature by His begotten Word, inasmuch as the say that the Father, by the Word or the Son, speaks Him- Word “begotten” adequately represents the Father and ev- self, and His creatures; and that the Father and the Son ery creature; so He loves Himself and every creature by love each other and us, by the Holy Ghost, or by Love the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as the Holy Ghost proceeds as proceeding. the love of the primal goodness whereby the Father loves Reply to Objection 1. To be wise or intelligent is Himself and every creature. Thus it is evident that rela- taken only essentially in God; therefore we cannot say tion to the creature is implied both in the Word and in the that “the Father is wise or intelligent by the Son.” But proceeding Love, as it were in a secondary way, inasmuch to love is taken not only essentially, but also in a notional as the divine truth and goodness are a principle of under- sense; and in this way, we can say that the Father and the standing and loving all creatures. 194 FIRST PART, QUESTION 38 Of the Name of the Holy Ghost, As Gift (In Two Articles) There now follows the consideration of the Gift; concerning which there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether “Gift” can be a personal name? (2) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost? Whether “Gift” is a personal name? Ia q. 38 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that “Gift” is not a per- its own power avails nothing: hence this must be given it sonal name. For every personal name imports a distinction from above; for that is said to be given to us which we in God. But the name of “Gift” does not import a distinc- have from another source. Thus a divine person can “be tion in God; for Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 19): that given,” and can be a “gift.” “the Holy Ghost is so given as God’s Gift, that He also Reply to Objection 1. The name “Gift” imports a gives Himself as God.” Therefore “Gift” is not a personal personal distinction , in so far as gift imports something name. belonging to another through its origin. Nevertheless, the Objection 2. Further, no personal name belongs to the Holy Ghost gives Himself, inasmuch as He is His own, divine essence. But the divine essence is the Gift which and can use or rather enjoy Himself; as also a free man be- the Father gives to the Son, as Hilary says (De Trin. ix). longs to himself. And as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. Therefore “Gift” is not a personal name. xxix): “What is more yours than yourself?” Or we might Objection 3. Further, according to Damascene (De say, and more fittingly, that a gift must belong in a way to Fide Orth. iv, 19) there is no subjection nor service in the giver. But the phrase, “this is this one’s,” can be un- the divine persons. But gift implies a subjection both as derstood in several senses. In one way it means identity, regards him to whom it is given, and as regards him by as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix); and in that sense whom it is given. Therefore “Gift” is not a personal name. “gift” is the same as “the giver,” but not the same as the Objection 4. Further, “Gift” imports relation to the one to whom it is given. The Holy Ghost gives Himself in creature, and it thus seems to be said of God in time. But that sense. In another sense, a thing is another’s as a pos- personal names are said of God from eternity; as “Father,” session, or as a slave; and in that sense gift is essentially and “Son.” Therefore “Gift” is not a personal name. distinct from the giver; and the gift of God so taken is a On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 19): created thing. In a third sense “this is this one’s” through “As the body of flesh is nothing but flesh; so the gift of the its origin only; and in this sense the Son is the Father’s; Holy Ghost is nothing but the Holy Ghost.” But the Holy and the Holy Ghost belongs to both. Therefore, so far as Ghost is a personal name; so also therefore is “Gift.” gift in this way signifies the possession of the giver, it is I answer that, The word “gift” imports an aptitude for personally distinguished from the giver, and is a personal being given. And what is given has an aptitude or relation name. both to the giver and to that to which it is given. For it Reply to Objection 2. The divine essence is the Fa- would not be given by anyone, unless it was his to give; ther’s gift in the first sense, as being the Father’s by way and it is given to someone to be his. Now a divine person of identity. is said to belong to another, either by origin, as the Son Reply to Objection 3. Gift as a personal name in God belongs to the Father; or as possessed by another. But we does not imply subjection, but only origin, as regards the are said to possess what we can freely use or enjoy as we giver; but as regards the one to whom it is given, it implies please: and in this way a divine person cannot be pos- a free use, or enjoyment, as above explained. sessed, except by a rational creature united to God. Other Reply to Objection 4. Gift is not so called from being creatures can be moved by a divine person, not, however, actually given, but from its aptitude to be given. Hence in such a way as to be able to enjoy the divine person, the divine person is called Gift from eternity, although He and to use the effect thereof. The rational creature does is given in time. Nor does it follow that it is an essen- sometimes attain thereto; as when it is made partaker of tial name because it imports relation to the creature; but the divine Word and of the Love proceeding, so as freely that it includes something essential in its meaning; as the to know God truly and to love God rightly. Hence the ra- essence is included in the idea of person, as stated above tional creature alone can possess the divine person. Nev- (q. 34, a. 3). ertheless in order that it may possess Him in this manner, 195 Whether “Gift” is the proper name of the Holy Ghost? Ia q. 38 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Gift is not the proper tuitously forasmuch as we wish him well. So what we first name of the Holy Ghost. For the name Gift comes from give him is the love whereby we wish him well. Hence it being given. But, as Is. 9:16 says: “A Son is give to us.” is manifest that love has the nature of a first gift, through Therefore to be Gift belongs to the Son, as well as to the which all free gifts are given. So since the Holy Ghost Holy Ghost. proceeds as love, as stated above (q. 27, a. 4; q. 37, a. 1), Objection 2. Further, every proper name of a person He proceeds as the first gift. Hence Augustine says (De signifies a property. But this word Gift does not signify a Trin. xv, 24): “By the gift, which is the Holy Ghost, property of the Holy Ghost. Therefore Gift is not a proper many particular gifts are portioned out to the members of name of the Holy Ghost. Christ.” Objection 3. Further, the Holy Ghost can be called Reply to Objection 1. As the Son is properly called the spirit of a man, whereas He cannot be called the gift the Image because He proceeds by way of a word, whose of any man, but “God’s Gift” only. Therefore Gift is not nature it is to be the similitude of its principle, although the proper name of the Holy Ghost. the Holy Ghost also is like to the Father; so also, because On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father as love, He is “As ‘to be born’ is, for the Son, to be from the Father, so, properly called Gift, although the Son, too, is given. For for the Holy Ghost, ‘to be the Gift of God’ is to proceed that the Son is given is from the Father’s love, according from Father and Son.” But the Holy Ghost receives His to the words, “God so loved the world, as to give His only proper name from the fact that He proceeds from Father begotten Son” (Jn. 3:16). and Son. Therefore Gift is the proper name of the Holy Reply to Objection 2. The name Gift involves the Ghost. idea of belonging to the Giver through its origin; and thus I answer that, Gift, taken personally in God, is the it imports the property of the origin of the Holy Ghost— proper name of the Holy Ghost. that is, His procession. In proof of this we must know that a gift is properly Reply to Objection 3. Before a gift is given, it be- an unreturnable giving, as Aristotle says (Topic. iv, 4)— longs only to the giver; but when it is given, it is his to i.e. a thing which is not given with the intention of a whom it is given. Therefore, because “Gift” does not im- return—and it thus contains the idea of a gratuitous do- port the actual giving, it cannot be called a gift of man, but nation. Now, the reason of donation being gratuitous is the Gift of God giving. When, however, it has been given, love; since therefore do we give something to anyone gra- then it is the spirit of man, or a gift bestowed on man. 196 FIRST PART, QUESTION 39 Of the Persons in Relation to the Essence (In Eight Articles) Those things considered which belong to the divine persons absolutely, we next treat of what concerns the person in reference to the essence, to the properties, and to the notional acts; and of the comparison of these with each other. As regards the first of these, there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the essence in God is the same as the person? (2) Whether we should say that the three persons are of one essence? (3) Whether essential names should be predicated of the persons in the plural, or in the singular? (4) Whether notional adjectives, or verbs, or participles, can be predicated of the essential names taken in a concrete sense? (5) Whether the same can be predicated of essential names taken in the abstract? (6) Whether the names of the persons can be predicated of concrete essential names? (7) Whether essential attributes can be appropriated to the persons? (8) Which attributes should be appropriated to each person? Whether in God the essence is the same as the person? Ia q. 39 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that in God the essence relations as realities. But as it was shown above (q. 28, is not the same as person. For whenever essence is the a. 2) in creatures relations are accidental, whereas in God same as person or “suppositum,” there can be only one they are the divine essence itself. Thence it follows that “suppositum” of one nature, as is clear in the case of all in God essence is not really distinct from person; and yet separate substances. For in those things which are really that the persons are really distinguished from each other. one and the same, one cannot be multiplied apart from For person, as above stated (q. 29, a. 4), signifies relation the other. But in God there is one essence and three per- as subsisting in the divine nature. But relation as referred sons, as is clear from what is above expounded (q. 28, a. 3; to the essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in q. 30, a. 2). Therefore essence is not the same as person. our way of thinking; while as referred to an opposite rela- Objection 2. Further, simultaneous affirmation and tion, it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition. negation of the same things in the same respect cannot be Thus there are one essence and three persons. true. But affirmation and negation are true of essence and Reply to Objection 1. There cannot be a distinction of person. For person is distinct, whereas essence is not. of “suppositum” in creatures by means of relations, but Therefore person and essence are not the same. only by essential principles; because in creatures relations Objection 3. Further, nothing can be subject to it- are not subsistent. But in God relations are subsistent, and self. But person is subject to essence; whence it is called so by reason of the opposition between them they distin- “suppositum” or “hypostasis.” Therefore person is not the guish the “supposita”; and yet the essence is not distin- same as essence. guished, because the relations themselves are not distin- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 7): guished from each other so far as they are identified with “When we say the person of the Father we mean nothing the essence. else but the substance of the Father.” Reply to Objection 2. As essence and person in God I answer that, The truth of this question is quite clear differ in our way of thinking, it follows that something if we consider the divine simplicity. For it was shown can be denied of the one and affirmed of the other; and above (q. 3, a. 3) that the divine simplicity requires that in therefore, when we suppose the one, we need not suppose God essence is the same as “suppositum,” which in intel- the other. lectual substances is nothing else than person. But a dif- Reply to Objection 3. Divine things are named by us ficulty seems to arise from the fact that while the divine after the way of created things, as above explained (q. 13, persons are multiplied, the essence nevertheless retains its Aa. 1,3). And since created natures are individualized by unity. And because, as Boethius says (De Trin. i), “rela- matter which is the subject of the specific nature, it fol- tion multiplies the Trinity of persons,” some have thought lows that individuals are called “subjects,” “supposita,” that in God essence and person differ, forasmuch as they or “hypostases.” So the divine persons are named “sup- held the relations to be “adjacent”; considering only in the posita” or “hypostases,” but not as if there really existed relations the idea of “reference to another,” and not the any real “supposition” or “subjection.” 197 Whether it must be said that the three persons are of one essence? Ia q. 39 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem not right to say that the unless some adjective qualifies the form; as when we say: three persons are of one essence. For Hilary says (De “That woman is of a handsome figure,” or: “This man is of Synod.) that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost “are indeed perfect virtue.” In like manner, as in God the persons are three by substance, but one in harmony.” But the sub- multiplied, and the essence is not multiplied, we speak of stance of God is His essence. Therefore the three persons one essence of the three persons, and three persons of the are not of one essence. one essence, provided that these genitives be understood Objection 2. Further, nothing is to be affirmed of God as designating the form. except what can be confirmed by the authority of Holy Reply to Objection 1. Substance is here taken for the Writ, as appears from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i). Now “hypostasis,” and not for the essence. Holy Writ never says that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost Reply to Objection 2. Although we may not find it are of one essence. Therefore this should not be asserted. declared in Holy Writ in so many words that the three per- Objection 3. Further, the divine nature is the same sons are of one essence, nevertheless we find it so stated as the divine essence. It suffices therefore to say that the as regards the meaning; for instance, “I and the Father are three persons are of one nature. one (Jn. 10:30),” and “I am in the Father, and the Father Objection 4. Further, it is not usual to say that the in Me (Jn. 10:38)”; and there are many other texts of the person is of the essence; but rather that the essence is of same import. the person. Therefore it does not seem fitting to say that Reply to Objection 3. Because “nature” designates the three persons are of one essence. the principle of action while “essence” comes from being Objection 5. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, [essendo], things may be said to be of one nature which 6) that we do not say that the three persons are “from one agree in some action, as all things which give heat; but essence [ex una essentia],” lest we should seem to indi- only those things can be said to be of “one essence” which cate a distinction between the essence and the persons in have one being. So the divine unity is better described by God. But prepositions which imply transition, denote the saying that the three persons are “of one essence,” than by oblique case. Therefore it is equally wrong to say that the saying they are “of one nature.” three persons are “of one essence [unius essentiae].” Reply to Objection 4. Form, in the absolute sense, Objection 6. Further, nothing should be said of God is wont to be designated as belonging to that of which it which can be occasion of error. Now, to say that the three is the form, as we say “the virtue of Peter.” On the other persons are of one essence or substance, furnishes occa- hand, the thing having form is not wont to be designated sion of error. For, as Hilary says (De Synod.): “One sub- as belonging to the form except when we wish to qualify stance predicated of the Father and the Son signifies either or designate the form. In which case two genitives are re- one subsistent, with two denominations; or one substance quired, one signifying the form, and the other signifying divided into two imperfect substances; or a third prior sub- the determination of the form, as, for instance, when we stance taken and assumed by the other two.” Therefore it say, “Peter is of great virtue [magnae virtutis],” or else one must not be said that the three persons are of one sub- genitive must have the force of two, as, for instance, “he stance. is a man of blood”—that is, he is a man who sheds much On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii) blood [multi sanguinis]. So, because the divine essence that the word homoousion, which the Council of Nicaea signifies a form as regards the person, it may properly be adopted against the Arians, means that the three persons said that the essence is of the person; but we cannot say are of one essence. the converse, unless we add some term to designate the I answer that, As above explained (q. 13, Aa. 1,2), essence; as, for instance, the Father is a person of the “di- divine things are named by our intellect, not as they really vine essence”; or, the three persons are “of one essence.” are in themselves, for in that way it knows them not; but in Reply to Objection 5. The preposition “from” or “out a way that belongs to things created. And as in the objects of” does not designate the habitude of a formal cause, but of the senses, whence the intellect derives its knowledge, rather the habitude of an efficient or material cause; which the nature of the species is made individual by the matter, causes are in all cases distinguished from those things of and thus the nature is as the form, and the individual is which they are the causes. For nothing can be its own the “suppositum” of the form; so also in God the essence matter, nor its own active principle. Yet a thing may be its is taken as the form of the three persons, according to our own form, as appears in all immaterial things. So, when mode of signification. Now in creatures we say that every we say, “three persons of one essence,” taking essence as form belongs to that whereof it is the form; as the health having the habitude of form, we do not mean that essence and beauty of a man belongs to the man. But we do not is different from person, which we should mean if we said, say of that which has a form, that it belongs to the form, “three persons from the same essence.” 198 Reply to Objection 6. As Hilary says (De Synod.): to me, if I understand it rightly?. . . The oneness of nature “It would be prejudicial to holy things, if we had to do does not result from division, or from union or from com- away with them, just because some do not think them munity of possession, but from one nature being proper to holy. So if some misunderstand homoousion, what is that both Father and Son.” Whether essential names should be predicated in the singular of the three persons? Ia q. 39 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that essential names, as they adjectives. For we say that many men are a college, the name “God,” should not be predicated in the singular or an army, or a people; but we say that many men are of the three persons, but in the plural. For as “man” sig- collegians. Now in God the divine essence is signified by nifies “one that has humanity,” so God signifies “one that way of a form, as above explained (a. 2), which, indeed, has Godhead.” But the three persons are three who have is simple and supremely one, as shown above (q. 3, a. 7; Godhead. Therefore the three persons are “three Gods.” q. 11, a. 4). So, names which signify the divine essence in Objection 2. Further, Gn. 1:1, where it is said, “In a substantive manner are predicated of the three persons the beginning God created heaven and earth,” the Hebrew in the singular, and not in the plural. This, then, is the rea- original has “Elohim,” which may be rendered “Gods” or son why we say that Socrates, Plato and Cicero are “three “Judges”: and this word is used on account of the plural- men”; whereas we do not say the Father, Son and Holy ity of persons. Therefore the three persons are “several Ghost are “three Gods,” but “one God”; forasmuch as in Gods,” and not “one” God. the three “supposita” of human nature there are three hu- Objection 3. Further, this word “thing” when it is said manities, whereas in the three divine Persons there is but absolutely, seems to belong to substance. But it is pred- one divine essence. On the other hand, the names which icated of the three persons in the plural. For Augustine signify essence in an adjectival manner are predicated of says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): “The things that are the the three persons plurally, by reason of the plurality of objects of our future glory are the Father, Son and Holy “supposita.” For we say there are three “existent” or three Ghost.” Therefore other essential names can be predicated “wise” beings, or three “eternal,” “uncreated,” and “im- in the plural of the three persons. mense” beings, if these terms are understood in an adjec- Objection 4. Further, as this word “God” signifies “a tival sense. But if taken in a substantive sense, we say being who has Deity,” so also this word “person” signifies “one uncreated, immense, eternal being,” as Athanasius a being subsisting in an intellectual nature. But we say declares. there are three persons. So for the same reason we can Reply to Objection 1. Though the name “God” sig- say there are “three Gods.” nifies a being having Godhead, nevertheless the mode of On the contrary, It is said (Dt. 6:4): “Hear, O Israel, signification is different. For the name “God” is used sub- the Lord thy God is one God.” stantively; whereas “having Godhead” is used adjectively. I answer that, Some essential names signify the Consequently, although there are “three having Godhead,” essence after the manner of substantives; while others sig- it does not follow that there are three Gods. nify it after the manner of adjectives. Those which signify Reply to Objection 2. Various languages have diverse it as substantives are predicated of the three persons in the modes of expression. So as by reason of the plurality of singular only, and not in the plural. Those which signify “supposita” the Greeks said “three hypostases,” so also in the essence as adjectives are predicated of the three per- Hebrew “Elohim” is in the plural. We, however, do not sons in the plural. The reason of this is that substantives apply the plural either to “God” or to “substance,” lest signify something by way of substance, while adjectives plurality be referred to the substance. signify something by way of accident, which adheres to a Reply to Objection 3. This word “thing” is one of the subject. Now just as substance has existence of itself, so transcendentals. Whence, so far as it is referred to rela- also it has of itself unity or multitude; wherefore the sin- tion, it is predicated of God in the plural; whereas, so far gularity or plurality of a substantive name depends upon as it is referred to the substance, it is predicated in the sinthe form signified by the name. But as accidents have their gular. So Augustine says, in the passage quoted, that “the existence in a subject, so they have unity or plurality from same Trinity is a thing supreme.” their subject; and therefore the singularity and plurality of Reply to Objection 4. The form signified by the word adjectives depends upon their “supposita.” In creatures, “person” is not essence or nature, but personality. So, as one form does not exist in several “supposita” except by there are three personalities—that is, three personal prop- unity of order, as the form of an ordered multitude. So erties in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost—it is predicated if the names signifying such a form are substantives, they of the three, not in the singular, but in the plural. are predicated of many in the singular, but otherwise if 199 Whether the concrete essential names can stand for the person? Ia q. 39 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the concrete, essen- by reason of the form signified—that is, Godhead. But tial names cannot stand for the person, so that we can truly sometimes it stands for the person, either for only one, as say “God begot God.” For, as the logicians say, “a singu- when we say, “God begets,” or for two, as when we say, lar term signifies what it stands for.” But this name “God” “God spirates”; or for three, as when it is said: “To the seems to be a singular term, for it cannot be predicated King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God,” etc. (1 in the plural, as above explained (a. 3). Therefore, since Tim. 1:17). it signifies the essence, it stands for essence, and not for Reply to Objection 1. Although this name “God” person. agrees with singular terms as regards the form signified Objection 2. Further, a term in the subject is not mod- not being multiplied; nevertheless it agrees also with gen- ified by a term in the predicate, as to its signification; eral terms so far as the form signified is to be found in but only as to the sense signified in the predicate. But several “supposita.” So it need not always stand for the when I say, “God creates,” this name “God” stands for the essence it signifies. essence. So when we say “God begot,” this term “God” Reply to Objection 2. This holds good against those cannot by reason of the notional predicate, stand for per- who say that the word “God” does not naturally stand for son. person. Objection 3. Further, if this be true, “God begot,” be- Reply to Objection 3. The word “God” stands for the cause the Father generates; for the same reason this is true, person in a different way from that in which this word “God does not beget,” because the Son does not beget. “man” does; for since the form signified by this word Therefore there is God who begets, and there is God who “man”—that is, humanity—is really divided among its does not beget; and thus it follows that there are two Gods. different subjects, it stands of itself for the person, even Objection 4. Further, if “God begot God,” He begot if there is no adjunct determining it to the person—that either God, that is Himself, or another God. But He did is, to a distinct subject. The unity or community of the not beget God, that is Himself; for, as Augustine says (De human nature, however, is not a reality, but is only in the Trin. i, 1), “nothing begets itself.” Neither did He beget consideration of the mind. Hence this term “man” does another God; as there is only one God. Therefore it is not stand for the common nature, unless this is required false to say, “God begot God.” by some adjunct, as when we say, “man is a species”; Objection 5. Further, if “God begot God,” He begot whereas the form signified by the name “God”—that is, either God who is the Father, or God who is not the Fa- the divine essence—is really one and common. So of it- ther. If God who is the Father, then God the Father was self it stands for the common nature, but by some adjunct begotten. If God who is not the Father, then there is a God it may be restricted so as to stand for the person. So, when who is not God the Father: which is false. Therefore it we say, “God generates,” by reason of the notional act this cannot be said that “God begot God.” name “God” stands for the person of the Father. But when On the contrary, In the Creed it is said, “God of we say, “God does not generate,” there is no adjunct to God.” determine this name to the person of the Son, and hence I answer that, Some have said that this name “God” the phrase means that generation is repugnant to the di- and the like, properly according to their nature, stand for vine nature. If, however, something be added belonging the essence, but by reason of some notional adjunct are to the person of the Son, this proposition, for instance, made to stand for the Person. This opinion apparently “God begotten does not beget,” is true. Consequently, it arose from considering the divine simplicity, which re- does not follow that there exists a “God generator,” and a quires that in God, He “who possesses” and “what is pos- “God not generator”; unless there be an adjunct pertain- sessed” be the same. So He who possesses Godhead, ing to the persons; as, for instance, if we were to say, “the which is signified by the name God, is the same as God- Father is God the generator” and the “Son is God the non- head. But when we consider the proper way of expressing generator” and so it does not follow that there are many ourselves, the mode of signification must be considered Gods; for the Father and the Son are one God, as was said no less than the thing signified. Hence as this word “God” above (a. 3). signifies the divine essence as in Him Who possesses it, Reply to Objection 4. This is false, “the Father be- just as the name “man” signifies humanity in a subject, got God, that is Himself,” because the word “Himself,” others more truly have said that this word “God,” from as a reciprocal term, refers to the same “suppositum.” its mode of signification, can, in its proper sense, stand Nor is this contrary to what Augustine says (Ep. lxvi for person, as does the word “man.” So this word “God” ad Maxim.) that “God the Father begot another self [al- sometimes stands for the essence, as when we say “God terum se],” forasmuch as the word “se” is either in the creates”; because this predicate is attributed to the subject ablative case, and then it means “He begot another from 200 Himself,” or it indicates a single relation, and thus points false. Wherefore the negative of the proposition is true, to identity of nature. This is, however, either a figurative “He begot God Who is not God the Father.” If however, or an emphatic way of speaking, so that it would really we understand these words not to be in apposition, and mean, “He begot another most like to Himself.” Likewise require something to be added, then, on the contrary, the also it is false to say, “He begot another God,” because affirmative proposition is true, and the negative is false; so although the Son is another than the Father, as above ex- that the meaning would be, “He begot God Who is God plained (q. 31, a. 2), nevertheless it cannot be said that He Who is the Father.” Such a rendering however appears to is “another God”; forasmuch as this adjective “another” be forced, so that it is better to say simply that the affir- would be understood to apply to the substantive God; and mative proposition is false, and the negative is true. Yet thus the meaning would be that there is a distinction of Prepositivus said that both the negative and affirmative Godhead. Yet this proposition “He begot another God” is are false, because this relative “Who” in the affirmative tolerated by some, provided that “another” be taken as a proposition can be referred to the “suppositum”; whereas substantive, and the word “God” be construed in apposi- in the negative it denotes both the thing signified and the tion with it. This, however, is an inexact way of speaking, “suppositum.” Whence, in the affirmative the sense is that and to be avoided, for fear of giving occasion to error. “to be God the Father” is befitting to the person of the Son; Reply to Objection 5. To say, “God begot God Who and in the negative sense is that “to be God the Father,” is is God the Father,” is wrong, because since the word “Fa- to be removed from the Son’s divinity as well as from His ther” is construed in apposition to “God,” the word “God” personality. This, however, appears to be irrational; since, is restricted to the person of the Father; so that it would according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. ii), what is open mean, “He begot God, Who is Himself the Father”; and to affirmation, is open also to negation. then the Father would be spoken of as begotten, which is Whether abstract essential names can stand for the person? Ia q. 39 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that abstract essential On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1): names can stand for the person, so that this proposition “Nothing begets itself.” But if the essence begets the is true, “Essence begets essence.” For Augustine says (De essence, it begets itself only, since nothing exists in God Trin. vii, i, 2): “The Father and the Son are one Wisdom, as distinguished from the divine essence. Therefore the because they are one essence; and taken singly Wisdom is essence does not beget essence. from Wisdom, as essence from essence.” I answer that, Concerning this, the abbot Joachim Objection 2. Further, generation or corruption in our- erred in asserting that as we can say “God begot God,” so selves implies generation or corruption of what is within we can say “Essence begot essence”: considering that, by us. But the Son is generated. Therefore since the divine reason of the divine simplicity God is nothing else but the essence is in the Son, it seems that the divine essence is divine essence. In this he was wrong, because if we wish generated. to express ourselves correctly, we must take into account Objection 3. Further, God and the divine essence not only the thing which is signified, but also the mode are the same, as is clear from what is above explained of its signification as above stated (a. 4). Now although (q. 3, a. 3). But, as was shown, it is true to say that “God “God” is really the same as “Godhead,” nevertheless the begets God.” Therefore this is also true: “Essence begets mode of signification is not in each case the same. For essence.” since this word “God” signifies the divine essence in Him Objection 4. Further, a predicate can stand for that of that possesses it, from its mode of signification it can of which it is predicated. But the Father is the divine essence; its own nature stand for person. Thus the things which therefore essence can stand for the person of the Father. properly belong to the persons, can be predicated of this Thus the essence begets. word, “God,” as, for instance, we can say “God is begot- Objection 5. Further, the essence is “a thing beget- ten” or is “Begetter,” as above explained (a. 4). The word ting,” because the essence is the Father who is begetting. “essence,” however, in its mode of signification, cannot Therefore if the essence is not begetting, the essence will stand for Person, because it signifies the essence as an ab- be “a thing begetting,” and “not begetting”: which cannot stract form. Consequently, what properly belongs to the be. persons whereby they are distinguished from each other, Objection 6. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, cannot be attributed to the essence. For that would imply 20): “The Father is the principle of the whole Godhead.” distinction in the divine essence, in the same way as there But He is principle only by begetting or spirating. There- exists distinction in the “supposita.” fore the Father begets or spirates the Godhead. Reply to Objection 1. To express unity of essence 201 and of person, the holy Doctors have sometimes expressed are predicated of another as the universal of a particular. themselves with greater emphasis than the strict propri- Reply to Objection 5. The difference between sub- ety of terms allows. Whence instead of enlarging upon stantive and adjectival names consist in this, that the for- such expressions we should rather explain them: thus, mer carry their subject with them, whereas the latter do for instance, abstract names should be explained by con- not, but add the thing signified to the substantive. Whence crete names, or even by personal names; as when we find logicians are wont to say that the substantive is consid- “essence from essence”; or “wisdom from wisdom”; we ered in the light of “suppositum,” whereas the adjective should take the sense to be, “the Son” who is essence and indicates something added to the “suppositum.” There- wisdom, is from the Father who is essence and wisdom. fore substantive personal terms can be predicated of the Nevertheless, as regards these abstract names a certain or- essence, because they are really the same; nor does it fol- der should be observed, forasmuch as what belongs to ac- low that a personal property makes a distinct essence; but tion is more nearly allied to the persons because actions it belongs to the “suppositum” implied in the substantive. belong to “supposita.” So “nature from nature,” and “wis- But notional and personal adjectives cannot be predicated dom from wisdom” are less inexact than “essence from of the essence unless we add some substantive. We cannot essence.” say that the “essence is begetting”; yet we can say that the Reply to Objection 2. In creatures the one generated “essence is a thing begetting,” or that it is “God begetting,” has not the same nature numerically as the generator, but if “thing” and God stand for person, but not if they stand another nature, numerically distinct, which commences to for essence. Consequently there exists no contradiction exist in it anew by generation, and ceases to exist by cor- in saying that “essence is a thing begetting,” and “a thing ruption, and so it is generated and corrupted accidentally; not begetting”; because in the first case “thing” stands for whereas God begotten has the same nature numerically as person, and in the second it stands for the essence. the begetter. So the divine nature in the Son is not begot- Reply to Objection 6. So far as Godhead is one in ten either directly or accidentally. several “supposita,” it agrees in a certain degree with the Reply to Objection 3. Although God and the divine form of a collective term. So when we say, “the Father essence are really the same, nevertheless, on account of is the principle of the whole Godhead,” the term Godhead their different mode of signification, we must speak in a can be taken for all the persons together, inasmuch as it is different way about each of them. the principle in all the divine persons. Nor does it follow Reply to Objection 4. The divine essence is predi- that He is His own principle; as one of the people may cated of the Father by mode of identity by reason of the be called the ruler of the people without being ruler of divine simplicity; yet it does not follow that it can stand himself. We may also say that He is the principle of the for the Father, its mode of signification being different. whole Godhead; not as generating or spirating it, but as This objection would hold good as regards things which communicating it by generation and spiration. Whether the persons can be predicated of the essential terms? Ia q. 39 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the persons cannot persons cannot be predicated of this name “God,” except be predicated of the concrete essential names; so that we in an accidental sense. can say for instance, “God is three persons”; or “God is On the contrary, Augustine says, in his sermon on the Trinity.” For it is false to say, “man is every man,” be- Faith∗, “We believe that one God is one divinely named cause it cannot be verified as regards any particular sub- Trinity.” ject. For neither Socrates, nor Plato, nor anyone else is I answer that, As above explained (a. 5), although every man. In the same way this proposition, “God is the adjectival terms, whether personal or notional, cannot be Trinity,” cannot be verified of any one of the “supposita” predicated of the essence, nevertheless substantive terms of the divine nature. For the Father is not the Trinity; nor can be so predicated, owing to the real identity of essence is the Son; nor is the Holy Ghost. So to say, “God is the and person. The divine essence is not only really the same Trinity,” is false. as one person, but it is really the same as the three persons. Objection 2. Further, the lower is not predicated of Whence, one person, and two, and three, can be predi- the higher except by accidental predication; as when I say, cated of the essence as if we were to say, “The essence “animal is man”; for it is accidental to animal to be man. is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost.” And be- But this name “God” as regards the three persons is as cause this word “God” can of itself stand for the essence, a general term to inferior terms, as Damascene says (De as above explained (a. 4, ad 3), hence, as it is true to say, Fide Orth. iii, 4). Therefore it seems that the names of the “The essence is the three persons”; so likewise it is true to ∗ Serm. ii, in coena Domini 202 say, “God is the three persons.” theless it is true of the divine essence. This was denied by Reply to Objection 1. As above explained this term Porretanus because he did not take note of this distinction. “man” can of itself stand for person, whereas an adjunct Reply to Objection 2. When we say, “God,” or “the is required for it to stand for the universal human nature. divine essence is the Father,” the predication is one of So it is false to say, “Man is every man”; because it cannot identity, and not of the lower in regard to a higher species: be verified of any particular human subject. On the con- because in God there is no universal and singular. Hence, trary, this word “God” can of itself be taken for the divine as this proposition, “The Father is God” is of itself true, so essence. So, although to say of any of the “supposita” of this proposition “God is the Father” is true of itself, and the divine nature, “God is the Trinity,” is untrue, never- by no means accidentally. Whether the essential names should be appropriated to the persons? Ia q. 39 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the essential names for the manifestation of the divine persons, so also in the should not be appropriated to the persons. For whatever same manner do we make use of the essential attributes. might verge on error in faith should be avoided in the And such a manifestation of the divine persons by the use treatment of divine things; for, as Jerome says, “careless of the essential attributes is called “appropriation.” words involve risk of heresy”∗. But to appropriate to any The divine person can be manifested in a twofold man- one person the names which are common to the three per- ner by the essential attributes; in one way by similitude, sons, may verge on error in faith; for it may be supposed and thus the things which belong to the intellect are appro- either that such belong only to the person to whom they priated to the Son, Who proceeds by way of intellect, as are appropriated or that they belong to Him in a fuller de- Word. In another way by dissimilitude; as power is appro- gree than to the others. Therefore the essential attributes priated to the Father, as Augustine says, because fathers should not be appropriated to the persons. by reason of old age are sometimes feeble; lest anything Objection 2. Further, the essential attributes ex- of the kind be imagined of God. pressed in the abstract signify by mode of form. But Reply to Objection 1. The essential attributes are not one person is not as a form to another; since a form is appropriated to the persons as if they exclusively belonged not distinguished in subject from that of which it is the to them; but in order to make the persons manifest by way form. Therefore the essential attributes, especially when of similitude, or dissimilitude, as above explained. So, expressed in the abstract, are not to be appropriated to the no error in faith can arise, but rather manifestation of the persons. truth. Objection 3. Further, property is prior to the appro- Reply to Objection 2. If the essential attributes were priated, for property is included in the idea of the appro- appropriated to the persons as exclusively belonging to priated. But the essential attributes, in our way of under- each of them, then it would follow that one person would standing, are prior to the persons; as what is common is be as a form as regards another; which Augustine alto- prior to what is proper. Therefore the essential attributes gether repudiates (De Trin. vi, 2), showing that the Father are not to be appropriated to the persons. is wise, not by Wisdom begotten by Him, as though only On the contrary, the Apostle says: “Christ the power the Son were Wisdom; so that the Father and the Son to- of God and the wisdom of God” (1 Cor. 1:24). gether only can be called wise, but not the Father without I answer that, For the manifestation of our faith it is the Son. But the Son is called the Wisdom of the Father, fitting that the essential attributes should be appropriated because He is Wisdom from the Father Who is Wisdom. to the persons. For although the trinity of persons can- For each of them is of Himself Wisdom; and both together not be proved by demonstration, as was above expounded are one Wisdom. Whence the Father is not wise by the (q. 32, a. 1), nevertheless it is fitting that it be declared wisdom begotten by Him, but by the wisdom which is His by things which are more known to us. Now the essential own essence. attributes of God are more clear to us from the standpoint Reply to Objection 3. Although the essential attribute of reason than the personal properties; because we can is in its proper concept prior to person, according to our derive certain knowledge of the essential attributes from way of understanding; nevertheless, so far as it is appro- creatures which are sources of knowledge to us, such as priated, there is nothing to prevent the personal property we cannot obtain regarding the personal properties, as was from being prior to that which is appropriated. Thus color above explained (q. 32, a. 1). As, therefore, we make use is posterior to body considered as body, but is naturally of the likeness of the trace or image found in creatures prior to “white body,” considered as white. ∗ In substance Ep. lvii. 203 Whether the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons in a fitting manner Ia q. 39 a. 8 by the holy doctors? Objection 1. It would seem that the essential at- where a gloss observes, “that is, with the Father Who is tributes are appropriated to the persons unfittingly by the My head,” also this word “Who is”; because on the text of holy doctors. For Hilary says (De Trin. ii): “Eternity is Is. 65:1, “Behold I go to the Gentiles,” a gloss adds, “The in the Father, the species in the Image; and use is in the Son speaks Who said to Moses, I am Who am.” These Gift.” In which words he designates three names proper to appear to belong to the Son, and are not appropriated. For the persons: the name of the “Father,” the name “Image” “truth,” according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 36), “is proper to the Son (q. 35, a. 2), and the name “Bounty” or the supreme similitude of the principle without any dis- “Gift,” which is proper to the Holy Ghost (q. 38, a. 2). He similitude.” So it seems that it properly belongs to the also designates three appropriated terms. For he appro- Son, Who has a principle. Also the “book of life” seems priates “eternity” to the Father, “species” to the Son, and proper to the Son, as signifying “a thing from another”; “use” to the Holy Ghost. This he does apparently with- for every book is written by someone. This also, “Who out reason. For “eternity” imports duration of existence; is,” appears to be proper to the Son; because if when it “species,” the principle of existence; and ‘use’ belongs to was said to Moses, “I am Who am,” the Trinity spoke, the operation. But essence and operation are not found to then Moses could have said, “He Who is Father, Son, and be appropriated to any person. Therefore the above terms Holy Ghost, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you,” so also are not fittingly appropriated to the persons. he could have said further, “He Who is the Father, and the Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Son, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you,” pointing out a Christ. i, 5): “Unity is in the Father, equality in the certain person. This, however, is false; because no per- Son, and in the Holy Ghost is the concord of equality and son is Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Therefore it cannot be unity.” This does not, however, seem fitting; because one common to the Trinity, but is proper to the Son. person does not receive formal denomination from what is I answer that, Our intellect, which is led to the knowl- appropriated to another. For the Father is not wise by the edge of God from creatures, must consider God according wisdom begotten, as above explained (q. 37, a. 2, ad 1). to the mode derived from creatures. In considering any But, as he subjoins, “All these three are one by the Father; creature four points present themselves to us in due order. all are equal by the Son, and all united by the Holy Ghost.” Firstly, the thing itself taken absolutely is considered as The above, therefore, are not fittingly appropriated to the a being. Secondly, it is considered as one. Thirdly, its Persons. intrinsic power of operation and causality is considered. Objection 3. Further, according to Augustine, to the The fourth point of consideration embraces its relation to Father is attributed “power,” to the Son “wisdom,” to the its effects. Hence this fourfold consideration comes to our Holy Ghost “goodness.” Nor does this seem fitting; for mind in reference to God. “strength” is part of power, whereas strength is found to According to the first point of consideration, whereby be appropriated to the Son, according to the text, “Christ we consider God absolutely in His being, the appropri- the strength∗ of God” (1 Cor. 1:24). So it is likewise ation mentioned by Hilary applies, according to which appropriated to the Holy Ghost, according to the words, “eternity” is appropriated to the Father, “species” to the “strength† came out from Him and healed all” (Lk. 6:19). Son, “use” to the Holy Ghost. For “eternity” as mean- Therefore power should not be appropriated to the Father. ing a “being” without a principle, has a likeness to the Objection 4. Likewise Augustine says (De Trin. vi, property of the Father, Who is “a principle without a prin- 10): “What the Apostle says, “From Him, and by Him, ciple.” Species or beauty has a likeness to the property of and in Him,” is not to be taken in a confused sense.” And the Son. For beauty includes three conditions, “integrity” (Contra Maxim. ii) “ ‘from Him’ refers to the Father, ‘by or “perfection,” since those things which are impaired are Him’ to the Son, ‘in Him’ to the Holy Ghost.’ ” This, how- by the very fact ugly; due “proportion” or “harmony”; and ever, seems to be incorrectly said; for the words “in Him” lastly, “brightness” or “clarity,” whence things are called seem to imply the relation of final cause, which is first beautiful which have a bright color. among the causes. Therefore this relation of cause should The first of these has a likeness to the property of the be appropriated to the Father, Who is “the principle from Son, inasmuch as He as Son has in Himself truly and per- no principle.” fectly the nature of the Father. To insinuate this, Augus- Objection 5. Likewise, Truth is appropriated to the tine says in his explanation (De Trin. vi, 10): “Where— Son, according to Jn. 14:6, “I am the Way, the Truth, and that is, in the Son—there is supreme and primal life,” etc. the Life”; and likewise “the book of life,” according to Ps. The second agrees with the Son’s property, inasmuch 39:9, “In the beginning of the book it is written of Me,” as He is the express Image of the Father. Hence we see ∗ Douay: power † Douay: virtue 204 that an image is said to be beautiful, if it perfectly repre-moved, we do not find equality in the Father, but we find sents even an ugly thing. This is indicated by Augustine it as soon as we suppose the Son. So, all are equal by when he says (De Trin. vi, 10), “Where there exists won- reason of the Son, not as if the Son were the principle of drous proportion and primal equality,” etc. equality in the Father, but that, without the Son equal to The third agrees with the property of the Son, as the the Father, the Father could not be called equal; because Word, which is the light and splendor of the intellect, as His equality is considered firstly in regard to the Son: for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3). Augustine alludes that the Holy Ghost is equal to the Father, is also from the to the same when he says (De Trin. vi, 10): “As the per- Son. Likewise, if the Holy Ghost, Who is the union of fect Word, not wanting in anything, and, so to speak, the the two, be excluded, we cannot understand the oneness art of the omnipotent God,” etc. of the union between the Father and the Son. So all are “Use” has a likeness to the property of the Holy Ghost; connected by reason of the Holy Ghost; because given the provided the “use” be taken in a wide sense, as includ- Holy Ghost, we find whence the Father and the Son are ing also the sense of “to enjoy”; according as “to use” is said to be united. to employ something at the beck of the will, and “to en- According to the third consideration, which brings be- joy” means to use joyfully, as Augustine says (De Trin. fore us the adequate power of God in the sphere of causal- x, 11). So “use,” whereby the Father and the Son enjoy ity, there is said to be a third kind of appropriation, of each other, agrees with the property of the Holy Ghost, “power,” “wisdom,” and “goodness.” This kind of appro- as Love. This is what Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): priation is made both by reason of similitude as regards “That love, that delectation, that felicity or beatitude, is what exists in the divine persons, and by reason of dis- called use by him” (Hilary). But the “use” by which we similitude if we consider what is in creatures. For “power” enjoy God, is likened to the property of the Holy Ghost as has the nature of a principle, and so it has a likeness to the the Gift; and Augustine points to this when he says (De heavenly Father, Who is the principle of the whole God- Trin. vi, 10): “In the Trinity, the Holy Ghost, the sweet- head. But in an earthly father it is wanting sometimes by ness of the Begettor and the Begotten, pours out upon us reason of old age. “Wisdom” has likeness to the heavenly mere creatures His immense bounty and wealth.” Thus it Son, as the Word, for a word is nothing but the concept is clear how “eternity,” “species,” and “use” are attributed of wisdom. In an earthly son this is sometimes absent by or appropriated to the persons, but not essence or oper- reason of lack of years. “Goodness,” as the nature and ation; because, being common, there is nothing in their object of love, has likeness to the Holy Ghost; but seems concept to liken them to the properties of the Persons. repugnant to the earthly spirit, which often implies a cer- The second consideration of God regards Him as tain violent impulse, according to Is. 25:4: “The spirit of “one.” In that view Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) the strong is as a blast beating on the wall.” “Strength” is appropriates “unity” to the Father, “equality” to the Son, appropriated to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, not as de- “concord” or “union” to the Holy Ghost. It is manifest noting the power itself of a thing, but as sometimes used to that these three imply unity, but in different ways. For express that which proceeds from power; for instance, we “unity” is said absolutely, as it does not presuppose any- say that the strong work done by an agent is its strength. thing else; and for this reason it is appropriated to the Fa- According to the fourth consideration, i.e. God’s rela- ther, to Whom any other person is not presupposed since tion to His effects, there arise appropriation of the expres- He is the “principle without principle.” “Equality” implies sion “from Whom, by Whom, and in Whom.” For this unity as regards another; for that is equal which has the preposition “from” [ex] sometimes implies a certain rela- same quantity as another. So equality is appropriated to tion of the material cause; which has no place in God; the Son, Who is the “principle from a principle.” “Union” and sometimes it expresses the relation of the efficient implies the unity of two; and is therefore appropriated to cause, which can be applied to God by reason of His ac- the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He proceeds from two. And tive power; hence it is appropriated to the Father in the from this we can understand what Augustine means when same way as power. The preposition “by” [per] some- he says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) that “The Three are one, times designates an intermediate cause; thus we may say by reason of the Father; They are equal by reason of the that a smith works “by” a hammer. Hence the word “by” Son; and are united by reason of the Holy Ghost.” For is not always appropriated to the Son, but belongs to the it is clear that we trace a thing back to that in which we Son properly and strictly, according to the text, “All things find it first: just as in this lower world we attribute life were made by Him” (Jn. 1:3); not that the Son is an in- to the vegetative soul, because therein we find the first strument, but as “the principle from a principle.” Some- trace of life. Now “unity” is perceived at once in the per- times it designates the habitude of a form “by” which an son of the Father, even if by an impossible hypothesis, the agent works; thus we say that an artificer works by his art. other persons were removed. So the other persons derive Hence, as wisdom and art are appropriated to the Son, so their unity from the Father. But if the other persons be re- also is the expression “by Whom.” The preposition “in” 205 strictly denotes the habitude of one containing. Now, God knowledge regarding those who are to possess eternal life. contains things in two ways: in one way by their simili- Consequently, it is appropriated to the Son; although life tudes; thus things are said to be in God, as existing in His is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as implying a certain knowledge. In this sense the expression “in Him” should kind of interior movement, agreeing in that sense with the be appropriated to the Son. In another sense things are property of the Holy Ghost as Love. To be written by an- contained in God forasmuch as He in His goodness pre- other is not of the essence of a book considered as such; serves and governs them, by guiding them to a fitting end; but this belongs to it only as a work produced. So this does and in this sense the expression “in Him” is appropriated not imply origin; nor is it personal, but an appropriation to to the Holy Ghost, as likewise is “goodness.” Nor need the a person. The expression “Who is” is appropriated to the habitude of the final cause (though the first of causes) be person of the Son, not by reason of itself, but by reason appropriated to the Father, Who is “the principle without of an adjunct, inasmuch as, in God’s word to Moses, was a principle”: because the divine persons, of Whom the Fa- prefigured the delivery of the human race accomplished ther is the principle, do not proceed from Him as towards by the Son. Yet, forasmuch as the word “Who” is taken an end, since each of Them is the last end; but They pro- in a relative sense, it may sometimes relate to the person ceed by a natural procession, which seems more to belong of the Son; and in that sense it would be taken person- to the nature of a natural power. ally; as, for instance, were we to say, “The Son is the Regarding the other points of inquiry, we can say begotten ‘Who is,’ ” inasmuch as “God begotten is per- that since “truth” belongs to the intellect, as stated above sonal.” But taken indefinitely, it is an essential term. And (q. 16, a. 1), it is appropriated to the Son, without, how- although the pronoun “this” [iste] seems grammatically to ever, being a property of His. For truth can be considered point to a particular person, nevertheless everything that as existing in the thought or in the thing itself. Hence, as we can point to can be grammatically treated as a per- intellect and thing in their essential meaning, are referred son, although in its own nature it is not a person; as we to the essence, and not to the persons, so the same is to may say, “this stone,” and “this ass.” So, speaking in a be said of truth. The definition quoted from Augustine grammatical sense, so far as the word “God” signifies and belongs to truth as appropriated to the Son. The “book stands for the divine essence, the latter may be designated of life” directly means knowledge but indirectly it means by the pronoun “this,” according to Ex. 15:2: “This is my life. For, as above explained (q. 24, a. 1), it is God’s God, and I will glorify Him.” 206 FIRST PART, QUESTION 40 Of the Persons As Compared to the Relations or Properties (In Four Articles) We now consider the persons in connection with the relations, or properties; and there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether relation is the same as person? (2) Whether the relations distinguish and constitute the persons? (3) Whether mental abstraction of the relations from the persons leaves the hypostases distinct? (4) Whether the relations, according to our mode of understanding, presuppose the acts of the persons, or contrariwise? Whether relation is the same as person? Ia q. 40 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that in God relation is not We must, however, say that there are properties in God; the same as person. For when things are identical, if one as we have shown (q. 32, a. 2). These are designated by is multiplied the others are multiplied. But in one person abstract terms, being forms, as it were, of the persons. So, there are several relations; as in the person of the Father since the nature of a form requires it to be “in” that of there is paternity and common spiration. Again, one re- which it is the form, we must say that the properties are in lation exists in two person, as common spiration in the the persons, and yet that they are the persons; as we say Father and in the Son. Therefore relation is not the same that the essence is in God, and yet is God. as person. Reply to Objection 1. Person and property are re- Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher ally the same, but differ in concept. Consequently, it does (Phys. iv, text. 24), nothing is contained by itself. But not follow that if one is multiplied, the other must also relation is in the person; nor can it be said that this occurs be multiplied. We must, however, consider that in God, because they are identical, for otherwise relation would be by reason of the divine simplicity, a twofold real identity also in the essence. Therefore relation, or property, is not exists as regards what in creatures are distinct. For, since the same as person in God. the divine simplicity excludes the composition of matter Objection 3. Further, when several things are identi- and form, it follows that in God the abstract is the same as cal, what is predicated of one is predicated of the others. the concrete, as “Godhead” and “God.” And as the divine But all that is predicated of a Person is not predicated of simplicity excludes the composition of subject and acci- His property. For we say that the Father begets; but not dent, it follows that whatever is attributed to God, is His that the paternity is begetting. Therefore property is not essence Itself; and so, wisdom and power are the same in the same as person in God. God, because they are both in the divine essence. Accord- On the contrary, in God “what is” and “whereby it ing to this twofold identity, property in God is the same is” are the same, according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). person. For personal properties are the same as the per- But the Father is Father by paternity. In the same way, the sons because the abstract and the concrete are the same other properties are the same as the persons. in God; since they are the subsisting persons themselves, I answer that, Different opinions have been held on as paternity is the Father Himself, and filiation is the Son, this point. Some have said that the properties are not the and procession is the Holy Ghost. But the non-personal persons, nor in the persons; and these have thought thus properties are the same as the persons according to the owing to the mode of signification of the relations, which other reason of identity, whereby whatever is attributed do not indeed signify existence “in” something, but rather to God is His own essence. Thus, common spiration is existence “towards” something. Whence, they styled the the same as the person of the Father, and the person of relations “assistant,” as above explained (q. 28, a. 2). But the Son; not that it is one self-subsisting person; but that since relation, considered as really existing in God, is the as there is one essence in the two persons, so also there is divine essence Itself, and the essence is the same as per- one property in the two persons, as above explained (q. 30, son, as appears from what was said above (q. 39, a. 1), a. 2 ). relation must necessarily be the same as person. Reply to Objection 2. The properties are said to be in Others, therefore, considering this identity, said that the essence, only by mode of identity; but in the persons the properties were indeed the persons; but not “in” the they exist by mode of identity, not merely in reality, but persons; for, they said, there are no properties in God ex- also in the mode of signification; as the form exists in its cept in our way of speaking, as stated above (q. 32, a. 2). subject. Thus the properties determine and distinguish the 207 persons, but not the essence. but as forms of “supposita.” And so their mode of sig- Reply to Objection 3. Notional participles and verbs nification is against notional participles and verbs being signify the notional acts: and acts belong to a “supposi- predicated of the properties. tum.” Now, properties are not designated as “supposita,” Whether the persons are distinguished by the relations? Ia q. 40 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the persons are not it results from their matter or their form. Now origin of distinguished by the relations. For simple things are dis- a thing does not designate anything intrinsic, but means tinct by themselves. But the persons are supremely sim- the way from something, or to something; as generation ple. Therefore they are distinguished by themselves, and signifies the way to a thing generated, and as proceeding not by the relation. from the generator. Hence it is not possible that what is Objection 2. Further, a form is distinguished only in generated and the generator should be distinguished by relation to its genus. For white is distinguished from black generation alone; but in the generator and in the thing only by quality. But “hypostasis” signifies an individual in generated we must presuppose whatever makes them to the genus of substance. Therefore the hypostases cannot be distinguished from each other. In a divine person there be distinguished by relations. is nothing to presuppose but essence, and relation or prop- Objection 3. Further, what is absolute comes before erty. Whence, since the persons agree in essence, it only what is relative. But the distinction of the divine persons remains to be said that the persons are distinguished from is the primary distinction. Therefore the divine persons each other by the relations. Secondly: because the dis- are not distinguished by the relations. tinction of the divine persons is not to be so understood Objection 4. Further, whatever presupposes distinc- as if what is common to them all is divided, because the tion cannot be the first principle of distinction. But rela- common essence remains undivided; but the distinguish- tion presupposes distinction, which comes into its defini- ing principles themselves must constitute the things which tion; for a relation is essentially what is towards another. are distinct. Now the relations or the properties distin- Therefore the first distinctive principle in God cannot be guish or constitute the hypostases or persons, inasmuch relation. as they are themselves the subsisting persons; as paternity On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.): “Relation is the Father, and filiation is the Son, because in God the alone multiplies the Trinity of the divine persons.” abstract and the concrete do not differ. But it is against I answer that, In whatever multitude of things is to the nature of origin that it should constitute hypostasis or be found something common to all, it is necessary to seek person. For origin taken in an active sense signifies pro- out the principle of distinction. So, as the three persons ceeding from a subsisting person, so that it presupposes agree in the unity of essence, we must seek to know the the latter; while in a passive sense origin, as “nativity,” principle of distinction whereby they are several. Now, signifies the way to a subsisting person, and as not yet there are two principles of difference between the divine constituting the person. persons, and these are “origin” and “relation.” Although It is therefore better to say that the persons or hy- these do not really differ, yet they differ in the mode of postases are distinguished rather by relations than by ori- signification; for “origin” is signified by way of act, as gin. For, although in both ways they are distinguished, “generation”; and “relation” by way of the form, as “pa- nevertheless in our mode of understanding they are dis- ternity.” tinguished chiefly and firstly by relations; whence this Some, then, considering that relation follows upon act, name “Father” signifies not only a property, but also the have said that the divine hypostases are distinguished by hypostasis; whereas this term “Begetter” or “Begetting” origin, so that we may say that the Father is distinguished signifies property only; forasmuch as this name “Father” from the Son, inasmuch as the former begets and the lat- signifies the relation which is distinctive and constitutive ter is begotten. Further, that the relations, or the prop- of the hypostasis; and this term “Begetter” or “Begotten” erties, make known the distinctions of the hypostases or signifies the origin which is not distinctive and constitu- persons as resulting therefrom; as also in creatures the tive of the hypostasis. properties manifest the distinctions of individuals, which Reply to Objection 1. The persons are the subsisting distinctions are caused by the material principles. relations themselves. Hence it is not against the simplicity This opinion, however, cannot stand—for two reasons. of the divine persons for them to be distinguished by the Firstly, because, in order that two things be understood as relations. distinct, their distinction must be understood as resulting Reply to Objection 2. The divine persons are not dis- from something intrinsic to both; thus in things created tinguished as regards being, in which they subsist, nor in 208 anything absolute, but only as regards something relative. Reply to Objection 4. Relation presupposes the dis- Hence relation suffices for their distinction. tinction of the subjects, when it is an accident; but when Reply to Objection 3. The more prior a distinction the relation is subsistent, it does not presuppose, but is, the nearer it approaches to unity; and so it must be the brings about distinction. For when it is said that relation is least possible distinction. So the distinction of the persons by nature to be towards another, the word “another” sig- must be by that which distinguishes the least possible; and nifies the correlative which is not prior, but simultaneous this is by relation. in the order of nature. Whether the hypostases remain if the relations are mentally abstracted from the perIa q. 40 a. 3 sons? Objection 1. It would seem that the hypostases re- the intellect; as, for instance, if we abstract the form of a main if the properties or relations are mentally abstracted circle from brass, there remains in our intellect separately from the persons. For that to which something is added, the understanding both of a circle, and of brass. Now, may be understood when the addition is taken away; as although there is no universal nor particular in God, nor man is something added to animal which can be under- form and matter, in reality; nevertheless, as regards the stood if rational be taken away. But person is something mode of signification there is a certain likeness of these added to hypostasis; for person is “a hypostasis distin- things in God; and thus Damascene says (De Fide Orth. guished by a property of dignity.” Therefore, if a personal iii, 6) that “substance is common and hypostasis is par- property be taken away from a person, the hypostasis re- ticular.” So, if we speak of the abstraction of the uni- mains. versal from the particular, the common universal essence Objection 2. Further, that the Father is Father, and remains in the intellect if the properties are removed; but that He is someone, are not due to the same reason. For as not the hypostasis of the Father, which is, as it were, a He is the Father by paternity, supposing He is some one by particular. paternity, it would follow that the Son, in Whom there is But as regards the abstraction of the form from the not paternity, would not be “someone.” So when paternity matter, if the non-personal properties are removed, then is mentally abstracted from the Father, He still remains the idea of the hypostases and persons remains; as, for in- “someone”—that is, a hypostasis. Therefore, if property stance, if the fact of the Father’s being unbegotten or spi- be removed from person, the hypostasis remains. rating be mentally abstracted from the Father, the Father’s Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6): hypostasis or person remains. “Unbegotten is not the same as Father; for if the Father If, however, the personal property be mentally ab- had not begotten the Son, nothing would prevent Him be- stracted, the idea of the hypostasis no longer remains. ing called unbegotten.” But if He had not begotten the For the personal properties are not to be understood as Son, there would be no paternity in Him. Therefore, if added to the divine hypostases, as a form is added to a paternity be removed, there still remains the hypostasis of pre-existing subject: but they carry with them their own the Father as unbegotten. “supposita,” inasmuch as they are themselves subsisting On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): “The Son persons; thus paternity is the Father Himself. For hyposta- has nothing else than birth.” But He is Son by “birth.” sis signifies something distinct in God, since hypostasis Therefore, if filiation be removed, the Son’s hypostasis no means an individual substance. So, as relation distin- more remains; and the same holds as regards the other guishes and constitutes the hypostases, as above explained persons. (a. 2), it follows that if the personal relations are mentally I answer that, Abstraction by the intellect is abstracted, the hypostases no longer remain. Some, how- twofold—when the universal is abstracted from the partic- ever, think, as above noted, that the divine hypostases are ular, as animal abstracted from man; and when the form not distinguished by the relations, but only by origin; so is abstracted from the matter, as the form of a circle is that the Father is a hypostasis as not from another, and the abstracted by the intellect from any sensible matter. The Son is a hypostasis as from another by generation. And difference between these two abstractions consists in the that the consequent relations which are to be regarded as fact that in the abstraction of the universal from the par- properties of dignity, constitute the notion of a person, and ticular, that from which the abstraction is made does not are thus called “personal properties.” Hence, if these re- remain; for when the difference of rationality is removed lations are mentally abstracted, the hypostasis, but not the from man, the man no longer remains in the intellect, but persons, remain. animal alone remains. But in the abstraction of the form But this is impossible, for two reasons: first, because from the matter, both the form and the matter remain in the relations distinguish and constitute the hypostases, as 209 shown above (a. 2); secondly, because every hypostasis guishing relation belongs essentially to both. of a rational nature is a person, as appears from the def- Reply to Objection 2. By paternity the Father is not inition of Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) that, “person is the only Father, but is a person, and is “someone,” or a hy- individual substance of a rational nature.” Hence, to have postasis. It does not follow, however, that the Son is not hypostasis and not person, it would be necessary to ab- “someone” or a hypostasis; just as it does not follow that stract the rationality from the nature, but not the property He is not a person. from the person. Reply to Objection 3. Augustine does not mean to Reply to Objection 1. Person does not add to hy- say that the hypostasis of the Father would remain as un- postasis a distinguishing property absolutely, but a distin- begotten, if His paternity were removed, as if innascibility guishing property of dignity, all of which must be taken constituted and distinguished the hypostasis of the Father; as the difference. Now, this distinguishing property is one for this would be impossible, since “being unbegotten” of dignity precisely because it is understood as subsisting says nothing positive and is only a negation, as he himself in a rational nature. Hence, if the distinguishing property says. But he speaks in a general sense, forasmuch as not be removed from the person, the hypostasis no longer re- every unbegotten being is the Father. So, if paternity be mains; whereas it would remain were the rationality of removed, the hypostasis of the Father does not remain in the nature removed; for both person and hypostasis are God, as distinguished from the other persons, but only as individual substances. Consequently, in God the distin- distinguished from creatures; as the Jews understand it. Whether the properties presuppose the notional acts? Ia q. 40 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the notional acts are as nativity is attributed to the Son, and procession to the understood before the properties. For the Master of the Holy Ghost. For, in the order of intelligence, origin, in Sentences says (Sent. i, D, xxvii) that “the Father always the passive sense, simply precedes the personal proper- is, because He is ever begetting the Son.” So it seems that ties of the person proceeding; because origin, as passively generation precedes paternity in the order of intelligence. understood, signifies the way to a person constituted by Objection 2. Further, in the order of intelligence ev- the property. Likewise, origin signified actively is prior ery relation presupposes that on which it is founded; as in the order of intelligence to the non-personal relation equality presupposes quantity. But paternity is a relation of the person originating; as the notional act of spiration founded on the action of generation. Therefore paternity precedes, in the order of intelligence, the unnamed rela- presupposes generation. tive property common to the Father and the Son. The per- Objection 3. Further, active generation is to paternity sonal property of the Father can be considered in a twofold as nativity is to filiation. But filiation presupposes nativ- sense: firstly, as a relation; and thus again in the order of ity; for the Son is so called because He is born. Therefore intelligence it presupposes the notional act, for relation, paternity also presupposes generation. as such, is founded upon an act: secondly, according as On the contrary, Generation is the operation of the it constitutes the person; and thus the notional act pre- person of the Father. But paternity constitutes the person supposes the relation, as an action presupposes a person of the Father. Therefore in the order of intelligence, pater- acting. nity is prior to generation. Reply to Objection 1. When the Master says that “be- I answer that, According to the opinion that the prop- cause He begets, He is Father,” the term “Father” is taken erties do not distinguish and constitute the hypostases in as meaning relation only, but not as signifying the sub- God, but only manifest them as already distinct and con- sisting person; for then it would be necessary to say con- stituted, we must absolutely say that the relations in our versely that because He is Father He begets. mode of understanding follow upon the notional acts, so Reply to Objection 2. This objection avails of pater- that we can say, without qualifying the phrase, that “be- nity as a relation, but not as constituting a person. cause He begets, He is the Father.” A distinction, however, Reply to Objection 3. Nativity is the way to the per- is needed if we suppose that the relations distinguish and son of the Son; and so, in the order of intelligence, it pre- constitute the divine hypostases. For origin has in God cedes filiation, even as constituting the person of the Son. an active and passive signification—active, as generation But active generation signifies a proceeding from the per- is attributed to the Father, and spiration, taken for the no- son of the Father; wherefore it presupposes the personal tional act, is attributed to the Father and the Son; passive, property of the Father. 210 FIRST PART, QUESTION 41 Of the Persons in Reference to the Notional Acts (In Six Articles) We now consider the persons in reference to the notional acts, concerning which six points of inquiry arise: (1) Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons? (2) Whether these acts are necessary, or voluntary? (3) Whether as regards these acts, a person proceeds from nothing or from something? (4) Whether in God there exists a power as regards the notional acts? (5) What this power means? (6) Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act? Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons? Ia q. 41 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the notional acts are Reply to Objection 2. The notional acts differ from not to be attributed to the persons. For Boethius says the relations of the persons only in their mode of signifi- (De Trin.): “Whatever is predicated of God, of whatever cation; and in reality are altogether the same. Whence the genus it be, becomes the divine substance, except what Master says that “generation and nativity in other words pertains to the relation.” But action is one of the ten “gen- are paternity and filiation” (Sent. i, D, xxvi). To see era.” Therefore any action attributed to God belongs to this, we must consider that the origin of one thing from His essence, and not to a notion. another is firstly inferred from movement: for that any- Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, thing be changed from its disposition by movement evi- 4,5) that, “everything which is said of God, is said of Him dently arises from some cause. Hence action, in its pri- as regards either His substance, or relation.” But what- mary sense, means origin of movement; for, as movement ever belongs to the substance is signified by the essential derived from another into a mobile object, is called “pas- attributes; and whatever belongs to the relations, by the sion,” so the origin of movement itself as beginning from names of the persons, or by the names of the properties. another and terminating in what is moved, is called “ac- Therefore, in addition to these, notional acts are not to be tion.” Hence, if we take away movement, action implies attributed to the persons. nothing more than order of origin, in so far as action pro- Objection 3. Further, the nature of action is of itself ceeds from some cause or principle to what is from that to cause passion. But we do not place passions in God. principle. Consequently, since in God no movement ex- Therefore neither are notional acts to be placed in God. ists, the personal action of the one producing a person On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad is only the habitude of the principle to the person who Petrum ii) says: “It is a property of the Father to beget the is from the principle; which habitudes are the relations, Son.” Therefore notional acts are to be placed in God. or the notions. Nevertheless we cannot speak of divine I answer that, In the divine persons distinction is and intelligible things except after the manner of sensible founded on origin. But origin can be properly designated things, whence we derive our knowledge, and wherein ac- only by certain acts. Wherefore, to signify the order of tions and passions, so far as these imply movement, differ origin in the divine persons, we must attribute notional from the relations which result from action and passion, acts to the persons. and therefore it was necessary to signify the habitudes of Reply to Objection 1. Every origin is designated by the persons separately after the manner of act, and sepa- an act. In God there is a twofold order of origin: one, rately after the manner of relations. Thus it is evident that inasmuch as the creature proceeds from Him, and this is they are really the same, differing only in their mode of common to the three persons; and so those actions which signification. are attributed to God to designate the proceeding of crea- Reply to Objection 3. Action, so far as it means ori- tures from Him, belong to His essence. Another order of gin of movement, naturally involves passion; but action origin in God regards the procession of person from per- in that sense is not attributed to God. Whence, passions son; wherefore the acts which designate the order of this are attributed to Him only from a grammatical standpoint, origin are called notional; because the notions of the per- and in accordance with our manner of speaking, as we at- sons are the mutual relations of the persons, as is clear tribute “to beget” with the Father, and to the Son “to be from what was above explained (q. 32, a. 2). begotten.” 211 Whether the notional acts are voluntary? Ia q. 41 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the notional acts are the nature of a created being; because God is of Himself voluntary. For Hilary says (De Synod.): “Not by natural necessary being, whereas a creature is made from noth- necessity was the Father led to beget the Son.” ing. Thus, the Arians, wishing to prove the Son to be a Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says, “He trans- creature, said that the Father begot the Son by will, tak- ferred us to the kingdom of the Son of His love” (Col. ing will in the sense of principle. But we, on the contrary, 1:13). But love belongs to the will. Therefore the Son must assert that the Father begot the Son, not by will, but was begotten of the Father by will. by nature. Wherefore Hilary says (De Synod.): “The will Objection 3. Further, nothing is more voluntary than of God gave to all creatures their substance: but perfect love. But the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love from the Fa- birth gave the Son a nature derived from a substance im- ther and the Son. Therefore He proceeds voluntarily. passible and unborn. All things created are such as God Objection 4. Further, the Son proceeds by mode of willed them to be; but the Son, born of God, subsists in the intellect, as the Word. But every word proceeds by the the perfect likeness of God.” will from a speaker. Therefore the Son proceeds from the Reply to Objection 1. This saying is directed against Father by will, and not by nature. those who did not admit even the concomitance of the Fa- Objection 5. Further, what is not voluntary is nec- ther’s will in the generation of the Son, for they said that essary. Therefore if the Father begot the Son, not by the the Father begot the Son in such a manner by nature that will, it seems to follow that He begot Him by necessity; the will to beget was wanting; just as we ourselves suffer and this is against what Augustine says (Ad Orosium qu. many things against our will from natural necessity—as, vii). for instance, death, old age, and like ills. This appears On the contrary, Augustine says, in the same book, from what precedes and from what follows as regards the that, “the Father begot the Son neither by will, nor by ne- words quoted, for thus we read: “Not against His will, cessity.” nor as it were, forced, nor as if He were led by natural I answer that, When anything is said to be, or to be necessity did the Father beget the Son.” made by the will, this can be understood in two senses. In Reply to Objection 2. The Apostle calls Christ the one sense, the ablative designates only concomitance, as I Son of the love of God, inasmuch as He is superabun- can say that I am a man by my will—that is, I will to be dantly loved by God; not, however, as if love were the a man; and in this way it can be said that the Father begot principle of the Son’s generation. the Son by will; as also He is God by will, because He Reply to Objection 3. The will, as a natural faculty, wills to be God, and wills to beget the Son. In the other wills something naturally, as man’s will naturally tends sense, the ablative imports the habitude of a principle as to happiness; and likewise God naturally wills and loves it is said that the workman works by his will, as the will Himself; whereas in regard to things other than Himself, is the principle of his work; and thus in that sense it must the will of God is in a way, undetermined in itself, as be said the God the Father begot the Son, not by His will; above explained (q. 19, a. 3). Now, the Holy Ghost pro- but that He produced the creature by His will. Whence ceeds as Love, inasmuch as God loves Himself, and hence in the book De Synod, it is said: “If anyone say that the He proceeds naturally, although He proceeds by mode of Son was made by the Will of God, as a creature is said will. to be made, let him be anathema.” The reason of this is Reply to Objection 4. Even as regards the intellec- that will and nature differ in their manner of causation, tual conceptions of the mind, a return is made to those in such a way that nature is determined to one, while the first principles which are naturally understood. But God will is not determined to one; and this because the effect naturally understands Himself, and thus the conception of is assimilated to the form of the agent, whereby the latter the divine Word is natural. acts. Now it is manifest that of one thing there is only Reply to Objection 5. A thing is said to be necessary one natural form whereby it exists; and hence such as it “of itself,” and “by reason of another.” Taken in the latter is itself, such also is its work. But the form whereby the sense, it has a twofold meaning: firstly, as an efficient and will acts is not only one, but many, according to the num- compelling cause, and thus necessary means what is vio- ber of ideas understood. Hence the quality of the will’s lent; secondly, it means a final cause, when a thing is said action does not depend on the quality of the agent, but on to be necessary as the means to an end, so far as without it the agent’s will and understanding. So the will is the prin- the end could not be attained, or, at least, so well attained. ciple of those things which may be this way or that way; In neither of these ways is the divine generation neces- whereas of those things which can be only in one way, the sary; because God is not the means to an end, nor is He principle is nature. What, however, can exist in different subject to compulsion. But a thing is said to be necessary ways is far from the divine nature, whereas it belongs to “of itself” which cannot but be: in this sense it is neces- 212 sary for God to be; and in the same sense it is necessary that the Father beget the Son. Whether the notional acts proceed from something? Ia q. 41 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the notional acts do beginning, begot the Son equal to Himself.” not proceed from anything. For if the Father begets the I answer that, The Son was not begotten from noth- Son from something, this will be either from Himself or ing, but from the Father’s substance. For it was explained from something else. If from something else, since that above (q. 27, a. 2; q. 33, Aa. 2 ,3) that paternity, filia- whence a thing is generated exists in what is generated, tion and nativity really and truly exist in God. Now, this it follows that something different from the Father exists is the difference between true “generation,” whereby one in the Son, and this contradicts what is laid down by Hi- proceeds from another as a son, and “making,” that the lary (De Trin. vii) that, “In them nothing diverse or dif- maker makes something out of external matter, as a car- ferent exists.” If the Father begets the Son from Himself, penter makes a bench out of wood, whereas a man begets since again that whence a thing is generated, if it be some- a son from himself. Now, as a created workman makes a thing permanent, receives as predicate the thing generated thing out of matter, so God makes things out of nothing, as therefrom just as we say, “The man is white,” since the will be shown later on (q. 45, a. 1), not as if this nothing man remains, when not from white he is made white— were a part of the substance of the thing made, but be- it follows that either the Father does not remain after the cause the whole substance of a thing is produced by Him Son is begotten, or that the Father is the Son, which is without anything else whatever presupposed. So, were the false. Therefore the Father does not beget the Son from Son to proceed from the Father as out of nothing, then the something, but from nothing. Son would be to the Father what the thing made is to the Objection 2. Further, that whence anything is gener- maker, whereto, as is evident, the name of filiation would ated is the principle regarding what is generated. So if the not apply except by a kind of similitude. Thus, if the Son Father generate the Son from His own essence or nature, of God proceeds from the Father out of nothing, He could it follows that the essence or nature of the Father is the not be properly and truly called the Son, whereas the con- principle of the Son. But it is not a material principle, be- trary is stated (1 Jn. 5:20): “That we may be in His true cause in God nothing material exists; and therefore it is, Son Jesus Christ.” Therefore the true Son of God is not as it were, an active principle, as the begetter is the prin- from nothing; nor is He made, but begotten. ciple of the one begotten. Thus it follows that the essence That certain creatures made by God out of nothing are generates, which was disproved above (q. 39, a. 5). called sons of God is to be taken in a metaphorical sense, Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, according to a certain likeness of assimilation to Him Who 6) that the three persons are not from the same essence; is the true Son. Whence, as He is the only true and natural because the essence is not another thing from person. But Son of God, He is called the “only begotten,” according the person of the Son is not another thing from the Fa- to Jn. 1:18, “The only begotten Son, Who is in the bosom ther’s essence. Therefore the Son is not from the Father’s of the Father, He hath declared Him”; and so as others essence. are entitled sons of adoption by their similitude to Him, Objection 4. Further, every creature is from nothing. He is called the “first begotten,” according to Rom. 8:29: But in Scripture the Son is called a creature; for it is said “Whom He foreknew He also predestinated to be made (Ecclus. 24:5), in the person of the Wisdom begotten,“I conformable to the image of His Son, that He might be the came out of the mouth of the Most High, the first-born first born of many brethren.” Therefore the Son of God before all creatures”: and further on (Ecclus. 24:14) it is begotten of the substance of the Father, but not in the is said as uttered by the same Wisdom, “From the begin- same way as man is born of man; for a part of the human ning, and before the world was I created.” Therefore the substance in generation passes into the substance of the Son was not begotten from something, but from nothing. one begotten, whereas the divine nature cannot be parted; Likewise we can object concerning the Holy Ghost, by whence it necessarily follows that the Father in begetting reason of what is said (Zech. 12:1): “Thus saith the Lord the Son does not transmit any part of His nature, but com- Who stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the founda- municates His whole nature to Him, the distinction only tions of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within of origin remaining as explained above (q. 40, a. 2). him”; and (Amos 4:13) according to another version∗: “I Reply to Objection 1. When we say that the Son was Who form the earth, and create the spirit.” born of the Father, the preposition “of” designates a con- On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad substantial generating principle, but not a material princi- Petrum i, 1) says: “God the Father, of His nature, without ple. For that which is produced from matter, is made by ∗ The Septuagint 213 a change of form in that whence it is produced. But the which saves the distinction. But when we say that the divine essence is unchangeable, and is not susceptive of three persons are ‘of’ the divine essence, there is noth- another form. ing expressed to warrant the distinction signified by the Reply to Objection 2. When we say the Son is begot- preposition, so there is no parity of argument. ten of the essence of the Father, as the Master of the Sen- Reply to Objection 4. When we say “Wisdom was tences explains (Sent. i, D, v), this denotes the habitude created,” this may be understood not of Wisdom which of a kind of active principle, and as he expounds, “the Son is the Son of God, but of created wisdom given by God is begotten of the essence of the Father”—that is, of the to creatures: for it is said, “He created her [namely, Wis- Father Who is essence; and so Augustine says (De Trin. dom] in the Holy Ghost, and He poured her out over all xv, 13): “When I say of the Father Who is essence, it is His works” (Ecclus. 1:9,10). Nor is it inconsistent for the same as if I said more explicitly, of the essence of the Scripture in one text to speak of the Wisdom begotten and Father.” wisdom created, for wisdom created is a kind of partici- This, however, is not enough to explain the real mean- pation of the uncreated Wisdom. The saying may also be ing of the words. For we can say that the creature is from referred to the created nature assumed by the Son, so that God Who is essence; but not that it is from the essence the sense be, “From the beginning and before the world of God. So we may explain them otherwise, by observing was I made”—that is, I was foreseen as united to the crea- that the preposition “of” [de] always denotes consubstan- ture. Or the mention of wisdom as both created and be- tiality. We do not say that a house is “of” [de] the builder, gotten insinuates into our minds the mode of the divine since he is not the consubstantial cause. We can say, how- generation; for in generation what is generated receives ever, that something is “of” another, if this is its consub- the nature of the generator and this pertains to perfection; stantial principle, no matter in what way it is so, whether whereas in creation the Creator is not changed, but the it be an active principle, as the son is said to be “of” the creature does not receive the Creator’s nature. Thus the father, or a material principle, as a knife is “of” iron; or Son is called both created and begotten, in order that from a formal principle, but in those things only in which the the idea of creation the immutability of the Father may be forms are subsisting, and not accidental to another, for we understood, and from generation the unity of nature in the can say that an angel is “of” an intellectual nature. In this Father and the Son. In this way Hilary expounds the sense way, then, we say that the Son is begotten ‘of’ the essence of this text of Scripture (De Synod.). The other passages of the Father, inasmuch as the essence of the Father, com- quoted do not refer to the Holy Ghost, but to the created municated by generation, subsists in the Son. spirit, sometimes called wind, sometimes air, sometimes Reply to Objection 3. When we say that the Son the breath of man, sometimes also the soul, or any other is begotten of the essence of the Father, a term is added invisible substance. Whether in God there is a power in respect of the notional acts? Ia q. 41 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that in God there is no power does not exist in reference to the notional acts. power in respect of the notional acts. For every kind of On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, power is either active or passive; neither of which can be 1): “If God the Father could not beget a co-equal Son, here applied, there being in God nothing which we call where is the omnipotence of God the Father?” Power passive power, as above explained (q. 25, a. 1); nor can ac- therefore exists in God regarding the notional acts. tive power belong to one person as regards another, since I answer that, As the notional acts exist in God, so the divine persons were not made, as stated above (a. 3). must there be also a power in God regarding these acts; Therefore in God there is no power in respect of the no- since power only means the principle of act. So, as we tional acts. understand the Father to be principle of generation; and Objection 2. Further, the object of power is what is the Father and the Son to be the principle of spiration, possible. But the divine persons are not regarded as pos- we must attribute the power of generating to the Father, sible, but necessary. Therefore, as regards the notional and the power of spiration to the Father and the Son; for acts, whereby the divine persons proceed, there cannot be the power of generation means that whereby the generator power in God. generates. Now every generator generates by something. Objection 3. Further, the Son proceeds as the word, Therefore in every generator we must suppose the power which is the concept of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost of generating, and in the spirator the power of spirating. proceeds as love, which belongs to the will. But in God Reply to Objection 1. As a person, according to no- power exists as regards effects, and not as regards intellect tional acts, does not proceed as if made; so the power in and will, as stated above (q. 25, a. 1). Therefore, in God God as regards the notional acts has no reference to a per- 214 son as if made, but only as regards the person as proceedin God the distinction of action and agent is one of reason ing. only, otherwise action would be an accident in God. And Reply to Objection 2. Possible, as opposed to what therefore with regard to those actions in respect of which is necessary, is a consequence of a passive power, which certain things proceed which are distinct from God, either does not exist in God. Hence, in God there is no such personally or essentially, we may ascribe power to God in thing as possibility in this sense, but only in the sense of its proper sense of principle. And as we ascribe to God the possible as contained in what is necessary; and in this lat- power of creating, so we may ascribe the power of beget- ter sense it can be said that as it is possible for God to be, ting and of spirating. But “to understand” and “to will” are so also is it possible that the Son should be generated. not such actions as to designate the procession of some- Reply to Objection 3. Power signifies a principle: thing distinct from God, either essentially or personally. and a principle implies distinction from that of which it is Wherefore, with regard to these actions we cannot ascribe the principle. Now we must observe a double distinction power to God in its proper sense, but only after our way in things said of God: one is a real distinction, the other is of understanding and speaking: inasmuch as we designate a distinction of reason only. By a real distinction, God by by different terms the intellect and the act of understand- His essence is distinct from those things of which He is the ing in God, whereas in God the act of understanding is principle by creation: just as one person is distinct from His very essence which has no principle. the other of which He is principle by a notional act. But Whether the power of begetting signifies a relation, and not the essence? Ia q. 41 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the power of beget- other than God, Who subsists from no other source than ting, or of spirating, signifies the relation and not the God.” essence. For power signifies a principle, as appears from We must therefore conclude that the power of beget- its definition: for active power is the principle of action, ting signifies principally the divine essence as the Master as we find in Metaph. v, text 17. But in God principle says (Sent. i, D, vii), and not the relation only. Nor does in regard to Person is said notionally. Therefore, in God, it signify the essence as identified with the relation, so as power does not signify essence but relation. to signify both equally. For although paternity is signi- Objection 2. Further, in God, the power to act [posse] fied as the form of the Father, nevertheless it is a personal and ‘to act’ are not distinct. But in God, begetting signi- property, being in respect to the person of the Father, what fies relation. Therefore, the same applies to the power of the individual form is to the individual creature. Now the begetting. individual form in things created constitutes the person Objection 3. Further, terms signifying the essence in begetting, but is not that by which the begetter begets, oth- God, are common to the three persons. But the power of erwise Socrates would beget Socrates. So neither can pa- begetting is not common to the three persons, but proper ternity be understood as that by which the Father begets, to the Father. Therefore it does not signify the essence. but as constituting the person of the Father, otherwise the On the contrary, As God has the power to beget the Father would beget the Father. But that by which the Fa- Son, so also He wills to beget Him. But the will to beget ther begets is the divine nature, in which the Son is like to signifies the essence. Therefore, also, the power to beget. Him. And in this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. I answer that, Some have said that the power to beget i, 18) that generation is the “work of nature,” not of na- signifies relation in God. But this is not possible. For in ture generating, but of nature, as being that by which the every agent, that is properly called power, by which the generator generates. And therefore the power of beget- agent acts. Now, everything that produces something by ting signifies the divine nature directly, but the relation its action, produces something like itself, as to the form indirectly. by which it acts; just as man begotten is like his begetter Reply to Objection 1. Power does not signify the re- in his human nature, in virtue of which the father has the lation itself of a principle, for thus it would be in the genus power to beget a man. In every begetter, therefore, that of relation; but it signifies that which is a principle; not, is the power of begetting in which the begotten is like the indeed, in the sense in which we call the agent a principle, begetter. but in the sense of being that by which the agent acts. Now Now the Son of God is like the Father, who begets the agent is distinct from that which it makes, and the gen- Him, in the divine nature. Wherefore the divine nature in erator from that which it generates: but that by which the the Father is in Him the power of begetting. And so Hilary generator generates is common to generated and genera- says (De Trin. v): “The birth of God cannot but contain tor, and so much more perfectly, as the generation is more that nature from which it proceeded; for He cannot subsist perfect. Since, therefore, the divine generation is most 215 perfect, that by which the Begetter begets, is common to essence is the same in reality as the act of begetting or Begotten and Begetter by a community of identity, and not paternity; although there is a distinction of reason. only of species, as in things created. Therefore, from the Reply to Objection 3. When I speak of the “power fact that we say that the divine essence “is the principle by of begetting,” power is signified directly, generation indi- which the Begetter begets,” it does not follow that the di- rectly: just as if I were to say, the “essence of the Father.” vine essence is distinct (from the Begotten): which would Wherefore in respect of the essence, which is signified, follow if we were to say that the divine essence begets. the power of begetting is common to the three persons: Reply to Objection 2. As in God, the power of beget- but in respect of the notion that is connoted, it is proper to ting is the same as the act of begetting, so the divine the person of the Father. Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act? Ia q. 41 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that a notional act can one simple act. Wherefore there can be but one person be directed to several Persons, so that there may be sev- proceeding after the manner of word, which person is the eral Persons begotten or spirated in God. For whoever Son; and but one person proceeding after the manner of has the power of begetting can beget. But the Son has the love, which person is the Holy Ghost. power of begetting. Therefore He can beget. But He can- The third reason is taken from the manner in which the not beget Himself: therefore He can beget another son. persons proceed. For the persons proceed naturally, as we Therefore there can be several Sons in God. have said (a. 2), and nature is determined to one. Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. The fourth reason is taken from the perfection of the iii, 12): “The Son did not beget a Creator: not that He divine persons. For this reason is the Son perfect, that the could not, but that it behoved Him not.” entire divine filiation is contained in Him, and that there Objection 3. Further, God the Father has greater is but one Son. The argument is similar in regard to the power to beget than has a created father. But a man can other persons. beget several sons. Therefore God can also: the more so Reply to Objection 1. We can grant, without distinc- that the power of the Father is not diminished after beget- tion, that the Son has the same power as the Father; but ting the Son. we cannot grant that the Son has the power “generandi” On the contrary, In God “that which is possible,” and [of begetting] thus taking “generandi” as the gerund of the “that which is” do not differ. If, therefore, in God it were active verb, so that the sense would be that the Son has the possible for there to be several Sons, there would be sev- “power to beget.” Just as, although Father and Son have eral Sons. And thus there would be more than three Per- the same being, it does not follow that the Son is the Fa- sons in God; which is heretical. ther, by reason of the notional term added. But if the word I answer that, As Athanasius says, in God there is “generandi” [of being begotten] is taken as the gerundive only “one Father, one Son, one Holy Ghost.” For this four of the passive verb, the power “generandi” is in the Son— reasons may be given. that is, the power of being begotten. The same is to be The first reason is in regard to the relations by which said if it be taken as the gerundive of an impersonal verb, alone are the Persons distinct. For since the divine Persons so that the sense be “the power of generation”—that is, a are the relations themselves as subsistent, there would not power by which it is generated by some person. be several Fathers, or several Sons in God, unless there Reply to Objection 2. Augustine does not mean to were more than one paternity, or more than one filiation. say by those words that the Son could beget a Son: but And this, indeed, would not be possible except owing to that if He did not, it was not because He could not, as we a material distinction: since forms of one species are not shall see later on (q. 42, a. 6, ad 3). multiplied except in respect of matter, which is not in God. Reply to Objection 3. Divine perfection and the to- Wherefore there can be but one subsistent filiation in God: tal absence of matter in God require that there cannot be just as there could be but one subsistent whiteness. several Sons in God, as we have explained. Wherefore The second reason is taken from the manner of the that there are not several Sons is not due to any lack of processions. For God understands and wills all things by begetting power in the Father. 216 FIRST PART, QUESTION 42 Of Equality and Likeness Among the Divine Persons (In Six Articles) We now have to consider the persons as compared to one another: firstly, with regard to equality and likeness; secondly, with regard to mission. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry. (1) Whether there is equality among the divine persons? (2) Whether the person who proceeds is equal to the one from Whom He proceeds in eternity? (3) Whether there is any order among the divine persons? (4) Whether the divine persons are equal in greatness? (5) Whether the one divine person is in another? (6) Whether they are equal in power? Whether there is equality in God? Ia q. 42 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that equality is not be- of Godhead] who speak of either increase or decrease, as coming to the divine persons. For equality is in relation to the Arians do, who sunder the Trinity by distinguishing things which are one in quantity as the Philosopher says degrees as of numbers, thus involving a plurality.” Now (Metaph. v, text 20). But in the divine persons there is no the reason of this is that unequal things cannot have the quantity, neither continuous intrinsic quantity, which we same quantity. But quantity, in God, is nothing else than call size, nor continuous extrinsic quantity, which we call His essence. Wherefore it follows, that if there were any place and time. Nor can there be equality by reason of inequality in the divine persons, they would not have the discrete quantity, because two persons are more than one. same essence; and thus the three persons would not be Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons. one God; which is impossible. We must therefore admit Objection 2. Further, the divine persons are of one equality among the divine persons. essence, as we have said (q. 39, a. 2). Now essence is Reply to Objection 1. Quantity is twofold. There signified by way of form. But agreement in form makes is quantity of “bulk” or dimensive quantity, which is to things to be alike, not to be equal. Therefore, we may be found only in corporeal things, and has, therefore, no speak of likeness in the divine persons, but not of equal- place in God. There is also quantity of “virtue,” which is ity. measured according to the perfection of some nature or Objection 3. Further, things wherein there is to be form: to this sort of quantity we allude when we speak of found equality, are equal to one another, for equality is something as being more, or less, hot; forasmuch as it is reciprocal. But the divine persons cannot be said to be more or less, perfect in heat. Now this virtual quantity is equal to one another. For as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, measured firstly by its source—that is, by the perfection 10): “If an image answers perfectly to that whereof it is of that form or nature: such is the greatness of spiritual the image, it may be said to be equal to it; but that which things, just as we speak of great heat on account of its in- it represents cannot be said to be equal to the image.” But tensity and perfection. And so Augustine says (De Trin. the Son is the image of the Father; and so the Father is vi, 18) that “in things which are great, but not in bulk, to not equal to the Son. Therefore equality is not to be found be greater is to be better,” for the more perfect a thing is among the divine persons. the better it is. Secondly, virtual quantity is measured by Objection 4. Further, equality is a relation. But no the effects of the form. Now the first effect of form is be- relation is common to the three persons; for the persons ing, for everything has being by reason of its form. The are distinct by reason of the relations. Therefore equality second effect is operation, for every agent acts through is not becoming to the divine persons. its form. Consequently virtual quantity is measured both On the contrary, Athanasius says that “the three per- in regard to being and in regard to action: in regard to sons are co-eternal and co-equal to one another.” being, forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are I answer that, We must needs admit equality among of longer duration; and in regard to action, forasmuch as the divine persons. For, according to the Philosopher things of a more perfect nature are more powerful to act. (Metaph. x, text 15,16, 17), equality signifies the negation And so as Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) of greater or less. Now we cannot admit anything greater says: “We understand equality to be in the Father, Son or less in the divine persons; for as Boethius says (De and Holy Ghost, inasmuch as no one of them either pre- Trin. i): “They must needs admit a difference [namely, cedes in eternity, or excels in greatness, or surpasses in 217 power.” form is principally in the cause, and secondarily in the Reply to Objection 2. Where we have equality in effect. respect of virtual quantity, equality includes likeness and But verbs signify equality with movement. And al- something besides, because it excludes excess. For what- though movement is not in God, there is something that ever things have a common form may be said to be alike, receives. Since, therefore, the Son receives from the Fa- even if they do not participate in that form equally, just as ther, this, namely, that He is equal to the Father, and not the air may be said to be like fire in heat; but they cannot conversely, for this reason we say that the Son is equalled be said to be equal if one participates in the form more to the Father, but not conversely. perfectly than another. And because not only is the same Reply to Objection 4. In the divine persons there nature in both Father and Son, but also is it in both in per- is nothing for us to consider but the essence which they fect equality, therefore we say not only that the Son is like have in common and the relations in which they are dis- to the Father, in order to exclude the error of Eunomius, tinct. Now equality implies both —namely, distinction but also that He is equal to the Father to exclude the error of persons, for nothing can be said to be equal to itself; of Arius. and unity of essence, since for this reason are the persons Reply to Objection 3. Equality and likeness in God equal to one another, that they are of the same greatness may be designated in two ways—namely, by nouns and and essence. Now it is clear that the relation of a thing by verbs. When designated by nouns, equality in the di- to itself is not a real relation. Nor, again, is one relation vine persons is mutual, and so is likeness; for the Son is referred to another by a further relation: for when we say equal and like to the Father, and conversely. This is be- that paternity is opposed to filiation, opposition is not a cause the divine essence is not more the Father’s than the relation mediating between paternity and filiation. For in Son’s. Wherefore, just as the Son has the greatness of the both these cases relation would be multiplied indefinitely. Father, and is therefore equal to the Father, so the Father Therefore equality and likeness in the divine persons is has the greatness of the Son, and is therefore equal to the not a real relation distinct from the personal relations: but Son. But in reference to creatures, Dionysius says (Div. in its concept it includes both the relations which distin- Nom. ix): “Equality and likeness are not mutual.” For guish the persons, and the unity of essence. For this rea- effects are said to be like their causes, inasmuch as they son the Master says (Sent. i, D, xxxi) that in these “it is have the form of their causes; but not conversely, for the only the terms that are relative.” Whether the person proceeding is co-eternal with His principle, as the Son with the Ia q. 42 a. 2 Father? Objection 1. It would seem that the person proceed- realization of an idea [ideatio], as an external coffer arises ing is not co-eternal with His principle, as the Son with the from the one in the mind. The twelfth is birth, as a man is Father. For Arius gives twelve modes of generation. The begotten of his father; which implies priority and posteri- first mode is like the issue of a line from a point; wherein ority of time. Thus it is clear that equality of nature or of is wanting equality of simplicity. The second is like the time is absent in every mode whereby one thing is from emission of rays from the sun; wherein is absent equality another. So if the Son is from the Father, we must say that of nature. The third is like the mark or impression made He is less than the Father, or later than the Father, or both. by a seal; wherein is wanting consubstantiality and ex- Objection 2. Further, everything that comes from an- ecutive power. The fourth is the infusion of a good will other has a principle. But nothing eternal has a principle. from God; wherein also consubstantiality is wanting. The Therefore the Son is not eternal; nor is the Holy Ghost. fifth is the emanation of an accident from its subject; but Objection 3. Further, everything which is corrupted the accident has no subsistence. The sixth is the abstrac- ceases to be. Hence everything generated begins to be; tion of a species from matter, as sense receives the species for the end of generation is existence. But the Son is gen- from the sensible object; wherein is wanting equality of erated by the Father. Therefore He begins to exist, and is spiritual simplicity. The seventh is the exciting of the will not co-eternal with the Father. by knowledge, which excitation is merely temporal. The Objection 4. Further, if the Son be begotten by the Fa- eighth is transformation, as an image is made of brass; ther, either He is always being begotten, or there is some which transformation is material. The ninth is motion moment in which He is begotten. If He is always being from a mover; and here again we have effect and cause. begotten, since, during the process of generation, a thing The tenth is the taking of species from genera; but this must be imperfect, as appears in successive things, which mode has no place in God, for the Father is not predicated are always in process of becoming, as time and motion, it of the Son as the genus of a species. The eleventh is the follows that the Son must be always imperfect, which can- 218 not be admitted. Thus there is a moment to be assigned Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Ver-for the begetting of the Son, and before that moment the bis Domini, Serm. 38), no mode of the procession of any Son did not exist. creature perfectly represents the divine generation. Hence On the contrary, Athanasius declares that “all the we need to gather a likeness of it from many of these three persons are co-eternal with each other.” modes, so that what is wanting in one may be somewhat I answer that, We must say that the Son is co-eternal supplied from another; and thus it is declared in the coun- with the Father. In proof of which we must consider that cil of Ephesus: “Let Splendor tell thee that the co-eternal for a thing which proceeds from a principle to be poste- Son existed always with the Father; let the Word announce rior to its principle may be due to two reasons: one on the the impassibility of His birth; let the name Son insinuate part of the agent, and the other on the part of the action. His consubstantiality.” Yet, above them all the procession On the part of the agent this happens differently as regards of the word from the intellect represents it more exactly; free agents and natural agents. In free agents, on account the intellectual word not being posterior to its source ex- of the choice of time; for as a free agent can choose the cept in an intellect passing from potentiality to act; and form it gives to the effect, as stated above (q. 41, a. 2), so this cannot be said of God. it can choose the time in which to produce its effect. In Reply to Objection 2. Eternity excludes the principle natural agents, however, the same happens from the agent of duration, but not the principle of origin. not having its perfection of natural power from the very Reply to Objection 3. Every corruption is a change; first, but obtaining it after a certain time; as, for instance, and so all that corrupts begins not to exist and ceases to be. a man is not able to generate from the very first. Consid- The divine generation, however, is not changed, as stated ered on the part of action, anything derived from a prin- above (q. 27, a. 2). Hence the Son is ever being begotten, ciple cannot exist simultaneously with its principle when and the Father is always begetting. the action is successive. So, given that an agent, as soon Reply to Objection 4. In time there is something as it exists, begins to act thus, the effect would not exist in indivisible—namely, the instant; and there is something the same instant, but in the instant of the action’s termina- else which endures—namely, time. But in eternity the in- tion. Now it is manifest, according to what has been said divisible “now” stands ever still, as we have said above (q. 41, a. 2), that the Father does not beget the Son by will, (q. 10, a. 2 ad 1, a. 4 ad 2). But the generation of the Son but by nature; and also that the Father’s nature was per- is not in the “now” of time, or in time, but in eternity. And fect from eternity; and again that the action whereby the so to express the presentiality and permanence of eternity, Father produces the Son is not successive, because thus we can say that “He is ever being born,” as Origen said the Son would be successively generated, and this genera- (Hom. in Joan. i). But as Gregory∗ and Augustine† said, tion would be material, and accompanied with movement; it is better to say “ever born,” so that “ever” may denote which is quite impossible. Therefore we conclude that the the permanence of eternity, and “born” the perfection of Son existed whensoever the Father existed and thus the the only Begotten. Thus, therefore, neither is the Son im- Son is co-eternal with the Father, and likewise the Holy perfect, nor “was there a time when He was not,” as Arius Ghost is co-eternal with both. said. Whether in the divine persons there exists an order of nature? Ia q. 42 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that among the divine per- nature. Therefore it is not subject to order; and order of sons there does not exist an order of nature. For whatever nature does not exist in it. exists in God is the essence, or a person, or a notion. But Objection 4. Further, the divine nature is the divine the order of nature does not signify the essence, nor any essence. But there is no order of essence in God. There- of the persons, or notions. Therefore there is no order of fore neither is there of nature. nature in God. On the contrary, Where plurality exists without or- Objection 2. Further, wherever order of nature exists, der, confusion exists. But in the divine persons there is there one comes before another, at least, according to na- no confusion, as Athanasius says. Therefore in God order ture and intellect. But in the divine persons there exists exists. neither priority nor posteriority, as declared by Athana- I answer that, Order always has reference to some sius. Therefore, in the divine persons there is no order of principle. Wherefore since there are many kinds of nature. principle—namely, according to site, as a point; according Objection 3. Further, wherever order exists, distinc- to intellect, as the principle of demonstration; and accord- tion also exists. But there is no distinction in the divine ing to each individual cause—so are there many kinds of ∗ Moral. xxix, 21 † Super Ps. 2:7 219 order. Now principle, according to origin, without prior-from, it is clear that the things so related are simultaneous ity, exists in God as we have stated (q. 33, a. 1): so there in the order of nature and reason, inasmuch as the one en- must likewise be order according to origin, without prior- ters the definition of the other. But in God the relations ity; and this is called ‘the order of nature’: in the words themselves are the persons subsisting in one nature. So, of Augustine (Contra Maxim. iv): “Not whereby one is neither on the part of the nature, nor on the part the rela- prior to another, but whereby one is from another.” tions, can one person be prior to another, not even in the Reply to Objection 1. The order of nature signifies order of nature and reason. the notion of origin in general, not a special kind of ori- Reply to Objection 3. The order of nature means not gin. the ordering of nature itself, but the existence of order in Reply to Objection 2. In things created, even when the divine Persons according to natural origin. what is derived from a principle is co-equal in duration Reply to Objection 4. Nature in a certain way implies with its principle, the principle still comes first in the or- the idea of a principle, but essence does not; and so the or- der of nature and reason, if formally considered as prin- der of origin is more correctly called the order of nature ciple. If, however, we consider the relations of cause and than the order of essence. effect, or of the principle and the thing proceeding there- Whether the Son is equal to the Father in greatness? Ia q. 42 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the Son is not equal to manner and by change. Therefore we must say that the the Father in greatness. For He Himself said (Jn. 14:28): Son was eternally equal to the Father in greatness. Hence, “The Father is greater than I”; and the Apostle says (1 Cor. Hilary says (De Synod. Can. 27): “Remove bodily weak- 15:28): “The Son Himself shall be subject to Him that put ness, remove the beginning of conception, remove pain all things under Him.” and all human shortcomings, then every son, by reason of Objection 2. Further, paternity is part of the Father’s his natural nativity, is the father’s equal, because he has a dignity. But paternity does not belong to the Son. There- like nature.” fore the Son does not possess all the Father’s dignity; and Reply to Objection 1. These words are to be under- so He is not equal in greatness to the Father. stood of Christ’s human nature, wherein He is less than Objection 3. Further, wherever there exist a whole the Father, and subject to Him; but in His divine nature and a part, many parts are more than one only, or than He is equal to the Father. This is expressed by Athana- fewer parts; as three men are more than two, or than one. sius, “Equal to the Father in His Godhead; less than the But in God a universal whole exists, and a part; for under Father in humanity”: and by Hilary (De Trin. ix): “By the relation or notion, several notions are included. There- fact of giving, the Father is greater; but He is not less to fore, since in the Father there are three notions, while in Whom the same being is given”; and (De Synod.): “The the Son there are only two, the Son is evidently not equal Son subjects Himself by His inborn piety”—that is, by to the Father. His recognition of paternal authority; whereas “creatures On the contrary, It is said (Phil. 2:6): “He thought it are subject by their created weakness.” not robbery to be equal with God.” Reply to Objection 2. Equality is measured by great- I answer that, The Son is necessarily equal to the Fa- ness. In God greatness signifies the perfection of nature, ther in greatness. For the greatness of God is nothing but as above explained (a. 1, ad 1), and belongs to the essence. the perfection of His nature. Now it belongs to the very Thus equality and likeness in God have reference to the nature of paternity and filiation that the Son by genera- essence; nor can there be inequality or dissimilitude aris- tion should attain to the possession of the perfection of ing from the distinction of the relations. Wherefore Au- the nature which is in the Father, in the same way as it is gustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 13), “The question of in the Father Himself. But since in men generation is a origin is, Who is from whom? but the question of equality certain kind of transmutation of one proceeding from po- is, Of what kind, or how great, is he?” Therefore, pater- tentiality to act, it follows that a man is not equal at first to nity is the Father’s dignity, as also the Father’s essence: the father who begets him, but attains to equality by due since dignity is something absolute, and pertains to the growth, unless owing to a defect in the principle of gen- essence. As, therefore, the same essence, which in the Fa- eration it should happen otherwise. From what precedes ther is paternity, in the Son is filiation, so the same dignity (q. 27, a. 2; q. 33, Aa. 2 ,3), it is evident that in God there which, in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation. It exist real true paternity and filiation. Nor can we say that is thus true to say that the Son possesses whatever dig- the power of generation in the Father was defective, nor nity the Father has; but we cannot argue—“the Father has that the Son of God arrived at perfection in a successive paternity, therefore the Son has paternity,” for there is a 220 transition from substance to relation. For the Father and ing, which is irreconcilable with the idea of universal, the the Son have the same essence and dignity, which exist parts of which are distinguished in being. Persons like- in the Father by the relation of giver, and in the Son by wise is not a universal term in God as we have seen above relation of receiver. (q. 30, a. 4). Wherefore all the relations together are not Reply to Objection 3. In God relation is not a uni- greater than only one; nor are all the persons something versal whole, although it is predicated of each of the rela- greater than only one; because the whole perfection of the tions; because all the relations are one in essence and be- divine nature exists in each person. Whether the Son is in the Father, and conversely? Ia q. 42 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the Son and the Fa- so to speak, follows His own nature in begetting an un- ther are not in each other. For the Philosopher (Phys. iv, changeable subsisting God. So we understand the nature text. 23) gives eight modes of one thing existing in an- of God to subsist in Him, for He is God in God.” It is also other, according to none of which is the Son in the Father, manifest that as regards the relations, each of two relative or conversely; as is patent to anyone who examines each opposites is in the concept of the other. Regarding ori- mode. Therefore the Son and the Father are not in each gin also, it is clear that the procession of the intelligible other. word is not outside the intellect, inasmuch as it remains in Objection 2. Further, nothing that has come out from the utterer of the word. What also is uttered by the word another is within. But the Son from eternity came out is therein contained. And the same applies to the Holy from the Father, according to Mic. 5:2: “His going forth Ghost. is from the beginning, from the days of eternity.” There- Reply to Objection 1. What is contained in creatures fore the Son is not in the Father. does not sufficiently represent what exists in God; so ac- Objection 3. Further, one of two opposites cannot be cording to none of the modes enumerated by the Philoso- in the other. But the Son and the Father are relatively op- pher, are the Son and the Father in each other. The mode posed. Therefore one cannot be in the other. the most nearly approaching to the reality is to be found On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 14:10): “I am in the in that whereby something exists in its originating princi- Father, and the Father is in Me.” ple, except that the unity of essence between the principle I answer that, There are three points of consideration and that which proceeds therefrom is wanting in things as regards the Father and the Son; the essence, the rela- created. tion and the origin; and according to each the Son and the Reply to Objection 2. The Son’s going forth from the Father are in each other. The Father is in the Son by His Father is by mode of the interior procession whereby the essence, forasmuch as the Father is His own essence and word emerges from the heart and remains therein. Hence communicates His essence to the Son not by any change this going forth in God is only by the distinction of the on His part. Hence it follows that as the Father’s essence relations, not by any kind of essential separation. is in the Son, the Father Himself is in the Son; likewise, Reply to Objection 3. The Father and the Son are rel- since the Son is His own essence, it follows that He Him- atively opposed, but not essentially; while, as above ex- self is in the Father in Whom is His essence. This is ex- plained, one relative opposite is in the other. pressed by Hilary (De Trin. v), “The unchangeable God, Whether the Son is equal to the Father in power? Ia q. 42 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the Son is not equal Also, the Son hears: “As I hear, so I judge” (Jn. 5:30). to the Father in power. For it is said (Jn. 5:19): “The Son Therefore the Father has greater power than the Son. cannot do anything of Himself but what He seeth the Fa- Objection 3. Further, it belongs to the Father’s om- ther doing.” But the Father can act of Himself. Therefore nipotence to be able to beget a Son equal to Himself. For the Father’s power is greater than the Son’s. Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 7), “Were He unable Objection 2. Further, greater is the power of him who to beget one equal to Himself, where would be the om- commands and teaches than of him who obeys and hears. nipotence of God the Father?” But the Son cannot beget a But the Father commands the Son according to Jn. 14:31: Son, as proved above (q. 41, a. 6). Therefore the Son can- “As the Father gave Me commandment so do I.” The Fa- not do all that belongs to the Father’s omnipotence; and ther also teaches the Son: “The Father loveth the Son, hence He is not equal to Him power. and showeth Him all things that Himself doth” (Jn. 5:20). On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 5:19): “Whatsoever 221 things the Father doth, these the Son also doth in like man-Himself [per se], that He does not act by Himself [a se].” ner.” Reply to Objection 2. The Father’s “showing” and I answer that, The Son is necessarily equal to the Fa- the Son’s “hearing” are to be taken in the sense that the ther in power. Power of action is a consequence of per- Father communicates knowledge to the Son, as He com- fection in nature. In creatures, for instance, we see that municates His essence. The command of the Father can be the more perfect the nature, the greater power is there for explained in the same sense, as giving Him from eternity action. Now it was shown above (a. 4) that the very notion knowledge and will to act, by begetting Him. Or, better of the divine paternity and filiation requires that the Son still, this may be referred to Christ in His human nature. should be the Father’s equal in greatness—that is, in per- Reply to Objection 3. As the same essence is pater- fection of nature. Hence it follows that the Son is equal nity in the Father, and filiation in the Son: so by the same to the Father in power; and the same applies to the Holy power the Father begets, and the Son is begotten. Hence Ghost in relation to both. it is clear that the Son can do whatever the Father can Reply to Objection 1. The words, “the Son cannot do; yet it does not follow that the Son can beget; for to of Himself do anything,” do not withdraw from the Son argue thus would imply transition from substance to rela- any power possessed by the Father, since it is immedi- tion, for generation signifies a divine relation. So the Son ately added, “Whatsoever things the Father doth, the Son has the same omnipotence as the Father, but with another doth in like manner”; but their meaning is to show that the relation; the Father possessing power as “giving” signified Son derives His power from the Father, of Whom He re- when we say that He is able to beget; while the Son pos- ceives His nature. Hence, Hilary says (De Trin. ix), “The sesses the power of “receiving,” signified by saying that unity of the divine nature implies that the Son so acts of He can be begotten. 222 FIRST PART, QUESTION 43 The Mission of the Divine Persons (In Eight Articles) We next consider the mission of the divine persons, concerning which there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is suitable for a divine person to be sent? (2) Whether mission is eternal, or only temporal? (3) In what sense a divine person is invisibly sent? (4) Whether it is fitting that each person be sent? (5) Whether both the Son and the Holy Ghost are invisibly sent? (6) To whom the invisible mission is directed? (7) Of the visible mission (8) Whether any person sends Himself visibly or invisibly? Whether a divine person can be properly sent? Ia q. 43 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that a divine person can- in no way was he present before in the place whereto he not be properly sent. For one who is sent is less than the is sent, or because he begins to be there in some way in sender. But one divine person is not less than another. which he was not there hitherto. Thus the mission of a Therefore one person is not sent by another. divine person is a fitting thing, as meaning in one way the Objection 2. Further, what is sent is separated from procession of origin from the sender, and as meaning a the sender; hence Jerome says, commenting on Ezech. new way of existing in another; thus the Son is said to be 16:53: “What is joined and tied in one body cannot be sent by the Father into the world, inasmuch as He began sent.” But in the divine persons there is nothing that is to exist visibly in the world by taking our nature; whereas separable, as Hilary says (De Trin. vii). Therefore one “He was” previously “in the world” (Jn. 1:1). person is not sent by another. Reply to Objection 1. Mission implies inferiority in Objection 3. Further, whoever is sent, departs from the one sent, when it means procession from the sender one place and comes anew into another. But this does not as principle, by command or counsel; forasmuch as the apply to a divine person, Who is everywhere. Therefore it one commanding is the greater, and the counsellor is the is not suitable for a divine person to be sent. wiser. In God, however, it means only procession of ori- On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 8:16): “I am not alone, gin, which is according to equality, as explained above but I and the Father that sent Me.” (q. 42, Aa. 4,6). I answer that, the notion of mission includes two Reply to Objection 2. What is so sent as to begin to things: the habitude of the one sent to the sender; and exist where previously it did not exist, is locally moved by that of the one sent to the end whereto he is sent. Anyone being sent; hence it is necessarily separated locally from being sent implies a certain kind of procession of the one the sender. This, however, has no place in the mission of a sent from the sender: either according to command, as the divine person; for the divine person sent neither begins to master sends the servant; or according to counsel, as an exist where he did not previously exist, nor ceases to exist adviser may be said to send the king to battle; or accord- where He was. Hence such a mission takes place without ing to origin, as a tree sends forth its flowers. The habi- a separation, having only distinction of origin. tude to the term to which he is sent is also shown, so that Reply to Objection 3. This objection rests on the idea in some way he begins to be present there: either because of mission according to local motion, which is not in God. Whether mission is eternal, or only temporal? Ia q. 43 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that mission can be eter- Therefore the mission of a divine person is not temporal, nal. For Gregory says (Hom. xxvi, in Ev.), “The Son is but eternal. sent as He is begotten.” But the Son’s generation is eter- Objection 3. Further, mission implies procession. But nal. Therefore mission is eternal. the procession of the divine persons is eternal. Therefore Objection 2. Further, a thing is changed if it becomes mission is also eternal. something temporally. But a divine person is not changed. On the contrary, It is said (Gal. 4:4): “When the full- 223 ness of the time was come, God sent His Son.” likewise by dwelling in man according to His invisible I answer that, A certain difference is to be observed mission. in all the words that express the origin of the divine per- Reply to Objection 1. Gregory speaks of the tempo- sons. For some express only relation to the principle, as ral generation of the Son, not from the Father, but from “procession” and “going forth.” Others express the term His mother; or it may be taken to mean that He could be of procession together with the relation to the principle. sent because eternally begotten. Of these some express the eternal term, as “generation” Reply to Objection 2. That a divine person may and “spiration”; for generation is the procession of the di- newly exist in anyone, or be possessed by anyone in time, vine person into the divine nature, and passive spiration is does not come from change of the divine person, but from the procession of the subsisting love. Others express the change in the creature; as God Himself is called Lord tem- temporal term with the relation to the principle, as “mis- porally by change of the creature. sion” and “giving.” For a thing is sent that it may be in Reply to Objection 3. Mission signifies not only pro- something else, and is given that it may be possessed; but cession from the principle, but also determines the tempo- that a divine person be possessed by any creature, or exist ral term of the procession. Hence mission is only tempo- in it in a new mode, is temporal. ral. Or we may say that it includes the eternal procession, Hence “mission” and “giving” have only a temporal with the addition of a temporal effect. For the relation of a significance in God; but “generation” and “spiration” are divine person to His principle must be eternal. Hence the exclusively eternal; whereas “procession” and “giving,” procession may be called a twin procession, eternal and in God, have both an eternal and a temporal signification: temporal, not that there is a double relation to the princi- for the Son may proceed eternally as God; but temporally, ple, but a double term, temporal and eternal. by becoming man, according to His visible mission, or Whether the invisible mission of the divine person is only according to the gift of Ia q. 43 a. 3 sanctifying grace? Objection 1. It would seem that the invisible mis- that “the Holy Ghost proceeds temporally for the crea- sion of the divine person is not only according to the gift ture’s sanctification.” But mission is a temporal proces- of sanctifying grace. For the sending of a divine person sion. Since then the creature’s sanctification is by sancti- means that He is given. Hence if the divine person is sent fying grace, it follows that the mission of the divine per- only according to the gift of sanctifying grace, the divine son is only by sanctifying grace. person Himself will not be given, but only His gifts; and I answer that, The divine person is fittingly sent in this is the error of those who say that the Holy Ghost is the sense that He exists newly in any one; and He is given not given, but that His gifts are given. as possessed by anyone; and neither of these is otherwise Objection 2. Further, this preposition, “according to,” than by sanctifying grace. denotes the habitude of some cause. But the divine person For God is in all things by His essence, power and is the cause why the gift of sanctifying grace is possessed, presence, according to His one common mode, as the and not conversely, according to Rom. 5:5, “the charity of cause existing in the effects which participate in His good- God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who ness. Above and beyond this common mode, however, is given to us.” Therefore it is improperly said that the there is one special mode belonging to the rational nature divine person is sent according to the gift of sanctifying wherein God is said to be present as the object known is in grace. the knower, and the beloved in the lover. And since the ra- Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) tional creature by its operation of knowledge and love at- that “the Son, when temporally perceived by the mind, is tains to God Himself, according to this special mode God sent.” But the Son is known not only by sanctifying grace, is said not only to exist in the rational creature but also to but also by gratuitous grace, as by faith and knowledge. dwell therein as in His own temple. So no other effect can Therefore the divine person is not sent only according to be put down as the reason why the divine person is in the the gift of sanctifying grace. rational creature in a new mode, except sanctifying grace. Objection 4. Further, Rabanus says that the Holy Hence, the divine person is sent, and proceeds temporally Ghost was given to the apostles for the working of mir- only according to sanctifying grace. acles. This, however, is not a gift of sanctifying grace, Again, we are said to possess only what we can freely but a gratuitous grace. Therefore the divine person is not use or enjoy: and to have the power of enjoying the divine given only according to the gift of sanctifying grace. person can only be according to sanctifying grace. And On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) yet the Holy Ghost is possessed by man, and dwells within 224 him, in the very gift itself of sanctifying grace. Hence the known by us according to other effects, yet neither does Holy Ghost Himself is given and sent. He dwell in us, nor is He possessed by us according to Reply to Objection 1. By the gift of sanctifying grace those effects. the rational creature is perfected so that it can freely use Reply to Objection 4. The working of miracles man- not only the created gift itself, but enjoy also the divine ifests sanctifying grace as also does the gift of prophecy person Himself; and so the invisible mission takes place and any other gratuitous graces. Hence gratuitous grace according to the gift of sanctifying grace; and yet the di- is called the “manifestation of the Spirit” (1 Cor. 12:7). vine person Himself is given. So the Holy Ghost is said to be given to the apostles for Reply to Objection 2. Sanctifying grace disposes the the working of miracles, because sanctifying grace was soul to possess the divine person; and this is signified given to them with the outward sign. Were the sign only when it is said that the Holy Ghost is given according to of sanctifying grace given to them without the grace it- the gift of grace. Nevertheless the gift itself of grace is self, it would not be simply said that the Holy Ghost was from the Holy Ghost; which is meant by the words, “the given, except with some qualifying term; just as we read charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy of certain ones receiving the gift of the spirit of prophecy, Ghost.” or of miracles, as having from the Holy Ghost the power Reply to Objection 3. Although the Son can be of prophesying or of working miracles. Whether the Father can be fittingly sent? Ia q. 43 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that it is fitting also that to be sent; but this can only belong to the Son and to the the Father should be sent. For being sent means that the Holy Ghost, to Whom it belongs to be from another. divine person is given. But the Father gives Himself since Reply to Objection 1. In the sense of “giving” as a He can only be possessed by His giving Himself. There- free bestowal of something, the Father gives Himself, as fore it can be said that the Father sends Himself. freely bestowing Himself to be enjoyed by the creature. Objection 2. Further, the divine person is sent accord- But as implying the authority of the giver as regards what ing to the indwelling of grace. But by grace the whole is given, “to be given” only applies in God to the Per- Trinity dwells in us according to Jn. 14:23: “We will son Who is from another; and the same as regards “being come to him and make Our abode with him.” Therefore sent.” each one of the divine persons is sent. Reply to Objection 2. Although the effect of grace is Objection 3. Further, whatever belongs to one person, also from the Father, Who dwells in us by grace, just as belongs to them all, except the notions and persons. But the Son and the Holy Ghost, still He is not described as mission does not signify any person; nor even a notion, being sent, for He is not from another. Thus Augustine since there are only five notions, as stated above (q. 32, says (De Trin. iv, 20) that “The Father, when known by a. 3). Therefore every divine person can be sent. anyone in time, is not said to be sent; for there is no one On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ii, 3), whence He is, or from whom He proceeds.” “The Father alone is never described as being sent.” Reply to Objection 3. Mission, meaning procession I answer that, The very idea of mission means pro- from the sender, includes the signification of a notion, not cession from another, and in God it means procession ac- of a special notion, but in general; thus “to be from an- cording to origin, as above expounded. Hence, as the Fa- other” is common to two of the notions. ther is not from another, in no way is it fitting for Him Whether it is fitting for the Son to be sent invisibly? Ia q. 43 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not fitting for ing grace, since they can be held without the gift of char- the Son to be sent invisibly. For invisible mission of the ity, according to 1 Cor. 13:2: “If I should have prophecy, divine person is according to the gift of grace. But all and should know all mysteries, and all knowledge, and if I gifts of grace belong to the Holy Ghost, according to 1 should have all faith so that I could move mountains, and Cor. 12:11: “One and the same Spirit worketh all things.” have not charity, I am nothing.” Therefore, since the Son Therefore only the Holy Ghost is sent invisibly. proceeds as the word of the intellect, it seems unfitting for Objection 2. Further, the mission of the divine person Him to be sent invisibly. is according to sanctifying grace. But the gifts belonging Objection 3. Further, the mission of the divine per- to the perfection of the intellect are not gifts of sanctify- son is a procession, as expounded above (Aa. 1,4). But 225 the procession of the Son and of the Holy Ghost differ Because the Holy Ghost is Love, the soul is assimilated to from each other. Therefore they are distinct missions if the Holy Ghost by the gift of charity: hence the mission both are sent; and then one of them would be superfluous, of the Holy Ghost is according to the mode of charity. since one would suffice for the creature’s sanctification. Whereas the Son is the Word, not any sort of word, but On the contrary, It is said of divine Wisdom (Wis. one Who breathes forth Love. Hence Augustine says (De 9:10): “Send her from heaven to Thy Saints, and from the Trin. ix 10): “The Word we speak of is knowledge with seat of Thy greatness.” love.” Thus the Son is sent not in accordance with every I answer that, The whole Trinity dwells in the mind and any kind of intellectual perfection, but according to by sanctifying grace, according to Jn. 14:23: “We will the intellectual illumination, which breaks forth into the come to him, and will make Our abode with him.” But affection of love, as is said (Jn. 6:45): “Everyone that that a divine person be sent to anyone by invisible grace hath heard from the Father and hath learned, cometh to signifies both that this person dwells in a new way within Me,” and (Ps. 38:4): “In my meditation a fire shall flame him and that He has His origin from another. Hence, since forth.” Thus Augustine plainly says (De Trin. iv, 20): both to the Son and to the Holy Ghost it belongs to dwell “The Son is sent, whenever He is known and perceived by in the soul by grace, and to be from another, it therefore anyone.” Now perception implies a certain experimental belongs to both of them to be invisibly sent. As to the knowledge; and this is properly called wisdom [sapientia], Father, though He dwells in us by grace, still it does not as it were a sweet knowledge [sapida scientia], according belong to Him to be from another, and consequently He is to Ecclus. 6:23: “The wisdom of doctrine is according to not sent. her name.” Reply to Objection 1. Although all the gifts, consid- Reply to Objection 3. Since mission implies the ori- ered as such, are attributed to the Holy Ghost, forasmuch gin of the person Who is sent, and His indwelling by as He is by His nature the first Gift, since He is Love, grace, as above explained (a. 1), if we speak of mission as stated above (q. 38, a. 1), some gifts nevertheless, by according to origin, in this sense the Son’s mission is dis- reason of their own particular nature, are appropriated in tinguished from the mission of the Holy Ghost, as gen- a certain way to the Son, those, namely, which belong to eration is distinguished from procession. If we consider the intellect, and in respect of which we speak of the mis- mission as regards the effect of grace, in this sense the sion of the Son. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) two missions are united in the root which is grace, but are that “The Son is sent to anyone invisibly, whenever He is distinguished in the effects of grace, which consist in the known and perceived by anyone.” illumination of the intellect and the kindling of the affec- Reply to Objection 2. The soul is made like to God tion. Thus it is manifest that one mission cannot be with- by grace. Hence for a divine person to be sent to any- out the other, because neither takes place without sancti- one by grace, there must needs be a likening of the soul fying grace, nor is one person separated from the other. to the divine person Who is sent, by some gift of grace. Whether the invisible mission is to all who participate grace? Ia q. 43 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the invisible mission sion is not to all sharers in grace. is not to all who participate grace. For the Fathers of the Objection 4. Further, the Sacraments of the New Law Old Testament had their share of grace. Yet to them was contain grace, and it is not said that the invisible mission made no invisible mission; for it is said (Jn. 7:39): “The is sent to them. Therefore the invisible mission is not to Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glori- all that have grace. fied.” Therefore the invisible mission is not to all partak- On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Trin. ers in grace. iii, 4; xv, 27), the invisible mission is for the creature’s Objection 2. Further, progress in virtue is only by sanctification. Now every creature that has grace is sanc- grace. But the invisible mission is not according to tified. Therefore the invisible mission is to every such progress in virtue; because progress in virtue is contin- creature. uous, since charity ever increases or decreases; and thus I answer that, As above stated (Aa. 3,4,5), mission in the mission would be continuous. Therefore the invisible its very meaning implies that he who is sent either begins mission is not to all who share in grace. to exist where he was not before, as occurs to creatures; Objection 3. Further, Christ and the blessed have full- or begins to exist where he was before, but in a new way, ness of grace. But mission is not to them, for mission im- in which sense mission is ascribed to the divine persons. plies distance, whereas Christ, as man, and all the blessed Thus, mission as regards the one to whom it is sent implies are perfectly united to God. Therefore the invisible mis- two things, the indwelling of grace, and a certain renewal 226 by grace. Thus the invisible mission is sent to all in whom or in the fervor of charity leading a man to expose himself are to be found these two conditions. to the danger of martyrdom, or to renounce his posses- Reply to Objection 1. The invisible mission was di- sions, or to undertake any arduous work. rected to the Old Testament Fathers, as appears from what Reply to Objection 3. The invisible mission is di- Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), that the invisible mis- rected to the blessed at the very beginning of their beati- sion of the Son “is in man and with men. This was done tude. The invisible mission is made to them subsequently, in former times with the Fathers and the Prophets.” Thus not by “intensity” of grace, but by the further revelation of the words, “the Spirit was not yet given,” are to be applied mysteries; which goes on till the day of judgment. Such to that giving accompanied with a visible sign which took an increase is by the “extension” of grace, because it ex- place on the day of Pentecost. tends to a greater number of objects. To Christ the invis- Reply to Objection 2. The invisible mission takes ible mission was sent at the first moment of His concep- place also as regards progress in virtue or increase of tion; but not afterwards, since from the beginning of His grace. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), that “the conception He was filled with all wisdom and grace. Son is sent to each one when He is known and perceived Reply to Objection 4. Grace resides instrumentally by anyone, so far as He can be known and perceived ac- in the sacraments of the New Law, as the form of a thing cording to the capacity of the soul, whether journeying designed resides in the instruments of the art designing, towards God, or united perfectly to Him.” Such invisi- according to a process flowing from the agent to the pas- ble mission, however, chiefly occurs as regards anyone’s sive object. But mission is only spoken of as directed to proficiency in the performance of a new act, or in the ac- its term. Hence the mission of the divine person is not sent quisition of a new state of grace; as, for example, the pro- to the sacraments, but to those who receive grace through ficiency in reference to the gift of miracles or of prophecy, the sacraments. Whether it is fitting for the Holy Ghost to be sent visibly? Ia q. 43 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the Holy Ghost is not visible manner is only for the purpose of manifesting the fittingly sent in a visible manner. For the Son as visibly invisible mission; as invisible things are made known by sent to the world is said to be less than the Father. But the visible. So those to whom the invisible mission was the Holy Ghost is never said to be less than the Father. not sent, ought not to receive the visible mission; and to all Therefore the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent in a visible who received the invisible mission, whether in the New or manner. in the Old Testament, the visible mission ought likewise Objection 2. Further, the visible mission takes place to be sent; and this is clearly false. Therefore the Holy by way of union to a visible creature, as the Son’s mis- Ghost is not sent visibly. sion according to the flesh. But the Holy Ghost did not On the contrary, It is said (Mat. 3:16) that, when our assume any visible creature; and hence it cannot be said Lord was baptized, the Holy Ghost descended upon Him that He exists otherwise in some creatures than in others, in the shape of a dove. unless perhaps as in a sign, as He is also present in the I answer that, God provides for all things according sacraments, and in all the figures of the law. Thus the to the nature of each thing. Now the nature of man re- Holy Ghost is either not sent visibly at all, or His visible quires that he be led to the invisible by visible things, as mission takes place in all these things. explained above (q. 12, a. 12). Wherefore the invisible Objection 3. Further, every visible creature is an ef- things of God must be made manifest to man by the things fect showing forth the whole Trinity. Therefore the Holy that are visible. As God, therefore, in a certain way has Ghost is not sent by reason of those visible creatures more demonstrated Himself and His eternal processions to men than any other person. by visible creatures, according to certain signs; so was it Objection 4. Further, the Son was visibly sent by rea- fitting that the invisible missions also of the divine persons son of the noblest kind of creature—namely, the human should be made manifest by some visible creatures. nature. Therefore if the Holy Ghost is sent visibly, He This mode of manifestation applies in different ways ought to be sent by reason of rational creatures. to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. For it belongs to the Objection 5. Further, whatever is done visibly by God Holy Ghost, Who proceeds as Love, to be the gift of sanc- is dispensed by the ministry of the angels; as Augustine tification; to the Son as the principle of the Holy Ghost, it says (De Trin. iii, 4,5,9). So visible appearances, if there belongs to the author of this sanctification. Thus the Son have been any, came by means of the angels. Thus the has been sent visibly as the author of sanctification; the angels are sent, and not the Holy Ghost. Holy Ghost as the sign of sanctification. Objection 6. Further, the Holy Ghost being sent in a Reply to Objection 1. The Son assumed the visible 227 creature, wherein He appeared, into the unity of His per-and so likewise it was not required to last beyond what its son, so that whatever can be said of that creature can be use required. said of the Son of God; and so, by reason of the nature Reply to Objection 5. Those visible creatures were assumed, the Son is called less than the Father. But the formed by the ministry of the angels, not to signify the Holy Ghost did not assume the visible creature, in which person of an angel, but to signify the Person of the Holy He appeared, into the unity of His person; so that what Ghost. Thus, as the Holy Ghost resided in those visible is said of it cannot be predicated of Him. Hence He can- creatures as the one signified in the sign, on that account not be called less than the Father by reason of any visible the Holy Ghost is said to be sent visibly, and not as an creature. angel. Reply to Objection 2. The visible mission of the Holy Reply to Objection 6. It is not necessary that the in- Ghost does not apply to the imaginary vision which is that visible mission should always be made manifest by some of prophecy; because as Augustine says (De Trin. ii, 6): visible external sign; but, as is said (1 Cor. 12:7)—“the “The prophetic vision is not displayed to corporeal eyes manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto by corporeal shapes, but is shown in the spirit by the spir- profit”—that is, of the Church. This utility consists in the itual images of bodies. But whoever saw the dove and confirmation and propagation of the faith by such visible the fire, saw them by their eyes. Nor, again, has the Holy signs. This has been done chiefly by Christ and by the Ghost the same relation to these images that the Son has to apostles, according to Heb. 2:3, “which having begun to the rock, because it is said, “The rock was Christ” (1 Cor. be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by them 10:4). For that rock was already created, and after the that heard.” manner of an action was named Christ, Whom it typified; Thus in a special sense, a mission of the Holy Ghost whereas the dove and the fire suddenly appeared to signify was directed to Christ, to the apostles, and to some of the only what was happening. They seem, however, to be like early saints on whom the Church was in a way founded; to the flame of the burning bush seen by Moses and to the in such a manner, however, that the visible mission made column which the people followed in the desert, and to to Christ should show forth the invisible mission made to the lightning and thunder issuing forth when the law was Him, not at that particular time, but at the first moment given on the mountain. For the purpose of the bodily ap- of His conception. The visible mission was directed to pearances of those things was that they might signify, and Christ at the time of His baptism by the figure of a dove, a then pass away.” Thus the visible mission is neither dis- fruitful animal, to show forth in Christ the authority of the played by prophetic vision, which belongs to the imagina- giver of grace by spiritual regeneration; hence the Father’s tion, and not to the body, nor by the sacramental signs of voice spoke, “This is My beloved Son” (Mat. 3:17), that the Old and New Testament, wherein certain pre-existing others might be regenerated to the likeness of the only Be- things are employed to signify something. But the Holy gotten. The Transfiguration showed it forth in the appear- Ghost is said to be sent visibly, inasmuch as He showed ance of a bright cloud, to show the exuberance of doctrine; Himself in certain creatures as in signs especially made and hence it was said, “Hear ye Him” (Mat. 17:5). To the for that purpose. apostles the mission was directed in the form of breathing Reply to Objection 3. Although the whole Trinity to show forth the power of their ministry in the dispen- makes those creatures, still they are made in order to show sation of the sacraments; and hence it was said, “Whose forth in some special way this or that person. For as sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven” (Jn. 20:23): and the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are signified by diverse again under the sign of fiery tongues to show forth the names, so also can They each one be signified by differ- office of teaching; whence it is said that, “they began to ent things; although neither separation nor diversity exists speak with divers tongues” (Acts 2:4). The visible mis- amongst Them. sion of the Holy Ghost was fittingly not sent to the fa- Reply to Objection 4. It was necessary for the Son to thers of the Old Testament, because the visible mission be declared as the author of sanctification, as explained of the Son was to be accomplished before that of the Holy above. Thus the visible mission of the Son was nec- Ghost; since the Holy Ghost manifests the Son, as the Son essarily made according to the rational nature to which manifests the Father. Visible apparitions of the divine per- it belongs to act, and which is capable of sanctification; sons were, however, given to the Fathers of the Old Tes- whereas any other creature could be the sign of sanctifi- tament which, indeed, cannot be called visible missions; cation. Nor was such a visible creature, formed for such a because, according to Augustine (De Trin. ii, 17), they purpose, necessarily assumed by the Holy Ghost into the were not sent to designate the indwelling of the divine unity of His person, since it was not assumed or used for person by grace, but for the manifestation of something the purpose of action, but only for the purpose of a sign; else. 228 Whether a divine person is sent only by the person whence He proceeds eternally? Ia q. 43 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that a divine person is is to be explained as regards His human nature, by reason sent only by the one whence He proceeds eternally. For of which He was sent to preach by the Holy Ghost. Au- as Augustine says (De Trin. iv), “The Father is sent by gustine, however, says (De Trin. ii, 5) that the Son is sent no one because He is from no one.” Therefore if a divine by Himself, and by the Holy Ghost; and the Holy Ghost person is sent by another, He must be from that other. is sent by Himself, and by the Son; so that to be sent in Objection 2. Further, the sender has authority over the God does not apply to each person, but only to the person one sent. But there can be no authority as regards a divine proceeding from person except from origin. Therefore the divine person another, whereas to send belongs to each person. sent must proceed from the one sending. There is some truth in both of these opinions; because Objection 3. Further, if a divine person can be sent when a person is described as being sent, the person Him- by one whence He does not proceed, then the Holy Ghost self existing from another is designated, with the visible may be given by a man, although He proceeds not from or invisible effect, applicable to the mission of the divine him; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. person. Thus if the sender be designated as the principle xv). Therefore the divine person is sent only by the one of the person sent, in this sense not each person sends, whence He proceeds. but that person only Who is the principle of that person On the contrary, The Son is sent by the Holy Ghost, who is sent; and thus the Son is sent only by the Father; according to Is. 48:16, “Now the Lord God hath sent Me and the Holy Ghost by the Father and the Son. If, how- and His Spirit.” But the Son is not from the Holy Ghost. ever, the person sending is understood as the principle of Therefore a divine person is sent by one from Whom He the effect implied in the mission, in that sense the whole does not proceed. Trinity sends the person sent. This reason does not prove I answer that, There are different opinions on this that a man can send the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as man point. Some say that the divine person is sent only by cannot cause the effect of grace. the one whence He proceeds eternally; and so, when it is The answers to the objections appear from the above. said that the Son of God is sent by the Holy Ghost, this 229 FIRST PART, QUESTION 44 The Procession of Creatures From God, and of the First Cause of All Things (In Four Articles) After treating of the procession of the divine persons, we must consider the procession of creatures from God. This consideration will be threefold: (1) of the production of creatures; (2) of the distinction between them; (3) of their preservation and government. Concerning the first point there are three things to be considered: (1) the first cause of beings; (2) the mode of procession of creatures from the first cause; (3) the principle of the duration of things. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is the efficient cause of all beings? (2) Whether primary matter is created by God, or is an independent coordinate principle with Him? (3) Whether God is the exemplar cause of beings or whether there are other exemplar causes? (4) Whether He is the final cause of things? Whether it is necessary that every being be created by God? Ia q. 44 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not necessary more or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who that every being be created by God. For there is noth- possesses being most perfectly. ing to prevent a thing from being without that which does Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come not belong to its essence, as a man can be found without before multitude; and Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4) whiteness. But the relation of the thing caused to its cause that whatever is greatest in being and greatest in truth, is does not appear to be essential to beings, for some be- the cause of every being and of every truth; just as what- ings can be understood without it; therefore they can exist ever is the greatest in heat is the cause of all heat. without it; and therefore it is possible that some beings Reply to Objection 1. Though the relation to its cause should not be created by God. is not part of the definition of a thing caused, still it fol- Objection 2. Further, a thing requires an efficient lows, as a consequence, on what belongs to its essence; cause in order to exist. Therefore whatever cannot but because from the fact that a thing has being by partici- exist does not require an efficient cause. But no necessary pation, it follows that it is caused. Hence such a being thing can not exist, because whatever necessarily exists cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be cannot but exist. Therefore as there are many necessary without having the faculty of laughing. But, since to be things in existence, it appears that not all beings are from caused does not enter into the essence of being as such, God. therefore is it possible for us to find a being uncaused. Objection 3. Further, whatever things have a cause, Reply to Objection 2. This objection has led some to can be demonstrated by that cause. But in mathematics say that what is necessary has no cause (Phys. viii, text demonstration is not made by the efficient cause, as ap- 46). But this is manifestly false in the demonstrative sci- pears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, text 3); therefore ences, where necessary principles are the causes of neces- not all beings are from God as from their efficient cause. sary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle says (Metaph. On the contrary, It is said (Rom. 11:36): “Of Him, v, text 6), that there are some necessary things which have and by Him, and in Him are all things.” a cause of their necessity. But the reason why an efficient I answer that, It must be said that every being in any cause is required is not merely because the effect is not way existing is from God. For whatever is found in any- necessary, but because the effect might not be if the cause thing by participation, must be caused in it by that to were not. For this conditional proposition is true, whether which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes ignited by the antecedent and consequent be possible or impossible. fire. Now it has been shown above (q. 3, a. 4) when treat- Reply to Objection 3. The science of mathematics ing of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially self- treats its object as though it were something abstracted subsisting Being; and also it was shown (q. 11, Aa. 3,4) mentally, whereas it is not abstract in reality. Now, it is that subsisting being must be one; as, if whiteness were becoming that everything should have an efficient cause self-subsisting, it would be one, since whiteness is mul- in proportion to its being. And so, although the object tiplied by its recipients. Therefore all beings apart from of mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to God are not their own being, but are beings by partici- that cause is not the reason why it is brought under the pation. Therefore it must be that all things which are di- consideration of the mathematician, who therefore does versified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be not demonstrate that object from its efficient cause. 230 Whether primary matter is created by God? Ia q. 44 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that primary matter is not we must take into consideration that matter is contracted created by God. For whatever is made is composed of by its form to a determinate species, as a substance, be- a subject and of something else (Phys. i, text 62). But longing to a certain species, is contracted by a superven- primary matter has no subject. Therefore primary matter ing accident to a determinate mode of being; for instance, cannot have been made by God. man by whiteness. Each of these opinions, therefore, con- Objection 2. Further, action and passion are opposite sidered “being” under some particular aspect, either as members of a division. But as the first active principle “this” or as “such”; and so they assigned particular effi- is God, so the first passive principle is matter. Therefore cient causes to things. Then others there were who arose God and primary matter are two principles divided against to the consideration of “being,” as being, and who as- each other, neither of which is from the other. signed a cause to things, not as “these,” or as “such,” but Objection 3. Further, every agent produces its like, as “beings.” and thus, since every agent acts in proportion to its ac- Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered tuality, it follows that everything made is in some degree as beings, must be the cause of things, not only according actual. But primary matter is only in potentiality, formally as they are “such” by accidental forms, nor according as considered in itself. Therefore it is against the nature of they are “these” by substantial forms, but also according primary matter to be a thing made. to all that belongs to their being at all in any way. And On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. xii, 7), thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is cre- Two “things hast Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto ated by the universal cause of things. Thyself”—viz. angels—“the other nigh unto nothing”— Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher (Phys. i, text viz. primary matter. 62), is speaking of “becoming” in particular—that is, from I answer that, The ancient philosophers gradually, form to form, either accidental or substantial. But here we and as it were step by step, advanced to the knowledge are speaking of things according to their emanation from of truth. At first being of grosser mind, they failed to re- the universal principle of being; from which emanation alize that any beings existed except sensible bodies. And matter itself is not excluded, although it is excluded from those among them who admitted movement, did not con- the former mode of being made. sider it except as regards certain accidents, for instance, Reply to Objection 2. Passion is an effect of ac- in relation to rarefaction and condensation, by union and tion. Hence it is reasonable that the first passive principle separation. And supposing as they did that corporeal sub- should be the effect of the first active principle, since ev- stance itself was uncreated, they assigned certain causes ery imperfect thing is caused by one perfect. For the first for these accidental changes, as for instance, affinity, dis- principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle says (Metaph. cord, intellect, or something of that kind. An advance xii, text 40). was made when they understood that there was a distinc- Reply to Objection 3. The reason adduced does not tion between the substantial form and matter, which latter show that matter is not created, but that it is not created they imagined to be uncreated, and when they perceived without form; for though everything created is actual, still transmutation to take place in bodies in regard to essen- it is not pure act. Hence it is necessary that even what is tial forms. Such transmutations they attributed to certain potential in it should be created, if all that belongs to its universal causes, such as the oblique circle∗, according to being is created. Aristotle (De Gener. ii), or ideas, according to Plato. But Whether the exemplar cause is anything besides God? Ia q. 44 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the exemplar cause species is found not only what belongs to the species, but is something besides God. For the effect is like its ex- also individuating principles added to the principles of the emplar cause. But creatures are far from being like God. species. Therefore it is necessary to admit self-existing Therefore God is not their exemplar cause. species, as for instance, a “per se” man, and a “per se” Objection 2. Further, whatever is by participation is horse, and the like, which are called the exemplars. There- reduced to something self-existing, as a thing ignited is fore exemplar causes exist besides God. reduced to fire, as stated above (a. 1). But whatever ex- Objection 3. Further, sciences and definitions are ists in sensible things exists only by participation of some concerned with species themselves, but not as these are species. This appears from the fact that in all sensible in particular things, because there is no science or defini- ∗ The zodiac 231 tion of particular things. Therefore there are some beings, by different things. In this manner therefore God Him-which are beings or species not existing in singular things, self is the first exemplar of all things. Moreover, in things and these are called exemplars. Therefore the same con- created one may be called the exemplar of another by the clusion follows as above. reason of its likeness thereto, either in species, or by the Objection 4. Further, this likewise appears from analogy of some kind of imitation. Dionysius, who says (Div. Nom. v) that self-subsisting Reply to Objection 1. Although creatures do not at- being is before self-subsisting life, and before self- tain to a natural likeness to God according to similitude subsisting wisdom. of species, as a man begotten is like to the man begetting, On the contrary, The exemplar is the same as the still they do attain to likeness to Him, forasmuch as they idea. But ideas, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), represent the divine idea, as a material house is like to the are “the master forms, which are contained in the divine house in the architect’s mind. intelligence.” Therefore the exemplars of things are not Reply to Objection 2. It is of a man’s nature to be in outside God. matter, and so a man without matter is impossible. There- I answer that, God is the first exemplar cause of all fore although this particular man is a man by participa- things. In proof whereof we must consider that if for the tion of the species, he cannot be reduced to anything self- production of anything an exemplar is necessary, it is in existing in the same species, but to a superior species, order that the effect may receive a determinate form. For such as separate substances. The same applies to other an artificer produces a determinate form in matter by rea- sensible things. son of the exemplar before him, whether it is the exemplar Reply to Objection 3. Although every science and beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorily conceived in definition is concerned only with beings, still it is not nec- the mind. Now it is manifest that things made by nature essary that a thing should have the same mode in reality receive determinate forms. This determination of forms as the thought of it has in our understanding. For we ab- must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first princi- stract universal ideas by force of the active intellect from ple, for divine wisdom devised the order of the universe, the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that the which order consists in the variety of things. And there- universals should exist outside the particulars in order to fore we must say that in the divine wisdom are the types be their exemplars. of all things, which types we have called ideas—i.e. ex- Reply to Objection 4. As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. emplar forms existing in the divine mind (q. 15, a. 1). And iv), by “self-existing life and self-existing wisdom” he these ideas, though multiplied by their relations to things, sometimes denotes God Himself, sometimes the powers in reality are not apart from the divine essence, accord- given to things themselves; but not any self-subsisting ing as the likeness to that essence can be shared diversely things, as the ancients asserted. Whether God is the final cause of all things? Ia q. 44 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that God is not the final I answer that, Every agent acts for an end: otherwise cause of all things. For to act for an end seems to imply one thing would not follow more than another from the need of the end. But God needs nothing. Therefore it does action of the agent, unless it were by chance. Now the not become Him to act for an end. end of the agent and of the patient considered as such is Objection 2. Further, the end of generation, and the the same, but in a different way respectively. For the im- form of the thing generated, and the agent cannot be iden- pression which the agent intends to produce, and which tical (Phys. ii, text 70), because the end of generation is the patient intends to receive, are one and the same. Some the form of the thing generated. But God is the first agent things, however, are both agent and patient at the same producing all things. Therefore He is not the final cause time: these are imperfect agents, and to these it belongs of all things. to intend, even while acting, the acquisition of something. Objection 3. Further, all things desire their end. But But it does not belong to the First Agent, Who is agent all things do not desire God, for all do not even know Him. only, to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends Therefore God is not the end of all things. only to communicate His perfection, which is His good- Objection 4. Further, the final cause is the first of ness; while every creature intends to acquire its own per- causes. If, therefore, God is the efficient cause and the fection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection and final cause, it follows that before and after exist in Him; goodness. Therefore the divine goodness is the end of all which is impossible. things. On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 16:4): “The Lord Reply to Objection 1. To act from need belongs only has made all things for Himself.” to an imperfect agent, which by its nature is both agent 232 and patient. But this does not belong to God, and there-end, when they desire some good thing, whether this de- fore He alone is the most perfectly liberal giver, because sire be intellectual or sensible, or natural, i.e. without He does not act for His own profit, but only for His own knowledge; because nothing is good and desirable except goodness. forasmuch as it participates in the likeness to God. Reply to Objection 2. The form of the thing gener- Reply to Objection 4. Since God is the efficient, the ated is not the end of generation, except inasmuch as it is exemplar and the final cause of all things, and since pri- the likeness of the form of the generator, which intends to mary matter is from Him, it follows that the first principle communicate its own likeness; otherwise the form of the of all things is one in reality. But this does not prevent us thing generated would be more noble than the generator, from mentally considering many things in Him, some of since the end is more noble than the means to the end. which come into our mind before others. Reply to Objection 3. All things desire God as their 233 FIRST PART, QUESTION 45 The Mode of Emanation of Things From the First Principle (In Eight Articles) The next question concerns the mode of the emanation of things from the First Principle, and this is called creation, and includes eight points of inquiry: (1) What is creation? (2) Whether God can create anything? (3) Whether creation is anything in the very nature of things? (4) To what things it belongs to be created? (5) Whether it belongs to God alone to create? (6) Whether creation is common to the whole Trinity, or proper to any one Person? (7) Whether any trace of the Trinity is to be found in created things? (8) Whether the work of creation is mingled with the works of nature and of the will? Whether to create is to make something from nothing? Ia q. 45 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that to create is not to the “not-being” which is “nothing.” make anything from nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Reply to Objection 1. Augustine uses the word cre- Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): “To make concerns what did not ation in an equivocal sense, according as to be created exist at all; but to create is to make something by bringing signifies improvement in things; as when we say that a forth something from what was already.” bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of creation Objection 2. Further, the nobility of action and of in that way here, but as it is described above. motion is considered from their terms. Action is therefore Reply to Objection 2. Changes receive species and nobler from good to good, and from being to being, than dignity, not from the term “wherefrom,” but from the term from nothing to something. But creation appears to be the “whereto.” Therefore a change is more perfect and ex- most noble action, and first among all actions. Therefore cellent when the term “whereto” of the change is more it is not from nothing to something, but rather from being noble and excellent, although the term “wherefrom,” cor- to being. responding to the term “whereto,” may be more imper- Objection 3. Further, the preposition “from” [ex] im- fect: thus generation is simply nobler and more excellent ports relation of some cause, and especially of the ma- than alteration, because the substantial form is nobler than terial cause; as when we say that a statue is made from the accidental form; and yet the privation of the substan- brass. But “nothing” cannot be the matter of being, nor tial form, which is the term “wherefrom” in generation, in any way its cause. Therefore to create is not to make is more imperfect than the contrary, which is the term something from nothing. “wherefrom” in alteration. Similarly creation is more per- On the contrary, On the text of Gn. 1, “In the be- fect and excellent than generation and alteration, because ginning God created,” etc., the gloss has, “To create is to the term “whereto” is the whole substance of the thing; make something from nothing.” whereas what is understood as the term “wherefrom” is I answer that, As said above (q. 44, a. 2), we must simply not-being. consider not only the emanation of a particular being from Reply to Objection 3. When anything is said to be a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being from made from nothing, this preposition “from” [ex] does not the universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we signify the material cause, but only order; as when we say, designate by the name of creation. Now what proceeds “from morning comes midday”–i.e. after morning is mid- by particular emanation, is not presupposed to that ema- day. But we must understand that this preposition “from” nation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but [ex] can comprise the negation implied when I say the man is made from “not-man,” and white from “not-white.” word “nothing,” or can be included in it. If taken in the Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from first sense, then we affirm the order by stating the relation the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any between what is now and its previous non-existence. But being should be presupposed before this emanation. For if the negation includes the preposition, then the order is nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the genera- denied, and the sense is, “It is made from nothing—i.e. tion of a man is from the “not-being” which is “not-man,” it is not made from anything”—as if we were to say, “He so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from speaks of nothing,” because he does not speak of anything. 234 And this is verified in both ways, when it is said, that in this reply. In the second sense, it imports the material anything is made from nothing. But in the first way this cause, which is denied. preposition “from” [ex] implies order, as has been said Whether God can create anything? Ia q. 45 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot create cause of all being. Hence it is necessary to say that God anything, because, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, brings things into being from nothing. text 34), the ancient philosophers considered it as a com- Reply to Objection 1. Ancient philosophers, as is monly received axiom that “nothing is made from noth- said above (q. 44, a. 2), considered only the emanation ing.” But the power of God does not extend to the con- of particular effects from particular causes, which neces- traries of first principles; as, for instance, that God could sarily presuppose something in their action; whence came make the whole to be less than its part, or that affirmation their common opinion that “nothing is made from noth- and negation are both true at the same time. Therefore ing.” But this has no place in the first emanation from the God cannot make anything from nothing, or create. universal principle of things. Objection 2. Further, if to create is to make some- Reply to Objection 2. Creation is not change, ex- thing from nothing, to be created is to be made. But to be cept according to a mode of understanding. For change made is to be changed. Therefore creation is change. But means that the same something should be different now every change occurs in some subject, as appears by the from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the same definition of movement: for movement is the act of what actual thing is different now from what it was before, as is in potentiality. Therefore it is impossible for anything in motion according to quantity, quality and place; but to be made out of nothing by God. sometimes it is the same being only in potentiality, as in Objection 3. Further, what has been made must have substantial change, the subject of which is matter. But in at some time been becoming. But it cannot be said that creation, by which the whole substance of a thing is pro- what is created, at the same time, is becoming and has duced, the same thing can be taken as different now and been made, because in permanent things what is becom- before only according to our way of understanding, so that ing, is not, and what has been made, already is: and so it a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and after- would follow that something would be, and not be, at the wards as existing. But as action and passion coincide as same time. Therefore when anything is made, its becom- to the substance of motion, and differ only according to ing precedes its having been made. But this is impossible, diverse relations (Phys. iii, text 20,21), it must follow that unless there is a subject in which the becoming is sus- when motion is withdrawn, only diverse relations remain tained. Therefore it is impossible that anything should be in the Creator and in the creature. But because the mode made from nothing. of signification follows the mode of understanding as was Objection 4. Further, infinite distance cannot be said above (q. 13, a. 1), creation is signified by mode of crossed. But infinite distance exists between being and change; and on this account it is said that to create is to nothing. Therefore it does not happen that something is make something from nothing. And yet “to make” and made from nothing. “to be made” are more suitable expressions here than “to On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): “In the begin- change” and “to be changed,” because “to make” and “to ning God created heaven and earth.” be made” import a relation of cause to the effect, and of I answer that, Not only is it impossible that anything effect to the cause, and imply change only as a conse- should be created by God, but it is necessary to say that quence. all things were created by God, as appears from what has Reply to Objection 3. In things which are made with- been said (q. 44, a. 1). For when anyone makes one thing out movement, to become and to be already made are si- from another, this latter thing from which he makes is pre- multaneous, whether such making is the term of move- supposed to his action, and is not produced by his action; ment, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated and thus the craftsman works from natural things, as wood or is illuminated at the same time) or whether it is not the brass, which are caused not by the action of art, but by the term of movement, as the word is being made in the mind action of nature. So also nature itself causes natural things and is made at the same time. In these things what is being as regards their form, but presupposes matter. If therefore made, is; but when we speak of its being made, we mean God did only act from something presupposed, it would that it is from another, and was not previously. Hence follow that the thing presupposed would not be caused by since creation is without movement, a thing is being cre- Him. Now it has been shown above (q. 44, Aa. 1,2), that ated and is already created at the same time. nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is the universal Reply to Objection 4. This objection proceeds from a 235 false imagination, as if there were an infinite medium be-imagination comes from creation being taken to signify a tween nothing and being; which is plainly false. This false change existing between two forms. Whether creation is anything in the creature? Ia q. 45 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that creation is not any- thing pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in the par- thing in the creature. For as creation taken in a passive ticular productions of some beings, but cannot happen in sense is attributed to the creature, so creation taken in an the production of all being by the universal cause of all active sense is attributed to the Creator. But creation taken beings, which is God. Hence God by creation produces actively is not anything in the Creator, because otherwise things without movement. Now when movement is re- it would follow that in God there would be something tem- moved from action and passion, only relation remains, as poral. Therefore creation taken passively is not anything was said above (a. 2, ad 2). Hence creation in the creature in the creature. is only a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle Objection 2. Further, there is no medium between the of its being; even as in passion, which implies movement, Creator and the creature. But creation is signified as the is implied a relation to the principle of motion. medium between them both: since it is not the Creator, as Reply to Objection 1. Creation signified actively it is not eternal; nor is it the creature, because in that case means the divine action, which is God’s essence, with a it would be necessary for the same reason to suppose an- relation to the creature. But in God relation to the crea- other creation to create it, and so on to infinity. Therefore ture is not a real relation, but only a relation of reason; creation is not anything in the creature. whereas the relation of the creature to God is a real re- Objection 3. Further, if creation is anything besides lation, as was said above (q. 13, a. 7) in treating of the the created substance, it must be an accident belonging to divine names. it. But every accident is in a subject. Therefore a thing Reply to Objection 2. Because creation is signified as created would be the subject of creation, and so the same a change, as was said above (a. 2, ad 2), and change is a thing would be the subject and also the term of creation. kind of medium between the mover and the moved, there- This is impossible, because the subject is before the ac- fore also creation is signified as a medium between the cident, and preserves the accident; while the term is after Creator and the creature. Nevertheless passive creation is the action and passion whose term it is, and as soon as it in the creature, and is a creature. Nor is there need of a fur- exists, action and passion cease. Therefore creation itself ther creation in its creation; because relations, or their en- is not any thing. tire nature being referred to something, are not referred by On the contrary, It is greater for a thing to be made any other relations, but by themselves; as was also shown according to its entire substance, than to be made accord- above (q. 42, a. 1, ad 4), in treating of the equality of the ing to its substantial or accidental form. But generation Persons. taken simply, or relatively, whereby anything is made ac- Reply to Objection 3. The creature is the term of cre- cording to the substantial or the accidental form, is some- ation as signifying a change, but is the subject of creation, thing in the thing generated. Therefore much more is cre- taken as a real relation, and is prior to it in being, as the ation, whereby a thing is made according to its whole sub- subject is to the accident. Nevertheless creation has a cer- stance, something in the thing created. tain aspect of priority on the part of the object to which it I answer that, Creation places something in the thing is directed, which is the beginning of the creature. Nor is created according to relation only; because what is cre- it necessary that as long as the creature is it should be cre- ated, is not made by movement, or by change. For what ated; because creation imports a relation of the creature to is made by movement or by change is made from some- the Creator, with a certain newness or beginning. Whether to be created belongs to composite and subsisting things? Ia q. 45 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that to be created does nothing. But composite things are not from nothing, but not belong to composite and subsisting things. For in the are the result of their own component parts. Therefore book, De Causis (prop. iv) it is said, “The first of crea- composite things are not created. tures is being.” But the being of a thing created is not Objection 3. Further, what is presupposed in the sec- subsisting. Therefore creation properly speaking does not ond emanation is properly produced by the first: as natural belong to subsisting and composite things. generation produces the natural thing, which is presup- Objection 2. Further, whatever is created is from posed in the operation of art. But the thing supposed in 236 natural generation is matter. Therefore matter, and not the co-exist rather than to exist, so they ought to be called composite, is, properly speaking, that which is created. rather “concreated” than “created” things; whereas, prop- On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): “In the be- erly speaking, created things are subsisting beings. ginning God created heaven and earth.” But heaven and Reply to Objection 1. In the proposition “the first earth are subsisting composite things. Therefore creation of created things is being,” the word “being” does not re- belongs to them. fer to the subject of creation, but to the proper concept of I answer that, To be created is, in a manner, to be the object of creation. For a created thing is called cre- made, as was shown above (q. 44, a. 2, ad 2,3). Now, ated because it is a being, not because it is “this” being, to be made is directed to the being of a thing. Hence to since creation is the emanation of all being from the Uni- be made and to be created properly belong to whatever versal Being, as was said above (a. 1). We use a similar being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to sub- way of speaking when we say that “the first visible thing sisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the is color,” although, strictly speaking, the thing colored is case of separate substances, or composite, as in the case what is seen. of material substances. For being belongs to that which Reply to Objection 2. Creation does not mean the has being—that is, to what subsists in its own being. But building up of a composite thing from pre-existing princi- forms and accidents and the like are called beings, not ples; but it means that the “composite” is created so that as if they themselves were, but because something is by it is brought into being at the same time with all its prin- them; as whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its sub- ciples. ject is white by it. Hence, according to the Philosopher Reply to Objection 3. This reason does not prove (Metaph. vii, text 2) accident is more properly said to be that matter alone is created, but that matter does not exist “of a being” than “a being.” Therefore, as accidents and except by creation; for creation is the production of the forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said to whole being, and not only matter. Whether it belongs to God alone to create? Ia q. 45 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that it does not belong I answer that, It sufficiently appears at the first to God alone to create, because, according to the Philoso- glance, according to what precedes (a. 1), that to create pher (De Anima ii, text 34), what is perfect can make its can be the action of God alone. For the more universal own likeness. But immaterial creatures are more perfect effects must be reduced to the more universal and prior than material creatures, which nevertheless can make their causes. Now among all effects the most universal is being own likeness, for fire generates fire, and man begets man. itself: and hence it must be the proper effect of the first Therefore an immaterial substance can make a substance and most universal cause, and that is God. Hence also it like to itself. But immaterial substance can be made only is said (De Causis prop., iii) that “neither intelligence nor by creation, since it has no matter from which to be made. the soul gives us being, except inasmuch as it works by di- Therefore a creature can create. vine operation.” Now to produce being absolutely, not as Objection 2. Further, the greater the resistance is on this or that being, belongs to creation. Hence it is manifest the part of the thing made, so much the greater power that creation is the proper act of God alone. is required in the maker. But a “contrary” resists more It happens, however, that something participates the than “nothing.” Therefore it requires more power to make proper action of another, not by its own power, but instru- (something) from its contrary, which nevertheless a crea- mentally, inasmuch as it acts by the power of another; as ture can do, than to make a thing from nothing. Much air can heat and ignite by the power of fire. And so some more therefore can a creature do this. have supposed that although creation is the proper act of Objection 3. Further, the power of the maker is con- the universal cause, still some inferior cause acting by the sidered according to the measure of what is made. But power of the first cause, can create. And thus Avicenna created being is finite, as we proved above when treating asserted that the first separate substance created by God of the infinity of God (q. 7, Aa. 2,3,4). Therefore only a created another after itself, and the substance of the world finite power is needed to produce a creature by creation. and its soul; and that the substance of the world creates But to have a finite power is not contrary to the nature of the matter of inferior bodies. And in the same manner the a creature. Therefore it is not impossible for a creature to Master says (Sent. iv, D, 5) that God can communicate create. to a creature the power of creating, so that the latter can On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) that create ministerially, not by its own power. neither good nor bad angels can create anything. Much But such a thing cannot be, because the secondary less therefore can any other creatures. instrumental cause does not participate the action of the 237 superior cause, except inasmuch as by something proper like to itself as regards its being, but only as regards some to itself it acts dispositively to the effect of the principal added perfection; as we may say that a superior angel il- agent. If therefore it effects nothing, according to what luminates an inferior, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, is proper to itself, it is used to no purpose; nor would x). In this way even in heaven there is paternity, as the there be any need of certain instruments for certain ac- Apostle says (Eph. 3:15): “From whom all paternity in tions. Thus we see that a saw, in cutting wood, which heaven and on earth is named.” From which evidently it does by the property of its own form, produces the appears that no created being can cause anything, unless form of a bench, which is the proper effect of the prin- something is presupposed; which is against the very idea cipal agent. Now the proper effect of God creating is of creation. what is presupposed to all other effects, and that is ab- Reply to Objection 2. A thing is made from its con- solute being. Hence nothing else can act dispositively trary indirectly (Phys. i, text 43), but directly from the and instrumentally to this effect, since creation is not from subject which is in potentiality. And so the contrary resists anything presupposed, which can be disposed by the ac- the agent, inasmuch as it impedes the potentiality from tion of the instrumental agent. So therefore it is impossi- the act which the agent intends to induce, as fire intends ble for any creature to create, either by its own power or to reduce the matter of water to an act like to itself, but is instrumentally—that is, ministerially. impeded by the form and contrary dispositions, whereby And above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can the potentiality (of the water) is restrained from being re- create, for no body acts except by touching or moving; duced to act; and the more the potentiality is restrained, and thus it requires in its action some pre-existing thing, the more power is required in the agent to reduce the mat- which can be touched or moved, which is contrary to the ter to act. Hence a much greater power is required in the very idea of creation. agent when no potentiality pre-exists. Thus therefore it Reply to Objection 1. A perfect thing participating appears that it is an act of much greater power to make a any nature, makes a likeness to itself, not by absolutely thing from nothing, than from its contrary. producing that nature, but by applying it to something Reply to Objection 3. The power of the maker is else. For an individual man cannot be the cause of human reckoned not only from the substance of the thing made, nature absolutely, because he would then be the cause of but also from the mode of its being made; for a greater himself; but he is the cause of human nature being in the heat heats not only more, but quicker. Therefore although man begotten; and thus he presupposes in his action a de- to create a finite effect does not show an infinite power, terminate matter whereby he is an individual man. But as yet to create it from nothing does show an infinite power: an individual man participates human nature, so every cre- which appears from what has been said (ad 2). For if a ated being participates, so to speak, the nature of being; greater power is required in the agent in proportion to the for God alone is His own being, as we have said above distance of the potentiality from the act, it follows that the (q. 7, Aa. 1,2). Therefore no created being can produce a power of that which produces something from no presup- being absolutely, except forasmuch as it causes “being” in posed potentiality is infinite, because there is no propor- “this”: and so it is necessary to presuppose that whereby tion between “no potentiality” and the potentiality presup- a thing is this thing, before the action whereby it makes posed by the power of a natural agent, as there is no pro- its own likeness. But in an immaterial substance it is not portion between “not being” and “being.” And because possible to presuppose anything whereby it is this thing; no creature has simply an infinite power, any more than it because it is what it is by its form, whereby it has be- has an infinite being, as was proved above (q. 7, a. 2), it ing, since it is a subsisting form. Therefore an immaterial follows that no creature can create. substance cannot produce another immaterial substance Whether to create is proper to any person? Ia q. 45 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that to create is proper to create belongs to a Person. some Person. For what comes first is the cause of what Objection 2. Further, the divine Persons are distin- is after; and what is perfect is the cause of what is im- guished from each other only by their processions and re- perfect. But the procession of the divine Person is prior lations. Therefore whatever difference is attributed to the to the procession of the creature: and is more perfect, be- divine Persons belongs to them according to the proces- cause the divine Person proceeds in perfect similitude of sions and relations of the Persons. But the causation of its principle; whereas the creature proceeds in imperfect creatures is diversely attributed to the divine Persons; for similitude. Therefore the processions of the divine Per- in the Creed, to the Father is attributed that “He is the sons are the cause of the processions of things, and so to Creator of all things visible and invisible”; to the Son is 238 attributed that by Him “all things were made”; and to the Reply to Objection 1. The processions of the divine Holy Ghost is attributed that He is “Lord and Life-giver.” Persons are the cause of creation, as above explained. Therefore the causation of creatures belongs to the Per- Reply to Objection 2. As the divine nature, although sons according to processions and relations. common to the three Persons, still belongs to them in a Objection 3. Further, if it be said that the causation of kind of order, inasmuch as the Son receives the divine nathe creature flows from some essential attribute appropri- ture from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both: so ated to some one Person, this does not appear to be suf- also likewise the power of creation, whilst common to the ficient; because every divine effect is caused by every es- three Persons, belongs to them in a kind of order. For the sential attribute—viz. by power, goodness and wisdom— Son receives it from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from and thus does not belong to one more than to another. both. Hence to be the Creator is attributed to the Father as Therefore any determinate mode of causation ought not to Him Who does not receive the power of creation from to be attributed to one Person more than to another, unless another. And of the Son it is said (Jn. 1:3), “Through they are distinguished in creating according to relations Him all things were made,” inasmuch as He has the same and processions. power, but from another; for this preposition “through” On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that usually denotes a mediate cause, or “a principle from a all things caused are the common work of the whole God- principle.” But to the Holy Ghost, Who has the same head. power from both, is attributed that by His sway He gov- I answer that, To create is, properly speaking, to erns, and quickens what is created by the Father through cause or produce the being of things. And as every agent the Son. Again, the reason for this particular appropria- produces its like, the principle of action can be considered tion may be taken from the common notion of the appro- from the effect of the action; for it must be fire that gener- priation of the essential attributes. For, as above stated ates fire. And therefore to create belongs to God accord- (q. 39, a. 8, ad 3), to the Father is appropriated power ing to His being, that is, His essence, which is common which is chiefly shown in creation, and therefore it is at- to the three Persons. Hence to create is not proper to any tributed to Him to be the Creator. To the Son is appro- one Person, but is common to the whole Trinity. priated wisdom, through which the intellectual agent acts; Nevertheless the divine Persons, according to the na- and therefore it is said: “Through Whom all things were ture of their procession, have a causality respecting the made.” And to the Holy Ghost is appropriated goodness, creation of things. For as was said above (q. 14, a. 8; to which belong both government, which brings things to q. 19, a. 4), when treating of the knowledge and will of their proper end, and the giving of life—for life consists God, God is the cause of things by His intellect and will, in a certain interior movement; and the first mover is the just as the craftsman is cause of the things made by his end, and goodness. craft. Now the craftsman works through the word con- Reply to Objection 3. Although every effect of God ceived in his mind, and through the love of his will re- proceeds from each attribute, each effect is reduced to that garding some object. Hence also God the Father made the attribute with which it is naturally connected; thus the or- creature through His Word, which is His Son; and through der of things is reduced to “wisdom,” and the justification His Love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so the proces- of the sinner to “mercy” and “goodness” poured out super- sions of the Persons are the type of the productions of abundantly. But creation, which is the production of the creatures inasmuch as they include the essential attributes, very substance of a thing, is reduced to “power.” knowledge and will. Whether in creatures is necessarily found a trace of the Trinity? Ia q. 45 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that in creatures there is and so on to infinitude. not necessarily found a trace of the Trinity. For anything Objection 3. Further, the effect represents only its can be traced through its traces. But the trinity of persons own cause. But the causality of creatures belongs to the cannot be traced from the creatures, as was above stated common nature, and not to the relations whereby the Per- (q. 32, a. 1). Therefore there is no trace of the Trinity in sons are distinguished and numbered. Therefore in the creatures. creature is to be found a trace not of the Trinity but of the Objection 2. Further, whatever is in creatures is cre- unity of essence. ated. Therefore if the trace of the Trinity is found in crea- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10), tures according to some of their properties, and if every- that “the trace of the Trinity appears in creatures.” thing created has a trace of the Trinity, it follows that we I answer that, Every effect in some degree represents can find a trace of the Trinity in each of these (properties): its cause, but diversely. For some effects represent only 239 the causality of the cause, but not its form; as smoke rep-And therefore Augustine says (De Trin. vi 10) that the resents fire. Such a representation is called a “trace”: for trace of the Trinity is found in every creature, according a trace shows that someone has passed by but not who it “as it is one individual,” and according “as it is formed by is. Other effects represent the cause as regards the simil- a species,” and according as it “has a certain relation of itude of its form, as fire generated represents fire gener- order.” And to these also are reduced those three, “num- ating; and a statue of Mercury represents Mercury; and ber,” “weight,” and “measure,” mentioned in the Book of this is called the representation of “image.” Now the pro- Wisdom (9:21). For “measure” refers to the substance of cessions of the divine Persons are referred to the acts of the thing limited by its principles, “number” refers to the intellect and will, as was said above (q. 27). For the Son species, “weight” refers to the order. And to these three proceeds as the word of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost are reduced the other three mentioned by Augustine (De proceeds as love of the will. Therefore in rational crea- Nat. Boni iii), “mode,” “species,” and “order,” and also tures, possessing intellect and will, there is found the rep- those he mentions (QQ. 83, qu. 18): “that which exists; resentation of the Trinity by way of image, inasmuch as whereby it is distinguished; whereby it agrees.” For a there is found in them the word conceived, and the love thing exists by its substance, is distinct by its form, and proceeding. agrees by its order. Other similar expressions may be eas- But in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trin- ily reduced to the above. ity, inasmuch as in every creature are found some things Reply to Objection 1. The representation of the trace which are necessarily reduced to the divine Persons as to is to be referred to the appropriations: in which manner we their cause. For every creature subsists in its own being, are able to arrive at a knowledge of the trinity of the divine and has a form, whereby it is determined to a species, and persons from creatures, as we have said (q. 32, a. 1). has relation to something else. Therefore as it is a created Reply to Objection 2. A creature properly speaking substance, it represents the cause and principle; and so in is a thing self-subsisting; and in such are the three above- that manner it shows the Person of the Father, Who is the mentioned things to be found. Nor is it necessary that “principle from no principle.” According as it has a form these three things should be found in all that exists in the and species, it represents the Word as the form of the thing creature; but only to a subsisting being is the trace as- made by art is from the conception of the craftsman. Ac- cribed in regard to those three things. cording as it has relation of order, it represents the Holy Reply to Objection 3. The processions of the persons Ghost, inasmuch as He is love, because the order of the are also in some way the cause and type of creation; as effect to something else is from the will of the Creator. appears from the above (a. 6). Whether creation is mingled with works of nature and art? Ia q. 45 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that creation is mingled not creatures; which is heretical. in works of nature and art. For in every operation of na- On the contrary, Augustine (Super Gen. v, 6,14,15) ture and art some form is produced. But it is not produced distinguishes the work of propagation, which is a work of from anything, since matter has no part in it. Therefore it nature, from the work of creation. is produced from nothing; and thus in every operation of I answer that, The doubt on this subject arises from nature and art there is creation. the forms which, some said, do not come into existence Objection 2. Further, the effect is not more power- by the action of nature, but previously exist in matter; for ful than its cause. But in natural things the only agent is they asserted that forms are latent. This arose from ig- the accidental form, which is an active or a passive form. norance concerning matter, and from not knowing how Therefore the substantial form is not produced by the op- to distinguish between potentiality and act. For because eration of nature; and therefore it must be produced by forms pre-exist in matter, “in potentiality,” they asserted creation. that they pre-exist “simply.” Others, however, said that the Objection 3. Further, in nature like begets like. But forms were given or caused by a separate agent by way of some things are found generated in nature by a thing un- creation; and accordingly, that to each operation of nature like to them; as is evident in animals generated through is joined creation. But this opinion arose from ignorance putrefaction. Therefore the form of these is not from na- concerning form. For they failed to consider that the form ture, but by creation; and the same reason applies to other of the natural body is not subsisting, but is that by which things. a thing is. And therefore, since to be made and to be cre- Objection 4. Further, what is not created, is not a ated belong properly to a subsisting thing alone, as shown creature. If therefore in nature’s productions there were above (a. 4), it does not belong to forms to be made or to not creation, it would follow that nature’s productions are be created, but to be “concreated.” What, indeed, is prop- 240 erly made by the natural agent is the “composite,” which Reply to Objection 3. For the generation of imperis made from matter. fect animals, a universal agent suffices, and this is to be Hence in the works of nature creation does not enter, found in the celestial power to which they are assimilated, but is presupposed to the work of nature. not in species, but according to a kind of analogy. Nor is Reply to Objection 1. Forms begin to be actual when it necessary to say that their forms are created by a sepa- the composite things are made, not as though they were rate agent. However, for the generation of perfect animals made “directly,” but only “indirectly.” the universal agent does not suffice, but a proper agent is Reply to Objection 2. The active qualities in nature required, in the shape of a univocal generator. act by virtue of substantial forms: and therefore the nat- Reply to Objection 4. The operation of nature takes ural agent not only produces its like according to quality, place only on the presupposition of created principles; and but according to species. thus the products of nature are called creatures. 241 FIRST PART, QUESTION 46 Of the Beginning of the Duration of Creatures (In Three Articles) Next must be considered the beginning of the duration of creatures, about which there are three points for treatment: (1) Whether creatures always existed? (2) Whether that they began to exist in an article of Faith? (3) How God is said to have created heaven and earth in the beginning? Whether the universe of creatures always existed? Ia q. 46 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the universe of crea- moved always was, because movement is only in a mov- tures, called the world, had no beginning, but existed from able thing. eternity. For everything which begins to exist, is a possi- Objection 6. Further, every mover is either natural ble being before it exists: otherwise it would be impossi- or voluntary. But neither begins to move except by some ble for it to exist. If therefore the world began to exist, it pre-existing movement. For nature always moves in the was a possible being before it began to exist. But possi- same manner: hence unless some change precede either ble being is matter, which is in potentiality to existence, in the nature of the mover, or in the movable thing, there which results from a form, and to non-existence, which cannot arise from the natural mover a movement which results from privation of form. If therefore the world be- was not there before. And the will, without itself being gan to exist, matter must have existed before the world. changed, puts off doing what it proposes to do; but this But matter cannot exist without form: while the matter of can be only by some imagined change, at least on the part the world with its form is the world. Therefore the world of time. Thus he who wills to make a house tomorrow, existed before it began to exist: which is impossible. and not today, awaits something which will be tomorrow, Objection 2. Further, nothing which has power to be but is not today; and at least awaits for today to pass, and always, sometimes is and sometimes is not; because so for tomorrow to come; and this cannot be without change, far as the power of a thing extends so long is exists. But because time is the measure of movement. Therefore it every incorruptible thing has power to be always; for its remains that before every new movement, there was a pre- power does not extend to any determinate time. Therefore vious movement; and so the same conclusion follows as no incorruptible thing sometimes is, and sometimes is not: before. but everything which has a beginning at some time is, and Objection 7. Further, whatever is always in its begin- at some time is not; therefore no incorruptible thing be- ning, and always in its end, cannot cease and cannot be- gins to exist. But there are many incorruptible things in gin; because what begins is not in its end, and what ceases the world, as the celestial bodies and all intellectual sub- is not in its beginning. But time always is in its beginning stances. Therefore the world did not begin to exist. and end, because there is no time except “now” which is Objection 3. Further, what is unbegotten has no be- the end of the past and the beginning of the future. There- ginning. But the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 82) proves that fore time cannot begin or end, and consequently neither matter is unbegotten, and also (De Coelo et Mundo i, text can movement, the measure of what is time. 20) that the heaven is unbegotten. Therefore the universe Objection 8. Further, God is before the world either did not begin to exist. in the order of nature only, or also by duration. If in the Objection 4. Further, a vacuum is where there is not order of nature only, therefore, since God is eternal, the a body, but there might be. But if the world began to ex- world also is eternal. But if God is prior by duration; ist, there was first no body where the body of the world since what is prior and posterior in duration constitutes now is; and yet it could be there, otherwise it would not time, it follows that time existed before the world, which be there now. Therefore before the world there was a vac- is impossible. uum; which is impossible. Objection 9. Further, if there is a sufficient cause, Objection 5. Further, nothing begins anew to be there is an effect; for a cause to which there is no effect moved except through either the mover or the thing moved is an imperfect cause, requiring something else to make being otherwise than it was before. But what is otherwise the effect follow. But God is the sufficient cause of the now than it was before, is moved. Therefore before every world; being the final cause, by reason of His goodness, new movement there was a previous movement. There- the exemplar cause by reason of His wisdom, and the ef- fore movement always was; and therefore also the thing ficient cause, by reason of His power as appears from the 242 above (q. 44, Aa. 2,3,4). Since therefore God is eternal, things never began to exist; but that they did not begin by the world is also eternal. the natural mode whereby things generated and corrupt- Objection 10. Further, eternal action postulates an ible begin. eternal effect. But the action of God is His substance, Reply to Objection 3. Aristotle (Phys. i, text 82) which is eternal. Therefore the world is eternal. proves that matter is unbegotten from the fact that it has On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 17:5), “Glorify Me, O not a subject from which to derive its existence; and (De Father, with Thyself with the glory which I had before the Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) he proves that heaven is un- world was”; and (Prov. 8:22), “The Lord possessed Me in generated, forasmuch as it has no contrary from which to the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from be generated. Hence it appears that no conclusion follows the beginning.” either way, except that matter and heaven did not begin by I answer that, Nothing except God can be eternal. generation, as some said, especially about heaven. But we And this statement is far from impossible to uphold: for it say that matter and heaven were produced into being by has been shown above (q. 19, a. 4) that the will of God creation, as appears above (q. 44, a. 1, ad 2). is the cause of things. Therefore things are necessary, Reply to Objection 4. The notion of a vacuum is not according as it is necessary for God to will them, since only “in which is nothing,” but also implies a space ca- the necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the pable of holding a body and in which there is not a body, cause (Metaph. v, text 6). Now it was shown above (q. 19, as appears from Aristotle (Phys. iv, text 60). Whereas a. 3), that, absolutely speaking, it is not necessary that we hold that there was no place or space before the world God should will anything except Himself. It is not there- was. fore necessary for God to will that the world should al- Reply to Objection 5. The first mover was always ways exist; but the world exists forasmuch as God wills it in the same state: but the first movable thing was not al- to exist, since the being of the world depends on the will ways so, because it began to be whereas hitherto it was of God, as on its cause. It is not therefore necessary for not. This, however, was not through change, but by cre- the world to be always; and hence it cannot be proved by ation, which is not change, as said above (q. 45, a. 2, as demonstration. 2). Hence it is evident that this reason, which Aristotle Nor are Aristotle’s reasons (Phys. viii) simply, but rel- gives (Phys. viii), is valid against those who admitted atively, demonstrative—viz. in order to contradict the rea- the existence of eternal movable things, but not eternal sons of some of the ancients who asserted that the world movement, as appears from the opinions of Anaxagoras began to exist in some quite impossible manner. This ap- and Empedocles. But we hold that from the moment that pears in three ways. Firstly, because, both in Phys. viii movable things began to exist movement also existed. and in De Coelo i, text 101, he premises some opinions, Reply to Objection 6. The first agent is a voluntary as those of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato, and brings agent. And although He had the eternal will to produce forward reasons to refute them. Secondly, because wher- some effect, yet He did not produce an eternal effect. Nor ever he speaks of this subject, he quotes the testimony of is it necessary for some change to be presupposed, not the ancients, which is not the way of a demonstrator, but even on account of imaginary time. For we must take into of one persuading of what is probable. Thirdly, because consideration the difference between a particular agent, he expressly says (Topic. i, 9), that there are dialectical that presupposes something and produces something else, problems, about which we have nothing to say from rea- and the universal agent, who produces the whole. The son, as, “whether the world is eternal.” particular agent produces the form, and presupposes the Reply to Objection 1. Before the world existed it was matter; and hence it is necessary that it introduce the form possible for the world to be, not, indeed, according to a in due proportion into a suitable matter. Hence it is correct passive power which is matter, but according to the active to say that it introduces the form into such matter, and not power of God; and also, according as a thing is called ab- into another, on account of the different kinds of matter. solutely possible, not in relation to any power, but from But it is not correct to say so of God Who produces form the sole habitude of the terms which are not repugnant to and matter together: whereas it is correct to say of Him each other; in which sense possible is opposed to impos- that He produces matter fitting to the form and to the end. sible, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text Now, a particular agent presupposes time just as it pre- 17). supposes matter. Hence it is correctly described as acting Reply to Objection 2. Whatever has power always in time “after” and not in time “before,” according to an to be, from the fact of having that power, cannot some- imaginary succession of time after time. But the universal times be and sometimes not be; but before it received that agent who produces the thing and time also, is not cor- power, it did not exist. rectly described as acting now, and not before, according Hence this reason which is given by Aristotle (De to an imaginary succession of time succeeding time, as if Coelo i, text 120) does not prove simply that incorruptible time were presupposed to His action; but He must be con- 243 sidered as giving time to His effect as much as and when signifies the eternity of imaginary time, and not of time He willed, and according to what was fitting to demon- really existing; thus, when we say that above heaven there strate His power. For the world leads more evidently to is nothing, the word “above” signifies only an imaginary the knowledge of the divine creating power, if it was not place, according as it is possible to imagine other dimen- always, than if it had always been; since everything which sions beyond those of the heavenly body. was not always manifestly has a cause; whereas this is not Reply to Objection 9. As the effect follows from the so manifest of what always was. cause that acts by nature, according to the mode of its Reply to Objection 7. As is stated (Phys. iv, text 99), form, so likewise it follows from the voluntary agent, ac- “before” and “after” belong to time, according as they are cording to the form preconceived and determined by the in movement. Hence beginning and end in time must be agent, as appears from what was said above (q. 19, a. 4; taken in the same way as in movement. Now, granted the q. 41, a. 2). Therefore, although God was from eternity eternity of movement, it is necessary that any given mo- the sufficient cause of the world, we should not say that ment in movement be a beginning and an end of move- the world was produced by Him, except as preordained ment; which need not be if movement be a beginning. by His will—that is, that it should have being after not The same applies to the “now” of time. Thus it appears being, in order more manifestly to declare its author. that the idea of the instant “now,” as being always the be- Reply to Objection 10. Given the action, the effect ginning and end of time, presupposes the eternity of time follows according to the requirement of the form, which and movement. Hence Aristotle brings forward this rea- is the principle of action. But in agents acting by will, son (Phys. viii, text 10) against those who asserted the what is conceived and preordained is to be taken as the eternity of time, but denied the eternity of movement. form, which is the principle of action. Therefore from the Reply to Objection 8. God is prior to the world by eternal action of God an eternal effect did not follow; but priority of duration. But the word “prior” signifies pri- such an effect as God willed, an effect, to wit, which has ority not of time, but of eternity. Or we may say that it being after not being. Whether it is an article of faith that the world began? Ia q. 46 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not an article equal to God. But if the world had always been, it would of faith but a demonstrable conclusion that the world be- be equal to God in duration. Therefore it is certain that gan. For everything that is made has a beginning of its the world did not always exist. duration. But it can be proved demonstratively that God Objection 6. Further, if the world always was, the is the effective cause of the world; indeed this is asserted consequence is that infinite days preceded this present by the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can be day. But it is impossible to pass through an infinite demonstratively proved that the world began. medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this Objection 2. Further, if it is necessary to say that the present day; which is manifestly false. world was made by God, it must therefore have been made Objection 7. Further, if the world was eternal, gener- from nothing or from something. But it was not made ation also was eternal. Therefore one man was begotten of from something; otherwise the matter of the world would another in an infinite series. But the father is the efficient have preceded the world; against which are the arguments cause of the son (Phys. ii, text 5). Therefore in efficient of Aristotle (De Coelo i), who held that heaven was un- causes there could be an infinite series, which is disproved generated. Therefore it must be said that the world was (Metaph. ii, text 5). made from nothing; and thus it has being after not being. Objection 8. Further, if the world and generation al- Therefore it must have begun. ways were, there have been an infinite number of men. Objection 3. Further, everything which works by in- But man’s soul is immortal: therefore an infinite number tellect works from some principle, as appears in all kinds of human souls would actually now exist, which is impos- of craftsmen. But God acts by intellect: therefore His sible. Therefore it can be known with certainty that the work has a principle. The world, therefore, which is His world began, and not only is it known by faith. effect, did not always exist. On the contrary, The articles of faith cannot be Objection 4. Further, it appears manifestly that cer- proved demonstratively, because faith is of things “that tain arts have developed, and certain countries have be- appear not” (Heb. 11:1). But that God is the Creator of gun to be inhabited at some fixed time. But this would not the world: hence that the world began, is an article of be the case if the world had been always. Therefore it is faith; for we say, “I believe in one God,” etc. And again, manifest that the world did not always exist. Gregory says (Hom. i in Ezech.), that Moses prophesied Objection 5. Further, it is certain that nothing can be of the past, saying, “In the beginning God created heaven 244 and earth”: in which words the newness of the world is God from nothing, not that it was made after nothing, ac-stated. Therefore the newness of the world is known only cording to what we understand by the word creation, but by revelation; and therefore it cannot be proved demon- that it was not made from anything; and so also some of stratively. them do not reject the word creation, as appears from Avi- I answer that, By faith alone do we hold, and by no cenna (Metaph. ix, text 4). demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not al- Reply to Objection 3. This is the argument of ways exist, as was said above of the mystery of the Trinity Anaxagoras (as quoted in Phys. viii, text 15). But it does (q. 32, a. 1). The reason of this is that the newness of the not lead to a necessary conclusion, except as to that intel- world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world it- lect which deliberates in order to find out what should be self. For the principle of demonstration is the essence of done, which is like movement. Such is the human intel- a thing. Now everything according to its species is ab- lect, but not the divine intellect (q. 14, Aa. 7,12). stracted from “here” and “now”; whence it is said that Reply to Objection 4. Those who hold the eternity of universals are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be the world hold that some region was changed an infinite demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone were not al- number of times, from being uninhabitable to being in- ways. Likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the part habitable and “vice versa,” and likewise they hold that the of the efficient cause, which acts by will. For the will of arts, by reason of various corruptions and accidents, were God cannot be investigated by reason, except as regards subject to an infinite variety of advance and decay. Hence those things which God must will of necessity; and what Aristotle says (Meteor. i), that it is absurd from such par- He wills about creatures is not among these, as was said ticular changes to hold the opinion of the newness of the above (q. 19, a. 3). But the divine will can be manifested whole world. by revelation, on which faith rests. Hence that the world Reply to Objection 5. Even supposing that the world began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demonstra- always was, it would not be equal to God in eternity, as tion or science. And it is useful to consider this, lest any- Boethius says (De Consol. v, 6); because the divine Being one, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should is all being simultaneously without succession; but with bring forward reasons that are not cogent, so as to give the world it is otherwise. occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such Reply to Objection 6. Passage is always understood grounds we believe things that are of faith. as being from term to term. Whatever bygone day we Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Civ. choose, from it to the present day there is a finite number Dei xi, 4), the opinion of philosophers who asserted the of days which can be passed through. The objection is eternity of the world was twofold. For some said that the founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an substance of the world was not from God, which is an in- infinite number of mean terms. tolerable error; and therefore it is refuted by proofs that Reply to Objection 7. In efficient causes it is impos- are cogent. Some, however, said that the world was eter- sible to proceed to infinity “per se”—thus, there cannot nal, although made by God. For they hold that the world be an infinite number of causes that are “per se” required has a beginning, not of time, but of creation, so that in a for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved certain hardly intelligible way it was always made. “And by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity. they try to explain their meaning thus (De Civ. Dei x, 31): But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity “acciden- for as, if the foot were always in the dust from eternity, tally” as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the there would always be a footprint which without doubt causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of was caused by him who trod on it, so also the world al- only one cause, their multiplication being accidental, as ways was, because its Maker always existed.” To under- an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally, stand this we must consider that the efficient cause, which because one after the other may be broken. It is acciden- acts by motion, of necessity precedes its effect in time; tal, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the because the effect is only in the end of the action, and ev- action of another; and likewise it is accidental to this par- ery agent must be the principle of action. But if the action ticular man as generator to be generated by another man; is instantaneous and not successive, it is not necessary for for he generates as a man, and not as the son of another the maker to be prior to the thing made in duration as ap- man. For all men generating hold one grade in efficient pears in the case of illumination. Hence they say that it causes—viz. the grade of a particular generator. Hence does not follow necessarily if God is the active cause of it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to the world, that He should be prior to the world in duration; infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if the gen- because creation, by which He produced the world, is not eration of this man depended upon this man, and on an a successive change, as was said above (q. 45, a. 2). elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity. Reply to Objection 2. Those who would say that the Reply to Objection 8. Those who hold the eternity world was eternal, would say that the world was made by of the world evade this reason in many ways. For some 245 do not think it impossible for there to be an actual infina course of time; a fuller consideration of which matters ity of souls, as appears from the Metaphysics of Algazel, will be given later (q. 75, a. 2; q. 118, a. 6). But be it noted who says that such a thing is an accidental infinity. But that this argument considers only a particular case. Hence this was disproved above (q. 7, a. 4). Some say that the one might say that the world was eternal, or least some soul is corrupted with the body. And some say that of creature, as an angel, but not man. But we are consider- all souls only one will remain. But others, as Augustine ing the question in general, as to whether any creature can says∗, asserted on this account a circuit of souls—viz. that exist from eternity. souls separated from their bodies return again thither after Whether the creation of things was in the beginning of time? Ia q. 46 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the creation of things Son by reason of wisdom, in order that, as it is said (Ps. was not in the beginning of time. For whatever is not in 103:24), “Thou hast made all things in wisdom,” it may be time, is not of any part of time. But the creation of things understood that God made all things in the beginning— was not in time; for by the creation the substance of things that is, in the Son; according to the word of the Apostle was brought into being; and time does not measure the (Col. 1:16), “In Him”—viz. the Son—“were created all substance of things, and especially of incorporeal things. things.” But others said that corporeal things were created Therefore creation was not in the beginning of time. by God through the medium of spiritual creation; and to Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. exclude this it is expounded thus: “In the beginning”— vi, text 40) that everything which is made, was being i.e. before all things—“God created heaven and earth.” made; and so to be made implies a “before” and “after.” For four things are stated to be created together—viz. the But in the beginning of time, since it is indivisible, there empyrean heaven, corporeal matter, by which is meant the is no “before” and “after.” Therefore, since to be created earth, time, and the angelic nature. is a kind of “being made,” it appears that things were not Reply to Objection 1. Things are said to be created created in the beginning of time. in the beginning of time, not as if the beginning of time Objection 3. Further, even time itself is created. But were a measure of creation, but because together with time cannot be created in the beginning of time, since time heaven and earth were created. time is divisible, and the beginning of time is indivisible. Reply to Objection 2. This saying of the Philosopher Therefore, the creation of things was not in the beginning is understood “of being made” by means of movement, or of time. as the term of movement. Because, since in every move- On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): “In the begin- ment there is “before” and “after,” before any one point ning God created heaven and earth.” in a given movement—that is, whilst anything is in the I answer that, The words of Genesis, “In the begin- process of being moved and made, there is a “before” and ning God created heaven and earth,” are expounded in also an “after,” because what is in the beginning of move- a threefold sense in order to exclude three errors. For ment or in its term is not in “being moved.” But creation is some said that the world always was, and that time had neither movement nor the term of movement, as was said no beginning; and to exclude this the words “In the begin- above (q. 45, Aa. 2,3). Hence a thing is created in such a ning” are expounded—viz. “of time.” And some said that way that it was not being created before. there are two principles of creation, one of good things Reply to Objection 3. Nothing is made except as it and the other of evil things, against which “In the be- exists. But nothing exists of time except “now.” Hence ginning” is expounded—“in the Son.” For as the effi- time cannot be made except according to some “now”; cient principle is appropriated to the Father by reason of not because in the first “now” is time, but because from it power, so the exemplar principle is appropriated to the time begins. ∗ Serm. xiv, De Temp. 4,5; De Haeres., haeres. 46; De Civ. Dei xii. 13 246 FIRST PART, QUESTION 47 Of the Distinction of Things in General (In Three Articles) After considering the production of creatures, we come to the consideration of the distinction of things. This consideration will be threefold—first, of the distinction of things in general; secondly, of the distinction of good and evil; thirdly, of the distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creature. Under the first head, there are three points of inquiry: (1) The multitude or distinction of things. (2) Their inequality. (3) The unity of the world. Whether the multitude and distinction of things come from God? Ia q. 47 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the multitude and Others have attributed the distinction of things to sec- distinction of things does not come from God. For one ondary agents, as did Avicenna, who said that God by naturally always makes one. But God is supremely one, understanding Himself, produced the first intelligence; in as appears from what precedes (q. 11, a. 4). Therefore He which, forasmuch as it was not its own being, there is nec- produces but one effect. essarily composition of potentiality and act, as will appear Objection 2. Further, the representation is assimilated later (q. 50, a. 3). And so the first intelligence, inasmuch to its exemplar. But God is the exemplar cause of His ef- as it understood the first cause, produced the second intel- fect, as was said above (q. 44, a. 3). Therefore, as God is ligence; and in so far as it understood itself as in poten- one, His effect is one only, and not diverse. tiality it produced the heavenly body, which causes move- Objection 3. Further, the means are proportional to ment, and inasmuch as it understood itself as having actu- the end. But the end of the creation is one—viz. the divine ality it produced the soul of the heavens. goodness, as was shown above (q. 44 , a. 4). Therefore the But this opinion cannot stand, for two reasons. First, effect of God is but one. because it was shown above (q. 45, a. 5) that to create be- On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:4,7) that God “di- longs to God alone, and hence what can be caused only vided the light from the darkness,” and “divided waters by creation is produced by God alone—viz. all those from waters.” Therefore the distinction and multitude of things which are not subject to generation and corruption. things is from God. Secondly, because, according to this opinion, the univer- I answer that, The distinction of things has been as- sality of things would not proceed from the intention of cribed to many causes. For some attributed the distinction the first agent, but from the concurrence of many active to matter, either by itself or with the agent. Democritus, causes; and such an effect we can describe only as being for instance, and all the ancient natural philosophers, who produced by chance. Therefore, the perfection of the uni- admitted no cause but matter, attributed it to matter alone; verse, which consists of the diversity of things, would thus and in their opinion the distinction of things comes from be a thing of chance, which is impossible. chance according to the movement of matter. Anaxagoras, Hence we must say that the distinction and multitude however, attributed the distinction and multitude of things of things come from the intention of the first agent, who to matter and to the agent together; and he said that the is God. For He brought things into being in order that intellect distinguishes things by extracting what is mixed His goodness might be communicated to creatures, and be up in matter. represented by them; and because His goodness could not But this cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because, be adequately represented by one creature alone, He pro- as was shown above (q. 44, a. 2), even matter itself was duced many and diverse creatures, that what was wanting created by God. Hence we must reduce whatever distinc- to one in the representation of the divine goodness might tion comes from matter to a higher cause. Secondly, be- be supplied by another. For goodness, which in God is cause matter is for the sake of the form, and not the form simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and divided for the matter, and the distinction of things comes from and hence the whole universe together participates the di- their proper forms. Therefore the distinction of things is vine goodness more perfectly, and represents it better than not on account of the matter; but rather, on the contrary, any single creature whatever. created matter is formless, in order that it may be accom- And because the divine wisdom is the cause of the modated to different forms. distinction of things, therefore Moses said that things are 247 made distinct by the word of God, which is the concept of uncreated image, which is perfect, is only one. But no His wisdom; and this is what we read in Gn. 1:3,4: “God creature represents the first exemplar perfectly, which is said: Be light made. . . And He divided the light from the the divine essence; and, therefore, it can be represented darkness.” by many things. Still, according as ideas are called exem- Reply to Objection 1. The natural agent acts by the plars, the plurality of ideas corresponds in the divine mind form which makes it what it is, and which is only one in to the plurality of things. one thing; and therefore its effect is one only. But the vol- Reply to Objection 3. In speculative things the untary agent, such as God is, as was shown above (q. 19, medium of demonstration, which demonstrates the con- a. 4), acts by an intellectual form. Since, therefore, it is clusion perfectly, is one only; whereas probable means of not against God’s unity and simplicity to understand many proof are many. Likewise when operation is concerned, if things, as was shown above (q. 15, a. 2), it follows that, the means be equal, so to speak, to the end, one only is although He is one, He can make many things. sufficient. But the creature is not such a means to its end, Reply to Objection 2. This reason would apply to the which is God; and hence the multiplication of creatures is representation which reflects the exemplar perfectly, and necessary. which is multiplied by reason of matter only; hence the Whether the inequality of things is from God? Ia q. 47 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the inequality of punishment of sin, which is contrary to what is said: “God things is not from God. For it belongs to the best to pro- saw all the things that He had made, and they were very duce the best. But among things that are best, one is not good” (Gn. 1:31). And, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, greater than another. Therefore, it belongs to God, Who 3): “What can be more foolish than to say that the divine is the Best, to make all things equal. Architect provided this one sun for the one world, not to Objection 2. Further, equality is the effect of unity be an ornament to its beauty, nor for the benefit of cor- (Metaph. v, text 20). But God is one. Therefore, He has poreal things, but that it happened through the sin of one made all things equal. soul; so that, if a hundred souls had sinned, there would Objection 3. Further, it is the part of justice to give be a hundred suns in the world?” unequal to unequal things. But God is just in all His Therefore it must be said that as the wisdom of God is works. Since, therefore, no inequality of things is presup- the cause of the distinction of things, so the same wisdom posed to the operation whereby He gives being to things, is the cause of their inequality. This may be explained it seems that He has made all things equal. as follows. A twofold distinction is found in things; one On the contrary, It is said (Ecclus. 33:7): “Why does is a formal distinction as regards things differing specifi- one day excel another, and one light another, and one year cally; the other is a material distinction as regards things another year, one sun another sun? [Vulg.: ‘when all come differing numerically only. And as the matter is on ac- of the sun’]. By the knowledge of the Lord they were dis- count of the form, material distinction exists for the sake tinguished.” of the formal distinction. Hence we see that in incorrupt- I answer that, When Origen wished to refute those ible things there is only one individual of each species, who said that the distinction of things arose from the con- forasmuch as the species is sufficiently preserved in the trary principles of good and evil, he said that in the be- one; whereas in things generated and corruptible there are ginning all things were created equal by God. For he as- many individuals of one species for the preservation of the serted that God first created only the rational creatures and species. Whence it appears that formal distinction is of all equal; and that inequality arose in them from free-will, greater consequence than material. Now, formal distinc- some being turned to God more and some less, and others tion always requires inequality, because as the Philoso- turned more and others less away from God. And so those pher says (Metaph. viii, 10), the forms of things are like rational creatures which were turned to God by free-will, numbers in which species vary by addition or subtraction were promoted to the order of angels according to the di- of unity. Hence in natural things species seem to be ar- versity of merits. And those who were turned away from ranged in degrees; as the mixed things are more perfect God were bound down to bodies according to the diversity than the elements, and plants than minerals, and animals of their sin; and he said this was the cause of the creation than plants, and men than other animals; and in each of and diversity of bodies. But according to this opinion, these one species is more perfect than others. Therefore, it would follow that the universality of bodily creatures as the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of would not be the effect of the goodness of God as com- things for the sake of the perfection of the universe, so municated to creatures, but it would be for the sake of the it is the cause of inequality. For the universe would not 248 be perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in the Father, to Whom, according to Augustine (De Doctr. things. Christ. i, 5), is appropriated unity, the Son proceeds to Reply to Objection 1. It is part of the best agent to Whom is appropriated equality, and then from Him the produce an effect which is best in its entirety; but this does creature proceeds, to which belongs inequality; but never- not mean that He makes every part of the whole the best theless even creatures share in a certain equality—namely, absolutely, but in proportion to the whole; in the case of an of proportion. animal, for instance, its goodness would be taken away if Reply to Objection 3. This is the argument that per- every part of it had the dignity of an eye. Thus, therefore, suaded Origen: but it holds only as regards the distribu- God also made the universe to be best as a whole, accord- tion of rewards, the inequality of which is due to unequal ing to the mode of a creature; whereas He did not make merits. But in the constitution of things there is no in- each single creature best, but one better than another. And equality of parts through any preceding inequality, either therefore we find it said of each creature, “God saw the of merits or of the disposition of the matter; but inequality light that it was good” (Gn. 1:4); and in like manner of comes from the perfection of the whole. This appears also each one of the rest. But of all together it is said, “God in works done by art; for the roof of a house differs from saw all the things that He had made, and they were very the foundation, not because it is made of other material; good” (Gn. 1:31). but in order that the house may be made perfect of differ- Reply to Objection 2. The first effect of unity is ent parts, the artificer seeks different material; indeed, he equality; and then comes multiplicity; and therefore from would make such material if he could. Whether there is only one world? Ia q. 47 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that there is not only one as shown above (q. 11, a. 3; q. 21, a. 1). Hence it must world, but many. Because, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, be that all things should belong to one world. Therefore qu. 46), it is unfitting to say that God has created things those only can assert that many worlds exist who do not without a reason. But for the same reason He created one, acknowledge any ordaining wisdom, but rather believe in He could create many, since His power is not limited to chance, as Democritus, who said that this world, besides the creation of one world; but rather it is infinite, as was an infinite number of other worlds, was made from a ca- shown above (q. 25, a. 2). Therefore God has produced sual concourse of atoms. many worlds. Reply to Objection 1. This reason proves that the Objection 2. Further, nature does what is best and world is one because all things must be arranged in one much more does God. But it is better for there to be many order, and to one end. Therefore from the unity of order worlds than one, because many good things are better than in things Aristotle infers (Metaph. xii, text 52) the unity a few. Therefore many worlds have been made by God. of God governing all; and Plato (Tim.), from the unity of Objection 3. Further, everything which has a form in the exemplar, proves the unity of the world, as the thing matter can be multiplied in number, the species remaining designed. the same, because multiplication in number comes from Reply to Objection 2. No agent intends material plu- matter. But the world has a form in matter. Thus as when rality as the end forasmuch as material multitude has no I say “man” I mean the form, and when I say “this man,” certain limit, but of itself tends to infinity, and the infinite I mean the form in matter; so when we say “world,” the is opposed to the notion of end. Now when it is said that form is signified, and when we say “this world,” the form many worlds are better than one, this has reference to ma- in the matter is signified. Therefore there is nothing to terial order. But the best in this sense is not the intention prevent the existence of many worlds. of the divine agent; forasmuch as for the same reason it On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 1:10): “The world might be said that if He had made two worlds, it would be was made by Him,” where the world is named as one, as better if He had made three; and so on to infinite. if only one existed. Reply to Objection 3. The world is composed of the I answer that, The very order of things created by whole of its matter. For it is not possible for there to be an- God shows the unity of the world. For this world is called other earth than this one, since every earth would naturally one by the unity of order, whereby some things are or- be carried to this central one, wherever it was. The same dered to others. But whatever things come from God, applies to the other bodies which are part of the world. have relation of order to each other, and to God Himself, 249 FIRST PART, QUESTION 48 The Distinction of Things in Particular (In Six Articles) We must now consider the distinction of things in particular; and firstly the distinction of good and evil; and then the distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creatures. Concerning the first, we inquire into evil and its cause. Concerning evil, six points are to be considered: (1) Whether evil is a nature? (2) Whether evil is found in things? (3) Whether good is the subject of evil? (4) Whether evil totally corrupts good? (5) The division of evil into pain and fault. (6) Whether pain, or fault, has more the nature of evil? Whether evil is a nature? Ia q. 48 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that evil is a nature. fection of any nature is good. Hence it cannot be that For every genus is a nature. But evil is a genus; for the evil signifies being, or any form or nature. Therefore it Philosopher says (Praedic. x) that “good and evil are not must be that by the name of evil is signified the absence in a genus, but are genera of other things.” Therefore evil of good. And this is what is meant by saying that “evil is is a nature. neither a being nor a good.” For since being, as such, is Objection 2. Further, every difference which consti- good, the absence of one implies the absence of the other. tutes a species is a nature. But evil is a difference con- Reply to Objection 1. Aristotle speaks there accord- stituting a species of morality; for a bad habit differs in ing to the opinion of Pythagoreans, who thought that evil species from a good habit, as liberality from illiberality. was a kind of nature; and therefore they asserted the exis- Therefore evil signifies a nature. tence of the genus of good and evil. For Aristotle, espe- Objection 3. Further, each extreme of two contraries cially in his logical works, brings forward examples that is a nature. But evil and good are not opposed as priva- in his time were probable in the opinion of some philoso- tion and habit, but as contraries, as the Philosopher shows phers. Or, it may be said that, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. x) by the fact that between good and evil there (Metaph. iv, text 6), “the first kind of contrariety is habit is a medium, and from evil there can be a return to good. and privation,” as being verified in all contraries; since Therefore evil signifies a nature. one contrary is always imperfect in relation to another, as Objection 4. Further, what is not, acts not. But evil black in relation to white, and bitter in relation to sweet. acts, for it corrupts good. Therefore evil is a being and a And in this way good and evil are said to be genera not nature. simply, but in regard to contraries; because, as every form Objection 5. Further, nothing belongs to the perfec- has the nature of good, so every privation, as such, has the tion of the universe except what is a being and a nature. nature of evil. But evil belongs to the perfection of the universe of things; Reply to Objection 2. Good and evil are not con- for Augustine says (Enchir. 10,11) that the “admirable stitutive differences except in morals, which receive their beauty of the universe is made up of all things. In which species from the end, which is the object of the will, the even what is called evil, well ordered and in its place, is source of all morality. And because good has the nature the eminent commendation of what is good.” Therefore of an end, therefore good and evil are specific differences evil is a nature. in moral things; good in itself, but evil as the absence of On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), the due end. Yet neither does the absence of the due end “Evil is neither a being nor a good.” by itself constitute a moral species, except as it is joined I answer that, One opposite is known through the to the undue end; just as we do not find the privation of other, as darkness is known through light. Hence also the substantial form in natural things, unless it is joined what evil is must be known from the nature of good. Now, to another form. Thus, therefore, the evil which is a con- we have said above that good is everything appetible; and stitutive difference in morals is a certain good joined to thus, since every nature desires its own being and its own the privation of another good; as the end proposed by the perfection, it must be said also that the being and the per- intemperate man is not the privation of the good of rea- 250 son, but the delight of sense without the order of reason. a thing is said to act effectively, as when a painter makes Hence evil is not a constitutive difference as such, but by a wall white. Thirdly, it is said in the sense of the final reason of the good that is annexed. cause, as the end is said to effect by moving the efficient Reply to Objection 3. This appears from the above. cause. But in these two ways evil does not effect anything For the Philosopher speaks there of good and evil in of itself, that is, as a privation, but by virtue of the good morality. Because in that respect, between good and evil annexed to it. For every action comes from some form; there is a medium, as good is considered as something and everything which is desired as an end, is a perfection. rightly ordered, and evil as a thing not only out of right And therefore, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): “Evil order, but also as injurious to another. Hence the Philoso- does not act, nor is it desired, except by virtue of some pher says (Ethic. iv, i) that a “prodigal man is foolish, but good joined to it: while of itself it is nothing definite, and not evil.” And from this evil in morality, there may be beside the scope of our will and intention.” a return to good, but not from any sort of evil, for from Reply to Objection 5. As was said above, the parts blindness there is no return to sight, although blindness is of the universe are ordered to each other, according as one an evil. acts on the other, and according as one is the end and ex- Reply to Objection 4. A thing is said to act in a three- emplar of the other. But, as was said above, this can only fold sense. In one way, formally, as when we say that happen to evil as joined to some good. Hence evil neither whiteness makes white; and in that sense evil considered belongs to the perfection of the universe, nor does it come even as a privation is said to corrupt good, forasmuch as it under the order of the same, except accidentally, that is, is itself a corruption or privation of good. In another sense by reason of some good joined to it. Whether evil is found in things? Ia q. 48 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that evil is not found in quires that there should be some which can fail in good- things. For whatever is found in things, is either some- ness, and thence it follows that sometimes they do fail. thing, or a privation of something, that is a “not-being.” Now it is in this that evil consists, namely, in the fact that But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “evil is dis- a thing fails in goodness. Hence it is clear that evil is tant from existence, and even more distant from non- found in things, as corruption also is found; for corrup- existence.” Therefore evil is not at all found in things. tion is itself an evil. Objection 2. Further, “being” and “thing” are con- Reply to Objection 1. Evil is distant both from simple vertible. If therefore evil is a being in things, it follows being and from simple “not-being,” because it is neither a that evil is a thing, which is contrary to what has been habit nor a pure negation, but a privation. said (a. 1). Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says Objection 3. Further, “the white unmixed with black (Metaph. v, text 14), being is twofold. In one way it is is the most white,” as the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 4). considered as signifying the entity of a thing, as divisi- Therefore also the good unmixed with evil is the greater ble by the ten “predicaments”; and in that sense it is con- good. But God makes always what is best, much more vertible with thing, and thus no privation is a being, and than nature does. Therefore in things made by God there neither therefore is evil a being. In another sense being is no evil. conveys the truth of a proposition which unites together On the contrary, On the above assumptions, all pro- subject and attribute by a copula, notified by this word hibitions and penalties would cease, for they exist only for “is”; and in this sense being is what answers to the ques- evils. tion, “Does it exist?” and thus we speak of blindness as I answer that, As was said above (q. 47, Aa. 1,2), the being in the eye; or of any other privation. In this way perfection of the universe requires that there should be in- even evil can be called a being. Through ignorance of this equality in things, so that every grade of goodness may be distinction some, considering that things may be evil, or realized. Now, one grade of goodness is that of the good that evil is said to be in things, believed that evil was a which cannot fail. Another grade of goodness is that of the positive thing in itself. good which can fail in goodness, and this grade is to be Reply to Objection 3. God and nature and any other found in existence itself; for some things there are which agent make what is best in the whole, but not what is best cannot lose their existence as incorruptible things, while in every single part, except in order to the whole, as was some there are which can lose it, as things corruptible. said above (q. 47, a. 2). And the whole itself, which is the As, therefore, the perfection of the universe requires universe of creatures, is all the better and more perfect if that there should be not only beings incorruptible, but also some things in it can fail in goodness, and do sometimes corruptible beings; so the perfection of the universe re- fail, God not preventing this. This happens, firstly, be- 251 cause “it belongs to Providence not to destroy, but to save no evil to exist; for fire would not be generated if air was nature,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); but it belongs not corrupted, nor would the life of a lion be preserved to nature that what may fail should sometimes fail; sec- unless the ass were killed. Neither would avenging justice ondly, because, as Augustine says (Enchir. 11), “God is so nor the patience of a sufferer be praised if there were no powerful that He can even make good out of evil.” Hence injustice. many good things would be taken away if God permitted Whether evil is in good as in its subject? Ia q. 48 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that evil is not in good as subject of the substantial form, and of privation of the op- its subject. For good is something that exists. But Diony- posite form; or whether it be being in relative potentiality, sius says (Div. Nom. iv, 4) that “evil does not exist, nor and absolute actuality, as in the case of a transparent body, is it in that which exists.” Therefore, evil is not in good as which is the subject both of darkness and light. It is, how- its subject. ever, manifest that the form which makes a thing actual Objection 2. Further, evil is not a being; whereas is a perfection and a good; and thus every actual being is good is a being. But “non-being” does not require being a good; and likewise every potential being, as such, is a as its subject. Therefore, neither does evil require good as good, as having a relation to good. For as it has being in its subject. potentiality, so has it goodness in potentiality. Therefore, Objection 3. Further, one contrary is not the subject the subject of evil is good. of another. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore, Reply to Objection 1. Dionysius means that evil is evil is not in good as in its subject. not in existing things as a part, or as a natural property of Objection 4. Further, the subject of whiteness is any existing thing. called white. Therefore also the subject of evil is evil. If, Reply to Objection 2. “Not-being,” understood nega- therefore, evil is in good as in its subject, it follows that tively, does not require a subject; but privation is negation good is evil, against what is said (Is. 5:20): “Woe to you in a subject, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, text 4), who call evil good, and good evil!” and such “not-being” is an evil. On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion 14) Reply to Objection 3. Evil is not in the good opposed that “evil exists only in good.” to it as in its subject, but in some other good, for the sub- I answer that, As was said above (a. 1), evil imports ject of blindness is not “sight,” but “animal.” Yet, it ap- the absence of good. But not every absence of good is pears, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 13), that the rule of evil. For absence of good can be taken in a privative and dialectics here fails, where it is laid down that contraries in a negative sense. Absence of good, taken negatively, is cannot exist together. But this is to be taken as referring to not evil; otherwise, it would follow that what does not ex- good and evil in general, but not in reference to any partic- ist is evil, and also that everything would be evil, through ular good and evil. For white and black, sweet and bitter, not having the good belonging to something else; for in- and the like contraries, are only considered as contraries stance, a man would be evil who had not the swiftness of in a special sense, because they exist in some determinate the roe, or the strength of a lion. But the absence of good, genus; whereas good enters into every genus. Hence one taken in a privative sense, is an evil; as, for instance, the good can coexist with the privation of another good. privation of sight is called blindness. Reply to Objection 4. The prophet invokes woe to Now, the subject of privation and of form is one and those who say that good as such is evil. But this does the same—viz. being in potentiality, whether it be being not follow from what is said above, as is clear from the in absolute potentiality, as primary matter, which is the explanation given. Whether evil corrupts the whole good? Ia q. 48 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that evil corrupts the taken away by evil. whole good. For one contrary is wholly corrupted by an- Objection 3. Further, evil, as long as it lasts, hurts, other. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore evil and takes away good. But that from which something is corrupts the whole good. always being removed, is at some time consumed, unless Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion it is infinite, which cannot be said of any created good. 12) that “evil hurts inasmuch as it takes away good.” But Therefore evil wholly consumes good. good is all of a piece and uniform. Therefore it is wholly On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) 252 that “evil cannot wholly consume good.” ies were interposed to infinity between the sun and the air, I answer that, Evil cannot wholly consume good. To the aptitude of the air to light would be infinitely dimin- prove this we must consider that good is threefold. One ished, but still it would never be wholly removed while the kind of good is wholly destroyed by evil, and this is the air remained, which in its very nature is transparent. Like- good opposed to evil, as light is wholly destroyed by dark- wise, addition in sin can be made to infinitude, whereby ness, and sight by blindness. Another kind of good is nei- the aptitude of the soul to grace is more and more less- ther wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil, and that is ened; and these sins, indeed, are like obstacles interposed the good which is the subject of evil; for by darkness the between us and God, according to Is. 59:2: “Our sins have substance of the air is not injured. And there is also a kind divided between us and God.” Yet the aforesaid aptitude of good which is diminished by evil, but is not wholly of the soul is not wholly taken away, for it belongs to its taken away; and this good is the aptitude of a subject to very nature. some actuality. Reply to Objection 1. The good which is opposed to The diminution, however, of this kind of good is not evil is wholly taken away; but other goods are not wholly to be considered by way of subtraction, as diminution in removed, as said above. quantity, but rather by way of remission, as diminution in Reply to Objection 2. The aforesaid aptitude is a qualities and forms. The remission likewise of this habi- medium between subject and act. Hence, where it touches tude is to be taken as contrary to its intensity. For this act, it is diminished by evil; but where it touches the sub- kind of aptitude receives its intensity by the dispositions ject, it remains as it was. Therefore, although good is like whereby the matter is prepared for actuality; which the to itself, yet, on account of its relation to different things, more they are multiplied in the subject the more is it fitted it is not wholly, but only partially taken away. to receive its perfection and form; and, on the contrary, Reply to Objection 3. Some, imagining that the it receives its remission by contrary dispositions which, diminution of this kind of good is like the diminution of the more they are multiplied in the matter, and the more quantity, said that just as the continuous is infinitely divis- they are intensified, the more is the potentiality remitted ible, if the division be made in an ever same proportion as regards the actuality. (for instance, half of half, or a third of a third), so is it in Therefore, if contrary dispositions cannot be multi-the present case. But this explanation does not avail here. plied and intensified to infinity, but only to a certain limit, For when in a division we keep the same proportion, we neither is the aforesaid aptitude diminished or remitted in- continue to subtract less and less; for half of half is less finitely, as appears in the active and passive qualities of the than half of the whole. But a second sin does not neces-elements; for coldness and humidity, whereby the aptitude sarily diminish the above mentioned aptitude less than a of matter to the form of fire is diminished or remitted, can- preceding sin, but perchance either equally or more. not be infinitely multiplied. But if the contrary disposi- Therefore it must be said that, although this aptitude is tions can be infinitely multiplied, the aforesaid aptitude is a finite thing, still it may be so diminished infinitely, not also infinitely diminished or remitted; yet, nevertheless, it “per se,” but accidentally; according as the contrary dis- is not wholly taken away, because its root always remains, positions are also increased infinitely, as explained above. which is the substance of the subject. Thus, if opaque bod- Whether evil is adequately divided into pain* and fault? Ia q. 48 a. 5 ∗ not a fault; for “temptation which involves no consent, is Objection 1. It would seem that evil is not adequately not a sin, but an occasion for the exercise of virtue,” as divided into pain and fault. For every defect is a kind of is said in a gloss on 2 Cor. 12; not is it a pain; because evil. But in all creatures there is the defect of not being temptation precedes the fault, and the pain follows after- able to preserve their own existence, which nevertheless wards. Therefore, evil is not sufficiently divided into pain is neither a pain nor a fault. Therefore evil is inadequately and fault. divided into pain and fault. Objection 4. On the contrary, It would seem that this Objection 2. Further, in irrational creatures there is division is superfluous: for, as Augustine says (Enchirid- neither fault nor pain; but, nevertheless, they have corrup- ion 12), a thing is evil “because it hurts.” But whatever tion and defect, which are evils. Therefore not every evil hurts is penal. Therefore every evil comes under pain. is a pain or a fault. I answer that, Evil, as was said above (a. 3) is the Objection 3. Further, temptation is an evil, but it is privation of good, which chiefly and of itself consists in ∗ Pain here means “penalty”: such was its original signification, being derived from “poena.” In this sense we say “Pain of death, Pain of loss, Pain of sense.”—Ed. 253 perfection and act. Act, however, is twofold; first, and sec-therefore not every defect of good is an evil, but the defect ond. The first act is the form and integrity of a thing; the of the good which is naturally due. For the want of sight second act is its operation. Therefore evil also is twofold. is not an evil in a stone, but it is an evil in an animal; since In one way it occurs by the subtraction of the form, or of it is against the nature of a stone to see. So, likewise, it any part required for the integrity of the thing, as blind- is against the nature of a creature to be preserved in exis- ness is an evil, as also it is an evil to be wanting in any tence by itself, because existence and conservation come member of the body. In another way evil exists by the from one and the same source. Hence this kind of defect withdrawal of the due operation, either because it does not is not an evil as regards a creature. exist, or because it has not its due mode and order. But be- Reply to Objection 2. Pain and fault do not divide cause good in itself is the object of the will, evil, which is evil absolutely considered, but evil that is found in volun- the privation of good, is found in a special way in ratio- tary things. nal creatures which have a will. Therefore the evil which Reply to Objection 3. Temptation, as importing comes from the withdrawal of the form and integrity of provocation to evil, is always an evil of fault in the the thing, has the nature of a pain; and especially so on tempter; but in the one tempted it is not, properly speak- the supposition that all things are subject to divine provi- ing, a fault; unless through the temptation some change is dence and justice, as was shown above (q. 22, a. 2); for it wrought in the one who is tempted; for thus is the action is of the very nature of a pain to be against the will. But of the agent in the patient. And if the tempted is changed the evil which consists in the subtraction of the due oper- to evil by the tempter he falls into fault. ation in voluntary things has the nature of a fault; for this Reply to Objection 4. In answer to the opposite argu- is imputed to anyone as a fault to fail as regards perfect ment, it must be said that the very nature of pain includes action, of which he is master by the will. Therefore every the idea of injury to the agent in himself, whereas the idea evil in voluntary things is to be looked upon as a pain or a of fault includes the idea of injury to the agent in his op- fault. eration; and thus both are contained in evil, as including Reply to Objection 1. Because evil is the privation of the idea of injury. good, and not a mere negation, as was said above (a. 3), Whether pain has the nature of evil more than fault has? Ia q. 48 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that pain has more of evil becomes evil by the evil of fault, but not by the evil of than fault. For fault is to pain what merit is to reward. But pain, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): “To be punished reward has more good than merit, as its end. Therefore is not an evil; but it is an evil to be made worthy of pun- pain has more evil in it than fault has. ishment.” And this because, since good absolutely con- Objection 2. Further, that is the greater evil which is sidered consists in act, and not in potentiality, and the ul- opposed to the greater good. But pain, as was said above timate act is operation, or the use of something possessed, (a. 5), is opposed to the good of the agent, while fault is it follows that the absolute good of man consists in good opposed to the good of the action. Therefore, since the operation, or the good use of something possessed. Now agent is better than the action, it seems that pain is worse we use all things by the act of the will. Hence from a than fault. good will, which makes a man use well what he has, man Objection 3. Further, the privation of the end is a pain is called good, and from a bad will he is called bad. For a consisting in forfeiting the vision of God; whereas the evil man who has a bad will can use ill even the good he has, of fault is privation of the order to the end. Therefore pain as when a grammarian of his own will speaks incorrectly. is a greater evil than fault. Therefore, because the fault itself consists in the disor- On the contrary, A wise workman chooses a less evil dered act of the will, and the pain consists in the privation in order to prevent a greater, as the surgeon cuts off a limb of something used by the will, fault has more of evil in it to save the whole body. But divine wisdom inflicts pain to than pain has. prevent fault. Therefore fault is a greater evil than pain. The second reason can be taken from the fact that God I answer that, Fault has the nature of evil more than is the author of the evil of pain, but not of the evil of fault. pain has; not only more than pain of sense, consisting in And this is because the evil of pain takes away the crea- the privation of corporeal goods, which kind of pain ap- ture’s good, which may be either something created, as peals to most men; but also more than any kind of pain, sight, destroyed by blindness, or something uncreated, as thus taking pain in its most general meaning, so as to in- by being deprived of the vision of God, the creature for- clude privation of grace or glory. feits its uncreated good. But the evil of fault is properly There is a twofold reason for this. The first is that one opposed to uncreated good; for it is opposed to the fulfil- 254 ment of the divine will, and to divine love, whereby the destroyed by fault is the more perfect good of the agent, divine good is loved for itself, and not only as shared by since it is the second perfection, than the good taken away the creature. Therefore it is plain that fault has more evil by pain, which is the first perfection. in it than pain has. Reply to Objection 3. Pain and fault are not to be Reply to Objection 1. Although fault results in pain, compared as end and order to the end; because one may as merit in reward, yet fault is not intended on account be deprived of both of these in some way, both by fault of the pain, as merit is for the reward; but rather, on the and by pain; by pain, accordingly as a man is removed contrary, pain is brought about so that the fault may be from the end and from the order to the end; by fault, inas- avoided, and thus fault is worse than pain. much as this privation belongs to the action which is not Reply to Objection 2. The order of action which is ordered to its due end. 255 FIRST PART, QUESTION 49 The Cause of Evil (In Three Articles) We next inquire into the cause of evil. Concerning this there are three points of inquire: (1) Whether good can be the cause of evil? (2) Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil? (3) Whether there be any supreme evil, which is the first cause of all evils? Whether good can be the cause of evil? Ia q. 49 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that good cannot be the tion, either of the principal or the instrumental agent; thus cause of evil. For it is said (Mat. 7:18): “A good tree the defect in the movement of an animal may happen by cannot bring forth evil fruit.” reason of the weakness of the motive power, as in the Objection 2. Further, one contrary cannot be the case of children, or by reason only of the ineptitude of cause of another. But evil is the contrary to good. There- the instrument, as in the lame. On the other hand, evil is fore good cannot be the cause of evil. caused in a thing, but not in the proper effect of the agent, Objection 3. Further, a deficient effect can proceed sometimes by the power of the agent, sometimes by rea- only from a deficient cause. But evil is a deficient effect. son of a defect, either of the agent or of the matter. It is Therefore its cause, if it has one, is deficient. But every- caused by reason of the power or perfection of the agent thing deficient is an evil. Therefore the cause of evil can when there necessarily follows on the form intended by only be evil. the agent the privation of another form; as, for instance, Objection 4. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) when on the form of fire there follows the privation of the that evil has no cause. Therefore good is not the cause of form of air or of water. Therefore, as the more perfect evil. the fire is in strength, so much the more perfectly does it On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Julian. i, 9): impress its own form, so also the more perfectly does it “There is no possible source of evil except good.” corrupt the contrary. Hence that evil and corruption befall I answer that, It must be said that every evil in some air and water comes from the perfection of the fire: but way has a cause. For evil is the absence of the good, this is accidental; because fire does not aim at the priva- which is natural and due to a thing. But that anything tion of the form of water, but at the bringing in of its own fail from its natural and due disposition can come only form, though by doing this it also accidentally causes the from some cause drawing it out of its proper disposition. other. But if there is a defect in the proper effect of the For a heavy thing is not moved upwards except by some fire—as, for instance, that it fails to heat—this comes ei- impelling force; nor does an agent fail in its action except ther by defect of the action, which implies the defect of from some impediment. But only good can be a cause; some principle, as was said above, or by the indisposition because nothing can be a cause except inasmuch as it is a of the matter, which does not receive the action of the fire, being, and every being, as such, is good. the agent. But this very fact that it is a deficient being And if we consider the special kinds of causes, we see is accidental to good to which of itself it belongs to act. that the agent, the form, and the end, import some kind Hence it is true that evil in no way has any but an acciden- of perfection which belongs to the notion of good. Even tal cause; and thus is good the cause of evil. matter, as a potentiality to good, has the nature of good. Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (Contra Ju- Now that good is the cause of evil by way of the material lian. i): “The Lord calls an evil will the evil tree, and a cause was shown above (q. 48, a. 3). For it was shown that good will a good tree.” Now, a good will does not pro- good is the subject of evil. But evil has no formal cause, duce a morally bad act, since it is from the good will itself rather is it a privation of form; likewise, neither has it a fi-that a moral act is judged to be good. Nevertheless the nal cause, but rather is it a privation of order to the proper movement itself of an evil will is caused by the rational end; since not only the end has the nature of good, but also creature, which is good; and thus good is the cause of the useful, which is ordered to the end. Evil, however, has evil. a cause by way of an agent, not directly, but accidentally. Reply to Objection 2. Good does not cause that evil In proof of this, we must know that evil is caused in which is contrary to itself, but some other evil: thus the the action otherwise than in the effect. In the action evil goodness of the fire causes evil to the water, and man, is caused by reason of the defect of some principle of ac- good as to his nature, causes an act morally evil. And, as 256 explained above (q. 19, a. 9), this is by accident. More-follows in the effect, unless some other evil pre-exists in over, it does happen sometimes that one contrary causes the agent or in the matter, as was said above. But in vol- another by accident: for instance, the exterior surround- untary things the defect of the action comes from the will ing cold heats (the body) through the concentration of the actually deficient, inasmuch as it does not actually sub- inward heat. ject itself to its proper rule. This defect, however, is not a Reply to Objection 3. Evil has a deficient cause in fault, but fault follows upon it from the fact that the will voluntary things otherwise than in natural things. For the acts with this defect. natural agent produces the same kind of effect as it is it- Reply to Objection 4. Evil has no direct cause, but self, unless it is impeded by some exterior thing; and this only an accidental cause, as was said above. amounts to some defect belonging to it. Hence evil never Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil? Ia q. 49 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the supreme good, things created is the good of the order of the universe. God, is the cause of evil. For it is said (Is. 45:5,7): “I am Now, the order of the universe requires, as was said above the Lord, and there is no other God, forming the light, and (q. 22, a. 2, ad 2; q. 48, a. 2), that there should be some creating darkness, making peace, and creating evil.” And things that can, and do sometimes, fail. And thus God, Amos 3:6, “Shall there be evil in a city, which the Lord by causing in things the good of the order of the universe, hath not done?” consequently and as it were by accident, causes the cor- Objection 2. Further, the effect of the secondary ruptions of things, according to 1 2:6: “The Lord killeth cause is reduced to the first cause. But good is the cause and maketh alive.” But when we read that “God hath not of evil, as was said above (a. 1). Therefore, since God is made death” (Wis. 1:13), the sense is that God does not the cause of every good, as was shown above (q. 2 , a. 3; will death for its own sake. Nevertheless the order of jus- q. 6, Aa. 1,4), it follows that also every evil is from God. tice belongs to the order of the universe; and this requires Objection 3. Further, as is said by the Philosopher that penalty should be dealt out to sinners. And so God is (Phys. ii, text 30), the cause of both safety and danger of the author of the evil which is penalty, but not of the evil the ship is the same. But God is the cause of the safety of which is fault, by reason of what is said above. all things. Therefore He is the cause of all perdition and Reply to Objection 1. These passages refer to the evil of all evil. of penalty, and not to the evil of fault. On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21), Reply to Objection 2. The effect of the deficient sec- that, “God is not the author of evil because He is not the ondary cause is reduced to the first non-deficient cause cause of tending to not-being.” as regards what it has of being and perfection, but not I answer that, As appears from what was said (a. 1), as regards what it has of defect; just as whatever there the evil which consists in the defect of action is always is of motion in the act of limping is caused by the motive caused by the defect of the agent. But in God there is power, whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does not no defect, but the highest perfection, as was shown above come from the motive power, but from the curvature of the (q. 4, a. 1). Hence, the evil which consists in defect of leg. And, likewise, whatever there is of being and action action, or which is caused by defect of the agent, is not in a bad action, is reduced to God as the cause; whereas reduced to God as to its cause. whatever defect is in it is not caused by God, but by the But the evil which consists in the corruption of some deficient secondary cause. things is reduced to God as the cause. And this appears Reply to Objection 3. The sinking of a ship is at- as regards both natural things and voluntary things. For tributed to the sailor as the cause, from the fact that he it was said (a. 1) that some agent inasmuch as it produces does not fulfil what the safety of the ship requires; but by its power a form to which follows corruption and de- God does not fail in doing what is necessary for the safety fect, causes by its power that corruption and defect. But of all. Hence there is no parity. it is manifest that the form which God chiefly intends in Whether there be one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil? Ia q. 49 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that there is one supreme life against death; so also is the sinner against a just man.” evil which is the cause of every evil. For contrary effects Therefore there are many contrary principles, one of good, have contrary causes. But contrariety is found in things, the other of evil. according to Ecclus. 33:15: “Good is set against evil, and Objection 2. Further, if one contrary is in nature, so 257 is the other. But the supreme good is in nature, and is the cause. cause of every good, as was shown above (q. 2, a. 3; q. 6, Those, however, who upheld two first principles, one Aa. 2,4). Therefore, also, there is a supreme evil opposed good and the other evil, fell into this error from the same to it as the cause of every evil. cause, whence also arose other strange notions of the an- Objection 3. Further, as we find good and better cients; namely, because they failed to consider the univer- things, so we find evil and worse. But good and better are sal cause of all being, and considered only the particular so considered in relation to what is best. Therefore evil causes of particular effects. For on that account, if they and worse are so considered in relation to some supreme found a thing hurtful to something by the power of its own evil. nature, they thought that the very nature of that thing was Objection 4. Further, everything participated is re- evil; as, for instance, if one should say that the nature of duced to what is essential. But things which are evil fire was evil because it burnt the house of a poor man. The among us are evil not essentially, but by participation. judgment, however, of the goodness of anything does not Therefore we must seek for some supreme essential evil, depend upon its order to any particular thing, but rather which is the cause of every evil. upon what it is in itself, and on its order to the whole uni- Objection 5. Further, whatever is accidental is re- verse, wherein every part has its own perfectly ordered duced to that which is “per se.” But good is the accidental place, as was said above (q. 47, a. 2, ad 1). cause of evil. Therefore, we must suppose some supreme Likewise, because they found two contrary particu- evil which is the “per se” cause of evils. Nor can it be lar causes of two contrary particular effects, they did not said that evil has no “per se” cause, but only an accidental know how to reduce these contrary particular causes to cause; for it would then follow that evil would not exist in the universal common cause; and therefore they extended the many, but only in the few. the contrariety of causes even to the first principles. But Objection 6. Further, the evil of the effect is reduced since all contraries agree in something common, it is nec- to the evil of the cause; because the deficient effect comes essary to search for one common cause for them above from the deficient cause, as was said above (Aa. 1,2). But their own contrary proper causes; as above the contrary we cannot proceed to infinity in this matter. Therefore, we qualities of the elements exists the power of a heavenly must suppose one first evil as the cause of every evil. body; and above all things that exist, no matter how, there On the contrary, The supreme good is the cause of exists one first principle of being, as was shown above every being, as was shown above (q. 2, a. 3; q. 6, a. 4). (q. 2, a. 3). Therefore there cannot be any principle opposed to it as Reply to Objection 1. Contraries agree in one genus, the cause of evils. and they also agree in the nature of being; and therefore, I answer that, It appears from what precedes that although they have contrary particular cause, nevertheless there is no one first principle of evil, as there is one first we must come at last to one first common cause. principle of good. Reply to Objection 2. Privation and habit belong nat- First, indeed, because the first principle of good is es- urally to the same subject. Now the subject of privation sentially good, as was shown above (q. 6, Aa. 3,4). But is a being in potentiality, as was said above (q. 48, a. 3). nothing can be essentially bad. For it was shown above Hence, since evil is privation of good, as appears from that every being, as such, is good (q. 5, a. 3); and that evil what was said above (q. 48, Aa. 1, 2,3), it is opposed can exist only in good as in its subject (q. 48, a. 3). to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the Secondly, because the first principle of good is the supreme good, who is pure act. highest and perfect good which pre-contains in itself all Reply to Objection 3. Increase in intensity is in pro- goodness, as shown above (q. 6, a. 2). But there cannot be portion to the nature of a thing. And as the form is a per- a supreme evil; because, as was shown above (q. 48, a. 4), fection, so privation removes a perfection. Hence every although evil always lessens good, yet it never wholly form, perfection, and good is intensified by approach to consumes it; and thus, while good ever remains, nothing the perfect term; but privation and evil by receding from can be wholly and perfectly bad. Therefore, the Philoso- that term. Hence a thing is not said to be evil and worse, pher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that “if the wholly evil could be, by reason of access to the supreme evil, in the same way it would destroy itself”; because all good being destroyed as it is said to be good and better, by reason of access to (which it need be for something to be wholly evil), evil the supreme good. itself would be taken away, since its subject is good. Reply to Objection 4. No being is called evil by par- Thirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the ticipation, but by privation of participation. Hence it is not idea of a first principle; both because every evil is caused necessary to reduce it to any essential evil. by good, as was shown above (a. 1), and because evil can Reply to Objection 5. Evil can only have an acciden- be only an accidental cause, and thus it cannot be the first tal cause, as was shown above (a. 1). Hence reduction to cause, for the accidental cause is subsequent to the direct any ‘per se’ cause of evil is impossible. And to say that 258 evil is in the greater number is simply false. For things the senses is not the good of man as man—that is, in re-which are generated and corrupted, in which alone can gard to reason; and more men seek good in regard to the there be natural evil, are the smaller part of the whole uni- senses than good according to reason. verse. And again, in every species the defect of nature is Reply to Objection 6. In the causes of evil we do in the smaller number. In man alone does evil appear as not proceed to infinity, but reduce all evils to some good in the greater number; because the good of man as regards cause, whence evil follows accidentally. 259 FIRST PART, QUESTION 50 Of the Substance of the Angels Absolutely Considered (In Five Articles) Now we consider the distinction of corporeal and spiritual creatures: firstly, the purely spiritual creature which in Holy Scripture is called angel; secondly, the creature wholly corporeal; thirdly, the composite creature, corporeal and spiritual, which is man. Concerning the angels, we consider first what belongs to their substance; secondly, what belongs to their intellect; thirdly, what belongs to their will; fourthly, what belongs to their creation. Their substance we consider absolutely and in relation to corporeal things. Concerning their substance absolutely considered, there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is any entirely spiritual creature, altogether incorporeal? (2) Supposing that an angel is such, we ask whether it is composed of matter and form? (3) We ask concerning their number. (4) Of their difference from each other. (5) Of their immortality or incorruptibility. Whether an angel is altogether incorporeal? Ia q. 50 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that an angel is not en- limited to “here” and “now.” Hence the perfection of the tirely incorporeal. For what is incorporeal only as regards universe requires the existence of an incorporeal creature. ourselves, and not in relation to God, is not absolutely in- The ancients, however, not properly realizing the force corporeal. But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that of intelligence, and failing to make a proper distinction “an angel is said to be incorporeal and immaterial as re- between sense and intellect, thought that nothing existed gards us; but compared to God it is corporeal and material. in the world but what could be apprehended by sense and Therefore he is not simply incorporeal.” imagination. And because bodies alone fall under imagi- Objection 2. Further, nothing is moved except a body, nation, they supposed that no being existed except bodies, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vi, text 32). But Dama- as the Philosopher observes (Phys. iv, text 52,57). Thence scene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that “an angel is an ever came the error of the Sadducees, who said there was no movable intellectual substance.” Therefore an angel is a spirit (Acts 23:8). corporeal substance. But the very fact that intellect is above sense is a rea- Objection 3. Further, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. sonable proof that there are some incorporeal things com- i, 7): “Every creature is limited within its own nature.” prehensible by the intellect alone. But to be limited belongs to bodies. Therefore, every Reply to Objection 1. Incorporeal substances rank creature is corporeal. Now angels are God’s creatures, between God and corporeal creatures. Now the medium as appears from Ps. 148:2: “Praise ye” the Lord, “all compared to one extreme appears to be the other extreme, His angels”; and, farther on (verse 4), “For He spoke, and as what is tepid compared to heat seems to be cold; and they were made; He commanded, and they were created.” thus it is said that angels, compared to God, are material Therefore angels are corporeal. and corporeal, not, however, as if anything corporeal ex- On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 103:4): “Who makes isted in them. His angels spirits.” Reply to Objection 2. Movement is there taken in I answer that, There must be some incorporeal crea- the sense in which it is applied to intelligence and will. tures. For what is principally intended by God in crea- Therefore an angel is called an ever mobile substance, be- tures is good, and this consists in assimilation to God cause he is ever actually intelligent, and not as if he were Himself. And the perfect assimilation of an effect to a sometimes actually and sometimes potentially, as we are. cause is accomplished when the effect imitates the cause Hence it is clear that the objection rests on an equivoca- according to that whereby the cause produces the effect; tion. as heat makes heat. Now, God produces the creature by Reply to Objection 3. To be circumscribed by lo- His intellect and will (q. 14, a. 8; q. 19, a. 4 ). Hence the cal limits belongs to bodies only; whereas to be circum- perfection of the universe requires that there should be in- scribed by essential limits belongs to all creatures, both tellectual creatures. Now intelligence cannot be the action corporeal and spiritual. Hence Ambrose says (De Spir. of a body, nor of any corporeal faculty; for every body is Sanct. i, 7) that “although some things are not contained 260 in corporeal place, still they are none the less circumscribed by their substance.” Whether an angel is composed of matter and form? Ia q. 50 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that an angel is composed real form, and another receives the spiritual form. Mat- of matter and form. For everything which is contained un- ter, however, is not divisible into parts except as regarded der any genus is composed of the genus, and of the differ- under quantity; and without quantity substance is indivisi- ence which added to the genus makes the species. But the ble, as Aristotle says (Phys. i, text 15). Therefore it would genus comes from the matter, and the difference from the follow that the matter of spiritual things is subject to quan- form (Metaph. xiii, text 6). Therefore everything which is tity; which cannot be. Therefore it is impossible that cor- in a genus is composed of matter and form. But an angel poreal and spiritual things should have the same matter. is in the genus of substance. Therefore he is composed of It is, further, impossible for an intellectual substance matter and form. to have any kind of matter. For the operation belonging to Objection 2. Further, wherever the properties of mat- anything is according to the mode of its substance. Now ter exist, there is matter. Now the properties of matter to understand is an altogether immaterial operation, as ap- are to receive and to substand; whence Boethius says (De pears from its object, whence any act receives its species Trin.) that “a simple form cannot be a subject”: and the and nature. For a thing is understood according to its de- above properties are found in the angel. Therefore an an- gree of immateriality; because forms that exist in matter gel is composed of matter and form. are individual forms which the intellect cannot apprehend Objection 3. Further, form is act. So what is form as such. Hence it must be that every individual substance only is pure act. But an angel is not pure act, for this be- is altogether immaterial. longs to God alone. Therefore an angel is not form only, But things distinguished by the intellect are not neces- but has a form in matter. sarily distinguished in reality; because the intellect does Objection 4. Further, form is properly limited and not apprehend things according to their mode, but accord- perfected by matter. So the form which is not in matter is ing to its own mode. Hence material things which are an infinite form. But the form of an angel is not infinite, below our intellect exist in our intellect in a simpler mode for every creature is finite. Therefore the form of an angel than they exist in themselves. Angelic substances, on the is in matter. other hand, are above our intellect; and hence our intel- On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): lect cannot attain to apprehend them, as they are in them- “The first creatures are understood to be as immaterial as selves, but by its own mode, according as it apprehends they are incorporeal.” composite things; and in this way also it apprehends God I answer that, Some assert that the angels are com- (q. 3). posed of matter and form; which opinion Avicebron en- Reply to Objection 1. It is difference which con- deavored to establish in his book of the Fount of Life. stitutes the species. Now everything is constituted in a For he supposes that whatever things are distinguished by species according as it is determined to some special grade the intellect are really distinct. Now as regards incorpo- of being because “the species of things are like numbers,” real substance, the intellect apprehends that which distin- which differ by addition and subtraction of unity, as the guishes it from corporeal substance, and that which it has Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text 10). But in mate- in common with it. Hence he concludes that what distin- rial things there is one thing which determines to a special guishes incorporeal from corporeal substance is a kind of grade, and that is the form; and another thing which is de- form to it, and whatever is subject to this distinguishing termined, and this is the matter; and hence from the latter form, as it were something common, is its matter. There- the “genus” is derived, and from the former the “differ- fore, he asserts the universal matter of spiritual and cor- ence.” Whereas in immaterial things there is no separate poreal things is the same; so that it must be understood determinator and thing determined; each thing by its own that the form of incorporeal substance is impressed in the self holds a determinate grade in being; and therefore in matter of spiritual things, in the same way as the form of them “genus” and “difference” are not derived from dif- quantity is impressed in the matter of corporeal things. ferent things, but from one and the same. Nevertheless, But one glance is enough to show that there cannot this differs in our mode of conception; for, inasmuch as be one matter of spiritual and of corporeal things. For it is our intellect considers it as indeterminate, it derives the not possible that a spiritual and a corporeal form should be idea of their “genus”; and inasmuch as it considers it de- received into the same part of matter, otherwise one and terminately, it derives the idea of their “difference.” the same thing would be corporeal and spiritual. Hence it Reply to Objection 2. This reason is given in the book would follow that one part of matter receives the corpo- on the Fount of Life, and it would be cogent, supposing 261 that the receptive mode of the intellect and of matter were an angel is composed of, “whereby he is,” and “what is,” the same. But this is clearly false. For matter receives the or “existence,” and “what is,” as Boethius says. For “what form, that thereby it may be constituted in some species, is,” is the form itself subsisting; and the existence itself is either of air, or of fire, or of something else. But the intel-whereby the substance is; as the running is whereby the lect does not receive the form in the same way; otherwise runner runs. But in God “existence” and “what is” are not the opinion of Empedocles (De Anima i, 5, text 26) would different as was explained above (q. 3, a. 4). Hence God be true, to the effect that we know earth by earth, and fire alone is pure act. by fire. But the intelligible form is in the intellect accord- Reply to Objection 4. Every creature is simply finite, ing to the very nature of a form; for as such is it so known inasmuch as its existence is not absolutely subsisting, but by the intellect. Hence such a way of receiving is not that is limited to some nature to which it belongs. But there of matter, but of an immaterial substance. is nothing against a creature being considered relatively Reply to Objection 3. Although there is no compo- infinite. Material creatures are infinite on the part of mat- sition of matter and form in an angel, yet there is act and ter, but finite in their form, which is limited by the matter potentiality. And this can be made evident if we consider which receives it. But immaterial created substances are the nature of material things which contain a twofold com- finite in their being; whereas they are infinite in the sense position. The first is that of form and matter, whereby the that their forms are not received in anything else; as if we nature is constituted. Such a composite nature is not its were to say, for example, that whiteness existing separate own existence but existence is its act. Hence the nature is infinite as regards the nature of whiteness, forasmuch as itself is related to its own existence as potentiality to act. it is not contracted to any one subject; while its “being” is Therefore if there be no matter, and supposing that the finite as determined to some one special nature. form itself subsists without matter, there nevertheless still Whence it is said (De Causis, prop. 16) that “intel- remains the relation of the form to its very existence, as of ligence is finite from above,” as receiving its being from potentiality to act. And such a kind of composition is un- above itself, and is “infinite from below,” as not received derstood to be in the angels; and this is what some say, that in any matter. Whether the angels exist in any great number? Ia q. 50 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels are not in ing to the requirements of the first bodies—that is, of the great numbers. For number is a species of quantity, and heavenly ones, so that in some way the shedding form of follows the division of a continuous body. But this cannot the aforesaid rays may be terminated in them; and hence be in the angels, since they are incorporeal, as was shown the same conclusion is to be drawn as before. above (a. 1). Therefore the angels cannot exist in any great On the contrary, It is said (Dan. 7:10): “Thousands number. of thousands ministered to Him, and ten thousands times Objection 2. Further, the more a thing approaches a hundred thousand stood before Him.” to unity, so much the less is it multiplied, as is evident I answer that, There have been various opinions with in numbers. But among other created natures the angelic regard to the number of the separate substances. Plato nature approaches nearest to God. Therefore since God contended that the separate substances are the species of is supremely one, it seems that there is the least possible sensible things; as if we were to maintain that human na- number in the angelic nature. ture is a separate substance of itself: and according to Objection 3. Further, the proper effect of the separate this view it would have to be maintained that the num- substances seems to be the movements of the heavenly ber of the separate substances is the number of the species bodies. But the movements of the heavenly bodies fall of sensible things. Aristotle, however, rejects this view within some small determined number, which we can ap- (Metaph. i, text 31) because matter is of the very nature prehend. Therefore the angels are not in greater number of the species of sensible things. Consequently the sep- than the movements of the heavenly bodies. arate substances cannot be the exemplar species of these Objection 4. Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “all sensible things; but have their own fixed natures, which intelligible and intellectual substances subsist because of are higher than the natures of sensible things. Neverthe- the rays of the divine goodness.” But a ray is only multi- less Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43) that those more plied according to the different things that receive it. Now perfect natures bear relation to these sensible things, as it cannot be said that their matter is receptive of an intelli- that of mover and end; and therefore he strove to find out gible ray, since intellectual substances are immaterial, as the number of the separate substances according to the was shown above (a. 2). Therefore it seems that the mul- number of the first movements. tiplication of intellectual substances can only be accord- But since this appears to militate against the teach- 262 ings of Sacred Scripture, Rabbi Moses the Jew, wishing to Reply to Objection 1. In the angels number is not that bring both into harmony, held that the angels, in so far as of discrete quantity, brought about by division of what they are styled immaterial substances, are multiplied ac- is continuous, but that which is caused by distinction of cording to the number of heavenly movements or bodies, forms; according as multitude is reckoned among the tran- as Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43); while he contended scendentals, as was said above (q. 30, a. 3; q. 11). that in the Scriptures even men bearing a divine message Reply to Objection 2. From the angelic nature being are styled angels; and again, even the powers of natural the nighest unto God, it must needs have least of multi- things, which manifest God’s almighty power. It is, how- tude in its composition, but not so as to be found in few ever, quite foreign to the custom of the Scriptures for the subjects. powers of irrational things to be designated as angels. Reply to Objection 3. This is Aristotle’s argument Hence it must be said that the angels, even inasmuch (Metaph. xii, text 44), and it would conclude necessarily as they are immaterial substances, exist in exceeding great if the separate substances were made for corporeal sub- number, far beyond all material multitude. This is what stances. For thus the immaterial substances would exist Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiv): “There are many to no purpose, unless some movement from them were to blessed armies of the heavenly intelligences, surpassing appear in corporeal things. But it is not true that the im- the weak and limited reckoning of our material numbers.” material substances exist on account of the corporeal, be- The reason whereof is this, because, since it is the per- cause the end is nobler than the means to the end. Hence fection of the universe that God chiefly intends in the cre- Aristotle says (Metaph. xii, text 44) that this is not a nec- ation of things, the more perfect some things are, in so essary argument, but a probable one. He was forced to much greater an excess are they created by God. Now, as make use of this argument, since only through sensible in bodies such excess is observed in regard to their mag- things can we come to know intelligible ones. nitude, so in things incorporeal is it observed in regard to Reply to Objection 4. This argument comes from the their multitude. We see, in fact, that incorruptible bodies, opinion of such as hold that matter is the cause of the dis- exceed corruptible bodies almost incomparably in mag- tinction of things; but this was refuted above (q. 47, a. 1). nitude; for the entire sphere of things active and passive Accordingly, the multiplication of the angels is not to be is something very small in comparison with the heavenly taken according to matter, nor according to bodies, but ac- bodies. Hence it is reasonable to conclude that the imma- cording to the divine wisdom devising the various orders terial substances as it were incomparably exceed material of immaterial substances. substances as to multitude. Whether the angels differ in species? Ia q. 50 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels do not dif- such thing as “first” and “second” [prius et posterius], as fer in species. For since the “difference” is nobler than the Philosopher says (Metaph. iii, text 2). But in the an- the ‘genus,’ all things which agree in what is noblest in gels even of the one order there are first, middle, and last, them, agree likewise in their ultimate constitutive differ- as Dionysius says (Hier. Ang. x). Therefore the angels ence; and so they are the same according to species. But are not of the same species. all angels agree in what is noblest in them—that is to I answer that, Some have said that all spiritual sub- say, in intellectuality. Therefore all the angels are of one stances, even souls, are of the one species. Others, again, species. that all the angels are of the one species, but not souls; Objection 2. Further, more and less do not change a while others allege that all the angels of one hierarchy, or species. But the angels seem to differ only from one an- even of one order, are of the one species. other according to more and less—namely, as one is sim- But this is impossible. For such things as agree in pler than another, and of keener intellect. Therefore the species but differ in number, agree in form, but are distin- angels do not differ specifically. guished materially. If, therefore, the angels be not com- Objection 3. Further, soul and angel are contra- posed of matter and form, as was said above (a. 2), it distinguished mutually from each other. But all souls are follows that it is impossible for two angels to be of one of the one species. So therefore are the angels. species; just as it would be impossible for there to be sev- Objection 4. Further, the more perfect a thing is in na- eral whitenesses apart, or several humanities, since white- ture, the more ought it to be multiplied. But this would not nesses are not several, except in so far as they are in sev- be so if there were but one individual under one species. eral substances. And if the angels had matter, not even Therefore there are many angels of one species. then could there be several angels of one species. For it On the contrary, In things of one species there is no would be necessary for matter to be the principle of dis- 263 tinction of one from the other, not, indeed, according to Reply to Objection 2. More and less change the the division of quantity, since they are incorporeal, but species, not according as they are caused by the inten- according to the diversity of their powers; and such diver- sity or remissness of one form, but according as they are sity of matter causes diversity not merely of species, but caused by forms of diverse degrees; for instance, if we of genus. say that fire is more perfect than air: and in this way the Reply to Objection 1. “Difference” is nobler than angels are diversified according to more or less. “genus,” as the determined is more noble than the unde- Reply to Objection 3. The good of the species pre- termined, and the proper than the common, but not as one ponderates over the good of the individual. Hence it is nature is nobler than another; otherwise it would be nec- much better for the species to be multiplied in the angels essary that all irrational animals be of the same species; than for individuals to be multiplied in the one species. or that there should be in them some form which is higher Reply to Objection 4. Numerical multiplication, than the sensible soul. Therefore irrational animals differ since it can be drawn out infinitely, is not intended by the in species according to the various determined degrees of agent, but only specific multiplication, as was said above sensitive nature; and in like manner all the angels differ (q. 47, a. 3). Hence the perfection of the angelic nature in species according to the diverse degrees of intellectual calls for the multiplying of species, but not for the multi- nature. plying of individuals in one species. Whether the angels are incorruptible? Ia q. 50 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels are not form: whereas matter is an actual being by the form. Con- incorruptible; for Damascene, speaking of the angel, says sequently a subject composed of matter and form ceases (De Fide Orth. ii, 3) that he is “an intellectual substance, to be actually when the form is separated from the matter. partaking of immortality by favor, and not by nature.” But if the form subsists in its own being, as happens in the Objection 2. Further, Plato says in the Timaeus: “O angels, as was said above (a. 2), it cannot lose its being. gods of gods, whose maker and father am I: You are in- Therefore, the angel’s immateriality is the cause why it is deed my works, dissoluble by nature, yet indissoluble be- incorruptible by its own nature. cause I so will it.” But gods such as these can only be A token of this incorruptibility can be gathered from understood to be the angels. Therefore the angels are cor- its intellectual operation; for since everything acts accord- ruptible by their nature ing as it is actual, the operation of a thing indicates its Objection 3. Further, according to Gregory (Moral. mode of being. Now the species and nature of the oper- xvi), “all things would tend towards nothing, unless the ation is understood from the object. But an intelligible hand of the Almighty preserved them.” But what can be object, being above time, is everlasting. Hence every in- brought to nothing is corruptible. Therefore, since the an- tellectual substance is incorruptible of its own nature. gels were made by God, it would appear that they are cor- Reply to Objection 1. Damascene is dealing with per- ruptible of their own nature. fect immortality, which includes complete immutability; On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that since “every change is a kind of death,” as Augustine says the intellectual substances “have unfailing life, being free (Contra Maxim. iii). The angels obtain perfect immutabil- from all corruption, death, matter, and generation.” ity only by favor, as will appear later (q. 62). I answer that, It must necessarily be maintained that Reply to Objection 2. By the expression ‘gods’ Plato the angels are incorruptible of their own nature. The rea- understands the heavenly bodies, which he supposed to son for this is, that nothing is corrupted except by its form be made up of elements, and therefore dissoluble of their being separated from the matter. Hence, since an angel is own nature; yet they are for ever preserved in existence by a subsisting form, as is clear from what was said above the Divine will. (a. 2), it is impossible for its substance to be corrupt- Reply to Objection 3. As was observed above (q. 44, ible. For what belongs to anything considered in itself can a. 1) there is a kind of necessary thing which has a cause never be separated from it; but what belongs to a thing, of its necessity. Hence it is not repugnant to a necessary or considered in relation to something else, can be separated, incorruptible being to depend for its existence on another when that something else is taken away, in view of which as its cause. Therefore, when it is said that all things, even it belonged to it. Roundness can never be taken from the the angels, would lapse into nothing, unless preserved by circle, because it belongs to it of itself; but a bronze cir- God, it is not to be gathered therefrom that there is any cle can lose roundness, if the bronze be deprived of its principle of corruption in the angels; but that the nature circular shape. Now to be belongs to a form considered of the angels is dependent upon God as its cause. For in itself; for everything is an actual being according to its a thing is said to be corruptible not merely because God 264 can reduce it to non-existence, by withdrawing His act corruption within itself, or some contrariety, or at least the of preservation; but also because it has some principle of potentiality of matter. 265 FIRST PART, QUESTION 51 Of the Angels in Comparison with Bodies (In Three Articles) We next inquire about the angels in comparison with corporeal things; and in the first place about their comparison with bodies; secondly, of the angels in comparison with corporeal places; and, thirdly, of their comparison with local movement. Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether angels have bodies naturally united to them? (2) Whether they assume bodies? (3) Whether they exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed? Whether the angels have bodies naturally united to them? Ia q. 51 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that angels have bodies the genus of intellectual substances, not having the ful- naturally united to them. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): ness of knowledge in its own nature, but acquiring it from “It is God’s attribute alone—that is, it belongs to the Fa- sensible things through the bodily senses, as will be ex- ther, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, as a property of nature, plained later on (q. 84, a. 6; q. 89, a. 1). Now whenever that He is understood to exist without any material sub- we find something imperfect in any genus we must pre- stance and without any companionship of corporeal ad- suppose something perfect in that genus. Therefore in dition.” Bernard likewise says (Hom. vi. super Cant.): the intellectual nature there are some perfectly intellec- “Let us assign incorporeity to God alone even as we do tual substances, which do not need to acquire knowledge immortality, whose nature alone, neither for its own sake from sensible things. Consequently not all intellectual nor on account of anything else, needs the help of any cor- substances are united to bodies; but some are quite sep- poreal organ. But it is clear that every created spirit needs arated from bodies, and these we call angels. corporeal substance.” Augustine also says (Gen. ad lit. Reply to Objection 1. As was said above (q. 50, iii): “The demons are called animals of the atmosphere a. 1) it was the opinion of some that every being is a because their nature is akin to that of aerial bodies.” But body; and consequently some seem to have thought that the nature of demons and angels is the same. Therefore there were no incorporeal substances existing except as angels have bodies naturally united to them. united to bodies; so much so that some even held that God Objection 2. Further, Gregory (Hom. x in Ev.) calls was the soul of the world, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. an angel a rational animal. But every animal is composed Dei vii). As this is contrary to Catholic Faith, which as- of body and soul. Therefore angels have bodies naturally serts that God is exalted above all things, according to Ps. united to them. 8:2: “Thy magnificence is exalted beyond the heavens”; Objection 3. Further, life is more perfect in the angels Origen, while refusing to say such a thing of God, fol-than in souls. But the soul not only lives, but gives life to lowed the above opinion of others regarding the other sub- the body. Therefore the angels animate bodies which are stances; being deceived here as he was also in many other naturally united to them. points, by following the opinions of the ancient philoso- On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that phers. Bernard’s expression can be explained, that the cre- “the angels are understood to be incorporeal.” ated spirit needs some bodily instrument, which is not nat- I answer that, The angels have not bodies naturally urally united to it, but assumed for some purpose, as will united to them. For whatever belongs to any nature as an be explained (a. 2). Augustine speaks, not as asserting the accident is not found universally in that nature; thus, for fact, but merely using the opinion of the Platonists, who instance, to have wings, because it is not of the essence maintained that there are some aerial animals, which they of an animal, does not belong to every animal. Now since termed demons. to understand is not the act of a body, nor of any corpo- Reply to Objection 2. Gregory calls the angel a ratio- real energy, as will be shown later (q. 75, a. 2), it fol- nal animal metaphorically, on account of the likeness to lows that to have a body united to it is not of the nature the rational nature. of an intellectual substance, as such; but it is accidental Reply to Objection 3. To give life effectively is a per- to some intellectual substance on account of something fection simply speaking; hence it belongs to God, as is else. Even so it belongs to the human soul to be united said (1 Kings 2:6): “The Lord killeth, and maketh alive.” to a body, because it is imperfect and exists potentially in But to give life formally belongs to a substance which is 266 part of some nature, and which has not within itself the which is not united to a body is more perfect than one full nature of the species. Hence an intellectual substance which is united to a body. Whether angels assume bodies? Ia q. 51 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that angels do not assume gel who appeared to Tobias was seen by all present. From bodies. For there is nothing superfluous in the work of an all this it is clearly shown that such apparitions were be- angel, as there is nothing of the kind in the work of na- held by bodily vision, whereby the object seen exists out- ture. But it would be superfluous for the angels to assume side the person beholding it, and can accordingly be seen bodies, because an angel has no need for a body, since his by all. Now by such a vision only a body can be beheld. own power exceeds all bodily power. Therefore an angel Consequently, since the angels are not bodies, nor have does not assume a body. they bodies naturally united with them, as is clear from Objection 2. Further, every assumption is terminated what has been said (a. 1; q. 50, a. 1), it follows that they in some union; because to assume implies a taking to one- sometimes assume bodies. self [ad se sumere]. But a body is not united to an angel as Reply to Objection 1. Angels need an assumed body, to a form, as stated (a. 1); while in so far as it is united to not for themselves, but on our account; that by conversing the angel as to a mover, it is not said to be assumed, other- familiarly with men they may give evidence of that in- wise it would follow that all bodies moved by the angels tellectual companionship which men expect to have with are assumed by them. Therefore the angels do not assume them in the life to come. Moreover that angels assumed bodies. bodies under the Old Law was a figurative indication that Objection 3. Further, angels do not assume bodies the Word of God would take a human body; because all from the earth or water, or they could not suddenly dis- the apparitions in the Old Testament were ordained to that appear; nor again from fire, otherwise they would burn one whereby the Son of God appeared in the flesh. whatever things they touched; nor again from air, because Reply to Objection 2. The body assumed is united air is without shape or color. Therefore the angels do not to the angel not as its form, nor merely as its mover, but assume bodies. as its mover represented by the assumed movable body. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi) For as in the Sacred Scripture the properties of intelligible that angels appeared to Abraham under assumed bodies. things are set forth by the likenesses of things sensible, I answer that, Some have maintained that the angels in the same way by Divine power sensible bodies are so never assume bodies, but that all that we read in Scripture fashioned by angels as fittingly to represent the intelligi- of apparitions of angels happened in prophetic vision— ble properties of an angel. And this is what we mean by that is, according to imagination. But this is contrary to an angel assuming a body. the intent of Scripture; for whatever is beheld in imaginary Reply to Objection 3. Although air as long as it is in vision is only in the beholder’s imagination, and conse- a state of rarefaction has neither shape nor color, yet when quently is not seen by everybody. Yet Divine Scripture condensed it can both be shaped and colored as appears in from time to time introduces angels so apparent as to be the clouds. Even so the angels assume bodies of air, con- seen commonly by all; just as the angels who appeared to densing it by the Divine power in so far as is needful for Abraham were seen by him and by his whole family, by forming the assumed body. Lot, and by the citizens of Sodom; in like manner the an- Whether the angels exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed? Ia q. 51 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels exercise out a purpose in the body assumed by the angel, if he per- functions of life in assumed bodies. For pretence is un- ceived nothing by their means. Consequently, the angel becoming in angels of truth. But it would be pretence if perceives by the assumed body; and this is the most spe- the body assumed by them, which seems to live and to cial function of life. exercise vital functions, did not possess these functions. Objection 3. Further, to move hither and thither is one Therefore the angels exercise functions of life in the as- of the functions of life, as the Philosopher says (De An- sumed body. ima ii). But the angels are manifestly seen to move in their Objection 2. Further, in the works of the angels there assumed bodies. For it was said (Gn. 18:16) that “Abra- is nothing without a purpose. But eyes, nostrils, and the ham walked with” the angels, who had appeared to him, other instruments of the senses, would be fashioned with- “bringing them on the way”; and when Tobias said to the 267 angel (Tob. 5:7,8): “Knowest thou the way that leadeth to the properties of such men would lead us to men, and not the city of Medes?” he answered: “I know it; and I have to angels. often walked through all the ways thereof.” Therefore the Reply to Objection 2. Sensation is entirely a vital angels often exercise functions of life in assumed bodies. function. Consequently it can in no way be said that the Objection 4. Further, speech is the function of a liv- angels perceive through the organs of their assumed bod- ing subject, for it is produced by the voice, while the voice ies. Yet such bodies are not fashioned in vain; for they are itself is a sound conveyed from the mouth. But it is evi- not fashioned for the purpose of sensation through them, dent from many passages of Sacred Scripture that angels but to this end, that by such bodily organs the spiritual spoke in assumed bodies. Therefore in their assumed bod- powers of the angels may be made manifest; just as by the ies they exercise functions of life. eye the power of the angel’s knowledge is pointed out, and Objection 5. Further, eating is a purely animal func- other powers by the other members, as Dionysius teaches tion. Hence the Lord after His Resurrection ate with His (Coel. Hier.). disciples in proof of having resumed life (Lk. 24). Now Reply to Objection 3. Movement coming from a when angels appeared in their assumed bodies they ate, united mover is a proper function of life; but the bodies as- and Abraham offered them food, after having previously sumed by the angels are not thus moved, since the angels adored them as God (Gn. 18). Therefore the angels exer- are not their forms. Yet the angels are moved accidentally, cise functions of life in assumed bodies. when such bodies are moved, since they are in them as Objection 6. Further, to beget offspring is a vital act. movers are in the moved; and they are here in such a way But this has befallen the angels in their assumed bodies; as not to be elsewhere which cannot be said of God. Ac- for it is related: “After the sons of God went in to the cordingly, although God is not moved when the things are daughters of men, and they brought forth children, these moved in which He exists, since He is everywhere; yet the are the mighty men of old, men of renown” (Gn. 6:4). angels are moved accidentally according to the movement Consequently the angels exercised vital functions in their of the bodies assumed. But they are not moved accord- assumed bodies. ing to the movement of the heavenly bodies, even though On the contrary, The bodies assumed by angels have they be in them as the movers in the thing moved, because no life, as was stated in the previous article (ad 3). There- the heavenly bodies do not change place in their entirety; fore they cannot exercise functions of life through as- nor for the spirit which moves the world is there any fixed sumed bodies. locality according to any restricted part of the world’s sub- I answer that, Some functions of living subjects stance, which now is in the east, and now in the west, but have something in common with other operations; just as according to a fixed quarter; because “the moving energy speech, which is the function of a living creature, agrees is always in the east,” as stated in Phys. viii, text 84. with other sounds of inanimate things, in so far as it is Reply to Objection 4. Properly speaking, the angels sound; and walking agrees with other movements, in so do not talk through their assumed bodies; yet there is a far as it is movement. Consequently vital functions can semblance of speech, in so far as they fashion sounds in be performed in assumed bodies by the angels, as to that the air like to human voices. which is common in such operations; but not as to that Reply to Objection 5. Properly speaking, the angels which is special to living subjects; because, according to cannot be said to eat, because eating involves the taking the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vig. i), “that which has the of food convertible into the substance of the eater. faculty has the action.” Hence nothing can have a function Although after the Resurrection food was not con- of life except what has life, which is the potential principle verted into the substance of Christ’s body, but resolved of such action. into pre-existing matter; nevertheless Christ had a body Reply to Objection 1. As it is in no wise contrary of such a true nature that food could be changed into it; to truth for intelligible things to be set forth in Scripture hence it was a true eating. But the food taken by angels under sensible figures, since it is not said for the pur- was neither changed into the assumed body, nor was the pose of maintaining that intelligible things are sensible, body of such a nature that food could be changed into it; but in order that properties of intelligible things may be consequently, it was not a true eating, but figurative of understood according to similitude through sensible fig- spiritual eating. This is what the angel said to Tobias: ures; so it is not contrary to the truth of the holy angels “When I was with you, I seemed indeed to eat and to that through their assumed bodies they appear to be liv- drink; but I use an invisible meat and drink” (Tob. 12:19). ing men, although they are really not. For the bodies are Abraham offered them food, deeming them to be men, assumed merely for this purpose, that the spiritual prop- in whom, nevertheless, he worshipped God, as God is erties and works of the angels may be manifested by the wont to be in the prophets, as Augustine says (De Civ. properties of man and of his works. This could not so fit- Dei xvi). tingly be done if they were to assume true men; because Reply to Objection 6. As Augustine says (De Civ. 268 Dei xv): “Many persons affirm that they have had the ex-it to be wondered at that giants should be born of them; perience, or have heard from such as have experienced it, for they were not all giants, albeit there were many more that the Satyrs and Fauns, whom the common folk call in- before than after the deluge.” Still if some are occasion- cubi, have often presented themselves before women, and ally begotten from demons, it is not from the seed of such have sought and procured intercourse with them. Hence demons, nor from their assumed bodies, but from the seed it is folly to deny it. But God’s holy angels could not of men taken for the purpose; as when the demon assumes fall in such fashion before the deluge. Hence by the sons first the form of a woman, and afterwards of a man; just as of God are to be understood the sons of Seth, who were they take the seed of other things for other generating pur- good; while by the daughters of men the Scripture des- poses, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii), so that the person ignates those who sprang from the race of Cain. Nor is born is not the child of a demon, but of a man. 269 FIRST PART, QUESTION 52 Of the Angels in Relation to Place (In Three Articles) We now inquire into the place of the angels. Touching this there are three subjects of inquiry: (1) Is the angel in a place? (2) Can he be in several places at once? (3) Can several angels be in the same place? Whether an angel is in a place? Ia q. 52 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that an angel is not in holy angels who dwell herein, keep us in peace.” a place. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): “The com- I answer that, It is befitting an angel to be in a place; mon opinion of the learned is that things incorporeal are yet an angel and a body are said to be in a place in quite not in a place.” And again, Aristotle observes (Phys. iv, a different sense. A body is said to be in a place in such a text 48,57) that “it is not everything existing which is in way that it is applied to such place according to the con- a place, but only a movable body.” But an angel is not a tact of dimensive quantity; but there is no such quantity body, as was shown above (q. 50). Therefore an angel is in the angels, for theirs is a virtual one. Consequently an not in a place. angel is said to be in a corporeal place by application of Objection 2. Further, place is a “quantity having po- the angelic power in any manner whatever to any place. sition.” But everything which is in a place has some posi- Accordingly there is no need for saying that an angel tion. Now to have a position cannot benefit an angel, since can be deemed commensurate with a place, or that he oc- his substance is devoid of quantity, the proper difference cupies a space in the continuous; for this is proper to a of which is to have a position. Therefore an angel is not located body which is endowed with dimensive quantity. in a place. In similar fashion it is not necessary on this account for Objection 3. Further, to be in a place is to be mea- the angel to be contained by a place; because an incor- sured and to be contained by such place, as is evident from poreal substance virtually contains the thing with which the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text 14,119). But an angel can it comes into contact, and is not contained by it: for the neither be measured nor contained by a place, because the soul is in the body as containing it, not as contained by it. container is more formal than the contained; as air with In the same way an angel is said to be in a place which regard to water (Phys. iv, text 35,49). Therefore an angel is corporeal, not as the thing contained, but as somehow is not in a place. containing it. On the contrary, It is said in the Collect∗: “Let Thy And hereby we have the answers to the objections. Whether an angel can be in several places at once? Ia q. 52 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that an angel can be in is evident from the angel destroying Sodom (Gn. 19:25). several places at once. For an angel is not less endowed Therefore an angel can be in several places at the one time. with power than the soul. But the soul is in several places On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) at once, for it is entirely in every part of the body, as Au- that “while the angels are in heaven, they are not on earth.” gustine says (De Trin. vi). Therefore an angel can be in I answer that, An angel’s power and nature are finite, several places at once. whereas the Divine power and essence, which is the uni- Objection 2. Further, an angel is in the body which versal cause of all things, is infinite: consequently God he assumes; and, since the body which he assumes is con- through His power touches all things, and is not merely tinuous, it would appear that he is in every part thereof. present in some places, but is everywhere. Now since the But according to the various parts there are various places. angel’s power is finite, it does not extend to all things, but Therefore the angel is at one time in various places. to one determined thing. For whatever is compared with Objection 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. one power must be compared therewith as one determined ii) that “where the angel operates, there he is.” But oc- thing. Consequently since all being is compared as one casionally he operates in several places at one time, as thing to God’s universal power, so is one particular being ∗ Prayer at Compline, Dominican Breviary 270 compared as one with the angelic power. Hence, since the power is applied only to what is first moved by him. Now angel is in a place by the application of his power to the there is one part of the heavens in which there is move- place, it follows that he is not everywhere, nor in several ment first of all, namely, the part to the east: hence the places, but in only one place. Philosopher (Phys. vii, text 84) attributes the power of the Some, however, have been deceived in this matter. For heavenly mover to the part which is in the east. Secondly, some who were unable to go beyond the reach of their because philosophers do not hold that one separate sub- imaginations supposed the indivisibility of the angel to be stance moves all the spheres immediately. Hence it need like that of a point; consequently they thought that an an- not be everywhere. gel could be only in a place which is a point. But they So, then, it is evident that to be in a place appertains were manifestly deceived, because a point is something quite differently to a body, to an angel, and to God. For indivisible, yet having its situation; whereas the angel is a body is in a place in a circumscribed fashion, since it is indivisible, and beyond the genus of quantity and situa- measured by the place. An angel, however, is not there tion. Consequently there is no occasion for determining in a circumscribed fashion, since he is not measured by in his regard one indivisible place as to situation: any the place, but definitively, because he is in a place in such place which is either divisible or indivisible, great or small a manner that he is not in another. But God is neither suffices, according as to his own free-will he applies his circumscriptively nor definitively there, because He is ev- power to a great or to a small body. So the entire body erywhere. to which he is applied by his power, corresponds as one From this we can easily gather an answer to the ob- place to him. jections: because the entire subject to which the angelic Neither, if any angel moves the heavens, is it neces- power is immediately applied, is reputed as one place, sary for him to be everywhere. First of all, because his even though it be continuous. Whether several angels can be at the same time in the same place? Ia q. 52 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that several angels can be two complete causes to be the causes immediately of one at the same time in the same place. For several bodies can- and the same thing. This is evident in every class of not be at the same time in the same place, because they fill causes: for there is one proximate form of one thing, and the place. But the angels do not fill a place, because only a there is one proximate mover, although there may be sev- body fills a place, so that it be not empty, as appears from eral remote movers. Nor can it be objected that several the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text 52,58). Therefore several individuals may row a boat, since no one of them is a per- angels can be in the one place. fect mover, because no one man’s strength is sufficient for Objection 2. Further, there is a greater difference be- moving the boat; while all together are as one mover, in so tween an angel and a body than there is between two an- far as their united strengths all combine in producing the gels. But an angel and a body are at the one time in the one movement. Hence, since the angel is said to be in one one place: because there is no place which is not filled place by the fact that his power touches the place imme- with a sensible body, as we find proved in Phys. iv, text. diately by way of a perfect container, as was said (a. 1), 58. Much more, then, can two angels be in the same place. there can be but one angel in one place. Objection 3. Further, the soul is in every part of the Reply to Objection 1. Several angels are not hindered body, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi). But demons, from being in the same place because of their filling the although they do not obsess souls, do obsess bodies occa- place; but for another reason, as has been said. sionally; and thus the soul and the demon are at the one Reply to Objection 2. An angel and a body are not time in the same place; and consequently for the same in a place in the same way; hence the conclusion does not reason all other spiritual substances. follow. On the contrary, There are not two souls in the same Reply to Objection 3. Not even a demon and a soul body. Therefore for a like reason there are not two angels are compared to a body according to the same relation of in the same place. causality; since the soul is its form, while the demon is I answer that, There are not two angels in the same not. Hence the inference does not follow. place. The reason of this is because it is impossible for 271 FIRST PART, QUESTION 53 Of the Local Movement of the Angels (In Three Articles) We must next consider the local movement of the angels; under which heading there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether an angel can be moved locally. (2) Whether in passing from place to place he passes through intervening space? (3) Whether the angel’s movement is in time or instantaneous? Whether an angel can be moved locally? Ia q. 53 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that an angel cannot be moved angel in a place is nothing else than the various contacts locally. For, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text of various places successively, and not at once; because an 32,86) “nothing which is devoid of parts is moved”; be- angel cannot be in several places at one time, as was said cause, while it is in the term “wherefrom,” it is not moved; above (q. 52, a. 2). Nor is it necessary for these contacts to nor while it is in the term “whereto,” for it is then already be continuous. Nevertheless a certain kind of continuity moved; consequently it remains that everything which is can be found in such contacts. Because, as was said above moved, while it is being moved, is partly in the term (q. 52, a. 1), there is nothing to hinder us from assigning “wherefrom” and partly in the term “whereto.” But an an- a divisible place to an angel according to virtual contact; gel is without parts. Therefore an angel cannot be moved just as a divisible place is assigned to a body by contact locally. of magnitude. Hence as a body successively, and not all Objection 2. Further, movement is “the act of an im- at once, quits the place in which it was before, and thence perfect being,” as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text 14). arises continuity in its local movement; so likewise an an- But a beatified angel is not imperfect. Consequently a be- gel can successively quit the divisible place in which he atified angel is not moved locally. was before, and so his movement will be continuous. And Objection 3. Further, movement is simply because of he can all at once quit the whole place, and in the same want. But the holy angels have no want. Therefore the instant apply himself to the whole of another place, and holy angels are not moved locally. thus his movement will not be continuous. On the contrary, It is the same thing for a beatified Reply to Objection 1. This argument fails of its pur- angel to be moved as for a beatified soul to be moved. But pose for a twofold reason. First of all, because Aristotle’s it must necessarily be said that a blessed soul is moved demonstration deals with what is indivisible according to locally, because it is an article of faith that Christ’s soul quantity, to which responds a place necessarily indivisi- descended into Hell. Therefore a beatified angel is moved ble. And this cannot be said of an angel. locally. Secondly, because Aristotle’s demonstration deals I answer that, A beatified angel can be moved locally. with movement which is continuous. For if the move- As, however, to be in a place belongs equivocally to a ment were not continuous, it might be said that a thing body and to an angel, so likewise does local movement. is moved where it is in the term “wherefrom,” and while For a body is in a place in so far as it is contained under it is in the term “whereto”: because the very succession the place, and is commensurate with the place. Hence it is of “wheres,” regarding the same thing, would be called necessary for local movement of a body to be commensu- movement: hence, in whichever of those “wheres” the rate with the place, and according to its exigency. Hence it thing might be, it could be said to be moved. But the con- is that the continuity of movement is according to the con- tinuity of movement prevents this; because nothing which tinuity of magnitude; and according to priority and poste- is continuous is in its term, as is clear, because the line is riority of local movement, as the Philosopher says (Phys. not in the point. Therefore it is necessary for the thing iv, text 99). But an angel is not in a place as commensurate moved to be not totally in either of the terms while it and contained, but rather as containing it. Hence it is not is being moved; but partly in the one, and partly in the necessary for the local movement of an angel to be com- other. Therefore, according as the angel’s movement is mensurate with the place, nor for it to be according to the not continuous, Aristotle’s demonstration does not hold exigency of the place, so as to have continuity therefrom; good. But according as the angel’s movement is held to but it is a non-continuous movement. For since the an- be continuous, it can be so granted, that, while an angel gel is in a place only by virtual contact, as was said above is in movement, he is partly in the term “wherefrom,” and (q. 52, a. 1), it follows necessarily that the movement of an partly in the term “whereto” (yet so that such partiality 272 be not referred to the angel’s substance, but to the place); to something which is divisible. because at the outset of his continuous movement the an- Reply to Objection 2. The movement of that which gel is in the whole divisible place from which he begins is in potentiality is the act of an imperfect agent. But the to be moved; but while he is actually in movement, he is movement which is by application of energy is the act of in part of the first place which he quits, and in part of the one in act: because energy implies actuality. second place which he occupies. This very fact that he Reply to Objection 3. The movement of that which is can occupy the parts of two places appertains to the angel in potentiality is the act of an imperfect but the movement from this, that he can occupy a divisible place by apply- of what is in act is not for any need of its own, but for an- ing his power; as a body does by application of magni- other’s need. In this way, because of our need, the angel tude. Hence it follows regarding a body which is movable is moved locally, according to Heb. 1:14: “They are all∗ according to place, that it is divisible according to magni- ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who receive tude; but regarding an angel, that his power can be applied the inheritance of salvation.” Whether an angel passes through intermediate space? Ia q. 53 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that an angel does not out going through the middle: which is evident thus. Be- pass through intermediate space. For everything that tween the two extreme limits there are infinite intermedi- passes through a middle space first travels along a place of ate places; whether the places be taken as divisible or as its own dimensions, before passing through a greater. But indivisible. This is clearly evident with regard to places the place responding to an angel, who is indivisible, is which are indivisible; because between every two points confined to a point. Therefore if the angel passes through that are infinite intermediate points, since no two points middle space, he must reckon infinite points in his move- follow one another without a middle, as is proved in Phys. ment: which is not possible. vi, text. 1. And the same must of necessity be said of Objection 2. Further, an angel is of simpler substance divisible places: and this is shown from the continuous than the soul. But our soul by taking thought can pass movement of a body. For a body is not moved from place from one extreme to another without going through the to place except in time. But in the whole time which mea- middle: for I can think of France and afterwards of Syria, sures the movement of a body, there are not two “nows” in without ever thinking of Italy, which stands between them. which the body moved is not in one place and in another; Therefore much more can an angel pass from one extreme for if it were in one and the same place in two “nows,” to another without going through the middle. it would follow that it would be at rest there; since to be On the contrary, If the angel be moved from one at rest is nothing else than to be in the same place now place to another, then, when he is in the term “whither,” and previously. Therefore since there are infinite “nows” he is no longer in motion, but is changed. But a process between the first and the last “now” of the time which of changing precedes every actual change: consequently measures the movement, there must be infinite places be- he was being moved while existing in some place. But he tween the first from which the movement begins, and the was not moved so long as he was in the term “whence.” last where the movement ceases. This again is made ev- Therefore, he was moved while he was in mid-space: and ident from sensible experience. Let there be a body of so it was necessary for him to pass through intervening a palm’s length, and let there be a plane measuring two space. palms, along which it travels; it is evident that the first I answer that, As was observed above in the preced- place from which the movement starts is that of the one ing article, the local motion of an angel can be continu- palm; and the place wherein the movement ends is that ous, and non-continuous. If it be continuous, the angel of the other palm. Now it is clear that when it begins to cannot pass from one extreme to another without passing move, it gradually quits the first palm and enters the sec- through the mid-space; because, as is said by the Philoso- ond. According, then, as the magnitude of the palm is pher (Phys. v, text 22; vi, text 77), “The middle is that into divided, even so are the intermediate places multiplied; which a thing which is continually moved comes, before because every distinct point in the magnitude of the first arriving at the last into which it is moved”; because the or- palm is the beginning of a place, and a distinct point in the der of first and last in continuous movement, is according magnitude of the other palm is the limit of the same. Ac- to the order of the first and last in magnitude, as he says cordingly, since magnitude is infinitely divisible and the (Phys. iv, text 99). points in every magnitude are likewise infinite in poten- But if an angel’s movement be not continuous, it is tiality, it follows that between every two places there are possible for him to pass from one extreme to another with- infinite intermediate places. ∗ Vulg.: ‘Are they not all. . . ?’ 273 Now a movable body only exhausts the infinity of the wills, either through or without the intervening place. intermediate places by the continuity of its movement; be- Reply to Objection 1. The place of an angel is not cause, as the intermediate places are infinite in potential- taken as equal to him according to magnitude, but accord- ity, so likewise must there be reckoned some infinitudes ing to contact of power: and so the angel’s place can be in movement which is continuous. Consequently, if the divisible, and is not always a mere point. Yet even the in- movement be not continuous, then all the parts of the termediate divisible places are infinite, as was said above: movement will be actually numbered. If, therefore, any but they are consumed by the continuity of the movement, movable body be moved, but not by continuous move- as is evident from the foregoing. ment, it follows, either that it does not pass through all Reply to Objection 2. While an angel is moved lo- the intermediate places, or else that it actually numbers cally, his essence is applied to various places: but the infinite places: which is not possible. Accordingly, then, soul’s essence is not applied to the things thought of, but as the angel’s movement is not continuous, he does not rather the things thought of are in it. So there is no com- pass through all intermediate places. parison. Now, the actual passing from one extreme to the other, Reply to Objection 3. In continuous movement the without going through the mid-space, is quite in keeping actual change is not a part of the movement, but its conclu- with an angel’s nature; but not with that of a body, be- sion; hence movement must precede change. Accordingly cause a body is measured by and contained under a place; such movement is through the mid-space. But in move- hence it is bound to follow the laws of place in its move- ment which is not continuous, the change is a part, as a ment. But an angel’s substance is not subject to place as unit is a part of number: hence the succession of the var- contained thereby, but is above it as containing it: hence ious places, even without the mid-space, constitutes such it is under his control to apply himself to a place just as he movement. Whether the movement of an angel is instantaneous? Ia q. 53 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that an angel’s movement On the contrary, In every change there is a before and is instantaneous. For the greater the power of the mover, after. Now the before and after of movement is reckoned and the less the moved resist the mover, the more rapid is by time. Consequently every movement, even of an angel, the movement. But the power of an angel moving himself is in time, since there is a before and after in it. exceeds beyond all proportion the power which moves a I answer that, Some have maintained that the local body. Now the proportion of velocities is reckoned ac- movement of an angel is instantaneous. They said that cording to the lessening of the time. But between one when an angel is moved from place to place, during the length of time and any other length of time there is pro- whole of the preceding time he is in the term “where- portion. If therefore a body is moved in time, an angel is from”; but in the last instant of such time he is in the term moved in an instant. “whereto.” Nor is there any need for a medium between Objection 2. Further, the angel’s movement is sim- the terms, just as there is no medium between time and pler than any bodily change. But some bodily change is the limit of time. But there is a mid-time between two effected in an instant, such as illumination; both because “nows” of time: hence they say that a last “now” cannot the subject is not illuminated successively, as it gets hot be assigned in which it was in the term “wherefrom,” just successively; and because a ray does not reach sooner as in illumination, and in the substantial generation of fire, what is near than what is remote. Much more therefore there is no last instant to be assigned in which the air was is the angel’s movement instantaneous. dark, or in which the matter was under the privation of the Objection 3. Further, if an angel be moved from place form of fire: but a last time can be assigned, so that in the to place in time, it is manifest that in the last instant of last instant of such time there is light in the air, or the form such time he is in the term “whereto”: but in the whole of fire in the matter. And so illumination and substantial of the preceding time, he is either in the place immedi- generation are called instantaneous movements. ately preceding, which is taken as the term “wherefrom”; But this does not hold good in the present case; and it or else he is partly in the one, and partly in the other, it fol-is shown thus. It is of the nature of rest that the subject in lows that he is divisible; which is impossible. Therefore repose be not otherwise disposed now than it was before: during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term and therefore in every “now” of time which measures rest, “wherefrom.” Therefore he rests there: since to be at rest the subject reposing is in the same “where” in the first, in is to be in the same place now and previously, as was said the middle, and in the last “now.” On the other hand, it (a. 2). Therefore it follows that he is not moved except in is of the very nature of movement for the subject moved the last instant of time. to be otherwise now than it was before: and therefore in 274 every “now” of time which measures movement, the mov-which have their changeableness from the movement of able subject is in various dispositions; hence in the last the heavens; because the angel’s movement does not de- “now” it must have a different form from what it had be- pend upon the movement of the heavens. fore. So it is evident that to rest during the whole time in Reply to Objection 1. If the time of the angel’s some (disposition), for instance, in whiteness, is to be in it movement be not continuous, but a kind of succession of in every instant of such time. Hence it is not possible for ‘nows,’ it will have no proportion to the time which mea- anything to rest in one term during the whole of the pre- sures the movement of corporeal things, which is contin- ceding time, and afterwards in the last instant of that time uous; since it is not of the same nature. If, however, it be to be in the other term. But this is possible in movement: continuous, it is indeed proportionable, not, indeed, be- because to be moved in any whole time, is not to be in the cause of the proportion of the mover and the movable, but same disposition in every instant of that time. Therefore on account of the proportion of the magnitudes in which all instantaneous changes of the kind are terms of a con- the movement exists. Besides, the swiftness of the angel’s tinuous movement: just as generation is the term of the al- movement is not measured by the quantity of his power, teration of matter, and illumination is the term of the local but according to the determination of his will. movement of the illuminating body. Now the local move- Reply to Objection 2. Illumination is the term of a ment of an angel is not the term of any other continuous movement; and is an alteration, not a local movement, as movement, but is of itself, depending upon no other move- though the light were understood to be moved to what is ment. Consequently it is impossible to say that he is in any near, before being moved to what is remote. But the an- place during the whole time, and that in the last “now” he gel’s movement is local, and, besides, it is not the term of is in another place: but some “now” must be assigned in movement; hence there is no comparison. which he was last in the preceding place. But where there Reply to Objection 3. This objection is based on con- are many “nows” succeeding one another, there is neces- tinuous time. But the same time of an angel’s movement sarily time; since time is nothing else than the reckoning can be non-continuous. So an angel can be in one place in of before and after in movement. It remains, then, that the one instant, and in another place in the next instant, with- movement of an angel is in time. It is in continuous time if out any time intervening. If the time of the angel’s move- his movement be continuous, and in non-continuous time ment be continuous, he is changed through infinite places if his movement is non-continuous for, as was said (a. 1), throughout the whole time which precedes the last ‘now’; his movement can be of either kind, since the continu- as was already shown (a. 2). Nevertheless he is partly in ity of time comes of the continuity of movement, as the one of the continuous places, and partly in another, not Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99). because his substance is susceptible of parts, but because But that time, whether it be continuous or not, is not his power is applied to a part of the first place and to a part the same as the time which measures the movement of the of the second, as was said above (a. 2). heavens, and whereby all corporeal things are measured, 275 FIRST PART, QUESTION 54 Of the Knowledge of the Angels (In Five Articles) After considering what belongs to the angel’s substance, we now proceed to his knowledge. This investigation will be fourfold. In the first place inquiry must be made into his power of knowledge: secondly, into his medium of knowledge: thirdly, into the objects known: and fourthly, into the manner whereby he knows them. Under the first heading there are five points of inquiry: (1) Is the angel’s understanding his substance? (2) Is his being his understanding? (3) Is his substance his power of intelligence? (4) Is there in the angels an active and a passive intellect? (5) Is there in them any other power of knowledge besides the intellect? Whether an angel’s act of understanding is his substance? Ia q. 54 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the angel’s act of un- same as His existence and His action. derstanding is his substance. For the angel is both higher Besides, if an angel’s act of understanding were his and simpler than the active intellect of a soul. But the substance, it would be necessary for it to be subsisting. substance of the active intellect is its own action; as is Now a subsisting act of intelligence can be but one; just evident from Aristotle (De Anima iii) and from his Com- as an abstract thing that subsists. Consequently an angel’s mentator∗. Therefore much more is the angel’s substance substance would neither be distinguished from God’s sub- his action—that is, his act of understanding. stance, which is His very act of understanding subsisting Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. in itself, nor from the substance of another angel. xii, text 39) that “the action of the intellect is life.” But Also, if the angel were his own act of understanding, “since in living things to live is to be,” as he says (De An- there could then be no degrees of understanding more or ima ii, text 37), it seems that life is essence. Therefore less perfectly; for this comes about through the diverse the action of the intellect is the essence of an angel who participation of the act of understanding. understands. Reply to Objection 1. When the active intellect is Objection 3. Further, if the extremes be one, then the said to be its own action, such predication is not essential, middle does not differ from them; because extreme is far- but concomitant, because, since its very nature consists in ther from extreme than the middle is. But in an angel the act, instantly, so far as lies in itself, action accompanies it: intellect and the object understood are the same, at least which cannot be said of the passive intellect, for this has in so far as he understands his own essence. Therefore no actions until after it has been reduced to act. the act of understanding, which is between the intellect Reply to Objection 2. The relation between “life” and the thing understood, is one with the substance of the and “to live” is not the same as that between “essence” angel who understands. and “to be”; but rather as that between “a race” and “to On the contrary, The action of anything differs more run,” one of which signifies the act in the abstract, and the from its substance than does its existence. But no crea- other in the concrete. Hence it does not follow, if “to live” ture’s existence is its substance, for this belongs to God is “to be,” that “life” is “essence.” Although life is some- only, as is evident from what was said above (q. 3, a. 4). times put for the essence, as Augustine says (De Trin. x), Therefore neither the action of an angel, nor of any other “Memory and understanding and will are one essence, one creature, is its substance. life”: yet it is not taken in this sense by the Philosopher, I answer that, It is impossible for the action of an an- when he says that “the act of the intellect is life.” gel, or of any creature, to be its own substance. For an ac- Reply to Objection 3. The action which is transient, tion is properly the actuality of a power; just as existence passing to some extrinsic object, is really a medium be- is the actuality of a substance or of an essence. Now it is tween the agent and the subject receiving the action. The impossible for anything which is not a pure act, but which action which remains within the agent, is not really a has some admixture of potentiality, to be its own actual- medium between the agent and the object, but only ac- ity: because actuality is opposed to potentiality. But God cording to the manner of expression; for it really follows alone is pure act. Hence only in God is His substance the the union of the object with the agent. For the act of un- ∗ Averroes, A.D. 1126-1198 276 derstanding is brought about by the union of the object which differs from both. understood with the one who understands it, as an effect Whether in the angel to understand is to exist? Ia q. 54 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that in the angel to un- of which the object is “the good”; each of which is con- derstand is to exist. For in living things to live is to be, vertible with being; and so, to understand and to will, of as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, text. 37). But to themselves, bear relation to all things, and each receives “understand is in a sense to live” (De Anima ii, text. 37). its species from its object. But the act of sensation is rel- Therefore in the angel to understand is to exist. atively infinite, for it bears relation to all sensible things; Objection 2. Further, cause bears the same relation to as sight does to all things visible. Now the being of every cause, as effect to effect. But the form whereby the angel creature is restricted to one in genus and species; God’s exists is the same as the form by which he understands at being alone is simply infinite, comprehending all things least himself. Therefore in the angel to understand is to in itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Hence the Di- exist. vine nature alone is its own act of understanding and its On the contrary, The angel’s act of understanding is own act of will. his movement, as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Reply to Objection 1. Life is sometimes taken for the But to exist is not movement. Therefore in the angel to be existence of the living subject: sometimes also for a vital is not to understand. operation, that is, for one whereby something is shown to I answer that, The action of the angel, as also the be living. In this way the Philosopher says that to under- action of any creature, is not his existence. For as it is stand is, in a sense, to live: for there he distinguishes the said (Metaph. ix, text. 16), there is a twofold class of various grades of living things according to the various action; one which passes out to something beyond, and functions of life. causes passion in it, as burning and cutting; and another Reply to Objection 2. The essence of an angel is the which does not pass outwards, but which remains within reason of his entire existence, but not the reason of his the agent, as to feel, to understand, to will; by such actions whole act of understanding, since he cannot understand nothing outside is changed, but the whole action takes everything by his essence. Consequently in its own spe- place within the agent. It is quite clear regarding the first cific nature as such an essence, it is compared to the ex- kind of action that it cannot be the agent’s very existence: istence of the angel, whereas to his act of understanding because the agent’s existence is signified as within him, it is compared as included in the idea of a more universal while such an action denotes something as issuing from object, namely, truth and being. Thus it is evident, that, the agent into the thing done. But the second action of its although the form is the same, yet it is not the principle own nature has infinity, either simple or relative. As an ex- of existence and of understanding according to the same ample of simple infinity, we have the act “to understand,” formality. On this account it does not follow that in the of which the object is “the true”; and the act “to will,” angel “to be” is the same as ‘to understand.’ Whether an angel’s power of intelligence is his essence? Ia q. 54 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that in an angel the that God made the angelic nature “nigh unto Himself,” power or faculty of understanding is not different from while He made primary matter “nigh unto nothing”; from his essence. For, “mind” and “intellect” express the power this it would seem that the angel is of a simpler nature of understanding. But in many passages of his writings, than primary matter, as being closer to God. But primary Dionysius styles angels “intellects” and “minds.” There- matter is its own power. Therefore much more is an angel fore the angel is his own power of intelligence. his own power of intelligence. Objection 2. Further, if the angel’s power of intelli- On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xi) that gence be anything besides his essence, then it must needs “the angels are divided into substance, power, and opera- be an accident; for that which is besides the essence of tion.” Therefore substance, power, and operation, are all anything, we call it accident. But “a simple form cannot distinct in them. be a subject,” as Boethius states (De Trin. 1). Thus an an- I answer that, Neither in an angel nor in any creature, gel would not be a simple form, which is contrary to what is the power or operative faculty the same as its essence: has been previously said (q. 50, a. 2). which is made evident thus. Since every power is ordained Objection 3. Further, Augustine (Confess. xii) says, to an act, then according to the diversity of acts must be 277 the diversity of powers; and on this account it is said that act cannot be the subject of accident, because subject is each proper act responds to its proper power. But in ev- compared to accident as potentiality is to act. God alone ery creature the essence differs from the existence, and is is such a form: and of such is Boethius speaking there. compared to it as potentiality is to act, as is evident from But a simple form which is not its own existence, but is what has been already said (q. 44, a. 1). Now the act to compared to it as potentiality is to act, can be the subject which the operative power is compared is operation. But of accident; and especially of such accident as follows the in the angel to understand is not the same as to exist, nor species: for such accident belongs to the form—whereas is any operation in him, nor in any other created thing, the an accident which belongs to the individual, and which same as his existence. Hence the angel’s essence is not his does not belong to the whole species, results from the mat- power of intelligence: nor is the essence of any creature ter, which is the principle of individuation. And such a its power of operation. simple form is an angel. Reply to Objection 1. An angel is called “intellect” Reply to Objection 3. The power of matter is a po- and “mind,” because all his knowledge is intellectual: tentiality in regard to substantial being itself, whereas the whereas the knowledge of a soul is partly intellectual and power of operation regards accidental being. Hence there partly sensitive. is no comparison. Reply to Objection 2. A simple form which is pure Whether there is an active and a passive intellect in an angel? Ia q. 54 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that there is both an ac- necessary that there should be some power capable of ren- tive and a passive intellect in an angel. The Philosopher dering such natures actually intelligible: and this power in says (De Anima iii, text. 17) that, “in the soul, just as in us is called the active intellect. every nature, there is something whereby it can become But each of these necessities is absent from the an- all things, and there is something whereby it can make all gels. They are neither sometimes understanding only in things.” But an angel is a kind of nature. Therefore there potentiality, with regard to such things as they naturally is an active and a passive intellect in an angel. apprehend; nor, again, are their intelligible in potentiality, Objection 2. Further, the proper function of the pas- but they are actually such; for they first and principally sive intellect is to receive; whereas to enlighten is the understand immaterial things, as will appear later (q. 84, proper function of the active intellect, as is made clear in a. 7; q. 85, a. 1). Therefore there cannot be an active and De Anima iii, text. 2,3,18. But an angel receives enlight- a passive intellect in them, except equivocally. enment from a higher angel, and enlightens a lower one. Reply to Objection 1. As the words themselves show, Therefore there is in him an active and a passive intellect. the Philosopher understands those two things to be in ev- On the contrary, The distinction of active and pas- ery nature in which there chances to be generation or mak- sive intellect in us is in relation to the phantasms, which ing. Knowledge, however, is not generated in the angels, are compared to the passive intellect as colors to the sight; but is present naturally. Hence there is not need for admit- but to the active intellect as colors to the light, as is clear ting an active and a passive intellect in them. from De Anima iii, text. 18. But this is not so in the an- Reply to Objection 2. It is the function of the ac- gel. Therefore there is no active and passive intellect in tive intellect to enlighten, not another intellect, but things the angel. which are intelligible in potentiality, in so far as by ab- I answer that, The necessity for admitting a passive straction it makes them to be actually intelligible. It be- intellect in us is derived from the fact that we understand longs to the passive intellect to be in potentiality with re- sometimes only in potentiality, and not actually. Hence gard to things which are naturally capable of being known, there must exist some power, which, previous to the act and sometimes to apprehend them actually. Hence for one of understanding, is in potentiality to intelligible things, angel to enlighten another does not belong to the notion but which becomes actuated in their regard when it ap- of an active intellect: neither does it belong to the pas- prehends them, and still more when it reflects upon them. sive intellect for the angel to be enlightened with regard This is the power which is denominated the passive intel- to supernatural mysteries, to the knowledge of which he lect. The necessity for admitting an active intellect is due is sometimes in potentiality. But if anyone wishes to call to this—that the natures of the material things which we these by the names of active and passive intellect, he will understand do not exist outside the soul, as immaterial and then be speaking equivocally; and it is not about names actually intelligible, but are only intelligible in potential- that we need trouble. ity so long as they are outside the soul. Consequently it is 278 Whether there is only intellectual knowledge in the angels? Ia q. 54 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the knowledge of the universe for the highest intellectual creature to be entirely angels is not exclusively intellectual. For Augustine says intelligent; and not in part, as is our soul. For this reason (De Civ. Dei viii) that in the angels there is “life which un- the angels are called “intellects” and “minds,” as was said derstands and feels.” Therefore there is a sensitive faculty above (a. 3, ad 1). in them as well. A twofold answer can be returned to the contrary ob- Objection 2. Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono) jections. First, it may be replied that those authorities that the angels have learnt many things by experience. are speaking according to the opinion of such men as But experience comes of many remembrances, as stated contended that angels and demons have bodies naturally in Metaph. i, 1. Consequently they have likewise a power united to them. Augustine often makes use of this opin- of memory. ion in his books, although he does not mean to assert it; Objection 3. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) hence he says (De Civ. Dei xxi) that “such an inquiry that there is a sort of “perverted phantasy” in the demons. does not call for much labor.” Secondly, it may be said But phantasy belongs to the imaginative faculty. There- that such authorities and the like are to be understood by fore the power of the imagination is in the demons; and way of similitude. Because, since sense has a sure appre- for the same reason it is in the angels, since they are of the hension of its proper sensible object, it is a common usage same nature. of speech, when he understands something for certain, to On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. 29 in Ev.), that say that we “sense it.” And hence it is that we use the word “man senses in common with the brutes, and understands “sentence.” Experience can be attributed to the angels ac- with the angels.” cording to the likeness of the things known, although not I answer that, In our soul there are certain powers by likeness of the faculty knowing them. We have expe- whose operations are exercised by corporeal organs; such rience when we know single objects through the senses: powers are acts of sundry parts of the body, as sight of the the angels likewise know single objects, as we shall show eye, and hearing of the ear. There are some other powers (q. 57, a. 2), yet not through the senses. But memory can of the soul whose operations are not performed through be allowed in the angels, according as Augustine (De Trin. bodily organs, as intellect and will: these are not acts of x) puts it in the mind; although it cannot belong to them any parts of the body. Now the angels have no bodies nat- in so far as it is a part of the sensitive soul. In like fashion urally joined to them, as is manifest from what has been ‘a perverted phantasy’ is attributed to demons, since they said already (q. 51, a. 1). Hence of the soul’s powers only have a false practical estimate of what is the true good; intellect and will can belong to them. while deception in us comes properly from the phantasy, The Commentator (Metaph. xii) says the same thing, whereby we sometimes hold fast to images of things as namely, that the separated substances are divided into in- to the things themselves, as is manifest in sleepers and tellect and will. And it is in keeping with the order of the lunatics. 279 FIRST PART, QUESTION 55 Of the Medium of the Angelic Knowledge (In Three Articles) Next in order, the question arises as to the medium of the angelic knowledge. Under this heading there are three points of inquiry: (1) Do the angels know everything by their substance, or by some species? (2) If by species, is it by connatural species, or is it by such as they have derived from things? (3) Do the higher angels know by more universal species than the lower angels? Whether the angels know all things by their substance? Ia q. 55 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels know all ing or universal truth. The angel’s essence, however, does things by their substance. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. not comprise all things in itself, since it is an essence re- vii) that “the angels, according to the proper nature of a stricted to a genus and species. This is proper to the Di- mind, know the things which are happening upon earth.” vine essence, which is infinite, simply and perfectly to But the angel’s nature is his essence. Therefore the angel comprise all things in Itself. Therefore God alone knows knows things by his essence. all things by His essence. But an angel cannot know all Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher things by his essence; and his intellect must be perfected (Metaph. xii, text. 51; De Anima iii, text. 15), “in things by some species in order to know things. which are without matter, the intellect is the same as the Reply to Objection 1. When it is said that the angel object understood.” But the object understood is the same knows things according to his own nature, the words “ac- as the one who understands it, as regards that whereby it cording to” do not determine the medium of such knowl- is understood. Therefore in things without matter, such as edge, since the medium is the similitude of the thing the angels, the medium whereby the object is understood known; but they denote the knowing power, which be- is the very substance of the one understanding it. longs to the angel of his own nature. Objection 3. Further, everything which is contained Reply to Objection 2. As the sense in act is the sensi- in another is there according to the mode of the container. ble in act, as stated in De Anima ii, text. 53, not so that the But an angel has an intellectual nature. Therefore what-sensitive power is the sensible object’s likeness contained ever is in him is there in an intelligible mode. But all in the sense, but because one thing is made from both as things are in him: because the lower orders of beings are from act and potentiality: so likewise the intellect in act essentially in the higher, while the higher are in the lower is said to be the thing understood in act, not that the sub- participatively: and therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. stance of the intellect is itself the similitude by which it iv) that God “enfolds the whole in the whole,” i.e. all in understands, but because that similitude is its form. Now, all. Therefore the angel knows all things in his substance. it is precisely the same thing to say “in things which are On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) without matter, the intellect is the same thing as the object that “the angels are enlightened by the forms of things.” understood,” as to say that “the intellect in act is the thing Therefore they know by the forms of things, and not by understood in act”; for a thing is actually understood, pre- their own substance. cisely because it is immaterial. I answer that, The medium through which the intel- Reply to Objection 3. The things which are beneath lect understands, is compared to the intellect understand- the angel, and those which are above him, are in a measure ing it as its form, because it is by the form that the agent in his substance, not indeed perfectly, nor according to acts. Now in order that the faculty may be perfectly com- their own proper formality—because the angel’s essence, pleted by the form, it is necessary for all things to which as being finite, is distinguished by its own formality from the faculty extends to be contained under the form. Hence other things—but according to some common formality. it is that in things which are corruptible, the form does Yet all things are perfectly and according to their own for- not perfectly complete the potentiality of the matter: be- mality in God’s essence, as in the first and universal op- cause the potentiality of the matter extends to more things erative power, from which proceeds whatever is proper or than are contained under this or that form. But the in- common to anything. Therefore God has a proper knowl- tellective power of the angel extends to understanding all edge of all things by His own essence: and this the angel things: because the object of the intellect is universal be- has not, but only a common knowledge. 280 Whether the angels understand by species drawn from things? Ia q. 55 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels understand The same is evident from the manner of existence of by species drawn from things. For everything understood such substances. The lower spiritual substances—that is, is apprehended by some likeness within him who under- souls—have a nature akin to a body, in so far as they are stands it. But the likeness of the thing existing in another the forms of bodies: and consequently from their very is there either by way of an exemplar, so that the likeness mode of existence it behooves them to seek their intel- is the cause of the thing; or else by way of an image, so ligible perfection from bodies, and through bodies; oth- that it is caused by such thing. All knowledge, then, of erwise they would be united with bodies to no purpose. the person understanding must either be the cause of the On the other hand, the higher substances—that is, the object understood, or else caused by it. Now the angel’s angels—are utterly free from bodies, and subsist imma- knowledge is not the cause of existing things; that belongs terially and in their own intelligible nature; consequently to the Divine knowledge alone. Therefore it is necessary they attain their intelligible perfection through an intel- for the species, by which the angelic mind understands, to ligible outpouring, whereby they received from God the be derived from things. species of things known, together with their intellectual Objection 2. Further, the angelic light is stronger than nature. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8): “The the light of the active intellect of the soul. But the light other things which are lower than the angels are so cre- of the active intellect abstracts intelligible species from ated that they first receive existence in the knowledge of phantasms. Therefore the light of the angelic mind can the rational creature, and then in their own nature.” also abstract species from sensible things. So there is Reply to Objection 1. There are images of creatures nothing to hinder us from saying that the angel under- in the angel’s mind, not, indeed derived from creatures, stands through species drawn from things. but from God, Who is the cause of creatures, and in Whom Objection 3. Further, the species in the intellect are the likenesses of creatures first exist. Hence Augustine indifferent to what is present or distant, except in so far as says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that, “As the type, according to they are taken from sensible objects. Therefore, if the an- which the creature is fashioned, is in the Word of God be- gel does not understand by species drawn from things, his fore the creature which is fashioned, so the knowledge of knowledge would be indifferent as to things present and the same type exists first in the intellectual creature, and distant; and so he would be moved locally to no purpose. is afterwards the very fashioning of the creature.” On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Reply to Objection 2. To go from one extreme to the the “angels do not gather their Divine knowledge from other it is necessary to pass through the middle. Now the things divisible or sensible.” nature of a form in the imagination, which form is without I answer that, The species whereby the angels un- matter but not without material conditions, stands midway derstand are not drawn from things, but are connatural between the nature of a form which is in matter, and the to them. For we must observe that there is a similarity nature of a form which is in the intellect by abstraction between the distinction and order of spiritual substances from matter and from material conditions. Consequently, and the distinction and order of corporeal substances. The however powerful the angelic mind might be, it could highest bodies have in their nature a potentiality which not reduce material forms to an intelligible condition, ex- is fully perfected by the form; whereas in the lower bod- cept it were first to reduce them to the nature of imagined ies the potentiality of matter is not entirely perfected by forms; which is impossible, since the angel has no imagi- the form, but receives from some agent, now one form, nation, as was said above (q. 54, a. 5). Even granted that now another. In like fashion also the lower intellectual he could abstract intelligible species from material things, substances —that is to say, human souls—have a power yet he would not do so; because he would not need them, of understanding which is not naturally complete, but is for he has connatural intelligible species. successively completed in them by their drawing intel- Reply to Objection 3. The angel’s knowledge is quite ligible species from things. But in the higher spiritual indifferent as to what is near or distant. Nevertheless his substances—that is, the angels—the power of understand- local movement is not purposeless on that account: for ing is naturally complete by intelligible species, in so far he is not moved to a place for the purpose of acquiring as they have such species connatural to them, so as to un- knowledge, but for the purpose of operation. derstand all things which they can know naturally. 281 Whether the higher angels understand by more universal species than the lower an-Ia q. 55 a. 3 gels? Objection 1. It would seem that the higher angels do grasp an intelligible truth, unless it be explained to them not understand by more universal species than the lower in every part and detail; this comes of their weakness of angels. For the universal, seemingly, is what is abstracted intellect: while there are others of stronger intellect, who from particulars. But angels do not understand by species can grasp many things from few. abstracted from things. Therefore it cannot be said that the Reply to Objection 1. It is accidental to the universal species of the angelic intellect are more or less universal. to be abstracted from particulars, in so far as the intellect Objection 2. Further, whatever is known in detail is knowing it derives its knowledge from things. But if there more perfectly known than what is known generically; be- be an intellect which does not derive its knowledge from cause to know anything generically is, in a fashion, mid- things, the universal which it knows will not be abstracted way between potentiality and act. If, therefore, the higher from things, but in a measure will be pre-existing to them; angels know by more universal species than the lower, it either according to the order of causality, as the universal follows that the higher have a more imperfect knowledge ideas of things are in the Word of God; or at least in the than the lower; which is not befitting. order of nature, as the universal ideas of things are in the Objection 3. Further, the same cannot be the proper angelic mind. type of many. But if the higher angel knows various things Reply to Objection 2. To know anything universally by one universal form, which the lower angel knows by can be taken in two senses. In one way, on the part of the several special forms, it follows that the higher angel uses thing known, namely, that only the universal nature of the one universal form for knowing various things. Therefore thing is known. To know a thing thus is something less he will not be able to have a proper knowledge of each; perfect: for he would have but an imperfect knowledge of which seems unbecoming. a man who only knew him to be an animal. In another On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii) way, on the part of the medium of such knowledge. In that the higher angels have a more universal knowledge this way it is more perfect to know a thing in the univer- than the lower. And in De Causis it is said that the higher sal; for the intellect, which by one universal medium can angels have more universal forms. know each of the things which are properly contained in I answer that, For this reason are some things of a it, is more perfect than one which cannot. more exalted nature, because they are nearer to and more Reply to Objection 3. The same cannot be the proper like unto the first, which is God. Now in God the whole and adequate type of several things. But if it be eminent, plenitude of intellectual knowledge is contained in one then it can be taken as the proper type and likeness of thing, that is to say, in the Divine essence, by which God many. Just as in man, there is a universal prudence with knows all things. This plenitude of knowledge is found respect to all the acts of the virtues; which can be taken as in created intellects in a lower manner, and less simply. the proper type and likeness of that prudence which in the Consequently it is necessary for the lower intelligences to lion leads to acts of magnanimity, and in the fox to acts know by many forms what God knows by one, and by so of wariness; and so on of the rest. The Divine essence, many forms the more according as the intellect is lower. on account of Its eminence, is in like fashion taken as the Thus the higher the angel is, by so much the fewer proper type of each thing contained therein: hence each species will he be able to apprehend the whole mass of in- one is likened to It according to its proper type. The same telligible objects. Therefore his forms must be more uni- applies to the universal form which is in the mind of the versal; each one of them, as it were, extending to more angel, so that, on account of its excellence, many things things. An example of this can in some measure be ob- can be known through it with a proper knowledge. served in ourselves. For some people there are who cannot 282 FIRST PART, QUESTION 56 Of the Angel’s Knowledge of Immaterial Things (In Three Articles) We now inquire into the knowledge of the angels with regard to the objects known by them. We shall treat of their knowledge, first, of immaterial things, secondly of things material. Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry: (1) Does an angel know himself? (2) Does one angel know another? (3) Does the angel know God by his own natural principles? Whether an angel knows himself? Ia q. 56 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that an angel does not species. But if it always actually possesses the species, know himself. For Dionysius says that “the angels do not it can thereby have actual knowledge without any preced- know their own powers” (Coel. Hier. vi). But, when the ing change or reception. From this it is evident that it is substance is known, the power is known. Therefore an not of the nature of knower, as knowing, to be moved by angel does not know his own essence. the object, but as knowing in potentiality. Now, for the Objection 2. Further, an angel is a single substance, form to be the principle of the action, it makes no dif- otherwise he would not act, since acts belong to single ference whether it be inherent in something else, or self- subsistences. But nothing single is intelligible. There- subsisting; because heat would give forth heat none the fore, since the angel possesses only knowledge which is less if it were self-subsisting, than it does by inhering in intellectual, no angel can know himself. something else. So therefore, if in the order of intelligible Objection 3. Further, the intellect is moved by the beings there be any subsisting intelligible form, it will un- intelligible object: because, as stated in De Anima iii, 4 derstand itself. And since an angel is immaterial, he is a understanding is a kind of passion. But nothing is moved subsisting form; and, consequently, he is actually intelli- by or is passive to itself; as appears in corporeal things. gible. Hence it follows that he understands himself by his Therefore the angel cannot understand himself. form, which is his substance. On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii) that Reply to Objection 1. That is the text of the old trans- “the angel knew himself when he was established, that is, lation, which is amended in the new one, and runs thus: enlightened by truth.” “furthermore they,” that is to say the angels, “knew their I answer that, As is evident from what has been pre- own powers”: instead of which the old translation read— viously said (q. 14, a. 2; q. 54, a. 2), the object is on a “and furthermore they do not know their own powers.” different footing in an immanent, and in a transient, ac- Although even the letter of the old translation might be tion. In a transient action the object or matter into which kept in this respect, that the angels do not know their own the action passes is something separate from the agent, as power perfectly; according as it proceeds from the order the thing heated is from what gave it heat, and the build- of the Divine Wisdom, Which to the angels is incompre- ing from the builder; whereas in an immanent action, for hensible. the action to proceed, the object must be united with the Reply to Objection 2. We have no knowledge of sin- agent; just as the sensible object must be in contact with gle corporeal things, not because of their particularity, but sense, in order that sense may actually perceive. And the on account of the matter, which is their principle of indi- object which is united to a faculty bears the same rela- viduation. Accordingly, if there be any single things sub- tion to actions of this kind as does the form which is the sisting without matter, as the angels are, there is nothing principle of action in other agents: for, as heat is the for- to prevent them from being actually intelligible. mal principle of heating in the fire, so is the species of the Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to the intellect, in thing seen the formal principle of sight to the eye. so far as if is in potentiality, to be moved and to be pas- It must, however, be borne in mind that this image of sive. Hence this does not happen in the angelic intellect, the object exists sometimes only potentially in the know- especially as regards the fact that he understands himself. ing faculty; and then there is only knowledge in potential- Besides the action of the intellect is not of the same nature ity; and in order that there may be actual knowledge, it is as the action found in corporeal things, which passes into required that the faculty of knowledge be actuated by the some other matter. 283 Whether one angel knows another? Ia q. 56 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that one angel does not angelic mind; and secondly, so as to subsist in their own know another. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, natures. They proceeded into the angelic mind in such a text. 4), that if the human intellect were to have in itself way, that God impressed upon the angelic mind the im- any one of the sensible things, then such a nature exist- ages of the things which He produced in their own natural ing within it would prevent it from apprehending external being. Now in the Word of God from eternity there ex- things; as likewise, if the pupil of the eye were colored isted not only the forms of corporeal things, but likewise with some particular color, it could not see every color. the forms of all spiritual creatures. So in every one of But as the human intellect is disposed for understanding these spiritual creatures, the forms of all things, both cor- corporeal things, so is the angelic mind for understanding poreal and spiritual, were impressed by the Word of God; immaterial things. Therefore, since the angelic intellect yet so that in every angel there was impressed the form of has within itself some one determinate nature from the his own species according to both its natural and its intel- number of such natures, it would seem that it cannot un- ligible condition, so that he should subsist in the nature of derstand other natures. his species, and understand himself by it; while the forms Objection 2. Further, it is stated in De Causis that of other spiritual and corporeal natures were impressed “every intelligence knows what is above it, in so far as in him only according to their intelligible natures, so that it is caused by it; and what is beneath it, in so far as it by such impressed species he might know corporeal and is its cause.” But one angel is not the cause of another. spiritual creatures. Therefore one angel does not know another. Reply to Objection 1. The spiritual natures of the Objection 3. Further, one angel cannot be known to angels are distinguished from one another in a certain or- another angel by the essence of the one knowing; because der, as was already observed (q. 50, a. 4, ad 1,2). So the all knowledge is effected by way of a likeness. But the nature of an angel does not hinder him from knowing the essence of the angel knowing is not like the essence of the other angelic natures, since both the higher and lower bear angel known, except generically; as is clear from what has affinity to his nature, the only difference being according been said before (q. 50, a. 4; q. 55, a. 1, ad 3). Hence, it to their various degrees of perfection. follows that one angel would not have a particular knowl- Reply to Objection 2. The nature of cause and ef- edge of another, but only a general knowledge. In like fect does not lead one angel to know another, except on manner it cannot be said that one angel knows another account of likeness, so far as cause and effect are alike. by the essence of the angel known; because that whereby Therefore if likeness without causality be admitted in the the intellect understands is something within the intellect; angels, this will suffice for one to know another. whereas the Trinity alone can penetrate the mind. Again, Reply to Objection 3. One angel knows another by it cannot be said that one angel knows the other by a the species of such angel existing in his intellect, which species; because that species would not differ from the differs from the angel whose image it is, not according to angel understood, since each is immaterial. Therefore in material and immaterial nature, but according to natural no way does it appear that one angel can understand an- and intentional existence. The angel is himself a subsist- other. ing form in his natural being; but his species in the intel- Objection 4. Further, if one angel did understand an- lect of another angel is not so, for there it possesses only other, this would be either by an innate species; and so an intelligible existence. As the form of color on the wall it would follow that, if God were now to create another has a natural existence; but, in the deferent medium, it has angel, such an angel could not be known by the existing only intentional existence. angels; or else he would have to be known by a species Reply to Objection 4. God made every creature pro- drawn from things; and so it would follow that the higher portionate to the universe which He determined to make. angels could not know the lower, from whom they receive Therefore had God resolved to make more angels or more nothing. Therefore in no way does it seem that one angel natures of things, He would have impressed more intel- knows another. ligible species in the angelic minds; as a builder who, if On the contrary, We read in De Causis that “every he had intended to build a larger house, would have made intelligence knows the things which are not corrupted.” larger foundations. Hence, for God to add a new creature I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. lit. to the universe, means that He would add a new intelligi- ii), such things as pre-existed from eternity in the Word ble species to an angel. of God, came forth from Him in two ways: first, into the 284 Whether an angle knows God by his own natural principles? Ia q. 56 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels cannot To the first-named class that knowledge of God is know God by their natural principles. For Dionysius says likened by which He is seen through His essence; and (Div. Nom. i) that God “by His incomprehensible might knowledge such as this cannot accrue to any creature from is placed above all heavenly minds.” Afterwards he adds its natural principles, as was said above (q. 12, a. 4). The that, “since He is above all substances, He is remote from third class comprises the knowledge whereby we know all knowledge.” God while we are on earth, by His likeness reflected in Objection 2. Further, God is infinitely above the in- creatures, according to Rom. 1:20: “The invisible things tellect of an angel. But what is infinitely beyond cannot be of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things reached. Therefore it appears that an angel cannot know that are made.” Hence, too, we are said to see God God by his natural principles. in a mirror. But the knowledge, whereby according to Objection 3. Further, it is written (1 Cor. 13:12): “We his natural principles the angel knows God, stands mid- see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to way between these two; and is likened to that knowledge face.” From this it appears that there is a twofold knowl- whereby a thing is seen through the species abstracted edge of God; the one, whereby He is seen in His essence, from it. For since God’s image is impressed on the very according to which He is said to be seen face to face; the nature of the angel in his essence, the angel knows God other whereby He is seen in the mirror of creatures. As in as much as he is the image of God. Yet he does not was already shown (q. 12, a. 4), an angel cannot have the behold God’s essence; because no created likeness is suf- former knowledge by his natural principles. Nor does vi- ficient to represent the Divine essence. Such knowledge sion through a mirror belong to the angels, since they do then approaches rather to the specular kind; because the not derive their knowledge of God from sensible things, as angelic nature is itself a kind of mirror representing the Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the angels Divine image. cannot know God by their natural powers. Reply to Objection 1. Dionysius is speaking of On the contrary, The angels are mightier in knowl- the knowledge of comprehension, as his words expressly edge than men. Yet men can know God through their nat- state. In this way God is not known by any created intel- ural principles; according to Rom. 1:19: “what is known lect. of God is manifest in them.” Therefore much more so can Reply to Objection 2. Since an angel’s intellect and the angels. essence are infinitely remote from God, it follows that he I answer that, The angels can have some knowledge cannot comprehend Him; nor can he see God’s essence of God by their own principles. In evidence whereof it through his own nature. Yet it does not follow on that must be borne in mind that a thing is known in three ways: account that he can have no knowledge of Him at all: be- first, by the presence of its essence in the knower, as light cause, as God is infinitely remote from the angel, so the can be seen in the eye; and so we have said that an angel knowledge which God has of Himself is infinitely above knows himself—secondly, by the presence of its simili- the knowledge which an angel has of Him. tude in the power which knows it, as a stone is seen by Reply to Objection 3. The knowledge which an angel the eye from its image being in the eye—thirdly, when the has of God is midway between these two kinds of knowl- image of the object known is not drawn directly from the edge; nevertheless it approaches more to one of them, as object itself, but from something else in which it is made was said above. to appear, as when we behold a man in a mirror. 285 FIRST PART, QUESTION 57 Of the Angel’s Knowledge of Material Things (In Five Articles) We next investigate the material objects which are known by the angels. Under this heading there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether the angels know the natures of material things? (2) Whether they know single things? (3) Whether they know the future? (4) Whether they know secret thoughts? (5) Whether they know all mysteries of grace? Whether the angels know material things? Ia q. 57 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels do not pre-exist in the angels more simply and less materially know material things. For the object understood is the even than in themselves, yet in a more manifold manner perfection of him who understands it. But material things and less perfectly than in God. cannot be the perfections of angels, since they are beneath Now whatever exists in any subject, is contained in it them. Therefore the angels do not know material things. after the manner of such subject. But the angels are in- Objection 2. Further, intellectual vision is only of tellectual beings of their own nature. Therefore, as God such things as exist within the soul by their essence, as knows material things by His essence, so do the angels is said in the gloss∗. But the material things cannot enter know them, forasmuch as they are in the angels by their by their essence into man’s soul, nor into the angel’s mind. intelligible species. Therefore they cannot be known by intellectual vision, but Reply to Objection 1. The thing understood is the only by imaginary vision, whereby the images of bodies perfection of the one who understands, by reason of the are apprehended, and by sensible vision, which regards intelligible species which he has in his intellect. And thus bodies in themselves. Now there is neither imaginary nor the intelligible species which are in the intellect of an an- sensible vision in the angels, but only intellectual. There- gel are perfections and acts in regard to that intellect. fore the angels cannot know material things. Reply to Objection 2. Sense does not apprehend the Objection 3. Further, material things are not actually essences of things, but only their outward accidents. In intelligible, but are knowable by apprehension of sense like manner neither does the imagination; for it appre- and of imagination, which does not exist in angels. There- hends only the images of bodies. The intellect alone ap- fore angels do not know material things. prehends the essences of things. Hence it is said (De An- On the contrary, Whatever the lower power can do, ima iii, text. 26) that the object of the intellect is “what a the higher can do likewise. But man’s intellect, which in thing is,” regarding which it does not err; as neither does the order of nature is inferior to the angel’s, can know ma- sense regarding its proper sensible object. So therefore terial things. Therefore much more can the mind of an the essences of material things are in the intellect of man angel. and angels, as the thing understood is in him who under- I answer that, The established order of things is for stands, and not according to their real natures. But some the higher beings to be more perfect than the lower; and things are in an intellect or in the soul according to both for whatever is contained deficiently, partially, and in natures; and in either case there is intellectual vision. manifold manner in the lower beings, to be contained in Reply to Objection 3. If an angel were to draw his the higher eminently, and in a certain degree of fulness knowledge of material things from the material things and simplicity. Therefore, in God, as in the highest source themselves, he would require to make them actually in- of things, all things pre-exist supersubstantially in respect telligible by a process of abstraction. But he does not de- of His simple Being itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. rive his knowledge of them from the material things them- 1). But among other creatures the angels are nearest to selves; he has knowledge of material things by actually God, and resemble Him most; hence they share more fully intelligible species of things, which species are connatu- and more perfectly in the Divine goodness, as Dionysius ral to him; just as our intellect has, by species which it says (Coel. Hier. iv). Consequently, all material things makes intelligible by abstraction. ∗ On 2 Cor. 12:2, taken from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii. 28) 286 Whether an angel knows singulars? Ia q. 57 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that angels do not know existing. singulars. For the Philosopher says (Poster. i, text. 22): Therefore, it must be said differently, that, as man “The sense has for its object singulars, but the intellect, by his various powers of knowledge knows all classes universals.” Now, in the angels there is no power of un- of things, apprehending universals and immaterial things derstanding save the intellectual power, as is evident from by his intellect, and things singular and corporeal by the what was said above (q. 54, a. 5). Consequently they do senses, so an angel knows both by his one mental power. not know singulars. For the order of things runs in this way, that the higher Objection 2. Further, all knowledge comes about by a thing is, so much the more is its power united and far- some assimilation of the knower to the object known. But reaching: thus in man himself it is manifest that the com- it is not possible for any assimilation to exist between an mon sense which is higher than the proper sense, although angel and a singular object, in so far as it is singular; be- it is but one faculty, knows everything apprehended by the cause, as was observed above (q. 50, a. 2), an angel is five outward senses, and some other things which no outer immaterial, while matter is the principle of singularity. sense knows; for example, the difference between white Therefore the angel cannot know singulars. and sweet. The same is to be observed in other cases. Ac- Objection 3. Further, if an angel does know singulars, cordingly, since an angel is above man in the order of na- it is either by singular or by universal species. It is not by ture, it is unreasonable to say that a man knows by any one singular species; because in this way he would require to of his powers something which an angel by his one fac- have an infinite number of species. Nor is it by universal ulty of knowledge, namely, the intellect, does not know. species; since the universal is not the sufficient principle Hence Aristotle pronounces it ridiculous to say that a dis- for knowing the singular as such, because singular things cord, which is known to us, should be unknown to God are not known in the universal except potentially. There- (De Anima i, text. 80; Metaph. text. 15). fore the angel does not know singulars. The manner in which an angel knows singular things On the contrary, No one can guard what he does not can be considered from this, that, as things proceed from know. But angels guard individual men, according to Ps. God in order that they may subsist in their own natures, 90:11: “He hath given His angels charge over Thee.” Con- so likewise they proceed in order that they may exist in sequently the angels know singulars. the angelic mind. Now it is clear that there comes forth I answer that, Some have denied to the angels all from God not only whatever belongs to their universal na- knowledge of singulars. In the first place this derogates ture, but likewise all that goes to make up their principles from the Catholic faith, which asserts that these lower of individuation; since He is the cause of the entire sub- things are administered by angels, according to Heb. 1:14: stance of the thing, as to both its matter and its form. And “They are all ministering spirits.” Now, if they had no for as much as He causes, does He know; for His knowl- knowledge of singulars, they could exercise no provision edge is the cause of a thing, as was shown above (q. 14, over what is going on in this world; since acts belong to a. 8). Therefore as by His essence, by which He causes individuals: and this is against the text of Eccles. 5:5: all things, God is the likeness of all things, and knows all “Say not before the angel: There is no providence.” Sec- things, not only as to their universal natures, but also as to ondly, it is also contrary to the teachings of philosophy, their singularity; so through the species imparted to them according to which the angels are stated to be the movers do the angels know things, not only as to their universal of the heavenly spheres, and to move them according to nature, but likewise in their individual conditions, in so far their knowledge and will. as they are the manifold representations of that one simple Consequently others have said that the angel possesses essence. knowledge of singulars, but in their universal causes, to Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking which all particular effects are reduced; as if the as- of our intellect, which apprehends only by a process of tronomer were to foretell a coming eclipse from the dis- abstraction; and by such abstraction from material con- positions of the movements of the heavens. This opinion ditions the thing abstracted becomes a universal. Such a does not escape the aforesaid implications; because, to manner of understanding is not in keeping with the nature know a singular, merely in its universal causes, is not to of the angels, as was said above (q. 55, a. 2, a. 3 ad 1), and know it as singular, that is, as it exists here and now. The consequently there is no comparison. astronomer, knowing from computation of the heavenly Reply to Objection 2. It is not according to their na- movements that an eclipse is about to happen, knows it ture that the angels are likened to material things, as one in the universal; yet he does not know it as taking place thing resembles another by agreement in genus, species, now, except by the senses. But administration, providence or accident; but as the higher bears resemblance to the and movement are of singulars, as they are here and now lower, as the sun does to fire. Even in this way there is 287 in God a resemblance of all things, as to both matter and Reply to Objection 3. Angels know singulars by uniform, in so far as there pre-exists in Him as in its cause versal forms, which nevertheless are the images of things whatever is to be found in things. For the same reason, the both as to their universal, and as to their individuating species in the angel’s intellect, which are images drawn principles. How many things can be known by the same from the Divine essence, are the images of things not only species, has been already stated above (q. 55, a. 3, ad 3). as to their form, but also as to their matter. Whether angels know the future? Ia q. 57 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels know fu- In another way future events are known in themselves. ture events. For angels are mightier in knowledge than To know the future in this way belongs to God alone; and men. But some men know many future events. Therefore not merely to know those events which happen of neces- much more do the angels. sity, or in the majority of cases, but even casual and chance Objection 2. Further, the present and the future are events; for God sees all things in His eternity, which, be- differences of time. But the angel’s intellect is above ing simple, is present to all time, and embraces all time. time; because, as is said in De Causis, “an intelligence And therefore God’s one glance is cast over all things keeps pace with eternity,” that is, aeviternity. Therefore, which happen in all time as present before Him; and He to the angel’s mind, past and future are not different, but beholds all things as they are in themselves, as was said he knows each indifferently. before when dealing with God’s knowledge (q. 14, a. 13). Objection 3. Further, the angel does not understand But the mind of an angel, and every created intellect, fall by species derived from things, but by innate universal far short of God’s eternity; hence the future as it is in itself species. But universal species refer equally to present, cannot be known by any created intellect. past, and future. Therefore it appears that the angels know Reply to Objection 1. Men cannot know future things indifferently things past, present, and future. except in their causes, or by God’s revelation. The an- Objection 4. Further, as a thing is spoken of as distant gels know the future in the same way, but much more dis-by reason of time, so is it by reason of place. But angels tinctly. know things which are distant according to place. There- Reply to Objection 2. Although the angel’s intellect fore they likewise know things distant according to future is above that time according to which corporeal move- time. ments are reckoned, yet there is a time in his mind accord- On the contrary, Whatever is the exclusive sign of the ing to the succession of intelligible concepts; of which Divinity, does not belong to the angels. But to know fu- Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii) that “God moves the ture events is the exclusive sign of the Divinity, according spiritual creature according to time.” And thus, since there to Is. 41:23: “Show the things that are to come hereafter, is succession in the angel’s intellect, not all things that and we shall know that ye are gods.” Therefore the angels happen through all time, are present to the angelic mind. do not know future events. Reply to Objection 3. Although the species in the I answer that, The future can be known in two ways. intellect of an angel, in so far as they are species, refer First, it can be known in its cause. And thus, future events equally to things present, past, and future; nevertheless the which proceed necessarily from their causes, are known present, past, and future; nevertheless the present, past, with sure knowledge; as that the sun will rise tomorrow. and future do not bear the same relations to the species. But events which proceed from their causes in the major- Present things have a nature according to which they re- ity of cases, are not known for certain, but conjecturally; semble the species in the mind of an angel: and so they thus the doctor knows beforehand the health of the patient. can be known thereby. Things which are yet to come have This manner of knowing future events exists in the angels, not yet a nature whereby they are likened to such species; and by so much the more than it does in us, as they under- consequently, they cannot be known by those species. stand the causes of things both more universally and more Reply to Objection 4. Things distant according to perfectly; thus doctors who penetrate more deeply into the place are already existing in nature; and share in some causes of an ailment can pronounce a surer verdict on the species, whose image is in the angel; whereas this is not future issue thereof. But events which proceed from their true of future things, as has been stated. Consequently causes in the minority of cases are quite unknown; such there is no comparison. as casual and chance events. 288 Whether angels know secret thoughts? Ia q. 57 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels know se- God alone can know the thoughts of hearts and affections cret thoughts. For Gregory (Moral. xviii), explaining Job of wills. The reason of this is, because the rational crea- 28:17: “Gold or crystal cannot equal it,” says that “then,” ture is subject to God only, and He alone can work in it namely in the bliss of those rising from the dead, “one Who is its principal object and last end: this will be de- shall be as evident to another as he is to himself, and when veloped later (q. 63, a. 1; q. 105, a. 5). Consequently all once the mind of each is seen, his conscience will at the that is in the will, and all things that depend only on the same time be penetrated.” But those who rise shall be like will, are known to God alone. Now it is evident that it de- the angels, as is stated (Mat. 22:30). Therefore an angel pends entirely on the will for anyone actually to consider can see what is in another’s conscience. anything; because a man who has a habit of knowledge, Objection 2. Further, intelligible species bear the or any intelligible species, uses them at will. Hence the same relation to the intellect as shapes do to bodies. But Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11): “For what man knoweth the when the body is seen its shape is seen. Therefore, when things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?” an intellectual substance is seen, the intelligible species Reply to Objection 1. In the present life one man’s within it is also seen. Consequently, when one angel be- thought is not known by another owing to a twofold hin- holds another, or even a soul, it seems that he can see the drance; namely, on account of the grossness of the body, thoughts of both. and because the will shuts up its secrets. The first obstacle Objection 3. Further, the ideas of our intellect resem- will be removed at the Resurrection, and does not exist at ble the angel more than do the images in our imagination; all in the angels; while the second will remain, and is in because the former are actually understood, while the lat- the angels now. Nevertheless the brightness of the body ter are understood only potentially. But the images in our will show forth the quality of the soul; as to its amount of imagination can be known by an angel as corporeal things grace and of glory. In this way one will be able to see the are known: because the imagination is a corporeal faculty. mind of another. Therefore it seems that an angel can know the thoughts of Reply to Objection 2. Although one angel sees the the intellect. intelligible species of another, by the fact that the species On the contrary, What is proper to God does not be- are proportioned to the rank of these substances according long to the angels. But it is proper to God to read the to greater or lesser universality, yet it does not follow that secrets of hearts, according to Jer. 17:9: “The heart is per- one knows how far another makes use of them by actual verse above all things, and unsearchable; who can know consideration. it? I am the Lord, Who search the heart.” Therefore angels Reply to Objection 3. The appetite of the brute does do not know the secrets of hearts. not control its act, but follows the impression of some I answer that, A secret thought can be known in two other corporeal or spiritual cause. Since, therefore, the ways: first, in its effect. In this way it can be known not angels know corporeal things and their dispositions, they only by an angel, but also by man; and with so much the can thereby know what is passing in the appetite or in the greater subtlety according as the effect is the more hid- imaginative apprehension of the brute beasts, and even of den. For thought is sometimes discovered not merely by man, in so far as the sensitive appetite sometimes, through outward act, but also by change of countenance; and doc- following some bodily impression, influences his conduct, tors can tell some passions of the soul by the mere pulse. as always happens in brutes. Yet the angels do not neces- Much more then can angels, or even demons, the more sarily know the movement of the sensitive appetite and deeply they penetrate those occult bodily modifications. the imaginative apprehension of man in so far as these are Hence Augustine says (De divin. daemon.) that demons moved by the will and reason; because, even the lower “sometimes with the greatest faculty learn man’s disposi- part of the soul has some share of reason, as obeying its tions, not only when expressed by speech, but even when ruler, as is said in Ethics iii, 12. But it does not follow conceived in thought, when the soul expresses them by that, if the angel knows what is passing through man’s certain signs in the body”; although (Retract. ii, 30) he sensitive appetite or imagination, he knows what is in the says “it cannot be asserted how this is done.” thought or will: because the intellect or will is not subject In another way thoughts can be known as they are in to the sensitive appetite or the imagination, but can make the mind, and affections as they are in the will: and thus various uses of them. 289 Whether the angels know the mysteries of grace? Ia q. 57 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels know mys- they all know them equally; but just as God wills them teries of grace. For, the mystery of the Incarnation is the to learn by revelation; as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:10): most excellent of all mysteries. But the angels knew of it “But to us God hath revealed them through His Spirit”; from the beginning; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, yet so that the higher angels beholding the Divine wis- 19): “This mystery was hidden in God through the ages, dom more clearly, learn more and deeper mysteries in the yet so that it was known to the princes and powers in heav- vision of God, which mysteries they communicate to the enly places.” And the Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:16): “That lower angels by enlightening them. Some of these mys- great mystery of godliness appeared unto angels∗.” There- teries they knew from the very beginning of their creation; fore the angels know the mysteries of grace. others they are taught afterwards, as befits their ministra- Objection 2. Further, the reasons of all mysteries of tions. grace are contained in the Divine wisdom. But the angels Reply to Objection 1. One can speak in two ways behold God’s wisdom, which is His essence. Therefore of the mystery of the Incarnation. First of all, in general; they know the mysteries of grace. and in this way it was revealed to all from the commence- Objection 3. Further, the prophets are enlightened by ment of their beatitude. The reason of this is, that this the angels, as is clear from Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv). But is a kind of general principle to which all their duties are the prophets knew mysteries of grace; for it is said (Amos ordered. For “all are‡ ministering spirits, sent to minis- 3:7): “For the Lord God doth nothing without revealing ter for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation His secret to His servants the prophets.” Therefore angels (Heb. 1:14)”; and this is brought by the mystery of the know the mysteries of grace. Incarnation. Hence it was necessary for all of them to be On the contrary, No one learns what he knows al- instructed in this mystery from the very beginning. ready. Yet even the highest angels seek out and learn mys- We can speak of the mystery of the Incarnation in an- teries of grace. For it is stated (Coel. Hier. vii) that “Sa- other way, as to its special conditions. Thus not all the cred Scripture describes some heavenly essences as ques- angels were instructed on all points from the beginning; tioning Jesus, and learning from Him the knowledge of even the higher angels learned these afterwards, as ap- His Divine work for us; and Jesus as teaching them di- pears from the passage of Dionysius already quoted. rectly”: as is evident in Is. 63:1, where, on the angels Reply to Objection 2. Although the angels in bliss asking, “Who is he who cometh up from Edom?” Jesus behold the Divine wisdom, yet they do not comprehend answered, “It is I, Who speak justice.” Therefore the an- it. So it is not necessary for them to know everything hid- gels do not know mysteries of grace. den in it. I answer that, There is a twofold knowledge in the Reply to Objection 3. Whatever the prophets knew angel. The first is his natural knowledge, according to by revelation of the mysteries of grace, was revealed in which he knows things both by his essence, and by innate a more excellent way to the angels. And although God species. By such knowledge the angels cannot know mys- revealed in general to the prophets what He was one day teries of grace. For these mysteries depend upon the pure to do regarding the salvation of the human race, still the will of God: and if an angel cannot learn the thoughts of apostles knew some particulars of the same, which the another angel, which depend upon the will of such angel, prophets did not know. Thus we read (Eph. 3:4,5): “As much less can he ascertain what depends entirely upon you reading, may understand my knowledge in the mys- God’s will. The Apostle reasons in this fashion (1 Cor. tery of Christ, which in other generations was not known 2:11): “No one knoweth the things of a man†, but the to the sons of men, as it is now revealed to His holy spirit of a man that is in him.” So, “the things also that apostles.” Among the prophets also, the later ones knew are of God no man knoweth but the Spirit of God.” what the former did not know; according to Ps. 118:100: There is another knowledge of the angels, which ren- “I have had understanding above ancients,” and Gregory ders them happy; it is the knowledge whereby they see says: “The knowledge of Divine things increased as time the Word, and things in the Word. By such vision they went on” (Hom. xvi in Ezech.). know mysteries of grace, but not all mysteries: nor do ∗ Vulg.: ‘Great is the mystery of godliness, which. . . appeared unto angels.’ † Vulg.: ‘What man knoweth the things of a man, but. . . ?’ ‡ Vulg.: ‘Are they not all.’ 290 FIRST PART, QUESTION 58 Of the Mode of Angelic Knowledge (In Seven Articles) After the foregoing we have now to treat of the mode of the angelic knowledge, concerning which there are seven points of inquiry: (1) Whether the angel’s intellect be sometimes in potentiality, and sometimes in act? (2) Whether the angel can understand many things at the same time? (3) Whether the angel’s knowledge is discursive? (4) Whether he understands by composing and dividing? (5) Whether there can be error in the angel’s intellect? (6) Whether his knowledge can be styled as morning and evening? (7) Whether the morning and evening knowledge are the same, or do they differ? Whether the angel’s intellect is sometimes in potentiality, sometimes in act? Ia q. 58 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the angel’s intellect lects, the angels, have no intelligible potentiality which is sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in act. For is not fully completed by connatural intelligible species. movement is the act of what is in potentiality, as stated in But with regard to things divinely revealed to them, there Phys. iii, 6. But the angels’ minds are moved by under- is nothing to hinder them from being in potentiality: be- standing, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore the cause even the heavenly bodies are at times in potentiality angelic minds are sometimes in potentiality. to being enlightened by the sun. Objection 2. Further, since desire is of a thing not In the second way an angel’s intellect can be in poten- possessed but possible to have, whoever desires to know tiality with regard to things learnt by natural knowledge; anything is in potentiality thereto. But it is said (1 Pet. for he is not always actually considering everything that 1:12): “On Whom the angels desire to look.” Therefore he knows by natural knowledge. But as to the knowledge the angel’s intellect is sometimes in potentiality. of the Word, and of the things he beholds in the Word, he Objection 3. Further, in the book De Causis it is stated is never in this way in potentiality; because he is always that “an intelligence understands according to the mode actually beholding the Word, and the things he sees in the of its substance.” But the angel’s intelligence has some Word. For the bliss of the angels consists in such vision; admixture of potentiality. Therefore it sometimes under- and beatitude does not consist in habit, but in act, as the stands potentially. Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8). On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii): Reply to Objection 1. Movement is taken there not as “Since the angels were created, in the eternity of the the act of something imperfect, that is, of something ex- Word, they enjoy holy and devout contemplation.” Now isting in potentiality, but as the act of something perfect, a contemplating intellect is not in potentiality, but in act. that is, of one actually existing. In this way understanding Therefore the intellect of an angel is not in potentiality. and feeling are termed movements, as stated in De Anima I answer that, As the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, text. 28. iii, text. 8; Phys. viii, 32), the intellect is in potential- Reply to Objection 2. Such desire on the part of the ity in two ways; first, “as before learning or discovering,” angels does not exclude the object desired, but weariness that is, before it has the habit of knowledge; secondly, as thereof. Or they are said to desire the vision of God with “when it possesses the habit of knowledge, but does not regard to fresh revelations, which they receive from God actually consider.” In the first way an angel’s intellect is to fit them for the tasks which they have to perform. never in potentiality with regard to the things to which his Reply to Objection 3. In the angel’s substance there natural knowledge extends. For, as the higher, namely, the is no potentiality divested of act. In the same way, the an- heavenly, bodies have no potentiality to existence, which gel’s intellect is never so in potentiality as to be without is not fully actuated, in the same way the heavenly intel- act. 291 Whether an angel can understand many things at the same time? Ia q. 58 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that an angel cannot un- that many things, in so far as they are distinct, cannot be derstand many things at the same time. For the Philoso- understood at once; but in so far as they are comprised pher says (Topic. ii, 4) that “it may happen that we know under one intelligible concept, they can be understood to- many things, but understand only one.” gether. Now everything is actually intelligible according Objection 2. Further, nothing is understood unless the as its image is in the intellect. All things, then, which can intellect be informed by an intelligible species; just at the be known by one intelligible species, are known as one body is formed by shape. But one body cannot be formed intelligible object, and therefore are understood simulta- into many shapes. Therefore neither can one intellect si- neously. But things known by various intelligible species, multaneously understand various intelligible things. are apprehended as different intelligible objects. Objection 3. Further, to understand is a kind of move- Consequently, by such knowledge as the angels have ment. But no movement terminates in various terms. of things through the Word, they know all things un- Therefore many things cannot be understood altogether. der one intelligible species, which is the Divine essence. On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 32): Therefore, as regards such knowledge, they know all “The spiritual faculty of the angelic mind comprehends things at once: just as in heaven “our thoughts will not be most easily at the same time all things that it wills.” fleeting, going and returning from one thing to another, I answer that, As unity of term is requisite for unity of but we shall survey all our knowledge at the same time movement, so is unity of object required for unity of op- by one glance,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16). But eration. Now it happens that several things may be taken by that knowledge wherewith the angels know things by as several or as one; like the parts of a continuous whole. innate species, they can at one time know all things which For if each of the parts be considered severally they are can be comprised under one species; but not such as are many: consequently neither by sense nor by intellect are under various species. they grasped by one operation, nor all at once. In another Reply to Objection 1. To understand many things as way they are taken as forming one in the whole; and so one, is, so to speak, to understand one thing. they are grasped both by sense and intellect all at once and Reply to Objection 2. The intellect is informed by by one operation; as long as the entire continuous whole the intelligible species which it has within it. So it can be- is considered, as is stated in De Anima iii, text. 23. In hold at the same time many intelligible objects under one this way our intellect understands together both the sub- species; as one body can by one shape be likened to many ject and the predicate, as forming parts of one proposition; bodies. and also two things compared together, according as they To the third objection the answer is the same as the agree in one point of comparison. From this it is evident first. Whether an angel’s knowledge is discursive? Ia q. 58 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the knowledge of sive. an angel is discursive. For the discursive movement of the On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that mind comes from one thing being known through another. the “angels do not acquire Divine knowledge from sepa- But the angels know one thing through another; for they rate discourses, nor are they led to something particular know creatures through the Word. Therefore the intellect from something common.” of an angel knows by discursive method. I answer that, As has often been stated (a. 1; q. 55, Objection 2. Further, whatever a lower power can do, a. 1), the angels hold that grade among spiritual sub- the higher can do. But the human intellect can syllogize, stances which the heavenly bodies hold among corporeal and know causes in effects; all of which is the discur- substances: for Dionysius calls them “heavenly minds” sive method. Therefore the intellect of the angel, which (a. 1; q. 55, a. 1). Now, the difference between heavenly is higher in the order of nature, can with greater reason do and earthly bodies is this, that earthly bodies obtain their this. last perfection by chance and movement: while the heav- Objection 3. Further, Isidore (De sum. bono i, 10) enly bodies have their last perfection at once from their says that “demons learn more things by experience.” But very nature. So, likewise, the lower, namely, the human, experimental knowledge is discursive: for, “one experi- intellects obtain their perfection in the knowledge of truth ence comes of many remembrances, and one universal by a kind of movement and discursive intellectual opera- from many experiences,” as Aristotle observes (Poster. ii; tion; that is to say, as they advance from one known thing Metaph. vii). Therefore an angel’s knowledge is discur- to another. But, if from the knowledge of a known prin- 292 ciple they were straightway to perceive as known all its ment of a kind. Now all movement is from something consequent conclusions, then there would be no discur- before to something after. Hence discursive knowledge sive process at all. Such is the condition of the angels, comes about according as from something previously because in the truths which they know naturally, they at known one attains to the knowledge of what is afterwards once behold all things whatsoever that can be known in known, and which was previously unknown. But if in the them. thing perceived something else be seen at the same time, Therefore they are called “intellectual beings”: be- as an object and its image are seen simultaneously in a cause even with ourselves the things which are instantly mirror, it is not discursive knowledge. And in this way grasped by the mind are said to be understood [intelligi]; the angels know things in the Word. hence “intellect” is defined as the habit of first principles. Reply to Objection 2. The angels can syllogize, in But human souls which acquire knowledge of truth by the the sense of knowing a syllogism; and they see effects discursive method are called “rational”; and this comes of in causes, and causes in effects: yet they do not acquire the feebleness of their intellectual light. For if they pos- knowledge of an unknown truth in this way, by syllogiz- sessed the fulness of intellectual light, like the angels, then ing from causes to effect, or from effect to cause. in the first aspect of principles they would at once compre- Reply to Objection 3. Experience is affirmed of an- hend their whole range, by perceiving whatever could be gels and demons simply by way of similitude, forasmuch reasoned out from them. as they know sensible things which are present, yet with- Reply to Objection 1. Discursion expresses move- out any discursion withal. Whether the angels understand by composing and dividing? Ia q. 58 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels understand understand by discursion and reasoning. In like manner, by composing and dividing. For, where there is multiplic- if the intellect in apprehending the quiddity of the sub- ity of things understood, there is composition of the same, ject were at once to have knowledge of all that can be as is said in De Anima iii, text. 21. But there is a mul- attributed to, or removed from, the subject, it would never titude of things understood in the angelic mind; because understand by composing and dividing, but only by un- angels apprehend different things by various species, and derstanding the essence. Thus it is evident that for the not all at one time. Therefore there is composition and self-same reason our intellect understands by discursion, division in the angel’s mind. and by composing and dividing, namely, that in the first Objection 2. Further, negation is far more remote apprehension of anything newly apprehended it does not from affirmation than any two opposite natures are; be- at once grasp all that is virtually contained in it. And this cause the first of distinctions is that of affirmation and comes from the weakness of the intellectual light within negation. But the angel knows certain distant natures not us, as has been said (a. 3). Hence, since the intellectual by one, but by diverse species, as is evident from what light is perfect in the angel, for he is a pure and most clear was said (a. 2). Therefore he must know affirmation and mirror, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), it follows that negation by diverse species. And so it seems that he un- as the angel does not understand by reasoning, so neither derstands by composing and dividing. does he by composing and dividing. Objection 3. Further, speech is a sign of the intel- Nevertheless, he understands the composition and the lect. But in speaking to men, angels use affirmative and division of enunciations, just as he apprehends the reason- negative expressions, which are signs of composition and ing of syllogisms: for he understands simply, such things of division in the intellect; as is manifest from many pas- as are composite, things movable immovably, and mate- sages of Sacred Scripture. Therefore it seems that the an- rial things immaterially. gel understands by composing and dividing. Reply to Objection 1. Not every multitude of things On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that understood causes composition, but a multitude of such “the intellectual power of the angel shines forth with the things understood that one of them is attributed to, or de- clear simplicity of divine concepts.” But a simple intelli- nied of, another. When an angel apprehends the nature of gence is without composition and division. Therefore the anything, he at the same time understands whatever can angel understands without composition or division. be either attributed to it, or denied of it. Hence, in appre- I answer that, As in the intellect, when reasoning, the hending a nature, he by one simple perception grasps all conclusion is compared with the principle, so in the in- that we can learn by composing and dividing. tellect composing and dividing, the predicate is compared Reply to Objection 2. The various natures of things with the subject. For if our intellect were to see at once differ less as to their mode of existing than do affirma- the truth of the conclusion in the principle, it would never tion and negation. Yet, as to the way in which they are 293 known, affirmation and negation have something more in firmative and negative forms of speech, shows that they common; because directly the truth of an affirmation is know both composition and division: yet not that they known, the falsehood of the opposite negation is known know by composing and dividing, but by knowing sim- also. ply the nature of a thing. Reply to Objection 3. The fact that angels use af- Whether there can be falsehood in the intellect of an angel? Ia q. 58 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that there can be false- for either they are not grasped at all, and so we know noth- hood in the angel’s intellect. For perversity appertains to ing respecting them; or else they are known precisely as falsehood. But, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), there they exist. is “a perverted fancy” in the demons. Therefore it seems So therefore, no falsehood, error, or deception can ex- that there can be falsehood in the intellect of the angels. ist of itself in the mind of any angel; yet it does so happen Objection 2. Further, nescience is the cause of esti- accidentally; but very differently from the way it befalls mating falsely. But, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi), us. For we sometimes get at the quiddity of a thing by a there can be nescience in the angels. Therefore it seems composing and dividing process, as when, by division and there can be falsehood in them. demonstration, we seek out the truth of a definition. Such Objection 3. Further, everything which falls short of is not the method of the angels; but through the (knowl- the truth of wisdom, and which has a depraved reason, edge of the) essence of a thing they know everything that has falsehood or error in its intellect. But Dionysius (Div. can be said regarding it. Now it is quite evident that the Nom. vii) affirms this of the demons. Therefore it seems quiddity of a thing can be a source of knowledge with that there can be error in the minds of the angels. regard to everything belonging to such thing, or excluded On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, from it; but not of what may be dependent on God’s super- text. 41) that “the intelligence is always true.” Augustine natural ordinance. Consequently, owing to their upright likewise says (QQ. 83, qu. 32) that “nothing but what is will, from their knowing the nature of every creature, the true can be the object of intelligence” Therefore there can good angels form no judgments as to the nature of the be neither deception nor falsehood in the angel’s knowl- qualities therein, save under the Divine ordinance; hence edge. there can be no error or falsehood in them. But since the I answer that, The truth of this question depends minds of demons are utterly perverted from the Divine partly upon what has gone before. For it has been said wisdom, they at times form their opinions of things sim- (a. 4) that an angel understands not by composing and di- ply according to the natural conditions of the same. Nor viding, but by understanding what a thing is. Now the are they ever deceived as to the natural properties of any- intellect is always true as regards what a thing is, just as thing; but they can be misled with regard to supernatural the sense regarding its proper object, as is said in De An- matters; for example, on seeing a dead man, they may sup- ima iii, text. 26. But by accident, deception and falsehood pose that he will not rise again, or, on beholding Christ, creep in, when we understand the essence of a thing by they may judge Him not to be God. some kind of composition, and this happens either when From all this the answers to the objections of both we take the definition of one thing for another, or when sides of the question are evident. For the perversity of the parts of a definition do not hang together, as if we the demons comes of their not being subject to the Divine were to accept as the definition of some creature, “a four- wisdom; while nescience is in the angels as regards things footed flying beast,” for there is no such animal. And this knowable, not naturally but supernaturally. It is, further- comes about in things composite, the definition of which more, evident that their understanding of what a thing is, is drawn from diverse elements, one of which is as matter is always true, save accidentally, according as it is, in an to the other. But there is no room for error in understand- undue manner, referred to some composition or division. ing simple quiddities, as is stated in Metaph. ix, text. 22; Whether there is a “morning” and an “evening” knowledge in the angels? Ia q. 58 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that there is neither an knowledge ought not to be termed morning and evening evening nor a morning knowledge in the angels; because knowledge. evening and morning have an admixture of darkness. But Objection 2. Further, between evening and morning there is no darkness in the knowledge of an angel; since the night intervenes; while noonday falls between morn- there is no error nor falsehood. Therefore the angelic ing and evening. Consequently, if there be a morning and 294 an evening knowledge in the angels, for the same reason to an admixture of darkness, but as compared to beginning it appears that there ought to be a noonday and a night and end. Or else it can be said, as Augustine puts it (Gen. knowledge. ad lit. iv, 23), that there is nothing to prevent us from Objection 3. Further, knowledge is diversified ac- calling something light in comparison with one thing, and cording to the difference of the objects known: hence darkness with respect to another. In the same way the the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 38), “The sci- life of the faithful and the just is called light in compar- ences are divided just as things are.” But there is a three- ison with the wicked, according to Eph. 5:8: “You were fold existence of things: to wit, in the Word; in their own heretofore darkness; but now, light in the Lord”: yet this natures; and in the angelic knowledge, as Augustine ob- very life of the faithful, when set in contrast to the life of serves (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). If, therefore, a morning and glory, is termed darkness, according to 2 Pet. 1:19: “You an evening knowledge be admitted in the angels, because have the firm prophetic word, whereunto you do well to of the existence of things in the Word, and in their own attend, as to a light that shineth in a dark place.” So the nature, then there ought to be admitted a third class of angel’s knowledge by which he knows things in their own knowledge, on account of the existence of things in the nature, is day in comparison with ignorance or error; yet angelic mind. it is dark in comparison with the vision of the Word. On the contrary, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,31; Reply to Objection 2. The morning and evening De Civ. Dei xii, 7,20) divides the knowledge of the angels knowledge belong to the day, that is, to the enlightened into morning and evening knowledge. angels, who are quite apart from the darkness, that is, I answer that, The expression “morning” and from the evil spirits. The good angels, while knowing “evening” knowledge was devised by Augustine; who in- the creature, do not adhere to it, for that would be to turn terprets the six days wherein God made all things, not as to darkness and to night; but they refer this back to the ordinary days measured by the solar circuit, since the sun praise of God, in Whom, as in their principle, they know was only made on the fourth day, but as one day, namely, all things. Consequently after “evening” there is no night, the day of angelic knowledge as directed to six classes of but “morning”; so that morning is the end of the preced- things. As in the ordinary day, morning is the beginning, ing day, and the beginning of the following, in so far as the and evening the close of day, so, their knowledge of the angels refer to God’s praise their knowledge of the preced- primordial being of things is called morning knowledge; ing work. Noonday is comprised under the name of day, and this is according as things exist in the Word. But their as the middle between the two extremes. Or else the noon knowledge of the very being of the thing created, as it can be referred to their knowledge of God Himself, Who stands in its own nature, is termed evening knowledge; has neither beginning nor end. because the being of things flows from the Word, as from Reply to Objection 3. The angels themselves are also a kind of primordial principle; and this flow is terminated creatures. Accordingly the existence of things in the an- in the being which they have in themselves. gelic knowledge is comprised under evening knowledge, Reply to Objection 1. Evening and morning knowl- as also the existence of things in their own nature. edge in the angelic knowledge are not taken as compared Whether the morning and evening knowledge are one? Ia q. 58 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the morning and the “When that which is perfect is come, then that which is in evening knowledge are one. For it is said (Gn. 1:5): part shall be done away.” But, if the evening knowledge “There was evening and morning, one day.” But by the be different from the morning, it is compared to it as the expression “day” the knowledge of the angels is to be un- less perfect to the perfect. Therefore the evening knowl- derstood, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 23). There- edge cannot exist together with the morning knowledge. fore the morning and evening knowledge of the angels are On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24): one and the same. “There is a vast difference between knowing anything as Objection 2. Further, it is impossible for one faculty it is in the Word of God, and as it is in its own nature; to have two operations at the same time. But the angels so that the former belongs to the day, and the latter to the are always using their morning knowledge; because they evening.” are always beholding God and things in God, according I answer that, As was observed (a. 6), the evening to Mat. 18:10. Therefore, if the evening knowledge were knowledge is that by which the angels know things in their different from the morning, the angel could never exercise proper nature. This cannot be understood as if they drew his evening knowledge. their knowledge from the proper nature of things, so that Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10): the preposition “in” denotes the form of a principle; be- 295 cause, as has been already stated (q. 55, a. 2), the angels cording to the unit of the thing understood; which, never-do not draw their knowledge from things. It follows, then, theless, can be apprehended by various ways of knowing that when we say “in their proper nature” we refer to the it. aspect of the thing known in so far as it is an object of Reply to Objection 2. There can be two operations knowledge; that is to say, that the evening knowledge is in of the same faculty at the one time, one of which is re- the angels in so far as they know the being of things which ferred to the other; as is evident when the will at the same those things have in their own nature. time wills the end and the means to the end; and the in- Now they know this through a twofold medium, tellect at the same instant perceives principles and con- namely, by innate ideas, or by the forms of things exist- clusions through those principles, when it has already ac- ing in the Word. For by beholding the Word, they know quired knowledge. As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24), not merely the being of things as existing in the Word, but the evening knowledge is referred to the morning knowl- the being as possessed by the things themselves; as God edge in the angels; hence there is nothing to hinder both by contemplating Himself sees that being which things from being at the same time in the angels. have in their own nature. It, therefore, it be called evening Reply to Objection 3. On the coming of what is per- knowledge, in so far as when the angels behold the Word, fect, the opposite imperfect is done away: just as faith, they know the being which things have in their proper na- which is of the things that are not seen, is made void when ture, then the morning and the evening knowledge are vision succeeds. But the imperfection of the evening essentially one and the same, and only differ as to the knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of the morn- things known. If it be called evening knowledge, in so ing knowledge. For that a thing be known in itself, is not far as through innate ideas they know the being which opposite to its being known in its cause. Nor, again, is things have in their own natures, then the morning and there any inconsistency in knowing a thing through two the evening knowledge differ. Thus Augustine seems to mediums, one of which is more perfect and the other less understand it when he assigns one as inferior to the other. perfect; just as we can have a demonstrative and a prob- Reply to Objection 1. The six days, as Augustine able medium for reaching the same conclusion. In like understands them, are taken as the six classes of things manner a thing can be known by the angel through the known by the angels; so that the day’s unit is taken ac- uncreated Word, and through an innate idea. 296 FIRST PART, QUESTION 59 The Will of the Angels (In Four Articles) In the next place we must treat of things concerning the will of the angels. In the first place we shall treat of the will itself; secondly, of its movement, which is love. Under the first heading there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is will in the angels? (2) Whether the will of the angel is his nature, or his intellect? (3) Is there free-will in the angels? (4) Is there an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in them? Whether there is will in the angels? Ia q. 59 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no will in the belongs to the intellect. This is most perfectly inclined angels. For as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. towards what is good; not, indeed, as if it were merely 42), “The will is in the reason.” But there is no reason in guided by another towards some particular good only, like the angels, but something higher than reason. Therefore things devoid of knowledge, nor towards some particular there is no will in the angels, but something higher than good only, as things which have only sensitive knowledge, the will. but as inclined towards good in general. Such inclination Objection 2. Further, the will is comprised under the is termed “will.” Accordingly, since the angels by their appetite, as is evident from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, intellect know the universal aspect of goodness, it is man- text. 42). But the appetite argues something imperfect; ifest that there is a will in them. because it is a desire of something not as yet possessed. Reply to Objection 1. Reason surpasses sense in a Therefore, since there is no imperfection in the angels, es- different way from that in which intellect surpasses rea- pecially in the blessed ones, it seems that there is no will son. Reason surpasses sense according to the diversity in them. of the objects known; for sense judges of particular ob- Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima jects, while reason judges of universals. Therefore there ii, text. 54) that the will is a mover which is moved; for it must be one appetite tending towards good in the abstract, is moved by the appetible object understood. Now the an- which appetite belongs to reason; and another with a ten- gels are immovable, since they are incorporeal. Therefore dency towards particular good, which appetite belongs to there is no will in the angels. sense. But intellect and reason differ as to their manner of On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11,12) knowing; because the intellect knows by simple intuition, that the image of the Trinity is found in the soul according while reason knows by a process of discursion from one to memory, understanding, and will. But God’s image is thing to another. Nevertheless by such discursion reason found not only in the soul of man, but also in the angelic comes to know what intellect learns without it, namely, mind, since it also is capable of knowing God. Therefore the universal. Consequently the object presented to the there is will in the angels. appetitive faculty on the part of reason and on the part of I answer that, We must necessarily place a will in the intellect is the same. Therefore in the angels, who are angels. In evidence thereof, it must be borne in mind that, purely intellectual, there is no appetite higher than the since all things flow from the Divine will, all things in will. their own way are inclined by appetite towards good, but Reply to Objection 2. Although the name of the ap- in different ways. Some are inclined to good by their nat- petitive part is derived from seeking things not yet pos- ural inclination, without knowledge, as plants and inan- sessed, yet the appetitive part reaches out not to these imate bodies. Such inclination towards good is called things only, but also to many other things; thus the name “a natural appetite.” Others, again, are inclined towards of a stone [lapis] is derived from injuring the foot [lae- good, but with some knowledge; not that they know the sione pedis], though not this alone belongs to a stone. In aspect of goodness, but that they apprehend some partic- the same way the irascible faculty is so denominated from ular good; as in the sense, which knows the sweet, the anger [ira]; though at the same time there are several other white, and so on. The inclination which follows this ap- passions in it, as hope, daring, and the rest. prehension is called “a sensitive appetite.” Other things, Reply to Objection 3. The will is called a mover again, have an inclination towards good, but with a knowl- which is moved, according as to will and to understand edge whereby they perceive the aspect of goodness; this are termed movements of a kind; and there is nothing to 297 prevent movement of this kind from existing in the angels, in De Anima iii, text. 28. since such movement is the act of a perfect agent, as stated Whether in the angels the will differs from the intellect? Ia q. 59 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that in the angel the will Now the will has a natural tendency towards good. does not differ from the intellect and from the nature. For Consequently there alone are essence and will identified an angel is more simple than a natural body. But a natural where all good is contained within the essence of him who body is inclined through its form towards its end, which is wills; that is to say, in God, Who wills nothing beyond its good. Therefore much more so is the angel. Now the Himself except on account of His goodness. This cannot angel’s form is either the nature in which he subsists, or be said of any creature, because infinite goodness is quite else it is some species within his intellect. Therefore the foreign to the nature of any created thing. Accordingly, angel inclines towards the good through his own nature, neither the will of the angel, nor that of any creature, can or through an intelligible species. But such inclination to- be the same thing as its essence. wards the good belongs to the will. Therefore the will of In like manner neither can the will be the same thing as the angel does not differ from his nature or his intellect. the intellect of angel or man. Because knowledge comes Objection 2. Further, the object of the intellect is the about in so far as the object known is within the knower; true, while the object of the will is the good. Now the consequently the intellect extends itself to what is outside good and the true differ, not really but only logically∗. it, according as what, in its essence, is outside it is dis- Therefore will and intellect are not really different. posed to be somehow within it. On the other hand, the Objection 3. Further, the distinction of common and will goes out to what is beyond it, according as by a kind proper does not differentiate the faculties; for the same of inclination it tends, in a manner, to what is outside it. power of sight perceives color and whiteness. But the Now it belongs to one faculty to have within itself some- good and the true seem to be mutually related as common thing which is outside it, and to another faculty to tend to to particular; for the true is a particular good, to wit, of what is outside it. Consequently intellect and will must the intellect. Therefore the will, whose object is the good, necessarily be different powers in every creature. It is not does not differ from the intellect, whose object is the true. so with God, for He has within Himself universal being, On the contrary, The will in the angels regards good and the universal good. Therefore both intellect and will things only, while their intellect regards both good and are His nature. bad things, for they know both. Therefore the will of the Reply to Objection 1. A natural body is moved to its angels is distinct from their intellect. own being by its substantial form: while it is inclined to I answer that, In the angels the will is a special fac- something outside by something additional, as has been ulty or power, which is neither their nature nor their in- said. tellect. That it is not their nature is manifest from this, Reply to Objection 2. Faculties are not differentiated that the nature or essence of a thing is completely com- by any material difference of their objects, but according prised within it: whatever, then, extends to anything be- to their formal distinction, which is taken from the nature yond it, is not its essence. Hence we see in natural bodies of the object as such. Consequently the diversity derived that the inclination to being does not come from anything from the notion of good and true suffices for the difference superadded to the essence, but from the matter which de- of intellect from will. sires being before possessing it, and from the form which Reply to Objection 3. Because the good and the true keeps it in such being when once it exists. But the inclina- are really convertible, it follows that the good is appre- tion towards something extrinsic comes from something hended by the intellect as something true; while the true superadded to the essence; as tendency to a place comes is desired by the will as something good. Nevertheless, from gravity or lightness, while the inclination to make the diversity of their aspects is sufficient for diversifying something like itself comes from the active qualities. the faculties, as was said above (ad 2). ∗ Cf. q. 16, a. 4 298 Whether there is free-will in the angels? Ia q. 59 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no free-will thing to be good. Consequently, wherever there is intel- in the angels. For the act of free-will is to choose. But lect, there is free-will. It is therefore manifest that just as there can be no choice with the angels, because choice there is intellect, so is there free-will in the angels, and in is “the desire of something after taking counsel,” while a higher degree of perfection than in man. counsel is “a kind of inquiry,” as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking But the angels’ knowledge is not the result of inquiring, of choice, as it is in man. As a man’s estimate in specu- for this belongs to the discursiveness of reason. Therefore lative matters differs from an angel’s in this, that the one it appears that there is no free-will in the angels. needs not to inquire, while the other does so need; so is it Objection 2. Further, free-will implies indifference to in practical matters. Hence there is choice in the angels, alternatives. But in the angels on the part of their intellect yet not with the inquisitive deliberation of counsel, but by there is no such indifference; because, as was observed the sudden acceptance of truth. already (q. 58, a. 5), their intellect is not deceived as to Reply to Objection 2. As was observed already (a. 2), things which are naturally intelligible to them. Therefore knowledge is effected by the presence of the known within neither on the part of their appetitive faculty can there be the knower. Now it is a mark of imperfection in anything free-will. not to have within it what it should naturally have. Con- Objection 3. Further, the natural endowments of the sequently an angel would not be perfect in his nature, if angels belong to them according to degrees of more or his intellect were not determined to every truth which he less; because in the higher angels the intellectual nature is can know naturally. But the act of the appetitive faculty more perfect than in the lower. But the free-will does not comes of this, that the affection is directed to something admit of degrees. Therefore there is no free-will in them. outside. Yet the perfection of a thing does not come from On the contrary, Free-will is part of man’s dignity. everything to which it is inclined, but only from some- But the angels’ dignity surpasses that of men. Therefore, thing which is higher than it. Therefore it does not argue since free-will is in men, with much more reason is it in imperfection in an angel if his will be not determined with the angels. regard to things beneath him; but it would argue imperfec- I answer that, Some things there are which act, not tion in him, with he to be indeterminate to what is above from any previous judgment, but, as it were, moved and him. made to act by others; just as the arrow is directed to the Reply to Objection 3. Free-will exists in a nobler target by the archer. Others act from some kind of judg- manner in the higher angels than it does in the lower, as ment; but not from free-will, such as irrational animals; also does the judgment of the intellect. Yet it is true that for the sheep flies from the wolf by a kind of judgment liberty, in so far as the removal of compulsion is consid- whereby it esteems it to be hurtful to itself: such a judg- ered, is not susceptible of greater and less degree; because ment is not a free one, but implanted by nature. Only an privations and negations are not lessened nor increased di- agent endowed with an intellect can act with a judgment rectly of themselves; but only by their cause, or through which is free, in so far as it apprehends the common note the addition of some qualification. of goodness; from which it can judge this or the other Whether there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels? Ia q. 59 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that there is an irascible Objection 3. Further, some virtues are said to reside and a concupiscible appetite in the angels. For Dionysius in the irascible appetite and some in the concupiscible: says (Div. Nom. iv) that in the demons there is “unrea- thus charity and temperance appear to be in the concupis- sonable fury and wild concupiscence.” But demons are cible, while hope and fortitude are in the irascible. But of the same nature as angels; for sin has not altered their these virtues are in the angels. Therefore there is both a nature. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible concupiscible and an irascible appetite in the angels. appetite in the angels. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima Objection 2. Further, love and joy are in the concu- iii, text. 42) that the irascible and concupiscible are in piscible; while anger, hope, and fear are in the irascible the sensitive part, which does not exist in angels. Conse- appetite. But in the Sacred Scriptures these things are at- quently there is no irascible or concupiscible appetite in tributed both to the good and to the wicked angels. There- the angels. fore there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in I answer that, The intellective appetite is not divided the angels. into irascible and concupiscible; only the sensitive ap- 299 petite is so divided. The reason of this is because, since are passions, are in the concupiscible appetite, but in so far the faculties are distinguished from one another not ac- as they express a simple act of the will, they are in the in- cording to the material but only by the formal distinction tellective part: in this sense to love is to wish well to any- of objects, if to any faculty there respond an object accord- one; and to be glad is for the will to repose in some good ing to some common idea, there will be no distinction of possessed. Universally speaking, none of these things is faculties according to the diversity of the particular things said of the angels, as by way of passions; as Augustine contained under that common idea. Just as if the proper says (De Civ. Dei ix). object of the power of sight be color as such, then there are Reply to Objection 3. Charity, as a virtue, is not in the not several powers of sight distinguished according to the concupiscible appetite, but in the will; because the object difference of black and white: whereas if the proper ob- of the concupiscible appetite is the good as delectable to ject of any faculty were white, as white, then the faculty the senses. But the Divine goodness, which is the object of seeing white would be distinguished from the faculty of charity, is not of any such kind. For the same reason it of seeing black. must be said that hope does not exist in the irascible ap- Now it is quite evident from what has been said (a. 1; petite; because the object of the irascible appetite is some- q. 16, a. 1), that the object of the intellective appetite, oththing arduous belonging to the sensible order, which the erwise known as the will, is good according to the com- virtue of hope does not regard; since the object of hope mon aspect of goodness; nor can there be any appetite is arduous and divine. Temperance, however, considered except of what is good. Hence, in the intellective part, as a human virtue, deals with the desires of sensible plea- the appetite is not divided according to the distinction of sures, which belong to the concupiscible faculty. Simi- some particular good things, as the sensitive appetite is di- larly, fortitude regulates daring and fear, which reside in vided, which does not crave for what is good according to the irascible part. Consequently temperance, in so far as its common aspect, but for some particular good object. it is a human virtue, resides in the concupiscible part, and Accordingly, since there exists in the angels only an in- fortitude in the irascible. But they do not exist in the an- tellective appetite, their appetite is not distinguished into gels in this manner. For in them there are no passions of irascible and concupiscible, but remains undivided; and it concupiscence, nor of fear and daring, to be regulated by is called the will. temperance and fortitude. But temperance is predicated Reply to Objection 1. Fury and concupiscence are of them according as in moderation they display their will metaphorically said to be in the demons, as anger is some- in conformity with the Divine will. Fortitude is likewise times attributed to God;—on account of the resemblance attributed to them, in so far as they firmly carry out the in the effect. Divine will. All of this is done by their will, and not by Reply to Objection 2. Love and joy, in so far as they the irascible or concupiscible appetite. 300 FIRST PART, QUESTION 60 Of the Love or Dilection of the Angels (In Five Articles) The next subject for our consideration is that act of the will which is love or dilection; because every act of the appetitive faculty comes of love. Under this heading there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is natural love in the angels? (2) Whether there is in them love of choice? (3) Whether the angel loves himself with natural love or with love of choice? (4) Whether one angel loves another with natural love as he loves himself? (5) Whether the angel loves God more than self with natural love? Whether there is natural love or dilection in an angel? Ia q. 60 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no natu- ently in different natures; but in each according to its ral love or dilection in the angels. For, natural love is mode. Consequently, in the intellectual nature there is to contradistinguished from intellectual love, as stated by be found a natural inclination coming from the will; in the Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But an angel’s love is intel- sensitive nature, according to the sensitive appetite; but lectual. Therefore it is not natural. in a nature devoid of knowledge, only according to the Objection 2. Further, those who love with natural love tendency of the nature to something. Therefore, since an are more acted upon than active in themselves; for nothing angel is an intellectual nature, there must be a natural love has control over its own nature. Now the angels are not in his will. acted upon, but act of themselves; because they possess Reply to Objection 1. Intellectual love is contradis- free-will, as was shown above (q. 59, a. 3). Consequently tinguished from that natural love, which is merely natural, there is no natural love in them. in so far as it belongs to a nature which has not likewise Objection 3. Further, every love is either ordinate or the perfection of either sense or intellect. inordinate. Now ordinate love belongs to charity; while Reply to Objection 2. All things in the world are inordinate love belongs to wickedness. But neither of moved to act by something else except the First Agent, these belongs to nature; because charity is above nature, Who acts in such a manner that He is in no way moved to while wickedness is against nature. Therefore there is no act by another; and in Whom nature and will are the same. natural love in the angels. So there is nothing unfitting in an angel being moved to On the contrary, Love results from knowledge; for, act in so far as such natural inclination is implanted in him nothing is loved except it be first known, as Augustine by the Author of his nature. Yet he is not so moved to act says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But there is natural knowledge in that he does not act himself, because he has free-will. the angels. Therefore there is also natural love. Reply to Objection 3. As natural knowledge is al- I answer that, We must necessarily place natural love ways true, so is natural love well regulated; because nat- in the angels. In evidence of this we must bear in mind ural love is nothing else than the inclination implanted in that what comes first is always sustained in what comes nature by its Author. To say that a natural inclination is after it. Now nature comes before intellect, because the not well regulated, is to derogate from the Author of na- nature of every subject is its essence. Consequently what- ture. Yet the rectitude of natural love is different from the ever belongs to nature must be preserved likewise in such rectitude of charity and virtue: because the one rectitude subjects as have intellect. But it is common to every na- perfects the other; even so the truth of natural knowledge ture to have some inclination; and this is its natural ap- is of one kind, and the truth of infused or acquired knowl- petite or love. This inclination is found to exist differ- edge is of another. 301 Whether there is love of choice in the angels? Ia q. 60 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no love of of that good, which a man naturally wills as an end, is his choice in the angels. For love of choice appears to be ra- natural love; but the love which comes of this, which is of tional love; since choice follows counsel, which lies in something loved for the end’s sake, is the love of choice. inquiry, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Now rational love is con- There is however a difference on the part of the intel- trasted with intellectual, which is proper to angels, as is lect and on the part of the will. Because, as was stated al- said (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore there is no love of choice ready (q. 59, a. 2), the mind’s knowledge is brought about in the angels. by the inward presence of the known within the knower. It Objection 2. Further, the angels have only natural comes of the imperfection of man’s intellectual nature that knowledge besides such as is infused: since they do not his mind does not simultaneously possess all things capa- proceed from principles to acquire the knowledge of con- ble of being understood, but only a few things from which clusions. Hence they are disposed to everything they can he is moved in a measure to grasp other things. The act know, as our intellect is disposed towards first principles, of the appetitive faculty, on the contrary, follows the in- which it can know naturally. Now love follows knowl- clination of man towards things; some of which are good edge, as has been already stated (a. 1; q. 16, a. 1). Con- in themselves, and consequently are appetible in them- sequently, besides their infused love, there is only natural selves; others being good only in relation to something love in the angels. Therefore there is no love of choice in else, and being appetible on account of something else. them. Consequently it does not argue imperfection in the per- On the contrary, We neither merit nor demerit by our son desiring, for him to seek one thing naturally as his natural acts. But by their love the angels merit or demerit. end, and something else from choice as ordained to such Therefore there is love of choice in them. end. Therefore, since the intellectual nature of the angels I answer that, There exists in the angels a natural is perfect, only natural and not deductive knowledge is to love, and a love of choice. Their natural love is the prin- be found in them, but there is to be found in them both ciple of their love of choice; because, what belongs to natural love and love of choice. that which precedes, has always the nature of a princi- In saying all this, we are passing over all that regards ple. Wherefore, since nature is first in everything, what things which are above nature, since nature is not the suf- belongs to nature must be a principle in everything. ficient principle thereof: but we shall speak of them later This is clearly evident in man, with respect to both his on (q. 62). intellect and his will. For the intellect knows principles Reply to Objection 1. Not all love of choice is ra- naturally; and from such knowledge in man comes the tional love, according as rational is distinguished from in- knowledge of conclusions, which are known by him not tellectual love. For rational love is so called which fol- naturally, but by discovery, or by teaching. In like manner, lows deductive knowledge: but, as was said above (q. 59, the end acts in the will in the same way as the principle a. 3, ad 1), when treating of free-will, every choice does does in the intellect, as is laid down in Phys. ii, text. 89. not follow a discursive act of the reason; but only human Consequently the will tends naturally to its last end; for choice. Consequently the conclusion does not follow. every man naturally wills happiness: and all other desires The reply to the second objection follows from what are caused by this natural desire; since whatever a man has been said. wills he wills on account of the end. Therefore the love Whether the angel loves himself with both natural love, and love of choice? Ia q. 60 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the angel does not Objection 3. Further, love is a kind of movement. But love himself both with natural love and a love of choice. every movement tends towards something else. Therefore For, as was said (a. 2), natural love regards the end itself; it seems that an angel cannot love himself with either nat- while love of choice regards the means to the end. But the ural or elective love. same thing, with regard to the same, cannot be both the On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8): end and a means to the end. Therefore natural love and “Love for others comes of love for oneself.” the love of choice cannot have the same object. I answer that, Since the object of love is good, and Objection 2. Further, as Dionysius observes (Div. good is to be found both in substance and in accident, as Nom. iv): “Love is a uniting and a binding power.” But is clear from Ethic. i, 6, a thing may be loved in two uniting and binding imply various things brought together. ways; first of all as a subsisting good; and secondly as an Therefore the angel cannot love himself. accidental or inherent good. That is loved as a subsisting 302 good, which is so loved that we wish well to it. But that under quite different aspects that an angel or a man loves which we wish unto another, is loved as an accidental or self with natural and with elective love, as was observed inherent good: thus knowledge is loved, not that any good above. may come to it but that it may be possessed. This kind of Reply to Objection 2. As to be one is better than to be love has been called by the name “concupiscence” while united, so there is more oneness in love which is directed the first is called “friendship.” to self than in love which unites one to others. Dionysius Now it is manifest that in things devoid of knowledge, used the terms “uniting” and “binding” in order to show everything naturally seeks to procure what is good for it- the derivation of love from self to things outside self; as self; as fire seeks to mount upwards. Consequently both uniting is derived from unity. angel and man naturally seek their own good and perfec- Reply to Objection 3. As love is an action which re- tion. This is to love self. Hence angel and man naturally mains within the agent, so also is it a movement which love self, in so far as by natural appetite each desires what abides within the lover, but does not of necessity tend to- is good for self. On the other hand, each loves self with wards something else; yet it can be reflected back upon the love of choice, in so far as from choice he wishes for the lover so that he loves himself; just as knowledge is re- something which will benefit himself. flected back upon the knower, in such a way that he knows Reply to Objection 1. It is not under the same but himself. Whether an angel loves another with natural love as he loves himself? Ia q. 60 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that an angel does not ically one with another, is the one according to nature. love another with natural love as he loves himself. For And so everything loves another which is one with it in love follows knowledge. But an angel does not know an- species, with a natural affection, in so far as it loves its other as he knows himself: because he knows himself by own species. This is manifest even in things devoid of his essence, while he knows another by his similitude, as knowledge: for fire has a natural inclination to communi- was said above (q. 56, Aa. 1,2). Therefore it seems that cate its form to another thing, wherein consists this other one angel does not love another with natural love as he thing’s good; as it is naturally inclined to seek its own loves himself. good, namely, to be borne upwards. Objection 2. Further, the cause is more powerful than So then, it must be said that one angel loves another the effect; and the principle than what is derived from it. with natural affection, in so far as he is one with him in na- But love for another comes of love for self, as the Philoso- ture. But so far as an angel has something else in common pher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore one angel does not love with another angel, or differs from him in other respects, another as himself, but loves himself more. he does not love him with natural love. Objection 3. Further, natural love is of something as Reply to Objection 1. The expression ‘as himself’ an end, and is unremovable. But no angel is the end of can in one way qualify the knowledge and the love on another; and again, such love can be severed from him, the part of the one known and loved: and thus one angel as is the case with the demons, who have no love for the knows another as himself, because he knows the other to good angels. Therefore an angel does not love another be even as he knows himself to be. In another way the with natural love as he loves himself. expression can qualify the knowledge and the love on the On the contrary, That seems to be a natural prop- part of the knower and lover. And thus one angel does not erty which is found in all, even in such as devoid of rea- know another as himself, because he knows himself by son. But, “every beast loves its like,” as is said, Ecclus. his essence, and the other not by the other’s essence. In 13:19. Therefore an angel naturally loves another as he like manner he does not love another as he loves himself, loves himself. because he loves himself by his own will; but he does not I answer that, As was observed (a. 3), both angel and love another by the other’s will. man naturally love self. Now what is one with a thing, is Reply to Objection 2. The expression “as” does not that thing itself: consequently every thing loves what is denote equality, but likeness. For since natural affection one with itself. So, if this be one with it by natural union, rests upon natural unity, the angel naturally loves less it loves it with natural love; but if it be one with it by non- what is less one with him. Consequently he loves more natural union, then it loves it with non-natural love. Thus what is numerically one with himself, than what is one a man loves his fellow townsman with a social love, while only generically or specifically. But it is natural for him he loves a blood relation with natural affection, in so far as to have a like love for another as for himself, in this re- he is one with him in the principle of natural generation. spect, that as he loves self in wishing well to self, so he Now it is evident that what is generically or specif- loves another in wishing well to him. 303 Reply to Objection 3. Natural love is said to be of the their still retaining a natural affection towards the good end, not as of that end to which good is willed, but rather angels, in so far as they share the same nature with them. as of that good which one wills for oneself, and in con- But they hate them, in so far as they are unlike them ac- sequence for another, as united to oneself. Nor can such cording to righteousness and unrighteousness. natural love be stripped from the wicked angels, without Whether an angel by natural love loves God more than he loves himself? Ia q. 60 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the angel does not self more than he does God, because he naturally loves love God by natural love more than he loves himself. For, himself before God, and with greater intensity. as was stated (a. 4), natural love rests upon natural union. The falsity of such an opinion stands in evidence, if Now the Divine nature is far above the angelic nature. one but consider whither natural movement tends in the Therefore, according to natural love, the angel loves God natural order of things; because the natural tendency of less than self, or even than another angel. things devoid of reason shows the nature of the natural Objection 2. Further, “That on account of which a inclination residing in the will of an intellectual nature. thing is such, is yet more so.” But every one loves an- Now, in natural things, everything which, as such, natu- other with natural love for his own sake: because one rally belongs to another, is principally, and more strongly thing loves another as good for itself. Therefore the an- inclined to that other to which it belongs, than towards gel does not love God more than self with natural love. itself. Such a natural tendency is evidenced from things Objection 3. Further, nature is self-centered in its op- which are moved according to nature: because “accord- eration; for we behold every agent acting naturally for its ing as a thing is moved naturally, it has an inborn aptitude own preservation. But nature’s operation would not be to be thus moved,” as stated in Phys. ii, text. 78. For self-centered were it to tend towards anything else more we observe that the part naturally exposes itself in order than to nature itself. Therefore the angel does not love to safeguard the whole; as, for instance, the hand is with- God more than himself from natural love. out deliberation exposed to the blow for the whole body’s Objection 4. Further, it is proper to charity to love safety. And since reason copies nature, we find the same God more than self. But to love from charity is not natu- inclination among the social virtues; for it behooves the ral to the angels; for “it is poured out upon their hearts by virtuous citizen to expose himself to the danger of death the Holy Spirit Who is given to them,” as Augustine says for the public weal of the state; and if man were a natural (De Civ. Dei xii, 9). Therefore the angels do not love God part of the city, then such inclination would be natural to more than themselves by natural love. him. Objection 5. Further, natural love lasts while nature Consequently, since God is the universal good, and endures. But the love of God more than self does not re- under this good both man and angel and all creatures are main in the angel or man who sins; for Augustine says (De comprised, because every creature in regard to its entire Civ. Dei xiv), “Two loves have made two cities; namely being naturally belongs to God, it follows that from natu- love of self unto the contempt of God has made the earthly ral love angel and man alike love God before themselves city; while love of God unto the contempt of self has made and with a greater love. Otherwise, if either of them the heavenly city.” Therefore it is not natural to love God loved self more than God, it would follow that natural love more than self. would be perverse, and that it would not be perfected but On the contrary, All the moral precepts of the law destroyed by charity. come of the law of nature. But the precept of loving God Reply to Objection 1. Such reasoning holds good of more than self is a moral precept of the law. Therefore, things adequately divided whereof one is not the cause it is of the law of nature. Consequently from natural love of the existence and goodness of the other; for in such the angel loves God more than himself. natures each loves itself naturally more than it does the I answer that, There have been some who maintained other, inasmuch as it is more one with itself than it is with that an angel loves God more than himself with natural the other. But where one is the whole cause of the exis- love, both as to the love of concupiscence, through his tence and goodness of the other, that one is naturally more seeking the Divine good for himself rather than his own loved than self; because, as we said above, each part natu- good; and, in a fashion, as to the love of friendship, in rally loves the whole more than itself: and each individual so far as he naturally desires a greater good to God than naturally loves the good of the species more than its own to himself; because he naturally wishes God to be God, individual good. Now God is not only the good of one while as for himself, he wills to have his own nature. But species, but is absolutely the universal good; hence every- absolutely speaking, out of the natural love he loves him- thing in its own way naturally loves God more than itself. 304 Reply to Objection 2. When it is said that God is loved by everything with natural love. So far as He is the loved by an angel “in so far” as He is good to the an- good which of its very nature beatifies all with supernatu- gel, if the expression “in so far” denotes an end, then it is ral beatitude, He is love with the love of charity. false; for he does not naturally love God for his own good, Reply to Objection 5. Since God’s substance and but for God’s sake. If it denotes the nature of love on the universal goodness are one and the same, all who behold lover’s part, then it is true; for it would not be in the nature God’s essence are by the same movement of love moved of anyone to love God, except from this—that everything towards the Divine essence as it is distinct from other is dependent on that good which is God. things, and according as it is the universal good. And Reply to Objection 3. Nature’s operation is self- because He is naturally loved by all so far as He is the centered not merely as to certain particular details, but universal good, it is impossible that whoever sees Him in much more as to what is common; for everything is in- His essence should not love Him. But such as do not be- clined to preserve not merely its individuality, but like- hold His essence, know Him by some particular effects, wise its species. And much more has everything a natural which are sometimes opposed to their will. So in this way inclination towards what is the absolutely universal good. they are said to hate God; yet nevertheless, so far as He is Reply to Objection 4. God, in so far as He is the uni- the universal good of all, every thing naturally loves God versal good, from Whom every natural good depends, is more than itself. 305 FIRST PART, QUESTION 61 Of the Production of the Angels in the Order of Natural Being (In Four Articles) After dealing with the nature of the angels, their knowledge and will, it now remains for us to treat of their creation, or, speaking in a general way, of their origin. Such consideration is threefold. In the first place we must see how they were brought into natural existence; secondly, how they were made perfect in grace or glory; and thirdly, how some of them became wicked. Under the first heading there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the angel has a cause of his existence? (2) Whether he has existed from eternity? (3) Whether he was created before corporeal creatures? (4) Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven? Whether the angels have a cause of their existence? Ia q. 61 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels have no His own essence: while all other things have their exis- cause of their existence. For the first chapter of Genesis tence by participation. Now whatever exists by partici- treats of things created by God. But there is no mention pation is caused by what exists essentially; as everything of angels. Therefore the angels were not created by God. ignited is caused by fire. Consequently the angels, of ne- Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. cessity, were made by God. viii, text. 16) that if any substance be a form without mat- Reply to Objection 1. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ter, “straightway it has being and unity of itself, and has xi, 50) that the angels were not passed over in that account no cause of its being and unity.” But the angels are imma- of the first creation of things, but are designated by the terial forms, as was shown above (q. 50, a. 2). Therefore name “heavens” or of “light.” And they were either passed they have no cause of their being. over, or else designated by the names of corporeal things, Objection 3. Further, whatever is produced by any because Moses was addressing an uncultured people, as agent, from the very fact of its being produced, receives yet incapable of understanding an incorporeal nature; and form from it. But since the angels are forms, they do not if it had been divulged that there were creatures existing derive their form from any agent. Therefore the angels beyond corporeal nature, it would have proved to them have no active cause. an occasion of idolatry, to which they were inclined, and On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 148:2): “Praise ye from which Moses especially meant to safeguard them. Him, all His angels”; and further on, verse 5: “For He Reply to Objection 2. Substances that are subsisting spoke and they were made.” forms have no ‘formal’ cause of their existence and unity, I answer that, It must be affirmed that angels and ev- nor such active cause as produces its effect by changing erything existing, except God, were made by God. God the matter from a state of potentiality to actuality; but they alone is His own existence; while in everything else the have a cause productive of their entire substance. essence differs from the existence, as was shown above From this the solution of the third difficulty is mani- (q. 3, a. 4). From this it is clear that God alone exists of fest. Whether the angel was produced by God from eternity? Ia q. 61 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the angel was pro- other non-existing, but exists always. duced by God from eternity. For God is the cause of the Objection 3. Further, Augustine (De Trin. xiii) proves angel by His being: for He does not act through something the soul’s incorruptibility by the fact that the mind is ca- besides His essence. But His being is eternal. Therefore pable of truth. But as truth is incorruptible, so is it eternal. He produced the angels from eternity. Therefore the intellectual nature of the soul and of the an- Objection 2. Further, everything which exists at one gel is not only incorruptible, but likewise eternal. period and not at another, is subject to time. But the an- On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 8:22), in the person gel is above time, as is laid down in the book De Causis. of begotten Wisdom: “The Lord possessed me in the be- Therefore the angel is not at one time existing and at an- ginning of His ways, before He made anything from the 306 beginning.” But, as was shown above (a. 1), the angels Reply to Objection 2. An angel is above that time were made by God. Therefore at one time the angels were which is the measure of the movement of the heavens; be- not. cause he is above every movement of a corporeal nature. I answer that, God alone, Father, Son and Holy Nevertheless he is not above time which is the measure Ghost, is from eternity. Catholic Faith holds this with- of the succession of his existence after his non-existence, out doubt; and everything to the contrary must be rejected and which is also the measure of the succession which is as heretical. For God so produced creatures that He made in his operations. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, them “from nothing”; that is, after they had not been. 20,21) that “God moves the spiritual creature according to Reply to Objection 1. God’s being is His will. So time.” the fact that God produced the angels and other creatures Reply to Objection 3. Angels and intelligent souls by His being does not exclude that He made them also are incorruptible by the very fact of their having a nature by His will. But, as was shown above (q. 19, a. 3; q. 46, whereby they are capable of truth. But they did not pos- a. 1 ), God’s will does not act by necessity in producing sess this nature from eternity; it was bestowed upon them creatures. Therefore He produced such as He willed, and when God Himself willed it. Consequently it does not when He willed. follow that the angels existed from eternity. Whether the angels were created before the corporeal world? Ia q. 61 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels were cre- of creature to creature; because the mutual relationship of ated before the corporeal world. For Jerome says (In Ep. creatures makes up the good of the universe. But no part is ad Tit. i, 2): “Six thousand years of our time have not yet perfect if separate from the whole. Consequently it is im- elapsed; yet how shall we measure the time, how shall we probable that God, Whose “works are perfect,” as it is said count the ages, in which the Angels, Thrones, Domina- Dt. 32:4, should have created the angelic creature before tions, and the other orders served God?” Damascene also other creatures. At the same time the contrary is not to says (De Fide Orth. ii): “Some say that the angels were be deemed erroneous; especially on account of the opin- begotten before all creation; as Gregory the Theologian ion of Gregory Nazianzen, “whose authority in Christian declares, He first of all devised the angelic and heavenly doctrine is of such weight that no one has ever raised ob- powers, and the devising was the making thereof.” jection to his teaching, as is also the case with the doctrine Objection 2. Further, the angelic nature stands mid- of Athanasius,” as Jerome says. way between the Divine and the corporeal natures. But Reply to Objection 1. Jerome is speaking according the Divine nature is from eternity; while corporeal nature to the teaching of the Greek Fathers; all of whom hold the is from time. Therefore the angelic nature was produced creation of the angels to have taken place previously to ere time was made, and after eternity. that of the corporeal world. Objection 3. Further, the angelic nature is more re- Reply to Objection 2. God is not a part of, but far mote from the corporeal nature than one corporeal na- above, the whole universe, possessing within Himself the ture is from another. But one corporeal nature was made entire perfection of the universe in a more eminent way. before another; hence the six days of the production of But an angel is a part of the universe. Hence the compari- things are set forth in the opening of Genesis. Much more, son does not hold. therefore, was the angelic nature made before every cor- Reply to Objection 3. All corporeal creatures are one poreal nature. in matter; while the angels do not agree with them in mat- On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): “In the begin- ter. Consequently the creation of the matter of the cor- ning God created heaven and earth.” Now, this would not poreal creature involves in a manner the creation of all be true if anything had been created previously. Conse- things; but the creation of the angels does not involve cre- quently the angels were not created before corporeal na- ation of the universe. ture. If the contrary view be held, then in the text of Gn. I answer that, There is a twofold opinion on this point 1, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” the to be found in the writings of the Fathers. The more proba- words, “In the beginning,” must be interpreted, “In the ble one holds that the angels were created at the same time Son,” or “In the beginning of time”: but not, “In the be- as corporeal creatures. For the angels are part of the uni- ginning, before which there was nothing,” unless we say verse: they do not constitute a universe of themselves; but “Before which there was nothing of the nature of corpo- both they and corporeal natures unite in constituting one real creatures.” universe. This stands in evidence from the relationship 307 Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven? Ia q. 61 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels were not empyrean heaven, or whatever else it be called. So Isidore created in the empyrean heaven. For the angels are incor- says that the highest heaven is the heaven of the angels, poreal substances. Now a substance which is incorporeal explaining the passage of Dt. 10:14: “Behold heaven is is not dependent upon a body for its existence; and as a the Lord’s thy God, and the heaven of heaven.” consequence, neither is it for its creation. Therefore the Reply to Objection 1. The angels were created in a angels were not created in any corporeal place. corporeal place, not as if depending upon a body either as Objection 2. Further, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. to their existence or as to their being made; because God iii, 10), that the angels were created in the upper atmo- could have created them before all corporeal creation, as sphere: therefore not in the empyrean heaven. many holy Doctors hold. They were made in a corporeal Objection 3. Further, the empyrean heaven is said to place in order to show their relationship to corporeal na- be the highest heaven. If therefore the angels were cre- ture, and that they are by their power in touch with bodies. ated in the empyrean heaven, it would not beseem them to Reply to Objection 2. By the uppermost atmosphere mount up to a still higher heaven. And this is contrary to Augustine possibly means the highest part of heaven, to what is said in Isaias, speaking in the person of the sinning which the atmosphere has a kind of affinity owing to its angel: “I will ascend into heaven” (Is. 14:13). subtlety and transparency. Or else he is not speaking of all On the contrary, Strabus, commenting on the text the angels; but only of such as sinned, who, in the opin- “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” says: ion of some, belonged to the inferior orders. But there is “By heaven he does not mean the visible firmament, but nothing to hinder us from saying that the higher angels, as the empyrean, that is, the fiery or intellectual firmament, having an exalted and universal power over all corporeal which is not so styled from its heat, but from its splendor; things, were created in the highest place of the corporeal and which was filled with angels directly it was made.” creature; while the other angels, as having more restricted I answer that, As was observed (a. 3), the universe powers, were created among the inferior bodies. is made up of corporeal and spiritual creatures. Conse- Reply to Objection 3. Isaias is not speaking there of quently spiritual creatures were so created as to bear some any corporeal heaven, but of the heaven of the Blessed relationship to the corporeal creature, and to rule over ev- Trinity; unto which the sinning angel wished to ascend, ery corporeal creature. Hence it was fitting for the an- when he desired to be equal in some manner to God, as gels to be created in the highest corporeal place, as pre- will appear later on (q. 63, a. 3). siding over all corporeal nature; whether it be styled the 308 FIRST PART, QUESTION 62 Of the Perfection of the Angels in the Order of Grace and of Glory (In Nine Articles) In due sequence we have to inquire how the angels were made in the order of grace and of glory; under which heading there are nine points of inquiry: (1) Were the angels created in beatitude? (2) Did they need grace in order to turn to God? (3) Were they created in grace? (4) Did they merit their beatitude? (5) Did they at once enter into beatitude after merit? (6) Did they receive grace and glory according to their natural capacities? (7) After entering glory, did their natural love and knowledge remain? (8) Could they have sinned afterwards? (9) After entering into glory, could they advance farther? Whether the angels were created in beatitude? Ia q. 62 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels were cre- and hence it is that it is naturally desired, since everything ated in beatitude. For it is stated (De Eccl. Dogm. xxix) naturally desires its ultimate perfection. Now there is a that “the angels who continue in the beatitude wherein twofold ultimate perfection of rational or of intellectual they were created, do not of their nature possess the ex- nature. The first is one which it can procure of its own cellence they have.” Therefore the angels were created in natural power; and this is in a measure called beatitude beatitude. or happiness. Hence Aristotle (Ethic. x) says that man’s Objection 2. Further, the angelic nature is nobler than ultimate happiness consists in his most perfect contempla- the corporeal creature. But the corporeal creature straight- tion, whereby in this life he can behold the best intelligible way from its creation was made perfect and complete; nor object; and that is God. Above this happiness there is still did its lack of form take precedence in time, but only in another, which we look forward to in the future, whereby nature, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 15). Therefore “we shall see God as He is.” This is beyond the nature of neither did God create the angelic nature imperfect and every created intellect, as was shown above (q. 12, a. 4). incomplete. But its formation and perfection are derived So, then, it remains to be said, that, as regards this first from its beatitude, whereby it enjoys God. Therefore it beatitude, which the angel could procure by his natural was created in beatitude. power, he was created already blessed. Because the angel Objection 3. Further, according to Augustine (Gen. does not acquire such beatitude by any progressive action, ad lit. iv, 34; v, 5), the things which we read of as being as man does, but, as was observed above (q. 58, Aa. 3 ,4), made in the works of the six days, were made together at is straightway in possession thereof, owing to his natural one time; and so all the six days must have existed in- dignity. But the angels did not have from the beginning stantly from the beginning of creation. But, according of their creation that ultimate beatitude which is beyond to his exposition, in those six days, “the morning” was the power of nature; because such beatitude is no part of the angelic knowledge, according to which they knew the their nature, but its end; and consequently they ought not Word and things in the Word. Therefore straightway from to have it immediately from the beginning. their creation they knew the Word, and things in the Word. Reply to Objection 1. Beatitude is there taken for But the bliss of the angels comes of seeing the Word. Con- that natural perfection which the angel had in the state of sequently the angels were in beatitude straightway from innocence. the very beginning of their creation. Reply to Objection 2. The corporeal creature in- On the contrary, To be established or confirmed in stantly in the beginning of its creation could not have the good is of the nature of beatitude. But the angels were not perfection to which it is brought by its operation; conse- confirmed in good as soon as they were created; the fall of quently, according to Augustine (Gen. ad. lit. v, 4,23; some of them shows this. Therefore the angels were not viii, 3), the growing of plants from the earth did not take in beatitude from their creation. place at once among the first works, in which only the I answer that, By the name of beatitude is understood germinating power of the plants was bestowed upon the the ultimate perfection of rational or of intellectual nature; earth. In the same way, the angelic creature in the begin- 309 ning of its existence had the perfection of its nature; but it he knows the Word through His essence. By both kinds did not have the perfection to which it had to come by its of knowledge the angel knows things in the Word; im- operation. perfectly by his natural knowledge, and perfectly by his Reply to Objection 3. The angel has a twofold knowl- knowledge of glory. Therefore the first knowledge of edge of the Word; the one which is natural, and the other things in the Word was present to the angel from the outset according to glory. He has a natural knowledge whereby of his creation; while the second was not, but only when he knows the Word through a similitude thereof shining the angels became blessed by turning to the good. And in his nature; and he has a knowledge of glory whereby this is properly termed their morning knowledge. Whether an angel needs grace in order to turn to God? Ia q. 62 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the angel had no need movement of the will directed towards such beatitude, ex- of grace in order to turn to God. For, we have no need of cept it be moved thereto by a supernatural agent. This is grace for what we can accomplish naturally. But the angel what we call the help of grace. Therefore it must be said naturally turns to God: because he loves God naturally, as that an angel could not of his own will be turned to such is clear from what has been said (q. 60, a. 5). Therefore beatitude, except by the help of grace. an angel did not need grace in order to turn to God. Reply to Objection 1. The angel loves God naturally, Objection 2. Further, seemingly we need help only so far as God is the author of his natural being. But here for difficult tasks. Now it was not a difficult task for the we are speaking of turning to God, so far as God bestows angel to turn to God; because there was no obstacle in him beatitude by the vision of His essence. to such turning. Therefore the angel had no need of grace Reply to Objection 2. A thing is “difficult” which is in order to turn to God. beyond a power; and this happens in two ways. First of Objection 3. Further, to turn oneself to God is to dis- all, because it is beyond the natural capacity of the power. pose oneself for grace; hence it is said (Zech. 1:3): “Turn Thus, if it can be attained by some help, it is said to be ye to Me, and I will turn to you.” But we do not stand in “difficult”; but if it can in no way be attained, then it is need of grace in order to prepare ourselves for grace: for “impossible”; thus it is impossible for a man to fly. In an- thus we should go on to infinity. Therefore the angel did other way a thing may be beyond the power, not according not need grace to turn to God. to the natural order of such power, but owing to some in- On the contrary, It was by turning to God that the an- tervening hindrance; as to mount upwards is not contrary gel reached to beatitude. If, then, he had needed no grace to the natural order of the motive power of the soul; be- in order to turn to God, it would follow that he did not re- cause the soul, considered in itself, can be moved in any quire grace in order to possess everlasting life. But this is direction; but is hindered from so doing by the weight of contrary to the saying of the Apostle (Rom. 6:23): “The the body; consequently it is difficult for a man to mount grace of God is life everlasting.” upwards. To be turned to his ultimate beatitude is difficult I answer that, The angels stood in need of grace in for man, both because it is beyond his nature, and because order to turn to God, as the object of beatitude. For, as he has a hindrance from the corruption of the body and in- was observed above (q. 60, a. 2) the natural movement fection of sin. But it is difficult for an angel, only because of the will is the principle of all things that we will. But it is supernatural. the will’s natural inclination is directed towards what is Reply to Objection 3. Every movement of the will in keeping with its nature. Therefore, if there is any- towards God can be termed a conversion to God. And thing which is above nature, the will cannot be inclined so there is a threefold turning to God. The first is by the towards it, unless helped by some other supernatural prin- perfect love of God; this belongs to the creature enjoying ciple. Thus it is clear that fire has a natural tendency to the possession of God; and for such conversion, consum- give forth heat, and to generate fire; whereas to generate mate grace is required. The next turning to God is that flesh is beyond the natural power of fire; consequently, fire which merits beatitude; and for this there is required ha- has no tendency thereto, except in so far as it is moved in- bitual grace, which is the principle of merit. The third strumentally by the nutritive soul. conversion is that whereby a man disposes himself so that Now it was shown above (q. 12, Aa. 4,5), when we he may have grace; for this no habitual grace is required; were treating of God’s knowledge, that to see God in but the operation of God, Who draws the soul towards His essence, wherein the ultimate beatitude of the ratio- Himself, according to Lam 5:21: “Convert us, O Lord, to nal creature consists, is beyond the nature of every created Thee, and we shall be converted.” Hence it is clear that intellect. Consequently no rational creature can have the there is no need to go on to infinity. 310 Whether the angels were created in grace? Ia q. 62 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels were not is evident that sanctifying grace bears the same relation to created in grace. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) beatitude as the seedlike form in nature does to the natu- that the angelic nature was first made without form, and ral effect; hence (1 Jn. 3:9) grace is called the “seed” of was called “heaven”: but afterwards it received its form, God. As, then, in Augustine’s opinion it is contended that and was then called “light.” But such formation comes the seedlike forms of all natural effects were implanted from grace. Therefore they were not created in grace. in the creature when corporeally created, so straightway Objection 2. Further, grace turns the rational creature from the beginning the angels were created in grace. towards God. If, therefore, the angel had been created in Reply to Objection 1. Such absence of form in the grace, no angel would ever have turned away from God. angels can be understood either by comparison with their Objection 3. Further, grace comes midway between formation in glory; and so the absence of formation pre- nature and glory. But the angels were not beatified in their ceded formation by priority of time. Or else it can be creation. Therefore it seems that they were not created in understood of the formation according to grace: and so it grace; but that they were first created in nature only, and did not precede in the order of time, but in the order of then received grace, and that last of all they were beatified. nature; as Augustine holds with regard to the formation of On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), corporeal things (Gen. ad lit. i, 15). “Who wrought the good will of the angels? Who, save Reply to Objection 2. Every form inclines the subject Him Who created them with His will, that is, with the after the mode of the subject’s nature. Now it is the mode pure love wherewith they cling to Him; at the same time of an intellectual nature to be inclined freely towards the building up their nature and bestowing grace on them?” objects it desires. Consequently the movement of grace I answer that, Although there are conflicting opin- does not impose necessity; but he who has grace can fail ions on this point, some holding that the angels were cre- to make use of it, and can sin. ated only in a natural state, while others maintain that Reply to Objection 3. Although in the order of nature they were created in grace; yet it seems more probable, grace comes midway between nature and glory, neverthe- and more in keeping with the sayings of holy men, that less, in the order of time, in created nature, glory is not they were created in sanctifying grace. For we see that all simultaneous with nature; because glory is the end of the things which, in the process of time, being created by the operation of nature helped by grace. But grace stands not work of Divine Providence, were produced by the opera- as the end of operation, because it is not of works, but as tion of God, were created in the first fashioning of things the principle of right operation. Therefore it was fitting according to seedlike forms, as Augustine says (Gen. ad for grace to be given straightway with nature. lit. viii, 3), such as trees, animals, and the rest. Now it Whether an angel merits his beatitude? Ia q. 62 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the angel did not On the contrary, It is stated (Apoc. 21:17) that the merit his beatitude. For merit arises from the difficulty “measure of the angel” in that heavenly Jerusalem is “the of the meritorious act. But the angel experienced no diffi- measure of a man.” Therefore the same is the case with culty in acting rightly. Therefore righteous action was not the angel. meritorious for him. I answer that, Perfect beatitude is natural only to Objection 2. Further, we do not merit by merely nat- God, because existence and beatitude are one and the ural operations. But it was quite natural for the angel to same thing in Him. Beatitude, however, is not of the na- turn to God. Therefore he did not thereby merit beatitude. ture of the creature, but is its end. Now everything attains Objection 3. Further, if a beatified angel merited his its last end by its operation. Such operation leading to beatitude, he did so either before he had it, or else after- the end is either productive of the end, when such end is wards. But it was not before; because, in the opinion of not beyond the power of the agent working for the end, many, he had no grace before whereby to merit it. Nor did as the healing art is productive of health; or else it is de- he merit it afterwards, because thus he would be meriting serving of the end, when such end is beyond the capacity it now; which is clearly false, because in that case a lower of the agent striving to attain it; wherefore it is looked for angel could by meriting rise up to the rank of a higher, from another’s bestowing. Now it is evident from what and the distinct degrees of grace would not be permanent; has gone before (Aa. 1,2; q. 12, Aa. 4,5), ultimate beat- which is not admissible. Consequently the angel did not itude exceeds both the angelic and the human nature. It merit his beatitude. remains, then, that both man and angel merited their beat- 311 itude. not stand, because free-will is not the sufficient cause of And if the angel was created in grace, without which merit; and, consequently, an act cannot be meritorious as there is no merit, there would be no difficulty in saying coming from free-will, except in so far as it is informed by that he merited beatitude: as also, if one were to say that grace; but it cannot at the same time be informed by im- he had grace in any way before he had glory. perfect grace, which is the principle of meriting, and by But if he had no grace before entering upon beatitude, perfect grace, which is the principle of enjoying. Hence it it would then have to be said that he had beatitude with- does not appear to be possible for anyone to enjoy beati- out merit, even as we have grace. This, however, is quite tude, and at the same time to merit it. foreign to the idea of beatitude; which conveys the no- Consequently it is better to say that the angel had grace tion of an end, and is the reward of virtue, as even the ere he was admitted to beatitude, and that by such grace Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). Or else it will have to be he merited beatitude. said, as some others have maintained, that the angels merit Reply to Objection 1. The angel’s difficulty of work- beatitude by their present ministrations, while in beati- ing righteously does not come from any contrariety or hin- tude. This is quite contrary, again, to the notion of merit: drance of natural powers; but from the fact that the good since merit conveys the idea of a means to an end; while work is beyond his natural capacity. what is already in its end cannot, properly speaking, be Reply to Objection 2. An angel did not merit beati- moved towards such end; and so no one merits to produce tude by natural movement towards God; but by the move- what he already enjoys. Or else it will have to be said ment of charity, which comes of grace. that one and the same act of turning to God, so far as it The answer to the Third Objection is evident from comes of free-will, is meritorious; and so far as it attains what we have said. the end, is the fruition of beatitude. Even this view will Whether the angel obtained beatitude immediately after one act of merit? Ia q. 62 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the angel did not pos- beatitude by only one meritorious act. sess beatitude instantly after one act of merit. For it is I answer that, The angel was beatified instantly af- more difficult for a man to do well than for an angel. But ter the first act of charity, whereby he merited beatitude. man is not rewarded at once after one act of merit. There- The reason whereof is because grace perfects nature ac- fore neither was the angel. cording to the manner of the nature; as every perfection is Objection 2. Further, an angel could act at once, and received in the subject capable of perfection, according to in an instant, from the very outset of his creation, for even its mode. Now it is proper to the angelic nature to receive natural bodies begin to be moved in the very instant of its natural perfection not by passing from one stage to an- their creation; and if the movement of a body could be other; but to have it at once naturally, as was shown above instantaneous, like operations of mind and will, it would (a. 1; q. 58, Aa. 3,4). But as the angel is of his nature in- have movement in the first instant of its generation. Con- clined to natural perfection, so is he by merit inclined to sequently, if the angel merited beatitude by one act of his glory. Hence instantly after merit the angel secured beat- will, he merited it in the first instant of his creation; and itude. Now the merit of beatitude in angel and man alike so, if their beatitude was not retarded, then the angels were can be from merely one act; because man merits beatitude in beatitude in the first instant. by every act informed by charity. Hence it remains that an Objection 3. Further, there must be many intervals angel was beatified straightway after one act of charity. between things which are far apart. But the beatific state Reply to Objection 1. Man was not intended to se- of the angels is very far remote from their natural condi- cure his ultimate perfection at once, like the angel. Hence tion: while merit comes midway between. Therefore the a longer way was assigned to man than to the angel for angel would have to pass through many stages of merit in securing beatitude. order to reach beatitude. Reply to Objection 2. The angel is above the time of On the contrary, Man’s soul and an angel are or- corporeal things; hence the various instants regarding the dained alike for beatitude: consequently equality with an- angels are not to be taken except as reckoning the succes- gels is promised to the saints. Now the soul separated sion of their acts. Now their act which merited beatitude from the body, if it has merit deserving beatitude, enters at could not be in them simultaneously with the act of beati- once into beatitude, unless there be some obstacle. There- tude, which is fruition; since the one belongs to imperfect fore so does an angel. Now an angel instantly, in his first grace, and the other to consummate grace. Consequently, act of charity, had the merit of beatitude. Therefore, since it remains for different instants to be conceived, in one there was no obstacle within him, he passed at once into of which the angel merited beatitude, and in another was 312 beatified. dained. Consequently, only one meritorious act is re- Reply to Objection 3. It is of the nature of an an- quired; which act can so far be called an interval as gel instantly to attain the perfection unto which he is or- through it the angel is brought to beatitude. Whether the angels receive grace and glory according to the degree of their natural Ia q. 62 a. 6 gifts? Objection 1. It would seem that the angels did not re- for greater gifts of grace and fuller beatitude, whom He ceive grace and glory according to the degree of their nat- made of a higher nature. ural gifts. For grace is bestowed of God’s absolute will. Secondly, the same is evident on the part of the an- Therefore the degree of grace depends on God’s will, and gel. The angel is not a compound of different natures, so not on the degree of their natural gifts. that the inclination of the one thwarts or retards the ten- Objection 2. Further, a moral act seems to be more dency of the other; as happens in man, in whom the move- closely allied with grace than nature is; because a moral ment of his intellective part is either retarded or thwarted act is preparatory to grace. But grace does not come “of by the inclination of his sensitive part. But when there works,” as is said Rom. 11:6. Therefore much less does is nothing to retard or thwart it, nature is moved with its the degree of grace depend upon the degree of their natu- whole energy. So it is reasonable to suppose that the an- ral gifts. gels who had a higher nature, were turned to God more Objection 3. Further, man and angel are alike or- mightily and efficaciously. The same thing happens in dained for beatitude or grace. But man does not receive men, since greater grace and glory are bestowed according more grace according to the degree of his natural gifts. to the greater earnestness of their turning to God. Hence it Therefore neither does the angel. appears that the angels who had the greater natural pow- On the contrary, Is the saying of the Master of the ers, had the more grace and glory. Sentences (Sent. ii, D, 3) that “those angels who were cre- Reply to Objection 1. As grace comes of God’s will ated with more subtle natures and of keener intelligence alone, so likewise does the nature of the angel: and as in wisdom, were likewise endowed with greater gifts of God’s will ordained nature for grace, so did it ordain the grace.” various degrees of nature to the various degrees of grace. I answer that, It is reasonable to suppose that gifts of Reply to Objection 2. The acts of the rational crea-graces and perfection of beatitude were bestowed on the ture are from the creature itself; whereas nature is imme- angels according to the degree of their natural gifts. The diately from God. Accordingly it seems rather that grace reason for this can be drawn from two sources. First of is bestowed according to degree of nature than according all, on the part of God, Who, in the order of His wisdom, to works. established various degrees in the angelic nature. Now as Reply to Objection 3. Diversity of natural gifts is the angelic nature was made by God for attaining grace in one way in the angels, who are themselves different and beatitude, so likewise the grades of the angelic nature specifically; and in quite another way in men, who differ seem to be ordained for the various degrees of grace and only numerically. For specific difference is on account of glory; just as when, for example, the builder chisels the the end; while numerical difference is because of the mat- stones for building a house, from the fact that he prepares ter. Furthermore, there is something in man which can some more artistically and more fittingly than others, it is thwart or impede the movement of his intellective nature; clear that he is setting them apart for the more ornate part but not in the angels. Consequently the argument is not of the house. So it seems that God destined those angels the same for both. Whether natural knowledge and love remain in the beatified angels? Ia q. 62 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that natural knowledge superfluous. But the knowledge and love of glory suffice and love do not remain in the beatified angels. For it is for the beatified angels. Therefore it would be superfluous said (1 Cor. 13:10): “When that which is perfect is come, for their natural knowledge and love to remain. then that which is in part shall be done away.” But natural Objection 3. Further, the same faculty has not two si- love and knowledge are imperfect in comparison with be- multaneous acts, as the same line cannot, at the same end, atified knowledge and love. Therefore, in beatitude, natu- be terminated in two points. But the beatified angels are ral knowledge and love cease. always exercising their beatified knowledge and love; for, Objection 2. Further, where one suffices, another is as is said Ethic. i, 8, happiness consists not in habit, but in 313 act. Therefore there can never be natural knowledge and the form. In the same way, the imperfection of natural love in the angels. knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of the knowl- On the contrary, So long as a nature endures, its op- edge in glory; for nothing hinders us from knowing a thing eration remains. But beatitude does not destroy nature, through various mediums, as a thing may be known at since it is its perfection. Therefore it does not take away the one time through a probable medium and through a natural knowledge and love. demonstrative one. In like manner, an angel can know I answer that, Natural knowledge and love remain in God by His essence, and this appertains to his knowledge the angels. For as principles of operations are mutually of glory; and at the same time he can know God by his related, so are the operations themselves. Now it is man- own essence, which belongs to his natural knowledge. ifest that nature is to beatitude as first to second; because Reply to Objection 2. All things which make up beat- beatitude is superadded to nature. But the first must ever itude are sufficient of themselves. But in order for them to be preserved in the second. Consequently nature must be exist, they presuppose the natural gifts; because no beati- preserved in beatitude: and in like manner the act of na- tude is self-subsisting, except the uncreated beatitude. ture must be preserved in the act of beatitude. Reply to Objection 3. There cannot be two opera- Reply to Objection 1. The advent of a perfection re- tions of the one faculty at the one time, except the one be moves the opposite imperfection. Now the imperfection ordained to the other. But natural knowledge and love are of nature is not opposed to the perfection of beatitude, ordained to the knowledge and love of glory. Accordingly but underlies it; as the imperfection of the power under- there is nothing to hinder natural knowledge and love from lies the perfection of the form, and the power is not taken existing in the angel conjointly with those of glory. away by the form, but the privation which is opposed to Whether a beatified angel can sin? Ia q. 62 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that a beatified angel can ated good, such as is the union of beatitude, it is rendered sin. For, as was said above (a. 7), beatitude does not do unable to sin, for the reason already alleged. away with nature. But it is of the very notion of created Reply to Objection 2. The rational powers are re- nature, that it can fail. Therefore a beatified angel can sin. ferred to opposites in the things to which they are not in- Objection 2. Further, the rational powers are referred clined naturally; but as to the things whereunto they have to opposites, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. iv, a natural tendency, they are not referred to opposites. For text. 3). But the will of the angel in beatitude does not the intellect cannot but assent to naturally known princi- cease to be rational. Therefore it is inclined towards good ples; in the same way, the will cannot help clinging to and evil. good, formally as good; because the will is naturally or- Objection 3. Further, it belongs to the liberty of free- dained to good as to its proper object. Consequently the will for man to be able to choose good or evil. But the will of the angels is referred to opposites, as to doing freedom of will is not lessened in the beatified angels. many things, or not doing them. But they have no ten- Therefore they can sin. dency to opposites with regard to God Himself, Whom On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi) that they see to be the very nature of goodness; but in all “there is in the holy angels that nature which cannot sin.” things their aim is towards God, which ever alternative Therefore the holy angels cannot sin. they choose, that is not sinful. I answer that, The beatified angels cannot sin. The Reply to Objection 3. Free-will in its choice of means reason for this is, because their beatitude consists in see- to an end is disposed just as the intellect is to conclusions. ing God through His essence. Now, God’s essence is the Now it is evident that it belongs to the power of the in- very essence of goodness. Consequently the angel be- tellect to be able to proceed to different conclusions, ac- holding God is disposed towards God in the same way cording to given principles; but for it to proceed to some as anyone else not seeing God is to the common form of conclusion by passing out of the order of the principles, goodness. Now it is impossible for any man either to will comes of its own defect. Hence it belongs to the perfec- or to do anything except aiming at what is good; or for tion of its liberty for the free-will to be able to choose him to wish to turn away from good precisely as such. between opposite things, keeping the order of the end in Therefore the beatified angel can neither will nor act, ex- view; but it comes of the defect of liberty for it to choose cept as aiming towards God. Now whoever wills or acts in anything by turning away from the order of the end; and this manner cannot sin. Consequently the beatified angel this is to sin. Hence there is greater liberty of will in the cannot sin. angels, who cannot sin, than there is in ourselves, who can Reply to Objection 1. Created good, considered in sin. itself, can fail. But from its perfect union with the uncre- 314 Whether the beatified angels advance in beatitude? Ia q. 62 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that the beatified angels being is in infinite degrees removed from the infinite; it can advance in beatitude. For charity is the principle of comes to pass that the rational creature understands God merit. But there is perfect charity in the angels. Therefore more or less clearly according to infinite degrees. And as the beatified angels can merit. Now, as merit increases, beatitude consists in vision, so the degree of vision lies in the reward of beatitude increases. Therefore the beatified a determinate mode of the vision. angels can progress in beatitude. Therefore every rational creature is so led by God to Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. the end of its beatitude, that from God’s predestination it Christ. i) that “God makes use of us for our own gain, is brought even to a determinate degree of beatitude. Con- and for His own goodness. The same thing happens to sequently, when that degree is once secured, it cannot pass the angels, whom He uses for spiritual ministrations”; to a higher degree. since “they are all∗ ministering spirits, sent to minister for Reply to Objection 1. Merit belongs to a subject them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation” (Heb. which is moving towards its end. Now the rational crea- 1:14). This would not be for their profit were they not ture is moved towards its end, not merely passively, but to merit thereby, nor to advance to beatitude. It remains, also by working actively. If the end is within the power of then, that the beatified angels can merit, and can advance the rational creature, then its action is said to procure the in beatitude. end; as man acquires knowledge by reflection: but if the Objection 3. Further, it argues imperfection for any- end be beyond its power, and is looked for from another, one not occupying the foremost place not to be able to ad- then the action will be meritorious of such end. But what vance. But the angels are not in the highest degree of beat- is already in the ultimate term is not said to be moved, but itude. Therefore if unable to ascend higher, it would ap- to have been moved. Consequently, to merit belongs to pear that there is imperfection and defect in them; which the imperfect charity of this life; whereas perfect charity is not admissible. does not merit but rather enjoys the reward. Even as in On the contrary, Merit and progress belong to this acquired habits, the operation preceding the habit is pro- present condition of life. But angels are not wayfarers ductive of the habit; but the operation from an acquired travelling towards beatitude, they are already in posses- habit is both perfect and enjoyable. In the same way the sion of beatitude. Consequently the beatified angels can act of perfect charity has no quality of merit, but belongs neither merit nor advance in beatitude. rather to the perfection of the reward. I answer that, In every movement the mover’s inten- Reply to Objection 2. A thing can be termed useful tion is centered upon one determined end, to which he in- in two ways. First of all, as being on the way to an end; tends to lead the movable subject; because intention looks and so the merit of beatitude is useful. Secondly, as the to the end, to which infinite progress is repugnant. Now part is useful for the whole; as the wall for a house. In it is evident, since the rational creature cannot of its own this way the angelic ministerings are useful for the beati- power attain to its beatitude, which consists in the vision fied angels, inasmuch as they are a part of their beatitude; of God, as is clear from what has gone before (q. 12, a. 4), for to pour out acquired perfection upon others is of the that it needs to be moved by God towards its beatitude. nature of what is perfect, considered as perfect. Therefore there must be some one determined thing to Reply to Objection 3. Although a beatified angel is which every rational creature is directed as to its last end. not absolutely in the highest degree of beatitude, yet, in Now this one determinate object cannot, in the vision his own regard he is in the highest degree, according to of God, consist precisely in that which is seen; for the Divine predestination. Nevertheless the joy of the angels Supreme Truth is seen by all the blessed in various de- can be increased with regard to the salvation of such as grees: but it is on the part of the mode of vision, that are saved by their ministrations, according to Lk. 15:10: diverse terms are fixed beforehand by the intention of “There is [Vulg.‘shall be’] joy before the angels of God Him Who directs towards the end. For it is impossible upon one sinner doing penance.” Such joy belongs to their that as the rational creature is led on to the vision of the accidental reward, which can be increased unto judgment Supreme Essence, it should be led on in the same way to day. Hence some writers say that they can merit as to their the supreme mode of vision, which is comprehension, for accidental reward. But it is better to say that the Blessed this belongs to God only; as is evident from what was said can in no wise merit without being at the same time a above (q. 12, a. 7; q. 14, a. 3). But since infinite efficacy wayfarer and a comprehensor; like Christ, Who alone was is required for comprehending God, while the creature’s such. For the Blessed acquire such joy from the virtue of efficacy in beholding is only finite; and since every finite their beatitude, rather than merit it. ∗ Vulg.: ‘Are they not all. . . ?’ 315 FIRST PART, QUESTION 63 The Malice of the Angels with Regard to Sin (In Nine Articles) In the next place we must consider how angels became evil: first of all with regard to the evil of fault; and secondly, as to the evil of punishment. Under the first heading there are nine points for consideration: (1) Can there be evil of fault in the angels? (2) What kind of sins can be in them? (3) What did the angel seek in sinning? (4) Supposing that some became evil by a sin of their own choosing, are any of them naturally evil? (5) Supposing that it is not so, could any one of them become evil in the first instant of his creation by an act of his own will? (6) Supposing that he did not, was there any interval between his creation and fall? (7) Was the highest of them who fell, absolutely the highest among the angels? (8) Was the sin of the foremost angel the cause of the others sinning? (9) Did as many sin as remained steadfast? Whether the evil of fault can be in the angels? Ia q. 63 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there can be no evil fall short of rectitude. Were the craftsman’s hand the rule of fault in the angels. For there can be no evil except in itself engraving, he could not engrave the wood otherwise things which are in potentiality, as is said by the Philoso- than rightly; but if the rightness of engraving be judged pher (Metaph. ix, text. 19), because the subject of priva- by another rule, then the engraving may be right or faulty. tion is a being in potentiality. But the angels have not be- Now the Divine will is the sole rule of God’s act, because ing in potentiality, since they are subsisting forms. There- it is not referred to any higher end. But every created will fore there can be no evil in them. has rectitude of act so far only as it is regulated according Objection 2. Further, the angels are higher than the to the Divine will, to which the last end is to be referred: heavenly bodies. But philosophers say that there cannot as every desire of a subordinate ought to be regulated by be evil in the heavenly bodies. Therefore neither can there the will of his superior; for instance, the soldier’s will, ac- by in the angels. cording to the will of his commanding officer. Thus only Objection 3. Further, what is natural to a thing is al- in the Divine will can there be no sin; whereas there can ways in it. But it is natural for the angels to be moved by be sin in the will of every creature; considering the condi- the movement of love towards God. Therefore such love tion of its nature. cannot be withdrawn from them. But in loving God they Reply to Objection 1. In the angels there is no poten- do not sin. Consequently the angels cannot sin. tiality to natural existence. Yet there is potentiality in their Objection 4. Further, desire is only of what is good intellective part, as regards their being inclined to this or or apparently good. Now for the angels there can be no the other object. In this respect there can be evil in them. apparent good which is not a true good; because in them Reply to Objection 2. The heavenly bodies have none either there can be no error at all, or at least not before but a natural operation. Therefore as there can be no evil guilt. Therefore the angels can desire only what it truly of corruption in their nature; so neither can there be evil good. But no one sins by desiring what is truly good. of disorder in their natural action. But besides their natu- Consequently the angel does not sin by desire. ral action there is the action of free-will in the angels, by On the contrary, It is said (Job 4:18): “In His angels reason of which evil may be in them. He found wickedness.” Reply to Objection 3. It is natural for the angel to turn I answer that, An angel or any other rational creature to God by the movement of love, according as God is the considered in his own nature, can sin; and to whatever principle of his natural being. But for him to turn to God creature it belongs not to sin, such creature has it as a gift as the object of supernatural beatitude, comes of infused of grace, and not from the condition of nature. The reason love, from which he could be turned away by sinning. of this is, because sinning is nothing else than a deviation Reply to Objection 4. Mortal sin occurs in two ways from that rectitude which an act ought to have; whether in the act of free-will. First, when something evil is cho- we speak of sin in nature, art, or morals. That act alone, sen; as man sins by choosing adultery, which is evil of the rule of which is the very virtue of the agent, can never itself. Such sin always comes of ignorance or error; oth- 316 erwise what is evil would never be chosen as good. The comes of free-will by choosing something good in itself, adulterer errs in the particular, choosing this delight of but not according to proper measure or rule; so that the an inordinate act as something good to be performed now, defect which induces sin is only on the part of the choice from the inclination of passion or of habit; even though he which is not properly regulated, but not on the part of the does not err in his universal judgment, but retains a right thing chosen; as if one were to pray, without heeding the opinion in this respect. In this way there can be no sin order established by the Church. Such a sin does not pre- in the angel; because there are no passions in the angels suppose ignorance, but merely absence of consideration to fetter reason or intellect, as is manifest from what has of the things which ought to be considered. In this way been said above (q. 59, a. 4); nor, again, could any habit the angel sinned, by seeking his own good, from his own inclining to sin precede their first sin. In another way sin free-will, insubordinately to the rule of the Divine will. Whether only the sin of pride and envy can exist in an angel? Ia q. 63 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that there can be other contrary. Now the envious man repines over the good sins in the angels besides those of pride and envy. Because possessed by another, inasmuch as he deems his neigh- whosoever can delight in any kind of sin, can fall into the bor’s good to be a hindrance to his own. But another’s sin itself. But the demons delight even in the obscenities good could not be deemed a hindrance to the good cov- of carnal sins; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3). eted by the wicked angel, except inasmuch as he coveted Therefore there can also be carnal sins in the demons. a singular excellence, which would cease to be singular Objection 2. Further, as pride and envy are spiritual because of the excellence of some other. So, after the sin sins, so are sloth, avarice, and anger. But spiritual sins are of pride, there followed the evil of envy in the sinning concerned with the spirit, just as carnal sins are with the angel, whereby he grieved over man’s good, and also over flesh. Therefore not only can there be pride and envy in the Divine excellence, according as against the devil’s will the angels; but likewise sloth and avarice. God makes use of man for the Divine glory. Objection 3. Further, according to Gregory (Moral. Reply to Objection 1. The demons do not delight in xxxi), many vices spring from pride; and in like manner the obscenities of the sins of the flesh, as if they them- from envy. But, if the cause is granted, the effect follows. selves were disposed to carnal pleasures: it is wholly If, therefore, there can be pride and envy in the angels, for through envy that they take pleasure in all sorts of human the same reason there can likewise be other vices in them. sins, so far as these are hindrances to a man’s good. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, Reply to Objection 2. Avarice, considered as a spe- 3) that the devil “is not a fornicator nor a drunkard, nor cial kind of sin, is the immoderate greed of temporal pos- anything of the like sort; yet he is proud and envious.” sessions which serve the use of human life, and which I answer that, Sin can exist in a subject in two ways: can be estimated in value of money; to these demons are first of all by actual guilt, and secondly by affection. As not at all inclined, any more than they are to carnal plea- to guilt, all sins are in the demons; since by leading men sures. Consequently avarice properly so called cannot be to sin they incur the guilt of all sins. But as to affection in them. But if every immoderate greed of possessing any only those sins can be in the demons which can belong created good be termed avarice, in this way avarice is con- to a spiritual nature. Now a spiritual nature cannot be af- tained under the pride which is in the demons. Anger im- fected by such pleasures as appertain to bodies, but only plies passion, and so does concupiscence; consequently by such as are in keeping with spiritual things; because they can only exist metaphorically in the demons. Sloth nothing is affected except with regard to something which is a kind of sadness, whereby a man becomes sluggish is in some way suited to its nature. But there can be no sin in spiritual exercises because they weary the body; which when anyone is incited to good of the spiritual order; un- does not apply to the demons. So it is evident that pride less in such affection the rule of the superior be not kept. and envy are the only spiritual sins which can be found in Such is precisely the sin of pride—not to be subject to a demons; yet so that envy is not to be taken for a passion, superior when subjection is due. Consequently the first but for a will resisting the good of another. sin of the angel can be none other than pride. Reply to Objection 3. Under envy and pride, as found Yet, as a consequence, it was possible for envy also in the demons, are comprised all other sins derived from to be in them, since for the appetite to tend to the desire them. of something involves on its part resistance to anything 317 Whether the devil desired to be as God? Ia q. 63 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the devil did not de- that, because a man seeks to occupy a higher grade as to sire to be as God. For what does not fall under apprehen- accidentals, which can increase without the destruction of sion, does not fall under desire; because the good which the subject, he can also seek a higher grade of nature, to is apprehended moves the appetite, whether sensible, ra- which he could not attain without ceasing to exist. Now it tional, or intellectual; and sin consists only in such desire. is quite evident that God surpasses the angels, not merely But for any creature to be God’s equal does not fall under in accidentals, but also in degree of nature; and one an- apprehension, because it implies a contradiction; for it the gel, another. Consequently it is impossible for one angel finite equals the infinite, then it would itself be infinite. of lower degree to desire equality with a higher; and still Therefore an angel could not desire to be as God. more to covet equality with God. Objection 2. Further, the natural end can always be To desire to be as God according to likeness can hap- desired without sin. But to be likened unto God is the end pen in two ways. In one way, as to that likeness whereby to which every creature naturally tends. If, therefore, the everything is made to be likened unto God. And so, if any- angel desired to be as God, not by equality, but by like- one desire in this way to be Godlike, he commits no sin; ness, it would seem that he did not thereby sin. provided that he desires such likeness in proper order, that Objection 3. Further, the angel was created with is to say, that he may obtain it of God. But he would sin greater fulness of wisdom than man. But no man, save were he to desire to be like unto God even in the right way, a fool, ever makes choice of being the equal of an an- as of his own, and not of God’s power. In another way one gel, still less of God; because choice regards only things may desire to be like unto God in some respect which is which are possible, regarding which one takes delibera- not natural to one; as if one were to desire to create heaven tion. Therefore much less did the angel sin by desiring to and earth, which is proper to God; in which desire there be as God. would be sin. It was in this way that the devil desired to be On the contrary, It is said, in the person of the devil as God. Not that he desired to resemble God by being sub- (Is. 14:13,14), “I will ascend into heaven. . . I will be like ject to no one else absolutely; for so he would be desiring the Most High.” And Augustine (De Qu. Vet. Test. cxiii) his own ‘not-being’; since no creature can exist except by says that being “inflated with pride, he wished to be called holding its existence under God. But he desired resem- God.” blance with God in this respect—by desiring, as his last I answer that, Without doubt the angel sinned by end of beatitude, something which he could attain by the seeking to be as God. But this can be understood in two virtue of his own nature, turning his appetite away from ways: first, by equality; secondly, by likeness. He could supernatural beatitude, which is attained by God’s grace. not seek to be as God in the first way; because by natural Or, if he desired as his last end that likeness of God which knowledge he knew that this was impossible: and there is bestowed by grace, he sought to have it by the power of was no habit preceding his first sinful act, nor any pas- his own nature; and not from Divine assistance according sion fettering his mind, so as to lead him to choose what to God’s ordering. This harmonizes with Anselm’s opin- was impossible by failing in some particular; as some- ion, who says∗ that “he sought that to which he would times happens in ourselves. And even supposing it were have come had he stood fast.” These two views in a man- possible, it would be against the natural desire; because ner coincide; because according to both, he sought to have there exists in everything the natural desire of preserving final beatitude of his own power, whereas this is proper to its own nature; which would not be preserved were it to be God alone. changed into another nature. Consequently, no creature of Since, then, what exists of itself is the cause of what a lower order can ever covet the grade of a higher nature; exists of another, it follows from this furthermore that he just as an ass does not desire to be a horse: for were it sought to have dominion over others; wherein he also per- to be so upraised, it would cease to be itself. But herein versely wished to be like unto God. the imagination plays us false; for one is liable to think From this we have the answer to all the objections. Whether any demons are naturally wicked? Ia q. 63 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that some demons are nat- dead.” But to be deceitful is to be evil. Therefore some urally wicked. For Porphyry says, as quoted by Augustine demons are naturally wicked. (De Civ. Dei x, 11): “There is a class of demons of crafty Objection 2. Further, as the angels are created by nature, pretending that they are gods and the souls of the God, so are men. But some men are naturally wicked, ∗ De casu diaboli, iv. 318 of whom it is said (Wis. 12:10): “Their malice is natural.” soever; consequently they cannot be naturally evil. Therefore some angels may be naturally wicked. Reply to Objection 1. Augustine rebukes Porphyry Objection 3. Further, some irrational animals have for saying that the demons are naturally deceitful; him- wicked dispositions by nature: thus the fox is naturally self maintaining that they are not naturally so, but of their sly, and the wolf naturally rapacious; yet they are God’s own will. Now the reason why Porphyry held that they are creatures. Therefore, although the demons are God’s crea- naturally deceitful was that, as he contended, demons are tures, they may be naturally wicked. animals with a sensitive nature. Now the sensitive nature On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that is inclined towards some particular good, with which evil “the demons are not naturally wicked.” may be connected. In this way, then, it can have a natural I answer that, Everything which exists, so far as it inclination to evil; yet only accidentally, inasmuch as evil exists and has a particular nature, tends naturally towards is connected with good. some good; since it comes from a good principle; because Reply to Objection 2. The malice of some men can the effect always reverts to its principle. Now a particu- be called natural, either because of custom which is a sec- lar good may happen to have some evil connected with it; ond nature; or on account of the natural proclivity on the thus fire has this evil connected with it that it consumes part of the sensitive nature to some inordinate passion, as other things: but with the universal good no evil can be some people are said to be naturally wrathful or lustful; connected. If, then, there be anything whose nature is in- but not on the part of the intellectual nature. clined towards some particular good, it can tend naturally Reply to Objection 3. Brute beasts have a natural to some evil; not as evil, but accidentally, as connected inclination in their sensitive nature towards certain partic- with some good. But if anything of its nature be inclined ular goods, with which certain evils are connected; thus to good in general, then of its own nature it cannot be in- the fox in seeking its food has a natural inclination to do clined to evil. Now it is manifest that every intellectual so with a certain skill coupled with deceit. Wherefore it nature is inclined towards good in general, which it can is not evil in the fox to be sly, since it is natural to him; as apprehend and which is the object of the will. Hence, it is not evil in the dog to be fierce, as Dionysius observes since the demons are intellectual substances, they can in (De Div. Nom. iv). no wise have a natural inclination towards any evil what- Whether the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his Ia q. 63 a. 5 creation? Objection 1. It would seem that the devil was wicked Objection 4. Further, the angelic nature is more pow- by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his cre- erful than the corporeal nature. But a corporeal thing be- ation. For it is said of the devil (Jn. 8:44): “He was a gins to have its operation in the first instant of its creation; murderer from the beginning.” as fire begins to move upwards in the first instant it is pro- Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine (Gen. duced. Therefore the angel could also have his operation ad lit. i, 15), the lack of form in the creature did not in the first instant of his creation. Now this operation was precede its formation in order of time, but merely in or- either ordinate or inordinate. It ordinate, then, since he der of nature. Now according to him (Gen. ad lit. ii, had grace, he thereby merited beatitude. But with the an- 8), the “heaven,” which is said to have been created in gels the reward follows immediately upon merit; as was the beginning, signifies the angelic nature while as yet said above (q. 62, a. 5). Consequently they would have not fully formed: and when it is said that God said: “Be become blessed at once; and so would never have sinned, light made: and light was made,” we are to understand the which is false. It remains, then, that they sinned by inor- full formation of the angel by turning to the Word. Con- dinate action in their first instant. sequently, the nature of the angel was created, and light On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:31): “God saw was made, in the one instant. But at the same moment all the things that He had made, and they were very good.” that light was made, it was made distinct from “darkness,” But among them were also the demons. Therefore the whereby the angels who sinned are denoted. Therefore in demons were at some time good. the first instant of their creation some of the angels were I answer that, Some have maintained that the demons made blessed, and some sinned. were wicked straightway in the first instant of their cre- Objection 3. Further, sin is opposed to merit. But ation; not by their nature, but by the sin of their own will; some intellectual nature can merit in the first instant of because, as soon as he was made, the devil refused righ- its creation; as the soul of Christ, or also the good angels. teousness. To this opinion, as Augustine says (De Civ. Therefore the demons likewise could sin in the first instant Dei xi, 13), if anyone subscribes, he does not agree with of their creation. those Manichean heretics who say that the devil’s nature 319 is evil of itself. Since this opinion, however, is in contra-operation which begins with the existence comes of the diction with the authority of Scripture—for it is said of the agent from which it drew its nature; just as upward move- devil under the figure of the prince of Babylon (Is. 14:12): ment in fire comes of its productive cause. Therefore, if “How art thou fallen. . . O Lucifer, who didst rise in the there be anything which derives its nature from a defec- morning!” and it is said to the devil in the person of the tive cause, which can be the cause of a defective action, King of Tyre (Ezech. 28:13): “Thou wast in the pleasures it can in the first instant of its existence have a defective of the paradise of God,” —consequently, this opinion was operation; just as the leg, which is defective from birth, reasonably rejected by the masters as erroneous. through a defect in the principle of generation, begins at Hence others have said that the angels, in the first in- once to limp. But the agent which brought the angels into stant of their creation, could have sinned, but did not. Yet existence, namely, God, cannot be the cause of sin. Con- this view also is repudiated by some, because, when two sequently it cannot be said that the devil was wicked in operations follow one upon the other, it seems impossible the first instant of his creation. for each operation to terminate in the one instant. Now it Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Civ. is clear that the angel’s sin was an act subsequent to his Dei xi, 15), when it is stated that “the devil sins from the creation. But the term of the creative act is the angel’s beginning,” “he is not to be thought of as sinning from the very being, while the term of the sinful act is the being beginning wherein he was created, but from the beginning wicked. It seems, then, an impossibility for the angel to of sin”: that is to say, because he never went back from his have been wicked in the first instant of his existence. sin. This argument, however, does not satisfy. For it holds Reply to Objection 2. That distinction of light and good only in such movements as are measured by time, darkness, whereby the sins of the demons are understood and take place successively; thus, if local movement fol- by the term darkness, must be taken as according to God’s lows a change, then the change and the local movement foreknowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, cannot be terminated in the same instant. But if the 15), that “He alone could discern light and darkness, Who changes are instantaneous, then all at once and in the also could foreknow, before they fell, those who would same instant there can be a term to the first and the sec- fall.” ond change; thus in the same instant in which the moon Reply to Objection 3. All that is in merit is from God; is lit up by the sun, the atmosphere is lit up by the moon. and consequently an angel could merit in the first instant Now, it is manifest that creation is instantaneous; so also of his creation. The same reason does not hold good of is the movement of free-will in the angels; for, as has been sin; as has been said. already stated, they have no occasion for comparison or Reply to Objection 4. God did not distinguish be- discursive reasoning (q. 58, a. 3 ). Consequently, there tween the angels before the turning away of some of them, is nothing to hinder the term of creation and of free-will and the turning of others to Himself, as Augustine says from existing in the same instant. (De Civ. Dei xi, 15). Therefore, as all were created in We must therefore reply that, on the contrary, it was grace, all merited in their first instant. But some of them impossible for the angel to sin in the first instant by an at once placed an impediment to their beatitude, thereby inordinate act of free-will. For although a thing can begin destroying their preceding merit; and consequently they to act in the first instant of its existence, nevertheless, that were deprived of the beatitude which they had merited. Whether there was any interval between the creation and the fall of the angel? Ia q. 63 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that there was some in- Objection 3. Further, capability of sinning is common terval between the angel’s creation and his fall. For, it alike to man and angel. But there was some delay between is said (Ezech. 28:15): “Thou didst walk perfect∗ in thy man’s formation and his sin. Therefore, for the like rea- ways from the day of thy creation until iniquity was found son there was some interval between the devil’s formation in thee.” But since walking is continuous movement, it and his sin. requires an interval. Therefore there was some interval Objection 4. Further, the instant wherein the devil between the devil’s creation and his fall. sinned was distinct from the instant wherein he was cre- Objection 2. Further, Origen says (Hom. i in Ezech.) ated. But there is a middle time between every two in- that “the serpent of old did not from the first walk upon stants. Therefore there was an interval between his cre- his breast and belly”; which refers to his sin. Therefore ation and his fall. the devil did not sin at once after the first instant of his On the contrary, It is said of the devil (Jn. 8:44): creation. “He stood not in the truth”: and, as Augustine says (De ∗ Vulg.: ‘Thou hast walked in the midst of the stones of fire; thou wast perfect. . . ’ 320 Civ. Dei xi, 15), “we must understand this in the sense, Reply to Objection 3. An angel has an inflexible free-that he was in the truth, but did not remain in it.” will after once choosing; consequently, if after the first I answer that, There is a twofold opinion on this instant, in which he had a natural movement to good, he point. But the more probable one, which is also more in had not at once placed a barrier to beatitude, he would harmony with the teachings of the Saints, is that the devil have been confirmed in good. It is not so with man; and sinned at once after the first instant of his creation. This therefore the argument does not hold good. must be maintained if it be held that he elicited an act of Reply to Objection 4. It is true to say that there is a free-will in the first instant of his creation, and that he was middle time between every two instants, so far as time is created in grace; as we have said (q. 62, a. 3). For since the continuous, as it is proved Phys. vi, text. 2. But in the angels attain beatitude by one meritorious act, as was said angels, who are not subject to the heavenly movement, above (q. 62, a. 5), if the devil, created in grace, merited in which is primarily measured by continuous time, time is the first instant, he would at once have received beatitude taken to mean the succession of their mental acts, or of after that first instant, if he had not placed an impediment their affections. So the first instant in the angels is un- by sinning. derstood to respond to the operation of the angelic mind, If, however, it be contended that the angel was not cre- whereby it introspects itself by its evening knowledge be- ated in grace, or that he could not elicit an act of free-will cause on the first day evening is mentioned, but not morn- in the first instant, then there is nothing to prevent some ing. This operation was good in them all. From such op- interval being interposed between his creation and fall. eration some of them were converted to the praise of the Reply to Objection 1. Sometimes in Holy Scripture Word by their morning knowledge while others, absorbed spiritual instantaneous movements are represented by cor- in themselves, became night, “swelling up with pride,” as poreal movements which are measured by time. In this Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24). Hence the first act way by “walking” we are to understand the movement of was common to them all; but in their second they were free-will tending towards good. separated. Consequently they were all of them good in Reply to Objection 2. Origen says, “The serpent of the first instant; but in the second the good were set apart old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly,” from the wicked. because of the first instant in which he was not wicked. Whether the highest angel among those who sinned was the highest of all? Ia q. 63 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the highest among I answer that, Two things have to be considered in the angels who sinned was not the highest of all. For it sin, namely, the proneness to sin, and the motive for sin- is stated (Ezech. 28:14): “Thou wast a cherub stretched ning. If, then, in the angels we consider the proneness to out, and protecting, and I set thee in the holy mountain of sin, it seems that the higher angels were less likely to sin God.” Now the order of the Cherubim is under the order than the lower. On this account Damascene says (De Fide of the Seraphim, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi, vii). Orth. ii), that the highest of those who sinned was set over Therefore, the highest angel among those who sinned was the terrestrial order. This opinion seems to agree with the not the highest of all. view of the Platonists, which Augustine quotes (De Civ. Objection 2. Further, God made intellectual nature Dei vii, 6,7; x, 9,10,11). For they said that all the gods in order that it might attain to beatitude. If therefore the were good; whereas some of the demons were good, and highest of the angels sinned, it follows that the Divine or- some bad; naming as ‘gods’ the intellectual substances dinance was frustrated in the noblest creature which is un- which are above the lunar sphere, and calling by the name fitting. of “demons” the intellectual substances which are beneath Objection 3. Further, the more a subject is inclined it, yet higher than men in the order of nature. Nor is towards anything, so much the less can it fall away from this opinion to be rejected as contrary to faith; because it. But the higher an angel is, so much the more is he in- the whole corporeal creation is governed by God through clined towards God. Therefore so much the less can he the angels, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5). Conse- turn away from God by sinning. And so it seems that the quently there is nothing to prevent us from saying that the angel who sinned was not the highest of all, but one of the lower angels were divinely set aside for presiding over lower angels. the lower bodies, the higher over the higher bodies; and On the contrary, Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.) says the highest to stand before God. And in this sense Dam- that the chief angel who sinned, “being set over all the ascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that they who fell were of hosts of angels, surpassed them in brightness, and was by the lower grade of angels; yet in that order some of them comparison the most illustrious among them.” remained good. 321 But if the motive for sinning be considered, we find ity, which is incompatible with mortal sin. Therefore that it existed in the higher angels more than in the lower. the first angel who sinned is called, not a Seraph, but a For, as has been said (a. 2), the demons’ sin was pride; and Cherub. the motive of pride is excellence, which was greater in the Reply to Objection 2. The Divine intention is not higher spirits. Hence Gregory says that he who sinned was frustrated either in those who sin, or in those who are the very highest of all. This seems to be the more probable saved; for God knows beforehand the end of both; and He view: because the angels’ sin did not come of any prone- procures glory from both, saving these of His goodness, ness, but of free choice alone. Consequently that argu- and punishing those of His justice. But the intellectual ment seems to have the more weight which is drawn from creature, when it sins, falls away from its due end. Nor the motive in sinning. Yet this must not be prejudicial to is this unfitting in any exalted creature; because the intel- the other view; because there might be some motive for lectual creature was so made by God, that it lies within its sinning in him also who was the chief of the lower angels. own will to act for its end. Reply to Objection 1. Cherubim is interpreted “ful- Reply to Objection 3. However great was the incli- ness of knowledge,” while “Seraphim” means “those who nation towards good in the highest angel, there was no are on fire,” or “who set on fire.” Consequently Cheru- necessity imposed upon him: consequently it was in his bim is derived from knowledge; which is compatible with power not to follow it. mortal sin; but Seraphim is derived from the heat of char- Whether the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning? Ia q. 63 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that the sin of the high- inducing them by a kind of exhortation. A token thereof est angel was not the cause of the others sinning. For the appears in this, that all the demons are subjects of that cause precedes the effect. But, as Damascene observes highest one; as is evident from our Lord’s words: “Go (De Fide Orth. ii), they all sinned at one time. Therefore [Vulg. ‘Depart from Me’], you cursed, into everlasting the sin of one was not the cause of the others’ sinning. fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels” Objection 2. Further, an angel’s first sin can only be (Mat. 25:41). For the order of Divine justice exacts that pride, as was shown above (a. 2). But pride seeks excel- whosoever consents to another’s evil suggestion, shall be lence. Now it is more contrary to excellence for anyone to subjected to him in his punishment; according to (2 Pet. be subject to an inferior than to a superior; and so it does 2:19): “By whom a man is overcome, of the same also he not appear that the angels sinned by desiring to be subject is the slave.” to a higher angel rather than to God. Yet the sin of one Reply to Objection 1. Although the demons all angel would have been the cause of the others sinning, if sinned in the one instant, yet the sin of one could be the he had induced them to be his subjects. Therefore it does cause of the rest sinning. For the angel needs no delay of not appear that the sin of the highest angel was the cause time for choice, exhortation, or consent, as man, who re- of the others sinning. quires deliberation in order to choose and consent, and vo- Objection 3. Further, it is a greater sin to wish to be cal speech in order to exhort; both of which are the work subject to another against God, than to wish to be over of time. And it is evident that even man begins to speak in another against God; because there is less motive for sin- the very instant when he takes thought; and in the last in- ning. If, therefore, the sin of the foremost angel was the stant of speech, another who catches his meaning can as- cause of the others sinning, in that he induced them to sent to what is said; as is especially evident with regard to subject themselves to him, then the lower angels would primary concepts, “which everyone accepts directly they have sinned more deeply than the highest one; which is are heard”∗. contrary to a gloss on Ps. 103:26: “This dragon which Taking away, then, the time for speech and delibera- Thou hast formed—He who was the more excellent than tion which is required in us; in the same instant in which the rest in nature, became the greater in malice.” There- the highest angel expressed his affection by intelligible fore the sin of the highest angel was not the cause of the speech, it was possible for the others to consent thereto. others sinning. Reply to Objection 2. Other things being equal, the On the contrary, It is said (Apoc. 12:4) that the proud would rather be subject to a superior than to an in- dragon “drew” with him “the third part of the stars of ferior. Yet he chooses rather to be subject to an inferior heaven.” than to a superior, if he can procure an advantage under an I answer that, The sin of the highest angel was the inferior which he cannot under a superior. Consequently cause of the others sinning; not as compelling them, but as it was not against the demons’ pride for them to wish to ∗ Boethius, De Hebdom. 322 serve an inferior by yielding to his rule; for they wanted a. 6), an angel has nothing in him to retard his action, to have him as their prince and leader, so that they might and with his whole might he is moved to whatsoever he is attain their ultimate beatitude of their own natural powers; moved, be it good or bad. Consequently since the highest especially because in the order of nature they were even angel had greater natural energy than the lower angels, he then subject to the highest angel. fell into sin with intenser energy, and therefore he became Reply to Objection 3. As was observed above (q. 62, the greater in malice. Whether those who sinned were as many as those who remained firm? Ia q. 63 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that more angels sinned men, and from forsaking the good dictated by reason, than stood firm. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): which good is known to the few. In the angels there is “Evil is in many, but good is in few.” only an intellectual nature; hence the argument does not Objection 2. Further, justice and sin are to be found hold. in the same way in men and in angels. But there are more And from this we have the answer to the second diffi- wicked men to be found than good; according to Eccles. culty. 1:15: “The number of fools is infinite.” Therefore for the Reply to Objection 3. According to those who hold same reason it is so with the angels. that the chief devil belonged to the lower order of the an- Objection 3. Further, the angels are distinguished ac- gels, who are set over earthly affairs, it is evident that cording to persons and orders. Therefore if more angelic some of every order did not fall, but only those of the low- persons stood firm, it would appear that those who sinned est order. According to those who maintain that the chief were not from all the orders. devil was of the highest order, it is probable that some On the contrary, It is said (4 Kings 6:16): “There are fell of every order; just as men are taken up into every or- more with us than with them”: which is expounded of the der to supply for the angelic ruin. In this view the liberty good angels who are with us to aid us, and the wicked of free-will is more established; which in every degree of spirits who are our foes. creature can be turned to evil. In the Sacred Scripture, I answer that, More angels stood firm than sinned. however, the names of some orders, as of Seraphim and Because sin is contrary to the natural inclination; while Thrones, are not attributed to demons; since they are de- that which is against the natural order happens with less rived from the ardor of love and from God’s indwelling, frequency; for nature procures its effects either always, or which are not consistent with mortal sin. Yet the names more often than not. of Cherubim, Powers, and Principalities are attributed to Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking them; because these names are derived from knowledge with regard to men, in whom evil comes to pass from and from power, which can be common to both good and seeking after sensible pleasures, which are known to most bad. 323 FIRST PART, QUESTION 64 The Punishment of the Demons (In Four Articles) It now remains as a sequel to deal with the punishment of the demons; under which heading there are four points of inquiry: (1) Of their darkness of intellect; (2) Of their obstinacy of will; (3) Of their grief; (4) Of their place of punishment. Whether the demons’ intellect is darkened by privation of the knowledge of all truth? Ia q. 64 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the demons’ intel- deriving it from someone else, as we know by learning; lect is darkened by being deprived of the knowledge of all or by long experience, as the things we learn by discov- truth. For it they knew any truth at all, they would most ery. Now, the demons cannot know the truth by their own of all know themselves; which is to know separated sub- nature, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 33), stances. But this is not in keeping with their unhappiness: the good angels are separated from them as light is from for this seems to belong to great happiness, insomuch as darkness; and every manifestation is made through light, that some writers have assigned as man’s last happiness as is said Eph. 5:13. In like manner they cannot learn by the knowledge of the separated substances. Therefore the revelation, nor by learning from the good angels: because demons are deprived of all knowledge of truth. “there is no fellowship of light with darkness∗” (2 Cor. Objection 2. Further, what is most manifest in its na- 6:14). Nor can they learn by long experience: because ture, seems to be specially manifest to the angels, whether experience comes of the senses. Consequently there is no good or bad. That the same is not manifest with regard to knowledge of truth in them. ourselves, comes from the weakness of our intellect which On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) draws its knowledge from phantasms; as it comes from the that, “certain gifts were bestowed upon the demons which, weakness of its eye that the owl cannot behold the light of we say, have not been changed at all, but remain entire the sun. But the demons cannot know God, Who is most and most brilliant.” Now, the knowledge of truth stands manifest of Himself, because He is the sovereign truth; among those natural gifts. Consequently there is some and this is because they are not clean of heart, whereby knowledge of truth in them. alone can God be seen. Therefore neither can they know I answer that, The knowledge of truth is twofold: one other things. which comes of nature, and one which comes of grace. Objection 3. Further, according to Augustine (Gen. The knowledge which comes of grace is likewise twofold: ad lit. iv, 22), the proper knowledge of the angels is the first is purely speculative, as when Divine secrets are twofold; namely, morning and evening. But the demons imparted to an individual; the other is effective, and pro- have no morning knowledge, because they do not see duces love for God; which knowledge properly belongs to things in the Word; nor have they the evening knowl- the gift of wisdom. edge, because this evening knowledge refers the things Of these three kinds of knowledge the first was nei- known to the Creator’s praise (hence, after “evening” ther taken away nor lessened in the demons. For it fol- comes “morning” [Gn. 1]). Therefore the demons can lows from the very nature of the angel, who, according have no knowledge of things. to his nature, is an intellect or mind: since on account Objection 4. Further, the angels at their creation knew of the simplicity of his substance, nothing can be with- the mystery of the kingdom of God, as Augustine says drawn from his nature, so as to punish him by subtracting (Gen. ad lit. v, 19; De Civ. Dei xi). But the demons are from his natural powers, as a man is punished by being deprived of such knowledge: “for if they had known it, deprived of a hand or a foot or of something else. There- they would never have crucified the Lord of glory,” as is fore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the natural gifts said 1 Cor. 2:8. Therefore, for the same reason, they are remain entire in them. Consequently their natural knowl- deprived of all other knowledge of truth. edge was not diminished. The second kind of knowledge, Objection 5. Further, whatever truth anyone knows is however, which comes of grace, and consists in specu- known either naturally, as we know first principles; or by lation, has not been utterly taken away from them, but ∗ Vulg.: ‘What fellowship hath. . . ?’ 324 lessened; because, of these Divine secrets only so much fails utterly, then it is night. So then the knowledge of is revealed to them as is necessary; and that is done either things in their own nature, when referred to the praise of by means of the angels, or “through some temporal work- the Creator, as it is in the good angels, has something of ings of Divine power,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, the Divine light, and can be called evening knowledge; 21); but not in the same degree as to the holy angels, to but if it be not referred to God, as is the case with the whom many more things are revealed, and more fully, in demons, it is not called evening, but “nocturnal” knowl- the Word Himself. But of the third knowledge, as likewise edge. Accordingly we read in Gn. 1:5 that the darkness, of charity, they are utterly deprived. which God separated from the light, “He called night.” Reply to Objection 1. Happiness consists in self- Reply to Objection 4. All the angels had some knowl- application to something higher. The separated substances edge from the very beginning respecting the mystery of are above us in the order of nature; hence man can have God’s kingdom, which found its completion in Christ; and happiness of a kind by knowing the separated substances, most of all from the moment when they were beatified by although his perfect happiness consists in knowing the the vision of the Word, which vision the demons never first substance, namely, God. But it is quite natural for had. Yet all the angels did not fully and equally appre- one separate substance to know another; as it is natural for hend it; hence the demons much less fully understood the us to know sensible natures. Hence, as man’s happiness mystery of the Incarnation, when Christ was in the world. does not consist in knowing sensible natures; so neither For, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 21), “It was does the angel’s happiness consist in knowing separated not manifested to them as it was to the holy angels, who substances. enjoy a participated eternity of the Word; but it was made Reply to Objection 2. What is most manifest in its known by some temporal effects, so as to strike terror into nature is hidden from us by its surpassing the bounds of them.” For had they fully and certainly known that He was our intellect; and not merely because our intellect draws the Son of God and the effect of His passion, they would knowledge from phantasms. Now the Divine substance never have procured the crucifixion of the Lord of glory. surpasses the proportion not only of the human intellect, Reply to Objection 5. The demons know a truth in but even of the angelic. Consequently, not even an angel three ways: first of all by the subtlety of their nature; can of his own nature know God’s substance. Yet on ac- for although they are darkened by privation of the light count of the perfection of his intellect he can of his nature of grace, yet they are enlightened by the light of their in- have a higher knowledge of God than man can have. Such tellectual nature: secondly, by revelation from the holy knowledge of God remains also in the demons. Although angels; for while not agreeing with them in conformity of they do not possess the purity which comes with grace, will, they do agree, nevertheless, by their likeness of in- nevertheless they have purity of nature; and this suffices tellectual nature, according to which they can accept what for the knowledge of God which belongs to them from is manifested by others: thirdly, they know by long expe- their nature. rience; not as deriving it from the senses; but when the Reply to Objection 3. The creature is darkness in similitude of their innate intelligible species is completed comparison with the excellence of the Divine light; and in individual things, they know some things as present, therefore the creature’s knowledge in its own nature is which they previously did not know would come to pass, called “evening” knowledge. For the evening is akin to as we said when dealing with the knowledge of the angels darkness, yet it possesses some light: but when the light (q. 57, a. 3, ad 3). Whether the will of the demons is obstinate in evil? Ia q. 64 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the will of the of justice. demons is not obstinate in evil. For liberty of will be- Objection 3. Further, if the demons have a will obsti- longs to the nature of an intellectual being, which nature nate in evil, then their will would be especially obstinate remains in the demons, as we said above (a. 1). But liberty in the sin whereby they fell. But that sin, namely, pride, of will is directly and firstly ordained to good rather than is in them no longer; because the motive for the sin no to evil. Therefore the demons’ will is not so obstinate in longer endures, namely, excellence. Therefore the demon evil as not to be able to return to what is good. is not obstinate in malice. Objection 2. Further, since God’s mercy is infinite, it Objection 4. Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv) that is greater than the demons’ malice, which is finite. But man can be reinstated by another, since he fell through an- no one returns from the malice of sin to the goodness of other. But, as was observed already (q. 63, a. 8), the lower justice save through God’s mercy. Therefore the demons demons fell through the highest one. Therefore their fall can likewise return from their state of malice to the state can be repaired by another. Consequently they are not ob- 325 stinate in malice. by his reason apprehends movably, passing from one con- Objection 5. Further, whoever is obstinate in malice, sideration to another; and having the way open by which never performs any good work. But the demon performs he may proceed to either of two opposites. Consequently some good works: for he confesses the truth, saying to man’s will adheres to a thing movably, and with the power Christ: “I know Who Thou art, the holy one of God” (Mk. of forsaking it and of clinging to the opposite; whereas the 1:24). “The demons” also “believe and tremble” (Jam. angel’s will adheres fixedly and immovably. Therefore, if 2:19). And Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv), that “they his will be considered before its adhesion, it can freely desire what is good and best, which is, to be, to live, to adhere either to this or to its opposite (namely, in such understand.” Therefore they are not obstinate in malice. things as he does not will naturally); but after he has once On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 73:23): “The pride adhered, he clings immovably. So it is customary to say of them that hate Thee, ascendeth continually”; and this that man’s free-will is flexible to the opposite both before is understood of the demons. Therefore they remain ever and after choice; but the angel’s free-will is flexible ei- obstinate in their malice. ther opposite before the choice, but not after. Therefore I answer that, It was Origen’s opinion∗ that every will the good angels who adhered to justice, were confirmed of the creature can by reason of free-will be inclined to therein; whereas the wicked ones, sinning, are obstinate good and evil; with the exception of the soul of Christ in sin. Later on we shall treat of the obstinacy of men on account of the union of the Word. Such a statement who are damned ( Suppl., q. 98, Aa. 1, 2). deprives angels and saints of true beatitude, because ev- Reply to Objection 1. The good and wicked angels erlasting stability is of the very nature of true beatitude; have free-will, but according to the manner and condition hence it is termed “life everlasting.” It is also contrary of their state, as has been said. to the authority of Sacred Scripture, which declares that Reply to Objection 2. God’s mercy delivers from sin demons and wicked men shall be sent “into everlasting those who repent. But such as are not capable of repent- punishment,” and the good brought “into everlasting life.” ing, cling immovably to sin, and are not delivered by the Consequently such an opinion must be considered erro- Divine mercy. neous; while according to Catholic Faith, it must be held Reply to Objection 3. The devil’s first sin still re- firmly both that the will of the good angels is confirmed in mains in him according to desire; although not as to his good, and that the will of the demons is obstinate in evil. believing that he can obtain what he desired. Even so, if a We must seek for the cause of this obstinacy, not in man were to believe that he can commit murder, and wills the gravity of the sin, but in the condition of their nature to commit it, and afterwards the power is taken from him; or state. For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), “death nevertheless, the will to murder can stay with him, so that is to men, what the fall is to the angels.” Now it is clear he would he had done it, or still would do it if he could. that all the mortal sins of men, grave or less grave, are par- Reply to Objection 4. The fact that man sinned from donable before death; whereas after death they are without another’s suggestion, is not the whole cause of man’s sin remission and endure for ever. being pardonable. Consequently the argument does not To find the cause, then, of this obstinacy, it must be hold good. borne in mind that the appetitive power is in all things pro- Reply to Objection 5. A demon’s act is twofold. portioned to the apprehensive, whereby it is moved, as the One comes of deliberate will; and this is properly called movable by its mover. For the sensitive appetite seeks a his own act. Such an act on the demon’s part is always particular good; while the will seeks the universal good, as wicked; because, although at times he does something was said above (q. 59, a. 1); as also the sense apprehends good, yet he does not do it well; as when he tells the truth particular objects, while the intellect considers universals. in order to deceive; and when he believes and confesses, Now the angel’s apprehension differs from man’s in this yet not willingly, but compelled by the evidence of things. respect, that the angel by his intellect apprehends immov- Another kind of act is natural to the demon; this can be ably, as we apprehend immovably first principles which good and bears witness to the goodness of nature. Yet he are the object of the habit of “intelligence”; whereas man abuses even such good acts to evil purpose. Whether there is sorrow in the demons? Ia q. 64 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no sorrow in (De Gen. Contra Manich. ii, 17) says: “The devil has the demons. For since sorrow and joy are opposites, they power over them who despise God’s commandments, and cannot be together in the same subject. But there is joy in he rejoices over this sinister power.” Therefore there is no the demons: for Augustine writing against the Maniches sorrow in the demons. ∗ Peri Archon i. 6 326 Objection 2. Further, sorrow is the cause of fear, for them: and especially because it is of the very notion of those things cause fear while they are future, which cause punishment for it to be repugnant to the will. Moreover, sorrow when they are present. But there is no fear in the they are deprived of happiness, which they desire natu- demons, according to Job 41:24, “Who was made to fear rally; and their wicked will is curbed in many respects. no one.” Therefore there is no grief in the demons. Reply to Objection 1. Joy and sorrow about the same Objection 3. Further, it is a good thing to be sorry thing are opposites, but not about different things. Hence for evil. But the demons can do no good action. There- there is nothing to hinder a man from being sorry for one fore they cannot be sorry, at least for the evil of sin; which thing, and joyful for another; especially so far as sorrow applies to the worm of conscience. and joy imply simple acts of the will; because, not merely On the contrary, The demon’s sin is greater than in different things, but even in one and the same thing, man’s sin. But man is punished with sorrow on account there can be something that we will, and something that of the pleasure taken in sin, according to Apoc. 18:7, “As we will not. much as she hath glorified herself, and lived in delicacies, Reply to Objection 2. As there is sorrow in the so much torment and sorrow give ye to her.” Consequently demons over present evil, so also there is fear of future much more is the devil punished with the grief of sorrow, evil. Now when it is said, “He was made to fear no one,” because he especially glorified himself. this is to be understood of the fear of God which restrains I answer that, Fear, sorrow, joy, and the like, so far from sin. For it is written elsewhere that “the devils be- as they are passions, cannot exist in the demons; for thus lieve and tremble” (James 2:19). they are proper to the sensitive appetite, which is a power Reply to Objection 3. To be sorry for the evil of sin in a corporeal organ. According, however, as they denote on account of the sin bears witness to the goodness of the simple acts of the will, they can be in the demons. And will, to which the evil of sin is opposed. But to be sorry it must be said that there is sorrow in them; because sor- for the evil of punishment, for the evil of sin on account of row, as denoting a simple act of the will, is nothing else the punishment, bears witness to the goodness of nature, than the resistance of the will to what is, or to what is not. to which the evil of punishment is opposed. Hence Au- Now it is evident that the demons would wish many things gustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13), that “sorrow for good not to be, which are, and others to be, which are not: for, lost by punishment, is the witness to a good nature.” Con- out of envy, they would wish others to be damned, who sequently, since the demon has a perverse and obstinate are saved. Consequently, sorrow must be said to exist in will, he is not sorry for the evil of sin. Whether our atmosphere is the demons’ place of punishment? Ia q. 64 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that this atmosphere is not gels. In another way, indirectly, as when anyone assailed the demons’ place of punishment. For a demon is a spiri- is exercised by fighting against opposition. It was fitting tual nature. But a spiritual nature is not affected by place. for this procuring of man’s welfare to be brought about Therefore there is no place of punishment for demons. through the wicked spirits, lest they should cease to be Objection 2. Further, man’s sin is not graver than the of service in the natural order. Consequently a twofold demons’. But man’s place of punishment is hell. Much place of punishment is due to the demons: one, by rea- more, therefore, is it the demons’ place of punishment; son of their sin, and this is hell; and another, in order that and consequently not the darksome atmosphere. they may tempt men, and thus the darksome atmosphere Objection 3. Further, the demons are punished with is their due place of punishment. the pain of fire. But there is no fire in the darksome at- Now the procuring of men’s salvation is prolonged mosphere. Therefore the darksome atmosphere is not the even to the judgment day: consequently, the ministry of place of punishment for the demons. the angels and wrestling with demons endure until then. On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, Hence until then the good angels are sent to us here; and 10), that “the darksome atmosphere is as a prison to the the demons are in this dark atmosphere for our trial: al- demons until the judgment day.” though some of them are even now in hell, to torment I answer that, The angels in their own nature stand those whom they have led astray; just as some of the good midway between God and men. Now the order of Divine angels are with the holy souls in heaven. But after the providence so disposes, that it procures the welfare of the judgment day all the wicked, both men and angels, will inferior orders through the superior. But man’s welfare is be in hell, and the good in heaven. disposed by Divine providence in two ways: first of all, Reply to Objection 1. A place is not penal to angel or directly, when a man is brought unto good and withheld soul as if affecting the nature by changing it, but as affect- from evil; and this is fittingly done through the good an- ing the will by saddening it: because the angel or the soul 327 apprehends that it is in a place not agreeable to its will. glory is not lessened by their coming to us, for they con- Reply to Objection 2. One soul is not set over another sider that place to be their own; in the same way as we say in the order of nature, as the demons are over men in the that the bishop’s honor is not lessened while he is not ac- order of nature; consequently there is no parallel. tually sitting on his throne. In like manner it must be said, Reply to Objection 3. Some have maintained that the that although the demons are not actually bound within pain of sense for demons and souls is postponed until the the fire of hell while they are in this dark atmosphere, nev- judgment day: and that the beatitude of the saints is like- ertheless their punishment is none the less; because they wise postponed until the judgment day. But this is erro- know that such confinement is their due. Hence it is said neous, and contrary to the teaching of the Apostle (2 Cor. in a gloss upon James 3:6: “They carry fire of hell with 5:1): “If our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, them wherever they go.” Nor is this contrary to what is we have a house in heaven.” Others, again, while not ad- said (Lk. 8:31), “They besought the Lord not to cast them mitting the same of souls, admit it as to demons. But it into the abyss”; for they asked for this, deeming it to be a is better to say that the same judgment is passed upon punishment for them to be cast out of a place where they wicked souls and wicked angels, even as on good souls could injure men. Hence it is stated, “They [Vulg. ‘He’] and good angels. besought Him that He would not expel them [Vulg. ‘him’] Consequently, it must be said that, although a heav- out of the country” (Mk. 5:10). enly place belongs to the glory of the angels, yet their 328 FIRST PART, QUESTION 65 The Work of Creation of Corporeal Creatures (In Four Articles) From the consideration of spiritual creatures we proceed to that of corporeal creatures, in the production of which, as Holy Scripture makes mention, three works are found, namely, the work of creation, as given in the words, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth”; the work of distinction as given in the words, “He divided the light from the darkness, and the waters that are above the firmament from the waters that are under the firmament”; and the work of adornment, expressed thus, “Let there be lights in the firmament.” First, then, we must consider the work of creation; secondly, the work of distinction; and thirdly, the work of adornment. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether corporeal creatures are from God? (2) Whether they were created on account of God’s goodness? (3) Whether they were created by God through the medium of the angels? (4) Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels or immediately from God. Whether corporeal creatures are from God? Ia q. 65 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that corporeal creatures different. There must, therefore, be one principle of be- are not from God. For it is said (Eccles. 3:14): “I have ing from which all things in whatever way existing have learned that all the works which God hath made, continue their being, whether they are invisible and spiritual, or vis- for ever.” But visible bodies do not continue for ever, for ible and corporeal. But the devil is called the god of this it is said (2 Cor. 4:18): “The things which are seen are world, not as having created it, but because worldlings temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal.” serve him, of whom also the Apostle says, speaking in the Therefore God did not make visible bodies. same sense, “Whose god is their belly” (Phil. 3:19). Objection 2. Further, it is said (Gn. 1:31): “God saw Reply to Objection 1. All the creatures of God in all things that He had made, and they were very good.” some respects continue for ever, at least as to matter, since But corporeal creatures are evil, since we find them harm- what is created will never be annihilated, even though it ful in many ways; as may be seen in serpents, in the sun’s be corruptible. And the nearer a creature approaches God, heat, and other things. Now a thing is called evil, in so Who is immovable, the more it also is immovable. For far as it is harmful. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not corruptible creatures endure for ever as regards their mat- from God. ter, though they change as regards their substantial form. Objection 3. Further, what is from God does not with- But incorruptible creatures endure with respect to their draw us from God, but leads us to Him. But corporeal substance, though they are mutable in other respects, such creatures withdraw us from God. Hence the Apostle (2 as place, for instance, the heavenly bodies; or the affec- Cor. 4:18): “While we look not at the things which are tions, as spiritual creatures. But the Apostle’s words, “The seen.” Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God. things which are seen are temporal,” though true even as On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 145:6): “Who made regards such things considered in themselves (in so far as heaven and earth, the sea, and all things that are in them.” every visible creature is subject to time, either as to being I answer that, Certain heretics maintain that visible or as to movement), are intended to apply to visible things things are not created by the good God, but by an evil in so far as they are offered to man as rewards. For such principle, and allege in proof of their error the words of rewards, as consist in these visible things, are temporal; the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:4), “The god of this world hath while those that are invisible endure for ever. Hence he blinded the minds of unbelievers.” But this position is al- said before (2 Cor. 4:17): “It worketh for us. . . an eternal together untenable. For, if things that differ agree in some weight of glory.” point, there must be some cause for that agreement, since Reply to Objection 2. Corporeal creatures accord- things diverse in nature cannot be united of themselves. ing to their nature are good, though this good is not uni- Hence whenever in different things some one thing com- versal, but partial and limited, the consequence of which mon to all is found, it must be that these different things is a certain opposition of contrary qualities, though each receive that one thing from some one cause, as different quality is good in itself. To those, however, who esti- bodies that are hot receive their heat from fire. But being mate things, not by the nature thereof, but by the good is found to be common to all things, however otherwise they themselves can derive therefrom, everything which 329 is harmful to themselves seems simply evil. For they do by the things that are made” (Rom. 1:20). If, then, they not reflect that what is in some way injurious to one per- withdraw men from God, it is the fault of those who use son, to another is beneficial, and that even to themselves them foolishly. Thus it is said (Wis. 14:11): “Creatures the same thing may be evil in some respects, but good in are turned into a snare to the feet of the unwise.” And the others. And this could not be, if bodies were essentially very fact that they can thus withdraw us from God proves evil and harmful. that they came from Him, for they cannot lead the foolish Reply to Objection 3. Creatures of themselves do not away from God except by the allurements of some good withdraw us from God, but lead us to Him; for “the in- that they have from Him. visible things of God are clearly seen, being understood Whether corporeal things were made on account of God’s goodness? Ia q. 65 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that corporeal creatures the evil in another might be punished. Secondly, because were not made on account of God’s goodness. For it is it would follow that the arrangement, which now exists, of said (Wis. 1:14) that God “created all things that they the corporeal world would arise from mere chance. For it might be.” Therefore all things were created for their own the sun’s body was made what it is, that it might serve for being’s sake, and not on account of God’s goodness. a punishment suitable to some sin of a spiritual creature, Objection 2. Further, good has the nature of an end; it would follow, if other spiritual creatures had sinned in therefore the greater good in things is the end of the lesser the same way as the one to punish whom the sun had been good. But spiritual creatures are related to corporeal crea- created, that many suns would exist in the world; and so tures, as the greater good to the lesser. Corporeal crea- of other things. But such a consequence is altogether in- tures, therefore, are created for the sake of spiritual crea- admissible. Hence we must set aside this theory as false, tures, and not on account of God’s goodness. and consider that the entire universe is constituted by all Objection 3. Further, justice does not give unequal creatures, as a whole consists of its parts. things except to the unequal. Now God is just: there- Now if we wish to assign an end to any whole, and to fore inequality not created by God must precede all in- the parts of that whole, we shall find, first, that each and equality created by Him. But an inequality not created by every part exists for the sake of its proper act, as the eye God can only arise from free-will, and consequently all for the act of seeing; secondly, that less honorable parts inequality results from the different movements of free- exist for the more honorable, as the senses for the intel- will. Now, corporeal creatures are unequal to spiritual lect, the lungs for the heart; and, thirdly, that all parts are creatures. Therefore the former were made on account for the perfection of the whole, as the matter for the form, of movements of free-will, and not on account of God’s since the parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole. goodness. Furthermore, the whole man is on account of an extrin- On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 16:4): “The Lord sic end, that end being the fruition of God. So, therefore, hath made all things for Himself.” in the parts of the universe also every creature exists for I answer that, Origen laid down∗ that corporeal crea- its own proper act and perfection, and the less noble for tures were not made according to God’s original purpose, the nobler, as those creatures that are less noble than man but in punishment of the sin of spiritual creatures. For he exist for the sake of man, whilst each and every creature maintained that God in the beginning made spiritual crea- exists for the perfection of the entire universe. Further- tures only, and all of equal nature; but that of these by more, the entire universe, with all its parts, is ordained the use of free-will some turned to God, and, according to towards God as its end, inasmuch as it imitates, as it were, the measure of their conversion, were given an higher or a and shows forth the Divine goodness, to the glory of God. lower rank, retaining their simplicity; while others turned Reasonable creatures, however, have in some special and from God, and became bound to different kinds of bodies higher manner God as their end, since they can attain to according to the degree of their turning away. But this po- Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving Him. sition is erroneous. In the first place, because it is contrary Thus it is plain that the Divine goodness is the end of all to Scripture, which, after narrating the production of each corporeal things. kind of corporeal creatures, subjoins, “God saw that it was Reply to Objection 1. In the very fact of any creature good” (Gn. 1), as if to say that everything was brought possessing being, it represents the Divine being and Its into being for the reason that it was good for it to be. But goodness. And, therefore, that God created all things, that according to Origen’s opinion, the corporeal creature was they might have being, does not exclude that He created made, not because it was good that it should be, but that them for His own goodness. ∗ Peri Archon ii. 330 Reply to Objection 2. The proximate end does not justice, places stones of the same kind in different parts exclude the ultimate end. Therefore that corporeal crea- of a building, not on account of any antecedent difference tures were, in a manner, made for the sake of the spiritual, in the stones, but with a view to securing that perfection does not prevent their being made on account of God’s of the entire building, which could not be obtained ex- goodness. cept by the different positions of the stones; even so, God Reply to Objection 3. Equality of justice has its place from the beginning, to secure perfection in the universe, in retribution, since equal rewards or punishments are due has set therein creatures of various and unequal natures, to equal merit or demerit. But this does not apply to things according to His wisdom, and without injustice, since no as at first instituted. For just as an architect, without in- diversity of merit is presupposed. Whether corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the an-Ia q. 65 a. 3 gels? Objection 1. It would seem that corporeal creatures save by God alone. were produced by God through the medium of the angels. In proof whereof it must be borne in mind that the For, as all things are governed by the Divine wisdom, so higher the cause, the more numerous the objects to which by it were all things made, according to Ps. 103:24 “Thou its causation extends. Now the underlying principle in hast made all things in wisdom.” But “it belongs to wis- things is always more universal than that which informs dom to ordain,” as stated in the beginning of the Meta- and restricts it; thus, being is more universal than living, physics (i, 2). Hence in the government of things the living than understanding, matter than form. The more lower is ruled by the higher in a certain fitting order, as widely, then, one thing underlies others, the more directly Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4). Therefore in the produc- does that thing proceed from a higher cause. Thus the tion of things it was ordained that the corporeal should be thing that underlies primarily all things, belongs properly produced by the spiritual, as the lower by the higher. to the causality of the supreme cause. Therefore no sec- Objection 2. Further, diversity of effects shows di- ondary cause can produce anything, unless there is pre- versity of causes, since like always produces like. It then supposed in the thing produced something that is caused all creatures, both spiritual and corporeal, were produced by a higher cause. But creation is the production of a immediately by God, there would be no diversity in crea- thing in its entire substance, nothing being presupposed tures, for one would not be further removed from God either uncreated or created. Hence it remains that noth- than another. But this is clearly false; for the Philosopher ing can create except God alone, Who is the first cause. says that some things are corruptible because they are far Therefore, in order to show that all bodies were created removed from God (De Gen. et Corrup. ii, text. 59). immediately by God, Moses said: “In the beginning God Objection 3. Further, infinite power is not required to created heaven and earth.” produce a finite effect. But every corporeal thing is finite. Reply to Objection 1. In the production of things an Therefore, it could be, and was, produced by the finite order exists, but not such that one creature is created by power of spiritual creatures: for in suchlike beings there another, for that is impossible; but rather such that by the is no distinction between what is and what is possible: es- Divine wisdom diverse grades are constituted in creatures. pecially as no dignity befitting a nature is denied to that Reply to Objection 2. God Himself, though one, has nature, unless it be in punishment of a fault. knowledge of many and different things without detriment On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): “In the begin- to the simplicity of His nature, as has been shown above ning God created heaven and earth”; by which are un- (q. 15, a. 2); so that by His wisdom He is the cause of derstood corporeal creatures. These, therefore, were pro- diverse things as known by Him, even as an artificer, by duced immediately by God. apprehending diverse forms, produces diverse works of I answer that, Some have maintained that creatures art. proceeded from God by degrees, in such a way that the Reply to Objection 3. The amount of the power of first creature proceeded from Him immediately, and in its an agent is measured not only by the thing made, but also turn produced another, and so on until the production of by the manner of making it; for one and the same thing corporeal creatures. But this position is untenable, since is made in one way by a higher power, in another by a the first production of corporeal creatures is by creation, lower. But the production of finite things, where nothing by which matter itself is produced: for in the act of com- is presupposed as existing, is the work of infinite power, ing into being the imperfect must be made before the per- and, as such, can belong to no creature. fect: and it is impossible that anything should be created, 331 Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels? Ia q. 65 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the forms of bod- the forms in the mind of the craftsman. This theory seems ies come from the angels. For Boethius says (De Trin. to be the same as that of certain heretics of modern times, i): “From forms that are without matter come the forms who say that God indeed created all things, but that the that are in matter.” But forms that are without matter are devil formed corporeal matter, and differentiated it into spiritual substances, and forms that are in matter are the species. forms of bodies. Therefore, the forms of bodies are from But all these opinions seem to have a common origin; spiritual substances. they all, in fact, sought for a cause of forms as though Objection 2. Further, all that is such by participa- the form were of itself brought into being. Whereas, as tion is reduced to that which is such by its essence. But Aristotle (Metaph. vii, text. 26,27,28), proves, what is, spiritual substances are forms essentially, whereas corpo- properly speaking, made, is the “composite.” Now, such real creatures have forms by participation. Therefore the are the forms of corruptible things that at one time they forms of corporeal things are derived from spiritual sub- exist and at another exist not, without being themselves stances. generated or corrupted, but by reason of the generation or Objection 3. Further, spiritual substances have more corruption of the “composite”; since even forms have not power of causation than the heavenly bodies. But the being, but composites have being through forms: for, ac- heavenly bodies give form to things here below, for which cording to a thing’s mode of being, is the mode in which reason they are said to cause generation and corruption. it is brought into being. Since, then, like is produced from Much more, therefore, are material forms derived from like, we must not look for the cause of corporeal forms spiritual substances. in any immaterial form, but in something that is compos- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): ite, as this fire is generated by that fire. Corporeal forms, “We must not suppose that this corporeal matter serves therefore, are caused, not as emanations from some imma- the angels at their nod, but rather that it obeys God thus.” terial form, but by matter being brought from potentiality But corporeal matter may be said thus to serve that from into act by some composite agent. But since the compos- which it receives its form. Corporeal forms, then, are not ite agent, which is a body, is moved by a created spiritual from the angels, but from God. substance, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5), it fol- I answer that, It was the opinion of some that all cor- lows further that even corporeal forms are derived from poreal forms are derived from spiritual substances, which spiritual substances, not emanating from them, but as the we call the angels. And there are two ways in which this term of their movement. And, further still, the species of has been stated. For Plato held that the forms of corpo- the angelic intellect, which are, as it were, the seminal real matter are derived from, and formed by, forms im- types of corporeal forms, must be referred to God as the materially subsisting, by a kind of participation. Thus he first cause. But in the first production of corporeal crea- held that there exists an immaterial man, and an immate- tures no transmutation from potentiality to act can have rial horse, and so forth, and that from such the individual taken place, and accordingly, the corporeal forms that sensible things that we see are constituted, in so far as bodies had when first produced came immediately form in corporeal matter there abides the impression received God, whose bidding alone matter obeys, as its own proper from these separate forms, by a kind of assimilation, or cause. To signify this, Moses prefaces each work with as he calls it, “participation” (Phaedo xlix). And, accord- the words, “God said, Let this thing be,” or “that,” to de- ing to the Platonists, the order of forms corresponds to note the formation of all things by the Word of God, from the order of those separate substances; for example, that Whom, according to Augustine∗, is “all form and fitness there is a single separate substance, which is horse and and concord of parts.” the cause of all horses, whilst above this is separate life, Reply to Objection 1. By immaterial forms Boethius or “per se” life, as they term it, which is the cause of all understands the types of things in the mind of God. Thus life, and that above this again is that which they call being the Apostle says (Heb. 11:3): “By faith we understand itself, which is the cause of all being. Avicenna, however, that the world was framed by the Word of God; that from and certain others, have maintained that the forms of cor- invisible things visible things might be made.” But if by poreal things do not subsist “per se” in matter, but in the immaterial forms he understands the angels, we say that intellect only. Thus they say that from forms existing in from them come material forms, not by emanation, but by the intellect of spiritual creatures (called “intelligences” motion. by them, but “angels” by us) proceed all the forms of cor- Reply to Objection 2. Forms received into matter are poreal matter, as the form of his handiwork proceeds from to be referred, not to self-subsisting forms of the same ∗ Tract. i. in Joan. and Gen. ad lit. i. 4 332 type, as the Platonists held, but either to intelligible forms that they may be able to be brought by movement into act. of the angelic intellect, from which they proceed by move- Reply to Objection 3. The heavenly bodies inform ment, or, still higher, to the types in the Divine intellect, by earthly ones by movement, not by emanation. which the seeds of forms are implanted in created things, 333 FIRST PART, QUESTION 66 On the Order of Creation Towards Distinction (In Four Articles) We must next consider the work of distinction; first, the ordering of creation towards distinction; secondly, the distinction itself. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its formation? (2) Whether the matter of all corporeal things is the same? (3) Whether the empyrean heaven was created contemporaneously with formless matter? (4) Whether time was created simultaneously with it? Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its formation? Ia q. 66 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that formlessness of mat- we thus understand it we cannot say that the formlessness ter preceded in time its formation. For it is said (Gn. 1:2): of matter was prior in time either to its formation or to its “The earth was void and empty,” or “invisible and shape- distinction. As to formation, the argument is clear. For it less,” according to another version∗; by which is under- formless matter preceded in duration, it already existed; stood the formlessness of matter, as Augustine says (Con- for this is implied by duration, since the end of creation fess. xii, 12). Therefore matter was formless until it re- is being in act: and act itself is a form. To say, then, that ceived its form. matter preceded, but without form, is to say that being ex- Objection 2. Further, nature in its working imitates isted actually, yet without act, which is a contradiction in the working of God, as a secondary cause imitates a first terms. Nor can it be said that it possessed some common cause. But in the working of nature formlessness precedes form, on which afterwards supervened the different forms form in time. It does so, therefore, in the Divine working. that distinguish it. For this would be to hold the opin- Objection 3. Further, matter is higher than accident, ion of the ancient natural philosophers, who maintained for matter is part of substance. But God can effect that ac- that primary matter was some corporeal thing in act, as cident exist without substance, as in the Sacrament of the fire, air, water, or some intermediate substance. Hence, Altar. He could, therefore, cause matter to exist without it followed that to be made means merely to be changed; form. for since that preceding form bestowed actual substantial On the contrary, An imperfect effect proves imper- being, and made some particular thing to be, it would re- fection in the agent. But God is an agent absolutely per- sult that the supervening form would not simply make an fect; wherefore it is said of Him (Dt. 32:4): “The works actual being, but ‘this’ actual being; which is the proper of God are perfect.” Therefore the work of His creation effect of an accidental form. Thus the consequent forms was at no time formless. Further, the formation of cor- would be merely accidents, implying not generation, but poreal creatures was effected by the work of distinction. alteration. Hence we must assert that primary matter was But confusion is opposed to distinction, as formlessness not created altogether formless, nor under any one com- to form. It, therefore, formlessness preceded in time the mon form, but under distinct forms. And so, if the form- formation of matter, it follows that at the beginning confu- lessness of matter be taken as referring to the condition of sion, called by the ancients chaos, existed in the corporeal primary matter, which in itself is formless, this formless- creation. ness did not precede in time its formation or distinction, I answer that, On this point holy men differ in opin- but only in origin and nature, as Augustine says; in the ion. Augustine for instance (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), believes same way as potentiality is prior to act, and the part to that the formlessness of matter was not prior in time to the whole. But the other holy writers understand by form- its formation, but only in origin or the order of nature, lessness, not the exclusion of all form, but the absence whereas others, as Basil (Hom. ii In Hexaem.), Ambrose of that beauty and comeliness which are now apparent (In Hexaem. i), and Chrysostom (Hom. ii In Gen.), hold in the corporeal creation. Accordingly they say that the that formlessness of matter preceded in time its forma- formlessness of corporeal matter preceded its form in du- tion. And although these opinions seem mutually contra- ration. And so, when this is considered, it appears that dictory, in reality they differ but little; for Augustine takes Augustine agrees with them in some respects, and in oth-the formlessness of matter in a different sense from the ers disagrees, as will be shown later (q. 69, a. 1; q. 74, others. In his sense it means the absence of all form, and if a. 2). ∗ Septuagint 334 As far as may be gathered from the text of Genesis a form, is a kind of act; whereas matter, as such, is essen-threefold beauty was wanting to corporeal creatures, for tially being in potentiality. Hence it is more repugnant that which reason they are said to be without form. For the matter should be in act without form, than for accident to beauty of light was wanting to all that transparent body be without subject. which we call the heavens, whence it is said that “dark- In reply to the first argument in the contrary sense, we ness was upon the fact of the deep.” And the earth lacked say that if, according to some holy writers, formlessness beauty in two ways: first, that beauty which it acquired was prior in time to the informing of matter, this arose, when its watery veil was withdrawn, and so we read that not from want of power on God’s part, but from His wis- “the earth was void,” or “invisible,” inasmuch as the wa- dom, and from the design of preserving due order in the ters covered and concealed it from view; secondly, that disposition of creatures by developing perfection from im- which it derives from being adorned by herbs and plants, perfection. for which reason it is called “empty,” or, according to an- In reply to the second argument, we say that certain other reading†, “shapeless”—that is, unadorned. Thus af- of the ancient natural philosophers maintained confusion ter mention of two created natures, the heaven and the devoid of all distinction; except Anaxagoras, who taught earth, the formlessness of the heaven is indicated by the that the intellect alone was distinct and without admix- words, “darkness was upon the face of the deep,” since the ture. But previous to the work of distinction Holy Scrip- air is included under heaven; and the formlessness of the ture enumerates several kinds of differentiation, the first earth, by the words, “the earth was void and empty.” being that of the heaven from the earth, in which even a Reply to Objection 1. The word earth is taken differ- material distinction is expressed, as will be shown later ently in this passage by Augustine, and by other writers. (a. 3; q. 68, a. 1). This is signified by the words, “In Augustine holds that by the words “earth” and “water,” the beginning God created heaven and earth.” The second in this passage. primary matter itself is signified on ac- distinction mentioned is that of the elements according to count of its being impossible for Moses to make the idea their forms, since both earth and water are named. That of such matter intelligible to an ignorant people, except air and fire are not mentioned by name is due to the fact under the similitude of well-known objects. Hence he that the corporeal nature of these would not be so evident uses a variety of figures in speaking of it, calling it not as that of earth and water, to the ignorant people to whom water only, nor earth only, lest they should think it to be Moses spoke. Plato (Timaeus xxvi), nevertheless, under- in very truth water or earth. At the same time it has so stood air to be signified by the words, “Spirit of God,” far a likeness to earth, in that it is susceptible of form, and since spirit is another name for air, and considered that to water in its adaptability to a variety of forms. In this by the word heaven is meant fire, for he held heaven to respect, then, the earth is said to be “void and empty,” or be composed of fire, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei “invisible and shapeless,” that matter is known by means viii, 11). But Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii), though other- of form. Hence, considered in itself, it is called “invisible” wise agreeing with Plato, says that fire is signified by the or “void,” and its potentiality is completed by form; thus word darkness, since, said he, fire does not shine in its Plato says that matter is “place”∗. But other holy writers own sphere. However, it seems more reasonable to hold understand by earth the element of earth, and we have said to what we stated above; because by the words “Spirit (a. 1) how, in this sense, the earth was, according to them, of God” Scripture usually means the Holy Ghost, Who without form. is said to “move over the waters,” not, indeed, in bodily Reply to Objection 2. Nature produces effect in act shape, but as the craftsman’s will may be said to move from being in potentiality; and consequently in the op- over the material to which he intends to give a form. The erations of nature potentiality must precede act in time, third distinction is that of place; since the earth is said to and formlessness precede form. But God produces being be under the waters that rendered it invisible, whilst the in act out of nothing, and can, therefore, produce a per- air, the subject of darkness, is described as being above fect thing in an instant, according to the greatness of His the waters, in the words: “Darkness was upon the face of power. the deep.” The remaining distinctions will appear from Reply to Objection 3. Accident, inasmuch as it is a what follows (q. 71). † Septuagint ∗ Timaeus, quoted by Aristotle, Phys. iv, text. 15 335 Whether the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same? Ia q. 66 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the formless matter arguing from their unity of form. And, indeed, if cor- of all corporeal things is the same. For Augustine says poreity were one form in itself, on which the other forms (Confess. xii, 12): “I find two things Thou hast made, one that distinguish bodies from each other supervene, this ar- formed, the other formless,” and he says that the latter gument would necessarily be true; for this form of cor- was the earth invisible and shapeless, whereby, he says, poreity would inhere in matter immutably and so far all the matter of all corporeal things is designated. Therefore bodies would be incorruptible. But corruption would then the matter of all corporeal things is the same. be merely accidental through the disappearance of suc- Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. cessive forms—that is to say, it would be corruption, not v, text. 10): “Things that are one in genus are one in mat- pure and simple, but partial, since a being in act would ter.” But all corporeal things are in the same genus of subsist under the transient form. Thus the ancient natu- body. Therefore the matter of all bodies is the same. ral philosophers taught that the substratum of bodies was Objection 3. Further, different acts befit different po- some actual being, such as air or fire. But supposing that tentialities, and the same act befits the same potentiality. no form exists in corruptible bodies which remains sub- But all bodies have the same form, corporeity. Therefore sisting beneath generation and corruption, it follows nec- all bodies have the same matter. essarily that the matter of corruptible and incorruptible Objection 4. Further, matter, considered in itself, is bodies is not the same. For matter, as it is in itself, is only in potentiality. But distinction is due to form. There- in potentiality to form. fore matter considered in itself is the same in all corporeal Considered in itself, then, it is in potentiality in respect things. to all those forms to which it is common, and in receiving On the contrary, Things of which the matter is the any one form it is in act only as regards that form. Hence same are mutually interchangeable and mutually active or it remains in potentiality to all other forms. And this is the passive, as is said (De Gener. i, text. 50). But heavenly case even where some forms are more perfect than others, and earthly bodies do not act upon each other mutually. and contain these others virtually in themselves. For po- Therefore their matter is not the same. tentiality in itself is indifferent with respect to perfection I answer that, On this question the opinions of and imperfection, so that under an imperfect form it is in philosophers have differed. Plato and all who preceded potentiality to a perfect form, and “vice versa.” Matter, Aristotle held that all bodies are of the nature of the four therefore, whilst existing under the form of an incorrupt- elements. Hence because the four elements have one ible body, would be in potentiality to the form of a cor- common matter, as their mutual generation and corrup- ruptible body; and as it does not actually possess the lat- tion prove, it followed that the matter of all bodies is the ter, it has both form and the privation of form; for want of same. But the fact of the incorruptibility of some bodies a form in that which is in potentiality thereto is privation. was ascribed by Plato, not to the condition of matter, but But this condition implies corruptibility. It is therefore to the will of the artificer, God, Whom he represents as impossible that bodies by nature corruptible, and those by saying to the heavenly bodies: “By your own nature you nature incorruptible, should possess the same matter. are subject to dissolution, but by My will you are indis- Neither can we say, as Averroes∗ imagines, that a soluble, for My will is more powerful than the link that heavenly body itself is the matter of the heaven—beings binds you together.” But this theory Aristotle (De Caelo i, in potentiality with regard to place, though not to being, text. 5) disproves by the natural movements of bodies. For and that its form is a separate substance united to it as since, he says, the heavenly bodies have a natural move- its motive force. For it is impossible to suppose any be- ment, different from that of the elements, it follows that ing in act, unless in its totality it be act and form, or be they have a different nature from them. For movement something which has act or form. Setting aside, then, in a circle, which is proper to the heavenly bodies, is not in thought, the separate substance stated to be endowed by contraries, whereas the movements of the elements are with motive power, if the heavenly body is not something mutually opposite, one tending upwards, another down- having form—that is, something composed of a form and wards: so, therefore, the heavenly body is without con- the subject of that form—it follows that in its totality it trariety, whereas the elemental bodies have contrariety in is form and act. But every such thing is something actu- their nature. And as generation and corruption are from ally understood, which the heavenly bodies are not, being contraries, it follows that, whereas the elements are cor- sensible. It follows, then, that the matter of the heavenly ruptible, the heavenly bodies are incorruptible. But in bodies, considered in itself, is in potentiality to that form spite of this difference of natural corruption and incor- alone which it actually possesses. Nor does it concern the ruption, Avicebron taught unity of matter in all bodies, point at issue to inquire whether this is a soul or any other ∗ De Substantia Orbis ii. 336 thing. Hence this form perfects this matter in such a way potentiality, as is said in Metaph. x, text. 26. Logically that there remains in it no potentiality with respect to be- considered, however, there is but one genus of all bodies, ing, but only to place, as Aristotle† says. So, then, the since they are all included in the one notion of corporeity. matter of the heavenly bodies and of the elements is not Reply to Objection 3. The form of corporeity is not the same, except by analogy, in so far as they agree in the one and the same in all bodies, being no other than the character of potentiality. various forms by which bodies are distinguished, as stated Reply to Objection 1. Augustine follows in this the above. opinion of Plato, who does not admit a fifth essence. Or Reply to Objection 4. As potentiality is directed to- we may say that formless matter is one with the unity of wards act, potential beings are differentiated by their dif- order, as all bodies are one in the order of corporeal crea- ferent acts, as sight is by color, hearing by sound. There- tures. fore for this reason the matter of the celestial bodies is Reply to Objection 2. If genus is taken in a physi- different from that of the elemental, because the matter of cal sense, corruptible and incorruptible things are not in the celestial is not in potentiality to an elemental form. the same genus, on account of their different modes of Whether the empyrean heaven was created at the same time as formless matter? Ia q. 66 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the empyrean heaven On the contrary, Strabus says that in the passage, “In was not created at the same time as formless matter. For the beginning God created heaven and earth,” heaven de- the empyrean, if it is anything at all, must be a sen- notes not the visible firmament, but the empyrean or fiery sible body. But all sensible bodies are movable, and heaven. the empyrean heaven is not movable. For if it were so, I answer that, The empyrean heaven rests only on the its movement would be ascertained by the movement of authority of Strabus and Bede, and also of Basil; all of some visible body, which is not the case. The empyrean whom agree in one respect, namely, in holding it to be the heaven, then, was not created contemporaneously with place of the blessed. Strabus and Bede say that as soon as formless matter. created it was filled with angels; and Basil∗ says: “Just as Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, the lost are driven into the lowest darkness, so the reward 4) that “the lower bodies are governed by the higher in a for worthy deeds is laid up in the light beyond this world, certain order.” If, therefore, the empyrean heaven is the where the just shall obtain the abode of rest.” But they highest of bodies, it must necessarily exercise some in- differ in the reasons on which they base their statement. fluence on bodies below it. But this does not seem to be Strabus and Bede teach that there is an empyrean heaven, the case, especially as it is presumed to be without move- because the firmament, which they take to mean the side- ment; for one body cannot move another unless itself also real heaven, is said to have been made, not in the begin- be moved. Therefore the empyrean heaven was not cre- ning, but on the second day: whereas the reason given ated together with formless matter. by Basil is that otherwise God would seem to have made Objection 3. Further, if it is held that the empyrean darkness His first work, as the Manicheans falsely assert, heaven is the place of contemplation, and not ordained to when they call the God of the Old Testament the God of natural effects; on the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. darkness. These reasons, however, are not very cogent. iv, 20): “In so far as we mentally apprehend eternal things, For the question of the firmament, said to have been made so far are we not of this world”; from which it is clear on the second day, is solved in one way by Augustine, and that contemplation lifts the mind above the things of this in another by other holy writers. But the question of the world. Corporeal place, therefore, cannot be the seat of darkness is explained according to Augustine†, by sup- contemplation. posing that formlessness, signified by darkness, preceded Objection 4. Further, among the heavenly bodies ex- form not by duration, but by origin. According to oth- ists a body, partly transparent and partly luminous, which ers, however, since darkness is no creature, but a privation we call the sidereal heaven. There exists also a heaven of light, it is a proof of Divine wisdom, that the things it wholly transparent, called by some the aqueous or crys- created from nothing it produced first of all in an imper- talline heaven. If, then, there exists a still higher heaven, fect state, and afterwards brought them to perfection. But it must be wholly luminous. But this cannot be, for then a better reason can be drawn from the state of glory it- the air would be constantly illuminated, and there would self. For in the reward to come a two-fold glory is looked be no night. Therefore the empyrean heaven was not cre- for, spiritual and corporeal, not only in the human body to ated together with formless matter. be glorified, but in the whole world which is to be made † De Coelo i, text. 20 ∗ Hom. ii. in Hexaem. † Gen. ad lit. i; vii. 337 new. Now the spiritual glory began with the beginning of bodies of another order—those, namely, that are directed the world, in the blessedness of the angels, equality with only to natural ends. Yet it seems still more probable that whom is promised to the saints. It was fitting, then, that it does influence bodies that are moved, though itself mo- even from the beginning, there should be made some be- tionless, just as angels of the highest rank, who assist∗, ginning of bodily glory in something corporeal, free at the influence those of lower degree who act as messengers, very outset from the servitude of corruption and change, though they themselves are not sent, as Dionysius teaches and wholly luminous, even as the whole bodily creation, (Coel. Hier. xii). For this reason it may be said that the in- after the Resurrection, is expected to be. So, then, that fluence of the empyrean upon that which is called the first heaven is called the empyrean, i.e. fiery, not from its heat, heaven, and is moved, produces therein not something that but from its brightness. It is to be noticed, however, that comes and goes as a result of movement, but something of Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 9,27) says that Porphyry sets a fixed and stable nature, as the power of conservation or the demons apart from the angels by supposing that the causation, or something of the kind pertaining to dignity. former inhabit the air, the latter the ether, or empyrean. Reply to Objection 3. Corporeal place is assigned to But Porphyry, as a Platonist, held the heaven, known as contemplation, not as necessary, but as congruous, that the sidereal, to be fiery, and therefore called it empyrean or splendor without may correspond to that which is within. ethereal, taking ethereal to denote the burning of flame, Hence Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) says: “The minister- and not as Aristotle understands it, swiftness of movement ing spirit could not live in darkness, but made his habitual (De Coel. i, text. 22). This much has been said to pre- dwelling in light and joy.” vent anyone from supposing that Augustine maintained Reply to Objection 4. As Basil says (Hom. ii in Hex- an empyrean heaven in the sense understood by modern aem.): “It is certain that the heaven was created spherical writers. in shape, of dense body, and sufficiently strong to separate Reply to Objection 1. Sensible corporeal things are what is outside it from what it encloses. On this account it movable in the present state of the world, for by the move- darkens the region external to it, the light by which itself ment of corporeal creatures is secured by the multiplica- is lit up being shut out from that region. “But since the tion of the elements. But when glory is finally consum- body of the firmament, though solid, is transparent, for mated, the movement of bodies will cease. And such that it does not exclude light (as is clear from the fact that must have been from the beginning the condition of the we can see the stars through the intervening heavens), we empyrean. may also say that the empyrean has light, not condensed Reply to Objection 2. It is sufficiently probable, as so as to emit rays, as the sun does, but of a more subtle na- some assert, that the empyrean heaven, having the state ture. Or it may have the brightness of glory which differs of glory for its ordained end, does not influence inferior from mere natural brightness. Whether time was created simultaneously with formless matter? Ia q. 66 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that time was not cre- of created things, so is place. Place, then, as truly as time, ated simultaneously with formless matter. For Augustine must be reckoned among the things first created. says (Confess. xii, 12): “I find two things that Thou didst On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 3): create before time was, the primary corporeal matter, and “Both spiritual and corporeal creatures were created at the the angelic nature. “Therefore time was not created with beginning of time.” formless matter. I answer that, It is commonly said that the first things Objection 2. Further, time is divided by day and created were these four—the angelic nature, the empyrean night. But in the beginning there was neither day nor heaven, formless corporeal matter, and time. It must be night, for these began when “God divided the light from observed, however, that this is not the opinion of Augus- the darkness. “Therefore in the beginning time was not. tine. For he (Confess. xii, 12) specifies only two things as Objection 3. Further, time is the measure of the fir- first created—the angelic nature and corporeal matter— mament’s movement; and the firmament is said to have making no mention of the empyrean heaven. But these been made on the second day. Therefore in the beginning two, namely, the angelic nature and formless matter, pre- time was not. cede the formation, by nature only, and not by duration; Objection 4. Further, movement precedes time, and and therefore, as they precede formation, so do they pre- therefore should be reckoned among the first things cre- cede movement and time. Time, therefore, cannot be in- ated, rather than time. cluded among them. But the enumeration above given is Objection 5. Further, as time is the extrinsic measure that of other holy writers, who hold that the formlessness ∗ Infra, q. 112, a. 3 338 of matter preceded by duration its form, and this view pos-measured by the first of its kind. And it must be granted tulates the existence of time as the measure of duration: that forthwith from the beginning, there was movement for otherwise there would be no such measure. of some kind, at least in the succession of concepts and Reply to Objection 1. The teaching of Augustine affections in the angelic mind: while movement without rests on the opinion that the angelic nature and formless time cannot be conceived, since time is nothing else than matter precede time by origin or nature. “the measure of priority and succession in movement.” Reply to Objection 2. As in the opinion of some holy Reply to Objection 4. Among the first created things writers matter was in some measure formless before it re- are to be reckoned those which have a general relation- ceived its full form, so time was in a manner formless ship to things. And, therefore, among these time must be before it was fully formed and distinguished into day and included, as having the nature of a common measure; but night. not movement, which is related only to the movable sub- Reply to Objection 3. If the movement of the firma- ject. ment did not begin immediately from the beginning, then Reply to Objection 5. Place is implied as existing in the time that preceded was the measure, not of the firma- the empyrean heaven, this being the boundary of the uni- ment’s movement, but of the first movement of whatso- verse. And since place has reference to things permanent, ever kind. For it is accidental to time to be the measure it was created at once in its totality. But time, as not being of the firmament’s movement, in so far as this is the first permanent, was created in its beginning: even as actually movement. But if the first movement was another than we cannot lay hold of any part of time save the “now.” this, time would have been its measure, for everything is 339 FIRST PART, QUESTION 67 On the Work of Distinction in Itself (In Four Articles) We must consider next the work of distinction in itself. First, the work of the first day; secondly, the work of the second day; thirdly the work of the third day. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the word light is used in its proper sense in speaking of spiritual things? (2) Whether light, in corporeal things, is itself corporeal? (3) Whether light is a quality? (4) Whether light was fittingly made on the first day? Whether the word “light” is used in its proper sense in speaking of spiritual things? Ia q. 67 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that “light” is used in its more extended meaning. This is clearly shown in the word proper sense in spiritual things. For Augustine says (Gen. “sight,” originally applied to the act of the sense, and then, ad lit. iv, 28) that “in spiritual things light is better and as sight is the noblest and most trustworthy of the senses, surer: and that Christ is not called Light in the same sense extended in common speech to all knowledge obtained as He is called the Stone; the former is to be taken literally, through the other senses. Thus we say, “Seeing how it and the latter metaphorically.” tastes,” or “smells,” or “burns. “Further, sight is applied Objection 2. Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) in- to knowledge obtained through the intellect, as in those cludes Light among the intellectual names of God. But words: “Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see such names are used in their proper sense in spiritual God” (Mat. 5:8). And thus it is with the word light. In its things. Therefore light is used in its proper sense in spiri- primary meaning it signifies that which makes manifest tual matters. to the sense of sight; afterwards it was extended to that Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:13): which makes manifest to cognition of any kind. If, then, “All that is made manifest is light.” But to be made mani- the word is taken in its strict and primary meaning, it is fest belongs more properly to spiritual things than to cor- to be understood metaphorically when applied to spiritual poreal. Therefore also does light. things, as Ambrose says (De Fide ii). But if taken in its On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii) that common and extended use, as applied to manifestation of “Splendor” is among those things which are said of God every kind, it may properly be applied to spiritual things. metaphorically. The answer to the objections will sufficiently appear I answer that, Any word may be used in two ways— from what has been said. that is to say, either in its original application or in its Whether light is a body? Ia q. 67 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that light is a body. For air. Therefore light is not a body. Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 5) that “light takes the I answer that, Light cannot be a body, for three evi- first place among bodies.“Therefore light is a body. dent reasons. First, on the part of place. For the place of Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. v, any one body is different from that of any other, nor is it 2) that “light is a species of fire.” But fire is a body, and possible, naturally speaking, for any two bodies of what- therefore so is light. ever nature, to exist simultaneously in the same place; Objection 3. Further, the powers of movement, in- since contiguity requires distinction of place. tersection, reflection, belong properly to bodies; and all The second reason is from movement. For if light these are attributes of light and its rays. Moreover, dif- were a body, its diffusion would be the local movement ferent rays of light, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) are of a body. Now no local movement of a body can be in- united and separated, which seems impossible unless they stantaneous, as everything that moves from one place to are bodies. Therefore light is a body. another must pass through the intervening space before On the contrary, Two bodies cannot occupy the same reaching the end: whereas the diffusion of light is instan- place simultaneously. But this is the case with light and taneous. Nor can it be argued that the time required is too 340 short to be perceived; for though this may be the case in densed round the candle when this is done, since it burns short distances, it cannot be so in distances so great as that no more brightly then than it burned before. which separates the East from the West. Yet as soon as the Since, therefore, these things are repugnant, not only sun is at the horizon, the whole hemisphere is illuminated to reason, but to common sense, we must conclude that from end to end. It must also be borne in mind on the part light cannot be a body. of movement that whereas all bodies have their natural de- Reply to Objection 1. Augustine takes light to be a terminate movement, that of light is indifferent as regards luminous body in act—in other words, to be fire, the no- direction, working equally in a circle as in a straight line. blest of the four elements. Hence it appears that the diffusion of light is not the local Reply to Objection 2. Aristotle pronounces light to movement of a body. be fire existing in its own proper matter: just as fire in The third reason is from generation and corruption. aerial matter is “flame,” or in earthly matter is “burning For if light were a body, it would follow that whenever the coal.” Nor must too much attention be paid to the in- air is darkened by the absence of the luminary, the body of stances adduced by Aristotle in his works on logic, as he light would be corrupted, and its matter would receive a merely mentions them as the more or less probable opin- new form. But unless we are to say that darkness is a body, ions of various writers. this does not appear to be the case. Neither does it ap- Reply to Objection 3. All these properties are as- pear from what matter a body can be daily generated large signed to light metaphorically, and might in the same way enough to fill the intervening hemisphere. Also it would be attributed to heat. For because movement from place be absurd to say that a body of so great a bulk is corrupted to place is naturally first in the order of movement as is by the mere absence of the luminary. And should anyone proved Phys. viii, text. 55, we use terms belonging to lo- reply that it is not corrupted, but approaches and moves cal movement in speaking of alteration and movement of around with the sun, we may ask why it is that when a all kinds. For even the word distance is derived from the lighted candle is obscured by the intervening object the idea of remoteness of place, to that of all contraries, as is whole room is darkened? It is not that the light is con- said Metaph. x, text. 13. Whether light is a quality? Ia q. 67 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that light is not a quality. ondly, because light produces natural effects, for by the For every quality remains in its subject, though the active rays of the sun bodies are warmed, and natural changes cause of the quality be removed, as heat remains in water cannot be brought about by mere intentions. Others have removed from the fire. But light does not remain in the air said that light is the sun’s substantial form, but this also when the source of light is withdrawn. Therefore light is seems impossible for two reasons. First, because substan- not a quality. tial forms are not of themselves objects of the senses; for Objection 2. Further, every sensible quality has its the object of the intellect is what a thing is, as is said De opposite, as cold is opposed to heat, blackness to white- Anima iii, text. 26: whereas light is visible of itself. In the ness. But this is not the case with light since darkness is second place, because it is impossible that what is the sub- merely a privation of light. Light therefore is not a sensi- stantial form of one thing should be the accidental form of ble quality. another; since substantial forms of their very nature con- Objection 3. Further, a cause is more potent than its stitute species: wherefore the substantial form always and effect. But the light of the heavenly bodies is a cause of everywhere accompanies the species. But light is not the substantial forms of earthly bodies, and also gives to col- substantial form of air, for if it were, the air would be de- ors their immaterial being, by making them actually vis- stroyed when light is withdrawn. Hence it cannot be the ible. Light, then, is not a sensible quality, but rather a substantial form of the sun. substantial or spiritual form. We must say, then, that as heat is an active quality con- On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. i) says sequent on the substantial form of fire, so light is an active that light is a species of quality. quality consequent on the substantial form of the sun, or I answer that, Some writers have said that the light of another body that is of itself luminous, if there is any in the air has not a natural being such as the color on a such body. A proof of this is that the rays of different stars wall has, but only an intentional being, as a similitude of produce different effects according to the diverse natures color in the air. But this cannot be the case for two rea- of bodies. sons. First, because light gives a name to the air, since by Reply to Objection 1. Since quality is consequent it the air becomes actually luminous. But color does not upon substantial form, the mode in which the subject re- do this, for we do not speak of the air as colored. Sec- ceives a quality differs as the mode differs in which a 341 subject receives a substantial form. For when matter re-disappearance of its active cause. ceives its form perfectly, the qualities consequent upon the Reply to Objection 2. It is accidental to light not form are firm and enduring; as when, for instance, water to have a contrary, forasmuch as it is the natural quality is converted into fire. When, however, substantial form of the first corporeal cause of change, which is itself re- is received imperfectly, so as to be, as it were, in process moved from contrariety. of being received, rather than fully impressed, the con- Reply to Objection 3. As heat acts towards perfect- sequent quality lasts for a time but is not permanent; as ing the form of fire, as an instrumental cause, by virtue of may be seen when water which has been heated returns in the substantial form, so does light act instrumentally, by time to its natural state. But light is not produced by the virtue of the heavenly bodies, towards producing substan- transmutation of matter, as though matter were in receipt tial forms; and towards rendering colors actually visible, of a substantial form, and light were a certain inception of inasmuch as it is a quality of the first sensible body. substantial form. For this reason light disappears on the Whether the production of light is fittingly assigned to the first day? Ia q. 67 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the production of ing, therefore, of this spiritual nature is signified by the light is not fittingly assigned to the first day. For light, production of light, that is to say, of spiritual light. For as stated above (a. 3), is a quality. But qualities are acci- a spiritual nature receives its form by the enlightenment dents, and as such should have, not the first, but a subor- whereby it is led to adhere to the Word of God. dinate place. The production of light, then, ought not to Other writers think that the production of spiritual be assigned to the first day. creatures was purposely omitted by Moses, and give var- Objection 2. Further, it is light that distinguishes ious reasons. Basil∗ says that Moses begins his narra- night from day, and this is effected by the sun, which is tive from the beginning of time which belongs to sensible recorded as having been made on the fourth day. There- things; but that the spiritual or angelic creation is passed fore the production of light could not have been on the over, as created beforehand. first day. Chrysostom† gives as a reason for the omission that Objection 3. Further, night and day are brought about Moses was addressing an ignorant people, to whom mate- by the circular movement of a luminous body. But move- rial things alone appealed, and whom he was endeavoring ment of this kind is an attribute of the firmament, and to withdraw from the service of idols. It would have been we read that the firmament was made on the second day. to them a pretext for idolatry if he had spoken to them of Therefore the production of light, dividing night from day, natures spiritual in substance and nobler than all corporeal ought not to be assigned to the first day. creatures; for they would have paid them Divine worship, Objection 4. Further, if it be said that spiritual light is since they were prone to worship as gods even the sun, here spoken of, it may be replied that the light made on the moon, and stars, which was forbidden them (Dt. 4). first day dispels the darkness. But in the beginning spir- But mention is made of several kinds of formlessness, itual darkness was not, for even the demons were in the in regard to the corporeal creature. One is where we read beginning good, as has been shown (q. 63, a. 5). There- that “the earth was void and empty,” and another where fore the production of light ought not to be assigned to the it is said that “darkness was upon the face of the deep.” first day. Now it seems to be required, for two reasons, that the On the contrary, That without which there could not formlessness of darkness should be removed first of all be day, must have been made on the first day. But there by the production of light. In the first place because light can be no day without light. Therefore light must have is a quality of the first body, as was stated (a. 3), and thus been made on the first day. by means of light it was fitting that the world should first I answer that, There are two opinions as to the pro- receive its form. The second reason is because light is a duction of light. Augustine seems to say (De Civ. Dei xi, common quality. For light is common to terrestrial and 9,33) that Moses could not have fittingly passed over the celestial bodies. But as in knowledge we proceed from production of the spiritual creature, and therefore when general principles, so do we in work of every kind. For we read, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” the living thing is generated before the animal, and the a spiritual nature as yet formless is to be understood by the animal before the man, as is shown in De Gener. Anim. word “heaven,” and formless matter of the corporeal crea- ii, 3. It was fitting, then, as an evidence of the Divine wis- ture by the word “earth.” And spiritual nature was formed dom, that among the works of distinction the production first, as being of higher dignity than corporeal. The form- of light should take first place, since light is a form of the ∗ Hom. i in Hexaem. † Hom. ii in Genes. 342 primary body, and because it is more common quality. signified by the words, “He called the light day, and the Basil‡, indeed, adds a third reason: that all other things darkness night.” are made manifest by light. And there is yet a fourth, al- Reply to Objection 3. Basil says (Hom. ii in Hex- ready touched upon in the objections; that day cannot be aem.) that day and night were then caused by expansion unless light exists, which was made therefore on the first and contraction of light, rather than by movement. But day. Augustine objects to this (Gen. ad lit. i), that there was Reply to Objection 1. According to the opinion of no reason for this vicissitude of expansion and contraction those who hold that the formlessness of matter preceded since there were neither men nor animals on the earth at its form in duration, matter must be held to have been cre- that time, for whose service this was required. Nor does ated at the beginning with substantial forms, afterwards the nature of a luminous body seem to admit of the with- receiving those that are accidental, among which light drawal of light, so long as the body is actually present; holds the first place. though this might be effected by a miracle. As to this, Reply to Objection 2. In the opinion of some the light however, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. i) that in the here spoken of was a kind of luminous nebula, and that on first founding of the order of nature we must not look for the making of the sun this returned to the matter of which miracles, but for what is in accordance with nature. We it had been formed. But this cannot well be maintained, hold, then, that the movement of the heavens is twofold. as in the beginning of Genesis Holy Scripture records the Of these movements, one is common to the entire heaven, institution of that order of nature which henceforth is to and is the cause of day and night. This, as it seems, had endure. We cannot, then, say that what was made at that its beginning on the first day. The other varies in propor- time afterwards ceased to exist. tion as it affects various bodies, and by its variations is Others, therefore, held that this luminous nebula con- the cause of the succession of days, months, and years. tinues in existence, but so closely attached to the sun as Thus it is, that in the account of the first day the distinc- to be indistinguishable. But this is as much as to say that tion between day and night alone is mentioned; this dis- it is superfluous, whereas none of God’s works have been tinction being brought about by the common movement of made in vain. On this account it is held by some that the the heavens. The further distinction into successive days, sun’s body was made out of this nebula. This, too, is im- seasons, and years recorded as begun on the fourth day, possible to those at least who believe that the sun is dif- in the words, “let them be for seasons, and for days, and ferent in its nature from the four elements, and naturally years” is due to proper movements. incorruptible. For in that case its matter cannot take on Reply to Objection 4. As Augustine teaches (Con- another form. fess. xii; Gen. ad lit. 1,15), formlessness did not precede I answer, then, with Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), that forms in duration; and so we must understand the produc- the light was the sun’s light, formless as yet, being already tion of light to signify the formation of spiritual creatures, the solar substance, and possessing illuminative power in not, indeed, with the perfection of glory, in which they a general way, to which was afterwards added the special were not created, but with the perfection of grace, which and determinative power required to produce determinate they possessed from their creation as said above (q. 62, effects. Thus, then, in the production of this light a triple a. 3). Thus the division of light from darkness will de- distinction was made between light and darkness. First, note the distinction of the spiritual creature from other cre- as to the cause, forasmuch as in the substance of the sun ated things as yet without form. But if all created things we have the cause of light, and in the opaque nature of received their form at the same time, the darkness must the earth the cause of darkness. Secondly, as to place, for be held to mean the spiritual darkness of the wicked, not in one hemisphere there was light, in the other darkness. as existing from the beginning but such as God foresaw Thirdly, as to time; because there was light for one and would exist. darkness for another in the same hemisphere; and this is ‡ Hom. ii in Hexaem. 343 FIRST PART, QUESTION 68 On the Work of the Second Day (In Four Articles) We must next consider the work of the second day. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the firmament was made on the second day? (2) Whether there are waters above the firmament? (3) Whether the firmament divides waters from waters? (4) Whether there is more than one heaven? Whether the firmament was made on the second day? Ia q. 68 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the firmament was tion, because its parts are, so to say, not in disunion, but in not made on the second day. For it is said (Gn. 1:8): “God harmony. Others held the firmament to be of the nature of called the firmament heaven.” But the heaven existed be- the four elements, not, indeed, compounded of them, but fore days, as is clear from the words, “In the beginning being as it were a simple element. Such was the opinion God created heaven and earth.” Therefore the firmament of Plato, who held that element to be fire. Others, again, was not made on the second day. have held that the heaven is not of the nature of the four Objection 2. Further, the work of the six days is or- elements, but is itself a fifth body, existing over and above dered conformably to the order of Divine wisdom. Now it these. This is the opinion of Aristotle (De Coel. i, text. would ill become the Divine wisdom to make afterwards 6,32). that which is naturally first. But though the firmament According to the first opinion, it may, strictly speak- naturally precedes the earth and the waters, these are men- ing, be granted that the firmament was made, even as to tioned before the formation of light, which was on the first substance, on the second day. For it is part of the work of day. Therefore the firmament was not made on the second creation to produce the substance of the elements, while it day. belongs to the work of distinction and adornment to give Objection 3. Further, all that was made in the six forms to the elements that pre-exist. days was formed out of matter created before days began. But the belief that the firmament was made, as to its But the firmament cannot have been formed out of pre- substance, on the second day is incompatible with the existing matter, for if so it would be liable to generation opinion of Plato, according to whom the making of the and corruption. Therefore the firmament was not made on firmament implies the production of the element of fire. the second day. This production, however, belongs to the work of creation, On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:6): “God said: at least, according to those who hold that formlessness of let there be a firmament,” and further on (verse 8); “And matter preceded in time its formation, since the first form the evening and morning were the second day.” received by matter is the elemental. I answer that, In discussing questions of this kind two Still less compatible with the belief that the substance rules are to observed, as Augustine teaches (Gen. ad lit. of the firmament was produced on the second day is the i, 18). The first is, to hold the truth of Scripture without opinion of Aristotle, seeing that the mention of days de- wavering. The second is that since Holy Scripture can be notes succession of time, whereas the firmament, being explained in a multiplicity of senses, one should adhere naturally incorruptible, is of a matter not susceptible of to a particular explanation, only in such measure as to be change of form; wherefore it could not be made out of ready to abandon it, if it be proved with certainty to be matter existing antecedently in time. false; lest Holy Scripture be exposed to the ridicule of un- Hence to produce the substance of the firmament be- believers, and obstacles be placed to their believing. longs to the work of creation. But its formation, in some We say, therefore, that the words which speak of the degree, belongs to the second day, according to both opin- firmament as made on the second day can be understood ions: for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), the light of in two senses. They may be understood, first, of the starry the sun was without form during the first three days, and firmament, on which point it is necessary to set forth the afterwards, on the fourth day, received its form. different opinions of philosophers. Some of these be- If, however, we take these days to denote merely se- lieved it to be composed of the elements; and this was the quence in the natural order, as Augustine holds (Gen. ad opinion of Empedocles, who, however, held further that lit. iv, 22,24), and not succession in time, there is then the body of the firmament was not susceptible of dissolu- nothing to prevent our saying, whilst holding any one of 344 the opinions given above, that the substantial formation of the beginning is not the same as that made on the second the firmament belongs to the second day. day; and there are several senses in which this may be un- Another possible explanation is to understand by the derstood. Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 9) that the heaven firmament that was made on the second day, not that in recorded as made on the first day is the formless spiritual which the stars are set, but the part of the atmosphere nature, and that the heaven of the second day is the corpo- where the clouds are collected, and which has received real heaven. According to Bede (Hexaem. i) and Strabus, the name firmament from the firmness and density of the the heaven made on the first day is the empyrean, and the air. “For a body is called firm,” that is dense and solid, firmament made on the second day, the starry heaven. Ac- “thereby differing from a mathematical body” as is re- cording to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii) that of the first marked by Basil (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). If, then, this ex- day was spherical in form and without stars, the same, in planation is adopted none of these opinions will be found fact, that the philosophers speak of, calling it the ninth repugnant to reason. Augustine, in fact (Gen. ad lit. ii, 4), sphere, and the primary movable body that moves with recommends it thus: “I consider this view of the question diurnal movement: while by the firmament made on the worthy of all commendation, as neither contrary to faith second day he understands the starry heaven. According nor difficult to be proved and believed.” to another theory, touched upon by Augustine∗ the heaven Reply to Objection 1. According to Chrysostom made on the first day was the starry heaven, and the fir- (Hom. iii in Genes.), Moses prefaces his record by speak- mament made on the second day was that region of the ing of the works of God collectively, in the words, “In air where the clouds are collected, which is also called the beginning God created heaven and earth,” and then heaven, but equivocally. And to show that the word is proceeds to explain them part by part; in somewhat the here used in an equivocal sense, it is expressly said that same way as one might say: “This house was constructed “God called the firmament heaven”; just as in a preced- by that builder,” and then add: “First, he laid the founda- ing verse it said that “God called the light day” (since the tions, then built the walls, and thirdly, put on the roof.” In word “day” is also used to denote a space of twenty-four accepting this explanation we are, therefore, not bound to hours). Other instances of a similar use occur, as pointed hold that a different heaven is spoken of in the words: “In out by Rabbi Moses. the beginning God created heaven and earth,” and when The second and third objections are sufficiently an- we read that the firmament was made on the second day. swered by what has been already said. We may also say that the heaven recorded as created in Whether there are waters above the firmament? Ia q. 68 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that there are not wa- ters are, and whatever their mode of existence, we cannot ters above the firmament. For water is heavy by nature, for a moment doubt that they are there.” As to the nature and heavy things tend naturally downwards, not upwards. of these waters, all are not agreed. Origen says (Hom. i Therefore there are not waters above the firmament. in Gen.) that the waters that are above the firmament are Objection 2. Further, water is fluid by nature, and flu- “spiritual substances.” Wherefore it is written (Ps. 148:4): ids cannot rest on a sphere, as experience shows. There- “Let the waters that are above the heavens praise the name fore, since the firmament is a sphere, there cannot be water of the Lord,” and (Dan. 3:60): “Ye waters that are above above it. the heavens, bless the Lord.“To this Basil answers (Hom. Objection 3. Further, water is an element, and ap- iii in Hexaem.) that these words do not mean that these pointed to the generation of composite bodies, according waters are rational creatures, but that “the thoughtful con- to the relation in which imperfect things stand towards templation of them by those who understand fulfils the perfect. But bodies of composite nature have their place glory of the Creator.” Hence in the same context, fire, upon the earth, and not above the firmament, so that water hail, and other like creatures, are invoked in the same way, would be useless there. But none of God’s works are use- though no one would attribute reason to these. less. Therefore there are not waters above the firmament. We must hold, then, these waters to be material, but On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:7): ”(God) their exact nature will be differently defined according divided the waters that were under the firmament, from as opinions on the firmament differ. For if by the firma- those that were above the firmament.” ment we understand the starry heaven, and as being of the I answer with Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 5) that, nature of the four elements, for the same reason it may “These words of Scripture have more authority than the be believed that the waters above the heaven are of the most exalted human intellect. Hence, whatever these wa- same nature as the elemental waters. But if by the firma- ∗ Gen. ad lit. ii, 1 345 ment we understand the starry heaven, not, however, as Him to work on them by way of miracle.” We leave this being of the nature of the four elements then the waters view, then, and answer that according to the last two opin- above the firmament will not be of the same nature as the ions on the firmament and the waters the solution appears elemental waters, but just as, according to Strabus, one from what has been said. According to the first opinion, heaven is called empyrean, that is, fiery, solely on account an order of the elements must be supposed different from of its splendor: so this other heaven will be called aque- that given by Aristotle, that is to say, that the waters sur- ous solely on account of its transparence; and this heaven rounding the earth are of a dense consistency, and those is above the starry heaven. Again, if the firmament is held around the firmament of a rarer consistency, in proportion to be of other nature than the elements, it may still be said to the respective density of the earth and of the heaven. to divide the waters, if we understand by water not the el- Or by the water, as stated, we may understand the mat- ement but formless matter. Augustine, in fact, says (Super ter of bodies to be signified. Gen. cont. Manich. i, 5,7) that whatever divides bodies Reply to Objection 2. The solution is clear from what from bodies can be said to divide waters from waters. has been said, according to the last two opinions. But ac- If, however, we understand by the firmament that part cording to the first opinion, Basil gives two replies (Hom. of the air in which the clouds are collected, then the waters iii in Hexaem.). He answers first, that a body seen as con- above the firmament must rather be the vapors resolved cave beneath need not necessarily be rounded, or convex, from the waters which are raised above a part of the at- above. Secondly, that the waters above the firmament are mosphere, and from which the rain falls. But to say, as not fluid, but exist outside it in a solid state, as a mass of some writers alluded to by Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 4), ice, and that this is the crystalline heaven of some writers. that waters resolved into vapor may be lifted above the Reply to Objection 3. According to the third opinion starry heaven, is a mere absurdity. The solid nature of given, the waters above the firmament have been raised the firmament, the intervening region of fire, wherein all in the form of vapors, and serve to give rain to the earth. vapor must be consumed, the tendency in light and rar- But according to the second opinion, they are above the efied bodies to drift to one spot beneath the vault of the heaven that is wholly transparent and starless. This, ac- moon, as well as the fact that vapors are perceived not to cording to some, is the primary mobile, the cause of the rise even to the tops of the higher mountains, all to go to daily revolution of the entire heaven, whereby the contin- show the impossibility of this. Nor is it less absurd to say, uance of generation is secured. In the same way the starry in support of this opinion, that bodies may be rarefied in- heaven, by the zodiacal movement, is the cause whereby finitely, since natural bodies cannot be infinitely rarefied different bodies are generated or corrupted, through the or divided, but up to a certain point only. rising and setting of the stars, and their various influences. Reply to Objection 1. Some have attempted to solve But according to the first opinion these waters are set there this difficulty by supposing that in spite of the natural to temper the heat of the celestial bodies, as Basil sup- gravity of water, it is kept in its place above the firma- poses (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). And Augustine says (Gen. ment by the Divine power. Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, ad lit. ii, 5) that some have considered this to be proved 1), however will not admit this solution, but says “It is by the extreme cold of Saturn owing to its nearness to the our business here to inquire how God has constituted the waters that are above the firmament. natures of His creatures, not how far it may have pleased Whether the firmament divides waters from waters? Ia q. 68 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the firmament does tinguishes waters from waters must be something which not divide waters from waters. For bodies that are of one is in contact with them on either side, as a wall standing and the same species have naturally one and the same in the midst of a river. But it is evident that the waters place. But the Philosopher says (Topic. i, 6): “All water below do not reach up to the firmament. Therefore the is the same species.” Water therefore cannot be distinct firmament does not divide the waters from the waters. from water by place. On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:6): “Let there be Objection 2. Further, should it be said that the waters a firmament made amidst the waters; and let it divide the above the firmament differ in species from those under the waters from the waters.” firmament, it may be argued, on the contrary, that things I answer that, The text of Genesis, considered super- distinct in species need nothing else to distinguish them. ficially, might lead to the adoption of a theory similar to If then, these waters differ in species, it is not the firma- that held by certain philosophers of antiquity, who taught ment that distinguishes them. that water was a body infinite in dimension, and the pri- Objection 3. Further, it would appear that what dis- mary element of all bodies. Thus in the words, “Darkness 346 was upon the face of the deep,” the word “deep” might and darkness, which, in fact, is the air. be taken to mean the infinite mass of water, understood as Whether, then, we understand by the firmament the the principle of all other bodies. These philosophers also starry heaven, or the cloudy region of the air, it is true to taught that not all corporeal things are confined beneath say that it divides the waters from the waters, according the heaven perceived by our senses, but that a body of wa- as we take water to denote formless matter, or any kind of ter, infinite in extent, exists above that heaven. On this transparent body, as fittingly designated under the name of view the firmament of heaven might be said to divide the waters. For the starry heaven divides the lower transparent waters without from those within—that is to say, from all bodies from the higher, and the cloudy region divides that bodies under the heaven, since they took water to be the higher part of the air, where the rain and similar things are principle of them all. generated, from the lower part, which is connected with As, however, this theory can be shown to be false by the water and included under that name. solid reasons, it cannot be held to be the sense of Holy Reply to Objection 1. If by the firmament is under- Scripture. It should rather be considered that Moses was stood the starry heaven, the waters above are not of the speaking to ignorant people, and that out of condescen- same species as those beneath. But if by the firmament is sion to their weakness he put before them only such things understood the cloudy region of the air, both these waters as are apparent to sense. Now even the most uneducated are of the same species, and two places are assigned to can perceive by their senses that earth and water are cor- them, though not for the same purpose, the higher being poreal, whereas it is not evident to all that air also is corpothe place of their begetting, the lower, the place of their real, for there have even been philosophers who said that repose. air is nothing, and called a space filled with air a vacuum. Reply to Objection 2. If the waters are held to dif- Moses, then, while he expressly mentions water and fer in species, the firmament cannot be said to divide the earth, makes no express mention of air by name, to avoid waters, as the cause of their destruction, but only as the setting before ignorant persons something beyond their boundary of each. knowledge. In order, however, to express the truth to Reply to Objection 3. On account of the air and other those capable of understanding it, he implies in the words: similar bodies being invisible, Moses includes all such “Darkness was upon the face of the deep,” the existence bodies under the name of water, and thus it is evident that of air as attendant, so to say, upon the water. For it may be waters are found on each side of the firmament, whatever understood from these words that over the face of the wa- be the sense in which the word is used. ter a transparent body was extended, the subject of light Whether there is only one heaven? Ia q. 68 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that there is only one I answer that, On this point there seems to be a diver- heaven. For the heaven is contrasted with the earth, in sity of opinion between Basil and Chrysostom. The lat- the words, “In the beginning God created heaven and ter says that there is only one heaven (Hom. iv in Gen.), earth.“But there is only one earth. Therefore there is only and that the words ‘heavens of heavens’ are merely the one heaven. translation of the Hebrew idiom according to which the Objection 2. Further, that which consists of the en- word is always used in the plural, just as in Latin there tire sum of its own matter, must be one; and such is the are many nouns that are wanting in the singular. On the heaven, as the Philosopher proves (De Coel. i, text. 95). other hand, Basil (Hom. iii in Hexaem.), whom Dama- Therefore there is but one heaven. scene follows (De Fide Orth. ii), says that there are many Objection 3. Further, whatever is predicated of many heavens. The difference, however, is more nominal than things univocally is predicated of them according to some real. For Chrysostom means by the one heaven the whole common notion. But if there are more heavens than one, body that is above the earth and the water, for which rea- they are so called univocally, for if equivocally only, they son the birds that fly in the air are called birds of heaven∗. could not properly be called many. If, then, they are But since in this body there are many distinct parts, Basil many, there must be some common notion by reason of said that there are more heavens than one. which each is called heaven, but this common notion can- In order, then, to understand the distinction of heav- not be assigned. Therefore there cannot be more than one ens, it must be borne in mind that Scripture speaks of heaven. heaven in a threefold sense. Sometimes it uses the word in On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 148:4): “Praise Him, its proper and natural meaning, when it denotes that body ye heavens of heavens.” on high which is luminous actually or potentially, and in- ∗ Ps. 8:9 347 corruptible by nature. In this body there are three heavens; Thirdly, there are metaphorical uses of the word the first is the empyrean, which is wholly luminous; the heaven, as when this name is applied to the Blessed Trin- second is the aqueous or crystalline, wholly transparent; ity, Who is the Light and the Most High Spirit. It is ex- and the third is called the starry heaven, in part transpar- plained by some, as thus applied, in the words, “I will as- ent, and in part actually luminous, and divided into eight cend into heaven”; whereby the evil spirit is represented spheres. One of these is the sphere of the fixed stars; the as seeking to make himself equal with God. Sometimes other seven, which may be called the seven heavens, are also spiritual blessings, the recompense of the Saints, the spheres of the planets. from being the highest of all good gifts, are signified by In the second place, the name heaven is applied to the word heaven, and, in fact, are so signified, according a body that participates in any property of the heavenly to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte), in the words, body, as sublimity and luminosity, actual or potential. “Your reward is very great in heaven” (Mat. 5:12). Thus Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii) holds as one heaven Again, three kinds of supernatural visions, bodily, all the space between the waters and the moon’s orb, call- imaginative, and intellectual, are called sometimes so ing it the aerial. According to him, then, there are three many heavens, in reference to which Augustine (Gen. ad heavens, the aerial, the starry, and one higher than both lit. xii) expounds Paul’s rapture “to the third heaven.” these, of which the Apostle is understood to speak when Reply to Objection 1. The earth stands in relation he says of himself that he was “rapt to the third heaven.” to the heaven as the centre of a circle to its circumfer- But since this space contains two elements, namely, ence. But as one center may have many circumferences, fire and air, and in each of these there is what is called a so, though there is but one earth, there may be many heav- higher and a lower region Rabanus subdivides this space ens. into four distinct heavens. The higher region of fire he Reply to Objection 2. The argument holds good as to calls the fiery heaven; the lower, the Olympian heaven the heaven, in so far as it denotes the entire sum of corpo- from a lofty mountain of that name: the higher region real creation, for in that sense it is one. of air he calls, from its brightness, the ethereal heaven; Reply to Objection 3. All the heavens have in com- the lower, the aerial. When, therefore, these four heavens mon sublimity and some degree of luminosity, as appears are added to the three enumerated above, there are seven from what has been said. corporeal heavens in all, in the opinion of Rabanus. 348 FIRST PART, QUESTION 69 On the Work of the Third Day (In Two Articles) We next consider the work of the third day. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) About the gathering together of the waters; (2) About the production of plants. Whether it was fitting that the gathering together of the waters should take place, as Ia q. 69 a. 1 recorded, on the third day? Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting that was made on the first day. For as the spiritual nature is the gathering together of the waters should take place on higher than the corporeal, so the higher bodies are nobler the third day. For what was made on the first and second than the lower. Hence the formation of the higher bodies days is expressly said to have been “made” in the words, is indicated in the second place, by the words, “Let there “God said: Be light made,” and “Let there be a firmament be made a firmament,” by which is to be understood the made.“But the third day is contradistinguished from the impression of celestial forms on formless matter, that pre- first and the second days. Therefore the work of the third ceded with priority not of time, but of origin only. But in day should have been described as a making not as a gath- the third place the impression of elemental forms on form- ering together. less matter is recorded, also with a priority of origin only. Objection 2. Further, the earth hitherto had been com- Therefore the words, “Let the waters be gathered together, pletely covered by the waters, wherefore it was described and the dry land appear,” mean that corporeal matter was as “invisible”∗. There was then no place on the earth to impressed with the substantial form of water, so as to have which the waters could be gathered together. such movement, and with the substantial form of earth, so Objection 3. Further, things which are not in con- as to have such an appearance. tinuous contact cannot occupy one place. But not all the According, however, to other holy writers† an order waters are in continuous contact, and therefore all were of duration in the works is to be understood, by which is not gathered together into one place. meant that the formlessness of matter precedes its forma- Objection 4. Further, a gathering together is a mode tion, and one form another, in order of time. Nevertheless, of local movement. But the waters flow naturally, and they do not hold that the formlessness of matter implies take their course towards the sea. In their case, therefore, the total absence of form, since heaven, earth, and wa- a Divine precept of this kind was unnecessary. ter already existed, since these three are named as already Objection 5. Further, the earth is given its name at its clearly perceptible to the senses; rather they understand first creation by the words, “In the beginning God created by formlessness the want of due distinction and of perfect heaven and earth.” Therefore the imposition of its name beauty, and in respect of these three Scripture mentions on the third day seems to be recorded without necessity. three kinds of formlessness. Heaven, the highest of them, On the contrary, The authority of Scripture suffices. was without form so long as “darkness” filled it, because it I answer that, It is necessary to reply differently was the source of light. The formlessness of water, which to this question according to the different interpretations holds the middle place, is called the “deep,” because, as given by Augustine and other holy writers. In all these Augustine says (Contr. Faust. xxii, 11), this word signi- works, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 15; iv, fies the mass of waters without order. Thirdly, the form- 22,34; De Gen. Contr. Manich. i, 5, 7), there is no or- less state of the earth is touched upon when the earth is der of duration, but only of origin and nature. He says said to be “void” or “invisible,” because it was covered by that the formless spiritual and formless corporeal natures the waters. Thus, then, the formation of the highest body were created first of all, and that the latter are at first in- took place on the first day. And since time results from the dicated by the words “earth” and “water.” Not that this movement of the heaven, and is the numerical measure of formlessness preceded formation, in time, but only in ori- the movement of the highest body, from this formation, gin; nor yet that one formation preceded another in dura- resulted the distinction of time, namely, that of night and tion, but merely in the order of nature. Agreeably, then, day. On the second day the intermediate body, water, was to this order, the formation of the highest or spiritual na- formed, receiving from the firmament a sort of distinction ture is recorded in the first place, where it is said that light and order (so that water be understood as including cer- ∗ q. 66, a. 1, obj. 1 † q. 66, a. 1 349 tain other things, as explained above (q. 68, a. 3)). On ters be gathered together in one place,” that is, apart from the third day the earth, the lowest body, received its form the dry land. That the waters occupied more places than by the withdrawal of the waters, and there resulted the one seems to be implied by the words that follow, “The distinction in the lowest body, namely, of land and sea. gathering together of the waters He called Seas.” Hence Scripture, having clearly expresses the manner in Reply to Objection 4. The Divine command gives which it received its form by the equally suitable words, bodies their natural movement and by these natural move- “Let the dry land appear.” ments they are said to “fulfill His word.” Or we may say Reply to Objection 1. According to Augustine∗, that it was according to the nature of water completely to Scripture does not say of the work of the third day, that cover the earth, just as the air completely surrounds both it was made, as it says of those that precede, in order to water and earth; but as a necessary means towards an end, show that higher and spiritual forms, such as the angels namely, that plants and animals might be on the earth, it and the heavenly bodies, are perfect and stable in being, was necessary for the waters to be withdrawn from a por- whereas inferior forms are imperfect and mutable. Hence tion of the earth. Some philosophers attribute this uncov- the impression of such forms is signified by the gathering ering of the earth’s surface to the action of the sun lifting of the waters, and the appearing of the land. For “wa- up the vapors and thus drying the land. Scripture, how- ter,” to use Augustine’s words, “glides and flows away, ever, attributes it to the Divine power, not only in the Book the earth abides” (Gen. ad lit. ii, 11). Others, again, hold of Genesis, but also Job 38:10 where in the person of the that the work of the third day was perfected on that day Lord it is said, “I set My bounds around the sea,” and Jer. only as regards movement from place to place, and that 5:22, where it is written: “Will you not then fear Me, saith for this reason Scripture had no reason to speak of it as the Lord, who have set the sand a bound for the sea?” made. Reply to Objection 5. According to Augustine (De Reply to Objection 2. This argument is easily Gen. Contr. Manich. i), primary matter is meant by the solved, according to Augustine’s opinion (De Gen. Contr. word earth, where first mentioned, but in the present pas- Manich. i), because we need not suppose that the earth sage it is to be taken for the element itself. Again it may was first covered by the waters, and that these were after- be said with Basil (Hom. iv in Hexaem.), that the earth wards gathered together, but that they were produced in is mentioned in the first passage in respect of its nature, this very gathering together. But according to the other but here in respect of its principal property, namely, dry- writers there are three solutions, which Augustine gives ness. Wherefore it is written: “He called the dry land, (Gen. ad lit. i, 12). The first supposes that the waters Earth.” It may also be said with Rabbi Moses, that the are heaped up to a greater height at the place where they expression, “He called,” denotes throughout an equivocal were gathered together, for it has been proved in regard to use of the name imposed. Thus we find it said at first the Red Sea, that the sea is higher than the land, as Basil that “He called the light Day”: for the reason that later remarks (Hom. iv in Hexaem.). The second explains the on a period of twenty-four hours is also called day, where water that covered the earth as being rarefied or nebulous, it is said that “there was evening and morning, one day.” which was afterwards condensed when the waters were In like manner it is said that “the firmament,” that is, the gathered together. The third suggests the existence of hol- air, “He called heaven”: for that which was first created lows in the earth, to receive the confluence of waters. Of was also called “heaven.” And here, again, it is said that the above the first seems the most probable. “the dry land,” that is, the part from which the waters had Reply to Objection 3. All the waters have the sea as withdrawn, “He called, Earth,” as distinct from the sea; their goal, into which they flow by channels hidden or ap- although the name earth is equally applied to that which parent, and this may be the reason why they are said to is covered with waters or not. So by the expression “He be gathered together into one place. Or, “one place” is to called” we are to understand throughout that the nature or be understood not simply, but as contrasted with the place property He bestowed corresponded to the name He gave. of the dry land, so that the sense would be, “Let the wa- Whether it was fitting that the production of plants should take place on the third Ia q. 69 a. 2 day? Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting that but of adornment. Therefore the production of plants, as the production of plants should take place on the third also belonging to the work of adornment, ought not to be day. For plants have life, as animals have. But the pro- recorded as taking place on the third day, which is devoted duction of animals belongs to the work, not of distinction, to the work of distinction. ∗ Gen. ad lit. ii, 7,8; iii, 20 350 Objection 2. Further, a work by which the earth is took place before they sprang up from the earth’s surface. accursed should have been recorded apart from the work And this is confirmed by reason, as follows. In these first by which it receives its form. But the words of Gn. 3:17, days God created all things in their origin or causes, and “Cursed is the earth in thy work, thorns and thistles shall it from this work He subsequently rested. Yet afterwards, by bring forth to thee,” show that by the production of certain governing His creatures, in the work of propagation, “He plants the earth was accursed. Therefore the production worketh until now.“Now the production of plants from out of plants in general should not have been recorded on the the earth is a work of propagation, and therefore they were third day, which is concerned with the work of formation. not produced in act on the third day, but in their causes Objection 3. Further, as plants are firmly fixed to the only. However, in accordance with other writers, it may earth, so are stones and metals, which are, nevertheless, be said that the first constitution of species belongs to the not mentioned in the work of formation. Plants, therefore, work of the six days, but the reproduction among them ought not to have been made on the third day. of like from like, to the government of the universe. And On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:12): “The earth Scripture indicates this in the words, “before it sprung up brought forth the green herb,” after which there follows, in the earth,” and “before it grew,” that is, before like was “The evening and the morning were the third day.” produced from like; just as now happens in the natural I answer that, On the third day, as said (a. 1), the course by the production of seed. Wherefore Scripture formless state of the earth comes to an end. But this state says pointedly (Gn. 1:11): “Let the earth bring forth the is described as twofold. On the one hand, the earth was green herb, and such as may seed,” as indicating the pro- “invisible” or “void,” being covered by the waters; on the duction of perfection of perfect species, from which the other hand, it was “shapeless” or “empty,” that is, with- seed of others should arise. Nor does the question where out that comeliness which it owes to the plants that clothe the seminal power may reside, whether in root, stem, or it, as it were, with a garment. Thus, therefore, in either fruit, affect the argument. respect this formless state ends on the third day: first, Reply to Objection 1. Life in plants is hidden, since when “the waters were gathered together into one place they lack sense and local movement, by which the animate and the dry land appeared”; secondly, when “the earth and the inanimate are chiefly discernible. And therefore, brought forth the green herb.” But concerning the pro- since they are firmly fixed in the earth, their production is duction of plants, Augustine’s opinion differs from that of treated as a part of the earth’s formation. others. For other commentators, in accordance with the Reply to Objection 2. Even before the earth was ac- surface meaning of the text, consider that the plants were cursed, thorns and thistles had been produced, either vir- produced in act in their various species on this third day; tually or actually. But they were not produced in punish- whereas Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5; viii, 3) says that ment of man; as though the earth, which he tilled to gain the earth is said to have then produced plants and trees in his food, produced unfruitful and noxious plants. Hence their causes, that is, it received then the power to produce it is said: “Shall it bring forth TO THEE.” them. He supports this view by the authority of Scrip- Reply to Objection 3. Moses put before the people ture, for it is said (Gn. 2:4,5): “These are the generations such things only as were manifest to their senses, as we of the heaven and the earth, when they were created, in have said (q. 67, a. 4; q. 68, a. 3). But minerals are gener- the day that. . . God made the heaven and the earth, and ated in hidden ways within the bowels of the earth. More- every plant of the field before it sprung up in the earth, over they seem hardly specifically distinct from earth, and and every herb of the ground before it grew.” Therefore, would seem to be species thereof. For this reason, there- the production of plants in their causes, within the earth, fore, he makes no mention of them. 351 FIRST PART, QUESTION 70 Of the Work of Adornment, As Regards the Fourth Day (In Three Articles) We must next consider the work of adornment, first as to each day by itself, secondly as to all seven days in general. In the first place, then, we consider the work of the fourth day, secondly, that of the fifth day, thirdly, that of the sixth day, and fourthly, such matters as belong to the seventh day. Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) As to the production of the lights; (2) As to the end of their production; (3) Whether they are living beings? Whether the lights ought to have been produced on the fourth day? Ia q. 70 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the lights ought not these two works is added the work of adornment, which to have been produced on the fourth day. For the heavenly is distinct from perfect. For the perfection of the heaven luminaries are by nature incorruptible bodies: wherefore and the earth regards, seemingly, those things that belong their matter cannot exist without their form. But as their to them intrinsically, but the adornment, those that are ex- matter was produced in the work of creation, before there trinsic, just as the perfection of a man lies in his proper was any day, so therefore were their forms. It follows, parts and forms, and his adornment, in clothing or such then, that the lights were not produced on the fourth day. like. Now just as distinction of certain things is made Objection 2. Further, the luminaries are, as it were, most evident by their local movement, as separating one vessels of light. But light was made on the first day. The from another; so the work of adornment is set forth by luminaries, therefore, should have been made on the first the production of things having movement in the heavens, day, not on the fourth. and upon the earth. But it has been stated above (q. 69, Objection 3. Further, the lights are fixed in the fir- a. 1), that three things are recorded as created, namely, the mament, as plants are fixed in the earth. For, the Scrip- heaven, the water, and the earth; and these three received ture says: “He set them in the firmament.” But plants are their form from the three days’ work of distinction, so that described as produced when the earth, to which they are heaven was formed on the first day; on the second day the attached, received its form. The lights, therefore, should waters were separated; and on the third day, the earth was have been produced at the same time as the firmament, divided into sea and dry land. So also is it in the work that is to say, on the second day. of adornment; on the first day of this work, which is the Objection 4. Further, plants are an effect of the sun, fourth of creation, are produced the lights, to adorn the moon, and other heavenly bodies. Now, cause precedes heaven by their movements; on the second day, which is effect in the order of nature. The lights, therefore, ought the fifth, birds and fishes are called into being, to make not to have been produced on the fourth day, but on the beautiful the intermediate element, for they move in air third day. and water, which are here taken as one; while on the third Objection 5. Further, as astronomers say, there are day, which is the sixth, animals are brought forth, to move many stars larger than the moon. Therefore the sun and upon the earth and adorn it. It must also here be noted that the moon alone are not correctly described as the “two Augustine’s opinion (Gen. ad lit. v, 5) on the production great lights.” of lights is not at variance with that of other holy writers, On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture. since he says that they were made actually, and not merely I answer that, In recapitulating the Divine works, virtually, for the firmament has not the power of produc- Scripture says (Gn. 2:1): “So the heavens and the earth ing lights, as the earth has of producing plants. Where- were finished and all the furniture of them,” thereby indi- fore Scripture does not say: “Let the firmament produce cating that the work was threefold. In the first work, that lights,” though it says: “Let the earth bring forth the green of “creation,” the heaven and the earth were produced, but herb.” as yet without form. In the second, or work of “distinc- Reply to Objection 1. In Augustine’s opinion there tion,” the heaven and the earth were perfected, either by is no difficulty here; for he does not hold a succession of adding substantial form to formless matter, as Augustine time in these works, and so there was no need for the mat- holds (Gen. ad lit. ii, 11), or by giving them the order ter of the lights to exist under another form. Nor is there and beauty due to them, as other holy writers suppose. To any difficulty in the opinion of those who hold the heav- 352 enly bodies to be of the nature of the four elements, for it bade them to be there, even as He placed man in Paradise, may be said that they were formed out of matter already to be there. In the opinion of Aristotle, however, the stars existing, as animals and plants were formed. For those, are fixed in their orbits, and in reality have no other move- however, who hold the heavenly bodies to be of another ment but that of the spheres; and yet our senses perceive nature from the elements, and naturally incorruptible, the the movement of the luminaries and not that of the spheres answer must be that the lights were substantially created (De Coel. ii, text. 43). But Moses describes what is obvi- at the beginning, but that their substance, at first formless, ous to sense, out of condescension to popular ignorance, is formed on this day, by receiving not its substantial form, as we have already said (q. 67, a. 4; q. 68, a. 3). The but a determination of power. As to the fact that the lights objection, however, falls to the ground if we regard the are not mentioned as existing from the beginning, but only firmament made on the second day as having a natural as made on the fourth day, Chrysostom (Hom. vi in Gen.) distinction from that in which the stars are placed, even explains this by the need of guarding the people from the though the distinction is not apparent to the senses, the danger of idolatry: since the lights are proved not to be testimony of which Moses follows, as stated above (De gods, by the fact that they were not from the beginning. Coel. ii, text. 43). For although to the senses there ap- Reply to Objection 2. No difficulty exists if we fol- pears but one firmament; if we admit a higher and a lower low Augustine in holding the light made on the first day to firmament, the lower will be that which was made on the be spiritual, and that made on this day to be corporeal. If, second day, and on the fourth the stars were fixed in the however, the light made on the first day is understood to higher firmament. be itself corporeal, then it must be held to have been pro- Reply to Objection 4. In the words of Basil (Hom. v duced on that day merely as light in general; and that on in Hexaem.), plants were recorded as produced before the the fourth day the lights received a definite power to pro- sun and moon, to prevent idolatry, since those who believe duce determinate effects. Thus we observe that the rays of the heavenly bodies to be gods, hold that plants originate the sun have one effect, those of the moon another, and so primarily from these bodies. Although as Chrysostom re- forth. Hence, speaking of such a determination of power, marks (Hom. vi in Gen.), the sun, moon, and stars coop- Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that the sun’s light which erate in the work of production by their movements, as the previously was without form, was formed on the fourth husbandman cooperates by his labor. day. Reply to Objection 5. As Chrysostom says, the two Reply to Objection 3. According to Ptolemy the lights are called great, not so much with regard to their di- heavenly luminaries are not fixed in the spheres, but have mensions as to their influence and power. For though the their own movement distinct from the movement of the stars be of greater bulk than the moon, yet the influence spheres. Wherefore Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in Gen.) of the moon is more perceptible to the senses in this lower that He is said to have set them in the firmament, not be- world. Moreover, as far as the senses are concerned, its cause He fixed them there immovably, but because He apparent size is greater. Whether the cause assigned for the production of the lights is reasonable? Ia q. 70 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the cause assigned “to rule the night.” But such it probably did when first for the production of the lights is not reasonable. For it made; for men begin to count from the new moon. The is said (Jer. 10:2): “Be not afraid of the signs of heaven, moon, therefore, was not made “to rule the night.” which the heathens fear.” Therefore the heavenly lights On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture. were not made to be signs. I answer that, As we have said above (q. 65, a. 2), Objection 2. Further, sign is contradistinguished from a corporeal creature can be considered as made either for cause. But the lights are the cause of what takes place the sake of its proper act, or for other creatures, or for the upon the earth. Therefore they are not signs. whole universe, or for the glory of God. Of these reasons Objection 3. Further, the distinction of seasons and only that which points out the usefulness of these things to days began from the first day. Therefore the lights were man, is touched upon by Moses, in order to withdraw his not made “for seasons, and days, and years,” that is, in people from idolatry. Hence it is written (Dt. 4:19): “Lest order to distinguish them. perhaps lifting up thy eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and Objection 4. Further, nothing is made for the sake of the moon and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived that which is inferior to itself, “since the end is better than by error thou adore and serve them, which the Lord thy the means” (Topic. iii). But the lights are nobler than the God created for the service of all nations.” Now, he ex- earth. Therefore they were not made “to enlighten it.” plains this service at the beginning of Genesis as three- Objection 5. Further, the new moon cannot be said fold. First, the lights are of service to man, in regard to 353 sight, which directs him in his works, and is most useful heaven and may be understood to have begun on that first for perceiving objects. In reference to this he says: “Let day. But the particular distinctions of days and seasons them shine in the firmament and give life to the earth.” and years, according as one day is hotter than another, Secondly, as regards the changes of the seasons, which one season than another, and one year than another, are prevent weariness, preserve health, and provide for the ne- due to certain particular movements of the stars: which cessities of food; all of which things could not be secured movements may have had their beginning on the fourth if it were always summer or winter. In reference to this he day. says: “Let them be for seasons, and for days, and years.” Reply to Objection 4. Light was given to the earth Thirdly, as regards the convenience of business and work, for the service of man, who, by reason of his soul, is no- in so far as the lights are set in the heavens to indicate fair bler than the heavenly bodies. Nor is it untrue to say that or foul weather, as favorable to various occupations. And a higher creature may be made for the sake of a lower, in this respect he says: “Let them be for signs.” considered not in itself, but as ordained to the good of the Reply to Objection 1. The lights in the heaven are set universe. for signs of changes effected in corporeal creatures, but Reply to Objection 5. When the moon is at its per- not of those changes which depend upon the free-will. fection it rises in the evening and sets in the morning, and Reply to Objection 2. We are sometimes brought thus it rules the night, and it was probably made in its to the knowledge of hidden effects through their sensible full perfection as were plants yielding seed, as also were causes, and conversely. Hence nothing prevents a sensible animals and man himself. For although the perfect is de- cause from being a sign. But he says “signs,” rather than veloped from the imperfect by natural processes, yet the “causes,” to guard against idolatry. perfect must exist simply before the imperfect. Augustine, Reply to Objection 3. The general division of time however (Gen. ad lit. ii), does not say this, for he says that into day and night took place on the first day, as regards it is not unfitting that God made things imperfect, which the diurnal movement, which is common to the whole He afterwards perfected. Whether the lights of heaven are living beings? Ia q. 70 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the lights of heaven intrinsic to the heavenly bodies: and consequently they are living beings. For the nobler a body is, the more are living beings. nobly it should be adorned. But a body less noble than the Objection 5. Further, the first of movables is the heaven, is adorned with living beings, with fish, birds, and heaven. Now, of all things that are endowed with move- the beasts of the field. Therefore the lights of heaven, as ment the first moves itself, as is proved in Phys. viii, text. pertaining to its adornment, should be living beings also. 34, because, what is such of itself precedes that which is Objection 2. Further, the nobler a body is, the nobler by another. But only beings that are living move them- must be its form. But the sun, moon, and stars are nobler selves, as is shown in the same book (text. 27). Therefore bodies than plants or animals, and must therefore have the heavenly bodies are living beings. nobler forms. Now the noblest of all forms is the soul, as On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), being the first principle of life. Hence Augustine (De Vera “Let no one esteem the heavens or the heavenly bodies to Relig. xxix) says: “Every living substance stands higher be living things, for they have neither life nor sense.” in the order of nature than one that has not life.” The lights I answer that, Philosophers have differed on this of heaven, therefore, are living beings. question. Anaxagoras, for instance, as Augustine men- Objection 3. Further, a cause is nobler than its effect. tions (De Civ. Dei xviii, 41), “was condemned by the But the sun, moon, and stars are a cause of life, as is es- Athenians for teaching that the sun was a fiery mass of pecially evidenced in the case of animals generated from stone, and neither a god nor even a living being.” On the putrefaction, which receive life from the power of the sun other hand, the Platonists held that the heavenly bodies and stars. Much more, therefore, have the heavenly bodies have life. Nor was there less diversity of opinion among a living soul. the Doctors of the Church. It was the belief of Origen Objection 4. Further, the movement of the heaven and (Peri Archon i) and Jerome that these bodies were alive, the heavenly bodies are natural (De Coel. i, text. 7,8): and and the latter seems to explain in that sense the words natural movement is from an intrinsic principle. Now the (Eccles. 1:6), “The spirit goeth forward, surveying all principle of movement in the heavenly bodies is a sub- places round about.” But Basil (Hom. iii, vi in Hex- stance capable of apprehension, and is moved as the de- aem.) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii) maintain that sirer is moved by the object desired (Metaph. xii, text. the heavenly bodies are inanimate. Augustine leaves the 36). Therefore, seemingly, the apprehending principle is matter in doubt, without committing himself to either the- 354 ory, though he goes so far as to say that if the heavenly this means nothing else but that substances of spiritual na-bodies are really living beings, their souls must be akin to ture are united to them, and act as their moving power. A the angelic nature (Gen. ad lit. ii, 18; Enchiridion lviii). proof that the heavenly bodies are moved by the direct in- In examining the truth of this question, where such di- fluence and contact of some spiritual substance, and not, versity of opinion exists, we shall do well to bear in mind like bodies of specific gravity, by nature, lies in the fact that the union of soul and body exists for the sake of the that whereas nature moves to one fixed end which having soul and not of the body; for the form does not exist for attained, it rests; this does not appear in the movement the matter, but the matter for the form. Now the nature of heavenly bodies. Hence it follows that they are moved and power of the soul are apprehended through its opera- by some intellectual substances. Augustine appears to be tion, which is to a certain extent its end. Yet for some of of the same opinion when he expresses his belief that all these operations, as sensation and nutrition, our body is a corporeal things are ruled by God through the spirit of life necessary instrument. Hence it is clear that the sensitive (De Trin. iii, 4). and nutritive souls must be united to a body in order to From what has been said, then, it is clear that the heav- exercise their functions. There are, however, operations enly bodies are not living beings in the same sense as of the soul, which are not exercised through the medium plants and animals, and that if they are called so, it can of the body, though the body ministers, as it were, to their only be equivocally. It will also be seen that the difference production. The intellect, for example, makes use of the of opinion between those who affirm, and those who deny, phantasms derived from the bodily senses, and thus far that these bodies have life, is not a difference of things but is dependent on the body, although capable of existing of words. apart from it. It is not, however, possible that the func- Reply to Objection 1. Certain things belong to the tions of nutrition, growth, and generation, through which adornment of the universe by reason of their proper move- the nutritive soul operates, can be exercised by the heav- ment; and in this way the heavenly luminaries agree with enly bodies, for such operations are incompatible with a others that conduce to that adornment, for they are moved body naturally incorruptible. Equally impossible is it that by a living substance. the functions of the sensitive soul can appertain to the Reply to Objection 2. One being may be nobler than heavenly body, since all the senses depend on the sense another absolutely, but not in a particular respect. While, of touch, which perceives elemental qualities, and all the then, it is not conceded that the souls of heavenly bod- organs of the senses require a certain proportion in the ad- ies are nobler than the souls of animals absolutely it must mixture of elements, whereas the nature of the heavenly be conceded that they are superior to them with regard bodies is not elemental. It follows, then, that of the oper- to their respective forms, since their form perfects their ations of the soul the only ones left to be attributed to the matter entirely, which is not in potentiality to other forms; heavenly bodies are those of understanding and moving; whereas a soul does not do this. Also as regards move- for appetite follows both sensitive and intellectual percep- ment the power that moves the heavenly bodies is of a tion, and is in proportion thereto. But the operations of nobler kind. the intellect, which does not act through the body, do not Reply to Objection 3. Since the heavenly body is a need a body as their instrument, except to supply phan- mover moved, it is of the nature of an instrument, which tasms through the senses. Moreover, the operations of the acts in virtue of the agent: and therefore since this agent sensitive soul, as we have seen, cannot be attributed to the is a living substance the heavenly body can impart life in heavenly bodies. Accordingly, the union of a soul to a virtue of that agent. heavenly body cannot be for the purpose of the operations Reply to Objection 4. The movements of the heav- of the intellect. It remains, then, only to consider whether enly bodies are natural, not on account of their active prin- the movement of the heavenly bodies demands a soul as ciple, but on account of their passive principle; that is to the motive power, not that the soul, in order to move the say, from a certain natural aptitude for being moved by an heavenly body, need be united to the latter as its form; but intelligent power. by contact of power, as a mover is united to that which he Reply to Objection 5. The heaven is said to move it- moves. Wherefore Aristotle (Phys. viii, text. 42,43), after self in as far as it is compounded of mover and moved; not showing that the first mover is made up of two parts, the by the union of the mover, as the form, with the moved, moving and the moved, goes on to show the nature of the as the matter, but by contact with the motive power, as we union between these two parts. This, he says, is effected have said. So far, then, the principle that moves it may by contact which is mutual if both are bodies; on the part be called intrinsic, and consequently its movement nat- of one only, if one is a body and the other not. The Platon- ural with respect to that active principle; just as we say ists explain the union of soul and body in the same way, as that voluntary movement is natural to the animal as ani- a contact of a moving power with the object moved, and mal (Phys. viii, text. 27). since Plato holds the heavenly bodies to be living beings, 355 FIRST PART, QUESTION 71 On the Work of the Fifth Day (In One Article) We must next consider the work of the fifth day. Objection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described. For the waters produce that which the power of water suffices to produce. But the power of water does not suffice for the production of every kind of fishes and birds since we find that many of them are generated from seed. Therefore the words, “Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life, and the fowl that may fly over the earth,” do not fittingly describe this work. Objection 2: Further, fishes and birds are not produced from water only, but earth seems to predominate over water in their composition, as is shown by the fact that their bodies tend naturally to the earth and rest upon it. It is not, then, fittingly that fishes and birds are produced from water. Objection 3: Further, fishes move in the waters, and birds in the air. If, then, fishes are produced from the waters, birds ought to be produced from the air, and not from the waters. Objection 4: Further, not all fishes creep through the waters, for some, as seals, have feet and walk on land. Therefore the production of fishes is not sufficiently described by the words, “Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life.” Objection 5: Further, land animals are more perfect than birds and fishes which appears from the fact that they have more distinct limbs, and generation of a higher order. For they bring forth living beings, whereas birds and fishes bring forth eggs. But the more perfect has precedence in the order of nature. Therefore fishes and birds ought not to have been produced on the fifth day, before land animals. On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture. I answer that, As said above, (q. 70, a. 1), the order of the work of adornment corresponds to the order of the work of distinction. Hence, as among the three days assigned to the work of distinction, the middle, or second, day is devoted to the work of distinction of water, which is the intermediate body, so in the three days of the work of adornment, the middle day, which is the fifth, is assigned to the adornment of the intermediate body, by the production of birds and fishes. As, then, Moses makes mention of the lights and the light on the fourth day, to show that the fourth day corresponds to the first day on which he had said that the light was made, so on this fifth day he mentions the waters and the firmament of heaven to show that the fifth day corresponds to the second. It must, however, be observed that Augustine differs from other writers in his opinion about the production of fishes and birds, as he differs about the production of plants. For while others say that fishes and birds were produced on the fifth day actually, he holds that the nature of the waters produced them on that day potentially. Reply to Objection 1: It was laid down by Avicenna that animals of all kinds can be generated by various minglings of the elements, and naturally, without any kind of seed. This, however, seems repugnant to the fact that nature produces its effects by determinate means, and consequently, those things that are naturally generated from seed cannot be generated naturally in any other way. It ought, then, rather to be said that in the natural generation of all animals that are generated from seed, the active principle lies in the formative power of the seed, but that in the case of animals generated from putrefaction, the formative power of is the influence of the heavenly bodies. The material principle, however, in the generation of either kind of animals, is either some element, or something compounded of the elements. But at the first beginning of the world the active principle was the Word of God, which produced animals from material elements, either in act, as some holy writers say, or virtually, as Augustine teaches. Not as though the power possessed by water or earth of producing all animals resides in the earth and the water themselves, as Avicenna held, but in the power originally given to the elements of producing them from elemental matter by the power of seed or the influence of the stars. Reply to Objection 2: The bodies of birds and fishes may be considered from two points of view. If considered in themselves, it will be evident that the earthly element must predominate, since the element that is least active, namely, the earth, must be the most abundant in quantity in order that the mingling may be duly tempered in the body of the animal. But if considered as by nature constituted to move with certain specific motions, thus they have some special affinity with the bodies in which they move; and hence the words in which their generation is described. Reply to Objection 3: The air, as not being so apparent to the senses, is not enumerated by itself, but with other things: partly with the water, because the lower region of the air is thickened by watery exhalations; partly with the heaven as to the higher region. But birds move in the lower part of the air, and so are said to fly “beneath the firmament,” even if the firmament be taken to mean the region of clouds. Hence the production of birds is ascribed to 356 the water. Reply to Objection 4: Nature passes from one extreme to another through the medium; and therefore there are creatures of intermediate type between the animals of the air and those of the water, having something in common with both; and they are reckoned as belonging to that class to which they are most allied, through the characters possessed in common with that class, rather than with the other. But in order to include among fishes all such intermediate forms as have special characters like to theirs, the words, “Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life,” are followed by these: “God created great whales,” etc. Reply to Objection 5: The order in which the production of these animals is given has reference to the order of those bodies which they are set to adorn, rather than to the superiority of the animals themselves. Moreover, in generation also the more perfect is reached through the less perfect. 357 FIRST PART, QUESTION 72 On the Work of the Sixth Day (In One Article) We must now consider the work of the sixth day. Objection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described. For as birds and fishes have a living soul, so also have land animals. But these animals are not themselves living souls. Therefore the words, “Let the earth bring forth the living creature,” should rather have been, “Let the earth bring forth the living four-footed creatures.” Objection 2: Further, a genus ought not to be opposed to its species. But beasts and cattle are quadrupeds. Therefore quadrupeds ought not to be enumerated as a class with beasts and cattle. Objection 3: Further, as animals belong to a determinate genus and species, so also does man. But in the making of man nothing is said of his genus and species, and therefore nothing ought to have been said about them in the production of other animals, whereas it is said “according to its genus” and “in its species.” Objection 4: Further, land animals are more like man, whom God is recorded to have blessed, than are birds and fishes. But as birds and fishes are said to be blessed, this should have been said, with much more reason, of the other animals as well. Objection 5: Further, certain animals are generated from putrefaction, which is a kind of corruption. But corruption is repugnant to the first founding of the world. Therefore such animals should not have been produced at that time. Objection 6: Further, certain animals are poisonous, and injurious to man. But there ought to have been nothing injurious to man before man sinned. Therefore such animals ought not to have been made by God at all, since He is the Author of good; or at least not until man had sinned. On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture. I answer that, As on the fifth day the intermediate body, namely, the water, is adorned, and thus that day corresponds to the second day; so the sixth day, on which the lowest body, or the earth, is adorned by the production of land animals, corresponds to the third day. Hence the earth is mentioned in both places. And here again Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v) that the production was potential, and other holy writers that it was actual. Reply to Objection 1: The different grades of life which are found in different living creatures can be discovered from the various ways in which Scripture speaks of them, as Basil says (Hom. viii in Hexaem.). The life of plants, for instance, is very imperfect and difficult to discern, and hence, in speaking of their production, nothing is said of their life, but only their generation is mentioned, since only in generation is a vital act observed in them. For the powers of nutrition and growth are subordinate to the generative life, as will be shown later on (q. 78, a. 2). But amongst animals, those that live on land are, generally speaking, more perfect than birds and fishes, not because the fish is devoid of memory, as Basil upholds (Hom. viii in Hexaem.) and Augustine rejects (Gen. ad lit. iii), but because their limbs are more distinct and their generation of a higher order, (yet some imperfect animals, such as bees and ants, are more intelligent in certain ways). Scripture, therefore, does not call fishes “living creatures,” but “creeping creatures having life”; whereas it does call land animals “living creatures” on account of their more perfect life, and seems to imply that fishes are merely bodies having in them something of a soul, whilst land animals, from the higher perfection of their life, are, as it were, living souls with bodies subject to them. But the life of man, as being the most perfect grade, is not said to be produced, like the life of other animals, by earth or water, but immediately by God. Reply to Objection 2: By “cattle,” domestic animals are signified, which in any way are of service to man: but by “beasts,” wild animals such as bears and lions are designated. By “creeping things” those animals are meant which either have no feet and cannot rise from the earth, as serpents, or those whose feet are too short to life them far from the ground, as the lizard and tortoise. But since certain animals, as deer and goats, seem to fall under none of these classes, the word “quadrupeds” is added. Or perhaps the word “quadruped” is used first as being the genus, to which the others are added as species, for even some reptiles, such as lizards and tortoises, are four-footed. Reply to Objection 3: In other animals, and in plants, mention is made of genus and species, to denote the generation of like from like. But it was unnecessary to do so in the case of man, as what had already been said of other creatures might be understood of him. Again, animals and plants may be said to be produced according to their kinds, to signify their remoteness from the Divine image and likeness, whereas man is said to be made “to the image and likeness of God.” Reply to Objection 4: The blessing of God gives power to multiply by generation, and, having been mentioned in the preceding account of the making of birds and fishes, could be understood of the beasts of the earth, without requiring to be repeated. The blessing, however, is repeated in the case of man, since in him generation of children has 358 a special relation to the number of the elect∗, and to prevent anyone from saying that there was any sin whatever in the act of begetting children. As to plants, since they experience neither desire of propagation, nor sensation in generating, they are deemed unworthy of a formal blessing. Reply to Objection 5: Since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, it was not incompatible with the first formation of things, that from the corruption of the less perfect the more perfect should be generated. Hence animals generated from the corruption of inanimate things, or of plants, may have been generated then. But those generated from corruption of animals could not have been produced then otherwise than potentially. Reply to Objection 6: In the words of Augustine (Super. Gen. contr. Manich. i): “If an unskilled person enters the workshop of an artificer he sees in it many appliances of which he does not understand the use, and which, if he is a foolish fellow, he considers unnecessary. Moreover, should he carelessly fall into the fire, or wound himself with a sharp-edged tool, he is under the impression that many of the things there are hurtful; whereas the craftsman, knowing their use, laughs at his folly. And thus some people presume to find fault with many things in this world, through not seeing the reasons for their existence. For though not required for the furnishing of our house, these things are necessary for the perfection of the universe.” And, since man before he sinned would have used the things of this world conformably to the order designed, poisonous animals would not have injured him. ∗ Cf. Augustine, Gen. ad lit. iii, 12 359 FIRST PART, QUESTION 73 On the Things That Belong to the Seventh Day (In Three Articles) We must next consider the things that belong to the seventh day. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) About the completion of the works; (2) About the resting of God; (3) About the blessing and sanctifying of this day. Whether the completion of the Divine works ought to be ascribed to the seventh day? Ia q. 73 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the completion of the either an operation, as the end of the harpist is to play the Divine works ought not to be ascribed to the seventh day. harp; or something that is attained by an operation, as the For all things that are done in this world belong to the Di- end of the builder is the house that he makes by build- vine works. But the consummation of the world will be at ing. But the first perfection is the cause of the second, the end of the world (Mat. 13:39,40). Moreover, the time because the form is the principle of operation. Now the of Christ’s Incarnation is a time of completion, wherefore final perfection, which is the end of the whole universe, it is called “the time of fulness∗” (Gal. 4:4). And Christ is the perfect beatitude of the Saints at the consummation Himself, at the moment of His death, cried out, “It is con- of the world; and the first perfection is the completeness summated” (Jn. 19:30). Hence the completion of the Di- of the universe at its first founding, and this is what is as- vine works does not belong to the seventh day. cribed to the seventh day. Objection 2. Further, the completion of a work is an Reply to Objection 1. The first perfection is the cause act in itself. But we do not read that God acted at all on the of the second, as above said. Now for the attaining of beat- seventh day, but rather that He rested from all His work. itude two things are required, nature and grace. Therefore, Therefore the completion of the works does not belong to as said above, the perfection of beatitude will be at the end the seventh day. of the world. But this consummation existed previously in Objection 3. Further, nothing is said to be complete to its causes, as to nature, at the first founding of the world, which many things are added, unless they are merely su- as to grace, in the Incarnation of Christ. For, “Grace and perfluous, for a thing is called perfect to which nothing is truth came by Jesus Christ” (Jn. 1:17). So, then, on the wanting that it ought to possess. But many things were seventh day was the consummation of nature, in Christ’s made after the seventh day, as the production of many Incarnation the consummation of grace, and at the end of individual beings, and even of certain new species that the world will be the consummation of glory. are frequently appearing, especially in the case of ani- Reply to Objection 2. God did act on the seventh mals generated from putrefaction. Also, God creates daily day, not by creating new creatures, but by directing and new souls. Again, the work of the Incarnation was a new moving His creatures to the work proper to them, and work, of which it is said (Jer. 31:22): “The Lord hath thus He made some beginning of the “second” perfec- created a new thing upon the earth.” Miracles also are tion. So that, according to our version of the Scripture, the new works, of which it is said (Eccles. 36:6): “Renew thy completion of the works is attributed to the seventh day, signs, and work new miracles.” Moreover, all things will though according to another it is assigned to the sixth. Ei- be made new when the Saints are glorified, according to ther version, however, may stand, since the completion of Apoc. 21:5: “And He that sat on the throne said: Behold the universe as to the completeness of its parts belongs to I make all things new.” Therefore the completion of the the sixth day, but its completion as regards their opera- Divine works ought not to be attributed to the seventh day. tion, to the seventh. It may also be added that in continu- On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 2:2): “On the seventh ous movement, so long as any movement further is possi- day God ended His work which He had made.” ble, movement cannot be called completed till it comes to I answer that, The perfection of a thing is twofold, rest, for rest denotes consummation of movement. Now the first perfection and the second perfection. The ‘first’ God might have made many other creatures besides those perfection is that according to which a thing is substan- which He made in the six days, and hence, by the fact that tially perfect, and this perfection is the form of the whole; He ceased making them on the seventh day, He is said on which form results from the whole having its parts com- that day to have consummated His work. plete. But the ‘second’ perfection is the end, which is Reply to Objection 3. Nothing entirely new was af- ∗ Vulg.: ‘the fulness of time’ 360 terwards made by God, but all things subsequently made different species, as the mule is the offspring of an ass and had in a sense been made before in the work of the six a mare; but even these existed previously in their causes, days. Some things, indeed, had a previous experience ma- in the works of the six days. Some also existed before- terially, as the rib from the side of Adam out of which God hand by way of similitude, as the souls now created. And formed Eve; whilst others existed not only in matter but the work of the Incarnation itself was thus foreshadowed, also in their causes, as those individual creatures that are for as we read (Phil. 2:7), The Son of God “was made in now generated existed in the first of their kind. Species, the likeness of men.” And again, the glory that is spiritual also, that are new, if any such appear, existed beforehand was anticipated in the angels by way of similitude; and in various active powers; so that animals, and perhaps that of the body in the heaven, especially the empyrean. even new species of animals, are produced by putrefac- Hence it is written (Eccles. 1:10), “Nothing under the sun tion by the power which the stars and elements received is new, for it hath already gone before, in the ages that at the beginning. Again, animals of new kinds arise occa- were before us.” sionally from the connection of individuals belonging to Whether God rested on the seventh day from all His work? Ia q. 73 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that God did not rest on sire. Now, in either sense God is said to have rested on the the seventh day from all His work. For it is said (Jn. 5:17), seventh day. First, because He ceased from creating new “My Father worketh until now, and I work.” God, then, creatures on that day, for, as said above (a. 1, ad 3), He did not rest on the seventh day from all His work. made nothing afterwards that had not existed previously, Objection 2. Further, rest is opposed to movement, or in some degree, in the first works; secondly, because He to labor, which movement causes. But, as God produced Himself had no need of the things that He had made, but His work without movement and without labor, He cannot was happy in the fruition of Himself. Hence, when all be said to have rested on the seventh day from His work. things were made He is not said to have rested “in” His Objection 3. Further, should it be said that God rested works, as though needing them for His own happiness, on the seventh day by causing man to rest; against this it but to have rested “from” them, as in fact resting in Him- may be argued that rest is set down in contradistinction self, as He suffices for Himself and fulfils His own desire. to His work; now the words “God created” or “made” And even though from all eternity He rested in Himself, this thing or the other cannot be explained to mean that yet the rest in Himself, which He took after He had fin- He made man create or make these things. Therefore the ished His works, is that rest which belongs to the seventh resting of God cannot be explained as His making man to day. And this, says Augustine, is the meaning of God’s rest. resting from His works on that day (Gen. ad lit. iv). On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 2:2): “God rested on Reply to Objection 1. God indeed “worketh until the seventh day from all the work which He had done.” now” by preserving and providing for the creatures He I answer that, Rest is, properly speaking, opposed to has made, but not by the making of new ones. movement, and consequently to the labor that arises from Reply to Objection 2. Rest is here not opposed to movement. But although movement, strictly speaking, is labor or to movement, but to the production of new crea- a quality of bodies, yet the word is applied also to spir- tures, and to the desire tending to an external object. itual things, and in a twofold sense. On the one hand, Reply to Objection 3. Even as God rests in Himself every operation may be called a movement, and thus the alone and is happy in the enjoyment of Himself, so our Divine goodness is said to move and go forth to its ob- own sole happiness lies in the enjoyment of God. Thus, ject, in communicating itself to that object, as Dionysius also, He makes us find rest in Himself, both from His says (Div. Nom. ii). On the other hand, the desire that works and our own. It is not, then, unreasonable to say tends to an object outside itself, is said to move towards that God rested in giving rest to us. Still, this explanation it. Hence rest is taken in two senses, in one sense meaning must not be set down as the only one, and the other is the a cessation from work, in the other, the satisfying of de- first and principal explanation. 361 Whether blessing and sanctifying are due to the seventh day? Ia q. 73 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that blessing and sancti- fits the seventh day, since, as we explained (q. 72, ad 4), fying are not due to the seventh day. For it is usual to call the blessing referred to the increase by multiplication; for a time blessed or holy for that some good thing has hap- which reason God said to the creatures which He blessed: pened in it, or some evil been avoided. But whether God “Increase and multiply.” Now, this increase is effected works or ceases from work nothing accrues to Him or is through God’s Providence over His creatures, securing the lost to Him. Therefore no special blessing or sanctifying generation of like from like. And according to the sec- are due to the seventh day. ond meaning, it is right that the seventh day should have Objection 2. Further, the Latin “benedictio” [bless- been sanctified, since the special sanctification of every ing] is derived from “bonitas” [goodness]. But it is the na- creature consists in resting in God. For this reason things ture of good to spread and communicate itself, as Diony- dedicated to God are said to be sanctified. sius says (Div. Nom. iv). The days, therefore, in which Reply to Objection 1. The seventh day is said to be God produced creatures deserved a blessing rather than sanctified not because anything can accrue to God, or be the day on which He ceased producing them. taken from Him, but because something is added to crea- Objection 3. Further, over each creature a blessing tures by their multiplying, and by their resting in God. was pronounced, as upon each work it was said, “God saw Reply to Objection 2. In the first six days crea- that it was good.” Therefore it was not necessary that after tures were produced in their first causes, but after being all had been produced, the seventh day should be blessed. thus produced, they are multiplied and preserved, and this On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:3), “God blessed work also belongs to the Divine goodness. And the per- the seventh day and sanctified it, because in it He had fection of this goodness is made most clear by the knowl- rested from all His work.” edge that in it alone God finds His own rest, and we may I answer that, As said above (a. 2), God’s rest on find ours in its fruition. the seventh day is understood in two ways. First, in that Reply to Objection 3. The good mentioned in the He ceased from producing new works, though He still works of each day belongs to the first institution of na- preserves and provides for the creatures He has made. ture; but the blessing attached to the seventh day, to its Secondly, in that after all His works He rested in Him- propagation. self. According to the first meaning, then, a blessing be- 362 FIRST PART, QUESTION 74 On All the Seven Days in Common (In Three Articles) We next consider all the seven days in common: and there are three points of inquiry: (1) As to the sufficiency of these days; (2) Whether they are all one day, or more than one? (3) As to certain modes of speaking which Scripture uses in narrating the works of the six days. Whether these days are sufficiently enumerated? Ia q. 74 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that these days are not on the middle day, and adorned on the fifth, and the third sufficiently enumerated. For the work of creation is no part distinguished on the third day, and adorned on the less distinct from the works of distinction and adornment sixth. But Augustine, while agreeing with the above writ- than these two works are from one another. But sepa- ers as to the last three days, differs as to the first three, rate days are assigned to distinction and to adornment, and for, according to him, spiritual creatures are formed on therefore separate days should be assigned to creation. the first day, and corporeal on the two others, the higher Objection 2. Further, air and fire are nobler elements bodies being formed on the first these two days, and the than earth and water. But one day is assigned to the dis- lower on the second. Thus, then, the perfection of the Di- tinction of water, and another to the distinction of the land. vine works corresponds to the perfection of the number Therefore, other days ought to be devoted to the distinc- six, which is the sum of its aliquot parts, one, two, three; tion of fire and air. since one day is assigned to the forming of spiritual crea- Objection 3. Further, fish differ from birds as much tures, two to that of corporeal creatures, and three to the as birds differ from the beasts of the earth, whereas man work of adornment. differs more from other animals than all animals whatso- Reply to Objection 1. According to Augustine, the ever differ from each other. But one day is devoted to the work of creation belongs to the production of formless production of fishes, and another to that of the beast of matter, and of the formless spiritual nature, both of which the earth. Another day, then, ought to be assigned to the are outside of time, as he himself says (Confess. xii, 12). production of birds and another to that of man. Thus, then, the creation of either is set down before there Objection 4. Further, it would seem, on the other was any day. But it may also be said, following other hand, that some of these days are superfluous. Light, for holy writers, that the works of distinction and adornment instance, stands to the luminaries in the relation of acci- imply certain changes in the creature which are measur- dent to subject. But the subject is produced at the same able by time; whereas the work of creation lies only in time as the accident proper to it. The light and the lu- the Divine act producing the substance of beings instan- minaries, therefore, ought not to have been produced on taneously. For this reason, therefore, every work of dis- different days. tinction and adornment is said to take place “in a day,” Objection 5. Further, these days are devoted to the but creation “in the beginning” which denotes something first instituting of the world. But as on the seventh day indivisible. nothing was instituted, that day ought not to be enumer- Reply to Objection 2. Fire and air, as not distinctly ated with the others. known by the unlettered, are not expressly named by I answer that, The reason of the distinction of these Moses among the parts of the world, but reckoned with days is made clear by what has been said above (q. 70, the intermediate part, or water, especially as regards the a. 1), namely, that the parts of the world had first to be lowest part of the air; or with the heaven, to which the distinguished, and then each part adorned and filled, as higher region of air approaches, as Augustine says (Gen. it were, by the beings that inhabit it. Now the parts into ad lit. ii, 13). which the corporeal creation is divided are three, accord- Reply to Objection 3. The production of animals is ing to some holy writers, these parts being the heaven, or recorded with reference to their adorning the various parts highest part, the water, or middle part, and the earth, or the of the world, and therefore the days of their production lowest part. Thus the Pythagoreans teach that perfection are separated or united according as the animals adorn the consists in three things, the beginning, the middle, and the same parts of the world, or different parts. end. The first part, then, is distinguished on the first day, Reply to Objection 4. The nature of light, as existing and adorned on the fourth, the middle part distinguished in a subject, was made on the first day; and the making of 363 the luminaries on the fourth day does not mean that their from His works: and for this reason it was right that the substance was produced anew, but that they then received seventh day should be mentioned after the six. It may a form that they had not before, as said above (q. 70, a. 1 also be said, with the other writers, that the world entered ad 2). on the seventh day upon a new state, in that nothing new Reply to Objection 5. According to Augustine (Gen. was to be added to it, and that therefore the seventh day is ad lit. iv, 15), after all that has been recorded that is mentioned after the six, from its being devoted to cessa- assigned to the six days, something distinct is attributed tion from work. to the seventh—namely, that on it God rested in Himself Whether all these days are one day? Ia q. 74 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that all these days are the first of the Divine works, the second day their knowl- one day. For it is written (Gn. 2:4,5): “These are the edge of the second work, and similarly with the rest. Thus, generations of the heaven and the earth, when they were then, each work is said to have been wrought in some one created, in the day that the Lord. . . made the heaven and of these days, inasmuch as God wrought in some one of the earth, and every plant of the field, before it sprung up these days, inasmuch as God wrought nothing in the uni- in the earth.” Therefore the day in which God made “the verse without impressing the knowledge thereof on the an- heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field,” is one gelic mind; which can know many things at the same time, and the same day. But He made the heaven and the earth especially in the Word, in Whom all angelic knowledge on the first day, or rather before there was any day, but the is perfected and terminated. So the distinction of days plant of the field He made on the third day. Therefore the denotes the natural order of the things known, and not first and third days are but one day, and for a like reason a succession in the knowledge acquired, or in the things all the rest. produced. Moreover, angelic knowledge is appropriately Objection 2. Further, it is said (Ecclus. 18:1): “He called “day,” since light, the cause of day, is to be found that liveth for ever, created all things together.” But this in spiritual things, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. iv, would not be the case if the days of these works were more 28). In the opinion of the others, however, the days signify than one. Therefore they are not many but one only. a succession both in time, and in the things produced. Objection 3. Further, on the seventh day God ceased If, however, these two explanations are looked at as from all new works. If, then, the seventh day is distinct referring to the mode of production, they will be found from the other days, it follows that He did not make that not greatly to differ, if the diversity of opinion existing on day; which is not admissible. two points, as already shown (q. 67, a. 1; q. 69, a. 1), be- Objection 4. Further, the entire work ascribed to one tween Augustine and other writers is taken into account. day God perfected in an instant, for with each work are First, because Augustine takes the earth and the water as the words (God) “said. . . . and it was. . . done.” If, then, He first created, to signify matter totally without form; but had kept back His next work to another day, it would fol- the making of the firmament, the gathering of the waters, low that for the remainder of a day He would have ceased and the appearing of dry land, to denote the impression from working and left it vacant, which would be superflu- of forms upon corporeal matter. But other holy writers ous. The day, therefore, of the preceding work is one with take the earth and the water, as first created, to signify the day of the work that follows. the elements of the universe themselves existing under the On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1), “The evening proper forms, and the works that follow to mean some sort and the morning were the second day. . . the third day,” and of distinction in bodies previously existing, as also has so on. But where there is a second and third there are more been shown (q. 67, Aa. 1,4; q. 69, a. 1 ). Secondly, some than one. There was not, therefore, only one day. writers hold that plants and animals were produced actu- I answer that, On this question Augustine differs ally in the work of the six days; Augustine, that they were from other expositors. His opinion is that all the days that produced potentially. Now the opinion of Augustine, that are called seven, are one day represented in a sevenfold the works of the six days were simultaneous, is consis- aspect (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22; De Civ. Dei xi, 9; Ad Oro- tent with either view of the mode of production. For the sium xxvi); while others consider there were seven dis- other writers agree with him that in the first production tinct days, not one only. Now, these two opinions, taken as of things matter existed under the substantial form of the explaining the literal text of Genesis, are certainly widely elements, and agree with him also that in the first institut- different. For Augustine understands by the word “day,” ing of the world animals and plants did not exist actually. the knowledge in the mind of the angels, and hence, ac- There remains, however, a difference as to four points; cording to him, the first day denotes their knowledge of since, according to the latter, there was a time, after the 364 production of creatures, in which light did not exist, the and adornment. Hence the word “creation” is significant. firmament had not been formed, and the earth was still Reply to Objection 3. On the seventh day God ceased covered by the waters, nor had the heavenly bodies been from making new things, but not from providing for their formed, which is the fourth difference; which are not con- increase, and to this latter work it belongs that the first day sistent with Augustine’s explanation. In order, therefore, is succeeded by other days. to be impartial, we must meet the arguments of either side. Reply to Objection 4. All things were not distin- Reply to Objection 1. On the day on which God cre- guished and adorned together, not from a want of power ated the heaven and the earth, He created also every plant on God’s part, as requiring time in which to work, but of the field, not, indeed, actually, but “before it sprung up that due order might be observed in the instituting of the in the earth,” that is, potentially. And this work Augus- world. Hence it was fitting that different days should be tine ascribes to the third day, but other writers to the first assigned to the different states of the world, as each suc- instituting of the world. ceeding work added to the world a fresh state of perfec- Reply to Objection 2. God created all things together tion. so far as regards their substance in some measure form- Reply to Objection 5. According to Augustine, the less. But He did not create all things together, so far as order of days refers to the natural order of the works at- regards that formation of things which lies in distinction tributed to the days. Whether Scripture uses suitable words to express the work of the six days? Ia q. 74 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem the Scripture does not use ad lit. i, 4), the person of the Son is mentioned both in suitable words to express the works of the six days. For as the first creation of the world, and in its distinction and light, the firmament, and other similar works were made adornment, but differently in either place. For distinction by the Word of God, so were the heaven and the earth. and adornment belong to the work by which the world re- For “all things were made by Him” (Jn. 1:3). Therefore ceives its form. But as the giving form to a work of art is in the creation of heaven and earth, as in the other works, by means of the form of the art in the mind of the artist, mention should have been made of the Word of God. which may be called his intelligible word, so the giving Objection 2. Further, the water was created by God, form to every creature is by the word of God; and for this yet its creation is not mentioned. Therefore the creation reason in the works of distinction and adornment the Word of the world is not sufficiently described. is mentioned. But in creation the Son is mentioned as the Objection 3. Further, it is said (Gn. 1:31): “God saw beginning, by the words, “In the beginning God created,” all the things that He had made, and they were very good.” since by creation is understood the production of formless It ought, then, to have been said of each work, “God saw matter. But according to those who hold that the elements that it was good.” The omission, therefore, of these words were created from the first under their proper forms, an- in the work of creation and in that of the second day, is other explanation must be given; and therefore Basil says not fitting. (Hom. ii, iii in Hexaem.) that the words, “God said,” Objection 4. Further, the Spirit of God is God Him- signify a Divine command. Such a command, however, self. But it does not befit God to move and to occupy could not have been given before creatures had been pro- place. Therefore the words, “The Spirit of God moved duced that could obey it. over the waters,” are unbecoming. Reply to Objection 2. According to Augustine (De Objection 5. Further, what is already made is not Civ. Dei ix, 33), by the heaven is understood the formless made over again. Therefore to the words, “God said: Let spiritual nature, and by the earth, the formless matter of all the firmament be made. . . and it was so,” it is superfluous corporeal things, and thus no creature is omitted. But, ac- to add, “God made the firmament.” And the like is to be cording to Basil (Hom. i in Hexaem.), the heaven and the said of other works. earth, as the two extremes, are alone mentioned, the inter- Objection 6. Further, evening and morning do not vening things being left to be understood, since all these sufficiently divide the day, since the day has many parts. move heavenwards, if light, or earthwards, if heavy. And Therefore the words, “The evening and morning were the others say that under the word, “earth,” Scripture is ac- second day” or, “the third day,” are not suitable. customed to include all the four elements as (Ps. 148:7,8) Objection 7. Further, “first,” not “one,” corresponds after the words, “Praise the Lord from the earth,” is added, to “second” and “third.” It should therefore have been said “fire, hail, snow, and ice.” that, “The evening and the morning were the first day,” Reply to Objection 3. In the account of the creation rather than “one day.” there is found something to correspond to the words, “God Reply to Objection 1. According to Augustine (Gen. saw that it was good,” used in the work of distinction and 365 adornment, and this appears from the consideration that over that which was incomplete and unfinished, since that the Holy Spirit is Love. Now, “there are two things,” says movement is not one of place, but of pre-eminent power, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 8) which came from God’s love as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 7). It is the opinion, of His creatures, their existence and their permanence. however, of Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) that the Spirit That they might then exist, and exist permanently, “the moved over the element of water, “fostering and quick- Spirit of God,” it is said, “moved over the waters”—that is ening its nature and impressing vital power, as the hen to say, over that formless matter, signified by water, even broods over her chickens.” For water has especially a life- as the love of the artist moves over the materials of his art, giving power, since many animals are generated in water, that out of them he may form his work. And the words, and the seed of all animals is liquid. Also the life of the “God saw that it was good,” signify that the things that soul is given by the water of baptism, according to Jn. 3:5: He had made were to endure, since they express a certain “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, satisfaction taken by God in His works, as of an artist in he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.” his art: not as though He knew the creature otherwise, or Reply to Objection 5. According to Augustine (Gen. that the creature was pleasing to Him otherwise, than be- ad lit. i, 8), these three phrases denote the threefold being fore He made it. Thus in either work, of creation and of of creatures; first, their being in the Word, denoted by the formation, the Trinity of Persons is implied. In creation command “Let. . . be made”; secondly, their being in the the Person of the Father is indicated by God the Creator, angelic mind, signified by the words, “It was. . . done”; the Person of the Son by the beginning, in which He cre- thirdly, their being in their proper nature, by the words, ated, and the Person of the Holy Ghost by the Spirit that “He made.” And because the formation of the angels is moved over the waters. But in the formation, the Person recorded on the first day, it was not necessary there to add, of the Father is indicated by God that speaks, and the Per- “He made.” It may also be said, following other writers, son of the Son by the Word in which He speaks, and the that the words, “He said,” and “Let. . . be made,” denote Person of the Holy Spirit by the satisfaction with which God’s command, and the words, “It was done,” the fulfil- God saw that what was made was good. And if the words, ment of that command. But as it was necessary, for the “God saw that it was good,” are not said of the work of sake of those especially who have asserted that all visible the second day, this is because the work of distinguishing things were made by the angels, to mention how things the waters was only begun on that day, but perfected on were made, it is added, in order to remove that error, that the third. Hence these words, that are said of the third God Himself made them. Hence, in each work, after the day, refer also to the second. Or it may be that Scrip- words, “It was done,” some act of God is expressed by ture does not use these words of approval of the second some such words as, “He made,” or, “He divided,” or, “He days’ work, because this is concerned with the distinction called.” of things not evident to the senses of mankind. Or, again, Reply to Objection 6. According to Augustine (Gen. because by the firmament is simply understood the cloudy ad lit. iv, 22,30), by the “evening” and the “morning” are region of the air, which is not one of the permanent parts understood the evening and the morning knowledge of the of the universe, nor of the principal divisions of the world. angels, which has been explained (q. 58, a. 6,7). But, ac- The above three reasons are given by Rabbi Moses∗, and cording to Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.), the entire period to these may be added a mystical one derived from num- takes its name, as is customary, from its more important bers and assigned by some writers, according to whom part, the day. And instance of this is found in the words the work of the second day is not marked with approval of Jacob, “The days of my pilgrimage,” where night is not because the second number is an imperfect number, as re- mentioned at all. But the evening and the morning are ceding from the perfection of unity. mentioned as being the ends of the day, since day begins Reply to Objection 4. Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii) un- with morning and ends with evening, or because evening derstands by the “Spirit of the Lord,” the air or the wind, denotes the beginning of night, and morning the beginning as Plato also did, and says that it is so called according to of day. It seems fitting, also, that where the first distinction the custom of Scripture, in which these things are through-of creatures is described, divisions of time should be de- out attributed to God. But according to the holy writers, noted only by what marks their beginning. And the reason the Spirit of the Lord signifies the Holy Ghost, Who is for mentioning the evening first is that as the evening ends said to “move over the water”—that is to say, over what the day, which begins with the light, the termination of the Augustine holds to mean formless matter, lest it should light at evening precedes the termination of the darkness, be supposed that God loved of necessity the works He which ends with the morning. But Chrysostom’s explana- was to produce, as though He stood in need of them. For tion is that thereby it is intended to show that the natural love of that kind is subject to, not superior to, the object of day does not end with the evening, but with the morning love. Moreover, it is fittingly implied that the Spirit moved (Hom. v in Gen.). ∗ Perplex. ii. 366 Reply to Objection 7. The words “one day” are used to the point from which it commenced its course. And when day is first instituted, to denote that one day is made yet another, because at the completion of a week of seven up of twenty-four hours. Hence, by mentioning “one,” the days, the first day returns which is one with the eighth day. measure of a natural day is fixed. Another reason may be The three reasons assigned above are those given by Basil to signify that a day is completed by the return of the sun (Hom. ii in Hexaem.). 367 FIRST PART, QUESTION 75 Of Man Who Is Composed of a Spiritual and a Corporeal Substance: And in the First Place, Concerning What Belongs to the Essence of the Soul (In Seven Articles) Having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we now proceed to treat of man, who is composed of a spiritual and corporeal substance. We shall treat first of the nature of man, and secondly of his origin. Now the theologian considers the nature of man in relation to the soul; but not in relation to the body, except in so far as the body has relation to the soul. Hence the first object of our consideration will be the soul. And since Dionysius (Ang. Hier. xi) says that three things are to be found in spiritual substances—essence, power, and operation—we shall treat first of what belongs to the essence of the soul; secondly, of what belongs to its power; thirdly, of what belongs to its operation. Concerning the first, two points have to be considered; the first is the nature of the soul considered in itself; the second is the union of the soul with the body. Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry. (1) Whether the soul is a body? (2) Whether the human soul is a subsistence? (3) Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent? (4) Whether the soul is man, or is man composed of soul and body? (5) Whether the soul is composed of matter and form? (6) Whether the soul is incorruptible? (7) Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel? Whether the soul is a body? Ia q. 75 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the soul is a body. For imate.” Now life is shown principally by two actions, the soul is the moving principle of the body. Nor does it knowledge and movement. The philosophers of old, not move unless moved. First, because seemingly nothing can being able to rise above their imagination, supposed that move unless it is itself moved, since nothing gives what it the principle of these actions was something corporeal: has not; for instance, what is not hot does not give heat. for they asserted that only bodies were real things; and Secondly, because if there be anything that moves and is that what is not corporeal is nothing: hence they main- not moved, it must be the cause of eternal, unchanging tained that the soul is something corporeal. This opinion movement, as we find proved Phys. viii, 6; and this does can be proved to be false in many ways; but we shall make not appear to be the case in the movement of an animal, use of only one proof, based on universal and certain prin- which is caused by the soul. Therefore the soul is a mover ciples, which shows clearly that the soul is not a body. moved. But every mover moved is a body. Therefore the It is manifest that not every principle of vital action is soul is a body. a soul, for then the eye would be a soul, as it is a princi- Objection 2. Further, all knowledge is caused by ple of vision; and the same might be applied to the other means of a likeness. But there can be no likeness of a body instruments of the soul: but it is the “first” principle of to an incorporeal thing. If, therefore, the soul were not a life, which we call the soul. Now, though a body may be body, it could not have knowledge of corporeal things. a principle of life, or to be a living thing, as the heart is Objection 3. Further, between the mover and the a principle of life in an animal, yet nothing corporeal can moved there must be contact. But contact is only between be the first principle of life. For it is clear that to be a bodies. Since, therefore, the soul moves the body, it seems principle of life, or to be a living thing, does not belong that the soul must be a body. to a body as such; since, if that were the case, every body On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6) that would be a living thing, or a principle of life. Therefore the soul “is simple in comparison with the body, inasmuch a body is competent to be a living thing or even a princi- as it does not occupy space by its bulk.” ple of life, as “such” a body. Now that it is actually such I answer that, To seek the nature of the soul, we must a body, it owes to some principle which is called its act. premise that the soul is defined as the first principle of Therefore the soul, which is the first principle of life, is life of those things which live: for we call living things not a body, but the act of a body; thus heat, which is the “animate,”∗, and those things which have no life, “inan- principle of calefaction, is not a body, but an act of a body. ∗ i.e. having a soul 368 Reply to Objection 1. As everything which is in mo-Reply to Objection 2. The likeness of a thing known tion must be moved by something else, a process which is not of necessity actually in the nature of the knower; cannot be prolonged indefinitely, we must allow that not but given a thing which knows potentially, and afterwards every mover is moved. For, since to be moved is to pass knows actually, the likeness of the thing known must be from potentiality to actuality, the mover gives what it has in the nature of the knower, not actually, but only poten- to the thing moved, inasmuch as it causes it to be in act. tially; thus color is not actually in the pupil of the eye, but But, as is shown in Phys. viii, 6, there is a mover which only potentially. Hence it is necessary, not that the like- is altogether immovable, and not moved either essentially, ness of corporeal things should be actually in the nature of or accidentally; and such a mover can cause an invariable the soul, but that there be a potentiality in the soul for such movement. There is, however, another kind of mover, a likeness. But the ancient philosophers omitted to distin- which, though not moved essentially, is moved acciden- guish between actuality and potentiality; and so they held tally; and for this reason it does not cause an invariable that the soul must be a body in order to have knowledge of movement; such a mover, is the soul. There is, again, a body; and that it must be composed of the principles of another mover, which is moved essentially—namely, the which all bodies are formed in order to know all bodies. body. And because the philosophers of old believed that Reply to Objection 3. There are two kinds of contact; nothing existed but bodies, they maintained that every of “quantity,” and of “power.” By the former a body can mover is moved; and that the soul is moved directly, and be touched only by a body; by the latter a body can be is a body. touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves that body. Whether the human soul is something subsistent? Ia q. 75 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the human soul is not that which is in it naturally would impede the knowl- something subsistent. For that which subsists is said to be edge of anything else. Thus we observe that a sick man’s “this particular thing.” Now “this particular thing” is said tongue being vitiated by a feverish and bitter humor, is in- not of the soul, but of that which is composed of soul and sensible to anything sweet, and everything seems bitter to body. Therefore the soul is not something subsistent. it. Therefore, if the intellectual principle contained the na- Objection 2. Further, everything subsistent operates. ture of a body it would be unable to know all bodies. Now But the soul does not operate; for, as the Philosopher says every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore it (De Anima i, 4), “to say that the soul feels or understands is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It is like saying that the soul weaves or builds.” Therefore is likewise impossible for it to understand by means of a the soul is not subsistent. bodily organ; since the determinate nature of that organ Objection 3. Further, if the soul were subsistent, it would impede knowledge of all bodies; as when a certain would have some operation apart from the body. But it determinate color is not only in the pupil of the eye, but has no operation apart from the body, not even that of un- also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase seems to be of derstanding: for the act of understanding does not take that same color. place without a phantasm, which cannot exist apart from Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the the body. Therefore the human soul is not something sub- mind or the intellect has an operation “per se” apart from sistent. the body. Now only that which subsists can have an oper- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 7): ation “per se.” For nothing can operate but what is actual: “Who understands that the nature of the soul is that of for which reason we do not say that heat imparts heat, but a substance and not that of a body, will see that those who that what is hot gives heat. We must conclude, therefore, maintain the corporeal nature of the soul, are led astray that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the through associating with the soul those things without mind, is something incorporeal and subsistent. which they are unable to think of any nature—i.e. imagi- Reply to Objection 1. “This particular thing” can be nary pictures of corporeal things.” Therefore the nature of taken in two senses. Firstly, for anything subsistent; sec- the human intellect is not only incorporeal, but it is also a ondly, for that which subsists, and is complete in a specific substance, that is, something subsistent. nature. The former sense excludes the inherence of an ac- I answer that, It must necessarily be allowed that the cident or of a material form; the latter excludes also the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, imperfection of the part, so that a hand can be called “this is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent. For it is particular thing” in the first sense, but not in the second. clear that by means of the intellect man can have knowl- Therefore, as the human soul is a part of human nature, edge of all corporeal things. Now whatever knows certain it can indeed be called “this particular thing,” in the first things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because sense, as being something subsistent; but not in the sec- 369 ond, for in this sense, what is composed of body and soul say that man sees with the eye, and feels with the hand, is said to be “this particular thing.” and not in the same sense as when we say that what is Reply to Objection 2. Aristotle wrote those words as hot gives heat by its heat; for heat, strictly speaking, does expressing not his own opinion, but the opinion of those not give heat. We may therefore say that the soul under- who said that to understand is to be moved, as is clear stands, as the eye sees; but it is more correct to say that from the context. Or we may reply that to operate “per man understands through the soul. se” belongs to what exists “per se.” But for a thing to ex- Reply to Objection 3. The body is necessary for the ist “per se,” it suffices sometimes that it be not inherent, action of the intellect, not as its origin of action, but on as an accident or a material form; even though it be part the part of the object; for the phantasm is to the intellect of something. Nevertheless, that is rightly said to subsist what color is to the sight. Neither does such a dependence “per se,” which is neither inherent in the above sense, nor on the body prove the intellect to be non-subsistent; oth- part of anything else. In this sense, the eye or the hand erwise it would follow that an animal is non-subsistent, cannot be said to subsist “per se”; nor can it for that rea- since it requires external objects of the senses in order to son be said to operate “per se.” Hence the operation of the perform its act of perception. parts is through each part attributed to the whole. For we Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent? Ia q. 75 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the souls of brute an- the sensitive soul has no “per se” operation of its own, imals are subsistent. For man is of the same ‘genus’ as and that every operation of the sensitive soul belongs to other animals; and, as we have just shown (a. 2), the soul the composite. Wherefore we conclude that as the souls of man is subsistent. Therefore the souls of other animals of brute animals have no “per se” operations they are not are subsistent. subsistent. For the operation of anything follows the mode Objection 2. Further, the relation of the sensitive fac- of its being. ulty to sensible objects is like the relation of the intellec- Reply to Objection 1. Although man is of the same tual faculty to intelligible objects. But the intellect, apart “genus” as other animals, he is of a different “species.” from the body, apprehends intelligible objects. Therefore Specific difference is derived from the difference of form; the sensitive faculty, apart from the body, perceives sen- nor does every difference of form necessarily imply a di- sible objects. Therefore, since the souls of brute animals versity of “genus.” are sensitive, it follows that they are subsistent; just as the Reply to Objection 2. The relation of the sensitive human intellectual soul is subsistent. faculty to the sensible object is in one way the same as Objection 3. Further, the soul of brute animals moves that of the intellectual faculty to the intelligible object, in the body. But the body is not a mover, but is moved. so far as each is in potentiality to its object. But in another Therefore the soul of brute animals has an operation apart way their relations differ, inasmuch as the impression of from the body. the object on the sense is accompanied with change in the On the contrary, Is what is written in the book De body; so that excessive strength of the sensible corrupts Eccl. Dogm. xvi, xvii: “Man alone we believe to have a sense; a thing that never occurs in the case of the intellect. subsistent soul: whereas the souls of animals are not sub- For an intellect that understands the highest of intelligible sistent.” objects is more able afterwards to understand those that I answer that, The ancient philosophers made no dis- are lower. If, however, in the process of intellectual oper- tinction between sense and intellect, and referred both a ation the body is weary, this result is accidental, inasmuch corporeal principle, as has been said (a. 1). Plato, how- as the intellect requires the operation of the sensitive pow- ever, drew a distinction between intellect and sense; yet he ers in the production of the phantasms. referred both to an incorporeal principle, maintaining that Reply to Objection 3. Motive power is of two kinds. sensing, just as understanding, belongs to the soul as such. One, the appetitive power, commands motion. The oper- From this it follows that even the souls of brute animals ation of this power in the sensitive soul is not apart from are subsistent. But Aristotle held that of the operations the body; for anger, joy, and passions of a like nature are of the soul, understanding alone is performed without a accompanied by a change in the body. The other motive corporeal organ. On the other hand, sensation and the power is that which executes motion in adapting the mem- consequent operations of the sensitive soul are evidently bers for obeying the appetite; and the act of this power accompanied with change in the body; thus in the act of does not consist in moving, but in being moved. Whence vision, the pupil of the eye is affected by a reflection of it is clear that to move is not an act of the sensitive soul color: and so with the other senses. Hence it is clear that without the body. 370 Whether the soul is man? Ia q. 75 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the soul is man. For it species, must belong to the substance of the species. is written (2 Cor. 4:16): “Though our outward man is cor- It may also be understood in this sense, that this soul rupted, yet the inward man is renewed day by day.” But is this man; and this could be held if it were supposed that which is within man is the soul. Therefore the soul is that the operation of the sensitive soul were proper to it, the inward man. apart from the body; because in that case all the operations Objection 2. Further, the human soul is a substance. which are attributed to man would belong to the soul only; But it is not a universal substance. Therefore it is a partic- and whatever performs the operations proper to a thing, is ular substance. Therefore it is a “hypostasis” or a person; that thing; wherefore that which performs the operations and it can only be a human person. Therefore the soul is of a man is man. But it has been shown above (a. 3) that man; for a human person is a man. sensation is not the operation of the soul only. Since, then, On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 3) com- sensation is an operation of man, but not proper to him, it mends Varro as holding “that man is not a mere soul, nor is clear that man is not a soul only, but something com- a mere body; but both soul and body.” posed of soul and body. Plato, through supposing that I answer that, The assertion “the soul is man,” can sensation was proper to the soul, could maintain man to be taken in two senses. First, that man is a soul; though be a soul making use of the body. this particular man, Socrates, for instance, is not a soul, Reply to Objection 1. According to the Philosopher but composed of soul and body. I say this, forasmuch (Ethic. ix, 8), a thing seems to be chiefly what is princi- as some held that the form alone belongs to the species; ple in it; thus what the governor of a state does, the state while matter is part of the individual, and not the species. is said to do. In this way sometimes what is principle This cannot be true; for to the nature of the species be- in man is said to be man; sometimes, indeed, the intel- longs what the definition signifies; and in natural things lectual part which, in accordance with truth, is called the the definition does not signify the form only, but the form “inward” man; and sometimes the sensitive part with the and the matter. Hence in natural things the matter is part body is called man in the opinion of those whose observa- of the species; not, indeed, signate matter, which is the tion does not go beyond the senses. And this is called the principle of individuality; but the common matter. For as “outward” man. it belongs to the notion of this particular man to be com- Reply to Objection 2. Not every particular substance posed of this soul, of this flesh, and of these bones; so is a hypostasis or a person, but that which has the com- it belongs to the notion of man to be composed of soul, plete nature of its species. Hence a hand, or a foot, is not flesh, and bones; for whatever belongs in common to the called a hypostasis, or a person; nor, likewise, is the soul substance of all the individuals contained under a given alone so called, since it is a part of the human species. Whether the soul is composed of matter and form? Ia q. 75 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the soul is composed virtue. Therefore matter is in the soul. of matter and form. For potentiality is opposed to actu- Objection 3. Further, things which have no matter, ality. Now, whatsoever things are in actuality participate have no cause of their existence, as the Philosopher says of the First Act, which is God; by participation of Whom, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6). But the soul has a cause of its all things are good, are beings, and are living things, as existence, since it is created by God. Therefore the soul is clear from the teaching of Dionysius (Div. Nom. v). has matter. Therefore whatsoever things are in potentiality participate Objection 4. Further, what has no matter, and is a of the first potentiality. But the first potentiality is pri- form only, is a pure act, and is infinite. But this belongs to mary matter. Therefore, since the human soul is, after a God alone. Therefore the soul has matter. manner, in potentiality; which appears from the fact that On the contrary, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9) sometimes a man is potentially understanding; it seems proves that the soul was made neither of corporeal matter, that the human soul must participate of primary matter, as nor of spiritual matter. part of itself. I answer that, The soul has no matter. We may con- Objection 2. Further, wherever the properties of mat- sider this question in two ways. First, from the notion of ter are found, there matter is. But the properties of matter a soul in general; for it belongs to the notion of a soul to are found in the soul—namely, to be a subject, and to be be the form of a body. Now, either it is a form by virtue changed, for it is a subject to science, and virtue; and it of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue of some part of itself. changes from ignorance to knowledge and from vice to If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it is impossible 371 that any part of it should be matter, if by matter we un-tentiality in the intellectual soul is other than the receptive derstand something purely potential: for a form, as such, potentiality of first matter, as appears from the diversity of is an act; and that which is purely potentiality cannot be the things received by each. For primary matter receives part of an act, since potentiality is repugnant to actual- individual forms; whereas the intelligence receives abso- ity as being opposite thereto. If, however, it be a form by lute forms. Hence the existence of such a potentiality in virtue of a part of itself, then we call that part the soul: and the intellectual soul does not prove that the soul is com-that matter, which it actualizes first, we call the “primary posed of matter and form. animate.” Reply to Objection 2. To be a subject and to be Secondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of changed belong to matter by reason of its being in poten- the human soul inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is tiality. As, therefore, the potentiality of the intelligence is clear that whatever is received into something is received one thing and the potentiality of primary matter another, according to the condition of the recipient. Now a thing is so in each is there a different reason of subjection and known in as far as its form is in the knower. But the in- change. For the intelligence is subject to knowledge, and tellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely: for is changed from ignorance to knowledge, by reason of its instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and there- being in potentiality with regard to the intelligible species. fore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal Reply to Objection 3. The form causes matter to be, idea, is in the intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual and so does the agent; wherefore the agent causes mat- soul itself is an absolute form, and not something com- ter to be, so far as it actualizes it by transmuting it to the posed of matter and form. For if the intellectual soul were act of a form. A subsistent form, however, does not owe composed of matter and form, the forms of things would its existence to some formal principle, nor has it a cause be received into it as individuals, and so it would only transmuting it from potentiality to act. So after the words know the individual: just as it happens with the sensitive quoted above, the Philosopher concludes, that in things powers which receive forms in a corporeal organ; since composed of matter and form “there is no other cause but matter is the principle by which forms are individualized. that which moves from potentiality to act; while whatso- It follows, therefore, that the intellectual soul, and every ever things have no matter are simply beings at once.”∗ intellectual substance which has knowledge of forms ab- Reply to Objection 4. Everything participated is solutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form. compared to the participator as its act. But whatever cre- Reply to Objection 1. The First Act is the universal ated form be supposed to subsist “per se,” must have ex- principle of all acts; because It is infinite, virtually “pre- istence by participation; for “even life,” or anything of containing all things,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). that sort, “is a participator of existence,” as Dionysius says Wherefore things participate of It not as a part of them- (Div. Nom. v). Now participated existence is limited by selves, but by diffusion of Its processions. Now as poten- the capacity of the participator; so that God alone, Who tiality is receptive of act, it must be proportionate to act. is His own existence, is pure act and infinite. But in in- But the acts received which proceed from the First Infi- tellectual substances there is composition of actuality and nite Act, and are participations thereof, are diverse, so that potentiality, not, indeed, of matter and form, but of form there cannot be one potentiality which receives all acts, as and participated existence. Wherefore some say that they there is one act, from which all participated acts are de- are composed of that “whereby they are” and that “which rived; for then the receptive potentiality would equal the they are”; for existence itself is that by which a thing is. active potentiality of the First Act. Now the receptive po- Whether the human soul is incorruptible? Ia q. 75 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the human soul is But the souls of brute animals are corruptible. Therefore, corruptible. For those things that have a like beginning also, the human soul is corruptible. and process seemingly have a like end. But the begin- Objection 2. Further, whatever is out of nothing can ning, by generation, of men is like that of animals, for return to nothingness; because the end should correspond they are made from the earth. And the process of life is to the beginning. But as it is written (Wis. 2:2), “We are alike in both; because “all things breathe alike, and man born of nothing”; which is true, not only of the body, but hath nothing more than the beast,” as it is written (Eccles. also of the soul. Therefore, as is concluded in the same 3:19). Therefore, as the same text concludes, “the death of passage, “After this we shall be as if we had not been,” man and beast is one, and the condition of both is equal.” even as to our soul. ∗ The Leonine edition has, “simpliciter sunt quod vere entia aliquid.” The Parma edition of St. Thomas’s Commentary on Aristotle has, “sta-tim per se unum quiddam est. . . et ens quiddam.” 372 Objection 3. Further, nothing is without its own of contraries are not themselves contrary, since contraries proper operation. But the operation proper to the soul, belong to the same knowledge. Therefore it is impossi- which is to understand through a phantasm, cannot be ble for the intellectual soul to be corruptible. Moreover without the body. For the soul understands nothing with- we may take a sign of this from the fact that everything out a phantasm; and there is no phantasm without the body naturally aspires to existence after its own manner. Now, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1). Therefore the in things that have knowledge, desire ensues upon knowl- soul cannot survive the dissolution of the body. edge. The senses indeed do not know existence, except On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that under the conditions of “here” and “now,” whereas the in- human souls owe to Divine goodness that they are “intel- tellect apprehends existence absolutely, and for all time; lectual,” and that they have “an incorruptible substantial so that everything that has an intellect naturally desires life.” always to exist. But a natural desire cannot be in vain. I answer that, We must assert that the intellectual Therefore every intellectual substance is incorruptible. principle which we call the human soul is incorruptible. Reply to Objection 1. Solomon reasons thus in the For a thing may be corrupted in two ways—“per se,” and person of the foolish, as expressed in the words of Wis- accidentally. Now it is impossible for any substance to be dom 2. Therefore the saying that man and animals have generated or corrupted accidentally, that is, by the gener- a like beginning in generation is true of the body; for all ation or corruption of something else. For generation and animals alike are made of earth. But it is not true of the corruption belong to a thing, just as existence belongs to soul. For the souls of brutes are produced by some power it, which is acquired by generation and lost by corruption. of the body; whereas the human soul is produced by God. Therefore, whatever has existence “per se” cannot be gen- To signify this it is written as to other animals: “Let the erated or corrupted except ‘per se’; while things which do earth bring forth the living soul” (Gn. 1:24): while of not subsist, such as accidents and material forms, acquire man it is written (Gn. 2:7) that “He breathed into his face existence or lost it through the generation or corruption the breath of life.” And so in the last chapter of Ecclesi- of composite things. Now it was shown above (Aa. 2,3) astes (12:7) it is concluded: ”(Before) the dust return into that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the its earth from whence it was; and the spirit return to God human soul is; so that the souls of brutes are corrupted, Who gave it.” Again the process of life is alike as to the when their bodies are corrupted; while the human soul body, concerning which it is written (Eccles. 3:19): “All could not be corrupted unless it were corrupted “per se.” things breathe alike,” and (Wis. 2:2), “The breath in our This, indeed, is impossible, not only as regards the human nostrils is smoke.” But the process is not alike of the soul; soul, but also as regards anything subsistent that is a form for man is intelligent, whereas animals are not. Hence it alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing by virtue is false to say: “Man has nothing more than beasts.” Thus of itself is inseparable from it; but existence belongs to a death comes to both alike as to the body, by not as to the form, which is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore mat- soul. ter acquires actual existence as it acquires the form; while Reply to Objection 2. As a thing can be created by it is corrupted so far as the form is separated from it. But reason, not of a passive potentiality, but only of the active it is impossible for a form to be separated from itself; and potentiality of the Creator, Who can produce something therefore it is impossible for a subsistent form to cease to out of nothing, so when we say that a thing can be reduced exist. to nothing, we do not imply in the creature a potentiality Granted even that the soul is composed of matter and to non-existence, but in the Creator the power of ceasing form, as some pretend, we should nevertheless have to to sustain existence. But a thing is said to be corruptible maintain that it is incorruptible. For corruption is found because there is in it a potentiality to non-existence. only where there is contrariety; since generation and cor- Reply to Objection 3. To understand through a phan- ruption are from contraries and into contraries. Wherefore tasm is the proper operation of the soul by virtue of its the heavenly bodies, since they have no matter subject to union with the body. After separation from the body it contrariety, are incorruptible. Now there can be no con- will have another mode of understanding, similar to other trariety in the intellectual soul; for it receives according substances separated from bodies, as will appear later on to the manner of its existence, and those things which (q. 89, a. 1). it receives are without contrariety; for the notions even 373 Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel? Ia q. 75 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the soul is of the fect than another; and the same applies to other species, same species as an angel. For each thing is ordained to because differences which divide a “genus” are contrary its proper end by the nature of its species, whence is de- to one another. Contraries, however, are compared to one rived its inclination for that end. But the end of the soul is another as the perfect to the imperfect, since the “prin- the same as that of an angel—namely, eternal happiness. ciple of contrariety is habit, and privation thereof,” as is Therefore they are of the same species. written Metaph. x (Did. ix, 4). The same would follow Objection 2. Further, the ultimate specific differ- if the aforesaid substances were composed of matter and ence is the noblest, because it completes the nature of the form. For if the matter of one be distinct from the matter species. But there is nothing nobler either in an angel or of another, it follows that either the form is the principle in the soul than their intellectual nature. Therefore the of the distinction of matter—that is to say, that the matter soul and the angel agree in the ultimate specific differ- is distinct on account of its relation to divers forms; and ence: therefore they belong to the same species. even then there would result a difference of species and Objection 3. Further, it seems that the soul does not inequality of nature: or else the matter is the principle of differ from an angel except in its union with the body. But the distinction of forms. But one matter cannot be distinct as the body is outside the essence of the soul, it seems that from another, except by a distinction of quantity, which it does not belong to its species. Therefore the soul and has no place in these incorporeal substances, such as an angel are of the same species. angel and the soul. So that it is not possible for the angel On the contrary, Things which have different natural and the soul to be of the same species. How it is that there operations are of different species. But the natural oper- can be many souls of one species will be explained later ations of the soul and of an angel are different; since, as (q. 76, a. 2, ad 1). Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), “Angelic minds have sim- Reply to Objection 1. This argument proceeds from ple and blessed intelligence, not gathering their knowl- the proximate and natural end. Eternal happiness is the edge of Divine things from visible things.” Subsequently ultimate and supernatural end. he says the contrary to this of the soul. Therefore the soul Reply to Objection 2. The ultimate specific differ- and an angel are not of the same species. ence is the noblest because it is the most determinate, I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon iii, 5) held that in the same way as actuality is nobler than potentiality. human souls and angels are all of the same species; and Thus, however, the intellectual faculty is not the noblest, this because he supposed that in these substances the dif- because it is indeterminate and common to many degrees ference of degree was accidental, as resulting from their of intellectuality; as the sensible faculty is common to free-will: as we have seen above (q. 47, a. 2). But this can- many degrees in the sensible nature. Hence, as all sensible not be; for in incorporeal substances there cannot be diver- things are not of one species, so neither are all intellectual sity of number without diversity of species and inequality things of one species. of nature; because, as they are not composed of matter and Reply to Objection 3. The body is not of the essence form, but are subsistent forms, it is clear that there is nec- of the soul; but the soul by the nature of its essence can essarily among them a diversity of species. For a separate be united to the body, so that, properly speaking, not the form cannot be understood otherwise than as one of a sin- soul alone, but the “composite,” is the species. And the gle species; thus, supposing a separate whiteness to exist, very fact that the soul in a certain way requires the body it could only be one; forasmuch as one whiteness does not for its operation, proves that the soul is endowed with a differ from another except as in this or that subject. But grade of intellectuality inferior to that of an angel, who is diversity of species is always accompanied with a diver- not united to a body. sity of nature; thus in species of colors one is more per- 374 FIRST PART, QUESTION 76 Of the Union of Body and Soul (In Eight Articles) We now consider the union of the soul with the body; and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form? (2) Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied numerically according to the number of bodies; or is there one intelligence for all men? (3) Whether in the body the form of which is an intellectual principle, there is some other soul? (4) Whether in the body there is any other substantial form? (5) Of the qualities required in the body of which the intellectual principle is the form? (6) Whether it be united to such a body by means of another body? (7) Whether by means of an accident? (8) Whether the soul is wholly in each part of the body? Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form? Ia q. 76 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that the intellectual principle is is not united to the body as its form; because a form is not united to the body as its form. For the Philosopher that by which a thing exists: so that the very existence of says (De Anima iii, 4) that the intellect is “separate,” and a form does not belong to the form by itself. But the intel- that it is not the act of any body. Therefore it is not united lectual principle has “per se” existence and is subsistent, to the body as its form. as was said above (q. 75, a. 2). Therefore it is not united Objection 2. Further, every form is determined ac- to the body as its form. cording to the nature of the matter of which it is the form; Objection 6. Further, whatever exists in a thing by otherwise no proportion would be required between mat- reason of its nature exists in it always. But to be united to ter and form. Therefore if the intellect were united to the matter belongs to the form by reason of its nature; because body as its form, since every body has a determinate na- form is the act of matter, not by an accidental quality, but ture, it would follow that the intellect has a determinate by its own essence; otherwise matter and form would not nature; and thus, it would not be capable of knowing all make a thing substantially one, but only accidentally one. things, as is clear from what has been said (q. 75, a. 2); Therefore a form cannot be without its own proper mat- which is contrary to the nature of the intellect. Therefore ter. But the intellectual principle, since it is incorruptible, the intellect is not united to the body as its form. as was shown above (q. 75, a. 6), remains separate from Objection 3. Further, whatever receptive power is an the body, after the dissolution of the body. Therefore the act of a body, receives a form materially and individu- intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form. ally; for what is received must be received according to On the contrary, According to the Philosopher, the condition of the receiver. But the form of the thing un- Metaph. viii (Did. vii 2), difference is derived from the derstood is not received into the intellect materially and form. But the difference which constitutes man is “ratio- individually, but rather immaterially and universally: oth- nal,” which is applied to man on account of his intellectual erwise the intellect would not be capable of the knowledge principle. Therefore the intellectual principle is the form of immaterial and universal objects, but only of individu- of man. als, like the senses. Therefore the intellect is not united to I answer that, We must assert that the intellect which the body as its form. is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of Objection 4. Further, power and action have the same the human body. For that whereby primarily anything subject; for the same subject is what can, and does, act. acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be at- But the intellectual action is not the action of a body, as tributed: for instance, that whereby a body is primarily appears from above (q. 75, a. 2). Therefore neither is healed is health, and that whereby the soul knows primar- the intellectual faculty a power of the body. But virtue ily is knowledge; hence health is a form of the body, and or power cannot be more abstract or more simple than knowledge is a form of the soul. The reason is because the essence from which the faculty or power is derived. nothing acts except so far as it is in act; wherefore a thing Therefore neither is the substance of the intellect the form acts by that whereby it is in act. Now it is clear that the of a body. first thing by which the body lives is the soul. And as life Objection 5. Further, whatever has “per se” existence appears through various operations in different degrees of 375 living things, that whereby we primarily perform each of Some, however, tried to maintain that the intellect is all these vital actions is the soul. For the soul is the pri- united to the body as its motor; and hence that the intel- mary principle of our nourishment, sensation, and local lect and body form one thing so that the act of the intellect movement; and likewise of our understanding. Therefore could be attributed to the whole. This is, however, absurd this principle by which we primarily understand, whether for many reasons. First, because the intellect does not it be called the intellect or the intellectual soul, is the form move the body except through the appetite, the movement of the body. This is the demonstration used by Aristotle of which presupposes the operation of the intellect. The (De Anima ii, 2). reason therefore why Socrates understands is not because But if anyone says that the intellectual soul is not the he is moved by his intellect, but rather, contrariwise, he is form of the body he must first explain how it is that this ac- moved by his intellect because he understands. Secondly, tion of understanding is the action of this particular man; because since Socrates is an individual in a nature of one for each one is conscious that it is himself who under- essence composed of matter and form, if the intellect be stands. Now an action may be attributed to anyone in not the form, it follows that it must be outside the essence, three ways, as is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. v, 1); and then the intellect is the whole Socrates as a motor to for a thing is said to move or act, either by virtue of its the thing moved. Whereas the act of intellect remains in whole self, for instance, as a physician heals; or by virtue the agent, and does not pass into something else, as does of a part, as a man sees by his eye; or through an acciden- the action of heating. Therefore the action of understand- tal quality, as when we say that something that is white ing cannot be attributed to Socrates for the reason that he builds, because it is accidental to the builder to be white. is moved by his intellect. Thirdly, because the action of So when we say that Socrates or Plato understands, it is a motor is never attributed to the thing moved, except as clear that this is not attributed to him accidentally; since to an instrument; as the action of a carpenter to a saw. it is ascribed to him as man, which is predicated of him Therefore if understanding is attributed to Socrates, as the essentially. We must therefore say either that Socrates un- action of what moves him, it follows that it is attributed to derstands by virtue of his whole self, as Plato maintained, him as to an instrument. This is contrary to the teaching holding that man is an intellectual soul; or that intelli- of the Philosopher, who holds that understanding is not gence is a part of Socrates. The first cannot stand, as was possible through a corporeal instrument (De Anima iii, shown above (q. 75, a. 4), for this reason, that it is one and 4). Fourthly, because, although the action of a part be at- the same man who is conscious both that he understands, tributed to the whole, as the action of the eye is attributed and that he senses. But one cannot sense without a body: to a man; yet it is never attributed to another part, except therefore the body must be some part of man. It follows perhaps indirectly; for we do not say that the hand sees be- therefore that the intellect by which Socrates understands cause the eye sees. Therefore if the intellect and Socrates is a part of Socrates, so that in some way it is united to the are united in the above manner, the action of the intellect body of Socrates. cannot be attributed to Socrates. If, however, Socrates be a The Commentator held that this union is through the whole composed of a union of the intellect with whatever intelligible species, as having a double subject, in the pos- else belongs to Socrates, and still the intellect be united to sible intellect, and in the phantasms which are in the cor- those other things only as a motor, it follows that Socrates poreal organs. Thus through the intelligible species the is not one absolutely, and consequently neither a being possible intellect is linked to the body of this or that par- absolutely, for a thing is a being according as it is one. ticular man. But this link or union does not sufficiently There remains, therefore, no other explanation than explain the fact, that the act of the intellect is the act that given by Aristotle—namely, that this particular man of Socrates. This can be clearly seen from comparison understands, because the intellectual principle is his form. with the sensitive faculty, from which Aristotle proceeds Thus from the very operation of the intellect it is made to consider things relating to the intellect. For the relation clear that the intellectual principle is united to the body as of phantasms to the intellect is like the relation of colors to its form. the sense of sight, as he says De Anima iii, 5,7. Therefore, The same can be clearly shown from the nature of the as the species of colors are in the sight, so are the species human species. For the nature of each thing is shown by of phantasms in the possible intellect. Now it is clear that its operation. Now the proper operation of man as man because the colors, the images of which are in the sight, is to understand; because he thereby surpasses all other are on a wall, the action of seeing is not attributed to the animals. Whence Aristotle concludes (Ethic. x, 7) that wall: for we do not say that the wall sees, but rather that it the ultimate happiness of man must consist in this oper- is seen. Therefore, from the fact that the species of phan- ation as properly belonging to him. Man must therefore tasms are in the possible intellect, it does not follow that derive his species from that which is the principle of this Socrates, in whom are the phantasms, understands, but operation. But the species of anything is derived from its that he or his phantasms are understood. form. It follows therefore that the intellectual principle is 376 the proper form of man. organ, like the act of seeing. But it exists in matter so far But we must observe that the nobler a form is, the as the soul itself, to which this power belongs, is the form more it rises above corporeal matter, the less it is merged of the body, and the term of human generation. And so in matter, and the more it excels matter by its power and the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that the intellect is its operation; hence we find that the form of a mixed body separate, because it is not the faculty of a corporeal organ. has another operation not caused by its elemental quali- From this it is clear how to answer the Second and ties. And the higher we advance in the nobility of forms, Third objections: since, in order that man may be able the more we find that the power of the form excels the el- to understand all things by means of his intellect, and that ementary matter; as the vegetative soul excels the form of his intellect may understand immaterial things and univer- the metal, and the sensitive soul excels the vegetative soul. sals, it is sufficient that the intellectual power be not the Now the human soul is the highest and noblest of forms. act of the body. Wherefore it excels corporeal matter in its power by the Reply to Objection 4. The human soul, by reason of fact that it has an operation and a power in which corpo- its perfection, is not a form merged in matter, or entirely real matter has no share whatever. This power is called embraced by matter. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the intellect. some power thereof not being the act of the body, although It is well to remark that if anyone holds that the soul the soul is essentially the form of the body. is composed of matter and form, it would follow that in Reply to Objection 5. The soul communicates that no way could the soul be the form of the body. For since existence in which it subsists to the corporeal matter, out the form is an act, and matter is only in potentiality, that of which and the intellectual soul there results unity of which is composed of matter and form cannot be the form existence; so that the existence of the whole composite is of another by virtue of itself as a whole. But if it is a form also the existence of the soul. This is not the case with by virtue of some part of itself, then that part which is the other non-subsistent forms. For this reason the human form we call the soul, and that of which it is the form we soul retains its own existence after the dissolution of the call the “primary animate,” as was said above (q. 75, a. 5). body; whereas it is not so with other forms. Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher says (Phys. Reply to Objection 6. To be united to the body be- ii, 2), the ultimate natural form to which the consideration longs to the soul by reason of itself, as it belongs to a light of the natural philosopher is directed is indeed separate; body by reason of itself to be raised up. And as a light yet it exists in matter. He proves this from the fact that body remains light, when removed from its proper place, “man and the sun generate man from matter.” It is sepa- retaining meanwhile an aptitude and an inclination for its rate indeed according to its intellectual power, because the proper place; so the human soul retains its proper exis- intellectual power does not belong to a corporeal organ, as tence when separated from the body, having an aptitude the power of seeing is the act of the eye; for understand- and a natural inclination to be united to the body. ing is an act which cannot be performed by a corporeal Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied according to the number of bodies? Ia q. 76 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual prin- your intellect, my intellect is an individual, and so is ciple is not multiplied according to the number of bodies, yours; for individuals are things which differ in num- but that there is one intellect in all men. For an immaterial ber but agree in one species. Now whatever is received substance is not multiplied in number within one species. into anything must be received according to the condi- But the human soul is an immaterial substance; since it tion of the receiver. Therefore the species of things would is not composed of matter and form as was shown above be received individually into my intellect, and also into (q. 75, a. 5). Therefore there are not many human souls yours: which is contrary to the nature of the intellect in one species. But all men are of one species. Therefore which knows universals. there is but one intellect in all men. Objection 4. Further, the thing understood is in the Objection 2. Further, when the cause is removed, the intellect which understands. If, therefore, my intellect effect is also removed. Therefore, if human souls were is distinct from yours, what is understood by me must multiplied according to the number of bodies, it follows be distinct from what is understood by you; and con- that the bodies being removed, the number of souls would sequently it will be reckoned as something individual, not remain; but from all the souls there would be but a and be only potentially something understood; so that the single remainder. This is heretical; for it would do away common intention will have to be abstracted from both; with the distinction of rewards and punishments. since from things diverse something intelligible common Objection 3. Further, if my intellect is distinct from to them may be abstracted. But this is contrary to the na- 377 ture of the intellect; for then the intellect would seem not one stroke. Now it is clear that no matter how the intellect to be distinct from the imagination. It seems, therefore, to is united or coupled to this or that man, the intellect has follow that there is one intellect in all men. the precedence of all the other things which appertain to Objection 5. Further, when the disciple receives man; for the sensitive powers obey the intellect, and are knowledge from the master, it cannot be said that the mas- at its service. Therefore, if we suppose two men to have ter’s knowledge begets knowledge in the disciple, because several intellects and one sense—for instance, if two men then also knowledge would be an active form, such as heat had one eye—there would be several seers, but one sight. is, which is clearly false. It seems, therefore, that the same But if there is one intellect, no matter how diverse may individual knowledge which is in the master is commu- be all those things of which the intellect makes use as in- nicated to the disciple; which cannot be, unless there is struments, in no way is it possible to say that Socrates and one intellect in both. Seemingly, therefore, the intellect of Plato are otherwise than one understanding man. And if to the disciple and master is but one; and, consequently, the this we add that to understand, which is the act of the in- same applies to all men. tellect, is not affected by any organ other than the intellect Objection 6. Further, Augustine (De Quant. Animae itself; it will further follow that there is but one agent and xxxii) says: “If I were to say that there are many human one action: that is to say that all men are but one “under- souls, I should laugh at myself.” But the soul seems to be stander,” and have but one act of understanding, in regard, one chiefly on account of the intellect. Therefore there is that is, of one intelligible object. one intellect of all men. However, it would be possible to distinguish my in- On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) tellectual action form yours by the distinction of the that the relation of universal causes to universals is like phantasms—that is to say, were there one phantasm of a the relation of particular causes to individuals. But it is stone in me, and another in you—if the phantasm itself, impossible that a soul, one in species, should belong to as it is one thing in me and another in you, were a form animals of different species. Therefore it is impossible of the possible intellect; since the same agent according that one individual intellectual soul should belong to sev- to divers forms produces divers actions; as, according to eral individuals. divers forms of things with regard to the same eye, there I answer that, It is absolutely impossible for one in- are divers visions. But the phantasm itself is not a form tellect to belong to all men. This is clear if, as Plato of the possible intellect; it is the intelligible species ab- maintained, man is the intellect itself. For it would fol- stracted from the phantasm that is a form. Now in one low that Socrates and Plato are one man; and that they are intellect, from different phantasms of the same species, not distinct from each other, except by something outside only one intelligible species is abstracted; as appears in the essence of each. The distinction between Socrates and one man, in whom there may be different phantasms of a Plato would be no other than that of one man with a tunic stone; yet from all of them only one intelligible species and another with a cloak; which is quite absurd. of a stone is abstracted; by which the intellect of that one It is likewise clear that this is impossible if, according man, by one operation, understands the nature of a stone, to the opinion of Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), it is supposed notwithstanding the diversity of phantasms. Therefore, if that the intellect is a part or a power of the soul which is there were one intellect for all men, the diversity of phan- the form of man. For it is impossible for many distinct tasms which are in this one and that one would not cause individuals to have one form, as it is impossible for them a diversity of intellectual operation in this man and that to have one existence, for the form is the principle of ex- man. It follows, therefore, that it is altogether impossible istence. and unreasonable to maintain that there exists one intellect Again, this is clearly impossible, whatever one may for all men. hold as to the manner of the union of the intellect to this Reply to Objection 1. Although the intellectual soul, or that man. For it is manifest that, supposing there is one like an angel, has no matter from which it is produced, principal agent, and two instruments, we can say that there yet it is the form of a certain matter; in which it is unlike is one agent absolutely, but several actions; as when one an angel. Therefore, according to the division of matter, man touches several things with his two hands, there will there are many souls of one species; while it is quite im- be one who touches, but two contacts. If, on the contrary, possible for many angels to be of one species. we suppose one instrument and several principal agents, Reply to Objection 2. Everything has unity in the we might say that there are several agents, but one act; same way that it has being; consequently we must judge for example, if there be many drawing a ship by means of the multiplicity of a thing as we judge of its being. Now of a rope; there will be many drawing, but one pull. If, it is clear that the intellectual soul, by virtue of its very be-however, there is one principal agent, and one instrument, ing, is united to the body as its form; yet, after the dissolu- we say that there is one agent and one action, as when the tion of the body, the intellectual soul retains its own being. smith strikes with one hammer, there is one striker and In like manner the multiplicity of souls is in proportion to 378 the multiplicity of the bodies; yet, after the dissolution of cording to its likeness; for “the stone is not in the soul, but the bodies, the souls retain their multiplied being. its likeness is,” as is said, De Anima iii, 8. Yet it is the Reply to Objection 3. Individuality of the intelligent stone which is understood, not the likeness of the stone; being, or of the species whereby it understands, does not except by a reflection of the intellect on itself: otherwise, exclude the understanding of universals; otherwise, since the objects of sciences would not be things, but only intel- separate intellects are subsistent substances, and conse- ligible species. Now it happens that different things, ac- quently individual, they could not understand universals. cording to different forms, are likened to the same thing. But the materiality of the knower, and of the species And since knowledge is begotten according to the assimi- whereby it knows, impedes the knowledge of the uni- lation of the knower to the thing known, it follows that the versal. For as every action is according to the mode of same thing may happen to be known by several knowers; the form by which the agent acts, as heating is accord- as is apparent in regard to the senses; for several see the ing to the mode of the heat; so knowledge is according same color, according to different likenesses. In the same to the mode of the species by which the knower knows. way several intellects understand one object understood. Now it is clear that common nature becomes distinct and But there is this difference, according to the opinion of multiplied by reason of the individuating principles which Aristotle, between the sense and the intelligence—that a come from the matter. Therefore if the form, which is the thing is perceived by the sense according to the disposi- means of knowledge, is material—that is, not abstracted tion which it has outside the soul —that is, in its individu- from material conditions—its likeness to the nature of a ality; whereas the nature of the thing understood is indeed species or genus will be according to the distinction and outside the soul, but the mode according to which it exists multiplication of that nature by means of individuating outside the soul is not the mode according to which it is principles; so that knowledge of the nature of a thing understood. For the common nature is understood as apart in general will be impossible. But if the species be ab- from the individuating principles; whereas such is not its stracted from the conditions of individual matter, there mode of existence outside the soul. But, according to the will be a likeness of the nature without those things which opinion of Plato, the thing understood exists outside the make it distinct and multiplied; thus there will be knowl- soul in the same condition as those under which it is un- edge of the universal. Nor does it matter, as to this particu- derstood; for he supposed that the natures of things exist lar point, whether there be one intellect or many; because, separate from matter. even if there were but one, it would necessarily be an in- Reply to Objection 5. One knowledge exists in the dividual intellect, and the species whereby it understands, disciple and another in the master. How it is caused will an individual species. be shown later on (q. 117, a. 1). Reply to Objection 4. Whether the intellect be one or Reply to Objection 6. Augustine denies a plurality of many, what is understood is one; for what is understood souls, that would involve a plurality of species. is in the intellect, not according to its own nature, but ac- Whether besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different Ia q. 76 a. 3 from one another? Objection 1. It would seem that besides the intellec- soul; and, therefore, “animal” will not be one genus com- tual soul there are in man other souls essentially different mon to man and other animals, which is absurd. from one another, such as the sensitive soul and the nu- Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says, Metaph. tritive soul. For corruptible and incorruptible are not of viii (Did. vii, 2), that the genus is taken from the matter, the same substance. But the intellectual soul is incorrupt- and difference from the form. But “rational,” which is the ible; whereas the other souls, as the sensitive and the nu- difference constituting man, is taken from the intellectual tritive, are corruptible, as was shown above (q. 75, a. 6). soul; while he is called “animal” by reason of his having Therefore in man the essence of the intellectual soul, the a body animated by a sensitive soul. Therefore the intel- sensitive soul, and the nutritive soul, cannot be the same. lectual soul may be compared to the body animated by a Objection 2. Further, if it be said that the sensitive sensitive soul, as form to matter. Therefore in man the in- soul in man is incorruptible; on the contrary, “corruptible tellectual soul is not essentially the same as the sensitive and incorruptible differ generically,” says the Philosopher, soul, but presupposes it as a material subject. Metaph. x (Did. ix, 10). But the sensitive soul in the On the contrary, It is said in the book De Ecclesias- horse, the lion, and other brute animals, is corruptible. If, ticis Dogmatibus xv: “Nor do we say that there are two therefore, in man it be incorruptible, the sensitive soul in souls in one man, as James and other Syrians write; one, man and brute animals will not be of the same “genus.” animal, by which the body is animated, and which is min- Now an animal is so called from its having a sensitive gled with the blood; the other, spiritual, which obeys the 379 reason; but we say that it is one and the same soul in man, other, the subject belonging to the definition of the predi-that both gives life to the body by being united to it, and cate; as a surface is presupposed to color; so that if we say orders itself by its own reasoning.” that a body with a surface is colored, we have the second I answer that, Plato held that there were several souls manner of essential predication.) Therefore, if we have in one body, distinct even as to organs, to which souls he one form by which a thing is an animal, and another form referred the different vital actions, saying that the nutri- by which it is a man, it follows either that one of these tive power is in the liver, the concupiscible in the heart, two things could not be predicated of the other, except ac- and the power of knowledge in the brain. Which opinion cidentally, supposing these two forms not to be ordered to is rejected by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), with regard to one another—or that one would be predicated of the other those parts of the soul which use corporeal organs; for this according to the second manner of essential predication, reason, that in those animals which continue to live when if one soul be presupposed to the other. But both of these they have been divided in each part are observed the oper- consequences are clearly false: because “animal” is pred- ations of the soul, as sense and appetite. Now this would icated of man essentially and not accidentally; and man is not be the case if the various principles of the soul’s op- not part of the definition of an animal, but the other way erations were essentially different, and distributed in the about. Therefore of necessity by the same form a thing is various parts of the body. But with regard to the intellec- animal and man; otherwise man would not really be the tual part, he seems to leave it in doubt whether it be “only thing which is an animal, so that animal can be essentially logically” distinct from the other parts of the soul, “or also predicated of man. locally.” Thirdly, this is shown to be impossible by the fact that The opinion of Plato might be maintained if, as he when one operation of the soul is intense it impedes an- held, the soul was supposed to be united to the body, not other, which could never be the case unless the principle as its form, but as its motor. For it involves nothing unrea- of action were essentially one. sonable that the same movable thing be moved by several We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive motors; and still less if it be moved according to its vari- soul, the intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are nu- ous parts. If we suppose, however, that the soul is united merically one soul. This can easily be explained, if we to the body as its form, it is quite impossible for several consider the differences of species and forms. For we ob- essentially different souls to be in one body. This can be serve that the species and forms of things differ from one made clear by three different reasons. another, as the perfect and imperfect; as in the order of In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely things, the animate are more perfect than the inanimate, one, in which there were several souls. For nothing is ab- and animals more perfect than plants, and man than brute solutely one except by one form, by which a thing has animals; and in each of these genera there are various de- existence: because a thing has from the same source both grees. For this reason Aristotle, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 3), existence and unity; and therefore things which are de- compares the species of things to numbers, which differ nominated by various forms are not absolutely one; as, in species by the addition or subtraction of unity. And for instance, “a white man.” If, therefore, man were ‘liv- (De Anima ii, 3) he compares the various souls to the ing’ by one form, the vegetative soul, and ‘animal’ by an- species of figures, one of which contains another; as a other form, the sensitive soul, and “man” by another form, pentagon contains and exceeds a tetragon. Thus the in- the intellectual soul, it would follow that man is not abso- tellectual soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the lutely one. Thus Aristotle argues, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, sensitive soul of brute animals, and to the nutritive souls 6), against Plato, that if the idea of an animal is distinct of plants. Therefore, as a surface which is of a pentagonal from the idea of a biped, then a biped animal is not ab- shape, is not tetragonal by one shape, and pentagonal by solutely one. For this reason, against those who hold that another—since a tetragonal shape would be superfluous there are several souls in the body, he asks (De Anima as contained in the pentagonal—so neither is Socrates a i, 5), “what contains them?”—that is, what makes them man by one soul, and animal by another; but by one and one? It cannot be said that they are united by the one the same soul he is both animal and man. body; because rather does the soul contain the body and Reply to Objection 1. The sensitive soul is incorrupt- make it one, than the reverse. ible, not by reason of its being sensitive, but by reason of Secondly, this is proved to be impossible by the man- its being intellectual. When, therefore, a soul is sensitive ner in which one thing is predicated of another. Those only, it is corruptible; but when with sensibility it has also things which are derived from various forms are predi- intellectuality, it is incorruptible. For although sensibility cated of one another, either accidentally, (if the forms are does not give incorruptibility, yet it cannot deprive intel- not ordered to one another, as when we say that something lectuality of its incorruptibility. white is sweet), or essentially, in the second manner of Reply to Objection 2. Not forms, but composites, are essential predication, (if the forms are ordered one to an- classified either generically or specifically. Now man is 380 corruptible like other animals. And so the difference of ner of understanding, because reason can apprehend one corruptible and incorruptible which is on the part of the and the same thing in various ways. Therefore since, as forms does not involve a generic difference between man we have said, the intellectual soul contains virtually what and the other animals. belongs to the sensitive soul, and something more, rea- Reply to Objection 3. The embryo has first of all a son can consider separately what belongs to the power of soul which is merely sensitive, and when this is removed, the sensitive soul, as something imperfect and material. it is supplanted by a more perfect soul, which is both sen- And because it observes that this is something common to sitive and intellectual: as will be shown further on (q. 118, man and to other animals, it forms thence the notion of the a. 2, ad 2). “genus”; while that wherein the intellectual soul exceeds Reply to Objection 4. We must not consider the di- the sensitive soul, it takes as formal and perfecting; thence versity of natural things as proceeding from the various it gathers the “difference” of man. logical notions or intentions, which flow from our man- Whether in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul? Ia q. 76 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that in man there is an- is not united to the body as its form, but only as its mo- other form besides the intellectual soul. For the Philoso- tor, as the Platonists maintain, it would necessarily follow pher says (De Anima ii, 1), that “the soul is the act of a that in man there is another substantial form, by which the physical body which has life potentially.” Therefore the body is established in its being as movable by the soul. If, soul is to the body as a form of matter. But the body has however, the intellectual soul be united to the body as its a substantial form by which it is a body. Therefore some substantial form, as we have said above (a. 1), it is impos- other substantial form in the body precedes the soul. sible for another substantial form besides the intellectual Objection 2. Further, man moves himself as every soul to be found in man. animal does. Now everything that moves itself is di- In order to make this evident, we must consider that vided into two parts, of which one moves, and the other the substantial form differs from the accidental form in is moved, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5). But this, that the accidental form does not make a thing to be the part which moves is the soul. Therefore the other part “simply,” but to be “such,” as heat does not make a thing must be such that it can be moved. But primary matter to be simply, but only to be hot. Therefore by the coming cannot be moved (Phys. v, 1), since it is a being only of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or potentially; indeed everything that is moved is a body. generated simply, but to be made such, or to be in some Therefore in man and in every animal there must be an- particular condition; and in like manner, when an acci- other substantial form, by which the body is constituted. dental form is removed, a thing is said to be corrupted, Objection 3. Further, the order of forms depends on not simply, but relatively. Now the substantial form gives their relation to primary matter; for “before” and “after” being simply; therefore by its coming a thing is said to apply by comparison to some beginning. Therefore if be generated simply; and by its removal to be corrupted there were not in man some other substantial form besides simply. For this reason, the old natural philosophers, who the rational soul, and if this were to inhere immediately held that primary matter was some actual being—for in- to primary matter; it would follow that it ranks among the stance, fire or air, or something of that sort—maintained most imperfect forms which inhere to matter immediately. that nothing is generated simply, or corrupted simply; and Objection 4. Further, the human body is a mixed stated that “every becoming is nothing but an alteration,” body. Now mingling does not result from matter alone; as we read, Phys. i, 4. Therefore, if besides the intel- for then we should have mere corruption. Therefore the lectual soul there pre-existed in matter another substantial forms of the elements must remain in a mixed body; and form by which the subject of the soul were made an ac- these are substantial forms. Therefore in the human body tual being, it would follow that the soul does not give be- there are other substantial forms besides the intellectual ing simply; and consequently that it is not the substantial soul. form: and so at the advent of the soul there would not be On the contrary, Of one thing there is but one sub- simple generation; nor at its removal simple corruption, stantial being. But the substantial form gives substantial all of which is clearly false. being. Therefore of one thing there is but one substan- Whence we must conclude, that there is no other sub- tial form. But the soul is the substantial form of man. stantial form in man besides the intellectual soul; and that Therefore it is impossible for there to be in man another the soul, as it virtually contains the sensitive and nutritive substantial form besides the intellectual soul. souls, so does it virtually contain all inferior forms, and I answer that, If we suppose that the intellectual soul itself alone does whatever the imperfect forms do in other 381 things. The same is to be said of the sensitive soul in brute body; and that the mixture is made by the contrary quali-animals, and of the nutritive soul in plants, and universally ties of the elements being reduced to an average. But this of all more perfect forms with regard to the imperfect. is impossible, because the various forms of the elements Reply to Objection 1. Aristotle does not say that the must necessarily be in various parts of matter; for the dis- soul is the act of a body only, but “the act of a physical tinction of which we must suppose dimensions, without organic body which has life potentially”; and that this po- which matter cannot be divisible. Now matter subject to tentiality “does not reject the soul.” Whence it is clear that dimension is not to be found except in a body. But various when the soul is called the act, the soul itself is included; bodies cannot be in the same place. Whence it follows that as when we say that heat is the act of what is hot, and elements in the mixed body would be distinct as to situ- light of what is lucid; not as though lucid and light were ation. And then there would not be a real mixture which two separate things, but because a thing is made lucid by is in respect of the whole; but only a mixture apparent to the light. In like manner, the soul is said to be the “act sense, by the juxtaposition of particles. of a body,” etc., because by the soul it is a body, and is Averroes maintained that the forms of elements, by organic, and has life potentially. Yet the first act is said reason of their imperfection, are a medium between ac- to be in potentiality to the second act, which is operation; cidental and substantial forms, and so can be “more” or for such a potentiality “does not reject”—that is, does not “less”; and therefore in the mixture they are modified and exclude—the soul. reduced to an average, so that one form emerges from Reply to Objection 2. The soul does not move the them. But this is even still more impossible. For the sub- body by its essence, as the form of the body, but by the stantial being of each thing consists in something indivisi- motive power, the act of which presupposes the body to ble, and every addition and subtraction varies the species, be already actualized by the soul: so that the soul by its as in numbers, as stated in Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 3); motive power is the part which moves; and the animate and consequently it is impossible for any substantial form body is the part moved. to receive “more” or “less.” Nor is it less impossible for Reply to Objection 3. We observe in matter various anything to be a medium between substance and accident. degrees of perfection, as existence, living, sensing, and Therefore we must say, in accordance with the understanding. Now what is added is always more per- Philosopher (De Gener. i, 10), that the forms of the el- fect. Therefore that form which gives matter only the first ements remain in the mixed body, not actually but vir- degree of perfection is the most imperfect; while that form tually. For the proper qualities of the elements remain, which gives the first, second, and third degree, and so on, though modified; and in them is the power of the elemen- is the most perfect: and yet it inheres to matter immedi- tary forms. This quality of the mixture is the proper dis- ately. position for the substantial form of the mixed body; for Reply to Objection 4. Avicenna held that the sub- instance, the form of a stone, or of any sort of soul. stantial forms of the elements remain entire in the mixed Whether the intellectual soul is properly united to such a body? Ia q. 76 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual soul Objection 4. Further, what is susceptible of a more is improperly united to such a body. For matter must be perfect form should itself be more perfect. But the intel- proportionate to the form. But the intellectual soul is in- lectual soul is the most perfect of souls. Therefore since corruptible. Therefore it is not properly united to a cor- the bodies of other animals are naturally provided with a ruptible body. covering, for instance, with hair instead of clothes, and Objection 2. Further, the intellectual soul is a per- hoofs instead of shoes; and are, moreover, naturally pro- fectly immaterial form; a proof whereof is its operation vided with arms, as claws, teeth, and horns; it seems that in which corporeal matter does not share. But the more the intellectual soul should not have been united to a body subtle is the body, the less has it of matter. Therefore the which is imperfect as being deprived of the above means soul should be united to a most subtle body, to fire, for of protection. instance, and not to a mixed body, still less to a terrestrial On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima body. ii, 1), that “the soul is the act of a physical organic body Objection 3. Further, since the form is the principle of having life potentially.” the species, one form cannot produce a variety of species. I answer that, Since the form is not for the matter, But the intellectual soul is one form. Therefore, it should but rather the matter for the form, we must gather from not be united to a body which is composed of parts be- the form the reason why the matter is such as it is; and longing to various species. not conversely. Now the intellectual soul, as we have seen 382 above (q. 55, a. 2) in the order of nature, holds the lowest by force of the matter itself. So the intellectual soul replace among intellectual substances; inasmuch as it is not quires a body of equable complexion, which, however, is naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth, as the angels corruptible by force of its matter. If, however, it be said are; but has to gather knowledge from individual things by that God could avoid this, we answer that in the forma- way of the senses, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But tion of natural things we do not consider what God might nature never fails in necessary things: therefore the intel- do; but what is suitable to the nature of things, as Augus- lectual soul had to be endowed not only with the power of tine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 1). God, however, provided in understanding, but also with the power of feeling. Now this case by applying a remedy against death in the gift of the action of the senses is not performed without a cor- grace. poreal instrument. Therefore it behooved the intellectual Reply to Objection 2. A body is not necessary to soul to be united to a body fitted to be a convenient organ the intellectual soul by reason of its intellectual operation of sense. considered as such; but on account of the sensitive power, Now all the other senses are based on the sense of which requires an organ of equable temperament. There- touch. But the organ of touch requires to be a medium fore the intellectual soul had to be united to such a body, between contraries, such as hot and cold, wet and dry, and and not to a simple element, or to a mixed body, in which the like, of which the sense of touch has the perception; fire was in excess; because otherwise there could not be an thus it is in potentiality with regard to contraries, and is equability of temperament. And this body of an equable able to perceive them. Therefore the more the organ of temperament has a dignity of its own by reason of its be- touch is reduced to an equable complexion, the more sen- ing remote from contraries, thereby resembling in a way sitive will be the touch. But the intellectual soul has the a heavenly body. power of sense in all its completeness; because what be- Reply to Objection 3. The parts of an animal, for in- longs to the inferior nature pre-exists more perfectly in stance, the eye, hand, flesh, and bones, and so forth, do the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Therefore not make the species; but the whole does, and therefore, the body to which the intellectual soul is united should be properly speaking, we cannot say that these are of differ- a mixed body, above others reduced to the most equable ent species, but that they are of various dispositions. This complexion. For this reason among animals, man has the is suitable to the intellectual soul, which, although it be best sense of touch. And among men, those who have the one in its essence, yet on account of its perfection, is man- best sense of touch have the best intelligence. A sign of ifold in power: and therefore, for its various operations it which is that we observe “those who are refined in body requires various dispositions in the parts of the body to are well endowed in mind,” as stated in De Anima ii, 9. which it is united. For this reason we observe that there Reply to Objection 1. Perhaps someone might at- is a greater variety of parts in perfect than in imperfect tempt to answer this by saying that before sin the human animals; and in these a greater variety than in plants. body was incorruptible. This answer does not seem suf- Reply to Objection 4. The intellectual soul as com- ficient; because before sin the human body was immortal prehending universals, has a power extending to the in- not by nature, but by a gift of Divine grace; otherwise its finite; therefore it cannot be limited by nature to cer- immortality would not be forfeited through sin, as neither tain fixed natural notions, or even to certain fixed means was the immortality of the devil. whether of defence or of clothing, as is the case with other Therefore we answer otherwise by observing that in animals, the souls of which are endowed with knowledge matter two conditions are to be found; one which is cho- and power in regard to fixed particular things. Instead of sen in order that the matter be suitable to the form; the all these, man has by nature his reason and his hands, other which follows by force of the first disposition. The which are “the organs of organs” (De Anima iii), since artisan, for instance, for the form of the saw chooses iron by their means man can make for himself instruments of adapted for cutting through hard material; but that the an infinite variety, and for any number of purposes. teeth of the saw may become blunt and rusted, follows Whether the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental Ia q. 76 a. 6 dispositions? Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual soul the substantial form; and therefore before the soul, since is united to the body through the medium of accidental the soul is a substantial form. dispositions. For every form exists in its proper disposed Objection 2. Further, various forms of one species re- matter. But dispositions to a form are accidents. There- quire various parts of matter. But various parts of matter fore we must presuppose accidents to be in matter before are unintelligible without division in measurable quanti- 383 ties. Therefore we must suppose dimensions in matter be-we have said above (a. 4). Wherefore it is impossible for fore the substantial forms, which are many belonging to any accidental dispositions to pre-exist in matter before one species. the substantial form, and consequently before the soul. Objection 3. Further, what is spiritual is connected Reply to Objection 1. As appears from what has with what is corporeal by virtual contact. But the virtue been already said (a. 4), the more perfect form virtually of the soul is its power. Therefore it seems that the soul contains whatever belongs to the inferior forms; therefore is united to the body by means of a power, which is an while remaining one and the same, it perfects matter ac- accident. cording to the various degrees of perfection. For the same On the contrary, Accident is posterior to substance, essential form makes man an actual being, a body, a living both in the order of time and in the order of reason, as the being, an animal, and a man. Now it is clear that to ev- Philosopher says, Metaph. vii (Did. vi, 1). Therefore it ery “genus” follow its own proper accidents. Therefore as is unintelligible that any accidental form exist in matter matter is apprehended as perfected in its existence, before before the soul, which is the substantial form. it is understood as corporeal, and so on; so those accidents I answer that, If the soul were united to the body, which belong to existence are understood to exist before merely as a motor, there would be nothing to prevent the corporeity; and thus dispositions are understood in mat- existence of certain dispositions mediating between the ter before the form, not as regards all its effects, but as soul and the body; on the contrary, they would be nec- regards the subsequent effect. essary, for on the part of the soul would be required the Reply to Objection 2. Dimensions of quantity are ac- power to move the body; and on the part of the body, a cidents consequent to the corporeity which belongs to the certain aptitude to be moved by the soul. whole matter. Wherefore matter, once understood as cor- If, however, the intellectual soul is united to the body poreal and measurable, can be understood as distinct in its as the substantial form, as we have already said above various parts, and as receptive of different forms accord- (a. 1), it is impossible for any accidental disposition to ing to the further degrees of perfection. For although it is come between the body and the soul, or between any sub- essentially the same form which gives matter the various stantial form whatever and its matter. The reason is be- degrees of perfection, as we have said (ad 1), yet it is con- cause since matter is in potentiality to all manner of acts sidered as different when brought under the observation in a certain order, what is absolutely first among the acts of reason. must be understood as being first in matter. Now the first Reply to Objection 3. A spiritual substance which among all acts is existence. Therefore, it is impossible is united to a body as its motor only, is united thereto by for matter to be apprehended as hot, or as having quan- power or virtue. But the intellectual soul is united by its tity, before it is actual. But matter has actual existence by very being to the body as a form; and yet it guides and the substantial form, which makes it to exist absolutely, as moves the body by its power and virtue. Whether the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body? Ia q. 76 a. 7 Objection 1. It seems that the soul is united to the an- ments, and unite them together. imal body by means of a body. For Augustine says (Gen. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, ad lit. vii, 19), that “the soul administers the body by 1): “We need not ask if the soul and body are one, as nei- light,” that is, by fire, “and by air, which is most akin to a ther do we ask if wax and its shape are one.” But the shape spirit.” But fire and air are bodies. Therefore the soul is is united to the wax without a body intervening. Therefore united to the human body by means of a body. also the soul is thus united to the body. Objection 2. Further, a link between two things seems I answer that, If the soul, according to the Platonists, to be that thing the removal of which involves the cessa-were united to the body merely as a motor, it would be tion of their union. But when breathing ceases, the soul is right to say that some other bodies must intervene between separated from the body. Therefore the breath, which is a the soul and body of man, or any animal whatever; for a subtle body, is the means of union between soul and body. motor naturally moves what is distant from it by means of Objection 3. Further, things which are very distant something nearer. from one another, are not united except by something be- If, however, the soul is united to the body as its form, tween them. But the intellectual soul is very distant from as we have said (a. 1), it is impossible for it to be united by the body, both because it is incorporeal, and because it means of another body. The reason of this is that a thing is is incorruptible. Therefore it seems to be united to the one, according as it is a being. Now the form, through it- body by means of an incorruptible body, and such would self, makes a thing to be actual since it is itself essentially be some heavenly light, which would harmonize the ele-an act; nor does it give existence by means of something 384 else. Wherefore the unity of a thing composed of matter the body as the form to matter. and form, is by virtue of the form itself, which by reason Reply to Objection 1. Augustine speaks there of the of its very nature is united to matter as its act. Nor is there soul as it moves the body; whence he uses the word “ad-any other cause of union except the agent, which causes ministration.” It is true that it moves the grosser parts of matter to be in act, as the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii the body by the more subtle parts. And the first instrument (Did. vii, 6). of the motive power is a kind of spirit, as the Philosopher From this it is clear how false are the opinions of those says in De causa motus animalium (De mot. animal. x). who maintained the existence of some mediate bodies be- Reply to Objection 2. The union of soul and body tween the soul and body of man. Of these certain Platon- ceases at the cessation of breath, not because this is the ists said that the intellectual soul has an incorruptible body means of union, but because of the removal of that dis- naturally united to it, from which it is never separated, and position by which the body is disposed for such a union. by means of which it is united to the corruptible body of Nevertheless the breath is a means of moving, as the first man. Others said that the soul is united to the body by instrument of motion. means of a corporeal spirit. Others said it is united to the Reply to Objection 3. The soul is indeed very dis- body by means of light, which, they say, is a body and of tant from the body, if we consider the condition of each the nature of the fifth essence; so that the vegetative soul separately: so that if each had a separate existence, many would be united to the body by means of the light of the means of connection would have to intervene. But inas- sidereal heaven; the sensible soul, by means of the light much as the soul is the form of the body, it has not an of the crystal heaven; and the intellectual soul by means existence apart from the existence of the body, but by its of the light of the empyrean heaven. Now all this is fic- own existence is united to the body immediately. This is tious and ridiculous: for light is not a body; and the fifth the case with every form which, if considered as an act, is essence does not enter materially into the composition of very distant from matter, which is a being only in poten- a mixed body (since it is unchangeable), but only virtu- tiality. ally: and lastly, because the soul is immediately united to Whether the soul is in each part of the body? Ia q. 76 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that the whole soul is not dent on the soul. Thus one part would not depend on an- in each part of the body; for the Philosopher says in De other; nor would one part be nobler than another; which causa motus animalium (De mot. animal. x): “It is not is clearly untrue. Therefore the soul is not in each part of necessary for the soul to be in each part of the body; it the body. suffices that it be in some principle of the body causing On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), that the other parts to live, for each part has a natural move- “in each body the whole soul is in the whole body, and in ment of its own.” each part is entire.” Objection 2. Further, the soul is in the body of which I answer that, As we have said, if the soul were united it is the act. But it is the act of an organic body. There- to the body merely as its motor, we might say that it is fore it exists only in an organic body. But each part of the not in each part of the body, but only in one part through human body is not an organic body. Therefore the whole which it would move the others. But since the soul is soul is not in each part. united to the body as its form, it must necessarily be in Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (De An- the whole body, and in each part thereof. For it is not an ima. ii, 1) that the relation of a part of the soul to a part accidental form, but the substantial form of the body. Now of the body, such as the sight to the pupil of the eye, is the the substantial form perfects not only the whole, but each same as the relation of the soul to the whole body of an part of the whole. For since a whole consists of parts, a animal. If, therefore, the whole soul is in each part of the form of the whole which does not give existence to each body, it follows that each part of the body is an animal. of the parts of the body, is a form consisting in compo- Objection 4. Further, all the powers of the soul are sition and order, such as the form of a house; and such rooted in the essence of the soul. If, therefore, the whole a form is accidental. But the soul is a substantial form; soul be in each part of the body, it follows that all the and therefore it must be the form and the act, not only of powers of the soul are in each part of the body; thus the the whole, but also of each part. Therefore, on the with- sight will be in the ear, and hearing in the eye, and this is drawal of the soul, as we do not speak of an animal or a absurd. man unless equivocally, as we speak of a painted animal Objection 5. Further, if the whole soul is in each part or a stone animal; so is it with the hand, the eye, the flesh of the body, each part of the body is immediately depen- and bones, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1). A 385 proof of which is, that on the withdrawal of the soul, no species and essence, then the whole whiteness is in each part of the body retains its proper action; although that part of a surface. which retains its species, retains the action of the species. Since, however, the soul has not quantitative totality, But act is in that which it actuates: wherefore the soul neither essentially, nor accidentally, as we have seen; it is must be in the whole body, and in each part thereof. enough to say that the whole soul is in each part of the That it is entire in each part thereof, may be concluded body, by totality of perfection and of essence, but not by from this, that since a whole is that which is divided into totality of power. For it is not in each part of the body, parts, there are three kinds of totality, corresponding to with regard to each of its powers; but with regard to sight, three kinds of division. There is a whole which is di- it is in the eye; and with regard to hearing, it is in the ear; vided into parts of quantity, as a whole line, or a whole and so forth. We must observe, however, that since the body. There is also a whole which is divided into logical soul requires variety of parts, its relation to the whole is and essential parts: as a thing defined is divided into the not the same as its relation to the parts; for to the whole parts of a definition, and a composite into matter and form. it is compared primarily and essentially, as to its proper There is, further, a third kind of whole which is potential, and proportionate perfectible; but to the parts, secondar- divided into virtual parts. The first kind of totality does ily, inasmuch as they are ordained to the whole. not apply to forms, except perhaps accidentally; and then Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking only to those forms, which have an indifferent relation- there of the motive power of the soul. ship to a quantitative whole and its parts; as whiteness, Reply to Objection 2. The soul is the act of an organic as far as its essence is concerned, is equally disposed to body, as of its primary and proportionate perfectible. be in the whole surface and in each part of the surface; Reply to Objection 3. An animal is that which is and, therefore, the surface being divided, the whiteness is composed of a soul and a whole body, which is the soul’s accidentally divided. But a form which requires variety primary and proportionate perfectible. Thus the soul is in the parts, such as a soul, and specially the soul of per- not in a part. Whence it does not follow that a part of an fect animals, is not equally related to the whole and the animal is an animal. parts: hence it is not divided accidentally when the whole Reply to Objection 4. Some of the powers of the soul is divided. So therefore quantitative totality cannot be at- are in it according as it exceeds the entire capacity of the tributed to the soul, either essentially or accidentally. But body, namely the intellect and the will; whence these pow- the second kind of totality, which depends on logical and ers are not said to be in any part of the body. Other powers essential perfection, properly and essentially belongs to are common to the soul and body; wherefore each of these forms: and likewise the virtual totality, because a form is powers need not be wherever the soul is, but only in that the principle of operation. part of the body, which is adapted to the operation of such Therefore if it be asked whether the whole whiteness a power. is in the whole surface and in each part thereof, it is neces- Reply to Objection 5. One part of the body is said to sary to distinguish. If we mean quantitative totality which be nobler than another, on account of the various powers, whiteness has accidentally, then the whole whiteness is of which the parts of the body are the organs. For that part not in each part of the surface. The same is to be said which is the organ of a nobler power, is a nobler part of of totality of power: since the whiteness which is in the the body: as also is that part which serves the same power whole surface moves the sight more than the whiteness in a nobler manner. which is in a small part thereof. But if we mean totality of 386 FIRST PART, QUESTION 77 Of Those Things Which Belong to the Powers of the Soul in General (In Eight Articles) We proceed to consider those things which belong to the powers of the soul; first, in general, secondly, in particular. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the essence of the soul is its power? (2) Whether there is one power of the soul, or several? (3) How the powers of the soul are distinguished from one another? (4) Of the orders of the powers, one to another; (5) Whether the powers of the soul are in it as in their subject? (6) Whether the powers flow from the essence of the soul? (7) Whether one power rises from another? (8) Whether all the powers of the soul remain in the soul after death? Whether the essence of the soul is its power? Ia q. 77 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the essence of the substantial differences; and they are taken from sense and soul is its power. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4), that reason, which are powers of the soul. Therefore the pow- “mind, knowledge, and love are in the soul substantially, ers of the soul are not accidents; and so it would seem that or, which is the same thing, essentially”: and (De Trin. x, the power of the soul is its own essence. 11), that “memory, understanding, and will are one life, On the contrary, Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi) says that one mind, one essence.” “heavenly spirits are divided into essence, power, and op- Objection 2. Further, the soul is nobler than primary eration.” Much more, then, in the soul is the essence dis- matter. But primary matter is its own potentiality. Much tinct from the virtue or power. more therefore is the soul its own power. I answer that, It is impossible to admit that the power Objection 3. Further, the substantial form is simpler of the soul is its essence, although some have maintained than the accidental form; a sign of which is that the sub- it. For the present purpose this may be proved in two stantial form is not intensified or relaxed, but is indivisi- ways. First, because, since power and act divide being ble. But the accidental form is its own power. Much more and every kind of being, we must refer a power and its act therefore is that substantial form which is the soul. to the same genus. Therefore, if the act be not in the genus Objection 4. Further, we sense by the sensitive power of substance, the power directed to that act cannot be in and we understand by the intellectual power. But “that by the genus of substance. Now the operation of the soul which we first sense and understand” is the soul, accord- is not in the genus of substance; for this belongs to God ing to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 2). Therefore the alone, whose operation is His own substance. Wherefore soul is its own power. the Divine power which is the principle of His operation Objection 5. Further, whatever does not belong to the is the Divine Essence itself. This cannot be true either of essence is an accident. Therefore if the power of the soul the soul, or of any creature; as we have said above when is something else besides the essence thereof, it is an ac- speaking of the angels (q. 54, a. 3). Secondly, this may be cident, which is contrary to Augustine, who says that the also shown to be impossible in the soul. For the soul by its foregoing (see obj. 1) “are not in the soul as in a subject very essence is an act. Therefore if the very essence of the as color or shape, or any other quality, or quantity, are in soul were the immediate principle of operation, whatever a body; for whatever is so, does not exceed the subject in has a soul would always have actual vital actions, as that which it is: Whereas the mind can love and know other which has a soul is always an actually living thing. For as things” (De Trin. ix, 4). a form the soul is not an act ordained to a further act, but Objection 6. Further, ” a simple form cannot be a sub- the ultimate term of generation. Wherefore, for it to be in ject.” But the soul is a simple form; since it is not com- potentiality to another act, does not belong to it according posed of matter and form, as we have said above (q. 75, to its essence, as a form, but according to its power. So the a. 5). Therefore the power of the soul cannot be in it as in soul itself, as the subject of its power, is called the first act, a subject. with a further relation to the second act. Now we observe Objection 7. Further, an accident is not the principle that what has a soul is not always actual with respect to of a substantial difference. But sensitive and rational are its vital operations; whence also it is said in the definition 387 of the soul, that it is “the act of a body having life poten-but not the proximate principle. In this sense the Philoso- tially”; which potentiality, however, “does not exclude the pher says that “the soul is that whereby we understand and soul.” Therefore it follows that the essence of the soul is sense.” not its power. For nothing is in potentiality by reason of Reply to Objection 5. If we take accident as mean- an act, as act. ing what is divided against substance, then there can be Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of the no medium between substance and accident; because they mind as it knows and loves itself. Thus knowledge and are divided by affirmation and negation, that is, according love as referred to the soul as known and loved, are to existence in a subject, and non-existence in a subject. substantially or essentially in the soul, for the very sub- In this sense, as the power of the soul is not its essence, it stance or essence of the soul is known and loved. In the must be an accident; and it belongs to the second species same way are we to understand what he says in the other of accident, that of quality. But if we take accident as passage, that those things are “one life, one mind, one one of the five universals, in this sense there is a medium essence.” Or, as some say, this passage is true in the sense between substance and accident. For the substance is all in which the potential whole is predicated of its parts, be- that belongs to the essence of a thing; whereas whatever ing midway between the universal whole, and the integral is beyond the essence of a thing cannot be called accident whole. For the universal whole is in each part according in this sense; but only what is not caused by the essential to its entire essence and power; as animal in a man and principle of the species. For the ‘proper’ does not belong in a horse; and therefore it is properly predicated of each to the essence of a thing, but is caused by the essential part. But the integral whole is not in each part, neither principles of the species; wherefore it is a medium be- according to its whole essence, nor according to its whole tween the essence and accident thus understood. In this power. Therefore in no way can it be predicated of each sense the powers of the soul may be said to be a medium part; yet in a way it is predicated, though improperly, of between substance and accident, as being natural proper- all the parts together; as if we were to say that the wall, ties of the soul. When Augustine says that knowledge and roof, and foundations are a house. But the potential whole love are not in the soul as accidents in a subject, this must is in each part according to its whole essence, not, how- be understood in the sense given above, inasmuch as they ever, according to its whole power. Therefore in a way are compared to the soul, not as loving and knowing, but it can be predicated of each part, but not so properly as as loved and known. His argument proceeds in this sense; the universal whole. In this sense, Augustine says that the for if love were in the soul loved as in a subject, it would memory, understanding, and the will are the one essence follow that an accident transcends its subject, since even of the soul. other things are loved through the soul. Reply to Objection 2. The act to which primary mat- Reply to Objection 6. Although the soul is not com- ter is in potentiality is the substantial form. Therefore the posed of matter and form, yet it has an admixture of po- potentiality of matter is nothing else but its essence. tentiality, as we have said above (q. 75, a. 5, ad 4); and Reply to Objection 3. Action belongs to the com- for this reason it can be the subject of an accident. The posite, as does existence; for to act belongs to what ex- statement quoted is verified in God, Who is the Pure Act; ists. Now the composite has substantial existence through in treating of which subject Boethius employs that phrase the substantial form; and it operates by the power which (De Trin. i). results from the substantial form. Hence an active acci- Reply to Objection 7. Rational and sensitive, as dif- dental form is to the substantial form of the agent (for ferences, are not taken from the powers of sense and rea- instance, heat compared to the form of fire) as the power son, but from the sensitive and rational soul itself. But of the soul is to the soul. because substantial forms, which in themselves are un- Reply to Objection 4. That the accidental form is a known to us, are known by their accidents; nothing pre- principle of action is due to the substantial form. There- vents us from sometimes substituting accidents for sub- fore the substantial form is the first principle of action; stantial differences. Whether there are several powers of the soul? Ia q. 77 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that there are not several in power. Therefore above all others it has one virtue or powers of the soul. For the intellectual soul approaches power. nearest to the likeness of God. But in God there is one Objection 3. Further, to operate belongs to what is in simple power: and therefore also in the intellectual soul. act. But by the one essence of the soul, man has actual ex- Objection 2. Further, the higher a power is, the more istence in the different degrees of perfection, as we have unified it is. But the intellectual soul excels all other forms seen above (q. 76, Aa. 3,4). Therefore by the one power 388 of the soul he performs operations of various degrees. can acquire beatitude. Yet he is in the last degree, accord- On the contrary, The Philosopher places several ing to his nature, of those to whom beatitude is possible; powers in the soul (De Anima ii, 2,3). therefore the human soul requires many and various op- I answer that, Of necessity we must place several erations and powers. But to angels a smaller variety of powers in the soul. To make this evident, we observe that, powers is sufficient. In God there is no power or action as the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, 12), the lowest or- beyond His own Essence. der of things cannot acquire perfect goodness, but they There is yet another reason why the human soul acquire a certain imperfect goodness, by few movements; abounds in a variety of powers—because it is on the con- and those which belong to a higher order acquire perfect fines of spiritual and corporeal creatures; and therefore the goodness by many movements; and those yet higher ac- powers of both meet together in the soul. quire perfect goodness by few movements; and the high- Reply to Objection 1. The intellectual soul ap- est perfection is found in those things which acquire per- proaches to the Divine likeness, more than inferior crea- fect goodness without any movement whatever. Thus he tures, in being able to acquire perfect goodness; although is least of all disposed of health, who can only acquire by many and various means; and in this it falls short of imperfect health by means of a few remedies; better dis- more perfect creatures. posed is he who can acquire perfect health by means of Reply to Objection 2. A unified power is superior if it many remedies; and better still, he who can by few reme- extends to equal things: but a multiform power is superior dies; best of all is he who has perfect health without any to it, if it is over many things. remedies. We conclude, therefore, that things which are Reply to Objection 3. One thing has one substantial below man acquire a certain limited goodness; and so they existence, but may have several operations. So there is have a few determinate operations and powers. But man one essence of the soul, with several powers. can acquire universal and perfect goodness, because he Whether the powers are distinguished by their acts and objects? Ia q. 77 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the powers of the soul (De Anima ii, 4) that “acts and operations precede the are not distinguished by acts and objects. For nothing is powers according to reason; and these again are preceded determined to its species by what is subsequent and ex- by their opposites,” that is their objects. Therefore the trinsic to it. But the act is subsequent to the power; and powers are distinguished according to their acts and ob- the object is extrinsic to it. Therefore the soul’s powers jects. are not specifically distinct by acts and objects. I answer that, A power as such is directed to an act. Objection 2. Further, contraries are what differ most Wherefore we seek to know the nature of a power from from each other. Therefore if the powers are distinguished the act to which it is directed, and consequently the nature by their objects, it follows that the same power could not of a power is diversified, as the nature of the act is diver- have contrary objects. This is clearly false in almost all sified. Now the nature of an act is diversified according to the powers; for the power of vision extends to white and the various natures of the objects. For every act is either black, and the power to taste to sweet and bitter. of an active power or of a passive power. Now, the object Objection 3. Further, if the cause be removed, the ef- is to the act of a passive power, as the principle and mov- fect is removed. Hence if the difference of powers came ing cause: for color is the principle of vision, inasmuch from the difference of objects, the same object would not as it moves the sight. On the other hand, to the act of an come under different powers. This is clearly false; for the active power the object is a term and end; as the object of same thing is known by the cognitive power, and desired the power of growth is perfect quantity, which is the end by the appetitive. of growth. Now, from these two things an act receives Objection 4. Further, that which of itself is the cause its species, namely, from its principle, or from its end or of anything, is the cause thereof, wherever it is. But var- term; for the act of heating differs from the act of cool- ious objects which belong to various powers, belong also ing, in this, that the former proceeds from something hot, to some one power; as sound and color belong to sight and which is the active principle, to heat; the latter from some- hearing, which are different powers, yet they come under thing cold, which is the active principle, to cold. There- the one power of common sense. Therefore the powers fore the powers are of necessity distinguished by their acts are not distinguished according to the difference of their and objects. objects. Nevertheless, we must observe that things which are On the contrary, Things that are subsequent are dis- accidental do not change the species. For since to be col- tinguished by what precedes. But the Philosopher says ored is accidental to an animal, its species is not changed 389 by a difference of color, but by a difference in that which Reply to Objection 2. If any power were to have one belongs to the nature of an animal, that is to say, by a of two contraries as such for its object, the other contrary difference in the sensitive soul, which is sometimes ra- would belong to another power. But the power of the soul tional, and sometimes otherwise. Hence “rational” and does not regard the nature of the contrary as such, but “irrational” are differences dividing animal, constituting rather the common aspect of both contraries; as sight does its various species. In like manner therefore, not any va- not regard white as such, but as color. This is because of riety of objects diversifies the powers of the soul, but a two contraries one, in a manner, includes the idea of the difference in that to which the power of its very nature is other, since they are to one another as perfect and imper- directed. Thus the senses of their very nature are directed fect. to the passive quality which of itself is divided into color, Reply to Objection 3. Nothing prevents things which sound, and the like, and therefore there is one sensitive coincide in subject, from being considered under different power with regard to color, namely, the sight, and another aspects; therefore they can belong to various powers of with regard to sound, namely, hearing. But it is accidental the soul. to a passive quality, for instance, to something colored, to Reply to Objection 4. The higher power of itself re- be a musician or a grammarian, great or small, a man or a gards a more universal formality of the object than the stone. Therefore by reason of such differences the powers lower power; because the higher a power is, to a greater of the soul are not distinct. number of things does it extend. Therefore many things Reply to Objection 1. Act, though subsequent in ex- are combined in the one formality of the object, which the istence to power, is, nevertheless, prior to it in intention higher power considers of itself; while they differ in the and logically; as the end is with regard to the agent. And formalities regarded by the lower powers of themselves. the object, although extrinsic, is, nevertheless, the princi- Thus it is that various objects belong to various lower ple or end of the action; and those conditions which are powers; which objects, however, are subject to one higher intrinsic to a thing, are proportionate to its principle and power. end. Whether among the powers of the soul there is order? Ia q. 77 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no order observe a triple order among them, two of which corre- among the powers of the soul. For in those things which spond to the dependence of one power on another; while come under one division, there is no before and after, but the third is taken from the order of the objects. Now the all are naturally simultaneous. But the powers of the soul dependence of one power on another can be taken in two are contradistinguished from one another. Therefore there ways; according to the order of nature, forasmuch as per- is no order among them. fect things are by their nature prior to imperfect things; Objection 2. Further, the powers of the soul are re- and according to the order of generation and time; foras- ferred to their objects and to the soul itself. On the part of much as from being imperfect, a thing comes to be per- the soul, there is not order among them, because the soul fect. Thus, according to the first kind of order among the is one. In like manner the objects are various and dissimi- powers, the intellectual powers are prior to the sensitive lar, as color and sound. Therefore there is no order among powers; wherefore they direct them and command them. the powers of the soul. Likewise the sensitive powers are prior in this order to the Objection 3. Further, where there is order among powers of the nutritive soul. powers, we find that the operation of one depends on the In the second kind of order, it is the other way about. operation of another. But the action of one power of the For the powers of the nutritive soul are prior by way of soul does not depend on that of another; for sight can act generation to the powers of the sensitive soul; for which, independently of hearing, and conversely. Therefore there therefore, they prepare the body. The same is to be said of is no order among the powers of the soul. the sensitive powers with regard to the intellectual. But On the contrary, The Philosopher (De Anima ii, 3) in the third kind of order, certain sensitive powers are compares the parts or powers of the soul to figures. But ordered among themselves, namely, sight, hearing, and figures have an order among themselves. Therefore the smelling. For the visible naturally comes first; since it is powers of the soul have order. common to higher and lower bodies. But sound is audi- I answer that, Since the soul is one, and the powers ble in the air, which is naturally prior to the mingling of are many; and since a number of things that proceed from elements, of which smell is the result. one must proceed in a certain order; there must be some Reply to Objection 1. The species of a given genus order among the powers of the soul. Accordingly we may are to one another as before and after, like numbers and 390 figures, if considered in their nature; although they may jects, and furthermore on the part of the acts, as we have be said to be simultaneous, according as they receive the said above. predication of the common genus. Reply to Objection 3. This argument is verified as Reply to Objection 2. This order among the powers regards those powers among which order of the third kind of the soul is both on the part of the soul (which, though exists. Those powers among which the two other kinds it be one according to its essence, has a certain aptitude to of order exist are such that the action of one depends on various acts in a certain order) and on the part of the ob- another. Whether all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject? Ia q. 77 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that all the powers of the understanding and will. Hence the powers of these opera- soul are in the soul as their subject. For as the powers of tions are in the soul as their subject. But some operations the body are to the body; so are the powers of the soul to of the soul are performed by means of corporeal organs; the soul. But the body is the subject of the corporeal pow- as sight by the eye, and hearing by the ear. And so it is ers. Therefore the soul is the subject of the powers of the with all the other operations of the nutritive and sensitive soul. parts. Therefore the powers which are the principles of Objection 2. Further, the operations of the powers of these operations have their subject in the composite, and the soul are attributed to the body by reason of the soul; not in the soul alone. because, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2), “The Reply to Objection 1. All the powers are said to be- soul is that by which we sense and understand primar- long to the soul, not as their subject, but as their principle; ily.” But the natural principles of the operations of the because it is by the soul that the composite has the power soul are the powers. Therefore the powers are primarily to perform such operations. in the soul. Reply to Objection 2. All such powers are primarily Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, in the soul, as compared to the composite; not as in their 7,24) that the soul senses certain things, not through the subject, but as in their principle. body, in fact, without the body, as fear and such like; and Reply to Objection 3. Plato’s opinion was that sensa- some things through the body. But if the sensitive powers tion is an operation proper to the soul, just as understand- were not in the soul alone as their subject, the soul could ing is. Now in many things relating to Philosophy Augus- not sense anything without the body. Therefore the soul tine makes use of the opinions of Plato, not asserting them is the subject of the sensitive powers; and for a similar as true, but relating them. However, as far as the present reason, of all the other powers. question is concerned, when it is said that the soul senses On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Somno et some things with the body, and some without the body, Vigilia i) that “sensation belongs neither to the soul, nor this can be taken in two ways. Firstly, the words “with to the body, but to the composite.” Therefore the sensitive the body or without the body” may determine the act of power is in “the composite” as its subject. Therefore the sense in its mode of proceeding from the sentient. Thus soul alone is not the subject of all the powers. the soul senses nothing without the body, because the ac- I answer that, The subject of operative power is that tion of sensation cannot proceed from the soul except by a which is able to operate, for every accident denominates corporeal organ. Secondly, they may be understood as de- its proper subject. Now the same is that which is able to termining the act of sense on the part of the object sensed. operate, and that which does operate. Wherefore the “sub- Thus the soul senses some things with the body, that is, ject of power” is of necessity “the subject of operation,” as things existing in the body, as when it feels a wound or again the Philosopher says in the beginning of De Somno something of that sort; while it senses some things with- et Vigilia. Now, it is clear from what we have said above out the body, that is, which do not exist in the body, but (q. 75, Aa. 2,3; q. 76, a. 1, ad 1), that some operations only in the apprehension of the soul, as when it feels sad of the soul are performed without a corporeal organ, as or joyful on hearing something. Whether the powers of the soul flow from its essence? Ia q. 77 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the powers of the soul are many and various, they cannot proceed from its soul do not flow from its essence. For different things do essence. not proceed from one simple thing. But the essence of the Objection 2. Further, that from which a thing pro- soul is one and simple. Since, therefore, the powers of the ceeds is its cause. But the essence of the soul cannot be 391 said to be the cause of the powers; as is clear if one conneous accident, the subject is receptive only, the accident siders the different kinds of causes. Therefore the powers being caused by an extrinsic agent. Secondly, substan- of the soul do not flow from its essence. tial and accidental forms differ, because, since that which Objection 3. Further, emanation involves some sort of is the less principal exists for the sake of that which is movement. But nothing is moved by itself, as the Philoso- the more principal, matter therefore exists on account of pher proves (Phys. vii, 1,2); except, perhaps, by reason of the substantial form; while on the contrary, the accidental a part of itself, as an animal is said to be moved by itself, form exists on account of the completeness of the subject. because one part thereof moves and another is moved. Now it is clear, from what has been said (a. 5), that Neither is the soul moved, as the Philosopher proves (De either the subject of the soul’s powers is the soul itself Anima i, 4). Therefore the soul does not produce its pow- alone, which can be the subject of an accident, forasmuch ers within itself. as it has something of potentiality, as we have said above On the contrary, The powers of the soul are its nat- (a. 1, ad 6); or else this subject is the composite. Now the ural properties. But the subject is the cause of its proper composite is actual by the soul. Whence it is clear that accidents; whence also it is included in the definition of all the powers of the soul, whether their subject be the accident, as is clear from Metaph. vii (Did. vi, 4). There- soul alone, or the composite, flow from the essence of the fore the powers of the soul proceed from its essence as soul, as from their principle; because it has already been their cause. said that the accident is caused by the subject according I answer that, The substantial and the accidental form as it is actual, and is received into it according as it is in partly agree and partly differ. They agree in this, that each potentiality. is an act; and that by each of them something is after Reply to Objection 1. From one simple thing many a manner actual. They differ, however, in two respects. things may proceed naturally, in a certain order; or again First, because the substantial form makes a thing to exist if there be diversity of recipients. Thus, from the one absolutely, and its subject is something purely potential. essence of the soul many and various powers proceed; But the accidental form does not make a thing to exist both because order exists among these powers; and also absolutely but to be such, or so great, or in some particu- by reason of the diversity of the corporeal organs. lar condition; for its subject is an actual being. Hence it Reply to Objection 2. The subject is both the final is clear that actuality is observed in the substantial form cause, and in a way the active cause, of its proper acci- prior to its being observed in the subject: and since that dent. It is also as it were the material cause, inasmuch as which is first in a genus is the cause in that genus, the sub- it is receptive of the accident. From this we may gather stantial form causes existence in its subject. On the other that the essence of the soul is the cause of all its powers, hand, actuality is observed in the subject of the acciden- as their end, and as their active principle; and of some as tal form prior to its being observed in the accidental form; receptive thereof. wherefore the actuality of the accidental form is caused by Reply to Objection 3. The emanation of proper ac- the actuality of the subject. So the subject, forasmuch as cidents from their subject is not by way of transmutation, it is in potentiality, is receptive of the accidental form: but but by a certain natural resultance; thus one thing results forasmuch as it is in act, it produces it. This I say of the naturally from another, as color from light. proper and “per se” accident; for with regard to the extra- Whether one power of the soul arises from another? Ia q. 77 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that one power of the soul is like it in species. Now the powers of the soul are oppo- does not arise from another. For if several things arise to- sitely divided, as various species. Therefore one of them gether, one of them does not arise from another. But all does not proceed from another. the powers of the soul are created at the same time with On the contrary, Powers are known by their actions. the soul. Therefore one of them does not arise from an- But the action of one power is caused by the action of an- other. other power, as the action of the imagination by the action Objection 2. Further, the power of the soul arises of the senses. Therefore one power of the soul is caused from the soul as an accident from the subject. But one by another. power of the soul cannot be the subject of another; be- I answer that, In those things which proceed from one cause nothing is the accident of an accident. Therefore according to a natural order, as the first is the cause of all, one power does not arise from another. so that which is nearer to the first is, in a way, the cause Objection 3. Further, one opposite does not arise from of those which are more remote. Now it has been shown the other opposite; but everything arises from that which above (a. 4) that among the powers of the soul there are 392 several kinds of order. Therefore one power of the soul material with regard to the intelligence. On this account, proceeds from the essence of the soul by the medium of the more imperfect powers precede the others in the order another. But since the essence of the soul is compared to of generation, for the animal is generated before the man. the powers both as a principle active and final, and as a Reply to Objection 1. As the power of the soul flows receptive principle, either separately by itself, or together from the essence, not by a transmutation, but by a certain with the body; and since the agent and the end are more natural resultance, and is simultaneous with the soul, so is perfect, while the receptive principle, as such, is less per- it the case with one power as regards another. fect; it follows that those powers of the soul which pre- Reply to Objection 2. An accident cannot of itself cede the others, in the order of perfection and nature, are be the subject of an accident; but one accident is received the principles of the others, after the manner of the end prior to another into substance, as quantity prior to qual- and active principle. For we see that the senses are for ity. In this sense one accident is said to be the subject the sake of the intelligence, and not the other way about. of another; as surface is of color, inasmuch as substance The senses, moreover, are a certain imperfect participa- receives an accident through the means of another. The tion of the intelligence; wherefore, according to their nat- same thing may be said of the powers of the soul. ural origin, they proceed from the intelligence as the im- Reply to Objection 3. The powers of the soul are op- perfect from the perfect. But considered as receptive prin- posed to one another, as perfect and imperfect; as also are ciples, the more perfect powers are principles with regard the species of numbers and figures. But this opposition to the others; thus the soul, according as it has the sensi- does not prevent the origin of one from another, because tive power, is considered as the subject, and as something imperfect things naturally proceed from perfect things. Whether all the powers remain in the soul when separated from the body? Ia q. 77 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that all the powers of the Objection 6. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. soul remain in the soul separated from the body. For we xii, 32) that, as the soul, when the body lies senseless, read in the book De Spiritu et Anima that “the soul with- yet not quite dead, sees some things by imaginary vision; draws from the body, taking with itself sense and imagi- so also when by death the soul is quite separate from the nation, reason and intelligence, concupiscibility and iras- body. But the imagination is a power of the sensitive part. cibility.” Therefore the power of the sensitive part remains in the Objection 2. Further, the powers of the soul are separate soul; and consequently all the other powers. its natural properties. But properties are always in that On the contrary, It is said (De Eccl. Dogm. xix) that to which they belong; and are never separated from it. “of two substances only does man consist; the soul with Therefore the powers of the soul are in it even after death. its reason, and the body with its senses.” Therefore the Objection 3. Further, the powers even of the sensi- body being dead, the sensitive powers do not remain. tive soul are not weakened when the body becomes weak; I answer that, As we have said already (Aa. 5,6,7), because, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), “If an all the powers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their old man were given the eye of a young man, he would see principle. But some powers belong to the soul alone as even as well as a young man.” But weakness is the road their subject; as the intelligence and the will. These pow- to corruption. Therefore the powers of the soul are not ers must remain in the soul, after the destruction of the corrupted when the body is corrupted, but remain in the body. But other powers are subjected in the composite; as separated soul. all the powers of the sensitive and nutritive parts. Now ac- Objection 4. Further, memory is a power of the sensi- cidents cannot remain after the destruction of the subject. tive soul, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. Wherefore, the composite being destroyed, such powers 1). But memory remains in the separated soul; for it was do not remain actually; but they remain virtually in the said to the rich glutton whose soul was in hell: “Remem- soul, as in their principle or root. ber that thou didst receive good things during thy lifetime” So it is false that, as some say, these powers remain in (Lk. 16:25). Therefore memory remains in the separated the soul even after the corruption of the body. It is much soul; and consequently the other powers of the sensitive more false that, as they say also, the acts of these powers part. remain in the separate soul; because these powers have no Objection 5. Further, joy and sorrow are in the concu- act apart from the corporeal organ. piscible part, which is a power of the sensitive soul. But it Reply to Objection 1. That book has no authority, is clear that separate souls grieve or rejoice at the pains or and so what is there written can be despised with the same rewards which they receive. Therefore the concupiscible facility as it was said; although we may say that the soul power remains in the separate soul. takes with itself these powers, not actually but virtually. 393 Reply to Objection 2. These powers, which we say Trin. x, 11; xiv, 7) places memory in the mind; not as a do not actually remain in the separate soul, are not the part of the sensitive soul. properties of the soul alone, but of the composite. Reply to Objection 5. In the separate soul, sorrow Reply to Objection 3. These powers are said not to and joy are not in the sensitive, but in the intellectual ap- be weakened when the body becomes weak, because the petite, as in the angels. soul remains unchangeable, and is the virtual principle of Reply to Objection 6. Augustine in that passage is these powers. speaking as inquiring, not as asserting. Wherefore he re- Reply to Objection 4. The recollection spoken of tracted some things which he had said there (Retrac. ii, there is to be taken in the same way as Augustine (De 24). 394 FIRST PART, QUESTION 78 Of the Specific Powers of the Soul (In Four Articles) We next treat of the powers of the soul specifically. The theologian, however, has only to inquire specifically concerning the intellectual and appetitive powers, in which the virtues reside. And since the knowledge of these powers depends to a certain extent on the other powers, our consideration of the powers of the soul taken specifically will be divided into three parts: first, we shall consider those powers which are a preamble to the intellect; secondly, the intellectual powers; thirdly, the appetitive powers. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) The powers of the soul considered generally; (2) The various species of the vegetative part; (3) The exterior senses; (4) The interior senses. Whether there are to be distinguished five genera of powers in the soul? Ia q. 78 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there are not to be and four are called modes of living. The reason of this distinguished five genera of powers in the soul—namely, diversity lies in the various souls being distinguished ac- vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive, and intellec- cordingly as the operation of the soul transcends the op- tual. For the powers of the soul are called its parts. But eration of the corporeal nature in various ways; for the only three parts of the soul are commonly assigned— whole corporeal nature is subject to the soul, and is related namely, the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul, and the ra- to it as its matter and instrument. There exists, therefore, tional soul. Therefore there are only three genera of pow- an operation of the soul which so far exceeds the corpo- ers in the soul, and not five. real nature that it is not even performed by any corporeal Objection 2. Further, the powers of the soul are the organ; and such is the operation of the “rational soul.” principles of its vital operations. Now, in four ways is a Below this, there is another operation of the soul, which thing said to live. For the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, is indeed performed through a corporeal organ, but not 2): “In several ways a thing is said to live, and even if only through a corporeal quality, and this is the operation of the one of these is present, the thing is said to live; as intellect “sensitive soul”; for though hot and cold, wet and dry, and and sense, local movement and rest, and lastly, movement other such corporeal qualities are required for the work of of decrease and increase due to nourishment.” Therefore the senses, yet they are not required in such a way that the there are only four genera of powers of the soul, as the operation of the senses takes place by virtue of such qual- appetitive is excluded. ities; but only for the proper disposition of the organ. The Objection 3. Further, a special kind of soul ought not lowest of the operations of the soul is that which is per- to be assigned as regards what is common to all the pow- formed by a corporeal organ, and by virtue of a corporeal ers. Now desire is common to each power of the soul. quality. Yet this transcends the operation of the corporeal For sight desires an appropriate visible object; whence we nature; because the movements of bodies are caused by read (Ecclus. 40:22): “The eye desireth favor and beauty, an extrinsic principle, while these operations are from an but more than these green sown fields.” In the same way intrinsic principle; for this is common to all the operations every other power desires its appropriate object. There- of the soul; since every animate thing, in some way, moves fore the appetitive power should not be made a special itself. Such is the operation of the “vegetative soul”; for genus of the powers of the soul. digestion, and what follows, is caused instrumentally by Objection 4. Further, the moving principle in animals the action of heat, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, is sense, intellect or appetite, as the Philosopher says (De 4). Anima iii, 10). Therefore the motive power should not be Now the powers of the soul are distinguished generi- added to the above as a special genus of soul. cally by their objects. For the higher a power is, the more On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima universal is the object to which it extends, as we have said ii, 3), “The powers are the vegetative, the sensitive, the above (q. 77, a. 3, ad 4). But the object of the soul’s op- appetitive, the locomotion, and the intellectual.” eration may be considered in a triple order. For in the I answer that, There are five genera of powers of the soul there is a power the object of which is only the body soul, as above numbered. Of these, three are called souls, that is united to that soul; the powers of this genus are 395 called “vegetative” for the vegetative power acts only on movement to seek necessaries of life from a distance. And the body to which the soul is united. There is another there are some living things which with these have intel- genus in the powers of the soul, which genus regards a lectual power—namely, men. But the appetitive power more universal object—namely, every sensible body, not does not constitute a degree of living things; because only the body to which the soul is united. And there is yet wherever there is sense there is also appetite (De Anima another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus re- ii, 3). gards a still more universal object—namely, not only the Thus the first two objectives are hereby solved. sensible body, but all being in universal. Wherefore it is Reply to Objection 3. The “natural appetite” is that evident that the latter two genera of the soul’s powers have inclination which each thing has, of its own nature, for an operation in regard not merely to that which is united to something; wherefore by its natural appetite each power them, but also to something extrinsic. Now, since what- desires something suitable to itself. But the “animal ap- ever operates must in some way be united to the object petite” results from the form apprehended; this sort of ap- about which it operates, it follows of necessity that this petite requires a special power of the soul—mere appre- something extrinsic, which is the object of the soul’s op- hension does not suffice. For a thing is desired as it exists eration, must be related to the soul in a twofold manner. in its own nature, whereas in the apprehensive power it First, inasmuch as this something extrinsic has a natural exists not according to its own nature, but according to aptitude to be united to the soul, and to be by its likeness its likeness. Whence it is clear that sight desires naturally in the soul. In this way there are two kinds of powers a visible object for the purpose of its act only—namely, —namely, the “sensitive” in regard to the less common for the purpose of seeing; but the animal by the appetitive object—the sensible body; and the “intellectual,” in re- power desires the thing seen, not merely for the purpose gard to the most common object—universal being. Sec- of seeing it, but also for other purposes. But if the soul ondly, forasmuch as the soul itself has an inclination and did not require things perceived by the senses, except on tendency to the something extrinsic. And in this way account of the actions of the senses, that is, for the pur- there are again two kinds of powers in the soul: one— pose of sensing them; there would be no need for a spe- the “appetitive”—in respect of which the soul is referred cial genus of appetitive powers, since the natural appetite to something extrinsic as to an end, which is first in the of the powers would suffice. intention; the other—the “locomotive” power—in respect Reply to Objection 4. Although sense and appetite of which the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to are principles of movement in perfect animals, yet sense the term of its operation and movement; for every animal and appetite, as such, are not sufficient to cause move- is moved for the purpose of realizing its desires and inten- ment, unless another power be added to them; for immov- tions. able animals have sense and appetite, and yet they have The modes of living are distinguished according to the not the power of motion. Now this motive power is not degrees of living things. There are some living things in only in the appetite and sense as commanding the move- which there exists only vegetative power, as the plants. ment, but also in the parts of the body, to make them obey There are others in which with the vegetative there exists the appetite of the soul which moves them. Of this we also the sensitive, but not the locomotive power; such as have a sign in the fact that when the members are deprived immovable animals, as shellfish. There are others which of their natural disposition, they do not move in obedience besides this have locomotive powers, as perfect animals, to the appetite. which require many things for their life, and consequently Whether the parts of the vegetative soul are fittingly described as the nutritive, aug-Ia q. 78 a. 2 mentative, and generative? Objection 1. It would seem that the parts of the veg- or not living. Therefore the generative force should not be etative soul are not fittingly described—namely, the nu- classed as a power of the soul. tritive, augmentative, and generative. For these are called Objection 3. Further, the soul is more powerful than “natural” forces. But the powers of the soul are above the the body. But the body by the same force gives species natural forces. Therefore we should not class the above and quantity; much more, therefore, does the soul. There- forces as powers of the soul. fore the augmentative power of the soul is not distinct Objection 2. Further, we should not assign a partic- from the generative power. ular power of the soul to that which is common to living Objection 4. Further, everything is preserved in be- and non-living things. But generation is common to all ing by that whereby it exists. But the generative power things that can be generated and corrupted, whether living is that whereby a living thing exists. Therefore by the 396 same power the living thing is preserved. Now the nutri-a thing which is already perfect to “produce another like tive force is directed to the preservation of the living thing unto itself.” And the generative power is served by the (De Anima ii, 4), being “a power which is capable of pre- augmentative and nutritive powers; and the augmentative serving whatever receives it.” Therefore we should not power by the nutritive. distinguish the nutritive power from the generative. Reply to Objection 1. Such forces are called natural, On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, both because they produce an effect like that of nature, 2,4) that the operations of this soul are “generation, the which also gives existence, quantity and preservation (al- use of food,” and (cf. De Anima iii, 9) “growth.” though the above forces accomplish these things in a more I answer that, The vegetative part has three powers. perfect way); and because those forces perform their ac- For the vegetative part, as we have said (a. 1), has for its tions instrumentally, through the active and passive quali- object the body itself, living by the soul; for which body a ties, which are the principles of natural actions. triple operation of the soul is required. One is whereby it Reply to Objection 2. Generation of inanimate things acquires existence, and to this is directed the “generative” is entirely from an extrinsic source; whereas the genera- power. Another is whereby the living body acquires its tion of living things is in a higher way, through something due quantity; to this is directed the “augmentative” power. in the living thing itself, which is the semen containing the Another is whereby the body of a living thing is preserved principle productive of the body. Therefore there must be in its existence and in its due quantity; to this is directed in the living thing a power that prepares this semen; and the “nutritive” power. this is the generative power. We must, however, observe a difference among these Reply to Objection 3. Since the generation of living powers. The nutritive and the augmentative have their ef- things is from a semen, it is necessary that in the begin- fect where they exist, since the body itself united to the ning an animal of small size be generated. For this reason soul grows and is preserved by the augmentative and nu- it must have a power in the soul, whereby it is brought to tritive powers which exist in one and the same soul. But its appropriate size. But the inanimate body is generated the generative power has its effect, not in one and the same from determinate matter by an extrinsic agent; therefore body but in another; for a thing cannot generate itself. it receives at once its nature and its quantity, according to Therefore the generative power, in a way, approaches to the condition of the matter. the dignity of the sensitive soul, which has an operation Reply to Objection 4. As we have said above (a. 1), extending to extrinsic things, although in a more excel- the operation of the vegetative principle is performed by lent and more universal manner; for that which is highest means of heat, the property of which is to consume hu- in an inferior nature approaches to that which is lowest midity. Therefore, in order to restore the humidity thus in the higher nature, as is made clear by Dionysius (Div. lost, the nutritive power is required, whereby the food is Nom. vii). Therefore, of these three powers, the gener- changed into the substance of the body. This is also nec- ative has the greater finality, nobility, and perfection, as essary for the action of the augmentative and generative the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4), for it belongs to powers. Whether the five exterior senses are properly distinguished? Ia q. 78 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem inaccurate to distinguish touch grasps several contraries; such as hot or cold, damp five exterior senses. But there are many kinds of acci- or dry, and suchlike. Therefore it is not a single sense but dents. Therefore, as powers are distinguished by their ob- several. Therefore there are more than five senses. jects, it seems that the senses are multiplied according to Objection 4. Further, a species is not divided against the number of the kinds of accidents. its genus. But taste is a kind of touch. Therefore it should Objection 2. Further, magnitude and shape, and other not be classed as a distinct sense of touch. things which are called “common sensibles,” are “not sen- On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, sibles by accident,” but are contradistinguished from them 1): “There is no other besides the five senses.” by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 6). Now the diversity of I answer that, The reason of the distinction and num- objects, as such, diversifies the powers. Since, therefore, ber of the senses has been assigned by some to the organs magnitude and shape are further from color than sound is, in which one or other of the elements preponderate, as wa- it seems that there is much more need for another sensi- ter, air, or the like. By others it has been assigned to the tive power than can grasp magnitude or shape than for that medium, which is either in conjunction or extrinsic and is which grasps color or sound. either water or air, or such like. Others have ascribed it Objection 3. Further, one sense regards one contra- to the various natures of the sensible qualities, according riety; as sight regards white and black. But the sense of as such quality belongs to a simple body or results from 397 complexity. But none of these explanations is apt. For the the motion of alteration, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. powers are not for the organs, but the organs for the pow- viii, 7). Touch and taste are the most material of all: of ers; wherefore there are not various powers for the reason the distinction of which we shall speak later on (ad 3,4). that there are various organs; on the contrary, for this has Hence it is that the three other senses are not exercised nature provided a variety of organs, that they might be through a medium united to them, to obviate any natural adapted to various powers. In the same way nature pro- immutation in their organ; as happens as regards these two vided various mediums for the various senses, according senses. to the convenience of the acts of the powers. And to be Reply to Objection 1. Not every accident has in it- cognizant of the natures of sensible qualities does not per- self a power of immutation but only qualities of the third tain to the senses, but to the intellect. species, which are the principles of alteration: therefore The reason of the number and distinction of the exte- only suchlike qualities are the objects of the senses; be- rior senses must therefore be ascribed to that which be- cause “the senses are affected by the same things whereby longs to the senses properly and “per se.” Now, sense is inanimate bodies are affected,” as stated in Phys. vii, 2. a passive power, and is naturally immuted by the exterior Reply to Objection 2. Size, shape, and the like, which sensible. Wherefore the exterior cause of such immuta- are called “common sensibles,” are midway between “ac- tion is what is “per se” perceived by the sense, and accord- cidental sensibles” and “proper sensibles,” which are the ing to the diversity of that exterior cause are the sensitive objects of the senses. For the proper sensibles first, and powers diversified. of their very nature, affect the senses; since they are qual- Now, immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the ities that cause alteration. But the common sensibles are other spiritual. Natural immutation takes place by the all reducible to quantity. As to size and number, it is clear form of the immuter being received according to its natu- that they are species of quantity. Shape is a quality about ral existence, into the thing immuted, as heat is received quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity, since the no- into the thing heated. Whereas spiritual immutation takes tion of shape consists of fixing the bounds of magnitude. place by the form of the immuter being received, accord- Movement and rest are sensed according as the subject is ing to a spiritual mode of existence, into the thing im- affected in one or more ways in the magnitude of the sub- muted, as the form of color is received into the pupil ject or of its local distance, as in the movement of growth which does not thereby become colored. Now, for the or of locomotion, or again, according as it is affected in operation of the senses, a spiritual immutation is required, some sensible qualities, as in the movement of alteration; whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected in the and thus to sense movement and rest is, in a way, to sense sensile organ. Otherwise, if a natural immutation alone one thing and many. Now quantity is the proximate sub- sufficed for the sense’s action, all natural bodies would ject of the qualities that cause alteration, as surface is of feel when they undergo alteration. color. Therefore the common sensibles do not move the But in some senses we find spiritual immutation only, senses first and of their own nature, but by reason of the as in “sight” while in others we find not only spiritual but sensible quality; as the surface by reason of color. Yet they also a natural immutation; either on the part of the ob- are not accidental sensibles, for they produce a certain va- ject only, or likewise on the part of the organ. On the riety in the immutation of the senses. For sense is im- part of the object we find natural immutation, as to place, muted differently by a large and by a small surface: since in sound which is the object of “hearing”; for sound is whiteness itself is said to be great or small, and therefore caused by percussion and commotion of air: and we find it is divided according to its proper subject. natural immutation by alteration, in odor which is the ob- Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher seems to ject of “smelling”; for in order to exhale an odor, a body say (De Anima ii, 11), the sense of touch is generically must be in a measure affected by heat. On the part of one, but is divided into several specific senses, and for this an organ, natural immutation takes place in “touch” and reason it extends to various contrarieties; which senses, “taste”; for the hand that touches something hot becomes however, are not separate from one another in their or- hot, while the tongue is moistened by the humidity of the gan, but are spread throughout the whole body, so that flavored morsel. But the organs of smelling and hearing their distinction is not evident. But taste, which perceives are not affected in their respective operations by any nat- the sweet and the bitter, accompanies touch in the tongue, ural immutation unless indirectly. but not in the whole body; so it is easily distinguished Now, the sight, which is without natural immutation from touch. We might also say that all those contrarieties either in its organ or in its object, is the most spiritual, agree, each in some proximate genus, and all in a com- the most perfect, and the most universal of all the senses. mon genus, which is the common and formal object of After this comes the hearing and then the smell, which re- touch. Such common genus is, however, unnamed, just as quire a natural immutation on the part of the object; while the proximate genus of hot and cold is unnamed. local motion is more perfect than, and naturally prior to, Reply to Objection 4. The sense of taste, according 398 to a saying of the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9), is a kind by reason of the quality which is its proper object. But of touch existing in the tongue only. It is not distinct from the organ of taste is not necessarily immuted by a natural touch in general, but only from the species of touch dis- immutation by reason of the quality which is its proper tributed in the body. But if touch is one sense only, on object, so that the tongue itself becomes sweet and bitter: account of the common formality of its object: we must but by reason of a quality which is a preamble to, and on say that taste is distinguished from touch by reason of a which is based, the flavor, which quality is moisture, the different formality of immutation. For touch involves a object of touch. natural, and not only a spiritual, immutation in its organ, Whether the interior senses are suitably distinguished? Ia q. 78 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the interior senses are 6,7,24) describes three kinds of vision; namely, corpo- not suitably distinguished. For the common is not divided real, which is the action of the sense; spiritual, which is against the proper. Therefore the common sense should an action of the imagination or phantasy; and intellectual, not be numbered among the interior sensitive powers, in which is an action of the intellect. Therefore there is no addition to the proper exterior senses. interior power between the sense and intellect, besides the Objection 2. Further, there is no need to assign an in- imagination. terior power of apprehension when the proper and exterior On the contrary, Avicenna (De Anima iv, 1) assigns sense suffices. But the proper and exterior senses suffice five interior sensitive powers; namely, “common sense, for us to judge of sensible things; for each sense judges of phantasy, imagination, and the estimative and memorative its proper object. In like manner they seem to suffice for powers.” the perception of their own actions; for since the action of I answer that, As nature does not fail in necessary the sense is, in a way, between the power and its object, things, there must needs be as many actions of the sen- it seems that sight must be much more able to perceive its sitive soul as may suffice for the life of a perfect animal. own vision, as being nearer to it, than the color; and in If any of these actions cannot be reduced to the same one like manner with the other senses. Therefore for this there principle, they must be assigned to diverse powers; since a is no need to assign an interior power, called the common power of the soul is nothing else than the proximate prin- sense. ciple of the soul’s operation. Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher Now we must observe that for the life of a perfect an- (De Memor. et Remin. i), the imagination and the mem- imal, the animal should apprehend a thing not only at the ory are passions of the “first sensitive.” But passion is not actual time of sensation, but also when it is absent. Oth- divided against its subject. Therefore memory and imagi- erwise, since animal motion and action follow apprehen- nation should not be assigned as powers distinct from the sion, an animal would not be moved to seek something senses. absent: the contrary of which we may observe specially Objection 4. Further, the intellect depends on the in perfect animals, which are moved by progression, for senses less than any power of the sensitive part. But the in- they are moved towards something apprehended and ab- tellect knows nothing but what it receives from the senses; sent. Therefore an animal through the sensitive soul must whence we read (Poster. i, 8), that “those who lack one not only receive the species of sensible things, when it sense lack one kind of knowledge.” Therefore much less is actually affected by them, but it must also retain and should we assign to the sensitive part a power, which they preserve them. Now to receive and retain are, in corpo- call the “estimative” power, for the perception of inten- real things, reduced to diverse principles; for moist things tions which the sense does not perceive. are apt to receive, but retain with difficulty, while it is the Objection 5. Further, the action of the cogitative reverse with dry things. Wherefore, since the sensitive power, which consists in comparing, adding and dividing, power is the act of a corporeal organ, it follows that the and the action of the reminiscence, which consists in the power which receives the species of sensible things must use of a kind of syllogism for the sake of inquiry, is not be distinct from the power which preserves them. less distant from the actions of the estimative and memo- Again we must observe that if an animal were moved rative powers, than the action of the estimative is from the by pleasing and disagreeable things only as affecting the action of the imagination. Therefore either we must add sense, there would be no need to suppose that an ani- the cognitive and reminiscitive to the estimative and mem- mal has a power besides the apprehension of those forms orative powers, or the estimative and memorative powers which the senses perceive, and in which the animal takes should not be made distinct from the imagination. pleasure, or from which it shrinks with horror. But the Objection 6. Further, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, animal needs to seek or to avoid certain things, not only 399 because they are pleasing or otherwise to the senses, but gold, and imaginary form of a mountain, we compose the also on account of other advantages and uses, or disad- one form of a golden mountain, which we have never vantages: just as the sheep runs away when it sees a wolf, seen. But this operation is not to be found in animals not on account of its color or shape, but as a natural en- other than man, in whom the imaginative power suffices emy: and again a bird gathers together straws, not because thereto. To man also does Averroes attribute this action they are pleasant to the sense, but because they are useful in his book De sensu et sensibilibus (viii). So there is no for building its nest. Animals, therefore, need to perceive need to assign more than four interior powers of the sen- such intentions, which the exterior sense does not per- sitive part—namely, the common sense, the imagination, ceive. And some distinct principle is necessary for this; and the estimative and memorative powers. since the perception of sensible forms comes by an immu- Reply to Objection 1. The interior sense is called tation caused by the sensible, which is not the case with “common” not by predication, as if it were a genus; but as the perception of those intentions. the common root and principle of the exterior senses. Thus, therefore, for the reception of sensible forms, Reply to Objection 2. The proper sense judges of the the “proper sense” and the “common sense” are ap- proper sensible by discerning it from other things which pointed, and of their distinction we shall speak farther on come under the same sense; for instance, by discerning (ad 1,2). But for the retention and preservation of these white from black or green. But neither sight nor taste forms, the “phantasy” or “imagination” is appointed; can discern white from sweet: because what discerns be- which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is as it tween two things must know both. Wherefore the dis- were a storehouse of forms received through the senses. cerning judgment must be assigned to the common sense; Furthermore, for the apprehension of intentions which are to which, as to a common term, all apprehensions of the not received through the senses, the “estimative” power is senses must be referred: and by which, again, all the appointed: and for the preservation thereof, the “memora- intentions of the senses are perceived; as when some- tive” power, which is a storehouse of such-like intentions. one sees that he sees. For this cannot be done by the A sign of which we have in the fact that the principle of proper sense, which only knows the form of the sensible memory in animals is found in some such intention, for by which it is immuted, in which immutation the action of instance, that something is harmful or otherwise. And the sight is completed, and from immutation follows another very formality of the past, which memory observes, is to in the common sense which perceives the act of vision. be reckoned among these intentions. Reply to Objection 3. As one power arises from the Now, we must observe that as to sensible forms there soul by means of another, as we have seen above (q. 77, is no difference between man and other animals; for they a. 7), so also the soul is the subject of one power through are similarly immuted by the extrinsic sensible. But there another. In this way the imagination and the memory are is a difference as to the above intentions: for other an- called passions of the “first sensitive.” imals perceive these intentions only by some natural in- Reply to Objection 4. Although the operation of the stinct, while man perceives them by means of coalition of intellect has its origin in the senses: yet, in the thing ap- ideas. Therefore the power by which in other animals is prehended through the senses, the intellect knows many called the natural estimative, in man is called the “cog- things which the senses cannot perceive. In like manner itative,” which by some sort of collation discovers these does the estimative power, though in a less perfect man- intentions. Wherefore it is also called the “particular rea- ner. son,” to which medical men assign a certain particular or- Reply to Objection 5. The cogitative and memora- gan, namely, the middle part of the head: for it compares tive powers in man owe their excellence not to that which individual intentions, just as the intellectual reason com- is proper to the sensitive part; but to a certain affinity pares universal intentions. As to the memorative power, and proximity to the universal reason, which, so to speak, man has not only memory, as other animals have in the overflows into them. Therefore they are not distinct pow- sudden recollection of the past; but also “reminiscence” ers, but the same, yet more perfect than in other animals. by syllogistically, as it were, seeking for a recollection of Reply to Objection 6. Augustine calls that vision the past by the application of individual intentions. Avi- spiritual which is effected by the images of bodies in the cenna, however, assigns between the estimative and the absence of bodies. Whence it is clear that it is common to imaginative, a fifth power, which combines and divides all interior apprehensions. imaginary forms: as when from the imaginary form of 400 FIRST PART, QUESTION 79 Of the Intellectual Powers (In Thirteen Articles) The next question concerns the intellectual powers, under which head there are thirteen points of inquiry: (1) Whether the intellect is a power of the soul, or its essence? (2) If it be a power, whether it is a passive power? (3) If it is a passive power, whether there is an active intellect? (4) Whether it is something in the soul? (5) Whether the active intellect is one in all? (6) Whether memory is in the intellect? (7) Whether the memory be distinct from the intellect? (8) Whether the reason is a distinct power from the intellect? (9) Whether the superior and inferior reason are distinct powers? (10) Whether the intelligence is distinct from the intellect? (11) Whether the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers? (12) Whether “synderesis” is a power of the intellectual part? (13) Whether the conscience is a power of the intellectual part? Whether the intellect is a power of the soul? Ia q. 79 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect is not that which operates is the immediate principle of opera- a power of the soul, but the essence of the soul. For the tion, when operation itself is its being: for as power is intellect seems to be the same as the mind. Now the mind to operation as its act, so is the essence to being. But in is not a power of the soul, but the essence; for Augustine God alone His action of understanding is His very Being. says (De Trin. ix, 2): “Mind and spirit are not relative Wherefore in God alone is His intellect His essence: while things, but denominate the essence.” Therefore the intel- in other intellectual creatures, the intellect is power. lect is the essence of the soul. Reply to Objection 1. Sense is sometimes taken for Objection 2. Further, different genera of the soul’s the power, and sometimes for the sensitive soul; for the powers are not united in some one power, but only in sensitive soul takes its name from its chief power, which the essence of the soul. Now the appetitive and the in- is sense. And in like manner the intellectual soul is some- tellectual are different genera of the soul’s powers as the times called intellect, as from its chief power; and thus we Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), but they are united in read (De Anima i, 4), that the “intellect is a substance.” the mind, for Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) places the in- And in this sense also Augustine says that the mind is telligence and will in the mind. Therefore the mind and spirit and essence (De Trin. ix, 2; xiv, 16). intellect of man is of the very essence of the soul and not Reply to Objection 2. The appetitive and intellectual a power thereof. powers are different genera of powers in the soul, by rea- Objection 3. Further, according to Gregory, in a son of the different formalities of their objects. But the homily for the Ascension (xxix in Ev.), “man understands appetitive power agrees partly with the intellectual power with the angels.” But angels are called “minds” and “in- and partly with the sensitive in its mode of operation ei- tellects.” Therefore the mind and intellect of man are not ther through a corporeal organ or without it: for appetite a power of the soul, but the soul itself. follows apprehension. And in this way Augustine puts Objection 4. Further, a substance is intellectual by the will in the mind; and the Philosopher, in the reason the fact that it is immaterial. But the soul is immaterial (De Anima iii, 9). through its essence. Therefore it seems that the soul must Reply to Objection 3. In the angels there is no other be intellectual through its essence. power besides the intellect, and the will, which follows the On the contrary, The Philosopher assigns the intel- intellect. And for this reason an angel is called a “mind” lectual faculty as a power of the soul (De Anima ii, 3). or an “intellect”; because his whole power consists in this. I answer that, In accordance with what has been al- But the soul has many other powers, such as the sensitive ready shown (q. 54, a. 3; q. 77, a. 1) it is necessary to and nutritive powers, and therefore the comparison fails. say that the intellect is a power of the soul, and not the Reply to Objection 4. The immateriality of the cre- very essence of the soul. For then alone the essence of ated intelligent substance is not its intellect; and through 401 its immateriality it has the power of intelligence. Where-soul, but that it is its virtue and power. fore it follows not that the intellect is the substance of the Whether the intellect is a passive power? Ia q. 79 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect is not a is compared to these intelligible things as a potentiality to passive power. For everything is passive by its matter, and act. acts by its form. But the intellectual power results from Now, potentiality has a double relation to act. There the immateriality of the intelligent substance. Therefore it is a potentiality which is always perfected by its act: as seems that the intellect is not a passive power. the matter of the heavenly bodies (q. 58, a. 1). And there Objection 2. Further, the intellectual power is incor- is another potentiality which is not always in act, but pro- ruptible, as we have said above (q. 79, a. 6). But “if the ceeds from potentiality to act; as we observe in things that intellect is passive, it is corruptible” (De Anima iii, 5). are corrupted and generated. Wherefore the angelic intel- Therefore the intellectual power is not passive. lect is always in act as regards those things which it can Objection 3. Further, the “agent is nobler than the pa- understand, by reason of its proximity to the first intel- tient,” as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16) and Aristotle lect, which is pure act, as we have said above. But the (De Anima iii, 5) says. But all the powers of the vege- human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intelli- tative part are active; yet they are the lowest among the gence and most remote from the perfection of the Divine powers of the soul. Much more, therefore, all the intellec- intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things intelligi- tual powers, which are the highest, are active. ble, and is at first “like a clean tablet on which nothing is On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, written,” as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). This 4) that “to understand is in a way to be passive.” is made clear from the fact, that at first we are only in I answer that, To be passive may be taken in three potentiality to understand, and afterwards we are made to ways. Firstly, in its most strict sense, when from a thing understand actually. And so it is evident that with us to is taken something which belongs to it by virtue either of understand is “in a way to be passive”; taking passion in its nature, or of its proper inclination: as when water loses the third sense. And consequently the intellect is a passive coolness by heating, and as when a man becomes ill or power. sad. Secondly, less strictly, a thing is said to be passive, Reply to Objection 1. This objection is verified of when something, whether suitable or unsuitable, is taken passion in the first and second senses, which belong to away from it. And in this way not only he who is ill is primary matter. But in the third sense passion is in any- said to be passive, but also he who is healed; not only thing which is reduced from potentiality to act. he that is sad, but also he that is joyful; or whatever way Reply to Objection 2. “Passive intellect” is the name he be altered or moved. Thirdly, in a wide sense a thing given by some to the sensitive appetite, in which are the is said to be passive, from the very fact that what is in passions of the soul; which appetite is also called “ratio- potentiality to something receives that to which it was in nal by participation,” because it “obeys the reason” (Ethic. potentiality, without being deprived of anything. And ac- i, 13). Others give the name of passive intellect to the cordingly, whatever passes from potentiality to act, may cogitative power, which is called the “particular reason.” be said to be passive, even when it is perfected. And thus And in each case “passive” may be taken in the two first with us to understand is to be passive. This is clear from senses; forasmuch as this so-called intellect is the act of the following reason. For the intellect, as we have seen a corporeal organ. But the intellect which is in potential- above (q. 78, a. 1), has an operation extending to univer- ity to things intelligible, and which for this reason Aris- sal being. We may therefore see whether the intellect be totle calls the “possible” intellect (De Anima iii, 4) is not in act or potentiality by observing first of all the nature of passive except in the third sense: for it is not an act of a the relation of the intellect to universal being. For we find corporeal organ. Hence it is incorruptible. an intellect whose relation to universal being is that of the Reply to Objection 3. The agent is nobler than the pa- act of all being: and such is the Divine intellect, which tient, if the action and the passion are referred to the same is the Essence of God, in which originally and virtually, thing: but not always, if they refer to different things. all being pre-exists as in its first cause. And therefore the Now the intellect is a passive power in regard to the whole Divine intellect is not in potentiality, but is pure act. But universal being: while the vegetative power is active in re- no created intellect can be an act in relation to the whole gard to some particular thing, namely, the body as united universal being; otherwise it would needs be an infinite to the soul. Wherefore nothing prevents such a passive being. Wherefore every created intellect is not the act of force being nobler than such an active one. all things intelligible, by reason of its very existence; but 402 Whether there is an active intellect? Ia q. 79 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no active era and species of things. But since Aristotle did not allow intellect. For as the senses are to things sensible, so is that forms of natural things exist apart from matter, and as our intellect to things intelligible. But because sense is in forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible; it fol- potentiality to things sensible, the sense is not said to be lows that the natures of forms of the sensible things which active, but only passive. Therefore, since our intellect is in we understand are not actually intelligible. Now nothing potentiality to things intelligible, it seems that we cannot is reduced from potentiality to act except by something say that the intellect is active, but only that it is passive. in act; as the senses as made actual by what is actually Objection 2. Further, if we say that also in the senses sensible. We must therefore assign on the part of the in- there is something active, such as light: on the con- tellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by trary, light is required for sight, inasmuch as it makes the abstraction of the species from material conditions. And medium to be actually luminous; for color of its own na- such is the necessity for an active intellect. ture moves the luminous medium. But in the operation of Reply to Objection 1. Sensible things are found in the intellect there is no appointed medium that has to be act outside the soul; and hence there is no need for an ac- brought into act. Therefore there is no necessity for an tive sense. Wherefore it is clear that in the nutritive part active intellect. all the powers are active, whereas in the sensitive part all Objection 3. Further, the likeness of the agent is re- are passive: but in the intellectual part, there is something ceived into the patient according to the nature of the pa- active and something passive. tient. But the passive intellect is an immaterial power. Reply to Objection 2. There are two opinions as to Therefore its immaterial nature suffices for forms to be the effect of light. For some say that light is required for received into it immaterially. Now a form is intelligible sight, in order to make colors actually visible. And ac- in act from the very fact that it is immaterial. Therefore cording to this the active intellect is required for under- there is no need for an active intellect to make the species standing, in like manner and for the same reason as light actually intelligible. is required for seeing. But in the opinion of others, light On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, is required for sight; not for the colors to become actually 5), “As in every nature, so in the soul is there something visible; but in order that the medium may become actually by which it becomes all things, and something by which luminous, as the Commentator says on De Anima ii. And it makes all things.” Therefore we must admit an active according to this, Aristotle’s comparison of the active in- intellect. tellect to light is verified in this, that as it is required for I answer that, According to the opinion of Plato, understanding, so is light required for seeing; but not for there is no need for an active intellect in order to make the same reason. things actually intelligible; but perhaps in order to provide Reply to Objection 3. If the agent pre-exist, it may intellectual light to the intellect, as will be explained far- well happen that its likeness is received variously into var- ther on (a. 4). For Plato supposed that the forms of natural ious things, on account of their dispositions. But if the things subsisted apart from matter, and consequently that agent does not pre-exist, the disposition of the recipient they are intelligible: since a thing is actually intelligible has nothing to do with the matter. Now the intelligible from the very fact that it is immaterial. And he called such in act is not something existing in nature; if we consider forms “species or ideas”; from a participation of which, he the nature of things sensible, which do not subsist apart said that even corporeal matter was formed, in order that from matter. And therefore in order to understand them, individuals might be naturally established in their proper the immaterial nature of the passive intellect would not genera and species: and that our intellect was formed by suffice but for the presence of the active intellect which such participation in order to have knowledge of the gen- makes things actually intelligible by way of abstraction. Whether the active intellect is something in the soul? Ia q. 79 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the active intellect is Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, not something in the soul. For the effect of the active intel- 5) says of the active intellect, “that it does not sometimes lect is to give light for the purpose of understanding. But understand and sometimes not understand.” But our soul this is done by something higher than the soul: according does not always understand: sometimes it understands, to Jn. 1:9, “He was the true light that enlighteneth every sometimes it does not understand. Therefore the active man coming into this world.” Therefore the active intel- intellect is not something in our soul. lect is not something in the soul. Objection 3. Further, agent and patient suffice for ac- 403 tion. If, therefore, the passive intellect, which is a passive ral things, besides the universal active causes, each one is power, is something belonging to the soul; and also the endowed with its proper powers derived from those uni- active intellect, which is an active power: it follows that a versal causes: for the sun alone does not generate man; man would always be able to understand when he wished, but in man is the power of begetting man: and in like which is clearly false. Therefore the active intellect is not manner with other perfect animals. Now among these something in our soul. lower things nothing is more perfect than the human soul. Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, Wherefore we must say that in the soul is some power de- 5) says that the active intellect is a “substance in actual rived from a higher intellect, whereby it is able to light up being.” But nothing can be in potentiality and in act with the phantasms. And we know this by experience, since we regard to the same thing. If, therefore, the passive intel- perceive that we abstract universal forms from their par- lect, which is in potentiality to all things intelligible, is ticular conditions, which is to make them actually intelli- something in the soul, it seems impossible for the active gible. Now no action belongs to anything except through intellect to be also something in our soul. some principle formally inherent therein; as we have said Objection 5. Further, if the active intellect is some- above of the passive intellect (q. 76, a. 1). Therefore the thing in the soul, it must be a power. For it is neither a power which is the principle of this action must be some- passion nor a habit; since habits and passions are not in thing in the soul. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, the nature of agents in regard to the passivity of the soul; 5) compared the active intellect to light, which is some- but rather passion is the very action of the passive power; thing received into the air: while Plato compared the sepa- while habit is something which results from acts. But ev- rate intellect impressing the soul to the sun, as Themistius ery power flows from the essence of the soul. It would says in his commentary on De Anima iii. But the sep- therefore follow that the active intellect flows from the arate intellect, according to the teaching of our faith, is essence of the soul. And thus it would not be in the soul God Himself, Who is the soul’s Creator, and only beati- by way of participation from some higher intellect: which tude; as will be shown later on (q. 90, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 3, is unfitting. Therefore the active intellect is not something a. 7). Wherefore the human soul derives its intellectual in our soul. light from Him, according to Ps. 4:7, “The light of Thy On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us.” 5), that “it is necessary for these differences,” namely, the Reply to Objection 1. That true light enlightens as passive and active intellect, “to be in the soul.” a universal cause, from which the human soul derives a I answer that, The active intellect, of which the particular power, as we have explained. Philosopher speaks, is something in the soul. In order Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher says those to make this evident, we must observe that above the in- words not of the active intellect, but of the intellect in act: tellectual soul of man we must needs suppose a superior of which he had already said: “Knowledge in act is the intellect, from which the soul acquires the power of un- same as the thing.” Or, if we refer those words to the ac- derstanding. For what is such by participation, and what tive intellect, then they are said because it is not owing to is mobile, and what is imperfect always requires the pre- the active intellect that sometimes we do, and sometimes existence of something essentially such, immovable and we do not understand, but to the intellect which is in po- perfect. Now the human soul is called intellectual by tentiality. reason of a participation in intellectual power; a sign of Reply to Objection 3. If the relation of the active in- which is that it is not wholly intellectual but only in part. tellect to the passive were that of the active object to a Moreover it reaches to the understanding of truth by argu- power, as, for instance, of the visible in act to the sight; it ing, with a certain amount of reasoning and movement. would follow that we could understand all things instantly, Again it has an imperfect understanding; both because since the active intellect is that which makes all things (in it does not understand everything, and because, in those act). But now the active intellect is not an object, rather things which it does understand, it passes from potential- is it that whereby the objects are made to be in act: for ity to act. Therefore there must needs be some higher in- which, besides the presence of the active intellect, we re- tellect, by which the soul is helped to understand. quire the presence of phantasms, the good disposition of Wherefore some held that this intellect, substantially the sensitive powers, and practice in this sort of operation; separate, is the active intellect, which by lighting up the since through one thing understood, other things come to phantasms as it were, makes them to be actually intelli- be understood, as from terms are made propositions, and gible. But, even supposing the existence of such a sepa- from first principles, conclusions. From this point of view rate active intellect, it would still be necessary to assign it matters not whether the active intellect is something be- to the human soul some power participating in that su- longing to the soul, or something separate from the soul. perior intellect, by which power the human soul makes Reply to Objection 4. The intellectual soul is indeed things actually intelligible. Just as in other perfect natu- actually immaterial, but it is in potentiality to determinate 404 species. On the contrary, phantasms are actual images of of its being in potentiality to such species. certain species, but are immaterial in potentiality. Where- Reply to Objection 5. Since the essence of the soul fore nothing prevents one and the same soul, inasmuch as is immaterial, created by the supreme intellect, nothing it is actually immaterial, having one power by which it prevents that power which it derives from the supreme in- makes things actually immaterial, by abstraction from the tellect, and whereby it abstracts from matter, flowing from conditions of individual matter: which power is called the the essence of the soul, in the same way as its other pow- “active intellect”; and another power, receptive of such ers. species, which is called the “passive intellect” by reason Whether the active intellect is one in all? Ia q. 79 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that there is one active Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher proves that intellect in all. For what is separate from the body is not the active intellect is separate, by the fact that the passive multiplied according to the number of bodies. But the intellect is separate: because, as he says (De Anima iii, active intellect is “separate,” as the Philosopher says (De 5), “the agent is more noble than the patient.” Now the Anima iii, 5). Therefore it is not multiplied in the many passive intellect is said to be separate, because it is not the human bodies, but is one for all men. act of any corporeal organ. And in the same sense the ac- Objection 2. Further, the active intellect is the cause tive intellect is also called “separate”; but not as a separate of the universal, which is one in many. But that which is substance. the cause of unity is still more itself one. Therefore the Reply to Objection 2. The active intellect is the cause active intellect is the same in all. of the universal, by abstracting it from matter. But for this Objection 3. Further, all men agree in the first intel- purpose it need not be the same intellect in all intelligent lectual concepts. But to these they assent by the active beings; but it must be one in its relationship to all those intellect. Therefore all agree in one active intellect. things from which it abstracts the universal, with respect On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima to which things the universal is one. And this befits the iii, 5) that the active intellect is as a light. But light is not active intellect inasmuch as it is immaterial. the same in the various things enlightened. Therefore the Reply to Objection 3. All things which are of one same active intellect is not in various men. species enjoy in common the action which accompanies I answer that, The truth about this question depends the nature of the species, and consequently the power on what we have already said (a. 4). For if the active in- which is the principle of such action; but not so as that tellect were not something belonging to the soul, but were power be identical in all. Now to know the first intelligible some separate substance, there would be one active intel- principles is the action belonging to the human species. lect for all men. And this is what they mean who hold Wherefore all men enjoy in common the power which is that there is one active intellect for all. But if the active the principle of this action: and this power is the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, as one of its intellect. But there is no need for it to be identical in all. powers, we are bound to say that there are as many active Yet it must be derived by all from one principle. And thus intellects as there are souls, which are multiplied accord- the possession by all men in common of the first princi- ing to the number of men, as we have said above (q. 76, ples proves the unity of the separate intellect, which Plato a. 2). For it is impossible that one same power belong to compares to the sun; but not the unity of the active intel- various substances. lect, which Aristotle compares to light. Whether memory is in the intellectual part of the soul? Ia q. 79 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that memory is not in Objection 2. Further, memory is of the past. But the intellectual part of the soul. For Augustine says (De the past is said of something with regard to a fixed time. Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that to the higher part of the soul belongs Memory, therefore, knows a thing under a condition of those things which are not “common to man and beast.” a fixed time; which involves knowledge under the condi- But memory is common to man and beast, for he says (De tions of “here” and “now.” But this is not the province of Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that “beasts can sense corporeal things the intellect, but of the sense. Therefore memory is not in through the senses of the body, and commit them to mem- the intellectual part, but only in the sensitive. ory.” Therefore memory does not belong to the intellec- Objection 3. Further, in the memory are preserved tual part of the soul. the species of those things of which we are not actually 405 thinking. But this cannot happen in the intellect, because thing through them, but also after ceasing to act through the intellect is reduced to act by the fact that the intelli- them, much more cogent reason is there for the intellect gible species are received into it. Now the intellect in act to receive the species unchangeably and lastingly, whether implies understanding in act; and therefore the intellect it receive them from things sensible, or derive them from actually understands all things of which it has the species. some superior intellect. Thus, therefore, if we take mem- Therefore the memory is not in the intellectual part. ory only for the power of retaining species, we must say On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11) that that it is in the intellectual part. But if in the notion of “memory, understanding, and will are one mind.” memory we include its object as something past, then the I answer that, Since it is of the nature of the memory memory is not in the intellectual, but only in the sensi- to preserve the species of those things which are not ac- tive part, which apprehends individual things. For past, tually apprehended, we must first of all consider whether as past, since it signifies being under a condition of fixed the intelligible species can thus be preserved in the intel- time, is something individual. lect: because Avicenna held that this was impossible. For Reply to Objection 1. Memory, if considered as re- he admitted that this could happen in the sensitive part, as tentive of species, is not common to us and other animals. to some powers, inasmuch as they are acts of corporeal For species are not retained in the sensitive part of the organs, in which certain species may be preserved apart soul only, but rather in the body and soul united: since the from actual apprehension. But in the intellect, which has memorative power is the act of some organ. But the intel- no corporeal organ, nothing but what is intelligible exists. lect in itself is retentive of species, without the association Wherefore every thing of which the likeness exists in the of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the Philosopher says intellect must be actually understood. Thus, therefore, ac- (De Anima iii, 4) that “the soul is the seat of the species, cording to him, as soon as we cease to understand some- not the whole soul, but the intellect.” thing actually, the species of that thing ceases to be in our Reply to Objection 2. The condition of past may intellect, and if we wish to understand that thing anew, we be referred to two things—namely, to the object which must turn to the active intellect, which he held to be a sep- is known, and to the act of knowledge. These two are arate substance, in order that the intelligible species may found together in the sensitive part, which apprehends thence flow again into our passive intellect. And from the something from the fact of its being immuted by a present practice and habit of turning to the active intellect there is sensible: wherefore at the same time an animal remem- formed, according to him, a certain aptitude in the passive bers to have sensed before in the past, and to have sensed intellect for turning to the active intellect; which aptitude some past sensible thing. But as concerns the intellectual he calls the habit of knowledge. According, therefore, to part, the past is accidental, and is not in itself a part of the this supposition, nothing is preserved in the intellectual object of the intellect. For the intellect understands man, part that is not actually understood: wherefore it would as man: and to man, as man, it is accidental that he exist not be possible to admit memory in the intellectual part. in the present, past, or future. But on the part of the act, But this opinion is clearly opposed to the teaching of the condition of past, even as such, may be understood Aristotle. For he says (De Anima iii, 4) that, when the to be in the intellect, as well as in the senses. Because passive intellect “is identified with each thing as knowing our soul’s act of understanding is an individual act, ex- it, it is said to be in act,” and that “this happens when it can isting in this or that time, inasmuch as a man is said to operate of itself. And, even then, it is in potentiality, but understand now, or yesterday, or tomorrow. And this is not in the same way as before learning and discovering.” not incompatible with the intellectual nature: for such an Now, the passive intellect is said to be each thing, inas- act of understanding, though something individual, is yet much as it receives the intelligible species of each thing. an immaterial act, as we have said above of the intellect To the fact, therefore, that it receives the species of intelli- (q. 76, a. 1); and therefore, as the intellect understands it- gible things it owes its being able to operate when it wills, self, though it be itself an individual intellect, so also it but not so that it be always operating: for even then is it in understands its act of understanding, which is an individ- potentiality in a certain sense, though otherwise than be- ual act, in the past, present, or future. In this way, then, fore the act of understanding—namely, in the sense that the notion of memory, in as far as it regards past events, whoever has habitual knowledge is in potentiality to ac- is preserved in the intellect, forasmuch as it understands tual consideration. that it previously understood: but not in the sense that it The foregoing opinion is also opposed to reason. For understands the past as something “here” and “now.” what is received into something is received according to Reply to Objection 3. The intelligible species is the conditions of the recipient. But the intellect is of a sometimes in the intellect only in potentiality, and then more stable nature, and is more immovable than corpo- the intellect is said to be in potentiality. Sometimes the real nature. If, therefore, corporeal matter holds the forms intelligible species is in the intellect as regards the ulti- which it receives, not only while it actually does some- mate completion of the act, and then it understands in act. 406 And sometimes the intelligible species is in a middle state, knowledge. In this way the intellect retains the species, between potentiality and act: and then we have habitual even when it does not understand in act. Whether the intellectual memory is a power distinct from the intellect? Ia q. 79 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual mem- ity.” Wherefore the passive intellect is not differentiated ory is distinct from the intellect. For Augustine (De Trin. by any difference of being. Nevertheless there is a dis- x, 11) assigns to the soul memory, understanding, and tinction between the power of the active intellect and of will. But it is clear that the memory is a distinct power the passive intellect: because as regards the same object, from the will. Therefore it is also distinct from the intel- the active power which makes the object to be in act must lect. be distinct from the passive power, which is moved by the Objection 2. Further, the reason of distinction among object existing in act. Thus the active power is compared the powers in the sensitive part is the same as in the intel- to its object as a being in act is to a being in potentiality; lectual part. But memory in the sensitive part is distinct whereas the passive power, on the contrary, is compared from sense, as we have said (q. 78, a. 4). Therefore mem- to its object as being in potentiality is to a being in act. ory in the intellectual part is distinct from the intellect. Therefore there can be no other difference of powers in Objection 3. Further, according to Augustine (De the intellect, but that of passive and active. Wherefore it Trin. x, 11; xi, 7), memory, understanding, and will are is clear that memory is not a distinct power from the in- equal to one another, and one flows from the other. But tellect: for it belongs to the nature of a passive power to this could not be if memory and intellect were the same retain as well as to receive. power. Therefore they are not the same power. Reply to Objection 1. Although it is said (3 Sent. D, On the contrary, From its nature the memory is the 1) that memory, intellect, and will are three powers, this treasury or storehouse of species. But the Philosopher (De is not in accordance with the meaning of Augustine, who Anima iii) attributes this to the intellect, as we have said says expressly (De Trin. xiv) that “if we take memory, in- (a. 6, ad 1). Therefore the memory is not another power telligence, and will as always present in the soul, whether from the intellect. we actually attend to them or not, they seem to pertain I answer that, As has been said above (q. 77, a. 3), the to the memory only. And by intelligence I mean that by powers of the soul are distinguished by the different for- which we understand when actually thinking; and by will mal aspects of their objects: since each power is defined I mean that love or affection which unites the child and in reference to that thing to which it is directed and which its parent.” Wherefore it is clear that Augustine does not is its object. It has also been said above (q. 59, a. 4) that take the above three for three powers; but by memory he if any power by its nature be directed to an object accord- understands the soul’s habit of retention; by intelligence, ing to the common ratio of the object, that power will not the act of the intellect; and by will, the act of the will. be differentiated according to the individual differences Reply to Objection 2. Past and present may differen- of that object: just as the power of sight, which regards its tiate the sensitive powers, but not the intellectual powers, object under the common ratio of color, is not differenti- for the reason give above. ated by differences of black and white. Now, the intellect Reply to Objection 3. Intelligence arises from mem- regards its object under the common ratio of being: since ory, as act from habit; and in this way it is equal to it, but the passive intellect is that “in which all are in potential- not as a power to a power. Whether the reason is distinct from the intellect? Ia q. 79 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that the reason is a dis- the same power. tinct power from the intellect. For it is stated in De Spiritu Objection 3. Further, man has intellect in common et Anima that “when we wish to rise from lower things to with the angels, and sense in common with the brutes. higher, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, But reason, which is proper to man, whence he is called a then reason, then the intellect.” Therefore the reason is rational animal, is a power distinct from sense. Therefore distinct from the intellect, as imagination is from sense. is it equally true to say that it is distinct from the intel- Objection 2. Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, lect, which properly belongs to the angel: whence they 6), that intellect is compared to reason, as eternity to time. are called intellectual. But it does not belong to the same power to be in eternity On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 20) and to be in time. Therefore reason and intellect are not that “that in which man excels irrational animals is reason, 407 or mind, or intelligence or whatever appropriate name we of which it examines what it has found. Now it is clear like to give it.” Therefore, reason, intellect and mind are that rest and movement are not to be referred to different one power. powers, but to one and the same, even in natural things: I answer that, Reason and intellect in man cannot be since by the same nature a thing is moved towards a cer- distinct powers. We shall understand this clearly if we tain place. Much more, therefore, by the same power do consider their respective actions. For to understand is sim- we understand and reason: and so it is clear that in man ply to apprehend intelligible truth: and to reason is to ad- reason and intellect are the same power. vance from one thing understood to another, so as to know Reply to Objection 1. That enumeration is made ac- an intelligible truth. And therefore angels, who according cording to the order of actions, not according to the dis- to their nature, possess perfect knowledge of intelligible tinction of powers. Moreover, that book is not of great truth, have no need to advance from one thing to another; authority. but apprehend the truth simply and without mental dis- Reply to Objection 2. The answer is clear from what cussion, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But man we have said. For eternity is compared to time as im- arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing movable to movable. And thus Boethius compared the from one thing to another; and therefore he is called ratio- intellect to eternity, and reason to time. nal. Reasoning, therefore, is compared to understanding, Reply to Objection 3. Other animals are so much as movement is to rest, or acquisition to possession; of lower than man that they cannot attain to the knowledge which one belongs to the perfect, the other to the imper- of truth, which reason seeks. But man attains, although fect. And since movement always proceeds from some- imperfectly, to the knowledge of intelligible truth, which thing immovable, and ends in something at rest; hence it angels know. Therefore in the angels the power of knowl- is that human reasoning, by way of inquiry and discov- edge is not of a different genus fro that which is in the ery, advances from certain things simply understood— human reason, but is compared to it as the perfect to the namely, the first principles; and, again, by way of judg- imperfect. ment returns by analysis to first principles, in the light Whether the higher and lower reason are distinct powers? Ia q. 79 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that the higher and lower which, according to Augustine, “is intent on the disposal reason are distinct powers. For Augustine says (De Trin. of temporal things.” Therefore the higher reason is an- xii, 4,7), that the image of the Trinity is in the higher part other power than the lower. of the reason, and not in the lower. But the parts of the Objection 4. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. soul are its powers. Therefore the higher and lower rea- ii) that “opinion rises from the imagination: then the mind son are two powers. by judging of the truth or error of the opinion discovers the Objection 2. Further, nothing flows from itself. Now, truth: whence” men’s (mind) “is derived from” metiendo the lower reason flows from the higher, and is ruled and di- [measuring]. “And therefore the intellect regards those rected by it. Therefore the higher reason is another power things which are already subject to judgment and true de- from the lower. cision.” Therefore the opinionative power, which is the Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. lower reason, is distinct from the mind and the intellect, vi, 1) that “the scientific part” of the soul, by which the by which we may understand the higher reason. soul knows necessary things, is another principle, and an- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) other part from the “opinionative” and “reasoning” part that “the higher and lower reason are only distinct by their by which it knows contingent things. And he proves this functions.” Therefore they are not two powers. from the principle that for those things which are “gener- I answer that, The higher and lower reason, as they ically different, generically different parts of the soul are are understood by Augustine, can in no way be two pow- ordained.” Now contingent and necessary are generically ers of the soul. For he says that “the higher reason is different, as corruptible and incorruptible. Since, there- that which is intent on the contemplation and consulta- fore, necessary is the same as eternal, and temporal the tion of things eternal”: forasmuch as in contemplation same as contingent, it seems that what the Philosopher it sees them in themselves, and in consultation it takes calls the “scientific” part must be the same as the higher its rules of action from them. But he calls the lower reason, which, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 7) reason that which “is intent on the disposal of temporal “is intent on the consideration and consultation of things things.” Now these two—namely, eternal and temporal eternal”; and that what the Philosopher calls the “reason- —are related to our knowledge in this way, that one of ing” or “opinionative” part is the same as the lower reason, them is the means of knowing the other. For by way 408 of discovery, we come through knowledge of temporal And the “opinionative” and “ratiocinative” part is more things to that of things eternal, according to the words of limited than the lower reason; for it regards only things the Apostle (Rom. 1:20), “The invisible things of God contingent. Neither must we say, without any qualifica- are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are tion, that a power, by which the intellect knows necessary made”: while by way of judgment, from eternal things al- things, is distinct from a power by which it knows contin- ready known, we judge of temporal things, and according gent things: because it knows both under the same objec- to laws of things eternal we dispose of temporal things. tive aspect—namely, under the aspect of being and truth. But it may happen that the medium and what is at- Wherefore it perfectly knows necessary things which have tained thereby belong to different habits: as the first in- perfect being in truth; since it penetrates to their very demonstrable principles belong to the habit of the intel- essence, from which it demonstrates their proper acci- lect; whereas the conclusions which we draw from them dents. On the other hand, it knows contingent things, but belong to the habit of science. And so it happens that imperfectly; forasmuch as they have but imperfect being from the principles of geometry we draw a conclusion in and truth. Now perfect and imperfect in the action do not another science—for example, perspective. But the power vary the power, but they vary the actions as to the mode of the reason is such that both medium and term belong to of acting, and consequently the principles of the actions it. For the act of the reason is, as it were, a movement and the habits themselves. And therefore the Philosopher from one thing to another. But the same movable thing postulates two lesser parts of the soul—namely, the “sci- passes through the medium and reaches the end. Where- entific” and the “ratiocinative,” not because they are two fore the higher and lower reasons are one and the same powers, but because they are distinct according to a differ- power. But according to Augustine they are distinguished ent aptitude for receiving various habits, concerning the by the functions of their actions, and according to their variety of which he inquires. For contingent and neces- various habits: for wisdom is attributed to the higher rea- sary, though differing according to their proper genera, son, science to the lower. nevertheless agree in the common aspect of being, which Reply to Objection 1. We speak of parts, in whatever the intellect considers, and to which they are variously way a thing is divided. And so far as reason is divided compared as perfect and imperfect. according to its various acts, the higher and lower reason Reply to Objection 4. That distinction given by Dam- are called parts; but not because they are different powers. ascene is according to the variety of acts, not according to Reply to Objection 2. The lower reason is said to flow the variety of powers. For “opinion” signifies an act of the from the higher, or to be ruled by it, as far as the princi- intellect which leans to one side of a contradiction, whilst ples made use of by the lower reason are drawn from and in fear of the other. While to “judge” or “measure” [men- directed by the principles of the higher reason. surare] is an act of the intellect, applying certain princi- Reply to Objection 3. The “scientific” part, of which ples to examine propositions. From this is taken the word the Philosopher speaks, is not the same as the higher rea- “mens” [mind]. Lastly, to “understand” is to adhere to the son: for necessary truths are found even among temporal formed judgment with approval. things, of which natural science and mathematics treat. Whether intelligence is a power distinct from intellect? Ia q. 79 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that the intelligence is an- gence is an act separate from others attributed to the in- other power than the intellect. For we read in De Spiritu tellect. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that “the et Anima that “when we wish to rise from lower to higher first movement is called intelligence; but that intelligence things, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, which is about a certain thing is called intention; that then reason, then intellect, and afterwards intelligence.” which remains and conforms the soul to that which is But imagination and sense are distinct powers. Therefore understood is called invention, and invention when it re- also intellect and intelligence are distinct. mains in the same man, examining and judging of itself, Objection 2. Further, Boethius says (De Consol. v, 4) is called phronesis [that is, wisdom], and phronesis if di- that “sense considers man in one way, imagination in an- lated makes thought, that is, orderly internal speech; from other, reason in another, intelligence in another.” But in- which, they say, comes speech expressed by the tongue.” tellect is the same power as reason. Therefore, seemingly, Therefore it seems that intelligence is some special power. intelligence is a distinct power from intellect, as reason is On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, a distinct power from imagination or sense. 6) that “intelligence is of indivisible things in which there Objection 3. Further, “actions came before powers,” is nothing false.” But the knowledge of these things be- as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). But intelli- longs to the intellect. Therefore intelligence is not another 409 power than the intellect. Reply to Objection 2. Boethius takes intelligence as I answer that, This word “intelligence” properly sig- meaning that act of the intellect which transcends the act nifies the intellect’s very act, which is to understand. of the reason. Wherefore he also says that reason alone However, in some works translated from the Arabic, the belongs to the human race, as intelligence alone belongs separate substances which we call angels are called “in- to God, for it belongs to God to understand all things with- telligences,” and perhaps for this reason, that such sub- out any investigation. stances are always actually understanding. But in works Reply to Objection 3. All those acts which Dama- translated from the Greek, they are called “intellects” or scene enumerates belong to one power—namely, the intel- “minds.” Thus intelligence is not distinct from intellect, as lectual power. For this power first of all only apprehends power is from power; but as act is from power. And such something; and this act is called “intelligence.” Secondly, a division is recognized even by the philosophers. For it directs what it apprehends to the knowledge of some- sometimes they assign four intellects—namely, the “ac- thing else, or to some operation; and this is called “inten- tive” and “passive” intellects, the intellect “in habit,” and tion.” And when it goes on in search of what it “intends,” the “actual” intellect. Of which four the active and passive it is called “invention.” When, by reference to something intellects are different powers; just as in all things the ac- known for certain, it examines what it has found, it is said tive power is distinct from the passive. But three of these to know or to be wise, which belongs to “phronesis” or are distinct, as three states of the passive intellect, which “wisdom”; for “it belongs to the wise man to judge,” as is sometimes in potentiality only, and thus it is called pas- the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). And when once it has sive; sometimes it is in the first act, which is knowledge, obtained something for certain, as being fully examined, and thus it is called intellect in habit; and sometimes it is it thinks about the means of making it known to others; in the second act, which is to consider, and thus it is called and this is the ordering of “interior speech,” from which intellect in act, or actual intellect. proceeds “external speech.” For every difference of acts Reply to Objection 1. If this authority is accepted, does not make the powers vary, but only what cannot be intelligence there means the act of the intellect. And thus reduced to the one same principle, as we have said above it is divided against intellect as act against power. (q. 78, a. 4). Whether the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers? Ia q. 79 a. 11 Objection 1. It would seem that the speculative and power; for it is accidental to a thing colored to be man, or practical intellects are distinct powers. For the appre- to be great or small; hence all such things are apprehended hensive and motive are different kinds of powers, as is by the same power of sight. Now, to a thing apprehended clear from De Anima ii, 3. But the speculative intellect is by the intellect, it is accidental whether it be directed to merely an apprehensive power; while the practical intel- operation or not, and according to this the speculative and lect is a motive power. Therefore they are distinct powers. practical intellects differ. For it is the speculative intel- Objection 2. Further, the different nature of the object lect which directs what it apprehends, not to operation, differentiates the power. But the object of the speculative but to the consideration of truth; while the practical intel- intellect is “truth,” and of the practical is “good”; which lect is that which directs what it apprehends to operation. differ in nature. Therefore the speculative and practical And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10); intellect are distinct powers. that “the speculative differs from the practical in its end.” Objection 3. Further, in the intellectual part, the prac-Whence each is named from its end: the one speculative, tical intellect is compared to the speculative, as the esti- the other practical—i.e. operative. mative is to the imaginative power in the sensitive part. Reply to Objection 1. The practical intellect is a mo- But the estimative differs from the imaginative, as power tive power, not as executing movement, but as directing form power, as we have said above (q. 78, a. 4). Therefore towards it; and this belongs to it according to its mode of also the speculative intellect differs from the practical. apprehension. On the contrary, The speculative intellect by exten- Reply to Objection 2. Truth and good include one sion becomes practical (De Anima iii, 10). But one power another; for truth is something good, otherwise it would is not changed into another. Therefore the speculative and not be desirable; and good is something true, otherwise it practical intellects are not distinct powers. would not be intelligible. Therefore as the object of the I answer that, The speculative and practical intellects appetite may be something true, as having the aspect of are not distinct powers. The reason of which is that, as good, for example, when some one desires to know the we have said above (q. 77, a. 3), what is accidental to the truth; so the object of the practical intellect is good di- nature of the object of a power, does not differentiate that rected to the operation, and under the aspect of truth. For 410 the practical intellect knows truth, just as the speculative, the sensitive powers, which do not differentiate the intel-but it directs the known truth to operation. lectual powers, as we have said above (a. 7 , ad 2; q. 77, Reply to Objection 3. Many differences differentiate a. 3, ad 4). Whether synderesis is a special power of the soul distinct from the others? Ia q. 79 a. 12 Objection 1. It would seem that “synderesis” is a ing, since it is a kind of movement, proceeds from the special power, distinct from the others. For those things understanding of certain things—namely, those which are which fall under one division, seem to be of the same naturally known without any investigation on the part of genus. But in the gloss of Jerome on Ezech. 1:6, “syn- reason, as from an immovable principle—and ends also at deresis” is divided against the irascible, the concupiscible, the understanding, inasmuch as by means of those princi- and the rational, which are powers. Therefore “syndere- ples naturally known, we judge of those things which we sis” is a power. have discovered by reasoning. Now it is clear that, as the Objection 2. Further, opposite things are of the same speculative reason argues about speculative things, so that genus. But “synderesis” and sensuality seem to be op- practical reason argues about practical things. Therefore posed to one another because “synderesis” always incites we must have, bestowed on us by nature, not only spec- to good; while sensuality always incites to evil: whence it ulative principles, but also practical principles. Now the is signified by the serpent, as is clear from Augustine (De first speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do Trin. xii, 12,13). It seems, therefore, that ‘synderesis’ is a not belong to a special power, but to a special habit, which power just as sensuality is. is called “the understanding of principles,” as the Philoso- Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, pher explains (Ethic. vi, 6). Wherefore the first practical 10) that in the natural power of judgment there are certain principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to “rules and seeds of virtue, both true and unchangeable.” a special power, but to a special natural habit, which we And this is what we call synderesis. Since, therefore, the call “synderesis.” Whence “synderesis” is said to incite unchangeable rules which guide our judgment belong to to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first the reason as to its higher part, as Augustine says (De Trin. principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we xii, 2), it seems that “synderesis” is the same as reason: have discovered. It is therefore clear that “synderesis” is and thus it is a power. not a power, but a natural habit. On the contrary, According to the Philosopher Reply to Objection 1. The division given by Jerome (Metaph. viii, 2), “rational powers regard opposite is taken from the variety of acts, and not from the variety things.” But “synderesis” does not regard opposites, but of powers; and various acts can belong to one power. inclines to good only. Therefore “synderesis” is not a Reply to Objection 2. In like manner, the opposition power. For if it were a power it would be a rational power, of sensuality to “syneresis” is an opposition of acts, and since it is not found in brute animals. not of the different species of one genus. I answer that, “Synderesis” is not a power but a habit; Reply to Objection 3. Those unchangeable notions though some held that it is a power higher than reason; are the first practical principles, concerning which no one while others∗ said that it is reason itself, not as reason, but errs; and they are attributed to reason as to a power, and to as a nature. In order to make this clear we must observe “synderesis” as to a habit. Wherefore we judge naturally that, as we have said above (a. 8), man’s act of reason- both by our reason and by “synderesis.” Whether conscience be a power? Ia q. 79 a. 13 Objection 1. It would seem that conscience is a Objection 2. Further, nothing is a subject of sin, ex- power; for Origen says† that “conscience is a correcting cept a power of the soul. But conscience is a subject of and guiding spirit accompanying the soul, by which it is sin; for it is said of some that “their mind and conscience led away from evil and made to cling to good.” But in are defiled” (Titus 1:15). Therefore it seems that con- the soul, spirit designates a power—either the mind itself, science is a power. according to the text (Eph. 4:13), “Be ye renewed in the Objection 3. Further, conscience must of necessity be spirit of your mind”—or the imagination, whence imagi- either an act, a habit, or a power. But it is not an act; for nary vision is called spiritual, as Augustine says (Gen. ad thus it would not always exist in man. Nor is it a habit; lit. xii, 7,24). Therefore conscience is a power. for conscience is not one thing but many, since we are di- ∗ Cf. Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. II, q. 73 † Commentary on Rom. 2:15 411 rected in our actions by many habits of knowledge. There-conscience is said to incite or to bind. In the third way, fore conscience is a power. so far as by conscience we judge that something done is On the contrary, Conscience can be laid aside. But a well done or ill done, and in this sense conscience is said power cannot be laid aside. Therefore conscience is not a to excuse, accuse, or torment. Now, it is clear that all power. these things follow the actual application of knowledge to I answer that, Properly speaking, conscience is not what we do. Wherefore, properly speaking, conscience a power, but an act. This is evident both from the very denominates an act. But since habit is a principle of act, name and from those things which in the common way sometimes the name conscience is given to the first natural of speaking are attributed to conscience. For conscience, habit—namely, ‘synderesis’: thus Jerome calls ‘syndere- according to the very nature of the word, implies the re- sis’ conscience (Gloss. Ezech. 1:6); Basil∗, the “natural lation of knowledge to something: for conscience may be power of judgment,” and Damascene† says that it is the resolved into “cum alio scientia,” i.e. knowledge applied “law of our intellect.” For it is customary for causes and to an individual case. But the application of knowledge effects to be called after one another. to something is done by some act. Wherefore from this Reply to Objection 1. Conscience is called a spirit, explanation of the name it is clear that conscience is an so far as spirit is the same as mind; because conscience is act. a certain pronouncement of the mind. The same is manifest from those things which are at- Reply to Objection 2. The conscience is said to be de- tributed to conscience. For conscience is said to witness, filed, not as a subject, but as the thing known is in knowl- to bind, or incite, and also to accuse, torment, or rebuke. edge; so far as someone knows he is defiled. And all these follow the application of knowledge or sci- Reply to Objection 3. Although an act does not al- ence to what we do: which application is made in three ways remain in itself, yet it always remains in its cause, ways. One way in so far as we recognize that we have which is power and habit. Now all the habits by which done or not done something; “Thy conscience knoweth conscience is formed, although many, nevertheless have that thou hast often spoken evil of others” (Eccles. 7:23), their efficacy from one first habit, the habit of first prin- and according to this, conscience is said to witness. In an- ciples, which is called “synderesis.” And for this special other way, so far as through the conscience we judge that reason, this habit is sometimes called conscience, as we something should be done or not done; and in this sense, have said above. ∗ Hom. in princ. Proverb. † De Fide Orth. iv. 22 412 FIRST PART, QUESTION 80 Of the Appetitive Powers in General (In Two Articles) Next we consider the appetitive powers, concerning which there are four heads of consideration: first, the appetitive powers in general; second, sensuality; third, the will; fourth, the free-will. Under the first there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether the appetite should be considered a special power of the soul? (2) Whether the appetite should be divided into intellectual and sensitive as distinct powers? Whether the appetite is a special power of the soul? Ia q. 80 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the appetite is not example, sense receives the species of all things sensi- a special power of the soul. For no power of the soul is ble, and the intellect, of all things intelligible, so that the to be assigned for those things which are common to ani-soul of man is, in a way, all things by sense and intellect: mate and to inanimate things. But appetite is common to and thereby, those things that have knowledge, in a way, animate and inanimate things: since “all desire good,” as approach to a likeness to God, “in Whom all things pre- the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore the appetite exist,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). is not a special power of the soul. Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have Objection 2. Further, powers are differentiated by knowledge in a higher manner and above the manner of their objects. But what we desire is the same as what we natural forms; so must there be in them an inclination sur- know. Therefore the appetitive power is not distinct from passing the natural inclination, which is called the natu- the apprehensive power. ral appetite. And this superior inclination belongs to the Objection 3. Further, the common is not divided from appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal the proper. But each power of the soul desires some par- is able to desire what it apprehends, and not only that to ticular desirable thing—namely its own suitable object. which it is inclined by its natural form. And so it is nec- Therefore, with regard to this object which is the desirable essary to assign an appetitive power to the soul. in general, we should not assign some particular power Reply to Objection 1. Appetite is found in things distinct from the others, called the appetitive power. which have knowledge, above the common manner in On the contrary, The Philosopher distinguishes (De which it is found in all things, as we have said above. Anima ii, 3) the appetitive from the other powers. Dama- Therefore it is necessary to assign to the soul a particu- scene also (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes the appeti- lar power. tive from the cognitive powers. Reply to Objection 2. What is apprehended and what I answer that, It is necessary to assign an appetitive is desired are the same in reality, but differ in aspect: for a power to the soul. To make this evident, we must observe thing is apprehended as something sensible or intelligible, that some inclination follows every form: for example, whereas it is desired as suitable or good. Now, it is diver- fire, by its form, is inclined to rise, and to generate its sity of aspect in the objects, and not material diversity, like. Now, the form is found to have a more perfect ex- which demands a diversity of powers. istence in those things which participate knowledge than Reply to Objection 3. Each power of the soul is a in those which lack knowledge. For in those which lack form or nature, and has a natural inclination to something. knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only Wherefore each power desires by the natural appetite that to its own being—that is, to its nature. Therefore this object which is suitable to itself. Above which natural ap- natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which petite is the animal appetite, which follows the apprehen- is called the natural appetite. But in those things which sion, and by which something is desired not as suitable to have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natu- this or that power, such as sight for seeing, or sound for ral being by its natural form, in such a manner that it is hearing; but simply as suitable to the animal. nevertheless receptive of the species of other things: for 413 Whether the sensitive and intellectual appetites are distinct powers? Ia q. 80 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the sensitive and in- hended appetible is a mover which is not moved, while tellectual appetites are not distinct powers. For powers are the appetite is a mover moved, as the Philosopher says in not differentiated by accidental differences, as we have De Anima iii, 10 and Metaph. xii (Did. xi, 7). Now things seen above (q. 77, a. 3). But it is accidental to the ap- passive and movable are differentiated according to the petible object whether it be apprehended by the sense or distinction of the corresponding active and motive prin- by the intellect. Therefore the sensitive and intellectual ciples; because the motive must be proportionate to the appetites are not distinct powers. movable, and the active to the passive: indeed, the pas- Objection 2. Further, intellectual knowledge is of uni- sive power itself has its very nature from its relation to its versals; and so it is distinct from sensitive knowledge, active principle. Therefore, since what is apprehended by which is of individual things. But there is no place for this the intellect and what is apprehended by sense are gener- distinction in the appetitive part: for since the appetite is a ically different; consequently, the intellectual appetite is movement of the soul to individual things, seemingly ev- distinct from the sensitive. ery act of the appetite regards an individual thing. There- Reply to Objection 1. It is not accidental to the thing fore the intellectual appetite is not distinguished from the desired to be apprehended by the sense or the intellect; sensitive. on the contrary, this belongs to it by its nature; for the Objection 3. Further, as under the apprehensive appetible does not move the appetite except as it is appre- power, the appetitive is subordinate as a lower power, so hended. Wherefore differences in the thing apprehended also is the motive power. But the motive power which in are of themselves differences of the appetible. And so the man follows the intellect is not distinct from the motive appetitive powers are distinct according to the distinction power which in animals follows sense. Therefore, for a of the things apprehended, as their proper objects. like reason, neither is there distinction in the appetitive Reply to Objection 2. The intellectual appetite, part. though it tends to individual things which exist outside the On the contrary, The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9) soul, yet tends to them as standing under the universal; as distinguishes a double appetite, and says (De Anima iii, when it desires something because it is good. Wherefore 11) that the higher appetite moves the lower. the Philosopher says (Rhetoric. ii, 4) that hatred can re- I answer that, We must needs say that the intellectual gard a universal, as when “we hate every kind of thief.” In appetite is a distinct power from the sensitive appetite. For the same way by the intellectual appetite we may desire the appetitive power is a passive power, which is naturally the immaterial good, which is not apprehended by sense, moved by the thing apprehended: wherefore the appre- such as knowledge, virtue, and suchlike. 414 FIRST PART, QUESTION 81 Of the Power of Sensuality (In Three Articles) Next we have to consider the power of sensuality, concerning which there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether sensuality is only an appetitive power? (2) Whether it is divided into irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers? (3) Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason? Whether sensuality is only appetitive? Ia q. 81 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that sensuality is not petite: since the operation of the apprehensive power is only appetitive, but also cognitive. For Augustine says completed in the very fact that the thing apprehended is (De Trin. xii, 12) that “the sensual movement of the soul in the one that apprehends: while the operation of the ap- which is directed to the bodily senses is common to us and petitive power is completed in the fact that he who desires beasts.” But the bodily senses belong to the apprehensive is borne towards the thing desirable. Therefore the opera- powers. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power. tion of the apprehensive power is likened to rest: whereas Objection 2. Further, things which come under one the operation of the appetitive power is rather likened to division seem to be of one genus. But Augustine (De Trin. movement. Wherefore by sensual movement we under- xii, 12) divides sensuality against the higher and lower stand the operation of the appetitive power: so that sensu- reason, which belong to knowledge. Therefore sensuality ality is the name of the sensitive appetite. also is apprehensive. Reply to Objection 1. By saying that the sensual Objection 3. Further, in man’s temptations sensuality movement of the soul is directed to the bodily senses, stands in the place of the “serpent.” But in the tempta- Augustine does not give us to understand that the bod- tion of our first parents, the serpent presented himself as ily senses are included in sensuality, but rather that the one giving information and proposing sin, which belong movement of sensuality is a certain inclination to the bod- to the cognitive power. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive ily senses, since we desire things which are apprehended power. through the bodily senses. And thus the bodily senses ap- On the contrary, Sensuality is defined as “the ap- pertain to sensuality as a preamble. petite of things belonging to the body.” Reply to Objection 2. Sensuality is divided against I answer that, The name sensuality seems to be taken higher and lower reason, as having in common with them from the sensual movement, of which Augustine speaks the act of movement: for the apprehensive power, to (De Trin. xii, 12, 13), just as the name of a power is which belong the higher and lower reason, is a motive taken from its act; for instance, sight from seeing. Now power; as is appetite, to which appertains sensuality. the sensual movement is an appetite following sensitive Reply to Objection 3. The serpent not only showed apprehension. For the act of the apprehensive power is and proposed sin, but also incited to the commission of not so properly called a movement as the act of the ap- sin. And in this, sensuality is signified by the serpent. Whether the sensitive appetite is divided into the irascible and concupiscible as dis-Ia q. 81 a. 2 tinct powers? Objection 1. It would seem that the sensitive ap- only what is suitable according to the senses. But such is petite is not divided into the irascible and concupiscible the object of the concupiscible power. Therefore there is as distinct powers. For the same power of the soul regards no sensitive appetite differing from the concupiscible. both sides of a contrariety, as sight regards both black and Objection 3. Further, hatred is in the irascible part: white, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 11). for Jerome says on Mat. 13:33: “We ought to have the But suitable and harmful are contraries. Since, then, the hatred of vice in the irascible power.” But hatred is con- concupiscible power regards what is suitable, while the trary to love, and is in the concupiscible part. Therefore irascible is concerned with what is harmful, it seems that the concupiscible and irascible are the same powers. irascible and concupiscible are the same power in the soul. On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Objection 2. Further, the sensitive appetite regards Natura Hominis) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) 415 assign two parts to the sensitive appetite, the irascible and fore also the passions of the irascible appetite counter-the concupiscible. act the passions of the concupiscible appetite: since the I answer that, The sensitive appetite is one generic concupiscence, on being aroused, diminishes anger; and power, and is called sensuality; but it is divided into two anger being roused, diminishes concupiscence in many powers, which are species of the sensitive appetite—the cases. This is clear also from the fact that the irascible irascible and the concupiscible. In order to make this is, as it were, the champion and defender of the concupis- clear, we must observe that in natural corruptible things cible when it rises up against what hinders the acquisition there is needed an inclination not only to the acquisition of the suitable things which the concupiscible desires, or of what is suitable and to the avoiding of what is harm- against what inflicts harm, from which the concupiscible ful, but also to resistance against corruptive and contrary flies. And for this reason all the passions of the irasci- agencies which are a hindrance to the acquisition of what ble appetite rise from the passions of the concupiscible is suitable, and are productive of harm. For example, fire appetite and terminate in them; for instance, anger rises has a natural inclination, not only to rise from a lower po- from sadness, and having wrought vengeance, terminates sition, which is unsuitable to it, towards a higher position in joy. For this reason also the quarrels of animals are which is suitable, but also to resist whatever destroys or about things concupiscible—namely, food and sex, as the hinders its action. Therefore, since the sensitive appetite Philosopher says∗. is an inclination following sensitive apprehension, as nat- Reply to Objection 1. The concupiscible power re- ural appetite is an inclination following the natural form, gards both what is suitable and what is unsuitable. But there must needs be in the sensitive part two appetitive the object of the irascible power is to resist the onslaught powers—one through which the soul is simply inclined to of the unsuitable. seek what is suitable, according to the senses, and to fly Reply to Objection 2. As in the apprehensive powers from what is hurtful, and this is called the concupiscible: of the sensitive part there is an estimative power, which and another, whereby an animal resists these attacks that perceives those things which do not impress the senses, as hinder what is suitable, and inflict harm, and this is called we have said above (q. 78, a. 2); so also in the sensitive the irascible. Whence we say that its object is some- appetite there is a certain appetitive power which regards thing arduous, because its tendency is to overcome and something as suitable, not because it pleases the senses, rise above obstacles. Now these two are not to be reduced but because it is useful to the animal for self-defense: and to one principle: for sometimes the soul busies itself with this is the irascible power. unpleasant things, against the inclination of the concupis- Reply to Objection 3. Hatred belongs simply to the cible appetite, in order that, following the impulse of the concupiscible appetite: but by reason of the strife which irascible appetite, it may fight against obstacles. Where- arises from hatred, it may belong to the irascible appetite. Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason? Ia q. 81 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the irascible and con- reason. cupiscible appetites do not obey reason. For irascible and On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. concupiscible are parts of sensuality. But sensuality does ii, 12) that “the part of the soul which is obedient and not obey reason, wherefore it is signified by the serpent, amenable to reason is divided into concupiscence and as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the anger.” irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason. I answer that, In two ways the irascible and concu- Objection 2. Further, what obeys a certain thing does piscible powers obey the higher part, in which are the in- not resist it. But the irascible and concupiscible appetites tellect or reason, and the will; first, as to reason, secondly resist reason: according to the Apostle (Rom. 7:23): “I as to the will. They obey the reason in their own acts, be- see another law in my members fighting against the law cause in other animals the sensitive appetite is naturally of my mind.” Therefore the irascible and concupiscible moved by the estimative power; for instance, a sheep, es- appetites do not obey reason. teeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In man the es- Objection 3. Further, as the appetitive power is in- timative power, as we have said above (q. 78, a. 4), is ferior to the rational part of the soul, so also is the sen- replaced by the cogitative power, which is called by some sitive power. But the sensitive part of the soul does not ‘the particular reason,’ because it compares individual in- obey reason: for we neither hear nor see just when we tentions. Wherefore in man the sensitive appetite is natu- wish. Therefore, in like manner, neither do the powers of rally moved by this particular reason. But this same par- the sensitive appetite, the irascible and concupscible, obey ticular reason is naturally guided and moved according to ∗ De Animal. Histor. viii. 416 the universal reason: wherefore in syllogistic matters par-power; but the intellect dominates the appetite by a politic ticular conclusions are drawn from universal propositions. and royal power.” For a power is called despotic whereby Therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs the a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to resist in sensitive appetite, which is divided into concupiscible and any way the orders of the one that commands them, since irascible; and this appetite obeys it. But because to draw they have nothing of their own. But that power is called particular conclusions from universal principles is not the politic and royal by which a man rules over free subjects, work of the intellect, as such, but of the reason: hence it who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have is that the irascible and concupiscible are said to obey the nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which reason rather than to obey the intellect. Anyone can ex- they can resist the orders of him who commands. And perience this in himself: for by applying certain universal so, the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic power, considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified because the members of the body cannot in any way re- or excited. sist the sway of the soul, but at the soul’s command both To the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in ex- hand and foot, and whatever member is naturally moved ecution, which is accomplished by the motive power. For by voluntary movement, are moved at once. But the in- in other animals movement follows at once the concu- tellect or reason is said to rule the irascible and concu- piscible and irascible appetites: for instance, the sheep, piscible by a politic power: because the sensitive appetite fearing the wolf, flees at once, because it has no supe- has something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist rior counteracting appetite. On the contrary, man is not the commands of reason. For the sensitive appetite is nat- moved at once, according to the irascible and concupis- urally moved, not only by the estimative power in other cible appetites: but he awaits the command of the will, animals, and in man by the cogitative power which the which is the superior appetite. For wherever there is or- universal reason guides, but also by the imagination and der among a number of motive powers, the second only sense. Whence it is that we experience that the irasci- moves by virtue of the first: wherefore the lower appetite ble and concupiscible powers do resist reason, inasmuch is not sufficient to cause movement, unless the higher ap- as we sense or imagine something pleasant, which rea- petite consents. And this is what the Philosopher says (De son forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands. And Anima iii, 11), that “the higher appetite moves the lower so from the fact that the irascible and concupiscible resist appetite, as the higher sphere moves the lower.” In this reason in something, we must not conclude that they do way, therefore, the irascible and concupiscible are subject not obey. to reason. Reply to Objection 3. The exterior senses require for Reply to Objection 1. Sensuality is signified by the action exterior sensible things, whereby they are affected, serpent, in what is proper to it as a sensitive power. But the and the presence of which is not ruled by reason. But the irascible and concupiscible powers denominate the sensi- interior powers, both appetitive and apprehensive, do not tive appetite rather on the part of the act, to which they are require exterior things. Therefore they are subject to the led by the reason, as we have said. command of reason, which can not only incite or modify Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (Polit. the affections of the appetitive power, but can also form i, 2): “We observe in an animal a despotic and a politic the phantasms of the imagination. principle: for the soul dominates the body by a despotic 417 FIRST PART, QUESTION 82 Of the Will (In Five Articles) We next consider the will. Under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether the will desires something of necessity? (2) Whether it desires anything of necessity? (3) Whether it is a higher power than the intellect? (4) Whether the will moves the intellect? (5) Whether the will is divided into irascible and concupiscible? Whether the will desires something of necessity? Ia q. 82 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the will desires noth- to the will. For we call that violent which is against the in- ing. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that it any- clination of a thing. But the very movement of the will is thing is necessary, it is not voluntary. But whatever the an inclination to something. Therefore, as a thing is called will desires is voluntary. Therefore nothing that the will natural because it is according to the inclination of nature, desires is desired of necessity. so a thing is called voluntary because it is according to Objection 2. Further, the rational powers, according the inclination of the will. Therefore, just as it is impossi- to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2), extend to opposite ble for a thing to be at the same time violent and natural, things. But the will is a rational power, because, as he so it is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced or says (De Anima iii, 9), “the will is in the reason.” There- violent, and voluntary. fore the will extends to opposite things, and therefore it is But necessity of end is not repugnant to the will, when determined to nothing of necessity. the end cannot be attained except in one way: thus from Objection 3. Further, by the will we are masters of the will to cross the sea, arises in the will the necessity to our own actions. But we are not masters of that which wish for a ship. is of necessity. Therefore the act of the will cannot be In like manner neither is natural necessity repugnant necessitated. to the will. Indeed, more than this, for as the intellect On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 4) of necessity adheres to the first principles, the will must that “all desire happiness with one will.” Now if this were of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness: not necessary, but contingent, there would at least be a since the end is in practical matters what the principle is few exceptions. Therefore the will desires something of in speculative matters. For what befits a thing naturally necessity. and immovably must be the root and principle of all else I answer that, The word “necessity” is employed in appertaining thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first many ways. For that which must be is necessary. Now in everything, and every movement arises from something that a thing must be may belong to it by an intrinsic immovable. principle—either material, as when we say that every- Reply to Objection 1. The words of Augustine are thing composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible— to be understood of the necessity of coercion. But natural or formal, as when we say that it is necessary for the three necessity “does not take away the liberty of the will,” as angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles. And he says himself (De Civ. Dei v, 10). this is “natural” and “absolute necessity.” In another way, Reply to Objection 2. The will, so far as it desires that a thing must be, belongs to it by reason of something a thing naturally, corresponds rather to the intellect as re- extrinsic, which is either the end or the agent. On the part gards natural principles than to the reason, which extends of the end, as when without it the end is not to be attained to opposite things. Wherefore in this respect it is rather an or so well attained: for instance, food is said to be neces- intellectual than a rational power. sary for life, and a horse is necessary for a journey. This Reply to Objection 3. We are masters of our own is called “necessity of end,” and sometimes also “utility.” actions by reason of our being able to choose this or that. On the part of the agent, a thing must be, when someone But choice regards not the end, but “the means to the end,” is forced by some agent, so that he is not able to do the as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9). Wherefore the de- contrary. This is called “necessity of coercion.” sire of the ultimate end does not regard those actions of Now this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant which we are masters. 418 Whether the will desires of necessity, whatever it desires? Ia q. 82 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the will desires all connection of these conclusions with the principles; but it things of necessity, whatever it desires. For Dionysius does not assent of necessity until through the demonstra- says (Div. Nom. iv) that “evil is outside the scope of the tion it recognizes the necessity of such connection. It is will.” Therefore the will tends of necessity to the good the same with the will. For there are certain individual which is proposed to it. goods which have not a necessary connection with happi- Objection 2. Further, the object of the will is com- ness, because without them a man can be happy: and to pared to the will as the mover to the thing movable. such the will does not adhere of necessity. But there are But the movement of the movable necessarily follows the some things which have a necessary connection with hap- mover. Therefore it seems that the will’s object moves it piness, by means of which things man adheres to God, in of necessity. Whom alone true happiness consists. Nevertheless, until Objection 3. Further, as the thing apprehended by through the certitude of the Divine Vision the necessity sense is the object of the sensitive appetite, so the thing of such connection be shown, the will does not adhere to apprehended by the intellect is the object of the intellec- God of necessity, nor to those things which are of God. tual appetite, which is called the will. But what is ap- But the will of the man who sees God in His essence of prehended by the sense moves the sensitive appetite of necessity adheres to God, just as now we desire of neces- necessity: for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that sity to be happy. It is therefore clear that the will does not “animals are moved by things seen.” Therefore it seems desire of necessity whatever it desires. that whatever is apprehended by the intellect moves the Reply to Objection 1. The will can tend to nothing will of necessity. except under the aspect of good. But because good is of On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that many kinds, for this reason the will is not of necessity de- “it is the will by which we sin and live well,” and so the termined to one. will extends to opposite things. Therefore it does not de- Reply to Objection 2. The mover, then, of necessity sire of necessity all things whatsoever it desires. causes movement in the thing movable, when the power I answer that, The will does not desire of necessity of the mover exceeds the thing movable, so that its entire whatsoever it desires. In order to make this evident we capacity is subject to the mover. But as the capacity of the must observe that as the intellect naturally and of neces- will regards the universal and perfect good, its capacity is sity adheres to the first principles, so the will adheres to not subjected to any individual good. And therefore it is the last end, as we have said already (a. 1). Now there are not of necessity moved by it. some things intelligible which have not a necessary con- Reply to Objection 3. The sensitive power does not nection with the first principles; such as contingent propo- compare different things with each other, as reason does: sitions, the denial of which does not involve a denial of the but it simply apprehends some one thing. Therefore, ac- first principles. And to such the intellect does not assent cording to that one thing, it moves the sensitive appetite of necessity. But there are some propositions which have in a determinate way. But the reason is a power that a necessary connection with the first principles: such as compares several things together: therefore from several demonstrable conclusions, a denial of which involves a things the intellectual appetite—that is, the will—may be denial of the first principles. And to these the intellect as- moved; but not of necessity from one thing. sents of necessity, when once it is aware of the necessary Whether the will is a higher power than the intellect? Ia q. 82 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the will is a higher Objection 3. Further, habits are proportioned to their power than the intellect. For the object of the will is good powers, as perfections to what they make perfect. But the and the end. But the end is the first and highest cause. habit which perfects the will—namely, charity—is more Therefore the will is the first and highest power. noble than the habits which perfect the intellect: for it is Objection 2. Further, in the order of natural things we written (1 Cor. 13:2): “If I should know all mysteries, observe a progress from imperfect things to perfect. And and if I should have all faith, and have not charity, I am this also appears in the powers of the soul: for sense pre- nothing.” Therefore the will is a higher power than the cedes the intellect, which is more noble. Now the act of intellect. the will, in the natural order, follows the act of the intel- On the contrary, The Philosopher holds the intellect lect. Therefore the will is a more noble and perfect power to be the higher power than the intellect. than the intellect. I answer that, The superiority of one thing over an- 419 other can be considered in two ways: “absolutely” and ror,” which are objects of the intellect, “are in the mind.” “relatively.” Now a thing is considered to be such abso- When, therefore, the thing in which there is good is no- lutely which is considered such in itself: but relatively as bler than the soul itself, in which is the idea understood; it is such with regard to something else. If therefore the by comparison with such a thing, the will is higher than intellect and will be considered with regard to themselves, the intellect. But when the thing which is good is less no- then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear if ble than the soul, then even in comparison with that thing we compare their respective objects to one another. For the intellect is higher than the will. Wherefore the love of the object of the intellect is more simple and more abso- God is better than the knowledge of God; but, on the con- lute than the object of the will; since the object of the in- trary, the knowledge of corporeal things is better than the tellect is the very idea of appetible good; and the appetible love thereof. Absolutely, however, the intellect is nobler good, the idea of which is in the intellect, is the object of than the will. the will. Now the more simple and the more abstract a Reply to Objection 1. The aspect of causality is per- thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and therefore ceived by comparing one thing to another, and in such a the object of the intellect is higher than the object of the comparison the idea of good is found to be nobler: but will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in truth signifies something more absolute, and extends to its order to its object, it follows that the intellect in itself the idea of good itself: wherefore even good is something and absolutely is higher and nobler than the will. But rel- true. But, again, truth is something good: forasmuch as atively and by comparison with something else, we find the intellect is a thing, and truth its end. And among that the will is sometimes higher than the intellect, from other ends this is the most excellent: as also is the intellect the fact that the object of the will occurs in something among the other powers. higher than that in which occurs the object of the intellect. Reply to Objection 2. What precedes in order of gen- Thus, for instance, I might say that hearing is relatively eration and time is less perfect: for in one and in the same nobler than sight, inasmuch as something in which there thing potentiality precedes act, and imperfection precedes is sound is nobler than something in which there is color, perfection. But what precedes absolutely and in the order though color is nobler and simpler than sound. For as we of nature is more perfect: for thus act precedes potential- have said above (q. 16, a. 1; q. 27, a. 4), the action of the ity. And in this way the intellect precedes the will, as the intellect consists in this—that the idea of the thing under- motive power precedes the thing movable, and as the ac- stood is in the one who understands; while the act of the tive precedes the passive; for good which is understood will consists in this—that the will is inclined to the thing moves the will. itself as existing in itself. And therefore the Philosopher Reply to Objection 3. This reason is verified of the says in Metaph. vi (Did. v, 2) that “good and evil,” which will as compared with what is above the soul. For charity are objects of the will, “are in things,” but “truth and er- is the virtue by which we love God. Whether the will moves the intellect? Ia q. 82 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the will does not act of the intellect by another act of the will, and so on move the intellect. For what moves excels and precedes indefinitely, which is impossible. Therefore the will does what is moved, because what moves is an agent, and “the not move the intellect. agent is nobler than the patient,” as Augustine says (Gen. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, ad lit. xii, 16), and the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5). 26): “It is in our power to learn an art or not, as we list.” But the intellect excels and precedes the will, as we have But a thing is in our power by the will, and we learn art said above (a. 3). Therefore the will does not move the by the intellect. Therefore the will moves the intellect. intellect. I answer that, A thing is said to move in two ways: Objection 2. Further, what moves is not moved by First, as an end; for instance, when we say that the end what is moved, except perhaps accidentally. But the in- moves the agent. In this way the intellect moves the will, tellect moves the will, because the good apprehended by because the good understood is the object of the will, and the intellect moves without being moved; whereas the ap- moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing is said to move petite moves and is moved. Therefore the intellect is not as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and moved by the will. what impels moves what is impelled. In this way the Objection 3. Further, we can will nothing but what will moves the intellect and all the powers of the soul, we understand. If, therefore, in order to understand, the as Anselm says (Eadmer, De Similitudinibus). The rea- will moves by willing to understand, that act of the will son is, because wherever we have order among a number must be preceded by another act of the intellect, and this of active powers, that power which regards the universal 420 end moves the powers which regard particular ends. And cause under the notion of being and truth is contained both we may observe this both in nature and in things politic. the will itself, and its act, and its object. Wherefore the in- For the heaven, which aims at the universal preservation tellect understands the will, and its act, and its object, just of things subject to generation and corruption, moves all as it understands other species of things, as stone or wood, inferior bodies, each of which aims at the preservation of which are contained in the common notion of being and its own species or of the individual. The king also, who truth. But if we consider the will as regards the common aims at the common good of the whole kingdom, by his nature of its object, which is good, and the intellect as a rule moves all the governors of cities, each of whom rules thing and a special power; then the intellect itself, and its over his own particular city. Now the object of the will is act, and its object, which is truth, each of which is some good and the end in general, and each power is directed to species of good, are contained under the common notion some suitable good proper to it, as sight is directed to the of good. And in this way the will is higher than the intel- perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of lect, and can move it. From this we can easily understand truth. Therefore the will as agent moves all the powers of why these powers include one another in their acts, be- the soul to their respective acts, except the natural powers cause the intellect understands that the will wills, and the of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our will. will wills the intellect to understand. In the same way Reply to Objection 1. The intellect may be consid- good is contained in truth, inasmuch as it is an understood ered in two ways: as apprehensive of universal being and truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as it is a desired good. truth, and as a thing and a particular power having a de- Reply to Objection 2. The intellect moves the will in terminate act. In like manner also the will may be con- one sense, and the will moves the intellect in another, as sidered in two ways: according to the common nature of we have said above. its object—that is to say, as appetitive of universal good— Reply to Objection 3. There is no need to go on in- and as a determinate power of the soul having a determi- definitely, but we must stop at the intellect as preceding all nate act. If, therefore, the intellect and the will be com- the rest. For every movement of the will must be preceded pared with one another according to the universality of by apprehension, whereas every apprehension is not pre- their respective objects, then, as we have said above (a. 3), ceded by an act of the will; but the principle of counselling the intellect is simply higher and nobler than the will. If, and understanding is an intellectual principle higher than however, we take the intellect as regards the common na- our intellect —namely, God—as also Aristotle says (Eth. ture of its object and the will as a determinate power, then Eudemic. vii, 14), and in this way he explains that there again the intellect is higher and nobler than the will, be- is no need to proceed indefinitely. Whether we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior ap-Ia q. 82 a. 5 petite? Objection 1. It would seem that we ought to distin- assign an irascible and concupiscible power to the intel- guish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior ap- lectual part. petite, which is the will. For the concupiscible power is Objection 3. Further, it is said (De Spiritu et Anima) so called from “concupiscere” [to desire], and the irasci- that “the soul has these powers”—namely, the irascible, ble part from “irasci” [to be angry]. But there is a con- concupiscible, and rational—“before it is united to the cupiscence which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, body.” But no power of the sensitive part belongs to the but only to the intellectual, which is the will; as the con- soul alone, but to the soul and body united, as we have cupiscence of wisdom, of which it is said (Wis. 6:21): said above (q. 78, Aa. 5,8). Therefore the irascible and “The concupiscence of wisdom bringeth to the eternal concupiscible powers are in the will, which is the intellec- kingdom.” There is also a certain anger which cannot be- tual appetite. long to the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual; On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De as when our anger is directed against vice. Wherefore Nat. Hom.) says “that the irrational” part of the soul is di- Jerome commenting on Mat. 13:33 warns us “to have the vided into the desiderative and irascible, and Damascene hatred of vice in the irascible part.” Therefore we should says the same (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). And the Philosopher distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts of the intel- says (De Anima iii, 9) “that the will is in reason, while lectual soul as well as in the sensitive. in the irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and Objection 2. Further, as is commonly said, charity is anger,” or “desire and animus.” in the concupiscible, and hope in the irascible part. But I answer that, The irascible and concupiscible are not they cannot be in the sensitive appetite, because their ob- parts of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. jects are not sensible, but intellectual. Therefore we must Because, as was said above (q. 59, a. 4; q. 79, a. 7), a 421 power which is directed to an object according to some Reply to Objection 1. Love, concupiscence, and the common notion is not differentiated by special differences like can be understood in two ways. Sometimes they are which are contained under that common notion. For in- taken as passions—arising, that is, with a certain commo- stance, because sight regards the visible thing under the tion of the soul. And thus they are commonly understood, common notion of something colored, the visual power and in this sense they are only in the sensitive appetite. is not multiplied according to the different kinds of color: They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as but if there were a power regarding white as white, and not they are simple affections without passion or commotion as something colored, it would be distinct from a power of the soul, and thus they are acts of the will. And in this regarding black as black. sense, too, they are attributed to the angels and to God. Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the com- But if taken in this sense, they do not belong to different mon notion of good, because neither do the senses appre- powers, but only to one power, which is called the will. hend the universal. And therefore the parts of the sensitive Reply to Objection 2. The will itself may be said to appetite are differentiated by the different notions of par- irascible, as far as it wills to repel evil, not from any sud- ticular good: for the concupiscible regards as proper to it den movement of a passion, but from a judgment of the the notion of good, as something pleasant to the senses reason. And in the same way the will may be said to be and suitable to nature: whereas the irascible regards the concupiscible on account of its desire for good. And thus notion of good as something that wards off and repels in the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope— what is hurtful. But the will regards good according to the that is, in the will as ordered to such acts. And in this common notion of good, and therefore in the will, which way, too, we may understand the words quoted (De Spir- is the intellectual appetite, there is no differentiation of apitu et Anima); that the irascible and concupiscible pow- petitive powers, so that there be in the intellectual appetite ers are in the soul before it is united to the body (as long an irascible power distinct from a concupiscible power: as we understand priority of nature, and not of time), al- just as neither on the part of the intellect are the apprehen- though there is no need to have faith in what that book sive powers multiplied, although they are on the part of says. Whence the answer to the third objection is clear. the senses. 422 FIRST PART, QUESTION 83 Of Free-Will (In Four Articles) We now inquire concerning free-will. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether man has free-will? (2) What is free-will—a power, an act, or a habit? (3) If it is a power, is it appetitive or cognitive? (4) If it is appetitive, is it the same power as the will, or distinct? Whether man has free-will? Ia q. 83 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that man has not free- ing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a nat- will. For whoever has free-will does what he wills. But ural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from man does not what he wills; for it is written (Rom. 7:19): reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is “For the good which I will I do not, but the evil which I to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But man will not, that I do.” Therefore man has not free-will. acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power Objection 2. Further, whoever has free-will has in he judges that something should be avoided or sought. his power to will or not to will, to do or not to do. But But because this judgment, in the case of some particu- this is not in man’s power: for it is written (Rom. 9:16): lar act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act “It is not of him that willeth”—namely, to will—“nor of of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free him that runneth”—namely, to run. Therefore man has judgment and retains the power of being inclined to var- not free-will. ious things. For reason in contingent matters may follow Objection 3. Further, what is “free is cause of itself,” opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). Therefore what is rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are con- moved by another is not free. But God moves the will, for tingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of rea- it is written (Prov. 21:1): “The heart of the king is in the son may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it” to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary and (Phil. 2:13): “It is God Who worketh in you both to that man have a free-will. will and to accomplish.” Therefore man has not free-will. Reply to Objection 1. As we have said above (q. 81, Objection 4. Further, whoever has free-will is master a. 3, ad 2), the sensitive appetite, though it obeys the rea- of his own actions. But man is not master of his own ac- son, yet in a given case can resist by desiring what the tions: for it is written (Jer. 10:23): “The way of a man is reason forbids. This is therefore the good which man does not his: neither is it in a man to walk.” Therefore man has not when he wishes—namely, “not to desire against rea- not free-will. son,” as Augustine says. Objection 5. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, Reply to Objection 2. Those words of the Apostle 5): “According as each one is, such does the end seem to are not to be taken as though man does not wish or does him.” But it is not in our power to be of one quality or not run of his free-will, but because the free-will is not another; for this comes to us from nature. Therefore it is sufficient thereto unless it be moved and helped by God. natural to us to follow some particular end, and therefore Reply to Objection 3. Free-will is the cause of its we are not free in so doing. own movement, because by his free-will man moves him- On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): “God self to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as nei- of his own counsel”; and the gloss adds: “That is of his ther for one thing to be cause of another need it be the free-will.” first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves I answer that, Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and pun- natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natu- ishments would be in vain. In order to make this evident, ral, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive we must observe that some things act without judgment; their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but according to its own nature. not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, see- Reply to Objection 4. “Man’s way” is said “not to be 423 his” in the execution of his choice, wherein he may be im-organ. And such as a man is by virtue of a corporeal qual- peded, whether he will or not. The choice itself, however, ity, such also does his end seem to him, because from such is in us, but presupposes the help of God. a disposition a man is inclined to choose or reject some- Reply to Objection 5. Quality in man is of two kinds: thing. But these inclinations are subject to the judgment natural and adventitious. Now the natural quality may be of reason, which the lower appetite obeys, as we have said in the intellectual part, or in the body and its powers. From (q. 81, a. 3). Wherefore this is in no way prejudicial to the very fact, therefore, that man is such by virtue of a nat- free-will. ural quality which is in the intellectual part, he naturally The adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by desires his last end, which is happiness. Which desire, in- virtue of which a man is inclined to one thing rather than deed, is a natural desire, and is not subject to free-will, as to another. And yet even these inclinations are subject is clear from what we have said above (q. 82, Aa. 1,2). But to the judgment of reason. Such qualities, too, are sub- on the part of the body and its powers man may be such ject to reason, as it is in our power either to acquire them, by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such a whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them, temperament or disposition due to any impression what- or to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is ever produced by corporeal causes, which cannot affect repugnant to free-will. the intellectual part, since it is not the act of a corporeal Whether free-will is a power? Ia q. 83 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that free-will is not a rally inclined are not subject to free-will, as we have said power. For free-will is nothing but a free judgment. But of the desire of happiness (q. 82, Aa. 1,2). Wherefore it judgment denominates an act, not a power. Therefore is against the very notion of free-will that it should be a free-will is not a power. natural habit. And that it should be a non-natural habit is Objection 2. Further, free-will is defined as “the fac- against its nature. Therefore in no sense is it a habit. ulty of the will and reason.” But faculty denominates a Secondly, this is clear because habits are defined as facility of power, which is due to a habit. Therefore free- that “by reason of which we are well or ill disposed with will is a habit. Moreover Bernard says (De Gratia et Lib. regard to actions and passions” (Ethic. ii, 5); for by tem- Arb. 1,2) that free-will is “the soul’s habit of disposing of perance we are well-disposed as regards concupiscences, itself.” Therefore it is not a power. and by intemperance ill-disposed: and by knowledge we Objection 3. Further, no natural power is forfeited are well-disposed to the act of the intellect when we know through sin. But free-will is forfeited through sin; for Au- the truth, and by the contrary ill-disposed. But the free- gustine says that “man, by abusing free-will, loses both it will is indifferent to good and evil choice: wherefore it and himself.” Therefore free-will is not a power. is impossible for free-will to be a habit. Therefore it is a On the contrary, Nothing but a power, seemingly, is power. the subject of a habit. But free-will is the subject of grace, Reply to Objection 1. It is not unusual for a power to by the help of which it chooses what is good. Therefore be named from its act. And so from this act, which is a free-will is a power. free judgment, is named the power which is the principle I answer that, Although free-will∗ in its strict sense of this act. Otherwise, if free-will denominated an act, it denotes an act, in the common manner of speaking we call would not always remain in man. free-will, that which is the principle of the act by which Reply to Objection 2. Faculty sometimes denomi- man judges freely. Now in us the principle of an act is nates a power ready for operation, and in this sense fac- both power and habit; for we say that we know something ulty is used in the definition of free-will. But Bernard both by knowledge and by the intellectual power. There- takes habit, not as divided against power, but as signify- fore free-will must be either a power or a habit, or a power ing a certain aptitude by which a man has some sort of with a habit. That it is neither a habit nor a power together relation to an act. And this may be both by a power and with a habit, can be clearly proved in two ways. First of by a habit: for by a power man is, as it were, empowered all, because, if it is a habit, it must be a natural habit; for it to do the action, and by the habit he is apt to act well or is natural to man to have a free-will. But there is not natu- ill. ral habit in us with respect to those things which come un- Reply to Objection 3. Man is said to have lost free- der free-will: for we are naturally inclined to those things will by falling into sin, not as to natural liberty, which is of which we have natural habits—for instance, to assent freedom from coercion, but as regards freedom from fault to first principles: while those things which we are natu- and unhappiness. Of this we shall treat later in the treatise ∗ Liberum arbitrium—i.e. free judgment 424 on Morals in the second part of this work ( Ia IIae, q. 85, seqq.; q. 109). Whether free-will is an appetitive power? Ia q. 83 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that free-will is not an ap- to the appetitive or the cognitive power: since he says that petitive, but a cognitive power. For Damascene (De Fide choice is either “an appetitive intellect or an intellectual Orth. ii, 27) says that “free-will straightway accompa- appetite.” But (Ethic. iii, 3) he inclines to its being an nies the rational nature.” But reason is a cognitive power. intellectual appetite when he describes choice as “a desire Therefore free-will is a cognitive power. proceeding from counsel.” And the reason of this is be- Objection 2. Further, free-will is so called as though cause the proper object of choice is the means to the end: it were a free judgment. But to judge is an act of a cogni- and this, as such, is in the nature of that good which is tive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power. called useful: wherefore since good, as such, is the object Objection 3. Further, the principal function of free- of the appetite, it follows that choice is principally an act will is to choose. But choice seems to belong to knowl- of the appetitive power. And thus free-will is an appetitive edge, because it implies a certain comparison of one thing power. to another, which belongs to the cognitive power. There- Reply to Objection 1. The appetitive powers accom- fore free-will is a cognitive power. pany the apprehensive, and in this sense Damascene says On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, that free-will straightway accompanies the rational power. 3) that choice is “the desire of those things which are in Reply to Objection 2. Judgment, as it were, con- us.” But desire is an act of the appetitive power: therefore cludes and terminates counsel. Now counsel is termi- choice is also. But free-will is that by which we choose. nated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, by Therefore free-will is an appetitive power. the acceptation of the appetite: whence the Philosopher I answer that, The proper act of free-will is choice: (Ethic. iii, 3) says that, “having formed a judgment by for we say that we have a free-will because we can take counsel, we desire in accordance with that counsel.” And one thing while refusing another; and this is to choose. in this sense choice itself is a judgment from which free- Therefore we must consider the nature of free-will, by will takes its name. considering the nature of choice. Now two things con- Reply to Objection 3. This comparison which is cur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the implied in the choice belongs to the preceding counsel, other on the part of the appetitive power. On the part of the which is an act of reason. For though the appetite does cognitive power, counsel is required, by which we judge not make comparisons, yet forasmuch as it is moved by one thing to be preferred to another: and on the part of the the apprehensive power which does compare, it has some appetitive power, it is required that the appetite should ac- likeness of comparison by choosing one in preference to cept the judgment of counsel. Therefore Aristotle (Ethic. another. vi, 2) leaves it in doubt whether choice belongs principally Whether free-will is a power distinct from the will? Ia q. 83 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that free-will is a power petite. But in the intellect there are two powers—the distinct from the will. For Damascene says (De Fide active and the passive. Therefore, also on the part of Orth. ii, 22) that thelesis is one thing and boulesis anthe intellectual appetite, there must be another power be- other. But thelesis is the will, while boulesis seems to be sides the will. And this, seemingly, can only be free-will. the free-will, because boulesis, according to him, is will Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will. as concerning an object by way of comparison between On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, two things. Therefore it seems that free-will is a distinct 14) free-will is nothing else than the will. power from the will. I answer that, The appetitive powers must be propor- Objection 2. Further, powers are known by their acts. tionate to the apprehensive powers, as we have said above But choice, which is the act of free-will, is distinct from (q. 64, a. 2). Now, as on the part of the intellectual ap- the act of willing, because “the act of the will regards the prehension we have intellect and reason, so on the part of end, whereas choice regards the means to the end” (Ethic. the intellectual appetite we have will, and free-will which iii, 2). Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is clear will. from their relations to their respective objects and acts. Objection 3. Further, the will is the intellectual ap- For the act of “understanding” implies the simple accep- 425 tation of something; whence we say that we understand to reason, so is the will to the power of choice, which is first principles, which are known of themselves without free-will. But it has been shown above (q. 79, a. 8) that it any comparison. But to “reason,” properly speaking, is belongs to the same power both to understand and to rea- to come from one thing to the knowledge of another: son, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and wherefore, properly speaking, we reason about conclu- to be in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same sions, which are known from the principles. In like man- power to will and to choose: and on this account the will ner on the part of the appetite to “will” implies the simple and the free-will are not two powers, but one. appetite for something: wherefore the will is said to re- Reply to Objection 1. Boulesis is distinct from thele-gard the end, which is desired for itself. But to “choose” sis on account of a distinction, not of powers, but of acts. is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something Reply to Objection 2. Choice and will—that is, the else: wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the means act of willing —are different acts: yet they belong to the to the end. Now, in matters of knowledge, the principles same power, as also to understand and to reason, as we are related to the conclusion to which we assent on ac- have said. count of the principles: just as, in appetitive matters, the Reply to Objection 3. The intellect is compared to the end is related to the means, which is desired on account will as moving the will. And therefore there is no need to of the end. Wherefore it is evident that as the intellect is distinguish in the will an active and a passive will. 426 FIRST PART, QUESTION 84 How the Soul While United to the Body Understands Corporeal Things Beneath It (In Eight Articles) We now have to consider the acts of the soul in regard to the intellectual and the appetitive powers: for the other powers of the soul do not come directly under the consideration of the theologian. Furthermore, the acts of the appetitive part of the soul come under the consideration of the science of morals; wherefore we shall treat of them in the second part of this work, to which the consideration of moral matters belongs. But of the acts of the intellectual part we shall treat now. In treating of these acts we shall proceed in the following order: First, we shall inquire how the soul understands when united to the body; secondly, how it understands when separated therefrom. The former of these inquiries will be threefold: (1) How the soul understands bodies which are beneath it; (2) How it understands itself and things contained in itself; (3) How it understands immaterial substances, which are above it. In treating of the knowledge of corporeal things there are three points to be considered: (1) Through what does the soul know them? (2) How and in what order does it know them? (3) What does it know in them? Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect? (2) Whether it understands them through its essence, or through any species? (3) If through some species, whether the species of all things intelligible are naturally innate in the soul? (4) Whether these species are derived by the soul from certain separate immaterial forms? (5) Whether our soul sees in the eternal ideas all that it understands? (6) Whether it acquires intellectual knowledge from the senses? (7) Whether the intellect can, through the species of which it is possessed, actually understand, without turning to the phantasms? (8) Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered by an obstacle in the sensitive powers? Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect? Ia q. 84 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the soul does not the world save bodies. And because they observed that know bodies through the intellect. For Augustine says all bodies are mobile, and considered them to be ever in (Soliloq. ii, 4) that “bodies cannot be understood by the a state of flux, they were of opinion that we can have no intellect; nor indeed anything corporeal unless it can be certain knowledge of the true nature of things. For what is perceived by the senses.” He says also (Gen. ad lit. xii, in a continual state of flux, cannot be grasped with any de- 24) that intellectual vision is of those things that are in the gree of certitude, for it passes away ere the mind can form soul by their essence. But such are not bodies. Therefore a judgment thereon: according to the saying of Heraclitus, the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect. that “it is not possible twice to touch a drop of water in a Objection 2. Further, as sense is to the intelligible, passing torrent,” as the Philosopher relates (Metaph. iv, so is the intellect to the sensible. But the soul can by Did. iii, 5). no means, through the senses, understand spiritual things, After these came Plato, who, wishing to save the certi- which are intelligible. Therefore by no means can it, tude of our knowledge of truth through the intellect, main- through the intellect, know bodies, which are sensible. tained that, besides these things corporeal, there is an- Objection 3. Further, the intellect is concerned with other genus of beings, separate from matter and move- things that are necessary and unchangeable. But all bod- ment, which beings he called “species” or “ideas,” by par- ies are mobile and changeable. Therefore the soul cannot ticipation of which each one of these singular and sensi- know bodies through the intellect. ble things is said to be either a man, or a horse, or the like. On the contrary, Science is in the intellect. If, there- Wherefore he said that sciences and definitions, and what- fore, the intellect does not know bodies, it follows that ever appertains to the act of the intellect, are not referred there is no science of bodies; and thus perishes natural to these sensible bodies, but to those beings immaterial science, which treats of mobile bodies. and separate: so that according to this the soul does not I answer that, It should be said in order to elucidate understand these corporeal things, but the separate species this question, that the early philosophers, who inquired thereof. into the natures of things, thought there was nothing in Now this may be shown to be false for two reasons. 427 First, because, since those species are immaterial and im-of sensible things without receiving matter, such as the movable, knowledge of movement and matter would be color of gold without receiving gold. So also the intellect, excluded from science (which knowledge is proper to according to its own mode, receives under conditions of natural science), and likewise all demonstration through immateriality and immobility, the species of material and moving and material causes. Secondly, because it seems mobile bodies: for the received is in the receiver accord- ridiculous, when we seek for knowledge of things which ing to the mode of the receiver. We must conclude, there- are to us manifest, to introduce other beings, which can- fore, that through the intellect the soul knows bodies by a not be the substance of those others, since they differ from knowledge which is immaterial, universal, and necessary. them essentially: so that granted that we have a knowl- Reply to Objection 1. These words of Augustine are edge of those separate substances, we cannot for that rea- to be understood as referring to the medium of intellectual son claim to form a judgment concerning these sensible knowledge, and not to its object. For the intellect knows things. bodies by understanding them, not indeed through bodies, Now it seems that Plato strayed from the truth be- nor through material and corporeal species; but through cause, having observed that all knowledge takes place immaterial and intelligible species, which can be in the through some kind of similitude, he thought that the form soul by their own essence. of the thing known must of necessity be in the knower in Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Civ. the same manner as in the thing known. Then he observed Dei xxii, 29), it is not correct to say that as the sense that the form of the thing understood is in the intellect un- knows only bodies so the intellect knows only spiritual der conditions of universality, immateriality, and immo- things; for it follows that God and the angels would not bility: which is apparent from the very operation of the know corporeal things. The reason of this diversity is that intellect, whose act of understanding has a universal ex- the lower power does not extend to those things that be- tension, and is subject to a certain amount of necessity: for long to the higher power; whereas the higher power oper- the mode of action corresponds to the mode of the agent’s ates in a more excellent manner those things which belong form. Wherefore he concluded that the things which we to the lower power. understand must have in themselves an existence under Reply to Objection 3. Every movement presupposes the same conditions of immateriality and immobility. something immovable: for when a change of quality oc- But there is no necessity for this. For even in sensi- curs, the substance remains unmoved; and when there is ble things it is to be observed that the form is otherwise a change of substantial form, matter remains unmoved. in one sensible than in another: for instance, whiteness Moreover the various conditions of mutable things are may be of great intensity in one, and of a less intensity themselves immovable; for instance, though Socrates be in another: in one we find whiteness with sweetness, in not always sitting, yet it is an immovable truth that when- another without sweetness. In the same way the sensible ever he does sit he remains in one place. For this reason form is conditioned differently in the thing which is exter- there is nothing to hinder our having an immovable sci- nal to the soul, and in the senses which receive the forms ence of movable things. Whether the soul understands corporeal things through its essence? Ia q. 84 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the soul understands (Coel. Hier. xii). Therefore all corporeal creatures exist corporeal things through its essence. For Augustine says in a more excellent way in the soul than in themselves. (De Trin. x, 5) that the soul “collects and lays hold of the Therefore the soul can know corporeal creatures through images of bodies which are formed in the soul and of the its essence. soul: for in forming them it gives them something of its On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3) that own substance.” But the soul understands bodies by im- “the mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things through ages of bodies. Therefore the soul knows bodies through the bodily senses.” But the soul itself cannot be known its essence, which it employs for the formation of such through the bodily senses. Therefore it does not know images, and from which it forms them. corporeal things through itself. Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (De An- I answer that, The ancient philosophers held that the ima iii, 8) that “the soul, after a fashion, is everything.” soul knows bodies through its essence. For it was uni- Since, therefore, like is known by like, it seems that the versally admitted that “like is known by like.” But they soul knows corporeal things through itself. thought that the form of the thing known is in the knower Objection 3. Further, the soul is superior to corpo- in the same mode as in the thing known. The Platonists real creatures. Now lower things are in higher things in a however were of a contrary opinion. For Plato, having more eminent way than in themselves, as Dionysius says observed that the intellectual soul has an immaterial na- 428 ture, and an immaterial mode of knowledge, held that the ing conditions of matter, has more perfect knowledge than forms of things known subsist immaterially. While the the senses, which receive the form of the thing known, earlier natural philosophers, observing that things known without matter indeed, but subject to material conditions. are corporeal and material, held that things known must Moreover, among the senses, sight has the most perfect exist materially even in the soul that knows them. And knowledge, because it is the least material, as we have therefore, in order to ascribe to the soul a knowledge of remarked above (q. 78, a. 3): while among intellects the all things, they held that it has the same nature in common more perfect is the more immaterial. with all. And because the nature of a result is determined It is therefore clear from the foregoing, that if there by its principles, they ascribed to the soul the nature of be an intellect which knows all things by its essence, then a principle; so that those who thought fire to be the prin- its essence must needs have all things in itself immate- ciple of all, held that the soul had the nature of fire; and rially; thus the early philosophers held that the essence in like manner as to air and water. Lastly, Empedocles, of the soul, that it may know all things, must be actually who held the existence of our four material elements and composed of the principles of all material things. Now two principles of movement, said that the soul was com- this is proper to God, that His Essence comprise all things posed of these. Consequently, since they held that things immaterially as effects pre-exist virtually in their cause. exist in the soul materially, they maintained that all the God alone, therefore, understands all things through His soul’s knowledge is material, thus failing to discern intel- Essence: but neither the human soul nor the angels can do lect from sense. so. But this opinion will not hold. First, because in the Reply to Objection 1. Augustine in that passage material principle of which they spoke, the various results is speaking of an imaginary vision, which takes place do not exist save in potentiality. But a thing is not known through the image of bodies. To the formation of such im- according as it is in potentiality, but only according as it ages the soul gives part of its substance, just as a subject is is in act, as is shown Metaph. ix (Did. viii, 9): where-given in order to be informed by some form. In this way fore neither is a power known except through its act. It the soul makes such images from itself; not that the soul is therefore insufficient to ascribe to the soul the nature or some part of the soul be turned into this or that image; of the principles in order to explain the fact that it knows but just as we say that a body is made into something col- all, unless we further admit in the soul natures and forms ored because of its being informed with color. That this of each individual result, for instance, of bone, flesh, and is the sense, is clear from what follows. For he says that the like; thus does Aristotle argue against Empedocles (De the soul “keeps something”—namely, not informed with Anima i, 5). Secondly, because if it were necessary for the such image—“which is able freely to judge of the species thing known to exist materially in the knower, there would of these images”: and that this is the “mind” or “intel- be no reason why things which have a material existence lect.” And he says that the part which is informed with outside the soul should be devoid of knowledge; why, for these images—namely, the imagination—is “common to instance, if by fire the soul knows fire, that fire also which us and beasts.” is outside the soul should not have knowledge of fire. Reply to Objection 2. Aristotle did not hold that the We must conclude, therefore, that material things soul is actually composed of all things, as did the earlier known must needs exist in the knower, not materially, but philosophers; he said that the soul is all things, “after a immaterially. The reason of this is, because the act of fashion,” forasmuch as it is in potentiality to all—through knowledge extends to things outside the knower: for we the senses, to all things sensible—through the intellect, to know things even that are external to us. Now by mat- all things intelligible. ter the form of a thing is determined to some one thing. Reply to Objection 3. Every creature has a finite and Wherefore it is clear that knowledge is in inverse ratio of determinate essence. Wherefore although the essence of materiality. And consequently things that are not recep- the higher creature has a certain likeness to the lower crea- tive of forms save materially, have no power of knowl- ture, forasmuch as they have something in common gener- edge whatever—such as plants, as the Philosopher says ically, yet it has not a complete likeness thereof, because (De Anima ii, 12). But the more immaterially a thing re- it is determined to a certain species other than the species ceives the form of the thing known, the more perfect is of the lower creature. But the Divine Essence is a perfect its knowledge. Therefore the intellect which abstracts the likeness of all, whatsoever may be found to exist in things species not only from matter, but also from the individuat- created, being the universal principle of all. 429 Whether the soul understands all things through innate species? Ia q. 84 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the soul understands realization of its act. But this seems to be unreasonable. all things through innate species. For Gregory says, in First, because, if the soul has a natural knowledge of all a homily for the Ascension (xxix in Ev.), that “man has things, it seems impossible for the soul so far to forget the understanding in common with the angels.” But angels existence of such knowledge as not to know itself to be understand all things through innate species: wherefore in possessed thereof: for no man forgets what he knows nat- the book De Causis it is said that “every intelligence is full urally; that, for instance, the whole is larger than the part, of forms.” Therefore the soul also has innate species of and such like. And especially unreasonable does this seem things, by means of which it understands corporeal things. if we suppose that it is natural to the soul to be united to Objection 2. Further, the intellectual soul is more ex- the body, as we have established above (q. 76 , a. 1): for cellent than corporeal primary matter. But primary matter it is unreasonable that the natural operation of a thing be was created by God under the forms to which it has po- totally hindered by that which belongs to it naturally. Sec- tentiality. Therefore much more is the intellectual soul ondly, the falseness of this opinion is clearly proved from created by God under intelligible species. And so the soul the fact that if a sense be wanting, the knowledge of what understands corporeal things through innate species. is apprehended through that sense is wanting also: for in- Objection 3. Further, no one can answer the truth ex- stance, a man who is born blind can have no knowledge of cept concerning what he knows. But even a person un- colors. This would not be the case if the soul had innate taught and devoid of acquired knowledge, answers the images of all intelligible things. We must therefore con- truth to every question if put to him in orderly fashion, clude that the soul does not know corporeal things through as we find related in the Meno (xv seqq.) of Plato, con- innate species. cerning a certain individual. Therefore we have some Reply to Objection 1. Man indeed has intelligence knowledge of things even before we acquire knowledge; in common with the angels, but not in the same degree which would not be the case unless we had innate species. of perfection: just as the lower grades of bodies, which Therefore the soul understands corporeal things through merely exist, according to Gregory (Homily on Ascen- innate species. sion, xxix In Ev.), have not the same degree of perfection On the contrary, The Philosopher, speaking of the as the higher bodies. For the matter of the lower bodies intellect, says (De Anima iii, 4) that it is like “a tablet on is not totally completed by its form, but is in potentiality which nothing is written.” to forms which it has not: whereas the matter of heavenly I answer that, Since form is the principle of action, bodies is totally completed by its form, so that it is not a thing must be related to the form which is the principle in potentiality to any other form, as we have said above of an action, as it is to that action: for instance, if upward (q. 66, a. 2). In the same way the angelic intellect is per- motion is from lightness, then that which only potentially fected by intelligible species, in accordance with its na- moves upwards must needs be only potentially light, but ture; whereas the human intellect is in potentiality to such that which actually moves upwards must needs be actu- species. ally light. Now we observe that man sometimes is only Reply to Objection 2. Primary matter has substan- a potential knower, both as to sense and as to intellect. tial being through its form, consequently it had need to And he is reduced from such potentiality to act—through be created under some form: else it would not be in act. the action of sensible objects on his senses, to the act of But when once it exists under one form it is in potential- sensation—by instruction or discovery, to the act of un- ity to others. On the other hand, the intellect does not derstanding. Wherefore we must say that the cognitive receive substantial being through the intelligible species; soul is in potentiality both to the images which are the and therefore there is no comparison. principles of sensing, and to those which are the principles Reply to Objection 3. If questions be put in an or- of understanding. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, derly fashion they proceed from universal self-evident 4) held that the intellect by which the soul understands has principles to what is particular. Now by such a process no innate species, but is at first in potentiality to all such knowledge is produced in the mind of the learner. Where- species. fore when he answers the truth to a subsequent question, But since that which has a form actually, is sometimes this is not because he had knowledge previously, but be- unable to act according to that form on account of some cause he thus learns for the first time. For it matters not hindrance, as a light thing may be hindered from mov- whether the teacher proceed from universal principles to ing upwards; for this reason did Plato hold that naturally conclusions by questioning or by asserting; for in either man’s intellect is filled with all intelligible species, but case the mind of the listener is assured of what follows by that, by being united to the body, it is hindered from the that which preceded. 430 Whether the intelligible species are derived by the soul from certain separate forms? Ia q. 84 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the intelligible real matter, are derived from the ideas as certain images species are derived by the soul from some separate forms. thereof: so he held that the intelligible species of our in- For whatever is such by participation is caused by what is tellect are images of the ideas, derived therefrom. And such essentially; for instance, that which is on fire is re- for this reason, as we have said above (a. 1), he referred duced to fire as the cause thereof. But the intellectual soul sciences and definitions to those ideas. forasmuch as it is actually understanding, participates the But since it is contrary to the nature of sensible things thing understood: for, in a way, the intellect in act is the that their forms should subsist without matter, as Aris- thing understood in act. Therefore what in itself and in totle proves in many ways (Metaph. vi), Avicenna (De its essence is understood in act, is the cause that the intel- Anima v) setting this opinion aside, held that the intelligi- lectual soul actually understands. Now that which in its ble species of all sensible things, instead of subsisting in essence is actually understood is a form existing without themselves without matter, pre-exist immaterially in the matter. Therefore the intelligible species, by which the separate intellects: from the first of which, said he, such soul understands, are caused by some separate forms. species are derived by a second, and so on to the last sep- Objection 2. Further, the intelligible is to the intellect, arate intellect which he called the “active intelligence,” as the sensible is to the sense. But the sensible species from which, according to him, intelligible species flow which are in the senses, and by which we sense, are into our souls, and sensible species into corporeal matter. caused by the sensible object which exists actually out- And so Avicenna agrees with Plato in this, that the intelli- side the soul. Therefore the intelligible species, by which gible species of our intellect are derived from certain sep- our intellect understands, are caused by some things actu- arate forms; but these Plato held to subsist of themselves, ally intelligible, existing outside the soul. But these can while Avicenna placed them in the “active intelligence.” be nothing else than forms separate from matter. There- They differ, too, in this respect, that Avicenna held that fore the intelligible forms of our intellect are derived from the intelligible species do not remain in our intellect after some separate substances. it has ceased actually to understand, and that it needs to Objection 3. Further, whatever is in potentiality is re- turn (to the active intellect) in order to receive them anew. duced to act by something actual. If, therefore, our intel- Consequently he does not hold that the soul has innate lect, previously in potentiality, afterwards actually under- knowledge, as Plato, who held that the participated ideas stands, this must needs be caused by some intellect which remain immovably in the soul. is always in act. But this is a separate intellect. Therefore But in this opinion no sufficient reason can be assigned the intelligible species, by which we actually understand, for the soul being united to the body. For it cannot be said are caused by some separate substances. that the intellectual soul is united to the body for the sake On the contrary, If this were true we should not need of the body: for neither is form for the sake of matter, the senses in order to understand. And this is proved to nor is the mover for the sake of the moved, but rather the be false especially from the fact that if a man be wanting reverse. Especially does the body seem necessary to the in a sense, he cannot have any knowledge of the sensibles intellectual soul, for the latter’s proper operation which is corresponding to that sense. to understand: since as to its being the soul does not de- I answer that, Some have held that the intelligible pend on the body. But if the soul by its very nature had an species of our intellect are derived from certain separate inborn aptitude for receiving intelligible species through forms or substances. And this in two ways. For Plato, as the influence of only certain separate principles, and were we have said (a. 1), held that the forms of sensible things not to receive them from the senses, it would not need subsist by themselves without matter; for instance, the the body in order to understand: wherefore to no purpose form of a man which he called “per se” man, and the form would it be united to the body. or idea of a horse which is called “per se” horse, and so But if it be said that our soul needs the senses in or- forth. He said therefore that these forms are participated der to understand, through being in some way awakened both by our soul and by corporeal matter; by our soul, to by them to the consideration of those things, the intelligi- the effect of knowledge thereof, and by corporeal matter ble species of which it receives from the separate princi- to the effect of existence: so that, just as corporeal matter ples: even this seems an insufficient explanation. For this by participating the idea of a stone, becomes an individ- awakening does not seem necessary to the soul, except in uating stone, so our intellect, by participating the idea of as far as it is overcome by sluggishness, as the Platonists a stone, is made to understand a stone. Now participation expressed it, and by forgetfulness, through its union with of an idea takes place by some image of the idea in the the body: and thus the senses would be of no use to the participator, just as a model is participated by a copy. So intellectual soul except for the purpose of removing the just as he held that the sensible forms, which are in corpo- obstacle which the soul encounters through its union with 431 the body. Consequently the reason of the union of the soul Reply to Objection 1. The intelligible species which with the body still remains to be sought. are participated by our intellect are reduced, as to their And if it be said with Avicenna, that the senses are first cause, to a first principle which is by its essence necessary to the soul, because by them it is aroused to intelligible—namely, God. But they proceed from that turn to the “active intelligence” from which it receives principle by means of the sensible forms and material the species: neither is this a sufficient explanation. Be- things, from which we gather knowledge, as Dionysius cause if it is natural for the soul to understand through says (Div. Nom. vii). species derived from the “active intelligence,” it follows Reply to Objection 2. Material things, as to the being that at times the soul of an individual wanting in one of which they have outside the soul, may be actually sensi- the senses can turn to the active intelligence, either from ble, but not actually intelligible. Wherefore there is no the inclination of its very nature, or through being roused comparison between sense and intellect. by another sense, to the effect of receiving the intelligible Reply to Objection 3. Our passive intellect is reduced species of which the corresponding sensible species are from potentiality to act by some being in act, that is, by wanting. And thus a man born blind could have knowl- the active intellect, which is a power of the soul, as we edge of colors; which is clearly untrue. We must there- have said (q. 79, a. 4); and not by a separate intelligence, fore conclude that the intelligible species, by which our as proximate cause, although perchance as remote cause. soul understands, are not derived from separate forms. Whether the intellectual soul knows material things in the eternal types? Ia q. 84 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual soul ous imitations or superstitious inventions, which we must does not know material things in the eternal types. For that be careful to avoid when we renounce the society of the in which anything is known must itself be known more heathens.” Consequently whenever Augustine, who was and previously. But the intellectual soul of man, in the imbued with the doctrines of the Platonists, found in their present state of life, does not know the eternal types: for teaching anything consistent with faith, he adopted it: and it does not know God in Whom the eternal types exist, but those thing which he found contrary to faith he amended. is “united to God as to the unknown,” as Dionysius says Now Plato held, as we have said above (a. 4), that the (Myst. Theolog. i). Therefore the soul does not know all forms of things subsist of themselves apart from matter; in the eternal types. and these he called ideas, by participation of which he Objection 2. Further, it is written (Rom. 1:20) that said that our intellect knows all things: so that just as cor- “the invisible things of God are clearly seen. . . by the poreal matter by participating the idea of a stone becomes things that are made.” But among the invisible things of a stone, so our intellect, by participating the same idea, God are the eternal types. Therefore the eternal types are has knowledge of a stone. But since it seems contrary to known through creatures and not the converse. faith that forms of things themselves, outside the things Objection 3. Further, the eternal types are nothing themselves and apart from matter, as the Platonists held, else but ideas, for Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 46) that asserting that “per se” life or “per se” wisdom are creative “ideas are permanent types existing in the Divine mind.” substances, as Dionysius relates (Div. Nom. xi); there- If therefore we say that the intellectual soul knows all fore Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), for the ideas defended things in the eternal types, we come back to the opinion of by Plato, substituted the types of all creatures existing in Plato who said that all knowledge is derived from them. the Divine mind, according to which types all things are On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. xii, 25): made in themselves, and are known to the human soul. “If we both see that what you say is true, and if we both When, therefore, the question is asked: Does the hu- see that what I say is true, where do we see this, I pray? man soul know all things in the eternal types? we must Neither do I see it in you, nor do you see it in me: but reply that one thing is said to be known in another in two we both see it in the unchangeable truth which is above ways. First, as in an object itself known; as one may see our minds.” Now the unchangeable truth is contained in in a mirror the images of things reflected therein. In this the eternal types. Therefore the intellectual soul knows all way the soul, in the present state of life, cannot see all true things in the eternal types. things in the eternal types; but the blessed who see God, I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. and all things in Him, thus know all things in the eternal ii, 11): “If those who are called philosophers said by types. Secondly, on thing is said to be known in another chance anything that was true and consistent with our as in a principle of knowledge: thus we might say that we faith, we must claim it from them as from unjust posses- see in the sun what we see by the sun. And thus we must sors. For some of the doctrines of the heathens are spuri- needs say that the human soul knows all things in the eter- 432 nal types, since by participation of these types we know iv, 16): “Although the philosophers prove by convincing all things. For the intellectual light itself which is in us, is arguments that all things occur in time according to the nothing else than a participated likeness of the uncreated eternal types, were they able to see in the eternal types, or light, in which are contained the eternal types. Whence it to find out from them how many kinds of animals there is written (Ps. 4:6,7), “Many say: Who showeth us good are and the origin of each? Did they not seek for this in- things?” which question the Psalmist answers, “The light formation from the story of times and places?” of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us,” as though But that Augustine did not understand all things to be he were to say: By the seal of the Divine light in us, all known in their “eternal types” or in the “unchangeable things are made known to us. truth,” as though the eternal types themselves were seen, is But since besides the intellectual light which is in us, clear from what he says (QQ. 83, qu. 46)—viz. that “not intelligible species, which are derived from things, are each and every rational soul can be said to be worthy of required in order for us to have knowledge of material that vision,” namely, of the eternal types, “but only those things; therefore this same knowledge is not due merely that are holy and pure,” such as the souls of the blessed. to a participation of the eternal types, as the Platonists From what has been said the objections are easily held, maintaining that the mere participation of ideas suf- solved. ficed for knowledge. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. Whether intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things? Ia q. 84 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that intellectual knowl- I answer that, On this point the philosophers held edge is not derived from sensible things. For Augustine three opinions. For Democritus held that “all knowledge says (QQ. 83, qu. 9) that “we cannot expect to learn the is caused by images issuing from the bodies we think of fulness of truth from the senses of the body.” This he and entering into our souls,” as Augustine says in his let- proves in two ways. First, because “whatever the bod- ter to Dioscorus (cxviii, 4). And Aristotle says (De Somn. ily senses reach, is continually being changed; and what et Vigil.) that Democritus held that knowledge is cause by is never the same cannot be perceived.” Secondly, be- a “discharge of images.” And the reason for this opinion cause, “whatever we perceive by the body, even when not was that both Democritus and the other early philosophers present to the senses, may be present to the imagination, did not distinguish between intellect and sense, as Aristo- as when we are asleep or angry: yet we cannot discern by tle relates (De Anima iii, 3). Consequently, since the sense the senses, whether what we perceive be the sensible ob- is affected by the sensible, they thought that all our knowl- ject or the deceptive image thereof. Now nothing can be edge is affected by this mere impression brought about by perceived which cannot be distinguished from its counter- sensible things. Which impression Democritus held to be feit.” And so he concludes that we cannot expect to learn caused by a discharge of images. the truth from the senses. But intellectual knowledge ap- Plato, on the other hand, held that the intellect is dis- prehends the truth. Therefore intellectual knowledge can- tinct from the senses: and that it is an immaterial power not be conveyed by the senses. not making use of a corporeal organ for its action. And Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. since the incorporeal cannot be affected by the corporeal, xii, 16): “We must not thing that the body can make any he held that intellectual knowledge is not brought about impression on the spirit, as though the spirit were to sup- by sensible things affecting the intellect, but by separate ply the place of matter in regard to the body’s action; for intelligible forms being participated by the intellect, as we that which acts is in every way more excellent than that have said above (Aa. 4 ,5). Moreover he held that sense is which it acts on.” Whence he concludes that “the body a power operating of itself. Consequently neither is sense, does not cause its image in the spirit, but the spirit causes since it is a spiritual power, affected by the sensible: but it in itself.” Therefore intellectual knowledge is not de- the sensible organs are affected by the sensible, the result rived from sensible things. being that the soul is in a way roused to form within it- Objection 3. Further, an effect does not surpass the self the species of the sensible. Augustine seems to touch power of its cause. But intellectual knowledge extends on this opinion (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24) where he says that beyond sensible things: for we understand some things the “body feels not, but the soul through the body, which which cannot be perceived by the senses. Therefore intel- it makes use of as a kind of messenger, for reproducing lectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things. within itself what is announced from without.” Thus ac- On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. i, cording to Plato, neither does intellectual knowledge pro- 1; Poster. ii, 15) that the principle of knowledge is in the ceed from sensible knowledge, nor sensible knowledge senses. exclusively from sensible things; but these rouse the sen- 433 sible soul to the sentient act, while the senses rouse the intellectual knowledge, but rather that it is in a way the intellect to the act of understanding. material cause. Aristotle chose a middle course. For with Plato he Reply to Objection 1. Those words of Augustine agreed that intellect and sense are different. But he held mean that we must not expect the entire truth from the that the sense has not its proper operation without the co- senses. For the light of the active intellect is needed, operation of the body; so that to feel is not an act of the through which we achieve the unchangeable truth of soul alone, but of the “composite.” And he held the same changeable things, and discern things themselves from in regard to all the operations of the sensitive part. Since, their likeness. therefore, it is not unreasonable that the sensible objects Reply to Objection 2. In this passage Augustine which are outside the soul should produce some effect speaks not of intellectual but of imaginary knowledge. in the “composite,” Aristotle agreed with Democritus in And since, according to the opinion of Plato, the imag- this, that the operations of the sensitive part are caused ination has an operation which belongs to the soul only, by the impression of the sensible on the sense: not by a Augustine, in order to show that corporeal images are im- discharge, as Democritus said, but by some kind of op- pressed on the imagination, not by bodies but by the soul, eration. For Democritus maintained that every operation uses the same argument as Aristotle does in proving that is by way of a discharge of atoms, as we gather from De the active intellect must be separate, namely, because “the Gener. i, 8. But Aristotle held that the intellect has an op- agent is more noble than the patient.” And without doubt, eration which is independent of the body’s cooperation. according to the above opinion, in the imagination there Now nothing corporeal can make an impression on the in- must needs be not only a passive but also an active power. corporeal. And therefore in order to cause the intellectual But if we hold, according to the opinion of Aristotle, that operation according to Aristotle, the impression caused by the action of the imagination, is an action of the “com- the sensible does not suffice, but something more noble is posite,” there is no difficulty; because the sensible body required, for “the agent is more noble than the patient,” as is more noble than the organ of the animal, in so far as he says (De Gener. i, 5). Not, indeed, in the sense that the it is compared to it as a being in act to a being in poten- intellectual operation is effected in us by the mere intel- tiality; even as the object actually colored is compared to lectual operation is effected in us by the mere impression the pupil which is potentially colored. It may, however, of some superior beings, as Plato held; but that the higher be said, although the first impression of the imagination is and more noble agent which he calls the active intellect, through the agency of the sensible, since “fancy is move- of which we have spoken above (q. 79, Aa. 3,4) causes the ment produced in accordance with sensation” (De Anima phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelli- iii, 3), that nevertheless there is in man an operation which gible, by a process of abstraction. by synthesis and analysis forms images of various things, According to this opinion, then, on the part of even of things not perceived by the senses. And Augus- the phantasms, intellectual knowledge is caused by the tine’s words may be taken in this sense. senses. But since the phantasms cannot of themselves Reply to Objection 3. Sensitive knowledge is not the affect the passive intellect, and require to be made actu- entire cause of intellectual knowledge. And therefore it ally intelligible by the active intellect, it cannot be said is not strange that intellectual knowledge should extend that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of further than sensitive knowledge. Whether the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which Ia q. 84 a. 7 it is possessed, without turning to the phantasms? Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect can actu- Objection 3. There are no phantasms of incorporeal ally understand through the intelligible species of which it things: for the imagination does not transcend time and is possessed, without turning to the phantasms. For the in- space. If, therefore, our intellect cannot understand any- tellect is made actual by the intelligible species by which thing actually without turning to the phantasms, it follows it is informed. But if the intellect is in act, it understands. that it cannot understand anything incorporeal. Which is Therefore the intelligible species suffices for the intellect clearly false: for we understand truth, and God, and the to understand actually, without turning to the phantasms. angels. Objection 2. Further, the imagination is more depen- On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima dent on the senses than the intellect on the imagination. iii, 7) that “the soul understands nothing without a phan- But the imagination can actually imagine in the absence tasm.” of the sensible. Therefore much more can the intellect I answer that, In the present state of life in which the understand without turning to the phantasms. soul is united to a passible body, it is impossible for our 434 intellect to understand anything actually, except by turn-individual horse, and so forth. Wherefore the nature of a ing to the phantasms. First of all because the intellect, stone or any material thing cannot be known completely being a power that does not make use of a corporeal or- and truly, except in as much as it is known as existing in gan, would in no way be hindered in its act through the the individual. Now we apprehend the individual through lesion of a corporeal organ, if for its act there were not the senses and the imagination. And, therefore, for the required the act of some power that does make use of a intellect to understand actually its proper object, it must corporeal organ. Now sense, imagination and the other of necessity turn to the phantasms in order to perceive powers belonging to the sensitive part, make use of a cor- the universal nature existing in the individual. But if the poreal organ. Wherefore it is clear that for the intellect proper object of our intellect were a separate form; or if, as to understand actually, not only when it acquires fresh the Platonists say, the natures of sensible things subsisted knowledge, but also when it applies knowledge already apart from the individual; there would be no need for the acquired, there is need for the act of the imagination and intellect to turn to the phantasms whenever it understands. of the other powers. For when the act of the imagination Reply to Objection 1. The species preserved in the is hindered by a lesion of the corporeal organ, for instance passive intellect exist there habitually when it does not un- in a case of frenzy; or when the act of the memory is hin- derstand them actually, as we have said above (q. 79, a. 6). dered, as in the case of lethargy, we see that a man is hin- Wherefore for us to understand actually, the fact that the dered from actually understanding things of which he had species are preserved does not suffice; we need further to a previous knowledge. Secondly, anyone can experience make use of them in a manner befitting the things of which this of himself, that when he tries to understand some- they are the species, which things are natures existing in thing, he forms certain phantasms to serve him by way individuals. of examples, in which as it were he examines what he is Reply to Objection 2. Even the phantasm is the desirous of understanding. For this reason it is that when likeness of an individual thing; wherefore the imagina- we wish to help someone to understand something, we lay tion does not need any further likeness of the individual, examples before him, from which he forms phantasms for whereas the intellect does. the purpose of understanding. Reply to Objection 3. Incorporeal things, of which Now the reason of this is that the power of knowledge there are no phantasms, are known to us by comparison is proportioned to the thing known. Wherefore the proper with sensible bodies of which there are phantasms. Thus object of the angelic intellect, which is entirely separate we understand truth by considering a thing of which we from a body, is an intelligible substance separate from a possess the truth; and God, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. body. Whereas the proper object of the human intellect, i), we know as cause, by way of excess and by way of which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing remotion. Other incorporeal substances we know, in the in corporeal matter; and through such natures of visible present state of life, only by way of remotion or by some things it rises to a certain knowledge of things invisible. comparison to corporeal things. And, therefore, when we Now it belongs to such a nature to exist in an individ- understand something about these things, we need to turn ual, and this cannot be apart from corporeal matter: for to phantasms of bodies, although there are no phantasms instance, it belongs to the nature of a stone to be in an of the things themselves. individual stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in an Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered through suspension of the sensitive Ia q. 84 a. 8 powers? Objection 1. It would seem that the judgment of the On the contrary, What a man does while asleep, intellect is not hindered by suspension of the sensitive against the moral law, is not imputed to him as a sin; as powers. For the superior does not depend on the infe- Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15). But this would not rior. But the judgment of the intellect is higher than the be the case if man, while asleep, had free use of his rea- senses. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hin- son and intellect. Therefore the judgment of the intellect dered through suspension of the senses. is hindered by suspension of the senses. Objection 2. Further, to syllogize is an act of the in- I answer that, As we have said above (a. 7), our in- tellect. But during sleep the senses are suspended, as is tellect’s proper and proportionate object is the nature of a said in De Somn. et Vigil. i and yet it sometimes happens sensible thing. Now a perfect judgment concerning any- to us to syllogize while asleep. Therefore the judgment thing cannot be formed, unless all that pertains to that of the intellect is not hindered through suspension of the thing’s nature be known; especially if that be ignored senses. which is the term and end of judgment. Now the Philoso- 435 pher says (De Coel. iii), that “as the end of a practical sci-certain exhalations, as we read in De Somn. et Vigil. iii. ence is action, so the end of natural science is that which And, therefore, according to the amount of such evapora- is perceived principally through the senses”; for the smith tion, the senses are more or less suspended. For when the does not seek knowledge of a knife except for the purpose amount is considerable, not only are the senses suspended, of action, in order that he may produce a certain individual but also the imagination, so that there are no phantasms; knife; and in like manner the natural philosopher does not thus does it happen, especially when a man falls asleep seek to know the nature of a stone and of a horse, save for after eating and drinking copiously. If, however, the evap- the purpose of knowing the essential properties of those oration be somewhat less, phantasms appear, but distorted things which he perceives with his senses. Now it is clear and without sequence; thus it happens in a case of fever. that a smith cannot judge perfectly of a knife unless he And if the evaporation be still more attenuated, the phan- knows the action of the knife: and in like manner the nat- tasms will have a certain sequence: thus especially does ural philosopher cannot judge perfectly of natural things, it happen towards the end of sleep in sober men and those unless he knows sensible things. But in the present state who are gifted with a strong imagination. If the evapora- of life whatever we understand, we know by comparison tion be very slight, not only does the imagination retain to natural sensible things. Consequently it is not possi- its freedom, but also the common sense is partly freed; so ble for our intellect to form a perfect judgment, while the that sometimes while asleep a man may judge that what he senses are suspended, through which sensible things are sees is a dream, discerning, as it were, between things, and known to us. their images. Nevertheless, the common sense remains Reply to Objection 1. Although the intellect is su- partly suspended; and therefore, although it discriminates perior to the senses, nevertheless in a manner it receives some images from the reality, yet is it always deceived in from the senses, and its first and principal objects are some particular. Therefore, while man is asleep, accord- founded in sensible things. And therefore suspension of ing as sense and imagination are free, so is the judgment the senses necessarily involves a hindrance to the judg- of his intellect unfettered, though not entirely. Conse- ment of the intellect. quently, if a man syllogizes while asleep, when he wakes Reply to Objection 2. The senses are suspended in up he invariably recognizes a flaw in some respect. the sleeper through certain evaporations and the escape of 436 FIRST PART, QUESTION 85 Of the Mode and Order of Understanding (In Eight Articles) We come now to consider the mode and order of understanding. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether our intellect understands by abstracting the species from the phantasms? (2) Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms are what our intellect understands, or that whereby it understands? (3) Whether our intellect naturally first understands the more universal? (4) Whether our intellect can know many things at the same time? (5) Whether our intellect understands by the process of composition and division? (6) Whether the intellect can err? (7) Whether one intellect can understand better than another? (8) Whether our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible? Whether our intellect understands corporeal and material things by abstraction from Ia q. 85 a. 1 phantasms? Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect does not color, but rather streams on to it. Therefore in no way do understand corporeal and material things by abstraction we understand by abstraction from phantasms. from the phantasms. For the intellect is false if it under- Objection 5. Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, stands an object otherwise than as it really is. Now the 7) says that “the intellect understands the species in the forms of material things do not exist as abstracted from phantasm”; and not, therefore, by abstraction. the particular things represented by the phantasms. There- On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima fore, if we understand material things by abstraction of the iii, 4) that “things are intelligible in proportion as they species from the phantasm, there will be error in the intel- are separate from matter.” Therefore material things must lect. needs be understood according as they are abstracted from Objection 2. Further, material things are those nat- matter and from material images, namely, phantasms. ural things which include matter in their definition. But I answer that, As stated above (q. 84, a. 7), the object nothing can be understood apart from that which enters of knowledge is proportionate to the power of knowledge. into its definition. Therefore material things cannot be Now there are three grades of the cognitive powers. For understood apart from matter. Now matter is the principle one cognitive power, namely, the sense, is the act of a cor- of individualization. Therefore material things cannot be poreal organ. And therefore the object of every sensitive understood by abstraction of the universal from the partic- power is a form as existing in corporeal matter. And since ular, which is the process whereby the intelligible species such matter is the principle of individuality, therefore ev- is abstracted from the phantasm. ery power of the sensitive part can only have knowledge of Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (De An- the individual. There is another grade of cognitive power ima iii, 7) that the phantasm is to the intellectual soul which is neither the act of a corporeal organ, nor in any what color is to the sight. But seeing is not caused by way connected with corporeal matter; such is the angelic abstraction of species from color, but by color impressing intellect, the object of whose cognitive power is therefore itself on the sight. Therefore neither does the act of un- a form existing apart from matter: for though angels know derstanding take place by abstraction of something from material things, yet they do not know them save in some- the phantasm, but by the phantasm impressing itself on thing immaterial, namely, either in themselves or in God. the intellect. But the human intellect holds a middle place: for it is not Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher says (De An- the act of an organ; yet it is a power of the soul which is the ima iii, 5) there are two things in the intellectual soul— form the body, as is clear from what we have said above the passive intellect and the active intellect. But it does (q. 76, a. 1). And therefore it is proper to it to know a form not belong to the passive intellect to abstract the intelligi- existing individually in corporeal matter, but not as exist- ble species from the phantasm, but to receive them when ing in this individual matter. But to know what is in indi- abstracted. Neither does it seem to be the function of the vidual matter, not as existing in such matter, is to abstract active intellect, which is related to the phantasm, as light the form from individual matter which is represented by is to color; since light does not abstract anything from the phantasms. Therefore we must needs say that our in- 437 tellect understands material things by abstracting from the is not part of the species. If that were so, matter would phantasms; and through material things thus considered not enter into the definition of natural things. Therefore it we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things, just as, must be said otherwise, that matter is twofold, common, on the contrary, angels know material things through the and “signate” or individual; common, such as flesh and immaterial. bone; and individual, as this flesh and these bones. The But Plato, considering only the immateriality of the intellect therefore abstracts the species of a natural thing human intellect, and not its being in a way united to the from the individual sensible matter, but not from the com- body, held that the objects of the intellect are separate mon sensible matter; for example, it abstracts the species ideas; and that we understand not by abstraction, but by of man from “this flesh and these bones,” which do not be- participating things abstract, as stated above (q. 84 , a. 1). long to the species as such, but to the individual (Metaph. Reply to Objection 1. Abstraction may occur in two vii, Did. vi, 10), and need not be considered in the species: ways: First, by way of composition and division; thus whereas the species of man cannot be abstracted by the in- we may understand that one thing does not exist in some tellect form “flesh and bones.” other, or that it is separate therefrom. Secondly, by way Mathematical species, however, can be abstracted by of simple and absolute consideration; thus we understand the intellect from sensible matter, not only from individ- one thing without considering the other. Thus for the in- ual, but also from common matter; not from common tellect to abstract one from another things which are not intelligible matter, but only from individual matter. For really abstract from one another, does, in the first mode sensible matter is corporeal matter as subject to sensible of abstraction, imply falsehood. But, in the second mode qualities, such as being cold or hot, hard or soft, and the of abstraction, for the intellect to abstract things which like: while intelligible matter is substance as subject to are not really abstract from one another, does not involve quantity. Now it is manifest that quantity is in substance falsehood, as clearly appears in the case of the senses. For before other sensible qualities are. Hence quantities, such if we understood or said that color is not in a colored body, as number, dimension, and figures, which are the termi- or that it is separate from it, there would be error in this nations of quantity, can be considered apart from sensible opinion or assertion. But if we consider color and its prop- qualities; and this is to abstract them from sensible matter; erties, without reference to the apple which is colored; or but they cannot be considered without understanding the if we express in word what we thus understand, there is substance which is subject to the quantity; for that would no error in such an opinion or assertion, because an apple be to abstract them from common intelligible matter. Yet is not essential to color, and therefore color can be un- they can be considered apart from this or that substance; derstood independently of the apple. Likewise, the things for that is to abstract them from individual intelligible which belong to the species of a material thing, such as a matter. But some things can be abstracted even from com- stone, or a man, or a horse, can be thought of apart from mon intelligible matter, such as “being,” “unity,” “power,” the individualizing principles which do not belong to the “act,” and the like; all these can exist without matter, as notion of the species. This is what we mean by abstracting is plain regarding immaterial things. Because Plato failed the universal from the particular, or the intelligible species to consider the twofold kind of abstraction, as above ex- from the phantasm; that is, by considering the nature of plained (ad 1), he held that all those things which we have the species apart from its individual qualities represented stated to be abstracted by the intellect, are abstract in re- by the phantasms. If, therefore, the intellect is said to be ality. false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is, Reply to Objection 3. Colors, as being in individ- that is so, if the word “otherwise” refers to the thing un- ual corporeal matter, have the same mode of existence as derstood; for the intellect is false when it understands a the power of sight: therefore they can impress their own thing otherwise than as it is; and so the intellect would be image on the eye. But phantasms, since they are images false if it abstracted the species of a stone from its matter of individuals, and exist in corporeal organs, have not the in such a way as to regard the species as not existing in same mode of existence as the human intellect, and there- matter, as Plato held. But it is not so, if the word “oth- fore have not the power of themselves to make an impres- erwise” be taken as referring to the one who understands. sion on the passive intellect. This is done by the power For it is quite true that the mode of understanding, in one of the active intellect which by turning towards the phan- who understands, is not the same as the mode of a thing tasm produces in the passive intellect a certain likeness in existing: since the thing understood is immaterially in which represents, as to its specific conditions only, the the one who understands, according to the mode of the thing reflected in the phantasm. It is thus that the intelligi- intellect, and not materially, according to the mode of a ble species is said to be abstracted from the phantasm; not material thing. that the identical form which previously was in the phan- Reply to Objection 2. Some have thought that the tasm is subsequently in the passive intellect, as a body species of a natural thing is a form only, and that matter transferred from one place to another. 438 Reply to Objection 4. Not only does the active intellect we are able to disregard the conditions of individual- lect throw light on the phantasm: it does more; by its own ity, and to take into our consideration the specific nature, power it abstracts the intelligible species from the phan- the image of which informs the passive intellect. tasm. It throws light on the phantasm, because, just as the Reply to Objection 5. Our intellect both abstracts the sensitive part acquires a greater power by its conjunction intelligible species from the phantasms, inasmuch as it with the intellectual part, so by the power of the active considers the natures of things in universal, and, never- intellect the phantasms are made more fit for the abstrac- theless, understands these natures in the phantasms since tion therefrom of intelligible intentions. Furthermore, the it cannot understand even the things of which it abstracts active intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the the species, without turning to the phantasms, as we have phantasm, forasmuch as by the power of the active intel- said above (q. 84, a. 7). Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intelIa q. 85 a. 2 lect as that which is understood? Objection 1. It would seem that the intelligible ery science would not be concerned with objects outside species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our in- the soul, but only with the intelligible species within the tellect as that which is understood. For the understood in soul; thus, according to the teaching of the Platonists all act is in the one who understands: since the understood science is about ideas, which they held to be actually un- in act is the intellect itself in act. But nothing of what is derstood∗. Secondly, it is untrue, because it would lead understood is in the intellect actually understanding, save to the opinion of the ancients who maintained that “what- the abstracted intelligible species. Therefore this species ever seems, is true”†, and that consequently contradicto- is what is actually understood. ries are true simultaneously. For if the faculty knows its Objection 2. Further, what is actually understood own impression only, it can judge of that only. Now a must be in something; else it would be nothing. But it thing seems according to the impression made on the cog- is not in something outside the soul: for, since what is nitive faculty. Consequently the cognitive faculty will al- outside the soul is material, nothing therein can be actu- ways judge of its own impression as such; and so every ally understood. Therefore what is actually understood is judgment will be true: for instance, if taste perceived only in the intellect. Consequently it can be nothing else than its own impression, when anyone with a healthy taste per- the aforesaid intelligible species. ceives that honey is sweet, he would judge truly; and if Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (1 Peri anyone with a corrupt taste perceives that honey is bitter, Herm. i) that “words are signs of the passions in the soul.” this would be equally true; for each would judge accord- But words signify the things understood, for we express ing to the impression on his taste. Thus every opinion by word what we understand. Therefore these passions of would be equally true; in fact, every sort of apprehension. the soul—viz. the intelligible species, are what is actually Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species understood. is related to the intellect as that by which it understands: On the contrary, The intelligible species is to the in- which is proved thus. There is a twofold action (Metaph. tellect what the sensible image is to the sense. But the ix, Did. viii, 8), one which remains in the agent; for in- sensible image is not what is perceived, but rather that by stance, to see and to understand; and another which passes which sense perceives. Therefore the intelligible species into an external object; for instance, to heat and to cut; and is not what is actually understood, but that by which the each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some form. intellect understands. And as the form from which proceeds an act tending to I answer that, Some have asserted that our intellec- something external is the likeness of the object of the ac- tual faculties know only the impression made on them; as, tion, as heat in the heater is a likeness of the thing heated; for example, that sense is cognizant only of the impres- so the form from which proceeds an action remaining in sion made on its own organ. According to this theory, the agent is the likeness of the object. Hence that by which the intellect understands only its own impression, namely, the sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing; and the the intelligible species which it has received, so that this likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible species is what is understood. species, is the form by which the intellect understands. This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons. But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflec- First, because the things we understand are the objects tion it understands both its own act of intelligence, and of science; therefore if what we understand is merely the the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible intelligible species in the soul, it would follow that ev- species is that which is understood secondarily; but that ∗ q. 84, a. 1 † Aristotle, Metaph. iii. 5 439 which is primarily understood is the object, of which the where is the color which is seen apart from the smell, it species is the likeness. This also appears from the opinion is quite clear that the color which is seen is only in the of the ancient philosophers, who said that “like is known apple: but that it be perceived apart from the smell, this by like.” For they said that the soul knows the earth out- is owing to the sight, forasmuch as the faculty of sight re- side itself, by the earth within itself; and so of the rest. If, ceives the likeness of color and not of smell. In like man-therefore, we take the species of the earth instead of the ner humanity understood is only in this or that man; but earth, according to Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), who says that humanity be apprehended without conditions of in- “that a stone is not in the soul, but only the likeness of the dividuality, that is, that it be abstracted and consequently stone”; it follows that the soul knows external things by considered as universal, occurs to humanity inasmuch as means of its intelligible species. it is brought under the consideration of the intellect, in Reply to Objection 1. The thing understood is in the which there is a likeness of the specific nature, but not of intellect by its own likeness; and it is in this sense that the principles of individuality. we say that the thing actually understood is the intellect Reply to Objection 3. There are two operations in in act, because the likeness of the thing understood is the the sensitive part. One, in regard of impression only, and form of the intellect, as the likeness of a sensible thing thus the operation of the senses takes place by the senses is the form of the sense in act. Hence it does not follow being impressed by the sensible. The other is formation, that the intelligible species abstracted is what is actually inasmuch as the imagination forms for itself an image of understood; but rather that it is the likeness thereof. an absent thing, or even of something never seen. Both Reply to Objection 2. In these words “the thing actu- of these operations are found in the intellect. For in the ally understood” there is a double implication—the thing first place there is the passion of the passive intellect as in-which is understood, and the fact that it is understood. formed by the intelligible species; and then the passive in- In like manner the words “abstract universal” imply two tellect thus informed forms a definition, or a division, or a things, the nature of a thing and its abstraction or univer- composition, expressed by a word. Wherefore the concept sality. Therefore the nature itself to which it occurs to be conveyed by a word is its definition; and a proposition understood, abstracted or considered as universal is only conveys the intellect’s division or composition. Words do in individuals; but that it is understood, abstracted or con- not therefore signify the intelligible species themselves; sidered as universal is in the intellect. We see something but that which the intellect forms for itself for the purpose similar to this is in the senses. For the sight sees the color of judging of external things. of the apple apart from its smell. If therefore it be asked Whether the more universal is first in our intellectual cognition? Ia q. 85 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the more universal sal to the singular and individual” (Phys. i, 1) is not first in our intellectual cognition. For what is first I answer that, In our knowledge there are two things and more known in its own nature, is secondarily and less to be considered. First, that intellectual knowledge in known in relation to ourselves. But universals come first some degree arises from sensible knowledge: and, be- as regards their nature, because “that is first which does cause sense has singular and individual things for its ob- not involve the existence of its correlative” (Categor. ix). ject, and intellect has the universal for its object, it follows Therefore the universals are secondarily known as regards that our knowledge of the former comes before our knowl- our intellect. edge of the latter. Secondly, we must consider that our in- Objection 2. Further, the composition precedes the tellect proceeds from a state of potentiality to a state of ac- simple in relation to us. But universals are the more sim- tuality; and every power thus proceeding from potentiality ple. Therefore they are known secondarily by us. to actuality comes first to an incomplete act, which is the Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. i, medium between potentiality and actuality, before accom- 1), that the object defined comes in our knowledge before plishing the perfect act. The perfect act of the intellect is the parts of its definition. But the more universal is part complete knowledge, when the object is distinctly and de- of the definition of the less universal, as “animal” is part terminately known; whereas the incomplete act is imper- of the definition of “man.” Therefore the universals are fect knowledge, when the object is known indistinctly, and secondarily known by us. as it were confusedly. A thing thus imperfectly known, is Objection 4. Further, we know causes and principles known partly in act and partly in potentiality, and hence by their effects. But universals are principles. Therefore the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1), that “what is manifest universals are secondarily known by us. and certain is known to us at first confusedly; afterwards On the contrary, “We must proceed from the univer- we know it by distinguishing its principles and elements.” 440 Now it is evident that to know an object that comprises the imperfect and the potential come first. In this way many things, without proper knowledge of each thing con- the more common comes first in the order of nature; as tained in it, is to know that thing confusedly. In this way appears clearly in the generation of man and animal; for we can have knowledge not only of the universal whole, “the animal is generated before man,” as the Philosopher which contains parts potentially, but also of the integral says (De Gener. Animal ii, 3). The other order is the or- whole; for each whole can be known confusedly, with- der of perfection or of the intention of nature: for instance, out its parts being known. But to know distinctly what act considered absolutely is naturally prior to potentiality, is contained in the universal whole is to know the less and the perfect to the imperfect: thus the less common common, as to “animal” indistinctly is to know it as “an- comes naturally before the more common; as man comes imal”; whereas to know “animal” distinctly is know it as before animal. For the intention of nature does not stop at “rational” or “irrational animal,” that is, to know a man the generation of animal but goes on to the generation of or a lion: therefore our intellect knows “animal” before it man. knows man; and the same reason holds in comparing any Reply to Objection 2. The more common universal more universal idea with the less universal. may be compared to the less common, as the whole, and Moreover, as sense, like the intellect, proceeds from as the part. As the whole, considering that in the more uni- potentiality to act, the same order of knowledge appears versal is potentially contained not only the less universal, in the senses. For by sense we judge of the more common but also other things, as in “animal” is contained not only before the less common, in reference both to place and “man” but also “horse.” As part, considering that the less time; in reference to place, when a thing is seen afar off common contains in its idea not only the more common, it is seen to be a body before it is seen to be an animal; but also more; as “man” contains not only “animal” but and to be an animal before it is seen to be a man, and to also “rational.” Therefore “animal” in itself comes into be a man before it seen to be Socrates or Plato; and the our knowledge before “man”; but “man” comes before same is true as regards time, for a child can distinguish “animal” considered as part of the same idea. man from not man before he distinguishes this man from Reply to Objection 3. A part can be known in two that, and therefore “children at first call men fathers, and ways. First, absolutely considered in itself; and thus noth- later on distinguish each one from the others” (Phys. i, 1). ing prevents the parts being known before the whole, as The reason of this is clear: because he who knows a thing stones are known before a house is known. Secondly as indistinctly is in a state of potentiality as regards its prin- belonging to a certain whole; and thus we must needs ciple of distinction; as he who knows “genus” is in a state know the whole before its parts. For we know a house of potentiality as regards “difference.” Thus it is evident vaguely before we know its different parts. So likewise that indistinct knowledge is midway between potentiality principles of definition are known before the thing defined and act. is known; otherwise the thing defined would not be known We must therefore conclude that knowledge of the sin- at all. But as parts of the definition they are known after. gular and individual is prior, as regards us, to the knowl- For we know man vaguely as man before we know how to edge of the universal; as sensible knowledge is prior to distinguish all that belongs to human nature. intellectual knowledge. But in both sense and intellect the Reply to Objection 4. The universal, as understood knowledge of the more common precedes the knowledge with the intention of universality, is, indeed, in a way, a of the less common. principle of knowledge, in so far as the intention of univer- Reply to Objection 1. The universal can be consid- sality results from the mode of understanding by way of ered in two ways. First, the universal nature may be con- abstraction. But what is a principle of knowledge is not of sidered together with the intention of universality. And necessity a principle of existence, as Plato thought: since since the intention of universality—viz. the relation of at times we know a cause through its effect, and substance one and the same to many—is due to intellectual abstrac- through accidents. Wherefore the universal thus consid- tion, the universal thus considered is a secondary consid- ered, according to the opinion of Aristotle, is neither a eration. Hence it is said (De Anima i, 1) that the “uni- principle of existence, nor a substance, as he makes clear versal animal is either nothing or something secondary.” (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 13). But if we consider the generic But according to Plato, who held that universals are sub- or specific nature itself as existing in the singular, thus in sistent, the universal considered thus would be prior to the a way it is in the nature of a formal principle in regard particular, for the latter, according to him, are mere partic- to the singulars: for the singular is the result of matter, ipations of the subsistent universals which he called ideas. while the idea of species is from the form. But the generic Secondly, the universal can be considered in the nature nature is compared to the specific nature rather after the itself—for instance, animality or humanity as existing in fashion of a material principle, because the generic nature the individual. And thus we must distinguish two orders is taken from that which is material in a thing, while the of nature: one, by way of generation and time; and thus idea of species is taken from that which is formal: thus the 441 notion of animal is taken from the sensitive part, whereas form. Neither is it necessary that, as regards us, knowl-the notion of man is taken from the intellectual part. Thus edge of any cause or principle should be secondary: since it is that the ultimate intention of nature is to the species at times through sensible causes we become acquainted and not to the individual, or the genus: because the form with unknown effects, and sometimes conversely. is the end of generation, while matter is for the sake of the Whether we can understand many things at the same time? Ia q. 85 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that we can understand reason of this is that it is impossible for one and the same many things at the same time. For intellect is above time, subject to be perfected at the same time by many forms of whereas the succession of before and after belongs to one genus and diverse species, just as it is impossible for time. Therefore the intellect does not understand differ- one and the same body at the same time to have different ent things in succession, but at the same time. colors or different shapes. Now all intelligible species be- Objection 2. Further, there is nothing to prevent dif- long to one genus, because they are the perfections of one ferent forms not opposed to each other from actually being intellectual faculty: although the things which the species in the same subject, as, for instance, color and smell are in represent belong to different genera. Therefore it is im- the apple. But intelligible species are not opposed to each possible for one and the same intellect to be perfected at other. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the same in- the same time by different intelligible species so as actu- tellect being in act as regards different intelligible species, ally to understand different things. and thus it can understand many things at the same time. Reply to Objection 1. The intellect is above that time, Objection 3. Further, the intellect understands a which is the measure of the movement of corporeal things. whole at the same time, such as a man or a house. But But the multitude itself of intelligible species causes a cer- a whole contains many parts. Therefore the intellect un- tain vicissitude of intelligible operations, according as one derstands many things at the same time. operation succeeds another. And this vicissitude is called Objection 4. Further, we cannot know the difference time by Augustine, who says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22), between two things unless we know both at the same time that “God moves the spiritual creature through time.” (De Anima iii, 2), and the same is to be said of any other Reply to Objection 2. Not only is it impossible for comparison. But our intellect knows the difference and opposite forms to exist at the same time in the same sub- comparison between one thing and another. Therefore it ject, but neither can any forms belonging to the same knows many things at the same time. genus, although they be not opposed to one another, as On the contrary, It is said (Topic. ii, 10) that “under- is clear from the examples of colors and shapes. standing is of one thing only, knowledge is of many.” Reply to Objection 3. Parts can be understood in I answer that, The intellect can, indeed, understand two ways. First, in a confused way, as existing in the many things as one, but not as many: that is to say by whole, and thus they are known through the one form of “one” but not by “many” intelligible species. For the the whole, and so are known together. In another way they mode of every action follows the form which is the princi- are known distinctly: thus each is known by its species; ple of that action. Therefore whatever things the intellect and so they are not understood at the same time. can understand under one species, it can understand at the Reply to Objection 4. If the intellect sees the dif- same time: hence it is that God sees all things at the same ference or comparison between one thing and another, it time, because He sees all in one, that is, in His Essence. knows both in relation to their difference or comparison; But whatever things the intellect understands under differ- just, as we have said above (ad 3), as it knows the parts in ent species, it does not understand at the same time. The the whole. Whether our intellect understands by composition and division? Ia q. 85 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect does not stracts from time, as also from other individual conditions. understand by composition and division. For composition Therefore the intellect does not understand by composi- and division are only of many; whereas the intellect can- tion and division. not understand many things at the same time. Therefore it Objection 3. Further, the intellect understands things cannot understand by composition and division. by a process of assimilation to them. But composition and Objection 2. Further, every composition and division division are not in things, for nothing is in things but what implies past, present, or future time. But the intellect ab- is signified by the predicate and the subject, and which is 442 one and the same, provided that the composition be true, from the phantasms, it does not understand actually with-for “man” is truly what “animal” is. Therefore the intel- out turning to the phantasms, as we have said (a. 1; q. 84, lect does not act by composition and division. a. 7). And forasmuch as it turns to the phantasms, compo- On the contrary, Words signify the conceptions of sition and division of the intellect involve time. the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i). But Reply to Objection 3. The likeness of a thing is re- in words we find composition and division, as appears in ceived into the intellect according to the mode of the in- affirmative and negative propositions. Therefore the intel- tellect, not according to the mode of the thing. Where- lect acts by composition and division. fore something on the part of the thing corresponds to the I answer that, The human intellect must of necessity composition and division of the intellect; but it does not understand by composition and division. For since the in- exist in the same way in the intellect and in the thing. For tellect passes from potentiality to act, it has a likeness to the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity things which are generated, which do not attain to perfec- of a material thing, which comes under the action of the tion all at once but acquire it by degrees: so likewise the senses and the imagination. Now in a material thing there human intellect does not acquire perfect knowledge by the is a twofold composition. First, there is the composition first act of apprehension; but it first apprehends something of form with matter; and to this corresponds that compo- about its object, such as its quiddity, and this is its first and sition of the intellect whereby the universal whole is pred-proper object; and then it understands the properties, ac- icated of its part: for the genus is derived from common cidents, and the various relations of the essence. Thus it matter, while the difference that completes the species is necessarily compares one thing with another by composi- derived from the form, and the particular from individual tion or division; and from one composition and division it matter. The second comparison is of accident with sub- proceeds to another, which is the process of reasoning. ject: and to this real composition corresponds that com- But the angelic and the Divine intellect, like all incor- position of the intellect, whereby accident is predicated of ruptible things, have their perfection at once from the be- subject, as when we say “the man is white.” Neverthe- ginning. Hence the angelic and the Divine intellect have less composition of the intellect differs from composition the entire knowledge of a thing at once and perfectly; and of things; for in the latter the things are diverse, whereas hence also in knowing the quiddity of a thing they know composition of the intellect is a sign of the identity of the at once whatever we can know by composition, division, components. For the above composition of the intellect and reasoning. Therefore the human intellect knows by does not imply that “man” and “whiteness” are identical, composition, division and reasoning. But the Divine intel- but the assertion, “the man is white,” means that “the man lect and the angelic intellect know, indeed, composition, is something having whiteness”: and the subject, which division, and reasoning, not by the process itself, but by is a man, is identified with a subject having whiteness. It understanding the simple essence. is the same with the composition of form and matter: for Reply to Objection 1. Composition and division of animal signifies that which has a sensitive nature; rational, the intellect are made by differentiating and comparing. that which has an intellectual nature; man, that which has Hence the intellect knows many things by composition both; and Socrates that which has all these things together and division, as by knowing the difference and compar- with individual matter; and according to this kind of iden- ison of things. tity our intellect predicates the composition of one thing Reply to Objection 2. Although the intellect abstracts with another. Whether the intellect can be false? Ia q. 85 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect can be that “everyone who is deceived, does not rightly under- false; for the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 4) stand that wherein he is deceived.” And the Philosopher that “truth and falsehood are in the mind.” But the mind says (De Anima iii, 10), that “the intellect is always true.” and intellect are the same, as is shown above (q. 79, a. 1). I answer that, The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 6) Therefore falsehood may be in the mind. compares intellect with sense on this point. For sense Objection 2. Further, opinion and reasoning belong is not deceived in its proper object, as sight in regard to to the intellect. But falsehood exists in both. Therefore color; has accidentally through some hindrance occurring falsehood can be in the intellect. to the sensile organ—for example, the taste of a fever- Objection 3. Further, sin is in the intellectual faculty. stricken person judges a sweet thing to be bitter, through But sin involves falsehood: for “those err that work evil” his tongue being vitiated by ill humors. Sense, however, (Prov. 14:22). Therefore falsehood can be in the intellect. may be deceived as regards common sensible objects, as On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 32), size or figure; when, for example, it judges the sun to be 443 only a foot in diameter, whereas in reality it exceeds the of an organ; but on the part of the composition affecting earth in size. Much more is sense deceived concerning ac- the definition, when, for instance, the definition of a thing cidental sensible objects, as when it judges that vinegar is is false in relation to something else, as the definition of a honey by reason of the color being the same. The reason circle applied to a triangle; or when a definition is false in of this is evident; for every faculty, as such, is “per se” itself as involving the composition of things incompatible; directed to its proper object; and things of this kind are as, for instance, to describe anything as “a rational winged always the same. Hence, as long as the faculty exists, its animal.” Hence as regards simple objects not subject to judgment concerning its own proper object does not fail. composite definitions we cannot be deceived unless, in- Now the proper object of the intellect is the “quiddity” deed, we understand nothing whatever about them, as is of a material thing; and hence, properly speaking, the in- said Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 10. tellect is not at fault concerning this quiddity; whereas it Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher says that may go astray as regards the surroundings of the thing in falsehood is in the intellect in regard to composition and its essence or quiddity, in referring one thing to another, as division. The same answer applies to the Second Objec- regards composition or division, or also in the process of tion concerning opinion and reasoning, and to the Third reasoning. Therefore, also in regard to those propositions, Objection, concerning the error of the sinner, who errs which are understood, the intellect cannot err, as in the in the practical judgment of the appetible object. But in case of first principles from which arises infallible truth in the absolute consideration of the quiddity of a thing, and the certitude of scientific conclusions. of those things which are known thereby, the intellect is The intellect, however, may be accidentally deceived never deceived. In this sense are to be understood the au- in the quiddity of composite things, not by the defect of thorities quoted in proof of the opposite conclusion. its organ, for the intellect is a faculty that is independent Whether one person can understand one and the same thing better than another can? Ia q. 85 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that one person cannot cause to understand it otherwise than as it is, either bet- understand one and the same thing better than another ter or worse, would entail being deceived, and such a one can. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 32), “Whoever would not understand it, as Augustine argues (QQ. 83, qu. understands a thing otherwise than as it is, does not un- 32). In another sense the word “more” can be taken as de- derstand it at all. Hence it is clear that there is a perfect termining the act of understanding on the part of him who understanding, than which none other is more perfect: and understands; and so one may understand the same thing therefore there are not infinite degrees of understanding a better than someone else, through having a greater power thing: nor can one person understand a thing better than of understanding: just as a man may see a thing better with another can.” his bodily sight, whose power is greater, and whose sight Objection 2. Further, the intellect is true in its act is more perfect. The same applies to the intellect in two of understanding. But truth, being a certain equality be- ways. First, as regards the intellect itself, which is more tween thought and thing, is not subject to more or less; for perfect. For it is plain that the better the disposition of a a thing cannot be said to be more or less equal. Therefore body, the better the soul allotted to it; which clearly ap- a thing cannot be more or less understood. pears in things of different species: and the reason thereof Objection 3. Further, the intellect is the most formal is that act and form are received into matter according to of all that is in man. But different forms cause different matter’s capacity: thus because some men have bodies of species. Therefore if one man understands better than an- better disposition, their souls have a greater power of un- other, it would seem that they do not belong to the same derstanding, wherefore it is said (De Anima ii, 9), that “it species. is to be observed that those who have soft flesh are of apt On the contrary, Experience shows that some under- mind.” Secondly, this occurs in regard to the lower pow- stand more profoundly than do others; as one who carries ers of which the intellect has need in its operation: for a conclusion to its first principles and ultimate causes un- those in whom the imaginative, cogitative, and memora- derstands it better than the one who reduces it only to its tive powers are of better disposition, are better disposed proximate causes. to understand. I answer that, A thing being understood more by one The reply to the First Objection is clear from the than by another may be taken in two senses. First, so that above; likewise the reply to the Second, for the truth of the word “more” be taken as determining the act of under- the intellect consists in the intellect understanding a thing standing as regards the thing understood; and thus, one as it is. cannot understand the same thing more than another, be- Reply to Objection 3. The difference of form which 444 is due only to the different disposition of matter, causes ent individuals have different forms, diversified according not a specific but only a numerical difference: for differ- to the difference of matter. Whether the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible? Ia q. 85 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect under- is that both these kinds of indivisible are understood by stands the indivisible before the divisible. For the Philoso- the intellect of itself, as being its proper object. The third pher says (Phys. i, 1) that “we understand and know from kind of indivisible is what is altogether indivisible, as a the knowledge of principles and elements.” But princi- point and unity, which cannot be divided either actually ples are indivisible, and elements are of divisible things. or potentially. And this indivisible is known secondarily, Therefore the indivisible is known to us before the divisi- through the privation of divisibility. Wherefore a point is ble. defined by way of privation “as that which has no parts”; Objection 2. Further, the definition of a thing con- and in like manner the notion of “one” is that is “indivis- tains what is known previously, for a definition “proceeds ible,” as stated in Metaph. x, Did. ix, 1. And the reason from the first and more known,” as is said Topic. vi, 4. of this is that this indivisible has a certain opposition to a But the indivisible is part of the definition of the divisible; corporeal being, the quiddity of which is the primary and as a point comes into the definition of a line; for as Eu- proper object of the intellect. clid says, “a line is length without breadth, the extremities But if our intellect understood by participation of cer- of which are points”; also unity comes into the definition tain separate indivisible (forms), as the Platonists main- of number, for “number is multitude measured by one,” tained, it would follow that a like indivisible is understood as is said Metaph. x, Did. ix, 6. Therefore our intellect primarily; for according to the Platonists what is first is understands the indivisible before the divisible. first participated by things. Objection 3. Further, “Like is known by like.” But Reply to Objection 1. In the acquisition of knowl- the indivisible is more like to the intellect than is the di- edge, principles and elements are not always (known) visible; because “the intellect is simple” (De Anima iii, first: for sometimes from sensible effects we arrive at the 4). Therefore our intellect first knows the indivisible. knowledge of principles and intelligible causes. But in On the contrary, It is said (De Anima iii, 6) that “the perfect knowledge, the knowledge of effects always de- indivisible is expressed as a privation.” But privation is pends on the knowledge of principles and elements: for known secondarily. Therefore likewise is the indivisible. as the Philosopher says in the same passage: “Then do we I answer that, The object of our intellect in its present consider that we know, when we can resolve principles state is the quiddity of a material thing, which it abstracts into their causes.” from the phantasms, as above stated (q. 84, a. 7). And Reply to Objection 2. A point is not included in the since that which is known first and of itself by our cogni- definition of a line in general: for it is manifest that in a tive power is its proper object, we must consider its rela- line of indefinite length, and in a circular line, there is no tionship to that quiddity in order to discover in what order point, save potentially. Euclid defines a finite straight line: the indivisible is known. Now the indivisible is threefold, and therefore he mentions a point in the definition, as the as is said De Anima iii, 6. First, the continuous is indi- limit in the definition of that which is limited. Unity is the visible, since actually it is undivided, although potentially measure of number: wherefore it is included in the defi- divisible: and this indivisible is known to us before its di- nition of a measured number. But it is not included in the vision, which is a division into parts: because confused definition of the divisible, but rather conversely. knowledge is prior to distinct knowledge, as we have said Reply to Objection 3. The likeness through which above (a. 3). Secondly, the indivisible is so called in re- we understand is the species of the known in the knower; lation to species, as man’s reason is something indivisi- therefore a thing is known first, not on account of its nat- ble. This way, also, the indivisible is understood before ural likeness to the cognitive power, but on account of its division into logical parts, as we have said above (De the power’s aptitude for the object: otherwise sight would Anima iii, 6); and again before the intellect disposes and perceive hearing rather than color. divides by affirmation and negation. The reason of this 445 FIRST PART, QUESTION 86 What Our Intellect Knows in Material Things (In Four Articles) We now have to consider what our intellect knows in material things. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether it knows singulars? (2) Whether it knows the infinite? (3) Whether it knows contingent things? (4) Whether it knows future things? Whether our intellect knows singulars? Ia q. 86 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect knows because, as we have said above (q. 85, a. 7), even after ab- singulars. For whoever knows composition, knows the stracting the intelligible species, the intellect, in order to terms of composition. But our intellect knows this com- understand, needs to turn to the phantasms in which it un- position; “Socrates is a man”: for it belongs to the intellect derstands the species, as is said De Anima iii, 7. Therefore to form a proposition. Therefore our intellect knows this it understands the universal directly through the intelligi- singular, Socrates. ble species, and indirectly the singular represented by the Objection 2. Further, the practical intellect directs to phantasm. And thus it forms the proposition “Socrates is action. But action has relation to singular things. There- a man.” Wherefore the reply to the first objection is clear. fore the intellect knows the singular. Reply to Objection 2. The choice of a particular thing Objection 3. Further, our intellect understands itself. to be done is as the conclusion of a syllogism formed by But in itself it is a singular, otherwise it would have no ac- the practical intellect, as is said Ethic. vii, 3. But a singu- tion of its own; for actions belong to singulars. Therefore lar proposition cannot be directly concluded from a uni- our intellect knows singulars. versal proposition, except through the medium of a sin- Objection 4. Further, a superior power can do what- gular proposition. Therefore the universal principle of the ever is done by an inferior power. But sense knows the practical intellect does not move save through the medium singular. Much more, therefore, can the intellect know it. of the particular apprehension of the sensitive part, as is On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. i, 5), said De Anima iii, 11. that “the universal is known by reason; and the singular is Reply to Objection 3. Intelligibility is incompatible known by sense.” with the singular not as such, but as material, for nothing I answer that, Our intellect cannot know the singular can be understood otherwise than immaterially. Therefore in material things directly and primarily. The reason of if there be an immaterial singular such as the intellect, this is that the principle of singularity in material things there is no reason why it should not be intelligible. is individual matter, whereas our intellect, as have said Reply to Objection 4. The higher power can do what above (q. 85, a. 1), understands by abstracting the intel- the lower power can, but in a more eminent way. Where- ligible species from such matter. Now what is abstracted fore what the sense knows materially and concretely, from individual matter is the universal. Hence our intel- which is to know the singular directly, the intellect knows lect knows directly the universal only. But indirectly, and immaterially and in the abstract, which is to know the uni- as it were by a kind of reflection, it can know the singular, versal. Whether our intellect can know the infinite? Ia q. 86 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect can in some genera, as in number, proportion, and figure. know the infinite. For God excels all infinite things. But Therefore our intellect can know the infinite. our intellect can know God, as we have said above (q. 12, Objection 3. Further, if one body can coexist with a. 1). Much more, therefore, can our intellect know all another in the same place, there is nothing to prevent an other infinite things. infinite number of bodies being in one place. But one in- Objection 2. Further, our intellect can naturally know telligible species can exist with another in the same intel- “genera” and “species.” But there is an infinity of species lect, for many things can be habitually known at the same 446 time. Therefore our intellect can have an habitual knowl-tellect know the infinite, but only potentially as explained edge of an infinite number of things. above. Objection 4. Further, as the intellect is not a corpo- Reply to Objection 1. As we have said above (q. 7, real faculty, as we have said (q. 76, a. 1), it appears to be a. 1), God is called infinite, because He is a form unlimited an infinite power. But an infinite power has a capacity for by matter; whereas in material things, the term ‘infinite’ an infinite object. Therefore our intellect can know the is applied to that which is deprived of any formal term. infinite. And form being known in itself, whereas matter cannot On the contrary, It is said (Phys. i, 4) that “the infi- be known without form, it follows that the material infi- nite, considered as such, is unknown.” nite is in itself unknowable. But the formal infinite, God, I answer that, Since a faculty and its object are pro- is of Himself known; but He is unknown to us by rea- portional to each other, the intellect must be related to the son of our feeble intellect, which in its present state has infinite, as is its object, which is the quiddity of a material a natural aptitude for material objects only. Therefore we thing. Now in material things the infinite does not exist ac- cannot know God in our present life except through ma- tually, but only potentially, in the sense of one succeeding terial effects. In the future life this defect of intellect will another, as is said Phys. iii, 6. Therefore infinity is poten-be removed by the state of glory, when we shall be able to tially in our mind through its considering successively one see the Essence of God Himself, but without being able to thing after another: because never does our intellect un- comprehend Him. derstand so many things, that it cannot understand more. Reply to Objection 2. The nature of our mind is to On the other hand, our intellect cannot understand the know species abstracted from phantasms; therefore it can- infinite either actually or habitually. Not actually, for our not know actually or habitually species of numbers or fig- intellect cannot know actually at the same time, except ures that are not in the imagination, except in a general what it knows through one species. But the infinite is way and in their universal principles; and this is to know not represented by one species, for if it were it would be them potentially and confusedly. something whole and complete. Consequently it cannot Reply to Objection 3. If two or more bodies were in be understood except by a successive consideration of one the same place, there would be no need for them to oc- part after another, as is clear from its definition (Phys. iii, cupy the place successively, in order for the things placed 6): for the infinite is that “from which, however much we to be counted according to this succession of occupation. may take, there always remains something to be taken.” On the other hand, the intelligible species enter into our Thus the infinite could not be known actually, unless all intellect successively; since many things cannot be actu- its parts were counted: which is impossible. ally understood at the same time: and therefore there must For the same reason we cannot have habitual knowl- be a definite and not an infinite number of species in our edge of the infinite: because in us habitual knowledge re- intellect. sults from actual consideration: since by understanding Reply to Objection 4. As our intellect is infinite in we acquire knowledge, as is said Ethic. ii, 1. Wherefore it power, so does it know the infinite. For its power is in- would not be possible for us to have a habit of an infinity deed infinite inasmuch as it is not terminated by corporeal of things distinctly known, unless we had already consid- matter. Moreover it can know the universal, which is ab- ered the entire infinity thereof, counting them according stracted from individual matter, and which consequently to the succession of our knowledge: which is impossible. is not limited to one individual, but, considered in itself, And therefore neither actually nor habitually can our in- extends to an infinite number of individuals. Whether our intellect can know contingent things? Ia q. 86 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect cannot But some sciences are of the contingent things, as the know contingent things: because, as the Philosopher says moral sciences, the objects of which are human actions (Ethic. vi, 6), the objects of understanding, wisdom and subject to free-will; and again, the natural sciences in knowledge are not contingent, but necessary things. as far as they relate to things generated and corruptible. Objection 2. Further, as stated in Phys. iv, 12, “what Therefore the intellect knows contingent things. sometimes is and sometimes is not, is measured by time.” I answer that, Contingent things can be considered Now the intellect abstracts from time, and from other ma- in two ways; either as contingent, or as containing some terial conditions. Therefore, as it is proper to a contingent element of necessity, since every contingent thing has in thing sometime to be and sometime not to be, it seems that it something necessary: for example, that Socrates runs, contingent things are not known by the intellect. is in itself contingent; but the relation of running to mo- On the contrary, All knowledge is in the intellect. tion is necessary, for it is necessary that Socrates move if 447 he runs. Now contingency arises from matter, for contin-of the intellect, as we have said above (a. 1). Therefore gency is a potentiality to be or not to be, and potentiality the contingent, considered as such, is known directly by belongs to matter; whereas necessity results from form, sense and indirectly by the intellect; while the universal because whatever is consequent on form is of necessity and necessary principles of contingent things are known in the subject. But matter is the individualizing princi- only by the intellect. Hence if we consider the objects ple: whereas the universal comes from the abstraction of of science in their universal principles, then all science is the form from the particular matter. Moreover it was laid of necessary things. But if we consider the things them- down above (a. 1) that the intellect of itself and directly selves, thus some sciences are of necessary things, some has the universal for its object; while the object of sense is of contingent things. the singular, which in a certain way is the indirect object From which the replies to the objections are clear. Whether our intellect can know the future? Ia q. 86 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect knows as to produce a certain result more frequently than not, the future. For our intellect knows by means of intelligi- then can the future be known more or less conjecturally, ble species abstracted from the “here” and “now,” and re- according as its cause is more or less inclined to produce lated indifferently to all time. But it can know the present. the effect. Therefore it can know the future. Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers that Objection 2. Further, man, while his senses are in knowledge which is drawn from universal causal princi- suspense, can know some future things, as in sleep, and in ples; from these the future may be known, according to frenzy. But the intellect is freer and more vigorous when the order of the effects to the cause. removed from sense. Therefore the intellect of its own Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (Confess. nature can know the future. xii∗), the soul has a certain power of forecasting, so that Objection 3. The intellectual knowledge of man is by its very nature it can know the future; hence when with- superior to any knowledge of brutes. But some animals drawn from corporeal sense, and, as it were, concentrated know the future; thus crows by their frequent cawing fore- on itself, it shares in the knowledge of the future. Such an tell rain. Therefore much more can the intellect know the opinion would be reasonable if we were to admit that the future. soul receives knowledge by participating the ideas as the On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 8:6,7), “There Platonists maintained, because in that case the soul by its is a great affliction for man, because he is ignorant of nature would know the universal causes of all effects, and things past; and things to come he cannot know by any would only be impeded in its knowledge by the body, and messenger.” hence when withdrawn from the corporeal senses it would I answer that, We must apply the same distinction know the future. to future things, as we applied above (a. 3) to contingent But since it is connatural to our intellect to know things. For future things considered as subject to time are things, not thus, but by receiving its knowledge from the singular, and the human intellect knows them by reflec- senses; it is not natural for the soul to know the future tion only, as stated above (a. 1). But the principles of fu- when withdrawn from the senses: rather does it know the ture things may be universal; and thus they may enter the future by the impression of superior spiritual and corpo- domain of the intellect and become the objects of science. real causes; of spiritual causes, when by Divine power Speaking, however, of the knowledge of the future in the human intellect is enlightened through the ministry of a general way, we must observe that the future may be angels, and the phantasms are directed to the knowledge known in two ways: either in itself, or in its cause. The of future events; or, by the influence of demons, when future cannot be known in itself save by God alone; to the imagination is moved regarding the future known to Whom even that is present which in the course of events the demons, as explained above (q. 57, a. 3). The soul is future, forasmuch as from eternity His glance embraces is naturally more inclined to receive these impressions of the whole course of time, as we have said above when spiritual causes when it is withdrawn from the senses, as treating of God’s knowledge (q. 14, a. 13). But foras- it is then nearer to the spiritual world, and freer from ex- much as it exists in its cause, the future can be known by ternal distractions. The same may also come from supe- us also. And if, indeed, the cause be such as to have a rior corporeal causes. For it is clear that superior bodies necessary connection with its future result, then the future influence inferior bodies. Hence, in consequence of the is known with scientific certitude, just as the astronomer sensitive faculties being acts of corporeal organs, the in- foresees the future eclipse. If, however, the cause be such fluence of the heavenly bodies causes the imagination to ∗ Gen. ad lit. xii. 13 448 be affected, and so, as the heavenly bodies cause many Reply to Objection 3. Brute animals have no power future events, the imagination receives certain images of above the imagination wherewith to regulate it, as man some such events. These images are perceived more at has his reason, and therefore their imagination follows night and while we sleep than in the daytime and while entirely the influence of the heavenly bodies. Thus from we are awake, because, as stated in De Somn. et Vigil. such animals’ movements some future things, such as rain ii†, “impressions made by day are evanescent. The night and the like, may be known rather from human move- air is calmer, when silence reigns, hence bodily impres- ments directed by reason. Hence the Philosopher says (De sions are made in sleep, when slight internal movements Somn. et Vig.), that “some who are most imprudent are are felt more than in wakefulness, and such movements most far-seeing; for their intelligence is not burdened with produce in the imagination images from which the future cares, but is as it were barren and bare of all anxiety mov- may be foreseen.” ing at the caprice of whatever is brought to bear on it.” † De Divinat. per somn. ii. 449 FIRST PART, QUESTION 87 How the Intellectual Soul Knows Itself and All Within Itself (In Four Articles) We have now to consider how the intellectual soul knows itself and all within itself. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the soul knows itself by its own essence? (2) Whether it knows its own habits? (3) How does the intellect know its own act? (4) How does it know the act of the will? Whether the intellectual soul knows itself by its essence? Ia q. 87 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual soul act of intelligence is not completed by his essence. For al- knows itself by its own essence. For Augustine says (De though an angel understands himself by his own essence, Trin. ix, 3), that “the mind knows itself, because it is in- still he cannot understand all other things by his own corporeal.” essence; for he knows things other than himself by their Objection 2. Further, both angels and human souls likenesses. Now the human intellect is only a potentiality belong to the genus of intellectual substance. But an angel in the genus of intelligible beings, just as primary matter understands itself by its own essence. Therefore likewise is a potentiality as regards sensible beings; and hence it does the human soul. is called “possible”∗. Therefore in its essence the human Objection 3. Further, “in things void of matter, the mind is potentially understanding. Hence it has in itself intellect and that which is understood are the same” (De the power to understand, but not to be understood, except Anima iii, 4). But the human mind is void of matter, not as it is made actual. For even the Platonists asserted than being the act of a body as stated above (q. 76, a. 1). There- an order of intelligible beings existed above the order of fore the intellect and its object are the same in the human intellects, forasmuch as the intellect understands only by mind; and therefore the human mind understands itself by participation of the intelligible; for they said that the par- its own essence. ticipator is below what it participates. If, therefore, the On the contrary, It is said (De Anima iii, 4) that “the human intellect, as the Platonists held, became actual by intellect understands itself in the same way as it under- participating separate intelligible forms, it would under- stands other things.” But it understands other things, not stand itself by such participation of incorporeal beings. by their essence, but by their similitudes. Therefore it But as in this life our intellect has material and sensible does not understand itself by its own essence. things for its proper natural object, as stated above (q. 84, I answer that, Everything is knowable so far as it is in a. 7), it understands itself according as it is made actual act, and not, so far as it is in potentiality (Metaph. ix, Did. by the species abstracted from sensible things, through the viii, 9): for a thing is a being, and is true, and therefore light of the active intellect, which not only actuates the in- knowable, according as it is actual. This is quite clear as telligible things themselves, but also, by their instrumen- regards sensible things, for the eye does not see what is tality, actuates the passive intellect. Therefore the intellect potentially, but what is actually colored. In like manner it knows itself not by its essence, but by its act. This hap- is clear that the intellect, so far as it knows material things, pens in two ways: In the first place, singularly, as when does not know save what is in act: and hence it does not Socrates or Plato perceives that he has an intellectual soul know primary matter except as proportionate to form, as because he perceives that he understands. In the second is stated Phys. i, 7. Consequently immaterial substances place, universally, as when we consider the nature of the are intelligible by their own essence according as each one human mind from knowledge of the intellectual act. It is is actual by its own essence. true, however, that the judgment and force of this knowl- Therefore it is that the Essence of God, the pure and edge, whereby we know the nature of the soul, comes to perfect act, is simply and perfectly in itself intelligible; us according to the derivation of our intellectual light from and hence God by His own Essence knows Himself, and the Divine Truth which contains the types of all things as all other things also. The angelic essence belongs, indeed, above stated (q. 84, a. 5). Hence Augustine says (De Trin. to the genus of intelligible things as “act,” but not as a ix, 6): “We gaze on the inviolable truth whence we can as “pure act,” nor as a “complete act,” and hence the angel’s perfectly as possible define, not what each man’s mind is, ∗ Possibilis—elsewhere in this translation rendered “passive”—Ed. 450 but what it ought to be in the light of the eternal types.” man mind, which is either altogether in potentiality to in- There is, however, a difference between these two kinds of telligible things—as is the passive intellect—or is the act knowledge, and it consists in this, that the mere presence of intelligible things abstracted from the phantasms—as of the mind suffices for the first; the mind itself being the is the active intellect. principle of action whereby it perceives itself, and hence Reply to Objection 3. This saying of the Philoso- it is said to know itself by its own presence. But as re- pher is universally true in every kind of intellect. For as gards the second kind of knowledge, the mere presence of sense in act is the sensible in act, by reason of the sen- the mind does not suffice, and there is further required a sible likeness which is the form of sense in act, so like- careful and subtle inquiry. Hence many are ignorant of the wise the intellect in act is the object understood in act, by soul’s nature, and many have erred about it. So Augustine reason of the likeness of the thing understood, which is says (De Trin. x, 9), concerning such mental inquiry: “Let the form of the intellect in act. So the human intellect, the mind strive not to see itself as if it were absent, but to which becomes actual by the species of the object under- discern itself as present”—i.e. to know how it differs from stood, is itself understood by the same species as by its other things; which is to know its essence and nature. own form. Now to say that in “things without matter the Reply to Objection 1. The mind knows itself by intellect and what is understood are the same,” is equal to means of itself, because at length it acquires knowledge saying that “as regards things actually understood the in- of itself, though led thereto by its own act: because it is tellect and what is understood are the same.” For a thing itself that it knows since it loves itself, as he says in the is actually understood in that it is immaterial. But a dis- same passage. For a thing can be called self-evident in tinction must be drawn: since the essences of some things two ways, either because we can know it by nothing else are immaterial—as the separate substances called angels, except itself, as first principles are called self-evident; or each of which is understood and understands, whereas because it is not accidentally knowable, as color is visible there are other things whose essences are not wholly im- of itself, whereas substance is visible by its accident. material, but only the abstract likenesses thereof. Hence Reply to Objection 2. The essence of an angel is an the Commentator says (De Anima iii) that the proposition act in the genus of intelligible things, and therefore it is quoted is true only of separate substances; because in a both intellect and the thing understood. Hence an angel sense it is verified in their regard, and not in regard of apprehends his own essence through itself: not so the hu- other substances, as already stated (Reply obj. 2). Whether our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence? Ia q. 87 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect knows powers, are known by their acts. the habits of the soul by their essence. For Augustine says I answer that, A habit is a kind of medium between (De Trin. xiii, 1): “Faith is not seen in the heart wherein it mere power and mere act. Now, it has been said (a. 1) that abides, as the soul of a man may be seen by another from nothing is known but as it is actual: therefore so far as a the movement of the body; but we know most certainly habit fails in being a perfect act, it falls short in being of that it is there, and conscience proclaims its existence”; itself knowable, and can be known only by its act; thus, and the same principle applies to the other habits of the for example, anyone knows he has a habit from the fact soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are not known by that he can produce the act proper to that habit; or he may their acts, but by themselves. inquire into the nature and idea of the habit by consider- Objection 2. Further, material things outside the soul ing the act. The first kind of knowledge of the habit arises are known by their likeness being present in the soul, from its being present, for the very fact of its presence and are said therefore to be known by their likenesses. causes the act whereby it is known. The second kind of But the soul’s habits are present by their essence in the knowledge of the habit arises from a careful inquiry, as is soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are known by their explained above of the mind (a. 1). essence. Reply to Objection 1. Although faith is not known Objection 3. Further, “whatever is the cause of a thing by external movement of the body, it is perceived by the being such is still more so.” But habits and intelligible subject wherein it resides, by the interior act of the heart. species cause things to be known by the soul. Therefore For no one knows that he has faith unless he knows that they are still more known by the soul in themselves. he believes. On the contrary, Habits like powers are the princi- Reply to Objection 2. Habits are present in our intel- ples of acts. But as is said (De Anima ii, 4), “acts and lect, not as its object since, in the present state of life, our operations are logically prior to powers.” Therefore in the intellect’s object is the nature of a material thing as stated same way they are prior to habits; and thus habits, like the above (q. 84, a. 7), but as that by which it understands. 451 Reply to Objection 3. The axiom, “whatever is the causes. So of two things belonging essentially to the order cause of a thing being such, is still more so,” is true of of the objects of knowledge, the one which is the cause of things that are of the same order, for instance, of the same the other being known, is the more known, as principles kind of cause; for example, we may say that health is de- are more known than conclusions. But habit as such does sirable on account of life, and therefore life is more de- not belong to the order of objects of knowledge; nor are sirable still. But if we take things of different orders the things known on account of the habit, as on account of an axiom is not true: for we may say that health is caused by object known, but as on account of a disposition or form medicine, but it does not follow that medicine is more de- whereby the subject knows: and therefore the argument sirable than health, for health belongs to the order of final does not prove. causes, whereas medicine belongs to the order of efficient Whether our intellect knows its own act? Ia q. 87 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect does thing, together with its perfection, understood. And there not know its own act. For what is known is the object of is yet another, namely, the human intellect, which neither the knowing faculty. But the act differs from the object. is its own act of understanding, nor is its own essence the Therefore the intellect does not know its own act. first object of its act of understanding, for this object is Objection 2. Further, whatever is known is known by the nature of a material thing. And therefore that which some act. If, then, the intellect knows its own act, it knows is first known by the human intellect is an object of this it by some act, and again it knows that act by some other kind, and that which is known secondarily is the act by act; this is to proceed indefinitely, which seems impossi- which that object is known; and through the act the intel- ble. lect itself is known, the perfection of which is this act of Objection 3. Further, the intellect has the same rela- understanding. For this reason did the Philosopher assert tion to its act as sense has to its act. But the proper sense that objects are known before acts, and acts before powers does not feel its own act, for this belongs to the common (De Anima ii, 4). sense, as stated De Anima iii, 2. Therefore neither does Reply to Objection 1. The object of the intellect is the intellect understand its own act. something universal, namely, “being” and “the true,” in On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), “I which the act also of understanding is comprised. Where- understand that I understand.” fore the intellect can understand its own act. But not pri- I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,2) a thing is marily, since the first object of our intellect, in this state intelligible according as it is in act. Now the ultimate of life, is not every being and everything true, but “being” perfection of the intellect consists in its own operation: and “true,” as considered in material things, as we have for this is not an act tending to something else in which said above (q. 84, a. 7), from which it acquires knowledge lies the perfection of the work accomplished, as build- of all other things. ing is the perfection of the thing built; but it remains in Reply to Objection 2. The intelligent act of the hu- the agent as its perfection and act, as is said Metaph. ix, man intellect is not the act and perfection of the material Did. viii, 8. Therefore the first thing understood of the nature understood, as if the nature of the material thing intellect is its own act of understanding. This occurs in and intelligent act could be understood by one act; just different ways with different intellects. For there is an as a thing and its perfection are understood by one act. intellect, namely, the Divine, which is Its own act of in- Hence the act whereby the intellect understands a stone telligence, so that in God the understanding of His intel- is distinct from the act whereby it understands that it un- ligence, and the understanding of His Essence, are one derstands a stone; and so on. Nor is there any difficulty and the same act, because His Essence is His act of un- in the intellect being thus potentially infinite, as explained derstanding. But there is another intellect, the angelic, above (q. 86, a. 2). which is not its own act of understanding, as we have said Reply to Objection 3. The proper sense feels by rea- above (q. 79, a. 1), and yet the first object of that act is son of the immutation in the material organ caused by the the angelic essence. Wherefore although there is a log- external sensible. A material object, however, cannot im- ical distinction between the act whereby he understands mute itself; but one is immuted by another, and therefore that he understands, and that whereby he understands his the act of the proper sense is perceived by the common essence, yet he understands both by one and the same act; sense. The intellect, on the contrary, does not perform because to understand his own essence is the proper per- the act of understanding by the material immutation of an fection of his essence, and by one and the same act is a organ; and so there is no comparison. 452 Whether the intellect understands the act of the will? Ia q. 87 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect does not subject intelligibly as in its principle and proper subject. understand the act of the will. For nothing is known by the Hence the Philosopher expresses himself thus (De Anima intellect, unless it be in some way present in the intellect. iii, 9)—that “the will is in the reason.” Now whatever is But the act of the will is not in the intellect; since the will intelligibly in an intelligent subject, is understood by that and the intellect are distinct. Therefore the act of the will subject. Therefore the act of the will is understood by the is not known by the intellect. intellect, both inasmuch as one knows that one wills; and Objection 2. Further, the act is specified by the object. inasmuch as one knows the nature of this act, and conse- But the object of the will is not the same as the object of quently, the nature of its principle which is the habit or the intellect. Therefore the act of the will is specifically power. distinct from the object of the intellect, and therefore the Reply to Objection 1. This argument would hold act of the will is not known by the intellect. good if the will and the intellect were in different sub- Objection 3. Augustine (Confess. x, 17) says of the jects, as they are distinct powers; for then whatever was soul’s affections that “they are known neither by images in the will would not be in the intellect. But as both are as bodies are known; nor by their presence, like the arts; rooted in the same substance of the soul, and since one is but by certain notions.” Now it does not seem that there in a certain way the principle of the other, consequently can be in the soul any other notions of things but either what is in the will is, in a certain way, also in the intellect. the essences of things known or the likenesses thereof. Reply to Objection 2. The “good” and the “true” Therefore it seems impossible for the intellect to known which are the objects of the will and of the intellect, dif- such affections of the soul as the acts of the will. fer logically, but one is contained in the other, as we have On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), “I said above (q. 82, a. 4, ad 1; q. 16, a. 4, ad 1); for the true understand that I will.” is good and the good is true. Therefore the objects of the I answer that, As stated above (q. 59, a. 1), the act will fall under the intellect, and those of the intellect can of the will is nothing but an inclination consequent on the fall under the will. form understood; just as the natural appetite is an inclina- Reply to Objection 3. The affections of the soul are tion consequent on the natural form. Now the inclination in the intellect not by similitude only, like bodies; nor by of a thing resides in it according to its mode of existence; being present in their subject, as the arts; but as the thing and hence the natural inclination resides in a natural thing caused is in its principle, which contains some notion of naturally, and the inclination called the sensible appetite is the thing caused. And so Augustine says that the soul’s in the sensible thing sensibly; and likewise the intelligible affections are in the memory by certain notions. inclination, which is the act of the will, is in the intelligent 453 FIRST PART, QUESTION 88 How the Human Soul Knows What Is Above Itself (In Three Articles) We must now consider how the human soul knows what is above itself, viz. immaterial substances. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand the immaterial substances called angels, in themselves? (2) Whether it can arrive at the knowledge thereof by the knowledge of material things? (3) Whether God is the first object of our knowledge? Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand immaterial sub-Ia q. 88 a. 1 stances in themselves? Objection 1. It would seem that the human soul in the intelligible substances, even the superior and immaterial. present state of life can understand immaterial substances On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 9:16): “The in themselves. For Augustine (De Trin. ix, 3) says: “As things that are in heaven, who shall search out?” But the mind itself acquires the knowledge of corporeal things these substances are said to be in heaven, according to by means of the corporeal senses, so it gains from itself Mat. 18:10, “Their angels in heaven,” etc. Therefore im- the knowledge of incorporeal things.” But these are the material substances cannot be known by human investiga- immaterial substances. Therefore the human mind under- tion. stands immaterial substances. I answer that, In the opinion of Plato, immaterial sub- Objection 2. Further, like is known by like. But the stances are not only understood by us, but are the objects human mind is more akin to immaterial than to material we understand first of all. For Plato taught that immaterial things; since its own nature is immaterial, as is clear from subsisting forms, which he called “Ideas,” are the proper what we have said above (q. 76, a. 1). Since then our objects of our intellect, and thus first and “per se” under- mind understands material things, much more is it able to stood by us; and, further, that material objects are known understand immaterial things. by the soul inasmuch as phantasy and sense are mixed up Objection 3. Further, the fact that objects which are with the mind. Hence the purer the intellect is, so much in themselves most sensible are not most felt by us, comes the more clearly does it perceive the intelligible truth of from sense being corrupted by their very excellence. But immaterial things. the intellect is not subject to such a corrupting influence But in Aristotle’s opinion, which experience corrobo- from its object, as is stated De Anima iii, 4. Therefore rates, our intellect in its present state of life has a natural things which are in themselves in the highest degree of relationship to the natures of material things; and there- intelligibility, are likewise to us most intelligible. As ma- fore it can only understand by turning to the phantasms, terial things, however, are intelligible only so far as we as we have said above (q. 84, a. 7). Thus it clearly ap- make them actually so by abstracting them from material pears that immaterial substances which do not fall under conditions, it is clear that those substances are more intel- sense and imagination, cannot first and “per se” be known ligible in themselves whose nature is immaterial. There- by us, according to the mode of knowledge which experi- fore they are much more known to us than are material ence proves us to have. things. Nevertheless Averroes (Comment. De Anima iii) Objection 4. Further, the Commentator says (Metaph. teaches that in this present life man can in the end arrive at ii) that “nature would be frustrated in its end” were we un- the knowledge of separate substances by being coupled or able to understand abstract substances, “because it would united to some separate substance, which he calls the “ac- have made what in itself is naturally intelligible not to be tive intellect,” and which, being a separate substance it- understood at all.” But in nature nothing is idle or pur- self, can naturally understand separate substances. Hence, poseless. Therefore immaterial substances can be under- when it is perfectly united to us so that by its means we are stood by us. able to understand perfectly, we also shall be able to un- Objection 5. Further, as sense is to the sensible, so is derstand separate substances, as in the present life through intellect to the intelligible. But our sight can see all things the medium of the passive intellect united to us, we can corporeal, whether superior and incorruptible; or lower understand material things. Now he said that the active and corruptible. Therefore our intellect can understand all intellect is united to us, thus. For since we understand 454 by means of both the active intellect and intelligible ob-follows that the knowledge of all material things would jects, as, for instance, we understand conclusions by prin- not make the active intellect to be so united to us as to en- ciples understood; it is clear that the active intellect must able us by its instrumentality to understand separate sub- be compared to the objects understood, either as the prin- stances. cipal agent is to the instrument, or as form to matter. For Fourthly, this opinion is untrue, because it is hardly an action is ascribed to two principles in one of these two possible for anyone in this world to understand all ma- ways; to a principal agent and to an instrument, as cutting terial things: and thus no one, or very few, could reach to the workman and the saw; to a form and its subject, to perfect felicity; which is against what the Philosopher as heating to heat and fire. In both these ways the active says (Ethic. i, 9), that happiness is a “kind of common intellect can be compared to the intelligible object as per- good, communicable to all capable of virtue.” Further, it fection is to the perfectible, and as act is to potentiality. is unreasonable that only the few of any species attain to Now a subject is made perfect and receives its perfection the end of the species. at one and the same time, as the reception of what is ac- Fifthly, the Philosopher expressly says (Ethic. i, tually visible synchronizes with the reception of light in 10), that happiness is “an operation according to perfect the eye. Therefore the passive intellect receives the in- virtue”; and after enumerating many virtues in the tenth telligible object and the active intellect together; and the book, he concludes (Ethic. i, 7) that ultimate happiness more numerous the intelligible objects received, so much consisting in the knowledge of the highest things intelli- the nearer do we come to the point of perfect union be- gible is attained through the virtue of wisdom, which in tween ourselves and the active intellect; so much so that the sixth chapter he had named as the chief of specula- when we understand all the intelligible objects, the active tive sciences. Hence Aristotle clearly places the ultimate intellect becomes one with us, and by its instrumentality felicity of man in the knowledge of separate substances, we can understand all things material and immaterial. In obtainable by speculative science; and not by being united this he makes the ultimate happiness of man to consist. to the active intellect as some imagined. Nor, as regards the present inquiry, does it matter whether Sixthly, as was shown above (q. 79, a. 4), the active in- the passive intellect in that state of happiness understands tellect is not a separate substance; but a faculty of the soul, separate substances by the instrumentality of the active extending itself actively to the same objects to which the intellect, as he himself maintains, or whether (as he says passive intellect extends receptively; because, as is stated Alexander holds) the passive intellect can never under- (De Anima iii, 5), the passive intellect is “all things po- stand separate substances (because according to him it is tentially,” and the active intellect is “all things in act.” corruptible), but man understands separate substances by Therefore both intellects, according to the present state means of the active intellect. of life, extend to material things only, which are made ac- This opinion, however, is untrue. First, because, sup- tually intelligible by the active intellect, and are received posing the active intellect to be a separate substance, we in the passive intellect. Hence in the present state of life could not formally understand by its instrumentality, for we cannot understand separate immaterial substances in the medium of an agent’s formal action consists in its themselves, either by the passive or by the active intellect. form and act, since every agent acts according to its ac- Reply to Objection 1. Augustine may be taken to tuality, as was said of the passive intellect (q. 70, a. 1). mean that the knowledge of incorporeal things in the mind Secondly, this opinion is untrue, because in the above ex- can be gained by the mind itself. This is so true that planation, the active intellect, supposing it to be a separate philosophers also say that the knowledge concerning the substance, would not be joined to us in its substance, but soul is a principle for the knowledge of separate sub- only in its light, as participated in things understood; and stances. For by knowing itself, it attains to some knowl- would not extend to the other acts of the active intellect edge of incorporeal substances, such as is within its com- so as to enable us to understand immaterial substances; pass; not that the knowledge of itself gives it a perfect and just as when we see colors set off by the sun, we are not absolute knowledge of them. united to the substance of the sun so as to act like the sun, Reply to Objection 2. The likeness of nature is not but its light only is united to us, that we may see the col- a sufficient cause of knowledge; otherwise what Empedo- ors. Thirdly, this opinion is untrue, because granted that, cles said would be true —that the soul needs to have the as above explained, the active intellect were united to us nature of all in order to know all. But knowledge requires in substance, still it is not said that it is wholly so united that the likeness of the thing known be in the knower, as in regard to one intelligible object, or two; but rather in a kind of form thereof. Now our passive intellect, in the regard to all intelligible objects. But all such objects to- present state of life, is such that it can be informed with gether do not equal the force of the active intellect, as it similitudes abstracted from phantasms: and therefore it is a much greater thing to understand separate substances knows material things rather than immaterial substances. than to understand all material things. Hence it clearly Reply to Objection 3. There must needs be some pro- 455 portion between the object and the faculty of knowledge; Secondly, to be understood by us is not the end of sep-such as of the active to the passive, and of perfection to the arate substances: while only that is vain and purposeless, perfectible. Hence that sensible objects of great power are which fails to attain its end. It does not follow, therefore, not grasped by the senses, is due not merely to the fact that that immaterial substances are purposeless, even if they they corrupt the organ, but also to their being impropor- are not understood by us at all. tionate to the sensitive power. And thus it is that immate- Reply to Objection 5. Sense knows bodies, whether rial substances are improportionate to our intellect, in our superior or inferior, in the same way, that is, by the sensi- present state of life, so that it cannot understand them. ble acting on the organ. But we do not understand material Reply to Objection 4. This argument of the Com- and immaterial substances in the same way. The former mentator fails in several ways. First, because if separate we understand by a process of abstraction, which is im- substances are not understood by us, it does not follow possible in the case of the latter, for there are no phan- that they are not understood by any intellect; for they are tasms of what is immaterial. understood by themselves, and by one another. Whether our intellect can understand immaterial substances through its knowledge Ia q. 88 a. 2 of material things? Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect can again be made subject to abstraction; and as the process of know immaterial substances through the knowledge of abstraction cannot go on forever, it must arrive at length at material things. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that some immaterial quiddity, absolutely without matter; and “the human mind cannot be raised up to immaterial con- this would be the understanding of immaterial substance. templation of the heavenly hierarchies, unless it is led Now this opinion would be true, were immaterial sub- thereto by material guidance according to its own nature.” stances the forms and species of these material things; as Therefore we can be led by material things to know im- the Platonists supposed. But supposing, on the contrary, material substances. that immaterial substances differ altogether from the quid- Objection 2. Further, science resides in the intellect. dity of material things, it follows that however much our But there are sciences and definitions of immaterial sub- intellect abstract the quiddity of material things from mat- stances; for Damascene defines an angel (De Fide Orth. ter, it could never arrive at anything akin to immaterial ii, 3); and we find angels treated of both in theology and substance. Therefore we are not able perfectly to under- philosophy. Therefore immaterial substances can be un- stand immaterial substances through material substances. derstood by us. Reply to Objection 1. From material things we can Objection 3. Further, the human soul belongs to the rise to some kind of knowledge of immaterial things, but genus of immaterial substances. But it can be understood not to the perfect knowledge thereof; for there is no proper by us through its act by which it understands material and adequate proportion between material and immaterial things. Therefore also other material substances can be things, and the likenesses drawn from material things for understood by us, through their material effects. the understanding of immaterial things are very dissimilar Objection 4. Further, the only cause which cannot therefrom, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii). be comprehended through its effects is that which is in- Reply to Objection 2. Science treats of higher things finitely distant from them, and this belongs to God alone. principally by way of negation. Thus Aristotle (De Coel. Therefore other created immaterial substances can be un- i, 3) explains the heavenly bodies by denying to them in- derstood by us through material things. ferior corporeal properties. Hence it follows that much On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that less can immaterial substances be known by us in such a “intelligible things cannot be understood through sensible way as to make us know their quiddity; but we may have things, nor composite things through simple, nor incorpo- a scientific knowledge of them by way of negation and by real through corporeal.” their relation to material things. I answer that, Averroes says (De Anima iii) that a Reply to Objection 3. The human soul understands it- philosopher named Avempace∗ taught that by the under- self through its own act of understanding, which is proper standing of natural substances we can be led, according to it, showing perfectly its power and nature. But the to true philosophical principles, to the knowledge of im- power and nature of immaterial substances cannot be per- material substances. For since the nature of our intellect fectly known through such act, nor through any other ma- is to abstract the quiddity of material things from matter, terial thing, because there is no proportion between the anything material residing in that abstracted quiddity can latter and the power of the former. ∗ Ibn-Badja, Arabian Philosopher; ob. 1183 456 Reply to Objection 4. Created immaterial substances ral genus or logical genus; because God is in no genus, are not in the same natural genus as material substances, as stated above (q. 3, a. 5). Hence through the like- for they do not agree in power or in matter; but they be- ness derived from material things we can know some- long to the same logical genus, because even immaterial thing positive concerning the angels, according to some substances are in the predicament of substance, as their common notion, though not according to the specific na- essence is distinct from their existence. But God has no ture; whereas we cannot acquire any such knowledge at connection with material things, as regards either natu- all about God. Whether God is the first object known by the human mind? Ia q. 88 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that God is the first ob- the Apostle (Rom. 1:20), “the invisible things of God ject known by the human mind. For that object in which are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are all others are known, and by which we judge others, is made”: while the first object of our knowledge in this life the first thing known to us; as light is to the eye, and first is the “quiddity of a material thing,” which is the proper principles to the intellect. But we know all things in the object of our intellect, as appears above in many passages light of the first truth, and thereby judge of all things, as (q. 84, a. 7; q. 85, a. 8; q. 87, a. 2, ad 2) Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2; De Vera Relig. xxxi;∗). Reply to Objection 1. We see and judge of all things Therefore God is the first object known to us. in the light of the first truth, forasmuch as the light it- Objection 2. Further, whatever causes a thing to be self of our mind, whether natural or gratuitous, is nothing such is more so. But God is the cause of all our knowl- else than the impression of the first truth upon it, as stated edge; for He is “the true light which enlighteneth every above (q. 12, a. 2). Hence, as the light itself of our intel- man that cometh into this world” (Jn. 1:9). Therefore lect is not the object it understands, much less can it be God is our first and most known object. said that God is the first object known by our intellect. Objection 3. Further, what is first known in the image Reply to Objection 2. The axiom, “Whatever causes is the exemplar to which it is made. But in our mind is a thing to be such is more so,” must be understood of the image of God, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4,7). things belonging to one and the same order, as explained Therefore God is the first object known to our mind. above (q. 81, a. 2, ad 3). Other things than God are known On the contrary, “No man hath seen God at any time” because of God; not as if He were the first known object, (Jn. 1:18). but because He is the first cause of our faculty of knowl- I answer that, Since the human intellect in the present edge. state of life cannot understand even immaterial created Reply to Objection 3. If there existed in our souls a substances (a. 1), much less can it understand the essence perfect image of God, as the Son is the perfect image of of the uncreated substance. Hence it must be said sim- the Father, our mind would know God at once. But the ply that God is not the first object of our knowledge. image in our mind is imperfect; hence the argument does Rather do we know God through creatures, according to not prove. ∗ Confess. xii, 25 457 FIRST PART, QUESTION 89 Of the Knowledge of the Separated Soul (In Eight Articles) We must now consider the knowledge of the separated soul. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the soul separated from the body can understand? (2) Whether it understands separate substances? (3) Whether it understands all natural things? (4) Whether it understands individuals and singulars? (5) Whether the habits of knowledge acquired in this life remain? (6) Whether the soul can use the habit of knowledge here acquired? (7) Whether local distance impedes the separated soul’s knowledge? (8) Whether souls separated from the body know what happens here? Whether the separated soul can understand anything? Ia q. 89 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the soul separated ence shows. Did this not proceed from the soul’s very from the body can understand nothing at all. For the nature, but accidentally through its being bound up with Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4) that “the understanding the body, as the Platonists said, the difficulty would van- is corrupted together with its interior principle.” But by ish; for in that case when the body was once removed, the death all human interior principles are corrupted. There- soul would at once return to its own nature, and would fore also the intellect itself is corrupted. understand intelligible things simply, without turning to Objection 2. Further, the human soul is hindered from the phantasms, as is exemplified in the case of other sep- understanding when the senses are tied, and by a dis- arate substances. In that case, however, the union of soul tracted imagination, as explained above (q. 84, Aa. 7,8). and body would not be for the soul’s good, for evidently it But death destroys the senses and imagination, as we have would understand worse in the body than out of it; but for shown above (q. 77, a. 8). Therefore after death the soul the good of the body, which would be unreasonable, since understands nothing. matter exists on account of the form, and not the form for Objection 3. Further, if the separated soul can under- the sake of matter. But if we admit that the nature of the stand, this must be by means of some species. But it does soul requires it to understand by turning to the phantasms, not understand by means of innate species, because it has it will seem, since death does not change its nature, that it none such; being at first “like a tablet on which nothing can then naturally understand nothing; as the phantasms is written”: nor does it understand by species abstracted are wanting to which it may turn. from things, for it does not then possess organs of sense To solve this difficulty we must consider that as noth- and imagination which are necessary for the abstraction of ing acts except so far as it is actual, the mode of action in species: nor does it understand by means of species, for- every agent follows from its mode of existence. Now the merly abstracted and retained in the soul; for if that were soul has one mode of being when in the body, and another so, a child’s soul would have no means of understand- when apart from it, its nature remaining always the same; ing at all: nor does it understand by means of intelligible but this does not mean that its union with the body is an species divinely infused, for such knowledge would not accidental thing, for, on the contrary, such union belongs be natural, such as we treat of now, but the effect of grace. to its very nature, just as the nature of a light object is not Therefore the soul apart from the body understands noth-changed, when it is in its proper place, which is natural to ing. it, and outside its proper place, which is beside its nature. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima i, The soul, therefore, when united to the body, consistently 1), “If the soul had no proper operation, it could not be with that mode of existence, has a mode of understanding, separated from the body.” But the soul is separated from by turning to corporeal phantasms, which are in corporeal the body; therefore it has a proper operation and above all, organs; but when it is separated from the body, it has a that which consists in intelligence. Therefore the soul can mode of understanding, by turning to simply intelligible understand when it is apart from the body. objects, as is proper to other separate substances. Hence I answer that, The difficulty in solving this question it is as natural for the soul to understand by turning to the arises from the fact that the soul united to the body can phantasms as it is for it to be joined to the body; but to understand only by turning to the phantasms, as experi- be separated from the body is not in accordance with its 458 nature, and likewise to understand without turning to the those who have a better understanding, unless things are phantasms is not natural to it; and hence it is united to explained to them singly and in detail. Now it is clear that the body in order that it may have an existence and an op- in the natural order human souls hold the lowest place eration suitable to its nature. But here again a difficulty among intellectual substances. But the perfection of the arises. For since nature is always ordered to what is best, universe required various grades of being. If, therefore, and since it is better to understand by turning to simply God had willed souls to understand in the same way as intelligible objects than by turning to the phantasms; God separate substances, it would follow that human knowl- should have ordered the soul’s nature so that the nobler edge, so far from being perfect, would be confused and way of understanding would have been natural to it, and general. Therefore to make it possible for human souls to it would not have needed the body for that purpose. possess perfect and proper knowledge, they were so made In order to resolve this difficulty we must consider that that their nature required them to be joined to bodies, and while it is true that it is nobler in itself to understand by thus to receive the proper and adequate knowledge of sen- turning to something higher than to understand by turning sible things from the sensible things themselves; thus we to phantasms, nevertheless such a mode of understand- see in the case of uneducated men that they have to be ing was not so perfect as regards what was possible to taught by sensible examples. the soul. This will appear if we consider that every in- It is clear then that it was for the soul’s good that it was tellectual substance possesses intellective power by the united to a body, and that it understands by turning to the influence of the Divine light, which is one and simple phantasms. Nevertheless it is possible for it to exist apart in its first principle, and the farther off intellectual crea- from the body, and also to understand in another way. tures are from the first principle so much the more is the Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher’s words care- light divided and diversified, as is the case with lines ra- fully examined will show that he said this on the previous diating from the centre of a circle. Hence it is that God supposition that understanding is a movement of body and by His one Essence understands all things; while the su- soul as united, just as sensation is, for he had not as yet perior intellectual substances understand by means of a explained the difference between intellect and sense. We number of species, which nevertheless are fewer and more may also say that he is referring to the way of understand- universal and bestow a deeper comprehension of things, ing by turning to phantasms. This is also the meaning of because of the efficaciousness of the intellectual power the second objection. of such natures: whereas the inferior intellectual natures Reply to Objection 3. The separated soul does not possess a greater number of species, which are less uni- understand by way of innate species, nor by species ab- versal, and bestow a lower degree of comprehension, in stracted then, nor only by species retained, and this the proportion as they recede from the intellectual power of objection proves; but the soul in that state understands by the higher natures. If, therefore, the inferior substances means of participated species arising from the influence received species in the same degree of universality as of the Divine light, shared by the soul as by other separate the superior substances, since they are not so strong in substances; though in a lesser degree. Hence as soon as understanding, the knowledge which they would derive it ceases to act by turning to corporeal (phantasms), the through them would be imperfect, and of a general and soul turns at once to the superior things; nor is this way of confused nature. We can see this to a certain extent in knowledge unnatural, for God is the author of the influx man, for those who are of weaker intellect fail to acquire of both of the light of grace and of the light of nature. perfect knowledge through the universal conceptions of Whether the separated soul understands separate substances? Ia q. 89 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the separated soul God alone can enter into the soul; nor by means of species does not understand separate substances. For the soul is abstracted by the soul from an angel, for an angel is more more perfect when joined to the body than when existing simple than a soul. Therefore the separated soul cannot at apart from it, being an essential part of human nature; and all understand separate substances. every part of a whole is more perfect when it exists in that Objection 3. Further, some philosophers said that the whole. But the soul in the body does not understand sep- ultimate happiness of man consists in the knowledge of arate substances as shown above (q. 88, a. 1). Therefore separate substances. If, therefore, the separated soul can much less is it able to do so when apart from the body. understand separate substances, its happiness would be Objection 2. Further, whatever is known is known secured by its separation alone; which cannot be reason- either by its presence or by its species. But separate sub- ably be said. stances cannot be known to the soul by their presence, for On the contrary, Souls apart from the body know 459 other separated souls; as we see in the case of the rich as that of other separated souls. Therefore the soul apart man in hell, who saw Lazarus and Abraham (Lk. 16:23). from the body has perfect knowledge of other separated Therefore separated souls see the devils and the angels. souls, but it has an imperfect and defective knowledge of I answer that, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), “our the angels so far as its natural knowledge is concerned. mind acquires the knowledge of incorporeal things by But the knowledge of glory is otherwise. itself”—i.e. by knowing itself (q. 88, a. 1, ad 1). There- Reply to Objection 1. The separated soul is, indeed, fore from the knowledge which the separated soul has of less perfect considering its nature in which it communi- itself, we can judge how it knows other separate things. cates with the nature of the body: but it has a greater Now it was said above (a. 1), that as long as it is united freedom of intelligence, since the weight and care of the to the body the soul understands by turning to phantasms, body is a clog upon the clearness of its intelligence in the and therefore it does not understand itself save through be- present life. coming actually intelligent by means of ideas abstracted Reply to Objection 2. The separated soul understands from phantasms; for thus it understands itself through its the angels by means of divinely impressed ideas; which, own act, as shown above (q. 87, a. 1). When, however, however, fail to give perfect knowledge of them, foras- it is separated from the body, it understands no longer by much as the nature of the soul is inferior to that of an turning to phantasms, but by turning to simply intelligible angel. objects; hence in that state it understands itself through Reply to Objection 3. Man’s ultimate happiness con- itself. Now, every separate substance “understands what sists not in the knowledge of any separate substances; but is above itself and what is below itself, according to the in the knowledge of God, Who is seen only by grace. The mode of its substance” (De Causis viii): for a thing is un- knowledge of other separate substances if perfectly under- derstood according as it is in the one who understands; stood gives great happiness—not final and ultimate hap- while one thing is in another according to the nature of piness. But the separated soul does not understand them that in which it is. And the mode of existence of a sep- perfectly, as was shown above in this article. arated soul is inferior to that of an angel, but is the same Whether the separated soul knows all natural things? Ia q. 89 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the separated soul thereof. Now angels through such species know all nat- knows all natural things. For the types of all natural ural things perfectly; because all that God has produced things exist in separate substances. Therefore, as sepa- in the respective natures of natural things has been pro- rated souls know separate substances, they also know all duced by Him in the angelic intelligence, as Augustine natural things. says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). Hence it follows that separated Objection 2. Further, whoever understands the souls know all natural things not with a certain and proper greater intelligible, will be able much more to understand knowledge, but in a general and confused manner. the lesser intelligible. But the separated soul understands Reply to Objection 1. Even an angel does not under- immaterial substances, which are in the highest degree of stand all natural things through his substance, but through intelligibility. Therefore much more can it understand all certain species, as stated above (q. 87, a. 1). So it does natural things which are in a lower degree of intelligibil- not follow that the soul knows all natural things because ity. it knows separate substances after a fashion. On the contrary, The devils have greater natural Reply to Objection 2. As the soul separated from the knowledge than the separated soul; yet they do not know body does not perfectly understand separate substances, all natural things, but have to learn many things by long so neither does it know all natural things perfectly; but it experience, as Isidore says (De Summo Bono i). There- knows them confusedly, as above explained in this article. fore neither can the separated soul know all natural things. Reply to Objection 3. Isidore speaks of the knowl- I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the separated edge of the future which neither angels, nor demons, soul, like the angels, understands by means of species, nor separated souls, know except so far as future things received from the influence of the Divine light. Neverthe- pre-exist in their causes or are known by Divine revela- less, as the soul by nature is inferior to an angel, to whom tion. But we are here treating of the knowledge of natural this kind of knowledge is natural, the soul apart from the things. body through such species does not receive perfect knowl- Reply to Objection 4. Knowledge acquired here by edge, but only a general and confused kind of knowledge. study is proper and perfect; the knowledge of which we Separated souls, therefore, have the same relation through speak is confused. Hence it does not follow that to study such species to imperfect and confused knowledge of nat- in order to learn is useless. ural things as the angels have to the perfect knowledge 460 Whether the separated soul knows singulars? Ia q. 89 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the separated soul versal and individual principles (q. 14, a. 2), so likewise does not know singulars. For no cognitive power besides separate substances can know singulars by species which the intellect remains in the separated soul, as is clear from are a kind of participated similitude of the Divine Essence. what has been said above (q. 77, a. 8). But the intellect There is a difference, however, between angels and sepa- cannot know singulars, as we have shown (q. 86, a. 1). rated souls in the fact that through these species the angels Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars. have a perfect and proper knowledge of things; whereas Objection 2. Further, the knowledge of the singular separated have only a confused knowledge. Hence the is more determinate than knowledge of the universal. But angels, by reason of their perfect intellect, through these the separated soul has no determinate knowledge of the species, know not only the specific natures of things, but species of natural things, therefore much less can it know also the singulars contained in those species; whereas sep- singulars. arated souls by these species know only those singulars to Objection 3. Further, if it knew the singulars, yet not which they are determined by former knowledge in this by sense, for the same reason it would know all singulars. life, or by some affection, or by natural aptitude, or by the But it does not know all singulars. Therefore it knows disposition of the Divine order; because whatever is re- none. ceived into anything is conditioned according to the mode On the contrary, The rich man in hell said: “I have of the recipient. five brethren” (Lk. 16:28). Reply to Objection 1. The intellect does not know the I answer that, Separated souls know some singulars, singular by way of abstraction; neither does the separated but not all, not even all present singulars. To understand soul know it thus; but as explained above. this, we must consider that there is a twofold way of Reply to Objection 2. The knowledge of the sepa- knowing things, one by means of abstraction from phan- rated soul is confined to those species or individuals to tasms, and in this way singulars cannot be directly known which the soul has some kind of determinate relation, as by the intellect, but only indirectly, as stated above (q. 86, we have said. a. 1). The other way of understanding is by the infusion of Reply to Objection 3. The separated soul has not the species by God, and in that way it is possible for the intel- same relation to all singulars, but one relation to some, lect to know singulars. For as God knows all things, uni- and another to others. Therefore there is not the same rea- versal and singular, by His Essence, as the cause of uni- son why it should know all singulars. Whether the habit of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul? Ia q. 89 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the habit of knowl- destroyed by death. edge acquired in this life does not remain in the soul sep- On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. liii, ad Paulinum), arated from the body: for the Apostle says: “Knowledge “Let us learn on earth that kind of knowledge which will shall be destroyed” (1 Cor. 13:8). remain with us in heaven.” Objection 2. Further, some in this world who are less I answer that, Some say that the habit of knowledge good enjoy knowledge denied to others who are better. resides not in the intellect itself, but in the sensitive pow- If, therefore, the habit of knowledge remained in the soul ers, namely, the imaginative, cogitative, and memorative, after death, it would follow that some who are less good and that the intelligible species are not kept in the pas- would, even in the future life, excel some who are better; sive intellect. If this were true, it would follow that when which seems unreasonable. the body is destroyed by death, knowledge here acquired Objection 3. Further, separated souls will possess would also be entirely destroyed. knowledge by influence of the Divine light. Supposing, But, since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is therefore, that knowledge here acquired remained in the “the abode of species,” as the Philosopher says (De An- separated soul, it would follow that two forms of the same ima iii, 4), the habit of knowledge here acquired must be species would co-exist in the same subject which cannot partly in the aforesaid sensitive powers and partly in the be. intellect. This can be seen by considering the very ac- Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher says (Praedic. tions from which knowledge arises. For “habits are like vi, 4,5), that “a habit is a quality hard to remove: yet the actions whereby they are acquired” (Ethic. ii, 1). Now sometimes knowledge is destroyed by sickness or the the actions of the intellect, by which knowledge is here like.” But in this life there is no change so thorough as acquired, are performed by the mind turning to the phan- death. Therefore it seems that the habit of knowledge is tasms in the aforesaid sensitive powers. Hence through 461 such acts the passive intellect acquires a certain facility in trary to truth. And thus knowledge may be corrupted by considering the species received: and the aforesaid sen- its contrary when a false argument seduces anyone from sitive powers acquire a certain aptitude in seconding the the knowledge of truth. For this reason the Philosopher in action of the intellect when it turns to them to consider the above work mentions two ways in which knowledge the intelligible object. But as the intellectual act resides is corrupted directly: namely, “forgetfulness” on the part chiefly and formally in the intellect itself, whilst it re- of the memorative power, and “deception” on the part of sides materially and dispositively in the inferior powers, a false argument. But these have no place in the sepa- the same distinction is to be applied to habit. rated soul. Therefore we must conclude that the habit of Knowledge, therefore, acquired in the present life knowledge, so far as it is in the intellect, remains in the does not remain in the separated soul, as regards what separated soul. belongs to the sensitive powers; but as regards what be- Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle is not speaking of longs to the intellect itself, it must remain; because, as knowledge as a habit, but as to the act of knowing; and the Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii), a form hence he says, in proof of the assertion quoted, “Now, I may be corrupted in two ways; first, directly, when cor- know in part.” rupted by its contrary, as heat, by cold; and secondly, indi- Reply to Objection 2. As a less good man may ex- rectly, when its subject is corrupted. Now it is evident that ceed a better man in bodily stature, so the same kind of human knowledge is not corrupted through corruption of man may have a habit of knowledge in the future life the subject, for the intellect is an incorruptible faculty, as which a better man may not have. Such knowledge, how- above stated (q. 79, a. 2, ad 2). Neither can the intelligi- ever, cannot be compared with the other prerogatives en- ble species in the passive intellect be corrupted by their joyed by the better man. contrary; for there is no contrary to intelligible “inten- Reply to Objection 3. These two kinds of knowledge tions,” above all as regards simple intelligence of “what are not of the same species, so there is no impossibility. a thing is.” But contrariety may exist in the intellect as re- Reply to Objection 4. This objection considers the gards mental composition and division, or also reasoning; corruption of knowledge on the part of the sensitive pow- so far as what is false in statement or argument is con- ers. Whether the act of knowledge acquired here remains in the separated soul? Ia q. 89 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the act of knowledge I answer that, Action offers two things for our here acquired does not remain in the separated soul. For consideration—its species and its mode. Its species comes the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), that when the body from the object, whereto the faculty of knowledge is di- is corrupted, “the soul neither remembers nor loves.” But rected by the (intelligible) species, which is the object’s to consider what is previously known is an act of mem- similitude; whereas the mode is gathered from the power ory. Therefore the separated soul cannot retain an act of of the agent. Thus that a person see a stone is due to the knowledge here acquired. species of the stone in his eye; but that he see it clearly, is Objection 2. Further, intelligible species cannot have due to the eye’s visual power. Therefore as the intelligi- greater power in the separated soul than they have in the ble species remain in the separated soul, as stated above soul united to the body. But in this life we cannot under- (a. 5), and since the state of the separated soul is not the stand by intelligible species without turning to phantasms, same as it is in this life, it follows that through the intel- as shown above (q. 84, a. 7). Therefore the separated soul ligible species acquired in this life the soul apart from the cannot do so, and thus it cannot understand at all by intel- body can understand what it understood formerly, but in a ligible species acquired in this life. different way; not by turning to phantasms, but by a mode Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, suited to a soul existing apart from the body. Thus the act 1), that “habits produce acts similar to those whereby they of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul, are acquired.” But the habit of knowledge is acquired here but in a different way. by acts of the intellect turning to phantasms: therefore it Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher speaks of re- cannot produce any other acts. These acts, however, are membrance, according as memory belongs to the sensitive not adapted to the separated soul. Therefore the soul in the part, but not as belonging in a way to the intellect, as ex- state of separation cannot produce any act of knowledge plained above (q. 79, a. 6). acquired in this life. Reply to Objection 2. The different mode of intelli- On the contrary, It was said to Dives in hell (Lk. gence is produced by the different state of the intelligent 16:25): “Remember thou didst receive good things in thy soul; not by diversity of species. lifetime.” Reply to Objection 3. The acts which produce a habit 462 are like the acts caused by that habit, in species, but not whereby we act pleasurably. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethic. v, 8: in mode. For example, to do just things, but not justly, Magn. Moral. i, 34). that is, pleasurably, causes the habit of political justice, Whether local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul? Ia q. 89 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that local distance im- in either case a determinate distance would be necessary. pedes the separated soul’s knowledge. For Augustine says This is, however, impossible because abstraction of the (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), that “the souls of the dead are species from the sensible is done through the senses and where they cannot know what is done here.” But they other sensible faculties which do not remain actually in know what is done among themselves. Therefore local the soul apart from the body. But the soul when separated distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul. understands singulars by species derived from the Divine Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Divin. Dae- light, which is indifferent to what is near or distant. Hence mon. iii), that “the demon’s rapidity of movement enables knowledge in the separated soul is not hindered by local them to tell things unknown to us.” But agility of move- distance. ment would be useless in that respect unless their knowl- Reply to Objection 1. Augustine says that the souls edge was impeded by local distance; which, therefore, is a of the departed cannot see what is done here, not because much greater hindrance to the knowledge of the separated they are ‘there,’ as if impeded by local distance; but for soul, whose nature is inferior to the demon’s. some other cause, as we shall explain (a. 8). Objection 3. Further, as there is distance of place, so Reply to Objection 2. Augustine speaks there in ac- is there distance of time. But distance of time impedes cordance with the opinion that demons have bodies natu- knowledge in the separated soul, for the soul is ignorant rally united to them, and so have sensitive powers, which of the future. Therefore it seems that distance of place require local distance. In the same book he expressly sets also impedes its knowledge. down this opinion, though apparently rather by way of On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 16:23), that Dives, narration than of assertion, as we may gather from De Civ. “lifting up his eyes when he was in torment, saw Abra- Dei xxi, 10. ham afar off.” Therefore local distance does not impede Reply to Objection 3. The future, which is distant in knowledge in the separated soul. time, does not actually exist, and therefore is not know- I answer that, Some have held that the separated soul able in itself, because so far as a thing falls short of being, knows the singular by abstraction from the sensible. If so far does it fall short of being knowable. But what is that were so, it might be that local distance would im- locally distant exists actually, and is knowable in itself. pede its knowledge; for either the sensible would need Hence we cannot argue from distance of time to distance to act upon the soul, or the soul upon the sensible, and of place. Whether separated souls know that takes place on earth? Ia q. 89 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that separated souls know not understand whether his children come to honor or dis- what takes place on earth; for otherwise they would have honor.” no care for it, as they have, according to what Dives said I answer that, By natural knowledge, of which we (Lk. 16:27,28), “I have five brethren. . . he may testify are treating now, the souls of the dead do not know what unto them, lest they also come into the place of torments.” passes on earth. This follows from what has been laid Therefore separated souls know what passes on earth. down (a. 4), since the separated soul has knowledge of Objection 2. Further, the dead often appear to the liv- singulars, by being in a way determined to them, either ing, asleep or awake, and tell them of what takes place by some vestige of previous knowledge or affection, or by there; as Samuel appeared to Saul (1 Kings 28:11). But the Divine order. Now the souls departed are in a state this could not be unless they knew what takes place here. of separation from the living, both by Divine order and Therefore they know what takes place on earth. by their mode of existence, whilst they are joined to the Objection 3. Further, separated souls know what hap- world of incorporeal spiritual substances; and hence they pens among themselves. If, therefore, they do not know are ignorant of what goes on among us. Whereof Gregory what takes place among us, it must be by reason of local gives the reason thus: “The dead do not know how the distance; which has been shown to be false (a. 7). living act, for the life of the spirit is far from the life of On the contrary, It is written (Job 14:21): “He will the flesh; and so, as corporeal things differ from incorpo- 463 real in genus, so they are distinct in knowledge” (Moral. not suffer from sorrow, nor do they interfere in mundane xii). Augustine seems to say the same (De Cura pro Mort. affairs, except in accordance with Divine justice. xiii), when he asserts that, “the souls of the dead have no Reply to Objection 1. The souls of the departed may concern in the affairs of the living.” care for the living, even if ignorant of their state; just as Gregory and Augustine, however, seem to be divided we care for the dead by pouring forth prayer on their be- in opinion as regards the souls of the blessed in heaven, half, though we are ignorant of their state. Moreover, the for Gregory continues the passage above quoted: “The affairs of the living can be made known to them not im- case of the holy souls is different, for since they see the mediately, but the souls who pass hence thither, or by an- light of Almighty God, we cannot believe that external gels and demons, or even by “the revelation of the Holy things are unknown to them.” But Augustine (De Cura Ghost,” as Augustine says in the same book. pro Mort. xiii) expressly says: “The dead, even the saints Reply to Objection 2. That the dead appear to the do not know what is done by the living or by their own living in any way whatever is either by the special dispen- children,” as a gloss quotes on the text, “Abraham hath sation of God; in order that the souls of the dead may in- not known us” (Is. 63:16). He confirms this opinion by terfere in affairs of the living—and this is to be accounted saying that he was not visited, nor consoled in sorrow by as miraculous. Or else such apparitions occur through the his mother, as when she was alive; and he could not think instrumentality of bad or good angels, without the knowl- it possible that she was less kind when in a happier state; edge of the departed; as may likewise happen when the and again by the fact that the Lord promised to king Josias living appear, without their own knowledge, to others liv- that he should die, lest he should see his people’s afflic- ing, as Augustine says in the same book. And so it may tions (4 Kings 22:20). Yet Augustine says this in doubt; be said of Samuel that he appeared through Divine reve- and premises, “Let every one take, as he pleases, what I lation; according to Ecclus. 46:23, “he slept, and told the say.” Gregory, on the other hand, is positive, since he says, king the end of his life.” Or, again, this apparition was “We cannot believe.” His opinion, indeed, seems to be the procured by the demons; unless, indeed, the authority of more probable one—that the souls of the blessed who see Ecclesiasticus be set aside through not being received by God do know all that passes here. For they are equal to the the Jews as canonical Scripture. angels, of whom Augustine says that they know what hap- Reply to Objection 3. This kind of ignorance does pens among those living on earth. But as the souls of the not proceed from the obstacle of local distance, but from blessed are most perfectly united to Divine justice, they do the cause mentioned above. 464 FIRST PART, QUESTION 90 Of the First Production of Man’s Soul (In Four Articles) After the foregoing we must consider the first production of man, concerning which there are four subjects of treatment: (1) the production of man himself; (2) the end of this production; (3) the state and condition of the first man; (4) the place of his abode. Concerning the production of man, there are three things to be considered: (1) the production of man’s soul; (2) the production of man’s body; (3) the production of the woman. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether man’s soul was something made, or was of the Divine substance? (2) Whether, if made, it was created? (3) Whether it was made by angelic instrumentality? (4) Whether it was made before the body? Whether the soul was made or was of God’s substance? Ia q. 90 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the soul was not fore they said that God was a body, which they consid- made, but was God’s substance. For it is written (Gn. 2:7): ered to be the principle of other bodies. And since they “God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed held that the soul was of the same nature as that body into his face the breath of life, and man was made a liv- which they regarded as the first principle, as is stated De ing soul.” But he who breathes sends forth something of Anima i, 2, it followed that the soul was of the nature himself. Therefore the soul, whereby man lives, is of the of God Himself. According to this supposition, also, the Divine substance. Manichaeans, thinking that God was corporeal light, held Objection 2. Further, as above explained (q. 75, a. 5), that the soul was part of that light bound up with the body. the soul is a simple form. But a form is an act. There- Then a further step in advance was made, and some fore the soul is a pure act; which applies to God alone. surmised the existence of something incorporeal, not apart Therefore the soul is of God’s substance. from the body, but the form of a body; so that Varro said, Objection 3. Further, things that exist and do differ “God is a soul governing the world by movement and rea- are the same. But God and the mind exist, and in no way son,” as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 6∗) So some differ, for they could only be differentiated by certain dif- supposed man’s soul to be part of that one soul, as man ferences, and thus would be composite. Therefore God is a part of the whole world; for they were unable to go and the human mind are the same. so far as to understand the different degrees of spiritual On the contrary, Augustine (De Orig. Animae iii, substance, except according to the distinction of bodies. 15) mentions certain opinions which he calls “exceed- But, all these theories are impossible, as proved above ingly and evidently perverse, and contrary to the Catholic (q. 3, Aa. 1,8; and q. 75, a. 1), wherefore it is evidently Faith,” among which the first is the opinion that “God false that the soul is of the substance of God. made the soul not out of nothing, but from Himself.” Reply to Objection 1. The term “breathe” is not to I answer that, To say that the soul is of the Divine be taken in the material sense; but as regards the act of substance involves a manifest improbability. For, as is God, to breathe [spirare], is the same as to “make a spirit.” clear from what has been said (q. 77 , a. 2; q. 79, a. 2; Moreover, in the material sense, man by breathing does q. 84, a. 6), the human soul is sometimes in a state of po- not send forth anything of his own substance, but an ex- tentiality to the act of intelligence —acquires its knowl- traneous thing. edge somehow from things—and thus has various pow- Reply to Objection 2. Although the soul is a simple ers; all of which are incompatible with the Divine Nature, form in its essence, yet it is not its own existence, but is a Which is a pure act—receives nothing from any other— being by participation, as above explained (q. 75, a. 5, ad and admits of no variety in itself, as we have proved (q. 3, 4). Therefore it is not a pure act like God. Aa. 1,7; q. 9, a. 1). Reply to Objection 3. That which differs, properly This error seems to have originated from two state- speaking, differs in something; wherefore we seek for dif- ments of the ancients. For those who first began to observe ference where we find also resemblance. For this reason the nature of things, being unable to rise above their imag- things which differ must in some way be compound; since ination, supposed that nothing but bodies existed. There- they differ in something, and in something resemble each ∗ The words as quoted are to be found iv. 31. 465 other. In this sense, although all that differ are diverse, yet man and a horse differ by the difference of rational and ir-all things that are diverse do not differ. For simple things rational; but we cannot say that these again differ by some are diverse; yet do not differ from one another by differ- further difference. ences which enter into their composition. For instance, a Whether the soul was produced by creation? Ia q. 90 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the soul was not pro- of all non-subsistent forms. Therefore, properly speak- duced by creation. For that which has in itself something ing, it does not belong to any non-existing form to be material is produced from matter. But the soul is in part made; but such are said to be made through the composite material, since it is not a pure act. Therefore the soul was substances being made. On the other hand, the rational made of matter; and hence it was not created. soul is a subsistent form, as above explained (q. 75, a. 2). Objection 2. Further, every actuality of matter is Wherefore it is competent to be and to be made. And educed from the potentiality of that matter; for since mat- since it cannot be made of pre-existing matter—whether ter is in potentiality to act, any act pre-exists in matter corporeal, which would render it a corporeal being—or potentially. But the soul is the act of corporeal matter, as spiritual, which would involve the transmutation of one is clear from its definition. Therefore the soul is educed spiritual substance into another, we must conclude that it from the potentiality of matter. cannot exist except by creation. Objection 3. Further, the soul is a form. Therefore, if Reply to Objection 1. The soul’s simple essence is as the soul is created, all other forms also are created. Thus the material element, while its participated existence is its no forms would come into existence by generation; which formal element; which participated existence necessarily is not true. co-exists with the soul’s essence, because existence natu- On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:27): “God cre- rally follows the form. The same reason holds if the soul ated man to His own image.” But man is like to God in is supposed to be composed of some spiritual matter, as his soul. Therefore the soul was created. some maintain; because the said matter is not in potential- I answer that, The rational soul can be made only by ity to another form, as neither is the matter of a celestial creation; which, however, is not true of other forms. The body; otherwise the soul would be corruptible. Wherefore reason is because, since to be made is the way to exis- the soul cannot in any way be made of pre-existent matter. tence, a thing must be made in such a way as is suitable Reply to Objection 2. The production of act from the to its mode of existence. Now that properly exists which potentiality of matter is nothing else but something be- itself has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own exis- coming actually that previously was in potentiality. But tence. Wherefore only substances are properly and truly since the rational soul does not depend in its existence on called beings; whereas an accident has not existence, but corporeal matter, and is subsistent, and exceeds the capac- something is (modified) by it, and so far is it called a be- ity of corporeal matter, as we have seen (q. 75, a. 2), it is ing; for instance, whiteness is called a being, because by not educed from the potentiality of matter. it something is white. Hence it is said Metaph. vii, Did. Reply to Objection 3. As we have said, there is no vi, 1 that an accident should be described as “of some- comparison between the rational soul and other forms. thing rather than as something.” The same is to be said Whether the rational soul is produced by God immediately? Ia q. 90 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the rational soul is not says (Eccl. Hier. v); therefore also the inferior are pro-immediately made by God, but by the instrumentality of duced into existence by the higher, and souls by angels. the angels. For spiritual things have more order than cor- Objection 3. Further, “perfect is that which can pro- poreal things. But inferior bodies are produced by means duce its like,” as is stated Metaph. v. But spiritual sub- of the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). There- stances are much more perfect than corporeal. Therefore, fore also the inferior spirits, who are the rational souls, are since bodies produce their like in their own species, much produced by means of the superior spirits, the angels. more are angels able to produce something specifically in- Objection 2. Further, the end corresponds to the be- ferior to themselves; and such is the rational soul. ginning of things; for God is the beginning and end of all. On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:7) that God Him- Therefore the issue of things from their beginning corre- self “breathed into the face of man the breath of life.” sponds to the forwarding of them to their end. But “in- I answer that, Some have held that angels, acting by ferior things are forwarded by the higher,” as Dionysius the power of God, produce rational souls. But this is quite 466 impossible, and is against faith. For it has been proved by creation. Since, therefore, the rational soul cannot be that the rational soul cannot be produced except by cre- produced by a change in matter, it cannot be produced, ation. Now, God alone can create; for the first agent alone save immediately by God. can act without presupposing the existence of anything; Thus the replies to the objections are clear. For while the second cause always presupposes something de- that bodies produce their like or something inferior to rived from the first cause, as above explained (q. 75, a. 3): themselves, and that the higher things lead forward the and every agent, that presupposes something to its act, inferior—all these things are effected through a certain acts by making a change therein. Therefore everything transmutation. else acts by producing a change, whereas God alone acts Whether the human soul was produced before the body? Ia q. 90 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the human soul was ated, together with the angels; and that afterwards, by its made before the body. For the work of creation preceded own will, was joined to the service of the body. But he the work of distinction and adornment, as shown above does not say this by way of assertion; as his words prove. (q. 66, a. 1; q. 70, a. 1). But the soul was made by cre- For he says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 29): “We may believe, if nei- ation; whereas the body was made at the end of the work ther Scripture nor reason forbid, that man was made on of adornment. Therefore the soul of man was made before the sixth day, in the sense that his body was created as to the body. its causal virtue in the elements of the world, but that the Objection 2. Further, the rational soul has more in soul was already created.” common with the angels than with the brute animals. But Now this could be upheld by those who hold that the angels were created before bodies, or at least, at the be- soul has of itself a complete species and nature, and that ginning with corporeal matter; whereas the body of man it is not united to the body as its form, but as its admin- was formed on the sixth day, when also the animals were istrator. But if the soul is united to the body as its form, made. Therefore the soul of man was created before the and is naturally a part of human nature, the above supposi- body. tion is quite impossible. For it is clear that God made the Objection 3. Further, the end is proportionate to the first things in their perfect natural state, as their species beginning. But in the end the soul outlasts the body. required. Now the soul, as a part of human nature, has Therefore in the beginning it was created before the body. its natural perfection only as united to the body. There- On the contrary, The proper act is produced in its fore it would have been unfitting for the soul to be created proper potentiality. Therefore since the soul is the proper without the body. act of the body, the soul was produced in the body. Therefore, if we admit the opinion of Augustine about I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon i, 7,8) held that the work of the six days (q. 74, a. 2), we may say that the not only the soul of the first man, but also the souls of human soul preceded in the work of the six days by a cer- all men were created at the same time as the angels, be- tain generic similitude, so far as it has intellectual nature fore their bodies: because he thought that all spiritual sub- in common with the angels; but was itself created at the stances, whether souls or angels, are equal in their natu- same time as the body. According to the other saints, both ral condition, and differ only by merit; so that some of the body and soul of the first man were produced in the them—namely, the souls of men or of heavenly bodies— work of the six days. are united to bodies while others remain in their different Reply to Objection 1. If the soul by its nature were orders entirely free from matter. Of this opinion we have a complete species, so that it might be created as to itself, already spoken (q. 47, a. 2); and so we need say nothing this reason would prove that the soul was created by itself about it here. in the beginning. But as the soul is naturally the form of Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), says that the body, it was necessarily created, not separately, but in the soul of the first man was created at the same time as the body. the angels, before the body, for another reason; because Reply to Objection 2. The same observation applies he supposes that the body of man, during the work of the to the second objection. For if the soul had a species of six days, was produced, not actually, but only as to some itself it would have something still more in common with “causal virtues”; which cannot be said of the soul, because the angels. But, as the form of the body, it belongs to the neither was it made of any pre-existing corporeal or spir- animal genus, as a formal principle. itual matter, nor could it be produced from any created Reply to Objection 3. That the soul remains after the virtue. Therefore it seems that the soul itself, during the body, is due to a defect of the body, namely, death. Which work of the six days, when all things were made, was cre- defect was not due when the soul was first created. 467 FIRST PART, QUESTION 91 The Production of the First Man’s Body (In Four Articles) We have now to consider the production of the first man’s body. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) The matter from which it was produced; (2) The author by whom it was produced; (3) The disposition it received in its production; (4) The mode and order of its production. Whether the body of the first man was made of the slime of the earth? Ia q. 91 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the body of the first temperament. As to the elements, he has them in their man was not made of the slime of the earth. For it is very substance, yet in such a way that the higher elements, an act of greater power to make something out of noth- fire and air, predominate in him by their power; for life is ing than out of something; because “not being” is farther mostly found where there is heat, which is from fire; and off from actual existence than “being in potentiality.” But where there is humor, which is of the air. But the inferior since man is the most honorable of God’s lower creatures, elements abound in man by their substance; otherwise the it was fitting that in the production of man’s body, the mingling of elements would not be evenly balanced, un- power of God should be most clearly shown. Therefore it less the inferior elements, which have the less power, pre- should not have been made of the slime of the earth, but dominated in quantity. Therefore the body of man is said out of nothing. to have been formed from the slime of the earth; because Objection 2. Further, the heavenly bodies are nobler earth and water mingled are called slime, and for this rea- than earthly bodies. But the human body has the greatest son man is called ‘a little world,’ because all creatures of nobility; since it is perfected by the noblest form, which the world are in a way to be found in him. is the rational soul. Therefore it should not be made of an Reply to Objection 1. The power of the Divine Cre- earthly body, but of a heavenly body. ator was manifested in man’s body when its matter was Objection 3. Further, fire and air are nobler than earth produced by creation. But it was fitting that the hu- and water, as is clear from their subtlety. Therefore, since man body should be made of the four elements, that man the human body is most noble, it should rather have been might have something in common with the inferior bod- made of fire and air than of the slime of the earth. ies, as being something between spiritual and corporeal Objection 4. Further, the human body is composed of substances. the four elements. Therefore it was not made of the slime Reply to Objection 2. Although the heavenly body is of the earth, but of the four elements. in itself nobler than the earthly body, yet for the acts of On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:7): “God made the rational soul the heavenly body is less adapted. For man of the slime of the earth.” the rational soul receives the knowledge of truth in a cer- I answer that, As God is perfect in His works, He tain way through the senses, the organs of which cannot bestowed perfection on all of them according to their ca- be formed of a heavenly body which is impassible. Nor pacity: “God’s works are perfect” (Dt. 32:4). He Him- is it true that something of the fifth essence enters materi- self is simply perfect by the fact that “all things are pre- ally into the composition of the human body, as some say, contained” in Him, not as component parts, but as “united who suppose that the soul is united to the body by means in one simple whole,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v); of light. For, first of all, what they say is false—that light in the same way as various effects pre-exist in their cause, is a body. Secondly, it is impossible for something to be according to its one virtue. This perfection is bestowed taken from the fifth essence, or from a heavenly body, and on the angels, inasmuch as all things which are produced to be mingled with the elements, since a heavenly body is by God in nature through various forms come under their impassible; wherefore it does not enter into the composi- knowledge. But on man this perfection is bestowed in an tion of mixed bodies, except as in the effects of its power. inferior way. For he does not possess a natural knowl- Reply to Objection 3. If fire and air, whose action edge of all natural things, but is in a manner composed is of greater power, predominated also in quantity in the of all things, since he has in himself a rational soul of the human body, they would entirely draw the rest into them- genus of spiritual substances, and in likeness to the heav- selves, and there would be no equality in the mingling, enly bodies he is removed from contraries by an equable such as is required in the composition of man, for the 468 sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses. two contraries, as much needs be the case with regard to For the organ of any particular sense must not actually touch; for the medium is in potentiality to the extremes. have the contraries of which that sense has the percep- Reply to Objection 4. In the slime of the earth are tion, but only potentially; either in such a way that it is earth, and water binding the earth together. Of the other entirely void of the whole “genus” of such contraries— elements, Scripture makes no mention, because they are thus, for instance, the pupil of the eye is without color, less in quantity in the human body, as we have said; and so as to be in potentiality as regards all colors; which is because also in the account of the Creation no mention is not possible in the organ of touch, since it is composed made of fire and air, which are not perceived by senses of of the very elements, the qualities of which are perceived uncultured men such as those to whom the Scripture was by that sense—or so that the organ is a medium between immediately addressed. Whether the human body was immediately produced by God? Ia q. 91 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the human body was must be like its effect, it is not fitting that a pure form, not produced by God immediately. For Augustine says not existing in matter, should produce a form which is in (De Trin. iii, 4), that “corporeal things are disposed by matter, and which form is only made by the fact that the God through the angels.” But the human body was made composite is made. So a form which is in matter can only of corporeal matter, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore it be the cause of another form that is in matter, according as was produced by the instrumentality of the angels, and composite is made by composite. Now God, though He is not immediately by God. absolutely immaterial, can alone by His own power pro- Objection 2. Further, whatever can be made by a cre- duce matter by creation: wherefore He alone can produce ated power, is not necessarily produced immediately by a form in matter, without the aid of any preceding material God. But the human body can be produced by the created form. For this reason the angels cannot transform a body power of a heavenly body; for even certain animals are except by making use of something in the nature of a seed, produced from putrefaction by the active power of a heav- as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 19). Therefore as no pre- enly body; and Albumazar says that man is not generated existing body has been formed whereby another body of where heat and cold are extreme, but only in temperate the same species could be generated, the first human body regions. Therefore the human body was not necessarily was of necessity made immediately by God. produced immediately by God. Reply to Objection 1. Although the angels are the Objection 3. Further, nothing is made of corporeal ministers of God, as regards what He does in bodies, yet matter except by some material change. But all corpo- God does something in bodies beyond the angels’ power, real change is caused by a movement of a heavenly body, as, for instance, raising the dead, or giving sight to the which is the first movement. Therefore, since the human blind: and by this power He formed the body of the first body was produced from corporeal matter, it seems that a man from the slime of the earth. Nevertheless the angels heavenly body had part in its production. could act as ministers in the formation of the body of the Objection 4. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, first man, in the same way as they will do at the last res- 24) that man’s body was made during the work of the six urrection by collecting the dust. days, according to the causal virtues which God inserted Reply to Objection 2. Perfect animals, produced in corporeal creatures; and that afterwards it was actually from seed, cannot be made by the sole power of a heav- produced. But what pre-exists in the corporeal creature enly body, as Avicenna imagined; although the power of a by reason of causal virtues can be produced by some cor- heavenly body may assist by co-operation in the work of poreal body. Therefore the human body was produced by natural generation, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 26), some created power, and not immediately by God. “man and the sun beget man from matter.” For this rea- On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:1): “God son, a place of moderate temperature is required for the created man out of the earth.” production of man and other animals. But the power of I answer that, The first formation of the human body heavenly bodies suffices for the production of some im- could not be by the instrumentality of any created power, perfect animals from properly disposed matter: for it is but was immediately from God. Some, indeed, supposed clear that more conditions are required to produce a per- that the forms which are in corporeal matter are derived fect than an imperfect thing. from some immaterial forms; but the Philosopher refutes Reply to Objection 3. The movement of the heavens this opinion (Metaph. vii), for the reason that forms can- causes natural changes; but not changes that surpass the not be made in themselves, but only in the composite, as order of nature, and are caused by the Divine Power alone, we have explained (q. 65, a. 4); and because the agent as for the dead to be raised to life, or the blind to see: like 469 to which also is the making of man from the slime of the some pre-existing creature can produce it. Secondly, in earth. passive potentiality only; that is, that out of pre-existing Reply to Objection 4. An effect may be said to pre- matter it can be produced by God. In this sense, according exist in the causal virtues of creatures, in two ways. First, to Augustine, the human body pre-existed in the previous both in active and in passive potentiality, so that not only work in their causal virtues. can it be produced out of pre-existing matter, but also that Whether the body of man was given an apt disposition? Ia q. 91 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the body of man was Reply to Objection 1. The sense of touch, which is not given an apt disposition. For since man is the noblest the foundation of the other senses, is more perfect in man of animals, his body ought to be the best disposed in what than in any other animal; and for this reason man must is proper to an animal, that is, in sense and movement. have the most equable temperament of all animals. More- But some animals have sharper senses and quicker move- over man excels all other animals in the interior sensitive ment than man; thus dogs have a keener smell, and birds powers, as is clear from what we have said above (q. 78, a swifter flight. Therefore man’s body was not aptly dis- a. 4). But by a kind of necessity, man falls short of the posed. other animals in some of the exterior senses; thus of all Objection 2. Further, perfect is what lacks nothing. animals he has the least sense of smell. For man needs the But the human body lacks more than the body of other largest brain as compared to the body; both for his greater animals, for these are provided with covering and natural freedom of action in the interior powers required for the arms of defense, in which man is lacking. Therefore the intellectual operations, as we have seen above (q. 84, a. 7); human body is very imperfectly disposed. and in order that the low temperature of the brain may Objection 3. Further, man is more distant from plants modify the heat of the heart, which has to be considerable than he is from the brutes. But plants are erect in stature, in man for him to be able to stand erect. So that size of the while brutes are prone in stature. Therefore man should brain, by reason of its humidity, is an impediment to the not be of erect stature. smell, which requires dryness. In the same way, we may On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 7:30): “God suggest a reason why some animals have a keener sight, made man right.” and a more acute hearing than man; namely, on account I answer that, All natural things were produced by of a hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the the Divine art, and so may be called God’s works of art. perfect equability of his temperament. The same reason Now every artist intends to give to his work the best dis- suffices to explain why some animals are more rapid in position; not absolutely the best, but the best as regards movement than man, since this excellence of speed is in- the proposed end; and even if this entails some defect, the consistent with the equability of the human temperament. artist cares not: thus, for instance, when man makes him- Reply to Objection 2. Horns and claws, which are self a saw for the purpose of cutting, he makes it of iron, the weapons of some animals, and toughness of hide and which is suitable for the object in view; and he does not quantity of hair or feathers, which are the clothing of an- prefer to make it of glass, though this be a more beautiful imals, are signs of an abundance of the earthly element; material, because this very beauty would be an obstacle to which does not agree with the equability and softness of the end he has in view. Therefore God gave to each natu- the human temperament. Therefore such things do not ral being the best disposition; not absolutely so, but in the suit the nature of man. Instead of these, he has reason and view of its proper end. This is what the Philosopher says hands whereby he can make himself arms and clothes, and (Phys. ii, 7): “And because it is better so, not absolutely, other necessaries of life, of infinite variety. Wherefore the but for each one’s substance.” hand is called by Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), “the organ of Now the proximate end of the human body is the ratio- organs.” Moreover this was more becoming to the rational nal soul and its operations; since matter is for the sake of nature, which is capable of conceiving an infinite number the form, and instruments are for the action of the agent. I of things, so as to make for itself an infinite number of say, therefore, that God fashioned the human body in that instruments. disposition which was best, as most suited to such a form Reply to Objection 3. An upright stature was becom- and to such operations. If defect exists in the disposition ing to man for four reasons. First, because the senses of the human body, it is well to observe that such defect are given to man, not only for the purpose of procuring arises as a necessary result of the matter, from the con- the necessaries of life, which they are bestowed on other ditions required in the body, in order to make it suitably animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge. Hence, proportioned to the soul and its operations. whereas the other animals take delight in the objects of 470 the senses only as ordered to food and sex, man alone obliged to take hold of his food with his mouth. Thus he takes pleasure in the beauty of sensible objects for its own would have a protruding mouth, with thick and hard lips, sake. Therefore, as the senses are situated chiefly in the and also a hard tongue, so as to keep it from being hurt face, other animals have the face turned to the ground, by exterior things; as we see in other animals. Moreover, as it were for the purpose of seeking food and procuring a such an attitude would quite hinder speech, which is rea- livelihood; whereas man has his face erect, in order that by son’s proper operation. the senses, and chiefly by sight, which is more subtle and Nevertheless, though of erect stature, man is far above penetrates further into the differences of things, he may plants. For man’s superior part, his head, is turned to- freely survey the sensible objects around him, both heav- wards the superior part of the world, and his inferior part enly and earthly, so as to gather intelligible truth from all is turned towards the inferior world; and therefore he is things. Secondly, for the greater freedom of the acts of the perfectly disposed as to the general situation of his body. interior powers; the brain, wherein these actions are, in a Plants have the superior part turned towards the lower way, performed, not being low down, but lifted up above world, since their roots correspond to the mouth; and their other parts of the body. Thirdly, because if man’s stature inferior part towards the upper world. But brute animals were prone to the ground he would need to use his hands have a middle disposition, for the superior part of the an- as fore-feet; and thus their utility for other purposes would imal is that by which it takes food, and the inferior part cease. Fourthly, because if man’s stature were prone to the that by which it rids itself of the surplus. ground, and he used his hands as fore-feet, he would be Whether the production of the human body is fittingly described in Scripture? Ia q. 91 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the production of the tion, Scripture uses a special way of speaking, to show human body is not fittingly described in Scripture. For, as that other things were made for man’s sake. For we are the human body was made by God, so also were the other accustomed to do with more deliberation and care what works of the six days. But in the other works it is written, we have chiefly in mind. “God said; Let it be made, and it was made.” Therefore Reply to Objection 2. We must not imagine that when the same should have been said of man. God said “Let us make man,” He spoke to the angels, as Objection 2. Further, the human body was made by some were perverse enough to think. But by these words God immediately, as explained above (a. 2). Therefore it is signified the plurality of the Divine Person, Whose im- was not fittingly said, “Let us make man.” age is more clearly expressed in man. Objection 3. Further, the form of the human body is Reply to Objection 3. Some have thought that man’s the soul itself which is the breath of life. Therefore, hav- body was formed first in priority of time, and that after- ing said, “God made man of the slime of the earth,” he wards the soul was infused into the formed body. But should not have added: “And He breathed into him the it is inconsistent with the perfection of the production of breath of life.” things, that God should have made either the body with- Objection 4. Further, the soul, which is the breath of out the soul, or the soul without the body, since each is life, is in the whole body, and chiefly in the heart. There- a part of human nature. This is especially unfitting as re- fore it was not fittingly said: “He breathed into his face gards the body, for the body depends on the soul, and not the breath of life.” the soul on the body. Objection 5. Further, the male and female sex belong To remove the difficulty some have said that the to the body, while the image of God belongs to the soul. words, “God made man,” must be understood of the pro- But the soul, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, duction of the body with the soul; and that the subse- 24), was made before the body. Therefore having said: quent words, “and He breathed into his face the breath of “To His image He made them,” he should not have added, life,” should be understood of the Holy Ghost; as the Lord “male and female He created them.” breathed on His Apostles, saying, “Receive ye the Holy On the contrary, Is the authority of Scripture. Ghost” (Jn. 20:22). But this explanation, as Augustine Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine observes (Gen. says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 24), is excluded by the very words ad lit. vi, 12), man surpasses other things, not in the fact of Scripture. For we read farther on, “And man was made that God Himself made man, as though He did not make a living soul”; which words the Apostle (1 Cor. 15:45) other things; since it is written (Ps. 101:26), “The work refers not to spiritual life, but to animal life. Therefore, of Thy hands is the heaven,” and elsewhere (Ps. 94:5), by breath of life we must understand the soul, so that the “His hands laid down the dry land”; but in this, that man words, “He breathed into his face the breath of life,” are a is made to God’s image. Yet in describing man’s produc- sort of exposition of what goes before; for the soul is the 471 form of the body. one time; wherefore according to him man’s soul, which Reply to Objection 4. Since vital operations are he holds to have been made with the angels, was not made more clearly seen in man’s face, on account of the senses before the sixth day; but on the sixth day both the soul of which are there expressed; therefore Scripture says that the first man was made actually, and his body in its causal the breath of life was breathed into man’s face. elements. But other doctors hold that on the sixth day both Reply to Objection 5. According to Augustine (Gen. body and soul of man were actually made. ad lit. iv, 34), the works of the six days were done all at 472 FIRST PART, QUESTION 92 The Production of the Woman (In Four Articles) We must next consider the production of the woman. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the woman should have been made in that first production of things? (2) Whether the woman should have been made from man? (3) Whether of man’s rib? (4) Whether the woman was made immediately by God? Whether the woman should have been made in the first production of things? Ia q. 92 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the woman should sex, and the passive power to the female. And as among not have been made in the first production of things. For animals there is a vital operation nobler than generation, the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 3), that “the female to which their life is principally directed; therefore the is a misbegotten male.” But nothing misbegotten or de- male sex is not found in continual union with the female fective should have been in the first production of things. in perfect animals, but only at the time of coition; so that Therefore woman should not have been made at that first we may consider that by this means the male and female production. are one, as in plants they are always united; although in Objection 2. Further, subjection and limitation were some cases one of them preponderates, and in some the a result of sin, for to the woman was it said after sin (Gn. other. But man is yet further ordered to a still nobler vital 3:16): “Thou shalt be under the man’s power”; and Gre- action, and that is intellectual operation. Therefore there gory says that, “Where there is no sin, there is no inequal- was greater reason for the distinction of these two forces ity.” But woman is naturally of less strength and dignity in man; so that the female should be produced separately than man; “for the agent is always more honorable than from the male; although they are carnally united for gen- the patient,” as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). eration. Therefore directly after the formation of woman, Therefore woman should not have been made in the first it was said: “And they shall be two in one flesh” (Gn. production of things before sin. 2:24). Objection 3. Further, occasions of sin should be cut Reply to Objection 1. As regards the individual na- off. But God foresaw that the woman would be an occa- ture, woman is defective and misbegotten, for the active sion of sin to man. Therefore He should not have made force in the male seed tends to the production of a per- woman. fect likeness in the masculine sex; while the production On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:18): “It is not of woman comes from defect in the active force or from good for man to be alone; let us make him a helper like to some material indisposition, or even from some external himself.” influence; such as that of a south wind, which is moist, I answer that, It was necessary for woman to be as the Philosopher observes (De Gener. Animal. iv, 2). made, as the Scripture says, as a “helper” to man; not, in- On the other hand, as regards human nature in general, deed, as a helpmate in other works, as some say, since man woman is not misbegotten, but is included in nature’s in- can be more efficiently helped by another man in other tention as directed to the work of generation. Now the works; but as a helper in the work of generation. This general intention of nature depends on God, Who is the can be made clear if we observe the mode of generation universal Author of nature. Therefore, in producing na- carried out in various living things. Some living things ture, God formed not only the male but also the female. do not possess in themselves the power of generation, but Reply to Objection 2. Subjection is twofold. One are generated by some other specific agent, such as some is servile, by virtue of which a superior makes use of a plants and animals by the influence of the heavenly bod- subject for his own benefit; and this kind of subjection be- ies, from some fitting matter and not from seed: others gan after sin. There is another kind of subjection which is possess the active and passive generative power together; called economic or civil, whereby the superior makes use as we see in plants which are generated from seed; for the of his subjects for their own benefit and good; and this noblest vital function in plants is generation. Wherefore kind of subjection existed even before sin. For good or- we observe that in these the active power of generation in- der would have been wanting in the human family if some variably accompanies the passive power. Among perfect were not governed by others wiser than themselves. So animals the active power of generation belongs to the male by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally subject 473 to man, because in man the discretion of reason predomi-universe would have been imperfect. Nor was it fitting for nates. Nor is inequality among men excluded by the state the common good to be destroyed in order that individual of innocence, as we shall prove (q. 96, a. 3). evil might be avoided; especially as God is so powerful Reply to Objection 3. If God had deprived the world that He can direct any evil to a good end. of all those things which proved an occasion of sin, the Whether woman should have been made from man? Ia q. 92 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that woman should not mother, and shall cleave to his wife.” This was most nec- have been made from man. For sex belongs both to man essary as regards the human race, in which the male and and animals. But in the other animals the female was not female live together for life; which is not the case with made from the male. Therefore neither should it have other animals. Thirdly, because, as the Philosopher says been so with man. (Ethic. viii, 12), the human male and female are united, Objection 2. Further, things of the same species are not only for generation, as with other animals, but also for of the same matter. But male and female are of the same the purpose of domestic life, in which each has his or her species. Therefore, as man was made of the slime of the particular duty, and in which the man is the head of the earth, so woman should have been made of the same, and woman. Wherefore it was suitable for the woman to be not from man. made out of man, as out of her principle. Fourthly, there Objection 3. Further, woman was made to be a help- is a sacramental reason for this. For by this is signified mate to man in the work of generation. But close relation- that the Church takes her origin from Christ. Wherefore ship makes a person unfit for that office; hence near rela- the Apostle says (Eph. 5:32): “This is a great sacrament; tions are debarred from intermarriage, as is written (Lev. but I speak in Christ and in the Church.” 18:6). Therefore woman should not have been made from Reply obj. 1 is clear from the foregoing. man. Reply to Objection 2. Matter is that from which On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:5): “He something is made. Now created nature has a determi- created of him,” that is, out of man, “a helpmate like to nate principle; and since it is determined to one thing, it himself,” that is, woman. has also a determinate mode of proceeding. Wherefore I answer that, When all things were first formed, it from determinate matter it produces something in a de- was more suitable for the woman to be made from man terminate species. On the other hand, the Divine Power, that (for the female to be from the male) in other animals. being infinite, can produce things of the same species out First, in order thus to give the first man a certain dignity of any matter, such as a man from the slime of the earth, consisting in this, that as God is the principle of the whole and a woman from out of man. universe, so the first man, in likeness to God, was the prin- Reply to Objection 3. A certain affinity arises from ciple of the whole human race. Wherefore Paul says that natural generation, and this is an impediment to matri- “God made the whole human race from one” (Acts 17:26). mony. Woman, however, was not produced from man Secondly, that man might love woman all the more, and by natural generation, but by the Divine Power alone. cleave to her more closely, knowing her to be fashioned Wherefore Eve is not called the daughter of Adam; and from himself. Hence it is written (Gn. 2:23,24): “She was so this argument does not prove. taken out of man, wherefore a man shall leave father and Whether the woman was fittingly made from the rib of man? Ia q. 92 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the woman should a rib of Adam. not have been formed from the rib of man. For the rib Objection 2. Further, in those things which were first was much smaller than the woman’s body. Now from created there was nothing superfluous. Therefore a rib of a smaller thing a larger thing can be made only—either Adam belonged to the integrity of his body. So, if a rib by addition (and then the woman ought to have been de- was removed, his body remained imperfect; which is un- scribed as made out of that which was added, rather than reasonable to suppose. out of the rib itself)—or by rarefaction, because, as Au- Objection 3. Further, a rib cannot be removed from gustine says (Gen. ad lit. x): “A body cannot increase in man without pain. But there was no pain before sin. bulk except by rarefaction.” But the woman’s body is not Therefore it was not right for a rib to be taken from the more rarefied than man’s—at least, not in the proportion man, that Eve might be made from it. of a rib to Eve’s body. Therefore Eve was not formed from On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:22): “God built 474 the rib, which He took from Adam, into a woman.” rarefaction, which is for the same matter to receive greater I answer that, It was right for the woman to be made dimensions, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv). To say, from a rib of man. First, to signify the social union of therefore, that the same matter is enlarged, without being man and woman, for the woman should neither “use au- rarefied, is to combine contradictories —viz. the defini- thority over man,” and so she was not made from his head; tion with the absence of the thing defined. nor was it right for her to be subject to man’s contempt as Wherefore, as no rarefaction is apparent in such mul- his slave, and so she was not made from his feet. Sec- tiplication of matter, we must admit an addition of matter: ondly, for the sacramental signification; for from the side either by creation, or which is more probable, by conver- of Christ sleeping on the Cross the Sacraments flowed— sion. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in Joan.) that namely, blood and water—on which the Church was es- “Christ filled five thousand men with five loaves, in the tablished. same way as from a few seeds He produces the harvest Reply to Objection 1. Some say that the woman’s of corn”—that is, by transformation of the nourishment. body was formed by a material increase, without anything Nevertheless, we say that the crowds were fed with five being added; in the same way as our Lord multiplied the loaves, or that woman was made from the rib, because an five loaves. But this is quite impossible. For such an in- addition was made to the already existing matter of the crease of matter would either be by a change of the very loaves and of the rib. substance of the matter itself, or by a change of its dimen- Reply to Objection 2. The rib belonged to the inte- sions. Not by change of the substance of the matter, both gral perfection of Adam, not as an individual, but as the because matter, considered in itself, is quite unchange- principle of the human race; just as the semen belongs to able, since it has a potential existence, and has nothing the perfection of the begetter, and is released by a natural but the nature of a subject, and because quantity and size and pleasurable operation. Much more, therefore, was it are extraneous to the essence of matter itself. Wherefore possible that by the Divine power the body of the woman multiplication of matter is quite unintelligible, as long as should be produced from the man’s rib. the matter itself remains the same without anything added From this it is clear how to answer the third objection. to it; unless it receives greater dimensions. This implies Whether the woman was formed immediately by God? Ia q. 92 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the woman was not is the human semen of man or woman. Wherefore from formed immediately by God. For no individual is pro- any other matter an individual of the human species can- duced immediately by God from another individual alike not naturally be generated. Now God alone, the Author in species. But the woman was made from a man who is of nature, can produce an effect into existence outside the of the same species. Therefore she was not made imme- ordinary course of nature. Therefore God alone could pro- diately by God. duce either a man from the slime of the earth, or a woman Objection 2. Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) says from the rib of man. that corporeal things are governed by God through the an- Reply to Objection 1. This argument is verified when gels. But the woman’s body was formed from corporeal an individual is begotten, by natural generation, from that matter. Therefore it was made through the ministry of the which is like it in the same species. angels, and not immediately by God. Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (Gen. ad Objection 3. Further, those things which pre-exist in lit. ix, 15), we do not know whether the angels were em- creatures as to their causal virtues are produced by the ployed by God in the formation of the woman; but it is power of some creature, and not immediately by God. certain that, as the body of man was not formed by the an- But the woman’s body was produced in its causal virtues gels from the slime of the earth, so neither was the body among the first created works, as Augustine says (Gen. ad of the woman formed by them from the man’s rib. lit. ix, 15). Therefore it was not produced immediately by Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. God. ix, 18): “The first creation of things did not demand that On the contrary, Augustine says, in the same work: woman should be made thus; it made it possible for her “God alone, to Whom all nature owes its existence, could to be thus made.” Therefore the body of the woman did form or build up the woman from the man’s rib.” indeed pre-exist in these causal virtues, in the things first I answer that, As was said above (a. 2, ad 2), the nat- created; not as regards active potentiality, but as regards a ural generation of every species is from some determinate potentiality passive in relation to the active potentiality of matter. Now the matter whence man is naturally begotten the Creator. 475 FIRST PART, QUESTION 93 The End or Term of the Production of Man (In Nine Articles) We now treat of the end or term of man’s production, inasmuch as he is said to be made “to the image and likeness of God.” There are under this head nine points of inquiry: (1) Whether the image of God is in man? (2) Whether the image of God is in irrational creatures? (3) Whether the image of God is in the angels more than in man? (4) Whether the image of God is in every man? (5) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with the Essence, or with all the Divine Persons, or with one of them? (6) Whether the image of God is in man, as to his mind only? (7) Whether the image of God is in man’s power or in his habits and acts? (8) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with every object? (9) Of the difference between “image” and “likeness.” Whether the image of God is in man? Ia q. 93 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God is essence of a perfect image; for in a perfect image noth- not in man. For it is written (Is. 40:18): “To whom have ing is wanting that is to be found in that of which it is a you likened God? or what image will you make for Him?” copy. Now it is manifest that in man there is some like- Objection 2. Further, to be the image of God is the ness to God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet property of the First-Begotten, of Whom the Apostle says this likeness is not one of equality, for such an exemplar (Col. 1:15): “Who is the image of the invisible God, the infinitely excels its copy. Therefore there is in man a like- First-Born of every creature.” Therefore the image of God ness to God; not, indeed, a perfect likeness, but imperfect. is not to be found in man. And Scripture implies the same when it says that man was Objection 3. Further, Hilary says (De Synod∗) that made “to” God’s likeness; for the preposition “to” signi- “an image is of the same species as that which it repre- fies a certain approach, as of something at a distance. sents”; and he also says that “an image is the undivided Reply to Objection 1. The Prophet speaks of bodily and united likeness of one thing adequately representing images made by man. Therefore he says pointedly: “What another.” But there is no species common to both God and image will you make for Him?” But God made a spiritual man; nor can there be a comparison of equality between image to Himself in man. God and man. Therefore there can be no image of God in Reply to Objection 2. The First-Born of creatures man. is the perfect Image of God, reflecting perfectly that of On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:26): “Let Us which He is the Image, and so He is said to be the “Im- make man to Our own image and likeness.” age,” and never “to the image.” But man is said to be both I answer that, As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): “image” by reason of the likeness; and “to the image” by “Where an image exists, there forthwith is likeness; but reason of the imperfect likeness. And since the perfect where there is likeness, there is not necessarily an image.” likeness to God cannot be except in an identical nature, Hence it is clear that likeness is essential to an image; and the Image of God exists in His first-born Son; as the im- that an image adds something to likeness—namely, that it age of the king is in his son, who is of the same nature is copied from something else. For an “image” is so called as himself: whereas it exists in man as in an alien nature, because it is produced as an imitation of something else; as the image of the king is in a silver coin, as Augustine wherefore, for instance, an egg, however much like and says explains in De decem Chordis (Serm. ix, al, xcvi, De equal to another egg, is not called an image of the other Tempore). egg, because it is not copied from it. Reply to Objection 3. As unity means absence of But equality does not belong to the essence of an im- division, a species is said to be the same as far as it is age; for as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): “Where there one. Now a thing is said to be one not only numerically, is an image there is not necessarily equality,” as we see in specifically, or generically, but also according to a certain a person’s image reflected in a glass. Yet this is of the analogy or proportion. In this sense a creature is one with ∗ Super i can. Synod. Ancyr. 476 God, or like to Him; but when Hilary says “of a thing stood of a perfect image. which adequately represents another,” this is to be under- Whether the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures? Ia q. 93 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the is to be found in irrational creatures. For Dionysius says ultimate difference. But some things are like to God first (Div. Nom. ii): “Effects are contingent images of their and most commonly because they exist; secondly, because causes.” But God is the cause not only of rational, but they live; and thirdly because they know or understand; also of irrational creatures. Therefore the image of God is and these last, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51) “ap- to be found in irrational creatures. proach so near to God in likeness, that among all creatures Objection 2. Further, the more distinct a likeness is, nothing comes nearer to Him.” It is clear, therefore, that the nearer it approaches to the nature of an image. But intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “the solar ray has a to God’s image. very great similitude to the Divine goodness.” Therefore Reply to Objection 1. Everything imperfect is a par- it is made to the image of God. ticipation of what is perfect. Therefore even what falls Objection 3. Further, the more perfect anything is in short of the nature of an image, so far as it possesses any goodness, the more it is like God. But the whole universe sort of likeness to God, participates in some degree the is more perfect in goodness than man; for though each in- nature of an image. So Dionysius says that effects are dividual thing is good, all things together are called “very “contingent images of their causes”; that is, as much as good” (Gn. 1:31). Therefore the whole universe is to the they happen [contingit] to be so, but not absolutely. image of God, and not only man. Reply to Objection 2. Dionysius compares the solar Objection 4. Further, Boethius (De Consol. iii) says ray to Divine goodness, as regards its causality; not as re- of God: “Holding the world in His mind, and forming it gards its natural dignity which is involved in the idea of into His image.” Therefore the whole world is to the im- an image. age of God, and not only the rational creature. Reply to Objection 3. The universe is more perfect On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, in goodness than the intellectual creature as regards ex- 12): “Man’s excellence consists in the fact that God made tension and diffusion; but intensively and collectively the him to His own image by giving him an intellectual soul, likeness to the Divine goodness is found rather in the in- which raises him above the beasts of the field.” Therefore tellectual creature, which has a capacity for the highest things without intellect are not made to God’s image. good. Or else we may say that a part is not rightly divided I answer that, Not every likeness, not even what is against the whole, but only against another part. Where- copied from something else, is sufficient to make an im- fore, when we say that the intellectual nature alone is to age; for if the likeness be only generic, or existing by the image of God, we do not mean that the universe in virtue of some common accident, this does not suffice any part is not to God’s image, but that the other parts are for one thing to be the image of another. For instance, a excluded. worm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called Reply to Objection 4. Boethius here uses the word man’s image, merely because of the generic likeness. Nor, “image” to express the likeness which the product of an art if anything is made white like something else, can we say bears to the artistic species in the mind of the artist. Thus that it is the image of that thing; for whiteness is an ac- every creature is an image of the exemplar type thereof cident belonging to many species. But the nature of an in the Divine mind. We are not, however, using the word image requires likeness in species; thus the image of the “image” in this sense; but as it implies a likeness in na- king exists in his son: or, at least, in some specific acci- ture, that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are like to dent, and chiefly in the shape; thus, we speak of a man’s the First Being; as living, like to the First Life; and as image in copper. Whence Hilary says pointedly that “an intelligent, like to the Supreme Wisdom. image is of the same species.” Whether the angels are more to the image of God than man is? Ia q. 93 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels are not His image. Therefore it is not true to say that the angels more to the image of God than man is. For Augustine are more than man to the image of God. says in a sermon de Imagine xliii (de verbis Apost. xxvii) Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine (QQ. that God granted to no other creature besides man to be to 83, qu. 51), “man is so much to God’s image that God did 477 not make any creature to be between Him and man: and the image of God is more perfect in man than it is in the therefore nothing is more akin to Him.” But a creature is angels. But these do not of themselves belong to the na- called God’s image so far as it is akin to God. Therefore ture of the Divine image in man, unless we presuppose the the angels are not more to the image of God than man. first likeness, which is in the intellectual nature; otherwise Objection 3. Further, a creature is said to be to God’s even brute animals would be to God’s image. Therefore, image so far as it is of an intellectual nature. But the intel- as in their intellectual nature, the angels are more to the lectual nature does not admit of intensity or remissness; image of God than man is, we must grant that, absolutely for it is not an accidental thing, since it is a substance. speaking, the angels are more to the image of God than Therefore the angels are not more to the image of God man is, but that in some respects man is more like to God. than man. Reply to Objection 1. Augustine excludes the infe- On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. rior creatures bereft of reason from the image of God; but xxxiv): “The angel is called a “seal of resemblance” not the angels. [Ezech. 28:12] because in him the resemblance of the Di- Reply to Objection 2. As fire is said to be specifically vine image is wrought with greater expression.” the most subtle of bodies, while, nevertheless, one kind of I answer that, We may speak of God’s image in two fire is more subtle than another; so we say that nothing is ways. First, we may consider in it that in which the im- more like to God than the human soul in its generic and age chiefly consists, that is, the intellectual nature. Thus intellectual nature, because as Augustine had said previ- the image of God is more perfect in the angels than in ously, “things which have knowledge, are so near to Him man, because their intellectual nature is more perfect, as in likeness that of all creatures none are nearer.” Where- is clear from what has been said (q. 58, a. 3; q. 79, a. 8). fore this does not mean that the angels are not more to Secondly, we may consider the image of God in man as God’s image. regards its accidental qualities, so far as to observe in man Reply to Objection 3. When we say that substance a certain imitation of God, consisting in the fact that man does not admit of more or less, we do not mean that one proceeds from man, as God from God; and also in the fact species of substance is not more perfect than another; but that the whole human soul is in the whole body, as God that one and the same individual does not participate in from God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul its specific nature at one time more than at another; nor is in the whole body, and again, in every part, as God is do we mean that a species of substance is shared among in regard to the whole world. In these and the like things different individuals in a greater or lesser degree. Whether the image of God is found in every man? Ia q. 93 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God is God is in man in three ways. First, inasmuch as man not found in every man. For the Apostle says that “man is possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and lov- the image of God, but woman is the image [Vulg. glory] ing God; and this aptitude consists in the very nature of of man” (1 Cor. 11:7). Therefore, as woman is an individ- the mind, which is common to all men. Secondly, inas- ual of the human species, it is clear that every individual much as man actually and habitually knows and loves is not an image of God. God, though imperfectly; and this image consists in the Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 8:29): conformity of grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows “Whom God foreknew, He also predestined to be made and loves God perfectly; and this image consists in the conformable to the image of His Son.” But all men are likeness of glory. Wherefore on the words, “The light of not predestined. Therefore all men have not the confor- Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us” (Ps. 4:7), mity of image. the gloss distinguishes a threefold image of “creation,” Objection 3. Further, likeness belongs to the nature of of “re-creation,” and of “likeness.” The first is found in the image, as above explained (a. 1). But by sin man be- all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the comes unlike God. Therefore he loses the image of God. blessed. On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 38:7): “Surely man Reply to Objection 1. The image of God, in its prin- passeth as an image.” cipal signification, namely the intellectual nature, is found I answer that, Since man is said to be the image of both in man and in woman. Hence after the words, “To the God by reason of his intellectual nature, he is the most image of God He created him,” it is added, “Male and fe- perfectly like God according to that in which he can best male He created them” (Gn. 1:27). Moreover it is said imitate God in his intellectual nature. Now the intellectual “them” in the plural, as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iii, 22) nature imitates God chiefly in this, that God understands remarks, lest it should be thought that both sexes were and loves Himself. Wherefore we see that the image of united in one individual. But in a secondary sense the im- 478 age of God is found in man, and not in woman: for man is man is not of woman, but woman of man; and man was the beginning and end of woman; as God is the beginning not created for woman, but woman for man.” and end of every creature. So when the Apostle had said Reply obj. 2 and 3: These reasons refer to the image that “man is the image and glory of God, but woman is consisting in the conformity of grace and glory. the glory of man,” he adds his reason for saying this: “For Whether the image of God is in man according to the Trinity of Persons? Ia q. 93 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God and plants in another. Wherefore it is manifest that the does not exist in man as to the Trinity of Persons. For Au- distinction of the Divine Persons is suitable to the Divine gustine says (Fulgentius De Fide ad Petrum i): “One in Nature; and therefore to be to the image of God by imi- essence is the Godhead of the Holy Trinity; and one is the tation of the Divine Nature does not exclude being to the image to which man was made.” And Hilary (De Trin. v) same image by the representation of the Divine Persons: says: “Man is made to the image of that which is common but rather one follows from the other. We must, there- in the Trinity.” Therefore the image of God in man is of fore, say that in man there exists the image of God, both the Divine Essence, and not of the Trinity of Persons. as regards the Divine Nature and as regards the Trinity of Objection 2. Further, it is said (De Eccl. Dogmat.) Persons; for also in God Himself there is one Nature in that the image of God in man is to be referred to eternity. Three Persons. Damascene also says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the im- Thus it is clear how to solve the first two objections. age of God in man belongs to him as “an intelligent being Reply to Objection 3. This argument would avail if endowed with free-will and self-movement.” Gregory of the image of God in man represented God in a perfect Nyssa (De Homin. Opificio xvi) also asserts that, when manner. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 6), there Scripture says that “man was made to the image of God, is a great difference between the trinity within ourselves it means that human nature was made a participator of all and the Divine Trinity. Therefore, as he there says: “We good: for the Godhead is the fulness of goodness.” Now see, rather than believe, the trinity which is in ourselves; all these things belong more to the unity of the Essence whereas we believe rather than see that God is Trinity.” than to the distinction of the Persons. Therefore the im- Reply to Objection 4. Some have said that in man age of God in man regards, not the Trinity of Persons, but there is an image of the Son only. Augustine rejects this the unity of the Essence. opinion (De Trin. xii, 5,6). First, because as the Son is like Objection 3. Further, an image leads to the knowl- to the Father by a likeness of essence, it would follow of edge of that of which it is the image. Therefore, if there is necessity if man were made in likeness to the Son, that he in man the image of God as to the Trinity of Persons; since is made to the likeness of the Father. Secondly, because man can know himself by his natural reason, it follows if man were made only to the image of the Son, the Fa- that by his natural knowledge man could know the Trin- ther would not have said, “Let Us make man to Our own ity of the Divine Persons; which is untrue, as was shown image and likeness”; but “to Thy image.” When, there- above (q. 32, a. 1). fore, it is written, “He made him to the image of God,” Objection 4. Further, the name of Image is not appli- the sense is not that the Father made man to the image of cable to any of the Three Persons, but only to the Son; for the Son only, Who is God, as some explained it, but that Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 2) that “the Son alone is the the Divine Trinity made man to Its image, that is, of the image of the Father.” Therefore, if in man there were an whole Trinity. When it is said that God “made man to His image of God as regards the Person, this would not be an image,” this can be understood in two ways: first, so that image of the Trinity, but only of the Son. this preposition “to” points to the term of the making, and On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): “The plu- then the sense is, “Let Us make man in such a way that rality of the Divine Persons is proved from the fact that Our image may be in him.” Secondly, this preposition ‘to’ man is said to have been made to the image of God.” may point to the exemplar cause, as when we say, “This I answer that, as we have seen (q. 40, a. 2), the dis- book is made (like) to that one.” Thus the image of God tinction of the Divine Persons is only according to origin, is the very Essence of God, Which is incorrectly called an or, rather, relations of origin. Now the mode of origin is image forasmuch as image is put for the exemplar. Or, as not the same in all things, but in each thing is adapted some say, the Divine Essence is called an image because to the nature thereof; animated things being produced in thereby one Person imitates another. one way, and inanimate in another; animals in one way, 479 Whether the image of God is in man as regards the mind only? Ia q. 93 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God is hostile army. not only in man’s mind. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:7) Therefore we may observe this difference between ra- that “the man is the image. . . of God.” But man is not only tional creatures and others, both as to the representation mind. Therefore the image of God is to be observed not of the likeness of the Divine Nature in creatures, and as only in his mind. to the representation in them of the uncreated Trinity. For Objection 2. Further, it is written (Gn. 1:27): “God as to the likeness of the Divine Nature, rational creatures created man to His own image; to the image of God He seem to attain, after a fashion, to the representation of the created him; male and female He created them.” But the species, inasmuch as they imitate God, not only in being distinction of male and female is in the body. Therefore and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained (a. 2); the image of God is also in the body, and not only in the whereas other creatures do not understand, although we mind. observe in them a certain trace of the Intellect that created Objection 3. Further, an image seems to apply prin- them, if we consider their disposition. Likewise as the un- cipally to the shape of a thing. But shape belongs to the created Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the body. Therefore the image of God is to be seen in man’s Word from the Speaker, and of Love from both of these, body also, and not in his mind. as we have seen (q. 28, a. 3); so we may say that in ra- Objection 4. Further, according to Augustine (Gen. tional creatures wherein we find a procession of the word ad lit. xii, 7,24) there is a threefold vision in us, “corpo- in the intellect, and a procession of the love in the will, real,” “spiritual,” or imaginary, and “intellectual.” There- there exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain fore, if in the intellectual vision that belongs to the mind representation of the species. In other creatures, however, there exists in us a trinity by reason of which we are made we do not find the principle of the word, and the word and to the image of God, for the like reason there must be an- love; but we do see in them a certain trace of the existence other trinity in the others. of these in the Cause that produced them. For in the fact On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:23,24): that a creature has a modified and finite nature, proves that “Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the it proceeds from a principle; while its species points to the new man.” Whence we are given to understand that our (mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a house renewal which consists in putting on the new man, be- points to the idea of the architect; and order points to the longs to the mind. Now, he says (Col. 3:10): “Putting on maker’s love by reason of which he directs the effect to a the new” man; “him who is renewed unto knowledge” of good end; as also the use of the house points to the will God, “according to the image of Him that created him,” of the architect. So we find in man a likeness to God by where the renewal which consists in putting on the new way of an “image” in his mind; but in the other parts of man is ascribed to the image of God. Therefore to be to his being by way of a “trace.” the image of God belongs to the mind only. Reply to Objection 1. Man is called to the image of I answer that, While in all creatures there is some God; not that he is essentially an image; but that the im- kind of likeness to God, in the rational creature alone we age of God is impressed on his mind; as a coin is an image find a likeness of “image” as we have explained above of the king, as having the image of the king. Wherefore (Aa. 1,2); whereas in other creatures we find a like- there is no need to consider the image of God as existing ness by way of a “trace.” Now the intellect or mind is in every part of man. that whereby the rational creature excels other creatures; Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Trin. wherefore this image of God is not found even in the xii, 5), some have thought that the image of God was not rational creature except in the mind; while in the other in man individually, but severally. They held that “the parts, which the rational creature may happen to possess, man represents the Person of the Father; those born of we find the likeness of a “trace,” as in other creatures to man denote the person of the Son; and that the woman which, in reference to such parts, the rational creature can is a third person in likeness to the Holy Ghost, since she be likened. We may easily understand the reason of this so proceeded from man as not to be his son or daughter.” if we consider the way in which a “trace,” and the way in All of this is manifestly absurd; first, because it would which an “image,” represents anything. An “image” rep- follow that the Holy Ghost is the principle of the Son, as resents something by likeness in species, as we have said; the woman is the principle of the man’s offspring; sec- while a “trace” represents something by way of an effect, ondly, because one man would be only the image of one which represents the cause in such a way as not to attain to Person; thirdly, because in that case Scripture should not the likeness of species. For imprints which are left by the have mentioned the image of God in man until after the movements of animals are called “traces”: so also ashes birth of the offspring. Therefore we must understand that are a trace of fire, and desolation of the land a trace of a when Scripture had said, “to the image of God He cre- 480 ated him,” it added, “male and female He created them,” which occurs by the impression on the sight of a certain not to imply that the image of God came through the dis- likeness of the said species; thirdly, the intention of the tinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both will applying the sight to see, and to rest on what is seen. sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual Likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to species kept in the memory; secondly, the vision itself, both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sex- which is caused by the penetrative power of the soul, that ual distinction. Wherefore the Apostle (Col. 3:10), after is, the faculty of imagination, informed by the species; saying, “According to the image of Him that created him,” and thirdly, we find the intention of the will joining both added, “Where there is neither male nor female”∗ (Vulg. together. But each of these trinities falls short of the Di- “neither Gentile nor Jew”). vine image. For the species of the external body is ex- Reply to Objection 3. Although the image of God in trinsic to the essence of the soul; while the species in the man is not to be found in his bodily shape, yet because memory, though not extrinsic to the soul, is adventitious “the body of man alone among terrestrial animals is not to it; and thus in both cases the species falls short of rep- inclined prone to the ground, but is adapted to look up- resenting the connaturality and co-eternity of the Divine ward to heaven, for this reason we may rightly say that it Persons. The corporeal vision, too, does not proceed only is made to God’s image and likeness, rather than the bod- from the species of the external body, but from this, and ies of other animals,” as Augustine remarks (QQ. 83, qu. at the same time from the sense of the seer; in like man- 51). But this is not to be understood as though the image ner imaginary vision is not from the species only which is of God were in man’s body; but in the sense that the very preserved in the memory, but also from the imagination. shape of the human body represents the image of God in For these reasons the procession of the Son from the Fa- the soul by way of a trace. ther alone is not suitably represented. Lastly the intention Reply to Objection 4. Both in the corporeal and in the of the will joining the two together, does not proceed from imaginary vision we may find a trinity, as Augustine says them either in corporeal or spiritual vision. Wherefore the (De Trin. xi, 2). For in corporeal vision there is first the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son species of the exterior body; secondly, the act of vision, is not thus properly represented. Whether the image of God is to be found in the acts of the soul? Ia q. 93 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God is the actual vision, whether sensible or imaginative. There- not found in the acts of the soul. For Augustine says (De fore, also, the trinity in the mind, by reason of which man Civ. Dei xi, 26), that “man was made to God’s image, is like to God’s image, must be referred to actual vision. inasmuch as we exist and know that we exist, and love I answer that, As above explained (a. 2), a certain this existence and knowledge.” But to exist does not sig- representation of the species belongs to the nature of an nify an act. Therefore the image of God is not to be found image. Hence, if the image of the Divine Trinity is to be in the soul’s acts. found in the soul, we must look for it where the soul ap- Objection 2. Further, Augustine (De Trin. ix, 4) as- proaches the nearest to a representation of the species of signs God’s image in the soul to these three things—mind, the Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct knowledge, and love. But mind does not signify an act, from each other by reason of the procession of the Word but rather the power or the essence of the intellectual soul. from the Speaker, and the procession of Love connecting Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts of Both. But in our soul word “cannot exist without actual the soul. thought,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 7). Therefore, Objection 3. Further, Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) as- first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be found in signs the image of the Trinity in the soul to “memory, un- the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowl- derstanding, and will.” But these three are “natural powers edge which we possess, by actual thought we form an in- of the soul,” as the Master of the Sentences says (1 Sent. ternal word; and thence break forth into love. But, since D iii). Therefore the image of God is in the powers, and the principles of acts are the habits and powers, and ev- does not extend to the acts of the soul. erything exists virtually in its principle, therefore, secon- Objection 4. Further, the image of the Trinity always darily and consequently, the image of the Trinity may be remains in the soul. But an act does not always remain. considered as existing in the powers, and still more in the Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts. habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist therein. On the contrary, Augustine (De Trin. xi, 2 seqq.) as- Reply to Objection 1. Our being bears the image of signs the trinity in the lower part of the soul, in relation to God so far as if is proper to us, and excels that of the other ∗ these words are in reality from Gal. 3:28 481 animals, that is to say, in so far as we are endowed with that whereby we understand with actual thought; and by a mind. Therefore, this trinity is the same as that which will, love, or dilection I mean that which unites this child Augustine mentions (De Trin. ix, 4), and which consists with its parent.” From which it is clear that he places the in mind, knowledge, and love. image of the Divine Trinity more in actual understanding Reply to Objection 2. Augustine observed this trin- and will, than in these as existing in the habitual retention ity, first, as existing in the mind. But because the mind, of the memory; although even thus the image of the Trin- though it knows itself entirely in a certain degree, yet also ity exists in the soul in a certain degree, as he says in the in a way does not know itself—namely, as being distinct same place. Thus it is clear that memory, understanding, from others (and thus also it searches itself, as Augus- and will are not three powers as stated in the Sentences. tine subsequently proves—De Trin. x, 3,4); therefore, as Reply to Objection 4. Someone might answer by re- though knowledge were not in equal proportion to mind, ferring to Augustine’s statement (De Trin. xiv, 6), that he takes three things in the soul which are proper to the “the mind ever remembers itself, ever understands itself, mind, namely, memory, understanding, and will; which ever loves itself”; which some take to mean that the soul everyone is conscious of possessing; and assigns the im- ever actually understands, and loves itself. But he ex- age of the Trinity pre-eminently to these three, as though cludes this interpretation by adding that “it does not al- the first assignation were in part deficient. ways think of itself as actually distinct from other things.” Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine proves (De Trin. Thus it is clear that the soul always understands and loves xiv, 7), we may be said to understand, will, and to love itself, not actually but habitually; though we might say certain things, both when we actually consider them, and that by perceiving its own act, it understands itself when- when we do not thing of them. When they are not under ever it understands anything. But since it is not always our actual consideration, they are objects of our memory actually understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must only, which, in his opinion, is nothing else than habitual say that these acts, although not always actually existing, retention of knowledge and love∗. “But since,” as he says, yet ever exist in their principles, the habits and powers. “a word cannot be there without actual thought (for we Wherefore, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 4): “If the ra- think everything that we say, even if we speak with that tional soul is made to the image of God in the sense that interior word belonging to no nation’s tongue), this im- it can make use of reason and intellect to understand and age chiefly consists in these three things, memory, under- consider God, then the image of God was in the soul from standing, and will. And by understanding I mean here the beginning of its existence.” Whether the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul only by comparison with God Ia q. 93 a. 8 as its object? Objection 1. It would seem that the image of the Di- perfectly conformed to the image of God by the beatific vine Trinity is in the soul not only by comparison with vision; wherefore it is written (2 Cor. 3:18): “We. . . are God as its object. For the image of the Divine Trinity is to transformed into the same image from glory to glory.” But be found in the soul, as shown above (a. 7), according as temporal things are known by the beatific vision. There- the word in us proceeds from the speaker; and love from fore the image of God exists in us even according to tem- both. But this is to be found in us as regards any object. poral things. Therefore the image of the Divine Trinity is in our mind On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 12): as regards any object. “The image of God exists in the mind, not because it has a Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, remembrance of itself, loves itself, and understands itself; 4) that “when we seek trinity in the soul, we seek it in but because it can also remember, understand, and love the whole of the soul, without separating the process of God by Whom it was made.” Much less, therefore, is the reasoning in temporal matters from the consideration of image of God in the soul, in respect of other objects. things eternal.” Therefore the image of the Trinity is to be I answer that, As above explained (Aa. 2,7), image found in the soul, even as regards temporal objects. means a likeness which in some degree, however small, Objection 3. Further, it is by grace that we can know attains to a representation of the species. Wherefore we and love God. If, therefore, the image of the Trinity is need to seek in the image of the Divine Trinity in the soul found in the soul by reason of the memory, understand- some kind of representation of species of the Divine Per- ing, and will or love of God, this image is not in man by sons, so far as this is possible to a creature. Now the Di- nature but by grace, and thus is not common to all. vine Persons, as above stated (Aa. 6,7), are distinguished Objection 4. Further, the saints in heaven are most from each other according to the procession of the word ∗ Cf. q. 79, a. 7, ad 1 482 from the speaker, and the procession of love from both. things, “any third thing should be required to make up the Moreover the Word of God is born of God by the knowl- trinity,” as he adds in the same passage. But in that part of edge of Himself; and Love proceeds from God according the reason which is concerned with temporal things, “al- as He loves Himself. But it is clear that diversity of ob- though a trinity may be found; yet the image of God is jects diversifies the species of word and love; for in the not to be seen there,” as he says farther on; forasmuch as human mind the species of a stone is specifically different this knowledge of temporal things is adventitious to the from that of a horse, which also the love regarding each of soul. Moreover even the habits whereby temporal things them is specifically different. Hence we refer the Divine are known are not always present; but sometimes they are image in man to the verbal concept born of the knowl- actually present, and sometimes present only in memory edge of God, and to the love derived therefrom. Thus the even after they begin to exist in the soul. Such is clearly image of God is found in the soul according as the soul the case with faith, which comes to us temporally for this turns to God, or possesses a nature that enables it to turn present life; while in the future life faith will no longer to God. Now the mind may turn towards an object in two exist, but only the remembrance of faith. ways: directly and immediately, or indirectly and medi- Reply to Objection 3. The meritorious knowledge ately; as, for instance, when anyone sees a man reflected and love of God can be in us only by grace. Yet there is a in a looking-glass he may be said to be turned towards that certain natural knowledge and love as seen above (q. 12, man. So Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 8), the “the mind a. 12; q. 56, a. 3; q. 60, a. 5). This, too, is natural that the remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If mind, in order to understand God, can make use of rea- we perceive this, we perceive a trinity, not, indeed, God, son, in which sense we have already said that the image but, nevertheless, rightly called the image of God.” But of God abides ever in the soul; “whether this image of God this is due to the fact, not that the mind reflects on itself be so obsolete,” as it were clouded, “as almost to amount absolutely, but that thereby it can furthermore turn to God, to nothing,” as in those who have not the use of reason; as appears from the authority quoted above (Arg. On the “or obscured and disfigured,” as in sinners; or “clear and contrary). beautiful,” as in the just; as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, Reply to Objection 1. For the notion of an image it 6). is not enough that something proceed from another, but Reply to Objection 4. By the vision of glory tempo- it is also necessary to observe what proceeds and whence ral things will be seen in God Himself; and such a vision it proceeds; namely, that what is Word of God proceeds of things temporal will belong to the image of God. This from knowledge of God. is what Augustine means (De Trin. xiv, 6), when he says Reply to Objection 2. In all the soul we may see a that “in that nature to which the mind will blissfully ad- kind of trinity, not, however, as though besides the ac- here, whatever it sees it will see as unchangeable”; for in tion of temporal things and the contemplation of eternal the Uncreated Word are the types of all creatures. Whether “likeness” is properly distinguished from “image”? Ia q. 93 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that “likeness” is not D, xvi) “that the image is taken from the memory, the un- properly distinguished from “image.” For “genus” is not derstanding and the will, while the likeness is from inno- properly distinguished from “species.” Now, “likeness” is cence and righteousness.” to “image” as genus to species: because, “where there is Objection 4. Further, knowledge of truth belongs to image, forthwith there is likeness, but not conversely” as the intellect, and love of virtue to the will; which two Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74). Therefore “likeness” is things are parts of the image. Therefore it is incorrect not properly to be distinguished from “image.” to say (Sent. ii, D, xvi) that “the image consists in the Objection 2. Further, the nature of the image consists knowledge of truth, and the likeness in the love of virtue.” not only in the representation of the Divine Persons, but On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51): also in the representation of the Divine Essence, to which “Some consider that these two were mentioned not with- representation belong immortality and indivisibility. So it out reason, namely “image” and “likeness,” since, if they is not true to say that the “likeness is in the essence be- meant the same, one would have sufficed.” cause it is immortal and indivisible; whereas the image is I answer that, Likeness is a kind of unity, for one- in other things” (Sent. ii, D, xvi). ness in quality causes likeness, as the Philosopher says Objection 3. Further, the image of God in man is (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 15). Now, since “one” is a tran- threefold—the image of nature, of grace, and of glory, as scendental, it is both common to all, and adapted to each above explained (a. 4). But innocence and righteousness single thing, just as the good and the true. Wherefore, as belong to grace. Therefore it is incorrectly said (Sent. ii, the good can be compared to each individual thing both as 483 its preamble, and as subsequent to it, as signifying some fying the expression and perfection of the image. In this perfection in it, so also in the same way there exists a kind sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the im- of comparison between “likeness” and “image.” For the age implies “an intelligent being, endowed with free-will good is a preamble to man, inasmuch as man is an indi- and self-movement, whereas likeness implies a likeness of vidual good; and, again, the good is subsequent to man, power, as far as this may be possible in man.” In the same inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he is good, sense “likeness” is said to belong to “the love of virtue”: by reason of his perfect virtue. In like manner, likeness for there is no virtue without love of virtue. may be considered in the light of a preamble to image, Reply to Objection 1. “Likeness” is not distinct from inasmuch as it is something more general than image, as “image” in the general notion of “likeness” (for thus it is we have said above (a. 1): and, again, it may be consid- included in “image”); but so far as any “likeness” falls ered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as it signifies a short of “image,” or again, as it perfects the idea of “im- certain perfection of image. For we say that an image is age.” like or unlike what it represents, according as the repre- Reply to Objection 2. The soul’s essence belongs to sentation is perfect or imperfect. Thus likeness may be the “image,” as representing the Divine Essence in those distinguished from image in two ways: first as its pream- things which belong to the intellectual nature; but not in ble and existing in more things, and in this sense like- those conditions subsequent to general notions of being, ness regards things which are more common than the in- such as simplicity and indissolubility. tellectual properties, wherein the image is properly to be Reply to Objection 3. Even certain virtues are natural seen. In this sense it is stated (QQ. 83, qu. 51) that “the to the soul, at least, in their seeds, by reason of which we spirit” (namely, the mind) without doubt was made to the may say that a natural “likeness” exists in the soul. Nor it image of God. “But the other parts of man,” belonging is unfitting to us the term “image” from one point of view to the soul’s inferior faculties, or even to the body, “are and from another the term “likeness.” in the opinion of some made to God’s likeness.” In this Reply to Objection 4. Love of the word, which is sense he says (De Quant. Animae ii) that the likeness of knowledge loved, belongs to the nature of “image”; but God is found in the soul’s incorruptibility; for corrupt- love of virtue belongs to “likeness,” as virtue itself be- ible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings. longs to likeness. But likeness may be considered in another way, as signi- 484 FIRST PART, QUESTION 94 Of the State and Condition of the First Man As Regards His Intellect (In Four Articles) We next consider the state or condition of the first man; first, as regards his soul; secondly, as regards his body. Concerning the first there are two things to be considered: (1) The condition of man as to his intellect; (2) the condition of man as to his will. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the first man saw the Essence of God? (2) Whether he could see the separate substances, that is, the angels? (3) Whether he possessed all knowledge? (4) Whether he could err or be deceived? Whether the first man saw God through His Essence? Ia q. 94 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the first man saw it, and shuns unhappiness. Wherefore no one who sees the God through His Essence. For man’s happiness consists Essence of God can willingly turn away from God, which in the vision of the Divine Essence. But the first man, means to sin. Hence all who see God through His Essence “while established in paradise, led a life of happiness in are so firmly established in the love of God, that for eter- the enjoyment of all things,” as Damascene says (De Fide nity they can never sin. Therefore, as Adam did sin, it is Orth. ii, 11). And Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, clear that he did not see God through His Essence. 10): “If man was gifted with the same tastes as now, how Nevertheless he knew God with a more perfect knowl- happy must he have been in paradise, that place of inef- edge than we do now. Thus in a sense his knowledge was fable happiness!” Therefore the first man in paradise saw midway between our knowledge in the present state, and God through His Essence. the knowledge we shall have in heaven, when we see God Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei through His Essence. To make this clear, we must con- xiv, loc. cit.) that “the first man lacked nothing which sider that the vision of God through His Essence is con- his good-will might obtain.” But our good-will can ob- tradistinguished from the vision of God through His crea- tain nothing better than the vision of the Divine Essence. tures. Now the higher the creature is, and the more like Therefore man saw God through His Essence. it is to God, the more clearly is God seen in it; for in- Objection 3. Further, the vision of God is His Essence stance, a man is seen more clearly through a mirror in is whereby God is seen without a medium or enigma. But which his image is the more clearly expressed. Thus God man in the state of innocence “saw God immediately,” as is seen in a much more perfect manner through His in- the Master of the Sentences asserts (Sent. iv, D, i). He also telligible effects than through those which are only sensi- saw without an enigma, for an enigma implies obscurity, ble or corporeal. But in his present state man is impeded as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 9). Now, obscurity re- as regards the full and clear consideration of intelligible sulted from sin. Therefore man in the primitive state saw creatures, because he is distracted by and occupied with God through His Essence. sensible things. Now, it is written (Eccles. 7:30): “God On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46): made man right.” And man was made right by God in this “That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is sense, that in him the lower powers were subjected to the natural.” But to see God through His Essence is most spir- higher, and the higher nature was made so as not to be itual. Therefore the first man in the primitive state of his impeded by the lower. Wherefore the first man was not natural life did not see God through His Essence. impeded by exterior things from a clear and steady con- I answer that, The first man did not see God through templation of the intelligible effects which he perceived His Essence if we consider the ordinary state of that life; by the radiation of the first truth, whether by a natural or unless, perhaps, it be said that he saw God in a vision, by a gratuitous knowledge. Hence Augustine says (Gen. when “God cast a deep sleep upon Adam” (Gn. 2:21). The ad lit. xi, 33) that, “perhaps God used to speak to the first reason is because, since in the Divine Essence is beatitude man as He speaks to the angels; by shedding on his mind itself, the intellect of a man who sees the Divine Essence a ray of the unchangeable truth, yet without bestowing on has the same relation to God as a man has to beatitude. him the experience of which the angels are capable in the Now it is clear that man cannot willingly be turned away participation of the Divine Essence.” Therefore, through from beatitude, since naturally and necessarily he desires these intelligible effects of God, man knew God then more 485 clearly than we know Him now. something unknown; such as the medium in a demonstra- Reply to Objection 1. Man was happy in paradise, tion. God was seen without this second kind of medium, but not with that perfect happiness to which he was des- but not without the first kind. For there was no need for the tined, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. first man to attain to the knowledge of God by demonstra- He was, however, endowed with “a life of happiness in a tion drawn from an effect, such as we need; since he knew certain measure,” as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 18), God simultaneously in His effects, especially in the intel- so far as he was gifted with natural integrity and perfec- ligible effects, according to His capacity. Again, we must tion. remark that the obscurity which is implied in the word Reply to Objection 2. A good will is a well-ordered enigma may be of two kinds: first, so far as every creature will; but the will of the first man would have been ill- is something obscure when compared with the immensity ordered had he wished to have, while in the state of merit, of the Divine light; and thus Adam saw God in an enigma, what had been promised to him as a reward. because he saw Him in a created effect: secondly, we may Reply to Objection 3. A medium (of knowledge) is take obscurity as an effect of sin, so far as man is impeded twofold; one through which, and, at the same time, in in the consideration of intelligible things by being preoc- which, something is seen, as, for example, a man is seen cupied with sensible things; in which sense Adam did not through a mirror, and is seen with the mirror: another kind see God in an enigma. of medium is that whereby we attain to the knowledge of Whether Adam in the state of innocence saw the angels through their essence? Ia q. 94 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Adam, in the state with integrity as to this life, in that the body was entirely of innocence, saw the angels through their essence. For subject to the soul, hindering it in no way, as we have said Gregory says (Dialog. iv, 1): “In paradise man was accus- above (a. 1). Now it is clear from what has been already tomed to enjoy the words of God; and by purity of heart said (q. 84, a. 7; q. 85, a. 1; q. 89, a. 1) that since the and loftiness of vision to have the company of the good soul is adapted to perfect and govern the body, as regards angels.” animal life, it is fitting that it should have that mode of un- Objection 2. Further, the soul in the present state is derstanding which is by turning to phantasms. Wherefore impeded from the knowledge of separate substances by this mode of understanding was becoming to the soul of union with a corruptible body which “is a load upon the the first man also. soul,” as is written Wis. 9:15. Wherefore the separate soul Now, in virtue of this mode of understanding, there can see separate substances, as above explained (q. 89, are three degrees of movement in the soul, as Dionysius a. 2). But the body of the first man was not a load upon says (Div. Nom. iv). The first is by the soul “passing his soul; for the latter was not corruptible. Therefore he from exterior things to concentrate its powers on itself”; was able to see separate substances. the second is by the soul ascending “so as to be associ- Objection 3. Further, one separate substance knows ated with the united superior powers,” namely the angels; another separate substance, by knowing itself (De Causis the third is when the soul is “led on” yet further “to the xiii). But the soul of the first man knew itself. Therefore supreme good,” that is, to God. it knew separate substances. In virtue of the first movement of the soul from ex- On the contrary, The soul of Adam was of the same terior things to itself, the soul’s knowledge is perfected. nature as ours. But our souls cannot now understand sep- This is because the intellectual operation of the soul has arate substances. Therefore neither could Adam’s soul. a natural order to external things, as we have said above I answer that, The state of the human soul may be dis- (q. 87, a. 3): and so by the knowledge thereof, our intellec- tinguished in two ways. First, from a diversity of mode in tual operation can be known perfectly, as an act through its natural existence; and in this point the state of the sep- its object. And through the intellectual operation itself, arate soul is distinguished from the state of the soul joined the human intellect can be known perfectly, as a power to the body. Secondly, the state of the soul is distinguished through its proper act. But in the second movement we do in relation to integrity and corruption, the state of natural not find perfect knowledge. Because, since the angel does existence remaining the same: and thus the state of inno- not understand by turning to phantasms, but by a far more cence is distinct from the state of man after sin. For man’s excellent process, as we have said above (q. 55, a. 2); the soul, in the state of innocence, was adapted to perfect and above-mentioned mode of knowledge, by which the soul govern the body; wherefore the first man is said to have knows itself, is not sufficient to lead it to the knowledge been made into a “living soul”; that is, a soul giving life of an angel. Much less does the third movement lead to to the body—namely animal life. But he was endowed perfect knowledge: for even the angels themselves, by the 486 fact that they know themselves, are not able to arrive at Reply to Objection 2. That the soul of the first man the knowledge of the Divine Substance, by reason of its fell short of the knowledge regarding separate substances, surpassing excellence. Therefore the soul of the first man was not owing to the fact that the body was a load upon could not see the angels in their essence. Nevertheless he it; but to the fact that its connatural object fell short of had a more excellent mode of knowledge regarding the the excellence of separate substances. We, in our present angels than we possess, because his knowledge of intelli- state, fall short on account of both these reasons. gible things within him was more certain and fixed than Reply to Objection 3. The soul of the first man was our knowledge. And it was on account of this excellence not able to arrive at knowledge of separate substances by of knowledge that Gregory says that “he enjoyed the com- means of its self-knowledge, as we have shown above; pany of the angelic spirits.” for even each separate substance knows others in its own This makes clear the reply to the first objection. measure. Whether the first man knew all things? Ia q. 94 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the first man did not state, as regards his body, for the work of generation, so know all things. For if he had such knowledge it would also was his soul established in a perfect state to instruct be either by acquired species, or by connatural species, or and govern others. by infused species. Not, however, by acquired species; for Now no one can instruct others unless he has knowl- this kind of knowledge is acquired by experience, as stated edge, and so the first man was established by God in such in Metaph. i, 1; and the first man had not then gained a manner as to have knowledge of all those things for experience of all things. Nor through connatural species, which man has a natural aptitude. And such are what- because he was of the same nature as we are; and our soul, ever are virtually contained in the first self-evident princi- as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4), is “like a clean tablet ples, that is, whatever truths man is naturally able to know. on which nothing is written.” And if his knowledge came Moreover, in order to direct his own life and that of oth- by infused species, it would have been of a different kind ers, man needs to know not only those things which can be from ours, which we acquire from things themselves. naturally known, but also things surpassing natural knowl- Objection 2. Further, individuals of the same species edge; because the life of man is directed to a supernatural have the same way of arriving at perfection. Now other end: just as it is necessary for us to know the truths of faith men have not, from the beginning, knowledge of all in order to direct our own lives. Wherefore the first man things, but they acquire it in the course of time accord- was endowed with such a knowledge of these supernatu- ing to their capacity. Therefore neither did Adam know ral truths as was necessary for the direction of human life all things when he was first created. in that state. But those things which cannot be known by Objection 3. Further, the present state of life is given merely human effort, and which are not necessary for the to man in order that his soul may advance in knowledge direction of human life, were not known by the first man; and merit; indeed, the soul seems to be united to the body such as the thoughts of men, future contingent events, and for that purpose. Now man would have advanced in merit some individual facts, as for instance the number of peb- in that state of life; therefore also in knowledge. Therefore bles in a stream; and the like. he was not endowed with knowledge of all things. Reply to Objection 1. The first man had knowledge On the contrary, Man named the animals (Gn. 2:20). of all things by divinely infused species. Yet his knowl- But names should be adapted to the nature of things. edge was not different from ours; as the eyes which Christ Therefore Adam knew the animals’ natures; and in like gave to the man born blind were not different from those manner he was possessed of the knowledge of all other given by nature. things. Reply to Objection 2. To Adam, as being the first I answer that, In the natural order, perfection comes man, was due to a degree of perfection which was not due before imperfection, as act precedes potentiality; for to other men, as is clear from what is above explained. whatever is in potentiality is made actual only by some- Reply to Objection 3. Adam would have advanced in thing actual. And since God created things not only for natural knowledge, not in the number of things known, but their own existence, but also that they might be the prin- in the manner of knowing; because what he knew specula- ciples of other things; so creatures were produced in their tively he would subsequently have known by experience. perfect state to be the principles as regards others. Now But as regards supernatural knowledge, he would also man can be the principle of another man, not only by gen- have advanced as regards the number of things known, eration of the body, but also by instruction and govern- by further revelation; as the angels advance by further en- ment. Hence, as the first man was produced in his perfect lightenment. Moreover there is no comparison between 487 advance in knowledge and advance in merit; since one can be to another a principle of knowledge. man cannot be a principle of merit to another, although he Whether man in his first state could be deceived? Ia q. 94 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that man in his primi- (Ethic. vi, 2). So that, as long as the state of innocence tive state could have been deceived. For the Apostle says continued, it was impossible for the human intellect to as- (1 Tim. 2:14) that “the woman being seduced was in the sent to falsehood as if it were truth. For as some perfec- transgression.” tions, such as clarity, were lacking in the bodily members Objection 2. Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxi) of the first man, though no evil could be therein; so there that, “the woman was not frightened at the serpent speak- could be in his intellect the absence of some knowledge, ing, because she thought that he had received the faculty but no false opinion. of speech from God.” But this was untrue. Therefore be- This is clear also from the very rectitude of the prim- fore sin the woman was deceived. itive state, by virtue of which, while the soul remained Objection 3. Further, it is natural that the farther off subject to God, the lower faculties in man were subject to anything is from us, the smaller it seems to be. Now, the higher, and were no impediment to their action. And the nature of the eyes is not changed by sin. Therefore from what has preceded (q. 85, a. 6), it is clear that as re- this would have been the case in the state of innocence. gards its proper object the intellect is ever true; and hence Wherefore man would have been deceived in the size of it is never deceived of itself; but whatever deception oc- what he saw, just as he is deceived now. curs must be ascribed to some lower faculty, such as the Objection 4. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, imagination or the like. Hence we see that when the natu- 2) that, in sleep the soul adheres to the images of things ral power of judgment is free we are not deceived by such as if they were the things themselves. But in the state of images, but only when it is not free, as is the case in sleep. innocence man would have eaten and consequently have Therefore it is clear that the rectitude of the primitive state slept and dreamed. Therefore he would have been de-was incompatible with deception of the intellect. ceived, adhering to images as to realities. Reply to Objection 1. Though the woman was de- Objection 5. Further, the first man would have been ceived before she sinned in deed, still it was not till she ignorant of other men’s thoughts, and of future contingent had already sinned by interior pride. For Augustine says events, as stated above (a. 3). So if anyone had told him (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that “the woman could not have be- what was false about these things, he would have been lieved the words of the serpent, had she not already acqui- deceived. esced in the love of her own power, and in a presumption On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, of self-conceit.” 18): “To regard what is true as false, is not natural to man Reply to Objection 2. The woman thought that the as created; but is a punishment of man condemned.” serpent had received this faculty, not as acting in accor- I answer that, in the opinion of some, deception may dance with nature, but by virtue of some supernatural op- mean two things; namely, any slight surmise, in which one eration. We need not, however, follow the Master of the adheres to what is false, as though it were true, but without Sentences in this point. the assent of belief—or it may mean a firm belief. Thus Reply to Objection 3. Were anything presented to before sin Adam could not be deceived in either of these the imagination or sense of the first man, not in accor- ways as regards those things to which his knowledge ex- dance with the nature of things, he would not have been tended; but as regards things to which his knowledge did deceived, for his reason would have enabled him to judge not extend, he might have been deceived, if we take decep- the truth. tion in the wide sense of the term for any surmise without Reply to Objection 4. A man is not accountable for assent of belief. This opinion was held with the idea that what occurs during sleep; as he has not then the use of his it is not derogatory to man to entertain a false opinion in reason, wherein consists man’s proper action. such matters, and that provided he does not assent rashly, Reply to Objection 5. If anyone had said something he is not to be blamed. untrue as regards future contingencies, or as regards se- Such an opinion, however, is not fitting as regards the cret thoughts, man in the primitive state would not have integrity of the primitive state of life; because, as Augus- believed it was so: but he might have believed that such a tine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), in that state of life “sin was thing was possible; which would not have been to enter-avoided without struggle, and while it remained so, no evil tain a false opinion. could exist.” Now it is clear that as truth is the good of the It might also be said that he would have been divinely intellect, so falsehood is its evil, as the Philosopher says guided from above, so as not to be deceived in a matter to 488 which his knowledge did not extend. reply that man had already sinned in his heart, and that he If any object, as some do, that he was not guided, when failed to have recourse to the Divine aid. tempted, though he was then most in need of guidance, we 489 FIRST PART, QUESTION 95 Of Things Pertaining to the First Man’s Will—Namely, Grace and Righteousness (In Four Articles) We next consider what belongs to the will of the first man; concerning which there are two points of treatment: (1) the grace and righteousness of the first man; (2) the use of righteousness as regards his dominion over other things. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the first man was created in grace? (2) Whether in the state of innocence he had passions of the soul? (3) Whether he had all virtues? (4) Whether what he did would have been as meritorious as now? Whether the first man was created in grace? Ia q. 95 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the first man was not I answer that, Some say that man was not created in created in grace. For the Apostle, distinguishing between grace; but that it was bestowed on him subsequently be- Adam and Christ, says (1 Cor. 15:45): “The first Adam fore sin: and many authorities of the Saints declare that was made into a living soul; the last Adam into a quicken- man possessed grace in the state of innocence. ing spirit.” But the spirit is quickened by grace. Therefore But the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith Christ alone was made in grace. man was endowed by God, seems to require that, as oth- Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et ers say, he was created in grace, according to Eccles. 7:30, Nov. Test., qu. 123)∗ that “Adam did not possess the “God made man right.” For this rectitude consisted in his Holy Ghost.” But whoever possesses grace has the Holy reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, Ghost. Therefore Adam was not created in grace. and the body to the soul: and the first subjection was the Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Correp. et cause of both the second and the third; since while reason Grat. x) that “God so ordered the life of the angels and was subject to God, the lower powers remained subject to men, as to show first what they could do by free-will, then reason, as Augustine says†. Now it is clear that such a what they could do by His grace, and by the discernment subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower pow- of righteousness.” God thus first created men and angels ers to reason, was not from nature; otherwise it would in the state of natural free-will only; and afterwards be- have remained after sin; since even in the demons the nat- stowed grace on them. ural gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declared (Div. Objection 4. Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, Nom. iv). Hence it is clear that also the primitive sub- xxiv): “When man was created he was given sufficient jection by virtue of which reason was subject to God, was help to stand, but not sufficient to advance.” But whoever not a merely natural gift, but a supernatural endowment has grace can advance by merit. Therefore the first man of grace; for it is not possible that the effect should be of was not created in grace. greater efficiency than the cause. Hence Augustine says Objection 5. Further, the reception of grace requires (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13) that, “as soon as they disobeyed the the consent of the recipient, since thereby a kind of spiri- Divine command, and forfeited Divine grace, they were tual marriage takes place between God and the soul. But ashamed of their nakedness, for they felt the impulse of consent presupposes existence. Therefore man did not re- disobedience in the flesh, as though it were a punishment ceive grace in the first moment of his creation. corresponding to their own disobedience.” Hence if the Objection 6. Further, nature is more distant from loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the grace than grace is from glory, which is but grace con- soul, we may gather that the inferior powers were sub- summated. But in man grace precedes glory. Therefore jected to the soul through grace existing therein. much more did nature precede grace. Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle in these words On the contrary, Man and angel are both ordained to means to show that there is a spiritual body, if there is an grace. But the angels were created in grace, for Augustine animal body, inasmuch as the spiritual life of the body be- says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9): “God at the same time fashioned gan in Christ, who is “the firstborn of the dead,” as the their nature and endowed them with grace.” Therefore body’s animal life began in Adam. From the Apostle’s man also was created in grace. words, therefore, we cannot gather that Adam had no spir- ∗ Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine † Cf. De Civ. Dei xiii, 13; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 16 490 itual life in his soul; but that he had not spiritual life as Reply to Objection 4. The Master here speaks ac-regards the body. cording to the opinion of those who held that man was not Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says in the same created in grace, but only in a state of nature. We may passage, it is not disputed that Adam, like other just souls, also say that, though man was created in grace, yet it was was in some degree gifted with the Holy Ghost; but “he not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created that he did not possess the Holy Ghost, as the faithful possess could advance by merit, but by virtue of the grace which Him now,” who are admitted to eternal happiness directly was added. after death. Reply to Objection 5. As the motion of the will is not Reply to Objection 3. This passage from Augustine continuous there is nothing against the first man having does not assert that angels or men were created with nat- consented to grace even in the first moment of his exis- ural free-will before they possessed grace; but that God tence. shows first what their free-will could do before being con- Reply to Objection 6. We merit glory by an act of firmed in grace, and what they acquired afterwards by be- grace; but we do not merit grace by an act of nature; hence ing so confirmed. the comparison fails. Whether passions existed in the soul of the first man? Ia q. 95 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the first man’s soul be possessed then, as burning concupiscence. But those had no passions. For by the passions of the soul “the flesh passions which regard present good, as joy and love; or lusteth against the spirit” (Gal. 5:7). But this did not hap- which regard future good to be had at the proper time, as pen in the state of innocence. Therefore in the state of desire and hope that casteth not down, existed in the state innocence there were no passions of the soul. of innocence; otherwise, however, than as they exist in Objection 2. Further, Adam’s soul was nobler than ourselves. For our sensual appetite, wherein the passions his body. But his body was impassible. Therefore no pas- reside, is not entirely subject to reason; hence at times our sions were in his soul. passions forestall and hinder reason’s judgment; at other Objection 3. Further, the passions of the soul are re- times they follow reason’s judgment, accordingly as the strained by the moral virtues. But in Adam the moral sensual appetite obeys reason to some extent. But in the virtues were perfect. Therefore the passions were entirely state of innocence the inferior appetite was wholly sub- excluded from him. ject to reason: so that in that state the passions of the soul On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason. 10) that “in our first parents there was undisturbed love of Reply to Objection 1. The flesh lusts against the spirit God,” and other passions of the soul. by the rebellion of the passions against reason; which I answer that, The passions of the soul are in the could not occur in the state of innocence. sensual appetite, the object of which is good and evil. Reply to Objection 2. The human body was impassi- Wherefore some passions of the soul are directed to what ble in the state of innocence as regards the passions which is good, as love and joy; others to what is evil, as fear and alter the disposition of nature, as will be explained later on sorrow. And since in the primitive state, evil was neither (q. 97, a. 2); likewise the soul was impassible as regards present nor imminent, nor was any good wanting which the passions which impede the free use of reason. a good-will could desire to have then, as Augustine says Reply to Objection 3. Perfection of moral virtue does (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), therefore Adam had no passion with not wholly take away the passions, but regulates them; for evil as its object; such as fear, sorrow, and the like; neither the temperate man desires as he ought to desire, and what had he passions in respect of good not possessed, but to he ought to desire, as stated in Ethic. iii, 11. Whether Adam had all the virtues? Ia q. 95 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Adam had not all the the passions which have evil as their object; as meekness virtues. For some virtues are directed to curb passions: with anger; fortitude with fear. But these passions did thus immoderate concupiscence is restrained by temper- not exist in the state of innocence, as stated above (a. 2). ance, and immoderate fear by fortitude. But in the state Therefore neither did those virtues exist then. of innocence no immoderation existed in the passions. Objection 3. Further, penance is a virtue that regards Therefore neither did these virtues then exist. sin committed. Mercy, too, is a virtue concerned with un- Objection 2. Further, some virtues are concerned with happiness. But in the state of innocence neither sin nor 491 unhappiness existed. Therefore neither did those virtues virtues existed as habits in the first man, but not as to their exist. acts; for he was so disposed that he would repent, if there Objection 4. Further, perseverance is a virtue. But had been a sin to repent for; and had he seen unhappiness Adam possessed it not; as proved by his subsequent sin. in his neighbor, he would have done his best to remedy Therefore he possessed not every virtue. it. This is in accordance with what the Philosopher says, Objection 5. Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not “Shame, which regards what is ill done, may be found in a exist in the state of innocence; for it implies an obscurity virtuous man, but only conditionally; as being so disposed of knowledge which seems to be incompatible with the that he would be ashamed if he did wrong” (Ethic. iv, 9). perfection of the primitive state. Reply to Objection 1. It is accidental to temperance On the contrary, Augustine says, in a homily (Serm. and fortitude to subdue superabundant passion, in so far contra Judaeos): “The prince of sin overcame Adam who as they are in a subject which happens to have superabun- was made from the slime of the earth to the image of God, dant passions, and yet those virtues are ‘per se’ competent adorned with modesty, restrained by temperance, reful- to moderate the passions. gent with brightness.” Reply to Objection 2. Passions which have evil for I answer that, in the state of innocence man in a cer- their object were incompatible with the perfection of the tain sense possessed all the virtues; and this can be proved primitive state, if that evil be in the one affected by the from what precedes. For it was shown above (a. 1) that passion; such as fear and sorrow. But passions which re- such was the rectitude of the primitive state, that reason late to evil in another are not incompatible with the perfec- was subject to God, and the lower powers to reason. Now tion of the primitive state; for in that state man could hate the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby rea- the demons’ malice, as he could love God’s goodness. son is directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated Thus the virtues which relate to such passions could exist according to the dictate of reason, as will be explained in in the primitive state, in habit and in act. Virtues, how- the Treatise on the Virtues ( Ia IIae, q. 63, a. 2). Where- ever, relating to passions which regard evil in the same fore the rectitude of the primitive state required that man subject, if relating to such passions only, could not exist should in a sense possess every virtue. in the primitive state in act, but only in habit, as we have It must, however, be noted that some virtues of their said above of penance and of mercy. But other virtues very nature do not involve imperfection, such as charity there are which have relation not to such passions only, and justice; and these virtues did exist in the primitive but to others; such as temperance, which relates not only state absolutely, both in habit and in act. But other virtues to sorrow, but also to joy; and fortitude, which relates not are of such a nature as to imply imperfection either in their only to fear, but also to daring and hope. Thus the act of act, or on the part of the matter. If such imperfection be temperance could exist in the primitive state, so far as it consistent with the perfection of the primitive state, such moderates pleasure; and in like manner, fortitude, as mod- virtues necessarily existed in that state; as faith, which is erating daring and hope, but not as moderating sorrow and of things not seen, and hope which is of things not yet fear. possessed. For the perfection of that state did not extend Reply to Objection 3. appears from what has been to the vision of the Divine Essence, and the possession said above. of God with the enjoyment of final beatitude. Hence faith Reply to Objection 4. Perseverance may be taken in and hope could exist in the primitive state, both as to habit two ways: in one sense as a particular virtue, signifying and as to act. But any virtue which implies imperfection a habit whereby a man makes a choice of persevering in incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, good; in that sense Adam possessed perseverance. In an- could exist in that state as a habit, but not as to the act; other sense it is taken as a circumstance of virtue; sig- for instance, penance, which is sorrow for sin commit- nifying a certain uninterrupted continuation of virtue; in ted; and mercy, which is sorrow for others’ unhappiness; which sense Adam did not possess perseverance. because sorrow, guilt, and unhappiness are incompatible Reply to Objection 5. appears from what has been with the perfection of the primitive state. Wherefore such said above. Whether the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are? Ia q. 95 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the actions of the grace is more copiously poured out upon us; and since first man were less meritorious than ours are. For grace is grace is the source of merit, our actions are more merito- given to us through the mercy of God, Who succors most rious. those who are most in need. Now we are more in need of Objection 2. Further, struggle and difficulty are re- grace than was man in the state of innocence. Therefore quired for merit; for it is written (2 Tim. 2:5): “He. . . is 492 not crowned except he strive lawfully” and the Philoso-because, as man would have had greater virtue, he would pher says (Ethic. ii, 3): “The object of virtue is the diffi- have performed greater works. But if we consider the pro- cult and the good.” But there is more strife and difficulty portionate degree, a greater reason for merit exists after now. Therefore there is greater efficacy for merit. sin, on account of man’s weakness; because a small deed Objection 3. Further, the Master says (Sent. ii., is more beyond the capacity of one who works with dif- D, xxiv) that “man would not have merited in resisting ficulty than a great deed is beyond one who performs it temptation; whereas he does merit now, when he resists.” easily. Therefore our actions are more meritorious than in the Reply to Objection 1. After sin man requires grace primitive state. for more things than before sin; but he does not need grace On the contrary, if such were the case, man would be more; forasmuch as man even before sin required grace to better off after sinning. obtain eternal life, which is the chief reason for the need I answer that, Merit as regards degree may be gauged of grace. But after sin man required grace also for the in two ways. First, in its root, which is grace and charity. remission of sin, and for the support of his weakness. Merit thus measured corresponds in degree to the essen- Reply to Objection 2. Difficulty and struggle belong tial reward, which consists in the enjoyment of God; for to the degree of merit according to the proportionate de- the greater the charity whence our actions proceed, the gree of the work done, as above explained. It is also a more perfectly shall we enjoy God. Secondly, the degree sign of the will’s promptitude striving after what is diffi- of merit is measured by the degree of the action itself. cult to itself: and the promptitude of the will is caused by This degree is of two kinds, absolute and proportional. the intensity of charity. Yet it may happen that a person The widow who put two mites into the treasury performed performs an easy deed with as prompt a will as another a deed of absolutely less degree than the others who put performs an arduous deed; because he is ready to do even great sums therein. But in proportionate degree the widow what may be difficult to him. But the actual difficulty, by gave more, as Our Lord said; because she gave more in its penal character, enables the deed to satisfy for sin. proportion to her means. In each of these cases the de- Reply to Objection 3. The first man would not have gree of merit corresponds to the accidental reward, which gained merit in resisting temptation, according to the consists in rejoicing for created good. opinion of those who say that he did not possess grace; We conclude therefore that in the state of innocence even as now there is no merit to those who have not grace. man’s works were more meritorious than after sin was But in this point there is a difference, inasmuch as in the committed, if we consider the degree of merit on the part primitive state there was no interior impulse to evil, as in of grace, which would have been more copious as meet- our present state. Hence man was more able then than ing with no obstacle in human nature: and in like man- now to resist temptation even without grace. ner, if we consider the absolute degree of the work done; 493 FIRST PART, QUESTION 96 Of the Mastership Belonging to Man in the State of Innocence (In Four Articles) We next consider the mastership which belonged to man in the state of innocence. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether man in the state of innocence was master over the animals? (2) Whether he was master over all creatures? (3) Whether in the state of innocence all men were equal? (4) Whether in that state man would have been master over men? Whether Adam in the state of innocence had mastership over the animals? Ia q. 96 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of in- in the use of natural things; thus the imperfect are for the nocence Adam had no mastership over the animals. For use of the perfect; as the plants make use of the earth for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14), that the animals were their nourishment, and animals make use of plants, and brought to Adam, under the direction of the angels, to re- man makes use of both plants and animals. Therefore it ceive their names from him. But the angels need not have is in keeping with the order of nature, that man should be intervened thus, if man himself were master over the an- master over animals. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. imals. Therefore in the state of innocence man had no i, 5) that the hunting of wild animals is just and natural, mastership of the animals. because man thereby exercises a natural right. Secondly, Objection 2. Further, it is unfitting that elements hos- this is proved by the order of Divine Providence which tile to one another should be brought under the mastership always governs inferior things by the superior. Where- of one. But many animals are hostile to one another, as fore, as man, being made to the image of God, is above the sheep and the wolf. Therefore all animals were not other animals, these are rightly subject to his government. brought under the mastership of man. Thirdly, this is proved from a property of man and of other Objection 3. Further, Jerome says∗: “God gave man animals. For we see in the latter a certain participated mastership over the animals, although before sin he had prudence of natural instinct, in regard to certain particular no need of them: for God foresaw that after sin animals acts; whereas man possesses a universal prudence as re- would become useful to man.” Therefore, at least before gards all practical matters. Now whatever is participated sin, it was unfitting for man to make use of his mastership. is subject to what is essential and universal. Therefore the Objection 4. Further, it is proper to a master to com- subjection of other animals to man is proved to be natural. mand. But a command is not given rightly save to a ra- Reply to Objection 1. A higher power can do many tional being. Therefore man had no mastership over the things that an inferior power cannot do to those which are irrational animals. subject to them. Now an angel is naturally higher than On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:26): “Let him man. Therefore certain things in regard to animals could have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of be done by angels, which could not be done by man; for the air, and the beasts of the earth” [Vulg.“and the whole instance, the rapid gathering together of all the animals. earth”]. Reply to Objection 2. In the opinion of some, those I answer that, As above stated (q. 95, a. 1) for his dis-animals which now are fierce and kill others, would, in obedience to God, man was punished by the disobedience that state, have been tame, not only in regard to man, but of those creatures which should be subject to him. There- also in regard to other animals. But this is quite unreason- fore in the state of innocence, before man had disobeyed, able. For the nature of animals was not changed by man’s nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject to him. sin, as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh Now all animals are naturally subject to man. This can be of others, would then have lived on herbs, as the lion and proved in three ways. First, from the order observed by falcon. Nor does Bede’s gloss on Gn. 1:30, say that trees nature; for just as in the generation of things we perceive and herbs were given as food to all animals and birds, but a certain order of procession of the perfect from the imper- to some. Thus there would have been a natural antipathy fect (thus matter is for the sake of form; and the imperfect between some animals. They would not, however, on this form, for the sake of the perfect), so also is there order account have been excepted from the mastership of man: ∗ The words quoted are not in St. Jerome’s works. St. Thomas may have had in mind Bede, Hexaem., as quoted in the Glossa ordinaria on Gn. 1:26 494 as neither at present are they for that reason excepted from purpose. But man needed animals in order to have experi-the mastership of God, Whose Providence has ordained all mental knowledge of their natures. This is signified by the this. Of this Providence man would have been the execu- fact that God led the animals to man, that he might give tor, as appears even now in regard to domestic animals, them names expressive of their respective natures. since fowls are given by men as food to the trained falcon. Reply to Objection 4. All animals by their natural Reply to Objection 3. In the state of innocence man instinct have a certain participation of prudence and rea- would not have had any bodily need of animals—neither son: which accounts for the fact that cranes follow their for clothing, since then they were naked and not ashamed, leader, and bees obey their queen. So all animals would there being no inordinate motions of concupiscence—nor have obeyed man of their own accord, as in the present for food, since they fed on the trees of paradise—nor to state some domestic animals obey him. carry him about, his body being strong enough for that Whether man had mastership over all other creatures? Ia q. 96 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of inno- things; and so according as he is master of what is within cence man would not have had mastership over all other himself, in the same way he can have mastership over creatures. For an angel naturally has a greater power than other things. Now we may consider four things in man: man. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8), “corpo- his “reason,” which makes him like to the angels’; his real matter would not have obeyed even the holy angels.” “sensitive powers,” whereby he is like the animals; his Much less therefore would it have obeyed man in the state “natural forces,” which liken him to the plants; and “the of innocence. body itself,” wherein he is like to inanimate things. Now Objection 2. Further, the only powers of the soul ex- in man reason has the position of a master and not of a isting in plants are nutritive, augmentative, and generative. subject. Wherefore man had no mastership over the an- Now these doe not naturally obey reason; as we can see gels in the primitive state; so when we read “all creatures,” in the case of any one man. Therefore, since it is by his we must understand the creatures which are not made to reason that man is competent to have mastership, it seems God’s image. Over the sensitive powers, as the irascible that in the state of innocence man had no dominion over and concupiscible, which obey reason in some degree, the plants. soul has mastership by commanding. So in the state of Objection 3. Further, whosoever is master of a thing, innocence man had mastership over the animals by com- can change it. But man could not have changed the course manding them. But of the natural powers and the body it- of the heavenly bodies; for this belongs to God alone, as self man is master not by commanding, but by using them. Dionysius says (Ep. ad Polycarp. vii). Therefore man had Thus also in the state of innocence man’s mastership over no dominion over them. plants and inanimate things consisted not in commanding On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:26): “That he or in changing them, but in making use of them without may have dominion over. . . every creature.” hindrance. I answer that, Man in a certain sense contains all The answers to the objections appear from the above. Whether men were equal in the state of innocence? Ia q. 96 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of in- men seems to arise, on the part of God, from the fact that nocence all would have been equal. For Gregory says He rewards some and punishes others; and on the part of (Moral. xxi): “Where there is no sin, there is no inequal- nature, from the fact that some, through a defect of na- ity.” But in the state of innocence there was no sin. There- ture, are born weak and deficient, others strong and per- fore all were equal. fect, which would not have been the case in the primitive Objection 2. Further, likeness and equality are the state. Therefore, etc. basis of mutual love, according to Ecclus. 13:19, “Every On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 13:1): “The beast loveth its like; so also every man him that is nearest things which are of God, are well ordered” [Vulg.“Those to himself.” Now in that state there was among men an that are, are ordained of God”]. But order chiefly consists abundance of love, which is the bond of peace. Therefore in inequality; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): all were equal in the state of innocence. “Order disposes things equal and unequal in their proper Objection 3. Further, the cause ceasing, the effect place.” Therefore in the primitive state, which was most also ceases. But the cause of present inequality among proper and orderly, inequality would have existed. 495 I answer that, We must needs admit that in the prim-beautiful, and all ways better disposed; so that, however, itive state there would have been some inequality, at least in those who were thus surpassed, there would have been as regards sex, because generation depends upon diversity no defect or fault either in soul or body. of sex: and likewise as regards age; for some would have Reply to Objection 1. By those words Gregory means been born of others; nor would sexual union have been to exclude such inequality as exists between virtue and sterile. vice; the result of which is that some are placed in subjec- Moreover, as regards the soul, there would have been tion to others as a penalty. inequality as to righteousness and knowledge. For man Reply to Objection 2. Equality is the cause of equal- worked not of necessity, but of his own free-will, by virtue ity in mutual love. Yet between those who are unequal of which man can apply himself, more or less, to action, there can be a greater love than between equals; although desire, or knowledge; hence some would have made a there be not an equal response: for a father naturally loves greater advance in virtue and knowledge than others. his son more than a brother loves his brother; although the There might also have been bodily disparity. For the son does not love his father as much as he is loved by him. human body was not entirely exempt from the laws of na- Reply to Objection 3. The cause of inequality could ture, so as not to receive from exterior sources more or be on the part of God; not indeed that He would punish less advantage and help: since indeed it was dependent on some and reward others, but that He would exalt some food wherewith to sustain life. above others; so that the beauty of order would the more So we may say that, according to the climate, or the shine forth among men. Inequality might also arise on the movement of the stars, some would have been born more part of nature as above described, without any defect of robust in body than others, and also greater, and more nature. Whether in the state of innocence man would have been master over man? Ia q. 96 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of inno- fice of governing and directing free men, can be called a cence man would not have been master over man. For Au- master. In the state of innocence man could have been a gustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): “God willed that man, master of men, not in the former but in the latter sense. who was endowed with reason and made to His image, This distinction is founded on the reason that a slave dif- should rule over none but irrational creatures; not over fers from a free man in that the latter has the disposal of men, but over cattle.” himself, as is stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics, Objection 2. Further, what came into the world as a whereas a slave is ordered to another. So that one man penalty for sin would not have existed in the state of inno- is master of another as his slave when he refers the one cence. But man was made subject to man as a penalty; for whose master he is, to his own—namely the master’s use. after sin it was said to the woman (Gn. 3:16): “Thou shalt And since every man’s proper good is desirable to him- be under thy husband’s power.” Therefore in the state of self, and consequently it is a grievous matter to anyone innocence man would not have been subject to man. to yield to another what ought to be one’s own, therefore Objection 3. Further, subjection is opposed to lib- such dominion implies of necessity a pain inflicted on the erty. But liberty is one of the chief blessings, and would subject; and consequently in the state of innocence such a not have been lacking in the state of innocence, “where mastership could not have existed between man and man. nothing was wanting that man’s good-will could desire,” But a man is the master of a free subject, by directing as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10). Therefore man him either towards his proper welfare, or to the common would not have been master over man in the state of inno- good. Such a kind of mastership would have existed in cence. the state of innocence between man and man, for two rea- On the contrary, The condition of man in the state of sons. First, because man is naturally a social being, and innocence was not more exalted than the condition of the so in the state of innocence he would have led a social life. angels. But among the angels some rule over others; and Now a social life cannot exist among a number of people so one order is called that of “Dominations.” Therefore it unless under the presidency of one to look after the com- was not beneath the dignity of the state of innocence that mon good; for many, as such, seek many things, whereas one man should be subject to another. one attends only to one. Wherefore the Philosopher says, I answer that, Mastership has a twofold meaning. in the beginning of the Politics, that wherever many things First, as opposed to slavery, in which sense a master are directed to one, we shall always find one at the head means one to whom another is subject as a slave. In an- directing them. Secondly, if one man surpassed another other sense mastership is referred in a general sense to any in knowledge and virtue, this would not have been fitting kind of subject; and in this sense even he who has the of- unless these gifts conduced to the benefit of others, ac- 496 cording to 1 Pet. 4:10, “As every man hath received grace, sel”: and (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): “The natural order of ministering the same one to another.” Wherefore Augus- things requires this; and thus did God make man.” tine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 14): “Just men command not From this appear the replies to the objections which by the love of domineering, but by the service of coun- are founded on the first-mentioned mode of mastership. 497 FIRST PART, QUESTION 97 Of the Preservation of the Individual in the Primitive State (In Four Articles) We next consider what belongs to the bodily state of the first man: first, as regards the preservation of the individual; secondly, as regards the preservation of the species. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether man in the state of innocence was immortal? (2) Whether he was impassible? (3) Whether he stood in need of food? (4) Whether he would have obtained immortality by the tree of life? Whether in the state of innocence man would have been immortal? Ia q. 97 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of in- ible, yet it has an inherent disposition which preserves it nocence man was not immortal. For the term “mortal” wholly from corruption; and this is called incorruptibility belongs to the definition of man. But if you take away the of glory; because as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.): definition, you take away the thing defined. Therefore as “God made man’s soul of such a powerful nature, that long as man was man he could not be immortal. from its fulness of beatitude, there redounds to the body a Objection 2. Further, corruptible and incorruptible fulness of health, with the vigor of incorruption.” Thirdly, are generically distinct, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient x, Did. ix, 10). But there can be no passing from one cause; in this sense man was incorruptible and immortal genus to another. Therefore if the first man was incorrupt- in the state of innocence. For, as Augustine says (QQ. Vet. ible, man could not be corruptible in the present state. et Nov. Test. qu. 19∗): “God made man immortal as long Objection 3. Further, if man were immortal in the as he did not sin; so that he might achieve for himself life state of innocence, this would have been due either to na- or death.” For man’s body was indissoluble not by reason ture or to grace. Not to nature, for since nature does not of any intrinsic vigor of immortality, but by reason of a su- change within the same species, he would also have been pernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby it was immortal now. Likewise neither would this be owing to enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so long grace; for the first man recovered grace by repentance, ac- as it remained itself subject to God. This entirely agrees cording to Wis. 10:2: “He brought him out of his sins.” with reason; for since the rational soul surpasses the ca- Hence he would have regained his immortality; which is pacity of corporeal matter, as above explained (q. 76, a. 1), clearly not the case. Therefore man was not immortal in it was most properly endowed at the beginning with the the state of innocence. power of preserving the body in a manner surpassing the Objection 4. Further, immortality is promised to man capacity of corporeal matter. as a reward, according to Apoc. 21:4: “Death shall be no Reply obj. 1 and 2: These objections are founded on more.” But man was not created in the state of reward, but natural incorruptibility and immortality. that he might deserve the reward. Therefore man was not Reply to Objection 3. This power of preserving the immortal in the state of innocence. body was not natural to the soul, but was the gift of grace. On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:12): “By sin And though man recovered grace as regards remission of death came into the world.” Therefore man was immortal guilt and the merit of glory; yet he did not recover immor- before sin. tality, the loss of which was an effect of sin; for this was I answer that, A thing may be incorruptible in three reserved for Christ to accomplish, by Whom the defect ways. First, on the part of matter—that is to say, either of nature was to be restored into something better, as we because it possesses no matter, like an angel; or because shall explain further on ( IIIa, q. 14 , a. 4, ad 1). it possesses matter that is in potentiality to one form only, Reply to Objection 4. The promised reward of the like the heavenly bodies. Such things as these are incor- immortality of glory differs from the immortality which ruptible by their very nature. Secondly, a thing is incor- was bestowed on man in the state of innocence. ruptible in its form, inasmuch as being by nature corrupt- ∗ Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine 498 Whether in the state of innocence man would have been passible? Ia q. 97 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of in- active or passive, according as one thing changes another nocence man was passible. For “sensation is a kind of from its natural disposition. Secondly, “passion” can be passion.” But in the state of innocence man would have taken in a general sense for any kind of change, even if been sensitive. Therefore he would have been passible. belonging to the perfecting process of nature. Thus un- Objection 2. Further, sleep is a kind of passion. Now, derstanding and sensation are said to be passions. In this man slept in the state of innocence, according to Gn. 2:21, second sense, man was passible in the state of innocence, “God cast a deep sleep upon Adam.” Therefore he would and was passive both in soul and body. In the first sense, have been passible. man was impassible, both in soul and body, as he was like- Objection 3. Further, the same passage goes on to say wise immortal; for he could curb his passion, as he could that “He took a rib out of Adam.” Therefore he was pas- avoid death, so long as he refrained from sin. sible even to the degree of the cutting out of part of his Thus it is clear how to reply to the first two objections; body. since sensation and sleep do not remove from man his nat- Objection 4. Further, man’s body was soft. But a soft ural disposition, but are ordered to his natural welfare. body is naturally passible as regards a hard body; there- Reply to Objection 3. As already explained (q. 92, fore if a hard body had come in contact with the soft body a. 3, ad 2), the rib was in Adam as the principle of the hu- of the first man, the latter would have suffered from the man race, as the semen in man, who is a principle through impact. Therefore the first man was passible. generation. Hence as man does not suffer any natural de- On the contrary, Had man been passible, he would terioration by seminal issue; so neither did he through the have been also corruptible, because, as the Philosopher separation of the rib. says (Top. vi, 3): “Excessive suffering wastes the very Reply to Objection 4. Man’s body in the state of in- substance.” nocence could be preserved from suffering injury from a I answer that, “Passion” may be taken in two senses. hard body; partly by the use of his reason, whereby he First, in its proper sense, and thus a thing is said to suffer could avoid what was harmful; and partly also by Divine when changed from its natural disposition. For passion is Providence, so preserving him, that nothing of a harmful the effect of action; and in nature contraries are mutually nature could come upon him unawares. Whether in the state of innocence man had need of food? Ia q. 97 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of inno- this clear, we must observe that the rational soul is both cence man did not require food. For food is necessary for soul and spirit. It is called a soul by reason of what it man to restore what he has lost. But Adam’s body suf- possesses in common with other souls—that is, as giving fered no loss, as being incorruptible. Therefore he had no life to the body; whence it is written (Gn. 2:7): “Man need of food. was made into a living soul”; that is, a soul giving life Objection 2. Further, food is needed for nourishment. to the body. But the soul is called a spirit according to But nourishment involves passibility. Since, then, man’s what properly belongs to itself, and not to other souls, as body was impassible; it does not appear how food could possessing an intellectual immaterial power. be needful to him. Thus in the primitive state, the rational soul commu- Objection 3. Further, we need food for the preserva- nicated to the body what belonged to itself as a soul; and tion of life. But Adam could preserve his life otherwise; so the body was called “animal”∗, through having its life for had he not sinned, he would not have died. Therefore from the soul. Now the first principle of life in these in- he did not require food. ferior creatures as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) Objection 4. Further, the consumption of food in- is the vegetative soul: the operations of which are the use volves voiding of the surplus, which seems unsuitable to of food, generation, and growth. Wherefore such opera- the state of innocence. Therefore it seems that man did tions befitted man in the state of innocence. But in the not take food in the primitive state. final state, after the resurrection, the soul will, to a certain On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:16): “Of every extent, communicate to the body what properly belongs tree in paradise ye shall [Vulg. ‘thou shalt’] eat.” to itself as a spirit; immortality to everyone; impassibility, I answer that, In the state of innocence man had an glory, and power to the good, whose bodies will be called animal life requiring food; but after the resurrection he “spiritual.” So, after the resurrection, man will not require will have a spiritual life needing no food. In order to make food; whereas he required it in the state of innocence. ∗ From ‘anima’, a soul; Cf. 1 Cor. 15:44 seqq. 499 Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (QQ. Vet. the food taken was passible; although this kind of passion et Nov. Test. qu. 19†): “How could man have an im- conduced to the perfection of the nature. mortal body, which was sustained by food? Since an im- Reply to Objection 3. If man had not taken food he mortal being needs neither food nor drink.” For we have would have sinned; as he also sinned by taking the for- explained (a. 1) that the immortality of the primitive state bidden fruit. For he was told at the same time, to abstain was based on a supernatural force in the soul, and not on from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and to eat of any intrinsic disposition of the body: so that by the action every other tree of Paradise. of heat, the body might lose part of its humid qualities; Reply to Objection 4. Some say that in the state of and to prevent the entire consumption of the humor, man innocence man would not have taken more than necessary was obliged to take food. food, so that there would have been nothing superfluous; Reply to Objection 2. A certain passion and alter- which, however, is unreasonable to suppose, as implying ation attends nutriment, on the part of the food changed that there would have been no faecal matter. Wherefore into the substance of the thing nourished. So we cannot there was need for voiding the surplus, yet so disposed by thence conclude that man’s body was passible, but that God as to be decorous and suitable to the state. Whether in the state of innocence man would have acquired immortality by the tree Ia q. 97 a. 4 of life? Objection 1. It would seem that the tree of life could the humor which is caused from extraneous sources, being not be the cause of immortality. For nothing can act be- added to the humor already existing, lessens the specific yond its own species; as an effect does not exceed its active power: as water added to wine takes at first the taste cause. But the tree of life was corruptible, otherwise it of wine, then, as more water is added, the strength of the could not be taken as food; since food is changed into the wine is diminished, till the wine becomes watery. In like substance of the thing nourished. Therefore the tree of life manner, we may observe that at first the active force of the could not give incorruptibility or immortality. species is so strong that it is able to transform so much of Objection 2. Further, effects caused by the forces of the food as is required to replace the lost tissue, as well plants and other natural agencies are natural. If therefore as what suffices for growth; later on, however, the assim- the tree of life caused immortality, this would have been ilated food does not suffice for growth, but only replaces natural immortality. what is lost. Last of all, in old age, it does not suffice Objection 3. Further, this would seem to be reduced even for this purpose; whereupon the body declines, and to the ancient fable, that the gods, by eating a certain finally dies from natural causes. Against this defect man food, became immortal; which the Philosopher ridicules was provided with a remedy in the tree of life; for its ef- (Metaph. iii, Did. ii, 4). fect was to strengthen the force of the species against the On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 3:22): “Lest per- weakness resulting from the admixture of extraneous nu- haps he put forth his hand, and take of the tree of life, and triment. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): eat, and live for ever.” Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. “Man had food to appease his hunger, drink to slake his et Nov. Test. qu. 19∗): “A taste of the tree of life warded thirst; and the tree of life to banish the breaking up of old off corruption of the body; and even after sin man would age”; and (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19†) “The tree of have remained immortal, had he been allowed to eat of the life, like a drug, warded off all bodily corruption.” tree of life.” Yet it did not absolutely cause immortality; for neither I answer that, The tree of life in a certain degree was was the soul’s intrinsic power of preserving the body due the cause of immortality, but not absolutely. To under- to the tree of life, nor was it of such efficiency as to give stand this, we must observe that in the primitive state the body a disposition to immortality, whereby it might man possessed, for the preservation of life, two reme- become indissoluble; which is clear from the fact that ev- dies, against two defects. One of these defects was the ery bodily power is finite; so the power of the tree of life lost of humidity by the action of natural heat, which acts could not go so far as to give the body the prerogative of as the soul’s instrument: as a remedy against such loss living for an infinite time, but only for a definite time. For man was provided with food, taken from the other trees it is manifest that the greater a force is, the more durable is of paradise, as now we are provided with the food, which its effect; therefore, since the power of the tree of life was we take for the same purpose. The second defect, as the finite, man’s life was to be preserved for a definite time by Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), arises from the fact that partaking of it once; and when that time had elapsed, man † Works of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine ∗ Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine † Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine 500 was to be either transferred to a spiritual life, or had need cause immortality; while the others show that it caused to eat once more of the tree of life. incorruption by warding off corruption, according to the From this the replies to the objections clearly appear. explanation above given. For the first proves that the tree of life did not absolutely 501 FIRST PART, QUESTION 98 Of the Preservation of the Species (In Two Articles) We next consider what belongs to the preservation of the species; and, first, of generation; secondly, of the state of the offspring. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation? (2) Whether generation would have been through coition? Whether in the state of innocence generation existed? Ia q. 98 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem there would have been perpetual; while what is only for a time is seemingly not no generation in the state of innocence. For, as stated in the chief purpose of nature, but as it were, subordinate Phys. v, 5, “corruption is contrary to generation.” But to something else; otherwise, when it ceased to exist, na- contraries affect the same subject: also there would have ture’s purpose would become void. been no corruption in the state of innocence. Therefore Therefore, since in things corruptible none is everlast- neither would there have been generation. ing and permanent except the species, it follows that the Objection 2. Further, the object of generation is the chief purpose of nature is the good of the species; for the preservation in the species of that which is corruptible in preservation of which natural generation is ordained. On the individual. Wherefore there is no generation in those the other hand, incorruptible substances survive, not only individual things which last for ever. But in the state of in- in the species, but also in the individual; wherefore even nocence man would have lived for ever. Therefore in the the individuals are included in the chief purpose of nature. state of innocence there would have been no generation. Hence it belongs to man to beget offspring, on the part Objection 3. Further, by generation man is multiplied. of the naturally corruptible body. But on the part of the But the multiplication of masters requires the division of soul, which is incorruptible, it is fitting that the multitude property, to avoid confusion of mastership. Therefore, of individuals should be the direct purpose of nature, or since man was made master of the animals, it would have rather of the Author of nature, Who alone is the Creator been necessary to make a division of rights when the hu- of the human soul. Wherefore, to provide for the multi- man race increased by generation. This is against the nat- plication of the human race, He established the begetting ural law, according to which all things are in common, as of offspring even in the state of innocence. Isidore says (Etym. v, 4). Therefore there would have Reply to Objection 1. In the state of innocence the been no generation in the state of innocence. human body was in itself corruptible, but it could be pre- On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:28): “Increase served from corruption by the soul. Therefore, since gen- and multiply, and fill the earth.” But this increase could eration belongs to things corruptible, man was not to be not come about save by generation, since the original deprived thereof. number of mankind was two only. Therefore there would Reply to Objection 2. Although generation in the have been generation in the state of innocence. state of innocence might not have been required for the I answer that, In the state of innocence there would preservation of the species, yet it would have been re- have been generation of offspring for the multiplication quired for the multiplication of the individual. of the human race; otherwise man’s sin would have been Reply to Objection 3. In our present state a division very necessary, for such a great blessing to be its result. of possessions is necessary on account of the multiplic- We must, therefore, observe that man, by his nature, is ity of masters, inasmuch as community of possession is a established, as it were, midway between corruptible and source of strife, as the Philosopher says (Politic. ii, 5). In incorruptible creatures, his soul being naturally incorrupt- the state of innocence, however, the will of men would ible, while his body is naturally corruptible. We must also have been so ordered that without any danger of strife observe that nature’s purpose appears to be different as re- they would have used in common, according to each one’s gards corruptible and incorruptible things. For that seems need, those things of which they were masters—a state of to be the direct purpose of nature, which is invariable and things to be observed even now among many good men. 502 Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation by coition? Ia q. 98 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that generation by coition is natural to other perfect animals, as the corporeal mem- would not have existed in the state of innocence. For, as bers make it clear. So we cannot allow that these members Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11; iv, 25), the first would not have had a natural use, as other members had, man in the terrestrial Paradise was “like an angel.” But in before sin. the future state of the resurrection, when men will be like Thus, as regards generation by coition, there are, in the angels, “they shall neither marry nor be married,” as is the present state of life, two things to be considered. One, written Mat. 22:30. Therefore neither in paradise would which comes from nature, is the union of man and woman; there have been generation by coition. for in every act of generation there is an active and a pas- Objection 2. Further, our first parents were created at sive principle. Wherefore, since wherever there is distinc- the age of perfect development. Therefore, if generation tion of sex, the active principle is male and the passive is by coition had existed before sin, they would have had in- female; the order of nature demands that for the purpose tercourse while still in paradise: which was not the case of generation there should be concurrence of male and fe- according to Scripture (Gn. 4:1). male. The second thing to be observed is a certain de- Objection 3. Further, in carnal intercourse, more than formity of excessive concupiscence, which in the state of at any other time, man becomes like the beasts, on account innocence would not have existed, when the lower pow- of the vehement delight which he takes therein; whence ers were entirely subject to reason. Wherefore Augustine contingency is praiseworthy, whereby man refrains from says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): “We must be far from suppos- such pleasures. But man is compared to beasts by rea- ing that offspring could not be begotten without concupis- son of sin, according to Ps. 48:13: “Man, when he was cence. All the bodily members would have been equally in honor, did not understand; he is compared to senseless moved by the will, without ardent or wanton incentive, beasts, and is become like to them.” Therefore, before with calmness of soul and body.” sin, there would have been no such intercourse of man Reply to Objection 1. In paradise man would have and woman. been like an angel in his spirituality of mind, yet with an Objection 4. Further, in the state of innocence there animal life in his body. After the resurrection man will be would have been no corruption. But virginal integrity like an angel, spiritualized in soul and body. Wherefore is corrupted by intercourse. Therefore there would have there is no parallel. been no such thing in the state of innocence. Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (Gen. ad On the contrary, God made man and woman before lit. ix, 4), our first parents did not come together in par- sin (Gn. 1,2). But nothing is void in God’s works. There- adise, because on account of sin they were ejected from fore, even if man had not sinned, there would have been paradise shortly after the creation of the woman; or be- such intercourse, to which the distinction of sex is or- cause, having received the general Divine command rela- dained. Moreover, we are told that woman was made tive to generation, they awaited the special command rel- to be a help to man (Gn. 2:18,20). But she is not fitted ative to time. to help man except in generation, because another man Reply to Objection 3. Beasts are without reason. In would have proved a more effective help in anything else. this way man becomes, as it were, like them in coition, Therefore there would have been such generation also in because he cannot moderate concupiscence. In the state the state of innocence. of innocence nothing of this kind would have happened I answer that, Some of the earlier doctors, consider- that was not regulated by reason, not because delight of ing the nature of concupiscence as regards generation in sense was less, as some say (rather indeed would sensible our present state, concluded that in the state of innocence delight have been the greater in proportion to the greater generation would not have been effected in the same way. purity of nature and the greater sensibility of the body), Thus Gregory of Nyssa says (De Hom. Opif. xvii) that in but because the force of concupiscence would not have so paradise the human race would have been multiplied by inordinately thrown itself into such pleasure, being curbed some other means, as the angels were multiplied without by reason, whose place it is not to lessen sensual pleasure, coition by the operation of the Divine Power. He adds that but to prevent the force of concupiscence from cleaving God made man male and female before sin, because He to it immoderately. By “immoderately” I mean going be- foreknew the mode of generation which would take place yond the bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take after sin, which He foresaw. But this is unreasonable. For less pleasure in food taken in moderation than the glutton, what is natural to man was neither acquired nor forfeited but his concupiscence lingers less in such pleasures. This by sin. Now it is clear that generation by coition is natural is what Augustine means by the words quoted, which do to man by reason of his animal life, which he possessed not exclude intensity of pleasure from the state of inno- even before sin, as above explained (q. 97, a. 3), just as it cence, but ardor of desire and restlessness of the mind. 503 Therefore continence would not have been praiseworthy without prejudice to virginal integrity; this would have re-in the state of innocence, whereas it is praiseworthy in our mained intact, as it does in the menses. And just as in giv- present state, not because it removes fecundity, but be- ing birth the mother was then relieved, not by groans of cause it excludes inordinate desire. In that state fecundity pain, but by the instigations of maturity; so in conceiving, would have been without lust. the union was one, not of lustful desire, but of deliberate Reply to Objection 4. As Augustine says (De Civ. action.” Dei xiv, 26): In that state “intercourse would have been 504 FIRST PART, QUESTION 99 Of the Condition of the Offspring As to the Body (In Two Articles) We must now consider the condition of the offspring—first, as regards the body; secondly, as regards virtue; thirdly, in knowledge. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have had full powers of the body immediately after birth? (2) Whether all infants would have been of the male sex? Whether in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of body Ia q. 99 a. 1 as to the use of its members immediately after birth? Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of in- ately after birth. Because in proportion to other animals nocence children would have had perfect strength of the man has naturally a larger brain. Wherefore it is natural, body, as to the use of its members, immediately after on account of the considerable humidity of the brain in birth. For Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. children, that the nerves which are instruments of move- i, 38): “This weakness of the body befits their weakness ment, should not be apt for moving the limbs. On the of mind.” But in the state of innocence there would have other hand, no Catholic doubts it possible for a child to been no weakness of mind. Therefore neither would there have, by Divine power, the use of its limbs immediately have been weakness of body in infants. after birth. Objection 2. Further, some animals at birth have suf- Now we have it on the authority of Scripture that “God ficient strength to use their members. But man is nobler made man right” (Eccles. 7:30), which rightness, as Au- than other animals. Therefore much more is it natural to gustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 11), consists in the per- man to have strength to use his members at birth; and thus fect subjection of the body to the soul. As, therefore, in it appears to be a punishment of sin that he has not that the primitive state it was impossible to find in the human strength. limbs anything repugnant to man’s well-ordered will, so Objection 3. Further, inability to secure a proffered was it impossible for those limbs to fail in executing the pleasure causes affliction. But if children had not full will’s commands. Now the human will is well ordered strength in the use of their limbs, they would often have when it tends to acts which are befitting to man. But the been unable to procure something pleasurable offered to same acts are not befitting to man at every season of life. them; and so they would have been afflicted, which was We must, therefore, conclude that children would not have not possible before sin. Therefore, in the state of inno- had sufficient strength for the use of their limbs for the cence, children would not have been deprived of the use purpose of performing every kind of act; but only for the of their limbs. acts befitting the state of infancy, such as suckling, and the Objection 4. Further, the weakness of old age seems like. to correspond to that of infancy. But in the state of in- Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of the nocence there would have been no weakness of old age. weakness which we observe in children even as regards Therefore neither would there have been such weakness those acts which befit the state of infancy; as is clear from in infancy. his preceding remark that “even when close to the breast, On the contrary, Everything generated is first imper- and longing for it, they are more apt to cry than to suckle.” fect. But in the state of innocence children would have Reply to Objection 2. The fact that some animals been begotten by generation. Therefore from the first they have the use of their limbs immediately after birth, is due, would have been imperfect in bodily size and power. not to their superiority, since more perfect animals are not I answer that, By faith alone do we hold truths which so endowed; but to the dryness of the brain, and to the op- are above nature, and what we believe rests on authority. erations proper to such animals being imperfect, so that a Wherefore, in making any assertion, we must be guided small amount of strength suffices them. by the nature of things, except in those things which are Reply obj. 3 is clear from what we have said above. above nature, and are made known to us by Divine au- We may add that they would have desired nothing except thority. Now it is clear that it is as natural as it is befitting with an ordinate will; and only what was befitting to their to the principles of human nature that children should not state of life. have sufficient strength for the use of their limbs immedi- Reply to Objection 4. In the state of innocence 505 man would have been born, yet not subject to corruption. tile defects which result from birth; but not senile defects Therefore in that state there could have been certain infan- leading to corruption. Whether, in the primitive state, women would have been born? Ia q. 99 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that in the primitive state of human nature would have been lacking in the state of woman would not have been born. For the Philosopher innocence. And as different grades belong to the perfec- says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) that woman is a “misbe- tion of the universe, so also diversity of sex belongs to gotten male,” as though she were a product outside the the perfection of human nature. Therefore in the state of purpose of nature. But in that state nothing would have innocence, both sexes would have been begotten. been unnatural in human generation. Therefore in that Reply to Objection 1. Woman is said to be a “mis- state women would not have been born. begotten male,” as being a product outside the purpose of Objection 2. Further, every agent produces its like, nature considered in the individual case: but not against unless prevented by insufficient power or ineptness of the purpose of universal nature, as above explained (q. 92, matter: thus a small fire cannot burn green wood. But a. 1, ad 2). in generation the active force is in the male. Since, there- Reply to Objection 2. The generation of woman is fore, in the state of innocence man’s active force was not not occasioned either by a defect of the active force or by subject to defect, nor was there inept matter on the part of inept matter, as the objection proposes; but sometimes by the woman, it seems that males would always have been an extrinsic accidental cause; thus the Philosopher says born. (De Animal. Histor. vi, 19): “The northern wind favors Objection 3. Further, in the state of innocence gener- the generation of males, and the southern wind that of fe- ation is ordered to the multiplication of the human race. males”: sometimes also by some impression in the soul But the race would have been sufficiently multiplied by (of the parents), which may easily have some effect on the first man and woman, from the fact that they would the body (of the child). Especially was this the case in the have lived for ever. Therefore, in the state of innocence, state of innocence, when the body was more subject to the there was no need for women to be born. soul; so that by the mere will of the parent the sex of the On the contrary, Nature’s process in generation offspring might be diversified. would have been in harmony with the manner in which Reply to Objection 3. The offspring would have been it was established by God. But established male and fe- begotten to an animal life, as to the use of food and gen- male in human nature, as it is written (Gn. 1,2). Therefore eration. Hence it was fitting that all should generate, and also in the state of innocence male and female would have not only the first parents. From this it seems to follow that been born. males and females would have been in equal number. I answer that, Nothing belonging to the completeness 506 FIRST PART, QUESTION 100 Of the Condition of the Offspring As Regards Righteousness (In Two Articles) We now have to consider the condition of the offspring as to righteousness. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness? (2) Whether they would have been born confirmed in righteousness? Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness? Ia q. 100 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of inno- ture. This is clear from the fact that opposites are of the cence men would not have been born in a state of righ- same genus; and original sin, which is opposed to original teousness. For Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. i): righteousness, is called the sin of nature, wherefore it is “Before sin the first man would have begotten children transmitted from the parent to the offspring; and for this sinless; but not heirs to their father’s righteousness.” reason also, the children would have been assimilated to Objection 2. Further, righteousness is effected by their parents as regards original righteousness. grace, as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:16,21). Now grace Reply to Objection 1. These words of Hugh are to be is not transfused from one to another, for thus it would be understood as referring, not to the habit of righteousness, natural; but is infused by God alone. Therefore children but to the execution of the act thereof. would not have been born righteous. Reply to Objection 2. Some say that children would Objection 3. Further, righteousness is in the soul. But have been born, not with the righteousness of grace, which the soul is not transmitted from the parent. Therefore nei- is the principle of merit, but with original righteousness. ther would righteousness have been transmitted from par- But since the root of original righteousness, which con- ents, to the children. ferred righteousness on the first man when he was made, On the contrary, Anselm says (De Concep. Virg. x): consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to “As long as man did not sin, he would have begotten chil- God, which subjection results from sanctifying grace, as dren endowed with righteousness together with the ratio- above explained (q. 95, a. 1), we must conclude that if nal soul.” children were born in original righteousness, they would I answer that, Man naturally begets a specific like- also have been born in grace; thus we have said above that ness to himself. Hence whatever accidental qualities re- the first man was created in grace (q. 95, a. 1). This grace, sult from the nature of the species, must be alike in parent however, would not have been natural, for it would not and child, unless nature fails in its operation, which would have been transfused by virtue of the semen; but would not have occurred in the state of innocence. But individ- have been conferred on man immediately on his receiving ual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in parent and a rational soul. In the same way the rational soul, which child. Now original righteousness, in which the first man is not transmitted by the parent, is infused by God as soon was created, was an accident pertaining to the nature of as the human body is apt to receive it. the species, not as caused by the principles of the species, From this the reply to the third objection is clear. but as a gift conferred by God on the entire human na- Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righ-Ia q. 100 a. 2 teousness? Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of inno- born confirmed in righteousness. cence children would have been born confirmed in righ- Objection 2. Further, Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo teousness. For Gregory says (Moral. iv) on the words of i, 18): “If our first parents had lived so as not to yield to Job 3:13: “For now I should have been asleep, etc.: If no temptation, they would have been confirmed in grace, so sinful corruption had infected our first parent, he would that with their offspring they would have been unable to not have begotten “children of hell”; no children would sin any more.” Therefore the children would have been have been born of him but such as were destined to be born confirmed in righteousness. saved by the Redeemer.” Therefore all would have been Objection 3. Further, good is stronger than evil. But 507 by the sin of the first man there resulted, in those born of privilege, such as we believe was granted to the Virgin him, the necessity of sin. Therefore, if the first man had Mother of God. And as soon as Adam had attained to persevered in righteousness, his descendants would have that happy state of seeing God in His Essence, he would derived from him the necessity of preserving righteous- have become spiritual in soul and body; and his animal ness. life would have ceased, wherein alone there is generation. Objection 4. Further, the angels who remained faith- Hence it is clear that children would not have been born ful to God, while the others sinned, were at once con- confirmed in righteousness. firmed in grace, so as to be unable henceforth to sin. In Reply to Objection 1. If Adam had not sinned, he like manner, therefore, man would have been confirmed would not have begotten “children of hell” in the sense in grace if he had persevered. But he would have begot- that they would contract from him sin which is the cause ten children like himself. Therefore they also would have of hell: yet by sinning of their own free-will they could been born confirmed in righteousness. have become “children of hell.” If, however, they did not On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, become “children of hell” by falling into sin, this would 10): “Happy would have been the whole human race if not have been owing to their being confirmed in righteous- neither they—that is our first parents—had committed any ness, but to Divine Providence preserving them free from evil to be transmitted to their descendants, nor any of their sin. race had committed any sin for which they would have Reply to Objection 2. Anselm does not say this by been condemned.” From which words we gather that even way of assertion, but only as an opinion, which is clear if our first parents had not sinned, any of their descendants from his mode of expression as follows: “It seems that if might have done evil; and therefore they would not have they had lived, etc.” been born confirmed in righteousness. Reply to Objection 3. This argument is not conclu- I answer that, It does not seem possible that in the sive, though Anselm seems to have been influenced by it, state of innocence children would have been born con- as appears from his words above quoted. For the necessity firmed in righteousness. For it is clear that at their birth of sin incurred by the descendants would not have been they would not have had greater perfection than their par- such that they could not return to righteousness, which is ents at the time of begetting. Now the parents, as long the case only with the damned. Wherefore neither would as they begot children, would not have been confirmed in the parents have transmitted to their descendants the ne- righteousness. For the rational creature is confirmed in cessity of not sinning, which is only in the blessed. righteousness through the beatitude given by the clear vi- Reply to Objection 4. There is no comparison be- sion of God; and when once it has seen God, it cannot but tween man and the angels; for man’s free-will is change- cleave to Him Who is the essence of goodness, wherefrom able, both before and after choice; whereas the angel’s is no one can turn away, since nothing is desired or loved but not changeable, as we have said above in treating of the under the aspect of good. I say this according to the gen- angels (q. 64, a. 2). eral law; for it may be otherwise in the case of special 508 FIRST PART, QUESTION 101 Of the Condition of the Offspring As Regards Knowledge (In Two Articles) We next consider the condition of the offspring as to knowledge. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge? (2) Whether they would have had perfect use of reason at the moment of birth? Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowl-Ia q. 101 a. 1 edge? Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of inno- proper operation; and this would not be so if the soul were cence children would have been born with perfect knowl- endowed at birth with knowledge not acquired through the edge. For Adam would have begotten children like him- sensitive powers. We must conclude then, that, in the state self. But Adam was gifted with perfect knowledge (q. 94, of innocence, children would not have been born with per- a. 3). Therefore children would have been born of him fect knowledge; but in course of time they would have ac- with perfect knowledge. quired knowledge without difficulty by discovery or learn- Objection 2. Further, ignorance is a result of sin, as ing. Bede says (Cf. Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 3). But ignorance is pri- Reply to Objection 1. The perfection of knowledge vation of knowledge. Therefore before sin children would was an individual accident of our first parent, so far as he have had perfect knowledge as soon as they were born. was established as the father and instructor of the whole Objection 3. Further, children would have been gifted human race. Therefore he begot children like himself, not with righteousness from birth. But knowledge is required in that respect, but only in those accidents which were for righteousness, since it directs our actions. Therefore natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature. they would also have been gifted with knowledge. Reply to Objection 2. Ignorance is privation of On the contrary, The human soul is naturally “like a knowledge due at some particular time; and this would not blank tablet on which nothing is written,” as the Philoso- have been in children from their birth, for they would have pher says (De Anima iii, 4). But the nature of the soul is possessed the knowledge due to them at that time. Hence, the same now as it would have been in the state of inno- no ignorance would have been in them, but only nescience cence. Therefore the souls of children would have been in regard to certain matters. Such nescience was even in without knowledge at birth. the holy angels, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). I answer that, As above stated (q. 99, a. 1), as re- Reply to Objection 3. Children would have had suffi- gards belief in matters which are above nature, we rely cient knowledge to direct them to deeds of righteousness, on authority alone; and so, when authority is wanting, we in which men are guided by universal principles of right; must be guided by the ordinary course of nature. Now it is and this knowledge of theirs would have been much more natural for man to acquire knowledge through the senses, complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise as above explained (q. 55, a. 2; q. 84, a. 6); and for this their knowledge of other universal principles. reason is the soul united to the body, that it needs it for its Whether children would have had perfect use of reason at birth? Ia q. 101 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that children would have the wolf. Much more, therefore, would men in the state of had perfect use of reason at birth. For that children have innocence have had perfect use of reason at birth. not perfect use of reason in our present state, is due to the On the contrary, In all things produced by generation soul being weighed down by the body; which was not the nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. There- case in paradise, because, as it is written, “The corrupt- fore children would not have had the perfect use of reason ible body is a load upon the soul” (Wis. 9:15). Therefore, from the very outset. before sin and the corruption which resulted therefrom, I answer that, As above stated (q. 84, a. 7), the use of children would have had the perfect use of reason at birth. reason depends in a certain manner on the use of the sen- Objection 2. Further, some animals at birth have the sitive powers; wherefore, while the senses are tired and use of their natural powers, as the lamb at once flees from the interior sensitive powers hampered, man has not the 509 perfect use of reason, as we see in those who are asleep that particular state, as explained above regarding the use or delirious. Now the sensitive powers are situate in cor- of their limbs (q. 99, a. 1). poreal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are hin- Reply to Objection 1. The corruptible body is a load dered, the action of the former is of necessity hindered upon the soul, because it hinders the use of reason even in also; and likewise, consequently, the use of reason. Now those matters which belong to man at all ages. children are hindered in the use of these powers on ac- Reply to Objection 2. Even other animals have not count of the humidity of the brain; wherefore they have at birth such a perfect use of their natural powers as they perfect use neither of these powers nor of reason. There- have later on. This is clear from the fact that birds teach fore, in the state of innocence, children would not have their young to fly; and the like may be observed in other had the perfect use of reason, which they would have en- animals. Moreover a special impediment exists in man joyed later on in life. Yet they would have had a more from the humidity of the brain, as we have said above perfect use than they have now, as to matters regarding (q. 99, a. 1). 510 FIRST PART, QUESTION 102 Of Man’s Abode, Which Is Paradise (In Four Articles) We next consider man’s abode, which is paradise. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether paradise is a corporeal place? (2) Whether it is a place apt for human habitation? (3) For what purpose was man placed in paradise? (4) Whether he should have been created in paradise? Whether paradise is a corporeal place? Ia q. 102 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that paradise is not a cor- narrative as a foundation of whatever spiritual explana- poreal place. For Bede∗ says that “paradise reaches to the tion we may offer. And so paradise, as Isidore says (Etym. lunar circle.” But no earthly place answers that descrip- xiv, 3), “is a place situated in the east, its name being the tion, both because it is contrary to the nature of the earth Greek for garden.” It was fitting that it should be in the to be raised up so high, and because beneath the moon is east; for it is to be believed that it was situated in the most the region of fire, which would consume the earth. There-excellent part of the earth. Now the east is the right hand fore paradise is not a corporeal place. on the heavens, as the Philosopher explains (De Coel. ii, Objection 2. Further, Scripture mentions four rivers 2); and the right hand is nobler than the left: hence it was as rising in paradise (Gn. 2:10). But the rivers there men- fitting that God should place the earthly paradise in the tioned have visible sources elsewhere, as is clear from the east. Philosopher (Meteor. i). Therefore paradise is not a cor- Reply to Objection 1. Bede’s assertion is untrue, if poreal place. taken in its obvious sense. It may, however, be explained Objection 3. Further, although men have explored the to mean that paradise reaches to the moon, not literally, entire habitable world, yet none have made mention of the but figuratively; because, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3), place of paradise. Therefore apparently it is not a corpo- the atmosphere there is “a continually even temperature”; real place. and in this respect it is like the heavenly bodies, which are Objection 4. Further, the tree of life is described as devoid of opposing elements. Mention, however, is made growing in paradise. But the tree of life is a spiritual of the moon rather than of other bodies, because, of all the thing, for it is written of Wisdom that “She is a tree of heavenly bodies, the moon is nearest to us, and is, more- life to them that lay hold on her” (Prov. 3:18). Therefore over, the most akin to the earth; hence it is observed to paradise also is not a corporeal, but a spiritual place. be overshadowed by clouds so as to be almost obscured. Objection 5. Further, if paradise be a corporeal place, Others say that paradise reached to the moon—that is, to the trees also of paradise must be corporeal. But it seems the middle space of the air, where rain, and wind, and the they were not; for corporeal trees were produced on the like arise; because the moon is said to have influence on third day, while the planting of the trees of paradise is such changes. But in this sense it would not be a fit place recorded after the work of the six days. Therefore par- for human dwelling, through being uneven in temperature, adise was not a corporeal place. and not attuned to the human temperament, as is the lower On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 1): atmosphere in the neighborhood of the earth. “Three general opinions prevail about paradise. Some un- Reply to Objection 2. Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. derstand a place merely corporeal; others a place entirely viii, 7): “It is probable that man has no idea where par- spiritual; while others, whose opinion, I confess, hold that adise was, and that the rivers, whose sources are said to be paradise was both corporeal and spiritual.” known, flowed for some distance underground, and then I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, sprang up elsewhere. For who is not aware that such is the 21): “Nothing prevents us from holding, within proper case with some other streams?” limits, a spiritual paradise; so long as we believe in the Reply to Objection 3. The situation of paradise is truth of the events narrated as having there occurred.” For shut off from the habitable world by mountains, or seas, whatever Scripture tells us about paradise is set down as or some torrid region, which cannot be crossed; and so matter of history; and wherever Scripture makes use of people who have written about topography make no men- this method, we must hold to the historical truth of the tion of it. ∗ Strabus, Gloss on Gn. 2:8 511 Reply to Objection 4. The tree of life is a material ad lit. v, 5, viii, 3), the plants were not actually produced tree, and so called because its fruit was endowed with a on the third day, but in their seminal virtues; whereas, af- life-preserving power as above stated (q. 97 , a. 4). Yet ter the work of the six days, the plants, both of paradise it had a spiritual signification; as the rock in the desert and others, were actually produced. According to other was of a material nature, and yet signified Christ. In like holy writers, we ought to say that all the plants were ac- manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a tually produced on the third day, including the trees of material tree, so called in view of future events; because, paradise; and what is said of the trees of paradise being after eating of it, man was to learn, by experience of the planted after the work of the six days is to be understood, consequent punishment, the difference between the good they say, by way of recapitulation. Whence our text reads: of obedience and the evil of rebellion. It may also be said “The Lord God had planted a paradise of pleasure from to signify spiritually the free-will as some say. the beginning” (Gn. 2:8). Reply to Objection 5. According to Augustine (Gen. Whether paradise was a place adapted to be the abode of man? Ia q. 102 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that paradise was not a corruption by food. Among those things which corrupt place adapted to be the abode of man. For man and angels the body from without, the chief seems to be an atmo- are similarly ordered to beatitude. But the angels from the sphere of unequal temperature; and to such corruption a very beginning of their existence were made to dwell in remedy is found in an atmosphere of equable nature. In the abode of the blessed—that is, the empyrean heaven. paradise both conditions were found; because, as Dama- Therefore the place of man’s habitation should have been scene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): “Paradise was perme- there also. ated with the all pervading brightness of a temperate, pure, Objection 2. Further, if some definite place were re- and exquisite atmosphere, and decked with ever-flowering quired for man’s abode, this would be required on the part plants.” Whence it is clear that paradise was most fit to be either of the soul or of the body. If on the part of the soul, a dwelling-place for man, and in keeping with his original the place would be in heaven, which is adapted to the na- state of immortality. ture of the soul; since the desire of heaven is implanted Reply to Objection 1. The empyrean heaven is the in all. On the part of the body, there was no need for highest of corporeal places, and is outside the region of any other place than the one provided for other animals. change. By the first of these two conditions, it is a fit- Therefore paradise was not at all adapted to be the abode ting abode for the angelic nature: for, as Augustine says of man. (De Trin. ii), “God rules corporeal creatures through spir- Objection 3. Further, a place which contains nothing itual creatures.” Hence it is fitting that the spiritual nature is useless. But after sin, paradise was not occupied by should be established above the entire corporeal nature, as man. Therefore if it were adapted as a dwelling-place for presiding over it. By the second condition, it is a fitting man, it seems that God made paradise to no purpose. abode for the state of beatitude, which is endowed with Objection 4. Further, since man is of an even temper- the highest degree of stability. Thus the abode of beati- ament, a fitting place for him should be of even tempera- tude was suited to the very nature of the angel; therefore ture. But paradise was not of an even temperature; for it is he was created there. But it is not suited to man’s nature, said to have been on the equator—a situation of extreme since man is not set as a ruler over the entire corporeal heat, since twice in the year the sun passes vertically over creation: it is a fitting abode for man in regard only to the heads of its inhabitants. Therefore paradise was not a his beatitude. Wherefore he was not placed from the be- fit dwelling-place for man. ginning in the empyrean heaven, but was destined to be On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, transferred thither in the state of his final beatitude. 11): “Paradise was a divinely ordered region, and worthy Reply to Objection 2. It is ridiculous to assert that of him who was made to God’s image.” any particular place is natural to the soul or to any spir- I answer that, As above stated (q. 97, a. 1), Man itual substances, though some particular place may have was incorruptible and immortal, not because his body had a certain fitness in regard to spiritual substances. For the a disposition to incorruptibility, but because in his soul earthly paradise was a place adapted to man, as regards there was a power preserving the body from corruption. both his body and his soul—that is, inasmuch as in his Now the human body may be corrupted from within or soul was the force which preserved the human body from from without. From within, the body is corrupted by the corruption. This could not be said of the other animals. consumption of the humors, and by old age, as above ex- Therefore, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): plained (q. 97, a. 4), and man was able to ward off such “No irrational animal inhabited paradise”; although, by a 512 certain dispensation, the animals were brought thither by ity of day and night; that it is never too cold there, because God to Adam; and the serpent was able to trespass therein the sun is never too far off; and never too hot, because, al- by the complicity of the devil. though the sun passes over the heads of the inhabitants, it Reply to Objection 3. Paradise did not become use- does not remain long in that position. However, Aristotle less through being unoccupied by man after sin, just as distinctly says (Meteor. ii, 5) that such a region is unin- immortality was not conferred on man in vain, though he habitable on account of the heat. This seems to be more was to lose it. For thereby we learn God’s kindness to probable; because, even those regions where the sun does man, and what man lost by sin. Moreover, some say that not pass vertically overhead, are extremely hot on account Enoch and Elias still dwell in that paradise. of the mere proximity of the sun. But whatever be the Reply to Objection 4. Those who say that paradise truth of the matter, we must hold that paradise was situ- was on the equinoctial line are of opinion that such a situa- ated in a most temperate situation, whether on the equator tion is most temperate, on account of the unvarying equal- or elsewhere. Whether man was placed in paradise to dress it and keep it? Ia q. 102 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that man was not placed I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, in paradise to dress and keep it. For what was brought on 10), these words in Genesis may be understood in two him as a punishment of sin would not have existed in par- ways. First, in the sense that God placed man in paradise adise in the state of innocence. But the cultivation of the that He might Himself work in man and keep him, by soil was a punishment of sin (Gn. 3:17). Therefore man sanctifying him (for if this work cease, man at once re- was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it. lapses into darkness, as the air grows dark when the light Objection 2. Further, there is no need of a keeper ceases to shine); and by keeping man from all corruption when there is no fear of trespass with violence. But in par- and evil. Secondly, that man might dress and keep par- adise there was no fear of trespass with violence. There- adise, which dressing would not have involved labor, as it fore there was no need for man to keep paradise. did after sin; but would have been pleasant on account of Objection 3. Further, if man was placed in paradise man’s practical knowledge of the powers of nature. Nor to dress and keep it, man would apparently have been would man have kept paradise against a trespasser; but made for the sake of paradise, and not contrariwise; which he would have striven to keep paradise for himself lest he seems to be false. Therefore man was not place in par- should lose it by sin. All of which was for man’s good; adise to dress and keep it. wherefore paradise was ordered to man’s benefit, and not On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2: 15): “The Lord conversely. God took man and placed in the paradise of pleasure, to Whence the Replies to the Objections are made clear. dress and keep it.” Whether man was created in paradise? Ia q. 102 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that man was created I answer that, Paradise was a fitting abode for man as in paradise. For the angel was created in his dwelling- regards the incorruptibility of the primitive state. Now this place—namely, the empyrean heaven. But before sin par- incorruptibility was man’s, not by nature, but by a super- adise was a fitting abode for man. Therefore it seems that natural gift of God. Therefore that this might be attributed man was created in paradise. to God, and not to human nature, God made man outside Objection 2. Further, other animals remain in the of paradise, and afterwards placed him there to live there place where they are produced, as the fish in the water, during the whole of his animal life; and, having attained and walking animals on the earth from which they were to the spiritual life, to be transferred thence to heaven. made. Now man would have remained in paradise after Reply to Objection 1. The empyrean heaven was a he was created (q. 97, a. 4). Therefore he was created in fitting abode for the angels as regards their nature, and paradise. therefore they were created there. Objection 3. Further, woman was made in paradise. In the same way I reply to the second objection, for But man is greater than woman. Therefore much more those places befit those animals in their nature. should man have been made in paradise. Reply to Objection 3. Woman was made in paradise, On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:15): “God took not by reason of her own dignity, but on account of the man and placed him in paradise.” dignity of the principle from which her body was formed. 513 For the same reason the children would have been born in paradise, where their parents were already. 514 FIRST PART, QUESTION 103 Of the Government of Things in General (In Eight Articles) Having considered the creation of things and their distinction, we now consider in the third place the government thereof, and (1) the government of things in general; (2) in particular, the effects of this government. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the world is governed by someone? (2) What is the end of this government? (3) Whether the world is governed by one? (4) Of the effects of this government? (5) Whether all things are subject to Divine government? (6) Whether all things are immediately governed by God? (7) Whether the Divine government is frustrated in anything? (8) Whether anything is contrary to the Divine Providence? Whether the world is governed by anyone? Ia q. 103 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the world is not gov- goodness, which, as we have said above (q. 44, a. 4; q. 65, erned by anyone. For it belongs to those things to be gov- a. 2), was the cause of the production of things in exis- erned, which move or work for an end. But natural things tence. For as “it belongs to the best to produce the best,” which make up the greater part of the world do not move, it is not fitting that the supreme goodness of God should or work for an end; for they have no knowledge of their produce things without giving them their perfection. Now end. Therefore the world is not governed. a thing’s ultimate perfection consists in the attainment of Objection 2. Further, those things are governed which its end. Therefore it belongs to the Divine goodness, as it are moved towards an object. But the world does not ap- brought things into existence, so to lead them to their end: pear to be so directed, but has stability in itself. Therefore and this is to govern. it is not governed. Reply to Objection 1. A thing moves or operates for Objection 3. Further, what is necessarily determined an end in two ways. First, in moving itself to the end, by its own nature to one particular thing, does not require as man and other rational creatures; and such things have any external principle of government. But the principal knowledge of their end, and of the means to the end. Sec- parts of the world are by a certain necessity determined ondly, a thing is said to move or operate for an end, as to something particular in their actions and movements. though moved or directed by another thereto, as an ar- Therefore the world does not require to be governed. row directed to the target by the archer, who knows the On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 14:3): “But Thou, end unknown to the arrow. Wherefore, as the movement O Father, governest all things by Thy Providence.” And of the arrow towards a definite end shows clearly that it Boethius says (De Consol. iii): “Thou Who governest this is directed by someone with knowledge, so the unvary- universe by mandate eternal.” ing course of natural things which are without knowledge, I answer that, Certain ancient philosophers denied the shows clearly that the world is governed by some reason. government of the world, saying that all things happened Reply to Objection 2. In all created things there is by chance. But such an opinion can be refuted as impos- a stable element, at least primary matter; and something sible in two ways. First, by observation of things them- belonging to movement, if under movement we include selves: for we observe that in nature things happen always operation. And things need governing as to both: because or nearly always for the best; which would not be the case even that which is stable, since it is created from noth- unless some sort of providence directed nature towards ing, would return to nothingness were it not sustained by good as an end; which is to govern. Wherefore the un- a governing hand, as will be explained later (q. 104, a. 1). failing order we observe in things is a sign of their being Reply to Objection 3. The natural necessity inher- governed; for instance, if we enter a well-ordered house ent in those beings which are determined to a particular we gather therefrom the intention of him that put it in or- thing, is a kind of impression from God, directing them to der, as Tullius says (De Nat. Deorum ii), quoting Aristo- their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so tle∗. Secondly, this is clear from a consideration of Divine as to fly towards a certain point is an impression from the ∗ Cleanthes 515 archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference, fore, as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow inasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their shows the action of the archer, so the natural necessity of nature, while that which natural things receive from man things shows the government of Divine Providence. in addition to their nature is somewhat violent. Where- Whether the end of the government of the world is something outside the world? Ia q. 103 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the end of the gov- Universal Good; Which is good of Itself by virtue of Its ernment of the world is not something existing outside Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness; whereas the world. For the end of the government of a thing is that a particular good is good by participation. Now it is man- whereto the thing governed is brought. But that whereto ifest that in the whole created universe there is not a good a thing is brought is some good in the thing itself; thus which is not such by participation. Wherefore that good a sick man is brought back to health, which is something which is the end of the whole universe must be a good good in him. Therefore the end of government of things is outside the universe. some good not outside, but within the things themselves. Reply to Objection 1. We may acquire some good Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, in many ways: first, as a form existing in us, such as 1): “Some ends are an operation; some are a work”—i.e. health or knowledge; secondly, as something done by us, produced by an operation. But nothing can be produced as a builder attains his end by building a house; thirdly, by the whole universe outside itself; and operation exists as something good possessed or acquired by us, as the in the agent. Therefore nothing extrinsic can be the end of buyer of a field attains his end when he enters into posses- the government of things. sion. Wherefore nothing prevents something outside the Objection 3. Further, the good of the multitude seems universe being the good to which it is directed. to consist in order, and peace which is the “tranquillity of Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher is speaking of order,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). But the the ends of various arts; for the end of some arts consists world is composed of a multitude of things. Therefore the in the operation itself, as the end of a harpist is to play end of the government of the world is the peaceful order in the harp; whereas the end of other arts consists in some- things themselves. Therefore the end of the government thing produced, as the end of a builder is not the act of of the world is not an extrinsic good. building, but the house he builds. Now it may happen that On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 16:4): “The Lord something extrinsic is the end not only as made, but also hath made all things for Himself.” But God is outside the as possessed or acquired or even as represented, as if we entire order of the universe. Therefore the end of all things were to say that Hercules is the end of the statue made is something extrinsic to them. to represent him. Therefore we may say that some good I answer that, As the end of a thing corresponds to outside the whole universe is the end of the government its beginning, it is not possible to be ignorant of the end of the universe, as something possessed and represented; of things if we know their beginning. Therefore, since the for each thing tends to a participation thereof, and to an beginning of all things is something outside the universe, assimilation thereto, as far as is possible. namely, God, it is clear from what has been expounded Reply to Objection 3. A good existing in the uni- above (q. 44, Aa. 1,2), that we must conclude that the end verse, namely, the order of the universe, is an end thereof; of all things is some extrinsic good. This can be proved by this. however, is not its ultimate end, but is ordered to the reason. For it is clear that good has the nature of an end; extrinsic good as to the end: thus the order in an army is wherefore, a particular end of anything consists in some ordered to the general, as stated in Metaph. xii, Did. xi, particular good; while the universal end of all things is the 10. Whether the world is governed by one? Ia q. 103 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the world is not gov- one do not act against each other, except by the incapacity erned by one. For we judge the cause by the effect. Now, or unskillfulness of the ruler; which cannot apply to God. we see in the government of the universe that things are But created things agree not together, and act against each not moved and do not operate uniformly, but some contin- other; as is evident in the case of contraries. Therefore the gently and some of necessity in variously different ways. world is not governed by one. Therefore the world is not governed by one. Objection 3. Further, in nature we always find what is Objection 2. Further, things which are governed by the better. But it “is better that two should be together than 516 one” (Eccles. 4:9). Therefore the world is not governed Now the proper cause of unity is one. For it is clear that by one, but by many. several cannot be the cause of unity or concord, except so On the contrary, We confess our belief in one God far as they are united. Furthermore, what is one in itself is and one Lord, according to the words of the Apostle (1 a more apt and a better cause of unity than several things Cor. 8:6): “To us there is but one God, the Father. . . and united. Therefore a multitude is better governed by one one Lord”: and both of these pertain to government. For than by several. From this it follows that the government to the Lord belongs dominion over subjects; and the name of the world, being the best form of government, must be of God is taken from Providence as stated above (q. 13, by one. This is expressed by the Philosopher (Metaph. a. 8). Therefore the world is governed by one. xii, Did. xi, 10): “Things refuse to be ill governed; and I answer that, We must of necessity say that the world multiplicity of authorities is a bad thing, therefore there is governed by one. For since the end of the government should be one ruler.” of the world is that which is essentially good, which is the Reply to Objection 1. Movement is “the act of a thing greatest good; the government of the world must be the moved, caused by the mover.” Wherefore dissimilarity best kind of government. Now the best government is the of movements is caused by diversity of things moved, government by one. The reason of this is that government which diversity is essential to the perfection of the uni- is nothing but the directing of the things governed to the verse (q. 47, Aa. 1,2; q. 48, a. 2), and not by a diversity of end; which consists in some good. But unity belongs to governors. the idea of goodness, as Boethius proves (De Consol. iii, Reply to Objection 2. Although contraries do not 11) from this, that, as all things desire good, so do they agree with each other in their proximate ends, neverthe- desire unity; without which they would cease to exist. For less they agree in the ultimate end, so far as they are in- a thing so far exists as it is one. Whence we observe that cluded in the one order of the universe. things resist division, as far as they can; and the dissolu- Reply to Objection 3. If we consider individual tion of a thing arises from defect therein. Therefore the goods, then two are better than one. But if we consider intention of a ruler over a multitude is unity, or peace. the essential good, then no addition is possible. Whether the effect of government is one or many? Ia q. 103 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that there is but one ef- fect of the government of the world may be taken in three fect of the government of the world and not many. For the ways. First, on the part of the end itself; and in this way effect of government is that which is caused in the things there is but one effect, that is, assimilation to the supreme governed. This is one, namely, the good which consists in good. Secondly, the effect of the government of the world order; as may be seen in the example of an army. There- may be considered on the part of those things by means of fore the government of the world has but one effect. which the creature is made like to God. Thus there are, in Objection 2. Further, from one there naturally pro- general, two effects of the government. For the creature ceeds but one. But the world is governed by one as we is assimilated to God in two things; first, with regard to have proved (a. 3). Therefore also the effect of this gov- this, that God is good; and so the creature becomes like ernment is but one. Him by being good; and secondly, with regard to this, that Objection 3. Further, if the effect of government is God is the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature not one by reason of the unity of the Governor, it must be becomes like God by moving others to be good. Where- many by reason of the many things governed. But these fore there are two effects of government, the preservation are too numerous to be counted. Therefore we cannot as- of things in their goodness, and the moving of things to sign any definite number to the effects of government. good. Thirdly, we may consider in the individual the ef- On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): fects of the government of the world; and in this way they “God contains all and fills all by His providence and per- are without number. fect goodness.” But government belongs to providence. Reply to Objection 1. The order of the universe in- Therefore there are certain definite effects of the Divine cludes both the preservation of things created by God and government. their movement. As regards these two things we find or- I answer that, The effect of any action may be judged der among them, inasmuch as one is better than another; from its end; because it is by action that the attainment and one is moved by another. of the end is effected. Now the end of the government From what has been said above, we can gather the of the world is the essential good, to the participation and replies to the other two objections. similarity of which all things tend. Consequently the ef- 517 Whether all things are subject to the Divine government? Ia q. 103 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that not all things are abandoned the earth” (Ezech. 9:9). subject to the Divine government. For it is written (Ec- Reply to Objection 1. These things are said to be un- cles. 9:11): “I saw that under the sun the race is not to the der the sun which are generated and corrupted according swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, to the sun’s movement. In all such things we find chance: nor riches to the learned, nor favor to the skillful, but time not that everything is casual which occurs in such things; and chance in all.” But things subject to the Divine gov- but that in each one there is an element of chance. And ernment are not ruled by chance. Therefore those things the very fact that an element of chance is found in those which are under the sun are not subject to the Divine gov- things proves that they are subject to government of some ernment. kind. For unless corruptible things were governed by a Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9): higher being, they would tend to nothing definite, espe- “God hath no care for oxen.” But he that governs has care cially those which possess no kind of knowledge. So noth- for the things he governs. Therefore all things are not sub- ing would happen unintentionally; which constitutes the ject to the Divine government. nature of chance. Wherefore to show how things happen Objection 3. Further, what can govern itself needs not by chance and yet according to the ordering of a higher to be governed by another. But the rational creature can cause, he does not say absolutely that he observes chance govern itself; since it is master of its own act, and acts in all things, but “time and chance,” that is to say, that of itself; and is not made to act by another, which seems defects may be found in these things according to some proper to things which are governed. Therefore all things order of time. are not subject to the Divine government. Reply to Objection 2. Government implies a cer- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 11): tain change effected by the governor in the things gov- “Not only heaven and earth, not only man and angel, even erned. Now every movement is the act of a movable thing, the bowels of the lowest animal, even the wing of the bird, caused by the moving principle, as is laid down Phys. iii, the flower of the plant, the leaf of the tree, hath God en- 3. And every act is proportionate to that of which it is dowed with every fitting detail of their nature.” Therefore an act. Consequently, various movable things must be all things are subject to His government. moved variously, even as regards movement by one and I answer that, For the same reason is God the ruler of the same mover. Thus by the one art of the Divine gov- things as He is their cause, because the same gives exis- ernor, various things are variously governed according to tence as gives perfection; and this belongs to government. their variety. Some, according to their nature, act of them- Now God is the cause not indeed only of some particular selves, having dominion over their actions; and these are kind of being, but of the whole universal being, as proved governed by God, not only in this, that they are moved by above (q. 44, Aa. 1,2). Wherefore, as there can be noth- God Himself, Who works in them interiorly; but also in ing which is not created by God, so there can be nothing this, that they are induced by Him to do good and to fly which is not subject to His government. This can also from evil, by precepts and prohibitions, rewards and pun- be proved from the nature of the end of government. For ishments. But irrational creatures which do not act but are a man’s government extends over all those things which acted upon, are not thus governed by God. Hence, when come under the end of his government. Now the end of the Apostle says that “God hath no care for oxen,” he does the Divine government is the Divine goodness; as we have not wholly withdraw them from the Divine government, shown (a. 2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing that is but only as regards the way in which rational creatures are not ordered to the Divine goodness as its end, as is clear governed. from what we have said above (q. 44, a. 4; q. 65, a. 2), Reply to Objection 3. The rational creature governs so it is impossible for anything to escape from the Divine itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to government. be governed and perfected by the Divine intellect and Foolish therefore was the opinion of those who said will. Therefore above the government whereby the ra- that the corruptible lower world, or individual things, or tional creature governs itself as master of its own act, it that even human affairs, were not subject to the Divine requires to be governed by God. government. These are represented as saying, “God hath 518 Whether all things are immediately governed by God? Ia q. 103 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that all things are gov- The reason of this is that as God is the very essence erned by God immediately. For Gregory of Nyssa (Neme- of goodness, so everything must be attributed to God in sius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves the opinion of Plato who its highest degree of goodness. Now the highest degree of divides providence into three parts. The first he ascribes goodness in any practical order, design or knowledge (and to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly things such is the design of government) consists in knowing the and all universals; the second providence he attributes to individuals acted upon; as the best physician is not the the secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to one who can only give his attention to general principles, watch over generation and corruption; while he ascribes but who can consider the least details; and so on in other a third providence to certain spirits who are guardians on things. Therefore we must say that God has the design of earth of human actions. Therefore it seems that all things the government of all things, even of the very least. are immediately governed by God. But since things which are governed should be Objection 2. Further, it is better that a thing be done brought to perfection by government, this government by one, if possible, than by many, as the Philosopher says will be so much the better in the degree the things gov- (Phys. viii, 6). But God can by Himself govern all things erned are brought to perfection. Now it is a greater per- without any intermediary cause. Therefore it seems that fection for a thing to be good in itself and also the cause of He governs all things immediately. goodness in others, than only to be good in itself. There- Objection 3. Further, in God nothing is defective or fore God so governs things that He makes some of them imperfect. But it seems to be imperfect in a ruler to gov- to be causes of others in government; as a master, who ern by means of others; thus an earthly king, by reason not only imparts knowledge to his pupils, but gives also of his not being able to do everything himself, and be- the faculty of teaching others. cause he cannot be everywhere at the same time, requires Reply to Objection 1. Plato’s opinion is to be re- to govern by means of ministers. Therefore God governs jected, because he held that God did not govern all things all things immediately. immediately, even in the design of government; this is On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): “As clear from the fact that he divided providence, which is the lower and grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly the design of government, into three parts. way by bodies of greater subtlety and power; so all bodies Reply to Objection 2. If God governed alone, things are ruled by the rational spirit of life; and the sinful and would be deprived of the perfection of causality. Where- unfaithful spirit is ruled by the good and just spirit of life; fore all that is effected by many would not be accom-and this spirit by God Himself.” plished by one. I answer that, In government there are two things to Reply to Objection 3. That an earthly king should be considered; the design of government, which is prov- have ministers to execute his laws is a sign not only of idence itself; and the execution of the design. As to the his being imperfect, but also of his dignity; because by design of government, God governs all things immedi- the ordering of ministers the kingly power is brought into ately; whereas in its execution, He governs some things greater evidence. by means of others. Whether anything can happen outside the order of the Divine government? Ia q. 103 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem possible that something with the eternal design. Therefore, if nothing happens may occur outside the order of the Divine government. outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that For Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that “God disposes all all things happen by necessity, and nothing is contingent; for good.” Therefore, if nothing happens outside the or- which is false. Therefore it is possible for something to der of the Divine government, it would follow that no evil occur outside the order of the Divine government. exists. On the contrary, It is written (Esther 13:9): “O Lord, Objection 2. Further, nothing that is in accordance Lord, almighty King, all things are in Thy power, and with the pre-ordination of a ruler occurs by chance. there is none that can resist Thy will.” Therefore, if nothing occurs outside the order of the Di- I answer that, It is possible for an effect to result out-vine government, it follows that there is nothing fortuitous side the order of some particular cause; but not outside and casual. the order of the universal cause. The reason of this is that Objection 3. Further, the order of Divine Providence no effect results outside the order of a particular cause, is certain and unchangeable; because it is in accordance except through some other impeding cause; which other 519 cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause; evil through its escaping from the order of some particu-as indigestion may occur outside the order of the nutri- lar good. If it wholly escaped from the order of the Divine tive power by some such impediment as the coarseness government, it would wholly cease to exist. of the food, which again is to be ascribed to some other Reply to Objection 2. Things are said to be fortuitous cause, and so on till we come to the first universal cause. as regards some particular cause from the order of which Therefore as God is the first universal cause, not of one they escape. But as to the order of Divine providence, genus only, but of all being in general, it is impossible for “nothing in the world happens by chance,” as Augustine anything to occur outside the order of the Divine govern- declares (QQ. 83, qu. 24). ment; but from the very fact that from one point of view Reply to Objection 3. Certain effects are said to be something seems to evade the order of Divine providence contingent as compared to their proximate causes, which considered in regard to one particular cause, it must nec- may fail in their effects; and not as though anything could essarily come back to that order as regards some other happen entirely outside the order of Divine government. cause. The very fact that something occurs outside the order of Reply to Objection 1. There is nothing wholly evil some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself in the world, for evil is ever founded on good, as shown subject to the Divine government. above (q. 48, a. 3). Therefore something is said to be Whether anything can resist the order of the Divine government? Ia q. 103 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem possible that some resis- ways: firstly from the fact that the order of the Divine gov- tance can be made to the order of the Divine government. ernment is wholly directed to good, and everything by its For it is written (Is. 3:8): “Their tongue and their devices own operation and effort tends to good only, “for no one are against the Lord.” acts intending evil,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): Objection 2. Further, a king does not justly punish secondly from the fact that, as we have said above (a. 1, ad those who do not rebel against his commands. Therefore 3; a. 5, ad 2), every inclination of anything, whether natu- if no one rebelled against God’s commands, no one would ral or voluntary, is nothing but a kind of impression from be justly punished by God. the first mover; as the inclination of the arrow towards a Objection 3. Further, everything is subject to the or- fixed point is nothing but an impulse received from the der of the Divine government. But some things oppose archer. Wherefore every agent, whether natural or free, others. Therefore some things rebel against the order of attains to its divinely appointed end, as though of its own the Divine government. accord. For this reason God is said “to order all things On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii): sweetly.” “There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this Reply to Objection 1. Some are said to think or sovereign good. It is this sovereign good therefore that speak, or act against God: not that they entirely resist the ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly,” as is said order of the Divine government; for even the sinner in- (Wis. 8) of Divine wisdom. tends the attainment of a certain good: but because they I answer that, We may consider the order of Divine resist some particular good, which belongs to their nature providence in two ways: in general, inasmuch as it pro- or state. Therefore they are justly punished by God. ceeds from the governing cause of all; and in particular, Reply obj. 2 is clear from the above. inasmuch as it proceeds from some particular cause which Reply to Objection 3. From the fact that one thing executes the order of the Divine government. opposes another, it follows that some one thing can resist Considered in the first way, nothing can resist the or- the order of a particular cause; but not that order which der of the Divine government. This can be proved in two depends on the universal cause of all things. 520 FIRST PART, QUESTION 104 The Special Effects of the Divine Government (In Four Articles) We next consider the effects of the Divine government in particular; concerning which four points of inquiry arise: (1) Whether creatures need to be kept in existence by God? (2) Whether they are immediately preserved by God? (3) Whether God can reduce anything to nothingness? (4) Whether anything is reduced to nothingness? Whether creatures need to be kept in being by God? Ia q. 104 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that creatures do not need Objection 4. Further, if God keeps creatures in be- to be kept in being by God. For what cannot not-be, does ing, this is done by some action. Now every action of an not need to be kept in being; just as that which cannot de- agent, if that action be efficacious, produces something in part, does not need to be kept from departing. But some the effect. Therefore the preserving power of God must creatures by their very nature cannot not-be. Therefore produce something in the creature. But this is not so; be- not all creatures need to be kept in being by God. The cause this action does not give being to the creature, since middle proposition is proved thus. That which is included being is not given to that which already is: nor does it add in the nature of a thing is necessarily in that thing, and its anything new to the creature; because either God would contrary cannot be in it; thus a multiple of two must nec- not keep the creature in being continually, or He would be essarily be even, and cannot possibly be an odd number. continually adding something new to the creature; either Now form brings being with itself, because everything is of which is unreasonable. Therefore creatures are not kept actually in being, so far as it has form. But some crea- in being by God. tures are subsistent forms, as we have said of the angels On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 1:3): “Upholding (q. 50, Aa. 2,5): and thus to be is in them of themselves. all things by the word of His power.” The same reasoning applies to those creatures whose mat- I answer that, Both reason and faith bind us to say ter is in potentiality to one form only, as above explained that creatures are kept in being by God. To make this of heavenly bodies (q. 66, a. 2). Therefore such creatures clear, we must consider that a thing is preserved by an- as these have in their nature to be necessarily, and cannot other in two ways. First, indirectly, and accidentally; not-be; for there can be no potentiality to not-being, either thus a person is said to preserve anything by removing in the form which has being of itself, or in matter exist- the cause of its corruption, as a man may be said to pre- ing under a form which it cannot lose, since it is not in serve a child, whom he guards from falling into the fire. In potentiality to any other form. this way God preserves some things, but not all, for there Objection 2. Further, God is more powerful than any are some things of such a nature that nothing can corrupt created agent. But a created agent, even after ceasing to them, so that it is not necessary to keep them from cor- act, can cause its effect to be preserved in being; thus the ruption. Secondly, a thing is said to preserve another ‘per house continues to stand after the builder has ceased to se’ and directly, namely, when what is preserved depends build; and water remains hot for some time after the fire on the preserver in such a way that it cannot exist without has ceased to heat. Much more, therefore, can God cause it. In this manner all creatures need to be preserved by His creature to be kept in being, after He has ceased to God. For the being of every creature depends on God, so create it. that not for a moment could it subsist, but would fall into Objection 3. Further, nothing violent can occur, ex- nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of cept there be some active cause thereof. But tendency to the Divine power, as Gregory says (Moral. xvi). not-being is unnatural and violent to any creature, since This is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on all creatures naturally desire to be. Therefore no creature its cause, so far as it is its cause. But we must observe that can tend to not-being, except through some active cause an agent may be the cause of the “becoming” of its effect, of corruption. Now there are creatures of such a nature but not directly of its “being.” This may be seen both in that nothing can cause them to corrupt; such are spiritual artificial and in natural beings: for the builder causes the substances and heavenly bodies. Therefore such creatures house in its “becoming,” but he is not the direct cause of cannot tend to not-being, even if God were to withdraw its “being.” For it is clear that the “being” of the house is His action. a result of its form, which consists in the putting together 521 and arrangement of the materials, and results from the nat-it has the form of fire imperfectly and inchoately, the heat ural qualities of certain things. Thus a cook dresses the will remain for a time only, by reason of the imperfect food by applying the natural activity of fire; thus a builder participation of the principle of heat. On the other hand, constructs a house, by making use of cement, stones, and air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same wood which are able to be put together in a certain or- way as it exists in the sun, which is the principle of light. der and to preserve it. Therefore the “being” of a house Therefore, since it has not root in the air, the light ceases depends on the nature of these materials, just as its “be- with the action of the sun. coming” depends on the action of the builder. The same Now every creature may be compared to God, as the principle applies to natural things. For if an agent is not air is to the sun which enlightens it. For as the sun pos- the cause of a form as such, neither will it be directly the sesses light by its nature, and as the air is enlightened by cause of “being” which results from that form; but it will sharing the sun’s nature; so God alone is Being in virtue be the cause of the effect, in its “becoming” only. of His own Essence, since His Essence is His existence; Now it is clear that of two things in the same species whereas every creature has being by participation, so that one cannot directly cause the other’s form as such, since it its essence is not its existence. Therefore, as Augustine would then be the cause of its own form, which is essen- says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): “If the ruling power of God tially the same as the form of the other; but it can be the were withdrawn from His creatures, their nature would at cause of this form for as much as it is in matter—in other once cease, and all nature would collapse.” In the same words, it may be the cause that “this matter” receives “this work (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) he says: “As the air becomes form.” And this is to be the cause of “becoming,” as when light by the presence of the sun, so is man enlightened by man begets man, and fire causes fire. Thus whenever a the presence of God, and in His absence returns at once to natural effect is such that it has an aptitude to receive from darkness.” its active cause an impression specifically the same as in Reply to Objection 1. “Being” naturally results from that active cause, then the “becoming” of the effect, but the form of a creature, given the influence of the Divine not its “being,” depends on the agent. action; just as light results from the diaphanous nature of Sometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to the air, given the action of the sun. Wherefore the po- receive the impression of its cause, in the same way as it tentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures and heavenly exists in the agent: as may be seen clearly in all agents bodies is rather something in God, Who can withdraw His which do not produce an effect of the same species as influence, than in the form or matter of those creatures. themselves: thus the heavenly bodies cause the genera- Reply to Objection 2. God cannot grant to a creature tion of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. to be preserved in being after the cessation of the Divine Such an agent can be the cause of a form as such, and influence: as neither can He make it not to have received not merely as existing in this matter, consequently it is its being from Himself. For the creature needs to be pre- not merely the cause of “becoming” but also the cause of served by God in so far as the being of an effect depends “being.” on the cause of its being. So that there is no comparison Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue with an agent that is not the cause of ‘being’ but only of when that action of the agent ceases which causes the “be- “becoming.” coming” of the effect: so neither can the “being” of a thing Reply to Objection 3. This argument holds in regard continue after that action of the agent has ceased, which is to that preservation which consists in the removal of cor- the cause of the effect not only in “becoming” but also in ruption: but all creatures do not need to be preserved thus, “being.” This is why hot water retains heat after the ces- as stated above. sation of the fire’s action; while, on the contrary, the air Reply to Objection 4. The preservation of things by does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when God is a continuation of that action whereby He gives ex- the sun ceases to act upon it, because water is a matter istence, which action is without either motion or time; so susceptive of the fire’s heat in the same way as it exists in also the preservation of light in the air is by the continual the fire. Wherefore if it were to be reduced to the perfect influence of the sun. form of fire, it would retain that form always; whereas if Whether God preserves every creature immediately? Ia q. 104 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that God preserves ev- serves all things immediately. ery creature immediately. For God creates and preserves Objection 2. Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to things by the same action, as above stated (a. 1, ad 4). But another. But it cannot be given to a creature to preserve God created all things immediately. Therefore He pre- itself; much less therefore can it be given to a creature 522 to preserve another. Therefore God preserves all things vation and continuation of things is ascribed to the higher without any intermediate cause preserving them. causes: thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, Objection 3. Further, an effect is kept in being by the 6), that the first, namely the diurnal movement is the cause cause, not only of its “becoming,” but also of its being. of the continuation of things generated; whereas the sec- But all created causes do not seem to cause their effects ond movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of except in their “becoming,” for they cause only by mov- diversity owing to generation and corruption. In like man- ing, as above stated (q. 45, a. 3). Therefore they do not ner astrologers ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the plan- cause so as to keep their effects in being. ets, those things which are permanent and fixed. So we On the contrary, A thing is kept in being by that conclude that God keeps certain things in being, by means which gives it being. But God gives being by means of certain causes. of certain intermediate causes. Therefore He also keeps Reply to Objection 1. God created all things imme- things in being by means of certain causes. diately, but in the creation itself He established an order I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), a thing keeps among things, so that some depend on others, by which another in being in two ways; first, indirectly and acciden- they are preserved in being, though He remains the prin- tally, by removing or hindering the action of a corrupting cipal cause of their preservation. cause; secondly, directly and “per se,” by the fact that that Reply to Objection 2. Since an effect is preserved on it depends the other’s being, as the being of the effect by its proper cause on which it depends; just as no ef- depends on the cause. And in both ways a created thing fect can be its own cause, but can only produce another keeps another in being. For it is clear that even in corpo- effect, so no effect can be endowed with the power of real things there are many causes which hinder the action self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving of corrupting agents, and for that reason are called preser- another. vatives; just as salt preserves meat from putrefaction; and Reply to Objection 3. No created nature can be the in like manner with many other things. It happens also cause of another, as regards the latter acquiring a new that an effect depends on a creature as to its being. For form, or disposition, except by virtue of some change; when we have a series of causes depending on one an- for the created nature acts always on something presup- other, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends posed. But after causing the form or disposition in the first and principally on the first cause, it also depends in effect, without any fresh change in the effect, the cause a secondary way on all the middle causes. Therefore the preserves that form or disposition; as in the air, when it first cause is the principal cause of the preservation of the is lit up anew, we must allow some change to have taken effect which is to be referred to the middle causes in a place, while the preservation of the light is without any secondary way; and all the more so, as the middle cause further change in the air due to the presence of the source is higher and nearer to the first cause. of light. For this reason, even in things corporeal, the preser- Whether God can annihilate anything? Ia q. 104 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot anni- corruption. Therefore God cannot annihilate anything. hilate anything. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21) On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 10:24): “Correct that “God is not the cause of anything tending to non- me, O Lord, but yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury, existence.” But He would be such a cause if He were to lest Thou bring me to nothing.” annihilate anything. Therefore He cannot annihilate any- I answer that, Some have held that God, in giving ex- thing. istence to creatures, acted from natural necessity. Were Objection 2. Further, by His goodness God is the this true, God could not annihilate anything, since His na- cause why things exist, since, as Augustine says (De ture cannot change. But, as we have said above (q. 19, Doctr. Christ. i, 32): “Because God is good, we exist.” a. 4), such an opinion is entirely false, and absolutely con- But God cannot cease to be good. Therefore He cannot trary to the Catholic faith, which confesses that God cre- cause things to cease to exist; which would be the case ated things of His own free-will, according to Ps. 134:6: were He to annihilate anything. “Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done.” Therefore Objection 3. Further, if God were to annihilate any- that God gives existence to a creature depends on His will; thing it would be by His action. But this cannot be; be- nor does He preserve things in existence otherwise than by cause the term of every action is existence. Hence even the continually pouring out existence into them, as we have action of a corrupting cause has its term in something gen- said. Therefore, just as before things existed, God was erated; for when one thing is generated another undergoes free not to give them existence, and not to make them; so 523 after they are made, He is free not to continue their exis-Reply to Objection 2. God’s goodness is the cause tence; and thus they would cease to exist; and this would of things, not as though by natural necessity, because the be to annihilate them. Divine goodness does not depend on creatures; but by His Reply to Objection 1. Non-existence has no direct free-will. Wherefore, as without prejudice to His good- cause; for nothing is a cause except inasmuch as it has ness, He might not have produced things into existence, existence, and a being essentially as such is a cause of so, without prejudice to His goodness, He might not pre- something existing. Therefore God cannot cause a thing serve things in existence. to tend to non-existence, whereas a creature has this ten- Reply to Objection 3. If God were to annihilate any- dency of itself, since it is produced from nothing. But thing, this would not imply an action on God’s part; but a indirectly God can be the cause of things being reduced to mere cessation of His action. non-existence, by withdrawing His action therefrom. Whether anything is annihilated? Ia q. 104 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that something is annihi- ruption. Moreover, the annihilation of things does not per- lated. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But in the tain to the manifestation of grace; since rather the power beginning there was nothing but God. Therefore all things and goodness of God are manifested by the preservation must tend to this end, that there shall be nothing but God. of things in existence. Wherefore we must conclude by Therefore creatures will be reduced to nothing. denying absolutely that anything at all will be annihilated. Objection 2. Further, every creature has a finite Reply to Objection 1. That things are brought into power. But no finite power extends to the infinite. Where- existence from a state of non-existence, clearly shows the fore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that, “a finite power of Him Who made them; but that they should be power cannot move in infinite time.” Therefore a creature reduced to nothing would hinder that manifestation, since cannot last for an infinite duration; and so at some time it the power of God is conspicuously shown in His preserv- will be reduced to nothing. ing all things in existence, according to the Apostle: “Up- Objection 3. Further, forms and accidents have no holding all things by the word of His power” (Heb. 1:3). matter as part of themselves. But at some time they cease Reply to Objection 2. A creature’s potentiality to ex- to exist. Therefore they are reduced to nothing. istence is merely receptive; the active power belongs to On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 3:14): “I have God Himself, from Whom existence is derived. Where- learned that all the works that God hath made continue for fore the infinite duration of things is a consequence of the ever.” infinity of the Divine power. To some things, however, is I answer that, Some of those things which God does given a determinate power of duration for a certain time, in creatures occur in accordance with the natural course so far as they may be hindered by some contrary agent of things; others happen miraculously, and not in accor- from receiving the influx of existence which comes from dance with the natural order, as will be explained (q. 105, Him Whom finite power cannot resist, for an infinite, but a. 6). Now whatever God wills to do according to the nat- only for a fixed time. So things which have no contrary, ural order of things may be observed from their nature; but although they have a finite power, continue to exist for those things which occur miraculously, are ordered for the ever. manifestation of grace, according to the Apostle, “To each Reply to Objection 3. Forms and accidents are not one is given the manifestation of the Spirit, unto profit” (1 complete beings, since they do not subsist: but each one Cor. 12:7); and subsequently he mentions, among others, of them is something “of a being”; for it is called a be- the working of miracles. ing, because something is by it. Yet so far as their mode Now the nature of creatures shows that none of them is of existence is concerned, they are not entirely reduced to annihilated. For, either they are immaterial, and therefore nothingness; not that any part of them survives, but that have no potentiality to non-existence; or they are material, they remain in the potentiality of the matter, or of the sub- and then they continue to exist, at least in matter, which is ject. incorruptible, since it is the subject of generation and cor- 524 FIRST PART, QUESTION 105 Of the Change of Creatures by God (In Eight Articles) We now consider the second effect of the Divine government, i.e. the change of creatures; and first, the change of creatures by God; secondly, the change of one creature by another. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether God can move immediately the matter to the form? (2) Whether He can immediately move a body? (3) Whether He can move the intellect? (4) Whether He can move the will? (5) Whether God works in every worker? (6) Whether He can do anything outside the order imposed on things? (7) Whether all that God does is miraculous? (8) Of the diversity of miracles. Whether God can move the matter immediately to the form? Ia q. 105 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot move Reply to Objection 1. An effect is assimilated to the the matter immediately to receive the form. For as the active cause in two ways. First, according to the same Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), nothing can species; as man is generated by man, and fire by fire. Sec- bring a form into any particular matter, except that form ondly, by being virtually contained in the cause; as the which is in matter; because, like begets like. But God is form of the effect is virtually contained in its cause: thus not a form in matter. Therefore He cannot cause a form in animals produced by putrefaction, and plants, and miner- matter. als are like the sun and stars, by whose power they are Objection 2. Further, any agent inclined to several ef- produced. In this way the effect is like its active cause fects will produce none of them, unless it is determined to as regards all that over which the power of that cause ex- a particular one by some other cause; for, as the Philoso- tends. Now the power of God extends to both matter and pher says (De Anima iii, 11), a general assertion does not form; as we have said above (q. 14, a. 2; q. 44, a. 2); move the mind, except by means of some particular ap- wherefore if a composite thing be produced, it is likened prehension. But the Divine power is the universal cause to God by way of a virtual inclusion; or it is likened to the of all things. Therefore it cannot produce any particular composite generator by a likeness of species. Therefore form, except by means of a particular agent. just as the composite generator can move matter to a form Objection 3. As universal being depends on the first by generating a composite thing like itself; so also can universal cause, so determinate being depends on deter- God. But no other form not existing in matter can do this; minate particular causes; as we have seen above (q. 104, because the power of no other separate substance extends a. 2). But the determinate being of a particular thing is over matter. Hence angels and demons operate on visible from its own form. Therefore the forms of things are pro- matter; not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making duced by God, only by means of particular causes. use of corporeal seeds. On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:7): “God formed Reply to Objection 2. This argument would hold if man of the slime of the earth.” God were to act of natural necessity. But since He acts by I answer that, God can move matter immediately to His will and intellect, which knows the particular and not form; because whatever is in passive potentiality can be only the universal natures of all forms, it follows that He reduced to act by the active power which extends over can determinately imprint this or that form on matter. that potentiality. Therefore, since the Divine power ex- Reply to Objection 3. The fact that secondary causes tends over matter, as produced by God, it can be reduced are ordered to determinate effects is due to God; where- to act by the Divine power: and this is what is meant by fore since God ordains other causes to certain effects He matter being moved to a form; for a form is nothing else can also produce certain effects by Himself without any but the act of matter. other cause. 525 Whether God can move a body immediately? Ia q. 105 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot move a fore, as God can imprint form immediately in matter, it body immediately. For as the mover and the moved must follows that He can move any body whatever in respect of exist simultaneously, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, any movement whatever. 2), it follows that there must be some contact between Reply to Objection 1. There are two kinds of contact; the mover and moved. But there can be no contact be- corporeal contact, when two bodies touch each other; and tween God and a body; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): virtual contact, as the cause of sadness is said to touch the “There is no contact with God.” Therefore God cannot one made sad. According to the first kind of contact, God, move a body immediately. as being incorporeal, neither touches, nor is touched; but Objection 2. Further, God is the mover unmoved. according to virtual contact He touches creatures by mov- But such also is the desirable object when apprehended. ing them; but He is not touched, because the natural power Therefore God moves as the object of desire and appre- of no creature can reach up to Him. Thus did Dionysius hension. But He cannot be apprehended except by the understand the words, “There is no contact with God”; intellect, which is neither a body nor a corporeal power. that is, so that God Himself be touched. Therefore God cannot move a body immediately. Reply to Objection 2. God moves as the object of Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. desire and apprehension; but it does not follow that He viii, 10) that an infinite power moves instantaneously. But always moves as being desired and apprehended by that it is impossible for a body to be moved in one instant; which is moved; but as being desired and known by Him- for since every movement is between opposites, it follows self; for He does all things for His own goodness. that two opposites would exist at once in the same subject, Reply to Objection 3. The Philosopher (Phys. viii, which is impossible. Therefore a body cannot be moved 10) intends to prove that the power of the first mover is immediately by an infinite power. But God’s power is in- not a power of the first mover “of bulk,” by the following finite, as we have explained (q. 25, a. 2). Therefore God argument. The power of the first mover is infinite (which cannot move a body immediately. he proves from the fact that the first mover can move in On the contrary, God produced the works of the six infinite time). Now an infinite power, if it were a power days immediately among which is included the move- “of bulk,” would move without time, which is impossible; ments of bodies, as is clear from Gn. 1:9 “Let the waters therefore the infinite power of the first mover must be in be gathered together into one place.” Therefore God alone something which is not measured by its bulk. Whence it can move a body immediately. is clear that for a body to be moved without time can only I answer that, It is erroneous to say that God can- be the result of an infinite power. The reason is that ev- not Himself produce all the determinate effects which are ery power of bulk moves in its entirety; since it moves by produced by any created cause. Wherefore, since bodies the necessity of its nature. But an infinite power surpasses are moved immediately by created causes, we cannot pos- out of all proportion any finite power. Now the greater sibly doubt that God can move immediately any bodies the power of the mover, the greater is the velocity of the whatever. This indeed follows from what is above stated movement. Therefore, since a finite power moves in a de- (a. 1). For every movement of any body whatever, either terminate time, it follows that an infinite power does not results from a form, as the movements of things heavy move in any time; for between one time and any other and light result from the form which they have from their time there is some proportion. On the other hand, a power generating cause, for which reason the generator is called which is not in bulk is the power of an intelligent being, the mover; or else tends to a form, as heating tends to the which operates in its effects according to what is fitting to form of heat. Now it belongs to the same cause, to imprint them; and therefore, since it cannot be fitting for a body a form, to dispose to that form, and to give the movement to be moved without time, it does not follow that it moves which results from that form; for fire not only generates without time. fire, but it also heats and moves things upwards. There- Whether God moves the created intellect immediately? Ia q. 105 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that God does not imme- not proceed from that wherein it is; but from the mover. diately move the created intellect. For the action of the Therefore the intellect is not moved by another; and so intellect is governed by its own subject; since it does not apparently God cannot move the created intellect. pass into external matter; as stated in Metaph. ix, Did. Objection 2. Further, anything which in itself is a suf- viii, 8. But the action of what is moved by another does ficient principle of movement, is not moved by another. 526 But the movement of the intellect is its act of understand-the cause of all that follows, we must conclude that from ing; in the sense in which we say that to understand or to Him proceeds all intellectual power. In like manner, since feel is a kind of movement, as the Philosopher says (De He is the First Being, and all other beings pre-exist in Him Anima iii, 7). But the intellectual light which is natural to as in their First Cause, it follows that they exist intelligi- the soul, is a sufficient principle of understanding. There- bly in Him, after the mode of His own Nature. For as the fore it is not moved by another. intelligible types of everything exist first of all in God, and Objection 3. Further, as the senses are moved by the are derived from Him by other intellects in order that these sensible, so the intellect is moved by the intelligible. But may actually understand; so also are they derived by crea- God is not intelligible to us, and exceeds the capacity of tures that they may subsist. Therefore God so moves the our intellect. Therefore God cannot move our intellect. created intellect, inasmuch as He gives it the intellectual On the contrary, The teacher moves the intellect of power, whether natural, or superadded; and impresses on the one taught. But it is written (Ps. 93:10) that God the created intellect the intelligible species, and maintains “teaches man knowledge.” Therefore God moves the hu- and preserves both power and species in existence. man intellect. Reply to Objection 1. The intellectual operation is I answer that, As in corporeal movement that is performed by the intellect in which it exists, as by a sec- called the mover which gives the form that is the principle ondary cause; but it proceeds from God as from its first of movement, so that is said to move the intellect, which cause. For by Him the power to understand is given to the is the cause of the form that is the principle of the intellec- one who understands. tual operation, called the movement of the intellect. Now Reply to Objection 2. The intellectual light together there is a twofold principle of intellectual operation in the with the likeness of the thing understood is a sufficient intelligent being; one which is the intellectual power it- principle of understanding; but it is a secondary principle, self, which principle exists in the one who understands in and depends upon the First Principle. potentiality; while the other is the principle of actual un- Reply to Objection 3. The intelligible object moves derstanding, namely, the likeness of the thing understood our human intellect, so far as, in a way, it impresses on it in the one who understands. So a thing is said to move its own likeness, by means of which the intellect is able the intellect, whether it gives to him who understands the to understand it. But the likenesses which God impresses power of understanding; or impresses on him the likeness on the created intellect are not sufficient to enable the cre- of the thing understood. ated intellect to understand Him through His Essence, as Now God moves the created intellect in both ways. we have seen above (q. 12, a. 2; q. 56, a. 3). Hence He For He is the First immaterial Being; and as intellectuality moves the created intellect, and yet He cannot be intelli- is a result of immateriality, it follows that He is the First gible to it, as we have explained (q. 12, a. 4). intelligent Being. Therefore since in each order the first is Whether God can move the created will? Ia q. 105 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot move accomplish.” the created will. For whatever is moved from without, is I answer that, As the intellect is moved by the object forced. But the will cannot be forced. Therefore it is not and by the Giver of the power of intelligence, as stated moved from without; and therefore cannot be moved by above (a. 3), so is the will moved by its object, which is God. good, and by Him who creates the power of willing. Now Objection 2. Further, God cannot make two contra- the will can be moved by good as its object, but by God dictories to be true at the same time. But this would follow alone sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move if He moved the will; for to be voluntarily moved means a movable thing sufficiently unless the active power of the to be moved from within, and not by another. Therefore mover surpasses or at least equals the potentiality of the God cannot move the will. thing movable. Now the potentiality of the will extends Objection 3. Further, movement is attributed to the to the universal good; for its object is the universal good; mover rather than to the one moved; wherefore homicide just as the object of the intellect is the universal being. But is not ascribed to the stone, but to the thrower. Therefore, every created good is some particular good; God alone is if God moves the will, it follows that voluntary actions are the universal good. Whereas He alone fills the capacity not imputed to man for reward or blame. But this is false. of the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object. In like Therefore God does not move the will. manner the power of willing is caused by God alone. For On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:13): “It is God to will is nothing but to be inclined towards the object of who worketh in us [Vulgate—‘you’] both to will and to the will, which is universal good. But to incline towards 527 the universal good belongs to the First Mover, to Whom not force it, because He gives the will its own natural inthe ultimate end is proportionate; just as in human affairs clination. to him that presides over the community belongs the di- Reply to Objection 2. To be moved voluntarily, is to recting of his subjects to the common weal. Wherefore in be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle: yet both ways it belongs to God to move the will; but espe- this interior principle may be caused by an exterior prin- cially in the second way by an interior inclination of the ciple; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to will. being moved by another. Reply to Objection 1. A thing moved by another is Reply to Objection 3. If the will were so moved by forced if moved against its natural inclination; but if it is another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the moved by another giving to it the proper natural inclina- act of the will would not be imputed for reward or blame. tion, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is made to But since its being moved by another does not prevent its move downwards by that which produced it, then it is not being moved from within itself, as we have stated (ad 2), forced. In like manner God, while moving the will, does it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit. Whether God works in every agent? Ia q. 105 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that God does not work in is the first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the every agent. For we must not attribute any insufficiency second act; and thus operation is the end of the creature. to God. If therefore God works in every agent, He works We must therefore understand that God works in things in sufficiently in each one. Hence it would be superfluous such a manner that things have their proper operation. for the created agent to work at all. In order to make this clear, we must observe that as Objection 2. Further, the same work cannot proceed there are few kinds of causes; matter is not a principle of at the same time from two sources; as neither can one and action, but is the subject that receives the effect of action. the same movement belong to two movable things. There- On the other hand, the end, the agent, and the form are fore if the creature’s operation is from God operating in principles of action, but in a certain order. For the first the creature, it cannot at the same time proceed from the principle of action is the end which moves the agent; the creature; and so no creature works at all. second is the agent; the third is the form of that which Objection 3. Further, the maker is the cause of the op- the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts eration of the thing made, as giving it the form whereby through its own form); as may be clearly seen in things it operates. Therefore, if God is the cause of the opera- made by art. For the craftsman is moved to action by the tion of things made by Him, this would be inasmuch as end, which is the thing wrought, for instance a chest or a He gives them the power of operating. But this is in the bed; and applies to action the axe which cuts through its beginning, when He makes them. Thus it seems that God being sharp. does not operate any further in the operating creature. Thus then does God work in every worker, according On the contrary, It is written (Is. 26:12): “Lord, to these three things. First as an end. For since every op- Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: ‘for’] us.” eration is for the sake of some good, real or apparent; and I answer that, Some have understood God to work in nothing is good either really or apparently, except in as every agent in such a way that no created power has any far as it participates in a likeness to the Supreme Good, effect in things, but that God alone is the ultimate cause which is God; it follows that God Himself is the cause of everything wrought; for instance, that it is not fire that of every operation as its end. Again it is to be observed gives heat, but God in the fire, and so forth. But this is that where there are several agents in order, the second al- impossible. First, because the order of cause and effect ways acts in virtue of the first; for the first agent moves would be taken away from created things: and this would the second to act. And thus all agents act in virtue of God imply lack of power in the Creator: for it is due to the Himself: and therefore He is the cause of action in ev- power of the cause, that it bestows active power on its ef- ery agent. Thirdly, we must observe that God not only fect. Secondly, because the active powers which are seen moves things to operated, as it were applying their forms to exist in things, would be bestowed on things to no pur- and powers to operation, just as the workman applies the pose, if these wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all axe to cut, who nevertheless at times does not give the things created would seem, in a way, to be purposeless, axe its form; but He also gives created agents their forms if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the pur- and preserves them in being. Therefore He is the cause pose of everything is its operation. For the less perfect is of action not only by giving the form which is the prin- always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently ciple of action, as the generator is said to be the cause as the matter is for the sake of the form, so the form which of movement in things heavy and light; but also as pre- 528 serving the forms and powers of things; just as the sun is and sinews.” said to be the cause of the manifestation of colors, inas- Reply to Objection 1. God works sufficiently in much as it gives and preserves the light by which colors things as First Agent, but it does not follow from this that are made manifest. And since the form of a thing is within the operation of secondary agents is superfluous. the thing, and all the more, as it approaches nearer to the Reply to Objection 2. One action does not proceed First and Universal Cause; and because in all things God from two agents of the same order. But nothing hinders Himself is properly the cause of universal being which is the same action from proceeding from a primary and a innermost in all things; it follows that in all things God secondary agent. works intimately. For this reason in Holy Scripture the Reply to Objection 3. God not only gives things their operations of nature are attributed to God as operating in form, but He also preserves them in existence, and ap- nature, according to Job 10:11: “Thou hast clothed me plies them to act, and is moreover the end of every action, with skin and flesh: Thou hast put me together with bones as above explained. Whether God can do anything outside the established order of nature? Ia q. 105 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot do any- the contrary, this order is subject to Him, as proceeding thing outside the established order of nature. For Augus- from Him, not by a natural necessity, but by the choice tine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3) says: “God the Maker and of His own will; for He could have created another order Creator of each nature, does nothing against nature.” But of things. Wherefore God can do something outside this that which is outside the natural order seems to be against order created by Him, when He chooses, for instance by nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the natural producing the effects of secondary causes without them, order. or by producing certain effects to which secondary causes Objection 2. Further, as the order of justice is from do not extend. So Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): God, so is the order of nature. But God cannot do any- “God acts against the wonted course of nature, but by no thing outside the order of justice; for then He would do means does He act against the supreme law; because He something unjust. Therefore He cannot do anything out- does not act against Himself.” side the order of nature. Reply to Objection 1. In natural things something Objection 3. Further, God established the order of na- may happen outside this natural order, in two ways. It ture. Therefore it God does anything outside the order of may happen by the action of an agent which did not give nature, it would seem that He is changeable; which cannot them their natural inclination; as, for example, when a be said. man moves a heavy body upwards, which does not owe to On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, him its natural inclination to move downwards; and that 3): “God sometimes does things which are contrary to the would be against nature. It may also happen by the ac- ordinary course of nature.” tion of the agent on whom the natural inclination depends; I answer that, From each cause there results a certain and this is not against nature, as is clear in the ebb and order to its effects, since every cause is a principle; and flow of the tide, which is not against nature; although it so, according to the multiplicity of causes, there results a is against the natural movement of water in a downward multiplicity of orders, subjected one to the other, as cause direction; for it is owing to the influence of a heavenly is subjected to cause. Wherefore a higher cause is not sub- body, on which the natural inclination of lower bodies jected to a cause of a lower order; but conversely. An ex- depends. Therefore since the order of nature is given to ample of this may be seen in human affairs. On the father things by God; if He does anything outside this order, it of a family depends the order of the household; which or- is not against nature. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra der is contained in the order of the city; which order again Faust. xxvi, 3): “That is natural to each thing which is depends on the ruler of the city; while this last order de- caused by Him from Whom is all mode, number, and or- pends on that of the king, by whom the whole kingdom is der in nature.” ordered. Reply to Objection 2. The order of justice arises by If therefore we consider the order of things depend- relation to the First Cause, Who is the rule of all justice; ing on the first cause, God cannot do anything against and therefore God can do nothing against such order. this order; for, if He did so, He would act against His Reply to Objection 3. God fixed a certain order in foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness. But if we things in such a way that at the same time He reserved to consider the order of things depending on any secondary Himself whatever he intended to do otherwise than by a cause, thus God can do something outside such order; for particular cause. So when He acts outside this order, He He is not subject to the order of secondary causes; but, on does not change. 529 Whether whatever God does outside the natural order is miraculous? Ia q. 105 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that not everything which I answer that, The word miracle is derived from ad- God does outside the natural order of things, is miracu- miration, which arises when an effect is manifest, whereas lous. For the creation of the world, and of souls, and the its cause is hidden; as when a man sees an eclipse without justification of the unrighteous, are done by God outside knowing its cause, as the Philosopher says in the begin- the natural order; as not being accomplished by the action ning of his Metaphysics. Now the cause of a manifest ef- of any natural cause. Yet these things are not called mir- fect may be known to one, but unknown to others. Where- acles. Therefore not everything that God does outside the fore a thing is wonderful to one man, and not at all to oth- natural order is a miracle. ers: as an eclipse is to a rustic, but not to an astronomer. Objection 2. Further, a miracle is “something diffi- Now a miracle is so called as being full of wonder; as cult, which seldom occurs, surpassing the faculty of na- having a cause absolutely hidden from all: and this cause ture, and going so far beyond our hopes as to compel our is God. Wherefore those things which God does outside astonishment”∗. But some things outside the order of na- those causes which we know, are called miracles. ture are not arduous; for they occur in small things, such Reply to Objection 1. Creation, and the justification as the recovery and healing of the sick. Nor are they of of the unrighteous, though done by God alone, are not, rare occurrence, since they happen frequently; as when properly speaking, miracles, because they are not of a na- the sick were placed in the streets, to be healed by the ture to proceed from any other cause; so they do not occur shadow of Peter (Acts 5:15). Nor do they surpass the fac- outside the order of nature, since they do not belong to ulty of nature; as when people are cured of a fever. Nor that order. are they beyond our hopes, since we all hope for the res- Reply to Objection 2. An arduous thing is called urrection of the dead, which nevertheless will be outside a miracle, not on account of the excellence of the thing the course of nature. Therefore not all things are outside wherein it is done, but because it surpasses the faculty of the course of natur are miraculous. nature: likewise a thing is called unusual, not because it Objection 3. Further, the word miracle is derived does not often happen, but because it is outside the usual from admiration. Now admiration concerns things man- natural course of things. Furthermore, a thing is said to ifest to the senses. But sometimes things happen out- be above the faculty of nature, not only by reason of the side the order of nature, which are not manifest to the substance of the thing done, but also on account of the senses; as when the Apostles were endowed with knowl- manner and order in which it is done. Again, a miracle edge without studying or being taught. Therefore not ev- is said to go beyond the hope “of nature,” not above the erything that occurs outside the order of nature is miracu- hope “of grace,” which hope comes from faith, whereby lous. we believe in the future resurrection. On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, Reply to Objection 3. The knowledge of the Apos- 3): “Where God does anything against that order of nature tles, although not manifest in itself, yet was made mani- which we know and are accustomed to observe, we call it fest in its effect, from which it was shown to be wonderful. a miracle.” Whether one miracle is greater than another? Ia q. 105 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that one miracle is not do, and greater than these shall he do.” greater than another. For Augustine says (Epist. ad Volu- I answer that, Nothing is called a miracle by compar- sian. cxxxvii): “In miraculous deeds, the whole measure ison with the Divine Power; because no action is of any of the deed is the power of the doer.” But by the same account compared with the power of God, according to Is. power of God all miracles are done. Therefore one mira- 40:15: “Behold the Gentiles are as a drop from a bucket, cle is not greater than another. and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance.” But a Objection 2. Further, the power of God is infinite. thing is called a miracle by comparison with the power of But the infinite exceeds the finite beyond all proportion; nature which it surpasses. So the more the power of na- and therefore no more reason exists to wonder at one ef- ture is surpassed, the greater the miracle. Now the power fect thereof than at another. Therefore one miracle is not of nature is surpassed in three ways: firstly, in the sub- greater than another. stance of the deed, for instance, if two bodies occupy the On the contrary, The Lord says, speaking of miracu- same place, or if the sun goes backwards; or if a human lous works (Jn. 14:12): “The works that I do, he also shall body is glorified: such things nature is absolutely unable ∗ St. Augustine, De utilitate credendi xvi. 530 to do; and these hold the highest rank among miracles. suddenly condensed into rain, by Divine power without a Secondly, a thing surpasses the power of nature, not in the natural cause, as occurred at the prayers of Samuel and deed, but in that wherein it is done; as the raising of the Elias; and these hold the lowest place in miracles. More- dead, and giving sight to the blind, and the like; for nature over, each of these kinds has various degrees, according can give life, but not to the dead; and such hold the sec- to the different ways in which the power of nature is sur- ond rank in miracles. Thirdly, a thing surpasses nature’s passed. power in the measure and order in which it is done; as From this is clear how to reply to the objections, argu- when a man is cured of a fever suddenly, without treat- ing as they do from the Divine power. ment or the usual process of nature; or as when the air is 531 FIRST PART, QUESTION 106 How One Creature Moves Another (In Four Articles) We next consider how one creature moves another. This consideration will be threefold: (1) How the angels move, who are purely spiritual creatures; (2) How bodies move; (3) How man moves, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature. Concerning the first point, there are three things to be considered: (1) How an angel acts on an angel; (2) How an angel acts on a corporeal nature; (3) How an angel acts on man. The first of these raises the question of the enlightenment and speech of the angels; and of their mutual coordination, both of the good and of the bad angels. Concerning their enlightenment there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether one angel moves the intellect of another by enlightenment? (2) Whether one angel moves the will of another? (3) Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel? (4) Whether a superior angel enlightens an inferior angel in all that he knows himself? Whether one angel enlightens another? Ia q. 106 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that one angel does not knows himself. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): enlighten another. For the angels possess now the same “Theologians plainly show that the orders of the heavenly beatitude which we hope to obtain. But one man will not beings are taught Divine science by the higher minds.” then enlighten another, according to Jer. 31:34: “They Now since two things concur in the intellectual oper- shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every ation, as we have said (q. 105, a. 3), namely, the intel- man his brother.” Therefore neither does an angel en- lectual power, and the likeness of the thing understood; lighten another now. in both of these one angel can notify the known truth to Objection 2. Further, light in the angels is threefold; another. First, by strengthening his intellectual power; of nature, of grace, and of glory. But an angel is enlight- for just as the power of an imperfect body is strength- ened in the light of nature by the Creator; in the light of ened by the neighborhood of a more perfect body —for grace by the Justifier; in the light of glory by the Beatifier; instance, the less hot is made hotter by the presence of all of which comes from God. Therefore one angel does what is hotter; so the intellectual power of an inferior an- not enlighten another. gel is strengthened by the superior angel turning to him: Objection 3. Further, light is a form in the mind. But since in spiritual things, for one thing to turn to another, the rational mind is “informed by God alone, without cre- corresponds to neighborhood in corporeal things. Sec- ated intervention,” as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51). ondly, one angel manifests the truth to another as regards Therefore one angel does not enlighten the mind of an- the likeness of the thing understood. For the superior an- other. gel receives the knowledge of truth by a kind of univer- On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) sal conception, to receive which the inferior angel’s in- that “the angels of the second hierarchy are cleansed, en- tellect is not sufficiently powerful, for it is natural to him lightened and perfected by the angels of the first hierar- to receive truth in a more particular manner. Therefore chy.” the superior angel distinguishes, in a way, the truth which I answer that, One angel enlightens another. To make he conceives universally, so that it can be grasped by the this clear, we must observe that intellectual light is noth- inferior angel; and thus he proposes it to his knowledge. ing else than a manifestation of truth, according to Eph. Thus it is with us that the teacher, in order to adapt himself 5:13: “All that is made manifest is light.” Hence to en- to others, divides into many points the knowledge which lighten means nothing else but to communicate to others he possesses in the universal. This is thus expressed by the manifestation of the known truth; according to the Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xv): “Every intellectual substance Apostle (Eph. 3:8): “To me the least of all the saints is with provident power divides and multiplies the uniform given this grace. . . to enlighten all men, that they may see knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to God, so as to what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been lead its inferiors upwards by analogy.” hidden from eternity in God.” Therefore one angel is said Reply to Objection 1. All the angels, both inferior to enlighten another by manifesting the truth which he and superior, see the Essence of God immediately, and in 532 this respect one does not teach another. It is of this truth Reply to Objection 2. An angel does not enlighten that the prophet speaks; wherefore he adds: “They shall another by giving him the light of nature, grace, or glory; teach no more every man his brother, saying: ‘Know the but by strengthening his natural light, and by manifesting Lord’: for all shall know Me, from the least of them even to him the truth concerning the state of nature, of grace, to the greatest.” But all the types of the Divine works, and of glory, as explained above. which are known in God as in their cause, God knows in Reply to Objection 3. The rational mind is formed Himself, because He comprehends Himself; but of others immediately by God, either as the image from the exem- who see God, each one knows the more types, the more plar, forasmuch as it is made to the image of God alone; perfectly he sees God. Hence a superior angel knows or as the subject by the ultimate perfecting form: for the more about the types of the Divine works than an inferior created mind is always considered to be unformed, except angel, and concerning these the former enlightens the lat- it adhere to the first truth; while the other kinds of enlight- ter; and as to this Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the enment that proceed from man or angel, are, as it were, angels “are enlightened by the types of existing things.” dispositions to this ultimate form. Whether one angel moves another angel’s will? Ia q. 106 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that one angel can move ficiently, either as the object or as showing the object. But another angel’s will. Because, according to Dionysius he inclines the will as something lovable, and as manifest- quoted above (a. 1), as one angel enlightens another, so ing some created good ordered to God’s goodness. And does he cleanse and perfect another. But cleansing and thus he can incline the will to the love of the creature or perfecting seem to belong to the will: for the former seems of God, by way of persuasion. to point to the stain of sin which appertains to will; while But on the part of the power the will cannot be moved to be perfected is to obtain an end, which is the object at all save by God. For the operation of the will is a cer- of the will. Therefore an angel can move another angel’s tain inclination of the willer to the thing willed. And He will. alone can change this inclination, Who bestowed on the Objection 2. Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. creature the power to will: just as that agent alone can vii): “The names of the angels designate their properties.” change the natural inclination, which can give the power Now the Seraphim are so called because they “kindle” or to which follows that natural inclination. Now God alone “give heat”: and this is by love which belongs to the will. gave to the creature the power to will, because He alone Therefore one angel moves another angel’s will. is the author of the intellectual nature. Therefore an angel Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (De An- cannot move another angel’s will. ima iii, 11) that the higher appetite moves the lower. But Reply to Objection 1. Cleansing and perfecting are as the intellect of the superior angel is higher, so also is to be understood according to the mode of enlightenment. his will. It seems, therefore, that the superior angel can And since God enlightens by changing the intellect and change the will of another angel. will, He cleanses by removing defects of intellect and will, On the contrary, To him it belongs to change the will, and perfects unto the end of the intellect and will. But to whom it belongs to bestow righteousness: for righ- the enlightenment caused by an angel concerns the intel- teousness is the rightness of the will. But God alone be- lect, as explained above (a. 1); therefore an angel is to be stows righteousness. Therefore one angel cannot change understood as cleansing from the defect of nescience in another angel’s will. the intellect; and as perfecting unto the consummate end I answer that, As was said above (q. 105, a. 4), the of the intellect, and this is the knowledge of truth. Thus will is changed in two ways; on the part of the object, and Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi): that “in the heavenly hier- on the part of the power. On the part of the object, both the archy the chastening of the inferior essence is an enlight- good itself which is the object of the will, moves the will, ening of things unknown, that leads them to more perfect as the appetible moves the appetite; and he who points knowledge.” For instance, we might say that corporeal out the object, as, for instance, one who proves something sight is cleansed by the removal of darkness; enlightened to be good. But as we have said above (q. 105, a. 4), by the diffusion of light; and perfected by being brought other goods in a measure incline the will, yet nothing suf- to the perception of the colored object. ficiently moves the will save the universal good, and that Reply to Objection 2. One angel can induce another is God. And this good He alone shows, that it may be to love God by persuasion as explained above. seen by the blessed, Who, when Moses asked: “Show me Reply to Objection 3. The Philosopher speaks of the Thy glory,” answered: “I will show thee all good” (Ex. lower sensitive appetite which can be moved by the supe- 33:18,19). Therefore an angel does not move the will suf- rior intellectual appetite, because it belongs to the same 533 nature of the soul, and because the inferior appetite is a angels. power in a corporeal organ. But this does not apply to the Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel? Ia q. 106 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that an inferior angel can side the order of the inferior cause, to be ordered to the enlighten a superior angel. For the ecclesiastical hierarchy superior cause, as in human affairs the command of the is derived from, and represents the heavenly hierarchy; president is passed over from obedience to the prince. So and hence the heavenly Jerusalem is called “our mother” it happens that God works miraculously outside the or- (Gal. 4:26). But in the Church even superiors are enlight- der of corporeal nature, that men may be ordered to the ened and taught by their inferiors, as the Apostle says (1 knowledge of Him. But the passing over of the order that Cor. 14:31): “You may all prophesy one by one, that all belongs to spiritual substances in no way belongs to the may learn and all may be exhorted.” Therefore, likewise ordering of men to God; since the angelic operations are in the heavenly hierarchy, the superiors can be enlightened not made known to us; as are the operations of sensible by inferiors. bodies. Thus the order which belongs to spiritual sub- Objection 2. Further, as the order of corporeal sub- stances is never passed over by God; so that the inferiors stances depends on the will of God, so also does the order are always moved by the superior, and not conversely. of spiritual substances. But, as was said above (q. 105, Reply to Objection 1. The ecclesiastical hierarchy a. 6), God sometimes acts outside the order of corporeal imitates the heavenly in some degree, but by a perfect like- substances. Therefore He also sometimes acts outside the ness. For in the heavenly hierarchy the perfection of the order of spiritual substances, by enlightening inferior oth- order is in proportion to its nearness to God; so that those erwise than through their superiors. Therefore in that way who are the nearer to God are the more sublime in grade, the inferiors enlightened by God can enlighten superiors. and more clear in knowledge; and on that account the su- Objection 3. Further, one angel enlightens the other periors are never enlightened by the inferiors, whereas in to whom he turns, as was above explained (a. 1). But since the ecclesiastical hierarchy, sometimes those who are the this turning to another is voluntary, the highest angel can nearer to God in sanctity, are in the lowest grade, and are turn to the lowest passing over the others. Therefore he not conspicuous for science; and some also are eminent can enlighten him immediately; and thus the latter can en- in one kind of science, and fail in another; and on that lighten his superiors. account superiors may be taught by inferiors. On the contrary, Dionysius says that “this is the Di- Reply to Objection 2. As above explained, there is vine unalterable law, that inferior things are led to God by no similarity between what God does outside the order of the superior” (Coel. Hier. iv; Eccl. Hier. v). corporeal nature, and that of spiritual nature. Hence the I answer that, The inferior angels never enlighten the argument does not hold. superior, but are always enlightened by them. The reason Reply to Objection 3. An angel turns voluntarily to is, because, as above explained (q. 105, a. 6), one order enlighten another angel, but the angel’s will is ever regu- is under another, as cause is under cause; and hence as lated by the Divine law which made the order in the an- cause is ordered to cause, so is order to order. Therefore gels. there is no incongruity if sometimes anything is done out- Whether the superior angel enlightens the inferior as regards all he himself knows? Ia q. 106 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the superior angel gels did not know it until it was accomplished. Thus we does not enlighten the inferior concerning all he himself find that on some of the angels inquiring, as it were, in knows. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii) that the su- ignorance: “Who is this King of glory?” other angels, perior angels have a more universal knowledge; and the who knew, answered: “The Lord of Hosts, He is the King inferior a more particular and individual knowledge. But of glory,” as Dionysius expounds (Coel. Hier. vii). But more is contained under a universal knowledge than under this would not apply if the superior angels enlightened the a particular knowledge. Therefore not all that the superior inferior concerning all they know themselves. Therefore angels know, is known by the inferior, through these being they do not do so. enlightened by the former. Objection 3. Further, if the superior angels enlighten Objection 2. Further, the Master of the Sentences the inferior about all they know, nothing that the superior (ii, D, 11) says that the superior angels had long known angels know would be unknown to the inferior angels. the Mystery of the Incarnation, whereas the inferior an- Therefore the superior angels could communicate noth- 534 ing more to the inferior; which appears open to objection. vine goodness, impart the same to those below them. Therefore the superior angels enlighten the inferior in all Nevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by things. the inferior as by the superior angels; and therefore the On the contrary, Gregory∗ says: “In that heavenly superior ever remain in a higher order, and have a more country, though there are some excellent gifts, yet noth- perfect knowledge; as the master understands the same ing is held individually.” And Dionysius says: “Each thing better than the pupil who learns from him. heavenly essence communicates to the inferior the gift de- Reply to Objection 1. The knowledge of the superior rived from the superior” (Coel. Hier. xv), as quoted above angels is said to be more universal as regards the more (a. 1). eminent mode of knowledge. I answer that, Every creature participates in the Di- Reply to Objection 2. The Master’s words are not vine goodness, so as to diffuse the good it possesses to to be understood as if the inferior angels were entirely others; for it is of the nature of good to communicate it- ignorant of the Mystery of the Incarnation but that they self to others. Hence also corporeal agents give their like- did not know it as fully as the superior angels; and that ness to others so far as they can. So the more an agent is they progressed in the knowledge of it afterwards when established in the share of the Divine goodness, so much the Mystery was accomplished. the more does it strive to transmit its perfections to others Reply to Objection 3. Till the Judgment Day some as far as possible. Hence the Blessed Peter admonishes new things are always being revealed by God to the high- those who by grace share in the Divine goodness; saying: est angels, concerning the course of the world, and espe- “As every man hath received grace, ministering the same cially the salvation of the elect. Hence there is always one to another; as good stewards of the manifold grace something for the superior angels to make known to the of God” (1 Pet. 4:10). Much more therefore do the holy inferior. angels, who enjoy the plenitude of participation of the Di- ∗ Peter Lombard, Sent. ii, D, ix; Cf. Gregory, Hom. xxxiv, in Ev. 535 FIRST PART, QUESTION 107 The Speech of the Angels (In Five Articles) We next consider the speech of the angels. Here there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether one angel speaks to another? (2) Whether the inferior speaks to the superior? (3) Whether an angel speaks to God? (4) Whether the angelic speech is subject to local distance? (5) Whether all the speech of one angel to another is known to all? Whether one angel speaks to another? Ia q. 107 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that one angel does not instance, either to the performing of an action, or to being speak to another. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that, in made known to another. Now when the mind turns itself to the state of the resurrection “each one’s body will not hide the actual consideration of any habitual knowledge, then his mind from his fellows.” Much less, therefore, is one a person speaks to himself; for the concept of the mind is angel’s mind hidden from another. But speech manifests called “the interior word.” And by the fact that the con- to another what lies hidden in the mind. Therefore it is cept of the angelic mind is ordered to be made known to not necessary that one angel should speak to another. another by the will of the angel himself, the concept of one Objection 2. Further, speech is twofold; interior, angel is made known to another; and in this way one angel whereby one speaks to oneself; and exterior, whereby speaks to another; for to speak to another only means to one speaks to another. But exterior speech takes place by make known the mental concept to another. some sensible sign, as by voice, or gesture, or some bod- Reply to Objection 1. Our mental concept is hidden ily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and this cannot by a twofold obstacle. The first is in the will, which can apply to the angels. Therefore one angel does not speak retain the mental concept within, or can direct it exter- to another. nally. In this way God alone can see the mind of another, Objection 3. Further, the speaker incites the hearer to according to 1 Cor. 2:11: “What man knoweth the things listen to what he says. But it does not appear that one an- of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?” The other gel incites another to listen; for this happens among us by obstacle whereby the mental concept is excluded from an- some sensible sign. Therefore one angel does not speak other one’s knowledge, comes from the body; and so it to another. happens that even when the will directs the concept of the On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:1): “If mind to make itself known, it is not at once make known I speak with the tongues of men and of angels.” to another; but some sensible sign must be used. Gregory I answer that, The angels speak in a certain way. But, alludes to this fact when he says (Moral. ii): “To other as Gregory says (Moral. ii): “It is fitting that our mind, ris- eyes we seem to stand aloof as it were behind the wall of ing above the properties of bodily speech, should be lifted the body; and when we wish to make ourselves known, to the sublime and unknown methods of interior speech.” we go out as it were by the door of the tongue to show To understand how one angel speaks to another, we what we really are.” But an angel is under no such obsta- must consider that, as we explained above (q. 82, a. 4), cle, and so he can make his concept known to another at when treating of the actions and powers of the soul, the once. will moves the intellect to its operation. Now an intelli- Reply to Objection 2. External speech, made by the gible object is present to the intellect in three ways; first, voice, is a necessity for us on account of the obstacle of habitually, or in the memory, as Augustine says (De Trin. the body. Hence it does not befit an angel; but only interior xiv, 6,7); secondly, as actually considered or conceived; speech belongs to him, and this includes not only the inte- thirdly, as related to something else. And it is clear that rior speech by mental concept, but also its being ordered the intelligible object passes from the first to the second to another’s knowledge by the will. So the tongue of an stage by the command of the will, and hence in the defini- angel is called metaphorically the angel’s power, whereby tion of habit these words occur, “which anyone uses when he manifests his mental concept. he wills.” So likewise the intelligible object passes from Reply to Objection 3. There is no need to draw the the second to the third stage by the will; for by the will the attention of the good angels, inasmuch as they always see concept of the mind is ordered to something else, as, for each other in the Word; for as one ever sees the other, so he 536 ever sees what is ordered to himself. But because by their is affected by the sensible object. Therefore, as sense is very nature they can speak to each other, and even now aroused by the sensible object, so the mind of an angel the bad angels speak to each other, we must say that the can be aroused to attention by some intelligible power. intellect is moved by the intelligible object just as sense Whether the inferior angel speaks to the superior? Ia q. 107 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the inferior angel we actually consider anything. But because truth is the does not speak to the superior. For on the text (1 Cor. light of the intellect, and God Himself is the rule of all 13:1), “If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels,” truth; the manifestation of what is conceived by the mind, a gloss remarks that the speech of the angels is an enlight- as depending on the primary truth, is both speech and en- enment whereby the superior enlightens the inferior. But lightenment; for example, when one man says to another: the inferior never enlightens the superior, as was above “Heaven was created by God”; or, “Man is an animal.” explained (q. 106, a. 3). Therefore neither do the inferior The manifestation, however, of what depends on the will speak to the superior. of the one who understands, cannot be called an enlight- Objection 2. Further, as was said above (q. 106, a. 1), enment, but is only a speech; for instance, when one says to enlighten means merely to acquaint one man of what is to another: “I wish to learn this; I wish to do this or that.” known to another; and this is to speak. Therefore to speak The reason is that the created will is not a light, nor a rule and to enlighten are the same; so the same conclusion fol- of truth; but participates of light. Hence to communicate lows. what comes from the created will is not, as such, an en- Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii): “God lightening. For to know what you may will, or what you speaks to the angels by the very fact that He shows to may understand does not belong to the perfection of my their hearts His hidden and invisible things.” But this is intellect; but only to know the truth in reality. to enlighten them. Therefore, whenever God speaks, He Now it is clear that the angels are called superior or in- enlightens. In the same way every angelic speech is an ferior by comparison with this principle, God; and there- enlightening. Therefore an inferior angel can in no way fore enlightenment, which depends on the principle which speak to a superior angel. is God, is conveyed only by the superior angels to the infe- On the contrary, According to the exposition of rior. But as regards the will as the principle, he who wills Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), the inferior angels said to is first and supreme; and therefore the manifestation of the superior: “Who is this King of Glory?” what belongs to the will, is conveyed to others by the one I answer that, The inferior angels can speak to the who wills. In that manner both the superior angels speak superior. To make this clear, we must consider that every to the inferior, and the inferior speak to the superior. angelic enlightening is an angelic speech; but on the other From this clearly appear the replies to the first and sec- hand, not every speech is an enlightening; because, as we ond objections. have said (a. 1), for one angel to speak to another angel Reply to Objection 3. Every speech of God to the an- means nothing else, but that by his own will he directs his gels is an enlightening; because since the will of God is mental concept in such a way, that it becomes known to the rule of truth, it belongs to the perfection and enlight- the other. Now what the mind conceives may be reduced enment of the created mind to know even what God wills. to a twofold principle; to God Himself, Who is the primal But the same does not apply to the will of the angels, as truth; and to the will of the one who understands, whereby was explained above. Whether an angel speaks to God? Ia q. 107 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that an angel does not in some ways appears to be unreasonable, since an angel speak to God. For speech makes known something to an- sometimes speaks to another angel. Therefore it seems other. But an angel cannot make known anything to God, that an angel never speaks to God. Who knows all things. Therefore an angel does not speak On the contrary, It is written (Zech. 1:12): “The an- to God. gel of the Lord answered and said: O Lord of hosts, how Objection 2. Further, to speak is to order the mental long wilt Thou not have mercy on Jerusalem.” Therefore concept in reference to another, as was shown above (a. 1). an angel speaks to God. But an angel ever orders his mental concept to God. So I answer that, As was said above (Aa. 1,2), the angel if an angel speaks to God, he ever speaks to God; which speaks by ordering his mental concept to something else. 537 Now one thing is ordered to another in a twofold manner. can never comprehend; thus Gregory says (Moral. ii) that In one way for the purpose of giving one thing to another, “the angels speak to God, when by contemplating what is as in natural things the agent is ordered to the patient, and above themselves they rise to emotions of admiration.” in human speech the teacher is ordered to the learner; and Reply to Objection 1. Speech is not always for the in this sense an angel in no way speaks to God either of purpose of making something known to another; but is what concerns the truth, or of whatever depends on the sometimes finally ordered to the purpose of manifesting created will; because God is the principle and source of something to the speaker himself; as when the disciples all truth and of all will. In another way one thing is or- ask instruction from the master. dered to another to receive something, as in natural things Reply to Objection 2. The angels are ever speaking the passive is ordered to the agent, and in human speech to God in the sense of praising and admiring Him and His the disciple to the master; and in this way an angel speaks works; but they speak to Him by consulting Him about to God, either by consulting the Divine will of what ought what ought to be done whenever they have to perform any to be done, or by admiring the Divine excellence which he new work, concerning which they desire enlightenment. Whether local distance influences the angelic speech? Ia q. 107 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that local distance affects dentally on the part of the phantasms, which do not exist the angelic speech. For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. at all in an angel. But as regards whatever is abstracted i, 13): “An angel works where he is.” But speech is an an- from “here and now,” neither difference of time nor local gelic operation. Therefore, as an angel is in a determinate distance has any influence whatever. Hence in the angelic place, it seems that an angel’s speech is limited by the speech local distance is no impediment. bounds of that place. Reply to Objection 1. The angelic speech, as above Objection 2. Further, a speaker cries out on account explained (a. 1, ad 2), is interior; perceived, nevertheless, of the distance of the hearer. But it is said of the Seraphim by another; and therefore it exists in the angel who speaks, that “they cried one to another” (Is. 6:3). Therefore in the and consequently where the angel is who speaks. But as angelic speech local distance has some effect. local distance does not prevent one angel seeing another, On the contrary, It is said that the rich man in hell so neither does it prevent an angel perceiving what is or- spoke to Abraham, notwithstanding the local distance dered to him on the part of another; and this is to perceive (Lk. 16:24). Much less therefore does local distance im- his speech. pede the speech of one angel to another. Reply to Objection 2. The cry mentioned is not a I answer that, The angelic speech consists in an intel- bodily voice raised by reason of the local distance; but is lectual operation, as explained above (Aa. 1,2,3). And the taken to signify the magnitude of what is said, or the in- intellectual operation of an angel abstracts from the “here tensity of the affection, according to what Gregory says and now.” For even our own intellectual operation takes (Moral. ii): “The less one desires, the less one cries out.” place by abstraction from the “here and now,” except acci- Whether all the angels know what one speaks to another? Ia q. 107 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that all the angels know cates what he learns to the others.” Therefore the speech what one speaks to another. For unequal local distance is of one angel to another extends to all. the reason why all men do not know what one man says On the contrary, One man can speak to another to another. But in the angelic speech local distance has no alone; much more can this be the case among the angels. effect, as above explained (a. 4). Therefore all the angels I answer that, As above explained (Aa. 1,2), the men- know what one speaks to another. tal concept of one angel can be perceived by another when Objection 2. Further, all the angels have the intellec- the angel who possesses the concept refers it by his will tual power in common. So if the mental concept of one to another. Now a thing can be ordered through some ordered to another is known by one, it is for the same rea- cause to one thing and not to another; consequently the son known by all. concept of one (angel) may be known by one and not by Objection 3. Further, enlightenment is a kind of another; and therefore an angel can perceive the speech of speech. But the enlightenment of one angel by another ex- one angel to another; whereas others do not, not through tends to all the angels, because, as Dionysius says (Coel. the obstacle of local distance, but on account of the will Hier. xv): “Each one of the heavenly beings communi- so ordering, as explained above. 538 From this appear the replies to the first and second ob-all enlightenments are common to all. But speech may be jections. of something ordered to the principle of the created will, Reply to Objection 3. Enlightenment is of those which is proper to each angel; and in this way it is not truths that emanate from the first rule of truth, which is necessary that these speeches should be common to all. the principle common to all the angels; and in that way 539 FIRST PART, QUESTION 108 Of the Angelic Degrees of Hierarchies and Orders (In Eight Articles) We next consider the degrees of the angels in their hierarchies and orders; for it was said above (q. 106, a. 3), that the superior angels enlighten the inferior angels; and not conversely. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether all the angels belong to one hierarchy? (2) Whether in one hierarchy there is only one order? (3) Whether in one order there are many angels? (4) Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders is natural? (5) Of the names and properties of each order. (6) Of the comparison of the orders to one another. (7) Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment? (8) Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders? Whether all the angels are of one hierarchy? Ia q. 108 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that all the angels belong long to different principalities: thus, under one king there to one hierarchy. For since the angels are supreme among are different cities, which are governed by different laws creatures, it is evident that they are ordered for the best. and administrators. Now it is evident that men do not re- But the best ordering of a multitude is for it to be governed ceive the Divine enlightenments in the same way as do by one authority, as the Philosopher shows (Metaph. xii, the angels; for the angels receive them in their intelligible Did. xi, 10; Polit. iii, 4). Therefore as a hierarchy is noth- purity, whereas men receive them under sensible signs, ing but a sacred principality, it seems that all the angels as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i). Therefore there must belong to one hierarchy. needs be a distinction between the human and the angelic Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii) hierarchy. In the same manner we distinguish three an- that “hierarchy is order, knowledge, and action.” But all gelic hierarchies. For it was shown above (q. 55, a. 3), in the angels agree in one order towards God, Whom they treating of the angelic knowledge, that the superior angels know, and by Whom in their actions they are ruled. There- have a more universal knowledge of the truth than the in- fore all the angels belong to one hierarchy. ferior angels. This universal knowledge has three grades Objection 3. Further, the sacred principality called hi- among the angels. For the types of things, concerning erarchy is to be found among men and angels. But all men which the angels are enlightened, can be considered in a are of one hierarchy. Therefore likewise all the angels are threefold manner. First as preceding from God as the first of one hierarchy. universal principle, which mode of knowledge belongs to On the contrary, Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vi) distin- the first hierarchy, connected immediately with God, and, guishes three hierarchies of angels. “as it were, placed in the vestibule of God,” as Dionysius I answer that, Hierarchy means a “sacred” principal- says (Coel. Hier. vii). Secondly, forasmuch as these types ity, as above explained. Now principality includes two depend on the universal created causes which in some way things: the prince himself and the multitude ordered un- are already multiplied; which mode belongs to the second der the prince. Therefore because there is one God, the hierarchy. Thirdly, forasmuch as these types are applied Prince not only of all the angels but also of men and all to particular things as depending on their causes; which creatures; so there is one hierarchy, not only of all the an- mode belongs to the lowest hierarchy. All this will appear gels, but also of all rational creatures, who can be partic- more clearly when we treat of each of the orders (a. 6). ipators of sacred things; according to Augustine (De Civ. In this way are the hierarchies distinguished on the part of Dei xii, 1): “There are two cities, that is, two societies, the multitude of subjects. one of the good angels and men, the other of the wicked.” Hence it is clear that those err and speak against the But if we consider the principality on the part of the mul- opinion of Dionysius who place a hierarchy in the Divine titude ordered under the prince, then principality is said Persons, and call it the “supercelestial” hierarchy. For in to be “one” accordingly as the multitude can be subject the Divine Persons there exists, indeed, a natural order, in “one” way to the government of the prince. And those but there is no hierarchical order, for as Dionysius says that cannot be governed in the same way by a prince be- (Coel. Hier. iii): “The hierarchical order is so directed 540 that some be cleansed, enlightened, and perfected; and self, Whom all see in one way—that is, in His essence— that others cleanse, enlighten, and perfect”; which far be there is no hierarchical distinction among the angels; but it from us to apply to the Divine Persons. there is such a distinction as regards the types of created Reply to Objection 1. This objection considers prin- things, as above explained. cipality on the part of the ruler, inasmuch as a multitude is Reply to Objection 3. All men are of one species, and best ruled by one ruler, as the Philosopher asserts in those have one connatural mode of understanding; which is not passages. the case in the angels: and hence the same argument does Reply to Objection 2. As regards knowing God Him- not apply to both. Whether there are several orders in one hierarchy? Ia q. 108 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that in the one hierarchy all may be reduced to three, when we consider that every there are not several orders. For when a definition is mul- multitude has a beginning, a middle, and an end. So in tiplied, the thing defined is also multiplied. But hierarchy every city, a threefold order of men is to be seen, some is order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii). Therefore, if of whom are supreme, as the nobles; others are the last, there are many orders, there is not one hierarchy only, but as the common people, while others hold a place between many. these, as the middle-class [populus honorabilis]. In the Objection 2. Further, different orders are different same way we find in each angelic hierarchy the orders grades, and grades among spirits are constituted by differ- distinguished according to their actions and offices, and ent spiritual gifts. But among the angels all the spiritual all this diversity is reduced to three—namely, to the sum- gifts are common to all, for “nothing is possessed individ- mit, the middle, and the base; and so in every hierarchy ually” (Sent. ii, D, ix). Therefore there are not different Dionysius places three orders (Coel. Hier. vi). orders of angels. Reply to Objection 1. Order is twofold. In one way Objection 3. Further, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy it is taken as the order comprehending in itself different the orders are distinguished according to the actions of grades; and in that way a hierarchy is called an order. In “cleansing,” “enlightening,” and “perfecting.” For the another way one grade is called an order; and in that sense order of deacons is “cleansing,” the order of priests, is the several orders of one hierarchy are so called. “enlightening,” and of bishops “perfecting,” as Dionysius Reply to Objection 2. All things are possessed in says (Eccl. Hier. v). But each of the angels cleanses, en- common by the angelic society, some things, however, be- lightens, and perfects. Therefore there is no distinction of ing held more excellently by some than by others. Each orders among the angels. gift is more perfectly possessed by the one who can com- On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 1:20,21) municate it, than by the one who cannot communicate it; that “God has set the Man Christ above all principality as the hot thing which can communicate heat is more per- and power, and virtue, and dominion”: which are the var- fect that what is unable to give heat. And the more per- ious orders of the angels, and some of them belong to one fectly anyone can communicate a gift, the higher grade he hierarchy, as will be explained (a. 6). occupies, as he is in the more perfect grade of mastership I answer that, As explained above, one hierarchy is who can teach a higher science. By this similitude we can one principality—that is, one multitude ordered in one reckon the diversity of grades or orders among the angels, way under the rule of a prince. Now such a multitude according to their different offices and actions. would not be ordered, but confused, if there were not in Reply to Objection 3. The inferior angel is supe- it different orders. So the nature of a hierarchy requires rior to the highest man of our hierarchy, according to the diversity of orders. words, “He that is the lesser in the kingdom of heaven, This diversity of order arises from the diversity of is greater than he”—namely, John the Baptist, than whom offices and actions, as appears in one city where there “there hath not risen a greater among them that are born of are different orders according to the different actions; for women” (Mat. 11:11). Hence the lesser angel of the heav- there is one order of those who judge, and another of those enly hierarchy can not only cleanse, but also enlighten and who fight, and another of those who labor in the fields, and perfect, and in a higher way than can the orders of our hi- so forth. erarchy. Thus the heavenly orders are not distinguished But although one city thus comprises several orders, by reason of these, but by reason of other different acts. 541 Whether there are many angels in one order? Ia q. 108 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that there are not many angels order, inanimate inferior bodies in another, plants in an- in one order. For it was shown above (q. 50, a. 4), that all other, and animals in another; whilst he who knows natu- the angels are unequal. But equals belong to one order. ral things perfectly, is able to distinguish different orders Therefore there are not many angels in one order. in the heavenly bodies themselves, and in each of the other Objection 2. Further, it is superfluous for a thing to orders. be done by many, which can be done sufficiently by one. Now our knowledge of the angels is imperfect, as But that which belongs to one angelic office can be done Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi). Hence we can only dis- sufficiently by one angel; so much more sufficiently than tinguish the angelic offices and orders in a general way, so the one sun does what belongs to the office of the sun, as as to place many angels in one order. But if we knew the the angel is more perfect than a heavenly body. If, there- offices and distinctions of the angels perfectly, we should fore, the orders are distinguished by their offices, as stated know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his above (a. 2), several angels in one order would be super- own order among things, and much more so than any star, fluous. though this be hidden from us. Objection 3. Further, it was said above (obj. 1) that Reply to Objection 1. All the angels of one order are all the angels are unequal. Therefore, if several angels (for in some way equal in a common similitude, whereby they instance, three or four), are of one order, the lowest one of are placed in that order; but absolutely speaking they are the superior order will be more akin to the highest of the not equal. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) that in inferior order than with the highest of his own order; and one and the same order of angels there are those who are thus he does not seem to be more of one order with the first, middle, and last. latter than with the former. Therefore there are not many Reply to Objection 2. That special distinction of or- angels of one order. ders and offices wherein each angel has his own office and On the contrary, It is written: “The Seraphim cried order, is hidden from us. to one another” (Is. 6:3). Therefore there are many angels Reply to Objection 3. As in a surface which is partly in the one order of the Seraphim. white and partly black, the two parts on the borders of I answer that, Whoever knows anything perfectly, is white and black are more akin as regards their position able to distinguish its acts, powers, and nature, down to than any other two white parts, but are less akin in qual- the minutest details, whereas he who knows a thing in ity; so two angels who are on the boundary of two orders an imperfect manner can only distinguish it in a general are more akin in propinquity of nature than one of them way, and only as regards a few points. Thus, one who is akin to the others of its own order, but less akin in their knows natural things imperfectly, can distinguish their or- fitness for similar offices, which fitness, indeed, extends ders in a general way, placing the heavenly bodies in one to a definite limit. Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders comes from the angelic nature? Ia q. 108 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the distinction of hi- copied from the heavenly. But the orders among men are erarchies and of orders is not from the nature of the an- not from nature, but by the gift of grace; for it is not a nat- gels. For hierarchy is “a sacred principality,” and Diony- ural gift for one to be a bishop, and another a priest, and sius places in its definition that it “approaches a resem- another a deacon. Therefore neither in the angels are the blance to God, as far as may be” (Coel. Hier. iii). But orders from nature, but from grace only. sanctity and resemblance to God is in the angels by grace, On the contrary, The Master says (ii, D. 9) that “an and not by nature. Therefore the distinction of hierarchies angelic order is a multitude of heavenly spirits, who are and orders in the angels is by grace, and not by nature. likened to each other by some gift of grace, just as they Objection 2. Further, the Seraphim are called “burn- agree also in the participation of natural gifts.” Therefore ing” or “kindling,” as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). the distinction of orders among the angels is not only by This belongs to charity which comes not from nature but gifts of grace, but also by gifts of nature. from grace; for “it is poured forth in our hearts by the I answer that, The order of government, which is the Holy Ghost Who is given to us” (Rom. 5:5): “which is order of a multitude under authority, is derived from its said not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels,” as end. Now the end of the angels may be considered in two Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore the angelic ways. First, according to the faculty of nature, so that orders are not from nature, but from grace. they may know and love God by natural knowledge and Objection 3. Further, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is love; and according to their relation to this end the orders 542 of the angels are distinguished by natural gifts. Secondly, are given gratuitous gifts according to the capacity of their the end of the angelic multitude can be taken from what natural gifts; which is not the case with men, as above ex- is above their natural powers, which consists in the vision plained (q. 62, a. 6). Hence among men the orders are of the Divine Essence, and in the unchangeable fruition distinguished according to the gratuitous gifts only, and of His goodness; to which end they can reach only by not according to natural gifts. grace; and hence as regards this end, the orders in the an- From the above the replies to the objections are evi- gels are adequately distinguished by the gifts of grace, but dent. dispositively by natural gifts, forasmuch as to the angels Whether the orders of the angels are properly named? Ia q. 108 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the orders of the an- is said to be in another by way of property, if it is ad- gels are not properly named. For all the heavenly spir- equate and proportionate to its nature: by excess when its are called angels and heavenly virtues. But common an attribute is less than that to which it is attributed, but names should not be appropriated to individuals. There- is possessed thereby in an eminent manner, as we have fore the orders of the angels and virtues are ineptly named. stated (q. 13, a. 2) concerning all the names which are Objection 2. Further, it belongs to God alone to be attributed to God: by participation, when an attribute is Lord, according to the words, “Know ye that the Lord He possessed by something not fully but partially; thus holy is God” (Ps. 99:3). Therefore one order of the heavenly men are called gods by participation. Therefore, if any- spirits is not properly called “Dominations.” thing is to be called by a name designating its property, Objection 3. Further, the name “Domination” seems it ought not to be named from what it participates imper- to imply government and likewise the names “Principal- fectly, nor from that which it possesses in excess, but from ities” and “Powers.” Therefore these three names do not that which is adequate thereto; as, for instance, when we seem to be properly applied to three orders. wish properly to name a man, we should call him a “ratio- Objection 4. Further, archangels are as it were angel nal substance,” but not an “intellectual substance,” which princes. Therefore this name ought not to be given to any latter is the proper name of an angel; because simple intel- other order than to the “Principalities.” ligence belongs to an angel as a property, and to man by Objection 5. Further, the name “Seraphim” is de- participation; nor do we call him a “sensible substance,” rived from ardor, which pertains to charity; and the name which is the proper name of a brute; because sense is less “Cherubim” from knowledge. But charity and knowledge than the property of a man, and belongs to man in a more are gifts common to all the angels. Therefore they ought excellent way than to other animals. not to be names of any particular orders. So we must consider that in the angelic orders all spir- Objection 6. Further, Thrones are seats. But from itual perfections are common to all the angels, and that the fact that God knows and loves the rational creature they are all more excellently in the superior than in the He is said to sit within it. Therefore there ought not to inferior angels. Further, as in these perfections there are be any order of “Thrones” besides the “Cherubim” and grades, the superior perfection belongs to the superior or- “Seraphim.” Therefore it appears that the orders of angels der as its property, whereas it belongs to the inferior by are not properly styled. participation; and conversely the inferior perfection be- On the contrary is the authority of Holy Scripture longs to the inferior order as its property, and to the su- wherein they are so named. For the name “Seraphim” perior by way of excess; and thus the superior order is is found in Is. 6:2; the name “Cherubim” in Ezech. 1 denominated from the superior perfection. (Cf. 10:15,20); “Thrones” in Col. 1:16; “Dominations,” So in this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the “Virtues,” “Powers,” and “Principalities” are mentioned in names of the orders accordingly as they befit the spiritual Eph. 1:21; the name “Archangels” in the canonical epistle perfections they signify. Gregory, on the other hand, in of St. Jude (9), and the name “Angels” is found in many expounding these names (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.) seems places of Scripture. to regard more the exterior ministrations; for he says that I answer that, As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), “angels are so called as announcing the least things; and in the names of the angelic orders it is necessary to ob- the archangels in the greatest; by the virtues miracles serve that the proper name of each order expresses its are wrought; by the powers hostile powers are repulsed; property. Now to see what is the property of each order, and the principalities preside over the good spirits them- we must consider that in coordinated things, something selves.” may be found in a threefold manner: by way of property, Reply to Objection 1. Angel means “messenger.” So by way of excess, and by way of participation. A thing all the heavenly spirits, so far as they make known Divine 543 things, are called “angels.” But the superior angels enjoy is to be done by those who are subject to them. To preside a certain excellence, as regards this manifestation, from [principari] as Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) is “to be which the superior orders are denominated. The lowest first among others,” as being first in carrying out what is order of angels possess no excellence above the common ordered to be done. And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. manifestation; and therefore it is denominated from man- ix) that the name of “Principalities” signifies “one who ifestation only; and thus the common name remains as it leads in a sacred order.” For those who lead others, being were proper to the lowest order, as Dionysius says (Coel. first among them, are properly called “princes,” according Hier. v). Or we may say that the lowest order can be to the words, “Princes went before joined with singers” specially called the order of “angels,” forasmuch as they (Ps. 67:26). announce things to us immediately. Reply to Objection 4. The “Archangels,” according “Virtue” can be taken in two ways. First, commonly, to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ix), are between the “Principal- considered as the medium between the essence and the op- ities” and the “Angels.” A medium compared to one ex- eration, and in that sense all the heavenly spirits are called treme seems like the other, as participating in the nature of heavenly virtues, as also “heavenly essences.” Secondly, both extremes; thus tepid seems cold compared to hot, and as meaning a certain excellence of strength; and thus it hot compared to cold. So the “Archangels” are called the is the proper name of an angelic order. Hence Dionysius “angel princes”; forasmuch as they are princes as regards says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the “name ‘virtues’ signifies the “Angels,” and angels as regards the Principalities. But a certain virile and immovable strength”; first, in regard according to Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) they are called of those Divine operations which befit them; secondly, in “Archangels,” because they preside over the one order of regard to receiving Divine gifts. Thus it signifies that they the “Angels”; as it were, announcing greater things: and undertake fearlessly the Divine behests appointed to them; the “Principalities” are so called as presiding over all the and this seems to imply strength of mind. heavenly “Virtues” who fulfil the Divine commands. Reply to Objection 2. As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. Reply to Objection 5. The name “Seraphim” does not xii): “Dominion is attributed to God in a special manner, come from charity only, but from the excess of charity, ex- by way of excess: but the Divine word gives the more pressed by the word ardor or fire. Hence Dionysius (Coel. illustrious heavenly princes the name of Lord by partici- Hier. vii) expounds the name “Seraphim” according to the pation, through whom the inferior angels receive the Di- properties of fire, containing an excess of heat. Now in fire vine gifts.” Hence Dionysius also states (Coel. Hier. viii) we may consider three things. First, the movement which that the name “Domination” means first “a certain liberty, is upwards and continuous. This signifies that they are free from servile condition and common subjection, such borne inflexibly towards God. Secondly, the active force as that of plebeians, and from tyrannical oppression,” en- which is “heat,” which is not found in fire simply, but ex- dured sometimes even by the great. Secondly, it signifies ists with a certain sharpness, as being of most penetrating “a certain rigid and inflexible supremacy which does not action, and reaching even to the smallest things, and as it bend to any servile act, or to the act, of those who are were, with superabundant fervor; whereby is signified the subject to or oppressed by tyrants.” Thirdly, it signifies action of these angels, exercised powerfully upon those “the desire and participation of the true dominion which who are subject to them, rousing them to a like fervor, and belongs to God.” Likewise the name of each order signi- cleansing them wholly by their heat. Thirdly we consider fies the participation of what belongs to God; as the name in fire the quality of clarity, or brightness; which signifies “Virtues” signifies the participation of the Divine virtue; that these angels have in themselves an inextinguishable and the same principle applies to the rest. light, and that they also perfectly enlighten others. Reply to Objection 3. The names “Domination,” In the same way the name “Cherubim” comes from a “Power,” and “Principality” belong to government in dif- certain excess of knowledge; hence it is interpreted “ful- ferent ways. The place of a lord is only to prescribe what ness of knowledge,” which Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) ex- is to be done. So Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Evang.), that pounds in regard to four things: the perfect vision of God; “some companies of the angels, because others are subject the full reception of the Divine Light; their contemplation to obedience to them, are called dominations.” The name in God of the beauty of the Divine order; and in regard to “Power” points out a kind of order, according to what the the fact that possessing this knowledge fully, they pour it Apostle says, “He that resisteth the power, resisteth the forth copiously upon others. ordination of God” (Rom. 13:2). And so Dionysius says Reply to Objection 6. The order of the “Thrones” ex- (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name “Power” signifies a kind of cels the inferior orders as having an immediate knowledge ordination both as regards the reception of Divine things, of the types of the Divine works; whereas the “Cherubim” and as regards the Divine actions performed by superiors have the excellence of knowledge and the “Seraphim” the towards inferiors by leading them to things above. There- excellence of ardor. And although these two excellent fore, to the order of “Powers” it belongs to regulate what attributes include the third, yet the gift belonging to the 544 “Thrones” does not include the other two; and so the order Secondly, because in material seats is displayed strength, of the “Thrones” is distinguished from the orders of the forasmuch as a person sits firmly on them. But here the “Cherubim” and the “Seraphim.” For it is a common rule reverse is the case; for the angels themselves are made in all things that the excellence of the inferior is contained firm by God. Thirdly, because the seat receives him who in the superior, but not conversely. But Dionysius (Coel. sits thereon, and he can be carried thereupon; and so the Hier. vii) explains the name “Thrones” by its relation angels receive God in themselves, and in a certain way to material seats, in which we may consider four things. bear Him to the inferior creatures. Fourthly, because in its First, the site; because seats are raised above the earth, shape, a seat is open on one side to receive the sitter; and and to the angels who are called “Thrones” are raised up thus are the angels promptly open to receive God and to to the immediate knowledge of the types of things in God. serve Him. Whether the grades of the orders are properly assigned? Ia q. 108 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the grades of the or- (1:16), numbering the same orders from the highest, he ders are not properly assigned. For the order of prelates is says: “Whether Thrones, or Dominations, or Principal- the highest. But the names of “Dominations,” “Principal- ities, or Powers, all things were created by Him and in ities,” and “Powers” of themselves imply prelacy. There- Him.” Here he places the “Principalities” between “Dom- fore these orders ought not to be supreme. inations” and “Powers,” as does also Gregory. Objection 2. Further, the nearer an order is to God, Let us then first examine the reason for the ordering of the higher it is. But the order of “Thrones” is the nearest Dionysius, in which we see, that, as said above (a. 1), the to God; for nothing is nearer to the sitter than the seat. highest hierarchy contemplates the ideas of things in God Therefore the order of the “Thrones” is the highest. Himself; the second in the universal causes; and third in Objection 3. Further, knowledge comes before love, their application to particular effects. And because God and intellect is higher than will. Therefore the order of is the end not only of the angelic ministrations, but also “Cherubim” seems to be higher than the “Seraphim.” of the whole creation, it belongs to the first hierarchy to Objection 4. Further, Gregory (Hom. xxiv in consider the end; to the middle one belongs the universal Evang.) places the “Principalities” above the “Powers.” disposition of what is to be done; and to the last belongs These therefore are not placed immediately above the the application of this disposition to the effect, which is Archangels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix). the carrying out of the work; for it is clear that these three On the contrary, Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), places things exist in every kind of operation. So Dionysius, in the highest hierarchy the “Seraphim” as the first, the considering the properties of the orders as derived from “Cherubim” as the middle, the “Thrones” as the last; in their names, places in the first hierarchy those orders the the middle hierarchy he places the “Dominations,” as the names of which are taken from their relation to God, the first, the “Virtues” in the middle, the “Powers” last; in “Seraphim,” “Cherubim,” and “Thrones”; and he places in the lowest hierarchy the “Principalities” first, then the the middle hierarchy those orders whose names denote a “Archangels,” and lastly the “Angels.” certain kind of common government or disposition—the I answer that, The grades of the angelic orders are “Dominations,” “Virtues,” and “Powers”; and he places assigned by Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) and Diony- in the third hierarchy the orders whose names denote the sius (Coel. Hier. vii), who agree as regards all except execution of the work, the “Principalities,” “Angels,” and the “Principalities” and “Virtues.” For Dionysius places “Archangels.” the “Virtues” beneath the “Dominations,” and above As regards the end, three things may be considered. the “Powers”; the “Principalities” beneath the “Powers” For firstly we consider the end; then we acquire perfect and above the “Archangels.” Gregory, however, places knowledge of the end; thirdly, we fix our intention on the the “Principalities” between the “Dominations” and the end; of which the second is an addition to the first, and “Powers”; and the “Virtues” between the “Powers” and the third an addition to both. And because God is the end the “Archangels.” Each of these placings may claim au- of creatures, as the leader is the end of an army, as the thority from the words of the Apostle, who (Eph. 1:20,21) Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10); so a some- enumerates the middle orders, beginning from the lowest what similar order may be seen in human affairs. For there saying that “God set Him,” i.e. Christ, “on His right hand are some who enjoy the dignity of being able with famil- in the heavenly places above all Principality and Power, iarity to approach the king or leader; others in addition and Virtue, and Dominion.” Here he places “Virtues” are privileged to know his secrets; and others above these between “Powers” and “Dominations,” according to the ever abide with him, in a close union. According to this placing of Dionysius. Writing however to the Colossians similitude, we can understand the disposition in the orders 545 of the first hierarchy; for the “Thrones” are raised up so The disposition of the orders which is mentioned by as to be the familiar recipients of God in themselves, in Gregory is also reasonable. For since the “Dominations” the sense of knowing immediately the types of things in appoint and order what belongs to the Divine ministra- Himself; and this is proper to the whole of the first hierar- tions, the orders subject to them are arranged according to chy. The “Cherubim” know the Divine secrets superemi- the disposition of those things in which the Divine min- nently; and the “Seraphim” excel in what is the supreme istrations are effected. Still, as Augustine says (De Trin. excellence of all, in being united to God Himself; and all iii), “bodies are ruled in a certain order; the inferior by the this in such a manner that the whole of this hierarchy can superior; and all of them by the spiritual creature, and the be called the “Thrones”; as, from what is common to all bad spirit by the good spirit.” So the first order after the the heavenly spirits together, they are all called “Angels.” “Dominations” is called that of “Principalities,” who rule As regards government, three things are comprised even over good spirits; then the “Powers,” who coerce the therein, the first of which is to appoint those things which evil spirits; even as evil-doers are coerced by earthly pow- are to be done, and this belongs to the “Dominations”; the ers, as it is written (Rom. 13:3,4). After these come the second is to give the power of carrying out what is to be “Virtues,” which have power over corporeal nature in the done, which belongs to the “Virtues”; the third is to order working of miracles; after these are the “Angels” and the how what has been commanded or decided to be done can “Archangels,” who announce to men either great things be carried out by others, which belongs to the “Powers.” above reason, or small things within the purview of rea- The execution of the angelic ministrations consists in son. announcing Divine things. Now in the execution of any Reply to Objection 1. The angel’s subjection to God action there are beginners and leaders; as in singing, the is greater than their presiding over inferior things; and the precentors; and in war, generals and officers; this belongs latter is derived from the former. Thus the orders which to the “Principalities.” There are others who simply exe- derive their name from presiding are not the first and high- cute what is to be done; and these are the “Angels.” Oth- est; but rather the orders deriving their name from their ers hold a middle place; and these are the “Archangels,” nearness and relation to God. as above explained. Reply to Objection 2. The nearness to God desig- This explanation of the orders is quite a reasonable nated by the name of the “Thrones,” belongs also to the one. For the highest in an inferior order always has affin- “Cherubim” and “Seraphim,” and in a more excellent way, ity to the lowest in the higher order; as the lowest animals as above explained. are near to the plants. Now the first order is that of the Di- Reply to Objection 3. As above explained (q. 27, vine Persons, which terminates in the Holy Ghost, Who is a. 3), knowledge takes place accordingly as the thing Love proceeding, with Whom the highest order of the first known is in the knower; but love as the lover is united hierarchy has affinity, denominated as it is from the fire of to the object loved. Now higher things are in a nobler way love. The lowest order of the first hierarchy is that of the in themselves than in lower things; whereas lower things “Thrones,” who in their own order are akin to the “Domi- are in higher things in a nobler way than they are in them- nations”; for the “Thrones,” according to Gregory (Hom. selves. Therefore to know lower things is better than to xxiv in Ev.), are so called “because through them God ac- love them; and to love the higher things, God above all, is complishes His judgments,” since they are enlightened by better than to know them. Him in a manner adapted to the immediate enlightening Reply to Objection 4. A careful comparison will of the second hierarchy, to which belongs the disposition show that little or no difference exists in reality between of the Divine ministrations. The order of the “Powers” the dispositions of the orders according to Dionysius and is akin to the order of the “Principalities”; for as it be- Gregory. For Gregory expounds the name “Principalities” longs to the “Powers” to impose order on those subject to from their “presiding over good spirits,” which also agrees them, this ordering is plainly shown at once in the name of with the “Virtues” accordingly as this name expressed “Principalities,” who, as presiding over the government of a certain strength, giving efficacy to the inferior spirits peoples and kingdoms (which occupies the first and prin- in the execution of the Divine ministrations. Again, ac- cipal place in the Divine ministrations), are the first in the cording to Gregory, the “Virtues” seem to be the same execution thereof; “for the good of a nation is more di- as “Principalities” of Dionysius. For to work miracles vine than the good of one man” (Ethic. i, 2); and hence holds the first place in the Divine ministrations; since it is written, “The prince of the kingdom of the Persians thereby the way is prepared for the announcements of the resisted me” (Dan. 10:13). “Archangels” and the “Angels.” 546 Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment? Ia q. 108 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the orders of angels are directed towards leading others to their end; but it will will not outlast the Day of Judgment. For the Apostle remain, accordingly as it agrees with the attainment of the says (1 Cor. 15:24), that Christ will “bring to naught all end. Thus also the various ranks of soldiers have different principality and power, when He shall have delivered up duties to perform in battle and in triumph. the kingdom to God and the Father,” and this will be in Reply to Objection 1. The principalities and powers the final consummation. Therefore for the same reason all will come to an end in that final consummation as regards others will be abolished in that state. their office of leading others to their end; because when Objection 2. Further, to the office of the angelic or- the end is attained, it is no longer necessary to tend to- ders it belongs to cleanse, enlighten, and perfect. But after wards the end. This is clear from the words of the Apos- the Day of Judgment one angel will not cleanse, enlighten, tle, “When He shall have delivered up the kingdom of God or perfect another, because they will not advance any more and the Father,” i.e. when He shall have led the faithful to in knowledge. Therefore the angelic orders would remain the enjoyment of God Himself. for no purpose. Reply to Objection 2. The actions of angels over the Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says of the angels other angels are to be considered according to a likeness (Heb. 1:14), that “they are all ministering spirits, sent to to our own intellectual actions. In ourselves we find many minister to them who shall receive the inheritance of sal- intellectual actions which are ordered according to the or- vation”; whence it appears that the angelic offices are or- der of cause and effect; as when we gradually arrive at dered for the purpose of leading men to salvation. But all one conclusion by many middle terms. Now it is mani- the elect are in pursuit of salvation until the Day of Judg- fest that the knowledge of a conclusion depends on all the ment. Therefore the angelic offices and orders will not preceding middle terms not only in the new acquisition of outlast the Day of Judgment. knowledge, but also as regards the keeping of the knowl- On the contrary, It is written (Judges 5:20): “Stars edge acquired. A proof of this is that when anyone forgets remaining in their order and courses,” which is applied to any of the preceding middle terms he can have opinion or the angels. Therefore the angels will ever remain in their belief about the conclusion, but not knowledge; as he is orders. ignorant of the order of the causes. So, since the inferior I answer that, In the angelic orders we may consider angels know the types of the Divine works by the light of two things; the distinction of grades, and the execution of the superior angels, their knowledge depends on the light their offices. The distinction of grades among the angels of the superior angels not only as regards the acquisition takes place according to the difference of grace and na- of knowledge, but also as regards the preserving of the ture, as above explained (a. 4); and these differences will knowledge possessed. So, although after the Judgment ever remain in the angels; for these differences of natures the inferior angels will not progress in the knowledge of cannot be taken from them unless they themselves be cor- some things, still this will not prevent their being enlight- rupted. The difference of glory will also ever remain in ened by the superior angels. them according to the difference of preceding merit. As Reply to Objection 3. Although after the Day of to the execution of the angelic offices, it will to a certain Judgment men will not be led any more to salvation by the degree remain after the Day of Judgment, and to a certain ministry of the angels, still those who are already saved degree will cease. It will cease accordingly as their offices will be enlightened through the angelic ministry. Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders? Ia q. 108 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that men are not taken to the angelic orders. up into the orders of the angels. For the human hierarchy Objection 3. Further, as the good angels lead on to is stationed beneath the lowest heavenly hierarchy, as the good, so do the demons to what is evil. But it is erroneous lowest under the middle hierarchy and the middle beneath to say that the souls of bad men are changed into demons; the first. But the angels of the lowest hierarchy are never for Chrysostom rejects this (Hom. xxviii in Matt.). There- transferred into the middle, or the first. Therefore neither fore it does not seem that the souls of the saints will be are men transferred to the angelic orders. transferred to the orders of angels. Objection 2. Further, certain offices belong to the or- On the contrary, The Lord says of the saints that, ders of the angels, as to guard, to work miracles, to coerce “they will be as the angels of God” (Mat. 22:30). I an- the demons, and the like; which do not appear to belong to swer that, As above explained (Aa. 4,7), the orders of the the souls of the saints. Therefore they are not transferred angels are distinguished according to the conditions of na- 547 ture and according to the gifts of grace. Considered only proportion to their natural gifts. This, however, does not as regards the grade of nature, men can in no way be as- apply to men, as above explained (a. 4; q. 62, a. 6). So, sumed into the angelic orders; for the natural distinction as the inferior angels cannot be transferred to the natural will always remain. In view of this distinction, some as- grade of the superior, neither can they be transferred to serted that men can in no way be transferred to an equal- the superior grade of grace; whereas men can ascend to ity with the angels; but this is erroneous, contradicting the grade of grace, but not of nature. as it does the promise of Christ saying that the children Reply to Objection 2. The angels according to the of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in heaven order of nature are between us and God; and therefore (Lk. 20:36). For whatever belongs to nature is the ma- according to the common law not only human affairs are terial part of an order; whilst that which perfects is from administered by them, but also all corporeal matters. But grace which depends on the liberality of God, and not on holy men even after this life are of the same nature with the order of nature. Therefore by the gift of grace men can ourselves; and hence according to the common law they merit glory in such a degree as to be equal to the angels, do not administer human affairs, “nor do they interfere in each of the angelic grades; and this implies that men in the things of the living,” as Augustine says (De cura are taken up into the orders of the angels. Some, however, pro mortuis xiii, xvi). Still, by a certain special dispensa- say that not all who are saved are assumed into the angelic tion it is sometimes granted to some of the saints to ex- orders, but only virgins or the perfect; and that the other ercise these offices; by working miracles, by coercing the will constitute their own order, as it were, corresponding demons, or by doing something of that kind, as Augustine to the whole society of the angels. But this is against what says (De cura pro mortuis xvi). Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), that “there will not Reply to Objection 3. It is not erroneous to say that be two societies of men and angels, but only one; because men are transferred to the penalty of demons; but some the beatitude of all is to cleave to God alone.” erroneously stated that the demons are nothing but souls Reply to Objection 1. Grace is given to the angels in of the dead; and it is this that Chrysostom rejects. 548 FIRST PART, QUESTION 109 The Ordering of the Bad Angels (In Four Articles) We now consider the ordering of the bad angels; concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are orders among the demons? (2) Whether among them there is precedence? (3) Whether one enlightens another? (4) Whether they are subject to the precedence of the good angels? Whether there are orders among the demons? Ia q. 109 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there are no orders and the perfect, which is that of consummate glory. among the demons. For order belongs to good, as also If therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light mode, and species, as Augustine says (De Nat. Boni iii); of the perfection of glory, then the demons are not in the and on the contrary, disorder belongs to evil. But there angelic orders, and never were. But if we consider them is nothing disorderly in the good angels. Therefore in the in relation to imperfect grace, in that view the demons bad angels there are no orders. were at the time in the orders of angels, but fell away from Objection 2. Further, the angelic orders are contained them, according to what was said above (q. 62, a. 3), that under a hierarchy. But the demons are not in a hierarchy, all the angels were created in grace. But if we consider which is defined as a holy principality; for they are void them in the light of nature, in that view they are still in of all holiness. Therefore among the demons there are no those orders; because they have not lost their natural gifts; orders. as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Objection 3. Further, the demons fell from every one Reply to Objection 1. Good can exist without evil; of the angelic orders; as is commonly supposed. There- whereas evil cannot exist without good (q. 49, a. 3); so fore, if some demons are said to belong to an order, as there is order in the demons, as possessing a good nature. falling from that order, it would seem necessary to give Reply to Objection 2. If we consider the ordering of them the names of each of those orders. But we never find the demons on the part of God Who orders them, it is sa- that they are called “Seraphim,” or “Thrones,” or “Domi- cred; for He uses the demons for Himself; but on the part nations.” Therefore on the same ground they are not to be of the demons’ will it is not a sacred thing, because they placed in any other order. abuse their nature for evil. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 6:12): “Our Reply to Objection 3. The name “Seraphim” is given wrestling. . . is against principalities and powers, against from the ardor of charity; and the name “Thrones” from the rulers of the world of this darkness.” the Divine indwelling; and the name “Dominations” im- I answer that, As explained above (q. 108, Aa. 4,7,8), ports a certain liberty; all of which are opposed to sin; order in the angels is considered both according to the and therefore these names are not given to the angels who grade of nature; and according to that of grace. Now grace sinned. has a twofold state, the imperfect, which is that of merit; Whether among the demons there is precedence? Ia q. 109 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no prece- no precedence among the demons. dence among the demons. For every precedence is ac- Objection 3. If there be precedence among them it cording to some order of justice. But the demons are is either according to nature, or according to their sin or wholly fallen from justice. Therefore there is no prece- punishment. But it is not according to their nature, for dence among them. subjection and service do not come from nature but from Objection 2. Further, there is no precedence where subsequent sin; neither is it according to sin or punish- obedience and subjection do not exist. But these cannot ment, because in that case the superior demons who have be without concord; which is not to be found among the sinned the most grievously, would be subject to the infe- demons, according to the text, “Among the proud there rior. Therefore there is no precedence among the demons. are always contentions” (Prov. 13:10). Therefore there is On the contrary, On 1 Cor. 15:24 the gloss says: 549 “While the world lasts, angels will preside over angels, Reply to Objection 1. The authority of the demons men over men, and demons over demons.” is not founded on their justice, but on the justice of God I answer that, Since action follows the nature of a ordering all things. thing, where natures are subordinate, actions also must be Reply to Objection 2. The concord of the demons, subordinate to each other. Thus it is in corporeal things, whereby some obey others, does not arise from mutual for as the inferior bodies by natural order are below the friendships, but from their common wickedness whereby heavenly bodies, their actions and movements are sub- they hate men, and fight against God’s justice. For it be- ject to the actions and movements of the heavenly bodies. longs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those Now it is plain from what we have said (a. 1), that the whom they see to be stronger, in order to carry out their demons are by natural order subject to others; and hence own wickedness. their actions are subject to the action of those above them, Reply to Objection 3. The demons are not equal in and this is what we mean by precedence—that the action nature; and so among them there exists a natural prece- of the subject should be under the action of the prelate. dence; which is not the case with men, who are naturally So the very natural disposition of the demons requires equal. That the inferior are subject to the superior, is not that there should be authority among them. This agrees for the benefit of the superior, but rather to their detriment; too with Divine wisdom, which leaves nothing inordinate, because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree which “reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth to unhappiness, it follows that to preside in evil is to be all things sweetly” (Wis. 8:1). more unhappy. Whether there is enlightenment in the demons? Ia q. 109 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that enlightenment is in ifestation of the truth in reference to God, Who enlightens the demons. For enlightenment means the manifestation every intellect. Another kind of manifestation of the truth of the truth. But one demon can manifest truth to another, is speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to an- because the superior excel in natural knowledge. There- other. Now the demon’s perversity does not lead one to fore the superior demons can enlighten the inferior. order another to God, but rather to lead away from the Di- Objection 2. Further, a body abounding in light can vine order; and so one demon does not enlighten another; enlighten a body deficient in light, as the sun enlightens but one can make known his mental concept to another by the moon. But the superior demons abound in the partici- way of speech. pation of natural light. Therefore it seems that the superior Reply to Objection 1. Not every kind of manifesta- demons can enlighten the inferior. tion of the truth is enlightenment, but only that which is On the contrary, Enlightenment is not without above described. cleansing and perfecting, as stated above (q. 106, a. 1). Reply to Objection 2. According to what belongs to But to cleanse does not befit the demons, according to the natural knowledge, there is no necessary manifestation of words: “What can be made clean by the unclean?” (Ec- the truth either in the angels, or in the demons, because, as clus. 34:4). Therefore neither can they enlighten. above explained (q. 55, a. 2; q. 58, a. 2; q. 79, a. 2), they I answer that, There can be no enlightenment prop- know from the first all that belongs to their natural knowl- erly speaking among the demons. For, as above explained edge. So the greater fulness of natural light in the superior (q. 107, a. 2), enlightenment properly speaking is the man- demons does not prove that they can enlighten others. Whether the good angels have precedence over the bad angels? Ia q. 109 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the good angels have to the good angels; which cannot be admitted. no precedence over the bad angels. For the angels’ prece- Objection 3. Further, the angels’ precedence follows dence is especially connected with enlightenment. But upon the order of nature, as above explained (a. 2). But the bad angels, being darkness, are not enlightened by the if the demons fell from every order, as is commonly said, good angels. Therefore the good angels do not rule over many of the demons are superior to many good angels the bad. in the natural order. Therefore the good angels have no Objection 2. Further, superiors are responsible as re- precedence over all the bad angels. gards negligence for the evil deeds of their subjects. But On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii), that the demons do much evil. Therefore if they are subject to “the treacherous and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the the good angels, it seems that negligence is to be charged rational, pious, and just spirit of life”; and Gregory says 550 (Hom. xxxiv) that “the Powers are the angels to whose This revelation, if compared to the angelic revealers, can charge are subjected the hostile powers.” be called an enlightenment, forasmuch as they direct it I answer that, The whole order of precedence is first to God; but it is not an enlightenment on the part of the and originally in God; and it is shared by creatures ac- demons, for these do not direct it to God; but to the fulfil- cordingly as they are the nearer to God. For those crea- ment of their own wickedness. tures, which are more perfect and nearer to God, have the Reply to Objection 2. The holy angels are the minis- power to act on others. Now the greatest perfection and ters of the Divine wisdom. Hence as the Divine wisdom that which brings them nearest to God belongs to the crea- permits some evil to be done by bad angels or men, for tures who enjoy God, as the holy angels; of which per- the sake of the good that follows; so also the good angels fection the demons are deprived; and therefore the good do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm. angels have precedence over the bad, and these are ruled Reply to Objection 3. An angel who is inferior in the by them. natural order presides over demons, although these may Reply to Objection 1. Many things concerning Di- be naturally superior; because the power of Divine jus- vine mysteries are made known by the holy angels to tice to which the good angels cleave, is stronger than the the bad angels, whenever the Divine justice requires the natural power of the angels. Hence likewise among men, demons to do anything for the punishment of the evil; or “the spiritual man judgeth all things” (1 Cor. 2:15), and for the trial of the good; as in human affairs the judge’s the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 4; x, 5) that “the virtuous assessors make known his sentence to the executioners. man is the rule and measure of all human acts.” 551 FIRST PART, QUESTION 110 How Angels Act On Bodies (In Four Articles) We now consider how the angels preside over the corporeal creatures. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels? (2) Whether the corporeal creature obeys the mere will of the angels? (3) Whether the angels by their own power can immediately move bodies locally? (4) Whether the good or bad angels can work miracles? Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels? Ia q. 110 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the corporeal crea- but also by all philosophers who admit the existence of ture is not governed by angels. For whatever possesses incorporeal substances. a determinate mode of action, needs not to be governed Reply to Objection 1. Corporeal things have determi- by any superior power; for we require to be governed lest nate actions; but they exercise such actions only according we do what we ought not. But corporeal things have their as they are moved; because it belongs to a body not to act actions determined by the nature divinely bestowed upon unless moved. Hence a corporeal creature must be moved them. Therefore they do not need the government of an- by a spiritual creature. gels. Reply to Objection 2. The reason alleged is accord- Objection 2. Further, the lowest things are ruled by ing to the opinion of Aristotle who laid down (Metaph. the superior. But some corporeal things are inferior, and xi, 8) that the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual sub- others are superior. Therefore they need not be governed stances; the number of which he endeavored to assign ac- by the angels. cording to the number of motions apparent in the heav- Objection 3. Further, the different orders of the an- enly bodies. But he did not say that there were any spiri- gels are distinguished by different offices. But if corpo- tual substances with immediate rule over the inferior bod- real creatures were ruled by the angels, there would be ies, except perhaps human souls; and this was because as many angelic offices as there are species of things. So he did not consider that any operations were exercised in also there would be as many orders of angels as there are the inferior bodies except the natural ones for which the species of things; which is against what is laid down above movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed. But because (q. 108, a. 2). Therefore the corporeal creature is not gov- we assert that many things are done in the inferior bodies erned by angels. besides the natural corporeal actions, for which the move- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that ments of the heavenly bodies are not sufficient; therefore “all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life”; and Gre- in our opinion we must assert that the angels possess an gory says (Dial. iv, 6), that “in this visible world nothing immediate presidency not only over the heavenly bodies, takes place without the agency of the invisible creature.” but also over the inferior bodies. I answer that, It is generally found both in human af- Reply to Objection 3. Philosophers have held differ- fairs and in natural things that every particular power is ent opinions about immaterial substances. For Plato laid governed and ruled by the universal power; as, for exam- down that immaterial substances were types and species ple, the bailiff’s power is governed by the power of the of sensible bodies; and that some were more universal king. Among the angels also, as explained above (q. 55, than others; and so he held that immaterial substances a. 3 ; q. 108, a. 1), the superior angels who preside over preside immediately over all sensible bodies, and differ- the inferior possess a more universal knowledge. Now it ent ones over different bodies. But Aristotle held that im- is manifest that the power of any individual body is more material substances are not the species of sensible bodies, particular than the power of any spiritual substance; for but something higher and more universal; and so he did every corporeal form is a form individualized by matter, not attribute to them any immediate presiding over sin- and determined to the “here and now”; whereas imma- gle bodies, but only over the universal agents, the heav- terial forms are absolute and intelligible. Therefore, as enly bodies. Avicenna followed a middle course. For he the inferior angels who have the less universal forms, are agreed with Plato in supposing some spiritual substance to ruled by the superior; so are all corporeal things ruled by preside immediately in the sphere of active and passive el- the angels. This is not only laid down by the holy doctors, ements; because, as Plato also said, he held that the forms 552 of these sensible things are derived from immaterial sub-is not that an angel is more fitted by his nature to preside stances. But he differed from Plato because he supposed over animals than over plants; because each angel, even only one immaterial substance to preside over all inferior the least, has a higher and more universal power than any bodies, which he called the “active intelligence.” kind of corporeal things: the reason is to be sought in the The holy doctors held with the Platonists that differ- order of Divine wisdom, Who places different rulers over ent spiritual substances were placed over corporeal things. different things. Nor does it follow that there are more For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): “Every visible thing than nine orders of angels, because, as above expounded in this world has an angelic power placed over it”; and (q. 108, a. 2), the orders are distinguished by their gen- Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4): “The devil was one eral offices. Hence as according to Gregory all the angels of the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial or- whose proper office it is to preside over the demons are of der”; and Origen says on the text, “When the ass saw the the order of the “powers”; so to the order of the “virtues” angel” (Num. 22:23), that “the world has need of angels do those angels seem to belong who preside over purely who preside over beasts, and over the birth of animals, corporeal creatures; for by their ministration miracles are and trees, and plants, and over the increase of all other sometimes performed. things” (Hom. xiv in Num.). The reason of this, however, Whether corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel? Ia q. 110 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that corporeal matter I answer that, The Platonists∗ asserted that the forms obeys the mere will of an angel. For the power of an angel which are in matter are caused by immaterial forms, be- excels the power of the soul. But corporeal matter obeys cause they said that the material forms are participations a conception of the soul; for the body of man is changed of immaterial forms. Avicenna followed them in this by a conception of the soul as regards heat and cold, and opinion to some extent, for he said that all forms which sometimes even as regards health and sickness. Therefore are in matter proceed from the concept of the “intellect”; much more is corporeal matter changed by a conception and that corporeal agents only dispose [matter] for the of an angel. forms. They seem to have been deceived on this point, Objection 2. Further, whatever can be done by an in- through supposing a form to be something made “per se,” ferior power, can be done by a superior power. Now the so that it would be the effect of a formal principle. But, power of an angel is superior to corporeal power. But a as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), what body by its power is able to transform corporeal matter; is made, properly speaking, is the “composite”: for this as appears when fire begets fire. Therefore much more ef- properly speaking, is, as it were, what subsists. Whereas ficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal the form is called a being, not as that which is, but as matter. that by which something is; and consequently neither is a Objection 3. Further, all corporeal nature is under an- form, properly speaking, made; for that is made which is; gelic administration, as appears above (a. 1), and thus it since to be is nothing but the way to existence. appears that bodies are as instruments to the angels, for Now it is manifest that what is made is like to the an instrument is essentially a mover moved. Now in ef- maker, forasmuch as every agent makes its like. So what- fects there is something that is due to the power of their ever makes natural things, has a likeness to the composite; principal agents, and which cannot be due to the power of either because it is composite itself, as when fire begets the instrument; and this it is that takes the principal place fire, or because the whole “composite” as to both mat- in the effect. For example, digestion is due to the force of ter and form is within its power; and this belongs to God natural heat, which is the instrument of the nutritive soul: alone. Therefore every informing of matter is either im- but that living flesh is thus generated is due to the power mediately from God, or form some corporeal agent; but of the soul. Again the cutting of the wood is from the saw; not immediately from an angel. but that it assumes the length the form of a bed is from the Reply to Objection 1. Our soul is united to the body design of the [joiner’s] art. Therefore the substantial form as the form; and so it is not surprising for the body to be which takes the principal place in the corporeal effects, formally changed by the soul’s concept; especially as the is due to the angelic power. Therefore matter obeys the movement of the sensitive appetite, which is accompanied angels in receiving its form. with a certain bodily change, is subject to the command On the contrary, Augustine says “It is not to be of reason. An angel, however, has not the same connec- thought, that this visible matter obeys these rebel angels; tion with natural bodies; and hence the argument does not for it obeys God alone.” hold. ∗ Phaedo. xlix: Tim. (Did.) vol. ii, p. 218 553 Reply to Objection 2. Whatever an inferior power some natural effect taking place by angelic power, for can do, that a superior power can do, not in the same way, which the power of corporeal agents would not suffice. but in a more excellent way; for example, the intellect This, however, is not to obey an angel’s will (as neither knows sensible things in a more excellent way than sense does matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by reg- knows them. So an angel can change corporeal matter in ulating the fire according to the prescription of his art he a more excellent way than can corporeal agents, that is produces a dish that the fire could not have produced by by moving the corporeal agents themselves, as being the itself); since to reduce matter to the act of the substantial superior cause. form does not exceed the power of a corporeal agent; for Reply to Objection 3. There is nothing to prevent it is natural for like to make like. Whether bodies obey the angels as regards local motion? Ia q. 110 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that bodies do not obey 7). The reason of this is that what is moved locally is the angels in local motion. For the local motion of natu- not as such in potentiality to anything intrinsic, but only ral bodies follows on their forms. But the angels do not to something extrinsic—that is, to place. Therefore the cause the forms of natural bodies, as stated above (a. 2). corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved im- Therefore neither can they cause in them local motion. mediately by the spiritual nature as regards place. Hence Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, also the philosophers asserted that the supreme bodies are 7) proves that local motion is the first of all movements. moved locally by the spiritual substances; whence we see But the angels cannot cause other movements by a formal that the soul moves the body first and chiefly by a local change of the matter. Therefore neither can they cause motion. local motion. Reply to Objection 1. There are in bodies other local Objection 3. Further, the corporeal members obey the movements besides those which result from the forms; for concept of the soul as regards local movement, as having instance, the ebb and flow of the sea does not follow from in themselves some principle of life. In natural bodies, the substantial form of the water, but from the influence however, there is not vital principle. Therefore they do of the moon; and much more can local movements result not obey the angels in local motion. from the power of spiritual substances. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9) Reply to Objection 2. The angels, by causing local that the angels use corporeal seed to produce certain ef- motion, as the first motion, can thereby cause other move- fects. But they cannot do this without causing local move- ments; that is, by employing corporeal agents to produce ment. Therefore bodies obey them in local motion. these effects, as a workman employs fire to soften iron. I answer that, As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): Reply to Objection 3. The power of an angel is not “Divine wisdom has joined the ends of the first to the so limited as is the power of the soul. Hence the motive principles of the second.” Hence it is clear that the in- power of the soul is limited to the body united to it, which ferior nature at its highest point is in conjunction with su- is vivified by it, and by which it can move other things. perior nature. Now corporeal nature is below the spiritual But an angel’s power is not limited to any body; hence it nature. But among all corporeal movements the most per- can move locally bodies not joined to it. fect is local motion, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, Whether angels can work miracles? Ia q. 110 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels can work where in the same work∗. Therefore the demons can work miracles. For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): miracles. Therefore much more can the good angels. “Those spirits are called virtues by whom signs and mira- Objection 3. Further, Augustine says in the same cles are usually done.” work† that “it is not absurd to believe that all the things Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. we see happen may be brought about by the lower pow- 79) that “magicians work miracles by private contracts; ers that dwell in our atmosphere.” But when an effect of good Christians by public justice, bad Christians by the natural causes is produced outside the order of the natural signs of public justice.” But magicians work miracles be- cause, we call it a miracle, as, for instance, when anyone cause they are “heard by the demons,” as he says else- is cured of a fever without the operation of nature. There- ∗ Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine † Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine 554 fore the angels and demons can work miracles. the order of the whole created nature. But as we do not Objection 4. Further, superior power is not subject know all the power of created nature, it follows that when to the order of an inferior cause. But corporeal nature is anything is done outside the order of created nature by inferior to an angel. Therefore an angel can work outside a power unknown to us, it is called a miracle as regards the order of corporeal agents; which is to work miracles. ourselves. So when the demons do anything of their own On the contrary, It is written of God (Ps. 135:4): natural power, these things are called “miracles” not in “Who alone doth great wonders.” an absolute sense, but in reference to ourselves. In this I answer that, A miracle properly so called is when way the magicians work miracles through the demons; something is done outside the order of nature. But it is not and these are said to be done by “private contracts,” foras- enough for a miracle if something is done outside the or- much as every power of the creature, in the universe, may der of any particular nature; for otherwise anyone would be compared to the power of a private person in a city. perform a miracle by throwing a stone upwards, as such Hence when a magician does anything by compact with a thing is outside the order of the stone’s nature. So for a the devil, this is done as it were by private contract. On miracle is required that it be against the order of the whole the other hand, the Divine justice is in the whole universe created nature. But God alone can do this, because, what- as the public law is in the city. Therefore good Christians, ever an angel or any other creature does by its own power, so far as they work miracles by Divine justice, are said to is according to the order of created nature; and thus it is work miracles by “public justice”: but bad Christians by not a miracle. Hence God alone can work miracles. the “signs of public justice,” as by invoking the name of Reply to Objection 1. Some angels are said to work Christ, or by making use of other sacred signs. miracles; either because God works miracles at their re- Reply to Objection 3. Spiritual powers are able to ef- quest, in the same way as holy men are said to work mir- fect whatever happens in this visible world, by employing acles; or because they exercise a kind of ministry in the corporeal seeds by local movement. miracles which take place; as in collecting the dust in the Reply to Objection 4. Although the angels can do general resurrection, or by doing something of that kind. something which is outside the order of corporeal nature, Reply to Objection 2. Properly speaking, as said yet they cannot do anything outside the whole created or- above, miracles are those things which are done outside der, which is essential to a miracle, as above explained. 555 FIRST PART, QUESTION 111 The Action of the Angels On Man (In Four Articles) We now consider the action of the angels on man, and inquire: (1) How far they can change them by their own natural power; (2) How they are sent by God to the ministry of men; (3) How they guard and protect men. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether an angel can enlighten the human intellect? (2) Whether he can change man’s will? (3) Whether he can change man’s imagination? (4) Whether he can change man’s senses? Whether an angel can enlighten man? Ia q. 111 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that an angel cannot his universal concept of the truth according to the capacity enlighten man. For man is enlightened by faith; hence of the inferior angel, as explained above (q. 106, a. 1). Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii) attributes enlightenment to The human intellect, however, cannot grasp the uni- baptism, as “the sacrament of faith.” But faith is imme- versal truth itself unveiled; because its nature requires it diately from God, according to Eph. 2:8: “By grace you to understand by turning to the phantasms, as above ex- are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it plained (q. 84, a. 7). So the angels propose the intelligible is the gift of God.” Therefore man is not enlightened by truth to men under the similitudes of sensible things, ac- an angel; but immediately by God. cording to what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), that, “It Objection 2. Further, on the words, “God hath man- is impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise ifested it to them” (Rom. 1:19), the gloss observes that than shrouded by the variety of the sacred veils.” On the “not only natural reason availed for the manifestation of other hand, the human intellect as the inferior, is strength- Divine truths to men, but God also revealed them by His ened by the action of the angelic intellect. And in these work,” that is, by His creature. But both are immediately two ways man is enlightened by an angel. from God—that is, natural reason and the creature. There- Reply to Objection 1. Two dispositions concur in the fore God enlightens man immediately. virtue of faith; first, the habit of the intellect whereby it Objection 3. Further, whoever is enlightened is con- is disposed to obey the will tending to Divine truth. For scious of being enlightened. But man is not conscious of the intellect assents to the truth of faith, not as convinced being enlightened by angels. Therefore he is not enlight- by the reason, but as commanded by the will; hence Au- ened by them. gustine says, “No one believes except willingly.” In this On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that respect faith comes from God alone. Secondly, faith re- the revelation of Divine things reaches men through the quires that what is to be believed be proposed to the be- ministry of the angels. But such revelation is an enlighten- liever; which is accomplished by man, according to Rom. ment as we have stated (q. 106, a. 1; q. 107, a. 2). There- 10:17, “Faith cometh by hearing”; principally, however, fore men are enlightened by the angels. by the angels, by whom Divine things are revealed to men. I answer that, Since the order of Divine Providence Hence the angels have some part in the enlightenment of disposes that lower things be subject to the actions of faith. Moreover, men are enlightened by the angels not higher, as explained above (q. 109, a. 2); as the inferior only concerning what is to be believed; but also as regards angels are enlightened by the superior, so men, who are what is to be done. inferior to the angels, are enlightened by them. Reply to Objection 2. Natural reason, which is im- The modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment mediately from God, can be strengthened by an angel, as are in one way alike and in another way unlike. For, as we have said above. Again, the more the human intellect was shown above (q. 106, a. 1), the enlightenment which is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible truth can consists in making known Divine truth has two functions; be elicited from the species derived from creatures. Thus namely, according as the inferior intellect is strengthened man is assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from by the action of the superior intellect, and according as the creatures a more perfect knowledge of God. intelligible species which are in the superior intellect are Reply to Objection 3. Intellectual operation and en- proposed to the inferior so as to be grasped thereby. This lightenment can be understood in two ways. First, on the takes place in the angels when the superior angel divides part of the object understood; thus whoever understands 556 or is enlightened, knows that he understands or is enlight-what the intellect is, which is the principle of the intel- ened, because he knows that the object is made known to lectual operation. In like manner not everyone who is en- him. Secondly, on the part of the principle; and thus it lightened by an angel, knows that he is enlightened by does not follow that whoever understands a truth, knows him. Whether the angels can change the will of man? Ia q. 111 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels can change Secondly, the will is moved from without. As regards the will of man. For, upon the text, “Who maketh His an- an angel, this can be only in one way—by the good ap- gels spirits and His ministers a flame of fire” (Heb. 1:7), prehended by the intellect. Hence in as far as anyone may the gloss notes that “they are fire, as being spiritually fer- be the cause why anything be apprehended as an appetible vent, and as burning away our vices.” This could not be, good, so far does he move the will. In this way also God however, unless they changed the will. Therefore the an- alone can move the will efficaciously; but an angel and gels can change the will. man move the will by way of persuasion, as above ex- Objection 2. Further, Bede says (Super Matth. xv, plained (q. 106, a. 2). 11), that, “the devil does not send wicked thoughts, but In addition to this mode the human will can be moved kindles them.” Damascene, however, says that he also from without in another way; namely, by the passion re- sends them; for he remarks that “every malicious act and siding in the sensitive appetite: thus by concupiscence or unclean passion is contrived by the demons and put into anger the will is inclined to will something. In this man- men” (De Fide Orth. ii, 4); in like manner also the good ner the angels, as being able to rouse these passions, can angels introduce and kindle good thoughts. But this could move the will, not however by necessity, for the will ever only be if they changed the will. Therefore the will is remains free to consent to, or to resist, the passion. changed by them. Reply to Objection 1. Those who act as God’s min- Objection 3. Further, the angel, as above explained, isters, either men or angels, are said to burn away vices, enlightens the human intellect by means of the phantasms. and to incite to virtue by way of persuasion. But as the imagination which serves the intellect can be Reply to Objection 2. The demon cannot put changed by an angel, so can the sensitive appetite which thoughts in our minds by causing them from within, since serves the will, because it also is a faculty using a corpo- the act of the cogitative faculty is subject to the will; nev- real organ. Therefore as the angel enlightens the mind, so ertheless the devil is called the kindler of thoughts, inas- can he change the will. much as he incites to thought, by the desire of the things On the contrary, To change the will belongs to God thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the pas- alone, according to Prov. 21:1: “The heart of the king is sions. Damascene calls this kindling “a putting in” be- in the hand of the Lord, whithersoever He will He shall cause such a work is accomplished within. But good turn it.” thoughts are attributed to a higher principle, namely, God, I answer that, The will can be changed in two ways. though they may be procured by the ministry of the an- First, from within; in which way, since the movement of gels. the will is nothing but the inclination of the will to the Reply to Objection 3. The human intellect in its thing willed, God alone can thus change the will, because present state can understand only by turning to the phan- He gives the power of such an inclination to the intellec- tasms; but the human will can will something following tual nature. For as the natural inclination is from God the judgment of reason rather than the passion of the sen- alone Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the will sitive appetite. Hence the comparison does not hold. is from God alone, Who causes the will. Whether an angel can change man’s imagination? Ia q. 111 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that an angel cannot Objection 2. Further, since the forms in the imagina- change man’s imagination. For the phantasy, as is said De tion are spiritual, they are nobler than the forms existing in Anima iii, is “a motion caused by the sense in act.” But sensible matter. But an angel cannot impress forms upon if this motion were caused by an angel, it would not be sensible matter (q. 110, a. 2). Therefore he cannot impress caused by the sense in act. Therefore it is contrary to the forms on the imagination, and so he cannot change it. nature of the phantasy, which is the act of the imaginative Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. faculty, to be changed by an angel. xii, 12): “One spirit by intermingling with another can 557 communicate his knowledge to the other spirit by these great that such appearances may even occur to those who images, so that the latter either understands it himself, or are awake, as is seen in mad people, and the like. So, as accepts it as understood by the other.” But it does not seem this happens by a natural disturbance of the humors, and that an angel can be mingled with the human imagination, sometimes also by the will of man who voluntarily imag- nor that the imagination can receive the knowledge of an ines what he previously experienced, so also the same may angel. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot change the be done by the power of a good or a bad angel, sometimes imagination. with alienation from the bodily senses, sometimes without Objection 4. Further, in the imaginative vision man such alienation. cleaves to the similitudes of the things as to the things Reply to Objection 1. The first principle of the imag- themselves. But in this there is deception. So as a good ination is from the sense in act. For we cannot imag- angel cannot be the cause of deception, it seems that ine what we have never perceived by the senses, either he cannot cause the imaginative vision, by changing the wholly or partly; as a man born blind cannot imagine imagination. color. Sometimes, however, the imagination is informed On the contrary, Those things which are seen in in such a way that the act of the imaginative movement dreams are seen by imaginative vision. But the an- arises from the impressions preserved within. gels reveal things in dreams, as appears from Mat. Reply to Objection 2. An angel changes the imag- 1:20;[2]:13,[19] in regard to the angel who appeared to ination, not indeed by the impression of an imaginative Joseph in dreams. Therefore an angel can move the imag- form in no way previously received from the senses (for ination. he cannot make a man born blind imagine color), but by I answer that, Both a good and a bad angel by their local movement of the spirits and humors, as above ex- own natural power can move the human imagination. This plained. may be explained as follows. For it was said above Reply to Objection 3. The commingling of the an- (q. 110, a. 3), that corporeal nature obeys the angel as gelic spirit with the human imagination is not a mingling regards local movement, so that whatever can be caused of essences, but by reason of an effect which he produces by the local movement of bodies is subject to the natu- in the imagination in the way above stated; so that he ral power of the angels. Now it is manifest that imagina- shows man what he [the angel] knows, but not in the way tive apparitions are sometimes caused in us by the local he knows. movement of animal spirits and humors. Hence Aristo- Reply to Objection 4. An angel causing an imagina- tle says (De Somn. et Vigil.)∗, when assigning the cause tive vision, sometimes enlightens the intellect at the same of visions in dreams, that “when an animal sleeps, the time, so that it knows what these images signify; and then blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, there is not deception. But sometimes by the angelic op- and movements descend with it,” that is, the impressions eration the similitudes of things only appear in the imagi- left from the movements are preserved in the animal spir- nation; but neither then is deception caused by the angel, its, “and move the sensitive principle”; so that a certain but by the defect in the intellect to whom such things ap- appearance ensues, as if the sensitive principle were be- pear. Thus neither was Christ a cause of deception when ing then changed by the external objects themselves. In- He spoke many things to the people in parables, which He deed, the commotion of the spirits and humors may be so did not explain to them. Whether an angel can change the human senses? Ia q. 111 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that an angel cannot change the by the sensible objects. But an angel cannot change the human senses. For the sensitive operation is a vital opera- order of nature (q. 110, a. 4). Therefore an angel cannot tion. But such an operation does not come from an extrin- change the senses; but these are changed always by the sic principle. Therefore the sensitive operation cannot be sensible object. caused by an angel. On the contrary, The angels who overturned Sodom, Objection 2. Further, the sensitive operation is nobler “struck the people of Sodom with blindness or aorasia, so than the nutritive. But the angel cannot change the nutri-that they could not find the door” (Gn. 19:11).† The same tive power, nor other natural forms. Therefore neither can is recorded of the Syrians whom Eliseus led into Samaria he change the sensitive power. (4 Kings 6:18). Objection 3. Further, the senses are naturally moved I answer that, The senses may be changed in a ∗ De Insomniis iii. † It is worth noting that these are the only two passages in the Greek version where the word aorasia appears. It expresses, in fact, the effect produced on the people of Sodom—namely, dazzling (French version, “eblouissement”), which the Latin “caecitas” (blindness) does not necessarily imply. 558 twofold manner; from without, as when affected by the operation cannot be without the interior principle which sensible object: and from within, for we see that the is the sensitive power; but this interior principle can be senses are changed when the spirits and humors are dis- moved in many ways by the exterior principle, as above turbed; as for example, a sick man’s tongue, charged with explained. choleric humor, tastes everything as bitter, and the like Reply to Objection 2. By the interior movement of with the other senses. Now an angel, by his natural power, the spirits and humors an angel can do something towards can work a change in the senses both ways. For an an- changing the act of the nutritive power, and also of the ap- gel can offer the senses a sensible object from without, petitive and sensitive power, and of any other power using formed by nature or by the angel himself, as when he as- a corporeal organ. sumes a body, as we have said above (q. 51, a. 2). Like- Reply to Objection 3. An angel can do nothing out- wise he can move the spirits and humors from within, as side the entire order of creatures; but he can outside some above remarked, whereby the senses are changed in vari- particular order of nature, since he is not subject to that or- ous ways. der; thus in some special way an angel can work a change Reply to Objection 1. The principle of the sensitive in the senses outside the common mode of nature. 559 FIRST PART, QUESTION 112 The Mission of the Angels (In Four Articles) We next consider the mission of the angels. Under this head arise four points of inquiry: (1) Whether any angels are sent on works of ministry? (2) Whether all are sent? (3) Whether those who are sent, assist? (4) From what orders they are sent. Whether the angels are sent on works of ministry? Ia q. 112 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels are not does not reach to the whole universe, but reaches to one sent on works of ministry. For every mission is to some thing in such a way as not to reach another; and so he is determinate place. But intellectual actions do not deter- “here” in such a manner as not to be “there.” But it is clear mine a place, for intellect abstracts from the “here” and from what was above stated (q. 110, a. 1), that the corpo- “now.” Since therefore the angelic actions are intellectual, real creature is governed by the angels. Hence, whenever it appears that the angels are not sent to perform their own an angel has to perform any work concerning a corporeal actions. creature, the angel applies himself anew to that body by Objection 2. Further, the empyrean heaven is the his power; and in that way begins to be there afresh. Now place that beseems the angelic dignity. Therefore if they all this takes place by Divine command. Hence it follows are sent to us in ministry, it seems that something of their that an angel is sent by God. dignity would be lost; which is unseemly. Yet the action performed by the angel who is sent, pro- Objection 3. Further, external occupation hinders the ceeds from God as from its first principle, at Whose nod contemplation of wisdom; hence it is said: “He that is and by Whose authority the angels work; and is reduced to less in action, shall receive wisdom” (Ecclus. 38:25). So God as to its last end. Now this is what is meant by a min- if some angels are sent on external ministrations, they ister: for a minister is an intelligent instrument; while an would seemingly be hindered from contemplation. But instrument is moved by another, and its action is ordered the whole of their beatitude consists in the contemplation to another. Hence angels’ actions are called ‘ministries’; of God. So if they were sent, their beatitude would be and for this reason they are said to be sent in ministry. lessened; which is unfitting. Reply to Objection 1. An operation can be intellec- Objection 4. Further, to minister is the part of an infetual in two ways. In one way, as dwelling in the intellect rior; hence it is written (Lk. 22:27): “Which is the greater, itself, as contemplation; such an operation does not de- he that sitteth at table, or he that serveth? is not he that sit-mand to occupy a place; indeed, as Augustine says (De teth at table?” But the angels are naturally greater than we Trin. iv, 20): “Even we ourselves as mentally tasting are. Therefore they are not sent to administer to us. something eternal, are not in this world.” In another sense On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 23:20): “Behold I an action is said to be intellectual because it is regulated will send My angels who shall go before thee.” and commanded by some intellect; in that sense the intel- I answer that, From what has been said above (q. 108, lectual operations evidently have sometimes a determinate a. 6), it may be shown that some angels are sent in min- place. istry by God. For, as we have already stated (q. 43, a. 1), Reply to Objection 2. The empyrean heaven belongs in treating of the mission of the Divine Persons, he is said to the angelic dignity by way of congruity; forasmuch as to be sent who in any way proceeds from another so as it is congruous that the higher body should be attributed to to begin to be where he was not, or to be in another way, that nature which occupies a rank above bodies. Yet an an- where he already was. Thus the Son, or the Holy Ghost gel does not derive his dignity from the empyrean heaven; is said to be sent as proceeding from the Father by ori- so when he is not actually in the empyrean heaven, noth- gin; and begins to be in a new way, by grace or by the ing of his dignity is lost, as neither does a king lessen nature assumed, where He was before by the presence of his dignity when not actually sitting on his regal throne, His Godhead; for it belongs to God to be present every- which suits his dignity. where, because, since He is the universal agent, His power Reply to Objection 3. In ourselves the purity of con- reaches to all being, and hence He exists in all things (q. 8, templation is obscured by exterior occupation; because a. 1). An angel’s power, however, as a particular agent, we give ourselves to action through the sensitive faculties, 560 the action of which when intense impedes the action of the manner as to lose the delights of inward contemplation.” intellectual powers. An angel, on the contrary, regulates Reply to Objection 4. In their external actions the his exterior actions by intellectual operation alone. Hence angels chiefly minister to God, and secondarily to us; not it follows that his external occupations in no respect im- because we are superior to them, absolutely speaking, but pede his contemplation; because given two actions, one because, since every man or angel by cleaving to God is of which is the rule and the reason of the other, one does made one spirit with God, he is thereby superior to every not hinder but helps the other. Wherefore Gregory says creature. Hence the Apostle says (Phil. 2:3): “Esteeming (Moral. ii) that “the angels do not go abroad in such a others better than themselves.” Whether all the angels are sent in ministry? Ia q. 112 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that all the angels are sent condensation of the clouds to rain, and by producing some in ministry. For the Apostle says (Heb. 1:14): “All are such effects. Nor can anyone doubt that God can immedi- ministering spirits, sent to minister” [Vulg. ‘Are they not ately reveal things to men without the help of the angels, all. . . ?’]. and the superior angels without the inferior. From this Objection 2. Further, among the orders, the highest is standpoint some have said that according to the general that of the Seraphim, as stated above (q. 108, a. 6). But law the superior angels are not sent, but only the inferior; a Seraph was sent to purify the lips of the prophet (Is. yet that sometimes, by Divine dispensation, the superior 6:6,7). Therefore much more are the inferior orders sent. angels also are sent. Objection 3. Further, the Divine Persons infinitely ex- It may also be said that the Apostle wishes to prove cel all the angelic orders. But the Divine Persons are sent. that Christ is greater than the angels who were chosen as Therefore much more are even the highest angels sent. the messengers of the law; in order that He might show Objection 4. Further, if the superior angels are not the excellence of the new over the old law. Hence there sent to the external ministries, this can only be because the is no need to apply this to any other angels besides those superior angels execute the Divine ministries by means of who were sent to give the law. the inferior angels. But as all the angels are unequal, as Reply to Objection 2. According to Dionysius (Coel. stated above (q. 50, a. 4), each angel has an angel infe- Hier. xiii), the angel who was sent to purify the prophet’s rior to himself except the last one. Therefore only the lips was one of the inferior order; but was called a “Ser- last angel would be sent in ministry; which contradicts aph,” that is, “kindling ” in an equivocal sense, because the words, “Thousands of thousands ministered to Him” he came to “kindle” the lips of the prophet. It may also (Dan. 7:10). be said that the superior angels communicate their own On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in proper gifts whereby they are denominated, through the Evang.), quoting the statement of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ministry of the inferior angels. Thus one of the Seraphim xiii), that “the higher ranks fulfil no exterior service.” is described as purifying by fire the prophet’s lips, not as I answer that, As appears from what has been said if he did so immediately, but because an inferior angel did above (q. 106, a. 3; q. 110, a. 1), the order of Divine so by his power; as the Pope is said to absolve a man when Providence has so disposed not only among the angels, he gives absolution by means of someone else. but also in the whole universe, that inferior things are ad- Reply to Objection 3. The Divine Persons are not ministered by the superior. But the Divine dispensation, sent in ministry, but are said to be sent in an equivocal however, this order is sometimes departed from as regards sense, as appears from what has been said (q. 43, a. 1). corporeal things, for the sake of a higher order, that is, Reply to Objection 4. A manifold grade exists in the according as it is suitable for the manifestation of grace. Divine ministries. Hence there is nothing to prevent an- That the man born blind was enlightened, that Lazarus gels though unequal from being sent immediately in min- was raised from the dead, was accomplished immediately istry, in such a manner however that the superior are sent by God without the action of the heavenly bodies. More- to the higher ministries, and the lower to the inferior min- over both good and bad angels can work some effect in istries. these bodies independently of the heavenly bodies, by the 561 Whether all the angels who are sent, assist? Ia q. 112 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels who are to whom the royal commands are conveyed by those who sent also assist. For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): are in attendance—for instance, those who are placed at “So the angels are sent, and assist; for, though the angelic the head of the administration of various cities; these are spirit is limited, yet the supreme Spirit, God, is not lim- said to administer, not to assist. ited.” We must therefore observe that all the angels gaze Objection 2. Further, the angel was sent to administer upon the Divine Essence immediately; in regard to which to Tobias. Yet he said, “I am the angel Raphael, one of the all, even those who minister, are said to assist. Hence Gre- seven who stand before the Lord” (Tob. 12:15). Therefore gory says (Moral. ii) that “those who are sent on the ex- the angels who are sent, assist. ternal ministry of our salvation can always assist and see Objection 3. Further, every holy angel is nearer to the face of the Father.” Yet not all the angels can perceive God than Satan is. Yet Satan assisted God, according to the secrets of the Divine mysteries in the clearness itself Job 1:6: “When the sons of God came to stand before of the Divine Essence; but only the superior angels who the Lord, Satan also was present among them.” Therefore announce them to the inferior: and in that respect only the much more do the angels, who are sent to minister, assist. superior angels belonging to the highest hierarchy are said Objection 4. Further, if the inferior angels do not as- to assist, whose special prerogative it is to be enlightened sist, the reason is because they receive the Divine enlight- immediately by God. enment, not immediately, but through the superior angels. From this may be deduced the reply to the first and But every angel receives the Divine enlightenment from a second objections, which are based on the first mode of superior, except the one who is highest of all. Therefore assisting. only the highest angel would assist; which is contrary to Reply to Objection 3. Satan is not described as hav- the text of Dan. 7:10: “Ten thousand times a hundred ing assisted, but as present among the assistants; for, as thousand stood before Him.” Therefore the angels who Gregory says (Moral. ii), “though he has lost beatitude, are sent also assist. still he has retained a nature like to the angels.” On the contrary, Gregory says, on Job 25:3: “Is there Reply to Objection 4. All the assistants see some any numbering of His soldiers?” (Moral. xvii): “Those things immediately in the glory of the Divine Essence; powers assist, who do not go forth as messengers to men.” and so it may be said that it is the prerogative of the whole Therefore those who are sent in ministry do not assist. of the highest hierarchy to be immediately enlightened by I answer that, The angels are spoken of as “assisting” God; while the higher ones among them see more than is and “administering,” after the likeness of those who at- seen by the inferior; some of whom enlighten others: as tend upon a king; some of whom ever wait upon him, and also among those who assist the king, one knows more of hear his commands immediately; while others there are the king’s secrets than another. Whether all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent? Ia q. 112 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that all the angels of the external ministry properly belongs to an angel according second hierarchy are sent. For all the angels either assist, as he acts by Divine command in respect of any corporeal or minister, according to Dan. 7:10. But the angels of the creature; which is part of the execution of the Divine min- second hierarchy do not assist; for they are enlightened by istry. Now the angelic properties are manifested by their the angels of the first hierarchy, as Dionysius says (Coel. names, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii); and therefore Hier. viii). Therefore all the angels of the second hierar- the angels of those orders are sent to external ministry chy are sent in ministry. whose names signify some kind of administration. But Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral. xvii) the name “dominations” does not signify any such admin- that “there are more who minister than who assist.” This istration, but only disposition and command in adminis- would not be the case if the angels of the second hierarchy tering. On the other hand, the names of the inferior orders were not sent in ministry. Therefore all the angels of the imply administration, for the “Angels” and “Archangels” second hierarchy are sent to minister. are so called from “announcing”; the “Virtues” and “Pow- On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) ers” are so called in respect of some act; and it is right that the “Dominations are above all subjection.” But to that the “Prince,” according to what Gregory says (Hom. be sent implies subjection. Therefore the dominations are xxxiv in Evang.), “be first among the workers.” Hence it not sent to minister. belongs to these five orders to be sent to external ministry; I answer that, As above stated (a. 1), to be sent to not to the four superior orders. 562 Reply to Objection 1. The Dominations are reckoned Dionysius, however, (Coel. Hier. xiv) declares that the among the ministering angels, not as exercising but as dis- multitude of angels surpasses all the multitude of material posing and commanding what is to be done by others; thus things; so that, as the superior bodies exceed the inferior an architect does not put his hands to the production of his in magnitude to an immeasurable degree, so the superior art, but only disposes and orders what others are to do. incorporeal natures surpass all corporeal natures in mul- Reply to Objection 2. A twofold reason may be given titude; because whatever is better is more intended and in assigning the number of the assisting and ministering more multiplied by God. Hence, as the assistants are supe- angels. For Gregory says that those who minister are rior to the ministers there will be more assistants than min- more numerous than those who assist; because he takes isters. In this way, the words “thousands of thousands” the words (Dan. 7:10) “thousands of thousands minis- are taken by way of multiplication, to signify “a thousand tered to Him,” not in a multiple but in a partitive sense, times a thousand.” And because ten times a hundred is a to mean “thousands out of thousands”; thus the number thousand, if it were said “ten times a hundred thousand” of those who minister is indefinite, and signifies excess; it would mean that there are as many assistants as minis- while the number of assistants is finite as in the words ters: but since it is written “ten thousand times a hundred added, “and ten thousand times a hundred thousand as- thousand,” we are given to understand that the assistants sisted Him.” This explanation rests on the opinion of are much more numerous than the ministers. Nor is this the Platonists, who said that the nearer things are to the said to signify that this is the precise number of angels, but one first principle, the smaller they are in number; as the rather that it is much greater, in that it exceeds all material nearer a number is to unity, the lesser it is than multitude. multitude. This is signified by the multiplication together This opinion is verified as regards the number of orders, of all the greatest numbers, namely ten, a hundred, and a as six administer and three assist. thousand, as Dionysius remarks in the same passage. 563 FIRST PART, QUESTION 113 Of the Guardianship of the Good Angels (In Eight Articles) We next consider the guardianship exercised by the good angels; and their warfare against the bad angels. Under the first head eight points of inquiry arise: (1) Whether men are guarded by the angels? (2) Whether to each man is assigned a single guardian angel? (3) Whether the guardianship belongs only to the lowest order of angels? (4) Whether it is fitting for each man to have an angel guardian? (5) When does an angel’s guardianship of a man begin? (6) Whether the angel guardians always watch over men? (7) Whether the angel grieves over the loss of the one guarded? (8) Whether rivalry exists among the angels as regards their guardianship? Whether men are guarded by the angels? Ia q. 113 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that men are not guarded angels should be deputed for the guardianship of men, in by the angels. For guardians are deputed to some because order to regulate them and move them to good. they either know not how, or are not able, to guard them- Reply to Objection 1. By free-will man can avoid evil selves, as children and the sick. But man is able to guard to a certain degree, but not in any sufficient degree; foras- himself by his free-will; and knows how by his natural much as he is weak in affection towards good on account knowledge of natural law. Therefore man is not guarded of the manifold passions of the soul. Likewise universal by an angel. natural knowledge of the law, which by nature belongs to Objection 2. Further, a strong guard makes a weaker man, to a certain degree directs man to good, but not in one superfluous. But men are guarded by God, accord- a sufficient degree; because in the application of the uni- ing to Ps. 120:4: “He shall neither slumber nor sleep, versal principles of law to particular actions man happens that keepeth Israel.” Therefore man does not need to be to be deficient in many ways. Hence it is written (Wis. guarded by an angel. 9:14): “The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our Objection 3. Further, the loss of the guarded redounds counsels uncertain.” Thus man needs to be guarded by the to the negligence of the guardian; hence it was said to a angels. certain one: “Keep this man; and if he shall slip away, thy Reply to Objection 2. Two things are required for a life shall be for his life” (3 Kings 20:39). Now many per- good action; first, that the affection be inclined to good, ish daily through falling into sin; whom the angels could which is effected in us by the habit of mortal virtue. Sec- help by visible appearance, or by miracles, or in some ondly, that reason should discover the proper methods such-like way. The angels would therefore be negligent to make perfect the good of virtue; this the Philosopher if men are given to their guardianship. But that is clearly (Ethic. vi) attributes to prudence. As regards the first, false. Therefore the angels are not the guardians of men. God guards man immediately by infusing into him grace On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 90:11): “He hath and virtues; as regards the second, God guards man as given His angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy his universal instructor, Whose precepts reach man by the ways.” medium of the angels, as above stated (q. 111, a. 1). I answer that, According to the plan of Divine Provi- Reply to Objection 3. As men depart from the natural dence, we find that in all things the movable and variable instinct of good by reason of a sinful passion, so also do are moved and regulated by the immovable and invari- they depart from the instigation of the good angels, which able; as all corporeal things by immovable spiritual sub- takes place invisibly when they enlighten man that he may stances, and the inferior bodies by the superior which are do what is right. Hence that men perish is not to be im- invariable in substance. We ourselves also are regulated puted to the negligence of the angels but to the malice of as regards conclusions, about which we may have various men. That they sometimes appear to men visibly outside opinions, by the principles which we hold in an invariable the ordinary course of nature comes from a special grace manner. It is moreover manifest that as regards things to of God, as likewise that miracles occur outside the order be done human knowledge and affection can vary and fail of nature. from good in many ways; and so it was necessary that 564 Whether each man is guarded by an angel? Ia q. 113 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that each man is not to coerce the demons, the “Virtues” to work miracles in guarded by an angel. For an angel is stronger than a man. things corporeal; while it is probable that the different But one man suffices to guard many men. Therefore much species are presided over by different angels of the same more can one angel guard many men. order. Hence it is also reasonable to suppose that different Objection 2. Further, the lower things are brought to angels are appointed to the guardianship of different men. God through the medium of the higher, as Dionysius says Reply to Objection 1. A guardian may be assigned (Coel. Hier. iv, xiii). But as all the angels are unequal to a man for two reasons: first, inasmuch as a man is an (q. 50, a. 4), there is only one angel between whom and individual, and thus to one man one guardian is due; and men there is no medium. Therefore there is only one angel sometimes several are appointed to guard one. Secondly, who immediately keeps men. inasmuch as a man is part of a community, and thus one Objection 3. Further, the greater angels are deputed man is appointed as guardian of a whole community; to to the greater offices. But it is not a greater office to keep whom it belongs to provide what concerns one man in his one man more than another; since all men are naturally relation to the whole community, such as external works, equal. Since therefore of all the angels one is greater than which are sources of strength or weakness to others. But another, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x), it seems that angel guardians are given to men also as regards invisible different men are not guarded by different angels. and occult things, concerning the salvation of each one in On the contrary, On the text, “Their angels in his own regard. Hence individual angels are appointed to heaven,” etc. (Mat. 8:10), Jerome says: “Great is the guard individual men. dignity of souls, for each one to have an angel deputed to Reply to Objection 2. As above stated (q. 112, a. 3, guard it from its birth.” ad 4), all the angels of the first hierarchy are, as to some I answer that, Each man has an angel guardian ap- things, enlightened by God directly; but as to other things, pointed to him. This rests upon the fact that the guardian- only the superior are directly enlightened by God, and ship of angels belongs to the execution of Divine prov- these reveal them to the inferior. And the same also ap- idence concerning men. But God’s providence acts dif- plies to the inferior orders: for a lower angel is enlight- ferently as regards men and as regards other corruptible ened in some respects by one of the highest, and in other creatures, for they are related differently to incorruptibil- respects by the one immediately above him. Thus it is ity. For men are not only incorruptible in the common possible that some one angel enlightens a man immedi- species, but also in the proper forms of each individual, ately, and yet has other angels beneath him whom he en- which are the rational souls, which cannot be said of other lightens. incorruptible things. Now it is manifest that the provi- Reply to Objection 3. Although men are equal in na- dence of God is chiefly exercised towards what remains ture, still inequality exists among them, according as Di- for ever; whereas as regards things which pass away, the vine Providence orders some to the greater, and others to providence of God acts so as to order their existence to the the lesser things, according to Ecclus. 33:11,12: “With things which are perpetual. Thus the providence of God much knowledge the Lord hath divided them, and diver- is related to each man as it is to every genus or species sified their ways: some of them hath He blessed and ex- of things corruptible. But, according to Gregory (Hom. alted, and some of them hath He cursed and brought low.” xxxiv in Evang.), the different orders are deputed to the Thus it is a greater office to guard one man than another. different “genera” of things, for instance, the “Powers” Whether to guard men belongs only to the lowest order of angels? Ia q. 113 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the guardianship of But five orders are sent in external ministry (q. 112, a. 4). men does not belong only to the lowest order of the angels. Therefore all the angels of the five orders are deputed to For Chrysostom says that the text (Mat. 18:10), “Their an- the guardianship of men. gels in heaven,” etc. is to be understood not of any angels Objection 3. Further, for the guardianship of men it but of the highest. Therefore the superior angels guard seems especially necessary to coerce the demons, which men. belongs most of all to the Powers, according to Gregory Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says that angels “are (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.); and to work miracles, which sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance belongs to the Virtues. Therefore these orders are also de- of salvation” (Heb. 1:14); and thus it seems that the mis- puted to the work of guardianship, and not only the lowest sion of the angels is directed to the guardianship of men. order. 565 On the contrary, In the Psalm (90) the guardianship the “Virtues”; and likewise the demons by the “Powers,” of men is attributed to the angels; who belong to the low- and the good spirits by the “Principalities,” according to est order, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. v, ix). Gregory’s opinion (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.). I answer that, As above stated (a. 2), man is guarded Reply to Objection 1. Chrysostom can be taken to in two ways; in one way by particular guardianship, ac- mean the highest in the lowest order of angels; for, as cording as to each man an angel is appointed to guard Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) in each order there are him; and such guardianship belongs to the lowest order first, middle, and last. It is, however, probable that the of the angels, whose place it is, according to Gregory, to greater angels are deputed to keep those chosen by God announce the “lesser things”; for it seems to be the least for the higher degree of glory. of the angelic offices to procure what concerns the sal- Reply to Objection 2. Not all the angels who are vation of only one man. The other kind of guardianship sent have guardianship of individual men; but some orders is universal, multiplied according to the different orders. have a universal guardianship, greater or less, as above ex- For the more universal an agent is, the higher it is. Thus plained. the guardianship of the human race belongs to the order Reply to Objection 3. Even inferior angels exercise of “Principalities,” or perhaps to the “Archangels,” whom the office of the superior, as they share in their gifts, and we call the angel princes. Hence, Michael, whom we call they are executors of the superiors’ power; and in this way an archangel, is also styled “one of the princes” (Dan. all the angels of the lowest order can coerce the demons, 10:13). Moreover all corporeal creatures are guarded by and work miracles. Whether angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men? Ia q. 113 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that angels are not ap- 159:4: “In this way wherein I walked, they have hidden a pointed to the guardianship of all men. For it is written snare for me.” And therefore as guardians are appointed of Christ (Phil. 2:7) that “He was made in the likeness for men who have to pass by an unsafe road, so an angel of men, and in habit found as a man.” If therefore angels guardian is assigned to each man as long as he is a way- are appointed to the guardianship of all men, Christ also farer. When, however, he arrives at the end of life he no would have had an angel guardian. But this is unseemly, longer has a guardian angel; but in the kingdom he will for Christ is greater than all the angels. Therefore angels have an angel to reign with him, in hell a demon to punish are not appointed to the guardianship of all men. him. Objection 2. Further, Adam was the first of all Reply to Objection 1. Christ as man was guided im- men. But it was not fitting that he should have an an- mediately by the Word of God: wherefore He needed not gel guardian, at least in the state of innocence: for then be guarded by an angel. Again as regards His soul, He he was not beset by any dangers. Therefore angels are not was a comprehensor, although in regard to His passible appointed to the guardianship of all men. body, He was a wayfarer. In this latter respect it was right Objection 3. Further, angels are appointed to the that He should have not a guardian angel as superior to guardianship of men, that they may take them by the Him, but a ministering angel as inferior to Him. Whence hand and guide them to eternal life, encourage them to it is written (Mat. 4:11) that “angels came and ministered good works, and protect them against the assaults of the to Him.” demons. But men who are foreknown to damnation, never Reply to Objection 2. In the state of innocence man attain to eternal life. Infidels, also, though at times they was not threatened by any peril from within: because perform good works, do not perform them well, for they within him all was well ordered, as we have said above have not a right intention: for “faith directs the intention” (q. 95, Aa. 1,3). But peril threatened from without on ac- as Augustine says (Enarr. ii in Ps. 31). Moreover, the count of the snares of the demons; as was proved by the coming of Antichrist will be “according to the working of event. For this reason he needed a guardian angel. Satan,” as it is written (2 Thess. 2:9). Therefore angels Reply to Objection 3. Just as the foreknown, the infi- are not deputed to the guardianship of all men. dels, and even Anti-christ, are not deprived of the interior On the contrary, is the authority of Jerome quoted help of natural reason; so neither are they deprived of that above (a. 2), for he says that “each soul has an angel ap- exterior help granted by God to the whole human race— pointed to guard it.” namely the guardianship of the angels. And although the I answer that, Man while in this state of life, is, as help which they receive therefrom does not result in their it were, on a road by which he should journey towards deserving eternal life by good works, it does neverthe- heaven. On this road man is threatened by many dan- less conduce to their being protected from certain evils gers both from within and from without, according to Ps. which would hurt both themselves and others. For even 566 the demons are held off by the good angels, lest they hurt do as much harm as he would wish. as much as they would. In like manner Antichrist will not Whether an angel is appointed to guard a man from his birth? Ia q. 113 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that an angel is not ap- are conferred by God on man as a rational being, are be- pointed to guard a man from his birth. For angels are “sent stowed on him at his birth, for then it is that he receives to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of that nature. Among the latter benefits we must count the salvation,” as the Apostle says (Heb. 1:14). But men be- guardianship of angels, as we have said above (Aa. 1,4). gin to receive the inheritance of salvation, when they are Wherefore from the very moment of his birth man has an baptized. Therefore an angel is appointed to guard a man angel guardian appointed to him. from the time of his baptism, not of his birth. Reply to Objection 1. Angels are sent to minister, and Objection 2. Further, men are guarded by angels in that efficaciously indeed, for those who shall receive the as far as angels enlighten and instruct them. But children inheritance of salvation, if we consider the ultimate effect are not capable of instruction as soon as they are born, for of their guardianship, which is the realizing of that inher- they have not the use of reason. Therefore angels are not itance. But for all that, the angelic ministrations are not appointed to guard children as soon as they are born. withdrawn for others although they are not so efficacious Objection 3. Further, a child has a rational soul for as to bring them to salvation: efficacious, nevertheless, some time before birth, just as well as after. But it does they are, inasmuch as they ward off many evils. not appear that an angel is appointed to guard a child be- Reply to Objection 2. Guardianship is ordained to en- fore its birth, for they are not then admitted to the sacra- lightenment by instruction, as to its ultimate and principal ments of the Church. Therefore angels are not appointed effect. Nevertheless it has many other effects consistent to guard men from the moment of their birth. with childhood; for instance to ward off the demons, and On the contrary, Jerome says (vide A, 4) that “each to prevent both bodily and spiritual harm. soul has an angel appointed to guard it from its birth.” Reply to Objection 3. As long as the child is in the I answer that, as Origen observes (Tract. v, super mother’s womb it is not entirely separate, but by reason of Matt.) there are two opinions on this matter. For some a certain intimate tie, is still part of her: just as the fruit have held that the angel guardian is appointed at the time while hanging on the tree is part of the tree. And therefore of baptism, others, that he is appointed at the time of birth. it can be said with some degree of probability, that the an- The latter opinion Jerome approves (vide A, 4), and with gel who guards the mother guards the child while in the reason. For those benefits which are conferred by God womb. But at its birth, when it becomes separate from the on man as a Christian, begin with his baptism; such as mother, an angel guardian is appointed to it; as Jerome, receiving the Eucharist, and the like. But those which above quoted, says. Whether the angel guardian ever forsakes a man? Ia q. 113 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the angel guardian On the contrary, The demons are ever assailing us, sometimes forsakes the man whom he is appointed to according to 1 Pet. 5:8: “Your adversary the devil, as a guard. For it is said (Jer. 51:9) in the person of the angels: roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour.” “We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed: Much more therefore do the good angels ever guard us. let us forsake her.” And (Is. 5:5) it is written: “I will I answer that, As appears above (a. 2), the guardian- take away the hedge”—that is, “the guardianship of the ship of the angels is an effect of Divine providence in re- angels” [gloss]—“and it shall be wasted.” gard to man. Now it is evident that neither man, nor any- Objection 2. Further, God’s guardianship excels that thing at all, is entirely withdrawn from the providence of of the angels. But God forsakes man at times, according God: for in as far as a thing participates being, so far is it to Ps. 21:2: “O God, my God, look upon me: why hast subject to the providence that extends over all being. God Thou forsaken me?” Much rather therefore does an angel indeed is said to forsake man, according to the ordering guardian forsake man. of His providence, but only in so far as He allows man Objection 3. Further, according to Damascene (De to suffer some defect of punishment or of fault. In like Fide Orth. ii, 3), “When the angels are here with us, they manner it must be said that the angel guardian never for- are not in heaven.” But sometimes they are in heaven. sakes a man entirely, but sometimes he leaves him in some Therefore sometimes they forsake us. particular, for instance by not preventing him from being 567 subject to some trouble, or even from falling into sin, ac-Reply to Objection 3. Although an angel may for- cording to the ordering of Divine judgments. In this sense sake a man sometimes locally, he does not for that reason Babylon and the House of Israel are said to have been for- forsake him as to the effect of his guardianship: for even saken by the angels, because their angel guardians did not when he is in heaven he knows what is happening to man; prevent them from being subject to tribulation. nor does he need time for his local motion, for he can be From this the answers are clear to the first and second with man in an instant. objections. Whether angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard? Ia q. 113 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that angels grieve for the simply speaking, nothing occurs in the world against the ills of those whom they guard. For it is written (Is. 33:7): will of the blessed. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, “The angels of peace shall weep bitterly.” But weeping is 1) that is called simply voluntary, which a man wills in a a sign of grief and sorrow. Therefore angels grieve for the particular case, and at a particular time, having considered ills of those whom they guard. all the circumstances; although universally speaking, such Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine (De a thing would not be voluntary: thus the sailor does not Civ. Dei xiv, 15), “sorrow is for those things that hap- will the casting of his cargo into the sea, considered uni- pen against our will.” But the loss of the man whom he versally and absolutely, but on account of the threatened has guarded is against the guardian angel’s will. There- danger of his life, he wills it. Wherefore this is volun- fore angels grieve for the loss of men. tary rather than involuntary, as stated in the same passage. Objection 3. Further, as sorrow is contrary to joy, so Therefore universally and absolutely speaking the angels penance is contrary to sin. But angels rejoice about one do not will sin and the pains inflicted on its account: but sinner doing penance, as we are told, Lk. 15:7. Therefore they do will the fulfilment of the ordering of Divine jus- they grieve for the just man who falls into sin. tice in this matter, in respect of which some are subjected Objection 4. Further, on Numbers 18:12: “Whatso- to pains and are allowed to fall into sin. ever first-fruits they offer,” etc. the gloss of Origen says: Reply to Objection 1. These words of Isaias may be “The angels are brought to judgment as to whether men understood of the angels, i.e. the messengers, of Ezechias, have fallen through their negligence or through their own who wept on account of the words of Rabsaces, as related fault.” But it is reasonable for anyone to grieve for the ills Is. 37:2 seqq.: this would be the literal sense. According which have brought him to judgment. Therefore angels to the allegorical sense the “angels of peace” are the apos- grieve for men’s sins. tles and preachers who weep for men’s sins. If according On the contrary, Where there is grief and sorrow, to the anagogical sense this passage be expounded of the there is not perfect happiness: wherefore it is written blessed angels, then the expression is metaphorical, and (Apoc. 21:4): “Death shall be no more, nor mourning, nor signifies that universally speaking the angels will the sal- crying, nor sorrow.” But the angels are perfectly happy. vation of mankind: for in this sense we attribute passions Therefore they have no cause for grief. to God and the angels. I answer that, Angels do not grieve, either for sins or The reply to the second objection appears from what for the pains inflicted on men. For grief and sorrow, ac- has been said. cording to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15) are for those Reply to Objection 3. Both in man’s repentance and things which occur against our will. But nothing happens in man’s sin there is one reason for the angel’s joy, namely in the world contrary to the will of the angels and the other the fulfilment of the ordering of the Divine Providence. blessed, because they will cleaves entirely to the ordering Reply to Objection 4. The angels are brought into of Divine justice; while nothing happens in the world save judgment for the sins of men, not as guilty, but as wit- what is effected or permitted by Divine justice. Therefore nesses to convict man of weakness. Whether there can be strife or discord among the angels? Ia q. 113 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that there can be strife Objection 2. Further, where there is perfect charity or discord among the angels. For it is written (Job 25:2): and just authority there can be no strife. But all this exists “Who maketh peace in His high places.” But strife is op- among the angels. Therefore there is no strife among the posed to peace. Therefore among the high angels there is angels. no strife. Objection 3. Further, if we say that angels strive for 568 those whom they guard, one angel must needs take one put up for that same people. side, and another angel the opposite side. But if one side But according to Gregory (Moral. xvii), the prince of is in the right the other side is in the wrong. It will follow the kingdom of Persia was a good angel appointed to the therefore, that a good angel is a compounder of wrong; guardianship of that kingdom. To see therefore how one which is unseemly. Therefore there is no strife among angel can be said to resist another, we must note that the good angels. Divine judgments in regard to various kingdoms and vari- On the contrary, It is written (Dan. 10:13): “The ous men are executed by the angels. Now in their actions, prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one and the angels are ruled by the Divine decree. But it happens twenty days.” But this prince of the Persians was the angel at times in various kingdoms or various men there are con- deputed to the guardianship of the kingdom of the Per- trary merits or demerits, so that one of them is subject to or sians. Therefore one good angel resists the others; and placed over another. As to what is the ordering of Divine thus there is strife among them. wisdom on such matters, the angels cannot know it unless I answer that, The raising of this question is occa- God reveal it to them: and so they need to consult Divine sioned by this passage of Daniel. Jerome explains it by wisdom thereupon. Wherefore forasmuch as they consult saying that the prince of the kingdom of the Persians is the Divine will concerning various contrary and opposing the angel who opposed the setting free of the people of merits, they are said to resist one another: not that their Israel, for whom Daniel was praying, his prayers being wills are in opposition, since they are all of one mind as offered to God by Gabriel. And this resistance of his may to the fulfilment of the Divine decree; but that the things have been caused by some prince of the demons having about which they seek knowledge are in opposition. led the Jewish captives in Persia into sin; which sin was From this the answers to the objections are clear. an impediment to the efficacy of the prayer which Daniel 569 FIRST PART, QUESTION 114 Of the Assaults of the Demons (In Five Articles) We now consider the assaults of the demons. Under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether men are assailed by the demons? (2) Whether to tempt is proper to the devil? (3) Whether all the sins of men are to be set down to the assaults or temptations of the demons? (4) Whether they can work real miracles for the purpose of leading men astray? (5) Whether the demons who are overcome by men, are hindered from making further assaults? Whether men are assailed by the demons? Ia q. 114 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that men are not assailed Who knows how to make orderly use of evil by ordering by the demons. For angels are sent by God to guard man. it to good. On the other hand, in regard to the angels, But demons are not sent by God: for the demons’ inten- both their guardianship and the ordering thereof are to be tion is the loss of souls; whereas God’s is the salvation of referred to God as their first author. souls. Therefore demons are not deputed to assail man. Reply to Objection 1. The wicked angels assail men Objection 2. Further, it is not a fair fight, for the weak in two ways. Firstly by instigating them to sin; and thus to be set against the strong, and the ignorant against the as- they are not sent by God to assail us, but are sometimes tute. But men are weak and ignorant, whereas the demons permitted to do so according to God’s just judgments. But are strong and astute. It is not therefore to be permitted by sometimes their assault is a punishment to man: and thus God, the author of all justice, that men should be assailed they are sent by God; as the lying spirit was sent to punish by demons. Achab, King of Israel, as is related in 3 Kings 22:20. For Objection 3. Further, the assaults of the flesh and the punishment is referred to God as its first author. Never- world are enough for man’s exercise. But God permits His theless the demons who are sent to punish, do so with an elect to be assailed that they may be exercised. Therefore intention other than that for which they are sent; for they there is no need for them to be assailed by the demons. punish from hatred or envy; whereas they are sent by God On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 6:12): “Our on account of His justice. wrestling is not against flesh and blood; but against Prin- Reply to Objection 2. In order that the conditions cipalities and Powers, against the rulers of the world of of the fight be not unequal, there is as regards man the this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the high promised recompense, to be gained principally through places.” the grace of God, secondarily through the guardianship of I answer that, Two things may be considered in the the angels. Wherefore (4 Kings 6:16), Eliseus said to his assault of the demons—the assault itself, and the order- servant: “Fear not, for there are more with us than with ing thereof. The assault itself is due to the malice of them.” the demons, who through envy endeavor to hinder man’s Reply to Objection 3. The assault of the flesh and progress; and through pride usurp a semblance of Divine the world would suffice for the exercise of human weak- power, by deputing certain ministers to assail man, as the ness: but it does not suffice for the demon’s malice, which angels of God in their various offices minister to man’s makes use of both the above in assailing men. But by the salvation. But the ordering of the assault is from God, Divine ordinance this tends to the glory of the elect. Whether to tempt is proper to the devil? Ia q. 114 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that to tempt is not proper But the demons know what happens among men. There- to the devil. For God is said to tempt, according to Gn. fore the demons do not tempt. 22:1, “God tempted Abraham.” Moreover man is tempted Objection 3. Further, temptation is the road to sin. by the flesh and the world. Again, man is said to tempt Now sin dwells in the will. Since therefore the demons God, and to tempt man. Therefore it is not proper to the cannot change man’s will, as appears from what has been devil to tempt. said above (q. 111, a. 2), it seems that it is not in their Objection 2. Further, to tempt is a sign of ignorance. province to tempt. 570 On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. 3:5): “Lest devil. God is said to tempt that He may know, in the same perhaps he that tempteth should have tempted you”: to sense as that is said to know which makes others to know. which the gloss adds, “that is, the devil, whose office it is Hence it is written (Dt. 13:3): “The Lord your God trieth to tempt.” you, that it may appear whether you love him.” I answer that, To tempt is, properly speaking, to make The flesh and the world are said to tempt as the in- trial of something. Now we make trial of something in or- struments or matter of temptations; inasmuch as one can der to know something about it: hence the immediate end know what sort of man someone is, according as he fol- of every tempter is knowledge. But sometimes another lows or resists the desires of the flesh, and according as end, either good or bad, is sought to be acquired through he despises worldly advantages and adversity: of which that knowledge; a good end, when, for instance, one de- things the devil also makes use in tempting. sires to know of someone, what sort of a man he is as to Thus the reply to the first objection is clear. knowledge, or virtue, with a view to his promotion; a bad Reply to Objection 2. The demons know what hap- end, when that knowledge is sought with the purpose of pens outwardly among men; but the inward disposition of deceiving or ruining him. man God alone knows, Who is the “weigher of spirits” From this we can gather how various beings are said (Prov. 16:2). It is this disposition that makes man more to tempt in various ways. For man is said to tempt, some- prone to one vice than to another: hence the devil tempts, times indeed merely for the sake of knowing something; in order to explore this inward disposition of man, so that and for this reason it is a sin to tempt God; for man, being he may tempt him to that vice to which he is most prone. uncertain as it were, presumes to make an experiment of Reply to Objection 3. Although a demon cannot God’s power. Sometimes too he tempts in order to help, change the will, yet, as stated above (q. 111, a. 3), he can sometimes in order to hurt. The devil, however, always change the inferior powers of man, in a certain degree: tempts in order to hurt by urging man into sin. In this by which powers, though the will cannot be forced, it can sense it is said to be his proper office to tempt: for thought nevertheless be inclined. at times man tempts thus, he does this as minister of the Whether all sins are due to the temptation of the devil? Ia q. 114 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that all sins are due to the the cause of the wood burning. In this way we must admit temptation of the devil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. that the devil is the cause of all our sins; because he it was iv) that “the multitude of demons is the cause of all evils, who instigated the first man to sin, from whose sin there both to themselves and to others.” And Damascene says resulted a proneness to sin in the whole human race: and (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that “all malice and all uncleanness in this sense we must take the words of Damascene and have been devised by the devil.” Dionysius. Objection 2. Further, of every sinner can be said what But a thing is said to be the direct cause of something, the Lord said of the Jews (Jn. 8:44): “You are of your when its action tends directly thereunto. And in this way father the devil.” But this was in as far as they sinned the devil is not the cause of every sin: for all sins are not through the devil’s instigation. Therefore every sin is due committed at the devil’s instigation, but some are due to to the devil’s instigation. the free-will and the corruption of the flesh. For, as Ori- Objection 3. Further, as angels are deputed to guard gen says (Peri Archon iii), even if there were no devil, men, so demons are deputed to assail men. But every good men would have the desire for food and love and such thing we do is due to the suggestion of the good angels: like pleasures; with regard to which many disorders may because the Divine gifts are borne to us by the angels. arise unless those desires are curbed by reason, especially Therefore all the evil we do, is due to the instigation of if we presuppose the corruption of our natures. Now it is the devil. in the power of the free-will to curb this appetite and keep On the contrary, It is written (De Eccl. Dogmat. it in order. Consequently there is no need for all sins to be xlix): “Not all our evil thoughts are stirred up by the devil, due to the instigation of the devil. But those sins which but sometimes they arise from the movement of our free- are due thereto man perpetrates “through being deceived will.” by the same blandishments as were our first parents,” as I answer that, One thing can be the cause of another Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii). in two ways; directly and indirectly. Indirectly as when an Thus the answer to the first objection is clear. agent is the cause of a disposition to a certain effect, it is Reply to Objection 2. When man commits sin with- said to be the occasional and indirect cause of that effect: out being thereto instigated by the devil, he nevertheless for instance, we might say that he who dries the wood is becomes a child of the devil thereby, in so far as he imi- 571 tates him who was the first to sin. of the angels. For this reason the angels take part in all Reply to Objection 3. Man can of his own accord our good works: whereas all our sins are not due to the fall into sin: but he cannot advance in merit without the demons’ instigation. Nevertheless there is no kind of sin Divine assistance, which is borne to man by the ministry which is not sometimes due to the demons’ suggestion. Whether demons can lead men astray by means of real miracles? Ia q. 114 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the demons cannot toms”; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 19). lead men astray by means of real miracles. For the activ- Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says in the same ity of the demons will show itself especially in the works place, the works of Antichrist may be called lying won- of Antichrist. But as the Apostle says (2 Thess. 2:9), ders, “either because he will deceive men’s senses by his “coming is according to the working of Satan, in all means of phantoms, so that he will not really do what he power, and signs, and lying wonders.” Much more there- will seem to do; or because, if he work real prodigies, they fore at other times do the demons perform lying wonders. will lead those into falsehood who believe in him.” Objection 2. Further, true miracles are wrought by Reply to Objection 2. As we have said above (q. 110, some corporeal change. But demons are unable to change a. 2), corporeal matter does not obey either good or bad the nature of a body; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei angels at their will, so that demons be able by their power xviii, 18): “I cannot believe that the human body can re- to transmute matter from one form to another; but they ceive the limbs of a beast by means of a demon’s art or can employ certain seeds that exist in the elements of the power.” Therefore the demons cannot work real miracles. world, in order to produce these effects, as Augustine says Objection 3. Further, an argument is useless which (De Trin. iii, 8,9). Therefore it must be admitted that all may prove both ways. If therefore real miracles can be the transformation of corporeal things which can be pro- wrought by demons, to persuade one of what is false, they duced by certain natural powers, to which we must as- will be useless to confirm the teaching of the faith. This is sign the seeds above mentioned, can alike be produced by unfitting; for it is written (Mk. 16:20): “The Lord working the operation of the demons, by the employment of these withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed.” seeds; such as the transformation of certain things into On the contrary, Augustine says (q. 83;∗): “Often by serpents or frogs, which can be produced by putrefaction. means of the magic art miracles are wrought like those On the contrary, those transformations which cannot be which are wrought by the servants of God.” produced by the power of nature, cannot in reality be ef- I answer that, As is clear from what has been said fected by the operation of the demons; for instance, that above (q. 110, a. 4), if we take a miracle in the strict the human body be changed into the body of a beast, or sense, the demons cannot work miracles, nor can any crea- that the body of a dead man return to life. And if at times ture, but God alone: since in the strict sense a miracle is something of this sort seems to be effected by the oper- something done outside the order of the entire created na- ation of demons, it is not real but a mere semblance of ture, under which order every power of a creature is con- reality. tained. But sometimes miracle may be taken in a wide Now this may happen in two ways. Firstly, from sense, for whatever exceeds the human power and experi- within; in this way a demon can work on man’s imagina- ence. And thus demons can work miracles, that is, things tion and even on his corporeal senses, so that something which rouse man’s astonishment, by reason of their being seems otherwise that it is, as explained above (q. 111, beyond his power and outside his sphere of knowledge. Aa. 3,4). It is said indeed that this can be done sometimes For even a man by doing what is beyond the power and by the power of certain bodies. Secondly, from without: knowledge of another, leads him to marvel at what he has for just as he can from the air form a body of any form and done, so that in a way he seems to that man to have worked shape, and assume it so as to appear in it visibly: so, in a miracle. the same way he can clothe any corporeal thing with any It is to be noted, however, that although these works corporeal form, so as to appear therein. This is what Au- of demons which appear marvelous to us are not real mir- gustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): “Man’s imagination, acles, they are sometimes nevertheless something real. which whether thinking or dreaming, takes the forms of Thus the magicians of Pharaoh by the demons’ power pro- an innumerable number of things, appears to other men’s duced real serpents and frogs. And “when fire came down senses, as it were embodied in the semblance of some an- from heaven and at one blow consumed Job’s servants and imal.” This not to be understood as though the imagi- sheep; when the storm struck down his house and with nation itself or the images formed therein were identified it his children—these were the work of Satan, not phan- with that which appears embodied to the senses of another ∗ Lib. xxi, Sent. sent 4, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine 572 man: but that the demon, who forms an image in a man’s it for a different end and by a different right. The former imagination, can offer the same picture to another man’s do it for their own glory; the latter, for the glory of God: senses. the former, by certain private compacts; the latter by the Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (QQ. 83, evident assistance and command of God, to Whom every qu. 79): “When magicians do what holy men do, they do creature is subject.” Whether a demon who is overcome by man, is for this reason hindered from making Ia q. 114 a. 5 further assaults? Objection 1. It would seem that a demon who is over- more probable as long as we understand it to be so for a come by a man, is not for that reason hindered from any certain definite time: wherefore (Lk. 4:13) it is written: further assault. For Christ overcame the tempter most ef- “All temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him fectively. Yet afterwards the demon assailed Him by in- for a time.” There are two reasons for this. One is on the stigating the Jews to kill Him. Therefore it is not true that part of God’s clemency; for as Chrysostom says (Super the devil when conquered ceases his assaults. Matt. Hom. v)∗, “the devil does not tempt man for just Objection 2. Further, to inflict punishment on one as long as he likes, but for as long as God allows; for al- who has been worsted in a fight, is to incite him to a though He allows him to tempt for a short time, He orders sharper attack. But this is not befitting God’s mercy. him off on account of our weakness.” The other reason Therefore the conquered demons are not prevented from is taken from the astuteness of the devil. As to this, Am- further assaults. brose says on Lk. 4:13: “The devil is afraid of persisting, On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 4:11): “Then the because he shrinks from frequent defeat.” That the devil devil left Him,” i.e. Christ Who overcame. does nevertheless sometimes return to the assault, is ap- I answer that, Some say that when once a demon has parent from Mat. 12:44: “I will return into my house from been overcome he can no more tempt any man at all, nei- whence I came out.” ther to the same nor to any other sin. And others say that From what has been said, the objections can easily be he can tempt others, but not the same man. This seems solved. ∗ In the Opus Imperfectum, among his supposititious works 573 FIRST PART, QUESTION 115 Of the Action of the Corporeal Creature (In Six Articles) We have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature; and fate, which is ascribed to certain bodies. Concerning corporeal actions there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether a body can be active? (2) Whether there exist in bodies certain seminal virtues? (3) Whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what is done here by the inferior bodies? (4) Whether they are the cause of human acts? (5) Whether demons are subject to their influence? (6) Whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things which are subject to their influence? Whether a body can be active? Ia q. 115 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that no bodies are active. hold.” For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 9): “There are things I answer that, It is apparent to the senses that some that are acted upon, but do not act; such are bodies: there bodies are active. But concerning the action of bodies is one Who acts but is not acted upon; this is God: there there have been three errors. For some denied all action are things that both act and are acted upon; these are the to bodies. This is the opinion of Avicebron in his book spiritual substances.” on The Fount of Life, where, by the arguments mentioned Objection 2. Further, every agent except the first above, he endeavors to prove that no bodies act, but that agent requires in its work a subject susceptible of its ac- all the actions which seem to be the actions of bodies, tion. But there is not substance below the corporeal sub- are the actions of some spiritual power that penetrates all stance which can be susceptible of the latter’s action; bodies: so that, according to him, it is not fire that heats, since it belongs to the lowest degree of beings. Therefore but a spiritual power which penetrates, by means of the corporeal substance is not active. fire. And this opinion seems to be derived from that of Objection 3. Further, every corporeal substance is Plato. For Plato held that all forms existing in corporeal limited by quantity. But quantity hinders substance from matter are participated thereby, and determined and lim- movement and action, because it surrounds it and pene- ited thereto; and that separate forms are absolute and as trates it: just as a cloud hinders the air from receiving it were universal; wherefore he said that these separate light. A proof of this is that the more a body increases in forms are the causes of forms that exist in matter. There- quantity, the heavier it is and the more difficult to move. fore inasmuch as the form which is in corporeal matter Therefore no corporeal substance is active. is determined to this matter individualized by quantity, Objection 4. Further, the power of action in every Avicebron held that the corporeal form is held back and agent is according to its propinquity to the first active imprisoned by quantity, as the principle of individuality, cause. But bodies, being most composite, are most re- so as to be unable by action to extend to any other matter: mote from the first active cause, which is most simple. and that the spiritual and immaterial form alone, which Therefore no bodies are active. is not hedged in by quantity, can issue forth by acting on Objection 5. Further, if a body is an agent, the term of something else. its action is either a substantial, or an accidental form. But But this does not prove that the corporeal form is not it is not a substantial form; for it is not possible to find in a an agent, but that it is not a universal agent. For in propor-body any principle of action, save an active quality, which tion as a thing is participated, so, of necessity, must that be is an accident; and an accident cannot be the cause of a participated which is proper thereto; thus in proportion to substantial form, since the cause is always more excellent the participation of light is the participation of visibility. than the effect. Likewise, neither is it an accidental form, But to act, which is nothing else than to make something for “an accident does not extend beyond its subject,” as to be in act, is essentially proper to an act as such; where- Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4). Therefore no bodies are fore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the fact active. of its being a form not determined by matter subject to On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv) quantity, a thing owes its being an agent indeterminate that among other qualities of corporeal fire, “it shows its and universal: but to the fact that it is determined to this greatness in its action and power on that of which it lays matter, it owes its being an agent limited and particular. 574 Wherefore if the form of fire were separate, as the Pla-thus, “There is a mover who is not moved, to wit, the tonists supposed, it would be, in a fashion, the cause of first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand, there exists every ignition. But this form of fire which is in this corpo- something moved which is purely passive,” that this is to real matter, is the cause of this ignition which passes from be conceded. But this latter is primary matter, which is a this body to that. Hence such an action is effected by the pure potentiality, just as God is pure act. Now a body is contact of two bodies. composed of potentiality and act; and therefore it is both But this opinion of Avicebron goes further than that active and passive. of Plato. For Plato held only substantial forms to be sep- Reply to Objection 3. Quantity does not entirely arate; while he referred accidents to the material princi- hinder the corporeal form from action, as stated above; ples which are “the great” and “the small,” which he con- but from being a universal agent, forasmuch as a form is sidered to be the first contraries, by others considered to individualized through being in matter subject to quan- the “the rare” and “the dense.” Consequently both Plato tity. The proof taken from the weight of bodies is not to and Avicenna, who follows him to a certain extent, held the purpose. First, because addition of quantity does not that corporeal agents act through their accidental forms, cause weight; as is proved (De Coelo et Mundo iv, 2). Sec- by disposing matter for the substantial form; but that the ondly, it is false that weight retards movement; on the con- ultimate perfection attained by the introduction of the sub- trary, the heavier a thing, the greater its movement, if we stantial form is due to an immaterial principle. And this consider the movement proper thereto. Thirdly, because is the second opinion concerning the action of bodies; of action is not effected by local movement, as Democritus which we have spoken above when treating of the creation held: but by something being reduced from potentiality to (q. 45, a. 8). act. The third opinion is that of Democritus, who held that Reply to Objection 4. A body is not that which is action takes place through the issue of atoms from the cor- most distant from God; for it participates something of a poreal agent, while passion consists in the reception of the likeness to the Divine Being, forasmuch as it has a form. atoms in the pores of the passive body. This opinion is dis- That which is most distant from God is primary matter; proved by Aristotle (De Gener. i, 8,9). For it would fol- which is in no way active, since it is a pure potentiality. low that a body would not be passive as a whole, and the Reply to Objection 5. The term of a body’s action is quantity of the active body would be diminished through both an accidental form and a substantial form. For the its action; which things are manifestly untrue. active quality, such as heat, although itself an accident, We must therefore say that a body acts forasmuch as acts nevertheless by virtue of the substantial form, as its it is in act, on a body forasmuch as it is in potentiality. instrument: wherefore its action can terminate in a sub- Reply to Objection 1. This passage of Augustine is to stantial form; thus natural heat, as the instrument of the be understood of the whole corporeal nature considered as soul, has an action terminating in the generation of flesh. a whole, while thus has no nature inferior to it, on which But by its own virtue it produces an accident. Nor is it it can act; as the spiritual nature acts on the corporeal, against the nature of an accident to surpass its subject in and the uncreated nature on the created. Nevertheless one acting, but it is to surpass it in being; unless indeed one body is inferior to another, forasmuch as it is in potential- were to imagine that an accident transfers its identical self ity to that which the other has in act. from the agent to the patient; thus Democritus explained From this follows the solution of the second objec- action by an issue of atoms. tion. But it must be observed, when Avicebron argues Whether there are any seminal virtues in corporeal matter? Ia q. 115 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that there are no semi- to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter. nal virtues in corporeal matter. For virtue [ratio] implies Objection 3. Further, seeds are active principles. But something of a spiritual order. But in corporeal matter there are no active principles in corporeal matter; since, as nothing exists spiritually, but only materially, that is, ac- we have said above, matter is not competent to act (a. 1, ad cording to the mode of that in which it is. Therefore there 2,4). Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. matter. Objection 2. Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8,9) Objection 4. Further, there are said to be certain says that demons produce certain results by employing “causal virtues” (Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. v, 4) which with a hidden movement certain seeds, which they know seem to suffice for the production of things. But seminal to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues, can be em- virtues are not causal virtues: for miracles are outside the ployed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal virtues. There- 575 fore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues ther particular effects, as the primordial universal causes in corporeal matter. to the first effects produced. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): Reply to Objection 1. These active and passive “Of all the things which are generated in a corporeal and virtues of natural things, thought not called “virtues” [ra- visible fashion, certain seeds lie hidden in the corporeal tiones] by reason of their being in corporeal matter, can things of this world.” nevertheless be so called in respect of their origin, foras- I answer that, It is customary to name things after much as they are the effect of the typal ideas [rationes what is more perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ideales]. ii, 4). Now in the whole corporeal nature, living bodies are Reply to Objection 2. These active and passive the most perfect: wherefore the word “nature” has been virtues are in certain parts of corporeal things: and when transferred from living things to all natural things. For the they are employed with local movement for the produc- word itself, “nature,” as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, tion of certain results, we speak of the demons as employ- Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation of ing seeds. living things, which is called “nativity”: and because liv- Reply to Objection 3. The seed of the male is the ac- ing things are generated from a principle united to them, tive principle in the generation of an animal. But that can as fruit from a tree, and the offspring from the mother, be called seed also which the female contributes as the to whom it is united, consequently the word “nature” has passive principle. And thus the word “seed” covers both been applied to every principle of movement existing in active and passive principles. that which is moved. Now it is manifest that the active and Reply to Objection 4. From the words of Augustine passive principles of the generation of living things are the when speaking of these seminal virtues, it is easy to gather seeds from which living things are generated. Therefore that they are also causal virtues, just as seed is a kind of Augustine fittingly gave the name of “seminal virtues” cause: for he says (De Trin. iii, 9) that, “as a mother is [seminales rationes] to all those active and passive virtues pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is the world itself which are the principles of natural generation and move- pregnant with the causes of unborn things.” Nevertheless, ment. the “typal ideas” can be called “causal virtues,” but not, These active and passive virtues may be considered strictly speaking, “seminal virtues,” because seed is not a in several orders. For in the first place, as Augustine separate principle; and because miracles are not wrought says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 10), they are principally and orig- outside the scope of causal virtues. Likewise neither are inally in the Word of God, as “typal ideas.” Secondly, miracles wrought outside the scope of the passive virtues they are in the elements of the world, where they were so implanted in the creature, that the latter can be used to produced altogether at the beginning, as in “universal any purpose that God commands. But miracles are said to causes.” Thirdly, they are in those things which, in the be wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues, succession of time, are produced by universal causes, for and the passive potentialities which are ordered to such instance in this plant, and in that animal, as in “particular active virtues, and this is what is meant when we say that causes.” Fourthly, they are in the “seeds” produced from they are wrought outside the scope of seminal virtues. animals and plants. And these again are compared to fur- Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of what is produced in bodies here below? Ia q. 115 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the heavenly bodies below is produced through the action of heat and cold, are not the cause of what is produced in bodies here below. moisture and dryness, and other such qualities, which do For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7): “We say that not exist in heavenly bodies. Therefore the heavenly bod- they”—namely, the heavenly bodies—“are not the cause ies are not the cause of what is produced here below. of generation or corruption: they are rather signs of storms Objection 4. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei and atmospheric changes.” v, 6): “Nothing is more corporeal than sex.” But sex is Objection 2. Further, for the production of anything, not caused by the heavenly bodies: a sign of this is that an agent and matter suffice. But in things here below there of twins born under the same constellation, one may be is passive matter; and there are contrary agents—heat and male, the other female. Therefore the heavenly bodies are cold, and the like. Therefore for the production of things not the cause of things produced in bodies here below. here below, there is no need to ascribe causality to the On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): heavenly bodies. “Bodies of a grosser and inferior nature are ruled in a cer- Objection 3. Further, the agent produces its like. Now tain order by those of a more subtle and powerful nature.” it is to be observed that everything which is produced here And Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that “the light of the 576 sun conduces to the generation of sensible bodies, moves act. And therefore it is necessary to suppose some active them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and perfec- principle above these material dispositions. tion.” This is why the Platonists maintained the existence I answer that, Since every multitude proceeds from of separate species, by participation of which the infe- unity; and since what is immovable is always in the same rior bodies receive their substantial forms. But this does way of being, whereas what is moved has many ways not seem enough. For the separate species, since they are of being: it must be observed that throughout the whole supposed to be immovable, would always have the same of nature, all movement proceeds from the immovable. mode of being: and consequently there would be no va- Therefore the more immovable certain things are, the riety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies: more are they the cause of those things which are most which is clearly false. movable. Now the heavenly bodies are of all bodies the Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De most immovable, for they are not moved save locally. Gener. ii, 10), to suppose a movable principle, which by Therefore the movements of bodies here below, which are reason of its presence or absence causes variety in the gen- various and multiform, must be referred to the movement eration and corruption of inferior bodies. Such are the of the heavenly bodies, as to their cause. heavenly bodies. Consequently whatever generates here Reply to Objection 1. These words of Damascene are below, moves to the production of the species, as the in- to be understood as denying that the heavenly bodies are strument of a heavenly body: thus the Philosopher says the first cause of generation and corruption here below; (Phys. ii, 2) that “man and the sun generate man.” for this was affirmed by those who held that the heavenly Reply to Objection 3. The heavenly bodies have not a bodies are gods. specific likeness to the bodies here below. Their likeness Reply to Objection 2. The active principles of bodies consists in this, that by reason of their universal power, here below are only the active qualities of the elements, whatever is generated in inferior bodies, is contained in such as hot and cold and the like. If therefore the sub- them. In this way also we say that all things are like God. stantial forms of inferior bodies were not diversified save Reply to Objection 4. The actions of heavenly bodies according to accidents of that kind, the principles of which are variously received in inferior bodies, according to the the early natural philosophers held to be the “rare” and the various dispositions of matter. Now it happens at times “dense”; there would be no need to suppose some princi- that the matter in the human conception is not wholly dis- ple above these inferior bodies, for they would be of them- posed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed sometimes selves sufficient to act. But to anyone who considers the into a male, sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes matter aright, it is clear that those accidents are merely this as an argument against divination by stars: because material dispositions in regard to the substantial forms of the effects of the stars are varied even in corporeal things, natural bodies. Now matter is not of itself sufficient to according to the various dispositions of matter. Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions? Ia q. 115 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the heavenly bodies On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, are the cause of human actions. For since the heavenly 7) that “the heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of bodies are moved by spiritual substances, as stated above human actions.” (q. 110, a. 3), they act by virtue thereof as their instru- I answer that, The heavenly bodies can directly and ments. But those spiritual substances are superior to our of themselves act on bodies, as stated above (a. 3). They souls. Therefore it seems that they can cause impressions can act directly indeed on those powers of the soul which on our souls, and thereby cause human actions. are the acts of corporeal organs, but accidentally: because Objection 2. Further, every multiform is reducible to the acts of such powers must needs be hindered by ob- a uniform principle. But human actions are various and stacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed cannot multiform. Therefore it seems that they are reducible to see well. Wherefore if the intellect and will were powers the uniform movements of heavenly bodies, as to their affixed to corporeal organs, as some maintained, holding principles. that intellect does not differ from sense; it would follow of Objection 3. Further, astrologers often foretell the necessity that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human truth concerning the outcome of wars, and other human choice and action. It would also follow that man is led actions, of which the intellect and will are the principles. by natural instinct to his actions, just as other animals, in But they could not do this by means of the heavenly bod- which there are powers other than those which are affixed ies, unless these were the cause of human actions. There- to corporeal organs: for whatever is done here below in fore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions. virtue of the action of heavenly bodies, is done naturally. 577 It would therefore follow that man has no free-will, and the father of men and of gods brings on” (Odyssey xviii that he would have determinate actions, like other natu- 135). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect and will ral things. All of which is manifestly false, and contrary are not acts of corporeal organs, it is impossible that heav- to human habit. It must be observed, however, that indi- enly bodies be the cause of human actions. rectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bod- Reply to Objection 1. The spiritual substances, that ies can reach the intellect and will, forasmuch, namely, as move the heavenly bodies, do indeed act on corporeal both intellect and will receive something from the inferior things by means of the heavenly bodies; but they act im- powers which are affixed to corporeal organs. But in this mediately on the human intellect by enlightening it. On the intellect and will are differently situated. For the intel- the other hand, they cannot compel the will, as stated lect, of necessity, receives from the inferior apprehensive above (q. 111, a. 2). powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or mem- Reply to Objection 2. Just as the multiformity of cor- orative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, poreal movements is reducible to the uniformity of the of necessity, disturbed also. The will, on the contrary, heavenly movement as to its cause: so the multiformity does not, of necessity, follow the inclination of the infe- of actions proceeding from the intellect and the will is re- rior appetite; for although the passions in the irascible and duced to a uniform principle which is the Divine intellect concupiscible have a certain force in inclining the will; and will. nevertheless the will retains the power of following the Reply to Objection 3. The majority of men follow passions or repressing them. Therefore the impressions of their passions, which are movements of the sensitive ap- the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior pow- petite, in which movements of the heavenly bodies can co- ers can be changed, has less influence on the will, which operate: but few are wise enough to resist these passions. is the proximate cause of human actions, than on the in- Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the truth in tellect. the majority of cases, especially in a general way. But not To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the in particular cases; for nothing prevents man resisting his cause of human actions is proper to those who hold that passions by his free-will. Wherefore the astrologers them- intellect does not differ from sense. Wherefore some of selves are wont to say that “the wise man is stronger than these said that “such is the will of men, as is the day which the stars”∗, forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his passions. Whether heavenly bodies can act on the demons? Ia q. 115 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that heavenly bodies can I answer that, There have been three opinions about act on the demons. For the demons, according to certain the demons. In the first place the Peripatetics denied the phases of the moon, can harass men, who on that account existence of demons; and held that what is ascribed to the are called lunatics, as appears from Mat. 4:24 and 17:14. demons, according to the necromantic art, is effected by But this would not be if they were not subject to the heav- the power of the heavenly bodies. This is what Augustine enly bodies. Therefore the demons are subject to them. (De Civ. Dei x, 11) relates as having been held by Por- Objection 2. Further, necromancers observe certain phyry, namely, that “on earth men fabricate certain pow- constellations in order to invoke the demons. But these ers useful in producing certain effects of the stars.” But would not be invoked through the heavenly bodies unless this opinion is manifestly false. For we know by experi- they were subject to them. Therefore they are subject to ence that many things are done by demons, for which the them. power of heavenly bodies would in no way suffice: for Objection 3. Further, heavenly bodies are more pow- instance, that a man in a state of delirium should speak erful than inferior bodies. But the demons are confined to an unknown tongue, recite poetry and authors of whom certain inferior bodies, namely, “herbs, stones, animals, he has no previous knowledge; that necromancers make and to certain sounds and words, forms and figures,” as statues to speak and move, and other like things. Porphyry says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11). For this reason the Platonists were led to hold that Much more therefore are the demons subject to the action demons are “animals with an aerial body and a passive of heavenly bodies. soul,” as Apuleius says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei On the contrary, The demons are superior in the or- viii, 16). And this is the second of the opinions mentioned der of nature, to the heavenly bodies. But the “agent is above: according to which it could be said that demons superior to the patient,” as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. are subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we xii, 16). Therefore the demons are not subject to the ac- have said man is subject thereto (a. 4). But this opinion tion of heavenly bodies. is proved to be false from what we have said above (q. 51, ∗ Ptolemy, Centiloquium, prop. 5 578 a. 1): for we hold that demons are spiritual substances not demons, according to certain phases of the moon, disturb united to bodies. Hence it is clear that they are subject to man’s imagination, when they observe that the brain is the action of heavenly bodies neither essentially nor acci- thereto disposed. dentally, neither directly nor indirectly. Reply to Objection 2. Demons when summoned Reply to Objection 1. That demons harass men, ac- through certain constellations, come for two reasons. cording to certain phases of the moon, happens in two Firstly, in order to lead man into the error of believing that ways. Firstly, they do so in order to “defame God’s crea- there is some Divine power in the stars. Secondly, because ture,” namely, the moon; as Jerome (In Matt. iv, 24) and they consider that under certain constellations corporeal Chrysostom (Hom. lvii in Matt.) say. Secondly, because matter is better disposed for the result for which they are as they are unable to effect anything save by means of the summoned. natural forces, as stated above (q. 114, a. 4, ad 2) they take Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Civ. into account the aptitude of bodies for the intended result. Dei xxi, 6), the “demons are enticed through various kinds Now it is manifest that “the brain is the most moist of all of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs, rites, not as an an- the parts of the body,” as Aristotle says∗: wherefore it is imal is enticed by food, but as a spirit by signs”; that is to the most subject to the action of the moon, the property say, forasmuch as these things are offered to them in token of which is to move what is moist. And it is precisely of the honor due to God, of which they are covetous. in the brain that animal forces culminate: wherefore the Whether heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action? Ia q. 115 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that heavenly bodies im- ies produces certain inclinations in corporeal nature, the pose necessity on things subject to their action. For given will nevertheless does not of necessity follow these incli- a sufficient cause, the effect follows of necessity. But nations. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the effect of heavenly bodies are a sufficient cause of their effects. heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of the will, Since, therefore, heavenly bodies, with their movements not only in man himself, but also in other things to which and dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their human action extends. effects follow of necessity. But in natural things there is no such principle, en- Objection 2. Further, an agent’s effect results of ne- dowed with freedom to follow or not to follow the impres- cessity in matter, when the power of the agent is such sions produced by heavenly agents. Wherefore it seems that it can subject the matter to itself entirely. But the that in such things at least, everything happens of neces- entire matter of inferior bodies is subject to the power of sity; according to the reasoning of some of the ancients heavenly bodies, since this is a higher power than theirs. who supposing that everything that is, has a cause; and Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity that, given the cause, the effect follows of necessity; con- received in corporeal matter. cluded that all things happen of necessity. This opinion Objection 3. Further, if the effect of the heavenly is refuted by Aristotle (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 3) as to this body does not follow of necessity, this is due to some hin- double supposition. dering cause. But any corporeal cause, that might possibly For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause hinder the effect of a heavenly body, must of necessity be whatever, the effect must follow of necessity. For some reducible to some heavenly principle: since the heavenly causes are so ordered to their effects, as to produce them, bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below. not of necessity, but in the majority of cases, and in the Therefore, since also that heavenly principle is necessary, minority to fail in producing them. But that such cases it follows that the effect of the heavenly body is necessar- do fail in the minority of cases is due to some hindering ily hindered. Consequently it would follow that all that cause; consequently the above-mentioned difficulty seems takes place here below happens of necessity. not to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Somn. et of necessity. Vigil.†): “It is not incongruous that many of the signs ob- Therefore we must say, in the second place, that ev- served in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as erything that is a being “per se,” has a cause; but what is rain and wind, should not be fulfilled.” Therefore not all accidentally, has not a cause, because it is not truly a be- the effects of heavenly bodies take place of necessity. ing, since it is not truly one. For (that a thing is) “white” I answer that, This question is partly solved by what has a cause, likewise (that a man is) “musical” has not was said above (a. 4); and in part presents some difficulty. a cause, but (that a being is) “white-musical” has not a For it was shown that although the action of heavenly bod- cause, because it is not truly a being, nor truly one. Now it ∗ De Part. Animal. ii, 7: De Sens. et Sensato ii: De Somn. et Vigil. iii † De Divin. per Somn. ii 579 is manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause particular inferior causes, which can fail in their effects in so ordered to its effect as to produce it in the majority of the minority of cases. cases, clashes sometimes with this cause by accident: and Reply to Objection 2. The power of a heavenly body the clashing of these two causes, inasmuch as it is acci- is not infinite. Wherefore it requires a determinate dispo- dental, has no cause. Consequently what results from this sition in matter, both as to local distance and as to other clashing of causes is not to be reduced to a further pre- conditions, in order to produce its effect. Therefore as lo- existing cause, from which it follows of necessity. For cal distance hinders the effect of a heavenly body (for the instance, that some terrestrial body take fire in the higher sun has not the same effect in heat in Dacia as in Ethiopia); regions of the air and fall to the earth, is caused by some so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature or heavenly power: again, that there be on the surface of the other such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly earth some combustible matter, is reducible to some heav- body. enly principle. But that the burning body should alight on Reply to Objection 3. Although the cause that hin- this matter and set fire to it, is not caused by a heavenly ders the effect of another cause can be reduced to a heav- body, but is accidental. Consequently not all the effects of enly body as its cause; nevertheless the clashing of two heavenly bodies result of necessity. causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the causality of Reply to Objection 1. The heavenly bodies are causes a heavenly body, as stated above. of effects that take place here below, through the means of 580 FIRST PART, QUESTION 116 On Fate (In Four Articles) We come now to the consideration of fate. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Is there such a thing as fate? (2) Where is it? (3) Is it unchangeable? (4) Are all things subject to fate? Whether there be such a thing as fate? Ia q. 116 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that fate is nothing. For we have proved above (q. 115, a. 4) that human actions Gregory says in a homily for the Epiphany (Hom. x in are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies, save ac- Evang.): “Far be it from the hearts of the faithful to think cidentally and indirectly. Now the cause of fate, since it that fate is anything real.” has the ordering of things that happen by fate, must of Objection 2. Further, what happens by fate is not un- necessity be directly and of itself the cause of what takes foreseen, for as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 4), “fate is place. Secondly, as to all things that happen accidentally: understood to be derived from the verb ‘fari’ which means for it has been said (q. 115, a. 6) that what is accidental, is to speak”; as though things were said to happen by fate, properly speaking neither a being, nor a unity. But every which are “fore-spoken” by one who decrees them to hap- action of nature terminates in some one thing. Where- pen. Now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance- fore it is impossible for that which is accidental to be the like. If therefore things happen by fate, there will be nei- proper effect of an active natural principle. No natural ther luck nor chance in the world. cause can therefore have for its proper effect that a man On the contrary, What does not exist cannot be de- intending to dig a grace finds a treasure. Now it is mani- fined. But Boethius (De Consol. iv) defines fate thus: fest that a heavenly body acts after the manner of a natural “Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things, by principle: wherefore its effects in this world are natural. which Providence connects each one with its proper or- It is therefore impossible that any active power of a heav- der.” enly body be the cause of what happens by accident here I answer that, In this world some things seem to hap- below, whether by luck or by chance. pen by luck or chance. Now it happens sometimes that We must therefore say that what happens here by ac- something is lucky or chance-like as compared to infe- cident, both in natural things and in human affairs, is rior causes, which, if compared to some higher cause, is reduced to a preordaining cause, which is Divine Prov- directly intended. For instance, if two servants are sent idence. For nothing hinders that which happens by acci- by their master to the same place; the meeting of the two dent being considered as one by an intellect: otherwise the servants in regard to themselves is by chance; but as com- intellect could not form this proposition: “The digger of pared to the master, who had ordered it, it is directly in- a grave found a treasure.” And just as an intellect can ap- tended. prehend this so can it effect it; for instance, someone who So there were some who refused to refer to a higher knows a place where a treasure is hidden, might instigate a cause such events which by luck or chance take place here rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave there. Consequently, below. These denied the existence of fate and Providence, nothing hinders what happens here by accident, by luck or as Augustine relates of Tully (De Civ. Dei v, 9). And this by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which is contrary to what we have said above about Providence acts by the intellect, especially the Divine intellect. For (q. 22, a. 2). God alone can change the will, as shown above (q. 105, On the other hand, some have considered that every- a. 4). Consequently the ordering of human actions, the thing that takes place here below by luck or by chance, principle of which is the will, must be ascribed to God whether in natural things or in human affairs, is to be re- alone. duced to a superior cause, namely, the heavenly bodies. So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below According to these fate is nothing else than “a disposition is subject to Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, of the stars under which each one is begotten or born”∗. and as it were “fore-spoken,” we can admit the existence But this will not hold. First, as to human affairs: because of fate: although the holy doctors avoided the use of this ∗ Cf. St. Augustine De Civ. Dei v, 1,8,9 581 word, on account of those who twisted its application to a objection’s solution is manifest. certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine Reply to Objection 2. Nothing hinders certain things says (De Civ. Dei v, 1): “If anyone ascribes human affairs happening by luck or by chance, if compared to their to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of God, let him proximate causes: but not if compared to Divine Prov- keep to his opinion, but hold his tongue.” For this reason idence, whereby “nothing happens at random in the Gregory denies the existence of fate: wherefore the first world,” as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 24). Whether fate is in created things? Ia q. 116 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that fate is not in created spirits; whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which things. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements of the “Divine will or power is called fate.” But the Divine will stars, whether by the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of or power is not in creatures, but in God. Therefore fate is the demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the chain not in creatures but in God. of fate is forged.” Of each of these things we have spo- Objection 2. Further, fate is compared to things that ken above (a. 1; q. 104, a. 2; q. 110, a. 1; q. 113; q. 114). happen by fate, as their cause; as the very use of the word It is therefore manifest that fate is in the created causes proves. But the universal cause that of itself effects what themselves, as ordered by God to the production of their takes place by accident here below, is God alone, as stated effects. above (a. 1). Therefore fate is in God, and not in creatures. Reply to Objection 1. The ordering itself of second Objection 3. Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either causes, which Augustine (De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the “se-a substance or an accident: and whichever it is it must be ries of causes,” has not the nature of fate, except as depen- multiplied according to the number of creatures. Since, dent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or will can be therefore, fate seems to be one thing only, it seems that called fate, as being the cause of fate. But essentially fate fate is not in creatures, but in God. is the very disposition or “series,” i.e. order, of second On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv): causes. “Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things.” Reply to Objection 2. Fate has the nature of a cause, I answer that, As is clear from what has been stated just as much as the second causes themselves, the order- above (q. 22, a. 3; q. 103, a. 6), Divine Providence pro- ing of which is called fate. duces effects through mediate causes. We can therefore Reply to Objection 3. Fate is called a disposition, not consider the ordering of the effects in two ways. Firstly, that disposition which is a species of quality, but in the as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering of the sense in which it signifies order, which is not a substance, effects is called Providence. But if we consider this or- but a relation. And if this order be considered in relation dering as being in the mediate causes ordered by God to to its principle, it is one; and thus fate is one. But if it the production of certain effects, thus it has the nature of be considered in relation to its effects, or to the mediate fate. This is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv): “Fate is causes, this fate is multiple. In this sense the poet wrote: worked out when Divine Providence is served by certain “Thy fate draws thee.” Whether fate is unchangeable? Ia q. 116 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that fate is not unchangeable. world, but all things would happen of necessity. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): “As reasoning is to On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that the intellect, as the begotten is to that which is, as time to fate is an unchangeable disposition. eternity, as the circle to its centre; so is the fickle chain of I answer that, The disposition of second causes fate to the unwavering simplicity of Providence.” which we call fate, can be considered in two ways: firstly, Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, in regard to the second causes, which are thus disposed or 7): “If we be moved, what is in us is moved.” But fate is ordered; secondly, in regard to the first principle, namely, a “disposition inherent to changeable things,” as Boethius God, by Whom they are ordered. Some, therefore, have says (De Consol. iv). Therefore fate is changeable. held that the series itself or dispositions of causes is in Objection 3. Further, if fate is unchangeable, what itself necessary, so that all things would happen of neces- is subject to fate happens unchangeably and of necessity. sity; for this reason that each effect has a cause, and given But things ascribed to fate seem principally to be contin- a cause the effect must follow of necessity. But this is gencies. Therefore there would be no contingencies in the false, as proved above (q. 115, a. 6). 582 Others, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, absolute but of conditional necessity. In this sense we even as dependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the say that this conditional is true and necessary: “If God Egyptians said that fate could be changed by certain sacri- foreknew that this would happen, it will happen.” Where- fices, as Gregory of Nyssa says (Nemesius, De Homine). fore Boethius, having said that the chain of fate is fickle, This too has been disproved above for the reason that it is shortly afterwards adds—“which, since it is derived from repugnant to Divine Providence. an unchangeable Providence must also itself be unchange- We must therefore say that fate, considered in regard able.” to second causes, is changeable; but as subject to Divine From this the answers to the objections are clear. Providence, it derives a certain unchangeableness, not of Whether all things are subject to fate? Ia q. 116 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that all things are subject to ever, therefore, is subject to second causes, is subject also fate. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): “The chain of to fate. But whatever is done immediately by God, since fate moves the heaven and the stars, tempers the elements it is not subject to second causes, neither is it subject to to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transfor- fate; such are creation, the glorification of spiritual sub- mation. By fate all things that are born into the world and stances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says (De perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring Consol. iv): viz. that “those things which are nigh to God and seed.” Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable or- the domain of fate. der of fate.” Hence it is clear that “the further a thing is Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, from the First Mind, the more it is involved in the chain of 1) that fate is something real, as referred to the Divine will fate”; since so much the more it is bound up with second and power. But the Divine will is cause of all things that causes. happen, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 1 seqq.). There- Reply to Objection 1. All the things mentioned in fore all things are subject to fate. this passage are done by God by means of second causes; Objection 3. Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) for this reason they are contained in the order of fate. But that fate “is a disposition inherent to changeable things.” it is not the same with everything else, as stated above. But all creatures are changeable, and God alone is truly Reply to Objection 2. Fate is to be referred to the Di- unchangeable, as stated above (q. 9, a. 2). Therefore fate vine will and power, as to its first principle. Consequently is in all things. it does not follow that whatever is subject to the Divine On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that will or power, is subject also to fate, as already stated. “some things subject to Providence are above the ordering Reply to Objection 3. Although all creatures are in of fate.” some way changeable, yet some of them do not proceed I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), fate is the order-from changeable created causes. And these, therefore, are ing of second causes to effects foreseen by God. What- not subject to fate, as stated above. 583 FIRST PART, QUESTION 117 Of Things Pertaining to the Action of Man (In Four Articles) We have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of man, who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual nature. In the first place we shall consider that action (in general) and secondly in regard to the propagation of man from man. As to the first, there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether one man can teach another, as being the cause of his knowledge? (2) Whether man can teach an angel? (3) Whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter? (4) Whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local movement? Whether one man can teach another? Ia q. 117 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that one man cannot teach mon, as stated above (q. 76, a. 2). From this it follows another. For the Lord says (Mat. 22:8): “Be not you called that the same intelligible species belong to all men. Con- Rabbi”: on which the gloss of Jerome says, “Lest you give sequently he held that one man does not cause another to to men the honor due to God.” Therefore to be a master is have a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; properly an honor due to God. But it belongs to a master but that he communicates the identical knowledge which to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is proper he has himself, by moving him to order rightly the phan- to God. tasms in his soul, so that they be rightly disposed for intel- Objection 2. Further, if one man teaches another this ligible apprehension. This opinion is true so far as knowl- is only inasmuch as he acts through his own knowledge, edge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider the so as to cause knowledge in the other. But a quality identity of the thing known: for the same objective truth through which anyone acts so as to produce his like, is is known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that an active quality. Therefore it follows that knowledge is all men have but one passive intellect, and the same intel- an active quality just as heat is. ligible species, differing only as to various phantasms, his Objection 3. Further, for knowledge we require in- opinion is false, as stated above (q. 76, a. 2). tellectual light, and the species of the thing understood. Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, But a man cannot cause either of these in another man. who held that our souls are possessed of knowledge from Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause knowledge in the very beginning, through the participation of separate another man. forms, as stated above (q. 84, Aa. 3,4); but that the soul Objection 4. Further, the teacher does nothing in re- is hindered, through its union with the body, from the gard to a disciple save to propose to him certain signs, so free consideration of those things which it knows. Ac- as to signify something by words or gestures. But it is not cording to this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowl- possible to teach anyone so as to cause knowledge in him, edge from his master, but is roused by him to consider by putting signs before him. For these are signs either of what he knows; so that to learn would be nothing else things that he knows, or of things he does not know. If than to remember. In the same way they held that natu- of things that he knows, he to whom these signs are pro- ral agents only dispose (matter) to receive forms, which posed is already in the possession of knowledge, and does matter acquires by a participation of separate substances. not acquire it from the master. If they are signs of things But against this we have proved above (q. 79, a. 2; q. 84, that he does not know, he can learn nothing therefrom: a. 3) that the passive intellect of the human soul is in pure for instance, if one were to speak Greek to a man who potentiality to intelligible (species), as Aristotle says (De only knows Latin, he would learn nothing thereby. There- Anima iii, 4). fore in no way can a man cause knowledge in another by We must therefore decide the question differently, by teaching him. saying that the teacher causes knowledge in the learner, On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:7): by reducing him from potentiality to act, as the Philoso- “Whereunto I am appointed a preacher and an apostle. . . a pher says (Phys. viii, 4). In order to make this clear, we doctor of the Gentiles in faith and truth.” must observe that of effects proceeding from an exterior I answer that, On this question there have been vari- principle, some proceed from the exterior principle alone; ous opinions. For Averroes, commenting on De Anima iii, as the form of a house is caused to be in matter by art maintains that all men have one passive intellect in com- alone: whereas other effects proceed sometimes from an 584 exterior principle, sometimes from an interior principle: which the intellect of the learner is led to the knowledge thus health is caused in a sick man, sometimes by an ex- of truth previously unknown. Secondly, by strengthening terior principle, namely by the medical art, sometimes by the intellect of the learner; not, indeed, by some active an interior principle as when a man is healed by the force power as of a higher nature, as explained above (q. 106, of nature. In these latter effects two things must be no- a. 1; q. 111, a. 1) of the angelic enlightenment, because ticed. First, that art in its work imitates nature for just as all human intellects are of one grade in the natural order; nature heals a man by alteration, digestion, rejection of but inasmuch as he proposes to the disciple the order of the matter that caused the sickness, so does art. Secondly, principles to conclusions, by reason of his not having suf- we must remark that the exterior principle, art, acts, not as ficient collating power to be able to draw the conclusions principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, but as from the principles. Hence the Philosopher says (Poster. i, helping the principal agent, which is the interior principle, 2) that “a demonstration is a syllogism that causes knowl- by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with instruments edge.” In this way a demonstrator causes his hearer to and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use know. in producing the effect. Thus the physician strengthens Reply to Objection 1. As stated above, the teacher nature, and employs food and medicine, of which nature only brings exterior help as the physician who heals: but makes use for the intended end. just as the interior nature is the principal cause of the heal- Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an inte- ing, so the interior light of the intellect is the principal rior principle, as is clear in one who procures knowledge cause of knowledge. But both of these are from God. by his own research; and from an exterior principle, as Therefore as of God is it written: “Who healeth all thy is clear in one who learns (by instruction). For in every diseases” (Ps. 102:3); so of Him is it written: “He that man there is a certain principle of knowledge, namely the teacheth man knowledge” (Ps. 93:10), inasmuch as “the light of the active intellect, through which certain univer- light of His countenance is signed upon us” (Ps. 4:7), sal principles of all the sciences are naturally understood through which light all things are shown to us. as soon as proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone ap- Reply to Objection 2. As Averroes argues, the plies these universal principles to certain particular things, teacher does not cause knowledge in the disciple after the the memory or experience of which he acquires through manner of a natural active cause. Wherefore knowledge the senses; then by his own research advancing from the need not be an active quality: but is the principle by which known to the unknown, he obtains knowledge of what he one is directed in teaching, just as art is the principle by knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches, leads which one is directed in working. the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowl- Reply to Objection 3. The master does not cause the edge of things previously unknown to him; according to intellectual light in the disciple, nor does he cause the in- what the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1): “All teaching and telligible species directly: but he moves the disciple by all learning proceed from previous knowledge.” teaching, so that the latter, by the power of his intellect, Now the master leads the disciple from things known forms intelligible concepts, the signs of which are pro- to knowledge of the unknown, in a twofold manner. posed to him from without. Firstly, by proposing to him certain helps or means of in- Reply to Objection 4. The signs proposed by the struction, which his intellect can use for the acquisition master to the disciple are of things known in a general and of science: for instance, he may put before him certain confused manner; but not known in detail and distinctly. less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the dis- Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by himself, ciple is able to judge from previous knowledge: or he may he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have his own propose to him some sensible examples, either by way of master because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, likeness or of opposition, or something of the sort, from such as is required in a master. Whether man can teach the angels? Ia q. 117 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that men teach angels. can instruct the inferior angels, as stated above (q. 116, For the Apostle says (Eph. 3:10): “That the manifold wis- a. 1; q. 112, a. 3). But some men are instructed imme- dom of God may be made known to the principalities and diately concerning Divine things by the Word of God; as powers in the heavenly places through the Church.” But appears principally of the apostles from Heb. 1:1,2: “Last the Church is the union of all the faithful. Therefore some of all, in these days (God) hath spoken to us by His Son.” things are made known to angels through men. Therefore some men have been able to teach the angels. Objection 2. Further, the superior angels, who are en- Objection 3. Further, the inferior angels are instructed lightened immediately concerning Divine things by God, by the superior. But some men are higher than some 585 angels; since some men are taken up to the highest an-which is contained in the principalities and powers who gelic orders, as Gregory says in a homily (Hom. xxxiv knew it “from all ages, but not before all ages: because in Evang.). Therefore some of the inferior angels can be the Church was at first there, where after the resurrection instructed by men concerning Divine things. this Church composed of men will be gathered together.” On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) It can also be explained otherwise that “what is hid- that every Divine enlightenment to the superior angels, den, is known by the angels, not only in God, but also here by making their thoughts known to them; but concerning where when it takes place and is made public,” as Augus- Divine things superior angels are never enlightened by in- tine says further on (Gen. ad lit. v, 19). Thus when the ferior angels. Now it is manifest that in the same way as mysteries of Christ and the Church were fulfilled by the inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became are subject even to the lowest angels. This is clear from apparent to the angels, which were hidden from them be- Our Lord’s words (Mat. 11:11): “There hath not risen fore. In this way we can understand what Jerome says among them that are born of woman a greater than John (Comment. in Ep. ad Eph.)—that from the preaching of the Baptist; yet he that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven the apostles the angels learned certain mysteries; that is to is greater than he.” Therefore angels are never enlight- say, through the preaching of the apostles, the mysteries ened by men concerning Divine things. But men can by were realized in the things themselves: thus by the preach- means of speech make known to angels the thoughts of ing of Paul the Gentiles were converted, of which mystery their hearts: because it belongs to God alone to know the the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted. heart’s secrets. Reply to Objection 2. The apostles were instructed Reply to Objection 1. Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) immediately by the Word of God, not according to His thus explains this passage of the Apostle, who in the pre- Divinity, but according as He spoke in His human nature. ceding verses says: “To me, the least of all the saints, is Hence the argument does not prove. given this grace. . . to enlighten all men, that they may see Reply to Objection 3. Certain men in this state of life what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been are greater than certain angels, not actually, but virtually; hidden from eternity in God. Hidden, yet so that the mul- forasmuch as they have such great charity that they can tiform wisdom of God was made known to the principal- merit a higher degree of beatitude than that possessed by ities and powers in the heavenly places—that is, through certain angels. In the same way we might say that the seed the Church.” As though he were to say: This mystery of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree, though was hidden from men, but not from the Church in heaven, actually it is much smaller. Whether man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter? Ia q. 117 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that man by the power of Much more, then, can the human soul by its power change his soul can change corporeal matter. For Gregory says corporeal matter. (Dialog. ii, 30): “Saints work miracles sometimes by On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): prayer, sometimes by their power: thus Peter, by prayer, “Corporeal matter obeys God alone at will.” raised the dead Tabitha to life, and by his reproof deliv- I answer that, As stated above (q. 110, a. 2), corpo- ered to death the lying Ananias and Saphira.” But in the real matter is not changed to (the reception of) a form save working of miracles a change is wrought in corporeal mat- either by some agent composed of matter and form, or by ter. Therefore men, by the power of the soul, can change God Himself, in whom both matter and form pre-exist vir- corporeal matter. tually, as in the primordial cause of both. Wherefore of the Objection 2. Further, on these words (Gal. 3:1): angels also we have stated (q. 110, a. 2) that they cannot “Who hath bewitched you, that you should not obey the change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by truth?” the gloss says that “some have blazing eyes, who employing corporeal agents for the production of certain by a single look bewitch others, especially children.” But effects. Much less therefore can the soul, by its natural this would not be unless the power of the soul could power, change corporeal matter, except by means of bod- change corporeal matter. Therefore man can change cor- ies. poreal matter by the power of his soul. Reply to Objection 1. The saints are said to work mir- Objection 3. Further, the human body is nobler than acles by the power of grace, not of nature. This is clear other inferior bodies. But by the apprehension of the hu- from what Gregory says in the same place: “Those who man soul the human body is changed to heat and cold, as are sons of God, in power, as John says—what wonder is appears when a man is angry or afraid: indeed this change there that they should work miracles by that power?” sometimes goes so far as to bring on sickness and death. Reply to Objection 2. Avicenna assigns the cause of 586 bewitchment to the fact that corporeal matter has a natu-wickedness, as occurs mostly in little old women, accord- ral tendency to obey spiritual substance rather than natu- ing to the above explanation, the countenance becomes ral contrary agents. Therefore when the soul is of strong venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who have imagination, it can change corporeal matter. This he says a tender and most impressionable body. It is also possi- is the cause of the “evil eye.” ble that by God’s permission, or from some hidden deed, But it has been shown above (q. 110, a. 2) that cor- the spiteful demons co-operate in this, as the witches may poreal matter does not obey spiritual substances at will, have some compact with them. but the Creator alone. Therefore it is better to say, that Reply to Objection 3. The soul is united to the body by a strong imagination the (corporeal) spirits of the body as its form; and the sensitive appetite, which obeys the united to that soul are changed, which change in the spir- reason in a certain way, as stated above (q. 81, a. 3), it is its takes place especially in the eyes, to which the more the act of a corporeal organ. Therefore at the apprehen- subtle spirits can reach. And the eyes infect the air which sion of the human soul, the sensitive appetite must needs is in contact with them to a certain distance: in the same be moved with an accompanying corporeal operation. But way as a new and clear mirror contracts a tarnish from the the apprehension of the human soul does not suffice to look of a “menstruata,” as Aristotle says (De Somn. et work a change in exterior bodies, except by means of a Vigil.;∗). change in the body united to it, as stated above (ad 2). Hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to Whether the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally? Ia q. 117 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that the separate human soul power the separate soul cannot command the obedience of can move bodies at least locally. For a body naturally a body; though, by the power of God, it can exceed those obeys a spiritual substance as to local motion, as stated limits. above (q. 110, a. 5). But the separate soul is a spiritual Reply to Objection 1. There are certain spiritual sub- substance. Therefore it can move exterior bodies by its stances whose powers are not determinate to certain bod- command. ies; such are the angels who are naturally unfettered by a Objection 2. Further, in the Itinerary of Clement it is body; consequently various bodies may obey them as to said in the narrative of Nicetas to Peter, that Simon Ma- movement. But if the motive power of a separate sub- gus, by sorcery retained power over the soul of a child that stance is naturally determinate to move a certain body, he had slain, and that through this soul he worked magical that substance will not be able to move a body of higher wonders. But this could not have been without some cor- degree, but only one of lower degree: thus according to poreal change at least as to place. Therefore, the separate philosophers the mover of the lower heaven cannot move soul has the power to move bodies locally. the higher heaven. Wherefore, since the soul is by its na- On the contrary, the Philosopher says (De Anima i, ture determinate to move the body of which it is the form, 3) that the soul cannot move any other body whatsoever it cannot by its natural power move any other body. but its own. Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine (De Civ. Dei I answer that, The separate soul cannot by its natural x, 11) and Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matt.) say, the power move a body. For it is manifest that, even while the demons often pretend to be the souls of the dead, in order soul is united to the body, it does not move the body ex- to confirm the error of heathen superstition. It is therefore cept as endowed with life: so that if one of the members credible that Simon Magus was deceived by some demon become lifeless, it does not obey the soul as to local mo- who pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magi- tion. Now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by cian had slain. the separate soul. Therefore within the limits of its natural ∗ De Insomniis ii 587 FIRST PART, QUESTION 118 Of the Production of Man From Man As to the Soul (In Three Articles) We next consider the production of man from man: first, as to the soul; secondly, as to the body. Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen? (2) Whether the intellectual soul is thus transmitted? (3) Whether all souls were created at the same time? Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen? Ia q. 118 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the sensitive soul is the world is to animals produced from these elements— not transmitted with the semen, but created by God. For for instance by putrefaction. But in the latter animals the every perfect substance, not composed of matter and form, soul is produced by the elemental power, according to Gn. that begins to exist, acquires existence not by generation, 1:20: “Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures but by creation: for nothing is generated save from mat- having life.” Therefore also the souls of animals semi- ter. But the sensitive soul is a perfect substance, otherwise nally generated are produced by the seminal power. it could not move the body; and since it is the form of a I answer that, Some have held that the sensitive souls body, it is not composed of matter and form. Therefore it of animals are created by God (q. 65, a. 4). This opinion begins to exist not by generation but by creation. would hold if the sensitive soul were subsistent, having Objection 2. Further, in living things the principle being and operation of itself. For thus, as having being of generation is the generating power; which, since it is and operation of itself, to be made would needs be proper one of the powers of the vegetative soul, is of a lower or- to it. And since a simple and subsistent thing cannot be der than the sensitive soul. Now nothing acts beyond its made except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive species. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot be caused by soul would arrive at existence by creation. the animal’s generating power. But this principle is false—namely, that being and op- Objection 3. Further, the generator begets its like: so eration are proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made that the form of the generator must be actually in the cause clear above (q. 75, a. 3): for it would not cease to exist of generation. But neither the sensitive soul itself nor any when the body perishes. Since, therefore, it is not a sub- part thereof is actually in the semen, for no part of the sistent form, its relation to existence is that of the corpo- sensitive soul is elsewhere than in some part of the body; real forms, to which existence does not belong as proper while in the semen there is not even a particle of the body, to them, but which are said to exist forasmuch as the sub- because there is not a particle of the body which is not sistent composites exist through them. made from the semen and by the power thereof. There- Wherefore to be made is proper to composites. And fore the sensitive soul is not produced through the semen. since the generator is like the generated, it follows of Objection 4. Further, if there be in the semen any necessity that both the sensitive soul, and all other like principle productive of the sensitive soul, this principle forms are naturally brought into existence by certain cor- either remains after the animal is begotten, or it does not poreal agents that reduce the matter from potentiality to remain. Now it cannot remain. For either it would be act, through some corporeal power of which they are pos- identified with the sensitive soul of the begotten animal; sessed. which is impossible, for thus there would be identity be- Now the more powerful an agent, the greater scope tween begetter and begotten, maker and made: or it would its action has: for instance, the hotter a body, the greater be distinct therefrom; and again this is impossible, for it the distance to which its heat carries. Therefore bodies has been proved above (q. 76, a. 4) that in one animal not endowed with life, which are the lowest in the order there is but one formal principle, which is the soul. If of nature, generate their like, not through some medium, on the other hand the aforesaid principle does not remain, but by themselves; thus fire by itself generates fire. But this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent would living bodies, as being more powerful, act so as to gen- act to its own destruction, which cannot be. Therefore the erate their like, both without and with a medium. With- sensitive soul cannot be generated from the semen. out a medium—in the work of nutrition, in which flesh On the contrary, The power in the semen is to the an- generates flesh: with a medium—in the act of generation, imal seminally generated, as the power in the elements of because the semen of the animal or plant derives a cer- 588 tain active force from the soul of the generator, just as the enly body, it has been said that “man and the sun generate instrument derives a certain motive power from the prin- man.” Moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumen- cipal agent. And as it matters not whether we say that tally by the soul’s power, as also by the nutritive power, as something is moved by the instrument or by the principal stated (De Anima ii, 4). agent, so neither does it matter whether we say that the Reply to Objection 4. In perfect animals, generated soul of the generated is caused by the soul of the genera- by coition, the active force is in the semen of the male, as tor, or by some seminal power derived therefrom. the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3); but the Reply to Objection 1. The sensitive soul is not a foetal matter is provided by the female. In this matter, the perfect self-subsistent substance. We have said enough vegetative soul exists from the very beginning, not as to (q. 25, a. 3) on this point, nor need we repeat it here. the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul Reply to Objection 2. The generating power begets is in one who sleeps. But as soon as it begins to attract not only by its own virtue but by that of the whole soul, nourishment, then it already operates in act. This matter of which it is a power. Therefore the generating power therefore is transmuted by the power which is in the semen of a plant generates a plant, and that of an animal begets of the male, until it is actually informed by the sensitive an animal. For the more perfect the soul is, to so much a soul; not as though the force itself which was in the semen more perfect effect is its generating power ordained. becomes the sensitive soul; for thus, indeed, the generator Reply to Objection 3. This active force which is in and generated would be identical; moreover, this would the semen, and which is derived from the soul of the gen- be more like nourishment and growth than generation, as erator, is, as it were, a certain movement of this soul itself: the Philosopher says. And after the sensitive soul, by the nor is it the soul or a part of the soul, save virtually; thus power of the active principle in the semen, has been pro- the form of a bed is not in the saw or the axe, but a cer- duced in one of the principal parts of the thing generated, tain movement towards that form. Consequently there is then it is that the sensitive soul of the offspring begins to no need for this active force to have an actual organ; but it work towards the perfection of its own body, by nourish- is based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy, ment and growth. As to the active power which was in as is attested by its whiteness. In which spirit, moreover, the semen, it ceases to exist, when the semen is dissolved there is a certain heat derived from the power of the heav- and the (vital) spirit thereof vanishes. Nor is there any- enly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior bodies also thing unreasonable in this, because this force is not the act towards the production of the species as stated above principal but the instrumental agent; and the movement of (q. 115, a. 3, ad 2). And since in this (vital) spirit the an instrument ceases when once the effect has been pro- power of the soul is concurrent with the power of a heav- duced. Whether the intellectual soul is produced from the semen? Ia q. 118 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual soul semen. Therefore the intellectual soul also is produced by is produced from the semen. For it is written (Gn. 46:26): the power of the semen. “All the souls that came out of [Jacob’s] thigh, sixty-six.” Objection 4. Further, man begets his like in species. But nothing is produced from the thigh of a man, except But the human species is constituted by the rational soul. from the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul is pro- Therefore the rational soul is from the begetter. duced from the semen. Objection 5. Further, it cannot be said that God con- Objection 2. Further, as shown above (q. 76, a. 3), curs in sin. But if the rational soul be created by God, the intellectual, sensitive, and nutritive souls are, in sub- sometimes God concurs in the sin of adultery, since some- stance, one soul in man. But the sensitive soul in man times offspring is begotten of illicit intercourse. Therefore is generated from the semen, as in other animals; where- the rational soul is not created by God. fore the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) that On the contrary, It is written in De Eccl. Dogmat. the animal and the man are not made at the same time, xiv that “the rational soul is not engendered by coition.” but first of all the animal is made having a sensitive soul. I answer that, It is impossible for an active power ex- Therefore also the intellectual soul is produced from the isting in matter to extend its action to the production of an semen. immaterial effect. Now it is manifest that the intellectual Objection 3. Further, it is one and the same agent principle in man transcends matter; for it has an operation whose action is directed to the matter and to the form: else in which the body takes no part whatever. It is therefore from the matter and the form there would not result some- impossible for the seminal power to produce the intellec- thing simply one. But the intellectual soul is the form of tual principle. the human body, which is produced by the power of the Again, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of 589 the begetter according as the soul of the begetter is the act not generation simply, because the subject thereof would of the body, making use of the body in its operation. Now be a being in act. For if the vegetative soul is from the the body has nothing whatever to do in the operation of beginning in the matter of offspring, and is subsequently the intellect. Therefore the power of the intellectual prin- gradually brought to perfection; this will imply addition ciple, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen. Hence the of further perfection without corruption of the preceding Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3): “It follows perfection. And this is contrary to the nature of gener- that the intellect alone comes from without.” ation properly so called. Fourthly, because either that Again, since the intellectual soul has an operation in- which is caused by the action of God is something sub- dependent of the body, it is subsistent, as proved above sistent: and thus it must needs be essentially distinct from (q. 75, a. 2): therefore to be and to be made are proper to it. the pre-existing form, which was non-subsistent; and we Moreover, since it is an immaterial substance it cannot be shall then come back to the opinion of those who held the caused through generation, but only through creation by existence of several souls in the body—or else it is not God. Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul is caused subsistent, but a perfection of the pre-existing soul: and by the begetter, is nothing else than to hold the soul to be from this it follows of necessity that the intellectual soul non-subsistent and consequently to perish with the body. perishes with the body, which cannot be admitted. It is therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is There is again another explanation, according to those transmitted with the semen. who held that all men have but one intellect in common: Reply to Objection 1. In the passage quoted, the part but this has been disproved above (q. 76, a. 2). is put instead of the whole, the soul for the whole man, by We must therefore say that since the generation of one the figure of synecdoche. thing is the corruption of another, it follows of necessity Reply to Objection 2. Some say that the vital func- that both in men and in other animals, when a more per- tions observed in the embryo are not from its soul, but fect form supervenes the previous form is corrupted: yet from the soul of the mother; or from the formative power so that the supervening form contains the perfection of the of the semen. Both of these explanations are false; for previous form, and something in addition. It is in this way vital functions such as feeling, nourishment, and growth that through many generations and corruptions we arrive cannot be from an extrinsic principle. Consequently it at the ultimate substantial form, both in man and other an- must be said that the soul is in the embryo; the nutritive imals. This indeed is apparent to the senses in animals soul from the beginning, then the sensitive, lastly the in- generated from putrefaction. We conclude therefore that tellectual soul. the intellectual soul is created by God at the end of human Therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative generation, and this soul is at the same time sensitive and soul which existed first, another, namely the sensitive, nutritive, the pre-existing forms being corrupted. soul supervenes; and in addition to this, again another, Reply to Objection 3. This argument holds in the case namely the intellectual soul. Thus there would be in man of diverse agents not ordered to one another. But where three souls of which one would be in potentiality to an- there are many agents ordered to one another, nothing hin- other. This has been disproved above (q. 76, a. 3). ders the power of the higher agent from reaching to the Therefore others say that the same soul which was at ultimate form; while the powers of the inferior agents ex- first merely vegetative, afterwards through the action of tend only to some disposition of matter: thus in the gener- the seminal power, becomes a sensitive soul; and finally ation of an animal, the seminal power disposes the matter, this same soul becomes intellectual, not indeed through but the power of the soul gives the form. Now it is man- the active seminal power, but by the power of a higher ifest from what has been said above (q. 105, a. 5; q. 110, agent, namely God enlightening (the soul) from with- a. 1) that the whole of corporeal nature acts as the instru- out. For this reason the Philosopher says that the intellect ment of a spiritual power, especially of God. Therefore comes from without. But this will not hold. First, because nothing hinders the formation of the body from being due no substantial form is susceptible of more or less; but to a corporeal power, while the intellectual soul is from addition of greater perfection constitutes another species, God alone. just as the addition of unity constitutes another species of Reply to Objection 4. Man begets his like, forasmuch number. Now it is not possible for the same identical form as by his seminal power the matter is disposed for the re- to belong to different species. Secondly, because it would ception of a certain species of form. follow that the generation of an animal would be a contin- Reply to Objection 5. In the action of the adulterer, uous movement, proceeding gradually from the imperfect what is of nature is good; in this God concurs. But what to the perfect, as happens in alteration. Thirdly, because it there is of inordinate lust is evil; in this God does not con- would follow that the generation of a man or an animal is cur. 590 Whether human souls were created together at the beginning of the world? Ia q. 118 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that human souls were a body. created together at the beginning of the world. For it is But if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to written (Gn. 2:2): “God rested Him from all His work be united to the body, he must give the reason why it is which He had done.” This would not be true if He created united to a body. And the reason must be either because new souls every day. Therefore all souls were created at the soul so willed, or for some other reason. If because the same time. the soul willed it—this seems incongruous. First, because Objection 2. Further, spiritual substances before all it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united others belong to the perfection of the universe. If there- to the body, if it did not need the body: for if it did need fore souls were created with the bodies, every day innu- it, it would be natural for it to be united to it, since “na- merable spiritual substances would be added to the per- ture does not fail in what is necessary.” Secondly, because fection of the universe: consequently at the beginning the there would be no reason why, having been created from universe would have been imperfect. This is contrary to the beginning of the world, the soul should, after such a Gn. 2:2, where it is said that “God ended” all “His work.” long time, come to wish to be united to the body. For Objection 3. Further, the end of a thing corresponds a spiritual substance is above time, and superior to the to its beginning. But the intellectual soul remains, when heavenly revolutions. Thirdly, because it would seem that the body perishes. Therefore it began to exist before the this body was united to this soul by chance: since for this body. union to take place two wills would have to concur—to On the contrary, It is said (De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv, wit, that of the incoming soul, and that of the begetter. xviii) that “the soul is created together with the body.” If, however, this union be neither voluntary nor natural I answer that, Some have maintained that it is ac- on the part of the soul, then it must be the result of some cidental to the intellectual soul to be united to the body, violent cause, and to the soul would have something of asserting that the soul is of the same nature as those spir- a penal and afflicting nature. This is in keeping with the itual substances which are not united to a body. These, opinion of Origen, who held that souls were embodies in therefore, stated that the souls of men were created to- punishment of sin. Since, therefore, all these opinions are gether with the angels at the beginning. But this state- unreasonable, we must simply confess that souls were not ment is false. Firstly, in the very principle on which it is created before bodies, but are created at the same time as based. For if it were accidental to the soul to be united to they are infused into them. the body, it would follow that man who results from this Reply to Objection 1. God is said to have rested on union is a being by accident; or that the soul is a man, the seventh day, not from all work, since we read (Jn. which is false, as proved above (q. 75, a. 4). Moreover, 5:17): “My Father worketh until now”; but from the cre- that the human soul is not of the same nature as the an- ation of any new genera and species, which may not have gels, is proved from the different mode of understanding, already existed in the first works. For in this sense, the as shown above (q. 55, a. 2; q. 85, a. 1 ): for man under- souls which are created now, existed already, as to the stands through receiving from the senses, and turning to likeness of the species, in the first works, which included phantasms, as stated above (q. 84, Aa. 6,7; q. 85, a. 1). the creation of Adam’s soul. For this reason the soul needs to be united to the body, Reply to Objection 2. Something can be added every which is necessary to it for the operation of the sensitive day to the perfection of the universe, as to the number of part: whereas this cannot be said of an angel. individuals, but not as to the number of species. Secondly, this statement can be proved to be false in it- Reply to Objection 3. That the soul remains without self. For if it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, the body is due to the corruption of the body, which was it is unnatural to it to be without a body, and as long as it a result of sin. Consequently it was not fitting that God is without a body it is deprived of its natural perfection. should make the soul without the body from the begin- Now it was not fitting that God should begin His work ning: for as it is written (Wis. 1:13,16): “God made not with things imperfect and unnatural, for He did not make death. . . but the wicked with works and words have called man without a hand or a foot, which are natural parts of a it to them.” man. Much less, therefore, did He make the soul without 591 FIRST PART, QUESTION 119 Of the Propagation of Man As to the Body (In Two Articles) We now consider the propagation of man, as to the body. Concerning this there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether any part of the food is changed into true human nature? (2) Whether the semen, which is the principle of human generation, is produced from the surplus food? Whether some part of the food is changed into true human nature? Ia q. 119 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that none of the food is I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. changed into true human nature. For it is written (Mat. ii), “The relation of a thing to truth is the same as its re- 15:17): “Whatsoever entereth into the mouth, goeth into lation to being.” Therefore that belongs to the true nature the belly, and is cast out into the privy.” But what is cast of any thing which enters into the constitution of that na- out is not changed into the reality of human nature. There- ture. But nature can be considered in two ways: firstly, fore none of the food is changed into true human nature. in general according to the species; secondly, as in the in- Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 5) dividual. And whereas the form and the common matter distinguishes flesh belonging to the “species” from flesh belong to a thing’s true nature considered in general; indi- belonging to “matter”; and says that the latter “comes and vidual signate matter, and the form individualized by that goes.” Now what is formed from food comes and goes. matter belong to the true nature considered in this partic- Therefore what is produced from food is flesh belonging ular individual. Thus a soul and body belong to the true to matter, not to the species. But what belongs to true hu- human nature in general, but to the true human nature of man nature belongs to the species. Therefore the food is Peter and Martin belong this soul and this body. not changed into true human nature. Now there are certain things whose form cannot exist Objection 3. Further, the “radical humor” seems to but in one individual matter: thus the form of the sun can- belong to the reality of human nature; and if it be lost, not exist save in the matter in which it actually is. And it cannot be recovered, according to physicians. But it in this sense some have said that the human form cannot could be recovered if the food were changed into the hu- exist but in a certain individual matter, which, they said, mor. Therefore food is not changed into true human na- was given that form at the very beginning in the first man. ture. So that whatever may have been added to that which was Objection 4. Further, if the food were changed into derived by posterity from the first parent, does not belong true human nature, whatever is lost in man could be re- to the truth of human nature, as not receiving in truth the stored. But man’s death is due only to the loss of some- form of human nature. thing. Therefore man would be able by taking food to But, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was insure himself against death in perpetuity. the subject of the human form, was multiplied in itself: Objection 5. Further, if the food is changed into true and in this way the multitude of human bodies is derived human nature, there is nothing in man which may not re- from the body of the first man. According to these, the cede or be repaired: for what is generated in a man from food is not changed into true human nature; we take food, his food can both recede and be repaired. If therefore a they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action of man lived long enough, it would follow that in the end natural heat, and prevent the consumption of the “radical nothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at humor”; just as lead or tin is mixed with silver to prevent the beginning. Consequently he would not be numerically its being consumed by fire. the same man throughout his life; since for the thing to be But this is unreasonable in many ways. Firstly, be- numerically the same, identity of matter is necessary. But cause it comes to the same that a form can be produced in this is incongruous. Therefore the food is not changed another matter, or that it can cease to be in its proper mat- into true human nature. ter; wherefore all things that can be generated are corrupt- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xi): ible, and conversely. Now it is manifest that the human “The bodily food when corrupted, that is, having lost its form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which form, is changed into the texture of the members.” But is its subject: else the human body would not be corrupt- the texture of the members belongs to true human nature. ible. Consequently it can begin to exist in another matter, Therefore the food is changed into the reality of human so that something else be changed into true human na- nature. ture. Secondly, because in all beings whose entire matter 592 is contained in one individual there is only one individual And if anything further is produced from the food, this in the species: as is clearly the case with the sun, moon does not belong to true human nature, properly speak- and such like. Thus there would only be one individual ing. However, this also is inadmissible. First, because this of the human species. Thirdly, because multiplication of opinion judges of living bodies as of inanimate bodies; in matter cannot be understood otherwise than either in re- which, although there be a power of generating their like spect of quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so in species, there is not the power of generating their like that their matter increases in dimensions; or in respect of in the individual; which power in living bodies is the nu- the substance itself of the matter. But as long as the sub- tritive power. Nothing, therefore, would be added to liv- stance alone of matter remains, it cannot be said to be ing bodies by their nutritive power, if their food were not multiplied; for multitude cannot consist in the addition of changed into their true nature. Secondly, because the ac- a thing to itself, since of necessity it can only result from tive seminal power is a certain impression derived from division. Therefore some other substance must be added the soul of the begetter, as stated above (q. 118, a. 1). to matter, either by creation, or by something else being Hence it cannot have a greater power in acting, than the changed into it. Consequently no matter can be multiplied soul from which it is derived. If, therefore, by the seminal save either by rarefaction as when air is made from water; power a certain matter truly assumes the form of human or by the change of some other things, as fire is multiplied nature, much more can the soul, by the nutritive power, by the addition of wood; or lastly by creation. Now it imprint the true form of human nature on the food which is is manifest that the multiplication of matter in the human assimilated. Thirdly, because food is needed not only for body does not occur by rarefaction: for thus the body of a growth, else at the term of growth, food would be need- man of perfect age would be more imperfect than the body ful no longer; but also to renew that which is lost by the of a child. Nor does it occur by creation of flesh matter: action of natural heat. But there would be no renewal, un- for, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxii): “All things were less what is formed from the food, took the place of what created together as to the substance of matter, but not as is lost. Wherefore just as that which was there previously to the specific form.” Consequently the multiplication of belonged to true human nature, so also does that which is the human body can only be the result of the food being formed from the food. changed into the true human nature. Fourthly, because, Therefore, according to others, it must be said that the since man does not differ from animals and plants in re- food is really changed into the true human nature by rea- gard to the vegetative soul, it would follow that the bodies son of its assuming the specific form of flesh, bones and of animals and plants do not increase through a change such like parts. This is what the Philosopher says (De An- of nourishment into the body so nourished, but through ima ii, 4): “Food nourishes inasmuch as it is potentially some kind of multiplication. Which multiplication can- flesh.” not be natural: since the matter cannot naturally extend Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord does not say that the beyond a certain fixed quantity; nor again does anything “whole” of what enters into the mouth, but “all”—because increase naturally, save either by rarefaction or the change something from every kind of food is cast out into the of something else into it. Consequently the whole process privy. It may also be said that whatever is generated from of generation and nourishment, which are called “natural food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and be cast aside forces,” would be miraculous. Which is altogether inad- through the pores, as Jerome expounds the passage. missible. Reply to Objection 2. By flesh belonging to the Wherefore others have said that the human form can species, some have understood that which first receives indeed begin to exist in some other matter, if we consider the human species, which is derived from the begetter: the human nature in general: but not if we consider it as this, they say, lasts as long as the individual does. By flesh in this individual. For in the individual the form remains belonging to the matter these understand what is gener- confined to a certain determinate matter, on which it is ated from food: and this, they say, does not always re- first imprinted at the generation of that individual, so that main, but as it comes so it goes. But this is contrary to it never leaves that matter until the ultimate dissolution the mind of Aristotle. For he says there, that “just as in of the individual. And this matter, say they, principally things which have their species in matter”—for instance, belongs to the true human nature. But since this mat- wood or stone—“so in flesh, there is something belonging ter does not suffice for the requisite quantity, some other to the species, and something belonging to matter.” Now matter must be added, through the change of food into it is clear that this distinction has no place in inanimate the substance of the individual partaking thereof, in such things, which are not generated seminally, or nourished. a quantity as suffices for the increase required. And this Again, since what is generated from food is united to, by matter, they state, belongs secondarily to the true human mixing with, the body so nourished, just as water is mixed nature: because it is not required for the primary exis- with wine, as the Philosopher says there by way of exam- tence of the individual, but for the quantity due to him. ple: that which is added, and that to which it is added, 593 cannot be different natures, since they are already made is weakened by continuous action, because such agents one by being mixed together. Therefore there is no reason are also patient. Therefore the transforming virtue is for saying that one is destroyed by natural heat, while the strong at first so as to be able to transform not only enough other remains. for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth. Later It must therefore be said that this distinction of the on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what Philosopher is not of different kinds of flesh, but of the is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do same flesh considered from different points of view. For this; and then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails if we consider the flesh according to the species, that is, altogether, the animal dies. Thus the virtue of wine that according to that which is formed therein, thus it remains transforms the water added to it, is weakened by further always: because the nature of flesh always remains to- additions of water, so as to become at length watery, as gether with its natural disposition. But if we consider flesh the Philosopher says by way of example (De Gener. i, 5). according to matter, then it does not remain, but is gradu- Reply to Objection 5. As the Philosopher says (De ally destroyed and renewed: thus in the fire of a furnace, Gener. i, 5), when a certain matter is directly transformed the form of fire remains, but the matter is gradually con- into fire, then fire is said to be generated anew: but when sumed, and other matter is substituted in its place. matter is transformed into a fire already existing, then fire Reply to Objection 3. The “radical humor” is said is said to be fed. Wherefore if the entire matter together to comprise whatever the virtue of the species is founded loses the form of fire, and another matter transformed into on. If this be taken away it cannot be renewed; as when fire, there will be another distinct fire. But if, while one a man’s hand or foot is amputated. But the “nutritive hu- piece of wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on mor” is that which has not yet received perfectly the spe- until the first piece is entirely consumed, the same iden- cific nature, but is on the way thereto; such is the blood, tical fire will remain all the time: because that which is and the like. Wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue added passes into what pre-existed. It is the same with of the species remains in its root, which is not destroyed. living bodies, in which by means of nourishment that is Reply to Objection 4. Every virtue of a passible body renewed which was consumed by natural heat. Whether the semen is produced from surplus food? Ia q. 119 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the semen is not pro- plus food.” duced from the surplus food, but from the substance of I answer that, This question depends in some way on the begetter. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 8) what has been stated above (a. 1; q. 118, a. 1). For if that “generation is a work of nature, producing, from the human nature has a virtue for the communication of its substance of the begetter, that which is begotten.” But that form to alien matter not only in another, but also in its which is generated is produced from the semen. Therefore own subject; it is clear that the food which at first is dis- the semen is produced from the substance of the begetter. similar, becomes at length similar through the form com- Objection 2. Further, the son is like his father, in re- municated to it. Now it belongs to the natural order that a spect of that which he receives from him. But if the semen thing should be reduced from potentiality to act gradually: from which something is generated, is produced from the hence in things generated we observe that at first each is surplus food, a man would receive nothing from his grand- imperfect and is afterwards perfected. But it is clear that father and his ancestors in whom the food never existed. the common is to the proper and determinate, as imper- Therefore a man would not be more like to his grandfather fect is to perfect: therefore we see that in the generation or ancestors, than to any other men. of an animal, the animal is generated first, then the man or Objection 3. Further, the food of the generator is the horse. So therefore food first of all receives a certain sometimes the flesh of cows, pigs and suchlike. If there- common virtue in regard to all the parts of the body, which fore, the semen were produced from surplus food, the man virtue is subsequently determinate to this or that part. begotten of such semen would be more akin to the cow Now it is not possible that the semen be a kind of solu- and the pig, than to his father or other relations. tion from what is already transformed into the substance Objection 4. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x, of the members. For this solution, if it does not retain the 20) that we were in Adam “not only by seminal virtue, but nature of the member it is taken from, it would no longer also in the very substance of the body.” But this would not be of the nature of the begetter, and would be due to a pro- be, if the semen were produced from surplus food. There- cess of corruption; and consequently it would not have the fore the semen is not produced therefrom. power of transforming something else into the likeness of On the contrary, The Philosopher proves in many that nature. But if it retained the nature of the member it ways (De Gener. Animal. i, 18) that “the semen is sur- is taken from, then, since it is limited to a certain part of 594 the body, it would not have the power of moving towards to the begotten is on account not of the matter, but of the (the production of) the whole nature, but only the nature form of the agent that generates its like. Wherefore in or- of that part. Unless one were to say that the solution is der for a man to be like his grandfather, there is no need taken from all the parts of the body, and that it retains the that the corporeal seminal matter should have been in the nature of each part. Thus the semen would be a small an- grandfather; but that there be in the semen a virtue derived imal in act; and generation of animal from animal would from the soul of the grandfather through the father. In like be a mere division, as mud is generated from mud, and manner the third objection is answered. For kinship is as animals which continue to live after being cut in two: not in relation to matter, but rather to the derivation of the which is inadmissible. forms. It remains to be said, therefore, that the semen is Reply to Objection 4. These words of Augustine are not something separated from what was before the actual not to be understood as though the immediate seminal whole; rather is it the whole, though potentially, having virtue, or the corporeal substance from which this individ- the power, derived from the soul of the begetter, to pro- ual was formed were actually in Adam: but so that both duce the whole body, as stated above (a. 1; q. 108, a. 1 were in Adam as in principle. For even the corporeal mat- ). Now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is that ter, which is supplied by the mother, and which he calls which is generated from the food, before it is transformed the corporeal substance, is originally derived from Adam: into the substance of the members. Therefore the semen is and likewise the active seminal power of the father, which taken from this. In this sense the nutritive power is said to is the immediate seminal virtue (in the production) of this serve the generative power: because what is transformed man. by the nutritive power is employed as semen by the gener- But Christ is said to have been in Adam according ative power. A sign of this, according to the Philosopher, to the “corporeal substance,” not according to the semi- is that animals of great size, which require much food, nal virtue. Because the matter from which His Body was have little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies, formed, and which was supplied by the Virgin Mother, and generated seldom; in like manner fat men, and for the was derived from Adam; whereas the active virtue was not same reason. derived from Adam, because His Body was not formed by Reply to Objection 1. Generation is from the sub- the seminal virtue of a man, but by the operation of the stance of the begetter in animals and plants, inasmuch as Holy Ghost. For “such a birth was becoming to Him,”∗, the semen owes its virtue to the form of the begetter, and WHO IS ABOVE ALL GOD FOR EVER BLESSED. inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the substance. Amen. Reply to Objection 2. The likeness of the begetter ∗ Hymn for Vespers at Christmas; Breviary, O. P. 595 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART PROLOGUE Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), man is said to be made in God’s image, in so far as the image implies “an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement”: now that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e. God, and of those things which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to treat of His image, i.e. man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions. FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 1 Of Man’s Last End (In Eight Articles) In this matter we shall consider first the last end of human life; and secondly, those things by means of which man may advance towards this end, or stray from the path: for the end is the rule of whatever is ordained to the end. And since the last end of human life is stated to be happiness, we must consider (1) the last end in general; (2) happiness. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether it belongs to man to act for an end? (2) Whether this is proper to the rational nature? (3) Whether a man’s actions are specified by their end? (4) Whether there is any last end of human life? (5) Whether one man can have several last ends? (6) Whether man ordains all to the last end? (7) Whether all men have the same last end? (8) Whether all other creatures concur with man in that last end? Whether it belongs to man to act for an end? Ia IIae q. 1 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it does not belong to everything for an end. man to act for an end. For a cause is naturally first. But I answer that, Of actions done by man those alone an end, in its very name, implies something that is last. are properly called “human,” which are proper to man as Therefore an end is not a cause. But that for which a man man. Now man differs from irrational animals in this, acts, is the cause of his action; since this preposition “for” that he is master of his actions. Wherefore those actions indicates a relation of causality. Therefore it does not be- alone are properly called human, of which man is mas- long to man to act for an end. ter. Now man is master of his actions through his reason Objection 2. Further, that which is itself the last end and will; whence, too, the free-will is defined as “the fac- is not for an end. But in some cases the last end is an ac- ulty and will of reason.” Therefore those actions are prop- tion, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore man erly called human which proceed from a deliberate will. does not do everything for an end. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be Objection 3. Further, then does a man seem to act for called actions “of a man,” but not properly “human” ac- an end, when he acts deliberately. But man does many tions, since they are not proper to man as man. Now it things without deliberation, sometimes not even thinking is clear that whatever actions proceed from a power, are of what he is doing; for instance when one moves one’s caused by that power in accordance with the nature of its foot or hand, or scratches one’s beard, while intent on object. But the object of the will is the end and the good. something else. Therefore man does not do everything Therefore all human actions must be for an end. for an end. Reply to Objection 1. Although the end be last in the On the contrary, All things contained in a genus are order of execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent’s derived from the principle of that genus. Now the end intention. And it is this way that it is a cause. is the principle in human operations, as the Philosopher Reply to Objection 2. If any human action be the last states (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore it belongs to man to do end, it must be voluntary, else it would not be human, as 596 stated above. Now an action is voluntary in one of two a human action be the last end, it must be an action com-ways: first, because it is commanded by the will, e.g. to manded by the will: so that there, some action of man, at walk, or to speak; secondly, because it is elicited by the least the act of willing, is for the end. Therefore whatever will, for instance the very act of willing. Now it is impos- a man does, it is true to say that man acts for an end, even sible for the very act elicited by the will to be the last end. when he does that action in which the last end consists. For the object of the will is the end, just as the object of Reply to Objection 3. Such like actions are not prop- sight is color: wherefore just as the first visible cannot be erly human actions; since they do not proceed from de- the act of seeing, because every act of seeing is directed to liberation of the reason, which is the proper principle of a visible object; so the first appetible, i.e. the end, cannot human actions. Therefore they have indeed an imaginary be the very act of willing. Consequently it follows that if end, but not one that is fixed by reason. Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end? Ia IIae q. 1 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that it is proper to the are possessed of reason, move themselves to an end; be- rational nature to act for an end. For man, to whom it be- cause they have dominion over their actions through their longs to act for an end, never acts for an unknown end. On free-will, which is the “faculty of will and reason.” But the other hand, there are many things that have no knowl- those things that lack reason tend to an end, by natural edge of an end; either because they are altogether without inclination, as being moved by another and not by them- knowledge, as insensible creatures: or because they do selves; since they do not know the nature of an end as not apprehend the idea of an end as such, as irrational an- such, and consequently cannot ordain anything to an end, imals. Therefore it seems proper to the rational nature to but can be ordained to an end only by another. For the en- act for an end. tire irrational nature is in comparison to God as an instru- Objection 2. Further, to act for an end is to order one’s ment to the principal agent, as stated above ( Ia, q. 22, a. 2, action to an end. But this is the work of reason. Therefore ad 4; Ia, q. 103, a. 1, ad 3). Consequently it is proper to it does not belong to things that lack reason. the rational nature to tend to an end, as directing [agens] Objection 3. Further, the good and the end is the ob- and leading itself to the end: whereas it is proper to the ject of the will. But “the will is in the reason” (De Anima irrational nature to tend to an end, as directed or led by iii, 9). Therefore to act for an end belongs to none but a another, whether it apprehend the end, as do irrational an- rational nature. imals, or do not apprehend it, as is the case of those things On the contrary, The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) which are altogether void of knowledge. that “not only mind but also nature acts for an end.” Reply to Objection 1. When a man of himself acts for I answer that, Every agent, of necessity, acts for an an end, he knows the end: but when he is directed or led end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to one an- by another, for instance, when he acts at another’s com- other, the first be removed, the others must, of necessity, mand, or when he is moved under another’s compulsion, be removed also. Now the first of all causes is the final it is not necessary that he should know the end. And it is cause. The reason of which is that matter does not receive thus with irrational creatures. form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for noth- Reply to Objection 2. To ordain towards an end be- ing reduces itself from potentiality to act. But an agent longs to that which directs itself to an end: whereas to be does not move except out of intention for an end. For if ordained to an end belongs to that which is directed by the agent were not determinate to some particular effect, it another to an end. And this can belong to an irrational would not do one thing rather than another: consequently nature, but owing to some one possessed of reason. in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of Reply to Objection 3. The object of the will is the necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has end and the good in universal. Consequently there can be the nature of an end. And just as this determination is ef- no will in those things that lack reason and intellect, since fected, in the rational nature, by the “rational appetite,” they cannot apprehend the universal; but they have a nat- which is called the will; so, in other things, it is caused ural appetite or a sensitive appetite, determinate to some by their natural inclination, which is called the “natural particular good. Now it is clear that particular causes are appetite.” moved by a universal cause: thus the governor of a city, Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to who intends the common good, moves, by his command, an end, by its action or movement, in two ways: first, as all the particular departments of the city. Consequently a thing, moving itself to the end, as man; secondly, as a all things that lack reason are, of necessity, moved to their thing moved by another to the end, as an arrow tends to a particular ends by some rational will which extends to the determinate end through being moved by the archer who universal good, namely by the Divine will. directs his action to the end. Therefore those things that 597 Whether human acts are specified by their end? Ia IIae q. 1 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that human acts are man, is the end. In like manner it is their terminus: for not specified by their end. For the end is an extrinsic the human act terminates at that which the will intends as cause. But everything is specified by an intrinsic princi- the end; thus in natural agents the form of the thing gener- ple. Therefore human acts are not specified by their end. ated is conformed to the form of the generator. And since, Objection 2. Further, that which gives a thing its as Ambrose says (Prolog. super Luc.) “morality is said species should exist before it. But the end comes into ex- properly of man,” moral acts properly speaking receive istence afterwards. Therefore a human act does not derive their species from the end, for moral acts are the same as its species from the end. human acts. Objection 3. Further, one thing cannot be in more Reply to Objection 1. The end is not altogether ex- than one species. But one and the same act may happen to trinsic to the act, because it is related to the act as principle be ordained to various ends. Therefore the end does not or terminus; and thus it just this that is essential to an act, give the species to human acts. viz. to proceed from something, considered as action, and On the contrary, Augustine says (De Mor. Eccl. to proceed towards something, considered as passion. et Manich. ii, 13): “According as their end is worthy Reply to Objection 2. The end, in so far as it pre- of blame or praise so are our deeds worthy of blame or exists in the intention, pertains to the will, as stated above praise.” (a. 1, ad 1). And it is thus that it gives the species to the I answer that Each thing receives its species in re- human or moral act. spect of an act and not in respect of potentiality; where- Reply to Objection 3. One and the same act, in so far fore things composed of matter and form are established as it proceeds once from the agent, is ordained to but one in their respective species by their own forms. And this proximate end, from which it has its species: but it can be is also to be observed in proper movements. For since ordained to several remote ends, of which one is the end movements are, in a way, divided into action and passion, of the other. It is possible, however, that an act which is each of these receives its species from an act; action in- one in respect of its natural species, be ordained to sev- deed from the act which is the principle of acting, and pas- eral ends of the will: thus this act “to kill a man,” which sion from the act which is the terminus of the movement. is but one act in respect of its natural species, can be or- Wherefore heating, as an action, is nothing else than a dained, as to an end, to the safeguarding of justice, and to certain movement proceeding from heat, while heating as the satisfying of anger: the result being that there would a passion is nothing else than a movement towards heat: be several acts in different species of morality: since in and it is the definition that shows the specific nature. And one way there will be an act of virtue, in another, an act either way, human acts, whether they be considered as ac- of vice. For a movement does not receive its species from tions, or as passions, receive their species from the end. that which is its terminus accidentally, but only from that For human acts can be considered in both ways, since man which is its “per se” terminus. Now moral ends are acci- moves himself, and is moved by himself. Now it has been dental to a natural thing, and conversely the relation to a stated above (a. 1) that acts are called human, inasmuch natural end is accidental to morality. Consequently there as they proceed from a deliberate will. Now the object is no reason why acts which are the same considered in of the will is the good and the end. And hence it is clear their natural species, should not be diverse, considered in that the principle of human acts, in so far as they are hu- their moral species, and conversely. Whether there is one last end of human life? Ia IIae q. 1 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no last end are infinite, since, given any number, the reason can think of human life, but that we proceed to infinity. For good is of one yet greater. But desire of the end is consequent on essentially diffusive, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). the apprehension of the reason. Therefore it seems that Consequently if that which proceeds from good is itself there is also an infinite series of ends. good, the latter must needs diffuse some other good: so Objection 3. Further, the good and the end is the ob- that the diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But good ject of the will. But the will can react on itself an infinite has the nature of an end. Therefore there is an indefinite number of times: for I can will something, and will to will series of ends. it, and so on indefinitely. Therefore there is an infinite se- Objection 2. Further, things pertaining to the reason ries of ends of the human will, and there is no last end of can be multiplied to infinity: thus mathematical quantities the human will. have no limit. For the same reason the species of numbers On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 598 2) that “to suppose a thing to be indefinite is to deny that And in this way it happens that there is an accidental in-it is good.” But the good is that which has the nature of finity of ends, and of things ordained to the end. an end. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of an end to Reply to Objection 1. The very nature of good is that proceed indefinitely. Therefore it is necessary to fix one something flows from it, but not that it flows from some- last end. thing else. Since, therefore, good has the nature of end, I answer that, Absolutely speaking, it is not possi- and the first good is the last end, this argument does not ble to proceed indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any prove that there is no last end; but that from the end, al- point of view. For in whatsoever things there is an essen- ready supposed, we may proceed downwards indefinitely tial order of one to another, if the first be removed, those towards those things that are ordained to the end. And this that are ordained to the first, must of necessity be removed would be true if we considered but the power of the First also. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5) Good, which is infinite. But, since the First Good dif- that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes of move- fuses itself according to the intellect, to which it is proper ment, because then there would be no first mover, without to flow forth into its effects according to a certain fixed which neither can the others move, since they move only form; it follows that there is a certain measure to the flow through being moved by the first mover. Now there is to of good things from the First Good from Which all other be observed a twofold order in ends—the order of inten- goods share the power of diffusion. Consequently the dif- tion and the order of execution: and in either of these or- fusion of goods does not proceed indefinitely but, as it is ders there must be something first. For that which is first written (Wis. 11:21), God disposes all things “in number, in the order of intention, is the principle, as it were, mov- weight and measure.” ing the appetite; consequently, if you remove this princi- Reply to Objection 2. In things which are of them- ple, there will be nothing to move the appetite. On the selves, reason begins from principles that are known natu- other hand, the principle in execution is that wherein op- rally, and advances to some term. Wherefore the Philoso- eration has its beginning; and if this principle be taken pher proves (Poster. i, 3) that there is no infinite pro- away, no one will begin to work. Now the principle in the cess in demonstrations, because there we find a process of intention is the last end; while the principle in execution is things having an essential, not an accidental, connection the first of the things which are ordained to the end. Con- with one another. But in those things which are acciden- sequently, on neither side is it possible to go to infinity tally connected, nothing hinders the reason from proceed- since if there were no last end, nothing would be desired, ing indefinitely. Now it is accidental to a stated quantity nor would any action have its term, nor would the inten- or number, as such, that quantity or unity be added to it. tion of the agent be at rest; while if there is no first thing Wherefore in such like things nothing hinders the reason among those that are ordained to the end, none would be- from an indefinite process. gin to work at anything, and counsel would have no term, Reply to Objection 3. This multiplication of acts of but would continue indefinitely. the will reacting on itself, is accidental to the order of On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being ends. This is clear from the fact that in regard to one and in things that are ordained to one another not essentially the same end, the will reacts on itself indifferently once or but accidentally; for accidental causes are indeterminate. several times. Whether one man can have several last ends? Ia IIae q. 1 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem possible for one man’s before it placed its last end in that thing, e.g. pleasure, it will to be directed at the same time to several things, as could place it in something else, e.g. riches. Therefore last ends. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1) that even after having placed his last end in pleasure, a man some held man’s last end to consist in four things, viz. “in can at the same time place his last end in riches. There- pleasure, repose, the gifts of nature, and virtue.” But these fore it is possible for one man’s will to be directed at the are clearly more than one thing. Therefore one man can same time to several things, as last ends. place the last end of his will in many things. On the contrary, That in which a man rests as in his Objection 2. Further, things not in opposition to one last end, is master of his affections, since he takes there- another do not exclude one another. Now there are many from his entire rule of life. Hence of gluttons it is written things which are not in opposition to one another. There- (Phil. 3:19): “Whose god is their belly”: viz. because fore the supposition that one thing is the last end of the they place their last end in the pleasures of the belly. Now will does not exclude others. according to Mat. 6:24, “No man can serve two masters,” Objection 3. Further, by the fact that it places its last such, namely, as are not ordained to one another. There-end in one thing, the will does not lose its freedom. But fore it is impossible for one man to have several last ends 599 not ordained to one another. receive their species from the end, as stated above (a. 3), I answer that, It is impossible for one man’s will to they must needs receive their genus from the last end, be directed at the same time to diverse things, as last ends. which is common to them all: just as natural things are Three reasons may be assigned for this. First, because, placed in a genus according to a common form. Since, since everything desires its own perfection, a man desires then, all things that can be desired by the will, belong, as for his ultimate end, that which he desires as his perfect such, to one genus, the last end must needs be one. And and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, all the more because in every genus there is one first prin- 1): “In speaking of the end of good we mean now, not that ciple; and the last end has the nature of a first principle, as it passes away so as to be no more, but that it is perfected stated above. Now as the last end of man, simply as man, so as to be complete.” It is therefore necessary for the last is to the whole human race, so is the last end of any indi- end so to fill man’s appetite, that nothing is left besides it vidual man to that individual. Therefore, just as of all men for man to desire. Which is not possible, if something else there is naturally one last end, so the will of an individual be required for his perfection. Consequently it is not pos- man must be fixed on one last end. sible for the appetite so to tend to two things, as though Reply to Objection 1. All these several objects were each were its perfect good. considered as one perfect good resulting therefrom, by The second reason is because, just as in the process of those who placed in them the last end. reasoning, the principle is that which is naturally known, Reply to Objection 2. Although it is possible to find so in the process of the rational appetite, i.e. the will, several things which are not in opposition to one another, the principle needs to be that which is naturally desired. yet it is contrary to a thing’s perfect good, that anything Now this must needs be one: since nature tends to one besides be required for that thing’s perfection. thing only. But the principle in the process of the rational Reply to Objection 3. The power of the will does not appetite is the last end. Therefore that to which the will extend to making opposites exist at the same time. Which tends, as to its last end, is one. would be the case were it to tend to several diverse objects The third reason is because, since voluntary actions as last ends, as has been shown above (ad 2). Whether man will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end? Ia IIae q. 1 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that man does not will all, and of art. Wherefore every beginning of perfection is or- whatsoever he wills, for the last end. For things ordained dained to complete perfection which is achieved through to the last end are said to be serious matter, as being use- the last end. Secondly, because the last end stands in the ful. But jests are foreign to serious matter. Therefore what same relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in man does in jest, he ordains not to the last end. other movements. Now it is clear that secondary moving Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says at the be- causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by ginning of his Metaphysics 1,[2] that speculative science the first mover. Therefore secondary objects of the ap- is sought for its own sake. Now it cannot be said that each petite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to the speculative science is the last end. Therefore man does first object of the appetite, which is the last end. not desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end. Reply to Objection 1. Actions done jestingly are not Objection 3. Further, whosoever ordains something directed to any external end; but merely to the good of the to an end, thinks of that end. But man does not always jester, in so far as they afford him pleasure or relaxation. think of the last end in all that he desires or does. There- But man’s consummate good is his last end. fore man neither desires nor does all for the last end. Reply to Objection 2. The same applies to specula- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, tive science; which is desired as the scientist’s good, in- 1): “That is the end of our good, for the sake of which we cluded in complete and perfect good, which is the ultimate love other things, whereas we love it for its own sake.” end. I answer that, Man must, of necessity, desire all, Reply to Objection 3. One need not always be think- whatsoever he desires, for the last end. This is evident ing of the last end, whenever one desires or does some- for two reasons. First, because whatever man desires, he thing: but the virtue of the first intention, which was in desires it under the aspect of good. And if he desire it, respect of the last end, remains in every desire directed not as his perfect good, which is the last end, he must, to any object whatever, even though one’s thoughts be not of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, be- actually directed to the last end. Thus while walking along cause the beginning of anything is always ordained to its the road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every completion; as is clearly the case in effects both of nature step. 600 Whether all men have the same last end? Ia IIae q. 1 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that all men have not the ment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfilment same last end. For before all else the unchangeable good in which the last end consists, as stated above (a. 5). But seems to be the last end of man. But some turn away from as to the thing in which this aspect is realized, all men are the unchangeable good, by sinning. Therefore all men not agreed as to their last end: since some desire riches have not the same last end. as their consummate good; some, pleasure; others, some- Objection 2. Further, man’s entire life is ruled accord- thing else. Thus to every taste the sweet is pleasant but to ing to his last end. If, therefore, all men had the same last some, the sweetness of wine is most pleasant, to others, end, they would not have various pursuits in life. Which the sweetness of honey, or of something similar. Yet that is evidently false. sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant things, in which Objection 3. Further, the end is the term of action. he who has the best taste takes most pleasure. In like man- But actions are of individuals. Now although men agree ner that good is most complete which the man with well in their specific nature, yet they differ in things pertaining disposed affections desires for his last end. to individuals. Therefore all men have not the same last Reply to Objection 1. Those who sin turn from that end. in which their last end really consists: but they do not turn On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3) away from the intention of the last end, which intention that all men agree in desiring the last end, which is happi- they mistakenly seek in other things. ness. Reply to Objection 2. Various pursuits in life are I answer that, We can speak of the last end in two found among men by reason of the various things in which ways: first, considering only the aspect of last end; sec- men seek to find their last end. ondly, considering the thing in which the aspect of last Reply to Objection 3. Although actions are of indi- end is realized. So, then, as to the aspect of last end, all viduals, yet their first principle of action is nature, which agree in desiring the last end: since all desire the fulfil- tends to one thing, as stated above (a. 5). Whether other creatures concur in that last end? Ia IIae q. 1 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that all other creatures I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), concur in man’s last end. For the end corresponds to the the end is twofold—the end “for which” and the end “by beginning. But man’s beginning—i.e. God—is also the which”; viz. the thing itself in which is found the aspect beginning of all else. Therefore all other things concur in of good, and the use or acquisition of that thing. Thus we man’s last end. say that the end of the movement of a weighty body is Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) either a lower place as “thing,” or to be in a lower place, that “God turns all things to Himself as to their last end.” as “use”; and the end of the miser is money as “thing,” or But He is also man’s last end; because He alone is to be possession of money as “use.” enjoyed by man, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, If, therefore, we speak of man’s last end as of the thing 5,22). Therefore other things, too, concur in man’s last which is the end, thus all other things concur in man’s end. last end, since God is the last end of man and of all other Objection 3. Further, man’s last end is the object of things. If, however, we speak of man’s last end, as of the will. But the object of the will is the universal good, the acquisition of the end, then irrational creatures do not which is the end of all. Therefore other things, too, concur concur with man in this end. For man and other rational in man’s last end. creatures attain to their last end by knowing and loving On the contrary, man’s last end is happiness; which God: this is not possible to other creatures, which acquire all men desire, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3,4). But their last end, in so far as they share in the Divine likeness, “happiness is not possible for animals bereft of reason,” inasmuch as they are, or live, or even know. as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 5). Therefore other things Hence it is evident how the objections are solved: do not concur in man’s last end. since happiness means the acquisition of the last end. 601 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 2 Of Those Things in Which Man’s Happiness Consists (In Eight Articles) We have now to consider happiness: and (1) in what it consists; (2) what it is; (3) how we can obtain it. Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether happiness consists in wealth? (2) Whether in honor? (3) Whether in fame or glory? (4) Whether in power? (5) Whether in any good of the body? (6) Whether in pleasure? (7) Whether in any good of the soul? (8) Whether in any created good? Whether man’s happiness consists in wealth? Ia IIae q. 2 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that man’s happiness con- the sake of something else, viz. as a support of human sists in wealth. For since happiness is man’s last end, it nature: consequently it cannot be man’s last end, rather is must consist in that which has the greatest hold on man’s it ordained to man as to its end. Wherefore in the order affections. Now this is wealth: for it is written (Eccles. of nature, all such things are below man, and made for 10:19): “All things obey money.” Therefore man’s happi- him, according to Ps. 8:8: “Thou hast subjected all things ness consists in wealth. under his feet.” Objection 2. Further, according to Boethius (De Con- And as to artificial wealth, it is not sought save for the sol. iii), happiness is “a state of life made perfect by the sake of natural wealth; since man would not seek it except aggregate of all good things.” Now money seems to be because, by its means, he procures for himself the neces- the means of possessing all things: for, as the Philosopher saries of life. Consequently much less can it be consid- says (Ethic. v, 5), money was invented, that it might be ered in the light of the last end. Therefore it is impossible a sort of guarantee for the acquisition of whatever man for happiness, which is the last end of man, to consist in desires. Therefore happiness consists in wealth. wealth. Objection 3. Further, since the desire for the Reply to Objection 1. All material things obey sovereign good never fails, it seems to be infinite. But this money, so far as the multitude of fools is concerned, who is the case with riches more than anything else; since “a know no other than material goods, which can be obtained covetous man shall not be satisfied with riches” (Eccles. for money. But we should take our estimation of human 5:9). Therefore happiness consists in wealth. goods not from the foolish but from the wise: just as it is On the contrary, Man’s good consists in retaining for a person whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge happiness rather than in spreading it. But as Boethius says whether a thing is palatable. (De Consol. ii), “wealth shines in giving rather than in Reply to Objection 2. All things salable can be had hoarding: for the miser is hateful, whereas the generous for money: not so spiritual things, which cannot be sold. man is applauded.” Therefore man’s happiness does not Hence it is written (Prov. 17:16): “What doth it avail a consist in wealth. fool to have riches, seeing he cannot buy wisdom.” I answer that, It is impossible for man’s happiness to Reply to Objection 3. The desire for natural riches consist in wealth. For wealth is twofold, as the Philoso- is not infinite: because they suffice for nature in a certain pher says (Polit. i, 3), viz. natural and artificial. Natural measure. But the desire for artificial wealth is infinite, wealth is that which serves man as a remedy for his nat- for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence, which ural wants: such as food, drink, clothing, cars, dwellings, is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear (Polit. i, and such like, while artificial wealth is that which is not a 3). Yet this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than direct help to nature, as money, but is invented by the art the desire for the sovereign good. For the more perfectly of man, for the convenience of exchange, and as a mea- the sovereign good is possessed, the more it is loved, and sure of things salable. other things despised: because the more we possess it, the Now it is evident that man’s happiness cannot consist more we know it. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 24:29): in natural wealth. For wealth of this kind is sought for “They that eat me shall yet hunger.” Whereas in the de- 602 sire for wealth and for whatsoever temporal goods, the thirst again.” The reason of this is that we realize more contrary is the case: for when we already possess them, their insufficiency when we possess them: and this very we despise them, and seek others: which is the sense of fact shows that they are imperfect, and the sovereign good Our Lord’s words (Jn. 4:13): “Whosoever drinketh of does not consist therein. this water,” by which temporal goods are signified, “shall Whether man’s happiness consists in honors? Ia IIae q. 2 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that man’s happiness con- some excellence in him; and consequently it is a sign and sists in honors. For happiness or bliss is “the reward of attestation of the excellence that is in the person honored. virtue,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). But honor Now a man’s excellence is in proportion, especially to his more than anything else seems to be that by which virtue happiness, which is man’s perfect good; and to its parts, is rewarded, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). There- i.e. those goods by which he has a certain share of happi- fore happiness consists especially in honor. ness. And therefore honor can result from happiness, but Objection 2. Further, that which belongs to God and happiness cannot principally consist therein. to persons of great excellence seems especially to be hap- Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. piness, which is the perfect good. But that is honor, as i, 5), honor is not that reward of virtue, for which the vir- the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Moreover, the Apos- tuous work: but they receive honor from men by way of tle says (1 Tim. 1:17): “To. . . the only God be honor and reward, “as from those who have nothing greater to offer.” glory.” Therefore happiness consists in honor. But virtue’s true reward is happiness itself, for which the Objection 3. Further, that which man desires above virtuous work: whereas if they worked for honor, it would all is happiness. But nothing seems more desirable to man no longer be a virtue, but ambition. than honor: since man suffers loss in all other things, lest Reply to Objection 2. Honor is due to God and to he should suffer loss of honor. Therefore happiness con- persons of great excellence as a sign of attestation of ex- sists in honor. cellence already existing: not that honor makes them ex- On the contrary, Happiness is in the happy. But cellent. honor is not in the honored, but rather in him who hon- Reply to Objection 3. That man desires honor above ors, and who offers deference to the person honored, as all else, arises from his natural desire for happiness, from the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5). Therefore happiness which honor results, as stated above. Wherefore man does not consist in honor. seeks to be honored especially by the wise, on whose I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to con- judgment he believes himself to be excellent or happy. sist in honor. For honor is given to a man on account of Whether man’s happiness consists in fame or glory? Ia IIae q. 2 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that man’s happiness con- (De Consol. ii): “You seem to beget unto yourselves eter- sists in glory. For happiness seems to consist in that which nity, when you think of your fame in future time.” There- is paid to the saints for the trials they have undergone in fore man’s happiness consists in fame or glory. the world. But this is glory: for the Apostle says (Rom. On the contrary, Happiness is man’s true good. But 8:18): “The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be it happens that fame or glory is false: for as Boethius says compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in (De Consol. iii), “many owe their renown to the lying us.” Therefore happiness consists in glory. reports spread among the people. Can anything be more Objection 2. Further, good is diffusive of itself, as shameful? For those who receive false fame, must needs stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But man’s good is blush at their own praise.” Therefore man’s happiness spread abroad in the knowledge of others by glory more does not consist in fame or glory. than by anything else: since, according to Ambrose∗, I answer that, Man’s happiness cannot consist in hu- glory consists “in being well known and praised.” There- man fame or glory. For glory consists “in being well fore man’s happiness consists in glory. known and praised,” as Ambrose† says. Now the thing Objection 3. Further, happiness is the most enduring known is related to human knowledge otherwise than to good. Now this seems to be fame or glory; because by this God’s knowledge: for human knowledge is caused by the men attain to eternity after a fashion. Hence Boethius says things known, whereas God’s knowledge is the cause of ∗ Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii. 13 † Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii, 13 603 the things known. Wherefore the perfection of human Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle speaks, then, not good, which is called happiness, cannot be caused by hu- of the glory which is with men, but of the glory which man knowledge: but rather human knowledge of another’s is from God, with His Angels. Hence it is written (Mk. happiness proceeds from, and, in a fashion, is caused by, 8:38): “The Son of Man shall confess him in the glory of human happiness itself, inchoate or perfect. Consequently His Father, before His angels”∗. man’s happiness cannot consist in fame or glory. On the Reply to Objection 2. A man’s good which, through other hand, man’s good depends on God’s knowledge as fame or glory, is in the knowledge of many, if this knowl- its cause. And therefore man’s beatitude depends, as on edge be true, must needs be derived from good existing its cause, on the glory which man has with God; accord- in the man himself: and hence it presupposes perfect or ing to Ps. 90:15,16: “I will deliver him, and I will glorify inchoate happiness. But if the knowledge be false, it does him; I will fill him with length of days, and I will show not harmonize with the thing: and thus good does not ex- him my salvation.” ist in him who is looked upon as famous. Hence it follows Furthermore, we must observe that human knowledge that fame can nowise make man happy. often fails, especially in contingent singulars, such as are Reply to Objection 3. Fame has no stability; in fact, human acts. For this reason human glory is frequently de- it is easily ruined by false report. And if sometimes it en- ceptive. But since God cannot be deceived, His glory is dures, this is by accident. But happiness endures of itself, always true; hence it is written (2 Cor. 10:18): “He. . . is and for ever. approved. . . whom God commendeth.” Whether man’s happiness consists in power? Ia IIae q. 2 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that happiness consists Now four general reasons may be given to prove in power. For all things desire to become like to God, as that happiness consists in none of the foregoing external to their last end and first beginning. But men who are in goods. First, because, since happiness is man’s supreme power, seem, on account of the similarity of power, to be good, it is incompatible with any evil. Now all the forego- most like to God: hence also in Scripture they are called ing can be found both in good and in evil men. Secondly, “gods” (Ex. 22:28), “Thou shalt not speak ill of the gods.” because, since it is the nature of happiness to “satisfy of Therefore happiness consists in power. itself,” as stated in Ethic. i, 7, having gained happiness, Objection 2. Further, happiness is the perfect good. man cannot lack any needful good. But after acquiring But the highest perfection for man is to be able to rule any one of the foregoing, man may still lack many goods others; which belongs to those who are in power. There- that are necessary to him; for instance, wisdom, bodily fore happiness consists in power. health, and such like. Thirdly, because, since happiness is Objection 3. Further, since happiness is supremely the perfect good, no evil can accrue to anyone therefrom. desirable, it is contrary to that which is before all to be This cannot be said of the foregoing: for it is written (Ec- shunned. But, more than aught else, men shun servitude, cles. 5:12) that “riches” are sometimes “kept to the hurt of which is contrary to power. Therefore happiness consists the owner”; and the same may be said of the other three. in power. Fourthly, because man is ordained to happiness through On the contrary, Happiness is the perfect good. But principles that are in him; since he is ordained thereto power is most imperfect. For as Boethius says (De Con- naturally. Now the four goods mentioned above are due sol. iii), “the power of man cannot relieve the gnawings rather to external causes, and in most cases to fortune; for of care, nor can it avoid the thorny path of anxiety”: and which reason they are called goods of fortune. Therefore further on: “Think you a man is powerful who is sur- it is evident that happiness nowise consists in the forego- rounded by attendants, whom he inspires with fear indeed, ing. but whom he fears still more?” Reply to Objection 1. God’s power is His goodness: I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist hence He cannot use His power otherwise than well. But in power; and this for two reasons. First because power it is not so with men. Consequently it is not enough for has the nature of principle, as is stated in Metaph. v, 12, man’s happiness, that he become like God in power, un- whereas happiness has the nature of last end. Secondly, less he become like Him in goodness also. because power has relation to good and evil: whereas hap- Reply to Objection 2. Just as it is a very good thing piness is man’s proper and perfect good. Wherefore some for a man to make good use of power in ruling many, so happiness might consist in the good use of power, which is it a very bad thing if he makes a bad use of it. And so it is by virtue, rather than in power itself. is that power is towards good and evil. ∗ St. Thomas joins Mk. 8:38 with Lk. 12:8 owing to a possible variant in his text, or to the fact that he was quoting from memory 604 Reply to Objection 3. Servitude is a hindrance to the it; not because man’s supreme good consists in power. good use of power: therefore is it that men naturally shun Whether man’s happiness consists in any bodily good? Ia IIae q. 2 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that man’s happiness con- as his end: since man is not the supreme good. There- sists in bodily goods. For it is written (Ecclus. 30:16): fore the last end of man’s reason and will cannot be the “There is no riches above the riches of the health of the preservation of man’s being. body.” But happiness consists in that which is best. There- Secondly, because, granted that the end of man’s will fore it consists in the health of the body. and reason be the preservation of man’s being, it could Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v), not be said that the end of man is some good of the body. that “to be” is better than “to live,” and “to live” is better For man’s being consists in soul and body; and though the than all that follows. But for man’s being and living, the being of the body depends on the soul, yet the being of health of the body is necessary. Since, therefore, happi- the human soul depends not on the body, as shown above ness is man’s supreme good, it seems that health of the ( Ia, q. 75, a. 2); and the very body is for the soul, as body belongs more than anything else to happiness. matter for its form, and the instruments for the man that Objection 3. Further, the more universal a thing is, puts them into motion, that by their means he may do his the higher the principle from which it depends; because work. Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to the higher a cause is, the greater the scope of its power. the goods of the soul, as to their end. Consequently hap- Now just as the causality of the efficient cause consists piness, which is man’s last end, cannot consist in goods of in its flowing into something, so the causality of the end the body. consists in its drawing the appetite. Therefore, just as the Reply to Objection 1. Just as the body is ordained to First Cause is that which flows into all things, so the last the soul, as its end, so are external goods ordained to the end is that which attracts the desire of all. But being it- body itself. And therefore it is with reason that the good self is that which is most desired by all. Therefore man’s of the body is preferred to external goods, which are sig- happiness consists most of all in things pertaining to his nified by “riches,” just as the good of the soul is preferred being, such as the health of the body. to all bodily goods. On the contrary, Man surpasses all other animals Reply to Objection 2. Being taken simply, as includ- in regard to happiness. But in bodily goods he is sur- ing all perfection of being, surpasses life and all that fol- passed by many animals; for instance, by the elephant in lows it; for thus being itself includes all these. And in this longevity, by the lion in strength, by the stag in fleetness. sense Dionysius speaks. But if we consider being itself as Therefore man’s happiness does not consist in goods of participated in this or that thing, which does not possess the body. the whole perfection of being, but has imperfect being, I answer that, It is impossible for man’s happiness to such as the being of any creature; then it is evident that consist in the goods of the body; and this for two reasons. being itself together with an additional perfection is more First, because, if a thing be ordained to another as to its excellent. Hence in the same passage Dionysius says that end, its last end cannot consist in the preservation of its things that live are better than things that exist, and intel- being. Hence a captain does not intend as a last end, the ligent better than living things. preservation of the ship entrusted to him, since a ship is Reply to Objection 3. Since the end corresponds to ordained to something else as its end, viz. to navigation. the beginning; this argument proves that the last end is Now just as the ship is entrusted to the captain that he may the first beginning of being, in Whom every perfection of steer its course, so man is given over to his will and rea- being is: Whose likeness, according to their proportion, son; according to Ecclus. 15:14: “God made man from some desire as to being only, some as to living being, the beginning and left him in the hand of his own coun- some as to being which is living, intelligent and happy. sel.” Now it is evident that man is ordained to something And this belongs to few. Whether man’s happiness consists in pleasure? Ia IIae q. 2 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that man’s happiness con- it is absurd to ask anyone what is his motive in wishing sists in pleasure. For since happiness is the last end, it is to be pleased” (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore happiness consists not desired for something else, but other things for it. But principally in pleasure and delight. this answers to pleasure more than to anything else: “for Objection 2. Further, “the first cause goes more 605 deeply into the effect than the second cause” (De Causis independent of a corporeal organ, has a certain infinity i). Now the causality of the end consists in its attract- in regard to the body and those parts of the soul which ing the appetite. Therefore, seemingly that which moves are tied down to the body: just as immaterial things are most the appetite, answers to the notion of the last end. in a way infinite as compared to material things, since a Now this is pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so form is, after a fashion, contracted and bounded by mat- far absorbs man’s will and reason, that it causes him to ter, so that a form which is independent of matter is, in despise other goods. Therefore it seems that man’s last a way, infinite. Therefore sense, which is a power of the end, which is happiness, consists principally in pleasure. body, knows the singular, which is determinate through Objection 3. Further, since desire is for good, it seems matter: whereas the intellect, which is a power indepen-that what all desire is best. But all desire delight; both dent of matter, knows the universal, which is abstracted wise and foolish, and even irrational creatures. Therefore from matter, and contains an infinite number of singulars. delight is the best of all. Therefore happiness, which is Consequently it is evident that good which is fitting to the the supreme good, consists in pleasure. body, and which causes bodily delight through being ap- On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii): prehended by sense, is not man’s perfect good, but is quite “Any one that chooses to look back on his past excesses, a trifle as compared with the good of the soul. Hence it is will perceive that pleasures had a sad ending: and if they written (Wis. 7:9) that “all gold in comparison of her, is can render a man happy, there is no reason why we should as a little sand.” And therefore bodily pleasure is neither not say that the very beasts are happy too.” happiness itself, nor a proper accident of happiness. I answer that, Because bodily delights are more gen- Reply to Objection 1. It comes to the same whether erally known, “the name of pleasure has been appropri- we desire good, or desire delight, which is nothing else ated to them” (Ethic. vii, 13), although other delights than the appetite’s rest in good: thus it is owing to the excel them: and yet happiness does not consist in them. same natural force that a weighty body is borne down- Because in every thing, that which pertains to its essence wards and that it rests there. Consequently just as good is distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one is desired for itself, so delight is desired for itself and not thing that he is a mortal rational animal, and another that for anything else, if the preposition “for” denote the fi- he is a risible animal. We must therefore consider that ev- nal cause. But if it denote the formal or rather the motive ery delight is a proper accident resulting from happiness, cause, thus delight is desirable for something else, i.e. for or from some part of happiness; since the reason that a the good, which is the object of that delight, and conse- man is delighted is that he has some fitting good, either quently is its principle, and gives it its form: for the reason in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory. Now a fitting that delight is desired is that it is rest in the thing desired. good, if indeed it be the perfect good, is precisely man’s Reply to Objection 2. The vehemence of desire for happiness: and if it is imperfect, it is a share of happiness, sensible delight arises from the fact that operations of the either proximate, or remote, or at least apparent. There- senses, through being the principles of our knowledge, are fore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from more perceptible. And so it is that sensible pleasures are the perfect good, the very essence of happiness, but some- desired by the majority. thing resulting therefrom as its proper accident. Reply to Objection 3. All desire delight in the same But bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect way as they desire good: and yet they desire delight by good even in that way. For it results from a good ap- reason of the good and not conversely, as stated above prehended by sense, which is a power of the soul, which (ad 1). Consequently it does not follow that delight is the power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to supreme and essential good, but that every delight results the body, and apprehended by sense, cannot be man’s from some good, and that some delight results from that perfect good. For since the rational soul excels the ca- which is the essential and supreme good. pacity of corporeal matter, that part of the soul which is Whether some good of the soul constitutes man’s happiness? Ia IIae q. 2 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that some good of the sire good, more than the good that we desire for it: thus soul constitutes man’s happiness. For happiness is man’s we love a friend for whom we desire money, more than good. Now this is threefold: external goods, goods of the we love money. But whatever good a man desires, he de- body, and goods of the soul. But happiness does not con- sires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself more than sist in external goods, nor in goods of the body, as shown all other goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: above (Aa. 4,5). Therefore it consists in goods of the soul. which is evident from the fact that for its sake all else is Objection 2. Further, we love that for which we de- loved and desired. Therefore happiness consists in some 606 good of man himself: not, however, in goods of the body; good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none therefore, in goods of the soul. of them can be man’s last end. Objection 3. Further, perfection is something belong- But if we speak of man’s last end, as to the attainment ing to that which is perfected. But happiness is a perfec- or possession thereof, or as to any use whatever of the tion of man. Therefore happiness is something belonging thing itself desired as an end, thus does something of man, to man. But it is not something belonging to the body, as in respect of his soul, belong to his last end: since man shown above (a. 5). Therefore it is something belonging attains happiness through his soul. Therefore the thing to the soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul. itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes On the contrary, As Augustine says (De Doctr. happiness, and makes man happy; but the attainment of Christ. i, 22), “that which constitutes the life of happi- this thing is called happiness. Consequently we must say ness is to be loved for its own sake.” But man is not to that happiness is something belonging to the soul; but that be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man is to be which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul. loved for God’s sake. Therefore happiness consists in no Reply to Objection 1. Inasmuch as this division in- good of the soul. cludes all goods that man can desire, thus the good of the I answer that, As stated above (q. 1, a. 8), the end is soul is not only power, habit, or act, but also the object of twofold: namely, the thing itself, which we desire to at- these, which is something outside. And in this way noth- tain, and the use, namely, the attainment or possession of ing hinders us from saying that what constitutes happiness that thing. If, then, we speak of man’s last end, it is impos- is a good of the soul. sible for man’s last end to be the soul itself or something Reply to Objection 2. As far as the proposed objec- belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in itself, is as tion is concerned, happiness is loved above all, as the good something existing in potentiality: for it becomes know- desired; whereas a friend is loved as that for which good is ing actually, from being potentially knowing; and actually desired; and thus, too, man loves himself. Consequently it virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since po- is not the same kind of love in both cases. As to whether tentiality is for the sake of act as for its fulfilment, that man loves anything more than himself with the love of which in itself is in potentiality cannot be the last end. friendship there will be occasion to inquire when we treat Therefore the soul itself cannot be its own last end. of Charity. In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, Reply to Objection 3. Happiness, itself, since it is a whether power, habit, or act. For that good which is the perfection of the soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but last end, is the perfect good fulfilling the desire. Now that which constitutes happiness, viz. which makes man man’s appetite, otherwise the will, is for the universal happy, is something outside his soul, as stated above. good. And any good inherent to the soul is a participated Whether any created good constitutes man’s happiness? Ia IIae q. 2 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that some created good then man’s capacity does not include that good which sur- constitutes man’s happiness. For Dionysius says (Div. passes the limits of all creation, it seems that man can be Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom “unites the ends of first made happy by some created good. Consequently some things to the beginnings of second things,” from which created good constitutes man’s happiness. we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, the base of the higher nature. But man’s highest good is 26): “As the soul is the life of the body, so God is man’s happiness. Since then the angel is above man in the order life of happiness: of Whom it is written: ‘Happy is that of nature, as stated in Ia, q. 111, a. 1, it seems that man’s people whose God is the Lord’ (Ps. 143:15).” happiness consists in man somehow reaching the angel. I answer that, It is impossible for any created good to Objection 2. Further, the last end of each thing is that constitute man’s happiness. For happiness is the perfect which, in relation to it, is perfect: hence the part is for good, which lulls the appetite altogether; else it would not the whole, as for its end. But the universe of creatures be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. which is called the macrocosm, is compared to man who Now the object of the will, i.e. of man’s appetite, is the is called the microcosm (Phys. viii, 2), as perfect to im- universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the uni- perfect. Therefore man’s happiness consists in the whole versal true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man’s universe of creatures. will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in Objection 3. Further, man is made happy by that any creature, but in God alone; because every creature has which lulls his natural desire. But man’s natural desire goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can sat- does not reach out to a good surpassing his capacity. Since isfy the will of man, according to the words of Ps. 102:5: 607 “Who satisfieth thy desire with good things.” Therefore the universe of creatures, to which man is compared as God alone constitutes man’s happiness. part to whole, is not the last end, but is ordained to God, Reply to Objection 1. The summit of man does in- as to its last end. Therefore the last end of man is not the deed touch the base of the angelic nature, by a kind of good of the universe, but God himself. likeness; but man does not rest there as in his last end, but Reply to Objection 3. Created good is not less than reaches out to the universal fount itself of good, which that good of which man is capable, as of something in- is the common object of happiness of all the blessed, as trinsic and inherent to him: but it is less than the good of being the infinite and perfect good. which he is capable, as of an object, and which is infinite. Reply to Objection 2. If a whole be not the last end, And the participated good which is in an angel, and in the but ordained to a further end, then the last end of a part whole universe, is a finite and restricted good. thereof is not the whole itself, but something else. Now 608 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 3 What Is Happiness (In Eight Articles) We have now to consider (1) what happiness is, and (2) what things are required for it. Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether happiness is something uncreated? (2) If it be something created, whether it is an operation? (3) Whether it is an operation of the sensitive, or only of the intellectual part? (4) If it be an operation of the intellectual part, whether it is an operation of the intellect, or of the will? (5) If it be an operation of the intellect, whether it is an operation of the speculative or of the practical intellect? (6) If it be an operation of the speculative intellect, whether it consists in the consideration of speculative sciences? (7) Whether it consists in the consideration of separate substances viz. angels? (8) Whether it consists in the sole contemplation of God seen in His Essence? Whether happiness is something uncreated? Ia IIae q. 3 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that happiness is some- In the first sense, then, man’s last end is the uncreated thing uncreated. For Boethius says (De Consol. iii): “We good, namely, God, Who alone by His infinite goodness must needs confess that God is happiness itself.” can perfectly satisfy man’s will. But in the second way, Objection 2. Further, happiness is the supreme good. man’s last end is something created, existing in him, and But it belongs to God to be the supreme good. Since, then, this is nothing else than the attainment or enjoyment of there are not several supreme goods, it seems that happi- the last end. Now the last end is called happiness. If, ness is the same as God. therefore, we consider man’s happiness in its cause or ob- Objection 3. Further, happiness is the last end, to ject, then it is something uncreated; but if we consider it which man’s will tends naturally. But man’s will should as to the very essence of happiness, then it is something tend to nothing else as an end, but to God, Who alone is to created. be enjoyed, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22). Reply to Objection 1. God is happiness by His Therefore happiness is the same as God. Essence: for He is happy not by acquisition or participa- On the contrary, Nothing made is uncreated. But tion of something else, but by His Essence. On the other man’s happiness is something made; because according hand, men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3): “Those things are to by participation; just as they are called “gods,” by partic- be enjoyed which make us happy.” Therefore happiness is ipation. And this participation of happiness, in respect of not something uncreated. which man is said to be happy, is something created. I answer that, As stated above (q. 1, a. 8; q. 2, a. 7), Reply to Objection 2. Happiness is called man’s our end is twofold. First, there is the thing itself which supreme good, because it is the attainment or enjoyment we desire to attain: thus for the miser, the end is money. of the supreme good. Secondly there is the attainment or possession, the use or Reply to Objection 3. Happiness is said to be the last enjoyment of the thing desired; thus we may say that the end, in the same way as the attainment of the end is called end of the miser is the possession of money; and the end the end. of the intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable. Whether happiness is an operation? Ia IIae q. 3 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that happiness is not an is not an operation. operation. For the Apostle says (Rom. 6:22): “You have Objection 2. Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) your fruit unto sanctification, and the end, life everlast- that happiness is “a state made perfect by the aggregate ing.” But life is not an operation, but the very being of of all good things.” But state does not indicate operation. living things. Therefore the last end, which is happiness, Therefore happiness is not an operation. 609 Objection 3. Further, happiness signifies something by some kind of operation. And so it is that he proves existing in the happy one: since it is man’s final perfec- happiness to be “the perfect good” (Ethic. i, 7). tion. But the meaning of operation does not imply any- Reply to Objection 3. As stated in Metaph. ix, 7 ac- thing existing in the operator, but rather something pro- tion is twofold. One proceeds from the agent into outward ceeding therefrom. Therefore happiness is not an opera- matter, such as “to burn” and “to cut.” And such an op- tion. eration cannot be happiness: for such an operation is an Objection 4. Further, happiness remains in the happy action and a perfection, not of the agent, but rather of the one. Now operation does not remain, but passes. There- patient, as is stated in the same passage. The other is an fore happiness is not an operation. action that remains in the agent, such as to feel, to under- Objection 5. Further, to one man there is one happi- stand, and to will: and such an action is a perfection and ness. But operations are many. Therefore happiness is not an act of the agent. And such an operation can be happi- an operation. ness. Objection 6. Further, happiness is in the happy one Reply to Objection 4. Since happiness signifies some uninterruptedly. But human operation is often interrupted; final perfection; according as various things capable of for instance, by sleep, or some other occupation, or by happiness can attain to various degrees of perfection, so cessation. Therefore happiness is not an operation. must there be various meanings applied to happiness. For On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, in God there is happiness essentially; since His very Being 13) that “happiness is an operation according to perfect is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Him- virtue.” self. In the happy angels, the final perfection is in respect I answer that, In so far as man’s happiness is some- of some operation, by which they are united to the Un- thing created, existing in him, we must needs say that it created Good: and this operation of theirs is one only and is an operation. For happiness is man’s supreme perfec- everlasting. But in men, according to their present state tion. Now each thing is perfect in so far as it is actual; of life, the final perfection is in respect of an operation since potentiality without act is imperfect. Consequently whereby man is united to God: but this operation neither happiness must consist in man’s last act. But it is evi- can be continual, nor, consequently, is it one only, be- dent that operation is the last act of the operator, where- cause operation is multiplied by being discontinued. And fore the Philosopher calls it “second act” (De Anima ii, for this reason in the present state of life, perfect happi- 1): because that which has a form can be potentially op- ness cannot be attained by man. Wherefore the Philoso- erating, just as he who knows is potentially considering. pher, in placing man’s happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10), And hence it is that in other things, too, each one is said says that it is imperfect, and after a long discussion, con- to be “for its operation” (De Coel ii, 3). Therefore man’s cludes: “We call men happy, but only as men.” But God happiness must of necessity consist in an operation. has promised us perfect happiness, when we shall be “as Reply to Objection 1. Life is taken in two senses. the angels. . . in heaven” (Mat. 22:30). First for the very being of the living. And thus happiness Consequently in regard to this perfect happiness, the is not life: since it has been shown (q. 2 , a. 5) that the objection fails: because in that state of happiness, man’s being of a man, no matter in what it may consist, is not mind will be united to God by one, continual, everlast- that man’s happiness; for of God alone is it true that His ing operation. But in the present life, in as far as we fall Being is His Happiness. Secondly, life means the opera- short of the unity and continuity of that operation so do tion of the living, by which operation the principle of life we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a par- is made actual: thus we speak of active and contemplative ticipation of happiness: and so much the greater, as the life, or of a life of pleasure. And in this sense eternal life operation can be more continuous and more one. Conse- is said to be the last end, as is clear from Jn. 17:3: “This is quently the active life, which is busy with many things, eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God.” has less of happiness than the contemplative life, which Reply to Objection 2. Boethius, in defining happi- is busied with one thing, i.e. the contemplation of truth. ness, considered happiness in general: for considered thus And if at any time man is not actually engaged in this op- it is the perfect common good; and he signified this by eration, yet since he can always easily turn to it, and since saying that happiness is “a state made perfect by the ag- he ordains the very cessation, by sleeping or occupying gregate of all good things,” thus implying that the state of himself otherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the latter a happy man consists in possessing the perfect good. But seems, as it were, continuous. From these remarks the Aristotle expressed the very essence of happiness, show- replies to Objections 5 and 6 are evident. ing by what man is established in this state, and that it is 610 Whether happiness is an operation of the sensitive part, or of the intellective part Ia IIae q. 3 a. 3 only? Objection 1. It would seem that happiness consists happiness does not consist in goods of the body, which in an operation of the senses also. For there is no more goods alone, however, we attain through the operation of excellent operation in man than that of the senses, except the senses. the intellective operation. But in us the intellective oper- Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong ation depends on the sensitive: since “we cannot under- to happiness, both antecedently and consequently: an- stand without a phantasm” (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore tecedently, in respect of imperfect happiness, such as can happiness consists in an operation of the senses also. be had in this life, since the operation of the intellect de- Objection 2. Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) mands a previous operation of the sense; consequently, in that happiness is “a state made perfect by the aggregate of that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because all good things.” But some goods are sensible, which we at the resurrection, “from the very happiness of the soul,” attain by the operation of the senses. Therefore it seems as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) “the body and the that the operation of the senses is needed for happiness. bodily senses will receive a certain overflow, so as to be Objection 3. Further, happiness is the perfect good, perfected in their operations”; a point which will be ex- as we find proved in Ethic. i, 7: which would not be plained further on when we treat of the resurrection ( IIa true, were not man perfected thereby in all his parts. But IIae, Qq. 82 -85). But then the operation whereby man’s some parts of the soul are perfected by sensitive opera- mind is united to God will not depend on the senses. tions. Therefore sensitive operation is required for happi- Reply to Objection 1. This objection proves that the ness. operation of the senses is required antecedently for imper- On the contrary, Irrational animals have the sensitive fect happiness, such as can be had in this life. operation in common with us: but they have not happiness Reply to Objection 2. Perfect happiness, such as the in common with us. Therefore happiness does not consist angels have, includes the aggregate of all good things, by in a sensitive operation. being united to the universal source of all good; not that it I answer that, A thing may belong to happiness in requires each individual good. But in this imperfect hap- three ways: (1) essentially, (2) antecedently, (3) conse- piness, we need the aggregate of those goods that suffice quently. Now the operation of sense cannot belong to for the most perfect operation of this life. happiness essentially. For man’s happiness consists essen- Reply to Objection 3. In perfect happiness the entire tially in his being united to the Uncreated Good, Which is man is perfected, in the lower part of his nature, by an his last end, as shown above (a. 1): to Which man can- overflow from the higher. But in the imperfect happiness not be united by an operation of his senses. Again, in of this life, it is otherwise; we advance from the perfection like manner, because, as shown above (q. 2, a. 5), man’s of the lower part to the perfection of the higher part. Whether, if happiness is in the intellective part, it is an operation of the intellect or of Ia IIae q. 3 a. 4 the will? Objection 1. It would seem that happiness consists in it must needs be man’s most excellent operation. But the an act of the will. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, love of God, which is an act of the will, is a more excellent 10,11), that man’s happiness consists in peace; wherefore operation than knowledge, which is an operation of the in- it is written (Ps. 147:3): “Who hath placed peace in thy tellect, as the Apostle declares (1 Cor. 13). Therefore it end [Douay: ‘borders’]”. But peace pertains to the will. seems that happiness consists in an act of the will. Therefore man’s happiness is in the will. Objection 5. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, Objection 2. Further, happiness is the supreme good. 5) that “happy is he who has whatever he desires, and de- But good is the object of the will. Therefore happiness sires nothing amiss.” And a little further on (6) he adds: consists in an operation of the will. “He is most happy who desires well, whatever he desires: Objection 3. Further, the last end corresponds to the for good things make a man happy, and such a man al- first mover: thus the last end of the whole army is victory, ready possesses some good—i.e. a good will.” Therefore which is the end of the general, who moves all the men. happiness consists in an act of the will. But the first mover in regard to operations is the will: be- On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 17:3): “This is cause it moves the other powers, as we shall state further eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God.” on (q. 9, Aa. 1,3). Therefore happiness regards the will. Now eternal life is the last end, as stated above (a. 2, ad Objection 4. Further, if happiness be an operation, 1). Therefore man’s happiness consists in the knowledge 611 of God, which is an act of the intellect. Reply to Objection 1. Peace pertains to man’s last I answer that, As stated above (q. 2, a. 6) two things end, not as though it were the very essence of happiness; are needed for happiness: one, which is the essence of but because it is antecedent and consequent thereto: an- happiness: the other, that is, as it were, its proper accident, tecedent, in so far as all those things are removed which i.e. the delight connected with it. I say, then, that as to the disturb and hinder man in attaining the last end: conse-very essence of happiness, it is impossible for it to consist quent inasmuch as when man has attained his last end, he in an act of the will. For it is evident from what has been remains at peace, his desire being at rest. said (Aa. 1,2; q. 2, a. 7) that happiness is the attainment of Reply to Objection 2. The will’s first object is not its the last end. But the attainment of the end does not consist act: just as neither is the first object of the sight, vision, in the very act of the will. For the will is directed to the but a visible thing. Wherefore, from the very fact that end, both absent, when it desires it; and present, when it happiness belongs to the will, as the will’s first object, it is delighted by resting therein. Now it is evident that the follows that it does not belong to it as its act. desire itself of the end is not the attainment of the end, but Reply to Objection 3. The intellect apprehends the is a movement towards the end: while delight comes to end before the will does: yet motion towards the end be- the will from the end being present; and not conversely, is gins in the will. And therefore to the will belongs that a thing made present, by the fact that the will delights in which last of all follows the attainment of the end, viz. it. Therefore, that the end be present to him who desires delight or enjoyment. it, must be due to something else than an act of the will. Reply to Objection 4. Love ranks above knowledge This is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends. in moving, but knowledge precedes love in attaining: for For if the acquisition of money were through an act of the “naught is loved save what is known,” as Augustine says will, the covetous man would have it from the very mo- (De Trin. x, 1). Consequently we first attain an intelligi- ment that he wished for it. But at the moment it is far ble end by an act of the intellect; just as we first attain a from him; and he attains it, by grasping it in his hand, or sensible end by an act of sense. in some like manner; and then he delights in the money Reply to Objection 5. He who has whatever he de- got. And so it is with an intelligible end. For at first we sires, is happy, because he has what he desires: and this desire to attain an intelligible end; we attain it, through its indeed is by something other than the act of his will. But being made present to us by an act of the intellect; and to desire nothing amiss is needed for happiness, as a nec- then the delighted will rests in the end when attained. essary disposition thereto. And a good will is reckoned So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an among the good things which make a man happy, foras- act of the intellect: but the delight that results from hap- much as it is an inclination of the will: just as a movement piness pertains to the will. In this sense Augustine says is reduced to the genus of its terminus, for instance, “al- (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is “joy in truth,” because, teration” to the genus “quality.” to wit, joy itself is the consummation of happiness. Whether happiness is an operation of the speculative, or of the practical intellect? Ia IIae q. 3 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that happiness is an oper- Objection 3. Further, happiness is a good of man him- ation of the practical intellect. For the end of every crea- self. But the speculative intellect is more concerned with ture consists in becoming like God. But man is like God, things outside man; whereas the practical intellect is con- by his practical intellect, which is the cause of things un- cerned with things belonging to man himself, viz. his op- derstood, rather than by his speculative intellect, which erations and passions. Therefore man’s happiness consists derives its knowledge from things. Therefore man’s hap- in an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the piness consists in an operation of the practical intellect speculative. rather than of the speculative. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that Objection 2. Further, happiness is man’s perfect “contemplation is promised us, as being the goal of all our good. But the practical intellect is ordained to the good actions, and the everlasting perfection of our joys.” rather than the speculative intellect, which is ordained to I answer that, Happiness consists in an operation of the true. Hence we are said to be good, in reference to the the speculative rather than of the practical intellect. This perfection of the practical intellect, but not in reference is evident for three reasons. First because if man’s happi- to the perfection of the speculative intellect, according to ness is an operation, it must needs be man’s highest op- which we are said to be knowing or understanding. There- eration. Now man’s highest operation is that of his high- fore man’s happiness consists in an act of the practical in- est power in respect of its highest object: and his high- tellect rather than of the speculative. est power is the intellect, whose highest object is the Di- 612 vine Good, which is the object, not of the practical but of stated in Ethic. x, 7,8. the speculative intellect. Consequently happiness consists Reply to Objection 1. The asserted likeness of the principally in such an operation, viz. in the contemplation practical intellect to God is one of proportion; that is to of Divine things. And since that “seems to be each man’s say, by reason of its standing in relation to what it knows, self, which is best in him,” according to Ethic. ix, 8, and as God does to what He knows. But the likeness of the x, 7, therefore such an operation is most proper to man speculative intellect to God is one of union and “informa- and most delightful to him. tion”; which is a much greater likeness. And yet it may Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contempla- be answered that, in regard to the principal thing known, tion is sought principally for its own sake. But the act of which is His Essence, God has not practical but merely the practical intellect is not sought for its own sake but for speculative knowledge. the sake of action: and these very actions are ordained to Reply to Objection 2. The practical intellect is or- some end. Consequently it is evident that the last end can- dained to good which is outside of it: but the specula- not consist in the active life, which pertains to the practical tive intellect has good within it, viz. the contemplation of intellect. truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole man is per- Thirdly, it is again evident, from the fact that in the fected and made good thereby: such a good the practical contemplative life man has something in common with intellect has not; but it directs man thereto. things above him, viz. with God and the angels, to whom Reply to Objection 3. This argument would hold, if he is made like by happiness. But in things pertaining to man himself were his own last end; for then the consid- the active life, other animals also have something in com- eration and direction of his actions and passions would mon with man, although imperfectly. be his happiness. But since man’s last end is something Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we outside of him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by await in the life to come, consists entirely in contempla- an operation of the speculative intellect; therefore, man’s tion. But imperfect happiness, such as can be had here, happiness consists in an operation of the speculative intel- consists first and principally, in an operation of the prac- lect rather than of the practical intellect. tical intellect directing human actions and passions, as Whether happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences? Ia IIae q. 3 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that man’s happiness con- happiness does not consist in the consideration of these. sists in the consideration of speculative sciences. For I answer that, As stated above (a. 2, ad 4), man’s hap- the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that “happiness is piness is twofold, one perfect, the other imperfect. And by an operation according to perfect virtue.” And in distin- perfect happiness we are to understand that which attains guishing the virtues, he gives no more than three specu- to the true notion of happiness; and by imperfect happi- lative virtues—“knowledge,” “wisdom” and “understand- ness that which does not attain thereto, but partakes of ing,” which all belong to the consideration of speculative some particular likeness of happiness. Thus perfect pru- sciences. Therefore man’s final happiness consists in the dence is in man, with whom is the idea of things to be consideration of speculative sciences. done; while imperfect prudence is in certain irrational an- Objection 2. Further, that which all desire for its own imals, who are possessed of certain particular instincts in sake, seems to be man’s final happiness. Now such is the respect of works similar to works of prudence. consideration of speculative sciences; because, as stated Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essen- in Metaph. i, 1, “all men naturally desire to know”; and, a tially in the consideration of speculative sciences. To little farther on (2), it is stated that speculative sciences are prove this, we must observe that the consideration of a sought for their own sakes. Therefore happiness consists speculative science does not extend beyond the scope of in the consideration of speculative sciences. the principles of that science: since the entire science is Objection 3. Further, happiness is man’s final per- virtually contained in its principles. Now the first prin- fection. Now everything is perfected, according as it is ciples of speculative sciences are received through the reduced from potentiality to act. But the human intel- senses, as the Philosopher clearly states at the beginning lect is reduced to act by the consideration of speculative of the Metaphysics (i, 1), and at the end of the Poste- sciences. Therefore it seems that in the consideration of rior Analytics (ii, 15). Wherefore the entire consider- these sciences, man’s final happiness consists. ation of speculative sciences cannot extend farther than On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 9:23): “Let not knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man’s final hap- the wise man glory in his wisdom”: and this is said in piness, which is his final perfection cannot consist in the reference to speculative sciences. Therefore man’s final knowledge of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected by 613 something lower, except in so far as the lower partakes ation of speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible of something higher. Now it is evident that the form of a forms there is a participation of the higher substances, so stone or of any sensible, is lower than man. Consequently the consideration of speculative sciences is a certain par- the intellect is not perfected by the form of a stone, as ticipation of true and perfect happiness. such, but inasmuch as it partakes of a certain likeness to Reply to Objection 1. In his book on Ethics the that which is above the human intellect, viz. the intelli- Philosopher treats of imperfect happiness, such as can be gible light, or something of the kind. Now whatever is had in this life, as stated above (a. 2, ad 4). by something else is reduced to that which is of itself. Reply to Objection 2. Not only is perfect happiness Therefore man’s final perfection must needs be through naturally desired, but also any likeness or participation knowledge of something above the human intellect. But it thereof. has been shown ( Ia, q. 88, a. 2), that man cannot acquire Reply to Objection 3. Our intellect is reduced to act, through sensibles, the knowledge of separate substances, in a fashion, by the consideration of speculative sciences, which are above the human intellect. Consequently it fol- but not to its final and perfect act. lows that man’s happiness cannot consist in the consider- Whether happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels? Ia IIae q. 3 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that man’s happiness con- its final perfection. Since, therefore, the order of things sists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, an- is the same in being and in truth (Metaph ii, 1); whatever gels. For Gregory says in a homily (xxvi in Evang.): “It are beings by participation, are true by participation. Now avails nothing to take part in the feasts of men, if we fail to angels have being by participation: because in God alone take part in the feasts of angels”; by which he means final is His Being His Essence, as shown in the Ia, q. 44, a. 1. It happiness. But we can take part in the feasts of the angels follows that contemplation of Him makes man perfectly by contemplating them. Therefore it seems that man’s fi- happy. However, there is no reason why we should not nal happiness consists in contemplating the angels. admit a certain imperfect happiness in the contemplation Objection 2. Further, the final perfection of each thing of the angels; and higher indeed than in the consideration is for it to be united to its principle: wherefore a circle is of speculative science. said to be a perfect figure, because its beginning and end Reply to Objection 1. We shall take part in the feasts coincide. But the beginning of human knowledge is from of the angels, by contemplating not only the angels, but, the angels, by whom men are enlightened, as Dionysius together with them, also God Himself. says (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the perfection of the hu- Reply to Objection 2. According to those that hold man intellect consists in contemplating the angels. human souls to be created by the angels, it seems fitting Objection 3. Further, each nature is perfect, when enough, that man’s happiness should consist in the con- united to a higher nature; just as the final perfection of templation of the angels, in the union, as it were, of man a body is to be united to the spiritual nature. But above with his beginning. But this is erroneous, as stated in Ia, the human intellect, in the natural order, are the angels. q. 90, a. 3. Wherefore the final perfection of the human Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect is to intellect is by union with God, Who is the first principle be united to the angels by contemplation. both of the creation of the soul and of its enlightenment. On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 9:24): “Let him Whereas the angel enlightens as a minister, as stated in the that glorieth, glory in this, that he understandeth and Ia, q. 111, a. 2, ad 2. Consequently, by his ministration he knoweth Me.” Therefore man’s final glory or happiness helps man to attain to happiness; but he is not the object consists only in the knowledge of God. of man’s happiness. I answer that, As stated above (a. 6), man’s perfect Reply to Objection 3. The lower nature may reach happiness consists not in that which perfects the intel- the higher in two ways. First, according to a degree of lect by some participation, but in that which is so by its the participating power: and thus man’s final perfection essence. Now it is evident that whatever is the perfection will consist in his attaining to a contemplation such as of a power is so in so far as the proper formal object of that that of the angels. Secondly, as the object is attained by power belongs to it. Now the proper object of the intel- the power: and thus the final perfection of each power is lect is the true. Therefore the contemplation of whatever to attain that in which is found the fulness of its formal has participated truth, does not perfect the intellect with object. 614 Whether man’s happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence? Ia IIae q. 3 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that man’s happiness does urally remains in the man the desire to know about the not consist in the vision of the Divine Essence. For Diony- cause, “what it is.” And this desire is one of wonder, and sius says (Myst. Theol. i) that by that which is highest in causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning of the Meta- his intellect, man is united to God as to something alto- physics (i, 2). For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse gether unknown. But that which is seen in its essence is of the sun, consider that it must be due to some cause, not altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of and know not what that cause is, he wonders about it, and the intellect, namely, happiness, does not consist in God from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry being seen in His Essence. cease until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the Objection 2. Further, the higher the perfection be- cause. longs to the higher nature. But to see His own Essence If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence is the perfection proper to the Divine intellect. Therefore of some created effect, knows no more of God than “that the final perfection of the human intellect does not reach He is”; the perfection of that intellect does not yet reach to this, but consists in something less. simply the First Cause, but there remains in it the natural On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 3:2): “When He desire to seek the cause. Wherefore it is not yet perfectly shall appear, we shall be like to Him; and [Vulg.: ‘be- happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect cause’] we shall see Him as He is.” needs to reach the very Essence of the First Cause. And I answer that, Final and perfect happiness can consist thus it will have its perfection through union with God as in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence. To with that object, in which alone man’s happiness consists, make this clear, two points must be observed. First, that as stated above (Aa. 1,7; q. 2, a. 8). man is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains Reply to Objection 1. Dionysius speaks of the knowl- for him to desire and seek: secondly, that the perfection edge of wayfarers journeying towards happiness. of any power is determined by the nature of its object. Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 1, a. 8), Now the object of the intellect is “what a thing is,” i.e. the the end has a twofold acceptation. First, as to the thing essence of a thing, according to De Anima iii, 6. Where- itself which is desired: and in this way, the same thing fore the intellect attains perfection, in so far as it knows is the end of the higher and of the lower nature, and in- the essence of a thing. If therefore an intellect knows the deed of all things, as stated above (q. 1, a. 8). Secondly, essence of some effect, whereby it is not possible to know as to the attainment of this thing; and thus the end of the the essence of the cause, i.e. to know of the cause “what higher nature is different from that of the lower, accord- it is”; that intellect cannot be said to reach that cause sim- ing to their respective habitudes to that thing. So then in ply, although it may be able to gather from the effect the the happiness of God, Who, in understanding his Essence, knowledge of that the cause is. Consequently, when man comprehends It, is higher than that of a man or angel who knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there nat- sees It indeed, but comprehends It not. 615 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 4 Of Those Things That Are Required for Happiness (In Eight Articles) We have now to consider those things that are required for happiness: and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether delight is required for happiness? (2) Which is of greater account in happiness, delight or vision? (3) Whether comprehension is required? (4) Whether rectitude of the will is required? (5) Whether the body is necessary for man’s happiness? (6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary? (7) Whether any external goods are necessary? (8) Whether the fellowship of friends is necessary? Whether delight is required for happiness? Ia IIae q. 4 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that delight is not required for fire. And in this way delight is necessary for happi- for happiness. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that “vi- ness. For it is caused by the appetite being at rest in the sion is the entire reward of faith.” But the prize or reward good attained. Wherefore, since happiness is nothing else of virtue is happiness, as the Philosopher clearly states but the attainment of the Sovereign Good, it cannot be (Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing besides vision is required without concomitant delight. for happiness. Reply to Objection 1. From the very fact that a re- Objection 2. Further, happiness is “the most self- ward is given to anyone, the will of him who deserves it is sufficient of all goods,” as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. at rest, and in this consists delight. Consequently, delight i, 7). But that which needs something else is not self- is included in the very notion of reward. sufficient. Since then the essence of happiness consists Reply to Objection 2. The very sight of God causes in seeing God, as stated above (q. 3, a. 8); it seems that delight. Consequently, he who sees God cannot need de- delight is not necessary for happiness. light. Objection 3. Further, the “operation of bliss or hap- Reply to Objection 3. Delight that is attendant upon piness should be unhindered” (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight the operation of the intellect does not hinder it, rather does hinders the operation of the intellect: since it destroys the it perfect it, as stated in Ethic. x, 4: since what we do with estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore delight is delight, we do with greater care and perseverance. On the not necessary for happiness. other hand, delight which is extraneous to the operation is On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that a hindrance thereto: sometimes by distracting the atten- happiness is “joy in truth.” tion because, as already observed, we are more attentive I answer that, One thing may be necessary for an- to those things that delight us; and when we are very at- other in four ways. First, as a preamble and preparation to tentive to one thing, we must needs be less attentive to it: thus instruction is necessary for science. Secondly, as another: sometimes on account of opposition; thus a sen- perfecting it: thus the soul is necessary for the life of the sual delight that is contrary to reason, hinders the estimate body. Thirdly, as helping it from without: thus friends are of prudence more than it hinders the estimate of the spec- necessary for some undertaking. Fourthly, as something ulative intellect. attendant on it: thus we might say that heat is necessary Whether in happiness vision ranks before delight? Ia IIae q. 4 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that in happiness, delight Objection 2. Further, that by reason of which a thing ranks before vision. For “delight is the perfection of oper- is desirable, is yet more desirable. But operations are de- ation” (Ethic. x, 4). But perfection ranks before the thing sired on account of the delight they afford: hence, too, perfected. Therefore delight ranks before the operation of nature has adjusted delight to those operations which are the intellect, i.e. vision. necessary for the preservation of the individual and of 616 the species, lest animals should disregard such operations. reposes ranks before the resting of the will therein. Therefore, in happiness, delight ranks before the opera- Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. tion of the intellect, which is vision. x, 4) “delight perfects operation as vigor perfects youth,” Objection 3. Further, vision corresponds to faith; because it is a result of youth. Consequently delight is while delight or enjoyment corresponds to charity. But a perfection attendant upon vision; but not a perfection charity ranks before faith, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. whereby vision is made perfect in its own species. 13:13). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks before vi- Reply to Objection 2. The apprehension of the senses sion. does not attain to the universal good, but to some particu- On the contrary, The cause is greater than its effect. lar good which is delightful. And consequently, according But vision is the cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks to the sensitive appetite which is in animals, operations before delight. are sought for the sake of delight. But the intellect appre- I answer that, The Philosopher discusses this ques- hends the universal good, the attainment of which results tion (Ethic. x, 4), and leaves it unsolved. But if one in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed to good rather consider the matter carefully, the operation of the intel- than to delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which lect which is vision, must needs rank before delight. For is the Author of nature, adjusted delights to operations on delight consists in a certain repose of the will. Now that account of the operations. And we should form our es- the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of timate of things not simply according to the order of the the goodness of that thing in which it reposes. If therefore sensitive appetite, but rather according to the order of the the will reposes in an operation, the will’s repose is caused intellectual appetite. by the goodness of the operation. Nor does the will seek Reply to Objection 3. Charity does not seem the good for the sake of repose; for thus the very act of the beloved good for the sake of delight: it is for charity a will would be the end, which has been disproved above consequence that it delights in the good gained which it (q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; q. 3, a. 4): but it seeks to be at rest in loves. Thus delight does not answer to charity as its end, the operation, because that operation is its good. Conse- but vision does, whereby the end is first made present to quently it is evident that the operation in which the will charity. Whether comprehension is necessary for happiness? Ia IIae q. 4 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that comprehension is not the last end, those things that are required for Happiness necessary for happiness. For Augustine says (Ad Pauli- must be gathered from the way in which man is ordered to nam de Videndo Deum;∗): “To reach God with the mind an end. Now man is ordered to an intelligible end partly is happiness, to comprehend Him is impossible.” There- through his intellect, and partly through his will: through fore happiness is without comprehension. his intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of Objection 2. Further, happiness is the perfection of the end pre-exists in the intellect: through the will, first man as to his intellective part, wherein there are no other by love which is the will’s first movement towards any- powers than the intellect and will, as stated in the Ia, thing; secondly, by a real relation of the lover to the thing Qq. 79 and following. But the intellect is sufficiently beloved, which relation may be threefold. For sometimes perfected by seeing God, and the will by enjoying Him. the thing beloved is present to the lover: and then it is no Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third. longer sought for. Sometimes it is not present, and it is Objection 3. Further, happiness consists in an opera- impossible to attain it: and then, too, it is not sought for. tion. But operations are determined by their objects: and But sometimes it is possible to attain it, yet it is raised there are two universal objects, the true and the good: of above the capability of the attainer, so that he cannot have which the true corresponds to vision, and good to delight. it forthwith; and this is the relation of one that hopes, to Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third. that which he hopes for, and this relation alone causes a On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:24): “So search for the end. To these three, there are a correspond- run that you may comprehend [Douay: ‘obtain’].” But ing three in Happiness itself. For perfect knowledge of happiness is the goal of the spiritual race: hence he says the end corresponds to imperfect knowledge; presence of (2 Tim. 4:7,8): “I have fought a good fight, I have finished the end corresponds to the relation of hope; but delight in my course, I have kept the faith; as to the rest there is laid the end now present results from love, as already stated up for me a crown of justice.” Therefore comprehension (a. 2, ad 3). And therefore these three must concur with is necessary for Happiness. Happiness; to wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of I answer that, Since Happiness consists in gaining the intelligible end; comprehension, which implies pres- ∗ Cf. Serm. xxxciii De Verb. Dom. 617 ence of the end; and delight or enjoyment, which implies Reply to Objection 2. Just as hope and love pertain to repose of the lover in the object beloved. the will, because it is the same one that loves a thing, and Reply to Objection 1. Comprehension is twofold. that tends towards it while not possessed, so, too, compre- First, inclusion of the comprehended in the comprehen- hension and delight belong to the will, since it is the same sor; and thus whatever is comprehended by the finite, is that possesses a thing and reposes therein. itself finite. Wherefore God cannot be thus comprehended Reply to Objection 3. Comprehension is not a dis- by a created intellect. Secondly, comprehension means tinct operation from vision; but a certain relation to the nothing but the holding of something already present and end already gained. Wherefore even vision itself, or the possessed: thus one who runs after another is said to com- thing seen, inasmuch as it is present, is the object of com- prehend∗ him when he lays hold on him. And in this sense prehension. comprehension is necessary for Happiness. Whether rectitude of the will is necessary for happiness? Ia IIae q. 4 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that rectitude of the will duly ordered to the last end. Now the end in comparison to is not necessary for Happiness. For Happiness consists what is ordained to the end is as form compared to matter. essentially in an operation of the intellect, as stated above Wherefore, just as matter cannot receive a form, unless it (q. 3, a. 4). But rectitude of the will, by reason of which be duly disposed thereto, so nothing gains an end, except men are said to be clean of heart, is not necessary for the it be duly ordained thereto. And therefore none can obtain perfect operation of the intellect: for Augustine says (Re- Happiness, without rectitude of the will. Concomitantly, tract. i, 4) “I do not approve of what I said in a prayer: O because as stated above (q. 3, a. 8), final Happiness con- God, Who didst will none but the clean of heart to know sists in the vision of the Divine Essence, Which is the very the truth. For it can be answered that many who are not essence of goodness. So that the will of him who sees the clean of heart, know many truths.” Therefore rectitude of Essence of God, of necessity, loves, whatever he loves, the will is not necessary for Happiness. in subordination to God; just as the will of him who sees Objection 2. Further, what precedes does not depend not God’s Essence, of necessity, loves whatever he loves, on what follows. But the operation of the intellect pre- under the common notion of good which he knows. And cedes the operation of the will. Therefore Happiness, this is precisely what makes the will right. Wherefore it is which is the perfect operation of the intellect, does not evident that Happiness cannot be without a right will. depend on rectitude of the will. Reply to Objection 2. Every act of the will is pre- Objection 3. Further, that which is ordained to an- ceded by an act of the intellect: but a certain act of the other as its end, is not necessary, when the end is already will precedes a certain act of the intellect. For the will gained; as a ship, for instance, after arrival in port. But tends to the final act of the intellect which is happiness. rectitude of will, which is by reason of virtue, is ordained And consequently right inclination of the will is required to Happiness as to its end. Therefore, Happiness once ob- antecedently for happiness, just as the arrow must take a tained, rectitude of the will is no longer necessary. right course in order to strike the target. On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:8): “Blessed Reply to Objection 3. Not everything that is or- are the clean of heart; for they shall see God”: and (Heb. dained to the end, ceases with the getting of the end: but 12:14): “Follow peace with all men, and holiness; without only that which involves imperfection, such as movement. which no man shall see God.” Hence the instruments of movement are no longer neces- I answer that, Rectitude of will is necessary for sary when the end has been gained: but the due order to Happiness both antecedently and concomitantly. An- the end is necessary. tecedently, because rectitude of the will consists in being Whether the body is necessary for man’s happiness? Ia IIae q. 4 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the body is necessary separated from its whole. Therefore the soul cannot be for Happiness. For the perfection of virtue and grace pre- happy without the body. supposes the perfection of nature. But Happiness is the Objection 2. Further, Happiness is a perfect opera- perfection of virtue and grace. Now the soul, without the tion, as stated above (q. 3, Aa. 2,5). But perfect operation body, has not the perfection of nature; since it is naturally follows perfect being: since nothing operates except in a part of human nature, and every part is imperfect while so far as it is an actual being. Since, therefore, the soul ∗ In English we should say ‘catch.’ 618 has not perfect being, while it is separated from the body, souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, “walk by just as neither has a part, while separate from its whole; it sight,” seeing the Essence of God, wherein is true Happi- seems that the soul cannot be happy without the body. ness. Objection 3. Further, Happiness is the perfection of Again this is made clear by reason. For the intellect man. But the soul, without the body, is not man. There- needs not the body, for its operation, save on account of fore Happiness cannot be in the soul separated from the the phantasms, wherein it looks on the intelligible truth, body. as stated in the Ia, q. 84, a. 7. Now it is evident that the Objection 4. Further, according to the Philosopher Divine Essence cannot be seen by means of phantasms, as (Ethic. vii, 13) “the operation of bliss,” in which operation stated in the Ia, q. 12, a. 3. Wherefore, since man’s perfect happiness consists, is “not hindered.” But the operation of Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, it the separate soul is hindered; because, as Augustine says does not depend on the body. Consequently, without the (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), the soul “has a natural desire to body the soul can be happy. rule the body, the result of which is that it is held back, We must, however, notice that something may belong so to speak, from tending with all its might to the heav- to a thing’s perfection in two ways. First, as constitut- enward journey,” i.e. to the vision of the Divine Essence. ing the essence thereof; thus the soul is necessary for Therefore the soul cannot be happy without the body. man’s perfection. Secondly, as necessary for its well- Objection 5. Further, Happiness is the sufficient good being: thus, beauty of body and keenness of perfection and lulls desire. But this cannot be said of the separated belong to man’s perfection. Wherefore though the body soul; for it yet desires to be united to the body, as Augus- does not belong in the first way to the perfection of human tine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore the soul is not Happiness, yet it does in the second way. For since oper- happy while separated from the body. ation depends on a thing’s nature, the more perfect is the Objection 6. Further, in Happiness man is equal to the soul in its nature, the more perfectly it has its proper oper- angels. But the soul without the body is not equal to the ation, wherein its happiness consists. Hence, Augustine, angels, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore after inquiring (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) “whether that perfect it is not happy. Happiness can be ascribed to the souls of the dead sep- On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 14:13): “Happy arated from their bodies,” answers “that they cannot see [Douay: ‘blessed’] are the dead who die in the Lord.” the Unchangeable Substance, as the blessed angels see It; I answer that, Happiness is twofold; the one is imper- either for some other more hidden reason, or because they fect and is had in this life; the other is perfect, consisting have a natural desire to rule the body.” in the vision of God. Now it is evident that the body is Reply to Objection 1. Happiness is the perfection of necessary for the happiness of this life. For the happi- the soul on the part of the intellect, in respect of which the ness of this life consists in an operation of the intellect, soul transcends the organs of the body; but not accord- either speculative or practical. And the operation of the ing as the soul is the natural form of the body. Wherefore intellect in this life cannot be without a phantasm, which the soul retains that natural perfection in respect of which is only in a bodily organ, as was shown in the Ia, q. 84, happiness is due to it, though it does not retain that natural Aa. 6,7. Consequently that happiness which can be had perfection in respect of which it is the form of the body. in this life, depends, in a way, on the body. But as to Reply to Objection 2. The relation of the soul to be- perfect Happiness, which consists in the vision of God, ing is not the same as that of other parts: for the being some have maintained that it is not possible to the soul of the whole is not that of any individual part: wherefore, separated from the body; and have said that the souls of either the part ceases altogether to be, when the whole is saints, when separated from their bodies, do not attain to destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when the animal that Happiness until the Day of Judgment, when they will is destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual receive their bodies back again. And this is shown to be being, just as a part of a line has another being from that false, both by authority and by reason. By authority, since of the whole line. But the human soul retains the being of the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6): “While we are in the body, the composite after the destruction of the body: and this we are absent from the Lord”; and he points out the reason because the being of the form is the same as that of its of this absence, saying: “For we walk by faith and not by matter, and this is the being of the composite. Now the sight.” Now from this it is clear that so long as we walk soul subsists in its own being, as stated in the Ia, q. 75, by faith and not by sight, bereft of the vision of the Divine a. 2. It follows, therefore, that after being separated from Essence, we are not present to the Lord. But the souls of the body it has perfect being and that consequently it can the saints, separated from their bodies, are in God’s pres- have a perfect operation; although it has not the perfect ence; wherefore the text continues: “But we are confident specific nature. and have a good will to be absent. . . from the body, and to Reply to Objection 3. Happiness belongs to man in be present with the Lord.” Whence it is evident that the respect of his intellect: and, therefore, since the intel- 619 lect remains, it can have Happiness. Thus the teeth of way, that it would still wish the body to attain to its share. an Ethiopian, in respect of which he is said to be white, Reply to Objection 5. The desire of the separated can retain their whiteness, even after extraction. soul is entirely at rest, as regards the thing desired; since, Reply to Objection 4. One thing is hindered by an- to wit, it has that which suffices its appetite. But it is not other in two ways. First, by way of opposition; thus cold wholly at rest, as regards the desirer, since it does not pos- hinders the action of heat: and such a hindrance to opera- sess that good in every way that it would wish to possess tion is repugnant to Happiness. Secondly, by way of some it. Consequently, after the body has been resumed, Hap- kind of defect, because, to wit, that which is hindered piness increases not in intensity, but in extent. has not all that is necessary to make it perfect in every Reply to Objection 6. The statement made (Gen. ad way: and such a hindrance to operation is not incompati- lit. xii, 35) to the effect that “the souls of the departed see ble with Happiness, but prevents it from being perfect in not God as the angels do,” is not to be understood as re- every way. And thus it is that separation from the body is ferring to inequality of quantity; because even now some said to hold the soul back from tending with all its might souls of the Blessed are raised to the higher orders of the to the vision of the Divine Essence. For the soul desires angels, thus seeing God more clearly than the lower an- to enjoy God in such a way that the enjoyment also may gels. But it refers to inequality of proportion: because the overflow into the body, as far as possible. And therefore, angels, even the lowest, have every perfection of Happi- as long as it enjoys God, without the fellowship of the ness that they ever will have, whereas the separated souls body, its appetite is at rest in that which it has, in such a of the saints have not. Whether perfection of the body is necessary for happiness? Ia IIae q. 4 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that perfection of the But speaking of perfect Happiness, some have main- body is not necessary for man’s perfect Happiness. For tained that no disposition of body is necessary for Happi- perfection of the body is a bodily good. But it has been ness; indeed, that it is necessary for the soul to be entirely shown above (q. 2) that Happiness does not consist in bod- separated from the body. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei ily goods. Therefore no perfect disposition of the body is xxii, 26) quotes the words of Porphyry who said that “for necessary for man’s Happiness. the soul to be happy, it must be severed from everything Objection 2. Further, man’s Happiness consists in the corporeal.” But this is unreasonable. For since it is natural vision of the Divine Essence, as shown above (q. 3, a. 8). to the soul to be united to the body; it is not possible for But the body has not part in this operation, as shown above the perfection of the soul to exclude its natural perfection. (a. 5). Therefore no disposition of the body is necessary Consequently, we must say that perfect disposition for Happiness. of the body is necessary, both antecedently and conse- Objection 3. Further, the more the intellect is ab- quently, for that Happiness which is in all ways perfect. stracted from the body, the more perfectly it understands. Antecedently, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. But Happiness consists in the most perfect operation of xii, 35), “if body be such, that the governance thereof is the intellect. Therefore the soul should be abstracted from difficult and burdensome, like unto flesh which is corrupt- the body in every way. Therefore, in no way is a disposi- ible and weighs upon the soul, the mind is turned away tion of the body necessary for Happiness. from that vision of the highest heaven.” Whence he con- On the contrary, Happiness is the reward of virtue; cludes that, “when this body will no longer be ‘natural,’ wherefore it is written (Jn. 13:17): “You shall be blessed, but ‘spiritual,’ then will it be equalled to the angels, and if you do them.” But the reward promised to the saints is that will be its glory, which erstwhile was its burden.” not only that they shall see and enjoy God, but also that Consequently, because from the Happiness of the soul their bodies shall be well-disposed; for it is written (Is. there will be an overflow on to the body, so that this too 66:14): “You shall see and your heart shall rejoice, and will obtain its perfection. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad your bones shall flourish like a herb.” Therefore good dis- Dioscor.) that “God gave the soul such a powerful nature position of the body is necessary for Happiness. that from its exceeding fulness of happiness the vigor of I answer that, If we speak of that happiness which incorruption overflows into the lower nature.” man can acquire in this life, it is evident that a well- Reply to Objection 1. Happiness does not consist in disposed body is of necessity required for it. For this bodily good as its object: but bodily good can add a cer- happiness consists, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. tain charm and perfection to Happiness. i, 13) in “an operation according to perfect virtue”; and it Reply to Objection 2. Although the body has not part is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition of the in that operation of the intellect whereby the Essence of body, from every operation of virtue. God is seen, yet it might prove a hindrance thereto. Con- 620 sequently, perfection of the body is necessary, lest it hin-this corruptible body which weighs upon the soul; but not der the mind from being lifted up. from the spiritual body, which will be wholly subject to Reply to Objection 3. The perfect operation of the in- the spirit. On this point we shall treat in the Third Part of tellect requires indeed that the intellect be abstracted from this work ( IIa IIae, q. 82, seqq.). Whether any external goods are necessary for happiness? Ia IIae q. 4 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that external goods also God. The reason of this is that all suchlike external goods are necessary for Happiness. For that which is promised are requisite either for the support of the animal body; or the saints for reward, belongs to Happiness. But exter- for certain operations which belong to human life, which nal goods are promised the saints; for instance, food and we perform by means of the animal body: whereas that drink, wealth and a kingdom: for it is said (Lk. 22:30): perfect Happiness which consists in seeing God, will be “That you may eat and drink at My table in My king- either in the soul separated from the body, or in the soul dom”: and (Mat. 6:20): “Lay up to yourselves treasures in united to the body then no longer animal but spiritual. heaven”: and (Mat. 25:34): “Come, ye blessed of My Fa- Consequently these external goods are nowise necessary ther, possess you the kingdom.” Therefore external goods for that Happiness, since they are ordained to the animal are necessary for Happiness. life. And since, in this life, the felicity of contemplation, Objection 2. Further, according to Boethius (De Con- as being more Godlike, approaches nearer than that of ac- sol. iii): happiness is “a state made perfect by the aggre- tion to the likeness of that perfect Happiness, therefore it gate of all good things.” But some of man’s goods are stands in less need of these goods of the body as stated in external, although they be of least account, as Augustine Ethic. x, 8. says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore they too are neces- Reply to Objection 1. All those material promises sary for Happiness. contained in Holy Scripture, are to be understood Objection 3. Further, Our Lord said (Mat. 5:12): metaphorically, inasmuch as Scripture is wont to express “Your reward is very great in heaven.” But to be in heaven spiritual things under the form of things corporeal, in or- implies being in a place. Therefore at least external place der “that from things we know, we may rise to the de- is necessary for Happiness. sire of things unknown,” as Gregory says (Hom. xi in On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 72:25): “For what Evang.). Thus food and drink signify the delight of Hap- have I in heaven? and besides Thee what do I desire upon piness; wealth, the sufficiency of God for man; the king- earth?” As though to say: “I desire nothing but this,”—“It dom, the lifting up of man to union of God. is good for me to adhere to my God.” Therefore nothing Reply to Objection 2. These goods that serve for further external is necessary for Happiness. the animal life, are incompatible with that spiritual life I answer that, For imperfect happiness, such as can wherein perfect Happiness consists. Nevertheless in that be had in this life, external goods are necessary, not as be- Happiness there will be the aggregate of all good things, longing to the essence of happiness, but by serving as in- because whatever good there be in these things, we shall struments to happiness, which consists in an operation of possess it all in the Supreme Fount of goodness. virtue, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. For man needs in this life, Reply to Objection 3. According to Augustine (De the necessaries of the body, both for the operation of con- Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 5), it is not material heaven that is templative virtue, and for the operation of active virtue, described as the reward of the saints, but a heaven raised for which latter he needs also many other things by means on the height of spiritual goods. Nevertheless a bodily of which to perform its operations. place, viz. the empyrean heaven, will be appointed to the On the other hand, such goods as these are nowise Blessed, not as a need of Happiness, but by reason of a necessary for perfect Happiness, which consists in seeing certain fitness and adornment. Whether the fellowship of friend is necessary for happiness? Ia IIae q. 4 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that friends are neces- for Happiness. sary for Happiness. For future Happiness is frequently Objection 2. Further, Boethius∗ says that “there is no designated by Scripture under the name of “glory.” But delight in possessing any good whatever, without some- glory consists in man’s good being brought to the notice one to share it with us.” But delight is necessary for Hap- of many. Therefore the fellowship of friends is necessary piness. Therefore fellowship of friends is also necessary. ∗ Seneca, Ep. 6 621 Objection 3. Further, charity is perfected in Happi-his perfection in God. But the fellowship of friends con- ness. But charity includes the love of God and of our duces to the well-being of Happiness. Hence Augustine neighbor. Therefore it seems that fellowship of friends says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 25) that “the spiritual creatures re- is necessary for Happiness. ceive no other interior aid to happiness than the eternity, On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 7:11): “All good truth, and charity of the Creator. But if they can be said to things came to me together with her,” i.e. with divine wis- be helped from without, perhaps it is only by this that they dom, which consists in contemplating God. Consequently see one another and rejoice in God, at their fellowship.” nothing else is necessary for Happiness. Reply to Objection 1. That glory which is essential to I answer that, If we speak of the happiness of this Happiness, is that which man has, not with man but with life, the happy man needs friends, as the Philosopher says God. (Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed, to make use of them, since he Reply to Objection 2. This saying is to be understood suffices himself; nor to delight in them, since he possesses of the possession of good that does not fully satisfy. This perfect delight in the operation of virtue; but for the pur- does not apply to the question under consideration; be- pose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to cause man possesses in God a sufficiency of every good. them; that he may delight in seeing them do good; and Reply to Objection 3. Perfection of charity is essen- again that he may be helped by them in his good work. tial to Happiness, as to the love of God, but not as to the For in order that man may do well, whether in the works love of our neighbor. Wherefore if there were but one soul of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he enjoying God, it would be happy, though having no neigh- needs the fellowship of friends. bor to love. But supposing one neighbor to be there, love But if we speak of perfect Happiness which will be in of him results from perfect love of God. Consequently, our heavenly Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not friendship is, as it were, concomitant with perfect Happi- essential to Happiness; since man has the entire fulness of ness. 622 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 5 Of the Attainment of Happiness (In Eight Articles) We must now consider the attainment of Happiness. Under this heading there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether man can attain Happiness? (2) Whether one man can be happier than another? (3) Whether any man can be happy in this life? (4) Whether Happiness once had can be lost? (5) Whether man can attain Happiness by means of his natural powers? (6) Whether man attains Happiness through the action of some higher creature? (7) Whether any actions of man are necessary in order that man may obtain Happiness of God? (8) Whether every man desires Happiness? Whether man can attain happiness? Ia IIae q. 5 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that man cannot attain Happiness consists. happiness. For just as the rational is above the sensible Reply to Objection 1. The rational exceeds the sen- nature, so the intellectual is above the rational, as Diony- sitive nature, otherwise than the intellectual surpasses the sius declares (Div. Nom. iv, vi, vii) in several passages. rational. For the rational exceeds the sensitive nature in re- But irrational animals that have the sensitive nature only, spect of the object of its knowledge: since the senses have cannot attain the end of the rational nature. Therefore nei- no knowledge whatever of the universal, whereas the rea- ther can man, who is of rational nature, attain the end of son has knowledge thereof. But the intellectual surpasses the intellectual nature, which is Happiness. the rational nature, as to the mode of knowing the same in- Objection 2. Further, True Happiness consists in see- telligible truth: for the intellectual nature grasps forthwith ing God, Who is pure Truth. But from his very nature, the truth which the rational nature reaches by the inquiry man considers truth in material things: wherefore “he un- of reason, as was made clear in the Ia, q. 58, a. 3; Ia, q. 79, derstands the intelligible species in the phantasm” (De a. 8. Therefore reason arrives by a kind of movement at Anima iii, 7). Therefore he cannot attain Happiness. that which the intellect grasps. Consequently the ratio- Objection 3. Further, Happiness consists in attain- nal nature can attain Happiness, which is the perfection of ing the Sovereign Good. But we cannot arrive at the top the intellectual nature: but otherwise than the angels. Be- without surmounting the middle. Since, therefore, the an- cause the angels attained it forthwith after the beginning gelic nature through which man cannot mount is midway of their creation: whereas man attains if after a time. But between God and human nature; it seems that he cannot the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end. attain Happiness. Reply to Objection 2. To man in the present state On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 93:12): “Blessed is of life the natural way of knowing intelligible truth is by the man whom Thou shalt instruct, O Lord.” means of phantasms. But after this state of life, he has I answer that, Happiness is the attainment of the Per- another natural way, as was stated in the Ia, q. 84, a. 7 ; fect Good. Whoever, therefore, is capable of the Perfect Ia, q. 89, a. 1. Good can attain Happiness. Now, that man is capable of Reply to Objection 3. Man cannot surmount the an- the Perfect Good, is proved both because his intellect can gels in the degree of nature so as to be above them nat- apprehend the universal and perfect good, and because his urally. But he can surmount them by an operation of the will can desire it. And therefore man can attain Happi- intellect, by understanding that there is above the angels ness. This can be proved again from the fact that man something that makes men happy; and when he has at- is capable of seeing God, as stated in Ia, q. 12, a. 1: in tained it, he will be perfectly happy. which vision, as we stated above (q. 3, a. 8) man’s perfect 623 Whether one man can be happier than another? Ia IIae q. 5 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that one man cannot be i.e. the Sovereign Good; and the attainment or enjoy- happier than another. For Happiness is “the reward of ment of that same Good. As to that Good itself, Which is virtue,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). But equal the object and cause of Happiness, one Happiness cannot reward is given for all the works of virtue; because it is be greater than another, since there is but one Sovereign written (Mat. 20:10) that all who labor in the vineyard Good, namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made “received every man a penny”; for, as Gregory says (Hom. happy. But as to the attainment or enjoyment of this Good, xix in Evang.), “each was equally rewarded with eternal one man can be happier than another; because the more a life.” Therefore one man cannot be happier than another. man enjoys this Good the happier he is. Now, that one Objection 2. Further, Happiness is the supreme good. man enjoys God more than another, happens through his But nothing can surpass the supreme. Therefore one being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him. man’s Happiness cannot be surpassed by another’s. And in this sense one man can be happier than another. Objection 3. Further, since Happiness is “the perfect Reply to Objection 1. The one penny signifies that and sufficient good” (Ethic. i, 7) it brings rest to man’s Happiness is one in its object. But the many mansions desire. But his desire is not at rest, if he yet lacks some signify the manifold Happiness in the divers degrees of good that can be got. And if he lack nothing that he can enjoyment. get, there can be no still greater good. Therefore either Reply to Objection 2. Happiness is said to be the man is not happy; or, if he be happy, no other Happiness supreme good, inasmuch as it is the perfect possession or can be greater. enjoyment of the Supreme Good. On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 14:2): “In My Fa- Reply to Objection 3. None of the Blessed lacks any ther’s house there are many mansions”; which, according desirable good; since they have the Infinite Good Itself, to Augustine (Tract. lxvii in Joan.) signify “the diverse Which is “the good of all good,” as Augustine says (Enarr. dignities of merits in the one eternal life.” But the dig- in Ps. 134). But one is said to be happier than another, by nity of eternal life which is given according to merit, is reason of diverse participation of the same good. And the Happiness itself. Therefore there are diverse degrees of addition of other goods does not increase Happiness, since Happiness, and Happiness is not equally in all. Augustine says (Confess. v, 4): “He who knows Thee, and I answer that, As stated above (q. 1, a. 8; q. 2, a. 7), others besides, is not the happier for knowing them, but is Happiness implies two things, to wit, the last end itself, happy for knowing Thee alone.” Whether one can be happy in this life? Ia IIae q. 5 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Happiness can be had cannot be happy in this life. in this life. For it is written (Ps. 118:1): “Blessed are the I answer that, A certain participation of Happiness undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord.” can be had in this life: but perfect and true Happiness can- But this happens in this life. Therefore one can be happy not be had in this life. This may be seen from a twofold in this life. consideration. Objection 2. Further, imperfect participation in the First, from the general notion of happiness. For since Sovereign Good does not destroy the nature of Happi- happiness is a “perfect and sufficient good,” it excludes ness, otherwise one would not be happier than another. every evil, and fulfils every desire. But in this life every But men can participate in the Sovereign Good in this life, evil cannot be excluded. For this present life is subject to by knowing and loving God, albeit imperfectly. Therefore many unavoidable evils; to ignorance on the part of the in- man can be happy in this life. tellect; to inordinate affection on the part of the appetite, Objection 3. Further, what is said by many cannot and to many penalties on the part of the body; as Augus- be altogether false: since what is in many, comes, ap- tine sets forth in De Civ. Dei xix, 4. Likewise neither parently, from nature; and nature does not fail altogether. can the desire for good be satiated in this life. For man Now many say that Happiness can be had in this life, as naturally desires the good, which he has, to be abiding. appears from Ps. 143:15: “They have called the people Now the goods of the present life pass away; since life it- happy that hath these things,” to wit, the good things in self passes away, which we naturally desire to have, and this life. Therefore one can be happy in this life. would wish to hold abidingly, for man naturally shrinks On the contrary, It is written (Job 14:1): “Man born from death. Wherefore it is impossible to have true Hap- of a woman, living for a short time, is filled with many piness in this life. miseries.” But Happiness excludes misery. Therefore man Secondly, from a consideration of the specific nature 624 of Happiness, viz. the vision of the Divine Essence, which true Happiness. Secondly, the imperfection may be on the man cannot obtain in this life, as was shown in the Ia, part of the participator, who indeed attains the object of q. 12, a. 11. Hence it is evident that none can attain true Happiness, in itself, namely, God: imperfectly, however, and perfect Happiness in this life. in comparison with the way in which God enjoys Him- Reply to Objection 1. Some are said to be happy in self. This imperfection does not destroy the true nature this life, either on account of the hope of obtaining Hap- of Happiness; because, since Happiness is an operation, piness in the life to come, according to Rom. 8:24: “We as stated above (q. 3, a. 2), the true nature of Happiness are saved by hope”; or on account of a certain participa- is taken from the object, which specifies the act, and not tion of Happiness, by reason of a kind of enjoyment of the from the subject. Sovereign Good. Reply to Objection 3. Men esteem that there is some Reply to Objection 2. The imperfection of partici- kind of happiness to be had in this life, on account of a pated Happiness is due to one of two causes. First, on certain likeness to true Happiness. And thus they do not the part of the object of Happiness, which is not seen in fail altogether in their estimate. Its Essence: and this imperfection destroys the nature of Whether happiness once had can be lost? Ia IIae q. 5 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Happiness can be circumstance that appears to be contrary to the nature of lost. For Happiness is a perfection. But every perfection is happiness, therefore did the Philosopher state (Ethic. i, in the thing perfected according to the mode of the latter. 10) that some are happy in this life, not simply, but “as Since then man is, by his nature, changeable, it seems that men,” whose nature is subject to change. Happiness is participated by man in a changeable manner. But if we speak of that perfect Happiness which we And consequently it seems that man can lose Happiness. await after this life, it must be observed that Origen (Peri Objection 2. Further, Happiness consists in an act of Archon. ii, 3), following the error of certain Platonists, the intellect; and the intellect is subject to the will. But held that man can become unhappy after the final Happi- the will can be directed to opposites. Therefore it seems ness. that it can desist from the operation whereby man is made This, however, is evidently false, for two reasons. happy: and thus man will cease to be happy. First, from the general notion of happiness. For since hap- Objection 3. Further, the end corresponds to the be- piness is the “perfect and sufficient good,” it must needs ginning. But man’s Happiness has a beginning, since man set man’s desire at rest and exclude every evil. Now man was not always happy. Therefore it seems that it has an naturally desires to hold to the good that he has, and to end. have the surety of his holding: else he must of necessity On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:46) of the righ- be troubled with the fear of losing it, or with the sorrow of teous that “they shall god. . . into life everlasting,” which, knowing that he will lose it. Therefore it is necessary for as above stated (a. 2), is the Happiness of the saints. Now true Happiness that man have the assured opinion of never what is eternal ceases not. Therefore Happiness cannot be losing the good that he possesses. If this opinion be true, it lost. follows that he never will lose happiness: but if it be false, I answer that, If we speak of imperfect happiness, it is in itself an evil that he should have a false opinion: such as can be had in this life, in this sense it can be because the false is the evil of the intellect, just as the true lost. This is clear of contemplative happiness, which is is its good, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Consequently he will lost either by forgetfulness, for instance, when knowledge no longer be truly happy, if evil be in him. is lost through sickness; or again by certain occupations, Secondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific whereby a man is altogether withdrawn from contempla- nature of Happiness. For it has been shown above (q. 3, tion. a. 8) that man’s perfect Happiness consists in the vision This is also clear of active happiness: since man’s will of the Divine Essence. Now it is impossible for anyone can be changed so as to fall to vice from the virtue, in seeing the Divine Essence, to wish not to see It. Because whose act that happiness principally consists. If, how- every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be with- ever, the virtue remain unimpaired, outward changes can out, is either insufficient, something more sufficing being indeed disturb such like happiness, in so far as they hin- desired in its stead; or else has some inconvenience at- der many acts of virtue; but they cannot take it away tached to it, by reason of which it becomes wearisome. altogether because there still remains an act of virtue, But the vision of the Divine Essence fills the soul with all whereby man bears these trials in a praiseworthy man- good things, since it unites it to the source of all good- ner. And since the happiness of this life can be lost, a ness; hence it is written (Ps. 16:15): “I shall be satisfied 625 when Thy glory shall appear”; and (Wis. 7:11): “All good cause such like vicissitudes of time can only be for such things came to me together with her,” i.e. with the con- things as are subject to time and movement. templation of wisdom. In like manner neither has it any Reply to Objection 1. Happiness is consummate inconvenience attached to it; because it is written of the perfection, which excludes every defect from the happy. contemplation of wisdom (Wis. 8:16): “Her conversation And therefore whoever has happiness has it altogether hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness.” It unchangeably: this is done by the Divine power, which is thus evident that the happy man cannot forsake Hap- raises man to the participation of eternity which tran- piness of his own accord. Moreover, neither can he lose scends all change. Happiness, through God taking it away from him. Be- Reply to Objection 2. The will can be directed to op- cause, since the withdrawal of Happiness is a punishment, posites, in things which are ordained to the end; but it is it cannot be enforced by God, the just Judge, except for ordained, of natural necessity, to the last end. This is ev- some fault; and he that sees God cannot fall into a fault, ident from the fact that man is unable not to wish to be since rectitude of the will, of necessity, results from that happy. vision as was shown above (q. 4, a. 4). Nor again can it be Reply to Objection 3. Happiness has a beginning ow- withdrawn by any other agent. Because the mind that is ing to the condition of the participator: but it has no end united to God is raised above all other things: and conse- by reason of the condition of the good, the participation quently no other agent can sever the mind from that union. of which makes man happy. Hence the beginning of hap- Therefore it seems unreasonable that as time goes on, man piness is from one cause, its endlessness is from another. should pass from happiness to misery, and vice versa; be- Whether man can attain happiness by his natural powers? Ia IIae q. 5 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that man can attain Hap- perfect Happiness, as stated above (q. 3, a. 8), consists in piness by his natural powers. For nature does not fail in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the vision of God’s necessary things. But nothing is so necessary to man as Essence surpasses the nature not only of man, but also of that by which he attains the last end. Therefore this is not every creature, as was shown in the Ia, q. 12, a. 4. For the lacking to human nature. Therefore man can attain Hap- natural knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the piness by his natural powers. mode of his substance: thus it is said of the intelligence Objection 2. Further, since man is more noble than ir- (De Causis; Prop. viii) that “it knows things that are above rational creatures, it seems that he must be better equipped it, and things that are below it, according to the mode of than they. But irrational creatures can attain their end by its substance.” But every knowledge that is according to their natural powers. Much more therefore can man attain the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision of Happiness by his natural powers. the Divine Essence, which infinitely surpasses all created Objection 3. Further, Happiness is a “perfect opera- substance. Consequently neither man, nor any creature, tion,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13). Now can attain final Happiness by his natural powers. the beginning of a thing belongs to the same principle as Reply to Objection 1. Just as nature does not fail the perfecting thereof. Since, therefore, the imperfect op- man in necessaries, although it has not provided him with eration, which is as the beginning in human operations, weapons and clothing, as it provided other animals, be- is subject to man’s natural power, whereby he is master cause it gave him reason and hands, with which he is able of his own actions; it seems that he can attain to perfect to get these things for himself; so neither did it fail man operation, i.e. Happiness, by his natural powers. in things necessary, although it gave him not the where- On the contrary, Man is naturally the principle of his withal to attain Happiness: since this it could not do. But action, by his intellect and will. But final Happiness pre- it did give him free-will, with which he can turn to God, pared for the saints, surpasses the intellect and will of that He may make him happy. “For what we do by means man; for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:9) “Eye hath not of our friends, is done, in a sense, by ourselves” (Ethic. seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart iii, 3). of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Reply to Objection 2. The nature that can attain Him.” Therefore man cannot attain Happiness by his nat- perfect good, although it needs help from without in or- ural powers. der to attain it, is of more noble condition than a nature I answer that, Imperfect happiness that can be had in which cannot attain perfect good, but attains some imper- this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers, fect good, although it need no help from without in or- in the same way as virtue, in whose operation it consists: der to attain it, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12). on this point we shall speak further on (q. 63). But man’s Thus he is better disposed to health who can attain per- 626 fect health, albeit by means of medicine, than he who can power. But this does not follow of necessity, if they be attain but imperfect health, without the help of medicine. of different species: for not everything, that can cause And therefore the rational creature, which can attain the the disposition of matter, can produce the final perfec- perfect good of happiness, but needs the Divine assis- tion. Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to tance for the purpose, is more perfect than the irrational man’s natural power, is not of the same species as that creature, which is not capable of attaining this good, but perfect operation which is man’s happiness: since oper- attains some imperfect good by its natural powers. ation takes its species from its object. Consequently the Reply to Objection 3. When imperfect and perfect argument does not prove. are of the same species, they can be caused by the same Whether man attains happiness through the action of some higher creature? Ia IIae q. 5 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that man can be made stowed through the action of any creature: but by God happy through the action of some higher creature, viz. an alone is man made happy, if we speak of perfect Happi- angel. For since we observe a twofold order in things— ness. If, however, we speak of imperfect happiness, the one, of the parts of the universe to one another, the other, same is to be said of it as of the virtue, in whose act it of the whole universe to a good which is outside the uni- consists. verse; the former order is ordained to the second as to Reply to Objection 1. It often happens in the case of its end (Metaph. xii, 10). Thus the mutual order of the active powers ordained to one another, that it belongs to parts of an army is dependent on the order of the parts of the highest power to reach the last end, while the lower an army is dependent on the order of the whole army to powers contribute to the attainment of that last end, by the general. But the mutual order of the parts of the uni- causing a disposition thereto: thus to the art of sailing, verse consists in the higher creatures acting on the lower, which commands the art of shipbuilding, it belongs to use as stated in the Ia, q. 109, a. 2: while happiness consists in a ship for the end for which it was made. Thus, too, in the the order of man to a good which is outside the universe, order of the universe, man is indeed helped by the angels i.e. God. Therefore man is made happy, through a higher in the attainment of his last end, in respect of certain pre- creature, viz. an angel, acting on him. liminary dispositions thereto: whereas he attains the last Objection 2. Further, that which is such in potential- end itself through the First Agent, which is God. ity, can be reduced to act, by that which is such actually: Reply to Objection 2. When a form exists perfectly thus what is potentially hot, is made actually hot, by some- and naturally in something, it can be the principle of ac- thing that is actually hot. But man is potentially happy. tion on something else: for instance a hot thing heats Therefore he can be made actually happy by an angel who through heat. But if a form exist in something imperfectly, is actually happy. and not naturally, it cannot be the principle whereby it is Objection 3. Further, Happiness consists in an op- communicated to something else: thus the “intention” of eration of the intellect as stated above (q. 3, a. 4). But color which is in the pupil, cannot make a thing white; an angel can enlighten man’s intellect as shown in the Ia, nor indeed can everything enlightened or heated give heat q. 111, a. 1. Therefore an angel can make a man happy. or light to something else; for if they could, enlightening On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 83:12): “The Lord and heating would go on to infinity. But the light of glory, will give grace and glory.” whereby God is seen, is in God perfectly and naturally; I answer that, Since every creature is subject to the whereas in any creature, it is imperfectly and by likeness laws of nature, from the very fact that its power and ac- or participation. Consequently no creature can communi- tion are limited: that which surpasses created nature, can- cate its Happiness to another. not be done by the power of any creature. Consequently if Reply to Objection 3. A happy angel enlightens the anything need to be done that is above nature, it is done by intellect of a man or of a lower angel, as to certain notions God immediately; such as raising the dead to life, restor- of the Divine works: but not as to the vision of the Divine ing sight to the blind, and such like. Now it has been Essence, as was stated in the Ia, q. 106, a. 1: since in order shown above (a. 5) that Happiness is a good surpassing to see this, all are immediately enlightened by God. created nature. Therefore it is impossible that it be be- 627 Whether any good works are necessary that man may receive happiness from God? Ia IIae q. 5 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that no works of man are perfect good without movement, belongs to that which necessary that he may obtain Happiness from God. For has it naturally: and to have Happiness naturally belongs since God is an agent of infinite power, He requires be- to God alone. Therefore it belongs to God alone not to fore acting, neither matter, nor disposition of matter, but be moved towards Happiness by any previous operation. can forthwith produce the whole effect. But man’s works, Now since Happiness surpasses every created nature, no since they are not required for Happiness, as the efficient pure creature can becomingly gain Happiness, without the cause thereof, as stated above (a. 6), can be required only movement of operation, whereby it tends thereto. But the as dispositions thereto. Therefore God who does not re- angel, who is above man in the natural order, obtained it, quire dispositions before acting, bestows Happiness with- according to the order of Divine wisdom, by one move- out any previous works. ment of a meritorious work, as was explained in the Ia, Objection 2. Further, just as God is the immediate q. 62, a. 5; whereas man obtains it by many movements of cause of Happiness, so is He the immediate cause of na- works which are called merits. Wherefore also according ture. But when God first established nature, He produced to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9), happiness is the reward of creatures without any previous disposition or action on the works of virtue. part of the creature, but made each one perfect forthwith Reply to Objection 1. Works are necessary to man in its species. Therefore it seems that He bestows Happi- in order to gain Happiness; not on account of the insuffi- ness on man without any previous works. ciency of the Divine power which bestows Happiness, but Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 4:6) that the order in things be observed. that Happiness is of the man “to whom God reputeth jus- Reply to Objection 2. God produced the first crea- tice without works.” Therefore no works of man are nec- tures so that they are perfect forthwith, without any pre- essary for attaining Happiness. vious disposition or operation of the creature; because He On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 13:17): “If you instituted the first individuals of the various species, that know these things, you shall be blessed if you do them.” through them nature might be propagated to their progeny. Therefore Happiness is obtained through works. In like manner, because Happiness was to be bestowed on I answer that, Rectitude of the will, as stated above others through Christ, who is God and Man, “Who,” ac- (q. 4, a. 4), is necessary for Happiness; since it is nothing cording to Heb. 2:10, “had brought many children into else than the right order of the will to the last end; and it is glory”; therefore, from the very beginning of His concep-therefore necessary for obtaining the end, just as the right tion, His soul was happy, without any previous meritori- disposition of matter, in order to receive the form. But ous operation. But this is peculiar to Him: for Christ’s this does not prove that any work of man need precede his merit avails baptized children for the gaining of Happi- Happiness: for God could make a will having a right ten- ness, though they have no merits of their own; because by dency to the end, and at the same time attaining the end; Baptism they are made members of Christ. just as sometimes He disposes matter and at the same time Reply to Objection 3. The Apostle is speaking of the introduces the form. But the order of Divine wisdom de- Happiness of Hope, which is bestowed on us by sancti- mands that it should not be thus; for as is stated in De fying grace, which is not given on account of previous Coel. ii, 12, “of those things that have a natural capacity works. For grace is not a term of movement, as Hap- for the perfect good, one has it without movement, some piness is; rather is it the principle of the movement that by one movement, some by several.” Now to possess the tends towards Happiness. Whether every man desires happiness? Ia IIae q. 5 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that not all desire Happi- But some consider it impossible for man to see the Divine ness. For no man can desire what he knows not; since the Essence; wherefore they desire it not. Therefore all men apprehended good is the object of the appetite (De An- do not desire Happiness. ima iii, 10). But many know not what Happiness is. This Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, is evident from the fact that, as Augustine says (De Trin. 5) that “happy is he who has all he desires, and desires xiii, 4), “some thought that Happiness consists in plea- nothing amiss.” But all do not desire this; for some de- sures of the body; some, in a virtue of the soul; some in sire certain things amiss, and yet they wish to desire such other things.” Therefore not all desire Happiness. things. Therefore all do not desire Happiness. Objection 2. Further, the essence of Happiness is the On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3): vision of the Divine Essence, as stated above (q. 3, a. 8). “If that actor had said: ‘You all wish to be happy; you 628 do not wish to be unhappy,’ he would have said that of necessity tends thereto, as stated above. Again it can which none would have failed to acknowledge in his will.” be considered under other special aspects, either on the Therefore everyone desires to be happy. part of the operation itself, or on the part of the operating I answer that, Happiness can be considered in two power, or on the part of the object; and thus the will does ways. First according to the general notion of happiness: not tend thereto of necessity. and thus, of necessity, every man desires happiness. For Reply to Objection 3. This definition of Happiness the general notion of happiness consists in the perfect given by some—“Happy is the man that has all he de- good, as stated above (Aa. 3,4). But since good is the sires,” or, “whose every wish is fulfilled” is a good and object of the will, the perfect good of a man is that which adequate definition; but an inadequate definition if under- entirely satisfies his will. Consequently to desire happi- stood in another. For if we understand it simply of all that ness is nothing else than to desire that one’s will be satis- man desires by his natural appetite, thus it is true that he fied. And this everyone desires. Secondly we may speak who has all that he desires, is happy: since nothing sat- of Happiness according to its specific notion, as to that in isfies man’s natural desire, except the perfect good which which it consists. And thus all do not know Happiness; is Happiness. But if we understand it of those things that because they know not in what thing the general notion of man desires according to the apprehension of the reason, happiness is found. And consequently, in this respect, not thus it does not belong to Happiness, to have certain things all desire it. Wherefore the reply to the first Objection is that man desires; rather does it belong to unhappiness, in clear. so far as the possession of such things hinders man from Reply to Objection 2. Since the will follows the ap- having all that he desires naturally; thus it is that reason prehension of the intellect or reason; just as it happens sometimes accepts as true things that are a hindrance to that where there is no real distinction, there may be a dis- the knowledge of truth. And it was through taking this tinction according to the consideration of reason; so does into consideration that Augustine added so as to include it happen that one and the same thing is desired in one perfect Happiness—that he “desires nothing amiss”: al- way, and not desired in another. So that happiness may be though the first part suffices if rightly understood, to wit, considered as the final and perfect good, which is the gen- that “happy is he who has all he desires.” eral notion of happiness: and thus the will naturally and 629 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 6 Of the Voluntary and the Involuntary (In Eight Articles) Since therefore Happiness is to be gained by means of certain acts, we must in due sequence consider human acts, in order to know by what acts we may obtain Happiness, and by what acts we are prevented from obtaining it. But because operations and acts are concerned with things singular, consequently all practical knowledge is incomplete unless it take account of things in detail. The study of Morals, therefore, since it treats of human acts, should consider first the general principles; and secondly matters of detail. In treating of the general principles, the points that offer themselves for our consideration are (1) human acts themselves; (2) their principles. Now of human acts some are proper to man; others are common to man and animals. And since Happiness is man’s proper good, those acts which are proper to man have a closer connection with Happiness than have those which are common to man and the other animals. First, then, we must consider those acts which are proper to man; secondly, those acts which are common to man and the other animals, and are called Passions. The first of these points offers a twofold consideration: (1) What makes a human act? (2) What distinguishes human acts? And since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary, because the will is the rational appetite, which is proper to man; we must consider acts in so far as they are voluntary. First, then, we must consider the voluntary and involuntary in general; secondly, those acts which are voluntary, as being elicited by the will, and as issuing from the will immediately; thirdly, those acts which are voluntary, as being commanded by the will, which issue from the will through the medium of the other powers. And because voluntary acts have certain circumstances, according to which we form our judgment concerning them, we must first consider the voluntary and the involuntary, and afterwards, the circumstances of those acts which are found to be voluntary or involuntary. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts? (2) Whether in irrational animals? (3) Whether there can be voluntariness without any action? (4) Whether violence can be done to the will? (5) Whether violence causes involuntariness? (6) Whether fear causes involuntariness? (7) Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness? (8) Whether ignorance causes involuntariness? Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts? Ia IIae q. 6 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there is nothing vol- 15:5): “Without Me you can do nothing.” Therefore there untary in human acts. For that is voluntary “which has its is nothing voluntary in human acts. principle within itself.” as Gregory of Nyssa∗, Damascene On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) (De Fide Orth. ii, 24), and Aristotle (Ethic. iii, 1) declare. that “the voluntary is an act consisting in a rational op- But the principle of human acts is not in man himself, but eration.” Now such are human acts. Therefore there is outside him: since man’s appetite is moved to act, by the something voluntary in human acts. appetible object which is outside him, and is as a “mover I answer that, There must needs be something volun- unmoved” (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore there is nothing tary in human acts. In order to make this clear, we must voluntary in human acts. take note that the principle of some acts or movements is Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 2) within the agent, or that which is moved; whereas the prin- proves that in animals no new movement arises that is not ciple of some movements or acts is outside. For when a preceded by a motion from without. But all human acts stone is moved upwards, the principle of this movement are new, since none is eternal. Consequently, the principle is outside the stone: whereas when it is moved down- of all human acts is from without: and therefore there is wards, the principle of this movement is in the stone. Now nothing voluntary in them. of those things that are moved by an intrinsic principle, Objection 3. Further, he that acts voluntarily, can act some move themselves, some not. For since every agent of himself. But this is not true of man; for it is written (Jn. or thing moved, acts or is moved for an end, as stated ∗ Nemesius, De Natura Hom. xxxii. 630 above (q. 1, a. 2); those are perfectly moved by an ingenus of things subject to alteration, the first principle of trinsic principle, whose intrinsic principle is one not only alteration is a heavenly body, which is nevertheless, is not of movement but of movement for an end. Now in order the first mover simply, but is moved locally by a higher for a thing to be done for an end, some knowledge of the mover. And so the intrinsic principle of the voluntary act, end is necessary. Therefore, whatever so acts or is moved i.e. the cognitive and appetitive power, is the first prin- by an intrinsic principle, that it has some knowledge of ciple in the genus of appetitive movement, although it is the end, has within itself the principle of its act, so that moved by an extrinsic principle according to other species it not only acts, but acts for an end. On the other hand, of movement. if a thing has no knowledge of the end, even though it Reply to Objection 2. New movements in animals have an intrinsic principle of action or movement, never- are indeed preceded by a motion from without; and this theless the principle of acting or being moved for an end in two respects. First, in so far as by means of an extrin- is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the sic motion an animal’s senses are confronted with some- principle of its action towards an end is not in that thing, thing sensible, which, on being apprehended, moves the but in something else, by which the principle of its action appetite. Thus a lion, on seeing a stag in movement and towards an end is imprinted on it. Wherefore such like coming towards him, begins to be moved towards the stag. things are not said to move themselves, but to be moved Secondly, in so far as some extrinsic motion produces a by others. But those things which have a knowledge of physical change in an animal’s body, as in the case of cold the end are said to move themselves because there is in or heat; and through the body being affected by the mo- them a principle by which they not only act but also act tion of an outward body, the sensitive appetite which is the for an end. And consequently, since both are from an in- power of a bodily organ, is also moved indirectly; thus it trinsic principle, to wit, that they act and that they act for happens that through some alteration in the body the ap- an end, the movements of such things are said to be vol- petite is roused to the desire of something. But this is not untary: for the word “voluntary” implies that their move- contrary to the nature of voluntariness, as stated above (ad ments and acts are from their own inclination. Hence it 1), for such movements caused by an extrinsic principle is that, according to the definitions of Aristotle, Gregory are of another genus of movement. of Nyssa, and Damascene†, the voluntary is defined not Reply to Objection 3. God moves man to act, not only as having “a principle within” the agent, but also as only by proposing the appetible to the senses, or by ef- implying “knowledge.” Therefore, since man especially fecting a change in his body, but also by moving the will knows the end of his work, and moves himself, in his acts itself; because every movement either of the will or of na- especially is the voluntary to be found. ture, proceeds from God as the First Mover. And just as Reply to Objection 1. Not every principle is a first it is not incompatible with nature that the natural move- principle. Therefore, although it is essential to the volun- ment be from God as the First Mover, inasmuch as nature tary act that its principle be within the agent, nevertheless is an instrument of God moving it: so it is not contrary to it is not contrary to the nature of the voluntary act that the essence of a voluntary act, that it proceed from God, this intrinsic principle be caused or moved by an extrinsic inasmuch as the will is moved by God. Nevertheless both principle: because it is not essential to the voluntary act natural and voluntary movements have this in common, that its intrinsic principle be a first principle. Yet again it that it is essential that they should proceed from a princi-must be observed that a principle of movement may hap- ple within the agent. pen to be first in a genus, but not first simply: thus in the Whether there is anything voluntary in irrational animals? Ia IIae q. 6 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that there is nothing vol- a voluntary act in irrational animals. untary in irrational animals. For a thing is called “volun- Objection 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. tary” from “voluntas” [will]. Now since the will is in the 24) that “voluntary acts lead to praise and blame.” But reason (De Anima iii, 9), it cannot be in irrational animals. neither praise nor blame is due to the acts of irrational Therefore neither is there anything voluntary in them. minds. Therefore such acts are not voluntary. Objection 2. Further, according as human acts are On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, voluntary, man is said to be master of his actions. But ir- 2) that “both children and irrational animals participate in rational animals are not masters of their actions; for “they the voluntary.” The same is said by Damascene (De Fide act not; rather are they acted upon,” as Damascene says Orth. 24) and Gregory of Nyssa∗. (De Fide Orth. ii, 27). Therefore there is no such thing as I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), it is essential † See Objection 1 ∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxii. 631 to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, Wherefore the voluntary in its perfection belongs to none together with some knowledge of the end. Now knowl- but the rational nature: whereas the imperfect voluntary is edge of the end is twofold; perfect and imperfect. Perfect within the competency of even irrational animals. knowledge of the end consists in not only apprehending Reply to Objection 1. The will is the name of the ra- the thing which is the end, but also in knowing it under tional appetite; and consequently it cannot be in things de- the aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to that void of reason. But the word “voluntary” is derived from end. And such knowledge belongs to none but the ratio- “voluntas” [will], and can be extended to those things in nal nature. But imperfect knowledge of the end consists which there is some participation of will, by way of like- in mere apprehension of the end, without knowing it un- ness thereto. It is thus that voluntary action is attributed to der the aspect of end, or the relationship of an act to the irrational animals, in so far as they are moved to an end, end. Such knowledge of the end is exercised by irrational through some kind of knowledge. animals, through their senses and their natural estimative Reply to Objection 2. The fact that man is master power. of his actions, is due to his being able to deliberate about Consequently perfect knowledge of the end leads to them: for since the deliberating reason is indifferently dis- the perfect voluntary; inasmuch as, having apprehended posed to opposite things, the will can be inclined to either. the end, a man can, from deliberating about the end and But it is not thus that voluntariness is in irrational animals, the means thereto, be moved, or not, to gain that end. as stated above. But imperfect knowledge of the end leads to the imper- Reply to Objection 3. Praise and blame are the result fect voluntary; inasmuch as the agent apprehends the end, of the voluntary act, wherein is the perfect voluntary; such but does not deliberate, and is moved to the end at once. as is not to be found in irrational animals. Whether there can be voluntariness without any act? Ia IIae q. 6 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that voluntariness cannot the ship or if the ship’s helm be not entrusted to him, the be without any act. For that is voluntary which proceeds sinking of the ship would not be set down to him, although from the will. But nothing can proceed from the will, ex- it might be due to his absence from the helm. cept through some act, at least an act of the will. Therefore Since, then, the will by willing and acting, is able, and there cannot be voluntariness without act. sometimes ought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting; Objection 2. Further, just as one is said to wish by an this not-willing and not-acting is imputed to, as though act of the will, so when the act of the will ceases, one is proceeding from, the will. And thus it is that we can have said not to wish. But not to wish implies involuntariness, the voluntary without an act; sometimes without outward which is contrary to voluntariness. Therefore there can be act, but with an interior act; for instance, when one wills nothing voluntary when the act of the will ceases. not to act; and sometimes without even an interior act, as Objection 3. Further, knowledge is essential to the when one does not will to act. voluntary, as stated above (Aa. 1,2). But knowledge in- Reply to Objection 1. We apply the word “voluntary” volves an act. Therefore voluntariness cannot be without not only to that which proceeds from the will directly, as some act. from its action; but also to that which proceeds from it On the contrary, The word “voluntary” is applied to indirectly as from its inaction. that of which we are masters. Now we are masters in re- Reply to Objection 2. “Not to wish” is said in two spect of to act and not to act, to will and not to will. There- senses. First, as though it were one word, and the infini- fore just as to act and to will are voluntary, so also are not tive of “I-do-not-wish.” Consequently just as when I say to act and not to will. “I do not wish to read,” the sense is, “I wish not to read”; I answer that, Voluntary is what proceeds from the so “not to wish to read” is the same as “to wish not to will. Now one thing proceeds from another in two ways. read,” and in this sense “not to wish” implies involuntari- First, directly; in which sense something proceeds from ness. Secondly it is taken as a sentence: and then no act of another inasmuch as this other acts; for instance, heating the will is affirmed. And in this sense “not to wish” does from heat. Secondly, indirectly; in which sense something not imply involuntariness. proceeds from another through this other not acting; thus Reply to Objection 3. Voluntariness requires an act the sinking of a ship is set down to the helmsman, from of knowledge in the same way as it requires an act of will; his having ceased to steer. But we must take note that the namely, in order that it be in one’s power to consider, to cause of what follows from want of action is not always wish and to act. And then, just as not to wish, and not to the agent as not acting; but only then when the agent can act, when it is time to wish and to act, is voluntary, so is it and ought to act. For if the helmsman were unable to steer voluntary not to consider. 632 Whether violence can be done to the will? Ia IIae q. 6 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that violence can be done principle of knowledge: just as the natural appetite is an to the will. For everything can be compelled by that which inclination proceeding from an interior principle without is more powerful. But there is something, namely, God, knowledge. Now what is compelled or violent is from that is more powerful than the human will. Therefore it an exterior principle. Consequently it is contrary to the can be compelled, at least by Him. nature of the will’s own act, that it should be subject to Objection 2. Further, every passive subject is com- compulsion and violence: just as it is also contrary to the pelled by its active principle, when it is changed by it. But nature of a natural inclination or movement. For a stone the will is a passive force: for it is a “mover moved” (De may have an upward movement from violence, but that Anima iii, 10). Therefore, since it is sometimes moved this violent movement be from its natural inclination is by its active principle, it seems that sometimes it is com- impossible. In like manner a man may be dragged by pelled. force: but it is contrary to the very notion of violence, Objection 3. Further, violent movement is that which that he be dragged of his own will. is contrary to nature. But the movement of the will is Reply to Objection 1. God Who is more powerful sometimes contrary to nature; as is clear of the will’s than the human will, can move the will of man, accord- movement to sin, which is contrary to nature, as Dama- ing to Prov. 21:1: “The heart of the king is in the hand scene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20). Therefore the move- of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it.” But ment of the will can be compelled. if this were by compulsion, it would no longer be by an On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) act of the will, nor would the will itself be moved, but that what is done by the will is not done of necessity. Now, something else against the will. whatever is done under compulsion is done of necessity: Reply to Objection 2. It is not always a violent move- consequently what is done by the will, cannot be com- ment, when a passive subject is moved by its active prin- pelled. Therefore the will cannot be compelled to act. ciple; but only when this is done against the interior incli- I answer that, The act of the will is twofold: one is its nation of the passive subject. Otherwise every alteration immediate act, as it were, elicited by it, namely, “to wish”; and generation of simply bodies would be unnatural and the other is an act of the will commanded by it, and put violent: whereas they are natural by reason of the natural into execution by means of some other power, such as “to interior aptitude of the matter or subject to such a disposi- walk” and “to speak,” which are commanded by the will tion. In like manner when the will is moved, according to to be executed by means of the motive power. its own inclination, by the appetible object, this movement As regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the is not violent but voluntary. will can suffer violence, in so far as violence can prevent Reply to Objection 3. That to which the will tends the exterior members from executing the will’s command. by sinning, although in reality it is evil and contrary to But as to the will’s own proper act, violence cannot be the rational nature, nevertheless is apprehended as some- done to the will. thing good and suitable to nature, in so far as it is suitable The reason of this is that the act of the will is noth- to man by reason of some pleasurable sensation or some ing else than an inclination proceeding from the interior vicious habit. Whether violence causes involuntariness? Ia IIae q. 6 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that violence does not upwards; or when a man contorts his limbs in a way con- cause involuntariness. For we speak of voluntariness and trary to their natural flexibility. Therefore violence does involuntariness in respect of the will. But violence can- not cause involuntariness. not be done to the will, as shown above (a. 4). Therefore On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) and violence cannot cause involuntariness. Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) say that “things done Objection 2. Further, that which is done involuntar- under compulsion are involuntary.” ily is done with grief, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, I answer that, Violence is directly opposed to the vol- 24) and the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 5) say. But sometimes untary, as likewise to the natural. For the voluntary and a man suffers compulsion without being grieved thereby. the natural have this in common, that both are from an Therefore violence does not cause involuntariness. intrinsic principle; whereas violence is from an extrinsic Objection 3. Further, what is from the will cannot be principle. And for this reason, just as in things devoid of involuntary. But some violent actions proceed from the knowledge, violence effects something against nature: so will: for instance, when a man with a heavy body goes in things endowed with knowledge, it effects something 633 against the will. Now that which is against nature is said to be natural, by reason of the natural aptitude in a heav-to be “unnatural”; and in like manner that which is against enly body to receive such movement; although the cause the will is said to be “involuntary.” Therefore violence of that movement is a voluntary agent. In like manner an causes involuntariness. act is said to be voluntary in two ways. First, in regard Reply to Objection 1. The involuntary is opposed to to action, for instance, when one wishes to be passive to the voluntary. Now it has been said (a. 4) that not only the another. Hence when action is brought to bear on some- act, which proceeds immediately from the will, is called thing, by an extrinsic agent, as long as the will to suffer voluntary, but also the act commanded by the will. Con- that action remains in the passive subject, there is not vi- sequently, as to the act which proceeds immediately from olence simply: for although the patient does nothing by the will, violence cannot be done to the will, as stated way of action, he does something by being willing to suf- above (a. 4): wherefore violence cannot make that act fer. Consequently this cannot be called involuntary. involuntary. But as to the commanded act, the will can Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (Phys. suffer violence: and consequently in this respect violence viii, 4) the movement of an animal, whereby at times causes involuntariness. an animal is moved against the natural inclination of the Reply to Objection 2. As that is said to be natural, body, although it is not natural to the body, is neverthe- which is according to the inclination of nature; so that is less somewhat natural to the animal, to which it is natural said to be voluntary, which is according to the inclination to be moved according to its appetite. Accordingly this of the will. Now a thing is said to be natural in two ways. is violent, not simply but in a certain respect. The same First, because it is from nature as from an active princi- remark applies in the case of one who contorts his limbs ple: thus it is natural for fire to produce heat. Secondly, in a way that is contrary to their natural disposition. For according to a passive principle; because, to wit, there is this is violent in a certain respect, i.e. as to that particular in nature an inclination to receive an action from an ex-limb; but not simply, i.e. as to the man himself. trinsic principle: thus the movement of the heavens is said Whether fear causes involuntariness simply? Ia IIae q. 6 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that fear causes involun- likewise Gregory of Nyssa in his book on Man (Neme- tariness simply. For just as violence regards that which is sius, De Nat. Hom. xxx), such things are done through contrary to the will at the time, so fear regards a future fear “are of a mixed character,” being partly voluntary and evil which is repugnant to the will. But violence causes partly involuntary. For that which is done through fear, involuntariness simply. Therefore fear too causes invol- considered in itself, is not voluntary; but it becomes vol- untariness simply. untary in this particular case, in order, namely, to avoid Objection 2. Further, that which is such of itself, re- the evil feared. mains such, whatever be added to it: thus what is hot of But if the matter be considered aright, such things are itself, as long as it remains, is still hot, whatever be added voluntary rather than involuntary; for they are voluntary to it. But that which is done through fear, is involuntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect. For a thing is in itself. Therefore, even with the addition of fear, it is said to be simply, according as it is in act; but according involuntary. as it is only in apprehension, it is not simply, but in a cer- Objection 3. Further, that which is such, subject to tain respect. Now that which is done through fear, is in act a condition, is such in a certain respect; whereas what is in so far as it is done. For, since acts are concerned with such, without any condition, is such simply: thus what is singulars; and the singular, as such, is here and now; that necessary, subject to a condition, is necessary in some re- which is done is in act, in so far as it is here and now and spect: but what is necessary absolutely, is necessary sim- under other individuating circumstances. And that which ply. But that which is done through fear, is absolutely is done through fear is voluntary, inasmuch as it is here involuntary; and is not voluntary, save under a condi- and now, that is to say, in so far as, under the circum- tion, namely, in order that the evil feared may be avoided. stances, it hinders a greater evil which was feared; thus Therefore that which is done through fear, is involuntary the throwing of the cargo into the sea becomes voluntary simply. during the storm, through fear of the danger: wherefore On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa∗ and the Philoso- it is clear that it is voluntary simply. And hence it is that pher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that such things as are done through what is done out of fear is essentially voluntary, because fear are “voluntary rather than involuntary.” its principle is within. But if we consider what is done I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) and through fear, as outside this particular case, and inasmuch ∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx. 634 as it is repugnant to the will, this is merely a consideration “the principal whereof is from without,” but with the ad- of the mind. And consequently what is done through fear dition, “in which he that suffers violence concurs not at is involuntary, considered in that respect, that is to say, all”; because the will of him that is in fear, does concur outside the actual circumstances of the case. somewhat in that which he does through fear. Reply to Objection 1. Things done through fear and Reply to Objection 2. Things that are such abso- compulsion differ not only according to present and future lutely, remain such, whatever be added to them; for in- time, but also in this, that the will does not consent, but is stance, a cold thing, or a white thing: but things that are moved entirely counter to that which is done through com- such relatively, vary according as they are compared with pulsion: whereas what is done through fear, becomes vol- different things. For what is big in comparison with one untary, because the will is moved towards it, albeit not for thing, is small in comparison with another. Now a thing its own sake, but on account of something else, that is, in is said to be voluntary, not only for its own sake, as it order to avoid an evil which is feared. For the conditions were absolutely; but also for the sake of something else, as of a voluntary act are satisfied, if it be done on account it were relatively. Accordingly, nothing prevents a thing of something else voluntary: since the voluntary is not which was not voluntary in comparison with one thing, only what we wish, for its own sake, as an end, but also from becoming voluntary when compared with another. what we wish for the sake of something else, as an end. Reply to Objection 3. That which is done through It is clear therefore that in what is done from compulsion, fear, is voluntary without any condition, that is to say, ac- the will does nothing inwardly; whereas in what is done cording as it is actually done: but it is involuntary, under through fear, the will does something. Accordingly, as a certain condition, that is to say, if such a fear were not Gregory of Nyssa∗ says, in order to exclude things done threatening. Consequently, this argument proves rather through fear, a violent action is defined as not only one, the opposite. Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness? Ia IIae q. 6 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that concupiscence causes will, whereas good harmonizes with the will. Therefore involuntariness. For just as fear is a passion, so is con- fear has a greater tendency than concupiscence to cause cupiscence. But fear causes involuntariness to a certain involuntariness. extent. Therefore concupiscence does so too. Reply to Objection 2. He who acts from fear retains Objection 2. Further, just as the timid man through the repugnance of the will to that which he does, consid- fear acts counter to that which he proposed, so does the ered in itself. But he that acts from concupiscence, e.g. an incontinent, through concupiscence. But fear causes in- incontinent man, does not retain his former will whereby voluntariness to a certain extent. Therefore concupiscence he repudiated the object of his concupiscence; for his will does so also. is changed so that he desires that which previously he re- Objection 3. Further, knowledge is necessary for vol- pudiated. Accordingly, that which is done out of fear is untariness. But concupiscence impairs knowledge; for the involuntary, to a certain extent, but that which is done Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that “delight,” or the lust of from concupiscence is nowise involuntary. For the man pleasure, “destroys the judgment of prudence.” Therefore who yields to concupiscence acts counter to that which he concupiscence causes involuntariness. purposed at first, but not counter to that which he desires On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, now; whereas the timid man acts counter to that which in 24): “The involuntary act deserves mercy or indulgence, itself he desires now. and is done with regret.” But neither of these can be said Reply to Objection 3. If concupiscence were to de- of that which is done out of concupiscence. Therefore stroy knowledge altogether, as happens with those whom concupiscence does not cause involuntariness. concupiscence has rendered mad, it would follow that I answer that, Concupiscence does not cause involun- concupiscence would take away voluntariness. And yet tariness, but on the contrary makes something to be vol- properly speaking it would not result in the act being in- untary. For a thing is said to be voluntary, from the fact voluntary, because in things bereft of reason, there is nei- that the will is moved to it. Now concupiscence inclines ther voluntary nor involuntary. But sometimes in those the will to desire the object of concupiscence. Therefore actions which are done from concupiscence, knowledge the effect of concupiscence is to make something to be is not completely destroyed, because the power of know- voluntary rather than involuntary. ing is not taken away entirely, but only the actual consid- Reply to Objection 1. Fear regards evil, but concu- eration in some particular possible act. Nevertheless, this piscence regards good. Now evil of itself is counter to the itself is voluntary, according as by voluntary we mean that ∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx. 635 which is in the power of the will, for example “not to act” the will can resist the passion, as we shall state later on or “not to will,” and in like manner “not to consider”; for (q. 10, a. 3; q. 77, a. 7). Whether ignorance causes involuntariness? Ia IIae q. 6 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that ignorance does not sequent” to the act of the will, in so far as ignorance it- cause involuntariness. For “the involuntary act deserves self is voluntary: and this happens in two ways, in accor- pardon,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24). But dance with the two aforesaid modes of voluntary (a. 3). sometimes that which is done through ignorance does not First, because the act of the will is brought to bear on the deserve pardon, according to 1 Cor. 14:38: “If any man ignorance: as when a man wishes not to know, that he know not, he shall not be known.” Therefore ignorance may have an excuse for sin, or that he may not be with- does not cause involuntariness. held from sin; according to Job 21:14: “We desire not Objection 2. Further, every sin implies ignorance; the knowledge of Thy ways.” And this is called “affected according to Prov. 14: 22: “They err, that work evil.” ignorance.” Secondly, ignorance is said to be voluntary, If, therefore, ignorance causes involuntariness, it would when it regards that which one can and ought to know: follow that every sin is involuntary: which is opposed to for in this sense “not to act” and “not to will” are said to the saying of Augustine, that “every sin is voluntary” (De be voluntary, as stated above (a. 3). And ignorance of this Vera Relig. xiv). kind happens, either when one does not actually consider Objection 3. Further, “involuntariness is not without what one can and ought to consider; this is called “ig- sadness,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24). But norance of evil choice,” and arises from some passion or some things are done out of ignorance, but without sad- habit: or when one does not take the trouble to acquire the ness: for instance, a man may kill a foe, whom he wishes knowledge which one ought to have; in which sense, igno- to kill, thinking at the time that he is killing a stag. There- rance of the general principles of law, which one to know, fore ignorance does not cause involuntariness. is voluntary, as being due to negligence. Accordingly, if On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) in either of these ways, ignorance is voluntary, it cannot and the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that “what is done cause involuntariness simply. Nevertheless it causes in- through ignorance is involuntary.” voluntariness in a certain respect, inasmuch as it precedes I answer that, If ignorance causes involuntariness, it the movement of the will towards the act, which move- is in so far as it deprives one of knowledge, which is a nec- ment would not be, if there were knowledge. Ignorance is essary condition of voluntariness, as was declared above “antecedent” to the act of the will, when it is not volun- (a. 1). But it is not every ignorance that deprives one of tary, and yet is the cause of man’s willing what he would this knowledge. Accordingly, we must take note that igno- not will otherwise. Thus a man may be ignorant of some rance has a threefold relationship to the act of the will: in circumstance of his act, which he was not bound to know, one way, “concomitantly”; in another, “consequently”; in the result being that he does that which he would not do, a third way, “antecedently.” “Concomitantly,” when there if he knew of that circumstance; for instance, a man, af- is ignorance of what is done; but, so that even if it were ter taking proper precaution, may not know that someone known, it would be done. For then, ignorance does not is coming along the road, so that he shoots an arrow and induce one to wish this to be done, but it just happens that slays a passer-by. Such ignorance causes involuntariness a thing is at the same time done, and not known: thus simply. in the example given (obj. 3) a man did indeed wish to From this may be gathered the solution of the objec- kill his foe, but killed him in ignorance, thinking to kill tions. For the first objection deals with ignorance of what a stag. And ignorance of this kind, as the Philosopher a man is bound to know. The second, with ignorance of states (Ethic. iii, 1), does not cause involuntariness, since choice, which is voluntary to a certain extent, as stated it is not the cause of anything that is repugnant to the above. The third, with that ignorance which is concomi- will: but it causes “non-voluntariness,” since that which tant with the act of the will. is unknown cannot be actually willed. Ignorance is “con- 636 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 7 Of the Circumstances of Human Acts (In Four Articles) We must now consider the circumstances of human acts: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What is a circumstance? (2) Whether a theologian should take note of the circumstances of human acts? (3) How many circumstances are there? (4) Which are the most important of them? Whether a circumstance is an accident of a human act? Ia IIae q. 7 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that a circumstance is not stance of an act, and yet in some way touch the human act, an accident of a human act. For Tully says (De Invent. are called circumstances. Now what is outside a thing’s Rhetor. i) that a circumstance is that from “which an or- substance, while it belongs to that thing, is called its acci- ator adds authority and strength to his argument.” But dent. Wherefore the circumstances of human acts should oratorical arguments are derived principally from things be called their accidents. pertaining to the essence of a thing, such as the definition, Reply to Objection 1. The orator gives strength to his the genus, the species, and the like, from which also Tully argument, in the first place, from the substance of the act; declares that an orator should draw his arguments. There- and secondly, from the circumstances of the act. Thus fore a circumstance is not an accident of a human act. a man becomes indictable, first, through being guilty of Objection 2. Further, “to be in” is proper to an acci- murder; secondly, through having done it fraudulently, or dent. But that which surrounds [circumstat] is rather out from motives of greed or at a holy time or place, and so than in. Therefore the circumstances are not accidents of forth. And so in the passage quoted, it is said pointedly human acts. that the orator “adds strength to his argument,” as though Objection 3. Further, an accident has no accident. But this were something secondary. human acts themselves are accidents. Therefore the cir- Reply to Objection 2. A thing is said to be an acci- cumstances are not accidents of acts. dent of something in two ways. First, from being in that On the contrary, The particular conditions of any sin- thing: thus, whiteness is said to be an accident of Socrates. gular thing are called its individuating accidents. But the Secondly, because it is together with that thing in the same Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) calls the circumstances partic- subject: thus, whiteness is an accident of the art of music, ular things∗, i.e. the particular conditions of each act. inasmuch as they meet in the same subject, so as to touch Therefore the circumstances are individual accidents of one another, as it were. And in this sense circumstances human acts. are said to be the accidents of human acts. I answer that, Since, according to the Philosopher Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (ad 2), an acci- (Peri Herm. i), “words are the signs of what we under- dent is said to be the accident of an accident, from the fact stand,” it must needs be that in naming things we follow that they meet in the same subject. But this happens in the process of intellectual knowledge. Now our intellec- two ways. First, in so far as two accidents are both related tual knowledge proceeds from the better known to the to the same subject, without any relation to one another; less known. Accordingly with us, names of more obvious as whiteness and the art of music in Socrates. Secondly, things are transferred so as to signify things less obvious: when such accidents are related to one another; as when and hence it is that, as stated in Metaph. x, 4, “the no- the subject receives one accident by means of the other; tion of distance has been transferred from things that are for instance, a body receives color by means of its sur- apart locally, to all kinds of opposition”: and in like man- face. And thus also is one accident said to be in another; ner words that signify local movement are employed to for we speak of color as being in the surface. designate all other movements, because bodies which are Accordingly, circumstances are related to acts in both circumscribed by place, are best known to us. And hence these ways. For some circumstances that have a relation it is that the word “circumstance” has passed from located to acts, belong to the agent otherwise than through the act; things to human acts. as place and condition of person; whereas others belong Now in things located, that is said to surround some- to the agent by reason of the act, as the manner in which thing, which is outside it, but touches it, or is placed near the act is done. it. Accordingly, whatever conditions are outside the sub- ∗ ta kath’ ekasta 637 Whether theologians should take note of the circumstances of human acts? Ia IIae q. 7 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that theologians should be voluntary. Now a human act is deemed to be volun- not take note of the circumstances of human acts. Because tary or involuntary, according to knowledge or ignorance theologians do not consider human acts otherwise than ac- of circumstances, as stated above (q. 6, a. 8). Therefore cording to their quality of good or evil. But it seems that the theologian has to consider circumstances. circumstances cannot give quality to human acts; for a Reply to Objection 1. Good directed to the end is thing is never qualified, formally speaking, by that which said to be useful; and this implies some kind of relation: is outside it; but by that which is in it. Therefore theolo- wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 6) that “the good gians should not take note of the circumstances of acts. in the genus ‘relation’ is the useful.” Now, in the genus Objection 2. Further, circumstances are the accidents “relation” a thing is denominated not only according to of acts. But one thing may be subject to an infinity of ac- that which is inherent in the thing, but also according to cidents; hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 2) that that which is extrinsic to it: as may be seen in the ex- “no art or science considers accidental being, except only pressions “right” and “left,” “equal” and “unequal,” and the art of sophistry.” Therefore the theologian has not to such like. Accordingly, since the goodness of acts con- consider circumstances. sists in their utility to the end, nothing hinders their being Objection 3. Further, the consideration of circum- called good or bad according to their proportion to extrin- stances belongs to the orator. But oratory is not a part sic things that are adjacent to them. of theology. Therefore it is not a theologian’s business to Reply to Objection 2. Accidents which are altogether consider circumstances. accidental are neglected by every art, by reason of their On the contrary, Ignorance of circumstances causes uncertainty and infinity. But such like accidents are not an act to be involuntary, according to Damascene (De Fide what we call circumstances; because circumstances al- Orth. ii, 24) and Gregory of Nyssa∗. But involuntariness though, as stated above (a. 1), they are extrinsic to the excuses from sin, the consideration of which belongs to act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by being the theologian. Therefore circumstances also should be related to it. Proper accidents, however, come under the considered by the theologian. consideration of art. I answer that, Circumstances come under the consid- Reply to Objection 3. The consideration of circum- eration of the theologian, for a threefold reason. First, stances belongs to the moralist, the politician, and the or- because the theologian considers human acts, inasmuch ator. To the moralist, in so far as with respect to circum- as man is thereby directed to Happiness. Now, everything stances we find or lose the mean of virtue in human acts that is directed to an end should be proportionate to that and passions. To the politician and to the orator, in so end. But acts are made proportionate to an end by means far as circumstances make acts to be worthy of praise or of a certain commensurateness, which results from the blame, of excuse or indictment. In different ways, how- due circumstances. Hence the theologian has to consider ever: because where the orator persuades, the politician the circumstances. Secondly, because the theologian con- judges. To the theologian this consideration belongs, in siders human acts according as they are found to be good all the aforesaid ways: since to him all the other arts are or evil, better or worse: and this diversity depends on cir- subservient: for he has to consider virtuous and vicious cumstances, as we shall see further on (q. 18, Aa. 10,11; acts, just as the moralist does; and with the orator and q. 73, a. 7). Thirdly, because the theologian considers hu- politician he considers acts according as they are deserv- man acts under the aspect of merit and demerit, which is ing of reward or punishment. proper to human acts; and for this it is requisite that they Whether the circumstances are properly set forth in the third book of Ethics? Ia IIae q. 7 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the circumstances are stances are included under one, which is the “mode of not properly set forth in Ethic. iii, 1. For a circumstance acting.” of an act is described as something outside the act. Now Objection 3. Further, circumstances are not part of the time and place answer to this description. Therefore there substance of an act. But the causes of an act seem to be- are only two circumstances, to wit, “when” and “where.” long to its substance. Therefore no circumstance should Objection 2. Further, we judge from the circum- be taken from the cause of the act itself. Accordingly, stances whether a thing is well or ill done. But this be- neither “who,” nor “why,” nor “about what,” are circum- longs to the mode of an act. Therefore all the circum- stances: since “who” refers to the efficient cause, “why” ∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi. 638 to the final cause, and “about what” to the material cause. stance “by what aids.” On the contrary is the authority of the Philosopher in Reply to Objection 1. Time and place surround [cir- Ethic. iii, 1. cumstant] the act by way of measure; but the others sur- I answer that, Tully, in his Rhetoric (De Invent. round the act by touching it in any other way, while they Rhetor. i), gives seven circumstances, which are con- are extrinsic to the substance of the act. tained in this verse: Reply to Objection 2. This mode “well” or “ill” is “Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, not a circumstance, but results from all the circumstances. quando— But the mode which refers to a quality of the act is a spe- Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and cial circumstance; for instance, that a man walk fast or when.” slowly; that he strike hard or gently, and so forth. For in acts we must take note of “who” did it, “by what Reply to Objection 3. A condition of the cause, on aids” or “instruments” he did it, “what” he did, “where” he which the substance of the act depends, is not a circum- did it, “why” he did it, “how” and “when” he did it. But stance; it must be an additional condition. Thus, in regard Aristotle in Ethic. iii, 1 adds yet another, to wit, “about to the object, it is not a circumstance of theft that the ob- what,” which Tully includes in the circumstance “what.” ject is another’s property, for this belongs to the substance The reason of this enumeration may be set down as of the act; but that it be great or small. And the same follows. For a circumstance is described as something applies to the other circumstances which are considered outside the substance of the act, and yet in a way touch- in reference to the other causes. For the end that speci- ing it. Now this happens in three ways: first, inasmuch as fies the act is not a circumstance, but some additional end. it touches the act itself; secondly, inasmuch as it touches Thus, that a valiant man act “valiantly for the sake of” the the cause of the act; thirdly, inasmuch as it touches the good of the virtue or fortitude, is not a circumstance; but effect. It touches the act itself, either by way of mea- if he act valiantly for the sake of the delivery of the state, sure, as “time” and “place”; or by qualifying the act as the or of Christendom, or some such purpose. The same is to “mode of acting.” It touches the effect when we consider be said with regard to the circumstance “what”; for that a “what” is done. It touches the cause of the act, as to the man by pouring water on someone should happen to wash final cause, by the circumstance “why”; as to the material him, is not a circumstance of the washing; but that in do- cause, or object, in the circumstance “about what”; as to ing so he give him a chill, or scald him; heal him or harm the principal efficient cause, in the circumstance “who”; him, these are circumstances. and as to the instrumental efficient cause, in the circum- Whether the most important circumstances are “why” and “in what the act consists”? Ia IIae q. 7 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that these are not the properly called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary. most important circumstances, namely, “why” and those Now, the motive and object of the will is the end. There- “in which the act is,∗” as stated in Ethic. iii, 1. For those fore that circumstance is the most important of all which in which the act is seem to be place and time: and these do touches the act on the part of the end, viz. the circum- not seem to be the most important of the circumstances, stance “why”: and the second in importance, is that which since, of them all, they are the most extrinsic to the act. touches the very substance of the act, viz. the circum- Therefore those things in which the act is are not the most stance “what he did.” As to the other circumstances, they important circumstances. are more or less important, according as they more or less Objection 2. Further, the end of a thing is extrinsic to approach to these. it. Therefore it is not the most important circumstance. Reply to Objection 1. By those things “in which the Objection 3. Further, that which holds the foremost act is” the Philosopher does not mean time and place, place in regard to each thing, is its cause and its form. But but those circumstances that are affixed to the act itself. the cause of an act is the person that does it; while the Wherefore Gregory of Nyssa‡, as though he were explain- form of an act is the manner in which it is done. There- ing the dictum of the Philosopher, instead of the latter’s fore these two circumstances seem to be of the greatest term—“in which the act is”—said, “what is done.” importance. Reply to Objection 2. Although the end is not part On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa† says that “the of the substance of the act, yet it is the most important most important circumstances” are “why it is done” and cause of the act, inasmuch as it moves the agent to act. “what is done.” Wherefore the moral act is specified chiefly by the end. I answer that, As stated above (q. 1, a. 1), acts are Reply to Objection 3. The person that does the act is ∗ hen ois e praxis † Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi. ‡ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi 639 the cause of that act, inasmuch as he is moved thereto by not the substantial form of the act, for in an act the sub-the end; and it is chiefly in this respect that he is directed stantial form depends on the object and term or end; but it to the act; while other conditions of the person have not is, as it were, a certain accidental quality of the act. such an important relation to the act. As to the mode, it is 640 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 8 Of the Will, in Regard to What It Wills (In Three Articles) We must now consider the different acts of the will; and in the first place, those acts which belong to the will itself immediately, as being elicited by the will; secondly, those acts which are commanded by the will. Now the will is moved to the end, and to the means to the end; we must therefore consider: (1) those acts of the will whereby it is moved to the end; and (2) those whereby it is moved to the means. And since it seems that there are three acts of the will in reference to the end; viz. “volition,” “enjoyment,” and “intention”; we must consider: (1) volition; (2) enjoyment; (3) intention. Concerning the first, three things must be considered: (1) Of what things is the will? (2) By what is the will moved? (3) How is it moved? Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the will is of good only? (2) Whether it is of the end only, or also of the means? (3) If in any way it be of the means, whether it be moved to the end and to the means, by the same movement? Whether the will is of good only? Ia IIae q. 8 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not of good sults from a form, the natural appetite results from a only. For the same power regards opposites; for instance, form existing in the nature of things: while the sensi- sight regards white and black. But good and evil are op- tive appetite, as also the intellective or rational appetite, posites. Therefore the will is not only of good, but also of which we call the will, follows from an apprehended form. evil. Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to good exist- Objection 2. Further, rational powers can be di- ing in a thing; so the animal or voluntary appetite tends rected to opposite purposes, according to the Philosopher to a good which is apprehended. Consequently, in order (Metaph. ix, 2). But the will is a rational power, since it is that the will tend to anything, it is requisite, not that this “in the reason,” as is stated in De Anima iii, 9. Therefore be good in very truth, but that it be apprehended as good. the will can be directed to opposites; and consequently its Wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that “the end volition is not confined to good, but extends to evil. is a good, or an apparent good.” Objection 3. Further, good and being are convertible. Reply to Objection 1. The same power regards oppo- But volition is directed not only to beings, but also to non- sites, but it is not referred to them in the same way. Ac- beings. For sometimes we wish “not to walk,” or “not cordingly, the will is referred both to good and evil: but to speak”; and again at times we wish for future things, to good by desiring it: to evil, by shunning it. Wherefore which are not actual beings. Therefore the will is not of the actual desire of good is called “volition”∗, meaning good only. thereby the act of the will; for it is in this sense that we On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that are now speaking of the will. On the other hand, the shun- “evil is outside the scope of the will,” and that “all things ning of evil is better described as “nolition”: wherefore, desire good.” just as volition is of good, so nolition is of evil. I answer that, The will is a rational appetite. Now Reply to Objection 2. A rational power is not to be di- every appetite is only of something good. The reason of rected to all opposite purposes, but to those which are con- this is that the appetite is nothing else than an inclination tained under its proper object; for no power seeks other of a person desirous of a thing towards that thing. Now than its proper object. Now, the object of the will is good. every inclination is to something like and suitable to the Wherefore the will can be directed to such opposite pur- thing inclined. Since, therefore, everything, inasmuch as poses as are contained under good, such as to be moved it is being and substance, is a good, it must needs be that or to be at rest, to speak or to be silent, and such like: for every inclination is to something good. And hence it is the will can be directed to either under the aspect of good. that the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1) that “the good is Reply to Objection 3. That which is not a being in that which all desire.” nature, is considered as a being in the reason, wherefore But it must be noted that, since every inclination re- negations and privations are said to be “beings of reason.” ∗ In Latin, ‘voluntas’. To avoid confusion with “voluntas” (the will) St. Thomas adds a word of explanation, which in the translation may appear superfluous 641 In this way, too, future things, in so far as they are appre-and it is thus that the will is directed to them. Where- hended, are beings. Accordingly, in so far as such like are fore the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that “to lack evil is beings, they are apprehended under the aspect of good; considered as a good.” Whether volition is of the end only, or also of the means? Ia IIae q. 8 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that volition is not of simple act of that power: thus “to understand” designates the means, but of the end only. For the Philosopher says the simple act of the understanding. Now the simple act (Ethic. iii, 2) that “volition is of the end, while choice is of a power is referred to that which is in itself the object of the means.” of that power. But that which is good and willed in it- Objection 2. Further, “For objects differing in genus self is the end. Wherefore volition, properly speaking, is there are corresponding different powers of the soul” of the end itself. On the other hand, the means are good (Ethic. vi, 1). Now, the end and the means are in dif- and willed, not in themselves, but as referred to the end. ferent genera of good: because the end, which is a good Wherefore the will is directed to them, only in so far as it either of rectitude or of pleasure, is in the genus “quality,” is directed to the end: so that what it wills in them, is the or “action,” or “passion”; whereas the good which is use- end. Thus, to understand, is properly directed to things ful, and is directed to and end, is in the genus “relation” that are known in themselves, i.e. first principles: but (Ethic. i, 6). Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is not we do not speak of understanding with regard to things of the means. known through first principles, except in so far as we see Objection 3. Further, habits are proportionate to pow- the principles in those things. For in morals the end is ers, since they are perfections thereof. But in those habits what principles are in speculative science (Ethic. viii, 8). which are called practical arts, the end belongs to one, and Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking of the means to another art; thus the use of a ship, which is the will in reference to the simple act of the will; not in its end, belongs to the (art of the) helmsman; whereas the reference to the power of the will. building of the ship, which is directed to the end, belongs Reply to Objection 2. There are different powers for to the art of the shipwright. Therefore, since volition is of objects that differ in genus and are on an equality; for in- the end, it is not of the means. stance, sound and color are different genera of sensibles, On the contrary, In natural things, it is by the same to which are referred hearing and sight. But the useful and power that a thing passes through the middle space, and the righteous are not on an equality, but are as that which arrives at the terminus. But the means are a kind of middle is of itself, and that which is in relation to another. Now space, through which one arrives at the end or terminus. such like objects are always referred to the same power; Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is also of the means. for instance, the power of sight perceives both color and I answer that, The word “voluntas” sometimes des- light by which color is seen. ignates the power of the will, sometimes its act∗. Accord- Reply to Objection 3. Not everything that diversifies ingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends habits, diversifies the powers: since habits are certain de- both to the end and to the means. For every power extends terminations of powers to certain special acts. Moreover, to those things in which may be considered the aspect of every practical art considers both the end and the means. the object of that power in any way whatever: thus the For the art of the helmsman does indeed consider the end, sight extends to all things whatsoever that are in any way as that which it effects; and the means, as that which it colored. Now the aspect of good, which is the object of commands. On the other hand, the ship-building art con- the power of the will, may be found not only in the end, siders the means as that which it effects; but it considers but also in the means. that which is the end, as that to which it refers what it If, however, we speak of the will in regard to its act, effects. And again, in every practical art there is an end then, properly speaking, volition is of the end only. Be- proper to it and means that belong properly to that art. cause every act denominated from a power, designates the ∗ See note: above a. 1, Reply obj. 1 642 Whether the will is moved by the same act to the end and to the means? Ia IIae q. 8 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the will is moved by have health, and afterwards deliberating by what means the same act, to the end and to the means. Because accord- to be healed, wills to send for the doctor to heal him. The ing to the Philosopher (Topic. iii, 2) “where one thing is same happens in regard to the intellect: for at first a man on account of another there is only one.” But the will does understands the principles in themselves; but afterwards not will the means save on account of the end. Therefore he understands them in the conclusions, inasmuch as he it is moved to both by the same act. assents to the conclusions on account of the principles. Objection 2. Further, the end is the reason for willing Reply to Objection 1. This argument holds in respect the means, just as light is the reason of seeing colors. But of the will being moved to the end as the reason for willing light and colors are seen by the same act. Therefore it is the means. the same movement of the will, whereby it wills the end Reply to Objection 2. Whenever color is seen, by the and the means. same act the light is seen; but the light can be seen with- Objection 3. Further, it is one and the same natural out the color being seen. In like manner whenever a man movement which tends through the middle space to the wills the means, by the same act he wills the end; but not terminus. But the means are in comparison to the end, as the conversely. the middle space is to the terminus. Therefore it is the Reply to Objection 3. In the execution of a work, the same movement of the will whereby it is directed to the means are as the middle space, and the end, as the termi- end and to the means. nus. Wherefore just as natural movement sometimes stops On the contrary, Acts are diversified according to in the middle and does not reach the terminus; so some- their objects. But the end is a different species of good times one is busy with the means, without gaining the end. from the means, which are a useful good. Therefore the But in willing it is the reverse: the will through (willing) will is not moved to both by the same act. the end comes to will the means; just as the intellect ar- I answer that, Since the end is willed in itself, rives at the conclusions through the principles which are whereas the means, as such, are only willed for the end, it called “means.” Hence it is that sometimes the intellect is evident that the will can be moved to the end, without understands a mean, and does not proceed thence to the being moved to the means; whereas it cannot be moved conclusion. And in like manner the will sometimes wills to the means, as such, unless it is moved to the end. Ac- the end, and yet does not proceed to will the means. cordingly the will is moved to the end in two ways: first, The solution to the argument in the contrary sense is to the end absolutely and in itself; secondly, as the reason clear from what has been said above (a. 2, ad 2). For for willing the means. Hence it is evident that the will the useful and the righteous are not species of good in an is moved by one and the same movement, to the end, as equal degree, but are as that which is for its own sake and the reason for willing the means; and to the means them- that which is for the sake of something else: wherefore selves. But it is another act whereby the will is moved the act of the will can be directed to one and not to the to the end absolutely. And sometimes this act precedes other; but not conversely. the other in time; for example when a man first wills to 643 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 9 Of That Which Moves the Will (In Six Articles) We must now consider what moves the will: and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the will is moved by the intellect? (2) Whether it is moved by the sensitive appetite? (3) Whether the will moves itself? (4) Whether it is moved by an extrinsic principle? (5) Whether it is moved by a heavenly body? (6) Whether the will is moved by God alone as by an extrinsic principle? Whether the will is moved by the intellect? Ia IIae q. 9 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not moved The motion of the subject itself is due to some agent. by the intellect. For Augustine says on Ps. 118:20: “My And since every agent acts for an end, as was shown above soul hath coveted to long for Thy justifications: The intel- (q. 1, a. 2), the principle of this motion lies in the end. And lect flies ahead, the desire follows sluggishly or not at all: hence it is that the art which is concerned with the end, we know what is good, but deeds delight us not.” But it by its command moves the art which is concerned with would not be so, if the will were moved by the intellect: the means; just as the “art of sailing commands the art of because movement of the movable results from motion of shipbuilding” (Phys. ii, 2). Now good in general, which the mover. Therefore the intellect does not move the will. has the nature of an end, is the object of the will. Conse- Objection 2. Further, the intellect in presenting the quently, in this respect, the will moves the other powers of appetible object to the will, stands in relation to the will, the soul to their acts, for we make use of the other powers as the imagination in representing the appetible will to the when we will. For the end and perfection of every other sensitive appetite. But the imagination, does not remove power, is included under the object of the will as some the sensitive appetite: indeed sometimes our imagination particular good: and always the art or power to which the affects us no more than what is set before us in a picture, universal end belongs, moves to their acts the arts or pow- and moves us not at all (De Anima ii, 3). Therefore nei- ers to which belong the particular ends included in the ther does the intellect move the will. universal end. Thus the leader of an army, who intends Objection 3. Further, the same is not mover and the common good—i.e. the order of the whole army—by moved in respect of the same thing. But the will moves his command moves one of the captains, who intends the the intellect; for we exercise the intellect when we will. order of one company. Therefore the intellect does not move the will. On the other hand, the object moves, by determining On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in iii, 10) that “the appetible object is a mover not moved, natural things actions are specified, as heating by heat. whereas the will is a mover moved.” Now the first formal principle is universal “being” and I answer that, A thing requires to be moved by some- “truth,” which is the object of the intellect. And there- thing in so far as it is in potentiality to several things; for fore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as that which is in potentiality needs to be reduced to act by presenting its object to it. something actual; and to do this is to move. Now a power Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted proves, not of the soul is seen to be in potentiality to different things in that the intellect does not move, but that it does not move two ways: first, with regard to acting and not acting; sec- of necessity. ondly, with regard to this or that action. Thus the sight Reply to Objection 2. Just as the imagination of a sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and form without estimation of fitness or harmfulness, does sometimes it sees white, and sometimes black. It needs not move the sensitive appetite; so neither does the ap- therefore a mover in two respects, viz. as to the exercise prehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and or use of the act, and as to the determination of the act. desirability. Hence it is not the speculative intellect that The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is moves, but the practical intellect (De Anima iii, 9). sometimes acting, sometimes not acting: while the other Reply to Objection 3. The will moves the intellect as is on the part of the object, by reason of which the act is to the exercise of its act; since even the true itself which is specified. the perfection of the intellect, is included in the universal 644 good, as a particular good. But as to the determination of a special aspect as contained in the universal true. It is the act, which the act derives from the object, the intellect therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved in moves the will; since the good itself is apprehended under the same respect. Whether the will is moved by the sensitive appetite? Ia IIae q. 9 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the will cannot be various ways, as being fitting or unfitting. Wherefore as moved by the sensitive appetite. For “to move and to act the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): “According as a man is more excellent than to be passive,” as Augustine says is, such does the end seem to him.” (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). But the sensitive appetite is less Now it is evident that according to a passion of the excellent than the will which is the intellectual appetite; sensitive appetite man is changed to a certain disposi- just as sense is less excellent than intellect. Therefore the tion. Wherefore according as man is affected by a pas- sensitive appetite does not move the will. sion, something seems to him fitting, which does not seem Objection 2. Further, no particular power can produce so when he is not so affected: thus that seems good to a a universal effect. But the sensitive appetite is a particu- man when angered, which does not seem good when he lar power, because it follows the particular apprehension is calm. And in this way, the sensitive appetite moves the of sense. Therefore it cannot cause the movement of the will, on the part of the object. will, which movement is universal, as following the uni- Reply to Objection 1. Nothing hinders that which is versal apprehension of the intellect. better simply and in itself, from being less excellent in a Objection 3. Further, as is proved in Phys. viii, 5, certain respect. Accordingly the will is simply more ex- the mover is not moved by that which it moves, in such a cellent than the sensitive appetite: but in respect of the way that there be reciprocal motion. But the will moves man in whom a passion is predominant, in so far as he the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite is subject to that passion, the sensitive appetite is more obeys the reason. Therefore the sensitive appetite does excellent. not move the will. Reply to Objection 2. Men’s acts and choices are in On the contrary, It is written (James 1:14): “Every reference to singulars. Wherefore from the very fact that man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn the sensitive appetite is a particular power, it has great in- away and allured.” But man would not be drawn away by fluence in disposing man so that something seems to him his concupiscence, unless his will were moved by the sen- such or otherwise, in particular cases. sitive appetite, wherein concupiscence resides. Therefore Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (Polit. the sensitive appetite moves the will. i, 2), the reason, in which resides the will, moves, by its I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), that which is command, the irascible and concupiscible powers, not, in- apprehended as good and fitting, moves the will by way deed, “by a despotic sovereignty,” as a slave is moved by of object. Now, that a thing appear to be good and fitting, his master, but by a “royal and politic sovereignty,” as happens from two causes: namely, from the condition, ei- free men are ruled by their governor, and can neverthe- ther of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it is pro- less act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible posed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence and concupiscible can move counter to the will: and ac- it depends on both extremes. And hence it is that taste, cordingly nothing hinders the will from being moved by according as it is variously disposed, takes to a thing in them at times. Whether the will moves itself? Ia IIae q. 9 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the will does not itself. If, therefore, it moved itself, it would always be move itself. For every mover, as such, is in act: whereas moving itself, which is clearly false. what is moved, is in potentiality; since “movement is the Objection 3. Further, the will is moved by the in- act of that which is in potentiality, as such”∗. Now the tellect, as stated above (a. 1). If, therefore, the will move same is not in potentiality and in act, in respect of the itself, it would follow that the same thing is at once moved same. Therefore nothing moves itself. Neither, therefore, immediately by two movers; which seems unreasonable. can the will move itself. Therefore the will does not move itself. Objection 2. Further, the movable is moved on the On the contrary, The will is mistress of its own act, mover being present. But the will is always present to and to it belongs to will and not to will. But this would not ∗ Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1 645 be so, had it not the power to move itself to will. Therether is it in act and in potentiality in respect of the same. fore it moves itself. But forasmuch as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), it belongs to the from potentiality to act, in respect of the means, so as, in will to move the other powers, by reason of the end which a word, to will them actually. is the will’s object. Now, as stated above (q. 8, a. 2), the Reply to Objection 2. The power of the will is always end is in things appetible, what the principle is in things actually present to itself; but the act of the will, whereby it intelligible. But it is evident that the intellect, through its wills an end, is not always in the will. But it is by this act knowledge of the principle, reduces itself from potential- that it moves itself. Accordingly it does not follow that it ity to act, as to its knowledge of the conclusions; and thus is always moving itself. it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, through its Reply to Objection 3. The will is moved by the intel- volition of the end, moves itself to will the means. lect, otherwise than by itself. By the intellect it is moved Reply to Objection 1. It is not in respect of the same on the part of the object: whereas it is moved by itself, as that the will moves itself and is moved: wherefore nei- to the exercise of its act, in respect of the end. Whether the will is moved by an exterior principle? Ia IIae q. 9 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not moved reflection he comes to the conclusion that he can be healed by anything exterior. For the movement of the will is vol- by a physician: and this he wills. But since he did not al- untary. But it is essential to the voluntary act that it be ways actually will to have health, he must, of necessity, from an intrinsic principle, just as it is essential to the nathave begun, through something moving him, to will to be ural act. Therefore the movement of the will is not from healed. And if the will moved itself to will this, it must, of anything exterior. necessity, have done this with the aid of counsel follow- Objection 2. Further, the will cannot suffer violence, ing some previous volition. But this process could not go as was shown above (q. 6, a. 4). But the violent act is one on to infinity. Wherefore we must, of necessity, suppose “the principle of which is outside the agent”∗. Therefore that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the the will cannot be moved by anything exterior. instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes Objection 3. Further, that which is sufficiently moved in a chapter of the Eudemian Ethics (vii, 14). by one mover, needs not to be moved by another. But the Reply to Objection 1. It is essential to the volun- will moves itself sufficiently. Therefore it is not moved by tary act that its principle be within the agent: but it is not anything exterior. necessary that this inward principle be the first principle On the contrary, The will is moved by the object, as unmoved by another. Wherefore though the voluntary act stated above (a. 1 ). But the object of the will can be some- has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless its first thing exterior, offered to the sense. Therefore the will can principle is from without. Thus, too, the first principle of be moved by something exterior. the natural movement is from without, that, to wit, which I answer that, As far as the will is moved by the ob- moves nature. ject, it is evident that it can be moved by something ex- Reply to Objection 2. For an act to be violent it is terior. But in so far as it is moved in the exercise of its not enough that its principle be extrinsic, but we must add act, we must again hold it to be moved by some exterior “without the concurrence of him that suffers violence.” principle. This does not happen when the will is moved by an exte- For everything that is at one time an agent actually, rior principle: for it is the will that wills, though moved by and at another time an agent in potentiality, needs to be another. But this movement would be violent, if it were moved by a mover. Now it is evident that the will begins counter to the movement of the will: which in the present to will something, whereas previously it did not will it. case is impossible; since then the will would will and not Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by something to will the same thing. will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as stated above (a. 3), Reply to Objection 3. The will moves itself suffi- in so far as through willing the end it reduces itself to the ciently in one respect, and in its own order, that is to say act of willing the means. Now it cannot do this without as proximate agent; but it cannot move itself in every re- the aid of counsel: for when a man wills to be healed, he spect, as we have shown. Wherefore it needs to be moved begins to reflect how this can be attained, and through this by another as first mover. ∗ Aristotle, Ethic. iii, 1 646 Whether the will is moved by a heavenly body? Ia IIae q. 9 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the human will is For all the sensitive powers, since they are acts of bodily moved by a heavenly body. For all various and multiform organs, can be moved accidentally, by the heavenly bod- movements are reduced, as to their cause, to a uniform ies, i.e. through those bodies being moved, whose acts movement which is that of the heavens, as is proved in they are. Phys. viii, 9. But human movements are various and mul- But since it has been stated (a. 2) that the intellectual tiform, since they begin to be, whereas previously they appetite is moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite, were not. Therefore they are reduced, as to their cause, to the movements of the heavenly bodies have an indirect the movement of the heavens, which is uniform according bearing on the will; in so far as the will happens to be to its nature. moved by the passions of the sensitive appetite. Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine (De Reply to Objection 1. The multiform movements of Trin. iii, 4) “the lower bodies are moved by the higher.” the human will are reduced to some uniform cause, which, But the movements of the human body, which are caused however, is above the intellect and will. This can be said, by the will, could not be reduced to the movement of the not of any body, but of some superior immaterial sub- heavens, as to their cause, unless the will too were moved stance. Therefore there is no need for the movement of by the heavens. Therefore the heavens move the human the will to be referred to the movement of the heavens, as will. to its cause. Objection 3. Further, by observing the heavenly bod- Reply to Objection 2. The movements of the human ies astrologers foretell the truth about future human acts, body are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of which are caused by the will. But this would not be so, if a heavenly body, in so far as the disposition suitable to a the heavenly bodies could not move man’s will. Therefore particular movement, is somewhat due to the influence of the human will is moved by a heavenly body. heavenly bodies; also, in so far as the sensitive appetite On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, is stirred by the influence of heavenly bodies; and again, 7) that “the heavenly bodies are not the causes of our acts.” in so far as exterior bodies are moved in accordance with But they would be, if the will, which is the principle of hu- the movement of heavenly bodies, at whose presence, the man acts, were moved by the heavenly bodies. Therefore will begins to will or not to will something; for instance, the will is not moved by the heavenly bodies. when the body is chilled, we begin to wish to make the I answer that, It is evident that the will can be moved fire. But this movement of the will is on the part of the by the heavenly bodies in the same way as it is moved object offered from without: not on the part of an inward by its object; that is to say, in so far as exterior bodies, instigation. which move the will, through being offered to the senses, Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (Cf. Ia, q. 84, and also the organs themselves of the sensitive powers, Aa. 6,7) the sensitive appetite is the act of a bodily or- are subject to the movements of the heavenly bodies. gan. Wherefore there is no reason why man should not But some have maintained that heavenly bodies have be prone to anger or concupiscence, or some like passion, an influence on the human will, in the same way as some by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies, just as by exterior agent moves the will, as to the exercise of its act. reason of his natural complexion. But the majority of men But this is impossible. For the “will,” as stated in De An- are led by the passions, which the wise alone resist. Con- ima iii, 9, “is in the reason.” Now the reason is a power of sequently, in the majority of cases predictions about hu- the soul, not bound to a bodily organ: wherefore it follows man acts, gathered from the observation of heavenly bod- that the will is a power absolutely incorporeal and imma- ies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy says (Centil- terial. But it is evident that no body can act on what is oquium v), “the wise man governs the stars”; which is a incorporeal, but rather the reverse: because things incor- though to say that by resisting his passions, he opposes his poreal and immaterial have a power more formal and more will, which is free and nowise subject to the movement of universal than any corporeal things whatever. Therefore it the heavens, to such like effects of the heavenly bodies. is impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the in- Or, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 15): “We must tellect or will. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 3) confess that when the truth is foretold by astrologers, this ascribed to those who held that intellect differs not from is due to some most hidden inspiration, to which the hu- sense, the theory that “such is the will of men, as is the day man mind is subject without knowing it. And since this is which the father of men and of gods bring on”∗ (referring done in order to deceive man, it must be the work of the to Jupiter, by whom they understand the entire heavens). lying spirits.” ∗ Odyssey xviii. 135 647 Whether the will is moved by God alone, as exterior principle? Ia IIae q. 9 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not moved times moved by something that is not his cause; but that by God alone as exterior principle. For it is natural that his voluntary movement be from an exterior principle that the inferior be moved by its superior: thus the lower bod- is not the cause of his will, is impossible. ies are moved by the heavenly bodies. But there is some- Now the cause of the will can be none other than God. thing which is higher than the will of man and below God, And this is evident for two reasons. First, because the will namely, the angel. Therefore man’s will can be moved by is a power of the rational soul, which is caused by God an angel also, as exterior principle. alone, by creation, as was stated in the Ia, q. 90, a. 2. Sec- Objection 2. Further, the act of the will follows the ondly, it is evident from the fact that the will is ordained act of the intellect. But man’s intellect is reduced to act, to the universal good. Wherefore nothing else can be the not by God alone, but also by the angel who enlightens it, cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the univer- as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). For the same reason, sal good: while every other good is good by participation, therefore, the will also is moved by an angel. and is some particular good, and a particular cause does Objection 3. Further, God is not the cause of other not give a universal inclination. Hence neither can pri- than good things, according to Gn. 1:31: “God saw all the mary matter, which is potentiality to all forms, be created things that He had made, and they were very good.” If, by some particular agent. therefore man’s will were moved by God alone, it would Reply to Objection 1. An angel is not above man in never be moved to evil: and yet it is the will whereby “we such a way as to be the cause of his will, as the heavenly sin and whereby we do right,” as Augustine says (Retract. bodies are the causes of natural forms, from which result i, 9). the natural movements of natural bodies. On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:13): “It is God Reply to Objection 2. Man’s intellect is moved by Who worketh in us” [Vulg.‘you’] “both to will and to ac- an angel, on the part of the object, which by the power of complish.” the angelic light is proposed to man’s knowledge. And in I answer that, The movement of the will is from this way the will also can be moved by a creature from within, as also is the movement of nature. Now although it without, as stated above (a. 4). is possible for something to move a natural thing, without Reply to Objection 3. God moves man’s will, as the being the cause of the thing moved, yet that alone, which Universal Mover, to the universal object of the will, which is in some way the cause of a thing’s nature, can cause is good. And without this universal motion, man cannot a natural movement in that thing. For a stone is moved will anything. But man determines himself by his reason upwards by a man, who is not the cause of the stone’s to will this or that, which is true or apparent good. Never- nature, but this movement is not natural to the stone; but theless, sometimes God moves some specially to the will- the natural movement of the stone is caused by no other ing of something determinate, which is good; as in the than the cause of its nature. Wherefore it is said in Phys. case of those whom He moves by grace, as we shall state vii, 4, that the generator moves locally heavy and light later on (q. 109, a. 2). things. Accordingly man endowed with a will is some- 648 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 10 Of the Manner in Which the Will Is Moved (In Four Articles) We must now consider the manner in which the will is moved. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the will is moved to anything naturally? (2) Whether it is moved of necessity by its object? (3) Whether it is moved of necessity by the lower appetite? (4) Whether it is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God? Whether the will is moved to anything naturally? Ia IIae q. 10 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not moved intelligible: and, speaking generally, it is all those things to anything naturally. For the natural agent is condivided which belong to the willer according to his nature. For it with the voluntary agent, as stated at the beginning of is not only things pertaining to the will that the will de- Phys. ii, 1. Therefore the will is not moved to anything sires, but also that which pertains to each power, and to naturally. the entire man. Wherefore man wills naturally not only Objection 2. Further, that which is natural is in a thing the object of the will, but also other things that are ap-always: as “being hot” is in fire. But no movement is al- propriate to the other powers; such as the knowledge of ways in the will. Therefore no movement is natural to the truth, which befits the intellect; and to be and to live and will. other like things which regard the natural well-being; all Objection 3. Further, nature is determinate to one of which are included in the object of the will, as so many thing: whereas the will is referred to opposites. There- particular goods. fore the will wills nothing naturally. Reply to Objection 1. The will is distinguished from On the contrary, The movement of the will follows nature as one kind of cause from another; for some things the movement of the intellect. But the intellect under- happen naturally and some are done voluntarily. There stands some things naturally. Therefore the will, too, wills is, however, another manner of causing that is proper to some things naturally. the will, which is mistress of its act, besides the manner I answer that, As Boethius says (De Duabus Nat.) proper to nature, which is determinate to one thing. But and the Philosopher also (Metaph. v, 4) the word “nature” since the will is founded on some nature, it is necessary is used in a manifold sense. For sometimes it stands for that the movement proper to nature be shared by the will, the intrinsic principle in movable things. In this sense na- to some extent: just as what belongs to a previous cause is ture is either matter or the material form, as stated in Phys. shared by a subsequent cause. Because in every thing, be- ii, 1. In another sense nature stands for any substance, ing itself, which is from nature, precedes volition, which or even for any being. And in this sense, that is said to is from the will. And hence it is that the will wills some- be natural to a thing which befits it in respect of its sub- thing naturally. stance. And this is that which of itself is in a thing. Now Reply to Objection 2. In the case of natural things, all things that do not of themselves belong to the thing in that which is natural, as a result of the form only, is al- which they are, are reduced to something which belongs ways in them actually, as heat is in fire. But that which is of itself to that thing, as to their principle. Wherefore, tak- natural as a result of matter, is not always in them actu- ing nature in this sense, it is necessary that the principle of ally, but sometimes only in potentiality: because form is whatever belongs to a thing, be a natural principle. This is act, whereas matter is potentiality. Now movement is “the evident in regard to the intellect: for the principles of in- act of that which is in potentiality” (Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1). tellectual knowledge are naturally known. In like manner Wherefore that which belongs to, or results from, move- the principle of voluntary movements must be something ment, in regard to natural things, is not always in them. naturally willed. Thus fire does not always move upwards, but only when Now this is good in general, to which the will tends it is outside its own place.∗ And in like manner it is not naturally, as does each power to its object; and again it is necessary that the will (which is reduced from potentiality the last end, which stands in the same relation to things ap- to act, when it wills something), should always be in the petible, as the first principles of demonstrations to things act of volition; but only when it is in a certain determinate ∗ The Aristotelian theory was that fire’s proper place is the fiery heaven, i.e. the Empyrean. 649 disposition. But God’s will, which is pure act, is always individual. Since, therefore, the will is an immaterial in the act of volition. power like the intellect, some one general thing corre- Reply to Objection 3. To every nature there is one sponds to it, naturally which is the good; just as to the thing corresponding, proportionate, however, to that na- intellect there corresponds some one general thing, which ture. For to nature considered as a genus, there cor- is the true, or being, or “what a thing is.” And under good responds something one generically; and to nature as in general are included many particular goods, to none of species there corresponds something one specifically; and which is the will determined. to the individualized nature there corresponds some one Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by its object? Ia IIae q. 10 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that the will is moved, of neces- some respects, and in other respects not, the sight would sity, by its object. For the object of the will is compared not of necessity see such an object: for it might look at to the will as mover to movable, as stated in De Anima iii, that part of the object which is not actually colored, and 10. But a mover, if it be sufficient, moves the movable of thus it would not see it. Now just as the actually colored necessity. Therefore the will can be moved of necessity is the object of sight, so is good the object of the will. by its object. Wherefore if the will be offered an object which is good Objection 2. Further, just as the will is an immaterial universally and from every point of view, the will tends to power, so is the intellect: and both powers are ordained it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it cannot will to a universal object, as stated above (a. 1, ad 3). But the the opposite. If, on the other hand, the will is offered an intellect is moved, of necessity, by its object: therefore the object that is not good from every point of view, it will not will also, by its object. tend to it of necessity. And since lack of any good what- Objection 3. Further, whatever one wills, is either the ever, is a non-good, consequently, that good alone which end, or something ordained to an end. But, seemingly, one is perfect and lacking in nothing, is such a good that the wills an end necessarily: because it is like the principle in will cannot not-will it: and this is Happiness. Whereas speculative matters, to which principle one assents of ne- any other particular goods, in so far as they are lacking cessity. Now the end is the reason for willing the means; in some good, can be regarded as non-goods: and from and so it seems that we will the means also necessarily. this point of view, they can be set aside or approved by Therefore the will is moved of necessity by its object. the will, which can tend to one and the same thing from On the contrary, The rational powers, according to various points of view. the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2) are directed to opposites. Reply to Objection 1. The sufficient mover of a But the will is a rational power, since it is in the reason, power is none but that object that in every respect presents as stated in De Anima iii, 9. Therefore the will is directed the aspect of the mover of that power. If, on the other to opposites. Therefore it is not moved, of necessity, to hand, it is lacking in any respect, it will not move of ne- either of the opposites. cessity, as stated above. I answer that, The will is moved in two ways: first, Reply to Objection 2. The intellect is moved, of ne- as to the exercise of its act; secondly, as to the specifica- cessity, by an object which is such as to be always and tion of its act, derived from the object. As to the first way, necessarily true: but not by that which may be either true no object moves the will necessarily, for no matter what or false—viz. by that which is contingent: as we have said the object be, it is in man’s power not to think of it, and of the good. consequently not to will it actually. But as to the second Reply to Objection 3. The last end moves the will manner of motion, the will is moved by one object neces- necessarily, because it is the perfect good. In like man- sarily, by another not. For in the movement of a power by ner whatever is ordained to that end, and without which its object, we must consider under what aspect the object the end cannot be attained, such as “to be” and “to live,” moves the power. For the visible moves the sight, under and the like. But other things without which the end can the aspect of color actually visible. Wherefore if color be be gained, are not necessarily willed by one who wills offered to the sight, it moves the sight necessarily: unless the end: just as he who assents to the principle, does not one turns one’s eyes away; which belongs to the exercise necessarily assent to the conclusions, without which the of the act. But if the sight were confronted with some- principles can still be true. thing not in all respects colored actually, but only so in 650 Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by the lower appetite? Ia IIae q. 10 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the will is moved of movement of reason, nor, consequently, of will. necessity by a passion of the lower appetite. For the Apos- Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely en- tle says (Rom. 7:19): “The good which I will I do not; but grossed by the passion, so that the judgment of reason the evil which I will not, that I do”: and this is said by retains, to a certain extent, its freedom: and thus the move- reason of concupiscence, which is a passion. Therefore ment of the will remains in a certain degree. Accordingly the will is moved of necessity by a passion. in so far as the reason remains free, and not subject to the Objection 2. Further, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5, “ac- passion, the will’s movement, which also remains, does cording as a man is, such does the end seem to him.” But it not tend of necessity to that whereto the passion inclines is not in man’s power to cast aside a passion once. There- it. Consequently, either there is no movement of the will fore it is not in man’s power not to will that to which the in that man, and the passion alone holds its sway: or if passion inclines him. there be a movement of the will, it does not necessarily Objection 3. Further, a universal cause is not ap- follow the passion. plied to a particular effect, except by means of a particular Reply to Objection 1. Although the will cannot pre- cause: wherefore the universal reason does not move save vent the movement of concupiscence from arising, of by means of a particular estimation, as stated in De Anima which the Apostle says: “The evil which I will not, that iii, 11. But as the universal reason is to the particular es- I do—i.e. I desire”; yet it is in the power of the will not timation, so is the will to the sensitive appetite. Therefore to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence. And the will is not moved to will something particular, except thus it does not necessarily follow the movement of con- through the sensitive appetite. Therefore, if the sensitive cupiscence. appetite happen to be disposed to something, by reason of Reply to Objection 2. Since there is in man a twofold a passion, the will cannot be moved in a contrary sense. nature, intellectual and sensitive; sometimes man is such On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 4:7): “Thy lust and such uniformly in respect of his whole soul: either be- [Vulg. ‘The lust thereof’] shall be under thee, and thou cause the sensitive part is wholly subject to this reason, as shalt have dominion over it.” Therefore man’s will is in the virtuous; or because reason is entirely engrossed by moved of necessity by the lower appetite. passion, as in a madman. But sometimes, although rea- I answer that, As stated above (q. 9, a. 2), the pas- son is clouded by passion, yet something of this reason sion of the sensitive appetite moves the will, in so far as remains free. And in respect of this, man can either repel the will is moved by its object: inasmuch as, to wit, man the passion entirely, or at least hold himself in check so through being disposed in such and such a way by a pas- as not to be led away by the passion. For when thus dis- sion, judges something to be fitting and good, which he posed, since man is variously disposed according to the would not judge thus were it not for the passion. Now various parts of the soul, a thing appears to him otherwise this influence of a passion on man occurs in two ways. according to his reason, than it does according to a pas- First, so that his reason is wholly bound, so that he has sion. not the use of reason: as happens in those who through a Reply to Objection 3. The will is moved not only by violent access of anger or concupiscence become furious the universal good apprehended by the reason, but also by or insane, just as they may from some other bodily dis- good apprehended by sense. Wherefore he can be moved order; since such like passions do not take place without to some particular good independently of a passion of the some change in the body. And of such the same is to be sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things with- said as of irrational animals, which follow, of necessity, out passion, and through choice alone; as is most evident the impulse of their passions: for in them there is neither in those cases wherein reason resists passion. Whether the will is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God? Ia IIae q. 10 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the will is moved of But “whatever God does in a thing is natural to it,” as Au- necessity by God. For every agent that cannot be resisted gustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3). Therefore the will moves of necessity. But God cannot be resisted, because wills of necessity everything to which God moves it. His power is infinite; wherefore it is written (Rom. 9:19): Objection 3. Further, a thing is possible, if nothing “Who resisteth His will?” Therefore God moves the will impossible follows from its being supposed. But some- of necessity. thing impossible follows from the supposition that the will Objection 2. Further, the will is moved of necessity does not will that to which God moves it: because in that to whatever it wills naturally, as stated above (a. 2, ad 3). case God’s operation would be ineffectual. Therefore it 651 is not possible for the will not to will that to which God only to the doing of something by the thing which He moves it. Therefore it wills it of necessity. moves, but also to its being done in a way which is fit- On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): “God ting to the nature of that thing. And therefore it would be made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand more repugnant to the Divine motion, for the will to be of his own counsel.” Therefore He does not of necessity moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature; than move man’s will. for it to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature. I answer that, As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) Reply to Objection 2. That is natural to a thing, “it belongs to Divine providence, not to destroy but to which God so works in it that it may be natural to it: for preserve the nature of things.” Wherefore it moves all thus is something becoming to a thing, according as God things in accordance with their conditions; so that from wishes it to be becoming. Now He does not wish that necessary causes through the Divine motion, effects fol- whatever He works in things should be natural to them, low of necessity; but from contingent causes, effects fol- for instance, that the dead should rise again. But this He low contingently. Since, therefore, the will is an active does wish to be natural to each thing—that it be subject to principle, not determinate to one thing, but having an in- the Divine power. different relation to many things, God so moves it, that Reply to Objection 3. If God moves the will to any- He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its thing, it is incompatible with this supposition, that the will movement remains contingent and not necessary, except be not moved thereto. But it is not impossible simply. in those things to which it is moved naturally. Consequently it does not follow that the will is moved by Reply to Objection 1. The Divine will extends not God necessarily. 652 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 11 Of Enjoyment∗, Which Is an Act of the Will (In Four Articles) We must now consider enjoyment: concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power? (2) Whether it belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to irrational animals? (3) Whether enjoyment is only of the last end? (4) Whether it is only of the end possessed? Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power? Ia IIae q. 11 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that to enjoy belongs not from sensible fruits. But sensible fruit is that which we only to the appetitive power. For to enjoy seems noth- expect the tree to produce in the last place, and in which a ing else than to receive the fruit. But it is the intellect, in certain sweetness is to be perceived. Hence fruition seems whose act Happiness consists, as shown above (q. 3, a. 4), to have relation to love, or to the delight which one has in that receives the fruit of human life, which is Happiness. realizing the longed-for term, which is the end. Now the Therefore to enjoy is not an act of the appetitive power, end and the good is the object of the appetitive power. but of the intellect. Wherefore it is evident that fruition is the act of the appet- Objection 2. Further, each power has its proper end, itive power. which is its perfection: thus the end of sight is to know the Reply to Objection 1. Nothing hinders one and the visible; of the hearing, to perceive sounds; and so forth. same thing from belonging, under different aspects, to dif- But the end of a thing is its fruit. Therefore to enjoy be- ferent powers. Accordingly the vision of God, as vision, longs to each power, and not only to the appetite. is an act of the intellect, but as a good and an end, is the Objection 3. Further, enjoyment implies a certain de- object of the will. And as such is the fruition thereof: so light. But sensible delight belongs to sense, which de- that the intellect attains this end, as the executive power, lights in its object: and for the same reason, intellectual but the will as the motive power, moving (the powers) to- delight belongs to the intellect. Therefore enjoyment be- wards the end and enjoying the end attained. longs to the apprehensive, and not to the appetitive power. Reply to Objection 2. The perfection and end of ev- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, ery other power is contained in the object of the appetitive 4; and De Trin. x, 10,11): “To enjoy is to adhere lovingly power, as the proper is contained in the common, as stated to something for its own sake.” But love belongs to the above (q. 9, a. 1). Hence the perfection and end of each appetitive power. Therefore also to enjoy is an act of the power, in so far as it is a good, belongs to the appetitive appetitive power. power. Wherefore the appetitive power moves the other I answer that, “Fruitio” [enjoyment] and “fructus” powers to their ends; and itself realizes the end, when each [fruit] seem to refer to the same, one being derived from of them reaches the end. the other; which from which, matters not for our pur- Reply to Objection 3. In delight there are two things: pose; though it seems probable that the one which is more perception of what is becoming; and this belongs to the clearly known, was first named. Now those things are apprehensive power; and complacency in that which is most manifest to us which appeal most to the senses: offered as becoming: and this belongs to the appetitive wherefore it seems that the word “fruition” is derived power, in which power delight is formally completed. Whether to enjoy belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to irrational animals? Ia IIae q. 11 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that to enjoy belongs to fore it is not for them to enjoy. men alone. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) Objection 3. Further, just as the sensitive appetite is that “it is given to us men to enjoy and to use.” Therefore beneath the intellectual appetite, so is the natural appetite other animals cannot enjoy. beneath the sensitive. If, therefore, to enjoy belongs to Objection 2. Further, to enjoy relates to the last end. the sensitive appetite, it seems that for the same reason it But irrational animals cannot obtain the last end. There- can belong to the natural appetite. But this is evidently ∗ or, Fruition 653 false, since the latter cannot delight in anything. There-the universal formality of the end and the good; and such fore the sensitive appetite cannot enjoy: and accordingly knowledge belongs to the rational nature alone. On the enjoyment is not possible for irrational animals. other hand, imperfect knowledge is that by which the end On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): and the good are known in the particular. Such knowledge “It is not so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy their is in irrational animals: whose appetitive powers do not food and any bodily pleasure.” command with freedom, but are moved according to a nat- I answer that, As was stated above (a. 1) to enjoy is ural instinct to whatever they apprehend. Consequently, not the act of the power that achieves the end as execu- enjoyment belongs to the rational nature, in a perfect de- tor, but of the power that commands the achievement; for gree; to irrational animals, imperfectly; to other creatures, it has been said to belong to the appetitive power. Now not at all. things void of reason have indeed a power of achieving Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking there of an end by way of execution, as that by which a heavy perfect enjoyment. body has a downward tendency, whereas a light body has Reply to Objection 2. Enjoyment need not be of the an upward tendency. Yet the power of command in re- last end simply; but of that which each one chooses for his spect of the end is not in them, but in some higher nature, last end. which moves all nature by its command, just as in things Reply to Objection 3. The sensitive appetite follows endowed with knowledge, the appetite moves the other some knowledge; not so the natural appetite, especially in powers to their acts. Wherefore it is clear that things void things void of knowledge. of knowledge, although they attain an end, have no enjoy- Reply to Objection 4. Augustine is speaking there of ment of the end: this is only for those that are endowed imperfect enjoyment. This is clear from his way of speak- with knowledge. ing: for he says that “it is not so absurd to suppose that Now knowledge of the end is twofold: perfect and im- even beasts enjoy,” that is, as it would be, if one were to perfect. Perfect knowledge of the end, is that whereby not say that they “use.” only is that known which is the end and the good, but also Whether enjoyment is only of the last end? Ia IIae q. 11 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that enjoyment is not only atively; simply, if it be referred to nothing else; relatively, of the last end. For the Apostle says (Philem. 20): “Yea, if it is the last in a particular series. Therefore that which brother, may I enjoy thee in the Lord.” But it is evident is last simply, and in which one delights as in the last end, that Paul had not placed his last end in a man. Therefore is properly called fruit; and this it is that one is properly to enjoy is not only of the last end. said to enjoy. But that which is delightful not in itself, Objection 2. Further, what we enjoy is the fruit. But but is desired, only as referred to something else, e.g. a the Apostle says (Gal. 5:22): “The fruit of the Spirit is bitter potion for the sake of health, can nowise be called charity, joy, peace,” and other like things, which are not fruit. And that which has something delightful about it, in the nature of the last end. Therefore enjoyment is not to which a number of preceding things are referred, may only of the last end. indeed by called fruit in a certain manner; but we cannot Objection 3. Further, the acts of the will reflect on be said to enjoy it properly or as though it answered per- one another; for I will to will, and I love to love. But to fectly to the notion of fruit. Hence Augustine says (De enjoy is an act of the will: since “it is the will with which Trin. x, 10) that “we enjoy what we know, when the de- we enjoy,” as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10). Therefore a lighted will is at rest therein.” But its rest is not absolute man enjoys his enjoyment. But the last end of man is not save in the possession of the last end: for as long as some- enjoyment, but the uncreated good alone, which is God. thing is looked for, the movement of the will remains in Therefore enjoyment is not only of the last end. suspense, although it has reached something. Thus in lo- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): “A cal movement, although any point between the two terms man does not enjoy that which he desires for the sake of is a beginning and an end, yet it is not considered as an something else.” But the last end alone is that which man actual end, except when the movement stops there. does not desire for the sake of something else. Therefore Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Doctr. enjoyment is of the last end alone. Christ. i, 33), “if he had said, ‘May I enjoy thee,’ without I answer that, As stated above (a. 1) the notion of adding ‘in the Lord,’ he would seem to have set the end fruit implies two things: first that it should come last; sec- of his love in him. But since he added that he set his end ond, that it should calm the appetite with a certain sweet- in the Lord, he implied his desire to enjoy Him”: as if we ness and delight. Now a thing is last either simply or rel- were to say that he expressed his enjoyment of his brother 654 not as a term but as a means. ought to find pleasure in them. Reply to Objection 2. Fruit bears one relation to the Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 1, a. 8; q. 2, tree that bore it, and another to man that enjoys it. To the a. 7), we speak of an end in a twofold sense: first, as being tree indeed that bore it, it is compared as effect to cause; the thing itself; secondly, as the attainment thereof. These to the one enjoying it, as the final object of his longing are not, of course, two ends, but one end, considered in and the consummation of his delight. Accordingly these itself, and in its relation to something else. Accordingly fruits mentioned by the Apostle are so called because they God is the last end, as that which is ultimately sought for: are certain effects of the Holy Ghost in us, wherefore they while the enjoyment is as the attainment of this last end. are called “fruits of the spirit”: but not as though we are to And so, just as God is not one end, and the enjoyment of enjoy them as our last end. Or we may say with Ambrose God, another: so it is the same enjoyment whereby we that they are called fruits because “we should desire them enjoy God, and whereby we enjoy our enjoyment of God. for their own sake”: not indeed as though they were not And the same applies to created happiness which consists ordained to the last end; but because they are such that we in enjoyment. Whether enjoyment is only of the end possessed? Ia IIae q. 11 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that enjoyment is only of sessed not only in intention but also in reality; imperfectly, the end possessed. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1) that when it is possessed in intention only. Perfect enjoyment, “to enjoy is to use joyfully, with the joy, not of hope, but therefore, is of the end already possessed: but imperfect of possession.” But so long as a thing is not had, there is enjoyment is also of the end possessed not really, but only joy, not of possession, but of hope. Therefore enjoyment in intention. is only of the end possessed. Reply to Objection 1. Augustine speaks there of per- Objection 2. Further, as stated above (a. 3), enjoy- fect enjoyment. ment is not properly otherwise than of the last end: be- Reply to Objection 2. The will is hindered in two cause this alone gives rest to the appetite. But the appetite ways from being at rest. First on the part of the object; by has no rest save in the possession of the end. Therefore en- reason of its not being the last end, but ordained to some- joyment, properly speaking, is only of the end possessed. thing else: secondly on the part of the one who desires Objection 3. Further, to enjoy is to lay hold of the the end, by reason of his not being yet in possession of it. fruit. But one does not lay hold of the fruit until one is in Now it is the object that specifies an act: but on the agent possession of the end. Therefore enjoyment is only of the depends the manner of acting, so that the act be perfect or end possessed. imperfect, as compared with the actual circumstances of On the contrary, “to enjoy is to adhere lovingly to the agent. Therefore enjoyment of anything but the last something for its own sake,” as Augustine says (De Doctr. end is not enjoyment properly speaking, as falling short Christ. i, 4). But this is possible, even in regard to a thing of the nature of enjoyment. But enjoyment of the last which is not in our possession. Therefore it is possible to end, not yet possessed, is enjoyment properly speaking, enjoy the end even though it be not possessed. but imperfect, on account of the imperfect way in which I answer that, To enjoy implies a certain relation of it is possessed. the will to the last end, according as the will has some- Reply to Objection 3. One is said to lay hold of or to thing by way of last end. Now an end is possessed in two have an end, not only in reality, but also in intention, as ways; perfectly and imperfectly. Perfectly, when it is pos- stated above. 655 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 12 Of Intention (In Five Articles) We must now consider Intention: concerning which there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether intention is an act of intellect or of the will? (2) Whether it is only of the last end? (3) Whether one can intend two things at the same time? (4) Whether intention of the end is the same act as volition of the means? (5) Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals? Whether intention is an act of the intellect or of the will? Ia IIae q. 12 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that intention is an act of anyone who is in authority, by his command moves others the intellect, and not of the will. For it is written (Mat. to that which he intends. Now the will moves all the other 6:22): “If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be light- powers of the soul to the end, as shown above (q. 9, a. 1). some”: where, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. Wherefore it is evident that intention, properly speaking, in Monte ii, 13) the eye signifies intention. But since is an act of the will. the eye is the organ of sight, it signifies the apprehensive Reply to Objection 1. The eye designates intention power. Therefore intention is not an act of the appetitive figuratively, not because intention has reference to knowl- but of the apprehensive power. edge, but because it presupposes knowledge, which pro- Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Serm. poses to the will the end to which the latter moves; thus Dom. in Monte ii, 13) that Our Lord spoke of intention we foresee with the eye whither we should tend with our as a light, when He said (Mat. 6:23): “If the light that is bodies. in thee be darkness,” etc. But light pertains to knowledge. Reply to Objection 2. Intention is called a light be- Therefore intention does too. cause it is manifest to him who intends. Wherefore works Objection 3. Further, intention implies a kind of or- are called darkness because a man knows what he intends, daining to an end. But to ordain is an act of reason. There- but knows not what the result may be, as Augustine ex- fore intention belongs not to the will but to the reason. pounds (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13). Objection 4. Further, an act of the will is either of Reply to Objection 3. The will does not ordain, the end or of the means. But the act of the will in respect but tends to something according to the order of reason. of the end is called volition, or enjoyment; with regard to Consequently this word “intention” indicates an act of the means, it is choice, from which intention is distinct. the will, presupposing the act whereby the reason orders Therefore it is not an act of the will. something to the end. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 4,8,9) Reply to Objection 4. Intention is an act of the will that “the intention of the will unites the sight to the ob- in regard to the end. Now the will stands in a threefold ject seen; and the images retained in the memory, to the relation to the end. First, absolutely; and thus we have penetrating gaze of the soul’s inner thought.” Therefore “volition,” whereby we will absolutely to have health, and intention is an act of the will. so forth. Secondly, it considers the end, as its place of I answer that, Intention, as the very word denotes, rest; and thus “enjoyment” regards the end. Thirdly, it signifies, “to tend to something.” Now both the action considers the end as the term towards which something is of the mover and the movement of thing moved, tend to ordained; and thus “intention” regards the end. For when something. But that the movement of the thing moved we speak of intending to have health, we mean not only tends to anything, is due to the action of the mover. Con- that we have it, but that we will have it by means of some- sequently intention belongs first and principally to that thing else. which moves to the end: hence we say that an architect or 656 Whether intention is only of the last end? Ia IIae q. 12 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that intention is only of to a stop; this is the terminus of the whole movement. the last end. For it is said in the book of Prosper’s Sen- Secondly, some point midway, which is the beginning of tences (Sent. 100): “The intention of the heart is a cry to one part of the movement, and the end or terminus of the God.” But God is the last end of the human heart. There- other. Thus in the movement from A to C through B, C is fore intention is always regards the last end. the last terminus, while B is a terminus, but not the last. Objection 2. Further, intention regards the end as the And intention can be both. Consequently though intention terminus, as stated above (a. 1, ad 4). But a terminus is is always of the end, it need not be always of the last end. something last. Therefore intention always regards the Reply to Objection 1. The intention of the heart is last end. called a cry to God, not that God is always the object of Objection 3. Further, just as intention regards the end, intention, but because He sees our intention. Or because, so does enjoyment. But enjoyment is always of the last when we pray, we direct our intention to God, which in- end. Therefore intention is too. tention has the force of a cry. On the contrary, There is but one last end of human Reply to Objection 2. A terminus is something last, wills, viz. Happiness, as stated above (q. 1, a. 7). If, there- not always in respect of the whole, but sometimes in re- fore, intentions were only of the last end, men would not spect of a part. have different intentions: which is evidently false. Reply to Objection 3. Enjoyment implies rest in the I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 4), intention end; and this belongs to the last end alone. But intention regards the end as a terminus of the movement of the will. implies movement towards an end, not rest. Wherefore Now a terminus of movement may be taken in two ways. the comparison proves nothing. First, the very last terminus, when the movement comes Whether one can intend two things at the same time? Ia IIae q. 12 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that one cannot intend of an intermediary end. Now a man intends at the same several things at the same time. For Augustine says (De time, both the proximate and the last end; as the mixing Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 14,16,17) that man’s intention of a medicine and the giving of health. cannot be directed at the same time to God and to bodily But if we take two things that are not ordained to one benefits. Therefore, for the same reason, neither to any another, thus also a man can intend several things at the other two things. same time. This is evident from the fact that a man prefers Objection 2. Further, intention designates a move- one thing to another because it is the better of the two. ment of the will towards a terminus. Now there cannot Now one of the reasons for which one thing is better than be several termini in the same direction of one movement. another is that it is available for more purposes: wherefore Therefore the will cannot intend several things at the same one thing can be chosen in preference to another, because time. of the greater number of purposes for which it is avail- Objection 3. Further, intention presupposes an act of able: so that evidently a man can intend several things at reason or of the intellect. But “it is not possible to un- the same time. derstand several things at the same time,” according to the Reply to Objection 1. Augustine means to say that Philosopher (Topic. ii, 10). Therefore neither is it possible man cannot at the same time direct his attention to God to intend several things at the same time. and to bodily benefits, as to two last ends: since, as stated On the contrary, Art imitates nature. Now nature in- above (q. 1, a. 5), one man cannot have several last ends. tends two purposes by means of one instrument: thus “the Reply to Objection 2. There can be several termini tongue is for the purpose of taste and speech” (De Anima ordained to one another, of the same movement and in ii, 8). Therefore, for the same reason, art or reason can the same direction; but not unless they be ordained to one at the same time direct one thing to two ends: so that one another. At the same time it must be observed that what can intend several ends at the same time. is not one in reality may be taken as one by the reason. I answer that, The expression “two things” may be Now intention is a movement of the will to something al- taken in two ways: they may be ordained to one another ready ordained by the reason, as stated above (a. 1, ad 3). or not so ordained. And if they be ordained to one an- Wherefore where we have many things in reality, we may other, it is evident, from what has been said, that a man take them as one term of intention, in so far as the rea- can intend several things at the same time. For intention son takes them as one: either because two things concur is not only of the last end, as stated above (a. 2), but also in the integrity of one whole, as a proper measure of heat 657 and cold conduce to health; or because two things are in-both the others. cluded in one which may be intended. For instance, the Reply to Objection 3. As stated in the Ia, q. 12, a. 10; acquiring of wine and clothing is included in wealth, as Ia, q. 58, a. 2; Ia, q. 85, a. 4 it is possible to understand in something common to both; wherefore nothing hinders several things at the same time, in so far as, in some way, the man who intends to acquire wealth, from intending they are one. Whether intention of the end is the same act as the volition of the means? Ia IIae q. 12 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the intention of the and its movement to the means are one and the same thing. end and the volition of the means are not one and the same For when I say: “I wish to take medicine for the sake of movement. For Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 6) that “the health,” I signify no more than one movement of my will. will to see the window, has for its end the seeing of the And this is because the end is the reason for willing the window; and is another act from the will to see, through means. Now the object, and that by reason of which it is the window, the passersby.” But that I should will to see an object, come under the same act; thus it is the same the passersby, through the window, belongs to intention; act of sight that perceives color and light, as stated above whereas that I will to see the window, belongs to the voli- (q. 8, a. 3, ad 2). And the same applies to the intellect; tion of the means. Therefore intention of the end and the for if it consider principle and conclusion absolutely, it willing of the means are distinct movements of the will. considers each by a distinct act; but when it assents to the Objection 2. Further, acts are distinct according to conclusion on account of the principles, there is but one their objects. But the end and the means are distinct ob- act of the intellect. jects. Therefore the intention of the end and the willing of Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of see- the means are distinct movements of the will. ing the window and of seeing, through the window, the Objection 3. Further, the willing of the means is passersby, according as the will is moved to either abso- called choice. But choice and intention are not the same. lutely. Therefore intention of the end and the willing of the Reply to Objection 2. The end, considered as a thing, means are not the same movement of the will. and the means to that end, are distinct objects of the will. On the contrary, The means in relation to the end, are But in so far as the end is the formal object in willing the as the mid-space to the terminus. Now it is all the same means, they are one and the same object. movement that passes through the mid-space to the termi- Reply to Objection 3. A movement which is one as nus, in natural things. Therefore in things pertaining to to the subject, may differ, according to our way of looking the will, the intention of the end is the same movement as at it, as to its beginning and end, as in the case of ascent the willing of the means. and descent (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly, in so far as the I answer that, The movement of the will to the end movement of the will is to the means, as ordained to the and to the means can be considered in two ways. First, end, it is called “choice”: but the movement of the will according as the will is moved to each of the aforesaid ab- to the end as acquired by the means, it is called “inten- solutely and in itself. And thus there are really two move- tion.” A sign of this is that we can have intention of the ments of the will to them. Secondly, it may be considered end without having determined the means which are the accordingly as the will is moved to the means for the sake object of choice. of the end: and thus the movement of the will to the end Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals? Ia IIae q. 12 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that irrational animals in- Objection 3. Further, to intend an end belongs to one tend the end. For in things void of reason nature stands who acts for an end; since to intend is nothing else than to further apart from the rational nature, than does the sen- tend to something. But irrational animals act for an end; sitive nature in irrational animals. But nature intends the for an animal is moved either to seek food, or to do some- end even in things void of reason, as is proved in Phys. ii, thing of the kind. Therefore irrational animals intend an 8. Much more, therefore, do irrational animals intend the end. end. On the contrary, Intention of an end implies ordain- Objection 2. Further, just as intention is of the end, ing something to an end: which belongs to reason. Since so is enjoyment. But enjoyment is in irrational animals, therefore irrational animals are void of reason, it seems as stated above (q. 11, a. 2). Therefore intention is too. that they do not intend an end. 658 I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), to intend is to to intend properly and principally, as stated above (a. 1). tend to something; and this belongs to the mover and to Reply to Objection 1. This argument takes intention the moved. According, therefore, as that which is moved in the sense of being moved to an end. to an end by another is said to intend the end, thus nature Reply to Objection 2. Enjoyment does not imply the is said to intend an end, as being moved to its end by God, ordaining of one thing to another, as intention does, but as the arrow is moved by the archer. And in this way, irra- absolute repose in the end. tional animals intend an end, inasmuch as they are moved Reply to Objection 3. Irrational animals are moved to to something by natural instinct. The other way of intend- an end, not as though they thought that they can gain the ing an end belongs to the mover; according as he ordains end by this movement; this belongs to one that intends; the movement of something, either his own or another’s, but through desiring the end by natural instinct, they are to an end. This belongs to reason alone. Wherefore irra- moved to an end, moved, as it were, by another, like other tional animals do not intend an end in this way, which is things that are moved naturally. 659 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 13 Of Choice, Which Is an Act of the Will with Regard to the Means (In Six Articles) We must now consider the acts of the will with regard to the means. There are three of them: to choose, to consent, and to use. And choice is preceded by counsel. First of all, then, we must consider choice: secondly, counsel; thirdly, consent; fourthly, use. Concerning choice there are six points of inquiry: (1) Of what power is it the act; of the will or of the reason? (2) Whether choice is to be found in irrational animals? (3) Whether choice is only the means, or sometimes also of the end? (4) Whether choice is only of things that we do ourselves? (5) Whether choice is only of possible things? (6) Whether man chooses of necessity or freely? Whether choice is an act of will or of reason? Ia IIae q. 13 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that choice is an act, receives a form or species from a higher power or habit, not of will but of reason. For choice implies compari- according as an inferior is ordained by a superior: for if son, whereby one is given preference to another. But to a man were to perform an act of fortitude for the love of compare is an act of reason. Therefore choice is an act of God, that act is materially an act of fortitude, but formally, reason. an act of charity. Now it is evident that, in a sense, reason Objection 2. Further, it is for the same faculty to form precedes the will and ordains its act: in so far as the will a syllogism, and to draw the conclusion. But, in practical tends to its object, according to the order of reason, since matters, it is the reason that forms syllogisms. Since there- the apprehensive power presents the object to the appetite. fore choice is a kind of conclusion in practical matters, as Accordingly, that act whereby the will tends to something stated in Ethic. vii, 3, it seems that it is an act of reason. proposed to it as being good, through being ordained to Objection 3. Further, ignorance does not belong to the end by the reason, is materially an act of the will, but the will but to the cognitive power. Now there is an “ig- formally an act of the reason. Now in such like matters norance of choice,” as is stated in Ethic. iii, 1. Therefore the substance of the act is as the matter in comparison to it seems that choice does not belong to the will but to the the order imposed by the higher power. Wherefore choice reason. is substantially not an act of the reason but of the will: On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) for choice is accomplished in a certain movement of the that choice is “the desire of things in our power.” But de- soul towards the good which is chosen. Consequently it is sire is an act of will. Therefore choice is too. evidently an act of the appetitive power. I answer that, The word choice implies something Reply to Objection 1. Choice implies a previous belonging to the reason or intellect, and something be- comparison; not that it consists in the comparison itself. longing to the will: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) Reply to Objection 2. It is quite true that it is for the that choice is either “intellect influenced by appetite or ap-reason to draw the conclusion of a practical syllogism; petite influenced by intellect.” Now whenever two things and it is called “a decision” or “judgment,” to be followed concur to make one, one of them is formal in regard to by “choice.” And for this reason the conclusion seems to the other. Hence Gregory of Nyssa∗ says that choice “is belong to the act of choice, as to that which results from neither desire only, nor counsel only, but a combination it. of the two. For just as we say that an animal is composed Reply to Objection 3. In speaking “of ignorance of of soul and body, and that it is neither a mere body, nor a choice,” we do not mean that choice is a sort of knowl- mere soul, but both; so is it with choice.” edge, but that there is ignorance of what ought to be cho- Now we must observe, as regards the acts of the soul, sen. that an act belonging essentially to some power or habit, ∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiii. 660 Whether choice is to be found in irrational animals? Ia IIae q. 13 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that irrational animals less indeterminate in respect of particular goods. Conse- are able to choose. For choice “is the desire of certain quently choice belongs properly to the will, and not to the things on account of an end,” as stated in Ethic. iii, 2,3. sensitive appetite which is all that irrational animals have. But irrational animals desire something on account of an Wherefore irrational animals are not competent to choose. end: since they act for an end, and from desire. Therefore Reply to Objection 1. Not every desire of one thing choice is in irrational animals. on account of an end is called choice: there must be a cer- Objection 2. Further, the very word “electio” [choice] tain discrimination of one thing from another. And this seems to signify the taking of something in preference to cannot be except when the appetite can be moved to sev- others. But irrational animals take something in prefer- eral things. ence to others: thus we can easily see for ourselves that Reply to Objection 2. An irrational animal takes one a sheep will eat one grass and refuse another. Therefore thing in preference to another, because its appetite is nat- choice is in irrational animals. urally determinate to that thing. Wherefore as soon as an Objection 3. Further, according to Ethic. vi, 12, “it is animal, whether by its sense or by its imagination, is of-from prudence that a man makes a good choice of means.” fered something to which its appetite is naturally inclined, But prudence is found in irrational animals: hence it is it is moved to that alone, without making any choice. Just said in the beginning of Metaph. i, 1 that “those animals as fire is moved upwards and not downwards, without its which, like bees, cannot hear sounds, are prudent by in- making any choice. stinct.” We see this plainly, in wonderful cases of sagacity Reply to Objection 3. As stated in Phys. iii, 3 manifested in the works of various animals, such as bees, “movement is the act of the movable, caused by a mover.” spiders, and dogs. For a hound in following a stag, on Wherefore the power of the mover appears in the move- coming to a crossroad, tries by scent whether the stag has ment of that which it moves. Accordingly, in all things passed by the first or the second road: and if he find that moved by reason, the order of reason which moves them the stag has not passed there, being thus assured, takes to is evident, although the things themselves are without rea- the third road without trying the scent; as though he were son: for an arrow through the motion of the archer goes reasoning by way of exclusion, arguing that the stag must straight towards the target, as though it were endowed have passed by this way, since he did not pass by the oth- with reason to direct its course. The same may be seen ers, and there is no other road. Therefore it seems that in the movements of clocks and all engines put together irrational animals are able to choose. by the art of man. Now as artificial things are in compar- On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa∗ says that “chil- ison to human art, so are all natural things in comparison dren and irrational animals act willingly but not from to the Divine art. And accordingly order is to be seen in choice.” Therefore choice is not in irrational animals. things moved by nature, just as in things moved by reason, I answer that, Since choice is the taking of one thing as is stated in Phys. ii. And thus it is that in the works of in preference to another it must of necessity be in respect irrational animals we notice certain marks of sagacity, in of several things that can be chosen. Consequently in so far as they have a natural inclination to set about their those things which are altogether determinate to one there actions in a most orderly manner through being ordained is no place for choice. Now the difference between the by the Supreme art. For which reason, too, certain animals sensitive appetite and the will is that, as stated above (q. 1, are called prudent or sagacious; and not because they rea-a. 2, ad 3), the sensitive appetite is determinate to one par- son or exercise any choice about things. This is clear from ticular thing, according to the order of nature; whereas the fact that all that share in one nature, invariably act in the will, although determinate to one thing in general, viz. the same way. the good, according to the order of nature, is neverthe- Whether choice is only of the means, or sometimes also of the end? Ia IIae q. 13 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that choice is not only choice is of the end. of the means. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) Objection 2. Further, choice implies preference of that “virtue makes us choose aright; but it is not the part one thing to another. But just as there can be preference of virtue, but of some other power to direct aright those of means, so can there be preference of ends. Therefore things which are to be done for its sake.” But that for the choice can be of ends, just as it can be of means. sake of which something is done is the end. Therefore On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) ∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiii. 661 that “volition is of the end, but choice of the means.” in the work of a physician health is the end: wherefore it I answer that, As already stated (a. 1, ad 2), choice is not a matter of choice for a physician, but a matter of results from the decision or judgment which is, as it were, principle. Now the health of the body is ordained to the the conclusion of a practical syllogism. Hence that which good of the soul, consequently with one who has charge is the conclusion of a practical syllogism, is the matter of of the soul’s health, health or sickness may be a matter of choice. Now in practical things the end stands in the posi- choice; for the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:10): “For when I tion of a principle, not of a conclusion, as the Philosopher am weak, then am I powerful.” But the last end is nowise says (Phys. ii, 9). Wherefore the end, as such, is not a a matter of choice. matter of choice. Reply to Objection 1. The proper ends of virtues are But just as in speculative knowledge nothing hinders ordained to Happiness as to their last end. And thus it is the principle of one demonstration or of one science, from that they can be a matter of choice. being the conclusion of another demonstration or science; Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 1, a. 5), while the first indemonstrable principle cannot be the con- there is but one last end. Accordingly wherever there are clusion of any demonstration or science; so too that which several ends, they can be the subject of choice, in so far as is the end in one operation, may be ordained to something they are ordained to a further end. as an end. And in this way it is a matter of choice. Thus Whether choice is of those things only that are done by us? Ia IIae q. 13 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that choice is not only or enjoys the thing which is the end; thus for the miser, in respect of human acts. For choice regards the means. money or the possession of money is the end. The same Now, not only acts, but also the organs, are means (Phys. is to be said of the means. For the means must needs be ii, 3). Therefore choice is not only concerned with human either an action; or a thing, with some action intervening acts. whereby man either makes the thing which is the means, Objection 2. Further, action is distinct from contem- or puts it to some use. And thus it is that choice is always plation. But choice has a place even in contemplation; in in regard to human acts. so far as one opinion is preferred to another. Therefore Reply to Objection 1. The organs are ordained to the choice is not concerned with human acts alone. end, inasmuch as man makes use of them for the sake of Objection 3. Further, men are chosen for certain the end. posts, whether secular or ecclesiastical, by those who ex- Reply to Objection 2. In contemplation itself there ercise no action in their regard. Therefore choice is not is the act of the intellect assenting to this or that opinion. concerned with human acts alone. It is exterior action that is put in contradistinction to con- On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) templation. that “no man chooses save what he can do himself.” Reply to Objection 3. When a man chooses some- I answer that, Just as intention regards the end, so one for a bishopric or some high position in the state, he does choice regard the means. Now the end is either an ac- chooses to name that man to that post. Else, if he had no tion or a thing. And when the end is a thing, some human right to act in the appointment of the bishop or official, he action must intervene; either in so far as man produces the would have no right to choose. Likewise, whenever we thing which is the end, as the physician produces health speak of one thing being chosen in preference to another, (wherefore the production of health is said to be the end of it is in conjunction with some action of the chooser. the physician); or in so far as man, in some fashion, uses Whether choice is only of possible things? Ia IIae q. 13 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that choice in not only of to the chooser. Now it often happens that we are unable possible things. For choice is an act of the will, as stated to accomplish what we choose: so that this proves to be above (a. 1). Now there is “a willing of impossibilities” impossible to us. Therefore choice is of the impossible. (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore there is also a choice of impossi- Objection 3. Further, to try to do a thing is to choose bilities. to do it. But the Blessed Benedict says (Regula lxviii) that Objection 2. Further, choice is of things done by us, if the superior command what is impossible, it should be as stated above (a. 4). Therefore it matters not, as far as attempted. Therefore choice can be of the impossible. the act of choosing is concerned, whether one choose that On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) which is impossible in itself, or that which is impossible that “there is no choice of impossibilities.” 662 I answer that, As stated above (a. 4), our choice is al-under the universal notion of good: but the term or per- ways concerned with our actions. Now whatever is done fection of the will’s act is to be observed in its relation by us, is possible to us. Therefore we must needs say that to the action whereby a man tends to the attainment of a choice is only of possible things. thing; for the movement of the will is from the soul to the Moreover, the reason for choosing a thing is that it thing. Consequently the perfect act of the will is in respect conduces to an end. But what is impossible cannot con- of something that is good for one to do. Now this cannot duce to an end. A sign of this is that when men in taking be something impossible. Wherefore the complete act of counsel together come to something that is impossible to the will is only in respect of what is possible and good for them, they depart, as being unable to proceed with the him that wills. But the incomplete act of the will is in re- business. spect of the impossible; and by some is called “velleity,” Again, this is evident if we examine the previous pro- because, to wit, one would will [vellet] such a thing, were cess of the reason. For the means, which are the object of it possible. But choice is an act of the will, fixed on some- choice, are to the end, as the conclusion is to the principle. thing to be done by the chooser. And therefore it is by no Now it is clear that an impossible conclusion does not fol- means of anything but what is possible. low from a possible principle. Wherefore an end cannot Reply to Objection 2. Since the object of the will is be possible, unless the means be possible. Now no one the apprehended good, we must judge of the object of the is moved to the impossible. Consequently no one would will according as it is apprehended. And so, just as some- tend to the end, save for the fact that the means appear to times the will tends to something which is apprehended be possible. Therefore the impossible is not the object of as good, and yet is not really good; so is choice some- choice. times made of something apprehended as possible to the Reply to Objection 1. The will stands between the chooser, and yet impossible to him. intellect and the external action: for the intellect proposes Reply to Objection 3. The reason for this is that the to the will its object, and the will causes the external ac- subject should not rely on his own judgment to decide tion. Hence the principle of the movement in the will is whether a certain thing is possible; but in each case should to be found in the intellect, which apprehends something stand by his superior’s judgment. Whether man chooses of necessity or freely? Ia IIae q. 13 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that man chooses of ne- place is chosen of necessity. But every act of choosing cessity. For the end stands in relation to the object of is in regard to something that seems in some way better. choice, as the principle of that which follows from the Therefore every choice is made necessarily. principles, as declared in Ethic. vii, 8. But conclusions On the contrary, Choice is an act of a rational power; follow of necessity from their principles. Therefore man which according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2) stands is moved of necessity from (willing) the end of the choice in relation to opposites. (of the means). I answer that, Man does not choose of necessity. And Objection 2. Further, as stated above (a. 1, ad 2), this is because that which is possible not to be, is not of ne- choice follows the reason’s judgment of what is to be cessity. Now the reason why it is possible not to choose, done. But reason judges of necessity about some things: or to choose, may be gathered from a twofold power in on account of the necessity of the premises. Therefore it man. For man can will and not will, act and not act; again, seems that choice also follows of necessity. he can will this or that, and do this or that. The reason of Objection 3. Further, if two things are absolutely this is seated in the very power of the reason. For the will equal, man is not moved to one more than to the other; can tend to whatever the reason can apprehend as good. thus if a hungry man, as Plato says (Cf. De Coelo ii, Now the reason can apprehend as good, not only this, viz. 13), be confronted on either side with two portions of “to will” or “to act,” but also this, viz. “not to will” or food equally appetizing and at an equal distance, he is not “not to act.” Again, in all particular goods, the reason can moved towards one more than to the other; and he finds consider an aspect of some good, and the lack of some the reason of this in the immobility of the earth in the mid- good, which has the aspect of evil: and in this respect, dle of the world. Now, if that which is equally (eligible) it can apprehend any single one of such goods as to be with something else cannot be chosen, much less can that chosen or to be avoided. The perfect good alone, which be chosen which appears as less (eligible). Therefore if is Happiness, cannot be apprehended by the reason as an two or more things are available, of which one appears evil, or as lacking in any way. Consequently man wills to be more (eligible), it is impossible to choose any of Happiness of necessity, nor can he will not to be happy, the others. Therefore that which appears to hold the first or to be unhappy. Now since choice is not of the end, but 663 of the means, as stated above (a. 3); it is not of the perfect Reply to Objection 2. The reason’s decision or judg-good, which is Happiness, but of other particular goods. ment of what is to be done is about things that are contin- Therefore man chooses not of necessity, but freely. gent and possible to us. In such matters the conclusions Reply to Objection 1. The conclusion does not al- do not follow of necessity from principles that are abso- ways of necessity follow from the principles, but only lutely necessary, but from such as are so conditionally; as, when the principles cannot be true if the conclusion is not for instance, “If he runs, he is in motion.” true. In like manner, the end does not always necessi- Reply to Objection 3. If two things be proposed as tate in man the choosing of the means, because the means equal under one aspect, nothing hinders us from consid- are not always such that the end cannot be gained without ering in one of them some particular point of superiority, them; or, if they be such, they are not always considered so that the will has a bent towards that one rather than in that light. towards the other. 664 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 14 Of Counsel, Which Precedes Choice (In Six Articles) We must now consider counsel; concerning which there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether counsel is an inquiry? (2) Whether counsel is of the end or of the means? (3) Whether counsel is only of things that we do? (4) Whether counsel is of all things that we do? (5) Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis? (6) Whether the process of counsel is indefinite? Whether counsel is an inquiry? Ia IIae q. 14 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that counsel is not an in- and the act of the will tending to these means according to quiry. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that the reason’s direction, are ordained to one another. Conse- counsel is “an act of the appetite.” But inquiry is not an quently there is to be found something of the reason, viz. act of the appetite. Therefore counsel is not an inquiry. order, in that act of the will, which is choice: and in coun- Objection 2. Further, inquiry is a discursive act of the sel, which is an act of reason, something of the will—both intellect: for which reason it is not found in God, Whose as matter (since counsel is of what man wills to do)—and knowledge is not discursive, as we have shown in the Ia, as motive (because it is from willing the end, that man q. 14, a. 7. But counsel is ascribed to God: for it is written is moved to take counsel in regard to the means). And (Eph. 1:11) that “He worketh all things according to the therefore, just as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that counsel of His will.” Therefore counsel is not inquiry. choice “is intellect influenced by appetite,” thus pointing Objection 3. Further, inquiry is of doubtful matters. out that both concur in the act of choosing; so Damascene But counsel is given in matters that are certainly good; says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel is “appetite based thus the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:25): “Now concerning on inquiry,” so as to show that counsel belongs, in a way, virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I give both to the will, on whose behalf and by whose impulsion counsel.” Therefore counsel is not an inquiry. the inquiry is made, and to the reason that executes the On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa∗ says: “Every inquiry. counsel is an inquiry; but not every inquiry is a counsel.” Reply to Objection 2. The things that we say of God I answer that, Choice, as stated above (q. 13, a. 1, ad must be understood without any of the defects which are 2; a. 3), follows the judgment of the reason about what to be found in us: thus in us science is of conclusions is to be done. Now there is much uncertainty in things derived by reasoning from causes to effects: but science that have to be done; because actions are concerned with when said of God means sure knowledge of all effects in contingent singulars, which by reason of their vicissitude, the First Cause, without any reasoning process. In like are uncertain. Now in things doubtful and uncertain the manner we ascribe counsel to God, as to the certainty of reason does not pronounce judgment, without previous His knowledge or judgment, which certainty in us arises inquiry: wherefore the reason must of necessity institute from the inquiry of counsel. But such inquiry has no place an inquiry before deciding on the objects of choice; and in God; wherefore in this respect it is not ascribed to God: this inquiry is called counsel. Hence the Philosopher says in which sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22): (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice is the “desire of what has been “God takes not counsel: those only take counsel who lack already counselled.” knowledge.” Reply to Objection 1. When the acts of two powers Reply to Objection 3. It may happen that things are ordained to one another, in each of them there is some- which are most certainly good in the opinion of wise thing belonging to the other power: consequently each act and spiritual men are not certainly good in the opinion can be denominated from either power. Now it is evident of many, or at least of carnal-minded men. Consequently that the act of the reason giving direction as to the means, in such things counsel may be given. ∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv. 665 Whether counsel is of the end, or only of the means? Ia IIae q. 14 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that counsel is not only of means. Nevertheless it may happen that what is the end the means but also of the end. For whatever is doubtful, in regard to some things, is ordained to something else; can be the subject of inquiry. Now in things to be done by just as also what is the principle of one demonstration, is man there happens sometimes a doubt as to the end and the conclusion of another: and consequently that which not only as to the means. Since therefore inquiry as to is looked upon as the end in one inquiry, may be looked what is to be done is counsel, it seems that counsel can be upon as the means in another; and thus it will become an of the end. object of counsel. Objection 2. Further, the matter of counsel is human Reply to Objection 1. That which is looked upon as actions. But some human actions are ends, as stated in an end, is already fixed: consequently as long as there Ethic. i, 1. Therefore counsel can be of the end. is any doubt about it, it is not looked upon as an end. On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa∗ says that “coun- Wherefore if counsel is taken about it, it will be counsel sel is not of the end, but of the means.” not about the end, but about the means. I answer that, The end is the principle in practical Reply to Objection 2. Counsel is about operations, in matters: because the reason of the means is to be found in so far as they are ordained to some end. Consequently if the end. Now the principle cannot be called in question, any human act be an end, it will not, as such, be the matter but must be presupposed in every inquiry. Since therefore of counsel. counsel is an inquiry, it is not of the end, but only of the Whether counsel is only of things that we do? Ia IIae q. 14 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that counsel is not only since what one takes note of, escapes the notice of an- of things that we do. For counsel implies some kind of other; whereas in necessary and universal things, our view conference. But it is possible for many to confer about is brought to bear on matters much more absolute and sim- things that are not subject to movement, and are not the ple, so that one man by himself may be sufficient to con- result of our actions, such as the nature of various things. sider these things. Wherefore the inquiry of counsel is Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do. concerned, properly speaking, with contingent singulars. Objection 2. Further, men sometimes seek counsel Now the knowledge of the truth in such matters does not about things that are laid down by law; hence we speak rank so high as to be desirable of itself, as is the knowl- of counsel at law. And yet those who seek counsel thus, edge of things universal and necessary; but it is desired have nothing to do in making the laws. Therefore counsel as being useful towards action, because actions bear on is not only of things that we do. things singular and contingent. Consequently, properly Objection 3. Further, some are said to take consulta- speaking, counsel is about things done by us. tion about future events; which, however, are not in our Reply to Objection 1. Counsel implies conference, power. Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do. not of any kind, but about what is to be done, for the rea- Objection 4. Further, if counsel were only of things son given above. that we do, no would take counsel about what another Reply to Objection 2. Although that which is laid does. But this is clearly untrue. Therefore counsel is not down by the law is not due to the action of him who seeks only of things that we do. counsel, nevertheless it directs him in his action: since the On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa† says: “We take mandate of the law is one reason for doing something. counsel of things that are within our competency and that Reply to Objection 3. Counsel is not only about what we are able to do.” is done, but also about whatever has relation to what is I answer that, Counsel properly implies a conference done. And for this reason we speak of consulting about held between several; the very word [consilium] denotes future events, in so far as man is induced to do or omit this, for it means a sitting together [considium], from the something, through the knowledge of future events. fact that many sit together in order to confer with one an- Reply to Objection 4. We seek counsel about the ac- other. Now we must take note that in contingent partic- tions of others, in so far as they are, in some way, one ular cases, in order that anything be known for certain, it with us; either by union of affection—thus a man is so- is necessary to take several conditions or circumstances licitous about what concerns his friend, as though it con- into consideration, which it is not easy for one to con- cerned himself; or after the manner of an instrument, for sider, but are considered by several with greater certainty, the principal agent and the instrument are, in a way, one ∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv. † Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv. 666 cause, since one acts through the other; thus the master takes counsel about what he would do through his servant. Whether counsel is about all things that we do? Ia IIae q. 14 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that counsel is about all tion; thus a writer does not take counsel how to form his things that we have to do. For choice is the “desire of what letters, for this is determined by art. Secondly, from the is counselled” as stated above (a. 1). But choice is about fact that it little matters whether it is done this or that way; all things that we do. Therefore counsel is too. this occurs in minute matters, which help or hinder but Objection 2. Further, counsel implies the reason’s in- little with regard to the end aimed at; and reason looks quiry. But, whenever we do not act through the impulse of upon small things as mere nothings. Consequently there passion, we act in virtue of the reason’s inquiry. Therefore are two things of which we do not take counsel, although there is counsel about everything that we do. they conduce to the end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, iii, 3): namely, minute things, and those which have a 3) that “if it appears that something can be done by more fixed way of being done, as in works produced by art, means than one, we take counsel by inquiring whereby with the exception of those arts that admit of conjecture it may be done most easily and best; but if it can be ac- such as medicine, commerce, and the like, as Gregory of complished by one means, how it can be done by this.” Nyssa says‡. But whatever is done, is done by one means or by several. Reply to Objection 1. Choice presupposes counsel Therefore counsel takes place in all things that we do. by reason of its judgment or decision. Consequently when On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa∗ says that “coun- the judgment or decision is evident without inquiry, there sel has no place in things that are done according to sci- is no need for the inquiry of counsel. ence or art.” Reply to Objection 2. In matters that are evident, I answer that, Counsel is a kind of inquiry, as stated the reason makes no inquiry, but judges at once. Con- above (a. 1). But we are wont to inquire about things that sequently there is no need of counsel in all that is done by admit of doubt; hence the process of inquiry, which is reason. called an argument, “is a reason that attests something Reply to Objection 3. When a thing can be accom- that admitted of doubt”†. Now, that something in re- plished by one means, but in different ways, doubt may lation to human acts admits of no doubt, arises from a arise, just as when it can be accomplished by several twofold source. First, because certain determinate ends means: hence the need of counsel. But when not only are gained by certain determinate means: as happens in the means, but also the way of using the means, is fixed, the arts which are governed by certain fixed rules of ac- then there is no need of counsel. Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis? Ia IIae q. 14 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the process of coun- on what we are able or unable to do, in order to gain such sel is not one of analysis. For counsel is about things that and such an end. Therefore the inquiry of counsel should we do. But the process of our actions is not one of analy- begin from things present. sis, but rather one of synthesis, viz. from the simple to the On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) composite. Therefore counsel does not always proceed by that “he who takes counsel seems to inquire and analyze.” way of analysis. I answer that, In every inquiry one must begin from Objection 2. Further, counsel is an inquiry of the some principle. And if this principle precedes both in reason. But reason proceeds from things that precede to knowledge and in being, the process is not analytic, but things that follow, according to the more appropriate or- synthetic: because to proceed from cause to effect is to der. Since then, the past precedes the present, and the proceed synthetically, since causes are more simple than present precedes the future, it seems that in taking coun- effects. But if that which precedes in knowledge is later sel one should proceed from the past and present to the in the order of being, the process is one of analysis, as future: which is not an analytical process. Therefore the when our judgment deals with effects, which by analy- process of counsel is not one of analysis. sis we trace to their simple causes. Now the principle in Objection 3. Further, counsel is only of such things as the inquiry of counsel is the end, which precedes indeed are possible to us, according to Ethic. iii, 3. But the ques- in intention, but comes afterwards into execution. Hence tion as to whether a certain thing is possible to us, depends the inquiry of counsel must needs be one of analysis, be- ∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv. † Cicero, Topic. ad Trebat. ‡ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxiv. 667 ginning that is to say, from that which is intended in the is first according to reason; but not always with that which future, and continuing until it arrives at that which is to be is first in point of time. done at once. Reply to Objection 3. We should not want to know Reply to Objection 1. Counsel is indeed about ac- whether something to be done for an end be possible, if tion. But actions take their reason from the end; and con- it were not suitable for gaining that end. Hence we must sequently the order of reasoning about actions is contrary first inquire whether it be conducive to the end, before to the order of actions. considering whether it be possible. Reply to Objection 2. Reason begins with that which Whether the process of counsel is indefinite? Ia IIae q. 14 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the process of coun- another, without inquiring into them. Now these princi- sel is indefinite. For counsel is an inquiry about the partic- ples which are taken for granted in the inquiry of counsel ular things with which action is concerned. But singulars are any facts received through the senses—for instance, are infinite. Therefore the process of counsel is indefinite. that this is bread or iron: and also any general statements Objection 2. Further, the inquiry of counsel has to known either through speculative or through practical sci- consider not only what is to be done, but how to avoid ob- ence; for instance, that adultery is forbidden by God, or stacles. But every human action can be hindered, and an that man cannot live without suitable nourishment. Of obstacle can be removed by some human reason. There- such things counsel makes no inquiry. But the term of fore the inquiry about removing obstacles can go on in- inquiry is that which we are able to do at once. For just definitely. as the end is considered in the light of a principle, so the Objection 3. Further, the inquiry of demonstrative means are considered in the light of a conclusion. Where- science does not go on indefinitely, because one can come fore that which presents itself as to be done first, holds to principles that are self-evident, which are absolutely the position of an ultimate conclusion whereat the inquiry certain. But such like certainty is not to be had in contin- comes to an end. Nothing however prevents counsel from gent singulars, which are variable and uncertain. There- being infinite potentially, for as much as an infinite num- fore the inquiry of counsel goes on indefinitely. ber of things may present themselves to be inquired into On the contrary, “No one is moved to that which he by means of counsel. cannot possibly reach” (De Coelo i, 7). But it is impos- Reply to Objection 1. Singulars are infinite; not ac- sible to pass through the infinite. If therefore the inquiry tually, but only potentially. of counsel is infinite, no one would begin to take counsel. Reply to Objection 2. Although human action can Which is clearly untrue. be hindered, the hindrance is not always at hand. Conse- I answer that, The inquiry of counsel is actually fi- quently it is not always necessary to take counsel about nite on both sides, on that of its principle and on that of its removing the obstacle. term. For a twofold principle is available in the inquiry of Reply to Objection 3. In contingent singulars, some- counsel. One is proper to it, and belongs to the very genus thing may be taken for certain, not simply, indeed, but for of things pertaining to operation: this is the end which is the time being, and as far as it concerns the work to be not the matter of counsel, but is taken for granted as its done. Thus that Socrates is sitting is not a necessary state- principle, as stated above (a. 2). The other principle is ment; but that he is sitting, as long as he continues to sit, taken from another genus, so to speak; thus in demonstra- is necessary; and this can be taken for a certain fact. tive sciences one science postulates certain things from 668 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 15 Of Consent, Which Is an Act of the Will in Regard to the Means (In Four Articles) We must now consider consent; concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive power? (2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals? (3) Whether it is directed to the end or to the means? (4) Whether consent to an act belongs to the higher part of the soul only? Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive power? Ia IIae q. 15 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that consent belongs only similitude, the name of sense, since, as it were, it acquires to the apprehensive part of the soul. For Augustine (De direct knowledge of the thing to which it cleaves, in so Trin. xii, 12) ascribes consent to the higher reason. But far as it takes complacency in it. Hence it is written (Wis. the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent 1:1): “Think of [Sentite] the Lord in goodness.” And on belongs to an apprehensive power. these grounds consent is an act of the appetitive power. Objection 2. Further, consent is “co-sense.” But sense Reply to Objection 1. As stated in De Anima iii, 9, is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent is the act of “the will is in the reason.” Hence, when Augustine as- an apprehensive power. cribes consent to the reason, he takes reason as including Objection 3. Further, just as assent is an application the will. of the intellect to something, so is consent. But assent Reply to Objection 2. Sense, properly speaking, be- belongs to the intellect, which is an apprehensive power. longs to the apprehensive faculty; but by way of simili- Therefore consent also belongs to an apprehensive power. tude, in so far as it implies seeking acquaintance, it be- On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, longs to the appetitive power, as stated above. 22) that “if a man judge without affection for that of which Reply to Objection 3. “Assentire” [to assent] is, to he judges, there is no sentence,” i.e. consent. But affec- speak, “ad aliud sentire” [to feel towards something]; and tion belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore consent thus it implies a certain distance from that to which assent does also. is given. But “consentire” [to consent] is “to feel with,” I answer that, Consent implies application of sense to and this implies a certain union to the object of consent. something. Now it is proper to sense to take cognizance of Hence the will, to which it belongs to tend to the thing things present; for the imagination apprehends the simili- itself, is more properly said to consent: whereas the intel- tude of corporeal things, even in the absence of the things lect, whose act does not consist in a movement towards of which they bear the likeness; while the intellect ap- the thing, but rather the reverse, as we have stated in the prehends universal ideas, which it can apprehend indif- Ia, q. 16, a. 1; Ia, q. 27, a. 4; Ia, q. 59, a. 2, is more prop-ferently, whether the singulars be present or absent. And erly said to assent: although one word is wont to be used since the act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination for the other∗. We may also say that the intellect assents, to the thing itself, the application of the appetitive power in so far as it is moved by the will. to the thing, in so far as it cleaves to it, gets by a kind of Whether consent is to be found in irrational animals? Ia IIae q. 15 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that consent is to be found animals, there would be no act accomplished; which is in irrational animals. For consent implies a determination clearly false. of the appetite to one thing. But the appetite of irrational Objection 3. Further, men are sometimes said to con- animals is determinate to one thing. Therefore consent is sent to do something, through some passion; desire, for to be found in irrational animals. instance, or anger. But irrational animals act through pas- Objection 2. Further, if you remove what is first, you sion. Therefore they consent. remove what follows. But consent precedes the accom- On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, plished act. If therefore there were no consent in irrational 22) that “after judging, man approves and embraces the ∗ In Latin rather than in English. 669 judgment of his counselling, and this is called the sen-apply or not to apply it to this or that thing. tence,” i.e. consent. But counsel is not in irrational ani- Reply to Objection 1. In irrational animals the de- mals. Therefore neither is consent. termination of the appetite to a particular thing is merely I answer that, Consent, properly speaking, is not in ir- passive: whereas consent implies a determination of the rational animals. The reason of this is that consent implies appetite, which is active rather than merely passive. an application of the appetitive movement to something Reply to Objection 2. If the first be removed, then as to be done. Now to apply the appetitive movement to what follows is removed, provided that, properly speak- the doing of something, belongs to the subject in whose ing, it follow from that only. But if something can follow power it is to move the appetite: thus to touch a stone from several things, it is not removed by the fact that one is an action suitable to a stick, but to apply the stick so of them is removed; thus if hardening is the effect of heat that it touch the stone, belongs to one who has the power and of cold (since bricks are hardened by the fire, and of moving the stick. But irrational animals have not the frozen water is hardened by the cold), then by removing command of the appetitive movement; for this is in them heat it does not follow that there is no hardening. Now the through natural instinct. Hence in the irrational animal, accomplishment of an act follows not only from consent, there is indeed the movement of the appetite, but it does but also from the impulse of the appetite, such as is found not apply that movement to some particular thing. And in irrational animals. hence it is that the irrational animal is not properly said Reply to Objection 3. The man who acts through pas- to consent: this is proper to the rational nature, which has sion is able not to follow the passion: whereas irrational the command of the appetitive movement, and is able to animals have not that power. Hence the comparison fails. Whether consent is directed to the end or to the means? Ia IIae q. 15 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that consent is directed to in so far as they are directed to the end, they come un- the end. Because that on account of which a thing is such der counsel: and so counsel can be applied to them, in so is still more such. But it is on account of the end that we far as the appetitive movement is applied to the judgment consent to the means. Therefore, still more do we consent resulting from counsel. But the appetitive movement to to the end. the end is not applied to counsel: rather is counsel applied Objection 2. Further, the act of the intemperate man is to it, because counsel presupposes the desire of the end. his end, just as the act of the virtuous man is his end. But On the other hand, the desire of the means presupposes the intemperate man consents to his own act. Therefore the decision of counsel. And therefore the application of consent can be directed to the end. the appetitive movement to counsel’s decision is consent, Objection 3. Further, desire of the means is choice, as properly speaking. Consequently, since counsel is only stated above (q. 13, a. 1). If therefore consent were only about the means, consent, properly speaking, is of noth- directed to the means it would nowise differ from choice. ing else but the means. And this is proved to be false by the authority of Dama- Reply to Objection 1. Just as the knowledge of con- scene who says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that “after the ap- clusions through the principles is science, whereas the proval” which he calls “the sentence,” “comes the choice.” knowledge of the principles is not science, but something Therefore consent is not only directed to the means. higher, namely, understanding; so do we consent to the On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, means on account of the end, in respect of which our act 22) that the “sentence,” i.e. the consent, takes place “when is not consent but something greater, namely, volition. a man approves and embraces the judgment of his coun- Reply to Objection 2. Delight in his act, rather than sel.” But counsel is only about the means. Therefore the the act itself, is the end of the intemperate man, and for same applies to consent. sake of this delight he consents to that act. I answer that, Consent is the application of the appet- Reply to Objection 3. Choice includes something itive movement to something that is already in the power that consent has not, namely, a certain relation to some- of him who causes the application. Now the order of ac- thing to which something else is preferred: and therefore tion is this: First there is the apprehension of the end; then after consent there still remains a choice. For it may hap- the desire of the end; then the counsel about the means; pen that by aid of counsel several means have been found then the desire of the means. Now the appetite tends to conducive to the end, and through each of these meeting the last end naturally: wherefore the application of the with approval, consent has been given to each: but af- appetitive movement to the apprehended end has not the ter approving of many, we have given our preference to nature of consent, but of simple volition. But as to those one by choosing it. But if only one meets with approval, things which come under consideration after the last end, then consent and choice do not differ in reality, but only 670 in our way of looking at them; so that we call it consent, according as we prefer it to those that do not meet with according as we approve of doing that thing; but choice our approval. Whether consent to the act belongs only to the higher part of the soul? Ia IIae q. 15 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that consent to the act which is the function of the higher reason. Wherefore as does not always belong to the higher reason. For “de- long as a man is uncertain whether he resists or not, ac- light follows action, and perfects it, just as beauty perfects cording to Divine principles, no judgment of the reason youth”∗ (Ethic. x, 4). But consent to delight belongs to can be considered in the light of a final decision. Now the the lower reason, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12). final decision of what is to be done is consent to the act. Therefore consent to the act does not belong only to the Therefore consent to the act belongs to the higher reason; higher reason. but in that sense in which the reason includes the will, as Objection 2. Further, an act to which we consent is stated above (a. 1, ad 1). said to be voluntary. But it belongs to many powers to Reply to Objection 1. Consent to delight in the work produce voluntary acts. Therefore the higher reason is not done belongs to the higher reason, as also does consent alone in consenting to the act. to the work; but consent to delight in thought belongs to Objection 3. Further, “the higher reason is that which the lower reason, just as to the lower reason it belongs to is intent on the contemplation and consultation of things think. Nevertheless the higher reason exercises judgment eternal,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7). But man on the fact of thinking or not thinking, considered as an often consents to an act not for eternal, but for temporal action; and in like manner on the delight that results. But reasons, or even on account of some passion of the soul. in so far as the act of thinking is considered as ordained Therefore consent to an act does not belong to the higher to a further act, it belongs to the lower reason. For that reason alone. which is ordained to something else, belongs to a lower On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): art or power than does the end to which it is ordained: “It is impossible for man to make up his mind to commit hence the art which is concerned with the end is called the a sin, unless that mental faculty which has the sovereign master or principal art. power of urging his members to, or restraining them from, Reply to Objection 2. Since actions are called vol- act, yield to the evil deed and become its slave.” untary from the fact that we consent to them, it does not I answer that, The final decision belongs to him who follow that consent is an act of each power, but of the will holds the highest place, and to whom it belongs to judge which is in the reason, as stated above (a. 1, ad 1), and of the others; for as long as judgment about some mat- from which the voluntary act is named. ter remains to be pronounced, the final decision has not Reply to Objection 3. The higher reason is said to been given. Now it is evident that it belongs to the higher consent not only because it always moves to act, accord- reason to judge of all: since it is by the reason that we ing to the eternal reasons; but also because it fails to dis- judge of sensible things; and of things pertaining to hu- sent according to those same reasons. man principles we judge according to Divine principles, ∗ oion tois akmaiois he hora;—as youthful vigor perfects a man in his prime 671 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 16 Of Use, Which Is an Act of the Will in Regard to the Means (In Four Articles) We must now consider use; concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether use is an act of the will? (2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals? (3) Whether it regards the means only, or the end also? (4) Of the relation of use to choice. Whether use is an act of the will? Ia IIae q. 16 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that use is not an act of body; as the intellect, to understand; and the eye, to see; the will. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4) that but also external things, as a stick, to strike. But it is ev- “to use is to refer that which is the object of use to the ident that we do not apply external things to an operation obtaining of something else.” But “to refer” something to save through the interior principles which are either the another is an act of the reason to which it belongs to com- powers of the soul, or the habits of those powers, or the pare and to direct. Therefore use is an act of the reason organs which are parts of the body. Now it has been shown and not of the will. above (q. 9, a. 1) that it is the will which moves the soul’s Objection 2. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. powers to their acts, and this is to apply them to operation. ii, 22) that man “goes forward to the operation, and this Hence it is evident that first and principally use belongs to is called impulse; then he makes use (of the powers) and the will as first mover; to the reason, as directing; and to this is called use.” But operation belongs to the executive the other powers as executing the operation, which pow- power; and the act of the will does not follow the act of ers are compared to the will which applies them to act, as the executive power, on the contrary execution comes last. the instruments are compared to the principal agent. Now Therefore use is not an act of the will. action is properly ascribed, not to the instrument, but to Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. the principal agent, as building is ascribed to the builder, 30): “All things that were made were made for man’s use, not to his tools. Hence it is evident that use is, properly because reason with which man is endowed uses all things speaking, an act of the will. by its judgment of them.” But judgment of things created Reply to Objection 1. Reason does indeed refer one by God belongs to the speculative reason; which seems to thing to another; but the will tends to that which is referred be altogether distinct from the will, which is the principle by the reason to something else. And in this sense to use of human acts. Therefore use is not an act of the will. is to refer one thing to another. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): Reply to Objection 2. Damascene is speaking of use “To use is to apply to something to purpose of the will.” in so far as it belongs to the executive powers. I answer that, The use of a thing implies the applica- Reply to Objection 3. Even the speculative reason is tion of that thing to an operation: hence the operation to applied by the will to the act of understanding or judging. which we apply a thing is called its use; thus the use of Consequently the speculative reason is said to use, in so a horse is to ride, and the use of a stick is to strike. Now far as it is moved by the will, in the same way as the other we apply to an operation not only the interior principles of powers. action, viz. the powers of the soul or the members of the Whether use is to be found in irrational animals? Ia IIae q. 16 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that use is to be found in Objection 2. Further, to apply the members to action irrational animals. For it is better to enjoy than to use, be- is to use them. But irrational animals apply their mem- cause, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10): “We use things bers to action; for instance, their feet, to walk; their horns, by referring them to something else which we are to en-to strike. Therefore it is possible for irrational animals to joy.” But enjoyment is to be found in irrational animals, use. as stated above (q. 11, a. 2). Much more, therefore, is it On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): possible for them to use. “None but a rational animal can make use of a thing.” 672 I answer that, as stated above (a. 1), to use is to apply ter than use; because that which is appetible absolutely an active principle to action: thus to consent is to apply the is better than that which is appetible only as directed to appetitive movement to the desire of something, as stated something else. But if we compare them in respect of above (q. 15, Aa. 1,2,3). Now he alone who has the dis- the apprehensive power that precedes them, greater excel- posal of a thing, can apply it to something else; and this lence is required on the part of use: because to direct one belongs to him alone who knows how to refer it to some- thing to another is an act of reason; whereas to apprehend thing else, which is an act of the reason. And therefore something absolutely is within the competency even of none but a rational animal consents and uses. sense. Reply to Objection 1. To enjoy implies the absolute Reply to Objection 2. Animals by means of their movement of the appetite to the appetible: whereas to use members do something from natural instinct; not through implies a movement of the appetite to something as di- knowing the relation of their members to these opera- rected to something else. If therefore we compare use and tions. Wherefore, properly speaking, they do not apply enjoyment in respect of their objects, enjoyment is bet- their members to action, nor do they use them. Whether use regards also the last end? Ia IIae q. 16 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that use can regard also sometimes the attainment or possession of that thing (thus the last end. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): “Who- the miser’s end is either money or the possession of it); it ever enjoys, uses.” But man enjoys the last end. Therefore is evident that, simply speaking, the last end is the thing he uses the last end. itself; for the possession of money is good only inasmuch Objection 2. Further, “to use is to apply something as there is some good in money. But in regard to the in- to the purpose of the will” (De Trin. x, 11). But the last dividual, the obtaining of money is the last end; for the end, more than anything else, is the object of the will’s miser would not seek for money, save that he might have application. Therefore it can be the object of use. it. Therefore, simply and properly speaking, a man enjoys Objection 3. Further, Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that money, because he places his last end therein; but in so far “Eternity is in the Father, Likeness in the Image,” i.e. in as he seeks to possess it, he is said to use it. the Son, “Use in the Gift,” i.e. in the Holy Ghost. But the Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of use Holy Ghost, since He is God, is the last end. Therefore in general, in so far as it implies the relation of an end to the last end can be the object of use. the enjoyment which a man seeks in that end. On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): Reply to Objection 2. The end is applied to the pur- “No one rightly uses God, but one enjoys Him.” But God pose of the will, that the will may find rest in it. Con- alone is the last end. Therefore we cannot use the last end. sequently this rest in the end, which is the enjoyment I answer that, Use, as stated above (a. 1), implies the thereof, is in this sense called use of the end. But the application of one thing to another. Now that which is means are applied to the will’s purpose, not only in being applied to another is regarded in the light of means to an used as means, but as ordained to something else in which end; and consequently use always regards the means. For the will finds rest. this reason things that are adapted to a certain end are said Reply to Objection 3. The words of Hilary refer to to be “useful”; in fact their very usefulness is sometimes use as applicable to rest in the last end; just as, speaking called use. in a general sense, one may be said to use the end for the It must, however, be observed that the last end may purpose of attaining it, as stated above. Hence Augustine be taken in two ways: first, simply; secondly, in respect says (De Trin. vi, 10) that “this love, delight, felicity, or of an individual. For since the end, as stated above (q. 1, happiness, is called use by him.” a. 8; q. 2, a. 7), signifies sometimes the thing itself, and Whether use precedes choice? Ia IIae q. 16 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that use precedes choice. But choice implies two relations: one, of the thing chosen, For nothing follows after choice, except execution. But in relation to the end; the other, of the thing chosen, in re- use, since it belongs to the will, precedes execution. spect of that to which it is preferred; whereas use implies Therefore it precedes choice also. relation to the end only. Therefore use precedes choice. Objection 2. Further, the absolute precedes the rela- Objection 3. Further, the will uses the other powers tive. Therefore the less relative precedes the more relative. in so far as it removes them. But the will moves itself, 673 too, as stated above (q. 9, a. 3). Therefore it uses itself, willed. Wherefore it is evident that use follows choice; by applying itself to act. But it does this when it consents. provided that by use we mean the will’s use of the exec- Therefore there is use in consent. But consent precedes utive power in moving it. But since the will, in a way, choice as stated above (q. 15, a. 3, ad 3). Therefore use moves the reason also, and uses it, we may take the use does also. of the means, as consisting in the consideration of the rea- On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, son, whereby it refers the means to the end. In this sense 22) that “the will after choosing has an impulse to the op- use precedes choice. eration, and afterwards it uses (the powers).” Therefore Reply to Objection 1. The motion of the will to the use follows choice. execution of the work, precedes execution, but follows I answer that, The will has a twofold relation to the choice. And so, since use belongs to that very motion thing willed. One, according as the thing willed is, in a of the will, it stands between choice and execution. way, in the willing subject, by a kind of proportion or or- Reply to Objection 2. What is essentially relative is der to the thing willed. Wherefore those things that are after the absolute; but the thing to which relation is re- naturally proportionate to a certain end, are said to desire ferred need not come after. Indeed, the more a cause pre- that end naturally. Yet to have an end thus is to have it im- cedes, the more numerous the effects to which it has rela- perfectly. Now every imperfect thing tends to perfection. tion. And therefore both the natural and the voluntary appetite Reply to Objection 3. Choice precedes use, if they be tend to have the end in reality; and this is to have it per- referred to the same object. But nothing hinders the use of fectly. This is the second relation of the will to the thing one thing preceding the choice of another. And since the willed. acts of the will react on one another, in each act of the will Now the thing willed is not only the end, but also the we can find both consent and choice and use; so that we means. And the last act that belongs to the first relation of may say that the will consents to choose, and consents to the will to the means, is choice; for there the will becomes consent, and uses itself in consenting and choosing. And fully proportionate, by willing the means fully. Use, on such acts as are ordained to that which precedes, precede the other hand, belongs to the second relation of the will, also. in respect of which it tends to the realization of the thing 674 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 17 Of the Acts Commanded by the Will (In Nine Articles) We must now consider the acts commanded by the will; under which head there are nine points of inquiry: (1) Whether command is an act of the will or of the reason? (2) Whether command belongs to irrational animals? (3) Of the order between command and use (4) Whether command and the commanded act are one act or distinct? (5) Whether the act of the will is commanded? (6) Whether the act of the reason is commanded? (7) Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded? (8) Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded? (9) Whether the acts of the external members are commanded? Whether command is an act of the reason or of the will? Ia IIae q. 17 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that command is not an Now, command is essentially indeed an act of the rea- act of the reason but of the will. For command is a kind son: for the commander orders the one commanded to of motion; because Avicenna says that there are four ways do something, by way of intimation or declaration; and of moving, “by perfecting, by disposing, by commanding, to order thus by intimating or declaring is an act of the and by counselling.” But it belongs to the will to move all reason. Now the reason can intimate or declare some- the other powers of the soul, as stated above (q. 9, a. 1). thing in two ways. First, absolutely: and this intimation Therefore command is an act of the will. is expressed by a verb in the indicative mood, as when Objection 2. Further, just as to be commanded be- one person says to another: “This is what you should do.” longs to that which is subject, so, seemingly, to command Sometimes, however, the reason intimates something to belongs to that which is most free. But the root of liberty a man by moving him thereto; and this intimation is ex- is especially in the will. Therefore to command belongs pressed by a verb in the imperative mood; as when it is to the will. said to someone: “Do this.” Now the first mover, among Objection 3. Further, command is followed at once the powers of the soul, to the doing of an act is the will, as by act. But the act of the reason is not followed at once by stated above (q. 9, a. 1). Since therefore the second mover act: for he who judges that a thing should be done, does does not move, save in virtue of the first mover, it follows not do it at once. Therefore command is not an act of the that the very fact that the reason moves by commanding, reason, but of the will. is due to the power of the will. Consequently it follows On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa∗ and the Philoso- that command is an act of the reason, presupposing an act pher (Ethic. i, 13) say that “the appetite obeys reason.” of the will, in virtue of which the reason, by its command, Therefore command is an act of the reason. moves (the power) to the execution of the act. I answer that, Command is an act of the reason pre- Reply to Objection 1. To command is to move, not supposing, however, an act of the will. In proof of this, anyhow, but by intimating and declaring to another; and we must take note that, since the acts of the reason and of this is an act of the reason. the will can be brought to bear on one another, in so far Reply to Objection 2. The root of liberty is the will as the reason reasons about willing, and the will wills to as the subject thereof; but it is the reason as its cause. For reason, the result is that the act of the reason precedes the the will can tend freely towards various objects, precisely act of the will, and conversely. And since the power of the because the reason can have various perceptions of good. preceding act continues in the act that follows, it happens Hence philosophers define the free-will as being “a free sometimes that there is an act of the will in so far as it judgment arising from reason,” implying that reason is the retains in itself something of an act of the reason, as we root of liberty. have stated in reference to use and choice; and conversely, Reply to Objection 3. This argument proves that that there is an act of the reason in so far as it retains in command is an act of reason not absolutely, but with a itself something of an act of the will. kind of motion as stated above. ∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi. 675 Whether command belongs to irrational animals? Ia IIae q. 17 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that command belongs fore it is impossible that irrational animals should com- to irrational animals. Because, according to Avicenna, mand in any way, since they are devoid of reason. “the power that commands movement is the appetite; and Reply to Objection 1. The appetitive power is said the power that executes movement is in the muscles and to command movement, in so far as it moves the com- nerves.” But both powers are in irrational animals. There- manding reason. But this is only in man. In irrational fore command is to be found in irrational animals. animals the appetitive power is not, properly speaking, a Objection 2. Further, the condition of a slave is that of commanding faculty, unless command be taken loosely one who receives commands. But the body is compared for motion. to the soul as a slave to his master, as the Philosopher says Reply to Objection 2. The body of the irrational an- (Polit. i, 2). Therefore the body is commanded by the imal is competent to obey; but its soul is not competent soul, even in irrational animals, since they are composed to command, because it is not competent to direct. Con- of soul and body. sequently there is no ratio there of commander and com- Objection 3. Further, by commanding, man has an manded; but only of mover and moved. impulse towards an action. But impulse to action is to be Reply to Objection 3. Impulse to action is in irra- found in irrational animals, as Damascene says (De Fide tional animals otherwise than in man. For the impulse Orth. ii, 22). Therefore command is to be found in irra- of man to action arises from the directing reason; where- tional animals. fore his impulse is one of command. On the other hand, On the contrary, Command is an act of reason, as the impulse of the irrational animal arises from natural in- stated above (a. 1). But in irrational animals there is no stinct; because as soon as they apprehend the fitting or the reason. Neither, therefore, is there command. unfitting, their appetite is moved naturally to pursue or to I answer that, To command is nothing else than to di- avoid. Wherefore they are directed by another to act; and rect someone to do something, by a certain motion of inti- they themselves do not direct themselves to act. Conse- mation. Now to direct is the proper act of reason. Where- quently in them is impulse but not command. Whether use precedes command? Ia IIae q. 17 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that use precedes com- the user is united to the act of the thing used; for one does mand. For command is an act of the reason presupposing not use a stick before doing something with the stick. But an act of the will, as stated above (a. 1). But, as we have command is not simultaneous with the act of the thing to already shown (q. 16, a. 1), use is an act of the will. There- which the command is given: for it naturally precedes its fore use precedes command. fulfilment, sometimes, indeed, by priority of time. Conse- Objection 2. Further, command is one of those things quently it is evident that command precedes use. that are ordained to the end. But use is of those things Reply to Objection 1. Not every act of the will pre- that are ordained to the end. Therefore it seems that use cedes this act of the reason which is command; but an act precedes command. of the will precedes, viz. choice; and an act of the will Objection 3. Further, every act of a power moved by follows, viz. use. Because after counsel’s decision, which the will is called use; because the will uses the other pow- is reason’s judgment, the will chooses; and after choice, ers, as stated above (q. 16, a. 1). But command is an act the reason commands that power which has to do what of the reason as moved by the will, as stated above (a. 1). was chosen; and then, last of all, someone’s will begins to Therefore command is a kind of use. Now the common use, by executing the command of reason; sometimes it is precedes the proper. Therefore use precedes command. another’s will, when one commands another; sometimes On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, the will of the one that commands, when he commands 22) that impulse to action precedes use. But impulse to himself to do something. operation is given by command. Therefore command pre- Reply to Objection 2. Just as act ranks before power, cedes use. so does the object rank before the act. Now the object I answer that, use of that which is directed to the end, of use is that which is directed to the end. Consequently, in so far as it is in the reason referring this to the end, prefrom the fact that command precedes, rather than that it cedes choice, as stated above (q. 16, a. 4). Wherefore still follows use. more does it precede command. On the other hand, use of Reply to Objection 3. Just as the act of the will in us- that which is directed to the end, in so far as it is subject ing the reason for the purpose of command, precedes the to the executive power, follows command; because use in command; so also we may say that this act whereby the 676 will uses the reason, is preceded by a command of reason; since the acts of these powers react on one another. Whether command and the commanded act are one act, or distinct? Ia IIae q. 17 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the commanded act parts are being and substances in the whole. But those is not one with the command itself. For the acts of differ- things which are distinct in substance, and one according ent powers are themselves distinct. But the commanded to an accident, are distinct simply, and one in a certain act belongs to one power, and the command to another; respect: thus many men are one people, and many stones since one is the power that commands, and the other is are one heap; which is unity of composition or order. In the power that receives the command. Therefore the com- like manner also many individuals that are one in genus manded act is not one with the command. or species are many simply, and one in a certain respect: Objection 2. Further, whatever things can be separate since to be one in genus or species is to be one according from one another, are distinct: for nothing is severed from to the consideration of the reason. itself. But sometimes the commanded act is separate from Now just as in the genus of natural things, a whole is the command: for sometimes the command is given, and composed of matter and form (e.g. man, who is one natu- the commanded act follows not. Therefore command is a ral being, though he has many parts, is composed of soul distinct act from the act commanded. and body); so, in human acts, the act of a lower power is Objection 3. Further, whatever things are related to in the position of matter in regard to the act of a higher one another as precedent and consequent, are distinct. But power, in so far as the lower power acts in virtue of the command naturally precedes the commanded act. There- higher power moving it: for thus also the act of the first fore they are distinct. mover is as the form in regard to the act of its instrument. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) Hence it is evident that command and the commanded act that “where one thing is by reason of another, there is but are one human act, just as a whole is one, yet in its parts, one.” But there is no commanded act unless by reason of many. the command. Therefore they are one. Reply to Objection 1. If the distinct powers are not I answer that, Nothing prevents certain things being ordained to one another, their acts are diverse simply. But distinct in one respect, and one in another respect. Indeed, when one power is the mover of the other, then their acts every multitude is one in some respect, as Dionysius says are, in a way, one: since “the act of the mover and the act (Div. Nom. xiii). But a difference is to be observed in of the thing moved are one act” (Phys. iii, 3). this, that some are simply many, and one in a particular Reply to Objection 2. The fact that command and the aspect: while with others it is the reverse. Now “one” is commanded act can be separated from one another shows predicated in the same way as “being.” And substance is that they are different parts. Because the parts of a man being simply, whereas accident or being “of reason” is a can be separated from one another, and yet they form one being only in a certain respect. Wherefore those things whole. that are one in substance are one simply, though many in Reply to Objection 3. In those things that are many a certain respect. Thus, in the genus substance, the whole in parts, but one as a whole, nothing hinders one part from composed of its integral or essential parts, is one simply: preceding another. Thus the soul, in a way, precedes the because the whole is being and substance simply, and the body; and the heart, the other members. Whether the act of the will is commanded? Ia IIae q. 17 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the act of the will is manded, for the same reason all are commanded. But if not commanded. For Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): all the acts of the will are commanded, we must needs “The mind commands the mind to will, and yet it does proceed to infinity; because the act of the will precedes not.” But to will is the act of the will. Therefore the act of the act of reason commanding, as stated above (a. 1); for the will is not commanded. if that act of the will be also commanded, this command Objection 2. Further, to receive a command belongs will be precedes by another act of the reason, and so on to to one who can understand the command. But the will infinity. But to proceed to infinity is not possible. There- cannot understand the command; for the will differs from fore the act of the will is not commanded. the intellect, to which it belongs to understand. Therefore On the contrary, Whatever is in our power, is subject the act of the will is not commanded. to our command. But the acts of the will, most of all, are Objection 3. Further, if one act of the will is com- in our power; since all our acts are said to be in our power, 677 in so far as they are voluntary. Therefore the acts of the fails to command perfectly. will are commanded by us. Reply to Objection 2. Just as each of the members of I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), command is the body works not for itself alone but for the whole body; nothing else than the act of the reason directing, with a thus it is for the whole body that the eye sees; so is it with certain motion, something to act. Now it is evident that the powers of the soul. For the intellect understands, not the reason can direct the act of the will: for just as it can for itself alone, but for all the powers; and the will wills judge it to be good to will something, so it can direct by not only for itself, but for all the powers too. Wherefore commanding man to will. From this it is evident that an man, in so far as he is endowed with intellect and will, act of the will can be commanded. commands the act of the will for himself. Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (Confess. Reply to Objection 3. Since command is an act of viii, 9) when the mind commands itself perfectly to will, reason, that act is commanded which is subject to reason. then already it wills: but that sometimes it commands and Now the first act of the will is not due to the direction of wills not, is due to the fact that it commands imperfectly. the reason but to the instigation of nature, or of a higher Now imperfect command arises from the fact that the rea- cause, as stated above (q. 9, a. 4). Therefore there is no son is moved by opposite motives to command or not to need to proceed to infinity. command: wherefore it fluctuates between the two, and Whether the act of the reason is commanded? Ia IIae q. 17 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the act of the reason which two acts of the reason have to be noticed. One is cannot be commanded. For it seems impossible for a thing the act whereby it apprehends the truth about something. to command itself. But it is the reason that commands, as This act is not in our power: because it happens in virtue stated above (a. 1). Therefore the act of the reason is not of a natural or supernatural light. Consequently in this commanded. respect, the act of the reason is not in our power, and can- Objection 2. Further, that which is essential is dif- not be commanded. The other act of the reason is that ferent from that which is by participation. But the power whereby it assents to what it apprehends. If, therefore, whose act is commanded by reason, is rational by partic- that which the reason apprehends is such that it naturally ipation, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the act of that assents thereto, e.g. the first principles, it is not in our power, which is essentially rational, is not commanded. power to assent or dissent to the like: assent follows natu- Objection 3. Further, that act is commanded, which rally, and consequently, properly speaking, is not subject is in our power. But to know and judge the truth, which to our command. But some things which are apprehended is the act of reason, is not always in our power. Therefore do not convince the intellect to such an extent as not to the act of the reason cannot be commanded. leave it free to assent or dissent, or at least suspend its as- On the contrary, That which we do of our free-will, sent or dissent, on account of some cause or other; and in can be done by our command. But the acts of the reason such things assent or dissent is in our power, and is subject are accomplished through the free-will: for Damascene to our command. says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that “by his free-will man in- Reply to Objection 1. Reason commands itself, just quires, considers, judges, approves.” Therefore the acts of as the will moves itself, as stated above (q. 9, a. 3), that is the reason can be commanded. to say, in so far as each power reacts on its own acts, and I answer that, Since the reason reacts on itself, just as from one thing tends to another. it directs the acts of other powers, so can it direct its own Reply to Objection 2. On account of the diversity of act. Consequently its act can be commanded. objects subject to the act of the reason, nothing prevents But we must take note that the act of the reason may the reason from participating in itself: thus the knowledge be considered in two ways. First, as to the exercise of the of principles is participated in the knowledge of the con- act. And considered thus, the act of the reason can always clusions. be commanded: as when one is told to be attentive, and to The reply to the third object is evident from what has use one’s reason. Secondly, as to the object; in respect of been said. 678 Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded? Ia IIae q. 17 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the act of the sen- the command of reason: and consequently in this respect, sitive appetite is not commanded. For the Apostle says the movement of the sensitive appetite is hindered from (Rom. 7:15): “For I do not that good which I will”: and being wholly subject to the command of reason. a gloss explains this by saying that man lusts, although Moreover it happens sometimes that the movement of he wills not to lust. But to lust is an act of the sensitive the sensitive appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence appetite. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not of an apprehension of the imagination of sense. And then subject to our command. such movement occurs without the command of reason: Objection 2. Further, corporeal matter obeys God although reason could have prevented it, had it foreseen. alone, to the effect of formal transmutation, as was shown Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2) that the reason in the Ia, q. 65, a. 4; Ia, q. 91, a. 2; Ia, q. 110, a. 2. But governs the irascible and concupiscible not by a “despotic the act of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a for- supremacy,” which is that of a master over his slave; but mal transmutation of the body, consisting in heat or cold. by a “politic and royal supremacy,” whereby the free are Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to governed, who are not wholly subject to command. man’s command. Reply to Objection 1. That man lusts, although he Objection 3. Further, the proper motive principle of wills not to lust, is due to a disposition of the body, the sensitive appetite is something apprehended by sense whereby the sensitive appetite is hindered from perfect or imagination. But it is not always in our power to appre- compliance with the command of reason. Hence the hend something by sense or imagination. Therefore the Apostle adds (Rom. 7:15): “I see another law in my mem- act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to our command. bers, fighting against the law of my mind.” This may also On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa∗ says: “That happen through a sudden movement of concupiscence, as which obeys reason is twofold, the concupiscible and the stated above. irascible,” which belong to the sensitive appetite. There- Reply to Objection 2. The condition of the body fore the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the com- stands in a twofold relation to the act of the sensitive ap- mand of reason. petite. First, as preceding it: thus a man may be disposed I answer that, An act is subject to our command, in in one way or another, in respect of his body, to this or so far as it is in our power, as stated above (a. 5). Con- that passion. Secondly, as consequent to it: thus a man sequently in order to understand in what manner the act becomes heated through anger. Now the condition that of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of rea- precedes, is not subject to the command of reason: since son, we must consider in what manner it is in our power. it is due either to nature, or to some previous movement, Now it must be observed that the sensitive appetite differs which cannot cease at once. But the condition that is con- from the intellective appetite, which is called the will, in sequent, follows the command of reason: since it results the fact that the sensitive appetite is a power of a corpo- from the local movement of the heart, which has various real organ, whereas the will is not. Again, every act of a movements according to the various acts of the sensitive power that uses a corporeal organ, depends not only on a appetite. power of the soul, but also on the disposition of that cor- Reply to Objection 3. Since the external sensible is poreal organ: thus the act of vision depends on the power necessary for the apprehension of the senses, it is not in of sight, and on the condition of the eye, which condition our power to apprehend anything by the senses, unless the is a help or a hindrance to that act. Consequently the act sensible be present; which presence of the sensible is not of the sensitive appetite depends not only on the appetitive always in our power. For it is then that man can use his power, but also on the disposition of the body. senses if he will so to do; unless there be some obstacle Now whatever part the power of the soul takes in the on the part of the organ. On the other hand, the appre- act, follows apprehension. And the apprehension of the hension of the imagination is subject to the ordering of imagination, being a particular apprehension, is regulated reason, in proportion to the strength or weakness of the by the apprehension of reason, which is universal; just as imaginative power. For that man is unable to imagine the a particular active power is regulated by a universal active things that reason considers, is either because they cannot power. Consequently in this respect the act of the sensitive be imagined, such as incorporeal things; or because of the appetite is subject to the command of reason. On the other weakness of the imaginative power, due to some organic hand, condition or disposition of the body is not subject to indisposition. ∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi. 679 Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded? Ia IIae q. 17 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that the acts of the veg- fore those acts that proceed from the intellective or the an- etal soul are subject to the command of reason. For the imal appetite, can be commanded by reason: but not those sensitive powers are of higher rank than the vegetal pow- acts that proceed from the natural appetite. And such are ers. But the powers of the sensitive soul are subject to the acts of the vegetal soul; wherefore Gregory of Nyssa the command of reason. Much more, therefore, are the (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii) says “that generation and powers of the vegetal soul. nutrition belong to what are called natural powers.” Con- Objection 2. Further, man is called a “little world”∗, sequently the acts of the vegetal soul are not subject to the because the soul is in the body, as God is in the world. But command of reason. God is in the world in such a way, that everything in the Reply to Objection 1. The more immaterial an act world obeys His command. Therefore all that is in man, is, the more noble it is, and the more is it subject to the even the powers of the vegetal soul, obey the command of command of reason. Hence the very fact that the acts of reason. the vegetal soul do not obey reason, shows that they rank Objection 3. Further, praise and blame are awarded lowest. only to such acts as are subject to the command of rea- Reply to Objection 2. The comparison holds in a cer- son. But in the acts of the nutritive and generative power, tain respect: because, to wit, as God moves the world, so there is room for praise and blame, virtue and vice: as in the soul moves the body. But it does not hold in every re- the case of gluttony and lust, and their contrary virtues. spect: for the soul did not create the body out of nothing, Therefore the acts of these powers are subject to the com- as God created the world; for which reason the world is mand of reason. wholly subject to His command. On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa† sats that “the nu- Reply to Objection 3. Virtue and vice, praise and tritive and generative power is one over which the reason blame do not affect the acts themselves of the nutritive has no control.” and generative power, i.e. digestion, and formation of the I answer that, Some acts proceed from the natural human body; but they affect the acts of the sensitive part, appetite, others from the animal, or from the intellectual that are ordained to the acts of generation and nutrition; appetite: for every agent desires an end in some way. Now for example the desire for pleasure in the act of taking the natural appetite does not follow from some apprehen- food or in the act of generation, and the right or wrong sion, as to the animal and the intellectual appetite. But the use thereof. reason commands by way of apprehensive power. Where- Whether the acts of the external members are commanded? Ia IIae q. 17 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that the members of the members are not obedient to reason. body do not obey reason as to their acts. For it is evident On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): that the members of the body are more distant from the “The mind commands a movement of the hand, and so reason, than the powers of the vegetal soul. But the pow- ready is the hand to obey, that scarcely can one discern ers of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, as stated above obedience from command.” (a. 8). Therefore much less do the members of the body I answer that, The members of the body are organs of obey. the soul’s powers. Consequently according as the powers Objection 2. Further, the heart is the principle of an- of the soul stand in respect of obedience to reason, so do imal movement. But the movement of the heart is not the members of the body stand in respect thereof. Since subject to the command of reason: for Gregory of Nyssa‡ then the sensitive powers are subject to the command of says that “the pulse is not controlled by reason.” There- reason, whereas the natural powers are not; therefore all fore the movement of the bodily members is not subject movements of members, that are moved by the sensitive to the command of reason. powers, are subject to the command of reason; whereas Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei those movements of members, that arise from the natural xiv, 16) that “the movement of the genital members is powers, are not subject to the command of reason. sometimes inopportune and not desired; sometimes when Reply to Objection 1. The members do not move sought it fails, and whereas the heart is warm with desire, themselves, but are moved through the powers of the soul; the body remains cold.” Therefore the movements of the of which powers, some are in closer contact with the rea- ∗ Aristotle, Phys. viii. 2 † Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii. ‡ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii. 680 son than are the powers of the vegetal soul. God, by the insubmission of that member whereby origi- Reply to Objection 2. In things pertaining to intellect nal sin is transmitted to posterity. and will, that which is according to nature stands first, But because, as we shall state later on, the effect of whence all other things are derived: thus from the knowl- the sin of our first parent was that his nature was left edge of principles that are naturally known, is derived to itself, through the withdrawal of the supernatural gift knowledge of the conclusions; and from volition of the which God had bestowed on man, we must consider the end naturally desired, is derived the choice of the means. natural cause of this particular member’s insubmission to So also in bodily movements the principle is according reason. This is stated by Aristotle (De Causis Mot. An- to nature. Now the principle of bodily movements begins imal.) who says that “the movements of the heart and of with the movement of the heart. Consequently the move- the organs of generation are involuntary,” and that the rea- ment of the heart is according to nature, and not according son of this is as follows. These members are stirred at the to the will: for like a proper accident, it results from life, occasion of some apprehension; in so far as the intellect which follows from the union of soul and body. Thus the and imagination represent such things as arouse the pas- movement of heavy and light things results from their sub- sions of the soul, of which passions these movements are stantial form: for which reason they are said to be moved a consequence. But they are not moved at the command by their generator, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii, of the reason or intellect, because these movements are 4). Wherefore this movement is called “vital.” For which conditioned by a certain natural change of heat and cold, reason Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii) which change is not subject to the command of reason. says that, just as the movement of generation and nutrition This is the case with these two organs in particular, be- does not obey reason, so neither does the pulse which is a cause each is as it were a separate animal being, in so far vital movement. By the pulse he means the movement of as it is a principle of life; and the principle is virtually the the heart which is indicated by the pulse veins. whole. For the heart is the principle of the senses; and Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Civ. from the organ of generation proceeds the seminal virtue, Dei xiv, 17,20) it is in punishment of sin that the move- which is virtually the entire animal. Consequently they ment of these members does not obey reason: in this have their proper movements naturally: because princi- sense, that the soul is punished for its rebellion against ples must needs be natural, as stated above (Reply obj. 2). 681 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 18 Of the Good and Evil of Human Acts, in General (In Eleven Articles) We must now consider the good and evil of human acts. First, how a human act is good or evil; secondly, what results from the good or evil of a human act, as merit or demerit, sin and guilt. Under the first head there will be a threefold consideration: the first will be of the good and evil of human acts, in general; the second, of the good and evil of internal acts; the third, of the good and evil of external acts. Concerning the first there are eleven points of inquiry: (1) Whether every human action is good, or are there evil actions? (2) Whether the good or evil of a human action is derived from its object? (3) Whether it is derived from a circumstance? (4) Whether it is derived from the end? (5) Whether a human action is good or evil in its species? (6) Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end? (7) Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus, or conversely? (8) Whether any action is indifferent in its species? (9) Whether an individual action can be indifferent? (10) Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good or evil? (11) Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, places the moral action in the species of good or evil? Whether every human action is good, or are there evil actions? Ia IIae q. 18 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that every human action happens with some things, that they have being in some is good, and that none is evil. For Dionysius says (Div. respect, and yet they are lacking in the fulness of being Nom. iv) that evil acts not, save in virtue of the good. But due to them. Thus the fulness of human being requires a no evil is done in virtue of the good. Therefore no action compound of soul and body, having all the powers and in- is evil. struments of knowledge and movement: wherefore if any Objection 2. Further, nothing acts except in so far as man be lacking in any of these, he is lacking in something it is in act. Now a thing is evil, not according as it is in act, due to the fulness of his being. So that as much as he has but according as its potentiality is void of act; whereas in of being, so much has he of goodness: while so far as he so far as its potentiality is perfected by act, it is good, as is lacking in goodness, and is said to be evil: thus a blind stated in Metaph. ix, 9. Therefore nothing acts in so far as man is possessed of goodness inasmuch as he lives; and it is evil, but only according as it is good. Therefore every of evil, inasmuch as he lacks sight. That, however, which action is good, and none is evil. has nothing of being or goodness, could not be said to be Objection 3. Further, evil cannot be a cause, save ac- either evil or good. But since this same fulness of being cidentally, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). But ev- is of the very essence of good, if a thing be lacking in its ery action has some effect which is proper to it. Therefore due fulness of being, it is not said to be good simply, but no action is evil, but every action is good. in a certain respect, inasmuch as it is a being; although On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 3:20): “Every it can be called a being simply, and a non-being in a cer- one that doth evil, hateth the light.” Therefore some ac- tain respect, as was stated in the Ia, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1. We tions of man are evil. must therefore say that every action has goodness, in so I answer that, We must speak of good and evil in ac- far as it has being; whereas it is lacking in goodness, in so tions as of good and evil in things: because such as ev- far as it is lacking in something that is due to its fulness erything is, such is the act that it produces. Now in things, of being; and thus it is said to be evil: for instance if it each one has so much good as it has being: since good and lacks the quantity determined by reason, or its due place, being are convertible, as was stated in the Ia, q. 5, Aa. 1,3. or something of the kind. But God alone has the whole plenitude of His Being in Reply to Objection 1. Evil acts in virtue of deficient a certain unity: whereas every other thing has its proper goodness. For it there were nothing of good there, there fulness of being in a certain multiplicity. Wherefore it would be neither being nor possibility of action. On the 682 other hand if good were not deficient, there would be no of sight he suffers a defect in walking by stumbling when evil. Consequently the action done is a deficient good, he walks. which is good in a certain respect, but simply evil. Reply to Objection 3. An evil action can have a Reply to Objection 2. Nothing hinders a thing from proper effect, according to the goodness and being that being in act in a certain respect, so that it can act; and in it has. Thus adultery is the cause of human generation, a certain respect deficient in act, so as to cause a deficient inasmuch as it implies union of male and female, but not act. Thus a blind man has in act the power of walking, inasmuch as it lacks the order of reason. whereby he is able to walk; but inasmuch as he is deprived Whether the good or evil of a man’s action is derived from its object? Ia IIae q. 18 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the good or evil of an not realize its specific form (for instance, if instead of a action is not derived from its object. For the object of any man, something else be generated); so the primary evil in action is a thing. But “evil is not in things, but in the sin- moral actions is that which is from the object, for instance, ner’s use of them,” as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. “to take what belongs to another.” And this action is said iii, 12). Therefore the good or evil of a human action is to be “evil in its genus,” genus here standing for species, not derived from their object. just as we apply the term “mankind” to the whole human Objection 2. Further, the object is compared to the species. action as its matter. But the goodness of a thing is not Reply to Objection 1. Although external things are from its matter, but rather from the form, which is an act. good in themselves, nevertheless they have not always a Therefore good and evil in actions is not derived from due proportion to this or that action. And so, inasmuch as their object. they are considered as objects of such actions, they have Objection 3. Further, the object of an active power is not the quality of goodness. compared to the action as effect to cause. But the good- Reply to Objection 2. The object is not the matter “of ness of a cause does not depend on its effect; rather is it which” (a thing is made), but the matter “about which” the reverse. Therefore good or evil in actions is not de- (something is done); and stands in relation to the act as its rived from their object. form, as it were, through giving it its species. On the contrary, It is written (Osee 9:10): “They be- Reply to Objection 3. The object of the human ac- came abominable as those things which they loved.” Now tion is not always the object of an active power. For the man becomes abominable to God on account of the mal- appetitive power is, in a way, passive; in so far as it is ice of his action. Therefore the malice of his action is ac- moved by the appetible object; and yet it is a principle of cording to the evil objects that man loves. And the same human actions. Nor again have the objects of the active applies to the goodness of his action. powers always the nature of an effect, but only when they I answer that, as stated above (a. 1) the good or evil are already transformed: thus food when transformed is of an action, as of other things, depends on its fulness of the effect of the nutritive power; whereas food before be- being or its lack of that fulness. Now the first thing that ing transformed stands in relation to the nutritive power belongs to the fulness of being seems to be that which as the matter about which it exercises its operation. Now gives a thing its species. And just as a natural thing has its since the object is in some way the effect of the active species from its form, so an action has its species from its power, it follows that it is the term of its action, and con- object, as movement from its term. And therefore just as sequently that it gives it its form and species, since move- the primary goodness of a natural thing is derived from its ment derives its species from its term. Moreover, although form, which gives it its species, so the primary goodness the goodness of an action is not caused by the goodness of a moral action is derived from its suitable object: hence of its effect, yet an action is said to be good from the fact some call such an action “good in its genus”; for instance, that it can produce a good effect. Consequently the very “to make use of what is one’s own.” And just as, in natu- proportion of an action to its effect is the measure of its ral things, the primary evil is when a generated thing does goodness. 683 Whether man’s action is good or evil from a circumstance? Ia IIae q. 18 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that an action is not good I answer that, In natural things, it is to be noted that or evil from a circumstance. For circumstances stand the whole fulness of perfection due to a thing, is not from around [circumstant] an action, as being outside it, as the mere substantial form, that gives it its species; since stated above (q. 7, a. 1). But “good and evil are in things a thing derives much from supervening accidents, as man themselves,” as is stated in Metaph. vi, 4. Therefore an does from shape, color, and the like; and if any one of action does not derive goodness or malice from a circum- these accidents be out of due proportion, evil is the result. stance. So it is with action. For the plenitude of its goodness does Objection 2. Further, the goodness or malice of an not consist wholly in its species, but also in certain ad- action is considered principally in the doctrine of morals. ditions which accrue to it by reason of certain accidents: But since circumstances are accidents of actions, it seems and such are its due circumstances. Wherefore if some- that they are outside the scope of art: because “no art takes thing be wanting that is requisite as a due circumstance notice of what is accidental” (Metaph. vi, 2). Therefore the action will be evil. the goodness or malice of an action is not taken from a Reply to Objection 1. Circumstances are outside an circumstance. action, inasmuch as they are not part of its essence; but Objection 3. Further, that which belongs to a thing, they are in an action as accidents thereof. Thus, too, acci- in respect of its substance, is not ascribed to it in respect dents in natural substances are outside the essence. of an accident. But good and evil belong to an action in Reply to Objection 2. Every accident is not acciden- respect of its substance; because an action can be good or tally in its subject; for some are proper accidents; and of evil in its genus as stated above (a. 2). Therefore an action these every art takes notice. And thus it is that the cir- is not good or bad from a circumstance. cumstances of actions are considered in the doctrine of On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) morals. that a virtuous man acts as he should, and when he should, Reply to Objection 3. Since good and being are con- and so on in respect of the other circumstances. Therefore, vertible; according as being is predicated of substance and on the other hand, the vicious man, in the matter of each of accident, so is good predicated of a thing both in respect vice, acts when he should not, or where he should not, of its essential being, and in respect of its accidental be- and so on with the other circumstances. Therefore human ing; and this, both in natural things and in moral actions. actions are good or evil according to circumstances. Whether a human action is good or evil from its end? Ia IIae q. 18 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the good and evil in in these it suffices to consider their being absolutely. But human actions are not from the end. For Dionysius says there are things the being of which depends on something (Div. Nom. iv) that “nothing acts with a view to evil.” else, and hence in their regard we must consider their be- If therefore an action were good or evil from its end, no ing in its relation to the cause on which it depends. Now action would be evil. Which is clearly false. just as the being of a thing depends on the agent, and Objection 2. Further, the goodness of an action is the form, so the goodness of a thing depends on its end. something in the action. But the end is an extrinsic cause. Hence in the Divine Persons, Whose goodness does not Therefore an action is not said to be good or bad according depend on another, the measure of goodness is not taken to its end. from the end. Whereas human actions, and other things, Objection 3. Further, a good action may happen to the goodness of which depends on something else, have a be ordained to an evil end, as when a man gives an alms measure of goodness from the end on which they depend, from vainglory; and conversely, an evil action may hap- besides that goodness which is in them absolutely. pen to be ordained to a good end, as a theft committed in Accordingly a fourfold goodness may be considered order to give something to the poor. Therefore an action in a human action. First, that which, as an action, it de- is not good or evil from its end. rives from its genus; because as much as it has of action On the contrary, Boethius says (De Differ. Topic. ii) and being so much has it of goodness, as stated above that “if the end is good, the thing is good, and if the end (a. 1). Secondly, it has goodness according to its species; be evil, the thing also is evil.” which is derived from its suitable object. Thirdly, it has I answer that, The disposition of things as to good- goodness from its circumstances, in respect, as it were, of ness is the same as their disposition as to being. Now in its accidents. Fourthly, it has goodness from its end, to some things the being does not depend on another, and which it is compared as to the cause of its goodness. 684 Reply to Objection 1. The good in view of which is good in one of the way mentioned above, from lacking one acts is not always a true good; but sometimes it is a goodness in another way. And thus it may happen that an true good, sometimes an apparent good. And in the latter action which is good in its species or in its circumstances event, an evil action results from the end in view. is ordained to an evil end, or vice versa. However, an ac- Reply to Objection 2. Although the end is an ex- tion is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways: trinsic cause, nevertheless due proportion to the end, and since “evil results from any single defect, but good from relation to the end, are inherent to the action. the complete cause,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Reply to Objection 3. Nothing hinders an action that Whether a human action is good or evil in its species? Ia IIae q. 18 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that good and evil in the intellect. moral actions do not make a difference of species. For the Now in human actions, good and evil are predicated in existence of good and evil in actions is in conformity with reference to the reason; because as Dionysius says (Div. their existence in things, as stated above (a. 1). But good Nom. iv), “the good of man is to be in accordance with and evil do not make a specific difference in things; for a reason,” and evil is “to be against reason.” For that is good good man is specifically the same as a bad man. Therefore for a thing which suits it in regard to its form; and evil, neither do they make a specific difference in actions. that which is against the order of its form. It is therefore Objection 2. Further, since evil is a privation, it is a evident that the difference of good and evil considered in non-being. But non-being cannot be a difference, accord- reference to the object is an essential difference in relation ing to the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, 3). Since therefore the to reason; that is to say, according as the object is suitable difference constitutes the species, it seems that an action or unsuitable to reason. Now certain actions are called hu- is not constituted in a species through being evil. Con- man or moral, inasmuch as they proceed from the reason. sequently good and evil do not diversify the species of Consequently it is evident that good and evil diversify the human actions. species in human actions; since essential differences cause Objection 3. Further, acts that differ in species pro- a difference of species. duce different effects. But the same specific effect results Reply to Objection 1. Even in natural things, good from a good and from an evil action: thus a man is born and evil, inasmuch as something is according to na- of adulterous or of lawful wedlock. Therefore good and ture, and something against nature, diversify the natural evil actions do not differ in species. species; for a dead body and a living body are not of the Objection 4. Further, actions are sometimes said to be same species. In like manner, good, inasmuch as it is in good or bad from a circumstance, as stated above (a. 3). accord with reason, and evil, inasmuch as it is against rea- But since a circumstance is an accident, it does not give an son, diversify the moral species. action its species. Therefore human actions do not differ Reply to Objection 2. Evil implies privation, not ab- in species on account of their goodness or malice. solute, but affecting some potentiality. For an action is On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Ethic said to be evil in its species, not because it has no object at ii. 1) “like habits produce like actions.” But a good and all; but because it has an object in disaccord with reason, a bad habit differ in species, as liberality and prodigality. for instance, to appropriate another’s property. Wherefore Therefore also good and bad actions differ in species. in so far as the object is something positive, it can consti- I answer that, Every action derives its species from tute the species of an evil act. its object, as stated above (a. 2). Hence it follows that Reply to Objection 3. The conjugal act and adul- a difference of object causes a difference of species in tery, as compared to reason, differ specifically and have actions. Now, it must be observed that a difference of effects specifically different; because the other deserves objects causes a difference of species in actions, accord- praise and reward, the other, blame and punishment. But ing as the latter are referred to one active principle, which as compared to the generative power, they do not differ in does not cause a difference in actions, according as they species; and thus they have one specific effect. are referred to another active principle. Because nothing Reply to Objection 4. A circumstance is sometimes accidental constitutes a species, but only that which is es- taken as the essential difference of the object, as compared sential; and a difference of object may be essential in ref- to reason; and then it can specify a moral act. And it must erence to one active principle, and accidental in reference needs be so whenever a circumstance transforms an action to another. Thus to know color and to know sound, differ from good to evil; for a circumstance would not make an essentially in reference to sense, but not in reference to action evil, except through being repugnant to reason. 685 Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end? Ia IIae q. 18 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the good and evil the object of the interior act of the will: while the ob- which are from the end do not diversify the species of ac- ject of the external action, is that on which the action is tions. For actions derive their species from the object. But brought to bear. Therefore just as the external action takes the end is altogether apart from the object. Therefore the its species from the object on which it bears; so the inte- good and evil which are from the end do not diversify the rior act of the will takes its species from the end, as from species of an action. its own proper object. Objection 2. Further, that which is accidental does Now that which is on the part of the will is formal in not constitute the species, as stated above (a. 5). But it is regard to that which is on the part of the external action: accidental to an action to be ordained to some particular because the will uses the limbs to act as instruments; nor end; for instance, to give alms from vainglory. Therefore have external actions any measure of morality, save in so actions are not diversified as to species, according to the far as they are voluntary. Consequently the species of a good and evil which are from the end. human act is considered formally with regard to the end, Objection 3. Further, acts that differ in species, can be but materially with regard to the object of the external ac-ordained to the same end: thus to the end of vainglory, ac- tion. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that “he tions of various virtues and vices can be ordained. There- who steals that he may commit adultery, is strictly speak- fore the good and evil which are taken from the end, do ing, more adulterer than thief.” not diversify the species of action. Reply to Objection 1. The end also has the character On the contrary, It has been shown above (q. 1, of an object, as stated above. a. 3) that human actions derive their species from the end. Reply to Objection 2. Although it is accidental to the Therefore good and evil in respect of the end diversify the external action to be ordained to some particular end, it is species of actions. not accidental to the interior act of the will, which act is I answer that, Certain actions are called human, inas- compared to the external act, as form to matter. much as they are voluntary, as stated above (q. 1, a. 1). Reply to Objection 3. When many actions, differing Now, in a voluntary action, there is a twofold action, viz. in species, are ordained to the same end, there is indeed a the interior action of the will, and the external action: and diversity of species on the part of the external actions; but each of these actions has its object. The end is properly unity of species on the part of the internal action. Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from Ia IIae q. 18 a. 7 the object, as under its genus, or conversely? Objection 1. It would seem that the species of good- derived from the end, is more formal than that which is ness derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object, as stated above (a. 6). There- of goodness derived from the object, as a species is con- fore the species derived from the end is contained under tained under its genus; for instance, when a man commits the species derived from the object, as the most specific a theft in order to give alms. For an action takes its species species is contained under the subaltern genus. from its object, as stated above (Aa. 2,6). But it is impos- On the contrary, Each genus has its determinate dif- sible for a thing to be contained under another species, if ferences. But an action of one same species on the part of this species be not contained under the proper species of its object, can be ordained to an infinite number of ends: that thing; because the same thing cannot be contained in for instance, theft can be ordained to an infinite number different species that are not subordinate to one another. of good and bad ends. Therefore the species derived from Therefore the species which is taken from the end, is con- the end is not contained under the species derived from tained under the species which is taken from the object. the object, as under its genus. Objection 2. Further, the last difference always con- I answer that, The object of the external act can stand stitutes the most specific species. But the difference de- in a twofold relation to the end of the will: first, as be- rived from the end seems to come after the difference de- ing of itself ordained thereto; thus to fight well is of itself rived from the object: because the end is something last. ordained to victory; secondly, as being ordained thereto Therefore the species derived from the end, is contained accidentally; thus to take what belongs to another is or- under the species derived from the object, as its most spe- dained accidentally to the giving of alms. Now the dif- cific species. ferences that divide a genus, and constitute the species of Objection 3. Further, the more formal a difference that genus, must, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii, is compared to genus, as form to matter. But the species 12), divide that genus essentially: and if they divide it 686 accidentally, the division is incorrect: as, if one were to this it follows that the specific difference derived from the say: “Animals are divided into rational and irrational; and end, is more general; and that the difference derived from the irrational into animals with wings, and animals with- an object which of itself is ordained to that end, is a spe- out wings”; for “winged” and “wingless” are not essential cific difference in relation to the former. For the will, the determinations of the irrational being. But the following proper object of which is the end, is the universal mover division would be correct: “Some animals have feet, some in respect of all the powers of the soul, the proper objects have no feet: and of those that have feet, some have two of which are the objects of their particular acts. feet, some four, some many”: because the latter division Reply to Objection 1. One and the same thing, con- is an essential determination of the former. Accordingly sidered in its substance, cannot be in two species, one of when the object is not of itself ordained to the end, the which is not subordinate to the other. But in respect of specific difference derived from the object is not an essen- those things which are superadded to the substance, one tial determination of the species derived from the end, nor thing can be contained under different species. Thus one is the reverse the case. Wherefore one of these species is and the same fruit, as to its color, is contained under one not under the other; but then the moral action is contained species, i.e. a white thing: and, as to its perfume, un- under two species that are disparate, as it were. Conse- der the species of sweet-smelling things. In like man- quently we say that he that commits theft for the sake of ner an action which, as to its substance, is in one natural adultery, is guilty of a twofold malice in one action. On species, considered in respect to the moral conditions that the other hand, if the object be of itself ordained to the are added to it, can belong to two species, as stated above end, one of these differences is an essential determination (q. 1, a. 3, ad 3). of the other. Wherefore one of these species will be con- Reply to Objection 2. The end is last in execution; tained under the other. but first in the intention of the reason, in regard to which It remains to be considered which of the two is con- moral actions receive their species. tained under the other. In order to make this clear, we Reply to Objection 3. Difference is compared to must first of all observe that the more particular the form genus as form to matter, inasmuch as it actualizes the is from which a difference is taken, the more specific is genus. On the other hand, the genus is considered as more the difference. Secondly, that the more universal an agent formal than the species, inasmuch as it is something more is, the more universal a form does it cause. Thirdly, that absolute and less contracted. Wherefore also the parts of the more remote an end is, the more universal the agent a definition are reduced to the genus of formal cause, as to which it corresponds; thus victory, which is the last is stated in Phys. ii, 3. And in this sense the genus is the end of the army, is the end intended by the commander in formal cause of the species; and so much the more formal, chief; while the right ordering of this or that regiment is as it is more universal. the end intended by one of the lower officers. From all Whether any action is indifferent in its species? Ia IIae q. 18 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that no action is indiffer- and none is indifferent. ent in its species. For evil is the privation of good, ac- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. cording to Augustine (Enchiridion xi). But privation and in Monte ii, 18) that “there are certain deeds of a mid- habit are immediate contraries, according to the Philoso- dle kind, which can be done with a good or evil mind, pher (Categor. viii). Therefore there is not such thing as of which it is rash to form a judgment.” Therefore some an action that is indifferent in its species, as though it were actions are indifferent according to their species. between good and evil. I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 2,5), every ac- Objection 2. Further, human actions derive their tion takes its species from its object; while human action, species from their end or object, as stated above (a. 6; q. 1, which is called moral, takes its species from the object, a. 3). But every end and every object is either good or bad. in relation to the principle of human actions, which is Therefore every human action is good or evil according to the reason. Wherefore if the object of an action includes its species. None, therefore, is indifferent in its species. something in accord with the order of reason, it will be Objection 3. Further, as stated above (a. 1), an ac- a good action according to its species; for instance, to tion is said to be good, when it has its due complement of give alms to a person in want. On the other hand, if it goodness; and evil, when it lacks that complement. But includes something repugnant to the order of reason, it every action must needs either have the entire plenitude will be an evil act according to its species; for instance, to of its goodness, or lack it in some respect. Therefore ev- steal, which is to appropriate what belongs to another. But ery action must needs be either good or bad in its species, it may happen that the object of an action does not include 687 something pertaining to the order of reason; for instance, as Simplicius says in his commentary on the Categories: to pick up a straw from the ground, to walk in the fields, because it does not take away all good, but leaves some. and the like: and such actions are indifferent according to Consequently there can be something between good and their species. evil. Reply to Objection 1. Privation is twofold. One is Reply to Objection 2. Every object or end has some privation “as a result” [privatum esse], and this leaves goodness or malice, at least natural to it: but this does not nothing, but takes all away: thus blindness takes away imply moral goodness or malice, which is considered in sight altogether; darkness, light; and death, life. Be- relation to the reason, as stated above. And it is of this tween this privation and the contrary habit, there can be that we are here treating. no medium in respect of the proper subject. The other Reply to Objection 3. Not everything belonging to an is privation “in process” [privari]: thus sickness is priva- action belongs also to its species. Wherefore although an tion of health; not that it takes health away altogether, but action’s specific nature may not contain all that belongs to that it is a kind of road to the entire loss of health, occa- the full complement of its goodness, it is not therefore an sioned by death. And since this sort of privation leaves action specifically bad; nor is it specifically good. Thus a something, it is not always the immediate contrary of the man in regard to his species is neither virtuous nor wicked. opposite habit. In this way evil is a privation of good, Whether an individual action can be indifferent? Ia IIae q. 18 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that an individual action as something belongs to a man by reason of his individ- can be indifferent. For there is no species that does not, ual accidents, which does not belong to him by reason of cannot, contain an individual. But an action can be indif- his species. And every individual action must needs have ferent in its species, as stated above (a. 8). Therefore an some circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in individual action can be indifferent. respect of the intention of the end. For since it belongs to Objection 2. Further, individual actions cause like the reason to direct; if an action that proceeds from delib- habits, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a habit can be in- erate reason be not directed to the due end, it is, by that different: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that those fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character of who are of an even temper and prodigal disposition are evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with not evil; and yet it is evident that they are not good, since reason; wherefore it has the character of good. Now it they depart from virtue; and thus they are indifferent in must needs be either directed or not directed to a due end. respect of a habit. Therefore some individual actions are Consequently every human action that proceeds from de- indifferent. liberate reason, if it be considered in the individual, must Objection 3. Further, moral good belongs to virtue, be good or bad. while moral evil belongs to vice. But it happens some- If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate rea- times that a man fails to ordain a specifically indifferent son, but from some act of the imagination, as when a man action to a vicious or virtuous end. Therefore an individ- strokes his beard, or moves his hand or foot; such an ac- ual action may happen to be indifferent. tion, properly speaking, is not moral or human; since this On the contrary, Gregory says in a homily (vi in depends on the reason. Hence it will be indifferent, as Evang.): “An idle word is one that lacks either the useful- standing apart from the genus of moral actions. ness of rectitude or the motive of just necessity or pious Reply to Objection 1. For an action to be indifferent utility.” But an idle word is an evil, because “men. . . shall in its species can be understood in several ways. First in render an account of it in the day of judgment” (Mat. such a way that its species demands that it remain indif- 12:36): while if it does not lack the motive of just ne- ferent; and the objection proceeds along this line. But no cessity or pious utility, it is good. Therefore every word action can be specifically indifferent thus: since no ob- is either good or bad. For the same reason every other ac- ject of human action is such that it cannot be directed to tion is either good or bad. Therefore no individual action good or evil, either through its end or through a circum- is indifferent. stance. Secondly, specific indifference of an action may I answer that, It sometimes happens that an action is be due to the fact that as far as its species is concerned, it indifferent in its species, but considered in the individual is neither good nor bad. Wherefore it can be made good it is good or evil. And the reason of this is because a moral or bad by something else. Thus man, as far as his species action, as stated above (a. 3), derives its goodness not only is concerned, is neither white nor black; nor is it a con- from its object, whence it takes its species; but also from dition of his species that he should not be black or white; the circumstances, which are its accidents, as it were; just but blackness or whiteness is superadded to man by other 688 principles than those of his species. Reply to Objection 3. Whenever an end is intended Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher states that a by deliberate reason, it belongs either to the good of some man is evil, properly speaking, if he be hurtful to oth- virtue, or to the evil of some vice. Thus, if a man’s action ers. And accordingly, because he hurts none save himself. is directed to the support or repose of his body, it is also And the same applies to all others who are not hurtful to directed to the good of virtue, provided he direct his body other men. But we say here that evil, in general, is all itself to the good of virtue. The same clearly applies to that is repugnant to right reason. And in this sense every other actions. individual action is either good or bad, as stated above. Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good or evil? Ia IIae q. 18 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that a circumstance can- object that determines the action’s species. Thus to ap- not place a moral action in the species of good or evil. propriate another’s property is specified by reason of the For the species of an action is taken from its object. But property being “another’s,” and in this respect it is placed circumstances differ from the object. Therefore circum- in the species of theft; and if we consider that action also stances do not give an action its species. in its bearing on place or time, then this will be an ad- Objection 2. Further, circumstances are as accidents ditional circumstance. But since the reason can direct as in relation to the moral action, as stated above (q. 7, a. 1). to place, time, and the like, it may happen that the condi- But an accident does not constitute the species. Therefore tion as to place, in relation to the object, is considered as a circumstance does not constitute a species of good or being in disaccord with reason: for instance, reason for- evil. bids damage to be done to a holy place. Consequently to Objection 3. Further, one thing is not in several steal from a holy place has an additional repugnance to species. But one action has several circumstances. There- the order of reason. And thus place, which was first of fore a circumstance does not place a moral action in a all considered as a circumstance, is considered here as the species of good or evil. principal condition of the object, and as itself repugnant On the contrary, Place is a circumstance. But place to reason. And in this way, whenever a circumstance has makes a moral action to be in a certain species of evil; for a special relation to reason, either for or against, it must theft of a thing from a holy place is a sacrilege. There- needs specify the moral action whether good or bad. fore a circumstance makes a moral action to be specifi- Reply to Objection 1. A circumstance, in so far as cally good or bad. it specifies an action, is considered as a condition of the I answer that, Just as the species of natural things are object, as stated above, and as being, as it were, a specific constituted by their natural forms, so the species of moral difference thereof. actions are constituted by forms as conceived by the rea- Reply to Objection 2. A circumstance, so long as it son, as is evident from what was said above (a. 5). But is but a circumstance, does not specify an action, since since nature is determinate to one thing, nor can a process thus it is a mere accident: but when it becomes a principal of nature go on to infinity, there must needs be some ul- condition of the object, then it does specify the action. timate form, giving a specific difference, after which no Reply to Objection 3. It is not every circumstance further specific difference is possible. Hence it is that in that places the moral action in the species of good or evil; natural things, that which is accidental to a thing, cannot since not every circumstance implies accord or disaccord be taken as a difference constituting the species. But the with reason. Consequently, although one action may have process of reason is not fixed to one particular term, for many circumstances, it does not follow that it is in many at any point it can still proceed further. And consequently species. Nevertheless there is no reason why one action that which, in one action, is taken as a circumstance added should not be in several, even disparate, moral species, as to the object that specifies the action, can again be taken said above (a. 7, ad 1; q. 1, a. 3, ad 3). by the directing reason, as the principal condition of the Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, places a moral Ia IIae q. 18 a. 11 action in a species of good or evil? Objection 1. It would seem that every circumstance of a moral action, causes a specific difference, which is relating to good or evil, specifies an action. For good and the same as to make it differ in species. Now that which evil are specific differences of moral actions. Therefore makes an action better or worse, makes it differ in good- that which causes a difference in the goodness or malice ness and malice. Therefore it causes it to differ in species. 689 Therefore every circumstance that makes an action better take something in a large or small quantity, does not re-or worse, constitutes a species. gard the order of reason in respect of good or evil, except Objection 2. Further, an additional circumstance ei- a certain other condition be presupposed, from which the ther has in itself the character of goodness or malice, or it action takes its malice or goodness; for instance, if what has not. If not, it cannot make the action better or worse; is taken belongs to another, which makes the action to be because what is not good, cannot make a greater good; discordant with reason. Wherefore to take what belongs and what is not evil, cannot make a greater evil. But if to another in a large or small quantity, does not change the it has in itself the character of good or evil, for this very species of the sin. Nevertheless it can aggravate or dimin- reason it has a certain species of good or evil. Therefore ish the sin. The same applies to other evil or good actions. every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, Consequently not every circumstance that makes a moral constitutes a new species of good or evil. action better or worse, changes its species. Objection 3. Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Reply to Objection 1. In things which can be more or Nom. iv), “evil is caused by each single defect.” Now less intense, the difference of more or less does not change every circumstance that increases malice, has a special the species: thus by differing in whiteness through being defect. Therefore every such circumstance adds a new more or less white a thing is not changed in regard to its species of sin. And for the same reason, every cir- species of color. In like manner that which makes an ac- cumstance that increases goodness, seems to add a new tion to be more or less good or evil, does not make the species of goodness: just as every unity added to a number action differ in species. makes a new species of number; since the good consists Reply to Objection 2. A circumstance that aggravates in “number, weight, and measure” ( Ia, q. 5, a. 5). a sin, or adds to the goodness of an action, sometimes has On the contrary, More and less do not change a no goodness or malice in itself, but in regard to some other species. But more and less is a circumstance of addi- condition of the action, as stated above. Consequently it tional goodness or malice. Therefore not every circum- does not add a new species, but adds to the goodness or stance that makes a moral action better or worse, places it malice derived from this other condition of the action. in a species of good or evil. Reply to Objection 3. A circumstance does not al- I answer that, As stated above (a. 10), a circumstance ways involve a distinct defect of its own; sometimes it gives the species of good or evil to a moral action, in so causes a defect in reference to something else. In like far as it regards a special order of reason. Now it happens manner a circumstance does not always add further per- sometimes that a circumstance does not regard a special fection, except in reference to something else. And, for as order of reason in respect of good or evil, except on the much as it does, although it may add to the goodness or supposition of another previous circumstance, from which malice, it does not always change the species of good or the moral action takes its species of good or evil. Thus to evil. 690 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 19 Of the Goodness and Malice of the Interior Act of the Will (In Ten Articles) We must now consider the goodness of the interior act of the will; under which head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether the goodness of the will depends on the subject? (2) Whether it depends on the object alone? (3) Whether it depends on reason? (4) Whether it depends on the eternal law? (5) Whether erring reason binds? (6) Whether the will is evil if it follows the erring reason against the law of God? (7) Whether the goodness of the will in regard to the means, depends on the intention of the end? (8) Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the degree of good or evil in the intention? (9) Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine Will? (10) Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be conformed to the Divine Will, as regards the thing willed? Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object? Ia IIae q. 19 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the goodness of the is from the fact that a man wills that which is good. will does not depend on the object. For the will cannot be I answer that, Good and evil are essential differences directed otherwise than to what is good: since “evil is out- of the act of the will. Because good and evil of themselves side the scope of the will,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. regard the will; just as truth and falsehood regard reason; iv). If therefore the goodness of the will depended on the the act of which is divided essentially by the difference object, it would follow that every act of the will is good, of truth and falsehood, for as much as an opinion is said and none bad. to be true or false. Consequently good and evil will are Objection 2. Further, good is first of all in the end: acts differing in species. Now the specific difference in wherefore the goodness of the end, as such, does not de- acts is according to objects, as stated above (q. 18, a. 5). pend on any other. But, according to the Philosopher Therefore good and evil in the acts of the will is derived (Ethic. vi, 5), “goodness of action is the end, but good- properly from the objects. ness of making is never the end”: because the latter is Reply to Objection 1. The will is not always directed always ordained to the thing made, as to its end. There- to what is truly good, but sometimes to the apparent good; fore the goodness of the act of the will does not depend which has indeed some measure of good, but not of a good on any object. that is simply suitable to be desired. Hence it is that the Objection 3. Further, such as a thing is, such does it act of the will is not always good, but sometimes evil. make a thing to be. But the object of the will is good, by Reply to Objection 2. Although an action can, in a reason of the goodness of nature. Therefore it cannot give certain way, be man’s last end; nevertheless such action is moral goodness to the will. Therefore the moral goodness not an act of the will, as stated above (q. 1, a. 1, ad 2). of the will does not depend on the object. Reply to Objection 3. Good is presented to the will On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) as its object by the reason: and in so far as it is in accord that justice is that habit “from which men wish for just with reason, it enters the moral order, and causes moral things”: and accordingly, virtue is a habit from which men goodness in the act of the will: because the reason is the wish for good things. But a good will is one which is in principle of human and moral acts, as stated above (q. 18, accordance with virtue. Therefore the goodness of the will a. 5). 691 Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object alone? Ia IIae q. 19 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the goodness of the depend on several things. will does not depend on the object alone. For the end has Now that one thing which is the principle in each a closer relationship to the will than to any other power. genus, is not something accidental to that genus, but But the acts of the other powers derive goodness not only something essential thereto: because whatever is acciden- from the object but also from the end, as we have shown tal is reduced to something essential, as to its principle. above (q. 18 , a. 4). Therefore the act also of the will de- Therefore the goodness of the will’s act depends on that rives goodness not only from the object but also from the one thing alone, which of itself causes goodness in the act; end. and that one thing is the object, and not the circumstances, Objection 2. Further, the goodness of an action is which are accidents, as it were, of the act. derived not only from the object but also from the circum- Reply to Objection 1. The end is the object of the stances, as stated above (q. 18, a. 3). But according to will, but not of the other powers. Hence, in regard to the the diversity of circumstances there may be diversity of act of the will, the goodness derived from the object, does goodness and malice in the act of the will: for instance, not differ from that which is derived from the end, as they if a man will, when he ought, where he ought, as much differ in the acts of the other powers; except perhaps acci- as he ought, and how he ought, or if he will as he ought dentally, in so far as one end depends on another, and one not. Therefore the goodness of the will depends not only act of the will on another. on the object, but also on the circumstances. Reply to Objection 2. Given that the act of the will Objection 3. Further, ignorance of circumstances ex- is fixed on some good, no circumstances can make that cuses malice of the will, as stated above (q. 6, a. 8). But it act bad. Consequently when it is said that a man wills would not be so, unless the goodness or malice of the will a good when he ought not, or where he ought not, this depended on the circumstances. Therefore the goodness can be understood in two ways. First, so that this circum- and malice of the will depend on the circumstances, and stance is referred to the thing willed. And thus the act of not only on the object. the will is not fixed on something good: since to will to On the contrary, An action does not take its species do something when it ought not to be done, is not to will from the circumstances as such, as stated above (q. 18, something good. Secondly, so that the circumstance is re- a. 10, ad 2). But good and evil are specific differences ferred to the act of willing. And thus, it is impossible to of the act of the will, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore will something good when one ought not to, because one the goodness and malice of the will depend, not on the ought always to will what is good: except, perhaps, ac- circumstances, but on the object alone. cidentally, in so far as a man by willing some particular I answer that, In every genus, the more a thing is first, good, is prevented from willing at the same time another the more simple it is, and the fewer the principles of which good which he ought to will at that time. And then evil it consists: thus primary bodies are simple. Hence it is to results, not from his willing that particular good, but from be observed that the first things in every genus, are, in his not willing the other. The same applies to the other some way, simple and consist of one principle. Now the circumstances. principle of the goodness and malice of human actions is Reply to Objection 3. Ignorance of circumstances taken from the act of the will. Consequently the good- excuses malice of the will, in so far as the circumstance ness and malice of the act of the will depend on some one affects the thing willed: that is to say, in so far as a man thing; while the goodness and malice of other acts may ignores the circumstances of the act which he wills. Whether the goodness of the will depends on reason? Ia IIae q. 19 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the goodness of the reason depends on the goodness of the will, rather than will does not depend on reason. For what comes first does conversely. not depend on what follows. But the good belongs to the Objection 3. Further, the mover does not depend on will before it belongs to reason, as is clear from what has that which is moved, but vice versa. But the will moves been said above (q. 9, a. 1). Therefore the goodness of the the reason and the other powers, as stated above (q. 9, will does not depend on reason. a. 1). Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, on reason. 2) that the goodness of the practical intellect is “a truth On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. x): “It is an that is in conformity with right desire.” But right desire unruly will that persists in its desires in opposition to rea- is a good will. Therefore the goodness of the practical son.” But the goodness of the will consists in not being 692 unruly. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on its the reason. But considered as true it pertains to the rea-being subject to reason. son, before, under the aspect of goodness, pertaining to I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,2), the goodness the will: because the will cannot desire a good that is not of the will depends properly on the object. Now the will’s previously apprehended by reason. object is proposed to it by reason. Because the good un- Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher speaks here derstood is the proportionate object of the will; while sen- of the practical intellect, in so far as it counsels and rea- sitive or imaginary good is proportionate not to the will sons about the means: for in this respect it is perfected by but to the sensitive appetite: since the will can tend to prudence. Now in regard to the means, the rectitude of the universal good, which reason apprehends; whereas the the reason depends on its conformity with the desire of a sensitive appetite tends only to the particular good, appre- due end: nevertheless the very desire of the due end pre- hended by the sensitive power. Therefore the goodness of supposes on the part of reason a right apprehension of the the will depends on reason, in the same way as it depends end. on the object. Reply to Objection 3. The will moves the reason in Reply to Objection 1. The good considered as such, one way: the reason moves the will in another, viz. on the i.e. as appetible, pertains to the will before pertaining to part of the object, as stated above (q. 9, a. 1). Whether the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law? Ia IIae q. 19 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the goodness of the only in virtue of the first. Now it is from the eternal law, human will does not depend on the eternal law. Because which is the Divine Reason, that human reason is the rule to one thing there is one rule and one measure. But the of the human will, from which the human derives its good- rule of the human will, on which its goodness depends, is ness. Hence it is written (Ps. 4:6,7): “Many say: Who right reason. Therefore the goodness of the will does not showeth us good things? The light of Thy countenance, depend on the eternal law. O Lord, is signed upon us”: as though to say: “The light Objection 2. Further, “a measure is homogeneous of our reason is able to show us good things, and guide with the thing measured” (Metaph. x, 1). But the eter- our will, in so far as it is the light (i.e. derived from) Thy nal law is not homogeneous with the human will. There- countenance.” It is therefore evident that the goodness fore the eternal law cannot be the measure on which the of the human will depends on the eternal law much more goodness of the human will depends. than on human reason: and when human reason fails we Objection 3. Further, a measure should be most cer- must have recourse to the Eternal Reason. tain. But the eternal law is unknown to us. Therefore it Reply to Objection 1. To one thing there are not sev- cannot be the measure on which the goodness of our will eral proximate measures; but there can be several mea- depends. sures if one is subordinate to the other. On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, Reply to Objection 2. A proximate measure is ho- 27) that “sin is a deed, word or desire against the eternal mogeneous with the thing measured; a remote measure is law.” But malice of the will is the root of sin. Therefore, not. since malice is contrary to goodness, the goodness of the Reply to Objection 3. Although the eternal law is un- will depends on the eternal law. known to us according as it is in the Divine Mind: never- I answer that, Wherever a number of causes are sub- theless, it becomes known to us somewhat, either by natu- ordinate to one another, the effect depends more on the ral reason which is derived therefrom as its proper image; first than on the second cause: since the second cause acts or by some sort of additional revelation. Whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason? Ia IIae q. 19 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not evil command of a lower authority does not bind if it be con- when it is at variance with erring reason. Because the rea- trary to the command of a higher authority: for instance, if son is the rule of the human will, in so far as it is derived a provincial governor command something that is forbid- from the eternal law, as stated above (a. 4). But erring rea- den by the emperor. But erring reason sometimes pro- son is not derived from the eternal law. Therefore erring poses what is against the command of a higher power, reason is not the rule of the human will. Therefore the will namely, God Whose power is supreme. Therefore the de- is not evil, if it be at variance with erring reason. cision of an erring reason does not bind. Consequently the Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine, the will is not evil if it be at variance with erring reason. 693 Objection 3. Further, every evil will is reducible to proposed by the reason as being evil, the will by tending some species of malice. But the will that is at variance thereto becomes evil. And this is the case not only in in- with erring reason is not reducible to some species of mal- different matters, but also in those that are good or evil in ice. For instance, if a man’s reason err in telling him to themselves. For not only indifferent matters can received commit fornication, his will in not willing to do so, can- the character of goodness or malice accidentally; but also not be reduced to any species of malice. Therefore the that which is good, can receive the character of evil, or will is not evil when it is at variance with erring reason. that which is evil, can receive the character of goodness, On the contrary, As stated in the Ia, q. 79, a. 13, con- on account of the reason apprehending it as such. For science is nothing else than the application of knowledge instance, to refrain from fornication is good: yet the will to some action. Now knowledge is in the reason. There- does not tend to this good except in so far as it is proposed fore when the will is at variance with erring reason, it is by the reason. If, therefore, the erring reason propose it as against conscience. But every such will is evil; for it is an evil, the will tends to it as to something evil. Conse- written (Rom. 14:23): “All that is not of faith”—i.e. all quently the will is evil, because it wills evil, not indeed that is against conscience—“is sin.” Therefore the will is that which is evil in itself, but that which is evil acciden- evil when it is at variance with erring reason. tally, through being apprehended as such by the reason. I answer that, Since conscience is a kind of dictate of In like manner, to believe in Christ is good in itself, and the reason (for it is an application of knowledge to action, necessary for salvation: but the will does not tend thereto, as was stated in the Ia, q. 19, a. 13), to inquire whether the except inasmuch as it is proposed by the reason. Conse- will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason, is the quently if it be proposed by the reason as something evil, same as to inquire “whether an erring conscience binds.” the will tends to it as to something evil: not as if it were On this matter, some distinguished three kinds of actions: evil in itself, but because it is evil accidentally, through the for some are good generically; some are indifferent; some apprehension of the reason. Hence the Philosopher says are evil generically. And they say that if reason or con- (Ethic. vii, 9) that “properly speaking the incontinent man science tell us to do something which is good generically, is one who does not follow right reason; but accidentally, there is no error: and in like manner if it tell us not to do he is also one who does not follow false reason.” We must something which is evil generically; since it is the same therefore conclude that, absolutely speaking, every will at reason that prescribes what is good and forbids what is variance with reason, whether right or erring, is always evil. On the other hand if a man’s reason or conscience evil. tells him that he is bound by precept to do what is evil in Reply to Objection 1. Although the judgment of an itself; or that what is good in itself, is forbidden, then his erring reason is not derived from God, yet the erring rea- reason or conscience errs. In like manner if a man’s rea- son puts forward its judgment as being true, and conse- son or conscience tell him, that what is indifferent in itself, quently as being derived from God, from Whom is all for instance to raise a straw from the ground, is forbidden truth. or commanded, his reason or conscience errs. They say, Reply to Objection 2. The saying of Augustine holds therefore, that reason or conscience when erring in mat- good when it is known that the inferior authority pre- ters of indifference, either by commanding or by forbid- scribes something contrary to the command of the higher ding them, binds: so that the will which is at variance with authority. But if a man were to believe the command that erring reason is evil and sinful. But they say that when of the proconsul to be the command of the emperor, in reason or conscience errs in commanding what is evil in scorning the command of the proconsul he would scorn itself, or in forbidding what is good in itself and necessary the command of the emperor. In like manner if a man for salvation, it does not bind; wherefore in such cases the were to know that human reason was dictating something will which is at variance with erring reason or conscience contrary to God’s commandment, he would not be bound is not evil. to abide by reason: but then reason would not be entirely But this is unreasonable. For in matters of indiffer- erroneous. But when erring reason proposes something ence, the will that is at variance with erring reason or con- as being commanded by God, then to scorn the dictate of science, is evil in some way on account of the object, on reason is to scorn the commandment of God. which the goodness or malice of the will depends; not in- Reply to Objection 3. Whenever reason apprehends deed on account of the object according as it is in its own something as evil, it apprehends it under some species of nature; but according as it is accidentally apprehended by evil; for instance, as being something contrary to a divine reason as something evil to do or to avoid. And since the precept, or as giving scandal, or for some such like reason. object of the will is that which is proposed by the reason, And then that evil is reduced to that species of malice. as stated above (a. 3), from the very fact that a thing is 694 Whether the will is good when it abides by erring reason? Ia IIae q. 19 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the will is good when untary, which is due to negligence, by reason of a man not it abides by erring reason. For just as the will, when wishing to know what he ought to know, as stated above at variance with the reason, tends to that which reason (q. 6, a. 8). judges to be evil; so, when in accord with reason, it tends If then reason or conscience err with an error that is to what reason judges to be good. But the will is evil when involuntary, either directly, or through negligence, so that it is at variance with reason, even when erring. Therefore one errs about what one ought to know; then such an er- even when it abides by erring reason, the will is good. ror of reason or conscience does not excuse the will, that Objection 2. Further, the will is always good, when abides by that erring reason or conscience, from being it abides by the commandment of God and the eternal evil. But if the error arise from ignorance of some circum- law. But the eternal law and God’s commandment are pro- stance, and without any negligence, so that it cause the act posed to us by the apprehension of the reason, even when to be involuntary, then that error of reason or conscience it errs. Therefore the will is good, even when it abides by excuses the will, that abides by that erring reason, from erring reason. being evil. For instance, if erring reason tell a man that Objection 3. Further, the will is evil when it is at vari-he should go to another man’s wife, the will that abides ance with erring reason. If, therefore, the will is evil also by that erring reason is evil; since this error arises from when it abides by erring reason, it seems that the will is ignorance of the Divine Law, which he is bound to know. always evil when in conjunction with erring reason: so But if a man’s reason, errs in mistaking another for his that in such a case a man would be in a dilemma, and, of wife, and if he wish to give her her right when she asks for necessity, would sin: which is unreasonable. Therefore it, his will is excused from being evil: because this error the will is good when it abides by erring reason. arises from ignorance of a circumstance, which ignorance On the contrary, The will of those who slew the apos- excuses, and causes the act to be involuntary. tles was evil. And yet it was in accord with the erring Reply to Objection 1. As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. reason, according to Jn. 16:2: “The hour cometh, that iv), “good results from the entire cause, evil from each whosoever killeth you, will think that he doth a service to particular defect.” Consequently in order that the thing to God.” Therefore the will can be evil, when it abides by which the will tends be called evil, it suffices, either that erring reason. it be evil in itself, or that it be apprehended as evil. But in I answer that, Whereas the previous question is the order for it to be good, it must be good in both ways. same as inquiring “whether an erring conscience binds”; Reply to Objection 2. The eternal law cannot err, but so this question is the same as inquiring “whether an human reason can. Consequently the will that abides by erring conscience excuses.” Now this question depends human reason, is not always right, nor is it always in ac- on what has been said above about ignorance. For it was cord with the eternal law. said (q. 6, a. 8) that ignorance sometimes causes an act to Reply to Objection 3. Just as in syllogistic argu- be involuntary, and sometimes not. And since moral good ments, granted one absurdity, others must needs follow; and evil consist in action in so far as it is voluntary, as so in moral matters, given one absurdity, others must fol- was stated above (a. 2); it is evident that when ignorance low too. Thus suppose a man to seek vainglory, he will causes an act to be involuntary, it takes away the character sin, whether he does his duty for vainglory or whether he of moral good and evil; but not, when it does not cause omit to do it. Nor is he in a dilemma about the matter: be- the act to be involuntary. Again, it has been stated above cause he can put aside his evil intention. In like manner, (q. 6, a. 8) that when ignorance is in any way willed, either suppose a man’s reason or conscience to err through inex- directly or indirectly, it does not cause the act to be invol- cusable ignorance, then evil must needs result in the will. untary. And I call that ignorance “directly” voluntary, to Nor is this man in a dilemma: because he can lay aside which the act of the will tends: and that, “indirectly” vol- his error, since his ignorance is vincible and voluntary. Whether the goodness of the will, as regards the means, depends on the intention of Ia IIae q. 19 a. 7 the end? Objection 1. It would seem that the goodness of the is another. Therefore in such matters the goodness of the will does not depend on the intention of the end. For it will does not depend on the intention of the end. has been stated above (a. 2) that the goodness of the will Objection 2. Further, to wish to keep God’s com- depends on the object alone. But as regards the means, mandment, belongs to a good will. But this can be re- the object of the will is one thing, and the end intended ferred to an evil end, for instance, to vainglory or cov- 695 etousness, by willing to obey God for the sake of temporal when it is added to a preceding act of the will; for in-gain. Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend stance, a man may will to do something, and may after- on the intention of the end. wards refer it to God. And then the goodness of the pre- Objection 3. Further, just as good and evil diversify vious act of the will does not depend on the subsequent the will, so do they diversify the end. But malice of the intention, except in so far as that act is repeated with the will does not depend on the malice of the end intended; subsequent intention. since a man who wills to steal in order to give alms, has Reply to Objection 1. When the intention is the cause an evil will, although he intends a good end. Therefore of the act of willing, the order to the end is considered as neither does the goodness of the will depend on the good- the reason of the goodness of the object, as stated above. ness of the end intended. Reply to Objection 2. The act of the will cannot be On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ix, 3) that said to be good, if an evil intention is the cause of will- God rewards the intention. But God rewards a thing be- ing. For when a man wills to give an alms for the sake cause it is good. Therefore the goodness of the will de- of vainglory, he wills that which is good in itself, under a pends on the intention of the end. species of evil; and therefore, as willed by him, it is evil. I answer that, The intention may stand in a twofold Wherefore his will is evil. If, however, the intention is relation to the act of the will; first, as preceding it, sec- subsequent to the act of the will, then the latter may be ondly as following∗ it. The intention precedes the act of good: and the intention does not spoil that act of the will the will causally, when we will something because we in- which preceded, but that which is repeated. tend a certain end. And then the order to the end is con- Reply to Objection 3. As we have already stated (a. 6, sidered as the reason of the goodness of the thing willed: ad 1), “evil results from each particular defect, but good for instance, when a man wills to fast for God’s sake; be- from the whole and entire cause.” Hence, whether the cause the act of fasting is specifically good from the very will tend to what is evil in itself, even under the species of fact that it is done for God’s sake. Wherefore, since the good; or to the good under the species of evil, it will be goodness of the will depends on the goodness of the thing evil in either case. But in order for the will to be good, it willed, as stated above (Aa. 1,2), it must, of necessity, de- must tend to the good under the species of good; in other pend on the intention of the end. words, it must will the good for the sake of the good. On the other hand, intention follows the act of the will, Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the degree of good Ia IIae q. 19 a. 8 or evil in the intention? Objection 1. It would seem that the degree of good- I answer that, In regard to both the act, and the in- ness in the will depends on the degree of good in the in- tention of the end, we may consider a twofold quantity: tention. Because on Mat. 12:35, “A good man out of one, on the part of the object, by reason of a man will- the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is ing or doing a good that is greater; the other, taken from good,” a gloss says: “A man does as much good as he in- the intensity of the act, according as a man wills or acts tends.” But the intention gives goodness not only to the intensely; and this is more on the part of the agent. external action, but also to the act of the will, as stated If then we speak of these respective quantities from above (a. 7). Therefore the goodness of a man’s will is the point of view of the object, it is evident that the quan- according to the goodness of his intention. tity in the act does not depend on the quantity in the in- Objection 2. Further, if you add to the cause, you tention. With regard to the external act this may happen add to the effect. But the goodness of the intention is the in two ways. First, through the object that is ordained to cause of the good will. Therefore a man’s will is good, the intended end not being proportionate to that end; for according as his intention is good. instance, if a man were to give ten pounds, he could not Objection 3. Further, in evil actions, a man sins in realize his intention, if he intended to buy a thing worth proportion to his intention: for if a man were to throw a a hundred pounds. Secondly, on account of the obstacles stone with a murderous intention, he would be guilty of that may supervene in regard to the exterior action, which murder. Therefore, for the same reason, in good actions, obstacles we are unable to remove: for instance, a man in- the will is good in proportion to the good intended. tends to go to Rome, and encounters obstacles, which pre- On the contrary, The intention can be good, while the vent him from going. On the other hand, with regard to the will is evil. Therefore, for the same reason, the intention interior act of the will, this happens in only one way: be- can be better, and the will less good. cause the interior acts of the will are in our power, whereas ∗ Leonine edn.: ‘accompanying’ 696 the external actions are not. But the will can will an object its object: as when a man intends to will intensely, or to that is not proportionate to the intended end: and thus the do something intensely. And yet it does not follow that he will that tends to that object considered absolutely, is not wills or acts intensely; because the quantity of goodness so good as the intention. Yet because the intention also in the interior or exterior act does not depend on the quan- belongs, in a way, to the act of the will, inasmuch, to wit, tity of the good intended, as is shown above. And hence as it is the reason thereof; it comes to pass that the quan- it is that a man does not merit as much as he intends to tity of goodness in the intention redounds upon the act of merit: because the quantity of merit is measured by the the will; that is to say, in so far as the will wills some great intensity of the act, as we shall show later on (q. 20 , a. 4; good for an end, although that by which it wills to gain so q. 114, a. 4). great a good, is not proportionate to that good. Reply to Objection 1. This gloss speaks of good as But if we consider the quantity in the intention and in in the estimation of God, Who considers principally the the act, according to their respective intensity, then the in- intention of the end. Wherefore another gloss says on the tensity of the intention redounds upon the interior act and same passage that “the treasure of the heart is the inten- the exterior act of the will: since the intention stands in tion, according to which God judges our works.” For the relation to them as a kind of form, as is clear from what goodness of the intention, as stated above, redounds, so to has been said above (q. 12, a. 4; q. 18, a. 6). And yet speak, upon the goodness of the will, which makes even considered materially, while the intention is intense, the the external act to be meritorious in God’s sight. interior or exterior act may be not so intense, materially Reply to Objection 2. The goodness of the intention speaking: for instance, when a man does not will with is not the whole cause of a good will. Hence the argument as much intensity to take medicine as he wills to regain does not prove. health. Nevertheless the very fact of intending health in- Reply to Objection 3. The mere malice of the inten- tensely, redounds, as a formal principle, upon the intense tion suffices to make the will evil: and therefore too, the volition of medicine. will is as evil as the intention is evil. But the same reason- We must observe, however, that the intensity of the in- ing does not apply to goodness, as stated above (ad 2). terior or exterior act, may be referred to the intention as Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine will? Ia IIae q. 19 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine will. human will does not depend on its conformity to the Di- I answer that, As stated above (a. 7), the goodness vine will. Because it is impossible for man’s will to be of the will depends on the intention of the end. Now the conformed to the Divine will; as appears from the word of last end of the human will is the Sovereign Good, namely, Isa. 55:9: “As the heavens are exalted above the earth, so God, as stated above (q. 1, a. 8; q. 3, a. 1). Therefore the are My ways exalted above your ways, and My thoughts goodness of the human will requires it to be ordained to above your thoughts.” If therefore goodness of the will de- the Sovereign Good, that is, to God. pended on its conformity to the Divine will, it would fol- Now this Good is primarily and essentially compared low that it is impossible for man’s will to be good. Which to the Divine will, as its proper object. Again, that which is inadmissible. is first in any genus is the measure and rule of all that be- Objection 2. Further, just as our wills arise from the longs to that genus. Moreover, everything attains to rec- Divine will, so does our knowledge flow from the Divine titude and goodness, in so far as it is in accord with its knowledge. But our knowledge does not require to be proper measure. Therefore, in order that man’s will be conformed to God’s knowledge; since God knows many good it needs to be conformed to the Divine will. things that we know not. Therefore there is no need for Reply to Objection 1. The human will cannot be con- our will to be conformed to the Divine will. formed to the will of God so as to equal it, but only so as to Objection 3. Further, the will is a principle of action. imitate it. In like manner human knowledge is conformed But our action cannot be conformed to God’s. Therefore to the Divine knowledge, in so far as it knows truth: and neither can our will be conformed to His. human action is conformed to the Divine, in so far as it is On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 26:39): “Not as becoming to the agent: and this by way of imitation, not I will, but as Thou wilt”: which words He said, because by way of equality. “He wishes man to be upright and to tend to God,” as Au- From the above may be gathered the replies to the Sec- gustine expounds in the Enchiridion∗. But the rectitude ond and Third Objections. of the will is its goodness. Therefore the goodness of the ∗ Enarr. in Ps. 32, serm. i. 697 Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be conformed to Ia IIae q. 19 a. 10 the Divine will, as regards the thing willed? Objection 1. It would seem that the human will need justice, and therefore he wishes the thief’s death, which not always be conformed to the Divine will, as regards has the aspect of good in relation to the common estate; the thing willed. For we cannot will what we know not: whereas the thief’s wife has to consider the private, the since the apprehended good is the object of the will. But good of the family, and from this point of view she wishes in many things we know not what God wills. Therefore her husband, the thief, not to be put to death. Now the the human will cannot be conformed to the Divine will as good of the whole universe is that which is apprehended to the thing willed. by God, Who is the Maker and Governor of all things: Objection 2. Further, God wills to damn the man hence whatever He wills, He wills it under the aspect of whom He foresees about to die in mortal sin. If therefore the common good; this is His own Goodness, which is the man were bound to conform his will to the Divine will, in good of the whole universe. On the other hand, the appre- the point of the thing willed, it would follow that a man is hension of a creature, according to its nature, is of some bound to will his own damnation. Which is inadmissible. particular good, proportionate to that nature. Now a thing Objection 3. Further, no one is bound to will what may happen to be good under a particular aspect, and yet is against filial piety. But if man were to will what God not good under a universal aspect, or vice versa, as stated wills, this would sometimes be contrary to filial piety: for above. And therefore it comes to pass that a certain will instance, when God wills the death of a father: if his son is good from willing something considered under a partic- were to will it also, it would be against filial piety. There- ular aspect, which thing God wills not, under a universal fore man is not bound to conform his will to the Divine aspect, and vice versa. And hence too it is, that various will, as to the thing willed. wills of various men can be good in respect of opposite On the contrary, (1) On Ps. 32:1, “Praise becometh things, for as much as, under various aspects, they wish a the upright,” a gloss says: “That man has an upright heart, particular thing to be or not to be. who wills what God wills.” But everyone is bound to have But a man’s will is not right in willing a particular an upright heart. Therefore everyone is bound to will what good, unless he refer it to the common good as an end: God wills. since even the natural appetite of each part is ordained to (2) Moreover, the will takes its form from the object, the common good of the whole. Now it is the end that as does every act. If therefore man is bound to conform supplies the formal reason, as it were, of willing whatever his will to the Divine will, it follows that he is bound to is directed to the end. Consequently, in order that a man conform it, as to the thing willed. will some particular good with a right will, he must will (3) Moreover, opposition of wills arises from men that particular good materially, and the Divine and univer- willing different things. But whoever has a will in op- sal good, formally. Therefore the human will is bound to position to the Divine will, has an evil will. Therefore be conformed to the Divine will, as to that which is willed whoever does not conform his will to the Divine will, as formally, for it is bound to will the Divine and universal to the thing willed, has an evil will. good; but not as to that which is willed materially, for the I answer that, As is evident from what has been said reason given above. above (Aa. 3,5), the will tends to its object, according as At the same time in both these respects, the human it is proposed by the reason. Now a thing may be consid- will is conformed to the Divine, in a certain degree. Be- ered in various ways by the reason, so as to appear good cause inasmuch as it is conformed to the Divine will in from one point of view, and not good from another point the common aspect of the thing willed, it is conformed of view. And therefore if a man’s will wills a thing to be, thereto in the point of the last end. While, inasmuch as it according as it appears to be good, his will is good: and is not conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed ma- the will of another man, who wills that thing not to be, ac- terially, it is conformed to that will considered as efficient cording as it appears evil, is also good. Thus a judge has cause; since the proper inclination consequent to nature, a good will, in willing a thief to be put to death, because or to the particular apprehension of some particular thing, this is just: while the will of another—e.g. the thief’s wife comes to a thing from God as its efficient cause. Hence or son, who wishes him not to be put to death, inasmuch it is customary to say that a man’s will, in this respect, is as killing is a natural evil, is also good. conformed to the Divine will, because it wills what God Now since the will follows the apprehension of the wishes him to will. reason or intellect; the more universal the aspect of the There is yet another kind of conformity in respect of apprehended good, the more universal the good to which the formal cause, consisting in man’s willing something the will tends. This is evident in the example given above: from charity, as God wills it. And this conformity is also because the judge has care of the common good, which is reduced to the formal conformity, that is in respect of the 698 last end, which is the proper object of charity. to such things it suffices for man to will the upholding of Reply to Objection 1. We can know in a general way God’s justice and of the natural order. what God wills. For we know that whatever God wills, Wherefore the reply to the Third Objection is evident. He wills it under the aspect of good. Consequently who- To the first argument advanced in a contrary sense, it ever wills a thing under any aspect of good, has a will should be said that a man who conforms his will to God’s, conformed to the Divine will, as to the reason of the thing in the aspect of reason of the thing willed, wills what God willed. But we know not what God wills in particular: and wills, more than the man, who conforms his will to God’s, in this respect we are not bound to conform our will to the in the point of the very thing willed; because the will tends Divine will. more to the end, than to that which is on account of the But in the state of glory, every one will see in each end. thing that he wills, the relation of that thing to what God To the second, it must be replied that the species and wills in that particular matter. Consequently he will con- form of an act are taken from the object considered for- form his will to God in all things not only formally, but mally, rather than from the object considered materially. also materially. To the third, it must be said that there is no opposi- Reply to Objection 2. God does not will the damna- tion of wills when several people desire different things, tion of a man, considered precisely as damnation, nor a but not under the same aspect: but there is opposition of man’s death, considered precisely as death, because, “He wills, when under one and the same aspect, one man wills wills all men to be saved” (1 Tim. 2:4); but He wills such a thing which another wills not. But there is no question things under the aspect of justice. Wherefore in regard of this here. 699 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 20 Of Goodness and Malice in External Human Affairs (In Six Articles) We must next consider goodness and malice as to external actions: under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether goodness and malice is first in the act of the will, or in the external action? (2) Whether the whole goodness or malice of the external action depends on the goodness of the will? (3) Whether the goodness and malice of the interior act are the same as those of the external action? (4) Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of the interior act? (5) Whether the consequences of an external action increase its goodness or malice? (6) Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil? Whether goodness or malice is first in the action of the will, or in the external action? Ia IIae q. 20 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that good and evil are in proper object, it is evident that this aspect of good or evil, the external action prior to being in the act of the will. For which the external action derives from its relation to the the will derives goodness from its object, as stated above end, is to be found first of all in the act of the will, whence (q. 19, Aa. 1,2). But the external action is the object of the it passes to the external action. On the other hand, the interior act of the will: for a man is said to will to commit goodness or malice which the external action has of itself, a theft, or to will to give an alms. Therefore good and evil on account of its being about due matter and its being at- are in the external action, prior to being in the act of the tended by due circumstances, is not derived from the will, will. but rather from the reason. Consequently, if we consider Objection 2. Further, the aspect of good belongs first the goodness of the external action, in so far as it comes to the end: since what is directed to the end receives the from reason’s ordination and apprehension, it is prior to aspect of good from its relation to the end. Now whereas the goodness of the act of the will: but if we consider it in the act of the will cannot be an end, as stated above (q. 1, so far as it is in the execution of the action done, it is sub- a. 1, ad 2), the act of another power can be an end. There- sequent to the goodness of the will, which is its principle. fore good is in the act of some other power prior to being Reply to Objection 1. The exterior action is the ob- in the act of the will. ject of the will, inasmuch as it is proposed to the will by Objection 3. Further, the act of the will stands in a forthe reason, as good apprehended and ordained by the rea- mal relation to the external action, as stated above (q. 18, son: and thus it is prior to the good in the act of the will. a. 6). But that which is formal is subsequent; since form But inasmuch as it is found in the execution of the action, is something added to matter. Therefore good and evil are it is an effect of the will, and is subsequent to the will. in the external action, prior to being in the act of the will. Reply to Objection 2. The end precedes in the order On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that of intention, but follows in the order of execution. “it is by the will that we sin, and that we behave aright.” Reply to Objection 3. A form as received into mat- Therefore moral good and evil are first in the will. ter, is subsequent to matter in the order of generation, al- I answer that, External actions may be said to be though it precedes it in the order of nature: but inasmuch good or bad in two ways. First, in regard to their genus, as it is in the active cause, it precedes in every way. Now and the circumstances connected with them: thus the giv- the will is compared to the exterior action, as its efficient ing of alms, if the required conditions be observed, is said cause. Wherefore the goodness of the act of the will, as to be good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or evil, existing in the active cause, is the form of the exterior ac- from its relation to the end: thus the giving of alms for tion. vainglory is said to be evil. Now, since the end is the will’s Whether the whole goodness and malice of the external action depends on the good-Ia IIae q. 20 a. 2 ness of the will? Objection 1. It would seem that the whole goodness cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can an evil tree bring and malice of the external action depend on the goodness forth good fruit.” But, according to the gloss, the tree sig- of the will. For it is written (Mat. 7:18): “A good tree nifies the will, and fruit signifies works. Therefore, it is 700 impossible for the interior act of the will to be good, and towards it. the external action evil, or vice versa. Now it must be observed, as was noted above (q. 19, Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) a. 6, ad 1), that for a thing to be evil, one single defect suf-that there is no sin without the will. If therefore there is fices, whereas, for it to be good simply, it is not enough no sin in the will, there will be none in the external ac- for it to be good in one point only, it must be good in every tion. And so the whole goodness or malice of the external respect. If therefore the will be good, both from its proper action depends on the will. object and from its end, if follows that the external action Objection 3. Further, the good and evil of which we is good. But if the will be good from its intention of the are speaking now are differences of the moral act. Now end, this is not enough to make the external action good: differences make an essential division in a genus, accord- and if the will be evil either by reason of its intention of ing to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 12). Since therefore the end, or by reason of the act willed, it follows that the an act is moral from being voluntary, it seems that good- external action is evil. ness and malice in an act are derived from the will alone. Reply to Objection 1. If the good tree be taken to sig- On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mendac. nify the good will, it must be in so far as the will derives vii), that “there are some actions which neither a good goodness from the act willed and from the end intended. end nor a good will can make good.” Reply to Objection 2. A man sins by his will, not I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), we may con- only when he wills an evil end; but also when he wills an sider a twofold goodness or malice in the external action: evil act. one in respect of due matter and circumstances; the other Reply to Objection 3. Voluntariness applies not only in respect of the order to the end. And that which is in to the interior act of the will, but also to external actions, respect of the order to the end, depends entirely on the inasmuch as they proceed from the will and the reason. will: while that which is in respect of due matter or cir- Consequently the difference of good and evil is applica- cumstances, depends on the reason: and on this goodness ble to both the interior and external act. depends the goodness of the will, in so far as the will tends Whether the goodness and malice of the external action are the same as those of the Ia IIae q. 20 a. 3 interior act? Objection 1. It would seem that the goodness and tion. Now that which results from the material and formal malice of the interior act of the will are not the same as element is one thing. Therefore there is but one goodness those of the external action. For the principle of the inte- of the internal and external act. rior act is the interior apprehensive or appetitive power of I answer that, As stated above (q. 17, a. 4), the in- the soul; whereas the principle of the external action is the terior act of the will, and the external action, considered power that accomplishes the movement. Now where the morally, are one act. Now it happens sometimes that one principles of action are different, the actions themselves and the same individual act has several aspects of good- are different. Moreover, it is the action which is the sub- ness or malice, and sometimes that it has but one. Hence ject of goodness or malice: and the same accident cannot we must say that sometimes the goodness or malice of the be in different subjects. Therefore the goodness of the in- interior act is the same as that of the external action, and terior act cannot be the same as that of the external action. sometimes not. For as we have already said (Aa. 1,2), Objection 2. Further, “A virtue makes that, which has these two goodnesses or malices, of the internal and ex- it, good, and renders its action good also” (Ethic. ii, 6). ternal acts, are ordained to one another. Now it may hap- But the intellective virtue in the commanding power is dis- pen, in things that are subordinate to something else, that a tinct from the moral virtue in the power commanded, as thing is good merely from being subordinate; thus a bitter is declared in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the goodness of the draught is good merely because it procures health. Where- interior act, which belongs to the commanding power, is fore there are not two goodnesses, one the goodness of distinct from the goodness of the external action, which health, and the other the goodness of the draught; but one belongs to the power commanded. and the same. On the other hand it happens sometimes Objection 3. Further, the same thing cannot be cause that that which is subordinate to something else, has some and effect; since nothing is its own cause. But the good- aspect of goodness in itself, besides the fact of its being ness of the interior act is the cause of the goodness of the subordinate to some other good: thus a palatable medicine external action, or vice versa, as stated above (Aa. 1,2). can be considered in the light of a pleasurable good, be- Therefore it is not the same goodness in each. sides being conducive to health. On the contrary, It was shown above (q. 18, a. 6) that We must therefore say that when the external action the act of the will is the form, as it were, of the external ac-derives goodness or malice from its relation to the end 701 only, then there is but one and the same goodness of the the end. For this reason various virtues are necessary. But act of the will which of itself regards the end, and of right reason in regard to the very end of a virtue has no the external action, which regards the end through the other goodness than the goodness of that virtue, in so far medium of the act of the will. But when the external ac- as the goodness of the reason is participated in each virtue. tion has goodness or malice of itself, i.e. in regard to its Reply to Objection 3. When a thing is derived by matter and circumstances, then the goodness of the exter- one thing from another, as from a univocal efficient cause, nal action is distinct from the goodness of the will in re- then it is not the same in both: thus when a hot thing heats, garding the end; yet so that the goodness of the end passes the heat of the heater is distinct from the heat of the thing into the external action, and the goodness of the matter heated, although it be the same specifically. But when a and circumstances passes into the act of the will, as stated thing is derived from one thing from another, according above (Aa. 1,2). to analogy or proportion, then it is one and the same in Reply to Objection 1. This argument proves that the both: thus the healthiness which is in medicine or urine internal and external actions are different in the physical is derived from the healthiness of the animal’s body; nor order: yet distinct as they are in that respect, they com- is health as applied to urine and medicine, distinct from bine to form one thing in the moral order, as stated above health as applied to the body of an animal, of which health (q. 17, a. 4). medicine is the cause, and urine the sign. It is in this way Reply to Objection 2. As stated in Ethic. vi, 12, a that the goodness of the external action is derived from the moral virtue is ordained to the act of that virtue, which act goodness of the will, and vice versa; viz. according to the is the end, as it were, of that virtue; whereas prudence, order of one to the other. which is in the reason, is ordained to things directed to Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of the interior act? Ia IIae q. 20 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the external action external action derives from the will tending to the end, does not add any goodness or malice to that of the inte- then the external action adds nothing to this goodness, rior action. For Chrysostom says (Hom. xix in Mat.): “It unless it happens that the will in itself is made better in is the will that is rewarded for doing good, or punished good things, or worse in evil things. This, seemingly, may for doing evil.” Now works are the witnesses of the will. happen in three ways. First in point of number; if, for Therefore God seeks for works not on His own account, instance, a man wishes to do something with a good or in order to know how to judge; but for the sake of others, an evil end in view, and does not do it then, but after- that all may understand how just He is. But good or evil is wards wills and does it, the act of his will is doubled and to be estimated according to God’s judgment rather than a double good, or a double evil is the result. Secondly, in according to the judgment of man. Therefore the external point of extension: when, for instance, a man wishes to action adds no goodness or malice to that of the interior do something for a good or an evil end, and is hindered act. by some obstacle, whereas another man perseveres in the Objection 2. Further, the goodness and malice of the movement of the will until he accomplish it in deed; it is interior and external acts are one and the same, as stated evident that the will of the latter is more lasting in good above (a. 3). But increase is the addition of one thing to or evil, and in this respect, is better or worse. Thirdly, in another. Therefore the external action does not add to the point of intensity: for these are certain external actions, goodness or malice of the interior act. which, in so far as they are pleasurable, or painful, are Objection 3. Further, the entire goodness of created such as naturally to make the will more intense or more things does not add to the Divine Goodness, because it remiss; and it is evident that the more intensely the will is entirely derived therefrom. But sometimes the entire tends to good or evil, the better or worse it is. goodness of the external action is derived from the good- On the other hand, if we speak of the goodness which ness of the interior act, and sometimes conversely, as the external action derives from its matter and due circum- stated above (Aa. 1,2). Therefore neither of them adds stances, thus it stands in relation to the will as its term and to the goodness or malice of the other. end. And in this way it adds to the goodness or malice On the contrary, Every agent intends to attain good of the will; because every inclination or movement is per- and avoid evil. If therefore by the external action no fur- fected by attaining its end or reaching its term. Wherefore ther goodness or malice be added, it is to no purpose that the will is not perfect, unless it be such that, given the he who has a good or an evil will, does a good deed or opportunity, it realizes the operation. But if this prove im- refrains from an evil deed. Which is unreasonable. possible, as long as the will is perfect, so as to realize the I answer that, If we speak of the goodness which the operation if it could; the lack of perfection derived from 702 the external action, is simply involuntary. Now just as the Reply to Objection 2. This argument applies to that involuntary deserves neither punishment nor reward in the goodness which the external action derives from the will accomplishment of good or evil deeds, so neither does it as tending to the end. But the goodness which the external lessen reward or punishment, if a man through simple in- action takes from its matter and circumstances, is distinct voluntariness fail to do good or evil. from that which it derives from the end; but it is not dis- Reply to Objection 1. Chrysostom is speaking of the tinct from that which it has from the very act willed, to case where a man’s will is complete, and does not refrain which it stands in the relation of measure and cause, as from the deed save through the impossibility of achieve- stated above (Aa. 1,2). ment. From this the reply to the Third Objection is evident. Whether the consequences of the external action increase its goodness or malice? Ia IIae q. 20 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the consequences of like manner, if a man bear patiently a wrong done to him, the external action increase its goodness or malice. For the wrongdoer is not thereby excused. Therefore the con- the effect pre-exists virtually in its cause. But the conse- sequences of an action doe not increase its goodness or quences result from the action as an effect from its cause. malice. Therefore they pre-exist virtually in actions. Now a thing I answer that, The consequences of an action are ei- is judged to be good or bad according to its virtue, since ther foreseen or not. If they are foreseen, it is evident that a virtue “makes that which has it to be good” (Ethic. ii, they increase the goodness or malice. For when a man 6). Therefore the consequences increase the goodness or foresees that many evils may follow from his action, and malice of an action. yet does not therefore desist therefrom, this shows his will Objection 2. Further, the good actions of his hearers to be all the more inordinate. are consequences resulting from the words of a preacher. But if the consequences are not foreseen, we must But such goods as these redound to the merit of the make a distinction. Because if they follow from the nature preacher, as is evident from Phil. 4:1: “My dearly beloved of the action and in the majority of cases, in this respect, brethren, my joy and my crown.” Therefore the conse- the consequences increase the goodness or malice of that quences of an action increase its goodness or malice. action: for it is evident that an action is specifically better, Objection 3. Further, punishment is not increased, if better results can follow from it; and specifically worse, unless the fault increases: wherefore it is written (Dt. if it is of a nature to produce worse results. On the other 25:2): “According to the measure of the sin shall the mea- hand, if the consequences follow by accident and seldom, sure also of the stripes be.” But the punishment is in- then they do not increase the goodness or malice of the creased on account of the consequences; for it is written action: because we do not judge of a thing according to (Ex. 21:29): “But if the ox was wont to push with his horn that which belongs to it by accident, but only according to yesterday and the day before, and they warned his master, that which belongs to it of itself. and he did not shut him up, and he shall kill a man or a Reply to Objection 1. The virtue of a cause is mea- woman, then the ox shall be stoned, and his owner also sured by the effect that flows from the nature of the cause, shall be put to death.” But he would not have been put not by that which results by accident. to death, if the ox, although he had not been shut up, had Reply to Objection 2. The good actions done by the not killed a man. Therefore the consequences increase the hearers, result from the preacher’s words, as an effect that goodness or malice of an action. flows from their very nature. Hence they redound to the Objection 4. Further, if a man do something which merit of the preacher: especially when such is his inten- may cause death, by striking, or by sentencing, and if tion. death does not ensue, he does not contract irregularity: Reply to Objection 3. The consequences for which but he would if death were to ensue. Therefore the conse- that man is ordered to be punished, both follow from the quence of an action increase its goodness or malice. nature of the cause, and are supposed to be foreseen. For On the contrary, The consequences do not make an this reason they are reckoned as punishable. action that was evil, to be good; nor one that was good, Reply to Objection 4. This argument would prove if to be evil. For instance, if a man give an alms to a poor irregularity were the result of the fault. But it is not the man who makes bad use of the alms by committing a sin, result of the fault, but of the fact, and of the obstacle to this does not undo the good done by the giver; and, in the reception of a sacrament. 703 Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil? Ia IIae q. 20 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that one and the same ex- face is one, considered as in the genus of quantity; and yet ternal action can be both good and evil. For “movement, it is manifold, considered as to the genus of color, if it be if continuous, is one and the same” (Phys. v, 4). But one partly white, and partly black. And accordingly, nothing continuous movement can be both good and bad: for in- hinders an action from being one, considered in the nat- stance, a man may go to church continuously, intending at ural order; whereas it is not one, considered in the moral first vainglory, and afterwards the service of God. There- order; and vice versa, as we have stated above (a. 3, ad fore one and the same action can be both good and bad. 1; q. 18, a. 7, ad 1). For continuous walking is one ac- Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher tion, considered in the natural order: but it may resolve (Phys. iii, 3), action and passion are one act. But the pas- itself into many actions, considered in the moral order, if sion may be good, as Christ’s was; and the action evil, as a change take place in the walker’s will, for the will is that of the Jews. Therefore one and the same act can be the principle of moral actions. If therefore we consider both good and evil. one action in the moral order, it is impossible for it to be Objection 3. Further, since a servant is an instrument, morally both good and evil. Whereas if it be one as to as it were, of his master, the servant’s action is his mas- natural and not moral unity, it can be both good and evil. ter’s, just as the action of a tool is the workman’s action. Reply to Objection 1. This continual movement But it may happen that the servant’s action result from his which proceeds from various intentions, although it is one master’s good will, and is therefore good: and from the in the natural order, is not one in the point of moral unity. evil will of the servant, and is therefore evil. Therefore Reply to Objection 2. Action and passion belong to the same action can be both good and evil. the moral order, in so far as they are voluntary. And there- On the contrary, The same thing cannot be the sub- fore in so far as they are voluntary in respect of wills that ject of contraries. But good and evil are contraries. There- differ, they are two distinct things, and good can be in one fore the same action cannot be both good and evil. of them while evil is in the other. On the contrary, The same thing cannot be the sub- Reply to Objection 3. The action of the servant, in so ject of contraries. But good and evil are contraries. There- far as it proceeds from the will of the servant, is not the fore the same action cannot be both good and evil. master’s action: but only in so far as it proceeds from the I answer that, Nothing hinders a thing from being master’s command. Wherefore the evil will of the servant one, in so far as it is in one genus, and manifold, in so far does not make the action evil in this respect. as it is referred to another genus. Thus a continuous sur- 704 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 21 Of the Consequences of Human Actions by Reason of Their Goodness and Malice (In Four Articles) We have now to consider the consequences of human actions by reason of their goodness and malice: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether a human action is right or sinful by reason of its being good or evil? (2) Whether it thereby deserves praise or blame? (3) Whether accordingly, it is meritorious or demeritorious? (4) Whether it is accordingly meritorious or demeritorious before God? Whether a human action is right or sinful, in so far as it is good or evil? Ia IIae q. 21 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that a human action is not right its, viz. the action does not swerve from the order of its or sinful, in so far as it is good or evil. For “monsters are active principle to the end. But when an action strays from the sins of nature” (Phys. ii, 8). But monsters are not ac- this rectitude, it comes under the notion of sin. tions, but things engendered outside the order of nature. Now in those things that are done by the will, the prox- Now things that are produced according to art and reason imate rule is the human reason, while the supreme rule is imitate those that are produced according to nature (Phys. the Eternal Law. When, therefore, a human action tends to ii, 8). Therefore an action is not sinful by reason of its the end, according to the order of reason and of the Eter- being inordinate and evil. nal Law, then that action is right: but when it turns aside Objection 2. Further, sin, as stated in Phys. ii, 8 oc- from that rectitude, then it is said to be a sin. Now it is ev- curs in nature and art, when the end intended by nature or ident from what has been said (q. 19, Aa. 3,4) that every art is not attained. But the goodness or malice of a human voluntary action that turns aside from the order of reason action depends, before all, on the intention of the end, and and of the Eternal Law, is evil, and that every good action on its achievement. Therefore it seems that the malice of is in accord with reason and the Eternal Law. Hence it an action does not make it sinful. follows that a human action is right or sinful by reason of Objection 3. Further, if the malice of an action makes its being good or evil. it sinful, it follows that wherever there is evil, there is sin. Reply to Objection 1. Monsters are called sins, inas- But this is false: since punishment is not a sin, although much as they result from a sin in nature’s action. it is an evil. Therefore an action is not sinful by reason of Reply to Objection 2. The end is twofold; the last its being evil. end, and the proximate end. In the sin of nature, the ac- On the contrary, As shown above (q. 19, a. 4), the tion does indeed fail in respect of the last end, which is goodness of a human action depends principally on the the perfection of the thing generated; but it does not fail Eternal Law: and consequently its malice consists in its in respect of any proximate end whatever; since when na- being in disaccord with the Eternal Law. But this is the ture works it forms something. In like manner, the sin very nature of sin; for Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, of the will always fails as regards the last end intended, 27) that “sin is a word, deed, or desire, in opposition to because no voluntary evil action can be ordained to hap- the Eternal Law.” Therefore a human action is sinful by piness, which is the last end: and yet it does not fail in reason of its being evil. respect of some proximate end: intended and achieved by I answer that, Evil is more comprehensive than sin, the will. Wherefore also, since the very intention of this as also is good than right. For every privation of good, in end is ordained to the last end, this same intention may be whatever subject, is an evil: whereas sin consists properly right or sinful. in an action done for a certain end, and lacking due order Reply to Objection 3. Each thing is ordained to its to that end. Now the due order to an end is measured by end by its action: and therefore sin, which consists in some rule. In things that act according to nature, this rule straying from the order to the end, consists properly in is the natural force that inclines them to that end. When an action. On the other hand, punishment regards the per- therefore an action proceeds from a natural force, in ac- son of the sinner, as was stated in the Ia, q. 48, a. 5, ad 4; cord with the natural inclination to an end, then the action a. 6, ad 3. is said to be right: since the mean does not exceed its lim- 705 Whether a human action deserves praise or blame, by reason of its being good or evil? Ia IIae q. 21 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that a human action does follows that good or evil, in voluntary actions alone, ren- not deserve praise or blame by reason of its being good ders them worthy of praise or blame: and in such like or evil. For “sin happens even in things done by nature” actions, evil, sin and guilt are one and the same thing. (Phys. ii, 8). And yet natural things are not deserving of Reply to Objection 1. Natural actions are not in the praise or blame (Ethic. iii, 5). Therefore a human action power of the natural agent: since the action of nature is does not deserve blame, by reason of its being evil or sin- determinate. And, therefore, although there be sin in nat- ful; and, consequently, neither does it deserve praise, by ural actions, there is no blame. reason of its being good. Reply to Objection 2. Reason stands in different re- Objection 2. Further, just as sin occurs in moral ac- lations to the productions of art, and to moral actions. In tions, so does it happen in the productions of art: because matters of art, reason is directed to a particular end, which as stated in Phys. ii, 8 “it is a sin in a grammarian to write is something devised by reason: whereas in moral matters, badly, and in a doctor to give the wrong medicine.” But it is directed to the general end of all human life. Now a the artist is not blamed for making something bad: be- particular end is subordinate to the general end. Since cause the artist’s work is such, that he can produce a good therefore sin is a departure from the order to the end, as or a bad thing, just as he lists. Therefore it seems that nei- stated above (a. 1), sin may occur in two ways, in a pro- ther is there any reason for blaming a moral action, in the duction of art. First, by a departure from the particular fact that it is evil. end intended by the artist: and this sin will be proper to Objection 3. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) the art; for instance, if an artist produce a bad thing, while that evil is “weak and incapable.” But weakness or in- intending to produce something good; or produce some- ability either takes away or diminishes guilt. Therefore a thing good, while intending to produce something bad. human action does not incur guilt from being evil. Secondly, by a departure from the general end of human On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Virt. et life: and then he will be said to sin, if he intend to produce Vit. i) that “virtuous deeds deserve praise, while deeds a bad work, and does so in effect, so that another is taken that are opposed to virtue deserve censure and blame.” in thereby. But this sin is not proper to the artist as such, But good actions are virtuous; because “virtue makes that but as man. Consequently for the former sin the artist is which has it, good, and makes its action good” (Ethic. ii, blamed as an artist; while for the latter he is blamed as 6): wherefore actions opposed to virtue are evil. There- a man. On the other hand, in moral matters, where we fore a human action deserves praise or blame, through be- take into consideration the order of reason to the general ing good or evil. end of human life, sin and evil are always due to a depar- I answer that, Just as evil is more comprehensive than ture from the order of reason to the general end of human sin, so is sin more comprehensive than blame. For an ac- life. Wherefore man is blamed for such a sin, both as man tion is said to deserve praise or blame, from its being im- and as a moral being. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. puted to the agent: since to praise or to blame means noth- vi, 5) that “in art, he who sins voluntarily is preferable; ing else than to impute to someone the malice or goodness but in prudence, as in the moral virtues,” which prudence of his action. Now an action is imputed to an agent, when directs, “he is the reverse.” it is in his power, so that he has dominion over it: because Reply to Objection 3. Weakness that occurs in volun- it is through his will that man has dominion over his ac- tary evils, is subject to man’s power: wherefore it neither tions, as was made clear above (q. 1, Aa. 1,2). Hence it takes away nor diminishes guilt. Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious in so far as it is good or evil? Ia IIae q. 21 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that a human action is not master: thus if a man destroys what belongs to him, he is meritorious or demeritorious on account of its goodness not punished, as if he had destroyed what belongs to an- or malice. For we speak of merit or demerit in relation to other. But man is master of his own actions. Therefore a retribution, which has no place save in matters relating to man does not merit punishment or reward, through putting another person. But good or evil actions are not all related his action to a good or evil purpose. to another person, for some are related to the person of the Objection 3. Further, if a man acquire some good for agent. Therefore not every good or evil human action is himself, he does not on that account deserve to be bene- meritorious or demeritorious. fited by another man: and the same applies to evil. Now a Objection 2. Further, no one deserves punishment or good action is itself a kind of good and perfection of the reward for doing as he chooses with that of which he is agent: while an inordinate action is his evil. Therefore a 706 man does not merit or demerit, from the fact that he does advantage, then again is retribution owed to him, in so far a good or an evil deed. as this too affects the community, forasmuch as he is a On the contrary, It is written (Is. 3:10,11): “Say to part of society: although retribution is not due to him, in the just man that it is well; for he shall eat the fruit of his so far as it conduces to the good or harm of an individual, doings. Woe to the wicked unto evil; for the reward of his who is identical with the agent: unless, perchance, he owe hands shall be given him.” retribution to himself, by a sort of resemblance, in so far I answer that, We speak of merit and demerit, in re- as man is said to be just to himself. lation to retribution, rendered according to justice. Now, It is therefore evident that a good or evil action de- retribution according to justice is rendered to a man, by serves praise or blame, in so far as it is in the power of the reason of his having done something to another’s advan- will: that it is right or sinful, according as it is ordained tage or hurt. It must, moreover, be observed that every to the end; and that its merit or demerit depends on the individual member of a society is, in a fashion, a part and recompense for justice or injustice towards another. member of the whole society. Wherefore, any good or Reply to Objection 1. A man’s good or evil actions, evil, done to the member of a society, redounds on the although not ordained to the good or evil of another in- whole society: thus, who hurts the hand, hurts the man. dividual, are nevertheless ordained to the good or evil of When, therefore, anyone does good or evil to another in- another, i.e. the community. dividual, there is a twofold measure of merit or demerit Reply to Objection 2. Man is master of his actions; in his action: first, in respect of the retribution owed to and yet, in so far as he belongs to another, i.e. the com- him by the individual to whom he has done good or harm; munity, of which he forms part, he merits or demerits, secondly, in respect of the retribution owed to him by the inasmuch as he disposes his actions well or ill: just as if whole of society. Now when a man ordains his action di- he were to dispense well or ill other belongings of his, in rectly for the good or evil of the whole society, retribution respect of which he is bound to serve the community. is owed to him, before and above all, by the whole soci- Reply to Objection 3. This very good or evil, which ety; secondarily, by all the parts of society. Whereas when a man does to himself by his action, redounds to the com- a man does that which conduces to his own benefit or dis- munity, as stated above. Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious before God, according as it Ia IIae q. 21 a. 4 is good or evil? Objection 1. It would seem that man’s actions, good in God’s sight. or evil, are not meritorious or demeritorious in the sight On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 12:14): of God. Because, as stated above (a. 3), merit and demerit “All things that are done, God will bring into judg- imply relation to retribution for good or harm done to an- ment. . . whether it be good or evil.” Now judgment im- other. But a man’s action, good or evil, does no good or plies retribution, in respect of which we speak of merit harm to God; for it is written (Job 35:6,7): “If thou sin, and demerit. Therefore every human action, both good what shalt thou hurt Him?. . . And if thou do justly, what and evil, acquires merit or demerit in God’s sight. shalt thou give Him?” Therefore a human action, good I answer that, A human action, as stated above (a. 3), or evil, is not meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of acquires merit or demerit, through being ordained to God. someone else, either by reason of himself, or by reason Objection 2. Further, an instrument acquires no merit of the community: and in each way, our actions, good and or demerit in the sight of him that uses it; because the evil, acquire merit or demerit, in the sight of God. On the entire action of the instrument belongs to the user. Now part of God Himself, inasmuch as He is man’s last end; when man acts he is the instrument of the Divine power and it is our duty to refer all our actions to the last end, as which is the principal cause of his action; hence it is writ-stated above (q. 19, a. 10). Consequently, whoever does ten (Is. 10:15): “Shall the axe boast itself against him that an evil deed, not referable to God, does not give God the cutteth with it? Or shall the saw exalt itself against him honor due to Him as our last end. On the part of the whole by whom it is drawn?” where man while acting is evi- community of the universe, because in every community, dently compared to an instrument. Therefore man merits he who governs the community, cares, first of all, for the or demerits nothing in God’s sight, by good or evil deeds. common good; wherefore it is his business to award retri- Objection 3. Further, a human action acquires merit bution for such things as are done well or ill in the com- or demerit through being ordained to someone else. But munity. Now God is the governor and ruler of the whole not all human actions are ordained to God. Therefore universe, as stated in the Ia, q. 103, a. 5: and especially not every good or evil action acquires merit or demerit of rational creatures. Consequently it is evident that hu- 707 man actions acquire merit or demerit in reference to Him: Consequently, by his action, he acquires merit or demerit else it would follow that human actions are no business of in God’s sight. God’s. Reply to Objection 3. Man is not ordained to the Reply to Objection 1. God in Himself neither gains body politic, according to all that he is and has; and so nor losses anything by the action of man: but man, for it does not follow that every action of his acquires merit his part, takes something from God, or offers something or demerit in relation to the body politic. But all that man to Him, when he observes or does not observe the order is, and can, and has, must be referred to God: and there- instituted by God. fore every action of man, whether good or bad, acquires Reply to Objection 2. Man is so moved, as an instru- merit or demerit in the sight of God, as far as the action ment, by God, that, at the same time, he moves himself itself is concerned. by his free-will, as was explained above (q. 9, a. 6, ad 3). 708 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 22 Of the Subject of the Soul’s Passions (In Three Articles) We must now consider the passions of the soul: first, in general; secondly, in particular. Taking them in general, there are four things to be considered: (1) Their subject: (2) The difference between them: (3) Their mutual relationship: (4) Their malice and goodness. Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is any passion in the soul? (2) Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part? (3) Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite, which is called the will? Whether any passion is in the soul? Ia IIae q. 22 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no passion else. Moreover in De Generat. i, 3 it is stated that when in the soul. Because passivity belongs to matter. But the a more excellent thing is generated from a less excellent, soul is not composed of matter and form, as stated in the we have generation simply, and corruption in a particu- Ia, q. 75, a. 5. Therefore there is no passion in the soul. lar respect: whereas the reverse is the case, when from Objection 2. Further, passion is movement, as is a more excellent thing, a less excellent is generated. In stated in Phys. iii, 3. But the soul is not moved, as is these three ways it happens that passions are in the soul. proved in De Anima i, 3. Therefore passion is not in the For in the sense of mere reception, we speak of “feeling soul. and understanding as being a kind of passion” (De Anima Objection 3. Further, passion is the road to corrup- i, 5). But passion, accompanied by the loss of something, tion; since “every passion, when increased, alters the sub- is only in respect of a bodily transmutation; wherefore stance,” as is stated in Topic. vi, 6. But the soul is incor- passion properly so called cannot be in the soul, save ac- ruptible. Therefore no passion is in the soul. cidentally, in so far, to wit, as the “composite” is passive. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:5): But here again we find a difference; because when this “When we were in the flesh, the passions of sins which transmutation is for the worse, it has more of the nature of were by the law, did the work in our members.” Now sins a passion, than when it is for the better: hence sorrow is are, properly speaking, in the soul. Therefore passions more properly a passion than joy. also, which are described as being “of sins,” are in the Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to matter to be pas- soul. sive in such a way as to lose something and to be trans- I answer that, The word “passive” is used in three muted: hence this happens only in those things that are ways. First, in a general way, according as whatever composed of matter and form. But passivity, as implying receives something is passive, although nothing is taken mere reception, need not be in matter, but can be in any- from it: thus we may say that the air is passive when it is thing that is in potentiality. Now, though the soul is not lit up. But this is to be perfected rather than to be passive. composed of matter and form, yet it has something of po- Secondly, the word “passive” is employed in its proper tentiality, in respect of which it is competent to receive or sense, when something is received, while something else to be passive, according as the act of understanding is a is taken away: and this happens in two ways. For some- kind of passion, as stated in De Anima iii, 4. times that which is lost is unsuitable to the thing: thus Reply to Objection 2. Although it does not belong when an animal’s body is healed, and loses sickness. At to the soul in itself to be passive and to be moved, yet it other times the contrary occurs: thus to ail is to be pas- belongs accidentally as stated in De Anima i, 3. sive; because the ailment is received and health is lost. Reply to Objection 3. This argument is true of pas- And here we have passion in its most proper acceptation. sion accompanied by transmutation to something worse. For a thing is said to be passive from its being drawn to the And passion, in this sense, is not found in the soul, ex- agent: and when a thing recedes from what is suitable to cept accidentally: but the composite, which is corruptible, it, then especially does it appear to be drawn to something admits of it by reason of its own nature. 709 Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part? Ia IIae q. 22 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that passion is in the ap- intensity is in proportion to the approach to one first prin- prehensive part of the soul rather than in the appetitive. ciple; to which the nearer a thing approaches, the more Because that which is first in any genus, seems to rank intense it is. Thus the intensity of a thing possessed of first among all things that are in that genus, and to be their light depends on its approach to something endowed with cause, as is stated in Metaph. ii, 1. Now passion is found light in a supreme degree, to which the nearer a thing ap- to be in the apprehensive, before being in the appetitive proaches the more light it possesses. But in things that part: for the appetitive part is not affected unless there relate to defect, intensity depends, not on approach to be a previous passion in the apprehensive part. Therefore something supreme, but in receding from that which is passion is in the apprehensive part more than in the appet- perfect; because therein consists the very notion of priva- itive. tion and defect. Wherefore the less a thing recedes from Objection 2. Further, what is more active is less pas- that which stands first, the less intense it is: and the result sive; for action is contrary to passion. Now the appetitive is that at first we always find some small defect, which part is more active than the apprehensive part. Therefore afterwards increases as it goes on. Now passion pertains it seems that passion is more in the apprehensive part. to defect, because it belongs to a thing according as it is Objection 3. Further, just as the sensitive appetite is in potentiality. Wherefore in those things that approach to the power of a corporeal organ, so is the power of sensitive the Supreme Perfection, i.e. to God, there is but little po- apprehension. But passion in the soul occurs, properly tentiality and passion: while in other things, consequently, speaking, in respect of a bodily transmutation. Therefore there is more. Hence also, in the supreme, i.e. the appre- passion is not more in the sensitive appetitive than in the hensive, power of the soul, passion is found less than in sensitive apprehensive part. the other powers. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) Reply to Objection 2. The appetitive power is said that “the movement of the soul, which the Greeks called to be more active, because it is, more than the apprehen- pathe, are styled by some of our writers, Cicero∗ for insive power, the principle of the exterior action: and this stance, disturbances; by some, affections or emotions; for the same reason that it is more passive, namely, its be- while others rendering the Greek more accurately, call ing related to things as existing in themselves: since it is them passions.” From this it is evident that the passions of through the external action that we come into contact with the soul are the same as affections. But affections mani- things. festly belong to the appetitive, and not to the apprehensive Reply to Objection 3. As stated in the Ia, q. 78, a. 3 part. Therefore the passions are in the appetitive rather the organs of the soul can be changed in two ways. First, than in the apprehensive part. by a spiritual change, in respect of which the organ re- I answer that, As we have already stated (a. 1) the ceives an “intention” of the object. And this is essential word “passion” implies that the patient is drawn to that to the act of the sensitive apprehension: thus is the eye which belongs to the agent. Now the soul is drawn to a changed by the object visible, not by being colored, but thing by the appetitive power rather than by the appre- by receiving an intention of color. But the organs are re- hensive power: because the soul has, through its appeti- ceptive of another and natural change, which affects their tive power, an order to things as they are in themselves: natural disposition; for instance, when they become hot hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 4) that “good or cold, or undergo some similar change. And whereas and evil,” i.e. the objects of the appetitive power, “are in this kind of change is accidental to the act of the sensitive things themselves.” On the other hand the apprehensive apprehension; for instance, if the eye be wearied through power is not drawn to a thing, as it is in itself; but knows gazing intently at something or be overcome by the in- it by reason of an “intention” of the thing, which “inten- tensity of the object: on the other hand, it is essential to tion” it has in itself, or receives in its own way. Hence we the act of the sensitive appetite; wherefore the material find it stated (Metaph. vi, 4) that “the true and the false,” element in the definitions of the movements of the appet- which pertain to knowledge, “are not in things, but in the itive part, is the natural change of the organ; for instance, mind.” Consequently it is evident that the nature of pas- “anger is” said to be “a kindling of the blood about the sion is consistent with the appetitive, rather than with the heart.” Hence it is evident that the notion of passion is apprehensive part. more consistent with the act of the sensitive appetite, than Reply to Objection 1. In things relating to perfec- with that of the sensitive apprehension, although both are tion the case is the opposite, in comparison to things that actions of a corporeal organ. pertain to defect. Because in things relating to perfection, ∗ Those things which the Greeks call pathe, we prefer to call disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5) 710 Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite, Ia IIae q. 22 a. 3 which is called the will? Objection 1. It would seem that passion is not more in sitive appetite, and is not only spiritual, as in the sensitive the sensitive than in the intellectual appetite. For Diony-apprehension, but also natural. Now there is no need for sius declares (Div. Nom. ii) Hierotheus “to be taught by corporeal transmutation in the act of the intellectual ap- a kind of yet more Godlike instruction; not only by learn- petite: because this appetite is not exercised by means of ing Divine things, but also by suffering [patiens] them.” a corporeal organ. It is therefore evident that passion is But the sensitive appetite cannot “suffer” Divine things, more properly in the act of the sensitive appetite, than in since its object is the sensible good. Therefore passion is that of the intellectual appetite; and this is again evident in the intellectual appetite, just as it is also in the sensitive from the definitions of Damascene quoted above. appetite. Reply to Objection 1. By “suffering” Divine things Objection 2. Further, the more powerful the active is meant being well affected towards them, and united to force, the more intense the passion. But the object of the them by love: and this takes place without any alteration intellectual appetite, which is the universal good, is a more in the body. powerful active force than the object of the sensitive ap- Reply to Objection 2. Intensity of passion depends petite, which is a particular good. Therefore passion is not only on the power of the agent, but also on the pas- more consistent with the intellectual than with the sensi- sibility of the patient: because things that are disposed to tive appetite. passion, suffer much even from petty agents. Therefore Objection 3. Further, joy and love are said to be pas- although the object of the intellectual appetite has greater sions. But these are to be found in the intellectual and activity than the object of the sensitive appetite, yet the not only in the sensitive appetite: else they would not be sensitive appetite is more passive. ascribed by the Scriptures to God and the angels. There- Reply to Objection 3. When love and joy and the like fore the passions are not more in the sensitive than in the are ascribed to God or the angels, or to man in respect intellectual appetite. of his intellectual appetite, they signify simple acts of the On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, will having like effects, but without passion. Hence Au- 22), while describing the animal passions: “Passion is a gustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): “The holy angels feel no movement of the sensitive appetite when we imagine good anger while they punish. . . no fellow-feeling with misery or evil: in other words, passion is a movement of the irra- while they relieve the unhappy: and yet ordinary human tional soul, when we think of good or evil.” speech is wont to ascribe to them also these passions by I answer that, As stated above (a. 1) passion is prop- name, because, although they have none of our weakness, erly to be found where there is corporeal transmutation. their acts bear a certain resemblance to ours.” This corporeal transmutation is found in the act of the sen- 711 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 23 How the Passions Differ From One Another (In Four Articles) We must now consider how the passions differ from one another: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part? (2) Whether the contrariety of passions in the irascible part is based on the contrariety of good and evil? (3) Whether there is any passion that has no contrary? (4) Whether, in the same power, there are any passions, differing in species, but not contrary to one another? Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible Ia IIae q. 23 a. 1 part? Objection 1. It would seem that the same passions are order, diversity of genus arises from diversity in the po- in the irascible and concupiscible parts. For the Philoso- tentiality of matter, while diversity of species arises from pher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that the passions of the soul are diversity of form in the same matter; so in the acts of the those emotions “which are followed by joy or sorrow.” soul, those that belong to different powers, differ not only But joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part. There- in species but also in genus, while acts and passions re- fore all the passions are in the concupiscible part, and not garding different specific objects, included under the one some in the irascible, others in the concupiscible part. common object of a single power, differ as the species of Objection 2. Further, on the words of Mat. 13:33, that genus. “The kingdom of heaven is like to leaven,” etc., Jerome’s In order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the gloss says: “We should have prudence in the reason; ha- irascible, and which in the concupiscible, we must take tred of vice in the irascible faculty; desire of virtue, in the object of each of these powers. For we have stated the concupiscible part.” But hatred is in the concupiscible in the Ia, q. 81, a. 2, that the object of the concupisci- faculty, as also is love, of which it is the contrary, as is ble power is sensible good or evil, simply apprehended stated in Topic. ii, 7. Therefore the same passion is in the as such, which causes pleasure or pain. But, since the concupiscible and irascible faculties. soul must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at Objection 3. Further, passions and actions differ times, in acquiring some such good, or in avoiding some specifically according to their objects. But the objects of such evil, in so far as such good or evil is more than our the irascible and concupiscible passions are the same, viz. animal nature can easily acquire or avoid; therefore this good and evil. Therefore the same passions are in the iras- very good or evil, inasmuch as it is of an arduous or diffi- cible and concupiscible faculties. cult nature, is the object of the irascible faculty. Therefore On the contrary, The acts of the different powers dif- whatever passions regard good or evil absolutely, belong fer in species; for instance, to see, and to hear. But the to the concupiscible power; for instance, joy, sorrow, love, irascible and the concupiscible are two powers into which hatred, and such like: whereas those passions which re- the sensitive appetite is divided, as stated in the Ia, q. 81, gard good or bad as arduous, through being difficult to a. 2. Therefore, since the passions are movements of the obtain or avoid, belong to the irascible faculty; such are sensitive appetite, as stated above (q. 22, a. 3), the pas- daring, fear, hope and the like. sions of the irascible faculty are specifically distinct from Reply to Objection 1. As stated in the Ia, q. 81, a. 2, those of the concupiscible part. the irascible faculty is bestowed on animals, in order to I answer that, The passions of the irascible part dif- remove the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible power fer in species from those of the concupiscible faculty. For from tending towards its object, either by making some since different powers have different objects, as stated in good difficult to obtain, or by making some evil hard to the Ia, q. 77, a. 3, the passions of different powers must avoid. The result is that all the irascible passions termi- of necessity be referred to different objects. Much more, nate in the concupiscible passions: and thus it is that even therefore, do the passions of different faculties differ in the passions which are in the irascible faculty are followed species; since a greater difference in the object is required by joy and sadness which are in the concupiscible faculty. to diversify the species of the powers, than to diversify the Reply to Objection 2. Jerome ascribes hatred of vice species of passions or actions. For just as in the physical to the irascible faculty, not by reason of hatred, which is 712 properly a concupiscible passion; but on account of the trariety to the concupiscible power: and hence the need of struggle, which belongs to the irascible power. another power tending to that good. The same applies to Reply to Objection 3. Good, inasmuch as it is de- evil. And this power is the irascible faculty. Consequently lightful, moves the concupiscible power. But if it prove the concupiscible passions are specifically different from difficult to obtain, from this very fact it has a certain con- the irascible passions. Whether the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on the contrariety of good Ia IIae q. 23 a. 2 and evil? Objection 1. It would seem that the contrariety of the Accordingly there is a twofold contrariety in the pas- irascible passions is based on no other contrariety than sions of the soul: one, according to contrariety of objects, that of good and evil. For the irascible passions are or- i.e. of good and evil; the other, according to approach dained to the concupiscible passions, as stated above (a. 1, and withdrawal in respect of the same term. In the con- ad 1). But the contrariety of the concupiscible passions is cupiscible passions the former contrariety alone is to be no other than that of good and evil; take, for instance, love found; viz. that which is based on the objects: whereas and hatred, joy and sorrow. Therefore the same applies to in the irascible passions, we find both forms of contrari- the irascible passions. ety. The reason of this is that the object of the concupisci- Objection 2. Further, passions differ according to ble faculty, as stated above (a. 1), is sensible good or evil their objects; just as movements differ according to their considered absolutely. Now good, as such, cannot be a termini. But there is no other contrariety of movements, term wherefrom, but only a term whereto, since nothing except that of the termini, as is stated in Phys. v, 3. There- shuns good as such; on the contrary, all things desire it. In fore there is no other contrariety of passions, save that of like manner, nothing desires evil, as such; but all things the objects. Now the object of the appetite is good or evil. shun it: wherefore evil cannot have the aspect of a term Therefore in no appetitive power can there be contrariety whereto, but only of a term wherefrom. Accordingly ev- of passions other than that of good and evil. ery concupiscible passion in respect of good, tends to it, Objection 3. Further, “every passion of the soul is by as love, desire and joy; while every concupiscible passion way of approach and withdrawal,” as Avicenna declares in in respect of evil, tends from it, as hatred, avoidance or his sixth book of Physics. Now approach results from the dislike, and sorrow. Wherefore, in the concupiscible pas- apprehension of good; withdrawal, from the apprehension sions, there can be no contrariety of approach and with- of evil: since just as “good is what all desire” (Ethic. i, 1), drawal in respect of the same object. so evil is what all shun. Therefore, in the passions of the On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty soul, there can be no other contrariety than that of good is sensible good or evil, considered not absolutely, but un- and evil. der the aspect of difficulty or arduousness. Now the good On the contrary, Fear and daring are contrary to one which is difficult or arduous, considered as good, is of another, as stated in Ethic. iii, 7. But fear and daring do such a nature as to produce in us a tendency to it, which not differ in respect of good and evil: because each re- tendency pertains to the passion of “hope”; whereas, con- gards some kind of evil. Therefore not every contrariety sidered as arduous or difficult, it makes us turn from it; of the irascible passions is that of good and evil. and this pertains to the passion of “despair.” In like man- I answer that, Passion is a kind of movement, as ner the arduous evil, considered as an evil, has the as- stated in Phys. iii, 3. Therefore contrariety of passions pect of something to be shunned; and this belongs to the is based on contrariety of movements or changes. Now passion of “fear”: but it also contains a reason for tend- there is a twofold contrariety in changes and movements, ing to it, as attempting something arduous, whereby to as stated in Phys. v, 5. One is according to approach escape being subject to evil; and this tendency is called and withdrawal in respect of the same term: and this con- “daring.” Consequently, in the irascible passions we find trariety belongs properly to changes, i.e. to generation, contrariety in respect of good and evil (as between hope which is a change “to being,” and to corruption, which is and fear): and also contrariety according to approach and a change “from being.” The other contrariety is according withdrawal in respect of the same term (as between daring to opposition of termini, and belongs properly to move- and fear). ments: thus whitening, which is movement from black to From what has been said the replies to the objections white, is contrary to blackening, which is movement from are evident. white to black. 713 Whether any passion of the soul has no contrariety? Ia IIae q. 23 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that every passion of the must needs either succumb, so that it does not go beyond soul has a contrary. For every passion of the soul is either the limits of “sadness,” which is a concupiscible passion; in the irascible or in the concupiscible faculty, as stated or else it has a movement of attack on the hurtful evil, above (a. 1). But both kinds of passion have their respec- which movement is that of “anger.” But it cannot have a tive modes of contrariety. Therefore every passion of the movement of withdrawal: because the evil is supposed to soul has its contrary. be already present or past. Thus no passion is contrary Objection 2. Further, every passion of the soul has ei- to anger according to contrariety of approach and with- ther good or evil for its object; for these are the common drawal. objects of the appetitive part. But a passion having good In like manner neither can there be according to con- for its object, is contrary to a passion having evil for its trariety of good and evil. Because the opposite of present object. Therefore every passion has a contrary. evil is good obtained, which can be no longer have the as- Objection 3. Further, every passion of the soul is in pect of arduousness or difficulty. Nor, when once good is respect of approach or withdrawal, as stated above (a. 2). obtained, does there remain any other movement, except But every approach has a corresponding contrary with- the appetite’s repose in the good obtained; which repose drawal, and vice versa. Therefore every passion of the belongs to joy, which is a passion of the concupiscible soul has a contrary. faculty. On the contrary, Anger is a passion of the soul. But Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary no passion is set down as being contrary to anger, as stated to the movement of anger, and nothing else than cessation in Ethic. iv, 5. Therefore not every passion has a contrary. from its movement is contrary thereto; thus the Philoso- I answer that, The passion of anger is peculiar in this, pher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that “calm is contrary to anger,” by that it cannot have a contrary, either according to approach opposition not of contrariety but of negation or privation. and withdrawal, or according to the contrariety of good From what has been said the replies to the objections and evil. For anger is caused by a difficult evil already are evident. present: and when such an evil is present, the appetite Whether in the same power, there are any passions, specifically different, but not Ia IIae q. 23 a. 4 contrary to one another? Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be, in passions of the same power to differ in species, without the same power, specifically different passions that are not being contrary to one another. contrary to one another. For the passions of the soul differ On the contrary, Love and joy differ in species, and according to their objects. Now the objects of the soul’s are in the concupiscible power; and yet they are not con- passions are good and evil; and on this distinction is based trary to one another; rather, in fact, one causes the other. the contrariety of the passions. Therefore no passions of Therefore in the same power there are passions that differ the same power, that are not contrary to one another, differ in species without being contrary to one another. specifically. I answer that, Passions differ in accordance with their Objection 2. Further, difference of species implies active causes, which, in the case of the passions of the a difference of form. But every difference of form is in soul, are their objects. Now, the difference in active causes respect of some contrariety, as stated in Metaph. x, 8. may be considered in two ways: first, from the point of Therefore passions of the same power, that are not con- view of their species or nature, as fire differs from water; trary to one another, do not differ specifically. secondly, from the point of view of the difference in their Objection 3. Further, since every passion of the soul active power. In the passions of the soul we can treat the consists in approach or withdrawal in respect of good or difference of their active or motive causes in respect of evil, it seems that every difference in the passions of the their motive power, as if they were natural agents. For ev- soul must needs arise from the difference of good and ery mover, in a fashion, either draws the patient to itself, evil; or from the difference of approach and withdrawal; or repels it from itself. Now in drawing it to itself, it does or from degrees in approach or withdrawal. Now the first three things in the patient. Because, in the first place, it two differences cause contrariety in the passions of the gives the patient an inclination or aptitude to tend to the soul, as stated above (a. 2): whereas the third difference mover: thus a light body, which is above, bestows light- does not diversify the species; else the species of the soul’s ness on the body generated, so that it has an inclination or passions would be infinite. Therefore it is not possible for aptitude to be above. Secondly, if the generated body be 714 outside its proper place, the mover gives it movement to-On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the apti- wards that place. Thirdly, it makes it to rest, when it shall tude, or inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is pre- have come to its proper place: since to the same cause are supposed as arising from the concupiscible faculty, which due, both rest in a place, and the movement to that place. regards good or evil absolutely. And in respect of good not The same applies to the cause of repulsion. yet obtained, we have “hope” and “despair.” In respect of Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good evil not yet present we have “fear” and “daring.” But in has, as it were, a force of attraction, while evil has a force respect of good obtained there is no irascible passion: be- of repulsion. In the first place, therefore, good causes, cause it is no longer considered in the light of something in the appetitive power, a certain inclination, aptitude or arduous, as stated above (a. 3). But evil already present connaturalness in respect of good: and this belongs to the gives rise to the passion of “anger.” passion of “love”: the corresponding contrary of which Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty is “hatred” in respect of evil. Secondly, if the good be there are three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, not yet possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement desire and aversion, joy and sadness. In like manner there towards the attainment of the good beloved: and this be- are three groups in the irascible faculty; viz. hope and de- longs to the passion of “desire” or “concupiscence”: and spair, fear and daring, and anger which has not contrary contrary to it, in respect of evil, is the passion of “aver- passion. sion” or “dislike.” Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it Consequently there are altogether eleven passions dif- causes the appetite to rest, as it were, in the good obtained: fering specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and and this belongs to the passion of “delight” or “joy”; the five in the irascible; and under these all the passions of contrary of which, in respect of evil, is “sorrow” or “sad- the soul are contained. ness.” From this the replies to the objections are evident. 715 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 24 Of Good and Evil in the Passions of the Soul (In Four Articles) We must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul? (2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil? (3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness of malice of an act? (4) Whether any passion is good or evil specifically? Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul? Ia IIae q. 24 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that no passion of the good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as soul is morally good or evil. For moral good and evil are stated above (q. 18 , a. 5). If, however, they be considered proper to man: since “morals are properly predicated of as subject to the command of the reason and will, then man,” as Ambrose says (Super Luc. Prolog.). But pas- moral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive sions are not proper to man, for he has them in common appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason with other animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is and will; and yet the movements and actions of the out- morally good or evil. ward members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they Objection 2. Further, the good or evil of man con- are voluntary. Much more, therefore, may the passions, sists in “being in accord, or in disaccord with reason,” as in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Now the passions of the evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either from being soul are not in the reason, but in the sensitive appetite, as commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the stated above (q. 22, a. 3). Therefore they have no connec- will. tion with human, i.e. moral, good or evil. Reply to Objection 1. These passions, considered in Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, themselves, are common to man and other animals: but, 5) that “we are neither praised nor blamed for our pas- as commanded by the reason, they are proper to man. sions.” But we are praised and blamed for moral good Reply to Objection 2. Even the lower appetitive pow- and evil. Therefore the passions are not morally good or ers are called rational, in so far as “they partake of reason evil. in some sort” (Ethic. i, 13). On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) Reply to Objection 3. The Philosopher says that we while speaking of the passions of the soul: “They are evil are neither praised nor blamed for our passions consid- if our love is evil; good if our love is good.” ered absolutely; but he does not exclude their becoming I answer that, We may consider the passions of the worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they are subordi- soul in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being nate to reason. Hence he continues: “For the man who subject to the command of the reason and will. If then the fears or is angry, is not praised. . . or blamed, but the man passions be considered in themselves, to wit, as move- who is angry in a certain way, i.e. according to, or against ments of the irrational appetite, thus there is no moral reason.” Whether every passion of the soul is evil morally? Ia IIae q. 24 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that all the passions of the ii, 22) that “movement in accord with nature is an ac- soul are morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, tion, but movement contrary to nature is passion.” But 4) that “some call the soul’s passions diseases or distur- in movements of the soul, what is against nature is sinful bances of the soul”∗. But every disease or disturbance of and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere (De Fide Orth. the soul is morally evil. Therefore every passion of the ii, 4) that “the devil turned from that which is in accord soul is evil morally. with nature to that which is against nature.” Therefore Objection 2. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. these passions are morally evil. ∗ Those things which the Greeks call pathe, we prefer to call disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5) 716 Objection 3. Further, whatever leads to sin, has an as-are unsound are wanting in sense.” Hence we speak of pect of evil. But these passions lead to sin: wherefore they those who are wanting in sense of being “unsound.” are called “the passions of sins” (Rom. 7:5). Therefore it On the other hand, the Peripatetics give the name of seems that they are morally evil. “passions” to all the movements of the sensitive appetite. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) Wherefore they esteem them good, when they are con- that “all these emotions are right in those whose love is trolled by reason; and evil when they are not controlled rightly placed. . . For they fear to sin, they desire to perse- by reason. Hence it is evident that Cicero was wrong in vere; they grieve for sin, they rejoice in good works.” disapproving (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) of the Peripatetic I answer that, On this question the opinion of the Sto- theory of a mean in the passions, when he says that “ev- ics differed from that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics ery evil, though moderate, should be shunned; for, just as held that all passions are evil, while the Peripatetics main- a body, though it be moderately ailing, is not sound; so, tained that moderate passions are good. This difference, this mean in the diseases or passions of the soul, is not although it appears great in words, is nevertheless, in re- sound.” For passions are not called “diseases” or “distur- ality, none at all, or but little, if we consider the intent of bances” of the soul, save when they are not controlled by either school. For the Stoics did not discern between sense reason. and intellect; and consequently neither between the intel- Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident. lectual and sensitive appetite. Hence they did not discrim- Reply to Objection 2. In every passion there is an in- inate the passions of the soul from the movements of the crease or decrease in the natural movement of the heart, will, in so far as the passions of the soul are in the sensitive according as the heart is moved more or less intensely by appetite, while the simple movements of the will are in the contraction and dilatation; and hence it derives the charac- intellectual appetite: but every rational movement of the ter of passion. But there is no need for passion to deviate appetitive part they call will, while they called passion, a always from the order of natural reason. movement that exceeds the limits of reason. Wherefore Reply to Objection 3. The passions of the soul, in so Cicero, following their opinion (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) far as they are contrary to the order of reason, incline us calls all passions “diseases of the soul”: whence he argues to sin: but in so far as they are controlled by reason, they that “those who are diseased are unsound; and those who pertain to virtue. Whether passion increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act? Ia IIae q. 24 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that every passion de- 5) that “the passion of pity is obedient to reason, when creases the goodness of a moral action. For anything pity is bestowed without violating right, as when the poor that hinders the judgment of reason, on which depends are relieved, or the penitent forgiven.” But nothing that the goodness of a moral act, consequently decreases the is obedient to reason lessens the moral good. Therefore a goodness of the moral act. But every passion hinders the passion of the soul does not lessen moral good. judgment of reason: for Sallust says (Catilin.): “All those I answer that, As the Stoics held that every passion of that take counsel about matters of doubt, should be free the soul is evil, they consequently held that every passion from hatred, anger, friendship and pity.” Therefore pas- of the soul lessens the goodness of an act; since the ad- sion decreases the goodness of a moral act. mixture of evil either destroys good altogether, or makes Objection 2. Further, the more a man’s action is like it to be less good. And this is true indeed, if by passions to God, the better it is: hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:1): we understand none but the inordinate movements of the “Be ye followers of God, as most dear children.” But sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances or ailments. “God and the holy angels feel no anger when they pun- But if we give the name of passions to all the movements ish. . . no fellow-feeling with misery when they relieve the of the sensitive appetite, then it belongs to the perfection unhappy,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). There- of man’s good that his passions be moderated by reason. fore it is better to do such like deeds without than with a For since man’s good is founded on reason as its root, passion of the soul. that good will be all the more perfect, according as it ex- Objection 3. Further, just as moral evil depends on tends to more things pertaining to man. Wherefore no its relation to reason, so also does moral good. But moral one questions the fact that it belongs to the perfection of evil is lessened by passion: for he sins less, who sins from moral good, that the actions of the outward members be passion, than he who sins deliberately. Therefore he does controlled by the law of reason. Hence, since the sensitive a better deed, who does well without passion, than he who appetite can obey reason, as stated above (q. 17, a. 7), it does with passion. belongs to the perfection of moral or human good, that the On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, passions themselves also should be controlled by reason. 717 Accordingly just as it is better that man should both part also follows that movement: and thus the passion that will good and do it in his external act; so also does it be- results in consequence, in the sensitive appetite, is a sign long to the perfection of moral good, that man should be of the intensity of the will, and so indicates greater moral moved unto good, not only in respect of his will, but also goodness. Secondly, by way of choice; when, to wit, a in respect of his sensitive appetite; according to Ps. 83:3: man, by the judgment of his reason, chooses to be affected “My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God”: by a passion in order to work more promptly with the co- where by “heart” we are to understand the intellectual ap- operation of the sensitive appetite. And thus a passion of petite, and by “flesh” the sensitive appetite. the soul increases the goodness of an action. Reply to Objection 1. The passions of the soul may Reply to Objection 2. In God and the angels there stand in a twofold relation to the judgment of reason. is no sensitive appetite, nor again bodily members: and First, antecedently: and thus, since they obscure the judg- so in them good does not depend on the right ordering of ment of reason, on which the goodness of the moral act passions or of bodily actions, as it does in us. depends, they diminish the goodness of the act; for it is Reply to Objection 3. A passion that tends to evil, more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judg- and precedes the judgment of reason, diminishes sin; but ment of reason than from the mere passion of pity. In the if it be consequent in either of the ways mentioned above second place, consequently: and this in two ways. First, (Reply obj. 1), it aggravates the sin, or else it is a sign of by way of redundance: because, to wit, when the higher its being more grievous. part of the soul is intensely moved to anything, the lower Whether any passion is good or evil in its species? Ia IIae q. 24 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that no passion of the soul view. First, according to its natural genus; and thus moral is good or evil morally according to its species. Because good and evil have no connection with the species of an moral good and evil depend on reason. But the passions act or passion. Secondly, according to its moral genus, are in the sensitive appetite; so that accordance with rea- inasmuch as it is voluntary and controlled by reason. In son is accidental to them. Since, therefore, nothing acci- this way moral good and evil can belong to the species of dental belongs to a thing’s species, it seems that no pas- a passion, in so far as the object to which a passion tends, sion is good or evil according to its species. is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with reason: as is Objection 2. Further, acts and passions take their clear in the case of “shame” which is base fear; and of species from their object. If, therefore, any passion were “envy” which is sorrow for another’s good: for thus pas- good or evil, according to its species, it would follow that sions belong to the same species as the external act. those passions the object of which is good, are specifically Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers the good, such as love, desire and joy: and that those passions, passions in their natural species, in so far as the sensitive the object of which is evil, are specifically evil, as hatred, appetite is considered in itself. But in so far as the sen- fear and sadness. But this is clearly false. Therefore no sitive appetite obeys reason, good and evil of reason are passion is good or evil according to its species. no longer accidentally in the passions of the appetite, but Objection 3. Further, there is no species of passion essentially. that is not to be found in other animals. But moral good is Reply to Objection 2. Passions having a tendency in man alone. Therefore no passion of the soul is good or to good, are themselves good, if they tend to that which evil according to its species. is truly good, and in like manner, if they turn away from On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, that which is truly evil. On the other hand, those passions 5) that “pity is a kind of virtue.” Moreover, the Philoso- which consist in aversion from good, and a tendency to pher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that modesty is a praiseworthy pas- evil, are themselves evil. sion. Therefore some passions are good or evil according Reply to Objection 3. In irrational animals the sen- to their species. sitive appetite does not obey reason. Nevertheless, in so I answer that, We ought, seemingly, to apply to pas- far as they are led by a kind of estimative power, which is sions what has been said in regard to acts (q. 18, Aa. 5,6; subject to a higher, i.e. the Divine reason, there is a cer- q. 20, a. 1)—viz. that the species of a passion, as the tain likeness of moral good in them, in regard to the soul’s species of an act, can be considered from two points of passions. 718 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 25 Of the Order of the Passions to One Another (In Four Articles) We must now consider the order of the passions to one another: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) The relation of the irascible passions to the concupiscible passions; (2) The relation of the concupiscible passions to one another; (3) The relation of the irascible passions to one another; (4) The four principal passions. Whether the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions, or vice versa? Ia IIae q. 25 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the irascible passions good, it is evident that in the order of execution, the iras- precede the concupiscible passions. For the order of the cible passions take precedence of such like passions of the passions is that of their objects. But the object of the iras- concupiscible faculty: thus hope precedes joy, and hence cible faculty is the difficult good, which seems to be the causes it, according to the Apostle (Rom. 12:12): “Re- highest good. Therefore the irascible passions seem to joicing in hope.” But the concupiscible passion which de- precede the concupiscible passions. notes rest in evil, viz. sadness, comes between two iras- Objection 2. Further, the mover precedes that which cible passions: because it follows fear; since we become is moved. But the irascible faculty is compared to the sad when we are confronted by the evil that we feared: concupiscible, as mover to that which is moved: since it while it precedes the movement of anger; since the move- is given to animals, for the purposed of removing the ob- ment of self-vindication, that results from sadness, is the stacles that hinder the concupiscible faculty from enjoy- movement of anger. And because it is looked upon as a ing its object, as stated above (q. 23, a. 1, ad 1; Ia, q. 81, good thing to pay back the evil done to us; when the an- a. 2 ). Now “that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of gry man has achieved this he rejoices. Thus it is evident mover” (Phys. viii, 4). Therefore the irascible passions that every passion of the irascible faculty terminates in a precede the concupiscible passions. concupiscible passion denoting rest, viz. either in joy or Objection 3. Further, joy and sadness are concupis- in sadness. cible passions. But joy and sadness succeed to the iras- But if we compare the irascible passions to those con- cible passions: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) cupiscible passions that denote movement, then it is clear that“retaliation causes anger to cease, because it produces that the latter take precedence: because the passions of pleasure instead of the previous pain.” Therefore the con- the irascible faculty add something to those of the con- cupiscible passions follow the irascible passions. cupiscible faculty; just as the object of the irascible adds On the contrary, The concupiscible passions regard the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the object of the the absolute good, while the irascible passions regard a concupiscible faculty. Thus hope adds to desire a certain restricted, viz. the difficult, good. Since, therefore, the effort, and a certain raising of the spirits to the realization absolute good precedes the restricted good, it seems that of the arduous good. In like manner fear adds to aversion the concupiscible passions precede the irascible. or detestation a certain lowness of spirits, on account of I answer that, In the concupiscible passions there is difficulty in shunning the evil. more diversity than in the passions of the irascible fac- Accordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand ulty. For in the former we find something relating to between those concupiscible passions that denote move- movement—e.g. desire; and something belonging to re- ment towards good or evil, and those concupiscible pas- pose, e.g. joy and sadness. But in the irascible passions sions that denote rest in good or evil. And it is therefore there is nothing pertaining to repose, and only that which evident that the irascible passions both arise from and ter- belongs to movement. The reason of this is that when we minate in the passions of the concupiscible faculty. find rest in a thing, we no longer look upon it as some- Reply to Objection 1. This argument would prove, if thing difficult or arduous; whereas such is the object of the formal object of the concupiscible faculty were some- the irascible faculty. thing contrary to the arduous, just as the formal object Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in of the irascible faculty is that which is arduous. But be- the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. cause the object of the concupiscible faculty is good abso- If, therefore, we compare the passions of the irascible fac- lutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as ulty with those concupiscible passions that denote rest in the common precedes the proper. 719 Reply to Objection 2. The remover of an obsta- stacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its cle is not a direct but an accidental mover: and here we object. Wherefore it only follows that the irascible pas- are speaking of passions as directly related to one an- sions precede those concupiscible passions that connote other. Moreover, the irascible passion removes the ob- rest. The third object leads to the same conclusion. Whether love is the first of the concupiscible passions? Ia IIae q. 25 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that love is not the first tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or pro- of the concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible fac- portion to that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate ulty is so called from concupiscence, which is the same end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in passion as desire. But “things are named from their chief the end, after having attained it. And this very aptitude or characteristic” (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore desire takes proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is com- precedence of love. placency in good; while movement towards good is desire Objection 2. Further, love implies a certain union; or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure. Ac- since it is a “uniting and binding force,” as Dionysius cordingly in this order, love precedes desire, and desire says (Div. Nom. iv). But concupiscence or desire is a precedes pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the movement towards union with the thing coveted or de- reverse: because the pleasure intended causes desire and sired. Therefore desire precedes love. love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which Objection 3. Further, the cause precedes its effect. enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is, But pleasure is sometimes the cause of love: since some as stated above (q. 11, a. 3, ad 3). love on account of pleasure (Ethic. viii, 3,4). Therefore Reply to Objection 1. We name a thing as we under- pleasure precedes love; and consequently love is not the stand it, for “words are signs of thoughts,” as the Philoso- first of the concupiscible passions. pher states (Peri Herm. i, 1). Now in most cases we On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love, when 7,9) that all the passions are caused by love: since “love the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure: when it is yearning for the beloved object, is desire; and, having and not possessed, it is desire or concupiscence: and, as Au- enjoying it, is joy.” Therefore love is the first of the con- gustine says (De Trin. x, 12), “we are more sensible to cupiscible passions. love, when we lack that which we love.” Consequently of I answer that, Good and evil are the object of the all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence is felt most; concupiscible faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil; and for this reason the power is named after it. since evil is privation of good. Wherefore all the passions, Reply to Objection 2. The union of lover and beloved the object of which is good, are naturally before those, the is twofold. There is real union, consisting in the conjunc- object of which is evil—that is to say, each precedes its tion of one with the other. This union belongs to joy or contrary passion: because the quest of a good is the rea- pleasure, which follows desire. There is also an affective son for shunning the opposite evil. union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, in so far as Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is in- one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for deed first in the order of intention, but last in the order and an inclination to another, partakes of it: and love be- of execution. Consequently the order of the concupiscible tokens such a union. This union precedes the movement passions can be considered either in the order of intention of desire. or in the order of execution. In the order of execution, Reply to Objection 3. Pleasure causes love, in so far the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the as it precedes love in the order of intention. thing that tends to the end. Now it is evident that whatever Whether hope is the first of the irascible passions? Ia IIae q. 25 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that hope is not the first strive to overcome a contrary evil that threatens soon to of the irascible passions. Because the irascible faculty overtake us, which pertains to daring; or an evil actually is denominated from anger. Since, therefore, “things are present, which pertains to anger; than to strive simply to names from their chief characteristic” (cf. a. 2, obj. 1), it obtain some good. Again, it seems more arduous to strive seems that anger precedes and surpasses hope. to overcome a present evil, than a future evil. Therefore Objection 2. Further, the object of the irascible fac- anger seems to be a stronger passion than daring, and dar- ulty is something arduous. Now it seems more arduous to ing, than hope. And consequently it seems that hope does 720 not precede them. naturally precede fear and daring is evident from this— Objection 3. Further, when a thing is moved towards that as the desire of good is the reason for avoiding evil, an end, the movement of withdrawal precedes the move- so hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring: ment of approach. But fear and despair imply withdrawal because daring arises from the hope of victory, and fear from something; while daring and hope imply approach arises from the despair of overcoming. Lastly, anger arises towards something. Therefore fear and despair precede from daring: for no one is angry while seeking vengeance, hope and daring. unless he dare to avenge himself, as Avicenna observes in On the contrary, The nearer a thing is to the first, the the sixth book of his Physics. Accordingly, it is evident more it precedes others. But hope is nearer to love, which that hope is the first of all the irascible passions. is the first of the passions. Therefore hope is the first of And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the passions in the irascible faculty. the way of generation, love and hatred are first; desire and I answer that, As stated above (a. 1) all irascible aversion, second; hope and despair, third; fear and daring, passions imply movement towards something. Now this fourth; anger, fifth; sixth and last, joy and sadness, which movement of the irascible faculty towards something may follow from all the passions, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5: yet so be due to two causes: one is the mere aptitude or propor-that love precedes hatred; desire precedes aversion; hope tion to the end; and this pertains to love or hatred, those precedes despair; fear precedes daring; and joy precedes whose object is good, or evil; and this belongs to sadness sadness, as may be gathered from what has been stated or joy. As a matter of fact, the presence of good produces above. no passion in the irascible, as stated above (q. 23, Aa. 3,4); Reply to Objection 1. Because anger arises from the but the presence of evil gives rise to the passion of anger. other passions, as an effect from the causes that precede Since then in order of generation or execution, propor- it, it is from anger, as being more manifest than the other tion or aptitude to the end precedes the achievement of the passions, that the power takes its name. end; it follows that, of all the irascible passions, anger is Reply to Objection 2. It is not the arduousness but the last in the order of generation. And among the other the good that is the reason for approach or desire. Con- passions of the irascible faculty, which imply a movement sequently hope, which regards good more directly, takes arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those whose precedence: although at times daring or even anger re- object is good, viz. hope and despair, must naturally pre- gards something more arduous. cede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet Reply to Objection 3. The movement of the appetite so that hope precedes despair; since hope is a movement is essentially and directly towards the good as towards its towards good as such, which is essentially attractive, so proper object; its movement from evil results from this. that hope tends to good directly; whereas despair is a For the movement of the appetitive part is in proportion, movement away from good, a movement which is con- not to natural movement, but to the intention of nature, sistent with good, not as such, but in respect of something which intends the end before intending the removal of a else, wherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as contrary, which removal is desired only for the sake of it were. In like manner fear, through being a movement obtaining the end. from evil, precedes daring. And that hope and despair Whether these are the four principal passions: joy, sadness, hope and fear? Ia IIae q. 25 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that joy, sadness, hope so fear is caused by despair. Either, therefore, hope and and fear are not the four principal passions. For Augus- despair should be reckoned as principal passions, since tine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,[7] sqq.) omits hope and puts they cause others: or hope and daring, from being akin to desire in its place. one another. Objection 2. Further, there is a twofold order in the On the contrary, Boethius (De Consol. i) in enumer- passions of the soul: the order of intention, and the order ating the four principal passions, says: of execution or generation. The principal passions should “Banish joys: banish fears: therefore be taken, either in the order of intention; and Away with hope: away with tears.” thus joy and sadness, which are the final passions, will be I answer that, These four are commonly called the the principal passions; or in the order of execution or gen- principal passions. Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are eration, and thus love will be the principal passion. There- said to be principal because in them all the other passions fore joy and sadness, hope and fear should in no way be have their completion and end; wherefore they arise from called the four principal passions. all the other passions, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Fear and Objection 3. Further, just as daring is caused by hope, hope are principal passions, not because they complete the 721 others simply, but because they complete them as regards the same object, viz. some future good. the movement of the appetite towards something: for in Reply to Objection 2. These are called principal respect of good, movement begins in love, goes forward passions, in the order of intention and completion. And to desire, and ends in hope; while in respect of evil, it though fear and hope are not the last passions simply, yet begins in hatred, goes on to aversion, and ends in fear. they are the last of those passions that tend towards some- Hence it is customary to distinguish these four passions thing as future. Nor can the argument be pressed any fur- in relation to the present and the future: for movement ther except in the case of anger: yet neither can anger be regards the future, while rest is in something present: so reckoned a principal passion, because it is an effect of dar- that joy relates to present good, sadness relates to present ing, which cannot be a principal passion, as we shall state evil; hope regards future good, and fear, future evil. further on (Reply obj. 3). As to the other passions that regard good or evil, Reply to Objection 3. Despair implies movement present or future, they all culminate in these four. For away from good; and this is, as it were, accidental: and this reason some have said that these four are the princi- daring implies movement towards evil; and this too is pal passions, because they are general passions; and this accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal pas- is true, provided that by hope and fear we understand the sions; because that which is accidental cannot be said to appetite’s common tendency to desire or shun something. be principal. And so neither can anger be called a princi- Reply to Objection 1. Augustine puts desire or cov- pal passion, because it arises from daring. etousness in place of hope, in so far as they seem to regard 722 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 26 Of the Passions of the Soul in Particular: And First, of Love (In Four Articles) We have now to consider the soul’s passions in particular, and (1) the passions of the concupiscible faculty; (2) the passions of the irascible faculty. The first of these considerations will be threefold: since we shall consider (1) Love and hatred; (2) Desire and aversion; (3) Pleasure and sadness. Concerning love, three points must be considered: (1) Love itself; (2) The cause of love; (3) The effects of love. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether love is in the concupiscible power? (2) Whether love is a passion? (3) Whether love is the same as dilection? (4) Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence? Whether love is in the concupiscible power? Ia IIae q. 26 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that love is not in the but from necessity and not from free-will. Such is, in ir- concupiscible power. For it is written (Wis. 8:2): “Her,” rational animals, the “sensitive appetite,” which, however, namely wisdom, “have I loved, and have sought her out in man, has a certain share of liberty, in so far as it obeys from my youth.” But the concupiscible power, being reason. Again, there is another appetite following freely a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot tend to wisdom, from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite. And which is not apprehended by the senses. Therefore love is this is the rational or intellectual appetite, which is called not in the concupiscible power. the “will.” Objection 2. Further, love seems to be identified with Now in each of these appetites, the name “love” is every passion: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7): given to the principle movement towards the end loved. In “Love, yearning for the object beloved, is desire; having the natural appetite the principle of this movement is the and enjoying it, is joy; fleeing what is contrary to it, is appetitive subject’s connaturalness with the thing to which fear; and feeling what is contrary to it, is sadness.” But it tends, and may be called “natural love”: thus the con- not every passion is in the concupiscible power; indeed, naturalness of a heavy body for the centre, is by reason of fear, which is mentioned in this passage, is in the irascible its weight and may be called “natural love.” In like man- power. Therefore we must not say absolutely that love is ner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will to in the concupiscible power. some good, that is to say, its very complacency in good is Objection 3. Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) men- called “sensitive love,” or “intellectual” or “rational love.” tions a “natural love.” But natural love seems to pertain So that sensitive love is in the sensitive appetite, just as rather to the natural powers, which belong to the vegetal intellectual love is in the intellectual appetite. And it be- soul. Therefore love is not simply in the concupiscible longs to the concupiscible power, because it regards good power. absolutely, and not under the aspect of difficulty, which is On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) the object of the irascible faculty. that “love is in the concupiscible power.” Reply to Objection 1. The words quoted refer to in- I answer that, Love is something pertaining to the tellectual or rational love. appetite; since good is the object of both. Wherefore love Reply to Objection 2. Love is spoken of as being fear, differs according to the difference of appetites. For there joy, desire and sadness, not essentially but causally. is an appetite which arises from an apprehension existing, Reply to Objection 3. Natural love is not only in the not in the subject of the appetite, but in some other: and powers of the vegetal soul, but in all the soul’s powers, this is called the “natural appetite.” Because natural things and also in all the parts of the body, and universally in seek what is suitable to them according to their nature, by all things: because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), reason of an apprehension which is not in them, but in the “Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things”; since Author of their nature, as stated in the Ia, q. 6, a. 1, ad 2; each single thing has a connaturalness with that which is Ia, q. 103, a. 1, ad 1,3. And there is another appetite aris- naturally suitable to it. ing from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite, 723 Whether love is a passion? Ia IIae q. 26 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that love is not a passion. ject moves the appetite, introducing itself, as it were, into For no power is a passion. But every love is a power, as its intention; while the appetite moves towards the real- Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore love is not a ization of the appetible object, so that the movement ends passion. where it began. Accordingly, the first change wrought in Objection 2. Further, love is a kind of union or bond, the appetite by the appetible object is called “love,” and as Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10). But a union or bond is nothing else than complacency in that object; and from is not a passion, but rather a relation. Therefore love is not this complacency results a movement towards that same a passion. object, and this movement is “desire”; and lastly, there Objection 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. is rest which is “joy.” Since, therefore, love consists in ii, 22) that passion is a movement. But love does not imply a change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object, the movement of the appetite; for this is desire, of which it is evident that love is a passion: properly so called, ac- movement love is the principle. Therefore love is not a cording as it is in the concupiscible faculty; in a wider and passion. extended sense, according as it is in the will. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, Reply to Objection 1. Since power denotes a princi- 5) that “love is a passion.” ple of movement or action, Dionysius calls love a power, I answer that, Passion is the effect of the agent on in so far as it is a principle of movement in the appetite. the patient. Now a natural agent produces a twofold effect Reply to Objection 2. Union belongs to love in so far on the patient: for in the first place it gives it the form; as by reason of the complacency of the appetite, the lover and secondly it gives it the movement that results from stands in relation to that which he loves, as though it were the form. Thus the generator gives the generated body himself or part of himself. Hence it is clear that love is both weight and the movement resulting from weight: so not the very relation of union, but that union is a result of that weight, from being the principle of movement to the love. Hence, too, Dionysius says that “love is a unitive place, which is connatural to that body by reason of its force” (Div. Nom. iv), and the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, weight, can, in a way, be called “natural love.” In the same 1) that union is the work of love. way the appetible object gives the appetite, first, a certain Reply to Objection 3. Although love does not denote adaptation to itself, which consists in complacency in that the movement of the appetite in tending towards the ap- object; and from this follows movement towards the ap- petible object, yet it denotes that movement whereby the petible object. For “the appetitive movement is circular,” appetite is changed by the appetible object, so as to have as stated in De Anima iii, 10; because the appetible ob- complacency therein. Whether love is the same as dilection? Ia IIae q. 26 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that love is the same as On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) dilection. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that love that “some holy men have held that love means something is to dilection, “as four is to twice two, and as a rectilin- more Godlike than dilection does.” ear figure is to one composed of straight lines.” But these I answer that, We find four words referring in a way, have the same meaning. Therefore love and dilection de- to the same thing: viz. love, dilection, charity and friend- note the same thing. ship. They differ, however, in this, that “friendship,” ac- Objection 2. Further, the movements of the appetite cording to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5), “is like a habit,” differ by reason of their objects. But the objects of dilec- whereas “love” and “dilection” are expressed by way of tion and love are the same. Therefore these are the same. act or passion; and “charity” can be taken either way. Objection 3. Further, if dilection and love differ, it Moreover these three express act in different ways. seems that it is chiefly in the fact that “dilection refers to For love has a wider signification than the others, since good things, love to evil things, as some have maintained,” every dilection or charity is love, but not vice versa. Be- according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7). But they do cause dilection implies, in addition to love, a choice [elec- not differ thus; because as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei tionem] made beforehand, as the very word denotes: and xiv, 7) the holy Scripture uses both words in reference to therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power, but either good or bad things. Therefore love and dilection only in the will, and only in the rational nature. Charity do not differ: thus indeed Augustine concludes (De Civ. denotes, in addition to love, a certain perfection of love, Dei xiv, 7) that “it is not one thing to speak of love, and in so far as that which is loved is held to be of great price, another to speak of dilection.” 724 as the word itself implies∗. love.” However, the fact that love, which is concupisci- Reply to Objection 1. Dionysius is speaking of love ble passion, inclines many to evil, is the reason why some and dilection, in so far as they are in the intellectual ap- assigned the difference spoken of. petite; for thus love is the same as dilection. Reply to Objection 4. The reason why some held Reply to Objection 2. The object of love is more gen- that, even when applied to the will itself, the word “love” eral than the object of dilection: because love extends to signifies something more Godlike than “dilection,” was more than dilection does, as stated above. because love denotes a passion, especially in so far as it Reply to Objection 3. Love and dilection differ, not is in the sensitive appetite; whereas dilection presupposes in respect of good and evil, but as stated. Yet in the in- the judgment of reason. But it is possible for man to tend tellectual faculty love is the same as dilection. And it to God by love, being as it were passively drawn by Him, is in this sense that Augustine speaks of love in the pas- more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his reason, sage quoted: hence a little further on he adds that “a right which pertains to the nature of dilection, as stated above. will is well-directed love, and a wrong will is ill-directed And consequently love is more Godlike than dilection. Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence? Ia IIae q. 26 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that love is not properly and towards that to which he wishes some good. Accord- divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence. ingly, man has love of concupiscence towards the good For “love is a passion, while friendship is a habit,” accord- that he wishes to another, and love of friendship towards ing to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). But habit cannot be him to whom he wishes good. the member of a division of passions. Therefore love is Now the members of this division are related as pri- not properly divided into love of concupiscence and love mary and secondary: since that which is loved with the of friendship. love of friendship is loved simply and for itself; whereas Objection 2. Further, a thing cannot be divided by an- that which is loved with the love of concupiscence, is other member of the same division; for man is not a mem- loved, not simply and for itself, but for something else. ber of the same division as “animal.” But concupiscence For just as that which has existence, is a being simply, is a member of the same division as love, as a passion dis- while that which exists in another is a relative being; so, tinct from love. Therefore concupiscence is not a division because good is convertible with being, the good, which of love. itself has goodness, is good simply; but that which is an- Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher other’s good, is a relative good. Consequently the love (Ethic. viii, 3) friendship is threefold, that which is with which a thing is loved, that it may have some good, founded on “usefulness,” that which is founded on “plea- is love simply; while the love, with which a thing is loved, sure,” and that which is founded on “goodness.” But use- that it may be another’s good, is relative love. ful and pleasant friendship are not without concupiscence. Reply to Objection 1. Love is not divided into friend- Therefore concupiscence should not be contrasted with ship and concupiscence, but into love of friendship, and friendship. love of concupiscence. For a friend is, properly speaking, On the contrary, We are said to love certain things, one to whom we wish good: while we are said to desire, because we desire them: thus “a man is said to love wine, what we wish for ourselves. on account of its sweetness which he desires”; as stated Hence the Reply to the Second Objection. in Topic. ii, 3. But we have no friendship for wine and Reply to Objection 3. When friendship is based on suchlike things, as stated in Ethic. viii, 2. Therefore love usefulness or pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend of concupiscence is distinct from love of friendship. some good: and in this respect the character of friendship I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4), is preserved. But since he refers this good further to his “to love is to wish good to someone.” Hence the move- own pleasure or use, the result is that friendship of the ment of love has a twofold tendency: towards the good useful or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with love of which a man wishes to someone (to himself or to another) concupiscence, loses the character to true friendship. ∗ Referring to the Latin “carus” (dear) 725 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 27 Of the Cause of Love (In Four Articles) We must now consider the cause of love: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether good is the only cause of love? (2) Whether knowledge is a cause of love? (3) Whether likeness is a cause of love? (4) Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love? Whether good is the only cause of love? Ia IIae q. 27 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that good is not the only in some respect, and is considered as being good simply. cause of love. For good does not cause love, except be- And thus a certain love is evil, in so far as it tends to that cause it is loved. But it happens that evil also is loved, which is not simply a true good. It is in this way that man according to Ps. 10:6: “He that loveth iniquity, hateth his “loves iniquity,” inasmuch as, by means of iniquity, some own soul”: else, every love would be good. Therefore good is gained; pleasure, for instance, or money, or such good is not the only cause of love. like. Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. Reply to Objection 2. Those who acknowledge their ii, 4) that “we love those who acknowledge their evils.” evils, are beloved, not for their evils, but because they Therefore it seems that evil is the cause of love. acknowledge them, for it is a good thing to acknowl- Objection 3. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) edge one’s faults, in so far as it excludes insincerity or that not “the good” only but also “the beautiful is beloved hypocrisy. by all.” Reply to Objection 3. The beautiful is the same as On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 3): the good, and they differ in aspect only. For since good “Assuredly the good alone is beloved.” Therefore good is what all seek, the notion of good is that which calms alone is the cause of love. the desire; while the notion of the beautiful is that which I answer that, As stated above (q. 26, a. 1), Love be- calms the desire, by being seen or known. Consequently longs to the appetitive power which is a passive faculty. those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the Wherefore its object stands in relation to it as the cause most cognitive, viz. sight and hearing, as ministering of its movement or act. Therefore the cause of love must to reason; for we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful needs be love’s object. Now the proper object of love is sounds. But in reference to the other objects of the other the good; because, as stated above (q. 26, Aa. 1,2), love senses, we do not use the expression “beautiful,” for we implies a certain connaturalness or complacency of the do not speak of beautiful tastes, and beautiful odors. Thus lover for the thing beloved, and to everything, that thing it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to the is a good, which is akin and proportionate to it. It follows, cognitive faculty: so that “good” means that which simply therefore, that good is the proper cause of love. pleases the appetite; while the “beautiful” is something Reply to Objection 1. Evil is never loved except un- pleasant to apprehend. der the aspect of good, that is to say, in so far as it is good Whether knowledge is a cause of love? Ia IIae q. 27 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that knowledge is not a things are loved more than they are known: thus in this cause of love. For it is due to love that a thing is sought. life God can be loved in Himself, but cannot be known in But some things are sought without being known, for in- Himself. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love. stance, the sciences; for since “to have them is the same Objection 3. Further, if knowledge were the cause of as to know them,” as Augustine says (Qq. 83, qu. 35), if love, there would be no love, where there is no knowl- we knew them we should have them, and should not seek edge. But in all things there is love, as Dionysius says them. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love. (Div. Nom. iv); whereas there is not knowledge in all Objection 2. Further, to love what we know not seems things. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love. like loving something more than we know it. But some On the contrary, Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1,2) 726 that “none can love what he does not know.” ity are united, and to unite together, after a fashion, things I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), good is the that are distinct, by comparing one with another. Con- cause of love, as being its object. But good is not the sequently the perfection of knowledge requires that man object of the appetite, except as apprehended. And there- should know distinctly all that is in a thing, such as its fore love demands some apprehension of the good that is parts, powers, and properties. On the other hand, love loved. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 5,12) is in the appetitive power, which regards a thing as it is says that bodily sight is the beginning of sensitive love: in itself: wherefore it suffices, for the perfection of love, and in like manner the contemplation of spiritual beauty that a thing be loved according as it is known in itself. or goodness is the beginning of spiritual love. Accord- Hence it is, therefore, that a thing is loved more than it is ingly knowledge is the cause of love for the same reason known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being as good is, which can be loved only if known. perfectly known. This is most evident in regard to the sci- Reply to Objection 1. He who seeks science, is not ences, which some love through having a certain general entirely without knowledge thereof: but knows something knowledge of them: for instance, they know that rhetoric about it already in some respect, either in a general way, is a science that enables man to persuade others; and this or in some one of its effects, or from having heard it com- is what they love in rhetoric. The same applies to the love mended, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But to have of God. it is not to know it thus, but to know it perfectly. Reply to Objection 3. Even natural love, which is Reply to Objection 2. Something is required for the in all things, is caused by a kind of knowledge, not indeed perfection of knowledge, that is not requisite for the per- existing in natural things themselves, but in Him Who cre- fection of love. For knowledge belongs to the reason, ated their nature, as stated above (q. 26, a. 1; cf. Ia, q. 6, whose function it is to distinguish things which in real- a. 1, ad 2). Whether likeness is a cause of love? Ia IIae q. 27 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that likeness is not a thing having the same quality actually: for example, two cause of love. For the same thing is not the cause of con- things possessing the quality of whiteness are said to be traries. But likeness is the cause of hatred; for it is writ- alike. Another kind of likeness arises from one thing hav- ten (Prov. 13:10) that “among the proud there are always ing potentially and by way of inclination, a quality which contentions”; and the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 1) that the other has actually: thus we may say that a heavy body “potters quarrel with one another.” Therefore likeness is existing outside its proper place is like another heavy body not a cause of love. that exists in its proper place: or again, according as po- Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, tentiality bears a resemblance to its act; since act is con- 14) that “a man loves in another that which he would not tained, in a manner, in the potentiality itself. be himself: thus he loves an actor, but would not himself Accordingly the first kind of likeness causes love of be an actor.” But it would not be so, if likeness were the friendship or well-being. For the very fact that two men proper cause of love; for in that case a man would love in are alike, having, as it were, one form, makes them to be, another, that which he possesses himself, or would like to in a manner, one in that form: thus two men are one thing possess. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love. in the species of humanity, and two white men are one Objection 3. Further, everyone loves that which he thing in whiteness. Hence the affections of one tend to needs, even if he have it not: thus a sick man loves health, the other, as being one with him; and he wishes good to and a poor man loves riches. But in so far as he needs him as to himself. But the second kind of likeness causes them and lacks them, he is unlike them. Therefore not love of concupiscence, or friendship founded on useful- only likeness but also unlikeness is a cause of love. ness or pleasure: because whatever is in potentiality, as Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. such, has the desire for its act; and it takes pleasure in its ii, 4) that “we love those who bestow money and health realization, if it be a sentient and cognitive being. on us; and also those who retain their friendship for the Now it has been stated above (q. 26, a. 4), that in the dead.” But all are not such. Therefore likeness is not a love of concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves cause of love. himself, in willing the good that he desires. But a man On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 13:19): “Every loves himself more than another: because he is one with beast loveth its like.” himself substantially, whereas with another he is one only I answer that, Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause in the likeness of some form. Consequently, if this other’s of love. But it must be observed that likeness between likeness to him arising from the participation of a form, things is twofold. One kind of likeness arises from each hinders him from gaining the good that he loves, he be- 727 comes hateful to him, not for being like him, but for hin-bears a likeness to what he loves, as potentiality bears a dering him from gaining his own good. This is why “pot- likeness to its act, as stated above. ters quarrel among themselves,” because they hinder one Reply to Objection 4. According to the same likeness another’s gain: and why “there are contentions among the of potentiality to its act, the illiberal man loves the man proud,” because they hinder one another in attaining the who is liberal, in so far as he expects from him something position they covet. which he desires. The same applies to the man who is Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident. constant in his friendship as compared to one who is in- Reply to Objection 2. Even when a man loves in an- constant. For in either case friendship seems to be based other what he loves not in himself, there is a certain like- on usefulness. We might also say that although not all ness of proportion: because as the latter is to that which men have these virtues in the complete habit, yet they have is loved in him, so is the former to that which he loves in them according to certain seminal principles in the reason, himself: for instance, if a good singer love a good writer, in force of which principles the man who is not virtuous we can see a likeness of proportion, inasmuch as each one loves the virtuous man, as being in conformity with his has that which is becoming to him in respect of his art. own natural reason. Reply to Objection 3. He that loves what he needs, Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love? Ia IIae q. 27 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that some other passion this does love consist. Therefore it is not possible for any can be the cause of love. For the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, other passion of the soul to be universally the cause of ev- 3) says that some are loved for the sake of the pleasure ery love. But it may happen that some other passion is they give. But pleasure is a passion. Therefore another the cause of some particular love: just as one good is the passion is a cause of love. cause of another. Objection 2. Further, desire is a passion. But we Reply to Objection 1. When a man loves a thing for love some because we desire to receive something from the pleasure it affords, his love is indeed caused by plea- them: as happens in every friendship based on usefulness. sure; but that very pleasure is caused, in its turn, by an- Therefore another passion is a cause of love. other preceding love; for none takes pleasure save in that Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1): which is loved in some way. “When we have no hope of getting a thing, we love it but Reply to Objection 2. Desire for a thing always pre- half-heartedly or not at all, even if we see how beautiful it supposes love for that thing. But desire of one thing can is.” Therefore hope too is a cause of love. be the cause of another thing’s being loved; thus he that On the contrary, All the other emotions of the soul desires money, for this reason loves him from whom he are caused by love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, receives it. 7,9). Reply to Objection 3. Hope causes or increases love; I answer that, There is no other passion of the soul both by reason of pleasure, because it causes pleasure; and that does not presuppose love of some kind. The reason is by reason of desire, because hope strengthens desire, since that every other passion of the soul implies either move- we do not desire so intensely that which we have no hope ment towards something, or rest in something. Now ev- of receiving. Nevertheless hope itself is of a good that is ery movement towards something, or rest in something, loved. arises from some kinship or aptness to that thing; and in 728 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 28 Of the Effects of Love (In Six Articles) We now have to consider the effects of love: under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether union is an effect of love? (2) Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love? (3) Whether ecstasy is an effect of love? (4) Whether zeal is an effect of love? (5) Whether love is a passion that is hurtful to the lover? (6) Whether love is cause of all that the lover does? Whether union is an effect of love? Ia IIae q. 28 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that union is not an effect did one say to his friend: Thou half of my soul.” of love. For absence is incompatible with union. But love The first of these unions is caused “effectively” by is compatible with absence; for the Apostle says (Gal. love; because love moves man to desire and seek the pres- 4:18): “Be zealous for that which is good in a good thing ence of the beloved, as of something suitable and belong- always” (speaking of himself, according to a gloss), “and ing to him. The second union is caused “formally” by not only when I am present with you.” Therefore union is love; because love itself is this union or bond. In this sense not an effect of love. Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10) that “love is a vital prin- Objection 2. Further, every union is either according ciple uniting, or seeking to unite two together, the lover, to essence, thus form is united to matter, accident to sub- to wit, and the beloved.” For in describing it as “uniting” ject, and a part to the whole, or to another part in order he refers to the union of affection, without which there is to make up the whole: or according to likeness, in genus, no love: and in saying that “it seeks to unite,” he refers to species, or accident. But love does not cause union of real union. essence; else love could not be between things essentially Reply to Objection 1. This argument is true of real distinct. On the other hand, love does not cause union of union. That is necessary to pleasure as being its cause; likeness, but rather is caused by it, as stated above (q. 27, desire implies the real absence of the beloved: but love a. 3). Therefore union is not an effect of love. remains whether the beloved be absent or present. Objection 3. Further, the sense in act is the sensible Reply to Objection 2. Union has a threefold relation in act, and the intellect in act is the thing actually under- to love. There is union which causes love; and this is sub- stood. But the lover in act is not the beloved in act. There- stantial union, as regards the love with which one loves fore union is the effect of knowledge rather than of love. oneself; while as regards the love wherewith one loves On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that other things, it is the union of likeness, as stated above every love is a “unitive love.” (q. 27, a. 3). There is also a union which is essentially I answer that, The union of lover and beloved is love itself. This union is according to a bond of affection, twofold. The first is real union; for instance, when the and is likened to substantial union, inasmuch as the lover beloved is present with the lover. The second is union stands to the object of his love, as to himself, if it be love of affection: and this union must be considered in rela- of friendship; as to something belonging to himself, if it tion to the preceding apprehension; since movement of the be love of concupiscence. Again there is a union, which is appetite follows apprehension. Now love being twofold, the effect of love. This is real union, which the lover seeks viz. love of concupiscence and love of friendship; each with the object of his love. Moreover this union is in keep- of these arises from a kind of apprehension of the one- ing with the demands of love: for as the Philosopher re- ness of the thing loved with the lover. For when we love lates (Polit. ii, 1), “Aristophanes stated that lovers would a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to wish to be united both into one,” but since “this would our well-being. In like manner when a man loves another result in either one or both being destroyed,” they seek a with the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as suitable and becoming union—to live together, speak to- he wills good to himself: wherefore he apprehends him as gether, and be united together in other like things. his other self, in so far, to wit, as he wills good to him as Reply to Objection 3. Knowledge is perfected by to himself. Hence a friend is called a man’s “other self” the thing known being united, through its likeness, to the (Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), “Well knower. But the effect of love is that the thing itself which 729 is loved, is, in a way, united to the lover, as stated above. which is caused by knowledge. Consequently the union caused by love is closer than that Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love? Ia IIae q. 28 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that love does not cause from any extrinsic cause (as when we desire one thing on mutual indwelling, so that the lover be in the beloved and account of another, or wish good to another on account vice versa. For that which is in another is contained in it. of something else), but because the complacency in the But the same cannot be container and contents. Therefore beloved is rooted in the lover’s heart. For this reason we love cannot cause mutual indwelling, so that the lover be speak of love as being “intimate”; and “of the bowels of in the beloved and vice versa. charity.” On the other hand, the lover is in the beloved, Objection 2. Further, nothing can penetrate within a by the love of concupiscence and by the love of friend- whole, except by means of a division of the whole. But it ship, but not in the same way. For the love of concupis- is the function of the reason, not of the appetite where love cence is not satisfied with any external or superficial pos- resides, to divide things that are really united. Therefore session or enjoyment of the beloved; but seeks to possess mutual indwelling is not an effect of love. the beloved perfectly, by penetrating into his heart, as it Objection 3. Further, if love involves the lover being were. Whereas, in the love of friendship, the lover is in in the beloved and vice versa, it follows that the beloved is the beloved, inasmuch as he reckons what is good or evil united to the lover, in the same way as the lover is united to his friend, as being so to himself; and his friend’s will to the beloved. But the union itself is love, as stated above as his own, so that it seems as though he felt the good or (a. 1). Therefore it follows that the lover is always loved suffered the evil in the person of his friend. Hence it is by the object of his love; which is evidently false. There- proper to friends “to desire the same things, and to grieve fore mutual indwelling is not an effect of love. and rejoice at the same,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:16): “He that ix, 3 and Rhet. ii, 4). Consequently in so far as he reck- abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him.” Now ons what affects his friend as affecting himself, the lover charity is the love of God. Therefore, for the same reason, seems to be in the beloved, as though he were become one every love makes the beloved to be in the lover, and vice with him: but in so far as, on the other hand, he wills and versa. acts for his friend’s sake as for his own sake, looking on I answer that, This effect of mutual indwelling may his friend as identified with himself, thus the beloved is in be understood as referring both to the apprehensive and the lover. to the appetitive power. Because, as to the apprehensive In yet a third way, mutual indwelling in the love of power, the beloved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as friendship can be understood in regard to reciprocal love: the beloved abides in the apprehension of the lover, ac- inasmuch as friends return love for love, and both desire cording to Phil. 1:7, “For that I have you in my heart”: and do good things for one another. while the lover is said to be in the beloved, according to Reply to Objection 1. The beloved is contained in the apprehension, inasmuch as the lover is not satisfied with lover, by being impressed on his heart and thus becoming a superficial apprehension of the beloved, but strives to the object of his complacency. On the other hand, the gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to lover is contained in the beloved, inasmuch as the lover the beloved, so as to penetrate into his very soul. Thus it penetrates, so to speak, into the beloved. For nothing hin- is written concerning the Holy Ghost, Who is God’s Love, ders a thing from being both container and contents in dif- that He “searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God” ferent ways: just as a genus is contained in its species, and (1 Cor. 2:10). vice versa. As the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be Reply to Objection 2. The apprehension of the reason in the lover, inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind precedes the movement of love. Consequently, just as the of complacency: causing him either to take pleasure in reason divides, so does the movement of love penetrate it, or in its good, when present; or, in the absence of the into the beloved, as was explained above. object loved, by his longing, to tend towards it with the Reply to Objection 3. This argument is true of the love of concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills third kind of mutual indwelling, which is not to be found to the beloved, with the love of friendship: not indeed in every kind of love. 730 Whether ecstasy is an effect of love? Ia IIae q. 28 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that ecstasy is not an thus a man may be said to suffer ecstasy, when he is over- effect of love. For ecstasy seems to imply loss of rea- come by violent passion or madness. As to the appetitive son. But love does not always result in loss of reason: for power, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, when that power lovers are masters of themselves at times. Therefore love is borne towards something else, so that it goes forth out does not cause ecstasy. from itself, as it were. Objection 2. Further, the lover desires the beloved to The first of these ecstasies is caused by love disposi- be united to him. Therefore he draws the beloved to him- tively in so far, namely, as love makes the lover dwell on self, rather than betakes himself into the beloved, going the beloved, as stated above (a. 2), and to dwell intently forth out from himself as it were. on one thing draws the mind from other things. The sec- Objection 3. Further, love unites the beloved to the ond ecstasy is caused by love directly; by love of friend- lover, as stated above (a. 1). If, therefore, the lover ship, simply; by love of concupiscence not simply but in goes out from himself, in order to betake himself into the a restricted sense. Because in love of concupiscence, the beloved, it follows that the lover always loves the beloved lover is carried out of himself, in a certain sense; in so far, more than himself: which is evidently false. Therefore namely, as not being satisfied with enjoying the good that ecstasy is not an effect of love. he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside himself. But On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that since he seeks to have this extrinsic good for himself, he “the Divine love produces ecstasy,” and that “God Himself does not go out from himself simply, and this movement suffered ecstasy through love.” Since therefore according remains finally within him. On the other hand, in the love to the same author (Div. Nom. iv), every love is a partici- of friendship, a man’s affection goes out from itself sim- pated likeness of the Divine Love, it seems that every love ply; because he wishes and does good to his friend, by causes ecstasy. caring and providing for him, for his sake. I answer that, To suffer ecstasy means to be placed Reply to Objection 1. This argument is true of the outside oneself. This happens as to the apprehensive first kind of ecstasy. power and as to the appetitive power. As to the appre- Reply to Objection 2. This argument applies to love hensive power, a man is said to be placed outside himself, of concupiscence, which, as stated above, does not cause when he is placed outside the knowledge proper to him. ecstasy simply. This may be due to his being raised to a higher knowl- Reply to Objection 3. He who loves, goes out from edge; thus, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, inasmuch as himself, in so far as he wills the good of his friend and he is placed outside the connatural apprehension of his works for it. Yet he does not will the good of his friend sense and reason, when he is raised up so as to compre- more than his own good: and so it does not follow that he hend things that surpass sense and reason: or it may be loves another more than himself. due to his being cast down into a state of debasement; Whether zeal is an effect of love? Ia IIae q. 28 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that zeal is not an effect should not be set down as an effect of love any more than of love. For zeal is a beginning of contention; wherefore it of hatred. is written (1 Cor. 3:3): “Whereas there is among you zeal On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): [Douay: ‘envying’] and contention,” etc. But contention “God is said to be a zealot, on account of his great love is incompatible with love. Therefore zeal is not an effect for all things.” of love. I answer that, Zeal, whatever way we take it, arises Objection 2. Further, the object of love is the good, from the intensity of love. For it is evident that the more which communicates itself to others. But zeal is opposed intensely a power tends to anything, the more vigorously it to communication; since it seems an effect of zeal, that a withstands opposition or resistance. Since therefore love man refuses to share the object of his love with another: is “a movement towards the object loved,” as Augustine thus husbands are said to be jealous of [zelare] their wives, says (QQ. 83, qu. 35), an intense love seeks to remove because they will not share them with others. Therefore everything that opposes it. zeal is not an effect of love. But this happens in different ways according to love of Objection 3. Further, there is no zeal without hatred, concupiscence, and love of friendship. For in love of con- as neither is there without love: for it is written (Ps. 72:3): cupiscence he who desires something intensely, is moved “I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked.” Therefore it against all that hinders his gaining or quietly enjoying the 731 object of his love. It is thus that husbands are said to be laments it.” jealous of their wives, lest association with others prove a Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle is speaking in this hindrance to their exclusive individual rights. In like man- passage of the zeal of envy; which is indeed the cause of ner those who seek to excel, are moved against those who contention, not against the object of love, but for it, and seem to excel, as though these were a hindrance to their against that which is opposed to it. excelling. And this is the zeal of envy, of which it is writ- Reply to Objection 2. Good is loved inasmuch as it ten (Ps. 36:1): “Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy can be communicated to the lover. Consequently what- [zelaveris] them that work iniquity.” ever hinders the perfection of this communication, be- On the other hand, love of friendship seeks the friend’s comes hateful. Thus zeal arises from love of good. But good: wherefore, when it is intense, it causes a man to be through defect of goodness, it happens that certain small moved against everything that opposes the friend’s good. goods cannot, in their entirety, be possessed by many at In this respect, a man is said to be zealous on behalf of his the same time: and from the love of such things arises the friend, when he makes a point of repelling whatever may zeal of envy. But it does not arise, properly speaking, in be said or done against the friend’s good. In this way, the case of those things which, in their entirety, can be too, a man is said to be zealous on God’s behalf, when possessed by many: for no one envies another the knowl- he endeavors, to the best of his means, to repel whatever edge of truth, which can be known entirely by many; ex- is contrary to the honor or will of God; according to 3 cept perhaps one may envy another his superiority in the Kings 19:14: “With zeal I have been zealous for the Lord knowledge of it. of hosts.” Again on the words of Jn. 2:17: “The zeal of Reply to Objection 3. The very fact that a man hates Thy house hath eaten me up,” a gloss says that “a man is whatever is opposed to the object of his love, is the effect eaten up with a good zeal, who strives to remedy what- of love. Hence zeal is set down as an effect of love rather ever evil he perceives; and if he cannot, bears with it and than of hatred. Whether love is a passion that wounds the lover? Ia IIae q. 28 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that love wounds the thereby. Consequently love of a suitable good perfects lover. For languor denotes a hurt in the one that lan- and betters the lover; but love of a good which is unsuit- guishes. But love causes languor: for it is written (Cant able to the lover, wounds and worsens him. Wherefore 2:5): “Stay me up with flowers, compass me about with man is perfected and bettered chiefly by the love of God: apples; because I languish with love.” Therefore love is a but is wounded and worsened by the love of sin, according wounding passion. to Osee 9:10: “They became abominable, as those things Objection 2. Further, melting is a kind of dissolution. which they loved.” But love melts that in which it is: for it is written (Cant And let this be understood as applying to love in re- 5:6): “My soul melted when my beloved spoke.” There- spect of its formal element, i.e. in regard to the appetite. fore love is a dissolvent: therefore it is a corruptive and a But in respect of the material element in the passion of wounding passion. love, i.e. a certain bodily change, it happens that love is Objection 3. Further, fervor denotes a certain excess hurtful, by reason of this change being excessive: just as of heat; which excess has a corruptive effect. But love it happens in the senses, and in every act of a power of the causes fervor: for Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) in reckoning soul that is exercised through the change of some bodily the properties belonging to the Seraphim’s love, includes organ. “hot” and “piercing” and “most fervent.” Moreover it is In reply to the objections, it is to be observed that four said of love (Cant 8:6) that “its lamps are fire and flames.” proximate effects may be ascribed to love: viz. melting, Therefore love is a wounding and corruptive passion. enjoyment, languor, and fervor. Of these the first is “melt- On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that ing,” which is opposed to freezing. For things that are “everything loves itself with a love that holds it together,” frozen, are closely bound together, so as to be hard to i.e. that preserves it. Therefore love is not a wounding pierce. But it belongs to love that the appetite is fitted passion, but rather one that preserves and perfects. to receive the good which is loved, inasmuch as the object I answer that, As stated above (q. 26, Aa. 1,2; q. 27, loved is in the lover, as stated above (a. 2). Consequently a. 1), love denotes a certain adapting of the appetitive the freezing or hardening of the heart is a disposition in- power to some good. Now nothing is hurt by being compatible with love: while melting denotes a softening adapted to that which is suitable to it; rather, if possible, of the heart, whereby the heart shows itself to be ready for it is perfected and bettered. But if a thing be adapted to the entrance of the beloved. If, then, the beloved is present that which is not suitable to it, it is hurt and made worse and possessed, pleasure or enjoyment ensues. But if the 732 beloved be absent, two passions arise; viz. sadness at its love considered formally, according to the relation of the absence, which is denoted by “languor” (hence Cicero in appetitive power to its object. But in the passion of love, De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 11 applies the term “ailment” chiefly other effects ensue, proportionate to the above, in respect to sadness); and an intense desire to possess the beloved, of a change in the organ. which is signified by “fervor.” And these are the effects of Whether love is cause of all that the lover does? Ia IIae q. 28 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the lover does not above (q. 1, a. 2 ). Now the end is the good desired and do everything from love. For love is a passion, as stated loved by each one. Wherefore it is evident that every above (q. 26, a. 2). But man does not do everything from agent, whatever it be, does every action from love of some passion: but some things he does from choice, and some kind. things from ignorance, as stated in Ethic. v, 8. Therefore Reply to Objection 1. This objection takes love as not everything that a man does, is done from love. a passion existing in the sensitive appetite. But here we Objection 2. Further, the appetite is a principle of are speaking of love in a general sense, inasmuch as it in- movement and action in all animals, as stated in De An- cludes intellectual, rational, animal, and natural love: for ima iii, 10. If, therefore, whatever a man does is done it is in this sense that Dionysius speaks of love in chapter from love, the other passions of the appetitive faculty are iv of De Divinis Nominibus. superfluous. Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (a. 5; q. 27, Objection 3. Further, nothing is produced at one and a. 4) desire, sadness and pleasure, and consequently all the same time by contrary causes. But some things are the other passions of the soul, result from love. Where- done from hatred. Therefore all things are not done from fore every act proceeds from any passion, proceeds also love. from love as from a first cause: and so the other passions, On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) which are proximate causes, are not superfluous. that “all things, whatever they do, they do for the love Reply to Objection 3. Hatred also is a result of love, of good.” as we shall state further on (q. 29, a. 2). I answer that, Every agent acts for an end, as stated 733 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 29 Of Hatred (In Six Articles) We must now consider hatred: concerning which there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether evil is the cause and the object of hatred? (2) Whether love is the cause of hatred? (3) Whether hatred is stronger than love? (4) Whether a man can hate himself? (5) Whether a man can hate the truth? (6) Whether a thing can be the object of universal hatred? Whether evil is the cause and object of hatred? Ia IIae q. 29 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that evil is not the object opposes and destroys it; and this is natural hatred. So, and cause of hatred. For everything that exists, as such, is therefore, in the animal appetite, or in the intellectual ap- good. If therefore evil be the object of hatred, it follows petite, love is a certain harmony of the appetite with that that nothing but the lack of something can be the object of which is apprehended as suitable; while hatred is disso- hatred: which is clearly untrue. nance of the appetite from that which is apprehended as Objection 2. Further, hatred of evil is praise-worthy; repugnant and hurtful. Now, just as whatever is suitable, hence (2 Macc 3:1) some are praised for that “the laws as such, bears the aspect of good; so whatever is repug- were very well kept, because of the godliness of Onias nant, as such, bears the aspect of evil. And therefore, just the high-priest, and the hatred of their souls [Douay: ‘his as good is the object of love, so evil is the object of hatred. soul’] had no evil.” If, therefore, nothing but evil be the Reply to Objection 1. Being, as such, has not the as- object of hatred, it would follow that all hatred is com- pect of repugnance but only of fittingness; because being mendable: and this is clearly false. is common to all things. But being, inasmuch as it is this Objection 3. Further, the same thing is not at the same determinate being, has an aspect of repugnance to some time both good and evil. But the same thing is lovable and determinate being. And in this way, one being is hateful hateful to different subjects. Therefore hatred is not only to another, and is evil; though not in itself, but by compar- of evil, but also of good. ison with something else. On the contrary, Hatred is the opposite of love. But Reply to Objection 2. Just as a thing may be appre- the object of love is good, as stated above (q. 26, a. 1; hended as good, when it is not truly good; so a thing may q. 27, a. 1). Therefore the object of hatred is evil. be apprehended as evil, whereas it is not truly evil. Hence I answer that, Since the natural appetite is the result it happens sometimes that neither hatred of evil nor love of apprehension (though this apprehension is not in the of good is good. same subject as the natural appetite), it seems that what Reply to Objection 3. To different things the same applies to the inclination of the natural appetite, applies thing may be lovable or hateful: in respect of the natural also to the animal appetite, which does result from an ap- appetite, owing to one and the same thing being naturally prehension in the same subject, as stated above (q. 26, suitable to one thing, and naturally unsuitable to another: a. 1). Now, with regard to the natural appetite, it is thus heat is becoming to fire and unbecoming to water: evident, that just as each thing is naturally attuned and and in respect of the animal appetite, owing to one and adapted to that which is suitable to it, wherein consists the same thing being apprehended by one as good, by an- natural love; so has it a natural dissonance from that which other as bad. Whether love is a cause of hatred? Ia IIae q. 29 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that love is not a cause of Therefore love is not the cause of hatred. hatred. For “the opposite members of a division are natu- Objection 2. Further, of two contraries, one is not rally simultaneous” (Praedic. x). But love and hatred are the cause of the other. But love and hatred are contraries. opposite members of a division, since they are contrary to Therefore love is not the cause of hatred. one another. Therefore they are naturally simultaneous. Objection 3. Further, that which follows is not the 734 cause of that which precedes. But hatred precedes love, species of numbers, figures and movements. Sometimes seemingly: since hatred implies a turning away from evil, they are not simultaneous either really or logically; e.g. whereas love implies a turning towards good. Therefore substance and accident; for substance is in reality the love is not the cause of hatred. cause of accident; and being is predicated of substance On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, before it is predicated of accident, by a priority of reason, 7,9) that all emotions are caused by love. Therefore ha- because it is not predicated of accident except inasmuch tred also, since it is an emotion of the soul, is caused by as the latter is in substance. Now love and hatred are nat- love. urally simultaneous, logically but not really. Wherefore I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), love consists in a nothing hinders love from being the cause of hatred. certain agreement of the lover with the object loved, while Reply to Objection 2. Love and hatred are contraries hatred consists in a certain disagreement or dissonance. if considered in respect of the same thing. But if taken in Now we should consider in each thing, what agrees with respect of contraries, they are not themselves contrary, but it, before that which disagrees: since a thing disagrees consequent to one another: for it amounts to the same that with another, through destroying or hindering that which one love a certain thing, or that one hate its contrary. Thus agrees with it. Consequently love must needs precede ha- love of one thing is the cause of one’s hating its contrary. tred; and nothing is hated, save through being contrary to Reply to Objection 3. In the order of execution, the a suitable thing which is loved. And hence it is that every turning away from one term precedes the turning towards hatred is caused by love. the other. But the reverse is the case in the order of inten- Reply to Objection 1. The opposite members of a di- tion: since approach to one term is the reason for turning vision are sometimes naturally simultaneous, both really away from the other. Now the appetitive movement be- and logically; e.g. two species of animal, or two species of longs rather to the order of intention than to that of execu- color. Sometimes they are simultaneous logically, while, tion. Wherefore love precedes hatred: because each is an in reality, one precedes, and causes the other; e.g. the appetitive movement. Whether hatred is stronger than love? Ia IIae q. 29 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that hatred is stronger speaking, stronger than hatred. Because a thing is moved than love. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36): “There is to the end more strongly than to the means. Now turning no one who does not flee from pain, more than he desires away from evil is directed as a means to the gaining of pleasure.” But flight from pain pertains to hatred; while good. Wherefore, absolutely speaking, the soul’s move- desire for pleasure belongs to love. Therefore hatred is ment in respect of good is stronger than its movement in stronger than love. respect of evil. Objection 2. Further, the weaker is overcome by the Nevertheless hatred sometimes seems to be stronger stronger. But love is overcome by hatred: when, that is to than love, for two reasons. First, because hatred is more say, love is turned into hatred. Therefore hatred is stronger keenly felt than love. For, since the sensitive perception than love. is accompanied by a certain impression; when once the Objection 3. Further, the emotions of the soul are impression has been received it is not felt so keenly as shown by their effects. But man insists more on repelling in the moment of receiving it. Hence the heat of a hec- what is hateful, than on seeking what is pleasant: thus tic fever, though greater, is nevertheless not felt so much also irrational animals refrain from pleasure for fear of the as the heat of tertian fever; because the heat of the hectic whip, as Augustine instances (QQ. 83, qu. 36). Therefore fever is habitual and like a second nature. For this rea- hatred is stronger than love. son, love is felt more keenly in the absence of the object On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil; because loved; thus Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12) that “love is “evil does nothing except in virtue of good,” as Dionysius felt more keenly when we lack what we love.” And for the says (Div. Nom. iv). But hatred and love differ accord- same reason, the unbecomingness of that which is hated ing to the difference of good and evil. Therefore love is is felt more keenly than the becomingness of that which is stronger than hatred. loved. Secondly, because comparison is made between a I answer that, It is impossible for an effect to be hatred and a love which are not mutually corresponding. stronger than its cause. Now every hatred arises from Because, according to different degrees of good there are some love as its cause, as above stated (a. 2). Therefore different degrees of love to which correspond different de- it is impossible for hatred to be stronger than love abso- grees of hatred. Wherefore a hatred that corresponds to a lutely. greater love, moves us more than a lesser love. But furthermore, love must needs be, absolutely Hence it is clear how to reply to the First Objec- 735 tion. For the love of pleasure is less than the love of Wherefore we flee from pain more than we love pleasure. self-preservation, to which corresponds flight from pain. Whether a man can hate himself? Ia IIae q. 29 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that a man can hate him- ply evil; and in this way, a man accidentally wills evil to self. For it is written (Ps. 10:6): “He that loveth iniquity, himself; and thus hates himself. Secondly, in regard to hateth his own soul.” But many love iniquity. Therefore himself, to whom he wills good. For each thing is that many hate themselves. which is predominant in it; wherefore the state is said to Objection 2. Further, him we hate, to whom we wish do what the king does, as if the king were the whole state. and work evil. But sometimes a man wishes and works Now it is clear that man is principally the mind of man. evil to himself, e.g. a man who kills himself. Therefore And it happens that some men account themselves as be- some men hate themselves. ing principally that which they are in their material and Objection 3. Further, Boethius says (De Consol. ii) sensitive nature. Wherefore they love themselves accord- that “avarice makes a man hateful”; whence we may con- ing to what they take themselves to be, while they hate clude that everyone hates a miser. But some men are mis- that which they really are, by desiring what is contrary to ers. Therefore they hate themselves. reason. And in both these ways, “he that loveth iniquity On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:29) that hateth” not only “his own soul,” but also himself. “no man ever hated his own flesh.” Wherefore the reply to the First Objection is evident. I answer that, Properly speaking, it is impossible for Reply to Objection 2. No man wills and works evil to a man to hate himself. For everything naturally desires himself, except he apprehend it under the aspect of good. good, nor can anyone desire anything for himself, save For even they who kill themselves, apprehend death itself under the aspect of good: for “evil is outside the scope of as a good, considered as putting an end to some unhappi- the will,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Now to love ness or pain. a man is to will good to him, as stated above (q. 26, a. 4). Reply to Objection 3. The miser hates something ac- Consequently, a man must, of necessity, love himself; and cidental to himself, but not for that reason does he hate it is impossible for a man to hate himself, properly speak- himself: thus a sick man hates his sickness for the very ing. reason that he loves himself. Or we may say that avarice But accidentally it happens that a man hates himself: makes man hateful to others, but not to himself. In fact, it and this in two ways. First, on the part of the good which is caused by inordinate self-love, in respect of which, man a man wills to himself. For it happens sometimes that desires temporal goods for himself more than he should. what is desired as good in some particular respect, is sim- Whether a man can hate the truth? Ia IIae q. 29 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that a man cannot hate I answer that, Good, true and being are the same in the truth. For good, true, and being are convertible. But a reality, but differ as considered by reason. For good is man cannot hate good. Neither, therefore, can he hate the considered in the light of something desirable, while be- truth. ing and true are not so considered: because good is “what Objection 2. Further, “All men have a natural desire all things seek.” Wherefore good, as such, cannot be the for knowledge,” as stated in the beginning of the Meta- object of hatred, neither in general nor in particular. Be- physics i, 1. But knowledge is only of truth. Therefore ing and truth in general cannot be the object of hatred: be- truth is naturally desired and loved. But that which is in a cause disagreement is the cause of hatred, and agreement thing naturally, is always in it. Therefore no man can hate is the cause of love; while being and truth are common to the truth. all things. But nothing hinders some particular being or Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, some particular truth being an object of hatred, in so far 4) that “men love those who are straightforward.” But as it is considered as hurtful and repugnant; since hurtful- there can be no other motive for this save truth. Therefore ness and repugnance are not incompatible with the notion man loves the truth naturally. Therefore he cannot hate it. of being and truth, as they are with the notion of good. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 4:16): “Am Now it may happen in three ways that some particular I become your enemy because I tell you the truth?”∗ truth is repugnant or hurtful to the good we love. First, ∗ St. Thomas quotes the passage, probably from memory, as though it were an assertion: “I am become,” etc. 736 according as truth is in things as in its cause and origin. gustine says (Confess. x, 23) that men “love truth when And thus man sometimes hates a particular truth, when he it enlightens, they hate it when it reproves.” This suffices wishes that what is true were not true. Secondly, accord- for the Reply to the First Objection. ing as truth is in man’s knowledge, which hinders him Reply to Objection 2. The knowledge of truth is lov- from gaining the object loved: such is the case of those able in itself: hence Augustine says that men love it when who wish not to know the truth of faith, that they may it enlightens. But accidentally, the knowledge of truth sin freely; in whose person it is said (Job 21:14): “We may become hateful, in so far as it hinders one from ac- desire not the knowledge of Thy ways.” Thirdly, a partic- complishing one’s desire. ular truth is hated, as being repugnant, inasmuch as it is in Reply to Objection 3. The reason why we love those the intellect of another man: as, for instance, when a man who are straightforward is that they make known the truth, wishes to remain hidden in his sin, he hates that anyone and the knowledge of the truth, considered in itself, is a should know the truth about his sin. In this respect, Au- desirable thing. Whether anything can be an object of universal hatred? Ia IIae q. 29 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that a thing cannot be an sion and of appetite, can tend to something universally. object of universal hatred. Because hatred is a passion of Thus we say that the object of sight is color considered the sensitive appetite, which is moved by an apprehension generically; not that the sight is cognizant of universal in the senses. But the senses cannot apprehend the uni- color, but because the fact that color is cognizant by the versal. Therefore a thing cannot be an object of universal sight, is attributed to color, not as being this particular hatred. color, but simply because it is color. Accordingly hatred Objection 2. Further, hatred is caused by disagree- in the sensitive faculty can regard something universally: ment; and where there is disagreement, there is nothing because this thing, by reason of its common nature, and in common. But the notion of universality implies some- not merely as an individual, is hostile to the animal—for thing in common. Therefore nothing can be the object of instance, a wolf in regard to a sheep. Hence a sheep hates universal hatred. the wolf universally. On the other hand, anger is always Objection 3. Further, the object of hatred is evil. But caused by something in particular: because it is caused “evil is in things, and not in the mind” (Metaph. vi, 4). by some action of the one that hurts us; and actions pro- Since therefore the universal is in the mind only, which ceed from individuals. For this reason the Philosopher abstracts the universal from the particular, it would seem says (Rhet. ii, 4) that “anger is always directed to some- that hatred cannot have a universal object. thing singular, whereas hatred can be directed to a thing On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) in general.” that “anger is directed to something singular, whereas ha- But according as hatred is in the intellectual part, since tred is also directed to a thing in general; for everybody it arises from the universal apprehension of the intellect, hates the thief and the backbiter.” it can regard the universal in both ways. I answer that, There are two ways of speaking of the Reply to Objection 1. The senses do not apprehend universal: first, as considered under the aspect of univer- the universal, as such: but they apprehend something to sality; secondly, as considered in the nature to which it which the character of universality is given by abstraction. is ascribed: for it is one thing to consider the universal Reply to Objection 2. That which is common to all man, and another to consider a man as man. If, therefore, cannot be a reason of hatred. But nothing hinders a thing we take the universal, in the first way, no sensitive power, from being common to many, and at variance with others, whether of apprehension or of appetite, can attain the uni- so as to be hateful to them. versal: because the universal is obtained by abstraction Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the from individual matter, on which every sensitive power is universal under the aspect of universality: and thus it does based. not come under the sensitive apprehension or appetite. Nevertheless the sensitive powers, both of apprehen- 737 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 30 Of Concupiscence (In Four Articles) We have now to consider concupiscence: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only? (2) Whether concupiscence is a specific passion? (3) Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural? (4) Whether concupiscence is infinite? Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only? Ia IIae q. 30 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that concupiscence is not body: because the sense is a power seated in a bodily or- only in the sensitive appetite. For there is a concupiscence gan: wherefore sensible good is the good of the whole of wisdom, according to Wis. 6:21: “The concupiscence composite. Now concupiscence seems to be the craving [Douay: ‘desire’] of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting for this latter pleasure, since it belongs to the united soul kingdom.” But the sensitive appetite can have no ten- and body, as is implied by the Latin word “concupiscen- dency to wisdom. Therefore concupiscence is not only tia.” Therefore, properly speaking, concupiscence is in the in the sensitive appetite. sensitive appetite, and in the concupiscible faculty, which Objection 2. Further, the desire for the command- takes its name from it. ments of God is not in the sensitive appetite: in fact the Reply to Objection 1. The craving for wisdom, or Apostle says (Rom. 7:18): “There dwelleth not in me, that other spiritual goods, is sometimes called concupiscence; is to say, in my flesh, that which is good.” But desire for either by reason of a certain likeness; or on account of the God’s commandments is an act of concupiscence, accord- craving in the higher part of the soul being so vehement ing to Ps. 118:20: “My soul hath coveted [concupivit] that it overflows into the lower appetite, so that the latter to long for thy justifications.” Therefore concupiscence is also, in its own way, tends to the spiritual good, following not only in the sensitive appetite. the lead of the higher appetite, the result being that the Objection 3. Further, to each power, its proper good body itself renders its service in spiritual matters, accord- is a matter of concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence is ing to Ps. 83:3: “My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in in each power of the soul, and not only in the sensitive the living God.” appetite. Reply to Objection 2. Properly speaking, desire may On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, be not only in the lower, but also in the higher appetite. 12) that “the irrational part which is subject and amenable For it does not imply fellowship in craving, as concupis- to reason, is divided into the faculties of concupiscence cence does; but simply movement towards the thing de- and anger. This is the irrational part of the soul, passive sired. and appetitive.” Therefore concupiscence is in the sensi- Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to each power of tive appetite. the soul to seek its proper good by the natural appetite, I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, which does not arise from apprehension. But the craving 11), “concupiscence is a craving for that which is pleas- for good, by the animal appetite, which arises from ap- ant.” Now pleasure is twofold, as we shall state later on prehension, belongs to the appetitive power alone. And (q. 31, Aa. 3,4): one is in the intelligible good, which to crave a thing under the aspect of something delightful is the good of reason; the other is in good perceptible to the senses, wherein concupiscence properly consists, to the senses. The former pleasure seems to belong to belongs to the concupiscible power. soul alone: whereas the latter belongs to both soul and Whether concupiscence is a specific passion? Ia IIae q. 30 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that concupiscence is not senses; and this is also the object of concupiscence, as a specific passion of the concupiscible power. For pas- the Philosopher declares (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore con- sions are distinguished by their objects. But the object cupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible of the concupiscible power is something delightful to the faculty. 738 Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. sent: because, according as it is present, it causes the 33) that “covetousness is the love of transitory things”: so faculty to find rest in it; whereas, according as it is ab- that it is not distinct from love. But all specific passions sent, it causes the faculty to be moved towards it. Where- are distinct from one another. Therefore concupiscence is fore the object of sensible pleasure causes love, inasmuch not a specific passion in the concupiscible faculty. as, so to speak, it attunes and conforms the appetite to it- Objection 3. Further, to each passion of the concupis- self; it causes concupiscence, inasmuch as, when absent, cible faculty there is a specific contrary passion in that fac- it draws the faculty to itself; and it causes pleasure, inas- ulty, as stated above (q. 23, a. 4). But no specific passion much as, when present, it makes the faculty to find rest in of the concupiscible faculty is contrary to concupiscence. itself. Accordingly, concupiscence is a passion differing For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that “good “in species” from both love and pleasure. But concupis- when desired gives rise to concupiscence; when present, cences of this or that pleasurable object differ “in num- it gives joy: in like manner, the evil we apprehend makes ber.” us fear, the evil that is present makes us sad”: from which Reply to Objection 1. Pleasurable good is the object we gather that as sadness is contrary to joy, so is fear con- of concupiscence, not absolutely, but considered as ab- trary to concupiscence. But fear is not in the concupisci- sent: just as the sensible, considered as past, is the object ble, but in the irascible part. Therefore concupiscence is of memory. For these particular conditions diversify the not a specific passion of the concupiscible faculty. species of passions, and even of the powers of the sensi- On the contrary, Concupiscence is caused by love, tive part, which regards particular things. and tends to pleasure, both of which are passions of the Reply to Objection 2. In the passage quoted we have concupiscible faculty. Hence it is distinguished from the causal, not essential predication: for covetousness is not other concupiscible passions, as a specific passion. essentially love, but an effect of love. We may also say I answer that, As stated above (a. 1; q. 23, a. 1), the that Augustine is taking covetousness in a wide sense, for good which gives pleasure to the senses is the common any movement of the appetite in respect of good to come: object of the concupiscible faculty. Hence the various so that it includes both love and hope. concupiscible passions are distinguished according to the Reply to Objection 3. The passion which is directly differences of that good. Now the diversity of this object contrary to concupiscence has no name, and stands in rela- can arise from the very nature of the object, or from a di- tion to evil, as concupiscence in regard to good. But since, versity in its active power. The diversity, derived from the like fear, it regards the absent evil; sometimes it goes by nature of the active object, causes a material difference of the name of fear, just as hope is sometimes called cov- passions: while the difference in regard to its active power etousness. For a small good or evil is reckoned as though causes a formal diversity of passions, in respect of which it were nothing: and consequently every movement of the the passions differ specifically. appetite in future good or evil is called hope or fear, which Now the nature of the motive power of the end or of regard good and evil as arduous. the good, differs according as it is really present, or ab- Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural? Ia IIae q. 30 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that concupiscences are cupiscence which is not natural, it must needs be rational. not divided into those which are natural and those which But this is impossible: because, since concupiscence is a are not. For concupiscence belongs to the animal appetite, passion, it belongs to the sensitive appetite, and not to the as stated above (a. 1, ad 3). But the natural appetite is will, which is the rational appetite. Therefore there are no contrasted with the animal appetite. Therefore no concu- concupiscences which are not natural. piscence is natural. On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11 and Objection 2. Further, material differences makes no Rhetor. i, 11) distinguishes natural concupiscences from difference of species, but only numerical difference; a dif- those that are not natural. ference which is outside the purview of science. But if I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), concupiscence some concupiscences are natural, and some not, they dif- is the craving for pleasurable good. Now a thing is plea- fer only in respect of their objects; which amounts to a surable in two ways. First, because it is suitable to the material difference, which is one of number only. There- nature of the animal; for example, food, drink, and the fore concupiscences should not be divided into those that like: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said are natural and those that are not. to be natural. Secondly, a thing is pleasurable because it is Objection 3. Further, reason is contrasted with nature, apprehended as suitable to the animal: as when one appre- as stated in Phys. ii, 5. If therefore in man there is a con- hends something as good and suitable, and consequently 739 takes pleasure in it: and concupiscence of such pleasur-Reply to Objection 2. The difference between those able things is said to be not natural, and is more wont to concupiscences that are natural and those that are not, be called “cupidity.” is not merely a material difference; it is also, in a way, Accordingly concupiscences of the first kind, or nat- formal, in so far as it arises from a difference in the ac- ural concupiscences, are common to men and other an- tive object. Now the object of the appetite is the appre- imals: because to both is there something suitable and hended good. Hence diversity of the active object follows pleasurable according to nature: and in these all men from diversity of apprehension: according as a thing is agree; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11) calls apprehended as suitable, either by absolute apprehension, them “common” and “necessary.” But concupiscences of whence arise natural concupiscences, which the Philoso- the second kind are proper to men, to whom it is proper to pher calls “irrational” (Rhet. i, 11); or by apprehension devise something as good and suitable, beyond that which together with deliberation, whence arise those concupis- nature requires. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) cences that are not natural, and which for this very reason that the former concupiscences are “irrational,” but the lat- the Philosopher calls “rational” (Rhet. i, 11). ter, “rational.” And because different men reason differ- Reply to Objection 3. Man has not only universal ently, therefore the latter are also called (Ethic. iii, 11) reason, pertaining to the intellectual faculty; but also par- “peculiar and acquired,” i.e. in addition to those that are ticular reason pertaining to the sensitive faculty, as stated natural. in the Ia, q. 78, a. 4; Ia, q. 81, a. 3: so that even ratio- Reply to Objection 1. The same thing that is the ob- nal concupiscence may pertain to the sensitive appetite. ject of the natural appetite, may be the object of the an- Moreover the sensitive appetite can be moved by the uni- imal appetite, once it is apprehended. And in this way versal reason also, through the medium of the particular there may be an animal concupiscence of food, drink, and imagination. the like, which are objects of the natural appetite. Whether concupiscence is infinite? Ia IIae q. 30 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that concupiscence is not Our Lord said to the woman of Samaria (Jn. 4:13): “Who- infinite. For the object of concupiscence is good, which sever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again.” has the aspect of an end. But where there is infinity there But non-natural concupiscence is altogether infinite. is no end (Metaph. ii, 2). Therefore concupiscence cannot Because, as stated above (a. 3), it follows from the reason, be infinite. and it belongs to the reason to proceed to infinity. Hence Objection 2. Further, concupiscence is of the fitting he that desires riches, may desire to be rich, not up to a good, since it proceeds from love. But the infinite is with- certain limit, but to be simply as rich as possible. out proportion, and therefore unfitting. Therefore concu- Another reason may be assigned, according to the piscence cannot be infinite. Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), why a certain concupiscence Objection 3. Further, there is no passing through infi- is finite, and another infinite. Because concupiscence of nite things: and thus there is no reaching an ultimate term the end is always infinite: since the end is desired for its in them. But the subject of concupiscence is not delighted own sake, e.g. health: and thus greater health is more until he attain the ultimate term. Therefore, if concupis- desired, and so on to infinity; just as, if a white thing of cence were infinite, no delight would ever ensue. itself dilates the sight, that which is more white dilates yet On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) more. On the other hand, concupiscence of the means is that “since concupiscence is infinite, men desire an infi- not infinite, because the concupiscence of the means is in nite number of things.” suitable proportion to the end. Consequently those who I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), concupiscence place their end in riches have an infinite concupiscence of is twofold; one is natural, the other is not natural. Natu- riches; whereas those who desire riches, on account of the ral concupiscence cannot be actually infinite: because it necessities of life, desire a finite measure of riches, suf- is of that which nature requires; and nature ever tends to ficient for the necessities of life, as the Philosopher says something finite and fixed. Hence man never desires infi- (Polit. i, 3). The same applies to the concupiscence of any nite meat, or infinite drink. But just as in nature there is other things. potential successive infinity, so can this kind of concupis- Reply to Objection 1. Every object of concupiscence cence be infinite successively; so that, for instance, after is taken as something finite: either because it is finite in regetting food, a man may desire food yet again; and so of ality, as being once actually desired; or because it is finite anything else that nature requires: because these bodily as apprehended. For it cannot be apprehended as infinite, goods, when obtained, do not last for ever, but fail. Hence since the infinite is that “from which, however much we 740 may take, there always remains something to be taken” reason apprehends, is infinite in a sense, inasmuch as it (Phys. iii, 6). contains potentially an infinite number of singulars. Reply to Objection 2. The reason is possessed of infi- Reply to Objection 3. In order that a man be de- nite power, in a certain sense, in so far as it can consider a lighted, there is no need for him to realize all that he de- thing infinitely, as appears in the addition of numbers and sires: for he delights in the realization of each object of lines. Consequently, the infinite, taken in a certain way, his concupiscence. is proportionate to reason. In fact the universal which the 741 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 31 Of Delight Considered in Itself∗ (In Eight Articles) We must now consider delight and sadness. Concerning delight four things must be considered: (1) Delight in itself; (2) The causes of delight; (3) Its effects; (4) Its goodness and malice. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether delight is a passion? (2) Whether delight is subject to time? (3) Whether it differs from joy? (4) Whether it is in the intellectual appetite? (5) Of the delights of the higher appetite compared with the delight of the lower; (6) Of sensible delights compared with one another; (7) Whether any delight is non-natural? (8) Whether one delight can be contrary to another? Whether delight is a passion? Ia IIae q. 31 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that delight is not a once. Now there is this difference between animals and passion. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distin- other natural things, that when these latter are established guishes operation from passion, and says that “operation in the state becoming their nature, they do not perceive it, is a movement in accord with nature, while passion is a whereas animals do. And from this perception there arises movement contrary to nature.” But delight is an opera- a certain movement of the soul in the sensitive appetite; tion, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 5). which movement is called delight. Accordingly by say- Therefore delight is not a passion. ing that delight is “a movement of the soul,” we designate Objection 2. Further, “To be passive is to be moved,” its genus. By saying that it is “an establishing in keeping as stated in Phys. iii, 3. But delight does not consist in with the thing’s nature,” i.e. with that which exists in the being moved, but in having been moved; for it arises from thing, we assign the cause of delight, viz. the presence of good already gained. Therefore delight is not a passion. a becoming good. By saying that this establishing is “all Objection 3. Further, delight is a kind of a perfection at once,” we mean that this establishing is to be under- of the one who is delighted; since it “perfects operation,” stood not as in the process of establishment, but as in the as stated in Ethic. x, 4,5. But to be perfected does not fact of complete establishment, in the term of the move- consist in being passive or in being altered, as stated in ment, as it were: for delight is not a “becoming” as Plato† Phys. vii, 3 and De Anima ii, 5. Therefore delight is not a maintained, but a “complete fact,” as stated in Ethic. vii, passion. 12. Lastly, by saying that this establishing is “sensible,” On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv, we exclude the perfections of insensible things wherein 5 seqq) reckons delight, joy, or gladness among the other there is no delight. It is therefore evident that, since de- passions of the soul. light is a movement of the animal appetite arising from an I answer that, The movements of the sensitive ap- apprehension of sense, it is a passion of the soul. petite, are properly called passions, as stated above (q. 22, Reply to Objection 1. Connatural operation, which a. 3). Now every emotion arising from a sensitive ap- is unhindered, is a second perfection, as stated in De An- prehension, is a movement of the sensitive appetite: and ima ii, 1: and therefore when a thing is established in its this must needs be said of delight, since, according to the proper connatural and unhindered operation, delight fol- Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) “delight is a certain movement lows, which consists in a state of completion, as observed of the soul and a sensible establishing thereof all at once, above. Accordingly when we say that delight is an opera- in keeping with the nature of the thing.” tion, we designate, not its essence, but its cause. In order to understand this, we must observe that just Reply to Objection 2. A twofold movement is to be as in natural things some happen to attain to their natural observed in an animal: one, according to the intention of perfections, so does this happen in animals. And though the end, and this belongs to the appetite; the other, accord- movement towards perfection does not occur all at once, ing to the execution, and this belongs to the external op- yet the attainment of natural perfection does occur all at eration. And so, although in him who has already gained ∗ or, Pleasure † Phileb. 32,33 742 the good in which he delights, the movement of execution by its object, by reason of which delight is a kind of move-ceases, by which the tends to the end; yet the movement ment. of the appetitive faculty does not cease, since, just as be- Reply to Objection 3. Although the name of passion fore it desired that which it had not, so afterwards does it is more appropriate to those passions which have a cor- delight in that which is possesses. For though delight is a ruptive and evil tendency, such as bodily ailments, as also certain repose of the appetite, if we consider the presence sadness and fear in the soul; yet some passions have a ten- of the pleasurable good that satisfies the appetite, never- dency to something good, as stated above (q. 23, Aa. 1,4): theless there remains the impression made on the appetite and in this sense delight is called a passion. Whether delight is in time? Ia IIae q. 31 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that delight is in time. being is subject to changeable causes, in this respect, to For “delight is a kind of movement,” as the Philosopher be a man is in time. says (Rhet. i, 11). But all movement is in time. Therefore Accordingly, we must say that delight, of itself indeed, delight is in time. is not in time: for it regards good already gained, which Objection 2. Further, a thing is said to last long and is, as it were, the term of the movement. But if this good to be morose in respect of time. But some pleasures are gained be subject to change, the delight therein will be in called morose. Therefore pleasure is in time. time accidentally: whereas if it be altogether unchange- Objection 3. Further, the passions of the soul are of able, the delight therein will not be in time, either by rea- one same genus. But some passions of the soul are in son of itself or accidentally. time. Therefore delight is too. Reply to Objection 1. As stated in De Anima iii, On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) 7, movement is twofold. One is “the act of something that “no one takes pleasure according to time.” imperfect, i.e. of something existing in potentiality, as I answer that, A thing may be in time in two ways: such”: this movement is successive and is in time. An- first, by itself; secondly, by reason of something else, and other movement is “the act of something perfect, i.e. of accidentally as it were. For since time is the measure of something existing in act,” e.g. to understand, to feel, and successive things, those things are of themselves said to to will and such like, also to have delight. This movement be in time, to which succession or something pertaining is not successive, nor is it of itself in time. to succession is essential: such are movement, repose, Reply to Objection 2. Delight is said to be long last- speech and such like. On the other hand, those things are ing or morose, according as it is accidentally in time. said to be in time, by reason of something else and not Reply to Objection 3. Other passions have not for of themselves, to which succession is not essential, but their object a good obtained, as delight has. Wherefore which are subject to something successive. Thus the fact there is more of the movement of the imperfect in them of being a man is not essentially something successive; than in delight. And consequently it belongs more to de- since it is not a movement, but the term of a movement or light not to be in time. change, viz. of this being begotten: yet, because human Whether delight differs from joy? Ia IIae q. 31 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that delight is altogether they would all be various passions of the soul. But this the same as joy. Because the passions of the soul differ seems to be untrue. Therefore joy does not differ from according to their objects. But delight and joy have the delight. same object, namely, a good obtained. Therefore joy is On the contrary, We do not speak of joy in irrational altogether the same as delight. animals; whereas we do speak of delight in them. There- Objection 2. Further, one movement does not end in fore joy is not the same as delight. two terms. But one and the same movement, that of de- I answer that, Joy, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv), sire, ends in joy and delight. Therefore delight and joy are is a kind of delight. For we must observe that, just as altogether the same. some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural, Objection 3. Further, if joy differs from delight, it but consequent to reason, as stated above (q. 30, a. 3), so seems that there is equal reason for distinguishing glad- also some delights are natural, and some are not natural ness, exultation, and cheerfulness from delight, so that but rational. Or, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 13) ∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii. 743 and Gregory of Nyssa∗ put it, “some delights are of the from bodily delights, which are not called otherwise than body, some are of the soul”; which amounts to the same. delights: as we have observed above in regard to concu- For we take delight both in those things which we desire piscences (q. 30, a. 3, ad 2). naturally, when we get them, and in those things which Reply to Objection 2. A like difference is to be we desire as a result of reason. But we do not speak of observed in concupiscences also: so that delight corre- joy except when delight follows reason; and so we do not sponds to concupiscence, while joy corresponds to desire, ascribe joy to irrational animals, but only delight. which seems to pertain more to concupiscence of the soul. Now whatever we desire naturally, can also be the ob- Hence there is a difference of repose corresponding to the ject of reasoned desire and delight, but not vice versa. difference of movement. Consequently whatever can be the object of delight, can Reply to Objection 3. These other names pertain- also be the object of joy in rational beings. And yet ev- ing to delight are derived from the effects of delight; for erything is not always the object of joy; since sometimes “laetitia” [gladness] is derived from the “dilation” of the one feels a certain delight in the body, without rejoicing heart, as if one were to say “latitia”; “exultation” is de- thereat according to reason. And accordingly delight ex- rived from the exterior signs of inward delight, which ap- tends to more things than does joy. pear outwardly in so far as the inward joy breaks forth Reply to Objection 1. Since the object of the appetite from its bounds; and “cheerfulness” is so called from cer- of the soul is an apprehended good, diversity of apprehen- tain special signs and effects of gladness. Yet all these sion pertains, in a way, to diversity of the object. And so names seem to belong to joy; for we do not employ them delights of the soul, which are also called joys, are distinct save in speaking of rational beings. Whether delight is in the intellectual appetite? Ia IIae q. 31 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that delight is not in the the will. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that intellectual appetite. Because the Philosopher says (Rhet. “desire and joy are nothing else but a volition of consent i, 11) that “delight is a sensible movement.” But sensi- to the things we wish.” ble movement is not in an intellectual power. Therefore Reply to Objection 1. In this definition of the delight is not in the intellectual appetite. Philosopher, he uses the word “sensible” in its wide ac- Objection 2. Further, delight is a passion. But every ceptation for any kind of perception. For he says (Ethic. passion is in the sensitive appetite. Therefore delight is x, 4) that “delight is attendant upon every sense, as it is only in the sensitive appetite. also upon every act of the intellect and contemplation.” Objection 3. Further, delight is common to us and to Or we may say that he is defining delight of the sensitive the irrational animals. Therefore it is not elsewhere than appetite. in that power which we have in common with irrational Reply to Objection 2. Delight has the character of animals. passion, properly speaking, when accompanied by bodily On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 36:4): “Delight in transmutation. It is not thus in the intellectual appetite, the Lord.” But the sensitive appetite cannot reach to God; but according to simple movement: for thus it is also in only the intellectual appetite can. Therefore delight can God and the angels. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. be in the intellectual appetite. vii, 14) that “God rejoices by one simple act”: and Diony- I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), a certain de- sius says at the end of De Coel. Hier., that “the angels are light arises from the apprehension of the reason. Now on not susceptible to our passible delight, but rejoice together the reason apprehending something, not only the sensi- with God with the gladness of incorruption.” tive appetite is moved, as regards its application to some Reply to Objection 3. In us there is delight, not only particular thing, but also the intellectual appetite, which in common with dumb animals, but also in common with is called the will. And accordingly in the intellectual ap- angels. Wherefore Dionysius says (De Coel. Hier.) that petite or will there is that delight which is called joy, but “holy men often take part in the angelic delights.” Ac- not bodily delight. cordingly we have delight, not only in the sensitive ap- However, there is this difference of delight in either petite, which we have in common with dumb animals, but power, that delight of the sensitive appetite is accompa- also in the intellectual appetite, which we have in common nied by a bodily transmutation, whereas delight of the in- with the angels. tellectual appetite is nothing but the mere movement of 744 Whether bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intellectual plea-Ia IIae q. 31 a. 5 sures? Objection 1. It would seem that bodily and sensible And this appears from the consideration of the three things pleasures are greater than spiritual and intelligible plea- needed for pleasure, viz. the good which is brought into sures. For all men seek some pleasure, according to the conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and the con- Philosopher (Ethic. x, 2,4). But more seek sensible plea- junction itself. For spiritual good is both greater and more sures, than intelligible spiritual pleasures. Therefore bod- beloved than bodily good: a sign whereof is that men ab- ily pleasures are greater. stain from even the greatest bodily pleasures, rather than Objection 2. Further, the greatness of a cause is suffer loss of honor which is an intellectual good. Like- known by its effect. But bodily pleasures have greater wise the intellectual faculty is much more noble and more effects; since “they alter the state of the body, and in some knowing than the sensitive faculty. Also the conjunction they cause madness” (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore bodily is more intimate, more perfect and more firm. More inti- pleasures are greater. mate, because the senses stop at the outward accidents of Objection 3. Further, bodily pleasures need to be a thing, whereas the intellect penetrates to the essence; for tempered and checked, by reason of their vehemence: the object of the intellect is “what a thing is.” More per- whereas there is no need to check spiritual pleasures. fect, because the conjunction of the sensible to the sense Therefore bodily pleasures are greater. implies movement, which is an imperfect act: wherefore On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 118:103): “How sensible pleasures are not perceived all at once, but some sweet are Thy words to my palate; more than honey to part of them is passing away, while some other part is my mouth!” And the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 7) that looked forward to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in “the greatest pleasure is derived from the operation of wis- pleasures of the table and in sexual pleasures: whereas in- dom.” telligible things are without movement: hence pleasures I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), pleasure arises of this kind are realized all at once. More firm; because from union with a suitable object perceived or known. the objects of bodily pleasure are corruptible, and soon Now, in the operations of the soul, especially of the sen- pass away; whereas spiritual goods are incorruptible. sitive and intellectual soul, it must be noted that, since On the other hand, in relation to us, bodily pleasures they do not pass into outward matter, they are acts or per- are more vehement, for three reasons. First, because sen- fections of the agent, e.g. to understand, to feel, to will sible things are more known to us, than intelligible things. and the like: because actions which pass into outward Secondly, because sensible pleasures, through being pas- matter, are actions and perfections rather of the matter sions of the sensitive appetite, are accompanied by some transformed; for “movement is the act produced by the alteration in the body: whereas this does not occur in mover in the thing moved” (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly spiritual pleasures, save by reason of a certain reaction the aforesaid actions of the sensitive and intellectual soul, of the superior appetite on the lower. Thirdly, because are themselves a certain good of the agent, and are known bodily pleasures are sought as remedies for bodily de- by sense and intellect. Wherefore from them also does fects or troubles, whence various griefs arise. Wherefore pleasure arise, and not only from their objects. bodily pleasures, by reason of their succeeding griefs of If therefore we compare intellectual pleasures with this kind, are felt the more, and consequently are wel- sensible pleasures, according as we delight in the very ac- comed more than spiritual pleasures, which have no con- tions, for instance in sensitive and in intellectual knowl- trary griefs, as we shall state farther on (q. 35, a. 5). edge; without doubt intellectual pleasures are much Reply to Objection 1. The reason why more seek greater than sensible pleasures. For man takes much more bodily pleasures is because sensible goods are known bet- delight in knowing something, by understanding it, than in ter and more generally: and, again, because men need knowing something by perceiving it with his sense. Be- pleasures as remedies for many kinds of sorrow and sad- cause intellectual knowledge is more perfect; and because ness: and since the majority cannot attain spiritual plea- it is better known, since the intellect reflects on its own sures, which are proper to the virtuous, hence it is that act more than sense does. Moreover intellectual knowl- they turn aside to seek those of the body. edge is more beloved: for there is no one who would not Reply to Objection 2. Bodily transmutation arises forfeit his bodily sight rather than his intellectual vision, more from bodily pleasures, inasmuch as they are pas- as beasts or fools are deprived thereof, as Augustine says sions of the sensitive appetite. in De Civ. Dei (De Trin. xiv, 14). Reply to Objection 3. Bodily pleasures are realized in If, however, intellectual spiritual pleasures be com- the sensitive faculty which is governed by reason: where- pared with sensible bodily pleasures, then, in themselves fore they need to be tempered and checked by reason. But and absolutely speaking, spiritual pleasures are greater. spiritual pleasures are in the mind, which is itself the rule: 745 wherefore they are in themselves both sober and moderate. Whether the pleasures of touch are greater than the pleasures afforded by the other Ia IIae q. 31 a. 6 senses? Objection 1. It would seem that the pleasures of touch and cold and the like. Wherefore in this respect, the plea- are not greater than the pleasures afforded by the other sures of touch are greater as being more closely related senses. Because the greatest pleasure seems to be that to the end. For this reason, too, other animals which do without which all joy is at an end. But such is the pleasure not experience sensible pleasure save by reason of use- afforded by the sight, according to the words of Tob. 5:12: fulness, derive no pleasure from the other senses except “What manner of joy shall be to me, who sit in darkness, as subordinated to the sensible objects of the touch: “for and see not the light of heaven?” Therefore the pleasure dogs do not take delight in the smell of hares, but in eating afforded by the sight is the greatest of sensible pleasures. them;. . . nor does the lion feel pleasure in the lowing of an Objection 2. Further, “every one finds treasure in ox, but in devouring it” (Ethic. iii, 10). what he loves,” as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But Since then the pleasure afforded by touch is the great- “of all the senses the sight is loved most”∗. Therefore the est in respect of usefulness, and the pleasure afforded by greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight. sight the greatest in respect of knowledge; if anyone wish Objection 3. Further, the beginning of friendship to compare these two, he will find that the pleasure of which is for the sake of the pleasant is principally sight. touch is, absolutely speaking, greater than the pleasure of But pleasure is the cause of such friendship. Therefore the sight, so far as the latter remains within the limits of sensi- greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight. ble pleasure. Because it is evident that in everything, that On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, which is natural is most powerful: and it is to these plea- 10), that the greatest pleasures are those which are af- sures of the touch that the natural concupiscences, such forded by the touch. as those of food, sexual union, and the like, are ordained. I answer that, As stated above (q. 25, a. 2, ad 1; q. 27, If, however, we consider the pleasures of sight, inasmuch a. 4, ad 1), everything gives pleasure according as it is sight is the handmaid of the mind, then the pleasures of loved. Now, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, the senses are loved sight are greater, forasmuch as intellectual pleasures are for two reasons: for the purpose of knowledge, and on greater than sensible. account of their usefulness. Wherefore the senses afford Reply to Objection 1. Joy, as stated above (a. 3), de- pleasure in both these ways. But because it is proper to notes pleasure of the soul; and this belongs principally to man to apprehend knowledge itself as something good, it the sight. But natural pleasure belongs principally to the follows that the former pleasures of the senses, i.e. those touch. which arise from knowledge, are proper to man: whereas Reply to Objection 2. The sight is loved most, “on pleasures of the senses, as loved for their usefulness, are account of knowledge, because it helps us to distinguish common to all animals. many things,” as is stated in the same passage (Metaph. i, If therefore we speak of that sensible pleasure by 1). which reason of knowledge, it is evident that the sight af- Reply to Objection 3. Pleasure causes carnal love fords greater pleasure than any other sense. On the other in one way; the sight, in another. For pleasure, especially hand, if we speak of that sensible pleasure which is by rea- that which is afforded by the touch, is the final cause of the son of usefulness, then the greatest pleasure is afforded by friendship which is for the sake of the pleasant: whereas the touch. For the usefulness of sensible things is gauged the sight is a cause like that from which a movement has by their relation to the preservation of the animal’s nature. its beginning, inasmuch as the beholder on seeing the lov- Now the sensible objects of touch bear the closest relation able object receives an impression of its image, which en- to this usefulness: for the touch takes cognizance of those tices him to love it and to seek its delight. things which are vital to an animal, namely, of things hot Whether any pleasure is not natural? Ia IIae q. 31 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that no pleasure is not can the repose of the animal appetite, which is pleasure, natural. For pleasure is to the emotions of the soul what be elsewhere than in something connatural. Therefore no repose is to bodies. But the appetite of a natural body does pleasure is non-natural. not repose save in a connatural place. Neither, therefore, Objection 2. Further, what is against nature is vio- ∗ Metaph. i, 1 746 lent. But “whatever is violent causes grief” (Metaph. v, which pertains to the preservation of the body, either as re-5). Therefore nothing which is unnatural can give plea- gards the individual, as food, drink, sleep, and the like, or sure. as regards the species, as sexual intercourse, are said to af- Objection 3. Further, the fact of being established in ford man natural pleasure. Under each kind of pleasures, one’s own nature, if perceived, gives rise to pleasure, as we find some that are “not natural” speaking absolutely, is evident from the Philosopher’s definition quoted above and yet “connatural” in some respect. For it happens in (a. 1). But it is natural to every thing to be established an individual that some one of the natural principles of in its nature; because natural movement tends to a natural the species is corrupted, so that something which is con- end. Therefore every pleasure is natural. trary to the specific nature, becomes accidentally natural On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, to this individual: thus it is natural to this hot water to 5,6) that some things are pleasant “not from nature but give heat. Consequently it happens that something which from disease.” is not natural to man, either in regard to reason, or in re- I answer that, We speak of that as being natural, gard to the preservation of the body, becomes connatural which is in accord with nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. to this individual man, on account of there being some Now, in man, nature can be taken in two ways. First, inas- corruption of nature in him. And this corruption may be much as intellect and reason is the principal part of man’s either on the part of the body—from some ailment; thus nature, since in respect thereof he has his own specific to a man suffering from fever, sweet things seem bitter, nature. And in this sense, those pleasures may be called and vice versa—or from an evil temperament; thus some natural to man, which are derived from things pertaining take pleasure in eating earth and coals and the like; or on to man in respect of his reason: for instance, it is natural to the part of the soul; thus from custom some take pleasure man to take pleasure in contemplating the truth and in do- in cannibalism or in the unnatural intercourse of man and ing works of virtue. Secondly, nature in man may be taken beast, or other such things, which are not in accord with as contrasted with reason, and as denoting that which is human nature. common to man and other animals, especially that part of This suffices for the answers to the objections. man which does not obey reason. And in this sense, that Whether one pleasure can be contrary to another? Ia IIae q. 31 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that one pleasure can- place is contrary to repose in a low place” (Phys. v, 6). not be contrary to another. Because the passions of the Wherefore it happens in the emotions of the soul that one soul derive their species and contrariety from their ob- pleasure is contrary to another. jects. Now the object of pleasure is the good. Since there- Reply to Objection 1. This saying of the Philosopher fore good is not contrary to good, but “good is contrary to is to be understood of good and evil as applied to virtues evil, and evil to good,” as stated in Praedic. viii; it seems and vices: because one vice may be contrary to another that one pleasure is not contrary to another. vice, whereas no virtue can be contrary to another virtue. Objection 2. Further, to one thing there is one con- But in other things nothing prevents one good from being trary, as is proved in Metaph. x, 4. But sadness is contrary contrary to another, such as hot and cold, of which the to pleasure. Therefore pleasure is not contrary to pleasure. former is good in relation to fire, the latter, in relation to Objection 3. Further, if one pleasure is contrary to water. And in this way one pleasure can be contrary to another, this is only on account of the contrariety of the another. That this is impossible with regard to the good things which give pleasure. But this difference is mate- of virtue, is due to the fact that virtue’s good depends on rial: whereas contrariety is a difference of form, as stated fittingness in relation to some one thing—i.e. the reason. in Metaph. x, 4. Therefore there is no contrariety between Reply to Objection 2. Pleasure, in the emotions of one pleasure and another. the soul, is likened to natural repose in bodies: because its On the contrary, Things of the same genus that im- object is something suitable and connatural, so to speak. pede one another are contraries, as the Philosopher states But sadness is like a violent repose; because its object (Phys. viii, 8). But some pleasures impede one another, is disagreeable to the animal appetite, just as the place as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore some pleasures are of violent repose is disagreeable to the natural appetite. contrary to one another. Now natural repose is contrary both to violent repose of I answer that, Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is the same body, and to the natural repose of another, as likened to repose in natural bodies, as stated above (q. 23, stated in Phys. v, 6. Wherefore pleasure is contrary to a. 4). Now one repose is said to be contrary to another both to another pleasure and to sadness. when they are in contrary termini; thus, “repose in a high Reply to Objection 3. The things in which we take 747 pleasure, since they are the objects of pleasure, cause not the formal object causes a specific difference in acts and only a material, but also a formal difference, if the formal- passions, as stated above (q. 23, Aa. 1,4; q. 30, a. 2). ity of pleasurableness be different. Because difference in 748 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 32 Of the Cause of Pleasure (In Eight Articles) We must now consider the causes of pleasure: and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure? (2) Whether movement is a cause of pleasure? (3) Whether hope and memory cause pleasure? (4) Whether sadness causes pleasure? (5) Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us? (6) Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure? (7) Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure? (8) Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure? Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure? Ia IIae q. 32 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that operation is not the not pleasurable save inasmuch as they are united to us; proper and first cause of pleasure. For, as the Philoso- either by knowledge alone, as when we take pleasure pher says (Rhet. i, 11), “pleasure consists in a perception in thinking of or looking at certain things; or in some of the senses,” since knowledge is requisite for pleasure, other way in addition to knowledge; as when a man takes as stated above (q. 31, a. 1). But the objects of operations pleasure in knowing that he has something good–riches, are knowable before the operations themselves. Therefore honor, or the like; which would not be pleasurable unless operation is not the proper cause of pleasure. they were apprehended as possessed. For as the Philoso- Objection 2. Further, pleasure consists especially in pher observes (Polit. ii, 2) “we take great pleasure in look- an end gained: since it is this that is chiefly desired. But ing upon a thing as our own, by reason of the natural love the end is not always an operation, but is sometimes the ef- we have for ourselves.” Now to have such like things is fect of the operation. Therefore operation is not the proper nothing else but to use them or to be able to use them: and direct cause of pleasure. and this is through some operation. Wherefore it is evi- Objection 3. Further, leisure and rest consist in ces- dent that every pleasure is traced to some operation as its sation from work: and they are objects of pleasure (Rhet. cause. i, 11). Therefore operation is not the proper cause of plea- Reply to Objection 2. Even when it is not an oper- sure. ation, but the effect of an operation, that is the end, this On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, effect is pleasant in so far as possessed or effected: and 12,13; x, 4) that “pleasure is a connatural and uninter- this implies use or operation. rupted operation.” Reply to Objection 3. Operations are pleasant, in so I answer that, As stated above (q. 31, a. 1), two things far as they are proportionate and connatural to the agent. are requisite for pleasure: namely, the attainment of the Now, since human power is finite, operation is proportion- suitable good, and knowledge of this attainment. Now ate thereto according to a certain measure. Wherefore if it each of these consists in a kind of operation: because ac- exceed that measure, it will be no longer proportionate or tual knowledge is an operation; and the attainment of the pleasant, but, on the contrary, painful and irksome. And suitable good is by means of an operation. Moreover, the in this sense, leisure and play and other things pertaining proper operation itself is a suitable good. Wherefore every to repose, are pleasant, inasmuch as they banish sadness pleasure must needs be the result of some operation. which results from labor. Reply to Objection 1. The objects of operations are Whether movement is a cause of pleasure? Ia IIae q. 32 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that movement is not a (Ethic. vii, 12) that pleasure is not compared with gen- cause of pleasure. Because, as stated above (q. 31, a. 1), eration, but with the operation of a thing already in exis- the good which is obtained and is actually possessed, is tence. Now that which is being moved towards something the cause of pleasure: wherefore the Philosopher says has it not as yet; but, so to speak, is being generated in its 749 regard, forasmuch as generation or corruption are united man desires to know something whole and perfect: when to every movement, as stated in Phys. viii, 3. Therefore therefore a thing cannot be apprehended all at once as a movement is not a cause of pleasure. whole, change in such a thing is pleasant, so that one part Objection 2. Further, movement is the chief cause of may pass and another succeed, and thus the whole be per- toil and fatigue in our works. But operations through be- ceived. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iv, 11): “Thou ing toilsome and fatiguing are not pleasant but disagree- wouldst not have the syllables stay, but fly away, that oth- able. Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure. ers may come, and thou hear the whole. And so whenever Objection 3. Further, movement implies a certain in- any one thing is made up of many, all of which do not ex- novation, which is the opposite of custom. But things ist together, all would please collectively more than they “which we are accustomed to, are pleasant,” as the do severally, if all could be perceived collectively.” Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore movement is If therefore there be any thing, whose nature is un- not a cause of pleasure. changeable; the natural mode of whose being cannot be On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3): exceeded by the continuation of any pleasing object; and “What means this, O Lord my God, whereas Thou art ev- which can behold the whole object of its delight at once— erlasting joy to Thyself, and some things around Thee ev- to such a one change will afford no delight. And the more ermore rejoice in Thee? What means this, that this portion any pleasures approach to this, the more are they capable of things ebbs and flows alternately displeased and recon- of being continual. ciled?” From these words we gather that man rejoices and Reply to Objection 1. Although the subject of move- takes pleasure in some kind of alterations: and therefore ment has not yet perfectly that to which it is moved, nev- movement seems to cause pleasure. ertheless it is beginning to have something thereof: and I answer that, Three things are requisite for pleasure; in this respect movement itself has something of pleasure. two, i.e. the one that is pleased and the pleasurable ob- But it falls short of the perfection of pleasure; because the ject conjoined to him; and a third, which is knowledge more perfect pleasures regard things that are unchange- of this conjunction: and in respect of these three, move- able. Moreover movement becomes the cause of pleasure, ment is pleasant, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14 in so far as thereby something which previously was un- and Rhetor. i, 11). For as far as we who feel pleasure are suitable, becomes suitable or ceases to be, as stated above. concerned, change is pleasant to us because our nature is Reply to Objection 2. Movement causes toil and fa- changeable: for which reason that which is suitable to us tigue, when it exceeds our natural aptitude. It is not thus at one time is not suitable at another; thus to warm him- that it causes pleasure, but by removing the obstacles to self at a fire is suitable to man in winter but not in summer. our natural aptitude. Again, on the part of the pleasing good which is united to Reply to Objection 3. What is customary becomes us, change is pleasant. Because the continued action of an pleasant, in so far as it becomes natural: because custom agent increases its effect: thus the longer a person remains is like a second nature. But the movement which gives near the fire, the more he is warmed and dried. Now the pleasure is not that which departs from custom, but rather natural mode of being consists in a certain measure; and that which prevents the corruption of the natural mode of therefore when the continued presence of a pleasant object being, that might result from continued operation. And exceeds the measure of one’s natural mode of being, the thus from the same cause of connaturalness, both custom removal of that object becomes pleasant. On the part of and movement become pleasant. the knowledge itself (change becomes pleasant), because Whether hope and memory causes pleasure? Ia IIae q. 32 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that memory and hope do sure in regarding good, so also do desire and love. There- not cause pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by present fore hope should not be assigned as a cause of pleasure, good, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). But hope any more than desire or love. and memory regard what is absent: since memory is of On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 12:12): “Rejoic- the past, and hope of the future. Therefore memory and ing in hope”; and (Ps. 76:4): “I remembered God, and hope do not cause pleasure. was delighted.” Objection 2. Further, the same thing is not the cause I answer that, Pleasure is caused by the presence of of contraries. But hope causes affliction, according to suitable good, in so far as it is felt, or perceived in any Prov. 13:12: “Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul.” way. Now a thing is present to us in two ways. First, Therefore hope does not cause pleasure. in knowledge—i.e. according as the thing known is in Objection 3. Further, just as hope agrees with plea- the knower by its likeness; secondly, in reality—i.e. ac- 750 cording as one thing is in real conjunction of any kind possibility, at least supposed, of attainment. with another, either actually or potentially. And since real Reply to Objection 2. Nothing prevents the same conjunction is greater than conjunction by likeness, which thing, in different ways, being the cause of contraries. is the conjunction of knowledge; and again, since actual And so hope, inasmuch as it implies a present apprais- is greater than potential conjunction: therefore the great- ing of a future good, causes pleasure; whereas, inasmuch est pleasure is that which arises from sensation which re- as it implies absence of that good, it causes affliction. quires the presence of the sensible object. The second Reply to Objection 3. Love and concupiscence also place belongs to the pleasure of hope, wherein there is cause pleasure. For everything that is loved becomes pleasurable conjunction, not only in respect of apprehen- pleasing to the lover, since love is a kind of union or con- sion, but also in respect of the faculty or power of obtain- naturalness of lover and beloved. In like manner every ing the pleasurable object. The third place belongs to the object of desire is pleasing to the one that desires, since pleasure of memory, which has only the conjunction of desire is chiefly a craving for pleasure. However hope, as apprehension. implying a certainty of the real presence of the pleasing Reply to Objection 1. Hope and memory are indeed good, that is not implied either by love or by concupis- of things which, absolutely speaking, are absent: and yet cence, is reckoned in preference to them as causing plea- those are, after a fashion, present, i.e. either according sure; and also in preference to memory, which is of that to apprehension only; or according to apprehension and which has already passed away. Whether sadness causes pleasure? Ia IIae q. 32 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that sadness does not ensued: because absence of evil is looked upon as some- cause pleasure. For nothing causes its own contrary. But thing good; wherefore so far as a man thinks that he has sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore it does not been delivered from that which caused him sorrow and cause it. pain, so much reason has he to rejoice. Hence Augus- Objection 2. Further, contraries have contrary ef- tine says in De Civ. Dei xxii, 31∗ that “oftentimes in joy fects. But pleasures, when called to mind, cause plea- we call to mind sad things. . . and in the season of health sure. Therefore sad things, when remembered, cause sor- we recall past pains without feeling pain. . . and in propor- row and not pleasure. tion are the more filled with joy and gladness”: and again Objection 3. Further, as sadness is to pleasure, so is (Confess. viii, 3) he says that “the more peril there was hatred to love. But hatred does not cause love, but rather in the battle, so much the more joy will there be in the the other way about, as stated above (q. 29, a. 2). There- triumph.” fore sadness does not cause pleasure. Reply to Objection 1. Sometimes accidentally a thing On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 41:4): “My tears is the cause of its contrary: thus “that which is cold some- have been my bread day and night”: where bread denotes times causes heat,” as stated in Phys. viii, 1. In like man- the refreshment of pleasure. Therefore tears, which arise ner sadness is the accidental cause of pleasure, in so far as from sadness, can give pleasure. it gives rise to the apprehension of something pleasant. I answer that, Sadness may be considered in two Reply to Objection 2. Sad things, called to mind, ways: as existing actually, and as existing in the mem- cause pleasure, not in so far as they are sad and contrary ory: and in both ways sadness can cause pleasure. Be- to pleasant things; but in so far as man is delivered from cause sadness, as actually existing, causes pleasure, inas- them. In like manner the recollection of pleasant things, much as it brings to mind that which is loved, the absence by reason of these being lost, may cause sadness. of which causes sadness; and yet the mere thought of it Reply to Objection 3. Hatred also can be the acci- gives pleasure. The recollection of sadness becomes a dental cause of love: i.e. so far as some love one another, cause of pleasure, on account of the deliverance which inasmuch as they agree in hating one and the same thing. Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us? Ia IIae q. 32 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the actions of others are not a cause of pleasure to us. are not a cause of pleasure to us. Because the cause of Objection 2. Further, the action is the agent’s own pleasure is our own good when conjoined to us. But the good. If, therefore, the actions of others are a cause of actions of others are not conjoined to us. Therefore they pleasure to us, for the same reason all goods belonging to ∗ Gregory, Moral. iv. 751 others will be pleasing to us: which is evidently untrue. hence men take greater pleasure in being praised and hon- Objection 3. Further, action is pleasant through pro- ored by them. And because a flatterer appears to praise, ceeding from an innate habit; hence it is stated in Ethic. therefore flattery is pleasing to some. And as love is for ii, 3 that “we must reckon the pleasure which follows af- something good, while admiration is for something great, ter action, as being the sign of a habit existing in us.” But so it is pleasant to be loved and admired by others, inas- the actions of others do not proceed from habits existing much as a man thus becomes aware of his own good- in us, but, sometimes, from habits existing in the agents. ness or greatness, through their giving pleasure to others. Therefore the actions of others are not pleasing to us, but Thirdly, from the fact that another’s actions, if they be to the agents themselves. good, are reckoned as one’s own good, by reason of the On the contrary, It is written in the second canoni- power of love, which makes a man to regard his friend as cal epistle of John (verse 4): “I was exceeding glad that I one with himself. And on account of hatred, which makes found thy children walking in truth.” one to reckon another’s good as being in opposition to I answer that, As stated above (a. 1; q. 31, a. 1), two oneself, the evil action of an enemy becomes an object of things are requisite for pleasure, namely, the attainment of pleasure: whence it is written (1 Cor. 13:6) that charity one’s proper good, and the knowledge of having obtained “rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth.” it. Wherefore the action of another may cause pleasure Reply to Objection 1. Another’s action may be con- to us in three ways. First, from the fact that we obtain joined to me, either by its effect, as in the first way, or by some good through the action of another. And in this way, knowledge, as in the second way; or by affection, as in the the actions of those who do some good to us, are pleas- third way. ing to us: since it is pleasant to be benefited by another. Reply to Objection 2. This argument avails for the Secondly, from the fact that another’s action makes us to third mode, but not for the first two. know or appreciate our own good: and for this reason men Reply to Objection 3. Although the actions of an- take pleasure in being praised or honored by others, be- other do not proceed from habits that are in me, yet they cause, to wit, they thus become aware of some good ex- either produce in me something that gives pleasure; or isting in themselves. And since this appreciation receives they make me appreciate or know a habit of mind; or they greater weight from the testimony of good and wise men, proceed from the habit of one who is united to me by love. Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure? Ia IIae q. 32 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that doing good to another sure in three ways. First, in consideration of the effect, is not a cause of pleasure. Because pleasure is caused which is the good conferred on another. In this respect, by one’s obtaining one’s proper good, as stated above inasmuch as through being united to others by love, we (Aa. 1,5; q. 31, a. 1). But doing good pertains not to look upon their good as being our own, we take pleasure the obtaining but to the spending of one’s proper good. in the good we do to others, especially to our friends, as Therefore it seems to be the cause of sadness rather than in our own good. Secondly, in consideration of the end; of pleasure. as when a man, from doing good to another, hopes to get Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, some good for himself, either from God or from man: for 1) that “illiberality is more connatural to man than prodi- hope is a cause of pleasure. Thirdly, in consideration of gality.” Now it is a mark of prodigality to do good to oth- the principle: and thus, doing good to another, can give ers; while it is a mark of illiberality to desist from doing pleasure in respect of a threefold principle. One is the good. Since therefore everyone takes pleasure in a con- faculty of doing good: and in this regard, doing good to natural operation, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14 and x, 4, it another becomes pleasant, in so far as it arouses in man an seems that doing good to others is not a cause of pleasure. imagination of abundant good existing in him, whereof he Objection 3. Further, contrary effects proceed from is able to give others a share. Wherefore men take plea- contrary causes. But man takes a natural pleasure in cer- sure in their children, and in their own works, as being tain kinds of ill-doing, such as overcoming, contradicting things on which they bestow a share of their own good. or scolding others, or, if he be angry, in punishing them, as Another principle is man’s habitual inclination to do good, the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore doing good by reason of which doing good becomes connatural to to others is a cause of sadness rather than pleasure. him: for which reason the liberal man takes pleasure in On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) giving to others. The third principle is the motive: for in- that “it is most pleasant to give presents or assistance to stance when a man is moved by one whom he loves, to friends and strangers.” do good to someone: for whatever we do or suffer for a I answer that, Doing good to another may give plea- friend is pleasant, because love is the principal cause of 752 pleasure. generally all contests, in so far as they admit hope of vic- Reply to Objection 1. Spending gives pleasure as tory. To contradict and to scold can give pleasure in two showing forth one’s good. But in so far as it empties us of ways. First, as making man imagine himself to be wise our own good it may be a cause of sadness; for instance and excellent; since it belongs to wise men and elders to when it is excessive. reprove and to scold. Secondly, in so far as by scolding Reply to Objection 2. Prodigality is an excessive and reproving, one does good to another: for this gives spending, which is unnatural: wherefore prodigality is one pleasure, as stated above. It is pleasant to an angry said to be contrary to nature. man to punish, in so far as he thinks himself to be remov- Reply to Objection 3. To overcome, to contradict, ing an apparent slight, which seems to be due to a previous and to punish, give pleasure, not as tending to another’s hurt: for when a man is hurt by another, he seems to be ill, but as pertaining to one’s own good, which man loves slighted thereby; and therefore he wishes to be quit of this more than he hates another’s ill. For it is naturally pleas- slight by paying back the hurt. And thus it is clear that ant to overcome, inasmuch as it makes a man to appre- doing good to another may be of itself pleasant: whereas ciate his own superiority. Wherefore all those games in doing evil to another is not pleasant, except in so far as it which there is a striving for the mastery, and a possibility seems to affect one’s own good. of winning it, afford the greatest pleasure: and speaking Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure? Ia IIae q. 32 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that likeness is not a cause his own excellence or profits, which he seeks as his own of pleasure. Because ruling and presiding seem to imply good. a certain unlikeness. But “it is natural to take pleasure in Reply to Objection 1. Since ruler and subject are in ruling and presiding,” as stated in Rhetor. i, 11. Therefore communion with one another, there is a certain likeness unlikeness, rather than likeness, is a cause of pleasure. between them: but this likeness is conditioned by a cer- Objection 2. Further, nothing is more unlike pleasure tain superiority, since ruling and presiding pertain to the than sorrow. But those who are burdened by sorrow are excellence of a man’s own good: because they belong to most inclined to seek pleasures, as the Philosopher says men who are wise and better than others; the result being (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore unlikeness, rather than like- that they give man an idea of his own excellence. Another ness, is a cause of pleasure. reason is that by ruling and presiding, a man does good to Objection 3. Further, those who are satiated with cer- others, which is pleasant. tain delights, derive not pleasure but disgust from them; Reply to Objection 2. That which gives pleasure to as when one is satiated with food. Therefore likeness is the sorrowful man, though it be unlike sorrow, bears some not a cause of pleasure. likeness to the man that is sorrowful: because sorrows are On the contrary, Likeness is a cause of love, as above contrary to his own good. Wherefore the sorrowful man stated (q. 27, a. 3): and love is the cause of pleasure. seeks pleasure as making for his own good, in so far as Therefore likeness is a cause of pleasure. it is a remedy for its contrary. And this is why bodily I answer that, Likeness is a kind of unity; hence that pleasures, which are contrary to certain sorrows, are more which is like us, as being one with us, causes pleasure; sought than intellectual pleasures, which have no contrary just at it causes love, as stated above (q. 27, a. 3). And sorrow, as we shall state later on (q. 35, a. 5). And this if that which is like us does not hurt our own good, but explains why all animals naturally desire pleasure: be- increase it, it is pleasurable simply; for instance one man cause animals ever work through sense and movement. in respect of another, one youth in relation to another. But For this reason also young people are most inclined to if it be hurtful to our own good, thus accidentally it causes seek pleasures; on account of the many changes to which disgust or sadness, not as being like and one with us, but they are subject, while yet growing. Moreover this is why as hurtful to that which is yet more one with us. the melancholic has a strong desire for pleasures, in order Now it happens in two ways that something like is to drive away sorrow: because his “body is corroded by a hurtful to our own good. First, by destroying the measure base humor,” as stated in Ethic. vii, 14. of our own good, by a kind of excess; because good, espe- Reply to Objection 3. Bodily goods are conditioned cially bodily good, as health, is conditioned by a certain by a certain fixed measure: wherefore surfeit of such measure: wherefore superfluous good or any bodily plea- things destroys the proper good, and consequently gives sure, causes disgust. Secondly, by being directly contrary rise to disgust and sorrow, through being contrary to the to one’s own good: thus a potter dislikes other potters, not proper good of man. because they are potters, but because they deprive him of 753 Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure? Ia IIae q. 32 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that wonder is not a cause pleasing, for instance things that are scarce. Also, repre- of pleasure. Because wonder is the act of one who is igno- sentations of things, even of those which are not pleasant rant of the nature of something, as Damascene says. But in themselves, give rise to pleasure; for the soul rejoices in knowledge, rather than ignorance, is a cause of pleasure. comparing one thing with another, because comparison of Therefore wonder is not a cause of pleasure. one thing with another is the proper and connatural act of Objection 2. Further, wonder is the beginning of wis- the reason, as the Philosopher says (Poet. iv). This again dom, being as it were, the road to the search of truth, as is why “it is more delightful to be delivered from great stated in the beginning of Metaph. i, 2. But “it is more danger, because it is something wonderful,” as stated in pleasant to think of what we know, than to seek what we Rhetor. i, 11. know not,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 7): since Reply to Objection 1. Wonder gives pleasure, not be- in the latter case we encounter difficulties and hindrances, cause it implies ignorance, but in so far as it includes the in the former not; while pleasure arises from an operation desire of learning the cause, and in so far as the wonderer which is unhindered, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13. There- learns something new, i.e. that the cause is other than he fore wonder hinders rather than causes pleasure. had thought it to be.∗ Objection 3. Further, everyone takes pleasure in what Reply to Objection 2. Pleasure includes two things; he is accustomed to: wherefore the actions of habits ac- rest in the good, and perception of this rest. As to the quired by custom, are pleasant. But “we wonder at what former therefore, since it is more perfect to contemplate is unwonted,” as Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in Joan.). the known truth, than to seek for the unknown, the con- Therefore wonder is contrary to the cause of pleasure. templation of what we know, is in itself more pleasing On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) than the research of what we do not know. Nevertheless, that wonder is the cause of pleasure. as to the second, it happens that research is sometimes I answer that, It is pleasant to get what one desires, more pleasing accidentally, in so far as it proceeds from as stated above (q. 23, a. 4): and therefore the greater the a greater desire: for greater desire is awakened when we desire for the thing loved, the greater the pleasure when are conscious of our ignorance. This is why man takes the it is attained: indeed the very increase of desire brings greatest pleasure in finding or learning things for the first with it an increase of pleasure, according as it gives rise time. to the hope of obtaining that which is loved, since it was Reply to Objection 3. It is pleasant to do what we stated above (a. 3, ad 3) that desire resulting from hope is are wont to do, inasmuch as this is connatural to us, as it a cause of pleasure. Now wonder is a kind of desire for were. And yet things that are of rare occurrence can be knowledge; a desire which comes to man when he sees pleasant, either as regards knowledge, from the fact that an effect of which the cause either is unknown to him, we desire to know something about them, in so far as they or surpasses his knowledge or faculty of understanding. are wonderful; or as regards action, from the fact that “the Consequently wonder is a cause of pleasure, in so far as mind is more inclined by desire to act intensely in things it includes a hope of getting the knowledge which one de- that are new,” as stated in Ethic. x, 4, since more perfect sires to have. For this reason whatever is wonderful is operation causes more perfect pleasure. ∗ According to another reading:—that he is other than he thought himself to be. 754 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 33 Of the Effects of Pleasure (In Four Articles) We must now consider the effects of pleasure; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure? (2) Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself? (3) Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason? (4) Whether pleasure perfects operation? Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure? Ia IIae q. 33 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that expansion is not an ceives that he has attained a certain perfection, which is a effect of pleasure. For expansion seems to pertain more to magnitude of the spiritual order: and in this respect man’s love, according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 6:11): “Our heart is mind is said to be magnified or expanded by pleasure. The enlarged.” Wherefore it is written (Ps. 118:96) concern- other requisite for pleasure is on the part of the appetitive ing the precept of charity: “Thy commandment is exceed- power, which acquiesces in the pleasurable object, and ing broad.” But pleasure is a distinct passion from love. rests therein, offering, as it were, to enfold it within it- Therefore expansion is not an effect of pleasure. self. And thus man’s affection is expanded by pleasure, as Objection 2. Further, when a thing expands it is en- though it surrendered itself to hold within itself the object abled to receive more. But receiving pertains to desire, of its pleasure. which is for something not yet possessed. Therefore ex- Reply to Objection 1. In metaphorical expressions pansion seems to belong to desire rather than to pleasure. nothing hinders one and the same thing from being at- Objection 3. Further, contraction is contrary to ex- tributed to different things according to different like- pansion. But contraction seems to belong to pleasure, for nesses. And in this way expansion pertains to love by the hand closes on that which we wish to grasp firmly: reason of a certain spreading out, in so far as the affection and such is the affection of appetite in regard to that which of the lover spreads out to others, so as to care, not only pleases it. Therefore expansion does not pertain to plea- for his own interests, but also for what concerns others. sure. On the other hand expansion pertains to pleasure, in so far On the contrary, In order to express joy, it is written as a thing becomes more ample in itself so as to become (Is. 60:5): “Thou shall see and abound, thy heart shall more capacious. wonder and be enlarged.” Moreover pleasure is called by Reply to Objection 2. Desire includes a certain ex- the name of “laetitia” as being derived from “dilatatio” pansion arising from the imagination of the thing desired; [expansion], as stated above (q. 31, a. 3, ad 3). but this expansion increases at the presence of the plea- I answer that, Breadth [latitudo] is a dimension of surable object: because the mind surrenders itself more to bodily magnitude: hence it is not applied to the emo- that object when it is already taking pleasure in it, than tions of the soul, save metaphorically. Now expansion when it desires it before possessing it; since pleasure is denotes a kind of movement towards breadth; and it be- the end of desire. longs to pleasure in respect of the two things requisite for Reply to Objection 3. He that takes pleasure in a pleasure. One of these is on the part of the apprehensive thing holds it fast, by clinging to it with all his might: power, which is cognizant of the conjunction with some but he opens his heart to it that he may enjoy it perfectly. suitable good. As a result of this apprehension, man per- Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself? Ia IIae q. 33 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that pleasure does not cause desire. cause desire for itself. Because all movement ceases when Objection 2. Further, a thing does not cause its con- repose is reached. But pleasure is, as it were, a certain re- trary. But pleasure is, in a way, contrary to desire, on the pose of the movement of desire, as stated above (q. 23, part of the object: since desire regards a good which is a. 4; q. 25, a. 2). Therefore the movement of desire ceases not yet possessed, whereas pleasure regards the good that when pleasure is reached. Therefore pleasure does not is possessed. Therefore pleasure does not cause desire for 755 itself. the mere intensity of the emotion, that excludes distaste, Objection 3. Further, distaste is incompatible with de- thus more than all others spiritual pleasures cause thirst sire. But pleasure often causes distaste. Therefore it does or desire for themselves. Because bodily pleasures be- not cause desire. come distasteful by reason of their causing an excess in On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 4:13): “Whoso- the natural mode of being, when they are increased or ever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again”: where, ac- even when they are protracted; as is evident in the case cording to Augustine (Tract. xv in Joan.), water denotes of pleasures of the table. This is why, when a man arrives pleasures of the body. at the point of perfection in bodily pleasures, he wearies of I answer that, Pleasure can be considered in two them, and sometimes desires another kind. Spiritual plea- ways; first, as existing in reality; secondly, as existing in sures, on the contrary, do not exceed the natural mode of the memory. Again thirst, or desire, can be taken in two being, but perfect nature. Hence when their point of per- ways; first, properly, as denoting a craving for something fection is reached, then do they afford the greatest delight: not possessed; secondly, in general, as excluding distaste. except, perchance, accidentally, in so far as the work of Considered as existing in reality, pleasure does not of contemplation is accompanied by some operation of the itself cause thirst or desire for itself, but only acciden- bodily powers, which tire from protracted activity. And in tally; provided we take thirst or desire as denoting a crav- this sense also we may understand those words of Ecclus. ing for some thing not possessed: because pleasure is an 24:29: “They that drink me shall yet thirst”: for, even of emotion of the appetite in respect of something actually the angels, who know God perfectly, and delight in Him, present. But it may happen that what is actually present it is written (1 Pet. 1:12) that they “desire to look at Him.” is not perfectly possessed: and this may be on the part of Lastly, if we consider pleasure, not as existing in re- the thing possessed, or on the part of the possessor. On ality, but as existing in the memory, thus it has of itself a the part of the thing possessed, this happens through the natural tendency to cause thirst and desire for itself: when, thing possessed not being a simultaneous whole; where- to wit, man returns to that disposition, in which he was fore one obtains possession of it successively, and while when he experienced the pleasure that is past. But if he be taking pleasure in what one has, one desires to possess changed from that disposition, the memory of that plea- the remainder: thus if a man is pleased with the first part sure does not give him pleasure, but distaste: for instance, of a verse, he desires to hear the second part, as Augus- the memory of food in respect of a man who has eaten to tine says (Confess. iv, 11). In this way nearly all bodily repletion. pleasures cause thirst for themselves, until they are fully Reply to Objection 1. When pleasure is perfect, then realized, because pleasures of this kind arise from some it includes complete rest; and the movement of desire, movement: as is evident in pleasures of the table. On the tending to what was not possessed, ceases. But when it part of the possessor, this happens when a man possesses is imperfect, then the desire, tending to what was not pos- a thing which is perfect in itself, yet does not possess it sessed, does not cease altogether. perfectly, but obtains possession of it little by little. Thus Reply to Objection 2. That which is possessed imper- in this life, a faint perception of Divine knowledge affords fectly, is possessed in one respect, and in another respect us delight, and delight sets up a thirst or desire for perfect is not possessed. Consequently it may be the object of knowledge; in which sense we may understand the words desire and pleasure at the same time. of Ecclus. 24:29: “They that drink me shall yet thirst.” Reply to Objection 3. Pleasures cause distaste in one On the other hand, if by thirst or desire we understand way, desire in another, as stated above. Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason? Ia IIae q. 33 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that pleasure does not other. But pleasure is in the appetitive faculty, while the hinder the use of reason. Because repose facilitates very use of reason is in the apprehensive power. Therefore much the due use of reason: wherefore the Philosopher pleasure does not hinder the use of reason. says (Phys. vii, 3) that “while we sit and rest, the soul Objection 3. Further, that which is hindered by an- is inclined to knowledge and prudence”; and it is written other, seems to be moved, as it were, thereby. But the use (Wis. 8:16): “When I go into my house, I shall repose of an apprehensive power moves pleasure rather than is myself with her,” i.e. wisdom. But pleasure is a kind of moved by it: because it is the cause of pleasure. There- repose. Therefore it helps rather than hinders the use of fore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason. reason. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5), Objection 2. Further, things which are not in the same that “pleasure destroys the estimate of prudence.” subject though they be contraries, do not hinder one an- I answer that, As is stated in Ethic. x, 5, “appropri- 756 ate pleasures increase activity. . . whereas pleasures arising they hinder both estimates. Thirdly, by fettering the rea-from other sources are impediments to activity.” Accord- son: in so far as bodily pleasure is followed by a certain ingly there is a certain pleasure that is taken in the very act alteration in the body, greater even than in the other pas-of reason, as when one takes pleasure in contemplating or sions, in proportion as the appetite is more vehemently in reasoning: and such pleasure does not hinder the act affected towards a present than towards an absent thing. of reason, but helps it; because we are more attentive in Now such bodily disturbances hinder the use of reason; as doing that which gives us pleasure, and attention fosters may be seen in the case of drunkards, in whom the use of activity. reason is fettered or hindered. On the other hand bodily pleasures hinder the use of Reply to Objection 1. Bodily pleasure implies indeed reason in three ways. First, by distracting the reason. Be- repose of the appetite in the object of pleasure; which re- cause, as we have just observed, we attend much to that pose is sometimes contrary to reason; but on the part of which pleases us. Now when the attention is firmly fixed the body it always implies alteration. And in respect of on one thing, it is either weakened in respect of other both points, it hinders the use of reason. things, or it is entirely withdrawn from them; and thus Reply to Objection 2. The powers of the appetite and if the bodily pleasure be great, either it entirely hinders of apprehension are indeed distinct parts, but belonging the use of reason, by concentrating the mind’s attention to the one soul. Consequently when the soul is very intent on itself; or else it hinders it considerably. Secondly, by on the action of one part, it is hindered from attending to being contrary to reason. Because some pleasures, espe- a contrary act of the other part. cially those that are in excess, are contrary to the order of Reply to Objection 3. The use of reason requires the reason: and in this sense the Philosopher says that “bod- due use of the imagination and of the other sensitive pow- ily pleasures destroy the estimate of prudence, but not the ers, which are exercised through a bodily organ. Conse- speculative estimate,” to which they are not opposed, “for quently alteration in the body hinders the use of reason, instance that the three angles of a triangle are together because it hinders the act of the imagination and of the equal to two right angles.” In the first sense, however, other sensitive powers. Whether pleasure perfects operation? Ia IIae q. 33 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that pleasure does not per- end added to it”: that is to say, inasmuch as to this good, fect operation. For every human operation depends on the which is operation, there is added another good, which is use of reason. But pleasure hinders the use of reason, as pleasure, denoting the repose of the appetite in a good that stated above (a. 3). Therefore pleasure does not perfect, is presupposed. Secondly, as agent; not indeed directly, but weakens human operation. for the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that “pleasure per- Objection 2. Further, nothing perfects itself or its fects operation, not as a physician makes a man healthy, cause. But pleasure is an operation (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 4), but as health does”: but it does so indirectly; inasmuch as i.e. either in its essence or in its cause. Therefore pleasure the agent, through taking pleasure in his action, is more does not perfect operation. eagerly intent on it, and carries it out with greater care. Objection 3. Further, if pleasure perfects operation, And in this sense it is said in Ethic. x, 5 that “pleasures it does so either as end, or as form, or as agent. But increase their appropriate activities, and hinder those that not as end; because operation is not sought for the sake are not appropriate.” of pleasure, but rather the reverse, as stated above (q. 4, Reply to Objection 1. It is not every pleasure that a. 2): nor as agent, because rather is it the operation that hinders the act of reason, but only bodily pleasure; for causes pleasure: nor again as form, because, according to this arises, not from the act of reason, but from the act of the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 4), “pleasure does not perfect the concupiscible faculty, which act is intensified by plea- operation, as a habit does.” Therefore pleasure does not sure. On the contrary, pleasure that arises from the act of perfect operation. reason, strengthens the use of reason. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) Reply to Objection 2. As stated in Phys. ii, 3 two that “pleasure perfects operation.” things may be causes of one another, if one be the effi- I answer that, Pleasure perfects operation in two cient, the other the final cause. And in this way, operation ways. First, as an end: not indeed according as an end is the efficient cause of pleasure, while pleasure perfects is that on “account of which a thing is”; but according as operation by way of final cause, as stated above. every good which is added to a thing and completes it, can The Reply to the Third Objection is evident for what be called its end. And in this sense the Philosopher says has been said. (Ethic. x, 4) that “pleasure perfects operation. . . as some 757 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 34 Of the Goodness and Malice of Pleasures (In Four Articles) We must now consider the goodness and malice of pleasures: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether every pleasure is evil? (2) If not, whether every pleasure is good? (3) Whether any pleasure is the greatest good? (4) Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good and evil? Whether every pleasure is evil? Ia IIae q. 34 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that every pleasure is evil. that man, being prone to immoderate pleasures, arrives at For that which destroys prudence and hinders the use of the mean of virtue by abstaining from pleasure. But they reason, seems to be evil in itself: since man’s good is to were wrong in holding this opinion. Because, since none be “in accord with reason,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. can live without some sensible and bodily pleasure, if they iv). But pleasure destroys prudence and hinders the use of who teach that all pleasures are evil, are found in the act of reason; and so much the more, as the pleasure is greater: taking pleasure; men will be more inclined to pleasure by wherefore “in sexual pleasures,” which are the greatest of following the example of their works instead of listening all, “it is impossible to understand anything,” as stated in to the doctrine of their words: since, in human actions and Ethic. vii, 11. Moreover, Jerome says in his commentary passions, wherein experience is of great weight, example on Matthew∗ that “at the time of conjugal intercourse, the moves more than words. presence of the Holy Ghost is not vouchsafed, even if it be We must therefore say that some pleasures are good, a prophet that fulfils the conjugal duty.” Therefore plea- and that some are evil. For pleasure is a repose of the sure is evil in itself; and consequently every pleasure is appetitive power in some loved good, and resulting from evil. some operation; wherefore we assign a twofold reason for Objection 2. Further, that which the virtuous man this assertion. The first is in respect of the good in which a shuns, and the man lacking in virtue seeks, seems to be man reposes with pleasure. For good and evil in the moral evil in itself, and should be avoided; because, as stated order depend on agreement or disagreement with reason, in Ethic. x, 5 “the virtuous man is a kind of measure as stated above (q. 18, a. 5): just as in the order of nature, a and rule of human actions”; and the Apostle says (1 Cor. thing is said to be natural, if it agrees with nature, and un- 2:15): “The spiritual man judgeth all things.” But children natural, if it disagrees. Accordingly, just as in the natural and dumb animals, in whom there is no virtue, seek plea- order there is a certain natural repose, whereby a thing sure: whereas the man who is master of himself does not. rests in that which agrees with its nature, for instance, Therefore pleasures are evil in themselves and should be when a heavy body rests down below; and again an unnat- avoided. ural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which disagrees Objection 3. Further, “virtue and art are concerned with its nature, as when a heavy body rests up aloft: so, about the difficult and the good” (Ethic. ii, 3). But no art in the moral order, there is a good pleasure, whereby the is ordained to pleasure. Therefore pleasure is not some- higher or lower appetite rests in that which is in accord thing good. with reason; and an evil pleasure, whereby the appetite On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 36:4): “Delight in rests in that which is discordant from reason and the law the Lord.” Since, therefore, Divine authority leads to no of God. evil, it seems that not every pleasure is evil. The second reason can be found by considering the ac- I answer that, As stated in Ethic. x, 2,[3] some have tions, some of which are good, some evil. Now pleasures maintained that all pleasure is evil. The reason seems to which are conjoined to actions are more akin to those ac- have been that they took account only of sensible and bod- tions, than desires, which precede them in point of time. ily pleasures which are more manifest; since, also in other Wherefore, since the desires of good actions are good, and respects, the ancient philosophers did not discriminate be- of evil actions, evil; much more are the pleasures of good tween the intelligible and the sensible, nor between in- actions good, and those of evil actions evil. tellect and sense (De Anima iii, 3). And they held that Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 33, a. 3), all bodily pleasures should be reckoned as bad, and thus it is not the pleasures which result from an act of reason, ∗ Origen, Hom. vi in Num. 758 that hinder the reason or destroy prudence, but extraneous malice, namely, from the sin of our first parent; because, pleasures, such as the pleasures of the body. These indeed as stated in the Ia, q. 98, a. 2 the case was different in the hinder the use of reason, as stated above (q. 33, a. 3), ei- state of innocence. ther by contrariety of the appetite that rests in something Reply to Objection 2. The temperate man does not repugnant to reason, which makes the pleasure morally shun all pleasures, but those that are immoderate, and con- bad; or by fettering the reason: thus in conjugal inter- trary to reason. The fact that children and dumb animals course, though the pleasure be in accord with reason, yet seek pleasures, does not prove that all pleasures are evil: it hinders the use of reason, on account of the accompa- because they have from God their natural appetite, which nying bodily change. But in this case the pleasure is not is moved to that which is naturally suitable to them. morally evil; as neither is sleep, whereby the reason is Reply to Objection 3. Art is not concerned with all fettered, morally evil, if it be taken according to reason: kinds of good, but with the making of external things, as for reason itself demands that the use of reason be inter- we shall state further on (q. 57, a. 3). But actions and rupted at times. We must add, however, that although this passions, which are within us, are more the concern of fettering of the reason through the pleasure of conjugal prudence and virtue than of art. Nevertheless there is an intercourse has no moral malice, since it is neither a mor- art of making pleasure, namely, “the art of cookery and tal nor a venial sin; yet it proceeds from a kind of moral the art of making arguments,” as stated in Ethic. vii, 12. Whether every pleasure is good? Ia IIae q. 34 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that every pleasure is him by reason of a disposition in which he is now, which good. Because as stated in the Ia, q. 5, a. 6 there are three disposition, however, is not natural: thus it is sometimes kinds of good: the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. good for a leper to eat things that are poisonous, which But everything virtuous is good; and in like manner ev- are not suitable simply to the human temperament. In an- erything useful is good. Therefore also every pleasure is other way, through something unsuitable being esteemed good. suitable. And since pleasure is the repose of the appetite Objection 2. Further, that which is not sought for the in some good, if the appetite reposes in that which is good sake of something else, is good in itself, as stated in Ethic. simply, the pleasure will be pleasure simply, and good i, 6,7. But pleasure is not sought for the sake of some- simply. But if a man’s appetite repose in that which is thing else; for it seems absurd to ask anyone why he seeks good, not simply, but in respect of that particular man, to be pleased. Therefore pleasure is good in itself. Now then his pleasure will not be pleasure simply, but a plea- that which is predicated to a thing considered in itself, is sure to him; neither will it be good simply, but in a certain predicated thereof universally. Therefore every pleasure respect, or an apparent good. is good. Reply to Objection 1. The virtuous and the useful de- Objection 3. Further, that which is desired by all, pend on accordance with reason, and consequently noth- seems to be good of itself: because good is “what all ing is virtuous or useful, without being good. But the things seek,” as stated in Ethic. i, 1. But everyone seeks pleasant depends on agreement with the appetite, which some kind of pleasure, even children and dumb animals. tends sometimes to that which is discordant from reason. Therefore pleasure is good in itself: and consequently all Consequently not every object of pleasure is good in the pleasure is good. moral order which depends on the order of reason. On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 2:14): “Who are Reply to Objection 2. The reason why pleasure is not glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked sought for the sake of something else is because it is re- things.” pose in the end. Now the end may be either good or evil; I answer that, While some of the Stoics maintained although nothing can be an end except in so far as it is that all pleasures are evil, the Epicureans held that plea- good in respect of such and such a man: and so too with sure is good in itself, and that consequently all pleasures regard to pleasure. are good. They seem to have thus erred through not dis- Reply to Objection 3. All things seek pleasure in the criminating between that which is good simply, and that same way as they seek good: since pleasure is the repose which is good in respect of a particular individual. That of the appetite in good. But, just as it happens that not which is good simply, is good in itself. Now that which every good which is desired, is of itself and verily good; is not good in itself, may be good in respect of some indi- so not every pleasure is of itself and verily good. vidual in two ways. In one way, because it is suitable to 759 Whether any pleasure is the greatest good? Ia IIae q. 34 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that no pleasure is the one takes pleasure, not only in the “becoming” of knowl- greatest good. Because nothing generated is the greatest edge, for instance, when one learns or wonders, as stated good: since generation cannot be the last end. But plea- above (q. 32, a. 8, ad 2); but also in the act of contempla- sure is a consequence of generation: for the fact that a tion, by making use of knowledge already acquired. thing takes pleasure is due to its being established in its Secondly, because by greatest good he understood that own nature, as stated above (q. 31, a. 1). Therefore no which is the supreme good simply, i.e. the good as exist- pleasure is the greatest good. ing apart from, and unparticipated by, all else, in which Objection 2. Further, that which is the greatest good sense God is the Supreme Good; whereas we are speak- cannot be made better by addition. But pleasure is made ing of the greatest good in human things. Now the greatest better by addition; since pleasure together with virtue is good of everything is its last end. And the end, as stated better than pleasure without virtue. Therefore pleasure is above (q. 1, a. 8; q. 2, a. 7) is twofold; namely, the thing itnot the greatest good. self, and the use of that thing; thus the miser’s end is either Objection 3. Further, that which is the greatest good money or the possession of money. Accordingly, man’s is universally good, as being good of itself: since that last end may be said to be either God Who is the Supreme which is such of itself is prior to and greater than that Good simply; or the enjoyment of God, which implies a which is such accidentally. But pleasure is not universally certain pleasure in the last end. And in this sense a cer- good, as stated above (a. 2). Therefore pleasure is not the tain pleasure of man may be said to be the greatest among greatest good. human goods. On the contrary, Happiness is the greatest good: Reply to Objection 1. Not every pleasure arises from since it is the end of man’s life. But Happiness is not a “becoming”; for some pleasures result from perfect op- without pleasure: for it is written (Ps. 15:11): “Thou shalt erations, as stated above. Accordingly nothing prevents fill me with joy with Thy countenance; at Thy right hand some pleasure being the greatest good, although every are delights even to the end.” pleasure is not such. I answer that, Plato held neither with the Stoics, who Reply to Objection 2. This argument is true of asserted that all pleasures are evil, nor with the Epicure- the greatest good simply, by participation of which all ans, who maintained that all pleasures are good; but he things are good; wherefore no addition can make it better: said that some are good, and some evil; yet, so that no whereas in regard to other goods, it is universally true that pleasure be the sovereign or greatest good. But, judging any good becomes better by the addition of another good. from his arguments, he fails in two points. First, because, Moreover it might be said that pleasure is not something from observing that sensible and bodily pleasure consists extraneous to the operation of virtue, but that it accompa- in a certain movement and “becoming,” as is evident in nies it, as stated in Ethic. i, 8. satiety from eating and the like; he concluded that all plea- Reply to Objection 3. That pleasure is the greatest sure arises from some “becoming” and movement: and good is due not to the mere fact that it is pleasure, but to from this, since “becoming” and movement are the acts of the fact that it is perfect repose in the perfect good. Hence something imperfect, it would follow that pleasure is not it does not follow that every pleasure is supremely good, of the nature of ultimate perfection. But this is seen to be or even good at all. Thus a certain science is supremely evidently false as regards intellectual pleasures: because good, but not every science is. Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good or evil? Ia IIae q. 34 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that pleasure is not the them are good, and some evil. Therefore pleasure is not measure or rule of moral good and evil. Because “that the measure and rule of morals. which is first in a genus is the measure of all the rest” Objection 3. Further, judgment of the effect from its (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasure is not the first thing in the cause is more certain than judgment of cause from effect. moral genus, for it is preceded by love and desire. There- Now goodness or malice of operation is the cause of good- fore it is not the rule of goodness and malice in moral ness or malice of pleasure: because “those pleasures are matters. good which result from good operations, and those are Objection 2. Further, a measure or rule should be uni- evil which arise from evil operations,” as stated in Ethic. form; hence that movement which is the most uniform, is x, 5. Therefore pleasures are not the rule and measure of the measure and rule of all movements (Metaph. x, 1). moral goodness and malice. But pleasures are various and multiform: since some of On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on Ps. 7:10 760 “The searcher of hearts and reins is God,” says: “The end good and of evil men. But the will of the good man takes of care and thought is the pleasure which each one aims pleasure in them in accordance with reason, to which the at achieving.” And the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11) will of the evil man gives no heed. that “pleasure is the architect,” i.e. the principal, “end∗, Reply to Objection 1. Love and desire precede plea- in regard to which, we say absolutely that this is evil, and sure in the order of generation. But pleasure precedes that, good.” them in the order of the end, which serves a principle in I answer that, Moral goodness or malice depends actions; and it is by the principle, which is the rule and chiefly on the will, as stated above (q. 20, a. 1); and it measure of such matters, that we form our judgment. is chiefly from the end that we discern whether the will is Reply to Objection 2. All pleasures are uniform in good or evil. Now the end is taken to be that in which the the point of their being the repose of the appetite in some- will reposes: and the repose of the will and of every ap- thing good: and in this respect pleasure can be a rule or petite in the good is pleasure. And therefore man is reck- measure. Because that man is good, whose will rests in oned to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure the true good: and that man evil, whose will rests in evil. of the human will; since that man is good and virtuous, Reply to Objection 3. Since pleasure perfects opera- who takes pleasure in the works of virtue; and that man tion as its end, as stated above (q. 33, a. 4); an operation evil, who takes pleasure in evil works. cannot be perfectly good, unless there be also pleasure in On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite good: because the goodness of a thing depends on its end. are not the rule of moral goodness and malice; since food And thus, in a way, the goodness of the pleasure is the is universally pleasurable to the sensitive appetite both of cause of goodness in the operation. ∗ St. Thomas took “finis” as being the nominative, whereas it is the genitive— tou telous; and the Greek reads “He” (i.e. the political philosopher), “is the architect of the end.” 761 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 35 Of Pain or Sorrow, in Itself (In Eight Articles) We have now to consider pain and sorrow: concerning which we must consider: (1) Sorrow or pain in itself; (2) Its cause; (3) Its effects; (4) Its remedies; (5) Its goodness or malice. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether pain is a passion of the soul? (2) Whether sorrow is the same as pain? (3) Whether sorrow or pain is contrary in pleasure? (4) Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure? (5) Whether there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation? (6) Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought? (7) Whether exterior pain is greater than interior? (8) Of the species of sorrow. Whether pain is a passion of the soul? Ia IIae q. 35 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that pain is not a passion evident that something under the aspect of good or evil is of the soul. Because no passion of the soul is in the body. the object of the pleasure or pain. But good and evil, as But pain can be in the body, since Augustine says (De such, are objects of the appetite. Consequently it is clear Vera Relig. xii), that “bodily pain is a sudden corruption that pleasure and pain belong to the appetite. of the well-being of that thing which the soul, by making Now every appetitive movement or inclination conse- evil use of it, made subject to corruption.” Therefore pain quent to apprehension, belongs to the intellective or sen- is not a passion of the soul. sitive appetite: since the inclination of the natural appetite Objection 2. Further, every passion of the soul be- is not consequent to an apprehension of the subject of that longs to the appetitive faculty. But pain does not belong to appetite, but to the apprehension of another, as stated in the appetitive, but rather to the apprehensive part: for Au- the Ia, q. 103, Aa. 1,3. Since then pleasure and pain pre- gustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that “bodily pain is caused suppose some sense or apprehension in the same subject, by the sense resisting a more powerful body.” Therefore it is evident that pain, like pleasure, is in the intellective pain is not a passion of the soul. or sensitive appetite. Objection 3. Further, every passion of the soul be- Again every movement of the sensitive appetite is longs to the animal appetite. But pain does not belong to called a passion, as stated above (q. 22, Aa. 1,3): and es- the animal appetite, but rather to the natural appetite; for pecially those which tend to some defect. Consequently Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14): “Had not some pain, according as it is in the sensitive appetite, is most good remained in nature, we should feel no pain in be- properly called a passion of the soul: just as bodily ail- ing punished by the loss of good.” Therefore pain is not a ments are properly called passions of the body. Hence passion of the soul. Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,[8]∗) reckons pain espe- On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8) reck- cially as being a kind of ailment. ons pain among the passions of the soul; quoting Vir- Reply to Objection 1. We speak of the body, because gil (Aeneid, vi, 733): “hence wild desires and grovelling the cause of pain is in the body: as when we suffer some- fears/And human laughter, human tears.” [Translation: thing hurtful to the body. But the movement of pain is al- Conington.] ways in the soul; since “the body cannot feel pain unless I answer that, Just as two things are requisite for pleathe soul feel it,” as Augustine says (Super Psalm 87:4). sure; namely, conjunction with good and perception of Reply to Objection 2. We speak of pain of the senses, this conjunction; so also two things are requisite for pain: not as though it were an act of the sensitive power; but be- namely, conjunction with some evil (which is in so far evil cause the senses are required for bodily pain, in the same as it deprives one of some good), and perception of this way as for bodily pleasure. conjunction. Now whatever is conjoined, if it have not the Reply to Objection 3. Pain at the loss of good proves aspect of good or evil in regard to the being to which it the goodness of the nature, not because pain is an act of is conjoined, cannot cause pleasure or pain. Whence it is the natural appetite, but because nature desires something ∗ Quoting Cicero 762 as good, the removal of which being perceived, there results the passion of pain in the sensitive appetite. Whether sorrow is the same as pain? Ia IIae q. 35 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow is not pain. Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking there For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that “pain is used of the use of the word: because “pain” is more generally to express bodily suffering.” But sorrow is used more in used in reference to bodily pains, which are better known, reference to the soul. Therefore sorrow is not pain. than in reference to spiritual pains. Objection 2. Further, pain is only in respect of present Reply to Objection 2. External sense perceives only evil. But sorrow can refer to both past and future evil: thus what is present; but the interior cognitive power can per- repentance is sorrow for the past, and anxiety for the fu- ceive the present, past and future. Consequently sorrow ture. Therefore sorrow is quite different from pain. can regard present, past and future: whereas bodily pain, Objection 3. Further, pain seems not to follow save which follows apprehension of the external sense, can from the sense of touch. But sorrow can arise from all the only regard something present. senses. Therefore sorrow is not pain, and extends to more Reply to Objection 3. The sensibles of touch are objects. painful, not only in so far as they are disproportionate to On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 9:2): “I the apprehensive power, but also in so far as they are con- have great sorrow [Douay: ‘sadness’] and continual pain trary to nature: whereas the objects of the other senses can [Douay: ‘sorrow’] in my heart,” thus denoting the same indeed be disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but thing by sorrow and pain. they are not contrary to nature, save as they are subordi- I answer that, Pleasure and pain can arise from a nate to the sensibles of touch. Consequently man alone, twofold apprehension, namely, from the apprehension of who is a perfectly cognizant animal, takes pleasure in the an exterior sense; and from the interior apprehension of objects of the other senses for their own sake; whereas the intellect or of the imagination. Now the interior appre- other animals take no pleasure in them save as referable hension extends to more objects than the exterior appre- to the sensibles of touch, as stated in Ethic. iii, 10. Ac- hension: because whatever things come under the exterior cordingly, in referring to the objects of the other senses, apprehension, come under the interior, but not conversely. we do not speak of pain in so far as it is contrary to natu- Consequently that pleasure alone which is caused by an ral pleasure: but rather of sorrow, which is contrary to joy. interior apprehension is called joy, as stated above (q. 31, So then if pain be taken as denoting bodily pain, which a. 3): and in like manner that pain alone which is caused is its more usual meaning, then it is contrasted with sor- by an interior apprehension, is called sorrow. And just row, according to the distinction of interior and exterior as that pleasure which is caused by an exterior apprehen- apprehension; although, on the part of the objects, plea- sion, is called pleasure but not joy; so too that pain which sure extends further than does bodily pain. But if pain be is caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pain in- taken in a wide sense, then it is the genus of sorrow, as deed but not sorrow. Accordingly sorrow is a species of stated above. pain, as joy is a species of pleasure. Whether sorrow or pain is contrary to pleasure? Ia IIae q. 35 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow is not contrary the other; because contraries cannot co-exist together. But to pleasure. For one of two contraries is not the cause of sorrow can be the matter of pleasure; for Augustine says the other. But sorrow can be the cause of pleasure; for it (De Poenit. xiii): “The penitent should ever sorrow, and is written (Mat. 5:5): “Blessed are they that mourn, for rejoice in his sorrow.” The Philosopher too says (Ethic. they shall be comforted.” Therefore they are not contrary ix, 4) that, on the other hand, “the evil man feels pain at to one another. having been pleased.” Therefore pleasure and pain are not Objection 2. Further, one contrary does not denomi- contrary to one another. nate the other. But to some, pain or sorrow gives pleasure: On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) thus Augustine says (Confess. iii, 2) that in stage-plays that “joy is the volition of consent to the things we wish: sorrow itself gives pleasure: and (Confess. iv, 5) that and that sorrow is the volition of dissent from the things “weeping is a bitter thing, and yet it sometimes pleases we do not wish.” But consent and dissent are contraries. us.” Therefore pain is not contrary to pleasure. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are contrary to one another. Objection 3. Further, one contrary is not the matter of I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, 763 4), contrariety is a difference in respect of a form. Now hardships and straits in order to obtain it. the form or species of a passion or movement is taken Reply to Objection 2. Pain itself can be pleasurable from the object or term. Consequently, since the objects of accidentally in so far as it is accompanied by wonder, as pleasure and sorrow or pain, viz. present good and present in stage-plays; or in so far as it recalls a beloved object evil, are contrary to one another, it follows that pain and to one’s memory, and makes one feel one’s love for the pleasure are contrary to one another. thing, whose absence gives us pain. Consequently, since Reply to Objection 1. Nothing hinders one contrary love is pleasant, both pain and whatever else results from causing the other accidentally: and thus sorrow can be the love, forasmuch as they remind us of our love, are pleas- cause of pleasure. In one way, in so far as from sorrow ant. And, for this reason, we derive pleasure even from at the absence of something, or at the presence of its con- pains depicted on the stage: in so far as, in witnessing trary, one seeks the more eagerly for something pleasant: them, we perceive ourselves to conceive a certain love for thus a thirsty man seeks more eagerly the pleasure of a those who are there represented. drink, as a remedy for the pain he suffers. In another way, Reply to Objection 3. The will and the reason reflect in so far as, from a strong desire for a certain pleasure, on their own acts, inasmuch as the acts themselves of the one does not shrink from undergoing pain, so as to obtain will and reason are considered under the aspect of good that pleasure. In each of these ways, the sorrows of the or evil. In this way sorrow can be the matter of pleasure, present life lead us to the comfort of the future life. Be- or vice versa, not essentially but accidentally: that is, in cause by the mere fact that man mourns for his sins, or for so far as either of them is considered under the aspect of the delay of glory, he merits the consolation of eternity. good or evil. In like manner a man merits it when he shrinks not from Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure? Ia IIae q. 35 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that all sorrow is contrary species from their terms or objects. Accordingly in those to all pleasure. Because, just as whiteness and blackness things that are specified by absolute forms, it happens that are contrary species of color, so pleasure and sorrow are species contained under contrary genera are not contrary contrary species of the soul’s passions. But whiteness and as to their specific nature: but it does not happen for them blackness are universally contrary to one another. There- to have any affinity or fittingness to one another. For in- fore pleasure and sorrow are so too. temperance and justice, which are in the contrary genera Objection 2. Further, remedies are made of things of virtue and vice, are not contrary to one another in re- contrary (to the evil). But every pleasure is a remedy for spect of their specific nature; and yet they have no affinity all manner of sorrow, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. or fittingness to one another. On the other hand, in those vii, 14). Therefore every pleasure is contrary to every sor- things that are specified in relation to something extrin- row. sic, it happens that species belonging to contrary genera, Objection 3. Further, contraries are hindrances to one are not only not contrary to one another, but also that they another. But every sorrow hinders any kind of pleasure: have a certain mutual affinity or fittingness. The reason of as is evident from Ethic. x, 5. Therefore every sorrow is this is that where there is one same relation to two con- contrary to every pleasure. traries, there is contrariety; e.g. to approach to a white On the contrary, The same thing is not the cause of thing, and to approach to a black thing, are contraries; contraries. But joy for one thing, and sorrow for the oppo- whereas contrary relations to contrary things, implies a site thing, proceed from the same habit: thus from charity certain likeness, e.g. to recede from something white, and it happens that we “rejoice with them that rejoice,” and to approach to something black. This is most evident in “weep with them that weep” (Rom. 12:15). Therefore not the case of contradiction, which is the principle of oppo- every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure. sition: because opposition consists in affirming and deny- I answer that, As stated in Metaph. x, 4 contrari- ing the same thing, e.g. “white” and “non-white”; while ety is a difference in respect of a form. Now a form may there is fittingness and likeness in the affirmation of one be generic or specific. Consequently things may be con- contrary and the denial of the other, as, if I were to say traries in respect of a generic form, as virtue and vice; or “black” and “not white.” in respect of a specific form, as justice and injustice. Now sorrow and pleasure, being passions, are speci- Now we must observe that some things are specified fied by their objects. According to their respective gen- by absolute forms, e.g. substances and qualities; whereas era, they are contrary to one another: since one is a kind other things are specified in relation to something extrin- of “pursuit,” the other a kind of “avoidance,” which “are sic, e.g. passions and movements, which derive their to the appetite, what affirmation and denial are to the in- 764 tellect” (Ethic. vi, 2). Consequently sorrow and pleasure ject takes the place of matter. Now it has been said above in respect of the same object, are specifically contrary to that pleasure and sorrow are generically contrary to one one another: whereas sorrow and pleasure in respect of another. Consequently in every sorrow the subject has a objects that are not contrary but disparate, are not specif- disposition contrary to the disposition of the subject of ically contrary to one another, but are also disparate; for pleasure: because in every pleasure the appetite is viewed instance, sorrow at the death of a friend, and pleasure in as accepting what it possesses, and in every sorrow, as contemplation. If, however, those diverse objects be con- avoiding it. And therefore on the part of the subject every trary to one another, then pleasure and sorrow are not only pleasure is a remedy for any kind of sorrow, and every sor- specifically contrary, but they also have a certain mutual row is a hindrance of all manner of pleasure: but chiefly fittingness and affinity: for instance to rejoice in good and when pleasure is opposed to sorrow specifically. to sorrow for evil. Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. Reply to Objection 1. Whiteness and blackness do Or we may say that, although not every sorrow is specif- not take their species from their relationship to something ically contrary to every pleasure, yet they are contrary to extrinsic, as pleasure and sorrow do: wherefore the com- one another in regard to their effects: since one has the parison does not hold. effect of strengthening the animal nature, while the other Reply to Objection 2. Genus is taken from matter, results in a kind of discomfort. as is stated in Metaph. viii, 2; and in accidents the sub- Whether there is any sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation? Ia IIae q. 35 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that there is a sorrow that templation. Therefore there is no sorrow contrary to the is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. For the Apos- pleasure of contemplation. tle says (2 Cor. 7:10): “The sorrow that is according to I answer that, The pleasure of contemplation can be God, worketh penance steadfast unto salvation.” Now to understood in two ways. In one way, so that contempla- look at God belongs to the higher reason, whose act is to tion is the cause, but not the object of pleasure: and then give itself to contemplation, according to Augustine (De pleasure is taken not in contemplating but in the thing con- Trin. xii, 3,4). Therefore there is a sorrow contrary to the templated. Now it is possible to contemplate something pleasure of contemplation. harmful and sorrowful, just as to contemplate something Objection 2. Further, contrary things have contrary suitable and pleasant. Consequently if the pleasure of con- effects. If therefore the contemplation of one contrary templation be taken in this way, nothing hinders some sor- gives pleasure, the other contrary will give sorrow: and row being contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. so there will be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of con- In another way, the pleasure of contemplation is un- templation. derstood, so that contemplation is its object and cause; as Objection 3. Further, as the object of pleasure is good, when one takes pleasure in the very act of contemplating. so the object of sorrow is evil. But contemplation can be And thus, according to Gregory of Nyssa∗, “no sorrow is an evil: since the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, 9) that “it contrary to that pleasure which is about contemplation”: is unfitting to think of certain things.” Therefore sorrow and the Philosopher says the same (Topic. i, 13; Ethic. x, can be contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. 3). This, however, is to be understood as being the case Objection 4. Further, any work, so far as it is unhin- properly speaking. The reason is because sorrow is of it- dered, can be a cause of pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, self contrary to pleasure in a contrary object: thus pleasure 12,13; x, 4. But the work of contemplation can be hin- in heat is contrary to sorrow caused by cold. But there is dered in many ways, either so as to destroy it altogether, no contrary to the object of contemplation: because con- or as to make it difficult. Therefore in contemplation there traries, as apprehended by the mind, are not contrary, but can be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure. one is the means of knowing the other. Wherefore, prop- Objection 5. Further, affliction of the flesh is a cause erly speaking, there cannot be a sorrow contrary to the of sorrow. But, as it is written (Eccles. 12:12) “much pleasure of contemplation. Nor has it any sorrow annexed study is an affliction of the flesh.” Therefore contempla- to it, as bodily pleasures have, which are like remedies tion admits of sorrow contrary to its pleasure. against certain annoyances; thus a man takes pleasure in On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 8:16): “Her,” i.e. drinking through being troubled with thirst, but when the wisdom’s, “conversation hath no bitterness nor her com- thirst is quite driven out, the pleasure of drinking ceases pany any tediousness; but joy and gladness.” Now the also. Because the pleasure of contemplation is not caused conversation and company of wisdom are found in con- by one’s being quit of an annoyance, but by the fact that ∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii. 765 contemplation is pleasant in itself: for pleasure is not a is evident from what has been said above (a. 4): while pain “becoming” but a perfect operation, as stated above (q. 31, or sorrow caused by bodily weariness, does not belong to a. 1). the same genus, wherefore it is altogether disparate. Ac- Accidentally, however, sorrow is mingled with the cordingly it is evident that no sorrow is contrary to plea- pleasure of contemplation; and this in two ways: first, sure taken in the very act of contemplation; nor is any on the part of an organ, secondly, through some impedi- sorrow connected with it save accidentally. ment in the apprehension. On the part of an organ, sorrow Reply to Objection 1. The “sorrow which is accord- or pain is mingled with apprehension, directly, as regards ing to God,” is not caused by the very act of intellectual the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part, which have contemplation, but by something which the mind contem- a bodily organ; either from the sensible object disagree- plates: viz. by sin, which the mind considers as contrary ing with the normal condition of the organ, as the taste of to the love of God. something bitter, and the smell of something foul; or from Reply to Objection 2. Things which are contrary ac- the sensible object, though agreeable, being so continu- cording to nature are not contrary according as they exist ous in its action on the sense, that it exceeds the normal in the mind: for things that are contrary in reality are not condition of the organ, as stated above (q. 33, a. 2), the re- contrary in the order of thought; indeed rather is one con- sult being that an apprehension which at first was pleasant trary the reason for knowing the other. Hence one and the becomes tedious. But these two things cannot occur di- same science considers contraries. rectly in the contemplation of the mind; because the mind Reply to Objection 3. Contemplation, in itself, is has no corporeal organ: wherefore it was said in the au- never evil, since it is nothing else than the consideration thority quoted above that intellectual contemplation has of truth, which is the good of the intellect: it can, however, neither “bitterness,” nor “tediousness.” Since, however, be evil accidentally, i.e. in so far as the contemplation of the human mind, in contemplation, makes use of the sen- a less noble object hinders the contemplation of a more sitive powers of apprehension, to whose acts weariness is noble object; or on the part of the object contemplated, to incidental; therefore some affliction or pain is indirectly which the appetite is inordinately attached. mingled with contemplation. Reply to Objection 4. Sorrow caused by a hindrance Nevertheless, in neither of these ways, is the pain thus to contemplation, is not contrary to the pleasure of con- accidentally mingled with contemplation, contrary to the templation, but is in harmony with it, as stated above. pleasure thereof. Because pain caused by a hindrance to Reply to Objection 5. Affliction of the flesh affects contemplation, is not contrary to the pleasure of contem- contemplation accidentally and indirectly, as stated above. plation, but rather is in affinity and in harmony with it, as Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought? Ia IIae q. 35 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow is to be is more virtuous than the temperate man, who resists the shunned more than pleasure is to be sought. For Augus- movement of desire for pleasure: since the Philosopher tine says (QQ. 83, qu. 63): “There is nobody that does says (Rhet. ii, 4) that “the brave and the just are chiefly not shun sorrow more than he seeks pleasure.” Now that praised.” Therefore the movement of shunning sorrow is which all agree in doing, seems to be natural. Therefore more eager than the movement of seeking pleasure. it is natural and right for sorrow to be shunned more than On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil, as pleasure is sought. Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure is desir- Objection 2. Further, the action of a contrary con- able for the sake of the good which is its object; whereas duces to rapidity and intensity of movement: for “hot wa- the shunning of sorrow is on account of evil. Therefore ter freezes quicker and harder,” as the Philosopher says the desire for pleasure is more eager than the shunning of (Meteor. i, 12). But the shunning of sorrow is due to the sorrow. contrariety of the cause of sorrow; whereas the desire for I answer that, The desire for pleasure is of itself more pleasure does not arise from any contrariety, but rather eager than the shunning of sorrow. The reason of this is from the suitableness of the pleasant object. Therefore that the cause of pleasure is a suitable good; while the sorrow is shunned more eagerly than pleasure is sought. cause of pain or sorrow is an unsuitable evil. Now it Objection 3. Further, the stronger the passion which a happens that a certain good is suitable without any re- man resists according to reason, the more worthy is he of pugnance at all: but it is not possible for any evil to be praise, and the more virtuous: since “virtue is concerned so unsuitable as not to be suitable in some way. Where- with the difficult and the good” (Ethic. ii, 3). But the fore pleasure can be entire and perfect: whereas sorrow is brave man who resists the movement of shunning sorrow, always partial. Therefore desire for pleasure is naturally 766 greater than the shunning of sorrow. Another reason is be-Reply to Objection 1. The saying of Augustine that cause the good, which is the object of pleasure, is sought “sorrow is shunned more than pleasure is sought” is true for its own sake: whereas the evil, which is the object of accidentally but not simply. And this is clear from what sorrow, is to be shunned as being a privation of good: and he says after: “Since we see that the most savage animals that which is by reason of itself is stronger than that which are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear of pain,” is by reason of something else. Moreover we find a con- which pain is contrary to life which is loved above all. firmation of this in natural movements. For every natural Reply to Objection 2. It is not the same with move- movement is more intense in the end, when a thing ap- ment from within and movement from without. For move- proaches the term that is suitable to its nature, than at the ment from within tends to what is suitable more than it beginning, when it leaves the term that is unsuitable to its recedes from that which is unsuitable; as we remarked nature: as though nature were more eager in tending to above in regard to natural movement. But movement from what is suitable to it, than in shunning what is unsuitable. without is intensified by the very opposition: because each Therefore the inclination of the appetitive power is, of it- thing strives in its own way to resist anything contrary to self, more eager in tending to pleasure than in shunning it, as aiming at its own preservation. Hence violent move- sorrow. ment is intense at first, and slackens towards the end. Now But it happens accidentally that a man shuns sorrow the movement of the appetitive faculty is from within: more eagerly than he seeks pleasure: and this for three since it tends from the soul to the object. Consequently reasons. First, on the part of the apprehension. Because, pleasure is, of itself, more to be sought than sorrow is to as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), “love is felt more be shunned. But the movement of the sensitive faculty keenly, when we lack that which we love.” Now from the is from without, as it were from the object of the soul. lack of what we love, sorrow results, which is caused ei- Consequently the more contrary a thing is the more it is ther by the loss of some loved good, or by the presence felt. And then too, accidentally, in so far as the senses are of some contrary evil. But pleasure suffers no lack of the requisite for pleasure and pain, pain is shunned more than good loved, for it rests in possession of it. Since then love pleasure is sought. is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, the latter is more the Reply to Objection 3. A brave man is not praised shunned, according as love is the more keenly felt on ac- because, in accordance with reason, he is not overcome count of that which is contrary to it. Secondly, on the part by any kind of sorrow or pain whatever, but because he is of the cause of sorrow or pain, which cause is repugnant not overcome by that which is concerned with the dangers to a good that is more loved than the good in which we of death. And this kind of sorrow is more shunned, than take pleasure. For we love the natural well-being of the pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse are sought, body more than the pleasure of eating: and consequently which latter pleasures are the object of temperance: thus we would leave the pleasure of eating and the like, from life is loved more than food and sexual pleasure. But the fear of the pain occasioned by blows or other such causes, temperate man is praised for refraining from pleasures of which are contrary to the well-being of the body. Thirdly, touch, more than for not shunning the pains which are on the part of the effect: namely, in so far as sorrow hin- contrary to them, as is stated in Ethic. iii, 11. ders not only one pleasure, but all. Whether outward pain is greater than interior sorrow? Ia IIae q. 35 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that outward pain is But outward pain has more striking effects: since man dies greater than interior sorrow of the heart. Because outward sooner of outward pain than of interior sorrow. Therefore pain arises from a cause repugnant to the well-being of the outward pain is greater and is shunned more than interior body in which is life: whereas interior sorrow is caused by sorrow. some evil in the imagination. Since, therefore, life is loved On the contrary, it is written (Ecclus. 25:17): “The more than an imagined good, it seems that, according to sadness of the heart is every wound [Douay: ‘plague’], what has been said above (a. 6), outward pain is greater and the wickedness of a woman is all evil.” Therefore, just than interior sorrow. as the wickedness of a woman surpasses all other wicked- Objection 2. Further, the reality moves more than its ness, as the text implies; so sadness of the heart surpasses likeness does. But outward pain arises from the real con- every outward wound. junction of some contrary; whereas inward sorrow arises I answer that, Interior and exterior pain agree in one from the apprehended likeness of a contrary. Therefore point and differ in two. They agree in this, that each is a outward pain is greater than inward sorrow. movement of the appetitive power, as stated above (a. 1). Objection 3. Further, a cause is known by its effect. But they differ in respect of those two things which are 767 requisite for pain and pleasure; namely, in respect of the whatever is apprehended by sense may be apprehended cause, which is a conjoined good or evil; and in respect by imagination and reason, but not conversely. Hence in of the apprehension. For the cause of outward pain is a the passage quoted above it is said expressively: “Sadness conjoined evil repugnant to the body; while the cause of of the heart is every wound,” because even the pains of inward pain is a conjoined evil repugnant to the appetite. outward wounds are comprised in the interior sorrows of Again, outward pain arises from an apprehension of sense, the heart. chiefly of touch; while inward pain arises from an interior Reply to Objection 1. Inward pain can also arise from apprehension, of the imagination or of the reason. things that are destructive of life. And then the compari- If then we compare the cause of inward pain to the son of inward to outward pain must not be taken in refer- cause of outward pain, the former belongs, of itself, to the ence to the various evils that cause pain; but in regard to appetite to which both these pains belong: while the lat- the various ways in which this cause of pain is compared ter belongs to the appetite directly. Because inward pain to the appetite. arises from something being repugnant to the appetite it- Reply to Objection 2. Inward pain is not caused by self, while outward pain arises from something being re- the apprehended likeness of a thing: for a man is not in- pugnant to the appetite, through being repugnant to the wardly pained by the apprehended likeness itself, but by body. Now, that which is of itself is always prior to that the thing which the likeness represents. And this thing which is by reason of another. Wherefore, from this point is all the more perfectly apprehended by means of its of view, inward pain surpasses outward pain. In like man- likeness, as this likeness is more immaterial and abstract. ner also on the part of apprehension: because the appre- Consequently inward pain is, of itself, greater, as being hension of reason and imagination is of a higher order caused by a greater evil, forasmuch as evil is better known than the apprehension of the sense of touch. Consequently by an inward apprehension. inward pain is, simply and of itself, more keen than out- Reply to Objection 3. Bodily changes are more liable ward pain: a sign whereof is that one willingly undergoes to be caused by outward pain, both from the fact that out- outward pain in order to avoid inward pain: and in so far ward pain is caused by a corruptive conjoined corporally, as outward pain is not repugnant to the interior appetite, which is a necessary condition of the sense of touch; and it becomes in a manner pleasant and agreeable by way of from the fact that the outward sense is more material than inward joy. Sometimes, however, outward pain is accom- the inward sense, just as the sensitive appetite is more ma- panied by inward pain, and then the pain is increased. Be- terial than the intellective. For this reason, as stated above cause inward pain is not only greater than outward pain, (q. 22, a. 3; q. 31, a. 5 ), the body undergoes a greater it is also more universal: since whatever is repugnant to change from the movement of the sensitive appetite: and, the body, can be repugnant to the interior appetite; and in like manner, from outward than from inward pain. Whether there are only four species of sorrow? Ia IIae q. 35 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that Damascene’s (De it is possible for one to sorrow for another’s wrongs, and Fide Orth. ii, 14) division of sorrow into four species is for another’s good, and at the same time to be weighed incorrect; viz. into “torpor, distress,” which Gregory of down inwardly, and outwardly to be speechless. There- Nyssa∗ calls “anxiety,”—“pity,” and “envy.” For sorrow fore this division is correct. is contrary to pleasure. But there are not several species On the contrary, stands the twofold authority of Gre- of pleasure. Therefore it is incorrect to assign different gory of Nyssa‡ and of Damascene. species of sorrow. I answer that, It belongs to the notion of a species Objection 2. Further, “Repentance” is a species of that it is something added to the genus. But a thing can be sorrow; and so are “indignation” and “jealousy,” as the added to a genus in two ways. First, as something belong- Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9,11). But these are not in- ing of itself to the genus, and virtually contained therein: cluded in the above species. Therefore this division is in- thus “rational” is added to “animal.” Such an addition sufficient. makes true species of a genus: as the Philosopher says Objection 3. Further, the members of a division (Metaph. vii, 12; viii, 2,3). But, secondly, a thing may be should be things that are opposed to one another. But added to a genus, that is, as it were, foreign to the notion these species are not opposed to one another. For accord- conveyed by that genus: thus “white” or something of the ing to Gregory† “torpor is sorrow depriving of speech; kind may be added to “animal.” Such an addition does anxiety is the sorrow that weighs down; envy is sorrow for not make true species of the genus, according to the usual another’s good; pity is sorrow for another’s wrongs.” But sense in which we speak of genera and species. But some- ∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix. † Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix. ‡ Nemesius 768 times a thing is said to be a species of a certain genus, which weighs on the mind, so as to make escape seem im-through having something foreign to that genus indeed, possible: hence it is also called “perplexity.” If, however, but to which the notion of that genus is applicable: thus a the mind be weighed down so much, that even the limbs live coal or a flame is said to be a species of fire, because become motionless, which belongs to “torpor,” then we in each of them the nature of fire is applied to a foreign have the foreign element affecting both, since there is nei- matter. In like manner we speak of astronomy and per- ther flight, nor is the effect in the appetite. And the reason spective as being species of mathematics, inasmuch as the why torpor especially is said to deprive one of speech is principles of mathematics are applied to natural matter. because of all the external movements the voice is the best In accordance with this manner of speaking, the expression of the inward thought and desire, not only in species of sorrow are reckoned by an application of the men, but also in other animals, as is stated in Polit. i, 1. notion of sorrow to something foreign to it. This foreign Reply to Objection 1. Pleasure is caused by good, matter may be taken on the part of the cause or the ob- which has only one meaning: and so pleasure is not di- ject, or of the effect. For the proper object of sorrow is vided into several species as sorrow is; for the latter is “one’s own evil.” Hence sorrow may be concerned for an caused by evil, which “happens in many ways,” as Diony- object foreign to it either through one’s being sorry for sius says (Div. Nom. iv). an evil that is not one’s own; and thus we have “pity” Reply to Objection 2. Repentance is for one’s own which is sorrow for another’s evil, considered, however, evil, which is the proper object of sorrow: wherefore it as one’s own: or through one’s being sorry for something does not belong to these species. Jealousy and indigna- that is neither evil nor one’s own, but another’s good, con- tion are included in envy, as we shall explain later ( IIa sidered, however, as one’s own evil: and thus we have IIae, q. 36, a. 2). “envy.” The proper effect of sorrow consists in a certain Reply to Objection 3. This division is not according “flight of the appetite.” Wherefore the foreign element in to opposite species; but according to the diversity of for- the effect of sorrow, may be taken so as to affect the first eign matter to which the notion of sorrow is applied, as part only, by excluding flight: and thus we have “anxiety” stated above. 769 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 36 Of the Causes of Sorrow or Pain (In Four Articles) We must now consider the causes of sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of a good or rather by the presence of an evil? (2) Whether desire is a cause of sorrow? (3) Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow? (4) Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow? Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of good or by the presence of evil? Ia IIae q. 36 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow is caused by is to be found by considering natural movements. For the loss of a good rather than by the presence of an evil. if, in natural movements, we observe those of approach For Augustine says (De viii QQ. Dulcit. qu. 1) that sor- and withdrawal, approach is of itself directed to some- row is caused by the loss of temporal goods. Therefore, thing suitable to nature; while withdrawal is of itself di- in like manner, every sorrow is caused by the loss of some rected to something contrary to nature; thus a heavy body, good. of itself, withdraws from a higher place, and approaches Objection 2. Further, it was said above (q. 35, a. 4) naturally to a lower place. But if we consider the cause that the sorrow which is contrary to a pleasure, has the of both these movements, viz. gravity, then gravity itself same object as that pleasure. But the object of pleasure is inclines towards the lower place more than it withdraws good, as stated above (q. 23, a. 4; q. 31, a. 1; q. 35, a. 3). from the higher place, since withdrawal from the latter is Therefore sorrow is caused chiefly by the loss of good. the reason for its downward tendency. Objection 3. Further, according to Augustine (De Accordingly, since, in the movements of the appetite, Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), love is the cause of sorrow, as of the sorrow is a kind of flight or withdrawal, while pleasure is other emotions of the soul. But the object of love is good. a kind of pursuit or approach; just as pleasure regards first Therefore pain or sorrow is felt for the loss of good rather the good possessed, as its proper object, so sorrow regards than for an evil that is present. the evil that is present. On the other hand love, which is On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, the cause of pleasure and sorrow, regards good rather than 12) that “the dreaded evil gives rise to fear, the present evil: and therefore, forasmuch as the object is the cause evil is the cause of sorrow.” of a passion, the present evil is more properly the cause of I answer that, If privations, as considered by the sorrow or pain, than the good which is lost. mind, were what they are in reality, this question would Reply to Objection 1. The loss itself of good is appre- seem to be of no importance. For, as stated in the Ia, hended as an evil, just as the loss of evil is apprehended as q. 14, a. 10 and Ia, q. 48, a. 3, evil is the privation of a good: and in this sense Augustine says that pain results good: and privation is in reality nothing else than the lack from the loss of temporal goods. of the contrary habit; so that, in this respect, to sorrow for Reply to Objection 2. Pleasure and its contrary pain the loss of good, would be the same as to sorrow for the have the same object, but under contrary aspects: because presence of evil. But sorrow is a movement of the appetite if the presence of a particular thin be the object of plea- in consequence of an apprehension: and even a privation, sure, the absence of that same thing is the object of sor- as apprehended, has the aspect of a being, wherefore it is row. Now one contrary includes the privation of the other, called “a being of reason.” And in this way evil, being a as stated in Metaph. x, 4: and consequently sorrow in re- privation, is regarded as a “contrary.” Accordingly, so far spect of one contrary is, in a way, directed to the same as the movement of the appetite is concerned, it makes a thing under a contrary aspect. difference which of the two it regards chiefly, the present Reply to Objection 3. When many movements arise evil or the good which is lost. from one cause, it does not follow that they all regard Again, since the movement of the animal appetite chiefly that which the cause regards chiefly, but only the holds the same place in the actions of the soul, as nat- first of them. And each of the others regards chiefly that ural movement in natural things; the truth of the matter which is suitable to it according to its own nature. 770 Whether desire is a cause of sorrow? Ia IIae q. 36 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that desire is not a cause evil. Hence the first principle of this appetitive movement of pain or sorrow. Because sorrow of itself regards evil, as is love, which is the first inclination of the appetite to- stated above (a. 1): whereas desire is a movement of the wards the possession of good: while the second principle appetite towards good. Now movement towards one con- is hatred, which is the first inclination of the appetite to- trary is not a cause of movement towards the other con- wards the avoidance of evil. But since concupiscence or trary. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain. desire is the first effect of love, which gives rise to the Objection 2. Further, pain, according to Damascene greatest pleasure, as stated above (q. 32, a. 6); hence it (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), is caused by something present; is that Augustine often speaks of desire or concupiscence whereas the object of desire is something future. There- in the sense of love, as was also stated (q. 30, a. 2, ad fore desire is not a cause of pain. 2): and in this sense he says that desire is the universal Objection 3. Further, that which is pleasant in itself cause of sorrow. Sometimes, however, desire taken in its is not a cause of pain. But desire is pleasant in itself, as proper sense, is the cause of sorrow. Because whatever the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore desire is not hinders a movement from reaching its end is contrary to a cause of pain or sorrow. that movement. Now that which is contrary to the move- On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiv): ment of the appetite, is a cause of sorrow. Consequently, “When ignorance of things necessary to be done, and de- desire becomes a cause of sorrow, in so far as we sorrow sire of things hurtful, found their way in: error and pain for the delay of a desired good, or for its entire removal. stole an entrance in their company.” But ignorance is the But it cannot be a universal cause of sorrow: since we sor- cause of error. Therefore desire is a cause of sorrow. row more for the loss of present good, in which we have I answer that, Sorrow is a movement of the animal already taken pleasure, than for the withdrawal of future appetite. Now, as stated above (a. 1), the appetitive move- good which we desire to have. ment is likened to the natural appetite; a likeness, that may Reply to Objection 1. The inclination of the appetite be assigned to a twofold cause; one, on the part of the end, to the possession of good causes the inclination of the ap- the other, on the part of the principle of movement. Thus, petite to fly from evil, as stated above. And hence it is that on the part of the end, the cause of a heavy body’s down- the appetitive movements that regard good, are reckoned ward movement is the lower place; while the principle of as causing the appetitive movements that regard evil. that movement is a natural inclination resulting from grav- Reply to Objection 2. That which is desired, though ity. really future, is, nevertheless, in a way, present, inasmuch Now the cause of the appetitive movement, on the part as it is hoped for. Or we may say that although the de- of the end, is the object of that movement. And thus, it sired good itself is future, yet the hindrance is reckoned has been said above (a. 1) that the cause of pain or sor- as present, and so gives rise to sorrow. row is a present evil. On the other hand, the cause, by Reply to Objection 3. Desire gives pleasure, so long way or principle, of that movement, is the inward inclina- as there is hope of obtaining that which is desired. But, tion of the appetite; which inclination regards, first of all, when hope is removed through the presence of an obsta- the good, and in consequence, the rejection of a contrary cle, desire causes sorrow. Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow? Ia IIae q. 36 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the craving for unity unity, no separation would be pleasant: and this is clearly is not a cause of sorrow. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. untrue as regards the separation of whatever is superflu- x, 3) that “this opinion,” which held repletion to be the ous. cause of pleasure, and division∗, the cause of sorrow, Objection 3. Further, for the same reason we desire “seems to have originated in pains and pleasures con- the conjunction of good and the removal of evil. But as nected with food.” But not every pleasure or sorrow is conjunction regards unity, since it is a kind of union; so of this kind. Therefore the craving for unity is not the uni- separation is contrary to unity. Therefore the craving for versal cause of sorrow; since repletion pertains to unity, unity should not be reckoned, rather than the craving for and division is the cause of multitude. separation, as causing sorrow. Objection 2. Further, every separation is opposed to On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, unity. If therefore sorrow were caused by a craving for 23), that “from the pain that dumb animals feel, it is quite ∗ Aristotle wrote endeian, ‘want’; St. Thomas, in the Latin version, read ‘incisionem’; should he have read ‘indigentiam’? 771 evident how their souls desire unity, in ruling and quick-tained: whose opinion is refuted by the Philosopher from ening their bodies. For what else is pain but a feeling of the fact that repletion is not always pleasant; for instance, impatience of division or corruption?” when a man has eaten to repletion, he takes no further I answer that, Forasmuch as the desire or craving for pleasure in eating; because repletion or union of this kind, good is reckoned as a cause of sorrow, so must a craving is repugnant rather than conducive to perfect being. Con- for unity, and love, be accounted as causing sorrow. Be- sequently sorrow is caused by the craving, not for any kind cause the good of each thing consists in a certain unity, of unity, but for that unity in which the perfection of na- inasmuch as each thing has, united in itself, the elements ture consists. of which its perfection consists: wherefore the Platonists Reply to Objection 2. Separation can be pleasant, ei- held that “one” is a principle, just as “good” is. Hence ther because it removes something contrary to a thing’s everything naturally desires unity, just as it desires good- perfection, or because it has some union connected with ness: and therefore, just as love or desire for good is a it, such as union of the sense to its object. cause of sorrow, so also is the love or craving for unity. Reply to Objection 3. Separation from things hurtful Reply to Objection 1. Not every kind of union causes and corruptive is desired, in so far as they destroy the unity perfect goodness, but only that on which the perfect being which is due. Wherefore the desire for such like separa- of a thing depends. Hence neither does the desire of any tion is not the first cause of sorrow, whereas the craving kind of unity cause pain or sorrow, as some have main- for unity is. Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow? Ia IIae q. 36 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that a greater power But it must be noted that if the stronger power goes so should not be reckoned a cause of sorrow. For that which far as to transform the contrary inclination into its own in- is in the power of the agent is not present but future. But clination there will be no longer repugnance or violence: sorrow is for present evil. Therefore a greater power is not thus if a stronger agent, by its action on a heavy body, de- a cause of sorrow. prives it of its downward tendency, its consequent upward Objection 2. Further, hurt inflicted is the cause of tendency is not violent but natural to it. sorrow. But hurt can be inflicted even by a lesser power. Accordingly if some greater power prevail so far as to Therefore a greater power should not be reckoned as a take away from the will or the sensitive appetite, their re- cause of sorrow. spective inclinations, pain or sorrow will not result there- Objection 3. Further, the interior inclinations of the from; such is the result only when the contrary inclination soul are the causes of the movements of appetite. But a of the appetite remains. And hence Augustine says (De greater power is something external. Therefore it should Nat. Boni xx) that sorrow is caused by the will “resisting not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow. a stronger power”: for were it not to resist, but to yield by On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni consenting, the result would be not sorrow but pleasure. xx): “Sorrow in the soul is caused by the will resisting a Reply to Objection 1. A greater power causes sorrow, stronger power: while pain in the body is caused by sense as acting not potentially but actually, i.e. by causing the resisting a stronger body.” actual presence of the corruptive evil. I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), a present evil, Reply to Objection 2. Nothing hinders a power which is cause of sorrow or pain, by way of object. Therefore is not simply greater, from being greater in some respect: that which is the cause of the evil being present, should and accordingly it is able to inflict some harm. But if it be reckoned as causing pain or sorrow. Now it is evident be nowise stronger, it can do no harm at all: wherefore it that it is contrary to the inclination of the appetite to be cannot bring about that which causes sorrow. united with a present evil: and whatever is contrary to a Reply to Objection 3. External agents can be the thing’s inclination does not happen to it save by the ac- causes of appetitive movements, in so far as they cause tion of something stronger. Wherefore Augustine reckons the presence of the object: and it is thus that a greater a greater power as being the cause of sorrow. power is reckoned to be the cause of sorrow. 772 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 37 Of the Effects of Pain or Sorrow (In Four Articles) We must now consider the effects of pain or of sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn? (2) Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul? (3) Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity? (4) Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than all the other passions of the soul? Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn? Ia IIae q. 37 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that pain does not deprive thing to tend wholly to repel whatever is contrary to it, as one of the power to learn. For it is written (Is. 26:9): may be observed even in natural things. It is likewise evi- “When Thou shalt do Thy judgments on the earth, the in- dent that in order to learn anything new, we require study habitants of the world shall learn justice”: and further on and effort with a strong intention, as is clearly stated in (verse 16): “In the tribulation of murmuring Thy instruc- Prov. 2:4,5: “If thou shalt seek wisdom as money, and tion was with them.” But the judgments of God and tribu- shall dig for her as for a treasure, then shalt thou under- lation cause sorrow in men’s hearts. Therefore pain or stand learning” [Vulg: ‘the fear of the Lord’]. Conse- sorrow, far from destroying, increases the power of learn- quently if the pain be acute, man is prevented at the time ing. from learning anything: indeed it can be so acute, that, as Objection 2. Further, it is written (Is. 28:9): “Whom long as it lasts, a man is unable to give his attention even shall He teach knowledge? And whom shall He make to to that which he knew already. However a difference is to understand the hearing? Them that are weaned from the be observed according to the difference of love that a man milk, that are drawn away from the breasts,” i.e. from has for learning or for considering: because the greater his pleasures. But pain and sorrow are most destructive of love, the more will he retain the intention of his mind so pleasure; since sorrow hinders all pleasure, as stated in as to prevent it from turning entirely to the pain. Ethic. vii, 14: and (Ecclus. 11:29) it is stated that “the Reply to Objection 1. Moderate sorrow, that does not affliction of an hour maketh one forget great delights.” cause the mind to wander, can conduce to the acquisition Therefore pain, instead of taking away, increases the fac- of learning especially in regard to those things by which ulty of learning. a man hopes to be freed from sorrow. And thus, “in the Objection 3. Further, inward sorrow surpasses out- tribulation of murmuring,” men are more apt to be taught ward pain, as stated above (q. 35, a. 7). But man can by God. learn while sorrowful. Much more, therefore, can he learn Reply to Objection 2. Both pleasure and pain, in so while in bodily pain. far as they draw upon themselves the soul’s intention, hin- On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): “Al- der the reason from the act of consideration, wherefore it though during those days I was tormented with a violent is stated in Ethic. vii, 11 that “in the moment of sexual tooth-ache, I was not able to turn over in my mind other pleasure, a man cannot understand anything.” Neverthe- things than those I had already learnt; and as to learning less pain attracts the soul’s intention more than pleasure anything, I was quite unequal to it, because it required un- does: thus we observe in natural things that the action of divided attention.” a natural body is more intense in regard to its contrary; I answer that, Since all the powers of the soul are for instance, hot water is more accessible to the action of rooted in the one essence of the soul, it must needs hap- cold, and in consequence freezes harder. If therefore pain pen, when the intention of the soul is strongly drawn to- or sorrow be moderate, it can conduce accidentally to the wards the action of one power, that it is withdrawn from facility of learning, in so far as it takes away an excess the action of another power: because the soul, being one, of pleasure. But, of itself, it is a hindrance; and if it be can only have one intention. The result is that if one thing intense, it prevents it altogether. draws upon itself the entire intention of the soul, or a great Reply to Objection 3. External pain arises from hurt portion thereof, anything else requiring considerable at- done to the body, so that it involves bodily transmutation tention is incompatible therewith. more than inward sorrow does: and yet the latter is greater Now it is evident that sensible pain above all draws in regard to the formal element of pain, which belongs to the soul’s attention to itself; because it is natural for each the soul. Consequently bodily pain is a greater hindrance 773 to contemplation which requires complete repose, than in-learn anything for the first time: wherefore on account of ward sorrow is. Nevertheless if inward sorrow be very sorrow Gregory interrupted his commentary on Ezechiel intense, it attracts the intention, so that man is unable to (Hom. xxii in Ezechiel). Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul? Ia IIae q. 37 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not an effect of has been said above (q. 23, a. 4; q. 25, a. 4; q. 36, a. 1) that sorrow to burden the soul. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. sorrow is caused by a present evil: and this evil, from the 7:11): “Behold this self-same thing, that you were made very fact that it is repugnant to the movement of the will, sorrowful according to God, how great carefulness it wor- depresses the soul, inasmuch as it hinders it from enjoying keth in you: yea, defence, yea indignation,” etc. Now that which it wishes to enjoy. And if the evil which is the carefulness and indignation imply that the soul is uplifted, cause of sorrow be not so strong as to deprive one of the which is contrary to being depressed. Therefore depres- hope of avoiding it, although the soul be depressed in so sion is not an effect of sorrow. far as, for the present, it fails to grasp that which it craves Objection 2. Further, sorrow is contrary to pleasure. for; yet it retains the movement whereby to repulse that But the effect of pleasure is expansion: the opposite of evil. If, on the other hand, the strength of the evil be such which is not depression but contraction. Therefore de- as to exclude the hope of evasion, then even the interior pression should not be reckoned as an effect of sorrow. movement of the afflicted soul is absolutely hindered, so Objection 3. Further, sorrow consumes those who are that it cannot turn aside either this way or that. Sometimes inflicted therewith, as may be gathered from the words of even the external movement of the body is paralyzed, so the Apostle (2 Cor. 2:7): “Lest perhaps such an one be that a man becomes completely stupefied. swallowed up with overmuch sorrow.” But that which is Reply to Objection 1. That uplifting of the soul en- depressed is not consumed; nay, it is weighed down by sues from the sorrow which is according to God, because something heavy, whereas that which is consumed enters it brings with it the hope of the forgiveness of sin. within the consumer. Therefore depression should not be Reply to Objection 2. As far as the movement of the reckoned an effect of sorrow. appetite is concerned, contraction and depression amount On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa∗ and Damascene to the same: because the soul, through being depressed so (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) speak of “depressing sorrow.” as to be unable to attend freely to outward things, with- I answer that, The effects of the soul’s passions are draws to itself, closing itself up as it were. sometimes named metaphorically, from a likeness to sen- Reply to Objection 3. Sorrow is said to consume sible bodies: for the reason that the movements of the an- man, when the force of the afflicting evil is such as to shut imal appetite are like the inclinations of the natural ap- out all hope of evasion: and thus also it both depresses petite. And in this way fervor is ascribed to love, expan- and consumes at the same time. For certain things, taken sion to pleasure, and depression to sorrow. For a man is metaphorically, imply one another, which taken literally, said to be depressed, through being hindered in his own appear to exclude one another. movement by some weight. Now it is evident from what Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity? Ia IIae q. 37 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow does not the joyful, so are others proper to the sorrowful; for in- weaken all activity. Because carefulness is caused by sor- stance, to mourn. Now a thing is improved by that which row, as is clear from the passage of the Apostle quoted is suitable to it. Therefore certain actions are not hindered above (a. 2, obj. 1). But carefulness conduces to good but improved by reason of sorrow. work: wherefore the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:15): “Care- On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) fully study to present thyself. . . a workman that needeth that “pleasure perfects action,” whereas on the other hand, not to be ashamed.” Therefore sorrow is not a hindrance “sorrow hinders it” (Ethic. x, 5). to work, but helps one to work well. I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), sorrow at times Objection 2. Further, sorrow causes desire in many does not depress or consume the soul, so as to shut out cases, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14. But desire causes inten- all movement, internal or external; but certain movements sity of action. Therefore sorrow does too. are sometimes caused by sorrow itself. Accordingly ac- Objection 3. Further, as some actions are proper to tion stands in a twofold relation to sorrow. First, as being ∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix. 774 the object of sorrow: and thus sorrow hinders any action: its principle and cause: and such action must needs be im-for we never do that which we do with sorrow, so well as proved by sorrow: thus the more one sorrows on account that which we do with pleasure, or without sorrow. The of a certain thing, the more one strives to shake off sor- reason for this is that the will is the cause of human ac- row, provided there is a hope of shaking it off: otherwise tions: and consequently when we do something that gives no movement or action would result from that sorrow. pain, the action must of necessity be weakened in conse- From what has been said the replies to the objections quence. Secondly, action stands in relation to sorrow, as to are evident. Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul? Ia IIae q. 37 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow is not most Now it must be noted that, in all the passions of the harmful to the body. For sorrow has a spiritual existence soul, the bodily transmutation which is their material el- in the soul. But those things which have only a spiritual ement, is in conformity with and in proportion to the ap- existence do not cause a transmutation in the body: as is petitive movement, which is the formal element: just as in evident with regard to the images of colors, which images everything matter is proportionate to form. Consequently are in the air and do not give color to bodies. Therefore those passions that imply a movement of the appetite in sorrow is not harmful to the body. pursuit of something, are not repugnant to the vital move- Objection 2. Further if it be harmful to the body, this ment as regards its species, but they may be repugnant can only be due to its having a bodily transmutation in thereto as regards its measure: such are love, joy, de- conjunction with it. But bodily transmutation takes place sire and the like; wherefore these passions conduce to the in all the passions of the soul, as stated above (q. 22, well-being of the body; though, if they be excessive, they Aa. 1,3). Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the may be harmful to it. On the other hand, those passions body than the other passions of the soul. which denote in the appetite a movement of flight or con- Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, traction, are repugnant to the vital movement, not only as 3) that “anger and desire drive some to madness”: which regards its measure, but also as regards its species; where- seems to be a very great harm, since reason is the most ex- fore they are simply harmful: such are fear and despair, cellent thing in man. Moreover, despair seems to be more and above all sorrow which depresses the soul by reason harmful than sorrow; for it is the cause of sorrow. There- of a present evil, which makes a stronger impression than fore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other future evil. passions of the soul. Reply to Objection 1. Since the soul naturally moves On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 17:22): “A joyful the body, the spiritual movement of the soul is naturally mind maketh age flourishing: a sorrowful spirit drieth up the cause of bodily transmutation. Nor is there any par- the bones”: and (Prov. 25:20): “As a moth doth by a gar- allel with spiritual images, because they are not naturally ment, and a worm by the wood: so the sadness of a man ordained to move such other bodies as are not naturally consumeth the heart”: and (Ecclus. 38:19): “Of sadness moved by the soul. cometh death.” Reply to Objection 2. Other passions imply a bodily I answer that, Of all the soul’s passions, sorrow is transmutation which is specifically in conformity with the most harmful to the body. The reason of this is because vital movement: whereas sorrow implies a transmutation sorrow is repugnant to man’s life in respect of the species that is repugnant thereto, as stated above. of its movement, and not merely in respect of its mea- Reply to Objection 3. A lesser cause suffices to hin- sure or quantity, as is the case with the other passions of der the use of reason, than to destroy life: since we ob- the soul. For man’s life consists in a certain movement, serve that many ailments deprive one of the use of reason, which flows from the heart to the other parts of the body: before depriving one of life. Nevertheless fear and anger and this movement is befitting to human nature according cause very great harm to the body, by reason of the sor- to a certain fixed measure. Consequently if this move- row which they imply, and which arises from the absence ment goes beyond the right measure, it will be repugnant of the thing desired. Moreover sorrow too sometimes de- to man’s life in respect of the measure of quantity; but not prives man of the use of reason: as may be seen in those in respect of its specific character: whereas if this move- who through sorrow become a prey to melancholy or mad- ment be hindered in its progress, it will be repugnant to ness. life in respect of its species. 775 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 38 Of the Remedies of Sorrow or Pain (In Five Articles) We must now consider the remedies of pain or sorrow: under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure? (2) Whether it is assuaged by weeping? (3) Whether it is assuaged by the sympathy of friends? (4) Whether it is assuaged by contemplating the truth? (5) Whether it is assuaged by sleep and baths? Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure? Ia IIae q. 38 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that not every pleasure transmutation; for sorrow itself implies a certain weari- assuages every pain or sorrow. For pleasure does not as- ness or ailing of the appetitive faculty. Therefore just as suage sorrow, save in so far as it is contrary to it: for all repose of the body brings relief to any kind of weari- “remedies work by contraries” (Ethic. ii, 3). But not ev- ness, ensuing from any non-natural cause; so every plea- ery pleasure is contrary to every sorrow; as stated above sure brings relief by assuaging any kind of sorrow, due to (q. 35, a. 4 ). Therefore not every pleasure assuages every any cause whatever. sorrow. Reply to Objection 1. Although not every pleasure is Objection 2. Further, that which causes sorrow does specifically contrary to every sorrow, yet it is generically, not assuage it. But some pleasures cause sorrow; since, as as stated above (q. 35, a. 4). And consequently, on the stated in Ethic. ix, 4, “the wicked man feels pain at hav- part of the disposition of the subject, any sorrow can be ing been pleased.” Therefore not every pleasure assuages assuaged by any pleasure. sorrow. Reply to Objection 2. The pleasures of wicked men Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, are not a cause of sorrow while they are enjoyed, but af- 7) that he fled from his country, where he had been wont terwards: that is to say, in so far as wicked men repent of to associate with his friend, now dead: “for so should his those things in which they took pleasure. This sorrow is eyes look for him less, where they were not wont to see healed by contrary pleasures. him.” Hence we may gather that those things which united Reply to Objection 3. When there are two causes in- us to our dead or absent friends, become burdensome to clining to contrary movements, each hinders the other; yet us when we mourn their death or absence. But nothing the one which is stronger and more persistent, prevails in united us more than the pleasures we enjoyed in common. the end. Now when a man is made sorrowful by those Therefore these very pleasures become burdensome to us things in which he took pleasure in common with a de- when we mourn. Therefore not every pleasure assuages ceased or absent friend, there are two causes producing every sorrow. contrary movements. For the thought of the friend’s death On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, or absence, inclines him to sorrow: whereas the present 14) that “sorrow is driven forth by pleasure, both by a con- good inclines him to pleasure. Consequently each is mod- trary pleasure and by any other, provided it be intense.” ified by the other. And yet, since the perception of the I answer that, As is evident from what has been said present moves more strongly than the memory of the past, above (q. 23, a. 4 ), pleasure is a kind of repose of the ap- and since love of self is more persistent than love of an- petite in a suitable good; while sorrow arises from some- other; hence it is that, in the end, the pleasure drives out thing unsuited to the appetite. Consequently in move- the sorrow. Wherefore a little further on (Confess. iv, 8) ments of the appetite pleasure is to sorrow, what, in bod- Augustine says that his “sorrow gave way to his former ies, repose is to weariness, which is due to a non-natural pleasures.” 776 Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by tears? Ia IIae q. 38 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that tears do not assuage (a. 1), every pleasure assuages sorrow or pain somewhat, sorrow. Because no effect diminishes its cause. But tears it follows that sorrow is assuaged by weeping and groans. or groans are an effect of sorrow. Therefore they do not Reply to Objection 1. This relation of the cause to ef- diminish sorrow. fect is opposed to the relation existing between the cause Objection 2. Further, just as tears or groans are an ef- of sorrow and the sorrowing man. For every effect is fect of sorrow, so laughter is an effect of joy. But laughter suited to its cause, and consequently is pleasant to it; but does not lessen joy. Therefore tears do not lessen sorrow. the cause of sorrow is disagreeable to him that sorrows. Objection 3. Further, when we weep, the evil that Hence the effect of sorrow is not related to him that sor- saddens us is present to the imagination. But the image of rows in the same way as the cause of sorrow is. For this that which saddens us increases sorrow, just as the image reason sorrow is assuaged by its effect, on account of the of a pleasant thing adds to joy. Therefore it seems that aforesaid contrariety. tears do not assuage sorrow. Reply to Objection 2. The relation of effect to cause On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that is like the relation of the object of pleasure to him that when he mourned the death of his friend, “in groans and takes pleasure in it: because in each case the one agrees in tears alone did he find some little refreshment.” with the other. Now every like thing increases its like. I answer that, Tears and groans naturally assuage sor- Therefore joy is increased by laughter and the other ef- row: and this for two reasons. First, because a hurtful fects of joy: except they be excessive, in which case, ac- thing hurts yet more if we keep it shut up, because the cidentally, they lessen it. soul is more intent on it: whereas if it be allowed to es- Reply to Objection 3. The image of that which sad- cape, the soul’s intention is dispersed as it were on out- dens us, considered in itself, has a natural tendency to in- ward things, so that the inward sorrow is lessened. This crease sorrow: yet from the very fact that a man imagines is why men, burdened with sorrow, make outward show himself to be doing that which is fitting according to his of their sorrow, by tears or groans or even by words, their actual state, he feels a certain amount of pleasure. For the sorrow is assuaged. Secondly, because an action, that be- same reason if laughter escapes a man when he is so dis- fits a man according to his actual disposition, is always posed that he thinks he ought to weep, he is sorry for it, pleasant to him. Now tears and groans are actions befit- as having done something unbecoming to him, as Cicero ting a man who is in sorrow or pain; and consequently says (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 27). they become pleasant to him. Since then, as stated above Whether pain or sorrow are assuaged by the sympathy of friends? Ia IIae q. 38 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the sorrow of sym- On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 11) pathizing friends does not assuage our own sorrow. For that those who are in pain are consoled when their friends contraries have contrary effects. Now as Augustine says sympathize with them. (Confess. viii, 4), “when many rejoice together, each one I answer that, When one is in pain, it is natural has more exuberant joy, for they are kindled and inflamed that the sympathy of a friend should afford consola- one by the other.” Therefore, in like manner, when many tion: whereof the Philosopher indicates a twofold reason are sorrowful, it seems that their sorrow is greater. (Ethic. ix, 11). The first is because, since sorrow has a Objection 2. Further, friendship demands mutual depressing effect, it is like a weight whereof we strive to love, as Augustine declares (Confess. iv, 9). But a sym- unburden ourselves: so that when a man sees others sad- pathizing friend is pained at the sorrow of his friend with dened by his own sorrow, it seems as though others were whom he sympathizes. Consequently the pain of a sym- bearing the burden with him, striving, as it were, to lessen pathizing friend becomes, to the friend in sorrow, a further its weight; wherefore the load of sorrow becomes lighter cause of sorrow: so that, his pain being doubled his sor- for him: something like what occurs in the carrying of row seems to increase. bodily burdens. The second and better reason is because Objection 3. Further, sorrow arises from every evil when a man’s friends condole with him, he sees that he affecting a friend, as though it affected oneself: since “a is loved by them, and this affords him pleasure, as stated friend is one’s other self” (Ethic. ix, 4,9). But sorrow is above (q. 32, a. 5). Consequently, since every pleasure as- an evil. Therefore the sorrow of the sympathizing friend suages sorrow, as stated above (a. 1), it follows that sorrow increases the sorrow of the friend with whom he sympa- is mitigated by a sympathizing friend. thizes. Reply to Objection 1. In either case there is a proof 777 of friendship, viz. when a man rejoices with the joyful, would be a cause of sorrow: but consideration of its cause, and when he sorrows with the sorrowful. Consequently viz. his love, gives rise rather to pleasure. each becomes an object of pleasure by reason of its cause. And this suffices for the reply to the Third Objection. Reply to Objection 2. The friend’s sorrow itself Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by the contemplation of truth? Ia IIae q. 38 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the contemplation of dom. And therefore in the midst of tribulations men re- truth does not assuage sorrow. For it is written (Eccles. joice in the contemplation of Divine things and of future 1:18): “He that addeth knowledge addeth also sorrow” Happiness, according to James 1:2: “My brethren, count [Vulg.: ‘labor’]. But knowledge pertains to the contem- it all joy, when you shall fall into divers temptations”: and, plation of truth. Therefore the contemplation of truth does what is more, even in the midst of bodily tortures this joy not assuage sorrow. is found; as the “martyr Tiburtius, when he was walking Objection 2. Further, the contemplation of truth be- barefoot on the burning coals, said: Methinks, I walk on longs to the speculative intellect. But “the speculative in- roses, in the name of Jesus Christ.”∗ tellect is not a principle of movement”; as stated in De Reply to Objection 1. “He that addeth knowledge, Anima iii, 11. Therefore, since joy and sorrow are move- addeth sorrow,” either on account of the difficulty and dis- ments of the soul, it seems that the contemplation of truth appointment in the search for truth; or because knowledge does not help to assuage sorrow. makes man acquainted with many things that are contrary Objection 3. Further, the remedy for an ailment to his will. Accordingly, on the part of the things known, should be applied to the part which ails. But contem- knowledge causes sorrow: but on the part of the contem- plation of truth is in the intellect. Therefore it does not plation of truth, it causes pleasure. assuage bodily pain, which is in the senses. Reply to Objection 2. The speculative intellect does On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): “It not move the mind on the part of the thing contemplated: seemed to me that if the light of that truth were to dawn but on the part of contemplation itself, which is man’s on our minds, either I should not feel that pain, or at least good and naturally pleasant to him. that pain would seem nothing to me.” Reply to Objection 3. In the powers of the soul there I answer that, As stated above (q. 3, a. 5), the great- is an overflow from the higher to the lower powers: and est of all pleasures consists in the contemplation of truth. accordingly, the pleasure of contemplation, which is in Now every pleasure assuages pain as stated above (a. 1): the higher part, overflows so as to mitigate even that pain hence the contemplation of truth assuages pain or sorrow, which is in the senses. and the more so, the more perfectly one is a lover of wis- Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by sleep and baths? Ia IIae q. 38 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that sleep and baths do On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ix, 12): not assuage sorrow. For sorrow is in the soul: whereas “I had heard that the bath had its name†. . . from the fact sleep and baths regard the body. Therefore they do not of its driving sadness from the mind.” And further on, he conduce to the assuaging of sorrow. says: “I slept, and woke up again, and found my grief not Objection 2. Further, the same effect does not seem a little assuaged”: and quotes the words from the hymn to ensue from contrary causes. But these, being bodily of Ambrose‡, in which it is said that “Sleep restores the things, are incompatible with the contemplation of truth tired limbs to labor, refreshes the weary mind, and ban- which is a cause of the assuaging of sorrow, as stated ishes sorrow.” above (a. 4). Therefore sorrow is not mitigated by the I answer that, As stated above (q. 37, a. 4), sorrow, like. by reason of its specific nature, is repugnant to the vi- Objection 3. Further, sorrow and pain, in so far as tal movement of the body; and consequently whatever they affect the body, denote a certain transmutation of the restores the bodily nature to its due state of vital move- heart. But such remedies as these seem to pertain to the ment, is opposed to sorrow and assuages it. Moreover outward senses and limbs, rather than to the interior dispo- such remedies, from the very fact that they bring nature sition of the heart. Therefore they do not assuage sorrow. back to its normal state, are causes of pleasure; for this is ∗ Cf. Dominican Breviary, August 11th, commemoration of St. Tiburtius. † Balneum, from the Greek balaneion ‡ Cf. Sarum Breviary: First Sunday after the octave of the Epiphany, Hymn for first Vespers 778 precisely in what pleasure consists, as stated above (q. 31, suages sorrow. Consequently it is not unreasonable that a. 1). Therefore, since every pleasure assuages sorrow, sorrow should be assuaged by causes which hinder one sorrow is assuaged by such like bodily remedies. another. Reply to Objection 1. The normal disposition of the Reply to Objection 3. Every good disposition of the body, so far as it is felt, is itself a cause of pleasure, and body reacts somewhat on the heart, which is the beginning consequently assuages sorrow. and end of bodily movements, as stated in De Causa Mot. Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 31, a. 8), Animal. xi. one pleasure hinders another; and yet every pleasure as- 779 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 39 Of the Goodness and Malice of Sorrow or Pain (In Four Articles) We must now consider the goodness and malice of pain or sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether all sorrow is evil? (2) Whether sorrow can be a virtuous good? (3) Whether it can be a useful good? (4) Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil? Whether all sorrow is evil? Ia IIae q. 39 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that all sorrow is evil. For dening or painful, it is a sign of goodness if a man is in Gregory of Nyssa∗ says: “All sorrow is evil, from its very sorrow or pain on account of this present evil. For if he nature.” Now what is naturally evil, is evil always and were not to be in sorrow or pain, this could only be either everywhere. Therefore, all sorrow is evil. because he feels it not, or because he does not reckon it as Objection 2. Further, that which all, even the virtu- something unbecoming, both of which are manifest evils. ous, avoid, is evil. But all avoid sorrow, even the virtuous, Consequently it is a condition of goodness, that, suppos- since as stated in Ethic. vii, 11, “though the prudent man ing an evil to be present, sorrow or pain should ensue. does not aim at pleasure, yet he aims at avoiding sorrow.” Wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14): “It is Therefore sorrow is evil. also a good thing that he sorrows for the good he has lost: Objection 3. Further, just as bodily evil is the object for had not some good remained in his nature, he could not and cause of bodily pain, so spiritual evil is the object and be punished by the loss of good.” Because, however, in cause of sorrow in the soul. But every bodily pain is a the science of Morals, we consider things individually— bodily evil. Therefore every spiritual sorrow is an evil of for actions are concerned about individuals—that which is the soul. good on some supposition, should be considered as good: On the contrary, Sorrow for evil is contrary to plea- just as that which is voluntary on some supposition, is sure in evil. But pleasure in evil is evil: wherefore in judged to be voluntary, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1, and like- condemnation of certain men, it is written (Prov. 2:14), wise above (q. 6, a. 6). that “they were glad when they had done evil.” Therefore Reply to Objection 1. Gregory of Nyssa† is speaking sorrow for evil is good. of sorrow on the part of the evil that causes it, but not on I answer that, A thing may be good or evil in two the part of the subject that feels and rejects the evil. And ways: first considered simply and in itself; and thus all from this point of view, all shun sorrow, inasmuch as they sorrow is an evil, because the mere fact of a man’s appetite shun evil: but they do not shun the perception and rejec- being uneasy about a present evil, is itself an evil, because tion of evil. The same also applies to bodily pain: because it hinders the response of the appetite in good. Secondly, the perception and rejection of bodily evil is the proof of a thing is said to be good or evil, on the supposition of the goodness of nature. something else: thus shame is said to be good, on the sup- This suffices for the Replies to the Second and Third position of a shameful deed done, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9. Objections. Accordingly, supposing the presence of something sad- Whether sorrow can be a virtuous good? Ia IIae q. 39 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow is not a vir- sorrow is not a virtuous good. tuous good. For that which leads to hell is not a virtuous Objection 2. Further, the virtuous good is praisewor- good. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 33), “Jacob thy and meritorious. But sorrow lessens praise or merit: seems to have feared lest he should be troubled overmuch for the Apostle says (2 Cor. 9:7): “Everyone, as he hath by sorrow, and so, instead of entering into the rest of the determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity.” blessed, be consigned to the hell of sinners.” Therefore Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good. ∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix. † Nemesius 780 Objection 3. Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei results from these two things, the rectitude of the reason xiv, 15), “sorrow is concerned about those things which and the will. Wherefore it is evident that sorrow may be a happen against our will.” But not to will those things virtuous good. which are actually taking place, is to have a will opposed Reply to Objection 1. All the passions of the soul to the decree of God, to Whose providence whatever is should be regulated according to the rule of reason, which done is subject. Since, then, conformity of the human to is the root of the virtuous good; but excessive sorrow, the Divine will is a condition of the rectitude of the will, of which Augustine is speaking, oversteps this rule, and as stated above (q. 19, a. 9), it seems that sorrow is incom- therefore it fails to be a virtuous good. patible with rectitude of the will, and that consequently it Reply to Objection 2. Just as sorrow for an evil arises is not virtuous. from a right will and reason, which detest the evil, so sor- On the contrary, Whatever merits the reward of eter- row for a good is due to a perverse reason and will, which nal life is virtuous. But such is sorrow; as is evident from detest the good. Consequently such sorrow is an obstacle Mat. 5:5: “Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be to the praise and merit of the virtuous good; for instance, comforted.” Therefore sorrow is a virtuous good. when a man gives an alms sorrowfully. I answer that, In so far as sorrow is good, it can be a Reply to Objection 3. Some things do actually hap- virtuous good. For it has been said above (a. 1) that sorrow pen, not because God wills, but because He permits them is a good inasmuch as it denotes perception and rejection to happen—such as sins. Consequently a will that is op- of evil. These two things, as regards bodily pain, are a posed to sin, whether in oneself or in another, is not dis- proof of the goodness of nature, to which it is due that the cordant from the Divine will. Penal evils happen actually, senses perceive, and that nature shuns, the harmful thing even by God’s will. But it is not necessary for the rectitude that causes pain. As regards interior sorrow, perception of of his will, that man should will them in themselves: but the evil is sometimes due to a right judgment of reason; only that he should not revolt against the order of Divine while the rejection of the evil is the act of the will, well justice, as stated above (q. 19, a. 10). disposed and detesting that evil. Now every virtuous good Whether sorrow can be a useful good? Ia IIae q. 39 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow cannot be a trary to good; for instance, sin. Wherefore sorrow for sin useful good. For it is written (Ecclus. 30:25): “Sadness is useful as inducing a man to avoid sin: hence the Apos- hath killed many, and there is no profit in it.” tle says (2 Cor. 7:9): “I am glad: not because you were Objection 2. Further, choice is of that which is useful made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful to an end. But sorrow is not an object of choice; in fact, “a unto penance.” Secondly, a thing is to be avoided, not as thing without sorrow is to be chosen rather than the same though it were evil in itself, but because it is an occasion thing with sorrow” (Topic. iii, 2). Therefore sorrow is not of evil; either through one’s being attached to it, and lov- a useful good. ing it too much, or through one’s being thrown headlong Objection 3. Further, “Everything is for the sake of thereby into an evil, as is evident in the case of temporal its own operation,” as stated in De Coel. ii, 3. But “sor- goods. And, in this respect, sorrow for temporal goods row hinders operation,” as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore may be useful; according to Eccles. 7:3: “It is better to go sorrow is not a useful good. to the house of mourning, than to the house of feasting: On the contrary, The wise man seeks only that which for in that we are put in mind of the end of all.” is useful. But according to Eccles. 7:5, “the heart of the Moreover, sorrow for that which ought to be avoided wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools is always useful, since it adds another motive for avoiding where there is mirth.” Therefore sorrow is useful. it. Because the very evil is in itself a thing to be avoided: I answer that, A twofold movement of the appetite while everyone avoids sorrow for its own sake, just as ev- ensues from a present evil. One is that whereby the ap- eryone seeks the good, and pleasure in the good. There- petite is opposed to the present evil; and, in this respect, fore just as pleasure in the good makes one seek the good sorrow is of no use; because that which is present, cannot more earnestly, so sorrow for evil makes one avoid evil be not present. The other movement arises in the appetite more eagerly. to the effect of avoiding or expelling the saddening evil: Reply to Objection 1. This passage is to be taken as and, in this respect, sorrow is of use, if it be for something referring to excessive sorrow, which consumes the soul: which ought to be avoided. Because there are two reasons for such sorrow paralyzes the soul, and hinders it from for which it may be right to avoid a thing. First, because shunning evil, as stated above (q. 37, a. 2). it should be avoided in itself, on account of its being con- Reply to Objection 2. Just as any object of choice 781 becomes less eligible by reason of sorrow, so that which Reply to Objection 3. Sorrow caused by an action ought to be shunned is still more to be shunned by reason hinders that action: but sorrow for the cessation of an ac- of sorrow: and, in this respect, sorrow is useful. tion, makes one do it more earnestly. Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil? Ia IIae q. 39 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that pain is the greatest for something that is truly evil, or for something that is evil. Because “the worst is contrary to the best” (Ethic. apparently evil, but good in reality. Now pain or sorrow viii, 10). But a certain pleasure is the greatest good, viz. for that which is truly evil cannot be the greatest evil: for the pleasure of bliss. Therefore a certain pain is the great- there is something worse, namely, either not to reckon as est evil. evil that which is really evil, or not to reject it. Again, sor-Objection 2. Further, happiness is man’s greatest row or pain, for that which is apparently evil, but really good, because it is his last end. But man’s Happiness con- good, cannot be the greatest evil, for it would be worse sists in his “having whatever he will, and in willing naught to be altogether separated from that which is truly good. amiss,” as stated above (q. 3, a. 4, obj. 5; q. 5, a. 8, obj. 3). Hence it is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man’s Therefore man’s greatest good consists in the fulfilment greatest evil. of his will. Now pain consists in something happening Reply to Objection 1. Pleasure and sorrow have two contrary to the will, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei good points in common: namely, a true judgment con- xiv, 6,15). Therefore pain is man’s greatest evil. cerning good and evil; and the right order of the will in Objection 3. Further, Augustine argues thus (Soliloq. approving of good and rejecting evil. Thus it is clear that i, 12): “We are composed of two parts, i.e. of a soul and a in pain or sorrow there is a good, by the removal of which body, whereof the body is the inferior. Now the sovereign they become worse: and yet there is not an evil in every good is the greatest good of the better part: while the pleasure, by the removal of which the pleasure is better. supreme evil is the greatest evil of the inferior part. But Consequently, a pleasure can be man’s highest good, in wisdom is the greatest good of the soul; while the worst the way above stated (q. 34, a. 3): whereas sorrow cannot thing in the body is pain. Therefore man’s greatest good be man’s greatest evil. is to be wise: while his greatest evil is to suffer pain.” Reply to Objection 2. The very fact of the will being On the contrary, Guilt is a greater evil than punish- opposed to evil is a good. And for this reason, sorrow or ment, as was stated in the Ia, q. 48, a. 6. But sorrow or pain pain cannot be the greatest evil; because it has an admix- belongs to the punishment of sin, just as the enjoyment of ture of good. changeable things is an evil of guilt. For Augustine says Reply to Objection 3. That which harms the better (De Vera Relig. xii): “What is pain of the soul, except for thing is worse than that which harms the worse. Now a the soul to be deprived of that which it was wont to enjoy, thing is called evil “because it harms,” as Augustine says or had hoped to enjoy? And this is all that is called evil, (Enchiridion xii). Therefore that which is an evil to the i.e. sin, and the punishment of sin.” Therefore sorrow or soul is a greater evil than that which is an evil to the body. pain is not man’s greatest evil. Therefore this argument does not prove: nor does Augus- I answer that, It is impossible for any sorrow or pain tine give it as his own, but as taken from another∗. to be man’s greatest evil. For all sorrow or pain is either ∗ Cornelius Celsus 782 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 40 Of the Irascible Passions, and First, of Hope and Despair (In Eight Articles) We must now consider the irascible passions: (1) Hope and despair; (2) Fear and daring; (3) Anger. Under first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether hope is the same as desire or cupidity? (2) Whether hope is in the apprehensive, or in the appetitive faculty? (3) Whether hope is in dumb animals? (4) Whether despair is contrary to hope? (5) Whether experience is a cause of hope? (6) Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards? (7) Concerning the order of hope to love; (8) Whether love conduces to action? Whether hope is the same as desire of cupidity? Ia IIae q. 40 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that hope is the same as from desire or cupidity, which regards the future good ab- desire or cupidity. Because hope is reckoned as one of the solutely: wherefore it belongs to the concupiscible, while four principal passions. But Augustine in setting down hope belongs to the irascible faculty. Fourthly, that this the four principal passions puts cupidity in the place of difficult thing is something possible to obtain: for one hope (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,7). Therefore hope is the same does not hope for that which one cannot get at all: and, as cupidity or desire. in this respect, hope differs from despair. It is therefore Objection 2. Further, passions differ according to evident that hope differs from desire, as the irascible pas- their objects. But the object of hope is the same as the sions differ from the concupiscible. For this reason, more- object of cupidity or desire, viz. the future good. There- over, hope presupposes desire: just as all irascible pas- fore hope is the same as cupidity or desire. sions presuppose the passions of the concupiscible fac- Objection 3. If it be said that hope, in addition to de- ulty, as stated above (q. 25, a. 1). sire, denotes the possibility of obtaining the future good; Reply to Objection 1. Augustine mentions desire in- on the contrary, whatever is accidental to the object does stead of hope, because each regards future good; and be- not make a different species of passion. But possibility cause the good which is not arduous is reckoned as noth- of acquisition is accidental to a future good, which is the ing: thus implying that desire seems to tend chiefly to the object of cupidity or desire, and of hope. Therefore hope arduous good, to which hope tends likewise. does not differ specifically from desire or cupidity. Reply to Objection 1. The object of hope is the fu- On the contrary, To different powers belong different ture good considered, not absolutely, but as arduous and species of passions. But hope is in the irascible power; difficult of attainment, as stated above. whereas desire or cupidity is in the concupiscible. There- Reply to Objection 3. The object of hope adds not fore hope differs specifically from desire or cupidity. only possibility to the object of desire, but also difficulty: I answer that, The species of a passion is taken from and this makes hope belong to another power, viz. the the object. Now, in the object of hope, we may note four irascible, which regards something difficult, as stated in conditions. First, that it is something good; since, prop- the Ia, q. 81, a. 2. Moreover, possibility and impossibility erly speaking, hope regards only the good; in this respect, are not altogether accidental to the object of the appeti- hope differs from fear, which regards evil. Secondly, that tive power: because the appetite is a principle of move- it is future; for hope does not regard that which is present ment; and nothing is moved to anything except under the and already possessed: in this respect, hope differs from aspect of being possible; for no one is moved to that which joy which regards a present good. Thirdly, that it must he reckons impossible to get. Consequently hope differs be something arduous and difficult to obtain, for we do from despair according to the difference of possible and not speak of any one hoping for trifles, which are in one’s impossible. power to have at any time: in this respect, hope differs 783 Whether hope is in the apprehensive or in the appetitive power? Ia IIae q. 40 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that hope belongs to and of something impossible. And accordingly hope is a the cognitive power. Because hope, seemingly, is a kind movement of the appetitive power ensuing from the appre- of awaiting; for the Apostle says (Rom. 8:25): “If we hension of a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; hope for that which we see not; we wait for it with pa- namely, a stretching forth of the appetite to such a good. tience.” But awaiting seems to belong to the cognitive Reply to Objection 1. Since hope regards a possible power, which we exercise by “looking out.” Therefore good, there arises in man a twofold movement of hope; hope belongs to the cognitive power. for a thing may be possible to him in two ways, viz. by Objection 2. Further, apparently hope is the same as his own power, or by another’s. Accordingly when a man confidence; hence when a man hopes he is said to be con- hopes to obtain something by his own power, he is not fident, as though to hope and to be confident were the said to wait for it, but simply to hope for it. But, properly same thing. But confidence, like faith, seems to belong speaking, he is said to await that which he hopes to get to the cognitive power. Therefore hope does too. by another’s help as though to await [exspectare] implied Objection 3. Further, certainty is a property of the keeping one’s eyes on another [ex alio spectare], in so far cognitive power. But certainty is ascribed to hope. There- as the apprehensive power, by going ahead, not only keeps fore hope belongs to the cognitive power. its eye on the good which man intends to get, but also On the contrary, Hope regards good, as stated above on the thing by whose power he hopes to get it; accord- (a. 1). Now good, as such, is not the object of the cogni- ing to Ecclus. 51:10, “I looked for the succor of men.” tive, but of the appetitive power. Therefore hope belongs, Wherefore the movement of hope is sometimes called ex- not to the cognitive, but to the appetitive power. pectation, on account of the preceding inspection of the I answer that, Since hope denotes a certain stretch- cognitive power. ing out of the appetite towards good, it evidently belongs Reply to Objection 2. When a man desires a thing to the appetitive power; since movement towards things and reckons that he can get it, he believes that he can get belongs properly to the appetite: whereas the action of it, he believes that he will get it; and from this belief which the cognitive power is accomplished not by the move-precedes in the cognitive power, the ensuing movement in ment of the knower towards things, but rather according the appetite is called confidence. Because the movement as the things known are in the knower. But since the cog- of the appetite takes its name from the knowledge that pre- nitive power moves the appetite, by presenting its object cedes it, as an effect from a cause which is better known; to it; there arise in the appetite various movements ac- for the apprehensive power knows its own act better than cording to various aspects of the apprehended object. For that of the appetite. the apprehension of good gives rise to one kind of move- Reply to Objection 3. Certainty is ascribed to the ment in the appetite, while the apprehension of evil gives movement, not only of the sensitive, but also of the natural rise to another: in like manner various movements arise appetite; thus we say that a stone is certain to tend down- from the apprehension of something present and of some- wards. This is owing to the inerrancy which the movement thing future; of something considered absolutely, and of of the sensitive or even natural appetite derives from the something considered as arduous; of something possible, certainty of the knowledge that precedes it. Whether hope is in dumb animals? Ia IIae q. 40 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no hope in Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, dumb animals. Because hope is for some future good, as 14) that “animals are moved by the things that they see.” Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). But knowledge But hope is of things unseen: “for what a man seeth, why of the future is not in the competency of dumb animals, doth he hope for?” (Rom. 8:24). Therefore there is no whose knowledge is confined to the senses and does not hope in dumb animals. extend to the future. Therefore there is no hope in dumb On the contrary, Hope is an irascible passion. But animals. the irascible faculty is in dumb animals. Therefore hope Objection 2. Further, the object of hope is a future is also. good, possible of attainment. But possible and impossible I answer that, The internal passions of animals can are differences of the true and the false, which are only in be gathered from their outward movements: from which the mind, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vi, 4). There- it is clear that hope is in dumb animals. For if a dog see a fore there is no hope in dumb animals, since they have no hare, or a hawk see a bird, too far off, it makes no move- mind. ment towards it, as having no hope to catch it: whereas, 784 if it be near, it makes a movement towards it, as being in Reply to Objection 1. Although dumb animals do not hopes of catching it. Because as stated above (q. 1, a. 2; know the future, yet an animal is moved by its natural in- q. 26, a. 1; q. 35, a. 1), the sensitive appetite of dumb stinct to something future, as though it foresaw the future. animals, and likewise the natural appetite of insensible Because this instinct is planted in them by the Divine In- things, result from the apprehension of an intellect, just as tellect that foresees the future. the appetite of the intellectual nature, which is called the Reply to Objection 2. The object of hope is not the will. But there is a difference, in that the will is moved possible as differentiating the true, for thus the possible by an apprehension of the intellect in the same subject; ensues from the relation of a predicate to a subject. The whereas the movement of the natural appetite results from object of hope is the possible as compared to a power. For the apprehension of the separate Intellect, Who is the Au- such is the division of the possible given in Metaph. v, 12, thor of nature; as does also the sensitive appetite of dumb i.e. into the two kinds we have just mentioned. animals, who act from a certain natural instinct. Conse- Reply to Objection 3. Although the thing which is fu- quently, in the actions of irrational animals and of other ture does not come under the object of sight; nevertheless natural things, we observe a procedure which is similar to through seeing something present, an animal’s appetite is that which we observe in the actions of art: and in this moved to seek or avoid something future. way hope and despair are in dumb animals. Whether despair is contrary to hope? Ia IIae q. 40 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that despair is not con- it be considered in the light of something attainable; and trary to hope. Because “to one thing there is one contrary” thus hope tends thereto, for it denotes a kind of approach. (Metaph. x, 5). But fear is contrary to hope. Therefore de- But in so far as it is considered as unobtainable, it has the spair is not contrary to hope. character of a principle of repulsion, because, as stated in Objection 2. Further, contraries seem to bear on the Ethic. iii, 3, “when men come to an impossibility they same thing. But hope and despair do not bear on the disperse.” And this is how despair stands in regard to this same thing: since hope regards the good, whereas despair object, wherefore it implies a movement of withdrawal: arises from some evil that is in the way of obtaining good. and consequently it is contrary to hope, as withdrawal is Therefore hope is not contrary to despair. to approach. Objection 3. Further, movement is contrary to move- Reply to Objection 1. Fear is contrary to hope, be- ment: while repose is in opposition to movement as a cause their objects, i.e. good and evil, are contrary: for privation thereof. But despair seems to imply immobil- this contrariety is found in the irascible passions, accord- ity rather than movement. Therefore it is not contrary to ing as they ensue from the passions of the concupiscible. hope, which implies movement of stretching out towards But despair is contrary to hope, only by contrariety of ap- the hoped-for good. proach and withdrawal. On the contrary, The very name of despair [despera- Reply to Objection 2. Despair does not regard evil as tio] implies that it is contrary to hope [spes]. such; sometimes however it regards evil accidentally, as I answer that, As stated above (q. 23, a. 2), there is making the difficult good impossible to obtain. But it can a twofold contrariety of movements. One is in respect arise from the mere excess of good. of approach to contrary terms: and this contrariety alone Reply to Objection 3. Despair implies not only pri- is to be found in the concupiscible passions, for instance vation of hope, but also a recoil from the thing desired, between love and hatred. The other is according to ap- by reason of its being esteemed impossible to get. Hence proach and withdrawal with regard to the same term; and despair, like hope, presupposes desire; because we nei- is to be found in the irascible passions, as stated above ther hope for nor despair of that which we do not desire to (q. 23, a. 2). Now the object of hope, which is the ardu- have. For this reason, too, each of them regards the good, ous good, has the character of a principle of attraction, if which is the object of desire. Whether experience is a cause of hope? Ia IIae q. 40 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that experience is not a hope is not in the cognitive power, but in the appetite, as cause of hope. Because experience belongs to the cogni- stated above (a. 2). Therefore experience is not a cause of tive power; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) hope. that “intellectual virtue needs experience and time.” But Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 785 13) that “the old are slow to hope, on account of their makes man think that he can obtain something: and thus experience”; whence it seems to follow that experience both teaching and persuasion may be a cause of hope. causes want of hope. But the same cause is not productive And then again experience is a cause of hope, in so far of opposites. Therefore experience is not a cause of hope. as it makes him reckon something possible, which before Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (De Coel. his experience he looked upon as impossible. However, ii, 5) that “to have something to say about everything, in this way, experience can cause a lack of hope: be- without leaving anything out, is sometimes a proof of cause just as it makes a man think possible what he had folly.” But to attempt everything seems to point to great previously thought impossible; so, conversely, experience hopes; while folly arises from inexperience. Therefore in- makes a man consider as impossible that which hitherto experience, rather than experience, seems to be a cause of he had thought possible. Accordingly experience causes hope. hope in two ways, despair in one way: and for this reason On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) we may say rather that it causes hope. “some are hopeful, through having been victorious often Reply to Objection 1. Experience in matters pertain- and over many opponents”: which seems to pertain to ex- ing to action not only produces knowledge; it also causes perience. Therefore experience is a cause of hope. a certain habit, by reason of custom, which renders the ac- I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the object of tion easier. Moreover, the intellectual virtue itself adds to hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain. Con- the power of acting with ease: because it shows something sequently a thing may be a cause of hope, either because it to be possible; and thus is a cause of hope. makes something possible to a man: or because it makes Reply to Objection 2. The old are wanting in hope him think something possible. In the first way hope is because of their experience, in so far as experience makes caused by everything that increases a man’s power; e.g. them think something impossible. Hence he adds (Rhet. riches, strength, and, among others, experience: since by ii, 13) that “many evils have befallen them.” experience man acquires the faculty of doing something Reply to Objection 3. Folly and inexperience can be easily, and the result of this is hope. Wherefore Vegetius a cause of hope accidentally as it were, by removing the says (De Re Milit. i): “No one fears to do that which he knowledge which would help one to judge truly a thing to is sure of having learned well.” be impossible. Wherefore inexperience is a cause of hope, In the second way, hope is caused by everything that for the same reason as experience causes lack of hope. Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards? Ia IIae q. 40 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that youth and drunken- past: and therefore since memory is of the past, and hope ness are not causes of hope. Because hope implies cer- of the future, it has little to remember and lives very much tainty and steadiness; so much so that it is compared to in hope. Again, youths, on account of the heat of their an anchor (Heb. 6:19). But young men and drunkards nature, are full of spirit; so that their heart expands: and it are wanting in steadiness; since their minds are easily is owing to the heart being expanded that one tends to that changed. Therefore youth and drunkenness are not causes which is arduous; wherefore youths are spirited and hope- of hope. ful. Likewise they who have not suffered defeat, nor had Objection 2. Further, as stated above (a. 5), the cause experience of obstacles to their efforts, are prone to count of hope is chiefly whatever increases one’s power. But a thing possible to them. Wherefore youths, through inex- youth and drunkenness are united to weakness. Therefore perience of obstacles and of their own shortcomings, eas- they are not causes of hope. ily count a thing possible; and consequently are of good Objection 3. Further, experience is a cause of hope, as hope. Two of these causes are also in those who are in stated above (a. 5). But youth lacks experience. Therefore drink—viz. heat and high spirits, on account of wine, and it is not a cause of hope. heedlessness of dangers and shortcomings. For the same On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) reason all foolish and thoughtless persons attempt every- that “drunken men are hopeful”: and (Rhet. ii, 12) that thing and are full of hope. “the young are full of hope.” Reply to Objection 1. Although youths and men in I answer that, Youth is a cause of hope for three rea- drink lack steadiness in reality, yet they are steady in their sons, as the Philosopher states in Rhet. ii, 12: and these own estimation, for they think that they will steadily ob- three reasons may be gathered from the three conditions tain that which they hope for. of the good which is the object of hope—namely, that it In like manner, in reply to the Second Objection, we is future, arduous and possible, as stated above (a. 1). For must observe that young people and men in drink are in- youth has much of the future before it, and little of the deed unsteady in reality: but, in their own estimation, they 786 are capable, for they know not their shortcomings. lack of experience, is, in some way, a cause of hope, as Reply to Objection 3. Not only experience, but also explained above (a. 5, ad 3). Whether hope is a cause of love? Ia IIae q. 40 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that hope is not a cause sible to obtain; and since it happens sometimes that what of love. Because, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei is difficult becomes possible to us, not through ourselves xiv, 7,9), love is the first of the soul’s emotions. But hope but through others; hence it is that hope regards also that is an emotion of the soul. Therefore love precedes hope, by which something becomes possible to us. and consequently hope does not cause love. In so far, then, as hope regards the good we hope to Objection 2. Further, desire precedes hope. But de- get, it is caused by love: since we do not hope save for sire is caused by love, as stated above (q. 25, a. 2). There- that which we desire and love. But in so far as hope re- fore hope, too, follows love, and consequently is not its gards one through whom something becomes possible to cause. us, love is caused by hope, and not vice versa. Because Objection 3. Further, hope causes pleasure, as stated by the very fact that we hope that good will accrue to us above (q. 32, a. 3). But pleasure is only of the good that is through someone, we are moved towards him as to our loved. Therefore love precedes hope. own good; and thus we begin to love him. Whereas from On the contrary, The gloss commenting on Mat. 1:2, the fact that we love someone we do not hope in him, “Abraham begot Isaac, and Isaac begot Jacob,” says, i.e. except accidentally, that is, in so far as we think that he “faith begets hope, and hope begets charity.” But charity returns our love. Wherefore the fact of being loved by an- is love. Therefore love is caused by hope. other makes us hope in him; but our love for him is caused I answer that, Hope can regard two things. For it re- by the hope we have in him. gards as its object, the good which one hopes for. But Wherefore the Replies to the Objections are evident. since the good we hope for is something difficult but pos- Whether hope is a help or a hindrance to action? Ia IIae q. 40 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that hope is not a help but is intent on his action. Secondly, on account of its effect. a hindrance to action. Because hope implies security. But Because hope, as stated above (q. 32, a. 3), causes plea- security begets negligence which hinders action. There- sure; which is a help to action, as stated above (q. 33, a. 4). fore hope is a hindrance to action. Therefore hope is conducive to action. Objection 2. Further, sorrow hinders action, as stated Reply to Objection 1. Hope regards a good to be ob- above (q. 37, a. 3). But hope sometimes causes sorrow: tained; security regards an evil to be avoided. Wherefore for it is written (Prov. 13:12): “Hope that is deferred af- security seems to be contrary to fear rather than to belong flicteth the soul.” Therefore hope hinders action. to hope. Yet security does not beget negligence, save in Objection 3. Further, despair is contrary to hope, as so far as it lessens the idea of difficulty: whereby it also stated above (a. 4). But despair, especially in matters of lessens the character of hope: for the things in which a war, conduces to action; for it is written (2 Kings 2:26), man fears no hindrance, are no longer looked upon as dif- that “it is dangerous to drive people to despair.” Therefore ficult. hope has a contrary effect, namely, by hindering action. Reply to Objection 2. Hope of itself causes plea- On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 9:10) that “he sure; it is by accident that it causes sorrow, as stated above that plougheth should plough in hope. . . to receive fruit”: (q. 32, a. 3, ad 2). and the same applies to all other actions. Reply to Objection 3. Despair threatens danger in I answer that, Hope of its very nature is a help to ac- war, on account of a certain hope that attaches to it. For tion by making it more intense: and this for two reasons. they who despair of flight, strive less to fly, but hope to First, by reason of its object, which is a good, difficult but avenge their death: and therefore in this hope they fight possible. For the thought of its being difficult arouses our the more bravely, and consequently prove dangerous to attention; while the thought that it is possible is no drag the foe. on our effort. Hence it follows that by reason of hope man 787 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 41 Of Fear, in Itself (In Four Articles) We must now consider, in the first place, fear; and, secondly, daring. With regard to fear, four things must be considered: (1) Fear, in itself; (2) Its object; (3) Its cause; (4) Its effect. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether fear is a passion of the soul? (2) Whether fear is a special passion? (3) Whether there is a natural fear? (4) Of the species of fear. Whether fear is a passion of the soul? Ia IIae q. 41 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that fear is not a pas- tation. And, again, most properly those movements are sion of the soul. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. called passions, which imply some deterioration. Now it iii, 23) that “fear is a power, by way of systole”—i.e. is evident that fear, since it regards evil, belongs to the of contraction—“desirous of vindicating nature.” But no appetitive power, which of itself regards good and evil. virtue is a passion, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 5. Therefore Moreover, it belongs to the sensitive appetite: for it is ac- fear is not a passion. companied by a certain transmutation—i.e. contraction— Objection 2. Further, every passion is an effect due as Damascene says (Cf. obj. 1). Again, it implies relation to the presence of an agent. But fear is not of something to evil as overcoming, so to speak, some particular good. present, but of something future, as Damascene declares Wherefore it has most properly the character of passion; (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). Therefore fear is not a passion. less, however, than sorrow, which regards the present evil: Objection 3. Further, every passion of the soul is a because fear regards future evil, which is not so strong a movement of the sensitive appetite, in consequence of an motive as present evil. apprehension of the senses. But sense apprehends, not the Reply to Objection 1. Virtue denotes a principle of future but the present. Since, then, fear is of future evil, it action: wherefore, in so far as the interior movements seems that it is not a passion of the soul. of the appetitive faculty are principles of external action, On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 5, they are called virtues. But the Philosopher denies that seqq.) reckons fear among the other passions of the soul. passion is a virtue by way of habit. I answer that, Among the other passions of the soul, Reply to Objection 2. Just as the passion of a natural after sorrow, fear chiefly has the character of passion. For body is due to the bodily presence of an agent, so is the as we have stated above (q. 22 ), the notion of passion passion of the soul due to the agent being present to the implies first of all a movement of a passive power—i.e. soul, although neither corporally nor really present: that is of a power whose object is compared to it as its active to say, in so far as the evil which is really future, is present principle: since passion is the effect of an agent. In this in the apprehension of the soul. way, both “to feel” and “to understand” are passions. Sec- Reply to Objection 3. The senses do not apprehend ondly, more properly speaking, passion is a movement the future: but from apprehending the present, an animal of the appetitive power; and more properly still, it is a is moved by natural instinct to hope for a future good, or movement of an appetitive power that has a bodily organ, to fear a future evil. such movement being accompanied by a bodily transmu- Whether fear is a special passion? Ia IIae q. 41 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that fear is not a spe- removed. Therefore fear is not a special but a general pas- cial passion. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that sion. “the man who is not distraught by fear, is neither harassed Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, by desire, nor wounded by sickness”—i.e. sorrow—“nor 2) that “pursuit and avoidance in the appetite are what tossed about in transports of empty joys.” Wherefore it affirmation and denial are in the intellect.” But denial seems that, if fear be set aside, all the other passions are is nothing special in the intellect, as neither is affirma- 788 tion, but something common to many. Therefore neither nected with one another. By reason of this connection, is avoidance anything special in the appetite. But fear is when fear is put aside, the other passions of the soul are nothing but a kind of avoidance of evil. Therefore it is not dispersed; not, however, as though it were a general pas- a special passion. sion. Objection 3. Further, if fear were a special passion, it Reply to Objection 2. Not every avoidance in the ap-would be chiefly in the irascible part. But fear is also in petite is fear, but avoidance of a special object, as stated. the concupiscible: since the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) Wherefore, though avoidance be something common, yet that “fear is a kind of sorrow”; and Damascene says (De fear is a special passion. Fide Orth. iii, 23) that fear is “a power of desire”: and Reply to Objection 3. Fear is nowise in the concu- both sorrow and desire are in the concupiscible faculty, as piscible: for it regards evil, not absolutely, but as difficult stated above (q. 23, a. 4). Therefore fear is not a special or arduous, so as to be almost unavoidable. But since the passion, since it belongs to different powers. irascible passions arise from the passions of the concupis- On the contrary, Fear is condivided with the other cible faculty, and terminate therein, as stated above (q. 25, passions of the soul, as is clear from Damascene (De Fide a. 1); hence it is that what belongs to the concupiscible is Orth. ii, 12,15). ascribed to fear. For fear is called sorrow, in so far as I answer that, The passions of the soul derive their the object of fear causes sorrow when present: wherefore species from their objects: hence that is a special passion, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that fear arises “from the which has a special object. Now fear has a special object, representation of a future evil which is either corruptive or as hope has. For just as the object of hope is a future good, painful.” In like manner desire is ascribed by Damascene difficult but possible to obtain; so the object of fear is a fu-to fear, because just as hope arises from the desire of good, ture evil, difficult and irresistible. Consequently fear is a so fear arises from avoidance of evil; while avoidance of special passion of the soul. evil arises from the desire of good, as is evident from what Reply to Objection 1. All the passions of the soul has been said above (q. 25, a. 2; q. 29, a. 2; q. 36, a. 2). arise from one source, viz. love, wherein they are con- Whether there is a natural fear? Ia IIae q. 41 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that there is a natural fear. of the apprehensive power, such as understanding, feeling, For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that “there is a and remembering, as well as the movements of the animal natural fear, through the soul refusing to be severed from appetite, are sometimes said to be natural. the body.” And in this sense we may say that there is a natural Objection 2. Further, fear arises from love, as stated fear; and it is distinguished from non-natural fear, by rea- above (a. 2, ad 1). But there is a natural love, as Dionysius son of the diversity of its object. For, as the Philosopher says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore there is also a natural fear. says (Rhet. ii, 5), there is a fear of “corruptive evil,” which Objection 3. Further, fear is opposed to hope, as nature shrinks from on account of its natural desire to ex- stated above (q. 40, a. 4, ad 1). But there is a hope of ist; and such fear is said to be natural. Again, there is a nature, as is evident from Rom. 4:18, where it is said of fear of “painful evil,” which is repugnant not to nature, but Abraham that “against hope” of nature, “he believed in to the desire of the appetite; and such fear is not natural. hope” of grace. Therefore there is also a fear of nature. In this sense we have stated above (q. 26, a. 1; q. 30, a. 3; On the contrary, That which is natural is common to q. 31, a. 7) that love, desire, and pleasure are divisible into things animate and inanimate. But fear is not in things natural and non-natural. inanimate. Therefore there is no natural fear. But in the first sense of the word “natural,” we must I answer that, A movement is said to be natural, be- observe that certain passions of the soul are sometimes cause nature inclines thereto. Now this happens in two said to be natural, as love, desire, and hope; whereas the ways. First, so that it is entirely accomplished by nature, others cannot be called natural. The reason of this is be- without any operation of the apprehensive faculty: thus to cause love and hatred, desire and avoidance, imply a cer- have an upward movement is natural to fire, and to grow is tain inclination to pursue what is good or to avoid what the natural movement of animals and plants. Secondly, a is evil; which inclination is to be found in the natural ap- movement is said to be natural, if nature inclines thereto, petite also. Consequently there is a natural love; while we though it be accomplished by the apprehensive faculty may also speak of desire and hope as being even in natural alone: since, as stated above (q. 10, a. 1), the movements things devoid of knowledge. On the other hand the other of the cognitive and appetitive faculties are reducible to passions of the soul denote certain movements, whereto nature as to their first principle. In this way, even the acts the natural inclination is nowise sufficient. This is due ei- 789 ther to the fact that perception or knowledge is essential ture of natural inclination: for instance, despair flies from to these passions (thus we have said, q. 31, Aa. 1,3; q. 35, good on account of some difficulty; and fear shrinks from a. 1, that apprehension is a necessary condition of pleasure repelling a contrary evil; both of which are contrary to the and sorrow), wherefore things devoid of knowledge can- inclination of nature. Wherefore such like passions are in not be said to take pleasure or to be sorrowful: or else it is no way ascribed to inanimate beings. because such like movements are contrary to the very na- Thus the Replies to the Objections are evident. Whether the species of fear is suitably assigned? Ia IIae q. 41 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that six species of fear to say, a man considers some great evil the outcome of are unsuitably assigned by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, which he is unable to gauge: and then there is “amaze- 15); namely, “laziness, shamefacedness, shame, amaze- ment.” Secondly, by reason of its being unwonted; be- ment, stupor, and anxiety.” Because, as the Philosopher cause, to wit, some unwonted evil arises before us, and on says (Rhet. ii, 5), “fear regards a saddening evil.” There- that account is great in our estimation: and then there is fore the species of fear should correspond to the species “stupor,” which is caused by the representation of some- of sorrow. Now there are four species of sorrow, as stated thing unwonted. Thirdly, by reason of its being unfore- above (q. 35, a. 8). Therefore there should only be four seen: thus future misfortunes are feared, and fear of this species of fear corresponding to them. kind is called “anxiety.” Objection 2. Further, that which consists in an ac- Reply to Objection 1. Those species of sorrow given tion of our own is in our power. But fear regards an evil above are not derived from the diversity of objects, but that surpasses our power, as stated above (a. 2). Therefore from the diversity of effects, and for certain special rea- laziness, shamefacedness, and shame, which regard our sons. Consequently there is no need for those species of own actions, should not be reckoned as species of fear. sorrow to correspond with these species of fear, which are Objection 3. Further, fear is of the future, as stated derived from the proper division of the object of fear it- above (Aa. 1, 2). But “shame regards a disgraceful deed self. already done,” as Gregory of Nyssa∗ says. Therefore Reply to Objection 2. A deed considered as being ac- shame is not a species of fear. tually done, is in the power of the doer. But it is possible Objection 4. Further, fear is only of evil. But to take into consideration something connected with the amazement and stupor regard great and unwonted things, deed, and surpassing the faculty of the doer, for which rea- whether good or evil. Therefore amazement and stupor son he shrinks from the deed. It is in this sense that lazi- are not species of fear. ness, shamefacedness, and shame are reckoned as species Objection 5. Further, Philosophers have been led by of fear. amazement to seek the truth, as stated in the beginning of Reply to Objection 3. The past deed may be the oc- Metaphysics. But fear leads to flight rather than to search. casion of fear of future reproach or disgrace: and in this Therefore amazement is not a species of fear. sense shame is a species of fear. On the contrary suffices the authority of Damascene Reply to Objection 4. Not every amazement and and Gregory of Nyssa† (Cf. obj. 1,3). stupor are species of fear, but that amazement which is I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), fear regards a caused by a great evil, and that stupor which arises from future evil which surpasses the power of him that fears, so an unwonted evil. Or else we may say that, just as laziness that it is irresistible. Now man’s evil, like his good, may shrinks from the toil of external work, so amazement and be considered either in his action or in external things. In stupor shrink from the difficulty of considering a great and his action he has a twofold evil to fear. First, there is the unwonted thing, whether good or evil: so that amazement toil that burdens his nature: and hence arises “laziness,” and stupor stand in relation to the act of the intellect, as as when a man shrinks from work for fear of too much laziness does to external work. toil. Secondly, there is the disgrace which damages him Reply to Objection 5. He who is amazed shrinks at in the opinion of others. And thus, if disgrace is feared in present from forming a judgment of that which amazes a deed that is yet to be done, there is “shamefacedness”; him, fearing to fall short of the truth, but inquires after- if, however, it be a deed already done, there is “shame.” wards: whereas he who is overcome by stupor fears both On the other hand, the evil that consists in external to judge at present, and to inquire afterwards. Where- things may surpass man’s faculty of resistance in three fore amazement is a beginning of philosophical research: ways. First by reason of its magnitude; when, that is whereas stupor is a hindrance thereto. ∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx. † Nemesius 790 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 42 Of the Object of Fear (In Six Articles) We must now consider the object of fear: under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether good or evil is the object of fear? (2) Whether evil of nature is the object of fear? (3) Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear? (4) Whether fear itself can be feared? (5) Whether sudden things are especially feared? (6) Whether those things are more feared against which there is no remedy? Whether the object of fear is good or evil? Ia IIae q. 42 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that good is the object of an evil causes privation of good. Now a thing is evil from fear. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 83) that “we fear the very fact that it is a privation of some good. Where- nothing save to lose what we love and possess, or not to fore, since evil is shunned because it is evil, it follows that obtain that which we hope for.” But that which we love is it is shunned because it deprives one of the good that one good. Therefore fear regards good as its proper object. pursues through love thereof. And in this sense Augustine Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, says that there is no cause for fear, save loss of the good 5) that “power and to be above another is a thing to be we love. feared.” But this is a good thing. Therefore good is the In another way, good stands related to evil as its cause: object of fear. in so far as some good can by its power bring harm to Objection 3. Further, there can be no evil in God. But the good we love: and so, just as hope, as stated above we are commanded to fear God, according to Ps. 33:10: (q. 40, a. 7), regards two things, namely, the good to which “Fear the Lord, all ye saints.” Therefore even the good is it tends, and the thing through which there is a hope of an object of fear. obtaining the desired good; so also does fear regard two On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, things, namely, the evil from which it shrinks, and that 12) that fear is of future evil. good which, by its power, can inflict that evil. In this way I answer that, Fear is a movement of the appetitive God is feared by man, inasmuch as He can inflict punish- power. Now it belongs to the appetitive power to pur- ment, spiritual or corporal. In this way, too, we fear the sue and to avoid, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2: and pursuit is power of man; especially when it has been thwarted, or of good, while avoidance is of evil. Consequently what- when it is unjust, because then it is more likely to do us a ever movement of the appetitive power implies pursuit, harm. has some good for its object: and whatever movement In like manner one fears “to be over another,” i.e. to implies avoidance, has an evil for its object. Wherefore, lean on another, so that it is in his power to do us a harm: since fear implies an avoidance, in the first place and of thus a man fears another, who knows him to be guilty of a its very nature it regards evil as its proper object. crime lest he reveal it to others. It can, however, regard good also, in so far as referable This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. to evil. This can be in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as Whether evil of nature is an object of fear? Ia IIae q. 42 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that evil of nature is not like evils were an object of fear, man would needs be al- an object of fear. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) ways in fear. that “fear makes us take counsel.” But we do not take Objection 3. Further, nature does not move to con- counsel about things which happen naturally, as stated in traries. But evil of nature is an effect of nature. Therefore Ethic. iii, 3. Therefore evil of nature is not an object of if a man shrinks from such like evils through fear thereof, fear. this is not an effect of nature. Therefore natural fear is not Objection 2. Further, natural defects such as death of the evil of nature; and yet it seems that it should be. and the like are always threatening man. If therefore such On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6) 791 that “the most terrible of all things is death,” which is an they heed it not.” Secondly, a future evil is considered as evil of nature. though it were not to be, on account of its being inevitable, I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), wherefore we look upon it as already present. Hence the fear is caused by the “imagination of a future evil which Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that “those who are already is either corruptive or painful.” Now just as a painful evil on the scaffold, are not afraid,” seeing that they are on the is that which is contrary to the will, so a corruptive evil very point of a death from which there is no escape; “but is that which is contrary to nature: and this is the evil of in order that a man be afraid, there must be some hope of nature. Consequently evil of nature can be the object of escape for him.” fear. Consequently evil of nature is not feared if it be not But it must be observed that evil of nature sometimes apprehended as future: but if evil of nature, that is corrup- arises from a natural cause; and then it is called evil of tive, be apprehended as near at hand, and yet with some nature, not merely from being a privation of the good of hope of escape, then it will be feared. nature, but also from being an effect of nature; such are Reply to Objection 1. The evil of nature sometimes natural death and other like defects. But sometimes evil is not an effect of nature, as stated above. But in so far as of nature arises from a non-natural cause; such as violent it is an effect of nature, although it may be impossible to death inflicted by an assailant. In either case evil of na- avoid it entirely, yet it may be possible to delay it. And ture is feared to a certain extent, and to a certain extent with this hope one may take counsel about avoiding it. not. For since fear arises “from the imagination of fu- Reply to Objection 2. Although evil of nature ever ture evil,” as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), whatever threatens, yet it does not always threaten from near at removes the imagination of the future evil, removes fear hand: and consequently it is not always feared. also. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil may not Reply to Objection 3. Death and other defects of na- appear as about to be. First, through being remote and far ture are the effects of the common nature; and yet the indi- off: for, on account of the distance, such a thing is con- vidual nature rebels against them as far as it can. Accord- sidered as though it were not to be. Hence we either do ingly, from the inclination of the individual nature arise not fear it, or fear it but little; for, as the Philosopher says pain and sorrow for such like evils, when present; fear (Rhet. ii, 5), “we do not fear things that are very far off; when threatening in the future. since all know that they shall die, but as death is not near, Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear? Ia IIae q. 42 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the evil of sin can unjust or slow.” be an object of fear. For Augustine says on the canonical I answer that, As stated above (q. 40, a. 1; q. 41, a. 2), Epistle of John (Tract. ix), that “by chaste fear man fears as the object of hope is a future good difficult but possible to be severed from God.” Now nothing but sin severs us to obtain, so the object of fear is a future evil, arduous and from God; according to Is. 59:2: “Your iniquities have not to be easily avoided. From this we may gather that divided between you and your God.” Therefore the evil of whatever is entirely subject to our power and will, is not sin can be an object of fear. an object of fear; and that nothing gives rise to fear save Objection 2. Further, Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv, what is due to an external cause. Now human will is the 4,6) that “we fear when they are yet to come, those things proper cause of the evil of sin: and consequently evil of which give us pain when they are present.” But it is pos- sin, properly speaking, is not an object of fear. sible for one to be pained or sorrowful on account of the But since the human will may be inclined to sin by an evil of sin. Therefore one can also fear the evil of sin. extrinsic cause; if this cause have a strong power of incli- Objection 3. Further, hope is contrary to fear. But the nation, in that respect a man may fear the evil of sin, in so good of virtue can be the object of hope, as the Philoso- far as it arises from that extrinsic cause: as when he fears pher declares (Ethic. ix, 4): and the Apostle says (Gal. to dwell in the company of wicked men, lest he be led by 5:10): “I have confidence in you in the Lord, that you will them to sin. But, properly speaking, a man thus disposed, not be of another mind.” Therefore fear can regard evil of fears the being led astray rather than the sin considered in sin. its proper nature, i.e. as a voluntary act; for considered in Objection 4. Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated this light it is not an object of fear to him. above (q. 41, a. 4). But shame regards a disgraceful deed, Reply to Objection 1. Separation from God is a pun- which is an evil of sin. Therefore fear does so likewise. ishment resulting from sin: and every punishment is, in On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) some way, due to an extrinsic cause. that “not all evils are feared, for instance that someone be Reply to Objection 2. Sorrow and fear agree in one 792 point, since each regards evil: they differ, however, in able. Now one may obtain a good either of oneself, or two points. First, because sorrow is about present evil, through another: and so, hope may be of an act of virtue, whereas fear is future evil. Secondly, because sorrow, be- which lies within our own power. On the other hand, fear ing in the concupiscible faculty, regards evil absolutely; is of an evil that does not lie in our own power: and conse- wherefore it can be about any evil, great or small; whereas quently the evil which is feared is always from an extrinsic fear, being in the irascible part, regards evil with the addi- cause; while the good that is hoped for may be both from tion of a certain arduousness or difficulty; which difficulty an intrinsic and from an extrinsic cause. ceases in so far as a thing is subject to the will. Con- Reply to Objection 4. As stated above (q. 41, a. 4, sequently not all things that give us pain when they are ad 2,3), shame is not fear of the very act of sin, but of the present, make us fear when they are yet to come, but only disgrace or ignominy which arises therefrom, and which some things, namely, those that are difficult. is due to an extrinsic cause. Reply to Objection 3. Hope is of good that is obtain- Whether fear itself can be feared? Ia IIae q. 42 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that fear cannot be feared. fear, i.e. a man may fear lest he should be threatened by For whatever is feared, is prevented from being lost, the necessity of fearing, through being assailed by some through fear thereof: thus a man who fears to lose his great evil. It is subject to the will, in so far as the lower health, keeps it, through fearing its loss. If therefore a appetite obeys reason; wherefore man is able to drive fear man be afraid of fear, he will keep himself from fear by away. In this sense fear cannot be the object of fear, as being afraid: which seems absurd. Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33). Lest, however, anyone Objection 2. Further, fear is a kind of flight. But noth-make use of his arguments, in order to prove that fear can- ing flies from itself. Therefore fear cannot be the object not be at all be the object of fear, we must add a solution of fear. to the same. Objection 3. Further, fear is about the future. But Reply to Objection 1. Not every fear is identically the fear is present to him that fears. Therefore it cannot be the same; there are various fears according to the various ob- object of his fear. jects of fear. Nothing, then, prevents a man from keeping On the contrary, A man can love his own love, and himself from fearing one thing, by fearing another, so that can grieve at his own sorrow. Therefore, in like manner, the fear which he has preserves him from the fear which he can fear his own fear. he has not. I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), nothing can be Reply to Objection 2. Since fear of an imminent evil an object of fear, save what is due to an extrinsic cause; is not identical with the fear of the fear of imminent evil; but not that which ensues from our own will. Now fear it does not follow that a thing flies from itself, or that it is partly arises from an extrinsic cause, and is partly subject the same flight in both cases. to the will. It is due to an extrinsic cause, in so far as it is Reply to Objection 3. On account of the various a passion resulting from the imagination of an imminent kinds of fear already alluded to (ad 2) a man’s present evil. In this sense it is possible for fear to be the object of fear may have a future fear for its object. Whether sudden things are especially feared? Ia IIae q. 42 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that unwonted and sud- happen suddenly. But the more we think about a thing, den things are not especially feared. Because, as hope is the more we fear it; hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, about good things, so fear is about evil things. But ex- 8) that “some appear to be courageous through ignorance, perience conduces to the increase of hope in good things. but as soon as they discover that the case is different from Therefore it also adds to fear in evil things. what they expected, they run away.” Therefore sudden Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. things are feared less. ii, 5) that “those are feared most, not who are quick- On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): tempered, but who are gentle and cunning.” Now it is “Fear is startled at things unwonted and sudden, which clear that those who are quick-tempered are more subject endanger things beloved, and takes forethought for their to sudden emotions. Therefore sudden things are less to safety.” be feared. I answer that, As stated about (a. 3; q. 41, a. 2), the Objection 3. Further, we think less about things that object of fear is an imminent evil, which can be repelled, 793 but with difficulty. Now this is due to one of two causes: Reply to Objection 2. Those who are quick-tempered to the greatness of the evil, or to the weakness of him do not hide their anger; wherefore the harm they do others that fears; while unwontedness and suddenness conduce is not so sudden, as not to be foreseen. On the other hand, to both of these causes. First, it helps an imminent evil to those who are gentle or cunning hide their anger; where- seem greater. Because all material things, whether good fore the harm which may be impending from them, cannot or evil, the more we consider them, the smaller they seem. be foreseen, but takes one by surprise. For this reason the Consequently, just as sorrow for a present evil is mitigated Philosopher says that such men are feared more than oth- in course of time, as Cicero states (De Quaest. Tusc. iii, ers. 30); so, too, fear of a future evil is diminished by thinking Reply to Objection 3. Bodily good or evil, consid- about it beforehand. Secondly, unwontedness and sudden- ered in itself, seems greater at first. The reason for this ness increase the weakness of him that fears, in so far as is that a thing is more obvious when seen in juxtaposition they deprive him of the remedies with which he might oth- with its contrary. Hence, when a man passes unexpectedly erwise provide himself to forestall the coming evil, were from penury to wealth, he thinks more of his wealth on it not for the evil taking him by surprise. account of his previous poverty: while, on the other hand, Reply to Objection 1. The object of hope is a good the rich man who suddenly becomes poor, finds poverty that is possible to obtain. Consequently whatever in- all the more disagreeable. For this reason sudden evil is creases a man’s power, is of a nature to increase hope, and, feared more, because it seems more to be evil. However, for the same reason, to diminish fear, since fear is about it may happen through some accident that the greatness of an evil which cannot be easily repelled. Since, therefore, some evil is hidden; for instance if the foe hides himself experience increases a man’s power of action, therefore, in ambush: and then it is true that evil inspires greater fear as it increases hope, so does it diminish fear. through being much thought about. Whether those things are more feared, for which there is no remedy? Ia IIae q. 42 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that those things are not (q. 18, a. 3). And of all the circumstances, longlasting- more to be feared, for which there is no remedy. Because ness, or even everlastingness, seems to have the greatest it is a condition of fear, that there be some hope of safety, bearing on the increase of evil. Because things that exist as stated above (a. 2). But an evil that cannot be remedied in time are measured, in a way, according to the duration leaves no hope of escape. Therefore such things are not of time: wherefore if it be an evil to suffer something for feared at all. a certain length of time, we should reckon the evil dou- Objection 2. Further, there is no remedy for the evil bled, if it be suffered for twice that length of time. And of death: since, in the natural course of things, there is no accordingly, to suffer the same thing for an infinite length return from death to life. And yet death is not the most of time, i.e. for ever, implies, so to speak, an infinite in- feared of all things, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, crease. Now those evils which, after they have come, can- 5). Therefore those things are not feared most, for which not be remedied at all, or at least not easily, are considered there is no remedy. as lasting for ever or for a long time: for which reason they Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, inspire the greatest fear. 6) that “a thing which lasts long is no better than that Reply to Objection 1. Remedy for an evil is twofold. which lasts but one day: nor is that which lasts for ever One, by which a future evil is warded off from coming. any better than that which is not everlasting”: and the If such a remedy be removed, there is an end to hope and same applies to evil. But things that cannot be remedied consequently to fear; wherefore we do not speak now of seem to differ from other things, merely in the point of remedies of that kind. The other remedy is one by which their lasting long or for ever. Consequently they are not an already present evil is removed: and of such a remedy therefore any worse or more to be feared. we speak now. On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) Reply to Objection 2. Although death be an evil with- that “those things are most to be feared which when done out remedy, yet, since it threatens not from near, it is not wrong cannot be put right. . . or for which there is no help, feared, as stated above (a. 2). or which are not easy.” Reply to Objection 3. The Philosopher is speaking I answer that, The object of fear is evil: consequently there of things that are good in themselves, i.e. good whatever tends to increase evil, conduces to the increase specifically. And such like good is no better for lasting of fear. Now evil is increased not only in its species of long or for ever: its goodness depends on its very nature. evil, but also in respect of circumstances, as stated above 794 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 43 Of the Cause of Fear (In Two Articles) We must now consider the cause of fear: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether love is the cause of fear? (2) Whether defect is the cause of fear? Whether love is the cause of fear? Ia IIae q. 43 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that love is not the cause its cause by way of material disposition, is a habit or any of fear. For that which leads to a thing is its cause. But sort of disposition by reason of which this conjoined good “fear leads to the love of charity” as Augustine says on the becomes suitable or is apprehended as such. canonical epistle of John (Tract. ix). Therefore fear is the Accordingly, as to the matter in question, the object cause of love, and not conversely. of fear is something reckoned as an evil to come, near at Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, hand and difficult to avoid. Therefore that which can in- 5) that “those are feared most from whom we dread the flict such an evil, is the efficient cause of the object of fear, advent of some evil.” But the dread of evil being caused and, consequently, of fear itself. While that which renders by someone, makes us hate rather than love him. There- a man so disposed that thing is such an evil to him, is a fore fear is caused by hate rather than by love. cause of fear and of its object, by way of material disposi- Objection 3. Further, it has been stated above (q. 42, tion. And thus it is that love causes fear: since it is through a. 3) that those things which occur by our own doing are his loving a certain good, that whatever deprives a man of not fearful. But that which we do from love, is done from that good is an evil to him, and that consequently he fears our inmost heart. Therefore fear is not caused by love. it as an evil. On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33): Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 42, a. 1), “There can be no doubt that there is no cause for fear save fear, of itself and in the first place, regards the evil from the loss of what we love, when we possess it, or the failure which it recoils as being contrary to some loved good: to obtain what we hope for.” Therefore all fear is caused and thus fear, of itself, is born of love. But, in the second by our loving something: and consequently love is the place, it regards the cause from which that evil ensues: so cause of fear. that sometimes, accidentally, fear gives rise to love; in so I answer that, The objects of the soul’s passions stand far as, for instance, through fear of God’s punishments, in relation thereto as the forms to things natural or artifi- man keeps His commandments, and thus begins to hope, cial: because the passions of the soul take their species while hope leads to love, as stated above (q. 40 , a. 7). from their objects, as the aforesaid things do from their Reply to Objection 2. He, from whom evil is ex- forms. Therefore, just as whatever is a cause of the form, pected, is indeed hated at first; but afterwards, when once is a cause of the thing constituted by that form, so what- we begin to hope for good from him, we begin to love ever is a cause, in any way whatever, of the object, is a him. But the good, the contrary evil of which is feared, cause of the passion. Now a thing may be a cause of the was loved from the beginning. object, either by way of efficient cause, or by way of mate- Reply to Objection 3. This argument is true of rial disposition. Thus the object of pleasure is good appre- that which is the efficient cause of the evil to be feared: hended as suitable and conjoined: and its efficient cause whereas love causes fear by way of material disposition, is that which causes the conjunction, or the suitableness, as stated above. or goodness, or apprehension of that good thing; while Whether defect is the cause of fear? Ia IIae q. 43 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that defect is not a cause ready being executed is extreme. But such like do not fear of fear. Because those who are in power are very much as stated in Rhet. ii, 5. Therefore defect is not a cause of feared. But defect is contrary to power. Therefore defect fear. is not a cause of fear. Objection 3. Further, contests arise from strength not Objection 2. Further, the defect of those who are al- from defect. But “those who contend fear those who con- 795 tend with them” (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore defect is not a But as to the second, power and strength are, of them-cause of fear. selves, the cause of fear: because it is owing to the fact On the contrary, Contraries ensue from contrary that the cause apprehended as harmful is powerful, that its causes. But “wealth, strength, a multitude of friends, and effect cannot be repulsed. It may happen, however, in this power drive fear away” (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore fear is respect, that some defect causes fear accidentally, in so far caused by lack of these. as owing to some defect someone wishes to hurt another; I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), fear may be set for instance, by reason of injustice, either because that down to a twofold cause: one is by way of a material dis- other has already done him a harm, or because he fears to position, on the part of him that fears; the other is by way be harmed by him. of efficient cause, on the part of the person feared. As to Reply to Objection 1. This argument is true of the the first then, some defect is, of itself, the cause of fear: cause of fear, on the part of the efficient cause. for it is owing to some lack of power that one is unable Reply to Objection 2. Those who are already be- easily to repulse a threatening evil. And yet, in order to ing executed, are actually suffering from a present evil; cause fear, this defect must be according to a measure. wherefore their defect exceeds the measure of fear. For the defect which causes fear of a future evil, is less Reply to Objection 3. Those who contend with one than the defect caused by evil present, which is the object another are afraid, not on account of the power which of sorrow. And still greater would be the defect, if per- enables them to contend: but on account of the lack of ception of the evil, or love of the good whose contrary is power, owing to which they are not confident of victory. feared, were entirely absent. 796 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 44 Of the Effects of Fear (In Four Articles) We must now consider the effects of fear: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether fear causes contraction? (2) Whether it makes men suitable for counsel? (3) Whether it makes one tremble? (4) Whether it hinders action? Whether fear causes contraction? Ia IIae q. 44 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that fear does not cause when seized with fear, leave the outskirts, and, as far as contraction. For when contraction takes place, the heat possible, make for the inner quarters. It is in resemblance and vital spirits are withdrawn inwardly. But accumula- to this contraction, which pertains to the appetite of the tion of heat and vital spirits in the interior parts of the soul, that in fear a similar contraction of heat and vital body, dilates the heart unto endeavors of daring, as may be spirits towards the inner parts takes place in regard to the seen in those who are angered: while the contrary happens body. in those who are afraid. Therefore fear does not cause Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher says (De contraction. Problem. xxvii, 3), although in those who fear, the vital Objection 2. Further, when, as a result of contraction, spirits recede from outer to the inner parts of the body, the vital spirits and heat are accumulated in the interior yet the movement of vital spirits is not the same in those parts, man cries out, as may be seen in those who are in who are angry and those who are afraid. For in those who pain. But those who fear utter nothing: on the contrary are angry, by reason of the heat and subtlety of the vital they lose their speech. Therefore fear does not cause con- spirits, which result from the craving for vengeance, the traction. inward movement has an upward direction: wherefore the Objection 3. Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated vital spirits and heat concentrate around the heart: the re-above (q. 41, a. 4). But “those who are ashamed blush,” sult being that an angry man is quick and brave in attack- as Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8), and the Philosopher ing. But in those who are afraid, on account of the conden- (Ethic. iv, 9) observe. But blushing is an indication, not sation caused by cold, the vital spirits have a downward of contraction, but of the reverse. Therefore contraction is movement; the said cold being due to the imagined lack not an effect of fear. of power. Consequently the heat and vital spirits abandon On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, the heart instead of concentrating around it: the result be- 23) that “fear is a power according to systole,” i.e. con-ing that a man who is afraid is not quick to attack, but is traction. more inclined to run away. I answer that, As stated above (q. 28, a. 5), in the pasReply to Objection 2. To everyone that is in pain, sions of the soul, the formal element is the movement of whether man or animal, it is natural to use all possible the appetitive power, while the bodily transmutation is the means of repelling the harmful thing that causes pain but material element. Both of these are mutually proportion- its presence: thus we observe that animals, when in pain, ate; and consequently the bodily transmutation assumes a attack with their jaws or with their horns. Now the greatest resemblance to and the very nature of the appetitive move- help for all purposes, in animals, is heat and vital spirits: ment. Now, as to the appetitive movement of the soul, fear wherefore when they are in pain, their nature stores up implies a certain contraction: the reason of which is that the heat and vital spirits within them, in order to make fear arises from the imagination of some threatening evil use thereof in repelling the harmful object. Hence the which is difficult to repel, as stated above (q. 41, a. 2). But Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 9) when the vital that a thing be difficult to repel is due to lack of power, as spirits and heat are concentrated together within, they re- stated above (q. 43, a. 2): and the weaker a power is, the quire to find a vent in the voice: for which reason those fewer the things to which it extends. Wherefore from the who are in pain can scarcely refrain from crying aloud. On very imagination that causes fear there ensues a certain the other hand, in those who are afraid, the internal heat contraction in the appetite. Thus we observe in one who and vital spirits move from the heart downwards, as stated is dying that nature withdraws inwardly, on account of the above (ad 1): wherefore fear hinders speech which ensues lack of power: and again we see the inhabitants of a city, from the emission of the vital spirits in an upward direc- 797 tion through the mouth: the result being that fear makes the body, as though it were threatened by a natural death. its subject speechless. For this reason, too, fear “makes Hence it is that “those who are in fear of death turn pale” its subject tremble,” as the Philosopher says (De Problem. (Ethic. iv, 9). But the evil that shame fears, is contrary, xxvii, 1,6,7). not to nature, but only to the appetite of the soul. Conse- Reply to Objection 3. Mortal perils are contrary not quently there results a contraction in this appetite, but not only to the appetite of the soul, but also to nature. Con- in the corporeal nature; in fact, the soul, as though con- sequently in such like fear, there is contraction not only tracted in itself, is free to set the vital spirits and heat in in the appetite, but also in the corporeal nature: for when movement, so that they spread to the outward parts of the an animal is moved by the imagination of death, it ex- body: the result being that those who are ashamed blush. periences a contraction of heat towards the inner parts of Whether fear makes one suitable for counsel? Ia IIae q. 44 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that fear does not make Secondly, a man of counsel means one who is apt for one suitable for counsel. For the same thing cannot be giving good counsel: and in this sense, neither fear nor conducive to counsel, and a hindrance thereto. But fear any passion makes men of counsel. Because when a man hinders counsel: because every passion disturbs repose, is affected by a passion, things seem to him greater or which is requisite for the good use of reason. Therefore smaller than they really are: thus to a lover, what he loves fear does not make a man suitable for counsel. seems better; to him that fears, what he fears seems more Objection 2. Further, counsel is an act of reason, in dreadful. Consequently owing to the want of right judg- thinking and deliberating about the future. But a certain ment, every passion, considered in itself, hinders the fac- fear “drives away all thought, and dislocates the mind,” as ulty of giving good counsel. Cicero observes (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8). Therefore fear This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. does not conduce to counsel, but hinders it. Reply to Objection 2. The stronger a passion is, the Objection 3. Further, just as we have recourse to greater the hindrance is it to the man who is swayed by it. counsel in order to avoid evil, so do we, in order to attain Consequently, when fear is intense, man does indeed wish good things. But whereas fear is of evil to be avoided, so to take counsel, but his thoughts are so disturbed, that he is hope of good things to be obtained. Therefore fear is can find no counsel. If, however, the fear be slight, so as not more conducive to counsel, than hope is. to make a man wish to take counsel, without gravely dis- On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) turbing the reason; it may even make it easier for him to that “fear makes men of counsel.” take good counsel, by reason of his ensuing carefulness. I answer that, A man of counsel may be taken in two Reply to Objection 3. Hope also makes man a good ways. First, from his being willing or anxious to take counsellor: because, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, counsel. And thus fear makes men of counsel. Because, 5), “no man takes counsel in matters he despairs of,” nor as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), “we take counsel about impossible things, as he says in Ethic. iii, 3. But on great matters, because therein we distrust ourselves.” fear incites to counsel more than hope does. Because hope Now things which make us afraid, are not simply evil, but is of good things, as being possible of attainment; whereas have a certain magnitude, both because they seem diffi- fear is of evil things, as being difficult to repel, so that fear cult to repel, and because they are apprehended as near to regards the aspect of difficulty more than hope does. And us, as stated above (q. 42, a. 2). Wherefore men seek for it is in matters of difficulty, especially when we distrust counsel especially when they are afraid. ourselves, that we take counsel, as stated above. Whether fear makes one tremble? Ia IIae q. 44 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that trembling is not an Objection 2. Further, faecal evacuation is occasioned effect of fear. Because trembling is occasioned by cold; by heat; hence laxative medicines are generally warm. thus we observe that a cold person trembles. Now fear But these evacuations are often caused by fear. There- does not seem to make one cold, but rather to cause a fore fear apparently causes heat; and consequently does parching heat: a sign whereof is that those who fear are not cause trembling. thirsty, especially if their fear be very great, as in the case Objection 3. Further, in fear, the heat is withdrawn of those who are being led to execution. Therefore fear from the outer to the inner parts of the body. If, therefore, does not cause trembling. man trembles in his outward parts, through the heat being 798 withdrawn thus; it seems that fear should cause this trem-or even seminal evacuation. Or else such like evacuations bling in all the external members. But such is not the case. are due to contraction of the abdomen and testicles, as the Therefore trembling of the body is not caused by fear. Philosopher says (De Problem. xxii, 11). On the contrary, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8) This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. that “fear is followed by trembling, pallor and chattering Reply to Objection 3. In fear, heat abandons the of the teeth.” heart, with a downward movement: hence in those who I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), in fear there are afraid the heart especially trembles, as also those takes place a certain contraction from the outward to the members which are connected with the breast where the inner parts of the body, the result being that the outer parts heart resides. Hence those who fear tremble especially in become cold; and for this reason trembling is occasioned their speech, on account of the tracheal artery being near in these parts, being caused by a lack of power in control- the heart. The lower lip, too, and the lower jaw trem- ling the members: which lack of power is due to the want ble, through their connection with the heart; which ex- of heat, which is the instrument whereby the soul moves plains the chattering of the teeth. For the same reason the those members, as stated in De Anima ii, 4. arms and hands tremble. Or else because the aforesaid Reply to Objection 1. When the heat withdraws from members are more mobile. For which reason the knees the outer to the inner parts, the inward heat increases, es- tremble in those who are afraid, according to Is. 35:3: pecially in the inferior or nutritive parts. Consequently “Strengthen ye the feeble hands, and confirm the trem- the humid element being spent, thirst ensues; sometimes bling [Vulg.: ‘weak’] knees.” indeed the result is a loosening of the bowels, and urinary Whether fear hinders action? Ia IIae q. 44 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that fear hinders action. On the part of the bodily instruments, fear, considered in For action is hindered chiefly by a disturbance in the rea- itself, is always apt to hinder exterior action, on account son, which directs action. But fear disturbs reason, as of the outward members being deprived, through fear, of stated above (a. 2). Therefore fear hinders action. their heat. But on the part of the soul, if the fear be mod- Objection 2. Further, those who fear while doing any- erate, without much disturbance of the reason, it conduces thing, are more apt to fail: thus a man who walks on a to working well, in so far as it causes a certain solicitude, plank placed aloft, easily falls through fear; whereas, if and makes a man take counsel and work with greater at- he were to walk on the same plank down below, he would tention. If, however, fear increases so much as to disturb not fall, through not being afraid. Therefore fear hinders the reason, it hinders action even on the part of the soul. action. But of such a fear the Apostle does not speak. Objection 3. Further, laziness or sloth is a kind of This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. fear. But laziness hinders action. Therefore fear does too. Reply to Objection 2. He that falls from a plank On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil. 2:12): placed aloft, suffers a disturbance of his imagination, “With fear and trembling work out your salvation”: and through fear of the fall that is pictured to his imagination. he would not say this if fear were a hindrance to a good Reply to Objection 3. Everyone in fear shuns that work. Therefore fear does not hinder a good action. which he fears: and therefore, since laziness is a fear of I answer that, Man’s exterior actions are caused by work itself as being toilsome, it hinders work by with- the soul as first mover, but by the bodily members as in- drawing the will from it. But fear of other things conduces struments. Now action may be hindered both by defect to action, in so far as it inclines the will to do that whereby of the instrument, and by defect of the principal mover. a man escapes from what he fears. 799 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 45 Of Daring (In Four Articles) We must now consider daring: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether daring is contrary to fear? (2) How is daring related to hope? (3) Of the cause of daring; (4) Of its effect. Whether daring is contrary to fear? Ia IIae q. 45 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that daring is not contrary names of the passions can be taken in two ways. First, as to fear. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 31) that “daring denoting absolutely movements of the sensitive appetite is a vice.” Now vice is contrary to virtue. Since, therefore, in respect of some object, good or bad: and thus they fear is not a virtue but a passion, it seems that daring is not are names of passions. Secondly, as denoting besides this contrary to fear. movement, a straying from the order of reason: and thus Objection 2. Further, to one thing there is one con- they are names of vices. It is in this sense that Augus- trary. But hope is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not tine speaks of daring: but we are speaking of it in the first contrary to fear. sense. Objection 3. Further, every passion excludes its op- Reply to Objection 2. To one thing, in the same posite. But fear excludes safety; for Augustine says (Con- respect, there are not several contraries; but in different fess. ii, 6) that “fear takes forethought for safety.” There- respects nothing prevents one thing having several con- fore safety is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not con- traries. Accordingly it has been said above (q. 23, a. 2; trary to fear. q. 40, a. 4) that the irascible passions admit of a twofold On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) contrariety: one, according to the opposition of good and that “daring is contrary to fear.” evil, and thus fear is contrary to hope: the other, according I answer that, It is of the essence of contraries to be to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, and thus “farthest removed from one another,” as stated in Metaph. daring is contrary to fear, and despair contrary to hope. x, 4. Now that which is farthest removed from fear, is Reply to Objection 3. Safety does not denote some- daring: since fear turns away from the future hurt, on ac- thing contrary to fear, but merely the exclusion of fear: count of its victory over him that fears it; whereas daring for he is said to be safe, who fears not. Wherefore safety turns on threatened danger because of its own victory over is opposed to fear, as a privation: while daring is opposed that same danger. Consequently it is evident that daring is thereto as a contrary. And as contrariety implies privation, contrary to fear. so daring implies safety. Reply to Objection 1. Anger, daring and all the Whether daring ensues from hope? Ia IIae q. 45 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that daring does not ensue good, viz. victory. But it belongs to hope to tend to that from hope. Because daring regards evil and fearful things, which is good and difficult. Therefore daring is the same as stated in Ethic. iii, 7. But hope regards good things, as as hope; and consequently does not result from it. stated above (q. 40, a. 1). Therefore they have different On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) objects and are not in the same order. Therefore daring that “those are hopeful are full of daring.” Therefore it does not ensue from hope. seems that daring ensues from hope. Objection 2. Further, just as daring is contrary to fear, I answer that, As we have often stated (q. 22, a. 2; so is despair contrary to hope. But fear does not ensue q. 35, a. 1; q. 41, a. 1), all these passions belong to the from despair: in fact, despair excludes fear, as the Philoso- appetitive power. Now every movement of the appetitive pher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore daring does not result power is reducible to one either of pursuit or of avoidance. from hope. Again, pursuit or avoidance is of something either by rea- Objection 3. Further, daring is intent on something son of itself or by reason of something else. By reason 800 of itself, good is the object of pursuit, and evil, the ob-good, as privation comes after habit; consequently daring ject of avoidance: but by reason of something else, evil which pursues evil, comes after hope which pursues good. can be the object of pursuit, through some good attaching Reply to Objection 2. Although good, absolutely to it; and good can be the object of avoidance, through speaking, is prior to evil, yet avoidance of evil precedes some evil attaching to it. Now that which is by reason of avoidance of good; just as the pursuit of good precedes something else, follows that which is by reason of itself. the pursuit of evil. Consequently just as hope precedes Consequently pursuit of evil follows pursuit of good; and daring, so fear precedes despair. And just as fear does avoidance of good follows avoidance of evil. Now these not always lead to despair, but only when it is intense; so four things belong to four passions, since pursuit of good hope does not always lead to daring, save only when it is belongs to hope, avoidance of evil to fear, the pursuit of strong. the fearful evil belongs to daring, and the avoidance of Reply to Objection 3. Although the object of daring good to despair. It follows, therefore, that daring results is an evil to which, in the estimation of the daring man, from hope; since it is in the hope of overcoming the threat- the good of victory is conjoined; yet daring regards the ening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly. But despair evil, and hope regards the conjoined good. In like man- results from fear: since the reason why a man despairs ner despair regards directly the good which it turns away is because he fears the difficulty attaching to the good he from, while fear regards the conjoined evil. Hence, prop- should hope for. erly speaking, daring is not a part of hope, but its effect: Reply to Objection 1. This argument would hold, if just as despair is an effect, not a part, of fear. For this good and evil were not co-ordinate objects. But because reason, too, daring cannot be a principal passion. evil has a certain relation to good, since it comes after Whether some defect is a cause of daring? Ia IIae q. 45 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that some defect is a cause the bodily transmutation. of daring. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, On the part of the appetitive movement which fol- 4) that “lovers of wine are strong and daring.” But from lows apprehension, hope that leads to daring is roused by wine ensues the effect of drunkenness. Therefore daring those things that make us reckon victory as possible. Such is caused by a defect. things regard either our own power, as bodily strength, ex- Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, perience of dangers, abundance of wealth, and the like; or 5) that “those who have no experience of danger are bold.” they regard the powers of others, such as having a great But want of experience is a defect. Therefore daring is number of friends or any other means of help, especially caused by a defect. if a man trust in the Divine assistance: wherefore “those Objection 3. Further, those who have suffered wrongs are more daring, with whom it is well in regard to godlike are wont to be daring; “like the beasts when beaten,” as things,” as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Fear is ban- stated in Ethic. iii, 5. But the suffering of wrongs pertains ished, in this way, by the removal of threatening causes of to defect. Therefore daring is caused by a defect. fear; for instance, by the fact that a man has not enemies, On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) through having harmed nobody, so that he is not aware of that the cause of daring “is the presence in the imagination any imminent danger; since those especially appear to be of the hope that the means of safety are nigh, and that the threatened by danger, who have harmed others. things to be feared are either non-existent or far off.” But On the part of the bodily transmutation, daring is anything pertaining to defect implies either the removal of caused through the incitement of hope and the banish- the means of safety, or the proximity of something to be ment of fear, by those things which raise the temperature feared. Therefore nothing pertaining to defect is a cause about the heart. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Part. of daring. Animal. iii, 4) that “those whose heart is small in size, I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,2) daring results are more daring; while animals whose heart is large are from hope and is contrary to fear: wherefore whatever is timid; because the natural heat is unable to give the same naturally apt to cause hope or banish fear, is a cause of degree of temperature to a large as to a small heart; just daring. Since, however, fear and hope, and also daring, as a fire does not heat a large house as well as it does a being passions, consist in a movement of the appetite, and small house.” He says also (De Problem. xxvii, 4), that in a certain bodily transmutation; a thing may be consid- “those whose lungs contain much blood, are more dar- ered as the cause of daring in two ways, whether by rais- ing, through the heat in the heart that results therefrom.” ing hope, or by banishing fear; in one way, in the part of He says also in the same passage that “lovers of wine are the appetitive movement; in another way, on the part of more daring, on account of the heat of the wine”: hence 801 it has been said above (q. 40, a. 6) that drunkenness con-they do not know their own failings, nor the dangers that duces to hope, since the heat in the heart banishes fear and threaten. Hence it is that the removal of the cause of fear raises hope, by reason of the dilatation and enlargement of gives rise to daring. the heart. Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (Rhet. Reply to Objection 1. Drunkenness causes daring, ii, 5) “those who have been wronged are courageous, be- not through being a defect, but through dilating the heart: cause they think that God comes to the assistance of those and again through making a man think greatly of himself. who suffer unjustly.” Reply to Objection 2. Those who have no experience Hence it is evident that no defect causes daring ex- of dangers are more daring, not on account of a defect, but cept accidentally, i.e. in so far as some excellence attaches accidentally, i.e. in so far as through being inexperienced thereto, real or imaginary, either in oneself or in another. Whether the brave are more eager at first than in the midst of danger? Ia IIae q. 45 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the daring are not ties of a situation. Consequently men of fortitude who more eager at first than in the midst of danger. Because face danger according to the judgment of reason, at first trembling is caused by fear, which is contrary to daring, seem slack, because they face the danger not from passion as stated above (a. 1; q. 44, a. 3). But the daring some- but with due deliberation. Yet when they are in the midst times tremble at first, as the Philosopher says (De Prob- of danger, they experience nothing unforeseen, but some- lem. xxvii, 3). Therefore they are not more eager at first times the difficulty turns out to be less than they antici- than in the midst of danger. pated; wherefore they are more persevering. Moreover, Objection 2. Further, passion is intensified by an in- it may be because they face the danger on account of the crease in its object: thus since a good is lovable, what good of virtue which is the abiding object of their will, is better is yet more lovable. But the object of daring is however great the danger may prove: whereas men of dar- something difficult. Therefore the greater the difficulty, ing face the danger on account of a mere thought giving the greater the daring. But danger is more arduous and rise to hope and banishing fear, as stated above (a. 3). difficult when present. It is then therefore that daring is Reply to Objection 1. Trembling does occur in men greatest. of daring, on account of the heat being withdrawn from Objection 3. Further, anger is provoked by the inflic- the outer to the inner parts of the body, as occurs also in tion of wounds. But anger causes daring; for the Philoso- those who are afraid. But in men of daring the heat with- pher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that “anger makes man bold.” draws to the heart; whereas in those who are afraid, it Therefore when man is in the midst of danger and when withdraws to the inferior parts. he is being beaten, then is he most daring. Reply to Objection 2. The object of love is good sim- On the contrary, It is said in Ethic. iii, 7 that “the dar-ply, wherefore if it be increased, love is increased simply. ing are precipitate and full of eagerness before the danger, But the object of daring is a compound of good and evil; yet in the midst of dangers they stand aloof.” and the movement of daring towards evil presupposes the I answer that, Daring, being a movement of the sen- movement of hope towards good. If, therefore, so much sitive appetite, follows an apprehension of the sensitive difficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes hope, faculty. But the sensitive faculty cannot make compar- the movement of daring does not ensue, but fails. But if isons, nor can it inquire into circumstances; its judgment the movement of daring does ensue, the greater the dan- is instantaneous. Now it happens sometimes that it is im- ger, the greater is the daring considered to be. possible for a man to take note in an instant of all the Reply to Objection 3. Hurt does not give rise to anger difficulties of a certain situation: hence there arises the unless there be some kind of hope, as we shall see later on movement of daring to face the danger; so that when he (q. 46, a. 1). Consequently if the danger be so great as to comes to experience the danger, he feels the difficulty to banish all hope of victory, anger does not ensue. It is true, be greater than he expected, and so gives way. however, that if anger does ensue, there will be greater On the other hand, reason discusses all the difficul- daring. 802 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 46 Of Anger, in Itself (In Eight Articles) We must now consider anger: and (1) anger in itself; (2) the cause of anger and its remedy; (3) the effect of anger. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether anger is a special passion? (2) Whether the object of anger is good or evil? (3) Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty? (4) Whether anger is accompanied by an act of reason? (5) Whether anger is more natural than desire? (6) Whether anger is more grievous than hatred? (7) Whether anger is only towards those with whom we have a relation of justice? (8) Of the species of anger. Whether anger is a special passion? Ia IIae q. 46 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that anger is not a special Accordingly in the first way, anger is not a general pas- passion. For the irascible power takes its name from anger sion but is condivided with the other passions, as stated [ira]. But there are several passions in this power, not only above (q. 23, a. 4). In like manner, neither is it in the one. Therefore anger is not one special passion. second way: since it is not a cause of the other passions. Objection 2. Further, to every special passion there is But in this way, love may be called a general passion, as a contrary passion; as is evident by going through them Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), because love is one by one. But no passion is contrary to anger, as stated the primary root of all the other passions, as stated above above (q. 23, a. 3). Therefore anger is not a special pas- (q. 27, a. 4 ). But, in a third way, anger may be called sion. a general passion, inasmuch as it is caused by a concur- Objection 3. Further, one special passion does not in- rence of several passions. Because the movement of anger clude another. But anger includes several passions: since does not arise save on account of some pain inflicted, and it accompanies sorrow, pleasure, and hope, as the Philoso- unless there be desire and hope of revenge: for, as the pher states (Rhet. ii, 2). Therefore anger is not a special Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2), “the angry man hopes to passion. punish; since he craves for revenge as being possible.” On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) Consequently if the person, who inflicted the injury, ex- calls anger a special passion: and so does Cicero (De cel very much, anger does not ensue, but only sorrow, as Quaest. Tusc. iv, 7). Avicenna states (De Anima iv, 6). I answer that, A thing is said to be general in two Reply to Objection 1. The irascible power takes its ways. First, by predication; thus “animal” is general in name from “ira” [anger], not because every movement of respect of all animals. Secondly, by causality; thus the that power is one of anger; but because all its movements sun is the general cause of all things generated here be- terminate in anger; and because, of all these movements, low, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Because just anger is the most patent. as a genus contains potentially many differences, accord- Reply to Objection 2. From the very fact that anger ing to a likeness of matter; so an efficient cause contains is caused by contrary passions, i.e. by hope, which is of many effects according to its active power. Now it hap- good, and by sorrow, which is of evil, it includes in itself pens that an effect is produced by the concurrence of vari- contrariety: and consequently it has no contrary outside ous causes; and since every cause remains somewhat in its itself. Thus also in mixed colors there is no contrariety, effect, we may say that, in yet a third way, an effect which except that of the simple colors from which they are made. is due to the concurrence of several causes, has a certain Reply to Objection 3. Anger includes several pas- generality, inasmuch as several causes are, in a fashion, sions, not indeed as a genus includes several species; but actually existing therein. rather according to the inclusion of cause and effect. 803 Whether the object of anger is good or evil? Ia IIae q. 46 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the object of anger is recoils from evil: and such movements are desire, hope, evil. For Gregory of Nyssa says∗ that anger is “the sword- pleasure, sorrow, and so forth: by way of a complex ob- bearer of desire,” inasmuch, to wit, as it assails whatever ject, as when the appetite is concerned with some good obstacle stands in the way of desire. But an obstacle has or evil being in, or being done to, another, either seeking the character of evil. Therefore anger regards evil as its this or recoiling from it. This is evident in the case of love object. and hatred: for we love someone, in so far as we wish Objection 2. Further, anger and hatred agree in their some good to be in him; and we hate someone, in so far effect, since each seeks to inflict harm on another. But ha- as we wish some evil to be in him. It is the same with tred regards evil as its object, as stated above (q. 29, a. 1). anger; for when a man is angry, he wishes to be avenged Therefore anger does also. on someone. Hence the movement of anger has a twofold Objection 3. Further, anger arises from sorrow; tendency: viz. to vengeance itself, which it desires and wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 6) that “anger hopes for as being a good, wherefore it takes pleasure in acts with sorrow.” But evil is the object of sorrow. There- it; and to the person on whom it seeks vengeance, as to fore it is also the object of anger. something contrary and hurtful, which bears the character On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that of evil. “anger craves for revenge.” But the desire for revenge is a We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this desire for something good: since revenge belongs to jus- respect, between anger on the one side, and hatred and tice. Therefore the object of anger is good. love on the other. The first difference is that anger always Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, regards two objects: whereas love and hatred sometimes wherefore it causes pleasure, as the Philosopher says regard but one object, as when a man is said to love wine (Rhet. ii, 2). But the object of hope and of pleasure is or something of the kind, or to hate it. The second dif- good. Therefore good is also the object of anger. ference is, that both the objects of love are good: since I answer that, The movement of the appetitive power the lover wishes good to someone, as to something agree- follows an act of the apprehensive power. Now the appre- able to himself: while both the objects of hatred bear the hensive power apprehends a thing in two ways. First, by character of evil: for the man who hates, wishes evil to way of an incomplex object, as when we understand what someone, as to something disagreeable to him. Whereas a man is; secondly, by way of a complex object, as when anger regards one object under the aspect of evil, viz. the we understand that whiteness is in a man. Consequently noxious person, on whom it seeks to be avenged. Con- in each of these ways the appetitive power can tend to both sequently it is a passion somewhat made up of contrary good and evil: by way of a simple and incomplex object, passions. when the appetite simply follows and adheres to good, or This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty? Ia IIae q. 46 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that anger is in the con- cupiscible power, the irascible would not take its name cupiscible faculty. For Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, from it. 9) that anger is a kind of “desire.” But desire is in the I answer that, As stated above (q. 23, a. 1), the pas- concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger is too. sions of the irascible part differ from the passions of the Objection 2. Further, Augustine says in his Rule, that concupiscible faculty, in that the objects of the concupis- “anger grows into hatred”: and Cicero says (De Quaest. cible passions are good and evil absolutely considered, Tusc. iv, 9) that “hatred is inveterate anger.” But hatred, whereas the objects of the irascible passions are good and like love, is a concupiscible passion. Therefore anger is in evil in a certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has the concupiscible faculty. been stated (a. 2) that anger regards two objects: viz. the Objection 3. Further, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, vengeance that it seeks; and the person on whom it seeks 16) and Gregory of Nyssa† say that “anger is made up of vengeance; and in respect of both, anger requires a certain sorrow and desire.” Both of these are in the concupiscible arduousness: for the movement of anger does not arise, faculty. Therefore anger is a concupiscible passion. unless there be some magnitude about both these objects; On the contrary, The concupiscible is distinct from since “we make no ado about things that are naught or the irascible faculty. If, therefore, anger were in the con- very minute,” as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2). It ∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi. † Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi. 804 is therefore evident that anger is not in the concupiscible, tred, not as though the same passion which at first was but in the irascible faculty. anger, afterwards becomes hatred by becoming inveter- Reply to Objection 1. Cicero gives the name of de- ate; but by a process of causality. For anger when it lasts sire to any kind of craving for a future good, without dis- a long time engenders hatred. criminating between that which is arduous and that which Reply to Objection 3. Anger is said to be composed is not. Accordingly he reckons anger as a kind of desire, of sorrow and desire, not as though they were its parts, inasmuch as it is a desire of vengeance. In this sense, how- but because they are its causes: and it has been said above ever, desire is common to the irascible and concupiscible (q. 25, a. 2) that the concupiscible passions are the causes faculties. of the irascible passions. Reply to Objection 2. Anger is said to grow into ha- Whether anger requires an act of reason? Ia IIae q. 46 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that anger does not re- commands: and thus the will follows reason, wherefore it quire an act of reason. For, since anger is a passion, it is called the rational appetite. In another way, it follows is in the sensitive appetite. But the sensitive appetite fol- reason in so far as the reason denounces, and thus anger lows an apprehension, not of reason, but of the sensitive follows reason. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. faculty. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason. xxviii, 3) that “anger follows reason, not in obedience to Objection 2. Further, dumb animals are devoid of rea- reason’s command, but as a result of reason’s denouncing son: and yet they are seen to be angry. Therefore anger the injury.” Because the sensitive appetite is subject to the does not require an act of reason. reason, not immediately but through the will. Objection 3. Further, drunkenness fetters the reason; Reply to Objection 2. Dumb animals have a natu- whereas it is conducive to anger. Therefore anger does not ral instinct imparted to them by the Divine Reason, in require an act of reason. virtue of which they are gifted with movements, both On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) internal and external, like unto rational movements, as that “anger listens to reason somewhat.” stated above (q. 40, a. 3). I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), anger is a de- Reply to Objection 3. As stated in Ethic. vii, 6, sire for vengeance. Now vengeance implies a compari- “anger listens somewhat to reason” in so far as reason de- son between the punishment to be inflicted and the hurt nounces the injury inflicted, “but listens not perfectly,” be- done; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that cause it does not observe the rule of reason as to the mea- “anger, as if it had drawn the inference that it ought to sure of vengeance. Anger, therefore, requires an act of quarrel with such a person, is therefore immediately exas- reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason. Wherefore perated.” Now to compare and to draw an inference is an the Philosopher says (De Problem. iii, 2,27) that whose act of reason. Therefore anger, in a fashion, requires an who are very drunk, so as to be incapable of the use of act of reason. reason, do not get angry: but those who are slightly drunk, Reply to Objection 1. The movement of the appeti- do get angry, through being still able, though hampered, tive power may follow an act of reason in two ways. In to form a judgment of reason. the first way, it follows the reason in so far as the reason Whether anger is more natural than desire? Ia IIae q. 46 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that anger is not more nat- vengeance: while desire is a craving for those things es- ural than desire. Because it is proper to man to be by na- pecially which are pleasant to the touch, viz. for pleasures ture a gentle animal. But “gentleness is contrary to anger,” of the table and for sexual pleasures. But these things are as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger is more natural to man than vengeance. Therefore desire is no more natural than desire, in fact it seems to be alto- more natural than anger. gether unnatural to man. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) Objection 2. Further, reason is contrasted with na- that “anger is more natural than desire.” ture: since those things that act according to reason, are I answer that, By “natural” we mean that which is not said to act according to nature. Now “anger requires caused by nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. Consequently an act of reason, but desire does not,” as stated in Ethic. the question as to whether a particular passion is more vii, 6. Therefore desire is more natural than anger. or less natural cannot be decided without reference to the Objection 3. Further, anger is a craving for cause of that passion. Now the cause of a passion, as 805 stated above (q. 36, a. 2), may be considered in two ways: cause disposition to anger is due to a bilious temperament; first, on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of and of all the humors, the bile moves quickest; for it is like the subject. If then we consider the cause of anger and fire. Consequently he that is temperamentally disposed to of desire, on the part of the object, thus desire, especially anger is sooner incensed with anger, than he that is tem- of pleasures of the table, and of sexual pleasures, is more peramentally disposed to desire, is inflamed with desire: natural than anger; in so far as these pleasures are more and for this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that natural to man than vengeance. a disposition to anger is more liable to be transmitted from If, however, we consider the cause of anger on the part parent to child, than a disposition to desire. of the subject, thus anger, in a manner, is more natural; Reply to Objection 1. We may consider in man both and, in a manner, desire is more natural. Because the na- the natural temperament on the part of the body, and the ture of an individual man may be considered either as to reason. On the part of the bodily temperament, a man, the generic, or as to the specific nature, or again as to the considered specifically, does not naturally excel others ei- particular temperament of the individual. If then we con- ther in anger or in any other passion, on account of the sider the generic nature, i.e. the nature of this man consid- moderation of his temperament. But other animals, for ered as an animal; thus desire is more natural than anger; as much as their temperament recedes from this moder- because it is from this very generic nature that man is in- ation and approaches to an extreme disposition, are nat- clined to desire those things which tend to preserve in him urally disposed to some excess of passion, such as the the life both of the species and of the individual. If, how- lion in daring, the hound in anger, the hare in fear, and ever, we consider the specific nature, i.e. the nature of this so forth. On the part of reason, however, it is natural to man as a rational being; then anger is more natural to man man, both to be angry and to be gentle: in so far as reason than desire, in so far as anger follows reason more than somewhat causes anger, by denouncing the injury which desire does. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) causes anger; and somewhat appeases anger, in so far as that “revenge” which pertains to anger “is more natural to the angry man “does not listen perfectly to the command man than meekness”: for it is natural to everything to rise of reason,” as stated above (a. 4, ad 3). up against things contrary and hurtful. And if we consider Reply to Objection 2. Reason itself belongs to the the nature of the individual, in respect of his particular nature of man: wherefore from the very fact that anger re- temperament, thus anger is more natural than desire; for quires an act of reason, it follows that it is, in a manner, the reason that anger is prone to ensue from the natural natural to man. tendency to anger, more than desire, or any other passion, Reply to Objection 3. This argument regards anger is to ensue from a natural tendency to desire, which ten- and desire on the part of the object. dencies result from a man’s individual temperament. Be- Whether anger is more grievous than hatred? Ia IIae q. 46 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that anger is more On the contrary, Augustine, in his Rule, compares grievous than hatred. For it is written (Prov. 27:4) that hatred to “a beam,” but anger to “a mote.” “anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth.” I answer that, The species and nature of a passion are But hatred sometimes has mercy. Therefore anger is more taken from its object. Now the object of anger is the same grievous than hatred. in substance as the object of hatred; since, just as the hater Objection 2. Further, it is worse to suffer evil and wishes evil to him whom he hates, so does the angry man to grieve for it, than merely to suffer it. But when a man wish evil to him with whom he is angry. But there is a hates, he is contented if the object of his hatred suffer evil: difference of aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his en-whereas the angry man is not satisfied unless the object of emy, as evil, whereas the angry man wishes evil to him his anger know it and be aggrieved thereby, as the Philoso- with whom he is angry, not as evil but in so far as it has pher says (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore, anger is more grievous an aspect of good, that is, in so far as he reckons it as just, than hatred. since it is a means of vengeance. Wherefore also it has Objection 3. Further, a thing seems to be so much the been said above (a. 2) that hatred implies application of more firm according as more things concur to set it up: evil to evil, whereas anger denotes application of good to thus a habit is all the more settled through being caused evil. Now it is evident that to seek evil under the aspect of by several acts. But anger is caused by the concurrence justice, is a lesser evil, than simply to seek evil to some- of several passions, as stated above (a. 1): whereas hatred one. Because to wish evil to someone under the aspect is not. Therefore anger is more settled and more grievous of justice, may be according to the virtue of justice, if it than hatred. be in conformity with the order of reason; and anger fails 806 only in this, that it does not obey the precept of reason in wishes evil to someone, in so far as this evil is a means of taking vengeance. Consequently it is evident that hatred just vengeance. Now vengeance is wrought by the inflic- is far worse and graver than anger. tion of a punishment: and the nature of punishment con- Reply to Objection 1. In anger and hatred two points sists in being contrary to the will, painful, and inflicted may be considered: namely, the thing desired, and the in- for some fault. Consequently an angry man desires this, tensity of the desire. As to the thing desired, anger has that the person whom he is hurting, may feel it and be in more mercy than hatred has. For since hatred desires an- pain, and know that this has befallen him on account of the other’s evil for evil’s sake, it is satisfied with no particu- harm he has done the other. The hater, on the other hand, lar measure of evil: because those things that are desired cares not for all this, since he desires another’s evil as for their own sake, are desired without measure, as the such. It is not true, however, that an evil is worse through Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3), instancing a miser with re- giving pain: because “injustice and imprudence, although gard to riches. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 12:16): “An evil,” yet, being voluntary, “do not grieve those in whom enemy. . . if he find an opportunity, will not be satisfied they are,” as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 4). with blood.” Anger, on the other hand, seeks evil only un- Reply to Objection 3. That which proceeds from sev- der the aspect of a just means of vengeance. Consequently eral causes, is more settled when these causes are of one when the evil inflicted goes beyond the measure of justice kind: but it may be that one cause prevails over many oth- according to the estimate of the angry man, then he has ers. Now hatred ensues from a more lasting cause than mercy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that anger does. Because anger arises from an emotion of “the angry man is appeased if many evils befall, whereas the soul due to the wrong inflicted; whereas hatred en- the hater is never appeased.” sues from a disposition in a man, by reason of which he As to the intensity of the desire, anger excludes mercy considers that which he hates to be contrary and hurtful more than hatred does; because the movement of anger to him. Consequently, as passion is more transitory than is more impetuous, through the heating of the bile. Hence disposition or habit, so anger is less lasting than hatred; the passage quoted continues: “Who can bear the violence although hatred itself is a passion ensuing from this dis- of one provoked?” position. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that Reply to Objection 2. As stated above, an angry man “hatred is more incurable than anger.” Whether anger is only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice? Ia IIae q. 46 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that anger is not only evil as being a means of just vengeance. Consequently, towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice. anger is towards those to whom we are just or unjust: For there is no justice between man and irrational beings. since vengeance is an act of justice, and wrong-doing is And yet sometimes one is angry with irrational beings; an act of injustice. Therefore both on the part of the thus, out of anger, a writer throws away his pen, or a cause, viz. the harm done by another, and on the part of rider strikes his horse. Therefore anger is not only towards the vengeance sought by the angry man, it is evident that those to whom one has an obligation of justice. anger concerns those to whom one is just or unjust. Objection 2. Further, “there is no justice towards one- Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 4, ad 2), self. . . nor is there justice towards one’s own” (Ethic. v, 6). anger, though it follows an act of reason, can nevertheless But sometimes a man is angry with himself; for instance, be in dumb animals that are devoid of reason, in so far a penitent, on account of his sin; hence it is written (Ps. as through their natural instinct they are moved by their 4:5): “Be ye angry and sin not.” Therefore anger is not imagination to something like rational action. Since then only towards those with whom one has a relation of jus- in man there is both reason and imagination, the move- tice. ment of anger can be aroused in man in two ways. First, Objection 3. Further, justice and injustice can be of when only his imagination denounces the injury: and, in one man towards an entire class, or a whole community: this way, man is aroused to a movement of anger even for instance, when the state injures an individual. But against irrational and inanimate beings, which movement anger is not towards a class but only towards an individual, is like that which occurs in animals against anything that as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore properly injures them. Secondly, by the reason denouncing the in- speaking, anger is not towards those with whom one is in jury: and thus, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, relation of justice or injustice. 3), “it is impossible to be angry with insensible things, or The contrary, however, may be gathered from the with the dead”: both because they feel no pain, which is, Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2,3). above all, what the angry man seeks in those with whom I answer that, As stated above (a. 6), anger desires he is angry: and because there is no question of vengeance 807 on them, since they can do us no harm. “hatred may be felt towards a class, as we hate the entire Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. class of thieves; whereas anger is directed only towards v, 11), “metaphorically speaking there is a certain justice an individual.” The reason is that hatred arises from our and injustice between a man and himself,” in so far as the considering a quality as disagreeing with our disposition; reason rules the irascible and concupiscible parts of the and this may refer to a thing in general or in particular. soul. And in this sense a man is said to be avenged on Anger, on the other hand, ensues from someone having himself, and consequently, to be angry with himself. But injured us by his action. Now all actions are the deeds of properly, and in accordance with the nature of things, a individuals: and consequently anger is always pointed at man is never angry with himself. an individual. When the whole state hurts us, the whole Reply to Objection 3. The Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) state is reckoned as one individual∗. assigns as one difference between hatred and anger, that Whether the species of anger are suitably assigned? Ia IIae q. 46 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that Damascene (De Fide scene and Gregory of Nyssa are taken from those things Orth. ii, 16) unsuitably assigns three species of anger— which give increase to anger. This happens in three ways. “wrath,” “ill-will” and “rancor.” For no genus derives its First from facility of the movement itself, and he calls this specific differences from accidents. But these three are di- kind of anger cholos [bile] because it quickly aroused. versified in respect of an accident: because “the beginning Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes anger, and of the movement of anger is called wrath cholos, if anger which dwells some time in the memory; this belongs to continue it is called ill-will menis; while rancor kotos is menis [ill-will] which is derived from menein [to dwell]. anger waiting for an opportunity of vengeance.” There- Thirdly, on the part of that which the angry man seeks, viz. fore these are not different species of anger. vengeance; and this pertains to kotos [rancor] which never Objection 2. Further, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. rests until it is avenged‡. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9) that “excandescentia [irascibility] is what the Greeks iv, 5) calls some angry persons akrocholoi [choleric], be-call thymosis, and is a kind of anger that arises and sub-cause they are easily angered; some he calls pikroi [bitter], sides intermittently”; while according to Damascene thy-because they retain their anger for a long time; and some mosis, is the same as the Greek kotos [rancor]. Therefore he calls chalepoi [ill-tempered], because they never rest kotos does not bide its time for taking vengeance, but in until they have retaliated§. course of time spends itself. Reply to Objection 1. All those things which give Objection 3. Further, Gregory (Moral. xxi, 4) gives anger some kind of perfection are not altogether acciden- three degrees of anger, namely, “anger without utter- tal to anger; and consequently nothing prevents them from ance, anger with utterance, and anger with perfection of causing a certain specific difference thereof. speech,” corresponding to the three degrees mentioned by Reply to Objection 2. Irascibility, which Cicero men- Our Lord (Mat. 5:22): “Whosoever is angry with his tions, seems to pertain to the first species of anger, which brother” [thus implying “anger without utterance”], and consists in a certain quickness of temper, rather than to then, “whosoever shall say to his brother, ‘Raca’ ” [im- rancor [furor]. And there is no reason why the Greek thy- plying “anger with utterance yet without full expression”], mosis, which is denoted by the Latin “furor,” should not and lastly, “whosoever shall say ‘Thou fool’ ” [where we signify both quickness to anger, and firmness of purpose have “perfection of speech”]. Therefore Damascene’s di- in being avenged. vision is imperfect, since it takes no account of utterance. Reply to Objection 3. These degrees are distin- On the contrary, stands the authority of Damascene guished according to various effects of anger; and not ac- (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa†. cording to degrees of perfection in the very movement of I answer that, The species of anger given by Dama- anger. ∗ Cf. q. 29, a. 6 † Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi. ‡ Eph. 4:31: “Let all bitterness and anger and indignation. . . be put away from you.” § Cf. IIa IIae, q. 158, a. 5 808 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 47 Of the Cause That Provokes Anger, and of the Remedies of Anger∗ (In Four Articles) We must now consider the cause that provokes anger, and its remedies. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry? (2) Whether slight or contempt is the sole motive of anger? (3) Of the cause of anger on the part of the angry person; (4) Of the cause of anger on the part of the person with whom one is angry. Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry? Ia IIae q. 47 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the motive of anger is vengeance. Now unless some injury has been done, there not always something done against the one who is angry. is no question of vengeance: nor does any injury provoke Because man, by sinning, can do nothing against God; one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the per- since it is written (Job 35:6): “If thy iniquities be multi- son who seeks vengeance: for just as everything naturally plied, what shalt thou do against Him?” And yet God is seeks its own good, so does it naturally repel its own evil. spoken of as being angry with man on account of sin, ac- But injury done by anyone does not affect a man unless cording to Ps. 105:40: “The Lord was exceedingly angry in some way it be something done against him. Conse- with His people.” Therefore it is not always on account of quently the motive of a man’s anger is always something something done against him, that a man is angry. done against him. Objection 2. Further, anger is a desire for vengeance. Reply to Objection 1. We speak of anger in God, not But one may desire vengeance for things done against oth- as of a passion of the soul but as of judgment of justice, ers. Therefore we are not always angry on account of inasmuch as He wills to take vengeance on sin. Because something done against us. the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any actual harm: Objection 3. Further, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. but so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against God ii, 2) man is angry especially with those “who despise in two ways. First, in so far as he despises God in His what he takes a great interest in; thus men who study phi- commandments. Secondly, in so far as he harms himself losophy are angry with those who despise philosophy,” or another; which injury redounds to God, inasmuch as and so forth. But contempt of philosophy does not harm the person injured is an object of God’s providence and the philosopher. Therefore it is not always a harm done to protection. us that makes us angry. Reply to Objection 2. If we are angry with those who Objection 4. Further, he that holds his tongue when harm others, and seek to be avenged on them, it is because another insults him, provokes him to greater anger, as those who are injured belong in some way to us: either by Chrysostom observes (Hom. xxii, in Ep. ad Rom.). But some kinship or friendship, or at least because of the na- by holding his tongue he does the other no harm. There- ture we have in common. fore a man is not always provoked to anger by something Reply to Objection 3. When we take a very great in- done against him. terest in a thing, we look upon it as our own good; so that On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) if anyone despise it, it seems as though we ourselves were that “anger is always due to something done to oneself: despised and injured. whereas hatred may arise without anything being done to Reply to Objection 4. Silence provokes the insulter us, for we hate a man simply because we think him such.” to anger when he thinks it is due to contempt, as though I answer that, As stated above (q. 46, a. 6), anger his anger were slighted: and a slight is an action. is the desire to hurt another for the purpose of just ∗ There Is No Further Mention of These Remedies in the Text, Except in A. 4. 809 Whether the sole motive of anger is slight or contempt? Ia IIae q. 47 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that slight or contempt all angry with those who, in our opinion, have hurt us on is not the sole motive of anger. For Damascene says (De purpose. For if we think that some one has done us an in- Fide Orth. ii, 16) that we are angry “when we suffer, or jury through ignorance or through passion, either we are think that we are suffering, an injury.” But one may suffer not angry with them at all, or very much less: since to an injury without being despised or slighted. Therefore a do anything through ignorance or through passion takes slight is not the only motive of anger. away from the notion of injury, and to a certain extent Objection 2. Further, desire for honor and grief for calls for mercy and forgiveness. Those, on the other hand, a slight belong to the same subject. But dumb animals who do an injury on purpose, seem to sin from contempt; do not desire honor. Therefore they are not grieved by wherefore we are angry with them most of all. Hence the being slighted. And yet “they are roused to anger, when Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that “we are either not an- wounded,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8). There- gry at all, or not very angry with those who have acted fore a slight is not the sole motive of anger. through anger, because they do not seem to have acted Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2) slightingly.” gives many other causes of anger, for instance, “being for- The second reason is because a slight is opposed to gotten by others; that others should rejoice in our misfor- a man’s excellence: because “men think little of things tunes; that they should make known our evils; being hin- that are not worth much ado” (Rhet. ii, 2). Now we seek dered from doing as we like.” Therefore being slighted is for some kind of excellence from all our goods. Conse- not the only motive for being angry. quently whatever injury is inflicted on us, in so far as it is On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) derogatory to our excellence, seems to savor of a slight. that anger is “a desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on ac- Reply to Objection 1. Any other cause, besides con- count of a seeming slight done unbecomingly.” tempt, through which a man suffers an injury, takes away I answer that, All the causes of anger are reduced to from the notion of injury: contempt or slight alone adds slight. For slight is of three kinds, as stated in Rhet. ii, 2, to the motive of anger, and consequently is of itself the viz. “contempt,” “despiteful treatment,” i.e. hindering one cause of anger. from doing one’s will, and “insolence”: and all motives of Reply to Objection 2. Although a dumb animal does anger are reduced to these three. Two reasons may be as- not seek honor as such, yet it naturally seeks a certain su- signed for this. First, because anger seeks another’s hurt periority, and is angry with anything derogatory thereto. as being a means of just vengeance: wherefore it seeks Reply to Objection 3. Each of those causes amounts vengeance in so far as it seems just. Now just vengeance to some kind of slight. Thus forgetfulness is a clear sign is taken only for that which is done unjustly; hence that of slight esteem, for the more we think of a thing the more which provokes anger is always something considered in is it fixed in our memory. Again if a man does not hesitate the light of an injustice. Wherefore the Philosopher says by his remarks to give pain to another, this seems to show (Rhet. ii, 3) that “men are not angry—if they think they that he thinks little of him: and those too who show signs have wronged some one and are suffering justly on that of hilarity when another is in misfortune, seem to care lit- account; because there is no anger at what is just.” Now tle about his good or evil. Again he that hinders another injury is done to another in three ways: namely, through from carrying out his will, without deriving thereby any ignorance, through passion, and through choice. Then, profit to himself, seems not to care much for his friend- most of all, a man does an injustice, when he does an ship. Consequently all those things, in so far as they are injury from choice, on purpose, or from deliberate mal- signs of contempt, provoke anger. ice, as stated in Ethic. v, 8. Wherefore we are most of Whether a man’s excellence is the cause of his being angry? Ia IIae q. 47 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that a man’s excellence 2) that “some are very much inclined to be angry when is not the cause of his being more easily angry. For the they are despised for some failing or weakness of the ex- Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that “some are angry es- istence of which there are grounds for suspicion; but if pecially when they are grieved, for instance, the sick, the they think they excel in those points, they do not trouble.” poor, and those who are disappointed.” But these things But a suspicion of this kind is due to some defect. There- seem to pertain to defect. Therefore defect rather than ex- fore defect rather than excellence is a cause of a man being cellence makes one prone to anger. angry. Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, Objection 3. Further, whatever savors of excellence 810 makes a man agreeable and hopeful. But the Philosopher in him by the motive aforesaid. Now it is evident that says (Rhet. ii, 3) that “men are not angry when they play, nothing moves a man to anger except a hurt that grieves make jokes, or take part in a feast, nor when they are pros- him: while whatever savors of defect is above all a cause perous or successful, nor in moderate pleasures and well- of grief; since men who suffer from some defect are more founded hope.” Therefore excellence is not a cause of easily hurt. And this is why men who are weak, or subject anger. to some other defect, are more easily angered, since they On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9) are more easily grieved. that excellence makes men prone to anger. This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. I answer that, The cause of anger, in the man who Reply to Objection 2. If a man be despised in a matter is angry, may be taken in two ways. First in respect of in which he evidently excels greatly, he does not consider the motive of anger: and thus excellence is the cause of himself the loser thereby, and therefore is not grieved: and a man being easily angered. Because the motive of anger in this respect he is less angered. But in another respect, is an unjust slight, as stated above (a. 2). Now it is evi- in so far as he is more undeservedly despised, he has more dent that the more excellent a man is, the more unjust is a reason for being angry: unless perhaps he thinks that he slight offered him in the matter in which he excels. Con- is envied or insulted not through contempt but through ig- sequently those who excel in any matter, are most of all norance, or some other like cause. angry, if they be slighted in that matter; for instance, a Reply to Objection 3. All these things hinder anger in wealthy man in his riches, or an orator in his eloquence, so far as they hinder sorrow. But in another respect they and so forth. are naturally apt to provoke anger, because they make it Secondly, the cause of anger, in the man who is angry, more unseemly to insult anyone. may be considered on the part of the disposition produced Whether a person’s defect is a reason for being more easily angry with him? Ia IIae q. 47 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that a person’s defect is For just as the higher a man’s position is, the more unde- not a reason for being more easily angry with him. For the servedly he is despised; so the lower it is, the less reason Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that “we are not angry with he has for despising. Thus a nobleman is angry if he be those who confess and repent and humble themselves; on insulted by a peasant; a wise man, if by a fool; a master, the contrary, we are gentle with them. Wherefore dogs if by a servant. bite not those who sit down.” But these things savor of If, however, the littleness or deficiency lessens the un- littleness and defect. Therefore littleness of a person is a merited contempt, then it does not increase but lessens reason for being less angry with him. anger. In this way those who repent of their ill-deeds, and Objection 2. Further, there is no greater defect than confess that they have done wrong, who humble them- death. But anger ceases at the sight of death. Therefore selves and ask pardon, mitigate anger, according to Prov. defect of a person does not provoke anger against him. 15:1: “A mild answer breaketh wrath”: because, to wit, Objection 3. Further, no one thinks little of a man they seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those through his being friendly towards him. But we are more before whom they humble themselves. angry with friends, if they offend us or refuse to help us; This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. hence it is written (Ps. 54:13): “If my enemy had reviled Reply to Objection 2. There are two reasons why me I would verily have borne with it.” Therefore a per- anger ceases at the sight of death. One is because the dead son’s defect is not a reason for being more easily angry are incapable of sorrow and sensation; and this is chiefly with him. what the angry seek in those with whom they are angered. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) Another reason is because the dead seem to have attained that “the rich man is angry with the poor man, if the latter to the limit of evils. Hence anger ceases in regard to all despise him; and in like manner the prince is angry with who are grievously hurt, in so far as this hurt surpasses the his subject.” measure of just retaliation. I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 2,3) unmerited Reply to Objection 3. To be despised by one’s friends contempt more than anything else is a provocative of seems also a greater indignity. Consequently if they de- anger. Consequently deficiency or littleness in the per- spise us by hurting or by failing to help, we are angry son with whom we are angry, tends to increase our anger, with them for the same reason for which we are angry in so far as it adds to the unmeritedness of being despised. with those who are beneath us. 811 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 48 Of the Effects of Anger (In Four Articles) We must now consider the effects of anger: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether anger causes pleasure? (2) Whether above all it causes heat in the heart? (3) Whether above all it hinders the use of reason? (4) Whether it causes taciturnity? Whether anger causes pleasure? Ia IIae q. 48 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that anger does not cause sorrow vengeance is sought as a remedy. Consequently pleasure. Because sorrow excludes pleasure. But anger as soon as vengeance is present, pleasure ensues, and so is never without sorrow, since, as stated in Ethic. vii, 6, much the greater according as the sorrow was greater. “everyone that acts from anger, acts with pain.” Therefore Therefore if vengeance be really present, perfect pleasure anger does not cause pleasure. ensues, entirely excluding sorrow, so that the movement Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, of anger ceases. But before vengeance is really present, 5) that “vengeance makes anger to cease, because it sub- it becomes present to the angry man in two ways: in one stitutes pleasure for pain”: whence we may gather that way, by hope; because none is angry except he hopes for the angry man derives pleasure from vengeance, and that vengeance, as stated above (q. 46, a. 1); in another way, vengeance quells his anger. Therefore on the advent of by thinking of it continually, for to everyone that desires pleasure, anger departs: and consequently anger is not an a thing it is pleasant to dwell on the thought of what he effect united with pleasure. desires; wherefore the imaginings of dreams are pleas- Objection 3. Further, no effect hinders its cause, since ant. Accordingly an angry man takes pleasure in think-it is conformed to its cause. But pleasure hinders anger as ing much about vengeance. This pleasure, however, is not stated in Rhet. ii, 3. Therefore pleasure is not an effect of perfect, so as to banish sorrow and consequently anger. anger. Reply to Objection 1. The angry man does not grieve On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) and rejoice at the same thing; he grieves for the wrong quotes the saying that anger is “Sweet to the soul as honey done, while he takes pleasure in the thought and hope of to the taste” (Iliad, xviii, 109 [trl. Pope]). vengeance. Consequently sorrow is to anger as its begin- I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, ning; while pleasure is the effect or terminus of anger. 14), pleasures, chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are Reply to Objection 2. This argument holds in re- remedies against sorrow: and therefore the greater the sor- gard to pleasure caused by the real presence of vengeance, row or anxiety, the more sensible are we to the pleasure which banishes anger altogether. which heals it, as is evident in the case of thirst which in- Reply to Objection 3. Pleasure that precedes hinders creases the pleasure of drink. Now it is clear from what sorrow from ensuing, and consequently is a hindrance to has been said (q. 47, Aa. 1,3), that the movement of anger anger. But pleasure felt in taking vengeance follows from arises from a wrong done that causes sorrow, for which anger. Whether anger above all causes fervor in the heart? Ia IIae q. 48 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that heat is not above all anger grows weaker; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) the effect of anger. For fervor, as stated above (q. 28, a. 5; that “time puts an end to anger.” Therefore fervor is not q. 37, a. 2), belongs to love. But love, as above stated, is the proper effect of anger. the beginning and cause of all the passions. Since then the Objection 3. Further, fervor added to fervor pro- cause is more powerful than its effect, it seems that anger duces greater fervor. But “the addition of a greater anger is not the chief cause of fervor. banishes already existing anger,” as the Philosopher says Objection 2. Further, those things which, of them- (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger does not cause fervor. selves, arouse fervor, increase as time goes on; thus love On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, grows stronger the longer it lasts. But in course of time 16) that “anger is fervor of the blood around the heart, 812 resulting from an exhalation of the bile.” reason sanguine temperaments are more inclined to love; I answer that, As stated above (q. 44, a. 1), the bod- and hence the saying that “love springs from the liver,” be- ily transmutation that occurs in the passions of the soul is cause of the blood being formed there. On the other hand, proportionate to the movement of the appetite. Now it is the fervor of anger has a certain bitterness with a tendency evident that every appetite, even the natural appetite, tends to destroy, for it seeks to be avenged on the contrary evil: with greater force to repel that which is contrary to it, if it whence it is likened to the heat of fire and of the bile, and be present: hence we see that hot water freezes harder, as for this reason Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that though the cold acted with greater force on the hot object. it “results from an exhalation of the bile whence it takes Since then the appetitive movement of anger is caused by its name chole.” some injury inflicted, as by a contrary that is present; it Reply to Objection 2. Time, of necessity, weak- follows that the appetite tends with great force to repel the ens all those things, the causes of which are impaired by injury by the desire of vengeance; and hence ensues great time. Now it is evident that memory is weakened by time; vehemence and impetuosity in the movement of anger. for things which happened long ago easily slip from our And because the movement of anger is not one of recoil, memory. But anger is caused by the memory of a wrong which corresponds to the action of cold, but one of prose- done. Consequently the cause of anger is impaired little cution, which corresponds to the action of heat, the result by little as time goes on, until at length it vanishes alto- is that the movement of anger produces fervor of the blood gether. Moreover a wrong seems greater when it is first and vital spirits around the heart, which is the instrument felt; and our estimate thereof is gradually lessened the of the soul’s passions. And hence it is that, on account further the sense of present wrong recedes into the past. of the heart being so disturbed by anger, those chiefly The same applies to love, so long as the cause of love is in who are angry betray signs thereof in their outer mem- the memory alone; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. bers. For, as Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) “the heart that viii, 5) that “if a friend’s absence lasts long, it seems to is inflamed with the stings of its own anger beats quick, make men forget their friendship.” But in the presence of the body trembles, the tongue stammers, the countenance a friend, the cause of friendship is continually being mul- takes fire, the eyes grow fierce, they that are well known tiplied by time: wherefore the friendship increases: and are not recognized. With the mouth indeed he shapes a the same would apply to anger, were its cause continually sound, but the understanding knows not what it says.” multiplied. Reply to Objection 1. “Love itself is not felt so Nevertheless the very fact that anger soon spends it- keenly as in the absence of the beloved,” as Augustine self proves the strength of its fervor: for as a great fire is observes (De Trin. x, 12). Consequently when a man suf- soon spent having burnt up all the fuel; so too anger, by fers from a hurt done to the excellence that he loves, he reason of its vehemence, soon dies away. feels his love thereof the more: the result being that his Reply to Objection 3. Every power that is divided in heart is moved with greater heat to remove the hindrance itself is weakened. Consequently if a man being already to the object of his love; so that anger increases the fervor angry with one, becomes angry with another, by this very of love and makes it to be felt more. fact his anger with the former is weakened. Especially Nevertheless, the fervor arising from heat differs ac- is this so if his anger in the second case be greater: be- cording as it is to be referred to love or to anger. Be- cause the wrong done which aroused his former anger, cause the fervor of love has a certain sweetness and gen- will, in comparison with the second wrong, which is reck- tleness; for it tends to the good that one loves: whence it is oned greater, seem to be of little or no account. likened to the warmth of the air and of the blood. For this Whether anger above all hinders the use of reason? Ia IIae q. 48 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that anger does not hin- also states (Ethic. vii, 6.). der the use of reason. Because that which presupposes an Objection 3. Further, the judgment of reason becomes act of reason, does not seem to hinder the use of reason. more evident by juxtaposition of the contrary: because But “anger listens to reason,” as stated in Ethic. vii, 6. contraries stand out more clearly when placed beside one Therefore anger does not hinder reason. another. But this also increases anger: for the Philoso- Objection 2. Further, the more the reason is hindered, pher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that “men are more angry if they the less does a man show his thoughts. But the Philoso- receive unwonted treatment; for instance, honorable men, pher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that “an angry man is not cunning if they be dishonored”: and so forth. Therefore the same but is open.” Therefore anger does not seem to hinder the cause increases anger, and facilitates the judgment of rea- use of reason, as desire does; for desire is cunning, as he son. Therefore anger does not hinder the judgment of rea- 813 son. but because he acts openly, without thought of hiding him- On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that self. This is due partly to the reason being hindered, so anger “withdraws the light of understanding, while by ag- as not to discern what should be hidden and what done itating it troubles the mind.” openly, nor to devise the means of hiding; and partly to I answer that, Although the mind or reason makes no the dilatation of the heart which pertains to magnanim- use of a bodily organ in its proper act, yet, since it needs ity which is an effect of anger: wherefore the Philosopher certain sensitive powers for the execution of its act, the says of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv, 3) that “he is acts of which powers are hindered when the body is dis- open in his hatreds and his friendships. . . and speaks and turbed, it follows of necessity that any disturbance in the acts openly.” Desire, on the other hand, is said to lie low body hinders even the judgment of reason; as is clear in and to be cunning, because, in many cases, the pleasur- the case of drunkenness or sleep. Now it has been stated able things that are desired, savor of shame and volup- (a. 2) that anger, above all, causes a bodily disturbance in tuousness, wherein man wishes not to be seen. But in the region of the heart, so much as to effect even the out- those things that savor of manliness and excellence, such ward members. Consequently, of all the passions, anger as matters of vengeance, man seeks to be in the open. is the most manifest obstacle to the judgment of reason, Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (ad 1), the according to Ps. 30:10: “My eye is troubled with wrath.” movement of anger begins in the reason, wherefore the Reply to Objection 1. The beginning of anger is in juxtaposition of one contrary with another facilitates the the reason, as regards the appetitive movement, which is judgment of reason, on the same grounds as it increases the formal element of anger. But the passion of anger fore- anger. For when a man who is possessed of honor stalls the perfect judgment of reason, as though it listened or wealth, suffers a loss therein, the loss seems all the but imperfectly to reason, on account of the commotion greater, both on account of the contrast, and because it was of the heat urging to instant action, which commotion is unforeseen. Consequently it causes greater grief: just as a the material element of anger. In this respect it hinders the great good, through being received unexpectedly, causes judgment of reason. greater delight. And in proportion to the increase of the Reply to Objection 2. An angry man is said to be grief that precedes, anger is increased also. open, not because it is clear to him what he ought to do, Whether anger above all causes taciturnity? Ia IIae q. 48 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that anger does not cause I answer that, As stated above (a. 3; q. 46, a. 4), anger taciturnity. Because taciturnity is opposed to speech. But both follows an act of reason, and hinders the reason: and increase in anger conduces to speech; as is evident from in both respects it may cause taciturnity. On the part of the the degrees of anger laid down by Our Lord (Mat. 5:22): reason, when the judgment of reason prevails so far, that where He says: “Whosoever is angry with his brother”; although it does not curb the appetite in its inordinate de- and ”. . . whosoever shall say to his brother, ‘Raca’ ”; and sire for vengeance, yet it curbs the tongue from unbridled ”. . . whosoever shall say to his brother, ‘Thou fool.’ ” speech. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 30): “Some- Therefore anger does not cause taciturnity. times when the mind is disturbed, anger, as if in judg- Objection 2. Further, through failing to obey reason, ment, commands silence.” On the part of the impediment man sometimes breaks out into unbecoming words: hence to reason because, as stated above (a. 2), the disturbance it is written (Prov. 25:28): “As a city that lieth open and is of anger reaches to the outward members, and chiefly to not compassed with walls, so is a man that cannot refrain those members which reflect more distinctly the emotions his own spirit in speaking.” But anger, above all, hinders of the heart, such as the eyes, face and tongue; wherefore, the judgment of reason, as stated above (a. 3). Conse- as observed above (a. 2), “the tongue stammers, the coun- quently above all it makes one break out into unbecoming tenance takes fire, the eyes grow fierce.” Consequently words. Therefore it does not cause taciturnity. anger may cause such a disturbance, that the tongue is al- Objection 3. Further, it is written (Mat. 12:34): “Out together deprived of speech; and taciturnity is the result. of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh.” But Reply to Objection 1. Anger sometimes goes so far anger, above all, causes a disturbance in the heart, as as to hinder the reason from curbing the tongue: but some- stated above (a. 2). Therefore above all it conduces to times it goes yet farther, so as to paralyze the tongue and speech. Therefore it does not cause taciturnity. other outward members. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that And this suffices for the Reply to the Second Objec- “when anger does not vent itself outwardly by the lips, tion. inwardly it burns the more fiercely.” Reply to Objection 3. The disturbance of the heart 814 may sometimes superabound to the extend that the move-even death. If, however, the disturbance be not so great, ments of the outward members are hindered by the inor- then “out of the abundance of the heart” thus disturbed, dinate movement of the heart. Thence ensue taciturnity the mouth proceeds to speak. and immobility of the outward members; and sometimes 815 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 49 Of Habits in General, As to Their Substance (In Four Articles) After treating of human acts and passions, we now pass on to the consideration of the principles of human acts, and firstly of intrinsic principles, secondly of extrinsic principles. The intrinsic principle is power and habit; but as we have treated of powers in the Ia, q. 77, seqq., it remains for us to consider them in general: in the second place we shall consider virtues and vices and other like habits, which are the principles of human acts. Concerning habits in general there are four points to consider: First, the substance of habits; second, their subject; third, the cause of their generation, increase, and corruption; fourth, how they are distinguished from one another. Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether habit is a quality? (2) Whether it is a distinct species of quality? (3) Whether habit implies an order to an act? (4) Of the necessity of habit. Whether habit is a quality? Ia IIae q. 49 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that habit is not a qual- is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity. ity. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 73): “this word Then there are some in which there is a medium, but only ‘habit’ is derived from the verb ‘to have.’ ” But “to have” a relation: as, for instance, a man is said to have a com- belongs not only to quality, but also to the other cate- panion or a friend. And, further, there are some in which gories: for we speak of ourselves as “having” quantity there is a medium, not indeed an action or passion, but and money and other like things. Therefore habit is not a something after the manner of action or passion: thus, for quality. instance, something adorns or covers, and something else Objection 2. Further, habit is reckoned as one of the is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says predicaments; as may be clearly seen in the Book of the (Metaph. v, text. 25) that “a habit is said to be, as it Predicaments (Categor. vi). But one predicament is not were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is contained under another. Therefore habit is not a quality. had”; as is the case in those things which we have about Objection 3. Further, “every habit is a disposition,” ourselves. And therefore these constitute a special genus as is stated in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). of things, which are comprised under the predicament of Now disposition is “the order of that which has parts,” as “habit”: of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. stated in Metaph. v, text. 24. But this belongs to the 25) that “there is a habit between clothing and the man predicament Position. Therefore habit is not a quality. who is clothed.” On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of But if “to have” be taken according as a thing has a re- Predicaments (Categor. vi) that “habit is a quality which lation in regard to itself or to something else; in that case is difficult to change.” habit is a quality; since this mode of having is in respect of I answer that, This word “habitus” [habit] is derived some quality: and of this the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, from “habere” [to have]. Now habit is taken from this text. 25) that “habit is a disposition whereby that which is word in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as man, or any disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard other thing, is said to “have” something; in another way, to itself or in regard to another: thus health is a habit.” inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation [se habet] ei- And in this sense we speak of habit now. Wherefore we ther in regard to itself, or in regard to something else. must say that habit is a quality. Concerning the first, we must observe that “to have,” Reply to Objection 1. This argument takes “to have” as said in regard to anything that is “had,” is common to in the general sense: for thus it is common to many the various predicaments. And so the Philosopher puts “to predicaments, as we have said. have” among the “post-predicaments,” so called because Reply to Objection 2. This argument takes habit in they result from the various predicaments; as, for instance, the sense in which we understand it to be a medium be- opposition, priority, posterity, and such like. Now among tween the haver, and that which is had: and in this sense things which are had, there seems to be this distinction, it is a predicament, as we have said. that there are some in which there is no medium between Reply to Objection 3. Disposition does always, in- the “haver” and that which is had: as, for instance, there deed, imply an order of that which has parts: but this hap- 816 pens in three ways, as the Philosopher goes on at once to he says ‘as to power,’ he includes all those dispositions says (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely, “either as to place, or which are in course of formation and not yet arrived at as to power, or as to species.” “In saying this,” as Sim- perfect usefulness,” such as inchoate science and virtue: plicius observes in his Commentary on the Predicaments, “and when he says, ‘as to species,’ he includes perfect “he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when he dispositions, which are called habits,” such as perfected says ‘as to place,’ ” and this belongs to the predicament science and virtue. “Position,” which is the order of parts in a place: “when Whether habit is a distinct species of quality? Ia IIae q. 49 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that habit is not a distinct like qualities, which are not natural but adventitious: and species of quality. Because, as we have said (a. 1), habit, there are also many dispositions which are not adventi- in so far as it is a quality, is “a disposition whereby that tious but natural, as health, beauty, and the like. More- which is disposed is disposed well or ill.” But this happens over, it does not suit the order of the species, since that in regard to any quality: for a thing happens to be well or which is the more natural is always first. ill disposed in regard also to shape, and in like manner, in Therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of regard to heat and cold, and in regard to all such things. dispositions and habits from other qualities. For quality, Therefore habit is not a distinct species of quality. properly speaking, implies a certain mode of substance. Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says in the Now mode, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), “is Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi), that heat and that which a measure determines”: wherefore it implies cold are dispositions or habits, just as sickness and health. a certain determination according to a certain measure. Therefore habit or disposition is not distinct from the other Therefore, just as that in accordance with which the ma- species of quality. terial potentiality [potentia materiae] is determined to its Objection 3. Further, “difficult to change” is not a dif-substantial being, is called quality, which is a difference ference belonging to the predicament of quality, but rather affecting the substance, so that, in accordance with the to movement or passion. Now, no genus should be con- potentiality of the subject is determined to its accidental tracted to a species by a difference of another genus; but being, is called an accidental quality, which is also a kind “differences should be proper to a genus,” as the Philoso- of difference, as is clear from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, pher says in Metaph. vii, text. 42. Therefore, since habit text. 19). is “a quality difficult to change,” it seems not to be a dis- Now the mode of determination of the subject to ac- tinct species of quality. cidental being may be taken in regard to the very nature On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of of the subject, or in regard to action, and passion resulting the Predicaments (Categor. vi) that “one species of quality from its natural principles, which are matter and form; or is habit and disposition.” again in regard to quantity. If we take the mode or deter- I answer that, The Philosopher in the Book of mination of the subject in regard to quantity, we shall then Predicaments (Categor. vi) reckons disposition and habit have the fourth species of quality. And because quantity, as the first species of quality. Now Simplicius, in his Com- considered in itself, is devoid of movement, and does not mentary on the Predicaments, explains the difference of imply the notion of good or evil, so it does not concern these species as follows. He says “that some qualities are the fourth species of quality whether a thing be well or ill natural, and are in their subject in virtue of its nature, and disposed, nor quickly or slowly transitory. are always there: but some are adventitious, being caused But the mode of determination of the subject, in re- from without, and these can be lost. Now the latter,” i.e. gard to action or passion, is considered in the second and those which are adventitious, “are habits and dispositions, third species of quality. And therefore in both, we take differing in the point of being easily or difficultly lost. As into account whether a thing be done with ease or diffi- to natural qualities, some regard a thing in the point of its culty; whether it be transitory or lasting. But in them, we being in a state of potentiality; and thus we have the sec- do not consider anything pertaining to the notion of good ond species of quality: while others regard a thing which or evil: because movements and passions have not the as- is in act; and this either deeply rooted therein or only on pect of an end, whereas good and evil are said in respect its surface. If deeply rooted, we have the third species of of an end. quality: if on the surface, we have the fourth species of On the other hand, the mode or determination of the quality, as shape, and form which is the shape of an ani- subject, in regard to the nature of the thing, belongs to the mated being.” But this distinction of the species of quality first species of quality, which is habit and disposition: for seems unsuitable. For there are many shapes, and passion- the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17), when speak- 817 ing of habits of the soul and of the body, that they are disposition is included in the definition of habit (Metaph. “dispositions of the perfect to the best; and by perfect I v, text. 25): in another way, according as it is divided mean that which is disposed in accordance with its na- against habit. Again, disposition, properly so called, can ture.” And since the form itself and the nature of a thing be divided against habit in two ways: first, as perfect and is the end and the cause why a thing is made (Phys. ii, imperfect within the same species; and thus we call it a text. 25), therefore in the first species we consider both disposition, retaining the name of the genus, when it is evil and good, and also changeableness, whether easy or had imperfectly, so as to be easily lost: whereas we call difficult; inasmuch as a certain nature is the end of gener- it a habit, when it is had perfectly, so as not to be lost ation and movement. And so the Philosopher (Metaph. v, easily. And thus a disposition becomes a habit, just as a text. 25) defines habit, a “disposition whereby someone boy becomes a man. Secondly, they may be distinguished is disposed, well or ill”; and in Ethic. ii, 4, he says that as diverse species of the one subaltern genus: so that by “habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the we call dispositions, those qualities of the first species, passions.” For when the mode is suitable to the thing’s which by reason of their very nature are easily lost, be- nature, it has the aspect of good: and when it is unsuit- cause they have changeable causes; e.g. sickness and able, it has the aspect of evil. And since nature is the first health: whereas we call habits those qualities which, by object of consideration in anything, for this reason habit reason of their very nature, are not easily changed, in that is reckoned as the first species of quality. they have unchangeable causes, e.g. sciences and virtues. Reply to Objection 1. Disposition implies a certain And in this sense, disposition does not become habit. The order, as stated above (a. 1, ad 3). Wherefore a man is not latter explanation seems more in keeping with the inten- said to be disposed by some quality except in relation to tion of Aristotle: for in order to confirm this distinction something else. And if we add “well or ill,” which belongs he adduces the common mode of speaking, according to to the essential notion of habit, we must consider the qual- which, when a quality is, by reason of its nature, easily ity’s relation to the nature, which is the end. So in regard changeable, and, through some accident, becomes diffi- to shape, or heat, or cold, a man is not said to be well or ill cultly changeable, then it is called a habit: while the con-disposed, except by reason of a relation to the nature of a trary happens in regard to qualities, by reason of their na- thing, with regard to its suitability or unsuitability. Conse- ture, difficultly changeable: for supposing a man to have a quently even shapes and passion-like qualities, in so far as science imperfectly, so as to be liable to lose it easily, we they are considered to be suitable or unsuitable to the na- say that he is disposed to that science, rather than that he ture of a thing, belong to habits or dispositions: for shape has the science. From this it is clear that the word “habit” and color, according to their suitability to the nature of implies a certain lastingness: while the word “disposition” thing, concern beauty; while heat and cold, according to does not. their suitability to the nature of a thing, concern health. Nor does it matter that thus to be easy and difficult And in this way heat and cold are put, by the Philosopher, to change are specific differences (of a quality), although in the first species of quality. they belong to passion and movement, and not the genus Wherefore it is clear how to answer the second ob- of quality. For these differences, though apparently acci- jection: though some give another solution, as Simplicius dental to quality, nevertheless designate differences which says in his Commentary on the Predicaments. are proper and essential to quality. In the same way, in Reply to Objection 3. This difference, “difficult to the genus of substance we often take accidental instead of change,” does not distinguish habit from the other species substantial differences, in so far as by the former, essential of quality, but from disposition. Now disposition may be principles are designated. taken in two ways; in one way, as the genus of habit, for Whether habit implies order to an act? Ia IIae q. 49 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that habit does not imply principle of action, is put in the definition of power, as we order to an act. For everything acts according as it is in read in Metaph. v, text. 17. Therefore to be the principle act. But the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text 8), that of an act belongs to power essentially. Now that which is “when one is become knowing by habit, one is still in a essential is first in every genus. If therefore, habit also is state of potentiality, but otherwise than before learning.” a principle of act, it follows that it is posterior to power. Therefore habit does not imply the relation of a principle And so habit and disposition will not be the first species to an act. of quality. Objection 2. Further, that which is put in the defi- Objection 3. Further, health is sometimes a habit, and nition of a thing, belongs to it essentially. But to be a so are leanness and beauty. But these do not indicate rela- 818 tion to an act. Therefore it is not essential to habit to be a pally relation to an act. For, as we have said, habit primar-principle of act. ily and of itself implies a relation to the thing’s nature. If On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. therefore the nature of a thing, in which the habit is, con- xxi) that “habit is that whereby something is done when sists in this very relation to an act, it follows that the habit necessary.” And the Commentator says (De Anima iii) principally implies relation to an act. Now it is clear that that “habit is that whereby we act when we will.” the nature and the notion of power is that it should be a I answer that, To have relation to an act may belong principle of act. Wherefore every habit is subjected in a to habit, both in regard to the nature of habit, and in re- power, implies principally relation to an act. gard to the subject in which the habit is. In regard to the Reply to Objection 1. Habit is an act, in so far as it nature of habit, it belongs to every habit to have relation is a quality: and in this respect it can be a principle of op- to an act. For it is essential to habit to imply some relation eration. It is, however, in a state of potentiality in respect to a thing’s nature, in so far as it is suitable or unsuitable to operation. Wherefore habit is called first act, and oper- thereto. But a thing’s nature, which is the end of gener- ation, second act; as it is explained in De Anima ii, text. ation, is further ordained to another end, which is either 5. an operation, or the product of an operation, to which one Reply to Objection 2. It is not the essence of habit to attains by means of operation. Wherefore habit implies be related to power, but to be related to nature. And as na- relation not only to the very nature of a thing, but also, ture precedes action, to which power is related, therefore consequently, to operation, inasmuch as this is the end of habit is put before power as a species of quality. nature, or conducive to the end. Whence also it is stated Reply to Objection 3. Health is said to be a habit, or a (Metaph. v, text. 25) in the definition of habit, that it is a habitual disposition, in relation to nature, as stated above. disposition whereby that which is disposed, is well or ill But in so far as nature is a principle of act, it consequently disposed either in regard to itself, that is to its nature, or implies a relation to act. Wherefore the Philosopher says in regard to something else, that is to the end. (De Hist. Animal. x, 1), that man, or one of his members, But there are some habits, which even on the part of is called healthy, “when he can perform the operation of a the subject in which they are, imply primarily and princi- healthy man.” And the same applies to other habits. Whether habits are necessary? Ia IIae q. 49 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that habits are not neces- it should be related to it as potentiality is to act. Whence, sary. For by habits we are well or ill disposed in respect if there is a being whose nature is not composed of poten- of something, as stated above. But a thing is well or ill tiality and act, and whose substance is its own operation, disposed by its form: for in respect of its form a thing is which itself is for itself, there we can find no room for good, even as it is a being. Therefore there is no necessity habit and disposition, as is clearly the case in God. for habits. The second condition is, that that which is in a state of Objection 2. Further, habit implies relation to an act. potentiality in regard to something else, be capable of de- But power implies sufficiently a principle of act: for even termination in several ways and to various things. Whence the natural powers, without any habits, are principles of if something be in a state of potentiality in regard to some- acts. Therefore there was no necessity for habits. thing else, but in regard to that only, there we find no room Objection 3. Further, as power is related to good and for disposition and habit: for such a subject from its own evil, so also is habit: and as power does not always act, nature has the due relation to such an act. Wherefore if so neither does habit. Given, therefore, the powers, habits a heavenly body be composed of matter and form, since become superfluous. that matter is not in a state of potentiality to another form, On the contrary, Habits are perfections (Phys. vii, as we said in the Ia, q. 56, a. 2, there is no need for dispo- text. 17). But perfection is of the greatest necessity to a sition or habit in respect of the form, or even in respect of thing: since it is in the nature of an end. Therefore it is operation, since the nature of the heavenly body is not in necessary that there should be habits. a state of potentiality to more than one fixed movement. I answer that, As we have said above (Aa. 2,3), habit The third condition is that in disposing the subject to implies a disposition in relation to a thing’s nature, and to one of those things to which it is in potentiality, several its operation or end, by reason of which disposition a thing things should occur, capable of being adjusted in vari- is well or ill disposed thereto. Now for a thing to need to ous ways: so as to dispose the subject well or ill to its be disposed to something else, three conditions are neces- form or to its operation. Wherefore the simple qualities sary. The first condition is that which is disposed should of the elements which suit the natures of the elements in be distinct from that to which it is disposed; and so, that one single fixed way, are not called dispositions or habits, 819 but “simple qualities”: but we call dispositions or habits, to one fixed operation, no further disposition, besides the such things as health, beauty, and so forth, which imply form itself, is needed for the operation. But if the form the adjustment of several things which may vary in their be such that it can operate in diverse ways, as the soul; it relative adjustability. For this reason the Philosopher says needs to be disposed to its operations by means of habits. (Metaph. v, text. 24,25) that “habit is a disposition”: Reply to Objection 2. Power sometimes has a rela- and disposition is “the order of that which has parts ei- tion to many things: and then it needs to be determined ther as to place, or as to potentiality, or as to species,” as by something else. But if a power has not a relation to we have said above (a. 1, ad 3). Wherefore, since there many things, it does not need a habit to determine it, as are many things for whose natures and operations several we have said. For this reason the natural forces do not things must concur which may vary in their relative ad- perform their operations by means of habits: because they justability, it follows that habit is necessary. are of themselves determined to one mode of operation. Reply to Objection 1. By the form the nature of a Reply to Objection 3. The same habit has not a re- thing is perfected: yet the subject needs to be disposed lation to good and evil, as will be made clear further on in regard to the form by some disposition. But the form (q. 54, a. 3): whereas the same power has a relation to itself is further ordained to operation, which is either the good and evil. And, therefore, habits are necessary that end, or the means to the end. And if the form is limited the powers be determined to good. 820 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 50 Of the Subject of Habits (In Six Articles) We consider next the subject of habits: and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is a habit in the body? (2) Whether the soul is a subject of habit, in respect of its essence or in respect of its power? (3) Whether in the powers of the sensitive part there can be a habit? (4) Whether there is a habit in the intellect? (5) Whether there is a habit in the will? (6) Whether there is a habit in separate substances? Whether there is a habit in the body? Ia IIae q. 50 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there is not a habit in to form, thus a habitual disposition can be in the body, the body. For, as the Commentator says (De Anima iii), which is related to the soul as a subject is to its form. And “a habit is that whereby we act when we will.” But bodily in this way health and beauty and such like are called ha- actions are not subject to the will, since they are natural. bitual dispositions. Yet they have not the nature of habit Therefore there can be no habit in the body. perfectly: because their causes, of their very nature, are Objection 2. Further, all bodily dispositions are easy easily changeable. to change. But habit is a quality, difficult to change. On the other hand, as Simplicius reports in his Com- Therefore no bodily disposition can be a habit. mentary on the Predicaments, Alexander denied abso- Objection 3. Further, all bodily dispositions are sub- lutely that habits or dispositions of the first species are ject to change. But change can only be in the third species in the body: and held that the first species of quality be- of quality, which is divided against habit. Therefore there longed to the soul alone. And he held that Aristotle men- is no habit in the body. tions health and sickness in the Book on the Predicaments On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book not as though they belonged to the first species of quality, of Predicaments (De Categor. vi) that health of the body but by way of example: so that he would mean that just and incurable disease are called habits. as health and sickness may be easy or difficult to change, I answer that, As we have said above (q. 49, Aa. 2 so also are all the qualities of the first species, which are seqq.), habit is a disposition of a subject which is in a state called habits and dispositions. But this is clearly contrary of potentiality either to form or to operation. Therefore in to the intention of Aristotle: both because he speaks in so far as habit implies disposition to operation, no habit is the same way of health and sickness as examples, as of principally in the body as its subject. For every operation virtue and science; and because in Phys. vii, text. 17, he of the body proceeds either from a natural quality of the expressly mentions beauty and health among habits. body or from the soul moving the body. Consequently, Reply to Objection 1. This objection runs in the sense as to those operations which proceed from its nature, the of habit as a disposition to operation, and of those actions body is not disposed by a habit: because the natural forces of the body which are from nature: but not in the sense of are determined to one mode of operation; and we have al- those actions which proceed from the soul, and the prin- ready said (q. 49, a. 4) that it is when the subject is in ciple of which is the will. potentiality to many things that a habitual disposition is Reply to Objection 2. Bodily dispositions are not required. As to the operations which proceed from the simply difficult to change on account of the changeable- soul through the body, they belong principally to the soul, ness of their bodily causes. But they may be difficult to and secondarily to the body. Now habits are in proportion change by comparison to such a subject, because, to wit, to their operations: whence “by like acts like habits are as long as such a subject endures, they cannot be removed; formed” (Ethic. ii, 1,2). And therefore the dispositions to or because they are difficult to change, by comparison to such operations are principally in the soul. But they can other dispositions. But qualities of the soul are simply be secondarily in the body: to wit, in so far as the body difficult to change, on account of the unchangeableness is disposed and enabled with promptitude to help in the of the subject. And therefore he does not say that health operations of the soul. which is difficult to change is a habit simply: but that it is If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject “as a habit,” as we read in the Greek∗. On the other hand, ∗ isos hexin (Categor. viii) 821 the qualities of the soul are called habits simply. the point that it is able to heat something else, then it is a Reply to Objection 3. Bodily dispositions which are disposition; and if it goes so far as to be firmly fixed and in the first species of quality, as some maintained, differ to become difficult to change, then it will be a habit: so from qualities of the third species, in this, that the quali- that disposition would be a certain intensity of passion or ties of the third species consist in some “becoming” and passion-like quality, and habit an intensity or disposition. movement, as it were, wherefore they are called passions But Simplicius disapproves of this, for such intensity and or passible qualities. But when they have attained to per- remissness do not imply diversity on the part of the form fection (specific perfection, so to speak), they have then itself, but on the part of the diverse participation thereof passed into the first species of quality. But Simplicius by the subject; so that there would be no diversity among in his Commentary disapproves of this; for in this way the species of quality. And therefore we must say oth- heating would be in the third species, and heat in the first erwise that, as was explained above (q. 49, a. 2, ad 1), species of quality; whereas Aristotle puts heat in the third. the adjustment of the passion-like qualities themselves, Wherefore Porphyrius, as Simplicius reports (Com- according to their suitability to nature, implies the no- mentary), says that passion or passion-like quality, dispo- tion of disposition: and so, when a change takes place in sition and habit, differ in bodies by way of intensity and these same passion-like qualities, which are heat and cold, remissness. For when a thing receives heat in this only moisture and dryness, there results a change as to sickness that it is being heated, and not so as to be able to give heat, and health. But change does not occur in regard to like then we have passion, if it is transitory; or passion-like habits and dispositions, primarily and of themselves. quality if it is permanent. But when it has been brought to Whether the soul is the subject of habit in respect of its essence or in respect of its Ia IIae q. 50 a. 2 power? Objection 1. It would seem that habit is in the soul of which man may become a partaker, according to 2 Pet. in respect of its essence rather than in respect of its pow- 1, “that we may be partakers of the Divine Nature”: thus ers. For we speak of dispositions and habits in relation to nothing hinders some habit, namely, grace, from being in nature, as stated above (q. 49, a. 2). But nature regards the soul in respect of its essence, as we shall state later on the essence of the soul rather than the powers; because it (q. 110, a. 4). is in respect of its essence that the soul is the nature of On the other hand, if we take habit in its relation to op- such a body and the form thereof. Therefore habits are in eration, it is chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul: the soul in respect of its essence and not in respect of its in so far as the soul is not determined to one operation, powers. but is indifferent to many, which is a condition for a habit, Objection 2. Further, accident is not the subject of as we have said above (q. 49, a. 4). And since the soul accident. Now habit is an accident. But the powers of the is the principle of operation through its powers, therefore, soul are in the genus of accident, as we have said in the regarded in this sense, habits are in the soul in respect of Ia, q. 77, a. 1, ad 5. Therefore habit is not in the soul in its powers. respect of its powers. Reply to Objection 1. The essence of the soul be- Objection 3. Further, the subject is prior to that which longs to human nature, not as a subject requiring to be is in the subject. But since habit belongs to the first disposed to something further, but as a form and nature to species of quality, it is prior to power, which belongs to which someone is disposed. the second species. Therefore habit is not in a power of Reply to Objection 2. Accident is not of itself the the soul as its subject. subject of accident. But since among accidents them- On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) puts selves there is a certain order, the subject, according as it various habits in the various powers of the soul. is under one accident, is conceived as the subject of a fur- I answer that, As we have said above (q. 49, Aa. 2,3), ther accident. In this way we say that one accident is the habit implies a certain disposition in relation to nature or subject of another; as superficies is the subject of color, in to operation. If therefore we take habit as having a rela- which sense power is the subject of habit. tion to nature, it cannot be in the soul—that is, if we speak Reply to Objection 3. Habit takes precedence of of human nature: for the soul itself is the form completing power, according as it implies a disposition to nature: the human nature; so that, regarded in this way, habit or whereas power always implies a relation to operation, disposition is rather to be found in the body by reason of which is posterior, since nature is the principle of oper- its relation to the soul, than in the soul by reason of its ation. But the habit whose subject is a power, does not relation to the body. But if we speak of a higher nature, imply relation to nature, but to operation. Wherefore it is 822 posterior to power. Or, we may say that habit takes prece-For act is naturally prior to potentiality, though potential- dence of power, as the complete takes precedence of the ity is prior in order of generation and time, as stated in incomplete, and as act takes precedence of potentiality. Metaph. vii, text. 17; ix, text. 13. Whether there can be any habits in the powers of the sensitive parts? Ia IIae q. 50 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be any are left to themselves, such animals act from natural in- habits in the powers of the sensitive part. For as the nutri- stinct: and so in them there are no habits ordained to op- tive power is an irrational part, so is the sensitive power. erations. There are in them, however, certain dispositions But there can be no habits in the powers of the nutritive in relation to nature, as health and beauty. But whereas by part. Therefore we ought not to put any habit in the pow- man’s reason brutes are disposed by a sort of custom to ers of the sensitive part. do things in this or that way, so in this sense, to a certain Objection 2. Further, the sensitive parts are common extent, we can admit the existence of habits in dumb an- to us and the brutes. But there are not any habits in brutes: imals: wherefore Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 36): for in them there is no will, which is put in the definition “We find the most untamed beasts, deterred by fear of of habit, as we have said above (q. 49, a. 3). Therefore pain, from that wherein they took the keenest pleasure; there are no habits in the sensitive powers. and when this has become a custom in them, we say that Objection 3. Further, the habits of the soul are sci- they are tame and gentle.” But the habit is incomplete, as ences and virtues: and just as science is related to the to the use of the will, for they have not that power of us- apprehensive power, so it virtue related to the appetitive ing or of refraining, which seems to belong to the notion power. But in the sensitive powers there are no sciences: of habit: and therefore, properly speaking, there can be no since science is of universals, which the sensitive powers habits in them. cannot apprehend. Therefore, neither can there be habits Reply to Objection 3. The sensitive appetite has an of virtue in the sensitive part. inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite, as On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, stated in De Anima iii, text. 57: but the rational powers 10) that “some virtues,” namely, temperance and fortitude, of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from “belong to the irrational part.” the sensitive powers. And therefore it is more suitable I answer that, The sensitive powers can be consid- that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite ered in two ways: first, according as they act from natural than in the powers of sensitive apprehension, since in the instinct: secondly, according as they act at the command powers of sensitive appetite habits do not exist except ac- of reason. According as they act from natural instinct, cording as they act at the command of the reason. And they are ordained to one thing, even as nature is; but ac- yet even in the interior powers of sensitive apprehension, cording as they act at the command of reason, they can be we may admit of certain habits whereby man has a facil- ordained to various things. And thus there can be habits ity of memory, thought or imagination: wherefore also the in them, by which they are well or ill disposed in regard Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii) that “custom to something. conduces much to a good memory”: the reason of which Reply to Objection 1. The powers of the nutritive is that these powers also are moved to act at the command part have not an inborn aptitude to obey the command of of the reason. reason, and therefore there are no habits in them. But the On the other hand the exterior apprehensive powers, sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the com- as sight, hearing and the like, are not susceptible of habits, mand of reason; and therefore habits can be in them: for but are ordained to their fixed acts, according to the dispo- in so far as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are sition of their nature, just as the members of the body, for said to be rational, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. there are no habits in them, but rather in the powers which Reply to Objection 2. The sensitive powers of dumb command their movements. animals do not act at the command of reason; but if they Whether there is any habit in the intellect? Ia IIae q. 50 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that there are no habits in Therefore also are habits. But the intellect is not an act of the intellect. For habits are in conformity with operations, the body (De Anima iii, text. 6). Therefore the intellect is as stated above (a. 1). But the operations of man are com- not the subject of a habit. mon to soul and body, as stated in De Anima i, text. 64. Objection 2. Further, whatever is in a thing, is there 823 according to the mode of that in which it is. But that which sidering: “and even then it is in potentiality in a sense; but is form without matter, is act only: whereas what is com- not in the same way as before learning and discovering.” posed of form and matter, has potentiality and act at the Therefore the “possible” intellect itself is the subject of same time. Therefore nothing at the same time potential the habit of science, by which the intellect, even though it and actual can be in that which is form only, but only in be not actually considering, is able to consider. In the sec- that which is composed of matter and form. Now the in- ond place, this supposition is contrary to the truth. For as tellect is form without matter. Therefore habit, which has to whom belongs the operation, belongs also the power to potentiality at the same time as act, being a sort of medium operate, belongs also the habit. But to understand and to between the two, cannot be in the intellect; but only in the consider is the proper act of the intellect. Therefore also “conjunction,” which is composed of soul and body. the habit whereby one considers is properly in the intellect Objection 3. Further, habit is a disposition whereby itself. we are well or ill disposed in regard to something, as is Reply to Objection 1. Some said, as Simplicius re- said (Metaph. v, text. 25). But that anyone should be ports in his Commentary on the Predicaments, that, since well or ill disposed to an act of the intellect is due to some every operation of man is to a certain extent an operation disposition of the body: wherefore also it is stated (De of the “conjunctum,” as the Philosopher says (De Anima Anima ii, text. 94) that “we observe men with soft flesh to i, text. 64); therefore no habit is in the soul only, but in be quick witted.” Therefore the habits of knowledge are the “conjunctum.” And from this it follows that no habit not in the intellect, which is separate, but in some power is in the intellect, for the intellect is separate, as ran the ar-which is the act of some part of the body. gument, given above. But the argument is no cogent. For On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3,10) habit is not a disposition of the object to the power, but puts science, wisdom and understanding, which is the rather a disposition of the power to the object: wherefore habit of first principles, in the intellective part of the soul. the habit needs to be in that power which is principle of I answer that, concerning intellective habits there the act, and not in that which is compared to the power as have been various opinions. Some, supposing that there its object. was only one “possible”∗ intellect for all men, were bound Now the act of understanding is not said to be com- to hold that habits of knowledge are not in the intellect it- mon to soul and body, except in respect of the phantasm, self, but in the interior sensitive powers. For it is manifest as is stated in De Anima, text. 66. But it is clear that that men differ in habits; and so it was impossible to put the phantasm is compared as object to the passive intel- the habits of knowledge directly in that, which, being only lect (De Anima iii, text. 3,39). Whence it follows that one, would be common to all men. Wherefore if there the intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect were but one single “possible” intellect of all men, the itself; and not on the part of the phantasm, which is com- habits of science, in which men differ from one another, mon to soul and body. And therefore we must say that could not be in the “possible” intellect as their subject, but the “possible” intellect is the subject of habit, which is in would be in the interior sensitive powers, which differ in potentiality to many: and this belongs, above all, to the various men. “possible” intellect. Wherefore the “possible” intellect is Now, in the first place, this supposition is contrary to the subject of intellectual habits. the mind of Aristotle. For it is manifest that the sensi- Reply to Objection 2. As potentiality to sensible be- tive powers are rational, not by their essence, but only by ing belongs to corporeal matter, so potentiality to intellec- participation (Ethic. i, 13). Now the Philosopher puts the tual being belongs to the “possible” intellect. Wherefore intellectual virtues, which are wisdom, science and under- nothing forbids habit to be in the “possible” intellect, for standing, in that which is rational by its essence. Where- it is midway between pure potentiality and perfect act. fore they are not in the sensitive powers, but in the in- Reply to Objection 3. Because the apprehensive tellect itself. Moreover he says expressly (De Anima iii, powers inwardly prepare their proper objects for the “pos- text. 8,18) that when the “possible” intellect “is thus iden- sible intellect,” therefore it is by the good disposition of tified with each thing,” that is, when it is reduced to act in these powers, to which the good disposition of the body respect of singulars by the intelligible species, “then it is cooperates, that man is rendered apt to understand. And said to be in act, as the knower is said to be in act; and this so in a secondary way the intellective habit can be in these happens when the intellect can act of itself,” i.e. by con- powers. But principally it is in the “possible” intellect. ∗ Ia, q. 79, a. 2, ad 2 824 Whether any habit is in the will? Ia IIae q. 50 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that there is not a habit above (a. 1). in the will. For the habit which is in the intellect is the Reply to Objection 1. Even as in the intellect there intelligible species, by means of which the intellect actu- is a species which is the likeness of the object; so in the ally understands. But the will does not act by means of will, and in every appetitive power there must be some- species. Therefore the will is not the subject of habit. thing by which the power is inclined to its object; for the Objection 2. Further, no habit is allotted to the active act of the appetitive power is nothing but a certain incli-intellect, as there is to the “possible” intellect, because the nation, as we have said above (q. 6, a. 4; q. 22, a. 2). And former is an active power. But the will is above all an ac- therefore in respect of those things to which it is inclined tive power, because it moves all the powers to their acts, sufficiently by the nature of the power itself, the power as stated above (q. 9, a. 1). Therefore there is no habit in needs no quality to incline it. But since it is necessary, the will. for the end of human life, that the appetitive power be in- Objection 3. Further, in the natural powers there is no clined to something fixed, to which it is not inclined by the habit, because, by reason of their nature, they are determi- nature of the power, which has a relation to many and var- nate to one thing. But the will, by reason of its nature, is ious things, therefore it is necessary that, in the will and ordained to tend to the good which reason directs. There- in the other appetitive powers, there be certain qualities to fore there is no habit in the will. incline them, and these are called habits. On the contrary, Justice is a habit. But justice is in Reply to Objection 2. The active intellect is active the will; for it is “a habit whereby men will and do that only, and in no way passive. But the will, and every ap- which is just” (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the will is the sub- petitive power, is both mover and moved (De Anima iii, ject of a habit. text. 54). And therefore the comparison between them I answer that, Every power which may be variously does not hold; for to be susceptible of habit belongs to directed to act, needs a habit whereby it is well disposed that which is somehow in potentiality. to its act. Now since the will is a rational power, it may Reply to Objection 3. The will from the very nature be variously directed to act. And therefore in the will we of the power inclined to the good of the reason. But be- must admit the presence of a habit whereby it is well dis- cause this good is varied in many ways, the will needs to posed to its act. Moreover, from the very nature of habit, be inclined, by means of a habit, to some fixed good of the it is clear that it is principally related to the will; inasmuch reason, in order that action may follow more promptly. as habit “is that which one uses when one wills,” as stated Whether there are habits in the angels? Ia IIae q. 50 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that there are no habits Objection 3. Further, habit is a disposition (Metaph. in the angels. For Maximus, commentator of Dionysius v, text. 25). But disposition, as is said in the same book, (Coel. Hier. vii), says: “It is not proper to suppose that is “the order of that which has parts.” Since, therefore, there are intellectual (i.e. spiritual) powers in the divine angels are simple substances, it seems that there are no intelligences (i.e. in the angels) after the manner of ac- dispositions and habits in them. cidents, as in us: as though one were in the other as in a On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) subject: for accident of any kind is foreign to them.” But that the angels are of the first hierarchy are called: “Fire- every habit is an accident. Therefore there are no habits bearers and Thrones and Outpouring of Wisdom, by in the angels. which is indicated the godlike nature of their habits.” Objection 2. Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. I answer that, Some have thought that there are no iv): “The holy dispositions of the heavenly essences par- habits in the angels, and that whatever is said of them, is ticipate, above all other things, in God’s goodness.” But said essentially. Whence Maximus, after the words which that which is of itself [per se] is prior to and more power we have quoted, says: “Their dispositions, and the pow- than that which is by another [per aliud]. Therefore the ers which are in them, are essential, through the absence angelic essences are perfected of themselves unto confor- of matter in them.” And Simplicius says the same in his mity with God, and therefore not by means of habits. And Commentary on the Predicaments: “Wisdom which is in this seems to have been the reasoning of Maximus, who in the soul is its habit: but that which is in the intellect, is its the same passage adds: “For if this were the case, surely substance. For everything divine is sufficient of itself, and their essence would not remain in itself, nor could it have exists in itself.” been as far as possible deified of itself.” Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error. 825 For it is manifest from what we have said (q. 49, a. 4) that ual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard to only a being in potentiality is the subject of habit. So its proper operation: but so far as it is in act, through its the above-mentioned commentators considered that an- own essence it can understand some things, at least itself, gels are immaterial substances, and that there is no ma- and other things according to the mode of its substance, as terial potentiality in them, and on that account, excluded stated in De Causis: and the more perfect it is, the more from them habit and any kind of accident. Yet since perfectly will it understand. though there is no material potentiality in angels, there is But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but still some potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs all are infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in or- to God alone), therefore, as far as potentiality is found der to attain to God Himself, through intellect and will, to be in them, so far may habits be found in them. But the angels need some habits, being as it were in potential- because the potentiality of matter and the potentiality of ity in regard to that Pure Act. Wherefore Dionysius says intellectual substance are not of the same kind. Whence, (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are “godlike,” that is to Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments say, that by them they are made like to God. that: “The habits of the intellectual substance are not like But those habits that are dispositions to the natural be- the habits here below, but rather are they like simple and ing are not in angels, since they are immaterial. immaterial images which it contains in itself.” Reply to Objection 1. This saying of Maximus must However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect be understood of material habits and accidents. differ with regard to this habit. For the human intellect, Reply to Objection 2. As to that which belongs to being the lowest in the intellectual order, is in potential- angels by their essence, they do not need a habit. But as ity as regards all intelligible things, just as primal matter they are not so far beings of themselves, as not to partake is in respect of all sensible forms; and therefore for the of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore, so far as they understanding of all things, it needs some habit. But the need to partake of something from without, so far do they angelic intellect is not as a pure potentiality in the order need to have habits. of intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act Reply to Objection 3. In angels there are no essential (for this belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of parts: but there are potential parts, in so far as their intel- some potentiality: and the higher it is, the less potential- lect is perfected by several species, and in so far as their ity it has. And therefore, as we said in the Ia, q. 55, a. 1, will has a relation to several things. so far as it is in potentiality, so far is it in need of habit- 826 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 51 Of the Cause of Habits, As to Their Formation (In Four Articles) We must next consider the cause of habits: and firstly, as to their formation; secondly, as to their increase; thirdly, as to their diminution and corruption. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether any habit is from nature? (2) Whether any habit is caused by acts? (3) Whether any habit can be caused by one act? (4) Whether any habits are infused in man by God? Whether any habit is from nature? Ia IIae q. 51 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that no habit is from na- has a certain latitude, it happens that different grades of ture. For the use of those things which are from nature this disposition are becoming to different men in respect does not depend on the will. But habit “is that which we of the individual nature. And this disposition may be ei- use when we will,” as the Commentator says on De Anima ther entirely from nature, or partly from nature, and partly iii. Therefore habit is not from nature. from an extrinsic principle, as we have said of those who Objection 2. Further, nature does not employ two are healed by means of art. where one is sufficient. But the powers of the soul are But the habit which is a disposition to operation, and from nature. If therefore the habits of the powers were whose subject is a power of the soul, as stated above from nature, habit and power would be one. (q. 50, a. 2), may be natural whether in respect of the Objection 3. Further, nature does not fail in neces- specific nature or in respect of the individual nature: in saries. But habits are necessary in order to act well, as we respect of the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself, have stated above (q. 49, a. 4). If therefore any habits were which, since it is the form of the body, is the specific prin- from nature, it seems that nature would not fail to cause ciple; but in respect of the individual nature, on the part all necessary habits: but this is clearly false. Therefore of the body, which is the material principle. Yet in neither habits are not from nature. way does it happen that there are natural habits in man, so On the contrary, In Ethic. vi, 6, among other habits, that they be entirely from nature. In the angels, indeed, place is given to understanding of first principles, which this does happen, since they have intelligible species nat- habit is from nature: wherefore also first principles are urally impressed on them, which cannot be said of the said to be known naturally. human soul, as we have said in the Ia, q. 55, a. 2; Ia, q. 84, I answer that, One thing can be natural to another a. 3. in two ways. First in respect of the specific nature, as There are, therefore, in man certain natural habits, ow- the faculty of laughing is natural to man, and it is natu- ing their existence, partly to nature, and partly to some ex- ral to fire to have an upward tendency. Secondly, in re- trinsic principle: in one way, indeed, in the apprehensive spect of the individual nature, as it is natural to Socrates powers; in another way, in the appetitive powers. For in or Plato to be prone to sickness or inclined to health, in the apprehensive powers there may be a natural habit by accordance with their respective temperaments. Again, in way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific nature, respect of both natures, something may be called natural and in respect of the individual nature. This happens with in two ways: first, because it entirely is from the nature; regard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself: secondly, because it is partly from nature, and partly from thus the understanding of first principles is called a natural an extrinsic principle. For instance, when a man is healed habit. For it is owing to the very nature of the intellectual by himself, his health is entirely from nature; but when a soul that man, having once grasped what is a whole and man is healed by means of medicine, health is partly from what is a part, should at once perceive that every whole nature, partly from an extrinsic principle. is larger than its part: and in like manner with regard to Thus, then, if we speak of habit as a disposition of the other such principles. Yet what is a whole, and what is subject in relation to form or nature, it may be natural in a part—this he cannot know except through the intelligi- either of the foregoing ways. For there is a certain natu- ble species which he has received from phantasms: and ral disposition demanded by the human species, so that no for this reason, the Philosopher at the end of the Posterior man can be without it. And this disposition is natural in Analytics shows that knowledge of principles comes to us respect of the specific nature. But since such a disposition from the senses. 827 But in respect of the individual nature, a habit of naturally to the nature of a power, while it cannot belong knowledge is natural as to its beginning, in so far as one to the power itself. For instance, with regard to the angels, man, from the disposition of his organs of sense, is more it cannot belong to the intellective power itself capable of apt than another to understand well, since we need the knowing all things: for thus it would have to be the act of sensitive powers for the operation of the intellect. all things, which belongs to God alone. Because that by In the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natu- which something is known, must needs be the actual like- ral in its beginning, on the part of the soul itself, as to ness of the thing known: whence it would follow, if the the substance of the habit; but only as to certain principles power of the angel knew all things by itself, that it was the thereof, as, for instance, the principles of common law are likeness and act of all things. Wherefore there must needs called the “nurseries of virtue.” The reason of this is be- be added to the angels’ intellective power, some intelli- cause the inclination to its proper objects, which seems to gible species, which are likenesses of things understood: be the beginning of a habit, does not belong to the habit, for it is by participation of the Divine wisdom and not by but rather to the very nature of the powers. their own essence, that their intellect can be actually those But on the part of the body, in respect of the individual things which they understand. And so it is clear that not nature, there are some appetitive habits by way of natural everything belonging to a natural habit can belong to the beginnings. For some are disposed from their own bodily power. temperament to chastity or meekness or such like. Reply to Objection 3. Nature is not equally inclined Reply to Objection 1. This objection takes nature as to cause all the various kinds of habits: since some can be divided against reason and will; whereas reason itself and caused by nature, and some not, as we have said above. will belong to the nature of man. And so it does not follow that because some habits are Reply to Objection 2. Something may be added even natural, therefore all are natural. Whether any habit is caused by acts? Ia IIae q. 51 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that no habit is caused by passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For acts. For habit is a quality, as we have said above (q. 49, the acts of the appetitive power proceed from that same a. 1). Now every quality is caused in a subject, according power according as it is moved by the apprehensive power to the latter’s receptivity. Since then the agent, inasmuch presenting the object: and further, the intellective power, as it acts, does not receive but rather gives: it seems im- according as it reasons about conclusions, has, as it were, possible for a habit to be caused in an agent by its own an active principle in a self-evident proposition. Where- acts. fore by such acts habits can be caused in their agents; not Objection 2. Further, the thing wherein a quality is indeed with regard to the first active principle, but with re- caused is moved to that quality, as may be clearly seen in gard to that principle of the act, which principle is a mover that which is heated or cooled: whereas that which pro- moved. For everything that is passive and moved by an- duces the act that causes the quality, moves, as may be other, is disposed by the action of the agent; wherefore seen in that which heats or cools. If therefore habits were if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed in the caused in anything by its own act, it would follow that power which is passive and moved, which quality is called the same would be mover and moved, active and passive: a habit: just as the habits of moral virtue are caused in the which is impossible, as stated in Physics iii, 8. appetitive powers, according as they are moved by the rea- Objection 3. Further, the effect cannot be more noble son, and as the habits of science are caused in the intellect, than its cause. But habit is more noble than the act which according as it is moved by first propositions. precedes the habit; as is clear from the fact that the lat- Reply to Objection 1. The agent, as agent, does not ter produces more noble acts. Therefore habit cannot be receive anything. But in so far as it moves through being caused by an act which precedes the habit. moved by another, it receives something from that which On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1,2) moves it: and thus is a habit caused. teaches that habits of virtue and vice are caused by acts. Reply to Objection 2. The same thing, and in the I answer that, In the agent there is sometimes only same respect, cannot be mover and moved; but nothing the active principle of its act: for instance in fire there prevents a thing from being moved by itself as to different is only the active principle of heating. And in such an respects, as is proved in Physics viii, text. 28,29. agent a habit cannot be caused by its own act: for which Reply to Objection 3. The act which precedes the reason natural things cannot become accustomed or unac- habit, in so far as it comes from an active principle, pro- customed, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a certain agent ceeds from a more excellent principle than is the habit is to be found, in which there is both the active and the caused thereby: just as the reason is a more excellent prin- 828 ciple than the habit of moral virtue produced in the appet-first principles is a more excellent principle than the sci- itive power by repeated acts, and as the understanding of ence of conclusions. Whether a habit can be caused by one act? Ia IIae q. 51 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that a habit can be caused is inclined variously, and to many things; while the rea- by one act. For demonstration is an act of reason. But son judges in a single act, what should be willed in regard science, which is the habit of one conclusion, is caused by to various aspects and circumstances. Wherefore the ap- one demonstration. Therefore habit can be caused by one petitive power is not thereby entirely overcome, so as to act. be inclined like nature to the same thing, in the majority Objection 2. Further, as acts happen to increase by of cases; which inclination belongs to the habit of virtue. multiplication so do they happen to increase by intensity. Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act, But a habit is caused by multiplication of acts. There- but only by many. fore also if an act be very intense, it can be the generating But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that cause of a habit. there are two passive principles: one is the “possible”∗ in- Objection 3. Further, health and sickness are habits. tellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle (De But it happens that a man is healed or becomes ill, by one Anima iii, text. 20) calls “passive,” and is the “particu- act. Therefore one act can cause a habit. lar reason,” that is the cogitative power, with memory and On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7): “As imagination. With regard then to the former passive prin- neither does one swallow nor one day make spring: so ciple, it is possible for a certain active principle to entirely neither does one day nor a short time make a man blessed overcome, by one act, the power of its passive principle: and happy.” But “happiness is an operation in respect of thus one self-evident proposition convinces the intellect, a habit of perfect virtue” (Ethic. i, 7,10,13). Therefore a so that it gives a firm assent to the conclusion, but a proba- habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other habits, is ble proposition cannot do this. Wherefore a habit of opin- not caused by one act. ion needs to be caused by many acts of the reason, even I answer that, As we have said already (a. 2), habit on the part of the “possible” intellect: whereas a habit of is caused by act, because a passive power is moved by science can be caused by a single act of the reason, so far an active principle. But in order that some quality be as the “possible” intellect is concerned. But with regard to caused in that which is passive the active principle must the lower apprehensive powers, the same acts need to be entirely overcome the passive. Whence we see that be- repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed cause fire cannot at once overcome the combustible, it on the memory. And so the Philosopher says (De Memor. does not enkindle at once; but it gradually expels con- et Remin. 1) that “meditation strengthens memory.” Bod- trary dispositions, so that by overcoming it entirely, it may ily habits, however, can be caused by one act, if the ac- impress its likeness on it. Now it is clear that the active tive principle is of great power: sometimes, for instance, principle which is reason, cannot entirely overcome the a strong dose of medicine restores health at once. appetitive power in one act: because the appetitive power Hence the solutions to the objections are clear. Whether any habits are infused in man by God? Ia IIae q. 51 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that no habit is infused in “from those acts a like habit is caused” (Ethic. ii, 1,2). man by God. For God treats all equally. If therefore He Consequently there will be two habits of the same species infuses habits into some, He would infuse them into all: in the same man, one acquired, the other infused. Now which is clearly untrue. this seems impossible: for the two forms of the same Objection 2. Further, God works in all things accord- species cannot be in the same subject. Therefore a habit ing to the mode which is suitable to their nature: for “it be- is not infused into man by God. longs to Divine providence to preserve nature,” as Diony- On the contrary, it is written (Ecclus. 15:5): “God sius says (Div. Nom. iv). But habits are naturally caused filled him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding.” in man by acts, as we have said above (a. 2). Therefore Now wisdom and understanding are habits. Therefore God does not cause habits to be in man except by acts. some habits are infused into man by God. Objection 3. Further, if any habit be infused into man I answer that, Some habits are infused by God into by God, man can by that habit perform many acts. But man, for two reasons. ∗ See Ia, q. 79, a. 2 ad 2 829 The first reason is because there are some habits by by a natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the sci-which man is disposed to an end which exceeds the pro- ence of the Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can portion of human nature, namely, the ultimate and perfect acquire by study or by custom, but not so perfectly. happiness of man, as stated above (q. 5, a. 5). And since Reply to Objection 1. God, in respect of His Nature, habits need to be in proportion with that to which man is the same to all, but in respect of the order of His Wis- is disposed by them, therefore is it necessary that those dom, for some fixed motive, gives certain things to some, habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion which He does not give to others. of human nature. Wherefore such habits can never be in Reply to Objection 2. That God works in all accord- man except by Divine infusion, as is the case with all gra- ing to their mode, does not hinder God from doing what tuitous virtues. nature cannot do: but it follows from this that He does The other reason is, because God can produce the ef- nothing contrary to that which is suitable to nature. fects of second causes, without these second causes, as we Reply to Objection 3. Acts produced by an infused have said in the Ia, q. 105, a. 6. Just as, therefore, some- habit, do not cause a habit, but strengthen the already ex- times, in order to show His power, He causes health, with- isting habit; just as the remedies of medicine given to a out its natural cause, but which nature could have caused, man who is naturally health, do not cause a kind of health, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His power, He but give new strength to the health he had before. infuses into man even those habits which can be caused 830 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 52 Of the Increase of Habits (In Three Articles) We have now to consider the increase of habits; under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether habits increase? (2) Whether they increase by addition? (3) Whether each act increases the habit? Whether habits increase? Ia IIae q. 52 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that habits cannot in- cording to its specific nature, and another to consider it in crease. For increase concerns quantity (Phys. v, text. 18). respect of its participation by a subject. But habits are not in the genus quantity, but in that of qual- In this way, then, there were four opinions among ity. Therefore there can be no increase of habits. philosophers concerning intensity and remission of habits Objection 2. Further, habit is a perfection (Phys. vii, and forms, as Simplicius relates in his Commentary on the text. 17,18). But since perfection conveys a notion of end Predicaments. For Plotinus and the other Platonists held and term, it seems that it cannot be more or less. There- that qualities and habits themselves were susceptible of fore a habit cannot increase. more or less, for the reason that they were material and Objection 3. Further, those things which can be more so had a certain want of definiteness, on account of the or less are subject to alteration: for that which from being infinity of matter. Others, on the contrary, held that quali- less hot becomes more hot, is said to be altered. But in ties and habits of themselves were not susceptible of more habits there is no alteration, as is proved in Phys. vii, text. or less; but that the things affected by them [qualia] are 15,17. Therefore habits cannot increase. said to be more or less, in respect of the participation of On the contrary, Faith is a habit, and yet it increases: the subject: that, for instance, justice is not more or less, wherefore the disciples said to our Lord (Lk. 17:5): but the just thing. Aristotle alludes to this opinion in the “Lord, increase our faith.” Therefore habits increase. Predicaments (Categor. vi). The third opinion was that of I answer that, Increase, like other things pertaining to the Stoics, and lies between the two preceding opinions. quantity, is transferred from bodily quantities to intelligi- For they held that some habits are of themselves suscepti- ble spiritual things, on account of the natural connection ble of more and less, for instance, the arts; and that some of the intellect with corporeal things, which come under are not, as the virtues. The fourth opinion was held by the imagination. Now in corporeal quantities, a thing is some who said that qualities and immaterial forms are not said to be great, according as it reaches the perfection of susceptible of more or less, but that material forms are. quantity due to it; wherefore a certain quantity is reputed In order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we great in man, which is not reputed great in an elephant. must observe that, in respect of which a thing receives its And so also in forms, we say a thing is great because it species, must be something fixed and stationary, and as is perfect. And since good has the nature of perfection, it were indivisible: for whatever attains to that thing, is therefore “in things which are great, but not in quantity, to contained under the species, and whatever recedes from be greater is the same as to be better,” as Augustine says it more or less, belongs to another species, more or less (De Trin. vi, 8). perfect. Wherefore, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, Now the perfection of a form may be considered in text. 10) that species of things are like numbers, in which two ways: first, in respect of the form itself: secondly, in addition or subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, respect of the participation of the form by its subject. In a form, or anything at all, receives its specific nature in so far as we consider the perfections of a form in respect respect of itself, or in respect of something belonging to of the form itself, thus the form is said to be “little” or it, it is necessary that, considered in itself, it be something “great”: for instance great or little health or science. But of a definite nature, which can be neither more nor less. in so far as we consider the perfection of a form in re- Such are heat, whiteness or other like qualities which are spect of the participation thereof by the subject, it is said not denominated from a relation to something else: and to be “more” or “less”: for instance more or less white or much more so, substance, which is “per se” being. But healthy. Now this distinction is not to be understood as those things which receive their species from something implying that the form has a being outside its matter or to which they are related, can be diversified, in respect subject, but that it is one thing to consider the form ac- of themselves, according to more or less: and nonethe- 831 less they remain in the same species, on account of the Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form oneness of that to which they are related, and from which is essentially indivisible: wherefore if anything partici- they receive their species. For example, movement is in pate that form, it must needs participate it in respect of itself more intense or more remiss: and yet it remains in its indivisibility. For this reason we do not speak of the the same species, on account of the oneness of the term by species of number as varying in respect of more or less; which it is specified. We may observe the same thing in because each species thereof is constituted by an indivis- health; for a body attains to the nature of health, accord- ible unity. The same is to be said of the species of con- ing as it has a disposition suitable to an animal’s nature, tinuous quantity, which are denominated from numbers, to which various dispositions may be suitable; which dis- as two-cubits-long, three-cubits-long, and of relations of position is therefore variable as regards more or less, and quantity, as double and treble, and of figures of quantity, withal the nature of health remains. Whence the Philoso- as triangle and tetragon. pher says (Ethic. x, 2,3): “Health itself may be more or This same explanation is given by Aristotle in the less: for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it always Predicaments (Categor. vi), where in explaining why fig- the same in one individual; but down to a certain point it ures are not susceptible of more or less, he says: “Things may decrease and still remain health.” which are given the nature of a triangle or a circle, are ac- Now these various dispositions and measures of health cordingly triangles and circles”: to wit, because indivisi- are by way of excess and defect: wherefore if the name of bility is essential to the motion of such, wherefore what- health were given to the most perfect measure, then we ever participates their nature must participate it in its indi- should not speak of health as greater or less. Thus there- visibility. fore it is clear how a quality or form may increase or de- It is clear, therefore, since we speak of habits and dis- crease of itself, and how it cannot. positions in respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, But if we consider a quality or form in respect of its text. 17), that in two ways intensity and remission may participation by the subject, thus again we find that some be observed in habits and dispositions. First, in respect of qualities and forms are susceptible of more or less, and the habit itself: thus, for instance, we speak of greater or some not. Now Simplicius assigns the cause of this di- less health; greater or less science, which extends to more versity to the fact that substance in itself cannot be sus- or fewer things. Secondly, in respect of participation by ceptible of more or less, because it is “per se” being. And the subject: in so far as equal science or health is partici- therefore every form which is participated substantially by pated more in one than in another, according to a diverse its subject, cannot vary in intensity and remission: where- aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For fore in the genus of substance nothing is said to be more habit and disposition do not give species to the subject: or less. And because quantity is nigh to substance, and be- nor again do they essentially imply indivisibility. cause shape follows on quantity, therefore is it that neither We shall say further on (q. 66, a. 1) how it is with the in these can there be such a thing as more or less. Whence virtues. the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 15) that when a thing Reply to Objection 1. As the word “great” is taken receives form and shape, it is not said to be altered, but to from corporeal quantities and applied to the intelligible be made. But other qualities which are further removed perfections of forms; so also is the word “growth,” the from quantity, and are connected with passions and ac- term of which is something great. tions, are susceptible of more or less, in respect of their Reply to Objection 2. Habit is indeed a perfection, participation by the subject. but not a perfection which is the term of its subject; for Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason instance, a term giving the subject its specific being. Nor of this diversity. For, as we have said, that from which again does the nature of a habit include the notion of term, a thing receives its species must remain indivisibly fixed as do the species of numbers. Wherefore there is nothing and constant in something indivisible. Wherefore in two to hinder it from being susceptible of more or less. ways it may happen that a form cannot be participated Reply to Objection 3. Alteration is primarily indeed more or less. First because the participator has its species in the qualities of the third species; but secondarily it may in respect of that form. And for this reason no substantial be in the qualities of the first species: for, supposing an form is participated more or less. Wherefore the Philoso- alteration as to hot and cold, there follows in an animal pher says (Metaph. viii, text. 10) that, “as a number can- an alteration as to health and sickness. In like manner, not be more or less, so neither can that which is in the if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive species of substance,” that is, in respect of its participa- appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension, an al- tion of the specific form: “but in so far as substance may teration follows as to science and virtue (Phys. viii, text. be with matter,” i.e. in respect of material dispositions, 20). “more or less are found in substance.” 832 Whether habits increases by addition? Ia IIae q. 52 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the increase of habits after being cold in one part of his body, is cold in several is by way of addition. For the word “increase,” as we parts), or because some other subject is added sharing in have said, is transferred to forms, from corporeal quanti- the same form (as when a hot thing is added to another, ties. But in corporeal quantities there is no increase with- or one white thing to another). But in either of these two out addition: wherefore (De Gener. i, text. 31) it is said ways we have not a more white or a more hot thing, but a that “increase is an addition to a magnitude already exist- greater white or hot thing. ing.” Therefore in habits also there is no increase without Since, however, as stated above (a. 1), certain acci- addition. dents are of themselves susceptible of more or less, in Objection 2. Further, habit is not increased except by some of these we may find increase by addition. For means of some agent. But every agent does something in movement increases by an addition either to the time it the passive subject: for instance, that which heats, causes lasts, or to the course it follows: and yet the species re- heat in that which is heated. Therefore there is no increase mains the same on account of the oneness of the term. Yet without addition. movement increases the intensity as to participation in its Objection 3. Further, as that which is not white, is subject: i.e. in so far as the same movement can be exe- in potentiality to be white: so that which is less white, is cuted more or less speedily or readily. In like manner, sci- in potentiality to be more white. But that which is not ence can increase in itself by addition; thus when anyone white, is not made white except by the addition of white- learns several conclusions of geometry, the same specific ness. Therefore that which is less white, is not made more habit of science increases in that man. Yet a man’s sci- white, except by an added whiteness. ence increases, as to the subject’s participation thereof, in On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. intensity, in so far as one man is quicker and readier than 84): “That which is hot is made hotter, without making, another in considering the same conclusions. in the matter, something hot, that was not hot, when the As to bodily habits, it does not seem very probable that thing was less hot.” Therefore, in like manner, neither is they receive increase by way of addition. For an animal any addition made in other forms when they increase. is not said to be simply healthy or beautiful, unless it be I answer that, The solution of this question depends such in all its parts. And if it be brought to a more perfect on what we have said above (a. 1). For we said that in- measure, this is the result of a change in the simple quali- crease and decrease in forms which are capable of inten- ties, which are not susceptible of increase save in intensity sity and remissness, happen in one way not on the part of on the part of the subject partaking of them. the very form considered in itself, through the diverse par- How this question affects virtues we shall state further ticipation thereof by the subject. Wherefore such increase on (q. 66, a. 1 ). of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of Reply to Objection 1. Even in bodily bulk increase form to form; but by the subject participating more or less is twofold. First, by addition of one subject to another; perfectly, one and the same form. And just as, by an agent such is the increase of living things. Secondly, by mere which is in act, something is made actually hot, beginning, intensity, without any addition at all; such is the case with as it were, to participate a form, not as though the form it- things subject to rarefaction, as is stated in Phys. iv, text. self were made, as is proved in Metaph. vii, text. 32, so, 63. by an intense action of the agent, something is made more Reply to Objection 2. The cause that increases a hot, as it were participating the form more perfectly, not habit, always effects something in the subject, but not a as though something were added to the form. new form. But it causes the subject to partake more per- For if this increase in forms were understood to be by fectly of a pre-existing form, or it makes the form to ex- way of addition, this could only be either in the form it- tend further. self or in the subject. If it be understood of the form itself, Reply to Objection 3. What is not already white, is it has already been stated (a. 1) that such an addition or potentially white, as not yet possessing the form of white- subtraction would change the species; even as the species ness: hence the agent causes a new form in the subject. of color is changed when a thing from being pale becomes But that which is less hot or white, is not in potentiality to white. If, on the other hand, this addition be understood as those forms, since it has them already actually: but it is in applying to the subject, this could only be either because potentiality to a perfect mode of participation; and this it one part of the subject receives a form which it had not receives through the agent’s action. previously (thus we may say cold increases in a man who, 833 Whether every act increases its habit? Ia IIae q. 52 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that every act increases For it is not only black that is unlike white, but also less its habit. For when the cause is increased the effect is in- white is unlike more white, since there is movement from creased. Now acts are causes of habits, as stated above less white to more white, even as from one opposite to (q. 51, a. 2). Therefore a habit increases when its acts are another, as stated in Phys. v, text. 52. multiplied. But since use of habits depends on the will, as was Objection 2. Further, of like things a like judgment shown above (q. 50, a. 5); just as one who has a habit may should be formed. But all the acts proceeding from one fail to use it or may act contrary to it; so may he happen to and the same habit are alike (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Therefore if use the habit by performing an act that is not in proportion some acts increase a habit, every act should increase it. to the intensity of the habit. Accordingly, if the intensity Objection 3. Further, like is increased by like. But of the act correspond in proportion to the intensity of the any act is like the habit whence it proceeds. Therefore habit, or even surpass it, every such act either increases every act increases the habit. the habit or disposes to an increase thereof, if we may On the contrary, Opposite effects do not result from speak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of the same cause. But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts an animal. For not every morsel of food actually increases lessen the habit whence they proceed, for instance if they the animal’s size as neither does every drop of water hol- be done carelessly. Therefore it is not every act that in- low out the stone: but the multiplication of food results creases a habit. at last in an increase of the body. So, too, repeated acts I answer that, “Like acts cause like habits” (Ethic. ii, cause a habit to grow. If, however, the act falls short of 1,2). Now things are like or unlike not only in respect the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to of their qualities being the same or various, but also in an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof. respect of the same or a different mode of participation. From this it is clear how to solve the objections. 834 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 53 How Habits Are Corrupted or Diminished (In Three Articles) We must now consider how habits are lost or weakened; and under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether a habit can be corrupted? (2) Whether it can be diminished? (3) How are habits corrupted or diminished? Whether a habit can be corrupted? Ia IIae q. 53 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that a habit cannot be cor- an incorruptible subject, cannot be corrupted indirectly. rupted. For habit is within its subject like a second nature; There are, however, some habits which, while residing wherefore it is pleasant to act from habit. Now so long as chiefly in an incorruptible subject, reside nevertheless sec- a thing is, its nature is not corrupted. Therefore neither ondarily in a corruptible subject; such is the habit of sci- can a habit be corrupted so long as its subject remains. ence which is chiefly indeed in the “possible” intellect, Objection 2. Further, whenever a form is corrupted, but secondarily in the sensitive powers of apprehension, this is due either to corruption of its subject, or to its con- as stated above (q. 50, a. 3, ad 3). Consequently the habit trary: thus sickness ceases through corruption of the ani- of science cannot be corrupted indirectly, on the part of mal, or through the advent of health. Now science, which the “possible” intellect, but only on the part of the lower is a habit, cannot be lost through corruption of its subject: sensitive powers. since “the intellect,” which is its subject, “is a substance We must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind that is incorruptible” (De Anima i, text. 65). In like man- can be corrupted directly. If then there be a habit having ner, neither can it be lost through the action of its contrary: a contrary, either on the part of itself or on the part of its since intelligible species are not contrary to one another cause, it can be corrupted directly: but if it has no con- (Metaph. vii, text. 52). Therefore the habit of science can trary, it cannot be corrupted directly. Now it is evident nowise be lost. that an intelligible species residing in the “possible” intel- Objection 3. Further, all corruption results from some lect, has no contrary; nor can the active intellect, which movement. But the habit of science, which is in the soul, is the cause of that species, have a contrary. Wherefore if cannot be corrupted by a direct movement of the soul it- in the “possible” intellect there be a habit caused immedi- self, since the soul is not moved directly. It is, however, ately by the active intellect, such a habit is incorruptible moved indirectly through the movement of the body: and both directly and indirectly. Such are the habits of the first yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the in- principles, both speculative and practical, which cannot telligible species residing in the intellect: since the intel- be corrupted by any forgetfulness or deception whatever: lect independently of the body is the proper abode of the even as the Philosopher says about prudence (Ethic. vi, species; for which reason it is held that habits are not lost 5) that “it cannot be lost by being forgotten.” There is, either through old age or through death. Therefore sci- however, in the “possible” intellect a habit caused by the ence cannot be corrupted. For the same reason neither reason, to wit, the habit of conclusions, which is called can habits of virtue be corrupted, since they also are in the science, to the cause of which something may be contrary rational soul, and, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, in two ways. First, on the part of those very propositions 10), “virtue is more lasting than learning.” which are the starting point of the reason: for the assertion On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et “Good is not good” is contrary to the assertion “Good is Brev. Vitae ii) that “forgetfulness and deception are the good” (Peri Herm. ii). Secondly, on the part of the pro- corruption of science.” Moreover, by sinning a man loses cess of reasoning; forasmuch as a sophistical syllogism is a habit of virtue: and again, virtues are engendered and contrary to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. Where- corrupted by contrary acts (Ethic. ii, 2). fore it is clear that a false reason can corrupt the habit of I answer that, A form is said to be corrupted directly a true opinion or even of science. Hence the Philosopher, by its contrary; indirectly, through its subject being cor- as stated above, says that “deception is the corruption of rupted. When therefore a habit has a corruptible subject, science.” As to virtues, some of them are intellectual, re- and a cause that has a contrary, it can be corrupted both siding in reason itself, as stated in Ethic. vi, 1: and to ways. This is clearly the case with bodily habits—for in- these applies what we have said of science and opinion. stance, health and sickness. But those habits that have Some, however, viz. the moral virtues, are in the appet- 835 itive part of the soul; and the same may be said of the tions and to the process of reason, as stated above. contrary vices. Now the habits of the appetitive part are Reply to Objection 3. Science is not taken away by caused therein because it is natural to it to be moved by movement of the body, if we consider the root itself of the the reason. Therefore a habit either of virtue or of vice, habit, but only as it may prove an obstacle to the act of may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its science; in so far as the intellect, in its act, has need of the motion is contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through sensitive powers, which are impeded by corporal transmu- ignorance, passion or deliberate choice. tation. But the intellectual movement of the reason can Reply to Objection 1. As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root a habit is like a second nature, and yet it falls short of of the habit. In like manner a habit of virtue can be cor- it. And so it is that while the nature of a thing cannot in rupted. Nevertheless when it is said that “virtue is more any way be taken away from a thing, a habit is removed, lasting than learning,” this must be understood in respect, though with difficulty. not of the subject or cause, but of the act: because the use Reply to Objection 2. Although there is no contrary of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas the to intelligible species, yet there can be a contrary to asser- use of learning does not. Whether a habit can diminish? Ia IIae q. 53 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that a habit cannot dimin- participates in it. This is due to the fact that the subject’s ish. Because a habit is a simple quality and form. Now potentiality is indeterminate, through its being able to par- a simple thing is possessed either wholly or not at all. ticipate a form in various ways, or to extend to a greater Therefore although a habit can be lost it cannot diminish. or a smaller number of things. Objection 2. Further, if a thing is befitting an acci- Reply to Objection 2. This argument would hold, if dent, this is by reason either of the accident or of its sub- the essence itself of a habit were nowise subject to de- ject. Now a habit does not become more or less intense by crease. This we do not say; but that a certain decrease in reason of itself; else it would follow that a species might the essence of a habit has its origin, not in the habit, but in be predicated of its individuals more or less. And if it can its subject. become less intense as to its participation by its subject, Reply to Objection 3. No matter how we take an ac- it would follow that something is accidental to a habit, cident, its very notion implies dependence on a subject, proper thereto and not common to the habit and its sub- but in different ways. For if we take an accident in the ject. Now whenever a form has something proper to it abstract, it implies relation to a subject, which relation besides its subject, that form can be separate, as stated in begins in the accident and terminates in the subject: for De Anima i, text. 13. Hence it follows that a habit is a “whiteness is that whereby a thing is white.” Accordingly separable form; which is impossible. in defining an accident in the abstract, we do not put the Objection 3. Further, the very notion and nature of a subject as though it were the first part of the definition, habit as of any accident, is inherence in a subject: where- viz. the genus; but we give it the second place, which fore any accident is defined with reference to its subject. is that of the difference; thus we say that “simitas” is “a Therefore if a habit does not become more or less intense curvature of the nose.” But if we take accidents in the con- in itself, neither can it in its inherence in its subject: and crete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates in consequently it will be nowise less intense. the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and termi- On the contrary, It is natural for contraries to be ap- nates at the accident: for “a white thing” is “something plicable to the same thing. Now increase and decrease are that has whiteness.” Accordingly in defining this kind contraries. Since therefore a habit can increase, it seems of accident, we place the subject as the genus, which is that it can also diminish. the first part of a definition; for we say that a “simum” is I answer that, Habits diminish, just as they increase, a “snub-nose.” Accordingly whatever is befitting an ac- in two ways, as we have already explained (q. 52, a. 1). cident on the part of the subject, but is not of the very And since they increase through the same cause as that essence of the accident, is ascribed to that accident, not in which engenders them, so too they diminish by the same the abstract, but in the concrete. Such are increase and de- cause as that which corrupts them: since the diminishing crease in certain accidents: wherefore to be more or less of a habit is the road which leads to its corruption, even white is not ascribed to whiteness but to a white thing. as, on the other hand, the engendering of a habit is a foun- The same applies to habits and other qualities; save that dation of its increase. certain habits and other qualities; save that certain habits Reply to Objection 1. A habit, considered in itself, is increase or diminish by a kind of addition, as we have al- a simple form. It is not thus that it is subject to decrease; ready clearly explained (q. 52, a. 2). but according to the different ways in which its subject 836 Whether a habit is corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act? Ia IIae q. 53 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that a habit is not cor- habits that are gradually undermined by contrary agencies rupted or diminished through mere cessation from act. which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from For habits are more lasting than passion-like qualities, as those habits, are diminished or even destroyed altogether we have explained above (q. 49, a. 2, ad 3; q. 50, a. 1). by long cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case But passion-like qualities are neither corrupted nor dimin- both of science and of virtue. For it is evident that a habit ished by cessation from act: for whiteness is not lessened of moral virtue makes a man ready to choose the mean in through not affecting the sight, nor heat through ceasing deeds and passions. And when a man fails to make use to make something hot. Therefore neither are habits di- of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own pas- minished or corrupted through cessation from act. sions or deeds, the necessary result is that many passions Objection 2. Further, corruption and diminution are and deeds fail to observe the mode of virtue, by reason of changes. Now nothing is changed without a moving the inclination of the sensitive appetite and of other exter- cause. Since therefore cessation from act does not im- nal agencies. Wherefore virtue is destroyed or lessened ply a moving cause, it does not appear how a habit can be through cessation from act. The same applies to the intel- diminished or corrupted through cessation from act. lectual habits, which render man ready to judge aright of Objection 3. Further, the habits of science and virtue those things that are pictured by his imagination. Hence are in the intellectual soul which is above time. Now those when man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, things that are above time are neither destroyed nor di- strange fancies, sometimes in opposition to them, arise minished by length of time. Neither, therefore, are such in his imagination; so that unless those fancies be, as it habits destroyed or diminished through length of time, if were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his intel- one fails for long to exercise them. lectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary, and Brev. Vitae ii) that not only “deception,” but also “forget- thus the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly fulness, is the corruption of science.” Moreover he says destroyed by cessation from act. (Ethic. viii, 5) that “want of intercourse has dissolved Reply to Objection 1. Even heat would be destroyed many a friendship.” In like manner other habits of virtue through ceasing to give heat, if, for this same reason, cold are diminished or destroyed through cessation from act. which is destructive of heat were to increase. I answer that, As stated in Phys. vii, text. 27, a Reply to Objection 2. Cessation from act is a moving thing is a cause of movement in two ways. First, directly; cause, conducive of corruption or diminution, by remov- and such a thing causes movement by reason of its proper ing the obstacles, thereto, as explained above. form; thus fire causes heat. Secondly, indirectly; for in- Reply to Objection 3. The intellectual part of the stance, that which removes an obstacle. It is in this lat- soul, considered in itself, is above time, but the sensitive ter way that the destruction or diminution of a habit re- part is subject to time, and therefore in course of time it sults through cessation from act, in so far, to wit, as we undergoes change as to the passions of the sensitive part, cease from exercising an act which overcame the causes and also as to the powers of apprehension. Hence the that destroyed or weakened that habit. For it has been Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes stated (a. 1) that habits are destroyed or diminished di- us forget. rectly through some contrary agency. Consequently all 837 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 54 Of the Distinction of Habits (In Four Articles) We have now to consider the distinction of habits; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether many habits can be in one power? (2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects? (3) Whether habits are divided into good and bad? (4) Whether one habit may be made up of many habits? Whether many habits can be in one power? Ia IIae q. 54 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be many reason for this is that the subject of a habit is a passive habits in one power. For when several things are distin- power, as stated above (q. 51, a. 2): for it is only an active guished in respect of the same thing, if one of them be power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was clearly multiplied, the others are too. Now habits and powers are shown above (q. 51, a. 2). Now a passive power is com- distinguished in respect of the same thing, viz. their acts pared to the determinate act of any species, as matter to and objects. Therefore they are multiplied in like manner. form: because, just as matter is determinate to one form Therefore there cannot be many habits in one power. by one agent, so, too, is a passive power determined by Objection 2. Further, a power is a simple force. Now the nature of one active object to an act specifically one. in one simple subject there cannot be diversity of acci- Wherefore, just as several objects can move one passive dents; for the subject is the cause of its accidents; and it power, so can one passive power be the subject of several does not appear how diverse effects can proceed from one acts or perfections specifically diverse. Now habits are simple cause. Therefore there cannot be many habits in qualities or forms adhering to a power, and inclining that one power. power to acts of a determinate species. Consequently sev- Objection 3. Further, just as the body is informed by eral habits, even as several specifically different acts, can its shape, so is a power informed by a habit. But one body belong to one power. cannot be informed at the same time by various shapes. Reply to Objection 1. Even as in natural things, di- Therefore neither can a power be informed at the same versity of species is according to the form, and diversity time by many habits. Therefore several habits cannot be of genus, according to matter, as stated in Metaph. v, at the same time in one power. text. 33 (since things that differ in matter belong to dif- On the contrary, The intellect is one power; wherein, ferent genera): so, too, generic diversity of objects entails nevertheless, are the habits of various sciences. a difference of powers (wherefore the Philosopher says in I answer that, As stated above (q. 49, a. 4), habits are Ethic. vi, 1, that “those objects that differ generically be-dispositions of a thing that is in potentiality to something, long to different departments of the soul”); while specific either to nature, or to operation, which is the end of na- difference of objects entails a specific difference of acts, ture. As to those habits which are dispositions to nature, and consequently of habits also. Now things that differ in it is clear that several can be in one same subject: since in genus differ in species, but not vice versa. Wherefore the one subject we may take parts in various ways, according acts and habits of different powers differ in species: but it to the various dispositions of which parts there are var- does not follow that different habits are in different pow- ious habits. Thus, if we take the humors as being parts ers, for several can be in one power. And even as several of the human body, according to their disposition in re- genera may be included in one genus, and several species spect of human nature, we have the habit or disposition of be contained in one species; so does it happen that there health: while, if we take like parts, such as nerves, bones, are several species of habits and powers. and flesh, the disposition of these in respect of nature is Reply to Objection 2. Although a power is simple as strength or weakness; whereas, if we take the limbs, i.e. to its essence, it is multiple virtually, inasmuch as it ex- the hands, feet, and so on, the disposition of these in pro- tends to many specifically different acts. Consequently portion to nature, is beauty: and thus there are several there is nothing to prevent many superficially different habits or dispositions in the same subject. habits from being in one power. If, however, we speak of those habits that are dispo- Reply to Objection 3. A body is informed by its sitions to operation, and belong properly to the powers; shape as by its own terminal boundaries: whereas a habit thus, again, there may be several habits in one power. The is not the terminal boundary of a power, but the disposi- 838 tion of a power to an act as to its ultimate term. Conse-three-sided in a four-sided figure. For the intellect cannot quently one same power cannot have several acts at the understand several things at the same time “actually”; and same time, except in so far as perchance one act is com- yet it can know several things at the same time “habitu- prised in another; just as neither can a body have several ally.” shapes, save in so far as one shape enters into another, as a Whether habits are distinguished by their objects? Ia IIae q. 54 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that habits are not distin- nature and to an operation consequent to nature. guished by their objects. For contraries differ in species. Accordingly habits are specifically distinct in respect Now the same habit of science regards contraries: thus of three things. First, in respect of the active principles of medicine regards the healthy and the unhealthy. There- such dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, fore habits are not distinguished by objects specifically in respect of specifically different objects, as will appear distinct. from what follows. Objection 2. Further, different sciences are different Reply to Objection 1. In distinguishing powers, or habits. But the same scientific truth belongs to different also habits, we must consider the object not in its mate- sciences: thus both the physicist and the astronomer prove rial but in its formal aspect, which may differ in species the earth to be round, as stated in Phys. ii, text. 17. There- or even in genus. And though the distinction between fore habits are not distinguished by their objects. specific contraries is a real distinction yet they are both Objection 3. Further, wherever the act is the same, the known under one aspect, since one is known through the object is the same. But the same act can belong to differ- other. And consequently in so far as they concur in the ent habits of virtue, if it be directed to different ends; thus one aspect of cognoscibility, they belong to one cognitive to give money to anyone, if it be done for God’s sake, is habit. an act of charity; while, if it be done in order to pay a debt, Reply to Objection 2. The physicist proves the earth it is an act of justice. Therefore the same object can also to be round by one means, the astronomer by another: for belong to different habits. Therefore diversity of habits the latter proves this by means of mathematics, e.g. by the does not follow diversity of objects. shapes of eclipses, or something of the sort; while the for- On the contrary, Acts differ in species according to mer proves it by means of physics, e.g. by the movement the diversity of their objects, as stated above (q. 18, a. 5). of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth. Now But habits are dispositions to acts. Therefore habits also the whole force of a demonstration, which is “a syllogism are distinguished according to the diversity of objects. producing science,” as stated in Poster. i, text. 5, depends I answer that, A habit is both a form and a habit. on the mean. And consequently various means are as so Hence the specific distinction of habits may be taken in many active principles, in respect of which the habits of the ordinary way in which forms differ specifically; or science are distinguished. according to that mode of distinction which is proper to Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (Phys. habits. Accordingly forms are distinguished from one an- ii, text. 89; Ethic. vii, 8), the end is, in practical mat- other in reference to the diversity of their active princi- ters, what the principle is in speculative matters. Conse- ples, since every agent produces its like in species. Habits, quently diversity of ends demands a diversity of virtues, however, imply order to something: and all things that im- even as diversity of active principles does. Moreover the ply order to something, are distinguished according to the ends are objects of the internal acts, with which, above distinction of the things to which they are ordained. Now all, the virtues are concerned, as is evident from what has a habit is a disposition implying a twofold order: viz. to been said (q. 18, a. 6; q. 19, a. 2, ad 1; q. 34, a. 4). Whether habits are divided into good and bad? Ia IIae q. 54 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that habits are not divided a specific difference, as the Philosopher declares (Topic. into good and bad. For good and bad are contraries. Now iv). Again, evil, since it is a privation and a non-being, the same habit regards contraries, as was stated above cannot differentiate any being. Therefore habits cannot (a. 2, obj. 1). Therefore habits are not divided into good be specifically divided into good and evil. and bad. Objection 3. Further, there can be different evil habits Objection 2. Further, good is convertible with being; about one same object; for instance, intemperance and in- so that, since it is common to all, it cannot be accounted sensibility about matters of concupiscence: and in like 839 manner there can be several good habits; for instance, hu-tinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which disposes to an man virtue and heroic or godlike virtue, as the Philoso- act befitting some higher nature. pher clearly states (Ethic. vii, 1). Therefore, habits are Reply to Objection 1. The same habit may be about not divided into good and bad. contraries in so far as contraries agree in one common as- On the contrary, A good habit is contrary to a bad pect. Never, however, does it happen that contrary habits habit, as virtue to vice. Now contraries are divided specif- are in one species: since contrariety of habits follows con- ically into good and bad habits. trariety of aspect. Accordingly habits are divided into I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), habits are good and bad, namely, inasmuch as one habit is good, and specifically distinct not only in respect of their objects and another bad; but not by reason of one habit being some- active principles, but also in their relation to nature. Now, thing good, and another about something bad. this happens in two ways. First, by reason of their suit- Reply to Objection 2. It is not the good which is com- ableness or unsuitableness to nature. In this way a good mon to every being, that is a difference constituting the habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit: since a good species of a habit; but some determinate good by reason habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent’s of suitability to some determinate, viz. the human, na- nature, while an evil habit is one which disposes to an act ture. In like manner the evil that constitutes a difference unsuitable to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to of habits is not a pure privation, but something determi- human nature, since they are according to reason, whereas nate repugnant to a determinate nature. acts of vice are discordant from human nature, since they Reply to Objection 3. Several good habits about one are against reason. Hence it is clear that habits are distin- same specific thing are distinct in reference to their suit- guished specifically by the difference of good and bad. ability to various natures, as stated above. But several bad Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation to na- habits in respect of one action are distinct in reference to ture, from the fact that one habit disposes to an act that is their diverse repugnance to that which is in keeping with suitable to a lower nature, while another habit disposes to nature: thus, various vices about one same matter are con- an act befitting a higher nature. And thus human virtue, trary to one virtue. which disposes to an act befitting human nature, is dis- Whether one habit is made up of many habits? Ia IIae q. 54 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that one habit is made up are related to one, for instance, to some specific objective of many habits. For whatever is engendered, not at once, aspect, or to one nature, or to one principle, as was clearly but little by little, seems to be made up of several parts. stated above (Aa. 2,3). But a habit is engendered, not at once, but little by little If then we consider a habit as to the extent of its object, out of several acts, as stated above (q. 51, a. 3). Therefore we shall find a certain multiplicity therein. But since this one habit is made up of several. multiplicity is directed to one thing, on which the habit is Objection 2. Further, a whole is made up of its parts. chiefly intent, hence it is that a habit is a simple quality, Now many parts are assigned to one habit: thus Tully not composed to several habits, even though it extend to assigns many parts of fortitude, temperance, and other many things. For a habit does not extend to many things virtues. Therefore one habit is made up of many. save in relation to one, whence it derives its unity. Objection 3. Further, one conclusion suffices both for Reply to Objection 1. That a habit is engendered lit- an act and for a habit of scientific knowledge. But many tle by little, is due, not to one part being engendered after conclusions belong to but one science, to geometry, for another, but to the fact that the subject does not acquire all instance, or to arithmetic. Therefore one habit is made up at once a firm and difficultly changeable disposition; and of many. also to the fact that it begins by being imperfectly in the On the contrary, A habit, since it is a quality, is a subject, and is gradually perfected. The same applies to simple form. But nothing simple is made up of many. other qualities. Therefore one habit is not made up of many. Reply to Objection 2. The parts which are assigned I answer that, A habit directed to operation, such as to each cardinal virtue, are not integral parts that combine we are chiefly concerned with at present, is a perfection to form a whole; but subjective or potential parts, as we of a power. Now every perfection should be in proportion shall explain further on (q. 57, a. 6, ad 4; IIa IIae, q. 48). with that which it perfects. Hence, just as a power, while Reply to Objection 3. In any science, he who ac- it is one, extends to many things, in so far as they have quires, by demonstration, scientific knowledge of one something in common, i.e. some general objective aspect, conclusion, has the habit indeed, yet imperfectly. And so also a habit extends to many things, in so far as they when he obtains, by demonstration, the scientific knowl- 840 edge of another conclusion, no additional habit is engen-cause the conclusions and demonstrations of one science dered in him: but the habit which was in him previously are coordinate, and one flows from another. is perfected, forasmuch as it has increased in extent; be- 841 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 55 Of the Virtues, As to Their Essence (In Four Articles) We come now to the consideration of habits specifically. And since habits, as we have said (q. 54, a. 3), are divided into good and bad, we must speak in the first place of good habits, which are virtues, and of other matters connected with them, namely the Gifts, Beatitudes and Fruits; in the second place, of bad habits, namely of vices and sins. Now five things must be considered about virtues: (1) the essence of virtue; (2) its subject; (3) the division of virtue; (4) the cause of virtue; (5) certain properties of virtue. Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether human virtue is a habit? (2) Whether it is an operative habit? (3) Whether it is a good habit? (4) Of the definition of virtue. Whether human virtue is a habit? Ia IIae q. 55 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that human virtue is not a determinate to their acts; for instance, the active natural habit: For virtue is “the limit of power” (De Coelo i, text. powers. And therefore these natural powers are in them- 116). But the limit of anything is reducible to the genus of selves called virtues. But the rational powers, which are that of which it is the limit; as a point is reducible to the proper to man, are not determinate to one particular ac- genus of line. Therefore virtue is reducible to the genus tion, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are of power, and not to the genus of habit. determinate to acts by means of habits, as is clear from Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. what we have said above (q. 49, a. 4 ). Therefore human ii)∗ that “virtue is good use of free-will.” But use of free- virtues are habits. will is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an act. Reply to Objection 1. Sometimes we give the name Objection 3. Further, we do not merit by our habits, of a virtue to that to which the virtue is directed, namely, but by our actions: otherwise a man would merit contin- either to its object, or to its act: for instance, we give the ually, even while asleep. But we do merit by our virtues. name Faith, to that which we believe, or to the act of be- Therefore virtues are not habits, but acts. lieving, as also to the habit by which we believe. When Objection 4. Further, Augustine says (De Moribus therefore we say that “virtue is the limit of power,” virtue Eccl. xv) that “virtue is the order of love,” and (QQ. is taken for the object of virtue. For the furthest point to lxxxiii, qu. 30) that “the ordering which is called virtue which a power can reach, is said to be its virtue; for in- consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy, and using stance, if a man can carry a hundredweight and not more, what we ought to use.” Now order, or ordering, denomi- his virtue† is put at a hundredweight, and not at sixty. But nates either an action or a relation. Therefore virtue is not the objection takes virtue as being essentially the limit of a habit, but an action or a relation. power. Objection 5. Further, just as there are human virtues, Reply to Objection 2. Good use of free-will is said so are there natural virtues. But natural virtues are not to be a virtue, in the same sense as above (ad 1); that is to habits, but powers. Neither therefore are human virtues say, because it is that to which virtue is directed as to its habits. proper act. For the act of virtue is nothing else than the On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Categor. vi) good use of free-will. that science and virtue are habits. Reply to Objection 3. We are said to merit by some- I answer that, Virtue denotes a certain perfection of thing in two ways. First, as by merit itself, just as we are a power. Now a thing’s perfection is considered chiefly in said to run by running; and thus we merit by acts. Sec- regard to its end. But the end of power is act. Wherefore ondly, we are said to merit by something as by the princi- power is said to be perfect, according as it is determinate ple whereby we merit, as we are said to run by the motive to its act. power; and thus are we said to merit by virtues and habits. Now there are some powers which of themselves are Reply to Objection 4. When we say that virtue is the ∗ Retract. ix; cf. De Lib. Arb. ii, 19 † In English we should say ‘strength,’ which is the original signification of the Latin ‘virtus’: thus we speak of an engine being so many horse-power, to indicate its ‘strength’ 842 order or ordering of love, we refer to the end to which Reply to Objection 5. Natural powers are of them-virtue is ordered: because in us love is set in order by selves determinate to one act: not so the rational powers. virtue. And so there is no comparison, as we have said. Whether human virtue is an operative habit? Ia IIae q. 55 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not essential Now man is so constituted that the body holds the to human virtue to be an operative habit. For Tully says place of matter, the soul that of form. The body, indeed, (Tuscul. iv) that as health and beauty belong to the body, man has in common with other animals; and the same is so virtue belongs to the soul. But health and beauty are to be said of the forces which are common to the soul and not operative habits. Therefore neither is virtue. body: and only those forces which are proper to the soul, Objection 2. Further, in natural things we find virtue namely, the rational forces, belong to man alone. And not only in reference to act, but also in reference to being: therefore, human virtue, of which we are speaking now, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Coelo i), since some cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to that which have a virtue to be always, while some have a virtue to is proper to the soul. Wherefore human virtue does not be not always, but at some definite time. Now as natural imply reference to being, but rather to act. Consequently virtue is in natural things, so is human virtue in rational it is essential to human virtue to be an operative habit. beings. Therefore also human virtue is referred not only Reply to Objection 1. Mode of action follows on the to act, but also to being. disposition of the agent: for such as a thing is, such is its Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, act. And therefore, since virtue is the principle of some text. 17) that virtue “is the disposition of a perfect thing kind of operation, there must needs pre-exist in the oper- to that which is best.” Now the best thing to which man ator in respect of virtue some corresponding disposition. needs to be disposed by virtue is God Himself, as Au- Now virtue causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue gustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. 3,6, 14) to Whom the itself is an ordered disposition of the soul, in so far as, to soul is disposed by being made like to Him. Therefore it wit, the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to seems that virtue is a quality of the soul in reference to one another, and to that which is outside. Hence virtue, God, likening it, as it were, to Him; and not in reference inasmuch as it is a suitable disposition of the soul, is like to operation. It is not, therefore, an operative habit. health and beauty, which are suitable dispositions of the On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) says body. But this does not hinder virtue from being a princi- that “virtue of a thing is that which makes its work good.” ple of operation. I answer that, Virtue, from the very nature of the Reply to Objection 2. Virtue which is referred to be- word, implies some perfection of power, as we have said ing is not proper to man; but only that virtue which is above (a. 1). Wherefore, since power∗ is of two kinds, referred to works of reason, which are proper to man. namely, power in reference to being, and power in refer- Reply to Objection 3. As God’s substance is His act, ence to act; the perfection of each of these is called virtue. the highest likeness of man to God is in respect of some But power in reference to being is on the part of matter, operation. Wherefore, as we have said above (q. 3, a. 2), which is potential being, whereas power in reference to happiness or bliss by which man is made most perfectly act, is on the part of the form, which is the principle of conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, action, since everything acts in so far as it is in act. consists in an operation. Whether human virtue is a good habit? Ia IIae q. 55 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not essential to wine, and stout men at drunkenness.” Therefore virtue virtue that it should be a good habit. For sin is always also is referred to good and evil. taken in a bad sense. But there is a virtue even of sin; ac- Objection 3. Further, according to the Apostle (2 Cor. cording to 1 Cor. 15:56: “The virtue [Douay: ‘strength’] 12:9): “Virtue [Douay: ‘power’] is made perfect in infir- of sin is the Law.” Therefore virtue is not always a good mity.” But infirmity is an evil. Therefore virtue is referred habit. not only to good, but also to evil. Objection 2. Further, Virtue corresponds to power. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. But power is not only referred to good, but also to evil: vi): “No one can doubt that virtue makes the soul exceed- according to Is. 5: “Woe to you that are mighty to drink ing good”: and the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): “Virtue ∗ The one Latin word ‘potentia’ is rendered ‘potentiality’ in the first case, and ‘power’ in the second 843 is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good to attain to the limit of its possibility. likewise.” Reply to Objection 2. The evil of drunkenness and I answer that, As we have said above (a. 1), virtue excessive drink, consists in a falling away from the or- implies a perfection of power: wherefore the virtue of a der of reason. Now it happens that, together with this thing is fixed by the limit of its power (De Coelo i). Now falling away from reason, some lower power is perfect the limit of any power must needs be good: for all evil im- in reference to that which belongs to its own kind, even plies defect; wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Hom. ii) that in direct opposition to reason, or with some falling away every evil is a weakness. And for this reason the virtue of therefrom. But the perfection of that power, since it is a thing must be regarded in reference to good. Therefore compatible with a falling away from reason, cannot be human virtue which is an operative habit, is a good habit, called a human virtue. productive of good works. Reply to Objection 3. Reason is shown to be so much Reply to Objection 1. Just as bad things are said the more perfect, according as it is able to overcome or metaphorically to be perfect, so are they said to be good: endure more easily the weakness of the body and of the for we speak of a perfect thief or robber; and of a good lower powers. And therefore human virtue, which is at- thief or robber, as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. v, tributed to reason, is said to be “made perfect in infirmity,” text. 21). In this way therefore virtue is applied to evil not of the reason indeed, but of the body and of the lower things: so that the “virtue” of sin is said to be law, in so powers. far as occasionally sin is aggravated through the law, so as Whether virtue is suitably defined? Ia IIae q. 55 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the definition, usu- things than these,” says∗: “He who created thee without ally given, of virtue, is not suitable, to wit: “Virtue is a thee, will not justify thee without thee.” It is therefore un- good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of suitable to say that “God works virtue in us, without us.” which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, On the contrary, We have the authority of Augustine without us.” For virtue is man’s goodness, since virtue it is from whose words this definition is gathered, and princi- that makes its subject good. But goodness does not seem pally in De Libero Arbitrio ii, 19. to be good, as neither is whiteness white. It is therefore I answer that, This definition comprises perfectly the unsuitable to describe virtue as a “good quality.” whole essential notion of virtue. For the perfect essential Objection 2. Further, no difference is more common notion of anything is gathered from all its causes. Now than its genus; since it is that which divides the genus. But the above definition comprises all the causes of virtue. good is more common than quality, since it is convertible For the formal cause of virtue, as of everything, is gath- with being. Therefore “good” should not be put in the ered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as definition of virtue, as a difference of quality. “a good quality”: for “quality” is the genus of virtue, and Objection 3. Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, the difference, “good.” But the definition would be more 3): “When we come across anything that is not common suitable if for “quality” we substitute “habit,” which is the to us and the beasts of the field, it is something appertain- proximate genus. ing to the mind.” But there are virtues even of the irra- Now virtue has no matter “out of which” it is formed, tional parts; as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10). Every as neither has any other accident; but it has matter “about virtue, therefore, is not a good quality “of the mind.” which” it is concerned, and matter “in which” it exits, Objection 4. Further, righteousness seems to belong namely, the subject. The matter about which virtue is con- to justice; whence the righteous are called just. But jus- cerned is its object, and this could not be included in the tice is a species of virtue. It is therefore unsuitable to put above definition, because the object fixes the virtue to a “righteous” in the definition of virtue, when we say that certain species, and here we are giving the definition of virtue is that “by which we live righteously.” virtue in general. And so for material cause we have the Objection 5. Further, whoever is proud of a thing, subject, which is mentioned when we say that virtue is a makes bad use of it. But many are proud of virtue, for Au- good quality “of the mind.” gustine says in his Rule, that “pride lies in wait for good The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is works in order to slay them.” It is untrue, therefore, “that operation. But it must be observed that some operative no one can make bad use of virtue.” habits are always referred to evil, as vicious habits: oth- Objection 6. Further, man is justified by virtue. But ers are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to evil; Augustine commenting on Jn. 15:11: “He shall do greater for instance, opinion is referred both to the true and to ∗ Tract. xxvii in Joan.: Serm. xv de Verb. Ap. 11 844 the untrue: whereas virtue is a habit which is always re-Reply to Objection 2. Good, which is put in the defi- ferred to good: and so the distinction of virtue from those nition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible habits which are always referred to evil, is expressed in with being, and which extends further than quality, but the the words “by which we live righteously”: and its distinc- good as fixed by reason, with regard to which Dionysius tion from those habits which are sometimes directed unto says (Div. Nom. iv) “that the good of the soul is to be in good, sometimes unto evil, in the words, “of which no one accord with reason.” makes bad use.” Reply to Objection 3. Virtue cannot be in the irra- Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to tional part of the soul, except in so far as this participates which this definition applies; and this is expressed in the in the reason (Ethic. i, 13). And therefore reason, or the words “which God works in us without us.” If we omit mind, is the proper subject of virtue. this phrase, the remainder of the definition will apply to Reply to Objection 4. Justice has a righteousness of all virtues in general, whether acquired or infused. its own by which it puts those outward things right which Reply to Objection 1. That which is first seized by come into human use, and are the proper matter of justice, the intellect is being: wherefore everything that we appre- as we shall show further on (q. 60, a. 2; IIa IIae, q. 58, hend we consider as being, and consequently as gone, and a. 8). But the righteousness which denotes order to a due as good, which are convertible with being. Wherefore we end and to the Divine law, which is the rule of the human say that essence is being and is one and is good; and that will, as stated above (q. 19, a. 4), is common to all virtues. oneness is being and one and good: and in like manner Reply to Objection 5. One can make bad use of a goodness. But this is not the case with specific forms, as virtue objectively, for instance by having evil thoughts whiteness and health; for everything that we apprehend, about a virtue, e.g. by hating it, or by being proud of is not apprehended with the notion of white and healthy. it: but one cannot make bad use of virtue as principle of We must, however, observe that, as accidents and non- action, so that an act of virtue be evil. subsistent forms are called beings, not as if they them- Reply to Objection 6. Infused virtue is caused in us selves had being, but because things are by them; so also by God without any action on our part, but not without are they called good or one, not by some distinct goodness our consent. This is the sense of the words, “which God or oneness, but because by them something is good or one. works in us without us.” As to those things which are done So also is virtue called good, because by it something is by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action on good. our part, for He works in every will and in every nature. 845 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 56 Of the Subject of Virtue (In Six Articles) We now have to consider the subject of virtue, about which there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul? (2) Whether one virtue can be in several powers? (3) Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue? (4) Whether the irascible and concupiscible faculties can be the subject of virtue? (5) Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension can be the subject of virtue? (6) Whether the will can be the subject of virtue? Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul? Ia IIae q. 56 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the subject of virtue from the soul through a power. Thirdly, from the fact that is not a power of the soul. For Augustine says (De Lib. virtue disposes to that which is best: for the best is the Arb. ii, 19) that “virtue is that by which we live righ- end, which is either a thing’s operation, or something ac- teously.” But we live by the essence of the soul, and not quired by an operation proceeding from the thing’s power. by a power of the soul. Therefore virtue is not a power, Therefore a power of the soul is the subject of virtue. but in the essence of the soul. Reply to Objection 1. “To live” may be taken in two Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, ways. Sometimes it is taken for the very existence of the 6) that “virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and living thing: in this way it belongs to the essence of the his work good likewise.” But as work is set up by power, soul, which is the principle of existence in the living thing. so he that has a virtue is set up by the essence of the soul. But sometimes “to live” is taken for the operation of the Therefore virtue does not belong to the power, any more living thing: in this sense, by virtue we live righteously, than to the essence of the soul. inasmuch as by virtue we perform righteous actions. Objection 3. Further, power is in the second species Reply to Objection 2. Good is either the end, or of quality. But virtue is a quality, as we have said above something referred to the end. And therefore, since the (q. 55, a. 4): and quality is not the subject of quality. good of the worker consists in the work, this fact also, that Therefore a power of the soul is not the subject of virtue. virtue makes the worker good, is referred to the work, and On the contrary, “Virtue is the limit of power” (De consequently, to the power. Coelo ii). But the limit is in that of which it is the limit. Reply to Objection 3. One accident is said to be Therefore virtue is in a power of the soul. the subject of another, not as though one accident could I answer that, It can be proved in three ways that uphold another; but because one accident inheres to sub- virtue belongs to a power of the soul. First, from the no- stance by means of another, as color to the body by means tion of the very essence of virtue, which implies perfec- of the surface; so that surface is said to be the subject of tion of a power; for perfection is in that which it perfects. color. In this way a power of the soul is said to be the Secondly, from the fact that virtue is an operative habit, as subject of virtue. we have said above (q. 55, a. 2): for all operation proceeds Whether one virtue can be in several powers? Ia IIae q. 56 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that one virtue can be in belongs to the intellect, and “to will” belongs to the will. several powers. For habits are known by their acts. But Therefore virtue can be in several powers. one act proceeds in various way from several powers: thus Objection 3. Further, prudence is in the reason since walking proceeds from the reason as directing, from the it is “the right reason of things to be done” (Ethic. vi, 5). will as moving, and from the motive power as executing. And it is also in the will: for it cannot exist together with Therefore also one habit can be in several powers. a perverse will (Ethic. vi, 12). Therefore one virtue can Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, be in two powers. 4) that three things are required for virtue, namely: “to On the contrary, The subject of virtue is a power of know, to will, and to work steadfastly.” But “to know” the soul. But the same accident cannot be in several sub- 846 jects. Therefore one virtue cannot be in several powers of of diffusion, or by way of a disposition, in so far as one the soul. power is moved by another, and one power receives from I answer that, It happens in two ways that one thing another. is subjected in two. First, so that it is in both on an equal Reply to Objection 1. One act cannot belong to sev- footing. In this way it is impossible for one virtue to be in eral powers equally, and in the same degree; but only from two powers: since diversity of powers follows the generic different points of view, and in various degrees. conditions of the objects, while diversity of habits follows Reply to Objection 2. “To know” is a condition re- the specific conditions thereof: and so wherever there is quired for moral virtue, inasmuch as moral virtue works diversity of powers, there is diversity of habits; but not according to right reason. But moral virtue is essentially vice versa. In another way one thing can be subjected in in the appetite. two or more, not on an equal footing, but in a certain or- Reply to Objection 3. Prudence is really subjected in der. And thus one virtue can belong to several powers, so reason: but it presupposes as its principle the rectitude of that it is in one chiefly, while it extends to others by a kind the will, as we shall see further on (a. 3; q. 57, a. 4). Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue? Ia IIae q. 56 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect is not the in like manner as regards other such virtues. And since subject of virtue. For Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. virtue is that “which makes its possessor good, and his xv) that all virtue is love. But the subject of love is not work good likewise,” these latter habits are called virtuous the intellect, but the appetitive power alone. Therefore no simply: because they make the work to be actually good, virtue is in the intellect. and the subject good simply. But the first kind of habits Objection 2. Further, virtue is referred to good, as is are not called virtues simply: because they do not make clear from what has been said above (q. 55, a. 3). Now the work good except in regard to a certain aptness, nor good is not the object of the intellect, but of the appetitive do they make their possessor good simply. For through power. Therefore the subject of virtue is not the intellect, being gifted in science or art, a man is said to be good, not but the appetitive power. simply, but relatively; for instance, a good grammarian or Objection 3. Further, virtue is that “which makes its a good smith. And for this reason science and art are often possessor good,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6). divided against virtue; while at other times they are called But the habit which perfects the intellect does not make virtues (Ethic. vi, 2). its possessor good: since a man is not said to be a good Hence the subject of a habit which is called a virtue in man on account of his science or his art. Therefore the a relative sense, can be the intellect, and not only the prac- intellect is not the subject of virtue. tical intellect, but also the speculative, without any refer- On the contrary, The mind is chiefly called the in- ence to the will: for thus the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3) tellect. But the subject of virtue is the mind, as is clear holds that science, wisdom and understanding, and also from the definition, above given, of virtue (q. 55, a. 4). art, are intellectual virtues. But the subject of a habit Therefore the intellect is the subject of virtue. which is called a virtue simply, can only be the will, or I answer that, As we have said above (q. 55, a. 3), a some power in so far as it is moved by the will. And the virtue is a habit by which we work well. Now a habit may reason of this is, that the will moves to their acts all those be directed to a good act in two ways. First, in so far as other powers that are in some way rational, as we have by the habit a man acquires an aptness to a good act; for said above (q. 9, a. 1; q. 17, Aa. 1,5; Ia, q. 82, a. 4): and instance, by the habit of grammar man has the aptness to therefore if man do well actually, this is because he has speak correctly. But grammar does not make a man al- a good will. Therefore the virtue which makes a man to ways speak correctly: for a grammarian may be guilty of do well actually, and not merely to have the aptness to do a barbarism or make a solecism: and the case is the same well, must be either in the will itself; or in some power as with other sciences and arts. Secondly, a habit may confer moved by the will. not only aptness to act, but also the right use of that apt- Now it happens that the intellect is moved by the will, ness: for instance, justice not only gives man the prompt just as are the other powers: for a man considers some- will to do just actions, but also makes him act justly. thing actually, because he wills to do so. And therefore And since good, and, in like manner, being, is said the intellect, in so far as it is subordinate to the will, can of a thing simply, in respect, not of what it is potentially, be the subject of virtue absolutely so called. And in this but of what it is actually: therefore from having habits of way the speculative intellect, or the reason, is the sub- the latter sort, man is said simply to do good, and to be ject of Faith: for the intellect is moved by the command good; for instance, because he is just, or temperate; and of the will to assent to what is of faith: for “no man be- 847 lieveth, unless he will”∗. But the practical intellect is the be understood of virtue simply so called: not that every subject of prudence. For since prudence is the right rea- virtue is love simply: but that it depends in some way son of things to be done, it is a condition thereof that man on love, in so far as it depends on the will, whose first be rightly disposed in regard to the principles of this rea- movement consists in love, as we have said above (q. 25, son of things to be done, that is in regard to their ends, to Aa. 1,2,3; q. 27, a. 4; Ia, q. 20, a. 1). which man is rightly disposed by the rectitude of the will, Reply to Objection 2. The good of each thing is its just as to the principles of speculative truth he is rightly end: and therefore, as truth is the end of the intellect, so disposed by the natural light of the active intellect. And to know truth is the good act of the intellect. Whence the therefore as the subject of science, which is the right rea- habit, which perfects the intellect in regard to the knowl- son of speculative truths, is the speculative intellect in its edge of truth, whether speculative or practical, is a virtue. relation to the active intellect, so the subject of prudence Reply to Objection 3. This objection considers virtue is the practical intellect in its relation to the right will. simply so called. Reply to Objection 1. The saying of Augustine is to Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers are the subject of virtue? Ia IIae q. 56 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the irascible and con- virtues belong to the irrational part of the soul.” cupiscible powers cannot be the subject of virtue. For I answer that, The irascible and concupiscible pow- these powers are common to us and dumb animals. But ers can be considered in two ways. First, in themselves, we are now speaking of virtue as proper to man, since for in so far as they are parts of the sensitive appetite: and this reason it is called human virtue. It is therefore impos- in this way they are not competent to be the subject of sible for human virtue to be in the irascible and concupis- virtue. Secondly, they can be considered as participat- cible powers which are parts of the sensitive appetite, as ing in the reason, from the fact that they have a natural we have said in the Ia, q. 81, a. 2. aptitude to obey reason. And thus the irascible or concu- Objection 2. Further, the sensitive appetite is a power piscible power can be the subject of human virtue: for, in which makes use of a corporeal organ. But the good so far as it participates in the reason, it is the principle of of virtue cannot be in man’s body: for the Apostle says a human act. And to these powers we must needs assign (Rom. 7): “I know that good does not dwell in my flesh.” virtues. Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot be the subject of For it is clear that there are some virtues in the iras- virtue. cible and concupiscible powers. Because an act, which Objection 3. Further, Augustine proves (De Moribus proceeds from one power according as it is moved by an- Eccl. v) that virtue is not in the body but in the soul, for other power, cannot be perfect, unless both powers be well the reason that the body is ruled by the soul: wherefore it disposed to the act: for instance, the act of a craftsman is entirely due to his soul that a man make good use of his cannot be successful unless both the craftsman and his in- body: “For instance, if my coachman, through obedience strument be well disposed to act. Therefore in the matter to my orders, guides well the horses which he is driving; of the operations of the irascible and concupiscible pow- this is all due to me.” But just as the soul rules the body, ers, according as they are moved by reason, there must so also does the reason rule the sensitive appetite. There- needs be some habit perfecting in respect of acting well, fore that the irascible and concupiscible powers are rightly not only the reason, but also the irascible and concupisci- ruled, is entirely due to the rational powers. Now “virtue ble powers. And since the good disposition of the power is that by which we live rightly,” as we have said above which moves through being moved, depends on its con- (q. 55, a. 4). Therefore virtue is not in the irascible and formity with the power that moves it: therefore the virtue concupiscible powers, but only in the rational powers. which is in the irascible and concupiscible powers is noth- Objection 4. Further, “the principal act of moral ing else but a certain habitual conformity of these powers virtue is choice” (Ethic. viii, 13). Now choice is not an to reason. act of the irascible and concupiscible powers, but of the Reply to Objection 1. The irascible and concupisci- rational power, as we have said above (q. 13, a. 2). There- ble powers considered in themselves, as parts of the sen- fore moral virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible sitive appetite, are common to us and dumb animals. But powers, but in the reason. in so far as they are rational by participation, and are obe- On the contrary, Fortitude is assigned to the irasci- dient to the reason, they are proper to man. And in this ble power, and temperance to the concupiscible power. way they can be the subject of human virtue. Whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 10) says that “these Reply to Objection 2. Just as human flesh has not ∗ Augustine: Tract. xxvi in Joan. 848 of itself the good of virtue, but is made the instrument their own proper movements, by which, at times, they go of a virtuous act, inasmuch as being moved by reason, we against reason, whence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) “yield our members to serve justice”; so also, the irascible that the “reason rules the irascible and concupiscible pow- and concupiscible powers, of themselves indeed, have not ers by a political command” such as that by which free the good of virtue, but rather the infection of the “fomes”: men are ruled, who have in some respects a will of their whereas, inasmuch as they are in conformity with reason, own. And for this reason also must there be some virtues the good of reason is begotten in them. in the irascible and concupiscible powers, by which these Reply to Objection 3. The body is ruled by the soul, powers are well disposed to act. and the irascible and concupiscible powers by the reason, Reply to Objection 4. In choice there are two things, but in different ways. For the body obeys the soul blindly namely, the intention of the end, and this belongs to the without any contradiction, in those things in which it has moral virtue; and the preferential choice of that which a natural aptitude to be moved by the soul: whence the is unto the end, and this belongs to prudence (Ethic. vi, Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that the “soul rules the body 2,5). But that the irascible and concupiscible powers have with a despotic command” as the master rules his slave: a right intention of the end in regard to the passions of the wherefore the entire movement of the body is referred to soul, is due to the good disposition of these powers. And the soul. For this reason virtue is not in the body, but in therefore those moral virtues which are concerned with the soul. But the irascible and concupiscible powers do the passions are in the irascible and concupiscible pow- not obey the reason blindly; on the contrary, they have ers, but prudence is in the reason. Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension are the subject of virtue? Ia IIae q. 56 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that it is possible for in his Rhetoric that “it is a habit like a second nature in ac- virtue to be in the interior sensitive powers of apprehen- cord with reason.” Yet, in man, that which he acquires by sion. For the sensitive appetite can be the subject of virtue, use, in his memory and other sensitive powers of appre- in so far as it obeys reason. But the interior sensitive pow- hension, is not a habit properly so called, but something ers of apprehension obey reason: for the powers of imagi- annexed to the habits of the intellective faculty, as we have nation, of cogitation, and of memory∗ act at the command said above (q. 50, a. 4, ad 3). of reason. Therefore in these powers there can be virtue. Nevertheless even if there be habits in such powers, Objection 2. Further, as the rational appetite, which they cannot be virtues. For virtue is a perfect habit, by is the will, can be hindered or helped in its act, by the which it never happens that anything but good is done: sensitive appetite, so also can the intellect or reason be and so virtue must needs be in that power which consum- hindered or helped by the powers mentioned above. As, mates the good act. But the knowledge of truth is not con- therefore, there can be virtue in the interior powers of ap- summated in the sensitive powers of apprehension: for petite, so also can there be virtue in the interior powers of such powers prepare the way to the intellective knowl- apprehension. edge. And therefore in these powers there are none of Objection 3. Further, prudence is a virtue, of which the virtues, by which we know truth: these are rather in Cicero (De Invent. Rhetor. ii) says that memory is a part. the intellect or reason. Therefore also in the power of memory there can be a Reply to Objection 1. The sensitive appetite is re- virtue: and in like manner, in the other interior sensitive lated to the will, which is the rational appetite, through powers of apprehension. being moved by it. And therefore the act of the appetitive On the contrary, All virtues are either intellectual or power is consummated in the sensitive appetite: and for moral (Ethic. ii, 1). Now all the moral virtues are in the this reason the sensitive appetite is the subject of virtue. appetite; while the intellectual virtues are in the intellect Whereas the sensitive powers of apprehension are related or reason, as is clear from Ethic. vi, 1. Therefore there is to the intellect rather through moving it; for the reason no virtue in the interior sensitive powers of apprehension. that the phantasms are related to the intellective soul, as I answer that, In the interior sensitive powers of ap- colors to sight (De Anima iii, text. 18). And therefore the prehension there are some habits. And this is made clear act of knowledge is terminated in the intellect; and for this principally from what the Philosopher says (De Memo- reason the cognoscitive virtues are in the intellect itself, or ria ii), that “in remembering one thing after another, we the reason. become used to it; and use is a second nature.” Now a And thus is made clear the Reply to the Second Ob- habit of use is nothing else than a habit acquired by use, jection. which is like unto nature. Wherefore Tully says of virtue Reply to Objection 3. Memory is not a part of pru- ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 78, a. 4 849 dence, as species is of a genus, as though memory were quired for prudence is a good memory; so that, in a fash-a virtue properly so called: but one of the conditions re- ion, it is after the manner of an integral part. Whether the will can be the subject of virtue? Ia IIae q. 56 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not the power’s own proper nature does not suffice for the pur- subject of virtue. Because no habit is required for that pose. which belongs to a power by reason of its very nature. But Now the proper nature of a power is seen in its rela- since the will is in the reason, it is of the very essence of tion to its object. Since, therefore, as we have said above the will, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. (q. 19, a. 3), the object of the will is the good of reason 42), to tend to that which is good, according to reason. proportionate to the will, in respect of this the will does And to this good every virtue is ordered, since everything not need a virtue perfecting it. But if man’s will is con- naturally desires its own proper good; for virtue, as Tully fronted with a good that exceeds its capacity, whether as says in his Rhetoric, is a “habit like a second nature in ac- regards the whole human species, such as Divine good, cord with reason.” Therefore the will is not the subject of which transcends the limits of human nature, or as re- virtue. gards the individual, such as the good of one’s neighbor, Objection 2. Further, every virtue is either intellectual then does the will need virtue. And therefore such virtues or moral (Ethic. i, 13; ii, 1). But intellectual virtue is sub- as those which direct man’s affections to God or to his jected in the intellect and reason, and not in the will: while neighbor are subjected in the will, as charity, justice, and moral virtue is subjected in the irascible and concupisci- such like. ble powers which are rational by participation. Therefore Reply to Objection 1. This objection is true of those no virtue is subjected in the will. virtues which are ordained to the willer’s own good; such Objection 3. Further, all human acts, to which virtues as temperance and fortitude, which are concerned with the are ordained, are voluntary. If therefore there be a virtue human passions, and the like, as is clear from what we in the will in respect of some human acts, in like manner have said (q. 35, a. 6). there will be a virtue in the will in respect of all human Reply to Objection 2. Not only the irascible and con- acts. Either, therefore, there will be no virtue in any other cupiscible powers are rational by participation but “the ap- power, or there will be two virtues ordained to the same petitive power altogether,” i.e. in its entirety (Ethic. i, 13). act, which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will cannot Now the will is included in the appetitive power. And be the subject of virtue. therefore whatever virtue is in the will must be a moral On the contrary, Greater perfection is required in the virtue, unless it be theological, as we shall see later on mover than in the moved. But the will moves the irascible (q. 62, a. 3). and concupiscible powers. Much more therefore should Reply to Objection 3. Some virtues are directed to there be virtue in the will than in the irascible and concu- the good of moderated passion, which is the proper good piscible powers. of this or that man: and in these cases there is no need for I answer that, Since the habit perfects the power in virtue in the will, for the nature of the power suffices for reference to act, then does the power need a habit perfect- the purpose, as we have said. This need exists only in the ing it unto doing well, which habit is a virtue, when the case of virtues which are directed to some extrinsic good. 850 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 57 Of the Intellectual Virtues (In Six Articles) We now have to consider the various kinds of virtue: and (1) the intellectual virtues; (2) the moral virtues; (3) the theological virtues. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether habits of the speculative intellect are virtues? (2) Whether they are three, namely, wisdom, science and understanding? (3) Whether the intellectual habit, which is art, is a virtue? (4) Whether prudence is a virtue distinct from art? (5) Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man? (6) Whether “eubulia,” “synesis” and “gnome” are virtues annexed to prudence? Whether the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues? Ia IIae q. 57 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the habits of the spec- virtues in so far as they confer aptness for a good work, ulative intellect are not virtues. For virtue is an operative viz. the consideration of truth (since this is the good work habit, as we have said above (q. 55, a. 2). But speculative of the intellect): yet they are not called virtues in the sec- habits are not operative: for speculative matter is distinct ond way, as though they conferred the right use of a power from practical, i.e. operative matter. Therefore the habits or habit. For if a man possess a habit of speculative sci- of the speculative intellect are not virtues. ence, it does not follow that he is inclined to make use of Objection 2. Further, virtue is about those things by it, but he is made able to consider the truth in those mat- which man is made happy or blessed: for “happiness is the ters of which he has scientific knowledge: that he make reward of virtue” (Ethic. i, 9). Now intellectual habits do use of the knowledge which he has, is due to the motion not consider human acts or other human goods, by which of his will. Consequently a virtue which perfects the will, man acquires happiness, but rather things pertaining to na- as charity or justice, confers the right use of these specu- ture or to God. Therefore such like habits cannot be called lative habits. And in this way too there can be merit in the virtues. acts of these habits, if they be done out of charity: thus Objection 3. Further, science is a speculative habit. Gregory says (Moral. vi) that the “contemplative life has But science and virtue are distinct from one another as greater merit than the active life.” genera which are not subalternate, as the Philosopher Reply to Objection 1. Work is of two kinds, exterior proves in Topic. iv. Therefore speculative habits are not and interior. Accordingly the practical or active faculty virtues. which is contrasted with the speculative faculty, is con- On the contrary, The speculative habits alone con- cerned with exterior work, to which the speculative habit sider necessary things which cannot be otherwise than is not ordained. Yet it is ordained to the interior act of the they are. Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1) places certain intellect which is to consider the truth. And in this way it intellectual virtues in that part of the soul which consid- is an operative habit. ers necessary things that cannot be otherwise than they Reply to Objection 2. Virtue is about certain things are. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are in two ways. In the first place a virtue is about its ob- virtues. ject. And thus these speculative virtues are not about those I answer that, Since every virtue is ordained to some things whereby man is made happy; except perhaps, in good, as stated above (q. 55, a. 3), a habit, as we have al- so far as the word “whereby” indicates the efficient cause ready observed (q. 56, a. 3), may be called a virtue for two or object of complete happiness, i.e. God, Who is the reasons: first, because it confers aptness in doing good; supreme object of contemplation. Secondly, a virtue is secondly, because besides aptness, it confers the right use said to be about its acts: and in this sense the intellec- of it. The latter condition, as above stated (q. 55, a. 3), tual virtues are about those things whereby a man is made belongs to those habits alone which affect the appetitive happy; both because the acts of these virtues can be mer- part of the soul: since it is the soul’s appetitive power that itorious, as stated above, and because they are a kind of puts all the powers and habits to their respective uses. beginning of perfect bliss, which consists in the contem- Since, then, the habits of the speculative intellect do plation of truth, as we have already stated (q. 3, a. 7). not perfect the appetitive part, nor affect it in any way, Reply to Objection 3. Science is contrasted with but only the intellective part; they may indeed be called virtue taken in the second sense, wherein it belongs to the 851 appetitive faculty. Whether there are only three habits of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science Ia IIae q. 57 a. 2 and understanding? Objection 1. It would seem unfitting to distinguish judges all things and sets them in order, because there can three virtues of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, be no perfect and universal judgment that is not based on science and understanding. Because a species is a kind the first causes. But in regard to that which is last in this of science, as stated in Ethic. vi, 7. Therefore wisdom or that genus of knowable matter, it is “science” which should not be condivided with science among the intel- perfects the intellect. Wherefore according to the differ- lectual virtues. ent kinds of knowable matter, there are different habits of Objection 2. Further, in differentiating powers, habits scientific knowledge; whereas there is but one wisdom. and acts in respect of their objects, we consider chiefly Reply to Objection 1. Wisdom is a kind of science, the formal aspect of these objects, as we have already ex- in so far as it has that which is common to all the sci- plained ( Ia, q. 77, a. 3). Therefore diversity of habits is ences; viz. to demonstrate conclusions from principles. taken, not from their material objects, but from the formal But since it has something proper to itself above the other aspect of those objects. Now the principle of a demon- sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all, not only as stration is the formal aspect under which the conclusion is to their conclusions, but also as to their first principles, known. Therefore the understanding of principles should therefore it is a more perfect virtue than science. not be set down as a habit or virtue distinct from the Reply to Objection 2. When the formal aspect of the knowledge of conclusions. object is referred to a power or habit by one same act, Objection 3. Further, an intellectual virtue is one there is no distinction of habit or power in respect of the which resides in the essentially rational faculty. Now even formal aspect and of the material object: thus it belongs to the speculative reason employs the dialectic syllogism for the same power of sight to see both color, and light, which the sake of argument, just as it employs the demonstrative is the formal aspect under which color is seen, and is seen syllogism. Therefore as science, which is the result of at the same time as the color. On the other hand, the prin- a demonstrative syllogism, is set down as an intellectual ciples of a demonstration can be considered apart, without virtue, so also should opinion be. the conclusion being considered at all. Again they can be On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1) reck- considered together with the conclusions, since the con- ons these three alone as being intellectual virtues, viz. clusions can be deduced from them. Accordingly, to con- wisdom, science and understanding. sider the principles in this second way, belongs to science, I answer that, As already stated (a. 1), the virtues of which considers the conclusions also: while to consider the speculative intellect are those which perfect the spec- the principles in themselves belongs to understanding. ulative intellect for the consideration of truth: for this Consequently, if we consider the point aright, these is its good work. Now a truth is subject to a twofold three virtues are distinct, not as being on a par with one consideration—as known in itself, and as known through another, but in a certain order. The same is to be observed another. What is known in itself, is as a “principle,” and is in potential wholes, wherein one part is more perfect than at once understood by the intellect: wherefore the habit another; for instance, the rational soul is more perfect than that perfects the intellect for the consideration of such the sensitive soul; and the sensitive, than the vegetal. For truth is called “understanding,” which is the habit of prin- it is thus that science depends on understanding as on a ciples. virtue of higher degree: and both of these depend on wis- On the other hand, a truth which is known through an- dom, as obtaining the highest place, and containing be- other, is understood by the intellect, not at once, but by neath itself both understanding and science, by judging means of the reason’s inquiry, and is as a “term.” This both of the conclusions of science, and of the principles may happen in two ways: first, so that it is the last in on which they are based. some particular genus; secondly, so that it is the ultimate Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 55, term of all human knowledge. And, since “things that Aa. 3,4), a virtuous habit has a fixed relation to good, and are knowable last from our standpoint, are knowable first is nowise referable to evil. Now the good of the intellect and chiefly in their nature” (Phys. i, text. 2, 3); hence is truth, and falsehood is its evil. Wherefore those habits that which is last with respect to all human knowledge, alone are called intellectual virtues, whereby we tell the is that which is knowable first and chiefly in its nature. truth and never tell a falsehood. But opinion and suspi- And about these is “wisdom,” which considers the high- cion can be about both truth and falsehood: and so, as est causes, as stated in Metaph. i, 1,2. Wherefore it rightly stated in Ethic. vi, 3, they are not intellectual virtues. 852 Whether the intellectual habit, art, is a virtue? Ia IIae q. 57 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that art is not an intellec- habit, which is the property of a virtue that perfects the tual virtue. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) appetite, but only as regards the aptness to work well. that “no one makes bad use of virtue.” But one may make Reply to Objection 1. When anyone endowed with bad use of art: for a craftsman can work badly according an art produces bad workmanship, this is not the work of to the knowledge of his art. Therefore art is not a virtue. that art, in fact it is contrary to the art: even as when a man Objection 2. Further, there is no virtue of a virtue. lies, while knowing the truth, his words are not in accord But “there is a virtue of art,” according to the Philosopher with his knowledge, but contrary thereto. Wherefore, just (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore art is not a virtue. as science has always a relation to good, as stated above Objection 3. Further, the liberal arts excel the me- (a. 2, ad 3), so it is with art: and it is for this reason that chanical arts. But just as the mechanical arts are practical, it is called a virtue. And yet it falls short of being a per- so the liberal arts are speculative. Therefore, if art were fect virtue, because it does not make its possessor to use an intellectual virtue, it would have to be reckoned among it well; for which purpose something further is requisite: the speculative virtues. although there cannot be a good use without the art. On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,4) Reply to Objection 2. In order that man may make says that art is a virtue; and yet he does not reckon it good use of the art he has, he needs a good will, which is among the speculative virtues, which, according to him, perfected by moral virtue; and for this reason the Philoso- reside in the scientific part of the soul. pher says that there is a virtue of art; namely, a moral I answer that, Art is nothing else but “the right rea- virtue, in so far as the good use of art requires a moral son about certain works to be made.” And yet the good of virtue. For it is evident that a craftsman is inclined by these things depends, not on man’s appetitive faculty be- justice, which rectifies his will, to do his work faithfully. ing affected in this or that way, but on the goodness of the Reply to Objection 3. Even in speculative matters work done. For a craftsman, as such, is commendable, not there is something by way of work: e.g. the making of for the will with which he does a work, but for the quality a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or the work of count- of the work. Art, therefore, properly speaking, is an op- ing or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained to erative habit. And yet it has something in common with such like works of the speculative reason, are, by a kind the speculative habits: since the quality of the object con- of comparison, called arts indeed, but “liberal” arts, in or- sidered by the latter is a matter of concern to them also, der to distinguish them from those arts that are ordained but not how the human appetite may be affected towards to works done by the body, which arts are, in a fashion, that object. For as long as the geometrician demonstrates servile, inasmuch as the body is in servile subjection to the truth, it matters not how his appetitive faculty may be the soul, and man, as regards his soul, is free [liber]. On affected, whether he be joyful or angry: even as neither the other hand, those sciences which are not ordained to does this matter in a craftsman, as we have observed. And any such like work, are called sciences simply, and not so art has the nature of a virtue in the same way as the arts. Nor, if the liberal arts be more excellent, does it fol- speculative habits, in so far, to wit, as neither art nor spec- low that the notion of art is more applicable to them. ulative habit makes a good work as regards the use of the Whether prudence is a distinct virtue from art? Ia IIae q. 57 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is not a Objection 3. Further, it belongs to prudence, “to be of distinct virtue from art. For art is the right reason about good counsel” (Ethic. vi, 5). But counselling takes place certain works. But diversity of works does not make a in certain arts also, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, e.g. in the arts habit cease to be an art; since there are various arts about of warfare, of seamanship, and of medicine. Therefore works widely different. Since therefore prudence is also prudence is not distinct from art. right reason about works, it seems that it too should be On the contrary, The Philosopher distinguishes pru- reckoned a virtue. dence from art (Ethic. vi, 5). Objection 2. Further, prudence has more in common I answer that, Where the nature of virtue differs, there with art than the speculative habits have; for they are both is a different kind of virtue. Now it has been stated above “about contingent matters that may be otherwise than they (a. 1; q. 56, a. 3) that some habits have the nature of virtue, are” (Ethic. vi, 4,5). Now some speculative habits are through merely conferring aptness for a good work: while called arts. Much more, therefore, should prudence be some habits are virtues, not only through conferring apt- called an art. ness for a good work, but also through conferring the use. 853 But art confers the mere aptness for good work; since it good of man’s appetite, but the good of those things them-does not regard the appetite; whereas prudence confers selves: wherefore art does not presuppose rectitude of the not only aptness for a good work, but also the use: for appetite. The consequence is that more praise is given to it regards the appetite, since it presupposes the rectitude a craftsman who is at fault willingly, than to one who is thereof. unwillingly; whereas it is more contrary to prudence to The reason for this difference is that art is the “right sin willingly than unwillingly, since rectitude of the will reason of things to be made”; whereas prudence is the is essential to prudence, but not to art. Accordingly it is “right reason of things to be done.” Now “making” and evident that prudence is a virtue distinct from art. “doing” differ, as stated in Metaph. ix, text. 16, in that Reply to Objection 1. The various kinds of things “making” is an action passing into outward matter, e.g. made by art are all external to man: hence they do not “to build,” “to saw,” and so forth; whereas “doing” is an cause a different kind of virtue. But prudence is right rea- action abiding in the agent, e.g. “to see,” “to will,” and the son about human acts themselves: hence it is a distinct like. Accordingly prudence stands in the same relation to kind of virtue, as stated above. such like human actions, consisting in the use of powers Reply to Objection 2. Prudence has more in common and habits, as art does to outward making: since each is with art than a speculative habit has, if we consider their the perfect reason about the things with which it is con- subject and matter: for they are both in the thinking part cerned. But perfection and rectitude of reason in specula- of the soul, and about things that may be otherwise than tive matters, depend on the principles from which reason they are. But if we consider them as virtues, then art has argues; just as we have said above (a. 2, ad 2) that sci- more in common with the speculative habits, as is clear ence depends on and presupposes understanding, which from what has been said. is the habit of principles. Now in human acts the end is Reply to Objection 3. Prudence is of good counsel what the principles are in speculative matters, as stated in about matters regarding man’s entire life, and the end of Ethic. vii, 8. Consequently, it is requisite for prudence, human life. But in some arts there is counsel about mat- which is right reason about things to be done, that man be ters concerning the ends proper to those arts. Hence some well disposed with regard to the ends: and this depends men, in so far as they are good counselors in matters of on the rectitude of his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence warfare, or seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or there is need of a moral virtue, which rectifies the appetite. pilots, but not simply prudent: only those are simply pru- On the other hand the good things made by art is not the dent who give good counsel about all the concerns of life. Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man? Ia IIae q. 57 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is not a otherwise than they are. Hence it is written (Wis. 9:14): virtue necessary to lead a good life. For as art is to things “The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels that are made, of which it is the right reason, so is pru- uncertain.” Therefore it seems that prudence should not dence to things that are done, in respect of which we judge be reckoned an intellectual virtue. of a man’s life: for prudence is the right reason about these On the contrary, It is reckoned with other virtues nec- things, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. Now art is not necessary essary for human life, when it is written (Wis. 8:7) of in things that are made, save in order that they be made, Divine Wisdom: “She teacheth temperance and prudence but not after they have been made. Neither, therefore is and justice and fortitude, which are such things as men prudence necessary to man in order to lead a good life, af- can have nothing more profitable in life.” ter he has become virtuous; but perhaps only in order that I answer that, Prudence is a virtue most necessary he may become virtuous. for human life. For a good life consists in good deeds. Objection 2. Further, “It is by prudence that we are Now in order to do good deeds, it matters not only what of good counsel,” as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. But man can a man does, but also how he does it; to wit, that he do act not only from his own, but also from another’s good it from right choice and not merely from impulse or pas- counsel. Therefore man does not need prudence in or- sion. And, since choice is about things in reference to the der to lead a good life, but it is enough that he follow the end, rectitude of choice requires two things: namely, the counsels of prudent men. due end, and something suitably ordained to that due end. Objection 3. Further, an intellectual virtue is one by Now man is suitably directed to his due end by a virtue which one always tells the truth, and never a falsehood. which perfects the soul in the appetitive part, the object But this does not seem to be the case with prudence: for it of which is the good and the end. And to that which is is not human never to err in taking counsel about what is to suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be rightly be done; since human actions are about things that may be disposed by a habit in his reason, because counsel and 854 choice, which are about things ordained to the end, are man. acts of the reason. Consequently an intellectual virtue is Reply to Objection 2. When a man does a good deed, needed in the reason, to perfect the reason, and make it not of his own counsel, but moved by that of another, his suitably affected towards things ordained to the end; and deed is not yet quite perfect, as regards his reason in di- this virtue is prudence. Consequently prudence is a virtue recting him and his appetite in moving him. Wherefore, necessary to lead a good life. if he do a good deed, he does not do well simply; and yet Reply to Objection 1. The good of an art is to be this is required in order that he may lead a good life. found, not in the craftsman, but in the product of the art, Reply to Objection 3. As stated in Ethic. vi, 2, truth since art is right reason about things to be made: for since is not the same for the practical as for the speculative in- the making of a thing passes into external matter, it is a tellect. Because the truth of the speculative intellect de- perfection not of the maker, but of the thing made, even pends on conformity between the intellect and the thing. as movement is the act of the thing moved: and art is con- And since the intellect cannot be infallibly in conformity cerned with the making of things. On the other hand, the with things in contingent matters, but only in necessary good of prudence is in the active principle, whose activ- matters, therefore no speculative habit about contingent ity is its perfection: for prudence is right reason about things is an intellectual virtue, but only such as is about things to be done, as stated above (a. 4). Consequently art necessary things. On the other hand, the truth of the prac- does not require of the craftsman that his act be a good tical intellect depends on conformity with right appetite. act, but that his work be good. Rather would it be neces- This conformity has no place in necessary matters, which sary for the thing made to act well (e.g. that a knife should are not affected by the human will; but only in contingent carve well, or that a saw should cut well), if it were proper matters which can be effected by us, whether they be mat- to such things to act, rather than to be acted on, because ters of interior action, or the products of external work. they have not dominion over their actions. Wherefore the Hence it is only about contingent matters that an intellec- craftsman needs art, not that he may live well, but that he tual virtue is assigned to the practical intellect, viz. art, as may produce a good work of art, and have it in good keep-regards things to be made, and prudence, as regards things ing: whereas prudence is necessary to man, that he may to be done. lead a good life, and not merely that he may be a good Whether “eubulia, synesis, and gnome” are virtues annexed to prudence? ∗ Ia IIae q. 57 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that ” euboulia, synesis, Therefore it seems that the above are not the only virtues and gnome” are unfittingly assigned as virtues annexed annexed to prudence. to prudence. For ” euboulia” is “a habit whereby we take On the contrary, stands the authority of the Philoso-good counsel” (Ethic. vi, 9). Now it “belongs to prudence pher (Ethic. vi, 9,10,11), who assigns these three virtues to take good counsel,” as stated (Ethic. vi, 9). Therefore as being annexed to prudence. ” euboulia” is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather I answer that, Wherever several powers are subordi-is prudence itself. nate to one another, that power is the highest which is or- Objection 2. Further, it belongs to the higher to judge dained to the highest act. Now there are three acts of rea- the lower. The highest virtue would therefore seem to be son in respect of anything done by man: the first of these is the one whose act is judgment. Now ” synesis” enables us counsel; the second, judgment; the third, command. The to judge well. Therefore ” synesis” is not a virtue annexed first two correspond to those acts of the speculative intel-to prudence, but rather is a principal virtue. lect, which are inquiry and judgment, for counsel is a kind Objection 3. Further, just as there are various matters of inquiry: but the third is proper to the practical intellect, to pass judgment on, so are there different points on which in so far as this is ordained to operation; for reason does one has to take counsel. But there is one virtue referring not have to command in things that man cannot do. Now to all matters of counsel. Therefore, in order to judge well it is evident that in things done by man, the chief act is of what has to be done, there is no need, besides ” synesis” that of command, to which all the rest are subordinate. of the virtue of ” gnome.” Consequently, that virtue which perfects the command, Objection 4. Further, Cicero (De Invent. Rhet. iii) viz. prudence, as obtaining the highest place, has other mentions three other parts of prudence; viz. “memory of secondary virtues annexed to it, viz. ” eustochia,” which the past, understanding of the present, and foresight of perfects counsel; and ” synesis” and ” gnome,” which are the future.” Moreover, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. 1) parts of prudence in relation to judgment, and of whose mentions yet others: viz. “caution, docility,” and the like. distinction we shall speak further on (ad 3). ∗ euboulia, synesis, gnome 855 Reply to Objection 1. Prudence makes us be of good science of dialectics, which inquires about all matters; counsel, not as though its immediate act consisted in be- whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce judg- ing of good counsel, but because it perfects the latter act ment, differ according to their different objects. ” Syne- by means of a subordinate virtue, viz. ” euboulia.” sis” and ” gnome” differ in respect of the different rules Reply to Objection 2. Judgment about what is to be on which judgment is based: for ” synesis” judges of ac-done is directed to something further: for it may happen tions according to the common law; while ” gnome” bases in some matter of action that a man’s judgment is sound, its judgment on the natural law, in those cases where the while his execution is wrong. The matter does not attain common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on to its final complement until the reason has commanded ( IIa IIae, q. 51, a. 4). aright in the point of what has to be done. Reply to Objection 4. Memory, understanding and Reply to Objection 3. Judgment of anything should foresight, as also caution and docility and the like, are not be based on that thing’s proper principles. But inquiry virtues distinct from prudence: but are, as it were, integral does not reach to the proper principles: because, if we parts thereof, in so far as they are all requisite for perfect were in possession of these, we should need no more to in- prudence. There are, moreover, subjective parts or species quire, the truth would be already discovered. Hence only of prudence, e.g. domestic and political economy, and the one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, wheres like. But the three first names are, in a fashion, potential there are two virtues for good judgment: because differ- parts of prudence; because they are subordinate thereto, as ence is based not on common but on proper principles. secondary virtues to a principal virtue: and we shall speak Consequently, even in speculative matters, there is one of them later ( IIa IIae, q. 48, seqq.). 856 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 58 Of the Difference Between Moral and Intellectual Virtues (In Five Articles) We must now consider moral virtues. We shall speak (1) of the difference between them and intellectual virtues; (2) of their distinction, one from another, in respect of their proper matter; (3) of the difference between the chief or cardinal virtues and the others. Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether every virtue is a moral virtue? (2) Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue? (3) Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual virtue? (4) Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue? (5) Whether, on the other hand, there can be intellectual without moral virtue? Whether every virtue is a moral virtue? Ia IIae q. 58 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that every virtue is a Thus we read (2 Macc. 1:2) that “rushing violently upon moral virtue. Because moral virtue is so called from the the enemy, like lions∗, they slew them”: and the word Latin “mos,” i.e. custom. Now, we can accustom our- is used in the same sense in Ps. 67:7, where we read: selves to the acts of all the virtues. Therefore every virtue “Who maketh men of one manner [moris] to dwell in a is a moral virtue. house.” For both these significations there is but one word Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, in Latin; but in the Greek there is a distinct word for each, 6) that moral virtue is “a habit of choosing the rational for the word “ethos” is written sometimes with a long, and mean.” But every virtue is a habit of choosing: since sometimes a short “e”. the acts of any virtue can be done from choice. And, Now “moral” virtue is so called from “mos” in the moreover, every virtue consists in following the rational sense of a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some mean in some way, as we shall explain further on (q. 64, particular action. And the other meaning of “mos,” i.e. Aa. 1,2,3). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue. “custom,” is akin to this: because custom becomes a sec- Objection 3. Further, Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ond nature, and produces an inclination similar to a natu- ii) that “virtue is a habit like a second nature, in accord ral one. But it is evident that inclination to an action be- with reason.” But since every human virtue is directed to longs properly to the appetitive power, whose function it man’s good, it must be in accord with reason: since man’s is to move all the powers to their acts, as explained above good “consists in that which agrees with his reason,” as (q. 9, a. 1). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue, Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore every virtue but only those that are in the appetitive faculty. is a moral virtue. Reply to Objection 1. This argument takes “mos” in On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13): the sense of “custom.” “When we speak of a man’s morals, we do not say that he Reply to Objection 2. Every act of virtue can be done is wise or intelligent, but that he is gentle or sober.” Ac- from choice: but no virtue makes us choose aright, save cordingly, then, wisdom and understanding are not moral that which is in the appetitive part of the soul: for it has virtues: and yet they are virtues, as stated above (q. 57, been stated above that choice is an act of the appetitive a. 2). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue. faculty (q. 13, a. 1). Wherefore a habit of choosing, i.e. I answer that, In order to answer this question clearly, a habit which is the principle whereby we choose, is that we must consider the meaning of the Latin word “mos”; habit alone which perfects the appetitive faculty: although for thus we shall be able to discover what a “moral” virtue the acts of other habits also may be a matter of choice. is. Now “mos” has a twofold meaning. For sometimes Reply to Objection 3. “Nature is the principle of it means custom, in which sense we read (Acts 15:1): movement” (Phys. ii, text. 3). Now to move the facul- “Except you be circumcised after the manner (morem) of ties to act is the proper function of the appetitive power. Moses, you cannot be saved.” Sometimes it means a nat- Consequently to become as a second nature by consenting ural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular ac- to the reason, is proper to those virtues which are in the tion, in which sense the word is applied to dumb animals. appetitive faculty. ∗ Leonum more, i.e. as lions are in the habit of doing 857 Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue? Ia IIae q. 58 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtue does not kind of prudence,” as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Hence he differ from intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De maintained that as long as man is in possession of knowl- Civ. Dei iv, 21) “that virtue is the art of right conduct.” edge, he cannot sin; and that every one who sins, does so But art is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral and in- through ignorance. tellectual virtue do not differ. Now this is based on a false supposition. Because the Objection 2. Further, some authors put science in appetitive faculty obeys the reason, not blindly, but with the definition of virtues: thus some define perseverance a certain power of opposition; wherefore the Philosopher as a “science or habit regarding those things to which we says (Polit. i, 3) that “reason commands the appetitive should hold or not hold”; and holiness as “a science which faculty by a politic power,” whereby a man rules over sub- makes man to be faithful and to do his duty to God.” Now jects that are free, having a certain right of opposition. science is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral virtue Hence Augustine says on Ps. 118 (Serm. 8) that “some- should not be distinguished from intellectual virtue. times we understand [what is right] while desire is slow, Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 6) or follows not at all,” in so far as the habits or passions that “virtue is the rectitude and perfection of reason.” But of the appetitive faculty cause the use of reason to be im- this belongs to the intellectual virtues, as stated in Ethic. peded in some particular action. And in this way, there is vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intel- some truth in the saying of Socrates that so long as a man lectual. is in possession of knowledge he does not sin: provided, Objection 4. Further, a thing does not differ from however, that this knowledge is made to include the use that which is included in its definition. But intellectual of reason in this individual act of choice. virtue is included in the definition of moral virtue: for the Accordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requi- Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that “moral virtue is a habit site not only that his reason be well disposed by means of of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent a habit of intellectual virtue; but also that his appetite be man would appoint it.” Now this right reason that fixes well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue. And so the mean of moral virtue, belongs to an intellectual virtue, moral differs from intellectual virtue, even as the appetite as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differs from the reason. Hence just as the appetite is the differ from intellectual. principle of human acts, in so far as it partakes of reason, On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. i, 13 that “there so are moral habits to be considered virtues in so far as are two kinds of virtue: some we call intellectual; some they are in conformity with reason. moral.” Reply to Objection 1. Augustine usually applies the I answer that, Reason is the first principle of all hu- term “art” to any form of right reason; in which sense art man acts; and whatever other principles of human acts includes prudence which is the right reason about things may be found, they obey reason somewhat, but in vari- to be done, even as art is the right reason about things to ous ways. For some obey reason blindly and without any be made. Accordingly, when he says that “virtue is the art contradiction whatever: such are the limbs of the body, of right conduct,” this applies to prudence essentially; but provided they be in a healthy condition, for as soon as to other virtues, by participation, for as much as they are reason commands, the hand or the foot proceeds to ac- directed by prudence. tion. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that “the Reply to Objection 2. All such definitions, by whom- soul rules the body like a despot,” i.e. as a master rules soever given, were based on the Socratic theory, and his slave, who has no right to rebel. Accordingly some should be explained according to what we have said about held that all the active principles in man are subordinate art (ad 1). to reason in this way. If this were true, for man to act well The same applies to the Third Objection. it would suffice that his reason be perfect. Consequently, Reply to Objection 4. Right reason which is in ac- since virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing cord with prudence is included in the definition of moral good actions, it would follow that it is only in the reason, virtue, not as part of its essence, but as something belong- so that there would be none but intellectual virtues. This ing by way of participation to all the moral virtues, in so was the opinion of Socrates, who said “every virtue is a far as they are all under the direction of prudence. 858 Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual? Ia IIae q. 58 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that virtue is not ade- Reply to Objection 1. Prudence is essentially an in- quately divided into moral and intellectual. For prudence tellectual virtue. But considered on the part of its matter, seems to be a mean between moral and intellectual virtue, it has something in common with the moral virtues: for since it is reckoned among the intellectual virtues (Ethic. it is right reason about things to be done, as stated above vi, 3,5); and again is placed by all among the four cardinal (q. 57, a. 4). It is in this sense that it is reckoned with the virtues, which are moral virtues, as we shall show further moral virtues. on (q. 61, a. 1). Therefore virtue is not adequately divided Reply to Objection 2. Contingency and perseverance into intellectual and moral, as though there were no mean are not perfections of the sensitive appetite. This is clear between them. from the fact that passions abound in the continent and Objection 2. Further, contingency, perseverance, and persevering man, which would not be the case if his sen- patience are not reckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet sitive appetite were perfected by a habit making it con- neither are they moral virtues; since they do not reduce the formable to reason. Contingency and perseverance are, passions to a mean, and are consistent with an abundance however, perfections of the rational faculty, and withstand of passion. Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into the passions lest reason be led astray. But they fall short of intellectual and moral. being virtues: since intellectual virtue, which makes rea- Objection 3. Further, faith, hope, and charity are son to hold itself well in respect of moral matters, presup- virtues. Yet they are not intellectual virtues: for there poses a right appetite of the end, so that it may hold itself are only five of these, viz. science, wisdom, understand- aright in respect of principles, i.e. the ends, on which it ing, prudence, and art, as stated above (q. 57, Aa. 2 ,3,5). builds its argument: and this is wanting in the continent Neither are they moral virtues; since they are not about and persevering man. Nor again can an action proceed- the passions, which are the chief concern of moral virtue. ing from two principles be perfect, unless each principle Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual be perfected by the habit corresponding to that operation: and moral. thus, however perfect be the principal agent employing On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) an instrument, it will produce an imperfect effect, if the that “virtue is twofold, intellectual and moral.” instrument be not well disposed also. Hence if the sen- I answer that, Human virtue is a habit perfecting man sitive faculty, which is moved by the rational faculty, is in view of his doing good deeds. Now, in man there are not perfect; however perfect the rational faculty may be, but two principles of human actions, viz. the intellect or the resulting action will be imperfect: and consequently reason and the appetite: for these are the two principles of the principle of that action will not be a virtue. And for movement in man as stated in De Anima iii, text. 48. Con- this reason, contingency, desisting from pleasures, and sequently every human virtue must needs be a perfection perseverance in the midst of pains, are not virtues, but of one of these principles. Accordingly if it perfects man’s something less than a virtue, as the Philosopher maintains speculative or practical intellect in order that his deed may (Ethic. vii, 1,9). be good, it will be an intellectual virtue: whereas if it Reply to Objection 3. Faith, hope, and charity are su- perfects his appetite, it will be a moral virtue. It follows perhuman virtues: for they are virtues of man as sharing therefore that every human virtue is either intellectual or in the grace of God. moral. Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue? Ia IIae q. 58 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that moral can be without man obtains perfect use of reason. But it happens at times intellectual virtue. Because moral virtue, as Cicero says that men are virtuous and acceptable to God, without be- (De Invent. Rhet. ii) is “a habit like a second nature in ing vigorous in the use of reason. Therefore it seems that accord with reason.” Now though nature may be in ac- moral virtue can be without intellectual. cord with some sovereign reason that moves it, there is no Objection 3. Further moral virtue makes us inclined need for that reason to be united to nature in the same sub- to do good works. But some, without depending on the ject, as is evident of natural things devoid of knowledge. judgment of reason, have a natural inclination to do good Therefore in a man there may be a moral virtue like a sec- works. Therefore moral virtues can be without intellectual ond nature, inclining him to consent to his reason, without virtues. his reason being perfected by an intellectual virtue. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxii) that “the Objection 2. Further, by means of intellectual virtue other virtues, unless we do prudently what we desire to 859 do, cannot be real virtues.” But prudence is an intellec-things devoid of reason is without choice: wherefore such tual virtue, as stated above (q. 57, a. 5). Therefore moral an inclination does not of necessity require reason. But virtues cannot be without intellectual virtues. the inclination of moral virtue is with choice: and con- I answer that, Moral virtue can be without some of sequently in order that it may be perfect it requires that the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art; reason be perfected by intellectual virtue. but not without understanding and prudence. Moral virtue Reply to Objection 2. A man may be virtuous with- cannot be without prudence, because it is a habit of choos- out having full use of reason as to everything, provided he ing, i.e. making us choose well. Now in order that a have it with regard to those things which have to be done choice be good, two things are required. First, that the in- virtuously. In this way all virtuous men have full use of tention be directed to a due end; and this is done by moral reason. Hence those who seem to be simple, through lack virtue, which inclines the appetitive faculty to the good of worldly cunning, may possibly be prudent, according that is in accord with reason, which is a due end. Sec- to Mat. 10:16: “Be ye therefore prudent [Douay: ‘wise’] ondly, that man take rightly those things which have ref- as serpents, and simple as doves.” erence to the end: and this he cannot do unless his reason Reply to Objection 3. The natural inclination to a counsel, judge and command aright, which is the func- good of virtue is a kind of beginning of virtue, but is not tion of prudence and the virtues annexed to it, as stated perfect virtue. For the stronger this inclination is, the more above (q. 57, Aa. 5,6). Wherefore there can be no moral perilous may it prove to be, unless it be accompanied by virtue without prudence: and consequently neither can right reason, which rectifies the choice of fitting means to- there be without understanding. For it is by the virtue of wards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind, the understanding that we know self-evident principles both faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, and the more in speculative and in practical matters. Consequently just grievously will it be hurt. And consequently, although as right reason in speculative matters, in so far as it pro- moral virtue be not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not ceeds from naturally known principles, presupposes the only is it “according to right reason,” in so far as it in- understanding of those principles, so also does prudence, clines man to that which is, according to right reason, as which is the right reason about things to be done. the Platonists maintained∗; but also it needs to be “joined Reply to Objection 1. The inclination of nature in with right reason,” as Aristotle declares (Ethic. vi, 13). Whether there can be intellectual without moral virtue? Ia IIae q. 58 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that there can be intel- dence cannot, be without moral virtue. The reason for lectual without moral virtue. Because perfection of what this is that prudence is the right reason about things to be precedes does not depend on the perfection of what fol- done (and this, not merely in general, but also in partic- lows. Now reason precedes and moves the sensitive ap- ular); about which things actions are. Now right reason petite. Therefore intellectual virtue, which is a perfection demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue. of the reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is a And when reason argues about particular cases, it needs perfection of the appetitive faculty; and can be without it. not only universal but also particular principles. As to Objection 2. Further, morals are the matter of pru- universal principles of action, man is rightly disposed by dence, even as things makeable are the matter of art. Now the natural understanding of principles, whereby he un- art can be without its proper matter, as a smith without derstands that he should do no evil; or again by some iron. Therefore prudence can be without the moral virtue, practical science. But this is not enough in order that man although of all the intellectual virtues, it seems most akin may reason aright about particular cases. For it happens to the moral virtues. sometimes that the aforesaid universal principle, known Objection 3. Further, prudence is “a virtue whereby by means of understanding or science, is destroyed in a we are of good counsel” (Ethic. vi, 9). Now many are of particular case by a passion: thus to one who is swayed good counsel without having the moral virtues. Therefore by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the ob- prudence can be without a moral virtue. ject of his desire seems good, although it is opposed to the On the contrary, To wish to do evil is directly op- universal judgment of his reason. Consequently, as by the posed to moral virtue; and yet it is not opposed to any- habit of natural understanding or of science, man is made thing that can be without moral virtue. Now it is contrary to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal principles to prudence “to sin willingly” (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore of action; so, in order that he be rightly disposed with re- prudence cannot be without moral virtue. gard to the particular principles of action, viz. the ends, I answer that, Other intellectual virtues can, but pru- he needs to be perfected by certain habits, whereby it be- ∗ Cf. Plato, Meno xli. 860 comes connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright to the Reply to Objection 2. It does not depend on the dis-end. This is done by moral virtue: for the virtuous man position of our appetite whether we judge well or ill of judges aright of the end of virtue, because “such a man the principles of art, as it does, when we judge of the end is, such does the end seem to him” (Ethic. iii, 5). Con- which is the principle in moral matters: in the former case sequently the right reason about things to be done, viz. our judgment depends on reason alone. Hence art does prudence, requires man to have moral virtue. not require a virtue perfecting the appetite, as prudence Reply to Objection 1. Reason, as apprehending the does. end, precedes the appetite for the end: but appetite for the Reply to Objection 3. Prudence not only helps us to end precedes the reason, as arguing about the choice of be of good counsel, but also to judge and command well. the means, which is the concern of prudence. Even so, in This is not possible unless the impediment of the passions, speculative matters the understanding of principles is the destroying the judgment and command of prudence, be re- foundation on which the syllogism of the reason is based. moved; and this is done by moral virtue. 861 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 59 Of Moral Virtue in Relation to the Passions (In Five Articles) We must now consider the difference of one moral virtue from another. And since those moral virtues which are about the passions, differ accordingly to the difference of passions, we must consider (1) the relation of virtue to passion; (2) the different kinds of moral virtue in relation to the passions. Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether moral virtue is a passion? (2) Whether there can be moral virtue with passion? (3) Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue? (4) Whether every moral virtue is about a passion? (5) Whether there can be moral virtue without passion? Whether moral virtue is a passion? Ia IIae q. 59 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtue is a pas- movement of passion, as passion, begins in the appetite, sion. Because the mean is of the same genus as the ex- and ends in the reason, since the appetite tends to confor- tremes. But moral virtue is a mean between two passions. mity with reason. On the other hand, the movement of Therefore moral virtue is a passion. virtue is the reverse, for it begins in the reason and ends Objection 2. Further, virtue and vice, being contrary in the appetite, inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason. to one another, are in the same genus. But some passions Hence the definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6) states are reckoned to be vices, such as envy and anger. There- that it is “a habit of choosing the mean appointed by rea- fore some passions are virtues. son as a prudent man would appoint it.” Objection 3. Further, pity is a passion, since it is sorReply to Objection 1. Virtue is a mean between pas- row for another’s ills, as stated above (q. 35, a. 8). Now sions, not by reason of its essence, but on account of its “Cicero the renowned orator did not hesitate to call pity a effect; because, to wit, it establishes the mean between virtue,” as Augustine states in De Civ. Dei ix, 5. There- passions. fore a passion may be a moral virtue. Reply to Objection 2. If by vice we understand a On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. ii, 5 that “pas- habit of doing evil deeds, it is evident that no passion is a sions are neither virtues nor vices.” vice. But if vice is taken to mean sin which is a vicious I answer that, Moral virtue cannot be a passion. This act, nothing hinders a passion from being a vice, or, on the is clear for three reasons. First, because a passion is a other hand, from concurring in an act of virtue; in so far movement of the sensitive appetite, as stated above (q. 22, as a passion is either opposed to reason or in accordance a. 3): whereas moral virtue is not a movement, but rather with reason. a principle of the movement of the appetite, being a kind Reply to Objection 3. Pity is said to be a virtue, i.e. of habit. Secondly, because passions are not in them- an act of virtue, in so far as “that movement of the soul is selves good or evil. For man’s good or evil is something obedient to reason”; viz. “when pity is bestowed without in reference to reason: wherefore the passions, consid- violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the peni- ered in themselves, are referable both to good and evil, tent forgiven,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). But for as much as they may accord or disaccord with rea- if by pity we understand a habit perfecting man so that son. Now nothing of this sort can be a virtue: since virtue he bestows pity reasonably, nothing hinders pity, in this is referable to good alone, as stated above (q. 55, a. 3). sense, from being a virtue. The same applies to similar Thirdly, because, granted that some passions are, in some passions. way, referable to good only, or to evil only; even then the 862 Whether there can be moral virtue with passion? Ia IIae q. 59 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtue cannot other emotions of the soul, which are not passions, are be with passion. For the Philosopher says (Topic. iv) that movements of the intellective appetite or will; but only in “a gentle man is one who is not passionate; but a patient the point of the passions being, as they maintained, any man is one who is passionate but does not give way.” The emotions in disaccord with reason. These emotions could same applies to all the moral virtues. Therefore all moral not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose deliberately: virtues are without passion. while it would be possible for them to be in a wise man, if Objection 2. Further, virtue is a right affection of the they arose suddenly: because, in the words of Aulus Gel-soul, as health is to the body, as stated Phys. vii, text. 17: lius∗, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), “it is not in wherefore “virtue is a kind of health of the soul,” as Ci- our power to call up the visions of the soul, known as its cero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv). But the soul’s passions are fancies; and when they arise from awesome things, they “the soul’s diseases,” as he says in the same book. Now must needs disturb the mind of a wise man, so that he is health is incompatible with disease. Therefore neither is slightly startled by fear, or depressed with sorrow,” in so passion compatible with virtue. far as “these passions forestall the use of reason without Objection 3. Further, moral virtue requires perfect his approving of such things or consenting thereto.” use of reason even in particular matters. But the passions Accordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate are an obstacle to this: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. emotions, they cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he con- vi, 5) that “pleasures destroy the judgment of prudence”: sent to them deliberately; as the Stoics maintained. But if and Sallust says (Catilin.) that “when they,” i.e. the soul’s the passions be taken for any movements of the sensitive passions, “interfere, it is not easy for the mind to grasp appetite, they can be in a virtuous man, in so far as they the truth.” Therefore passion is incompatible with moral are subordinate to reason. Hence Aristotle says (Ethic. ii, virtue. 3) that “some describe virtue as being a kind of freedom On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, from passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because 6): “If the will is perverse, these movements,” viz. the the assertion should be qualified”: they should have said passions, “are perverse also: but if it is upright, they are virtue is freedom from those passions “that are not as they not only blameless, but even praiseworthy.” But nothing should be as to manner and time.” praiseworthy is incompatible with moral virtue. Therefore Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher quotes this, moral virtue does not exclude the passions, but is consis- as well as many other examples in his books on Logic, in tent with them. order to illustrate, not his own mind, but that of others. I answer that, The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed It was the opinion of the Stoics that the passions of the on this point, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4). soul were incompatible with virtue: and the Philosopher For the Stoics held that the soul’s passions cannot be in a rejects this opinion (Ethic. ii, 3), when he says that virtue wise or virtuous man: whereas the Peripatetics, who were is not freedom from passion. It may be said, however, that founded by Aristotle, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, when he says “a gentle man is not passionate,” we are to 4), maintained that the passions are compatible with moral understand this of inordinate passion. virtue, if they be reduced to the mean. Reply to Objection 2. This and all similar arguments This difference, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei which Tully brings forward in De Tusc. Quaest. iv take ix, 4), was one of words rather than of opinions. Because the passions in the execution of reason’s command. the Stoics, through not discriminating between the intel- Reply to Objection 3. When a passion forestalls the lective appetite, i.e. the will, and the sensitive appetite, judgment of reason, so as to prevail on the mind to give which is divided into irascible and concupiscible, did not, its consent, it hinders counsel and the judgment of rea- as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the passions from the son. But when it follows that judgment, as through being other affections of the human soul, in the point of their commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution of being movements of the sensitive appetite, whereas the reason’s command. Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue? Ia IIae q. 59 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow is incompati- tude.” Now the “conversation” of wisdom “hath no bitter- ble with virtue. Because the virtues are effects of wisdom, ness,” as we read further on (verse 16). Therefore sorrow according to Wis. 8:7: “She,” i.e. Divine wisdom, “tea- is incompatible with virtue also. cheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and forti- Objection 2. Further, sorrow is a hindrance to work, ∗ Noct. Attic. xix, 1 863 as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 13; x, 5). But a hin-sorrow is compatible with moral virtue in the same way drance to good works is incompatible with virtue. There- as the other passions are when moderated by reason. fore sorrow is incompatible with virtue. Their second reason for holding this opinion was that Objection 3. Further, Tully calls sorrow a disease of sorrow is about evil present, whereas fear is for evil to the mind (De Tusc. Quaest. iv). But disease of the mind come: even as pleasure is about a present good, while de- is incompatible with virtue, which is a good condition of sire is for a future good. Now the enjoyment of a good the mind. Therefore sorrow is opposed to virtue and is possessed, or the desire to have good that one possesses incompatible with it. not, may be consistent with virtue: but depression of the On the contrary, Christ was perfect in virtue. But mind resulting from sorrow for a present evil, is alto- there was sorrow in Him, for He said (Mat. 26:38): “My gether contrary to reason: wherefore it is incompatible soul is sorrowful even unto death.” Therefore sorrow is with virtue. But this is unreasonable. For there is an evil compatible with virtue. which can be present to the virtuous man, as we have just I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), stated; which evil is rejected by reason. Wherefore the the Stoics held that in the mind of the wise man there are sensitive appetite follows reason’s rejection by sorrowing three eupatheiai, i.e. “three good passions,” in place of the for that evil; yet moderately, according as reason dictates. three disturbances: viz. instead of covetousness, “desire”; Now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive appetite be con- instead of mirth, “joy”; instead of fear, “caution.” But formed to reason, as stated above (a. 1, ad 2). Wherefore they denied that anything corresponding to sorrow could moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us be in the mind of a wise man, for two reasons. sorrowful, is a mark of virtue; as also the Philosopher says First, because sorrow is for an evil that is already (Ethic. ii, 6,7). Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding present. Now they held that no evil can happen to a wise evil: since, just as good is more readily sought for the man: for they thought that, just as man’s only good is sake of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on virtue, and bodily goods are no good to man; so man’s account of sorrow. only evil is vice, which cannot be in a virtuous man. But Accordingly we must allow that sorrow for things per- this is unreasonable. For, since man is composed of soul taining to virtue is incompatible with virtue: since virtue and body, whatever conduces to preserve the life of the rejoices in its own. On the other hand, virtue sorrows body, is some good to man; yet not his supreme good, moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter how. because he can abuse it. Consequently the evil which is Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted proves that contrary to this good can be in a wise man, and can cause the wise man is not made sorrowful by wisdom. Yet he him moderate sorrow. Again, although a virtuous man sorrows for anything that hinders wisdom. Consequently can be without grave sin, yet no man is to be found to live there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom there without committing slight sins, according to 1 Jn. 1:8: “If can be no hindrance to wisdom. we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.” A third Reply to Objection 2. Sorrow hinders the work that reason is because a virtuous man, though not actually in makes us sorrowful: but it helps us to do more readily a state of sin, may have been so in the past. And he is whatever banishes sorrow. to be commended if he sorrow for that sin, according to Reply to Objection 3. Immoderate sorrow is a dis- 2 Cor. 7:10: “The sorrow that is according to God wor- ease of the mind: but moderate sorrow is the mark of a keth penance steadfast unto salvation.” Fourthly, because well-conditioned mind, according to the present state of he may praiseworthily sorrow for another’s sin. Therefore life. Whether all the moral virtues are about the passions? Ia IIae q. 59 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that all the moral virtues Objection 3. Further, some passion is to be found in are about the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. every moral virtue: and so either all are about the pas- ii, 3) that “moral virtue is about objects of pleasure and sions, or none are. But some are about the passions, as sorrow.” But pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated fortitude and temperance, as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10. above (q. 23, a. 4; q. 31, a. 1; q. 35, Aa. 1, 2). Therefore Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions. all the moral virtues are about the passions. On the contrary, Justice, which is a moral virtue, is Objection 2. Further, the subject of the moral virtues not about the passions; as stated in Ethic. v, 1, seqq. is a faculty which is rational by participation, as the I answer that, Moral virtue perfects the appetitive Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 13). But the passions are in part of the soul by directing it to good as defined by rea- this part of the soul, as stated above (q. 22, a. 3). There- son. Now good as defined by reason is that which is fore every moral virtue is about the passions. moderated or directed by reason. Consequently there are 864 moral virtues about all matters that are subject to reason’s words quoted, adds, “if virtues are about actions and pas-direction and moderation. Now reason directs, not only sions; now every action and passion is followed by plea- the passions of the sensitive appetite, but also the oper- sure or sorrow, so that in this way virtue is about pleasures ations of the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, which is and sorrows,” viz. as about something that results from not the subject of a passion, as stated above (q. 22, a. 3). virtue. Therefore not all the moral virtues are about passions, but Reply to Objection 2. Not only the sensitive appetite some are about passions, some about operations. which is the subject of the passions, is rational by partic- Reply to Objection 1. The moral virtues are not all ipation, but also the will, where there are no passions, as about pleasures and sorrows, as being their proper matter; stated above. but as being something resulting from their proper acts. Reply to Objection 3. Some virtues have passions as For every virtuous man rejoices in acts of virtue, and sor- their proper matter, but some virtues not. Hence the com- rows for the contrary. Hence the Philosopher, after the parison does not hold for all cases. Whether there can be moral virtue without passion? Ia IIae q. 59 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtue can be activities, but to make them execute the commands of rea- without passion. For the more perfect moral virtue is, the son, by exercising their proper acts. Wherefore just as more does it overcome the passions. Therefore at its high- virtue directs the bodily limbs to their due external acts, est point of perfection it is altogether without passion. so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its proper regu- Objection 2. Further, then is a thing perfect, when it lated movements. is removed from its contrary and from whatever inclines Those moral virtues, however, which are not about to its contrary. Now the passions incline us to sin which the passions, but about operations, can be without pas- is contrary to virtue: hence (Rom. 7:5) they are called sions. Such a virtue is justice: because it applies the will “passions of sins.” Therefore perfect virtue is altogether to its proper act, which is not a passion. Nevertheless, without passion. joy results from the act of justice; at least in the will, in Objection 3. Further, it is by virtue that we are con- which case it is not a passion. And if this joy be increased formed to God, as Augustine declares (De Moribus Eccl. through the perfection of justice, it will overflow into the vi, xi, xiii). But God does all things without passion at all. sensitive appetite; in so far as the lower powers follow the Therefore the most perfect virtue is without any passion. movement of the higher, as stated above (q. 17, a. 7; q. 24, On the contrary, “No man is just who rejoices not in a. 3). Wherefore by reason of this kind of overflow, the his deeds,” as stated in Ethic. i, 8. But joy is a passion. more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause passion. Therefore justice cannot be without passion; and still less Reply to Objection 1. Virtue overcomes inordinate can the other virtues be. passion; it produces ordinate passion. I answer that, If we take the passions as being in- Reply to Objection 2. It is inordinate, not ordinate, ordinate emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in passion that leads to sin. this sense perfect virtue is without the passions. But if Reply to Objection 3. The good of anything depends by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive on the condition of its nature. Now there is no sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about the appetite in God and the angels, as there is in man. Conse- passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without quently good operation in God and the angels is altogether passions. The reason for this is that otherwise it would without passion, as it is without a body: whereas the good follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite al- operation of man is with passion, even as it is produced together idle: whereas it is not the function of virtue to with the body’s help. deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper 865 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 60 How the Moral Virtues Differ From One Another (In Five Articles) We must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another: under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is only one moral virtue? (2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations, are distinct from those which are about passions? (3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations? (4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions? (5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions? Whether there is only one moral virtue? Ia IIae q. 60 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there is only one matter must of necessity receive a form specifically one: moral virtue. Because just as the direction of moral ac- thus the univocal effect of fire is of necessity something tions belongs to reason which is the subject of the intel- in the species of fire. Sometimes, however, the matter re- lectual virtues; so does their inclination belong to the ap- ceives the form from the agent, but not in the same kind petite which is the subject of moral virtues. But there is specifically as the agent, as is the case with non-univocal only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz. causes of generation: thus an animal is generated by the prudence. Therefore there is also but one moral virtue to sun. In this case the forms received into matter are not give all moral acts their respective inclinations. of one species, but vary according to the adaptability of Objection 2. Further, habits differ, not in respect of the matter to receive the influx of the agent: for instance, their material objects, but according to the formal aspect we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals of of their objects. Now the formal aspect of the good to various species are produced by putrefaction according to which moral virtue is directed, is one thing, viz. the mean the various adaptability of matter. defined by reason. Therefore, seemingly, there is but one Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds moral virtue. the place of commander and mover, while the appetitive Objection 3. Further, things pertaining to morals are power is commanded and moved. But the appetite does specified by their end, as stated above (q. 1, a. 3). Now not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say; there is but one common end of all moral virtues, viz. hap- because it is rational, not essentially, but by participation piness, while the proper and proximate ends are infinite in (Ethic. i, 13). Consequently objects made appetible by number. But the moral virtues themselves are not infinite the direction of reason belong to various species, accord- in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one. ing to their various relations to reason: so that it follows On the contrary, One habit cannot be in several pow- that moral virtues are of various species and are not one ers, as stated above (q. 56, a. 2). But the subject of the only. moral virtues is the appetitive part of the soul, which is Reply to Objection 1. The object of the reason is divided into several powers, as stated in the Ia, q. 80, a. 2; truth. Now in all moral matters, which are contingent Ia, q. 81, a. 2. Therefore there cannot be only one moral matters of action, there is but one kind of truth. Conse- virtue. quently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, I answer that, As stated above (q. 58, Aa. 1,2,3), the viz. prudence. On the other hand, the object of the ap- moral virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now petitive power is the appetible good, which varies in kind habits differ specifically according to the specific differ- according to its various relations to reason, the directing ences of their objects, as stated above (q. 54, a. 2). Again, power. the species of the object of appetite, as of any thing, Reply to Objection 2. This formal element is one depends on its specific form which it receives from the generically, on account of the unity of the agent: but it agent. But we must observe that the matter of the passive varies in species, on account of the various relations of subject bears a twofold relation to the agent. For some- the receiving matter, as explained above. times it receives the form of the agent, in the same kind Reply to Objection 3. Moral matters do not receive specifically as the agent has that form, as happens with all their species from the last end, but from their proximate univocal agents, so that if the agent be one specifically, the ends: and these, although they be infinite in number, are 866 not infinite in species. Whether moral virtues about operations are different from those that are about pas-Ia IIae q. 60 a. 2 sions? Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtues are not taken from the very nature of those operations, no mat- divided into those which are about operations and those ter how man may be affected towards them: viz. in so which are about passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. far as good and evil in them depend on their being com- ii, 3) that moral virtue is “an operative habit whereby we mensurate with someone else. In operations of this kind do what is best in matters of pleasure or sorrow.” Now there needs to be some power to regulate the operations pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above (q. 31, in themselves: such are buying and selling, and all such a. 1; q. 35, a. 1). Therefore the same virtue which is about operations in which there is an element of something due passions is also about operations, since it is an operative or undue to another. For this reason justice and its parts habit. are properly about operations as their proper matter. On Objection 2. Further, the passions are principles of the other hand, in some operations, good and evil depend external action. If therefore some virtues regulate the pas- only on commensuration with the agent. Consequently sions, they must, as a consequence, regulate operations good and evil in these operations depend on the way in also. Therefore the same moral virtues are about both pas- which man is affected to them. And for this reason in such sions and operations. like operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal Objection 3. Further, the sensitive appetite is moved emotions which are called the passions of the soul, as is well or ill towards every external operation. Now move- evidently the case with temperance, fortitude and the like. ments of the sensitive appetite are passions. Therefore the It happens, however, in operations which are directed same virtues that are about operations are also about pas- to another, that the good of virtue is overlooked by reason sions. of some inordinate passion of the soul. In such cases jus- On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons justice to tice is destroyed in so far as the due measure of the exter- be about operations; and temperance, fortitude and gen- nal act is destroyed: while some other virtue is destroyed tleness, about passions (Ethic. ii, 3,7; v, 1, seqq.). in so far as the internal passions exceed their due mea- I answer that, Operation and passion stand in a sure. Thus when through anger, one man strikes another, twofold relation to virtue. First, as its effects; and in this justice is destroyed in the undue blow; while gentleness way every moral virtue has some good operations as its is destroyed by the immoderate anger. The same may be product; and a certain pleasure or sorrow which are pas- clearly applied to other virtues. sions, as stated above (q. 59, a. 4, ad 1). This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the Secondly, operation may be compared to moral virtue first considers operations as the effect of virtue, while the as the matter about which virtue is concerned: and in this other two consider operation and passion as concurring in sense those moral virtues which are about operations must the same effect. But in some cases virtue is chiefly about needs differ from those which are about passions. The rea- operations, in others, about passions, for the reason given son for this is that good and evil, in certain operations, are above. Whether there is only one moral virtue about operations? Ia IIae q. 60 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that there is but one moral of operations does not cause a diversity of moral virtues. virtue about operations. Because the rectitude of all exter- Objection 3. Further, if there are various moral nal operations seems to belong to justice. Now justice is virtues about various operations, diversity of moral virtues but one virtue. Therefore there is but one virtue about op- would needs follow diversity of operations. But this is erations. clearly untrue: for it is the function of justice to establish Objection 2. Further, those operations seem to differ rectitude in various kinds of commutations, and again in most, which are directed on the one side to the good of the distributions, as is set down in Ethic. v, 2. Therefore there individual, and on the other to the good of the many. But are not different virtues about different operations. this diversity does not cause diversity among the moral On the contrary, Religion is a moral virtue distinct virtues: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that legal from piety, both of which are about operations. justice, which directs human acts to the common good, I answer that, All the moral virtues that are about op- does not differ, save logically, from the virtue which di- erations agree in one general notion of justice, which is in rects a man’s actions to one man only. Therefore diversity respect of something due to another: but they differ in re- 867 spect of various special notions. The reason for this is that extended also to all cases in which something due is ren-in external operations, the order of reason is established, dered: in this sense it is not as a special virtue. as we have stated (a. 2), not according as how man is af- Reply to Objection 2. That justice which seeks the fected towards such operations, but according to the be- common good is another virtue from that which is directed comingness of the thing itself; from which becomingness to the private good of an individual: wherefore common we derive the notion of something due which is the formal right differs from private right; and Tully (De Inv. ii) reck- aspect of justice: for, seemingly, it pertains to justice that ons as a special virtue, piety which directs man to the good a man give another his due. Wherefore all such virtues as of his country. But that justice which directs man to the are about operations, bear, in some way, the character of common good is a general virtue through its act of com- justice. But the thing due is not of the same kind in all mand: since it directs all the acts of the virtues to its own these virtues: for something is due to an equal in one way, end, viz. the common good. And the virtues, in so far as to a superior, in another way, to an inferior, in yet another; they are commanded by that justice, receive the name of and the nature of a debt differs according as it arises from justice: so that virtue does not differ, save logically, from a contract, a promise, or a favor already conferred. And legal justice; just as there is only a logical difference be- corresponding to these various kinds of debt there are var- tween a virtue that is active of itself, and a virtue that is ious virtues: e.g. “Religion” whereby we pay our debt to active through the command of another virtue. God; “Piety,” whereby we pay our debt to our parents or Reply to Objection 3. There is the same kind of due to our country; “Gratitude,” whereby we pay our debt to in all the operations belonging to special justice. Con- our benefactors, and so forth. sequently, there is the same virtue of justice, especially Reply to Objection 1. Justice properly so called is in regard to commutations. For it may be that distributive one special virtue, whose object is the perfect due, which justice is of another species from commutative justice; but can be paid in the equivalent. But the name of justice is about this we shall inquire later on ( IIa IIae, q. 61, a. 1). Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions? Ia IIae q. 60 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that there are not differ- as stated above (q. 23, a. 1). ent moral virtues about different passions. For there is but On the other hand, neither does every diversity of pas- one habit about things that concur in their source and end: sions necessarily suffice for a diversity of moral virtues. as is evident especially in the case of sciences. But the First, because some passions are in contrary opposition passions all concur in one source, viz. love; and they all to one another, such as joy and sorrow, fear and daring, terminate in the same end, viz. joy or sorrow, as we stated and so on. About such passions as are thus in opposition above (q. 25, Aa. 1,2,4; q. 27, a. 4). Therefore there is but to one another there must needs be one same virtue. Be- one moral virtue about all the passions. cause, since moral virtue consists in a kind of mean, the Objection 2. Further, if there were different moral mean in contrary passions stands in the same ratio to both, virtues about different passions, it would follow that there even as in the natural order there is but one mean between are as many moral virtues as passions. But this clearly is contraries, e.g. between black and white. Secondly, be- not the case: since there is one moral virtue about con- cause there are different passions contradicting reason in trary passions; namely, fortitude, about fear and daring; the same manner, e.g. by impelling to that which is con- temperance, about pleasure and sorrow. Therefore there trary to reason, or by withdrawing from that which is in is no need for different moral virtues about different pas- accord with reason. Wherefore the different passions of sions. the concupiscible faculty do not require different moral Objection 3. Further, love, desire, and pleasure are virtues, because their movements follow one another in a passions of different species, as stated above (q. 23, a. 4). certain order, as being directed to the one same thing, viz. Now there is but one virtue about all these three, viz. tem- the attainment of some good or the avoidance of some perance. Therefore there are not different moral virtues evil: thus from love proceeds desire, and from desire we about different passions. arrive at pleasure; and it is the same with the opposite On the contrary, Fortitude is about fear and daring; passions, for hatred leads to avoidance or dislike, and this temperance about desire; meekness about anger; as stated leads to sorrow. On the other hand, the irascible passions in Ethic. iii, 6,10; iv, 5. are not all of one order, but are directed to different things: I answer that, It cannot be said that there is only one for daring and fear are about some great danger; hope moral virtue about all the passions: since some passions and despair are about some difficult good; while anger are not in the same power as other passions; for some be- seeks to overcome something contrary which has wrought long to the irascible, others to the concupiscible faculty, harm. Consequently there are different virtues about such 868 like passions: e.g. temperance, about the concupiscible same principle causes movement from one extreme and passions; fortitude, about fear and daring; magnanimity, movement towards the other; and as in the intellectual about hope and despair; meekness, about anger. order contraries have one common ratio; so too between Reply to Objection 1. All the passions concur in one contrary passions there is but one moral virtue, which, like common principle and end; but not in one proper principle a second nature, consents to reason’s dictates. or end: and so this does not suffice for the unity of moral Reply to Objection 3. Those three passions are di- virtue. rected to the same object in a certain order, as stated Reply to Objection 2. Just as in the natural order the above: and so they belong to the same virtue. Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions? Ia IIae q. 60 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the moral virtues do movement of reason is not the same as that of the sensi- not differ according to the objects of the passions. For tive appetite. Wherefore nothing hinders a difference of just as there are objects of passions, so are there objects objects from causing diversity of passions, without caus- of operations. Now those moral virtues that are about op- ing diversity of virtues, as when one virtue is about several erations, do not differ according to the objects of those passions, as stated above (a. 4); and again, a difference of operations: for the buying and selling either of a house or objects from causing different virtues, without causing a of a horse belong to the one same virtue of justice. There- difference of passions, since several virtues are directed fore neither do those moral virtues that are about passions about one passion, e.g. pleasure. differ according to the objects of those passions. And because diverse passions belonging to diverse Objection 2. Further, the passions are acts or move- powers, always belong to diverse virtues, as stated above ments of the sensitive appetite. Now it needs a greater (a. 4); therefore a difference of objects that corresponds difference to differentiate habits than acts. Hence diverse to a difference of powers always causes a specific differ- objects which do not diversify the species of passions, do ence of virtues—for instance the difference between that not diversify the species of moral virtue: so that there is which is good absolutely speaking, and that which is good but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and the and difficult to obtain. Moreover since the reason rules same applies to the other passions. man’s lower powers in a certain order, and even extends Objection 3. Further, more or less do not change a to outward things; hence, one single object of the pas- species. Now various objects of pleasure differ only by sions, according as it is apprehended by sense, imagina- reason of being more or less pleasurable. Therefore all tion, or reason, and again, according as it belongs to the objects of pleasure belong to one species of virtue: and soul, body, or external things, has various relations to rea- for the same reason so do all fearful objects, and the same son, and consequently is of a nature to cause a difference applies to others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified of virtues. Consequently man’s good which is the object according to the objects of the passions. of love, desire and pleasure, may be taken as referred ei- Objection 4. Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it ther to a bodily sense, or to the inner apprehension of the produces good. But there are various virtues about the de- mind: and this same good may be directed to man’s good sires for good things: thus temperance is about desires for in himself, either in his body or in his soul, or to man’s the pleasure of touch, and “eutrapelia”∗ about pleasures in good in relation to other men. And every such difference, games. Therefore there should be different virtues about being differently related to reason, differentiates virtues. fears of evils. Accordingly, if we take a good, and it be something On the contrary, Chastity is about sexual pleasures, discerned by the sense of touch, and something pertaining abstinence about pleasures of the table, and “eutrapelia” to the upkeep of human life either in the individual or in about pleasures in games. the species, such as the pleasures of the table or of sexual I answer that, The perfection of a virtue depends on intercourse, it will belong to the virtue of “temperance.” the reason; whereas the perfection of a passion depends on As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they are not the sensitive appetite. Consequently virtues must needs be intense, and so do not present much difficulty to the rea- differentiated according to their relation to reason, but the son: hence there is no virtue corresponding to them; for passions according to their relation to the appetite. Hence virtue, “like art, is about difficult things” (Ethic. ii, 3). the objects of the passions, according as they are variously On the other hand, good discerned not by the senses, related to the sensitive appetite, cause the different species but by an inner power, and belonging to man in himself, of passions: while, according as they are related to rea- is like money and honor; the former, by its very nature, son, they cause the different species of virtues. Now the being employable for the good of the body, while the lat- ∗ eutrapelia 869 ter is based on the apprehension of the mind. These goods another virtue which (Ethic. iv, 7) he calls “truthfulness”†. again may be considered either absolutely, in which way For frankness is more akin to the reason than pleasure, and they concern the concupiscible faculty, or as being diffi- serious matters than play. Hence there is another virtue cult to obtain, in which way they belong to the irascible about the pleasures of games, which the Philosopher “eu- part: which distinction, however, has no place in pleasur- trapelia”‡ (Ethic. iv, 8). able objects of touch; since such are of base condition, It is therefore evident that, according to Aristotle, and are becoming to man in so far as he has something there are ten moral virtues about the passions, viz. for- in common with irrational animals. Accordingly in refer- titude, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanim- ence to money considered as a good absolutely, as an ob- ity, “philotimia,” gentleness, friendship, truthfulness, and ject of desire, pleasure, or love, there is “liberality”: but if “eutrapelia,” all of which differ in respect of their diverse we consider this good as difficult to get, and as being the matter, passions, or objects: so that if we add “justice,” object of our hope, there is “magnificence”†. With regard which is about operations, there will be eleven in all. to that good which we call honor, taken absolutely, as the Reply to Objection 1. All objects of the same specific object of love, we have a virtue called “philotimia”‡, i.e. operation have the same relation to reason: not so all the “love of honor”: while if we consider it as hard to attain, objects of the same specific passion; because operations and as an object of hope, then we have “magnanimity.” do not thwart reason as the passions do. Wherefore liberality and “philotimia” seem to be in the Reply to Objection 2. Passions are not differentiated concupiscible part, while magnificence and magnanimity by the same rule as virtues are, as stated above. are in the irascible. Reply to Objection 3. More and less do not cause a As regards man’s good in relation to other men, it does difference of species, unless they bear different relations not seem hard to obtain, but is considered absolutely, as to reason. the object of the concupiscible passions. This good may Reply to Objection 4. Good is a more potent mover be pleasurable to a man in his behavior towards another than evil: because evil does not cause movement save in either in some serious matter, in actions, to wit, that are virtue of good, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence directed by reason to a due end, or in playful actions, viz. an evil does not prove an obstacle to reason, so as to re- that are done for mere pleasure, and which do not stand in quire virtues unless that evil be great; there being, seem- the same relation to reason as the former. Now one man ingly, one such evil corresponding to each kind of passion. behaves towards another in serious matters, in two ways. Hence there is but one virtue, meekness, for every form of First, as being pleasant in his regard, by becoming speech anger; and, again, but one virtue, fortitude, for all forms and deeds: and this belongs to a virtue which Aristotle of daring. On the other hand, good involves difficulty, (Ethic. ii, 7) calls “friendship”∗, and may be rendered “af- which requires virtue, even if it be not a great good in that fability.” Secondly, one man behaves towards another by particular kind of passion. Consequently there are various being frank with him, in words and deeds: this belongs to moral virtues about desires, as stated above. † megaloprepeia ‡ philotimia ∗ philia † aletheia ‡ eutrapelia 870 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 61 Of the Cardinal Virtues (In Five Articles) We must now consider the cardinal virtues: under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues? (2) Of their number; (3) Which are they? (4) Whether they differ from one another? (5) Whether they are fittingly divided into social, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues? Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues? Ia IIae q. 61 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtues should quire rectitude of the appetite: because it merely confers not be called cardinal or principal virtues. For “the op- the faculty of doing well without causing the good deed posite members of a division are by nature simultaneous” to be done. Now it is evident that the perfect is principal (Categor. x), so that one is not principal rather than an- as compared to the imperfect: and so those virtues which other. Now all the virtues are opposite members of the imply rectitude of the appetite are called principal virtues. division of the genus “virtue.” Therefore none of them Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the in- should be called principal. tellectual virtues, for it is also something of a moral virtue, Objection 2. Further, the end is principal as compared as was clearly shown above (q. 57, a. 4). Consequently, to the means. But the theological virtues are about the those virtues which are called principal or cardinal are fit- end; while the moral virtues are about the means. There- tingly placed among the moral virtues. fore the theological virtues, rather than the moral virtues, Reply to Objection 1. When a univocal genus is di- should be called principal or cardinal. vided into its species, the members of the division are on Objection 3. Further, that which is essentially so is a par in the point of the generic idea; although considered principal in comparison with that which is so by partici- in their nature as things, one species may surpass another pation. But the intellectual virtues belong to that which in rank and perfection, as man in respect of other animals. is essentially rational: whereas the moral virtues belong But when we divide an analogous term, which is applied to that which is rational by participation, as stated above to several things, but to one before it is applied to another, (q. 58 , a. 3). Therefore the intellectual virtues are princi- nothing hinders one from ranking before another, even in pal, rather than the moral virtues. the point of the generic idea; as the notion of being is ap- On the contrary, Ambrose in explaining the words, plied to substance principally in relation to accident. Such “Blessed are the poor in spirit” (Lk. 6:20) says: “We know is the division of virtue into various kinds of virtue: since that there are four cardinal virtues, viz. temperance, jus- the good defined by reason is not found in the same way tice, prudence, and fortitude.” But these are moral virtues. in all things. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues. Reply to Objection 2. The theological virtues are I answer that, When we speak of virtue simply, we above man, as stated above (q. 58, a. 3, ad 3). Hence they are understood to speak of human virtue. Now human should properly be called not human, but “super-human” virtue, as stated above (q. 56, a. 3), is one that answers or godlike virtues. to the perfect idea of virtue, which requires rectitude of Reply to Objection 3. Although the intellectual the appetite: for such like virtue not only confers the fac- virtues, except in prudence, rank before the moral virtues, ulty of doing well, but also causes the good deed done. in the point of their subject, they do not rank before them On the other hand, the name virtue is applied to one that as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards good, which is the answers imperfectly to the idea of virtue, and does not re- object of the appetite. 871 Whether there are four cardinal virtues? Ia IIae q. 61 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that there are not four der into something else; either into operations, and then cardinal virtues. For prudence is the directing principle we have “Justice”; or into passions, and then we need two of the other moral virtues, as is clear from what has been virtues. For the need of putting the order of reason into said above (q. 58, a. 4). But that which directs other things the passions is due to their thwarting reason: and this oc- ranks before them. Therefore prudence alone is a princi- curs in two ways. First, by the passions inciting to some- pal virtue. thing against reason, and then the passions need a curb, Objection 2. Further, the principal virtues are, in a which we call “Temperance.” Secondly, by the passions way, moral virtues. Now we are directed to moral works withdrawing us from following the dictate of reason, e.g. both by the practical reason, and by a right appetite, as through fear of danger or toil: and then man needs to be stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Therefore there are only two cardi- strengthened for that which reason dictates, lest he turn nal virtues. back; and to this end there is “Fortitude.” Objection 3. Further, even among the other virtues In like manner, we find the same number if we con- one ranks higher than another. But in order that a virtue sider the subjects of virtue. For there are four subjects of be principal, it needs not to rank above all the others, but the virtue we speak of now: viz. the power which is ratio- above some. Therefore it seems that there are many more nal in its essence, and this is perfected by “Prudence”; and principal virtues. that which is rational by participation, and is threefold, the On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii): “The en- will, subject of “Justice,” the concupiscible faculty, sub- tire structure of good works is built on four virtues.” ject of “Temperance,” and the irascible faculty, subject of I answer that, Things may be numbered either in re- “Fortitude.” spect of their formal principles, or according to the sub- Reply to Objection 1. Prudence is the principal of all jects in which they are: and either way we find that there the virtues simply. The others are principal, each in its are four cardinal virtues. own genus. For the formal principle of the virtue of which we Reply to Objection 2. That part of the soul which is speak now is good as defined by reason; which good is rational by participation is threefold, as stated above. considered in two ways. First, as existing in the very act Reply to Objection 3. All the other virtues among of reason: and thus we have one principal virtue, called which one ranks before another, are reducible to the above “Prudence.” Secondly, according as the reason puts its or- four, both as to the subject and as to the formal principle. Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these? Ia IIae q. 61 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that other virtues should principles are found chiefly in certain acts and passions. be called principal rather than these. For, seemingly, the Thus the good which exists in the act of reason, is found greatest is the principal in any genus. Now “magnanim- chiefly in reason’s command, but not in its counsel or its ity has a great influence on all the virtues” (Ethic. iv, 3). judgment, as stated above (q. 57, a. 6). Again, good as Therefore magnanimity should more than any be called a defined by reason and put into our operations as some- principal virtue. thing right and due, is found chiefly in commutations and Objection 2. Further, that which strengthens the other distributions in respect of another person, and on a basis virtues should above all be called a principal virtue. But of equality. The good of curbing the passions is found such is humility: for Gregory says (Hom. iv in Ev.) that chiefly in those passions which are most difficult to curb, “he who gathers the other virtues without humility is as viz. in the pleasures of touch. The good of being firm in one who carries straw against the wind.” Therefore hu- holding to the good defined by reason, against the impulse mility seems above all to be a principal virtue. of passion, is found chiefly in perils of death, which are Objection 3. Further, that which is most perfect seems most difficult to withstand. to be principal. But this applies to patience, according to Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered James 1:4: “Patience hath a perfect work.” Therefore pa- in two ways. First, in respect of their common formal tience should be reckoned a principal virtue. principles. In this way they are called principal, being On the contrary, Cicero reduces all other virtues to general, as it were, in comparison with all the virtues: these four (De Invent. Rhet. ii). so that, for instance, any virtue that causes good in rea- I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), these four are son’s act of consideration, may be called prudence; every reckoned as cardinal virtues, in respect of the four for- virtue that causes the good of right and due in operation, mal principles of virtue as we understand it now. These be called justice; every virtue that curbs and represses 872 the passions, be called temperance; and every virtue that principal in comparison with the other virtues, on account strengthens the mind against any passions whatever, be of the importance of their matter: so that prudence is called fortitude. Many, both holy doctors, as also philoso- the virtue which commands; justice, the virtue which is phers, speak about these virtues in this sense: and in this about due actions between equals; temperance, the virtue way the other virtues are contained under them. Where- which suppresses desires for the pleasures of touch; and fore all the objections fail. fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against dangers of Secondly, they may be considered in point of their death. Thus again do the objections fail: because the other being denominated, each one from that which is fore- virtues may be principal in some other way, but these are most in its respective matter, and thus they are specific called principal by reason of their matter, as stated above. virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are called Whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another? Ia IIae q. 61 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the above four virtues are distinct from one another. are not diverse and distinct from one another. For Gregory I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), these four says (Moral. xxii, 1): “There is no true prudence, unless it virtues are understood differently by various writers. For be just, temperate and brave; no perfect temperance, that some take them as signifying certain general conditions is not brave, just and prudent; no sound fortitude, that is of the human mind, to be found in all the virtues: so that, not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice, without to wit, prudence is merely a certain rectitude of discre- prudence, fortitude and temperance.” But this would not tion in any actions or matters whatever; justice, a cer- be so, if the above virtues were distinct from one another: tain rectitude of the mind, whereby a man does what he since the different species of one genus do not qualify one ought in any matters; temperance, a disposition of the another. Therefore the aforesaid virtues are not distinct mind, moderating any passions or operations, so as to from one another. keep them within bounds; and fortitude, a disposition Objection 2. Further, among things distinct from one whereby the soul is strengthened for that which is in ac- another the function of one is not attributed to another. cord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, or But the function of temperance is attributed to fortitude: the toil involved by any operations. To distinguish these for Ambrose says (De Offic. xxxvi): “Rightly do we call it four virtues in this way does not imply that justice, tem- fortitude, when a man conquers himself, and is not weak- perance and fortitude are distinct virtuous habits: because ened and bent by any enticement.” And of temperance it is fitting that every moral virtue, from the fact that it he says (De Offic. xliii, xlv) that it “safeguards the man- is a “habit,” should be accompanied by a certain firmness ner and order in all things that we decide to do and say.” so as not to be moved by its contrary: and this, we have Therefore it seems that these virtues are not distinct from said, belongs to fortitude. Moreover, inasmuch as it is a one another. “virtue,” it is directed to good which involves the notion Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, of right and due; and this, we have said, belongs to justice. 4) that the necessary conditions of virtue are first of all Again, owing to the fact that it is a “moral virtue” partak- “that a man should have knowledge; secondly, that he ing of reason, it observes the mode of reason in all things, should exercise choice for a particular end; thirdly, that he and does not exceed its bounds, which has been stated to should possess the habit and act with firmness and stead- belong to temperance. It is only in the point of having dis- fastness.” But the first of these seems to belong to pru- cretion, which we ascribed to prudence, that there seems dence which is rectitude of reason in things to be done; to be a distinction from the other three, inasmuch as dis- the second, i.e. choice, belongs to temperance, whereby a cretion belongs essentially to reason; whereas the other man, holding his passions on the curb, acts, not from pas- three imply a certain share of reason by way of a kind sion but from choice; the third, that a man should act for of application (of reason) to passions or operations. Ac- the sake of a due end, implies a certain rectitude, which cording to the above explanation, then, prudence would seemingly belongs to justice; while the last, viz. firmness be distinct from the other three virtues: but these would and steadfastness, belongs to fortitude. Therefore each not be distinct from one another; for it is evident that one of these virtues is general in comparison to other virtues. and the same virtue is both habit, and virtue, and moral Therefore they are not distinct from one another. virtue. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. Others, however, with better reason, take these four xi) that “there are four virtues, corresponding to the var- virtues, according as they have their special determinate ious emotions of love,” and he applies this to the four matter; each of its own matter, in which special commen- virtues mentioned above. Therefore the same four virtues dation is given to that general condition from which the 873 virtue’s name is taken as stated above (a. 3). In this way titude against dangers of death, which is a matter of very it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct habits, dif-great difficulty, is more able to remain firm against the on- ferentiated in respect of their diverse objects. slaught of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De Offic. i), “it Reply to Objection 1. Gregory is speaking of these would be inconsistent for a man to be unbroken by fear, four virtues in the first sense given above. It may also be and yet vanquished by cupidity; or that he should be con- said that these four virtues qualify one another by a kind quered by lust, after showing himself to be unconquered of overflow. For the qualities of prudence overflow on to by toil.” the other virtues in so far as they are directed by prudence. From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. And each of the others overflows on to the rest, for the rea- For temperance observes the mean in all things, and for- son that whoever can do what is harder, can do what is less titude keeps the mind unbent by the enticements of plea- difficult. Wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the sures, either in so far as these virtues are taken to denote pleasures of touch, so that they keep within bounds, which certain general conditions of virtue, or in the sense that is a very hard thing to do, for this very reason is more able they overflow on to one another, as explained above. to check his daring in dangers of death, so as not to go Reply to Objection 3. These four general conditions too far, which is much easier; and in this sense fortitude of virtue set down by the Philosopher, are not proper to the is said to be temperate. Again, temperance is said to be aforesaid virtues. They may, however, be appropriated to brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing into temperance: them, in the way above stated. in so far, to wit, as he whose mind is strengthened by for- Whether the cardinal virtues are fittingly divided into social virtues, perfecting, perIa IIae q. 61 a. 5 fect, and exemplar virtues? Objection 1. It would seem that these four virtues “whereby good men work for the good of their country are unfittingly divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting and for the safety of the city.” But it is only legal justice virtues, perfect virtues, and social virtues. For as Macro- that is directed to the common weal, as the Philosopher bius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the “exemplar virtues states (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore other virtues should not be are such as exist in the mind of God.” Now the Philoso- called “social.” pher says (Ethic. x, 8) that “it is absurd to ascribe justice, On the contrary, Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God.” Therefore 1): “Plotinus, together with Plato foremost among teach- these virtues cannot be exemplar. ers of philosophy, says: ‘The four kinds of virtue are four- Objection 2. Further, the “perfect” virtues are those fold: In the first place there are social∗ virtues; secondly, which are without any passion: for Macrobius says (Su- there are perfecting virtues ; thirdly, there are perfect† per Somn. Scip. 1) that “in a soul that is cleansed, tem- virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues.’ ”‡ perance has not to check worldly desires, for it has for- I answer that, As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. gotten all about them: fortitude knows nothing about the vi), “the soul needs to follow something in order to give passions; it does not have to conquer them.” Now it was birth to virtue: this something is God: if we follow Him stated above (q. 59, a. 5) that the aforesaid virtues cannot we shall live aright.” Consequently the exemplar of hu- be without passions. Therefore there is no such thing as man virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just as in Him “perfect” virtue. pre-exist the types of all things. Accordingly virtue may Objection 3. Further, he says (Macrobius: Super be considered as existing originally in God, and thus we Somn. Scip. 1) that the “perfecting” virtues are those of speak of “exemplar” virtues: so that in God the Divine the man “who flies from human affairs and devotes him- Mind itself may be called prudence; while temperance is self exclusively to the things of God.” But it seems wrong the turning of God’s gaze on Himself, even as in us it is to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i): “I reckon that it is that which conforms the appetite to reason. God’s for-not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say titude is His unchangeableness; His justice is the obser- that he despises what most men admire, viz. power and vance of the Eternal Law in His works, as Plotinus states office.” Therefore there are no “perfecting” virtues. (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1). Objection 4. Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Again, since man by his nature is a social§ animal, Somn. Scip. 1) that the “social” virtues are those these virtues, in so far as they are in him according to the ∗ Virtutes purgatoriae: literally meaning, cleansing virtues † Virtutes purgati animi: literally, virtues of the clean soul ‡ Cf. Chrysostom’s fifteenth homily on St. Matthew, where he says: “The gentle, the modest, the merciful, the just man does not shut up his good deeds within himself. . . He that is clean of heart and peaceful, and suffers persecution for the sake of the truth, lives for the common weal.” § See above note on Chrysostom 874 condition of his nature, are called “social” virtues; since it Reply to Objection 2. Human virtues, that is to say, is by reason of them that man behaves himself well in the virtues of men living together in this world, are about the conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have passions. But the virtues of those who have attained to been speaking of these virtues until now. perfect bliss are without passions. Hence Plotinus says But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1) that “the social onward even to Divine things, as even the Philosopher de- virtues check the passions,” i.e. they bring them to the rel- clares in Ethic. x, 7, and as Scripture often admonishes ative mean; “the second kind,” viz. the perfecting virtues, us—for instance: “Be ye. . . perfect, as your heavenly Fa- “uproot them”; “the third kind,” viz. the perfect virtues, ther is perfect” (Mat. 5:48), we must needs place some “forget them; while it is impious to mention them in con- virtues between the social or human virtues, and the ex- nection with virtues of the fourth kind,” viz. the exemplar emplar virtues which are Divine. Now these virtues differ virtues. It may also be said that here he is speaking of by reason of a difference of movement and term: so that passions as denoting inordinate emotions. some are virtues of men who are on their way and tending Reply to Objection 3. To neglect human affairs towards the Divine similitude; and these are called “per- when necessity forbids is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. fecting” virtues. Thus prudence, by contemplating the Hence Cicero says a little earlier: “Perhaps one should things of God, counts as nothing all things of the world, make allowances for those who by reason of their ex- and directs all the thoughts of the soul to God alone: tem- ceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning; as perance, so far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the also to those who have retired from public life on account body; fortitude prevents the soul from being afraid of ne- of failing health, or for some other yet weightier motive; glecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and jus- when such men yielded to others the power and renown tice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted consent to of authority.” This agrees with what Augustine says (De follow the way thus proposed. Besides these there are the Civ. Dei xix, 19): “The love of truth demands a hollowed virtues of those who have already attained to the Divine leisure; charity necessitates good works. If no one lays similitude: these are called the “perfect virtues.” Thus this burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study prudence sees nought else but the things of God; temper- and contemplation of truth; but if the burden is laid on us ance knows no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge it is to be taken up under the pressure of charity.” of passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is Reply to Objection 4. Legal justice alone regards united thereto by an everlasting covenant. Such as the the common weal directly: but by commanding the other virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some virtues it draws them all into the service of the common who are at the summit of perfection. weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1). For we Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as we of these virtues according as they relate to human affairs; understand them here, to do well not only towards the for instance, justice, about buying and selling; fortitude, community, but also towards the parts of the community, about fear; temperance, about desires; for in this sense it viz. towards the household, or even towards one individ- is absurd to attribute them to God. ual. 875 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 62 Of the Theological Virtues (In Four Articles) We must now consider the Theological Virtues: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are any theological virtues? (2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues? (3) How many, and which are they? (4) Of their order. Whether there are any theological virtues? Ia IIae q. 62 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there are not any the- vine nature.” And because such happiness surpasses the ological virtues. For according to Phys. vii, text. 17, capacity of human nature, man’s natural principles which “virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is enable him to act well according to his capacity, do not best: and by perfect, I mean that which is disposed accord- suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is ing to nature.” But that which is Divine is above man’s necessary for man to receive from God some additional nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural a man. happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, Objection 2. Further, theological virtues are quasi- by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Di- Divine virtues. But the Divine virtues are exemplars, as vine assistance. Such like principles are called “theolog- stated above (q. 61, a. 5), which are not in us but in God. ical virtues”: first, because their object is God, inasmuch Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of man. as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are Objection 3. Further, the theological virtues are so infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues called because they direct us to God, Who is the first be- are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, con- ginning and last end of all things. But by the very nature tained in Holy Writ. of his reason and will, man is directed to his first begin- Reply to Objection 1. A certain nature may be as- ning and last end. Therefore there is no need for any habits cribed to a certain thing in two ways. First, essentially: of theological virtue, to direct the reason and will to God. and thus these theological virtues surpass the nature of On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about man. Secondly, by participation, as kindled wood par- acts of virtue. Now the Divine Law contains precepts takes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion, man about the acts of faith, hope, and charity: for it is writ- becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: ten (Ecclus. 2:8, seqq.): “Ye that fear the Lord believe so that these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of Him,” and again, “hope in Him,” and again, “love Him.” the Nature of which he is made a partaker. Therefore faith, hope, and charity are virtues directing us Reply to Objection 2. These virtues are called Di- to God. Therefore they are theological virtues. vine, not as though God were virtuous by reason of them, I answer that, Man is perfected by virtue, for those but because of them God makes us virtuous, and directs actions whereby he is directed to happiness, as was ex- us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but exemplate plained above (q. 5, a. 7). Now man’s happiness is virtues. twofold, as was also stated above (q. 5, a. 5). One is pro- Reply to Objection 3. The reason and will are natu- portionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which rally directed to God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The end of nature, but in proportion to nature. But the reason other is a happiness surpassing man’s nature, and which and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently di- man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of rected to Him in so far as He is the object of supernatural participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2 happiness. Pet. 1:4) that by Christ we are made “partakers of the Di- 876 Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues? Ia IIae q. 62 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the theological the theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual of all, as surpassing the knowledge of our reason. On the virtues. For the theological virtues, if they be in a human other hand, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues soul, must needs perfect it, either as to the intellective, or is something comprehensible to human reason. Where- as to the appetitive part. Now the virtues which perfect fore the theological virtues are specifically distinct from the intellective part are called intellectual; and the virtues the moral and intellectual virtues. which perfect the appetitive part, are called moral. There- Reply to Objection 1. The intellectual and moral fore, the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral virtues perfect man’s intellect and appetite according to and intellectual virtues. the capacity of human nature; the theological virtues, su- Objection 2. Further, the theological virtues are those pernaturally. which direct us to God. Now, among the intellectual Reply to Objection 2. The wisdom which the virtues there is one which directs us to God: this is wis- Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,7) reckons as an intellectual dom, which is about Divine things, since it considers the virtue, considers Divine things so far as they are open to highest cause. Therefore the theological virtues are not the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on the distinct from the intellectual virtues. other hand, is about those same things so far as they sur- Objection 3. Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. pass human reason. xv) shows how the four cardinal virtues are the “order of Reply to Objection 3. Though charity is love, yet love love.” Now love is charity, which is a theological virtue. is not always charity. When, then, it is stated that every Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct from the theo- virtue is the order of love, this can be understood either logical. of love in the general sense, or of the love of charity. If On the contrary, That which is above man’s nature it be understood of love, commonly so called, then each is distinct from that which is according to his nature. But virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each the theological virtues are above man’s nature; while the cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; and love is the intellectual and moral virtues are in proportion to his na- root and cause of every emotion, as stated above (q. 27, ture, as clearly shown above (q. 58, a. 3). Therefore they a. 4; q. 28, a. 6, ad 2; q. 41, a. 2, ad 1). If, however, it are distinct from one another. be understood of the love of charity, it does not mean that I answer that, As stated above (q. 54, a. 2, ad 1), every other virtue is charity essentially: but that all other habits are specifically distinct from one another in respect virtues depend on charity in some way, as we shall show of the formal difference of their objects. Now the object of further on (q. 65, Aa. 2,5; IIa IIae, q. 23, a. 7). Whether faith, hope, and charity are fittingly reckoned as theological virtues? Ia IIae q. 62 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that faith, hope, and char- intellect and will. Therefore there should be only two the- ity are not fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. ological virtues, one perfecting the intellect, the other, the For the theological virtues are in relation to Divine hap- will. piness, what the natural inclination is in relation to the On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13): connatural end. Now among the virtues directed to the “Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three.” connatural end there is but one natural virtue, viz. the un- I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the theological derstanding of principles. Therefore there should be but virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same one theological virtue. way as by the natural inclination man is directed to his Objection 2. Further, the theological virtues are more connatural end. Now the latter happens in respect of two perfect than the intellectual and moral virtues. Now faith things. First, in respect of the reason or intellect, in so is not reckoned among the intellectual virtues, but is far as it contains the first universal principles which are something less than a virtue, since it is imperfect knowl- known to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which edge. Likewise hope is not reckoned among the moral are reason’s starting-point, both in speculative and in prac- virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a tical matters. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will passion. Much less therefore should they be reckoned as which tends naturally to good as defined by reason. theological virtues. But these two fall short of the order of supernatural Objection 3. Further, the theological virtues direct happiness, according to 1 Cor. 2:9: “The eye hath not man’s soul to God. Now man’s soul cannot be directed seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart to God, save through the intellective part, wherein are the of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love 877 Him.” Consequently in respect of both the above things to its conformity with the end. But the nature of the power man needed to receive in addition something supernatu- is insufficient in either of these respects, for the will to be ral to direct him to a supernatural end. First, as regards directed to things that are above its nature. Consequently the intellect, man receives certain supernatural principles, there was need for an additional supernatural habit in both which are held by means of a Divine light: these are the respects. articles of faith, about which is faith. Secondly, the will Reply to Objection 2. Faith and hope imply a certain is directed to this end, both as to that end as something imperfection: since faith is of things unseen, and hope, attainable—and this pertains to hope—and as to a certain of things not possessed. Hence faith and hope, in things spiritual union, whereby the will is, so to speak, trans- that are subject to human power, fall short of the notion of formed into that end—and this belongs to charity. For the virtue. But faith and hope in things which are above the appetite of a thing is moved and tends towards its connat- capacity of human nature surpass all virtue that is in pro- ural end naturally; and this movement is due to a certain portion to man, according to 1 Cor. 1:25: “The weakness conformity of the thing with its end. of God is stronger than men.” Reply to Objection 1. The intellect requires intelligi- Reply to Objection 3. Two things pertain to the ap- ble species whereby to understand: consequently there is petite, viz. movement to the end, and conformity with the need of a natural habit in addition to the power. But the end by means of love. Hence there must needs be two the- very nature of the will suffices for it to be directed natu- ological virtues in the human appetite, namely, hope and rally to the end, both as to the intention of the end and as charity. Whether faith precedes hope, and hope charity? Ia IIae q. 62 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the order of the the- through someone, he looks on the man in whom he hopes ological virtues is not that faith precedes hope, and hope as a good of his own. Hence for the very reason that a man charity. For the root precedes that which grows from it. hopes in someone, he proceeds to love him: so that in the Now charity is the root of all the virtues, according to Eph. order of generation, hope precedes charity as regards their 3:17: “Being rooted and founded in charity.” Therefore respective acts. charity precedes the others. But in the order of perfection, charity precedes faith Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. and hope: because both faith and hope are quickened by Christ. i): “A man cannot love what he does not believe to charity, and receive from charity their full complement as exist. But if he believes and loves, by doing good works virtues. For thus charity is the mother and the root of all he ends in hoping.” Therefore it seems that faith precedes the virtues, inasmuch as it is the form of them all, as we charity, and charity hope. shall state further on ( IIa IIae, q. 23, a. 8). Objection 3. Further, love is the principle of all our This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. emotions, as stated above (a. 2, ad 3). Now hope is a kind Reply to Objection 2. Augustine is speaking of that of emotion, since it is a passion, as stated above (q. 25, hope whereby a man hopes to obtain bliss through the a. 2). Therefore charity, which is love, precedes hope. merits which he has already: this belongs to hope quick- On the contrary, The Apostle enumerates them thus ened by and following charity. But it is possible for a man (1 Cor. 13:13): “Now there remain faith, hope, charity.” before having charity, to hope through merits not already I answer that, Order is twofold: order of generation, possessed, but which he hopes to possess. and order of perfection. By order of generation, in re- Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 40, a. 7), spect of which matter precedes form, and the imperfect in treating of the passions, hope regards two things. One precedes the perfect, in one same subject faith precedes as its principal object, viz. the good hoped for. With re- hope, and hope charity, as to their acts: because habits gard to this, love always precedes hope: for good is never are all infused together. For the movement of the appetite hoped for unless it be desired and loved. Hope also re- cannot tend to anything, either by hoping or loving, unless gards the person from whom a man hopes to be able to that thing be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. obtain some good. With regard to this, hope precedes love Now it is by faith that the intellect apprehends the object at first; though afterwards hope is increased by love. Be- of hope and love. Hence in the order of generation, faith cause from the fact that a man thinks that he can obtain a precedes hope and charity. In like manner a man loves a good through someone, he begins to love him: and from thing because he apprehends it as his good. Now from the the fact that he loves him, he then hopes all the more in very fact that a man hopes to be able to obtain some good him. 878 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 63 Of the Cause of Virtues (In Four Articles) We must now consider the cause of virtues; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether virtue is in us by nature? (2) Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation? (3) Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion? (4) Whether virtue acquired by habituation, is of the same species as infused virtue? Whether virtue is in us by nature? Ia IIae q. 63 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that virtue is in us by na- ists. Others said that they are wholly from without, being ture. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14): “Virtues due to the inflow of the active intellect, as Avicenna main- are natural to us and are equally in all of us.” And Antony tained. Others said that sciences and virtues are within us says in his sermon to the monks: “If the will contradicts by nature, so far as we are adapted to them, but not in their nature it is perverse, if it follow nature it is virtuous.” perfection: this is the teaching of the Philosopher (Ethic. Moreover, a gloss on Mat. 4:23, “Jesus went about,” etc., ii, 1), and is nearer the truth. says: “He taught them natural virtues, i.e. chastity, jus- To make this clear, it must be observed that there are tice, humility, which man possesses naturally.” two ways in which something is said to be natural to a Objection 2. Further, the virtuous good consists in man; one is according to his specific nature, the other ac- accord with reason, as was clearly shown above (q. 55, cording to his individual nature. And, since each thing de- a. 4, ad 2). But that which accords with reason is natural rives its species from its form, and its individuation from to man; since reason is part of man’s nature. Therefore matter, and, again, since man’s form is his rational soul, virtue is in man by nature. while his matter is his body, whatever belongs to him in Objection 3. Further, that which is in us from birth is respect of his rational soul, is natural to him in respect of said to be natural to us. Now virtues are in some from his specific nature; while whatever belongs to him in re- birth: for it is written (Job 31:18): “From my infancy spect of the particular temperament of his body, is natural mercy grew up with me; and it came out with me from my to him in respect of his individual nature. For whatever is mother’s womb.” Therefore virtue is in man by nature. natural to man in respect of his body, considered as part On the contrary, Whatever is in man by nature is of his species, is to be referred, in a way, to the soul, in common to all men, and is not taken away by sin, since so far as this particular body is adapted to this particular even in the demons natural gifts remain, as Dionysius soul. states (Div. Nom. iv). But virtue is not in all men; and is In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoat- cast out by sin. Therefore it is not in man by nature. ively. This is so in respect of the specific nature, in so I answer that, With regard to corporeal forms, it far as in man’s reason are to be found instilled by nature has been maintained by some that they are wholly from certain naturally known principles of both knowledge and within, by those, for instance, who upheld the theory of action, which are the nurseries of intellectual and moral “latent forms”∗. Others held that forms are entirely from virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural ap- without, those, for instance, who thought that corporeal petite for good in accordance with reason. Again, this is forms originated from some separate cause. Others, how- so in respect of the individual nature, in so far as by reason ever, esteemed that they are partly from within, in so far as of a disposition in the body, some are disposed either well they pre-exist potentially in matter; and partly from with- or ill to certain virtues: because, to wit, certain sensitive out, in so far as they are brought into act by the agent. powers are acts of certain parts of the body, according to In like manner with regard to sciences and virtues, the disposition of which these powers are helped or hin- some held that they are wholly from within, so that all dered in the exercise of their acts, and, in consequence, the virtues and sciences would pre-exist in the soul naturally, rational powers also, which the aforesaid sensitive powers but that the hindrances to science and virtue, which are assist. In this way one man has a natural aptitude for sci- due to the soul being weighed down by the body, are re- ence, another for fortitude, another for temperance: and in moved by study and practice, even as iron is made bright these ways, both intellectual and moral virtues are in us by by being polished. This was the opinion of the Platon- way of a natural aptitude, inchoatively, but not perfectly, ∗ Anaxagoras; Cf. Ia, q. 45, a. 8; q. 65, a. 4 879 since nature is determined to one, while the perfection of entirely from without. these virtues does not depend on one particular mode of This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the action, but on various modes, in respect of the various first two argue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us matters, which constitute the sphere of virtue’s action, and by nature, inasmuch as we are rational beings. The third according to various circumstances. objection must be taken in the sense that, owing to the nat- It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by na- ural disposition which the body has from birth, one has an ture, according to aptitude and inchoation, but not accord- aptitude for pity, another for living temperately, another ing to perfection, except the theological virtues, which are for some other virtue. Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation? Ia IIae q. 63 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that virtues can not be is defined according to the rule of human reason can be caused in us by habituation. Because a gloss of Augus- caused by human acts: inasmuch as such acts proceed tine∗ commenting on Rom. 14:23, “All that is not of faith from reason, by whose power and rule the aforesaid good is sin,” says: “The whole life of an unbeliever is a sin: is established. On the other hand, virtue which directs and there is no good without the Sovereign Good. Where man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by hu- knowledge of the truth is lacking, virtue is a mockery even man reason, cannot be caused by human acts, the principle in the best behaved people.” Now faith cannot be acquired of which is reason, but is produced in us by the Divine op- by means of works, but is caused in us by God, accord- eration alone. Hence Augustine in giving the definition of ing to Eph. 2:8: “By grace you are saved through faith.” the latter virtue inserts the words, “which God works in Therefore no acquired virtue can be in us by habituation. us without us” (Super Ps. 118, Serm. xxvi). It is also of Objection 2. Further, sin and virtue are contraries, so these virtues that the First Objection holds good. that they are incompatible. Now man cannot avoid sin ex- Reply to Objection 2. Mortal sin is incompatible with cept by the grace of God, according to Wis. 8:21: “I knew divinely infused virtue, especially if this be considered in that I could not otherwise be continent, except God gave its perfect state. But actual sin, even mortal, is compatible it.” Therefore neither can any virtues be caused in us by with humanly acquired virtue; because the use of a habit habituation, but only by the gift of God. in us is subject to our will, as stated above (q. 49, a. 3): and Objection 3. Further, actions which lead toward one sinful act does not destroy a habit of acquired virtue, virtue, lack the perfection of virtue. But an effect cannot since it is not an act but a habit, that is directly contrary be more perfect than its cause. Therefore a virtue cannot to a habit. Wherefore, though man cannot avoid mortal be caused by actions that precede it. sin without grace, so as never to sin mortally, yet he is On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that not hindered from acquiring a habit of virtue, whereby he good is more efficacious than evil. But vicious habits are may abstain from evil in the majority of cases, and chiefly caused by evil acts. Much more, therefore, can virtuous in matters most opposed to reason. There are also certain habits be caused by good acts. mortal sins which man can nowise avoid without grace, I answer that, We have spoken above (q. 51, Aa. 2,3) those, namely, which are directly opposed to the theologi- in a general way about the production of habits from acts; cal virtues, which are in us through the gift of grace. This, and speaking now in a special way of this matter in re- however, will be more fully explained later (q. 109, a. 4). lation to virtue, we must take note that, as stated above Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (a. 1; q. 51, (q. 55, Aa. 3,4), man’s virtue perfects him in relation to a. 1), certain seeds or principles of acquired virtue pre- good. Now since the notion of good consists in “mode, exist in us by nature. These principles are more excellent species, and order,” as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni. iii) than the virtues acquired through them: thus the under- or in “number, weight, and measure,” as expressed in Wis. standing of speculative principles is more excellent than 11:21, man’s good must needs be appraised with respect the science of conclusions, and the natural rectitude of the to some rule. Now this rule is twofold, as stated above reason is more excellent than the rectification of the ap- (q. 19, Aa. 3,4), viz. human reason and Divine Law. And petite which results through the appetite partaking of rea- since Divine Law is the higher rule, it extends to more son, which rectification belongs to moral virtue. Accord- things, so that whatever is ruled by human reason, is ruled ingly human acts, in so far as they proceed from higher by the Divine Law too; but the converse does not hold. principles, can cause acquired human virtues. It follows that human virtue directed to the good which ∗ Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi cvi. 880 Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion? Ia IIae q. 63 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that no virtues besides the tain natural principles pre-existing in us, as above stated theological virtues are infused in us by God. Because God (a. 1; q. 51, a. 1): instead of which natural principles, God does not do by Himself, save perhaps sometimes miracu- bestows on us the theological virtues, whereby we are di- lously, those things that can be done by second causes; rected to a supernatural end, as stated (q. 62, a. 1). Where- for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv), “it is God’s rule fore we need to receive from God other habits correspond- to bring about extremes through the mean.” Now intellec- ing, in due proportion, to the theological virtues, which tual and moral virtues can be caused in us by our acts, as habits are to the theological virtues, what the moral and stated above (a. 2). Therefore it is not reasonable that they intellectual virtues are to the natural principles of virtue. should be caused in us by infusion. Reply to Objection 1. Some moral and intellectual Objection 2. Further, much less superfluity is found virtues can indeed be caused in us by our actions: but such in God’s works than in the works of nature. Now the the- are not proportionate to the theological virtues. Therefore ological virtues suffice to direct us to supernatural good. it was necessary for us to receive, from God immediately, Therefore there are no other supernatural virtues needing others that are proportionate to these virtues. to be caused in us by God. Reply to Objection 2. The theological virtues direct Objection 3. Further, nature does not employ two us sufficiently to our supernatural end, inchoatively: i.e. means where one suffices: much less does God. But God to God Himself immediately. But the soul needs further sowed the seeds of virtue in our souls, according to a gloss to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things, on Heb. 1∗. Therefore it is unfitting for Him to cause in yet in relation to God. us other virtues by means of infusion. Reply to Objection 3. The power of those naturally On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 8:7): “She tea- instilled principles does not extend beyond the capacity cheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude.” of nature. Consequently man needs in addition to be per- I answer that, Effects must needs be proportionate to fected by other principles in relation to his supernatural their causes and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual end. and moral, that are acquired by our actions, arise from cer- Whether virtue by habituation belongs to the same species as infused virtue? Ia IIae q. 63 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that infused virtue does words, “which God works in us without us,” as stated not differ in species from acquired virtue. Because ac- above (q. 55, a. 4). Therefore acquired virtue, to which quired and infused virtues, according to what has been these words cannot apply, is not of the same species as said (a. 3), do not differ seemingly, save in relation to the infused virtue. last end. Now human habits and acts are specified, not by I answer that, There is a twofold specific difference their last, but by their proximate end. Therefore the in- among habits. The first, as stated above (q. 54, a. 2; q. 56, fused moral or intellectual virtue does not differ from the a. 2; q. 60, a. 1), is taken from the specific and formal as- acquired virtue. pects of their objects. Now the object of every virtue is a Objection 2. Further, habits are known by their acts. good considered as in that virtue’s proper matter: thus the But the act of infused and acquired temperance is the object of temperance is a good in respect of the pleasures same, viz. to moderate desires of touch. Therefore they connected with the concupiscence of touch. The formal do not differ in species. aspect of this object is from reason which fixes the mean Objection 3. Further, acquired and infused virtue dif- in these concupiscences: while the material element is fer as that which is wrought by God immediately, from something on the part of the concupiscences. Now it is that which is wrought by a creature. But the man whom evident that the mean that is appointed in such like concu- God made, is of the same species as a man begotten nat- piscences according to the rule of human reason, is seen urally; and the eye which He gave to the man born blind, under a different aspect from the mean which is fixed ac- as one produced by the power of generation. Therefore it cording to Divine rule. For instance, in the consumption seems that acquired and infused virtue belong to the same of food, the mean fixed by human reason, is that food species. should not harm the health of the body, nor hinder the On the contrary, Any change introduced into the dif- use of reason: whereas, according to the Divine rule, it ference expressed in a definition involves a difference of behooves man to “chastise his body, and bring it into sub- species. But the definition of infused virtue contains the jection” (1 Cor. 9:27), by abstinence in food, drink and ∗ Cf. Jerome on Gal. 1: 15,16 881 the like. It is therefore evident that infused and acquired respect of human affairs. temperance differ in species; and the same applies to the Reply to Objection 1. Infused and acquired virtue other virtues. differ not only in relation to the ultimate end, but also in The other specific differences among habits is taken relation to their proper objects, as stated. from the things to which they are directed: for a man’s Reply to Objection 2. Both acquired and infused health and a horse’s are not of the same species, on ac- temperance moderate desires for pleasures of touch, but count of the difference between the natures to which their for different reasons, as stated: wherefore their respective respective healths are directed. In the same sense, the acts are not identical. Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3) that citizens have di- Reply to Objection 3. God gave the man born blind verse virtues according as they are well directed to diverse an eye for the same act as the act for which other eyes are forms of government. In the same way, too, those infused formed naturally: consequently it was of the same species. moral virtues, whereby men behave well in respect of their It would be the same if God wished to give a man miracu- being “fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the house- lously virtues, such as those that are acquired by acts. But hold [Douay: ‘domestics’] of God” (Eph. 2:19), differ the case is not so in the question before us, as stated. from the acquired virtues, whereby man behaves well in 882 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 64 Of the Mean of Virtue (In Four Articles) We must now consider the properties of virtues: and (1) the mean of virtue, (2) the connection between virtues, (3) equality of virtues, (4) the duration of virtues. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether moral virtue observes the mean? (2) Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean or the rational mean? (3) Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean? (4) Whether the theological virtues do? Whether moral virtues observe the mean? Ia IIae q. 64 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtue does not evident that moral virtue observes the mean. observe the mean. For the nature of a mean is incompat- Reply to Objection 1. Moral virtue derives goodness ible with that which is extreme. Now the nature of virtue from the rule of reason, while its matter consists in pas- is to be something extreme; for it is stated in De Coelo i sions or operations. If therefore we compare moral virtue that “virtue is the limit of power.” Therefore moral virtue to reason, then, if we look at that which is has of reason, it does not observe the mean. holds the position of one extreme, viz. conformity; while Objection 2. Further, the maximum is not a mean. excess and defect take the position of the other extreme, Now some moral virtues tend to a maximum: for instance, viz. deformity. But if we consider moral virtue in respect magnanimity to very great honors, and magnificence to of its matter, then it holds the position of mean, in so far as very large expenditure, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2,3. There-it makes the passion conform to the rule of reason. Hence fore not every moral virtue observes the mean. the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that “virtue, as to its Objection 3. Further, if it is essential to a moral virtue essence, is a mean state,” in so far as the rule of virtue to observe the mean, it follows that a moral virtue is not is imposed on its proper matter: “but it is an extreme in perfected, but the contrary corrupted, through tending to reference to the ‘best’ and the ‘excellent,’ ” viz. as to its something extreme. Now some moral virtues are per- conformity with reason. fected by tending to something extreme; thus virginity, Reply to Objection 2. In actions and passions the which abstains from all sexual pleasure, observes the ex- mean and the extremes depend on various circumstances: treme, and is the most perfect chastity: and to give all to hence nothing hinders something from being extreme in the poor is the most perfect mercy or liberality. There- a particular virtue as to one circumstance, while the same fore it seems that it is not essential to moral virtue that it thing is a mean in respect of other circumstances, through should observe the mean. being in conformity with reason. This is the case with On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) magnanimity and magnificence. For if we look at the ab- that “moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean.” solute quantity of the respective objects of these virtues, I answer that, As already explained (q. 55, a. 3), the we shall call it an extreme and a maximum: but if we nature of virtue is that it should direct man to good. Now consider the quantity in relation to other circumstances, moral virtue is properly a perfection of the appetitive part then it has the character of a mean: since these virtues of the soul in regard to some determinate matter: and the tend to this maximum in accordance with the rule of rea- measure or rule of the appetitive movement in respect of son, i.e. “where” it is right, “when” it is right, and for an appetible objects is the reason. But the good of that which “end” that is right. There will be excess, if one tends to is measured or ruled consists in its conformity with its this maximum “when” it is not right, or “where” it is not rule: thus the good things made by art is that they fol- right, or for an undue “end”; and there will be deficiency low the rule of art. Consequently, in things of this sort, if one fails to tend thereto “where” one ought, and “when” evil consists in discordance from their rule or measure. one aught. This agrees with the saying of the Philosopher Now this may happen either by their exceeding the mea- (Ethic. iv, 3) that the “magnanimous man observes the sure or by their falling short of it; as is clearly the case in extreme in quantity, but the mean in the right mode of his all things ruled or measured. Hence it is evident that the action.” good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule Reply to Objection 3. The same is to be said of of reason. Now it is clear that between excess and defi- virginity and poverty as of magnanimity. For virginity ciency the mean is equality or conformity. Therefore it is abstains from all sexual matters, and poverty from all 883 wealth, for a right end, and in a right manner, i.e. accord-if it be not done when it ought to be done, or as it ought to ing to God’s word, and for the sake of eternal life. But if be done, it is a vice by deficiency: for instance, in those this be done in an undue manner, i.e. out of unlawful su- who break their vows of virginity or poverty. perstition, or again for vainglory, it will be in excess. And Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, or the rational mean? Ia IIae q. 64 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the mean of moral that which the reason puts into some particular matter. In virtue is not the rational mean, but the real mean. For the this sense every mean of moral virtue is a rational mean, good of moral virtue consists in its observing the mean. since, as above stated (a. 1), moral virtue is said to observe Now, good, as stated in Metaph. ii, text. 8, is in things the mean, through conformity with right reason. themselves. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is a real But it happens sometimes that the rational mean is also mean. the real mean: in which case the mean of moral virtue is Objection 2. Further, the reason is a power of ap- the real mean, for instance, in justice. On the other hand, prehension. But moral virtue does not observe a mean sometimes the rational mean is not the real mean, but is between apprehensions, but rather a mean between oper- considered in relation to us: and such is the mean in all ations or passions. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is the other moral virtues. The reason for this is that jus- not the rational, but the real mean. tice is about operations, which deal with external things, Objection 3. Further, a mean that is observed ac- wherein the right has to be established simply and abso- cording to arithmetical or geometrical proportion is a real lutely, as stated above (q. 60, a. 2): wherefore the ratio- mean. Now such is the mean of justice, as stated in Ethic. nal mean in justice is the same as the real mean, in so v, 3. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational, far, to wit as justice gives to each one his due, neither but the real mean. more nor less. But the other moral virtues deal with in- On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) terior passions wherein the right cannot be established in that “moral virtue observes the mean fixed, in our regard, the same way, since men are variously situated in relation by reason.” to their passions; hence the rectitude of reason has to be I answer that, The rational mean can be understood established in the passions, with due regard to us, who are in two ways. First, according as the mean is observed in moved in respect of the passions. the act itself of reason, as though the very act of reason This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the were made to observe the mean: in this sense, since moral first two arguments take the rational mean as being in the virtue perfects not the act of reason, but the act of the ap- very act of reason, while the third argues from the mean petitive power, the mean of moral virtue is not the rational of justice. mean. Secondly, the mean of reason may be considered as Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean? Ia IIae q. 64 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual the intellect, are not in opposition to one another, but are virtues do not observe the mean. Because moral virtue understood together, as white and black, healthy and sick. observes the mean by conforming to the rule of reason. Therefore there is no mean in the intellectual virtues. But the intellectual virtues are in reason itself, so that they On the contrary, Art is an intellectual virtue; and yet seem to have no higher rule. Therefore the intellectual there is a mean in art (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore also intel- virtues do not observe the mean. lectual virtue observes the mean. Objection 2. Further, the mean of moral virtue is fixed I answer that, The good of anything consists in its by an intellectual virtue: for it is stated in Ethic. ii, 6, observing the mean, by conforming with a rule or mea- that “virtue observes the mean appointed by reason, as a sure in respect of which it may happen to be excessive or prudent man would appoint it.” If therefore intellectual deficient, as stated above (a. 1). Now intellectual virtue, virtue also observe the mean, this mean will have to be like moral virtue, is directed to the good, as stated above appointed for them by another virtue, so that there would (q. 56, a. 3). Hence the good of an intellectual virtue con- be an indefinite series of virtues. sists in observing the mean, in so far as it is subject to a Objection 3. Further, a mean is, properly speaking, measure. Now the good of intellectual virtue is the true; between contraries, as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. in the case of contemplative virtue, it is the true taken ab- x, text. 22,23). But there seems to be no contrariety in solutely (Ethic. vi, 2); in the case of practical virtue, it is the intellect; since contraries themselves, as they are in the true in conformity with a right appetite. 884 Now truth apprehended by our intellect, if we consider is to be applied in both cases. it absolutely, is measured by things; since things are the Reply to Objection 1. Intellectual virtues also have measure of our intellect, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5; their measure, as stated, and they observe the mean ac- because there is truth in what we think or say, according cording as they conform to that measure. as the thing is so or not. Accordingly the good of spec- Reply to Objection 2. There is no need for an indef- ulative intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean, by inite series of virtues: because the measure and rule of way of conformity with things themselves, in so far as the intellectual virtue is not another kind of virtue, but things intellect expresses them as being what they are, or as not themselves. being what they are not: and it is in this that the nature Reply to Objection 3. The things themselves that are of truth consists. There will be excess if something false contrary have no contrariety in the mind, because one is is affirmed, as though something were, which in reality it the reason for knowing the other: nevertheless there is in is not: and there will be deficiency if something is falsely the intellect contrariety of affirmation and negation, which denied, and declared not to be, whereas in reality it is. are contraries, as stated at the end of Peri Hermenias. For The truth of practical intellectual virtue, if we consider though “to be” and “not to be” are not in contrary, but it in relation to things, is by way of that which is mea- in contradictory opposition to one another, so long as we sured; so that both in practical and in speculative intellec- consider their signification in things themselves, for on tual virtues, the mean consists in conformity with things. the one hand we have “being” and on the other we have But if we consider it in relation to the appetite, it has the simply “non-being”; yet if we refer them to the act of the character of a rule and measure. Consequently the recti- mind, there is something positive in both cases. Hence “to tude of reason is the mean of moral virtue, and also the be” and “not to be” are contradictory: but the opinion stat- mean of prudence—of prudence as ruling and measuring, ing that “good is good” is contrary to the opinion stating of moral virtue, as ruled and measured by that mean. In that “good is not good”: and between two such contraries like manner the difference between excess and deficiency intellectual virtue observes the mean. Whether the theological virtues observe the mean? Ia IIae q. 64 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that theological virtue ob- observe the mean. serves the mean. For the good of other virtues consists in I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the mean of their observing the mean. Now the theological virtues sur- virtue depends on conformity with virtue’s rule or mea- pass the others in goodness. Therefore much more does sure, in so far as one may exceed or fall short of that rule. theological virtue observe the mean. Now the measure of theological virtue may be twofold. Objection 2. Further, the mean of moral virtue de- One is taken from the very nature of virtue, and thus the pends on the appetite being ruled by reason; while the measure and rule of theological virtue is God Himself: mean of intellectual virtue consists in the intellect being because our faith is ruled according to Divine truth; char- measured by things. Now theological virtue perfects both ity, according to His goodness; hope, according to the im- intellect and appetite, as stated above (q. 62, a. 3). There- mensity of His omnipotence and loving kindness. This fore theological virtue also observes the mean. measure surpasses all human power: so that never can we Objection 3. Further, hope, which is a theological love God as much as He ought to be loved, nor believe and virtue, is a mean between despair and presumption. Like- hope in Him as much as we should. Much less therefore wise faith holds a middle course between contrary here- can there be excess in such things. Accordingly the good sies, as Boethius states (De Duab. Natur. vii): thus, of such virtues does not consist in a mean, but increases by confessing one Person and two natures in Christ, we the more we approach to the summit. observe the mean between the heresy of Nestorius, who The other rule or measure of theological virtue is by maintained the existence of two persons and two natures, comparison with us: for although we cannot be borne to- and the heresy of Eutyches, who held to one person and wards God as much as we ought, yet we should approach one nature. Therefore theological virtue observes the to Him by believing, hoping and loving, according to the mean. measure of our condition. Consequently it is possible to On the contrary, Wherever virtue observes the mean find a mean and extremes in theological virtue, acciden- it is possible to sin by excess as well as by deficiency. But tally and in reference to us. there is no sinning by excess against God, Who is the ob- Reply to Objection 1. The good of intellectual and ject of theological virtue: for it is written (Ecclus. 43:33): moral virtues consists in a mean of reason by conformity “Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can: for He with a measure that may be exceeded: whereas this is not is above all praise.” Therefore theological virtue does not so in the case of theological virtue, considered in itself, as 885 stated above. dition; or to despair through failing to hope for that which Reply to Objection 2. Moral and intellectual virtues according to his condition he might hope for. But there perfect our intellect and appetite in relation to a created can be no excess of hope in comparison with God, Whose measure and rule; whereas the theological virtues perfect goodness is infinite. In like manner faith holds a middle them in relation to an uncreated rule and measure. Where- course between contrary heresies, not by comparison with fore the comparison fails. its object, which is God, in Whom we cannot believe too Reply to Objection 3. Hope observes the mean be- much; but in so far as human opinion itself takes a mid- tween presumption and despair, in relation to us, in so dle position between contrary opinions, as was explained far, to wit, as a man is said to be presumptuous, through above. hoping to receive from God a good in excess of his con- 886 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 65 Of the Connection of Virtues (In Five Articles) We must now consider the connection of virtues: under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another? (2) Whether the moral virtues can be without charity? (3) Whether charity can be without them? (4) Whether faith and hope can be without charity? (5) Whether charity can be without them? Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another? Ia IIae q. 65 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the moral virtues are says (Quaest. Tusc. ii): “If you confess to not having one not connected with one another. Because moral virtues are particular virtue, it must needs be that you have none at sometimes caused by the exercise of acts, as is proved in all.” Ethic. ii, 1,2. But man can exercise himself in the acts of I answer that, Moral virtue may be considered either one virtue, without exercising himself in the acts of some as perfect or as imperfect. An imperfect moral virtue, tem- other virtue. Therefore it is possible to have one moral perance for instance, or fortitude, is nothing but an incli- virtue without another. nation in us to do some kind of good deed, whether such Objection 2. Further, magnificence and magnanim- inclination be in us by nature or by habituation. If we take ity are moral virtues. Now a man may have other moral the moral virtues in this way, they are not connected: since virtues without having magnificence or magnanimity: for we find men who, by natural temperament or by being ac- the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2,3) that “a poor man can- customed, are prompt in doing deeds of liberality, but are not be magnificent,” and yet he may have other virtues; not prompt in doing deeds of chastity. and (Ethic. iv) that “he who is worthy of small things, and But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us so accounts his worth, is modest, but not magnanimous.” to do a good deed well; and if we take moral virtues in Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with one this way, we must say that they are connected, as nearly another. as all are agreed in saying. For this two reasons are given, Objection 3. Further, as the moral virtues perfect the corresponding to the different ways of assigning the dis- appetitive part of the soul, so do the intellectual virtues tinction of the cardinal virtues. For, as we stated above perfect the intellective part. But the intellectual virtues (q. 61, Aa. 3,4), some distinguish them according to cer- are not mutually connected: since we may have one sci- tain general properties of the virtues: for instance, by say- ence, without having another. Neither, therefore, are the ing that discretion belongs to prudence, rectitude to jus- moral virtues connected with one another. tice, moderation to temperance, and strength of mind to Objection 4. Further, if the moral virtues are mutually fortitude, in whatever matter we consider these properties connected, this can only be because they are united to- to be. In this way the reason for the connection is evident: gether in prudence. But this does not suffice to connect the for strength of mind is not commended as virtuous, if it moral virtues together. For, seemingly, one may be pru- be without moderation or rectitude or discretion: and so dent about things to be done in relation to one virtue, with- forth. This, too, is the reason assigned for the connection out being prudent in those that concern another virtue: by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxii, 1) that “a virtue can- even as one may have the art of making certain things, not be perfect” as a virtue, “if isolated from the others: for without the art of making certain others. Now prudence is there can be no true prudence without temperance, justice right reason about things to be done. Therefore the moral and fortitude”: and he continues to speak in like manner virtues are not necessarily connected with one another. of the other virtues (cf. q. 61, a. 4, obj. 1). Augustine also On the contrary, Ambrose says on Lk. 6:20: “The gives the same reason (De Trin. vi, 4). virtues are connected and linked together, so that whoever Others, however, differentiate these virtues in respect has one, is seen to have several”: and Augustine says (De of their matters, and it is in this way that Aristotle assigns Trin. vi, 4) that “the virtues that reside in the human mind the reason for their connection (Ethic. vi, 13). Because, are quite inseparable from one another”: and Gregory says as stated above (q. 58, a. 4), no moral virtue can be with- (Moral. xxii, 1) that “one virtue without the other is either out prudence; since it is proper to moral virtue to make a of no account whatever, or very imperfect”: and Cicero right choice, for it is an elective habit. Now right choice 887 requires not only the inclination to a due end, which incli-been presented to his mind before. Now we speak of hav- nation is the direct outcome of moral virtue, but also cor- ing a thing when we are on the point of having it, accord- rect choice of things conducive to the end, which choice is ing to the saying of the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text. 56): made by prudence, that counsels, judges, and commands “That which is scarcely lacking is not lacking at all.” in those things that are directed to the end. In like man- This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. ner one cannot have prudence unless one has the moral Reply to Objection 3. The intellectual virtues are virtues: since prudence is “right reason about things to be about divers matters having no relation to one another, done,” and the starting point of reason is the end of the as is clearly the case with the various sciences and arts. thing to be done, to which end man is rightly disposed by Hence we do not observe in them the connection that is to moral virtue. Hence, just as we cannot have speculative be found among the moral virtues, which are about pas- science unless we have the understanding of the princi- sions and operations, that are clearly related to one an- ples, so neither can we have prudence without the moral other. For all the passions have their rise in certain initial virtues: and from this it follows clearly that the moral passions, viz. love and hatred, and terminate in certain virtues are connected with one another. others, viz. pleasure and sorrow. In like manner all the Reply to Objection 1. Some moral virtues perfect operations that are the matter of moral virtue are related man as regards his general state, in other words, with re- to one another, and to the passions. Hence the whole mat- gard to those things which have to be done in every kind ter of moral virtues falls under the one rule of prudence. of human life. Hence man needs to exercise himself at Nevertheless, all intelligible things are related to first the same time in the matters of all moral virtues. And if principles. And in this way, all the intellectual virtues de- he exercise himself, by good deeds, in all such matters, pend on the understanding of principles; even as prudence he will acquire the habits of all the moral virtues. But if depends on the moral virtues, as stated. On the other hand, he exercise himself by good deeds in regard to one matter, the universal principles which are the object of the virtue but not in regard to another, for instance, by behaving well of understanding of principles, do not depend on the con- in matters of anger, but not in matters of concupiscence; clusions, which are the objects of the other intellectual he will indeed acquire a certain habit of restraining his virtues, as do the moral virtues depend on prudence, be- anger; but this habit will lack the nature of virtue, through cause the appetite, in a fashion, moves the reason, and the the absence of prudence, which is wanting in matters of reason the appetite, as stated above (q. 9, a. 1; q. 58, a. 5, concupiscence. In the same way, natural inclinations fail ad 1). to have the complete character of virtue, if prudence be Reply to Objection 4. Those things to which the lacking. moral virtues incline, are as the principles of prudence: But there are some moral virtues which perfect man whereas the products of art are not the principles, but the with regard to some eminent state, such as magnificence matter of art. Now it is evident that, though reason may and magnanimity; and since it does not happen to all in be right in one part of the matter, and not in another, yet common to be exercised in the matter of such virtues, it is in no way can it be called right reason, if it be deficient possible for a man to have the other moral virtues, with- in any principle whatever. Thus, if a man be wrong about out actually having the habits of these virtues—provided the principle, “A whole is greater than its part,” he cannot we speak of acquired virtue. Nevertheless, when once a acquire the science of geometry, because he must neces- man has acquired those other virtues he possesses these in sarily wander from the truth in his conclusion. Moreover, proximate potentiality. Because when, by practice, a man things “done” are related to one another, but not things has acquired liberality in small gifts and expenditure, if “made,” as stated above (ad 3). Consequently the lack of he were to come in for a large sum of money, he would prudence in one department of things to be done, would acquire the habit of magnificence with but little practice: result in a deficiency affecting other things to be done: even as a geometrician, by dint of little study, acquires sci- whereas this does not occur in things to be made. entific knowledge about some conclusion which had never Whether moral virtues can be without charity? Ia IIae q. 65 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtues can be Objection 2. Further, moral virtues can be acquired without charity. For it is stated in the Liber Sentent. Pros- by means of human acts, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, peri vii, that “every virtue save charity may be common whereas charity cannot be had otherwise than by infusion, to the good and bad.” But “charity can be in none except according to Rom. 5:5: “The charity of God is poured the good,” as stated in the same book. Therefore the other forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us.” virtues can be had without charity. Therefore it is possible to have the other virtues without 888 charity. wards his ultimate end, which is the effect of charity, than Objection 3. Further, the moral virtues are connected that he be well disposed in respect of other ends, which together, through depending on prudence. But charity is the effect of moral virtue: just as in speculative matters does not depend on prudence; indeed, it surpasses pru- right reason has greatest need of the first indemonstrable dence, according to Eph. 3:19: “The charity of Christ, principle, that “contradictories cannot both be true at the which surpasseth all knowledge.” Therefore the moral same time.” It is therefore evident that neither can infused virtues are not connected with charity, and can be with- prudence be without charity; nor, consequently, the other out it. moral virtues, since they cannot be without prudence. On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 3:14): “He that It is therefore clear from what has been said that only loveth not, abideth in death.” Now the spiritual life is per- the infused virtues are perfect, and deserve to be called fected by the virtues, since it is “by them” that “we lead virtues simply: since they direct man well to the ultimate a good life,” as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 17,19). end. But the other virtues, those, namely, that are ac- Therefore they cannot be without the love of charity. quired, are virtues in a restricted sense, but not simply: I answer that, As stated above (q. 63, a. 2), it is possi-for they direct man well in respect of the last end in some ble by means of human works to acquire moral virtues, in particular genus of action, but not in respect of the last end so far as they produce good works that are directed to an simply. Hence a gloss of Augustine∗ on the words, “All end not surpassing the natural power of man: and when that is not of faith is sin” (Rom. 14:23), says: “He that they are acquired thus, they can be without charity, even fails to acknowledge the truth, has no true virtue, even if as they were in many of the Gentiles. But in so far as his conduct be good.” they produce good works in proportion to a supernatu- Reply to Objection 1. Virtue, in the words quoted, ral last end, thus they have the character of virtue, truly denotes imperfect virtue. Else if we take moral virtue in and perfectly; and cannot be acquired by human acts, but its perfect state, “it makes its possessor good,” and conse- are infused by God. Such like moral virtues cannot be quently cannot be in the wicked. without charity. For it has been stated above (a. 1; q. 58, Reply to Objection 2. This argument holds good of Aa. 4,5) that the other moral virtues cannot be without virtue in the sense of acquired virtue. prudence; and that prudence cannot be without the moral Reply to Objection 3. Though charity surpasses sci- virtues, because these latter make man well disposed to ence and prudence, yet prudence depends on charity, as certain ends, which are the starting-point of the proce- stated: and consequently so do all the infused moral dure of prudence. Now for prudence to proceed aright, virtues. it is much more necessary that man be well disposed to- Whether charity can be without moral virtue? Ia IIae q. 65 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem possible to have charity virtues, than rejoiced at the virtues they have. Therefore, without the moral virtues. For when one thing suffices for if a man has charity, it does not follow of necessity that he a certain purpose, it is superfluous to employ others. Now has all the moral virtues. charity alone suffices for the fulfilment of all the works On the contrary, The whole Law is fulfilled through of virtue, as is clear from 1 Cor. 13:4, seqq.: “Charity is charity, for it is written (Rom. 13:8): “He that loveth his patient, is kind,” etc. Therefore it seems that if one has neighbor, hath fulfilled the Law.” Now it is not possible to charity, other virtues are superfluous. fulfil the whole Law, without having all the moral virtues: Objection 2. Further, he that has a habit of virtue eas- since the law contains precepts about all acts of virtue, ily performs the works of that virtue, and those works are as stated in Ethic. v, 1,2. Therefore he that has charity, pleasing to him for their own sake: hence “pleasure taken has all the moral virtues. Moreover, Augustine says in a in a work is a sign of habit” (Ethic. ii, 3). Now many have letter (Epis. clxvii)† that charity contains all the cardinal charity, being free from mortal sin, and yet they find it dif- virtues. ficult to do works of virtue; nor are these works pleasing I answer that, All the moral virtues are infused to- to them for their own sake, but only for the sake of charity. gether with charity. The reason for this is that God oper- Therefore many have charity without the other virtues. ates no less perfectly in works of grace than in works of Objection 3. Further, charity is to be found in every nature. Now, in the works of nature, we find that when- saint: and yet there are some saints who are without cer- ever a thing contains a principle of certain works, it has tain virtues. For Bede says (on Lk. 17:10) that the saints also whatever is necessary for their execution: thus an- are more humbled on account of their not having certain imals are provided with organs whereby to perform the ∗ Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi cvi. † Cf. Serm. xxxix and xlvi de Temp. 889 actions that their souls empower them to do. Now it is gards the end is the chief and moving principle in respect evident that charity, inasmuch as it directs man to his last of those things that are referred to the end. Therefore it is end, is the principle of all the good works that are refer- necessary to have the moral virtues together with charity. able to his last end. Wherefore all the moral virtues must Reply to Objection 2. It happens sometimes that a needs be infused together with charity, since it is through man who has a habit, finds it difficult to act in accor- them that man performs each different kind of good work. dance with the habit, and consequently feels no pleasure It is therefore clear that the infused moral virtues are and complacency in the act, on account of some imped- connected, not only through prudence, but also on account iment supervening from without: thus a man who has a of charity: and, again, that whoever loses charity through habit of science, finds it difficult to understand, through mortal sin, forfeits all the infused moral virtues. being sleepy or unwell. In like manner sometimes the Reply to Objection 1. In order that the act of a lower habits of moral virtue experience difficulty in their works, power be perfect, not only must there be perfection in the by reason of certain ordinary dispositions remaining from higher, but also in the lower power: for if the principal previous acts. This difficulty does not occur in respect of agent were well disposed, perfect action would not fol- acquired moral virtue: because the repeated acts by which low, if the instrument also were not well disposed. Con- they are acquired, remove also the contrary dispositions. sequently, in order that man work well in things referred Reply to Objection 3. Certain saints are said not to to the end, he needs not only a virtue disposing him well have certain virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty to the end, but also those virtues which dispose him well in the acts of those virtues, for the reason stated; although to whatever is referred to the end: for the virtue which re- they have the habits of all the virtues. Whether faith and hope can be without charity? Ia IIae q. 65 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that faith and hope are cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence. never without charity. Because, since they are theological Accordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fash- virtues, they seem to be more excellent than even the in- ion without charity: but they have not the perfect char- fused moral virtues. But the infused moral virtues cannot acter of virtue without charity. For, since the act of faith be without charity. Neither therefore can faith and hope is to believe in God; and since to believe is to assent to be without charity. someone of one’s own free will: to will not as one ought, Objection 2. Further, “no man believes unwillingly” will not be a perfect act of faith. To will as one ought as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But charity is is the outcome of charity which perfects the will: since in the will as a perfection thereof, as stated above (q. 62, every right movement of the will proceeds from a right a. 3). Therefore faith cannot be without charity. love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9). Hence faith Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion may be without charity, but not as a perfect virtue: just as viii) that “there can be no hope without love.” But love temperance and fortitude can be without prudence. The is charity: for it is of this love that he speaks. Therefore same applies to hope. Because the act of hope consists in hope cannot be without charity. looking to God for future bliss. This act is perfect, if it On the contrary, A gloss on Mat. 1:2 says that “faith is based on the merits which we have; and this cannot be begets hope, and hope, charity.” Now the begetter pre- without charity. But to expect future bliss through merits cedes the begotten, and can be without it. Therefore faith which one has not yet, but which one proposes to acquire can be without hope; and hope, without charity. at some future time, will be an imperfect act; and this is I answer that, Faith and hope, like the moral virtues, possible without charity. Consequently, faith and hope can be considered in two ways; first in an inchoate state; can be without charity; yet, without charity, they are not secondly, as complete virtues. For since virtue is directed virtues properly so-called; because the nature of virtue re- to the doing of good works, perfect virtue is that which quires that by it, we should not only do what is good, but gives the faculty of doing a perfectly good work, and this also that we should do it well (Ethic. ii, 6). consists in not only doing what is good, but also in doing Reply to Objection 1. Moral virtue depends on pru- it well. Else, if what is done is good, but not well done, dence: and not even infused prudence has the character it will not be perfectly good; wherefore neither will the of prudence without charity; for this involves the absence habit that is the principle of such an act, have the perfect of due order to the first principle, viz. the ultimate end. character of virtue. For instance, if a man do what is just, On the other hand faith and hope, as such, do not depend what he does is good: but it will not be the work of a per- either on prudence or charity; so that they can be without fect virtue unless he do it well, i.e. by choosing rightly, charity, although they are not virtues without charity, as which is the result of prudence; for which reason justice stated. 890 Reply to Objection 2. This argument is true of faith that hope whereby we look to gain future bliss through considered as a perfect virtue. merits which we have already; and this is not without Reply to Objection 3. Augustine is speaking here of charity. Whether charity can be without faith and hope? Ia IIae q. 65 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that charity can be with- faithful, by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of out faith and hope. For charity is the love of God. But it His Son.” Now this fellowship of man with God, which is possible for us to love God naturally, without already consists in a certain familiar colloquy with Him, is be- having faith, or hope in future bliss. Therefore charity can gun here, in this life, by grace, but will be perfected in be without faith and hope. the future life, by glory; each of which things we hold Objection 2. Further, charity is the root of all the by faith and hope. Wherefore just as friendship with a virtues, according to Eph. 3:17: “Rooted and founded person would be impossible, if one disbelieved in, or de- in charity.” Now the root is sometimes without branches. spaired of, the possibility of their fellowship or familiar Therefore charity can sometimes be without faith and colloquy; so too, friendship with God, which is charity, is hope, and the other virtues. impossible without faith, so as to believe in this fellow- Objection 3. Further, there was perfect charity in ship and colloquy with God, and to hope to attain to this Christ. And yet He had neither faith nor hope: because fellowship. Therefore charity is quite impossible without He was a perfect comprehensor, as we shall explain fur- faith and hope. ther on ( IIIa, q. 7, Aa. 3,4). Therefore charity can be Reply to Objection 1. Charity is not any kind of love without faith and hope. of God, but that love of God, by which He is loved as the On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:6): object of bliss, to which object we are directed by faith “Without faith it is impossible to please God”; and this ev- and hope. idently belongs most to charity, according to Prov. 8:17: Reply to Objection 2. Charity is the root of faith and “I love them that love me.” Again, it is by hope that we are hope, in so far as it gives them the perfection of virtue. brought to charity, as stated above (q. 62, a. 4). Therefore But faith and hope as such are the precursors of charity, it is not possible to have charity without faith and hope. as stated above (q. 62, a. 4), and so charity is impossible I answer that, Charity signifies not only the love of without them. God, but also a certain friendship with Him; which im- Reply to Objection 3. In Christ there was neither faith plies, besides love, a certain mutual return of love, to- nor hope, on account of their implying an imperfection. gether with mutual communion, as stated in Ethic. viii, But instead of faith, He had manifest vision, and instead 2. That this belongs to charity is evident from 1 Jn. 4:16: of hope, full comprehension∗: so that in Him was perfect “He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in charity. him,” and from 1 Cor. 1:9, where it is written: “God is ∗ See above, q. 4, a. 3 891 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 66 Of Equality Among the Virtues (In Six Articles) We must now consider equality among the virtues: under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another? (2) Whether all the virtues existing together in one subject are equal? (3) Of moral virtue in comparison with intellectual virtue; (4) Of the moral virtues as compared with one another; (5) Of the intellectual virtues in comparison with one another; (6) Of the theological virtues in comparison with one another. Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another? Ia IIae q. 66 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that one virtue cannot of reason. And among these, one is better than another, be greater or less than another. For it is written (Apoc. according as it approaches nearer to the reason. Conse- 21:16) that the sides of the city of Jerusalem are equal; quently justice, which is in the will, excels the remaining and a gloss says that the sides denote the virtues. There- moral virtues; and fortitude, which is in the irascible part, fore all virtues are equal; and consequently one cannot be stands before temperance, which is in the concupiscible, greater than another. which has a smaller share of reason, as stated in Ethic. vii, Objection 2. Further, a thing that, by its nature, con- 6. sists in a maximum, cannot be more or less. Now the na- The question can be taken in another way, as referring ture of virtue consists in a maximum, for virtue is “the to virtues of the same species. In this way, according to limit of power,” as the Philosopher states (De Coelo i, what was said above (q. 52, a. 1 ), when we were treat- text. 116); and Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that ing of the intensity of habits, virtue may be said to be “virtues are very great boons, and no one can use them to greater or less in two ways: first, in itself; secondly with evil purpose.” Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot regard to the subject that partakes of it. If we consider it be greater or less than another. in itself, we shall call it greater or little, according to the Objection 3. Further, the quantity of an effect is mea-things to which it extends. Now whosoever has a virtue, sured by the power of the agent. But perfect, viz. infused e.g. temperance, has it in respect of whatever temperance virtues, are from God Whose power is uniform and infi- extends to. But this does not apply to science and art: nite. Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater for every grammarian does not know everything relating than another. to grammar. And in this sense the Stoics said rightly, as On the contrary, Wherever there can be increase and Simplicius states in his Commentary on the Predicaments, greater abundance, there can be inequality. Now virtues that virtue cannot be more or less, as science and art can; admit of greater abundance and increase: for it is written because the nature of virtue consists in a maximum. (Mat. 5:20): “Unless your justice abound more than that If, however, we consider virtue on the part of the sub- of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the ject, it may then be greater or less, either in relation to kingdom of heaven”: and (Prov. 15:5): “In abundant jus- different times, or in different men. Because one man is tice there is the greatest strength [virtus].” Therefore it better disposed than another to attain to the mean of virtue seems that a virtue can be greater or less than another. which is defined by right reason; and this, on account I answer that, When it is asked whether one virtue of either greater habituation, or a better natural disposi- can be greater than another, the question can be taken tion, or a more discerning judgment of reason, or again a in two senses. First, as applying to virtues of different greater gift of grace, which is given to each one “accord- species. In this sense it is clear that one virtue is greater ing to the measure of the giving of Christ,” as stated in than another; since a cause is always more excellent than Eph. 4:9. And here the Stoics erred, for they held that its effect; and among effects, those nearest to the cause no man should be deemed virtuous, unless he were, in the are the most excellent. Now it is clear from what has been highest degree, disposed to virtue. Because the nature of said (q. 18, a. 5; q. 61, a. 2) that the cause and root of hu- virtue does not require that man should reach the mean of man good is the reason. Hence prudence which perfects right reason as though it were an indivisible point, as the the reason, surpasses in goodness the other moral virtues Stoics thought; but it is enough that he should approach which perfect the appetitive power, in so far as it partakes the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Moreover, one same in- 892 divisible mark is reached more nearly and more readily by “less” good, in the ways explained above: since, as stated, one than by another: as may be seen when several arches it is not an indivisible limit. aim at a fixed target. Reply to Objection 3. God does not work by neces- Reply to Objection 1. This equality is not one of ab- sity of nature, but according to the order of His wisdom, solute quantity, but of proportion: because all virtues grow whereby He bestows on men various measures of virtue, in a man proportionately, as we shall see further on (a. 2). according to Eph. 4:7: “To every one of you [Vulg.: ‘us’] Reply to Objection 2. This “limit” which belongs is given grace according to the measure of the giving of to virtue, can have the character of something “more” or Christ.” Whether all the virtues that are together in one man, are equal? Ia IIae q. 66 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the virtues in one in proportion to one another. same man are not all equally intense. For the Apostle says Now the nature of this equality is to be explained in (1 Cor. 7:7): “Everyone hath his proper gift from God; the same way as the connection of virtues; for equality one after this manner, and another after that.” Now one among virtues is their connection as to greatness. Now gift would not be more proper than another to a man, if it has been stated above (q. 65, a. 1) that a twofold con- God infused all the virtues equally into each man. There- nection of virtues may be assigned. The first is according fore it seems that the virtues are not all equal in one and to the opinion of those who understood these four virtues the same man. to be four general properties of virtues, each of which is Objection 2. Further, if all the virtues were equally found together with the other in any matter. In this way intense in one and the same man, it would follow that virtues cannot be said to be equal in any matter unless whoever surpasses another in one virtue, would surpass they have all these properties equal. Augustine alludes to him in all the others. But this is clearly not the case: since this kind of equality (De Trin. vi, 4) when he says: “If various saints are specially praised for different virtues; you say these men are equal in fortitude, but that one is e.g. Abraham for faith (Rom. 4), Moses for his meek- more prudent than the other; it follows that the fortitude ness (Num. 7:3), Job for his patience (Tob. 2:12). This of the latter is less prudent. Consequently they are not re- is why of each Confessor the Church sings: “There was ally equal in fortitude, since the former’s fortitude is more not found his like in keeping the law of the most High,”∗, prudent. You will find that this applies to the other virtues since each one was remarkable for some virtue or other. if you run over them all in the same way.” Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same The other kind of connection among virtues followed man. the opinion of those who hold these virtues to have their Objection 3. Further, the more intense a habit is, the own proper respective matters (q. 65 , Aa. 1,2). In this greater one’s pleasure and readiness in making use of it. way the connection among moral virtues results from pru- Now experience shows that a man is more pleased and dence, and, as to the infused virtues, from charity, and not ready to make use of one virtue than of another. There- from the inclination, which is on the part of the subject, fore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man. as stated above (q. 65, a. 1). Accordingly the nature of On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that the equality among virtues can also be considered on the “those who are equal in fortitude are equal in prudence part of prudence, in regard to that which is formal in all and temperance,” and so on. Now it would not be so, un- the moral virtues: for in one and the same man, so long less all the virtues in one man were equal. Therefore all as his reason has the same degree of perfection, the mean virtues are equal in one man. will be proportionately defined according to right reason I answer that, As explained above (a. 1), the compar- in each matter of virtue. ative greatness of virtues can be understood in two ways. But in regard to that which is material in the moral First, as referring to their specific nature: and in this way virtues, viz. the inclination to the virtuous act, one may there is no doubt that in a man one virtue is greater than be readier to perform the act of one virtue, than the act of another, for example, charity, than faith and hope. Sec- another virtue, and this either from nature, or from habit- ondly, it may be taken as referring to the degree of par- uation, or again by the grace of God. ticipation by the subject, according as a virtue becomes Reply to Objection 1. This saying of the Apostle may intense or remiss in its subject. In this sense all the virtues be taken to refer to the gifts of gratuitous grace, which are in one man are equal with an equality of proportion, in so not common to all, nor are all of them equal in the one far as their growth in man is equal: thus the fingers are same subject. We might also say that it refers to the mea- unequal in size, but equal in proportion, since they grow sure of sanctifying grace, by reason of which one man has ∗ See Lesson in the Mass Statuit (Dominican Missal) 893 all the virtues in greater abundance than another man, on one virtue, another saint for another virtue, on account of account of his greater abundance of prudence, or also of his more admirable readiness for the act of one virtue than charity, in which all the infused virtues are connected. for the act of another virtue. Reply to Objection 2. One saint is praised chiefly for This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection. Whether the moral virtues are better than the intellectual virtues? Ia IIae q. 66 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the moral virtues are ply, the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, are better than the intellectual. Because that which is more more excellent than the moral virtues, which perfect the necessary, and more lasting, is better. Now the moral appetite. virtues are “more lasting even than the sciences” (Ethic. But if we consider virtue in its relation to act, then i) which are intellectual virtues: and, moreover, they are moral virtue, which perfects the appetite, whose function more necessary for human life. Therefore they are prefer- it is to move the other powers to act, as stated above able to the intellectual virtues. (q. 9, a. 1), is more excellent. And since virtue is so Objection 2. Further, virtue is defined as “that which called from its being a principle of action, for it is the makes its possessor good.” Now man is said to be good perfection of a power, it follows again that the nature in respect of moral virtue, and art in respect of intellec- of virtue agrees more with moral than with intellectual tual virtue, except perhaps in respect of prudence alone. virtue, though the intellectual virtues are more excellent Therefore moral is better than intellectual virtue. habits, simply speaking. Objection 3. Further, the end is more excellent than Reply to Objection 1. The moral virtues are more the means. But according to Ethic. vi, 12, “moral virtue lasting than the intellectual virtues, because they are prac- gives right intention of the end; whereas prudence gives tised in matters pertaining to the life of the community. right choice of the means.” Therefore moral virtue is more Yet it is evident that the objects of the sciences, which are excellent than prudence, which is the intellectual virtue necessary and invariable, are more lasting than the objects that regards moral matters. of moral virtue, which are certain particular matters of ac- On the contrary, Moral virtue is in that part of the tion. That the moral virtues are more necessary for hu- soul which is rational by participation; while intellectual man life, proves that they are more excellent, not simply, virtue is in the essentially rational part, as stated in Ethic. but relatively. Indeed, the speculative intellectual virtues, i, 13. Now rational by essence is more excellent than ra- from the very fact that they are not referred to something tional by participation. Therefore intellectual virtue is bet- else, as a useful thing is referred to an end, are more excel- ter than moral virtue. lent. The reason for this is that in them we have a kind of I answer that, A thing may be said to be greater or beginning of that happiness which consists in the knowl- less in two ways: first, simply; secondly, relatively. For edge of truth, as stated above (q. 3, a. 6). nothing hinders something from being better simply, e.g. Reply to Objection 2. The reason why man is said to “learning than riches,” and yet not better relatively, i.e. be good simply, in respect of moral virtue, but not in re- “for one who is in want”∗. Now to consider a thing sim- spect of intellectual virtue, is because the appetite moves ply is to consider it in its proper specific nature. Ac- the other powers to their acts, as stated above (q. 56, a. 3). cordingly, a virtue takes its species from its object, as ex- Wherefore this argument, too, proves merely that moral plained above (q. 54, a. 2; q. 60, a. 1). Hence, speaking virtue is better relatively. simply, that virtue is more excellent, which has the more Reply to Objection 3. Prudence directs the moral excellent object. Now it is evident that the object of the virtues not only in the choice of the means, but also in reason is more excellent than the object of the appetite: appointing the end. Now the end of each moral virtue since the reason apprehends things in the universal, while is to attain the mean in the matter proper to that virtue; the appetite tends to things themselves, whose being is which mean is appointed according to the right ruling of restricted to the particular. Consequently, speaking sim- prudence, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6; vi, 13. ∗ Aristotle, Topic. iii. 894 Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues? Ia IIae q. 66 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that justice is not the chief i.e. fortitude, “is useful in war, and the latter,” i.e. justice, of the moral virtues. For it is better to give of one’s own “both in war and in peace.” After fortitude comes tem- than to pay what is due. Now the former belongs to liber- perance, which subjects the appetite to reason in matters ality, the latter to justice. Therefore liberality is apparently directly relating to life, in the one individual, or in the one a greater virtue than justice. species, viz. in matters of food and of sex. And so these Objection 2. Further, the chief quality of a thing is, three virtues, together with prudence, are called principal seemingly, that in which it is most perfect. Now, accord- virtues, in excellence also. ing to Jam. 1:4, “Patience hath a perfect work.” Therefore A virtue is said to be greater relatively, by reason of its it would seem that patience is greater than justice. helping or adorning a principal virtue: even as substance Objection 3. Further, “Magnanimity has a great influ- is more excellent simply than accident: and yet relatively ence on every virtue,” as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore it some particular accident is more excellent than substance magnifies even justice. Therefore it is greater than justice. in so far as it perfects substance in some accidental mode On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) of being. that “justice is the most excellent of the virtues.” Reply to Objection 1. The act of liberality needs to I answer that, A virtue considered in its species may be founded on an act of justice, for “a man is not liberal be greater or less, either simply or relatively. A virtue in giving, unless he gives of his own” (Polit. ii, 3). Hence is said to be greater simply, whereby a greater rational there could be no liberality apart from justice, which dis- good shines forth, as stated above (a. 1). In this way jus- cerns between “meum” and “tuum”: whereas justice can tice is the most excellent of all the moral virtues, as being be without liberality. Hence justice is simply greater than most akin to reason. This is made evident by considering liberality, as being more universal, and as being its foun- its subject and its object: its subject, because this is the dation: while liberality is greater relatively since it is an will, and the will is the rational appetite, as stated above ornament and an addition to justice. (q. 8, a. 1; q. 26, a. 1): its object or matter, because it Reply to Objection 2. Patience is said to have “a is about operations, whereby man is set in order not only perfect work,” by enduring evils, wherein it excludes not in himself, but also in regard to another. Hence “justice only unjust revenge, which is also excluded by justice; not is the most excellent of virtues” (Ethic. v, 1). Among only hatred, which is also suppressed by charity; nor only the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, the anger, which is calmed by gentleness; but also inordinate more excellent the matter in which the appetitive move- sorrow, which is the root of all the above. Wherefore it is ment is subjected to reason, so much the more does the more perfect and excellent through plucking up the root rational good shine forth in each. Now in things touch- in this matter. It is not, however, more perfect than all the ing man, the chief of all is life, on which all other things other virtues simply. Because fortitude not only endures depend. Consequently fortitude which subjects the ap- trouble without being disturbed, but also fights against it petitive movement to reason in matters of life and death, if necessary. Hence whoever is brave is patient; but the holds the first place among those moral virtues that are converse does not hold, for patience is a part of fortitude. about the passions, but is subordinate to justice. Hence the Reply to Objection 3. There can be no magnanimity Philosopher says (Rhet. 1) that “those virtues must needs without the other virtues, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Hence be greatest which receive the most praise: since virtue is it is compared to them as their ornament, so that relatively a power of doing good. Hence the brave man and the just it is greater than all the others, but not simply. man are honored more than others; because the former,” Whether wisdom is the greatest of the intellectual virtues? Ia IIae q. 66 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that wisdom is not the Objection 2. Further, it belongs to the nature of virtue greatest of the intellectual virtues. Because the comman-to direct man to happiness: because virtue is “the dispo- der is greater than the one commanded. Now prudence sition of a perfect thing to that which is best,” as stated in seems to command wisdom, for it is stated in Ethic. i, 2 Phys. vii, text. 17. Now prudence is “right reason about that political science, which belongs to prudence (Ethic. things to be done,” whereby man is brought to happiness: vi, 8), “orders that sciences should be cultivated in states, whereas wisdom takes no notice of human acts, whereby and to which of these each individual should devote him- man attains happiness. Therefore prudence is a greater self, and to what extent.” Since, then, wisdom is one of the virtue than wisdom. sciences, it seems that prudence is greater than wisdom. Objection 3. Further, the more perfect knowledge is, 895 the greater it seems to be. Now we can have more perject of happiness, viz. the Supreme Intelligible. And if in- fect knowledge of human affairs, which are the subject deed the consideration of wisdom were perfect in respect of science, than of Divine things, which are the object of its object, there would be perfect happiness in the act of of wisdom, which is the distinction given by Augustine wisdom: but as, in this life, the act of wisdom is imperfect (De Trin. xii, 14): because Divine things are incompre- in respect of its principal object, which is God, it follows hensible, according to Job 26:26: “Behold God is great, that the act of wisdom is a beginning or participation of exceeding our knowledge.” Therefore science is a greater future happiness, so that wisdom is nearer than prudence virtue than wisdom. to happiness. Objection 4. Further, knowledge of principles is more Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (De excellent than knowledge of conclusions. But wisdom Anima i, text. 1), “one knowledge is preferable to another, draws conclusions from indemonstrable principles which either because it is about a higher object, or because it is are the object of the virtue of understanding, even as other more certain.” Hence if the objects be equally good and sciences do. Therefore understanding is a greater virtue sublime, that virtue will be greater which possesses more than wisdom. certain knowledge. But a virtue which is less certain about On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, a higher and better object, is preferable to that which is 7) that wisdom is “the head” among “the intellectual more certain about an object of inferior degree. Where- virtues.” fore the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, text. 60) that “it is I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), the greatness of a great thing to be able to know something about celestial a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now beings, though it be based on weak and probable reason- the object of wisdom surpasses the objects of all the in- ing”; and again (De Part. Animal. i, 5) that “it is better to tellectual virtues: because wisdom considers the Supreme know a little about sublime things, than much about mean Cause, which is God, as stated at the beginning of the things.” Accordingly wisdom, to which knowledge about Metaphysics. And since it is by the cause that we judge God pertains, is beyond the reach of man, especially in of an effect, and by the higher cause that we judge of the this life, so as to be his possession: for this “belongs to lower effects; hence it is that wisdom exercises judgment God alone” (Metaph. i, 2): and yet this little knowledge over all the other intellectual virtues, directs them all, and about God which we can have through wisdom is prefer- is the architect of them all. able to all other knowledge. Reply to Objection 1. Since prudence is about human Reply to Objection 4. The truth and knowledge of affairs, and wisdom about the Supreme Cause, it is im- indemonstrable principles depends on the meaning of the possible for prudence to be a greater virtue than wisdom, terms: for as soon as we know what is a whole, and what “unless,” as stated in Ethic. vi, 7, “man were the greatest is a part, we know at once that every whole is greater than thing in the world.” Wherefore we must say, as stated in its part. Now to know the meaning of being and non- the same book (Ethic. vi), that prudence does not com- being, of whole and part, and of other things consequent to mand wisdom, but vice versa: because “the spiritual man being, which are the terms whereof indemonstrable prin- judgeth all things; and he himself is judged by no man” (1 ciples are constituted, is the function of wisdom: since Cor. 2:15). For prudence has no business with supreme universal being is the proper effect of the Supreme Cause, matters which are the object of wisdom: but its command which is God. And so wisdom makes use of indemon- covers things directed to wisdom, viz. how men are to ob- strable principles which are the object of understanding, tain wisdom. Wherefore prudence, or political science, is, not only by drawing conclusions from them, as other sci- in this way, the servant of wisdom; for it leads to wisdom, ences do, but also by passing its judgment on them, and preparing the way for her, as the doorkeeper for the king. by vindicating them against those who deny them. Hence Reply to Objection 2. Prudence considers the means it follows that wisdom is a greater virtue than understand- of acquiring happiness, but wisdom considers the very ob- ing. Whether charity is the greatest of the theological virtues? Ia IIae q. 66 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not the and charity. greatest of the theological virtues. Because, since faith Objection 2. Further, when two things are added to- is in the intellect, while hope and charity are in the appet- gether, the result is greater than either one. Now hope re- itive power, it seems that faith is compared to hope and sults from something added to charity; for it presupposes charity, as intellectual to moral virtue. Now intellectual love, as Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), and it adds a virtue is greater than moral virtue, as was made evident certain movement of stretching forward to the beloved. above (q. 62, a. 3). Therefore faith is greater than hope Therefore hope is greater than charity. 896 Objection 3. Further, a cause is more noble than its man. Now in things that are above man, to love them is effect. Now faith and hope are the cause of charity: for a more excellent than to know them. Because knowledge gloss on Mat. 1:3 says that “faith begets hope, and hope is perfected by the known being in the knower: whereas charity.” Therefore faith and hope are greater than charity. love is perfected by the lover being drawn to the beloved. On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13): Now that which is above man is more excellent in itself “Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but than in man: since a thing is contained according to the the greatest of these is charity.” mode of the container. But it is the other way about in I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), the greatness of things beneath man. Secondly, because prudence mod- a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now, erates the appetitive movements pertaining to the moral since the three theological virtues look at God as their virtues, whereas faith does not moderate the appetitive proper object, it cannot be said that any one of them is movement tending to God, which movement belongs to greater than another by reason of its having a greater ob- the theological virtues: it only shows the object. And ject, but only from the fact that it approaches nearer than this appetitive movement towards its object surpasses hu- another to that object; and in this way charity is greater man knowledge, according to Eph. 3:19: “The charity of than the others. Because the others, in their very nature, Christ which surpasseth all knowledge.” imply a certain distance from the object: since faith is of Reply to Objection 2. Hope presupposes love of that what is not seen, and hope is of what is not possessed. But which a man hopes to obtain; and such love is love of con- the love of charity is of that which is already possessed: cupiscence, whereby he who desires good, loves himself since the beloved is, in a manner, in the lover, and, again, rather than something else. On the other hand, charity im- the lover is drawn by desire to union with the beloved; plies love of friendship, to which we are led by hope, as hence it is written (1 Jn. 4:16): “He that abideth in char- stated above (q. 62, a. 4). ity, abideth in God, and God in him.” Reply to Objection 3. An efficient cause is more no- Reply to Objection 1. Faith and hope are not re- ble than its effect: but not a disposing cause. For other- lated to charity in the same way as prudence to moral wise the heat of fire would be more noble than the soul, to virtue; and for two reasons. First, because the theological which the heat disposes the matter. It is in this way that virtues have an object surpassing the human soul: whereas faith begets hope, and hope charity: in the sense, to wit, prudence and the moral virtues are about things beneath that one is a disposition to the other. 897 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 67 Of the Duration of Virtues After This Life (In Six Articles) We must now consider the duration of virtues after this life, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the moral virtues remain after this life? (2) Whether the intellectual virtues remain? (3) Whether faith remains? (4) Whether hope remains? (5) Whether anything remains of faith or hope? (6) Whether charity remains? Whether the moral virtues remain after this life? Ia IIae q. 67 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the moral virtues doe ement. For in the future life there will be no concupis- not remain after this life. For in the future state of glory cences and pleasures in matters of food and sex; nor fear men will be like angels, according to Mat. 22:30. But it and daring about dangers of death; nor distributions and is absurd to put moral virtues in the angels∗, as stated in commutations of things employed in this present life. But, Ethic. x, 8. Therefore neither in man will there be moral as regards the formal element, they will remain most per- virtues after this life. fect, after this life, in the Blessed, in as much as each one’s Objection 2. Further, moral virtues perfect man in reason will have most perfect rectitude in regard to things the active life. But the active life does not remain after concerning him in respect of that state of life: and his this life: for Gregory says (Moral. iv, 18): “The works of appetitive power will be moved entirely according to the the active life pass away from the body.” Therefore moral order of reason, in things pertaining to that same state. virtues do not remain after this life. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9) that “prudence Objection 3. Further, temperance and fortitude, will be there without any danger of error; fortitude, with- which are moral virtues, are in the irrational parts of the out the anxiety of bearing with evil; temperance, without soul, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 10). Now the the rebellion of the desires: so that prudence will neither irrational parts of the soul are corrupted, when the body is prefer nor equal any good to God; fortitude will adhere to corrupted: since they are acts of bodily organs. Therefore Him most steadfastly; and temperance will delight in Him it seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this life. Who knows no imperfection.” As to justice, it is yet more On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 1:15) that “justice evident what will be its act in that life, viz. “to be subject is perpetual and immortal.” to God”: because even in this life subjection to a superior I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), is part of justice. Cicero held that the cardinal virtues do not remain after Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking this life; and that, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), there of these moral virtues, as to their material element; “in the other life men are made happy by the mere knowl- thus he speaks of justice, as regards “commutations and edge of that nature, than which nothing is better or more distributions”; of fortitude, as to “matters of terror and lovable, that Nature, to wit, which created all others.” Af- danger”; of temperance, in respect of “lewd desires.” terwards he concludes that these four virtues remain in the The same applies to the Second Objection. For those future life, but after a different manner. things that concern the active life, belong to the material In order to make this evident, we must note that in element of the virtues. these virtues there is a formal element, and a quasi- Reply to Objection 3. There is a twofold state af- material element. The material element in these virtues is ter this life; one before the resurrection, during which the a certain inclination of the appetitive part to the passions soul will be separate from the body; the other, after the and operations according to a certain mode: and since this resurrection, when the souls will be reunited to their bod- mode is fixed by reason, the formal element is precisely ies. In this state of resurrection, the irrational powers will this order of reason. be in the bodily organs, just as they now are. Hence it will Accordingly we must say that these moral virtues do be possible for fortitude to be in the irascible, and temper- not remain in the future life, as regards their material el- ance in the concupiscible part, in so far as each power will ∗ “Whatever relates to moral action is petty, and unworthy of the gods” (Ethic. x, 8) 898 be perfectly disposed to obey the reason. But in the state stated above (q. 63, a. 1). Justice, however, will remain preceding the resurrection, the irrational parts will not be because it is in the will. Hence of justice it is specially in the soul actually, but only radically in its essence, as said that it is “perpetual and immortal”; both by reason of stated in the Ia, q. 77, a. 8. Wherefore neither will these its subject, since the will is incorruptible; and because its virtues be actually, but only in their root, i.e. in the reason act will not change, as stated. and will, wherein are certain nurseries of these virtues, as Whether the intellectual virtues remain after this life? Ia IIae q. 67 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual ther science nor any other intellectual virtue will remain virtues do not remain after this life. For the Apostle says after this life when once the body is corrupted. (1 Cor. 13:8,9) that “knowledge shall be destroyed,” and But this opinion is contrary to the mind of Aristotle, he states the reason to be because “we know in part.” Now who states (De Anima iii, text. 8) that “the possible in- just as the knowledge of science is in part, i.e. imperfect; tellect is in act when it is identified with each thing as so also is the knowledge of the other intellectual virtues, knowing it; and yet, even then, it is in potentiality to con- as long as this life lasts. Therefore all the intellectual sider it actually.” It is also contrary to reason, because virtues will cease after this life. intelligible species are contained by the “possible” intel- Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Categor. lect immovably, according to the mode of their container. vi) that since science is a habit, it is a quality difficult to Hence the “possible” intellect is called “the abode of the remove: for it is not easily lost, except by reason of some species” (De Anima iii) because it preserves the intelligi- great change or sickness. But no bodily change is so great ble species. as that of death. Therefore science and the other intellec- And yet the phantasms, by turning to which man un- tual virtues do not remain after death. derstands in this life, by applying the intelligible species Objection 3. Further, the intellectual virtues perfect to them as stated in the Ia, q. 84, a. 7; Ia, q. 85, a. 1, the intellect so that it may perform its proper act well. ad 5, cease as soon as the body is corrupted. Hence, so Now there seems to be no act of the intellect after this life, far as the phantasms are concerned, which are the quasi- since “the soul understands nothing without a phantasm” material element in the intellectual virtues, these latter (De Anima iii, text. 30); and, after this life, the phantasms cease when the body is destroyed: but as regards the in- do not remain, since their only subject is an organ of the telligible species, which are in the “possible” intellect, the body. Therefore the intellectual virtues do not remain af- intellectual virtues remain. Now the species are the quasi- ter this life. formal element of the intellectual virtues. Therefore these On the contrary, The knowledge of what is univer- remain after this life, as regards their formal element, just sal and necessary is more constant than that of particular as we have stated concerning the moral virtues (a. 1). and contingent things. Now the knowledge of contingent Reply to Objection 1. The saying of the Apostle is particulars remains in man after this life; for instance, the to be understood as referring to the material element in knowledge of what one has done or suffered, according to science, and to the mode of understanding; because, to Lk. 16:25: “Son, remember that thou didst receive good it, neither do the phantasms remain, when the body is things in thy life-time, and likewise Lazarus evil things.” destroyed; nor will science be applied by turning to the Much more, therefore, does the knowledge of universal phantasms. and necessary things remain, which belong to science and Reply to Objection 2. Sickness destroys the habit of the other intellectual virtues. science as to its material element, viz. the phantasms, but I answer that, As stated in the Ia, q. 79, a. 6 some not as to the intelligible species, which are in the “possi- have held that the intelligible species do not remain in the ble” intellect. passive intellect except when it actually understands; and Reply to Objection 3. As stated in the Ia, q. 89, a. 1 that so long as actual consideration ceases, the species are the separated soul has a mode of understanding, other than not preserved save in the sensitive powers which are acts by turning to the phantasms. Consequently science re- of bodily organs, viz. in the powers of imagination and mains, yet not as to the same mode of operation; as we memory. Now these powers cease when the body is cor- have stated concerning the moral virtues (a. 1). rupted: and consequently, according to this opinion, nei- 899 Whether faith remains after this life? Ia IIae q. 67 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that faith remains after evident, that if such an imperfection be removed, the thing this life. Because faith is more excellent than science. remains substantially. Now science remains after this life, as stated above (a. 2). Now it is clear that imperfect knowledge belongs to Therefore faith remains also. the very nature of faith: for it is included in its definition; Objection 2. Further, it is written (1 Cor. 3:11): faith being defined as “the substance of things to be hoped “Other foundation no man can lay, but that which is laid; for, the evidence of things that appear not” (Heb. 11:1). which is Christ Jesus,” i.e. faith in Jesus Christ. Now if Wherefore Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.): “Where is the foundation is removed, that which is built upon it re- faith? Believing without seeing.” But it is an imperfect mains no more. Therefore, if faith remains not after this knowledge that is of things unapparent or unseen. Con- life, no other virtue remains. sequently imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature Objection 3. Further, the knowledge of faith and the of faith: therefore it is clear that the knowledge of faith knowledge of glory differ as perfect from imperfect. Now cannot be perfect and remain identically the same. imperfect knowledge is compatible with perfect knowl- But we must also consider whether it is compatible edge: thus in an angel there can be “evening” and “morn- with perfect knowledge: for there is nothing to prevent ing” knowledge∗; and a man can have science through a some kind of imperfect knowledge from being sometimes demonstrative syllogism, together with opinion through a with perfect knowledge. Accordingly we must observe probable syllogism, about one same conclusion. There- that knowledge can be imperfect in three ways: first, on fore after this life faith also is compatible with the knowl- the part of the knowable object; secondly, on the part of edge of glory. the medium; thirdly, on the part of the subject. The differ- On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6,7): ence of perfect and imperfect knowledge on the part of the “While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord: knowable object is seen in the “morning” and “evening” for we walk by faith and not by sight.” But those who are knowledge of the angels: for the “morning” knowledge in glory are not absent from the Lord, but present to Him. is about things according to the being which they have in Therefore after this life faith does not remain in the life of the Word, while the “evening” knowledge is about things glory. according as they have being in their own natures, which I answer that, Opposition is of itself the proper cause being is imperfect in comparison with the First Being. On of one thing being excluded from another, in so far, to wit, the part of the medium, perfect and imperfect knowledge as wherever two things are opposite to one another, we are exemplified in the knowledge of a conclusion through find opposition of affirmation and negation. Now in some a demonstrative medium, and through a probable medium. things we find opposition in respect of contrary forms; On the part of the subject the difference of perfect and im- thus in colors we find white and black. In others we perfect knowledge applies to opinion, faith, and science. find opposition in respect of perfection and imperfection: For it is essential to opinion that we assent to one of two wherefore in alterations, more and less are considered to opposite assertions with fear of the other, so that our adhe- be contraries, as when a thing from being less hot is made sion is not firm: to science it is essential to have firm ad- more hot (Phys. v, text. 19). And since perfect and im- hesion with intellectual vision, for science possesses cer- perfect are opposite to one another, it is impossible for titude which results from the understanding of principles: perfection and imperfection to affect the same thing at the while faith holds a middle place, for it surpasses opinion same time. in so far as its adhesion is firm, but falls short of science Now we must take note that sometimes imperfection in so far as it lacks vision. belongs to a thing’s very nature, and belongs to its species: Now it is evident that a thing cannot be perfect and im- even as lack of reason belongs to the very specific nature perfect in the same respect; yet the things which differ as of a horse and an ox. And since a thing, so long as it re- perfect and imperfect can be together in the same respect mains the same identically, cannot pass from one species in one and the same other thing. Accordingly, knowledge to another, it follows that if such an imperfection be re- which is perfect on the part of the object is quite incom- moved, the species of that thing is changed: even as it patible with imperfect knowledge about the same object; would no longer be an ox or a horse, were it to be ra- but they are compatible with one another in respect of the tional. Sometimes, however, the imperfection does not same medium or the same subject: for nothing hinders a belong to the specific nature, but is accidental to the in- man from having at one and the same time, through one dividual by reason of something else; even as sometimes and the same medium, perfect and imperfect knowledge lack of reason is accidental to a man, because he is asleep, about two things, one perfect, the other imperfect, e.g. or because he is drunk, or for some like reason; and it is about health and sickness, good and evil. In like manner ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 58, a. 6 900 knowledge that is perfect on the part of the medium is in-ifest that faith and bliss are incompatible in one and the compatible with imperfect knowledge through one and the same subject. same medium: but nothing hinders them being about the Reply to Objection 1. Faith is more excellent than same subject or in the same subject: for one man can know science, on the part of the object, because its object is the same conclusions through a probable and through a the First Truth. Yet science has a more perfect mode of demonstrative medium. Again, knowledge that is perfect knowing its object, which is not incompatible with vision on the part of the subject is incompatible with imperfect which is the perfection of happiness, as the mode of faith knowledge in the same subject. Now faith, of its very na- is incompatible. ture, contains an imperfection on the part of the subject, Reply to Objection 2. Faith is the foundation in as viz. that the believer sees not what he believes: whereas much as it is knowledge: consequently when this knowl- bliss, of its very nature, implies perfection on the part of edge is perfected, the foundation will be perfected also. the subject, viz. that the Blessed see that which makes The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what them happy, as stated above (q. 3, a. 8). Hence it is man- has been said. Whether hope remains after death, in the state of glory? Ia IIae q. 67 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that hope remains after Reply to Objection 1. Hope surpasses the moral death, in the state of glory. Because hope perfects the hu- virtues as to its object, which is God. But the acts of the man appetite in a more excellent manner than the moral moral virtues are not incompatible with the perfection of virtues. But the moral virtues remain after this life, as happiness, as the act of hope is; except perhaps, as regards Augustine clearly states (De Trin. xiv, 9). Much more their matter, in respect of which they do not remain. For then does hope remain. moral virtue perfects the appetite, not only in respect of Objection 2. Further, fear is opposed to hope. But what is not yet possessed, but also as regards something fear remains after this life: in the Blessed, filial fear, which is in our actual possession. which abides for ever—in the lost, the fear of punishment. Reply to Objection 2. Fear is twofold, servile and Therefore, in a like manner, hope can remain. filial, as we shall state further on ( IIa IIae, q. 19, a. 2). Objection 3. Further, just as hope is of future good, Servile fear regards punishment, and will be impossible in so is desire. Now in the Blessed there is desire for future the life of glory, since there will no longer be possibility good; both for the glory of the body, which the souls of of being punished. Filial fear has two acts: one is an act of the Blessed desire, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii, reverence to God, and with regard to this act, it remains: 35); and for the glory of the soul, according to Ecclus. the other is an act of fear lest we be separated from God, 24:29: “They that eat me, shall yet hunger, and they that and as regards this act, it does not remain. Because sepa- drink me, shall yet thirst,” and 1 Pet. 1:12: “On Whom ration from God is in the nature of an evil: and no evil will the angels desire to look.” Therefore it seems that there be feared there, according to Prov. 1:33: “He. . . shall en- can be hope in the Blessed after this life is past. joy abundance without fear of evils.” Now fear is opposed On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): to hope by opposition of good and evil, as stated above “What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?” But the (q. 23, a. 2; q. 40, a. 1 ), and therefore the fear which will Blessed see that which is the object of hope, viz. God. remain in glory is not opposed to hope. In the lost there Therefore they do not hope. can be fear of punishment, rather than hope of glory in I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), that which, in its the Blessed. Because in the lost there will be a succession very nature, implies imperfection of its subject, is incom- of punishments, so that the notion of something future re- patible with the opposite perfection in that subject. Thus mains there, which is the object of fear: but the glory of it is evident that movement of its very nature implies im- the saints has no succession, by reason of its being a kind perfection of its subject, since it is “the act of that which is of participation of eternity, wherein there is neither past in potentiality as such” (Phys. iii): so that as soon as this nor future, but only the present. And yet, properly speak- potentiality is brought into act, the movement ceases; for ing, neither in the lost is there fear. For, as stated above a thing does not continue to become white, when once it is (q. 42, a. 2), fear is never without some hope of escape: made white. Now hope denotes a movement towards that and the lost have no such hope. Consequently neither will which is not possessed, as is clear from what we have said there be fear in them; except speaking in a general way, in above about the passion of hope (q. 40, Aa. 1,2). There- so far as any expectation of future evil is called fear. fore when we possess that which we hope for, viz. the Reply to Objection 3. As to the glory of the soul, enjoyment of God, it will no longer be possible to have there can be no desire in the Blessed, in so far as desire hope. looks for something future, for the reason already given 901 (ad 2). Yet hunger and thirst are said to be in them be-something difficult, as stated above (q. 40, a. 1): while cause they never weary, and for the same reason desire is a good whose unerring cause we already possess, is not said to be in the angels. With regard to the glory of the compared to us as something difficult. Hence he that has body, there can be desire in the souls of the saints, but not money is not, properly speaking, said to hope for what he hope, properly speaking; neither as a theological virtue, can buy at once. In like manner those who have the glory for thus its object is God, and not a created good; nor in of the soul are not, properly speaking, said to hope for the its general signification. Because the object of hope is glory of the body, but only to desire it. Whether anything of faith or hope remains in glory? Ia IIae q. 67 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that something of faith absolutely impossible. Because when you remove a spe- and hope remains in glory. For when that which is proper cific difference, the substance of the genus does not re- to a thing is removed, there remains what is common; thus main identically the same: thus if you remove the differ- it is stated in De Causis that “if you take away rational, ence constituting whiteness, the substance of color does there remains living, and when you remove living, there not remain identically the same, as though the identical remains being.” Now in faith there is something that it has color were at one time whiteness, and, at another, black- in common with beatitude, viz. knowledge: and there is ness. The reason is that genus is not related to differ- something proper to it, viz. darkness, for faith is knowl- ence as matter to form, so that the substance of the genus edge in a dark manner. Therefore, the darkness of faith remains identically the same, when the difference is re- removed, the knowledge of faith still remains. moved, as the substance of matter remains identically the Objection 2. Further, faith is a spiritual light of the same, when the form is changed: for genus and difference soul, according to Eph. 1:17,18: “The eyes of your heart are not the parts of a species, else they would not be pred- enlightened. . . in the knowledge of God”; yet this light is icated of the species. But even as the species denotes the imperfect in comparison with the light of glory, of which whole, i.e. the compound of matter and form in material it is written (Ps. 35:10): “In Thy light we shall see light.” things, so does the difference, and likewise the genus; the Now an imperfect light remains when a perfect light su- genus denotes the whole by signifying that which is mate- pervenes: for a candle is not extinguished when the sun’s rial; the difference, by signifying that which is formal; the rays appear. Therefore it seems that the light of faith itself species, by signifying both. Thus, in man, the sensitive remains with the light of glory. nature is as matter to the intellectual nature, and animal Objection 3. Further, the substance of a habit does is predicated of that which has a sensitive nature, rational not cease through the withdrawal of its matter: for a man of that which has an intellectual nature, and man of that may retain the habit of liberality, though he have lost his which has both. So that the one same whole is denoted by money: yet he cannot exercise the act. Now the object these three, but not under the same aspect. of faith is the First Truth as unseen. Therefore when this It is therefore evident that, since the signification of ceases through being seen, the habit of faith can still re- the difference is confined to the genus if the difference main. be removed, the substance of the genus cannot remain the On the contrary, Faith is a simple habit. Now a sim- same: for the same animal nature does not remain, if an- ple thing is either withdrawn entirely, or remains entirely. other kind of soul constitute the animal. Hence it is impos- Since therefore faith does not remain entirely, but is taken sible for the identical knowledge, which was previously away as stated above (a. 3), it seems that it is withdrawn obscure, to become clear vision. It is therefore evident entirely. that, in heaven, nothing remains of faith, either identically I answer that, Some have held that hope is taken away or specifically the same, but only generically. entirely: but that faith is taken away in part, viz. as to its Reply to Objection 1. If “rational” be withdrawn, the obscurity, and remains in part, viz. as to the substance of remaining “living” thing is the same, not identically, but its knowledge. And if this be understood to mean that it generically, as stated. remains the same, not identically but generically, it is ab- Reply to Objection 2. The imperfection of candle- solutely true; since faith is of the same genus, viz. knowl- light is not opposed to the perfection of sunlight, since edge, as the beatific vision. On the other hand, hope is not they do not regard the same subject: whereas the imper- of the same genus as heavenly bliss: because it is com- fection of faith and the perfection of glory are opposed to pared to the enjoyment of bliss, as movement is to rest in one another and regard the same subject. Consequently the term of movement. they are incompatible with one another, just as light and But if it be understood to mean that in heaven the darkness in the air. knowledge of faith remains identically the same, this is Reply to Objection 3. He that loses his money does 902 not therefore lose the possibility of having money, and possibility, by reason of the unchangeableness of heav-therefore it is reasonable for the habit of liberality to re- enly bliss: and so such a habit would remain to no pur- main. But in the state of glory not only is the object of pose. faith, which is the unseen, removed actually, but even its Whether charity remains after this life, in glory? Ia IIae q. 67 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that charity does not re- growth, and whiteness by intensity. Now charity is love, main after this life, in glory. Because according to 1 Cor. the nature of which does not include imperfection, since it 13:10, “when that which is perfect is come, that which is may relate to an object either possessed or not possessed, in part,” i.e. that which is imperfect, “shall be done away.” either seen or not seen. Therefore charity is not done Now the charity of the wayfarer is imperfect. Therefore it away by the perfection of glory, but remains identically will be done away when the perfection of glory is attained. the same. Objection 2. Further, habits and acts are differenti- Reply to Objection 1. The imperfection of charity is ated by their objects. But the object of love is good appre- accidental to it; because imperfection is not included in hended. Since therefore the apprehension of the present the nature of love. Now although that which is accidental life differs from the apprehension of the life to come, it to a thing be withdrawn, the substance remains. Hence seems that charity is not the same in both cases. the imperfection of charity being done away, charity itself Objection 3. Further, things of the same kind can ad- is not done away. vance from imperfection to perfection by continuous in- Reply to Objection 2. The object of charity is not crease. But the charity of the wayfarer can never attain knowledge itself; if it were, the charity of the wayfarer to equality with the charity of heaven, however much it would not be the same as the charity of heaven: its ob- be increased. Therefore it seems that the charity of the ject is the thing known, which remains the same, viz. God wayfarer does not remain in heaven. Himself. On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:8): Reply to Objection 3. The reason why charity of the “Charity never falleth away.” wayfarer cannot attain to the perfection of the charity of I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), when the im- heaven, is a difference on the part of the cause: for vision perfection of a thing does not belong to its specific nature, is a cause of love, as stated in Ethic. ix, 5: and the more there is nothing to hinder the identical thing passing from perfectly we know God, the more perfectly we love Him. imperfection to perfection, even as man is perfected by 903 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 68 Of the Gifts (In Eight Articles) We now come to consider the Gifts; under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues? (2) Of the necessity of the Gifts? (3) Whether the Gifts are habits? (4) Which, and how many are they? (5) Whether the Gifts are connected? (6) Whether they remain in heaven? (7) Of their comparison with one another; (8) Of their comparison with the virtues. Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues? Ia IIae q. 68 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the gifts do not dif- says, are signified by Job’s three daughters. He also dis- fer from the virtues. For Gregory commenting on Job tinguishes (Moral. ii, 26) the same seven gifts from the 1:2, “There were born to him seven sons,” says (Moral. four cardinal virtues, which he says were signified by the i, 12): “Seven sons were born to us, when through the four corners of the house. conception of heavenly thought, the seven virtues of the I answer that, If we speak of gift and virtue with Holy Ghost take birth in us”: and he quotes the words regard to the notion conveyed by the words themselves, of Is. 11:2,3: “And the Spirit. . . of understanding. . . shall there is no opposition between them. Because the word rest upon him,” etc. where the seven gifts of the Holy “virtue” conveys the notion that it perfects man in relation Ghost are enumerated. Therefore the seven gifts of the to well-doing, while the word “gift” refers to the cause Holy Ghost are virtues. from which it proceeds. Now there is no reason why Objection 2. Further, Augustine commenting on Mat. that which proceeds from one as a gift should not per- 12:45, “Then he goeth and taketh with him seven other fect another in well-doing: especially as we have already spirits,” etc., says (De Quaest. Evang. i, qu. 8): “The stated (q. 63, a. 3) that some virtues are infused into us seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues of the Holy by God. Wherefore in this respect we cannot differenti- Ghost,” i.e. to the seven gifts. Now the seven vices are ate gifts from virtues. Consequently some have held that opposed to the seven virtues, commonly so called. There- the gifts are not to be distinguished from the virtues. But fore the gifts do not differ from the virtues commonly so there remains no less a difficulty for them to solve; for called. they must explain why some virtues are called gifts and Objection 3. Further, things whose definitions are the some not; and why among the gifts there are some, fear, same, are themselves the same. But the definition of virtue for instance, that are not reckoned virtues. applies to the gifts; for each gift is “a good quality of the Hence it is that others have said that the gifts should mind, whereby we lead a good life,” etc.∗. Likewise the be held as being distinct from the virtues; yet they have definition of a gift can apply to the infused virtues: for a not assigned a suitable reason for this distinction, a rea- gift is “an unreturnable giving,” according to the Philoso- son, to wit, which would apply either to all the virtues, pher (Topic. iv, 4). Therefore the virtues and gifts do not and to none of the gifts, or vice versa. For, seeing that of differ from one another. the seven gifts, four belong to the reason, viz. wisdom, Objection 4. Several of the things mentioned among knowledge, understanding and counsel, and three to the the gifts, are virtues: for, as stated above (q. 57, a. 2), appetite, viz. fortitude, piety and fear; they held that the wisdom, understanding, and knowledge are intellectual gifts perfect the free-will according as it is a faculty of virtues, counsel pertains to prudence, piety to a kind of the reason, while the virtues perfect it as a faculty of the justice, and fortitude is a moral virtue. Therefore it seems will: since they observed only two virtues in the reason or that the gifts do not differ from the virtues. intellect, viz. faith and prudence, the others being in the On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. i, 12) distinguishes appetitive power or the affections. If this distinction were seven gifts, which he states to be denoted by the seven true, all the virtues would have to be in the appetite, and sons of Job, from the three theological virtues, which, he all the gifts in the reason. ∗ Cf. q. 55, a. 4 904 Others observing that Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that der to receive a higher teaching from his master. Now it is “the gift of the Holy Ghost, by coming into the soul en- manifest that human virtues perfect man according as it is dows it with prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude, natural for him to be moved by his reason in his interior and at the same time strengthens it against every kind of and exterior actions. Consequently man needs yet higher temptation by His sevenfold gift,” said that the virtues are perfections, whereby to be disposed to be moved by God. given us that we may do good works, and the gifts, that we These perfections are called gifts, not only because they may resist temptation. But neither is this distinction suf- are infused by God, but also because by them man is dis- ficient. Because the virtues also resist those temptations posed to become amenable to the Divine inspiration, ac- which lead to the sins that are contrary to the virtues; for cording to Is. 50:5: “The Lord. . . hath opened my ear, and everything naturally resists its contrary: which is espe- I do not resist; I have not gone back.” Even the Philoso- cially clear with regard to charity, of which it is written pher says in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem., (Cant 8:7): “Many waters cannot quench charity.” vii, 8) that for those who are moved by Divine instinct, Others again, seeing that these gifts are set down there is no need to take counsel according to human rea- in Holy Writ as having been in Christ, according to Is. son, but only to follow their inner promptings, since they 11:2,3, said that the virtues are given simply that we may are moved by a principle higher than human reason. This do good works, but the gifts, in order to conform us to then is what some say, viz. that the gifts perfect man for Christ, chiefly with regard to His Passion, for it was then acts which are higher than acts of virtue. that these gifts shone with the greatest splendor. Yet nei- Reply to Objection 1. Sometimes these gifts are ther does this appear to be a satisfactory distinction. Be- called virtues, in the broad sense of the word. Never- cause Our Lord Himself wished us to be conformed to theless, they have something over and above the virtues Him, chiefly in humility and meekness, according to Mat. understood in this broad way, in so far as they are Di- 11:29: “Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of vine virtues, perfecting man as moved by God. Hence heart,” and in charity, according to Jn. 15:12: “Love one the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1) above virtue commonly so another, as I have loved you.” Moreover, these virtues called, places a kind of “heroic” or “divine virtue∗,” in were especially resplendent in Christ’s Passion. respect of which some men are called “divine.” Accordingly, in order to differentiate the gifts from the Reply to Objection 2. The vices are opposed to the virtues, we must be guided by the way in which Scrip- virtues, in so far as they are opposed to the good as ap- ture expresses itself, for we find there that the term em- pointed by reason; but they are opposed to the gifts, in as ployed is “spirit” rather than “gift.” For thus it is written much as they are opposed to the Divine instinct. For the (Is. 11:2,3): “The spirit. . . of wisdom and of understand- same thing is opposed both to God and to reason, whose ing. . . shall rest upon him,” etc.: from which words we light flows from God. are clearly given to understand that these seven are there Reply to Objection 3. This definition applies to virtue set down as being in us by Divine inspiration. Now in- taken in its general sense. Consequently, if we wish to re- spiration denotes motion from without. For it must be strict it to virtue as distinguished from the gifts, we must noted that in man there is a twofold principle of move- explain the words, “whereby we lead a good life” as re- ment, one within him, viz. the reason; the other extrinsic ferring to the rectitude of life which is measured by the to him, viz. God, as stated above (q. 9, Aa. 4,6): moreover rule of reason. Likewise the gifts, as distinct from infused the Philosopher says this in the chapter On Good Fortune virtue, may be defined as something given by God in rela- (Ethic. Eudem. vii, 8). tion to His motion; something, to wit, that makes man to Now it is evident that whatever is moved must be pro- follow well the promptings of God. portionate to its mover: and the perfection of the mobile Reply to Objection 4. Wisdom is called an intellec- as such, consists in a disposition whereby it is disposed to tual virtue, so far as it proceeds from the judgment of rea- be well moved by its mover. Hence the more exalted the son: but it is called a gift, according as its work proceeds mover, the more perfect must be the disposition whereby from the Divine prompting. The same applies to the other the mobile is made proportionate to its mover: thus we virtues. see that a disciple needs a more perfect disposition in or- ∗ arete heroike kai theia 905 Whether the gifts are necessary to man for salvation? Ia IIae q. 68 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the gifts are not nec- of itself work, unless it be moved by another. Thus the essary to man for salvation. Because the gifts are or- sun which possesses light perfectly, can shine by itself; dained to a perfection surpassing the ordinary perfection whereas the moon which has the nature of light imper- of virtue. Now it is not necessary for man’s salvation that fectly, sheds only a borrowed light. Again, a physician, he should attain to a perfection surpassing the ordinary who knows the medical art perfectly, can work by him- standard of virtue; because such perfection falls, not un- self; but his pupil, who is not yet fully instructed, cannot der the precept, but under a counsel. Therefore the gifts work by himself, but needs to receive instructions from are not necessary to man for salvation. him. Objection 2. Further, it is enough, for man’s salva- Accordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and tion, that he behave well in matters concerning God and directed to man’s connatural end, man can work through matters concerning man. Now man’s behavior to God is the judgment of his reason. If, however, even in these sufficiently directed by the theological virtues; and his be- things man receive help in the shape of special promptings havior towards men, by the moral virtues. Therefore gifts from God, this will be out of God’s superabundant good- are not necessary to man for salvation. ness: hence, according to the philosophers, not every one Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that had the acquired moral virtues, had also the heroic or that “the Holy Ghost gives wisdom against folly, under- divine virtues. But in matters directed to the supernatural standing against dullness, counsel against rashness, for- end, to which man’s reason moves him, according as it is, titude against fears, knowledge against ignorance, piety in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the theologi- against hardness of our heart, and fear against pride.” But cal virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless a sufficient remedy for all these things is to be found in it receive in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy the virtues. Therefore the gifts are not necessary to man Ghost, according to Rom. 8:14,17: “Whosoever are led for salvation. by the Spirit of God, they are sons of God. . . and if sons, On the contrary, Of all the gifts, wisdom seems to heirs also”: and Ps. 142:10: “Thy good Spirit shall lead be the highest, and fear the lowest. Now each of these me into the right land,” because, to wit, none can receive is necessary for salvation: since of wisdom it is written the inheritance of that land of the Blessed, except he be (Wis. 7:28): “God loveth none but him that dwelleth with moved and led thither by the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in wisdom”; and of fear (Ecclus. 1:28): “He that is without order to accomplish this end, it is necessary for man to fear cannot be justified.” Therefore the other gifts that are have the gift of the Holy Ghost. placed between these are also necessary for salvation. Reply to Objection 1. The gifts surpass the ordinary I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the gifts are perfection of the virtues, not as regards the kind of works perfections of man, whereby he is disposed so as to be (as the counsels surpass the commandments), but as re- amenable to the promptings of God. Wherefore in those gards the manner of working, in respect of man being matters where the prompting of reason is not sufficient, moved by a higher principle. and there is need for the prompting of the Holy Ghost, Reply to Objection 2. By the theological and moral there is, in consequence, need for a gift. virtues, man is not so perfected in respect of his last end, Now man’s reason is perfected by God in two ways: as not to stand in continual need of being moved by the first, with its natural perfection, to wit, the natural light of yet higher promptings of the Holy Ghost, for the reason reason; secondly, with a supernatural perfection, to wit, already given. the theological virtues, as stated above (q. 62, a. 1). And, Reply to Objection 3. Whether we consider human though this latter perfection is greater than the former, yet reason as perfected in its natural perfection, or as per- the former is possessed by man in a more perfect manner fected by the theological virtues, it does not know all than the latter: because man has the former in his full pos- things, nor all possible things. Consequently it is unable session, whereas he possesses the latter imperfectly, since to avoid folly and other like things mentioned in the objec- we love and know God imperfectly. Now it is evident tion. God, however, to Whose knowledge and power all that anything that has a nature or a form or a virtue per- things are subject, by His motion safeguards us from all fectly, can of itself work according to them: not, however, folly, ignorance, dullness of mind and hardness of heart, excluding the operation of God, Who works inwardly in and the rest. Consequently the gifts of the Holy Ghost, every nature and in every will. On the other hand, that which make us amenable to His promptings, are said to which has a nature, or form, or virtue imperfectly, cannot be given as remedies to these defects. 906 Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits? Ia IIae q. 68 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the gifts of the Holy I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the gifts are Ghost are not habits. Because a habit is a quality abiding perfections of man, whereby he becomes amenable to the in man, being defined as “a quality difficult to remove,” promptings of the Holy Ghost. Now it is evident from as stated in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now it is what has been already said (q. 56, a. 4; q. 58, a. 2), that proper to Christ that the gifts of the Holy Ghost rest in the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power according Him, as stated in Is. 11:2,3: “He upon Whom thou shalt as it partakes somewhat of the reason, in so far, to wit, as see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the command of is that baptizeth”; on which words Gregory comments as reason. Accordingly the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as com- follows (Moral. ii, 27): “The Holy Ghost comes upon all pared with the Holy Ghost Himself, are related to man, the faithful; but, in a singular way, He dwells always in even as the moral virtues, in comparison with the reason, the Mediator.” Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are are related to the appetitive power. Now the moral virtues not habits. are habits, whereby the powers of appetite are disposed Objection 2. Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost per- to obey reason promptly. Therefore the gifts of the Holy fect man according as he is moved by the Spirit of God, Ghost are habits whereby man is perfected to obey readily as stated above (Aa. 1,2). But in so far as man is moved the Holy Ghost. by the Spirit of God, he is somewhat like an instrument in Reply to Objection 1. Gregory solves this objec- His regard. Now to be perfected by a habit is befitting, not tion (Moral. ii, 27) by saying that “by those gifts with- an instrument, but a principal agent. Therefore the gifts of out which one cannot obtain life, the Holy Ghost ever the Holy Ghost are not habits. abides in all the elect, but not by His other gifts.” Now Objection 3. Further, as the gifts of the Holy Ghost the seven gifts are necessary for salvation, as stated above are due to Divine inspiration, so is the gift of prophecy. (a. 2). Therefore, with regard to them, the Holy Ghost Now prophecy is not a habit: for “the spirit of prophecy ever abides in holy men. does not always reside in the prophets,” as Gregory states Reply to Objection 2. This argument holds, in the (Hom. i in Ezechiel). Neither, therefore, are the gifts of case of an instrument which has no faculty of action, but the Holy Ghost. only of being acted upon. But man is not an instrument On the contrary, Our Lord in speaking of the Holy of that kind; for he is so acted upon, by the Holy Ghost, Ghost said to His disciples (Jn. 14:17): “He shall abide that he also acts himself, in so far as he has a free-will. with you, and shall be in you.” Now the Holy Ghost is not Therefore he needs a habit. in a man without His gifts. Therefore His gifts abide in Reply to Objection 3. Prophecy is one of those gifts man. Therefore they are not merely acts or passions but which are for the manifestation of the Spirit, not for the abiding habits. necessity of salvation: hence the comparison fails. Whether the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are suitably enumerated? Ia IIae q. 68 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that seven gifts of the fect man according as he is moved by God, it seems Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated. For in that enu- that some gifts, corresponding to the theological virtues, meration four are set down corresponding to the intellec- should have been included. tual virtues, viz. wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and Objection 4. Further, even as God is an object of fear, counsel, which corresponds to prudence; whereas nothing so is He of love, of hope, and of joy. Now love, hope, and is set down corresponding to art, which is the fifth intellec- joy are passions condivided with fear. Therefore, as fear tual virtue. Moreover, something is included correspond- is set down as a gift, so ought the other three. ing to justice, viz. piety, and something corresponding to Objection 5. Further, wisdom is added in order to fortitude, viz. the gift of fortitude; while there is noth- direct understanding; counsel, to direct fortitude; knowl- ing to correspond to temperance. Therefore the gifts are edge, to direct piety. Therefore, some gift should have enumerated insufficiently. been added for the purpose of directing fear. Therefore Objection 2. Further, piety is a part of justice. But no the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumer-part of fortitude is assigned to correspond thereto, but for- ated. titude itself. Therefore justice itself, and not piety, ought On the contrary, stands the authority of Holy Writ to have been set down. (Is. 11:2,3). Objection 3. Further, the theological virtues, more I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), the gifts are than any, direct us to God. Since, then, the gifts per- habits perfecting man so that he is ready to follow the 907 promptings of the Holy Ghost, even as the moral virtues evil pleasures for the sake of the good appointed by rea-perfect the appetitive powers so that they obey the reason. son, so does it belong to the gift of fear, to withdraw man Now just as it is natural for the appetitive powers to be from evil pleasures through fear of God. moved by the command of reason, so it is natural for all Reply to Objection 2. Justice is so called from the the forces in man to be moved by the instinct of God, as by rectitude of the reason, and so it is more suitably called a superior power. Therefore whatever powers in man can a virtue than a gift. But the name of piety denotes the be the principles of human actions, can also be the sub- reverence which we give to our father and to our country. jects of gifts, even as they are virtues; and such powers And since God is the Father of all, the worship of God is are the reason and appetite. also called piety, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). Now the reason is speculative and practical: and in Therefore the gift whereby a man, through reverence for both we find the apprehension of truth (which pertains to God, works good to all, is fittingly called piety. the discovery of truth), and judgment concerning the truth. Reply to Objection 3. The mind of man is not moved Accordingly, for the apprehension of truth, the speculative by the Holy Ghost, unless in some way it be united to reason is perfected by “understanding”; the practical rea- Him: even as the instrument is not moved by the crafts- son, by “counsel.” In order to judge aright, the speculative man, unless there by contact or some other kind of union reason is perfected by “wisdom”; the practical reason by between them. Now the primal union of man with God “knowledge.” The appetitive power, in matters touching a is by faith, hope and charity: and, consequently, these man’s relations to another, is perfected by “piety”; in mat- virtues are presupposed to the gifts, as being their roots. ters touching himself, it is perfected by “fortitude” against Therefore all the gifts correspond to these three virtues, as the fear of dangers; and against inordinate lust for plea- being derived therefrom. sures, by “fear,” according to Prov. 15:27: “By the fear of Reply to Objection 4. Love, hope and joy have good the Lord every one declineth from evil,” and Ps. 118:120: for their object. Now God is the Sovereign Good: where- “Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear: for I am afraid of fore the names of these passions are transferred to the the- Thy judgments.” Hence it is clear that these gifts extend ological virtues which unite man to God. On the other to all those things to which the virtues, both intellectual hand, the object of fear is evil, which can nowise ap- and moral, extend. ply to God: hence fear does not denote union with God, Reply to Objection 1. The gifts of the Holy Ghost but withdrawal from certain things through reverence for perfect man in matters concerning a good life: whereas God. Hence it does not give its name to a theological art is not directed to such matters, but to external things virtue, but to a gift, which withdraws us from evil, for that can be made, since art is the right reason, not about higher motives than moral virtue does. things to be done, but about things to be made (Ethic. vi, Reply to Objection 5. Wisdom directs both the in- 4). However, we may say that, as regards the infusion of tellect and the affections of man. Hence two gifts are set the gifts, the art is on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who is down as corresponding to wisdom as their directing prin- the principal mover, and not on the part of men, who are ciple; on the part of the intellect, the gift of understanding; His organs when He moves them. The gift of fear corre-on the part of the affections, the gift of fear. Because the sponds, in a manner, to temperance: for just as it belongs principal reason for fearing God is taken from a consider- to temperance, properly speaking, to restrain man from ation of the Divine excellence, which wisdom considers. Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected? Ia IIae q. 68 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the gifts are not con- man. nected, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8): “To one. . . by Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Moral. i) that the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom, and to another, the wisdom “is of small account if it lack understanding, and word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit.” Now understanding is wholly useless if it be not based upon wisdom and knowledge are reckoned among the gifts of wisdom. . . Counsel is worthless, when the strength of for- the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are titude is lacking thereto. . . and fortitude is very weak if it given to divers men, and are not connected together in the be not supported by counsel. . . Knowledge is nought if it same man. hath not the use of piety. . . and piety is very useless if it Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, lack the discernment of knowledge. . . and assuredly, un- 1) that “many of the faithful have not knowledge, though less it has these virtues with it, fear itself rises up to the they have faith.” But some of the gifts, at least the gift doing of no good action”: from which it seems that it is of fear, accompany faith. Therefore it seems that the gifts possible to have one gift without another. Therefore the are not necessarily connected together in one and the same gifts of the Holy Ghost are not connected. 908 On the contrary, Gregory prefaces the passage above in another way for the gifts of the Holy Ghost: and thus quoted, with the following remark: “It is worthy of note wisdom and knowledge are nothing else but perfections of in this feast of Job’s sons, that by turns they fed one an- the human mind, rendering it amenable to the promptings other.” Now the sons of Job, of whom he is speaking, of the Holy Ghost in the knowledge of things Divine and denote the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of human. Consequently it is clear that these gifts are in all the Holy Ghost are connected together by strengthening who are possessed of charity. one another. Reply to Objection 2. Augustine is speaking there of I answer that, The true answer to this question is eas- knowledge, while expounding the passage of the Apos- ily gathered from what has been already set down. For it tle quoted above (obj. 1): hence he is referring to knowl- has been stated (a. 3) that as the powers of the appetite are edge, in the sense already explained, as a gratuitous grace. disposed by the moral virtues as regards the governance This is clear from the context which follows: “For it is of reason, so all the powers of the soul are disposed by one thing to know only what a man must believe in or- the gifts as regards the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now der to gain the blissful life, which is no other than eter- the Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, according to Rom. nal life; and another, to know how to impart this to godly 5:5: “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by souls, and to defend it against the ungodly, which latter the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us,” even as our reason the Apostle seems to have styled by the proper name of is perfected by prudence. Wherefore, just as the moral knowledge.” virtues are united together in prudence, so the gifts of Reply to Objection 3. Just as the connection of the the Holy Ghost are connected together in charity: so that cardinal virtues is proved in one way from the fact that whoever has charity has all the gifts of the Holy Ghost, one is, in a manner, perfected by another, as stated above none of which can one possess without charity. (q. 65, a. 1); so Gregory wishes to prove the connection Reply to Objection 1. Wisdom and knowledge can of the gifts, in the same way, from the fact that one can- be considered in one way as gratuitous graces, in so far, not be perfect without the other. Hence he had already to wit, as man so far abounds in the knowledge of things observed that “each particular virtue is to the last degree Divine and human, that he is able both to instruct the be- destitute, unless one virtue lend its support to another.” liever and confound the unbeliever. It is in this sense that We are therefore not to understand that one gift can be the Apostle speaks, in this passage, about wisdom and without another; but that if understanding were without knowledge: hence he mentions pointedly the “word” of wisdom, it would not be a gift; even as temperance, with- wisdom and the “word” of knowledge. They may be taken out justice, would not be a virtue. Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost remain in heaven? Ia IIae q. 68 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the gifts of the Holy and some in the active life, e.g. piety and fortitude. Now Ghost do not remain in heaven. For Gregory says (Moral. the active life ends with this as Gregory states (Moral. vi). ii, 26) that by means of His sevenfold gift the “Holy Ghost Therefore not all the gifts of the Holy Ghost will be in the instructs the mind against all temptations.” Now there will state of glory. be no temptations in heaven, according to Is. 11:9: “They On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Spiritu Sancto shall not hurt, nor shall they kill in all My holy moun- i, 20): “The city of God, the heavenly Jerusalem is not tain.” Therefore there will be no gifts of the Holy Ghost washed with the waters of an earthly river: it is the Holy in heaven. Ghost, of Whose outpouring we but taste, Who, proceed- Objection 2. Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost ing from the Fount of life, seems to flow more abundantly are habits, as stated above (a. 3). But habits are in those celestial spirits, a seething torrent of sevenfold of no use, where their acts are impossible. Now heavenly virtue.” the acts of some gifts are not possible in heaven; I answer that, We may speak of the gifts in two ways: for Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that “understand- first, as to their essence; and thus they will be most per- ing. . . penetrates the truths heard. . . counsel. . . stays us fectly in heaven, as may be gathered from the passage of from acting rashly. . . fortitude. . . has no fear of adver- Ambrose, just quoted. The reason for this is that the gifts sity. . . piety satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of of the Holy Ghost render the human mind amenable to mercy,” all of which are incompatible with the heavenly the motion of the Holy Ghost: which will be especially state. Therefore these gifts will not remain in the state of realized in heaven, where God will be “all in all” (1 Cor. glory. 15:28), and man entirely subject unto Him. Secondly, they Objection 3. Further, some of the gifts perfect man may be considered as regards the matter about which their in the contemplative life, e.g. wisdom and understanding: operations are: and thus, in the present life they have an 909 operation about a matter, in respect of which they will it “fears not adversity,” which is necessary in the present have no operation in the state of glory. Considered in this life; and further, that it “sets before us the viands of con- way, they will not remain in the state of glory; just as fidence,” which remains also in the future life. With re- we have stated to be the case with regard to the cardinal gard to knowledge he mentions only one thing, viz. that virtues (q. 67, a. 1). “she overcomes the void of ignorance,” which refers to the Reply to Objection 1. Gregory is speaking there of present state. When, however, he adds “in the womb of the the gifts according as they are compatible with the present mind,” this may refer figuratively to the fulness of knowl- state: for it is thus that they afford us protection against edge, which belongs to the future state. Of piety he says evil temptations. But in the state of glory, where all evil that “it satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy.” will have ceased, we shall be perfected in good by the gifts These words taken literally refer only to the present state: of the Holy Ghost. yet the inward regard for our neighbor, signified by “the Reply to Objection 2. Gregory, in almost every gift, inmost heart,” belongs also to the future state, when piety includes something that passes away with the present will achieve, not works of mercy, but fellowship of joy. state, and something that remains in the future state. Of fear he say that “it oppresses the mind, lest it pride it- For he says that “wisdom strengthens the mind with the self in present things,” which refers to the present state, hope and certainty of eternal things”; of which two, hope and that “it strengthens it with the meat of hope for the passes, and certainty remains. Of understanding, he says future,” which also belongs to the present state, as regards “that it penetrates the truths heard, refreshing the heart hope, but may also refer to the future state, as regards be- and enlightening its darkness,” of which, hearing passes ing “strengthened” for things we hope are here, and obtain away, since “they shall teach no more every man. . . his there. brother” (Jer. 31:3,4); but the enlightening of the mind Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the remains. Of counsel he says that it “prevents us from be- gifts as to their matter. For the matter of the gifts will ing impetuous,” which is necessary in the present life; and not be the works of the active life; but all the gifts will also that “it makes the mind full of reason,” which is nec- have their respective acts about things pertaining to the essary even in the future state. Of fortitude he says that contemplative life, which is the life of heavenly bliss. Whether the gifts are set down by Isaias in their order of dignity? Ia IIae q. 68 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the gifts are not set knowledge is a more excellent gift than fortitude; and yet down by Isaias in their order of dignity. For the principal the latter is given the precedence. Therefore the gifts are gift is, seemingly, that which, more than the others, God not set down in their order of dignity. requires of man. Now God requires of man fear, more On the contrary, Augustine says∗: “It seems to me than the other gifts: for it is written (Dt. 10:12): “And that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Ghost, of which now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, Isaias speaks, agrees in degrees and expression with these but that thou fear the Lord thy God?” and (Malachi 1:6): [of which we read in Mat. 5:3]: but there is a difference “If. . . I be a master, where is My fear?” Therefore it seems of order, for there [viz. in Isaias] the enumeration begins that fear, which is mentioned last, is not the lowest but the with the more excellent gifts, here, with the lower gifts.” greatest of the gifts. I answer that, The excellence of the gifts can be mea- Objection 2. Further, piety seems to be a kind of com- sured in two ways: first, simply, viz. by comparison to mon good; since the Apostle says (1 Tim. 4:8): “Piety their proper acts as proceeding from their principles; sec- [Douay: ‘Godliness’] is profitable to all things.” Now a ondly, relatively, viz. by comparison to their matter. If common good is preferable to particular goods. There- we consider the excellence of the gifts simply, they fol- fore piety, which is given the last place but one, seems to low the same rule as the virtues, as to their comparison be the most excellent gift. one with another; because the gifts perfect man for all the Objection 3. Further, knowledge perfects man’s judg- acts of the soul’s powers, even as the virtues do, as stated ment, while counsel pertains to inquiry. But judgment is above (a. 4). Hence, as the intellectual virtues have the more excellent than inquiry. Therefore knowledge is a precedence of the moral virtues, and among the intellec- more excellent gift than counsel; and yet it is set down as tual virtues, the contemplative are preferable to the active, being below it. viz. wisdom, understanding and science to prudence and Objection 4. Further, fortitude pertains to the appet- art (yet so that wisdom stands before understanding, and itive power, while science belongs to reason. But reason understanding before science, and prudence and synesis is a more excellent power than the appetite. Therefore before eubulia): so also among the gifts, wisdom, un- ∗ De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4 910 derstanding, knowledge, and counsel are more excellent Reply to Objection 2. In the words quoted from the than piety, fortitude, and fear; and among the latter, piety Apostle, piety is not compared with all God’s gifts, but excels fortitude, and fortitude fear, even as justice sur- only with “bodily exercise,” of which he had said it “is passes fortitude, and fortitude temperance. But in regard profitable to little.” to their matter, fortitude and counsel precede knowledge Reply to Objection 3. Although knowledge stands and piety: because fortitude and counsel are concerned before counsel by reason of its judgment, yet counsel is with difficult matters, whereas piety and knowledge re- more excellent by reason of its matter: for counsel is gard ordinary matters. Consequently the excellence of the only concerned with matters of difficulty (Ethic. iii, 3), gifts corresponds with the order in which they are enumer- whereas the judgment of knowledge embraces all matters. ated; but so far as wisdom and understanding are given Reply to Objection 4. The directive gifts which per- the preference to the others, their excellence is considered tain to the reason are more excellent than the executive simply, while, so far, as counsel and fortitude are preferred gifts, if we consider them in relation to their acts as pro- to knowledge and piety, it is considered with regard to ceeding from their powers, because reason transcends the their matter. appetite as a rule transcends the thing ruled. But on the Reply to Objection 1. Fear is chiefly required as be- part of the matter, counsel is united to fortitude as the di- ing the foundation, so to speak, of the perfection of the rective power to the executive, and so is knowledge united other gifts, for “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of to piety: because counsel and fortitude are concerned with wisdom” (Ps. 110:10; Ecclus. 1:16), and not as though matters of difficulty, while knowledge and piety are con- it were more excellent than the others. Because, in the cerned with ordinary matters. Hence counsel together order of generation, man departs from evil on account of with fortitude, by reason of their matter, are given the fear (Prov. 16:16), before doing good works, and which preference to knowledge and piety. result from the other gifts. Whether the virtues are more excellent than the gifts? Ia IIae q. 68 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that the virtues are more while it knows and yet loves not, may swell the mind; lest excellent than the gifts. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, piety, while it swerves from the right line, may become 18) while speaking of charity: “No gift of God is more distorted; and lest fear, while it is unduly alarmed, may excellent than this. It is this alone which divides the chil- plunge us into the pit of despair.” Therefore the virtues dren of the eternal kingdom from the children of eternal are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost. damnation. Other gifts are bestowed by the Holy Ghost, On the contrary, The gifts are bestowed to assist the but, without charity, they avail nothing.” But charity is a virtues and to remedy certain defects, as is shown in the virtue. Therefore a virtue is more excellent than the gifts passage quoted (obj. 2), so that, seemingly, they accom- of the Holy Ghost. plish what the virtues cannot. Therefore the gifts are more Objection 2. Further, that which is first naturally, excellent than the virtues. seems to be more excellent. Now the virtues precede I answer that, As was shown above (q. 58, a. 3; q. 62, the gifts of the Holy Ghost; for Gregory says (Moral. ii, a. 1), there are three kinds of virtues: for some are the- 26) that “the gift of the Holy Ghost in the mind it works ological, some intellectual, and some moral. The theo- on, forms first of all justice, prudence, fortitude, temper- logical virtues are those whereby man’s mind is united to ance. . . and doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven God; the intellectual virtues are those whereby reason it- virtues” [viz. the gifts], so “as against folly to bestow wis- self is perfected; and the moral virtues are those which dom; against dullness, understanding; against rashness, perfect the powers of appetite in obedience to the reason. counsel; against fear, fortitude; against ignorance, knowl- On the other hand the gifts of the Holy Ghost dispose all edge; against hardness of heart, piety; against piety, fear.” the powers of the soul to be amenable to the Divine mo- Therefore the virtues are more excellent than the gifts. tion. Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, Accordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the the- 19) that “the virtues cannot be used to evil purpose.” But ological virtues, by which man is united to the Holy Ghost it is possible to make evil use of the gifts, for Gregory says his Mover, in the same way as the moral virtues are com- (Moral. i, 18): “We offer up the sacrifice of prayer. . . lest pared to the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, wisdom may uplift; or understanding, while it runs nim- the moving principle of the moral virtues. Wherefore as bly, deviate from the right path; or counsel, while it mul- the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral tiplies itself, grow into confusion; that fortitude, while it virtues and control them, so the theological virtues are gives confidence, may not make us rash; lest knowledge, more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost and reg- 911 ulate them. Hence Gregory says (Moral. i, 12) that “the and dignity, as love of God precedes love of our neighbor: seven sons,” i.e. the seven gifts, “never attain the perfec- and in this way the gifts precede the intellectual and moral tion of the number ten, unless all they do be done in faith, virtues, but follow the theological virtues. The other is hope, and charity.” the order of generation or disposition: thus love of one’s But if we compare the gifts to the other virtues, intel- neighbor precedes love of God, as regards the act: and in lectual and moral, then the gifts have the precedence of the this way moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts, virtues. Because the gifts perfect the soul’s powers in re- since man, through being well subordinate to his own rea- lation to the Holy Ghost their Mover; whereas the virtues son, is disposed to be rightly subordinate to God. perfect, either the reason itself, or the other powers in re- Reply to Objection 3. Wisdom and understanding lation to reason: and it is evident that the more exalted and the like are gifts of the Holy Ghost, according as they the mover, the more excellent the disposition whereby the are quickened by charity, which “dealeth not perversely” thing moved requires to be disposed. Therefore the gifts (1 Cor. 13:4). Consequently wisdom and understanding are more perfect than the virtues. and the like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far as Reply to Objection 1. Charity is a theological virtue; they are gifts of the Holy Ghost. But, lest they depart from and such we grant to be more perfect than the gifts. the perfection of charity, they assist one another. This is Reply to Objection 2. There are two ways in which what Gregory means to say. one thing precedes another. One is in order of perfection 912 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 69 Of the Beatitudes (In Four Articles) We must now consider the beatitudes: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the beatitudes differ from the gifts and virtues? (2) Of the rewards of the beatitudes: whether they refer to this life? (3) Of the number of the beatitudes; (4) Of the fittingness of the rewards ascribed to the beatitudes. Whether the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts? Ia IIae q. 69 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the beatitudes do the Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): “We are saved by hope.” not differ from the virtues and gifts. For Augustine (De Again, we hope to obtain an end, because we are suitably Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) assigns the beatitudes recited moved towards that end, and approach thereto; and this by Matthew (v 3, seqq.) to the gifts of the Holy Ghost; implies some action. And a man is moved towards, and and Ambrose in his commentary on Luke 6:20, seqq., as- approaches the happy end by works of virtue, and above cribes the beatitudes mentioned there, to the four cardinal all by the works of the gifts, if we speak of eternal hap- virtues. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from the piness, for which our reason is not sufficient, since we virtues and gifts. need to be moved by the Holy Ghost, and to be perfected Objection 2. Further, there are but two rules of the hu- with His gifts that we may obey and follow him. Conse- man will: the reason and the eternal law, as stated above quently the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts, not (q. 19, a. 3; q. 21, a. 1). Now the virtues perfect man as habit, but as act from habit. in relation to reason; while the gifts perfect him in rela- Reply to Objection 1. Augustine and Ambrose as- tion to the eternal law of the Holy Ghost, as is clear from sign the beatitudes to the gifts and virtues, as acts are as- what has been said (q. 68, Aa. 1,3, seqq.). Therefore there cribed to habits. But the gifts are more excellent than the cannot be anything else pertaining to the rectitude of the cardinal virtues, as stated above (q. 68, a. 8). Wherefore human will, besides the virtues and gifts. Therefore the Ambrose, in explaining the beatitudes propounded to the beatitudes do not differ from them. throng, assigns them to the cardinal virtues, whereas Au- Objection 3. Further, among the beatitudes are in- gustine, who is explaining the beatitudes delivered to the cluded meekness, justice, and mercy, which are said to be disciples on the mountain, and so to those who were more virtues. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from the perfect, ascribes them to the gifts of the Holy Ghost. virtues and gifts. Reply to Objection 2. This argument proves that no On the contrary, Certain things are included among other habits, besides the virtues and gifts, rectify human the beatitudes, that are neither virtues nor gifts, e.g. conduct. poverty, mourning, and peace. Therefore the beatitudes Reply to Objection 3. Meekness is to be taken as de- differ from the virtues and gifts. noting the act of meekness: and the same applies to justice I answer that, As stated above (q. 2, a. 7; q. 3, a. 1), and mercy. And though these might seem to be virtues, happiness is the last end of human life. Now one is said they are nevertheless ascribed to gifts, because the gifts to possess the end already, when one hopes to possess it; perfect man in all matters wherein the virtues perfect him, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9) that “children as stated above (q. 68, a. 2). are said to be happy because they are full of hope”; and Whether the rewards assigned to the beatitudes refer to this life? Ia IIae q. 69 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the rewards assigned down in opposition to the beatitudes, Lk. 6:25, where we to the beatitudes do not refer to this life. Because some are read: “Woe to you that are filled; for you shall hunger. said to be happy because they hope for a reward, as stated Woe to you that now laugh, for you shall mourn and above (a. 1). Now the object of hope is future happiness. weep.” Now these punishments do not refer to this life, Therefore these rewards refer to the life to come. because frequently men are not punished in this life, ac- Objection 2. Further, certain punishments are set cording to Job 21:13: “They spend their days in wealth.” 913 Therefore neither do the rewards of the beatitudes refer to the virtues and gifts, it is to be hoped that he will arrive this life. at perfection, both as a wayfarer, and as a citizen of the Objection 3. Further, the kingdom of heaven which heavenly kingdom. is set down as the reward of poverty is the happiness of Reply to Objection 1. Hope regards future happiness heaven, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix)∗. Again, as the last end: yet it may also regard the assistance of abundant fullness is not to be had save in the life to come, grace as that which leads to that end, according to Ps. according to Ps. 16:15: “I shall be filled [Douay: ‘satis- 27:7: “In Him hath my heart hoped, and I have been fied’] when Thy glory shall appear.” Again, it is only in helped.” the future life that we shall see God, and that our Divine Reply to Objection 2. Although sometimes the sonship will be made manifest, according to 1 Jn. 3:2: wicked do not undergo temporal punishment in this life, “We are now the sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared yet they suffer spiritual punishment. Hence Augustine what we shall be. We know that, when He shall appear, says (Confess. i): “Thou hast decreed, and it is so, Lord— we shall be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He that the disordered mind should be its own punishment.” is.” Therefore these rewards refer to the future life. The Philosopher, too, says of the wicked (Ethic. ix, 4) On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in that “their soul is divided against itself. . . one part pulls Monte i, 4): “These promises can be fulfilled in this life, this way, another that”; and afterwards he concludes, say- as we believe them to have been fulfilled in the apostles. ing: “If wickedness makes a man so miserable, he should For no words can express that complete change into the strain every nerve to avoid vice.” In like manner, although, likeness even of an angel, which is promised to us after on the other hand, the good sometimes do not receive ma- this life.” terial rewards in this life, yet they never lack spiritual re- I answer that, Expounders of Holy Writ are not wards, even in this life, according to Mat. 19:29, and Mk. agreed in speaking of these rewards. For some, with Am- 10:30: “Ye shall receive a hundred times as much” even brose (Super Luc. v), hold that all these rewards refer to “in this time.” the life to come; while Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Reply to Objection 3. All these rewards will be fully Monte i, 4) holds them to refer to the present life; and consummated in the life to come: but meanwhile they are, Chrysostom in his homilies (In Matth. xv) says that some in a manner, begun, even in this life. Because the “king- refer to the future, and some to the present life. dom of heaven,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv)†, can In order to make the matter clear we must take note denote the beginning of perfect wisdom, in so far as “the that hope of future happiness may be in us for two rea- spirit” begins to reign in men. The “possession” of the sons. First, by reason of our having a preparation for, or land denotes the well-ordered affections of the soul that a disposition to future happiness; and this is by way of rests, by its desire, on the solid foundation of the eternal merit; secondly, by a kind of imperfect inchoation of fu- inheritance, signified by “the land.” They are “comforted” ture happiness in holy men, even in this life. For it is one in this life, by receiving the Holy Ghost, Who is called thing to hope that the tree will bear fruit, when the leaves the “Paraclete,” i.e. the Comforter. They “have their fill,” begin to appear, and another, when we see the first signs even in this life, of that food of which Our Lord said (Jn. of the fruit. 4:34): “My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me.” Accordingly, those things which are set down as mer- Again, in this life, men “obtain” God’s “Mercy.” Again, its in the beatitudes, are a kind of preparation for, or dispo- the eye being cleansed by the gift of understanding, we sition to happiness, either perfect or inchoate: while those can, so to speak, “see God.” Likewise, in this life, those that are assigned as rewards, may be either perfect happi- who are the “peacemakers” of their own movements, ap- ness, so as to refer to the future life, or some beginning proach to likeness to God, and are called “the children of of happiness, such as is found in those who have attained God.” Nevertheless these things will be more perfectly perfection, in which case they refer to the present life. Be- fulfilled in heaven. cause when a man begins to make progress in the acts of Whether the beatitudes are suitably enumerated? Ia IIae q. 69 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the beatitudes are un- contemplation, for all are assigned to matters connected suitably enumerated. For the beatitudes are assigned to with the active life. Therefore the beatitudes are insuffi- the gifts, as stated above (a. 1, ad 1). Now some of the ciently enumerated. gifts, viz. wisdom and understanding, belong to the con- Objection 2. Further, not only do the executive gifts templative life: yet no beatitude is assigned to the act of belong to the active life, but also some of the directive ∗ Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1 † Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte, i, 1 914 gifts, e.g. knowledge and counsel: yet none of the beat-meek.” From following the concupiscible passions, man itudes seems to be directly connected with the acts of is withdrawn—by a virtue, so that man uses these pas- knowledge or counsel. Therefore the beatitudes are in- sions in moderation—and by gift, so that, if necessary, he sufficiently indicated. casts them aside altogether; nay more, so that, if need be, Objection 3. Further, among the executive gifts con- he makes a deliberate choice of sorrow†; hence the third nected with the active life, fear is said to be connected beatitude is: “Blessed are they that mourn.” with poverty, while piety seems to correspond to the beat- Active life consists chiefly in man’s relations with his itude of mercy: yet nothing is included directly connected neighbor, either by way of duty or by way of spontaneous with justice. Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently gratuity. To the former we are disposed—by a virtue, enumerated. so that we do not refuse to do our duty to our neighbor, Objection 4. Further, many other beatitudes are men- which pertains to justice—and by a gift, so that we do the tioned in Holy Writ. Thus, it is written (Job 5:17): same much more heartily, by accomplishing works of jus- “Blessed is the man whom God correcteth”; and (Ps. i, tice with an ardent desire, even as a hungry and thirsty 1): “Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the coun- man eats and drinks with eager appetite. Hence the fourth sel of the ungodly”; and (Prov. 3:13): “Blessed is the man beatitude is: “Blessed are they that hunger and thirst af- that findeth wisdom.” Therefore the beatitudes are insuf- ter justice.” With regard to spontaneous favors we are ficiently enumerated. perfected—by a virtue, so that we give where reason dic- Objection 5. On the other hand, it seems that too tates we should give, e.g. to our friends or others united many are mentioned. For there are seven gifts of the Holy to us; which pertains to the virtue of liberality–and by a Ghost: whereas eight beatitudes are indicated. gift, so that, through reverence for God, we consider only Objection 6. Further, only four beatitudes are indi- the needs of those on whom we bestow our gratuitous cated in the sixth chapter of Luke. Therefore the seven or bounty: hence it is written (Lk. 14:12,13): “When thou eight mentioned in Matthew 5 are too many. makest a dinner or supper, call not thy friends, nor thy I answer that, These beatitudes are most suitably enu- brethren,” etc. . . “but. . . call the poor, the maimed,” etc.; merated. To make this evident it must be observed that which, properly, is to have mercy: hence the fifth beati- beatitude has been held to consist in one of three things: tude is: “Blessed are the merciful.” for some have ascribed it to a sensual life, some, to an ac- Those things which concern the contemplative life, are tive life, and some, to a contemplative life∗. Now these either final beatitude itself, or some beginning thereof: three kinds of happiness stand in different relations to wherefore they are included in the beatitudes, not as mer- future beatitude, by hoping for which we are said to be its, but as rewards. Yet the effects of the active life, which happy. Because sensual happiness, being false and con- dispose man for the contemplative life, are included in the trary to reason, is an obstacle to future beatitude; while beatitudes. Now the effect of the active life, as regards happiness of the active life is a disposition of future beat- those virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected in him- itude; and contemplative happiness, if perfect, is the very self, is the cleansing of man’s heart, so that it is not defiled essence of future beatitude, and, if imperfect, is a begin-by the passions: hence the sixth beatitude is: “Blessed are ning thereof. the clean of heart.” But as regards the virtues and gifts And so Our Lord, in the first place, indicated certain whereby man is perfected in relation to his neighbor, the beatitudes as removing the obstacle of sensual happiness. effect of the active life is peace, according to Is. 32:17: For a life of pleasure consists of two things. First, in “The work of justice shall be peace”: hence the seventh the affluence of external goods, whether riches or honors; beatitude is “Blessed are the peacemakers.” from which man is withdrawn—by a virtue so that he uses Reply to Objection 1. The acts of the gifts which them in moderation—and by a gift, in a more excellent belong to the active life are indicated in the merits: but way, so that he despises them altogether. Hence the first the acts of the gifts pertaining to the contemplative life beatitude is: “Blessed are the poor in spirit,” which may are indicated in the rewards, for the reason given above. refer either to the contempt of riches, or to the contempt Because to “see God” corresponds to the gift of under- of honors, which results from humility. Secondly, the sen- standing; and to be like God by being adoptive “children sual life consists in following the bent of one’s passions, of God,” corresponds to the gift of wisdom. whether irascible or concupiscible. From following the Reply to Objection 2. In things pertaining to the ac- irascible passions man is withdrawn—by a virtue, so that tive life, knowledge is not sought for its own sake, but they are kept within the bounds appointed by the ruling of for the sake of operation, as even the Philosopher states reason—and by a gift, in a more excellent manner, so that (Ethic. ii, 2). And therefore, since beatitude implies man, according to God’s will, is altogether undisturbed something ultimate, the beatitudes do not include the acts by them: hence the second beatitude is: “Blessed are the of those gifts which direct man in the active life, such acts, ∗ See q. 3 † Cf. q. 35, a. 3 915 to wit, as are elicited by those gifts, as, e.g. to counsel is when we read, “Blessed is the man whom the Lord cor-the act of counsel, and to judge, the act of knowledge: recteth,” we must refer this to the beatitude of mourning: but, on the other hand, they include those operative acts when we read, “Blessed is the man that hath not walked of which the gifts have the direction, as, e.g. mourning in in the counsel of the ungodly,” we must refer it to clean- respect of knowledge, and mercy in respect of counsel. ness of heart: and when we read, “Blessed is the man that Reply to Objection 3. In applying the beatitudes to findeth wisdom,” this must be referred to the reward of the the gifts we may consider two things. One is likeness of seventh beatitude. The same applies to all others that can matter. In this way all the first five beatitudes may be be adduced. assigned to knowledge and counsel as to their directing Reply to Objection 5. The eighth beatitude is a con- principles: whereas they must be distributed among the firmation and declaration of all those that precede. Be- executive gifts: so that, to wit, hunger and thirst for jus- cause from the very fact that a man is confirmed in poverty tice, and mercy too, correspond to piety, which perfects of spirit, meekness, and the rest, it follows that no per- man in his relations to others; meekness to fortitude, for secution will induce him to renounce them. Hence the Ambrose says on Lk. 6:22: “It is the business of fortitude eighth beatitude corresponds, in a way, to all the preced- to conquer anger, and to curb indignation,” fortitude being ing seven. about the irascible passions: poverty and mourning to the Reply to Objection 6. Luke relates Our Lord’s ser- gift of fear, whereby man withdraws from the lusts and mon as addressed to the multitude (Lk. 6:17). Hence he pleasures of the world. sets down the beatitudes according to the capacity of the Secondly, we may consider the motives of the beati- multitude, who know no other happiness than pleasure, tudes: and, in this way, some of them will have to be as- temporal and earthly: wherefore by these four beatitudes signed differently. Because the principal motive for meek- Our Lord excludes four things which seem to belong to ness is reverence for God, which belongs to piety. The such happiness. The first of these is abundance of exter- chief motive for mourning is knowledge, whereby man nal goods, which he sets aside by saying: “Blessed are ye knows his failings and those of worldly things, according poor.” The second is that man be well off as to his body, in to Eccles. 1:18: “He that addeth knowledge, addeth also food and drink, and so forth; this he excludes by saying in sorrow [Vulg: labor].” The principal motive for hunger- the second place: “Blessed are ye that hunger.” The third ing after the works of justice is fortitude of the soul: and is that it should be well with man as to joyfulness of heart, the chief motive for being merciful is God’s counsel, ac- and this he puts aside by saying: “Blessed are ye that weep cording to Dan. 4:24: “Let my counsel be acceptable to now.” The fourth is the outward favor of man; and this he the king [Vulg: to thee, O king]: and redeem thou thy sins excludes, saying, fourthly: “Blessed shall you be, when with alms, and thy iniquities with works of mercy to the men shall hate you.” And as Ambrose says on Lk. 6:20, poor.” It is thus that Augustine assigns them (De Serm. “poverty corresponds to temperance, which is unmoved Dom. in Monte i, 4). by delights; hunger, to justice, since who hungers is com- Reply to Objection 4. All the beatitudes mentioned in passionate and, through compassion gives; mourning, to Holy Writ must be reduced to these, either as to the merits prudence, which deplores perishable things; endurance of or as to the rewards: because they must all belong either men’s hatred belongs to fortitude.” to the active or to the contemplative life. Accordingly, Whether the rewards of the beatitudes are suitably enumerated? Ia IIae q. 69 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the rewards of the is less than to possess “the kingdom of heaven.” Therefore beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated. Because the king- these rewards are unsuitably enumerated. dom of heaven, which is eternal life, contains all good On the contrary, stands the authority of Our Lord things. Therefore, once given the kingdom of heaven, no Who propounded these rewards. other rewards should be mentioned. I answer that, These rewards are most suitably as- Objection 2. Further, the kingdom of heaven is as- signed, considering the nature of the beatitudes in rela- signed as the reward, both of the first and of the eighth tion to the three kinds of happiness indicated above (a. 3). beatitude. Therefore, on the same ground it should have For the first three beatitudes concerned the withdrawal of been assigned to all. man from those things in which sensual happiness con- Objection 3. Further, the beatitudes are arranged sists: which happiness man desires by seeking the object in the ascending order, as Augustine remarks (De Serm. of his natural desire, not where he should seek it, viz. in Dom. in Monte i, 4): whereas the rewards seem to be God, but in temporal and perishable things. Wherefore the placed in the descending order, since to “possess the land” rewards of the first three beatitudes correspond to these 916 things which some men seek to find in earthly happiness. to make peace either in oneself or among others, shows a For men seek in external things, viz. riches and honors, a man to be a follower of God, Who is the God of unity and certain excellence and abundance, both of which are im- peace. Hence, as a reward, he is promised the glory of plied in the kingdom of heaven, whereby man attains to the Divine sonship, consisting in perfect union with God excellence and abundance of good things in God. Hence through consummate wisdom. Our Lord promised the kingdom of heaven to the poor in Reply to Objection 1. As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv spirit. Again, cruel and pitiless men seek by wrangling in Matth.), all these rewards are one in reality, viz. eternal and fighting to destroy their enemies so as to gain secu- happiness, which the human intellect cannot grasp. Hence rity for themselves. Hence Our Lord promised the meek it was necessary to describe it by means of various boons a secure and peaceful possession of the land of the liv- known to us, while observing due proportion to the merits ing, whereby the solid reality of eternal goods is denoted. to which those rewards are assigned. Again, men seek consolation for the toils of the present Reply to Objection 2. Just as the eighth beatitude is life, in the lusts and pleasures of the world. Hence Our a confirmation of all the beatitudes, so it deserves all the Lord promises comfort to those that mourn. rewards of the beatitudes. Hence it returns to the first, that Two other beatitudes belong to the works of active we may understand all the other rewards to be attributed to happiness, which are the works of virtues directing man it in consequence. Or else, according to Ambrose (Super in his relations to his neighbor: from which operations Luc. v), the kingdom of heaven is promised to the poor some men withdraw through inordinate love of their own in spirit, as regards the glory of the soul; but to those who good. Hence Our Lord assigns to these beatitudes rewards suffer persecution in their bodies, it is promised as regards in correspondence with the motives for which men recede the glory of the body. from them. For there are some who recede from acts of Reply to Objection 3. The rewards are also arranged justice, and instead of rendering what is due, lay hands in ascending order. For it is more to possess the land of the on what is not theirs, that they may abound in temporal heavenly kingdom than simply to have it: since we have goods. Wherefore Our Lord promised those who hunger many things without possessing them firmly and peace- after justice, that they shall have their fill. Some, again, refully. Again, it is more to be comforted in the kingdom cede from works of mercy, lest they be busied with other than to have and possess it, for there are many things the people’s misery. Hence Our Lord promised the merciful possession of which is accompanied by sorrow. Again, it that they should obtain mercy, and be delivered from all is more to have one’s fill than simply to be comforted, be- misery. cause fulness implies abundance of comfort. And mercy The last two beatitudes belong to contemplative happi- surpasses satiety, for thereby man receives more than he ness or beatitude: hence the rewards are assigned in corre- merited or was able to desire. And yet more is it to see spondence with the dispositions included in the merit. For God, even as he is a greater man who not only dines at cleanness of the eye disposes one to see clearly: hence the court, but also sees the king’s countenance. Lastly, the clean of heart are promised that they shall see God. Again, highest place in the royal palace belongs to the king’s son. 917 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 70 Of the Fruits of the Holy Ghost (In Four Articles) We must now consider the Fruits of the Holy Ghost: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are acts? (2) Whether they differ from the beatitudes? (3) Of their number? (4) Of their opposition to the works of the flesh. Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost which the Apostle enumerates (Gal. 5) are acts? Ia IIae q. 70 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the fruits of the Holy If, however, by man’s fruit we understand a product of Ghost, enumerated by the Apostle (Gal. 5:22,23), are not man, then human actions are called fruits: because oper- acts. For that which bears fruit, should not itself be called ation is the second act of the operator, and gives pleasure a fruit, else we should go on indefinitely. But our actions if it is suitable to him. If then man’s operation proceeds bear fruit: for it is written (Wis. 3:15): “The fruit of good from man in virtue of his reason, it is said to be the fruit labor is glorious,” and (Jn. 4:36): “He that reapeth re- of his reason: but if it proceeds from him in respect of a ceiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life everlasting.” higher power, which is the power of the Holy Ghost, then Therefore our actions are not to be called fruits. man’s operation is said to be the fruit of the Holy Ghost, as Objection 2. Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, of a Divine seed, for it is written (1 Jn. 3:9): “Whosoever 10), “we enjoy∗ the things we know, when the will rests is born of God, committeth no sin, for His seed abideth in by rejoicing in them.” But our will should not rest in our him.” actions for their own sake. Therefore our actions should Reply to Objection 1. Since fruit is something last not be called fruits. and final, nothing hinders one fruit bearing another fruit, Objection 3. Further, among the fruits of the Holy even as one end is subordinate to another. And so our Ghost, the Apostle numbers certain virtues, viz. charity, works, in so far as they are produced by the Holy Ghost meekness, faith, and chastity. Now virtues are not actions working in us, are fruits: but, in so far as they are re- but habits, as stated above (q. 55, a. 1). Therefore the ferred to the end which is eternal life, they should rather fruits are not actions. be called flowers: hence it is written (Ecclus. 24:23): “My On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 12:33): “By the flowers are the fruits of honor and riches.” fruit the tree is known”; that is to say, man is known by his Reply to Objection 2. When the will is said to de- works, as holy men explain the passage. Therefore human light in a thing for its own sake, this may be understood actions are called fruits. in two ways. First, so that the expression “for the sake I answer that, The word “fruit” has been transferred of” be taken to designate the final cause; and in this way, from the material to the spiritual world. Now fruit, among man delights in nothing for its own sake, except the last material things, is the product of a plant when it comes to end. Secondly, so that it expresses the formal cause; and perfection, and has a certain sweetness. This fruit has a in this way, a man may delight in anything that is delight- twofold relation: to the tree that produces it, and to the ful by reason of its form. Thus it is clear that a sick man man who gathers the fruit from the tree. Accordingly, delights in health, for its own sake, as in an end; in a nice in spiritual matters, we may take the word “fruit” in two medicine, not as in an end, but as in something tasty; and ways: first, so that the fruit of man, who is likened to the in a nasty medicine, nowise for its own sake, but only for tree, is that which he produces; secondly, so that man’s the sake of something else. Accordingly we must say that fruit is what he gathers. man must delight in God for His own sake, as being his Yet not all that man gathers is fruit, but only that which last end, and in virtuous deeds, not as being his end, but is last and gives pleasure. For a man has both a field and a for the sake of their inherent goodness which is delight- tree, and yet these are not called fruits; but that only which ful to the virtuous. Hence Ambrose says (De Parad. xiii) is last, to wit, that which man intends to derive from the that virtuous deeds are called fruits because “they refresh field and from the tree. In this sense man’s fruit is his last those that have them, with a holy and genuine delight.” end which is intended for his enjoyment. Reply to Objection 3. Sometimes the names of the ∗ ‘Fruimur’, from which verb we have the Latin ‘fructus’ and the English ‘fruit’ 918 virtues are applied to their actions: thus Augustine writes ment of the soul in loving God and our neighbor.” It is (Tract. xl in Joan.): “Faith is to believe what thou seest thus that the names of the virtues are used in reckoning not”; and (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): “Charity is the move- the fruits. Whether the fruits differ from the beatitudes? Ia IIae q. 70 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the fruits do not dif- from the beatitudes. fer from the beatitudes. For the beatitudes are assigned to I answer that, More is required for a beatitude than the gifts, as stated above (q. 69, a. 1, ad 1). But the gifts for a fruit. Because it is sufficient for a fruit to be some- perfect man in so far as he is moved by the Holy Ghost. thing ultimate and delightful; whereas for a beatitude, it Therefore the beatitudes themselves are fruits of the Holy must be something perfect and excellent. Hence all the Ghost. beatitudes may be called fruits, but not vice versa. For Objection 2. Further, as the fruit of eternal life is to the fruits are any virtuous deeds in which one delights: future beatitude which is that of actual possession, so are whereas the beatitudes are none but perfect works, and the fruits of the present life to the beatitudes of the present which, by reason of their perfection, are assigned to the life, which are based on hope. Now the fruit of eternal life gifts rather than to the virtues, as already stated (q. 69, is identified with future beatitude. Therefore the fruits of a. 1, ad 1). the present life are the beatitudes. Reply to Objection 1. This argument proves the beat- Objection 3. Further, fruit is essentially something itudes to be fruits, but not that all the fruits are beatitudes. ultimate and delightful. Now this is the very nature of Reply to Objection 2. The fruit of eternal life is ulti- beatitude, as stated above (q. 3, a. 1; q. 4, a. 1). Therefore mate and perfect simply: hence it nowise differs from fu- fruit and beatitude have the same nature, and consequently ture beatitude. On the other hand the fruits of the present should not be distinguished from one another. life are not simply ultimate and perfect; wherefore not all On the contrary, Things divided into different the fruits are beatitudes. species, differ from one another. But fruits and beatitudes Reply to Objection 3. More is required for a beati- are divided into different parts, as is clear from the way tude than for a fruit, as stated. in which they are enumerated. Therefore the fruits differ Whether the fruits are suitably enumerated by the Apostle? Ia IIae q. 70 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the fruits are un- fruits; yet not all are mentioned here. Nor is there any- suitably enumerated by the Apostle (Gal. 5:22,23). Be- thing corresponding to the acts of wisdom, and of many cause, elsewhere, he says that there is only one fruit of other virtues. Therefore it seems that the fruits are insuf- the present life; according to Rom. 6:22: “You have ficiently enumerated. your fruit unto sanctification.” Moreover it is written I answer that, The number of the twelve fruits enu- (Is. 27:9): “This is all the fruit. . . that the sin. . . be taken merated by the Apostle is suitable, and that there may be away.” Therefore we should not reckon twelve fruits. a reference to them in the twelve fruits of which it is writ- Objection 2. Further, fruit is the product of spiri- ten (Apoc. 22:2): “On both sides of the river was the tree tual seed, as stated (a. 1 ). But Our Lord mentions (Mat. bearing twelve fruits.” Since, however, a fruit is some- 13:23) a threefold fruit as growing from a spiritual seed in thing that proceeds from a source as from a seed or root, a good ground, viz. “hundredfold, sixtyfold,” and “thirty- the difference between these fruits must be gathered from fold.” Therefore one should not reckon twelve fruits. the various ways in which the Holy Ghost proceeds in us: Objection 3. Further, the very nature of fruit is to be which process consists in this, that the mind of man is set something ultimate and delightful. But this does not apply in order, first of all, in regard to itself; secondly, in regard to all the fruits mentioned by the Apostle: for patience and to things that are near it; thirdly, in regard to things that long-suffering seem to imply a painful object, while faith are below it. is not something ultimate, but rather something primary Accordingly man’s mind is well disposed in regard to and fundamental. Therefore too many fruits are enumer- itself when it has a good disposition towards good things ated. and towards evil things. Now the first disposition of the Objection 4. On the other hand, It seems that they human mind towards the good is effected by love, which are enumerated insufficiently and incompletely. For it has is the first of our emotions and the root of them all, as been stated (a. 2) that all the beatitudes may be called stated above (q. 27, a. 4). Wherefore among the fruits of 919 the Holy Ghost, we reckon “charity,” wherein the Holy Man is well disposed in respect of that which is below Ghost is given in a special manner, as in His own like- him, as regards external action, by “modesty,” whereby ness, since He Himself is love. Hence it is written (Rom. we observe the “mode” in all our words and deeds: as 5:5): “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts regards internal desires, by “contingency” and “chastity”: by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us.” The necessary whether these two differ because chastity withdraws man result of the love of charity is joy: because every lover re- from unlawful desires, contingency also from lawful de- joices at being united to the beloved. Now charity has sires: or because the continent man is subject to concu- always actual presence in God Whom it loves, accord- piscence, but is not led away; whereas the chaste man is ing to 1 Jn. 4:16: “He that abideth in charity, abideth in neither subject to, nor led away from them. God, and God in Him”: wherefore the sequel of charity is Reply to Objection 1. Sanctification is effected by “joy.” Now the perfection of joy is peace in two respects. all the virtues, by which also sins are taken away. Conse- First, as regards freedom from outward disturbance; for quently fruit is mentioned there in the singular, on account it is impossible to rejoice perfectly in the beloved good, of its being generically one, though divided into many if one is disturbed in the enjoyment thereof; and again, species which are spoken of as so many fruits. if a man’s heart is perfectly set at peace in one object, Reply to Objection 2. The hundredfold, sixtyfold, he cannot be disquieted by any other, since he accounts and thirtyfold fruits do not differ as various species of vir- all others as nothing; hence it is written (Ps. 118:165): tuous acts, but as various degrees of perfection, even in “Much peace have they that love Thy Law, and to them the same virtue. Thus contingency of the married state is there is no stumbling-block,” because, to wit, external said to be signified by the thirtyfold fruit; the contingency things do not disturb them in their enjoyment of God. of widowhood, by the sixtyfold; and virginal contingency, Secondly, as regards the calm of the restless desire: for by the hundredfold fruit. There are, moreover, other ways he does not perfectly rejoice, who is not satisfied with the in which holy men distinguish three evangelical fruits ac- object of his joy. Now peace implies these two things, cording to the three degrees of virtue: and they speak of namely, that we be not disturbed by external things, and three degrees, because the perfection of anything is con- that our desires rest altogether in one object. Wherefore sidered with respect to its beginning, its middle, and its after charity and joy, “peace” is given the third place. In end. evil things the mind has a good disposition, in respect of Reply to Objection 3. The fact of not being disturbed two things. First, by not being disturbed whenever evil by painful things is something to delight in. And as to threatens: which pertains to “patience”; secondly, by not faith, if we consider it as the foundation, it has the aspect being disturbed, whenever good things are delayed; which of being ultimate and delightful, in as much as it contains belongs to “long suffering,” since “to lack good is a kind certainty: hence a gloss expounds thus: “Faith, which is of evil” (Ethic. v, 3). certainly about the unseen.” Man’s mind is well disposed as regards what is near Reply to Objection 4. As Augustine says on Gal. him, viz. his neighbor, first, as to the will to do good; and 5:22,23, “the Apostle had no intention of teaching us how to this belongs “goodness.” Secondly, as to the execution many [either works of the flesh, or fruits of the Spirit] of well-doing; and to this belongs “benignity,” for the be- there are; but to show how the former should be avoided, nign are those in whom the salutary flame [bonus ignis] and the latter sought after.” Hence either more or fewer of love has enkindled the desire to be kind to their neigh- fruits might have been mentioned. Nevertheless, all the bor. Thirdly, as to his suffering with equanimity the evils acts of the gifts and virtues can be reduced to these by his neighbor inflicts on him. To this belongs “meekness,” a certain kind of fittingness, in so far as all the virtues which curbs anger. Fourthly, in the point of our refraining and gifts must needs direct the mind in one of the above- from doing harm to our neighbor not only through anger, mentioned ways. Wherefore the acts of wisdom and of but also through fraud or deceit. To this pertains “faith,” if any gifts directing to good, are reduced to charity, joy and we take it as denoting fidelity. But if we take it for the faith peace. The reason why he mentions these rather than oth-whereby we believe in God, then man is directed thereby ers, is that these imply either enjoyment of good things, to that which is above him, so that he subject his intellect or relief from evils, which things seem to belong to the and, consequently, all that is his, to God. notion of fruit. 920 Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are contrary to the works of the flesh? Ia IIae q. 70 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the fruits of the Holy nature. And in this they are not of necessity contrary each Ghost are not contrary to the works of the flesh, which to each: because, as stated above (a. 3, ad 4), the Apostle the Apostle enumerates (Gal. 5:19, seqq.). Because con- did not intend to enumerate all the works, whether spir- traries are in the same genus. But the works of the flesh itual or carnal. However, by a kind of adaptation, Au- are not called fruits. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are gustine, commenting on Gal. 5:22,23, contrasts the fruits not contrary to them. with the carnal works, each to each. Thus “to fornication, Objection 2. Further, one thing has a contrary. Now which is the love of satisfying lust outside lawful wed- the Apostle mentions more works of the flesh than fruits lock, we may contrast charity, whereby the soul is wed- of the Spirit. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit and the ded to God: wherein also is true chastity. By uncleanness works of the flesh are not contrary to one another. we must understand whatever disturbances arise from for- Objection 3. Further, among the fruits of the Spirit, nication: and to these the joy of tranquillity is opposed. the first place is given to charity, joy, and peace: to which, Idolatry, by reason of which war was waged against the fornication, uncleanness, and immodesty, which are the Gospel of God, is opposed to peace. Against witchcrafts, first of the works of the flesh are not opposed. Therefore enmities, contentions, emulations, wraths and quarrels, the fruits of the Spirit are not contrary to the works of the there is longsuffering, which helps us to bear the evils flesh. inflicted on us by those among whom we dwell; while On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 5:17) that kindness helps us to cure those evils; and goodness, to “the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against forgive them. In contrast to heresy there is faith; to envy, the flesh.” mildness; to drunkenness and revellings, contingency.” I answer that, The works of the flesh and the fruits Reply to Objection 1. That which proceeds from a of the Spirit may be taken in two ways. First, in general: tree against the tree’s nature, is not called its fruit, but and in this way the fruits of the Holy Ghost considered rather its corruption. And since works of virtue are con- in general are contrary to the works of the flesh. Because natural to reason, while works of vice are contrary to na- the Holy Ghost moves the human mind to that which is in ture, therefore it is that works of virtue are called fruits, accord with reason, or rather to that which surpasses rea- but not so works of vice. son: whereas the fleshly, viz. the sensitive, appetite draws Reply to Objection 2. “Good happens in one way, man to sensible goods which are beneath him. Wherefore, evil in all manner of ways,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. since upward and downward are contrary movements in iv): so that to one virtue many vices are contrary. Conse- the physical order, so in human actions the works of the quently we must not be surprised if the works of the flesh flesh are contrary to the fruits of the Spirit. are more numerous than the fruits of the spirit. Secondly, both fruits and fleshly works as enumerated The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what may be considered singly, each according to its specific has been said. 921 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 71 Of Vice and Sin Considered in Themselves (In Six Articles) We have in the next place to consider vice and sin: about which six points have to be considered: (1) Vice and sin considered in themselves; (2) their distinction; (3) their comparison with one another; (4) the subject of sin; (5) the cause of sin; (6) the effect of sin. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether vice is contrary to virtue? (2) Whether vice is contrary to nature? (3) Which is worse, a vice or a vicious act? (4) Whether a vicious act is compatible with virtue? (5) Whether every sin includes action? (6) Of the definition of sin proposed by Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii): “Sin is a word, deed, or desire against the eternal law.” Whether vice is contrary to virtue? Ia IIae q. 71 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that vice is not contrary respect of that to which virtue is ordained: since, properly to virtue. For one thing has one contrary, as proved in speaking, sin denotes an inordinate act; even as an act of Metaph. x, text. 17. Now sin and malice are contrary virtue is an ordinate and due act: in respect of that which to virtue. Therefore vice is not contrary to it: since vice virtue implies consequently, viz. that it is a kind of good- applies also to undue disposition of bodily members or of ness, the contrary of virtue is “malice”: while in respect any things whatever. of that which belongs to the essence of virtue directly, its Objection 2. Further, virtue denotes a certain perfec- contrary is “vice”: because the vice of a thing seems to tion of power. But vice does not denote anything relative consist in its not being disposed in a way befitting its na- to power. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue. ture: hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): “Whatever Objection 3. Further, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) is lacking for a thing’s natural perfection may be called a says that “virtue is the soul’s health.” Now sickness or vice.” disease, rather than vice, is opposed to health. Therefore Reply to Objection 1. These three things are contrary vice is not contrary to virtue. to virtue, but not in the same respect: for sin is opposed On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. to virtue, according as the latter is productive of a good ii) that “vice is a quality in respect of which the soul is work; malice, according as virtue is a kind of goodness; evil.” But “virtue is a quality which makes its subject while vice is opposed to virtue properly as such. good,” as was shown above (q. 55, Aa. 3,4). Therefore Reply to Objection 2. Virtue implies not only per- vice is contrary to virtue. fection of power, the principle of action; but also the due I answer that, Two things may be considered in disposition of its subject. The reason for this is because virtue—the essence of virtue, and that to which virtue a thing operates according as it is in act: so that a thing is ordained. In the essence of virtue we may consider needs to be well disposed if it has to produce a good work. something directly, and we may consider something con- It is in this respect that vice is contrary to virtue. sequently. Virtue implies “directly” a disposition whereby Reply to Objection 3. As Cicero says (De Quaest. the subject is well disposed according to the mode of its Tusc. iv), “disease and sickness are vicious qualities,” for nature: wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. in speaking of the body “he calls it” disease “when the 17) that “virtue is a disposition of a perfect thing to that whole body is infected,” for instance, with fever or the which is best; and by perfect I mean that which is dis- like; he calls it sickness “when the disease is attended posed according to its nature.” That which virtue implies with weakness”; and vice “when the parts of the body “consequently” is that it is a kind of goodness: because are not well compacted together.” And although at times the goodness of a thing consists in its being well disposed there may be disease in the body without sickness, for in- according to the mode of its nature. That to which virtue stance, when a man has a hidden complaint without being is directed is a good act, as was shown above (q. 56, a. 3). hindered outwardly from his wonted occupations; “yet, Accordingly three things are found to be contrary to in the soul,” as he says, “these two things are indistin- virtue. One of these is “sin,” which is opposed to virtue in guishable, except in thought.” For whenever a man is ill- 922 disposed inwardly, through some inordinate affection, he when a man sins from weakness or passion. Consequently is rendered thereby unfit for fulfilling his duties: since “a vice is of wider extent than sickness or disease; even as tree is known by its fruit,” i.e. man by his works, accord- virtue extends to more things than health; for health it- ing to Mat. 12:33. But “vice of the soul,” as Cicero says self is reckoned a kind of virtue (Phys. vii, text. 17). (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), “is a habit or affection of the soul Consequently vice is reckoned as contrary to virtue, more discordant and inconsistent with itself through life”: and fittingly than sickness or disease. this is to be found even without disease and sickness, e.g. Whether vice is contrary to nature? Ia IIae q. 71 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that vice is not contrary to be in accord with reason, and his evil is to be against rea- nature. Because vice is contrary to virtue, as stated above son,” as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore hu- (a. 1). Now virtue is in us, not by nature but by infusion or man virtue, which makes a man good, and his work good, habituation, as stated above (q. 63, Aa. 1 ,2,3). Therefore is in accord with man’s nature, for as much as it accords vice is not contrary to nature. with his reason: while vice is contrary to man’s nature, in Objection 2. Further, it is impossible to become ha- so far as it is contrary to the order of reason. bituated to that which is contrary to nature: thus “a stone Reply to Objection 1. Although the virtues are not never becomes habituated to upward movement” (Ethic. caused by nature as regards their perfection of being, yet ii, 1). But some men become habituated to vice. There- they incline us to that which accords with reason, i.e. with fore vice is not contrary to nature. the order of reason. For Cicero says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that Objection 3. Further, anything contrary to a nature, is “virtue is a habit in accord with reason, like a second na- not found in the greater number of individuals possessed ture”: and it is in this sense that virtue is said to be in of that nature. Now vice is found in the greater number accord with nature, and on the other hand that vice is con- of men; for it is written (Mat. 7:13): “Broad is the way trary to nature. that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher is speaking thereat.” Therefore vice is not contrary to nature. there of a thing being against nature, in so far as “being Objection 4. Further, sin is compared to vice, as act against nature” is contrary to “being from nature”: and not to habit, as stated above (a. 1). Now sin is defined as “a in so far as “being against nature” is contrary to “being in word, deed, or desire, contrary to the Law of God,” as accord with nature,” in which latter sense virtues are said Augustine shows (Contra Faust. xxii, 27). But the Law of to be in accord with nature, in as much as they incline us God is above nature. Therefore we should say that vice is to that which is suitable to nature. contrary to the Law, rather than to nature. Reply to Objection 3. There is a twofold nature in On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, man, rational nature, and the sensitive nature. And since 13): “Every vice, simply because it is a vice, is contrary it is through the operation of his senses that man accom- to nature.” plishes acts of reason, hence there are more who follow I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), vice is contrary the inclinations of the sensitive nature, than who follow to virtue. Now the virtue of a thing consists in its being the order of reason: because more reach the beginning of well disposed in a manner befitting its nature, as stated a business than achieve its completion. Now the presence above (a. 1). Hence the vice of any thing consists in its of vices and sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows being disposed in a manner not befitting its nature, and the inclination of his sensitive nature against the order of for this reason is that thing “vituperated,” which word is his reason. derived from “vice” according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. Reply to Objection 4. Whatever is irregular in a work iii, 14). of art, is unnatural to the art which produced that work. But it must be observed that the nature of a thing is Now the eternal law is compared to the order of human chiefly the form from which that thing derives its species. reason, as art to a work of art. Therefore it amounts to the Now man derives his species from his rational soul: and same that vice and sin are against the order of human rea- consequently whatever is contrary to the order of reason son, and that they are contrary to the eternal law. Hence is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature of man, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 6) that “every nature, as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord such, is from God; and is a vicious nature, in so far as it with the nature of man, as man. Now “man’s good is to fails from the Divine art whereby it was made.” 923 Whether vice is worse than a vicious act? Ia IIae q. 71 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that vice, i.e. a bad habit, save in so far as it induces to a good or bad act: wherefore is worse than a sin, i.e. a bad act. For, as the more lasting a habit is called good or bad by reason of the goodness a good is, the better it is, so the longer an evil lasts, the or badness of its act: so that an act surpasses its habit in worse it is. Now a vicious habit is more lasting than vi- goodness or badness, since “the cause of a thing being cious acts, that pass forthwith. Therefore a vicious habit such, is yet more so.” is worse than a vicious act. Reply to Objection 1. Nothing hinders one thing Objection 2. Further, several evils are more to be from standing above another simply, and below it in some shunned than one. But a bad habit is virtually the cause of respect. Now a thing is deemed above another simply if many bad acts. Therefore a vicious habit is worse than a it surpasses it in a point which is proper to both; while it vicious act. is deemed above it in a certain respect, if it surpasses it in Objection 3. Further, a cause is more potent than its something which is accidental to both. Now it has been effect. But a habit produces its actions both as to their shown from the very nature of act and habit, that act sur- goodness and as to their badness. Therefore a habit is passes habit both in goodness and in badness. Whereas more potent than its act, both in goodness and in badness. the fact that habit is more lasting than act, is accidental to On the contrary, A man is justly punished for a vi- them, and is due to the fact that they are both found in a cious act; but not for a vicious habit, so long as no act nature such that it cannot always be in action, and whose ensues. Therefore a vicious action is worse than a vicious action consists in a transient movement. Consequently act habit. simply excels in goodness and badness, but habit excels in I answer that, A habit stands midway between power a certain respect. and act. Now it is evident that both in good and in evil, act Reply to Objection 2. A habit is several acts, not precedes power, as stated in Metaph. ix, 19. For it is better simply, but in a certain respect, i.e. virtually. Wherefore to do well than to be able to do well, and in like manner, this does not prove that habit precedes act simply, both in it is more blameworthy to do evil, than to be able to do goodness and in badness. evil: whence it also follows that both in goodness and in Reply to Objection 3. Habit causes act by way of badness, habit stands midway between power and act, so efficient causality: but act causes habit, by way of final that, to wit, even as a good or evil habit stands above the causality, in respect of which we consider the nature of corresponding power in goodness or in badness, so does good and evil. Consequently act surpasses habit both in it stand below the corresponding act. This is also made goodness and in badness. clear from the fact that a habit is not called good or bad, Whether sin is compatible with virtue? Ia IIae q. 71 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that a vicious act, i.e. causes.” Now one virtuous act does not cause a virtue, as sin, is incompatible with virtue. For contraries cannot be stated above (q. 51, a. 3): and, consequently, one sinful act together in the same subject. Now sin is, in some way, does not corrupt virtue. Therefore they can be together in contrary to virtue, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore sin is the same subject. incompatible with virtue. I answer that, Sin is compared to virtue, as evil act Objection 2. Further, sin is worse than vice, i.e. evil to good habit. Now the position of a habit in the soul is act than evil habit. But vice cannot be in the same subject not the same as that of a form in a natural thing. For the with virtue: neither, therefore, can sin. form of a natural thing produces, of necessity, an opera- Objection 3. Further, sin occurs in natural things, tion befitting itself; wherefore a natural form is incompat- even as in voluntary matters (Phys. ii, text. 82). Now ible with the act of a contrary form: thus heat is incompat- sin never happens in natural things, except through some ible with the act of cooling, and lightness with downward corruption of the natural power; thus monsters are due to movement (except perhaps violence be used by some ex- corruption of some elemental force in the seed, as stated trinsic mover): whereas the habit that resides in the soul, in Phys. ii. Therefore no sin occurs in voluntary matters, does not, of necessity, produce its operation, but is used except through the corruption of some virtue in the soul: by man when he wills. Consequently man, while possess- so that sin and virtue cannot be together in the same sub- ing a habit, may either fail to use the habit, or produce a ject. contrary act; and so a man having a virtue may produce On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, an act of sin. And this sinful act, so long as there is but 2,3) that “virtue is engendered and corrupted by contrary one, cannot corrupt virtue, if we compare the act to the 924 virtue itself as a habit: since, just as habit is not engen-Accordingly, mortal sin is incompatible with the in- dered by one act, so neither is it destroyed by one act as fused virtues, but is consistent with acquired virtue: while stated above (q. 63, a. 2, ad 2). But if we compare the venial sin is compatible with virtues, whether infused or sinful act to the cause of the virtues, then it is possible for acquired. some virtues to be destroyed by one sinful act. For every Reply to Objection 1. Sin is contrary to virtue, not mortal sin is contrary to charity, which is the root of all by reason of itself, but by reason of its act. Hence sin is the infused virtues, as virtues; and consequently, charity incompatible with the act, but not with the habit, of virtue. being banished by one act of mortal sin, it follows that all Reply to Objection 2. Vice is directly contrary to the infused virtues are expelled “as virtues.” And I say on virtue, even as sin to virtuous act: and so vice excludes account of faith and hope, whose habits remain unquick- virtue, just as sin excludes acts of virtue. ened after mortal sin, so that they are no longer virtues. Reply to Objection 3. The natural powers act of ne- On the other hand, since venial sin is neither contrary to cessity, and hence so long as the power is unimpaired, no charity, nor banishes it, as a consequence, neither does it sin can be found in the act. On the other hand, the virtues expel the other virtues. As to the acquired virtues, they of the soul do not produce their acts of necessity; hence are not destroyed by one act of any kind of sin. the comparison fails. Whether every sin includes an action? Ia IIae q. 71 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that every sin includes an of negligence. On the other hand, others say, that a sin action. For as merit is compared with virtue, even so is of omission does not necessarily suppose an act: for the sin compared with vice. Now there can be no merit with- mere fact of not doing what one is bound to do is a sin. out an action. Neither, therefore, can there be sin without Now each of these opinions has some truth in it. For action. if in the sin of omission we look merely at that in which Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. the essence of the sin consists, the sin of omission will be iii, 18)∗: So “true is it that every sin is voluntary, that, un-sometimes with an interior act, as when a man wills “not less it be voluntary, it is no sin at all.” Now nothing can to go to church”: while sometimes it will be without any be voluntary, save through an act of the will. Therefore act at all, whether interior or exterior, as when a man, at every sin implies an act. the time that he is bound to go to church, does not think Objection 3. Further, if sin could be without act, it of going or not going to church. would follow that a man sins as soon as he ceases doing If, however, in the sin of omission, we consider also what he ought. Now he who never does something that the causes, or occasions of the omission, then the sin of he ought to do, ceases continually doing what he ought. omission must of necessity include some act. For there is Therefore it would follow that he sins continually; and no sin of omission, unless we omit what we can do or not this is untrue. Therefore there is no sin without an act. do: and that we turn aside so as not to do what we can do On the contrary, It is written (James 4:17): “To or not do, must needs be due to some cause or occasion, him. . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him either united with the omission or preceding it. Now if it is a sin.” Now “not to do” does not imply an act. There- this cause be not in man’s power, the omission will not be fore sin can be without act. sinful, as when anyone omits going to church on account I answer that, The reason for urging this question has of sickness: but if the cause or occasion be subject to the reference to the sin of omission, about which there have will, the omission is sinful; and such cause, in so far as it been various opinions. For some say that in every sin of is voluntary, must needs always include some act, at least omission there is some act, either interior or exterior— the interior act of the will: which act sometimes bears di- interior, as when a man wills “not to go to church,” when rectly on the omission, as when a man wills “not to go to he is bound to go—exterior, as when a man, at the very church,” because it is too much trouble; and in this case hour that he is bound to go to church (or even before), this act, of its very nature, belongs to the omission, be- occupies himself in such a way that he is hindered from cause the volition of any sin whatever, pertains, of itself, going. This seems, in a way, to amount to the same as to that sin, since voluntariness is essential to sin. Some- the first, for whoever wills one thing that is incompati- times, however, the act of the will bears directly on some- ble with this other, wills, consequently, to go without this thing else which hinders man from doing what he ought, other: unless, perchance, it does not occur to him, that whether this something else be united with the omission, what he wishes to do, will hinder him from that which he as when a man wills to play at the time he ought to go is bound to do, in which case he might be deemed guilty to church—or, precede the omission, as when a man wills ∗ Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv. 925 to sit up late at night, the result being that he does not go as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): so that sin may arise to church in the morning. In this case the act, interior or from a man doing what he ought not, or by his not doing exterior, is accidental to the omission, since the omission what he ought; while there can be no merit, unless a man follows outside the intention, and that which is outside the do willingly what he ought to do: wherefore there can be intention is said to be accidental (Phys. ii, text. 49,50). no merit without act, whereas there can be sin without act. Wherefore it is evident that then the sin of omission has Reply to Objection 2. The term “voluntary” is ap- indeed an act united with, or preceding the omission, but plied not only to that on which the act of the will is that this act is accidental to the sin of omission. brought to bear, but also to that which we have the power Now in judging about things, we must be guided by to do or not to do, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. Hence even that which is proper to them, and not by that which is ac- not to will may be called voluntary, in so far as man has it cidental: and consequently it is truer to say that a sin can in his power to will, and not to will. be without any act; else the circumstantial acts and occa- Reply to Objection 3. The sin of omission is contrary sions would be essential to other actual sins. to an affirmative precept which binds always, but not for Reply to Objection 1. More things are required for always. Hence, by omitting to act, a man sins only for the good than for evil, since “good results from a whole and time at which the affirmative precept binds him to act. entire cause, whereas evil results from each single defect,” Whether sin is fittingly defined as a word, deed, or desire contrary to the eternal law? Ia IIae q. 71 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that sin is unfittingly de- On the contrary, the authority of Augustine suffices fined by saying: “Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary (Contra Faust. xxii, 27). to the eternal law.” Because “Word,” “deed,” and “de- I answer that, As was shown above (a. 1), sin is noth- sire” imply an act; whereas not every sin implies an act, ing else than a bad human act. Now that an act is a human as stated above (a. 5). Therefore this definition does not act is due to its being voluntary, as stated above (q. 1, a. 1), include every sin. whether it be voluntary, as being elicited by the will, e.g. Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Duab. to will or to choose, or as being commanded by the will, Anim. xii): “Sin is the will to retain or obtain what jus- e.g. the exterior actions of speech or operation. Again, a tice forbids.” Now will is comprised under desire, in so human act is evil through lacking conformity with its due far as desire denotes any act of the appetite. Therefore it measure: and conformity of measure in a thing depends was enough to say: “Sin is a desire contrary to the eternal on a rule, from which if that thing depart, it is incommen- law,” nor was there need to add “word” or “deed.” surate. Now there are two rules of the human will: one Objection 3. Further, sin apparently consists properly is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the human reason; in aversion from the end: because good and evil are mea- the other is the first rule, viz. the eternal law, which is sured chiefly with regard to the end as explained above God’s reason, so to speak. Accordingly Augustine (Con- (q. 1, a. 3; q. 18, Aa. 4,6; q. 20, Aa. 2,3): wherefore Au- tra Faust. xxii, 27) includes two things in the definition gustine (De Lib. Arb. i) defines sin in reference to the end, of sin; one, pertaining to the substance of a human act, by saying that “sin is nothing else than to neglect eternal and which is the matter, so to speak, of sin, when he says things, and seek after temporal things”: and again he says “word,” “deed,” or “desire”; the other, pertaining to the (Qq. lxxxii, qu. 30) that “all human wickedness consists nature of evil, and which is the form, as it were, of sin, in using what we should enjoy, and in enjoying what we when he says, “contrary to the eternal law.” should use.” Now the definition is question contains no Reply to Objection 1. Affirmation and negation are mention of aversion from our due end: therefore it is an reduced to one same genus: e.g. in Divine things, begot- insufficient definition of sin. ten and unbegotten are reduced to the genus “relation,” as Objection 4. Further, a thing is said to be forbidden, Augustine states (De Trin. v, 6,7): and so “word” and because it is contrary to the law. Now not all sins are evil “deed” denote equally what is said and what is not said, through being forbidden, but some are forbidden because what is done and what is not done. they are evil. Therefore sin in general should not be de- Reply to Objection 2. The first cause of sin is in the fined as being against the law of God. will, which commands all voluntary acts, in which alone Objection 5. Further, a sin denotes a bad human act, is sin to be found: and hence it is that Augustine some- as was explained above (a. 1). Now man’s evil is to be times defines sin in reference to the will alone. But since against reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). There- external acts also pertain to the substance of sin, through fore it would have been better to say that sin is against being evil of themselves, as stated, it was necessary in reason than to say that it is contrary to the eternal law. defining sin to include something referring to external ac- 926 tion. code of the human reason, then every sin is evil through Reply to Objection 3. The eternal law first and fore- being prohibited: since it is contrary to natural law, pre- most directs man to his end, and in consequence, makes cisely because it is inordinate. man to be well disposed in regard to things which are di- Reply to Objection 5. The theologian considers sin rected to the end: hence when he says, “contrary to the chiefly as an offense against God; and the moral philoso- eternal law,” he includes aversion from the end and all pher, as something contrary to reason. Hence Augustine other forms of inordinateness. defines sin with reference to its being “contrary to the eter- Reply to Objection 4. When it is said that not every nal law,” more fittingly than with reference to its being sin is evil through being forbidden, this must be under- contrary to reason; the more so, as the eternal law directs stood of prohibition by positive law. If, however, the pro- us in many things that surpass human reason, e.g. in mat- hibition be referred to the natural law, which is contained ters of faith. primarily in the eternal law, but secondarily in the natural 927 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 72 Of the Distinction of Sins (In Nine Articles) We must now consider the distinction of sins or vices: under which head there are nine points of inquiry: (1) Whether sins are distinguished specifically by their objects? (2) Of the distinction between spiritual and carnal sins; (3) Whether sins differ in reference to their causes? (4) Whether they differ with respect to those who are sinned against? (5) Whether sins differ in relation to the debt of punishment? (6) Whether they differ in regard to omission and commission? (7) Whether they differ according to their various stages? (8) Whether they differ in respect of excess and deficiency? (9) Whether they differ according to their various circumstances? Whether sins differ in species according to their objects? Ia IIae q. 72 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that sins do not differ in is referred accidentally to the intention of the sinner, for species, according to their objects. For acts are said to be “no one acts intending evil,” as Dionysius declares (Div. good or evil, in relation, chiefly, to their end, as shown Nom. iv). Now it is evident that a thing derives its species above (q. 1, a. 3; q. 18, Aa. 4,6). Since then sin is nothing from that which is essential and not from that which is else than a bad human act, as stated above (q. 71, a. 1), accidental: because what is accidental is outside the spe- it seems that sins should differ specifically according to cific nature. Consequently sins differ specifically on the their ends rather than according to their objects. part of the voluntary acts rather than of the inordinateness Objection 2. Further, evil, being a privation, differs inherent to sin. Now voluntary acts differ in species ac- specifically according to the different species of oppo- cording to their objects, as was proved above (q. 18, a. 2). sites. Now sin is an evil in the genus of human acts. Therefore it follows that sins are properly distinguished in Therefore sins differ specifically according to their oppo- species by their objects. sites rather than according to their objects. Reply to Objection 1. The aspect of good is found Objection 3. Further, if sins differed specifically ac- chiefly in the end: and therefore the end stands in the re- cording to their objects, it would be impossible to find the lation of object to the act of the will which is at the root of same specific sin with diverse objects: and yet such sins every sin. Consequently it amounts to the same whether are to be found. For pride is about things spiritual and sins differ by their objects or by their ends. material as Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 18); and avarice Reply to Objection 2. Sin is not a pure privation but is about different kinds of things. Therefore sins do not an act deprived of its due order: hence sins differ specifi- differ in species according to their objects. cally according to their objects of their acts rather than ac- On the contrary, “Sin is a word, deed, or desire cording to their opposites, although, even if they were dis- against God’s law.” Now words, deeds, and desires dif- tinguished in reference to their opposite virtues, it would fer in species according to their various objects: since acts come to the same: since virtues differ specifically accord- differ by their objects, as stated above (q. 18, a. 2 ). There- ing to their objects, as stated above (q. 60, a. 5). fore sins, also differ in species according to their objects. Reply to Objection 3. In various things, differing in I answer that, As stated above (q. 71, a. 6), two things species or genus, nothing hinders our finding one formal concur in the nature of sin, viz. the voluntary act, and its aspect of the object, from which aspect sin receives its inordinateness, which consists in departing from God’s species. It is thus that pride seeks excellence in reference law. Of these two, one is referred essentially to the sin- to various things; and avarice seeks abundance of things ner, who intends such and such an act in such and such adapted to human use. matter; while the other, viz. the inordinateness of the act, 928 Whether spiritual sins are fittingly distinguished from carnal sins? Ia IIae q. 72 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that spiritual sins are un- pleasure is twofold. One belongs to the soul, and is con- fittingly distinguished from carnal sins. For the Apostle summated in the mere apprehension of a thing possessed says (Gal. 5:19): “The works of the flesh are manifest, in accordance with desire; this can also be called spiritual which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury, pleasure, e.g. when one takes pleasure in human praise idolatry, witchcrafts,” etc. from which it seems that all or the like. The other pleasure is bodily or natural, and is kinds of sins are works of the flesh. Now carnal sins are realized in bodily touch, and this can also be called carnal called works of the flesh. Therefore carnal sins should not pleasure. be distinguished from spiritual sins. Accordingly, those sins which consist in spiritual plea- Objection 2. Further, whosoever sins, walks accord- sure, are called spiritual sins; while those which consist in ing to the flesh, as stated in Rom. 8:13: “If you live ac- carnal pleasure, are called carnal sins, e.g. gluttony, which cording to the flesh, you shall die. But if by the spirit you consists in the pleasures of the table; and lust, which con- mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live.” Now to sists in sexual pleasures. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. live or walk according to the flesh seems to pertain to the 7:1): “Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the nature of carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins should not be flesh and of the spirit.” distinguished from spiritual sins. Reply to Objection 1. As a gloss says on the same Objection 3. Further, the higher part of the soul, passage, these vices are called works of the flesh, not as which is the mind or reason, is called the spirit, accord- though they consisted in carnal pleasure; but flesh here de- ing to Eph. 4:23: “Be renewed in the spirit of your mind,” notes man, who is said to live according to the flesh, when where spirit stands for reason, according to a gloss. Now he lives according to himself, as Augustine says (De Civ. every sin, which is committed in accordance with the Dei xiv, 2,3). The reason of this is because every failing in flesh, flows from the reason by its consent; since consent the human reason is due in some way to the carnal sense. in a sinful act belongs to the higher reason, as we shall This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. state further on (q. 74, a. 7). Therefore the same sins are Reply to Objection 3. Even in the carnal sins there is both carnal and spiritual, and consequently they should a spiritual act, viz. the act of reason: but the end of these not be distinguished from one another. sins, from which they are named, is carnal pleasure. Objection 4. Further, if some sins are carnal specif- Reply to Objection 4. As the gloss says, “in the sin of ically, this, seemingly, should apply chiefly to those sins fornication the soul is the body’s slave in a special sense, whereby man sins against his own body. But, according because at the moment of sinning it can think of nothing to the Apostle (1 Cor. 6:18), “every sin that a man doth, is else”: whereas the pleasure of gluttony, although carnal, without the body: but he that committeth fornication, sin- does not so utterly absorb the reason. It may also be said neth against his own body.” Therefore fornication would that in this sin, an injury is done to the body also, for it be the only carnal sin, whereas the Apostle (Eph. 5:3) is defiled inordinately: wherefore by this sin alone is man reckons covetousness with the carnal sins. said specifically to sin against his body. While covetous- On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) says that ness, which is reckoned among the carnal sins, stands here “of the seven capital sins five are spiritual, and two car- for adultery, which is the unjust appropriation of another’s nal.” wife. Again, it may be said that the thing in which the cov- I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), sins take their etous man takes pleasure is something bodily, and in this species from their objects. Now every sin consists in the respect covetousness is numbered with the carnal sins: but desire for some mutable good, for which man has an in- the pleasure itself does not belong to the body, but to the ordinate desire, and the possession of which gives him spirit, wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that it is inordinate pleasure. Now, as explained above (q. 31, a. 3), a spiritual sin. Whether sins differ specifically in reference to their causes? Ia IIae q. 72 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that sins differ specif- cause seems to have least reference to the species. Now ically in reference to their causes. For a thing takes its the object in a sin is like its material cause. Since, there- species from that whence it derives its being. Now sins fore, sins differ specifically according to their objects, it derive their being from their causes. Therefore they take seems that much more do they differ in reference to their their species from them also. Therefore they differ specif- other causes. ically in reference to their causes. Objection 3. Further, Augustine, commenting on Ps. Objection 2. Further, of all the causes the material 79:17, “Things set on fire and dug down,” says that “every 929 sin is due either to fear inducing false humility, or to love ing are specifically distinct with reference to hot and cold. enkindling us to undue ardor.” For it is written (1 Jn. 2:16) On the other hand, the active principles in voluntary acts, that “all that is in the world, is the concupiscence of the such as the acts of sins, are not determined, of necessity, flesh, or [Vulg.: ‘and’] the concupiscence of the eyes, or to one act, and consequently from one active or motive [Vulg.: ‘and’] the pride of life.” Now a thing is said to be principle, diverse species of sins can proceed: thus from in the world on account of sin, in as much as the world de- fear engendering false humility man may proceed to theft, notes lovers of the world, as Augustine observes (Tract. ii or murder, or to neglect the flock committed to his care; in Joan.). Gregory, too (Moral. xxxi, 17), distinguishes all and these same things may proceed from love enkindling sins according to the seven capital vices. Now all these di- to undue ardor. Hence it is evident that sins do not dif- visions refer to the causes of sins. Therefore, seemingly, fer specifically according to their various active or motive sins differ specifically according to the diversity of their causes, but only in respect of diversity in the final cause, causes. which is the end and object of the will. For it has been On the contrary, If this were the case all sins would shown above (q. 1, a. 3; q. 18, Aa. 4,6) that human acts belong to one species, since they are due to one cause. For take their species from the end. it is written (Ecclus. 10:15) that “pride is the beginning of Reply to Objection 1. The active principles in volun- all sin,” and (1 Tim. 6:10) that “the desire of money is the tary acts, not being determined to one act, do not suffice root of all evils.” Now it is evident that there are various for the production of human acts, unless the will be deter- species of sins. Therefore sins do not differ specifically mined to one by the intention of the end, as the Philoso- according to their different causes. pher proves (Metaph. ix, text. 15,16), and consequently I answer that, Since there are four kinds of causes, sin derives both its being and its species from the end. they are attributed to various things in various ways. Be- Reply to Objection 2. Objects, in relation to exter- cause the “formal” and the “material” cause regard prop- nal acts, have the character of matter “about which”; but, erly the substance of a thing; and consequently substances in relation to the interior act of the will, they have the differ in respect of their matter and form, both in species character of end; and it is owing to this that they give the and in genus. The “agent” and the “end” regard directly act its species. Nevertheless, even considered as the mat- movement and operation: wherefore movements and op- ter “about which,” they have the character of term, from erations differ specifically in respect of these causes; in which movement takes its species (Phys. v, text. 4; Ethic. different ways, however, because the natural active prin- x, 4); yet even terms of movement specify movements, in ciples are always determined to the same acts; so that the so far as term has the character of end. different species of natural acts are taken not only from Reply to Objection 3. These distinctions of sins are the objects, which are the ends or terms of those acts, but given, not as distinct species of sins, but to show their var- also from their active principles: thus heating and cool- ious causes. Whether sin is fittingly divided into sin against God, against oneself, and against one’s Ia IIae q. 72 a. 4 neighbor? Objection 1. It would seem that sin is unfittingly di- according to these three. vided into sin against God, against one’s neighbor, and On the contrary, Isidore (De Summo Bono), in giv- against oneself. For that which is common to all sins ing the division of sins, says that “man is said to sin should not be reckoned as a part in the division of sin. against himself, against God, and against his neighbor.” But it is common to all sins to be against God: for it is I answer that, As stated above (q. 71, Aa. 1,6), sin stated in the definition of sin that it is “against God’s law,” is an inordinate act. Now there should be a threefold or- as stated above (q. 66, a. 6). Therefore sin against God der in man: one in relation to the rule of reason, in so far should not be reckoned a part of the division of sin. as all our actions and passions should be commensurate Objection 2. Further, every division should consist with the rule of reason: another order is in relation to the of things in opposition to one another. But these three rule of the Divine Law, whereby man should be directed kinds of sin are not opposed to one another: for whoever in all things: and if man were by nature a solitary animal, sins against his neighbor, sins against himself and against this twofold order would suffice. But since man is natu- God. Therefore sin is not fittingly divided into these three. rally a civic and social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2, Objection 3. Further, specification is not taken from hence a third order is necessary, whereby man is directed things external. But God and our neighbor are external to in relation to other men among whom he has to dwell. Of us. Therefore sins are not distinguished specifically with these orders the second contains the first and surpasses it. regard to them: and consequently sin is unfittingly divided For whatever things are comprised under the order of rea- 930 son, are comprised under the order of God Himself. Yet to which sins are opposed, differ specifically in respect some things are comprised under the order of God, which of these three. For it is evident from what has been said surpass the human reason, such as matters of faith, and (q. 62, Aa. 1,2,3) that by the theological virtues man is things due to God alone. Hence he that sins in such mat- directed to God; by temperance and fortitude, to himself; ters, for instance, by heresy, sacrilege, or blasphemy, is and by justice to his neighbor. said to sin against God. In like manner, the first order Reply to Objection 1. To sin against God is common includes the third and surpasses it, because in all things to all sins, in so far as the order to God includes every wherein we are directed in reference to our neighbor, we human order; but in so far as order to God surpasses the need to be directed according to the order of reason. Yet other two orders, sin against God is a special kind of sin. in some things we are directed according to reason, in re- Reply to Objection 2. When several things, of which lation to ourselves only, and not in reference to our neigh- one includes another, are distinct from one another, this bor; and when man sins in these matters, he is said to sin distinction is understood to refer, not to the part contained against himself, as is seen in the glutton, the lustful, and in another, but to that in which one goes beyond another. the prodigal. But when man sins in matters concerning his This may be seen in the division of numbers and figures: neighbor, he is said to sin against his neighbor, as appears for a triangle is distinguished from a four-sided figure not in the thief and murderer. Now the things whereby man in respect of its being contained thereby, but in respect of is directed to God, his neighbor, and himself are diverse. that in which it is surpassed thereby: and the same applies Wherefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their ob- to the numbers three and four. jects, according to which the species of sins are diversi- Reply to Objection 3. Although God and our neigh- fied: and consequently this distinction of sins is properly bor are external to the sinner himself, they are not external one of different species of sins: because the virtues also, to the act of sin, but are related to it as to its object. Whether the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their Ia IIae q. 72 a. 5 species? Objection 1. It would seem that the division of sins But punishment follows sin as the effect thereof. There- according to their debt of punishment diversifies their fore sins do not differ specifically according to the debt of species; for instance, when sin is divided into “mortal” punishment. and “venial.” For things which are infinitely apart, cannot I answer that, In things that differ specifically we belong to the same species, nor even to the same genus. find a twofold difference: the first causes the diversity of But venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart, since tem- species, and is not to be found save in different species, poral punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal punish- e.g. “rational” and “irrational,” “animate,” and “inani- ment to mortal sin; and the measure of the punishment mate”: the other difference is consequent to specific di- corresponds to the gravity of the fault, according to Dt. versity; and though, in some cases, it may be consequent 25:2: “According to the measure of the sin shall the mea- to specific diversity, yet, in others, it may be found within sure be also of the stripes be.” Therefore venial and mortal the same species; thus “white” and “black” are consequent sins are not of the same genus, nor can they be said to be- to the specific diversity of crow and swan, and yet this dif- long to the same species. ference is found within the one species of man. Objection 2. Further, some sins are mortal in virtue We must therefore say that the difference between ve- of their species∗, as murder and adultery; and some are nial and mortal sin, or any other difference is respect of venial in virtue of their species, as in an idle word, and the debt of punishment, cannot be a difference constitut- excessive laughter. Therefore venial and mortal sins dif- ing specific diversity. For what is accidental never consti- fer specifically. tutes a species; and what is outside the agent’s intention is Objection 3. Further, just as a virtuous act stands in accidental (Phys. ii, text. 50). Now it is evident that pun- relation to its reward, so does sin stand in relation to pun- ishment is outside the intention of the sinner, wherefore ishment. But the reward is the end of the virtuous act. it is accidentally referred to sin on the part of the sinner. Therefore punishment is the end of sin. Now sins differ Nevertheless it is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle, specifically in relation to their ends, as stated above (a. 1, viz. the justice of the judge, who imposes various punish- ad 1). Therefore they are also specifically distinct accord- ments according to the various manners of sin. Therefore ing to the debt of punishment. the difference derived from the debt of punishment, may On the contrary, Those things that constitute a be consequent to the specific diversity of sins, but cannot species are prior to the species, e.g. specific differences. constitute it. ∗ “Ex genere,” genus in this case denoting the species 931 Now the difference between venial and mortal sin is sinning, turns away from his last end, if we consider the consequent to the diversity of that inordinateness which nature of his sin, falls irreparably, and therefore is said to constitutes the notion of sin. For inordinateness is sin mortally and to deserve eternal punishment: whereas twofold, one that destroys the principle of order, and an- when a man sins without turning away from God, by the other which, without destroying the principle of order, im- very nature of his sin, his disorder can be repaired, be- plies inordinateness in the things which follow the princi- cause the principle of the order is not destroyed; where- ple: thus, in an animal’s body, the frame may be so out fore he is said to sin venially, because, to wit, he does not of order that the vital principle is destroyed; this is the sin so as to deserve to be punished eternally. inordinateness of death; while, on the other hand, saving Reply to Objection 1. Mortal and venial sins are in- the vital principle, there may be disorder in the bodily hu- finitely apart as regards what they “turn away from,” not as mors; and then there is sickness. Now the principle of regards what they “turn to,” viz. the object which specifies the entire moral order is the last end, which stands in the them. Hence nothing hinders the same species from in- same relation to matters of action, as the indemonstrable cluding mortal and venial sins; for instance, in the species principle does to matters of speculation (Ethic. vii, 8). “adultery” the first movement is a venial sin; while an idle Therefore when the soul is so disordered by sin as to turn word, which is, generally speaking, venial, may even be a away from its last end, viz. God, to Whom it is united mortal sin. by charity, there is mortal sin; but when it is disordered Reply to Objection 2. From the fact that one sin is without turning away from God, there is venial sin. For mortal by reason of its species, and another venial by rea- even as in the body, the disorder of death which results son of its species, it follows that this difference is conse- from the destruction of the principle of life, is irreparable quent to the specific difference of sins, not that it is the according to nature, while the disorder of sickness can be cause thereof. And this difference may be found even in repaired by reason of the vital principle being preserved, things of the same species, as stated above. so it is in matters concerning the soul. Because, in spec- Reply to Objection 3. The reward is intended by him ulative matters, it is impossible to convince one who errs that merits or acts virtually; whereas the punishment is not in the principles, whereas one who errs, but retains the intended by the sinner, but, on the contrary, is against his principles, can be brought back to the truth by means of will. Hence the comparison fails. the principles. Likewise in practical matters, he who, by Whether sins of commission and omission differ specifically? Ia IIae q. 72 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that sins of commission same species. and omission differ specifically. For “offense” and “sin” On the contrary, Omission and commission are are condivided with one another (Eph. 2:1), where it is found in the same species of sin. For the covetous man written: “When you were dead in your offenses and sins,” both takes what belongs to others, which is a sin of com- which words a gloss explains, saying: “ ‘Offenses,’ by mission; and gives not of his own to whom he should give, omitting to do what was commanded, and ‘sins,’ by doing which is a sin of omission. Therefore omission and com- what was forbidden.” Whence it is evident that “offenses” mission do not differ specifically. here denotes sins of omission; while “sin” denotes sins of I answer that, There is a twofold difference in sins; a commission. Therefore they differ specifically, since they material difference and a formal difference: the material are contrasted with one another as different species. difference is to be observed in the natural species of the Objection 2. Further, it is essential to sin to be against sinful act; while the formal difference is gathered from God’s law, for this is part of its definition, as is clear from their relation to one proper end, which is also their proper what has been said (q. 71, a. 6). Now in God’s law, the object. Hence we find certain acts differing from one an- affirmative precepts, against which is the sin of omission, other in the material specific difference, which are never- are different from the negative precepts, against which is theless formally in the same species of sin, because they the sin of omission. Therefore sins of omission and com- are directed to the one same end: thus strangling, ston- mission differ specifically. ing, and stabbing come under the one species of murder, Objection 3. Further, omission and commission differ although the actions themselves differ specifically accord- as affirmation and negation. Now affirmation and nega- ing to the natural species. Accordingly, if we refer to the tion cannot be in the same species, since negation has material species in sins of omission and commission, they no species; for “there is neither species nor difference of differ specifically, using species in a broad sense, in so far non-being,” as the Philosopher states (Phys. iv, text. 67). as negation and privation may have a species. But if we Therefore omission and commission cannot belong to the refer to the formal species of sins of omission and com- 932 mission, they do not differ specifically, because they are evil, being induced to this by the negative precepts, and directed to the same end, and proceed from the same mo- afterwards by doing good, to which we are induced by the tive. For the covetous man, in order to hoard money, both affirmative precepts. Wherefore the affirmative and neg- robs, and omits to give what he ought, and in like manner, ative precepts do not belong to different virtues, but to the glutton, to satiate his appetite, both eats too much and different degrees of virtue; and consequently they are not omits the prescribed fasts. The same applies to other sins: of necessity, opposed to sins of different species. More- for in things, negation is always founded on affirmation, over sin is not specified by that from which it turns away, which, in a manner, is its cause. Hence in the physical because in this respect it is a negation or privation, but order it comes under the same head, that fire gives forth by that to which it turns, in so far as sin is an act. Con- heat, and that it does not give forth cold. sequently sins do not differ specifically according to the Reply to Objection 1. This division in respect of various precepts of the Law. commission and omission, is not according to different Reply to Objection 3. This objection considers the formal species, but only according to material species, as material diversity of sins. It must be observed, how- stated. ever, that although, properly speaking, negation is not in Reply to Objection 2. In God’s law, the necessity for a species, yet it is allotted to a species by reduction to the various affirmative and negative precepts, was that men affirmation on which it is based. might be gradually led to virtue, first by abstaining from Whether sins are fittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed? Ia IIae q. 72 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that sins are unfittingly divided into these three, viz. sins of thought, word, and divided into sins of thought, word, and deed. For Augus- deed, not as into various complete species: for the con- tine (De Trin. xii, 12) describes three stages of sin, of summation of sin is in the deed, wherefore sins of deed which the first is “when the carnal sense offers a bait,” have the complete species; but the first beginning of sin is which is the sin of thought; the second stage is reached its foundation, as it were, in the sin of thought; the sec- “when one is satisfied with the mere pleasure of thought”; ond degree is the sin of word, in so far as man is ready to and the third stage, “when consent is given to the deed.” break out into a declaration of his thought; while the third Now these three belong to the sin of thought. Therefore it degree consists in the consummation of the deed. Conse- is unfitting to reckon sin of thought as one kind of sin. quently these three differ in respect of the various degrees Objection 2. Further, Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons of sin. Nevertheless it is evident that these three belong to four degrees of sin; the first of which is “a fault hidden in the one complete species of sin, since they proceed from the heart”; the second, “when it is done openly”; the third, the same motive. For the angry man, through desire of “when it is formed into a habit”; and the fourth, “when vengeance, is at first disturbed in thought, then he breaks man goes so far as to presume on God’s mercy or to give out into words of abuse, and lastly he goes on to wrongful himself up to despair”: where no distinction is made be- deeds; and the same applies to lust and to any other sin. tween sins of deed and sins of word, and two other degrees Reply to Objection 1. All sins of thought have the of sin are added. Therefore the first division was unfitting. common note of secrecy, in respect of which they form Objection 3. Further, there can be no sin of word or one degree, which is, however, divided into three stages, deed unless there precede sin of thought. Therefore these viz. of cogitation, pleasure, and consent. sins do not differ specifically. Therefore they should not Reply to Objection 2. Sins of words and deed are be condivided with one another. both done openly, and for this reason Gregory (Moral. On the contrary, Jerome in commenting on Ezech. iv, 25) reckons them under one head: whereas Jerome 43:23: “The human race is subject to three kinds of sin, (in commenting on Ezech. 43:23) distinguishes between for when we sin, it is either by thought, or word, or deed.” them, because in sins of word there is nothing but man- I answer that, Things differ specifically in two ways: ifestation which is intended principally; while in sins of first, when each has the complete species; thus a horse and deed, it is the consummation of the inward thought which an ox differ specifically: secondly, when the diversity of is principally intended, and the outward manifestation is species is derived from diversity of degree in generation by way of sequel. Habit and despair are stages following or movement: thus the building is the complete genera- the complete species of sin, even as boyhood and youth tion of a house, while the laying of the foundations, and follow the complete generation of a man. the setting up of the walls are incomplete species, as the Reply to Objection 3. Sin of thought and sin of word Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 4); and the same can ap- are not distinct from the sin of deed when they are united ply to the generation of animals. Accordingly sins are together with it, but when each is found by itself: even 933 as one part of a movement is not distinct from the whole when there is a break in the movement. movement, when the movement is continuous, but only Whether excess and deficiency diversify the species of sins? Ia IIae q. 72 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that excess and deficiency of deficiency; in fact, they are contrary to one another, just do not diversify the species of sins. For excess and defi- as the motive in the sin of intemperance is love for bod- ciency differ in respect of more and less. Now “more” ily pleasures, while the motive in the sin of insensibility and “less” do not diversify a species. Therefore excess is hatred of the same. Therefore these sins not only differ and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins. specifically, but are contrary to one another. Objection 2. Further, just as sin, in matters of action, Reply to Objection 1. Although “more” and “less” is due to straying from the rectitude of reason, so false- do not cause diversity of species, yet they are sometimes hood, in speculative matters, is due to straying from the consequent to specific difference, in so far as they are the truth of the reality. Now the species of falsehood is not di- result of diversity of form; thus we may say that fire is versified by saying more or less than the reality. Therefore lighter than air. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, neither is the species of sin diversified by straying more or 1) that “those who held that there are no different species less from the rectitude of reason. of friendship, by reason of its admitting of degree, were Objection 3. Further, “one species cannot be made led by insufficient proof.” In this way to exceed reason or out of two,” as Porphyry declares∗. Now excess and defi- to fall short thereof belongs to sins specifically different, ciency are united in one sin; for some are at once illiberal in so far as they result from different motives. and wasteful—illiberality being a sin of deficiency, and Reply to Objection 2. It is not the sinner’s intention prodigality, by excess. Therefore excess and deficiency to depart from reason; and so sins of excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins. do not become of one kind through departing from the one On the contrary, Contraries differ specifically, for rectitude of reason. On the other hand, sometimes he who “contrariety is a difference of form,” as stated in Metaph. utters a falsehood, intends to hide the truth, wherefore in x, text. 13,14. Now vices that differ according to excess this respect, it matters not whether he tells more or less. and deficiency are contrary to one another, as illiberality If, however, departure from the truth be not outside the to wastefulness. Therefore they differ specifically. intention, it is evident that then one is moved by different I answer that, While there are two things in sin, viz. causes to tell more or less; and in this respect there are the act itself and its inordinateness, in so far as sin is a different kinds of falsehood, as is evident of the “boaster,” departure from the order of reason and the Divine law, who exceeds in telling untruths for the sake of fame, and the species of sin is gathered, not from its inordinateness, the “cheat,” who tells less than the truth, in order to escape which is outside the sinner’s intention, as stated above from paying his debts. This also explains how some false (a. 1), but one the contrary, from the act itself as terminat- opinions are contrary to one another. ing in the object to which the sinner’s intention is directed. Reply to Objection 3. One may be prodigal and il- Consequently wherever we find a different motive inclin- liberal with regard to different objects: for instance one ing the intention to sin, there will be a different species of may be illiberal† in taking what one ought not: and noth- sin. Now it is evident that the motive for sinning, in sins ing hinders contraries from being in the same subject, in by excess, is not the same as the motive for sinning, in sins different respects. Whether sins differ specifically in respect of different circumstances? Ia IIae q. 72 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that vices and sins differ cally according as different circumstances are corrupted. in respect of different circumstances. For, as Dionysius Objection 3. Further, diverse species are assigned to says (Div. Nom. iv), “evil results from each single de- gluttony, according to the words contained in the follow- fect.” Now individual defects are corruptions of individ- ing verse: ual circumstances. Therefore from the corruption of each ‘Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily.’ circumstance there results a corresponding species of sin. Now these pertain to various circumstances, for “hastily” Objection 2. Further, sins are human acts. But human means sooner than is right; “too much,” more than is right, acts sometimes take their species from circumstances, as and so on with the others. Therefore the species of sin is stated above (q. 18, a. 10). Therefore sins differ specifi- diversified according to the various circumstances. ∗ Isagog.; cf. Arist. Metaph. i † Cf. IIa IIae, q. 119, a. 1, ad 1 934 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7; that a man eat hastily, may be due to the fact that he can-iv, 1) that “every vice sins by doing more than one ought, not brook the delay in taking food, on account of a rapid and when one ought not”; and in like manner as to the exhaustion of the digestive humors; and that he desire too other circumstances. Therefore the species of sins are not much food, may be due to a naturally strong digestion; diversified in this respect. that he desire choice meats, is due to his desire for plea- I answer that, As stated above (a. 8), wherever there sure in taking food. Hence in such matters, the corruption is a special motive for sinning, there is a different species of different circumstances entails different species of sins. of sin, because the motive for sinning is the end and ob- Reply to Objection 1. Evil, as such, is a privation, ject of sin. Now it happens sometimes that although dif- and so it has different species in respect of the thing which ferent circumstances are corrupted, there is but one mo- the subject is deprived, even as other privations. But sin tive: thus the illiberal man, for the same motive, takes does not take its species from the privation or aversion, as when he ought not, where he ought not, and more than he stated above (a. 1), but from turning to the object of the ought, and so on with the circumstances, since he does this act. through an inordinate desire of hoarding money: and in Reply to Objection 2. A circumstance never trans- such cases the corruption of different circumstances does fers an act from one species to another, save when there is not diversify the species of sins, but belongs to one and another motive. the same species. Reply to Objection 3. In the various species of glut- Sometimes, however, the corruption of different cir- tony there are various motives, as stated. cumstances arises from different motives: for instance 935 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 73 Of the Comparison of One Sin with Another (In Ten Articles) We must now consider the comparison of one sin with another: under which head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether all sins and vices are connected with one another? (2) Whether all are equal? (3) Whether the gravity of sin depends on its object? (4) Whether it depends on the excellence of the virtue to which it is opposed? (5) Whether carnal sins are more grievous than spiritual sins? (6) Whether the gravity of sins depends on their causes? (7) Whether it depends on their circumstances? (8) Whether it depends on how much harm ensues? (9) Whether on the position of the person sinned against? (10) Whether sin is aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning? Whether all sins are connected with one another? Ia IIae q. 73 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that all sins are connected. that all the virtues are connected together in the right rea- For it is written (James 2:10): “Whosoever shall keep the son of things to be done, viz. prudence, as stated above whole Law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of (q. 65, a. 1). But the intention of the sinner is not directed all.” Now to be guilty of transgressing all the precepts of to the point of straying from the path of reason; rather is Law, is the same as to commit all sins, because, as Am- it directed to tend to some appetible good whence it de- brose says (De Parad. viii), “sin is a transgression of the rives its species. Now these goods, to which the sinner’s Divine law, and disobedience of the heavenly command- intention is directed when departing from reason, are of ments.” Therefore whoever commits one sin is guilty of various kinds, having no mutual connection; in fact they all. are sometimes contrary to one another. Since, therefore, Objection 2. Further, each sin banishes its opposite vices and sins take their species from that to which they virtue. Now whoever lacks one virtue lacks them all, as turn, it is evident that, in respect of that which completes was shown above (q. 65, a. 1). Therefore whoever com- a sin’s species, sins are not connected with one another. mits one sin, is deprived of all the virtues. Therefore who- For sin does not consist in passing from the many to the ever commits one sin, is guilty of all sins. one, as is the case with virtues, which are connected, but Objection 3. Further, all virtues are connected, be- rather in forsaking the one for the many. cause they have a principle in common, as stated above Reply to Objection 1. James is speaking of sin, not (q. 65, Aa. 1,2). Now as the virtues have a common prin- as regards the thing to which it turns and which causes the ciple, so have sins, because, as the love of God, which distinction of sins, as stated above (q. 72 , a. 1), but as re- builds the city of God, is the beginning and root of all the gards that from which sin turns away, in as much as man, virtues, so self-love, which builds the city of Babylon, is by sinning, departs from a commandment of the law. Now the root of all sins, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei all the commandments of the law are from one and the xiv, 28). Therefore all vices and sins are also connected same, as he also says in the same passage, so that the same so that whoever has one, has them all. God is despised in every sin; and in this sense he says that On the contrary, Some vices are contrary to one an- whoever “offends in one point, is become guilty of all,” other, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But con- for as much as, by committing one sin, he incurs the debt traries cannot be together in the same subject. Therefore of punishment through his contempt of God, which is the it is impossible for all sins and vices to be connected with origin of all sins. one another. Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 71, a. 4), I answer that, The intention of the man who acts ac- the opposite virtue is not banished by every act of sin; be- cording to virtue in pursuance of his reason, is different cause venial sin does not destroy virtue; while mortal sin from the intention of the sinner in straying from the path destroys infused virtue, by turning man away from God. of reason. For the intention of every man acting accord- Yet one act, even of mortal sin, does not destroy the habit ing to virtue is to follow the rule of reason, wherefore the of acquired virtue; though if such acts be repeated so as intention of all the virtues is directed to the same end, so to engender a contrary habit, the habit of acquired virtue 936 is destroyed, the destruction of which entails the loss of virtue, as regards the virtue’s inclination to act, as stated prudence, since when man acts against any virtue what- above (q. 71, a. 1). Wherefore, as long as any virtuous ever, he acts against prudence, without which no moral inclinations remain, it cannot be said that man has the op- virtue is possible, as stated above (q. 58, a. 4; q. 65, a. 1). posite vices or sins. Consequently all the moral virtues are destroyed as to the Reply to Objection 3. The love of God is unitive, in perfect and formal being of virtue, which they have in so as much as it draws man’s affections from the many to the far as they partake of prudence, yet there remain the in- one; so that the virtues, which flow from the love of God, clinations to virtuous acts, which inclinations, however, are connected together. But self-love disunites man’s af- are not virtues. Nevertheless it does not follow that for fections among different things, in so far as man loves this reason man contracts all vices of sins—first, because himself, by desiring for himself temporal goods, which several vices are opposed to one virtue, so that a virtue are various and of many kinds: hence vices and sins, can be destroyed by one of them, without the others be- which arise from self-love, are not connected together. ing present; secondly, because sin is directly opposed to Whether all sins are equal? Ia IIae q. 73 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that all sins are equal. manner, a house is no darker if the light be covered with Because sin is to do what is unlawful. Now to do what is several shades, than if it were covered by a single shade unlawful is reproved in one and the same way in all things. shutting out all the light. There is, however, another pri- Therefore sin is reproved in one and the same way. There- vation which is not simple, but retains something of the fore one sin is not graver than another. opposite habit; it consists in “becoming” corrupted rather Objection 2. Further, every sin is a transgression of than in “being” corrupted, like sickness which is a pri- the rule of reason, which is to human acts what a linear vation of the due commensuration of the humors, yet so rule is in corporeal things. Therefore to sin is the same as that something remains of that commensuration, else the to pass over a line. But passing over a line occurs equally animal would cease to live: and the same applies to defor- and in the same way, even if one go a long way from it or mity and the like. Such privations admit of more or less on stay near it, since privations do not admit of more or less. the part of what remains or the contrary habit. For it mat- Therefore all sins are equal. ters much in sickness or deformity, whether one departs Objection 3. Further, sins are opposed to virtues. But more or less from the due commensuration of humors or all virtues are equal, as Cicero states (Paradox. iii). There- members. The same applies to vices and sins: because in fore all sins are equal. them the privation of the due commensuration of reason On the contrary, Our Lord said to Pilate (Jn. 19:11): is such as not to destroy the order of reason altogether; “He that hath delivered me to thee, hath the greater sin,” else evil, if total, destroys itself, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. and yet it is evident that Pilate was guilty of some sin. For the substance of the act, or the affection of the agent Therefore one sin is greater than another. could not remain, unless something remained of the order I answer that, The opinion of the Stoics, which Ci- of reason. Therefore it matters much to the gravity of a cero adopts in the book on Paradoxes (Paradox. iii), was sin whether one departs more or less from the rectitude of that all sins are equal: from which opinion arose the error reason: and accordingly we must say that sins are not all of certain heretics, who not only hold all sins to be equal, equal. but also maintain that all the pains of hell are equal. So Reply to Objection 1. To commit sin is lawful on far as can be gathered from the words of Cicero the Sto- account of some inordinateness therein: wherefore those ics arrived at their conclusion through looking at sin on which contain a greater inordinateness are more unlawful, the side of the privation only, in so far, to wit, as it is a and consequently graver sins. departure from reason; wherefore considering simply that Reply to Objection 2. This argument looks upon sin no privation admits of more or less, they held that all sins as though it were a pure privation. are equal. Yet, if we consider the matter carefully, we Reply to Objection 3. Virtues are proportionately shall see that there are two kinds of privation. For there is equal in one and the same subject: yet one virtue sur- a simple and pure privation, which consists, so to speak, passes another in excellence according to its species; and in “being” corrupted; thus death is privation of life, and again, one man is more virtuous than another, in the same darkness is privation of light. Such like privations do not species of virtue, as stated above (q. 66, Aa. 1,2). More- admit of more or less, because nothing remains of the op- over, even if virtues were equal, it would not follow that posite habit; hence a man is not less dead on the first day vices are equal, since virtues are connected, and vices or after his death, or on the third or fourth days, than after sins are not. a year, when his corpse is already dissolved; and, in like 937 Whether the gravity of sins varies according to their objects? Ia IIae q. 73 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the gravity of sins of action the reason directs all things in view of the end: does not vary according to their objects. Because the grav- wherefore the higher the end which attaches to sins in hu- ity of a sin pertains to its mode or quality: whereas the man acts, the graver the sin. Now the object of an act is its object is the matter of the sin. Therefore the gravity of end, as stated above (q. 72, a. 3, ad 2); and consequently sins does not vary according to their various objects. the difference of gravity in sins depends on their objects. Objection 2. Further, the gravity of a sin is the in- Thus it is clear that external things are directed to man tensity of its malice. Now sin does not derive its malice as their end, while man is further directed to God as his from its proper object to which it turns, and which is some end. Wherefore a sin which is about the very substance appetible good, but rather from that which it turns away of man, e.g. murder, is graver than a sin which is about from. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary accord- external things, e.g. theft; and graver still is a sin com- ing to their various objects. mitted directly against God, e.g. unbelief, blasphemy, and Objection 3. Further, sins that have different objects the like: and in each of these grades of sin, one sin will are of different kinds. But things of different kinds can- be graver than another according as it is about a higher or not be compared with one another, as is proved in Phys. lower principle. And forasmuch as sins take their species vii, text. 30, seqq. Therefore one sin is not graver than from their objects, the difference of gravity which is de- another by reason of the difference of objects. rived from the objects is first and foremost, as resulting On the contrary, Sins take their species from their ob- from the species. jects, as was shown above (q. 72, a. 1). But some sins are Reply to Objection 1. Although the object is the mat- graver than others in respect of their species, as murder ter about which an act is concerned, yet it has the character is graver than theft. Therefore the gravity of sins varies of an end, in so far as the intention of the agent is fixed on according to their objects. it, as stated above (q. 72, a. 3, ad 2). Now the form of a I answer that, As is clear from what has been said moral act depends on the end, as was shown above (q. 72, (q. 71, a. 5), the gravity of sins varies in the same way as a. 6; q. 18, a. 6). one sickness is graver than another: for just as the good Reply to Objection 2. From the very fact that man of health consists in a certain commensuration of the hu- turns unduly to some mutable good, it follows that he mors, in keeping with an animal’s nature, so the good of turns away from the immutable Good, which aversion virtue consists in a certain commensuration of the human completes the nature of evil. Hence the various degrees act in accord with the rule of reason. Now it is evident that of malice in sins must needs follow the diversity of those the higher the principle the disorder of which causes the things to which man turns. disorder in the humors, the graver is the sickness: thus a Reply to Objection 3. All the objects of human acts sickness which comes on the human body from the heart, are related to one another, wherefore all human acts are which is the principle of life, or from some neighboring somewhat of one kind, in so far as they are directed to the part, is more dangerous. Wherefore a sin must needs be last end. Therefore nothing prevents all sins from being so much the graver, as the disorder occurs in a principle compared with one another. which is higher in the order of reason. Now in matters Whether the gravity of sins depends on the excellence of the virtues to which they are Ia IIae q. 73 a. 4 opposed? Objection 1. It would seem that the gravity of sins more difficult. But it is a less grievous sin to fail in what does not vary according to the excellence of the virtues to is more difficult, than in what is less difficult. Therefore which they are opposed, so that, to wit, the graver the sin the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue. is opposed to the greater virtue. For, according to Prov. Objection 3. Further, charity is a greater virtue than 15:5, “In abundant justice there is the greatest strength.” faith or hope (1 Cor. 13:13). Now hatred which is op- Now, as Our Lord says (Mat. 5:20, seqq.) abundant justice posed to charity is a less grievous sin than unbelief or de- restrains anger, which is a less grievous sin than murder, spair which are opposed to faith and hope. Therefore the which less abundant justice restrains. Therefore the least less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue. grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. 8:10) Objection 2. Further, it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that that the “worst is opposed to the best.” Now in morals “virtue is about the difficult and the good”: whence it the best is the greatest virtue; and the worst is the most seems to follow that the greater virtue is about what is grievous sin. Therefore the most grievous sin is opposed 938 to the greatest virtue. man also from less grievous sins: even as the more perfect I answer that, A sin is opposed to a virtue in two health is, the more does it ward off even minor ailments. ways: first, principally and directly; that sin, to with, And in this way the less grievous sin is opposed to the which is about the same object: because contraries are greater virtue, on the part of the latter’s effect. about the same thing. In this way, the more grievous sin Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers the must needs be opposed to the greater virtue: because, just opposition which consists in restraining from sin; for thus as the degrees of gravity in a sin depend on the object, abundant justice checks even minor sins. so also does the greatness of a virtue, since both sin and Reply to Objection 2. The greater virtue that is about virtue take their species from the object, as shown above a more difficult good is opposed directly to the sin which (q. 60, a. 5; q. 72, a. 1). Wherefore the greatest sin must is about a more difficult evil. For in each case there is a needs be directly opposed to the greatest virtue, as being certain superiority, in that the will is shown to be more furthest removed from it in the same genus. Secondly, the intent on good or evil, through not being overcome by the opposition of virtue to sin may be considered in respect difficulty. of a certain extension of the virtue in checking sin. For Reply to Objection 3. Charity is not any kind of love, the greater a virtue is, the further it removes man from but the love of God: hence not any kind of hatred is op- the contrary sin, so that it withdraws man not only from posed to it directly, but the hatred of God, which is the that sin, but also from whatever leads to it. And thus it is most grievous of all sins. evident that the greater a virtue is, the more it withdraws Whether carnal sins are of less guilt than spiritual sins? Ia IIae q. 73 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that carnal sins are not of to turn away from Him; whereas carnal sins are consum- less guilt than spiritual sins. Because adultery is a more mated in the carnal pleasure of the appetite, to which it grievous sin than theft: for it is written (Prov. 6:30,32): chiefly belongs to turn to goods of the body; so that carnal “The fault is not so great when a man has stolen. . . but he sin, as such, denotes more a “turning to” something, and that is an adulterer, for the folly of his heart shall destroy for that reason, implies a closer cleaving; whereas spiri- his own soul.” Now theft belongs to covetousness, which tual sin denotes more a “turning from” something, whence is a spiritual sin; while adultery pertains to lust, which is the notion of guilt arises; and for this reason it involves a carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins are of greater guilt than greater guilt. A second reason may be taken on the part of spiritual sins. the person against whom sin is committed: because car- Objection 2. Further, Augustine says in his commen- nal sin, as such, is against the sinner’s own body, which tary on Leviticus∗ that “the devil rejoices chiefly in lust he ought to love less, in the order of charity, than God and and idolatry.” But he rejoices more in the greater sin. his neighbor, against whom he commits spiritual sins, and Therefore, since lust is a carnal sin, it seems that the car- consequently spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt. nal sins are of most guilt. A third reason may be taken from the motive, since the Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher proves (Ethic. stronger the impulse to sin, the less grievous the sin, as vii, 6) that “it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust we shall state further on (a. 6). Now carnal sins have a than in anger.” But anger is a spiritual sin, according to stronger impulse, viz. our innate concupiscence of the Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17); while lust pertains to carnal flesh. Therefore spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt. sins. Therefore carnal sin is more grievous than spiritual Reply to Objection 1. Adultery belongs not only to sin. the sin of lust, but also to the sin of injustice, and in this On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 11) respect may be brought under the head of covetousness, as that carnal sins are of less guilt, but of more shame than a gloss observes on Eph. 5:5. “No fornicator, or unclean, spiritual sins. or covetous person,” etc.; so that adultery is so much more I answer that, Spiritual sins are of greater guilt than grievous than theft, as a man loves his wife more than his carnal sins: yet this does not mean that each spiritual sin is chattels. of greater guilt than each carnal sin; but that, considering Reply to Objection 2. The devil is said to rejoice the sole difference between spiritual and carnal, spiritual chiefly in the sin of lust, because it is of the greatest ad- sins are more grievous than carnal sins, other things be- hesion, and man can with difficulty be withdrawn from it. ing equal. Three reasons may be assigned for this. The “For the desire of pleasure is insatiable,” as the Philoso- first is on the part of the subject: because spiritual sins be- pher states (Ethic. iii, 12). long to the spirit, to which it is proper to turn to God, and Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher himself ∗ The quotation is from De Civ. Dei ii, 4 and iv, 31. 939 says (Ethic. vii, 6), the reason why it is more shameful common to us and irrational minds”: hence, by these sins to be incontinent in lust than in anger, is that lust par- man is, so to speak, brutalized; for which same reason takes less of reason; and in the same sense he says (Ethic. Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that they are more shame- iii, 10) that “sins of intemperance are most worthy of re- ful. proach, because they are about those pleasures which are Whether the gravity of a sin depends on its cause? Ia IIae q. 73 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the gravity of a sin Among these causes we must make a distinction; for some does not depend on its cause. Because the greater a sin’s of them induce the will to sin in accord with the very na- cause, the more forcibly it moves to sin, and so the more ture of the will: such is the end, which is the proper object difficult is it to resist. But sin is lessened by the fact that of the will; and by a such like cause sin is made more it is difficult to resist; for it denotes weakness in the sin- grievous, because a man sins more grievously if his will is ner, if he cannot easily resist sin; and a sin that is due to induced to sin by the intention of a more evil end. Other weakness is deemed less grievous. Therefore sin does not causes incline the will to sin, against the nature and order derive its gravity from its cause. of the will, whose natural inclination is to be moved freely Objection 2. Further, concupiscence is a general of itself in accord with the judgment of reason. Wherefore cause of sin; wherefore a gloss on Rom. 7:7, “For I had those causes which weaken the judgment of reason (e.g. not known concupiscence,” says: “The law is good, since ignorance), or which weaken the free movement of the by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils.” Now will, (e.g. weakness, violence, fear, or the like), diminish the greater the concupiscence by which man is overcome, the gravity of sin, even as they diminish its voluntariness; the less grievous his sin. Therefore the gravity of a sin is and so much so, that if the act be altogether involuntary, it diminished by the greatness of its cause. is no longer sinful. Objection 3. Further, as rectitude of the reason is the Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers the cause of a virtuous act, so defect in the reason seems to be extrinsic moving cause, which diminishes voluntariness. the cause of sin. Now the greater the defect in the reason, The increase of such a cause diminishes the sin, as stated. the less grievous the sin: so much so that he who lacks Reply to Objection 2. If concupiscence be under- the use of reason, is altogether excused from sin, and he stood to include the movement of the will, then, where who sins through ignorance, sins less grievously. There- there is greater concupiscence, there is a greater sin. But fore the gravity of a sin is not increased by the greatness if by concupiscence we understand a passion, which is a of its cause. movement of the concupiscible power, then a greater con- On the contrary, If the cause be increased, the effect cupiscence, forestalling the judgment of reason and the is increased. Therefore the greater the cause of sin, the movement of the will, diminishes the sin, because the man more grievous the sin. who sins, being stimulated by a greater concupiscence, I answer that, In the genus of sin, as in every other falls through a more grievous temptation, wherefore he is genus, two causes may be observed. The first is the direct less to be blamed. On the other hand, if concupiscence be and proper cause of sin, and is the will to sin: for it is taken in this sense follows the judgment of reason, and the compared to the sinful act, as a tree to its fruit, as a gloss movement of the will, then the greater concupiscence, the observes on Mat. 7:18, “A good tree cannot bring forth graver the sin: because sometimes the movement of con- evil fruit”: and the greater this cause is, the more grievous cupiscence is redoubled by the will tending unrestrainedly will the sin be, since the greater the will to sin, the more to its object. grievously does man sin. Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the The other causes of sin are extrinsic and remote, as cause which renders the act involuntary, and such a cause it were, being those whereby the will is inclined to sin. diminishes the gravity of sin, as stated. Whether a circumstance aggravates a sin? Ia IIae q. 73 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that a circumstance does Objection 2. Further, a circumstance is either evil or not aggravate a sin. Because sin takes its gravity from its not: if it is evil, it causes, of itself, a species of evil; and species. Now a circumstance does not specify a sin, for it if it is not evil, it cannot make a thing worse. Therefore a is an accident thereof. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not circumstance nowise aggravates a sin. taken from a circumstance. Objection 3. Further, the malice of a sin is derived 940 from its turning away (from God). But circumstances affed him, who educated him, to whom he owes his lands, fect sin on the part of the object to which it turns. There- his house, his position in the republic.” Thirdly, a circum- fore they do not add to the sin’s malice. stance aggravates a sin by adding to the deformity which On the contrary, Ignorance of a circumstance dimin- the sin derives from another circumstance: thus, taking ishes sin: for he who sins through ignorance of a circum- another’s property constitutes the sin of theft; but if to this stance, deserves to be forgiven (Ethic. iii, 1). Now this be added the circumstance that much is taken of another’s would not be the case unless a circumstance aggravated a property, the sin will be more grievous; although in itself, sin. Therefore a circumstance makes a sin more grievous. to take more or less has not the character of a good or of I answer that, As the Philosopher says in speaking of an evil act. habits of virtue (Ethic. ii, 1,2), “it is natural for a thing to Reply to Objection 1. Some circumstances do spec-be increased by that which causes it.” Now it is evident ify a moral act, as stated above (q. 18, a. 10). Nevertheless that a sin is caused by a defect in some circumstance: be- a circumstance which does not give the species, may ag- cause the fact that a man departs from the order of reason gravate a sin; because, even as the goodness of a thing is is due to his not observing the due circumstances in his weighed, not only in reference to its species, but also in action. Wherefore it is evident that it is natural for a sin reference to an accident, so the malice of an act is mea- to be aggravated by reason of its circumstances. This hap- sured, not only according to the species of that act, but pens in three ways. First, in so far as a circumstance draws also according to a circumstance. a sin from one kind to another: thus fornication is the in- Reply to Objection 2. A circumstance may aggravate tercourse of a man with one who is not his wife: but if to a sin either way. For if it is evil, it does not follow that it this be added the circumstance that the latter is the wife of constitutes the sin’s species; because it may multiply the another, the sin is drawn to another kind of sin, viz. injus- ratio of evil within the same species, as stated above. And tice, in so far as he usurps another’s property; and in this if it be not evil, it may aggravate a sin in relation to the respect adultery is a more grievous sin than fornication. malice of another circumstance. Secondly, a circumstance aggravates a sin, not by draw- Reply to Objection 3. Reason should direct the action ing it into another genus, but only by multiplying the ratio not only as regards the object, but also as regards every of sin: thus if a wasteful man gives both when he ought circumstance. Therefore one may turn aside from the rule not, and to whom he ought not to give, he commits the of reason through corruption of any single circumstance; same kind of sin in more ways than if he were to merely for instance, by doing something when one ought not or to give to whom he ought not, and for that very reason his where one ought not; and to depart thus from the rule of sin is more grievous; even as that sickness is the graver reason suffices to make the act evil. This turning aside which affects more parts of the body. Hence Cicero says from the rule of reason results from man’s turning away (Paradox. iii) that “in taking his father’s life a man com- from God, to Whom man ought to be united by right rea- mits many sins; for he outrages one who begot him, who son. Whether sin is aggravated by reason of its causing more harm? Ia IIae q. 73 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that a sin is not aggra- than the life of nature, so far that man ought to despise his vated by reason of its causing more harm. Because the natural life lest he lose the life of grace. Now, speaking harm done is an issue consequent to the sinful act. But the absolutely, a man who leads a woman to commit fornica- issue of an act does not add to its goodness or malice, as tion deprives her of the life of grace by leading her into stated above (q. 20, a. 5). Therefore a sin is not aggravated mortal sin. If therefore a sin were more grievous on ac- on account of its causing more harm. count of its causing a greater harm, it would follow that Objection 2. Further, harm is inflicted by sins against fornication, absolutely speaking, is a more grievous sin our neighbor. Because no one wishes to harm himself: than murder, which is evidently untrue. Therefore a sin and no one can harm God, according to Job 35:6,8: “If is not more grievous on account of its causing a greater thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against harm. Him?. . . Thy wickedness may hurt a man that is like thee.” On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, If, therefore, sins were aggravated through causing more 14): “Since vice is contrary to nature, a vice is the more harm, it would follow that sins against our neighbor are grievous according as it diminishes the integrity of na- more grievous than sins against God or oneself. ture.” Now the diminution of the integrity of nature is a Objection 3. Further, greater harm is inflicted on a harm. Therefore a sin is graver according as it does more man by depriving him of the life of grace, than by taking harm. away his natural life; because the life of grace is better I answer that, Harm may bear a threefold relation to 941 sin. Because sometimes the harm resulting from a sin an unbeliever who has heard nothing about the pains of is foreseen and intended, as when a man does something hell, would suffer greater pain in hell for a sin of murder with a mind to harm another, e.g. a murderer or a thief. than for a sin of theft: but his sin is not aggravated on In this case the quantity of harm aggravates the sin di- account of his neither intending nor foreseeing this, as it rectly, because then the harm is the direct object of the would be in the case of a believer, who, seemingly, sins sin. Sometimes the harm is foreseen, but not intended; for more grievously in the very fact that he despises a greater instance, when a man takes a short cut through a field, the punishment, that he may satisfy his desire to sin; but the result being that he knowingly injures the growing crops, gravity of this harm is caused by the sole gravity of sin. although his intention is not to do this harm, but to com- Reply to Objection 1. As we have already stated mit fornication. In this case again the quantity of the harm (q. 20, a. 5), in treating of the goodness and malice of done aggravates the sin; indirectly, however, in so far, to external actions, the result of an action if foreseen and in- wit, as it is owing to his will being strongly inclined to tended adds to the goodness and malice of an act. sin, that a man does not forbear from doing, to himself Reply to Objection 2. Although the harm done ag- or to another, a harm which he would not wish simply. gravates a sin, it does not follow that this alone renders Sometimes, however, the harm is neither foreseen nor in- a sin more grievous: in fact, it is inordinateness which tended: and then if this harm is connected with the sin of itself aggravates a sin. Wherefore the harm itself that accidentally, it does not aggravate the sin directly; but, on ensues aggravates a sin, in so far only as it renders the account of his neglecting to consider the harm that might act more inordinate. Hence it does not follow, supposing ensue, a man is deemed punishable for the evil results of harm to be inflicted chiefly by sins against our neighbor, his action if it be unlawful. If, on the other hand, the harm that such sins are the most grievous, since a much greater follow directly from the sinful act, although it be neither inordinateness is to be found against which man commits foreseen nor intended, it aggravates the sin directly, be- against God, and in some which he commits against him- cause whatever is directly consequent to a sin, belongs, in self. Moreover we might say that although no man can a manner, to the very species of that sin: for instance, if do God any harm in His substance, yet he can endeavor a man is a notorious fornicator, the result is that many are to do so in things concerning Him, e.g. by destroying scandalized; and although such was not his intention, nor faith, by outraging holy things, which are most grievous was it perhaps foreseen by him, yet it aggravates his sin sins. Again, a man sometimes knowingly and freely in- directly. flicts harm on himself, as in the case of suicide, though But this does not seem to apply to penal harm, which this be referred finally to some apparent good, for exam- the sinner himself incurs. Such like harm, if accidentally ple, delivery from some anxiety. connected with the sinful act, and if neither foreseen nor Reply to Objection 3. This argument does not prove, intended, does not aggravate a sin, nor does it correspond for two reasons: first, because the murderer intends di- with the gravity of the sin: for instance, if a man in run- rectly to do harm to his neighbors; whereas the fornicator ning to slay, slips and hurts his foot. If, on the other hand, who solicits the woman intends not to harm but pleasure; this harm is directly consequent to the sinful act, although secondly, because murder is the direct and sufficient cause perhaps it be neither foreseen nor intended, then greater of bodily death; whereas no man can of himself be the suf- harm does not make greater sin, but, on the contrary, a ficient cause of another’s spiritual death, because no man graver sin calls for the infliction of a greater harm. Thus, dies spiritually except by sinning of his own will. Whether a sin is aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it Ia IIae q. 73 a. 9 is committed? Objection 1. It would seem that sin is not aggravated aggravated the sin, this would be still more the case if by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is the person be near of kin, because, as Cicero says (Para- committed. For if this were the case a sin would be aggra- dox. iii): “The man who kills his slave sins once: he that vated chiefly by being committed against a just and holy takes his father’s life sins many times.” But the kinship man. But this does not aggravate a sin: because a virtuous of a person sinned against does not apparently aggravate man who bears a wrong with equanimity is less harmed a sin, because every man is most akin to himself; and yet by the wrong done him, than others, who, through being it is less grievous to harm oneself than another, e.g. to scandalized, are also hurt inwardly. Therefore the condi- kill one’s own, than another’s horse, as the Philosopher tion of the person against whom a sin is committed does declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore kinship of the person not aggravate the sin. sinned against does not aggravate the sin. Objection 2. Further, if the condition of the person Objection 3. Further, the condition of the person who 942 sins aggravates a sin chiefly on account of his position the more grievous, according as it is committed against a or knowledge, according to Wis. 6:7: “The mighty shall person more closely united to God by reason of personal be mightily tormented,” and Lk. 12:47: “The servant sanctity, or official station. On the part of man himself, who knew the will of his lord. . . and did it not. . . shall it is evident that he sins all the more grievously, accord- be beaten with many stripes.” Therefore, in like man- ing as the person against whom he sins, is more united to ner, on the part of the person sinned against, the sin is him, either through natural affinity or kindness received or made more grievous by reason of his position and knowl- any other bond; because he seems to sin against himself edge. But, apparently, it is not a more grievous sin to rather than the other, and, for this very reason, sins all the inflict an injury on a rich and powerful person than on a more grievously, according to Ecclus. 14:5: “He that is poor man, since “there is no respect of persons with God” evil to himself, to whom will he be good?” On the part of (Col. 3:25), according to Whose judgment the gravity of his neighbor, a man sins the more grievously, according a sin is measured. Therefore the condition of the person as his sin affects more persons: so that a sin committed sinned against does not aggravate the sin. against a public personage, e.g. a sovereign prince who On the contrary, Holy Writ censures especially those stands in the place of the whole people, is more grievous sins that are committed against the servants of God. Thus than a sin committed against a private person; hence it is it is written (3 Kings 19:14): “They have destroyed Thy expressly prohibited (Ex. 22:28): “The prince of thy peo- altars, they have slain Thy prophets with the sword.” ple thou shalt not curse.” In like manner it would seem Moreover much blame is attached to the sin committed that an injury done to a person of prominence, is all the by a man against those who are akin to him, accord- more grave, on account of the scandal and the disturbance ing to Micah 7:6: “the son dishonoreth the father, and it would cause among many people. the daughter riseth up against her mother.” Furthermore Reply to Objection 1. He who inflicts an injury on a sins committed against persons of rank are expressly con- virtuous person, so far as he is concerned, disturbs him in- demned: thus it is written (Job 34:18): “Who saith to the ternally and externally; but that the latter is not disturbed king: ‘Thou art an apostate’; who calleth rulers ungodly.” internally is due to his goodness, which does not extenu- Therefore the condition of the person sinned against ag- ate the sin of the injurer. gravates the sin. Reply to Objection 2. The injury which a man in- I answer that, The person sinned against is, in a man- flicts on himself in those things which are subject to the ner, the object of the sin. Now it has been stated above dominion of his will, for instance his possessions, is less (a. 3) that the primary gravity of a sin is derived from its sinful than if it were inflicted on another, because he does object; so that a sin is deemed to be so much the more it of his own will; but in those things that are not subject grave, as its object is a more principal end. But the prin- to the dominion of his will, such as natural and spiritual cipal ends of human acts are God, man himself, and his goods, it is a graver sin to inflict an injury on oneself: for neighbor: for whatever we do, it is on account of one of it is more grievous for a man to kill himself than another. these that we do it; although one of them is subordinate to Since, however, things belonging to our neighbor are not the other. Therefore the greater or lesser gravity of a sin, subject to the dominion of our will, the argument fails to in respect of the person sinned against, may be considered prove, in respect of injuries done to such like things, that on the part of these three. it is less grievous to sin in their regard, unless indeed our First, on the part of God, to Whom man is the more neighbor be willing, or give his approval. closely united, as he is more virtuous or more sacred to Reply to Objection 3. There is no respect for per- God: so that an injury inflicted on such a person redounds sons if God punishes more severely those who sin against on to God according to Zech. 2:8: “He that toucheth a person of higher rank; for this is done because such an you, toucheth the apple of My eye.” Wherefore a sin is injury redounds to the harm of many. Whether the excellence of the person sinning aggravates the sin? Ia IIae q. 73 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that the excellence of the with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their fa- person sinning does not aggravate the sin. For man be- thers; and will not impute it to them that they are not sanc- comes great chiefly by cleaving to God, according to Ec- tified.” Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence clus. 25:13: “How great is he that findeth wisdom and of the person sinning. knowledge! but there is none above him that feareth the Objection 2. Further, “there is no respect of persons Lord.” Now the more a man cleaves to God, the less is a with God” (Rom. 2:11). Therefore He does not punish sin imputed to him: for it is written (2 Paral. 30: 18,19): one man more than another, for one and the same sin. “The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all them, who Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the 943 person sinning. in which a man excels, is a gift of God, to Whom man Objection 3. Further, no one should reap disadvan- is ungrateful when he sins: and in this respect any excel- tage from good. But he would, if his action were the more lence, even in temporal goods, aggravates a sin, according blameworthy on account of his goodness. Therefore a sin to Wis. 6:7: “The mighty shall be mightily tormented.” is not aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person Thirdly, on account of the sinful act being specially in- sinning. consistent with the excellence of the person sinning: for On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, instance, if a prince were to violate justice, whereas he 18): “A sin is deemed so much the more grievous as the is set up as the guardian of justice, or if a priest were to sinner is held to be a more excellent person.” be a fornicator, whereas he has taken the vow of chastity. I answer that, Sin is twofold. There is a sin which Fourthly, on account of the example or scandal; because, takes us unawares on account of the weakness of human as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 2): “Sin becomes much more nature: and such like sins are less imputable to one who scandalous, when the sinner is honored for his position”: is more virtuous, because he is less negligent in check- and the sins of the great are much more notorious and men ing those sins, which nevertheless human weakness does are wont to bear them with more indignation. not allow us to escape altogether. But there are other sins Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted alludes which proceed from deliberation: and these sins are all the to those things which are done negligently when we are more imputed to man according as he is more excellent. taken unawares through human weakness. Four reasons may be assigned for this. First, because a Reply to Objection 2. God does not respect persons more excellent person, e.g. one who excels in knowledge in punishing the great more severely, because their excel- and virtue, can more easily resist sin; hence Our Lord said lence conduces to the gravity of their sin, as stated. (Lk. 12:47) that the “servant who knew the will of his Reply to Objection 3. The man who excels in any- lord. . . and did it not. . . shall be beaten with many stripes.” thing reaps disadvantage, not from the good which he has, Secondly, on account of ingratitude, because every good but from his abuse thereof. 944 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 74 Of the Subject of Sin (In Ten Articles) We must now consider the subject of vice or sin: under which head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether the will can be the subject of sin? (2) Whether the will alone is the subject of sin? (3) Whether the sensuality can be the subject of sin? (4) Whether it can be the subject of mortal sin? (5) Whether the reason can be the subject of sin? (6) Whether morose delectation or non-morose delectation be subjected in the higher reason? (7) Whether the sin of consent in the act of sin is subjected in the higher reason? (8) Whether the lower reason can be the subject of mortal sin? (9) Whether the higher reason can be the subject of venial sin? (10) Whether there can be in the higher reason a venial sin directed to its proper object? Whether the will is a subject of sin? Ia IIae q. 74 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the will cannot be a matter, but remain in the agent, e.g. “to desire” and “to subject of sin. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that know”: and such are all moral acts, whether virtuous or “evil is outside the will and the intention.” But sin has the sinful. Consequently the proper subject of sin must needs character of evil. Therefore sin cannot be in the will. be the power which is the principle of the act. Now since Objection 2. Further, the will is directed either to the it is proper to moral acts that they are voluntary, as stated good or to what seems good. Now from the fact that will above (q. 1, a. 1 ; q. 18, a. 6), it follows that the will, which wishes the good, it does not sin: and that it wishes what is the principle of voluntary acts, both of good acts, and seems good but is not truly good, points to a defect in the of evil acts or sins, is the principle of sins. Therefore it apprehensive power rather than in the will. Therefore sin follows that sin is in the will as its subject. is nowise in the will. Reply to Objection 1. Evil is said to be outside the Objection 3. Further, the same thing cannot be both will, because the will does not tend to it under the aspect subject and efficient cause of sin: because “the efficient of evil. But since some evil is an apparent good, the will and the material cause do not coincide” (Phys. 2, text. sometimes desires an evil, and in this sense is in the will. 70). Now the will is the efficient cause of sin: because the Reply to Objection 2. If the defect in the apprehen- first cause of sinning is the will, as Augustine states (De sive power were nowise subject to the will, there would Duabus Anim. x, 10,11). Therefore it is not the subject of be no sin, either in the will, or in the apprehensive power, sin. as in the case of those whose ignorance is invincible. It On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that remains therefore that when there is in the apprehensive “it is by the will that we sin, and live righteously.” power a defect that is subject to the will, this defect also I answer that, Sin is an act, as stated above (q. 71, is deemed a sin. Aa. 1,6). Now some acts pass into external matter, e.g. Reply to Objection 3. This argument applies to those “to cut” and “to burn”: and such acts have for their matter efficient causes whose actions pass into external matter, and subject, the thing into which the action passes: thus and which do not move themselves, but move other things; the Philosopher states (Phys. iii, text. 18) that “movement the contrary of which is to be observed in the will; hence is the act of the thing moved, caused by a mover.” On the the argument does not prove. other hand, there are acts which do not pass into external Whether the will alone is the subject of sin? Ia IIae q. 74 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the will alone is the alone is the subject of sin. subject of sin. For Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, Objection 2. Further, sin is an evil contrary to reason. 10) that “no one sins except by the will.” Now the subject Now good and evil pertaining to reason are the object of of sin is the power by which we sin. Therefore the will the will alone. Therefore the will alone is the subject of 945 sin. also all those powers which can be moved to their acts, Objection 3. Further, every sin is a voluntary act, be- or restrained from their acts, by the will; and these same cause, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18)∗, “so true powers are the subjects of good and evil moral habits, be- is it that every sin is voluntary, that unless it be voluntary, cause act and habit belong to the same subject. it is no sin at all.” Now the acts of the other powers are Reply to Objection 1. We do not sin except by the not voluntary, except in so far as those powers are moved will as first mover; but we sin by the other powers as by the will; nor does this suffice for them to be the sub- moved by the will. ject of sin, because then even the external members of the Reply to Objection 2. Good and evil pertain to the body, which are moved by the will, would be a subject of will as its proper objects; but the other powers have cer- sin; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the will alone is tain determinate goods and evils, by reason of which they the subject of sin. can be the subject of virtue, vice, and sin, in so far as they On the contrary, Sin is contrary to virtue: and con- partake of will and reason. traries are about one same thing. But the other powers Reply to Objection 3. The members of the body are of the soul, besides the will, are the subject of virtues, as not principles but merely organs of action: wherefore they stated above (q. 56). Therefore the will is not the only are compared to the soul which moves them, as a slave subject of sin. who is moved but moves no other. On the other hand, I answer that, As was shown above (a. 1), whatever is the internal appetitive powers are compared to reason as the a principle of a voluntary act is a subject of sin. Now free agents, because they both act and are acted upon, as voluntary acts are not only those which are elicited by the is made clear in Polit. i, 3. Moreover, the acts of the ex- will, but also those which are commanded by the will, as ternal members are actions that pass into external matter, we stated above (q. 6, a. 4) in treating of voluntariness. as may be seen in the blow that is inflicted in the sin of Therefore not only the will can be a subject of sin, but murder. Consequently there is no comparison. Whether there can be sin in the sensuality? Ia IIae q. 74 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be sin found in any power whose act can be voluntary and in- in the sensuality. For sin is proper to man who is praised ordinate, wherein consists the nature of sin. Now it is or blamed for his actions. Now sensuality is common to evident that the act of the sensuality, or sensitive appetite, us and irrational animals. Therefore sin cannot be in the is naturally inclined to be moved by the will. Wherefore sensuality. it follows that sin can be in the sensuality. Objection 2. Further, “no man sins in what he cannot Reply to Objection 1. Although some of the powers avoid,” as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18). But of the sensitive part are common to us and irrational an- man cannot prevent the movement of the sensuality from imals, nevertheless, in us, they have a certain excellence being inordinate, since “the sensuality ever remains cor- through being united to the reason; thus we surpass other rupt, so long as we abide in this mortal life; wherefore animals in the sensitive part for as much as we have the it is signified by the serpent,” as Augustine declares (De powers of cogitation and reminiscence, as stated in the Ia, Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the inordinate movement of q. 78, a. 4. In the same way our sensitive appetite sur- the sensuality is not a sin. passes that of other animals by reason of a certain excel- Objection 3. Further, that which man himself does lence consisting in its natural aptitude to obey the reason; not do is not imputed to him as a sin. Now “that alone and in this respect it can be the principle of a voluntary do we seem to do ourselves, which we do with the delib- action, and, consequently, the subject of sin. eration of reason,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Reply to Objection 2. The continual corruption of the Therefore the movement of the sensuality, which is with- sensuality is to be understood as referring to the “fomes,” out the deliberation of reason, is not imputed to a man as which is never completely destroyed in this life, since, a sin. though the stain of original sin passes, its effect remains. On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 7:19): “The good However, this corruption of the “fomes” does not hinder which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I man from using his rational will to check individual in- do”: which words Augustine explains (Contra Julian. iii, ordinate movements, if he be presentient to them, for in- 26; De Verb. Apost. xii, 2,3), as referring to the evil of stance by turning his thoughts to other things. Yet while concupiscence, which is clearly a movement of the sensu- he is turning his thoughts to something else, an inordinate ality. Therefore there can be sin in the sensuality. movement may arise about this also: thus when a man, I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 2,3), sin may be in order to avoid the movements of concupiscence, turns ∗ Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv. 946 his thoughts away from carnal pleasures, to the considera-self what he does without the deliberation of reason, since tions of science, sometimes an unpremeditated movement the principal part of man does nothing therein: wherefore of vainglory will arise. Consequently, a man cannot avoid such is not perfectly a human act; and consequently it can- all such movements, on account of the aforesaid corrup- not be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but is something tion: but it is enough, for the conditions of a voluntary sin, imperfect of that kind. Therefore such movement of the that he be able to avoid each single one. sensuality as forestalls the reason, is a venial sin, which is Reply to Objection 3. Man does not do perfectly him- something imperfect in the genus of sin. Whether mortal sin can be in the sensuality? Ia IIae q. 74 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that mortal sin can be in the end. Wherefore mortal sin cannot be in the sensuality, the sensuality. Because an act is discerned by its object. but only in the reason. Now it is possible to commit a mortal sin about the objects Reply to Objection 1. The act of the sensuality can of the sensuality, e.g. about carnal pleasures. Therefore concur towards a mortal sin: yet the fact of its being a the act of the sensuality can be a mortal sin, so that mortal mortal sin is due, not to its being an act of the sensuality, sin can be found in the sensuality. but to its being an act of reason, to whom the ordering to Objection 2. Further, mortal sin is opposed to virtue. the end belongs. Consequently mortal sin is imputed, not But virtue can be in the sensuality; for temperance and to the sensuality, but to reason. fortitude are virtues of the irrational parts, as the Philoso- Reply to Objection 2. An act of virtue is perfected pher states (Ethic. iii, 10). Therefore, since it is natural to not only in that it is an act of the sensuality, but still more contraries to be about the same subject, sensuality can be in the fact of its being an act of reason and will, whose the subject of mortal sin. function it is to choose: for the act of moral virtue is not Objection 3. Further, venial sin is a disposition to without the exercise of choice: wherefore the act of moral mortal sin. Now disposition and habit are in the same sub- virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, is always ac- ject. Since therefore venial sin may be in the sensuality, companied by an act of prudence, which perfects the ra- as stated above (a. 3, ad 3), mortal sin can be there also. tional power; and the same applies to mortal sin, as stated On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 23): (ad 1). “The inordinate movement of concupiscence, which is the Reply to Objection 3. A disposition may be related sin of the sensuality, can even be in those who are in a in three ways to that to which it disposes: for sometimes it state of grace,” in whom, however, mortal sin is not to be is the same thing and is in the same subject; thus inchoate found. Therefore the inordinate movement of the sensual- science is a disposition to perfect science: sometimes it is ity is not a mortal sin. in the same subject, but is not the same thing; thus heat I answer that, Just as a disorder which destroys the is a disposition to the form of fire: sometimes it is neither principle of the body’s life causes the body’s death, so too the same thing, nor in the same subject, as in those things a disorder which destroys the principle of spiritual life, which are subordinate to one another in such a way that viz. the last end, causes spiritual death, which is mortal we can arrive at one through the other, e.g. goodness of sin, as stated above (q. 72, a. 5). Now it belongs to the the imagination is a disposition to science which is in the reason alone, and not to the sensuality, to order anything intellect. In this way the venial sin that is in the sensuality, to the end: and disorder in respect of the end can only be-may be a disposition to mortal sin, which is in the reason. long to the power whose function it is to order others to Whether sin can be in the reason? Ia IIae q. 74 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that sin cannot be in the things which are under our control. Now perfection and reason. For the sin of any power is a defect thereof. But defect of reason are not among those things which are un- the fault of the reason is not a sin, on the contrary, it ex- der our control: since by nature some are mentally defi- cuses sin: for a man is excused from sin on account of cient, and some shrewd-minded. Therefore no sin is in the ignorance. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason. reason. Objection 2. Further, the primary object of sin is the On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) will, as stated above (a. 1). Now reason precedes the will, that sin is in the lower and in the higher reason. since it directs it. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason. I answer that, The sin of any power is an act of that Objection 3. Further, there can be no sin except about power, as we have clearly shown (Aa. 1,2,3). Now rea- 947 son has a twofold act: one is its proper act in respect of thing which a man is able and ought to know, he is not its proper object, and this is the act of knowing the truth; altogether excused from sin, and the defect is imputed to the other is the act of reason as directing the other powers. him as a sin. The defect which belongs only to the act of Now in both of these ways there may be sin in the reason. directing the other powers, is always imputed to reason as First, in so far as it errs in the knowledge of truth, which a sin, because it can always obviate this defect by means error is imputed to the reason as a sin, when it is in ig- of its proper act. norance or error about what it is able and ought to know: Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 17, a. 1), secondly, when it either commands the inordinate move- when we were treating of the acts of the will and reason, ments of the lower powers, or deliberately fails to check the will moves and precedes the reason, in one way, and them. the reason moves and precedes the will in another: so that Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers the both the movement of the will can be called rational, and defect in the proper act of the reason in respect of its the act of the reason, voluntary. Accordingly sin is found proper object, and with regard to the case when it is a de- in the reason, either through being a voluntary defect of fect of knowledge about something which one is unable the reason, or through the reason being the principle of to know: for then this defect of reason is not a sin, and ex- the will’s act. cuses from sin, as is evident with regard to the actions of The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what madmen. If, however, the defect of reason be about some- has been said (ad 1). Whether the sin of morose delectation is in the reason? Ia IIae q. 74 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the sin of morose in directing the internal passions, sin is said to be in the delectation is not in the reason. For delectation denotes a reason, as also when it fails in directing external actions. movement of the appetitive power, as stated above (q. 31, Now it fails, in two ways, in directing internal passions: a. 1). But the appetitive power is distinct from the rea- first, when it commands unlawful passions; for instance, son, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore morose when a man deliberately provokes himself to a movement delectation is not in the reason. of anger, or of lust: secondly, when it fails to check the un- Objection 2. Further, the object shows to which lawful movement of a passion; for instance, when a man, power an act belongs, since it is through the act that the having deliberately considered that a rising movement of power is directed to its object. Now a morose delecta- passion is inordinate, continues, notwithstanding, to dwell tion is sometimes about sensible goods, and not about the [immoratur] upon it, and fails to drive it away. And in this goods of the reason. Therefore the sin of morose delecta- sense the sin of morose delectation is said to be in the tion is not in the reason. reason. Objection 3. Further, a thing is said to be morose∗ Reply to Objection 1. Delectation is indeed in the through taking a length of time. But length of time is no appetitive power as its proximate principle; but it is in the reason why an act should belong to a particular power. reason as its first mover, in accordance with what has been Therefore morose delectation does not belong to the rea- stated above (a. 1), viz. that actions which do not pass into son. external matter are subjected in their principles. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) Reply to Objection 2. Reason has its proper elicited that “if the consent to a sensual delectation goes no fur- act about its proper object; but it exercises the direction of ther than the mere thought of the pleasure, I deem this all the objects of those lower powers that can be directed to be like as though the woman alone had partaken of the by the reason: and accordingly delectation about sensible forbidden fruit.” Now “the woman” denotes the lower rea- objects comes also under the direction of reason. son, as he himself explains (De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore Reply to Objection 3. Delectation is said to be mo- the sin of morose delectation is in the reason. rose not from a delay of time, but because the reason in de- I answer that, As stated (a. 5), sin may be in the rea- liberating dwells [immoratur] thereon, and fails to drive it son, not only in respect of reason’s proper act, but some- away, “deliberately holding and turning over what should times in respect of its directing human actions. Now it have been cast aside as soon as it touched the mind,” as is evident that reason directs not only external acts, but Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12). also internal passions. Consequently when the reason fails ∗ From the Latin ‘mora’—delay 948 Whether the sin of consent to the act is in the higher reason? Ia IIae q. 74 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the sin of consent to naturally; and further still, from the rule of the Divine the act is not in the higher reason. For consent is an act of law, as stated above (q. 19, a. 4). Consequently, since the appetitive power, as stated above (q. 15, a. 1): whereas the rule of the Divine law is the higher rule, it follows the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore the sin of that the ultimate sentence, whereby the judgment is finally consent to the act is not in the higher reason. pronounced, belongs to the higher reason which is intent Objection 2. Further, “the higher reason is intent on on the eternal types. Now when judgment has to be pro- contemplating and consulting the eternal law,” as Augus- nounced on several points, the final judgment deals with tine states (De Trin. xii, 7).∗. But sometimes consent is that which comes last; and, in human acts, the action itself given to an act, without consulting the eternal law: since comes last, and the delectation which is the inducement to man does not always think about Divine things, whenever the action is a preamble thereto. Therefore the consent to he consents to an act. Therefore the sin of consent to the an action belongs properly to the higher reason, while the act is not always in the higher reason. preliminary judgment which is about the delectation be- Objection 3. Further, just as man can regulate his ex- longs to the lower reason, which delivers judgment in a ternal actions according to the eternal law, so can he regu- lower court: although the higher reason can also judge of late his internal pleasures or other passions. But “consent the delectation, since whatever is subject to the judgment to a pleasure without deciding to fulfil it by deed, belongs of the lower court, is subject also to the judgment of the to the lower reason,” as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, higher court, but not conversely. 2). Therefore the consent to a sinful act should also be Reply to Objection 1. Consent is an act of the appet- sometimes ascribed to the lower reason. itive power, not absolutely, but in consequence of an act Objection 4. Further, just as the higher reason excels of reason deliberating and judging, as stated above (q. 15, the lower, so does the reason excel the imagination. Now a. 3). Because the fact that the consent is finally given to sometimes man proceeds to act through the apprehension a thing is due to the fact that the will tends to that upon of the power of imagination, without any deliberation of which the reason has already passed its judgment. Hence his reason, as when, without premeditation, he moves his consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the reason. hand, or foot. Therefore sometimes also the lower reason Reply to Objection 2. The higher reason is said to may consent to a sinful act, independently of the higher consent, from the very fact that it fails to direct the human reason. act according to the Divine law, whether or not it advert On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): to the eternal law. For if it thinks of God’s law, it holds it “If the consent to the evil use of things that can be per- in actual contempt: and if not, it neglects it by a kind of ceived by the bodily senses, so far approves of any sin, as omission. Therefore the consent to a sinful act always pro- to point, if possible, to its consummation by deed, we are ceeds from the higher reason: because, as Augustine says to understand that the woman has offered the forbidden (De Trin. xii, 12), “the mind cannot effectively decide on fruit to her husband.” the commission of a sin, unless by its consent, whereby I answer that, Consent implies a judgment about the it wields its sovereign power of moving the members to thing to which consent is given. For just as the specula- action, or of restraining them from action, it become the tive reason judges and delivers its sentence about intel- servant or slave of the evil deed.” ligible matters, so the practical reason judges and pro- Reply to Objection 3. The higher reason, by con- nounces sentence on matters of action. Now we must sidering the eternal law, can direct or restrain the internal observe that in every case brought up for judgment, the delectation, even as it can direct or restrain the external final sentence belongs to the supreme court, even as we action: nevertheless, before the judgment of the higher see that in speculative matters the final sentence touch- reason is pronounced the lower reason, while deliberating ing any proposition is delivered by referring it to the first the matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes principles; since, so long as there remains a yet higher approves of this delectation: and then the consent to the principle, the question can yet be submitted to it: where- delectation belongs to the lower reason. If, however, af- fore the judgment is still in suspense, the final sentence ter considering the eternal law, man persists in giving the not being as yet pronounced. But it is evident that human same consent, such consent will then belong to the higher acts can be regulated by the rule of human reason, which reason. rule is derived from the created things that man knows Reply to Objection 4. The apprehension of the power ∗ ‘Rationes aeternae,’ cf. Ia, q. 15, Aa. 2,[3] where as in similar passages ‘ratio’ has been rendered by the English ‘type,’ because St. Thomas was speaking of the Divine ‘idea’ as the archetype of the creature. Hence the type or idea is a rule of conduct, and is identified with the eternal law, (cf. a. 8, obj. 1; a. 9) 949 of imagination is sudden and indeliberate: wherefore it reason can also deliberate; consequently, if by its deliber-can cause an act before the higher or lower reason has ation it does not check the sinful act, this will deservedly time to deliberate. But the judgment of the lower reason is by imputed to it. deliberate, and so requires time, during which the higher Whether consent to delectation is a mortal sin? Ia IIae q. 74 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that consent to delecta- sin is much less grievous than if it be decided to fulfil it by tion is not a mortal sin, for consent to delectation belongs deed: wherefore we ought to ask pardon for such thoughts to the lower reason, which does not consider the eternal also, and we should strike our breasts and say: ‘Forgive us types, i.e. the eternal law, and consequently does not turn our trespasses.’ ” Therefore consent to delectation is a ve- away from them. Now every mortal sin consists in turn- nial sin. ing away from Augustine’s definition of mortal sin, which On the contrary, Augustine adds after a few words: was quoted above (q. 71, a. 6). Therefore consent to delec- “Man will be altogether lost unless, through the grace tation is not a mortal sin. of the Mediator, he be forgiven those things which are Objection 2. Further, consent to a thing is not evil, un-deemed mere sins of thought, since without the will to do less the thing to which consent is given be evil. Now “the them, he desires nevertheless to enjoy them.” But no man cause of anything being such is yet more so,” or at any is lost except through mortal sin. Therefore consent to rate not less. Consequently the thing to which a man con- delectation is a mortal sin. sents cannot be a lesser evil than his consent. But delec- I answer that, There have been various opinions on tation without deed is not a mortal sin, but only a venial this point, for some have held that consent to delectation sin. Therefore neither is the consent to the delectation a is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin, while others have mortal sin. held it to be a mortal sin, and this opinion is more com- Objection 3. Further, delectations differ in goodness mon and more probable. For we must take note that since and malice, according to the difference of the deeds, as every delectation results from some action, as stated in the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 3,5). Now the inward Ethic. x, 4, and again, that since every delectation may be thought is one thing, and the outward deed, e.g. fornica- compared to two things, viz. to the operation from which tion, is another. Therefore the delectation consequent to it results, and to the object in which a person takes de- the act of inward thought, differs in goodness and malice light. Now it happens that an action, just as a thing, is from the pleasure of fornication, as much as the inward an object of delectation, because the action itself can be thought differs from the outward deed; and consequently considered as a good and an end, in which the person who there is a like difference of consent on either hand. But delights in it, rests. Sometimes the action itself, which re- the inward thought is not a mortal sin, nor is the consent sults in delectation, is the object of delectation, in so far to that thought: and therefore neither is the consent to the as the appetitive power, to which it belongs to take delight delectation. in anything, is brought to bear on the action itself as a Objection 4. Further, the external act of fornication or good: for instance, when a man thinks and delights in his adultery is a mortal sin, not by reason of the delectation, thought, in so far as his thought pleases him; while at other since this is found also in the marriage act, but by reason times the delight consequent to an action, e.g. a thought, of an inordinateness in the act itself. Now he that consents has for its object another action, as being the object of his to the delectation does not, for this reason, consent to the thought; and then his thought proceeds from the inclina- inordinateness of the act. Therefore he seems not to sin tion of the appetite, not indeed to the thought, but to the mortally. action thought of. Accordingly a man who is thinking of Objection 5. Further, the sin of murder is more fornication, may delight in either of two things: first, in grievous than simple fornication. Now it is not a mortal the thought itself, secondly, in the fornication thought of. sin to consent to the delectation resulting from the thought Now the delectation in the thought itself results from the of murder. Much less therefore is it a mortal sin to con- inclination of the appetite to the thought; and the thought sent to the delectation resulting from the thought of forni- itself is not in itself a mortal sin; sometimes indeed it is cation. only a venial sin, as when a man thinks of such a thing for Objection 6. Further, the Lord’s prayer is recited ev- no purpose; and sometimes it is no sin at all, as when a ery day for the remission of venial sins, as Augustine as- man has a purpose in thinking of it; for instance, he may serts (Enchiridion lxxviii). Now Augustine teaches that wish to preach or dispute about it. Consequently such af- consent to delectation may be driven away by means of fection or delectation in respect of the thought of fornica- the Lord’s Prayer: for he says (De Trin. xii, 12) that “this tion is not a mortal sin in virtue of its genus, but is some- 950 times a venial sin and sometimes no sin at all: wherefore Reply to Objection 2. Consent to a sin that is ve-neither is it a mortal sin to consent to such a thought. In nial in its genus, is itself a venial sin, and accordingly one this sense the first opinion is true. may conclude that the consent to take pleasure in a useless But that a man in thinking of fornication takes pleasure thought about fornication, is a venial sin. But delectation in the act thought of, is due to his desire being inclined to in the act itself of fornication is, in its genus, a mortal sin: this act. Wherefore the fact that a man consents to such and that it be a venial sin before the consent is given, is ac- a delectation, amounts to nothing less than a consent to cidental, viz. on account of the incompleteness of the act: the inclination of his appetite to fornication: for no man which incompleteness ceases when the deliberate consent takes pleasure except in that which is in conformity with has been given, so that therefore it has its complete nature his appetite. Now it is a mortal sin, if a man deliberately and is a mortal sin. chooses that his appetite be conformed to what is in itself Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the a mortal sin. Wherefore such a consent to delectation in delectation which has the thought for its object. a mortal sin, is itself a mortal sin, as the second opinion Reply to Objection 4. The delectation which has an maintains. external act for its object, cannot be without complacency Reply to Objection 1. Consent to delectation may be in the external act as such, even though there be no de- not only in the lower reason, but also in the higher rea- cision to fulfil it, on account of the prohibition of some son, as stated above (a. 7). Nevertheless the lower reason higher authority: wherefore the act is inordinate, and con- may turn away from the eternal types, for, though it is not sequently the delectation will be inordinate also. intent on them, as regulating according to them, which is Reply to Objection 5. The consent to delectation, re- proper to the higher reason, yet, it is intent on them, as sulting from complacency in an act of murder thought of, being regulated according to them: and by turning from is a mortal sin also: but not the consent to delectation re- them in this sense, it may sin mortally; since even the acts sulting from complacency in the thought of murder. of the lower powers and of the external members may be Reply to Objection 6. The Lord’s Prayer is to be said mortal sins, in so far as the direction of the higher reason in order that we may be preserved not only from venial fails in directing them according to the eternal types. sin, but also from mortal sin. Whether there can be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower powers? Ia IIae q. 74 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be ve- ing the eternal law”; it contemplates it by considering its nial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower pow- truth; it consults it by judging and directing other things ers, i.e. as consenting to a sinful act. For Augustine says according to it: and to this pertains the fact that by delib- (De Trin. xii, 7) that the “higher reason is intent on con- erating through the eternal types, it consents to an act or sidering and consulting the eternal law.” But mortal sin dissents from it. Now it may happen that the inordinate- consists in turning away from the eternal law. Therefore ness of the act to which it consents, is not contrary to the it seems that there can be no other than mortal sin in the eternal law, in the same way as mortal sin is, because it higher reason. does not imply aversion from the last end, but is beside Objection 2. Further, the higher reason is the princi- that law, as an act of venial sin is. Therefore when the ple of the spiritual life, as the heart is of the body’s life. higher reason consents to the act of a venial sin, it does But the diseases of the heart are deadly. Therefore the sins not turn away from the eternal law: wherefore it sins, not of the higher reason are mortal. mortally, but venially. Objection 3. Further, a venial sin becomes a mortal This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. sin if it be done out of contempt. But it would seem im- Reply to Objection 2. Disease of the heart is twofold: possible to commit even a venial sin, deliberately, with- one which is in the very substance of the heart, and affects out contempt. Since then the consent of the higher reason its natural consistency, and such a disease is always mor- is always accompanied by deliberate consideration of the tal: the other is a disease of the heart consisting in some eternal law, it seems that it cannot be without mortal sin, disorder either of the movement or of the parts surround- on account of the contempt of the Divine law. ing the heart, and such a disease is not always mortal. In On the contrary, Consent to a sinful act belongs to like manner there is mortal sin in the higher reason when- the higher reason, as stated above (a. 7). But consent to ever the order itself of the higher reason to its proper ob- an act of venial sin is itself a venial sin. Therefore a venial ject which is the eternal law, is destroyed; but when the sin can be in the higher reason. disorder leaves this untouched, the sin is not mortal but I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7), venial. the higher reason “is intent on contemplating or consult- Reply to Objection 3. Deliberate consent to a sin 951 does not always amount to contempt of the Divine law, but only when the sin is contrary to the Divine law. Whether venial sin can be in the higher reason as such? Ia IIae q. 74 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that venial sin cannot be in respect of simple intuition, it can have an inordinate in the higher reason as such, i.e. as considering the eternal movement about Divine things, as when a man suffers a law. For the act of a power is not found to fail except that sudden movement of unbelief. And although unbelief, in power be inordinately disposed with regard to its object. its genus, is a mortal sin, yet a sudden movement of un- Now the object of the higher reason is the eternal law, in belief is a venial sin, because there is no mortal sin unless respect of which there can be no disorder without mor- it be contrary to the law of God. Now it is possible for tal sin. Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher one of the articles of faith to present itself to the reason reason as such. suddenly under some other aspect, before the eternal law, Objection 2. Further, since the reason is a delibera- i.e. the law of God, is consulted, or can be consulted, on tive power, there can be no act of reason without delib- the matter; as, for instance, when a man suddenly appre- eration. Now every inordinate movement in things con- hends the resurrection of the dead as impossible naturally, cerning God, if it be deliberate, is a mortal sin. Therefore and rejects it, as soon as he had thus apprehended it, be- venial sin is never in the higher reason as such. fore he has had time to deliberate and consider that this Objection 3. Further, it happens sometimes that a sin is proposed to our belief in accordance with the Divine which takes us unawares, is a venial sin. Now a deliber- law. If, however, the movement of unbelief remains after ate sin is a mortal sin, through the reason, in deliberating, this deliberation, it is a mortal sin. Therefore, in sudden having recourse to some higher good, by acting against movements, the higher reason may sin venially in respect which, man sins more grievously; just as when the reason of its proper object, even if it be a mortal sin in its genus; in deliberating about an inordinate pleasurable act, con- or it may sin mortally in giving a deliberate consent; but in siders that it is contrary to the law of God, it sins more things pertaining to the lower powers, it always sins mor- grievously in consenting, than if it only considered that it tally, in things which are mortal sins in their genus, but is contrary to moral virtue. But the higher reason cannot not in those which are venial sins in their genus. have recourse to any higher tribunal than its own object. Reply to Objection 1. A sin which is against the eter- Therefore if a movement that takes us unawares is not a nal law, though it be mortal in its genus, may nevertheless mortal sin, neither will the subsequent deliberation make be venial, on account of the incompleteness of a sudden it a mortal sin; which is clearly false. Therefore there can action, as stated. be no venial sin in the higher reason as such. Reply to Objection 2. In matters of action, the simple On the contrary, A sudden movement of unbelief is intuition of the principles from which deliberation pro- a venial sin. But it belongs to the higher reason as such. ceeds, belongs to the reason, as well as the act of delib- Therefore there can be a venial sin in the higher reason as eration: even as in speculative matters it belongs to the such. reason both to syllogize and to form propositions: conse- I answer that, The higher reason regards its own ob- quently the reason also can have a sudden movement. ject otherwise than the objects of the lower powers that Reply to Objection 3. One and the same thing may are directed by the higher reason. For it does not regard be the subject of different considerations, of which one the objects of the lower powers, except in so far as it con- is higher than the other; thus the existence of God may sults the eternal law about them, and so it does not regard be considered, either as possible to be known by the hu- them save by way of deliberation. Now deliberate consent man reason, or as delivered to us by Divine revelation, to what is a mortal sin in its genus, is itself a mortal sin; which is a higher consideration. And therefore, although and consequently the higher reason always sins mortally, the object of the higher reason is, in its nature, something if the acts of the lower powers to which it consents are sublime, yet it is reducible to some yet higher considera- mortal sins. tion: and in this way, that which in the sudden movement With regard to its own object it has a twofold act, viz. was not a mortal sin, becomes a mortal sin in virtue of simple “intuition,” and “deliberation,” in respect of which the deliberation which brought it into the light of a higher it again consults the eternal law about its own object. But consideration, as was explained above. 952 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 75 Of the Causes of Sin, in General (In Four Articles) We must now consider the causes of sin: (1) in general; (2) in particular. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether sin has a cause? (2) Whether it has an internal cause? (3) Whether it has an external cause? (4) Whether one sin is the cause of another? Whether sin has a cause? Ia IIae q. 75 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that sin has no cause. For ficient cause. For that which naturally is and ought to be sin has the nature of evil, as stated above (q. 71, a. 6). in a thing, is never lacking except on account of some im- But evil has no cause, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). peding cause. And accordingly we are wont to say that Therefore sin has no cause. evil, which consists in a certain privation, has a deficient Objection 2. Further, a cause is that from which cause, or an accidental efficient cause. Now every acci- something follows of necessity. Now that which is of dental cause is reducible to the direct cause. Since then necessity, seems to be no sin, for every sin is voluntary. sin, on the part of its inordinateness, has an accidental ef- Therefore sin has no cause. ficient cause, and on the part of the act, a direct efficient Objection 3. Further, if sin has a cause, this cause is cause, it follows that the inordinateness of sin is a result either good or evil. It is not a good, because good pro- of the cause of the act. Accordingly then, the will lacking duces nothing but good, for “a good tree cannot bring the direction of the rule of reason and of the Divine law, forth evil fruit” (Mat. 7:18). Likewise neither can evil be and intent on some mutable good, causes the act of sin the cause of sin, because the evil of punishment is a sequel directly, and the inordinateness of the act, indirectly, and to sin, and the evil of guilt is the same as sin. Therefore beside the intention: for the lack of order in the act results sin has no cause. from the lack of direction in the will. On the contrary, Whatever is done has a cause, for, Reply to Objection 1. Sin signifies not only the pri- according to Job 5:6, “nothing upon earth is done with- vation of good, which privation is its inordinateness, but out a cause.” But sin is something done; since it a “word, also the act which is the subject of that privation, which deed, or desire contrary to the law of God.” Therefore sin has the nature of evil: and how this evil has a cause, has has a cause. been explained. I answer that, A sin is an inordinate act. Accordingly, Reply to Objection 2. If this definition is to be ver- so far as it is an act, it can have a direct cause, even as any ified in all cases, it must be understood as applying to a other act; but, so far as it is inordinate, it has a cause, in cause which is sufficient and not impeded. For it happens the same way as a negation or privation can have a cause. that a thing is the sufficient cause of something else, and Now two causes may be assigned to a negation: in the that the effect does not follow of necessity, on account of first place, absence of the cause of affirmation; i.e. the some supervening impediment: else it would follow that negation of the cause itself, is the cause of the negation all things happen of necessity, as is proved in Metaph. vi, in itself; since the result of the removing the cause is the text. 5. Accordingly, though sin has a cause, it does not removal of the effect: thus the absence of the sun is the follow that this is a necessary cause, since its effect can be cause of darkness. In the second place, the cause of an impeded. affirmation, of which a negation is a sequel, is the acci- Reply to Objection 3. As stated above, the will in dental cause of the resulting negation: thus fire by caus- failing to apply the rule of reason or of the Divine law, is ing heat in virtue of its principal tendency, consequently the cause of sin. Now the fact of not applying the rule of causes a privation of cold. The first of these suffices to reason or of the Divine law, has not in itself the nature of cause a simple negation. But, since the inordinateness of evil, whether of punishment or of guilt, before it is applied sin and of every evil is not a simple negation, but the pri- to the act. Wherefore accordingly, evil is not the cause of vation of that which something ought naturally to have, the first sin, but some good lacking some other good. such an inordinateness must needs have an accidental ef- 953 Whether sin has an internal cause? Ia IIae q. 75 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that sin has no internal of sin is some apparent good as motive, yet lacking the cause. For that which is within a thing is always in it. If due motive, viz. the rule of reason or the Divine law, this therefore sin had an internal cause, man would always be motive which is an apparent good, appertains to the appre- sinning, since given the cause, the effect follows. hension of the senses and to the appetite; while the lack of Objection 2. Further, a thing is not its own cause. But the due rule appertains to the reason, whose nature it is to the internal movements of a man are sins. Therefore they consider this rule; and the completeness of the voluntary are not the cause of sin. sinful act appertains to the will, so that the act of the will, Objection 3. Further, whatever is within man is either given the conditions we have just mentioned, is already a natural or voluntary. Now that which is natural cannot be sin. the cause of sin, for sin is contrary to nature, as Dama- Reply to Objection 1. That which is within a thing scene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 3; iv, 21); while that which as its natural power, is always in it: but that which is is voluntary, if it be inordinate, is already a sin. Therefore within it, as the internal act of the appetitive or apprehen- nothing intrinsic can be the cause of the first sin. sive power, is not always in it. Now the power of the will On the contrary, Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. is the potential cause of sin, but is made actual by the pre- x, 10,11; Retract. i, 9) that “the will is the cause of sin.” ceding movements, both of the sensitive part, in the first I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the direct cause place, and afterwards, of the reason. For it is because a of sin must be considered on the part of the act. Now we thing is proposed as appetible to the senses, and because may distinguish a twofold internal cause of human acts, the appetite is inclined, that the reason sometimes fails to one remote, the other proximate. The proximate internal consider the due rule, so that the will produces the act of cause of the human act is the reason and will, in respect of sin. Since therefore the movements that precede it are not which man has a free-will; while the remote cause is the always actual, neither is man always actually sinning. apprehension of the sensitive part, and also the sensitive Reply to Objection 2. It is not true that all the internal appetite. For just as it is due to the judgment of reason, acts belong to the substance of sin, for this consists prin- that the will is moved to something in accord with rea- cipally in the act of the will; but some precede and some son, so it is due to an apprehension of the senses that the follow the sin itself. sensitive appetite is inclined to something; which inclina- Reply to Objection 3. That which causes sin, as a tion sometimes influences the will and reason, as we shall power produces its act, is natural; and again, the move- explain further on (q. 77, a. 1). Accordingly a double in- ment of the sensitive part, from which sin follows, is natu- terior cause of sin may be assigned; one proximate, on the ral sometimes, as, for instance, when anyone sins through part of the reason and will; and the other remote, on the appetite for food. Yet sin results in being unnatural from part of the imagination or sensitive appetite. the very fact that the natural rule fails, which man, in ac- But since we have said above (a. 1, ad 3) that the cause cord with his nature, ought to observe. Whether sin has an external cause? Ia IIae q. 75 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that sin has no external On the contrary, It is written (Num. 21:16): “Are not cause. For sin is a voluntary act. Now voluntary acts be- these they, that deceived the children of Israel by the coun- long to principles that are within us, so that they have no sel of Balaam, and made you transgress against the Lord external cause. Therefore sin has no external cause. by the sin of Phogor?” Therefore something external can Objection 2. Further, as nature is an internal princi- be a cause of sin. ple, so is the will. Now in natural things sin can be due to I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), the internal no other than an internal cause; for instance, the birth of cause of sin is both the will, as completing the sinful act, a monster is due to the corruption of some internal prin- and the reason, as lacking the due rule, and the appetite, ciple. Therefore in the moral order, sin can arise from no as inclining to sin. Accordingly something external might other than an internal cause. Therefore it has no external be a cause of sin in three ways, either by moving the will cause. itself immediately, or by moving the reason, or by mov- Objection 3. Further, if the cause is multiplied, the ing the sensitive appetite. Now, as stated above (q. 9, a. 6; effect is multiplied. Now the more numerous and weighty q. 10, a. 4), none can move the will inwardly save God the external inducements to sin are, the less is a man’s in- alone, who cannot be a cause of sin, as we shall prove fur- ordinate act imputed to him as a sin. Therefore nothing ther on (q. 79, a. 1). Hence it follows that nothing external external is a cause of sin. can be a cause of sin, except by moving the reason, as a 954 man or devil by enticing to sin; or by moving the sensitive and necessarily, it follows that it remains in our power to appetite, as certain external sensibles move it. Yet neither sin or not to sin. does external enticement move the reason, of necessity, Reply to Objection 2. The fact that sin has an inter- in matters of action, nor do things proposed externally, of nal cause does not prevent its having an external cause; necessity move the sensitive appetite, except perhaps it be for nothing external is a cause of sin, except through the disposed thereto in a certain way; and even the sensitive medium of the internal cause, as stated. appetite does not, of necessity, move the reason and will. Reply to Objection 3. If the external causes inclining Therefore something external can be a cause moving to to sin be multiplied, the sinful acts are multiplied, because sin, but not so as to be a sufficient cause thereof: and the they incline to the sinful act in both greater numbers and will alone is the sufficient completive cause of sin being greater frequency. Nevertheless the character of guilt is accomplished. lessened, since this depends on the act being voluntary Reply to Objection 1. From the very fact that the ex- and in our power. ternal motive causes of sin do not lead to sin sufficiently Whether one sin is a cause of another? Ia IIae q. 75 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that one sin cannot be the first sin is the accidental cause of the second. Directly, cause of another. For there are four kinds of cause, none as when, by one sinful act, man is disposed to commit of which will fit in with one sin causing another. Because more readily another like act: because acts cause dispo- the end has the character of good; which is inconsistent sitions and habits inclining to like acts. Secondly, after with sin, which has the character of evil. In like manner the manner of a material cause, one sin is the cause of an- neither can a sin be an efficient cause, since “evil is not an other, by preparing its matter: thus covetousness prepares efficient cause, but is weak and powerless,” as Dionysius the matter for strife, which is often about the wealth a man declares (Div. Nom. iv). The material and formal cause has amassed together. Thirdly, after the manner of a final seems to have no place except in natural bodies, which are cause, one sin causes another, in so far as a man commits composed of matter and form. Therefore sin cannot have one sin for the sake of another which is his end; as when either a material or a formal cause. a man is guilty of simony for the end of ambition, or for- Objection 2. Further, “to produce its like belongs to a nication for the purpose of theft. And since the end gives perfect thing,” as stated in Meteor. iv, 2∗. But sin is essen- the form to moral matters, as stated above (q. 1, a. 3; q. 18, tially something imperfect. Therefore one sin cannot be a Aa. 4,6), it follows that one sin is also the formal cause of cause of another. another: because in the act of fornication committed for Objection 3. Further, if one sin is the cause of a sec- the purpose of theft, the former is material while the latter ond sin, in the same way, yet another sin will be the cause is formal. of the first, and thus we go on indefinitely, which is ab- Reply to Objection 1. Sin, in so far as it is inordinate, surd. Therefore one sin is not the cause of another. has the character of evil; but, in so far as it is an act, it On the contrary, Gregory says on Ezechiel (Hom. has some good, at least apparent, for its end: so that, as an xi): “A sin is not quickly blotted out by repentance, is act, but not as being inordinate, it can be the cause, both both a sin and a cause of sin.” final and efficient, of another sin. A sin has matter, not “of I answer that, Forasmuch as a sin has a cause on the which” but “about which” it is: and it has its form from part of the act of sin, it is possible for one sin to be the its end. Consequently one sin can be the cause of another, cause of another, in the same way as one human act is the in respect of the four kinds of cause, as stated above. cause of another. Hence it happens that one sin may be Reply to Objection 2. Sin is something imperfect on the cause of another in respect of the four kinds of causes. account of its moral imperfection on the part of its in- First, after the manner of an efficient or moving cause, ordinateness. Nevertheless, as an act it can have natural both directly and indirectly. Indirectly, as that which re- perfection: and thus it can be the cause of another sin. moves an impediment is called an indirect cause of move- Reply to Objection 3. Not every cause of one sin is ment: for when man, by one sinful act, loses grace, or another sin; so there is no need to go on indefinitely: for charity, or shame, or anything else that withdraws him one may come to one sin which is not caused by another from sin, he thereby falls into another sin, so that the sin. ∗ Cf. De Anima ii. 955 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 76 Of the Causes of Sin, in Particular (In Four Articles) We must now consider the causes of sin, in particular, and (1) The internal causes of sin; (2) its external causes; and (3) sins which are the causes of other sins. In view of what has been said above (a. 2), the first consideration will be threefold: so that in the first place we shall treat of ignorance, which is the cause of sin on the part of reason; secondly, of weakness or passion, which is the cause of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite; thirdly, of malice, which is the cause of sin on the part of the will. Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether ignorance is a cause of sin? (2) Whether ignorance is a sin? (3) Whether it excuses from sin altogether? (4) Whether it diminishes sin? Whether ignorance can be a cause of sin? Ia IIae q. 76 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that ignorance cannot be a practical syllogism is a singular proposition. But a sin- a cause of sin: because a non-being is not the cause of gular proposition does not follow from a universal propo- anything. Now ignorance is a non-being, since it is a pri- sition, except through the medium of a particular propo- vation of knowledge. Therefore ignorance is not a cause sition: thus a man is restrained from an act of parricide, of sin. by the knowledge that it is wrong to kill one’s father, and Objection 2. Further, causes of sin should be reck- that this man is his father. Hence ignorance about either oned in respect of sin being a “turning to” something, of these two propositions, viz. of the universal principle as was stated above (q. 75, a. 1). Now ignorance seems which is a rule of reason, or of the particular circumstance, to savor of “turning away” from something. Therefore it could cause an act of parricide. Hence it is clear that not should not be reckoned a cause of sin. every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone Objection 3. Further, every sin is seated in the will. which removes the knowledge which would prevent the Now the will does not turn to that which is not known, sinful act. Consequently if a man’s will be so disposed because its object is the good apprehended. Therefore ig- that he would not be restrained from the act of parricide, norance cannot be a cause of sin. even though he recognized his father, his ignorance about On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. his father is not the cause of his committing the sin, but is lxvii) “that some sin through ignorance.” concomitant with the sin: wherefore such a man sins, not I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Phys. “through ignorance” but “in ignorance,” as the Philoso- viii, 27) a moving cause is twofold, direct and indirect. A pher states (Ethic. iii, 1). direct cause is one that moves by its own power, as the Reply to Objection 1. Non-being cannot be the direct generator is the moving cause of heavy and light things. cause of anything: but it can be an accidental cause, as An indirect cause, is either one that removes an impedi- being the removal of an impediment. ment, or the removal itself of an impediment: and it is in Reply to Objection 2. As knowledge, which is re- this way that ignorance can be the cause of a sinful act; moved by ignorance, regards sin as turning towards some- because it is a privation of knowledge perfecting the rea- thing, so too, ignorance of this respect of a sin is the cause son that forbids the act of sin, in so far as it directs human of that sin, as removing its impediment. acts. Reply to Objection 3. The will cannot turn to that Now we must observe that the reason directs human which is absolutely unknown: but if something be known acts in accordance with a twofold knowledge, universal in one respect, and unknown in another, the will can will and particular: because in conferring about what is to be it. It is thus that ignorance is the cause of sin: for instance, done, it employs a syllogism, the conclusion of which is when a man knows that what he is killing is a man, but not an act of judgment, or of choice, or an operation. Now that it is his own father; or when one knows that a certain actions are about singulars: wherefore the conclusion of act is pleasurable, but not that it is a sin. 956 Whether ignorance is a sin? Ia IIae q. 76 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that ignorance is not a as the geometrical theorems, and contingent particulars, sin. For sin is “a word, deed or desire contrary to God’s except in some individual case. Now it is evident that law,” as stated above (q. 71, a. 5). Now ignorance does whoever neglects to have or do what he ought to have or not denote an act, either internal or external. Therefore do, commits a sin of omission. Wherefore through negli- ignorance is not a sin. gence, ignorance of what one is bound to know, is a sin; Objection 2. Further, sin is more directly opposed to whereas it is not imputed as a sin to man, if he fails to grace than to knowledge. Now privation of grace is not a know what he is unable to know. Consequently ignorance sin, but a punishment resulting from sin. Therefore igno- of such like things is called “invincible,” because it cannot rance which is privation of knowledge is not a sin. be overcome by study. For this reason such like ignorance, Objection 3. Further, if ignorance is a sin, this can not being voluntary, since it is not in our power to be rid only be in so far as it is voluntary. But if ignorance is of it, is not a sin: wherefore it is evident that no invincible a sin, through being voluntary, it seems that the sin will ignorance is a sin. On the other hand, vincible ignorance consist in the act itself of the will, rather than in the igno- is a sin, if it be about matters one is bound to know; but rance. Therefore the ignorance will not be a sin, but rather not, if it be about things one is not bound to know. a result of sin. Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 71, a. 6, ad Objection 4. Further, every sin is taken away by re- 1), when we say that sin is a “word, deed or desire,” we pentance, nor does any sin, except only original sin, pass include the opposite negations, by reason of which omis- as to guilt, yet remain in act. Now ignorance is not re- sions have the character of sin; so that negligence, in as moved by repentance, but remains in act, all its guilt being much as ignorance is a sin, is comprised in the above defi- removed by repentance. Therefore ignorance is not a sin, nition of sin; in so far as one omits to say what one ought, unless perchance it be original sin. or to do what one ought, or to desire what one ought, in Objection 5. Further, if ignorance be a sin, then a man order to acquire the knowledge which we ought to have. will be sinning, as long as he remains in ignorance. But ig- Reply to Objection 2. Although privation of grace is norance is continual in the one who is ignorant. Therefore not a sin in itself, yet by reason of negligence in preparing a person in ignorance would be continually sinning, which oneself for grace, it may have the character of sin, even is clearly false, else ignorance would be a most grievous as ignorance; nevertheless even here there is a difference, sin. Therefore ignorance is not a sin. since man can acquire knowledge by his acts, whereas On the contrary, Nothing but sin deserves punish- grace is not acquired by acts, but by God’s favor. ment. But ignorance deserves punishment, according to 1 Reply to Objection 3. Just as in a sin of transgres- Cor. 14:38: “If any man know not, he shall not be known.” sion, the sin consists not only in the act of the will, but Therefore ignorance is a sin. also in the act willed, which is commanded by the will; so I answer that, Ignorance differs from nescience, in a sin of omission not only the act of the will is a sin, in that nescience denotes mere absence of knowledge; but also the omission, in so far as it is in some way volun- wherefore whoever lacks knowledge about anything, can tary; and accordingly, the neglect to know, or even lack of be said to be nescient about it: in which sense Dionysius consideration is a sin. puts nescience in the angels (Coel. Hier. vii). On the other Reply to Objection 4. Although when the guilt has hand, ignorance denotes privation of knowledge, i.e. lack passed away through repentance, the ignorance remains, of knowledge of those things that one has a natural apti- according as it is a privation of knowledge, nevertheless tude to know. Some of these we are under an obligation to the negligence does not remain, by reason of which the know, those, to wit, without the knowledge of which we ignorance is said to be a sin. are unable to accomplish a due act rightly. Wherefore all Reply to Objection 5. Just as in other sins of omis- are bound in common to know the articles of faith, and the sion, man sins actually only at the time at which the af- universal principles of right, and each individual is bound firmative precept is binding, so is it with the sin of igno- to know matters regarding his duty or state. Meanwhile rance. For the ignorant man sins actually indeed, not con- there are other things which a man may have a natural ap- tinually, but only at the time for acquiring the knowledge titude to know, yet he is not bound to know them, such that he ought to have. 957 Whether ignorance excuses from sin altogether? Ia IIae q. 76 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that ignorance excuses which is not known. For ignorance excuses from sin, in from sin altogether. For as Augustine says (Retract. i, so far as something is not known to be a sin. Now it may 9), every sin is voluntary. Now ignorance causes involun- happen that a person ignores some circumstance of a sin, tariness, as stated above (q. 6, a. 8). Therefore ignorance the knowledge of which circumstance would prevent him excuses from sin altogether. from sinning, whether it belong to the substance of the Objection 2. Further, that which is done beside the sin, or not; and nevertheless his knowledge is sufficient intention, is done accidentally. Now the intention cannot for him to be aware that the act is sinful; for instance, if be about what is unknown. Therefore what a man does a man strike someone, knowing that it is a man (which through ignorance is accidental in human acts. But what suffices for it to be sinful) and yet be ignorant of the fact is accidental does not give the species. Therefore nothing that it is his father, (which is a circumstance constitut- that is done through ignorance in human acts, should be ing another species of sin); or, suppose that he is unaware deemed sinful or virtuous. that this man will defend himself and strike him back, and Objection 3. Further, man is the subject of virtue and that if he had known this, he would not have struck him sin, inasmuch as he is partaker of reason. Now ignorance (which does not affect the sinfulness of the act). Where- excludes knowledge which perfects the reason. Therefore fore, though this man sins through ignorance, yet he is ignorance excuses from sin altogether. not altogether excused, because, not withstanding, he has On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, knowledge of the sin. Secondly, this may happen on the 18) that “some things done through ignorance are rightly part of the ignorance itself, because, to wit, this ignorance reproved.” Now those things alone are rightly reproved is voluntary, either directly, as when a man wishes of set which are sins. Therefore some things done through ig- purpose to be ignorant of certain things that he may sin norance are sins. Therefore ignorance does not altogether the more freely; or indirectly, as when a man, through excuse from sin. stress of work or other occupations, neglects to acquire the I answer that, Ignorance, by its very nature, renders knowledge which would restrain him from sin. For such the act which it causes involuntary. Now it has already like negligence renders the ignorance itself voluntary and been stated (Aa. 1,2) that ignorance is said to cause the act sinful, provided it be about matters one is bound and able which the contrary knowledge would have prevented; so to know. Consequently this ignorance does not altogether that this act, if knowledge were to hand, would be contrary excuse from sin. If, however, the ignorance be such as to to the will, which is the meaning of the word involuntary. be entirely involuntary, either through being invincible, or If, however, the knowledge, which is removed by igno- through being of matters one is not bound to know, then rance, would not have prevented the act, on account of such like ignorance excuses from sin altogether. the inclination of the will thereto, the lack of this knowl- Reply to Objection 1. Not every ignorance causes in- edge does not make that man unwilling, but not willing, voluntariness, as stated above (q. 6, a. 8). Hence not every as stated in Ethic. iii, 1: and such like ignorance which is ignorance excuses from sin altogether. not the cause of the sinful act, as already stated, since it Reply to Objection 2. So far as voluntariness remains does not make the act to be involuntary, does not excuse in the ignorant person, the intention of sin remains in him: from sin. The same applies to any ignorance that does not so that, in this respect, his sin is not accidental. cause, but follows or accompanies the sinful act. Reply to Objection 3. If the ignorance be such as to On the other hand, ignorance which is the cause of exclude the use of reason entirely, it excuses from sin al- the act, since it makes it to be involuntary, of its very na- together, as is the case with madmen and imbeciles: but ture excuses from sin, because voluntariness is essential such is not always the ignorance that causes the sin; and to sin. But it may fail to excuse altogether from sin, and so it does not always excuse from sin altogether. this for two reasons. First, on the part of the thing itself Whether ignorance diminishes a sin? Ia IIae q. 76 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that ignorance does not Objection 2. Further, one sin added to another makes diminish a sin. For that which is common to all sins does a greater sin. But ignorance is itself a sin, as stated above not diminish sin. Now ignorance is common to all sins, (a. 2). Therefore it does not diminish a sin. for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that “every evil Objection 3. Further, the same thing does not both ag- man is ignorant.” Therefore ignorance does not diminish gravate and diminish sin. Now ignorance aggravates sin; sin. for Ambrose commenting on Rom. 2:4, “Knowest thou 958 not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to penance?” and indiscreet, and this ignorance diminishes voluntari- says: “Thy sin is most grievous if thou knowest not.” ness and consequently alleviates the sin. For when a thing Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin. is not known to be a sin, the will cannot be said to con- Objection 4. Further, if any kind of ignorance dimin- sent to the sin directly, but only accidentally; wherefore, ishes a sin, this would seem to be chiefly the case as re- in that case there is less contempt, and therefore less sin. gards the ignorance which removes the use of reason al- Reply to Objection 1. The ignorance whereby “every together. Now this kind of ignorance does not diminish evil man is ignorant,” is not the cause of sin being com- sin, but increases it: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, mitted, but something resulting from that cause, viz. of 5) that the “punishment is doubled for a drunken man.” the passion or habit inclining to sin. Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin. Reply to Objection 2. One sin is added to another On the contrary, Whatever is a reason for sin to be makes more sins, but it does not always make a sin greater, forgiven, diminishes sin. Now such is ignorance, as is since, perchance, the two sins do not coincide, but are sep- clear from 1 Tim. 1:13: “I obtained. . . mercy. . . because I arate. It may happen, if the first diminishes the second, did it ignorantly.” Therefore ignorance diminishes or alle- that the two together have not the same gravity as one of viates sin. them alone would have; thus murder is a more grievous I answer that, Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance sin if committed by a man when sober, than if committed can diminish sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntari- by a man when drunk, although in the latter case there are ness; and if it does not render it less voluntary, it nowise two sins: because drunkenness diminishes the sinfulness alleviates the sin. Now it is evident that the ignorance of the resulting sin more than its own gravity implies. which excuses from sin altogether (through making it al- Reply to Objection 3. The words of Ambrose may be together involuntary) does not diminish a sin, but does understood as referring to simply affected ignorance; or away with it altogether. On the other hand, ignorance they may have reference to a species of the sin of ingrati- which is not the cause of the sin being committed, but is tude, the highest degree of which is that man even ignores concomitant with it, neither diminishes nor increases the the benefits he has received; or again, they may be an al- sin. lusion to the ignorance of unbelief, which undermines the Therefore sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance, foundation of the spiritual edifice. but only by such as is a cause of the sin being commit- Reply to Objection 4. The drunken man deserves ted, and yet does not excuse from the sin altogether. Now a “double punishment” for the two sins which he com- it happens sometimes that such like ignorance is directly mits, viz. drunkenness, and the sin which results from and essentially voluntary, as when a man is purposely ig- his drunkenness: and yet drunkenness, on account of the norant that he may sin more freely, and ignorance of this ignorance connected therewith, diminishes the resulting kind seems rather to make the act more voluntary and sin, and more, perhaps, than the gravity of the drunken- more sinful, since it is through the will’s intention to sin ness implies, as stated above (ad 2). It might also be said that he is willing to bear the hurt of ignorance, for the that the words quoted refer to an ordinance of the legis- sake of freedom in sinning. Sometimes, however, the ig- lator named Pittacus, who ordered drunkards to be more norance which is the cause of a sin being committed, is not severely punished if they assaulted anyone; having an eye, directly voluntary, but indirectly or accidentally, as when a not to the indulgence which the drunkard might claim, but man is unwilling to work hard at his studies, the result be- to expediency, since more harm is done by the drunk than ing that he is ignorant, or as when a man willfully drinks by the sober, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii). too much wine, the result being that he becomes drunk 959 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 77 Of the Cause of Sin, On the Part of the Sensitive Appetite (In Eight Articles) We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of the sensitive appetite, as to whether a passion of the soul may be a cause of sin: and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether a passion of the sensitive appetite can move or incline the will? (2) Whether it can overcome the reason against the latter’s knowledge? (3) Whether a sin resulting from a passion is a sin of weakness? (4) Whether the passion of self-love is the cause of every sin? (5) Of three causes mentioned in 1 Jn. 2:16: “Concupiscence of the eyes, Concupiscence of the flesh,” and “Pride of life.” (6) Whether the passion which causes a sin diminishes it? (7) Whether passion excuses from sin altogether? (8) Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal? Whether the will is moved by a passion of the senstive appetite? Ia IIae q. 77 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not moved or is even altogether impeded, in its act, both because all by a passion of the sensitive appetite. For no passive energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the power is moved except by its object. Now the will is a contrary, through being centered on one thing, it is less power both passive and active, inasmuch as it is mover and able to be directed to several; and because, in the oper- moved, as the Philosopher says of the appetitive power in ations of the soul, a certain attention is requisite, and if general (De Anima iii, text. 54). Since therefore the ob- this be closely fixed on one thing, less attention is given ject of the will is not a passion of the sensitive appetite, to another. In this way, by a kind of distraction, when the but good defined by the reason, it seems that a passion of movement of the sensitive appetite is enforced in respect the sensitive appetite does not move the will. of any passion whatever, the proper movement of the ra- Objection 2. Further, the higher mover is not moved tional appetite or will must, of necessity, become remiss by the lower; thus the soul is not moved by the body. Now or altogether impeded. the will, which is the rational appetite, is compared to the Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will’s ob- sensitive appetite, as a higher mover to a lower: for the ject, which is good apprehended by reason. Because the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 57) that “the ratio- judgment and apprehension of reason is impeded on ac- nal appetite moves the sensitive appetite, even as, in the count of a vehement and inordinate apprehension of the heavenly bodies, one sphere moves another.” Therefore imagination and judgment of the estimative power, as ap- the will cannot be moved by a passion of the sensitive ap- pears in those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident petite. that the apprehension of the imagination and the judgment Objection 3. Further, nothing immaterial can be of the estimative power follow the passion of the sensi- moved by that which is material. Now the will is an im- tive appetite, even as the verdict of the taste follows the material power, because it does not use a corporeal organ, disposition of the tongue: for which reason we observe since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 42: that those who are in some kind of passion, do not easily whereas the sensitive appetite is a material force, since it turn their imagination away from the object of their emo- is seated in an organ of the body. Therefore a passion tion, the result being that the judgment of the reason often of the sensitive appetite cannot move the intellective ap- follows the passion of the sensitive appetite, and conse- petite. quently the will’s movement follows it also, since it has On the contrary, It is written (Dan. 13:56): “Lust a natural inclination always to follow the judgment of the hath perverted thy heart.” reason. I answer that, A passion of the sensitive appetite can- Reply to Objection 1. Although the passion of the not draw or move the will directly; but it can do so indi- sensitive appetite is not the direct object of the will, yet rectly, and this in two ways. First, by a kind of distraction: it occasions a certain change in the judgment about the because, since all the soul’s powers are rooted in the one object of the will, as stated. essence of the soul, it follows of necessity that, when one Reply to Objection 2. The higher mover is not di- power is intent in its act, another power becomes remiss, rectly moved by the lower; but, in a manner, it can be 960 moved by it indirectly, as stated. The Third Objection is solved in like manner. Whether the reason can be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge? Ia IIae q. 77 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the reason cannot be the law that is in the members is concupiscence, of which overcome by a passion, against its knowledge. For the he had been speaking previously. Since then concupis- stronger is not overcome by the weaker. Now knowledge, cence is a passion, it seems that a passion draws the reason on account of its certitude, is the strongest thing in us. counter to its knowledge. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a passion, which is I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, weak and soon passes away. 2), the opinion of Socrates was that knowledge can never Objection 2. Further, the will is not directed save to be overcome by passion; wherefore he held every virtue the good or the apparent good. Now when a passion draws to be a kind of knowledge, and every sin a kind of igno- the will to that which is really good, it does not influence rance. In this he was somewhat right, because, since the the reason against its knowledge; and when it draws it to object of the will is a good or an apparent good, it is never that which is good apparently, but not really, it draws it to moved to an evil, unless that which is not good appear that which appears good to the reason. But what appears good in some respect to the reason; so that the will would to the reason is in the knowledge of the reason. Therefore never tend to evil, unless there were ignorance or error in a passion never influences the reason against its knowl- the reason. Hence it is written (Prov. 14:22): “They err edge. that work evil.” Objection 3. Further, if it be said that it draws the Experience, however, shows that many act contrary to reason from its knowledge of something in general, to the knowledge that they have, and this is confirmed by form a contrary judgment about a particular matter—on Divine authority, according to the words of Lk. 12:47: the contrary, if a universal and a particular proposition be “The servant who knew that the will of his lord. . . and did opposed, they are opposed by contradiction, e.g. “Every not. . . shall be beaten with many stripes,” and of James man,” and “Not every man.” Now if two opinions con- 4:17: “To him. . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it tradict one another, they are contrary to one another, as not, to him it is a sin.” Consequently he was not altogether stated in Peri Herm. ii. If therefore anyone, while know- right, and it is necessary, with the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, ing something in general, were to pronounce an opposite 3) to make a distinction. Because, since man is directed judgment in a particular case, he would have two contrary to right action by a twofold knowledge, viz. universal and opinions at the same time, which is impossible. particular, a defect in either of them suffices to hinder the Objection 4. Further, whoever knows the universal, rectitude of the will and of the deed, as stated above (q. 76, knows also the particular which he knows to be contained a. 1). It may happen, then, that a man has some knowl- in the universal: thus who knows that every mule is ster- edge in general, e.g. that no fornication is lawful, and yet ile, knows that this particular animal is sterile, provided he does not know in particular that this act, which is forni- he knows it to be a mule, as is clear from Poster. i, text. cation, must not be done; and this suffices for the will not 2. Now he who knows something in general, e.g. that “no to follow the universal knowledge of the reason. Again, fornication is lawful,” knows this general proposition to it must be observed that nothing prevents a thing which is contain, for example, the particular proposition, “This is known habitually from not being considered actually: so an act of fornication.” Therefore it seems that his knowl- that it is possible for a man to have correct knowledge not edge extends to the particular. only in general but also in particular, and yet not to con- Objection 5. Further, according to the Philosopher sider his knowledge actually: and in such a case it does (Peri Herm. i), “words express the thoughts of the mind.” not seem difficult for a man to act counter to what he does Now it often happens that man, while in a state of pas- not actually consider. Now, that a man sometimes fails to sion, confesses that what he has chosen is an evil, even in consider in particular what he knows habitually, may hap- that particular case. Therefore he has knowledge, even in pen through mere lack of attention: for instance, a man particular. who knows geometry, may not attend to the consideration Therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the of geometrical conclusions, which he is ready to consider reason against its universal knowledge; because it is im- at any moment. Sometimes man fails to consider actually possible for it to have universal knowledge together with what he knows habitually, on account of some hindrance an opposite particular judgment. supervening, e.g. some external occupation, or some bod- On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): “I ily infirmity; and, in this way, a man who is in a state of see another law in my members, fighting against the law passion, fails to consider in particular what he knows in of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin.” Now general, in so far as the passions hinder him from consid- 961 ering it. Now it hinders him in three ways. First, by way of opinion about a particular negative proposition, or vice distraction, as explained above (a. 1). Secondly, by way of versa: but it may well happen that a man has true habitual opposition, because a passion often inclines to something knowledge about a universal affirmative proposition, and contrary to what man knows in general. Thirdly, by way actually a false opinion about a particular negative: be- of bodily transmutation, the result of which is that the rea- cause an act is directly opposed, not to a habit, but to an son is somehow fettered so as not to exercise its act freely; act. even as sleep or drunkenness, on account of some change Reply to Objection 4. He that has knowledge in a uni- wrought on the body, fetters the use of reason. That this versal, is hindered, on account of a passion, from reason- takes place in the passions is evident from the fact that ing about that universal, so as to draw the conclusion: but sometimes, when the passions are very intense, man loses he reasons about another universal proposition suggested the use of reason altogether: for many have gone out of by the inclination of the passion, and draws his conclusion their minds through excess of love or anger. It is in this accordingly. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) way that passion draws the reason to judge in particular, that the syllogism of an incontinent man has four propo- against the knowledge which it has in general. sitions, two particular and two universal, of which one is Reply to Objection 1. Universal knowledge, which is of the reason, e.g. No fornication is lawful, and the other, most certain, does not hold the foremost place in action, of passion, e.g. Pleasure is to be pursued. Hence pas- but rather particular knowledge, since actions are about sion fetters the reason, and hinders it from arguing and singulars: wherefore it is not astonishing that, in matters concluding under the first proposition; so that while the of action, passion acts counter to universal knowledge, if passions lasts, the reason argues and concludes under the the consideration of particular knowledge be lacking. second. Reply to Objection 2. The fact that something ap- Reply to Objection 5. Even as a drunken man some- pears good in particular to the reason, whereas it is not times gives utterance to words of deep signification, of good, is due to a passion: and yet this particular judgment which, however, he is incompetent to judge, his drunk- is contrary to the universal knowledge of the reason. enness hindering him; so that a man who is in a state of Reply to Objection 3. It is impossible for anyone to passion, may indeed say in words that he ought not to do have an actual knowledge or true opinion about a univer- so and so, yet his inner thought is that he must do it, as sal affirmative proposition, and at the same time a false stated in Ethic. vii, 3. Whether a sin committed through passion, should be called a sin of weakness? Ia IIae q. 77 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that a sin committed other name for disease. Therefore a sin that arises from through passion should not be called a sin of weakness. passion should be called a sin of weakness. For a passion is a vehement movement of the sensitive I answer that, The cause of sin is on the part of the appetite, as stated above (a. 1). Now vehemence of move- soul, in which, chiefly, sin resides. Now weakness may be ments is evidence of strength rather than of weakness. applied to the soul by way of likeness to weakness of the Therefore a sin committed through passion, should not be body. Accordingly, man’s body is said to be weak, when called a sin of weakness. it is disabled or hindered in the execution of its proper ac- Objection 2. Further, weakness in man regards that tion, through some disorder of the body’s parts, so that which is most fragile in him. Now this is the flesh; whence the humors and members of the human body cease to be it is written (Ps. 77:39): “He remembered that they are subject to its governing and motive power. Hence a mem- flesh.” Therefore sins of weakness should be those which ber is said to be weak, when it cannot do the work of a result from bodily defects, rather than those which are due healthy member, the eye, for instance, when it cannot see to a passion. clearly, as the Philosopher states (De Hist. Animal. x, Objection 3. Further, man does not seem to be weak 1). Therefore weakness of the soul is when the soul is in respect of things which are subject to his will. Now it is hindered from fulfilling its proper action on account of a subject to man’s will, whether he do or do not the things disorder in its parts. Now as the parts of the body are said to which his passions incline him, according to Gn. 4:7: to be out of order, when they fail to comply with the or- “Thy appetite shall be under thee∗, and thou shalt have do- der of nature, so too the parts of the soul are said to be minion over it.” Therefore sin committed through passion inordinate, when they are not subject to the order of rea- is not a sin of weakness. son, for the reason is the ruling power of the soul’s parts. On the contrary, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) calls Accordingly, when the concupiscible or irascible power is the passions diseases of the soul. Now weakness is an- affected by any passion contrary to the order of reason, ∗ Vulg.: ‘The lust thereof shall be under thee.’ 962 the result being that an impediment arises in the aforesaid tion, and yet be hindered by a passion, as stated above manner to the due action of man, it is said to be a sin of (a. 1). Hence when we speak of sins of weakness, we re- weakness. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares fer to weakness of soul rather than of body. And yet even the incontinent man to an epileptic, whose limbs move in weakness of soul is called weakness of the flesh, in so far a manner contrary to his intention. as it is owing to a condition of the flesh that the passions Reply to Objection 1. Just as in the body the stronger of the soul arise in us through the sensitive appetite being the movement against the order of nature, the greater the a power using a corporeal organ. weakness, so likewise, the stronger the movement of pas- Reply to Objection 3. It is in the will’s power to give sion against the order of reason, the greater the weakness or refuse its consent to what passion inclines us to do, and of the soul. it is in this sense that our appetite is said to be under us; Reply to Objection 2. Sin consists chiefly in an act of and yet this consent or dissent of the will is hindered in the will, which is not hindered by weakness of the body: the way already explained (a. 1). for he that is weak in body may have a will ready for ac- Whether self-love is the source of every sin? Ia IIae q. 77 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that self-love is not the and direct cause of sin is to be considered on the part of source of every sin. For that which is good and right in the adherence to a mutable good; in which respect every itself is not the proper cause of sin. Now love of self is sinful act proceeds from inordinate desire for some tem- a good and right thing in itself: wherefore man is com- poral good. Now the fact that anyone desires a temporal manded to love his neighbor as himself (Lev. 19:18). good inordinately, is due to the fact that he loves him- Therefore self-love cannot be the proper cause of sin. self inordinately; for to wish anyone some good is to love Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 7:8): him. Therefore it is evident that inordinate love of self is “Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me the cause of every sin. all manner of concupiscence”; on which words a gloss Reply to Objection 1. Well ordered self-love, says that “the law is good, since by forbidding concupis- whereby man desires a fitting good for himself, is right cence, it forbids all evils,” the reason for which is that and natural; but it is inordinate self-love, leading to con- concupiscence is the cause of every sin. Now concupis- tempt of God, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) reck- cence is a distinct passion from love, as stated above (q. 3, ons to be the cause of sin. a. 2; q. 23, a. 4). Therefore self-love is not the cause of Reply to Objection 2. Concupiscence, whereby a every sin. man desires good for himself, is reduced to self-love as Objection 3. Further, Augustine in commenting on to its cause, as stated. Ps. 79:17, “Things set on fire and dug down,” says that Reply to Objection 3. Man is said to love both the “every sin is due either to love arousing us to undue ardor good he desires for himself, and himself to whom he de- or to fear inducing false humility.” Therefore self-love is sires it. Love, in so far as it is directed to the object of not the only cause of sin. desire (e.g. a man is said to love wine or money) ad- Objection 4. Further, as man sins at times through mits, as its cause, fear which pertains to avoidance of evil: inordinate love of self, so does he sometimes through in- for every sin arises either from inordinate desire for some ordinate love of his neighbor. Therefore self-love is not good, or from inordinate avoidance of some evil. But each the cause of every sin. of these is reduced to self-love, since it is through loving On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, himself that man either desires good things, or avoids evil 28) that “self-love, amounting to contempt of God, builds things. up the city of Babylon.” Now every sin makes man a citi- Reply to Objection 4. A friend is like another self zen of Babylon. Therefore self-love is the cause of every (Ethic. ix): wherefore the sin which is committed through sin. love for a friend, seems to be committed through self-love. I answer that, As stated above (q. 75, a. 1), the proper Whether concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life are Ia IIae q. 77 a. 5 fittingly described as causes of sin? Objection 1. It would seem that “concupiscence of unfittingly described as causes of sin. Because, accord- the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life” are ing to the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:10), “covetousness∗ is the ∗ Douay: ‘The desire of money’ 963 root of all evils.” Now pride of life is not included in cov-concupiscence, and is directed to those things which do etousness. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the not afford sustentation or pleasure in respect of the fleshly causes of sin. senses, but are delectable in respect of the apprehension Objection 2. Further, concupiscence of the flesh is or imagination, or some similar mode of perception; such aroused chiefly by what is seen by the eyes, according are money, apparel, and the like; and this spiritual con- to Dan. 13:56: “Beauty hath deceived thee.” Therefore cupiscence is called “concupiscence of the eyes,” whether concupiscence of the eyes should not be condivided with this be taken as referring to the sight itself, of which the concupiscence of the flesh. eyes are the organ, so as to denote curiosity according to Objection 3. Further, concupiscence is desire for Augustine’s exposition (Confess. x); or to the concupis- pleasure, as stated above (q. 30, a. 2). Now objects of cence of things which are proposed outwardly to the eyes, pleasure are perceived not only by the sight, but also by so as to denote covetousness, according to the explanation the other senses. Therefore “concupiscence of the hear- of others. ing” and of the other senses should also have been men- The inordinate appetite of the arduous good pertains tioned. to the “pride of life”; for pride is the inordinate appetite Objection 4. Further, just as man is induced to sin, of excellence, as we shall state further on (q. 84, a. 2; IIa through inordinate desire of good things, so is he also, IIae, q. 162, a. 1). through inordinate avoidance of evil things, as stated It is therefore evident that all passions that are a cause above (a. 4, ad 3). But nothing is mentioned here per- of sin can be reduced to these three: since all the passions taining to avoidance of evil. Therefore the causes of sin of the concupiscible part can be reduced to the first two, are insufficiently described. and all the irascible passions to the third, which is not di- On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 2:16): “All that vided into two because all the irascible passions conform is in the world is concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: to spiritual concupiscence. ‘and’] pride of life.” Now a thing is said to be “in the Reply to Objection 1. “Pride of life” is included in world” by reason of sin: wherefore it is written (1 Jn. covetousness according as the latter denotes any kind of 5:19): “The whole world is seated in wickedness.” There- appetite for any kind of good. How covetousness, as a fore these three are causes of sin. special vice, which goes by the name of “avarice,” is the I answer that, As stated above (a. 4), inordinate self- root of all sins, shall be explained further on (q. 84, a. 1). love is the cause of every sin. Now self-love includes inor- Reply to Objection 2. “Concupiscence of the eyes” dinate desire of good: for a man desires good for the one does not mean here the concupiscence for all things which he loves. Hence it is evident that inordinate desire of good can be seen by the eyes, but only for such things as afford, is the cause of every sin. Now good is, in two ways, the not carnal pleasure in respect of touch, but in respect of object of the sensitive appetite, wherein are the passions the eyes, i.e. of any apprehensive power. which are the cause of sin: first, absolutely, according as Reply to Objection 3. The sense of sight is the most it is the object of the concupiscible part; secondly, under excellent of all the senses, and covers a larger ground, as the aspect of difficulty, according as it is the object of the stated in Metaph. i: and so its name is transferred to all irascible part, as stated above (q. 23, a. 1). Again, con- the other senses, and even to the inner apprehensions, as cupiscence is twofold, as stated above (q. 30, a. 3). One Augustine states (De Verb. Dom., serm. xxxiii). is natural, and is directed to those things which sustain Reply to Objection 4. Avoidance of evil is caused by the nature of the body, whether as regards the preserva- the appetite for good, as stated above (q. 25, a. 2; q. 39, tion of the individual, such as food, drink, and the like, a. 2); and so those passions alone are mentioned which or as regards the preservation of the species, such as sex- incline to good, as being the causes of those which cause ual matters: and the inordinate appetite of such things is inordinately the avoidance of evil. called “concupiscence of the flesh.” The other is spiritual Whether sin is alleviated on account of a passion? Ia IIae q. 77 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that sin is not alleviated Objection 2. Further, a good passion stands in the on account of passion. For increase of cause adds to the same relation to merit, as an evil passion does to sin. Now effect: thus if a hot thing causes something to melt, a hot- a good passion increases merit: for a man seems to merit ter will do so yet more. Now passion is a cause of sin, as the more, according as he is moved by a greater pity to stated (a. 5). Therefore the more intense the passion, the help a poor man. Therefore an evil passion also increases greater the sin. Therefore passion does not diminish sin, rather than diminishes a sin. but increases it. Objection 3. Further, a man seems to sin the more 964 grievously, according as he sins with a more intense will. of a passion, the more is it voluntary and under our con- But the passion that impels the will makes it tend with trol. In this respect passion diminishes sin, in so far as it greater intensity to the sinful act. Therefore passion ag- diminishes its voluntariness. gravates a sin. On the other hand, a consequent passion does not di- On the contrary, The passion of concupiscence is minish a sin, but increases it; or rather it is a sign of its called a temptation of the flesh. But the greater the temp- gravity, in so far, to wit, as it shows the intensity of the tation that overcomes a man, the less grievous his sin, as will towards the sinful act; and so it is true that the greater Augustine states (De Civ. Dei iv, 12). the pleasure or the concupiscence with which anyone sins, I answer that, Sin consists essentially in an act of the the greater the sin. free will, which is a faculty of the will and reason; while Reply to Objection 1. Passion is the cause of sin on passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite. Now the part of that to which the sinner turns. But the grav- the sensitive appetite can be related to the free-will, an- ity of a sin is measured on the part of that from which he tecedently and consequently: antecedently, according as turns, which results accidentally from his turning to some- a passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines the thing else—accidentally, i.e. beside his intention. Now an reason or will, as stated above (Aa. 1,2; q. 10, a. 3); and effect is increased by the increase, not of its accidental consequently, in so far as the movements of the higher cause, but of its direct cause. powers redound on to the lower, since it is not possible Reply to Objection 2. A good passion consequent to for the will to be moved to anything intensely, without a the judgment of reason increases merit; but if it precede, passion being aroused in the sensitive appetite. so that a man is moved to do well, rather by his passion Accordingly if we take passion as preceding the sinful than by the judgment of his reason, such a passion dimin- act, it must needs diminish the sin: because the act is a sin ishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his action. in so far as it is voluntary, and under our control. Now a Reply to Objection 3. Although the movement of the thing is said to be under our control, through the reason will incited by the passion is more intense, yet it is not so and will: and therefore the more the reason and will do much the will’s own movement, as if it were moved to sin anything of their own accord, and not through the impulse by the reason alone. Whether passion excuses from sin altogether? Ia IIae q. 77 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that passion excuses from it entirely excuses from sin; otherwise, it does not excuse sin altogether. For whatever causes an act to be involun- entirely. In this matter two points apparently should be tary, excuses from sin altogether. But concupiscence of observed: first, that a thing may be voluntary either “in the flesh, which is a passion, makes an act to be involun- itself,” as when the will tends towards it directly; or “in tary, according to Gal. 5:17: “The flesh lusteth against its cause,” when the will tends towards that cause and not the spirit. . . so that you do not the things that you would.” towards the effect; as is the case with one who wilfully Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether. gets drunk, for in that case he is considered to do volun- Objection 2. Further, passion causes a certain igno- tarily whatever he does through being drunk. Secondly, rance of a particular matter, as stated above (a. 2; q. 76, we must observe that a thing is said to be voluntary “di- a. 3). But ignorance of a particular matter excuses from rectly” or “indirectly”; directly, if the will tends towards sin altogether, as stated above (q. 6, a. 8). Therefore pas- it; indirectly, if the will could have prevented it, but did sion excuses from sin altogether. not. Objection 3. Further, disease of the soul is graver Accordingly therefore we must make a distinction: be- than disease of the body. But bodily disease excuses from cause a passion is sometimes so strong as to take away sin altogether, as in the case of mad people. Much more, the use of reason altogether, as in the case of those who therefore, does passion, which is a disease of the soul. are mad through love or anger; and then if such a passion On the contrary, The Apostle (Rom. 7:5) speaks of were voluntary from the beginning, the act is reckoned a the passions as “passions of sins,” for no other reason than sin, because it is voluntary in its cause, as we have stated that they cause sin: which would not be the case if they with regard to drunkenness. If, however, the cause be not excused from sin altogether. Therefore passion does not voluntary but natural, for instance, if anyone through sick- excuse from sin altogether. ness or some such cause fall into such a passion as de- I answer that, An act which, in its genus, is evil, can- prives him of the use of reason, his act is rendered wholly not be excused from sin altogether, unless it be rendered involuntary, and he is entirely excused from sin. Some- altogether involuntary. Consequently, if the passion be times, however, the passion is not such as to take away such that it renders the subsequent act wholly involuntary, the use of reason altogether; and then reason can drive 965 the passion away, by turning to other thoughts, or it can of their concupiscence. prevent it from having its full effect; since the members Reply to Objection 2. The particular ignorance which are not put to work, except by the consent of reason, as excuses altogether, is ignorance of a circumstance, which stated above (q. 17, a. 9): wherefore such a passion does a man is unable to know even after taking due precautions. not excuse from sin altogether. But passion causes ignorance of law in a particular case, Reply to Objection 1. The words, “So that you do not by preventing universal knowledge from being applied to the things that you would” are not to be referred to out- a particular act, which passion the reason is able to drive ward deeds, but to the inner movement of concupiscence; away, as stated. for a man would wish never to desire evil, in which sense Reply to Objection 3. Bodily disease is involuntary: we are to understand the words of Rom. 7:19: “The evil there would be a comparison, however, if it were volun- which I will not, that I do.” Or again they may be referred tary, as we have stated about drunkenness, which is a kind to the will as preceding the passion, as is the case with the of bodily disease. incontinent, who act counter to their resolution on account Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal? Ia IIae q. 77 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that sin committed movements. Now when anyone proceeds from passion to through passion cannot be mortal. Because venial sin a sinful act, or to a deliberate consent, this does not hap- is condivided with mortal sin. Now sin committed from pen suddenly: and so the deliberating reason can come weakness is venial, since it has in itself a motive for par- to the rescue here, since it can drive the passion away, or don [venia]. Since therefore sin committed through pas- at least prevent it from having its effect, as stated above: sion is a sin of weakness, it seems that it cannot be mortal. wherefore if it does not come to the rescue, there is a mor- Objection 2. Further, the cause is more powerful than tal sin; and it is thus, as we see, that many murders and its effect. But passion cannot be a mortal sin, for there adulteries are committed through passion. is no mortal sin in the sensuality, as stated above (q. 74, Reply to Objection 1. A sin may be venial in three a. 4). Therefore a sin committed through passion cannot ways. First, through its cause, i.e. through having cause be mortal. to be forgiven, which cause lessens the sin; thus a sin Objection 3. Further, passion is a hindrance to rea- that is committed through weakness or ignorance is said son, as explained above (Aa. 1,2). Now it belongs to the to be venial. Secondly, through its issue; thus every sin, reason to turn to God, or to turn away from Him, which through repentance, becomes venial, i.e. receives pardon is the essence of a mortal sin. Therefore a sin committed [veniam]. Thirdly, by its genus, e.g. an idle word. This is through passion cannot be mortal. the only kind of venial sin that is opposed to mortal sin: On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:5) that whereas the objection regards the first kind. “the passions of the sins. . . work [Vulg.: ‘did work’] in Reply to Objection 2. Passion causes sin as regards our members to bring forth fruit unto death.” Now it is the adherence to something. But that this be a mortal sin proper to mortal sin to bring forth fruit unto death. There- regards the aversion, which follows accidentally from the fore sin committed through passion may be mortal. adherence, as stated above (a. 6, ad 1): hence the argu- I answer that, Mortal sin, as stated above (q. 72, a. 5), ment does not prove. consists in turning away from our last end which is God, Reply to Objection 3. Passion does not always hin- which aversion pertains to the deliberating reason, whose der the act of reason altogether: consequently the reason function it is also to direct towards the end. Therefore remains in possession of its free-will, so as to turn away that which is contrary to the last end can happen not to from God, or turn to Him. If, however, the use of reason be a mortal sin, only when the deliberating reason is un- be taken away altogether, the sin is no longer either mortal able to come to the rescue, which is the case in sudden or venial. 966 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 78 Of That Cause of Sin Which Is Malice (In Four Articles) We must now consider the cause of sin on the part of the will, viz. malice: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is possible for anyone to sin through certain malice, i.e. purposely? (2) Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice? (3) Whether every one that sins through certain malice, sins through habit? (4) Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice, than through passion? Whether anyone sins through certain malice? Ia IIae q. 78 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that no one sins pur- the loss of a limb, that he may save his life which he loves posely, or through certain malice. Because ignorance is more. Accordingly when an inordinate will loves some opposed to purpose or certain malice. Now “every evil temporal good, e.g. riches or pleasure, more than the or- man is ignorant,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, der of reason or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some 1); and it is written (Prov. 14:22): “They err that work such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss evil.” Therefore no one sins through certain malice. of some spiritual good, so that it may obtain possession Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) of some temporal good. Now evil is merely the privation that “no one works intending evil.” Now to sin through of some good; and so a man wishes knowingly a spiritual malice seems to denote the intention of doing evil∗ in sin- evil, which is evil simply, whereby he is deprived of a spir- ning, because an act is not denominated from that which itual good, in order to possess a temporal good: wherefore is unintentional and accidental. Therefore no one sins he is said to sin through certain malice or on purpose, be- through malice. cause he chooses evil knowingly. Objection 3. Further, malice itself is a sin. If there- Reply to Objection 1. Ignorance sometimes excludes fore malice is a cause of sin, it follows that sin goes on the simple knowledge that a particular action is evil, and causing sin indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore no then man is said to sin through ignorance: sometimes it one sins through malice. excludes the knowledge that a particular action is evil at On the contrary, It is written (Job 34:27): ”[Who] this particular moment, as when he sins through passion: as it were on purpose have revolted from God [Vulg.: and sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particu- ‘Him’], and would not understand all His ways.” Now to lar evil is not to be suffered for the sake of possessing a revolt from God is to sin. Therefore some sin purposely particular good, but not the simple knowledge that it is an or through certain malice. evil: it is thus that a man is ignorant, when he sins through I answer that, Man like any other being has naturally certain malice. an appetite for the good; and so if his appetite incline away Reply to Objection 2. Evil cannot be intended by to evil, this is due to corruption or disorder in some one of anyone for its own sake; but it can be intended for the the principles of man: for it is thus that sin occurs in the sake of avoiding another evil, or obtaining another good, actions of natural things. Now the principles of human as stated above: and in this case anyone would choose to acts are the intellect, and the appetite, both rational (i.e. obtain a good intended for its own sake, without suffering the will) and sensitive. Therefore even as sin occurs in loss of the other good; even as a lustful man would wish human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect, to enjoy a pleasure without offending God; but with the as when anyone sins through ignorance, and sometimes two set before him to choose from, he prefers sinning and through a defect in the sensitive appetite, as when anyone thereby incurring God’s anger, to being deprived of the sins through passion, so too does it occur through a defect pleasure. consisting in a disorder of the will. Now the will is out Reply to Objection 3. The malice through which any- of order when it loves more the lesser good. Again, the one sins, may be taken to denote habitual malice, in the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to sense in which the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1) calls an evil suffer some hurt in its regard, in order to obtain a good that habit by the name of malice, just as a good habit is called one loves more: as when a man, even knowingly, suffers virtue: and in this way anyone is said to sin through mal- ∗ Alluding to the derivation of “malitia” (malice) from “malum” (evil) 967 ice when he sins through the inclination of a habit. It may pugns the grace of his brother through envy. Nor does this also denote actual malice, whether by malice we mean the imply that a thing is its own cause: for the interior act is choice itself of evil (and thus anyone is said to sin through the cause of the exterior act, and one sin is the cause of an- malice, in so far as he sins through making a choice of other; not indefinitely, however, since we can trace it back evil), or whether by malice we mean some previous fault to some previous sin, which is not caused by any previous that gives rise to a subsequent fault, as when anyone im- sin, as was explained above (q. 75, a. 4, ad 3). Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice? Ia IIae q. 78 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that not every one who remains unimpaired, the result being that a sinner does sins through habit, sins through certain malice. Because some works which are generically good; so too it may sin committed through certain malice, seems to be most happen sometimes that one who has a vicious habit, acts, grievous. Now it happens sometimes that a man commits not from that habit, but through the uprising of a passion, a slight sin through habit, as when he utters an idle word. or again through ignorance. But whenever he uses the Therefore sin committed from habit is not always com- vicious habit he must needs sin through certain malice: mitted through certain malice. because to anyone that has a habit, whatever is befitting to Objection 2. Further, “Acts proceeding from habits him in respect of that habit, has the aspect of something are like the acts by which those habits were formed” lovable, since it thereby becomes, in a way, connatural to (Ethic. ii, 1,2). But the acts which precede a vicious habit him, according as custom and habit are a second nature. are not committed through certain malice. Therefore the Now the very thing which befits a man in respect of a vi- sins that arise from habit are not committed through cer- cious habit, is something that excludes a spiritual good: tain malice. the result being that a man chooses a spiritual evil, that he Objection 3. Further, when a man commits a sin may obtain possession of what befits him in respect of that through certain malice, he is glad after having done it, habit: and this is to sin through certain malice. Wherefore according to Prov. 2:14: “Who are glad when they have it is evident that whoever sins through habit, sins through done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things”: and this, certain malice. because it is pleasant to obtain what we desire, and to Reply to Objection 1. Venial sin does not exclude do those actions which are connatural to us by reason of spiritual good, consisting in the grace of God or charity. habit. But those who sin through habit, are sorrowful after Wherefore it is an evil, not simply, but in a relative sense: committing a sin: because “bad men,” i.e. those who have and for that reason the habit thereof is not a simple but a a vicious habit, “are full of remorse” (Ethic. ix, 4). There- relative evil. fore sins that arise from habit are not committed through Reply to Objection 2. Acts proceeding from habits certain malice. are of like species as the acts from which those habits On the contrary, A sin committed through certain were formed: but they differ from them as perfect from malice is one that is done through choice of evil. Now imperfect. Such is the difference between sin committed we make choice of those things to which we are inclined through certain malice and sin committed through pas- by habit, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2 with regard to virtuous sion. habits. Therefore a sin that arises from habit is committed Reply to Objection 3. He that sins through habit is through certain malice. always glad for what he does through habit, as long as he I answer that, There is a difference between a sin uses the habit. But since he is able not to use the habit, and committed by one who has the habit, and a sin com- to think of something else, by means of his reason, which mitted by habit: for it is not necessary to use a habit, is not altogether corrupted, it may happen that while not since it is subject to the will of the person who has that using the habit he is sorry for what he has done through habit. Hence habit is defined as being “something we use the habit. And so it often happens that such a man is sorry when we will,” as stated above (q. 50, a. 1). And thus, for his sin not because sin in itself is displeasing to him, even as it may happen that one who has a vicious habit but on account of his reaping some disadvantage from the may break forth into a virtuous act, because a bad habit sin. does not corrupt reason altogether, something of which 968 Whether one who sins through certain malice, sins through habit? Ia IIae q. 78 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that whoever sins through amounts to a sin through certain malice; for then alone certain malice, sins through habit. For the Philosopher does anyone sin through certain malice, when his will is says (Ethic. v, 9) that “an unjust action is not done as moved to evil of its own accord. This may happen in two an unjust man does it,” i.e. through choice, “unless it be ways. First, through his having a corrupt disposition in- done through habit.” Now to sin through certain malice clining him to evil, so that, in respect of that disposition, is to sin through making a choice of evil, as stated above some evil is, as it were, suitable and similar to him; and to (a. 1). Therefore no one sins through certain malice, un- this thing, by reason of its suitableness, the will tends, as less he has the habit of sin. to something good, because everything tends, of its own Objection 2. Further, Origen says (Peri Archon iii) accord, to that which is suitable to it. Moreover this cor- that “a man is not suddenly ruined and lost, but must needs rupt disposition is either a habit acquired by custom, or a fall away little by little.” But the greatest fall seems to be sickly condition on the part of the body, as in the case of a that of the man who sins through certain malice. There- man who is naturally inclined to certain sins, by reason of fore a man comes to sin through certain malice, not from some natural corruption in himself. Secondly, the will, of the outset, but from inveterate custom, which may engen- its own accord, may tend to an evil, through the removal der a habit. of some obstacle: for instance, if a man be prevented from Objection 3. Further, whenever a man sins through sinning, not through sin being in itself displeasing to him, certain malice, his will must needs be inclined of itself to but through hope of eternal life, or fear of hell, if hope the evil he chooses. But by the nature of that power man is give place to despair, or fear to presumption, he will end inclined, not to evil but to good. Therefore if he chooses in sinning through certain malice, being freed from the evil, this must be due to something supervening, which is bridle, as it were. passion or habit. Now when a man sins through passion, It is evident, therefore, that sin committed through cer- he sins not through certain malice, but through weakness, tain malice, always presupposes some inordinateness in as stated (q. 77, a. 3). Therefore whenever anyone sins man, which, however, is not always a habit: so that it does through certain malice, he sins through habit. not follow of necessity, if a man sins through certain mal- On the contrary, The good habit stands in the same ice, that he sins through habit. relation to the choice of something good, as the bad habit Reply to Objection 1. To do an action as an unjust to the choice of something evil. But it happens sometimes man does, may be not only to do unjust things through cer- that a man, without having the habit of a virtue, chooses tain malice, but also to do them with pleasure, and without that which is good according to that virtue. Therefore any notable resistance on the part of reason, and this oc- sometimes also a man, without having the habit of a vice, curs only in one who has a habit. may choose evil, which is to sin through certain malice. Reply to Objection 2. It is true that a man does not I answer that, The will is related differently to good fall suddenly into sin from certain malice, and that some- and to evil. Because from the very nature of the power, thing is presupposed; but this something is not always a it is inclined to the rational good, as its proper object; habit, as stated above. wherefore every sin is said to be contrary to nature. Reply to Objection 3. That which inclines the will Hence, if a will be inclined, by its choice, to some evil, to evil, is not always a habit or a passion, but at times this must be occasioned by something else. Sometimes, in is something else. Moreover, there is no comparison be- fact, this is occasioned through some defect in the reason, tween choosing good and choosing evil: because evil is as when anyone sins through ignorance; and sometimes never without some good of nature, whereas good can be this arises through the impulse of the sensitive appetite, as perfect without the evil of fault. when anyone sins through passion. Yet neither of these Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion? Ia IIae q. 78 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not more Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) is ignorance of principle, for grievous to sin through certain malice than through pas- he has a false estimation of the end, which is the princi- sion. Because ignorance excuses from sin either alto- ple in matters of action. Therefore there is more excuse gether or in part. Now ignorance is greater in one who for one who sins through certain malice, than for one who sins through certain malice, than in one who sins through sins through passion. passion; since he that sins through certain malice suffers Objection 2. Further, the more a man is impelled to from the worst form of ignorance, which according to the sin, the less grievous his sin, as is clear with regard to a 969 man who is thrown headlong into sin by a more impetuous nent quality, so that he who sins through malice, abides passion. Now he that sins through certain malice, is im- longer in his sin. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. pelled by habit, the impulse of which is stronger than that vii, 8) compares the intemperate man, who sins through of passion. Therefore to sin through habit is less grievous malice, to a sick man who suffers from a chronic disease, than to sin through passion. while he compares the incontinent man, who sins through Objection 3. Further, to sin through certain malice is passion, to one who suffers intermittently. Thirdly, be- to sin through choosing evil. Now he that sins through cause he who sins through certain malice is ill-disposed passion, also chooses evil. Therefore he does not sin less in respect of the end itself, which is the principle in mat- than the man who sins through certain malice. ters of action; and so the defect is more dangerous than On the contrary, A sin that is committed on purpose, in the case of the man who sins through passion, whose for this very reason deserves heavier punishment, accord- purpose tends to a good end, although this purpose is in- ing to Job 34:26: “He hath struck them as being wicked, terrupted on account of the passion, for the time being. in open sight, who, as it were, on purpose, have revolted Now the worst of all defects is defect of principle. There- from Him.” Now punishment is not increased except for a fore it is evident that a sin committed through malice is graver fault. Therefore a sin is aggravated through being more grievous than one committed through passion. done on purpose, i.e. through certain malice. Reply to Objection 1. Ignorance of choice, to which I answer that, A sin committed through malice is the objection refers, neither excuses nor diminishes a sin, more grievous than a sin committed through passion, for as stated above (q. 76, a. 4). Therefore neither does a three reasons. First, because, as sin consists chiefly in an greater ignorance of the kind make a sin to be less grave. act of the will, it follows that, other things being equal, a Reply to Objection 2. The impulse due to passion, sin is all the more grievous, according as the movement of is, as it were, due to a defect which is outside the will: the sin belongs more to the will. Now when a sin is com- whereas, by a habit, the will is inclined from within. mitted through malice, the movement of sin belongs more Hence the comparison fails. to the will, which is then moved to evil of its own accord, Reply to Objection 3. It is one thing to sin while than when a sin is committed through passion, when the choosing, and another to sin through choosing. For he that will is impelled to sin by something extrinsic, as it were. sins through passion, sins while choosing, but not through Wherefore a sin is aggravated by the very fact that it is choosing, because his choosing is not for him the first committed through certain malice, and so much the more, principle of his sin; for he is induced through the passion, as the malice is greater; whereas it is diminished by being to choose what he would not choose, were it not for the committed through passion, and so much the more, as the passion. On the other hand, he that sins through certain passion is stronger. Secondly, because the passion which malice, chooses evil of his own accord, in the way already incites the will to sin, soon passes away, so that man re- explained (Aa. 2,3), so that his choosing, of which he has pents of his sin, and soon returns to his good intentions; full control, is the principle of his sin: and for this reason whereas the habit, through which a man sins, is a perma- he is said to sin “through” choosing. 970 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 79 Of the External Causes of Sin (In Four Articles) We must now consider the external causes of sin, and (1) on the part of God; (2) on the part of the devil; (3) on the part of man. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is a cause of sin? (2) Whether the act of sin is from God? (3) Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart? (4) Whether these things are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded or hardened? Whether God is a cause of sin? Ia IIae q. 79 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that God is a cause of (Ezech. 3:18) it is said to the watchman: “If thou say not sin. For the Apostle says of certain ones (Rom. 1:28): to the wicked: ‘Thou shalt surely die’∗. . . I will require “God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those his blood at thy hand.” Now God cannot be directly the things which are not right [Douay: ‘convenient’],” and cause of sin, either in Himself or in another, since every a gloss comments on this by saying that “God works in sin is a departure from the order which is to God as the men’s hearts, by inclining their wills to whatever He wills, end: whereas God inclines and turns all things to Himself whether to good or to evil.” Now sin consists in doing as to their last end, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i): what is not right, and in having a will inclined to evil. so that it is impossible that He should be either to Him- Therefore God is to man a cause of sin. self or to another the cause of departing from the order Objection 2. Further, it is written (Wis. 14:11): “The which is to Himself. Therefore He cannot be directly the creatures of God are turned to an abomination; and a cause of sin. In like manner neither can He cause sin in- temptation to the souls of men.” But a temptation usu- directly. For it happens that God does not give some the ally denotes a provocation to sin. Since therefore crea- assistance, whereby they may avoid sin, which assistance tures were made by God alone, as was established in the were He to give, they would not sin. But He does all this Ia, q. 44, a. 1, it seems that God is a cause of sin, by pro- according to the order of His wisdom and justice, since voking man to sin. He Himself is Wisdom and Justice: so that if someone sin Objection 3. Further, the cause of the cause is the it is not imputable to Him as though He were the cause of cause of the effect. Now God is the cause of the free-will, that sin; even as a pilot is not said to cause the wrecking of which itself is the cause of sin. Therefore God is the cause the ship, through not steering the ship, unless he cease to of sin. steer while able and bound to steer. It is therefore evident Objection 4. Further, every evil is opposed to good. that God is nowise a cause of sin. But it is not contrary to God’s goodness that He should Reply to Objection 1. As to the words of the Apos- cause the evil of punishment; since of this evil it is written tle, the solution is clear from the text. For if God delivered (Is. 45:7) that God creates evil, and (Amos 3:6): “Shall some up to a reprobate sense, it follows that they already there be evil in the city which God [Vulg.: ‘the Lord’] hath had a reprobate sense, so as to do what was not right. not done?” Therefore it is not incompatible with God’s Accordingly He is said to deliver them up to a reprobate goodness that He should cause the evil of fault. sense, in so far as He does not hinder them from follow- On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 11:25): ing that reprobate sense, even as we are said to expose a “Thou. . . hatest none of the things which Thou hast person to danger if we do not protect him. The saying of made.” Now God hates sin, according to Wis. 14:9: “To Augustine (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. xxi, whence the gloss God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful.” There- quoted is taken) to the effect that “God inclines men’s fore God is not a cause of sin. wills to good and evil,” is to be understood as meaning I answer that, Man is, in two ways, a cause either that He inclines the will directly to good; and to evil, in so of his own or of another’s sin. First, directly, namely be far as He does not hinder it, as stated above. And yet even inclining his or another’s will to sin; secondly, indirectly, this is due as being deserved through a previous sin. namely be not preventing someone from sinning. Hence Reply to Objection 2. When it is said the “creatures ∗ Vulg.: “If, when I say to the wicked, ‘Thou shalt surely die,’ thou declare it not to him.” 971 of God are turned ‘to’ an abomination, and a temptation the order of the first cause, it is not reduced to that first to the souls of men,” the preposition “to” does not denote cause: thus if a servant do anything contrary to his mas- causality but sequel†; for God did not make the creatures ter’s orders, it is not ascribed to the master as though he that they might be an evil to man; this was the result of were the cause thereof. In like manner sin, which the free- man’s folly, wherefore the text goes on to say, “and a snare will commits against the commandment of God, is not at- to the feet of the unwise,” who, to wit, in their folly, use tributed to God as being its cause. creatures for a purpose other than that for which they were Reply to Objection 4. Punishment is opposed to the made. good of the person punished, who is thereby deprived of Reply to Objection 3. The effect which proceeds some good or other: but fault is opposed to the good of from the middle cause, according as it is subordinate to subordination to God; and so it is directly opposed to the the first cause, is reduced to that first cause; but if it pro- Divine goodness; consequently there is no comparison be- ceed from the middle cause, according as it goes outside tween fault and punishment. Whether the act of sin is from God? Ia IIae q. 79 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the act of sin is not is an action. But sin denotes a being and an action with from God. For Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that a defect: and this defect is from the created cause, viz. “the act of sin is not a thing.” Now whatever is from God the free-will, as falling away from the order of the First is a thing. Therefore the act of sin is not from God. Agent, viz. God. Consequently this defect is not reduced Objection 2. Further, man is not said to be the cause to God as its cause, but to the free-will: even as the defect of sin, except because he is the cause of the sinful act: for of limping is reduced to a crooked leg as its cause, but not “no one works, intending evil,” as Dionysius states (Div. to the motive power, which nevertheless causes whatever Nom. iv). Now God is not a cause of sin, as stated above there is of movement in the limping. Accordingly God is (a. 1). Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin. the cause of the act of sin: and yet He is not the cause of Objection 3. Further, some actions are evil and sinful sin, because He does not cause the act to have a defect. in their species, as was shown above (q. 18, Aa. 2,8). Now Reply to Objection 1. In this passage Augustine calls whatever is the cause of a thing, causes whatever belongs by the name of “thing,” that which is a thing simply, viz. to it in respect of its species. If therefore God caused the substance; for in this sense the act of sin is not a thing. act of sin, He would be the cause of sin, which is false, as Reply to Objection 2. Not only the act, but also the was proved above (a. 1). Therefore God is not the cause defect, is reduced to man as its cause, which defect con- of the act of sin. sists in man not being subject to Whom he ought to be, On the contrary, The act of sin is a movement of although he does not intend this principally. Wherefore the free-will. Now “the will of God is the cause of ev- man is the cause of the sin: while God is the cause of the ery movement,” as Augustine declares (De Trin. iii, 4,9). act, in such a way, that nowise is He the cause of the de- Therefore God’s will is the cause of the act of sin. fect accompanying the act, so that He is not the cause of I answer that, The act of sin is both a being and an the sin. act; and in both respects it is from God. Because every Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 72, a. 1), being, whatever the mode of its being, must be derived acts and habits do not take their species from the priva- from the First Being, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. tion itself, wherein consists the nature of evil, but from v). Again every action is caused by something existing some object, to which that privation is united: and so this in act, since nothing produces an action save in so far as defect which consists in not being from God, belongs to it is in act; and every being in act is reduced to the First the species of the act consequently, and not as a specific Act, viz. God, as to its cause, Who is act by His Essence. difference. Therefore God is the cause of every action, in so far as it † This is made clear by the Douay Version: the Latin “factae sunt in abominationem” admits of the translation “were made to be an abomination,” which might imply causality. 972 Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart? Ia IIae q. 79 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that God is not the cause sal cause of the enlightening of bodies, though not in the of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. For Augus- same way; for the sun enlightens by necessity of nature, tine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 3) that God is not the cause of whereas God works freely, through the order of His wis- that which makes man worse. Now man is made worse dom. Now although the sun, so far as it is concerned, en- by spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. Therefore lightens all bodies, yet if it be encountered by an obstacle God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of in a body, it leaves it in darkness, as happens to a house heart. whose window-shutters are closed, although the sun is in Objection 2. Further, Fulgentius says (De Dupl. no way the cause of the house being darkened, since it Praedest. i, 19): “God does not punish what He causes.” does not act of its own accord in failing to light up the Now God punishes the hardened heart, according to Ec- interior of the house; and the cause of this is the person clus. 3:27: “A hard heart shall fear evil at the last.” There- who closed the shutters. On the other hand, God, of His fore God is not the cause of hardness of heart. own accord, withholds His grace from those in whom He Objection 3. Further, the same effect is not put down finds an obstacle: so that the cause of grace being with- to contrary causes. But the cause of spiritual blindness is held is not only the man who raises an obstacle to grace; said to be the malice of man, according to Wis. 2:21: “For but God, Who, of His own accord, withholds His grace. In their own malice blinded them,” and again, according to 2 this way, God is the cause of spiritual blindness, deafness Cor. 4:4: “The god of this world hath blinded the minds of ear, and hardness of heart. of unbelievers”: which causes seem to be opposed to God. These differ from one another in respect of the effects Therefore God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and of grace, which both perfects the intellect by the gift of hardness of heart. wisdom, and softens the affections by the fire of charity. On the contrary, It is written (Is. 6:10): “Blind the And since two of the senses excel in rendering service to heart of this people, and make their ears heavy,” and Rom. the intellect, viz. sight and hearing, of which the former 9:18: “He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He assists “discovery,” and the latter, “teaching,” hence it is will He hardeneth.” that spiritual “blindness” corresponds to sight, “heaviness I answer that, Spiritual blindness and hardness of of the ears” to hearing, and “hardness of heart” to the af- heart imply two things. One is the movement of the hu- fections. man mind in cleaving to evil, and turning away from the Reply to Objection 1. Blindness and hardhearted- Divine light; and as regards this, God is not the cause ness, as regards the withholding of grace, are punish- of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart, just as He is ments, and therefore, in this respect, they make man no not the cause of sin. The other thing is the withdrawal of worse. It is because he is already worsened by sin that he grace, the result of which is that the mind is not enlight- incurs them, even as other punishments. ened by God to see aright, and man’s heart is not softened Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers hard- to live aright; and as regards this God is the cause of spir- heartedness in so far as it is a sin. itual blindness and hardness of heart. Reply to Objection 3. Malice is the demeritorious Now we must consider that God is the universal cause cause of blindness, just as sin is the cause of punishment: of the enlightening of souls, according to Jn. 1:9: “That and in this way too, the devil is said to blind, in so far as was the true light which enlighteneth every man that he induces man to sin. cometh into this world,” even as the sun is the univer- Whether blindness and hardness of heart are directed to the salvation of those who Ia IIae q. 79 a. 4 are blinded and hardened? Objection 1. It would seem that blindness and hard- ness of heart, as stated above (a. 3). Therefore they are di- ness of heart are always directed to the salvation of rected to the salvation of those who are blinded and hard- those who are blinded and hardened. For Augustine ened. says (Enchiridion xi) that “as God is supremely good, He Objection 2. Further, it is written (Wis. 1:13) that would nowise allow evil to be done, unless He could draw “God hath no pleasure in the destruction of the ungodly∗.” some good from every evil.” Much more, therefore, does Now He would seem to take pleasure in their destruction, He direct to some good, the evil of which He Himself is if He did not turn their blindness to their profit: just as the cause. Now God is the cause of blindness and hard- a physician would seem to take pleasure in torturing the ∗ Vulg.: ‘God made not death, neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living.’ 973 invalid, if he did not intend to heal the invalid when he spiritual welfare of those who are blinded. This mercy, prescribes a bitter medicine for him. Therefore God turns however, is not vouchsafed to all those who are blinded, blindness to the profit of those who are blinded. but only to the predestinated, to whom “all things work Objection 3. Further, “God is not a respecter of per- together unto good” (Rom. 8:28). Therefore as regards sons” (Acts 10:34). Now He directs the blinding of some, some, blindness is directed to their healing; but as regards to their salvation, as in the case of some of the Jews, who others, to their damnation; as Augustine says (De Quaest. were blinded so as not to believe in Christ, and, through Evang. iii). not believing, to slay Him, and afterwards were seized Reply to Objection 1. Every evil that God does, or with compunction, and converted, as related by Augustine permits to be done, is directed to some good; yet not al- (De Quaest. Evang. iii). Therefore God turns all blind- ways to the good of those in whom the evil is, but some- ness to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded. times to the good of others, or of the whole universe: thus Objection 4. On the other hand, according to Rom. He directs the sin of tyrants to the good of the martyrs, 3:8, evil should not be done, that good may ensue. Now and the punishment of the lost to the glory of His justice. blindness is an evil. Therefore God does not blind some Reply to Objection 2. God does not take pleasure in for the sake of their welfare. the loss of man, as regards the loss itself, but by reason of I answer that, Blindness is a kind of preamble to sin. His justice, or of the good that ensues from the loss. Now sin has a twofold relation—to one thing directly, Reply to Objection 3. That God directs the blindness viz. to the sinner’s damnation—to another, by reason of of some to their spiritual welfare, is due to His mercy; but God’s mercy or providence, viz. that the sinner may be that the blindness of others is directed to their loss is due healed, in so far as God permits some to fall into sin, that to His justice: and that He vouchsafes His mercy to some, by acknowledging their sin, they may be humbled and and not to all, does not make God a respecter of persons, converted, as Augustine states (De Nat. et Grat. xxii). as explained in the Ia, q. 23, a. 5, ad 3. Therefore blindness, of its very nature, is directed to the Reply to Objection 4. Evil of fault must not be done, damnation of those who are blinded; for which reason it that good may ensue; but evil of punishment must be in- is accounted an effect of reprobation. But, through God’s flicted for the sake of good. mercy, temporary blindness is directed medicinally to the 974 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 80 Of the Cause of Sin, As Regards the Devil (In Four Articles) We must now consider the cause of sin, as regards the devil; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the devil is directly the cause of sin? (2) Whether the devil induces us to sin, by persuading us inwardly? (3) Whether he can make us sin of necessity? (4) Whether all sins are due to the devil’s suggestion? Whether the devil is directly the cause of man’s sinning? Ia IIae q. 80 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the devil is directly follows that in this respect, a man’s will alone is directly the cause of man’s sinning. For sin consists directly in an the cause of his sin. act of the appetite. Now Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 12) As regards the object, a thing may be understood as that “the devil inspires his friends with evil desires”; and moving the will in three ways. First, the object itself Bede, commenting on Acts 5:3, says that the devil “draws which is proposed to the will: thus we say that food the mind to evil desires”; and Isidore says (De Summo arouses man’s desire to eat. Secondly, he that proposes Bono ii, 41; iii, 5) that the devil “fills men’s hearts with or offers this object. Thirdly, he that persuades the will secret lusts.” Therefore the devil is directly the cause of that the object proposed has an aspect of good, because he sin. also, in a fashion, offers the will its proper object, which Objection 2. Further, Jerome says (Contra Jovin. ii, is a real or apparent good of reason. Accordingly, in the 2) that “as God is the perfecter of good, so is the devil first way the sensible things, which approach from with- the perfecter of evil.” But God is directly the cause of our out, move a man’s will to sin. In the second and third good. Therefore the devil is directly the cause of our sins. ways, either the devil or a man may incite to sin, either Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says in a chap- by offering an object of appetite to the senses, or by per- ter of the Eudemein Ethics (vii, 18): “There must needs suading the reason. But in none of these three ways can be some extrinsic principle of human counsel.” Now hu- anything be the direct cause of sin, because the will is not, man counsel is not only about good things but also about of necessity, moved by any object except the last end, as evil things. Therefore, as God moves man to take good stated above (q. 10, Aa. 1,2). Consequently neither the counsel, and so is the cause of good, so the devil moves thing offered from without, nor he that proposes it, nor he him to take evil counsel, and consequently is directly the that persuades, is the sufficient cause of sin. Therefore it cause of sin. follows that the devil is a cause of sin, neither directly nor On the contrary, Augustine proves (De Lib. Arb. i, sufficiently, but only by persuasion, or by proposing the 11) that “nothing else than his own will makes man’s mind object of appetite. the slave of his desire.” Now man does not become a slave Reply to Objection 1. All these, and other like au- to his desires, except through sin. Therefore the cause of thorities, if we meet with them, are to be understood as sin cannot be the devil, but man’s own will alone. denoting that the devil induces man to affection for a sin, I answer that, Sin is an action: so that a thing can either by suggesting to him, or by offering him objects of be directly the cause of sin, in the same way as anyone is appetite. directly the cause of an action; and this can only happen Reply to Objection 2. This comparison is true in so by moving that action’s proper principle to act. Now the far as the devil is somewhat the cause of our sins, even as proper principle of a sinful action is the will, since every God is in a certain way the cause of our good actions, but sin is voluntary. Consequently nothing can be directly the does not extend to the mode of causation: for God causes cause of sin, except that which can move the will to act. good things in us by moving the will inwardly, whereas Now the will, as stated above (q. 9, Aa. 3,4,6), can the devil cannot move us in this way. be moved by two things: first by its object, inasmuch as Reply to Objection 3. God is the universal principle the apprehended appetible is said to move the appetite: of all inward movements of man; but that the human will secondly by that agent which moves the will inwardly to be determined to an evil counsel, is directly due to the hu- will, and this is no other than the will itself, or God, as man will, and to the devil as persuading or offering the was shown above (q. 9, Aa. 3,4,6). Now God cannot be object of appetite. the cause of sin, as stated above (q. 79, a. 1). Therefore it 975 Whether the devil can induce man to sin, by internal instigations? Ia IIae q. 80 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the devil cannot in- a. 3, the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be duce man to sin, by internal instigations. Because the in- moved locally by the spiritual nature: so that the devil can ternal movements of the soul are vital functions. Now produce all those effects which can result from the local no vital functions can be exercised except by an intrinsic movement of bodies here below, except he be restrained principle, not even those of the vegetal soul, which are by the Divine power. Now the representation of forms the lowest of vital functions. Therefore the devil cannot to the imagination is due, sometimes, to local movement: instigate man to evil through his internal movements. for the Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigil.)∗ that “when Objection 2. Further, all the internal movements arise an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the from the external senses according to the order of na- sensitive principle, and the movements descend with it, ture. Now it belongs to God alone to do anything beside viz. the impressions left by the action of sensible objects, the order of nature, as was stated in the Ia, q. 110, a. 4. which impressions are preserved by means of sensible Therefore the devil cannot effect anything in man’s in- species, and continue to move the apprehensive principle, ternal movements, except in respect of things which are so that they appear just as though the sensitive principles perceived by the external senses. were being affected by them at the time.” Hence such a Objection 3. Further, the internal acts of the soul are local movement of the vital spirits or humors can be pro- to understand and to imagine. Now the devil can do noth- cured by the demons, whether man sleep or wake: and so ing in connection with either of these, because, as stated it happens that man’s imagination is brought into play. in the Ia, q. 111, Aa. 2,3, ad 2, the devil cannot impress In like manner, the sensitive appetite is incited to cer- species on the human intellect, nor does it seem possi- tain passions according to certain fixed movements of the ble for him to produce imaginary species, since imagi- heart and the vital spirits: wherefore the devil can coop- nary forms, being more spiritual, are more excellent than erate in this also. And through certain passions being those which are in sensible matter, which, nevertheless, aroused in the sensitive appetite, the result is that man the devil is unable to produce, as is clear from what we more easily perceives the movement or sensible image have said in the Ia, q. 110, a. 2; Ia, q. 111, Aa. 2,3, ad 2. which is brought in the manner explained, before the ap- Therefore the devil cannot through man’s internal move- prehensive principle, since, as the Philosopher observes ments induce him to sin. (De Somno et Virgil.: De Insomn. iii, iv), “lovers are On the contrary, In that case, the devil would never moved, by even a slight likeness, to an apprehension of tempt man, unless he appeared visibly; which is evidently the beloved.” It also happens, through the rousing of a false. passion, that what is put before the imagination, is judged, I answer that, The interior part of the soul is intel- as being something to be pursued, because, to him who is lective and sensitive; and the intellective part contains the held by a passion, whatever the passion inclines him to, intellect and the will. As regards the will, we have already seems good. In this way the devil induces man inwardly stated (a. 1; Ia, q. 111, a. 1) what is the devil’s relation to sin. thereto. Now the intellect, of its very nature, is moved by Reply to Objection 1. Although vital functions are that which enlightens it in the knowledge of truth, which always from an intrinsic principle, yet an extrinsic agent the devil has no intention of doing in man’s regard; rather can cooperate with them, even as external heat cooperates does he darken man’s reason so that it may consent to sin, with the functions of the vegetal soul, that food may be which darkness is due to the imagination and sensitive ap- more easily digested. petite. Consequently the operation of the devil seems to Reply to Objection 2. This apparition of imaginary be confined to the imagination and sensitive appetite, by forms is not altogether outside the order of nature, nor is moving either of which he can induce man to sin. For it due to a command alone, but according to local move- his operation may result in presenting certain forms to the ment, as explained above. imagination; and he is able to incite the sensitive appetite Consequently the Reply to the Third Objection is to some passion or other. clear, because these forms are received originally from the The reason of this is, that as stated in the Ia, q. 110, senses. ∗ De Insomn. iii, iv. 976 Whether the devil can induce man to sin of necessity? Ia IIae q. 80 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the devil can induce you,” which would be said neither rightly nor truly, if the man to sin of necessity. Because the greater can compel devil were able to compel us, in any way whatever, to sin; the lesser. Now it is said of the devil (Job 41:24) that for then neither would it be possible to resist him, nor “there is no power on earth that can compare with him.” would he fly from those who do. Therefore he does not Therefore he can compel man to sin, while he dwells on compel to sin. the earth. I answer that, The devil, by his own power, unless Objection 2. Further, man’s reason cannot be moved he be restrained by God, can compel anyone to do an act except in respect of things that are offered outwardly to which, in its genus, is a sin; but he cannot bring about the senses, or are represented to the imagination: because the necessity of sinning. This is evident from the fact that “all our knowledge arises from the senses, and we cannot man does not resist that which moves him to sin, except understand without a phantasm” (De Anima iii, text. 30. by his reason; the use of which the devil is able to impede 39). Now the devil can move man’s imagination, as stated altogether, by moving the imagination and the sensitive above (a. 2); and also the external senses, for Augustine appetite; as is the case with one who is possessed. But says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 12) that “this evil,” of which, to wit, then, the reason being thus fettered, whatever man may the devil is the cause, “extends gradually through all the do, it is not imputed to him as a sin. If, however, the rea- approaches to the senses, it adapts itself to shapes, blends son is not altogether fettered, then, in so far as it is free, with colors, mingles with sounds, seasons every flavor.” it can resist sin, as stated above (q. 77, a. 7). It is conse- Therefore it can incline man’s reason to sin of necessity. quently evident that the devil can nowise compel man to Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei sin. xix, 4) that “there is some sin when the flesh lusteth Reply to Objection 1. Not every power that is greater against the spirit.” Now the devil can cause concupiscence than man, can move man’s will; God alone can do this, as of the flesh, even as other passions, in the way explained stated above (q. 9, a. 6). above (a. 2). Therefore he can induce man to sin of neces- Reply to Objection 2. That which is apprehended by sity. the senses or the imagination does not move the will, of On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 5:8): “Your ad- necessity, so long as man has the use of reason; nor does versary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking such an apprehension always fetter the reason. whom he may devour.” Now it would be useless to ad- Reply to Objection 3. The lusting of the flesh against monish thus, if it were true that man were under the ne- the spirit, when the reason actually resists it, is not a sin, cessity of succumbing to the devil. Therefore he cannot but is matter for the exercise of virtue. That reason does induce man to sin of necessity. not resist, is not in the devil’s power; wherefore he cannot Further, it is likewise written (Jam. 4:7): “Be sub- bring about the necessity of sinning. ject. . . to God, but resist the devil, and he will fly from Whether all the sins of men are due to the devil’s suggestion? Ia IIae q. 80 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that all the sins of men suggestion. are due to the devil’s suggestion. For Dionysius says (Div. On the contrary, It is written (De Eccl. Dogm. Nom. iv) that the “crowd of demons are the cause of all lxxxii): “Not all our evil thoughts are incited by the devil; evils, both to themselves and to others.” sometimes they are due to a movement of the free-will.” Objection 2. Further, whoever sins mortally, becomes I answer that, the devil is the occasional and indirect the slave of the devil, according to Jn. 8:34: “Whoso- cause of all our sins, in so far as he induced the first man ever committeth sin is the slave [Douay: ‘servant’] of sin.” to sin, by reason of whose sin human nature is so infected, Now “by whom a man is overcome, of the same also he that we are all prone to sin: even as the burning of wood is the slave” (2 Pet. 2:19). Therefore whoever commits a might be imputed to the man who dried the wood so as sin, has been overcome by the devil. to make it easily inflammable. He is not, however, the di- Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv, 10) rect cause of all the sins of men, as though each were the the sin of the devil is irreparable, because he sinned at result of his suggestion. Origen proves this (Peri Archon no other’s suggestion. Therefore, if any men were to sin iii, 2) from the fact that even if the devil were no more, of their own free-will and without suggestion from any men would still have the desire for food, sexual pleasures other, their sin would be irremediable: which is clearly and the like; which desire might be inordinate, unless it false. Therefore all the sins of men are due to the devil’s were subordinate to reason, a matter that is subject to the 977 free-will. one who sins of his own accord, becomes the slave of the Reply to Objection 1. The crowd of demons are the devil. cause of all our evils, as regards their original cause, as Reply to Objection 3. The devil’s sin was irremedia- stated. ble, not only because he sinned without another’s sugges- Reply to Objection 2. A man becomes another’s tion; but also because he was not already prone to sin, on slave not only by being overcome by him, but also by account of any previous sin; which can be said of no sin subjecting himself to him spontaneously: it is thus that of man. 978 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 81 Of the Cause of Sin, On the Part of Man (In Five Articles) We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of man. Now, while man, like the devil, is the cause of another’s sin, by outward suggestion, he has a certain special manner of causing sin, by way of origin. Wherefore we must speak about original sin, the consideration of which will be three-fold: (1) Of its transmission; (2) of its essence; (3) of its subject. Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether man’s first sin is transmitted, by way of origin to his descendants? (2) Whether all the other sins of our first parent, or of any other parents, are transmitted to their descendants, by way of origin? (3) Whether original sin is contracted by all those who are begotten of Adam by way of seminal generation? (4) Whether it would be contracted by anyone formed miraculously from some part of the human body? (5) Whether original sin would have been contracted if the woman, and not the man, had sinned? Whether the first sin of our first parent is contracted by his descendants, by way of Ia IIae q. 81 a. 1 origin? Objection 1. It would seem that the first sin of our one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death.” first parent is not contracted by others, by way of origin. Nor can this be understood as denoting imitation or sug- For it is written (Ezech. 18:20): “The son shall not bear gestion, since it is written (Wis. 2:24): “By the envy of the iniquity of the father.” But he would bear the iniquity the devil, death came into this world.” It follows therefore if he contracted it from him. Therefore no one contracts that through origin from the first man sin entered into the any sin from one of his parents by way of origin. world. Objection 2. Further, an accident is not transmitted by I answer that, According to the Catholic Faith we are way of origin, unless its subject be also transmitted, since bound to hold that the first sin of the first man is transmit- accidents do not pass from one subject to another. Now ted to his descendants, by way of origin. For this reason the rational soul which is the subject of sin, is not trans- children are taken to be baptized soon after their birth, to mitted by way of origin, as was shown in the Ia, q. 118, show that they have to be washed from some uncleanness. a. 2. Therefore neither can any sin be transmitted by way The contrary is part of the Pelagian heresy, as is clear from of origin. Augustine in many of his books∗ Objection 3. Further, whatever is transmitted by way In endeavoring to explain how the sin of our first par- of human origin, is caused by the semen. But the semen ent could be transmitted by way of origin to his descen- cannot cause sin, because it lacks the rational part of the dants, various writers have gone about it in various ways. soul, which alone can be a cause of sin. Therefore no sin For some, considering that the subject of sin is the rational can be contracted by way of origin. soul, maintained that the rational soul is transmitted with Objection 4. Further, that which is more perfect in the semen, so that thus an infected soul would seem to nature, is more powerful in action. Now perfect flesh can- produce other infected souls. Others, rejecting this as er- not infect the soul united to it, else the soul could not be roneous, endeavored to show how the guilt of the parent’s cleansed of original sin, so long as it is united to the body. soul can be transmitted to the children, even though the Much less, therefore, can the semen infect the soul. soul be not transmitted, from the fact that defects of the Objection 5. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, body are transmitted from parent to child—thus a leper 5): “No one finds fault with those who are ugly by nature, may beget a leper, or a gouty man may be the father of but only those who are so through want of exercise and a gouty son, on account of some seminal corruption, al- through carelessness.” Now those are said to be “naturally though this corruption is not leprosy or gout. Now since ugly,” who are so from their origin. Therefore nothing the body is proportionate to the soul, and since the soul’s which comes by way of origin is blameworthy or sinful. defects redound into the body, and vice versa, in like man- On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): “By ner, say they, a culpable defect of the soul is passed on to ∗ For instance, Retract. i, 9; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. ix; Contra Julian. iii, 1; De Dono Persev. xi, xii. 979 the child, through the transmission of the semen, albeit just as the sin which flows from the soul into the bodily the semen itself is not the subject of the guilt. members is called “actual.” And just as the actual sin that But all these explanations are insufficient. Because, is committed by a member of the body, is not the sin of granted that some bodily defects are transmitted by way that member, except inasmuch as that member is a part of of origin from parent to child, and granted that even some the man, for which reason it is called a “human sin”; so defects of the soul are transmitted in consequence, on ac- original sin is not the sin of this person, except inasmuch count of a defect in the bodily habit, as in the case of id- as this person receives his nature from his first parent, for iots begetting idiots; nevertheless the fact of having a de- which reason it is called the “sin of nature,” according to fect by the way of origin seems to exclude the notion of Eph. 2:3: “We. . . were by nature children of wrath.” guilt, which is essentially something voluntary. Where- Reply to Objection 1. The son is said not to bear the fore granted that the rational soul were transmitted, from iniquity of his father, because he is not punished for his the very fact that the stain on the child’s soul is not in its father’s sin, unless he share in his guilt. It is thus in the will, it would cease to be a guilty stain binding its subject case before us: because guilt is transmitted by the way of to punishment; for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5), origin from father to son, even as actual sin is transmitted “no one reproaches a man born blind; one rather takes pity through being imitated. on him.” Reply to Objection 2. Although the soul is not trans- Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by mitted, because the power in the semen is not able to cause saying that all men born of Adam may be considered the rational soul, nevertheless the motion of the semen is as one man, inasmuch as they have one common nature, a disposition to the transmission of the rational soul: so which they receive from their first parents; even as in civil that the semen by its own power transmits the human na- matters, all who are members of one community are re- ture from parent to child, and with that nature, the stain puted as one body, and the whole community as one man. which infects it: for he that is born is associated with his Indeed Porphyry says (Praedic., De Specie) that “by shar- first parent in his guilt, through the fact that he inherits his ing the same species, many men are one man.” Accord-nature from him by a kind of movement which is that of ingly the multitude of men born of Adam, are as so many generation. members of one body. Now the action of one member Reply to Objection 3. Although the guilt is not ac- of the body, of the hand for instance, is voluntary not tually in the semen, yet human nature is there virtually by the will of that hand, but by the will of the soul, the accompanied by that guilt. first mover of the members. Wherefore a murder which Reply to Objection 4. The semen is the principle of the hand commits would not be imputed as a sin to the generation, which is an act proper to nature, by helping hand, considered by itself as apart from the body, but is it to propagate itself. Hence the soul is more infected by imputed to it as something belonging to man and moved the semen, than by the flesh which is already perfect, and by man’s first moving principle. In this way, then, the already affixed to a certain person. disorder which is in this man born of Adam, is voluntary, Reply to Objection 5. A man is not blamed for that not by his will, but by the will of his first parent, who, which he has from his origin, if we consider the man born, by the movement of generation, moves all who originate in himself. But it we consider him as referred to a prin- from him, even as the soul’s will moves all the members ciple, then he may be reproached for it: thus a man may to their actions. Hence the sin which is thus transmitted from his birth be under a family disgrace, on account of a by the first parent to his descendants is called “original,” crime committed by one of his forbears. Whether also other sins of the first parent or of nearer ancestors are transmitted to Ia IIae q. 81 a. 2 their descendants? Objection 1. It would seem that also other sins, transmitted to their descendants. whether of the first parent or of nearer ancestors, are trans- Objection 2. Further, a man can better transmit to an- mitted to their descendants. For punishment is never due other, that which he has of himself, than that which he unless for fault. Now some are punished by the judgment has received from another: thus fire heats better than hot of God for the sin of their immediate parents, according water does. Now a man transmits to his children, by the to Ex. 20:5: “I am. . . God. . . jealous, visiting the iniquity way, of origin, the sin which he has from Adam. Much of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth more therefore should he transmit the sin which he has generation.” Furthermore, according to human law, the contracted of himself. children of those who are guilty of high treason are dis- Objection 3. Further, the reason why we contract inherited. Therefore the guilt of nearer ancestors is also original sin from our first parent is because we were in 980 him as in the principle of our nature, which he corrupted. such, and also something through the gift of grace, so But we were likewise in our nearer ancestors, as in prin- may something belong to the nature as such, viz. what- ciples of our nature, which however it be corrupt, can be ever is caused by the principles of nature, and something corrupted yet more by sin, according to Apoc. 22:11: “He too through the gift of grace. In this way original jus- that is filthy, let him be filthier still.” Therefore children tice, as stated in the Ia, q. 100, a. 1, was a gift of grace, contract, by the way of origin, the sins of their nearer an- conferred by God on all human nature in our first parent. cestors, even as they contract the sin of their first parent. This gift the first man lost by his first sin. Wherefore as On the contrary, Good is more self-diffusive than that original justice together with the nature was to have evil. But the merits of the nearer ancestors are not trans- been transmitted to his posterity, so also was its disorder. mitted to their descendants. Much less therefore are their Other actual sins, however, whether of the first parent or sins. of others, do not corrupt the nature as nature, but only as I answer that, Augustine puts this question in the the nature of that person, i.e. in respect of the proneness Enchiridion xlvi, xlvii, and leaves it unsolved. Yet if we to sin: and consequently other sins are not transmitted. look into the matter carefully we shall see that it is im- Reply to Objection 1. According to Augustine in his possible for the sins of the nearer ancestors, or even any letter to Avitus∗, children are never inflicted with spiri- other but the first sin of our first parent to be transmit- tual punishment on account of their parents, unless they ted by way of origin. The reason is that a man begets his share in their guilt, either in their origin, or by imita- like in species but not in individual. Consequently those tion, because every soul is God’s immediate property, as things that pertain directly to the individual, such as per- stated in Ezech. 18:4. Sometimes, however, by Divine sonal actions and matters affecting them, are not transmit- or human judgment, children receive bodily punishment ted by parents to their children: for a grammarian does on their parents’ account, inasmuch as the child, as to its not transmit to his son the knowledge of grammar that he body, is part of its father. has acquired by his own studies. On the other hand, those Reply to Objection 2. A man can more easily trans- things that concern the nature of the species, are transmit- mit that which he has of himself, provided it be transmis- ted by parents to their children, unless there be a defect sible. But the actual sins of our nearer ancestors are not of nature: thus a man with eyes begets a son having eyes, transmissible, because they are purely personal, as stated unless nature fails. And if nature be strong, even certain above. accidents of the individual pertaining to natural disposi- Reply to Objection 3. The first sin infects nature with tion, are transmitted to the children, e.g. fleetness of body, a human corruption pertaining to nature; whereas other acuteness of intellect, and so forth; but nowise those that sins infect it with a corruption pertaining only to the per- are purely personal, as stated above. son. Now just as something may belong to the person as Whether the sin of the first parent is transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men? Ia IIae q. 81 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the sin of the first On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): parent is not transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men. “Death passed upon all men in whom all have sinned.” Because death is a punishment consequent upon original I answer that, According to the Catholic Faith we sin. But not all those, who are born of the seed of Adam, must firmly believe that, Christ alone excepted, all men will die: since those who will be still living at the com- descended from Adam contract original sin from him; else ing of our Lord, will never die, as, seemingly, may be all would not need redemption† which is through Christ; gathered from 1 Thess. 4:14: “We who are alive. . . unto and this is erroneous. The reason for this may be gath- the coming of the Lord, shall not prevent them who have ered from what has been stated (a. 1), viz. that original slept.” Therefore they do not contract original sin. sin, in virtue of the sin of our first parent, is transmitted Objection 2. Further, no one gives another what he to his posterity, just as, from the soul’s will, actual sin is has not himself. Now a man who has been baptized has transmitted to the members of the body, through their be- not original sin. Therefore he does not transmit it to his ing moved by the will. Now it is evident that actual sin children. can be transmitted to all such members as have an inborn Objection 3. Further, the gift of Christ is greater than aptitude to be moved by the will. Therefore original sin the sin of Adam, as the Apostle declares (Rom. 5:15, is transmitted to all those who are moved by Adam by the seqq). But the gift of Christ is not transmitted to all men: movement of generation. neither, therefore, is the sin of Adam. Reply to Objection 1. It is held with greater proba- ∗ Ep. ad Auxilium ccl. † Cf. Translator’s note inserted before IIIa, q. 27 981 bility and more commonly that all those that are alive at its effect as regards the “fomes,” which is the disorder of the coming of our Lord, will die, and rise again shortly, the lower parts of the soul and of the body itself, in respect as we shall state more fully in the IIIa ( Suppl., q. 78, of which, and not of the mind, man exercises his power of a. 1, obj. 1). If, however, it be true, as others hold, that generation. Consequently those who are baptized trans- they will never die, (an opinion which Jerome mentions mit original sin: since they do not beget as being renewed among others in a letter to Minerius, on the Resurrection in Baptism, but as still retaining something of the oldness of the Body—Ep. cxix), then we must say in reply to the of the first sin. objection, that although they are not to die, the debt of Reply to Objection 3. Just as Adam’s sin is trans- death is none the less in them, and that the punishment of mitted to all who are born of Adam corporally, so is the death will be remitted by God, since He can also forgive grace of Christ transmitted to all that are begotten of Him the punishment due for actual sins. spiritually, by faith and Baptism: and this, not only unto Reply to Objection 1. Original sin is taken away by the removal of sin of their first parent, but also unto the Baptism as to the guilt, in so far as the soul recovers grace removal of actual sins, and the obtaining of glory. as regards the mind. Nevertheless original sin remains in Whether original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously from hu-Ia IIae q. 81 a. 4 man flesh? Objection 1. It would seem that original sin would be as the members are moved by the soul to actual sin. Now contracted by a person formed miraculously from human there is no movement to generation except by the active flesh. For a gloss on Gn. 4:1 says that “Adam’s entire pos- power of generation: so that those alone contract origi- terity was corrupted in his loins, because they were not nal sin, who are descended from Adam through the active severed from him in the place of life, before he sinned, power of generation originally derived from Adam, i.e. but in the place of exile after he had sinned.” But if a who are descended from him through seminal power; for man were to be formed in the aforesaid manner, his flesh the seminal power is nothing else than the active power of would be severed in the place of exile. Therefore it would generation. But if anyone were to be formed by God out contract original sin. of human flesh, it is evident that the active power would Objection 2. Further, original sin is caused in us by not be derived from Adam. Consequently he would not the soul being infected through the flesh. But man’s flesh contract original sin: even as a hand would have no part is entirely corrupted. Therefore a man’s soul would con- in a human sin, if it were moved, not by the man’s will, tract the infection of original sin, from whatever part of but by some external power. the flesh it was formed. Reply to Objection 1. Adam was not in the place of Objection 3. Further, original sin comes upon all from exile until after his sin. Consequently it is not on account our first parent, in so far as we were all in him when he of the place of exile, but on account of the sin, that original sinned. But those who might be formed out of human sin is transmitted to those to whom his active generation flesh, would have been in Adam. Therefore they would extends. contract original sin. Reply to Objection 2. The flesh does not corrupt the On the contrary, They would not have been in Adam soul, except in so far as it is the active principle in gener- “according to seminal virtue,” which alone is the cause of ation, as we have stated. the transmission of original sin, as Augustine states (Gen. Reply to Objection 3. If a man were to be formed ad lit. x, 18, seqq.). from human flesh, he would have been in Adam, “by way I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,3), original sin of bodily substance”∗, but not according to seminal virtue, is transmitted from the first parent to his posterity, inas- as stated above. Therefore he would not contract original much as they are moved by him through generation, even sin. Whether if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have contracted Ia IIae q. 81 a. 5 original sin? Objection 1. It would seem that if Eve, and not Adam, in so far as we were once in them, according to the word had sinned, their children would have contracted original of the Apostle (Rom. 5:12): “In whom all have sinned.” sin. Because we contract original sin from our parents, Now a man pre-exist in his mother as well as in his father. ∗ The expression is St. Augustine’s (Gen. ad lit. x). Cf. Summa Theologica IIIa, q. 31, a. 6, Reply to obj. 1 982 Therefore a man would have contracted original sin from philosophers, the active principle of generation is from the his mother’s sin as well as from his father’s. father, while the mother provides the matter. Therefore Objection 2. Further, if Eve, and not Adam, had original sin, is contracted, not from the mother, but from sinned, their children would have been born liable to suf- the father: so that, accordingly, if Eve, and not Adam, fering and death, since it is “the mother” that “provides the had sinned, their children would not contract original sin: matter in generation” as the Philosopher states (De Gener. whereas, if Adam, and not Eve, had sinned, they would Animal. ii, 1,4), when death and liability to suffering are contract it. the necessary results of matter. Now liability to suffering Reply to Objection 1. The child pre-exists in its fa- and the necessity of dying are punishments of original sin. ther as in its active principle, and in its mother, as in its Therefore if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children material and passive principle. Consequently the compar- would contract original sin. ison fails. Objection 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. Reply to Objection 2. Some hold that if Eve, and not iii, 3) that “the Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin,” (of Adam, had sinned, their children would be immune from whom Christ was to be born without original sin) “puri- the sin, but would have been subject to the necessity of fying her.” But this purification would not have been nec- dying and to other forms of suffering that are a necessary essary, if the infection of original sin were not contracted result of the matter which is provided by the mother, not as from the mother. Therefore the infection of original sin is punishments, but as actual defects. This, however, seems contracted from the mother: so that if Eve had sinned, her unreasonable. Because, as stated in the Ia, q. 97, Aa. 1, 2, children would have contracted original sin, even if Adam ad 4, immortality and impassibility, in the original state, had not sinned. were a result, not of the condition of matter, but of origi- On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): “By nal justice, whereby the body was subjected to the soul, so one man sin entered into this world.” Now if the woman long as the soul remained subject to God. Now privation would have transmitted original sin to her children, he of original justice is original sin. If, therefore, supposing should have said that it entered by two, since both of them Adam had not sinned, original sin would not have been sinned, or rather that it entered by a woman, since she transmitted to posterity on account of Eve’s sin; it is ev- sinned first. Therefore original sin is transmitted to the ident that the children would not have been deprived of children, not by the mother, but by the father. original justice: and consequently they would not have I answer that, The solution of this question is made been liable to suffer and subject to the necessity of dying. clear by what has been said. For it has been stated (a. 1) Reply to Objection 3. This prevenient purification in that original sin is transmitted by the first parent in so the Blessed Virgin was not needed to hinder the transmis- far as he is the mover in the begetting of his children: sion of original sin, but because it behooved the Mother wherefore it has been said (a. 4) that if anyone were begot- of God “to shine with the greatest purity”∗. For nothing is ten materially only, of human flesh, they would not con- worthy to receive God unless it be pure, according to Ps. tract original sin. Now it is evident that in the opinion of 92:5: “Holiness becometh Thy House, O Lord.” ∗ Cf. Anselm, De Concep. Virg. xviii. 983 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 82 Of Original Sin, As to Its Essence (In Four Articles) We must now consider original sin as to its essence, and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether original sin is a habit? (2) Whether there is but one original sin in each man? (3) Whether original sin is concupiscence? (4) Whether original sin is equally in all? Whether original sin is a habit? Ia IIae q. 82 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that original sin is not a disposition of the body, by reason of the destruction of habit. For original sin is the absence of original justice, as that equilibrium which is essential to health. Hence it is Anselm states (De Concep. Virg. ii, iii, xxvi), so that orig- that original sin is called the “languor of nature”∗. inal sin is a privation. But privation is opposed to habit. Reply to Objection 1. As bodily sickness is partly a Therefore original sin is not a habit. privation, in so far as it denotes the destruction of the equi- Objection 2. Further, actual sin has the nature of fault librium of health, and partly something positive, viz. the more than original sin, in so far as it is more voluntary. very humors that are inordinately disposed, so too orig- Now the habit of actual sin has not the nature of a fault, inal sin denotes the privation of original justice, and be- else it would follow that a man while asleep, would be sides this, the inordinate disposition of the parts of the guilty of sin. Therefore no original habit has the nature of soul. Consequently it is not a pure privation, but a corrupt a fault. habit. Objection 3. Further, in wickedness act always pre- Reply to Objection 2. Actual sin is an inordinateness cedes habit, because evil habits are not infused, but ac- of an act: whereas original sin, being the sin of nature, is quired. Now original sin is not preceded by an act. There- an inordinate disposition of nature, and has the character fore original sin is not a habit. of fault through being transmitted from our first parent, as On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the stated above (q. 81, a. 1). Now this inordinate disposition Baptism of infants (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 39) that of nature is a kind of habit, whereas the inordinate dispo- on account of original sin little children have the aptitude sition of an act is not: and for this reason original sin can of concupiscence though they have not the act. Now apti- be a habit, whereas actual sin cannot. tude denotes some kind of habit. Therefore original sin is Reply to Objection 3. This objection considers the a habit. habit which inclines a power to an act: but original sin I answer that, As stated above (q. 49, a. 4; q. 50, a. 1), is not this kind of habit. Nevertheless a certain inclina-habit is twofold. The first is a habit whereby power is in- tion to an inordinate act does follow from original sin, not clined to an act: thus science and virtue are called habits. directly, but indirectly, viz. by the removal of the obsta- In this way original sin is not a habit. The second kind cle, i.e. original justice, which hindered inordinate move- of habit is the disposition of a complex nature, whereby ments: just as an inclination to inordinate bodily move- that nature is well or ill disposed to something, chiefly ments results indirectly from bodily sickness. Nor is it when such a disposition has become like a second nature, necessary to says that original sin is a habit “infused,” or as in the case of sickness or health. In this sense original a habit “acquired” (except by the act of our first parent, sin is a habit. For it is an inordinate disposition, arising but not by our own act): but it is a habit “inborn” due to from the destruction of the harmony which was essential our corrupt origin. to original justice, even as bodily sickness is an inordinate ∗ Cf. Augustine, In Ps. 118, serm. iii 984 Whether there are several original sins in one man? Ia IIae q. 82 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that there are many orig- from excessive heat or cold, or from a lesion in the lung inal sins in one man. For it is written (Ps. 1:7): “Behold or liver; while one specific sickness in one man will be I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my mother one in number. Now the cause of this corrupt disposition conceive me.” But the sin in which a man is conceived that is called original sin, is one only, viz. the privation of is original sin. Therefore there are several original sins in original justice, removing the subjection of man’s mind to man. God. Consequently original sin is specifically one, and, in Objection 2. Further, one and the same habit does one man, can be only one in number; while, in different not incline its subject to contraries: since the inclination men, it is one in species and in proportion, but is numeri- of habit is like that of nature which tends to one thing. cally many. Now original sin, even in one man, inclines to various and Reply to Objection 1. The employment of the contrary sins. Therefore original sin is not one habit; but plural—“in sins”—may be explained by the custom of the several. Divine Scriptures in the frequent use of the plural for the Objection 3. Further, original sin infects every part of singular, e.g. “They are dead that sought the life of the the soul. Now the different parts of the soul are different child”; or by the fact that all actual sins virtually pre-exist subjects of sin, as shown above (q. 74). Since then one sin in original sin, as in a principle so that it is virtually many; cannot be in different subjects, it seems that original sin is or by the fact of there being many deformities in the sin not one but several. of our first parent, viz. pride, disobedience, gluttony, and On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:29): “Behold the so forth; or by several parts of the soul being infected by Lamb of God, behold Him Who taketh away the sin of the original sin. world”: and the reason for the employment of the singu- Reply to Objection 2. Of itself and directly, i.e. by lar is that the “sin of the world” is original sin, as a gloss its own form, one habit cannot incline its subject to con- expounds this passage. traries. But there is no reason why it should not do so, in- I answer that, In one man there is one original sin. directly and accidentally, i.e. by the removal of an obsta- Two reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the cle: thus, when the harmony of a mixed body is destroyed, part of the cause of original sin. For it has been stated the elements have contrary local tendencies. In like man- (q. 81, a. 2), that the first sin alone of our first parent was ner, when the harmony of original justice is destroyed, the transmitted to his posterity. Wherefore in one man origi- various powers of the soul have various opposite tenden- nal sin is one in number; and in all men, it is one in pro- cies. portion, i.e. in relation to its first principle. The second Reply to Objection 3. Original sin infects the differ- reason may be taken from the very essence of original sin. ent parts of the soul, in so far as they are the parts of one Because in every inordinate disposition, unity of species whole; even as original justice held all the soul’s parts to- depends on the cause, while the unity of number is derived gether in one. Consequently there is but one original sin: from the subject. For example, take bodily sickness: vari- just as there is but one fever in one man, although the var- ous species of sickness proceed from different causes, e.g. ious parts of the body are affected. Whether original sin is concupiscence? Ia IIae q. 82 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that original sin is not Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7). Therefore original sin is concupiscence. For every sin is contrary to nature, accord- ignorance rather than concupiscence. ing to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30). But concupis- On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 15): cence is in accordance with nature, since it is the proper “Concupiscence is the guilt of original sin.” act of the concupiscible faculty which is a natural power. I answer that, Everything takes its species from its Therefore concupiscence is not original sin. form: and it has been stated (a. 2) that the species of orig- Objection 2. Further, through original sin “the pas- inal sin is taken from its cause. Consequently the for- sions of sins” are in us, according to the Apostle (Rom. mal element of original sin must be considered in respect 7:5). Now there are several other passions besides concu- of the cause of original sin. But contraries have contrary piscence, as stated above (q. 23, a. 4). Therefore original causes. Therefore the cause of original sin must be con- sin is not concupiscence any more than another passion. sidered with respect to the cause of original justice, which Objection 3. Further, by original sin, all the parts is opposed to it. Now the whole order of original justice of the soul are disordered, as stated above (a. 2, obj. 3). consists in man’s will being subject to God: which subjec- But the intellect is the highest of the soul’s parts, as the tion, first and chiefly, was in the will, whose function it is 985 to move all the other parts to the end, as stated above (q. 9, beyond the bounds of reason, it is, for a man, contrary to a. 1 ), so that the will being turned away from God, all reason. Such is the concupiscence of original sin. the other powers of the soul become inordinate. Accord- Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 25, a. 1), all ingly the privation of original justice, whereby the will the irascible passions are reducible to concupiscible pas- was made subject to God, is the formal element in origi- sions, as holding the principle place: and of these, con- nal sin; while every other disorder of the soul’s powers, is cupiscence is the most impetuous in moving, and is felt a kind of material element in respect of original sin. Now most, as stated above (q. 25, a. 2, ad 1). Therefore orig- the inordinateness of the other powers of the soul con- inal sin is ascribed to concupiscence, as being the chief sists chiefly in their turning inordinately to mutable good; passion, and as including all the others, in a fashion. which inordinateness may be called by the general name Reply to Objection 3. As, in good things, the intel- of concupiscence. Hence original sin is concupiscence, lect and reason stand first, so conversely in evil things, materially, but privation of original justice, formally. the lower part of the soul is found to take precedence, for Reply to Objection 1. Since, in man, the concupis- it clouds and draws the reason, as stated above (q. 77, cible power is naturally governed by reason, the act of Aa. 1,2; q. 80, a. 2). Hence original sin is called con- concupiscence is so far natural to man, as it is in accord cupiscence rather than ignorance, although ignorance is with the order of reason; while, in so far as it trespasses comprised among the material defects of original sin. Whether original sin is equally in all? Ia IIae q. 82 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that original sin is not nature of guilt; for relations cannot be more or less. Con- equally in all. Because original sin is inordinate concu- sequently it is evident that original sin cannot be more in piscence, as stated above (a. 3). Now all are not equally one than in another. prone to acts of concupiscence. Therefore original sin is Reply to Objection 1. Through the bond of original not equally in all. justice being broken, which held together all the powers Objection 2. Further, original sin is an inordinate dis- of the soul in a certain order, each power of the soul tends position of the soul, just as sickness is an inordinate dis- to its own proper movement, and the more impetuously, as position of the body. But sickness is subject to degrees. it is stronger. Now it happens that some of the soul’s pow- Therefore original sin is subject to degrees. ers are stronger in one man than in another, on account of Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Nup. et the different bodily temperaments. Consequently if one Concep. i, 23) that “lust transmits original sin to the man is more prone than another to acts of concupiscence, child.” But the act of generation may be more lustful in this is not due to original sin, because the bond of original one than in another. Therefore original sin may be greater justice is equally broken in all, and the lower parts of the in one than in another. soul are, in all, left to themselves equally; but it is due to On the contrary, Original sin is the sin of nature, as the various dispositions of the powers, as stated. stated above (q. 81, a. 1). But nature is equally in all. Reply to Objection 2. Sickness of the body, even Therefore original sin is too. sickness of the same species, has not an equal cause in I answer that, There are two things in original sin: all; for instance if a fever be caused by corruption of the one is the privation of original justice; the other is the re- bile, the corruption may be greater or less, and nearer to, lation of this privation to the sin of our first parent, from or further from a vital principle. But the cause of original whom it is transmitted to man through his corrupt origin. sin is equal to all, so that there is not comparison. As to the first, original sin has no degrees, since the gift Reply to Objection 3. It is not the actual lust that of original justice is taken away entirely; and privations transmits original sin: for, supposing God were to grant that remove something entirely, such as death and dark- to a man to feel no inordinate lust in the act of generation, ness, cannot be more or less, as stated above (q. 73, a. 2). he would still transmit original sin; we must understand In like manner, neither is this possible, as to the second: this to be habitual lust, whereby the sensitive appetite is since all are related equally to the first principle of our not kept subject to reason by the bonds of original justice. corrupt origin, from which principle original sin takes the This lust is equally in all. 986 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 83 Of the Subject of Original Sin (In Four Articles) We must now consider the subject of original sin, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the subject of original sin is the flesh rather than the soul? (2) If it be the soul, whether this be through its essence, or through its powers? (3) Whether the will prior to the other powers is the subject of original sin? (4) Whether certain powers of the soul are specially infected, viz. the generative power, the concupiscible part, and the sense of touch? Whether original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul? Ia IIae q. 83 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that original sin is more I answer that, One thing can be in another in two in the flesh than in the soul. Because the rebellion of the ways. First, as in its cause, either principal, or instru- flesh against the mind arises from the corruption of orig- mental; secondly, as in its subject. Accordingly the origi- inal sin. Now the root of this rebellion is seated in the nal sin of all men was in Adam indeed, as in its principal flesh: for the Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): “I see another cause, according to the words of the Apostle (Rom. 5:12): law in my members fighting against the law of my mind.” “In whom all have sinned”: whereas it is in the bodily se- Therefore original sin is seated chiefly in the flesh. men, as in its instrumental cause, since it is by the active Objection 2. Further, a thing is more in its cause than power of the semen that original sin together with human in its effect: thus heat is in the heating fire more than in nature is transmitted to the child. But original sin can no- the hot water. Now the soul is infected with the corruption wise be in the flesh as its subject, but only in the soul. of original sin by the carnal semen. Therefore original sin The reason for this is that, as stated above (q. 81, a. 1), is in the flesh rather than in the soul. original sin is transmitted from the will of our first parent Objection 3. Further, we contract original sin from to this posterity by a certain movement of generation, in our first parent, in so far as we were in him by reason of the same way as actual sin is transmitted from any man’s seminal virtue. Now our souls were not in him thus, but will to his other parts. Now in this transmission it is to only our flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul, be observed, that whatever accrues from the motion of but in the flesh. the will consenting to sin, to any part of man that can in Objection 4. Further, the rational soul created by God any way share in that guilt, either as its subject or as its is infused into the body. If therefore the soul were infected instrument, has the character of sin. Thus from the will with original sin, it would follow that it is corrupted in its consenting to gluttony, concupiscence of food accrues to creation or infusion: and thus God would be the cause of the concupiscible faculty, and partaking of food accrues sin, since He is the author of the soul’s creation and fu- to the hand and the mouth, which, in so far as they are sion. moved by the will to sin, are the instruments of sin. But Objection 5. Further, no wise man pours a precious that further action is evoked in the nutritive power and the liquid into a vessel, knowing that the vessel will corrupt internal members, which have no natural aptitude for be- the liquid. But the rational soul is more precious than any ing moved by the will, does not bear the character of guilt. liquid. If therefore the soul, by being united with the body, Accordingly, since the soul can be the subject of guilt, could be corrupted with the infection of original sin, God, while the flesh, of itself, cannot be the subject of guilt; Who is wisdom itself, would never infuse the soul into whatever accrues to the soul from the corruption of the such a body. And yet He does; wherefore it is not cor- first sin, has the character of guilt, while whatever accrues rupted by the flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the to the flesh, has the character, not of guilt but of punish- soul but in the flesh. ment: so that, therefore, the soul is the subject of original On the contrary, The same is the subject of a virtue sin, and not the flesh. and of the vice or sin contrary to that virtue. But the flesh Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (Retract. cannot be the subject of virtue: for the Apostle says (Rom. i, 27)∗, the Apostle is speaking, in that passage, of man 7:18): “I know that there dwelleth not in me, that is to say, already redeemed, who is delivered from guilt, but is still in my flesh, that which is good.” Therefore the flesh can- liable to punishment, by reason of which sin is stated to not be the subject of original sin, but only the soul. dwell “in the flesh.” Consequently it follows that the flesh ∗ Cf. QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 66 987 is the subject, not of guilt, but of punishment. said that the soul is tainted through being created. On the Reply to Objection 2. Original sin is caused by the other hand, infusion implies relation both to God infusing semen as instrumental cause. Now there is no need for and to the flesh into which the soul is infused. And so, anything to be more in the instrumental cause than in the with regard to God infusing, it cannot be said that the soul effect; but only in the principal cause: and, in this way, is stained through being infused; but only with regard to original sin was in Adam more fully, since in him it had the body into which it is infused. the nature of actual sin. Reply to Objection 5. The common good takes prece- Reply to Objection 3. The soul of any individual dence of private good. Wherefore God, according to His man was in Adam, in respect of his seminal power, not wisdom, does not overlook the general order of things indeed as in its effective principle, but as in a dispositive (which is that such a soul be infused into such a body), principle: because the bodily semen, which is transmit- lest this soul contract a singular corruption: all the more ted from Adam, does not of its own power produce the that the nature of the soul demands that it should not exist rational soul, but disposes the matter for it. prior to its infusion into the body, as stated in the Ia, q. 90, Reply to Objection 4. The corruption of original sin a. 4; Ia, q. 118, a. 3. And it is better for the soul to be thus, is nowise caused by God, but by the sin alone of our first according to its nature, than not to be at all, especially parent through carnal generation. And so, since creation since it can avoid damnation, by means of grace. implies a relation in the soul to God alone, it cannot be Whether original sin is in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers? Ia IIae q. 83 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that original sin is not power is the proper subject of that sin. Now it is evi- in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers. For dent that original sin is caused through our origin. Con- the soul is naturally apt to be the subject of sin, in respect sequently that part of the soul which is first reached by of those parts which can be moved by the will. Now the man’s origin, is the primary subject of original sin. Now soul is moved by the will, not as to its essence but only the origin reaches the soul as the term of generation, ac- as to the powers. Therefore original sin is in the soul, not cording as it is the form of the body: and this belongs to according to its essence, but only according to the powers. the soul in respect of its essence, as was proved in the Ia, Objection 2. Further, original sin is opposed to orig- q. 76, a. 6. Therefore the soul, in respect of its essence, is inal justice. Now original justice was in a power of the the primary subject of original sin. soul, because power is the subject of virtue. Therefore Reply to Objection 1. As the motion of the will of original sin also is in a power of the soul, rather than in its an individual reaches to the soul’s powers and not to its essence. essence, so the motion of the will of the first generator, Objection 3. Further, just as original sin is derived through the channel of generation, reaches first of all to from the soul as from the flesh, so is it derived by the the essence of the soul, as stated. powers from the essence. But original sin is more in the Reply to Objection 2. Even original justice pertained soul than in the flesh. Therefore it is more in the powers radically to the essence of the soul, because it was God’s than in the essence of the soul. gift to human nature, to which the essence of the soul is Objection 4. Further, original sin is said to be concu- related before the powers. For the powers seem to regard piscence, as stated (q. 82, a. 3). But concupiscence is in the person, in as much as they are the principles of per- the powers of the soul. Therefore original sin is also. sonal acts. Hence they are the proper subjects of actual On the contrary, Original sin is called the sin of na- sins, which are the sins of the person. ture, as stated above (q. 81, a. 1). Now the soul is the Reply to Objection 3. The body is related to the soul form and nature of the body, in respect of its essence and as matter to form, which though it comes second in order not in respect of its powers, as stated in the Ia, q. 76, a. 6. of generation, nevertheless comes first in the order of per- Therefore the soul is the subject of original sin chiefly in fection and nature. But the essence of the soul is related respect of its essence. to the powers, as a subject to its proper accidents, which I answer that, The subject of a sin is chiefly that part follow their subject both in the order of generation and in of the soul to which the motive cause of that sin primar- that of perfection. Consequently the comparison fails. ily pertains: thus if the motive cause of a sin is sensual Reply to Objection 4. Concupiscence, in relation to pleasure, which regards the concupiscible power through original sin, holds the position of matter and effect, as being its proper object, it follows that the concupiscible stated above (q. 82, a. 3). 988 Whether original sin infects the will before the other powers? Ia IIae q. 83 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that original sin does not as stated above (a. 2). In the second place we must con- infect the will before the other powers. For every sin be- sider its inclination to act; and in this way it regards the longs chiefly to that power by whose act it was caused. powers of the soul. It must therefore regard first of all that Now original sin is caused by an act of the generative power in which is seated the first inclination to commit a power. Therefore it seems to belong to the generative sin, and this is the will, as stated above (q. 74, Aa. 1,2). power more than to the others. Therefore original sin regards first of all the will. Objection 2. Further, original sin is transmitted Reply to Objection 1. Original sin, in man, is not through the carnal semen. But the other powers of the caused by the generative power of the child, but by the act soul are more akin to the flesh than the will is, as is evi- of the parental generative power. Consequently, it does dent with regard to all the sensitive powers, which use a not follow that the child’s generative power is the subject bodily organ. Therefore original sin is in them more than of original sin. in the will. Reply to Objection 2. Original sin spreads in two Objection 3. Further, the intellect precedes the will, ways; from the flesh to the soul, and from the essence for the object of the will is only the good understood. If of the soul to the powers. The former follows the order therefore original sin infects all the powers of the soul, it of generation, the latter follows the order of perfection. seems that it must first of all infect the intellect, as pre- Therefore, although the other, viz. the sensitive powers, ceding the others. are more akin to the flesh, yet, since the will, being the On the contrary, Original justice has a prior relation higher power, is more akin to the essence of the soul, the to the will, because it is “rectitude of the will,” as Anselm infection of original sin reaches it first. states (De Concep. Virg. iii). Therefore original sin, Reply to Objection 3. The intellect precedes the will, which is opposed to it, also has a prior relation to the will. in one way, by proposing its object to it. In another way, I answer that, Two things must be considered in the the will precedes the intellect, in the order of motion to infection of original sin. First, its inherence to its subject; act, which motion pertains to sin. and in this respect it regards first the essence of the soul, Whether the aforesaid powers are more infected than the others? Ia IIae q. 83 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the aforesaid powers the generative power, the concupiscible faculty and the are not more infected than the others. For the infection of sense of touch. original sin seems to pertain more to that part of the soul I answer that, Those corruptions especially are said which can be first the subject of sin. Now this is the ra- to be infectious, which are of such a nature as to be trans- tional part, and chiefly the will. Therefore that power is mitted from one subject to another: hence contagious dis- most infected by original sin. eases, such as leprosy and murrain and the like, are said to Objection 2. Further, no power of the soul is infected be infectious. Now the corruption of original sin is trans- by guilt, except in so far as it can obey reason. Now the mitted by the act of generation, as stated above (q. 81, generative power cannot obey reason, as stated in Ethic. a. 1). Therefore the powers which concur in this act, are i, 13. Therefore the generative power is not the most in- chiefly said to be infected. Now this act serves the genera- fected by original sin. tive power, in as much as it is directed to generation; and it Objection 3. Further, of all the senses the sight is the includes delectation of the touch, which is the most pow-most spiritual and the nearest to reason, in so far “as it erful object of the concupiscible faculty. Consequently, shows us how a number of things differ” (Metaph. i). But while all the parts of the soul are said to be corrupted by the infection of guilt is first of all in the reason. Therefore original sin, these three are said specially to be corrupted the sight is more infected than touch. and infected. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, Reply to Objection 1. Original sin, in so far as it in- 16, seqq., 24) that the infection of original sin is most clines to actual sins, belongs chiefly to the will, as stated apparent in the movements of the members of genera- above (a. 3). But in so far as it is transmitted to the off- tion, which are not subject to reason. Now those mem- spring, it belongs to the aforesaid powers proximately, and bers serve the generative power in the mingling of sexes, to the will, remotely. wherein there is the delectation of touch, which is the Reply to Objection 2. The infection of actual sin be- most powerful incentive to concupiscence. Therefore the longs only to the powers which are moved by the will of infection of original sin regards these three chiefly, viz. the sinner. But the infection of original sin is not derived 989 from the will of the contractor, but through his natural ori-far as the concupiscible species is seen through the sight. gin, which is effected by the generative power. Hence it is But the delectation is completed in the touch. Wherefore this power that is infected by original sin. the aforesaid infection is ascribed to the touch rather than Reply to Objection 3. Sight is not related to the act to the sight. of generation except in respect of remote disposition, in so 990 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 84 Of the Cause of Sin, in Respect of One Sin Being the Cause of Another (In Four Articles) We must now consider the cause of sin, in so far as one sin can be the cause of another. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether covetousness is the root of all sins? (2) Whether pride is the beginning of every sin? (3) Whether other special sins should be called capital vices, besides pride and covetousness? (4) How many capital vices there are, and which are they? Whether covetousness is the root of all sins? Ia IIae q. 84 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that covetousness is not he is speaking of covetousness as denoting the inordinate the root of all sins. For covetousness, which is immoder- desire for riches. Accordingly, we must say that covetous- ate desire for riches, is opposed to the virtue of liberality. ness, as denoting a special sin, is called the root of all sins, But liberality is not the root of all virtues. Therefore cov-in likeness to the root of a tree, in furnishing sustenance etousness is not the root of all sins. to the whole tree. For we see that by riches man acquires Objection 2. Further, the desire for the means pro- the means of committing any sin whatever, and of sating ceeds from desire for the end. Now riches, the desire for his desire for any sin whatever, since money helps man to which is called covetousness, are not desired except as be- obtain all manner of temporal goods, according to Eccles. ing useful for some end, as stated in Ethic. i, 5. Therefore 10:19: “All things obey money”: so that in this desire for covetousness is not the root of all sins, but proceeds from riches is the root of all sins. some deeper root. Reply to Objection 1. Virtue and sin do not arise from Objection 3. Further, it often happens that avarice, the same source. For sin arises from the desire of muta- which is another name for covetousness, arises from other ble good; and consequently the desire of that good which sins; as when a man desires money through ambition, or helps one to obtain all temporal goods, is called the root in order to sate his gluttony. Therefore it is not the root of of all sins. But virtue arises from the desire for the im- all sins. mutable God; and consequently charity, which is the love On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:10): of God, is called the root of the virtues, according to Eph. “The desire of money is the root of all evil.” 3:17: “Rooted and founded in charity.” I answer that, According to some, covetousness may Reply to Objection 2. The desire of money is said to be understood in different ways. First, as denoting in- be the root of sins, not as though riches were sought for ordinate desire for riches: and thus it is a special sin. their own sake, as being the last end; but because they are Secondly, as denoting inordinate desire for any temporal much sought after as useful for any temporal end. And good: and thus it is a genus comprising all sins, because since a universal good is more desirable than a particu- every sin includes an inordinate turning to a mutable good, lar good, they move the appetite more than any individual as stated above (q. 72, a. 2). Thirdly, as denoting an in- goods, which along with many others can be procured by clination of a corrupt nature to desire corruptible goods means of money. inordinately: and they say that in this sense covetousness Reply to Objection 3. Just as in natural things we do is the root of all sins, comparing it to the root of a tree, not ask what always happens, but what happens most fre- which draws its sustenance from earth, just as every sin quently, for the reason that the nature of corruptible things grows out of the love of temporal things. can be hindered, so as not always to act in the same way; Now, though all this is true, it does not seem to explain so also in moral matters, we consider what happens in the the mind of the Apostle when he states that covetousness majority of cases, not what happens invariably, for the rea- is the root of all sins. For in that passage he clearly speaks son that the will does not act of necessity. So when we say against those who, because they “will become rich, fall that covetousness is the root of all evils, we do not assert into temptation, and into the snare of the devil. . . for cov- that no other evil can be its root, but that other evils more etousness is the root of all evils.” Hence it is evident that frequently arise therefrom, for the reason given. 991 Whether pride is the beginning of every sin? Ia IIae q. 84 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that pride is not the be- overturned the thrones of proud princes”; indeed this is ginning of every sin. For the root is a beginning of a tree, the point of nearly the whole chapter. We must therefore so that the beginning of a sin seems to be the same as the say that pride, even as denoting a special sin, is the begin- root of sin. Now covetousness is the root of every sin, as ning of every sin. For we must take note that, in voluntary stated above (a. 1). Therefore it is also the beginning of actions, such as sins, there is a twofold order, of intention, every sin, and not pride. and of execution. In the former order, the principle is the Objection 2. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): end, as we have stated many times before (q. 1, a. 1, ad “The beginning of the pride of man is apostasy [Douay: 1; q. 18, a. 7, ad 2; q. 15, a. 1, ad 2; q. 25, a. 2). Now ‘to fall off’] from God.” But apostasy from God is a sin. man’s end in acquiring all temporal goods is that, through Therefore another sin is the beginning of pride, so that the their means, he may have some perfection and excellence. latter is not the beginning of every sin. Therefore, from this point of view, pride, which is the de- Objection 3. Further, the beginning of every sin sire to excel, is said to be the “beginning” of every sin. On would seem to be that which causes all sins. Now this is the other hand, in the order of execution, the first place be- inordinate self-love, which, according to Augustine (De longs to that which by furnishing the opportunity of ful- Civ. Dei xiv), “builds up the city of Babylon.” Therefore filling all desires of sin, has the character of a root, and self-love and not pride, is the beginning of every sin. such are riches; so that, from this point of view, covetous- On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): “Pride ness is said to be the “root” of all evils, as stated above is the beginning of all sin.” (a. 1). I answer that, Some say pride is to be taken in three This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire to excel; and Reply to Objection 2. Apostasy from God is stated to thus it is a special sin. Secondly, as denoting actual con- be the beginning of pride, in so far as it denotes a turning tempt of God, to the effect of not being subject to His away from God, because from the fact that man wishes commandment; and thus, they say, it is a generic sin. not to be subject to God, it follows that he desires inordi- Thirdly, as denoting an inclination to this contempt, ow- nately his own excellence in temporal things. Wherefore, ing to the corruption of nature; and in this sense they in the passage quoted, apostasy from God does not denote say that it is the beginning of every sin, and that it dif- the special sin, but rather that general condition of every fers from covetousness, because covetousness regards sin sin, consisting in its turning away from God. It may also as turning towards the mutable good by which sin is, as be said that apostasy from God is said to be the begin- it were, nourished and fostered, for which reason cov- ning of pride, because it is the first species of pride. For etousness is called the “root”; whereas pride regards sin it is characteristic of pride to be unwilling to be subject to as turning away from God, to Whose commandment man any superior, and especially to God; the result being that refuses to be subject, for which reason it is called the “be- a man is unduly lifted up, in respect of the other species ginning,” because the beginning of evil consists in turning of pride. away from God. Reply to Objection 3. In desiring to excel, man loves Now though all this is true, nevertheless it does not ex- himself, for to love oneself is the same as to desire some plain the mind of the wise man who said (Ecclus. 10:15): good for oneself. Consequently it amounts to the same “Pride is the beginning of all sin.” For it is evident that he whether we reckon pride or self-love as the beginning of is speaking of pride as denoting inordinate desire to ex- every evil. cel, as is clear from what follows (verse 17): “God hath Whether any other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called capital? Ia IIae q. 84 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that no other special sins, movement follow from the head. But sin implies privation besides pride and avarice, should be called capital. Be- of order. Therefore sin has not the character of head: so cause “the head seems to be to an animal, what the root that no sins should be called capital. is to a plant,” as stated in De Anima ii, text. 38: for the Objection 3. Further, capital crimes are those which roots are like a mouth. If therefore covetousness is called receive capital punishment. But every kind of sin com- the “root of all evils,” it seems that it alone, and no other prises some that are punished thus. Therefore the capital sin, should be called a capital vice. sins are not certain specific sins. Objection 2. Further, the head bears a certain relation On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) enumer- of order to the other members, in so far as sensation and ates certain special vices under the name of capital. 992 I answer that, The word capital is derived from “ca-vices to the “leaders of an army.” put” [a head]. Now the head, properly speaking, is that Reply to Objection 1. The term “capital” is taken part of an animal’s body, which is the principle and direc- from “caput” and applied to something connected with, tor of the whole animal. Hence, metaphorically speaking, or partaking of the head, as having some property thereof, every principle is called a head, and even men who direct but not as being the head taken literally. And therefore and govern others are called heads. Accordingly a capital the capital vices are not only those which have the char- vice is so called, in the first place, from “head” taken in acter of primary origin, as covetousness which is called the proper sense, and thus the name “capital” is given to the “root,” and pride which is called the beginning, but a sin for which capital punishment is inflicted. It is not in also those which have the character of proximate origin in this sense that we are now speaking of capital sins, but in respect of several sins. another sense, in which the term “capital” is derived from Reply to Objection 2. Sin lacks order in so far as it head, taken metaphorically for a principle or director of turns away from God, for in this respect it is an evil, and others. In this way a capital vice is one from which other evil, according to Augustine (De Natura Boni iv), is “the vices arise, chiefly by being their final cause, which ori- privation of mode, species and order.” But in so far as gin is formal, as stated above (q. 72, a. 6). Wherefore a sin implies a turning to something, it regards some good: capital vice is not only the principle of others, but is also wherefore, in this respect, there can be order in sin. their director and, in a way, their leader: because the art Reply to Objection 3. This objection considers cap- or habit, to which the end belongs, is always the princi- ital sin as so called from the punishment it deserves, in ple and the commander in matters concerning the means. which sense we are not taking it here. Hence Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) compares these capital Whether the seven capital vices are suitably reckoned? Ia IIae q. 84 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), the capital vices reckon seven capital vices, viz. vainglory, envy, anger, are those which give rise to others, especially by way of sloth, covetousness, gluttony, lust. For sins are opposed final cause. Now this kind of origin may take place in to virtues. But there are four principal virtues, as stated two ways. First, on account of the condition of the sinner, above (q. 61, a. 2). Therefore there are only four principal who is disposed so as to have a strong inclination for one or capital vices. particular end, the result being that he frequently goes for- Objection 2. Further, the passions of the soul are ward to other sins. But this kind of origin does not come causes of sin, as stated above (q. 77). But there are four under the consideration of art, because man’s particular principal passions of the soul; two of which, viz. hope and dispositions are infinite in number. Secondly, on account fear, are not mentioned among the above sins, whereas of a natural relationship of the ends to one another: and certain vices are mentioned to which pleasure and sad- it is in this way that most frequently one vice arises from ness belong, since pleasure belongs to gluttony and lust, another, so that this kind of origin can come under the and sadness to sloth and envy. Therefore the principal sins consideration of art. are unfittingly enumerated. Accordingly therefore, those vices are called capital, Objection 3. Further, anger is not a principal pas- whose ends have certain fundamental reasons for moving sion. Therefore it should not be placed among the princi- the appetite; and it is in respect of these fundamental rea- pal vices. sons that the capital vices are differentiated. Now a thing Objection 4. Further, just as covetousness or avarice moves the appetite in two ways. First, directly and of its is the root of sin, so is pride the beginning of sin, as stated very nature: thus good moves the appetite to seek it, while above (a. 2). But avarice is reckoned to be one of the cap- evil, for the same reason, moves the appetite to avoid it. ital vices. Therefore pride also should be placed among Secondly, indirectly and on account of something else, as the capital vices. it were: thus one seeks an evil on account of some atten- Objection 5. Further, some sins are committed which dant good, or avoids a good on account of some attendant cannot be caused through any of these: as, for instance, evil. when one sins through ignorance, or when one commits Again, man’s good is threefold. For, in the first place, a sin with a good intention, e.g. steals in order to give an there is a certain good of the soul, which derives its as- alms. Therefore the capital vices are insufficiently enu- pect of appetibility, merely through being apprehended, merated. viz. the excellence of honor and praise, and this good is On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory who sought inordinately by “vainglory.” Secondly, there is the enumerates them in this way (Moral. xxxi, 17). good of the body, and this regards either the preservation 993 of the individual, e.g. meat and drink, which good is pur-passions. Now all the passions of the irascible part arise sued inordinately by “gluttony,” or the preservation of the from passions of the concupiscible part; and these are all, species, e.g. sexual intercourse, which good is sought in- in a way, directed to pleasure or sorrow. Hence plea- ordinately by “lust.” Thirdly, there is external good, viz. sure and sorrow have a prominent place among the capital riches, to which “covetousness” is referred. These same sins, as being the most important of the passions, as stated four vices avoid inordinately the contrary evils. above (q. 25, a. 4). Or again, good moves the appetite chiefly through Reply to Objection 3. Although anger is not a prin- possessing some property of happiness, which all men cipal passion, yet it has a distinct place among the capital seek naturally. Now in the first place happiness im- vices, because it implies a special kind of movement in plies perfection, since happiness is a perfect good, to the appetite, in so far as recrimination against another’s which belongs excellence or renown, which is desired by good has the aspect of a virtuous good, i.e. of the right to “pride” or “vainglory.” Secondly, it implies satiety, which vengeance. “covetousness” seeks in riches that give promise thereof. Reply to Objection 4. Pride is said to be the begin- Thirdly, it implies pleasure, without which happiness is ning of every sin, in the order of the end, as stated above impossible, as stated in Ethic. i, 7; x, 6,7,[8] and this (a. 2): and it is in the same order that we are to consider “gluttony” and “lust” pursue. the capital sin as being principal. Wherefore pride, like On the other hand, avoidance of good on account of an a universal vice, is not counted along with the others, but attendant evil occurs in two ways. For this happens either is reckoned as the “queen of them all,” as Gregory states in respect of one’s own good, and thus we have “sloth,” (Moral. xxxi, 27). But covetousness is said to be the root which is sadness about one’s spiritual good, on account of from another point of view, as stated above (Aa. 1,2). the attendant bodily labor: or else it happens in respect of Reply to Objection 5. These vices are called capi- another’s good, and this, if it be without recrimination, be- tal because others, most frequently, arise from them: so longs to “envy,” which is sadness about another’s good as that nothing prevents some sins from arising out of other being a hindrance to one’s own excellence, while if it be causes. Nevertheless we might say that all the sins which with recrimination with a view to vengeance, it is “anger.” are due to ignorance, can be reduced to sloth, to which Again, these same vices seek the contrary evils. pertains the negligence of a man who declines to acquire Reply to Objection 1. Virtue and vice do not origi- spiritual goods on account of the attendant labor; for the nate in the same way: since virtue is caused by the sub- ignorance that can cause sin, is due to negligence, as ordination of the appetite to reason, or to the immutable stated above (q. 76, a. 2). That a man commit a sin with good, which is God, whereas vice arises from the appetite a good intention, seems to point to ignorance, in so far as for mutable good. Wherefore there is no need for the prin- he knows not that evil should not be done that good may cipal vices to be contrary to the principal virtues. come of it. Reply to Objection 2. Fear and hope are irascible 994 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 85 Of the Effects of Sin, and, First, of the Corruption of the Good of Nature (In Six Articles) We must now consider the effects of sin; and (1) the corruption of the good of nature; (2) the stain on the soul; (3) the debt of punishment. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the good of nature is diminished by sin? (2) Whether it can be taken away altogether? (3) Of the four wounds, mentioned by Bede, with which human nature is stricken in consequence of sin. (4) Whether privation of mode, species and order is an effect of sin? (5) Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin? (6) Whether they are, in any way, natural to man? Whether sin diminishes the good of nature? Ia IIae q. 85 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that sin does not diminish ture. Thirdly, the gift of original justice, conferred on the the good of nature. For man’s sin is no worse than the whole of human nature in the person of the first man, may devil’s. But natural good remains unimpaired in devils af- be called a good of nature. ter sin, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore Accordingly, the first-mentioned good of nature is nei- neither does sin diminish the good of human nature. ther destroyed nor diminished by sin. The third good of Objection 2. Further, when that which follows nature was entirely destroyed through the sin of our first is changed, that which precedes remains unchanged, parent. But the second good of nature, viz. the natu- since substance remains the same when its accidents are ral inclination to virtue, is diminished by sin. Because changed. But nature exists before the voluntary action. human acts produce an inclination to like acts, as stated Therefore, when sin has caused a disorder in a voluntary above (q. 50, a. 1). Now from the very fact that thing act, nature is not changed on that account, so that the good becomes inclined to one of two contraries, its inclination of nature be diminished. to the other contrary must needs be diminished. Where- Objection 3. Further, sin is an action, while diminu- fore as sin is opposed to virtue, from the very fact that a tion is a passion. Now no agent is passive by the very man sins, there results a diminution of that good of nature, reason of its acting, although it is possible for it to act on which is the inclination to virtue. one thing, and to be passive as regards another. Therefore Reply to Objection 1. Dionysius is speaking of the he who sins, does not, by his sin, diminish the good of his first-mentioned good of nature, which consists in “being, nature. living and understanding,” as anyone may see who reads Objection 4. Further, no accident acts on its subject: the context. because that which is patient is a potential being, while Reply to Objection 2. Although nature precedes the that which is subjected to an accident, is already an actual voluntary action, it has an inclination to a certain volun- being as regards that accident. But sin is in the good of tary action. Wherefore nature is not changed in itself, nature as an accident in a subject. Therefore sin does not through a change in the voluntary action: it is the incli- diminish the good of nature, since to diminish is to act. nation that is changed in so far as it is directed to its term. On the contrary, “A certain man going down from Reply to Objection 3. A voluntary action proceeds Jerusalem to Jericho (Lk. 10:30), i.e. to the corruption of from various powers, active and passive. The result is that sin, was stripped of his gifts, and wounded in his nature,” through voluntary actions something is caused or taken as Bede∗ expounds the passage. Therefore sin diminishes away in the man who acts, as we have stated when treat- the good of nature. ing of the production of habits (q. 51, a. 2). I answer that, The good of human nature is threefold. Reply to Objection 4. An accident does not act effec- First, there are the principles of which nature is consti- tively on its subject, but it acts on it formally, in the same tuted, and the properties that flow from them, such as the sense as when we say that whiteness makes a thing white. powers of the soul, and so forth. Secondly, since man has In this way there is nothing to hinder sin from diminish- from nature an inclination to virtue, as stated above (q. 60, ing the good of nature; but only in so far as sin is itself a. 1; q. 63, a. 1), this inclination to virtue is a good of na- a diminution of the good of nature, through being an in- ∗ The quotation is from the Glossa Ordinaria of Strabo 995 ordinateness of action. But as regards the inordinateness clines the reason and will, as stated above (q. 77, Aa. 1, of the agent, we must say that such like inordinateness 2). The result of this is the inordinateness, not as though is caused by the fact that in the acts of the soul, there is an accident acted on its own subject, but in so far as the an active, and a passive element: thus the sensible object object acts on the power, and one power acts on another moves the sensitive appetite, and the sensitive appetite in- and puts it out of order. Whether the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin? Ia IIae q. 85 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the entire good of quantity be halved, and one half be diminished by half, it human nature can be destroyed by sin. For the good of will be possible to go on thus indefinitely, provided that human nature is finite, since human nature itself is finite. what is subtracted in each case be less than what was sub- Now any finite thing is entirely taken away, if the subtrac- tracted before. But this does not apply to the question at tion be continuous. Since therefore the good of nature can issue, since a subsequent sin does not diminish the good be continually diminished by sin, it seems that in the end of nature less than a previous sin, but perhaps more, if it it can be entirely taken away. be a more grievous sin. Objection 2. Further, in a thing of one nature, the We must, therefore, explain the matter otherwise by whole and the parts are uniform, as is evidently the case saying that the aforesaid inclination is to be considered as with air, water, flesh and all bodies with similar parts. But a middle term between two others: for it is based on the ra- the good of nature is wholly uniform. Since therefore a tional nature as on its root, and tends to the good of virtue, part thereof can be taken away by sin, it seems that the as to its term and end. Consequently its diminution may whole can also be taken away by sin. be understood in two ways: first, on the part of its rood, Objection 3. Further, the good of nature, that is weak- secondly, on the part of its term. In the first way, it is not ened by sin, is aptitude for virtue. Now this aptitude is diminished by sin, because sin does not diminish nature, destroyed entirely in some on account of sin: thus the lost as stated above (a. 1). But it is diminished in the second cannot be restored to virtue any more than the blind can way, in so far as an obstacle is placed against its attain- to sight. Therefore sin can take away the good of nature ing its term. Now if it were diminished in the first way, entirely. it would needs be entirely destroyed at last by the rational On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xiv) nature being entirely destroyed. Since, however, it is di- that “evil does not exist except in some good.” But the minished on the part of the obstacle which is place against evil of sin cannot be in the good of virtue or of grace, its attaining its term, it is evident that it can be diminished because they are contrary to it. Therefore it must be in indefinitely, because obstacles can be placed indefinitely, the good of nature, and consequently it does not destroy it inasmuch as man can go on indefinitely adding sin to sin: entirely. and yet it cannot be destroyed entirely, because the root of I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the good of na- this inclination always remains. An example of this may ture, that is diminished by sin, is the natural inclination to be seen in a transparent body, which has an inclination virtue, which is befitting to man from the very fact that he to receive light, from the very fact that it is transparent; is a rational being; for it is due to this that he performs yet this inclination or aptitude is diminished on the part of actions in accord with reason, which is to act virtuously. supervening clouds, although it always remains rooted in Now sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact that the nature of the body. he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be ca- Reply to Objection 1. This objection avails when pable of sin. Wherefore it is not possible for this good of diminution is made by subtraction. But here the diminu- nature to be destroyed entirely. tion is made by raising obstacles, and this neither dimin- Since, however, this same good of nature may be con- ishes nor destroys the root of the inclination, as stated tinually diminished by sin, some, in order to illustrate this, above. have made use of the example of a finite thing being di- Reply to Objection 2. The natural inclination is in- minished indefinitely, without being entirely destroyed. deed wholly uniform: nevertheless it stands in relation For the Philosopher says (Phys. i, text. 37) that if from both to its principle and to its term, in respect of which a finite magnitude a continual subtraction be made in the diversity of relation, it is diminished on the one hand, and same quantity, it will at last be entirely destroyed, for in- not on the other. stance if from any finite length I continue to subtract the Reply to Objection 3. Even in the lost the natural length of a span. If, however, the subtraction be made inclination to virtue remains, else they would have no re- each time in the same proportion, and not in the same morse of conscience. That it is not reduced to act is owing quantity, it may go on indefinitely, as, for instance, if a to their being deprived of grace by Divine justice. Thus 996 even in a blind man the aptitude to see remains in the very for the lack of a cause capable of reducing it, by forming root of his nature, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally the organ requisite for sight. endowed with sight: yet this aptitude is not reduced to act, Whether weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are suitably reckoned as the Ia IIae q. 85 a. 3 wounds of nature consequent upon sin? Objection 1. It would seem that weakness, ignorance, wound of ignorance; in so far as the will is deprived of its malice and concupiscence are not suitably reckoned as order of good, there is the wound of malice; in so far as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin. For one same the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous, there thing is not both effect and cause of the same thing. But is the wound of weakness; and in so far as the concupis- these are reckoned to be causes of sin, as appears from cible is deprived of its order to the delectable, moderated what has been said above (q. 76, a. 1; q. 77, Aa. 3,5; q. 78, by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence. a. 1). Therefore they should not be reckoned as effects of Accordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the sin. whole of human nature as a result of our first parent’s sin. Objection 2. Further, malice is the name of a sin. But since the inclination to the good of virtue is dimin- Therefore it should have no place among the effects of ished in each individual on account of actual sin, as was sin. explained above (Aa. 1, 2), these four wounds are also Objection 3. Further, concupiscence is something the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin, the rea- natural, since it is an act of the concupiscible power. But son is obscured, especially in practical matters, the will that which is natural should not be reckoned a wound of hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult and nature. Therefore concupiscence should not be reckoned concupiscence more impetuous. a wound of nature. Reply to Objection 1. There is no reason why the ef- Objection 4. Further, it has been stated (q. 77, a. 3) fect of one sin should not be the cause of another: because that to sin from weakness is the same as to sin from pas- the soul, through sinning once, is more easily inclined to sion. But concupiscence is a passion. Therefore it should sin again. not be condivided with weakness. Reply to Objection 2. Malice is not to be taken here Objection 5. Further, Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. as a sin, but as a certain proneness of the will to evil, ac- lxvii, 67) reckons “two things to be punishments inflicted cording to the words of Gn. 8:21: “Man’s senses are prone on the soul of the sinner, viz. ignorance and difficulty,” to evil from his youth”†. from which arise “error and vexation,” which four do not Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 82, a. 3, coincide with the four in question. Therefore it seems that ad 1), concupiscence is natural to man, in so far as it is one or the other reckoning is incomplete. subject to reason: whereas, in so far as it is goes beyond On the contrary, The authority of Bede suffices∗. the bounds of reason, it is unnatural to man. I answer that, As a result of original justice, the rea- Reply to Objection 4. Speaking in a general way, son had perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while every passion can be called a weakness, in so far as it reason itself was perfected by God, and was subject to weakens the soul’s strength and clogs the reason. Bede, Him. Now this same original justice was forfeited through however, took weakness in the strict sense, as contrary to the sin of our first parent, as already stated (q. 81, a. 2); so fortitude which pertains to the irascible. that all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute Reply to Objection 5. The “difficulty” which is of their proper order, whereby they are naturally directed mentioned in this book of Augustine, includes the three to virtue; which destitution is called a wounding of nature. wounds affecting the appetitive powers, viz. “malice,” Again, there are four of the soul’s powers that can be “weakness” and “concupiscence,” for it is owing to these subject of virtue, as stated above (q. 61, a. 2), viz. the three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the good. “Er- reason, where prudence resides, the will, where justice is, ror” and “vexation” are consequent wounds, since a man the irascible, the subject of fortitude, and the concupis- is vexed through being weakened in respect of the objects cible, the subject of temperance. Therefore in so far as of his concupiscence. the reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the ∗ Reference not known † Vulgate: ‘The imagination and thought of man’s heart are prone to evil from his youth.’ 997 Whether privation of mode, species and order is the effect of sin? Ia IIae q. 85 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that privation of mode, form, whether substantial or accidental, of anything what- species and order is not the effect of sin. For Augustine ever, is according to some measure, wherefore it is stated says (De Natura Boni iii) that “where these three abound, in Metaph. viii, that “the forms of things are like num- the good is great; where they are less, there is less good; bers,” so that a form has a certain “mode” corresponding where they are not, there is no good at all.” But sin does to its measure. Lastly owing to its form, each thing has a not destroy the good of nature. Therefore it does not de- relation of “order” to something else. stroy mode, species and order. Accordingly there are different grades of mode, Objection 2. Further, nothing is its own cause. But species and order, corresponding to the different degrees sin itself is the “privation of mode, species and order,” as of good. For there is a good belonging to the very sub- Augustine states (De Natura Boni iv). Therefore privation stance of nature, which good has its mode, species and or- of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin. der, and is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. There Objection 3. Further, different effects result from dif- is again the good of the natural inclination, which also has ferent sins. Now since mode, species and order are di- its mode, species and order; and this is diminished by sin, verse, their corresponding privations must be diverse also, as stated above (Aa. 1 ,2), but is not entirely destroyed. and, consequently, must be the result of different sins. Again, there is the good of virtue and grace: this too has Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the its mode, species and order, and is entirely taken away by effect of each sin. sin. Lastly, there is a good consisting in the ordinate act On the contrary, Sin is to the soul what weakness is itself, which also has its mode, species and order, the pri- to the body, according to Ps. 6:3, “Have mercy on me, O vation of which is essentially sin. Hence it is clear both Lord, for I am weak.” Now weakness deprives the body how sin is privation of mode, species and order, and how of mode, species and order. it destroys or diminishes mode, species and order. I answer that, As stated in the Ia, q. 5, a. 5, mode, This suffices for the Replies to the first two Objections. species and order are consequent upon every created Reply to Objection 3. Mode, species and order fol- good, as such, and also upon every being. Because ev- low one from the other, as explained above: and so they ery being and every good as such depends on its form are destroyed or diminished together. from which it derives its “species.” Again, any kind of Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin? Ia IIae q. 85 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that death and other bod- sult being that the effect is directly intended by the cause. ily defects are not the result of sin. Because equal causes Consequently, as death and such like defects are beside have equal effects. Now these defects are not equal in all, the intention of the sinner, it is evident that sin is not, of but abound in some more than in others, whereas original itself, the cause of these defects. Accidentally, one thing sin, from which especially these defects seem to result, is is the cause of another if it causes it by removing an ob- equal in all, as stated above (q. 82, a. 4). Therefore death stacle: thus it is stated in Phys. viii, text. 32, that “by disand suchlike defects are not the result of sin. placing a pillar a man moves accidentally the stone resting Objection 2. Further, if the cause is removed, the ef- thereon.” In this way the sin of our first parent is the cause fect is removed. But these defects are not removed, when of death and all such like defects in human nature, in so all sin is removed by Baptism or Penance. Therefore they far as by the sin of our first parent original justice was are not the effect of sin. taken away, whereby not only were the lower powers of Objection 3. Further, actual sin has more of the char- the soul held together under the control of reason, with- acter of guilt than original sin has. But actual sin does out any disorder whatever, but also the whole body was not change the nature of the body by subjecting it to some held together in subjection to the soul, without any defect, defect. Much less, therefore, does original sin. Therefore as stated in the Ia, q. 97, a. 1. Wherefore, original jus- death and other bodily defects are not the result of sin. tice being forfeited through the sin of our first parent; just On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12), “By as human nature was stricken in the soul by the disorder one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death.” among the powers, as stated above (a. 3; q. 82, a. 3), so I answer that, One thing causes another in two ways: also it became subject to corruption, by reason of disorder first, by reason of itself; secondly, accidentally. By reason in the body. of itself, one thing is the cause of another, if it produces its Now the withdrawal of original justice has the char-effect by reason of the power of its nature or form, the re- acter of punishment, even as the withdrawal of grace has. 998 Consequently, death and all consequent bodily defects are are removed by the same cause that removes these de-punishments of original sin. And although the defects are fects, according to the Apostle (Rom. 8:11): “He. . . shall not intended by the sinner, nevertheless they are ordered quicken. . . your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that according to the justice of God Who inflicts them as pun- dwelleth in you”: but each is done according to the order ishments. of Divine wisdom, at a fitting time. Because it is right Reply to Objection 1. Causes that produce their ef- that we should first of all be conformed to Christ’s suffer- fects of themselves, if equal, produce equal effects: for if ings, before attaining to the immortality and impassibility such causes be increased or diminished, the effect is in- of glory, which was begun in Him, and by Him acquired creased or diminished. But equal causes of an obstacle for us. Hence it behooves that our bodies should remain, being removed, do not point to equal effects. For suppos- for a time, subject to suffering, in order that we may merit ing a man employs equal force in displacing two columns, the impassibility of glory, in conformity with Christ. it does not follow that the movements of the stones resting Reply to Objection 3. Two things may be considered on them will be equal; but that one will move with greater in actual sin, the substance of the act, and the aspect of velocity, which has the greater weight according to the fault. As regards the substance of the act, actual sin can property of its nature, to which it is left when the obsta- cause a bodily defect: thus some sicken and die through cle to its falling is removed. Accordingly, when original eating too much. But as regards the fault, it deprives us of justice is removed, the nature of the human body is left to grace which is given to us that we may regulate the acts itself, so that according to diverse natural temperaments, of the soul, but not that we may ward off defects of the some men’s bodies are subject to more defects, some to body, as original justice did. Wherefore actual sin does fewer, although original sin is equal in all. not cause those defects, as original sin does. Reply to Objection 2. Both original and actual sin Whether death and other defects are natural to man? Ia IIae q. 85 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that death and such like I answer that, We may speak of any corruptible thing defects are natural to man. For “the corruptible and the in- in two ways; first, in respect of its universal nature, sec- corruptible differ generically” (Metaph. x, text. 26). But ondly, as regards its particular nature. A thing’s particular man is of the same genus as other animals which are nat- nature is its own power of action and self-preservation. urally corruptible. Therefore man is naturally corruptible. And in respect of this nature, every corruption and defect Objection 2. Further, whatever is composed of con- is contrary to nature, as stated in De Coelo ii, text. 37, traries is naturally corruptible, as having within itself the since this power tends to the being and preservation of the cause of corruption. But such is the human body. There- thing to which it belongs. fore it is naturally corruptible. On the other hand, the universal nature is an active Objection 3. Further, a hot thing naturally consumes force in some universal principle of nature, for instance moisture. Now human life is preserved by hot and moist in some heavenly body; or again belonging to some supe- elements. Since therefore the vital functions are fulfilled rior substance, in which sense God is said by some to be by the action of natural heat, as stated in De Anima ii, text. “the Nature Who makes nature.” This force intends the 50, it seems that death and such like defects are natural to good and the preservation of the universe, for which alter- man. nate generation and corruption in things are requisite: and On the contrary, (1) God made in man whatever is in this respect corruption and defect in things are natural, natural to him. Now “God made not death” (Wis. 1:13). not indeed as regards the inclination of the form which is Therefore death is not natural to man. the principle of being and perfection, but as regards the in- (2) Further, that which is natural cannot be called ei- clination of matter which is allotted proportionately to its ther a punishment or an evil: since what is natural to a particular form according to the discretion of the universal thing is suitable to it. But death and such like defects agent. And although every form intends perpetual being are the punishment of original sin, as stated above (a. 5). as far as it can, yet no form of a corruptible being can Therefore they are not natural to man. achieve its own perpetuity, except the rational soul; for (3) Further, matter is proportionate to form, and every- the reason that the latter is not entirely subject to matter, thing to its end. Now man’s end is everlasting happiness, as other forms are; indeed it has an immaterial operation as stated above (q. 2, a. 7; q. 5 , Aa. 3,4): and the form of its own, as stated in the Ia, q. 75, a. 2. Consequently as of the human body is the rational soul, as was proved in regards his form, incorruption is more natural to man than the Ia, q. 75, a. 6. Therefore the human body is naturally to other corruptible things. But since that very form has incorruptible. a matter composed of contraries, from the inclination of 999 that matter there results corruptibility in the whole. In this clined to rust, results from the natural disposition of iron, respect man is naturally corruptible as regards the nature nor does the workman choose this in the iron, indeed he of his matter left to itself, but not as regards the nature of would do without it if he could: wherefore this disposi- his form. tion of matter is not adapted to the workman’s intention, The first three objections argue on the side of the mat- nor to the purpose of his art. In like manner the human ter; while the other three argue on the side of the form. body is the matter chosen by nature in respect of its be- Wherefore in order to solve them, we must observe that ing of a mixed temperament, in order that it may be most the form of man which is the rational soul, in respect of suitable as an organ of touch and of the other sensitive its incorruptibility is adapted to its end, which is everlast- and motive powers. Whereas the fact that it is corruptible ing happiness: whereas the human body, which is cor- is due to a condition of matter, and is not chosen by na- ruptible, considered in respect of its nature, is, in a way, ture: indeed nature would choose an incorruptible matter adapted to its form, and, in another way, it is not. For we if it could. But God, to Whom every nature is subject, in may note a twofold condition in any matter, one which forming man supplied the defect of nature, and by the gift the agent chooses, and another which is not chosen by the of original justice, gave the body a certain incorruptibility, agent, and is a natural condition of matter. Thus, a smith as was stated in the Ia, q. 97, a. 1. It is in this sense that in order to make a knife, chooses a matter both hard and it is said that “God made not death,” and that death is the flexible, which can be sharpened so as to be useful for punishment of sin. cutting, and in respect of this condition iron is a matter This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. adapted for a knife: but that iron be breakable and in- 1000 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 86 Of the Stain of Sin (In Two Articles) We must now consider the stain of sin; under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether an effect of sin is a stain on the soul? (2) Whether it remains in the soul after the act of sin? Whether sin causes a stain on the soul? Ia IIae q. 86 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that sin causes no stain through contact with another body, e.g. a garment, gold on the soul. For a higher nature cannot be defiled by con- or silver, or the like. Accordingly a stain is ascribed to tact with a lower nature: hence the sun’s ray is not defiled spiritual things in like manner. Now man’s soul has a by contact with tainted bodies, as Augustine says (Contra twofold comeliness; one from the refulgence of the nat- Quinque Haereses v). Now the human soul is of a much ural light of reason, whereby he is directed in his actions; higher nature than mutable things, to which it turns by sin- the other, from the refulgence of the Divine light, viz. of ning. Therefore it does not contract a stain from them by wisdom and grace, whereby man is also perfected for the sinning. purpose of doing good and fitting actions. Now, when the Objection 2. Further, sin is chiefly in the will, as soul cleaves to things by love, there is a kind of contact in stated above (q. 74, Aa. 1,2). Now the will is in the rea- the soul: and when man sins, he cleaves to certain things, son, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 42. But the reason or against the light of reason and of the Divine law, as shown intellect is not stained by considering anything whatever; above (q. 71, a. 6). Wherefore the loss of comeliness oc- rather indeed is it perfected thereby. Therefore neither is casioned by this contact, is metaphorically called a stain the will stained by sin. on the soul. Objection 3. Further, if sin causes a stain, this stain Reply to Objection 1. The soul is not defiled by in- is either something positive, or a pure privation. If it be ferior things, by their own power, as though they acted on something positive, it can only be either a disposition or a the soul: on the contrary, the soul, by its own action, de- habit: for it seems that nothing else can be caused by an files itself, through cleaving to them inordinately, against act. But it is neither disposition nor habit: for it happens the light of reason and of the Divine law. that a stain remains even after the removal of a disposition Reply to Objection 2. The action of the intellect is or habit; for instance, in a man who after committing a accomplished by the intelligible thing being in the intel- mortal sin of prodigality, is so changed as to fall into a sin lect, according to the mode of the intellect, so that the of the opposite vice. Therefore the stain does not denote intellect is not defiled, but perfected, by them. On the anything positive in the soul. Again, neither is it a pure other hand, the act of the will consists in a movement to- privation. Because all sins agree on the part of aversion wards things themselves, so that love attaches the soul to and privation of grace: and so it would follow that there is the thing loved. Thus it is that the soul is stained, when but one stain caused by all sins. Therefore the stain is not it cleaves inordinately, according to Osee 9:10: “They . the effect of sin. . . became abominable as those things were which they On the contrary, It was said to Solomon (Ecclus. loved.” 47:22): “Thou hast stained thy glory”: and it is written Reply to Objection 3. The stain is neither something (Eph. 5:27): “That He might present it to Himself a glori- positive in the soul, nor does it denote a pure privation: ous church not having spot or wrinkle”: and in each case it denotes a privation of the soul’s brightness in relation it is question of the stain of sin. Therefore a stain is the to its cause, which is sin; wherefore diverse sins occasion effect of sin. diverse stains. It is like a shadow, which is the privation of I answer that, A stain is properly ascribed to cor- light through the interposition of a body, and which varies poreal things, when a comely body loses its comeliness according to the diversity of the interposed bodies. 1001 Whether the stain remains in the soul after the act of sin? Ia IIae q. 86 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the stain does not re- he returns to the Divine light and to the light of reason, main in the soul after the act of sin. For after an action, the stain is removed. For although the act of sin ceases, nothing remains in the soul except habit or disposition. whereby man withdrew from the light of reason and of But the stain is not a habit or disposition, as stated above the Divine law, man does not at once return to the state (a. 1, obj. 3). Therefore the stain does not remain in the in which he was before, and it is necessary that his will soul after the act of sin. should have a movement contrary to the previous move- Objection 2. Further, the stain is to the sin what the ment. Thus if one man be parted from another on account shadow is to the body, as stated above (a. 1, ad 3). But of some kind of movement, he is not reunited to him as the shadow does not remain when the body has passed by. soon as the movement ceases, but he needs to draw nigh Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul when the to him and to return by a contrary movement. act of sin is past. Reply to Objection 1. Nothing positive remains in the Objection 3. Further, every effect depends on its soul after the act of sin, except the disposition or habit; but cause. Now the cause of the stain is the act of sin. There-there does remain something private, viz. the privation of fore when the act of sin is no longer there, neither is the union with the Divine light. stain in the soul. Reply to Objection 2. After the interposed body has On the contrary, It is written (Jos. 22:17): “Is it a passed by, the transparent body remains in the same posi- small thing to you that you sinned with Beelphegor, and tion and relation as regards the illuminating body, and so the stain of that crime remaineth in you [Vulg.: ‘us’] to the shadow passes at once. But when the sin is past, the this day?” soul does not remain in the same relation to God: and so I answer that, The stain of sin remains in the soul there is no comparison. even when the act of sin is past. The reason for this is Reply to Objection 3. The act of sin parts man from that the stain, as stated above (a. 1 ), denotes a blemish in God, which parting causes the defect of brightness, just as the brightness of the soul, on account of its withdrawing local movement causes local parting. Wherefore, just as from the light of reason or of the Divine law. And there- when movement ceases, local distance is not removed, so fore so long as man remains out of this light, the stain neither, when the act of sin ceases, is the stain removed. of sin remains in him: but as soon as, moved by grace, 1002 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 87 Of the Debt of Punishment (In Eight Articles) We must now consider the debt of punishment. We shall consider (1) the debt itself; (2) mortal and venial sin, which differ in respect of the punishment due to them. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin? (2) Whether one sin can be the punishment of another? (3) Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment? (4) Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment that is infinite in quantity? (5) Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal and infinite punishment? (6) Whether the debt of punishment can remain after sin? (7) Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin? (8) Whether one person can incur punishment for another’s sin? Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin? Ia IIae q. 87 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the debt of punish- an offense against an order: wherefore he is put down, ment is not an effect of sin. For that which is accidentally in consequence, by that same order, which repression is related to a thing, does not seem to be its proper effect. punishment. Now the debt of punishment is accidentally related to sin, Accordingly, man can be punished with a threefold for it is beside the intention of the sinner. Therefore the punishment corresponding to the three orders to which debt of punishment is not an effect of sin. the human will is subject. In the first place a man’s na- Objection 2. Further, evil is not the cause of good. ture is subjected to the order of his own reason; secondly, But punishment is good, since it is just, and is from God. it is subjected to the order of another man who governs Therefore it is not an effect of sin, which is evil. him either in spiritual or in temporal matters, as a mem- Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Confess. i) that ber either of the state or of the household; thirdly, it is “every inordinate affection is its own punishment.” But subjected to the universal order of the Divine government. punishment does not incur a further debt of punishment, Now each of these orders is disturbed by sin, for the sin- because then it would go on indefinitely. Therefore sin ner acts against his reason, and against human and Divine does not incur the debt of punishment. law. Wherefore he incurs a threefold punishment; one, in- On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 2:9): “Tribu- flicted by himself, viz. remorse of conscience; another, lation and anguish upon every soul of man that worketh inflicted by man; and a third, inflicted by God. evil.” But to work evil is to sin. Therefore sin incurs a Reply to Objection 1. Punishment follows sin, inas- punishment which is signified by the words “tribulation much as this is an evil by reason of its being inordinate. and anguish.” Wherefore just as evil is accidental to the sinner’s act, be- I answer that, It has passed from natural things to hu- ing beside his intention, so also is the debt of punishment. man affairs that whenever one thing rises up against an- Reply to Objection 2. Further, a just punishment may other, it suffers some detriment therefrom. For we ob- be inflicted either by God or by man: wherefore the pun- serve in natural things that when one contrary supervenes, ishment itself is the effect of sin, not directly but disposi- the other acts with greater energy, for which reason “hot tively. Sin, however, makes man deserving of punishment, water freezes more rapidly,” as stated in Meteor. i, 12. and that is an evil: for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that Wherefore we find that the natural inclination of man is to “punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment is.” repress those who rise up against him. Now it is evident Consequently the debt of punishment is considered to be that all things contained in an order, are, in a manner, one, directly the effect of sin. in relation to the principle of that order. Consequently, Reply to Objection 3. This punishment of the “in- whatever rises up against an order, is put down by that ordinate affection” is due to sin as overturning the order order or by the principle thereof. And because sin is an of reason. Nevertheless sin incurs a further punishment, inordinate act, it is evident that whoever sins, commits through disturbing the order of the Divine or human law. 1003 Whether sin can be the punishment of sin? Ia IIae q. 87 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that sin cannot be the stated above (q. 79, a. 3), the result is that the sin which punishment of sin. For the purpose of punishment is to ensues from this is also a punishment accidentally. It is bring man back to the good of virtue, as the Philosopher in this sense that the Apostle speaks (Rom. 1:24) when declares (Ethic. x, 9). Now sin does not bring man back to he says: “Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of the good of virtue, but leads him in the opposite direction. their heart,” i.e. to their passions; because, to wit, when Therefore sin is not the punishment of sin. men are deprived of the help of Divine grace, they are Objection 2. Further, just punishments are from God, overcome by their passions. In this way sin is always said as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 82). But sin is not to be the punishment of a preceding sin. Secondly, by rea- from God, and is an injustice. Therefore sin cannot be the son of the substance of the act, which is such as to cause punishment of sin. pain, whether it be an interior act, as is clearly the case Objection 3. Further, the nature of punishment is to with anger or envy, or an exterior act, as is the case with be something against the will. But sin is something from one who endures considerable trouble and loss in order to the will, as shown above (q. 74, Aa. 1 ,2). Therefore sin achieve a sinful act, according to Wis. 5:7: “We wearied cannot be the punishment of sin. ourselves in the way of iniquity.” Thirdly, on the part of On the contrary, Gregory speaks (Hom. xi in Ezech.) the effect, so that one sin is said to be a punishment by that some sins are punishments of others. reason of its effect. In the last two ways, a sin is a punish- I answer that, We may speak of sin in two ways: first, ment not only in respect of a preceding sin, but also with in its essence, as such; secondly, as to that which is acci- regard to itself. dental thereto. Sin as such can nowise be the punishment Reply to Objection 1. Even when God punishes men of another. Because sin considered in its essence is some- by permitting them to fall into sin, this is directed to the thing proceeding from the will, for it is from this that it good of virtue. Sometimes indeed it is for the good of derives the character of guilt. Whereas punishment is es- those who are punished, when, to wit, men arise from sin, sentially something against the will, as stated in the Ia, more humble and more cautious. But it is always for the q. 48, a. 5. Consequently it is evident that sin regarded in amendment of others, who seeing some men fall from sin its essence can nowise be the punishment of sin. to sin, are the more fearful of sinning. With regard to On the other hand, sin can be the punishment of sin ac- the other two ways, it is evident that the punishment is cidentally in three ways. First, when one sin is the cause intended for the sinner’s amendment, since the very fact of another, by removing an impediment thereto. For pas- that man endures toil and loss in sinning, is of a nature to sions, temptations of the devil, and the like are causes of withdraw man from sin. sin, but are impeded by the help of Divine grace which is Reply to Objection 2. This objection considers sin withdrawn on account of sin. Wherefore since the with- essentially as such: and the same answer applies to the drawal of grace is a punishment, and is from God, as Third Objection. Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment? Ia IIae q. 87 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that no sin incurs a debt of Objection 4. Further, nothing accidental is infinite. eternal punishment. For a just punishment is equal to the But punishment is accidental, for it is not natural to the fault, since justice is equality: wherefore it is written (Is. one who is punished. Therefore it cannot be of infinite 27:8): “In measure against measure, when it shall be cast duration. off, thou shalt judge it.” Now sin is temporal. Therefore it On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:46): “These does not incur a debt of eternal punishment. shall go into everlasting punishment”; and (Mk. 3:29): Objection 2. Further, “punishments are a kind of “He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, shall medicine” (Ethic. ii, 3). But no medicine should be infi- never have forgiveness, but shall be guilty of an everlast- nite, because it is directed to an end, and “what is directed ing sin.” to an end, is not infinite,” as the Philosopher states (Polit. I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), sin incurs a debt i, 6). Therefore no punishment should be infinite. of punishment through disturbing an order. But the effect Objection 3. Further, no one does a thing always un- remains so long as the cause remains. Wherefore so long less he delights in it for its own sake. But “God hath not as the disturbance of the order remains the debt of pun- pleasure in the destruction of men” [Vulg.: ‘of the liv- ishment must needs remain also. Now disturbance of an ing’]. Therefore He will not inflict eternal punishment on order is sometimes reparable, sometimes irreparable: be- man. cause a defect which destroys the principle is irreparable, 1004 whereas if the principle be saved, defects can be repaired in his own eternity should be punished in God’s eternity. by virtue of that principle. For instance, if the principle of A man is said to have sinned in his own eternity, not only sight be destroyed, sight cannot be restored except by Di- as regards continual sinning throughout his whole life, but vine power; whereas, if the principle of sight be preserved, also because, from the very fact that he fixes his end in sin, while there arise certain impediments to the use of sight, he has the will to sin, everlastingly. Wherefore Gregory these can be remedied by nature or by art. Now in every says (Dial. iv, 44) that the “wicked would wish to live order there is a principle whereby one takes part in that without end, that they might abide in their sins for ever.” order. Consequently if a sin destroys the principle of the Reply to Objection 2. Even the punishment that is order whereby man’s will is subject to God, the disorder inflicted according to human laws, is not always intended will be such as to be considered in itself, irreparable, al- as a medicine for the one who is punished, but sometimes though it is possible to repair it by the power of God. Now only for others: thus when a thief is hanged, this is not the principle of this order is the last end, to which man ad- for his own amendment, but for the sake of others, that heres by charity. Therefore whatever sins turn man away at least they may be deterred from crime through fear of from God, so as to destroy charity, considered in them- the punishment, according to Prov. 19:25: “The wicked selves, incur a debt of eternal punishment. man being scourged, the fool shall be wiser.” Accordingly Reply to Objection 1. Punishment is proportionate to the eternal punishments inflicted by God on the reprobate, sin in point of severity, both in Divine and in human judg- are medicinal punishments for those who refrain from sin ments. In no judgment, however, as Augustine says (De through the thought of those punishments, according to Civ. Dei xxi, 11) is it requisite for punishment to equal Ps. 59:6: “Thou hast given a warning to them that fear fault in point of duration. For the fact that adultery or Thee, that they may flee from before the bow, that Thy murder is committed in a moment does not call for a mo- beloved may be delivered.” mentary punishment: in fact they are punished sometimes Reply to Objection 3. God does not delight in pun- by imprisonment or banishment for life—sometimes even ishments for their own sake; but He does delight in the by death; wherein account is not taken of the time oc- order of His justice, which requires them. cupied in killing, but rather of the expediency of remov- Reply to Objection 4. Although punishment is re- ing the murderer from the fellowship of the living, so that lated indirectly to nature, nevertheless it is essentially re- this punishment, in its own way, represents the eternity of lated to the disturbance of the order, and to God’s justice. punishment inflicted by God. Now according to Gregory Wherefore, so long as the disturbance lasts, the punish- (Dial. iv, 44) it is just that he who has sinned against God ment endures. Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity? Ia IIae q. 87 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that sin incurs a debt ways, in duration, and in quantity. Now the punishment of punishment infinite in quantity. For it is written (Jer. is infinite in duration. Therefore it is infinite in quantity 10:24): “Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment: also. and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing.” On the contrary, If this were the case, the punish- Now God’s anger or fury signifies metaphorically the ments of all mortal sins would be equal; because one infi- vengeance of Divine justice: and to be brought to noth- nite is not greater than another. ing is an infinite punishment, even as to make a thing out I answer that, Punishment is proportionate to sin. of nothing denotes infinite power. Therefore according to Now sin comprises two things. First, there is the turning God’s vengeance, sin is awarded a punishment infinite in away from the immutable good, which is infinite, where- quantity. fore, in this respect, sin is infinite. Secondly, there is the Objection 2. Further, quantity of punishment corre- inordinate turning to mutable good. In this respect sin is sponds to quantity of fault, according to Dt. 25:2: “Ac- finite, both because the mutable good itself is finite, and cording to the measure of the sin shall the measure also because the movement of turning towards it is finite, since of the stripes be.” Now a sin which is committed against the acts of a creature cannot be infinite. Accordingly, in so God, is infinite: because the gravity of a sin increases ac- far as sin consists in turning away from something, its cor- cording to the greatness of the person sinned against (thus responding punishment is the “pain of loss,” which also is it is a more grievous sin to strike the sovereign than a pri- infinite, because it is the loss of the infinite good, i.e. God. vate individual), and God’s greatness is infinite. Therefore But in so far as sin turns inordinately to something, its an infinite punishment is due for a sin committed against corresponding punishment is the “pain of sense,” which is God. also finite. Objection 3. Further, a thing may be infinite in two Reply to Objection 1. It would be inconsistent with 1005 Divine justice for the sinner to be brought to nothing abso-Reply to Objection 3. Duration of punishment corre- lutely, because this would be incompatible with the perpe- sponds to duration of fault, not indeed as regards the act, tuity of punishment that Divine justice requires, as stated but on the part of the stain, for as long as this remains, the above (a. 3). The expression “to be brought to nothing” is debt of punishment remains. But punishment corresponds applied to one who is deprived of spiritual goods, accord- to fault in the point of severity. And a fault which is ir- ing to 1 Cor. 13:2: “If I. . . have not charity, I am nothing.” reparable, is such that, of itself, it lasts for ever; wherefore Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers sin as it incurs an everlasting punishment. But it is not infinite turning away from something, for it is thus that man sins as regards the thing it turns to; wherefore, in this respect, against God. it does not incur punishment of infinite quantity. Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment? Ia IIae q. 87 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that every sin incurs I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), a sin incurs a a debt of eternal punishment. Because punishment, as debt of eternal punishment, in so far as it causes an ir- stated above (a. 4), is proportionate to the fault. Now eter- reparable disorder in the order of Divine justice, through nal punishment differs infinitely from temporal punish- being contrary to the very principle of that order, viz. the ment: whereas no sin, apparently, differs infinitely from last end. Now it is evident that in some sins there is disor- another, since every sin is a human act, which cannot be der indeed, but such as not to involve contrariety in respect infinite. Since therefore some sins incur a debt of ever- of the last end, but only in respect of things referable to lasting punishment, as stated above (a. 4), it seems that no the end, in so far as one is too much or too little intent on sin incurs a debt of mere temporal punishment. them without prejudicing the order to the last end: as, for Objection 2. Further, original sin is the least of all instance, when a man is too fond of some temporal thing, sins, wherefore Augustine says (Enchiridion xciii) that yet would not offend God for its sake, by breaking one of “the lightest punishment is incurred by those who are pun- His commandments. Consequently such sins do not incur ished for original sin alone.” But original sin incurs ever- everlasting, but only temporal punishment. lasting punishment, since children who have died in origi- Reply to Objection 1. Sins do not differ infinitely nal sin through not being baptized, will never see the king- from one another in respect of their turning towards mu- dom of God, as shown by our Lord’s words (Jn. 3:3): ” table good, which constitutes the substance of the sinful Unless a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom act; but they do differ infinitely in respect of their turn- of God.” Much more, therefore, will the punishments of ing away from something. Because some sins consist in all other sins be everlasting. turning away from the last end, and some in a disorder af- Objection 3. Further, a sin does not deserve greater fecting things referable to the end: and the last end differs punishment through being united to another sin; for Di- infinitely from the things that are referred to it. vine justice has allotted its punishment to each sin. Now a Reply to Objection 2. Original sin incurs everlasting venial sin deserves eternal punishment if it be united to a punishment, not on account of its gravity, but by reason of mortal sin in a lost soul, because in hell there is no remis- the condition of the subject, viz. a human being deprived sion of sins. Therefore venial sin by itself deserves eternal of grace, without which there is no remission of sin. punishment. Therefore temporal punishment is not due The same answer applies to the Third Objection about for any sin. venial sin. Because eternity of punishment does not cor- On the contrary, Gregory says (Dial. iv, 39), that cer- respond to the quantity of the sin, but to its irremissibility, tain slighter sins are remitted after this life. Therefore all as stated above (a. 3). sins are not punished eternally. Whether the debt of punishment remains after sin? Ia IIae q. 87 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that there remains no debt but reward. Therefore, when sin is removed, the debt of of punishment after sin. For if the cause be removed the punishment no longer remains. effect is removed. But sin is the cause of the debt of pun- Objection 3. Further, “Punishments are a kind of ishment. Therefore, when the sin is removed, the debt of medicine” (Ethic. ii, 3). But a man is not given medicine punishment ceases also. after being cured of his disease. Therefore, when sin is Objection 2. Further, sin is removed by man returning removed the debt of punishment does not remain. to virtue. Now a virtuous man deserves, not punishment, On the contrary, It is written (2 Kings xii. 13,14): 1006 “David said to Nathan: I have sinned against the Lord. the punishment which God inflicts on him; and in both And Nathan said to David: The Lord also hath taken away ways punishment avails for satisfaction. Now when pun- thy sin; thou shalt not die. Nevertheless because thou ishment is satisfactory, it loses somewhat of the nature of hast given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blas- punishment: for the nature of punishment is to be against pheme. . . the child that is born to thee shall die.” There- the will; and although satisfactory punishment, absolutely fore a man is punished by God even after his sin is for- speaking, is against the will, nevertheless in this particular given: and so the debt of punishment remains, when the case and for this particular purpose, it is voluntary. Conse- sin has been removed. quently it is voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain I answer that, Two things may be considered in sin: respect, as we have explained when speaking of the volun- the guilty act, and the consequent stain. Now it is evi- tary and the involuntary (q. 6, a. 6). We must, therefore, dent that in all actual sins, when the act of sin has ceased, say that, when the stain of sin has been removed, there the guilt remains; because the act of sin makes man de- may remain a debt of punishment, not indeed of punish- serving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses the or- ment simply, but of satisfactory punishment. der of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he Reply to Objection 1. Just as after the act of sin has pay some sort of penal compensation, which restores him ceased, the stain remains, as stated above (q. 86, a. 2), so to the equality of justice; so that, according to the order the debt of punishment also can remain. But when the of Divine justice, he who has been too indulgent to his stain has been removed, the debt of punishment does not will, by transgressing God’s commandments, suffers, ei- remain in the same way, as stated. ther willingly or unwillingly, something contrary to what Reply to Objection 2. The virtuous man does not de- he would wish. This restoration of the equality of justice serve punishment simply, but he may deserve it as satis- by penal compensation is also to be observed in injuries factory: because his very virtue demands that he should done to one’s fellow men. Consequently it is evident that do satisfaction for his offenses against God or man. when the sinful or injurious act has ceased there still re- Reply to Objection 3. When the stain is removed, mains the debt of punishment. the wound of sin is healed as regards the will. But pun- But if we speak of the removal of sin as to the stain, ishment is still requisite in order that the other powers of it is evident that the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul be healed, since they were so disordered by the the soul, without the soul being united to God, since it sin committed, so that, to wit, the disorder may be reme- was through being separated from Him that it suffered the died by the contrary of that which caused it. Moreover loss of its brightness, in which the stain consists, as stated punishment is requisite in order to restore the equality of above (q. 86, a. 1). Now man is united to God by his justice, and to remove the scandal given to others, so that will. Wherefore the stain of sin cannot be removed from those who were scandalized at the sin many be edified by man, unless his will accept the order of Divine justice, the punishment, as may be seen in the example of David that is to say, unless either of his own accord he take upon quoted above. himself the punishment of his past sin, or bear patiently Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin? Ia IIae q. 87 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that not every punishment 72:5): “They are not in the labor of men: neither shall they is inflicted for a sin. For it is written (Jn. 9:3,2) about the be scourged like other men”; and (Job 21:7): ”[Why then man born blind: “Neither hath this man sinned, nor his do] the wicked live, are [they] advanced, and strength- parents. . . that he should be born blind.” In like manner ened with riches” (?)∗; and (Hab. 1:13): “Why lookest we see that many children, those also who have been bap- Thou upon the contemptuous [Vulg.: ‘them that do un- tized, suffer grievous punishments, fevers, for instance, just things’], and holdest Thy peace, when the wicked diabolical possession, and so forth, and yet there is no sin man oppresseth [Vulg.: ‘devoureth’], the man that is more in them after they have been baptized. Moreover before just than himself?” Therefore not every punishment is in- they are baptized, there is no more sin in them than in the flicted for a sin. other children who do not suffer such things. Therefore Objection 3. Further, it is written of Christ (1 Pet. not every punishment is inflicted for a sin. 2:22) that “He did no sin, nor was guile found in His Objection 2. Further, that sinners should thrive and mouth.” And yet it is said (1 Pet. 2:21) that “He suffered that the innocent should be punished seem to come under for us.” Therefore punishment is not always inflicted by the same head. Now each of these is frequently observed God for sin. in human affairs, for it is written about the wicked (Ps. On the contrary, It is written (Job 4:7, seqq.): “Who ∗ The words in brackets show the readings of the Vulgate 1007 ever perished innocent? Or when were the just de- medicinal punishment, because a medical man prescribes stroyed? On the contrary, I have seen those who work bitter potions to his patients, that he may restore them to iniquity. . . perishing by the blast of God”; and Augustine health. And since such like are not punishments prop- writes (Retract. i) that “all punishment is just, and is in- erly speaking, they are not referred to sin as their cause, flicted for a sin.” except in a restricted sense: because the very fact that hu- I answer that, As already stated (a. 6), punishment man nature needs a treatment of penal medicines, is due can be considered in two ways—simply, and as being sat- to the corruption of nature which is itself the punishment isfactory. A satisfactory punishment is, in a way, volun- of original sin. For there was no need, in the state of in- tary. And since those who differ as to the debt of punish- nocence, for penal exercises in order to make progress in ment, may be one in will by the union of love, it happens virtue; so that whatever is penal in the exercise of virtue, that one who has not sinned, bears willingly the punish- is reduced to original sin as its cause. ment for another: thus even in human affairs we see men Reply to Objection 1. Such like defects of those who take the debts of another upon themselves. If, however, are born with them, or which children suffer from, are we speak of punishment simply, in respect of its being the effects and the punishments of original sin, as stated something penal, it has always a relation to a sin in the above (q. 85, a. 5); and they remain even after baptism, one punished. Sometimes this is a relation to actual sin, as for the cause stated above (q. 85, a. 5, ad 2): and that when a man is punished by God or man for a sin commit- they are not equally in all, is due to the diversity of nature, ted by him. Sometimes it is a relation to original sin: and which is left to itself, as stated above (q. 85, a. 5, ad 1). this, either principally or consequently—principally, the Nevertheless, they are directed by Divine providence, to punishment of original sin is that human nature is left to the salvation of men, either of those who suffer, or of oth- itself, and deprived of original justice: and consequently, ers who are admonished by their means—and also to the all the penalties which result from this defect in human glory of God. nature. Reply to Objection 2. Temporal and bodily goods Nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing are indeed goods of man, but they are of small account: seems penal, and yet is not so simply. Because punish- whereas spiritual goods are man’s chief goods. Conse- ment is a species of evil, as stated in the Ia, q. 48, a. 5. quently it belongs to Divine justice to give spiritual goods Now evil is privation of good. And since man’s good is to the virtuous, and to award them as much temporal manifold, viz. good of the soul, good of the body, and goods or evils, as suffices for virtue: for, as Dionysius says external goods, it happens sometimes that man suffers (Div. Nom. viii), “Divine justice does not enfeeble the the loss of a lesser good, that he may profit in a greater fortitude of the virtuous man, by material gifts.” The very good, as when he suffers loss of money for the sake of fact that others receive temporal goods, is detrimental bodily health, or loss of both of these, for the sake of his to their spiritual good; wherefore the psalm quoted con- soul’s health and the glory of God. In such cases the loss cludes (verse 6): “Therefore pride hath held them fast.” is an evil to man, not simply but relatively; wherefore it Reply to Objection 3. Christ bore a satisfactory pun- does not answer to the name of punishment simply, but of ishment, not for His, but for our sins. Whether anyone is punished for another’s sin? Ia IIae q. 87 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that one may be pun- not be said of the children rather than of outsiders, who ished for another’s sin. For it is written (Ex. 20:5): “I are punished in like manner as those whose crimes they am. . . God. . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers imitate. It seems, therefore, that children are punished, upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of not for their own sins, but for those of their parents. them that hate Me”; and (Mat. 23:35): “That upon you On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:20): “The may come all the just blood that hath been shed upon the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father.” earth.” I answer that, If we speak of that satisfactory punish- Objection 2. Further, human justice springs from Di- ment, which one takes upon oneself voluntarily, one may vine justice. Now, according to human justice, children bear another’s punishment, in so far as they are, in some are sometimes punished for their parents, as in the case of way, one, as stated above (a. 7). If, however, we speak of high treason. Therefore also according to Divine justice, punishment inflicted on account of sin, inasmuch as it is one is punished for another’s sin. penal, then each one is punished for his own sin only, be- Objection 3. Further, if it be replied that the son is cause the sinful act is something personal. But if we speak punished, not for the father’s sin, but for his own, inas- of a punishment that is medicinal, in this way it does hap- much as he imitates his father’s wickedness; this would pen that one is punished for another’s sin. For it has been 1008 stated (a. 7) that ills sustained in bodily goods or even in these words are added, “Of them that hate Me,” and in the the body itself, are medicinal punishments intended for chapter quoted from Matthew (verse 32) we read: “Fill the health of the soul. Wherefore there is no reason why ye up then the measure of your fathers.” The sins of the one should not have such like punishments inflicted on fathers are said to be punished in their children, because one for another’s sin, either by God or by man; e.g. on the latter are the more prone to sin through being brought children for their parents, or on servants for their masters, up amid their parents’ crimes, both by becoming accus- inasmuch as they are their property so to speak; in such tomed to them, and by imitating their parents’ example, a way, however, that, if the children or the servants take conforming to their authority as it were. Moreover they part in the sin, this penal ill has the character of punish- deserve heavier punishment if, seeing the punishment of ment in regard to both the one punished and the one he is their parents, they fail to mend their ways. The text adds, punished for. But if they do not take part in the sin, it has “to the third and fourth generation,” because men are wont the character of punishment in regard to the one for whom to live long enough to see the third and fourth generation, the punishment is borne, while, in regard to the one who so that both the children can witness their parents’ sins so is punished, it is merely medicinal (except accidentally, if as to imitate them, and the parents can see their children’s he consent to the other’s sin), since it is intended for the punishments so as to grieve for them. good of his soul, if he bears it patiently. Reply to Objection 2. The punishments which human With regard to spiritual punishments, these are not justice inflicts on one for another’s sin are bodily and tem- merely medicinal, because the good of the soul is not di- poral. They are also remedies or medicines against future rected to a yet higher good. Consequently no one suffers sins, in order that either they who are punished, or others loss in the goods of the soul without some fault of his may be restrained from similar faults. own. Wherefore Augustine says (Ep. ad Avit.)∗, such like Reply to Objection 3. Those who are near of kin are punishments are not inflicted on one for another’s sin, be- said to be punished, rather than outsiders, for the sins of cause, as regards the soul, the son is not the father’s prop- others, both because the punishment of kindred redounds erty. Hence the Lord assigns the reason for this by saying somewhat upon those who sinned, as stated above, in so (Ezech. 18:4): “All souls are Mine.” far as the child is the father’s property, and because the Reply to Objection 1. Both the passages quoted examples and the punishments that occur in one’s own should, seemingly, be referred to temporal or bodily pun- household are more moving. Consequently when a man ishments, in so far as children are the property of their is brought up amid the sins of his parents, he is more ea- parents, and posterity, of their forefathers. Else, if they be ger to imitate them, and if he is not deterred by their pun- referred to spiritual punishments, they must be understood ishments, he would seem to be the more obstinate, and, in reference to the imitation of sin, wherefore in Exodus therefore, to deserve more severe punishment. ∗ Ep. ad Auxilium, ccl. 1009 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 88 Of Venial and Mortal Sin (In Six Articles) In the next place, since venial and mortal sins differ in respect of the debt of punishment, we must consider them. First, we shall consider venial sin as compared with mortal sin; secondly, we shall consider venial sin in itself. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin? (2) Whether they differ generically? (3) Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin? (4) Whether a venial sin can become mortal? (5) Whether a venial sin can become mortal by reason of an aggravating circumstance? (6) Whether a mortal sin can become venial? Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin? Ia IIae q. 88 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that venial sin is unfit- sin. tingly condivided with mortal sin. For Augustine says I answer that, Certain terms do not appear to be mu- (Contra Faust. xxii, 27): “Sin is a word, deed or desire tually opposed, if taken in their proper sense, whereas they contrary to the eternal law.” But the fact of being against are opposed if taken metaphorically: thus “to smile” is the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal. Consequently not opposed to “being dry”; but if we speak of the smil- every sin is mortal. Therefore venial sin is not condivided ing meadows when they are decked with flowers and fresh with mortal sin. with green hues this is opposed to drought. In like manner Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): if mortal be taken literally as referring to the death of the “Whether you eat or drink, or whatever else you do; do body, it does not imply opposition to venial, nor belong to all to the glory of God.” Now whoever sins breaks this the same genus. But if mortal be taken metaphorically, as commandment, because sin is not done for God’s glory. applied to sin, it is opposed to that which is venial. Consequently, since to break a commandment is to com- For sin, being a sickness of the soul, as stated above mit a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally. (q. 71, a. 1, ad 3; q. 72, a. 5; q. 74, a. 9, ad 2), is said Objection 3. Further, whoever cleaves to a thing by to be mortal by comparison with a disease, which is said love, cleaves either as enjoying it, or as using it, as Au- to be mortal, through causing an irreparable defect con- gustine states (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3,4). But no person, sisting in the corruption of a principle, as stated above in sinning, cleaves to a mutable good as using it: because (q. 72, a. 5). Now the principle of the spiritual life, which he does not refer it to that good which gives us happiness, is a life in accord with virtue, is the order to the last end, which, properly speaking, is to use, according to Augus- as stated above (q. 72, a. 5; q. 87, a. 3): and if this or- tine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3,4). Therefore whoever sins der be corrupted, it cannot be repaired by any intrinsic enjoys a mutable good. Now “to enjoy what we should principle, but by the power of God alone, as stated above use is human perverseness,” as Augustine again says (Qq. (q. 87, a. 3), because disorders in things referred to the lxxxiii, qu. 30). Therefore, since “perverseness”∗ denotes end, are repaired through the end, even as an error about a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally. conclusions can be repaired through the truth of the prin- Objection 4. Further, whoever approaches one term, ciples. Hence the defect of order to the last end cannot from that very fact turns away from the opposite. Now be repaired through something else as a higher principle, whoever sins, approaches a mutable good, and, conse- as neither can an error about principles. Wherefore such quently turns away from the immutable good, so that he sins are called mortal, as being irreparable. On the other sins mortally. Therefore venial sin is unfittingly condi- hand, sins which imply a disorder in things referred to the vided with mortal sin. end, the order to the end itself being preserved, are repara- On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. xli in Joan.), ble. These sins are called venial: because a sin receives its that “a crime is one that merits damnation, and a venial acquittal [veniam] when the debt of punishment is taken sin, one that does not.” But a crime denotes a mortal sin. away, and this ceases when the sin ceases, as explained Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal above (q. 87, a. 6). ∗ The Latin ‘pervertere’ means to overthrow, to destroy, hence ‘perversion’ of God’s law is a mortal sin. 1010 Accordingly, mortal and venial are mutually opposed Reply to Objection 2. This precept of the Apostle is as reparable and irreparable: and I say this with refer- affirmative, and so it does not bind for all times. Conse- ence to the intrinsic principle, but not to the Divine power, quently everyone who does not actually refer all his ac- which can repair all diseases, whether of the body or of tions to the glory of God, does not therefore act against the soul. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided with this precept. In order, therefore, to avoid mortal sin each mortal sin. time that one fails actually to refer an action to God’s Reply to Objection 1. The division of sin into ve- glory, it is enough to refer oneself and all that one has nial and mortal is not a division of a genus into its species to God habitually. Now venial sin excludes only actual which have an equal share of the generic nature: but it is reference of the human act to God’s glory, and not habit- the division of an analogous term into its parts, of which it ual reference: because it does not exclude charity, which is predicated, of the one first, and of the other afterwards. refers man to God habitually. Therefore it does not follow Consequently the perfect notion of sin, which Augustine that he who sins venially, sins mortally. gives, applies to mortal sin. On the other hand, venial sin Reply to Objection 3. He that sins venially, cleaves is called a sin, in reference to an imperfect notion of sin, to temporal good, not as enjoying it, because he does not and in relation to mortal sin: even as an accident is called fix his end in it, but as using it, by referring it to God, not a being, in relation to substance, in reference to the im-actually but habitually. perfect notion of being. For it is not “against” the law, Reply to Objection 4. Mutable good is not consid- since he who sins venially neither does what the law for- ered to be a term in contraposition to the immutable good, bids, nor omits what the law prescribes to be done; but he unless one’s end is fixed therein: because what is referred acts “beside” the law, through not observing the mode of to the end has not the character of finality. reason, which the law intends. Whether mortal and venial sin differ generically? Ia IIae q. 88 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that venial and mortal sin I answer that, Venial sin is so called from “venia” do not differ generically, so that some sins be generically [pardon]. Consequently a sin may be called venial, first of mortal, and some generically venial. Because human acts all, because it has been pardoned: thus Ambrose says that are considered to be generically good or evil according to “penance makes every sin venial”: and this is called venial their matter or object, as stated above (q. 18, a. 2). Now “from the result.” Secondly, a sin is called venial because either mortal or venial sin may be committed in regard it does not contain anything either partially or totally, to to any object or matter: since man can love any mutable prevent its being pardoned: partially, as when a sin con- good, either less than God, which may be a venial sin, or tains something diminishing its guilt, e.g. a sin committed more than God, which is a mortal sin. Therefore venial through weakness or ignorance: and this is called venial and mortal sin do not differ generically. “from the cause”: totally, through not destroying the order Objection 2. Further, as stated above (a. 1; q. 72, a. 5; to the last end, wherefore it deserves temporal, but not ev-q. 87, a. 3), a sin is called mortal when it is irreparable, ve-erlasting punishment. It is of this venial sin that we wish nial when it can be repaired. Now irreparability belongs to to speak now. sin committed out of malice, which, according to some, is For as regards the first two, it is evident that they have irremissible: whereas reparability belongs to sins commit- no determinate genus: whereas venial sin, taken in the ted through weakness or ignorance, which are remissible. third sense, can have a determinate genus, so that one sin Therefore mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed may be venial generically, and another generically mortal, through malice differs from sin committed through weak- according as the genus or species of an act is determined ness or ignorance. But, in this respect, sins differ not in by its object. For, when the will is directed to a thing that genus but in cause, as stated above (q. 77, a. 8, ad 1). is in itself contrary to charity, whereby man is directed Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically. to his last end, the sin is mortal by reason of its object. Objection 3. Further, it was stated above (q. 74, a. 3, Consequently it is a mortal sin generically, whether it be ad 3; a. 10) that sudden movements both of the sensuality contrary to the love of God, e.g. blasphemy, perjury, and and of the reason are venial sins. But sudden movements the like, or against the love of one’s neighbor, e.g. murder, occur in every kind of sin. Therefore no sins are generi- adultery, and such like: wherefore such sins are mortal by cally venial. reason of their genus. Sometimes, however, the sinner’s On the contrary, Augustine, in a sermon on Purga- will is directed to a thing containing a certain inordinate- tory (De Sanctis, serm. xli), enumerates certain generic ness, but which is not contrary to the love of God and venial sins, and certain generic mortal sins. one’s neighbor, e.g. an idle word, excessive laughter, and 1011 so forth: and such sins are venial by reason of their genus. reference to sudden movements of unbelief. Nevertheless, since moral acts derive their character Reply to Objection 1. The very fact that any- of goodness and malice, not only from their objects, but one chooses something that is contrary to divine charity, also from some disposition of the agent, as stated above proves that he prefers it to the love of God, and conse- (q. 18, Aa. 4,6), it happens sometimes that a sin which is quently, that he loves it more than he loves God. Hence venial generically by reason of its object, becomes mortal it belongs to the genus of some sins, which are of them- on the part of the agent, either because he fixes his last selves contrary to charity, that something is loved more end therein, or because he directs it to something that is than God; so that they are mortal by reason of their genus. a mortal sin in its own genus; for example, if a man di- Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers those rect an idle word to the commission of adultery. In like sins which are venial from their cause. manner it may happen, on the part of the agent, that a sin Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers those generically mortal because venial, by reason of the act be- sins which are venial by reason of the imperfection of the ing imperfect, i.e. not deliberated by reason, which is the act. proper principle of an evil act, as we have said above in Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin? Ia IIae q. 88 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that venial sin is not a dis- of its nature, dispose to a sin generically mortal, for they position to mortal sin. For one contrary does not dispose differ in species. Nevertheless, in this same way, a venial to another. But venial and mortal sin are condivided as sin can dispose, by way of consequence, to a sin which contrary to one another, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore is mortal on the part of the agent: because the disposition venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin. or habit may be so far strengthened by acts of venial sin, Objection 2. Further, an act disposes to something that the lust of sinning increases, and the sinner fixes his of like species, wherefore it is stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, end in that venial sin: since the end for one who has a that “from like acts like dispositions and habits are en- habit, as such, is to work according to that habit; and the gendered.” But mortal and venial sin differ in genus or consequence will be that, by sinning often venially, he be- species, as stated above (a. 2). Therefore venial sin does comes disposed to a mortal sin. Secondly, a human act not dispose to mortal sin. disposes to something by removing an obstacle thereto. Objection 3. Further, if a sin is called venial because In this way a sin generically venial can dispose to a sin it disposes to mortal sin, it follows that whatever disposes generically mortal. Because he that commits a sin gener- to mortal sin is a venial sin. Now every good work dis- ically venial, turns aside from some particular order; and poses to mortal sin; wherefore Augustine says in his Rule through accustoming his will not to be subject to the due (Ep. ccxi) that “pride lies in wait for good works that it order in lesser matters, is disposed not to subject his will may destroy them.” Therefore even good works would be even to the order of the last end, by choosing something venial sins, which is absurd. that is a mortal sin in its genus. On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 19:1): “He Reply to Objection 1. Venial and mortal sin are not that contemneth small things shall fall by little and little.” condivided in contrariety to one another, as though they Now he that sins venially seems to contemn small things. were species of one genus, as stated above (a. 1, ad 1), but Therefore by little and little he is disposed to fall away as an accident is condivided with substance. Wherefore together into mortal sin. an accident can be a disposition to a substantial form, so I answer that, A disposition is a kind of cause; where- can a venial sin dispose to mortal. fore as there is a twofold manner of cause, so is there a Reply to Objection 2. Venial sin is not like mortal sin twofold manner of disposition. For there is a cause which in species; but it is in genus, inasmuch as they both imply moves directly to the production of the effect, as a hot a defect of due order, albeit in different ways, as stated thing heats: and there is a cause which moves indirectly, (Aa. 1,2). by removing an obstacle, as he who displaces a pillar is Reply to Objection 3. A good work is not, of itself, said to displace the stone that rests on it. Accordingly an a disposition to mortal sin; but it can be the matter or oc- act of sin disposes to something in two ways. First, di- casion of mortal sin accidentally; whereas a venial sin, of rectly, and thus it disposes to an act of like species. In its very nature, disposes to mortal sin, as stated. this way, a sin generically venial does not, primarily and 1012 Whether a venial sin can become mortal? Ia IIae q. 88 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that a venial sin can be- world cannot incur a debt of punishment equal to that of come a mortal sin. For Augustine in explaining the words one mortal sin. This is evident as regards the duration of Jn. 3:36: “He that believeth not the Son, shall not see of the punishment, since mortal sin incurs a debt of eter- life,” says (Tract. xii in Joan.): “The slightest,” i.e. ve- nal punishment, while venial sin incurs a debt of temporal nial, “sins kill if we make little of them.” Now a sin is punishment, as stated above (q. 87, Aa. 3,5). It is also called mortal through causing the spiritual death of the evident as regards the pain of loss, because mortal sins soul. Therefore a venial sin can become mortal. deserve to be punished by the privation of seeing God, Objection 2. Further, a movement in the sensuality to which no other punishment is comparable, as Chrysos- before the consent of reason, is a venial sin, but after con- tom states (Hom. xxiv in Matth.). It is also evident as sent, is a mortal sin, as stated above (q. 74, a. 8, ad 2). regards the pain of sense, as to the remorse of conscience; Therefore a venial sin can become mortal. although as to the pain of fire, the punishments may per- Objection 3. Further, venial and mortal sin differ as haps not be improportionate to one another. curable and incurable disease, as stated above (a. 1). But a If, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial curable disease may become incurable. Therefore a venial sins make one mortal sin dispositively, it is true, as was sin may become mortal. shown above (a. 3) with regard to the two different man- Objection 4. Further, a disposition may become a ners of disposition, whereby venial sin disposes to mortal habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to mortal, as stated sin. (a. 3). Therefore a venial sin can become mortal. Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is referring to the I answer that, The fact of a venial sin becoming a fact of many venial sins making one mortal sin disposi- mortal sin may be understood in three ways. First, so that tively. the same identical act be at first a venial, and then a mor- Reply to Objection 2. The same movement of the tal sin. This is impossible: because a sin, like any moral sensuality which preceded the consent of reason can never act, consists chiefly in an act of the will: so that an act become a mortal sin; but the movement of the reason in is not one morally, if the will be changed, although the consenting is a mortal sin. act be continuous physically. If, however, the will be not Reply to Objection 3. Disease of the body is not an changed, it is not possible for a venial sin to become mor- act, but an abiding disposition; wherefore, while remain- tal. ing the same disease, it may undergo change. On the other Secondly, this may be taken to mean that a sin gener- hand, venial sin is a transient act, which cannot be taken ically venial, becomes mortal. This is possible, in so far up again: so that in this respect the comparison fails. as one may fix one’s end in that venial sin, or direct it to Reply to Objection 4. A disposition that becomes a some mortal sin as end, as stated above (a. 2). habit, is like an imperfect thing in the same species; thus Thirdly, this may be understood in the sense of many imperfect science, by being perfected, becomes a habit. venial sins constituting one mortal sin. If this be taken as On the other hand, venial sin is a disposition to something meaning that many venial sins added together make one differing generically, even as an accident which disposes mortal sin, it is false, because all the venial sins in the to a substantial form, into which it is never changed. Whether a circumstance can make a venial sin to be mortal? Ia IIae q. 88 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that a circumstance can sin to be mortal. make a venial sin mortal. For Augustine says in a sermon Objection 3. Further, evil and good differ more than on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm. xli) that “if anger con- venial and mortal sin, both of which are generically evil. tinue for a long time, or if drunkenness be frequent, they But a circumstance makes a good act to be evil, as when become mortal sins.” But anger and drunkenness are not a man gives an alms for vainglory. Much more, therefore, mortal but venial sins generically, else they would always can it make a venial sin to be mortal. be mortal sins. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial On the contrary, Since a circumstance is an accident, sin to be mortal. its quantity cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived Objection 2. Further, the Master says ( Sentent. ii, D, from the act’s genus, because the subject always excels its 24) that delectation, if morose∗, is a mortal sin, but that accident. If, therefore, an act be venial by reason of its if it be not morose, it is a venial sin. Now moroseness is genus, it cannot become mortal by reason of an accident: a circumstance. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the quantity ∗ See q. 74, a. 6 1013 of venial sin, as is evident from what has been said (q. 72, which is a mortal sin generically, such as murder or roba. 5, ad 1; q. 87, a. 5, ad 1). bery, that anger will be a mortal sin generically: and if it I answer that, As stated above (q. 7, a. 1; q. 18, be a venial sin, this will be due to the imperfection of the a. 5, ad 4; Aa. 10 ,11), when we were treating of cir- act, in so far as it is a sudden movement of the sensual- cumstances, a circumstance, as such, is an accident of the ity: whereas, if it last a long time, it returns to its generic moral act: and yet a circumstance may happen to be taken nature, through the consent of reason. If, on the other as the specific difference of a moral act, and then it loses hand, the hurt to which the angry movement tends, is a its nature of circumstance, and constitutes the species of sin generically venial, for instance, if a man be angry with the moral act. This happens in sins when a circumstance someone, so as to wish to say some trifling word in jest adds the deformity of another genus; thus when a man that would hurt him a little, the anger will not be mortal has knowledge of another woman than his wife, the de- sin, however long it last, unless perhaps accidentally; for formity of his act is opposed to chastity; but if this other instance, if it were to give rise to great scandal or some- be another man’s wife, there is an additional deformity thing of the kind. opposed to justice which forbids one to take what belongs With regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mor- to another; and accordingly this circumstance constitutes tal sin by reason of its genus; for, that a man, without a new species of sin known as adultery. necessity, and through the mere lust of wine, make him- It is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make self unable to use his reason, whereby he is directed to a venial sin become mortal, unless it adds the deformity God and avoids committing many sins, is expressly con- of another species. For it has been stated above (a. 1) that trary to virtue. That it be a venial sin, is due some sort the deformity of a venial sin consists in a disorder affect- of ignorance or weakness, as when a man is ignorant of ing things that are referred to the end, whereas the defor- the strength of the wine, or of his own unfitness, so that mity of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about the last he has no thought of getting drunk, for in that case the end. Consequently it is evident that a circumstance can- drunkenness is not imputed to him as a sin, but only the not make a venial sin to be mortal, so long as it remains a excessive drink. If, however, he gets drunk frequently, circumstance, but only when it transfers the sin to another this ignorance no longer avails as an excuse, for his will species, and becomes, as it were, the specific difference seems to choose to give way to drunkenness rather than to of the moral act. refrain from excess of wine: wherefore the sin returns to Reply to Objection 1. Length of time is not a cir- its specific nature. cumstance that draws a sin to another species, nor is fre- Reply to Objection 2. Morose delectation is not a quency or custom, except perhaps by something acciden- mortal sin except in those matters which are mortal sins tal supervening. For an action does not acquire a new generically. In such matters, if the delectation be not mo- species through being repeated or prolonged, unless by rose, there is a venial sin through imperfection of the act, chance something supervene in the repeated or prolonged as we have said with regard to anger (ad 1): because anger act to change its species, e.g. disobedience, contempt, or is said to be lasting, and delectation to be morose, on ac- the like. count of the approval of the deliberating reason. We must therefore reply to the objection by saying that Reply to Objection 3. A circumstance does not make since anger is a movement of the soul tending to the hurt a good act to be evil, unless it constitute the species of a of one’s neighbor, if the angry movement tend to a hurt sin, as we have stated above (q. 18, a. 5 , ad 4). Whether a mortal sin can become venial? Ia IIae q. 88 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that a mortal sin can be- God, commits the sin of fornication, yet so as to be ready, come venial. Because venial sin is equally distant from for the love of God, to refrain from that sin if he knew mortal, as mortal sin is from venial. But a venial sin can that by committing it he was acting counter to the love of become mortal, as stated above (a. 5). Therefore also a God. Therefore his will be a venial sin; and accordingly a mortal sin can become venial. mortal sin can become venial. Objection 2. Further, venial and mortal sin are said Objection 3. Further, as stated above (a. 5, obj. 3), to differ in this, that he who sins mortally loves a creature good is more distant from evil, than venial from mortal more than God, while he who sins venially loves the crea- sin. But an act which is evil in itself, can become good; ture less than God. Now it may happen that a person in thus to kill a man may be an act of justice, as when a committing a sin generically mortal, loves a creature less judge condemns a thief to death. Much more therefore than God; for instance, if anyone being ignorant that sim- can a mortal sin become venial. ple fornication is a mortal sin, and contrary to the love of On the contrary, An eternal thing can never become 1014 temporal. But mortal sin deserves eternal punishment, liberate reason, the result is that by such a subtraction the whereas venial sin deserves temporal punishment. There- species of the act is destroyed. fore a mortal sin can never become venial. Reply to Objection 1. Venial differs from mortal as I answer that, Venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect from perfect, even as a boy differs from a man. imperfect in the genus of sin, as stated above (a. 1, ad But the boy becomes a man and not vice versa. Hence the 1). Now the imperfect can become perfect, by some sort argument does not prove. of addition: and, consequently, a venial sin can become Reply to Objection 2. If the ignorance be such as to mortal, by the addition of some deformity pertaining to excuse sin altogether, as the ignorance of a madman or the genus of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word an imbecile, then he that commits fornication in a state for the purpose of fornication. On the other hand, the of such ignorance, commits no sin either mortal or venial. perfect cannot become imperfect, by addition; and so a But if the ignorance be not invincible, then the ignorance mortal sin cannot become venial, by the addition of a de- itself is a sin, and contains within itself the lack of the love formity pertaining to the genus of venial sin, for the sin of God, in so far as a man neglects to learn those things is not diminished if a man commit fornication in order to whereby he can safeguard himself in the love of God. utter an idle word; rather is it aggravated by the additional Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (Contra deformity. Mendacium vii), “those things which are evil in them- Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can be- selves, cannot be well done for any good end.” Now mur- come venial by reason of the imperfection of the act, be- der is the slaying of the innocent, and this can nowise be cause then it does not completely fulfil the conditions of well done. But, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 4,5), a moral act, since it is not a deliberate, but a sudden act, the judge who sentences a thief to death, or the soldier as is evident from what we have said above (a. 2). This who slays the enemy of the common weal, are not mur- happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of deliberate derers. reason. And since a moral act takes its species from de- 1015 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 89 Of Venial Sin in Itself (In Six Articles) We must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul? (2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as denoted by “wood,” “hay,” “stubble” (1 Cor. 3:12); (3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence? (4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially? (5) Whether the movements of unbelievers are venial sins? (6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone? Whether venial sin causes a stain on the soul? Ia IIae q. 89 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that venial sin causes a and colors, the other resulting from outward refulgence stain in the soul. For Augustine says (De Poenit.)∗, that supervening, so too, in the soul, there is a twofold come- if venial sins be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our liness, one habitual and, so to speak, intrinsic, the other souls so as to deprive us of the embraces of our heavenly actual like an outward flash of light. Now venial sin is a spouse. But the stain of sin is nothing else but the loss of hindrance to actual comeliness, but not to habitual come- the soul’s beauty. Therefore venial sins cause a stain in liness, because it neither destroys nor diminishes the habit the soul. of charity and of the other virtues, as we shall show fur- Objection 2. Further, mortal sin causes a stain in the ther on ( IIa IIae, q. 24, a. 10; q. 133, a. 1, ad 2), but only soul, on account of the inordinateness of the act and of the hinders their acts. On the other hand a stain denotes some- sinner’s affections. But, in venial sin, there is an inordi- thing permanent in the thing stained, wherefore it seems nateness of the act and of the affections. Therefore venial in the nature of a loss of habitual rather than of actual sin causes a stain in the soul. comeliness. Therefore, properly speaking, venial sin does Objection 3. Further, the stain on the soul is caused not cause a stain in the soul. If, however, we find it stated by contact with a temporal thing, through love thereof as anywhere that it does induce a stain, this is in a restricted stated above (q. 86, a. 1). But, in venial sin, the soul is sense, in so far as it hinders the comeliness that results in contact with a temporal thing through inordinate love. from acts of virtue. therefore, venial sin brings a stain on the soul. Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of the On the contrary, it is written, (Eph. 5:27): “That He case in which many venial sins lead to mortal sin dispos- might present it to Himself a glorious church, not hav- itively: because otherwise they would not sever the soul ing spot or wrinkle,” on which the gloss says: “i.e., some from its heavenly spouse. grievous sin.” Therefore it seems proper to mortal sin to Reply to Objection 2. In mortal sin the inordinateness cause a stain on the soul. of the act destroys the habit of virtue, but not in venial sin. I answer that as stated above (q. 86, a. 1), a stain de- Reply to Objection 3. In mortal sin the soul comes notes a loss of comeliness due to contact with something, into contact with a temporal thing as its end, so that the as may be seen in corporeal matters, from which the term shedding of the light of grace, which accrues to those who, has been transferred to the soul, by way of similitude. by charity, cleave to God as their last end, is entirely cut Now, just as in the body there is a twofold comeliness, off. On the contrary, in venial sin, man does not cleave to one resulting from the inward disposition of the members a creature as his last end: hence there is no comparison. Whether venial sins are suitably designated as “wood, hay, and stubble”? Ia IIae q. 89 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that venial sins are unsuit- outside the pale of science. Therefore, venial sins are not ably designated as “wood,” “hay,” and “stubble.” Because suitably designated as wood, hay and stubble. wood hay and stubble are said ( 1 Cor. 3:12) to be built Objection 2. Further, he who builds wood, hay and on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins are something stubble, “shall be saved yet so as by fire” (1 Cor. 3:15). outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions are But sometimes the man who commits a venial sin, will not ∗ Hom. 50, inter. L., 2 1016 be saved, even by fire, e.g. when a man dies in mortal sin “silver,” and “precious stones,” and consequently not by to which venial sins are attached. Therefore, venial sins “wood,” “hay,” and “stubble.” are unsuitably designated by wood, hay, and stubble. We must therefore say that the very venial sins that in- Objection 3. Further, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. sinuate themselves into those who have a care for earthly 3:12) those who build “gold, silver, precious stones,” i.e. things, are designated by wood, hay, and stubble. For just love of God and our neighbor, and good works, are oth- as these are stored in a house, without belonging to the ers from those who build wood, hay, and stubble. But substance of the house, and can be burnt, while the house those even who love God and their neighbor, and do good is saved, so also venial sins are multiplied in a man, while works, commit venial sins: for it is written (1 Jn. 1:8): “If the spiritual edifice remains, and for them, man suffers we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.” There- fire, either of temporal trials in this life, or of purgatory fore venial sins are not suitably designated by these three. after this life, and yet he is saved for ever. Objection 4. Further, there are many more than three Reply to Objection 1. Venial sins are not said to be differences and degrees of venial sins. Therefore they are built upon the spiritual foundation, as though they were unsuitably comprised under these three. laid directly upon it, but because they are laid beside it; in On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:15) that the same sense as it is written (Ps. 136:1): “Upon the wa- the man who builds up wood, hay and stubble, “shall be ters of Babylon,” i.e. “beside the waters”: because venial saved yet so as by fire,” so that he will suffer punishment, sins do not destroy the edifice. but not everlasting. Now the debt of temporal punishment Reply to Objection 2. It is not said that everyone belongs properly to venial sin, as stated above (q. 87, a. 5). who builds wood, hay and stubble, shall be saved as by Therefore these three signify venial sins. fire, but only those who build “upon” the “foundation.” I answer that, Some have understood the “founda- And this foundation is not dead faith, as some have es- tion” to be dead faith, upon which some build good works, teemed, but faith quickened by charity, according to Eph. signified by gold, silver, and precious stones, while others 3:17: “Rooted and founded in charity.” Accordingly, he build mortal sins, which according to them are designated that dies in mortal sin with venial sins, has indeed wood, by wood, hay and stubble. But Augustine disapproves of hay, and stubble, but not built upon the spiritual edifice; this explanation (De Fide et Oper. xv), because, as the and consequently he will not be saved so as by fire. Apostle says (Gal. 5:21), he who does the works of the Reply to Objection 3. Although those who are with- flesh, “shall not obtain the kingdom of God,” which sig- drawn from the care of temporal things, sin venially some- nifies to be saved; whereas the Apostle says that he who times, yet they commit but slight venial sins, and in most builds wood, hay, and stubble “shall be saved yet so as by cases they are cleansed by the fervor of charity: where- fire.” Consequently wood, hay, stubble cannot be under- fore they do not build up venial sins, because these do not stood to denote mortal sins. remain long in them. But the venial sins of those who are Others say that wood, hay, stubble designate good busy about earthly remain longer, because they are unable works, which are indeed built upon the spiritual edifice, to have such frequent recourse to the fervor of charity in but are mixed with venial sins: as, when a man is charged order to remove them. with the care of a family, which is a good thing, exces- Reply to Objection 4. As the Philosopher says (De sive love of his wife or of his children or of his posses- Coelo i, text. 2), “all things are comprised under three, sions insinuates itself into his life, under God however, the beginning, the middle, the end.” Accordingly all de- so that, to wit, for the sake of these things he would be grees of venial sins are reduced to three, viz. to “wood,” unwilling to do anything in opposition to God. But nei- which remains longer in the fire; “stubble,” which is burnt ther does this seem to be reasonable. For it is evident up at once; and “hay,” which is between these two: be- that all good works are referred to the love of God, and cause venial sins are removed by fire, quickly or slowly, one’s neighbor, wherefore they are designated by “gold,” according as man is more or less attached to them. Whether man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence? Ia IIae q. 89 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that man could commit commit a venial sin without sinning mortally. a venial sin in the state of innocence. Because on 1 Tim. Objection 2. Further Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 2:14, “Adam was not seduced,” a gloss says: “Having had xi, 5): “We must not suppose that the tempter would no experience of God’s severity, it was possible for him have overcome man, unless first of all there had arisen in to be so mistaken as to think that what he had done was man’s soul a movement of vainglory which should have a venial sin.” But he would not have thought this unless been checked.” Now the vainglory which preceded man’s he could have committed a venial sin. Therefore he could defeat, which was accomplished through his falling into 1017 mortal sin, could be nothing more than a venial sin. In each of these happens on account of some defect of order, like manner, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5) that “man by reason of the lower powers not being checked by the was allured by a certain desire of making the experiment, higher. Because the sudden rising of a movement of the when he saw that the woman did not die when she had sensuality in us is due to the sensuality not being perfectly taken the forbidden fruit.” Again there seems to have been subject to reason: and the sudden rising of a movement of a certain movement of unbelief in Eve, since she doubted reason itself is due, in us, to the fact that the execution what the Lord had said, as appears from her saying (Gn. of the act of reason is not subject to the act of delibera- 3:3): “Lest perhaps we die.” Now these apparently were tion which proceeds from a higher good, as stated above venial sins. Therefore man could commit a venial sin be- (q. 74, a. 10); and that the human mind be out of order fore he committed a mortal sin. as regards things directed to the end, the due order of the Objection 3. Further, mortal sin is more opposed to end being safeguarded, is due to the fact that the things re- the integrity of the original state, than venial sin is. Now ferred to the end are not infallibly directed under the end, man could sin mortally notwithstanding the integrity of which holds the highest place, being the beginning, as it the original state. Therefore he could also sin venially. were, in matters concerning the appetite, as stated above On the contrary, Every sin deserves some punish- (q. 10, Aa. 1,2, ad 3; q. 72, a. 5). Now, in the state of inno- ment. But nothing penal was possible in the state of inno- cence, as stated in the Ia, q. 95, a. 1, there was an unerring cence, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10). There- stability of order, so that the lower powers were always fore he could commit a sin that would not deprive him subjected to the higher, so long as man remained subject of that state of integrity. But venial sin does not change to God, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13). Hence man’s state. Therefore he could not sin venially. there can be no inordinateness in man, unless first of all I answer that, It is generally admitted that man could the highest part of man were not subject to God, which not commit a venial sin in the state of innocence. This, constitutes a mortal sin. From this it is evident that, in however, is not to be understood as though on account of the state of innocence, man could not commit a venial sin, the perfection of his state, the sin which is venial for us before committing a mortal sin. would have been mortal for him, if he had committed it. Reply to Objection 1. In the passage quoted, venial Because the dignity of a person is circumstance that ag- is not taken in the same sense as we take it now; but by gravates a sin, but it does not transfer it to another species, venial sin we mean that which is easily forgiven. unless there be an additional deformity by reason of dis- Reply to Objection 2. This vainglory which preceded obedience, or vow or the like, which does not apply to the man’s downfall, was his first mortal sin, for it is stated to question in point. Consequently what is venial in itself have preceded his downfall into the outward act of sin. could not be changed into mortal by reason of the excel- This vainglory was followed, in the man, by the desire to lence of the original state. We must therefore understand make and experiment, and in the woman, by doubt, for she this to mean that he could not sin venially, because it was gave way to vainglory, merely through hearing the serpent impossible for him to commit a sin which was venial in mention the precept, as though she refused to be held in itself, before losing the integrity of the original state by check by the precept. sinning mortally. Reply to Objection 3. Mortal sin is opposed to the The reason for this is because venial sin occurs in us, integrity of the original state in the fact of its destroying either through the imperfection of the act, as in the case that state: this a venial sin cannot do. And because the in- of sudden movements, in a genus of mortal sin or through tegrity of the primitive state is incompatible with any inor- some inordinateness in respect of things referred to the dinateness whatever, the result is that the first man could end, the due order of the end being safeguarded. Now not sin venially, before committing a mortal sin. Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially? Ia IIae q. 89 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that a good or wicked angel can God, and he did, by sinning mortally. Therefore he could sin venially. Because man agrees with the angels in the also love a creature less than God inordinately, by sinning higher part of his soul which is called the mind, according venially. to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxix in Evang.) that “man Objection 3. Further, wicked angels seem to do things understands in common with the angels.” But man can which are venial sins generically, by provoking men to commit a venial sin in the higher part of his soul. There- laughter, and other like frivolities. Now the circumstance fore an angel can commit a venial sin also. of the person does not make a mortal sin to be venial as Objection 2. Further, He that can do more can do stated above (a. 3), unless there is a special prohibition, less. But an angel could love a created good more than which is not the case in point. Therefore an angel can sin 1018 venially. due end which is God: wherefore all their acts are acts of On the contrary, The perfection of an angel is greater charity, so that no venial sin can be in them. On the other than that of man in the primitive state. But man could not hand, wicked angels are moved to nothing except in sub- sin venially in the primitive state, and much less, there- ordination to the end which is their sin of pride. Therefore fore, can an angel. they sin mortally in everything that they do of their own I answer that, An angel’s intellect, as stated above in will. This does not apply to the appetite for the natural the Ia, q. 58, a. 3; Ia, q. 79, a. 8, is not discursive, i.e. good, which appetite we have stated to be in them ( Ia, it does not proceed from principles to conclusions, so as q. 63, a. 4; q. 64, a. 2, ad 5). to understand both separately, as we do. Consequently, Reply to Objection 1. Man does indeed agree with whenever the angelic intellect considers a conclusion, it the angels in the mind or intellect, but he differs in his must, of necessity, consider it in its principles. Now in mode of understanding, as stated above. matters of appetite, as we have often stated (q. 8, a. 2; Reply to Objection 2. An angel could not love a crea- q. 10, a. 1; q. 72, a. 5), ends are like principles, while the ture less than God, without, at the same time, either refer- means are like conclusions. Wherefore, an angel’s mind is ring it to God, as the last end, or to some inordinate end, not directed to the means, except as they stand under the for the reason given above. order to the end. Consequently, from their very nature, Reply to Objection 3. The demons incite man to all they can have no inordinateness in respect of the means, such things which seem venial, that he may become used unless at the same time they have an inordinateness in re- to them, so as to lead him on to mortal sin. Consequently spect of the end, and this is a mortal sin. Now good angels in all such things they sin mortally, on account of the end are not moved to the means, except in subordination to the they have in view. Whether the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sin? Ia IIae q. 89 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the first movements pute to one unto condemnation, what He does not impute of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sins. For the to another. But he does not impute first movements to Apostle says (Rom. 8:1) that “there is. . . no condemnation believers, unto condemnation. Neither therefore does He to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to impute them to unbelievers. the flesh”: and he is speaking there of the concupiscence I answer that, It is unreasonable to say that the first of the sensuality, as appears from the context (Rom. 7). movements of unbelievers are mortal sins, when they do Therefore the reason why concupiscence is not a matter not consent to them. This is evident for two reasons. First, of condemnation to those who walk not according to the because the sensuality itself could not be the subject of flesh, i.e. by consenting to concupiscence, is because they mortal sin, as stated above (q. 79, a. 4). Now the sen- are in Christ Jesus. But unbelievers are not in Christ Jesus. suality has the same nature in unbelievers as in believ- Therefore in unbelievers this is a matter of condemnation. ers. Therefore it is not possible for the mere movements Therefore the first movements of unbelievers are mortal of the sensuality in unbelievers, to be mortal sins. Sec- sins. ondly, from the state of the sinner. Because excellence Objection 2. Further Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. of the person of the person never diminishes sin, but, on Arb. vii): “Those who are not in Christ, when they feel the contrary, increases it, as stated above (q. 73, a. 10). the sting of the flesh, follow the road of damnation, even Therefore a sin is not less grievous in a believer than in if they walk not according to the flesh.” But damnation is an unbeliever, but much more so. For the sins of an un- not due save to mortal sin. Therefore, since man feels the believer are more deserving of forgiveness, on account of sting of the flesh in the first movements of the concupis- their ignorance, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: “I obtained the cence, it seems that the first movements of concupiscence mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly in my unbelief”: in unbelievers are mortal sins. whereas the sins of believers are more grievous on ac- Objection 3. Further, Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. count of the sacraments of grace, according to Heb. 10:29: Arb. vii): “Man was so made that he was not liable to “How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse pun- feel concupiscence.” Now this liability seems to be remit- ishments. . . who hath esteemed the blood of the testament ted to man by the grace of Baptism, which the unbeliever unclean, by which he was sanctified?” has not. Therefore every act of concupiscence in an unbe- Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle is speaking of liever, even without his consent, is a mortal sin, because the condemnation due to original sin, which condemna- he acts against his duty. tion is remitted by the grace of Jesus Christ, although the On the contrary, It is stated in Acts 10:34 that “God “fomes” of concupiscence remain. Wherefore the fact that is not a respecter of persons.” Therefore he does not im- believers are subject to concupiscence is not in them a sign 1019 of the condemnation due to original sin, as it is in unbe-Reply to Objection 3. This freedom from liability to lievers. concupiscence was a result of original justice. Wherefore In this way also is to be understood the saying of that which is opposed to such liability pertains, not to ac- Anselm, wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is tual but to original sin. evident. Whether venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone? Ia IIae q. 89 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that venial sin can be in more does it excuse him from venial sin, if he does any- a man with original sin alone. For disposition precedes thing which is such generically. But when he begins to habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin, as have the use of reason, he is not entirely excused from the stated above (q. 88, a. 3). Therefore in an unbeliever, in guilt of venial or mortal sin. Now the first thing that oc- whom original sin is not remitted, venial sin exists before curs to a man to think about then, is to deliberate about mortal sin: and so sometimes unbelievers have venial to- himself. And if he then direct himself to the due end, he gether with original sin, and without mortal sins. will, by means of grace, receive the remission of original Objection 2. Further, venial sin has less in common, sin: whereas if he does not then direct himself to the due and less connection with mortal sin, than one mortal sin end, and as far as he is capable of discretion at that partic- has with another. But an unbeliever in the state of original ular age, he will sin mortally, for through not doing that sin, can commit one mortal sin without committing an- which is in his power to do. Accordingly thenceforward other. Therefore he can also commit a venial sin without there cannot be venial sin in him without mortal, until af- committing a mortal sin. terwards all sin shall have been remitted to him through Objection 3. Further, it is possible to fix the time at grace. which a child is first able to commit an actual sin: and Reply to Objection 1. Venial sin always precedes when the child comes to that time, it can stay a short mortal sin not as a necessary, but as a contingent dispo- time at least, without committing a mortal sin, because sition, just as work sometimes disposes to fever, but not this happens in the worst criminals. Now it is possible for as heat disposes to the form of fire. the child to sin venially during that space of time, however Reply to Objection 2. Venial sin is prevented from short it may be. Therefore venial sin can be in anyone with being with original sin alone, not on account of its want original sin alone and without mortal sin. of connection or likeness, but on account of the lack of On the contrary, Man is punished for original sin in use of reason, as stated above. the children’s limbo, where there is no pain of sense as we Reply to Objection 3. The child that is beginning to shall state further on ( IIa IIae, q. 69, a. 6): whereas men have the use of reason can refrain from other mortal sins are punished in hell for no other than mortal sin. There- for a time, but it is not free from the aforesaid sin of omis- fore there will be no place where a man can be punished sion, unless it turns to God as soon as possible. For the for venial sin with no other than original sin. first thing that occurs to a man who has discretion, is to I answer that, It is impossible for venial sin to be in think of himself, and to direct other things to himself as to anyone with original sin alone, and without mortal sin. their end, since the end is the first thing in the intention. The reason for this is because before a man comes to the Therefore this is the time when man is bound by God’s age of discretion, the lack of years hinders the use of rea- affirmative precept, which the Lord expressed by saying son and excuses him from mortal sin, wherefore, much (Zech. 1:3): “Turn ye to Me. . . and I will turn to you.” 1020 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 90 Of the Essence of Law (In Four Articles) We have now to consider the extrinsic principles of acts. Now the extrinsic principle inclining to evil is the devil, of whose temptations we have spoken in the Ia, q. 114. But the extrinsic principle moving to good is God, Who both instructs us by means of His Law, and assists us by His Grace: wherefore in the first place we must speak of law; in the second place, of grace. Concerning law, we must consider: (1) Law itself in general; (2) its parts. Concerning law in general three points offer themselves for our consideration: (1) Its essence; (2) The different kinds of law; (3) The effects of law. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether law is something pertaining to reason? (2) Concerning the end of law; (3) Its cause; (4) The promulgation of law. Whether law is something pertaining to reason? Ia IIae q. 90 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that law is not something the principle in any genus, is the rule and measure of that pertaining to reason. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): “I genus: for instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and the see another law in my members,” etc. But nothing pertain- first movement in the genus of movements. Consequently ing to reason is in the members; since the reason does not it follows that law is something pertaining to reason. make use of a bodily organ. Therefore law is not some- Reply to Objection 1. Since law is a kind of rule and thing pertaining to reason. measure, it may be in something in two ways. First, as Objection 2. Further, in the reason there is nothing in that which measures and rules: and since this is proper else but power, habit, and act. But law is not the power to reason, it follows that, in this way, law is in the reason itself of reason. In like manner, neither is it a habit of alone. Secondly, as in that which is measured and ruled. reason: because the habits of reason are the intellectual In this way, law is in all those things that are inclined to virtues of which we have spoken above (q. 57). Nor again something by reason of some law: so that any inclination is it an act of reason: because then law would cease, when arising from a law, may be called a law, not essentially the act of reason ceases, for instance, while we are asleep. but by participation as it were. And thus the inclination Therefore law is nothing pertaining to reason. of the members to concupiscence is called “the law of the Objection 3. Further, the law moves those who are members.” subject to it to act aright. But it belongs properly to the Reply to Objection 2. Just as, in external action, we will to move to act, as is evident from what has been said may consider the work and the work done, for instance above (q. 9, a. 1). Therefore law pertains, not to the rea- the work of building and the house built; so in the acts son, but to the will; according to the words of the Jurist of reason, we may consider the act itself of reason, i.e. (Lib. i, ff., De Const. Prin. leg. i): “Whatsoever pleaseth to understand and to reason, and something produced by the sovereign, has force of law.” this act. With regard to the speculative reason, this is first On the contrary, It belongs to the law to command of all the definition; secondly, the proposition; thirdly, the and to forbid. But it belongs to reason to command, as syllogism or argument. And since also the practical rea- stated above (q. 17, a. 1). Therefore law is something per- son makes use of a syllogism in respect of the work to be taining to reason. done, as stated above (q. 13, a. 3; q. 76, a. 1) and since I answer that, Law is a rule and measure of acts, as the Philosopher teaches (Ethic. vii, 3); hence we find whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting: in the practical reason something that holds the same po- for “lex” [law] is derived from “ligare” [to bind], because sition in regard to operations, as, in the speculative intel- it binds one to act. Now the rule and measure of human lect, the proposition holds in regard to conclusions. Such acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human like universal propositions of the practical intellect that acts, as is evident from what has been stated above (q. 1, are directed to actions have the nature of law. And these a. 1, ad 3); since it belongs to the reason to direct to the propositions are sometimes under our actual considera- end, which is the first principle in all matters of action, ac- tion, while sometimes they are retained in the reason by cording to the Philosopher (Phys. ii). Now that which is means of a habit. 1021 Reply to Objection 3. Reason has its power of mov-have the nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some ing from the will, as stated above (q. 17, a. 1): for it is rule of reason. And in this sense is to be understood the due to the fact that one wills the end, that the reason is- saying that the will of the sovereign has the force of law; sues its commands as regards things ordained to the end. otherwise the sovereign’s will would savor of lawlessness But in order that the volition of what is commanded may rather than of law. Whether the law is always something directed to the common good? Ia IIae q. 90 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the law is not always above definition of legal matters mentions both happiness directed to the common good as to its end. For it belongs and the body politic: for he says (Ethic. v, 1) that we call to law to command and to forbid. But commands are di- those legal matters “just, which are adapted to produce rected to certain individual goods. Therefore the end of and preserve happiness and its parts for the body politic”: the law is not always the common good. since the state is a perfect community, as he says in Polit. Objection 2. Further, the law directs man in his ac- i, 1. tions. But human actions are concerned with particular Now in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly matters. Therefore the law is directed to some particular is the principle of the others, and the others belong to that good. genus in subordination to that thing: thus fire, which is Objection 3. Further, Isidore says (Etym. v, 3): “If the chief among hot things, is the cause of heat in mixed bod-law is based on reason, whatever is based on reason will ies, and these are said to be hot in so far as they have a be a law.” But reason is the foundation not only of what share of fire. Consequently, since the law is chiefly or- is ordained to the common good, but also of that which dained to the common good, any other precept in regard is directed private good. Therefore the law is not only di- to some individual work, must needs be devoid of the na- rected to the good of all, but also to the private good of an ture of a law, save in so far as it regards the common good. individual. Therefore every law is ordained to the common good. On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 21) that “laws Reply to Objection 1. A command denotes an appli- are enacted for no private profit, but for the common ben- cation of a law to matters regulated by the law. Now the efit of the citizens.” order to the common good, at which the law aims, is ap- I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the law belongs plicable to particular ends. And in this way commands are to that which is a principle of human acts, because it is given even concerning particular matters. their rule and measure. Now as reason is a principle of Reply to Objection 2. Actions are indeed concerned human acts, so in reason itself there is something which with particular matters: but those particular matters are is the principle in respect of all the rest: wherefore to this referable to the common good, not as to a common genus principle chiefly and mainly law must needs be referred. or species, but as to a common final cause, according as Now the first principle in practical matters, which are the the common good is said to be the common end. object of the practical reason, is the last end: and the last Reply to Objection 3. Just as nothing stands firm end of human life is bliss or happiness, as stated above with regard to the speculative reason except that which is (q. 2, a. 7; q. 3, a. 1). Consequently the law must needs re- traced back to the first indemonstrable principles, so noth- gard principally the relationship to happiness. Moreover, ing stands firm with regard to the practical reason, unless since every part is ordained to the whole, as imperfect to it be directed to the last end which is the common good: perfect; and since one man is a part of the perfect commu- and whatever stands to reason in this sense, has the nature nity, the law must needs regard properly the relationship of a law. to universal happiness. Wherefore the Philosopher, in the Whether the reason of any man is competent to make laws? Ia IIae q. 90 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the reason of any man ii, 1), “the intention of the lawgiver is to lead men to is competent to make laws. For the Apostle says (Rom. virtue.” But every man can lead another to virtue. There- 2:14) that “when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do fore the reason of any man is competent to make laws. by nature those things that are of the law. . . they are a law Objection 3. Further, just as the sovereign of a state to themselves.” Now he says this of all in general. There- governs the state, so every father of a family governs his fore anyone can make a law for himself. household. But the sovereign of a state can make laws Objection 2. Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. for the state. Therefore every father of a family can make 1022 laws for his household. Reply to Objection 2. A private person cannot lead On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 10): “A law another to virtue efficaciously: for he can only advise, and is an ordinance of the people, whereby something is sanc- if his advice be not taken, it has no coercive power, such tioned by the Elders together with the Commonalty.” as the law should have, in order to prove an efficacious I answer that, A law, properly speaking, regards first inducement to virtue, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, and foremost the order to the common good. Now to order 9). But this coercive power is vested in the whole people anything to the common good, belongs either to the whole or in some public personage, to whom it belongs to inflict people, or to someone who is the viceregent of the whole penalties, as we shall state further on (q. 92, a. 2, ad 3; people. And therefore the making of a law belongs either IIa IIae, q. 64, a. 3). Wherefore the framing of laws to the whole people or to a public personage who has care belongs to him alone. of the whole people: since in all other matters the direct- Reply to Objection 3. As one man is a part of the ing of anything to the end concerns him to whom the end household, so a household is a part of the state: and the belongs. state is a perfect community, according to Polit. i, 1. And Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 1, ad 1), a therefore, as the good of one man is not the last end, but law is in a person not only as in one that rules, but also by is ordained to the common good; so too the good of one participation as in one that is ruled. In the latter way each household is ordained to the good of a single state, which one is a law to himself, in so far as he shares the direction is a perfect community. Consequently he that governs a that he receives from one who rules him. Hence the same family, can indeed make certain commands or ordinances, text goes on: “Who show the work of the law written in but not such as to have properly the force of law. their hearts.” Whether promulgation is essential to a law? Ia IIae q. 90 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that promulgation is not must needs be applied to the men who have to be ruled by essential to a law. For the natural law above all has the it. Such application is made by its being notified to them character of law. But the natural law needs no promul- by promulgation. Wherefore promulgation is necessary gation. Therefore it is not essential to a law that it be for the law to obtain its force. promulgated. Thus from the four preceding articles, the definition of Objection 2. Further, it belongs properly to a law to law may be gathered; and it is nothing else than an ordi- bind one to do or not to do something. But the obligation nance of reason for the common good, made by him who of fulfilling a law touches not only those in whose pres- has care of the community, and promulgated. ence it is promulgated, but also others. Therefore promul- Reply to Objection 1. The natural law is promulgated gation is not essential to a law. by the very fact that God instilled it into man’s mind so as Objection 3. Further, the binding force of a law ex- to be known by him naturally. tends even to the future, since “laws are binding in matters Reply to Objection 2. Those who are not present of the future,” as the jurists say (Cod. 1, tit. De lege et when a law is promulgated, are bound to observe the law, constit. leg. vii). But promulgation concerns those who in so far as it is notified or can be notified to them by oth- are present. Therefore it is not essential to a law. ers, after it has been promulgated. On the contrary, It is laid down in the Decretals, dist. Reply to Objection 3. The promulgation that takes 4, that “laws are established when they are promulgated.” place now, extends to future time by reason of the dura- I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), a law is im- bility of written characters, by which means it is continu- posed on others by way of a rule and measure. Now a rule ally promulgated. Hence Isidore says (Etym. v, 3; ii, 10) or measure is imposed by being applied to those who are that “lex [law] is derived from legere [to read] because it to be ruled and measured by it. Wherefore, in order that is written.” a law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law, it 1023 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 91 Of the Various Kinds of Law (In Six Articles) We must now consider the various kinds of law: under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is an eternal law? (2) Whether there is a natural law? (3) Whether there is a human law? (4) Whether there is a Divine law? (5) Whether there is one Divine law, or several? (6) Whether there is a law of sin? Whether there is an eternal law? Ia IIae q. 91 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no eternal according to Prov. 8:23, therefore it is that this kind of law. Because every law is imposed on someone. But there law must be called eternal. was not someone from eternity on whom a law could be Reply to Objection 1. Those things that are not in imposed: since God alone was from eternity. Therefore themselves, exist with God, inasmuch as they are fore- no law is eternal. known and preordained by Him, according to Rom. 4:17: Objection 2. Further, promulgation is essential to law. “Who calls those things that are not, as those that are.” But promulgation could not be from eternity: because Accordingly the eternal concept of the Divine law bears there was no one to whom it could be promulgated from the character of an eternal law, in so far as it is ordained eternity. Therefore no law can be eternal. by God to the government of things foreknown by Him. Objection 3. Further, a law implies order to an end. Reply to Objection 2. Promulgation is made by word But nothing ordained to an end is eternal: for the last end of mouth or in writing; and in both ways the eternal law is alone is eternal. Therefore no law is eternal. promulgated: because both the Divine Word and the writ- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): ing of the Book of Life are eternal. But the promulgation “That Law which is the Supreme Reason cannot be under- cannot be from eternity on the part of the creature that stood to be otherwise than unchangeable and eternal.” hears or reads. I answer that, As stated above (q. 90, a. 1, ad 2; Reply to Objection 3. The law implies order to the Aa. 3,4), a law is nothing else but a dictate of practical end actively, in so far as it directs certain things to the reason emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect end; but not passively—that is to say, the law itself is not community. Now it is evident, granted that the world is ordained to the end—except accidentally, in a governor ruled by Divine Providence, as was stated in the Ia, q. 22, whose end is extrinsic to him, and to which end his law Aa. 1,2, that the whole community of the universe is gov- must needs be ordained. But the end of the Divine gov- erned by Divine Reason. Wherefore the very Idea of the ernment is God Himself, and His law is not distinct from government of things in God the Ruler of the universe, Himself. Wherefore the eternal law is not ordained to an- has the nature of a law. And since the Divine Reason’s other end. conception of things is not subject to time but is eternal, Whether there is in us a natural law? Ia IIae q. 91 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no natural law directing of human acts to their end is not a function of in us. Because man is governed sufficiently by the eternal nature, as is the case in irrational creatures, which act for law: for Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i) that “the eternal an end solely by their natural appetite; whereas man acts law is that by which it is right that all things should be for an end by his reason and will. Therefore no law is most orderly.” But nature does not abound in superfluities natural to man. as neither does she fail in necessaries. Therefore no law is Objection 3. Further, the more a man is free, the less natural to man. is he under the law. But man is freer than all the animals, Objection 2. Further, by the law man is directed, in on account of his free-will, with which he is endowed his acts, to the end, as stated above (q. 90, a. 2). But the above all other animals. Since therefore other animals are 1024 not subject to a natural law, neither is man subject to a countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us”: thus implying natural law. that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 2:14: “When is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natu- the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those ral law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine things that are of the law,” comments as follows: “Al- light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing though they have no written law, yet they have the natural else than the rational creature’s participation of the eternal law, whereby each one knows, and is conscious of, what law. is good and what is evil.” Reply to Objection 1. This argument would hold, if I answer that, As stated above (q. 90, a. 1, ad 1), law, the natural law were something different from the eternal being a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways: law: whereas it is nothing but a participation thereof, as in one way, as in him that rules and measures; in another stated above. way, as in that which is ruled and measured, since a thing Reply to Objection 2. Every act of reason and will in is ruled and measured, in so far as it partakes of the rule us is based on that which is according to nature, as stated or measure. Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine above (q. 10, a. 1): for every act of reasoning is based on providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law, as principles that are known naturally, and every act of ap- was stated above (a. 1); it is evident that all things partake petite in respect of the means is derived from the natural somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from appetite in respect of the last end. Accordingly the first its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective direction of our acts to their end must needs be in virtue inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now among of the natural law. all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine prov- Reply to Objection 3. Even irrational animals partake idence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes in their own way of the Eternal Reason, just as the rational of a share of providence, by being provident both for it- creature does. But because the rational creature partakes self and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal thereof in an intellectual and rational manner, therefore Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in is properly called a law, since a law is something pertain- the rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the ing to reason, as stated above (q. 90, a. 1). Irrational crea- Psalmist after saying (Ps. 4:6): “Offer up the sacrifice of tures, however, do not partake thereof in a rational man- justice,” as though someone asked what the works of jus- ner, wherefore there is no participation of the eternal law tice are, adds: “Many say, Who showeth us good things?” in them, except by way of similitude. in answer to which question he says: “The light of Thy Whether there is a human law? Ia IIae q. 91 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that there is not a human poral, which he calls human. law. For the natural law is a participation of the eternal I answer that, As stated above (q. 90, a. 1, ad 2), law, as stated above (a. 2). Now through the eternal law a law is a dictate of the practical reason. Now it is to “all things are most orderly,” as Augustine states (De Lib. be observed that the same procedure takes place in the Arb. i, 6). Therefore the natural law suffices for the or- practical and in the speculative reason: for each proceeds dering of all human affairs. Consequently there is no need from principles to conclusions, as stated above (De Lib. for a human law. Arb. i, 6). Accordingly we conclude that just as, in the Objection 2. Further, a law bears the character of a speculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable measure, as stated above (q. 90, a. 1). But human rea- principles, we draw the conclusions of the various sci- son is not a measure of things, but vice versa, as stated in ences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by Metaph. x, text. 5. Therefore no law can emanate from nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason, so too it is human reason. from the precepts of the natural law, as from general and Objection 3. Further, a measure should be most cer- indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs tain, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 3. But the dictates of to proceed to the more particular determination of certain human reason in matters of conduct are uncertain, accord- matters. These particular determinations, devised by hu- ing to Wis. 9:14: “The thoughts of mortal men are fear- man reason, are called human laws, provided the other ful, and our counsels uncertain.” Therefore no law can essential conditions of law be observed, as stated above emanate from human reason. (q. 90, Aa. 2,3,4). Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric On the contrary, Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) distin- (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that “justice has its source in na- guishes two kinds of law, the one eternal, the other tem- ture; thence certain things came into custom by reason of 1025 their utility; afterwards these things which emanated from law. nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by Reply to Objection 2. Human reason is not, of itself, fear and reverence for the law.” the rule of things: but the principles impressed on it by Reply to Objection 1. The human reason cannot have nature, are general rules and measures of all things relat- a full participation of the dictate of the Divine Reason, ing to human conduct, whereof the natural reason is the but according to its own mode, and imperfectly. Con- rule and measure, although it is not the measure of things sequently, as on the part of the speculative reason, by a that are from nature. natural participation of Divine Wisdom, there is in us the Reply to Objection 3. The practical reason is con- knowledge of certain general principles, but not proper cerned with practical matters, which are singular and con- knowledge of each single truth, such as that contained in tingent: but not with necessary things, with which the the Divine Wisdom; so too, on the part of the practical speculative reason is concerned. Wherefore human laws reason, man has a natural participation of the eternal law, cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to the demon- according to certain general principles, but not as regards strated conclusions of sciences. Nor is it necessary for the particular determinations of individual cases, which every measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but are, however, contained in the eternal law. Hence the need according as it is possible in its own particular genus. for human reason to proceed further to sanction them by Whether there was any need for a Divine law? Ia IIae q. 91 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that there was no need for be directed to his end by a law given by God. a Divine law. Because, as stated above (a. 2), the natu- Secondly, because, on account of the uncertainty of ral law is a participation in us of the eternal law. But the human judgment, especially on contingent and particular eternal law is a Divine law, as stated above (a. 1). There- matters, different people form different judgments on hu- fore there was no need for a Divine law in addition to the man acts; whence also different and contrary laws result. natural law, and human laws derived therefrom. In order, therefore, that man may know without any doubt Objection 2. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 15:14) what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid, it was that “God left man in the hand of his own counsel.” Now necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a counsel is an act of reason, as stated above (q. 14, a. 1). law given by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot Therefore man was left to the direction of his reason. But err. a dictate of human reason is a human law as stated above Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters (a. 3). Therefore there is no need for man to be governed of which he is competent to judge. But man is not compe- also by a Divine law. tent to judge of interior movements, that are hidden, but Objection 3. Further, human nature is more self- only of exterior acts which appear: and yet for the per- sufficing than irrational creatures. But irrational creatures fection of virtue it is necessary for man to conduct him- have no Divine law besides the natural inclination im- self aright in both kinds of acts. Consequently human law pressed on them. Much less, therefore, should the rational could not sufficiently curb and direct interior acts; and it creature have a Divine law in addition to the natural law. was necessary for this purpose that a Divine law should On the contrary, David prayed God to set His law supervene. before him, saying (Ps. 118:33): “Set before me for a law Fourthly, because, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, the way of Thy justifications, O Lord.” 5,6), human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds: I answer that, Besides the natural and the human law since while aiming at doing away with all evils, it would it was necessary for the directing of human conduct to do away with many good things, and would hinder the ad- have a Divine law. And this for four reasons. First, be- vance of the common good, which is necessary for human cause it is by law that man is directed how to perform his intercourse. In order, therefore, that no evil might remain proper acts in view of his last end. And indeed if man unforbidden and unpunished, it was necessary for the Di- were ordained to no other end than that which is propor- vine law to supervene, whereby all sins are forbidden. tionate to his natural faculty, there would be no need for And these four causes are touched upon in Ps. 118:8, man to have any further direction of the part of his reason, where it is said: “The law of the Lord is unspotted,” i.e. besides the natural law and human law which is derived allowing no foulness of sin; “converting souls,” because it from it. But since man is ordained to an end of eternal directs not only exterior, but also interior acts; “the testi- happiness which is inproportionate to man’s natural fac- mony of the Lord is faithful,” because of the certainty of ulty, as stated above (q. 5, a. 5), therefore it was necessary what is true and right; “giving wisdom to little ones,” by that, besides the natural and the human law, man should directing man to an end supernatural and Divine. 1026 Reply to Objection 1. By the natural law the eter-enough for it to proceed from principles imparted by na- nal law is participated proportionately to the capacity of ture, which are the precepts of the natural law, for the rea- human nature. But to his supernatural end man needs to sons given above: but there is need for certain additional be directed in a yet higher way. Hence the additional law principles, namely, the precepts of the Divine law. given by God, whereby man shares more perfectly in the Reply to Objection 3. Irrational creatures are not or- eternal law. dained to an end higher than that which is proportionate to Reply to Objection 2. Counsel is a kind of inquiry: their natural powers: consequently the comparison fails. hence it must proceed from some principles. Nor is it Whether there is but one Divine law? Ia IIae q. 91 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that there is but one Di- this, man was directly ordained by the Old Law: where- vine law. Because, where there is one king in one king- fore, at the very outset of the law, the people were invited dom there is but one law. Now the whole of mankind is to the earthly kingdom of the Chananaeans (Ex. 3:8,17). compared to God as to one king, according to Ps. 46:8: Again it may be an intelligible and heavenly good: and “God is the King of all the earth.” Therefore there is but to this, man is ordained by the New Law. Wherefore, at one Divine law. the very beginning of His preaching, Christ invited men to Objection 2. Further, every law is directed to the end the kingdom of heaven, saying (Mat. 4:17): “Do penance, which the lawgiver intends for those for whom he makes for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.” Hence Augustine the law. But God intends one and the same thing for all says (Contra Faust. iv) that “promises of temporal goods men; since according to 1 Tim. 2:4: “He will have all men are contained in the Old Testament, for which reason it is to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth.” called old; but the promise of eternal life belongs to the Therefore there is but one Divine law. New Testament.” Objection 3. Further, the Divine law seems to be more Secondly, it belongs to the law to direct human acts ac- akin to the eternal law, which is one, than the natural law, cording to the order of righteousness (a. 4): wherein also according as the revelation of grace is of a higher order the New Law surpasses the Old Law, since it directs our than natural knowledge. Therefore much more is the Di- internal acts, according to Mat. 5:20: “Unless your justice vine law but one. abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 7:12): “The shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.” Hence the priesthood being translated, it is necessary that a trans- saying that “the Old Law restrains the hand, but the New lation also be made of the law.” But the priesthood is Law controls the mind” ( Sentent. iii, D, xl). twofold, as stated in the same passage, viz. the levitical Thirdly, it belongs to the law to induce men to observe priesthood, and the priesthood of Christ. Therefore the its commandments. This the Old Law did by the fear of Divine law is twofold, namely the Old Law and the New punishment: but the New Law, by love, which is poured Law. into our hearts by the grace of Christ, bestowed in the New I answer that, As stated in the Ia, q. 30, a. 3, distincLaw, but foreshadowed in the Old. Hence Augustine says tion is the cause of number. Now things may be distin- (Contra Adimant. Manich. discip. xvii) that “there is lit- guished in two ways. First, as those things that are alto- tle difference∗ between the Law and the Gospel—fear and gether specifically different, e.g. a horse and an ox. Sec- love.” ondly, as perfect and imperfect in the same species, e.g. a Reply to Objection 1. As the father of a family is- boy and a man: and in this way the Divine law is divided sues different commands to the children and to the adults, into Old and New. Hence the Apostle (Gal. 3:24,25) com- so also the one King, God, in His one kingdom, gave one pares the state of man under the Old Law to that of a child law to men, while they were yet imperfect, and another “under a pedagogue”; but the state under the New Law, more perfect law, when, by the preceding law, they had to that of a full grown man, who is “no longer under a been led to a greater capacity for Divine things. pedagogue.” Reply to Objection 2. The salvation of man could Now the perfection and imperfection of these two laws not be achieved otherwise than through Christ, according is to be taken in connection with the three conditions per- to Acts 4:12: “There is no other name. . . given to men, taining to law, as stated above. For, in the first place, it whereby we must be saved.” Consequently the law that belongs to law to be directed to the common good as to brings all to salvation could not be given until after the its end, as stated above (q. 90, a. 2). This good may be coming of Christ. But before His coming it was neces- twofold. It may be a sensible and earthly good; and to sary to give to the people, of whom Christ was to be born, ∗ The ‘little difference’ refers to the Latin words ‘timor’ and ‘amor’—‘fear’ and ‘love.’ 1027 a law containing certain rudiments of righteousness unto for all. But the Divine law directs man also in certain par-salvation, in order to prepare them to receive Him. ticular matters, to which the perfect and imperfect do not Reply to Objection 3. The natural law directs man by stand in the same relation. Hence the necessity for the way of certain general precepts, common to both the per- Divine law to be twofold, as already explained. fect and the imperfect: wherefore it is one and the same Whether there is a law in the fomes of sin? Ia IIae q. 91 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no law of the was so effective in the primitive state, that nothing either “fomes” of sin. For Isidore says (Etym. v) that the “law beside or against reason could take man unawares. But is based on reason.” But the “fomes” of sin is not based when man turned his back on God, he fell under the influ- on reason, but deviates from it. Therefore the “fomes” has ence of his sensual impulses: in fact this happens to each not the nature of a law. one individually, the more he deviates from the path of Objection 2. Further, every law is binding, so that reason, so that, after a fashion, he is likened to the beasts those who do not obey it are called transgressors. But that are led by the impulse of sensuality, according to Ps. man is not called a transgressor, from not following the 48:21: “Man, when he was in honor, did not understand: instigations of the “fomes”; but rather from his following he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like them. Therefore the “fomes” has not the nature of a law. to them.” Objection 3. Further, the law is ordained to the com- So, then, this very inclination of sensuality which is mon good, as stated above (q. 90, a. 2). But the “fomes” called the “fomes,” in other animals has simply the nature inclines us, not to the common, but to our own private of a law (yet only in so far as a law may be said to be good. Therefore the “fomes” has not the nature of sin. in such things), by reason of a direct inclination. But in On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): “I man, it has not the nature of law in this way, rather is it see another law in my members, fighting against the law a deviation from the law of reason. But since, by the just of my mind.” sentence of God, man is destitute of original justice, and I answer that, As stated above (a. 2; q. 90, a. 1, ad his reason bereft of its vigor, this impulse of sensuality, 1), the law, as to its essence, resides in him that rules and whereby he is led, in so far as it is a penalty following measures; but, by way of participation, in that which is from the Divine law depriving man of his proper dignity, ruled and measured; so that every inclination or ordination has the nature of a law. which may be found in things subject to the law, is called Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers the a law by participation, as stated above (a. 2; q. 90, a. 1 , “fomes” in itself, as an incentive to evil. It is not thus that ad 1). Now those who are subject to a law may receive a it has the nature of a law, as stated above, but according twofold inclination from the lawgiver. First, in so far as as it results from the justice of the Divine law: it is as he directly inclines his subjects to something; sometimes though we were to say that the law allows a nobleman to indeed different subjects to different acts; in this way we be condemned to hard labor for some misdeed. may say that there is a military law and a mercantile law. Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers law Secondly, indirectly; thus by the very fact that a lawgiver in the light of a rule or measure: for it is in this sense that deprives a subject of some dignity, the latter passes into those who deviate from the law become transgressors. But another order, so as to be under another law, as it were: the “fomes” is not a law in this respect, but by a kind of thus if a soldier be turned out of the army, he becomes a participation, as stated above. subject of rural or of mercantile legislation. Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the Accordingly under the Divine Lawgiver various crea- “fomes” as to its proper inclination, and not as to its ori- tures have various natural inclinations, so that what is, as gin. And yet if the inclination of sensuality be considered it were, a law for one, is against the law for another: thus I as it is in other animals, thus it is ordained to the common might say that fierceness is, in a way, the law of a dog, but good, namely, to the preservation of nature in the species against the law of a sheep or another meek animal. And or in the individual. And this is in man also, in so far as so the law of man, which, by the Divine ordinance, is al- sensuality is subject to reason. But it is called “fomes” in lotted to him, according to his proper natural condition, is so far as it strays from the order of reason. that he should act in accordance with reason: and this law 1028 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 92 Of the Effects of Law (In Two Articles) We must now consider the effects of law; under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether an effect of law is to make men good? (2) Whether the effects of law are to command, to forbid, to permit, and to punish, as the Jurist states? Whether an effect of law is to make men good? Ia IIae q. 92 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that it is not an effect of law to good simply. If, however, the intention of the lawgiver is make men good. For men are good through virtue, since fixed on that which is not simply good, but useful or plea- virtue, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6 is “that which makes its surable to himself, or in opposition to Divine justice; then subject good.” But virtue is in man from God alone, be- the law does not make men good simply, but in respect cause He it is Who “works it in us without us,” as we to that particular government. In this way good is found stated above (q. 55, a. 4) in giving the definition of virtue. even in things that are bad of themselves: thus a man is Therefore the law does not make men good. called a good robber, because he works in a way that is Objection 2. Further, Law does not profit a man un- adapted to his end. less he obeys it. But the very fact that a man obeys a law Reply to Objection 1. Virtue is twofold, as explained is due to his being good. Therefore in man goodness is above (q. 63, a. 2), viz. acquired and infused. Now the fact presupposed to the law. Therefore the law does not make of being accustomed to an action contributes to both, but men good. in different ways; for it causes the acquired virtue; while Objection 3. Further, Law is ordained to the com- it disposes to infused virtue, and preserves and fosters it mon good, as stated above (q. 90, a. 2). But some behave when it already exists. And since law is given for the pur- well in things regarding the community, who behave ill in pose of directing human acts; as far as human acts con- things regarding themselves. Therefore it is not the busi- duce to virtue, so far does law make men good. Wherefore ness of the law to make men good. the Philosopher says in the second book of the Politics Objection 4. Further, some laws are tyrannical, as the (Ethic. ii) that “lawgivers make men good by habituating Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 6). But a tyrant does not in- them to good works.” tend the good of his subjects, but considers only his own Reply to Objection 2. It is not always through perfect profit. Therefore law does not make men good. goodness of virtue that one obeys the law, but sometimes On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) it is through fear of punishment, and sometimes from the that the “intention of every lawgiver is to make good citi- mere dictates of reason, which is a beginning of virtue, as zens.” stated above (q. 63, a. 1). I answer that, as stated above (q. 90, a. 1, ad 2; Reply to Objection 3. The goodness of any part is Aa. 3,4), a law is nothing else than a dictate of reason considered in comparison with the whole; hence Augus- in the ruler by whom his subjects are governed. Now the tine says (Confess. iii) that “unseemly is the part that har- virtue of any subordinate thing consists in its being well monizes not with the whole.” Since then every man is a subordinated to that by which it is regulated: thus we see part of the state, it is impossible that a man be good, un- that the virtue of the irascible and concupiscible faculties less he be well proportionate to the common good: nor consists in their being obedient to reason; and accordingly can the whole be well consistent unless its parts be pro- “the virtue of every subject consists in his being well sub- portionate to it. Consequently the common good of the jected to his ruler,” as the Philosopher says (Polit. i). But state cannot flourish, unless the citizens be virtuous, at every law aims at being obeyed by those who are subject least those whose business it is to govern. But it is enough to it. Consequently it is evident that the proper effect of for the good of the community, that the other citizens be so law is to lead its subjects to their proper virtue: and since far virtuous that they obey the commands of their rulers. virtue is “that which makes its subject good,” it follows Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that “the virtue that the proper effect of law is to make those to whom it of a sovereign is the same as that of a good man, but the is given, good, either simply or in some particular respect. virtue of any common citizen is not the same as that of a For if the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on true good, good man.” which is the common good regulated according to Divine Reply to Objection 4. A tyrannical law, through not justice, it follows that the effect of the law is to make men being according to reason, is not a law, absolutely speak- 1029 ing, but rather a perversion of law; and yet in so far as it jects, and aims at being obeyed by them, which is to make is something in the nature of a law, it aims at the citizens’ them good, not simply, but with respect to that particular being good. For all it has in the nature of a law consists government. in its being an ordinance made by a superior to his sub- Whether the acts of law are suitably assigned? Ia IIae q. 92 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the acts of law are acts, in which the law directs, as stated above (q. 90, not suitably assigned as consisting in “command,” “prohi- Aa. 1,2; q. 91, a. 4). Again there are three kinds of human bition,” “permission” and “punishment.” For “every law acts: for, as stated above (q. 18, a. 8), some acts are good is a general precept,” as the jurist states. But command generically, viz. acts of virtue; and in respect of these the and precept are the same. Therefore the other three are act of the law is a precept or command, for “the law com- superfluous. mands all acts of virtue” (Ethic. v, 1). Some acts are evil Objection 2. Further, the effect of a law is to induce generically, viz. acts of vice, and in respect of these the its subjects to be good, as stated above (a. 1). But counsel law forbids. Some acts are generically indifferent, and in aims at a higher good than a command does. Therefore it respect of these the law permits; and all acts that are either belongs to law to counsel rather than to command. not distinctly good or not distinctly bad may be called in- Objection 3. Further, just as punishment stirs a man different. And it is the fear of punishment that law makes to good deeds, so does reward. Therefore if to punish is use of in order to ensure obedience: in which respect pun- reckoned an effect of law, so also is to reward. ishment is an effect of law. Objection 4. Further, the intention of a lawgiver is Reply to Objection 1. Just as to cease from evil is a to make men good, as stated above (a. 1). But he that kind of good, so a prohibition is a kind of precept: and obeys the law, merely through fear of being punished, is accordingly, taking precept in a wide sense, every law is a not good: because “although a good deed may be done kind of precept. through servile fear, i.e. fear of punishment, it is not done Reply to Objection 2. To advise is not a proper act of well,” as Augustine says (Contra duas Epist. Pelag. ii). law, but may be within the competency even of a private Therefore punishment is not a proper effect of law. person, who cannot make a law. Wherefore too the Apos- On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 19): “Every tle, after giving a certain counsel (1 Cor. 7:12) says: “I law either permits something, as: ‘A brave man may de- speak, not the Lord.” Consequently it is not reckoned as mand his reward’ ”: or forbids something, as: “No man an effect of law. may ask a consecrated virgin in marriage”: or punishes, Reply to Objection 3. To reward may also pertain to as: “Let him that commits a murder be put to death.” anyone: but to punish pertains to none but the framer of I answer that, Just as an assertion is a dictate of rea- the law, by whose authority the pain is inflicted. Where- son asserting something, so is a law a dictate of reason, fore to reward is not reckoned an effect of law, but only to commanding something. Now it is proper to reason to punish. lead from one thing to another. Wherefore just as, in Reply to Objection 4. From becoming accustomed to demonstrative sciences, the reason leads us from certain avoid evil and fulfill what is good, through fear of pun- principles to assent to the conclusion, so it induces us by ishment, one is sometimes led on to do so likewise, with some means to assent to the precept of the law. delight and of one’s own accord. Accordingly, law, even Now the precepts of law are concerned with human by punishing, leads men on to being good. 1030 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 93 Of the Eternal Law (In Six Articles) We must now consider each law by itself; and (1) The eternal law; (2) The natural law; (3) The human law; (4) The old law; (5) The new law, which is the law of the Gospel. Of the sixth law which is the law of the “fomes,” suffice what we have said when treating of original sin. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry: (1) What is the eternal law? (2) Whether it is known to all? (3) Whether every law is derived from it? (4) Whether necessary things are subject to the eternal law? (5) Whether natural contingencies are subject to the eternal law? (6) Whether all human things are subject to it? Whether the eternal law is a sovereign type∗ existing in God? Ia IIae q. 93 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the eternal law is not to be found in each single creature, as was also stated in a sovereign type existing in God. For there is only one the Ia, q. 103, a. 5. Wherefore as the type of the Divine eternal law. But there are many types of things in the Di- Wisdom, inasmuch as by It all things are created, has the vine mind; for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 46) that character of art, exemplar or idea; so the type of Divine God “made each thing according to its type.” Therefore Wisdom, as moving all things to their due end, bears the the eternal law does not seem to be a type existing in the character of law. Accordingly the eternal law is nothing Divine mind. else than the type of Divine Wisdom, as directing all ac- Objection 2. Further, it is essential to a law that it be tions and movements. promulgated by word, as stated above (q. 90, a. 4). But Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking in that Word is a Personal name in God, as stated in the Ia, q. 34, passage of the ideal types which regard the proper nature a. 1: whereas type refers to the Essence. Therefore the of each single thing; and consequently in them there is a eternal law is not the same as a Divine type. certain distinction and plurality, according to their differ- Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Vera Re- ent relations to things, as stated in the Ia, q. 15, a. 2. But lig. xxx): “We see a law above our minds, which is called law is said to direct human acts by ordaining them to the truth.” But the law which is above our minds is the eternal common good, as stated above (q. 90, a. 2). And things, law. Therefore truth is the eternal law. But the idea of which are in themselves different, may be considered as truth is not the same as the idea of a type. Therefore the one, according as they are ordained to one common thing. eternal law is not the same as the sovereign type. Wherefore the eternal law is one since it is the type of this On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) order. that “the eternal law is the sovereign type, to which we Reply to Objection 2. With regard to any sort of must always conform.” word, two points may be considered: viz. the word itself, I answer that, Just as in every artificer there pre-exists and that which is expressed by the word. For the spoken a type of the things that are made by his art, so too in ev- word is something uttered by the mouth of man, and ex- ery governor there must pre-exist the type of the order of presses that which is signified by the human word. The those things that are to be done by those who are subject same applies to the human mental word, which is nothing to his government. And just as the type of the things yet else that something conceived by the mind, by which man to be made by an art is called the art or exemplar of the expresses his thoughts mentally. So then in God the Word products of that art, so too the type in him who governs the conceived by the intellect of the Father is the name of a acts of his subjects, bears the character of a law, provided Person: but all things that are in the Father’s knowledge, the other conditions be present which we have mentioned whether they refer to the Essence or to the Persons, or to above (q. 90). Now God, by His wisdom, is the Creator the works of God, are expressed by this Word, as Augus- of all things in relation to which He stands as the artificer tine declares (De Trin. xv, 14). And among other things to the products of his art, as stated in the Ia, q. 14, a. 8. expressed by this Word, the eternal law itself is expressed Moreover He governs all the acts and movements that are thereby. Nor does it follow that the eternal law is a Per- ∗ Ratio 1031 sonal name in God: yet it is appropriated to the Son, on with things, since “an opinion is true or false according as account of the kinship between type and word. it answers to the reality.” But the Divine intellect is the Reply to Objection 3. The types of the Divine in- measure of things: since each thing has so far truth in it, tellect do not stand in the same relation to things, as the as it represents the Divine intellect, as was stated in the types of the human intellect. For the human intellect is Ia, q. 16, a. 1. Consequently the Divine intellect is true in measured by things, so that a human concept is not true itself; and its type is truth itself. by reason of itself, but by reason of its being consonant Whether the eternal law is known to all? Ia IIae q. 93 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the eternal law is not common principles of the natural law: and as to the oth- known to all. Because, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11), ers, they partake of the knowledge of truth, some more, “the things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit some less; and in this respect are more or less cognizant of God.” But the eternal law is a type existing in the Di- of the eternal law. vine mind. Therefore it is unknown to all save God alone. Reply to Objection 1. We cannot know the things that Objection 2. Further, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. are of God, as they are in themselves; but they are made i, 6) “the eternal law is that by which it is right that all known to us in their effects, according to Rom. 1:20: “The things should be most orderly.” But all do not know how invisible things of God. . . are clearly seen, being under- all things are most orderly. Therefore all do not know the stood by the things that are made.” eternal law. Reply to Objection 2. Although each one knows the Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. eternal law according to his own capacity, in the way ex- xxxi) that “the eternal law is not subject to the judgment plained above, yet none can comprehend it: for it can- of man.” But according to Ethic. i, “any man can judge not be made perfectly known by its effects. Therefore it well of what he knows.” Therefore the eternal law is not does not follow that anyone who knows the eternal law in known to us. the way aforesaid, knows also the whole order of things, On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) whereby they are most orderly. that “knowledge of the eternal law is imprinted on us.” Reply to Objection 3. To judge a thing may be un- I answer that, A thing may be known in two ways: derstood in two ways. First, as when a cognitive power first, in itself; secondly, in its effect, wherein some like- judges of its proper object, according to Job 12:11: “Doth ness of that thing is found: thus someone not seeing the not the ear discern words, and the palate of him that eateth, sun in its substance, may know it by its rays. So then the taste?” It is to this kind of judgment that the Philoso- no one can know the eternal law, as it is in itself, except pher alludes when he says that “anyone can judge well of the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every ratio- what he knows,” by judging, namely, whether what is put nal creature knows it in its reflection, greater or less. For forward is true. In another way we speak of a superior every knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and par- judging of a subordinate by a kind of practical judgment, ticipation of the eternal law, which is the unchangeable as to whether he should be such and such or not. And thus truth, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi). Now all none can judge of the eternal law. men know the truth to a certain extent, at least as to the Whether every law is derived from the eternal law? Ia IIae q. 93 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that not every law is unjust, according to Is. 10:1: “Woe to them that make derived from the eternal law. For there is a law of the wicked laws.” Therefore not every law is derived from “fomes,” as stated above (q. 91, a. 6), which is not de- the eternal law. rived from that Divine law which is the eternal law, since Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. thereunto pertains the “prudence of the flesh,” of which i, 5) that “the law which is framed for ruling the people, the Apostle says (Rom. 8:7), that “it cannot be subject to rightly permits many things which are punished by Divine the law of God.” Therefore not every law is derived from providence.” But the type of Divine providence is the eter- the eternal law. nal law, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore not even every Objection 2. Further, nothing unjust can be derived good law is derived from the eternal law. from the eternal law, because, as stated above (a. 2, obj. 2), On the contrary, Divine Wisdom says (Prov. 8:15): “the eternal law is that, according to which it is right that “By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things.” all things should be most orderly.” But some laws are But the type of Divine Wisdom is the eternal law, as stated 1032 above (a. 1). Therefore all laws proceed from the eternal law in man, in so far as it is a punishment resulting from law. Divine justice; and in this respect it is evident that it is I answer that, As stated above (q. 90, Aa. 1,2), the derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it denotes a law denotes a kind of plan directing acts towards an end. proneness to sin, it is contrary to the Divine law, and has Now wherever there are movers ordained to one another, not the nature of law, as stated above (q. 91, a. 6). the power of the second mover must needs be derived Reply to Objection 2. Human law has the nature of from the power of the first mover; since the second mover law in so far as it partakes of right reason; and it is clear does not move except in so far as it is moved by the first. that, in this respect, it is derived from the eternal law. But Wherefore we observe the same in all those who govern, in so far as it deviates from reason, it is called an unjust so that the plan of government is derived by secondary law, and has the nature, not of law but of violence. Nev- governors from the governor in chief; thus the plan of ertheless even an unjust law, in so far as it retains some what is to be done in a state flows from the king’s com- appearance of law, though being framed by one who is in mand to his inferior administrators: and again in things of power, is derived from the eternal law; since all power is art the plan of whatever is to be done by art flows from the from the Lord God, according to Rom. 13:1. chief craftsman to the under-crafts-men, who work with Reply to Objection 3. Human law is said to permit their hands. Since then the eternal law is the plan of gov- certain things, not as approving them, but as being unable ernment in the Chief Governor, all the plans of govern- to direct them. And many things are directed by the Di- ment in the inferior governors must be derived from the vine law, which human law is unable to direct, because eternal law. But these plans of inferior governors are all more things are subject to a higher than to a lower cause. other laws besides the eternal law. Therefore all laws, in Hence the very fact that human law does not meddle with so far as they partake of right reason, are derived from the matters it cannot direct, comes under the ordination of eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that the eternal law. It would be different, were human law “in temporal law there is nothing just and lawful, but what to sanction what the eternal law condemns. Consequently man has drawn from the eternal law.” it does not follow that human law is not derived from the Reply to Objection 1. The “fomes” has the nature of eternal law, but that it is not on a perfect equality with it. Whether necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law? Ia IIae q. 93 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that necessary and eter- is the type of the Divine government. Consequently what- nal things are subject to the eternal law. For whatever is ever is subject to the Divine government, is subject to the reasonable is subject to reason. But the Divine will is rea- eternal law: while if anything is not subject to the Divine sonable, for it is just. Therefore it is subject to (the Divine) government, neither is it subject to the eternal law. The reason. But the eternal law is the Divine reason. There- application of this distinction may be gathered by looking fore God’s will is subject to the eternal law. But God’s around us. For those things are subject to human govern- will is eternal. Therefore eternal and necessary things are ment, which can be done by man; but what pertains to the subject to the eternal law. nature of man is not subject to human government; for Objection 2. Further, whatever is subject to the King, instance, that he should have a soul, hands, or feet. Ac- is subject to the King’s law. Now the Son, according to cordingly all that is in things created by God, whether it 1 Cor. 15:28,24, “shall be subject. . . to God and the Fa- be contingent or necessary, is subject to the eternal law: ther. . . when He shall have delivered up the Kingdom to while things pertaining to the Divine Nature or Essence Him.” Therefore the Son, Who is eternal, is subject to the are not subject to the eternal law, but are the eternal law eternal law. itself. Objection 3. Further, the eternal law is Divine prov- Reply to Objection 1. We may speak of God’s will idence as a type. But many necessary things are subject in two ways. First, as to the will itself: and thus, since to Divine providence: for instance, the stability of incor- God’s will is His very Essence, it is subject neither to the poreal substances and of the heavenly bodies. Therefore Divine government, nor to the eternal law, but is the same even necessary things are subject to the eternal law. thing as the eternal law. Secondly, we may speak of God’s On the contrary, Things that are necessary cannot be will, as to the things themselves that God wills about crea- otherwise, and consequently need no restraining. But laws tures; which things are subject to the eternal law, in so are imposed on men, in order to restrain them from evil, as far as they are planned by Divine Wisdom. In reference explained above (q. 92, a. 2). Therefore necessary things to these things God’s will is said to be reasonable [ratio- are not subject to the eternal law. nalis]: though regarded in itself it should rather be called I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the eternal law their type [ratio]. 1033 Reply to Objection 2. God the Son was not made by those necessary things that are created. God, but was naturally born of God. Consequently He is Reply to Objection 4. As the Philosopher says not subject to Divine providence or to the eternal law: but (Metaph. v, text. 6), some necessary things have a cause rather is Himself the eternal law by a kind of appropria- of their necessity: and thus they derive from something tion, as Augustine explains (De Vera Relig. xxxi). But He else the fact that they cannot be otherwise. And this is in is said to be subject to the Father by reason of His human itself a most effective restraint; for whatever is restrained, nature, in respect of which also the Father is said to be is said to be restrained in so far as it cannot do otherwise greater than He. than it is allowed to. The third objection we grant, because it deals with Whether natural contingents are subject to the eternal law? Ia IIae q. 93 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that natural contingents Now just as man, by such pronouncement, impresses are not subject to the eternal law. Because promulgation a kind of inward principle of action on the man that is is essential to law, as stated above (q. 90, a. 4). But a subject to him, so God imprints on the whole of nature law cannot be promulgated except to rational creatures, to the principles of its proper actions. And so, in this way, whom it is possible to make an announcement. Therefore God is said to command the whole of nature, according none but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law; to Ps. 148:6: “He hath made a decree, and it shall not and consequently natural contingents are not. pass away.” And thus all actions and movements of the Objection 2. Further, “Whatever obeys reason par- whole of nature are subject to the eternal law. Conse- takes somewhat of reason,” as stated in Ethic. i. But the quently irrational creatures are subject to the eternal law, eternal law, is the supreme type, as stated above (a. 1). through being moved by Divine providence; but not, as Since then natural contingents do not partake of reason in rational creatures are, through understanding the Divine any way, but are altogether void of reason, it seems that commandment. they are not subject to the eternal law. Reply to Objection 1. The impression of an inward Objection 3. Further, the eternal law is most efficient. active principle is to natural things, what the promulga- But in natural contingents defects occur. Therefore they tion of law is to men: because law, by being promulgated, are not subject to the eternal law. imprints on man a directive principle of human actions, as On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 8:29): “When stated above. He compassed the sea with its bounds, and set a law to the Reply to Objection 2. Irrational creatures neither par- waters, that they should not pass their limits.” take of nor are obedient to human reason: whereas they do I answer that, We must speak otherwise of the law of partake of the Divine Reason by obeying it; because the man, than of the eternal law which is the law of God. For power of Divine Reason extends over more things than the law of man extends only to rational creatures subject human reason does. And as the members of the human to man. The reason of this is because law directs the ac- body are moved at the command of reason, and yet do not tions of those that are subject to the government of some- partake of reason, since they have no apprehension subor- one: wherefore, properly speaking, none imposes a law dinate to reason; so too irrational creatures are moved by on his own actions. Now whatever is done regarding the God, without, on that account, being rational. use of irrational things subject to man, is done by the act Reply to Objection 3. Although the defects which of man himself moving those things, for these irrational occur in natural things are outside the order of particular creatures do not move themselves, but are moved by oth- causes, they are not outside the order of universal causes, ers, as stated above (q. 1, a. 2). Consequently man can- especially of the First Cause, i.e. God, from Whose prov- not impose laws on irrational beings, however much they idence nothing can escape, as stated in the Ia, q. 22, a. 2. may be subject to him. But he can impose laws on ratio- And since the eternal law is the type of Divine providence, nal beings subject to him, in so far as by his command or as stated above (a. 1), hence the defects of natural things pronouncement of any kind, he imprints on their minds a are subject to the eternal law. rule which is a principle of action. 1034 Whether all human affairs are subject to the eternal law? Ia IIae q. 93 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that not all human affairs their actions, indeed, since both their knowledge of good, are subject to the eternal law. For the Apostle says (Gal. and their inclination thereto, are imperfect; but this imper- 5:18): “If you are led by the spirit you are not under the fection on the part of action is supplied on the part of pas- law.” But the righteous who are the sons of God by adop- sion, in so far as they suffer what the eternal law decrees tion, are led by the spirit of God, according to Rom. 8:14: concerning them, according as they fail to act in harmony “Whosoever are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons with that law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 15): of God.” Therefore not all men are under the eternal law. “I esteem that the righteous act according to the eternal Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 8:7): law; and (De Catech. Rud. xviii): Out of the just misery “The prudence [Vulg.: ‘wisdom’] of the flesh is an enemy of the souls which deserted Him, God knew how to fur- to God: for it is not subject to the law of God.” But many nish the inferior parts of His creation with most suitable are those in whom the prudence of the flesh dominates. laws.” Therefore all men are not subject to the eternal law which Reply to Objection 1. This saying of the Apostle may is the law of God. be understood in two ways. First, so that a man is said Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. to be under the law, through being pinned down thereby, i, 6) that “the eternal law is that by which the wicked de- against his will, as by a load. Hence, on the same passage serve misery, the good, a life of blessedness.” But those a gloss says that “he is under the law, who refrains from who are already blessed, and those who are already lost, evil deeds, through fear of punishment threatened by the are not in the state of merit. Therefore they are not under law, and not from love of virtue.” In this way the spiritual the eternal law. man is not under the law, because he fulfils the law will- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, ingly, through charity which is poured into his heart by the 12): “Nothing evades the laws of the most high Creator Holy Ghost. Secondly, it can be understood as meaning and Governor, for by Him the peace of the universe is ad- that the works of a man, who is led by the Holy Ghost, are ministered.” the works of the Holy Ghost rather than his own. There- I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is fore, since the Holy Ghost is not under the law, as neither subject to the eternal law, as explained above (a. 5): first, is the Son, as stated above (a. 4, ad 2); it follows that such by partaking of the eternal law by way of knowledge; sec- works, in so far as they are of the Holy Ghost, are not un- ondly, by way of action and passion, i.e. by partaking of der the law. The Apostle witnesses to this when he says the eternal law by way of an inward motive principle: and (2 Cor. 3:17): “Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is in this second way, irrational creatures are subject to the liberty.” eternal law, as stated above (a. 5). But since the rational Reply to Objection 2. The prudence of the flesh can- nature, together with that which it has in common with not be subject to the law of God as regards action; since all creatures, has something proper to itself inasmuch as it it inclines to actions contrary to the Divine law: yet it is is rational, consequently it is subject to the eternal law in subject to the law of God, as regards passion; since it de- both ways; because while each rational creature has some serves to suffer punishment according to the law of Divine knowledge of the eternal law, as stated above (a. 2), it also justice. Nevertheless in no man does the prudence of the has a natural inclination to that which is in harmony with flesh dominate so far as to destroy the whole good of his the eternal law; for “we are naturally adapted to the recip- nature: and consequently there remains in man the incli- ients of virtue” (Ethic. ii, 1). nation to act in accordance with the eternal law. For we Both ways, however, are imperfect, and to a certain have seen above (q. 85, a. 2) that sin does not destroy en- extent destroyed, in the wicked; because in them the natu- tirely the good of nature. ral inclination to virtue is corrupted by vicious habits, and, Reply to Objection 3. A thing is maintained in the moreover, the natural knowledge of good is darkened by end and moved towards the end by one and the same passions and habits of sin. But in the good both ways are cause: thus gravity which makes a heavy body rest in the found more perfect: because in them, besides the natural lower place is also the cause of its being moved thither. knowledge of good, there is the added knowledge of faith We therefore reply that as it is according to the eternal law and wisdom; and again, besides the natural inclination to that some deserve happiness, others unhappiness, so is it good, there is the added motive of grace and virtue. by the eternal law that some are maintained in a happy Accordingly, the good are perfectly subject to the eter- state, others in an unhappy state. Accordingly both the nal law, as always acting according to it: whereas the blessed and the damned are under the eternal law. wicked are subject to the eternal law, imperfectly as to 1035 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 94 Of the Natural Law (In Six Articles) We must now consider the natural law; concerning which there are six points of inquiry: (1) What is the natural law? (2) What are the precepts of the natural law? (3) Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law? (4) Whether the natural law is the same in all? (5) Whether it is changeable? (6) Whether it can be abolished from the heart of man? Whether the natural law is a habit? Ia IIae q. 94 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law is Secondly, the term habit may be applied to that which a habit. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5), we hold by a habit: thus faith may mean that which we “there are three things in the soul: power, habit, and pas- hold by faith. And accordingly, since the precepts of the sion.” But the natural law is not one of the soul’s pow- natural law are sometimes considered by reason actually, ers: nor is it one of the passions; as we may see by going while sometimes they are in the reason only habitually, in through them one by one. Therefore the natural law is a this way the natural law may be called a habit. Thus, in habit. speculative matters, the indemonstrable principles are not Objection 2. Further, Basil∗ says that the conscience the habit itself whereby we hold those principles, but are or “synderesis is the law of our mind”; which can only the principles the habit of which we possess. apply to the natural law. But the “synderesis” is a habit, Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher proposes as was shown in the Ia, q. 79, a. 12. Therefore the natural there to discover the genus of virtue; and since it is ev- law is a habit. ident that virtue is a principle of action, he mentions only Objection 3. Further, the natural law abides in man those things which are principles of human acts, viz. pow- always, as will be shown further on (a. 6). But man’s rea- ers, habits and passions. But there are other things in the son, which the law regards, does not always think about soul besides these three: there are acts; thus “to will” is in the natural law. Therefore the natural law is not an act, but the one that wills; again, things known are in the knower; a habit. moreover its own natural properties are in the soul, such On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. as immortality and the like. xxi) that “a habit is that whereby something is done when Reply to Objection 2. “Synderesis” is said to be the necessary.” But such is not the natural law: since it is in law of our mind, because it is a habit containing the pre- infants and in the damned who cannot act by it. Therefore cepts of the natural law, which are the first principles of the natural law is not a habit. human actions. I answer that, A thing may be called a habit in two Reply to Objection 3. This argument proves that the ways. First, properly and essentially: and thus the natu- natural law is held habitually; and this is granted. ral law is not a habit. For it has been stated above (q. 90, To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we re- a. 1, ad 2) that the natural law is something appointed by ply that sometimes a man is unable to make use of that reason, just as a proposition is a work of reason. Now which is in him habitually, on account of some impedi- that which a man does is not the same as that whereby he ment: thus, on account of sleep, a man is unable to use the does it: for he makes a becoming speech by the habit of habit of science. In like manner, through the deficiency of grammar. Since then a habit is that by which we act, a law his age, a child cannot use the habit of understanding of cannot be a habit properly and essentially. principles, or the natural law, which is in him habitually. ∗ Damascene, De Fide Orth. iv, 22 1036 Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one? Ia IIae q. 94 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law con- ple is that “the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied tains, not several precepts, but one only. For law is a kind at the same time,” which is based on the notion of “be- of precept, as stated above (q. 92, a. 2). If therefore there ing” and “not-being”: and on this principle all others are were many precepts of the natural law, it would follow based, as is stated in Metaph. iv, text. 9. Now as “being” that there are also many natural laws. is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, Objection 2. Further, the natural law is consequent so “good” is the first thing that falls under the apprehen- to human nature. But human nature, as a whole, is one; sion of the practical reason, which is directed to action: though, as to its parts, it is manifold. Therefore, either since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good. there is but one precept of the law of nature, on account Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one of the unity of nature as a whole; or there are many, by founded on the notion of good, viz. that “good is that reason of the number of parts of human nature. The result which all things seek after.” Hence this is the first pre- would be that even things relating to the inclination of the cept of law, that “good is to be done and pursued, and evil concupiscible faculty belong to the natural law. is to be avoided.” All other precepts of the natural law Objection 3. Further, law is something pertaining to are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason reason, as stated above (q. 90, a. 1). Now reason is but one naturally apprehends as man’s good (or evil) belongs to in man. Therefore there is only one precept of the natural the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or law. avoided. On the contrary, The precepts of the natural law in Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and man stand in relation to practical matters, as the first prin- evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those ciples to matters of demonstration. But there are several things to which man has a natural inclination, are natu- first indemonstrable principles. Therefore there are also rally apprehended by reason as being good, and conse- several precepts of the natural law. quently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, I answer that, As stated above (q. 91, a. 3), the pre- and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the or- cepts of the natural law are to the practical reason, what der of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the first principles of demonstrations are to the specula- the natural law. Because in man there is first of all an incli- tive reason; because both are self-evident principles. Now nation to good in accordance with the nature which he has a thing is said to be self-evident in two ways: first, in it- in common with all substances: inasmuch as every sub- self; secondly, in relation to us. Any proposition is said to stance seeks the preservation of its own being, according be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is contained in the to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever notion of the subject: although, to one who knows not the is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off definition of the subject, it happens that such a proposition its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is not self-evident. For instance, this proposition, “Man is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more is a rational being,” is, in its very nature, self-evident, specially, according to that nature which he has in com- since who says “man,” says “a rational being”: and yet mon with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, to one who knows not what a man is, this proposition is those things are said to belong to the natural law, “which not self-evident. Hence it is that, as Boethius says (De nature has taught to all animals”∗, such as sexual inter- Hebdom.), certain axioms or propositions are universally course, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there self-evident to all; and such are those propositions whose is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature terms are known to all, as, “Every whole is greater than its of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has part,” and, “Things equal to one and the same are equal to a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to one another.” But some propositions are self-evident only live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms of this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, such propositions: thus to one who understands that an to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom angel is not a body, it is self-evident that an angel is not one has to live, and other such things regarding the above circumscriptively in a place: but this is not evident to the inclination. unlearned, for they cannot grasp it. Reply to Objection 1. All these precepts of the law Now a certain order is to be found in those things of nature have the character of one natural law, inasmuch that are apprehended universally. For that which, before as they flow from one first precept. aught else, falls under apprehension, is “being,” the no- Reply to Objection 2. All the inclinations of any parts tion of which is included in all things whatsoever a man whatsoever of human nature, e.g. of the concupiscible and apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable princi- irascible parts, in so far as they are ruled by reason, belong ∗ Pandect. Just. I, tit. i 1037 to the natural law, and are reduced to one first precept, as Reply to Objection 3. Although reason is one in it-stated above: so that the precepts of the natural law are self, yet it directs all things regarding man; so that what- many in themselves, but are based on one common foun- ever can be ruled by reason, is contained under the law of dation. reason. Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law? Ia IIae q. 94 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that not all acts of virtue to act according to reason: and this is to act according to are prescribed by the natural law. Because, as stated above virtue. Consequently, considered thus, all acts of virtue (q. 90, a. 2) it is essential to a law that it be ordained to are prescribed by the natural law: since each one’s reason the common good. But some acts of virtue are ordained to naturally dictates to him to act virtuously. But if we speak the private good of the individual, as is evident especially of virtuous acts, considered in themselves, i.e. in their in regards to acts of temperance. Therefore not all acts of proper species, thus not all virtuous acts are prescribed by virtue are the subject of natural law. the natural law: for many things are done virtuously, to Objection 2. Further, every sin is opposed to some which nature does not incline at first; but which, through virtuous act. If therefore all acts of virtue are prescribed the inquiry of reason, have been found by men to be con- by the natural law, it seems to follow that all sins are ducive to well-living. against nature: whereas this applies to certain special sins. Reply to Objection 1. Temperance is about the nat- Objection 3. Further, those things which are accord- ural concupiscences of food, drink and sexual matters, ing to nature are common to all. But acts of virtue are which are indeed ordained to the natural common good, not common to all: since a thing is virtuous in one, and just as other matters of law are ordained to the moral com- vicious in another. Therefore not all acts of virtue are pre- mon good. scribed by the natural law. Reply to Objection 2. By human nature we may On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, mean either that which is proper to man—and in this sense 4) that “virtues are natural.” Therefore virtuous acts also all sins, as being against reason, are also against nature, as are a subject of the natural law. Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): or we may mean I answer that, We may speak of virtuous acts in two that nature which is common to man and other animals; ways: first, under the aspect of virtuous; secondly, as such and in this sense, certain special sins are said to be against and such acts considered in their proper species. If then nature; thus contrary to sexual intercourse, which is natu- we speak of acts of virtue, considered as virtuous, thus all ral to all animals, is unisexual lust, which has received the virtuous acts belong to the natural law. For it has been special name of the unnatural crime. stated (a. 2) that to the natural law belongs everything to Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers acts which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now in themselves. For it is owing to the various conditions of each thing is inclined naturally to an operation that is suit- men, that certain acts are virtuous for some, as being pro- able to it according to its form: thus fire is inclined to portionate and becoming to them, while they are vicious give heat. Wherefore, since the rational soul is the proper for others, as being out of proportion to them. form of man, there is in every man a natural inclination Whether the natural law is the same in all men? Ia IIae q. 94 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law is not Objection 3. Further, as stated above (Aa. 2,3), to the the same in all. For it is stated in the Decretals (Dist. i) natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined that “the natural law is that which is contained in the Law according to his nature. Now different men are naturally and the Gospel.” But this is not common to all men; be- inclined to different things; some to the desire of plea- cause, as it is written (Rom. 10:16), “all do not obey the sures, others to the desire of honors, and other men to gospel.” Therefore the natural law is not the same in all other things. Therefore there is not one natural law for all. men. On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): “The nat- Objection 2. Further, “Things which are according to ural law is common to all nations.” the law are said to be just,” as stated in Ethic. v. But it I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 2,3), to the natural is stated in the same book that nothing is so universally law belongs those things to which a man is inclined natu- just as not to be subject to change in regard to some men. rally: and among these it is proper to man to be inclined Therefore even the natural law is not the same in all men. to act according to reason. Now the process of reason is 1038 from the common to the proper, as stated in Phys. i. The restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and speculative reason, however, is differently situated in this such a way; because the greater the number of conditions matter, from the practical reason. For, since the specu- added, the greater the number of ways in which the prin- lative reason is busied chiefly with the necessary things, ciple may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper con- restore. clusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to without fail. The practical reason, on the other hand, is general principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude busied with contingent matters, about which human ac- and as to knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, tions are concerned: and consequently, although there is which are conclusions, as it were, of those general prin- necessity in the general principles, the more we descend ciples, it is the same for all in the majority of cases, both to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter de- as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few fects. Accordingly then in speculative matters truth is the cases it may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of cer- same in all men, both as to principles and as to conclu- tain obstacles (just as natures subject to generation and sions: although the truth is not known to all as regards corruption fail in some few cases on account of some ob- the conclusions, but only as regards the principles which stacle), and as to knowledge, since in some the reason is are called common notions. But in matters of action, truth perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters nature; thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly con- of detail, but only as to the general principles: and where trary to the natural law, was not considered wrong among there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi). equally known to all. Reply to Objection 1. The meaning of the sentence It is therefore evident that, as regards the general prin- quoted is not that whatever is contained in the Law and the ciples whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth Gospel belongs to the natural law, since they contain many or rectitude is the same for all, and is equally known by things that are above nature; but that whatever belongs to all. As to the proper conclusions of the speculative reason, the natural law is fully contained in them. Wherefore Gra- the truth is the same for all, but is not equally known to tian, after saying that “the natural law is what is contained all: thus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle in the Law and the Gospel,” adds at once, by way of ex-are together equal to two right angles, although it is not ample, “by which everyone is commanded to do to others known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the prac- as he would be done by.” tical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for Reply to Objection 2. The saying of the Philosopher all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all. is to be understood of things that are naturally just, not as Thus it is right and true for all to act according to reason: general principles, but as conclusions drawn from them, and from this principle it follows as a proper conclusion, having rectitude in the majority of cases, but failing in a that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their few. owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it Reply to Objection 3. As, in man, reason rules and may happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, commands the other powers, so all the natural inclinations and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; belonging to the other powers must needs be directed ac- for instance, if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting cording to reason. Wherefore it is universally right for all against one’s country. And this principle will be found to men, that all their inclinations should be directed accord- fail the more, according as we descend further into detail, ing to reason. e.g. if one were to say that goods held in trust should be Whether the natural law can be changed? Ia IIae q. 94 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law can ordered the Jews to borrow and purloin the vessels of the be changed. Because on Ecclus. 17:9, “He gave them in- Egyptians (Ex. 12:35); and when He commanded Osee to structions, and the law of life,” the gloss says: “He wished take to himself “a wife of fornications” (Osee 1:2). There- the law of the letter to be written, in order to correct the fore the natural law can be changed. law of nature.” But that which is corrected is changed. Objection 3. Further, Isidore says (Etym. 5:4) that Therefore the natural law can be changed. “the possession of all things in common, and universal Objection 2. Further, the slaying of the innocent, freedom, are matters of natural law.” But these things are adultery, and theft are against the natural law. But we find seen to be changed by human laws. Therefore it seems these things changed by God: as when God commanded that the natural law is subject to change. Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gn. 22:2); and when he On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (Dist. v): 1039 “The natural law dates from the creation of the rational inflicted by the power of God on account of original sin, creature. It does not vary according to time, but remains according to 1 Kings 2:6: “The Lord killeth and maketh unchangeable.” alive.” Consequently, by the command of God, death can I answer that, A change in the natural law may be be inflicted on any man, guilty or innocent, without any understood in two ways. First, by way of addition. In this injustice whatever. In like manner adultery is intercourse sense nothing hinders the natural law from being changed: with another’s wife; who is allotted to him by the law since many things for the benefit of human life have been emanating from God. Consequently intercourse with any added over and above the natural law, both by the Divine woman, by the command of God, is neither adultery nor law and by human laws. fornication. The same applies to theft, which is the tak- Secondly, a change in the natural law may be under- ing of another’s property. For whatever is taken by the stood by way of subtraction, so that what previously was command of God, to Whom all things belong, is not taken according to the natural law, ceases to be so. In this against the will of its owner, whereas it is in this that theft sense, the natural law is altogether unchangeable in its consists. Nor is it only in human things, that whatever is first principles: but in its secondary principles, which, as commanded by God is right; but also in natural things, we have said (a. 4), are certain detailed proximate con- whatever is done by God, is, in some way, natural, as clusions drawn from the first principles, the natural law is stated in the Ia, q. 105, a. 6, ad 1. not changed so that what it prescribes be not right in most Reply to Objection 3. A thing is said to belong to cases. But it may be changed in some particular cases of the natural law in two ways. First, because nature inclines rare occurrence, through some special causes hindering thereto: e.g. that one should not do harm to another. Sec- the observance of such precepts, as stated above (a. 4). ondly, because nature did not bring in the contrary: thus Reply to Objection 1. The written law is said to be we might say that for man to be naked is of the natural given for the correction of the natural law, either because law, because nature did not give him clothes, but art in- it supplies what was wanting to the natural law; or because vented them. In this sense, “the possession of all things the natural law was perverted in the hearts of some men, in common and universal freedom” are said to be of the as to certain matters, so that they esteemed those things natural law, because, to wit, the distinction of possessions good which are naturally evil; which perversion stood in and slavery were not brought in by nature, but devised by need of correction. human reason for the benefit of human life. Accordingly Reply to Objection 2. All men alike, both guilty and the law of nature was not changed in this respect, except innocent, die the death of nature: which death of nature is by addition. Whether the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man? Ia IIae q. 94 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law can be long to the natural law, first, certain most general precepts, abolished from the heart of man. Because on Rom. 2:14, that are known to all; and secondly, certain secondary and “When the Gentiles who have not the law,” etc. a gloss more detailed precepts, which are, as it were, conclusions says that “the law of righteousness, which sin had blotted following closely from first principles. As to those general out, is graven on the heart of man when he is restored by principles, the natural law, in the abstract, can nowise be grace.” But the law of righteousness is the law of nature. blotted out from men’s hearts. But it is blotted out in the Therefore the law of nature can be blotted out. case of a particular action, in so far as reason is hindered Objection 2. Further, the law of grace is more effi- from applying the general principle to a particular point of cacious than the law of nature. But the law of grace is practice, on account of concupiscence or some other pas- blotted out by sin. Much more therefore can the law of sion, as stated above (q. 77, a. 2). But as to the other, i.e. nature be blotted out. the secondary precepts, the natural law can be blotted out Objection 3. Further, that which is established by law from the human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as is made just. But many things are enacted by men, which in speculative matters errors occur in respect of necessary are contrary to the law of nature. Therefore the law of conclusions; or by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as nature can be abolished from the heart of man. among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices, as the On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii): “Thy Apostle states (Rom. i), were not esteemed sinful. law is written in the hearts of men, which iniquity itself Reply to Objection 1. Sin blots out the law of na- effaces not.” But the law which is written in men’s hearts ture in particular cases, not universally, except perchance is the natural law. Therefore the natural law cannot be in regard to the secondary precepts of the natural law, in blotted out. the way stated above. I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 4,5), there be- Reply to Objection 2. Although grace is more effica- 1040 cious than nature, yet nature is more essential to man, and secondary precepts of the natural law, against which some therefore more enduring. legislators have framed certain enactments which are un- Reply to Objection 3. This argument is true of the just. 1041 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 95 Of Human Law (In Four Articles) We must now consider human law; and (1) this law considered in itself; (2) its power; (3) its mutability. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Its utility. (2) Its origin. (3) Its quality. (4) Its division. Whether it was useful for laws to be framed by men? Ia IIae q. 95 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it was not useful for man could suffice for himself in the matter of this training: laws to be framed by men. Because the purpose of ev- since the perfection of virtue consists chiefly in withdraw- ery law is that man be made good thereby, as stated above ing man from undue pleasures, to which above all man is (q. 92, a. 1). But men are more to be induced to be good inclined, and especially the young, who are more capable willingly by means of admonitions, than against their will, of being trained. Consequently a man needs to receive this by means of laws. Therefore there was no need to frame training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection laws. of virtue. And as to those young people who are inclined Objection 2. Further, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. to acts of virtue, by their good natural disposition, or by v, 4), “men have recourse to a judge as to animate justice.” custom, or rather by the gift of God, paternal training suf- But animate justice is better than inanimate justice, which fices, which is by admonitions. But since some are found contained in laws. Therefore it would have been better for to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily amenable the execution of justice to be entrusted to the decision of to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from judges, than to frame laws in addition. evil by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might Objection 3. Further, every law is framed for the di- desist from evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that rection of human actions, as is evident from what has been they themselves, by being habituated in this way, might stated above (q. 90, Aa. 1,2). But since human actions are be brought to do willingly what hitherto they did from about singulars, which are infinite in number, matter per- fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of training, taining to the direction of human actions cannot be taken which compels through fear of punishment, is the disci- into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who pline of laws. Therefore in order that man might have looks into each one of them. Therefore it would have been peace and virtue, it was necessary for laws to be framed: better for human acts to be directed by the judgment of for, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), “as man is the wise men, than by the framing of laws. Therefore there most noble of animals if he be perfect in virtue, so is he was no need of human laws. the lowest of all, if he be severed from law and righteous- On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 20): “Laws ness”; because man can use his reason to devise means of were made that in fear thereof human audacity might be satisfying his lusts and evil passions, which other animals held in check, that innocence might be safeguarded in the are unable to do. midst of wickedness, and that the dread of punishment Reply to Objection 1. Men who are well disposed are might prevent the wicked from doing harm.” But these led willingly to virtue by being admonished better than by things are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was coercion: but men who are evilly disposed are not led to necessary that human laws should be made. virtue unless they are compelled. I answer that, As stated above (q. 63, a. 1; q. 94, a. 3), Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (Rhet. man has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of i, 1), “it is better that all things be regulated by law, than virtue must be acquired by man by means of some kind left to be decided by judges”: and this for three reasons. of training. Thus we observe that man is helped by indus- First, because it is easier to find a few wise men competent try in his necessities, for instance, in food and clothing. to frame right laws, than to find the many who would be Certain beginnings of these he has from nature, viz. his necessary to judge aright of each single case. Secondly, reason and his hands; but he has not the full complement, because those who make laws consider long beforehand as other animals have, to whom nature has given suffi- what laws to make; whereas judgment on each single case ciency of clothing and food. Now it is difficult to see how has to be pronounced as soon as it arises: and it is eas- 1042 ier for man to see what is right, by taking many instances fore it was necessary, whenever possible, for the law to into consideration, than by considering one solitary fact. determine how to judge, and for very few matters to be Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of fu- left to the decision of men. ture events; whereas those who sit in judgment of things Reply to Objection 3. Certain individual facts which present, towards which they are affected by love, hatred, cannot be covered by the law “have necessarily to be com- or some kind of cupidity; wherefore their judgment is per- mitted to judges,” as the Philosopher says in the same pas- verted. sage: for instance, “concerning something that has hap- Since then the animated justice of the judge is not pened or not happened,” and the like. found in every man, and since it can be deflected, there- Whether every human law is derived from the natural law? Ia IIae q. 95 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that not every human law from the natural law in two ways: first, as a conclu- is derived from the natural law. For the Philosopher says sion from premises, secondly, by way of determination (Ethic. v, 7) that “the legal just is that which originally of certain generalities. The first way is like to that by was a matter of indifference.” But those things which which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn arise from the natural law are not matters of indifference. from the principles: while the second mode is likened to Therefore the enactments of human laws are not derived that whereby, in the arts, general forms are particularized from the natural law. as to details: thus the craftsman needs to determine the Objection 2. Further, positive law is contrasted with general form of a house to some particular shape. Some natural law, as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4) and the things are therefore derived from the general principles of Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7). But those things which flow the natural law, by way of conclusions; e.g. that “one must as conclusions from the general principles of the natural not kill” may be derived as a conclusion from the princi- law belong to the natural law, as stated above (q. 94, a. 4). ple that “one should do harm to no man”: while some are Therefore that which is established by human law does derived therefrom by way of determination; e.g. the law not belong to the natural law. of nature has it that the evil-doer should be punished; but Objection 3. Further, the law of nature is the same that he be punished in this or that way, is a determination for all; since the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that “the of the law of nature. natural just is that which is equally valid everywhere.” If Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the therefore human laws were derived from the natural law, human law. But those things which are derived in the first it would follow that they too are the same for all: which is way, are contained in human law not as emanating there- clearly false. from exclusively, but have some force from the natural Objection 4. Further, it is possible to give a reason law also. But those things which are derived in the second for things which are derived from the natural law. But “it way, have no other force than that of human law. is not possible to give the reason for all the legal enact- Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking ments of the lawgivers,” as the jurist says∗. Therefore not of those enactments which are by way of determination or all human laws are derived from the natural law. specification of the precepts of the natural law. On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii): “Things which Reply to Objection 2. This argument avails for those emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were things that are derived from the natural law, by way of sanctioned by fear and reverence for the laws.” conclusions. I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) Reply to Objection 3. The general principles of the “that which is not just seems to be no law at all”: where- natural law cannot be applied to all men in the same way fore the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice. on account of the great variety of human affairs: and Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just, from being hence arises the diversity of positive laws among various right, according to the rule of reason. But the first rule of people. reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been Reply to Objection 4. These words of the Jurist are stated above (q. 91, a. 2, ad 2). Consequently every human to be understood as referring to decisions of rulers in de- law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived termining particular points of the natural law: on which from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from determinations the judgment of expert and prudent men is the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of based as on its principles; in so far, to wit, as they see at law. once what is the best thing to decide. But it must be noted that something may be derived Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11) that in ∗ Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff, tit. iii, v; De Leg. et Senat. 1043 such matters, “we ought to pay as much attention to surpass us in experience, age and prudence, as to their the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of persons who demonstrations.” Whether Isidore’s description of the quality of positive law is appropriate? Ia IIae q. 95 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Isidore’s description a rule or measure ruled or measured by a higher measure. of the quality of positive law is not appropriate, when he And this higher measure is twofold, viz. the Divine law says (Etym. v, 21): “Law shall be virtuous, just, pos- and the natural law, as explained above (a. 2; q. 93, a. 3 ). sible to nature, according to the custom of the country, Now the end of human law is to be useful to man, as the suitable to place and time, necessary, useful; clearly ex- jurist states∗. Wherefore Isidore in determining the na- pressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding; ture of law, lays down, at first, three conditions; viz. that framed for no private benefit, but for the common good.” it “foster religion,” inasmuch as it is proportionate to the Because he had previously expressed the quality of law in Divine law; that it be “helpful to discipline,” inasmuch as three conditions, saying that “law is anything founded on it is proportionate to the nature law; and that it “further reason, provided that it foster religion, be helpful to dis- the common weal,” inasmuch as it is proportionate to the cipline, and further the common weal.” Therefore it was utility of mankind. needless to add any further conditions to these. All the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced Objection 2. Further, Justice is included in honesty, to these three. For it is called virtuous because it fos- as Tully says (De Offic. vii). Therefore after saying “hon- ters religion. And when he goes on to say that it should est” it was superfluous to add “just.” be “just, possible to nature, according to the customs of Objection 3. Further, written law is condivided with the country, adapted to place and time,” he implies that it custom, according to Isidore (Etym. ii, 10). Therefore should be helpful to discipline. For human discipline de- it should not be stated in the definition of law that it is pends on first on the order of reason, to which he refers “according to the custom of the country.” by saying “just”: secondly, it depends on the ability of Objection 4. Further, a thing may be necessary in two the agent; because discipline should be adapted to each ways. It may be necessary simply, because it cannot be one according to his ability, taking also into account the otherwise: and that which is necessary in this way, is not ability of nature (for the same burdens should be not laid subject to human judgment, wherefore human law is not on children as adults); and should be according to human concerned with necessity of this kind. Again a thing may customs; since man cannot live alone in society, paying be necessary for an end: and this necessity is the same as no heed to others: thirdly, it depends on certain circum- usefulness. Therefore it is superfluous to say both “neces- stances, in respect of which he says, “adapted to place sary” and “useful.” and time.” The remaining words, “necessary, useful,” etc. On the contrary, stands the authority of Isidore. mean that law should further the common weal: so that I answer that, Whenever a thing is for an end, its “necessity” refers to the removal of evils; “usefulness” to form must be determined proportionately to that end; as the attainment of good; “clearness of expression,” to the the form of a saw is such as to be suitable for cutting need of preventing any harm ensuing from the law itself. (Phys. ii, text. 88). Again, everything that is ruled and And since, as stated above (q. 90, a. 2), law is ordained to measured must have a form proportionate to its rule and the common good, this is expressed in the last part of the measure. Now both these conditions are verified of human description. law: since it is both something ordained to an end; and is This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. Whether Isidore’s division of human laws is appropriate? Ia IIae q. 95 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Isidore wrongly di- force, seem to differ not formally but only materially. But vided human statutes or human law (Etym. v, 4, seqq.). “statutes, decrees of the commonalty, senatorial decrees,” For under this law he includes the “law of nations,” so and the like which he mentions (Etym. v, 9), all have the called, because, as he says, “nearly all nations use it.” But same force. Therefore they do not differ, except materi- as he says, “natural law is that which is common to all na- ally. But art takes no notice of such a distinction: since tions.” Therefore the law of nations is not contained under it may go on to infinity. Therefore this division of human positive human law, but rather under natural law. laws is not appropriate. Objection 2. Further, those laws which have the same Objection 3. Further, just as, in the state, there are ∗ Pandect. Justin. lib. xxv, ff., tit. iii; De Leg. et Senat. 1044 princes, priests and soldiers, so are there other human of-the safety of the people. Wherefore certain special kinds fices. Therefore it seems that, as this division includes of law are adapted to these men. “military law,” and “public law,” referring to priests and Thirdly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be magistrates; so also it should include other laws pertain- framed by that one who governs the community of the ing to other offices of the state. state, as shown above (q. 90, a. 3). In this respect, there Objection 4. Further, those things that are accidental are various human laws according to the various forms should be passed over. But it is accidental to law that it be of government. Of these, according to the Philosopher framed by this or that man. Therefore it is unreasonable (Polit. iii, 10) one is “monarchy,” i.e. when the state is to divide laws according to the names of lawgivers, so that governed by one; and then we have “Royal Ordinances.” one be called the “Cornelian” law, another the “Falcidian” Another form is “aristocracy,” i.e. government by the law, etc. best men or men of highest rank; and then we have the On the contrary, The authority of Isidore (obj. 1) suf- “Authoritative legal opinions” [Responsa Prudentum] and fices. “Decrees of the Senate” [Senatus consulta]. Another form I answer that, A thing can of itself be divided in re- is “oligarchy,” i.e. government by a few rich and pow- spect of something contained in the notion of that thing. erful men; and then we have “Praetorian,” also called Thus a soul either rational or irrational is contained in the “Honorary,” law. Another form of government is that of notion of animal: and therefore animal is divided properly the people, which is called “democracy,” and there we and of itself in respect of its being rational or irrational; have “Decrees of the commonalty” [Plebiscita]. There is but not in the point of its being white or black, which are also tyrannical government, which is altogether corrupt, entirely beside the notion of animal. Now, in the notion of which, therefore, has no corresponding law. Finally, there human law, many things are contained, in respect of any is a form of government made up of all these, and which of which human law can be divided properly and of itself. is the best: and in this respect we have law sanctioned by For in the first place it belongs to the notion of human the “Lords and Commons,” as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, law, to be derived from the law of nature, as explained 4, seqq.). above (a. 2). In this respect positive law is divided into Fourthly, it belongs to the notion of human law to di- the “law of nations” and “civil law,” according to the two rect human actions. In this respect, according to the vari- ways in which something may be derived from the law of ous matters of which the law treats, there are various kinds nature, as stated above (a. 2). Because, to the law of na- of laws, which are sometimes named after their authors: tions belong those things which are derived from the law thus we have the “Lex Julia” about adultery, the “Lex Cor- of nature, as conclusions from premises, e.g. just buyings nelia” concerning assassins, and so on, differentiated in and sellings, and the like, without which men cannot live this way, not on account of the authors, but on account of together, which is a point of the law of nature, since man the matters to which they refer. is by nature a social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2. But Reply to Objection 1. The law of nations is indeed, those things which are derived from the law of nature by in some way, natural to man, in so far as he is a reasonable way of particular determination, belong to the civil law, being, because it is derived from the natural law by way according as each state decides on what is best for itself. of a conclusion that is not very remote from its premises. Secondly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to Wherefore men easily agreed thereto. Nevertheless it is be ordained to the common good of the state. In this re- distinct from the natural law, especially it is distinct from spect human law may be divided according to the differ- the natural law which is common to all animals. ent kinds of men who work in a special way for the com- The Replies to the other Objections are evident from mon good: e.g. priests, by praying to God for the people; what has been said. princes, by governing the people; soldiers, by fighting for 1045 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 96 Of the Power of Human Law (In Six Articles) We must now consider the power of human law. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether human law should be framed for the community? (2) Whether human law should repress all vices? (3) Whether human law is competent to direct all acts of virtue? (4) Whether it binds man in conscience? (5) Whether all men are subject to human law? (6) Whether those who are under the law may act beside the letter of the law? Whether human law should be framed for the community rather than for the individ-Ia IIae q. 96 a. 1 ual? Objection 1. It would seem that human law should be succeeding one another, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei framed not for the community, but rather for the individ- ii, 21; xxii, 6). ual. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that “the legal Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7) just. . . includes all particular acts of legislation. . . and all divides the legal just, i.e. positive law, into three parts. those matters which are the subject of decrees,” which are For some things are laid down simply in a general way: also individual matters, since decrees are framed about in- and these are the general laws. Of these he says that “the dividual actions. Therefore law is framed not only for the legal is that which originally was a matter of indifference, community, but also for the individual. but which, when enacted, is so no longer”: as the fixing of Objection 2. Further, law is the director of human the ransom of a captive. Some things affect the commu- acts, as stated above (q. 90, Aa. 1,2). But human acts are nity in one respect, and individuals in another. These are about individual matters. Therefore human laws should called “privileges,” i.e. “private laws,” as it were, because be framed, not for the community, but rather for the indi- they regard private persons, although their power extends vidual. to many matters; and in regard to these, he adds, “and fur- Objection 3. Further, law is a rule and measure of ther, all particular acts of legislation.” Other matters are human acts, as stated above (q. 90, Aa. 1,2). But a mea- legal, not through being laws, but through being applica- sure should be most certain, as stated in Metaph. x. Since tions of general laws to particular cases: such are decrees therefore in human acts no general proposition can be so which have the force of law; and in regard to these, he certain as not to fail in some individual cases, it seems adds “all matters subject to decrees.” that laws should be framed not in general but for individ- Reply to Objection 2. A principle of direction should ual cases. be applicable to many; wherefore (Metaph. x, text. 4) the On the contrary, The jurist says (Pandect. Justin. lib. Philosopher says that all things belonging to one genus, i, tit. iii, art. ii; De legibus, etc.) that “laws should be are measured by one, which is the principle in that genus. made to suit the majority of instances; and they are not For if there were as many rules or measures as there are framed according to what may possibly happen in an in- things measured or ruled, they would cease to be of use, dividual case.” since their use consists in being applicable to many things. I answer that, Whatever is for an end should be pro- Hence law would be of no use, if it did not extend further portionate to that end. Now the end of law is the com- than to one single act. Because the decrees than to one sin- mon good; because, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21) that gle act. Because the decrees of prudent men are made for “law should be framed, not for any private benefit, but for the purpose of directing individual actions; whereas law the common good of all the citizens.” Hence human laws is a general precept, as stated above (q. 92, a. 2, obj. 2). should be proportionate to the common good. Now the Reply to Objection 3. “We must not seek the same common good comprises many things. Wherefore law degree of certainty in all things” (Ethic. i, 3). Conse- should take account of many things, as to persons, as to quently in contingent matters, such as natural and human matters, and as to times. Because the community of the things, it is enough for a thing to be certain, as being true state is composed of many persons; and its good is pro- in the greater number of instances, though at times and cured by many actions; nor is it established to endure for less frequently it fail. only a short time, but to last for all time by the citizens 1046 Whether it belongs to the human law to repress all vices? Ia IIae q. 96 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that it belongs to human which would be intolerable in a virtuous man. law to repress all vices. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 20) that Now human law is framed for a number of human “laws were made in order that, in fear thereof, man’s au- beings, the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue. dacity might be held in check.” But it would not be held in Wherefore human laws do not forbid all vices, from which check sufficiently, unless all evils were repressed by law. the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, Therefore human laws should repress all evils. from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and Objection 2. Further, the intention of the lawgiver is chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the pro- to make the citizens virtuous. But a man cannot be virtu- hibition of which human society could not be maintained: ous unless he forbear from all kinds of vice. Therefore it thus human law prohibits murder, theft and such like. belongs to human law to repress all vices. Reply to Objection 1. Audacity seems to refer to the Objection 3. Further, human law is derived from the assailing of others. Consequently it belongs to those sins natural law, as stated above (q. 95, a. 2). But all vices are chiefly whereby one’s neighbor is injured: and these sins contrary to the law of nature. Therefore human law should are forbidden by human law, as stated. repress all vices. Reply to Objection 2. The purpose of human law is On the contrary, We read in De Lib. Arb. i, 5: “It to lead men to virtue, not suddenly, but gradually. Where- seems to me that the law which is written for the govern- fore it does not lay upon the multitude of imperfect men ing of the people rightly permits these things, and that Di- the burdens of those who are already virtuous, viz. that vine providence punishes them.” But Divine providence they should abstain from all evil. Otherwise these imper- punishes nothing but vices. Therefore human law rightly fect ones, being unable to bear such precepts, would break allows some vices, by not repressing them. out into yet greater evils: thus it is written (Ps. 30:33): I answer that, As stated above (q. 90, Aa. 1,2), law is “He that violently bloweth his nose, bringeth out blood”; framed as a rule or measure of human acts. Now a mea- and (Mat. 9:17) that if “new wine,” i.e. precepts of a per- sure should be homogeneous with that which it measures, fect life, “is put into old bottles,” i.e. into imperfect men, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 3,4, since different things are “the bottles break, and the wine runneth out,” i.e. the pre- measured by different measures. Wherefore laws imposed cepts are despised, and those men, from contempt, break on men should also be in keeping with their condition, for, into evils worse still. as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21), law should be “possible both Reply to Objection 3. The natural law is a participa- according to nature, and according to the customs of the tion in us of the eternal law: while human law falls short country.” Now possibility or faculty of action is due to an of the eternal law. Now Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. interior habit or disposition: since the same thing is not i, 5): “The law which is framed for the government of possible to one who has not a virtuous habit, as is possi- states, allows and leaves unpunished many things that are ble to one who has. Thus the same is not possible to a punished by Divine providence. Nor, if this law does not child as to a full-grown man: for which reason the law for attempt to do everything, is this a reason why it should children is not the same as for adults, since many things be blamed for what it does.” Wherefore, too, human law are permitted to children, which in an adult are punished does not prohibit everything that is forbidden by the natu- by law or at any rate are open to blame. In like manner ral law. many things are permissible to men not perfect in virtue, Whether human law prescribes acts of all the virtues? Ia IIae q. 96 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that human law does not are ordained, not to the common good, but to private good. prescribe acts of all the virtues. For vicious acts are con- Therefore the law does not prescribe all acts of virtue. trary to acts of virtue. But human law does not prohibit On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) all vices, as stated above (a. 2). Therefore neither does it that the law “prescribes the performance of the acts of a prescribe all acts of virtue. brave man. . . and the acts of the temperate man. . . and the Objection 2. Further, a virtuous act proceeds from a acts of the meek man: and in like manner as regards the virtue. But virtue is the end of law; so that whatever is other virtues and vices, prescribing the former, forbidding from a virtue, cannot come under a precept of law. There- the latter.” fore human law does not prescribe all acts of virtue. I answer that, The species of virtues are distinguished Objection 3. Further, law is ordained to the common by their objects, as explained above (q. 54, a. 2; q. 60, a. 1; good, as stated above (q. 90, a. 2). But some acts of virtue q. 62, a. 2). Now all the objects of virtues can be referred 1047 either to the private good of an individual, or to the com-vicious acts, by the obligation of a precept, as neither does mon good of the multitude: thus matters of fortitude may it prescribe all acts of virtue. But it forbids certain acts of be achieved either for the safety of the state, or for up-each vice, just as it prescribes some acts of each virtue. holding the rights of a friend, and in like manner with the Reply to Objection 2. An act is said to be an act of other virtues. But law, as stated above (q. 90, a. 2) is or- virtue in two ways. First, from the fact that a man does dained to the common good. Wherefore there is no virtue something virtuous; thus the act of justice is to do what is whose acts cannot be prescribed by the law. Nevertheless right, and an act of fortitude is to do brave things: and in human law does not prescribe concerning all the acts of this way law prescribes certain acts of virtue. Secondly an every virtue: but only in regard to those that are ordain- act of virtue is when a man does a virtuous thing in a way able to the common good—either immediately, as when in which a virtuous man does it. Such an act always pro- certain things are done directly for the common good— ceeds from virtue: and it does not come under a precept or mediately, as when a lawgiver prescribes certain things of law, but is the end at which every lawgiver aims. pertaining to good order, whereby the citizens are directed Reply to Objection 3. There is no virtue whose act in the upholding of the common good of justice and peace. is not ordainable to the common good, as stated above, Reply to Objection 1. Human law does not forbid all either mediately or immediately. Whether human law binds a man in conscience? Ia IIae q. 96 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that human law does not is and has, belongs to the community; just as a part, in all bind man in conscience. For an inferior power has no that it is, belongs to the whole; wherefore nature inflicts a jurisdiction in a court of higher power. But the power loss on the part, in order to save the whole: so that on this of man, which frames human law, is beneath the Divine account, such laws as these, which impose proportionate power. Therefore human law cannot impose its precept in burdens, are just and binding in conscience, and are legal a Divine court, such as is the court of conscience. laws. Objection 2. Further, the judgment of conscience de- On the other hand laws may be unjust in two ways: pends chiefly on the commandments of God. But some- first, by being contrary to human good, through being op- times God’s commandments are made void by human posed to the things mentioned above—either in respect of laws, according to Mat. 15:6: “You have made void the the end, as when an authority imposes on his subjects bur- commandment of God for your tradition.” Therefore hu- densome laws, conducive, not to the common good, but man law does not bind a man in conscience. rather to his own cupidity or vainglory—or in respect of Objection 3. Further, human laws often bring loss the author, as when a man makes a law that goes beyond of character and injury on man, according to Is. 10:1 et the power committed to him—or in respect of the form, as seqq.: “Woe to them that make wicked laws, and when when burdens are imposed unequally on the community, they write, write injustice; to oppress the poor in judg- although with a view to the common good. The like are ment, and do violence to the cause of the humble of My acts of violence rather than laws; because, as Augustine people.” But it is lawful for anyone to avoid oppression says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5), “a law that is not just, seems and violence. Therefore human laws do not bind man in to be no law at all.” Wherefore such laws do not bind in conscience. conscience, except perhaps in order to avoid scandal or On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 2:19): “This is disturbance, for which cause a man should even yield his thankworthy, if the conscience. . . a man endure sorrows, right, according to Mat. 5:40,41: “If a man. . . take away suffering wrongfully.” thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him; and whosoever I answer that, Laws framed by man are either just or will force thee one mile, go with him other two.” unjust. If they be just, they have the power of binding Secondly, laws may be unjust through being opposed in conscience, from the eternal law whence they are de- to the Divine good: such are the laws of tyrants inducing rived, according to Prov. 8:15: “By Me kings reign, and to idolatry, or to anything else contrary to the Divine law: lawgivers decree just things.” Now laws are said to be and laws of this kind must nowise be observed, because, just, both from the end, when, to wit, they are ordained to as stated in Acts 5:29, “we ought to obey God rather than the common good—and from their author, that is to say, man.” when the law that is made does not exceed the power of Reply to Objection 1. As the Apostle says (Rom. the lawgiver—and from their form, when, to wit, burdens 13:1,2), all human power is from God. . . “therefore he are laid on the subjects, according to an equality of pro- that resisteth the power,” in matters that are within its portion and with a view to the common good. For, since scope, “resisteth the ordinance of God”; so that he be- one man is a part of the community, each man in all that he comes guilty according to his conscience. 1048 Reply to Objection 2. This argument is true of laws that inflicts unjust hurt on its subjects. The power that man that are contrary to the commandments of God, which is holds from God does not extend to this: wherefore neither beyond the scope of (human) power. Wherefore in such in such matters is man bound to obey the law, provided he matters human law should not be obeyed. avoid giving scandal or inflicting a more grievous hurt. Reply to Objection 3. This argument is true of a law Whether all are subject to the law? Ia IIae q. 96 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that not all are subject to wicked. Because coercion and violence are contrary to the law. For those alone are subject to a law for whom a the will: but the will of the good is in harmony with the law is made. But the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:9): “The law law, whereas the will of the wicked is discordant from it. is not made for the just man.” Therefore the just are not Wherefore in this sense the good are not subject to the subject to the law. law, but only the wicked. Objection 2. Further, Pope Urban says∗: “He that is Reply to Objection 1. This argument is true of sub- guided by a private law need not for any reason be bound jection by way of coercion: for, in this way, “the law is by the public law.” Now all spiritual men are led by the not made for the just men”: because “they are a law to private law of the Holy Ghost, for they are the sons of themselves,” since they “show the work of the law written God, of whom it is said (Rom. 8:14): “Whosoever are led in their hearts,” as the Apostle says (Rom. 2:14,15). Con- by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God.” Therefore sequently the law does not enforce itself upon them as it not all men are subject to human law. does on the wicked. Objection 3. Further, the jurist says† that “the Reply to Objection 2. The law of the Holy Ghost is sovereign is exempt from the laws.” But he that is ex- above all law framed by man: and therefore spiritual men, empt from the law is not bound thereby. Therefore not all in so far as they are led by the law of the Holy Ghost, are are subject to the law. not subject to the law in those matters that are inconsis- On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): “Let tent with the guidance of the Holy Ghost. Nevertheless every soul be subject to the higher powers.” But sub- the very fact that spiritual men are subject to law, is due jection to a power seems to imply subjection to the laws to the leading of the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Pet. 2:13: framed by that power. Therefore all men should be subject “Be ye subject. . . to every human creature for God’s sake.” to human law. Reply to Objection 3. The sovereign is said to be I answer that, As stated above (q. 90, Aa. 1,2; a. 3, “exempt from the law,” as to its coercive power; since, ad 2), the notion of law contains two things: first, that properly speaking, no man is coerced by himself, and it is a rule of human acts; secondly, that it has coercive law has no coercive power save from the authority of the power. Wherefore a man may be subject to law in two sovereign. Thus then is the sovereign said to be exempt ways. First, as the regulated is subject to the regulator: from the law, because none is competent to pass sentence and, in this way, whoever is subject to a power, is subject on him, if he acts against the law. Wherefore on Ps. 50:6: to the law framed by that power. But it may happen in two “To Thee only have I sinned,” a gloss says that “there is no ways that one is not subject to a power. In one way, by be- man who can judge the deeds of a king.” But as to the di- ing altogether free from its authority: hence the subjects rective force of law, the sovereign is subject to the law by of one city or kingdom are not bound by the laws of the his own will, according to the statement (Extra, De Con- sovereign of another city or kingdom, since they are not stit. cap. Cum omnes) that “whatever law a man makes subject to his authority. In another way, by being under a for another, he should keep himself. And a wise authority‡ yet higher law; thus the subject of a proconsul should be says: ‘Obey the law that thou makest thyself.’ ” Moreover ruled by his command, but not in those matters in which the Lord reproaches those who “say and do not”; and who the subject receives his orders from the emperor: for in “bind heavy burdens and lay them on men’s shoulders, but these matters, he is not bound by the mandate of the lower with a finger of their own they will not move them” (Mat. authority, since he is directed by that of a higher. In this 23:3,4). Hence, in the judgment of God, the sovereign is way, one who is simply subject to a law, may not be a not exempt from the law, as to its directive force; but he subject thereto in certain matters, in respect of which he should fulfil it to his own free-will and not of constraint. is ruled by a higher law. Again the sovereign is above the law, in so far as, when Secondly, a man is said to be subject to a law as the it is expedient, he can change the law, and dispense in it coerced is subject to the coercer. In this way the virtu- according to time and place. ous and righteous are not subject to the law, but only the ∗ Decretals. caus. xix, qu. 2 † Pandect. Justin. i, ff., tit. 3, De Leg. et Senat. ‡ Dionysius Cato, Dist. de Moribus 1049 Whether he who is under a law may act beside the letter of the law? Ia IIae q. 96 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that he who is subject to a law law would be hurtful to the general welfare, it should not may not act beside the letter of the law. For Augustine be observed. For instance, suppose that in a besieged city says (De Vera Relig. 31): “Although men judge about it be an established law that the gates of the city are to be temporal laws when they make them, yet when once they kept closed, this is good for public welfare as a general are made they must pass judgment not on them, but ac- rule: but, it were to happen that the enemy are in pursuit cording to them.” But if anyone disregard the letter of the of certain citizens, who are defenders of the city, it would law, saying that he observes the intention of the lawgiver, be a great loss to the city, if the gates were not opened to he seems to pass judgment on the law. Therefore it is not them: and so in that case the gates ought to be opened, right for one who is under the law to disregard the letter of contrary to the letter of the law, in order to maintain the the law, in order to observe the intention of the lawgiver. common weal, which the lawgiver had in view. Objection 2. Further, he alone is competent to inter- Nevertheless it must be noted, that if the observance of pret the law who can make the law. But those who are the law according to the letter does not involve any sud- subject to the law cannot make the law. Therefore they den risk needing instant remedy, it is not competent for have no right to interpret the intention of the lawgiver, but everyone to expound what is useful and what is not useful should always act according to the letter of the law. to the state: those alone can do this who are in authority, Objection 3. Further, every wise man knows how to and who, on account of such like cases, have the power explain his intention by words. But those who framed the to dispense from the laws. If, however, the peril be so laws should be reckoned wise: for Wisdom says (Prov. sudden as not to allow of the delay involved by referring 8:15): “By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just the matter to authority, the mere necessity brings with it a things.” Therefore we should not judge of the intention dispensation, since necessity knows no law. of the lawgiver otherwise than by the words of the law. Reply to Objection 1. He who in a case of necessity On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): “The acts beside the letter of the law, does not judge the law; meaning of what is said is according to the motive for but of a particular case in which he sees that the letter of saying it: because things are not subject to speech, but the law is not to be observed. speech to things.” Therefore we should take account of Reply to Objection 2. He who follows the intention the motive of the lawgiver, rather than of his very words. of the lawgiver, does not interpret the law simply; but in a I answer that, As stated above (a. 4), every law is di- case in which it is evident, by reason of the manifest harm, rected to the common weal of men, and derives the force that the lawgiver intended otherwise. For if it be a matter and nature of law accordingly. Hence the jurist says∗: “By of doubt, he must either act according to the letter of the no reason of law, or favor of equity, is it allowable for us law, or consult those in power. to interpret harshly, and render burdensome, those use- Reply to Objection 3. No man is so wise as to be ful measures which have been enacted for the welfare of able to take account of every single case; wherefore he is man.” Now it happens often that the observance of some not able sufficiently to express in words all those things point of law conduces to the common weal in the major- that are suitable for the end he has in view. And even if a ity of instances, and yet, in some cases, is very hurtful. lawgiver were able to take all the cases into consideration, Since then the lawgiver cannot have in view every single he ought not to mention them all, in order to avoid confu- case, he shapes the law according to what happens most sion: but should frame the law according to that which is frequently, by directing his attention to the common good. of most common occurrence. Wherefore if a case arise wherein the observance of that ∗ Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff., tit. 3, De Leg. et Senat. 1050 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 97 Of Change in Laws (In Four Articles) We must now consider change in laws: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether human law is changeable? (2) Whether it should be always changed, whenever anything better occurs? (3) Whether it is abolished by custom, and whether custom obtains the force of law? (4) Whether the application of human law should be changed by dispensation of those in authority? Whether human law should be changed in any way? Ia IIae q. 97 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that human law should On the part of man, whose acts are regulated by law, not be changed in any way at all. Because human law is the law can be rightly changed on account of the changed derived from the natural law, as stated above (q. 95, a. 2). condition of man, to whom different things are expedient But the natural law endures unchangeably. Therefore hu- according to the difference of his condition. An exam- man law should also remain without any change. ple is proposed by Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): “If Objection 2. Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. the people have a sense of moderation and responsibility, v, 5), a measure should be absolutely stable. But human and are most careful guardians of the common weal, it law is the measure of human acts, as stated above (q. 90, is right to enact a law allowing such a people to choose Aa. 1,2). Therefore it should remain without change. their own magistrates for the government of the common- Objection 3. Further, it is of the essence of law to be wealth. But if, as time goes on, the same people become just and right, as stated above (q. 95, a. 2). But that which so corrupt as to sell their votes, and entrust the govern- is right once is right always. Therefore that which is law ment to scoundrels and criminals; then the right of ap- once, should be always law. pointing their public officials is rightly forfeit to such a On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): people, and the choice devolves to a few good men.” “A temporal law, however just, may be justly changed in Reply to Objection 1. The natural law is a partici- course of time.” pation of the eternal law, as stated above (q. 91, a. 2), and I answer that, As stated above (q. 91, a. 3), human therefore endures without change, owing to the unchange- law is a dictate of reason, whereby human acts are di- ableness and perfection of the Divine Reason, the Author rected. Thus there may be two causes for the just change of nature. But the reason of man is changeable and im- of human law: one on the part of reason; the other on the perfect: wherefore his law is subject to change. Moreover part of man whose acts are regulated by law. The cause on the natural law contains certain universal precepts, which the part of reason is that it seems natural to human reason are everlasting: whereas human law contains certain par- to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect. ticular precepts, according to various emergencies. Hence, in speculative sciences, we see that the teaching Reply to Objection 2. A measure should be as endur- of the early philosophers was imperfect, and that it was ing as possible. But nothing can be absolutely unchange- afterwards perfected by those who succeeded them. So able in things that are subject to change. And therefore also in practical matters: for those who first endeavored human law cannot be altogether unchangeable. to discover something useful for the human community, Reply to Objection 3. In corporal things, right is not being able by themselves to take everything into con- predicated absolutely: and therefore, as far as itself is sideration, set up certain institutions which were deficient concerned, always remains right. But right is predicated in many ways; and these were changed by subsequent of law with reference to the common weal, to which one lawgivers who made institutions that might prove less fre- and the same thing is not always adapted, as stated above: quently deficient in respect of the common weal. wherefore rectitude of this kind is subject to change. 1051 Whether human law should always be changed, whenever something better occurs? Ia IIae q. 97 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that human law should because custom avails much for the observance of laws, be changed, whenever something better occurs. Because seeing that what is done contrary to general custom, even human laws are devised by human reason, like other arts. in slight matters, is looked upon as grave. Consequently, But in the other arts, the tenets of former times give place when a law is changed, the binding power of the law is to others, if something better occurs. Therefore the same diminished, in so far as custom is abolished. Wherefore should apply to human laws. human law should never be changed, unless, in some way Objection 2. Further, by taking note of the past we or other, the common weal be compensated according to can provide for the future. Now unless human laws had the extent of the harm done in this respect. Such compen- been changed when it was found possible to improve sation may arise either from some very great and every ev- them, considerable inconvenience would have ensued; be- ident benefit conferred by the new enactment; or from the cause the laws of old were crude in many points. There- extreme urgency of the case, due to the fact that either the fore it seems that laws should be changed, whenever any- existing law is clearly unjust, or its observance extremely thing better occurs to be enacted. harmful. Wherefore the jurist says∗ that “in establishing Objection 3. Further, human laws are enacted about new laws, there should be evidence of the benefit to be single acts of man. But we cannot acquire perfect knowl- derived, before departing from a law which has long been edge in singular matters, except by experience, which “re- considered just.” quires time,” as stated in Ethic. ii. Therefore it seems that Reply to Objection 1. Rules of art derive their as time goes on it is possible for something better to occur force from reason alone: and therefore whenever some- for legislation. thing better occurs, the rule followed hitherto should be On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (Dist. xii, changed. But “laws derive very great force from custom,” 5): “It is absurd, and a detestable shame, that we should as the Philosopher states (Polit. ii, 5): consequently they suffer those traditions to be changed which we have re- should not be quickly changed. ceived from the fathers of old.” Reply to Objection 2. This argument proves that laws I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), human law is ought to be changed: not in view of any improvement, but rightly changed, in so far as such change is conducive for the sake of a great benefit or in a case of great urgency, to the common weal. But, to a certain extent, the mere as stated above. This answer applies also to the Third Ob- change of law is of itself prejudicial to the common good: jection. Whether custom can obtain force of law? Ia IIae q. 97 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that custom cannot ob- of our ancestors are to be considered as laws. And those tain force of law, nor abolish a law. Because human law is who throw contempt on the customs of the Church ought derived from the natural law and from the Divine law, as to be punished as those who disobey the law of God.” stated above (q. 93, a. 3; q. 95, a. 2). But human custom I answer that, All law proceeds from the reason and cannot change either the law of nature or the Divine law. will of the lawgiver; the Divine and natural laws from Therefore neither can it change human law. the reasonable will of God; the human law from the will Objection 2. Further, many evils cannot make one of man, regulated by reason. Now just as human rea- good. But he who first acted against the law, did evil. son and will, in practical matters, may be made manifest Therefore by multiplying such acts, nothing good is the by speech, so may they be made known by deeds: since result. Now a law is something good; since it is a rule of seemingly a man chooses as good that which he carries human acts. Therefore law is not abolished by custom, so into execution. But it is evident that by human speech, that the mere custom should obtain force of law. law can be both changed and expounded, in so far as it Objection 3. Further, the framing of laws belongs manifests the interior movement and thought of human to those public men whose business it is to govern the reason. Wherefore by actions also, especially if they be community; wherefore private individuals cannot make repeated, so as to make a custom, law can be changed and laws. But custom grows by the acts of private individu- expounded; and also something can be established which als. Therefore custom cannot obtain force of law, so as to obtains force of law, in so far as by repeated external ac- abolish the law. tions, the inward movement of the will, and concepts of On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Casulan. reason are most effectually declared; for when a thing is xxxvi): “The customs of God’s people and the institutions done again and again, it seems to proceed from a delib- ∗ Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff., tit. 4, De Constit. Princip. 1052 erate judgment of reason. Accordingly, custom has the law seeming useless, be that it is not “possible according force of a law, abolishes law, and is the interpreter of law. to the custom of the country”∗, which has been stated to Reply to Objection 1. The natural and Divine laws be one of the conditions of law. For it is not easy to set proceed from the Divine will, as stated above. Wherefore aside the custom of a whole people. they cannot be changed by a custom proceeding from the Reply to Objection 3. The people among whom a will of man, but only by Divine authority. Hence it is that custom is introduced may be of two conditions. For if they no custom can prevail over the Divine or natural laws: for are free, and able to make their own laws, the consent of Isidore says (Synon. ii, 16): “Let custom yield to author- the whole people expressed by a custom counts far more ity: evil customs should be eradicated by law and reason.” in favor of a particular observance, that does the authority Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 96, a. 6), of the sovereign, who has not the power to frame laws, ex- human laws fail in some cases: wherefore it is possible cept as representing the people. Wherefore although each sometimes to act beside the law; namely, in a case where individual cannot make laws, yet the whole people can. If the law fails; yet the act will not be evil. And when such however the people have not the free power to make their cases are multiplied, by reason of some change in man, own laws, or to abolish a law made by a higher authority; then custom shows that the law is no longer useful: just nevertheless with such a people a prevailing custom ob- as it might be declared by the verbal promulgation of a tains force of law, in so far as it is tolerated by those to law to the contrary. If, however, the same reason remains, whom it belongs to make laws for that people: because by for which the law was useful hitherto, then it is not the the very fact that they tolerate it they seem to approve of custom that prevails against the law, but the law that over- that which is introduced by custom. comes the custom: unless perhaps the sole reason for the Whether the rulers of the people can dispense from human laws? Ia IIae q. 97 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the rulers of the peo- because to each member of the household he distributes ple cannot dispense from human laws. For the law is es- work and necessaries of life in due weight and measure. tablished for the “common weal,” as Isidore says (Etym. Accordingly in every community a man is said to dis- v, 21). But the common good should not be set aside for pense, from the very fact that he directs how some gen- the private convenience of an individual: because, as the eral precept is to be fulfilled by each individual. Now it Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 2), “the good of the nation is happens at times that a precept, which is conducive to the more godlike than the good of one man.” Therefore it common weal as a general rule, is not good for a partic- seems that a man should not be dispensed from acting in ular individual, or in some particular case, either because compliance with the general law. it would hinder some greater good, or because it would Objection 2. Further, those who are placed over oth- be the occasion of some evil, as explained above (q. 96, ers are commanded as follows (Dt. 1:17): “You shall hear a. 6). But it would be dangerous to leave this to the dis- the little as well as the great; neither shall you respect any cretion of each individual, except perhaps by reason of man’s person, because it is the judgment of God.” But to an evident and sudden emergency, as stated above (q. 96, allow one man to do that which is equally forbidden to all, a. 6). Consequently he who is placed over a community seems to be respect of persons. Therefore the rulers of a is empowered to dispense in a human law that rests upon community cannot grant such dispensations, since this is his authority, so that, when the law fails in its application against a precept of the Divine law. to persons or circumstances, he may allow the precept of Objection 3. Further, human law, in order to be just, the law not to be observed. If however he grant this per- should accord with the natural and Divine laws: else it mission without any such reason, and of his mere will, he would not “foster religion,” nor be “helpful to discipline,” will be an unfaithful or an imprudent dispenser: unfaith- which is requisite to the nature of law, as laid down by ful, if he has not the common good in view; imprudent, if Isidore (Etym. v, 3). But no man can dispense from the he ignores the reasons for granting dispensations. Hence Divine and natural laws. Neither, therefore, can he dis- Our Lord says (Lk. 12:42): “Who, thinkest thou, is the pense from the human law. faithful and wise dispenser [Douay: steward], whom his On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:17): “A lord setteth over his family?” dispensation is committed to me.” Reply to Objection 1. When a person is dispensed I answer that, Dispensation, properly speaking, de- from observing the general law, this should not be done to notes a measuring out to individuals of some common the prejudice of, but with the intention of benefiting, the goods: thus the head of a household is called a dispenser, common good. ∗ q. 95, a. 3 1053 Reply to Objection 2. It is not respect of persons if grants a dispensation: for instance, that a loan should not unequal measures are served out to those who are them- be paid back to the betrayer of his country, or something selves unequal. Wherefore when the condition of any similar. But to the Divine law each man stands as a private person requires that he should reasonably receive special person to the public law to which he is subject. Where- treatment, it is not respect of persons if he be the object of fore just as none can dispense from public human law, ex- special favor. cept the man from whom the law derives its authority, or Reply to Objection 3. Natural law, so far as it con- his delegate; so, in the precepts of the Divine law, which tains general precepts, which never fail, does not allow are from God, none can dispense but God, or the man to of dispensations. In other precepts, however, which are whom He may give special power for that purpose. as conclusions of the general precepts, man sometimes 1054 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 98 Of the Old Law (In Six Articles) In due sequence we must now consider the Old Law; and (1) The Law itself; (2) Its precepts. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the Old Law was good? (2) Whether it was from God? (3) Whether it came from Him through the angels? (4) Whether it was given to all? (5) Whether it was binding on all? (6) Whether it was given at a suitable time? Whether the Old Law was good? Ia IIae q. 98 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law was ward man”: and again (verse 16): “I consent to the law, not good. For it is written (Ezech. 20:25): “I gave them that is good.” statutes that were not good, and judgments in which they But it must be noted that the good has various degrees, shall not live.” But a law is not said to be good except on as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): for there is a perfect account of the goodness of the precepts that it contains. good, and an imperfect good. In things ordained to an end, Therefore the Old Law was not good. there is perfect goodness when a thing is such that it is suf- Objection 2. Further, it belongs to the goodness of a ficient in itself to conduce to the end: while there is imper- law that it conduce to the common welfare, as Isidore says fect goodness when a thing is of some assistance in attain- (Etym. v, 3). But the Old Law was not salutary; rather was ing the end, but is not sufficient for the realization thereof. it deadly and hurtful. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:8, Thus a medicine is perfectly good, if it gives health to a seqq.): “Without the law sin was dead. And I lived some man; but it is imperfect, if it helps to cure him, without be- time without the law. But when the commandment came ing able to bring him back to health. Again it must be ob- sin revived; and I died.” Again he says (Rom. 5:20): “Law served that the end of human law is different from the end entered in that sin might abound.” Therefore the Old Law of Divine law. For the end of human law is the temporal was not good. tranquillity of the state, which end law effects by direct- Objection 3. Further, it belongs to the goodness of ing external actions, as regards those evils which might the law that it should be possible to obey it, both accord- disturb the peaceful condition of the state. On the other ing to nature, and according to human custom. But such hand, the end of the Divine law is to bring man to that end the Old Law was not: since Peter said (Acts 15:10): “Why which is everlasting happiness; which end is hindered by tempt you (God) to put a yoke on the necks of the disci- any sin, not only of external, but also of internal action. ples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to Consequently that which suffices for the perfection of hu- bear?” Therefore it seems that the Old Law was not good. man law, viz. the prohibition and punishment of sin, does On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:12): not suffice for the perfection of the Divine law: but it is “Wherefore the law indeed is holy, and the commandment requisite that it should make man altogether fit to partake holy, and just, and good.” of everlasting happiness. Now this cannot be done save I answer that, Without any doubt, the Old Law was by the grace of the Holy Ghost, whereby “charity” which good. For just as a doctrine is shown to be good by the fulfilleth the law. . . “is spread abroad in our hearts” (Rom. fact that it accords with right reason, so is a law proved to 5:5): since “the grace of God is life everlasting” (Rom. be good if it accords with reason. Now the Old Law was 6:23). But the Old Law could not confer this grace, for in accordance with reason. Because it repressed concu- this was reserved to Christ; because, as it is written (Jn. piscence which is in conflict with reason, as evidenced by 1:17), the law was given “by Moses, grace and truth came the commandment, “Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s by Jesus Christ.” Consequently the Old Law was good goods” (Ex. 20:17). Moreover the same law forbade all indeed, but imperfect, according to Heb. 7:19: “The law kinds of sin; and these too are contrary to reason. Conse- brought nothing to perfection.” quently it is evident that it was a good law. The Apostle Reply to Objection 1. The Lord refers there to the argues in the same way (Rom. 7): “I am delighted,” says ceremonial precepts; which are said not to be good, be- he (verse 22), “with the law of God, according to the in- cause they did not confer grace unto the remission of sins, 1055 although by fulfilling these precepts man confessed him-abound,” the conjunction “that” must be taken as consec- self a sinner. Hence it is said pointedly, “and judgments in utive and not final: in so far as men, taking occasion from which they shall not live”; i.e. whereby they are unable to the law, sinned all the more, both because a sin became obtain life; and so the text goes on: “And I polluted them,” more grievous after law had forbidden it, and because con- i.e. showed them to be polluted, “in their own gifts, when cupiscence increased, since we desire a thing the more they offered all that opened the womb, for their offenses.” from its being forbidden. Reply to Objection 2. The law is said to have been Reply to Objection 3. The yoke of the law could not deadly, as being not the cause, but the occasion of death, be borne without the help of grace, which the law did on account of its imperfection: in so far as it did not con- not confer: for it is written (Rom. 9:16): “It is not him fer grace enabling man to fulfil what is prescribed, and that willeth, nor of him that runneth,” viz. that he wills to avoid what it forbade. Hence this occasion was not and runs in the commandments of God, “but of God that given to men, but taken by them. Wherefore the Apos- showeth mercy.” Wherefore it is written (Ps. 118:32): tle says (Rom. 5:11): “Sin, taking occasion by the com- “I have run the way of Thy commandments, when Thou mandment, seduced me, and by it killed me.” In the same didst enlarge my heart,” i.e. by giving me grace and char- sense when it is said that “the law entered in that sin might ity. Whether the Old Law was from God? Ia IIae q. 98 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law was not lieve Moses, you would perhaps believe Me also; for he from God. For it is written (Dt. 32:4): “The works of God wrote of Me.” Secondly, as a kind of disposition, since are perfect.” But the Law was imperfect, as stated above by withdrawing men from idolatrous worship, it enclosed (a. 1). Therefore the Old Law was not from God. [concludebat] them in the worship of one God, by Whom Objection 2. Further, it is written (Eccles. 3:14): “I the human race was to be saved through Christ. Where- have learned that all the works which God hath made con- fore the Apostle says (Gal. 3:23): “Before the faith came, tinue for ever.” But the Old Law does not continue for we were kept under the law shut up [conclusi], unto that ever: since the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18): “There is in- faith which was to be revealed.” Now it is evident that deed a setting aside of the former commandment, because the same thing it is, which gives a disposition to the end, of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof.” Therefore and which brings to the end; and when I say “the same,” I the Old Law was not from God. mean that it does so either by itself or through its subjects. Objection 3. Further, a wise lawgiver should remove, For the devil would not make a law whereby men would not only evil, but also the occasions of evil. But the Old be led to Christ, Who was to cast him out, according to Law was an occasion of sin, as stated above (a. 1, ad 2). Mat. 12:26: “If Satan cast out Satan, his kingdom is di- Therefore the giving of such a law does not pertain to God, vided” [Vulg.: ‘he is divided against himself’]. Therefore to Whom “none is like among the lawgivers” (Job 36:22). the Old Law was given by the same God, from Whom Objection 4. Further, it is written (1 Tim. 2:4) that came salvation to man, through the grace of Christ. God “will have all men to be saved.” But the Old Law did Reply to Objection 1. Nothing prevents a thing being not suffice to save man, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore not perfect simply, and yet perfect in respect of time: thus the giving of such a law did not appertain to God. There- a boy is said to be perfect, not simply, but with regard to fore the Old Law was not from God. the condition of time. So, too, precepts that are given to On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 15:6) while children are perfect in comparison with the condition of speaking to the Jews, to whom the Law was given: “You those to whom they are given, although they are not per- have made void the commandment of God for your tradi- fect simply. Hence the Apostle says (Gal. 3:24): “The law tion.” And shortly before (verse 4) He had said: “Honor was our pedagogue in Christ.” thy father and mother,” which is contained expressly in Reply to Objection 2. Those works of God endure the Old Law (Ex. 20:12; Dt. 5:16). Therefore the Old for ever which God so made that they would endure for Law was from God. ever; and these are His perfect works. But the Old Law I answer that, The Old Law was given by the good was set aside when there came the perfection of grace; God, Who is the Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ. For not as though it were evil, but as being weak and useless the Old Law ordained men to Christ in two ways. First for this time; because, as the Apostle goes on to say, “the by bearing witness to Christ; wherefore He Himself says law brought nothing to perfection”: hence he says (Gal. (Lk. 24:44): “All things must needs be fulfilled, which 3:25): “After the faith is come, we are no longer under a are written in the law. . . and in the prophets, and in the pedagogue.” psalms, concerning Me”: and (Jn. 5:46): “If you did be- Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 79, a. 4), 1056 God sometimes permits certain ones to fall into sin, that Reply to Objection 4. Although the Old Law did not they may thereby be humbled. So also did He wish to give suffice to save man, yet another help from God besides such a law as men by their own forces could not fulfill, so the Law was available for man, viz. faith in the Media- that, while presuming on their own powers, they might tor, by which the fathers of old were justified even as we find themselves to be sinners, and being humbled might were. Accordingly God did not fail man by giving him have recourse to the help of grace. insufficient aids to salvation. Whether the Old Law was given through the angels? Ia IIae q. 98 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that the Old Law was not given self rivets the planks together, but prepares the material through the angels, but immediately by God. For an angel by means of the workmen who assist him under his direc- means a “messenger”; so that the word “angel” denotes tion. Consequently it was fitting that the perfect law of ministry, not lordship, according to Ps. 102:20,21: “Bless the New Testament should be given by the incarnate God the Lord, all ye His Angels. . . you ministers of His.” But immediately; but that the Old Law should be given to men the Old Law is related to have been given by the Lord: by the ministers of God, i.e. by the angels. It is thus that for it is written (Ex. 20:1): “And the Lord spoke. . . these the Apostle at the beginning of his epistle to the Hebrews words,” and further on: “I am the Lord Thy God.” More- (1:2) proves the excellence of the New Law over the Old; over the same expression is often repeated in Exodus, and because in the New Testament “God. . . hath spoken to us the later books of the Law. Therefore the Law was given by His Son,” whereas in the Old Testament “the word was by God immediately. spoken by angels” (Heb. 2:2). Objection 2. Further, according to Jn. 1:17, “the Law Reply to Objection 1. As Gregory says at the begin- was given by Moses.” But Moses received it from God ning of his Morals (Praef. chap. i), “the angel who is immediately: for it is written (Ex. 33:11): “The Lord described to have appeared to Moses, is sometimes men- spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak tioned as an angel, sometimes as the Lord: an angel, in to his friend.” Therefore the Old Law was given by God truth, in respect of that which was subservient to the ex- immediately. ternal delivery; and the Lord, because He was the Director Objection 3. Further, it belongs to the sovereign alone within, Who supported the effectual power of speaking.” to make a law, as stated above (q. 90, a. 3). But God alone Hence also it is that the angel spoke as personating the is Sovereign as regards the salvation of souls: while the Lord. angels are the “ministering spirits,” as stated in Heb. 1:14. Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (Gen. ad Therefore it was not meet for the Law to be given through lit. xii, 27), it is stated in Exodus that “the Lord spoke the angels, since it is ordained to the salvation of souls. to Moses face to face”; and shortly afterwards we read, On the contrary, The Apostle said (Gal. 3:19) that the “Show me Thy glory. Therefore He perceived what he Law was “given [Vulg.: ‘ordained’] by angels in the hand saw and he desired what he saw not.” Hence he did not of a Mediator.” And Stephen said (Acts 7:53): ”(Who) see the very Essence of God; and consequently he was have received the Law by the disposition of angels.” not taught by Him immediately. Accordingly when Scrip- I answer that, The Law was given by God through the ture states that “He spoke to him face to face,” this is to angels. And besides the general reason given by Diony- be understood as expressing the opinion of the people, sius (Coel. Hier. iv), viz. that “the gifts of God should be who thought that Moses was speaking with God mouth to brought to men by means of the angels,” there is a special mouth, when God spoke and appeared to him, by means reason why the Old Law should have been given through of a subordinate creature, i.e. an angel and a cloud. Again them. For it has been stated (Aa. 1,2) that the Old Law we may say that this vision “face to face” means some was imperfect, and yet disposed man to that perfect salva- kind of sublime and familiar contemplation, inferior to the tion of the human race, which was to come through Christ. vision of the Divine Essence. Now it is to be observed that wherever there is an order of Reply to Objection 3. It is for the sovereign alone powers or arts, he that holds the highest place, himself ex- to make a law by his own authority; but sometimes after ercises the principal and perfect acts; while those things making a law, he promulgates it through others. Thus God which dispose to the ultimate perfection are effected by made the Law by His own authority, but He promulgated him through his subordinates: thus the ship-builder him- it through the angels. 1057 Whether the Old Law should have been given to the Jews alone? Ia IIae q. 98 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law should made and to his seed. He saith not, ‘And to his seeds,’ not have been given to the Jews alone. For the Old Law as of many: but as of one, ‘And to thy seed,’ which is disposed men for the salvation which was to come through Christ.” And so God vouchsafed both the Law and other Christ, as stated above (Aa. 2,3). But that salvation was special boons to that people, on account of the promised to come not to the Jews alone but to all nations, according made to their fathers that Christ should be born of them. to Is. 49:6: “It is a small thing that thou shouldst be my For it was fitting that the people, of whom Christ was to servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to convert the be born, should be signalized by a special sanctification, dregs of Israel. Behold I have given thee to be the light of according to the words of Lev. 19:2: “Be ye holy, because the Gentiles, that thou mayest be My salvation, even to the I. . . am holy.” Nor again was it on account of the merit farthest part of the earth.” Therefore the Old Law should of Abraham himself that this promise was made to him, have been given to all nations, and not to one people only. viz. that Christ should be born of his seed: but of gratu- Objection 2. Further, according to Acts 10:34,35, itous election and vocation. Hence it is written (Is. 41:2): “God is not a respecter of persons: but in every nation, “Who hath raised up the just one form the east, hath called he that feareth Him, and worketh justice, is acceptable to him to follow him?” Him.” Therefore the way of salvation should not have It is therefore evident that it was merely from gratu- been opened to one people more than to another. itous election that the patriarchs received the promise, and Objection 3. Further, the law was given through the that the people sprung from them received the law; ac- angels, as stated above (a. 3). But God always vouchsafed cording to Dt. 4:36, 37: “Ye did [Vulg.: ‘Thou didst’] the ministrations of the angels not to the Jews alone, but hear His words out of the midst of the fire, because He to all nations: for it is written (Ecclus. 17:14): “Over ev- loved thy fathers, and chose their seed after them.” And ery nation He set a ruler.” Also on all nations He bestows if again it asked why He chose this people, and not an- temporal goods, which are of less account with God than other, that Christ might be born thereof; a fitting answer spiritual goods. Therefore He should have given the Law is given by Augustine (Tract. super Joan. xxvi): “Why also to all peoples. He draweth one and draweth not another, seek not thou to On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 3:1,2): “What judge, if thou wish not to err.” advantage then hath the Jew?. . . Much every way. First in- Reply to Objection 1. Although the salvation, which deed, because the words of God were committed to them”: was to come through Christ, was prepared for all na- and (Ps. 147:9): “He hath not done in like manner to ev- tions, yet it was necessary that Christ should be born of ery nation: and His judgments He hath not made manifest one people, which, for this reason, was privileged above unto them.” other peoples; according to Rom. 9:4: “To whom,” I answer that, It might be assigned as a reason for the namely the Jews, “belongeth the adoption as of chil- Law being given to the Jews rather than to other peoples, dren (of God). . . and the testament, and the giving of the that the Jewish people alone remained faithful to the wor- Law. . . whose are the fathers, and of whom is Christ ac- ship of one God, while the others turned away to idolatry; cording to the flesh.” wherefore the latter were unworthy to receive the Law, Reply to Objection 2. Respect of persons takes place lest a holy thing should be given to dogs. in those things which are given according to due; but it has But this reason does not seem fitting: because that no place in those things which are bestowed gratuitously. people turned to idolatry, even after the Law had been Because he who, out of generosity, gives of his own to one made, which was more grievous, as is clear from Ex. 32 and not to another, is not a respecter of persons: but if he and from Amos 5:25,26: “Did you offer victims and sacri- were a dispenser of goods held in common, and were not fices to Me in the desert for forty years, O house of Israel? to distribute them according to personal merits, he would But you carried a tabernacle for your Moloch, and the im- be a respecter of persons. Now God bestows the benefits age of your idols, the star of your god, which you made of salvation on the human race gratuitously: wherefore to yourselves.” Moreover it is stated expressly (Dt. 9:6): He is not a respecter of persons, if He gives them to some “Know therefore that the Lord thy God giveth thee not this rather than to others. Hence Augustine says (De Praedest. excellent land in possession for thy justices, for thou art a Sanct. viii): “All whom God teaches, he teaches out of very stiff-necked people”: but the real reason is given in pity; but whom He teaches not, out of justice He teaches the preceding verse: “That the Lord might accomplish His not”: for this is due to the condemnation of the human word, which He promised by oath to thy fathers Abraham, race for the sin of the first parent. Isaac, and Jacob.” Reply to Objection 3. The benefits of grace are for- What this promise was is shown by the Apostle, who feited by man on account of sin: but not the benefits of says (Gal. 3:16) that “to Abraham were the promises nature. Among the latter are the ministries of the angels, 1058 which the very order of various natures demands, viz. that only to men, but also to beasts, according to Ps. 35:7: the lowest beings be governed through the intermediate “Men and beasts Thou wilt preserve, O Lord.” beings: and also bodily aids, which God vouchsafes not Whether all men were bound to observe the Old Law? Ia IIae q. 98 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that all men were bound The reason of this is because the Old Law, as stated to observe the Old Law. Because whoever is subject to above (a. 4), was given to the Jewish people, that it might the king, must needs be subject to his law. But the Old receive a prerogative of holiness, in reverence for Christ Law was given by God, Who is “King of all the earth” Who was to be born of that people. Now whatever laws (Ps. 46:8). Therefore all the inhabitants of the earth were are enacted for the special sanctification of certain ones, bound to observe the Law. are binding on them alone: thus clerics who are set aside Objection 2. Further, the Jews could not be saved for the service of God are bound to certain obligations without observing the Old Law: for it is written (Dt. to which the laity are not bound; likewise religious are 27:26): “Cursed be he that abideth not in the words of bound by their profession to certain works of perfection, this law, and fulfilleth them not in work.” If therefore to which people living in the world are not bound. In like other men could be saved without the observance of the manner this people was bound to certain special obser- Old Law, the Jews would be in a worse plight than other vances, to which other peoples were not bound. Where- men. fore it is written (Dt. 18:13): “Thou shalt be perfect and Objection 3. Further, the Gentiles were admitted to without spot before the Lord thy God”: and for this reason the Jewish ritual and to the observances of the Law: for they used a kind of form of profession, as appears from Dt. it is written (Ex. 12:48): “If any stranger be willing to 26:3: “I profess this day before the Lord thy God,” etc. dwell among you, and to keep the Phase of the Lord, all Reply to Objection 1. Whoever are subject to a king, his males shall first be circumcised, and then shall he cel- are bound to observe his law which he makes for all in ebrate it according to the manner; and he shall be as he general. But if he orders certain things to be observed that is born in the land.” But it would have been useless by the servants of his household, others are not bound to admit strangers to the legal observances according to thereto. Divine ordinance, if they could have been saved without Reply to Objection 2. The more a man is united to the observance of the Law. Therefore none could be saved God, the better his state becomes: wherefore the more without observing the Law. the Jewish people were bound to the worship of God, the On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that greater their excellence over other peoples. Hence it is many of the Gentiles were brought back to God by the an- written (Dt. 4:8): “What other nation is there so renowned gels. But it is clear that the Gentiles did not observe the that hath ceremonies and just judgments, and all the law?” Law. Therefore some could be saved without observing In like manner, from this point of view, the state of clerics the Law. is better than that of the laity, and the state of religious I answer that, The Old Law showed forth the pre- than that of folk living in the world. cepts of the natural law, and added certain precepts of its Reply to Objection 3. The Gentiles obtained salva- own. Accordingly, as to those precepts of the natural law tion more perfectly and more securely under the obser- contained in the Old Law, all were bound to observe the vances of the Law than under the mere natural law: and Old Law; not because they belonged to the Old Law, but for this reason they were admitted to them. So too the because they belonged to the natural law. But as to those laity are now admitted to the ranks of the clergy, and sec- precepts which were added by the Old Law, they were not ular persons to those of the religious, although they can be binding on save the Jewish people alone. saved without this. Whether the Old Law was suitably given at the time of Moses? Ia IIae q. 98 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law was not sin. suitably given at the time of Moses. Because the Old Law Objection 2. Further, the Old Law was given for the disposed man for the salvation which was to come through sanctification of those from whom Christ was to be born. Christ, as stated above (Aa. 2,3). But man needed this Now the promise concerning the “seed, which is Christ” salutary remedy immediately after he had sinned. There- (Gal. 3:16) was first made to Abraham, as related in Gn. fore the Law should have been given immediately after 12:7. Therefore the Law should have been given at once 1059 at the time of Abraham. was convinced of his weakness, through his being unable Objection 3. Further, as Christ was born of those to fulfil what he knew. Hence, as the Apostle concludes alone who descended from Noe through Abraham, to (Rom. 8:3,4), “what the Law could not do in that it was whom the promise was made; so was He born of no other weak through the flesh, God sent [Vulg.: ‘sending’] His of the descendants of Abraham but David, to whom the own Son. . . that the justification of the Law might be ful- promise was renewed, according to 2 Kings 23:1: “The filled in us.” man to whom it was appointed concerning the Christ of With regard to good men, the Law was given to them the God of Jacob. . . said.” Therefore the Old Law should as a help; which was most needed by the people, at the have been given after David, just as it was given after time when the natural law began to be obscured on ac- Abraham. count of the exuberance of sin: for it was fitting that this On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 3:19) that help should be bestowed on men in an orderly manner, the Law “was set because of transgressions, until the seed so that they might be led from imperfection to perfection; should come, to whom He made the promise, being or- wherefore it was becoming that the Old Law should be dained by angels in the hand of a Mediator”: ordained, i.e. given between the law of nature and the law of grace. “given in orderly fashion,” as the gloss explains. There- Reply to Objection 1. It was not fitting for the Old fore it was fitting that the Old Law should be given in this Law to be given at once after the sin of the first man: both order of time. because man was so confident in his own reason, that he I answer that, It was most fitting for the Law to be did not acknowledge his need of the Old Law; because given at the time of Moses. The reason for this may be as yet the dictate of the natural law was not darkened by taken from two things in respect of which every law is habitual sinning. imposed on two kinds of men. Because it is imposed on Reply to Objection 2. A law should not be given save some men who are hard-hearted and proud, whom the law to the people, since it is a general precept, as stated above restrains and tames: and it is imposed on good men, who, (q. 90, Aa. 2,3); wherefore at the time of Abraham God through being instructed by the law, are helped to fulfil gave men certain familiar, and, as it were, household pre- what they desire to do. Hence it was fitting that the Law cepts: but when Abraham’s descendants had multiplied, should be given at such a time as would be appropriate so as to form a people, and when they had been freed from for the overcoming of man’s pride. For man was proud of slavery, it was fitting that they should be given a law; for two things, viz. of knowledge and of power. He was proud “slaves are not that part of the people or state to which it is of his knowledge, as though his natural reason could suf-fitting for the law to be directed,” as the Philosopher says fice him for salvation: and accordingly, in order that his (Polit. iii, 2,4,5). pride might be overcome in this matter, man was left to the Reply to Objection 3. Since the Law had to be given guidance of his reason without the help of a written law: to the people, not only those, of whom Christ was born, and man was able to learn from experience that his reason received the Law, but the whole people, who were marked was deficient, since about the time of Abraham man had with the seal of circumcision, which was the sign of the fallen headlong into idolatry and the most shameful vices. promise made to Abraham, and in which he believed, ac- Wherefore, after those times, it was necessary for a writ- cording to Rom. 4:11: hence even before David, the Law ten law to be given as a remedy for human ignorance: be- had to be given to that people as soon as they were col- cause “by the Law is the knowledge of sin” (Rom. 3:20). lected together. But, after man had been instructed by the Law, his pride 1060 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 99 Of the Precepts of the Old Law (In Six Articles) We must now consider the precepts of the Old Law; and (1) how they are distinguished from one another; (2) each kind of precept. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the Old Law contains several precepts or only one? (2) Whether the Old Law contains any moral precepts? (3) Whether it contains ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral precepts? (4) Whether besides these it contains judicial precepts? (5) Whether it contains any others besides these? (6) How the Old Law induced men to keep its precepts. Whether the Old Law contains only one precept? Ia IIae q. 99 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law contains of the diversity of those things that are ordained to that but one precept. Because a law is nothing else than a pre- end. cept, as stated above (q. 90, Aa. 2,3). Now there is but one Reply to Objection 1. The Old Law is said to be one Old Law. Therefore it contains but one precept. as being ordained to one end: yet it comprises various Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 13:9): precepts, according to the diversity of the things which it “If there be any other commandment, it is comprised in directs to the end. Thus also the art of building is one this word: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” But according to the unity of its end, because it aims at the this is only one commandment. Therefore the Old Law building of a house: and yet it contains various rules, ac- contained but one commandment. cording to the variety of acts ordained thereto. Objection 3. Further, it is written (Mat. 7:12): “All Reply to Objection 2. As the Apostle says (1 Tim. things. . . whatsoever you would that men should do to 1:5), “the end of the commandment is charity”; since ev- you, do you also to them. For this is the Law and the ery law aims at establishing friendship, either between prophets.” But the whole of the Old Law is comprised in man and man, or between man and God. Wherefore the the Law and the prophets. Therefore the whole of the Old whole Law is comprised in this one commandment, “Thou Law contains but one commandment. shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,” as expressing the end On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 2:15): of all commandments: because love of one’s neighbor in- “Making void the Law of commandments contained in de- cludes love of God, when we love our neighbor for God’s crees”: where he is referring to the Old Law, as the gloss sake. Hence the Apostle put this commandment in place comments, on the passage. Therefore the Old Law com- of the two which are about the love of God and of one’s prises many commandments. neighbor, and of which Our Lord said (Mat. 22:40): “On I answer that, Since a precept of law is binding, it is these two commandments dependeth the whole Law and about something which must be done: and, that a thing the prophets.” must be done, arises from the necessity of some end. Reply to Objection 3. As stated in Ethic. ix, 8, Hence it is evident that a precept implies, in its very idea, “friendship towards another arises from friendship to- relation to an end, in so far as a thing is commanded as wards oneself,” in so far as man looks on another as on being necessary or expedient to an end. Now many things himself. Hence when it is said, “All things whatsoever you may happen to be necessary or expedient to an end; and, would that men should do to you, do you also to them,” accordingly, precepts may be given about various things this is an explanation of the rule of neighborly love con- as being ordained to one end. Consequently we must say tained implicitly in the words, “Thou shalt love thy neigh- that all the precepts of the Old Law are one in respect of bor as thyself”: so that it is an explanation of this com- their relation to one end: and yet they are many in respect mandment. 1061 Whether the Old Law contains moral precepts? Ia IIae q. 99 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law con- is written (Lev. 19:2; 11:45): “You shall be holy, for I am tains no moral precepts. For the Old Law is distinct from holy.” But the goodness of man is virtue, which “makes the law of nature, as stated above (q. 91, Aa. 4,5; q. 98, its possessor good” (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore it was nec- a. 5). But the moral precepts belong to the law of nature. essary for the Old Law to include precepts about acts of Therefore they do not belong to the Old Law. virtue: and these are the moral precepts of the Law. Objection 2. Further, the Divine Law should have Reply to Objection 1. The Old Law is distinct from come to man’s assistance where human reason fails him: the natural law, not as being altogether different from it, as is evident in regard to things that are of faith, which but as something added thereto. For just as grace pre- are above reason. But man’s reason seems to suffice for supposes nature, so must the Divine law presuppose the the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts do not natural law. belong to the Old Law, which is a Divine law. Reply to Objection 2. It was fitting that the Divine Objection 3. Further, the Old Law is said to be “the law should come to man’s assistance not only in those letter that killeth” (2 Cor. 3:6). But the moral precepts do things for which reason is insufficient, but also in those not kill, but quicken, according to Ps. 118:93: “Thy justi- things in which human reason may happen to be impeded. fications I will never forget, for by them Thou hast given Now human reason could not go astray in the abstract, as me life.” Therefore the moral precepts do not belong to to the universal principles of the natural law; but through the Old Law. being habituated to sin, it became obscured in the point of On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:9): “More- things to be done in detail. But with regard to the other over, He gave them discipline [Douay: ‘instructions’] and moral precepts, which are like conclusions drawn from the law of life for an inheritance.” Now discipline belongs the universal principles of the natural law, the reason of to morals; for this gloss on Heb. 12:11: “Now all chastise- many men went astray, to the extend of judging to be law- ment [disciplina],” etc., says: “Discipline is an exercise in ful, things that are evil in themselves. Hence there was morals by means of difficulties.” Therefore the Law which need for the authority of the Divine law to rescue man was given by God comprised moral precepts. from both these defects. Thus among the articles of faith I answer that, The Old Law contained some moral not only are those things set forth to which reason cannot precepts; as is evident from Ex. 20:13,15: “Thou shalt not reach, such as the Trinity of the Godhead; but also those kill, Thou shalt not steal.” This was reasonable: because, to which right reason can attain, such as the Unity of the just as the principal intention of human law is to created Godhead; in order to remove the manifold errors to which friendship between man and man; so the chief intention reason is liable. of the Divine law is to establish man in friendship with Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine proves (De Spir- God. Now since likeness is the reason of love, accord- itu et Litera xiv), even the letter of the law is said to be the ing to Ecclus. 13:19: “Every beast loveth its like”; there occasion of death, as to the moral precepts; in so far as, to cannot possibly be any friendship of man to God, Who is wit, it prescribes what is good, without furnishing the aid supremely good, unless man become good: wherefore it of grace for its fulfilment. Whether the Old Law comprises ceremonial, besides moral, precepts? Ia IIae q. 99 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law does not Objection 3. Further, the ceremonial precepts seem to comprise ceremonial, besides moral, precepts. For every be those which signify something figuratively. But, as Au- law that is given to man is for the purpose of directing gustine observes (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3,4), “of all signs human actions. Now human actions are called moral, as employed by men words hold the first place.” Therefore stated above (q. 1, a. 3). Therefore it seems that the Old there is no need for the Law to contain ceremonial pre- Law given to men should not comprise other than moral cepts about certain figurative actions. precepts. On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:13,14): “Ten Objection 2. Further, those precepts that are styled words. . . He wrote in two tables of stone; and He com- ceremonial seem to refer to the Divine worship. But Di- manded me at that time that I should teach you the cere- vine worship is the act of a virtue, viz. religion, which, as monies and judgments which you shall do.” But the ten Tully says (De Invent. ii) “offers worship and ceremony commandments of the Law are moral precepts. Therefore to the Godhead.” Since, then, the moral precepts are about besides the moral precepts there are others which are cer- acts of virtue, as stated above (a. 2), it seems that the cer- emonial. emonial precepts should not be distinct from the moral. I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), the Divine law 1062 is instituted chiefly in order to direct men to God; while Reply to Objection 1. Human acts extend also to the human law is instituted chiefly in order to direct men in Divine worship: and therefore the Old Law given to man relation to one another. Hence human laws have not con- contains precepts about these matters also. cerned themselves with the institution of anything relat- Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 91, a. 3), ing to Divine worship except as affecting the common the precepts of the natural law are general, and require to good of mankind: and for this reason they have devised be determined: and they are determined both by human many institutions relating to Divine matters, according as law and by Divine law. And just as these very determi- it seemed expedient for the formation of human morals; as nations which are made by human law are said to be, not may be seen in the rites of the Gentiles. On the other hand of natural, but of positive law; so the determinations of the Divine law directed men to one another according to the precepts of the natural law, effected by the Divine law, the demands of that order whereby man is directed to God, are distinct from the moral precepts which belong to the which order was the chief aim of that law. Now man is di- natural law. Wherefore to worship God, since it is an act rected to God not only by the interior acts of the mind, of virtue, belongs to a moral precept; but the determina- which are faith, hope, and love, but also by certain exter- tion of this precept, namely that He is to be worshipped nal works, whereby man makes profession of his subjec- by such and such sacrifices, and such and such offerings, tion to God: and it is these works that are said to belong belongs to the ceremonial precepts. Consequently the cer- to the Divine worship. This worship is called “ceremony” emonial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts. [the munia, i.e. gifts] of Ceres (who was the goddess of Reply to Objection 3. As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. fruits), as some say: because, at first, offerings were made i), the things of God cannot be manifested to men except to God from the fruits: or because, as Valerius Maximus by means of sensible similitudes. Now these similitudes states∗, the word “ceremony” was introduced among the move the soul more when they are not only expressed in Latins, to signify the Divine worship, being derived from words, but also offered to the senses. Wherefore the things a town near Rome called “Caere”: since, when Rome was of God are set forth in the Scriptures not only by simili- taken by the Gauls, the sacred chattels of the Romans were tudes expressed in words, as in the case of metaphorical taken thither and most carefully preserved. Accordingly expressions; but also by similitudes of things set before those precepts of the Law which refer to the Divine wor- the eyes, which pertains to the ceremonial precepts. ship are specially called ceremonial. Whether, besides the moral and ceremonial precepts, there are also judicial precepts? Ia IIae q. 99 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that there are no judicial On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): “These precepts in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts are the precepts and ceremonies, and judgments”: where in the Old Law. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. vi, “precepts” stands for “moral precepts” antonomastically. 2) that in the Old Law there are “precepts concerning the Therefore there are judicial precepts besides moral and life we have to lead, and precepts regarding the life that is ceremonial precepts. foreshadowed.” Now the precepts of the life we have to I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 2,3), it belongs to lead are moral precepts; and the precepts of the life that the Divine law to direct men to one another and to God. is foreshadowed are ceremonial. Therefore besides these Now each of these belongs in the abstract to the dictates two kinds of precepts we should not put any judicial pre- of the natural law, to which dictates the moral precepts cepts in the Law. are to be referred: yet each of them has to be determined Objection 2. Further, a gloss on Ps. 118:102, “I have by Divine or human law, because naturally known prin- not declined from Thy judgments,” says, i.e. “from the ciples are universal, both in speculative and in practical rule of life Thou hast set for me.” But a rule of life be- matters. Accordingly just as the determination of the uni- longs to the moral precepts. Therefore the judicial pre- versal principle about Divine worship is effected by the cepts should not be considered as distinct from the moral ceremonial precepts, so the determination of the general precepts. precepts of that justice which is to be observed among Objection 3. Further, judgment seems to be an act of men is effected by the judicial precepts. justice, according to Ps. 93:15: “Until justice be turned We must therefore distinguish three kinds of precept in into judgment.” But acts of justice, like the acts of other the Old Law; viz. “moral” precepts, which are dictated by virtues, belong to the moral precepts. Therefore the moral the natural law; “ceremonial” precepts, which are deter- precepts include the judicial precepts, and consequently minations of the Divine worship; and “judicial” precepts, should not be held as distinct from them. which are determinations of the justice to be maintained ∗ Fact. et Dict. Memor. i, 1 1063 among men. Wherefore the Apostle (Rom. 7:12) after something in common with the moral precepts, in that saying that the “Law is holy,” adds that “the command- they are derived from reason; and something in common ment is just, and holy, and good”: “just,” in respect of with the ceremonial precepts, in that they are determina- the judicial precepts; “holy,” with regard to the ceremo- tions of general precepts. This explains why sometimes nial precepts (since the word “sanctus”—“holy”—is ap- “judgments” comprise both judicial and moral precepts, plied to that which is consecrated to God); and “good,” as in Dt. 5:1: “Hear, O Israel, the ceremonies and judg- i.e. conducive to virtue, as to the moral precepts. ments”; and sometimes judicial and ceremonial precepts, Reply to Objection 1. Both the moral and the judicial as in Lev. 18:4: “You shall do My judgments, and shall precepts aim at the ordering of human life: and conse- observe My precepts,” where “precepts” denotes moral quently they are both comprised under one of the heads precepts, while “judgments” refers to judicial and cere- mentioned by Augustine, viz. under the precepts of the monial precepts. life we have to lead. Reply to Objection 3. The act of justice, in general, Reply to Objection 2. Judgment denotes execution of belongs to the moral precepts; but its determination to justice, by an application of the reason to individual cases some special kind of act belongs to the judicial precepts. in a determinate way. Hence the judicial precepts have Whether the Old Law contains any others besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial Ia IIae q. 99 a. 5 precepts? Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law con- I answer that, Some things are included in the Law by tains others besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial way of precept; other things, as being ordained to the ful- precepts. Because the judicial precepts belong to the act filment of the precepts. Now the precepts refer to things of justice, which is between man and man; while the cer- which have to be done: and to their fulfilment man is in- emonial precepts belong to the act of religion, whereby duced by two considerations, viz. the authority of the law- God is worshipped. Now besides these there are many giver, and the benefit derived from the fulfilment, which other virtues, viz. temperance, fortitude, liberality, and benefit consists in the attainment of some good, useful, several others, as stated above (q. 60, a. 5). Therefore be- pleasurable or virtuous, or in the avoidance of some con- sides the aforesaid precepts, the Old Law should comprise trary evil. Hence it was necessary that in the Old Law others. certain things should be set forth to indicate the authority Objection 2. Further, it is written (Dt. 11:1): “Love of God the lawgiver: e.g. Dt. 6:4: “Hear, O Israel, the the Lord thy God, and observe His precepts and cere- Lord our God is one Lord”; and Gn. 1:1: “In the begin- monies, His judgments and commandments.” Now pre- ning God created heaven and earth”: and these are called cepts concern moral matters, as stated above (a. 4). There- “testimonies.” Again it was necessary that in the Law cer- fore besides the moral, judicial and ceremonial precepts, tain rewards should be appointed for those who observe the Law contains others which are called “command- the Law, and punishments for those who transgress; as it ments.”∗ may be seen in Dt. 28: “If thou wilt hear the voice of the Objection 3. Further, it is written (Dt. 6:17): “Keep Lord thy God. . . He will make thee higher than all the na- the precepts of the Lord thy God, and the testimonies and tions,” etc.: and these are called “justifications,” according ceremonies which I have [Vulg.: ‘He hath’] commanded as God punishes or rewards certain ones justly. thee.” Therefore in addition to the above, the Law com- The things that have to be done do not come under prises “testimonies.” the precept except in so far as they have the character of Objection 4. Further, it is written (Ps. 118:93): “Thy a duty. Now a duty is twofold: one according to the rule justifications (i.e. “Thy Law,” according to a gloss) I will of reason; the other according to the rule of a law which never forget.” Therefore in the Old Law there are not only prescribes that duty: thus the Philosopher distinguishes a moral, ceremonial and judicial precepts, but also others, twofold just—moral and legal (Ethic. v, 7). called “justifications.” Moral duty is twofold: because reason dictates that On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): “These are something must be done, either as being so necessary that the precepts and ceremonies and judgments which the without it the order of virtue would be destroyed; or as Lord your God commanded. . . you.” And these words are being useful for the better maintaining of the order of placed at the beginning of the Law. Therefore all the pre- virtue. And in this sense some of the moral precepts are cepts of the Law are included under them. expressed by way of absolute command or prohibition, as ∗ The “commandments” (mandata) spoken of here and in the body of this article are not to be confused with the Commandments (praecepta) in the ordinary acceptance of the word. 1064 “Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal”: and these are ments may be distinguished from the precepts, so that properly called “precepts.” Other things are prescribed or those things be called “precepts” which God Himself pre- forbidden, not as an absolute duty, but as something better scribed; and those things “commandments” which He en- to be done. These may be called “commandments”; be- joined [mandavit] through others, as the very word seems cause they are expressed by way of inducement and per- to denote. suasion: an example whereof is seen in Ex. 22:26: “If From this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are thou take of thy neighbor a garment in pledge, thou shalt either moral, ceremonial, or judicial; and that other ordi- give it him again before sunset”; and in other like cases. nances have not the character of a precept, but are directed Wherefore Jerome (Praefat. in Comment. super Marc.) to the observance of the precepts, as stated above. says that “justice is in the precepts, charity in the com- Reply to Objection 1. Justice alone, of all the virtues, mandments.” Duty as fixed by the Law, belongs to the implies the notion of duty. Consequently moral matters judicial precepts, as regards human affairs; to the “cere- are determinable by law in so far as they belong to justice: monial” precepts, as regards Divine matters. of which virtue religion is a part, as Tully says (De Invent. Nevertheless those ordinances also which refer to pun- ii). Wherefore the legal just cannot be anything foreign to ishments and rewards may be called “testimonies,” in so the ceremonial and judicial precepts. far as they testify to the Divine justice. Again all the pre- The Replies to the other Objections are clear from cepts of the Law may be styled “justifications,” as being what has been said. executions of legal justice. Furthermore the command- Whether the Old Law should have induced men to the observance of its precepts, by Ia IIae q. 99 a. 6 means of temporal promises and threats? Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law should things of the land. But if you will not, and will provoke not have induced men to the observance of its precepts, by Me to wrath: the sword shall devour you.” means of temporal promises and threats. For the purpose I answer that, As in speculative sciences men are per- of the Divine law is to subject man to God by fear and suaded to assent to the conclusions by means of syllogistic love: hence it is written (Dt. 10:12): “And now, Israel, arguments, so too in every law, men are persuaded to ob- what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou serve its precepts by means of punishments and rewards. fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways, and love Now it is to be observed that, in speculative sciences, Him?” But the desire for temporal goods leads man away the means of persuasion are adapted to the conditions of from God: for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36), that the pupil: wherefore the process of argument in sciences “covetousness is the bane of charity.” Therefore temporal should be ordered becomingly, so that the instruction is promises and threats seem to be contrary to the intention based on principles more generally known. And thus also of a lawgiver: and this makes a law worthy of rejection, he who would persuade a man to the observance of any as the Philosopher declares (Polit. ii, 6). precepts, needs to move him at first by things for which he Objection 2. Further, the Divine law is more excel- has an affection; just as children are induced to do some- lent than human law. Now, in sciences, we notice that the thing, by means of little childish gifts. Now it has been loftier the science, the higher the means of persuasion that said above (q. 98, Aa. 1,2,3) that the Old Law disposed it employs. Therefore, since human law employs tempo- men to (the coming of) Christ, as the imperfect in com- ral threats and promises, as means of persuading man, the parison disposes to the perfect, wherefore it was given to Divine law should have used, not these, but more lofty a people as yet imperfect in comparison to the perfection means. which was to result from Christ’s coming: and for this Objection 3. Further, the reward of righteousness reason, that people is compared to a child that is still un- and the punishment of guilt cannot be that which befalls der a pedagogue (Gal. 3:24). But the perfection of man equally the good and the wicked. But as stated in Eccles. consists in his despising temporal things and cleaving to 9:2, “all” temporal “things equally happen to the just and things spiritual, as is clear from the words of the Apostle to the wicked, to the good and the evil, to the clean and to (Phil. 3:13,15): “Forgetting the things that are behind, I the unclean, to him that offereth victims, and to him that stretch [Vulg.: ‘and stretching’] forth myself to those that despiseth sacrifices.” Therefore temporal goods or evils are before. . . Let us therefore, as many as are perfect, be are not suitably set forth as punishments or rewards of the thus minded.” Those who are yet imperfect desire tem- commandments of the Divine law. poral goods, albeit in subordination to God: whereas the On the contrary, It is written (Is. 1:19,20): “If you perverse place their end in temporalities. It was therefore be willing, and will hearken to Me, you shall eat the good fitting that the Old Law should conduct men to God by 1065 means of temporal goods for which the imperfect have an carefully the story of the Old Testament, the common affection. weal of the people prospered under the Law as long as Reply to Objection 1. Covetousness whereby man they obeyed it; and as soon as they departed from the pre- places his end in temporalities, is the bane of charity. But cepts of the Law they were overtaken by many calamities. the attainment of temporal goods which man desires in But certain individuals, although they observed the justice subordination to God is a road leading the imperfect to of the Law, met with misfortunes—either because they the love of God, according to Ps. 48:19: “He will praise had already become spiritual (so that misfortune might Thee, when Thou shalt do well to him.” withdraw them all the more from attachment to temporal Reply to Objection 2. Human law persuades men by things, and that their virtue might be tried)—or because, means of temporal rewards or punishments to be inflicted while outwardly fulfilling the works of the Law, their heart by men: whereas the Divine law persuades men by meas was altogether fixed on temporal goods, and far removed of rewards or punishments to be received from God. In from God, according to Is. 29:13 (Mat. 15:8): “This peo- this respect it employs higher means. ple honoreth Me with their lips; but their hearts is far from Reply to Objection 3. As any one can see, who reads Me.” 1066 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 100 Of the Moral Precepts of the Old Law (In Twelve Articles) We must now consider each kind of precept of the Old Law: and (1) the moral precepts, (2) the ceremonial precepts, (3) the judicial precepts. Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature? (2) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law are about the acts of all the virtues? (3) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue? (4) How the precepts of the decalogue are distinguished from one another? (5) Their number; (6) Their order; (7) The manner in which they were given; (8) Whether they are dispensable? (9) Whether the mode of observing a virtue comes under the precept of the Law? (10) Whether the mode of charity comes under the precept? (11) The distinction of other moral precepts; (12) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man? Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature? Ia IIae q. 100 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that not all the moral pre- good which accord with reason, and those are called bad cepts belong to the law of nature. For it is written (Ecclus. which are discordant from reason. And as every judgment 17:9): “Moreover He gave them instructions, and the law of speculative reason proceeds from the natural knowl- of life for an inheritance.” But instruction is in contradis- edge of first principles, so every judgment of practical rea- tinction to the law of nature; since the law of nature is not son proceeds from principles known naturally, as stated learnt, but instilled by natural instinct. Therefore not all above (q. 94, Aa. 2,4): from which principles one may the moral precepts belong to the natural law. proceed in various ways to judge of various matters. For Objection 2. Further, the Divine law is more perfect some matters connected with human actions are so evi- than human law. But human law adds certain things con- dent, that after very little consideration one is able at once cerning good morals, to those that belong to the law of to approve or disapprove of them by means of these gen- nature: as is evidenced by the fact that the natural law is eral first principles: while some matters cannot be the sub- the same in all men, while these moral institutions are var- ject of judgment without much consideration of the vari- ious for various people. Much more reason therefore was ous circumstances, which all are not competent to do care- there why the Divine law should add to the law of nature, fully, but only those who are wise: just as it is not possible ordinances pertaining to good morals. for all to consider the particular conclusions of sciences, Objection 3. Further, just as natural reason leads to but only for those who are versed in philosophy: and lastly good morals in certain matters, so does faith: hence it is there are some matters of which man cannot judge unless written (Gal. 5:6) that faith “worketh by charity.” But he be helped by Divine instruction; such as the articles of faith is not included in the law of nature; since that which faith. is of faith is above nature. Therefore not all the moral It is therefore evident that since the moral precepts are precepts of the Divine law belong to the law of nature. about matters which concern good morals; and since good On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 2:14) that morals are those which are in accord with reason; and “the Gentiles, who have not the Law, do by nature those since also every judgment of human reason must needs things that are of the Law”: which must be understood of by derived in some way from natural reason; it follows, of things pertaining to good morals. Therefore all the moral necessity, that all the moral precepts belong to the law of precepts of the Law belong to the law of nature. nature; but not all in the same way. For there are certain I answer that, The moral precepts, distinct from the things which the natural reason of every man, of its own ceremonial and judicial precepts, are about things pertain- accord and at once, judges to be done or not to be done: ing of their very nature to good morals. Now since human e.g. “Honor thy father and thy mother,” and “Thou shalt morals depend on their relation to reason, which is the not kill, Thou shalt not steal”: and these belong to the law proper principle of human acts, those morals are called of nature absolutely. And there are certain things which, 1067 after a more careful consideration, wise men deem oblig-struction, whereby we are taught about the things of God: atory. Such belong to the law of nature, yet so that they e.g. “Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor need to be inculcated, the wiser teaching the less wise: the likeness of anything; Thou shalt not take the name of e.g. “Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the per- the Lord thy God in vain.” son of the aged man,” and the like. And there are some This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. things, to judge of which, human reason needs Divine in- Whether the moral precepts of the Law are about all the acts of virtue? Ia IIae q. 100 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the moral precepts proper function consists in directing the human commu- of the Law are not about all the acts of virtue. For obser- nity. Wherefore human law makes precepts only about vance of the precepts of the Old Law is called justification, acts of justice; and if it commands acts of other virtues, according to Ps. 118:8: “I will keep Thy justifications.” this is only in so far as they assume the nature of justice, But justification is the execution of justice. Therefore the as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. v, 1). moral precepts are only about acts of justice. But the community for which the Divine law is or- Objection 2. Further, that which comes under a pre- dained, is that of men in relation to God, either in this cept has the character of a duty. But the character of duty life or in the life to come. And therefore the Divine law belongs to justice alone and to none of the other virtues, proposes precepts about all those matters whereby men for the proper act of justice consists in rendering to each are well ordered in their relations to God. Now man is one his due. Therefore the precepts of the moral law are united to God by his reason or mind, in which is God’s not about the acts of the other virtues, but only about the image. Wherefore the Divine law proposes precepts about acts of justice. all those matters whereby human reason is well ordered. Objection 3. Further, every law is made for the com- But this is effected by the acts of all the virtues: since the mon good, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21). But of all the intellectual virtues set in good order the acts of the reason virtues justice alone regards the common good, as the in themselves: while the moral virtues set in good order Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the moral pre- the acts of the reason in reference to the interior passions cepts are only about the acts of justice. and exterior actions. It is therefore evident that the Di- On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Paradiso viii) vine law fittingly proposes precepts about the acts of all that “a sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and a dis- the virtues: yet so that certain matters, without which the obedience to the commandments of heaven.” But there are order of virtue, which is the order of reason, cannot even sins contrary to all the acts of virtue. Therefore it belongs exist, come under an obligation of precept; while other to Divine law to direct all the acts of virtue. matters, which pertain to the well-being of perfect virtue, I answer that, Since the precepts of the Law are or- come under an admonition of counsel. dained to the common good, as stated above (q. 90, a. 2), Reply to Objection 1. The fulfilment of the com- the precepts of the Law must needs be diversified accord- mandments of the Law, even of those which are about the ing to the various kinds of community: hence the Philoso- acts of the other virtues, has the character of justification, pher (Polit. iv, 1) teaches that the laws which are made in inasmuch as it is just that man should obey God: or again, a state which is ruled by a king must be different from the inasmuch as it is just that all that belongs to man should laws of a state which is ruled by the people, or by a few be subject to reason. powerful men in the state. Now human law is ordained for Reply to Objection 2. Justice properly so called re- one kind of community, and the Divine law for another gards the duty of one man to another: but all the other kind. Because human law is ordained for the civil com- virtues regard the duty of the lower powers to reason. It munity, implying mutual duties of man and his fellows: is in relation to this latter duty that the Philosopher speaks and men are ordained to one another by outward acts, (Ethic. v, 11) of a kind of metaphorical justice. whereby men live in communion with one another. This The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what life in common of man with man pertains to justice, whose has been said about the different kinds of community. 1068 Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the Ia IIae q. 100 a. 3 decalogue? Objection 1. It would seem that not all the moral pre- precepts are not reckoned among the precepts of the deca- cepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of logue: viz. first general principles, for they need no fur- the decalogue. For the first and principal precepts of the ther promulgation after being once imprinted on the natu- Law are, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God,” and “Thou ral reason to which they are self-evident; as, for instance, shalt love thy neighbor,” as stated in Mat. 22:37,39. But that one should do evil to no man, and other similar princi- these two are not contained in the precepts of the deca- ples: and again those which the careful reflection of wise logue. Therefore not all the moral precepts are contained men shows to be in accord with reason; since the people in the precepts of the decalogue. receive these principles from God, through being taught Objection 2. Further, the moral precepts are not re- by wise men. Nevertheless both kinds of precepts are ducible to the ceremonial precepts, but rather vice versa. contained in the precepts of the decalogue; yet in differ- But among the precepts of the decalogue, one is ceremo- ent ways. For the first general principles are contained in nial, viz. “Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath- them, as principles in their proximate conclusions; while day.” Therefore the moral precepts are not reducible to all those which are known through wise men are contained, the precepts of the decalogue. conversely, as conclusions in their principles. Objection 3. Further, the moral precepts are about all Reply to Objection 1. Those two principles are the the acts of virtue. But among the precepts of the deca- first general principles of the natural law, and are self- logue are only such as regard acts of justice; as may be evident to human reason, either through nature or through seen by going through them all. Therefore the precepts of faith. Wherefore all the precepts of the decalogue are re- the decalogue do not include all the moral precepts. ferred to these, as conclusions to general principles. On the contrary, The gloss on Mat. 5:11: “Blessed Reply to Objection 2. The precept of the Sabbath ob- are ye when they shall revile you,” etc. says that “Moses, servance is moral in one respect, in so far as it commands after propounding the ten precepts, set them out in detail.” man to give some time to the things of God, according Therefore all the precepts of the Law are so many parts of to Ps. 45:11: “Be still and see that I am God.” In this the precepts of the decalogue. respect it is placed among the precepts of the decalogue: I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue differ but not as to the fixing of the time, in which respect it is a from the other precepts of the Law, in the fact that God ceremonial precept. Himself is said to have given the precepts of the deca- Reply to Objection 3. The notion of duty is not so logue; whereas He gave the other precepts to the people patent in the other virtues as it is in justice. Hence the through Moses. Wherefore the decalogue includes those precepts about the acts of the other virtues are not so well precepts the knowledge of which man has immediately known to the people as are the precepts about acts of jus- from God. Such are those which with but slight reflection tice. Wherefore the acts of justice especially come under can be gathered at once from the first general principles: the precepts of the decalogue, which are the primary ele- and those also which become known to man immediately ments of the Law. through divinely infused faith. Consequently two kinds of Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably distinguished from one another? Ia IIae q. 100 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the precepts of the which follows, “Thou shalt not have strange gods before decalogue are unsuitably distinguished from one another. Me,” is negative. Therefore these are two precepts, and do For worship is a virtue distinct from faith. Now the pre- not, as Augustine says (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi), make one. cepts are about acts of virtue. But that which is said Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 7:7): at the beginning of the decalogue, “Thou shalt not have “I had not known concupiscence, if the Law did not say: strange gods before Me,” belongs to faith: and that which ‘Thou shalt not covet.’ ” Hence it seems that this pre- is added, “Thou shalt not make. . . any graven thing,” etc. cept, “Thou shalt not covet,” is one precept; and, there- belongs to worship. Therefore these are not one precept, fore, should not be divided into two. as Augustine asserts (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi), but two. On the contrary, stands the authority of Augustine Objection 2. Further, the affirmative precepts in the who, in commenting on Exodus (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi) Law are distinct from the negative precepts; e.g. “Honor distinguishes three precepts as referring to God, and seven thy father and thy mother,” and, “Thou shalt not kill.” But as referring to our neighbor. this, “I am the Lord thy God,” is affirmative: and that I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are dif- 1069 ferently divided by different authorities. For Hesychius to covet another’s wife, for the purpose of carnal knowl-commenting on Lev. 26:26, “Ten women shall bake your edge, belongs to the concupiscence of the flesh; whereas, bread in one oven,” says that the precept of the Sabbath- to covet other things, which are desired for the purpose day observance is not one of the ten precepts, because its of possession, belongs to the concupiscence of the eyes; observance, in the letter, is not binding for all time. But he wherefore Augustine reckons as distinct precepts, that distinguishes four precepts pertaining to God, the first be- which forbids the coveting of another’s goods, and that ing, “I am the Lord thy God”; the second, “Thou shalt not which prohibits the coveting of another’s wife. Thus he have strange gods before Me,” (thus also Jerome distin- distinguishes three precepts as referring to God, and seven guishes these two precepts, in his commentary on Osee as referring to our neighbor. And this is better. 10:10, “On thy” [Vulg.: “their”] “two iniquities”); the Reply to Objection 1. Worship is merely a declara- third precept according to him is, “Thou shalt not make to tion of faith: wherefore the precepts about worship should thyself any graven thing”; and the fourth, “Thou shalt not not be reckoned as distinct from those about faith. Never- take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.” He states that theless precepts should be given about worship rather than there are six precepts pertaining to our neighbor; the first, about faith, because the precept about faith is presupposed “Honor thy father and thy mother”; the second, “Thou to the precepts of the decalogue, as is also the precept of shalt not kill”; the third, “Thou shalt not commit adul- charity. For just as the first general principles of the natu- tery”; the fourth, “Thou shalt not steal”; the fifth, “Thou ral law are self-evident to a subject having natural reason, shalt not bear false witness”; the sixth, “Thou shalt not and need no promulgation; so also to believe in God is a covet.” first and self-evident principle to a subject possessed of But, in the first place, it seems unbecoming for the faith: “for he that cometh to God, must believe that He is” precept of the Sabbath-day observance to be put among (Heb. 11:6). Hence it needs no other promulgation that the precepts of the decalogue, if it nowise belonged to the the infusion of faith. decalogue. Secondly, because, since it is written (Mat. Reply to Objection 2. The affirmative precepts are 6:24), “No man can serve two masters,” the two state- distinct from the negative, when one is not comprised in ments, “I am the Lord thy God,” and, “Thou shalt not the other: thus that man should honor his parents does not have strange gods before Me” seem to be of the same na- include that he should not kill another man; nor does the ture and to form one precept. Hence Origen (Hom. viii in latter include the former. But when an affirmative pre- Exod.) who also distinguishes four precepts as referring cept is included in a negative, or vice versa, we do not to God, unites these two under one precept; and reckons find that two distinct precepts are given: thus there is not in the second place, “Thou shalt not make. . . any graven one precept saying that “Thou shalt not steal,” and another thing”; as third, “Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord binding one to keep another’s property intact, or to give it thy God in vain”; and as fourth, “Remember that thou back to its owner. In the same way there are not different keep holy the Sabbath-day.” The other six he reckons in precepts about believing in God, and about not believing the same way as Hesychius. in strange gods. Since, however, the making of graven things or the Reply to Objection 3. All covetousness has one com- likeness of anything is not forbidden except as to the point mon ratio: and therefore the Apostle speaks of the com- of their being worshipped as gods—for God commanded mandment about covetousness as though it were one. But an image of the Seraphim [Vulg.: Cherubim] to be made because there are various special kinds of covetousness, and placed in the tabernacle, as related in Ex. 25:18— therefore Augustine distinguishes different prohibitions Augustine more fittingly unites these two, “Thou shalt against coveting: for covetousness differs specifically in not have strange gods before Me,” and, “Thou shalt not respect of the diversity of actions or things coveted, as the make. . . any graven thing,” into one precept. Likewise Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 5). Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably set forth? Ia IIae q. 100 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the precepts of the relations to God and himself, it seems that the precepts of decalogue are unsuitably set forth. Because sin, as stated the decalogue are insufficiently enumerated. by Ambrose (De Paradiso viii), is “a transgression of the Objection 2. Further, just as the Sabbath-day obser- Divine law and a disobedience to the commandments of vance pertained to the worship of God, so also did the heaven.” But sins are distinguished according as man sins observance of other solemnities, and the offering of sac- against God, or his neighbor, or himself. Since, then, the rifices. But the decalogue contains a precept about the decalogue does not include any precepts directing man in Sabbath-day observance. Therefore it should contain oth- his relations to himself, but only such as direct him in his ers also, pertaining to the other solemnities, and to the 1070 sacrificial rite. mandment, in the words “Thou shalt not have strange Objection 3. Further, as sins against God include the gods.” Reverence to his master requires that he should sin of perjury, so also do they include blasphemy, or other do nothing injurious to him: and this is conveyed by the ways of lying against the teaching of God. But there is a second commandment, “Thou shalt not take the name of precept forbidding perjury, “Thou shalt not take the name the Lord thy God in vain.” Service is due to the master of the Lord thy God in vain.” Therefore there should be in return for the benefits which his subjects receive from also a precept of the decalogue forbidding blasphemy and him: and to this belongs the third commandment of the false doctrine. sanctification of the Sabbath in memory of the creation of Objection 4. Further, just as man has a natural affec- all things. tion for his parents, so has he also for his children. More- To his neighbors a man behaves himself well both in over the commandment of charity extends to all our neigh- particular and in general. In particular, as to those to bors. Now the precepts of the decalogue are ordained whom he is indebted, by paying his debts: and in this unto charity, according to 1 Tim. 1:5: “The end of the sense is to be taken the commandment about honoring commandment is charity.” Therefore as there is a precept one’s parents. In general, as to all men, by doing harm to referring to parents, so should there have been some pre- none, either by deed, or by word, or by thought. By deed, cepts referring to children and other neighbors. harm is done to one’s neighbor—sometimes in his person, Objection 5. Further, in every kind of sin, it is pos- i.e. as to his personal existence; and this is forbidden by sible to sin in thought or in deed. But in some kinds of the words, “Thou shalt not kill”: sometimes in a person sin, namely in theft and adultery, the prohibition of sins united to him, as to the propagation of offspring; and this of deed, when it is said, “Thou shalt not commit adultery, is prohibited by the words, “Thou shalt not commit adul- Thou shalt not steal,” is distinct from the prohibition of the tery”: sometimes in his possessions, which are directed to sin of thought, when it is said, “Thou shalt not covet thy both the aforesaid; and with this regard to this it is said, neighbor’s goods,” and, “Thou shalt not covet thy neigh- “Thou shalt not steal.” Harm done by word is forbidden bor’s wife.” Therefore the same should have been done in when it is said, “Thou shalt not bear false witness against regard to the sins of homicide and false witness. thy neighbor”: harm done by thought is forbidden in the Objection 6. Further, just as sin happens through dis- words, “Thou shalt not covet.” order of the concupiscible faculty, so does it arise through The three precepts that direct man in his behavior to- disorder of the irascible part. But some precepts forbid wards God may also be differentiated in this same way. inordinate concupiscence, when it is said, “Thou shalt not For the first refers to deeds; wherefore it is said, “Thou covet.” Therefore the decalogue should have included shalt not make. . . a graven thing”: the second, to words; some precepts forbidding the disorders of the irascible wherefore it is said, “Thou shalt not take the name of the faculty. Therefore it seems that the ten precepts of the Lord thy God in vain”: the third, to thoughts; because the decalogue are unfittingly enumerated. sanctification of the Sabbath, as the subject of a moral pre- On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:13): “He shewed cept, requires repose of the heart in God. Or, according to you His covenant, which He commanded you to do, and Augustine (In Ps. 32: Conc. 1), by the first commandment the ten words that He wrote in two tablets of stone.” we reverence the unity of the First Principle; by the sec- I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), just as the pre- ond, the Divine truth; by the third, His goodness whereby cepts of human law direct man in his relations to the hu- we are sanctified, and wherein we rest as in our last end. man community, so the precepts of the Divine law direct Reply to Objection 1. This objection may be an- man in his relations to a community or commonwealth of swered in two ways. First, because the precepts of the men under God. Now in order that any man may dwell decalogue can be reduced to the precepts of charity. Now aright in a community, two things are required: the first there was need for man to receive a precept about loving is that he behave well to the head of the community; the God and his neighbor, because in this respect the natu- other is that he behave well to those who are his fellows ral law had become obscured on account of sin: but not and partners in the community. It is therefore necessary about the duty of loving oneself, because in this respect that the Divine law should contain in the first place pre- the natural law retained its vigor: or again, because love cepts ordering man in his relations to God; and in the sec- of oneself is contained in the love of God and of one’s ond place, other precepts ordering man in his relations to neighbor: since true self-love consists in directing oneself other men who are his neighbors and live with him under to God. And for this reason the decalogue includes those God. precepts only which refer to our neighbor and to God. Now man owes three things to the head of the commu- Secondly, it may be answered that the precepts of the nity: first, fidelity; secondly, reverence; thirdly, service. decalogue are those which the people received from God Fidelity to his master consists in his not giving sovereign immediately; wherefore it is written (Dt. 10:4): “He wrote honor to another: and this is the sense of the first com- in the tables, according as He had written before, the ten 1071 words, which the Lord spoke to you.” Hence the precepts Hence, since oaths are common to all, inordinate swear-of the decalogue need to be such as the people can under- ing is the matter of a special prohibition by a precept of stand at once. Now a precept implies the notion of duty. the decalogue. According to one interpretation, however, But it is easy for a man, especially for a believer, to under- the words, “Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy stand that, of necessity, he owes certain duties to God and God in vain,” are a prohibition of false doctrine, for one to his neighbor. But that, in matters which regard himself gloss expounds them thus: “Thou shalt not say that Christ and not another, man has, of necessity, certain duties to is a creature.” himself, is not so evident: for, at the first glance, it seems Reply to Objection 4. That a man should not do harm that everyone is free in matters that concern himself. And to anyone is an immediate dictate of his natural reason: therefore the precepts which prohibit disorders of a man and therefore the precepts that forbid the doing of harm with regard to himself, reach the people through the in- are binding on all men. But it is not an immediate dictate struction of men who are versed through the instruction of natural reason that a man should do one thing in return of men who are versed in such matters; and, consequently, for another, unless he happen to be indebted to someone. they are not contained in the decalogue. Now a son’s debt to his father is so evident that one can- Reply to Objection 2. All the solemnities of the Old not get away from it by denying it: since the father is the Law were instituted in celebration of some Divine favor, principle of generation and being, and also of upbringing either in memory of past favors, or in sign of some favor and teaching. Wherefore the decalogue does not prescribe to come: in like manner all the sacrifices were offered up deeds of kindness or service to be done to anyone except with the same purpose. Now of all the Divine favors to be to one’s parents. On the other hand parents do not seem to commemorated the chief was that of the Creation, which be indebted to their children for any favors received, but was called to mind by the sanctification of the Sabbath; rather the reverse is the case. Again, a child is a part of wherefore the reason for this precept is given in Ex. 20:11: his father; and “parents love their children as being a part “In six days the Lord made heaven and earth,” etc. And of of themselves,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 12). all future blessings, the chief and final was the repose of Hence, just as the decalogue contains no ordinance as to the mind in God, either, in the present life, by grace, or, man’s behavior towards himself, so, for the same reason, in the future life, by glory; which repose was also fore- it includes no precept about loving one’s children. shadowed in the Sabbath-day observance: wherefore it is Reply to Objection 5. The pleasure of adultery and written (Is. 58:13): “If thou turn away thy foot from the the usefulness of wealth, in so far as they have the char- Sabbath, from doing thy own will in My holy day, and acter of pleasurable or useful good, are of themselves, ob- call the Sabbath delightful, and the holy of the Lord glo- jects of appetite: and for this reason they needed to be rious.” Because these favors first and chiefly are borne in forbidden not only in the deed but also in the desire. But mind by men, especially by the faithful. But other solem- murder and falsehood are, of themselves, objects of repul- nities were celebrated on account of certain particular fa- sion (since it is natural for man to love his neighbor and vors temporal and transitory, such as the celebration of the the truth): and are desired only for the sake of something Passover in memory of the past favor of the delivery from else. Consequently with regard to sins of murder and false Egypt, and as a sign of the future Passion of Christ, which witness, it was necessary to proscribe, not sins of thought, though temporal and transitory, brought us to the repose but only sins of deed. of the spiritual Sabbath. Consequently, the Sabbath alone, Reply to Objection 6. As stated above (q. 25, a. 1), and none of the other solemnities and sacrifices, is men- all the passions of the irascible faculty arise from the pas- tioned in the precepts of the decalogue. sions of the concupiscible part. Hence, as the precepts of Reply to Objection 3. As the Apostle says (Heb. the decalogue are, as it were, the first elements of the Law, 6:16), “men swear by one greater than themselves; and an there was no need for mention of the irascible passions, oath for confirmation is the end of all their controversy.” but only of the concupiscible passions. Whether the ten precepts of the decalogue are set in proper order? Ia IIae q. 100 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the ten precepts of the other seven pertain to the love of our neighbor. There- the decalogue are not set in proper order. Because love of fore the precepts of the decalogue are not set in proper one’s neighbor is seemingly previous to love of God, since order. our neighbor is better known to us than God is; according Objection 2. Further, the acts of virtue are prescribed to 1 Jn. 4:20: “He that loveth not his brother, whom he by the affirmative precepts, and acts of vice are forbid- seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?” But den by the negative precepts. But according to Boethius the first three precepts belong to the love of God, while 1072 in his commentary on the Categories∗, vices should be wards his neighbor, it is evident that it is more repugnant uprooted before virtues are sown. Therefore among the to reason, and a more grievous sin, if man does not ob- precepts concerning our neighbor, the negative precepts serve the due order as to those persons to whom he is most should have preceded the affirmative. indebted. Consequently, among those precepts that direct Objection 3. Further, the precepts of the Law are man in his relations to his neighbor, the first place is given about men’s actions. But actions of thought precede ac- to that one which regards his parents. Among the other tions of word or outward deed. Therefore the precepts precepts we again find the order to be according to the about not coveting, which regard our thoughts, are unsuit- gravity of sin. For it is more grave and more repugnant to ably placed last in order. reason, to sin by deed than by word; and by word than by On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): thought. And among sins of deed, murder which destroys “The things that are of God, are well ordered” [Vulg.: life in one already living is more grievous than adultery, ‘Those that are, are ordained of God’]. But the precepts of which imperils the life of the unborn child; and adultery the decalogue were given immediately by God, as stated is more grave than theft, which regards external goods. above (a. 3). Therefore they are arranged in becoming Reply to Objection 1. Although our neighbor is bet- order. ter known than God by the way of the senses, nevertheless I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 3,5, ad 1), the the love of God is the reason for the love of our neighbor, precepts of the decalogue are such as the mind of man as shall be declared later on ( IIa IIae, q. 25, a. 1; IIa IIae, is ready to grasp at once. Now it is evident that a thing q. 26, a. 2). Hence the precepts ordaining man to God is so much the more easily grasped by the reason, as its demanded precedence of the others. contrary is more grievous and repugnant to reason. More- Reply to Objection 2. Just as God is the universal over, it is clear, since the order of reason begins with the principle of being in respect of all things, so is a father a end, that, for a man to be inordinately disposed towards principle of being in respect of his son. Therefore the pre- his end, is supremely contrary to reason. Now the end of cept regarding parents was fittingly placed after the pre- human life and society is God. Consequently it was neces- cepts regarding God. This argument holds in respect of sary for the precepts of the decalogue, first of all, to direct affirmative and negative precepts about the same kind of man to God; since the contrary to this is most grievous. deed: although even then it is not altogether cogent. For Thus also, in an army, which is ordained to the comman- although in the order of execution, vices should be up- der as to its end, it is requisite first that the soldier should rooted before virtues are sown, according to Ps. 33:15: be subject to the commander, and the opposite of this is “Turn away from evil, and do good,” and Is. 1:16,17: most grievous; and secondly it is requisite that he should “Cease to do perversely; learn to do well”; yet, in the order be in coordination with the other soldiers. of knowledge, virtue precedes vice, because “the crooked Now among those things whereby we are ordained to line is known by the straight” (De Anima i): and “by the God, the first is that man should be subjected to Him faith- law is the knowledge of sin” (Rom. 3:20). Wherefore the fully, by having nothing in common with His enemies. affirmation precept demanded the first place. However, The second is that he should show Him reverence: the this is not the reason for the order, but that which is given third that he should offer Him service. Thus, in an army, above. Because in the precepts regarding God, which be- it is a greater sin for a soldier to act treacherously and longs to the first table, an affirmative precept is placed last, make a compact with the foe, than to be insolent to his since its transgression implies a less grievous sin. commander: and this last is more grievous than if he be Reply to Objection 3. Although sin of thought stands found wanting in some point of service to him. first in the order of execution, yet its prohibition holds a As to the precepts that direct man in his behavior to- later position in the order of reason. Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably formulated? Ia IIae q. 100 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the precepts of the fitting that affirmative precepts should be framed in some decalogue are unsuitably formulated. Because the affir- matters, and negative precepts in others. mative precepts direct man to acts of virtue, while the Objection 2. Further, Isidore says (Etym. ii, 10) that negative precepts withdraw him from acts of vice. But in every law is based on reason. But all the precepts of the every matter there are virtues and vices opposed to one an- decalogue belong to the Divine law. Therefore the reason other. Therefore in whatever matter there is an ordinance should have been pointed out in each precept, and not only of a precept of the decalogue, there should have been an in the first and third. affirmative and a negative precept. Therefore it was un- Objection 3. Further, by observing the precepts ∗ Lib. iv, cap. De Oppos. 1073 man deserves to be rewarded by God. But the Divine Now there are two whose favors no man can sufficiently promises concern the rewards of the precepts. Therefore repay, viz. God and man’s father, as stated in Ethic. viii, the promise should have been included in each precept, 14. Therefore it is that there are only two affirmative pre- and not only in the second and fourth. cepts; one about the honor due to parents, the other about Objection 4. Further, the Old Law is called “the law the celebration of the Sabbath in memory of the Divine of fear,” in so far as it induced men to observe the pre- favor. cepts, by means of the threat of punishments. But all the Reply to Objection 2. The reasons for the purely precepts of the decalogue belong to the Old Law. There- moral precepts are manifest; hence there was no need to fore a threat of punishment should have been included in add the reason. But some of the precepts include ceremo- each, and not only in the first and second. nial matter, or a determination of a general moral precept; Objection 5. Further, all the commandments of God thus the first precept includes the determination, “Thou should be retained in the memory: for it is written (Prov. shalt not make a graven thing”; and in the third precept 3:3): “Write them in the tables of thy heart.” Therefore the Sabbath-day is fixed. Consequently there was need to it was not fitting that mention of the memory should be state the reason in each case. made in the third commandment only. Consequently it Reply to Objection 3. Generally speaking, men di- seems that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably rect their actions to some point of utility. Consequently in formulated. those precepts in which it seemed that there would be no On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 11:21) that “God useful result, or that some utility might be hindered, it was made all things, in measure, number and weight.” Much necessary to add a promise of reward. And since parents more therefore did He observe a suitable manner in for- are already on the way to depart from us, no benefit is ex- mulating His Law. pected from them: wherefore a promise of reward is added I answer that, The highest wisdom is contained in to the precept about honoring one’s parents. The same ap- the precepts of the Divine law: wherefore it is written plies to the precept forbidding idolatry: since thereby it (Dt. 4:6): “This is your wisdom and understanding in the seemed that men were hindered from receiving the appar- sight of nations.” Now it belongs to wisdom to arrange ent benefit which they think they can get by entering into all things in due manner and order. Therefore it must be a compact with the demons. evident that the precepts of the Law are suitably set forth. Reply to Objection 4. Punishments are necessary Reply to Objection 1. Affirmation of one thing al- against those who are prone to evil, as stated in Ethic. x, 9. ways leads to the denial of its opposite: but the denial of Wherefore a threat of punishment is only affixed to those one opposite does not always lead to the affirmation of precepts of the law which forbade evils to which men were the other. For it follows that if a thing is white, it is not prone. Now men were prone to idolatry by reason of the black: but it does not follow that if it is not black, it is general custom of the nations. Likewise men are prone to white: because negation extends further than affirmation. perjury on account of the frequent use of oaths. Hence it And hence too, that one ought not to do harm to another, is that a threat is affixed to the first two precepts. which pertains to the negative precepts, extends to more Reply to Objection 5. The commandment about the persons, as a primary dictate of reason, than that one ought Sabbath was made in memory of a past blessing. Where- to do someone a service or kindness. Nevertheless it is a fore special mention of the memory is made therein. Or primary dictate of reason that man is a debtor in the point again, the commandment about the Sabbath has a deter- of rendering a service or kindness to those from whom he mination affixed to it that does not belong to the natural has received kindness, if he has not yet repaid the debt. law, wherefore this precept needed a special admonition. Whether the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable? Ia IIae q. 100 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that the precepts of the to human law as God does to Divine law. But man can decalogue are dispensable. For the precepts of the deca- dispense with the precepts of a law made by man. There- logue belong to the natural law. But the natural law fails fore, since the precepts of the decalogue are ordained by in some cases and is changeable, like human nature, as the God, it seems that God can dispense with them. Now our Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7). Now the failure of law to superiors are God’s viceregents on earth; for the Apostle apply in certain particular cases is a reason for dispensa- says (2 Cor. 2:10): “For what I have pardoned, if I have tion, as stated above (q. 96, a. 6; q. 97, a. 4). Therefore pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the a dispensation can be granted in the precepts of the deca- person of Christ.” Therefore superiors can dispense with logue. the precepts of the decalogue. Objection 2. Further, man stands in the same relation Objection 3. Further, among the precepts of the deca- 1074 logue is one forbidding murder. But it seems that a disReply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is not speak- pensation is given by men in this precept: for instance, ing of the natural law which contains the very order of jus- when according to the prescription of human law, such tice: for it is a never-failing principle that “justice should as evil-doers or enemies are lawfully slain. Therefore the be preserved.” But he is speaking in reference to certain precepts of the decalogue are dispensable. fixed modes of observing justice, which fail to apply in Objection 4. Further, the observance of the Sabbath certain cases. is ordained by a precept of the decalogue. But a dispensa- Reply to Objection 2. As the Apostle says (2 Tim. tion was granted in this precept; for it is written (1 Macc. 2:13), “God continueth faithful, He cannot deny Himself.” 2:4): “And they determined in that day, saying: Whoso- But He would deny Himself if He were to do away with ever shall come up to fight against us on the Sabbath-day, the very order of His own justice, since He is justice it- we will fight against him.” Therefore the precepts of the self. Wherefore God cannot dispense a man so that it be decalogue are dispensable. lawful for him not to direct himself to God, or not to be On the contrary, are the words of Is. 24:5, where subject to His justice, even in those matters in which men some are reproved for that “they have changed the ordi- are directed to one another. nance, they have broken the everlasting covenant”; which, Reply to Objection 3. The slaying of a man is for- seemingly, apply principally to the precepts of the deca- bidden in the decalogue, in so far as it bears the character logue. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue cannot be of something undue: for in this sense the precept contains changed by dispensation. the very essence of justice. Human law cannot make it I answer that, As stated above (q. 96, a. 6; q. 97, lawful for a man to be slain unduly. But it is not undue for a. 4), precepts admit of dispensation, when there occurs evil-doers or foes of the common weal to be slain: hence a particular case in which, if the letter of the law be ob- this is not contrary to the precept of the decalogue; and served, the intention of the lawgiver is frustrated. Now such a killing is no murder as forbidden by that precept, the intention of every lawgiver is directed first and chiefly as Augustine observes (De Lib. Arb. i, 4). In like manner to the common good; secondly, to the order of justice and when a man’s property is taken from him, if it be due that virtue, whereby the common good is preserved and at- he should lose it, this is not theft or robbery as forbidden tained. If therefore there by any precepts which contain by the decalogue. the very preservation of the common good, or the very Consequently when the children of Israel, by God’s order of justice and virtue, such precepts contain the in- command, took away the spoils of the Egyptians, this was tention of the lawgiver, and therefore are indispensable. not theft; since it was due to them by the sentence of God. For instance, if in some community a law were enacted, Likewise when Abraham consented to slay his son, he did such as this—that no man should work for the destruction not consent to murder, because his son was due to be slain of the commonwealth, or betray the state to its enemies, by the command of God, Who is Lord of life and death: or that no man should do anything unjust or evil, such for He it is Who inflicts the punishment of death on all precepts would not admit of dispensation. But if other men, both godly and ungodly, on account of the sin of our precepts were enacted, subordinate to the above, and de- first parent, and if a man be the executor of that sentence termining certain special modes of procedure, these lat- by Divine authority, he will be no murderer any more than ter precepts would admit of dispensation, in so far as the God would be. Again Osee, by taking unto himself a wife omission of these precepts in certain cases would not be of fornications, or an adulterous woman, was not guilty prejudicial to the former precepts which contain the inten- either of adultery or of fornication: because he took unto tion of the lawgiver. For instance if, for the safeguarding himself one who was his by command of God, Who is the of the commonwealth, it were enacted in some city that Author of the institution of marriage. from each ward some men should keep watch as sentries Accordingly, therefore, the precepts of the decalogue, in case of siege, some might be dispensed from this on as to the essence of justice which they contain, are un- account of some greater utility. changeable: but as to any determination by application to Now the precepts of the decalogue contain the very in- individual actions—for instance, that this or that be mur- tention of the lawgiver, who is God. For the precepts of der, theft or adultery, or not—in this point they admit of the first table, which direct us to God, contain the very or- change; sometimes by Divine authority alone, namely, in der to the common and final good, which is God; while the such matters as are exclusively of Divine institution, as precepts of the second table contain the order of justice to marriage and the like; sometimes also by human author- be observed among men, that nothing undue be done to ity, namely in such matters as are subject to human juris- anyone, and that each one be given his due; for it is in this diction: for in this respect men stand in the place of God: sense that we are to take the precepts of the decalogue. and yet not in all respects. Consequently the precepts of the decalogue admit of no Reply to Objection 4. This determination was an in- dispensation whatever. terpretation rather than a dispensation. For a man is not 1075 taken to break the Sabbath, if he does something neces-seqq.). sary for human welfare; as Our Lord proves (Mat. 12:3, Whether the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law? Ia IIae q. 100 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that the mode of virtue competent to judge of the inward movements of wills, ac- falls under the precept of the law. For the mode of virtue cording to Ps. 7:10: “The searcher of hearts and reins is is that deeds of justice should be done justly, that deeds God.” of fortitude should be done bravely, and in like manner as Accordingly, therefore, we must say that the mode of to the other virtues. But it is commanded (Dt. 26:20) that virtue is in some sort regarded both by human and by Di- “thou shalt follow justly after that which is just.” There- vine law; in some respect it is regarded by the Divine, but fore the mode of virtue falls under the precept. not by the human law; and in another way, it is regarded Objection 2. Further, that which belongs to the inten- neither by the human nor by the Divine law. Now the tion of the lawgiver comes chiefly under the precept. But mode of virtue consists in three things, as the Philosopher the intention of the lawgiver is directed chiefly to make states in Ethic. ii. The first is that man should act “know- men virtuous, as stated in Ethic. ii: and it belongs to a vir- ingly”: and this is subject to the judgment of both Divine tuous man to act virtuously. Therefore the mode of virtue and human law; because what a man does in ignorance, falls under the precept. he does accidentally. Hence according to both human and Objection 3. Further, the mode of virtue seems to Divine law, certain things are judged in respect of igno- consist properly in working willingly and with pleasure. rance to be punishable or pardonable. But this falls under a precept of the Divine law, for it is The second point is that a man should act “deliber- written (Ps. 99:2): “Serve ye the Lord with gladness”; ately,” i.e. “from choice, choosing that particular action and (2 Cor. 9:7): “Not with sadness or necessity: for for its own sake”; wherein a twofold internal movement is God loveth a cheerful giver”; whereupon the gloss says: implied, of volition and of intention, about which we have “Whatever ye do, do gladly; and then you will do it well; spoken above (Qq. 8, 12): and concerning these two, Di- whereas if you do it sorrowfully, it is done in thee, not by vine law alone, and not human law, is competent to judge. thee.” Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept For human law does not punish the man who wishes to of the law. slay, and slays not: whereas the Divine law does, accord- On the contrary, No man can act as a virtuous man ing to Mat. 5:22: “Whosoever is angry with his brother, acts unless he has the habit of virtue, as the Philosopher shall be in danger of the judgment.” explains (Ethic. ii, 4; v, 8). Now whoever transgresses The third point is that he should “act from a firm and a precept of the law, deserves to be punished. Hence it immovable principle”: which firmness belongs properly would follow that a man who has not the habit of virtue, to a habit, and implies that the action proceeds from a would deserve to be punished, whatever he does. But rooted habit. In this respect, the mode of virtue does not this is contrary to the intention of the law, which aims at fall under the precept either of Divine or of human law, leading man to virtue, by habituating him to good works. since neither by man nor by God is he punished as break- Therefore the mode of virtue does not fall under the pre- ing the law, who gives due honor to his parents and yet cept. has not the habit of filial piety. I answer that, As stated above (q. 90, a. 3, ad 2), Reply to Objection 1. The mode of doing acts of jus- a precept of law has compulsory power. Hence that on tice, which falls under the precept, is that they be done in which the compulsion of the law is brought to bear, falls accordance with right; but not that they be done from the directly under the precept of the law. Now the law com- habit of justice. pels through fear of punishment, as stated in Ethic. x, 9, Reply to Objection 2. The intention of the lawgiver because that properly falls under the precept of the law, is twofold. His aim, in the first place, is to lead men to for which the penalty of the law is inflicted. But Divine something by the precepts of the law: and this is virtue. law and human law are differently situated as to the ap- Secondly, his intention is brought to bear on the matter pointment of penalties; since the penalty of the law is in- itself of the precept: and this is something leading or dis- flicted only for those things which come under the judg- posing to virtue, viz. an act of virtue. For the end of the ment of the lawgiver; for the law punishes in accordance precept and the matter of the precept are not the same: just with the verdict given. Now man, the framer of human as neither in other things is the end the same as that which law, is competent to judge only of outward acts; because conduces to the end. “man seeth those things that appear,” according to 1 Kings Reply to Objection 3. That works of virtue should be 16:7: while God alone, the framer of the Divine law, is done without sadness, falls under the precept of the Di- 1076 vine law; for whoever works with sadness works unwill-der the precept, in so far as pleasure ensues from a habit; ingly. But to work with pleasure, i.e. joyfully or cheer- for “pleasure taken in a work proves the existence of a fully, in one respect falls under the precept, viz. in so habit,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. For an act may give plea- far as pleasure ensues from the love of God and one’s sure either on account of its end, or through its proceeding neighbor (which love falls under the precept), and love from a becoming habit. causes pleasure: and in another respect does not fall un- Whether the mode of charity falls under the precept of the Divine law? Ia IIae q. 100 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that the mode of charity Both these opinions are true up to a certain point. Be- falls under the precept of the Divine law. For it is writ- cause the act of charity can be considered in two ways. ten (Mat. 19:17): “If thou wilt enter into life, keep the First, as an act by itself: and thus it falls under the precept commandments”: whence it seems to follow that the ob-of the law which specially prescribes it, viz. “Thou shalt servance of the commandments suffices for entrance into love the Lord thy God,” and “Thou shalt love thy neigh- life. But good works do not suffice for entrance into life, bor.” In this sense, the first opinion is true. Because it is except they be done from charity: for it is written (1 Cor. not impossible to observe this precept which regards the 13:3): “If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor, act of charity; since man can dispose himself to possess and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, and when he possesses it, he can use it. Secondly, charity, it profiteth me nothing.” Therefore the mode of the act of charity can be considered as being the mode of charity is included in the commandment. the acts of the other virtues, i.e. inasmuch as the acts of Objection 2. Further, the mode of charity consists the other virtues are ordained to charity, which is “the end properly speaking in doing all things for God. But this of the commandment,” as stated in 1 Tim. i, 5: for it has falls under the precept; for the Apostle says (1 Cor. been said above (q. 12, a. 4) that the intention of the end is 10:31): “Do all to the glory of God.” Therefore the mode a formal mode of the act ordained to that end. In this sense of charity falls under the precept. the second opinion is true in saying that the mode of char- Objection 3. Further, if the mode of charity does not ity does not fall under the precept, that is to say that this fall under the precept, it follows that one can fulfil the pre- commandment, “Honor thy father,” does not mean that a cepts of the law without having charity. Now what can be man must honor his father from charity, but merely that he done without charity can be done without grace, which must honor him. Wherefore he that honors his father, yet is always united to charity. Therefore one can fulfil the has not charity, does not break this precept: although he precepts of the law without grace. But this is the error does break the precept concerning the act of charity, for of Pelagius, as Augustine declares (De Haeres. lxxxviii). which reason he deserves to be punished. Therefore the mode of charity is included in the com- Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord did not say, “If thou mandment. wilt enter into life, keep one commandment”; but “keep” On the contrary, Whoever breaks a commandment all “the commandments”: among which is included the sins mortally. If therefore the mode of charity falls under commandment concerning the love of God and our neigh- the precept, it follows that whoever acts otherwise than bor. from charity sins mortally. But whoever has not char- Reply to Objection 2. The precept of charity con- ity, acts otherwise than from charity. Therefore it follows tains the injunction that God should be loved from our that whoever has not charity, sins mortally in whatever he whole heart, which means that all things would be referred does, however good this may be in itself: which is absurd. to God. Consequently man cannot fulfil the precept of I answer that, Opinions have been contrary on this charity, unless he also refer all things to God. Wherefore question. For some have said absolutely that the mode of he that honors his father and mother, is bound to honor charity comes under the precept; and yet that it is possible them from charity, not in virtue of the precept, “Honor for one not having charity to fulfil this precept: because thy father and mother,” but in virtue of the precept, “Thou he can dispose himself to receive charity from God. Nor shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart.” And (say they) does it follow that a man not having charity sins since these are two affirmative precepts, not binding for all mortally whenever he does something good of its kind: times, they can be binding, each one at a different time: so because it is an affirmative precept that binds one to act that it may happen that a man fulfils the precept of honor- from charity, and is binding not for all time, but only for ing his father and mother, without at the same time break- such time as one is in a state of charity. On the other hand, ing the precept concerning the omission of the mode of some have said that the mode of charity is altogether out- charity. side the precept. Reply to Objection 3. Man cannot fulfil all the pre- 1077 cepts of the law, unless he fulfil the precept of charity, not possible, as Pelagius maintained, for man to fulfil the which is impossible without charity. Consequently it is law without grace. Whether it is right to distinguish other moral precepts of the law besides the deca-Ia IIae q. 100 a. 11 logue? Objection 1. It would seem that it is wrong to distin- stances, happens to be led astray concerning them: these guish other moral precepts of the law besides the deca- are the precepts of the decalogue. Again, there are some logue. Because, as Our Lord declared (Mat. 22:40), precepts the reason of which is not so evident to everyone, “on these two commandments” of charity “dependeth the but only the wise; these are moral precepts added to the whole law and the prophets.” But these two command- decalogue, and given to the people by God through Moses ments are explained by the ten commandments of the and Aaron. decalogue. Therefore there is no need for other moral pre- But since the things that are evident are the principles cepts. whereby we know those that are not evident, these other Objection 2. Further, the moral precepts are distinct moral precepts added to the decalogue are reducible to the from the judicial and ceremonial precepts, as stated above precepts of the decalogue, as so many corollaries. Thus (q. 99, Aa. 3,4). But the determinations of the general the first commandment of the decalogue forbids the wor- moral precepts belong to the judicial and ceremonial pre- ship of strange gods: and to this are added other precepts cepts: and the general moral precepts are contained in the forbidding things relating to worship of idols: thus it is decalogue, or are even presupposed to the decalogue, as written (Dt. 18:10,11): “Neither let there be found among stated above (a. 3). Therefore it was unsuitable to lay you anyone that shall expiate his son or daughter, making down other moral precepts besides the decalogue. them to pass through the fire:. . . neither let there by any Objection 3. Further, the moral precepts are about the wizard nor charmer, nor anyone that consulteth pythonic acts of all the virtues, as stated above (a. 2). Therefore, as spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the truth from the Law contains, besides the decalogue, moral precepts the dead.” The second commandment forbids perjury. To pertaining to religion, liberality, mercy, and chastity; so this is added the prohibition of blasphemy (Lev. 24:15, there should have been added some precepts pertaining to seqq) and the prohibition of false doctrine (Dt. 13). To the other virtues, for instance, fortitude, sobriety, and so the third commandment are added all the ceremonial pre- forth. And yet such is not the case. It is therefore un- cepts. To the fourth commandment prescribing the honor becoming to distinguish other moral precepts in the Law due to parents, is added the precept about honoring the besides those of the decalogue. aged, according to Lev. 19:32: “Rise up before the hoary On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:8): “The law head, and honor the person of the aged man”; and likewise of the Lord is unspotted, converting souls.” But man is all the precepts prescribing the reverence to be observed preserved from the stain of sin, and his soul is converted towards our betters, or kindliness towards our equals or in- to God by other moral precepts besides those of the deca- feriors. To the fifth commandment, which forbids murder, logue. Therefore it was right for the Law to include other is added the prohibition of hatred and of any kind of vio- moral precepts. lence inflicted on our neighbor, according to Lev. 19:16: I answer that, As is evident from what has been stated “Thou shalt not stand against the blood of thy neigh- (q. 99, Aa. 3,4), the judicial and ceremonial precepts de- bor”: likewise the prohibition against hating one’s brother rive their force from their institution alone: since before (Lev. 19:17): “Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy they were instituted, it seemed of no consequence whether heart.” To the sixth commandment which forbids adul- things were done in this or that way. But the moral pre- tery, is added the prohibition about whoredom, according cepts derive their efficacy from the very dictate of natural to Dt. 23:17: “There shall be no whore among the daugh- reason, even if they were never included in the Law. Now ters of Israel, nor whoremonger among the sons of Israel”; of these there are three grades: for some are most cer- and the prohibition against unnatural sins, according to tain, and so evident as to need no promulgation; such as Lev. 28:22,23: “Thou shalt not lie with mankind. . . thou the commandments of the love of God and our neighbor, shalt not copulate with any beast.” To the seventh com- and others like these, as stated above (a. 3), which are, mandment which prohibits theft, is added the precept for- as it were, the ends of the commandments; wherefore no bidding usury, according to Dt. 23:19: “Thou shalt not man can have an erroneous judgment about them. Some lend to thy brother money to usury”; and the prohibition precepts are more detailed, the reason of which even an against fraud, according to Dt. 25:13: “Thou shalt not uneducated man can easily grasp; and yet they need to have divers weights in thy bag”; and universally all prohi- be promulgated, because human judgment, in a few in- bitions relating to peculations and larceny. To the eighth 1078 commandment, forbidding false testimony, is added the precepts. prohibition against false judgment, according to Ex. 23:2: Reply to Objection 3. The precepts of a law are or- “Neither shalt thou yield in judgment, to the opinion of dained for the common good, as stated above (q. 90, a. 2). the most part, to stray from the truth”; and the prohibition And since those virtues which direct our conduct towards against lying (Ex. 23:7): “Thou shalt fly lying,” and the others pertain directly to the common good, as also does prohibition against detraction, according to Lev. 19:16: the virtue of chastity, in so far as the generative act con- “Thou shalt not be a detractor, nor a whisperer among the duces to the common good of the species; hence precepts people.” To the other two commandments no further pre- bearing directly on these virtues are given, both in the cepts are added, because thereby are forbidden all kinds decalogue and in addition thereto. As to the act of for- of evil desires. titude there are the order to be given by the commanders Reply to Objection 1. The precepts of the decalogue in the war, which is undertaken for the common good: as are ordained to the love of God and our neighbor as per- is clear from Dt. 20:3, where the priest is commanded (to taining evidently to our duty towards them; but the other speak thus): “Be not afraid, do not give back.” In like precepts are so ordained as pertaining thereto less evi- manner the prohibition of acts of gluttony is left to pa- dently. ternal admonition, since it is contrary to the good of the Reply to Objection 2. It is in virtue of their institution household; hence it is said (Dt. 21:20) in the person of that the ceremonial and judicial precepts “are determina- parents: “He slighteth hearing our admonitions, he giveth tions of the precepts of the decalogue,” not by reason of himself to revelling, and to debauchery and banquetings.” a natural instinct, as in the case of the superadded moral Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man? Ia IIae q. 100 a. 12 Objection 1. It would seem that the moral precepts xxii, 24), “even the life of that people foretold and fore- of the Old Law justified man. Because the Apostle says shadowed Christ.” (Rom. 2:13): “For not the hearers of the Law are justified But if we speak of justification properly so called, then before God, but the doers of the Law shall be justified.” we must notice that it can be considered as in the habit But the doers of the Law are those who fulfil the precepts or as in the act: so that accordingly justification may be of the Law. Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the taken in two ways. First, according as man is made just, Law was a cause of justification. by becoming possessed of the habit of justice: secondly, Objection 2. Further, it is written (Lev. 18:5): “Keep according as he does works of justice, so that in this sense My laws and My judgments, which if a man do, he shall justification is nothing else than the execution of justice. live in them.” But the spiritual life of man is through jus- Now justice, like the other virtues, may denote either the tice. Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law acquired or the infused virtue, as is clear from what has was a cause of justification. been stated (q. 63, a. 4). The acquired virtue is caused Objection 3. Further, the Divine law is more effica- by works; but the infused virtue is caused by God Him- cious than human law. But human law justifies man; since self through His grace. The latter is true justice, of which there is a kind of justice consisting in fulfilling the pre- we are speaking now, and in this respect of which a man cepts of law. Therefore the precepts of the Law justified is said to be just before God, according to Rom. 4:2: man. “If Abraham were justified by works, he hath whereof to On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6): “The glory, but not before God.” Hence this justice could not letter killeth”: which, according to Augustine (De Spir. et be caused by moral precepts, which are about human ac- Lit. xiv), refers even to the moral precepts. Therefore the tions: wherefore the moral precepts could not justify man moral precepts did not cause justice. by causing justice. I answer that, Just as “healthy” is said properly and If, on the other hand, by justification we understand first of that which is possessed of health, and secondarily the execution of justice, thus all the precepts of the Law of that which is a sign or a safeguard of health; so jus- justified man, but in various ways. Because the ceremo- tification means first and properly the causing of justice; nial precepts taken as a whole contained something just in while secondarily and improperly, as it were, it may de- itself, in so far as they aimed at offering worship to God; note a sign of justice or a disposition thereto. If justice be whereas taken individually they contained that which is taken in the last two ways, it is evident that it was con- just, not in itself, but by being a determination of the Di- ferred by the precepts of the Law; in so far, to wit, as they vine law. Hence it is said of these precepts that they did disposed men to the justifying grace of Christ, which they not justify man save through the devotion and obedience also signified, because as Augustine says (Contra Faust. of those who complied with them. On the other hand the 1079 moral and judicial precepts, either in general or also in Reply to Objection 2. The man who fulfilled the pre-particular, contained that which is just in itself: but the cepts of the Law is said to live in them, because he did moral precepts contained that which is just in itself ac- not incur the penalty of death, which the Law inflicted on cording to that “general justice” which is “every virtue” its transgressors: in this sense the Apostle quotes this pas- according to Ethic. v, 1: whereas the judicial precepts be- sage (Gal. 3:12). longed to “special justice,” which is about contracts con- Reply to Objection 3. The precepts of human law nected with the human mode of life, between one man and justify man by acquired justice: it is not about this that another. we are inquiring now, but only about that justice which is Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle takes justification before God. for the execution of justice. 1080 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 101 Of the Ceremonial Precepts in Themselves (In Four Articles) We must now consider the ceremonial precepts: and first we must consider them in themselves; secondly, their cause; thirdly, their duration. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) The nature of the ceremonial precepts; (2) Whether they are figurative? (3) Whether there should have been many of them? (4) Of their various kinds. Whether the nature of the ceremonial precepts consists in their pertaining to the wor-Ia IIae q. 101 a. 1 ship of God? Objection 1. It would seem that the nature of the cer- On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 18:19,20): emonial precepts does not consist in their pertaining to the “Be thou to the people in those things that pertain to worship of God. Because, in the Old Law, the Jews were God. . . and. . . shew the people the ceremonies and the given certain precepts about abstinence from food (Lev. manner of worshipping.” 11); and about refraining from certain kinds of clothes, I answer that, As stated above (q. 99, a. 4), the cere- e.g. (Lev. 19:19): “Thou shalt not wear a garment that is monial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts woven of two sorts”; and again (Num. 15:38): “To make whereby man is directed to God, just as the judicial pre- to themselves fringes in the corners of their garments.” cepts are determinations of the moral precepts whereby he But these are not moral precepts; since they do not remain is directed to his neighbor. Now man is directed to God in the New Law. Nor are they judicial precepts; since they by the worship due to Him. Wherefore those precepts are do not pertain to the pronouncing of judgment between properly called ceremonial, which pertain to the Divine man and man. Therefore they are ceremonial precepts. worship. The reason for their being so called was given Yet they seem in no way to pertain to the worship of God. above (q. 99, a. 3), when we established the distinction Therefore the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not between the ceremonial and the other precepts. consist in their pertaining to Divine worship. Reply to Objection 1. The Divine worship includes Objection 2. Further, some state that the ceremonial not only sacrifices and the like, which seem to be directed precepts are those which pertain to solemnities; as though to God immediately, but also those things whereby His they were so called from the “cerei” [candles] which are worshippers are duly prepared to worship Him: thus too lit up on those occasions. But many other things besides in other matters, whatever is preparatory to the end comes solemnities pertain to the worship of God. Therefore it under the science whose object is the end. Accordingly does not seem that the ceremonial precepts are so called those precepts of the Law which regard the clothing and from their pertaining to the Divine worship. food of God’s worshippers, and other such matters, per- Objection 3. Further, some say that the ceremonial tain to a certain preparation of the ministers, with the view precepts are patterns, i.e. rules, of salvation: because the of fitting them for the Divine worship: just as those who Greek chaire is the same as the Latin “salve.” But all the administer to a king make use of certain special obser-precepts of the Law are rules of salvation, and not only vances. Consequently such are contained under the cere- those that pertain to the worship of God. Therefore not monial precepts. only those precepts which pertain to Divine worship are Reply to Objection 2. The alleged explanation of the called ceremonial. name does not seem very probable: especially as the Law Objection 4. Further, Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Per- does not contain many instances of the lighting of candles plex. iii) that the ceremonial precepts are those for which in solemnities; since, even the lamps of the Candlestick there is no evident reason. But there is evident reason for were furnished with “oil of olives,” as stated in Lev. 24:2. many things pertaining to the worship of God; such as Nevertheless we may say that all things pertaining to the the observance of the Sabbath, the feasts of the Passover Divine worship were more carefully observed on solemn and of the Tabernacles, and many other things, the reason festivals: so that all ceremonial precepts may be included for which is set down in the Law. Therefore the ceremo- under the observance of solemnities. nial precepts are not those which pertain to the worship of Reply to Objection 3. Neither does this explanation God. of the name appear to be very much to the point, since 1081 the word “ceremony” is not Greek but Latin. We may say, that they are called ceremonial precisely because there is however, that, since man’s salvation is from God, those no evident reason for them; this is a kind of consequence. precepts above all seem to be rules of salvation, which For, since the precepts referring to the Divine worship direct man to God: and accordingly those which refer to must needs be figurative, as we shall state further on (a. 2), Divine worship are called ceremonial precepts. the consequence is that the reason for them is not so very Reply to Objection 4. This explanation of the cere- evident. monial precepts has a certain amount of probability: not Whether the ceremonial precepts are figurative? Ia IIae q. 101 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the ceremonial pre- flesh have rejoiced in the living God.” And as the body is cepts are not figurative. For it is the duty of every teacher ordained to God through the soul, so the outward worship to express himself in such a way as to be easily under- is ordained to the internal worship. Now interior worship stood, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. iv, 4,10) consists in the soul being united to God by the intellect and this seems very necessary in the framing of a law: and affections. Wherefore according to the various ways because precepts of law are proposed to the populace; for in which the intellect and affections of the man who wor- which reason a law should be manifest, as Isidore declares ships God are rightly united to God, his external actions (Etym. v, 21). If therefore the precepts of the Law were are applied in various ways to the Divine worship. given as figures of something, it seems unbecoming that For in the state of future bliss, the human intellect will Moses should have delivered these precepts without ex- gaze on the Divine Truth in Itself. Wherefore the external plaining what they signified. worship will not consist in anything figurative, but solely Objection 2. Further, whatever is done for the wor- in the praise of God, proceeding from the inward knowl- ship of God, should be entirely free from unfittingness. edge and affection, according to Is. 51:3: “Joy and glad- But the performance of actions in representation of oth- ness shall be found therein, thanksgiving and the voice of ers, seems to savor of the theatre or of the drama: because praise.” formerly the actions performed in theatres were done to But in the present state of life, we are unable to gaze represent the actions of others. Therefore it seems that on the Divine Truth in Itself, and we need the ray of Di- such things should not be done for the worship of God. vine light to shine upon us under the form of certain sensi- But the ceremonial precepts are ordained to the Divine ble figures, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. i); in various worship, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore they should not ways, however, according to the various states of human be figurative. knowledge. For under the Old Law, neither was the Di- Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion iii, vine Truth manifest in Itself, nor was the way leading to iv) that “God is worshipped chiefly by faith, hope, and that manifestation as yet opened out, as the Apostle de- charity.” But the precepts of faith, hope, and charity are clares (Heb. 9:8). Hence the external worship of the Old not figurative. Therefore the ceremonial precepts should Law needed to be figurative not only of the future truth to not be figurative. be manifested in our heavenly country, but also of Christ, Objection 4. Further, Our Lord said (Jn. 4:24): “God Who is the way leading to that heavenly manifestation. is a spirit, and they that adore Him, must adore Him in But under the New Law this way is already revealed: and spirit and in truth.” But a figure is not the very truth: therefore it needs no longer to be foreshadowed as some- in fact one is condivided with the other. Therefore the thing future, but to be brought to our minds as something ceremonial precepts, which refer to the Divine worship, past or present: and the truth of the glory to come, which should not be figurative. is not yet revealed, alone needs to be foreshadowed. This On the contrary, The Apostle says (Col. 2:16,17): is what the Apostle says (Heb. 11:1): “The Law has “Let no man. . . judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect [Vulg.: ‘having’] a shadow of the good things to come, of a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbaths, not the very image of the things”: for a shadow is less which are a shadow of things to come.” than an image; so that the image belongs to the New Law, I answer that, As stated above (a. 1; q. 99, Aa. 3,4), but the shadow to the Old. the ceremonial precepts are those which refer to the wor- Reply to Objection 1. The things of God are not to ship of God. Now the Divine worship is twofold: internal, be revealed to man except in proportion to his capacity: and external. For since man is composed of soul and body, else he would be in danger of downfall, were he to de- each of these should be applied to the worship of God; the spise what he cannot grasp. Hence it was more beneficial soul by an interior worship; the body by an outward wor- that the Divine mysteries should be revealed to uncultured ship: hence it is written (Ps. 83:3): “My heart and my people under a veil of figures, that thus they might know 1082 them at least implicitly by using those figures to the honor sensible figures. of God. Reply to Objection 3. Augustine is speaking there Reply to Objection 2. Just as human reason fails to of internal worship; to which, however, external worship grasp poetical expressions on account of their being lack- should be ordained, as stated above. ing in truth, so does it fail to grasp Divine things perfectly, The same answer applies to the Fourth Objection: be-on account of the sublimity of the truth they contain: and cause men were taught by Him to practice more perfectly therefore in both cases there is need of signs by means of the spiritual worship of God. Whether there should have been man ceremonial precepts? Ia IIae q. 101 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that there should not have And since men served idols in many ways, it was neces- been many ceremonial precepts. For those things which sary on the other hand to devise many means of repressing conduce to an end should be proportionate to that end. every single one: and again, to lay many obligations on But the ceremonial precepts, as stated above (Aa. 1,2), such like men, in order that being burdened, as it were, by are ordained to the worship of God, and to the foreshad- their duties to the Divine worship, they might have no time owing of Christ. Now “there is but one God, of Whom for the service of idols. As to those who were inclined to are all things. . . and one Lord Jesus Christ, by Whom are good, it was again necessary that there should be many all things” (1 Cor. 8:6). Therefore there should not have ceremonial precepts; both because thus their mind turned been many ceremonial precepts. to God in many ways, and more continually; and because Objection 2. Further, the great number of the ceremo- the mystery of Christ, which was foreshadowed by these nial precepts was an occasion of transgression, according ceremonial precepts, brought many boons to the world, to the words of Peter (Acts 15:10): “Why tempt you God, and afforded men many considerations, which needed to to put a yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which nei- be signified by various ceremonies. ther our fathers nor we have been able to bear?” Now Reply to Objection 1. When that which conduces the transgression of the Divine precepts is an obstacle to to an end is sufficient to conduce thereto, then one such man’s salvation. Since, therefore, every law should con- thing suffices for one end: thus one remedy, if it be effi- duce to man’s salvation, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 3), it cacious, suffices sometimes to restore men to health, and seems that the ceremonial precepts should not have been then the remedy needs not to be repeated. But when that given in great number. which conduces to an end is weak and imperfect, it needs Objection 3. Further, the ceremonial precepts referred to be multiplied: thus many remedies are given to a sick to the outward and bodily worship of God, as stated above man, when one is not enough to heal him. Now the cer- (a. 2). But the Law should have lessened this bodily wor- emonies of the Old Law were weak and imperfect, both ship: since it directed men to Christ, Who taught them to for representing the mystery of Christ, on account of its worship God “in spirit and in truth,” as stated in Jn. 4:23. surpassing excellence; and for subjugating men’s minds Therefore there should not have been many ceremonial to God. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18,19): “There precepts. is a setting aside of the former commandment because On the contrary, (Osee 8:12): “I shall write to them of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof, for the law [Vulg.: ‘him’] My manifold laws”; and (Job 11:6): “That brought nothing to perfection.” Consequently these cere- He might show thee the secrets of His wisdom, and that monies needed to be in great number. His Law is manifold.” Reply to Objection 2. A wise lawgiver should suf- I answer that, As stated above (q. 96, a. 1), every law fer lesser transgressions, that the greater may be avoided. is given to a people. Now a people contains two kinds of And therefore, in order to avoid the sin of idolatry, and the men: some, prone to evil, who have to be coerced by the pride which would arise in the hearts of the Jews, were precepts of the law, as stated above (q. 95, a. 1); some, they to fulfil all the precepts of the Law, the fact that they inclined to good, either from nature or from custom, or would in consequence find many occasions of disobedi- rather from grace; and the like have to be taught and im- ence did not prevent God from giving them many cere- proved by means of the precepts of the law. Accordingly, monial precepts. with regard to both kinds of the law. Accordingly, with Reply to Objection 3. The Old Law lessened bodily regard to both kinds of men it was expedient that the Old worship in many ways. Thus it forbade sacrifices to be Law should contain many ceremonial precepts. For in that offered in every place and by any person. Many such like people there were many prone to idolatry; wherefore it things did it enact for the lessening of bodily worship; as was necessary to recall them by means of ceremonial pre- Rabbi Moses, the Egyptian testifies (Doct. Perplex. iii). cepts from the worship of idols to the worship of God. Nevertheless it behooved not to attenuate the bodily wor- 1083 ship of God so much as to allow men to fall away into the worship of idols. Whether the ceremonies of the Old Law are suitably divided into sacrifices, sacred Ia IIae q. 101 a. 4 things, sacraments, and observances? Objection 1. It would seem that the ceremonies of nial precepts are ordained to the Divine worship. Now in the Old Law are unsuitably divided into “sacrifices, sacred this worship we may consider the worship itself, the wor- things, sacraments, and observances.” For the ceremonies shippers, and the instruments of worship. The worship of the Old Law foreshadowed Christ. But this was done consists specially in “sacrifices,” which are offered up in only by the sacrifices, which foreshadowed the sacrifice in honor of God. The instruments of worship refer to the which Christ “delivered Himself an oblation and a sacri- “sacred things,” such as the tabernacle, the vessels and so fice to God” (Eph. 5:2). Therefore none but the sacrifices forth. With regard to the worshippers two points may be were ceremonies. considered. The first point is their preparation for Divine Objection 2. Further, the Old Law was ordained to worship, which is effected by a sort of consecration either the New. But in the New Law the sacrifice is the Sacra- of the people or of the ministers; and to this the “sacra- ment of the Altar. Therefore in the Old Law there should ments” refer. The second point is their particular mode be no distinction between “sacrifices” and “sacraments.” of life, whereby they are distinguished from those who do Objection 3. Further, a “sacred thing” is something not worship God: and to this pertain the “observances,” dedicated to God: in which sense the tabernacle and its for instance, in matters of food, clothing, and so forth. vessels were said to be consecrated. But all the ceremonial Reply to Objection 1. It was necessary for the sacri- precepts were ordained to the worship of God, as stated fices to be offered both in some certain place and by some above (a. 1). Therefore all ceremonies were sacred things. certain men: and all this pertained to the worship of God. Therefore “sacred things” should not be taken as a part of Wherefore just as their sacrifices signified Christ the vic- the ceremonies. tim, so too their sacraments and sacred things of the New Objection 4. Further, “observances” are so called Law; while their observances foreshadowed the mode of from having to be observed. But all the precepts of the life of the people under the New Law: all of which things Law had to be observed: for it is written (Dt. 8:11): pertain to Christ. “Observe [Douay: ‘Take heed’] and beware lest at any Reply to Objection 2. The sacrifice of the New Law, time thou forget the Lord thy God, and neglect His com- viz. the Eucharist, contains Christ Himself, the Author mandments and judgments and ceremonies.” Therefore of our Sanctification: for He sanctified “the people by the “observances” should not be considered as a part of His own blood” (Heb. 13:12). Hence this Sacrifice is the ceremonies. also a sacrament. But the sacrifices of the Old Law did Objection 5. Further, the solemn festivals are reck- not contain Christ, but foreshadowed Him; hence they oned as part of the ceremonial: since they were a shadow are not called sacraments. In order to signify this there of things to come (Col. 2:16,17): and the same may be were certain sacraments apart from the sacrifices of the said of the oblations and gifts, as appears from the words Old Law, which sacraments were figures of the sanctifica- of the Apostle (Heb. 9:9): and yet these do not seem to be tion to come. Nevertheless to certain consecrations certain inclined in any of those mentioned above. Therefore the sacrifices were united. above division of ceremonies is unsuitable. Reply to Objection 3. The sacrifices and sacraments On the contrary, In the Old Law each of the above were of course sacred things. But certain things were sa- is called a ceremony. For the sacrifices are called cer- cred, through being dedicated to the Divine worship, and emonies (Num. 15:24): “They shall offer a calf. . . and yet were not sacrifices or sacraments: wherefore they re- the sacrifices and libations thereof, as the ceremonies re- tained the common designation of sacred things. quire.” Of the sacrament of Order it is written (Lev. Reply to Objection 4. Those things which pertained 7:35): “This is the anointing of Aaron and his sons in to the mode of life of the people who worshipped God, re- the ceremonies.” Of sacred things also it is written (Ex. tained the common designation of observances, in so far 38:21): “These are the instruments of the tabernacle of as they fell short of the above. For they were not called the testimony. . . in the ceremonies of the Levites.” And sacred things, because they had no immediate connection again of the observances it is written (3 Kings 9:6): “If with the worship of God, such as the tabernacle and its you. . . shall turn away from following Me, and will not vessels had. But by a sort of consequence they were mat- observe [Douay: ‘keep’] My. . . ceremonies which I have ters of ceremony, in so far as they affected the fitness of set before you.” the people who worshipped God. I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,2), the ceremo- Reply to Objection 5. Just as the sacrifices were of- 1084 fered in a fixed place, so were they offered at fixed times: tle says (Heb. 5:1): “Every high-priest taken from among for which reason the solemn festivals seem to be reck- men, is ordained for men in things that appertain to God, oned among the sacred things. The oblations and gifts that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices.” are counted together with the sacrifices; hence the Apos- 1085 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 102 Of the Causes of the Ceremonial Precepts (In Six Articles) We must now consider the causes of the ceremonial precepts: under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts? (2) Whether the cause of the ceremonial precepts was literal or figurative? (3) The causes of the sacrifices; (4) The causes of the sacrifices; (5) The causes of the sacred things; (6) The causes of the observances. Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts? Ia IIae q. 102 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there was no cause der in matters of action: since those things that happen for the ceremonial precepts. Because on Eph. 2:15, “Mak- by chance outside the intention of the end, or which are ing void the law of the commandments,” the gloss says, not done seriously but for fun, are said to be inordinate. (i.e.) “making void the Old Law as to the carnal obser- Secondly, that which is done in view of the end should vances, by substituting decrees, i.e. evangelical precepts, be proportionate to the end. From this it follows that the which are based on reason.” But if the observances of the reason for whatever conduces to the end is taken from the Old Law were based on reason, it would have been use- end: thus the reason for the disposition of a saw is taken less to void them by the reasonable decrees of the New from cutting, which is its end, as stated in Phys. ii, 9. Law. Therefore there was no reason for the ceremonial Now it is evident that the ceremonial precepts, like all the observances of the Old Law. other precepts of the Law, were institutions of Divine wis- Objection 2. Further, the Old Law succeeded the law dom: hence it is written (Dt. 4:6): “This is your wisdom of nature. But in the law of nature there was a precept and understanding in the sight of nations.” Consequently for which there was no reason save that man’s obedience we must needs say that the ceremonial precepts were or- might be tested; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 6,13), dained to a certain end, wherefrom their reasonable causes concerning the prohibition about the tree of life. There- can be gathered. fore in the Old Law there should have been some precepts Reply to Objection 1. It may be said there was no for the purpose of testing man’s obedience, having no rea- reason for the observances of the Old Law, in the sense son in themselves. that there was no reason in the very nature of the thing Objection 3. Further, man’s works are called moral done: for instance that a garment should not be made of according as they proceed from reason. If therefore there wool and linen. But there could be a reason for them in is any reason for the ceremonial precepts, they would not relation to something else: namely, in so far as something differ from the moral precepts. It seems therefore that was signified or excluded thereby. On the other hand, the there was no cause for the ceremonial precepts: for the decrees of the New Law, which refer chiefly to faith and reason of a precept is taken from some cause. the love of God, are reasonable from the very nature of On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:9): “The the act. commandment of the Lord is lightsome, enlightening the Reply to Objection 2. The reason for the prohibition eyes.” But the ceremonial precepts are commandments of concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil was God. Therefore they are lightsome: and yet they would not that this tree was naturally evil: and yet this prohibi- not be so, if they had no reasonable cause. Therefore the tion was reasonable in its relation to something else, in as ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause. much as it signified something. And so also the ceremo- I answer that, Since, according to the Philosopher nial precepts of the Old Law were reasonable on account (Metaph. i, 2), it is the function of a “wise man to do of their relation to something else. everything in order,” those things which proceed from the Reply to Objection 3. The moral precepts in their Divine wisdom must needs be well ordered, as the Apostle very nature have reasonable causes: as for instance, “Thou states (Rom. 13:1). Now there are two conditions required shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal.” But the ceremonial for things to be well ordered. First, that they be ordained precepts have a reasonable cause in their relation to some- to their due end, which is the principle of the whole or- thing else, as stated above. 1086 Whether the ceremonial precepts have a literal cause or merely a figurative cause? Ia IIae q. 102 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the ceremonial pre- ceremonial precepts of the Old Law can be taken in two cepts have not a literal, but merely a figurative cause. For ways. First, in respect of the Divine worship which was to among the ceremonial precepts, the chief was circumci- be observed for that particular time: and these reasons are sion and the sacrifice of the paschal lamb. But neither of literal: whether they refer to the shunning of idolatry; or these had any but a figurative cause: because each was recall certain Divine benefits; or remind men of the Divine given as a sign. For it is written (Gn. 17:11): “You shall excellence; or point out the disposition of mind which was circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, that it may be a sign then required in those who worshipped God. Secondly, of the covenant between Me and you”: and of the celebra- their reasons can be gathered from the point of view of tion of the Passover it is written (Ex. 13:9): “It shall be their being ordained to foreshadow Christ: and thus their as a sign in thy hand, and as a memorial before thy eyes.” reasons are figurative and mystical: whether they be taken Therefore much more did the other ceremonial precepts from Christ Himself and the Church, which pertains to the have none but a figurative reason. allegorical sense; or to the morals of the Christian people, Objection 2. Further, an effect is proportionate to its which pertains to the moral sense; or to the state of fu- cause. But all the ceremonial precepts are figurative, as ture glory, in as much as we are brought thereto by Christ, stated above (q. 101, a. 2). Therefore they have no other which refers to the anagogical sense. than a figurative cause. Reply to Objection 1. Just as the use of metaphor- Objection 3. Further, if it be a matter of indifference ical expressions in Scripture belongs to the literal sense, whether a certain thing, considered in itself, be done in because the words are employed in order to convey that a particular way or not, it seems that it has not a literal particular meaning; so also the meaning of those legal cer- cause. Now there are certain points in the ceremonial pre- emonies which commemorated certain Divine benefits, on cepts, which appear to be a matter of indifference, as to account of which they were instituted, and of others sim- whether they be done in one way or in another: for in- ilar which belonged to that time, does not go beyond the stance, the number of animals to be offered, and other order of literal causes. Consequently when we assert that such particular circumstances. Therefore there is no lit- the cause of the celebration of the Passover was its signi- eral cause for the precepts of the Old Law. fication of the delivery from Egypt, or that circumcision On the contrary, Just as the ceremonial precepts fore- was a sign of God’s covenant with Abraham, we assign shadowed Christ, so did the stories of the Old Testament: the literal cause. for it is written (1 Cor. 10:11) that “all (these things) hap- Reply to Objection 2. This argument would avail if pened to them in figure.” Now in the stories of the Old the ceremonial precepts had been given merely as figures Testament, besides the mystical or figurative, there is the of things to come, and not for the purpose of worshipping literal sense. Therefore the ceremonial precepts had also God then and there. literal, besides their figurative causes. Reply to Objection 3. As we have stated when speak- I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the reason for ing of human laws (q. 96, Aa. 1 ,6), there is a reason for whatever conduces to an end must be taken from that end. them in the abstract, but not in regard to particular condi- Now the end of the ceremonial precepts was twofold: for tions, which depend on the judgment of those who frame they were ordained to the Divine worship, for that partic- them; so also many particular determinations in the cer- ular time, and to the foreshadowing of Christ; just as the emonies of the Old Law have no literal cause, but only a words of the prophets regarded the time being in such a figurative cause; whereas in the abstract they have a literal way as to be utterances figurative of the time to come, as cause. Jerome says on Osee 1:3. Accordingly the reasons for the Whether a suitable cause can be assigned for the ceremonies which pertained to sac-Ia IIae q. 102 a. 3 rifices? Objection 1. It would seem that no suitable cause Therefore such sacrifices were unfittingly offered to God. can be assigned for the ceremonies pertaining to sacri- Objection 2. Further, only three kinds of quadrupeds fices. For those things which were offered in sacrifice, were offered in sacrifice to God, viz. oxen, sheep and are those which are necessary for sustaining human life: goats; of birds, generally the turtledove and the dove; but such as certain animals and certain loaves. But God needs specially, in the cleansing of a leper, an offering was made no such sustenance; according to Ps. 49:13: “Shall I eat of sparrows. Now many other animals are more noble the flesh of bullocks? Or shall I drink the blood of goats?” than these. Since therefore whatever is best should be of- 1087 fered to God, it seems that not only of these three should Therefore it does not seem to be suitable that products of sacrifices have been offered to Him. the soil should be offered up in various ways; for some- Objection 3. Further, just as man has received from times an offering was made of ears of corn, sometimes of God the dominion over birds and beasts, so also has he flour, sometimes of bread, this being baked sometimes in received dominion over fishes. Consequently it was unfit- an oven, sometimes in a pan, sometimes on a gridiron. ting for fishes to be excluded from the divine sacrifices. Objection 13. Further, whatever things are service- Objection 4. Further, turtledoves and doves indiffer- able to us should be recognized as coming from God. It ently are commanded to be offered up. Since then the was therefore unbecoming that besides animals, nothing young of the dove are commanded to be offered, so also but bread, wine, oil, incense, and salt should be offered to should the young of the turtledove. God. Objection 5. Further, God is the Author of life, not Objection 14. Further, bodily sacrifices denote the in- only of men, but also of animals, as is clear from Gn. 1:20, ward sacrifice of the heart, whereby man offers his soul seqq. Now death is opposed to life. Therefore it was fit- to God. But in the inward sacrifice, the sweetness, which ting that living animals rather than slain animals should is denoted by honey, surpasses the pungency which salt be offered to God, especially as the Apostle admonishes represents; for it is written (Ecclus. 24:27): “My spirit us (Rom. 12:1), to present our bodies “a living sacrifice, is sweet above honey.” Therefore it was unbecoming that holy, pleasing unto God.” the use of honey, and of leaven which makes bread savory, Objection 6. Further, if none but slain animals were should be forbidden in a sacrifice; while the use was pre- offered in sacrifice to God, it seems that it mattered not scribed, of salt which is pungent, and of incense which has how they were slain. Therefore it was unfitting that the a bitter taste. Consequently it seems that things pertain- manner of immolation should be determined, especially ing to the ceremonies of the sacrifices have no reasonable as regards birds (Lev. 1:15, seqq.). cause. Objection 7. Further, every defect in an animal is a On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 1:13): “The priest step towards corruption and death. If therefore slain an- shall offer it all and burn it all upon the altar, for a holo- imals were offered to God, it was unreasonable to forbid caust, and most sweet savor to the Lord.” Now accord- the offering of an imperfect animal, e.g. a lame, or a blind, ing to Wis. 7:28, “God loveth none but him that dwelleth or otherwise defective animal. with wisdom”: whence it seems to follow that whatever is Objection 8. Further, those who offer victims to God acceptable to God is wisely done. Therefore these cere- should partake thereof, according to the words of the monies of the sacrifices were wisely done, as having rea- Apostle (1 Cor. 10:18): “Are not they that eat of the sacri- sonable causes. fices partakers of the altar?” It was therefore unbecoming I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), the ceremonies for the offerers to be denied certain parts of the victims, of the Old Law had a twofold cause, viz. a literal cause, namely, the blood, the fat, the breastbone and the right according as they were intended for Divine worship; and shoulder. a figurative or mystical cause, according as they were in- Objection 9. Further, just as holocausts were offered tended to foreshadow Christ: and on either hand the cer- up in honor of God, so also were the peace-offerings and emonies pertaining to the sacrifices can be assigned to a sin-offerings. But no female animals was offered up to fitting cause. God as a holocaust, although holocausts were offered of For, according as the ceremonies of the sacrifices were both quadrupeds and birds. Therefore it was inconsis- intended for the divine worship, the causes of the sacri- tent that female animals should be offered up in peace- fices can be taken in two ways. First, in so far as the sacri- offerings and sin-offerings, and that nevertheless birds fice represented the directing of the mind to God, to which should not be offered up in peace-offerings. the offerer of the sacrifice was stimulated. Now in order Objection 10. Further, all the peace-offerings seem to direct his mind to God aright, man must recognize that to be of one kind. Therefore it was unfitting to make whatever he has is from God as from its first principle, a distinction among them, so that it was forbidden to and direct it to God as its last end. This was denoted in eat the flesh of certain peace-offerings on the following the offerings and sacrifices, by the fact that man offered day, while it was allowed to eat the flesh of other peace- some of his own belongings in honor of God, as though offerings, as laid down in Lev. 7:15, seqq. in recognition of his having received them from God, ac- Objection 11. Further, all sins agree in turning us cording to the saying of David (1 Paral. xxix, 14): “All from God. Therefore, in order to reconcile us to God, things are Thine: and we have given Thee what we re- one kind of sacrifice should have been offered up for all ceived of Thy hand.” Wherefore in offering up sacrifices sins. man made protestation that God is the first principle of Objection 12. Further, all animals that were offered the creation of all things, and their last end, to which all up in sacrifice, were offered up in one way, viz. slain. things must be directed. And since, for the human mind to 1088 be directed to God aright, it must recognize no first author in sacrifice to their gods. Hence it is written (Ex. 8:26): of things other than God, nor place its end in any other; “We shall sacrifice the abominations of the Egyptians to for this reason it was forbidden in the Law to offer sac- the Lord our God.” For they worshipped the sheep; they rifice to any other but God, according to Ex. 22:20: “He reverenced the ram (because demons appeared under the that sacrificeth to gods, shall be put to death, save only to form thereof); while they employed oxen for agriculture, the Lord.” Wherefore another reasonable cause may be which was reckoned by them as something sacred. assigned to the ceremonies of the sacrifices, from the fact Secondly, this was suitable for the aforesaid right or- that thereby men were withdrawn from offering sacrifices dering of man’s mind to God: and in two ways. First, be- to idols. Hence too it is that the precepts about the sacri- cause it is chiefly by means of these animals that human fices were not given to the Jewish people until after they life is sustained: and moreover they are most clean, and had fallen into idolatry, by worshipping the molten calf: partake of a most clean food: whereas other animals are as though those sacrifices were instituted, that the people, either wild, and not deputed to ordinary use among men: being ready to offer sacrifices, might offer those sacrifices or, if they be tame, they have unclean food, as pigs and to God rather than to idols. Thus it is written (Jer. 7:22): geese: and nothing but what is clean should be offered to “I spake not to your fathers and I commanded them not, God. These birds especially were offered in sacrifice be- in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, cause there were plenty of them in the land of promise. concerning the matter of burnt-offerings and sacrifices.” Secondly, because the sacrificing of these animals repre- Now of all the gifts which God vouchsafed to mankind sented purity of heart. Because as the gloss says on Lev. after they had fallen away by sin, the chief is that He 1, “We offer a calf, when we overcome the pride of the gave His Son; wherefore it is written (Jn. 3:16): “God flesh; a lamb, when we restrain our unreasonable motions; so loved the world, as to give His only-begotten Son; that a goat, when we conquer wantonness; a turtledove, when whosoever believeth in Him, may not perish, but may have we keep chaste; unleavened bread, when we feast on the life everlasting.” Consequently the chief sacrifice is that unleavened bread of sincerity.” And it is evident that the whereby Christ Himself “delivered Himself. . . to God for dove denotes charity and simplicity of heart. an odor of sweetness” (Eph. 5:2). And for this reason Thirdly, it was fitting that these animals should be of- all the other sacrifices of the Old Law were offered up fered, that they might foreshadow Christ. Because, as the in order to foreshadow this one individual and paramount gloss observes, “Christ is offered in the calf, to denote sacrifice—the imperfect forecasting the perfect. Hence the strength of the cross; in the lamb, to signify His inno- the Apostle says (Heb. 10:11) that the priest of the Old cence; in the ram, to foreshadow His headship; and in the Law “often” offered “the same sacrifices, which can never goat, to signify the likeness of ‘sinful flesh’∗. The turtle- take away sins: but” Christ offered “one sacrifice for sins, dove and dove denoted the union of the two natures”; or for ever.” And since the reason of the figure is taken from else the turtledove signified chastity; while the dove was that which the figure represents, therefore the reasons of a figure of charity. “The wheat-flour foreshadowed the the figurative sacrifices of the Old Law should be taken sprinkling of believers with the water of Baptism.” from the true sacrifice of Christ. Reply to Objection 3. Fish through living in water Reply to Objection 1. God did not wish these sacri- are further removed from man than other animals, which, fices to be offered to Him on account of the things them- like man, live in the air. Again, fish die as soon as they are selves that were offered, as though He stood in need of taken out of water; hence they could not be offered in the them: wherefore it is written (Is. 1:11): “I desire not holo- temple like other animals. causts of rams, and fat of fatlings, and blood of calves and Reply to Objection 4. Among turtledoves the older lambs and buckgoats.” But, as stated above, He wished ones are better than the young; while with doves the case them to be offered to Him, in order to prevent idolatry; in is the reverse. Wherefore, as Rabbi Moses observes (Doct. order to signify the right ordering of man’s mind to God; Perplex. iii), turtledoves and young doves are commanded and in order to represent the mystery of the Redemption to be offered, because nothing should be offered to God of man by Christ. but what is best. Reply to Objection 2. In all the respects mentioned Reply to Objection 5. The animals which were of- above (ad 1), there was a suitable reason for these ani- fered in sacrifice were slain, because it is by being killed mals, rather than others, being offered in sacrifice to God. that they become useful to man, forasmuch as God gave First, in order to prevent idolatry. Because idolaters of- them to man for food. Wherefore also they were burnt fered all other animals to their gods, or made use of them with fire: because it is by being cooked that they are made in their sorceries: while the Egyptians (among whom the fit for human consumption. Moreover the slaying of the people had been dwelling) considered it abominable to animals signified the destruction of sins: and also that man slay these animals, wherefore they used not to offer them deserved death on account of his sins; as though those an- ∗ An allusion to Col. 2:11 (Textus Receptus) 1089 imals were slain in man’s stead, in order to betoken the burnt in honor of God; another part was allotted to the use expiation of sins. Again the slaying of these animals sig- of the priests; and the third part to the use of the offerers; nified the slaying of Christ. in order to signify that man’s salvation is from God, by the Reply to Objection 6. The Law fixed the special man- direction of God’s ministers, and through the cooperation ner of slaying the sacrificial animals in order to exclude of those who are saved. other ways of killing, whereby idolaters sacrificed ani- But it was the universal rule that the blood and fat were mals to idols. Or again, as Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Per- not allotted to the use either of the priests or of the offer- plex. iii), “the Law chose that manner of slaying which ers: the blood being poured out at the foot of the altar, in was least painful to the slain animal.” This excluded cru- honor of God, while the fat was burnt upon the altar (Lev. elty on the part of the offerers, and any mangling of the 9:9,10). The reason for this was, first, in order to pre- animals slain. vent idolatry: because idolaters used to drink the blood Reply to Objection 7. It is because unclean animals and eat the fat of the victims, according to Dt. 32:38: are wont to be held in contempt among men, that it was “Of whose victims they eat the fat, and drank the wine forbidden to offer them in sacrifice to God: and for this of their drink-offerings.” Secondly, in order to form them reason too they were forbidden (Dt. 23:18) to offer “the to a right way of living. For they were forbidden the use hire of a strumpet or the price of a dog in the house of the blood that they might abhor the shedding of hu- of. . . God.” For the same reason they did not offer ani- man blood; wherefore it is written (Gn. 9:4,5): “Flesh mals before the seventh day, because such were abortive with blood you shall not eat: for I will require the blood as it were, the flesh being not yet firm on account of its of your lives”: and they were forbidden to eat the fat, in exceeding softness. order to withdraw them from lasciviousness; hence it is Reply to Objection 8. There were three kinds of sac- written (Ezech. 34:3): “You have killed that which was rifices. There was one in which the victim was entirely fat.” Thirdly, on account of the reverence due to God: be- consumed by fire: this was called “a holocaust, i.e. all cause blood is most necessary for life, for which reason burnt.” For this kind of sacrifice was offered to God spe- “life” is said to be “in the blood” (Lev. 17:11,14): while cially to show reverence to His majesty, and love of His fat is a sign of abundant nourishment. Wherefore, in or- goodness: and typified the state of perfection as regards der to show that to God we owe both life and a sufficiency the fulfilment of the counsels. Wherefore the whole was of all good things, the blood was poured out, and the fat burnt up: so that as the whole animal by being dissolved burnt up in His honor. Fourthly, in order to foreshadow into vapor soared aloft, so it might denote that the whole the shedding of Christ’s blood, and the abundance of His man, and whatever belongs to him, are subject to the au- charity, whereby He offered Himself to God for us. thority of God, and should be offered to Him. In the peace-offerings, the breast-bone and the right Another sacrifice was the “sin-offering,” which was shoulder were allotted to the use of the priest, in order offered to God on account of man’s need for the forgive- to prevent a certain kind of divination which is known as ness of sin: and this typifies the state of penitents in satis- “spatulamantia,” so called because it was customary in di- fying for sins. It was divided into two parts: for one part vining to use the shoulder-blade [spatula], and the breast- was burnt; while the other was granted to the use of the bone of the animals offered in sacrifice; wherefore these priests to signify that remission of sins is granted by God things were taken away from the offerers. This is also de- through the ministry of His priests. When, however, this noted the priest’s need of wisdom in the heart, to instruct sacrifice was offered for the sins of the whole people, or the people—this was signified by the breast-bone, which specially for the sin of the priest, the whole victim was covers the heart; and his need of fortitude, in order to bear burnt up. For it was not fitting that the priests should have with human frailty—and this was signified by the right the use of that which was offered for their own sins, to sig- shoulder. nify that nothing sinful should remain in them. Moreover, Reply to Objection 9. Because the holocaust was the this would not be satisfaction for sin: for if the offering most perfect kind of sacrifice, therefore none but a male were granted to the use of those for whose sins it was of- was offered for a holocaust: because the female is an im- fered, it would seem to be the same as if it had not been perfect animal. The offering of turtledoves and doves was offered. on account of the poverty of the offerers, who were unable The third kind of sacrifice was called the “peace- to offer bigger animals. And since peace-victims were of- offering,” which was offered to God, either in thanksgiv- fered freely, and no one was bound to offer them against ing, or for the welfare and prosperity of the offerers, in his will, hence these birds were offered not among the acknowledgment of benefits already received or yet to be peace-victims, but among the holocausts and victims for received: and this typifies the state of those who are pro- sin, which man was obliged to offer at times. Moreover ficient in the observance of the commandments. These these birds, on account of their lofty flight, while befit- sacrifices were divided into three parts: for one part was ting the perfection of the holocausts: and were suitable 1090 for sin-offerings because their song is doleful. nature, in the faith of the patriarchs; He was like flour in Reply to Objection 10. The holocaust was the chief the doctrine of the Law of the prophets; and He was like of all the sacrifices: because all were burnt in honor of perfect bread after He had taken human nature; baked in God, and nothing of it was eaten. The second place in ho- the fire, i.e. formed by the Holy Ghost in the oven of the liness, belongs to the sacrifice for sins, which was eaten virginal womb; baked again in a pan by the toils which He in the court only, and on the very day of the sacrifice suffered in the world; and consumed by fire on the cross (Lev. 7:6,15). The third place must be given to the peace- as on a gridiron. offerings of thanksgiving, which were eaten on the same Reply to Objection 13. The products of the soil are day, but anywhere in Jerusalem. Fourth in order were useful to man, either as food, and of these bread was of- the “ex-voto” peace-offerings, the flesh of which could be fered; or as drink, and of these wine was offered; or as sea- eaten even on the morrow. The reason for this order is that soning, and of these oil and salt were offered; or as heal- man is bound to God, chiefly on account of His majesty; ing, and of these they offered incense, which both smells secondly, on account of the sins he has committed; thirdly, sweetly and binds easily together. because of the benefits he has already received from Him; Now the bread foreshadowed the flesh of Christ; and fourthly, by reason of the benefits he hopes to receive from the wine, His blood, whereby we were redeemed; oil be- Him. tokens the grace of Christ; salt, His knowledge; incense, Reply to Objection 11. Sins are more grievous by His prayer. reason of the state of the sinner, as stated above (q. 73, Reply to Objection 14. Honey was not offered in the a. 10): wherefore different victims are commanded to sacrifices to God, both because it was wont to be offered be offered for the sin of a priest, or of a prince, or of in the sacrifices to idols; and in order to denote the ab- some other private individual. “But,” as Rabbi Moses sence of all carnal sweetness and pleasure from those who says (Doct. Perplex. iii), “we must take note that the intend to sacrifice to God. Leaven was not offered, to de- more grievous the sin, the lower the species of animals note the exclusion of corruption. Perhaps too, it was wont offered for it. Wherefore the goat, which is a very base to be offered in the sacrifices to idols. animal, was offered for idolatry; while a calf was offered Salt, however, was offered, because it wards off the for a priest’s ignorance, and a ram for the negligence of a corruption of putrefaction: for sacrifices offered to God prince.” should be incorrupt. Moreover, salt signifies the discre- Reply to Objection 12. In the matter of sacrifices the tion of wisdom, or again, mortification of the flesh. Law had in view the poverty of the offerers; so that those Incense was offered to denote devotion of the heart, who could not have a four-footed animal at their disposal, which is necessary in the offerer; and again, to signify the might at least offer a bird; and that he who could not have odor of a good name: for incense is composed of matter, a bird might at least offer bread; and that if a man had not both rich and fragrant. And since the sacrifice “of jeal- even bread he might offer flour or ears of corn. ousy” did not proceed from devotion, but rather from sus- The figurative cause is that the bread signifies Christ picion, therefore incense was not offered therein (Num. Who is the “living bread” (Jn. 6:41,51). He was indeed 5:15). an ear of corn, as it were, during the state of the law of Whether sufficient reason can be assigned for the ceremonies pertaining to holy Ia IIae q. 102 a. 4 things? Objection 1. It would seem that no sufficient reason other indeed, should lead man to the worship of God. But can be assigned for the ceremonies of the Old Law that an increase of divine worship requires multiplication of pertain to holy things. For Paul said (Acts 17:24): “God altars and temples; as is evident in regard to the New Who made the world and all things therein; He being Lord Law. Therefore it seems that also under the Old Law there of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made by should have been not only one tabernacle or temple, but hands.” It was therefore unfitting that in the Old Law a many. tabernacle or temple should be set up for the worship of Objection 4. Further, the tabernacle or temple was God. ordained to the worship of God. But in God we should Objection 2. Further, the state of the Old Law was not worship above all His unity and simplicity. Therefore it changed except by Christ. But the tabernacle denoted the seems unbecoming for the tabernacle or temple to be di- state of the Old Law. Therefore it should not have been vided by means of veils. changed by the building of a temple. Objection 5. Further, the power of the First Mover, Objection 3. Further, the Divine Law, more than any i.e. God, appears first of all in the east, for it is in that 1091 quarter that the first movement begins. But the tabernacle are common, and indistinct from other things; whereas he was set up for the worship of God. Therefore it should admires and reveres those things which are distinct from have been built so as to point to the east rather than the others in some point of excellence. Hence too it is cus- west. tomary among men for kings and princes, who ought to Objection 6. Further, the Lord commanded (Ex. 20:4) be reverenced by their subjects, to be clothed in more pre- that they should “not make. . . a graven thing, nor the like- cious garments, and to possess vaster and more beautiful ness of anything.” It was therefore unfitting for graven im- abodes. And for this reason it behooved special times, a ages of the cherubim to be set up in the tabernacle or tem- special abode, special vessels, and special ministers to be ple. In like manner, the ark, the propitiatory, the candle- appointed for the divine worship, so that thereby the soul stick, the table, the two altars, seem to have been placed of man might be brought to greater reverence for God. there without reasonable cause. In like manner the state of the Old Law, as observed Objection 7. Further, the Lord commanded (Ex. above (a. 2; q. 100 , a. 12; q. 101, a. 2), was instituted 20:24): “You shall make an altar of earth unto Me”: and that it might foreshadow the mystery of Christ. Now that again (Ex. 20:26): “Thou shalt not go up by steps unto which foreshadows something should be determinate, so My altar.” It was therefore unfitting that subsequently they that it may present some likeness thereto. Consequently, should be commanded to make an altar of wood laid over certain special points had to be observed in matters per- with gold or brass; and of such a height that it was impos- taining to the worship of God. sible to go up to it except by steps. For it is written (Ex. Reply to Objection 1. The divine worship regards 27:1,2): “Thou shalt make also an altar of setim wood, two things: namely, God Who is worshipped; and men, which shall be five cubits long, and as many broad. . . and who worship Him. Accordingly God, Who is worshipped, three cubits high. . . and thou shalt cover it with brass”: is confined to no bodily place: wherefore there was no and (Ex. 30:1,3): “Thou shalt make. . . an altar to burn need, on His part, for a tabernacle or temple to be set up. incense, of setim wood. . . and thou shalt overlay it with But men, who worship Him, are corporeal beings: and for the purest gold.” their sake there was need for a special tabernacle or tem- Objection 8. Further, in God’s works nothing should ple to be set up for the worship of God, for two reasons. be superfluous; for not even in the works of nature is any- First, that through coming together with the thought that thing superfluous to be found. But one cover suffices for the place was set aside for the worship of God, they might one tabernacle or house. Therefore it was unbecoming to approach thither with greater reverence. Secondly, that furnish the tabernacle with many coverings, viz. curtains, certain things relating to the excellence of Christ’s Divine curtains of goats’ hair, rams’ skins dyed red, and violet- or human nature might be signified by the arrangement of colored skins (Ex. 26). various details in such temple or tabernacle. Objection 9. Further, exterior consecration signifies To this Solomon refers (3 Kings 8:27) when he says: interior holiness, the subject of which is the soul. It was “If heaven and the heavens of heavens cannot contain therefore unsuitable for the tabernacle and its vessels to Thee, how much less this house which I have built” for be consecrated, since they were inanimate things. Thee? And further on (3 Kings 8:29,20) he adds: “That Objection 10. Further, it is written (Ps. 33:2): “I will Thy eyes may be open upon this house. . . of which Thou bless the Lord at all times, His praise shall always be in hast said: My name shall be there;. . . that Thou mayest my mouth.” But the solemn festivals were instituted for hearken to the supplication of Thy servant and of Thy peo- the praise of God. Therefore it was not fitting that cer- ple Israel.” From this it is evident that the house of the tain days should be fixed for keeping solemn festivals; so sanctuary was set up, not in order to contain God, as abid- that it seems that there was no suitable cause for the cere- ing therein locally, but that God might be made known monies relating to holy things. there by means of things done and said there; and that On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 8:4) that those who prayed there might, through reverence for the those who “offer gifts according to the law. . . serve unto place, pray more devoutly, so as to be heard more readily. the example and shadow of heavenly things. As it was Reply to Objection 2. Before the coming of Christ, answered to Moses, when he was to finish the tabernacle: the state of the Old Law was not changed as regards the See, says He, that thou make all things according to the fulfilment of the Law, which was effected in Christ alone: pattern which was shown thee on the mount.” But that but it was changed as regards the condition of the peo- is most reasonable, which presents a likeness to heavenly ple that were under the Law. Because, at first, the people things. Therefore the ceremonies relating to holy things were in the desert, having no fixed abode: afterwards they had a reasonable cause. were engaged in various wars with the neighboring na- I answer that, The chief purpose of the whole exter- tions; and lastly, at the time of David and Solomon, the nal worship is that man may give worship to God. Now state of that people was one of great peace. And then for man’s tendency is to reverence less those things which the first time the temple was built in the place which Abra- 1092 ham, instructed by God, had chosen for the purpose of to gather together for the praise of God; just as now there sacrifice. For it is written (Gn. 22:2) that the Lord com- are places called churches in which the Christian people manded Abraham to “offer” his son “for a holocaust upon gather together for the divine worship. Thus our church one of the mountains which I will show thee”: and it is takes the place of both temple and synagogue: since the related further on (Gn. 22:14) that “he calleth the name very sacrifice of the Church is spiritual; wherefore with of that place, The Lord seeth,” as though, according to the us the place of sacrifice is not distinct from the place of Divine prevision, that place were chosen for the worship teaching. The figurative reason may be that hereby is of God. Hence it is written (Dt. 12:5,6): “You shall come signified the unity of the Church, whether militant or tri- to the place which the Lord your God shall choose. . . and umphant. you shall offer. . . your holocausts and victims.” Reply to Objection 4. Just as the unity of the temple Now it was not meet for that place to be pointed out or tabernacle betokened the unity of God, or the unity of by the building of the temple before the aforesaid time; the Church, so also the division of the tabernacle or tem- for three reasons assigned by Rabbi Moses. First, lest the ple signified the distinction of those things that are subject Gentiles might seize hold of that place. Secondly, lest the to God, and from which we arise to the worship of God. Gentiles might destroy it. The third reason is lest each Now the tabernacle was divided into two parts: one was tribe might wish that place to fall to their lot, and strifes called the “Holy of Holies,” and was placed to the west; and quarrels be the result. Hence the temple was not built the other was called the “Holy Place”∗, which was sit- until they had a king who would be able to quell such uated to the east. Moreover there was a court facing the quarrels. Until that time a portable tabernacle was em- tabernacle. Accordingly there are two reasons for this dis- ployed for divine worship, no place being as yet fixed for tinction. One is in respect of the tabernacle being ordained the worship of God. This is the literal reason for the dis- to the worship of God. Because the different parts of the tinction between the tabernacle and the temple. world are thus betokened by the division of the tabernacle. The figurative reason may be assigned to the fact that For that part which was called the Holy of Holies signi- they signify a twofold state. For the tabernacle, which fied the higher world, which is that of spiritual substances: was changeable, signifies the state of the present change- while that part which is called the Holy Place signified able life: whereas the temple, which was fixed and stable, the corporeal world. Hence the Holy Place was separated signifies the state of future life which is altogether un- from the Holy of Holies by a veil, which was of four dif- changeable. For this reason it is said that in the building of ferent colors (denoting the four elements), viz. of linen, the temple no sound was heard of hammer or saw, to sig- signifying earth, because linen, i.e. flax, grows out of the nify that all movements of disturbance will be far removed earth; purple, signifying water, because the purple tint was from the future state. Or else the tabernacle signifies the made from certain shells found in the sea; violet, signify- state of the Old Law; while the temple built by Solomon ing air, because it has the color of the air; and scarlet twice betokens the state of the New Law. Hence the Jews alone dyed, signifying fire: and this because matter composed of worked at the building of the tabernacle; whereas the tem- the four elements is a veil between us and incorporeal sub- ple was built with the cooperation of the Gentiles, viz. the stances. Hence the high-priest alone, and that once a year, Tyrians and Sidonians. entered into the inner tabernacle, i.e. the Holy of Holies: Reply to Objection 3. The reason for the unity of the whereby we are taught that man’s final perfection consists temple or tabernacle may be either literal or figurative. in his entering into that (higher) world: whereas into the The literal reason was the exclusion of idolatry. For the outward tabernacle, i.e. the Holy Place, the priests entered Gentiles put up various times to various gods: and so, to every day: whereas the people were only admitted to the strengthen in the minds of men their belief in the unity of court; because the people were able to perceived material the Godhead, God wished sacrifices to be offered to Him things, the inner nature of which only wise men by dint of in one place only. Another reason was in order to show study are able to discover. that bodily worship is not acceptable of itself: and so they But regard to the figurative reason, the outward taber- restrained from offering sacrifices anywhere and every- nacle, which was called the Holy Place, betokened the where. But the worship of the New Law, in the sacrifice state of the Old Law, as the Apostle says (Heb. 9:6, seqq.): whereof spiritual grace is contained, is of itself acceptable because into that tabernacle “the priests always entered to God; and consequently the multiplication of altars and accomplishing the offices of sacrifices.” But the inner temples is permitted in the New Law. tabernacle, which was called the Holy of Holies, signi- As to those matters that regarded the spiritual wor- fied either the glory of heaven or the spiritual state of the ship of God, consisting in the teaching of the Law and New Law to come. To the latter state Christ brought us; the Prophets, there were, even under the Old Law, vari- and this was signified by the high-priest entering alone, ous places, called synagogues, appointed for the people once a year, into the Holy of Holies. The veil betokened ∗ Or ‘Sanctuary’. The Douay version uses both expressions 1093 the concealing of the spiritual sacrifices under the sacri-Him was set up; to denote His invisibility. But there was fices of old. This veil was adorned with four colors: viz. something to represent his seat; since, to wit, the crea- that of linen, to designate purity of the flesh; purple, to ture, which is beneath God, as the seat under the sitter, is denote the sufferings which the saints underwent for God; comprehensible. Again in that higher world there are spir- scarlet twice dyed, signifying the twofold love of God and itual substances called angels. These are signified by the our neighbor; and violet, in token of heavenly contempla- two cherubim, looking one towards the other, to show that tion. With regard to the state of the Old Law the people they are at peace with one another, according to Job 25:2: and the priests were situated differently from one another. “Who maketh peace in. . . high places.” For this reason, For the people saw the mere corporeal sacrifices which too, there was more than one cherub, to betoken the mul- were offered in the court: whereas the priests were intent titude of heavenly spirits, and to prevent their receiving on the inner meaning of the sacrifices, because their faith worship from those who had been commanded to worship in the mysteries of Christ was more explicit. Hence they but one God. Moreover there are, enclosed as it were in entered into the outer tabernacle. This outer tabernacle that spiritual world, the intelligible types of whatsoever was divided from the court by a veil; because some mat- takes place in this world, just as in every cause are en- ters relating to the mystery of Christ were hidden from the closed the types of its effects, and in the craftsman the people, while they were known to the priests: though they types of the works of his craft. This was betokened by were not fully revealed to them, as they were subsequently the ark, which represented, by means of the three things in the New Testament (cf. Eph. 3:5). it contained, the three things of greatest import in human Reply to Objection 5. Worship towards the west was affairs. These are wisdom, signified by the tables of the introduced in the Law to the exclusion of idolatry: be- testament; the power of governing, betokened by the rod cause all the Gentiles, in reverence to the sun, worshipped of Aaron; and life, betokened by the manna which was towards the east; hence it is written (Ezech. 8:16) that cer- the means of sustenance. Or else these three things sig- tain men “had their backs towards the temple of the Lord, nified the three Divine attributes, viz. wisdom, in the ta- and their faces to the east, and they adored towards the ris- bles; power, in the rod; goodness, in the manna—both ing of the sun.” Accordingly, in order to prevent this, the by reason of its sweetness, and because it was through tabernacle had the Holy of Holies to westward, that they the goodness of God that it was granted to man, where- might adore toward the west. A figurative reason may also fore it was preserved as a memorial of the Divine mercy. be found in the fact that the whole state of the first taberna- Again, these three things were represented in Isaias’ vi- cle was ordained to foreshadow the death of Christ, which sion. For he “saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high is signified by the west, according to Ps. 67:5: “Who as- and elevated”; and the seraphim standing by; and that the cendeth unto the west; the Lord is His name.” house was filled with the glory of the Lord; wherefrom the Reply to Objection 6. Both literal and figurative rea- seraphim cried out: “All the earth is full of His glory” (Is. sons may be assigned for the things contained in the taber- 6:1,3). And so the images of the seraphim were set up, nacle. The literal reason is in connection with the divine not to be worshipped, for this was forbidden by the first worship. And because, as already observed (ad 4), the commandment; but as a sign of their function, as stated inner tabernacle, called the Holy of Holies, signified the above. higher world of spiritual substances, hence that taberna- The outer tabernacle, which denotes this present cle contained three things, viz. “the ark of the testament world, also contained three things, viz. the “altar of in- in which was a golden pot that had manna, and the rod cense,” which was directly opposite the ark; the “table of of Aaron that had blossomed, and the tables” (Heb. 9:4) proposition,” with the twelve loaves of proposition on it, on which were written the ten commandments of the Law. which stood on the northern side; and the “candlestick,” Now the ark stood between two “cherubim” that looked which was placed towards the south. These three things one towards the other: and over the ark was a table, called seem to correspond to the three which were enclosed in the “propitiatory,” raised above the wings of the cheru- the ark; and they represented the same things as the lat- bim, as though it were held up by them; and appearing, ter, but more clearly: because, in order that wise men, to the imagination, to be the very seat of God. For this denoted by the priests entering the temple, might grasp reason it was called the “propitiatory,” as though the peo- the meaning of these types, it was necessary to express ple received propitiation thence at the prayers of the high- them more manifestly than they are in the Divine or an- priest. And so it was held up, so to speak, by the cheru- gelic mind. Accordingly the candlestick betokened, as a bim, in obedience, as it were, to God: while the ark of sensible sign thereof, the wisdom which was expressed the testament was like the foot-stool to Him that sat on on the tables (of the Law) in intelligible words. The al- the propitiatory. These three things denote three things tar of incense signified the office of the priest, whose duty in that higher world: namely, God Who is above all, and it was to bring the people to God: and this was signified incomprehensible to any creature. Hence no likeness of also by the rod: because on that altar the sweet-smelling 1094 incense was burnt, signifying the holiness of the people the temple should take their food in the temple: where-acceptable to God: for it is written (Apoc. 8:3) that the fore, as stated in Mat. 12:4, it was lawful for none but the smoke of the sweet-smelling spices signifies the “justi- priests to eat the twelve loaves which were put on the ta- fications of the saints” (cf. Apoc. 19:8). Moreover it ble in memory of the twelve tribes. And the table was not was fitting that the dignity of the priesthood should be de- placed in the middle directly in front of the propitiatory, noted, in the ark, by the rod, and, in the outer tabernacle, in order to exclude an idolatrous rite: for the Gentiles, on by the altar of incense: because the priest is the mediator the feasts of the moon, set up a table in front of the idol of between God and the people, governing the people by Di- the moon, wherefore it is written (Jer. 7:18): “The women vine power, denoted by the rod; and offering to God the knead the dough, to make cakes to the queen of heaven.” fruit of His government, i.e. the holiness of the people, on In the court outside the tabernacle was the altar of the altar of incense, so to speak. The table signified the holocausts, on which sacrifices of those things which the sustenance of life, just as the manna did: but the former, a people possessed were offered to God: and consequently more general and a coarser kind of nourishment; the latter, the people who offered these sacrifices to God by the a sweeter and more delicate. Again, the candlestick was hands of the priest could be present in the court. But the fittingly placed on the southern side, while the table was priests alone, whose function it was to offer the people placed to the north: because the south is the right-hand to God, could approach the inner altar, whereon the very side of the world, while the north is the left-hand side, as devotion and holiness of the people was offered to God. stated in De Coelo et Mundo ii; and wisdom, like other And this altar was put up outside the tabernacle and in the spiritual goods, belongs to the right hand, while temporal court, to the exclusion of idolatrous worship: for the Gen- nourishment belongs on the left, according to Prov. 3:16: tiles placed altars inside the temples to offer up sacrifices “In her left hand (are) riches and glory.” And the priestly thereon to idols. power is midway between temporal goods and spiritual The figurative reason for all these things may be taken wisdom; because thereby both spiritual wisdom and tem- from the relation of the tabernacle to Christ, who was fore- poral goods are dispensed. shadowed therein. Now it must be observed that to show Another literal signification may be assigned. For the the imperfection of the figures of the Law, various fig- ark contained the tables of the Law, in order to prevent for- ures were instituted in the temple to betoken Christ. For getfulness of the Law, wherefore it is written (Ex. 24:12): He was foreshadowed by the “propitiatory,” since He is “a “I will give thee two tables of stone, and the Law, and the propitiation for our sins” (1 Jn. 2:2). This propitiatory was commandments which I have written: that thou mayest fittingly carried by cherubim, since of Him it is written teach them” to the children of Israel. The rod of Aaron (Heb. 1:6): “Let all the angels of God adore Him.” He is was placed there to restrain the people from insubordi- also signified by the ark: because just as the ark was made nation to the priesthood of Aaron; wherefore it is writ- of setim-wood, so was Christ’s body composed of most ten (Num. 17:10): “Carry back the rod of Aaron into the pure members. More over it was gilded: for Christ was tabernacle of the testimony, that it may be kept there for a full of wisdom and charity, which are betokened by gold. token of the rebellious children of Israel.” The manna was And in the ark was a golden pot, i.e. His holy soul, having kept in the ark to remind them of the benefit conferred by manna, i.e. “all the fulness of the Godhead” (Col. 2:9). God on the children of Israel in the desert; wherefore it is Also there was a rod in the ark, i.e. His priestly power: written (Ex. 16:32): “Fill a gomor of it, and let it be kept for “He was made a. . . priest for ever” (Heb. 6:20). And unto generations to come hereafter, that they may know therein were the tables of the Testament, to denote that the bread wherewith I fed you in the wilderness.” The Christ Himself is a lawgiver. Again, Christ was signified candlestick was set up to enhance the beauty of the tem- by the candlestick, for He said Himself (Jn. 8:12): “I am ple, for the magnificence of a house depends on its being the Light of the world”; while the seven lamps denoted the well lighted. Now the candlestick had seven branches, as seven gifts of the Holy Ghost. He is also betokened in the Josephus observes (Antiquit. iii, 7,8), to signify the seven table, because He is our spiritual food, according to Jn. planets, wherewith the whole world is illuminated. Hence 6:41,51: “I am the living bread”: and the twelve loaves the candlestick was placed towards the south; because for signified the twelve apostles, or their teaching. Or again, us the course of the planets is from that quarter. The al- the candlestick and table may signify the Church’s teach- tar of incense was instituted that there might always be in ing, and faith, which also enlightens and refreshes. Again, the tabernacle a sweet-smelling smoke; both through re- Christ is signified by the two altars of holocausts and in- spect for the tabernacle, and as a remedy for the stenches cense. Because all works of virtue must be offered to us arising from the shedding of blood and the slaying of ani- to God through Him; both those whereby we afflict the mals. For men despise evil-smelling things as being vile, body, which are offered, as it were, on the altar of holo- whereas sweet-smelling things are much appreciated. The causts; and those which, with greater perfection of mind, table was place there to signify that the priests who served are offered to God in Christ, by the spiritual desires of the 1095 perfect, on the altar of incense, as it were, according to curtain made of goats’ hair, which covered not only the Heb. 13:15: “By Him therefore let us offer the sacrifice roof of the tabernacle, but also reached to the ground and of praise always to God.” covered the boards of the tabernacle on the outside. The Reply to Objection 7. The Lord commanded an al- literal reason of these coverings taken altogether was the tar to be made for the offering of sacrifices and gifts, in adornment and protection of the tabernacle, that it might honor of God, and for the upkeep of the ministers who be an object of respect. Taken singly, according to some, served the tabernacle. Now concerning the construction the curtains denoted the starry heaven, which is adorned of the altar the Lord issued a twofold precept. One was with various stars; the curtain (of goats’ skin) signified the at the beginning of the Law (Ex. 20:24, seqq.) when the waters which are above the firmament; the skins dyed red Lord commanded them to make “an altar of earth,” or at denoted the empyrean heaven, where the angels are; the least “not of hewn stones”; and again, not to make the al- violet skins, the heaven of the Blessed Trinity. tar high, so as to make it necessary to “go up” to it “by The figurative meaning of these things is that the steps.” This was in detestation of idolatrous worship: for boards of which the tabernacle was constructed signify the the Gentiles made their altars ornate and high, thinking faithful of Christ, who compose the Church. The boards that there was something holy and divine in such things. were covered on the inner side by curtains of four col- For this reason, too, the Lord commanded (Dt. 16:21): ors: because the faithful are inwardly adorned with the “Thou shalt plant no grove, nor any tree near the altar of four virtues: for “the twisted linen,” as the gloss observes, the Lord thy God”: since idolaters were wont to offer sac- “signifies the flesh refulgent with purity; violet signifies rifices beneath trees, on account of the pleasantness and the mind desirous of heavenly things; purple denotes the shade afforded by them. There was also a figurative rea- flesh subject to passions; the twice dyed scarlet betokens son for these precepts. Because we must confess that in the mind in the midst of the passions enlightened by the Christ, Who is our altar, there is the true nature of flesh, love of God and our neighbor.” The coverings of the build- as regards His humanity—and this is to make an altar of ing designate prelates and doctors, who ought to be con- earth; and again, in regard to His Godhead, we must con- spicuous for their heavenly manner of life, signified by the fess His equality with the Father—and this is “not to go violet colored skins: and who should also be ready to suf- up” to the altar by steps. Moreover we should not cou- fer martyrdom, denoted by the skins dyed red; and austere ple the doctrine of Christ to that of the Gentiles, which of life and patient in adversity, betokened by the curtains provokes men to lewdness. of goats’ hair, which were exposed to wind and rain, as But when once the tabernacle had been constructed to the gloss observes. the honor of God, there was no longer reason to fear these Reply to Objection 9. The literal reason for the sanc- occasions of idolatry. Wherefore the Lord commanded tification of the tabernacle and vessels was that they might the altar of holocausts to be made of brass, and to be con- be treated with greater reverence, being deputed, as it spicuous to all the people; and the altar of incense, which were, to the divine worship by this consecration. The fig- was visible to none but the priests. Nor was brass so pre- urative reason is that this sanctification signified the sanc- cious as to give the people an occasion for idolatry. tification of the living tabernacle, i.e. the faithful of whom Since, however, the reason for the precept, “Thou shalt the Church of Christ is composed. not go up by steps unto My altar” (Ex. 20:26) is stated to Reply to Objection 10. Under the Old Law there were have been “lest thy nakedness be discovered,” it should be seven temporal solemnities, and one continual solemnity, observed that this too was instituted with the purpose of as may be gathered from Num. 28,29. There was a contin- preventing idolatry, for in the feasts of Priapus the Gen- ual feast, since the lamb was sacrificed every day, morn- tiles uncovered their nakedness before the people. But ing and evening: and this continual feast of an abiding later on the priests were prescribed the use of loin-cloths sacrifice signified the perpetuity of Divine bliss. Of the for the sake of decency: so that without any danger the temporal feasts the first was that which was repeated every altar could be placed so high that the priests when offer- week. This was the solemnity of the “Sabbath,” celebrated ing sacrifices would go up by steps of wood, not fixed but in memory of the work of the creation of the universe. movable. Another solemnity, viz. the “New Moon,” was repeated Reply to Objection 8. The body of the tabernacle every month, and was observed in memory of the work of consisted of boards placed on end, and covered on the in- the Divine government. For the things of this lower world side with curtains of four different colors, viz. twisted owe their variety chiefly to the movement of the moon; linen, violet, purple, and scarlet twice dyed. These cur- wherefore this feast was kept at the new moon: and not tains, however, covered the sides only of the tabernacle; at the full moon, to avoid the worship of idolaters who and the roof of the tabernacle was covered with violet- used to offer sacrifices to the moon at that particular time. colored skins; and over this there was another covering And these two blessings are bestowed in common on the of rams’ skins dyed red; and over this there was a third whole human race; and hence they were repeated more 1096 frequently. are to be found in the Land of promise; to signify that The other five feasts were celebrated once a year: and God had brought them through the arid land of the wilder- they commemorated the benefits which had been con- ness to a land of delights. On the eighth day another feast ferred especially on that people. For there was the feast was observed, of “Assembly and Congregation,” on which of the “Passover” in the first month to commemorate the the people collected the expenses necessary for the divine blessing of being delivered out of Egypt. The feast of worship: and it signified the uniting of the people and the “Pentecost” was celebrated fifty days later, to recall the peace granted to them in the Land of promise. blessing of the giving of the Law. The other three feasts The figurative reason for these feasts was that the con- were kept in the seventh month, nearly the whole of which tinual sacrifice of the lamb foreshadowed the perpetuity was solemnized by them, just as the seventh day. For on of Christ, Who is the “Lamb of God,” according to Heb. the first of the seventh month was the feast of “Trumpets,” 13:8: “Jesus Christ yesterday and today, and the same for in memory of the delivery of Isaac, when Abraham found ever.” The Sabbath signified the spiritual rest bestowed the ram caught by its horns, which they represented by by Christ, as stated in Heb. 4. The Neomenia, which is the horns which they blew. The feast of Trumpets was the beginning of the new moon, signified the enlightening a kind of invitation whereby they prepared themselves of the primitive Church by Christ’s preaching and mira- to keep the following feast which was kept on the tenth cles. The feast of Pentecost signified the Descent of the day. This was the feast of “Expiation,” in memory of Holy Ghost on the apostles. The feast of Trumpets signi- the blessing whereby, at the prayer of Moses, God for- fied the preaching of the apostles. The feast of Expiation gave the people’s sin of worshipping the calf. After this signified the cleansing of the Christian people from sins: was the feast of “Scenopegia” or of “Tents,” which was and the feast of Tabernacles signified their pilgrimage in kept for seven days, to commemorate the blessing of be- this world, wherein they walk by advancing in virtue. The ing protected and led by God through the desert, where feast of Assembly or Congregation foreshadowed the as- they lived in tents. Hence during this feast they had to sembly of the faithful in the kingdom of heaven: where- take “the fruits of the fairest tree,” i.e. the citron, “and fore this feast is described as “most holy” (Lev. 23:36). the trees of dense foliage”∗, i.e. the myrtle, which is fra- These three feasts followed immediately on one another, grant, “and the branches of palm-trees, and willows of the because those who expiate their vices should advance in brook,” which retain their greenness a long time; and these virtue, until they come to see God, as stated in Ps. 83:8. Whether there can be any suitable cause for the sacraments of the Old Law? Ia IIae q. 102 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that there can be no suit- eating of the lamb were prescribed, which seem altogether able cause for the sacraments of the Old Law. Because unreasonable. those things that are done for the purpose of divine wor- Objection 3. Further, the sacraments of the Old Law ship should not be like the observances of idolaters: since were figures of the sacraments of the New Law. Now the it is written (Dt. 12:31): “Thou shalt not do in like manner Paschal lamb signified the sacrament of the Eucharist, ac- to the Lord thy God: for they have done to their gods all cording to 1 Cor. 5:7: “Christ our Pasch is sacrificed.” the abominations which the Lord abhorreth.” Now wor- Therefore there should also have been some sacraments shippers of idols used to knive themselves to the shedding of the Old Law to foreshadow the other sacraments of the of blood: for it is related (3 Kings 18:28) that they “cut New Law, such as Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and themselves after their manner with knives and lancets, till Matrimony, and so forth. they were all covered with blood.” For this reason the Objection 4. Further, purification can scarcely be Lord commanded (Dt. 14:1): “You shall not cut your- done except by removing something impure. But as far as selves nor make any baldness for the dead.” Therefore it God is concerned, no bodily thing is reputed impure, be- was unfitting for circumcision to be prescribed by the Law cause all bodies are God’s creatures; and “every creature (Lev. 12:3). of God is good, and nothing to be rejected that is received Objection 2. Further, those things which are done for with thanksgiving” (1 Tim. 4:4). It was therefore unfitting the worship of God should be marked with decorum and for them to be purified after contact with a corpse, or any gravity; according to Ps. 34:18: “I will praise Thee in a similar corporeal infection. grave [Douay: ‘strong’] people.” But it seems to savor of Objection 5. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 34:4): levity for a man to eat with haste. Therefore it was un- “What can be made clean by the unclean?” But the ashes fittingly commanded (Ex. 12:11) that they should eat the of the red heifer† which was burnt, were unclean, since Paschal lamb “in haste.” Other things too relative to the they made a man unclean: for it is stated (Num. 19:7, ∗ Douay and A. V. and R. V. read: ‘Boughs of thick trees’ † Cf. Heb. 9:13 1097 seqq.) that the priest who immolated her was rendered I answer that, As stated above (q. 101, a. 4), the unclean “until the evening”; likewise he that burnt her; sacraments are, properly speaking, things applied to the and he that gathered up her ashes. Therefore it was unfit- worshippers of God for their consecration so as, in some tingly prescribed there that the unclean should be purified way, to depute them to the worship of God. Now the wor- by being sprinkled with those cinders. ship of God belonged in a general way to the whole peo- Objection 6. Further, sins are not something corpo- ple; but in a special way, it belonged to the priests and real that can be carried from one place to another: nor can Levites, who were the ministers of divine worship. Conse- man be cleansed from sin by means of something unclean. quently, in these sacraments of the Old Law, certain things It was therefore unfitting for the purpose of expiating the concerned the whole people in general; while others be- sins of the people that the priest should confess the sins longed to the ministers. of the children of Israel on one of the buck-goats, that it In regard to both, three things were necessary. The might carry them away into the wilderness: while they first was to be established in the state of worshipping God: were rendered unclean by the other, which they used for and this institution was brought about—for all in general, the purpose of purification, by burning it together with by circumcision, without which no one was admitted to the calf outside the camp; so that they had to wash their any of the legal observances—and for the priests, by their clothes and their bodies with water (Lev. 16). consecration. The second thing required was the use of Objection 7. Further, what is already cleansed should those things that pertain to divine worship. And thus, as not be cleansed again. It was therefore unfitting to apply a to the people, there was the partaking of the paschal ban- second purification to a man cleansed from leprosy, or to quet, to which no uncircumcised man was admitted, as is a house; as laid down in Lev. 14. clear from Ex. 12:43, seqq.: and, as to the priests, the of- Objection 8. Further, spiritual uncleanness cannot be fering of the victims, and the eating of the loaves of propo- cleansed by material water or by shaving the hair. There- sition and of other things that were allotted to the use of fore it seems unreasonable that the Lord ordered (Ex. the priests. The third thing required was the removal of 30:18, seqq.) the making of a brazen laver with its foot, all impediments to divine worship, viz. of uncleannesses. that the priests might wash their hands and feet before en- And then, as to the people, certain purifications were in- tering the temple; and that He commanded (Num. 8:7) the stituted for the removal of certain external uncleannesses; Levites to be sprinkled with the water of purification, and and also expiations from sins; while, as to the priests and to shave all the hairs of their flesh. Levites, the washing of hands and feet and the shaving of Objection 9. Further, that which is greater cannot be the hair were instituted. cleansed by that which is less. Therefore it was unfitting And all these things had reasonable causes, both lit- that, in the Law, the higher and lower priests, as stated in eral, in so far as they were ordained to the worship of God Lev. 8∗, and the Levites, according to Num. 8, should be for the time being, and figurative, in so far as they were consecrated with any bodily anointing, bodily sacrifices, ordained to foreshadow Christ: as we shall see by taking and bodily oblations. them one by one. Objection 10. Further, as stated in 1 Kings 16:7, Reply to Objection 1. The chief literal reason for cir- “Man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord behold- cumcision was in order that man might profess his belief eth the heart.” But those things that appear outwardly in one God. And because Abraham was the first to sever in man are the dispositions of his body and his clothes. himself from the infidels, by going out from his house and Therefore it was unfitting for certain special garments to kindred, for this reason he was the first to receive circum- be appointed to the higher and lower priests, as related in cision. This reason is set forth by the Apostle (Rom. 4:9, Ex. 28†. It seems, moreover, unreasonable that anyone seqq.) thus: “He received the sign of circumcision, a seal should be debarred from the priesthood on account of de- of the justice of the faith which he had, being uncircum- fects in the body, as stated in Lev. 21:17, seqq.: “Whoso- cised”; because, to wit, we are told that “unto Abraham ever of thy seed throughout their families, hath a blemish, faith was reputed to justice,” for the reason that “against he shall not offer bread to his God. . . if he be blind, if he hope he believed in hope,” i.e. against the hope that is of be lame,” etc. It seems, therefore, that the sacraments of nature he believed in the hope that is of grace, “that he the Old Law were unreasonable. might be made the father of many nations,” when he was On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 20:8): “I am the an old man, and his wife an old and barren woman. And Lord that sanctify you.” But nothing unreasonable is done in order that this declaration, and imitation of Abraham’s by God, for it is written (Ps. 103:24): “Thou hast made all faith, might be fixed firmly in the hearts of the Jews, they things in wisdom.” Therefore there was nothing without a received in their flesh such a sign as they could not for- reasonable cause in the sacraments of the Old Law, which get, wherefore it is written (Gn. 17:13): “My covenant were ordained to the sanctification of man. shall be in your flesh for a perpetual covenant.” This was ∗ Cf. Ex. 29 † Cf. Lev. 8:7, seqq. 1098 done on the eighth day, because until then a child is very command: “In one house shall it be eaten, neither shall tender, and so might be seriously injured; and is consid- you carry forth of the flesh thereof out of the house”: be- ered as something not yet consolidated: wherefore neither cause, to wit, on account of their haste, they could not are animals offered before the eighth day. And it was not send any gifts of it. delayed after that time, lest some might refuse the sign The stress they suffered while in Egypt was denoted of circumcision on account of the pain: and also lest the by the wild lettuces. The figurative reason is evident, be- parents, whose love for their children increases as they be- cause the sacrifice of the paschal lamb signified the sacri- come used to their presence and as they grow older, should fice of Christ according to 1 Cor. 5:7: “Christ our pasch withdraw their children from circumcision. A second rea- is sacrificed.” The blood of the lamb, which ensured de- son may have been the weakening of concupiscence in liverance from the destroyer, by being sprinkled on the that member. A third motive may have been to revile the transoms, signified faith in Christ’s Passion, in the hearts worship of Venus and Priapus, which gave honor to that and on the lips of the faithful, by which same Passion we part of the body. The Lord’s prohibition extended only to are delivered from sin and death, according to 1 Pet. 1:18: the cutting of oneself in honor of idols: and such was not “You were. . . redeemed. . . with the precious blood. . . of a the circumcision of which we have been speaking. lamb unspotted.” The partaking of its flesh signified the The figurative reason for circumcision was that it fore- eating of Christ’s body in the Sacrament; and the flesh shadowed the removal of corruption, which was to be was roasted at the fire to signify Christ’s Passion or char- brought about by Christ, and will be perfectly fulfilled in ity. And it was eaten with unleavened bread to signify the the eighth age, which is the age of those who rise from the blameless life of the faithful who partake of Christ’s body, dead. And since all corruption of guilt and punishment according to 1 Cor. 5:8: “Let us feast . . . with the unleav- comes to us through our carnal origin, from the sin of ened bread of sincerity and truth.” The wild lettuces were our first parent, therefore circumcision was applied to the added to denote repentance for sins, which is required of generative member. Hence the Apostle says (Col. 2:11): those who receive the body of Christ. Their loins were “You are circumcised” in Christ “with circumcision not girt in sign of chastity: and the shoes of their feet are the made by hand in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but examples of our dead ancestors. The staves they were to in the circumcision of” Our Lord Jesus “Christ.” hold in their hands denoted pastoral authority: and it was Reply to Objection 2. The literal reason of the commanded that the paschal lamb should be eaten in one paschal banquet was to commemorate the blessing of be- house, i.e. in a catholic church, and not in the conventicles ing led by God out of Egypt. Hence by celebrating this of heretics. banquet they declared that they belonged to that people Reply to Objection 3. Some of the sacraments of the which God had taken to Himself out of Egypt. For when New Law had corresponding figurative sacraments in the they were delivered from Egypt, they were commanded to Old Law. For Baptism, which is the sacrament of Faith, sprinkle the lamb’s blood on the transoms of their house corresponds to circumcision. Hence it is written (Col. doors, as though declaring that they were averse to the 2:11,12): “You are circumcised. . . in the circumcision of” rites of the Egyptians who worshipped the ram. Where- Our Lord Jesus “Christ: buried with Him in Baptism.” fore they were delivered by the sprinkling or rubbing of In the New Law the sacrament of the Eucharist corre- the blood of the lamb on the door-posts, from the danger sponds to the banquet of the paschal lamb. The sacra- of extermination which threatened the Egyptians. ment of Penance in the New Law corresponds to all the Now two things are to be observed in their departure purifications of the Old Law. The sacrament of Orders from Egypt: namely, their haste in going, for the Egyp- corresponds to the consecration of the pontiff and of the tians pressed them to go forth speedily, as related in Ex. priests. To the sacrament of Confirmation, which is the 12:33; and there was danger that anyone who did not has- sacrament of the fulness of grace, there would be no cor- ten to go with the crowd might be slain by the Egyptians. responding sacrament of the Old Law, because the time of Their haste was shown in two ways. First by what they fulness had not yet come, since “the Law brought no man ate. For they were commanded to eat unleavened bread, as [Vulg.: ‘nothing’] to perfection” (Heb. 7:19). The same a sign “that it could not be leavened, the Egyptians press- applies to the sacrament of Extreme Unction, which is an ing them to depart”; and to eat roast meat, for this took immediate preparation for entrance into glory, to which less time to prepare; and that they should not break a bone the way was not yet opened out in the Old Law, since the thereof, because in their haste there was no time to break price had not yet been paid. Matrimony did indeed exist bones. Secondly, as to the manner of eating. For it is writ- under the Old Law, as a function of nature, but not as the ten: “You shall gird your reins, and you shall have shoes sacrament of the union of Christ with the Church, for that on your feet, holding staves in your hands, and you shall union was not as yet brought about. Hence under the Old eat in haste”: which clearly designates men at the point Law it was allowable to give a bill of divorce, which is of starting on a journey. To this also is to be referred the contrary to the nature of the sacrament. 1099 Reply to Objection 4. As already stated, the purifi-the Gentiles sometimes employed human blood and seed. cations of the Old Law were ordained for the removal All these bodily uncleannesses were purified either by the of impediments to the divine worship: which worship is mere sprinkling of water, or, in the case of those which twofold; viz. spiritual, consisting in devotion of the mind were more grievous, by some sacrifice of expiation for the to God; and corporal, consisting in sacrifices, oblations, sin which was the occasion of the uncleanness in question. and so forth. Now men are hindered in the spiritual wor- The figurative reason for these uncleannesses was that ship by sins, whereby men were said to be polluted, for they were figures of various sins. For the uncleanness of instance, by idolatry, murder, adultery, or incest. From any corpse signifies the uncleanness of sin, which is the such pollutions men were purified by certain sacrifices, death of the soul. The uncleanness of leprosy betokened offered either for the whole community in general, or also the uncleanness of heretical doctrine: both because hereti- for the sins of individuals; not that those carnal sacrifices cal doctrine is contagious just as leprosy is, and because had of themselves the power of expiating sin; but that they no doctrine is so false as not to have some truth min- signified that expiation of sins which was to be effected gled with error, just as on the surface of a leprous body by Christ, and of which those of old became partakers by one may distinguish the healthy parts from those that are protesting their faith in the Redeemer, while taking part in infected. The uncleanness of a woman suffering from a the figurative sacrifices. flow of blood denotes the uncleanness of idolatry, on ac- The impediments to external worship consisted in cer- count of the blood which is offered up. The uncleanness tain bodily uncleannesses; which were considered in the of the man who has suffered seminal loss signifies the un- first place as existing in man, and consequently in other cleanness of empty words, for “the seed is the word of animals also, and in man’s clothes, dwelling-place, and God.” The uncleanness of sexual intercourse and of the vessels. In man himself uncleanness was considered as woman in child-birth signifies the uncleanness of original arising partly from himself and partly from contact with sin. The uncleanness of the woman in her periods signifies unclean things. Anything proceeding from man was re- the uncleanness of a mind that is sensualized by pleasure. puted unclean that was already subject to corruption, or Speaking generally, the uncleanness contracted by touch- exposed thereto: and consequently since death is a kind ing an unclean thing denotes the uncleanness arising from of corruption, the human corpse was considered unclean. consent in another’s sin, according to 2 Cor. 6:17: “Go In like manner, since leprosy arises from corruption of the out from among them, and be ye separate. . . and touch not humors, which break out externally and infect other per- the unclean thing.” sons, therefore were lepers also considered unclean; and, Moreover, this uncleanness arising from the touch was again, women suffering from a flow of blood, whether contracted even by inanimate objects; for whatever was from weakness, or from nature (either at the monthly touched in any way by an unclean man, became itself un- course or at the time of conception); and, for the same clean. Wherein the Law attenuated the superstition of reason, men were reputed unclean if they suffered from a the Gentiles, who held that uncleanness was contracted flow of seed, whether due to weakness, to nocturnal pollu- not only by touch, but also by speech or looks, as Rabbi tion, or to sexual intercourse. Because every humor issu- Moses states (Doct. Perplex. iii) of a woman in her pe- ing from man in the aforesaid ways involves some unclean riods. The mystical sense of this was that “to God the infection. Again, man contracted uncleanness by touching wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike” (Wis. 14:9). any unclean thing whatever. There was also an uncleanness of inanimate things Now there was both a literal and a figurative reason for considered in themselves, such as the uncleanness of lep- these uncleannesses. The literal reason was taken from rosy in a house or in clothes. For just as leprosy occurs the reverence due to those things that belong to the divine in men through a corrupt humor causing putrefaction and worship: both because men are not wont, when unclean, corruption in the flesh; so, too, through some corruption to touch precious things: and in order that by rarely ap- and excess of humidity or dryness, there arises sometimes proaching sacred things they might have greater respect a kind of corruption in the stones with which a house is for them. For since man could seldom avoid all the afore- built, or in clothes. Hence the Law called this corruption said uncleannesses, the result was that men could seldom by the name of leprosy, whereby a house or a garment approach to touch things belonging to the worship of God, was deemed to be unclean: both because all corruption so that when they did approach, they did so with greater savored of uncleanness, as stated above, and because the reverence and humility. Moreover, in some of these the Gentiles worshipped their household gods as a preserva- literal reason was that men should not be kept away from tive against this corruption. Hence the Law prescribed worshipping God through fear of coming in contact with such houses, where this kind of corruption was of a last- lepers and others similarly afflicted with loathsome and ing nature, to be destroyed; and such garments to be burnt, contagious diseases. In others, again, the reason was to in order to avoid all occasion of idolatry. There was also avoid idolatrous worship: because in their sacrificial rites an uncleanness of vessels, of which it is written (Num. 1100 19:15): “The vessel that hath no cover, and binding over just as the cow was burnt “with her skin and her flesh, her it, shall be unclean.” The cause of this uncleanness was blood and dung being delivered to the flames.” To this that anything unclean might easily drop into such vessels, burning were added “cedar-wood, and hyssop, and scar- so as to render them unclean. Moreover, this command let twice dyed,” to signify that just as cedar-wood is not aimed at the prevention of idolatry. For idolaters believed liable to putrefaction, and scarlet twice dyed does not eas- that if mice, lizards, or the like, which they used to sac- ily lose its color, and hyssop retains its odor after it has rifice to the idols, fell into the vessels or into the water, been dried; so also was this sacrifice for the preservation these became more pleasing to the gods. Even now some of the whole people, and for their good behavior and de- women let down uncovered vessels in honor of the noc- votion. Hence it is said of the ashes of the cow: “That turnal deities which they call “Janae.” they may be reserved for the multitude of the children of The figurative reason of these uncleannesses is that the Israel.” Or, according to Josephus (Antiq. iii, 8,9,10), the leprosy of a house signified the uncleanness of the assem- four elements are indicated here: for “cedar-wood” was bly of heretics; the leprosy of a linen garment signified an added to the fire, to signify the earth, on account of its evil life arising from bitterness of mind; the leprosy of a earthiness; “hyssop,” to signify the air, on account of its woolen garment denoted the wickedness of flatterers; lep- smell; “scarlet twice dyed,” to signify water, for the same rosy in the warp signified the vices of the soul; leprosy on reason as purple, on account of the dyes which are taken the woof denoted sins of the flesh, for as the warp is in out of the water: thus denoting the fact that this sacri- the woof, so is the soul in the body. The vessel that has fice was offered to the Creator of the four elements. And neither cover nor binding, betokens a man who lacks the since this sacrifice was offered for the sin of idolatry, both veil of taciturnity, and who is unrestrained by any severity “he that burned her,” and “he that gathered up the ashes,” of discipline. and “he that sprinkled the water” in which the ashes were Reply to Objection 5. As stated above (ad 4), there placed, were deemed unclean in detestation of that sin, in was a twofold uncleanness in the Law; one by way of cor- order to show that whatever was in any way connected ruption in the mind or in the body; and this was the graver with idolatry should be cast aside as being unclean. From uncleanness; the other was by mere contact with an un- this uncleanness they were purified by the mere washing clean thing, and this was less grave, and was more easily of their clothes; nor did they need to be sprinkled with expiated. Because the former uncleanness was expiated the water on account of this kind of uncleanness, because by sacrifices for sins, since all corruption is due to sin, and otherwise the process would have been unending, since signifies sin: whereas the latter uncleanness was expiated he that sprinkled the water became unclean, so that if he by the mere sprinkling of a certain water, of which water were to sprinkle himself he would remain unclean; and if we read in Num. 19. For there God commanded them another were to sprinkle him, that one would have become to take a red cow in memory of the sin they had commit- unclean, and in like manner, whoever might sprinkle him, ted in worshipping a calf. And a cow is mentioned rather and so on indefinitely. than a calf, because it was thus that the Lord was wont to The figurative reason of this sacrifice was that the red designate the synagogue, according to Osee 4:16: “Israel cow signified Christ in respect his assumed weakness, de- hath gone astray like a wanton heifer”: and this was, per- noted by the female sex; while the color of the cow desig- haps, because they worshipped heifers after the custom of nated the blood of His Passion. And the “red cow was of Egypt, according to Osee 10:5: ”(They) have worshipped full age,” because all Christ’s works are perfect, “in which the kine of Bethaven.” And in detestation of the sin of there” was “no blemish”; “and which” had “not carried idolatry it was sacrificed outside the camp; in fact, when- the yoke,” because Christ was innocent, nor did He carry ever sacrifice was offered up in expiation of the multitude the yoke of sin. It was commanded to be taken to Moses, of sins, it was all burnt outside the camp. Moreover, in because they blamed Him for transgressing the law of order to show that this sacrifice cleansed the people from Moses by breaking the Sabbath. And it was commanded all their sins, “the priest” dipped “his finger in her blood,” to be delivered “to Eleazar the priest,” because Christ was and sprinkled “it over against the door of the tabernacle delivered into the hands of the priests to be slain. It was seven times”; for the number seven signified universality. immolated “without the camp,” because Christ “suffered Further, the very sprinkling of blood pertained to the de- outside the gate” (Heb. 13:12). And the priest dipped “his testation of idolatry, in which the blood that was offered finger in her blood,” because the mystery of Christ’s Pas- up was not poured out, but was collected together, and sion should be considered and imitated. men gathered round it to eat in honor of the idols. Like- It was sprinkled “over against. . . the tabernacle,” wise it was burnt by fire, either because God appeared to which denotes the synagogue, to signify either the con- Moses in a fire, and the Law was given from the midst demnation of the unbelieving Jews, or the purification of fire; or to denote that idolatry, together with all that of believers; and this “seven times,” in token either of was connected therewith, was to be extirpated altogether; the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, or of the seven days 1101 wherein all time is comprised. Again, all things that per-fered up for sin had to be burnt, to denote the destruction tain to the Incarnation of Christ should be burnt with fire, of sins. They were not, however, burnt on the altar: since i.e. they should be understood spiritually; for the “skin” none but holocausts were burnt thereon; but it was pre- and “flesh” signified Christ’s outward works; the “blood” scribed that they should be burnt without the camp, in de- denoted the subtle inward force which quickened His ex- testation of sin: for this was done whenever sacrifice was ternal deeds; the “dung” betokened His weariness, His offered for a grievous sin, or for the multitude of sins. The thirst, and all such like things pertaining to His weakness. other goat was let loose into the wilderness: not indeed to Three things were added, viz. “cedar-wood,” which de- offer it to the demons, whom the Gentiles worshipped in notes the height of hope or contemplation; “hyssop,” in desert places, because it was unlawful to offer aught to token of humility or faith; “scarlet twice dyed,” which them; but in order to point out the effect of the sacrifice denotes twofold charity; for it is by these three that we which had been offered up. Hence the priest put his hand should cling to Christ suffering. The ashes of this burning on its head, while confessing the sins of the children of Is- were gathered by “a man that is clean,” because the relics rael: as though that goat were to carry them away into the of the Passion came into the possession of the Gentiles, wilderness, where it would be devoured by wild beasts, who were not guilty of Christ’s death. The ashes were put because it bore the punishment of the people’s sins. And into water for the purpose of expiation, because Baptism it was said to bear the sins of the people, either because receives from Christ’s Passion the power of washing away the forgiveness of the people’s sins was signified by its sins. The priest who immolated and burned the cow, and being let loose, or because on its head written lists of sins he who burned, and he who gathered together the ashes, were fastened. were unclean, as also he that sprinkled the water: either The figurative reason of these things was that Christ because the Jews became unclean through putting Christ was foreshadowed both by the calf, on account of His to death, whereby our sins are expiated; and this, until the power; and by the ram, because He is the Head of the evening, i.e. until the end of the world, when the remnants faithful; and by the he-goat, on account of “the likeness of of Israel will be converted; or else because they who han- sinful flesh” (Rom. 8:3). Moreover, Christ was sacrificed dle sacred things with a view to the cleansing of others for the sins of both priests and people: since both those contract certain uncleannesses, as Gregory says (Pastor. of high and those of low degree are cleansed from sin by ii, 5); and this until the evening, i.e. until the end of this His Passion. The blood of the calf and of the goat was life. brought into the Holies by the priest, because the entrance Reply to Objection 6. As stated above (ad 5), an un- to the kingdom of heaven was opened to us by the blood cleanness which was caused by corruption either of mind of Christ’s Passion. Their bodies were burnt without the or of body was expiated by sin-offerings. Now special camp, because “Christ suffered without the gate,” as the sacrifices were wont to be offered for the sins of individ- Apostle declares (Heb. 13:12). The scape-goat may de- uals: but since some were neglectful about expiating such note either Christ’s Godhead Which went away into soli- sins and uncleannesses; or, through ignorance, failed to tude when the Man Christ suffered, not by going to an- offer this expiation; it was laid down that once a year, on other place, but by restraining His power: or it may signify the tenth day of the seventh month, a sacrifice of expia- the base concupiscence which we ought to cast away from tion should be offered for the whole people. And because, ourselves, while we offer up to Our Lord acts of virtue. as the Apostle says (Heb. 7:28), “the Law maketh men With regard to the uncleanness contracted by those priests, who have infirmity,” it behooved the priest first of who burnt these sacrifices, the reason is the same as that all to offer a calf for his own sins, in memory of Aaron’s which we assigned (ad 5) to the sacrifice of the red heifer. sin in fashioning the molten calf; and besides, to offer Reply to Objection 7. The legal rite did not cleanse a ram for a holocaust, which signified that the priestly the leper of his deformity, but declared him to be cleansed. sovereignty denoted by the ram, who is the head of the This is shown by the words of Lev. 14:3, seqq., where it flock, was to be ordained to the glory of God. Then he was said that the priest, “when he shall find that the lep- offered two he-goats for the people: one of which was of- rosy is cleansed,” shall command “him that is to be puri- fered in expiation of the sins of the multitude. For the he- fied”: consequently, the leper was already healed: but he goat is an evil-smelling animal; and from its skin clothes was said to be purified in so far as the verdict of the priest are made having a pungent odor; to signify the stench, un- restored him to the society of men and to the worship of cleanness and the sting of sin. After this he-goat had been God. It happened sometimes, however, that bodily lep- immolated, its blood was taken, together with the blood of rosy was miraculously cured by the legal rite, when the the calf, into the Holy of Holies, and the entire sanctuary priest erred in his judgment. was sprinkled with it; to signify that the tabernacle was Now this purification of a leper was twofold: for, in cleansed from the uncleanness of the children of Israel. the first place, he was declared to be clean; and, secondly, But the corpses of the he-goat and calf which had been of- he was restored, as clean, to the society of men and to the 1102 worship of God, to wit, after seven days. At the first pu-of any other uncleannesses, call for no special remark, be- rification the leper who sought to be cleansed offered for yond what applies to other sacrifices, whether for sins or himself “two living sparrows. . . cedar-wood, and scarlet, for trespasses. and hyssop,” in such wise that a sparrow and the hyssop Reply obj. 8 and 9: Just as the people were initiated by should be tied to the cedar-wood with a scarlet thread, so circumcision to the divine worship, so were the ministers that the cedar-wood was like the handle of an aspersory: by some special purification or consecration: wherefore while the hyssop and sparrow were that part of the asper- they are commanded to be separated from other men, as sory which was dipped into the blood of the other spar- being specially deputed, rather than others, to the min- row which was “immolated. . . over living waters.” These istry of the divine worship. And all that was done touch- things he offered as an antidote to the four defects of lep- ing them in their consecration or institution, was with a rosy: for cedar-wood, which is not subject to putrefaction, view to show that they were in possession of a preroga- was offered against the putrefaction; hyssop, which is a tive of purity, power and dignity. Hence three things were sweet-smelling herb, was offered up against the stench; done in the institution of ministers: for first, they were a living sparrow was offered up against numbness; and purified; secondly, they were adorned∗ and consecrated; scarlet, which has a vivid color, was offered up against thirdly, they were employed in the ministry. All in gen- the repulsive color of leprosy. The living sparrow was let eral used to be purified by washing in water, and by cer- loose to fly away into the plain, because the leper was re- tain sacrifices; but the Levites in particular shaved all the stored to his former liberty. hair of their bodies, as stated in Lev. 8 (cf. Num. 8). On the eighth day he was admitted to divine worship, With regard to the high-priests and priests the conse- and was restored to the society of men; but only after hav- cration was performed as follows. First, when they had ing shaved all the hair of his body, and washed his clothes, been washed, they were clothed with certain special gar- because leprosy rots the hair, infects the clothes, and gives ments in designation of their dignity. In particular, the them an evil smell. Afterwards a sacrifice was offered for high-priest was anointed on the head with the oil of unc- his sin, since leprosy was frequently a result of sin: and tion: to denote that the power of consecration was poured some of the blood of the sacrifice was put on the tip of the forth by him on to others, just as oil flows from the head ear of the man that was to be cleansed, “and on the thumb on to the lower parts of the body; according to Ps. 132:2: of his right hand, and the great toe of his right foot”; be- “Like the precious ointment on the head that ran down cause it is in these parts that leprosy is first diagnosed and upon the beard, the beard of Aaron.” But the Levites felt. In this rite, moreover, three liquids were employed: received no other consecration besides being offered to viz. blood, against the corruption of the blood; oil, to de- the Lord by the children of Israel through the hands of note the healing of the disease; and living waters, to wash the high-priest, who prayed for them. The lesser priests away the filth. were consecrated on the hands only, which were to be em- The figurative reason was that the Divine and human ployed in the sacrifices. The tip of their right ear and the natures in Christ were denoted by the two sparrows, one thumb of their right hand, and the great toe of their right of which, in likeness of His human nature, was offered up foot were tinged with the blood of the sacrificial animal, in an earthen vessel over living waters, because the wa- to denote that they should be obedient to God’s law in ters of Baptism are sanctified by Christ’s Passion. The offering the sacrifices (this is denoted by touching their other sparrow, in token of His impassible Godhead, re- right ear); and that they should be careful and ready in mained living, because the Godhead cannot die: hence performing the sacrifices (this is signified by the moisten- it flew away, for the Godhead could not be encompassed ing of the right foot and hand). They themselves and their by the Passion. Now this living sparrow, together with garments were sprinkled with the blood of the animal that the cedar-wood and scarlet or cochineal, and hyssop, i.e. had been sacrificed, in memory of the blood of the lamb faith, hope and charity, as stated above (ad 5), was put by which they had been delivered in Egypt. At their con- into the water for the purpose of sprinkling, because we secration the following sacrifices were offered: a calf, for are baptized in the faith of the God-Man. By the waters sin, in memory of Aaron’s sin in fashioning the molten of Baptism or of his tears man washes his clothes, i.e. calf; a ram, for a holocaust, in memory of the sacrifice of his works, and all his hair, i.e. his thoughts. The tip of Abraham, whose obedience it behooved the high-priest to the right ear of the man to be cleansed is moistened with imitate; again, a ram of consecration, which was a peace- some the blood and oil, in order to strengthen his hearing offering, in memory of the delivery form Egypt through against harmful words; and the thumb and toe of his right the blood of the lamb; and a basket of bread, in memory hand and foot are moistened that his deeds may be holy. of the manna vouchsafed to the people. Other matters pertaining to this purification, or to that also In reference to their being destined to the ministry, the ∗ ‘Ornabantur.’ Some editions have ‘ordinabantur’—‘were ordained’: the former reading is a reference to Lev. 8:7-9 1103 fat of the ram, one roll of bread, and the right shoulder he wore them on his breast, bearing them in his heart, were placed on their hands, to show that they received so to speak. And the Lord commanded the “Doctrine the power of offering these things to the Lord: while the and Truth” to be put in the rational: for certain matters Levites were initiated to the ministry by being brought regarding moral and dogmatic truth were written on it. into the tabernacle of the covenant, as being destined to The Jews indeed pretend that on the rational was placed a the ministry touching the vessels of the sanctuary. stone which changed color according to the various things The figurative reason of these things was that those which were about to happen to the children of Israel: and who are to be consecrated to the spiritual ministry of this they call the “Truth and Doctrine.” Fifthly, he wore Christ, should be first of all purified by the waters of Bap- a belt or girdle made of the four colors mentioned above. tism, and by the waters of tears, in their faith in Christ’s Sixthly, there was the tiara or mitre which was made of Passion, which is a sacrifice both of expiation and of pu- linen. Seventhly, there was the golden plate which hung rification. They have also to shave all the hair of their over his forehead; on it was inscribed the Lord’s name. body, i.e. all evil thoughts. They should, moreover, be Eighthly, there were “the linen breeches to cover the flesh decked with virtues, and be consecrated with the oil of of their nakedness,” when they went up to the sanctuary or the Holy Ghost, and with the sprinkling of Christ’s blood. altar. Of these eight vestments the lesser priests had four, And thus they should be intent on the fulfilment of their viz. the linen tunic and breeches, the belt and the tiara. spiritual ministry. According to some, the literal reason for these vest- Reply to Objection 10. As already stated (a. 4), the ments was that they denoted the disposition of the terres- purpose of the Law was to induce men to have reverence trial globe; as though the high-priest confessed himself to for the divine worship: and this in two ways; first, by ex- be the minister of the Creator of the world, wherefore it cluding from the worship of God whatever might be an is written (Wis. 18:24): “In the robe” of Aaron “was the object of contempt; secondly, by introducing into the di- whole world” described. For the linen breeches signified vine worship all that seemed to savor of reverence. And, the earth out of which the flax grows. The surrounding indeed, if this was observed in regard to the tabernacle belt signified the ocean which surrounds the earth. The and its vessels, and in the animals to be sacrificed, much violet tunic denoted the air by its color: its little bells be- more was it to be observed in the very ministers. Where- token the thunder; the pomegranates, the lightning. The fore, in order to obviate contempt for the ministers, it was ephod, by its many colors, signified the starry heaven; the prescribed that they should have no bodily stain or defect: two onyx stones denoted the two hemispheres, or the sun since men so deformed are wont to be despised by oth- and moon. The twelve precious stones on the breast are ers. For the same reason it was also commanded that the the twelve signs of the zodiac: and they are said to have choice of those who were to be destined to the service of been placed on the rational because in heaven, are the God was not to be made in a broadcast manner from any types [rationes] of earthly things, according to Job 38:33: family, but according to their descent from one particular “Dost thou know the order of heaven, and canst thou set stock, thus giving them distinction and nobility. down the reason [rationem] thereof on the earth?” The In order that they might be revered, special ornate turban or tiara signified the empyrean: the golden plate vestments were appointed for their use, and a special form was a token of God, the governor of the universe. of consecration. This indeed is the general reason of or- The figurative reason is evident. Because bodily stains nate garments. But the high-priest in particular had eight or defects wherefrom the priests had to be immune, sig- vestments. First, he had a linen tunic. Secondly, he had nify the various vices and sins from which they should be a purple tunic; round the bottom of which were placed free. Thus it is forbidden that he should be blind, i.e. he “little bells” and “pomegranates of violet, and purple, and ought not to be ignorant: he must not be lame, i.e. vac- scarlet twice dyed.” Thirdly, he had the ephod, which cov- illating and uncertain of purpose: that he must have “a ered his shoulders and his breast down to the girdle; and it little, or a great, or a crooked nose,” i.e. that he should was made of gold, and violet and purple, and scarlet twice not, from lack of discretion, exceed in one direction or in dyed and twisted linen: and on his shoulders he bore two another, or even exercise some base occupation: for the onyx stones, on which were graven the names of the chil- nose signifies discretion, because it discerns odors. It is dren of Israel. Fourthly, he had the rational, made of the forbidden that he should have “a broken foot” or “hand,” same material; it was square in shape, and was worn on i.e. he should not lose the power of doing good works or the breast, and was fastened to the ephod. On this ratio- of advancing in virtue. He is rejected, too, if he have a nal there were twelve precious stones set in four rows, on swelling either in front or behind [Vulg.: ‘if he be crook- which also were graven the names of the children of Is- backed’]: by which is signified too much love of earthly rael, in token that the priest bore the burden of the whole things: if he be blear-eyed, i.e. if his mind is darkened by people, since he bore their names on his shoulders; and carnal affections: for running of the eyes is caused by a that it was his duty ever to think of their welfare, since flow of matter. He is also rejected if he had “a pearl in his 1104 eye,” i.e. if he presumes in his own estimation that he is was signified by the golden plate worn over the forehead, clothed in the white robe of righteousness. Again, he is with the name of God engraved thereon. Secondly, they rejected “if he have a continued scab,” i.e. lustfulness of had to bear with the shortcomings of the people: this was the flesh: also, if he have “a dry scurf,” which covers the denoted by the ephod which they bore on their shoulders. body without giving pain, and is a blemish on the comeli- Thirdly, they had to carry the people in their mind and ness of the members; which denotes avarice. Lastly, he is heart by the solicitude of charity, in token of which they rejected “if he have a rupture” or hernia; through baseness wore the rational. Fourthly, they had to lead a godly life by rending his heart, though it appear not in his deeds. performing works of perfection; and this was signified by The vestments denote the virtues of God’s ministers. the violet tunic. Hence little golden bells were fixed to the Now there are four things that are necessary to all His bottom of the violet tunic, which bells signified the teach- ministers, viz. chastity denoted by the breeches; a pure ing of divine things united in the high-priest to his godly life, signified by the linen tunic; the moderation of dis- mode of life. In addition to these were the pomegranates, cretion, betokened by the girdle; and rectitude of purpose, signifying unity of faith and concord in good morals: be- denoted by the mitre covering the head. But the high- cause his doctrine should hold together in such a way that priests needed four other things in addition to these. First, it should not rend asunder the unity of faith and peace. a continual recollection of God in their thoughts; and this Whether there was any reasonable cause for the ceremonial observances? Ia IIae q. 102 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that there was no rea- be offered to the Lord (Ex. 13). Therefore it is an un- sonable cause for the ceremonial observances. Because, fitting command that is set forth in Lev. 19:23: “when as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 4:4), “every creature of God you shall be come into the land, and shall have planted in is good, and nothing to be rejected that is received with it fruit trees, you shall take away the uncircumcision† of thanksgiving.” It was therefore unfitting that they should them,” i.e. the first crops, and they “shall be unclean to be forbidden to eat certain foods, as being unclean accord- you, neither shall you eat of them.” ing to Lev. 11∗. Objection 6. Further, clothing is something extrane- Objection 2. Further, just as animals are given to man ous to man’s body. Therefore certain kinds of garments for food, so also are herbs: wherefore it is written (Gn. should not have been forbidden to the Jews: for instance 9:3): “As the green herbs have I delivered all” flesh “to (Lev. 19:19): “Thou shalt not wear a garment that is wo- you.” But the Law did not distinguish any herbs from the ven of two sorts”: and (Dt. 22:5): “A woman shall not rest as being unclean, although some are most harmful, be clothed with man’s apparel, neither shall a man use for instance, those that are poisonous. Therefore it seems woman’s apparel”: and further on (Dt. 22:11): “Thou that neither should any animals have been prohibited as shalt not wear a garment that is woven of woolen and linen being unclean. together.” Objection 3. Further, if the matter from which a thing Objection 7. Further, to be mindful of God’s com- is generated be unclean, it seems that likewise the thing mandments concerns not the body but the heart. There- generated therefrom is unclean. But flesh is generated fore it is unsuitably prescribed (Dt. 6:8, seqq.) that they from blood. Since therefore all flesh was not prohibited should “bind” the commandments of God “as a sign” on as unclean, it seems that in like manner neither should their hands; and that they should “write them in the entry”; blood have been forbidden as unclean; nor the fat which and (Num. 15:38, seqq.) that they should “make to them- is engendered from blood. selves fringes in the corners of their garments, putting in Objection 4. Further, Our Lord said (Mat. 10:28; cf. them ribands of blue. . . they may remember. . . the com- Lk. 12:4), that those should not be feared “that kill the mandments of the Lord.” body,” since after death they “have no more that they can Objection 8. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9) do”: which would not be true if after death harm might that God does not “take care for oxen,” and, therefore, come to man through anything done with his body. Much neither of other irrational animals. Therefore without rea- less therefore does it matter to an animal already dead how son is it commanded (Dt. 22:6): “If thou find, as thou its flesh be cooked. Consequently there seems to be no walkest by the way, a bird’s nest in a tree. . . thou shalt not reason in what is said, Ex. 23:19: “Thou shalt not boil a take the dam with her young”; and (Dt. 25:4): “Thou kid in the milk of its dam.” shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out thy corn”; and Objection 5. Further, all that is first brought forth of (Lev. 19:19): “Thou shalt not make thy cattle to gender man and beast, as being most perfect, is commanded to with beasts of any other kind.” ∗ Cf. Dt. 14 † ‘Praeputia,’ which Douay version renders ‘first fruits’ 1105 Objection 9. Further, no distinction was made be-read (Mat. 15:11): “Not that which goeth into the mouth tween clean and unclean plants. Much less therefore defileth a man; but what cometh out of the mouth, this should any distinction have been made about the culti- defileth a man”: which words are explained (Mat. 15:17) vation of plants. Therefore it was unfittingly prescribed as referring to sins. Yet certain foods can defile the soul (Lev. 19:19): “Thou shalt not sow thy field with different accidentally; in so far as man partakes of them against seeds”; and (Dt. 22:9, seqq.): “Thou shalt sow thy vine- obedience or a vow, or from excessive concupiscence; or yard with divers seeds”; and: “Thou shalt not plough with through their being an incentive to lust, for which reason an ox and an ass together.” some refrain from wine and flesh-meat. Objection 10. Further, it is apparent that inanimate If, however, we speak of bodily uncleanness, consist- things are most of all subject to the power of man. There- ing in some kind of corruption, the flesh of certain animals fore it was unfitting to debar man from taking silver and is unclean, either because like the pig they feed on unclean gold of which idols were made, or anything they found in things; or because their life is among unclean surround- the houses of idols, as expressed in the commandment of ings: thus certain animals, like moles and mice and such the Law (Dt. 7:25, seqq.). It also seems an absurd com- like, live underground, whence they contract a certain un- mandment set forth in Dt. 23:13, that they should “dig pleasant smell; or because their flesh, through being too round about and. . . cover with earth that which they were moist or too dry, engenders corrupt humors in the human eased of.” body. Hence they were forbidden to eat the flesh of flat- Objection 11. Further, piety is required especially in footed animals, i.e. animals having an uncloven hoof, on priests. But it seems to be an act of piety to assist at the account of their earthiness; and in like manner they were burial of one’s friends: wherefore Tobias is commended forbidden to eat the flesh of animals that have many clefts for so doing (Tob. 1:20, seqq.). In like manner it is some- in their feet, because such are very fierce and their flesh times an act of piety to marry a loose woman, because is very dry, such as the flesh of lions and the like. For the she is thereby delivered from sin and infamy. Therefore same reason they were forbidden to eat certain birds of it seems inconsistent for these things to be forbidden to prey the flesh of which is very dry, and certain water-fowl priests (Lev. 21). on account of their exceeding humidity. In like manner On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:14): “But thou certain fish lacking fins and scales were prohibited on ac- art otherwise instructed by the Lord thy God”: from which count of their excessive moisture; such as eels and the words we may gather that these observances were insti- like. They were, however, allowed to eat ruminants and tuted by God to be a special prerogative of that people. animals with a divided hoof, because in such animals the Therefore they are not without reason or cause. humors are well absorbed, and their nature well balanced: I answer that, The Jewish people, as stated above for neither are they too moist, as is indicated by the hoof; (a. 5), were specially chosen for the worship of God, nor are they too earthly, which is shown by their having and among them the priests themselves were specially set not a flat but a cloven hoof. Of fishes they were allowed to apart for that purpose. And just as other things that are partake of the drier kinds, of which the fins and scales are applied to the divine worship, need to be marked in some an indication, because thereby the moist nature of the fish particular way so that they be worthy of the worship of is tempered. Of birds they were allowed to eat the tamer God; so too in that people’s, and especially the priests’, kinds, such as hens, partridges, and the like. Another rea- mode of life, there needed to be certain special things be- son was detestation of idolatry: because the Gentiles, and fitting the divine worship, whether spiritual or corporal. especially the Egyptians, among whom they had grown Now the worship prescribed by the Law foreshadowed the up, offered up these forbidden animals to their idols, or mystery of Christ: so that whatever they did was a figure employed them for the purpose of sorcery: whereas they of things pertaining to Christ, according to 1 Cor. 10:11: did not eat those animals which the Jews were allowed to “All these things happened to them in figures.” Conse- eat, but worshipped them as gods, or abstained, for some quently the reasons for these observances may be taken in other motive, from eating them, as stated above (a. 3, ad two ways, first according to their fittingness to the worship 2). The third reason was to prevent excessive care about of God; secondly, according as they foreshadow some- food: wherefore they were allowed to eat those animals thing touching the Christian mode of life. which could be procured easily and promptly. Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 5, ad 4,5), With regard to blood and fat, they were forbidden to the Law distinguished a twofold pollution or uncleanness; partake of those of any animals whatever without excep- one, that of sin, whereby the soul was defiled; and an- tion. Blood was forbidden, both in order to avoid cru- other consisting in some kind of corruption, whereby the elty, that they might abhor the shedding of human blood, body was in some way infected. Speaking then of the as stated above (a. 3, ad 8); and in order to shun idol- first-mentioned uncleanness, no kind of food is unclean, atrous rite whereby it was customary for men to collect or can defile a man, by reason of its nature; wherefore we the blood and to gather together around it for a banquet 1106 in honor of the idols, to whom they held the blood to be those who lack kindly feelings, for the raven did not remost acceptable. Hence the Lord commanded the blood to turn when once it had been let loose from the ark. The be poured out and to be covered with earth (Lev. 17:13). ostrich which, though a bird, cannot fly, and is always on For the same reason they were forbidden to eat animals the ground, signifies those who fight God’s cause, and at that had been suffocated or strangled: because the blood the same time are taken up with worldly business. The of these animals would not be separated from the body: owl, which sees clearly at night, but cannot see in the day- or because this form of death is very painful to the victim; time, denotes those who are clever in temporal affairs, but and the Lord wished to withdraw them from cruelty even dull in spiritual matters. The gull, which flies both in the in regard to irrational animals, so as to be less inclined to air and swims in the water, signifies those who are partial be cruel to other men, through being used to be kind to both to Circumcision and to Baptism: or else it denotes beasts. They were forbidden to eat the fat: both because those who would fly by contemplation, yet dwell in the idolaters ate it in honor of their gods; and because it used waters of sensual delights. The hawk, which helps men to to be burnt in honor of God; and, again, because blood seize the prey, is a figure of those who assist the strong to and fat are not nutritious, which is the cause assigned by prey on the poor. The screech-owl, which seeks its food Rabbi Moses (Doct. Perplex. iii). The reason why they by night but hides by day, signifies the lustful man who were forbidden to eat the sinews is given in Gn. 32:32, seeks to lie hidden in his deeds of darkness. The cor- where it is stated that “the children of Israel. . . eat not the morant, so constituted that it can stay a long time under sinew. . . because he touched the sinew of” Jacob’s “thing water, denotes the glutton who plunges into the waters of and it shrank.” pleasure. The ibis is an African bird with a long beak, and The figurative reason for these things is that all these feeds on snakes; and perhaps it is the same as the stork: it animals signified certain sins, in token of which those signifies the envious man, who refreshes himself with the animals were prohibited. Hence Augustine says (Contra ills of others, as with snakes. The swan is bright in color, Faustum iv, 7): “If the swine and lamb be called in ques- and by the aid of its long neck extracts its food from deep tion, both are clean by nature, because all God’s creatures places on land or water: it may denote those who seek are good: yet the lamb is clean, and the pig is unclean earthly profit though an external brightness of virtue. The in a certain signification. Thus if you speak of a foolish, bittern is a bird of the East: it has a long beak, and its jaws and of a wise man, each of these expressions is clean con-are furnished with follicules, wherein it stores its food at sidered in the nature of the sound, letters and syllables first, after a time proceeding to digest it: it is a figure of of which it is composed: but in signification, the one is the miser, who is excessively careful in hoarding up the clean, the other unclean.” The animal that chews the cud necessaries of life. The coot∗ has this peculiarity apart and has a divided hoof, is clean in signification. Because from other birds, that it has a webbed foot for swimming, division of the hoof is a figure of the two Testaments: or and a cloven foot for walking: for it swims like a duck in of the Father and Son: or of the two natures in Christ: the water, and walks like a partridge on land: it drinks only of the distinction of good and evil. While chewing the when it bites, since it dips all its food in water: it is a figure cud signifies meditation on the Scriptures and a sound un-of a man who will not take advice, and does nothing but derstanding thereof; and whoever lacks either of these is what is soaked in the water of his own will. The heron†, spiritually unclean. In like manner those fish that have commonly called a falcon, signifies those whose “feet are scales and fins are clean in signification. Because fins swift to shed blood” (Ps. 13:3). The plover‡, which is a signify the heavenly or contemplative life; while scales garrulous bird, signifies the gossip. The hoopoe, which signify a life of trials, each of which is required for spiri- builds its nest on dung, feeds on foetid ordure, and whose tual cleanness. Of birds certain kinds were forbidden. In song is like a groan, denotes worldly grief which works the eagle which flies at a great height, pride is forbidden: death in those who are unclean. The bat, which flies near in the griffon which is hostile to horses and men, cruelty the ground, signifies those who being gifted with worldly of powerful men is prohibited. The osprey, which feeds knowledge, seek none but earthly things. Of fowls and on very small birds, signifies those who oppress the poor. quadrupeds those alone were permitted which have the The kite, which is full of cunning, denotes those who are hind-legs longer than the forelegs, so that they can leap: fraudulent in their dealings. The vulture, which follows whereas those were forbidden which cling rather to the an army, expecting to feed on the carcases of the slain, earth: because those who abuse the doctrine of the four signifies those who like others to die or to fight among Evangelists, so that they are not lifted up thereby, are re- themselves that they may gain thereby. Birds of the raven puted unclean. By the prohibition of blood, fat and nerves, kind signify those who are blackened by their lusts; or we are to understand the forbidding of cruelty, lust, and ∗ Douay: ‘porphyrion.’ St. Thomas’ description tallies with the coot or moorhen: though of course he is mistaken about the feet differing from one another. † Vulg.: ‘herodionem’ ‡ Here, again, the Douay translators transcribed from the Vulgate: ‘charadrion’; ‘charadrius’ is the generic name for all plovers. 1107 bravery in committing sin. ried away to Babylon, the third until the time of Christ), Reply to Objection 2. Men were wont to eat plants the Fruit of the Law, i.e. Christ, was to be offered to God. and other products of the soil even before the deluge: but Or again, that we must mistrust our first efforts, on ac- the eating of flesh seems to have been introduced after the count of their imperfection. deluge; for it is written (Gn. 9:3): “Even as the green Reply to Objection 6. It is said of a man in Ecclus. herbs have I delivered. . . all” flesh “to you.” The reason 19:27, that “the attire of the body. . . ” shows “what he for this was that the eating of the products of the soil sa- is.” Hence the Lord wished His people to be distinguished vors rather of a simple life; whereas the eating of flesh sa- from other nations, not only by the sign of the circumci- vors of delicate and over-careful living. For the soil gives sion, which was in the flesh, but also by a certain differ- birth to the herb of its own accord; and such like products ence of attire. Wherefore they were forbidden to wear of the earth may be had in great quantities with very little garments woven of woolen and linen together, and for a effort: whereas no small trouble is necessary either to rear woman to be clothed with man’s apparel, or vice versa, or to catch an animal. Consequently God being wishful for two reasons. First, to avoid idolatrous worship. Be- to bring His people back to a more simple way of living, cause the Gentiles, in their religious rites, used garments forbade them to eat many kinds of animals, but not those of this sort, made of various materials. Moreover in the things that are produced by the soil. Another reason may worship of Mars, women put on men’s armor; while, con- be that animals were offered to idols, while the products versely, in the worship of Venus men donned women’s of the soil were not. attire. The second reason was to preserve them from lust: The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what because the employment of various materials in the mak- has been said (ad 1). ing of garments signified inordinate union of sexes, while Reply to Objection 4. Although the kid that is slain the use of male attire by a woman, or vice versa, has an has no perception of the manner in which its flesh is incentive to evil desires, and offers an occasion of lust. cooked, yet it would seem to savor of heartlessness if the The figurative reason is that the prohibition of wearing a dam’s milk, which was intended for the nourishment of garment woven of woolen and linen signified that it was her offspring, were served up on the same dish. It might forbidden to unite the simplicity of innocence, denoted by also be said that the Gentiles in celebrating the feasts of wool, with the duplicity of malice, betokened by linen. their idols prepared the flesh of kids in this manner, for It also signifies that woman is forbidden to presume to the purpose of sacrifice or banquet: hence (Ex. 23) after teach, or perform other duties of men: or that man should the solemnities to be celebrated under the Law had been not adopt the effeminate manners of a woman. foretold, it is added: “Thou shalt not boil a kid in the milk Reply to Objection 7. As Jerome says on Mat. of its dam.” The figurative reason for this prohibition is 23:6, “the Lord commanded them to make violet-colored this: the kid, signifying Christ, on account of “the like- fringes in the four corners of their garments, so that ness of sinful flesh” (Rom. 8:3), was not to be seethed, the Israelites might be distinguished from other nations.” i.e. slain, by the Jews, “in the milk of its dam,” i.e. during Hence, in this way, they professed to be Jews: and conse- His infancy. Or else it signifies that the kid, i.e. the sinner, quently the very sight of this sign reminded them of their should not be boiled in the milk of its dam, i.e. should not law. be cajoled by flattery. When we read: “Thou shalt bind them on thy hand, Reply to Objection 5. The Gentiles offered their gods and they shall be ever before thy eyes [Vulg.: ‘they shall the first-fruits, which they held to bring them good luck: be and shall move between thy eyes’], the Pharisees gave or they burnt them for the purpose of secrecy. Conse- a false interpretation to these words, and wrote the deca- quently (the Israelites) were commanded to look upon the logue of Moses on a parchment, and tied it on their fore- fruits of the first three years as unclean: for in that coun- heads like a wreath, so that it moved in front of their eyes”: try nearly all the trees bear fruit in three years’ time; those whereas the intention of the Lord in giving this command-trees, to wit, that are cultivated either from seed, or from a ment was that they should be bound in their hands, i.e. in graft, or from a cutting: but it seldom happens that the their works; and that they should be before their eyes, i.e. fruit-stones or seeds encased in a pod are sown: since in their thoughts. The violet-colored fillets which were it would take a longer time for these to bear fruit: and inserted in their cloaks signify the godly intention which the Law considered what happened most frequently. The should accompany our every deed. It may, however, be fruits, however, of the fourth year, as being the firstlings said that, because they were a carnal-minded and stiff- of clean fruits, were offered to God: and from the fifth necked people, it was necessary for them to be stirred by year onward they were eaten. these sensible things to the observance of the Law. The figurative reason was that this foreshadowed the Reply to Objection 8. Affection in man is twofold: it fact that after the three states of the Law (the first lasting may be an affection of reason, or it may be an affection from Abraham to David, the second, until they were car- of passion. If a man’s affection be one of reason, it mat- 1108 ters not how man behaves to animals, because God has senses, i.e. the offspring, and set aside the observance subjected all things to man’s power, according to Ps. 8:8: of the letter, i.e. the mother, for instance, in all the cere- “Thou hast subjected all things under his feet”: and it is monies of the Law. It is also forbidden that beast of bur- in this sense that the Apostle says that “God has no care den, i.e. any of the common people, should be allowed for oxen”; because God does not ask of man what he does to engender, i.e. to have any connection, with animals of with oxen or other animals. another kind, i.e. with Gentiles or Jews. But if man’s affection be one of passion, then it is Reply to Objection 9. All these minglings were for- moved also in regard to other animals: for since the pas- bidden in agriculture; literally, in detestation of idolatry. sion of pity is caused by the afflictions of others; and since For the Egyptians in worshipping the stars employed vari- it happens that even irrational animals are sensible to pain, ous combinations of seeds, animals and garments, in order it is possible for the affection of pity to arise in a man to represent the various connections of the stars. Or else with regard to the sufferings of animals. Now it is evident all these minglings were forbidden in detestation of the that if a man practice a pitiful affection for animals, he unnatural vice. is all the more disposed to take pity on his fellow-men: They have, however, a figurative reason. For the prohi- wherefore it is written (Prov. 11:10): “The just regardeth bition: “Thou shalt not sow thy field with different seeds,” the lives of his beasts: but the bowels of the wicked are is to be understood, in the spiritual sense, of the prohibi- cruel.” Consequently the Lord, in order to inculcate pity tion to sow strange doctrine in the Church, which is a spir- to the Jewish people, who were prone to cruelty, wished itual vineyard. Likewise “the field,” i.e. the Church, must them to practice pity even with regard to dumb animals, not be sown “with different seeds,” i.e. with Catholic and and forbade them to do certain things savoring of cruelty heretical doctrines. Neither is it allowed to plough “with to animals. Hence He prohibited them to “boil a kid in an ox and an ass together”; thus a fool should not accom- the milk of its dam”; and to “muzzle the ox that tread- pany a wise man in preaching, for one would hinder the eth out the corn”; and to slay “the dam with her young.” other. It may, nevertheless, be also said that these prohibitions Reply to Objection 10.∗ Silver and gold were rea- were made in hatred of idolatry. For the Egyptians held sonably forbidden (Dt. 7) not as though they were not it to be wicked to allow the ox to eat of the grain while subject to the power of man, but because, like the idols threshing the corn. Moreover certain sorcerers were wont themselves, all materials out of which idols were made, to ensnare the mother bird with her young during incu- were anathematized as hateful in God’s sight. This is bation, and to employ them for the purpose of securing clear from the same chapter, where we read further on (Dt. fruitfulness and good luck in bringing up children: also 7:26): “Neither shalt thou bring anything of the idol into because it was held to be a good omen to find the mother thy house, lest thou become an anathema like it.” Another sitting on her young. reason was lest, by taking silver and gold, they should be As to the mingling of animals of divers species, the led by avarice into idolatry to which the Jews were in- literal reason may have been threefold. The first was to clined. The other precept (Dt. 23) about covering up ex- show detestation for the idolatry of the Egyptians, who cretions, was just and becoming, both for the sake of bod- employed various mixtures in worshipping the planets, ily cleanliness; and in order to keep the air wholesome; which produce various effects, and on various kinds of and by reason of the respect due to the tabernacle of the things according to their various conjunctions. The sec- covenant which stood in the midst of the camp, wherein ond reason was in condemnation of unnatural sins. The the Lord was said to dwell; as is clearly set forth in the third reason was the entire removal of all occasions of same passage, where after expressing the command, the concupiscence. Because animals of different species do reason thereof is at once added, to wit: “For the Lord thy not easily breed, unless this be brought about by man; God walketh in the midst of thy camp, to deliver thee, and movements of lust are aroused by seeing such things. and to give up thy enemies to thee, and let thy camp be Wherefore in the Jewish traditions we find it prescribed as holy [i.e. clean], and let no uncleanness appear therein.” stated by Rabbi Moses that men shall turn away their eyes The figurative reason for this precept, according to Gre- from such sights. gory (Moral. xxxi), is that sins which are the fetid excre- The figurative reason for these things is that the ne- tions of the mind should be covered over by repentance, cessities of life should not be withdrawn from the ox that we may become acceptable to God, according to Ps. that treadeth the corn, i.e. from the preacher bearing the 31:1: “Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and sheaves of doctrine, as the Apostle states (1 Cor. 9:4, whose sins are covered.” Or else according to a gloss, that seqq.). Again, we should not take the dam with her young: we should recognize the unhappy condition of human na- because in certain things we have to keep the spiritual ture, and humbly cover and purify the stains of a puffed- ∗ The Reply to the Tenth Objection is lacking in the codices. The solution given here is found in some editions, and was supplied by Nicolai. 1109 up and proud spirit in the deep furrow of self-examination. when the priestly dignity was passed on from father to Reply to Objection 11. Sorcerers and idolatrous son. Again, they were commanded to shave neither head priests made use, in their rites, of the bones and flesh of nor beard, and not to make incisions in their flesh, in or- dead men. Wherefore, in order to extirpate the customs of der to exclude the rites of idolatry. For the priests of the idolatrous worship, the Lord commanded that the priests Gentiles shaved both head and beard, wherefore it is writ- of inferior degree, who at fixed times served in the tem- ten (Bar 6:30): “Priests sit in their temples having their ple, should not “incur an uncleanness at the death” of any- garments rent, and their heads and beards shaven.” More- one except of those who were closely related to them, viz. over, in worshipping their idols “they cut themselves with their father or mother, and others thus near of kin to them. knives and lancets” (3 Kings 18:28). For this reason the But the high-priest had always to be ready for the service priests of the Old Law were commanded to do the con- of the sanctuary; wherefore he was absolutely forbidden trary. to approach the dead, however nearly related to him. They The spiritual reason for these things is that priests were also forbidden to marry a “harlot” or “one that has should be entirely free from dead works, i.e. sins. And been put away,” or any other than a virgin: both on ac- they should not shave their heads, i.e. set wisdom aside; count of the reverence due to the priesthood, the honor of nor should they shave their beards, i.e. set aside the per- which would seem to be tarnished by such a marriage: and fection of wisdom; nor rend their garments or cut their for the sake of the children who would be disgraced by flesh, i.e. they should not incur the sin of schism. the mother’s shame: which was most of all to be avoided 1110 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 103 Of the Duration of the Ceremonial Precepts (In Four Articles) We must now consider the duration of the ceremonial precepts: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the ceremonial precepts were in existence before the Law? (2) Whether at the time of the Law the ceremonies of the Old Law had any power of justification? (3) Whether they ceased at the coming of Christ? (4) Whether it is a mortal sin to observe them after the coming of Christ? Whether the ceremonies of the Law were in existence before the Law? Ia IIae q. 103 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the ceremonies of the foreshadowing of Christ. Now whoever worships God the Law were in existence before the Law. For sacrifices must needs worship Him by means of certain fixed things and holocausts were ceremonies of the Old Law, as stated pertaining to external worship. But the fixing of the di- above (q. 101, a. 4). But sacrifices and holocausts pre- vine worship belongs to the ceremonies; just as the deter- ceded the Law: for it is written (Gn. 4:3,4) that “Cain of- mining of our relations with our neighbor is a matter de- fered, of the fruits of the earth, gifts to the Lord,” and that termined by the judicial precepts, as stated above (q. 99, “Abel offered of the firstlings of his flock, and of their fat.” a. 4). Consequently, as among men in general there were Noe also “offered holocausts” to the Lord (Gn. 18:20), certain judicial precepts, not indeed established by Divine and Abraham did in like manner (Gn. 22:13). Therefore authority, but ordained by human reason; so also there the ceremonies of the Old Law preceded the Law. were some ceremonies fixed, not by the authority of any Objection 2. Further, the erecting and consecrating law, but according to the will and devotion of those that of the altar were part of the ceremonies relating to holy worship God. Since, however, even before the Law some things. But these preceded the Law. For we read (Gn. of the leading men were gifted with the spirit of prophecy, 13:18) that “Abraham. . . built. . . an altar to the Lord”; and it is to be believed that a heavenly instinct, like a private (Gn. 28:18) that “Jacob. . . took the stone. . . and set it up law, prompted them to worship God in a certain definite for a title, pouring oil upon the top of it.” Therefore the way, which would be both in keeping with the interior legal ceremonies preceded the Law. worship, and a suitable token of Christ’s mysteries, which Objection 3. Further, the first of the legal sacraments were foreshadowed also by other things that they did, ac- seems to have been circumcision. But circumcision pre- cording to 1 Cor. 10:11: “All. . . things happened to them ceded the Law, as appears from Gn. 17. In like manner in figure.” Therefore there were some ceremonies before the priesthood preceded the Law; for it is written (Gn. the Law, but they were not legal ceremonies, because they 14:18) that “Melchisedech. . . was the priest of the most were not as yet established by legislation. high God.” Therefore the sacramental ceremonies pre- Reply to Objection 1. The patriarchs offered up these ceded the Law. oblations, sacrifices and holocausts previously to the Law, Objection 4. Further, the distinction of clean from un- out of a certain devotion of their own will, according as it clean animals belongs to the ceremonies of observances, seemed proper to them to offer up in honor of God those as stated above (q. 100, 2, a. 6, ad 1). But this distinction things which they had received from Him, and thus to tes- preceded the Law; for it is written (Gn. 7:2,3): “Of all tify that they worshipped God Who is the beginning and clean beasts take seven and seven. . . but of the beasts that end of all. are unclean, two and two.” Therefore the legal ceremonies Reply to Objection 2. They also established certain preceded the Law. sacred things, because they thought that the honor due to On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): “These are God demanded that certain places should be set apart from the precepts and ceremonies. . . which the Lord your God others for the purpose of divine worship. commanded that I should teach you.” But they would not Reply to Objection 3. The sacrament of circum- have needed to be taught about these things, if the afore- cision was established by command of God before the said ceremonies had been already in existence. Therefore Law. Hence it cannot be called a sacrament of the Law the legal ceremonies did not precede the Law. as though it were an institution of the Law, but only as I answer that, As is clear from what has been said an observance included in the Law. Hence Our Lord said (q. 101, a. 2; q. 102 , a. 2), the legal ceremonies were (Jn. 7:20) that circumcision was “not of Moses, but of his ordained for a double purpose; the worship of God, and fathers.” Again, among those who worshipped God, the 1111 priesthood was in existence before the Law by human aponly certain animals for that purpose. If, however, they pointment, for the Law allotted the priestly dignity to the did make any distinction in regard to eating; it was not firstborn. that it was considered illegal to eat such animals, since Reply to Objection 4. The distinction of clean from this was not forbidden by any law, but from dislike or cus- unclean animals was in vogue before the Law, not with tom: thus even now we see that certain foods are looked regard to eating them, since it is written (Gn. 9:3): “Ev- upon with disgust in some countries, while people partake erything that moveth and liveth shall be meat for you”: of them in others. but only as to the offering of sacrifices because they used Whether, at the time of the Law, the ceremonies of the Old Law had any power of Ia IIae q. 103 a. 2 justification? Objection 1. It would seem that the ceremonies of the remedies for the removal of the aforesaid uncleannesses Old Law had the power of justification at the time of the which were contracted in consequence of the prescription Law. Because expiation from sin and consecration per- of the Law. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 9:13) that “the tains to justification. But it is written (Ex. 39:21) that the blood of goats and of oxen, and the ashes of a heifer, be- priests and their apparel were consecrated by the sprin- ing sprinkled, sanctify such as are defiled, to the cleans- kling of blood and the anointing of oil; and (Lev. 16:16) ing of the flesh.” And just as this uncleanness which was that, by sprinkling the blood of the calf, the priest expi- washed away by such like ceremonies, affected the flesh ated “the sanctuary from the uncleanness of the children rather than the soul, so also the ceremonies themselves are of Israel, and from their transgressions and. . . their sins.” called by the Apostle shortly before (Heb. 9:10) justices Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power of the flesh: “justices of the flesh,” says he, “being laid on of justification. them until the time of correction.” Objection 2. Further, that by which man pleases God On the other hand, they had no power of cleansing pertains to justification, according to Ps. 10:8: “The Lord from uncleanness of the soul, i.e. from the uncleanness is just and hath loved justice.” But some pleased God by of sin. The reason of this was that at no time could there means of ceremonies, according to Lev. 10:19: “How be expiation from sin, except through Christ, “Who taketh could I. . . please the Lord in the ceremonies, having a sor- away the sins [Vulg.: ‘sin’] of the world” (Jn. 1:29). And rowful heart?” Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law since the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation and Passion had had the power of justification. not yet really taken place, those ceremonies of the Old Objection 3. Further, things relating to the divine Law could not really contain in themselves a power flow- worship regard the soul rather than the body, according to ing from Christ already incarnate and crucified, such as Ps. 18:8: “The Law of the Lord is unspotted, converting the sacraments of the New Law contain. Consequently souls.” But the leper was cleansed by means of the cere- they could not cleanse from sin: thus the Apostle says monies of the Old Law, as stated in Lev. 14. Much more (Heb. 10:4) that “it is impossible that with the blood of therefore could the ceremonies of the Old Law cleanse the oxen and goats sin should be taken away”; and for this rea- soul by justifying it. son he calls them (Gal. 4:9) “weak and needy elements”: On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 2)∗: “If weak indeed, because they cannot take away sin; but this there had been a law given which could justify [Vulg.: weakness results from their being needy, i.e. from the fact ‘give life’], Christ died in vain,” i.e. without cause. But that they do not contain grace within themselves. this is inadmissible. Therefore the ceremonies of the Old However, it was possible at the time of the Law, for Law did not confer justice. the minds of the faithful, to be united by faith to Christ I answer that, As stated above (q. 102, a. 5, ad 4), incarnate and crucified; so that they were justified by faith a twofold uncleanness was distinguished in the Old Law. in Christ: of which faith the observance of these cere- One was spiritual and is the uncleanness of sin. The other monies was a sort of profession, inasmuch as they fore- was corporal, which rendered a man unfit for divine wor- shadowed Christ. Hence in the Old Law certain sacrifices ship; thus a leper, or anyone that touched carrion, was were offered up for sins, not as though the sacrifices them- said to be unclean: and thus uncleanness was nothing but selves washed sins away, but because they were profes- a kind of irregularity. From this uncleanness, then, the sions of faith which cleansed from sin. In fact, the Law ceremonies of the Old Law had the power to cleanse: be- itself implies this in the terms employed: for it is written cause they were ordered by the Law to be employed as (Lev. 4:26; 5:16) that in offering the sacrifice for sin “the ∗ The first words of the quotation are from 3:21: St. Thomas probably quoting from memory, substituted them for 2:21, which runs thus: ‘If justice be by the Law, then Christ died in vain.’ 1112 priest shall pray for him. . . and it shall be forgiven him,” the ceremonies by their obedience and devotion, and by as though the sin were forgiven, not in virtue of the sac- their faith in the reality foreshadowed; not by reason of rifices, but through the faith and devotion of those who the things considered in themselves. offered them. It must be observed, however, that the very Reply to Objection 3. Those ceremonies which were fact that the ceremonies of the Old Law washed away un- prescribed in the cleansing of a leper, were not ordained cleanness of the body, was a figure of that expiation from for the purpose of taking away the defilement of leprosy. sins which was effected by Christ. This is clear from the fact that these ceremonies were not It is therefore evident that under the state of the Old applied to a man until he was already healed: hence it Law the ceremonies had no power of justification. is written (Lev. 14:3,4) that the priest, “going out of the Reply to Objection 1. That sanctification of priests camp, when he shall find that the leprosy is cleansed, shall and their sons, and of their apparel or of anything else be- command him that is to be purified to offer,” etc.; whence longing to them, by sprinkling them with blood, had no it is evident that the priest was appointed the judge of lep- other effect but to appoint them to the divine worship, and rosy, not before, but after cleansing. But these ceremonies to remove impediments from them, “to the cleansing of were employed for the purpose of taking away the un- the flesh,” as the Apostle states (Heb. 9:13) in token of cleanness of irregularity. They do say, however, that if that sanctification whereby “Jesus” sanctified “the people a priest were to err in his judgment, the leper would be by His own blood” (Heb. 13:12). Moreover, the expiation cleansed miraculously by the power of God, but not in must be understood as referring to the removal of these virtue of the sacrifice. Thus also it was by miracle that the bodily uncleannesses, not to the forgiveness of sin. Hence thigh of the adulterous woman rotted, when she had drunk even the sanctuary which could not be the subject of sin is the water “on which” the priest had “heaped curses,” as stated to be expiated. stated in Num. 5:19-27. Reply to Objection 2. The priests pleased God in Whether the ceremonies of the Old Law ceased at the coming of Christ? Ia IIae q. 103 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the ceremonies of of a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbaths, the Old Law did not cease at the coming of Christ. For it which are a shadow of things to come”: and (Heb. 8:13): is written (Bar 4:1): “This is the book of the command- “In saying a new (testament), he hath made the former ments of God, and the law that is for ever.” But the legal old: and that which decayeth and groweth old, is near its ceremonies were part of the Law. Therefore the legal cer- end.” emonies were to last for ever. I answer that, All the ceremonial precepts of the Old Objection 2. Further, the offering made by a leper af- Law were ordained to the worship of God as stated above ter being cleansed was a ceremony of the Law. But the (q. 101, Aa. 1,2). Now external worship should be in pro- Gospel commands the leper, who has been cleansed, to portion to the internal worship, which consists in faith, make this offering (Mat. 8:4). Therefore the ceremonies hope and charity. Consequently exterior worship had to of the Old Law did not cease at Christ’s coming. be subject to variations according to the variations in the Objection 3. Further, as long as the cause remains, internal worship, in which a threefold state may be distin- the effect remains. But the ceremonies of the Old Law guished. One state was in respect of faith and hope, both had certain reasonable causes, inasmuch as they were or- in heavenly goods, and in the means of obtaining them— dained to the worship of God, besides the fact that they in both of these considered as things to come. Such was were intended to be figures of Christ. Therefore the cere- the state of faith and hope in the Old Law. Another state of monies of the Old Law should not have ceased. interior worship is that in which we have faith and hope Objection 4. Further, circumcision was instituted as in heavenly goods as things to come; but in the means a sign of Abraham’s faith: the observance of the sabbath, of obtaining heavenly goods, as in things present or past. to recall the blessing of creation: and other solemnities, Such is the state of the New Law. The third state is that in in memory of other Divine favors, as state above (q. 102, which both are possessed as present; wherein nothing is a. 4, ad 10; a. 5, ad 1). But Abraham’s faith is ever to be believed in as lacking, nothing hoped for as being yet to imitated even by us: and the blessing of creation and other come. Such is the state of the Blessed. Divine favors should never be forgotten. Therefore at least In this state of the Blessed, then, nothing in regard to circumcision and the other legal solemnities should not worship of God will be figurative; there will be naught but have ceased. “thanksgiving and voice of praise” (Is. 51:3). Hence it is On the contrary, The Apostle says (Col. 2:16,17): written concerning the city of the Blessed (Apoc. 21:22): “Let no man. . . judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect “I saw no temple therein: for the Lord God Almighty is 1113 the temple thereof, and the Lamb.” Proportionately, there-thereto. fore, the ceremonies of the first-mentioned state which Reply to Objection 4. The faith of Abraham was foreshadowed the second and third states, had need to commended in that he believed in God’s promise con- cease at the advent of the second state; and other cere- cerning his seed to come, in which all nations were to monies had to be introduced which would be in keeping blessed. Wherefore, as long as this seed was yet to come, with the state of divine worship for that particular time, it was necessary to make profession of Abraham’s faith by wherein heavenly goods are a thing of the future, but the means of circumcision. But now that it is consummated, Divine favors whereby we obtain the heavenly boons are the same thing needs to be declared by means of another a thing of the present. sign, viz. Baptism, which, in this respect, took the place Reply to Objection 1. The Old Law is said to be “for of circumcision, according to the saying of the Apostle ever” simply and absolutely, as regards its moral precepts; (Col. 2:11, 12): “You are circumcised with circumcision but as regards the ceremonial precepts it lasts for even in not made by hand, in despoiling of the body of the flesh, respect of the reality which those ceremonies foreshad- but in the circumcision of Christ, buried with Him in Bap- owed. tism.” Reply to Objection 2. The mystery of the redemption As to the sabbath, which was a sign recalling the first of the human race was fulfilled in Christ’s Passion: hence creation, its place is taken by the “Lord’s Day,” which re- Our Lord said then: “It is consummated” (Jn. 19:30). calls the beginning of the new creature in the Resurrec- Consequently the prescriptions of the Law must have tion of Christ. In like manner other solemnities of the ceased then altogether through their reality being fulfilled. Old Law are supplanted by new solemnities: because the As a sign of this, we read that at the Passion of Christ “the blessings vouchsafed to that people, foreshadowed the fa- veil of the temple was rent” (Mat. 27:51). Hence, before vors granted us by Christ. Hence the feast of the Passover Christ’s Passion, while Christ was preaching and working gave place to the feast of Christ’s Passion and Resurrec- miracles, the Law and the Gospel were concurrent, since tion: the feast of Pentecost when the Old Law was given, the mystery of Christ had already begun, but was not as to the feast of Pentecost on which was given the Law of yet consummated. And for this reason Our Lord, before the living spirit: the feast of the New Moon, to Lady Day, His Passion, commanded the leper to observe the legal when appeared the first rays of the sun, i.e. Christ, by the ceremonies. fulness of grace: the feast of Trumpets, to the feasts of Reply to Objection 3. The literal reasons already the Apostles: the feast of Expiation, to the feasts of Mar- given (q. 102) for the ceremonies refer to the divine wor- tyrs and Confessors: the feast of Tabernacles, to the feast ship, which was founded on faith in that which was to of the Church Dedication: the feast of the Assembly and come. Hence, at the advent of Him Who was to come, Collection, to feast of the Angels, or else to the feast of both that worship ceased, and all the reasons referring All Hallows. Whether since Christ’s Passion the legal ceremonies can be observed without commit-Ia IIae q. 103 a. 4 ting mortal sin? Objection 1. It would seem that since Christ’s Pas- is stated (Gal. 2:12) that, “when” certain men “had come” sion the legal ceremonies can be observed without com- to Antioch, Peter “withdrew and separated himself” from mitting mortal sin. For we must not believe that the apos- the Gentiles. Therefore the legal ceremonies can be ob- tles committed mortal sin after receiving the Holy Ghost: served since Christ’s Passion without committing mortal since by His fulness they were “endued with power from sin. on high” (Lk. 24:49). But the apostles observed the le- Objection 3. Further, the commands of the apostles gal ceremonies after the coming of the Holy Ghost: for did not lead men into sin. But it was commanded by it is stated (Acts 16:3) that Paul circumcised Timothy: apostolic decree that the Gentiles should observe certain and (Acts 21:26) that Paul, at the advice of James, “took ceremonies of the Law: for it is written (Acts 15:28,29): the men, and. . . being purified with them, entered into the “It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, to lay temple, giving notice of the accomplishment of the days no further burden upon you than these necessary things: of purification, until an oblation should be offered for ev- that you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from ery one of them.” Therefore the legal ceremonies can be blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication.” observed since the Passion of Christ without mortal sin. Therefore the legal ceremonies can be observed since Objection 2. Further, one of the legal ceremonies con- Christ’s Passion without committing mortal sin. sisted in shunning the fellowship of Gentiles. But the first On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 5:2): “If Pastor of the Church complied with this observance; for it you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing.” But 1114 nothing save mortal sin hinders us from receiving Christ’s made use of pretense, in things pertaining to the salvation fruit. Therefore since Christ’s Passion it is a mortal sin to of the faithful; therefore Augustine (Epist. lxxxii) more be circumcised, or to observe the other legal ceremonies. fittingly distinguished three periods of time. One was the I answer that, All ceremonies are professions of faith, time that preceded the Passion of Christ, during which in which the interior worship of God consists. Now man the legal ceremonies were neither deadly nor dead: an- can make profession of his inward faith, by deeds as well other period was after the publication of the Gospel, dur- as by words: and in either profession, if he make a false ing which the legal ceremonies are both dead and deadly. declaration, he sins mortally. Now, though our faith in The third is a middle period, viz. from the Passion of Christ is the same as that of the fathers of old; yet, since Christ until the publication of the Gospel, during which they came before Christ, whereas we come after Him, the the legal ceremonies were dead indeed, because they had same faith is expressed in different words, by us and by neither effect nor binding force; but were not deadly, be- them. For by them was it said: “Behold a virgin shall cause it was lawful for the Jewish converts to Christianity conceive and bear a son,” where the verbs are in the future to observe them, provided they did not put their trust in tense: whereas we express the same by means of verbs them so as to hold them to be necessary unto salvation, as in the past tense, and say that she “conceived and bore.” though faith in Christ could not justify without the legal In like manner the ceremonies of the Old Law betokened observances. On the other hand, there was no reason why Christ as having yet to be born and to suffer: whereas those who were converted from heathendom to Christian- our sacraments signify Him as already born and having ity should observe them. Hence Paul circumcised Timo- suffered. Consequently, just as it would be a mortal sin thy, who was born of a Jewish mother; but was unwilling now for anyone, in making a profession of faith, to say to circumcise Titus, who was of heathen nationality. that Christ is yet to be born, which the fathers of old said The reason why the Holy Ghost did not wish the con- devoutly and truthfully; so too it would be a mortal sin verted Jews to be debarred at once from observing the le- now to observe those ceremonies which the fathers of old gal ceremonies, while converted heathens were forbidden fulfilled with devotion and fidelity. Such is the teaching to observe the rites of heathendom, was in order to show Augustine (Contra Faust. xix, 16), who says: “It is no that there is a difference between these rites. For heathen- longer promised that He shall be born, shall suffer and ish ceremonial was rejected as absolutely unlawful, and rise again, truths of which their sacraments were a kind of as prohibited by God for all time; whereas the legal cere- image: but it is declared that He is already born, has suf- monial ceased as being fulfilled through Christ’s Passion, fered and risen again; of which our sacraments, in which being instituted by God as a figure of Christ. Christians share, are the actual representation.” Reply to Objection 2. According to Jerome, Peter Reply to Objection 1. On this point there seems to withdrew himself from the Gentiles by pretense, in order have been a difference of opinion between Jerome and to avoid giving scandal to the Jews, of whom he was the Augustine. For Jerome (Super Galat. ii, 11, seqq.) distin- Apostle. Hence he did not sin at all in acting thus. On guished two periods of time. One was the time previous to the other hand, Paul in like manner made a pretense of Christ’s Passion, during which the legal ceremonies were blaming him, in order to avoid scandalizing the Gentiles, neither dead, since they were obligatory, and did expiate whose Apostle he was. But Augustine disapproves of this in their own fashion; nor deadly, because it was not sinful solution: because in the canonical Scripture (viz. Gal. to observe them. But immediately after Christ’s Passion 2:11), wherein we must not hold anything to be false, Paul they began to be not only dead, so as no longer to be ei- says that Peter “was to be blamed.” Consequently it is true ther effectual or binding; but also deadly, so that whoever that Peter was at fault: and Paul blamed him in very truth observed them was guilty of mortal sin. Hence he main- and not with pretense. Peter, however, did not sin, by ob- tained that after the Passion the apostles never observed serving the legal ceremonial for the time being; because the legal ceremonies in real earnest; but only by a kind this was lawful for him who was a converted Jew. But he of pious pretense, lest, to wit, they should scandalize the did sin by excessive minuteness in the observance of the Jews and hinder their conversion. This pretense, however, legal rites lest he should scandalize the Jews, the result is to be understood, not as though they did not in reality being that he gave scandal to the Gentiles. perform those actions, but in the sense that they performed Reply to Objection 3. Some have held that this pro- them without the mind to observe the ceremonies of the hibition of the apostles is not to be taken literally, but spir-Law: thus a man might cut away his foreskin for health’s itually: namely, that the prohibition of blood signifies the sake, not with the intention of observing legal circumci- prohibition of murder; the prohibition of things strangled, sion. that of violence and rapine; the prohibition of things of- But since it seems unbecoming that the apostles, in or- fered to idols, that of idolatry; while fornication is forbid- der to avoid scandal, should have hidden things pertaining den as being evil in itself: which opinion they gathered to the truth of life and doctrine, and that they should have from certain glosses, which expound these prohibitions in 1115 a mystical sense. Since, however, murder and rapine were pose of enforcing compliance with the legal ceremonies, held to be unlawful even by the Gentiles, there would have but in order to further the union of Gentiles and Jews been no need to give this special commandment to those living side by side. Because blood and things strangled who were converted to Christ from heathendom. Hence were loathsome to the Jews by ancient custom; while the others maintain that those foods were forbidden literally, Jews might have suspected the Gentiles of relapse into not to prevent the observance of legal ceremonies, but in idolatry if the latter had partaken of things offered to order to prevent gluttony. Thus Jerome says on Ezech. idols. Hence these things were prohibited for the time be- 44:31 (“The priest shall not eat of anything that is dead”): ing, during which the Gentiles and Jews were to become “He condemns those priests who from gluttony did not united together. But as time went on, with the lapse of the keep these precepts.” cause, the effect lapsed also, when the truth of the Gospel But since certain foods are more delicate than these teaching was divulged, wherein Our Lord taught that “not and more conducive to gluttony, there seems no reason that which entereth into the mouth defileth a man” (Mat. why these should have been forbidden more than the oth- 15:11); and that “nothing is to be rejected that is received ers. with thanksgiving” (1 Tim. 4:4). With regard to fornica- We must therefore follow the third opinion, and hold tion a special prohibition was made, because the Gentiles that these foods were forbidden literally, not with the pur- did not hold it to be sinful. 1116 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 104 Of the Judicial Precepts (In Four Articles) We must now consider the judicial precepts: and first of all we shall consider them in general; in the second place we shall consider their reasons. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What is meant by the judicial precepts? (2) Whether they are figurative? (3) Their duration; (4) Their division. Whether the judicial precepts were those which directed man in relation to his neigh-Ia IIae q. 104 a. 1 bor? Objection 1. It would seem that the judicial pre- precepts. When therefore the moral precepts are fixed by cepts were not those which directed man in his relations Divine institution in matters relating to man’s subordina- to his neighbor. For judicial precepts take their name from tion to God, they are called “ceremonial” precepts: but “judgment.” But there are many things that direct man as when they refer to man’s relations to other men, they are to his neighbor, which are not subordinate to judgment. called “judicial” precepts. Hence there are two conditions Therefore the judicial precepts were not those which di- attached to the judicial precepts: viz. first, that they refer rected man in his relations to his neighbor. to man’s relations to other men; secondly, that they derive Objection 2. Further, the judicial precepts are distinct their binding force not from reason alone, but in virtue of from the moral precepts, as stated above (q. 99, a. 4). But their institution. there are many moral precepts which direct man as to his Reply to Objection 1. Judgments emanate through neighbor: as is evidently the case with the seven precepts the official pronouncement of certain men who are at the of the second table. Therefore the judicial precepts are not head of affairs, and in whom the judicial power is vested. so called from directing man as to his neighbor. Now it belongs to those who are at the head of affairs to Objection 3. Further, as the ceremonial precepts re- regulate not only litigious matters, but also voluntary con- late to God, so do the judicial precepts relate to one’s tracts which are concluded between man and man, and neighbor, as stated above (q. 99, a. 4; q. 101, a. 1). But whatever matters concern the community at large and the among the ceremonial precepts there are some which con- government thereof. Consequently the judicial precepts cern man himself, such as observances in matter of food are not only those which concern actions at law; but also and apparel, of which we have already spoken (q. 102, all those that are directed to the ordering of one man in re- a. 6, ad 1,6). Therefore the judicial precepts are not so lation to another, which ordering is subject to the direction called from directing man as to his neighbor. of the sovereign as supreme judge. On the contrary, It is reckoned (Ezech. 18:8) among Reply to Objection 2. This argument holds in respect other works of a good and just man, that “he hath executed of those precepts which direct man in his relations to his true judgment between man and man.” But judicial pre- neighbor, and derive their binding force from the mere cepts are so called from “judgment.” Therefore it seems dictate of reason. that the judicial precepts were those which directed the Reply to Objection 3. Even in those precepts which relations between man and man. direct us to God, some are moral precepts, which the rea- I answer that, As is evident from what we have stated son itself dictates when it is quickened by faith; such as above (q. 95, a. 2 ; q. 99, a. 4), in every law, some precepts that God is to be loved and worshipped. There are also derive their binding force from the dictate of reason itself, ceremonial precepts, which have no binding force except because natural reason dictates that something ought to be in virtue of their Divine institution. Now God is con- done or to be avoided. These are called “moral” precepts: cerned not only with the sacrifices that are offered to Him, since human morals are based on reason. At the same time but also with whatever relates to the fitness of those who there are other precepts which derive their binding force, offer sacrifices to Him and worship Him. Because men not from the very dictate of reason (because, considered are ordained to God as to their end; wherefore it concerns in themselves, they do not imply an obligation of some- God and, consequently, is a matter of ceremonial precept, thing due or undue); but from some institution, Divine or that man should show some fitness for the divine worship. human: and such are certain determinations of the moral On the other hand, man is not ordained to his neighbor as 1117 to his end, so as to need to be disposed in himself with re-in the state. Nevertheless we must take note that, since the gard to his neighbor, for such is the relationship of a slave relations of man to his neighbor are more subject to reason to his master, since a slave “is his master’s in all that he is,” than the relations of man to God, there are more precepts as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Hence there are no whereby man is directed in his relations to his neighbor, judicial precepts ordaining man in himself; all such pre- than whereby he is directed to God. For the same reason cepts are moral: because the reason, which is the principal there had to be more ceremonial than judicial precepts in in moral matters, holds the same position, in man, with re- the Law. gard to things that concern him, as a prince or judge holds Whether the judicial precepts were figurative? Ia IIae q. 104 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the judicial precepts not primarily and in themselves, but consequently. In this were not figurative. Because it seems proper to the cere- way the judicial precepts of the Old Law are figurative. monial precepts to be instituted as figures of something For they were not instituted for the purpose of being fig- else. Therefore, if the judicial precepts are figurative, urative, but in order that they might regulate the state of there will be no difference between the judicial and cer- that people according to justice and equity. Nevertheless emonial precepts. they did foreshadow something consequently: since, to Objection 2. Further, just as certain judicial precepts wit, the entire state of that people, who were directed by were given to the Jewish people, so also were some given these precepts, was figurative, according to 1 Cor. 10:11: to other heathen peoples. But the judicial precepts given “All. . . things happened to them in figure.” to other peoples were not figurative, but stated what had to Reply to Objection 1. The ceremonial precepts are be done. Therefore it seems that neither were the judicial not figurative in the same way as the judicial precepts, as precepts of the Old Law figures of anything. explained above. Objection 3. Further, those things which relate to the Reply to Objection 2. The Jewish people were cho- divine worship had to be taught under certain figures, be- sen by God that Christ might be born of them. Conse- cause the things of God are above our reason, as stated quently the entire state of that people had to be prophetic above (q. 101, a. 2, ad 2). But things concerning our and figurative, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xxii, neighbor are not above our reason. Therefore the judi- 24). For this reason even the judicial precepts that were cial precepts which direct us in relation to our neighbor given to this people were more figurative that those which should not have been figurative. were given to other nations. Thus, too, the wars and deeds On the contrary, The judicial precepts are expounded of this people are expounded in the mystical sense: but not both in the allegorical and in the moral sense (Ex. 21). the wars and deeds of the Assyrians or Romans, although I answer that, A precept may be figurative in two the latter are more famous in the eyes of men. ways. First, primarily and in itself: because, to wit, it is in-Reply to Objection 3. In this people the direction of stituted principally that it may be the figure of something. man in regard to his neighbor, considered in itself, was In this way the ceremonial precepts are figurative; since subject to reason. But in so far as it was referred to the they were instituted for the very purpose that they might worship of God, it was above reason: and in this respect foreshadow something relating to the worship of God and it was figurative. the mystery of Christ. But some precepts are figurative, Whether the judicial precepts of the Old Law bind for ever? Ia IIae q. 104 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the judicial precepts that “there is a setting aside of the former commandment, of the Old Law bind for ever. Because the judicial pre- because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof.” cepts relate to the virtue of justice: since a judgment is Now this is true of the ceremonial precept, which “could an execution of the virtue of justice. Now “justice is per- [Vulg.: ‘can’] not, as to the conscience, make him per- petual and immortal” (Wis. 1:15). Therefore the judicial fect that serveth only in meats and in drinks, and divers precepts bind for ever. washings and justices of the flesh,” as the Apostle declares Objection 2. Further, Divine institutions are more en- (Heb. 9:9,10). On the other hand, the judicial precepts during than human institutions. But the judicial precepts were useful and efficacious in respect of the purpose for of human laws bind for ever. Therefore much more do the which they were instituted, viz. to establish justice and judicial precepts of the Divine Law. equity among men. Therefore the judicial precepts of the Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18) Old Law are not set aside, but still retain their efficacy. 1118 On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 7:12) that in Gal. 3:24. Since, however, these judicial precepts are “the priesthood being translated it is necessary that a instituted, not for the purpose of being figures, but for the translation also be made of the Law.” But the priesthood performance of certain deeds, the observance thereof is was transferred from Aaron to Christ. Therefore the entire not prejudicial to the truth of faith. But the intention of Law was also transferred. Therefore the judicial precepts observing them, as though one were bound by the Law, are no longer in force. is prejudicial to the truth of faith: because it would fol- I answer that, The judicial precepts did not bind for low that the former state of the people still lasts, and that ever, but were annulled by the coming of Christ: yet not Christ has not yet come. in the same way as the ceremonial precepts. For the cer- Reply to Objection 1. The obligation of observing emonial precepts were annulled so far as to be not only justice is indeed perpetual. But the determination of those “dead,” but also deadly to those who observe them since things that are just, according to human or Divine insti- the coming of Christ, especially since the promulgation tution, must needs be different, according to the different of the Gospel. On the other hand, the judicial precepts states of mankind. are dead indeed, because they have no binding force: but Reply to Objection 2. The judicial precepts estab- they are not deadly. For if a sovereign were to order these lished by men retain their binding force for ever, so long judicial precepts to be observed in his kingdom, he would as the state of government remains the same. But if the not sin: unless perchance they were observed, or ordered state or nation pass to another form of government, the to be observed, as though they derived their binding force laws must needs be changed. For democracy, which is through being institutions of the Old Law: for it would be government by the people, demands different laws from a deadly sin to intend to observe them thus. those of oligarchy, which is government by the rich, as The reason for this difference may be gathered from the Philosopher shows (Polit. iv, 1). Consequently when what has been said above (a. 2). For it has been stated the state of that people changed, the judicial precepts had that the ceremonial precepts are figurative primarily and to be changed also. in themselves, as being instituted chiefly for the purpose Reply to Objection 3. Those judicial precepts di- of foreshadowing the mysteries of Christ to come. On the rected the people to justice and equity, in keeping with other hand, the judicial precepts were not instituted that the demands of that state. But after the coming of Christ, they might be figures, but that they might shape the state there had to be a change in the state of that people, so of that people who were directed to Christ. Consequently, that in Christ there was no distinction between Gentile and when the state of that people changed with the coming Jew, as there had been before. For this reason the judicial of Christ, the judicial precepts lost their binding force: for precepts needed to be changed also. the Law was a pedagogue, leading men to Christ, as stated Whether it is possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts? Ia IIae q. 104 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that it is impossible to as- On the contrary, Wherever there is order there must sign a distinct division of the judicial precepts. Because needs be division. But the notion of order is chiefly ap- the judicial precepts direct men in their relations to one plicable to the judicial precepts, since thereby that people another. But those things which need to be directed, as was ordained. Therefore it is most necessary that they pertaining to the relationship between man and man, and should have a distinct division. which are made use of by men, are not subject to division, I answer that, Since law is the art, as it were, of di- since they are infinite in number. Therefore it is not pos- recting or ordering the life of man, as in every art there is sible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts. a distinct division in the rules of art, so, in every law, there Objection 2. Further, the judicial precepts are deci-must be a distinct division of precepts: else the law would sions on moral matters. But moral precepts do not seem be rendered useless by confusion. We must therefore say to be capable of division, except in so far as they are re- that the judicial precepts of the Old Law, whereby men ducible to the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore there were directed in their relations to one another, are subject is no distinct division of the judicial precepts. to division according to the divers ways in which man is Objection 3. Further, because there is a distinct di- directed. vision of the ceremonial precepts, the Law alludes to this Now in every people a fourfold order is to be found: division, by describing some as “sacrifices,” others as “ob- one, of the people’s sovereign to his subjects; a second of servances.” But the Law contains no allusion to a division the subjects among themselves; a third, of the citizens to of the judicial precepts. Therefore it seems that they have foreigners; a fourth, of members of the same household, no distinct division. such as the order of the father to his son; of the wife to 1119 her husband; of the master to his servant: and according Reply to Objection 1. Things pertaining to the order-to these four orders we may distinguish different kinds of ing of relations between one man and another are indeed judicial precepts in the Old Law. For certain precepts are infinite in number: yet they are reducible to certain dis- laid down concerning the institution of the sovereign and tinct heads, according to the different relations in which relating to his office, and about the respect due to him: this one man stands to another, as stated above. is one part of the judicial precepts. Again, certain precepts Reply to Objection 2. The precepts of the deca- are given in respect of a man to his fellow citizens: for in- logue held the first place in the moral order, as stated stance, about buying and selling, judgments and penalties: above (q. 100, a. 3): and consequently it is fitting that this is the second part of the judicial precepts. Again, cer- other moral precepts should be distinguished in relation tain precepts are enjoined with regard to foreigners: for to them. But the judicial and ceremonial precepts have a instance, about wars waged against their foes, and about different binding force, derived, not from natural reason, the way to receive travelers and strangers: this is the third but from their institution alone. Hence there is a distinct part of the judicial precepts. Lastly, certain precepts are reason for distinguishing them. given relating to home life: for instance, about servants, Reply to Objection 3. The Law alludes to the divi- wives and children: this is the fourth part of the judicial sion of the judicial precepts in the very things themselves precepts. which are prescribed by the judicial precepts of the Law. 1120 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 105 Of the Reason for the Judicial Precepts (In Four Articles) We must now consider the reason for the judicial precepts: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Concerning the reason for the judicial precepts relating to the rulers; (2) Concerning the fellowship of one man with another; (3) Concerning matters relating to foreigners; (4) Concerning things relating to domestic matters. Whether the Old Law enjoined fitting precepts concerning rulers? Ia IIae q. 105 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law made have been determined for the livelihood of the rulers of unfitting precepts concerning rulers. Because, as the the people: the more that they were forbidden to accept Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 4), “the ordering of the people presents, as is clearly stated in Ex. 23:8: “You shall not depends mostly on the chief ruler.” But the Law contains [Vulg.: ‘Neither shalt thou’] take bribes, which even blind no precept relating to the institution of the chief ruler; and the wise, and pervert the words of the just.” yet we find therein prescriptions concerning the inferior Objection 5. Further, as a kingdom is the best form rulers: firstly (Ex. 18:21): “Provide out of all the peo- of government, so is tyranny the most corrupt. But when ple wise [Vulg.: ‘able’] men,” etc.; again (Num. 11:16): the Lord appointed the king, He established a tyrannical “Gather unto Me seventy men of the ancients of Israel”; law; for it is written (1 Kings 8:11): “This will be the right and again (Dt. 1:13): “Let Me have from among you wise of the king, that shall reign over you: He will take your and understanding men,” etc. Therefore the Law provided sons,” etc. Therefore the Law made unfitting provision insufficiently in regard to the rulers of the people. with regard to the institution of rulers. Objection 2. Further, “The best gives of the best,” as On the contrary, The people of Israel is commended Plato states (Tim. ii). Now the best ordering of a state or for the beauty of its order (Num. 24:5): “How beautiful of any nation is to be ruled by a king: because this kind are thy tabernacles, O Jacob, and thy tents.” But the beau- of government approaches nearest in resemblance to the tiful ordering of a people depends on the right establish- Divine government, whereby God rules the world from ment of its rulers. Therefore the Law made right provision the beginning. Therefore the Law should have set a king for the people with regard to its rulers. over the people, and they should not have been allowed I answer that, Two points are to be observed concern- a choice in the matter, as indeed they were allowed (Dt. ing the right ordering of rulers in a state or nation. One is 17:14,15): “When thou. . . shalt say: I will set a king over that all should take some share in the government: for me. . . thou shalt set him,” etc. this form of constitution ensures peace among the people, Objection 3. Further, according to Mat. 12:25: “Ev- commends itself to all, and is most enduring, as stated in ery kingdom divided against itself shall be made deso- Polit. ii, 6. The other point is to be observed in respect of late”: a saying which was verified in the Jewish people, the kinds of government, or the different ways in which whose destruction was brought about by the division of the constitutions are established. For whereas these differ the kingdom. But the Law should aim chiefly at things in kind, as the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5), neverthe- pertaining to the general well-being of the people. There- less the first place is held by the “kingdom,” where the fore it should have forbidden the kingdom to be divided power of government is vested in one; and “aristocracy,” under two kings: nor should this have been introduced which signifies government by the best, where the power even by Divine authority; as we read of its being intro- of government is vested in a few. Accordingly, the best duced by the authority of the prophet Ahias the Silonite form of government is in a state or kingdom, where one is (3 Kings 11:29, seqq.). given the power to preside over all; while under him are Objection 4. Further, just as priests are instituted for others having governing powers: and yet a government of the benefit of the people in things concerning God, as this kind is shared by all, both because all are eligible to stated in Heb. 5:1; so are rulers set up for the benefit of govern, and because the rules are chosen by all. For this is the people in human affairs. But certain things were al- the best form of polity, being partly kingdom, since there lotted as a means of livelihood for the priests and Levites is one at the head of all; partly aristocracy, in so far as a of the Law: such as the tithes and first-fruits, and many number of persons are set in authority; partly democracy, like things. Therefore in like manner certain things should i.e. government by the people, in so far as the rulers can 1121 be chosen from the people, and the people have the right man of another nation king, because such kings are wont to choose their rulers. to take little interest in the people they are set over, and Such was the form of government established by the consequently to have no care for their welfare: secondly, Divine Law. For Moses and his successors governed the He prescribed how the king after his appointment should people in such a way that each of them was ruler over all; behave, in regard to himself; namely, that he should not so that there was a kind of kingdom. Moreover, seventy- accumulate chariots and horses, nor wives, nor immense two men were chosen, who were elders in virtue: for it wealth: because through craving for such things princes is written (Dt. 1:15): “I took out of your tribes wise and become tyrants and forsake justice. He also appointed the honorable, and appointed them rulers”: so that there was manner in which they were to conduct themselves towards an element of aristocracy. But it was a democratical gov- God: namely, that they should continually read and pon- ernment in so far as the rulers were chosen from all the der on God’s Law, and should ever fear and obey God. people; for it is written (Ex. 18:21): “Provide out of all Moreover, He decided how they should behave towards the people wise [Vulg.: ‘able’] men,” etc.; and, again, in their subjects: namely, that they should not proudly de- so far as they were chosen by the people; wherefore it is spise them, or ill-treat them, and that they should not de- written (Dt. 1:13): “Let me have from among you wise part from the paths of justice. [Vulg.: ‘able’] men,” etc. Consequently it is evident that Reply to Objection 3. The division of the king- the ordering of the rulers was well provided for by the dom, and a number of kings, was rather a punishment in- Law. flicted on that people for their many dissensions, specially Reply to Objection 1. This people was governed un- against the just rule of David, than a benefit conferred on der the special care of God: wherefore it is written (Dt. them for their profit. Hence it is written (Osee 13:11): “I 7:6): “The Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be His pecu- will give thee a king in My wrath”; and (Osee 8:4): “They liar people”: and this is why the Lord reserved to Himself have reigned, but not by Me: they have been princes, and the institution of the chief ruler. For this too did Moses I knew not.” pray (Num. 27:16): “May the Lord the God of the spirits Reply to Objection 4. The priestly office was be- of all the flesh provide a man, that may be over this mul- queathed by succession from father to son: and this, in titude.” Thus by God’s orders Josue was set at the head order that it might be held in greater respect, if not any in place of Moses; and we read about each of the judges man from the people could become a priest: since honor who succeeded Josue that God “raised. . . up a saviour” was given to them out of reverence for the divine wor- for the people, and that “the spirit of the Lord was” in ship. Hence it was necessary to put aside certain things them (Judges 3:9,10,15). Hence the Lord did not leave for them both as to tithes and as to first-fruits, and, again, the choice of a king to the people; but reserved this to as to oblations and sacrifices, that they might be afforded Himself, as appears from Dt. 17:15: “Thou shalt set him a means of livelihood. On the other hand, the rulers, as whom the Lord thy God shall choose.” stated above, were chosen from the whole people; where- Reply to Objection 2. A kingdom is the best form fore they had their own possessions, from which to de- of government of the people, so long as it is not corrupt. rive a living: and so much the more, since the Lord for- But since the power granted to a king is so great, it easily bade even a king to have superabundant wealth to make degenerates into tyranny, unless he to whom this power is too much show of magnificence: both because he could given be a very virtuous man: for it is only the virtuous scarcely avoid the excesses of pride and tyranny, arising man that conducts himself well in the midst of prosperity, from such things, and because, if the rulers were not very as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 3). Now perfect rich, and if their office involved much work and anxiety, it virtue is to be found in few: and especially were the Jews would not tempt the ambition of the common people; and inclined to cruelty and avarice, which vices above all turn would not become an occasion of sedition. men into tyrants. Hence from the very first the Lord did Reply to Objection 5. That right was not given to not set up the kingly authority with full power, but gave the king by Divine institution: rather was it foretold that them judges and governors to rule them. But afterwards kings would usurp that right, by framing unjust laws, and when the people asked Him to do so, being indignant with by degenerating into tyrants who preyed on their subjects. them, so to speak, He granted them a king, as is clear This is clear from the context that follows: “And you shall from His words to Samuel (1 Kings 8:7): “They have not be his slaves [Douay: ‘servants’]”: which is significative rejected thee, but Me, that I should not reign over them.” of tyranny, since a tyrant rules is subjects as though they Nevertheless, as regards the appointment of a king, were his slaves. Hence Samuel spoke these words to deter He did establish the manner of election from the very them from asking for a king; since the narrative contin- beginning (Dt. 17:14, seqq.): and then He determined ues: “But the people would not hear the voice of Samuel.” two points: first, that in choosing a king they should wait It may happen, however, that even a good king, without for the Lord’s decision; and that they should not make a being a tyrant, may take away the sons, and make them 1122 tribunes and centurions; and may take many things from his subjects in order to secure the common weal. Whether the judicial precepts were suitably framed as to the relations of one man Ia IIae q. 105 a. 2 with another? Objection 1. It would seem that the judicial precepts given to be kept, that He would preserve them safe, for were not suitably framed as regards the relations of one them that had deposited them.” But the precepts of the Old man with another. Because men cannot live together in Law observed little caution in regard to deposits: since it peace, if one man takes what belongs to another. But this is prescribed (Ex. 22:10,11) that when goods deposited seems to have been approved by the Law: since it is writ- are lost, the owner is to stand by the oath of the deposi- ten (Dt. 23:24): “Going into thy neighbor’s vineyard, thou tary. Therefore the Law made unsuitable provision in this mayest eat as many grapes as thou pleasest.” Therefore matter. the Old Law did not make suitable provisions for man’s Objection 6. Further, just as a workman offers his peace. work for hire, so do men let houses and so forth. But Objection 2. Further, one of the chief causes of the there is no need for the tenant to pay his rent as soon as he downfall of states has been the holding of property by takes a house. Therefore it seems an unnecessarily hard women, as the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 6). But this prescription (Lev. 19:13) that “the wages of him that hath was introduced by the Old Law; for it is written (Num. been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until morn- 27:8): “When a man dieth without a son, his inheritance ing.” shall pass to his daughter.” Therefore the Law made un- Objection 7. Further, since there is often pressing suitable provision for the welfare of the people. need for a judge, it should be easy to gain access to one. Objection 3. Further, it is most conducive to the It was therefore unfitting that the Law (Dt. 17:8,9) should preservation of human society that men may provide command them to go to a fixed place to ask for judgment themselves with necessaries by buying and selling, as on doubtful matters. stated in Polit. i. But the Old Law took away the force Objection 8. Further, it is possible that not only two, of sales; since it prescribes that in the 50th year of the ju- but three or more, should agree to tell a lie. Therefore it is bilee all that is sold shall return to the vendor (Lev. 25:28). unreasonably stated (Dt. 19:15) that “in the mouth of two Therefore in this matter the Law gave the people an unfit- or three witnesses every word shall stand.” ting command. Objection 9. Further, punishment should be fixed ac- Objection 4. Further, man’s needs require that men cording to the gravity of the fault: for which reason also should be ready to lend: which readiness ceases if the it is written (Dt. 25:2): “According to the measure of the creditors do not return the pledges: hence it is written sin, shall the measure also of the stripes be.” Yet the Law (Ecclus. 29:10): “Many have refused to lend, not out of fixed unequal punishments for certain faults: for it is writ- wickedness, but they were afraid to be defrauded without ten (Ex. 22:1) that the thief “shall restore five oxen for cause.” And yet this was encouraged by the Law. First, one ox, and four sheep for one sheep.” Moreover, certain because it prescribed (Dt. 15:2): “He to whom any thing slight offenses are severely punished: thus (Num. 15:32, is owing from his friend or neighbor or brother, cannot seqq.) a man is stoned for gathering sticks on the sabbath demand it again, because it is the year of remission of the day: and (Dt. 21:18, seqq.) the unruly son is commanded Lord”; and (Ex. 22:15) it is stated that if a borrowed ani- to be stoned on account of certain small transgressions, mal should die while the owner is present, the borrower is viz. because “he gave himself to revelling. . . and banquet- not bound to make restitution. Secondly, because the se- ings.” Therefore the Law prescribed punishments in an curity acquired through the pledge is lost: for it is written unreasonable manner. (Dt. 24:10): “When thou shalt demand of thy neighbor Objection 10. Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. any thing that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his Dei xxi, 11), “Tully writes that the laws recognize eight house to take away a pledge”; and again (Dt. 24:12,13): forms of punishment, indemnity, prison, stripes, retalia- “The pledge shall not lodge with thee that night, but thou tion, public disgrace, exile, death, slavery.” Now some of shalt restore it to him presently.” Therefore the Law made these were prescribed by the Law. “Indemnity,” as when a insufficient provision in the matter of loans. thief was condemned to make restitution fivefold or four- Objection 5. Further, considerable risk attaches to fold. “Prison,” as when (Num. 15:34) a certain man is goods deposited with a fraudulent depositary: wherefore ordered to be imprisoned. “Stripes”; thus (Dt. 25:2), “if great caution should be observed in such matters: hence they see that the offender be worthy of stripes; they shall it is stated in 2 Mac. 3:15 that “the priests. . . called upon lay him down, and shall cause him to be beaten before Him from heaven, Who made the law concerning things them.” “Public disgrace” was brought on to him who re- 1123 fused to take to himself the wife of his deceased brother, judges, as is clearly indicated in Dt. 16:18: “Thou shalt for she took “off his shoe from his foot, and” did “spit in appoint judges and magistrates in all its [Vulg.: ‘thy’] his face” (Dt. 25:9). It prescribed the “death” penalty, as gates. . . that they may judge the people with just judg- is clear from (Lev. 20:9): “He that curseth his father, or ment.” It is also directed the manner of pronouncing just mother, dying let him die.” The Law also recognized the judgments, according to Dt. 1:16,17: “Judge that which is “lex talionis,” by prescribing (Ex. 21:24): “Eye for eye, just, whether he be one of your own country or a stranger: tooth for tooth.” Therefore it seems unreasonable that the there shall be no difference of persons.” It also removed Law should not have inflicted the two other punishments, an occasion of pronouncing unjust judgment, by forbid- viz. “exile” and “slavery.” ding judges to accept bribes (Ex. 23:8; Dt. 16:19). It pre- Objection 11. Further, no punishment is due except scribed the number of witnesses, viz. two or three: and for a fault. But dumb animals cannot commit a fault. it appointed certain punishments to certain crimes, as we Therefore the Law is unreasonable in punishing them (Ex. shall state farther on (ad 10). 21:29): “If the ox. . . shall kill a man or a woman,” it “shall But with regard to possessions, it is a very good thing, be stoned”: and (Lev. 20:16): “The woman that shall lie says the Philosopher (Polit. ii, 2) that the things possessed under any beast, shall be killed together with the same.” should be distinct, and the use thereof should be partly Therefore it seems that matters pertaining to the relations common, and partly granted to others by the will of the of one man with another were unsuitably regulated by the possessors. These three points were provided for by the Law. Law. Because, in the first place, the possessions them- Objection 12. Further, the Lord commanded (Ex. selves were divided among individuals: for it is written 21:12) a murderer to be punished with death. But the (Num. 33:53,54): “I have given you” the land “for a pos- death of a dumb animal is reckoned of much less account session: and you shall divide it among you by lot.” And than the slaying of a man. Hence murder cannot be suffi- since many states have been ruined through want of regu- ciently punished by the slaying of a dumb animal. There- lations in the matter of possessions, as the Philosopher ob- fore it is unfittingly prescribed (Dt. 21:1,4) that “when serves (Polit. ii, 6); therefore the Law provided a threefold there shall be found. . . the corpse of a man slain, and it is remedy against the regularity of possessions. The first was not known who is guilty of the murder. . . the ancients” of that they should be divided equally, wherefore it is writ- the nearest city “shall take a heifer of the herd, that hath ten (Num. 33:54): “To the more you shall give a larger not drawn in the yoke, nor ploughed the ground, and they part, and to the fewer, a lesser.” A second remedy was shall bring her into a rough and stony valley, that never that possessions could not be alienated for ever, but after a was ploughed, nor sown; and there they shall strike off certain lapse of time should return to their former owner, the head of the heifer.” so as to avoid confusion of possessions (cf. ad 3). The On the contrary, It is recalled as a special blessing third remedy aimed at the removal of this confusion, and (Ps. 147:20) that “He hath not done in like manner to ev- provided that the dead should be succeeded by their next ery nation; and His judgments He hath not made manifest of kin: in the first place, the son; secondly, the daughter; to them.” thirdly, the brother; fourthly, the father’s brother; fifthly, I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21), any other next of kin. Furthermore, in order to preserve quoting Tully, “a nation is a body of men united together the distinction of property, the Law enacted that heiresses by consent to the law and by community of welfare.” Con- should marry within their own tribe, as recorded in Num. sequently it is of the essence of a nation that the mutual 36:6. relations of the citizens be ordered by just laws. Now the Secondly, the Law commanded that, in some re- relations of one man with another are twofold: some are spects, the use of things should belong to all in common. effected under the guidance of those in authority: others Firstly, as regards the care of them; for it was prescribed are effected by the will of private individuals. And since (Dt. 22:1-4): “Thou shalt not pass by, if thou seest thy whatever is subject to the power of an individual can be brother’s ox or his sheep go astray; but thou shalt bring disposed of according to his will, hence it is that the de- them back to thy brother,” and in like manner as to other cision of matters between one man and another, and the things. Secondly, as regards fruits. For all alike were al- punishment of evildoers, depend on the direction of those lowed on entering a friend’s vineyard to eat of the fruit, in authority, to whom men are subject. On the other hand, but not to take any away. And, specially, with respect to the power of private persons is exercised over the things the poor, it was prescribed that the forgotten sheaves, and they possess: and consequently their dealings with one the bunches of grapes and fruit, should be left behind for another, as regards such things, depend on their own will, them (Lev. 19:9; Dt. 24:19). Moreover, whatever grew for instance in buying, selling, giving, and so forth. Now in the seventh year was common property, as stated in Ex. the Law provided sufficiently in respect of each of these 23:11 and Lev. 25:4. relations between one man and another. For it established Thirdly, the law recognized the transference of goods 1124 by the owner. There was a purely gratuitous transfer: thus avail for a certain period, at the same time the said danger it is written (Dt. 14:28,29): “The third day thou shalt sepa- was removed, by prescribing the return of those posses- rate another tithe. . . and the Levite. . . and the stranger, and sions after that period had elapsed. The reason for this the fatherless, and the widow. . . shall come and shall eat law was to prevent confusion of possessions, and to en- and be filled.” And there was a transfer for a consider- sure the continuance of a definite distinction among the ation, for instance, by selling and buying, by letting out tribes. and hiring, by loan and also by deposit, concerning all of But as the town houses were not allotted to distinct es- which we find that the Law made ample provision. Con- tates, therefore the Law allowed them to be sold in perpe- sequently it is clear that the Old Law provided sufficiently tuity, like movable goods. Because the number of houses concerning the mutual relations of one man with another. in a town was not fixed, whereas there was a fixed limit Reply to Objection 1. As the Apostle says (Rom. to the amount of estates, which could not be exceeded, 13:8), “he that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the Law”: while the number of houses in a town could be increased. because, to wit, all the precepts of the Law, chiefly those On the other hand, houses situated not in a town, but “in concerning our neighbor, seem to aim at the end that men a village that hath no walls,” could not be sold in perpe- should love one another. Now it is an effect of love that tuity: because such houses are built merely with a view men give their own goods to others: because, as stated in to the cultivation and care of possessions; wherefore the 1 Jn. 3:17: “He that. . . shall see his brother in need, and Law rightly made the same prescription in regard to both shall shut up his bowels from him: how doth the charity of (Lev. 25). God abide in him?” Hence the purpose of the Law was to Reply to Objection 4. As stated above (ad 1), the pur- accustom men to give of their own to others readily: thus pose of the Law was to accustom men to its precepts, so the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:18) commands the rich “to give eas- as to be ready to come to one another’s assistance: be- ily and to communicate to others.” Now a man does not cause this is a very great incentive to friendship. The Law give easily to others if he will not suffer another man to granted these facilities for helping others in the matter not take some little thing from him without any great injury only of gratuitous and absolute donations, but also of mu- to him. And so the Law laid down that it should be lawful tual transfers: because the latter kind of succor is more for a man, on entering his neighbor’s vineyard, to eat of frequent and benefits the greater number: and it granted the fruit there: but not to carry any away, lest this should facilities for this purpose in many ways. First of all by lead to the infliction of a grievous harm, and cause a dis- prescribing that men should be ready to lend, and that they turbance of the peace: for among well-behaved people, should not be less inclined to do so as the year of remis- the taking of a little does not disturb the peace; in fact, it sion drew nigh, as stated in Dt. 15:7, seqq. Secondly, rather strengthens friendship and accustoms men to give by forbidding them to burden a man to whom they might things to one another. grant a loan, either by exacting usury, or by accepting ne- Reply to Objection 2. The Law did not prescribe cessities of life in security; and by prescribing that when that women should succeed to their father’s estate except this had been done they should be restored at once. For it in default of male issue: failing which it was necessary is written (Dt. 23:19): “Thou shalt not lend to thy brother that succession should be granted to the female line in or- money to usury”: and (Dt. 24:6): “Thou shalt not take der to comfort the father, who would have been sad to the nether nor the upper millstone to pledge; for he hath think that his estate would pass to strangers. Nevertheless pledged his life to thee”: and (Ex. 22:26): “If thou take the Law observed due caution in the matter, by providing of thy neighbor a garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him that those women who succeeded to their father’s estate, again before sunset.” Thirdly, by forbidding them to be should marry within their own tribe, in order to avoid con- importunate in exacting payment. Hence it is written (Ex. fusion of tribal possessions, as stated in Num. 36:7,8. 22:25): “If thou lend money to any of my people that is Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (Polit. poor that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt not be hard upon ii, 4), the regulation of possessions conduces much to the them as an extortioner.” For this reason, too, it is enacted preservation of a state or nation. Consequently, as he him- (Dt. 24:10,11): “When thou shalt demand of thy neigh- self observes, it was forbidden by the law in some of the bor anything that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his heathen states, “that anyone should sell his possessions, house to take away a pledge, but thou shalt stand without, except to avoid a manifest loss.” For if possessions were and he shall bring out to thee what he hath”: both because to be sold indiscriminately, they might happen to come a man’s house is his surest refuge, wherefore it is offensive into the hands of a few: so that it might become neces- to a man to be set upon in his own house; and because the sary for a state or country to become void of inhabitants. Law does not allow the creditor to take away whatever he Hence the Old Law, in order to remove this danger, or- likes in security, but rather permits the debtor to give what dered things in such a way that while provision was made he needs least. Fourthly, the Law prescribed that debts for men’s needs, by allowing the sale of possessions to should cease together after the lapse of seven years. For it 1125 was probable that those who could conveniently pay their offer other commodities for hire, are wont to be rich: nor debts, would do so before the seventh year, and would not are they in such need of their price in order to gain a liveli- defraud the lender without cause. But if they were alto- hood: and consequently the comparison does not hold. gether insolvent, there was the same reason for remitting Reply to Objection 7. The purpose for which judges the debt from love for them, as there was for renewing the are appointed among men, is that they may decide doubt- loan on account of their need. ful points in matters of justice. Now a matter may be As regards animals granted in loan, the Law enacted doubtful in two ways. First, among simple-minded peo- that if, through the neglect of the person to whom they ple: and in order to remove doubts of this kind, it was pre- were lent, they perished or deteriorated in his absence, scribed (Dt. 16:18) that “judges and magistrates” should he was bound to make restitution. But if they perished be appointed in each tribe, “to judge the people with just or deteriorated while he was present and taking proper judgment.” Secondly, a matter may be doubtful even care of them, he was not bound to make restitution, es- among experts: and therefore, in order to remove doubts pecially if they were hired for a consideration: because of this kind, the Law prescribed that all should foregather they might have died or deteriorated in the same way if in some chief place chosen by God, where there would they had remained in possession of the lender, so that if be both the high-priest, who would decide doubtful mat- the animal had been saved through being lent, the lender ters relating to the ceremonies of divine worship; and the would have gained something by the loan which would no chief judge of the people, who would decide matters re- longer have been gratuitous. And especially was this to lating to the judgments of men: just as even now cases be observed when animals were hired for a consideration: are taken from a lower to a higher court either by appeal because then the owner received a certain price for the use or by consultation. Hence it is written (Dt. 17:8,9): “If of the animals; wherefore he had no right to any profit, by thou perceive that there be among you a hard and doubt- receiving indemnity for the animal, unless the person who ful matter in judgment. . . and thou see that the words of had charge of it were negligent. In the case, however, of the judges within thy gates do vary; arise and go up to animals not hired for a consideration, equity demanded the place, which the Lord thy God shall choose; and thou that he should receive something by way of restitution at shalt come to the priests of the Levitical race, and to the least to the value of the hire of the animal that had per- judge that shall be at that time.” But such like doubtful ished or deteriorated. matters did not often occur for judgment: wherefore the Reply to Objection 5. The difference between a loan people were not burdened on this account. and a deposit is that a loan is in respect of goods trans- Reply to Objection 8. In the business affairs of ferred for the use of the person to whom they are trans- men, there is no such thing as demonstrative and infal- ferred, whereas a deposit is for the benefit of the deposi- lible proof, and we must be content with a certain con- tor. Hence in certain cases there was a stricter obligation jectural probability, such as that which an orator employs of returning a loan than of restoring goods held in deposit. to persuade. Consequently, although it is quite possible Because the latter might be lost in two ways. First, un- for two or three witnesses to agree to a falsehood, yet it avoidably: i.e. either through a natural cause, for instance is neither easy nor probable that they succeed in so do- if an animal held in deposit were to die or depreciate in ing: wherefore their testimony is taken as being true, es- value; or through an extrinsic cause, for instance, if it were pecially if they do not waver in giving it, or are not oth- taken by an enemy, or devoured by a beast (in which case, erwise suspect. Moreover, in order that witnesses might however, a man was bound to restore to the owner what not easily depart from the truth, the Law commanded that was left of the animal thus slain): whereas in the other they should be most carefully examined, and that those cases mentioned above, he was not bound to make resti- who were found untruthful should be severely punished, tution; but only to take an oath in order to clear himself as stated in Dt. 19:16, seqq. of suspicion. Secondly, the goods deposited might be lost There was, however, a reason for fixing on this partic- through an avoidable cause, for instance by theft: and then ular number, in token of the unerring truth of the Divine the depositary was bound to restitution on account of his Persons, Who are sometimes mentioned as two, because neglect. But, as stated above (ad 4), he who held an an- the Holy Ghost is the bond of the other two Persons; and imal on loan, was bound to restitution, even if he were sometimes as three: as Augustine observes on Jn. 8:17: absent when it depreciated or died: because he was held “In your law it is written that the testimony of two men is responsible for less negligence than a depositary, who was true.” only held responsible in case of theft. Reply to Objection 9. A severe punishment is in- Reply to Objection 6. Workmen who offer their labor flicted not only on account of the gravity of a fault, but for hire, are poor men who toil for their daily bread: and also for other reasons. First, on account of the greatness therefore the Law commanded wisely that they should be of the sin, because a greater sin, other things being equal, paid at once, lest they should lack food. But they who deserves a greater punishment. Secondly, on account of a 1126 habitual sin, since men are not easily cured of habitual sin in the case of other thefts: for there was reason to pre-except by severe punishments. Thirdly, on account of a sume that he intended to restore the animal, since he kept great desire for or a great pleasure in the sin: for men are it alive. Again, we might say, according to a gloss, that not easily deterred from such sins unless they be severely “a cow is useful in five ways: it may be used for sacrifice, punished. Fourthly, on account of the facility of commit- for ploughing, for food, for milk, and its hide is employed ting a sin and of concealing it: for such like sins, when for various purposes”: and therefore for one cow five had discovered, should be more severely punished in order to to be restored. But the sheep was useful in four ways: deter others from committing them. “for sacrifice, for meat, for milk, and for its wool.” The Again, with regard to the greatness of a sin, four de- unruly son was slain, not because he ate and drank: but grees may be observed, even in respect of one single deed. on account of his stubbornness and rebellion, which was The first is when a sin is committed unwillingly; because always punished by death, as stated above. As to the man then, if the sin be altogether involuntary, man is altogether who gathered sticks on the sabbath, he was stoned as a excused from punishment; for it is written (Dt. 22:25, breaker of the Law, which commanded the sabbath to be seqq.) that a damsel who suffers violence in a field is not observed, to testify the belief in the newness of the world, guilty of death, because “she cried, and there was no man as stated above (q. 100, a. 5): wherefore he was slain as to help her.” But if a man sinned in any way voluntarily, an unbeliever. and yet through weakness, as for instance when a man sins Reply to Objection 10. The Old Law inflicted the from passion, the sin is diminished: and the punishment, death penalty for the more grievous crimes, viz. for those according to true judgment, should be diminished also; which are committed against God, and for murder, for unless perchance the common weal requires that the sin stealing a man, irreverence towards one’s parents, adul- be severely punished in order to deter others from com- tery and incest. In the case of thief of other things it in- mitting such sins, as stated above. The second degree is flicted punishment by indemnification: while in the case when a man sins through ignorance: and then he was held of blows and mutilation it authorized punishment by re- to be guilty to a certain extent, on account of his negli- taliation; and likewise for the sin of bearing false witness. gence in acquiring knowledge: yet he was not punished In other faults of less degree it prescribed the punishment by the judges but expiated his sin by sacrifices. Hence it of stripes or of public disgrace. is written (Lev. 4:2): “The soul that sinneth through ig- The punishment of slavery was prescribed by the Law norance,” etc. This is, however, to be taken as applying in two cases. First, in the case of a slave who was unwill- to ignorance of fact; and not to ignorance of the Divine ing to avail himself of the privilege granted by the Law, precept, which all were bound to know. The third degree whereby he was free to depart in the seventh year of re- was when a man sinned from pride, i.e. through deliberate mission: wherefore he was punished by remaining a slave choice or malice: and then he was punished according to for ever. Secondly, in the case of a thief, who had not the greatness of the sin∗. The fourth degree was when a wherewith to make restitution, as stated in Ex. 22:3. man sinned from stubbornness or obstinacy: and then he The punishment of absolute exile was not prescribed was to be utterly cut off as a rebel and a destroyer of the by the Law: because God was worshipped by that people commandment of the Law†. alone, whereas all other nations were given to idolatry: Accordingly we must say that, in appointing the pun- wherefore if any man were exiled from that people abso- ishment for theft, the Law considered what would be lutely, he would be in danger of falling into idolatry. For likely to happen most frequently (Ex. 22:1-9): wherefore, this reason it is related (1 Kings 26:19) that David said to as regards theft of other things which can easily be safe- Saul: “They are cursed in the sight of the Lord, who have guarded from a thief, the thief restored only twice their case me out this day, that I should not dwell in the inheri- value. But sheep cannot be easily safeguarded from a tance of the Lord, saying: Go, serve strange gods.” There thief, because they graze in the fields: wherefore it hap- was, however, a restricted sort of exile: for it is written pened more frequently that sheep were stolen in the fields. in Dt. 19:4‡ that “he that striketh [Vulg.: ‘killeth’] his Consequently the Law inflicted a heavier penalty, by or- neighbor ignorantly, and is proved to have had no hatred dering four sheep to be restored for the theft of one. As against him, shall flee to one of the cities” of refuge and to cattle, they were yet more difficult to safeguard, be- “abide there until the death of the high-priest.” For then it cause they are kept in the fields, and do not graze in flocks became lawful for him to return home, because when the as sheep do; wherefore a yet more heavy penalty was in- whole people thus suffered a loss they forgot their private flicted in their regard, so that five oxen were to be restored quarrels, so that the next of kin of the slain were not so for one ox. And this I say, unless perchance the animal eager to kill the slayer. itself were discovered in the thief’s possession: because Reply to Objection 11. Dumb animals were ordered in that case he had to restore only twice the number, as to be slain, not on account of any fault of theirs; but as ∗ Cf. Dt. 25:2 † Cf. Num. 15:30,31 ‡ Cf. Num. 35:25 1127 a punishment to their owners, who had not safeguarded knew who he was: and it would seldom happen but that their beasts from these offenses. Hence the owner was some word or sign would escape about the matter. Or more severely punished if his ox had butted anyone “yes- again, this was done in order to frighten people, in detes- terday or the day before” (in which case steps might have tation of murder. Because the slaying of a heifer, which been taken to butting suddenly). Or again, the animal was is a useful animal and full of strength, especially before it slain in detestation of the sin; and lest men should be hor- has been put under the yoke, signified that whoever com- rified at the sight thereof. mitted murder, however useful and strong he might be, Reply to Objection 12. The literal reason for this was to forfeit his life; and that, by a cruel death, which commandment, as Rabbi Moses declares (Doct. Perplex. was implied by the striking off of its head; and that the iii), was because the slayer was frequently from the near- murderer, as vile and abject, was to be cut off from the est city: wherefore the slaying of the calf was a means of fellowship of men, which was betokened by the fact that investigating the hidden murder. This was brought about the heifer after being slain was left to rot in a rough and in three ways. In the first place the elders of the city swore uncultivated place. that they had taken every measure for safeguarding the Mystically, the heifer taken from the herd signifies the roads. Secondly, the owner of the heifer was indemnified flesh of Christ; which had not drawn a yoke, since it had for the slaying of his beast, and if the murder was pre- done no sin; nor did it plough the ground, i.e. it never viously discovered, the beast was not slain. Thirdly, the knew the stain of revolt. The fact of the heifer being killed place, where the heifer was slain, remained uncultivated. in an uncultivated valley signified the despised death of Wherefore, in order to avoid this twofold loss, the men of Christ, whereby all sins are washed away, and the devil is the city would readily make known the murderer, if they shown to be the arch-murderer. Whether the judicial precepts regarding foreigners were framed in a suitable manIa IIae q. 105 a. 3 ner? Objection 1. It would seem that the judicial precepts Objection 4. Further, men are much more akin to us regarding foreigners were not suitably framed. For Peter than trees. But we should show greater care and love for said (Acts 10:34,35): “In very deed I perceive that God these things that are nearest to us, according to Ecclus. is not a respecter of persons, but in every nation, he that 13:19: “Every beast loveth its like: so also every man him feareth Him and worketh justice is acceptable to Him.” that is nearest to himself.” Therefore the Lord unsuitably But those who are acceptable to God should not be ex- commanded (Dt. 20:13-19) that all the inhabitants of a cluded from the Church of God. Therefore it is unsuit- captured hostile city were to be slain, but that the fruit- ably commanded (Dt. 23:3) that “the Ammonite and the trees should not be cut down. Moabite, even after the tenth generation, shall not enter Objection 5. Further, every one should prefer the into the church of the Lord for ever”: whereas, on the common good of virtue to the good of the individual. But other hand, it is prescribed (Dt. 23:7) to be observed with the common good is sought in a war which men fight regard to certain other nations: “Thou shalt not abhor the against their enemies. Therefore it is unsuitably com- Edomite, because he is thy brother; nor the Egyptian be- manded (Dt. 20:5-7) that certain men should be sent cause thou wast a stranger in his land.” home, for instance a man that had built a new house, or Objection 2. Further, we do not deserve to be pun- who had planted a vineyard, or who had married a wife. ished for those things which are not in our power. But it Objection 6. Further, no man should profit by his own is not in man’s power to be an eunuch, or born of a pros- fault. But it is a man’s fault if he be timid or faint-hearted: titute. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded (Dt. 23:1,2) since this is contrary to the virtue of fortitude. Therefore that “an eunuch and one born of a prostitute shalt not enter the timid and faint-hearted are unfittingly excused from into the church of the Lord.” the toil of battle (Dt. 20:8). Objection 3. Further, the Old Law mercifully forbade On the contrary, Divine Wisdom declares (Prov. strangers to be molested: for it is written (Ex. 22:21): 8:8): “All my words are just, there is nothing wicked nor “Thou shalt not molest a stranger, nor afflict him; for your- perverse in them.” selves also were strangers in the land of Egypt”: and (Ex. I answer that, Man’s relations with foreigners are 23:9): “Thou shalt not molest a stranger, for you know twofold: peaceful, and hostile: and in directing both the hearts of strangers, for you also were strangers in the kinds of relation the Law contained suitable precepts. For land of Egypt.” But it is an affliction to be burdened with the Jews were offered three opportunities of peaceful re- usury. Therefore the Law unsuitably permitted them (Dt. lations with foreigners. First, when foreigners passed 23:19,20) to lend money to the stranger for usury. through their land as travelers. Secondly, when they came 1128 to dwell in their land as newcomers. And in both these eryone at once, for the reason given above: but to some, respects the Law made kind provision in its precepts: for i.e. the Egyptians and Idumeans, in the third generation; it is written (Ex. 22:21): “Thou shalt not molest a stranger while others were excluded in perpetuity, in detestation [advenam]”; and again (Ex. 22:9): “Thou shalt not mo- of their past offense, i.e. the peoples of Moab, Ammon, lest a stranger [peregrino].” Thirdly, when any foreign- and Amalec. For just as one man is punished for a sin ers wished to be admitted entirely to their fellowship and committed by him, in order that others seeing this may be mode of worship. With regard to these a certain order was deterred and refrain from sinning; so too may one nation observed. For they were not at once admitted to citizen- or city be punished for a crime, that others may refrain ship: just as it was law with some nations that no one was from similar crimes. deemed a citizen except after two or three generations, as Nevertheless it was possible by dispensation for a man the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 1). The reason for this to be admitted to citizenship on account of some act of was that if foreigners were allowed to meddle with the af- virtue: thus it is related (Judith 14:6) that Achior, the cap- fairs of a nation as soon as they settled down in its midst, tain of the children of Ammon, “was joined to the people many dangers might occur, since the foreigners not yet of Israel, with all the succession of his kindred.” The same having the common good firmly at heart might attempt applies to Ruth the Moabite who was “a virtuous woman” something hurtful to the people. Hence it was that the (Ruth 3:11): although it may be said that this prohibition Law prescribed in respect of certain nations that had close regarded men and not women, who are not competent to relations with the Jews (viz., the Egyptians among whom be citizens absolutely speaking. they were born and educated, and the Idumeans, the chil- Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (Polit. dren of Esau, Jacob’s brother), that they should be admit- iii, 3), a man is said to be a citizen in two ways: first, ted to the fellowship of the people after the third genera- simply; secondly, in a restricted sense. A man is a citizen tion; whereas others (with whom their relations had been simply if he has all the rights of citizenship, for instance, hostile, such as the Ammonites and Moabites) were never the right of debating or voting in the popular assembly. to be admitted to citizenship; while the Amalekites, who On the other hand, any man may be called citizen, only were yet more hostile to them, and had no fellowship of in a restricted sense, if he dwells within the state, even kindred with them, were to be held as foes in perpetuity: common people or children or old men, who are not fit for it is written (Ex. 17:16): “The war of the Lord shall be to enjoy power in matters pertaining to the common weal. against Amalec from generation to generation.” For this reason bastards, by reason of their base origin, In like manner with regard to hostile relations with were excluded from the “ecclesia,” i.e. from the popular foreigners, the Law contained suitable precepts. For, in assembly, down to the tenth generation. The same applies the first place, it commanded that war should be declared to eunuchs, who were not competent to receive the honor for a just cause: thus it is commanded (Dt. 20:10) that due to a father, especially among the Jews, where the di- when they advanced to besiege a city, they should at first vine worship was continued through carnal generation: make an offer of peace. Secondly, it enjoined that when for even among the heathens, those who had many chil- once they had entered on a war they should undauntedly dren were marked with special honor, as the Philosopher persevere in it, putting their trust in God. And in order remarks (Polit. ii, 6). Nevertheless, in matters pertaining that they might be the more heedful of this command, it to the grace of God, eunuchs were not discriminated from ordered that on the approach of battle the priest should others, as neither were strangers, as already stated: for it hearten them by promising them God’s aid. Thirdly, it is written (Isa. 56:3): “Let not the son of the stranger that prescribed the removal of whatever might prove an obsta- adhereth to the Lord speak, saying: The Lord will divide cle to the fight, and that certain men, who might be in the and separate me from His people. And let not the eunuch way, should be sent home. Fourthly, it enjoined that they say: Behold I am a dry tree.” should use moderation in pursuing the advantage of vic- Reply to Objection 3. It was not the intention of the tory, by sparing women and children, and by not cutting Law to sanction the acceptance of usury from strangers, down fruit-trees of that country. but only to tolerate it on account of the proneness of the Reply to Objection 1. The Law excluded the men of Jews to avarice; and in order to promote an amicable feel- no nation from the worship of God and from things per- ing towards those out of whom they made a profit. taining to the welfare of the soul: for it is written (Ex. Reply to Objection 4. A distinction was observed 12:48): “If any stranger be willing to dwell among you, with regard to hostile cities. For some of them were and to keep the Phase of the Lord; all his males shall first far distant, and were not among those which had been be circumcised, and then shall he celebrate it according promised to them. When they had taken these cities, they to the manner, and he shall be as that which is born in killed all the men who had fought against God’s people; the land.” But in temporal matters concerning the pub- whereas the women and children were spared. But in lic life of the people, admission was not granted to ev- the neighboring cities which had been promised to them, 1129 all were ordered to be slain, on account of their former and be so much the less brave in battle. Secondly, be-crimes, to punish which God sent the Israelites as executor cause, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 5), “it is a misfor- of Divine justice: for it is written (Dt. 9:5) “because they tune for a man if he is prevented from obtaining something have done wickedly, they are destroyed at thy coming in.” good when it is within his grasp.” And so lest the surviv- The fruit-trees were commanded to be left untouched, for ing relations should be the more grieved at the death of the use of the people themselves, to whom the city with these men who had not entered into the possession of the its territory was destined to be subjected. good things prepared for them; and also lest the people Reply to Objection 5. The builder of a new house, the should be horror-stricken at the sight of their misfortune: planter of a vineyard, the newly married husband, were these men were taken away from the danger of death by excluded from fighting, for two reasons. First, because being removed from the battle. man is wont to give all his affection to those things which Reply to Objection 6. The timid were sent back he has lately acquired, or is on the point of having, and home, not that they might be the gainers thereby; but lest consequently he is apt to dread the loss of these above the people might be the losers by their presence, since other things. Wherefore it was likely enough that on ac- their timidity and flight might cause others to be afraid count of this affection they would fear death all the more, and run away. Whether the Old Law set forth suitable precepts about the members of the household? Ia IIae q. 105 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law set forth Objection 6. Further, the Lord forbade them (Dt. 7:3, unsuitable precepts about the members of the household. seqq.) to make marriages with strange nations; and com- For a slave “is in every respect his master’s property,” as manded the dissolution of such as had been contracted (1 the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 2). But that which is a Esdras 10). Therefore it was unfitting to allow them to man’s property should be his always. Therefore it was marry captive women from strange nations (Dt. 21:10, unfitting for the Law to command (Ex. 21:2) that slaves seqq.). should “go out free” in the seventh year. Objection 7. Further, the Lord forbade them to marry Objection 2. Further, a slave is his master’s property, within certain degrees of consanguinity and affinity, ac- just as an animal, e.g. an ass or an ox. But it is com- cording to Lev. 18. Therefore it was unsuitably com- manded (Dt. 22:1-3) with regard to animals, that they manded (Dt. 25:5) that if any man died without issue, should be brought back to the owner if they be found go- his brother should marry his wife. ing astray. Therefore it was unsuitably commanded (Dt. Objection 8. Further, as there is the greatest familiar- 23:15): “Thou shalt not deliver to his master the servant ity between man and wife, so should there be the staunch- that is fled to thee.” est fidelity. But this is impossible if the marriage bond can Objection 3. Further, the Divine Law should encour- be sundered. Therefore it was unfitting for the Lord to al- age mercy more even than the human law. But according low (Dt. 24:1-4) a man to put his wife away, by writing to human laws those who ill-treat their servants and maid- a bill of divorce; and besides, that he could not take her servants are severely punished: and the worse treatment again to wife. of all seems to be that which results in death. Therefore Objection 9. Further, just as a wife can be faithless it is unfittingly commanded (Ex. 21:20,21) that “he that to her husband, so can a slave be to his master, and a son striketh his bondman or bondwoman with a rod, and they to his father. But the Law did not command any sacrifice die under his hands. . . if the party remain alive a day. . . he to be offered in order to investigate the injury done by a shall not be subject to the punishment, because it is his servant to his master, or by a son to his father. Therefore money.” it seems to have been superfluous for the Law to prescribe Objection 4. Further, the dominion of a master over the “sacrifice of jealousy” in order to investigate a wife’s his slave differs from that of the father over his son (Polit. adultery (Num. 5:12, seqq.). Consequently it seems that i, 3). But the dominion of master over slave gives the the Law put forth unsuitable judicial precepts about the former the right to sell his servant or maidservant. There- members of the household. fore it was unfitting for the Law to allow a man to sell his On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:10): “The judg- daughter to be a servant or handmaid (Ex. 21:7). ments of the Lord are true, justified in themselves.” Objection 5. Further, a father has power over his son. I answer that, The mutual relations of the members But he who has power over the sinner has the right to pun- of a household regard everyday actions directed to the ne- ish him for his offenses. Therefore it is unfittingly com- cessities of life, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 1). Now manded (Dt. 21:18, seqq.) that a father should bring his the preservation of man’s life may be considered from two son to the ancients of the city for punishment. points of view. First, from the point of view of the individ- 1130 ual, i.e. in so far as man preserves his individuality: and might be free to rejoice with his wife. for the purpose of the preservation of life, considered from With regard to children, the Law commanded parents this standpoint, man has at his service external goods, by to educate them by instructing them in the faith: hence it means of which he provides himself with food and cloth- is written (Ex. 12:26, seqq.): “When your children shall ing and other such necessaries of life: in the handling of say to you: What is the meaning of this service? You shall which he has need of servants. Secondly man’s life is pre- say to them: It is the victim of the passage of the Lord.” served from the point of view of the species, by means Moreover, they are commanded to teach them the rules of of generation, for which purpose man needs a wife, that right conduct: wherefore it is written (Dt. 21:20) that the she may bear him children. Accordingly the mutual rela- parents had to say: “He slighteth hearing our admonitions, tions of the members of a household admit of a threefold he giveth himself to revelling and to debauchery.” combination: viz. those of master and servant, those of Reply to Objection 1. As the children of Israel had husband and wife, and those of father and son: and in been delivered by the Lord from slavery, and for this rea- respect of all these relationships the Old Law contained son were bound to the service of God, He did not wish fitting precepts. Thus, with regard to servants, it com- them to be slaves in perpetuity. Hence it is written (Lev. manded them to be treated with moderation—both as to 25:39, seqq.): “If thy brother, constrained by poverty, sell their work, lest, to wit, they should be burdened with ex- himself to thee, thou shalt not oppress him with the ser- cessive labor, wherefore the Lord commanded (Dt. 5:14) vice of bondservants: but he shall be as a hireling and a that on the Sabbath day “thy manservant and thy maid- sojourner. . . for they are My servants, and I brought them servant” should “rest even as thyself”—and also as to the out of the land of Egypt: let them not be sold as bond- infliction of punishment, for it ordered those who maimed men”: and consequently, since they were slaves, not ab- their servants, to set them free (Ex. 21:26,27). Similar solutely but in a restricted sense, after a lapse of time they provision was made in favor of a maidservant when mar- were set free. ried to anyone (Ex. 21:7, seqq.). Moreover, with regard to Reply to Objection 2. This commandment is to be those servants in particular who were taken from among understood as referring to a servant whom his master the people, the Law prescribed that they should go out seeks to kill, or to help him in committing some sin. free in the seventh year taking whatever they brought with Reply to Objection 3. With regard to the ill-treatment them, even their clothes (Ex. 21:2, seqq.): and further- of servants, the Law seems to have taken into considera- more it was commanded (Dt. 15:13) that they should be tion whether it was certain or not: since if it were certain, given provision for the journey. the Law fixed a penalty: for maiming, the penalty was With regard to wives the Law made certain prescrip- forfeiture of the servant, who was ordered to be given his tions as to those who were to be taken in marriage: for in- liberty: while for slaying, the punishment was that of a stance, that they should marry a wife from their own tribe murderer, when the slave died under the blow of his mas- (Num. 36:6): and this lest confusion should ensue in the ter. If, however, the hurt was not certain, but only proba- property of various tribes. Also that a man should marry ble, the Law did not impose any penalty as regards a man’s the wife of his deceased brother when the latter died with- own servant: for instance if the servant did not die at once out issue, as prescribed in Dt. 25:5,6: and this in order after being struck, but after some days: for it would be that he who could not have successors according to carnal uncertain whether he died as a result of the blows he re- origin, might at least have them by a kind of adoption, and ceived. For when a man struck a free man, yet so that he that thus the deceased might not be entirely forgotten. It did not die at once, but “walked abroad again upon his also forbade them to marry certain women; to wit, women staff,” he that struck him was quit of murder, even though of strange nations, through fear of their losing their faith; afterwards he died. Nevertheless he was bound to pay the and those of their near kindred, on account of the natural doctor’s fees incurred by the victim of his assault. But respect due to them. Furthermore it prescribed in what this was not the case if a man killed his own servant: be- way wives were to be treated after marriage. To wit, that cause whatever the servant had, even his very person, was they should not be slandered without grave reason: where- the property of his master. Hence the reason for his not fore it ordered punishment to be inflicted on the man who being subject to a pecuniary penalty is set down as being falsely accused his wife of a crime (Dt. 22:13, seqq.). “because it is his money.” Also that a man’s hatred of his wife should not be detri- Reply to Objection 4. As stated above (ad 1), no Jew mental to his son (Dt. 21:15, seqq.). Again, that a man could own a Jew as a slave absolutely: but only in a re- should not ill-use his wife through hatred of her, but rather stricted sense, as a hireling for a fixed time. And in this that he should write a bill of divorce and send her away way the Law permitted that through stress of poverty a (Dt. 24:1). Furthermore, in order to foster conjugal love man might sell his son or daughter. This is shown by the from the very outset, it was prescribed that no public du- very words of the Law, where we read: “If any man sell ties should be laid on a recently married man, so that he his daughter to be a servant, she shall not go out as bond- 1131 women are wont to go out.” Moreover, in this way a man xlviii super Matth.), “because death was an unmitigated might sell not only his son, but even himself, rather as a evil for the Jews, who did everything with a view to the hireling than as a slave, according to Lev. 25:39,40: “If present life, it was ordained that children should be born thy brother, constrained by poverty, sell himself to thee, to the dead man through his brother: thus affording a cer- thou shalt not oppress him with the service of bondser- tain mitigation to his death. It was not, however, ordained vants: but he shall be as a hireling and a sojourner.” that any other than his brother or one next of kin should Reply to Objection 5. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. marry the wife of the deceased, because” the offspring of x, 9), the paternal authority has the power only of admo- this union “would not be looked upon as that of the de- nition; but not that of coercion, whereby rebellious and ceased: and moreover, a stranger would not be under the headstrong persons can be compelled. Hence in this case obligation to support the household of the deceased, as his the Lord commanded the stubborn son to be punished by brother would be bound to do from motives of justice on the rulers of the city. account of his relationship.” Hence it is evident that in Reply to Objection 6. The Lord forbade them to marrying the wife of his dead brother, he took his dead marry strange women on account of the danger of se- brother’s place. duction, lest they should be led astray into idolatry. And Reply to Objection 8. The Law permitted a wife to specially did this prohibition apply with respect to those be divorced, not as though it were just absolutely speak- nations who dwelt near them, because it was more proba- ing, but on account of the Jews’ hardness of heart, as Our ble that they would adopt their religious practices. When, Lord declared (Mat. 19:8). Of this, however, we must however, the woman was willing to renounce idolatry, and speak more fully in the treatise on Matrimony ( Suppl., become an adherent of the Law, it was lawful to take q. 67). her in marriage: as was the case with Ruth whom Booz Reply to Objection 9. Wives break their conjugal married. Wherefore she said to her mother-in-law (Ruth faith by adultery, both easily, for motives of pleasure, and 1:16): “Thy people shall be my people, and thy God my hiddenly, since “the eye of the adulterer observeth dark- God.” Accordingly it was not permitted to marry a cap- ness” (Job 24:15). But this does not apply to a son in tive woman unless she first shaved her hair, and pared her respect of his father, or to a servant in respect of his mas- nails, and put off the raiment wherein she was taken, and ter: because the latter infidelity is not the result of the lust mourned for her father and mother, in token that she re-of pleasure, but rather of malice: nor can it remain hidden nounced idolatry for ever. like the infidelity of an adulterous woman. Reply to Objection 7. As Chrysostom says (Hom. 1132 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 106 Of the Law of the Gospel, Called the New Law, Considered in Itself (In Four Articles) In proper sequence we have to consider now the Law of the Gospel which is called the New Law: and in the first place we must consider it in itself; secondly, in comparison with the Old Law; thirdly, we shall treat of those things that are contained in the New Law. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What kind of law is it? i.e. Is it a written law or is it instilled in the heart? (2) Of its efficacy, i.e. does it justify? (3) Of its beginning: should it have been given at the beginning of the world? (4) Of its end: i.e. whether it will last until the end, or will another law take its place? Whether the New Law is a written law? Ia IIae q. 106 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the New Law is a lieve in Christ. This is manifestly stated by the Apostle written law. For the New Law is just the same as the who says (Rom. 3:27): “Where is. . . thy boasting? It is Gospel. But the Gospel is set forth in writing, according excluded. By what law? Of works? No, but by the law of to Jn. 20:31: “But these are written that you may believe.” faith”: for he calls the grace itself of faith “a law.” And Therefore the New Law is a written law. still more clearly it is written (Rom. 8:2): “The law of the Objection 2. Further, the law that is instilled in the spirit of life, in Christ Jesus, hath delivered me from the heart is the natural law, according to Rom. 2:14,15: law of sin and of death.” Hence Augustine says (De Spir. ”(The Gentiles) do by nature those things that are of the et Lit. xxiv) that “as the law of deeds was written on ta- law. . . who have [Vulg.: ‘show’] the work of the law writ- bles of stone, so is the law of faith inscribed on the hearts ten in their hearts.” If therefore the law of the Gospel were of the faithful”: and elsewhere, in the same book (xxi): instilled in our hearts, it would not be distinct from the law “What else are the Divine laws written by God Himself of nature. on our hearts, but the very presence of His Holy Spirit?” Objection 3. Further, the law of the Gospel is proper Nevertheless the New Law contains certain things that to those who are in the state of the New Testament. But the dispose us to receive the grace of the Holy Ghost, and law that is instilled in the heart is common to those who pertaining to the use of that grace: such things are of sec- are in the New Testament and to those who are in the Old ondary importance, so to speak, in the New Law; and the Testament: for it is written (Wis. 7:27) that Divine Wis- faithful need to be instructed concerning them, both by dom “through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls, word and writing, both as to what they should believe and she maketh the friends of God and prophets.” Therefore as to what they should do. Consequently we must say that the New Law is not instilled in our hearts. the New Law is in the first place a law that is inscribed on On the contrary, The New Law is the law of the New our hearts, but that secondarily it is a written law. Testament. But the law of the New Testament is instilled Reply to Objection 1. The Gospel writings contain in our hearts. For the Apostle, quoting the authority of only such things as pertain to the grace of the Holy Ghost, Jeremiah 31:31,33: “Behold the days shall come, saith either by disposing us thereto, or by directing us to the the Lord; and I will perfect unto the house of Israel, and use thereof. Thus with regard to the intellect, the Gospel unto the house of Judah, a new testament,” says, explain- contains certain matters pertaining to the manifestation of ing what this statement is (Heb. 8:8,10): “For this is the Christ’s Godhead or humanity, which dispose us by means testament which I will make to the house of Israel. . . by of faith through which we receive the grace of the Holy giving [Vulg.: ‘I will give’] My laws into their mind, and Ghost: and with regard to the affections, it contains mat- in their heart will I write them.” Therefore the New Law ters touching the contempt of the world, whereby man is is instilled in our hearts. rendered fit to receive the grace of the Holy Ghost: for I answer that, “Each thing appears to be that which “the world,” i.e. worldly men, “cannot receive” the Holy preponderates in it,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, Ghost (Jn. 14:17). As to the use of spiritual grace, this 8). Now that which is preponderant in the law of the New consists in works of virtue to which the writings of the Testament, and whereon all its efficacy is based, is the New Testament exhort men in divers ways. grace of the Holy Ghost, which is given through faith in Reply to Objection 2. There are two ways in which Christ. Consequently the New Law is chiefly the grace a thing may be instilled into man. First, through being itself of the Holy Ghost, which is given to those who be- part of his nature, and thus the natural law is instilled into 1133 man. Secondly, a thing is instilled into man by being, as the Holy Ghost except through faith in Christ either ex-it were, added on to his nature by a gift of grace. In this plicit or implicit: and by faith in Christ man belongs to way the New Law is instilled into man, not only by indi- the New Testament. Consequently whoever had the law cating to him what he should do, but also by helping him of grace instilled into them belonged to the New Testa- to accomplish it. ment. Reply to Objection 3. No man ever had the grace of Whether the New Law justifies? Ia IIae q. 106 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the New Law does the New Testament, “it is given in an inward manner, that not justify. For no man is justified unless he obeys God’s they may be justified.” The other element of the Evan- law, according to Heb. 5:9: “He,” i.e. Christ, “became to gelical Law is secondary: namely, the teachings of faith, all that obey Him the cause of eternal salvation.” But the and those commandments which direct human affections Gospel does not always cause men to believe in it: for it and human actions. And as to this, the New Law does not is written (Rom. 10:16): “All do not obey the Gospel.” justify. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6) “The letter Therefore the New Law does not justify. killeth, but the spirit quickeneth”: and Augustine explains Objection 2. Further, the Apostle proves in his epistle this (De Spir. et Lit. xiv, xvii) by saying that the letter de- to the Romans that the Old Law did not justify, because notes any writing external to man, even that of the moral transgression increased at its advent: for it is stated (Rom. precepts such as are contained in the Gospel. Wherefore 4:15): “The Law worketh wrath: for where there is no the letter, even of the Gospel would kill, unless there were law, neither is there transgression.” But much more did the inward presence of the healing grace of faith. the New Law increase transgression: since he who sins Reply to Objection 1. This argument holds true of the after the giving of the New Law deserves greater punish- New Law, not as to its principal, but as to its secondary el- ment, according to Heb. 10:28,29: “A man making void ement: i.e. as to the dogmas and precepts outwardly put the Law of Moses dieth without any mercy under two or before man either in words or in writing. three witnesses. How much more, do you think, he de- Reply to Objection 2. Although the grace of the New serveth worse punishments, who hath trodden underfoot Testament helps man to avoid sin, yet it does not so con- the Son of God,” etc.? Therefore the New Law, like the firm man in good that he cannot sin: for this belongs to the Old Law, does not justify. state of glory. Hence if a man sin after receiving the grace Objection 3. Further, justification is an effect proper of the New Testament, he deserves greater punishment, as to God, according to Rom. 8:33: “God that justifieth.” But being ungrateful for greater benefits, and as not using the the Old Law was from God just as the New Law. There- help given to him. And this is why the New Law is not fore the New Law does not justify any more than the Old said to “work wrath”: because as far as it is concerned it Law. gives man sufficient help to avoid sin. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 1:16): “I Reply to Objection 3. The same God gave both the am not ashamed of the Gospel: for it is in the power of New and the Old Law, but in different ways. For He gave God unto salvation to everyone that believeth.” But there the Old Law written on tables of stone: whereas He gave is no salvation but to those who are justified. Therefore the New Law written “in the fleshly tables of the heart,” as the Law of the Gospel justifies. the Apostle expresses it (2 Cor. 3:3). Wherefore, as Au- I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), there is a gustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xviii), “the Apostle calls this twofold element in the Law of the Gospel. There is the letter which is written outside man, a ministration of death chief element, viz. the grace of the Holy Ghost bestowed and a ministration of condemnation: whereas he calls the inwardly. And as to this, the New Law justifies. Hence other letter, i.e. the Law of the New Testament, the minis- Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xvii): “There,” i.e. in tration of the spirit and the ministration of justice: because the Old Testament, “the Law was set forth in an outward through the gift of the Spirit we work justice, and are de- fashion, that the ungodly might be afraid”; “here,” i.e. in livered from the condemnation due to transgression.” 1134 Whether the New Law should have been given from the beginning of the world? Ia IIae q. 106 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the New Law should ful flesh, of sin∗ hath condemned sin in the flesh, that the have been given from the beginning of the world. “For justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us.” there is no respect of persons with God” (Rom. 2:11). But A second reason may be taken from the perfection of “all” men “have sinned and do need the glory of God” the New Law. Because a thing is not brought to perfection (Rom. 3:23). Therefore the Law of the Gospel should at once from the outset, but through an orderly succession have been given from the beginning of the world, in order of time; thus one is at first a boy, and then a man. And this that it might bring succor to all. reason is stated by the Apostle (Gal. 3:24,25): “The Law Objection 2. Further, as men dwell in various places, was our pedagogue in Christ that we might be justified by so do they live in various times. But God, “Who will have faith. But after the faith is come, we are no longer under all men to be saved” (1 Tim. 2:4), commanded the Gospel a pedagogue.” to be preached in all places, as may be seen in the last The third reason is found in the fact that the New Law chapters of Matthew and Mark. Therefore the Law of the is the law of grace: wherefore it behoved man first of all Gospel should have been at hand for all times, so as to be to be left to himself under the state of the Old Law, so given from the beginning of the world. that through falling into sin, he might realize his weak- Objection 3. Further, man needs to save his soul, ness, and acknowledge his need of grace. This reason is which is for all eternity, more than to save his body, which set down by the Apostle (Rom. 5:20): “The Law entered is a temporal matter. But God provided man from the be- in, that sin might abound: and when sin abounded grace ginning of the world with things that are necessary for the did more abound.” health of his body, by subjecting to his power whatever Reply to Objection 1. Mankind on account of the sin was created for the sake of man (Gn. 1:26-29). There- of our first parents deserved to be deprived of the aid of fore the New Law also, which is very necessary for the grace: and so “from whom it is withheld it is justly with- health of the soul, should have been given to man from held, and to whom it is given, it is mercifully given,” as the beginning of the world. Augustine states (De Perfect. Justit. iv)†. Consequently it On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46): does not follow that there is respect of persons with God, “That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is from the fact that He did not offer the Law of grace to natural.” But the New Law is highly spiritual. Therefore all from the beginning of the world, which Law was to be it was not fitting for it to be given from the beginning of published in due course of time, as stated above. the world. Reply to Objection 2. The state of mankind does not I answer that, Three reasons may be assigned why it vary according to diversity of place, but according to suc- was not fitting for the New Law to be given from the be- cession of time. Hence the New Law avails for all places, ginning of the world. The first is because the New Law, but not for all times: although at all times there have been as stated above (a. 1), consists chiefly in the grace of the some persons belonging to the New Testament, as stated Holy Ghost: which it behoved not to be given abundantly above (a. 1, ad 3). until sin, which is an obstacle to grace, had been cast out Reply to Objection 3. Things pertaining to the health of man through the accomplishment of his redemption by of the body are of service to man as regards his nature, Christ: wherefore it is written (Jn. 7:39): “As yet the which sin does not destroy: whereas things pertaining to Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified.” the health of the soul are ordained to grace, which is for- This reason the Apostle states clearly (Rom. 8:2, seqq.) feit through sin. Consequently the comparison will not where, after speaking of “the Law of the Spirit of life,” he hold. adds: “God sending His own Son, in the likeness of sin- Whether the New Law will last till the end of the world? Ia IIae q. 106 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the New Law will “We know in part and we prophesy in part.” Therefore the not last until the end of the world. Because, as the Apos- New Law is to be done away, and will be succeeded by a tle says (1 Cor. 13:10), “when that which is perfect is more perfect state. come, that which is in part shall be done away.” But the Objection 2. Further, Our Lord (Jn. 16:13) promised New Law is “in part,” since the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:9): His disciples the knowledge of all truth when the Holy ∗ St. Thomas, quoting perhaps from memory, omits the “et” (and), after “sinful flesh.” The text quoted should read thus: “in the likeness of sinful flesh, and a sin offering ( peri hamartias), hath,” etc. † Cf. Ep. ccvii; De Pecc. Mer. et Rem. ii, 19 1135 Ghost, the Comforter, should come. But the Church persons, according as the grace of the Holy Ghost dwells knows not yet all truth in the state of the New Testament. in man more or less perfectly. Nevertheless we are not to Therefore we must look forward to another state, wherein look forward to a state wherein man is to possess the grace all truth will be revealed by the Holy Ghost. of the Holy Ghost more perfectly than he has possessed it Objection 3. Further, just as the Father is distinct hitherto, especially the apostles who “received the first- from the Son and the Son from the Father, so is the Holy fruits of the Spirit, i.e. sooner and more abundantly than Ghost distinct from the Father and the Son. But there others,” as a gloss expounds on Rom. 8:23. was a state corresponding with the Person of the Father, Reply to Objection 1. As Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. viz. the state of the Old Law, wherein men were intent v), there is a threefold state of mankind; the first was un- on begetting children: and likewise there is a state cor- der the Old Law; the second is that of the New Law; the responding to the Person of the Son: viz. the state of third will take place not in this life, but in heaven. But the New Law, wherein the clergy who are intent on wis- as the first state is figurative and imperfect in comparison dom (which is appropriated to the Son) hold a prominent with the state of the Gospel; so is the present state figura- place. Therefore there will be a third state corresponding tive and imperfect in comparison with the heavenly state, to the Holy Ghost, wherein spiritual men will hold the first with the advent of which the present state will be done place. away as expressed in that very passage (1 Cor. 13:12): Objection 4. Further, Our Lord said (Mat. 24:14): “We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then “This Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in the face to face.” whole world. . . and then shall the consummation come.” Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (Contra But the Gospel of Christ is already preached throughout Faust. xix, 31), Montanus and Priscilla pretended that the whole world: and yet the consummation has not yet Our Lord’s promise to give the Holy Ghost was fulfilled, come. Therefore the Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of not in the apostles, but in themselves. In like manner the kingdom, but another Gospel, that of the Holy Ghost, the Manicheans maintained that it was fulfilled in Manes is to come yet, like unto another Law. whom they held to be the Paraclete. Hence none of the On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 24:34): “I above received the Acts of the Apostles, where it is clearly say to you that this generation shall not pass till all shown that the aforesaid promise was fulfilled in the apos- (these) things be done”: which passage Chrysostom tles: just as Our Lord promised them a second time (Acts (Hom. lxxvii) explains as referring to “the generation of 1:5): “You shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost, not those that believe in Christ.” Therefore the state of those many days hence”: which we read as having been fulfilled who believe in Christ will last until the consummation of in Acts 2. However, these foolish notions are refuted by the world. the statement (Jn. 7:39) that “as yet the Spirit was not I answer that, The state of the world may change in given, because Jesus was not yet glorified”; from which two ways. In one way, according to a change of law: and we gather that the Holy Ghost was given as soon as Christ thus no other state will succeed this state of the New Law. was glorified in His Resurrection and Ascension. More- Because the state of the New Law succeeded the state of over, this puts out of court the senseless idea that the Holy the Old Law, as a more perfect law a less perfect one. Now Ghost is to be expected to come at some other time. no state of the present life can be more perfect that the Now the Holy Ghost taught the apostles all truth in re- state of the New Law: since nothing can approach nearer spect of matters necessary for salvation; those things, to to the last end than that which is the immediate cause of wit, that we are bound to believe and to do. But He did not our being brought to the last end. But the New Law does teach them about all future events: for this did not regard this: wherefore the Apostle says (Heb. 10:19-22): “Hav- them according to Acts 1:7: “It is not for you to know the ing therefore, brethren, a confidence in the entering into times or moments which the Father hath put in His own the Holies by the blood of Christ, a new. . . way which He power.” hath dedicated for us. . . let us draw near.” Therefore no Reply to Objection 3. The Old Law corresponded state of the present life can be more perfect than that of not only to the Father, but also to the Son: because Christ the New Law, since the nearer a thing is to the last end the was foreshadowed in the Old Law. Hence Our Lord said more perfect it is. (Jn. 5:46): “If you did believe Moses, you would per- In another way the state of mankind may change ac- haps believe me also; for he wrote of Me.” In like manner cording as man stands in relation to one and the same the New Law corresponds not only to Christ, but also to law more or less perfectly. And thus the state of the Old the Holy Ghost; according to Rom. 8:2: “The Law of Law underwent frequent changes, since at times the laws the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus,” etc. Hence we are not were very well kept, and at other times were altogether to look forward to another law corresponding to the Holy unheeded. Thus, too, the state of the New Law is sub- Ghost. ject to change with regard to various places, times, and Reply to Objection 4. Since Christ said at the very 1136 outset of the preaching of the Gospel: “The kingdom of mation come,” refer to the destruction of Jerusalem, of heaven is at hand” (Mat. 4:17), it is most absurd to say that which He was speaking literally. Secondly, the preaching the Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of the kingdom. But of the Gospel may be understood as extending throughout the preaching of the Gospel of Christ may be understood the world and producing its full effect, so that, to wit, the in two ways. First, as denoting the spreading abroad of the Church would be founded in every nation. And in these knowledge of Christ: and thus the Gospel was preached sense, as Augustine writes to Hesychius (Epist. cxcix), throughout the world even at the time of the apostles, as the Gospel is not preached to the whole world yet, but, Chrysostom states (Hom. lxxv in Matth.). And in this when it is, the consummation of the world will come. sense the words that follow—“and then shall the consum- 1137 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 107 Of the New Law As Compared with the Old (In Four Articles) We must now consider the New Law as compared with the Old: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the New Law is distinct from the Old Law? (2) Whether the New Law fulfils the Old? (3) Whether the New Law is contained in the Old? (4) Which is the more burdensome, the New or the Old Law? Whether the New Law is distinct from the Old Law? Ia IIae q. 107 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the New Law is not tion also be made of the Law.” But the priesthood of the distinct from the Old. Because both these laws were given New Testament is distinct from that of the Old, as the to those who believe in God: since “without faith it is im- Apostle shows in the same place. Therefore the Law is possible to please God,” according to Heb. 11:6. But the also distinct. faith of olden times and of nowadays is the same, as the I answer that, As stated above (q. 90, a. 2; q. 91, gloss says on Mat. 21:9. Therefore the law is the same a. 4), every law ordains human conduct to some end. also. Now things ordained to an end may be divided in two Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Contra ways, considered from the point of view of the end. First, Adamant. Manich. discip. xvii) that “there is little dif- through being ordained to different ends: and this differ- ference between the Law and Gospel”∗—“fear and love.” ence will be specific, especially if such ends are proxi- But the New and Old Laws cannot be differentiated in re- mate. Secondly, by reason of being closely or remotely spect of these two things: since even the Old Law com- connected with the end. Thus it is clear that movements prised precepts of charity: “Thou shalt love thy neighbor” differ in species through being directed to different terms: (Lev. 19:18), and: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God” while according as one part of a movement is nearer to (Dt. 6:5). In like manner neither can they differ according the term than another part, the difference of perfect and to the other difference which Augustine assigns (Contra imperfect movement is assessed. Faust. iv, 2), viz. that “the Old Testament contained tem- Accordingly then two laws may be distinguished from poral promises, whereas the New Testament contains spir- one another in two ways. First, through being altogether itual and eternal promises”: since even the New Testament diverse, from the fact that they are ordained to diverse contains temporal promises, according to Mk. 10:30: He ends: thus a state-law ordained to democratic government, shall receive “a hundred times as much. . . in this time, would differ specifically from a law ordained to govern- houses and brethren,” etc.: while in the Old Testament ment by the aristocracy. Secondly, two laws may be dis- they hoped in promises spiritual and eternal, according to tinguished from one another, through one of them being Heb. 11:16: “But now they desire a better, that is to say, a more closely connected with the end, and the other more heavenly country,” which is said of the patriarchs. There- remotely: thus in one and the same state there is one law fore it seems that the New Law is not distinct from the enjoined on men of mature age, who can forthwith ac- Old. complish that which pertains to the common good; and Objection 3. Further, the Apostle seems to distinguish another law regulating the education of children who need both laws by calling the Old Law “a law of works,” and to be taught how they are to achieve manly deeds later on. the New Law “a law of faith” (Rom. 3:27). But the Old We must therefore say that, according to the first way, Law was also a law of faith, according to Heb. 11:39: the New Law is not distinct from the Old Law: because “All were [Vulg.: ‘All these being’] approved by the tes- they both have the same end, namely, man’s subjection timony of faith,” which he says of the fathers of the Old to God; and there is but one God of the New and of the Testament. In like manner the New Law is a law of works: Old Testament, according to Rom. 3:30: “It is one God since it is written (Mat. 5:44): “Do good to them that hate that justifieth circumcision by faith, and uncircumcision you”; and (Lk. 22:19): “Do this for a commemoration of through faith.” According to the second way, the New Me.” Therefore the New Law is not distinct from the Old. Law is distinct from the Old Law: because the Old Law On the contrary, the Apostle says (Heb. 7:12): “The is like a pedagogue of children, as the Apostle says (Gal. priesthood being translated it is necessary that a transla- 3:24), whereas the New Law is the law of perfection, since ∗ The ‘little difference’ refers to the Latin words ‘timor’ and ‘amor’ 1138 it is the law of charity, of which the Apostle says (Col. eign but as to something of their own. For this reason, too, 3:14) that it is “the bond of perfection.” the Old Law is described as “restraining the hand, not the Reply to Objection 1. The unity of faith under both will”∗; since when a man refrains from some sins through Testaments witnesses to the unity of end: for it has been fear of being punished, his will does not shrink simply stated above (q. 62, a. 2) that the object of the theological from sin, as does the will of a man who refrains from sin virtues, among which is faith, is the last end. Yet faith through love of righteousness: and hence the New Law, had a different state in the Old and in the New Law: since which is the Law of love, is said to restrain the will. what they believed as future, we believe as fact. Nevertheless there were some in the state of the Old Reply to Objection 2. All the differences assigned Testament who, having charity and the grace of the Holy between the Old and New Laws are gathered from their Ghost, looked chiefly to spiritual and eternal promises: relative perfection and imperfection. For the precepts of and in this respect they belonged to the New Law. In like every law prescribe acts of virtue. Now the imperfect, manner in the New Testament there are some carnal men who as yet are not possessed of a virtuous habit, are di- who have not yet attained to the perfection of the New rected in one way to perform virtuous acts, while those Law; and these it was necessary, even under the New Tes- who are perfected by the possession of virtuous habits tament, to lead to virtuous action by the fear of punish- are directed in another way. For those who as yet are not ment and by temporal promises. endowed with virtuous habits, are directed to the perfor- But although the Old Law contained precepts of char- mance of virtuous acts by reason of some outward cause: ity, nevertheless it did not confer the Holy Ghost by for instance, by the threat of punishment, or the promise Whom “charity. . . is spread abroad in our hearts” (Rom. of some extrinsic rewards, such as honor, riches, or the 5:5). like. Hence the Old Law, which was given to men who Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 106, were imperfect, that is, who had not yet received spiritual Aa. 1,2), the New Law is called the law of faith, in so grace, was called the “law of fear,” inasmuch as it induced far as its pre-eminence is derived from that very grace men to observe its commandments by threatening them which is given inwardly to believers, and for this reason with penalties; and is spoken of as containing temporal is called the grace of faith. Nevertheless it consists sec- promises. On the other hand, those who are possessed of ondarily in certain deeds, moral and sacramental: but the virtue, are inclined to do virtuous deeds through love of New Law does not consist chiefly in these latter things, virtue, not on account of some extrinsic punishment or re- as did the Old Law. As to those under the Old Testament ward. Hence the New Law which derives its pre-eminence who through faith were acceptable to God, in this respect from the spiritual grace instilled into our hearts, is called they belonged to the New Testament: for they were not the “Law of love”: and it is described as containing spiri- justified except through faith in Christ, Who is the Au- tual and eternal promises, which are objects of the virtues, thor of the New Testament. Hence of Moses the Apostle chiefly of charity. Accordingly such persons are inclined says (Heb. 11:26) that he esteemed “the reproach of Christ of themselves to those objects, not as to something for- greater riches than the treasure of the Egyptians.” Whether the New Law fulfils the Old? Ia IIae q. 107 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the New Law does tion, and against hating one’s enemies. In like manner not fulfil the Old. Because to fulfil and to void are con- Our Lord seems to have done away with the precepts of trary. But the New Law voids or excludes the observances the Old Law relating to the different kinds of foods (Mat. of the Old Law: for the Apostle says (Gal. 5:2): “If you 15:11): “Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth the be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing.” There- man: but what cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a fore the New Law is not a fulfilment of the Old. man.” Therefore the New Law is not a fulfilment of the Objection 2. Further, one contrary is not the fulfil- Old. ment of another. But Our Lord propounded in the New Objection 3. Further, whoever acts against a law does Law precepts that were contrary to precepts of the Old not fulfil the law. But Christ in certain cases acted against Law. For we read (Mat. 5:27-32): You have heard that the Law. For He touched the leper (Mat. 8:3), which it was said to them of old:. . . “Whosoever shall put away was contrary to the Law. Likewise He seems to have fre- his wife, let him give her a bill of divorce. But I say to quently broken the sabbath; since the Jews used to say of you that whosoever shall put away his wife. . . maketh her Him (Jn. 9:16): “This man is not of God, who keepeth not to commit adultery.” Furthermore, the same evidently ap- the sabbath.” Therefore Christ did not fulfil the Law: and plies to the prohibition against swearing, against retalia- so the New Law given by Christ is not a fulfilment of the ∗ Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 40 1139 Old. perjury: and this is more safely avoided, by abstaining al- Objection 4. Further, the Old Law contained precepts, together from swearing, save in cases of urgency. Thirdly, moral, ceremonial, and judicial, as stated above (q. 99, Our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law, by adding some a. 4). But Our Lord (Mat. 5) fulfilled the Law in some counsels of perfection: this is clearly seen in Mat. 19:21, respects, but without mentioning the judicial and ceremo- where Our Lord said to the man who affirmed that he had nial precepts. Therefore it seems that the New Law is not kept all the precepts of the Old Law: “One thing is want- a complete fulfilment of the Old. ing to thee: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell whatsoever On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 5:17): “I am thou hast,” etc.†. not come to destroy, but to fulfil”: and went on to say Reply to Objection 1. The New Law does not void (Mat. 5:18): “One jot or one tittle shall not pass of the observance of the Old Law except in the point of cere- Law till all be fulfilled.” monial precepts, as stated above (q. 103, Aa. 3,4). Now I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the New Law is the latter were figurative of something to come. Where- compared to the Old as the perfect to the imperfect. Now fore from the very fact that the ceremonial precepts were everything perfect fulfils that which is lacking in the im- fulfilled when those things were accomplished which they perfect. And accordingly the New Law fulfils the Old by foreshadowed, it follows that they are no longer to be ob- supplying that which was lacking in the Old Law. served: for it they were to be observed, this would mean Now two things of every law is to make men righ- that something is still to be accomplished and is not yet teous and virtuous, as was stated above (q. 92, a. 1): fulfilled. Thus the promise of a future gift holds no longer and consequently the end of the Old Law was the jus- when it has been fulfilled by the presentation of the gift. tification of men. The Law, however, could not accom- In this way the legal ceremonies are abolished by being plish this: but foreshadowed it by certain ceremonial ac- fulfilled. tions, and promised it in words. And in this respect, the Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (Contra New Law fulfils the Old by justifying men through the Faust. xix, 26), those precepts of Our Lord are not con- power of Christ’s Passion. This is what the Apostle says trary to the precepts of the Old Law. For what Our Lord (Rom. 8:3,4): “What the Law could not do. . . God send- commanded about a man not putting away his wife, is not ing His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh. . . hath con- contrary to what the Law prescribed. “For the Law did demned sin in the flesh, that the justification of the Law not say: ‘Let him that wills, put his wife away’: the con- might be fulfilled in us.” And in this respect, the New trary of which would be not to put her away. On the con- Law gives what the Old Law promised, according to 2 trary, the Law was unwilling that a man should put away Cor. 1:20: “Whatever are the promises of God, in Him,” his wife, since it prescribed a delay, so that excessive ea- i.e. in Christ, “they are ‘Yea’.”∗ Again, in this respect, gerness for divorce might cease through being weakened it also fulfils what the Old Law foreshadowed. Hence during the writing of the bill. Hence Our Lord, in order to it is written (Col. 2:17) concerning the ceremonial pre- impress the fact that a wife ought not easily to be put away, cepts that they were “a shadow of things to come, but the allowed no exception save in the case of fornication.” The body is of Christ”; in other words, the reality is found in same applies to the prohibition about swearing, as stated Christ. Wherefore the New Law is called the law of real- above. The same is also clear with respect to the prohibi- ity; whereas the Old Law is called the law of shadow or tion of retaliation. For the Law fixed a limit to revenge, by of figure. forbidding men to seek vengeance unreasonably: whereas Now Christ fulfilled the precepts of the Old Law both Our Lord deprived them of vengeance more completely in His works and in His doctrine. In His works, because by commanding them to abstain from it altogether. With He was willing to be circumcised and to fulfil the other regard to the hatred of one’s enemies, He dispelled the legal observances, which were binding for the time be- false interpretation of the Pharisees, by admonishing us to ing; according to Gal. 4:4: “Made under the Law.” In hate, not the person, but his sin. As to discriminating be- His doctrine He fulfilled the precepts of the Law in three tween various foods, which was a ceremonial matter, Our ways. First, by explaining the true sense of the Law. This Lord did not forbid this to be observed: but He showed is clear in the case of murder and adultery, the prohibition that no foods are naturally unclean, but only in token of of which the Scribes and Pharisees thought to refer only to something else, as stated above (q. 102, a. 6, ad 1). the exterior act: wherefore Our Lord fulfilled the Law by Reply to Objection 3. It was forbidden by the Law showing that the prohibition extended also to the interior to touch a leper; because by doing so, man incurred a cer- acts of sins. Secondly, Our Lord fulfilled the precepts of tain uncleanness of irregularity, as also by touching the the Law by prescribing the safest way of complying with dead, as stated above (q. 102, a. 5, ad 4). But Our Lord, the statutes of the Old Law. Thus the Old Law forbade Who healed the leper, could not contract an uncleanness. ∗ The Douay version reads thus: “All the promises of God are in Him, ‘It is’.” † St. Thomas combines Mat. 19:21 with Mk. 10:21 1140 By those things which He did on the sabbath, He did not of kindness on the sabbath; which was contrary to the in-break the sabbath in reality, as the Master Himself shows tention of the Law. in the Gospel: both because He worked miracles by His Reply to Objection 4. The reason why the ceremo- Divine power, which is ever active among things; and be- nial precepts of the Law are not mentioned in Mat. 5 is cause He worked miracles by His Divine power, which because, as stated above (ad 1), their observance was abol- is ever active among things; and because His works were ished by their fulfilment. But of the judicial precepts He concerned with the salvation of man, while the Pharisees mentioned that of retaliation: so that what He said about it were concerned for the well-being of animals even on the should refer to all the others. With regard to this precept, sabbath; and again because on account of urgency He ex- He taught that the intention of the Law was that retalia- cused His disciples for gathering the ears of corn on the tion should be sought out of love of justice, and not as sabbath. But He did seem to break the sabbath according a punishment out of revengeful spite, which He forbade, to the superstitious interpretation of the Pharisees, who admonishing man to be ready to suffer yet greater insults; thought that man ought to abstain from doing even works and this remains still in the New Law. Whether the New Law is contained in the Old? Ia IIae q. 107 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the New Law is not the full corn in the ear,” expresses himself as follows: “He contained in the Old. Because the New Law consists brought forth first the blade, i.e. the Law of Nature; then chiefly in faith: wherefore it is called the “law of faith” the ear, i.e. the Law of Moses; lastly, the full corn, i.e. the (Rom. 3:27). But many points of faith are set forth in the Law of the Gospel.” Hence then the New Law is in the New Law, which are not contained in the Old. Therefore Old as the corn in the ear. the New Law is not contained in the Old. Reply to Objection 1. Whatsoever is set down in the Objection 2. Further, a gloss says on Mat. 5:19, “He New Testament explicitly and openly as a point of faith, that shall break one of these least commandments,” that is contained in the Old Testament as a matter of belief, the lesser commandments are those of the Law, and the but implicitly, under a figure. And accordingly, even as to greater commandments, those contained in the Gospel. those things which we are bound to believe, the New Law Now the greater cannot be contained in the lesser. There- is contained in the Old. fore the New Law is not contained in the Old. Reply to Objection 2. The precepts of the New Law Objection 3. Further, who holds the container holds are said to be greater than those of the Old Law, in the the contents. If, therefore, the New Law is contained in point of their being set forth explicitly. But as to the sub- the Old, it follows that whoever had the Old Law had the stance itself of the precepts of the New Testament, they New: so that it was superfluous to give men a New Law are all contained in the Old. Hence Augustine says (Con- when once they had the Old. Therefore the New Law is tra Faust. xix, 23,28) that “nearly all Our Lord’s admo- not contained in the Old. nitions or precepts, where He expressed Himself by say- On the contrary, As expressed in Ezech. 1:16, there ing: ‘But I say unto you,’ are to be found also in those was “a wheel in the midst of a wheel,” i.e. “the New Testa- ancient books. Yet, since they thought that murder was ment within the Old,” according to Gregory’s exposition. only the slaying of the human body, Our Lord declared to I answer that, One thing may be contained in another them that every wicked impulse to hurt our brother is to in two ways. First, actually; as a located thing is in a be looked on as a kind of murder.” And it is in the point place. Secondly, virtually; as an effect in its cause, or as of declarations of this kind that the precepts of the New the complement in that which is incomplete; thus a genus Law are said to be greater than those of the Old. Nothing, contains its species, and a seed contains the whole tree, however, prevents the greater from being contained in the virtually. It is in this way that the New Law is contained lesser virtually; just as a tree is contained in the seed. in the Old: for it has been stated (a. 1) that the New Law Reply to Objection 3. What is set forth implicitly is compared to the Old as perfect to imperfect. Hence needs to be declared explicitly. Hence after the publish- Chrysostom, expounding Mk. 4:28, “The earth of itself ing of the Old Law, a New Law also had to be given. bringeth forth fruit, first the blade, then the ear, afterwards 1141 Whether the New Law is more burdensome than the Old? Ia IIae q. 107 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the New Law is more tion should be observed, lest good conduct should become burdensome than the Old. For Chrysostom (Opus Imp. a burden to the faithful. For he says in reply to the queries in Matth., Hom. x∗) say: “The commandments given to of Januarius (Ep. lv) that, “whereas God in His mercy Moses are easy to obey: Thou shalt not kill; Thou shalt wished religion to be a free service rendered by the public not commit adultery: but the commandments of Christ are solemnization of a small number of most manifest sacra- difficult to accomplish, for instance: Thou shalt not give ments, certain persons make it a slave’s burden; so much way to anger, or to lust.” Therefore the New Law is more so that the state of the Jews who were subject to the sacra- burdensome than the Old. ments of the Law, and not to the presumptuous devices of Objection 2. Further, it is easier to make use of man, was more tolerable.” earthly prosperity than to suffer tribulations. But in the The other difficulty attaches to works of virtue as to in- Old Testament observance of the Law was followed by terior acts: for instance, that a virtuous deed be done with temporal prosperity, as may be gathered from Dt. 28:1- promptitude and pleasure. It is this difficulty that virtue 14; whereas many kinds of trouble ensue to those who ob- solves: because to act thus is difficult for a man without serve the New Law, as stated in 2 Cor. 6:4-10: “Let us ex- virtue: but through virtue it becomes easy for him. In this hibit ourselves as the ministers of God, in much patience, respect the precepts of the New Law are more burden- in tribulation, in necessities, in distresses,” etc. Therefore some than those of the Old; because the New Law pro- the New Law is more burdensome than the Old. hibits certain interior movements of the soul, which were Objection 3. The more one has to do, the more dif- not expressly forbidden in the Old Law in all cases, al- ficult it is. But the New Law is something added to the though they were forbidden in some, without, however, Old. For the Old Law forbade perjury, while the New Law any punishment being attached to the prohibition. Now proscribed even swearing: the Old Law forbade a man to this is very difficult to a man without virtue: thus even cast off his wife without a bill of divorce, while the New the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 9) that it is easy to do Law forbade divorce altogether; as is clearly stated in Mat. what a righteous man does; but that to do it in the same 5:31, seqq., according to Augustine’s expounding. There- way, viz. with pleasure and promptitude, is difficult to a fore the New Law is more burdensome than the Old. man who is not righteous. Accordingly we read also (1 On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 11:28): “Come to Jn. 5:3) that “His commandments are not heavy”: which Me, all you that labor and are burdened”: which words are words Augustine expounds by saying that “they are not expounded by Hilary thus: “He calls to Himself all those heavy to the man that loveth; whereas they are a burden to that labor under the difficulty of observing the Law, and him that loveth not.” are burdened with the sins of this world.” And further on Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted speaks ex- He says of the yoke of the Gospel: “For My yoke is sweet pressly of the difficulty of the New Law as to the deliber- and My burden light.” Therefore the New Law is a lighter ate curbing of interior movements. burden than the Old. Reply to Objection 2. The tribulations suffered by I answer that, A twofold difficult may attach to works those who observe the New Law are not imposed by the of virtue with which the precepts of the Law are con- Law itself. Moreover they are easily borne, on account of cerned. One is on the part of the outward works, which of the love in which the same Law consists: since, as Augus- themselves are, in a way, difficult and burdensome. And tine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxx), “love makes light in this respect the Old Law is a much heavier burden than and nothing of things that seem arduous and beyond our the New: since the Old Law by its numerous ceremonies power.” prescribed many more outward acts than the New Law, Reply to Objection 3. The object of these additions which, in the teaching of Christ and the apostles, added to the precepts of the Old Law was to render it easier to do very few precepts to those of the natural law; although af- what it prescribed, as Augustine states†. Accordingly this terwards some were added, through being instituted by the does not prove that the New Law is more burdensome, but holy Fathers. Even in these Augustine says that modera- rather that it is a lighter burden. ∗ The work of an unknown author † De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 17,21; xix, 23,26 1142 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 108 Of Those Things That Are Contained in the New Law (In Four Articles) We must now consider those things that are contained in the New Law: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or to forbid any outward works? (2) Whether the New Law makes sufficient provision in prescribing and forbidding external acts? (3) Whether in the matter of internal acts it directs man sufficiently? (4) Whether it fittingly adds counsels to precepts? Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or prohibit any external acts? Ia IIae q. 108 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the New Law should “The Word was made flesh,” and afterwards: “full of not prescribe or prohibit any external acts. For the New grace and truth”; and further on: “Of His fulness we all Law is the Gospel of the kingdom, according to Mat. have received, and grace for grace.” Hence it is added that 24:14: “This Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in “grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.” Consequently the whole world.” But the kingdom of God consists not in it was becoming that the grace flows from the incarnate exterior, but only in interior acts, according to Lk. 17:21: Word should be given to us by means of certain external “The kingdom of God is within you”; and Rom. 14:17: sensible objects; and that from this inward grace, whereby “The kingdom of God is not meat and drink; but justice the flesh is subjected to the Spirit, certain external works and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost.” Therefore the New should ensue. Law should not prescribe or forbid any external acts. Accordingly external acts may have a twofold connec- Objection 2. Further, the New Law is “the law of the tion with grace. In the first place, as leading in some way Spirit” (Rom. 8:2). But “where the Spirit of the Lord is, to grace. Such are the sacramental acts which are insti- there is liberty” (2 Cor. 3:17). Now there is no liberty tuted in the New Law, e.g. Baptism, the Eucharist, and when man is bound to do or avoid certain external acts. the like. Therefore the New Law does not prescribe or forbid any In the second place there are those external acts which external acts. ensue from the promptings of grace: and herein we must Objection 3. Further, all external acts are understood observe a difference. For there are some which are nec- as referable to the hand, just as interior acts belong to the essarily in keeping with, or in opposition to inward grace mind. But this is assigned as the difference between the consisting in faith that worketh through love. Such ex- New and Old Laws that the “Old Law restrains the hand, ternal works are prescribed or forbidden in the New Law; whereas the New Law curbs the will”∗. Therefore the thus confession of faith is prescribed, and denial of faith is New Law should not contain prohibitions and commands forbidden; for it is written (Mat. 10:32,33) ”(Every one) about exterior deeds, but only about interior acts. that shall confess Me before men, I will also confess him On the contrary, Through the New Law, men are before My Father. . . But he that shall deny Me before men, made “children of light”: wherefore it is written (Jn. I will also deny him before My Father.” On the other hand, 12:36): “Believe in the light that you may be the children there are works which are not necessarily opposed to, or in of light.” Now it is becoming that children of the light keeping with faith that worketh through love. Such works should do deeds of light and cast aside deeds of darkness, are not prescribed or forbidden in the New Law, by virtue according to Eph. 5:8: “You were heretofore darkness, of its primitive institution; but have been left by the Law- but now light in the Lord. Walk. . . as children of the light.” giver, i.e. Christ, to the discretion of each individual. And Therefore the New Law had to forbid certain external acts so to each one it is free to decide what he should do or and prescribe others. avoid; and to each superior, to direct his subjects in such I answer that, As stated above (q. 106, Aa. 1,2), the matters as regards what they must do or avoid. Where- New Law consists chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost, fore also in this respect the Gospel is called the “law of which is shown forth by faith that worketh through love. liberty”†: since the Old Law decided many points and left Now men become receivers of this grace through God’s few to man to decide as he chose. Son made man, Whose humanity grace filled first, and Reply to Objection 1. The kingdom of God consists thence flowed forth to us. Hence it is written (Jn. 1:14): chiefly in internal acts: but as a consequence all things ∗ Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 40 † Cf. Reply obj. 2 1143 that are essential to internal acts belong also to the king-to some corruption affecting that nature. Since then the dom of God. Thus if the kingdom of God is internal righ- grace of the Holy Ghost is like an interior habit bestowed teousness, peace, and spiritual joy, all external acts that on us and inclining us to act aright, it makes us do freely are incompatible with righteousness, peace, and spiritual those things that are becoming to grace, and shun what is joy, are in opposition to the kingdom of God; and conse- opposed to it. quently should be forbidden in the Gospel of the kingdom. Accordingly the New Law is called the law of liberty On the other hand, those things that are indifferent as re- in two respects. First, because it does not bind us to do gards the aforesaid, for instance, to eat of this or that food, or avoid certain things, except such as are of themselves are not part of the kingdom of God; wherefore the Apos- necessary or opposed to salvation, and come under the tle says before the words quoted: “The kingdom of God prescription or prohibition of the law. Secondly, because is not meat and drink.” it also makes us comply freely with these precepts and Reply to Objection 2. According to the Philosopher prohibitions, inasmuch as we do so through the prompt- (Metaph. i, 2), what is “free is cause of itself.” Therefore ings of grace. It is for these two reasons that the New Law he acts freely, who acts of his own accord. Now man does is called “the law of perfect liberty” (James 1:25). of his own accord that which he does from a habit that is Reply to Objection 3. The New Law, by restraining suitable to his nature: since a habit inclines one as a sec- the mind from inordinate movements, must needs also re- ond nature. If, however, a habit be in opposition to nature, strain the hand from inordinate acts, which ensue from man would not act according to his nature, but according inward movements. Whether the New Law made sufficient ordinations about external acts? Ia IIae q. 108 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the New Law made and ceremonial precepts, there were certain judicial pre- insufficient ordinations about external acts. Because faith cepts. But in the New Law there are no judicial pre- that worketh through charity seems chiefly to belong to cepts. Therefore the New Law made insufficient ordina- the New Law, according to Gal. 5:6: “In Christ Jesus nei- tions about external works. ther circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision: On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 7:24): “Every but faith that worketh through charity.” But the New Law one. . . that heareth these My words, and doth them, shall declared explicitly certain points of faith which were not be likened to a wise man that built his house upon a rock.” set forth explicitly in the Old Law; for instance, belief But a wise builder leaves out nothing that is necessary to in the Trinity. Therefore it should also have added cer- the building. Therefore Christ’s words contain all things tain outward moral deeds, which were not fixed in the Old necessary for man’s salvation. Law. I answer that, as stated above (a. 1), the New Law Objection 2. Further, in the Old Law not only were had to make such prescriptions or prohibitions alone as sacraments instituted, but also certain sacred things, as are essential for the reception or right use of grace. And stated above (q. 101, a. 4; q. 102, a. 4). But in the New since we cannot of ourselves obtain grace, but through Law, although certain sacraments are instituted by Our Christ alone, hence Christ of Himself instituted the sacra- Lord; for instance, pertaining either to the sanctification ments whereby we obtain grace: viz. Baptism, Eucharist, of a temple or of the vessels, or to the celebration of some Orders of the ministers of the New Law, by the institu- particular feast. Therefore the New Law made insufficient tion of the apostles and seventy-two disciples, Penance, ordinations about external matters. and indissoluble Matrimony. He promised Confirmation Objection 3. Further, in the Old Law, just as there through the sending of the Holy Ghost: and we read that were certain observances pertaining to God’s ministers, by His institution the apostles healed the sick by anointing so also were there certain observances pertaining to the them with oil (Mk. 6:13). These are the sacraments of the people: as was stated above when we were treating of the New Law. ceremonial of the Old Law (q. 101, a. 4; q. 102, a. 6). The right use of grace is by means of works of char- Now in the New Law certain observances seem to have ity. These, in so far as they are essential to virtue, pertain been prescribed to the ministers of God; as may be gath- to the moral precepts, which also formed part of the Old ered from Mat. 10:9: “Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor Law. Hence, in this respect, the New Law had nothing money in your purses,” nor other things which are men- to add as regards external action. The determination of tioned here and Lk. 9,10. Therefore certain observances these works in their relation to the divine worship, be- pertaining to the faithful should also have been instituted longs to the ceremonial precepts of the Law; and, in re- in the New Law. lation to our neighbor, to the judicial precepts, as stated Objection 4. Further, in the Old Law, besides moral above (q. 99, a. 4). And therefore, since these determi- 1144 nations are not in themselves necessarily connected with from those to whom they preached: wherefore He goes inward grace wherein the Law consists, they do not come on to say: “For the laborer is worthy of his hire.” Nor is it under a precept of the New Law, but are left to the decision a sin, but a work of supererogation for a preacher to take of man; some relating to inferiors—as when a precept is means of livelihood with him, without accepting supplies given to an individual; others, relating to superiors, tem- from those to whom he preaches; as Paul did (1 Cor. 9:4, poral or spiritual, referring, namely, to the common good. seqq.). Accordingly the New Law had no other external works Secondly, according to the explanation of other holy to determine, by prescribing or forbidding, except the men, they may be considered as temporal commands laid sacraments, and those moral precepts which have a nec- upon the apostles for the time during which they were essary connection with virtue, for instance, that one must sent to preach in Judea before Christ’s Passion. For the not kill, or steal, and so forth. disciples, being yet as little children under Christ’s care, Reply to Objection 1. Matters of faith are above needed to receive some special commands from Christ, human reason, and so we cannot attain to them except such as all subjects receive from their superiors: and es- through grace. Consequently, when grace came to be be- pecially so, since they were to be accustomed little by stowed more abundantly, the result was an increase in the little to renounce the care of temporalities, so as to be- number of explicit points of faith. On the other hand, it come fitted for the preaching of the Gospel throughout the is through human reason that we are directed to works of whole world. Nor must we wonder if He established cer- virtue, for it is the rule of human action, as stated above tain fixed modes of life, as long as the state of the Old Law (q. 19, a. 3; q. 63, a. 2). Wherefore in such matters as endured and the people had not as yet achieved the perfect these there was no need for any precepts to be given be- liberty of the Spirit. These statutes He abolished shortly sides the moral precepts of the Law, which proceed from before His Passion, as though the disciples had by their the dictate of reason. means become sufficiently practiced. Hence He said (Lk. Reply to Objection 2. In the sacraments of the New 22:35,36) “When I sent you without purse and scrip and Law grace is bestowed, which cannot be received except shoes, did you want anything? But they said: Nothing. through Christ: consequently they had to be instituted by Then said He unto them: But now, he that hath a purse, let Him. But in the sacred things no grace is given: for in- him take it, and likewise a scrip.” Because the time of per- stance, in the consecration of a temple, an altar or the like, fect liberty was already at hand, when they would be left or, again, in the celebration of feasts. Wherefore Our Lord entirely to their own judgment in matters not necessarily left the institution of such things to the discretion of the connected with virtue. faithful, since they have not of themselves any necessary Reply to Objection 4. Judicial precepts also, are not connection with inward grace. essential to virtue in respect of any particular determina- Reply to Objection 3. Our Lord gave the apos- tion, but only in regard to the common notion of justice. tles those precepts not as ceremonial observances, but as Consequently Our Lord left the judicial precepts to the moral statutes: and they can be understood in two ways. discretion of those who were to have spiritual or temporal First, following Augustine (De Consensu Evang. 30), as charge of others. But as regards the judicial precepts of the being not commands but permissions. For He permitted Old Law, some of them He explained, because they were them to set forth to preach without scrip or stick, and so misunderstood by the Pharisees, as we shall state later on on, since they were empowered to accept their livelihood (a. 3, ad 2). Whether the New Law directed man sufficiently as regards interior actions? Ia IIae q. 108 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the New Law directed other judicial precepts of the Old Law, as stated above man insufficiently as regards interior actions. For there (q. 104, a. 4; q. 105). Therefore, in this respect, He di- are ten commandments of the decalogue directing man to rected human life insufficiently. God and his neighbor. But Our Lord partly fulfilled only Objection 3. Further, in the Old Law, besides moral three of them: as regards, namely, the prohibition of mur- and judicial, there were ceremonial precepts about which der, of adultery, and of perjury. Therefore it seems that, Our Lord made no ordination. Therefore it seems that He by omitting to fulfil the other precepts, He directed man ordained insufficiently. insufficiently. Objection 4. Further, in order that the mind be in- Objection 2. Further, as regards the judicial precepts, wardly well disposed, man should do no good deed for Our Lord ordained nothing in the Gospel, except in the any temporal whatever. But there are many other tempo- matter of divorcing of wife, of punishment by retaliation, ral goods besides the favor of man: and there are many and of persecuting one’s enemies. But there are many other good works besides fasting, alms-deeds, and prayer. 1145 Therefore Our Lord unbecomingly taught that only in re-wary lest we be led astray by evil influences. Moreover, spect of these three works, and of no other earthly goods He declares that we must observe His commandments, ought we to shun the glory of human favor. and that it is not enough to make profession of faith, or Objection 5. Further, solicitude for the necessary to work miracles, or merely to hear His words. means of livelihood is by nature instilled into man, and Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord explained the man- this solicitude even other animals share with man: where- ner of fulfilling those precepts which the Scribes and Phar- fore it is written (Prov. 6:6,8): “Go to the ant, O sluggard, isees did not rightly understand: and this affected chiefly and consider her ways. . . she provideth her meat for her- those precepts of the decalogue. For they thought that the self in the summer, and gathereth her food in the harvest.” prohibition of adultery and murder covered the external But every command issued against the inclination of na- act only, and not the internal desire. And they held this ture is an unjust command, forasmuch as it is contrary to opinion about murder and adultery rather than about theft the law of nature. Therefore it seems that Our Lord unbe- and false witness, because the movement of anger tending comingly forbade solicitude about food and raiment. to murder, and the movement of desire tending to adul- Objection 6. Further, no act of virtue should be the tery, seem to be in us from nature somewhat, but not the subject of a prohibition. Now judgment is an act of jus- desire of stealing or bearing false witness. They held a tice, according to Ps. 18:15: “Until justice be turned into false opinion about perjury, for they thought that perjury judgment.” Therefore it seems that Our Lord unbecom- indeed was a sin; but that oaths were of themselves to be ingly forbade judgment: and consequently that the New desired and to be taken frequently, since they seem to pro- Law directed man insufficiently in the matter of interior ceed from reverence to God. Hence Our Lord shows that acts. an oath is not desirable as a good thing; and that it is better On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. to speak without oaths, unless necessity forces us to have in Monte i, 1): We should take note that, when He said: recourse to them. “ ‘He that heareth these My words,’ He indicates clearly Reply to Objection 2. The Scribes and Pharisees that this sermon of the Lord is replete with all the precepts erred about the judicial precepts in two ways. First, be- whereby a Christian’s life is formed.” cause they considered certain matters contained in the I answer that, As is evident from Augustine’s words Law of Moses by way of permission, to be right in them- just quoted, the sermon, contains the whole process of selves: namely, divorce of a wife, and the taking of usury forming the life of a Christian. Therein man’s interior from strangers. Wherefore Our Lord forbade a man to movements are ordered. Because after declaring that his divorce his wife (Mat. 5:32); and to receive usury (Lk. end is Beatitude; and after commending the authority of 6:35), when He said: “Lend, hoping for nothing thereby.” the apostles, through whom the teaching of the Gospel In another way they erred by thinking that certain was to be promulgated, He orders man’s interior move- things which the Old Law commanded to be done for ments, first in regard to man himself, secondly in regard justice’s sake, should be done out of desire for revenge, to his neighbor. or out of lust for temporal goods, or out of hatred of This he does in regard to man himself, in two ways, one’s enemies; and this in respect of three precepts. For corresponding to man’s two interior movements in respect they thought that desire for revenge was lawful, on ac- of any prospective action, viz. volition of what has to be count of the precept concerning punishment by retalia- done, and intention of the end. Wherefore, in the first tion: whereas this precept was given that justice might place, He directs man’s will in respect of the various pre- be safeguarded, not that man might seek revenge. Where- cepts of the Law: by prescribing that man should refrain fore, in order to do away with this, Our Lord teaches that not merely from those external works that are evil in them- man should be prepared in his mind to suffer yet more selves, but also from internal acts, and from the occasions if necessary. They thought that movements of covetous- of evil deeds. In the second place He directs man’s inten- ness were lawful on account of those judicial precepts tion, by teaching that in our good works, we should seek which prescribed restitution of what had been purloined, neither human praise, nor worldly riches, which is to lay together with something added thereto, as stated above up treasures on earth. (q. 105, a. 2, ad 9); whereas the Law commanded this Afterwards He directs man’s interior movement in re- to be done in order to safeguard justice, not to encour- spect of his neighbor, by forbidding us, on the one hand, age covetousness. Wherefore Our Lord teaches that we to judge him rashly, unjustly, or presumptuously; and, on should not demand our goods from motives of cupidity, the other, to entrust him too readily with sacred things if and that we should be ready to give yet more if necessary. he be unworthy. They thought that the movement of hatred was lawful, on Lastly, He teaches us how to fulfil the teaching of the account of the commandments of the Law about the slay- Gospel; viz. by imploring the help of God; by striving to ing of one’s enemies: whereas the Law ordered this for enter by the narrow door of perfect virtue; and by being the fulfilment of justice, as stated above (q. 105, a. 3, ad 1146 4), not to satisfy hatred. Wherefore Our Lord teaches us torted the true meaning of these promises, as to think that that we ought to love our enemies, and to be ready to do we ought to serve God, with these things as the end in good to them if necessary. For these precepts are to be view. Wherefore Our Lord set this aside by teaching, first taken as binding “the mind to be prepared to fulfil them,” of all, that works of virtue should not be done for human as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19). glory. And He mentions three works, to which all oth- Reply to Objection 3. The moral precepts necessar- ers may be reduced: since whatever a man does in order ily retained their force under the New Law, because they to curb his desires, comes under the head of fasting; and are of themselves essential to virtue: whereas the judicial whatever a man does for the love of his neighbor, comes precepts did not necessarily continue to bind in exactly under the head of alms-deeds; and whatever a man does the same way as had been fixed by the Law: this was left for the worship of God, comes under the head of prayer. to man to decide in one way or another. Hence Our Lord And He mentions these three specifically, as they hold the directed us becomingly with regard to these two kinds of principal place, and are most often used by men in order precepts. On the other hand, the observance of the cer- to gain glory. In the second place He taught us that we emonial precepts was totally abolished by the advent of must not place our end in riches, when He said: “Lay not the reality; wherefore in regard to these precepts He com- up to yourselves treasures on earth” (Mat. 6:19). manded nothing on this occasion when He was giving the Reply to Objection 5. Our Lord forbade, not neces- general points of His doctrine. Elsewhere, however, He sary, but inordinate solicitude. Now there is a fourfold makes it clear that the entire bodily worship which was solicitude to be avoided in temporal matters. First, we fixed by the Law, was to be changed into spiritual wor- must not place our end in them, nor serve God for the ship: as is evident from Jn. 4:21,23, where He says: “The sake of the necessities of food and raiment. Wherefore hour cometh when you shall neither on this mountain, He says: “Lay not up for yourselves,” etc. Secondly, nor in Jerusalem adore the Father. . . but. . . the true ador- we must not be so anxious about temporal things, as to ers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth.” despair of God’s help: wherefore Our Lord says (Mat. Reply to Objection 4. All worldly goods may be 6:32): “Your Father knoweth that you have need of all reduced to three—honors, riches, and pleasures; accord- these things.” Thirdly, we must not add presumption to ing to 1 Jn. 2:16: “All that is in the world is the con- our solicitude; in other words, we must not be confident of cupiscence of the flesh,” which refers to pleasures of the getting the necessaries of life by our own efforts without flesh, “and the concupiscence of the eyes,” which refers to God’s help: such solicitude Our Lord sets aside by saying riches, “and the pride of life,” which refers to ambition for that a man cannot add anything to his stature (Mat. 6:27). renown and honor. Now the Law did not promise an abun- We must not anticipate the time for anxiety; namely, by dance of carnal pleasures; on the contrary, it forbade them. being solicitous now, for the needs, not of the present, but But it did promise exalted honors and abundant riches; for of a future time: wherefore He says (Mat. 6:34): “Be it is written in reference to the former (Dt. 28:1): “If thou not. . . solicitous for tomorrow.” wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy God. . . He will make Reply to Objection 6. Our Lord did not forbid the thee higher than all the nations”; and in reference to the judgment of justice, without which holy things could not latter, we read a little further on (Dt. 28:11): “He will be withdrawn from the unworthy. But he forbade inordi- make thee abound with all goods.” But the Jews so dis- nate judgment, as stated above. Whether certain definite counsels are fittingly proposed in the New Law? Ia IIae q. 108 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that certain definite coun- Objection 4. Further, many matters pertaining to the sels are not fittingly proposed in the New Law. For coun- life of perfection are found among the commandments, as, sels are given about that which is expedient for an end, as for instance, “Love your enemies” (Mat. 5:44), and those we stated above, when treating of counsel (q. 14 , a. 2). precepts which Our Lord gave His apostles (Mat. 10). But the same things are not expedient for all. Therefore Therefore the counsels are unfittingly given in the New certain definite counsels should not be proposed to all. Law: both because they are not all mentioned; and be- Objection 2. Further, counsels regard a greater good. cause they are not distinguished from the commandments. But there are no definite degrees to the greater good. On the contrary, The counsels of a wise friend are of Therefore definite counsels should not be given. great use, according to Prov. (27:9): “Ointment and per- Objection 3. Further, counsels pertain to the life of fumes rejoice the heart: and the good counsels of a friend perfection. But obedience pertains to the life of perfec- rejoice the soul.” But Christ is our wisest and greatest tion. Therefore it was unfitting that no counsel of obedi- friend. Therefore His counsels are supremely useful and ence should be contained in the Gospel. becoming. 1147 I answer that, The difference between a counsel and a not his will as to some deed which he might do lawfully, commandment is that a commandment implies obligation, he follows the counsel in that particular case: for instance, whereas a counsel is left to the option of the one to whom if he do good to his enemies when he is not bound to, or it is given. Consequently in the New Law, which is the if he forgive an injury of which he might justly seek to be law of liberty, counsels are added to the commandments, avenged. In this way, too, all particular counsels may be and not in the Old Law, which is the law of bondage. We reduced to these three general and perfect counsels. must therefore understand the commandments of the New Reply to Objection 1. The aforesaid counsels, con- Law to have been given about matters that are necessary sidered in themselves, are expedient to all; but owing to to gain the end of eternal bliss, to which end the New Law some people being ill-disposed, it happens that some of brings us forthwith: but that the counsels are about mat- them are inexpedient, because their disposition is not in- ters that render the gaining of this end more assured and clined to such things. Hence Our Lord, in proposing the expeditious. evangelical counsels, always makes mention of man’s fit- Now man is placed between the things of this world, ness for observing the counsels. For in giving the counsel and spiritual goods wherein eternal happiness consists: so of perpetual poverty (Mat. 19:21), He begins with the that the more he cleaves to the one, the more he with- words: “If thou wilt be perfect,” and then He adds: “Go, draws from the other, and conversely. Wherefore he that sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] thou hast.” In like manner when cleaves wholly to the things of this world, so as to make He gave the counsel of perpetual chastity, saying (Mat. them his end, and to look upon them as the reason and 19:12): “There are eunuchs who have made themselves rule of all he does, falls away altogether from spiritual eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven,” He adds straight- goods. Hence this disorder is removed by the command- way: “He that can take, let him take it.” And again, the ments. Nevertheless, for man to gain the end aforesaid, Apostle (1 Cor. 7:35), after giving the counsel of virgin- he does not need to renounce the things of the world alto- ity, says: “And this I speak for your profit; not to cast a gether: since he can, while using the things of this world, snare upon you.” attain to eternal happiness, provided he does not place his Reply to Objection 2. The greater goods are not def- end in them: but he will attain more speedily thereto by initely fixed in the individual; but those which are simply giving up the goods of this world entirely: wherefore the and absolutely the greater good in general are fixed: and evangelical counsels are given for this purpose. to these all the above particular goods may be reduced, as Now the goods of this world which come into use in stated above. human life, consist in three things: viz. in external wealth Reply to Objection 3. Even the counsel of obedi- pertaining to the “concupiscence of the eyes”; carnal plea- ence is understood to have been given by Our Lord in the sures pertaining to the “concupiscence of the flesh”; and words: “And [let him] follow Me.” For we follow Him honors, which pertain to the “pride of life,” according to not only by imitating His works, but also by obeying His 1 Jn. 2:16: and it is in renouncing these altogether, as far commandments, according to Jn. 10:27: “My sheep hear as possible, that the evangelical counsels consist. More- My voice. . . and they follow Me.” over, every form of the religious life that professes the Reply to Objection 4. Those things which Our Lord state of perfection is based on these three: since riches prescribed about the true love of our enemies, and other are renounced by poverty; carnal pleasures by perpetual similar sayings (Mat. 5; Lk. 6), may be referred to the chastity; and the pride of life by the bondage of obedi- preparation of the mind, and then they are necessary for ence. salvation; for instance, that man be prepared to do good Now if a man observe these absolutely, this is in ac- to his enemies, and other similar actions, when there is cordance with the counsels as they stand. But if a man need. Hence these things are placed among the precepts. observe any one of them in a particular case, this is taking But that anyone should actually and promptly behave thus that counsel in a restricted sense, namely, as applying to towards an enemy when there is no special need, is to be that particular case. For instance, when anyone gives an referred to the particular counsels, as stated above. As to alms to a poor man, not being bound so to do, he follows those matters which are set down in Mat. 10 and Lk. 9 the counsels in that particular case. In like manner, when and 10, they were either disciplinary commands for that a man for some fixed time refrains from carnal pleasures particular time, or concessions, as stated above (a. 2, ad that he may give himself to prayer, he follows the counsel 3). Hence they are not set down among the counsels. for that particular time. And again, when a man follows 1148 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 109 Of the Necessity of Grace (In Ten Articles) We must now consider the exterior principle of human acts, i.e. God, in so far as, through grace, we are helped by Him to do right: and, first, we must consider the grace of God; secondly, its cause; thirdly, its effects. The first point of consideration will be threefold: for we shall consider (1) The necessity of grace; (2) grace itself, as to its essence; (3) its division. Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether without grace man can know anything? (2) Whether without God’s grace man can do or wish any good? (3) Whether without grace man can love God above all things? (4) Whether without grace man can keep the commandments of the Law? (5) Whether without grace he can merit eternal life? (6) Whether without grace man can prepare himself for grace? (7) Whether without grace he can rise from sin? (8) Whether without grace man can avoid sin? (9) Whether man having received grace can do good and avoid sin without any further Divine help? (10) Whether he can of himself persevere in good? Whether without grace man can know any truth? Ia IIae q. 109 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that without grace man I answer that, To know truth is a use or act of intel- can know no truth. For, on 1 Cor. 12:3: “No man can say, lectual light, since, according to the Apostle (Eph. 5:13): the Lord Jesus, but by the Holy Ghost,” a gloss says: “Ev- “All that is made manifest is light.” Now every use implies ery truth, by whomsoever spoken is from the Holy Ghost.” movement, taking movement broadly, so as to call think- Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by grace. Therefore we ing and willing movements, as is clear from the Philoso- cannot know truth without grace. pher (De Anima iii, 4). Now in corporeal things we see Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Solil. i, 6) that that for movement there is required not merely the form “the most certain sciences are like things lit up by the sun which is the principle of the movement or action, but there so as to be seen. Now God Himself is He Whom sheds is also required the motion of the first mover. Now the the light. And reason is in the mind as sight is in the first mover in the order of corporeal things is the heav- eye. And the eyes of the mind are the senses of the soul.” enly body. Hence no matter how perfectly fire has heat, Now the bodily senses, however pure, cannot see any vis- it would not bring about alteration, except by the motion ible object, without the sun’s light. Therefore the human of the heavenly body. But it is clear that as all corpo- mind, however perfect, cannot, by reasoning, know any real movements are reduced to the motion of the heavenly truth without Divine light: and this pertains to the aid of body as to the first corporeal mover, so all movements, grace. both corporeal and spiritual, are reduced to the simple Objection 3. Further, the human mind can only un- First Mover, Who is God. And hence no matter how per- derstand truth by thinking, as is clear from Augustine (De fect a corporeal or spiritual nature is supposed to be, it Trin. xiv, 7). But the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:5): “Not that cannot proceed to its act unless it be moved by God; but we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of our- this motion is according to the plan of His providence, and selves; but our sufficiency is from God.” Therefore man not by necessity of nature, as the motion of the heavenly cannot, of himself, know truth without the help of grace. body. Now not only is every motion from God as from On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 4): “I do the First Mover, but all formal perfection is from Him as not approve having said in the prayer, O God, Who dost from the First Act. And thus the act of the intellect or of wish the sinless alone to know the truth; for it may be an- any created being whatsoever depends upon God in two swered that many who are not sinless know many truths.” ways: first, inasmuch as it is from Him that it has the Now man is cleansed from sin by grace, according to Ps. form whereby it acts; secondly, inasmuch as it is moved 50:12: “Create a clean heart in me, O God, and renew a by Him to act. right spirit within my bowels.” Therefore without grace Now every form bestowed on created things by God man of himself can know truth. has power for a determined act, which it can bring about 1149 in proportion to its own proper endowment; and beyond Reply to Objection 1. Every truth by whomsoever which it is powerless, except by a superadded form, as spoken is from the Holy Ghost as bestowing the natural water can only heat when heated by the fire. And thus the light, and moving us to understand and speak the truth, but human understanding has a form, viz. intelligible light, not as dwelling in us by sanctifying grace, or as bestowing which of itself is sufficient for knowing certain intelligi- any habitual gift superadded to nature. For this only takes ble things, viz. those we can come to know through the place with regard to certain truths that are known and spo- senses. Higher intelligible things of the human intellect ken, and especially in regard to such as pertain to faith, of cannot know, unless it be perfected by a stronger light, viz. which the Apostle speaks. the light of faith or prophecy which is called the “light of Reply to Objection 2. The material sun sheds its light grace,” inasmuch as it is added to nature. outside us; but the intelligible Sun, Who is God, shines Hence we must say that for the knowledge of any truth within us. Hence the natural light bestowed upon the soul whatsoever man needs Divine help, that the intellect may is God’s enlightenment, whereby we are enlightened to be moved by God to its act. But he does not need a new see what pertains to natural knowledge; and for this there light added to his natural light, in order to know the truth is required no further knowledge, but only for such things in all things, but only in some that surpass his natural as surpass natural knowledge. knowledge. And yet at times God miraculously instructs Reply to Objection 3. We always need God’s help for some by His grace in things that can be known by natural every thought, inasmuch as He moves the understanding reason, even as He sometimes brings about miraculously to act; for actually to understand anything is to think, as is what nature can do. clear from Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7). Whether man can wish or do any good without grace? Ia IIae q. 109 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that man can wish and do good proportionate to his nature, such as the good of ac- good without grace. For that is in man’s power, whereof quired virtue; but not surpassing good, as the good of in- he is master. Now man is master of his acts, and espe- fused virtue. But in the state of corrupt nature, man falls cially of his willing, as stated above (q. 1, a. 1; q. 13, a. 6). short of what he could do by his nature, so that he is un- Hence man, of himself, can wish and do good without the able to fulfil it by his own natural powers. Yet because help of grace. human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin, so as to Objection 2. Further, man has more power over what be shorn of every natural good, even in the state of cor- is according to his nature than over what is beyond his rupted nature it can, by virtue of its natural endowments, nature. Now sin is against his nature, as Damascene says work some particular good, as to build dwellings, plant (De Fide Orth. ii, 30); whereas deeds of virtue are accord- vineyards, and the like; yet it cannot do all the good nat- ing to his nature, as stated above (q. 71, a. 1). Therefore ural to it, so as to fall short in nothing; just as a sick man since man can sin of himself he can wish and do good. can of himself make some movements, yet he cannot be Objection 3. Further, the understanding’s good is perfectly moved with the movements of one in health, un- truth, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2). Now the intel- less by the help of medicine he be cured. lect can of itself know truth, even as every other thing can And thus in the state of perfect nature man needs a work its own operation of itself. Therefore, much more gratuitous strength superadded to natural strength for one can man, of himself, do and wish good. reason, viz. in order to do and wish supernatural good; On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 9:16): “It but for two reasons, in the state of corrupt nature, viz. in is not of him that willeth,” namely, to will, “nor of him that order to be healed, and furthermore in order to carry out runneth,” namely to run, “but of God that showeth mercy.” works of supernatural virtue, which are meritorious. Be- And Augustine says (De Corrept. et Gratia ii) that “with- yond this, in both states man needs the Divine help, that out grace men do nothing good when they either think or he may be moved to act well. wish or love or act.” Reply to Objection 1. Man is master of his acts and of I answer that, Man’s nature may be looked at in two his willing or not willing, because of his deliberate reason, ways: first, in its integrity, as it was in our first parent be-which can be bent to one side or another. And although fore sin; secondly, as it is corrupted in us after the sin of he is master of his deliberating or not deliberating, yet this our first parent. Now in both states human nature needs can only be by a previous deliberation; and since it can- the help of God as First Mover, to do or wish any good not go on to infinity, we must come at length to this, that whatsoever, as stated above (a. 1). But in the state of in- man’s free-will is moved by an extrinsic principle, which tegrity, as regards the sufficiency of the operative power, is above the human mind, to wit by God, as the Philoso- man by his natural endowments could wish and do the pher proves in the chapter “On Good Fortune” (Ethic. Eu- 1150 dem. vii). Hence the mind of man still unweakened is not need to be preserved by another in the good which perso much master of its act that it does not need to be moved tains to its nature. For it can of itself fail in good, even as by God; and much more the free-will of man weakened by of itself it can fall into non-existence, unless it is upheld sin, whereby it is hindered from good by the corruption of by God. the nature. Reply to Objection 3. Man cannot even know truth Reply to Objection 2. To sin is nothing else than to without Divine help, as stated above (a. 1). And yet hu- fail in the good which belongs to any being according to man nature is more corrupt by sin in regard to the desire its nature. Now as every created thing has its being from for good, than in regard to the knowledge of truth. another, and, considered in itself, is nothing, so does it Whether by his own natural powers and without grace man can love God above all Ia IIae q. 109 a. 3 things? Objection 1. It would seem that without grace man love, loves its own proper good on account of the com- cannot love God above all things by his own natural pow- mon good of the whole universe, which is God. Hence ers. For to love God above all things is the proper and Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “God leads everything principal act of charity. Now man cannot of himself pos- to love of Himself.” Hence in the state of perfect nature sess charity, since the “charity of God is poured forth in man referred the love of himself and of all other things our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us,” as is to the love of God as to its end; and thus he loved God said Rom. 5:5. Therefore man by his natural powers alone more than himself and above all things. But in the state cannot love God above all things. of corrupt nature man falls short of this in the appetite of Objection 2. Further, no nature can rise above itself. his rational will, which, unless it is cured by God’s grace, But to love God above all things is to tend above oneself. follows its private good, on account of the corruption of Therefore without the help of grace no created nature can nature. And hence we must say that in the state of per- love God above itself. fect nature man did not need the gift of grace added to his Objection 3. Further, to God, Who is the Highest natural endowments, in order to love God above all things Good, is due the best love, which is that He be loved above naturally, although he needed God’s help to move him to all things. Now without grace man is not capable of giving it; but in the state of corrupt nature man needs, even for God the best love, which is His due; otherwise it would this, the help of grace to heal his nature. be useless to add grace. Hence man, without grace and Reply to Objection 1. Charity loves God above all with his natural powers alone, cannot love God above all things in a higher way than nature does. For nature loves things. God above all things inasmuch as He is the beginning and On the contrary, As some maintain, man was first the end of natural good; whereas charity loves Him, as made with only natural endowments; and in this state it is He is the object of beatitude, and inasmuch as man has manifest that he loved God to some extent. But he did not a spiritual fellowship with God. Moreover charity adds love God equally with himself, or less than himself, other- to natural love of God a certain quickness and joy, in the wise he would have sinned. Therefore he loved God above same way that every habit of virtue adds to the good act himself. Therefore man, by his natural powers alone, can which is done merely by the natural reason of a man who love God more than himself and above all things. has not the habit of virtue. I answer that, As was said above ( Ia, q. 60, a. 5), Reply to Objection 2. When it is said that nature can- where the various opinions concerning the natural love of not rise above itself, we must not understand this as if it the angels were set forth, man in a state of perfect na- could not be drawn to any object above itself, for it is clear ture, could by his natural power, do the good natural to that our intellect by its natural knowledge can know things him without the addition of any gratuitous gift, though not above itself, as is shown in our natural knowledge of God. without the help of God moving him. Now to love God But we are to understand that nature cannot rise to an act above all things is natural to man and to every nature, not exceeding the proportion of its strength. Now to love God only rational but irrational, and even to inanimate nature above all things is not such an act; for it is natural to every according to the manner of love which can belong to each creature, as was said above. creature. And the reason of this is that it is natural to all Reply to Objection 3. Love is said to be best, both to seek and love things according as they are naturally fit with respect to degree of love, and with regard to the mo- (to be sought and loved) since “all things act according tive of loving, and the mode of love. And thus the highest as they are naturally fit” as stated in Phys. ii, 8. Now degree of love is that whereby charity loves God as the it is manifest that the good of the part is for the good of giver of beatitude, as was said above. the whole; hence everything, by its natural appetite and 1151 Whether man without grace and by his own natural powers can fulfil the command-Ia IIae q. 109 a. 4 ments of the Law? Objection 1. It would seem that man without grace, Divine commandments. But in the state of corrupted na- and by his own natural powers, can fulfil the command- ture man cannot fulfil all the Divine commandments with- ments of the Law. For the Apostle says (Rom. 2:14) that out healing grace. Secondly, the commandments of the “the Gentiles who have not the law, do by nature those law can be fulfilled, not merely as regards the substance things that are of the Law.” Now what a man does nat- of the act, but also as regards the mode of acting, i.e. their urally he can do of himself without grace. Hence a man being done out of charity. And in this way, neither in can fulfil the commandments of the Law without grace. the state of perfect nature, nor in the state of corrupt na- Objection 2. Further, Jerome says (Expos. Cathol. ture can man fulfil the commandments of the law without Fide∗) that “they are anathema who say God has laid im- grace. Hence, Augustine (De Corrupt. et Grat. ii) having possibilities upon man.” Now what a man cannot fulfil by stated that “without grace men can do no good whatever,” himself is impossible to him. Therefore a man can fulfil adds: “Not only do they know by its light what to do, but all the commandments of himself. by its help they do lovingly what they know.” Beyond this, Objection 3. Further, of all the commandments of the in both states they need the help of God’s motion in order Law, the greatest is this, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy to fulfil the commandments, as stated above (Aa. 2,3). God with thy whole heart” (Mat. 27:37). Now man with Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Spir. et his natural endowments can fulfil this command by lov- Lit. xxvii), “do not be disturbed at his saying that they do ing God above all things, as stated above (a. 3). Therefore by nature those things that are of the Law; for the Spirit man can fulfil all the commandments of the Law without of grace works this, in order to restore in us the image of grace. God, after which we were naturally made.” On the contrary, Augustine says (De Haeres. Reply to Objection 2. What we can do with the Di- lxxxviii) that it is part of the Pelagian heresy that “they vine assistance is not altogether impossible to us; accord- believe that without grace man can fulfil all the Divine ing to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 3): “What we can do commandments.” through our friends, we can do, in some sense, by our- I answer that, There are two ways of fulfilling the selves.” Hence Jerome† concedes that “our will is in such commandments of the Law. The first regards the sub- a way free that we must confess we still require God’s stance of the works, as when a man does works of justice, help.” fortitude, and of other virtues. And in this way man in the Reply to Objection 3. Man cannot, with his purely state of perfect nature could fulfil all the commandments natural endowments, fulfil the precept of the love of God, of the Law; otherwise he would have been unable to sin in as stated above (a. 3). that state, since to sin is nothing else than to transgress the Whether man can merit everlasting life without grace? Ia IIae q. 109 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that man can merit ev- Objection 3. Further, everlasting life is the last end erlasting life without grace. For Our Lord says (Mat. of human life. Now every natural thing by its natural en- 19:17): “If thou wilt enter into life, keep the command- dowments can attain its end. Much more, therefore, may ments”; from which it would seem that to enter into ever- man attain to life everlasting by his natural endowments, lasting life rests with man’s will. But what rests with our without grace. will, we can do of ourselves. Hence it seems that man can On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 6:23): merit everlasting life of himself. “The grace of God is life everlasting.” And as a gloss Objection 2. Further, eternal life is the wage of re- says, this is said “that we may understand that God, of ward bestowed by God on men, according to Mat. 5:12: His own mercy, leads us to everlasting life.” “Your reward is very great in heaven.” But wage or re- I answer that, Acts conducing to an end must be pro- ward is meted by God to everyone according to his works, portioned to the end. But no act exceeds the proportion of according to Ps. 61:12: “Thou wilt render to every man its active principle; and hence we see in natural things, according to his works.” Hence, since man is master of that nothing can by its operation bring about an effect his works, it seems that it is within his power to reach which exceeds its active force, but only such as is propor- everlasting life. tionate to its power. Now everlasting life is an end exceed- ∗ Symboli Explanatio ad Damasum, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome: now ascribed to Pelagius † Symboli Explanatio ad Damasum, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome: now ascribed to Pelagius 1152 ing the proportion of human nature, as is clear from what Reply to Objection 2. As the gloss upon Rom. 6:23, we have said above (q. 5, a. 5). Hence man, by his nat- “The grace of God is life everlasting,” says, “It is certain ural endowments, cannot produce meritorious works pro- that everlasting life is meter to good works; but the works portionate to everlasting life; and for this a higher force to which it is meted, belong to God’s grace.” And it has is needed, viz. the force of grace. And thus without been said (a. 4), that to fulfil the commandments of the grace man cannot merit everlasting life; yet he can per- Law, in their due way, whereby their fulfilment may be form works conducing to a good which is natural to man, meritorious, requires grace. as “to toil in the fields, to drink, to eat, or to have friends,” Reply to Objection 3. This objection has to do with and the like, as Augustine says in his third Reply to the the natural end of man. Now human nature, since it is Pelagians‡. nobler, can be raised by the help of grace to a higher end, Reply to Objection 1. Man, by his will, does works which lower natures can nowise reach; even as a man who meritorious of everlasting life; but as Augustine says, in can recover his health by the help of medicines is better the same book, for this it is necessary that the will of man disposed to health than one who can nowise recover it, as should be prepared with grace by God. the Philosopher observes (De Coelo ii, 12). Whether a man, by himself and without the external aid of grace, can prepare himself Ia IIae q. 109 a. 6 for grace? Objection 1. It would seem that man, by himself and will cannot take place without the habitual gift of grace, without the external help of grace, can prepare himself for which is the principle of meritorious works, as stated grace. For nothing impossible is laid upon man, as stated above (a. 5). There is a second way in which the human above (a. 4, ad 1). But it is written (Zech. 1:3): “Turn will may be taken to be prepared for the gift of habitual ye to Me. . . and I will turn to you.” Now to prepare for grace itself. Now in order that man prepare himself to re- grace is nothing more than to turn to God. Therefore it ceive this gift, it is not necessary to presuppose any further seems that man of himself, and without the external help habitual gift in the soul, otherwise we should go on to in- of grace, can prepare himself for grace. finity. But we must presuppose a gratuitous gift of God, Objection 2. Further, man prepares himself for grace Who moves the soul inwardly or inspires the good wish. by doing what is in him to do, since if man does what is For in these two ways do we need the Divine assistance, in him to do, God will not deny him grace, for it is written as stated above (Aa. 2,3). Now that we need the help of (Mat. 7:11) that God gives His good Spirit “to them that God to move us, is manifest. For since every agent acts ask Him.” But what is in our power is in us to do. There- for an end, every cause must direct is effect to its end, and fore it seems to be in our power to prepare ourselves for hence since the order of ends is according to the order of grace. agents or movers, man must be directed to the last end by Objection 3. Further, if a man needs grace in order the motion of the first mover, and to the proximate end by to prepare for grace, with equal reason will he need grace the motion of any of the subordinate movers; as the spirit to prepare himself for the first grace; and thus to infinity, of the soldier is bent towards seeking the victory by the which is impossible. Hence it seems that we must not go motion of the leader of the army—and towards following beyond what was said first, viz. that man, of himself and the standard of a regiment by the motion of the standard- without grace, can prepare himself for grace. bearer. And thus since God is the First Mover, simply, Objection 4. Further, it is written (Prov. 16:1) that “it it is by His motion that everything seeks to be likened to is the part of man to prepare the soul.” Now an action is God in its own way. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. said to be part of a man, when he can do it by himself. iv) that “God turns all to Himself.” But He directs righ- Hence it seems that man by himself can prepare himself teous men to Himself as to a special end, which they seek, for grace. and to which they wish to cling, according to Ps. 72:28, On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 6:44): “No man “it is good for Me to adhere to my God.” And that they can come to Me except the Father, Who hath sent Me, are “turned” to God can only spring from God’s having draw him.” But if man could prepare himself, he would “turned” them. Now to prepare oneself for grace is, as it not need to be drawn by another. Hence man cannot pre- were, to be turned to God; just as, whoever has his eyes pare himself without the help of grace. turned away from the light of the sun, prepares himself I answer that, The preparation of the human will for to receive the sun’s light, by turning his eyes towards the good is twofold: the first, whereby it is prepared to oper- sun. Hence it is clear that man cannot prepare himself to ate rightly and to enjoy God; and this preparation of the receive the light of grace except by the gratuitous help of ‡ Hypognosticon iii, among the spurious works of St. Augustine 1153 God moving him inwardly. he is moved by God. Reply to Objection 1. Man’s turning to God is by Reply to Objection 3. This objection regards habit- free-will; and thus man is bidden to turn himself to God. ual grace, for which some preparation is required, since But free-will can only be turned to God, when God turns every form requires a disposition in that which is to be its it, according to Jer. 31:18: “Convert me and I shall be con- subject. But in order that man should be moved by God, verted, for Thou art the Lord, my God”; and Lam. 5:21: no further motion is presupposed since God is the First “Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted.” Mover. Hence we need not go to infinity. Reply to Objection 2. Man can do nothing unless Reply to Objection 4. It is the part of man to prepare moved by God, according to Jn. 15:5: “Without Me, you his soul, since he does this by his free-will. And yet he can do nothing.” Hence when a man is said to do what is does not do this without the help of God moving him, and in him to do, this is said to be in his power according as drawing him to Himself, as was said above. Whether man can rise from sin without the help of grace? Ia IIae q. 109 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that man can rise from debt of punishment. He incurs a stain, inasmuch as he sin without the help of grace. For what is presupposed to forfeits the lustre of grace through the deformity of sin. grace, takes place without grace. But to rise to sin is pre- Natural good is corrupted, inasmuch as man’s nature is supposed to the enlightenment of grace; since it is written disordered by man’s will not being subject to God’s; and (Eph. 5:14): “Arise from the dead and Christ shall en- this order being overthrown, the consequence is that the lighten thee.” Therefore man can rise from sin without whole nature of sinful man remains disordered. Lastly, grace. there is the debt of punishment, inasmuch as by sinning Objection 2. Further, sin is opposed to virtue as ill- man deserves everlasting damnation. ness to health, as stated above (q. 71, a. 1, ad 3). Now, Now it is manifest that none of these three can be re- man, by force of his nature, can rise from illness to health, stored except by God. For since the lustre of grace springs without the external help of medicine, since there still re- from the shedding of Divine light, this lustre cannot be mains in him the principle of life, from which the natural brought back, except God sheds His light anew: hence a operation proceeds. Hence it seems that, with equal rea- habitual gift is necessary, and this is the light of grace. son, man may be restored by himself, and return from the Likewise, the order of nature can only be restored, i.e. state of sin to the state of justice without the help of exter- man’s will can only be subject to God when God draws nal grace. man’s will to Himself, as stated above (a. 6). So, too, Objection 3. Further, every natural thing can return the guilt of eternal punishment can be remitted by God by itself to the act befitting its nature, as hot water returns alone, against Whom the offense was committed and Who by itself to its natural coldness, and a stone cast upwards is man’s Judge. And thus in order that man rise from sin returns by itself to its natural movement. Now a sin is an there is required the help of grace, both as regards a habit- act against nature, as is clear from Damascene (De Fide ual gift, and as regards the internal motion of God. Orth. ii, 30). Hence it seems that man by himself can Reply to Objection 1. To man is bidden that which return from sin to the state of justice. pertains to the act of free-will, as this act is required in On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 2:21; Cf. order that man should rise from sin. Hence when it is Gal. 3:21): “For if there had been a law given which could said, “Arise, and Christ shall enlighten thee,” we are not give life—then Christ died in vain,” i.e. to no purpose. to think that the complete rising from sin precedes the en- Hence with equal reason, if man has a nature, whereby he lightenment of grace; but that when man by his free-will, can he justified, “Christ died in vain,” i.e. to no purpose. moved by God, strives to rise from sin, he receives the But this cannot fittingly be said. Therefore by himself he light of justifying grace. cannot be justified, i.e. he cannot return from a state of sin Reply to Objection 2. The natural reason is not the to a state of justice. sufficient principle of the health that is in man by justify- I answer that, Man by himself can no wise rise from ing grace. This principle is grace which is taken away by sin without the help of grace. For since sin is transient as sin. Hence man cannot be restored by himself; but he re- to the act and abiding in its guilt, as stated above (q. 87, quires the light of grace to be poured upon him anew, as if a. 6), to rise from sin is not the same as to cease the act the soul were infused into a dead body for its resurrection. of sin; but to rise from sin means that man has restored to Reply to Objection 3. When nature is perfect, it can him what he lost by sinning. Now man incurs a triple loss be restored by itself to its befitting and proportionate con- by sinning, as was clearly shown above (q. 85, a. 1; q. 86, dition; but without exterior help it cannot be restored to a. 1; q. 87, a. 1), viz. stain, corruption of natural good, and what surpasses its measure. And thus human nature un-1154 done by reason of the act of sin, remains no longer per-restored, by itself, to its connatural good, much less to the fect, but corrupted, as stated above (q. 85); nor can it be supernatural good of justice. Whether man without grace can avoid sin? Ia IIae q. 109 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that without grace man ways alert to avoid these movements, as was said above can avoid sin. Because “no one sins in what he cannot (q. 74, a. 3, ad 2). avoid,” as Augustine says (De Duab. Anim. x, xi; De So, too, before man’s reason, wherein is mortal sin, is Libero Arbit. iii, 18). Hence if a man in mortal sin cannot restored by justifying grace, he can avoid each mortal sin, avoid sin, it would seem that in sinning he does not sin, and for a time, since it is not necessary that he should be which is impossible. always actually sinning. But it cannot be that he remains Objection 2. Further, men are corrected that they may for a long time without mortal sin. Hence Gregory says not sin. If therefore a man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin, (Super Ezech. Hom. xi) that ” a sin not at once taken away correction would seem to be given to no purpose; which by repentance, by its weight drags us down to other sins”: is absurd. and this because, as the lower appetite ought to be subject Objection 3. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 15:18): to the reason, so should the reason be subject to God, and “Before man is life and death, good and evil; that which should place in Him the end of its will. Now it is by the he shall choose shall be given him.” But by sinning no end that all human acts ought to be regulated, even as it is one ceases to be a man. Hence it is still in his power to by the judgment of the reason that the movements of the choose good or evil; and thus man can avoid sin without lower appetite should be regulated. And thus, even as in- grace. ordinate movements of the sensitive appetite cannot help On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect Just. occurring since the lower appetite is not subject to reason, xxi): “Whoever denies that we ought to say the prayer so likewise, since man’s reason is not entirely subject to ‘Lead us not into temptation’ (and they deny it who main- God, the consequence is that many disorders occur in the tain that the help of God’s grace is not necessary to man reason. For when man’s heart is not so fixed on God as to for salvation, but that the gift of the law is enough for the be unwilling to be parted from Him for the sake of find- human will) ought without doubt to be removed beyond ing any good or avoiding any evil, many things happen for all hearing, and to be anathematized by the tongues of the achieving or avoiding of which a man strays from God all.” and breaks His commandments, and thus sins mortally: I answer that, We may speak of man in two ways: especially since, when surprised, a man acts according to first, in the state of perfect nature; secondly, in the state his preconceived end and his pre-existing habits, as the of corrupted nature. Now in the state of perfect nature, Philosopher says (Ethic. iii); although with premeditation man, without habitual grace, could avoid sinning either of his reason a man may do something outside the order of mortally or venially; since to sin is nothing else than to his preconceived end and the inclination of his habit. But stray from what is according to our nature—and in the because a man cannot always have this premeditation, it state of perfect nature man could avoid this. Nevertheless cannot help occurring that he acts in accordance with his he could not have done it without God’s help to uphold will turned aside from God, unless, by grace, he is quickly him in good, since if this had been withdrawn, even his brought back to the due order. nature would have fallen back into nothingness. Reply to Objection 1. Man can avoid each but every But in the state of corrupt nature man needs grace to act of sin, except by grace, as stated above. Nevertheless, heal his nature in order that he may entirely abstain from since it is by his own shortcoming that he does not pre- sin. And in the present life this healing is wrought in the pare himself to have grace, the fact that he cannot avoid mind—the carnal appetite being not yet restored. Hence sin without grace does not excuse him from sin. the Apostle (Rom. 7:25) says in the person of one who is Reply to Objection 2. Correction is useful “in order restored: “I myself, with the mind, serve the law of God, that out of the sorrow of correction may spring the wish but with the flesh, the law of sin.” And in this state man to be regenerate; if indeed he who is corrected is a son of can abstain from all mortal sin, which takes its stand in promise, in such sort that whilst the noise of correction is his reason, as stated above (q. 74, a. 5); but man cannot outwardly resounding and punishing, God by hidden in- abstain from all venial sin on account of the corruption spirations is inwardly causing to will,” as Augustine says of his lower appetite of sensuality. For man can, indeed, (De Corr. et Gratia vi). Correction is therefore necessary, repress each of its movements (and hence they are sinful from the fact that man’s will is required in order to abstain and voluntary), but not all, because whilst he is resisting from sin; yet it is not sufficient without God’s help. Hence one, another may arise, and also because the reason is al- it is written (Eccles. 7:14): “Consider the works of God 1155 that no man can correct whom He hath despised.” of sin. Hence he was able to sin and not to sin. Now, Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (Hypog- too, whatever a man wills, is given to him; but his willing nosticon iii∗), this saying is to be understood of man in good, he has by God’s assistance. the state of perfect nature, when as yet he was not a slave Whether one who has already obtained grace, can, of himself and without further Ia IIae q. 109 a. 9 help of grace, do good and avoid sin? Objection 1. It would seem that whoever has already need a further help of grace, e.g. a further infused habit. obtained grace, can by himself and without further help Yet he needs the help of grace in another way, i.e. in order of grace, do good and avoid sin. For a thing is useless or to be moved by God to act righteously, and this for two imperfect, if it does not fulfil what it was given for. Now reasons: first, for the general reason that no created thing grace is given to us that we may do good and keep from can put forth any act, unless by virtue of the Divine mo- sin. Hence if with grace man cannot do this, it seems that tion. Secondly, for this special reason—the condition of grace is either useless or imperfect. the state of human nature. For although healed by grace as Objection 2. Further, by grace the Holy Spirit dwells to the mind, yet it remains corrupted and poisoned in the in us, according to 1 Cor. 3:16: “Know you not that you flesh, whereby it serves “the law of sin,” Rom. 7:25. In are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth the intellect, too, there seems the darkness of ignorance, in you?” Now since the Spirit of God is omnipotent, He whereby, as is written (Rom. 8:26): “We know not what is sufficient to ensure our doing good and to keep us from we should pray for as we ought”; since on account of the sin. Hence a man who has obtained grace can do the above various turns of circumstances, and because we do not two things without any further assistance of grace. know ourselves perfectly, we cannot fully know what is Objection 3. Further, if a man who has obtained grace for our good, according to Wis. 9:14: “For the thoughts of needs further aid of grace in order to live righteously and mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain.” Hence to keep free from sin, with equal reason, will he need yet we must be guided and guarded by God, Who knows and another grace, even though he has obtained this first help can do all things. For which reason also it is becoming in of grace. Therefore we must go on to infinity; which is those who have been born again as sons of God, to say: impossible. Hence whoever is in grace needs no further “Lead us not into temptation,” and “Thy Will be done on help of grace in order to do righteously and to keep free earth as it is in heaven,” and whatever else is contained in from sin. the Lord’s Prayer pertaining to this. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Natura et Gra- Reply to Objection 1. The gift of habitual grace is tia xxvi) that “as the eye of the body though most healthy not therefore given to us that we may no longer need the cannot see unless it is helped by the brightness of light, Divine help; for every creature needs to be preserved in so, neither can a man, even if he is most righteous, live the good received from Him. Hence if after having re- righteously unless he be helped by the eternal light of jus- ceived grace man still needs the Divine help, it cannot be tice.” But justification is by grace, according to Rom. concluded that grace is given to no purpose, or that it is 3:24: “Being justified freely by His grace.” Hence even imperfect, since man will need the Divine help even in a man who already possesses grace needs a further assis- the state of glory, when grace shall be fully perfected. But tance of grace in order to live righteously. here grace is to some extent imperfect, inasmuch as it does I answer that, As stated above (a. 5), in order to live not completely heal man, as stated above. righteously a man needs a twofold help of God—first, a Reply to Objection 2. The operation of the Holy habitual gift whereby corrupted human nature is healed, Ghost, which moves and protects, is not circumscribed by and after being healed is lifted up so as to work deeds the effect of habitual grace which it causes in us; but be- meritoriously of everlasting life, which exceed the capa- yond this effect He, together with the Father and the Son, bility of nature. Secondly, man needs the help of grace in moves and protects us. order to be moved by God to act. Reply to Objection 3. This argument merely proves Now with regard to the first kind of help, man does not that man needs no further habitual grace. ∗ Among the spurious works of St. Augustine 1156 Whether man possessed of grace needs the help of grace in order to persevere? Ia IIae q. 109 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that man possessed of Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7). Secondly, perseverance grace needs no help to persevere. For perseverance is may be called a habit, whereby a man has the purpose of something less than virtue, even as continence is, as is persevering in good unto the end. And in both these ways clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7,9). Now since perseverance is infused together with grace, even as con- man is justified by grace, he needs no further help of grace tinence and the other virtues are. Thirdly, perseverance is in order to have the virtues. Much less, therefore, does he called the abiding in good to the end of life. And in or- need the help of grace to have perseverance. der to have this perseverance man does not, indeed, need Objection 2. Further, all the virtues are infused at another habitual grace, but he needs the Divine assistance once. But perseverance is put down as a virtue. Hence it guiding and guarding him against the attacks of the pas- seems that, together with grace, perseverance is given to sions, as appears from the preceding article. And hence the other infused virtues. after anyone has been justified by grace, he still needs to Objection 3. Further, as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:20) beseech God for the aforesaid gift of perseverance, that he more was restored to man by Christ’s gift, than he had lost may be kept from evil till the end of his life. For to many by Adam’s sin. But Adam received what enabled him to grace is given to whom perseverance in grace is not given. persevere; and thus man does not need grace in order to Reply to Objection 1. This objection regards the first persevere. mode of perseverance, as the second objection regards the On the contrary, Augustine says (De Persev. ii): second. “Why is perseverance besought of God, if it is not be- Hence the solution of the second objection is clear. stowed by God? For is it not a mocking request to seek Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Natura what we know He does not give, and what is in our power et Gratia xliii)∗: “in the original state man received a without His giving it?” Now perseverance is besought by gift whereby he could persevere, but to persevere was not even those who are hallowed by grace; and this is seen, given him. But now, by the grace of Christ, many receive when we say “Hallowed be Thy name,” which Augustine both the gift of grace whereby they may persevere, and confirms by the words of Cyprian (De Correp. et Grat. the further gift of persevering,” and thus Christ’s gift is xii). Hence man, even when possessed of grace, needs greater than Adam’s fault. Nevertheless it was easier for perseverance to be given to him by God. man to persevere, with the gift of grace in the state of in- I answer that, Perseverance is taken in three ways. nocence in which the flesh was not rebellious against the First, to signify a habit of the mind whereby a man stands spirit, than it is now. For the restoration by Christ’s grace, steadfastly, lest he be moved by the assault of sadness although it is already begun in the mind, is not yet com- from what is virtuous. And thus perseverance is to sad- pleted in the flesh, as it will be in heaven, where man will ness as continence is to concupiscence and pleasure, as the not merely be able to persevere but will be unable to sin. ∗ Cf. De Correp. et Grat. xii 1157 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 110 Of the Grace of God As Regards Its Essence (In Four Articles) We must now consider the grace of God as regards its essence; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether grace implies something in the soul? (2) Whether grace is a quality? (3) Whether grace differs from infused virtue? (4) Of the subject of grace. Whether grace implies anything in the soul? Ia IIae q. 110 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that grace does not imply love wherewith he receives him into his good “graces.” anything in the soul. For man is said to have the grace of And from the second proceeds the third, since from bene- God even as the grace of man. Hence it is written (Gn. fits bestowed “gratis” arises “gratitude.” 39:21) that the Lord gave to Joseph “grace [Douay: ‘fa- Now as regards the last two, it is clear that grace im- vor’] in the sight of the chief keeper of the prison.” Now plies something in him who receives grace: first, the gift when we say that a man has the favor of another, nothing given gratis; secondly, the acknowledgment of the gift. is implied in him who has the favor of the other, but an But as regards the first, a difference must be noted be- acceptance is implied in him whose favor he has. Hence tween the grace of God and the grace of man; for since the when we say that a man has the grace of God, nothing creature’s good springs from the Divine will, some good is implied in his soul; but we merely signify the Divine in the creature flows from God’s love, whereby He wishes acceptance. the good of the creature. On the other hand, the will of Objection 2. Further, as the soul quickens the body so man is moved by the good pre-existing in things; and does God quicken the soul; hence it is written (Dt. 30:20): hence man’s love does not wholly cause the good of the “He is thy life.” Now the soul quickens the body immedi- thing, but pre-supposes it either in part or wholly. There- ately. Therefore nothing can come as a medium between fore it is clear that every love of God is followed at some God and the soul. Hence grace implies nothing created in time by a good caused in the creature, but not co-eternal the soul. with the eternal love. And according to this difference of Objection 3. Further, on Rom. 1:7, “Grace to you and good the love of God to the creature is looked at differ- peace,” the gloss says: “Grace, i.e. the remission of sins.” ently. For one is common, whereby He loves “all things Now the remission of sin implies nothing in the soul, but that are” (Wis. 11:25), and thereby gives things their nat- only in God, Who does not impute the sin, according to ural being. But the second is a special love, whereby He Ps. 31:2: “Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not draws the rational creature above the condition of its na- imputed sin.” Hence neither does grace imply anything in ture to a participation of the Divine good; and according the soul. to this love He is said to love anyone simply, since it is by On the contrary, Light implies something in what is this love that God simply wishes the eternal good, which enlightened. But grace is a light of the soul; hence Au- is Himself, for the creature. gustine says (De Natura et Gratia xxii): “The light of truth Accordingly when a man is said to have the grace of rightly deserts the prevaricator of the law, and those who God, there is signified something bestowed on man by have been thus deserted become blind.” Therefore grace God. Nevertheless the grace of God sometimes signifies implies something in the soul. God’s eternal love, as we say the grace of predestination, I answer that, According to the common manner of inasmuch as God gratuitously and not from merits predes- speech, grace is usually taken in three ways. First, for tines or elects some; for it is written (Eph. 1:5): “He hath anyone’s love, as we are accustomed to say that the sol- predestinated us into the adoption of children. . . unto the dier is in the good graces of the king, i.e. the king looks praise of the glory of His grace.” on him with favor. Secondly, it is taken for any gift freely Reply to Objection 1. Even when a man is said to bestowed, as we are accustomed to say: I do you this act be in another’s good graces, it is understood that there is of grace. Thirdly, it is taken for the recompense of a gift something in him pleasing to the other; even as anyone is given “gratis,” inasmuch as we are said to be “grateful” for said to have God’s grace—with this difference, that what benefits. Of these three the second depends on the first, is pleasing to a man in another is presupposed to his love, since one bestows something on another “gratis” from the but whatever is pleasing to God in a man is caused by the 1158 Divine love, as was said above. “When I said that grace was for the remission of sins, and Reply to Objection 2. God is the life of the soul af- peace for our reconciliation with God, you must not take ter the manner of an efficient cause; but the soul is the it to mean that peace and reconciliation do not pertain to life of the body after the manner of a formal cause. Now general peace, but that the special name of grace signi- there is no medium between form and matter, since the fies the remission of sins.” Not only grace, therefore, but form, of itself, “informs” the matter or subject; whereas many other of God’s gifts pertain to grace. And hence the the agent “informs” the subject, not by its substance, but remission of sins does not take place without some effect by the form, which it causes in the matter. divinely caused in us, as will appear later (q. 113, a. 2). Reply to Objection 3. Augustine says (Retract. i, 25): Whether grace is a quality of the soul? Ia IIae q. 110 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that grace is not a quality come natural and easy to creatures, according to Wis. 8:1: of the soul. For no quality acts on its subject, since the “she. . . ordereth all things sweetly.” Much more therefore action of a quality is not without the action of its subject, does He infuse into such as He moves towards the acqui- and thus the subject would necessarily act upon itself. But sition of supernatural good, certain forms or supernatural grace acts upon the soul, by justifying it. Therefore grace qualities, whereby they may be moved by Him sweetly is not a quality. and promptly to acquire eternal good; and thus the gift of Objection 2. Furthermore, substance is nobler than grace is a quality. quality. But grace is nobler than the nature of the soul, Reply to Objection 1. Grace, as a quality, is said since we can do many things by grace, to which nature is to act upon the soul, not after the manner of an efficient not equal, as stated above (q. 109, Aa. 1,2,3). Therefore cause, but after the manner of a formal cause, as whiteness grace is not a quality. makes a thing white, and justice, just. Objection 3. Furthermore, no quality remains after it Reply to Objection 2. Every substance is either the has ceased to be in its subject. But grace remains; since nature of the thing whereof it is the substance or is a part it is not corrupted, for thus it would be reduced to noth- of the nature, even as matter and form are called sub- ing, since it was created from nothing; hence it is called a stance. And because grace is above human nature, it can- “new creature”(Gal. 6:15). not be a substance or a substantial form, but is an acciden- On the contrary, on Ps. 103:15: “That he may make tal form of the soul. Now what is substantially in God, the face cheerful with oil”; the gloss says: “Grace is a becomes accidental in the soul participating the Divine certain beauty of soul, which wins the Divine love.” But goodness, as is clear in the case of knowledge. And thus beauty of soul is a quality, even as beauty of body. There- because the soul participates in the Divine goodness im- fore grace is a quality. perfectly, the participation of the Divine goodness, which I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), there is under- is grace, has its being in the soul in a less perfect way than stood to be an effect of God’s gratuitous will in whoever is the soul subsists in itself. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it is said to have God’s grace. Now it was stated (q. 109, a. 1) the expression or participation of the Divine goodness, it that man is aided by God’s gratuitous will in two ways: is nobler than the nature of the soul, though not in its mode first, inasmuch as man’s soul is moved by God to know of being. or will or do something, and in this way the gratuitous ef- Reply to Objection 3. As Boethius∗ says, the “being fect in man is not a quality, but a movement of the soul; of an accident is to inhere.” Hence no accident is called for “motion is the act of the mover in the moved.” Sec- being as if it had being, but because by it something is; ondly, man is helped by God’s gratuitous will, inasmuch hence it is said to belong to a being rather to be a being as a habitual gift is infused by God into the soul; and for (Metaph. vii, text. 2). And because to become and to be this reason, that it is not fitting that God should provide corrupted belong to what is, properly speaking, no acci- less for those He loves, that they may acquire supernat- dent comes into being or is corrupted, but is said to come ural good, than for creatures, whom He loves that they into being and to be corrupted inasmuch as its subject be- may acquire natural good. Now He so provides for natu- gins or ceases to be in act with this accident. And thus ral creatures, that not merely does He move them to their grace is said to be created inasmuch as men are created natural acts, but He bestows upon them certain forms and with reference to it, i.e. are given a new being out of noth- powers, which are the principles of acts, in order that they ing, i.e. not from merits, according to Eph. 2:10, “created may of themselves be inclined to these movements, and in Jesus Christ in good works.” thus the movements whereby they are moved by God be- ∗ Pseudo-Bede, Sent. Phil. ex Artist 1159 Whether grace is the same as virtue? Ia IIae q. 110 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that grace is the same as vii, text. 17), “virtue is disposition of what is perfect— virtue. For Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xiv) that “op- and I call perfect what is disposed according to its nature.” erating grace is faith that worketh by charity.” But faith Now from this it is clear that the virtue of a thing has refer- that worketh by charity is a virtue. Therefore grace is a ence to some pre-existing nature, from the fact that every- virtue. thing is disposed with reference to what befits its nature. Objection 2. Further, what fits the definition, fits the But it is manifest that the virtues acquired by human acts defined. But the definitions of virtue given by saints and of which we spoke above (q. 55, seqq.) are dispositions, philosophers fit grace, since “it makes its subject good, whereby a man is fittingly disposed with reference to the and his work good,” and “it is a good quality of the mind, nature whereby he is a man; whereas infused virtues dis- whereby we live righteously,” etc. Therefore grace is pose man in a higher manner and towards a higher end, virtue. and consequently in relation to some higher nature, i.e. in Objection 3. Further, grace is a quality. Now it is relation to a participation of the Divine Nature, according clearly not in the “fourth” species of quality; viz. “form” to 2 Pet. 1:4: “He hath given us most great and most pre- which is the “abiding figure of things,” since it does not cious promises; that by these you may be made partakers belong to bodies. Nor is it in the “third,” since it is not a of the Divine Nature.” And it is in respect of receiving “passion nor a passion-like quality,” which is in the sen- this nature that we are said to be born again sons of God. sitive part of the soul, as is proved in Physic. viii; and And thus, even as the natural light of reason is some- grace is principally in the mind. Nor is it in the “sec- thing besides the acquired virtues, which are ordained to ond” species, which is “natural power” or “impotence”; this natural light, so also the light of grace which is a par- since grace is above nature and does not regard good and ticipation of the Divine Nature is something besides the evil, as does natural power. Therefore it must be in the infused virtues which are derived from and are ordained “first” species which is “habit” or “disposition.” Now to this light, hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:8): “For you habits of the mind are virtues; since even knowledge itself were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. Walk is a virtue after a manner, as stated above (q. 57, Aa. 1,2). then as children of the light.” For as the acquired virtues Therefore grace is the same as virtue. enable a man to walk, in accordance with the natural light On the contrary, If grace is a virtue, it would seem of reason, so do the infused virtues enable a man to walk before all to be one of the three theological virtues. But as befits the light of grace. grace is neither faith nor hope, for these can be without Reply to Objection 1. Augustine calls “faith that wor- sanctifying grace. Nor is it charity, since “grace foreruns keth by charity” grace, since the act of faith of him that charity,” as Augustine says in his book on the Predestina- worketh by charity is the first act by which sanctifying tion of the Saints (De Dono Persev. xvi). Therefore grace grace is manifested. is not virtue. Reply to Objection 2. Good is placed in the defini- I answer that, Some held that grace and virtue were tion of virtue with reference to its fitness with some pre- identical in essence, and differed only logically—in the existing nature essential or participated. Now good is not sense that we speak of grace inasmuch as it makes man attributed to grace in this manner, but as to the root of pleasing to God, or is given gratuitously—and of virtue goodness in man, as stated above. inasmuch as it empowers us to act rightly. And the Mas- Reply to Objection 3. Grace is reduced to the first ter seems to have thought this (Sent. ii, D 27). species of quality; and yet it is not the same as virtue, but But if anyone rightly considers the nature of virtue, is a certain disposition which is presupposed to the infused this cannot hold, since, as the Philosopher says (Physic. virtues, as their principle and root. Whether grace is in the essence of the soul as in a subject, or in one of the powers? Ia IIae q. 110 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that grace is not in the Objection 2. Further, “Man’s merit springs from essence of the soul, as in a subject, but in one of the pow- grace” as Augustine says (De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. vi). ers. For Augustine says (Hypognosticon iii∗) that grace Now merit consists in acts, which proceed from a power. is related to the will or to the free will “as a rider to his Hence it seems that grace is a perfection of a power of the horse.” Now the will or the free will is a power, as stated soul. above ( Ia, q. 83, a. 2). Hence grace is in a power of the Objection 3. Further, if the essence of the soul is the soul, as in a subject. proper subject of grace, the soul, inasmuch as it has an ∗ Among the spurious works of St. Augustine 1160 essence, must be capable of grace. But this is false; since Reply to Objection 1. As from the essence of the it would follow that every soul would be capable of grace. soul flows its powers, which are the principles of deeds, Therefore the essence of the soul is not the proper subject so likewise the virtues, whereby the powers are moved to of grace. act, flow into the powers of the soul from grace. And thus Objection 4. Further, the essence of the soul is prior grace is compared to the will as the mover to the moved, to its powers. Now what is prior may be understood with- which is the same comparison as that of a horseman to the out what is posterior. Hence it follows that grace may be horse—but not as an accident to a subject. taken to be in the soul, although we suppose no part or And thereby is made clear the Reply to the Second power of the soul—viz. neither the will, nor the intellect, Objection. For grace is the principle of meritorious works nor anything else; which is impossible. through the medium of virtues, as the essence of the soul On the contrary, By grace we are born again sons of is the principal of vital deeds through the medium of the God. But generation terminates at the essence prior to the powers. powers. Therefore grace is in the soul’s essence prior to Reply to Objection 3. The soul is the subject of grace, being in the powers. as being in the species of intellectual or rational nature. I answer that, This question depends on the preced- But the soul is not classed in a species by any of its pow- ing. For if grace is the same as virtue, it must necessar- ers, since the powers are natural properties of the soul fol- ily be in the powers of the soul as in a subject; since the lowing upon the species. Hence the soul differs specifi- soul’s powers are the proper subject of virtue, as stated cally in its essence from other souls, viz. of dumb ani- above (q. 56, a. 1). But if grace differs from virtue, it can- mals, and of plants. Consequently it does not follow that, not be said that a power of the soul is the subject of grace, if the essence of the human soul is the subject of grace, since every perfection of the soul’s powers has the nature every soul may be the subject of grace; since it belongs to of virtue, as stated above (q. 55, a. 1; q. 56, a. 1). Hence the essence of the soul, inasmuch as it is of such a species. it remains that grace, as it is prior to virtue, has a subject Reply to Objection 4. Since the powers of the soul prior to the powers of the soul, so that it is in the essence of are natural properties following upon the species, the soul the soul. For as man in his intellective powers participates cannot be without them. Yet, granted that it was without in the Divine knowledge through the virtue of faith, and in them, the soul would still be called intellectual or rational his power of will participates in the Divine love through in its species, not that it would actually have these pow- the virtue of charity, so also in the nature of the soul does ers, but on account of the essence of such a species, from he participate in the Divine Nature, after the manner of a which these powers naturally flow. likeness, through a certain regeneration or re-creation. 1161 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 111 Of the Division of Grace (In Five Articles) We must now consider the division of grace; under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether grace is fittingly divided into gratuitous grace and sanctifying grace? (2) Of the division into operating and cooperating grace; (3) Of the division of it into prevenient and subsequent grace; (4) Of the division of gratuitous grace; (5) Of the comparison between sanctifying and gratuitous grace. Whether grace is fittingly divided into sanctifying grace and gratuitous grace? Ia IIae q. 111 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that grace is not fittingly grace”; the other is that whereby one man cooperates with divided into sanctifying grace and gratuitous grace. For another in leading him to God, and this gift is called “gra- grace is a gift of God, as is clear from what has been al- tuitous grace,” since it is bestowed on a man beyond the ready stated (q. 110, a. 1). But man is not therefore pleas- capability of nature, and beyond the merit of the person. ing to God because something is given him by God, but But whereas it is bestowed on a man, not to justify him, rather on the contrary; since something is freely given by but rather that he may cooperate in the justification of an- God, because man is pleasing to Him. Hence there is no other, it is not called sanctifying grace. And it is of this sanctifying grace. that the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:7): “And the manifesta- Objection 2. Further, whatever is not given on ac- tion of the Spirit is given to every man unto utility,” i.e. of count of preceding merits is given gratis. Now even nat-others. ural good is given to man without preceding merit, since Reply to Objection 1. Grace is said to make pleasing, nature is presupposed to merit. Therefore nature itself is not efficiently but formally, i.e. because thereby a man is given gratuitously by God. But nature is condivided with justified, and is made worthy to be called pleasing to God, grace. Therefore to be gratuitously given is not fittingly according to Col. 1:21: “He hath made us worthy to be set down as a difference of grace, since it is found outside made partakers of the lot of the saints in light.” the genus of grace. Reply to Objection 2. Grace, inasmuch as it is gra- Objection 3. Further, members of a division are mu- tuitously given, excludes the notion of debt. Now debt tually opposed. But even sanctifying grace, whereby we may be taken in two ways: first, as arising from merit; are justified, is given to us gratuitously, according to Rom. and this regards the person whose it is to do meritorious 3:24: “Being justified freely [gratis] by His grace.” Hence works, according to Rom. 4:4: “Now to him that wor- sanctifying grace ought not to be divided against gratu- keth, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but itous grace. according to debt.” The second debt regards the condi- On the contrary, The Apostle attributes both to grace, tion of nature. Thus we say it is due to a man to have viz. to sanctify and to be gratuitously given. For with re- reason, and whatever else belongs to human nature. Yet gard to the first he says (Eph. 1:6): “He hath graced us in in neither way is debt taken to mean that God is under His beloved son.” And with regard to the second (Rom. an obligation to His creature, but rather that the creature 2:6): “And if by grace, it is not now by works, otherwise ought to be subject to God, that the Divine ordination may grace is no more grace.” Therefore grace can be distin- be fulfilled in it, which is that a certain nature should have guished by its having one only or both. certain conditions or properties, and that by doing certain I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1), works it should attain to something further. And hence “those things that are of God are well ordered [Vulg.: natural endowments are not a debt in the first sense but ‘those that are, are ordained by God].” Now the order in the second. Hence they especially merit the name of of things consists in this, that things are led to God by grace. other things, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). And Reply to Objection 3. Sanctifying grace adds to the hence since grace is ordained to lead men to God, this notion of gratuitous grace something pertaining to the na- takes place in a certain order, so that some are led to God ture of grace, since it makes man pleasing to God. And by others. hence gratuitous grace which does not do this keeps the And thus there is a twofold grace: one whereby man common name, as happens in many other cases; and thus himself is united to God, and this is called “sanctifying the two parts of the division are opposed as sanctifying 1162 and non-sanctifying grace. Whether grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace? Ia IIae q. 111 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that grace is not fittingly the interior act of the will, and with regard to this act the divided into operating and cooperating grace. For grace is will is a thing moved, and God is the mover; and espe- an accident, as stated above (q. 110, a. 2). Now no acci- cially when the will, which hitherto willed evil, begins to dent can act upon its subject. Therefore no grace can be will good. And hence, inasmuch as God moves the human called operating. mind to this act, we speak of operating grace. But there Objection 2. Further, if grace operates anything in us is another, exterior act; and since it is commanded by the it assuredly brings about justification. But not only grace will, as was shown above (q. 17, a. 9) the operation of this works this. For Augustine says, on Jn. 14:12, “the works act is attributed to the will. And because God assists us in that I do he also shall do,” says (Serm. clxix): “He Who this act, both by strengthening our will interiorly so as to created thee without thyself, will not justify thee without attain to the act, and by granting outwardly the capability thyself.” Therefore no grace ought to be called simply of operating, it is with respect to this that we speak of co- operating. operating grace. Hence after the aforesaid words Augus- Objection 3. Further, to cooperate seems to pertain tine subjoins: “He operates that we may will; and when to the inferior agent, and not to the principal agent. But we will, He cooperates that we may perfect.” And thus grace works in us more than free-will, according to Rom. if grace is taken for God’s gratuitous motion whereby He 9:16: “It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that run- moves us to meritorious good, it is fittingly divided into neth, but of God that sheweth mercy.” Therefore no grace operating and cooperating grace. ought to be called cooperating. But if grace is taken for the habitual gift, then again Objection 4. Further, division ought to rest on oppo- there is a double effect of grace, even as of every other sition. But to operate and to cooperate are not opposed; form; the first of which is “being,” and the second, “op- for one and the same thing can both operate and cooper- eration”; thus the work of heat is to make its subject hot, ate. Therefore grace is not fittingly divided into operating and to give heat outwardly. And thus habitual grace, inas- and cooperating. much as it heals and justifies the soul, or makes it pleas- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Gratia et Lib. ing to God, is called operating grace; but inasmuch as it is Arbit. xvii): “God by cooperating with us, perfects what the principle of meritorious works, which spring from the He began by operating in us, since He who perfects by free-will, it is called cooperating grace. cooperation with such as are willing, beings by operating Reply to Objection 1. Inasmuch as grace is a certain that they may will.” But the operations of God whereby accidental quality, it does not act upon the soul efficiently, He moves us to good pertain to grace. Therefore grace is but formally, as whiteness makes a surface white. fittingly divided into operating and cooperating. Reply to Objection 2. God does not justify us without I answer that, As stated above (q. 110, a. 2) grace ourselves, because whilst we are being justified we con- may be taken in two ways; first, as a Divine help, whereby sent to God’s justification [justitiae] by a movement of our God moves us to will and to act; secondly, as a habitual free-will. Nevertheless this movement is not the cause of gift divinely bestowed on us. grace, but the effect; hence the whole operation pertains Now in both these ways grace is fittingly divided into to grace. operating and cooperating. For the operation of an ef- Reply to Objection 3. One thing is said to cooper- fect is not attributed to the thing moved but to the mover. ate with another not merely when it is a secondary agent Hence in that effect in which our mind is moved and does under a principal agent, but when it helps to the end in- not move, but in which God is the sole mover, the oper- tended. Now man is helped by God to will the good, ation is attributed to God, and it is with reference to this through the means of operating grace. And hence, the that we speak of “operating grace.” But in that effect in end being already intended, grace cooperates with us. which our mind both moves and is moved, the operation Reply to Objection 4. Operating and cooperating is not only attributed to God, but also to the soul; and grace are the same grace; but are distinguished by their it is with reference to this that we speak of “cooperating different effects, as is plain from what has been said. grace.” Now there is a double act in us. First, there is 1163 Whether grace is fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent grace? Ia IIae q. 111 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that grace is not fittingly hence grace, inasmuch as it causes the first effect in us, divided into prevenient and subsequent. For grace is an is called prevenient with respect to the second, and inas- effect of the Divine love. But God’s love is never sub- much as it causes the second, it is called subsequent with sequent, but always prevenient, according to 1 Jn. 4:10: respect to the first effect. And as one effect is posterior “Not as though we had loved God, but because He hath to this effect, and prior to that, so may grace be called first loved us.” Therefore grace ought not to be divided prevenient and subsequent on account of the same effect into prevenient and subsequent. viewed relatively to divers others. And this is what Au- Objection 2. Further, there is but one sanctifying gustine says (De Natura et Gratia xxxi): “It is prevenient, grace in man, since it is sufficient, according to 2 Cor. inasmuch as it heals, and subsequent, inasmuch as, being 12:9: “My grace is sufficient for thee.” But the same thing healed, we are strengthened; it is prevenient, inasmuch as cannot be before and after. Therefore grace is not fittingly we are called, and subsequent, inasmuch as we are glori- divided into prevenient and subsequent. fied.” Objection 3. Further, grace is known by its effects. Reply to Objection 1. God’s love signifies something Now there are an infinite number of effects—one preced- eternal; and hence can never be called anything but pre- ing another. Hence it with regard to these, grace must venient. But grace signifies a temporal effect, which can be divided into prevenient and subsequent, it would seem precede and follow another; and thus grace may be both that there are infinite species of grace. Now no art takes prevenient and subsequent. note of the infinite in number. Hence grace is not fittingly Reply to Objection 2. The division into prevenient divided into prevenient and subsequent. and subsequent grace does not divide grace in its essence, On the contrary, God’s grace is the outcome of His but only in its effects, as was already said of operating and mercy. Now both are said in Ps. 58:11: “His mercy shall cooperating grace. For subsequent grace, inasmuch as it prevent me,” and again, Ps. 22:6: “Thy mercy will follow pertains to glory, is not numerically distinct from preve- me.” Therefore grace is fittingly divided into prevenient nient grace whereby we are at present justified. For even and subsequent. as the charity of the earth is not voided in heaven, so must I answer that, As grace is divided into operating and the same be said of the light of grace, since the notion of cooperating, with regard to its diverse effects, so also is neither implies imperfection. it divided into prevenient and subsequent, howsoever we Reply to Objection 3. Although the effects of grace consider grace. Now there are five effects of grace in us: may be infinite in number, even as human acts are infinite, of these, the first is, to heal the soul; the second, to desire nevertheless all reduced to some of a determinate species, good; the third, to carry into effect the good proposed; the and moreover all coincide in this—that one precedes an- fourth, to persevere in good; the fifth, to reach glory. And other. Whether gratuitous grace is rightly divided by the Apostle? Ia IIae q. 111 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that gratuitous grace is tation of speeches pertains either to wisdom or to knowl- not rightly divided by the Apostle. For every gift vouch- edge, according to Dan. 1:17: “And to these children God safed to us by God, may be called a gratuitous grace. Now gave knowledge and understanding in every book and wis- there are an infinite number of gifts freely bestowed on dom.” Hence it is not correct to divide the grace of healing us by God as regards both the good of the soul and the and kinds of tongues against the working of miracles; and good of the body—and yet they do not make us pleasing the interpretation of speeches against the word of wisdom to God. Hence gratuitous graces cannot be contained un- and knowledge. der any certain division. Objection 4. Further, as wisdom and knowledge are Objection 2. Further, gratuitous grace is distin- gifts of the Holy Ghost, so also are understanding, coun- guished from sanctifying grace. But faith pertains to sanc- sel, piety, fortitude, and fear, as stated above (q. 68, a. 4). tifying grace, since we are justified by it, according to Therefore these also ought to be placed amongst the gra- Rom. 5:1: “Being justified therefore by faith.” Hence it is tuitous gifts. not right to place faith amongst the gratuitous graces, es- On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8,9,10): pecially since the other virtues are not so placed, as hope “To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom; and charity. and to another the word of knowledge, according to the Objection 3. Further, the operation of healing, and same Spirit; to another, the working of miracles; to an- speaking divers tongues are miracles. Again, the interpre- other, prophecy; to another, the discerning of spirits; to 1164 another divers kinds of tongues; to another interpretation But the capability of speaking can regard either the id-of speeches.” iom in which a person can be understood, and thus there I answer that, As was said above (a. 1), gratuitous is “kinds of tongues”; or it can regard the sense of what is grace is ordained to this, viz. that a man may help another said, and thus there is the “interpretation of speeches.” to be led to God. Now no man can help in this by moving Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 1), not interiorly (for this belongs to God alone), but only exte- all the benefits divinely conferred upon us are called gra- riorly by teaching or persuading. Hence gratuitous grace tuitous graces, but only those that surpass the power of embraces whatever a man needs in order to instruct an- nature—e.g. that a fisherman should be replete with the other in Divine things which are above reason. Now for word of wisdom and of knowledge and the like; and such this three things are required: first, a man must possess as these are here set down as gratuitous graces. the fullness of knowledge of Divine things, so as to be Reply to Objection 2. Faith is enumerated here un- capable of teaching others. Secondly, he must be able to der the gratuitous graces, not as a virtue justifying man confirm or prove what he says, otherwise his words would in himself, but as implying a super-eminent certitude of have no weight. Thirdly, he must be capable of fittingly faith, whereby a man is fitted for instructing others con- presenting to his hearers what he knows. cerning such things as belong to the faith. With regard Now as regards the first, three things are necessary, as to hope and charity, they belong to the appetitive power, may be seen in human teaching. For whoever would teach according as man is ordained thereby to God. another in any science must first be certain of the princi- Reply to Objection 3. The grace of healing is distin- ples of the science, and with regard to this there is “faith,” guished from the general working of miracles because it which is certitude of invisible things, the principles of has a special reason for inducing one to the faith, since a Catholic doctrine. Secondly, it behooves the teacher to man is all the more ready to believe when he has received know the principal conclusions of the science, and hence the gift of bodily health through the virtue of faith. So, we have the word of “wisdom,” which is the knowledge too, to speak with divers tongues and to interpret speeches of Divine things. Thirdly, he ought to abound with ex- have special efficacy in bestowing faith. Hence they are amples and a knowledge of effects, whereby at times he set down as special gratuitous graces. needs to manifest causes; and thus we have the word of Reply to Objection 4. Wisdom and knowledge are “knowledge,” which is the knowledge of human things, not numbered among the gratuitous graces in the same since “the invisible things of Him. . . are clearly seen, be- way as they are reckoned among the gifts of the Holy ing understood by the things that are made” (Rom. 1:20). Ghost, i.e. inasmuch as man’s mind is rendered easily Now the confirmation of such things as are within rea- movable by the Holy Ghost to the things of wisdom and son rests upon arguments; but the confirmation of what knowledge; for thus they are gifts of the Holy Ghost, as is above reason rests on what is proper to the Divine stated above (q. 68, Aa. 1,4). But they are numbered power, and this in two ways: first, when the teacher of sa- amongst the gratuitous graces, inasmuch as they imply cred doctrine does what God alone can do, in miraculous such a fullness of knowledge and wisdom that a man may deeds, whether with respect to bodily health—and thus not merely think aright of Divine things, but may instruct there is the “grace of healing,” or merely for the purpose others and overpower adversaries. Hence it is significant of manifesting the Divine power; for instance, that the that it is the “word” of wisdom and the “word” of knowl- sun should stand still or darken, or that the sea should be edge that are placed in the gratuitous graces, since, as Au- divided—and thus there is the “working of miracles.” Sec- gustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1), “It is one thing merely to ondly, when he can manifest what God alone can know, know what a man must believe in order to reach everlast- and these are either future contingents—and thus there is ing life, and another thing to know how this may benefit “prophecy,” or also the secrets of hearts—and thus there the godly and may be defended against the ungodly.” is the “discerning of spirits.” Whether gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace? Ia IIae q. 111 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that gratuitous grace is sanctifying grace. nobler than sanctifying grace. For “the people’s good is Objection 2. Further, it is a greater power that is better than the individual good,” as the Philosopher says able to act upon another, than that which is confined to (Ethic. i, 2). Now sanctifying grace is ordained to the itself, even as greater is the brightness of the body that good of one man alone, whereas gratuitous grace is or- can illuminate other bodies, than of that which can only dained to the common good of the whole Church, as stated shine but cannot illuminate; and hence the Philosopher above (Aa. 1,4). Hence gratuitous grace is nobler than says (Ethic. v, 1) “that justice is the most excellent of the 1165 virtues,” since by it a man bears himself rightly towards Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher says others. But by sanctifying grace a man is perfected only (Metaph. xii, text. 52), a multitude, as an army, has a in himself; whereas by gratuitous grace a man works for double good; the first is in the multitude itself, viz. the the perfection of others. Hence gratuitous grace is nobler order of the army; the second is separate from the multi- than sanctifying grace. tude, viz. the good of the leader—and this is better good, Objection 3. Further, what is proper to the best is no- since the other is ordained to it. Now gratuitous grace is bler than what is common to all; thus to reason, which ordained to the common good of the Church, which is ec- is proper to man is nobler than to feel, which is common clesiastical order, whereas sanctifying grace is ordained to to all animals. Now sanctifying grace is common to all the separate common good, which is God. Hence sancti- members of the Church, but gratuitous grace is the proper fying grace is the nobler. gift of the more exalted members of the Church. Hence Reply to Objection 2. If gratuitous grace could cause gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace. a man to have sanctifying grace, it would follow that the On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. 12:31), hav- gratuitous grace was the nobler; even as the brightness of ing enumerated the gratuitous graces adds: “And I shew the sun that enlightens is more excellent than that of an unto you yet a more excellent way”; and as the sequel object that is lit up. But by gratuitous grace a man cannot proves he is speaking of charity, which pertains to sancti- cause another to have union with God, which he himself fying grace. Hence sanctifying grace is more noble than has by sanctifying grace; but he causes certain disposi- gratuitous grace. tions towards it. Hence gratuitous grace needs not to be I answer that, The higher the good to which a virtue the more excellent, even as in fire, the heat, which mani- is ordained, the more excellent is the virtue. Now the end fests its species whereby it produces heat in other things, is always greater than the means. But sanctifying grace is not more noble than its substantial form. ordains a man immediately to a union with his last end, Reply to Objection 3. Feeling is ordained to reason, whereas gratuitous grace ordains a man to what is prepara- as to an end; and thus, to reason is nobler. But here it tory to the end; i.e. by prophecy and miracles and so forth, is the contrary; for what is proper is ordained to what is men are induced to unite themselves to their last end. And common as to an end. Hence there is no comparison. hence sanctifying grace is nobler than gratuitous grace. 1166 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 112 Of the Cause of Grace (In Five Articles) We must now consider the cause of grace; and under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether God alone is the efficient cause of grace? (2) Whether any disposition towards grace is needed on the part of the recipient, by an act of free-will? (3) Whether such a disposition can make grace follow of necessity? (4) Whether grace is equal in all? (5) Whether anyone may know that he has grace? Whether God alone is the cause of grace? Ia IIae q. 112 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that God alone is not the bestowing a partaking of the Divine Nature by a partici- cause of grace. For it is written (Jn. 1:17): “Grace and pated likeness, as it is impossible that anything save fire truth came by Jesus Christ.” Now, by the name of Jesus should enkindle. Christ is understood not merely the Divine Nature assum- Reply to Objection 1. Christ’s humanity is an “organ ing, but the created nature assumed. Therefore a creature of His Godhead,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, may be the cause of grace. 19). Now an instrument does not bring forth the action of Objection 2. Further, there is this difference between the principal agent by its own power, but in virtue of the the sacraments of the New Law and those of the Old, that principal agent. Hence Christ’s humanity does not cause the sacraments of the New Law cause grace, whereas the grace by its own power, but by virtue of the Divine Nature sacraments of the Old Law merely signify it. Now the joined to it, whereby the actions of Christ’s humanity are sacraments of the New Law are certain visible elements. saving actions. Therefore God is not the only cause of grace. Reply to Objection 2. As in the person of Christ the Objection 3. Further, according to Dionysius (Coel. humanity causes our salvation by grace, the Divine power Hier. iii, iv, vii, viii), “Angels cleanse, enlighten, and being the principal agent, so likewise in the sacraments of perfect both lesser angels and men.” Now the rational the New Law, which are derived from Christ, grace is in- creature is cleansed, enlightened, and perfected by grace. strumentally caused by the sacraments, and principally by Therefore God is not the only cause of grace. the power of the Holy Ghost working in the sacraments, On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 83:12): “The Lord according to Jn. 3:5: “Unless a man be born again of wa- will give grace and glory.” ter and the Holy Ghost he cannot enter into the kingdom I answer that, Nothing can act beyond its species, of God.” since the cause must always be more powerful than its Reply to Objection 3. Angels cleanse, enlighten, and effect. Now the gift of grace surpasses every capability perfect angels or men, by instruction, and not by justifying of created nature, since it is nothing short of a partaking them through grace. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. of the Divine Nature, which exceeds every other nature. vii) that “this cleansing and enlightenment and perfecting And thus it is impossible that any creature should cause is nothing else than the assumption of Divine knowledge.” grace. For it is as necessary that God alone should deify, Whether any preparation and disposition for grace is required on man’s part? Ia IIae q. 112 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that no preparation or dis- are going on sinning grace is given, as is clear in the position for grace is required on man’s part, since, as the case of Paul, who received grace whilst he was “breath- Apostle says (Rom. 4:4), “To him that worketh, the re- ing our threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of ward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to the Lord” (Act 9:1). Hence no preparation for grace is debt.” Now a man’s preparation by free-will can only be required on man’s part. through some operation. Hence it would do away with the Objection 3. Further, an agent of infinite power needs notion of grace. no disposition in matter, since it does not even require Objection 2. Further, whoever is going on sinning, is matter, as appears in creation, to which grace is com- not preparing himself to have grace. But to some who pared, which is called “a new creature” (Gal. 6:15). But 1167 only God, Who has infinite power, causes grace, as stated sometimes precedes the gift of sanctifying grace, and yet above (a. 1 ). Hence no preparation is required on man’s it is from God’s motion. But it does not suffice for merit, part to obtain grace. since man is not yet justified by grace, and merit can only On the contrary, It is written (Amos 4:12): “Be pre- arise from grace, as will be seen further on (q. 114, a. 2). pared to meet thy God, O Israel,” and (1 Kings 7:3): “Pre- Reply to Objection 2. Since a man cannot prepare pare your hearts unto the Lord.” himself for grace unless God prevent and move him to I answer that, As stated above (q. 111, a. 2), grace is good, it is of no account whether anyone arrive at per- taken in two ways: first, as a habitual gift of God. Sec- fect preparation instantaneously, or step by step. For it ondly, as a help from God, Who moves the soul to good. is written (Ecclus. 11:23): “It is easy in the eyes of God Now taking grace in the first sense, a certain preparation on a sudden to make the poor man rich.” Now it some- of grace is required for it, since a form can only be in dis- times happens that God moves a man to good, but not posed matter. But if we speak of grace as it signifies a help perfect good, and this preparation precedes grace. But from God to move us to good, no preparation is required He sometimes moves him suddenly and perfectly to good, on man’s part, that, as it were, anticipates the Divine help, and man receives grace suddenly, according to Jn. 6:45: but rather, every preparation in man must be by the help “Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, of God moving the soul to good. And thus even the good cometh to Me.” And thus it happened to Paul, since, sud- movement of the free-will, whereby anyone is prepared denly when he was in the midst of sin, his heart was per- for receiving the gift of grace is an act of the free-will fectly moved by God to hear, to learn, to come; and hence moved by God. And thus man is said to prepare himself, he received grace suddenly. according to Prov. 16:1: “It is the part of man to prepare Reply to Objection 3. An agent of infinite power the soul”; yet it is principally from God, Who moves the needs no matter or disposition of matter, brought about free-will. Hence it is said that man’s will is prepared by by the action of something else; and yet, looking to the God, and that man’s steps are guided by God. condition of the thing caused, it must cause, in the thing Reply to Objection 1. A certain preparation of man caused, both the matter and the due disposition for the for grace is simultaneous with the infusion of grace; and form. So likewise, when God infuses grace into a soul, no this operation is meritorious, not indeed of grace, which preparation is required which He Himself does not bring is already possessed—but of glory which is not yet pos- about. sessed. But there is another imperfect preparation, which Whether grace is necessarily given to whoever prepares himself for it, or to whoever Ia IIae q. 112 a. 3 does what he can? Objection 1. It would seem that grace is necessarily the potter, according to Jer. 18:6: “As clay is in the hand of given to whoever prepares himself for grace, or to who- the potter, so are you in My hand.” But however much the ever does what he can, because, on Rom. 5:1, “Being jus- clay is prepared, it does not necessarily receive its shape tified. . . by faith, let us have peace,” etc. the gloss says: from the potter. Hence, however much a man prepares “God welcomes whoever flies to Him, otherwise there himself, he does not necessarily receive grace from God. would be injustice with Him.” But it is impossible for in- I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), man’s prepara- justice to be with God. Therefore it is impossible for God tion for grace is from God, as Mover, and from the free- not to welcome whoever flies to Him. Hence he receives will, as moved. Hence the preparation may be looked at grace of necessity. in two ways: first, as it is from free-will, and thus there is Objection 2. Further, Anselm says (De Casu Diaboli. no necessity that it should obtain grace, since the gift of iii) that the reason why God does not bestow grace on grace exceeds every preparation of human power. But it the devil, is that he did not wish, nor was he prepared, to may be considered, secondly, as it is from God the Mover, receive it. But if the cause be removed, the effect must and thus it has a necessity—not indeed of coercion, but needs be removed also. Therefore, if anyone is willing to of infallibility—as regards what it is ordained to by God, receive grace it is bestowed on them of necessity. since God’s intention cannot fail, according to the say- Objection 3. Further, good is diffusive of itself, as ing of Augustine in his book on the Predestination of the appears from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now the good Saints (De Dono Persev. xiv) that “by God’s good gifts of grace is better than the good of nature. Hence, since whoever is liberated, is most certainly liberated.” Hence natural forms necessarily come to disposed matter, much if God intends, while moving, that the one whose heart He more does it seem that grace is necessarily bestowed on moves should attain to grace, he will infallibly attain to it, whoever prepares himself for grace. according to Jn. 6:45: “Every one that hath heard of the On the contrary, Man is compared to God as clay to Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me.” 1168 Reply to Objection 1. This gloss is speaking of such Reply to Objection 2. The first cause of the defect of as fly to God by a meritorious act of their free-will, al- grace is on our part; but the first cause of the bestowal of ready “informed” with grace; for if they did not receive grace is on God’s according to Osee 13:9: “Destruction is grace, it would be against the justice which He Himself thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me.” established. Or if it refers to the movement of free-will Reply to Objection 3. Even in natural things, the before grace, it is speaking in the sense that man’s flight form does not necessarily ensue the disposition of the mat- to God is by a Divine motion, which ought not, in justice, ter, except by the power of the agent that causes the dis- to fail. position. Whether grace is greater in one than in another? Ia IIae q. 112 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that grace is not greater in prepares himself, only inasmuch as his free-will is pre- one than in another. For grace is caused in us by the Di- pared by God. Hence the first cause of this diversity is to vine love, as stated above (q. 110, a. 1). Now it is written be sought on the part of the God, Who dispenses His gifts (Wis. 6:8): “He made the little and the great and He hath of grace variously, in order that the beauty and perfection equally care of all.” Therefore all obtain grace from Him of the Church may result from these various degree; even equally. as He instituted the various conditions of things, that the Objection 2. Further, whatever is the greatest possi- universe might be perfect. Hence after the Apostle had ble, cannot be more or less. But grace is the greatest pos- said (Eph. 4:7): “To every one of us is given grace ac- sible, since it joins us with our last end. Therefore there is cording to the measure of the giving of Christ,” having no greater or less in it. Hence it is not greater in one than enumerated the various graces, he adds (Eph. 4:12): “For in another. the perfecting of the saints. . . for the edifying of the body Objection 3. Further, grace is the soul’s life, as stated of Christ.” above (q. 110, a. 1, ad 2). But there is no greater or less in Reply to Objection 1. The Divine care may be looked life. Hence, neither is there in grace. at in two ways: first, as regards the Divine act, which is On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:7): “But to ev- simple and uniform; and thus His care looks equally to ery one of us is given grace according to the measure of all, since by one simple act He administers great things the giving of Christ.” Now what is given in measure, is not and little. But, “secondly,” it may be considered in those given to all equally. Hence all have not an equal grace. things which come to be considered by the Divine care; I answer that, As stated above (q. 52, Aa. 1,2; q. 56, and thus, inequality is found, inasmuch as God by His Aa. 1,2), habits can have a double magnitude: one, as re- care provides greater gifts to some, and lesser gifts for gards the end or object, as when a virtue is said to be more others. noble through being ordained to a greater good; the other Reply to Objection 2. This objection is based on the on the part of the subject, which more or less participates first kind of magnitude of grace; since grace cannot be in the habit inhering to it. greater by ordaining to a greater good, but inasmuch as Now as regards the first magnitude, sanctifying grace it more or less ordains to a greater or less participation of cannot be greater or less, since, of its nature, grace joins the same good. For there may be diversity of intensity and man to the Highest Good, which is God. But as regards remissness, both in grace and in final glory as regards the the subject, grace can receive more or less, inasmuch as subjects’ participation. one may be more perfectly enlightened by grace than an- Reply to Objection 3. Natural life pertains to man’s other. And a certain reason for this is on the part of him substance, and hence cannot be more or less; but man par- who prepares himself for grace; since he who is better pre- takes of the life of grace accidentally, and hence man may pared for grace, receives more grace. Yet it is not here that possess it more or less. we must seek the first cause of this diversity, since man Whether man can know that he has grace? Ia IIae q. 112 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that man can know that he most certainly by one who has grace. has grace. For grace by its physical reality is in the soul. Objection 2. Further, as knowledge is a gift of God, Now the soul has most certain knowledge of those things so is grace. But whoever receives knowledge from God, that are in it by their physical reality, as appears from Au- knows that he has knowledge, according to Wis. 7:17: gustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 31). Hence grace may be known The Lord “hath given me the true knowledge of the things 1169 that are.” Hence, with equal reason, whoever receives self. . . but He that judgeth me is the Lord.” grace from God, knows that he has grace. Thirdly, things are known conjecturally by signs; and Objection 3. Further, light is more knowable than thus anyone may know he has grace, when he is conscious darkness, since, according to the Apostle (Eph. 5:13), “all of delighting in God, and of despising worldly things, and that is made manifest is light,” Now sin, which is spiritual inasmuch as a man is not conscious of any mortal sin. And darkness, may be known with certainty by one that is in thus it is written (Apoc. 2:17): “To him that overcometh I sin. Much more, therefore, may grace, which is spiritual will give the hidden manna. . . which no man knoweth, but light, be known. he that receiveth it,” because whoever receives it knows, Objection 4. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:12): by experiencing a certain sweetness, which he who does “Now we have received not the Spirit of this world, but not receive it, does not experience. Yet this knowledge is the Spirit that is of God; that we may know the things that imperfect; hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:4): “I am not are given us from God.” Now grace is God’s first gift. conscious to myself of anything, yet am I not hereby justi- Hence, the man who receives grace by the Holy Spirit, by fied,” since, according to Ps. 18:13: “Who can understand the same Holy Spirit knows the grace given to him. sins? From my secret ones cleanse me, O Lord, and from Objection 5. Further, it was said by the Lord to Abra- those of others spare Thy servant.” ham (Gn. 22:12): “Now I know that thou fearest God,” Reply to Objection 1. Those things which are in the i.e. “I have made thee know.” Now He is speaking there soul by their physical reality, are known through experi- of chaste fear, which is not apart from grace. Hence a man mental knowledge; in so far as through acts man has ex- may know that he has grace. perience of their inward principles: thus when we wish, On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 9:1): “Man we perceive that we have a will; and when we exercise the knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred.” functions of life, we observe that there is life in us. Now sanctifying grace maketh a man worthy of God’s Reply to Objection 2. It is an essential condition of love. Therefore no one can know whether he has sanc- knowledge that a man should have certitude of the objects tifying grace. of knowledge; and again, it is an essential condition of I answer that, There are three ways of knowing a faith that a man should be certain of the things of faith, thing: first, by revelation, and thus anyone may know that and this, because certitude belongs to the perfection of he has grace, for God by a special privilege reveals this at the intellect, wherein these gifts exist. Hence, whoever times to some, in order that the joy of safety may begin in has knowledge or faith is certain that he has them. But it them even in this life, and that they may carry on toilsome is otherwise with grace and charity and such like, which works with greater trust and greater energy, and may bear perfect the appetitive faculty. the evils of this present life, as when it was said to Paul (2 Reply to Objection 3. Sin has for its principal object Cor. 12:9): “My grace is sufficient for thee.” commutable good, which is known to us. But the object or Secondly, a man may, of himself, know something, end of grace is unknown to us on account of the greatness and with certainty; and in this way no one can know that of its light, according to 1 Tim. 6:16: “Who. . . inhabiteth he has grace. For certitude about a thing can only be had light inaccessible.” when we may judge of it by its proper principle. Thus Reply to Objection 4. The Apostle is here speaking it is by undemonstrable universal principles that certitude of the gifts of glory, which have been given to us in hope, is obtained concerning demonstrative conclusions. Now and these we know most certainly by faith, although we no one can know he has the knowledge of a conclusion if do not know for certain that we have grace to enable us to he does not know its principle. But the principle of grace merit them. Or it may be said that he is speaking of the and its object is God, Who by reason of His very excel- privileged knowledge, which comes of revelation. Hence lence is unknown to us, according to Job 36:26: “Behold he adds (1 Cor. 2:10): “But to us God hath revealed them God is great, exceeding our knowledge.” And hence His by His Spirit.” presence in us and His absence cannot be known with cer- Reply to Objection 5. What was said to Abraham tainty, according to Job 9:11: “If He come to me, I shall may refer to experimental knowledge which springs from not see Him; if He depart I shall not understand.” And deeds of which we are cognizant. For in the deed that hence man cannot judge with certainty that he has grace, Abraham had just wrought, he could know experimentally according to 1 Cor. 4:3,4: “But neither do I judge my own that he had the fear of God. Or it may refer to a revelation. 1170 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 113 Of the Effects of Grace (In Ten Articles) We have now to consider the effect of grace; (1) the justification of the ungodly, which is the effect of operating grace; and (2) merit, which is the effect of cooperating grace. Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) What is the justification of the ungodly? (2) Whether grace is required for it? (3) Whether any movement of the free-will is required? (4) Whether a movement of faith is required? (5) Whether a movement of the free-will against sin is required? (6) Whether the remission of sins is to be reckoned with the foregoing? (7) Whether the justification of the ungodly is a work of time or is sudden? (8) Of the natural order of the things concurring to justification; (9) Whether the justification of the ungodly is God’s greatest work? (10) Whether the justification of the ungodly is miraculous? Whether the justification of the ungodly is the remission of sins? Ia IIae q. 113 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the justification of lation to the common good of society, as appears from the ungodly is not the remission of sins. For sin is op- Ethic. v, 1. posed not only to justice, but to all the other virtues, as Secondly, justice is so-called inasmuch as it implies a stated above (q. 71, a. 1). Now justification signifies a certain rectitude of order in the interior disposition of a certain movement towards justice. Therefore not even re- man, in so far as what is highest in man is subject to God, mission of sin is justification, since movement is from one and the inferior powers of the soul are subject to the supe- contrary to the other. rior, i.e. to the reason; and this disposition the Philoso- Objection 2. Further, everything ought to be named pher calls “justice metaphorically speaking” (Ethic. v, from what is predominant in it, according to De Anima 11). Now this justice may be in man in two ways: first, by ii, text. 49. Now the remission of sins is brought about simple generation, which is from privation to form; and chiefly by faith, according to Acts 15:9: “Purifying their thus justification may belong even to such as are not in hearts by faith”; and by charity, according to Prov. 10:12: sin, when they receive this justice from God, as Adam is “Charity covereth all sins.” Therefore the remission of said to have received original justice. Secondly, this jus- sins ought to be named after faith or charity rather than tice may be brought about in man by a movement from justice. one contrary to the other, and thus justification implies a Objection 3. Further, the remission of sins seems transmutation from the state of injustice to the aforesaid to be the same as being called, for whoever is called is state of justice. And it is thus we are now speaking of afar off, and we are afar off from God by sin. But one the justification of the ungodly, according to the Apostle is called before being justified according to Rom. 8:30: (Rom. 4:5): “But to him that worketh not, yet believeth in “And whom He called, them He also justified.” Therefore Him that justifieth the ungodly,” etc. And because move- justification is not the remission of sins. ment is named after its term “whereto” rather than from On the contrary, On Rom. 8:30, “Whom He called, its term “whence,” the transmutation whereby anyone is them He also justified,” the gloss says i.e. “by the remis- changed by the remission of sins from the state of ungodli- sion of sins.” Therefore the remission of sins is justifica- ness to the state of justice, borrows its name from its term tion. “whereto,” and is called “justification of the ungodly.” I answer that, Justification taken passively implies a Reply to Objection 1. Every sin, inasmuch as it im- movement towards heat. But since justice, by its nature, plies the disorder of a mind not subject to God, may be implies a certain rectitude of order, it may be taken in two called injustice, as being contrary to the aforesaid justice, ways: first, inasmuch as it implies a right order in man’s according to 1 Jn. 3:4: “Whosoever committeth sin, com- act, and thus justice is placed amongst the virtues—either mitteth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity.” And thus the re- as particular justice, which directs a man’s acts by regulat- moval of any sin is called the justification of the ungodly. ing them in relation to his fellowman—or as legal justice, Reply to Objection 2. Faith and charity imply a spe- which directs a man’s acts by regulating them in their re- cial directing of the human mind to God by the intellect 1171 and will; whereas justice implies a general rectitude of orReply to Objection 3. Being called refers to God’s der. Hence this transmutation is named after justice rather help moving and exciting our mind to give up sin, and this than after charity or faith. motion of God is not the remission of sins, but its cause. Whether the infusion of grace is required for the remission of guilt, i.e. for the justifi-Ia IIae q. 113 a. 2 cation of the ungodly? Objection 1. It would seem that for the remission of us, which is taken away by sin, is grace, whereby a man guilt, which is the justification of the ungodly, no infusion is made worthy of eternal life, from which sin shuts him of grace is required. For anyone may be moved from one out. Hence we could not conceive the remission of guilt, contrary without being led to the other, if the contraries without the infusion of grace. are not immediate. Now the state of guilt and the state of Reply to Objection 1. More is required for an of- grace are not immediate contraries; for there is the middle fender to pardon an offense, than for one who has com- state of innocence wherein a man has neither grace nor mitted no offense, not to be hated. For it may happen guilt. Hence a man may be pardoned his guilt without his amongst men that one man neither hates nor loves another. being brought to a state of grace. But if the other offends him, then the forgiveness of the of- Objection 2. Further, the remission of guilt consists in fense can only spring from a special goodwill. Now God’s the Divine imputation, according to Ps. 31:2: “Blessed is goodwill is said to be restored to man by the gift of grace; the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin.” Now the and hence although a man before sinning may be without infusion of grace puts something into our soul, as stated grace and without guilt, yet that he is without guilt after above (q. 110, a. 1). Hence the infusion of grace is not sinning can only be because he has grace. required for the remission of guilt. Reply to Objection 2. As God’s love consists not Objection 3. Further, no one can be subject to two merely in the act of the Divine will but also implies a contraries at once. Now some sins are contraries, as certain effect of grace, as stated above (q. 110, a. 1), so wastefulness and miserliness. Hence whoever is subject likewise, when God does not impute sin to a man, there to the sin of wastefulness is not simultaneously subject to is implied a certain effect in him to whom the sin is not the sin of miserliness, yet it may happen that he has been imputed; for it proceeds from the Divine love, that sin is subject to it hitherto. Hence by sinning with the vice of not imputed to a man by God. wastefulness he is freed from the sin of miserliness. And Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Nup. thus a sin is remitted without grace. et Concup. i, 26), if to leave off sinning was the same as On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 3:24): “Justified to have no sin, it would be enough if Scripture warned us freely by His grace.” thus: “ ‘My son, hast thou sinned? do so no more?’ Now I answer that, by sinning a man offends God as stated this is not enough, but it is added: ‘But for thy former sins above (q. 71, a. 5 ). Now an offense is remitted to anyone, also pray that they may be forgiven thee.’ ” For the act of only when the soul of the offender is at peace with the sin passes, but the guilt remains, as stated above (q. 87, offended. Hence sin is remitted to us, when God is at a. 6). Hence when anyone passes from the sin of one vice peace with us, and this peace consists in the love whereby to the sin of a contrary vice, he ceases to have the act of God loves us. Now God’s love, considered on the part the former sin, but he does not cease to have the guilt, of the Divine act, is eternal and unchangeable; whereas, hence he may have the guilt of both sins at once. For sins as regards the effect it imprints on us, it is sometimes in- are not contrary to each other on the part of their turning terrupted, inasmuch as we sometimes fall short of it and from God, wherein sin has its guilt. once more require it. Now the effect of the Divine love in Whether for the justification of the ungodly is required a movement of the free-will? Ia IIae q. 113 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that no movement of his knowing, and was regenerated”; which is effected by the free-will is required for the justification of the un- sanctifying grace. Now God does not confine His power godly. For we see that by the sacrament of Baptism, in- to the sacraments. Hence He can justify a man without the fants and sometimes adults are justified without a move- sacraments, and without any movement of the free-will. ment of their free-will: hence Augustine says (Confess. Objection 2. Further, a man has not the use of reason iv) that when one of his friends was taken with a fever, when asleep, and without it there can be no movement of “he lay for a long time senseless and in a deadly sweat, the free-will. But Solomon received from God the gift of and when he was despaired of, he was baptized without wisdom when asleep, as related in 3 Kings 3 and 2 Paral 1172 1. Hence with equal reason the gift of sanctifying grace ness or sleep, he does not obtain justifying grace by the is sometimes bestowed by God on man without the move- exterior rite of Baptism, or of any other sacrament, unless ment of his free-will. he intended to make use of this sacrament, and this can Objection 3. Further, grace is preserved by the same only be by the use of his free-will. And it was in this way cause as brings it into being, for Augustine says (Gen. ad that he of whom Augustine speaks was regenerated, be- lit. viii, 12) that “so ought man to turn to God as he is ever cause both previously and afterwards he assented to the made just by Him.” Now grace is preserved in man with- Baptism. out a movement of his free-will. Hence it can be infused Reply to Objection 2. Solomon neither merited nor in the beginning without a movement of the free-will. received wisdom whilst asleep; but it was declared to him On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 6:45): “Every one in his sleep that on account of his previous desire wisdom that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to would be infused into him by God. Hence it is said in Me.” Now to learn cannot be without a movement of the his person (Wis. 7:7): “I wished, and understanding was free-will, since the learner assents to the teacher. Hence, given unto me.” no one comes to the Father by justifying grace without a Or it may be said that his sleep was not natural, but movement of the free-will. was the sleep of prophecy, according to Num. 12:6: “If I answer that, The justification of the ungodly is there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear brought about by God moving man to justice. For He it to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream.” In is “that justifieth the ungodly” according to Rom. 4:5. such cases the use of free-will remains. Now God moves everything in its own manner, just as we And yet it must be observed that the comparison be- see that in natural things, what is heavy and what is light tween the gift of wisdom and the gift of justifying grace are moved differently, on account of their diverse natures. does not hold. For the gift of justifying grace especially Hence He moves man to justice according to the condi- ordains a man to good, which is the object of the will; tion of his human nature. But it is man’s proper nature and hence a man is moved to it by a movement of the to have free-will. Hence in him who has the use of rea- will which is a movement of free-will. But wisdom per- son, God’s motion to justice does not take place without fects the intellect which precedes the will; hence without a movement of the free-will; but He so infuses the gift of any complete movement of the free-will, the intellect can justifying grace that at the same time He moves the free- be enlightened with the gift of wisdom, even as we see will to accept the gift of grace, in such as are capable of that things are revealed to men in sleep, according to Job being moved thus. 33:15,16: “When deep sleep falleth upon men and they Reply to Objection 1. Infants are not capable of the are sleeping in their beds, then He openeth the ears of movement of their free-will; hence it is by the mere infu- men, and teaching, instructeth them in what they are to sion of their souls that God moves them to justice. Now learn.” this cannot be brought about without a sacrament; because Reply to Objection 3. In the infusion of justifying as original sin, from which they are justified, does not grace there is a certain transmutation of the human soul, come to them from their own will, but by carnal gener- and hence a proper movement of the human soul is re- ation, so also is grace given them by Christ through spir- quired in order that the soul may be moved in its own itual regeneration. And the same reason holds good with manner. But the conservation of grace is without trans- madmen and idiots that have never had the use of their mutation: no movement on the part of the soul is required free-will. But in the case of one who has had the use of but only a continuation of the Divine influx. his free-will and afterwards has lost it either through sick- Whether a movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly? Ia IIae q. 113 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that no movement of faith and faith sins are purged away.” Hence the movement of is required for the justification of the ungodly. For as a faith is no more required for the justification of the un- man is justified by faith, so also by other things, viz. by godly, than the movements of the aforesaid virtues. fear, of which it is written (Ecclus. 1:27): “The fear of Objection 2. Further, the act of faith is required for the Lord driveth out sin, for he that is without fear can- justification only inasmuch as a man knows God by faith. not be justified”; and again by charity, according to Lk. But a man may know God in other ways, viz. by natural 7:47: “Many sins are forgiven her because she hath loved knowledge, and by the gift of wisdom. Hence no act of much”; and again by humility, according to James 4:6: faith is required for the justification of the ungodly. “God resisteth the proud and giveth grace to the humble”; Objection 3. Further, there are several articles of and again by mercy, according to Prov. 15:27: “By mercy faith. Therefore if the act of faith is required for the jus- 1173 tification of the ungodly, it would seem that a man ought of filial fear and an act of humility also concur. For it to think on every article of faith when he is first justified. may happen that one and the same act of free-will springs But this seems inconvenient, since such thought would re- from different virtues, when one commands and another quire a long delay of time. Hence it seems that an act of is commanded, inasmuch as the act may be ordained to faith is not required for the justification of the ungodly. various ends. But the act of mercy counteracts sin either On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:1): “Being by way of satisfying for it, and thus it follows justification; justified therefore by faith, let us have peace with God.” or by way of preparation, inasmuch as the merciful obtain I answer that, As stated above (a. 3) a movement of mercy; and thus it can either precede justification, or con- free-will is required for the justification of the ungodly, cur with the other virtues towards justification, inasmuch inasmuch as man’s mind is moved by God. Now God as mercy is included in the love of our neighbor. moves man’s soul by turning it to Himself according to Reply to Objection 2. By natural knowledge a man is Ps. 84:7 (Septuagint): “Thou wilt turn us, O God, and not turned to God, according as He is the object of beati- bring us to life.” Hence for the justification of the un- tude and the cause of justification. Hence such knowledge godly a movement of the mind is required, by which it is does not suffice for justification. But the gift of wisdom turned to God. Now the first turning to God is by faith, presupposes the knowledge of faith, as stated above (q. 68, according to Heb. 11:6: “He that cometh to God must be- a. 4, ad 3). lieve that He is.” Hence a movement of faith is required Reply to Objection 3. As the Apostle says (Rom. for the justification of the ungodly. 4:5), “to him that. . . believeth in Him that justifieth the Reply to Objection 1. The movement of faith is not ungodly his faith is reputed to justice, according to the perfect unless it is quickened by charity; hence in the purpose of the grace of God.” Hence it is clear that in the justification of the ungodly, a movement of charity is in- justification of the ungodly an act of faith is required in or- fused together with the movement of faith. Now free-will der that a man may believe that God justifies man through is moved to God by being subject to Him; hence an act the mystery of Christ. Whether for the justification of the ungodly there is required a movement of the free-Ia IIae q. 113 a. 5 will towards sin? Objection 1. It would seem that no movement of the On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 31:5): “I will con- free-will towards sin is required for the justification of the fess against myself my injustice to the Lord; and Thou ungodly. For charity alone suffices to take away sin, ac- hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin.” cording to Prov. 10:12: “Charity covereth all sins.” Now I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the justification the object of charity is not sin. Therefore for this justifica-of the ungodly is a certain movement whereby the human tion of the ungodly no movement of the free-will towards mind is moved by God from the state of sin to the state sin is required. of justice. Hence it is necessary for the human mind to Objection 2. Further, whoever is tending onward, regard both extremes by an act of free-will, as a body in ought not to look back, according to Phil. 3:13,14: “For- local movement is related to both terms of the movement. getting the things that are behind, and stretching forth my- Now it is clear that in local movement the moving body self to those that are before, I press towards the mark, leaves the term “whence” and nears the term “whereto.” to the prize of the supernal vocation.” But whoever is Hence the human mind whilst it is being justified, must, stretching forth to righteousness has his sins behind him. by a movement of its free-will withdraw from sin and Hence he ought to forget them, and not stretch forth to draw near to justice. them by a movement of his free-will. Now to withdraw from sin and to draw near to justice, Objection 3. Further, in the justification of the un- in an act of free-will, means detestation and desire. For godly one sin is not remitted without another, for “it is Augustine says on the words “the hireling fleeth,” etc. (Jn. irreverent to expect half a pardon from God”∗. Hence, 10:12): “Our emotions are the movements of our soul; joy in the justification of the ungodly, if man’s free-will must is the soul’s outpouring; fear is the soul’s flight; your soul move against sin, he ought to think of all his sins. But this goes forward when you seek; your soul flees, when you is unseemly, both because a great space of time would be are afraid.” Hence in the justification of the ungodly there required for such thought, and because a man could not must be two acts of the free-will—one, whereby it tends obtain the forgiveness of such sins as he had forgotten. to God’s justice; the other whereby it hates sin. Hence for the justification of the ungodly no movement Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to the same virtue to of the free-will is required. seek one contrary and to avoid the other; and hence, as it ∗ Cap., Sunt. plures: Dist. iii, De Poenit. 1174 belongs to charity to love God, so likewise, to detest sin must detest each sin he remembers to have committed, whereby the soul is separated from God. and from this remembrance the soul goes on to have a Reply to Objection 2. A man ought not to return to general movement of detestation with regard to all sins those things that are behind, by loving them; but, for that committed, in which are included such sins as have been matter, he ought to forget them, lest he be drawn to them. forgotten. For a man is then in such a frame of mind that Yet he ought to recall them to mind, in order to detest he would be sorry even for those he does not remember, them; for this is to fly from them. if they were present to his memory; and this movement Reply to Objection 3. Previous to justification a man cooperates in his justification. Whether the remission of sins ought to be reckoned amongst the things required for Ia IIae q. 113 a. 6 justification? Objection 1. It would seem that the remission of sins ungodly is a movement whereby the soul is moved by God ought not to be reckoned amongst the things required for from a state of sin to a state of justice. Now in the move- justification. For the substance of a thing is not reckoned ment whereby one thing is moved by another, three things together with those that are required for a thing; thus a are required: first, the motion of the mover; secondly, the man is not reckoned together with his body and soul. But movement of the moved; thirdly, the consummation of the the justification of the ungodly is itself the remission of movement, or the attainment of the end. On the part of the sins, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore the remission of Divine motion, there is the infusion of grace; on the part of sins ought not to be reckoned among the things required the free-will which is moved, there are two movements— for the justification of the ungodly. of departure from the term “whence,” and of approach to Objection 2. Further, infusion of grace and remis- the term “whereto”; but the consummation of the move- sion of sins are the same; as illumination and expulsion ment or the attainment of the end of the movement is im- of darkness are the same. But a thing ought not to be plied in the remission of sins; for in this is the justification reckoned together with itself; for unity is opposed to mul-of the ungodly completed. titude. Therefore the remission of sins ought not to be Reply to Objection 1. The justification of the ungodly reckoned with the infusion of grace. is called the remission of sins, even as every movement Objection 3. Further, the remission of sin follows as has its species from its term. Nevertheless, many other effect from cause, from the free-will’s movement towards things are required in order to reach the term, as stated God and sin; since it is by faith and contrition that sin is above (a. 5). forgiven. But an effect ought not to be reckoned with its Reply to Objection 2. The infusion of grace and the cause; since things thus enumerated together, and, as it remission of sin may be considered in two ways: first, were, condivided, are by nature simultaneous. Hence the with respect to the substance of the act, and thus they are remission of sins ought not to be reckoned with the things the same; for by the same act God bestows grace and re- required for the justification of the ungodly. mits sin. Secondly, they may be considered on the part of On the contrary, In reckoning what is required for a the objects; and thus they differ by the difference between thing we ought not to pass over the end, which is the chief guilt, which is taken away, and grace, which is infused; part of everything. Now the remission of sins is the end of just as in natural things generation and corruption differ, the justification of the ungodly; for it is written (Is. 27:9): although the generation of one thing is the corruption of “This is all the fruit, that the sin thereof should be taken another. away.” Hence the remission of sins ought to be reckoned Reply to Objection 3. This enumeration is not the amongst the things required for justification. division of a genus into its species, in which the things I answer that, There are four things which are ac- enumerated must be simultaneous; but it is division of the counted to be necessary for the justification of the un- things required for the completion of anything; and in this godly, viz. the infusion of grace, the movement of the enumeration we may have what precedes and what fol- free-will towards God by faith, the movement of the free- lows, since some of the principles and parts of a compos- will towards sin, and the remission of sins. The reason for ite thing may precede and some follow. this is that, as stated above (a. 1), the justification of the 1175 Whether the justification of the ungodly takes place in an instant or successively? Ia IIae q. 113 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the justification of the by grace that free-will is moved and sin is remitted. Now ungodly does not take place in an instant, but successively, the infusion of grace takes place in an instant and without since, as already stated (a. 3), for the justification of the succession. And the reason of this is that if a form be not ungodly, there is required a movement of free-will. Now suddenly impressed upon its subject, it is either because the act of the free-will is choice, which requires the de- that subject is not disposed, or because the agent needs liberation of counsel, as stated above (q. 13, a. 1). Hence, time to dispose the subject. Hence we see that immedi- since deliberation implies a certain reasoning process, and ately the matter is disposed by a preceding alteration, the this implies succession, the justification of the ungodly substantial form accrues to the matter; thus because the would seem to be successive. atmosphere of itself is disposed to receive light, it is sud- Objection 2. Further, the free-will’s movement is not denly illuminated by a body actually luminous. Now it without actual consideration. But it is impossible to un- was stated (q. 112, a. 2) that God, in order to infuse grace derstand many things actually and at once, as stated above into the soul, needs no disposition, save what He Him- ( Ia, q. 85, a. 4). Hence, since for the justification of the self has made. And sometimes this sufficient disposition ungodly there is required a movement of the free-will to- for the reception of grace He makes suddenly, sometimes wards several things, viz. towards God and towards sin, it gradually and successively, as stated above (q. 112, a. 2, would seem impossible for the justification of the ungodly ad 2). For the reason why a natural agent cannot sud- to be in an instant. denly dispose matter is that in the matter there is a re- Objection 3. Further, a form that may be greater or sistant which has some disproportion with the power of less, e.g. blackness or whiteness, is received successively the agent; and hence we see that the stronger the agent, by its subject. Now grace may be greater or less, as stated the more speedily is the matter disposed. Therefore, since above (q. 112, a. 4). Hence it is not received suddenly by the Divine power is infinite, it can suddenly dispose any its subject. Therefore, seeing that the infusion of grace matter whatsoever to its form; and much more man’s free- is required for the justification of the ungodly, it would will, whose movement is by nature instantaneous. There- seem that the justification of the ungodly cannot be in an fore the justification of the ungodly by God takes place in instant. an instant. Objection 4. Further, the free-will’s movement, Reply to Objection 1. The movement of the free-will, which cooperates in justification, is meritorious; and which concurs in the justification of the ungodly, is a con- hence it must proceed from grace, without which there sent to detest sin, and to draw near to God; and this con- is no merit, as we shall state further on (q. 114, a. 2). sent takes place suddenly. Sometimes, indeed, it happens Now a thing receives its form before operating by this that deliberation precedes, yet this is not of the substance form. Hence grace is first infused, and then the free-will is of justification, but a way of justification; as local move- moved towards God and to detest sin. Hence justification ment is a way of illumination, and alteration to generation. is not all at once. Reply to Objection 2. As stated above ( Ia, q. 85, Objection 5. Further, if grace is infused into the soul, a. 5), there is nothing to prevent two things being under-there must be an instant when it first dwells in the soul; stood at once, in so far as they are somehow one; thus we so, too, if sin is forgiven there must be a last instant that understand the subject and predicate together, inasmuch man is in sin. But it cannot be the same instant, otherwise as they are united in the order of one affirmation. And opposites would be in the same simultaneously. Hence in the same manner can the free-will be moved to two they must be two successive instants; between which there things at once in so far as one is ordained to the other. must be time, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vi, 1). There- Now the free-will’s movement towards sin is ordained to fore the justification of the ungodly takes place not all at the free-will’s movement towards God, since a man de- once, but successively. tests sin, as contrary to God, to Whom he wishes to cling. On the contrary, The justification of the ungodly is Hence in the justification of the ungodly the free-will si- caused by the justifying grace of the Holy Spirit. Now the multaneously detests sin and turns to God, even as a body Holy Spirit comes to men’s minds suddenly, according to approaches one point and withdraws from another simul- Acts 2:2: “And suddenly there came a sound from heaven taneously. as of a mighty wind coming,” upon which the gloss says Reply to Objection 3. The reason why a form is not that “the grace of the Holy Ghost knows no tardy efforts.” received instantaneously in the matter is not the fact that Hence the justification of the ungodly is not successive, it can inhere more or less; for thus the light would not be but instantaneous. suddenly received in the air, which can be illumined more I answer that, The entire justification of the ungodly or less. But the reason is to be sought on the part of the consists as to its origin in the infusion of grace. For it is disposition of the matter or subject, as stated above. 1176 Reply to Objection 4. The same instant the form is has the form which is the term of the movement. acquired, the thing begins to operate with the form; as But in those that are above time, it is otherwise. For if fire, the instant it is generated moves upwards, and if its there be any succession of affections or intellectual con- movement was instantaneous, it would be terminated in ceptions in them (as in the angels), such succession is not the same instant. Now to will and not to will—the move- measured by continuous time, but by discrete time, even ments of the free-will—are not successive, but instanta- as the things measured are not continuous, as stated above neous. Hence the justification of the ungodly must not be ( Ia, q. 53, Aa. 2,3). In these, therefore, there is a last in- successive. stant in which the preceding is, and a first instant in which Reply to Objection 5. The succession of opposites the subsequent is. Nor must there be time in between, in the same subject must be looked at differently in the since there is no continuity of time, which this would ne- things that are subject to time and in those that are above cessitate. time. For in those that are in time, there is no last instant in Now the human mind, which is justified, is, in itself, which the previous form inheres in the subject; but there is above time, but is subject to time accidentally, inasmuch the last time, and the first instant that the subsequent form as it understands with continuity and time, with respect inheres in the matter or subject; and this for the reason, to the phantasms in which it considers the intelligible that in time we are not to consider one instant, since nei- species, as stated above ( Ia, q. 85, Aa. 1,2). We must, ther do instants succeed each other immediately in time, therefore, decide from this about its change as regards the nor points in a line, as is proved in Physic. vi, 1. But time condition of temporal movements, i.e. we must say that is terminated by an instant. Hence in the whole of the pre- there is no last instant that sin inheres, but a last time; vious time wherein anything is moving towards its form, whereas there is a first instant that grace inheres; and in it is under the opposite form; but in the last instant of this all the time previous sin inhered. time, which is the first instant of the subsequent time, it Whether the infusion of grace is naturally the first of the things required for the jus-Ia IIae q. 113 a. 8 tification of the ungodly? Objection 1. It would seem that the infusion of grace wards God; the third, the free-will’s movement towards is not what is naturally required first for the justification of sin; the fourth, the remission of sin. the ungodly. For we withdraw from evil before drawing The reason for this is that in every movement the mo- near to good, according to Ps. 33:15: “Turn away from tion of the mover is naturally first; the disposition of the evil, and do good.” Now the remission of sins regards the matter, or the movement of the moved, is second; the end turning away from evil, and the infusion of grace regards or term of the movement in which the motion of the mover the turning to good. Hence the remission of sin is natu- rests, is last. Now the motion of God the Mover is the in- rally before the infusion of grace. fusion of grace, as stated above (a. 6); the movement or Objection 2. Further, the disposition naturally pre- disposition of the moved is the free-will’s double move- cedes the form to which it disposes. Now the free-will’s ment; and the term or end of the movement is the remis- movement is a disposition for the reception of grace. sion of sin, as stated above (a. 6). Hence in their natural Therefore it naturally precedes the infusion of grace. order the first in the justification of the ungodly is the in- Objection 3. Further, sin hinders the soul from tend- fusion of grace; the second is the free-will’s movement to- ing freely to God. Now a hindrance to movement must wards God; the third is the free-will’s movement towards be removed before the movement takes place. Hence the sin, for he who is being justified detests sin because it is remission of sin and the free-will’s movement towards sin against God, and thus the free-will’s movement towards are naturally before the infusion of grace. God naturally precedes the free-will’s movement towards On the contrary, The cause is naturally prior to its sin, since it is its cause and reason; the fourth and last effect. Now the infusion of grace is the cause of whatever is the remission of sin, to which this transmutation is or- is required for the justification of the ungodly, as stated dained as to an end, as stated above (Aa. 1,6). above (a. 7). Therefore it is naturally prior to it. Reply to Objection 1. The withdrawal from one term I answer that, The aforesaid four things required for and approach to another may be looked at in two ways: the justification of the ungodly are simultaneous in time, first, on the part of the thing moved, and thus the with- since the justification of the ungodly is not successive, as drawal from a term naturally precedes the approach to stated above (a. 7); but in the order of nature, one is prior a term, since in the subject of movement the opposite to another; and in their natural order the first is the in- which is put away is prior to the opposite which the sub- fusion of grace; the second, the free-will’s movement to- ject moved attains to by its movement. But on the part of 1177 the agent it is the other way about, since the agent, by the sin and of obtaining of justice. form pre-existing in it, acts for the removal of the oppo- Reply to Objection 2. The disposition of the subject site form; as the sun by its light acts for the removal of precedes the reception of the form, in the order of nature; darkness, and hence on the part of the sun, illumination is yet it follows the action of the agent, whereby the subject prior to the removal of darkness; but on the part of the at- is disposed. And hence the free-will’s movement precedes mosphere to be illuminated, to be freed from darkness is, the reception of grace in the order of nature, and follows in the order of nature, prior to being illuminated, although the infusion of grace. both are simultaneous in time. And since the infusion of Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (Phys. grace and the remission of sin regard God Who justifies, ii, 9), in movements of the soul the movement toward the hence in the order of nature the infusion of grace is prior to speculative principle or the practical end is the very first, the freeing from sin. But if we look at what is on the part but in exterior movements the removal of the impediment of the man justified, it is the other way about, since in the precedes the attainment of the end. And as the free-will’s order of nature the being freed from sin is prior to the ob- movement is a movement of the soul, in the order of na- taining of justifying grace. Or it may be said that the term ture it moves towards God as to its end, before removing “whence” of justification is sin; and the term “whereto” is the impediment of sin. justice; and that grace is the cause of the forgiveness of Whether the justification of the ungodly is God’s greatest work? Ia IIae q. 113 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that the justification of the is made from nothing; secondly, a work may be called ungodly is not God’s greatest work. For it is by the justi- great on account of what is made, and thus the justifica- fication of the ungodly that we attain the grace of a way- tion of the ungodly, which terminates at the eternal good farer. Now by glorification we receive heavenly grace, of a share in the Godhead, is greater than the creation of which is greater. Hence the glorification of angels and heaven and earth, which terminates at the good of mutable men is a greater work than the justification of the ungodly. nature. Hence, Augustine, after saying that “for a just man Objection 2. Further, the justification of the ungodly to be made from a sinner is greater than to create heaven is ordained to the particular good of one man. But the and earth,” adds, “for heaven and earth shall pass away, good of the universe is greater than the good of one man, but the justification of the ungodly shall endure.” as is plain from Ethic. i, 2. Hence the creation of heaven Again, we must bear in mind that a thing is called great and earth is a greater work than the justification of the un- in two ways: first, in an absolute quantity, and thus the gift godly. of glory is greater than the gift of grace that sanctifies the Objection 3. Further, to make something from noth- ungodly; and in this respect the glorification of the just is ing, where there is nought to cooperate with the agent, greater than the justification of the ungodly. Secondly, is greater than to make something with the cooperation a thing may be said to be great in proportionate quan- of the recipient. Now in the work of creation something tity, and thus the gift of grace that justifies the ungodly is is made from nothing, and hence nothing can cooperate greater than the gift of glory that beatifies the just, for the with the agent; but in the justification of the ungodly God gift of grace exceeds the worthiness of the ungodly, who makes something from something, i.e. a just man from are worthy of punishment, more than the gift of glory ex- a sinner, and there is a cooperation on man’s part, since ceeds the worthiness of the just, who by the fact of their there is a movement of the free-will, as stated above (a. 3). justification are worthy of glory. Hence Augustine says: Hence the justification of the ungodly is not God’s great- “Let him that can, judge whether it is greater to create the est work. angels just, than to justify the ungodly. Certainly, if they On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 144:9): “His ten- both betoken equal power, one betokens greater mercy.” der mercies are over all His works,” and in a collect∗ we And thus the reply to the first is clear. say: “O God, Who dost show forth Thine all-mightiness Reply to Objection 2. The good of the universe is most by pardoning and having mercy,” and Augustine, ex- greater than the particular good of one, if we consider both pounding the words, “greater than these shall he do” (Jn. in the same genus. But the good of grace in one is greater 14:12) says that “for a just man to be made from a sinner, than the good of nature in the whole universe. is greater than to create heaven and earth.” Reply to Objection 3. This objection rests on the I answer that, A work may be called great in two manner of acting, in which way creation is God’s great- ways: first, on the part of the mode of action, and thus the est work. work of creation is the greatest work, wherein something ∗ Tenth Sunday after Pentecost 1178 Whether the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work? Ia IIae q. 113 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that the justification of to the likeness of God, it is fit to receive God by grace, as the ungodly is a miraculous work. For miraculous works Augustine says, in the above quotation. are greater than non-miraculous. Now the justification of Thirdly, in miraculous works something is found be- the ungodly is greater than the other miraculous works, as sides the usual and customary order of causing an ef- is clear from the quotation from Augustine (a. 9). Hence fect, as when a sick man suddenly and beyond the wonted the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work. course of healing by nature or art, receives perfect health; Objection 2. Further, the movement of the will in the and thus the justification of the ungodly is sometimes soul is like the natural inclination in natural things. But miraculous and sometimes not. For the common and when God works in natural things against their inclina- wonted course of justification is that God moves the soul tion of their nature, it is a miraculous work, as when He interiorly and that man is converted to God, first by an gave sight to the blind or raised the dead. Now the will imperfect conversion, that it may afterwards become per- of the ungodly is bent on evil. Hence, since God in jus- fect; because “charity begun merits increase, and when tifying a man moves him to good, it would seem that the increased merits perfection,” as Augustine says (In Epist. justification of the ungodly is miraculous. Joan. Tract. v). Yet God sometimes moves the soul so ve- Objection 3. Further, as wisdom is a gift of God, so hemently that it reaches the perfection of justice at once, also is justice. Now it is miraculous that anyone should as took place in the conversion of Paul, which was accom- suddenly obtain wisdom from God without study. There- panied at the same time by a miraculous external prostra- fore it is miraculous that the ungodly should be justified tion. Hence the conversion of Paul is commemorated in by God. the Church as miraculous. On the contrary, Miraculous works are beyond natu- Reply to Objection 1. Certain miraculous works, al- ral power. Now the justification of the ungodly is not be- though they are less than the justification of the ungodly, yond natural power; for Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. as regards the good caused, are beyond the wonted order v) that “to be capable of having faith and to be capable of of such effects, and thus have more of the nature of a mir- having charity belongs to man’s nature; but to have faith acle. and charity belongs to the grace of the faithful.” Therefore Reply to Objection 2. It is not a miraculous work, the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous. whenever a natural thing is moved contrary to its incli- I answer that, In miraculous works it is usual to find nation, otherwise it would be miraculous for water to be three things: the first is on the part of the active power, be- heated, or for a stone to be thrown upwards; but only cause they can only be performed by Divine power; and whenever this takes place beyond the order of the proper they are simply wondrous, since their cause is hidden, as cause, which naturally does this. Now no other cause save stated above ( Ia, q. 105, a. 7). And thus both the justifi- God can justify the ungodly, even as nothing save fire can cation of the ungodly and the creation of the world, and, heat water. Hence the justification of the ungodly by God generally speaking, every work that can be done by God is not miraculous in this respect. alone, is miraculous. Reply to Objection 3. A man naturally acquires wis- Secondly, in certain miraculous works it is found that dom and knowledge from God by his own talent and the form introduced is beyond the natural power of such study. Hence it is miraculous when a man is made wise or matter, as in the resurrection of the dead, life is above the learned outside this order. But a man does not naturally natural power of such a body. And thus the justification acquire justifying grace by his own action, but by God’s. of the ungodly is not miraculous, because the soul is nat- Hence there is no parity. urally capable of grace; since from its having been made 1179 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 114 Of Merit (In Ten Articles) We must now consider merit, which is the effect of cooperating grace; and under this head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether a man can merit anything from God? (2) Whether without grace anyone can merit eternal life? (3) Whether anyone with grace may merit eternal life condignly? (4) Whether it is chiefly through the instrumentality of charity that grace is the principle of merit? (5) Whether a man may merit the first grace for himself? (6) Whether he may merit it for someone else? (7) Whether anyone can merit restoration after sin? (8) Whether he can merit for himself an increase of grace or charity? (9) Whether he can merit final perseverance? (10) Whether temporal goods fall under merit? Whether a man may merit anything from God? Ia IIae q. 114 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that a man can merit noth- tween those that are simply equal; but where there is no ing from God. For no one, it would seem, merits by giv- absolute equality between them, neither is there absolute ing another his due. But by all the good we do, we cannot justice, but there may be a certain manner of justice, as make sufficient return to God, since yet more is His due, when we speak of a father’s or a master’s right (Ethic. v, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14). Hence it 6), as the Philosopher says. And hence where there is jus- is written (Lk. 17:10): “When you have done all these tice simply, there is the character of merit and reward sim- things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable ply. But where there is no simple right, but only relative, servants; we have done that which we ought to do.” There- there is no character of merit simply, but only relatively, fore a man can merit nothing from God. in so far as the character of justice is found there, since the Objection 2. Further, it would seem that a man mer-child merits something from his father and the slave from its nothing from God, by what profits himself only, and his lord. profits God nothing. Now by acting well, a man prof- Now it is clear that between God and man there is the its himself or another man, but not God, for it is written greatest inequality: for they are infinitely apart, and all (Job 35:7): “If thou do justly, what shalt thou give Him, man’s good is from God. Hence there can be no justice of or what shall He receive of thy hand.” Hence a man can absolute equality between man and God, but only of a cer- merit nothing from God. tain proportion, inasmuch as both operate after their own Objection 3. Further, whoever merits anything from manner. Now the manner and measure of human virtue another makes him his debtor; for a man’s wage is a debt is in man from God. Hence man’s merit with God only due to him. Now God is no one’s debtor; hence it is writ- exists on the presupposition of the Divine ordination, so ten (Rom. 11:35): “Who hath first given to Him, and rec- that man obtains from God, as a reward of his operation, ompense shall be made to him?” Hence no one can merit what God gave him the power of operation for, even as anything from God. natural things by their proper movements and operations On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 31:16): “There is obtain that to which they were ordained by God; differ- a reward for thy work.” Now a reward means something ently, indeed, since the rational creature moves itself to bestowed by reason of merit. Hence it would seem that a act by its free-will, hence its action has the character of man may merit from God. merit, which is not so in other creatures. I answer that, Merit and reward refer to the same, Reply to Objection 1. Man merits, inasmuch as he for a reward means something given anyone in return for does what he ought, by his free-will; otherwise the act of work or toil, as a price for it. Hence, as it is an act of jus- justice whereby anyone discharges a debt would not be tice to give a just price for anything received from another, meritorious. so also is it an act of justice to make a return for work or Reply to Objection 2. God seeks from our goods not toil. Now justice is a kind of equality, as is clear from the profit, but glory, i.e. the manifestation of His goodness; Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3), and hence justice is simply be- even as He seeks it also in His own works. Now nothing 1180 accrues to Him, but only to ourselves, by our worship of acter of merit, only on the presupposition of the Divine Him. Hence we merit from God, not that by our works ordination, it does not follow that God is made our debtor anything accrues to Him, but inasmuch as we work for simply, but His own, inasmuch as it is right that His will His glory. should be carried out. Reply to Objection 3. Since our action has the char- Whether anyone without grace can merit eternal life? Ia IIae q. 114 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that without grace anyone seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of can merit eternal life. For man merits from God what he is man.” And hence it is that no created nature is a sufficient divinely ordained to, as stated above (a. 1). Now man by principle of an act meritorious of eternal life, unless there his nature is ordained to beatitude as his end; hence, too, is added a supernatural gift, which we call grace. But if he naturally wishes to be blessed. Hence man by his nat- we speak of man as existing in sin, a second reason is ural endowments and without grace can merit beatitude added to this, viz. the impediment of sin. For since sin is which is eternal life. an offense against God, excluding us from eternal life, as Objection 2. Further, the less a work is due, the more is clear from what has been said above (q. 71, a. 6; q. 113, meritorious it is. Now, less due is that work which is done a. 2), no one existing in a state of mortal sin can merit by one who has received fewer benefits. Hence, since he eternal life unless first he be reconciled to God, through who has only natural endowments has received fewer gifts his sin being forgiven, which is brought about by grace. from God, than he who has gratuitous gifts as well as na- For the sinner deserves not life, but death, according to ture, it would seem that his works are more meritorious Rom. 6:23: “The wages of sin is death.” with God. And thus if he who has grace can merit eternal Reply to Objection 1. God ordained human nature life to some extent, much more may he who has no grace. to attain the end of eternal life, not by its own strength, Objection 3. Further, God’s mercy and liberality in- but by the help of grace; and in this way its act can be finitely surpass human mercy and liberality. Now a man meritorious of eternal life. may merit from another, even though he has not hitherto Reply to Objection 2. Without grace a man cannot had his grace. Much more, therefore, would it seem that a have a work equal to a work proceeding from grace, since man without grace may merit eternal life. the more perfect the principle, the more perfect the ac- On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 6:23): tion. But the objection would hold good, if we supposed “The grace of God, life everlasting.” the operations equal in both cases. I answer that, Man without grace may be looked at in Reply to Objection 3. With regard to the first reason two states, as was said above (q. 109, a. 2): the first, a state adduced, the case is different in God and in man. For a of perfect nature, in which Adam was before his sin; the man receives all his power of well-doing from God, and second, a state of corrupt nature, in which we are before not from man. Hence a man can merit nothing from God being restored by grace. Therefore, if we speak of man except by His gift, which the Apostle expresses aptly say- in the first state, there is only one reason why man can- ing (Rom. 11:35): “Who hath first given to Him, and not merit eternal life without grace, by his purely natural recompense shall be made to him?” But man may merit endowments, viz. because man’s merit depends on the Di- from man, before he has received anything from him, by vine pre-ordination. Now no act of anything whatsoever what he has received from God. is divinely ordained to anything exceeding the proportion But as regards the second proof taken from the im- of the powers which are the principles of its act; for it is pediment of sin, the case is similar with man and God, a law of Divine providence that nothing shall act beyond since one man cannot merit from another whom he has its powers. Now everlasting life is a good exceeding the offended, unless he makes satisfaction to him and is rec- proportion of created nature; since it exceeds its knowl- onciled. edge and desire, according to 1 Cor. 2:9: “Eye hath not Whether a man in grace can merit eternal life condignly? Ia IIae q. 114 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that a man in grace cannot ferings of the saints would seem the most meritorious. merit eternal life condignly, for the Apostle says (Rom. Therefore no works of men are meritorious of eternal life 8:18): “The sufferings of this time are not worthy [condig- condignly. nae] to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be Objection 2. Further, on Rom. 6:23, “The grace of revealed in us.” But of all meritorious works, the suf- God, life everlasting,” a gloss says: “He might have truly 1181 said: ‘The wages of justice, life everlasting’; but He pre-for it would seem congruous that, if a man does what he ferred to say ‘The grace of God, life everlasting,’ that we can, God should reward him according to the excellence may know that God leads us to life everlasting of His own of his power. mercy and not by our merits.” Now when anyone merits If, however, we speak of a meritorious work, inasmuch something condignly he receives it not from mercy, but as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Ghost moving from merit. Hence it would seem that a man with grace us to life everlasting, it is meritorious of life everlasting cannot merit life everlasting condignly. condignly. For thus the value of its merit depends upon Objection 3. Further, merit that equals the reward, the power of the Holy Ghost moving us to life everlasting would seem to be condign. Now no act of the present life according to Jn. 4:14: “Shall become in him a fount of can equal everlasting life, which surpasses our knowledge water springing up into life everlasting.” And the worth of and our desire, and moreover, surpasses the charity or love the work depends on the dignity of grace, whereby a man, of the wayfarer, even as it exceeds nature. Therefore with being made a partaker of the Divine Nature, is adopted as grace a man cannot merit eternal life condignly. a son of God, to whom the inheritance is due by right of On the contrary, What is granted in accordance with adoption, according to Rom. 8:17: “If sons, heirs also.” a fair judgment, would seem a condign reward. But life Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle is speaking of the everlasting is granted by God, in accordance with the substance of these sufferings. judgment of justice, according to 2 Tim. 4:8: “As to the Reply to Objection 2. This saying is to be under- rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the stood of the first cause of our reaching everlasting life, Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day.” There- viz. God’s mercy. But our merit is a subsequent cause. fore man merits everlasting life condignly. Reply to Objection 3. The grace of the Holy Ghost I answer that, Man’s meritorious work may be con- which we have at present, although unequal to glory in sidered in two ways: first, as it proceeds from free-will; act, is equal to it virtually as the seed of a tree, wherein secondly, as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Ghost. the whole tree is virtually. So likewise by grace of the If it is considered as regards the substance of the work, Holy Ghost dwells in man; and He is a sufficient cause and inasmuch as it springs from the free-will, there can of life everlasting; hence, 2 Cor. 1:22, He is called the be no condignity because of the very great inequality. But “pledge” of our inheritance. there is congruity, on account of an equality of proportion: Whether grace is the principle of merit through charity rather than the other virtues? Ia IIae q. 114 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that grace is not the prin- him and will manifest Myself to him.” Now everlasting ciple of merit through charity rather than the other virtues. life consists in the manifest knowledge of God, accord- For wages are due to work, according to Mat. 20:8: “Call ing to Jn. 17:3: “This is eternal life: that they may know the laborers and pay them their hire.” Now every virtue is Thee, the only true” and living “God.” Hence the merit of a principle of some operation, since virtue is an operative eternal life rests chiefly with charity. habit, as stated above (q. 55, a. 2). Hence every virtue is I answer that, As we may gather from what has been equally a principle of merit. stated above (a. 1), human acts have the nature of merit Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:8): from two causes: first and chiefly from the Divine ordina- “Every man shall receive his own reward according to his tion, inasmuch as acts are said to merit that good to which labor.” Now charity lessens rather than increases the la- man is divinely ordained. Secondly, on the part of free- bor, because as Augustine says (De Verbis Dom., Serm. will, inasmuch as man, more than other creatures, has the lxx), “love makes all hard and repulsive tasks easy and power of voluntary acts by acting by himself. And in both next to nothing.” Hence charity is no greater principle of these ways does merit chiefly rest with charity. For we merit than any other virtue. must bear in mind that everlasting life consists in the en- Objection 3. Further, the greatest principle of merit joyment of God. Now the human mind’s movement to would seem to be the one whose acts are most meritori- the fruition of the Divine good is the proper act of char- ous. But the acts of faith and patience or fortitude would ity, whereby all the acts of the other virtues are ordained seem to be the most meritorious, as appears in the mar- to this end, since all the other virtues are commanded by tyrs, who strove for the faith patiently and bravely even charity. Hence the merit of life everlasting pertains first till death. Hence other virtues are a greater principle of to charity, and secondly, to the other virtues, inasmuch merit than charity. as their acts are commanded by charity. So, likewise, is it On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 14:21): “He that manifest that what we do out of love we do most willingly. loveth Me, shall be loved of My Father; and I will love Hence, even inasmuch as merit depends on voluntariness, 1182 merit is chiefly attributed to charity. things, if it exists,” as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxx). Reply to Objection 1. Charity, inasmuch as it has the Secondly, from the defect of the operator; for what is not last end for object, moves the other virtues to act. For done with a ready will is hard and difficult to all of us, and the habit to which the end pertains always commands the this toil lessens merit and is removed by charity. habits to which the means pertain, as was said above (q. 9, Reply to Objection 3. The act of faith is not merito- a. 1). rious unless “faith. . . worketh by charity” (Gal. 5:6). So, Reply to Objection 2. A work can be toilsome and too, the acts of patience and fortitude are not meritorious difficult in two ways: first, from the greatness of the work, unless a man does them out of charity, according to 1 Cor. and thus the greatness of the work pertains to the increase 13:3: “If I should deliver my body to be burned, and have of merit; and thus charity does not lessen the toil—rather, not charity, it profiteth me nothing.” it makes us undertake the greatest toils, “for it does great Whether a man may merit for himself the first grace? Ia IIae q. 114 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that a man may merit for ing grace, viz. sin. But when anyone has grace, the grace himself the first grace, because, as Augustine says (Ep. already possessed cannot come under merit, since reward clxxxvi), “faith merits justification.” Now a man is justi- is the term of the work, but grace is the principle of all fied by the first grace. Therefore a man may merit the first our good works, as stated above (q. 109). But of anyone grace. merits a further gratuitous gift by virtue of the preceding Objection 2. Further, God gives grace only to the wor- grace, it would not be the first grace. Hence it is manifest thy. Now, no one is said to be worthy of some good, unless that no one can merit for himself the first grace. he has merited it condignly. Therefore we may merit the Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (Retract. i, first grace condignly. 23), he was deceived on this point for a time, believing Objection 3. Further, with men we may merit a gift the beginning of faith to be from us, and its consumma- already received. Thus if a man receives a horse from his tion to be granted us by God; and this he here retracts. master, he merits it by a good use of it in his master’s ser- And seemingly it is in this sense that he speaks of faith vice. Now God is much more bountiful than man. Much as meriting justification. But if we suppose, as indeed it more, therefore, may a man, by subsequent works, merit is a truth of faith, that the beginning of faith is in us from the first grace already received from God. God, the first act must flow from grace; and thus it cannot On the contrary, The nature of grace is repugnant be meritorious of the first grace. Therefore man is jus- to reward of works, according to Rom. 4:4: “Now to tified by faith, not as though man, by believing, were to him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according merit justification, but that, he believes, whilst he is being to grace but according to debt.” Now a man merits what justified; inasmuch as a movement of faith is required for is reckoned to him according to debt, as the reward of his the justification of the ungodly, as stated above (q. 113, works. Hence a man may not merit the first grace. a. 4). I answer that, The gift of grace may be considered in Reply to Objection 2. God gives grace to none but two ways: first in the nature of a gratuitous gift, and thus to the worthy, not that they were previously worthy, but it is manifest that all merit is repugnant to grace, since as that by His grace He makes them worthy, Who alone “can the Apostle says (Rom. 11:6), “if by grace, it is not now make him clean that is conceived of unclean seed” (Job by works.” Secondly, it may be considered as regards the 14:4). nature of the thing given, and thus, also, it cannot come Reply to Objection 3. Man’s every good work pro- under the merit of him who has not grace, both because it ceeds from the first grace as from its principle; but not exceeds the proportion of nature, and because previous to from any gift of man. Consequently, there is no compari- grace a man in the state of sin has an obstacle to his merit- son between gifts of grace and gifts of men. Whether a man can merit the first grace for another? Ia IIae q. 114 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that a man can merit the Now inward healing is brought about by grace. Hence a first grace for another. Because on Mat. 9:2: “Jesus seeing man can merit the first grace for another. their faith,” etc. a gloss says: “How much is our personal Objection 2. Further, the prayers of the just are not faith worth with God, Who set such a price on another’s void, but efficacious, according to James 5:16: “The con- faith, as to heal the man both inwardly and outwardly!” tinued prayer of a just man availeth much.” Now he had 1183 previously said: “Pray one for another, that you may be glory of life everlasting, but so as to lead others to it, inas-saved.” Hence, since man’s salvation can only be brought much as He is the Head of the Church, and the Author about by grace, it seems that one man may merit for an- of human salvation, according to Heb. 2:10: “Who hath other his first grace. brought many children into glory [to perfect] the Author Objection 3. Further, it is written (Lk. 16:9): of their salvation.” “Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that But one may merit the first grace for another congru- when you shall fail they may receive you into everlasting ously; because a man in grace fulfils God’s will, and it dwellings.” Now it is through grace alone that anyone is is congruous and in harmony with friendship that God received into everlasting dwellings, for by it alone does should fulfil man’s desire for the salvation of another, al- anyone merit everlasting life as stated above (a. 2; q. 109, though sometimes there may be an impediment on the part a. 5). Hence one man may by merit obtain for another his of him whose salvation the just man desires. And it is in first grace. this sense that the passage from Jeremias speaks. On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 15:1): “If Moses Reply to Objection 1. A man’s faith avails for an- and Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is not towards other’s salvation by congruous and not by condign merit. this people” —yet they had great merit with God. Hence Reply to Objection 2. The impetration of prayer rests it seems that no one can merit the first grace for another. on mercy, whereas condign merit rests on justice; hence I answer that, As shown above (Aa. 1,3,4), our works a man may impetrate many things from the Divine mercy are meritorious from two causes: first, by virtue of the in prayer, which he does not merit in justice, according Divine motion; and thus we merit condignly; secondly, to Dan. 9:18: “For it is not for our justifications that we according as they proceed from free-will in so far as we present our prayers before Thy face, but for the multitude do them willingly, and thus they have congruous merit, of Thy tender mercies.” since it is congruous that when a man makes good use of Reply to Objection 3. The poor who receive alms his power God should by His super-excellent power work are said to receive others into everlasting dwellings, either still higher things. And therefore it is clear that no one by impetrating their forgiveness in prayer, or by meriting can merit condignly for another his first grace, save Christ congruously by other good works, or materially speaking, alone; since each one of us is moved by God to reach life inasmuch as by these good works of mercy, exercised to- everlasting through the gift of grace; hence condign merit wards the poor, we merit to be received into everlasting does not reach beyond this motion. But Christ’s soul is dwellings. moved by God through grace, not only so as to reach the Whether a man may merit restoration after a fall? Ia IIae q. 114 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that anyone may merit remembered.” Therefore his previous merits will nowise for himself restoration after a fall. For what a man may help him to rise again. Hence no one can merit for himself justly ask of God, he may justly merit. Now nothing may restoration after a fall. more justly be besought of God than to be restored after I answer that, No one can merit for himself restora- a fall, as Augustine says∗, according to Ps. 70:9: “When tion after a future fall, either condignly or congruously. my strength shall fail, do not Thou forsake me.” Hence a He cannot merit for himself condignly, since the reason man may merit to be restored after a fall. of this merit depends on the motion of Divine grace, and Objection 2. Further, a man’s works benefit himself this motion is interrupted by the subsequent sin; hence all more than another. Now a man may, to some extent, merit benefits which he afterwards obtains from God, whereby for another his restoration after a fall, even as his first he is restored, do not fall under merit—the motion of the grace. Much more, therefore, may he merit for himself preceding grace not extending to them. Again, congru- restoration after a fall. ous merit, whereby one merits the first grace for another, Objection 3. Further, when a man is once in grace he is prevented from having its effect on account of the im- merits life everlasting by the good works he does, as was pediment of sin in the one for whom it is merited. Much shown above (a. 2; q. 109, a. 5). Now no one can attain more, therefore, is the efficacy of such merit impeded by life everlasting unless he is restored by grace. Hence it the obstacle which is in him who merits, and in him for would seem that he merits for himself restoration. whom it is merited; for both these are in the same per- On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:24): “If the son. And therefore a man can nowise merit for himself just man turn himself away from his justice and do in- restoration after a fall. iquity. . . all his justices which he hath done shall not be Reply to Objection 1. The desire whereby we seek ∗ Cf. Ennar. i super Ps. lxx. 1184 for restoration after a fall is called just, and likewise the “absolutely” merits life everlasting except by the act of fi- prayer whereby this restoration is besought is called just, nal grace, but only “conditionally,” i.e. if he perseveres. because it tends to justice; and not that it depends on jus- But it is unreasonable to say this, for sometimes the act of tice by way of merit, but only on mercy. the last grace is not more, but less meritorious than pre- Reply to Objection 2. Anyone may congruously ceding acts, on account of the prostration of illness. Hence merit for another his first grace, because there is no im- it must be said that every act of charity merits eternal life pediment (at least, on the part of him who merits), such as absolutely; but by subsequent sin, there arises an impedi- is found when anyone recedes from justice after the merit ment to the preceding merit, so that it does not obtain its of grace. effect; just as natural causes fail of their effects on account Reply to Objection 3. Some have said that no one of a supervening impediment. Whether a man may merit the increase of grace or charity? Ia IIae q. 114 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that a man cannot merit increased merits to be perfected.” Hence the increase of an increase of grace or charity. For when anyone receives grace or charity falls under merit. the reward he merited no other reward is due to him; thus I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 6,7), whatever it was said of some (Mat. 6:2): “They have received their the motion of grace reaches to, falls under condign merit. reward.” Hence, if anyone were to merit the increase of Now the motion of a mover extends not merely to the last charity or grace, it would follow that, when his grace has term of the movement, but to the whole progress of the been increased, he could not expect any further reward, movement. But the term of the movement of grace is eter- which is unfitting. nal life; and progress in this movement is by the increase Objection 2. Further, nothing acts beyond its species. of charity or grace according to Prov. 4:18: “But the path But the principle of merit is grace or charity, as was shown of the just as a shining light, goeth forward and increaseth above (Aa. 2, 4). Therefore no one can merit greater grace even to perfect day,” which is the day of glory. And thus or charity than he has. the increase of grace falls under condign merit. Objection 3. Further, what falls under merit a man Reply to Objection 1. Reward is the term of merit. merits by every act flowing from grace or charity, as by But there is a double term of movement, viz. the last, and every such act a man merits life everlasting. If, therefore, the intermediate, which is both beginning and term; and the increase of grace or charity falls under merit, it would this term is the reward of increase. Now the reward of hu- seem that by every act quickened by charity a man would man favor is as the last end to those who place their end merit an increase of charity. But what a man merits, he in it; hence such as these receive no other reward. infallibly receives from God, unless hindered by subse- Reply to Objection 2. The increase of grace is not quent sin; for it is written (2 Tim. 1:12): “I know Whom above the virtuality of the pre-existing grace, although it I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to keep is above its quantity, even as a tree is not above the virtu- that which I have committed unto Him.” Hence it would ality of the seed, although above its quantity. follow that grace or charity is increased by every merito- Reply to Objection 3. By every meritorious act a man rious act; and this would seem impossible since at times merits the increase of grace, equally with the consumma- meritorious acts are not very fervent, and would not suf- tion of grace which is eternal life. But just as eternal life fice for the increase of charity. Therefore the increase of is not given at once, but in its own time, so neither is grace charity does not come under merit. increased at once, but in its own time, viz. when a man is On the contrary, Augustine says (super Ep. Joan.; sufficiently disposed for the increase of grace. cf. Ep. clxxxvi) that “charity merits increase, and being Whether a man may merit perseverance? Ia IIae q. 114 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that anyone may merit whoever has grace. perseverance. For what a man obtains by asking, can Objection 2. Further, it is more not to be able to sin come under the merit of anyone that is in grace. Now than not to sin. But not to be able to sin comes under men obtain perseverance by asking it of God; otherwise merit, for we merit eternal life, of which impeccability is it would be useless to ask it of God in the petitions of an essential part. Much more, therefore, may we merit not the Lord’s Prayer, as Augustine says (De Dono Persev. to sin, i.e. to persevere. ii). Therefore perseverance may come under the merit of Objection 3. Further, increase of grace is greater than 1185 perseverance in the grace we already possess. But a man that the perseverance of glory which is the term of the may merit an increase of grace, as was stated above (a. 8). aforesaid movement falls under merit; but perseverance Much more, therefore, may he merit perseverance in the of the wayfarer does not fall under merit, since it depends grace he has already. solely on the Divine motion, which is the principle of all On the contrary, What we merit, we obtain from merit. Now God freely bestows the good of perseverance, God, unless it is hindered by sin. Now many have mer- on whomsoever He bestows it. itorious works, who do not obtain perseverance; nor can it Reply to Objection 1. We impetrate in prayer things be urged that this takes place because of the impediment that we do not merit, since God hears sinners who beseech of sin, since sin itself is opposed to perseverance; and thus the pardon of their sins, which they do not merit, as ap- if anyone were to merit perseverance, God would not per- pears from Augustine∗ on Jn. 11:31, “Now we know that mit him to fall into sin. Hence perseverance does not come God doth not hear sinners,” otherwise it would have been under merit. useless for the publican to say: “O God, be merciful to I answer that, Since man’s free-will is naturally flex- me a sinner,” Lk. 18:13. So too may we impetrate of God ible towards good and evil, there are two ways of ob- in prayer the grace of perseverance either for ourselves or taining from God perseverance in good: first, inasmuch for others, although it does not fall under merit. as free-will is determined to good by consummate grace, Reply to Objection 2. The perseverance which is in which will be in glory; secondly, on the part of the Di- heaven is compared as term to the free-will’s movement; vine motion, which inclines man to good unto the end. not so, the perseverance of the wayfarer, for the reason Now as explained above (Aa. 6,7,8), that which is related given in the body of the article. as a term to the free-will’s movement directed to God the In the same way may we answer the third objection mover, falls under human merit; and not what is related which concerns the increase of grace, as was explained to the aforesaid movement as principle. Hence it is clear above. Whether temporal goods fall under merit? Ia IIae q. 114 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that temporal goods fall does not come upon all alike. But temporal goods regard under merit. For what is promised to some as a reward the good and the wicked alike; according to Eccles. 9:2: of justice, falls under merit. Now, temporal goods were “All things equally happen to the just and the wicked, to promised in the Old Law as the reward of justice, as ap- the good and to the evil, to the clean and to the unclean, to pears from Dt. 28. Hence it seems that temporal goods him that offereth victims and to him that despiseth sacri- fall under merit. fices.” Therefore temporal goods do not fall under merit. Objection 2. Further, that would seem to fall under I answer that, What falls under merit is the reward merit, which God bestows on anyone for a service done. or wage, which is a kind of good. Now man’s good is But God sometimes bestows temporal goods on men for twofold: the first, simply; the second, relatively. Now services done for Him. For it is written (Ex. 1:21): “And man’s good simply is his last end (according to Ps. 72:27: because the midwives feared God, He built them houses”; “But it is good for men to adhere to my God”) and conse- on which a gloss of Gregory (Moral. xviii, 4) says that quently what is ordained and leads to this end; and these “life everlasting might have been awarded them as the fall simply under merit. But the relative, not the simple, fruit of their goodwill, but on account of their sin of false- good of man is what is good to him now, or what is a good hood they received an earthly reward.” And it is writ- to him relatively; and this does not fall under merit simply, ten (Ezech. 29:18): “The King of Babylon hath made but relatively. his army to undergo hard service against Tyre. . . and there Hence we must say that if temporal goods are consid- hath been no reward given him,” and further on: “And it ered as they are useful for virtuous works, whereby we are shall be wages for his army. . . I have given him the land led to heaven, they fall directly and simply under merit, of Egypt because he hath labored for me.” Therefore tem- even as increase of grace, and everything whereby a man poral goods fall under merit. is helped to attain beatitude after the first grace. For God Objection 3. Further, as good is to merit so is evil to gives men, both just and wicked, enough temporal goods demerit. But on account of the demerit of sin some are to enable them to attain to everlasting life; and thus these punished by God with temporal punishments, as appears temporal goods are simply good. Hence it is written (Ps. from the Sodomites, Gn. 19. Hence temporal goods fall 33:10): “For there is no want to them that fear Him,” and under merit. again, Ps. 36:25: “I have not seen the just forsaken,” etc. Objection 4. On the contrary, What falls under merit But if these temporal goods are considered in them- ∗ Tract. xliv in Joan. 1186 selves, they are not man’s good simply, but relatively, tion, and not in relation to the malice of their wills, es-and thus they do not fall under merit simply, but rela- pecially as regards the King of Babylon, since he did not tively, inasmuch as men are moved by God to do tem- besiege Tyre as if wishing to serve God, but rather in order poral works, in which with God’s help they reach their to usurp dominion. So, too, although the midwives had a purpose. And thus as life everlasting is simply the reward good will with regard to saving the children, yet their will of the works of justice in relation to the Divine motion, as was not right, inasmuch as they framed falsehoods. stated above (Aa. 3,6), so have temporal goods, consid- Reply to Objection 3. Temporal evils are imposed ered in themselves, the nature of reward, with respect to as a punishment on the wicked, inasmuch as they are not the Divine motion, whereby men’s wills are moved to un- thereby helped to reach life everlasting. But to the just dertake these works, even though, sometimes, men have who are aided by these evils they are not punishments but not a right intention in them. medicines as stated above (q. 87, a. 8). Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (Contra Reply to Objection 4. All things happen equally to Faust. iv, 2), “in these temporal promises were figures the good and the wicked, as regards the substance of tem- of spiritual things to come. For the carnal people were ad- poral good or evil; but not as regards the end, since the hering to the promises of the present life; and not merely good and not the wicked are led to beatitude by them. their speech but even their life was prophetic.” And now enough has been said regarding morals in Reply to Objection 2. These rewards are said to have general. been divinely brought about in relation to the Divine mo- 1187 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 1 Of Faith (In Ten Articles) Having to treat now of the theological virtues, we shall begin with Faith, secondly we shall speak of Hope, and thirdly, of Charity. The treatise on Faith will be fourfold: (1) Of faith itself; (2) Of the corresponding gifts, knowledge and understanding; (3) Of the opposite vices; (4) Of the precepts pertaining to this virtue. About faith itself we shall consider: (1) its object; (2) its act; (3) the habit of faith. Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether the object of faith is the First Truth? (2) Whether the object of faith is something complex or incomplex, i.e. whether it is a thing or a proposition? (3) Whether anything false can come under faith? (4) Whether the object of faith can be anything seen? (5) Whether it can be anything known? (6) Whether the things to be believed should be divided into a certain number of articles? (7) Whether the same articles are of faith for all times? (8) Of the number of articles; (9) Of the manner of embodying the articles in a symbol; (10) Who has the right to propose a symbol of faith? Whether the object of faith is the First Truth? IIa IIae q. 1 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the object of faith is I answer that, The object of every cognitive habit in- not the First Truth. For it seems that the object of faith is cludes two things: first, that which is known materially, that which is proposed to us to be believed. Now not only and is the material object, so to speak, and, secondly, that things pertaining to the Godhead, i.e. the First Truth, are whereby it is known, which is the formal aspect of the ob- proposed to us to be believed, but also things concerning ject. Thus in the science of geometry, the conclusions are Christ’s human nature, and the sacraments of the Church, what is known materially, while the formal aspect of the and the condition of creatures. Therefore the object of science is the mean of demonstration, through which the faith is not only the First Truth. conclusions are known. Objection 2. Further, faith and unbelief have the same Accordingly if we consider, in faith, the formal as- object since they are opposed to one another. Now unbe- pect of the object, it is nothing else than the First Truth. lief can be about all things contained in Holy Writ, for For the faith of which we are speaking, does not assent whichever one of them a man denies, he is considered an to anything, except because it is revealed by God. Hence unbeliever. Therefore faith also is about all things con- the mean on which faith is based is the Divine Truth. If, tained in Holy Writ. But there are many things therein, however, we consider materially the things to which faith concerning man and other creatures. Therefore the object assents, they include not only God, but also many other of faith is not only the First Truth, but also created truth. things, which, nevertheless, do not come under the as- Objection 3. Further, faith is condivided with charity, sent of faith, except as bearing some relation to God, in as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 62, a. 3). Now by charity we as much as, to wit, through certain effects of the Divine love not only God, who is the sovereign Good, but also operation, man is helped on his journey towards the en- our neighbor. Therefore the object of Faith is not only the joyment of God. Consequently from this point of view First Truth. also the object of faith is, in a way, the First Truth, in as On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that much as nothing comes under faith except in relation to “faith is about the simple and everlasting truth.” Now this God, even as the object of the medical art is health, for it is the First Truth. Therefore the object of faith is the First considers nothing save in relation to health. Truth. Reply to Objection 1. Things concerning Christ’s 1188 human nature, and the sacraments of the Church, or any regards all things contained in Holy Writ. creatures whatever, come under faith, in so far as by them Reply to Objection 3. Charity also loves our neighbor we are directed to God, and in as much as we assent to on account of God, so that its object, properly speaking, them on account of the Divine Truth. is God, as we shall show further on (q. 25 , a. 1). The same answer applies to the Second Objection, as Whether the object of faith is something complex, by way of a proposition? IIa IIae q. 1 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the object of faith is hand, the Divine intellect knows, without any complexity, not something complex by way of a proposition. For the things that are complex in themselves. object of faith is the First Truth, as stated above (a. 1). Accordingly the object of faith may be considered in Now the First Truth is something simple. Therefore the two ways. First, as regards the thing itself which is be- object of faith is not something complex. lieved, and thus the object of faith is something simple, Objection 2. Further, the exposition of faith is con- namely the thing itself about which we have faith. Sec- tained in the symbol. Now the symbol does not con- ondly, on the part of the believer, and in this respect the tain propositions, but things: for it is not stated therein object of faith is something complex by way of a proposi- that God is almighty, but: “I believe in God. . . almighty.” tion. Therefore the object of faith is not a proposition but a Hence in the past both opinions have been held with a thing. certain amount of truth. Objection 3. Further, faith is succeeded by vision, ac- Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers the cording to 1 Cor. 13:12: “We see now through a glass in object of faith on the part of the thing believed. a dark manner; but then face to face. Now I know in part; Reply to Objection 2. The symbol mentions the but then I shall know even as I am known.” But the ob- things about which faith is, in so far as the act of the be- ject of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is liever is terminated in them, as is evident from the manner the Divine Essence. Therefore the faith of the wayfarer is of speaking about them. Now the act of the believer does also. not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For as in On the contrary, Faith is a mean between science and science we do not form propositions, except in order to opinion. Now the mean is in the same genus as the ex- have knowledge about things through their means, so is it tremes. Since, then, science and opinion are about propo- in faith. sitions, it seems that faith is likewise about propositions; Reply to Objection 3. The object of the heavenly vi- so that its object is something complex. sion will be the First Truth seen in itself, according to 1 I answer that, The thing known is in the knower ac- Jn. 3:2: “We know that when He shall appear, we shall be cording to the mode of the knower. Now the mode proper like to Him: because we shall see Him as He is”: hence to the human intellect is to know the truth by synthesis that vision will not be by way of a proposition but by way and analysis, as stated in the Ia, q. 85, a. 5. Hence things of a simple understanding. On the other hand, by faith, we that are simple in themselves, are known by the intellect do not apprehend the First Truth as it is in itself. Hence with a certain amount of complexity, just as on the other the comparison fails. Whether anything false can come under faith? IIa IIae q. 1 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that something false can that He did, so that what Abraham believed about Christ come under faith. For faith is condivided with hope and would have been false. Therefore the object of faith can charity. Now something false can come under hope, since be something false. many hope to have eternal life, who will not obtain it. The Objection 3. Further, the ancients believed in the fu- same may be said of charity, for many are loved as being ture birth of Christ, and many continued so to believe, un- good, who, nevertheless, are not good. Therefore some- til they heard the preaching of the Gospel. Now, when thing false can be the object of faith. once Christ was born, even before He began to preach, it Objection 2. Further, Abraham believed that Christ was false that Christ was yet to be born. Therefore some- would be born, according to Jn. 8:56: “Abraham your fa- thing false can come under faith. ther rejoiced that he might see My day: he saw it, and Objection 4. Further, it is a matter of faith, that one was glad.” But after the time of Abraham, God might should believe that the true Body of Christ is contained not have taken flesh, for it was merely because He willed in the Sacrament of the altar. But it might happen that 1189 the bread was not rightly consecrated, and that there was the comparison between them fails. not Christ’s true Body there, but only bread. Therefore Nevertheless neither can anything false come under something false can come under faith. hope, for a man hopes to obtain eternal life, not by his On the contrary, No virtue that perfects the intellect own power (since this would be an act of presumption), is related to the false, considered as the evil of the intel- but with the help of grace; and if he perseveres therein he lect, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 2). Now faith will obtain eternal life surely and infallibly. is a virtue that perfects the intellect, as we shall show fur- In like manner it belongs to charity to love God, wher- ther on (q. 4, Aa. 2,5). Therefore nothing false can come ever He may be; so that it matters not to charity, whether under it. God be in the individual whom we love for God’s sake. I answer that, Nothing comes under any power, habit Reply to Objection 2. That “God would not take or act, except by means of the formal aspect of the object: flesh,” considered in itself was possible even after Abra- thus color cannot be seen except by means of light, and ham’s time, but in so far as it stands in God’s foreknowl- a conclusion cannot be known save through the mean of edge, it has a certain necessity of infallibility, as explained demonstration. Now it has been stated (a. 1) that the for-in the Ia, q. 14, Aa. 13,15: and it is thus that it comes un- mal aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth; so that der faith. Hence in so far as it comes under faith, it cannot nothing can come under faith, save in so far as it stands un- be false. der the First Truth, under which nothing false can stand, Reply to Objection 3. After Christ’s birth, to believe as neither can non-being stand under being, nor evil under in Him, was to believe in Christ’s birth at some time or goodness. It follows therefore that nothing false can come other. The fixing of the time, wherein some were deceived under faith. was not due to their faith, but to a human conjecture. For Reply to Objection 1. Since the true is the good of the it is possible for a believer to have a false opinion through intellect, but not of the appetitive power, it follows that all a human conjecture, but it is quite impossible for a false virtues which perfect the intellect, exclude the false alto- opinion to be the outcome of faith. gether, because it belongs to the nature of a virtue to bear Reply to Objection 4. The faith of the believer is not relation to the good alone. On the other hand those virtues directed to such and such accidents of bread, but to the which perfect the appetitive faculty, do not entirely ex- fact that the true body of Christ is under the appearances clude the false, for it is possible to act in accordance with of sensible bread, when it is rightly consecrated. Hence if justice or temperance, while having a false opinion about it be not rightly consecrated, it does not follow that any- what one is doing. Therefore, as faith perfects the intel- thing false comes under faith. lect, whereas hope and charity perfect the appetitive part, Whether the object of faith can be something seen? IIa IIae q. 1 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the object of faith is that which is believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing something seen. For Our Lord said to Thomas (Jn. 20:29): in two ways. First, through being moved to assent by its “Because thou hast seen Me, Thomas, thou hast believed.” very object, which is known either by itself (as in the case Therefore vision and faith regard the same object. of first principles, which are held by the habit of under- Objection 2. Further, the Apostle, while speaking of standing), or through something else already known (as the knowledge of faith, says (1 Cor. 13:12): “We see now in the case of conclusions which are held by the habit through a glass in a dark manner.” Therefore what is be- of science). Secondly the intellect assents to something, lieved is seen. not through being sufficiently moved to this assent by its Objection 3. Further, faith is a spiritual light. Now proper object, but through an act of choice, whereby it something is seen under every light. Therefore faith is of turns voluntarily to one side rather than to the other: and things seen. if this be accompanied by doubt or fear of the opposite Objection 4. Further, “Every sense is a kind of sight,” side, there will be opinion, while, if there be certainty and as Augustine states (De Verb. Domini, Serm. xxxiii). no fear of the other side, there will be faith. But faith is of things heard, according to Rom. 10:17: Now those things are said to be seen which, of them- “Faith. . . cometh by hearing.” Therefore faith is of things selves, move the intellect or the senses to knowledge of seen. them. Wherefore it is evident that neither faith nor opin- On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that ion can be of things seen either by the senses or by the “faith is the evidence of things that appear not.” intellect. I answer that, Faith implies assent of the intellect to Reply to Objection 1. Thomas “saw one thing, and ∗ St. Gregory: Hom. xxvi in Evang. 1190 believed another”∗: he saw the Man, and believing Him Reply to Objection 3. The light of faith makes us see to be God, he made profession of his faith, saying: “My what we believe. For just as, by the habits of the other Lord and my God.” virtues, man sees what is becoming to him in respect of Reply to Objection 2. Those things which come un- that habit, so, by the habit of faith, the human mind is di- der faith can be considered in two ways. First, in particu- rected to assent to such things as are becoming to a right lar; and thus they cannot be seen and believed at the same faith, and not to assent to others. time, as shown above. Secondly, in general, that is, under Reply to Objection 4. Hearing is of words signify- the common aspect of credibility; and in this way they are ing what is of faith, but not of the things themselves that seen by the believer. For he would not believe unless, on are believed; hence it does not follow that these things are the evidence of signs, or of something similar, he saw that seen. they ought to be believed. Whether those things that are of faith can be an object of science∗? IIa IIae q. 1 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that those things that are by another: since we hope to see some day what we now of faith can be an object of science. For where science is believe about the Trinity, according to 1 Cor. 13:12: “We lacking there is ignorance, since ignorance is the opposite see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face of science. Now we are not in ignorance of those things to face”: which vision the angels possess already; so that we have to believe, since ignorance of such things savors what we believe, they see. In like manner it may happen of unbelief, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: “I did it ignorantly that what is an object of vision or scientific knowledge for in unbelief.” Therefore things that are of faith can be an one man, even in the state of a wayfarer, is, for another object of science. man, an object of faith, because he does not know it by Objection 2. Further, science is acquired by reasons. demonstration. Now sacred writers employ reasons to inculcate things Nevertheless that which is proposed to be believed that are of faith. Therefore such things can be an object of equally by all, is equally unknown by all as an object science. of science: such are the things which are of faith sim- Objection 3. Further, things which are demonstrated ply. Consequently faith and science are not about the same are an object of science, since a “demonstration is a syl- things. logism that produces science.” Now certain matters of Reply to Objection 1. Unbelievers are in ignorance faith have been demonstrated by the philosophers, such as of things that are of faith, for neither do they see or know the Existence and Unity of God, and so forth. Therefore them in themselves, nor do they know them to be credi- things that are of faith can be an object of science. ble. The faithful, on the other hand, know them, not as by Objection 4. Further, opinion is further from science demonstration, but by the light of faith which makes them than faith is, since faith is said to stand between opinion see that they ought to believe them, as stated above (a. 4, and science. Now opinion and science can, in a way, be ad 2,3). about the same object, as stated in Poster. i. Therefore Reply to Objection 2. The reasons employed by holy faith and science can be about the same object also. men to prove things that are of faith, are not demonstra- On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) tions; they are either persuasive arguments showing that that “when a thing is manifest, it is the object, not of faith, what is proposed to our faith is not impossible, or else they but of perception.” Therefore things that are of faith are are proofs drawn from the principles of faith, i.e. from not the object of perception, whereas what is an object of the authority of Holy Writ, as Dionysius declares (Div. science is the object of perception. Therefore there can be Nom. ii). Whatever is based on these principles is as well no faith about things which are an object of science. proved in the eyes of the faithful, as a conclusion drawn I answer that, All science is derived from self-evident from self-evident principles is in the eyes of all. Hence and therefore “seen” principles; wherefore all objects of again, theology is a science, as we stated at the outset of science must needs be, in a fashion, seen. this work ( Ia, q. 1, a. 2). Now as stated above (a. 4), it is impossible that one Reply to Objection 3. Things which can be proved and the same thing should be believed and seen by the by demonstration are reckoned among the articles of faith, same person. Hence it is equally impossible for one and not because they are believed simply by all, but because the same thing to be an object of science and of belief for they are a necessary presupposition to matters of faith, so the same person. It may happen, however, that a thing that those who do not known them by demonstration must which is an object of vision or science for one, is believed know them first of all by faith. ∗ Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration 1191 Reply to Objection 4. As the Philosopher says patible with either opinion or faith, yet for different rea- (Poster. i), “science and opinion about the same object sons. Because science is incompatible with opinion about can certainly be in different men,” as we have stated above the same object simply, for the reason that science de- about science and faith; yet it is possible for one and the mands that its object should be deemed impossible to be same man to have science and faith about the same thing otherwise, whereas it is essential to opinion, that its ob- relatively, i.e. in relation to the object, but not in the same ject should be deemed possible to be otherwise. Yet that respect. For it is possible for the same person, about one which is the object of faith, on account of the certainty of and the same object, to know one thing and to think an- faith, is also deemed impossible to be otherwise; and the other: and, in like manner, one may know by demonstra- reason why science and faith cannot be about the same tion the unity of the Godhead, and, by faith, the Trinity. object and in the same respect is because the object of sci- On the other hand, in one and the same man, about the ence is something seen whereas the object of faith is the same object, and in the same respect, science is incom- unseen, as stated above. Whether those things that are of faith should be divided into certain articles? IIa IIae q. 1 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that those things that are terror into your foes.” of faith should not be divided into certain articles. For all Hence matters of Christian faith are said to contain things contained in Holy Writ are matters of faith. But distinct articles, in so far as they are divided into parts, and these, by reason of their multitude, cannot be reduced to a fit together. Now the object of faith is something unseen certain number. Therefore it seems superfluous to distin- in connection with God, as stated above (a. 4). Conse- guish certain articles of faith. quently any matter that, for a special reason, is unseen, is Objection 2. Further, material differences can be mul- a special article; whereas when several matters are known tiplied indefinitely, and therefore art should take no notice or not known, under the same aspect, we are not to distin- of them. Now the formal aspect of the object of faith is guish various articles. Thus one encounters one difficulty one and indivisible, as stated above (a. 1), viz. the First in seeing that God suffered, and another in seeing that He Truth, so that matters of faith cannot be distinguished in rose again from the dead, wherefore the article of the Res- respect of their formal object. Therefore no notice should urrection is distinct from the article of the Passion. But be taken of a material division of matters of faith into ar- that He suffered, died and was buried, present the same ticles. difficulty, so that if one be accepted, it is not difficult to Objection 3. Further, it has been said by some∗ that accept the others; wherefore all these belong to one arti- “an article is an indivisible truth concerning God, exact- cle. ing [arctans] our belief.” Now belief is a voluntary act, Reply to Objection 1. Some things are proposed to since, as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), “no man our belief are in themselves of faith, while others are of believes against his will.” Therefore it seems that matters faith, not in themselves but only in relation to others: of faith should not be divided into articles. even as in sciences certain propositions are put forward On the contrary, Isidore says: “An article is a glimpse on their own account, while others are put forward in or- of Divine truth, tending thereto.” Now we can only get a der to manifest others. Now, since the chief object of faith glimpse of Divine truth by way of analysis, since things consists in those things which we hope to see, according which in God are one, are manifold in our intellect. There- to Heb. 11:2: “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped fore matters of faith should be divided into articles. for,” it follows that those things are in themselves of faith, I answer that, the word “article” is apparently derived which order us directly to eternal life. Such are the Trin- from the Greek; for the Greek arthron† which the Latin ity of Persons in Almighty God‡, the mystery of Christ’s renders “articulus,” signifies a fitting together of distinct Incarnation, and the like: and these are distinct articles of parts: wherefore the small parts of the body which fit to- faith. On the other hand certain things in Holy Writ are gether are called the articulations of the limbs. Likewise, proposed to our belief, not chiefly on their own account, in the Greek grammar, articles are parts of speech which but for the manifestation of those mentioned above: for in- are affixed to words to show their gender, number or case. stance, that Abraham had two sons, that a dead man rose Again in rhetoric, articles are parts that fit together in a again at the touch of Eliseus’ bones, and the like, which sentence, for Tully says (Rhet. iv) that an article is com- are related in Holy Writ for the purpose of manifesting posed of words each pronounced singly and separately, the Divine mystery or the Incarnation of Christ: and such thus: “Your passion, your voice, your look, have struck things should not form distinct articles. ∗ Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea † Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea ‡ The Leonine Edition reads: The Three Persons, the omnipotence of God, etc. 1192 Reply to Objection 2. The formal aspect of the object Reply to Objection 3. This definition of an article of faith can be taken in two ways: first, on the part of the is taken from an etymology of the word as derived from thing believed, and thus there is one formal aspect of all the Latin, rather than in accordance with its real meaning, matters of faith, viz. the First Truth: and from this point as derived from the Greek: hence it does not carry much of view there is no distinction of articles. Secondly, the weight. Yet even then it could be said that although faith is formal aspect of matters of faith, can be considered from exacted of no man by a necessity of coercion, since belief our point of view; and thus the formal aspect of a matter is a voluntary act, yet it is exacted of him by a necessity of faith is that it is something unseen; and from this point of end, since “he that cometh to God must believe that He of view there are various distinct articles of faith, as we is,” and “without faith it is impossible to please God,” as saw above. the Apostle declares (Heb. 11:6). Whether the articles of faith have increased in course of time? IIa IIae q. 1 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the articles of faith relation to the doctrine of faith, as self-evident principles have not increased in course of time. Because, as the to a teaching based on natural reason. Among these prin- Apostle says (Heb. 11:1), “faith is the substance of things ciples there is a certain order, so that some are contained to be hoped for.” Now the same things are to be hoped for implicitly in others; thus all principles are reduced, as to at all times. Therefore, at all times, the same things are to their first principle, to this one: “The same thing cannot be believed. be affirmed and denied at the same time,” as the Philoso- Objection 2. Further, development has taken place, in pher states (Metaph. iv, text. 9). In like manner all the sciences devised by man, on account of the lack of knowl- articles are contained implicitly in certain primary mat- edge in those who discovered them, as the Philosopher ters of faith, such as God’s existence, and His providence observes (Metaph. ii). Now the doctrine of faith was not over the salvation of man, according to Heb. 11: “He that devised by man, but was delivered to us by God, as stated cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder in Eph. 2:8: “It is the gift of God.” Since then there can to them that seek Him.” For the existence of God includes be no lack of knowledge in God, it seems that knowledge all that we believe to exist in God eternally, and in these of matters of faith was perfect from the beginning and did our happiness consists; while belief in His providence in- not increase as time went on. cludes all those things which God dispenses in time, for Objection 3. Further, the operation of grace proceeds man’s salvation, and which are the way to that happiness: in orderly fashion no less than the operation of nature. and in this way, again, some of those articles which fol- Now nature always makes a beginning with perfect things, low from these are contained in others: thus faith in the as Boethius states (De Consol. iii). Therefore it seems that Redemption of mankind includes belief in the Incarnation the operation of grace also began with perfect things, so of Christ, His Passion and so forth. that those who were the first to deliver the faith, knew it Accordingly we must conclude that, as regards the most perfectly. substance of the articles of faith, they have not received Objection 4. Further, just as the faith of Christ was any increase as time went on: since whatever those who delivered to us through the apostles, so too, in the Old Tes- lived later have believed, was contained, albeit implicitly, tament, the knowledge of faith was delivered by the early in the faith of those Fathers who preceded them. But fathers to those who came later, according to Dt. 32:7: there was an increase in the number of articles believed “Ask thy father, and he will declare to thee.” Now the explicitly, since to those who lived in later times some apostles were most fully instructed about the mysteries, were known explicitly which were not known explicitly for “they received them more fully than others, even as by those who lived before them. Hence the Lord said to they received them earlier,” as a gloss says on Rom. 8:23: Moses (Ex. 6:2,3): “I am the God of Abraham, the God “Ourselves also who have the first fruits of the Spirit.” of Isaac, the God of Jacob∗. . . and My name Adonai I did Therefore it seems that knowledge of matters of faith has not show them”: David also said (Ps. 118:100): “I have not increased as time went on. had understanding above ancients”: and the Apostle says On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Ezech.) (Eph. 3:5) that the mystery of Christ, “in other genera- that “the knowledge of the holy fathers increased as time tions was not known, as it is now revealed to His holy went on. . . and the nearer they were to Our Savior’s com- apostles and prophets.” ing, the more fully did they received the mysteries of sal- Reply to Objection 1. Among men the same things vation.” were always to be hoped for from Christ. But as they I answer that, The articles of faith stand in the same did not acquire this hope save through Christ, the further ∗ Vulg.: ‘I am the Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob’ 1193 they were removed from Christ in point of time, the furtence. On the other hand, in the order of the material ther they were from obtaining what they hoped for. Hence cause, the imperfect comes first, and in this way nature the Apostle says (Heb. 11:13): “All these died according proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Now in the to faith, not having received the promises, but beholding manifestation of faith, God is the active cause, having them afar off.” Now the further off a thing is the less perfect knowledge from all eternity; while man is likened distinctly is it seen; wherefore those who were nigh to to matter in receiving the influx of God’s action. Hence, Christ’s advent had a more distinct knowledge of the good among men, the knowledge of faith had to proceed from things to be hoped for. imperfection to perfection; and, although some men have Reply to Objection 2. Progress in knowledge occurs been after the manner of active causes, through being doc- in two ways. First, on the part of the teacher, be he one or tors of faith, nevertheless the manifestation of the Spirit is many, who makes progress in knowledge as time goes on: given to such men for the common good, according to 1 and this is the kind of progress that takes place in sciences Cor. 12:7; so that the knowledge of faith was imparted devised by man. Secondly, on the part of the learner; thus to the Fathers who were instructors in the faith, so far as the master, who has perfect knowledge of the art, does not was necessary at the time for the instruction of the people, deliver it all at once to his disciple from the very outset, for either openly or in figures. he would not be able to take it all in, but he condescends Reply to Objection 4. The ultimate consummation to the disciple’s capacity and instructs him little by little. of grace was effected by Christ, wherefore the time of It is in this way that men made progress in the knowledge His coming is called the “time of fulness∗” (Gal. 4:4). of faith as time went on. Hence the Apostle (Gal. 3:24) Hence those who were nearest to Christ, wherefore be- compares the state of the Old Testament to childhood. fore, like John the Baptist, or after, like the apostles, had Reply to Objection 3. Two causes are requisite before a fuller knowledge of the mysteries of faith; for even with actual generation can take place, an agent, namely, and regard to man’s state we find that the perfection of man- matter. In the order of the active cause, the more perfect hood comes in youth, and that a man’s state is all the more is naturally first; and in this way nature makes a beginning perfect, whether before or after, the nearer it is to the time with perfect things, since the imperfect is not brought to of his youth. perfection, except by something perfect already in exis- Whether the articles of faith are suitably formulated? IIa IIae q. 1 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that the articles of faith Now there are several articles about the Person of the Holy are unsuitably formulated. For those things, which can Ghost, and likewise about the Person of the Son. There- be known by demonstration, do not belong to faith as to fore there should be several articles about the Person of an object of belief for all, as stated above (a. 5 ). Now the Father. it can be known by demonstration that there is one God; Objection 5. Further, just as certain things are said by hence the Philosopher proves this (Metaph. xii, text. 52) appropriation, of the Person of the Father and of the Per- and many other philosophers demonstrated the same truth. son of the Holy Ghost, so too is something appropriated Therefore that “there is one God” should not be set down to the Person of the Son, in respect of His Godhead. Now, as an article of faith. among the articles of faith, a place is given to a work ap- Objection 2. Further, just as it is necessary to faith propriated to the Father, viz. the creation, and likewise, a that we should believe God to be almighty, so is it too that work appropriated to the Holy Ghost, viz. that “He spoke we should believe Him to be “all-knowing” and “provi- by the prophets.” Therefore the articles of faith should dent for all,” about both of which points some have erred. contain some work appropriated to the Son in respect of Therefore, among the articles of faith, mention should His Godhead. have been made of God’s wisdom and providence, even Objection 6. Further, the sacrament of the Eucharist as of His omnipotence. presents a special difficulty over and above the other arti- Objection 3. Further, to know the Father is the same cles. Therefore it should have been mentioned in a special things as to know the Son, according to Jn. 14:9: “He that article: and consequently it seems that there is not a suffi- seeth Me, seeth the Father also.” Therefore there ought to cient number of articles. be but one article about the Father and Son, and, for the On the contrary stands the authority of the Church who same reason, about the Holy Ghost. formulates the articles thus. Objection 4. Further, the Person of the Father is no I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 4,6), to faith those less than the Person of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. things in themselves belong, the sight of which we shall ∗ Vulg.: ‘fulness of time’ 1194 enjoy in eternal life, and by which we are brought to eter-not work save by the will and knowledge. Hence God’s nal life. Now two things are proposed to us to be seen in omnipotence includes, in a way, universal knowledge and eternal life: viz. the secret of the Godhead, to see which providence. For He would not be able to do all He wills is to possess happiness; and the mystery of Christ’s In- in things here below, unless He knew them, and exercised carnation, “by Whom we have access” to the glory of the His providence over them. sons of God, according to Rom. 5:2. Hence it is written Reply to Objection 3. We have but one knowledge (Jn. 17:3): “This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as to the unity of the the. . . true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent.” Essence, to which the first article refers: but, as to the dis- Wherefore the first distinction in matters of faith is that tinction of the Persons, which is by the relations of origin, some concern the majesty of the Godhead, while others knowledge of the Father does indeed, in a way, include pertain to the mystery of Christ’s human nature, which is knowledge of the Son, for He would not be Father, had the “mystery of godliness” (1 Tim. 3:16). He not a Son; the bond whereof being the Holy Ghost. Now with regard to the majesty of the Godhead, three From this point of view, there was a sufficient motive for things are proposed to our belief: first, the unity of the those who referred one article to the three Persons. Since, Godhead, to which the first article refers; secondly, the however, with regard to each Person, certain points have trinity of the Persons, to which three articles refer, cor- to be observed, about which some happen to fall into error, responding to the three Persons; and thirdly, the works looking at it in this way, we may distinguish three articles proper to the Godhead, the first of which refers to the or- about the three Persons. For Arius believed in the omnipo- der of nature, in relation to which the article about the tence and eternity of the Father, but did not believe the Son creation is proposed to us; the second refers to the order to be co-equal and consubstantial with the Father; hence of grace, in relation to which all matters concerning the the need for an article about the Person of the Son in or- sanctification of man are included in one article; while the der to settle this point. In like manner it was necessary to third refers to the order of glory, and in relation to this appoint a third article about the Person of the Holy Ghost, another article is proposed to us concerning the resurrec- against Macedonius. In the same way Christ’s conception tion of the dead and life everlasting. Thus there are seven and birth, just as the resurrection and life everlasting, can articles referring to the Godhead. from one point of view be united together in one article, in In like manner, with regard to Christ’s human na- so far as they are ordained to one end; while, from another ture, there are seven articles, the first of which refers to point of view, they can be distinct articles, in as much as Christ’s incarnation or conception; the second, to His vir- each one separately presents a special difficulty. ginal birth; the third, to His Passion, death and burial; Reply to Objection 4. It belongs to the Son and Holy the fourth, to His descent into hell; the fifth, to His res- Ghost to be sent to sanctify the creature; and about this urrection; the sixth, to His ascension; the seventh, to His several things have to be believed. Hence it is that there coming for the judgment, so that in all there are fourteen are more articles about the Persons of the Son and Holy articles. Ghost than about the Person of the Father, Who is never Some, however, distinguish twelve articles, six per- sent, as we stated in the Ia, q. 43, a. 4. taining to the Godhead, and six to the humanity. For they Reply to Objection 5. The sanctification of a creature include in one article the three about the three Persons; be- by grace, and its consummation by glory, is also effected cause we have one knowledge of the three Persons: while by the gift of charity, which is appropriated to the Holy they divide the article referring to the work of glorifica- Ghost, and by the gift of wisdom, which is appropriated to tion into two, viz. the resurrection of the body, and the the Son: so that each work belongs by appropriation, but glory of the soul. Likewise they unite the conception and under different aspects, both to the Son and to the Holy nativity into one article. Ghost. Reply to Objection 1. By faith we hold many truths Reply to Objection 6. Two things may be considered about God, which the philosophers were unable to dis- in the sacrament of the Eucharist. One is the fact that it cover by natural reason, for instance His providence and is a sacrament, and in this respect it is like the other ef- omnipotence, and that He alone is to be worshiped, all of fects of sanctifying grace. The other is that Christ’s body which are contained in the one article of the unity of God. is miraculously contained therein and thus it is included Reply to Objection 2. The very name of the Godhead under God’s omnipotence, like all other miracles which implies a kind of watching over things, as stated in the Ia, are ascribed to God’s almighty power. q. 13, a. 8. Now in beings having an intellect, power does 1195 Whether it is suitable for the articles of faith to be embodied in a symbol? IIa IIae q. 1 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that it is unsuitable for in Holy Writ, diffusely, under various modes of expres- the articles of faith to be embodied in a symbol. Because sion, and sometimes obscurely, so that, in order to gather Holy Writ is the rule of faith, to which no addition or sub- the truth of faith from Holy Writ, one needs long study traction can lawfully be made, since it is written (Dt. 4:2): and practice, which are unattainable by all those who re- “You shall not add to the word that I speak to you, neither quire to know the truth of faith, many of whom have no shall you take away from it.” Therefore it was unlawful to time for study, being busy with other affairs. And so it make a symbol as a rule of faith, after the Holy Writ had was necessary to gather together a clear summary from once been published. the sayings of Holy Writ, to be proposed to the belief of Objection 2. Further, according to the Apostle (Eph. all. This indeed was no addition to Holy Writ, but some- 4:5) there is but “one faith.” Now the symbol is a profes- thing taken from it. sion of faith. Therefore it is not fitting that there should Reply to Objection 2. The same doctrine of faith is be more than one symbol. taught in all the symbols. Nevertheless, the people need Objection 3. Further, the confession of faith, which more careful instruction about the truth of faith, when er- is contained in the symbol, concerns all the faithful. Now rors arise, lest the faith of simple-minded persons be cor- the faithful are not all competent to believe in God, but rupted by heretics. It was this that gave rise to the neces- only those who have living faith. Therefore it is unfitting sity of formulating several symbols, which nowise differ for the symbol of faith to be expressed in the words: “I from one another, save that on account of the obstinacy of believe in one God.” heretics, one contains more explicitly what another con- Objection 4. Further, the descent into hell is one of tains implicitly. the articles of faith, as stated above (a. 8). But the descent Reply to Objection 3. The confession of faith is into hell is not mentioned in the symbol of the Fathers. drawn up in a symbol in the person, as it were, of the Therefore the latter is expressed inadequately. whole Church, which is united together by faith. Now the Objection 5. Further, Augustine (Tract. xxix in Joan.) faith of the Church is living faith; since such is the faith to expounding the passage, “You believe in God, believe also be found in all those who are of the Church not only out- in Me” (Jn. 14:1) says: “We believe Peter or Paul, but we wardly but also by merit. Hence the confession of faith is speak only of believing ‘in’ God.” Since then the Catholic expressed in a symbol, in a manner that is in keeping with Church is merely a created being, it seems unfitting to say: living faith, so that even if some of the faithful lack living “In the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church.” faith, they should endeavor to acquire it. Objection 6. Further, a symbol is drawn up that it may Reply to Objection 4. No error about the descent into be a rule of faith. Now a rule of faith ought to be proposed hell had arisen among heretics, so that there was no need to all, and that publicly. Therefore every symbol, besides to be more explicit on that point. For this reason it is not the symbol of the Fathers, should be sung at Mass. There- repeated in the symbol of the Fathers, but is supposed as fore it seems unfitting to publish the articles of faith in a already settled in the symbol of the Apostles. For a sub- symbol. sequent symbol does not cancel a preceding one; rather On the contrary, The universal Church cannot err, does it expound it, as stated above (ad 2). since she is governed by the Holy Ghost, Who is the Spirit Reply to Objection 5. If we say: “ ‘In’ the holy of truth: for such was Our Lord’s promise to His disciples Catholic Church,” this must be taken as verified in so far (Jn. 16:13): “When He, the Spirit of truth, is come, He as our faith is directed to the Holy Ghost, Who sanctifies will teach you all truth.” Now the symbol is published by the Church; so that the sense is: “I believe in the Holy the authority of the universal Church. Therefore it con- Ghost sanctifying the Church.” But it is better and more tains nothing defective. in keeping with the common use, to omit the ‘in,’ and I answer that, As the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6), “he say simply, “the holy Catholic Church,” as Pope Leo† ob- that cometh to God, must believe that He is.” Now a man serves. cannot believe, unless the truth be proposed to him that Reply to Objection 6. Since the symbol of the Fa- he may believe it. Hence the need for the truth of faith thers is an explanation of the symbol of the Apostles, and to be collected together, so that it might the more easily was drawn up after the faith was already spread abroad, be proposed to all, lest anyone might stray from the truth and when the Church was already at peace, it is sung pub- through ignorance of the faith. It is from its being a col- licly in the Mass. On the other hand the symbol of the lection of maxims of faith that the symbol∗ takes its name. Apostles, which was drawn up at the time of persecution, Reply to Objection 1. The truth of faith is contained before the faith was made public, is said secretly at Prime ∗ The Greek symballein † Rufinus, Comm. in Sym. Apost. 1196 and Compline, as though it were against the darkness of past and future errors. Whether it belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith? IIa IIae q. 1 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that it does not belong to longs to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, “to whom the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith. For a the more important and more difficult questions that arise new edition of the symbol becomes necessary in order to in the Church are referred,” as stated in the Decretals‡. explain the articles of faith, as stated above (a. 9). Now, Hence our Lord said to Peter whom he made Sovereign in the Old Testament, the articles of faith were more and Pontiff (Lk. 22:32): “I have prayed for thee,” Peter, “that more explained as time went on, by reason of the truth of thy faith fail not, and thou, being once converted, confirm faith becoming clearer through greater nearness to Christ, thy brethren.” The reason of this is that there should be but as stated above (a. 7). Since then this reason ceased with one faith of the whole Church, according to 1 Cor. 1:10: the advent of the New Law, there is no need for the ar- “That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no ticles of faith to be more and more explicit. Therefore it schisms among you”: and this could not be secured unless does not seem to belong to the authority of the Sovereign any question of faith that may arise be decided by him Pontiff to draw up a new edition of the symbol. who presides over the whole Church, so that the whole Objection 2. Further, no man has the power to do Church may hold firmly to his decision. Consequently it what is forbidden under pain of anathema by the univer- belongs to the sole authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to sal Church. Now it was forbidden under pain of anath- publish a new edition of the symbol, as do all other mat- ema by the universal Church, to make a new edition of ters which concern the whole Church, such as to convoke the symbol. For it is stated in the acts of the first∗ coun- a general council and so forth. cil of Ephesus (P. ii, Act. 6) that “after the symbol of the Reply to Objection 1. The truth of faith is sufficiently Nicene council had been read through, the holy synod de-explicit in the teaching of Christ and the apostles. But creed that it was unlawful to utter, write or draw up any since, according to 2 Pet. 3:16, some men are so evil- other creed, than that which was defined by the Fathers minded as to pervert the apostolic teaching and other doc- assembled at Nicaea together with the Holy Ghost,” and trines and Scriptures to their own destruction, it was nec- this under pain of anathema. The same was repeated in essary as time went on to express the faith more explicitly the acts of the council of Chalcedon (P. ii, Act. 5). There- against the errors which arose. fore it seems that the Sovereign Pontiff has no authority Reply to Objection 2. This prohibition and sentence to publish a new edition of the symbol. of the council was intended for private individuals, who Objection 3. Further, Athanasius was not the have no business to decide matters of faith: for this de- Sovereign Pontiff, but patriarch of Alexandria, and yet he cision of the general council did not take away from a published a symbol which is sung in the Church. There- subsequent council the power of drawing up a new edi- fore it does not seem to belong to the Sovereign Pontiff tion of the symbol, containing not indeed a new faith, but any more than to other bishops, to publish a new edition the same faith with greater explicitness. For every coun- of the symbol. cil has taken into account that a subsequent council would On the contrary, The symbol was drawn us by a gen- expound matters more fully than the preceding council, if eral council. Now such a council cannot be convoked oth- this became necessary through some heresy arising. Con- erwise than by the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, as sequently this belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff, by whose stated in the Decretals†. Therefore it belongs to the au- authority the council is convoked, and its decision con- thority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol. firmed. I answer that, As stated above (obj. 1), a new edi- Reply to Objection 3. Athanasius drew up a declara- tion of the symbol becomes necessary in order to set aside tion of faith, not under the form of a symbol, but rather by the errors that may arise. Consequently to publish a new way of an exposition of doctrine, as appears from his way edition of the symbol belongs to that authority which is of speaking. But since it contained briefly the whole truth empowered to decide matters of faith finally, so that they of faith, it was accepted by the authority of the Sovereign may be held by all with unshaken faith. Now this be- Pontiff, so as to be considered as a rule of faith. ∗ St. Thomas wrote ‘first’ (expunged by Nicolai) to distinguish it from the other council, A.D. 451, known as the “Latrocinium” and condemned by the Pope. † Dist. xvii, Can. 4,5 ‡ Dist. xvii, Can. 5 1197 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 2 Of the Act of Faith (In Ten Articles) We must now consider the act of faith, and (1) the internal act; (2) the external act. Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) What is “to believe,” which is the internal act of faith? (2) In how many ways is it expressed? (3) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in anything above natural reason? (4) Whether it is necessary to believe those things that are attainable by natural reason? (5) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe certain things explicitly? (6) Whether all are equally bound to explicit faith? (7) Whether explicit faith in Christ is always necessary for salvation? (8) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity explicitly? (9) Whether the act of faith is meritorious? (10) Whether human reason diminishes the merit of faith? Whether to believe is to think with assent? IIa IIae q. 2 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that to believe is not comes our word. Hence the Word of God must be under- to think with assent. Because the Latin word “cogita- stood without any thinking on the part of God, for there tio” [thought] implies a research, for “cogitare” [to think] is nothing there that can take form, or be unformed.” In seems to be equivalent to “coagitare,” i.e. “to discuss to- this way thought is, properly speaking, the movement of gether.” Now Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv) that the mind while yet deliberating, and not yet perfected by faith is “an assent without research.” Therefore thinking the clear sight of truth. Since, however, such a movement has no place in the act of faith. of the mind may be one of deliberation either about uni- Objection 2. Further, faith resides in the reason, as versal notions, which belongs to the intellectual faculty, we shall show further on (q. 4, a. 2). Now to think is an or about particular matters, which belongs to the sensitive act of the cogitative power, which belongs to the sensitive part, hence it is that “to think” is taken secondly for an act faculty, as stated in the Ia, q. 78, a. 4. Therefore thought of the deliberating intellect, and thirdly for an act of the has nothing to do with faith. cogitative power. Objection 3. Further, to believe is an act of the intel- Accordingly, if “to think” be understood broadly ac- lect, since its object is truth. But assent seems to be an cording to the first sense, then “to think with assent,” does act not of the intellect, but of the will, even as consent is, not express completely what is meant by “to believe”: as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 15, a. 1, ad 3). Therefore to since, in this way, a man thinks with assent even when believe is not to think with assent. he considers what he knows by science∗, or understands. On the contrary, This is how “to believe” is defined If, on the other hand, “to think” be understood in the sec- by Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. ii). ond way, then this expresses completely the nature of the I answer that, “To think” can be taken in three ways. act of believing. For among the acts belonging to the in- First, in a general way for any kind of actual consideration tellect, some have a firm assent without any such kind of the intellect, as Augustine observes (De Trin. xiv, 7): of thinking, as when a man considers the things that he “By understanding I mean now the faculty whereby we knows by science, or understands, for this consideration understand when thinking.” Secondly, “to think” is more is already formed. But some acts of the intellect have strictly taken for that consideration of the intellect, which unformed thought devoid of a firm assent, whether they is accompanied by some kind of inquiry, and which pre- incline to neither side, as in one who “doubts”; or incline cedes the intellect’s arrival at the stage of perfection that to one side rather than the other, but on account of some comes with the certitude of sight. In this sense Augustine slight motive, as in one who “suspects”; or incline to one says (De Trin. xv, 16) that “the Son of God is not called side yet with fear of the other, as in one who “opines.” the Thought, but the Word of God. When our thought But this act “to believe,” cleaves firmly to one side, in realizes what we know and takes form therefrom, it be- which respect belief has something in common with sci- ∗ Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration. 1198 ence and understanding; yet its knowledge does not attain believe, for instance that such things have been uttered by the perfection of clear sight, wherein it agrees with doubt, God and confirmed by miracles. suspicion and opinion. Hence it is proper to the believer Reply to Objection 2. “To think” is not taken here to think with assent: so that the act of believing is distin- for the act of the cogitative power, but for an act of the guished from all the other acts of the intellect, which are intellect, as explained above. about the true or the false. Reply to Objection 3. The intellect of the believer Reply to Objection 1. Faith has not that research of is determined to one object, not by the reason, but by the natural reason which demonstrates what is believed, but will, wherefore assent is taken here for an act of the intel- a research into those things whereby a man is induced to lect as determined to one object by the will. Whether the act of faith is suitably distinguished as believing God, believing in a God IIa IIae q. 2 a. 2 and believing in God? Objection 1. It would seem that the act of faith is If it be considered on the part of the intellect, then unsuitably distinguished as believing God, believing in a two things can be observed in the object of faith, as stated God, and believing in God. For one habit has but one act. above (q. 1, a. 1). One of these is the material object of Now faith is one habit since it is one virtue. Therefore it faith, and in this way an act of faith is “to believe in a is unreasonable to say that there are three acts of faith. God”; because, as stated above (q. 1, a. 1) nothing is pro- Objection 2. Further, that which is common to all acts posed to our belief, except in as much as it is referred to of faith should not be reckoned as a particular kind of act God. The other is the formal aspect of the object, for it of faith. Now “to believe God” is common to all acts of is the medium on account of which we assent to such and faith, since faith is founded on the First Truth. Therefore such a point of faith; and thus an act of faith is “to believe it seems unreasonable to distinguish it from certain other God,” since, as stated above (q. 1, a. 1) the formal object acts of faith. of faith is the First Truth, to Which man gives his adhe- Objection 3. Further, that which can be said of unbe- sion, so as to assent to Its sake to whatever he believes. lievers, cannot be called an act of faith. Now unbelievers Thirdly, if the object of faith be considered in so far can be said to believe in a God. Therefore it should not be as the intellect is moved by the will, an act of faith is “to reckoned an act of faith. believe in God.” For the First Truth is referred to the will, Objection 4. Further, movement towards the end be- through having the aspect of an end. longs to the will, whose object is the good and the end. Reply to Objection 1. These three do not denote dif- Now to believe is an act, not of the will, but of the intel- ferent acts of faith, but one and the same act having dif- lect. Therefore “to believe in God,” which implies move- ferent relations to the object of faith. ment towards an end, should not be reckoned as a species This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. of that act. Reply to Objection 3. Unbelievers cannot be said “to On the contrary is the authority of Augustine who believe in a God” as we understand it in relation to the act makes this distinction (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxi—Tract. of faith. For they do not believe that God exists under the xxix in Joan.). conditions that faith determines; hence they do not truly I answer that, The act of any power or habit depends imply believe in a God, since, as the Philosopher observes on the relation of that power or habit to its object. Now (Metaph. ix, text. 22) “to know simple things defectively the object of faith can be considered in three ways. For, is not to know them at all.” since “to believe” is an act of the intellect, in so far as the Reply to Objection 4. As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 9, will moves it to assent, as stated above (a. 1, ad 3), the a. 1) the will moves the intellect and the other powers of object of faith can be considered either on the part of the the soul to the end: and in this respect an act of faith is “to intellect, or on the part of the will that moves the intellect. believe in God.” Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe anything above the natural reason? IIa IIae q. 2 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem unnecessary for salvation as stated above (q. 1, a. 4). Therefore to believe seems to believe anything above the natural reason. For the sal- unnecessary for salvation. vation and perfection of a thing seem to be sufficiently Objection 2. Further, it is dangerous for man to assent insured by its natural endowments. Now matters of faith, to matters, wherein he cannot judge whether that which is surpass man’s natural reason, since they are things unseen proposed to him be true or false, according to Job 12:11: 1199 “Doth not the ear discern words?” Now a man cannot Consequently the perfection of the rational creature form a judgment of this kind in matters of faith, since he consists not only in what belongs to it in respect of its na- cannot trace them back to first principles, by which all our ture, but also in that which it acquires through a supernat- judgments are guided. Therefore it is dangerous to believe ural participation of Divine goodness. Hence it was said in such matters. Therefore to believe is not necessary for above ( Ia IIae, q. 3, a. 8) that man’s ultimate happiness salvation. consists in a supernatural vision of God: to which vision Objection 3. Further, man’s salvation rests on God, man cannot attain unless he be taught by God, according according to Ps. 36:39: “But the salvation of the just is to Jn. 6:45: “Every one that hath heard of the Father and from the Lord.” Now “the invisible things” of God “are hath learned cometh to Me.” Now man acquires a share clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; of this learning, not indeed all at once, but by little and His eternal power also and Divinity,” according to Rom. little, according to the mode of his nature: and every one 1:20: and those things which are clearly seen by the un- who learns thus must needs believe, in order that he may derstanding are not an object of belief. Therefore it is not acquire science in a perfect degree; thus also the Philoso- necessary for man’s salvation, that he should believe cer- pher remarks (De Soph. Elench. i, 2) that “it behooves a tain things. learner to believe.” On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): “Without Hence in order that a man arrive at the perfect vision faith it is impossible to please God.” of heavenly happiness, he must first of all believe God, as I answer that, Wherever one nature is subordinate to a disciple believes the master who is teaching him. another, we find that two things concur towards the per- Reply to Objection 1. Since man’s nature is depen- fection of the lower nature, one of which is in respect of dent on a higher nature, natural knowledge does not suf- that nature’s proper movement, while the other is in re- fice for its perfection, and some supernatural knowledge spect of the movement of the higher nature. Thus water is necessary, as stated above. by its proper movement moves towards the centre (of the Reply to Objection 2. Just as man assents to first earth), while according to the movement of the moon, it principles, by the natural light of his intellect, so does a moves round the centre by ebb and flow. In like man- virtuous man, by the habit of virtue, judge aright of things ner the planets have their proper movements from west to concerning that virtue; and in this way, by the light of east, while in accordance with the movement of the first faith which God bestows on him, a man assents to matters heaven, they have a movement from east to west. Now the of faith and not to those which are against faith. Conse- created rational nature alone is immediately subordinate quently “there is no” danger or “condemnation to them to God, since other creatures do not attain to the univer- that are in Christ Jesus,” and whom He has enlightened sal, but only to something particular, while they partake by faith. of the Divine goodness either in “being” only, as inani- Reply to Objection 3. In many respects faith per- mate things, or also in “living,” and in “knowing singu- ceives the invisible things of God in a higher way than lars,” as plants and animals; whereas the rational nature, natural reason does in proceeding to God from His crea- in as much as it apprehends the universal notion of good tures. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 3:25): “Many things and being, is immediately related to the universal princi- are shown to thee above the understandings of man.” ple of being. Whether it is necessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural reason? IIa IIae q. 2 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem unnecessary to believe need to believe what can be proved by natural reason. those things which can be proved by natural reason. For Objection 3. Further, all things knowable scientifi- nothing is superfluous in God’s works, much less even cally∗ would seem to come under one head: so that if than in the works of nature. Now it is superfluous to em- some of them are proposed to man as objects of faith, in ploy other means, where one already suffices. Therefore like manner the others should also be believed. But this it would be superfluous to receive by faith, things that can is not true. Therefore it is not necessary to believe those be known by natural reason. things which can be proved by natural reason. Objection 2. Further, those things must be believed, On the contrary, It is necessary to believe that God is which are the object of faith. Now science and faith are one and incorporeal: which things philosophers prove by not about the same object, as stated above (q. 1, Aa. 4,5). natural reason. Since therefore all things that can be known by natural I answer that, It is necessary for man to accept by reason are an object of science, it seems that there is no faith not only things which are above reason, but also ∗ Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration 1200 those which can be known by reason: and this for three tigation, into human affairs, have fallen into many errors, motives. First, in order that man may arrive more quickly and have disagreed among themselves. And consequently, at the knowledge of Divine truth. Because the science to in order that men might have knowledge of God, free of whose province it belongs to prove the existence of God, doubt and uncertainty, it was necessary for Divine matters is the last of all to offer itself to human research, since it to be delivered to them by way of faith, being told to them, presupposes many other sciences: so that it would not by as it were, by God Himself Who cannot lie. until late in life that man would arrive at the knowledge of Reply to Objection 1. The researches of natural rea- God. The second reason is, in order that the knowledge of son do not suffice mankind for the knowledge of Divine God may be more general. For many are unable to make matters, even of those that can be proved by reason: and progress in the study of science, either through dullness so it is not superfluous if these others be believed. of mind, or through having a number of occupations, and Reply to Objection 2. Science and faith cannot be in temporal needs, or even through laziness in learning, all the same subject and about the same object: but what is of whom would be altogether deprived of an object of science for one, can be an object of faith for the knowledge of God, unless Divine things were another, as stated above (q. 1, a. 5). brought to their knowledge under the guise of faith. The Reply to Objection 3. Although all things that can third reason is for the sake of certitude. For human reason be known by science are of one common scientific aspect, is very deficient in things concerning God. A sign of this they do not all alike lead man to beatitude: hence they are is that philosophers in their researches, by natural inves- not all equally proposed to our belief. Whether man is bound to believe anything explicitly? IIa IIae q. 2 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that man is not bound is bound to fulfil, concern acts of virtue which are the to believe anything explicitly. For no man is bound to means of attaining salvation. Now an act of virtue, as do what is not in his power. Now it is not in man’s stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 60, a. 5) depends on the relation power to believe a thing explicitly, for it is written (Rom. of the habit to its object. Again two things may be consid- 10:14,15): “How shall they believe Him, of whom they ered in the object of any virtue; namely, that which is the have not heard? And how shall they hear without a proper and direct object of that virtue, and that which is preacher? And how shall they preach unless they be accidental and consequent to the object properly so called. sent?” Therefore man is not bound to believe anything Thus it belongs properly and directly to the object of forti- explicitly. tude, to face the dangers of death, and to charge at the foe Objection 2. Further, just as we are directed to God with danger to oneself, for the sake of the common good: by faith, so are we by charity. Now man is not bound yet that, in a just war, a man be armed, or strike another to keep the precepts of charity, and it is enough if he be with his sword, and so forth, is reduced to the object of ready to fulfil them: as is evidenced by the precept of Our fortitude, but indirectly. Lord (Mat. 5:39): “If one strike thee on one [Vulg.: ‘thy Accordingly, just as a virtuous act is required for the right’] cheek, turn to him also the other”; and by others of fulfilment of a precept, so is it necessary that the virtu- the same kind, according to Augustine’s exposition (De ous act should terminate in its proper and direct object: Serm. Dom. in Monte xix). Therefore neither is man but, on the other hand, the fulfilment of the precept does bound to believe anything explicitly, and it is enough if he not require that a virtuous act should terminate in those be ready to believe whatever God proposes to be believed. things which have an accidental or secondary relation to Objection 3. Further, the good of faith consists in the proper and direct object of that virtue, except in certain obedience, according to Rom. 1:5: “For obedience to the places and at certain times. We must, therefore, say that faith in all nations.” Now the virtue of obedience does not the direct object of faith is that whereby man is made one require man to keep certain fixed precepts, but it is enough of the Blessed, as stated above (q. 1, a. 8): while the in- that his mind be ready to obey, according to Ps. 118:60: “I direct and secondary object comprises all things delivered am ready and am not troubled; that I may keep Thy com- by God to us in Holy Writ, for instance that Abraham had mandments.” Therefore it seems enough for faith, too, two sons, that David was the son of Jesse, and so forth. that man should be ready to believe whatever God may Therefore, as regards the primary points or articles of propose, without his believing anything explicitly. faith, man is bound to believe them, just as he is bound On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): “He that to have faith; but as to other points of faith, man is not cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder bound to believe them explicitly, but only implicitly, or to to them that seek Him.” be ready to believe them, in so far as he is prepared to be- I answer that, The precepts of the Law, which man lieve whatever is contained in the Divine Scriptures. Then 1201 alone is he bound to believe such things explicitly, when vi∗). it is clear to him that they are contained in the doctrine of Reply to Objection 2. Man is bound to love definitely faith. those lovable things which are properly and directly the Reply to Objection 1. If we understand those things objects of charity, namely, God and our neighbor. The ob- alone to be in a man’s power, which we can do without the jection refers to those precepts of charity which belong, help of grace, then we are bound to do many things which as a consequence, to the objects of charity. we cannot do without the aid of healing grace, such as Reply to Objection 3. The virtue of obedience is to love God and our neighbor, and likewise to believe the seated, properly speaking, in the will; hence promptness articles of faith. But with the help of grace we can do of the will subject to authority, suffices for the act of obe- this, for this help “to whomsoever it is given from above dience, because it is the proper and direct object of obedi- it is mercifully given; and from whom it is withheld it is ence. But this or that precept is accidental or consequent justly withheld, as a punishment of a previous, or at least to that proper and direct object. of original, sin,” as Augustine states (De Corr. et Grat. v, Whether all are equally bound to have explicit faith? IIa IIae q. 2 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that all are equally bound through those of higher degree. Consequently, just as the to have explicit faith. For all are bound to those things higher angels, who enlighten those who are below them, which are necessary for salvation, as is evidenced by the have a fuller knowledge of Divine things than the lower precepts of charity. Now it is necessary for salvation that angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. xii), so too, men certain things should be believed explicitly. Therefore all of higher degree, whose business it is to teach others, are are equally bound to have explicit faith. under obligation to have fuller knowledge of matters of Objection 2. Further, no one should be put to test in faith, and to believe them more explicitly. matters that he is not bound to believe. But simple reasons Reply to Objection 1. The unfolding of the articles of are sometimes tested in reference to the slightest articles faith is not equally necessary for the salvation of all, since of faith. Therefore all are bound to believe everything ex- those of higher degree, whose duty it is to teach others, are plicitly. bound to believe explicitly more things than others are. Objection 3. Further, if the simple are bound to have, Reply to Objection 2. Simple persons should not be not explicit but only implicit faith, their faith must needs put to the test about subtle questions of faith, unless they be implied in the faith of the learned. But this seems un- be suspected of having been corrupted by heretics, who safe, since it is possible for the learned to err. Therefore are wont to corrupt the faith of simple people in such ques- it seems that the simple should also have explicit faith; so tions. If, however, it is found that they are free from ob- that all are, therefore, equally bound to have explicit faith. stinacy in their heterodox sentiments, and that it is due to On the contrary, It is written (Job 1:14): “The oxen their simplicity, it is no fault of theirs. were ploughing, and the asses feeding beside them,” be- Reply to Objection 3. The simple have no faith im- cause, as Gregory expounds this passage (Moral. ii, 17), plied in that of the learned, except in so far as the latter the simple, who are signified by the asses, ought, in mat- adhere to the Divine teaching. Hence the Apostle says ters of faith, to stay by the learned, who are denoted by (1 Cor. 4:16): “Be ye followers of me, as I also am of the oxen. Christ.” Hence it is not human knowledge, but the Divine I answer that, The unfolding of matters of faith is the truth that is the rule of faith: and if any of the learned stray result of Divine revelation: for matters of faith surpass from this rule, he does not harm the faith of the simple natural reason. Now Divine revelation reaches those of ones, who think that the learned believe aright; unless the lower degree through those who are over them, in a cer- simple hold obstinately to their individual errors, against tain order; to men, for instance, through the angels, and the faith of the universal Church, which cannot err, since to the lower angels through the higher, as Dionysius ex- Our Lord said (Lk. 22:32): “I have prayed for thee,” Peter, plains (Coel. Hier. iv, vii). In like manner therefore the “that thy faith fail not.” unfolding of faith must needs reach men of lower degree ∗ Cf. Ep. cxc; De Praed. Sanct. viii. 1202 Whether it is necessary for the salvation of all, that they should believe explicitly in IIa IIae q. 2 a. 7 the mystery of Christ? Objection 1. It would seem that it is not necessary leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife,” of for the salvation of all that they should believe explicitly which the Apostle says (Eph. 5:32) that “this is a great in the mystery of Christ. For man is not bound to believe sacrament. . . in Christ and the Church,” and it is incredi- explicitly what the angels are ignorant about: since the ble that the first man was ignorant about this sacrament. unfolding of faith is the result of Divine revelation, which But after sin, man believed explicitly in Christ, not reaches man by means of the angels, as stated above (a. 6; only as to the Incarnation, but also as to the Passion and Ia, q. 111, a. 1). Now even the angels were in ignorance Resurrection, whereby the human race is delivered from of the mystery of the Incarnation: hence, according to the sin and death: for they would not, else, have foreshad- commentary of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), it is they who owed Christ’s Passion by certain sacrifices both before ask (Ps. 23:8): “Who is this king of glory?” and (Is. and after the Law, the meaning of which sacrifices was 63:1): “Who is this that cometh from Edom?” Therefore known by the learned explicitly, while the simple folk, men were not bound to believe explicitly in the mystery under the veil of those sacrifices, believed them to be or- of Christ’s Incarnation. dained by God in reference to Christ’s coming, and thus Objection 2. Further, it is evident that John the Baptist their knowledge was covered with a veil, so to speak. was one of the teachers, and most nigh to Christ, Who said And, as stated above (q. 1, a. 7), the nearer they were to of him (Mat. 11:11) that “there hath not risen among them Christ, the more distinct was their knowledge of Christ’s that are born of women, a greater than” he. Now John mysteries. the Baptist does not appear to have known the mystery of After grace had been revealed, both learned and sim- Christ explicitly, since he asked Christ (Mat. 11:3): “Art ple folk are bound to explicit faith in the mysteries Thou He that art to come, or look we for another?” There- of Christ, chiefly as regards those which are observed fore even the teachers were not bound to explicit faith in throughout the Church, and publicly proclaimed, such as Christ. the articles which refer to the Incarnation, of which we Objection 3. Further, many gentiles obtained salva- have spoken above (q. 1, a. 8). As to other minute points in tion through the ministry of the angels, as Dionysius states reference to the articles of the Incarnation, men have been (Coel. Hier. ix). Now it would seem that the gentiles had bound to believe them more or less explicitly according to neither explicit nor implicit faith in Christ, since they re- each one’s state and office. ceived no revelation. Therefore it seems that it was not Reply to Objection 1. The mystery of the Kingdom necessary for the salvation of all to believe explicitly in of God was not entirely hidden from the angels, as Au- the mystery of Christ. gustine observes (Gen. ad lit. v, 19), yet certain aspects On the contrary, Augustine says (De Corr. et Gra- thereof were better known to them when Christ revealed tia vii; Ep. cxc): “Our faith is sound if we believe that them to them. no man, old or young is delivered from the contagion of Reply to Objection 2. It was not through ignorance death and the bonds of sin, except by the one Mediator of that John the Baptist inquired of Christ’s advent in the God and men, Jesus Christ.” flesh, since he had clearly professed his belief therein, I answer that, As stated above (a. 5; q. 1, a. 8), the saying: “I saw, and I gave testimony, that this is the Son of object of faith includes, properly and directly, that thing God” (Jn. 1:34). Hence he did not say: “Art Thou He that through which man obtains beatitude. Now the mystery of hast come?” but “Art Thou He that art to come?” thus Christ’s Incarnation and Passion is the way by which men saying about the future, not about the past. Likewise it obtain beatitude; for it is written (Acts 4:12): “There is no is not to be believed that he was ignorant of Christ’s fu- other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must ture Passion, for he had already said (Jn. 1:39): “Behold be saved.” Therefore belief of some kind in the mystery of the Lamb of God, behold Him who taketh away the sins Christ’s Incarnation was necessary at all times and for all [Vulg.: ‘sin’] of the world,” thus foretelling His future im- persons, but this belief differed according to differences molation; and since other prophets had foretold it, as may of times and persons. The reason of this is that before the be seen especially in Isaias 53. We may therefore say with state of sin, man believed, explicitly in Christ’s Incarna- Gregory (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that he asked this ques- tion, in so far as it was intended for the consummation of tion, being in ignorance as to whether Christ would de- glory, but not as it was intended to deliver man from sin scend into hell in His own Person. But he did not ignore by the Passion and Resurrection, since man had no fore- the fact that the power of Christ’s Passion would be ex- knowledge of his future sin. He does, however, seem to tended to those who were detained in Limbo, according have had foreknowledge of the Incarnation of Christ, from to Zech. 9:11: “Thou also, by the blood of Thy testament the fact that he said (Gn. 2:24): “Wherefore a man shall hast sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit, wherein there 1203 is no water”; nor was he bound to believe explicitly, before read in the history of the Romans, that at the time of Con-its fulfilment, that Christ was to descend thither Himself. stantine Augustus and his mother Irene a tomb was dis- It may also be replied that, as Ambrose observes in covered, wherein lay a man on whose breast was a golden his commentary on Lk. 7:19, he made this inquiry, not plate with the inscription: “Christ shall be born of a vir- from doubt or ignorance but from devotion: or again, with gin, and in Him, I believe. O sun, during the lifetime Chrysostom (Hom. xxxvi in Matth.), that he inquired, not of Irene and Constantine, thou shalt see me again”∗. If, as though ignorant himself, but because he wished his dis- however, some were saved without receiving any revela- ciples to be satisfied on that point, through Christ: hence tion, they were not saved without faith in a Mediator, for, the latter framed His answer so as to instruct the disciples, though they did not believe in Him explicitly, they did, by pointing to the signs of His works. nevertheless, have implicit faith through believing in Di- Reply to Objection 3. Many of the gentiles received vine providence, since they believed that God would de- revelations of Christ, as is clear from their predictions. liver mankind in whatever way was pleasing to Him, and Thus we read (Job 19:25): “I know that my Redeemer according to the revelation of the Spirit to those who knew liveth.” The Sibyl too foretold certain things about Christ, the truth, as stated in Job 35:11: “Who teacheth us more as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xiii, 15). Moreover, we than the beasts of the earth.” Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe explicitly in the Trinity? IIa IIae q. 2 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that it was not necessary “Let us make man to Our image and likeness” (Gn. 1:26). for salvation to believe explicitly in the Trinity. For the Therefore from the very beginning it was necessary for Apostle says (Heb. 11:6): “He that cometh to God must salvation to believe in the Trinity. believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek I answer that, It is impossible to believe explicitly in Him.” Now one can believe this without believing in the the mystery of Christ, without faith in the Trinity, since Trinity. Therefore it was not necessary to believe explic- the mystery of Christ includes that the Son of God took itly in the Trinity. flesh; that He renewed the world through the grace of the Objection 2. Further our Lord said (Jn. 17:5,6): Holy Ghost; and again, that He was conceived by the Holy “Father, I have manifested Thy name to men,” which Ghost. Wherefore just as, before Christ, the mystery of words Augustine expounds (Tract. cvi) as follows: “Not Christ was believed explicitly by the learned, but implic- the name by which Thou art called God, but the name itly and under a veil, so to speak, by the simple, so too whereby Thou art called My Father,” and further on he was it with the mystery of the Trinity. And consequently, adds: “In that He made this world, God is known to all when once grace had been revealed, all were bound to ex- nations; in that He is not to be worshipped together with plicit faith in the mystery of the Trinity: and all who are false gods, ‘God is known in Judea’; but, in that He is the born again in Christ, have this bestowed on them by the Father of this Christ, through Whom He takes away the invocation of the Trinity, according to Mat. 28:19: “Going sin of the world, He now makes known to men this name therefore teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of His, which hitherto they knew not.” Therefore before of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.” the coming of Christ it was not known that Paternity and Reply to Objection 1. Explicit faith in those two Filiation were in the Godhead: and so the Trinity was not things was necessary at all times and for all people: but believed explicitly. it was not sufficient at all times and for all people. Objection 3. Further, that which we are bound to be- Reply to Objection 2. Before Christ’s coming, faith lieve explicitly of God is the object of heavenly happiness. in the Trinity lay hidden in the faith of the learned, but Now the object of heavenly happiness is the sovereign through Christ and the apostles it was shown to the world. good, which can be understood to be in God, without any Reply to Objection 3. God’s sovereign goodness as distinction of Persons. Therefore it was not necessary to we understand it now through its effects, can be under- believe explicitly in the Trinity. stood without the Trinity of Persons: but as understood in On the contrary, In the Old Testament the Trinity of itself, and as seen by the Blessed, it cannot be understood Persons is expressed in many ways; thus at the very out- without the Trinity of Persons. Moreover the mission of set of Genesis it is written in manifestation of the Trinity: the Divine Persons brings us to heavenly happiness. ∗ Cf. Baron, Annal., A.D. 780 1204 Whether to believe is meritorious? IIa IIae q. 2 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that to believe in not mer- cedes the ultimate form. Now it is evident that the subject itorious. For the principle of all merit is charity, as stated or the matter cannot act save by virtue of the form, nor can above ( Ia IIae, q. 114, a. 4). Now faith, like nature, is a a preceding disposition, before the advent of the form: but preamble to charity. Therefore, just as an act of nature is after the advent of the form, both the subject and the pre- not meritorious, since we do not merit by our natural gifts, ceding disposition act by virtue of the form, which is the so neither is an act of faith. chief principle of action, even as the heat of fire acts by Objection 2. Further, belief is a mean between opin- virtue of the substantial form of fire. Accordingly neither ion and scientific knowledge or the consideration of things nature nor faith can, without charity, produce a meritori- scientifically known∗. Now the considerations of science ous act; but, when accompanied by charity, the act of faith are not meritorious, nor on the other hand is opinion. is made meritorious thereby, even as an act of nature, and Therefore belief is not meritorious. a natural act of the free-will. Objection 3. Further, he who assents to a point of Reply to Objection 2. Two things may be considered faith, either has a sufficient motive for believing, or he in science: namely the scientist’s assent to a scientific fact has not. If he has a sufficient motive for his belief, this and his consideration of that fact. Now the assent of sci- does not seem to imply any merit on his part, since he is ence is not subject to free-will, because the scientist is no longer free to believe or not to believe: whereas if he obliged to assent by force of the demonstration, wherefore has not a sufficient motive for believing, this is a mark of scientific assent is not meritorious. But the actual consid- levity, according to Ecclus. 19:4: “He that is hasty to give eration of what a man knows scientifically is subject to his credit, is light of heart,” so that, seemingly, he gains no free-will, for it is in his power to consider or not to con- merit thereby. Therefore to believe is by no means meri- sider. Hence scientific consideration may be meritorious torious. if it be referred to the end of charity, i.e. to the honor of On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:33) that the God or the good of our neighbor. On the other hand, in the saints “by faith. . . obtained promises,” which would not case of faith, both these things are subject to the free-will be the case if they did not merit by believing. Therefore so that in both respects the act of faith can be meritorious: to believe is meritorious. whereas in the case of opinion, there is no firm assent, I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 114, since it is weak and infirm, as the Philosopher observes Aa. 3,4), our actions are meritorious in so far as they pro- (Poster. i, 33), so that it does not seem to proceed from a ceed from the free-will moved with grace by God. There- perfect act of the will: and for this reason, as regards the fore every human act proceeding from the free-will, if it assent, it does not appear to be very meritorious, though it be referred to God, can be meritorious. Now the act of can be as regards the actual consideration. believing is an act of the intellect assenting to the Divine Reply to Objection 3. The believer has sufficient mo- truth at the command of the will moved by the grace of tive for believing, for he is moved by the authority of Di- God, so that it is subject to the free-will in relation to God; vine teaching confirmed by miracles, and, what is more, and consequently the act of faith can be meritorious. by the inward instinct of the Divine invitation: hence he Reply to Objection 1. Nature is compared to charity does not believe lightly. He has not, however, sufficient which is the principle of merit, as matter to form: whereas reason for scientific knowledge, hence he does not lose faith is compared to charity as the disposition which pre- the merit. Whether reasons in support of what we believe lessen the merit of faith? IIa IIae q. 2 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that reasons in support of virtue, lessens the amount of merit, since “happiness of what we believe lessen the merit of faith. For Gregory is the reward of virtue,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that “there is no merit in be- i, 9). Now human reasoning seems to diminish the mea- lieving what is shown by reason.” If, therefore, human sure of the virtue of faith, since it is essential to faith to reason provides sufficient proof, the merit of faith is al- be about the unseen, as stated above (q. 1, Aa. 4,5). Now together taken away. Therefore it seems that any kind of the more a thing is supported by reasons the less is it un- human reasoning in support of matters of faith, diminishes seen. Therefore human reasons in support of matters of the merit of believing. faith diminish the merit of faith. Objection 2. Further, whatever lessens the measure Objection 3. Further, contrary things have contrary ∗ Science is a certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration. 1205 causes. Now an inducement in opposition to faith in-have an indication of this in the words of the Samaritans creases the merit of faith whether it consist in persecu- to the woman, who is a type of human reason: “We now tion inflicted by one who endeavors to force a man to believe, not for thy saying” (Jn. 4:42). renounce his faith, or in an argument persuading him to Reply to Objection 1. Gregory is referring to the case do so. Therefore reasons in support of faith diminish the of a man who has no will to believe what is of faith, unless merit of faith. he be induced by reasons. But when a man has the will to On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 3:15): “Being believe what is of faith on the authority of God alone, al- ready always to satisfy every one that asketh you a reason though he may have reasons in demonstration of some of of that faith∗ and hope which is in you.” Now the Apostle them, e.g. of the existence of God, the merit of his faith is would not give this advice, if it would imply a diminution not, for that reason, lost or diminished. in the merit of faith. Therefore reason does not diminish Reply to Objection 2. The reasons which are brought the merit of faith. forward in support of the authority of faith, are not demon- I answer that, As stated above (a. 9), the act of faith strations which can bring intellectual vision to the human can be meritorious, in so far as it is subject to the will, intellect, wherefore they do not cease to be unseen. But not only as to the use, but also as to the assent. Now hu- they remove obstacles to faith, by showing that what faith man reason in support of what we believe, may stand in a proposes is not impossible; wherefore such reasons do twofold relation to the will of the believer. First, as pre- not diminish the merit or the measure of faith. On the ceding the act of the will; as, for instance, when a man other hand, though demonstrative reasons in support of either has not the will, or not a prompt will, to believe, the preambles of faith†, but not of the articles of faith, unless he be moved by human reasons: and in this way diminish the measure of faith, since they make the thing human reason diminishes the merit of faith. In this sense believed to be seen, yet they do not diminish the measure it has been said above ( Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 3, ad 1; q. 77, of charity, which makes the will ready to believe them, a. 6, ad 2) that, in moral virtues, a passion which precedes even if they were unseen; and so the measure of merit is choice makes the virtuous act less praiseworthy. For just not diminished. as a man ought to perform acts of moral virtue, on ac- Reply to Objection 3. Whatever is in opposition to count of the judgment of his reason, and not on account faith, whether it consist in a man’s thoughts, or in out- of a passion, so ought he to believe matters of faith, not ward persecution, increases the merit of faith, in so far as on account of human reason, but on account of the Divine the will is shown to be more prompt and firm in believ- authority. Secondly, human reasons may be consequent ing. Hence the martyrs had more merit of faith, through to the will of the believer. For when a man’s will is ready not renouncing faith on account of persecution; and even to believe, he loves the truth he believes, he thinks out the wise have greater merit of faith, through not renounc- and takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support ing their faith on account of the reasons brought forward thereof; and in this way human reason does not exclude by philosophers or heretics in opposition to faith. On the the merit of faith but is a sign of greater merit. Thus again, other hand things that are favorable to faith, do not always in moral virtues a consequent passion is the sign of a more diminish the promptness of the will to believe, and there- prompt will, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 3, ad 1). We fore they do not always diminish the merit of faith. ∗ Vulg.: ‘Of that hope which is in you.’ St. Thomas’ reading is apparently taken from Bede. † The Leonine Edition reads: ‘in support of matters of faith which are however, preambles to the articles of faith, diminish,’ etc. 1206 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 3 Of the Outward Act of Faith (In Two Articles) We must now consider the outward act, viz. the confession of faith: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether confession is an act of faith? (2) Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation? Whether confession is an act of faith? IIa IIae q. 3 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that confession is not an ferred specifically as to its end, to that which concerns act of faith. For the same act does not belong to different faith, according to 2 Cor. 4:13: “Having the same spirit virtues. Now confession belongs to penance of which it is of faith. . . we believe, and therefore we speak also.” For a part. Therefore it is not an act of faith. the outward utterance is intended to signify the inward Objection 2. Further, man is sometimes deterred by thought. Wherefore, just as the inward thought of matters fear or some kind of confusion, from confessing his faith: of faith is properly an act of faith, so too is the outward wherefore the Apostle (Eph. 6:19) asks for prayers that confession of them. it may be granted him “with confidence, to make known Reply to Objection 1. A threefold confession is com- the mystery of the gospel.” Now it belongs to fortitude, mended by the Scriptures. One is the confession of mat- which moderates daring and fear, not to be deterred from ters of faith, and this is a proper act of faith, since it is doing good on account of confusion or fear. Therefore it referred to the end of faith as stated above. Another is the seems that confession is not an act of faith, but rather of confession of thanksgiving or praise, and this is an act of fortitude or constancy. “latria,” for its purpose is to give outward honor to God, Objection 3. Further, just as the ardor of faith makes which is the end of “latria.” The third is the confession of one confess one’s faith outwardly, so does it make one do sins, which is ordained to the blotting out of sins, which is other external good works, for it is written (Gal. 5:6) that the end of penance, to which virtue it therefore belongs. “faith. . . worketh by charity.” But other external works are Reply to Objection 2. That which removes an obsta- not reckoned acts of faith. Therefore neither is confession cle is not a direct, but an indirect, cause, as the Philoso- an act of faith. pher proves (Phys. viii, 4). Hence fortitude which re- On the contrary, A gloss explains the words of 2 moves an obstacle to the confession of faith, viz. fear or Thess. 1:11, “and the work of faith in power” as refer- shame, is not the proper and direct cause of confession, ring to “confession which is a work proper to faith.” but an indirect cause so to speak. I answer that, Outward actions belong properly to the Reply to Objection 3. Inward faith, with the aid of virtue to whose end they are specifically referred: thus charity, causes all outward acts of virtue, by means of fasting is referred specifically to the end of abstinence, the other virtues, commanding, but not eliciting them; which is to tame the flesh, and consequently it is an act of whereas it produces the act of confession as its proper act, abstinence. without the help of any other virtue. Now confession of those things that are of faith is re- Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation? IIa IIae q. 3 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that confession of faith necessary save for those who have to instruct others in is not necessary for salvation. For, seemingly, a thing is the faith. Therefore it seems that the simple folk are not sufficient for salvation, if it is a means of attaining the end bound to confess the faith. of virtue. Now the proper end of faith is the union of the Objection 3. Further, whatever may tend to scandal- human mind with Divine truth, and this can be realized ize and disturb others, is not necessary for salvation, for without any outward confession. Therefore confession of the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:32): “Be without offense to faith is not necessary for salvation. the Jews and to the gentiles and to the Church of God.” Objection 2. Further, by outward confession of faith, Now confession of faith sometimes causes a disturbance a man reveals his faith to another man. But this is un- among unbelievers. Therefore it is not necessary for sal- 1207 vation. the other virtues, must be referred to the end of char- On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 10:10): ity, which is the love of God and our neighbor. Conse- “With the heart we believe unto justice; but with the quently when God’s honor and our neighbor’s good de- mouth, confession is made unto salvation.” mand, man should not be contented with being united by I answer that, Things that are necessary for salvation faith to God’s truth, but ought to confess his faith out- come under the precepts of the Divine law. Now since wardly. confession of faith is something affirmative, it can only Reply to Objection 2. In cases of necessity where fall under an affirmative precept. Hence its necessity for faith is in danger, every one is bound to proclaim his faith salvation depends on how it falls under an affirmative pre- to others, either to give good example and encouragement cept of the Divine law. Now affirmative precepts as stated to the rest of the faithful, or to check the attacks of un- above ( Ia IIae, q. 71, a. 5, ad 3; Ia IIae, q. 88, a. 1, ad 2) believers: but at other times it is not the duty of all the do not bind for always, although they are always binding; faithful to instruct others in the faith. but they bind as to place and time according to other due Reply to Objection 3. There is nothing commendable circumstances, in respect of which human acts have to be in making a public confession of one’s faith, if it causes a regulated in order to be acts of virtue. disturbance among unbelievers, without any profit either Thus then it is not necessary for salvation to confess to the faith or to the faithful. Hence Our Lord said (Mat. one’s faith at all times and in all places, but in certain 7:6): “Give not that which is holy to dogs, neither cast places and at certain times, when, namely, by omitting to ye your pearls before swine. . . lest turning upon you, they do so, we would deprive God of due honor, or our neigh- tear you.” Yet, if there is hope of profit to the faith, or if bor of a service that we ought to render him: for instance, there be urgency, a man should disregard the disturbance if a man, on being asked about his faith, were to remain of unbelievers, and confess his faith in public. Hence it is silent, so as to make people believe either that he is with- written (Mat. 15:12) that when the disciples had said to out faith, or that the faith is false, or so as to turn others Our Lord that “the Pharisee, when they heard this word, away from the faith; for in such cases as these, confession were scandalized,” He answered: “Let them alone, they of faith is necessary for salvation. are blind, and leaders of the blind.” Reply to Objection 1. The end of faith, even as of 1208 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 4 Of the Virtue Itself of Faith (In Eight Articles) We must now consider the virtue itself of faith, and, in the first place, faith itself; secondly, those who have faith; thirdly, the cause of faith; fourthly, its effects. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) What is faith? (2) In what power of the soul does it reside? (3) Whether its form is charity? (4) Whether living [formata] faith and lifeless [informis] faith are one identically? (5) Whether faith is a virtue? (6) Whether it is one virtue? (7) Of its relation to the other virtues; (8) Of its certitude as compared with the certitude of the intellectual virtues. Whether this is a fitting definition of faith: “Faith is the substance of things to be IIa IIae q. 4 a. 1 hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not?” Objection 1. It would seem that the Apostle gives a definition, just as the philosophers touch on the princi- an unfitting definition of faith (Heb. 11:1) when he says: ples of the syllogism, without employing the syllogistic “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evi- form. dence of things that appear not.” For no quality is a sub- In order to make this clear, we must observe that since stance: whereas faith is a quality, since it is a theological habits are known by their acts, and acts by their objects, virtue, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 62, a. 3). Therefore it faith, being a habit, should be defined by its proper act in is not a substance. relation to its proper object. Now the act of faith is to be- Objection 2. Further, different virtues have different lieve, as stated above (q. 2, Aa. 2,3), which is an act of the objects. Now things to be hoped for are the object of hope. intellect determinate to one object of the will’s command. Therefore they should not be included in a definition of Hence an act of faith is related both to the object of the faith, as though they were its object. will, i.e. to the good and the end, and to the object of the Objection 3. Further, faith is perfected by charity intellect, i.e. to the true. And since faith, through being a rather than by hope, since charity is the form of faith, as theological virtues, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 62, a. 2), we shall state further on (a. 3). Therefore the definition has one same thing for object and end, its object and end of faith should have included the thing to be loved rather must, of necessity, be in proportion to one another. Now than the thing to be hoped for. it has been already stated (q. 1, Aa. 1,4) that the object of Objection 4. Further, the same thing should not be faith is the First Truth, as unseen, and whatever we hold placed in different genera. Now “substance” and “evi- on account thereof: so that it must needs be under the as- dence” are different genera, and neither is subalternate to pect of something unseen that the First Truth is the end of the other. Therefore it is unfitting to state that faith is both the act of faith, which aspect is that of a thing hoped for, “substance” and “evidence.” according to the Apostle (Rom. 8:25): “We hope for that Objection 5. Further, evidence manifests the truth of which we see not”: because to see the truth is to possess the matter for which it is adduced. Now a thing is said to it. Now one hopes not for what one has already, but for be apparent when its truth is already manifest. Therefore what one has not, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 67, a. 4). Ac- it seems to imply a contradiction to speak of “evidence of cordingly the relation of the act of faith to its end which things that appear not”: and so faith is unfittingly defined. is the object of the will, is indicated by the words: “Faith On the contrary, The authority of the Apostle suf- is the substance of things to be hoped for.” For we are fices. wont to call by the name of substance, the first beginning I answer that, Though some say that the above words of a thing, especially when the whole subsequent thing is of the Apostle are not a definition of faith, yet if we con- virtually contained in the first beginning; for instance, we sider the matter aright, this definition overlooks none of might say that the first self-evident principles are the sub- the points in reference to which faith can be defined, al- stance of science, because, to wit, these principles are in beit the words themselves are not arranged in the form of us the first beginnings of science, the whole of which is 1209 itself contained in them virtually. In this way then faith not see,” and when Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, is said to be the “substance of things to be hoped for,” for 11) that “faith is an assent without research,” and when the reason that in us the first beginning of things to be others say that “faith is that certainty of the mind about hoped for is brought about by the assent of faith, which absent things which surpasses opinion but falls short of contains virtually all things to be hoped for. Because we science,” these all amount to the same as the Apostle’s hope to be made happy through seeing the unveiled truth words: “Evidence of things that appear not”; and when to which our faith cleaves, as was made evident when we Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that “faith is the solid were speaking of happiness ( Ia IIae, q. 3, a. 8; Ia IIae, foundation of the believer, establishing him in the truth, q. 4, a. 3). and showing forth the truth in him,” comes to the same as The relationship of the act of faith to the object of the “substance of things to be hoped for.” intellect, considered as the object of faith, is indicated by Reply to Objection 1. “Substance” here does not the words, “evidence of things that appear not,” where stand for the supreme genus condivided with the other “evidence” is taken for the result of evidence. For evi- genera, but for that likeness to substance which is found in dence induces the intellect to adhere to a truth, wherefore each genus, inasmuch as the first thing in a genus contains the firm adhesion of the intellect to the non-apparent truth the others virtually and is said to be the substance thereof. of faith is called “evidence” here. Hence another reading Reply to Objection 2. Since faith pertains to the intel- has “conviction,” because to wit, the intellect of the be- lect as commanded by the will, it must needs be directed, liever is convinced by Divine authority, so as to assent to as to its end, to the objects of those virtues which perfect what it sees not. Accordingly if anyone would reduce the the will, among which is hope, as we shall prove further foregoing words to the form of a definition, he may say on (q. 18, a. 1). For this reason the definition of faith in- that “faith is a habit of the mind, whereby eternal life is cludes the object of hope. begun in us, making the intellect assent to what is non- Reply to Objection 3. Love may be of the seen and of apparent.” the unseen, of the present and of the absent. Consequently In this way faith is distinguished from all other things a thing to be loved is not so adapted to faith, as a thing to pertaining to the intellect. For when we describe it as “ev- be hoped for, since hope is always of the absent and the idence,” we distinguish it from opinion, suspicion, and unseen. doubt, which do not make the intellect adhere to anything Reply to Objection 4. “Substance” and “evidence” as firmly; when we go on to say, “of things that appear not,” included in the definition of faith, do not denote various we distinguish it from science and understanding, the ob- genera of faith, nor different acts, but different relation- ject of which is something apparent; and when we say that ships of one act to different objects, as is clear from what it is “the substance of things to be hoped for,” we distin- has been said. guish the virtue of faith from faith commonly so called, Reply to Objection 5. Evidence taken from the which has no reference to the beatitude we hope for. proper principles of a thing, make it apparent, whereas ev- Whatever other definitions are given of faith, are ex- idence taken from Divine authority does not make a thing planations of this one given by the Apostle. For when apparent in itself, and such is the evidence referred to in Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.: QQ. Evang. ii, qu. the definition of faith. 39) that “faith is a virtue whereby we believe what we do Whether faith resides in the intellect? IIa IIae q. 4 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that faith does not reside avoided, as stated in De Anima iii, 9, so that it is not a in the intellect. For Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. principle of operation, whereas “faith. . . worketh by char- v) that “faith resides in the believer’s will.” Now the will ity” (Gal. 5:6). Likewise, neither is it in the practical in- is a power distinct from the intellect. Therefore faith does tellect, the object of which is some true, contingent thing, not reside in the intellect. that can be made or done. For the object of faith is the Objection 2. Further, the assent of faith to believe Eternal Truth, as was shown above (q. 1, a. 1). Therefore anything, proceeds from the will obeying God. Therefore faith does not reside in the intellect. it seems that faith owes all its praise to obedience. Now On the contrary, Faith is succeeded by the heavenly obedience is in the will. Therefore faith is in the will, and vision, according to 1 Cor. 13:12: “We see now through a not in the intellect. glass in a dark manner; but then face to face.” Now vision Objection 3. Further, the intellect is either speculative is in the intellect. Therefore faith is likewise. or practical. Now faith is not in the speculative intellect, I answer that, Since faith is a virtue, its act must since this is not concerned with things to be sought or needs be perfect. Now, for the perfection of an act pro- 1210 ceeding from two active principles, each of these princi-sequently faith, which is the proper principle of that act, ples must be perfect: for it is not possible for a thing to must needs reside in the intellect. be sawn well, unless the sawyer possess the art, and the Reply to Objection 1. Augustine takes faith for the saw be well fitted for sawing. Now, in a power of the act of faith, which is described as depending on the be- soul, which is related to opposite objects, a disposition to liever’s will, in so far as his intellect assents to matters of act well is a habit, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 49, a. 4, faith at the command of the will. ad 1,2,3). Wherefore an act that proceeds from two such Reply to Objection 2. Not only does the will need powers must be perfected by a habit residing in each of to be ready to obey but also the intellect needs to be well them. Again, it has been stated above (q. 2, Aa. 1,2) that disposed to follow the command of the will, even as the to believe is an act of the intellect inasmuch as the will concupiscible faculty needs to be well disposed in order moves it to assent. And this act proceeds from the will to follow the command of reason; hence there needs to be and the intellect, both of which have a natural aptitude a habit of virtue not only in the commanding will but also to be perfected in this way. Consequently, if the act of in the assenting intellect. faith is to be perfect, there needs to be a habit in the will Reply to Objection 3. Faith resides in the speculative as well as in the intellect: even as there needs to be the intellect, as evidenced by its object. But since this object, habit of prudence in the reason, besides the habit of tem- which is the First Truth, is the end of all our desires and perance in the concupiscible faculty, in order that the act actions, as Augustine proves (De Trin. i, 8), it follows that of that faculty be perfect. Now, to believe is immediately faith worketh by charity just as “the speculative intellect an act of the intellect, because the object of that act is becomes practical by extension” (De Anima iii, 10). “the true,” which pertains properly to the intellect. Con- Whether charity is the form of faith? IIa IIae q. 4 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not the form voluntary act is, in a manner, the end to which that act is of faith. For each thing derives its species from its form. directed, both because it takes its species therefrom, and When therefore two things are opposite members of a di- because the mode of an action should correspond propor- vision, one cannot be the form of the other. Now faith and tionately to the end. Now it is evident from what has been charity are stated to be opposite members of a division, said (a. 1), that the act of faith is directed to the object of as different species of virtue (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore the will, i.e. the good, as to its end: and this good which charity is not the form of faith. is the end of faith, viz. the Divine Good, is the proper Objection 2. Further, a form and the thing of which object of charity. Therefore charity is called the form of it is the form are in one subject, since together they form faith in so far as the act of faith is perfected and formed one simply. Now faith is in the intellect, while charity is by charity. in the will. Therefore charity is not the form of faith. Reply to Objection 1. Charity is called the form of Objection 3. Further, the form of a thing is a princi- faith because it quickens the act of faith. Now nothing ple thereof. Now obedience, rather than charity, seems to hinders one act from being quickened by different habits, be the principle of believing, on the part of the will, ac- so as to be reduced to various species in a certain order, as cording to Rom. 1:5: “For obedience to the faith in all stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 18, Aa. 6,7; Ia IIae, q. 61, a. 2) nations.” Therefore obedience rather than charity, is the when we were treating of human acts in general. form of faith. Reply to Objection 2. This objection is true of an in- On the contrary, Each thing works through its form. trinsic form. But it is not thus that charity is the form of Now faith works through charity. Therefore the love of faith, but in the sense that it quickens the act of faith, as charity is the form of faith. explained above. I answer that, As appears from what has been said Reply to Objection 3. Even obedience, and hope like- above ( Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 6), voluntary acts wise, and whatever other virtue might precede the act of take their species from their end which is the will’s object. faith, is quickened by charity, as we shall show further on Now that which gives a thing its species, is after the man- (q. 23, a. 8), and consequently charity is spoken of as the ner of a form in natural things. Wherefore the form of any form of faith. 1211 Whether lifeless faith can become living, or living faith, lifeless? IIa IIae q. 4 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that lifeless faith does not that pertains directly to faith, which pertains to the intel- become living, or living faith lifeless. For, according to lect. Again, what pertains to the will, does not pertain 1 Cor. 13:10, “when that which is perfect is come, that directly to faith, so as to be able to differentiate the habit which is in part shall be done away.” Now lifeless faith is of faith. But the distinction of living from lifeless faith is imperfect in comparison with living faith. Therefore when in respect of something pertaining to the will, i.e. charity, living faith comes, lifeless faith is done away, so that they and not in respect of something pertaining to the intellect. are not one identical habit. Therefore living and lifeless faith are not distinct habits. Objection 2. Further, a dead thing does not become a Reply to Objection 1. The saying of the Apostle living thing. Now lifeless faith is dead, according to James refers to those imperfect things from which imperfection 2:20: “Faith without works is dead.” Therefore lifeless is inseparable, for then, when the perfect comes the im- faith cannot become living. perfect must needs be done away. Thus with the advent of Objection 3. Further, God’s grace, by its advent, has clear vision, faith is done away, because it is essentially no less effect in a believer than in an unbeliever. Now “of the things that appear not.” When, however, imper- by coming to an unbeliever it causes the habit of faith. fection is not inseparable from the imperfect thing, the Therefore when it comes to a believer, who hitherto had same identical thing which was imperfect becomes per- the habit of lifeless faith, it causes another habit of faith fect. Thus childhood is not essential to man and conse- in him. quently the same identical subject who was a child, be- Objection 4. Further, as Boethius says (In Categ. comes a man. Now lifelessness is not essential to faith, Arist. i), “accidents cannot be altered.” Now faith is an but is accidental thereto as stated above. Therefore life- accident. Therefore the same faith cannot be at one time less faith itself becomes living. living, and at another, lifeless. Reply to Objection 2. That which makes an animal On the contrary, A gloss on the words, “Faith with- live is inseparable from an animal, because it is its sub- out works is dead” (James 2:20) adds, “by which it lives stantial form, viz. the soul: consequently a dead thing once more.” Therefore faith which was lifeless and with- cannot become a living thing, and a living and a dead out form hitherto, becomes formed and living. thing differ specifically. On the other hand that which I answer that, There have been various opinions on gives faith its form, or makes it live, is not essential to this question. For some∗ have said that living and lifeless faith. Hence there is no comparison. faith are distinct habits, but that when living faith comes, Reply to Objection 3. Grace causes faith not only lifeless faith is done away, and that, in like manner, when when faith begins anew to be in a man, but also as long a man sins mortally after having living faith, a new habit as faith lasts. For it has been said above ( Ia, q. 104, a. 1; of lifeless faith is infused into him by God. But it seems Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 9) that God is always working man’s unfitting that grace should deprive man of a gift of God by justification, even as the sun is always lighting up the air. coming to him, and that a gift of God should be infused Hence grace is not less effective when it comes to a be- into man, on account of a mortal sin. liever than when it comes to an unbeliever: since it causes Consequently others† have said that living and lifeless faith in both, in the former by confirming and perfecting faith are indeed distinct habits, but that, all the same, when it, in the latter by creating it anew. living faith comes the habit of lifeless faith is not taken We might also reply that it is accidental, namely on ac- away, and that it remains together with the habit of living count of the disposition of the subject, that grace does not faith in the same subject. Yet again it seems unreasonable cause faith in one who has it already: just as, on the other that the habit of lifeless faith should remain inactive in a hand, a second mortal sin does not take away grace from person having living faith. one who has already lost it through a previous mortal sin. We must therefore hold differently that living and life- Reply to Objection 4. When living faith becomes less faith are one and the same habit. The reason is that lifeless, faith is not changed, but its subject, the soul, a habit is differentiated by that which directly pertains to which at one time has faith without charity, and at another that habit. Now since faith is a perfection of the intellect, time, with charity. ∗ William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 15 † Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. iii, 64 1212 Whether faith is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 4 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that faith is not a virtue. the will: just as if temperance be in the concupiscible, For virtue is directed to the good, since “it is virtue that without prudence being in the rational part, temperance is makes its subject good,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. not a virtue, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 1), because ii, 6). But faith is directed to the true. Therefore faith is the act of temperance requires both an act of reason, and not a virtue. an act of the concupiscible faculty, even as the act of faith Objection 2. Further, infused virtue is more perfect requires an act of the will, and an act of the intellect. than acquired virtue. Now faith, on account of its im- Reply to Objection 1. The truth is itself the good of perfection, is not placed among the acquired intellectual the intellect, since it is its perfection: and consequently virtues, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3). Much faith has a relation to some good in so far as it directs the less, therefore, can it be considered an infused virtue. intellect to the true. Furthermore, it has a relation to the Objection 3. Further, living and lifeless faith are the good considered as the object of the will, inasmuch as it same species, as stated above (a. 4). Now lifeless faith is formed by charity. is not a virtue, since it is not connected with the other Reply to Objection 2. The faith of which the Philoso- virtues. Therefore neither is living faith a virtue. pher speaks is based on human reasoning in a conclusion Objection 4. Further, the gratuitous graces and the which does not follow, of necessity, from its premisses; fruits are distinct from the virtues. But faith is numbered and which is subject to be false: hence such like faith is among the gratuitous graces (1 Cor. 12:9) and likewise not a virtue. On the other hand, the faith of which we are among the fruits (Gal. 5:23). Therefore faith is not a speaking is based on the Divine Truth, which is infallible, virtue. and consequently its object cannot be anything false; so On the contrary, Man is justified by the virtues, since that faith of this kind can be a virtue. “justice is all virtue,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, Reply to Objection 3. Living and lifeless faith do 1). Now man is justified by faith according to Rom. 5:1: not differ specifically, as though they belonged to different “Being justified therefore by faith let us have peace,” etc. species. But they differ as perfect and imperfect within the Therefore faith is a virtue. same species. Hence lifeless faith, being imperfect, does I answer that, As shown above, it is by human virtue not satisfy the conditions of a perfect virtue, for “virtue is that human acts are rendered good; hence, any habit that is a kind of perfection” (Phys. vii, text. 18). always the principle of a good act, may be called a human Reply to Objection 4. Some say that faith which is virtue. Such a habit is living faith. For since to believe numbered among the gratuitous graces is lifeless faith. is an act of the intellect assenting to the truth at the com- But this is said without reason, since the gratuitous graces, mand of the will, two things are required that this act may which are mentioned in that passage, are not common to be perfect: one of which is that the intellect should infal- all the members of the Church: wherefore the Apostle libly tend to its object, which is the true; while the other says: “There are diversities of graces,” and again, “To one is that the will should be infallibly directed to the last end, is given” this grace and “to another” that. Now lifeless on account of which it assents to the true: and both of faith is common to all members of the Church, because these are to be found in the act of living faith. For it be- its lifelessness is not part of its substance, if we consider longs to the very essence of faith that the intellect should it as a gratuitous gift. We must, therefore, say that in that ever tend to the true, since nothing false can be the object passage, faith denotes a certain excellency of faith, for in- of faith, as proved above (q. 1, a. 3): while the effect of stance, “constancy in faith,” according to a gloss, or the charity, which is the form of faith, is that the soul ever has “word of faith.” its will directed to a good end. Therefore living faith is a Faith is numbered among the fruits, in so far as it virtue. gives a certain pleasure in its act by reason of its certainty, On the other hand, lifeless faith is not a virtue, be-wherefore the gloss on the fifth chapter to the Galatians, cause, though the act of lifeless faith is duly perfect on the where the fruits are enumerated, explains faith as being part of the intellect, it has not its due perfection as regards “certainty about the unseen.” Whether faith is one virtue? IIa IIae q. 4 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that faith is not one. For in this, that wisdom is about eternal things, and knowl- just as faith is a gift of God according to Eph. 2:8, so also edge about temporal things, as Augustine states (De Trin. wisdom and knowledge are numbered among God’s gifts xii, 14,15). Since, then, faith is about eternal things, and according to Is. 11:2. Now wisdom and knowledge differ also about some temporal things, it seems that faith is not 1213 one virtue, but divided into several parts. specifically, but differs numerically according to its vari- Objection 2. Further, confession is an act of faith, as ous subjects. stated above (q. 3, a. 1). Now confession of faith is not one If, on the other hand, we take faith for that which is and the same for all: since what we confess as past, the fa- believed, then, again, there is one faith, since what is be- thers of old confessed as yet to come, as appears from Is. lieved by all is one same thing: for though the things be- 7:14: “Behold a virgin shall conceive.” Therefore faith is lieved, which all agree in believing, be diverse from one not one. another, yet they are all reduced to one. Objection 3. Further, faith is common to all believers Reply to Objection 1. Temporal matters which are in Christ. But one accident cannot be in many subjects. proposed to be believed, do not belong to the object of Therefore all cannot have one faith. faith, except in relation to something eternal, viz. the On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:5): “One First Truth, as stated above (q. 1, a. 1). Hence there is Lord, one faith.” one faith of things both temporal and eternal. It is differ- I answer that, If we take faith as a habit, we can con- ent with wisdom and knowledge, which consider temporal sider it in two ways. First on the part of the object, and and eternal matters under their respective aspects. thus there is one faith. Because the formal object of faith Reply to Objection 2. This difference of past and fu- is the First Truth, by adhering to which we believe what- ture arises, not from any difference in the thing believed, ever is contained in the faith. Secondly, on the part of the but from the different relationships of believers to the one subject, and thus faith is differentiated according as it is thing believed, as also we have mentioned above ( Ia IIae, in various subjects. Now it is evident that faith, just as q. 103, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 107, a. 1, ad 1). any other habit, takes its species from the formal aspect Reply to Objection 3. This objection considers nu- of its object, but is individualized by its subject. Hence if merical diversity of faith. we take faith for the habit whereby we believe, it is one Whether faith is the first of the virtues? IIa IIae q. 4 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that faith is not the first “faith is the substance of things to be hoped for.” Now the of the virtues. For a gloss on Lk. 12:4, “I say to you My substance of a thing is that which comes first. Therefore friends,” says that fortitude is the foundation of faith. Now faith is first among the virtues. the foundation precedes that which is founded thereon. I answer that, One thing can precede another in two Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues. ways: first, by its very nature; secondly, by accident. Objection 2. Further, a gloss on Ps. 36, “Be not emu- Faith, by its very nature, precedes all other virtues. For lous,” says that hope “leads on to faith.” Now hope is a since the end is the principle in matters of action, as stated virtue, as we shall state further on (q. 17, a. 1). Therefore above ( Ia IIae, q. 13, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 34, a. 4, ad 1), the the-faith is not the first of the virtues. ological virtues, the object of which is the last end, must Objection 3. Further, it was stated above (a. 2) that needs precede all the others. Again, the last end must of the intellect of the believer is moved, out of obedience to necessity be present to the intellect before it is present to God, to assent to matters of faith. Now obedience also is the will, since the will has no inclination for anything ex- a virtue. Therefore faith is not the first virtue. cept in so far as it is apprehended by the intellect. Hence, Objection 4. Further, not lifeless but living faith is as the last end is present in the will by hope and char- the foundation, as a gloss remarks on 1 Cor. 3:11∗. Now ity, and in the intellect, by faith, the first of all the virtues faith is formed by charity, as stated above (a. 3). There-must, of necessity, be faith, because natural knowledge fore it is owing to charity that faith is the foundation: so cannot reach God as the object of heavenly bliss, which that charity is the foundation yet more than faith is (for the is the aspect under which hope and charity tend towards foundation is the first part of a building) and consequently Him. it seems to precede faith. On the other hand, some virtues can precede faith acci- Objection 5. Further, the order of habits is taken from dentally. For an accidental cause precedes its effect acci- the order of acts. Now, in the act of faith, the act of the will dentally. Now that which removes an obstacle is a kind of which is perfected by charity, precedes the act of the intel- accidental cause, according to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, lect, which is perfected by faith, as the cause which pre- 4): and in this sense certain virtues may be said to pre- cedes its effect. Therefore charity precedes faith. There- cede faith accidentally, in so far as they remove obstacles fore faith is not the first of the virtues. to belief. Thus fortitude removes the inordinate fear that On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that hinders faith; humility removes pride, whereby a man re- ∗ Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi. 1214 fuses to submit himself to the truth of faith. The same may an inclination to fulfil the commandments considered as be said of some other virtues, although there are no real a duty. In this way it is a special virtue, and a part of virtues, unless faith be presupposed, as Augustine states justice: for a man does his duty by his superior when (Contra Julian. iv, 3). he obeys him: and thus obedience follows faith, whereby This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. man knows that God is his superior, Whom he must obey. Reply to Objection 2. Hope cannot lead to faith ab- Reply to Objection 4. To be a foundation a thing re- solutely. For one cannot hope to obtain eternal happiness, quires not only to come first, but also to be connected with unless one believes this possible, since hope does not tend the other parts of the building: since the building would to the impossible, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 40, a. 1). not be founded on it unless the other parts adhered to it. It is, however, possible for one to be led by hope to per- Now the connecting bond of the spiritual edifice is charity, severe in faith, or to hold firmly to faith; and it is in this according to Col. 3:14: “Above all. . . things have charity sense that hope is said to lead to faith. which is the bond of perfection.” Consequently faith with- Reply to Objection 3. Obedience is twofold: for out charity cannot be the foundation: and yet it does not sometimes it denotes the inclination of the will to ful- follow that charity precedes faith. fil God’s commandments. In this way it is not a special Reply to Objection 5. Some act of the will is required virtue, but is a general condition of every virtue; since before faith, but not an act of the will quickened by char- all acts of virtue come under the precepts of the Divine ity. This latter act presupposes faith, because the will can- law, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 2); and thus it not tend to God with perfect love, unless the intellect pos- is requisite for faith. In another way, obedience denotes sesses right faith about Him. Whether faith is more certain than science and the other intellectual virtues? IIa IIae q. 4 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that faith is not more cer- ad 2) two of the intellectual virtues are about contingent tain than science and the other intellectual virtues. For matter, viz. prudence and art; to which faith is prefer- doubt is opposed to certitude, wherefore a thing would able in point of certitude, by reason of its matter, since seem to be the more certain, through being less doubtful, it is about eternal things, which never change, whereas just as a thing is the whiter, the less it has of an admixture the other three intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science† of black. Now understanding, science and also wisdom and understanding, are about necessary things, as stated are free of any doubt about their objects; whereas the be- above ( Ia IIae, q. 57, a. 5, ad 3). But it must be observed liever may sometimes suffer a movement of doubt, and that wisdom, science and understanding may be taken in doubt about matters of faith. Therefore faith is no more two ways: first, as intellectual virtues, according to the certain than the intellectual virtues. Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3); secondly, for the gifts of the Objection 2. Further, sight is more certain than hear- Holy Ghost. If we consider them in the first way, we must ing. But “faith is through hearing” according to Rom. note that certitude can be looked at in two ways. First, on 10:17; whereas understanding, science and wisdom im- the part of its cause, and thus a thing which has a more cer- ply some kind of intellectual sight. Therefore science and tain cause, is itself more certain. In this way faith is more understanding are more certain than faith. certain than those three virtues, because it is founded on Further, in matters concerning the intellect, the more the Divine truth, whereas the aforesaid three virtues are perfect is the more certain. Now understanding is more based on human reason. Secondly, certitude may be con- perfect than faith, since faith is the way to understand- sidered on the part of the subject, and thus the more a ing, according to another version∗ of Is. 7:9: “If you will man’s intellect lays hold of a thing, the more certain it is. not believe, you shall not understand [Vulg.: ‘continue’]”: In this way, faith is less certain, because matters of faith and Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that “faith is strength- are above the human intellect, whereas the objects of the ened by science.” Therefore it seems that science or un- aforesaid three virtues are not. Since, however, a thing is derstanding is more certain than faith. judged simply with regard to its cause, but relatively, with On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:15): respect to a disposition on the part of the subject, it fol- “When you had received of us the word of the hearing,” lows that faith is more certain simply, while the others are i.e. by faith. . . “you received it not as the word of men, more certain relatively, i.e. for us. Likewise if these three but, as it is indeed, the word of God.” Now nothing is be taken as gifts received in this present life, they are re- more certain than the word of God. Therefore science is lated to faith as to their principle which they presuppose: not more certain than faith; nor is anything else. so that again, in this way, faith is more certain. I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 57, a. 4, Reply to Objection 1. This doubt is not on the side of ∗ The Septuagint † In English the corresponding ‘gift’ is called knowledge 1215 the cause of faith, but on our side, in so far as we do not Reply to Objection 3. The gifts of understanding and fully grasp matters of faith with our intellect. knowledge are more perfect than the knowledge of faith Reply to Objection 2. Other things being equal sight in the point of their greater clearness, but not in regard is more certain than hearing; but if (the authority of) the to more certain adhesion: because the whole certitude of person from whom we hear greatly surpasses that of the the gifts of understanding and knowledge, arises from the seer’s sight, hearing is more certain than sight: thus a man certitude of faith, even as the certitude of the knowledge of little science is more certain about what he hears on the of conclusions arises from the certitude of premisses. But authority of an expert in science, than about what is appar- in so far as science, wisdom and understanding are intel- ent to him according to his own reason: and much more is lectual virtues, they are based upon the natural light of a man certain about what he hears from God, Who cannot reason, which falls short of the certitude of God’s word, be deceived, than about what he sees with his own reason, on which faith is founded. which can be mistaken. 1216 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 5 Of Those Who Have Faith (In Four Articles) We must now consider those who have faith: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their original state? (2) Whether the demons have faith? (3) Whether those heretics who err in one article, have faith in others? (4) Whether among those who have faith, one has it more than another? Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their original state? IIa IIae q. 5 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there was no faith, xl in Joan.; QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39), that manifestation either in the angels, or in man, in their original state. alone excludes faith, which renders apparent or seen the For Hugh St. Victor says in his Sentences (De Sacram. principal object of faith. Now the principal object of faith i, 10) that “man cannot see God or things that are in is the First Truth, the sight of which gives the happiness God, because he closes his eyes to contemplation.” Now of heaven and takes the place of faith. Consequently, as the angels, in their original state, before they were either the angels before their confirmation in grace, and man be- confirmed in grace, or had fallen from it, had their eyes fore sin, did not possess the happiness whereby God is opened to contemplation, since “they saw things in the seen in His Essence, it is evident that the knowledge they Word,” according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). Like- possessed was not such as to exclude faith. wise the first man, while in the state of innocence, seem- It follows then, that the absence of faith in them could ingly had his eyes open to contemplation; for Hugh St. only be explained by their being altogether ignorant of Victor says (De Sacram. i, 6) that “in his original state the object of faith. And if man and the angels were cre- man knew his Creator, not by the mere outward percep- ated in a purely natural state, as some∗ hold, perhaps one tion of hearing, but by inward inspiration, not as now be- might hold that there was no faith in the angels before lievers seek an absent God by faith, but by seeing Him their confirmation in grace, or in man before sin, because clearly present to their contemplation.” Therefore there the knowledge of faith surpasses not only a man’s but even was no faith in the angels and man in their original state. an angel’s natural knowledge about God. Objection 2. Further, the knowledge of faith is dark Since, however, we stated in the Ia, q. 62, a. 3; Ia, and obscure, according to 1 Cor. 13:13: “We see now q. 95, a. 1 that man and the angels were created with the through a glass in a dark manner.” Now in their original gift of grace, we must needs say that there was in them state there was not obscurity either in the angels or in man, a certain beginning of hoped-for happiness, by reason of because it is a punishment of sin. Therefore there could grace received but not yet consummated, which happiness be no faith in the angels or in man, in their original state. was begun in their will by hope and charity, and in the in- Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 10:17) tellect by faith, as stated above (q. 4, a. 7). Consequently that “faith. . . cometh by hearing.” Now this could not ap- we must hold that the angels had faith before they were ply to angels and man in their original state; for then they confirmed, and man, before he sinned. Nevertheless we could not hear anything from another. Therefore, in that must observe that in the object of faith, there is something state, there was no faith either in man or in the angels. formal, as it were, namely the First Truth surpassing all On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): “He that the natural knowledge of a creature, and something mate- cometh to God, must believe.” Now the original state of rial, namely, the thing to which we assent while adhering angels and man was one of approach to God. Therefore to the First Truth. With regard to the former, before ob- they had need of faith. taining the happiness to come, faith is common to all who I answer that, Some say that there was no faith in the have knowledge of God, by adhering to the First Truth: angels before they were confirmed in grace or fell from whereas with regard to the things which are proposed as it, and in man before he sinned, by reason of the manifest the material object of faith, some are believed by one, and contemplation that they had of Divine things. Since, how- known manifestly by another, even in the present state, ever, “faith is the evidence of things that appear not,” ac- as we have shown above (q. 1, a. 5; q. 2, a. 4, ad 2). In cording to the Apostle (Heb. 11:2), and since “by faith we this respect, too, it may be said that the angels before be- believe what we see not,” according to Augustine (Tract. ing confirmed, and man, before sin, possessed manifest ∗ St. Bonaventure, Sent. ii, D, 29 1217 knowledge about certain points in the Divine mysteries, since by the light of wisdom He was more present to them which now we cannot know except by believing them. than He is to us, although He was not so present to them Reply to Objection 1. Although the words of Hugh as He is to the Blessed by the light of glory. of St. Victor are those of a master, and have the force Reply to Objection 2. There was no darkness of sin of an authority, yet it may be said that the contemplation or punishment in the original state of man and the angels, which removes the need of faith is heavenly contempla- but there was a certain natural obscurity in the human and tion, whereby the supernatural truth is seen in its essence. angelic intellect, in so far as every creature is darkness in Now the angels did not possess this contemplation before comparison with the immensity of the Divine light: and they were confirmed, nor did man before he sinned: yet this obscurity suffices for faith. their contemplation was of a higher order than ours, for by Reply to Objection 3. In the original state there was its means they approached nearer to God, and had mani- no hearing anything from man speaking outwardly, but fest knowledge of more of the Divine effects and myster- there was from God inspiring inwardly: thus the prophets ies than we can have knowledge of. Hence faith was not in heard, as expressed by the Ps. 84:9: “I will hear what the them so that they sought an absent God as we seek Him: Lord God will speak in me.” Whether in the demons there is faith? IIa IIae q. 5 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the demons have no through the will being directed to the good, and in this faith. For Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that way, to believe is a praiseworthy action. Secondly, be- “faith depends on the believer’s will”: and this is a good cause the intellect is convinced that it ought to believe will, since by it man wishes to believe in God. Since then what is said, though that conviction is not based on ob- no deliberate will of the demons is good, as stated above jective evidence. Thus if a prophet, while preaching the ( Ia, q. 64, a. 2, ad 5), it seems that in the demons there is word of God, were to foretell something, and were to give no faith. a sign, by raising a dead person to life, the intellect of Objection 2. Further, faith is a gift of Divine grace, a witness would be convinced so as to recognize clearly according to Eph. 2:8: “By grace you are saved through that God, Who lieth not, was speaking, although the thing faith. . . for it is the gift of God.” Now, according to a gloss itself foretold would not be evident in itself, and conse-on Osee 3:1, “They look to strange gods, and love the quently the essence of faith would not be removed. husks of the grapes,” the demons lost their gifts of grace Accordingly we must say that faith is commended in by sinning. Therefore faith did not remain in the demons the first sense in the faithful of Christ: and in this way after they sinned. faith is not in the demons, but only in the second way, for Objection 3. Further, unbelief would seem to be they see many evident signs, whereby they recognize that graver than other sins, as Augustine observes (Tract. the teaching of the Church is from God, although they do lxxxix in Joan.) on Jn. 15:22, “If I had not come and not see the things themselves that the Church teaches, for spoken to them, they would not have sin: but now they instance that there are three Persons in God, and so forth. have no excuse for their sin.” Now the sin of unbelief Reply to Objection 1. The demons are, in a way, is in some men. Consequently, if the demons have faith, compelled to believe, by the evidence of signs, and so some men would be guilty of a sin graver than that of their will deserves no praise for their belief. the demons, which seems unreasonable. Therefore in the Reply to Objection 2. Faith, which is a gift of grace, demons there is no faith. inclines man to believe, by giving him a certain affec- On the contrary, It is written (James 2:19): “The dev- tion for the good, even when that faith is lifeless. Con- ils. . . believe and tremble.” sequently the faith which the demons have, is not a gift of I answer that, As stated above (q. 1, a. 4; q. 2, a. 1), grace. Rather are they compelled to believe through their the believer’s intellect assents to that which he believes, natural intellectual acumen. not because he sees it either in itself, or by resolving it Reply to Objection 3. The very fact that the signs of to first self-evident principles, but because his will com- faith are so evident, that the demons are compelled to be- mands his intellect to assent. Now, that the will moves lieve, is displeasing to them, so that their malice is by no the intellect to assent, may be due to two causes. First, means diminished by their believe. 1218 Whether a man who disbelieves one article of faith, can have lifeless faith in the other IIa IIae q. 5 a. 3 articles? Objection 1. It would seem that a heretic who dis- but merely an opinion about it. Now it is manifest that he believes one article of faith, can have lifeless faith in the who adheres to the teaching of the Church, as to an infal- other articles. For the natural intellect of a heretic is not lible rule, assents to whatever the Church teaches; other- more able than that of a catholic. Now a catholic’s intel- wise, if, of the things taught by the Church, he holds what lect needs the aid of the gift of faith in order to believe any he chooses to hold, and rejects what he chooses to reject, article whatever of faith. Therefore it seems that heretics he no longer adheres to the teaching of the Church as to cannot believe any articles of faith without the gift of life- an infallible rule, but to his own will. Hence it is evident less faith. that a heretic who obstinately disbelieves one article of Objection 2. Further, just as faith contains many ar- faith, is not prepared to follow the teaching of the Church ticles, so does one science, viz. geometry, contain many in all things; but if he is not obstinate, he is no longer in conclusions. Now a man may possess the science of ge- heresy but only in error. Therefore it is clear that such a ometry as to some geometrical conclusions, and yet be ig- heretic with regard to one article has no faith in the other norant of other conclusions. Therefore a man can believe articles, but only a kind of opinion in accordance with his some articles of faith without believing the others. own will. Objection 3. Further, just as man obeys God in be- Reply to Objection 1. A heretic does not hold the lieving the articles of faith, so does he also in keeping the other articles of faith, about which he does not err, in the commandments of the Law. Now a man can obey some same way as one of the faithful does, namely by adhering commandments, and disobey others. Therefore he can be- simply to the Divine Truth, because in order to do so, a lieve some articles, and disbelieve others. man needs the help of the habit of faith; but he holds the On the contrary, Just as mortal sin is contrary to char- things that are of faith, by his own will and judgment. ity, so is disbelief in one article of faith contrary to faith. Reply to Objection 2. The various conclusions of a Now charity does not remain in a man after one mortal science have their respective means of demonstration, one sin. Therefore neither does faith, after a man disbelieves of which may be known without another, so that we may one article. know some conclusions of a science without knowing the I answer that, Neither living nor lifeless faith remains others. On the other hand faith adheres to all the articles in a heretic who disbelieves one article of faith. of faith by reason of one mean, viz. on account of the The reason of this is that the species of every habit de- First Truth proposed to us in Scriptures, according to the pends on the formal aspect of the object, without which teaching of the Church who has the right understanding the species of the habit cannot remain. Now the formal of them. Hence whoever abandons this mean is altogether object of faith is the First Truth, as manifested in Holy lacking in faith. Writ and the teaching of the Church, which proceeds from Reply to Objection 3. The various precepts of the the First Truth. Consequently whoever does not adhere, Law may be referred either to their respective proxi- as to an infallible and Divine rule, to the teaching of the mate motives, and thus one can be kept without another; Church, which proceeds from the First Truth manifested or to their primary motive, which is perfect obedience in Holy Writ, has not the habit of faith, but holds that to God, in which a man fails whenever he breaks one which is of faith otherwise than by faith. Even so, it is ev- commandment, according to James 2:10: “Whosoever ident that a man whose mind holds a conclusion without shall. . . offend in one point is become guilty of all.” knowing how it is proved, has not scientific knowledge, Whether faith can be greater in one man than in another? IIa IIae q. 5 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that faith cannot be faith consists in something supreme, because it requires greater in one man than in another. For the quantity of that man should adhere to the First Truth above all things. a habit is taken from its object. Now whoever has faith Therefore faith cannot be “more” or “less.” believes everything that is of faith, since by failing in one Objection 3. Further, faith is to knowledge by grace, point, a man loses his faith altogether, as stated above as the understanding of principles is to natural knowledge, (a. 3). Therefore it seems that faith cannot be greater in since the articles of faith are the first principles of knowl- one than in another. edge by grace, as was shown above (q. 1, a. 7). Now the Objection 2. Further, those things which consist in understanding of principles is possessed in equal degree something supreme cannot be “more” or “less.” Now by all men. Therefore faith is possessed in equal degree 1219 by all the faithful. two ways, since the act of faith proceeds both from the On the contrary, Wherever we find great and little, intellect and from the will, as stated above (q. 2, Aa. 1,2; there we find more or less. Now in the matter of faith q. 4, a. 2). Consequently a man’s faith may be described we find great and little, for Our Lord said to Peter (Mat. as being greater, in one way, on the part of his intellect, 14:31): “O thou of little faith, why didst thou doubt?” on account of its greater certitude and firmness, and, in And to the woman he said (Mat. 15: 28): “O woman, another way, on the part of his will, on account of his great is thy faith!” Therefore faith can be greater in one greater promptitude, devotion, or confidence. than in another. Reply to Objection 1. A man who obstinately disbe- I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 52, Aa. 1,2; lieves a thing that is of faith, has not the habit of faith, and Ia IIae, q. 112, a. 4), the quantity of a habit may be con-yet he who does not explicitly believe all, while he is pre- sidered from two points of view: first, on the part of the pared to believe all, has that habit. In this respect, one man object; secondly, on the part of its participation by the has greater faith than another, on the part of the object, in subject. so far as he believes more things, as stated above. Now the object of faith may be considered in two Reply to Objection 2. It is essential to faith that one ways: first, in respect of its formal aspect; secondly, in should give the first place to the First Truth. But among respect of the material object which is proposed to be be- those who do this, some submit to it with greater certitude lieved. Now the formal object of faith is one and simple, and devotion than others; and in this way faith is greater namely the First Truth, as stated above (q. 1, a. 1). Hence in one than in another. in this respect there is no diversity of faith among believ- Reply to Objection 3. The understanding of prin- ers, but it is specifically one in all, as stated above (q. 4, ciples results from man’s very nature, which is equally a. 6). But the things which are proposed as the matter of shared by all: whereas faith results from the gift of grace, our belief are many and can be received more or less ex- which is not equally in all, as explained above ( Ia IIae, plicitly; and in this respect one man can believe explicitly q. 112, a. 4). Hence the comparison fails. more things than another, so that faith can be greater in Nevertheless the truth of principles is more known to one man on account of its being more explicit. one than to another, according to the greater capacity of If, on the other hand, we consider faith from the point intellect. of view of its participation by the subject, this happens in 1220 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 6 Of the Cause of Faith (In Two Articles) We must now consider the cause of faith, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether faith is infused into man by God? (2) Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God? Whether faith is infused into man by God? IIa IIae q. 6 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that faith is not infused preach, unless they be sent?” into man by God. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv) that As regards the second, viz. man’s assent to the things “science begets faith in us, and nourishes, defends and which are of faith, we may observe a twofold cause, one strengthens it.” Now those things which science begets of external inducement, such as seeing a miracle, or be- in us seem to be acquired rather than infused. Therefore ing persuaded by someone to embrace the faith: neither faith does not seem to be in us by Divine infusion. of which is a sufficient cause, since of those who see the Objection 2. Further, that to which man attains by same miracle, or who hear the same sermon, some be- hearing and seeing, seems to be acquired by him. Now lieve, and some do not. Hence we must assert another man attains to belief, both by seeing miracles, and by internal cause, which moves man inwardly to assent to hearing the teachings of faith: for it is written (Jn. 4:53): matters of faith. “The father. . . knew that it was at the same hour, that Je- The Pelagians held that this cause was nothing else sus said to him, Thy son liveth; and himself believed, and than man’s free-will: and consequently they said that the his whole house”; and (Rom. 10:17) it is said that “faith beginning of faith is from ourselves, inasmuch as, to wit, is through hearing.” Therefore man attains to faith by ac- it is in our power to be ready to assent to things which quiring it. are of faith, but that the consummation of faith is from Objection 3. Further, that which depends on a man’s God, Who proposes to us the things we have to believe. will can be acquired by him. But “faith depends on the be- But this is false, for, since man, by assenting to matters liever’s will,” according to Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. of faith, is raised above his nature, this must needs accrue v). Therefore faith can be acquired by man. to him from some supernatural principle moving him in- On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 2:8,9): “By wardly; and this is God. Therefore faith, as regards the grace you are saved through faith, and that not of your- assent which is the chief act of faith, is from God moving selves. . . that no man may glory. . . for it is the gift of God.” man inwardly by grace. I answer that, Two things are requisite for faith. First, Reply to Objection 1. Science begets and nourishes that the things which are of faith should be proposed to faith, by way of external persuasion afforded by science; man: this is necessary in order that man believe anything but the chief and proper cause of faith is that which moves explicitly. The second thing requisite for faith is the assent man inwardly to assent. of the believer to the things which are proposed to him. Reply to Objection 2. This argument again refers to Accordingly, as regards the first of these, faith must needs the cause that proposes outwardly the things that are of be from God. Because those things which are of faith faith, or persuades man to believe by words or deeds. surpass human reason, hence they do not come to man’s Reply to Objection 3. To believe does indeed depend knowledge, unless God reveal them. To some, indeed, on the will of the believer: but man’s will needs to be pre- they are revealed by God immediately, as those things pared by God with grace, in order that he may be raised which were revealed to the apostles and prophets, while to things which are above his nature, as stated above (q. 2 to some they are proposed by God in sending preachers , a. 3). of the faith, according to Rom. 10:15: “How shall they 1221 Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God? IIa IIae q. 6 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that lifeless faith is not a diaphanous body. gift of God. For it is written (Dt. 32:4) that “the works of Now the lifelessness of faith is not essential to the God are perfect.” Now lifeless faith is something imper- species of faith, since faith is said to be lifeless through fect. Therefore it is not the work of God. lack of an extrinsic form, as stated above (q. 4, a. 4). Con- Objection 2. Further, just as an act is said to be de- sequently the cause of lifeless faith is that which is the formed through lacking its due form, so too is faith called cause of faith strictly so called: and this is God, as stated lifeless [informis] when it lacks the form due to it. Now above (a. 1). It follows, therefore, that lifeless faith is a the deformed act of sin is not from God, as stated above ( gift of God. Ia IIae, q. 79, a. 2, ad 2). Therefore neither is lifeless faith Reply to Objection 1. Lifeless faith, though it is not from God. simply perfect with the perfection of a virtue, is, neverthe- Objection 3. Further, whomsoever God heals, He less, perfect with a perfection that suffices for the essential heals wholly: for it is written (Jn. 7:23): “If a man receive notion of faith. circumcision on the sabbath-day, that the law of Moses Reply to Objection 2. The deformity of an act is es- may not be broken; are you angry at Me because I have sential to the act’s species, considered as a moral act, as healed the whole man on the sabbath-day?” Now faith stated above ( Ia, q. 48, a. 1, ad 2; Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 5): for heals man from unbelief. Therefore whoever receives an act is said to be deformed through being deprived of an from God the gift of faith, is at the same time healed from intrinsic form, viz. the due commensuration of the act’s all his sins. But this is not done except by living faith. circumstances. Hence we cannot say that God is the cause Therefore living faith alone is a gift of God: and conse- of a deformed act, for He is not the cause of its deformity, quently lifeless faith is not from God. though He is the cause of the act as such. On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 13:2 says that We may also reply that deformity denotes not only “the faith which lacks charity is a gift of God.” Now this privation of a due form, but also a contrary disposition, is lifeless faith. Therefore lifeless faith is a gift of God. wherefore deformity is compared to the act, as falsehood I answer that, Lifelessness is a privation. Now it is to faith. Hence, just as the deformed act is not from must be noted that privation is sometimes essential to the God, so neither is a false faith; and as lifeless faith is from species, whereas sometimes it is not, but supervenes in a God, so too, acts that are good generically, though not thing already possessed of its proper species: thus priva- quickened by charity, as is frequently the case in sinners, tion of the due equilibrium of the humors is essential to are from God. the species of sickness, while darkness is not essential to Reply to Objection 3. He who receives faith from a diaphanous body, but supervenes in it. Since, therefore, God without charity, is healed from unbelief, not entirely when we assign the cause of a thing, we intend to assign (because the sin of his previous unbelief is not removed) the cause of that thing as existing in its proper species, it but in part, namely, in the point of ceasing from commit- follows that what is not the cause of privation, cannot be ting such and such a sin. Thus it happens frequently that assigned as the cause of the thing to which that privation a man desists from one act of sin, through God causing belongs as being essential to its species. For we cannot him thus to desist, without desisting from another act of assign as the cause of a sickness, something which is not sin, through the instigation of his own malice. And in this the cause of a disturbance in the humors: though we can way sometimes it is granted by God to a man to believe, assign as cause of a diaphanous body, something which is and yet he is not granted the gift of charity: even so the gift not the cause of the darkness, which is not essential to the of prophecy, or the like, is given to some without charity. 1222 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 7 Of the Effects of Faith (In Two Articles) We must now consider the effects of faith: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether fear is an effect of faith? (2) Whether the heart is purified by faith? Whether fear is an effect of faith? IIa IIae q. 7 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that fear is not an effect of inasmuch as faith makes us appreciate God as an unfaith. For an effect does not precede its cause. Now fear fathomable and supreme good, separation from which is precedes faith: for it is written (Ecclus. 2:8): “Ye that fear the greatest evil, and to which it is wicked to wish to be the Lord, believe in Him.” Therefore fear is not an effect equalled. Of the first fear, viz. servile fear, lifeless faith of faith. is the cause, while living faith is the cause of the second, Objection 2. Further, the same thing is not the cause viz. filial fear, because it makes man adhere to God and of contraries. Now fear and hope are contraries, as stated to be subject to Him by charity. above ( Ia IIae, q. 23, a. 2): and faith begets hope, as a Reply to Objection 1. Fear of God cannot altogether gloss observes on Mat. 1:2. Therefore fear is not an effect precede faith, because if we knew nothing at all about of faith. Him, with regard to rewards and punishments, concern- Objection 3. Further, one contrary does not cause an- ing which faith teaches us, we should nowise fear Him. other. Now the object of faith is a good, which is the First If, however, faith be presupposed in reference to certain Truth, while the object of fear is an evil, as stated above ( articles of faith, for example the Divine excellence, then Ia IIae, q. 42, a. 1). Again, acts take their species from the reverential fear follows, the result of which is that man object, according to what was stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 18, submits his intellect to God, so as to believe in all the Di- a. 2). Therefore faith is not a cause of fear. vine promises. Hence the text quoted continues: “And On the contrary, It is written (James 2:19): “The dev- your reward shall not be made void.” ils. . . believe and tremble.” Reply to Objection 2. The same thing in respect of I answer that, Fear is a movement of the appetitive contraries can be the cause of contraries, but not under the power, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 41, a. 1). Now the same aspect. Now faith begets hope, in so far as it en- principle of all appetitive movements is the good or evil ables us to appreciate the prize which God awards to the apprehended: and consequently the principle of fear and just, while it is the cause of fear, in so far as it makes us of every appetitive movement must be an apprehension. appreciate the punishments which He intends to inflict on Again, through faith there arises in us an apprehension of sinners. certain penal evils, which are inflicted in accordance with Reply to Objection 3. The primary and formal object the Divine judgment. In this way, then, faith is a cause of of faith is the good which is the First Truth; but the mate- the fear whereby one dreads to be punished by God; and rial object of faith includes also certain evils; for instance, this is servile fear. that it is an evil either not to submit to God, or to be sep- It is also the cause of filial fear, whereby one dreads arated from Him, and that sinners will suffer penal evils to be separated from God, or whereby one shrinks from from God: in this way faith can be the cause of fear. equalling oneself to Him, and holds Him in reverence, Whether faith has the effect of purifying the heart? IIa IIae q. 7 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that faith does not purify less faith. Therefore faith does not purify the heart. the heart. For purity of the heart pertains chiefly to the af- Objection 3. Further, if faith were to purify the hu- fections, whereas faith is in the intellect. Therefore faith man heart in any way, it would chiefly purify the intellect has not the effect of purifying the heart. of man. Now it does not purify the intellect from obscu- Objection 2. Further, that which purifies the heart is rity, since it is a veiled knowledge. Therefore faith nowise incompatible with impurity. But faith is compatible with purifies the heart. the impurity of sin, as may be seen in those who have life- On the contrary, Peter said (Acts 15:9): “Purifying 1223 their hearts by faith.” Reply to Objection 1. Things that are in the intellect I answer that, A thing is impure through being mixed are the principles of those which are in the appetite, in so with baser things: for silver is not called impure, when far as the apprehended good moves the appetite. mixed with gold, which betters it, but when mixed with Reply to Objection 2. Even lifeless faith excludes a lead or tin. Now it is evident that the rational creature is certain impurity which is contrary to it, viz. that of error, more excellent than all transient and corporeal creatures; and which consists in the human intellect, adhering inor- so that it becomes impure through subjecting itself to tran- dinately to things below itself, through wishing to mea- sient things by loving them. From this impurity the ratio- sure Divine things by the rule of sensible objects. But nal creature is purified by means of a contrary movement, when it is quickened by charity, then it is incompatible namely, by tending to that which is above it, viz. God. with any kind of impurity, because “charity covereth all The first beginning of this movement is faith: since “he sins” (Prov. 10:12). that cometh to God must believe that He is,” according Reply to Objection 3. The obscurity of faith does not to Heb. 11:6. Hence the first beginning of the heart’s pertain to the impurity of sin, but rather to the natural de- purifying is faith; and if this be perfected through being fect of the human intellect, according to the present state quickened by charity, the heart will be perfectly purified of life. thereby. 1224 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 8 Of the Gift of Understanding (In Eight Articles) We must now consider the gifts of understand and knowledge, which respond to the virtue of faith. With regard to the gift of understanding there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Ghost? (2) Whether it can be together with faith in the same person? (3) Whether the understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is only speculative, or practical also? (4) Whether all who are in a state of grace have the gift of understanding? (5) Whether this gift is to be found in those who are without grace? (6) Of the relationship of the gift of understanding to the other gifts; (7) Which of the beatitudes corresponds to this gift? (8) Which of the fruits? Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Ghost? IIa IIae q. 8 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that understanding is not the nature of the substantial reality, under words lies hid- a gift of the Holy Ghost. For the gifts of grace are distinct den their meaning; under likenesses and figures the truth from the gifts of nature, since they are given in addition they denote lies hidden (because the intelligible world to the latter. Now understanding is a natural habit of the is enclosed within as compared with the sensible world, soul, whereby self-evident principles are known, as stated which is perceived externally), and effects lie hidden in in Ethic. vi, 6. Therefore it should not be reckoned among their causes, and vice versa. Hence we may speak of un- the gifts of the Holy Ghost. derstanding with regard to all these things. Objection 2. Further, the Divine gifts are shared by Since, however, human knowledge begins with the creatures according to their capacity and mode, as Diony- outside of things as it were, it is evident that the stronger sius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now the mode of human nature the light of the understanding, the further can it penetrate is to know the truth, not simply (which is a sign of under- into the heart of things. Now the natural light of our un- standing), but discursively (which is a sign of reason), as derstanding is of finite power; wherefore it can reach to a Dionysius explains (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the Divine certain fixed point. Consequently man needs a supernat- knowledge which is bestowed on man, should be called a ural light in order to penetrate further still so as to know gift of reason rather than a gift of understanding. what it cannot know by its natural light: and this super- Objection 3. Further, in the powers of the soul the natural light which is bestowed on man is called the gift understanding is condivided with the will (De Anima iii, of understanding. 9,10). Now no gift of the Holy Ghost is called after the Reply to Objection 1. The natural light instilled will. Therefore no gift of the Holy Ghost should receive within us, manifests only certain general principles, which the name of understanding. are known naturally. But since man is ordained to super- On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): “The Spirit natural happiness, as stated above (q. 2, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 3 of the Lord shall rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom of , a. 8), man needs to reach to certain higher truths, for understanding.” which he requires the gift of understanding. I answer that, Understanding implies an intimate Reply to Objection 2. The discourse of reason always knowledge, for “intelligere” [to understand] is the same as begins from an understanding and ends at an understand- “intus legere” [to read inwardly]. This is clear to anyone ing; because we reason by proceeding from certain under- who considers the difference between intellect and sense, stood principles, and the discourse of reason is perfected because sensitive knowledge is concerned with external when we come to understand what hitherto we ignored. sensible qualities, whereas intellective knowledge pene- Hence the act of reasoning proceeds from something pre- trates into the very essence of a thing, because the object viously understood. Now a gift of grace does not proceed of the intellect is “what a thing is,” as stated in De Anima from the light of nature, but is added thereto as perfecting iii, 6. it. Wherefore this addition is not called “reason” but “un- Now there are many kinds of things that are hidden derstanding,” since the additional light is in comparison within, to find which human knowledge has to penetrate with what we know supernaturally, what the natural light within so to speak. Thus, under the accidents lies hidden is in regard to those things which we known from the first. 1225 Reply to Objection 3. “Will” denotes simply a move-knowledge that penetrates into the heart of things. Hence ment of the appetite without indicating any excellence; the supernatural gift is called after the understanding whereas “understanding” denotes a certain excellence of a rather than after the will. Whether the gift of understanding is compatible with faith? IIa IIae q. 8 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the gift of under- certain things, of themselves, come directly under faith, standing is incompatible with faith. For Augustine says such as the mystery to three Persons in one God, and the (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 15) that “the thing which is understood incarnation of God the Son; whereas other things come is bounded by the comprehension of him who understands under faith, through being subordinate, in one way or an- it.” But the thing which is believed is not comprehended, other, to those just mentioned, for instance, all that is con- according to the word of the Apostle to the Philippi- tained in the Divine Scriptures. ans 3:12: “Not as though I had already comprehended On the part of understanding the distinction to be ob- [Douay: ‘attained’], or were already perfect.” Therefore served is that there are two ways in which we may be it seems that faith and understanding are incompatible in said to understand. In one way, we understand a thing the same subject. perfectly, when we arrive at knowing the essence of the Objection 2. Further, whatever is understood is seen thing we understand, and the very truth considered in it- by the understanding. But faith is of things that appear self of the proposition understood. In this way, so long as not, as stated above (q. 1, a. 4; q. 4, a. 1). Therefore faith the state of faith lasts, we cannot understand those things is incompatible with understanding in the same subject. which are the direct object of faith: although certain other Objection 3. Further, understanding is more certain things that are subordinate to faith can be understood even than science. But science and faith are incompatible in in this way. the same subject, as stated above (q. 1, Aa. 4,5). Much In another way we understand a thing imperfectly, less, therefore, can understanding and faith be in the same when the essence of a thing or the truth of a proposition is subject. not known as to its quiddity or mode of being, and yet we On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that know that whatever be the outward appearances, they do “understanding enlightens the mind concerning the things not contradict the truth, in so far as we understand that we it has heard.” Now one who has faith can be enlightened ought not to depart from matters of faith, for the sake of in his mind concerning what he has heard; thus it is writ- things that appear externally. In this way, even during the ten (Lk. 24:27,32) that Our Lord opened the scriptures to state of faith, nothing hinders us from understanding even His disciples, that they might understand them. Therefore those things which are the direct object of faith. understanding is compatible with faith. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for I answer that, We need to make a twofold distinction the first three argue in reference to perfect understanding, here: one on the side of faith, the other on the part of un- while the last refers to the understanding of matters sub- derstanding. ordinate to faith. On the side of faith the distinction to be made is that Whether the gift of understanding is merely speculative or also practical? IIa IIae q. 8 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that understanding, con- fore, is the gift of understanding concerned with none but sidered as a gift of the Holy Ghost, is not practical, necessary matters. Now the practical intellect is not about but only speculative. For, according to Gregory (Moral. necessary things, but about things which may be other- i, 32), “understanding penetrates certain more exalted wise than they are, and which may result from man’s ac- things.” But the practical intellect is occupied, not with tivity. Therefore the gift of understanding is not practical. exalted, but with inferior things, viz. singulars, about Objection 3. Further, the gift of understanding en- which actions are concerned. Therefore understanding, lightens the mind in matters which surpass natural reason. considered as a gift, is not practical. Now human activities, with which the practical intellect Objection 2. Further, the gift of understanding is is concerned, do not surpass natural reason, which is the something more excellent than the intellectual virtue of directing principle in matters of action, as was made clear understanding. But the intellectual virtue of understand- above ( Ia IIae, q. 58, a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 71, a. 6). Therefore ing is concerned with none but necessary things, accord- the gift of understanding is not practical. ing to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 6). Much more, there- On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 110:10): “A good 1226 understanding to all that do it.” sidered in themselves, but, as referred to the rule of the I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), the gift of under-eternal law, and to the end of Divine happiness, they are standing is not only about those things which come under exalted so that they can be the matter of understanding. faith first and principally, but also about all things subordi- Reply to Objection 2. The excellence of the gift of nate to faith. Now good actions have a certain relationship understanding consists precisely in its considering eternal to faith: since “faith worketh through charity,” according or necessary matters, not only as they are rules of human to the Apostle (Gal. 5:6). Hence the gift of understanding actions, because a cognitive virtue is the more excellent, extends also to certain actions, not as though these were according to the greater extent of its object. its principal object, but in so far as the rule of our ac- Reply to Objection 3. The rule of human actions is tions is the eternal law, to which the higher reason, which the human reason and the eternal law, as stated above ( is perfected by the gift of understanding, adheres by con- Ia IIae, q. 71, a. 6). Now the eternal law surpasses hu- templating and consulting it, as Augustine states (De Trin. man reason: so that the knowledge of human actions, as xii, 7). ruled by the eternal law, surpasses the natural reason, and Reply to Objection 1. The things with which human requires the supernatural light of a gift of the Holy Ghost. actions are concerned are not surpassingly exalted con- Whether the gift of understanding is in all who are in a state of grace? IIa IIae q. 8 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the gift of under- I answer that, In all who are in a state of grace, there standing is not in all who are in a state of grace. For Gre-must needs be rectitude of the will, since grace prepares gory says (Moral. ii, 49) that “the gift of understanding is man’s will for good, according to Augustine (Contra Ju- given as a remedy against dulness of mind.” Now many lian. Pelag. iv, 3). Now the will cannot be rightly directed who are in a state of grace suffer from dulness of mind. to good, unless there be already some knowledge of the Therefore the gift of understanding is not in all who are in truth, since the object of the will is good understood, as a state of grace. stated in De Anima iii, 7. Again, just as the Holy Ghost Objection 2. Further, of all the things that are con- directs man’s will by the gift of charity, so as to move it nected with knowledge, faith alone seems to be necessary directly to some supernatural good; so also, by the gift for salvation, since by faith Christ dwells in our hearts, of understanding, He enlightens the human mind, so that according to Eph. 3:17. Now the gift of understanding it knows some supernatural truth, to which the right will is not in everyone that has faith; indeed, those who have needs to tend. faith ought to pray that they may understand, as Augustine Therefore, just as the gift of charity is in all of those says (De Trin. xv, 27). Therefore the gift of understanding who have sanctifying grace, so also is the gift of under- is not necessary for salvation: and, consequently, is not in standing. all who are in a state of grace. Reply to Objection 1. Some who have sanctifying Objection 3. Further, those things which are common grace may suffer dulness of mind with regard to things to all who are in a state of grace, are never withdrawn that are not necessary for salvation; but with regard to from them. Now the grace of understanding and of the those that are necessary for salvation, they are sufficiently other gifts sometimes withdraws itself profitably, for, at instructed by the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Jn. 2:27: times, “when the mind is puffed up with understanding “His unction teacheth you of all things.” sublime things, it becomes sluggish and dull in base and Reply to Objection 2. Although not all who have vile things,” as Gregory observes (Moral. ii, 49). There- faith understand fully the things that are proposed to be fore the gift of understanding is not in all who are in a believed, yet they understand that they ought to believe state of grace. them, and that they ought nowise to deviate from them. On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 81:5): “They have Reply to Objection 3. With regard to things necessary not known or understood, they walk on in darkness.” But for salvation, the gift of understanding never withdraws no one who is in a state of grace walks in darkness, ac- from holy persons: but, in order that they may have no in- cording to Jn. 8:12: “He that followeth Me, walketh not centive to pride, it does withdraw sometimes with regard in darkness.” Therefore no one who is in a state of grace to other things, so that their mind is unable to penetrate all is without the gift of understanding. things clearly. 1227 Whether the gift of understanding is found also in those who have not sanctifying IIa IIae q. 8 a. 5 grace? Objection 1. It would seem that the gift of under- cordingly then, the intellectual light of grace is called the standing is found also in those who have not sanctifying gift of understanding, in so far as man’s understanding grace. For Augustine, in expounding the words of Ps. is easily moved by the Holy Ghost, the consideration of 118:20: “My soul hath coveted to long for Thy justifica- which movement depends on a true apprehension of the tions,” says: “Understanding flies ahead, and man’s will is end. Wherefore unless the human intellect be moved by weak and slow to follow.” But in all who have sanctifying the Holy Ghost so far as to have a right estimate of the end, grace, the will is prompt on account of charity. Therefore it has not yet obtained the gift of understanding, however the gift of understanding can be in those who have not much the Holy Ghost may have enlightened it in regard to sanctifying grace. other truths that are preambles to the faith. Objection 2. Further, it is written (Dan. 10:1) that Now to have a right estimate about the last end one “there is need of understanding in a” prophetic “vision,” must not be in error about the end, and must adhere to it so that, seemingly, there is no prophecy without the gift of firmly as to the greatest good: and no one can do this with- understanding. But there can be prophecy without sancti- out sanctifying grace; even as in moral matters a man has fying grace, as evidenced by Mat. 7:22, where those who a right estimate about the end through a habit of virtue. say: “We have prophesied in Thy name∗,” are answered Therefore no one has the gift of understanding without with the words: “I never knew you.” Therefore the gift of sanctifying grace. understanding can be without sanctifying grace. Reply to Objection 1. By understanding Augustine Objection 3. Further, the gift of understanding re- means any kind of intellectual light, that, however, does sponds to the virtue of faith, according to Is. 7:9, follow- not fulfil all the conditions of a gift, unless the mind of ing another reading†: “If you will not believe you shall not man be so far perfected as to have a right estimate about understand.” Now faith can be without sanctifying grace. the end. Therefore the gift of understanding can be without it. Reply to Objection 2. The understanding that is req- On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 6:45): “Ev- uisite for prophecy, is a kind of enlightenment of the mind ery one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, with regard to the things revealed to the prophet: but it is cometh to Me.” Now it is by the intellect, as Gregory ob- not an enlightenment of the mind with regard to a right serves (Moral. i, 32), that we learn or understand what estimate about the last end, which belongs to the gift of we hear. Therefore whoever has the gift of understanding, understanding. cometh to Christ, which is impossible without sanctify- Reply to Objection 3. Faith implies merely assent ing grace. Therefore the gift of understanding cannot be to what is proposed but understanding implies a certain without sanctifying grace. perception of the truth, which perception, except in one I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, Aa. 1,2) who has sanctifying grace, cannot regard the end, as stated the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect the soul, according above. Hence the comparison fails between understand- as it is amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Ac- ing and faith. Whether the gift of understanding is distinct from the other gifts? IIa IIae q. 8 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the gift of under- ples, since the natural habit of first principles suffices in standing is not distinct from the other gifts. For there respect of those matters which are naturally self-evident: is no distinction between things whose opposites are not while faith is sufficient in respect of such things as are distinct. Now “wisdom is contrary to folly, understand- supernatural, since the articles of faith are like first prin- ing is contrary to dulness, counsel is contrary to rashness, ciples in supernatural knowledge, as stated above (q. 1, knowledge is contrary to ignorance,” as Gregory states a. 7). Therefore the gift of understanding does not differ (Moral. ii, 49). But there would seem to be no difference from the other intellectual gifts. between folly, dulness, ignorance and rashness. Therefore Objection 3. Further, all intellectual knowledge is ei- neither does understanding differ from the other gifts. ther speculative or practical. Now the gift of understand- Objection 2. Further, the intellectual virtue of under- ing is related to both, as stated above (a. 3). Therefore it is standing differs from the other intellectual virtues in that not distinct from the other intellectual gifts, but comprises it is proper to it to be about self-evident principles. But the them all. gift of understanding is not about any self-evident princi- On the contrary, When several things are enumerated ∗ Vulg.: ‘Have we not prophesied in Thy name? † The Septuagint 1228 together they must be, in some way, distinct from one an-Accordingly on the part of the things proposed to faith other, because distinction is the origin of number. Now for belief, two things are requisite on our part: first that the gift of understanding is enumerated together with the they be penetrated or grasped by the intellect, and this be- other gifts, as appears from Is. 11:2. Therefore the gift of longs to the gift of understanding. Secondly, it is nec- understanding is distinct from the other gifts. essary that man should judge these things aright, that he I answer that, The difference between the gift of un- should esteem that he ought to adhere to these things, and derstanding and three of the others, viz. piety, fortitude, to withdraw from their opposites: and this judgment, with and fear, is evident, since the gift of understanding be- regard to Divine things belong to the gift of wisdom, but longs to the cognitive power, while the three belong to the with regard to created things, belongs to the gift of knowl- appetitive power. edge, and as to its application to individual actions, be- But the difference between this gift of understanding longs to the gift of counsel. and the remaining three, viz. wisdom, knowledge, and Reply to Objection 1. The foregoing difference be- counsel, which also belong to the cognitive power, is not tween those four gifts is clearly in agreement with the dis- so evident. To some∗, it seems that the gift of understand- tinction of those things which Gregory assigns as their op- ing differs from the gifts of knowledge and counsel, in that posites. For dulness is contrary to sharpness, since an in- these two belong to practical knowledge, while the gift of tellect is said, by comparison, to be sharp, when it is able understanding belongs to speculative knowledge; and that to penetrate into the heart of the things that are proposed it differs from the gift of wisdom, which also belongs to to it. Hence it is dulness of mind that renders the mind speculative knowledge, in that wisdom is concerned with unable to pierce into the heart of a thing. A man is said judgment, while understanding renders the mind apt to to be a fool if he judges wrongly about the common end grasp the things that are proposed, and to penetrate into of life, wherefore folly is properly opposed to wisdom, their very heart. And in this sense we have assigned the which makes us judge aright about the universal cause. number of the gifts, above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 4). Ignorance implies a defect in the mind, even about any But if we consider the matter carefully, the gift of un- particular things whatever, so that it is contrary to knowl- derstanding is concerned not only with speculative, but edge, which gives man a right judgment about particular also with practical matters, as stated above (a. 3), and causes, viz. about creatures. Rashness is clearly opposed likewise, the gift of knowledge regards both matters, as to counsel, whereby man does not proceed to action be- we shall show further on (q. 9, a. 3), and consequently, fore deliberating with his reason. we must take their distinction in some other way. For all Reply to Objection 2. The gift of understanding is these four gifts are ordained to supernatural knowledge, about the first principles of that knowledge which is con- which, in us, takes its foundation from faith. Now “faith ferred by grace; but otherwise than faith, because it be- is through hearing” (Rom. 10:17). Hence some things longs to faith to assent to them, while it belongs to the gift must be proposed to be believed by man, not as seen, but of understanding to pierce with the mind the things that as heard, to which he assents by faith. But faith, first and are said. principally, is about the First Truth, secondarily, about Reply to Objection 3. The gift of understanding is certain considerations concerning creatures, and further- related to both kinds of knowledge, viz. speculative and more extends to the direction of human actions, in so far practical, not as to the judgment, but as to apprehension, as it works through charity, as appears from what has been by grasping what is said. said above (q. 4, a. 2, ad 3). Whether the sixth beatitude, “Blessed are the clean of heart,” etc., responds to the gift IIa IIae q. 8 a. 7 of understanding? Objection 1. It would seem that the sixth beatitude, rifying their hearts by faith.” Now cleanness of heart is “Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God,” acquired by the heart being purified. Therefore the afore- does not respond to the gift of understanding. Because said beatitude is related to the virtue of faith rather than to cleanness of heart seems to belong chiefly to the appetite. the gift of understanding. But the gift of understanding belongs, not to the appetite, Objection 3. Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost per- but rather to the intellectual power. Therefore the afore- fect man in the present state of life. But the sight of God said beatitude does not respond to the gift of understand- does not belong to the present life, since it is that which ing. gives happiness to the Blessed, as stated above ( Ia IIae, Objection 2. Further, it is written (Acts 15:9): “Pu- q. 3, a. 8). Therefore the sixth beatitude which comprises ∗ William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 8 1229 the sight of God, does not respond to the gift of under-longer by way of corporeal phantasms, nor infected with standing. heretical misrepresentations: and this cleanness is the re- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in sult of the gift of understanding. Monte i, 4): “The sixth work of the Holy Ghost which is Again, the sight of God is twofold. One is perfect, understanding, is applicable to the clean of heart, whose whereby God’s Essence is seen: the other is imperfect, eye being purified, they can see what eye hath not seen.” whereby, though we see not what God is, yet we see what I answer that, Two things are contained in the sixth He is not; and whereby, the more perfectly do we know beatitude, as also in the others, one by way of merit, viz. God in this life, the more we understand that He surpasses cleanness of heart; the other by way of reward, viz. the all that the mind comprehends. Each of these visions of sight of God, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 69, Aa. 2 ,4), God belongs to the gift of understanding; the first, to the and each of these, in some way, responds to the gift of gift of understanding in its state of perfection, as pos- understanding. sessed in heaven; the second, to the gift of understanding For cleanness is twofold. One is a preamble and a in its state of inchoation, as possessed by wayfarers. disposition to seeing God, and consists in the heart being This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the cleansed of inordinate affections: and this cleanness of first two arguments refer to the first kind of cleanness; heart is effected by the virtues and gifts belonging to the while the third refers to the perfect vision of God. More- appetitive power. The other cleanness of heart is a kind of over the gifts both perfect us in this life by way of inchoa- complement to the sight of God; such is the cleanness of tion, and will be fulfilled, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 69, the mind that is purged of phantasms and errors, so as to a. 2). receive the truths which are proposed to it about God, no Whether faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of understanding? IIa IIae q. 8 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that, among the fruits, is the proper object of the will: and consequently that faith does not respond to the gift of understanding. For which is ultimate and delightful with regard to the will, understanding is the fruit of faith, since it is written (Is. must be, after a fashion, the fruit of all the other things 7:9) according to another reading∗: “If you will not be- that pertain to the other powers. lieve you shall not understand,” where our version has: Accordingly, therefore, to this kind of gift of virtue “If you will not believe, you shall not continue.” There- that perfects a power, we may distinguish a double fruit: fore fruit is not the fruit of understanding. one, belonging to the same power; the other, the last of Objection 2. Further, that which precedes is not the all as it were, belonging to the will. In this way we must fruit of what follows. But faith seems to precede under- conclude that the fruit which properly responds to the gift standing, since it is the foundation of the entire spiritual of understanding is faith, i.e. the certitude of faith; while edifice, as stated above (q. 4, Aa. 1,7). Therefore faith is the fruit that responds to it last of all is joy, which belongs not the fruit of understanding. to the will. Objection 3. Further, more gifts pertain to the intel- Reply to Objection 1. Understanding is the fruit of lect than to the appetite. Now, among the fruits, only one faith, taken as a virtue. But we are not taking faith in this pertains to the intellect; namely, faith, while all the others sense here, but for a kind of certitude of faith, to which pertain to the appetite. Therefore faith, seemingly, does man attains by the gift of understanding. not pertain to understanding more than to wisdom, knowl- Reply to Objection 2. Faith cannot altogether pre- edge or counsel. cede understanding, for it would be impossible to assent On the contrary, The end of a thing is its fruit. Now by believing what is proposed to be believed, without un- the gift of understanding seems to be ordained chiefly to derstanding it in some way. However, the perfection of the certitude of faith, which certitude is reckoned a fruit. understanding follows the virtue of faith: which perfec- For a gloss on Gal. 5:22 says that the “faith which is tion of understanding is itself followed by a kind of cer- a fruit, is certitude about the unseen.” Therefore faith, tainty of faith. among the fruits, responds to the gift of understanding. Reply to Objection 3. The fruit of practical knowl- I answer that, The fruits of the Spirit, as stated above edge cannot consist in that very knowledge, since knowl- ( Ia IIae, q. 70, a. 1), when we were discussing them, are edge of that kind is known not for its own sake, but for so called because they are something ultimate and delight- the sake of something else. On the other hand, specula- ful, produced in us by the power of the Holy Ghost. Now tive knowledge has its fruit in its very self, which fruit the ultimate and delightful has the nature of an end, which is the certitude about the thing known. Hence the gift of ∗ The Septuagint 1230 counsel, which belongs only to practical knowledge, has The reason why there are several fruits pertaining to the no corresponding fruit of its own: while the gifts of wis- appetitive faculty, is because, as already stated, the char- dom, understanding and knowledge, which can belongs acter of end, which the word fruit implies, pertains to the also to speculative knowledge, have but one correspond- appetitive rather than to the intellective part. ing fruit, which is certainly denoted by the name of faith. 1231 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 9 Of the Gift of Knowledge (In Four Articles) We must now consider the gift of knowledge, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether knowledge is a gift? (2) Whether it is about Divine things? (3) Whether it is speculative or practical? (4) Which beatitude responds to it? Whether knowledge is a gift? IIa IIae q. 9 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that knowledge is not right judgment on them, so as to discern what is to be be- a gift. For the gifts of the Holy Ghost surpass the nat- lieved, from what is not to be believed, and for this the ural faculty. But knowledge implies an effect of natu- gift of knowledge is required. ral reason: for the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that Reply to Objection 1. Certitude of knowledge varies a “demonstration is a syllogism which produces knowl- in various natures, according to the various conditions of edge.” Therefore knowledge is not a gift of the Holy each nature. Because man forms a sure judgment about Ghost. a truth by the discursive process of his reason: and so Objection 2. Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are human knowledge is acquired by means of demonstrative common to all holy persons, as stated above (q. 8, a. 4; reasoning. On the other hand, in God, there is a sure judg- Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 5). Now Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, ment of truth, without any discursive process, by simple 1) that “many of the faithful lack knowledge though they intuition, as was stated in the Ia, q. 14, a. 7; wherefore have faith.” Therefore knowledge is not a gift. God’s knowledge is not discursive, or argumentative, but Objection 3. Further, the gifts are more perfect than absolute and simple, to which that knowledge is likened the virtues, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 8). There- which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, since it is a participated fore one gift suffices for the perfection of one virtue. Now likeness thereof. the gift of understanding responds to the virtue of faith, Reply to Objection 2. A twofold knowledge may be as stated above (q. 8, a. 2). Therefore the gift of knowl- had about matters of belief. One is the knowledge of what edge does not respond to that virtue, nor does it appear to one ought to believe by discerning things to be believed which other virtue it can respond. Since, then, the gifts from things not to be believe: in this way knowledge is are perfections of virtues, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, a gift and is common to all holy persons. The other is a Aa. 1,2), it seems that knowledge is not a gift. knowledge about matters of belief, whereby one knows On the contrary, Knowledge is reckoned among the not only what one ought to believe, but also how to make seven gifts (Is. 11:2). the faith known, how to induce others to believe, and con- I answer that, Grace is more perfect than nature, and, fute those who deny the faith. This knowledge is num- therefore, does not fail in those things wherein man can bered among the gratuitous graces, which are not given to be perfected by nature. Now, when a man, by his natural all, but to some. Hence Augustine, after the words quoted, reason, assents by his intellect to some truth, he is per- adds: “It is one thing for a man merely to know what he fected in two ways in respect of that truth: first, because ought to believe, and another to know how to dispense he grasps it; secondly, because he forms a sure judgment what he believes to the godly, and to defend it against the on it. ungodly.” Accordingly, two things are requisite in order that the Reply to Objection 3. The gifts are more perfect than human intellect may perfectly assent to the truth of the the moral and intellectual virtues; but they are not more faith: one of these is that he should have a sound grasp of perfect than the theological virtues; rather are all the gifts the things that are proposed to be believed, and this per- ordained to the perfection of the theological virtues, as to tains to the gift of understanding, as stated above (q. 8, their end. Hence it is not unreasonable if several gifts are a. 6): while the other is that he should have a sure and ordained to one theological virtue. 1232 Whether the gift of knowledge is about Divine things? IIa IIae q. 9 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the gift of knowl- edge has a special name, which is wisdom: for a wise man edge is about Divine things. For Augustine says (De Trin. in any branch of knowledge is one who knows the high- xiv, 1) that “knowledge begets, nourishes and strengthens est cause of that kind of knowledge, and is able to judge faith.” Now faith is about Divine things, because its object of all matters by that cause: and a wise man “absolutely,” is the First Truth, as stated above (q. 1, a. 1). Therefore is one who knows the cause which is absolutely highest, the gift of knowledge also is about Divine things. namely God. Hence the knowledge of Divine things is Objection 2. Further, the gift of knowledge is more called “wisdom,” while the knowledge of human things is excellent than acquired knowledge. But there is an ac- called “knowledge,” this being the common name denot- quired knowledge about Divine things, for instance, the ing certitude of judgment, and appropriated to the judg- science of metaphysics. Much more therefore is the gift ment which is formed through second causes. Accord- of knowledge about Divine things. ingly, if we take knowledge in this way, it is a distinct gift Objection 3. Further, according to Rom. 1:20, “the from the gift of wisdom, so that the gift of knowledge is invisible things of God. . . are clearly seen, being under- only about human or created things. stood by the things that are made.” If therefore there is Reply to Objection 1. Although matters of faith are knowledge about created things, it seems that there is also Divine and eternal, yet faith itself is something temporal knowledge of Divine things. in the mind of the believer. Hence to know what one ought On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1): to believe, belongs to the gift of knowledge, but to know in “The knowledge of Divine things may be properly called themselves the very things we believe, by a kind of union wisdom, and the knowledge of human affairs may prop- with them, belongs to the gift of wisdom. Therefore the erly receive the name of knowledge.” gift of wisdom corresponds more to charity which unites I answer that, A sure judgment about a thing formed man’s mind to God. chiefly from its cause, and so the order of judgments Reply to Objection 2. This argument takes knowl- should be according to the order of causes. For just as edge in the generic acceptation of the term: it is not thus the first cause is the cause of the second, so ought the that knowledge is a special gift, but according as it is re- judgment about the second cause to be formed through stricted to judgments formed through created things. the first cause: nor is it possible to judge of the first cause Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 1, a. 1), through any other cause; wherefore the judgment which is every cognitive habit regards formally the mean through formed through the first cause, is the first and most perfect which things are known, and materially, the things that are judgment. known through the mean. And since that which is formal, Now in those things where we find something most is of most account, it follows that those sciences which perfect, the common name of the genus is appropriated draw conclusions about physical matter from mathemati- for those things which fall short of the most perfect, and cal principles, are reckoned rather among the mathemat- some special name is adapted to the most perfect thing, as ical sciences, though, as to their matter they have more is the case in Logic. For in the genus of convertible terms, in common with physical sciences: and for this reason it that which signifies “what a thing is,” is given the spe- is stated in Phys. ii, 2 that they are more akin to physics. cial name of “definition,” but the convertible terms which Accordingly, since man knows God through His creatures, fall short of this, retain the common name, and are called this seems to pertain to “knowledge,” to which it belongs “proper” terms. formally, rather than to “wisdom,” to which it belongs ma- Accordingly, since the word knowledge implies certi- terially: and, conversely, when we judge of creatures ac- tude of judgment as stated above (a. 1), if this certitude of cording to Divine things, this pertains to “wisdom” rather the judgment is derived from the highest cause, the knowl- than to “knowledge.” Whether the gift of knowledge is practical knowledge? IIa IIae q. 9 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the knowledge, which Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): is numbered among the gifts, is practical knowledge. For “Knowledge is nought if it hath not its use for piety. . . and Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14) that “knowledge is con- piety is very useless if it lacks the discernment of knowl- cerned with the actions in which we make use of exter- edge.” Now it follows from this authority that knowledge nal things.” But the knowledge which is concerned about directs piety. But this cannot apply to a speculative sci- actions is practical. Therefore the gift of knowledge is ence. Therefore the gift of knowledge is not speculative practical. but practical. 1233 Objection 3. Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are so far as man knows what he ought to hold by faith; yet, only in the righteous, as stated above (q. 9, a. 5). But spec- secondarily, it extends to works, since we are directed in ulative knowledge can be also in the unrighteous, accord- our actions by the knowledge of matters of faith, and of ing to James 4:17: “To him. . . who knoweth to do good, conclusions drawn therefrom. and doth it not, to him it is a sin.” Therefore the gift of Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of the knowledge is not speculative but practical. gift of knowledge, in so far as it extends to works; for ac- On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): tion is ascribed to knowledge, yet not action solely, nor “Knowledge on her own day prepares a feast, because she primarily: and in this way it directs piety. overcomes the fast of ignorance in the mind.” Now ig- Hence the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. norance is not entirely removed, save by both kinds of Reply to Objection 3. As we have already stated knowledge, viz. speculative and practical. Therefore the (q. 8, a. 5) about the gift of understanding, not everyone gift of knowledge is both speculative and practical. who understands, has the gift of understanding, but only I answer that, As stated above (q. 9, a. 8), the gift of he that understands through a habit of grace: and so we knowledge, like the gift of understanding, is ordained to must take note, with regard to the gift of knowledge, that the certitude of faith. Now faith consists primarily and they alone have the gift of knowledge, who judge aright principally in speculation, in as much as it is founded about matters of faith and action, through the grace be- on the First Truth. But since the First Truth is also the stowed on them, so as never to wander from the straight last end for the sake of which our works are done, hence path of justice. This is the knowledge of holy things, ac- it is that faith extends to works, according to Gal. 5:6: cording to Wis. 10:10: “She conducted the just. . . through “Faith. . . worketh by charity.” the right ways. . . and gave him the knowledge of holy The consequence is that the gift of knowledge also, things.” primarily and principally indeed, regards speculation, in Whether the third beatitude, “Blessed are they that mourn,” etc. corresponds to the IIa IIae q. 9 a. 4 gift of knowledge? Objection 1. It would seem that the third beatitude, I answer that, Right judgment about creatures be- “Blessed are they that mourn,” does not correspond to the longs properly to knowledge. Now it is through creatures gift of knowledge. For, even as evil is the cause of sor- that man’s aversion from God is occasioned, according row and grief, so is good the cause of joy. Now knowl- to Wis. 14:11: “Creatures. . . are turned to an abomina- edge brings good to light rather than evil, since the latter tion. . . and a snare to the feet of the unwise,” of those, is known through evil: for “the straight line rules both it- namely, who do not judge aright about creatures, since self and the crooked line” (De Anima i, 5). Therefore the they deem the perfect good to consist in them. Hence aforesaid beatitude does not suitably correspond to the gift they sin by placing their last end in them, and lose the true of knowledge. good. It is by forming a right judgment of creatures that Objection 2. Further, consideration of truth is an act man becomes aware of the loss (of which they may be the of knowledge. Now there is no sorrow in the considera- occasion), which judgment he exercises through the gift tion of truth; rather is there joy, since it is written (Wis. of knowledge. 8:16): “Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her com- Hence the beatitude of sorrow is said to correspond to pany any tediousness, but joy and gladness.” Therefore the gift of knowledge. the aforesaid beatitude does not suitably correspond with Reply to Objection 1. Created goods do not cause the gift of knowledge. spiritual joy, except in so far as they are referred to the Objection 3. Further, the gift of knowledge consists Divine good, which is the proper cause of spiritual joy. in speculation, before operation. Now, in so far as it con- Hence spiritual peace and the resulting joy correspond di- sists in speculation, sorrow does not correspond to it, since rectly to the gift of wisdom: but to the gift of knowledge “the speculative intellect is not concerned about things to there corresponds, in the first place, sorrow for past errors, be sought or avoided” (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore the and, in consequence, consolation, since, by his right judg- aforesaid beatitude is not suitably reckoned to correspond ment, man directs creatures to the Divine good. For this with the gift of knowledge. reason sorrow is set forth in this beatitude, as the merit, On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in and the resulting consolation, as the reward; which is be- Monte iv): “Knowledge befits the mourner, who has dis- gun in this life, and is perfected in the life to come. covered that he has been mastered by the evil which he Reply to Objection 2. Man rejoices in the very con- coveted as though it were good.” sideration of truth; yet he may sometimes grieve for the 1234 thing, the truth of which he considers: it is thus that sor-sist somewhat in the right use of creatures, and in well- row is ascribed to knowledge. ordered love of them: and this I say with regard to the Reply to Objection 3. No beatitude corresponds to beatitude of a wayfarer. Hence beatitude relating to con- knowledge, in so far as it consists in speculation, because templation is not ascribed to knowledge, but to under- man’s beatitude consists, not in considering creatures, but standing and wisdom, which are about Divine things. in contemplating God. But man’s beatitude does con- 1235 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 10 Of Unbelief in General (In Twelve Articles) In due sequence we must consider the contrary vices: first, unbelief, which is contrary to faith; secondly, blasphemy, which is opposed to confession of faith; thirdly, ignorance and dulness of mind, which are contrary to knowledge and understanding. As to the first, we must consider (1) unbelief in general; (2) heresy; (3) apostasy from the faith. Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether unbelief is a sin? (2) What is its subject? (3) Whether it is the greatest of sins? (4) Whether every action of unbelievers is a sin? (5) Of the species of unbelief; (6) Of their comparison, one with another; (7) Whether we ought to dispute about faith with unbelievers? (8) Whether they ought to be compelled to the faith? (9) Whether we ought to have communications with them? (10) Whether unbelievers can have authority over Christians? (11) Whether the rites of unbelievers should be tolerated? (12) Whether the children of unbelievers are to be baptized against their parents’ will? Whether unbelief is a sin? IIa IIae q. 10 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that unbelief is not a sin. it, according to Is. 53:1: “Who hath believed our report?” For every sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene proves It is this that completes the notion of unbelief, and it is in (De Fide Orth. ii, 4). Now unbelief seems not to be con- this sense that unbelief is a sin. trary to nature; for Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. If, however, we take it by way of pure negation, as we v) that “to be capable to having faith, just as to be capable find it in those who have heard nothing about the faith, it of having charity, is natural to all men; whereas to have bears the character, not of sin, but of punishment, because faith, even as to have charity, belongs to the grace of the such like ignorance of Divine things is a result of the sin faithful.” Therefore not to have faith, which is to be an of our first parent. If such like unbelievers are damned, it unbeliever, is not a sin. is on account of other sins, which cannot be taken away Objection 2. Further, no one sins that which he cannot without faith, but not on account of their sin of unbelief. avoid, since every sin is voluntary. Now it is not in a man’s Hence Our Lord said (Jn. 15:22) “If I had not come, and power to avoid unbelief, for he cannot avoid it unless he spoken to them, they would not have sin”; which Augus- have faith, because the Apostle says (Rom. 10:14): “How tine expounds (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) as “referring to the shall they believe in Him, of Whom they have not heard? sin whereby they believed not in Christ.” And how shall they hear without a preacher?” Therefore Reply to Objection 1. To have the faith is not part of unbelief does not seem to be a sin. human nature, but it is part of human nature that man’s Objection 3. Further, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 84, mind should not thwart his inner instinct, and the outward a. 4), there are seven capital sins, to which all sins are re- preaching of the truth. Hence, in this way, unbelief is con- duced. But unbelief does not seem to be comprised under trary to nature. any of them. Therefore unbelief is not a sin. Reply to Objection 2. This argument takes unbelief On the contrary, Vice is opposed to virtue. Now faith as denoting a pure negation. is a virtue, and unbelief is opposed to it. Therefore unbe- Reply to Objection 3. Unbelief, in so far as it is a lief is a sin. sin, arises from pride, through which man is unwilling to I answer that, Unbelief may be taken in two ways: subject his intellect to the rules of faith, and to the sound first, by way of pure negation, so that a man be called an interpretation of the Fathers. Hence Gregory says (Moral. unbeliever, merely because he has not the faith. Secondly, xxxi, 45) that “presumptuous innovations arise from vain- unbelief may be taken by way of opposition to the faith; glory.” in which sense a man refuses to hear the faith, or despises It might also be replied that just as the theological 1236 virtues are not reduced to the cardinal virtues, but precede are not reduced to the capital vices. them, so too, the vices opposed to the theological virtues Whether unbelief is in the intellect as its subject? IIa IIae q. 10 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that unbelief is not in the principles: one is its first and universal principle, which intellect as its subject. For every sin is in the will, accord- commands all acts of sin; and this is the will, because ev- ing to Augustine (De Duabus Anim. x, xi). Now unbelief ery sin is voluntary. The other principle of the sinful act is is a sin, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore unbelief resides the proper and proximate principle which elicits the sinful in the will and not in the intellect. act: thus the concupiscible is the principle of gluttony and Objection 2. Further, unbelief is sinful through con- lust, wherefore these sins are said to be in the concupis- tempt of the preaching of the faith. But contempt pertains cible. Now dissent, which is the act proper to unbelief, is to the will. Therefore unbelief is in the will. an act of the intellect, moved, however, by the will, just as Objection 3. Further, a gloss∗ on 2 Cor. 11:14 “Sa- assent is. tan. . . transformeth himself into an angel of light,” says Therefore unbelief, like faith, is in the intellect as its that if “a wicked angel pretend to be a good angel, and proximate subject. But it is in the will as its first moving be taken for a good angel, it is not a dangerous or an un- principle, in which way every sin is said to be in the will. healthy error, if he does or says what is becoming to a Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear. good angel.” This seems to be because of the rectitude of Reply to Objection 2. The will’s contempt causes the the will of the man who adheres to the angel, since his in- intellect’s dissent, which completes the notion of unbelief. tention is to adhere to a good angel. Therefore the sin of Hence the cause of unbelief is in the will, while unbelief unbelief seems to consist entirely in a perverse will: and, itself is in the intellect. consequently, it does not reside in the intellect. Reply to Objection 3. He that believes a wicked an- On the contrary, Things which are contrary to one gel to be a good one, does not dissent from a matter of another are in the same subject. Now faith, to which unbe- faith, because “his bodily senses are deceived, while his lief is opposed, resides in the intellect. Therefore unbelief mind does not depart from a true and right judgment” as also is in the intellect. the gloss observes†. But, according to the same author- I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 74, ity, to adhere to Satan when he begins to invite one to his Aa. 1,2), sin is said to be in the power which is the prin- abode, i.e. wickedness and error, is not without sin. ciple of the sinful act. Now a sinful act may have two Whether unbelief is the greatest of sin? IIa IIae q. 10 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that unbelief is not the be.” Now a greater punishment is due to believers than to greatest of sins. For Augustine says (De Bapt. contra unbelievers, according to Heb. 10:29: “How much more, Donat. iv, 20): “I should hesitate to decide whether a do you think, he deserveth worse punishments, who hath very wicked Catholic ought to be preferred to a heretic, trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath esteemed the in whose life one finds nothing reprehensible beyond the blood of the testament unclean, by which he was sancti- fact that he is a heretic.” But a heretic is an unbeliever. fied?” Therefore unbelief is not the greatest of sins. Therefore we ought not to say absolutely that unbelief is On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on Jn. the greatest of sins. 15:22, “If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would Objection 2. Further, that which diminishes or not have sin,” says (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.): “Under the excuses a sin is not, seemingly, the greatest of sins. general name, He refers to a singularly great sin. For Now unbelief excuses or diminishes sin: for the Apos- this,” viz. infidelity, “is the sin to which all others may tle says (1 Tim. 1:12,13): “I. . . before was a blas- be traced.” Therefore unbelief is the greatest of sins. phemer, and a persecutor and contumelious; but I ob- I answer that, Every sin consists formally in aversion tained. . . mercy. . . because I did it ignorantly in unbelief.” from God, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 71, a. 6; Ia IIae, Therefore unbelief is not the greatest of sins. q. 73, a. 3). Hence the more a sin severs man from God, Objection 3. Further, the greater sin deserves the the graver it is. Now man is more than ever separated from greater punishment, according to Dt. 25:2: “According to God by unbelief, because he has not even true knowledge the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes of God: and by false knowledge of God, man does not ∗ Augustine, Enchiridion lx. † Augustine, Enchiridion lx 1237 approach Him, but is severed from Him. Reply to Objection 2. Unbelief includes both igno- Nor is it possible for one who has a false opinion of rance, as an accessory thereto, and resistance to matters God, to know Him in any way at all, because the object of faith, and in the latter respect it is a most grave sin. In of his opinion is not God. Therefore it is clear that the respect, however, of this ignorance, it has a certain reason sin of unbelief is greater than any sin that occurs in the for excuse, especially when a man sins not from malice, perversion of morals. This does not apply to the sins that as was the case with the Apostle. are opposed to the theological virtues, as we shall stated Reply to Objection 3. An unbeliever is more severely further on (q. 20, a. 3; q. 34, a. 2, ad 2; q. 39, a. 2, ad 3). punished for his sin of unbelief than another sinner is for Reply to Objection 1. Nothing hinders a sin that is any sin whatever, if we consider the kind of sin. But in more grave in its genus from being less grave in respect the case of another sin, e.g. adultery, committed by a be- of some circumstances. Hence Augustine hesitated to de- liever, and by an unbeliever, the believer, other things be- cide between a bad Catholic, and a heretic not sinning oth- ing equal, sins more gravely than the unbeliever, both on erwise, because although the heretic’s sin is more grave account of his knowledge of the truth through faith, and generically, it can be lessened by a circumstance, and con- on account of the sacraments of faith with which he has versely the sin of the Catholic can, by some circumstance, been satiated, and which he insults by committing sin. be aggravated. Whether every act of an unbeliever is a sin? IIa IIae q. 10 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that each act of an unbe- Hence it does not follow that they sin in everything liever is a sin. Because a gloss on Rom. 14:23, “All that they do; but whenever they do anything out of their un- is not of faith is sin,” says: “The whole life of unbeliev- belief, then they sin. For even as one who has the faith, ers is a sin.” Now the life of unbelievers consists of their can commit an actual sin, venial or even mortal, which he actions. Therefore every action of an unbeliever is a sin. does not refer to the end of faith, so too, an unbeliever can Objection 2. Further, faith directs the intention. Now do a good deed in a matter which he does not refer to the there can be no good save what comes from a right in- end of his unbelief. tention. Therefore, among unbelievers, no action can be Reply to Objection 1. The words quoted must be good. taken to mean either that the life of unbelievers cannot Objection 3. Further, when that which precedes is be sinless, since without faith no sin is taken away, or that corrupted, that which follows is corrupted also. Now an whatever they do out of unbelief, is a sin. Hence the same act of faith precedes the acts of all the virtues. Therefore, authority adds: “Because every one that lives or acts ac- since there is no act of faith in unbelievers, they can do no cording to his unbelief, sins grievously.” good work, but sin in every action of theirs. Reply to Objection 2. Faith directs the intention with On the contrary, It is said of Cornelius, while yet an regard to the supernatural last end: but even the light of unbeliever (Acts 10:4,31), that his alms were acceptable natural reason can direct the intention in respect of a con- to God. Therefore not every action of an unbeliever is a natural good. sin, but some of his actions are good. Reply to Objection 3. Unbelief does not so wholly I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 85, Aa. 2,4) destroy natural reason in unbelievers, but that some mortal sin takes away sanctifying grace, but does not knowledge of the truth remains in them, whereby they are wholly corrupt the good of nature. Since therefore, un- able to do deeds that are generically good. With regard, belief is a mortal sin, unbelievers are without grace in- however, to Cornelius, it is to be observed that he was not deed, yet some good of nature remains in them. Conse- an unbeliever, else his works would not have been accept- quently it is evident that unbelievers cannot do those good able to God, whom none can please without faith. Now he works which proceed from grace, viz. meritorious works; had implicit faith, as the truth of the Gospel was not yet yet they can, to a certain extent, do those good works for made manifest: hence Peter was sent to him to give him which the good of nature suffices. fuller instruction in the faith. 1238 Whether there are several species of unbelief? IIa IIae q. 10 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that there are not several Accordingly we must say that if unbelief be consid- species of unbelief. For, since faith and unbelief are con- ered in comparison to faith, there are several species of trary to one another, they must be about the same thing. unbelief, determinate in number. For, since the sin of un- Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, whence it belief consists in resisting the faith, this may happen in derives its unity, although its matter contains many points two ways: either the faith is resisted before it has been of belief. Therefore the object of unbelief also is the First accepted, and such is the unbelief of pagans or heathens; Truth; while the things which an unbeliever disbelieves or the Christian faith is resisted after it has been accepted, are the matter of his unbelief. Now the specific difference and this either in the figure, and such is the unbelief of depends not on material but on formal principles. There- the Jews, or in the very manifestation of truth, and such is fore there are not several species of unbelief, according to the unbelief of heretics. Hence we may, in a general way, the various points which the unbeliever disbelieves. reckon these three as species of unbelief. Objection 2. Further, it is possible to stray from the If, however, the species of unbelief be distinguished truth of faith in an infinite number of ways. If therefore according to the various errors that occur in matters of the various species of unbelief correspond to the number faith, there are not determinate species of unbelief: for er- of various errors, it would seem to follow that there is an rors can be multiplied indefinitely, as Augustine observes infinite number of species of unbelief, and consequently, (De Haeresibus). that we ought not to make these species the object of our Reply to Objection 1. The formal aspect of a sin can consideration. be considered in two ways. First, according to the inten- Objection 3. Further, the same thing does not belong tion of the sinner, in which case the thing to which the to different species. Now a man may be an unbeliever sinner turns is the formal object of his sin, and determines through erring about different points of truth. Therefore the various species of that sin. Secondly, it may be con- diversity of errors does not make a diversity of species of sidered as an evil, and in this case the good which is for- unbelief: and so there are not several species of unbelief. saken is the formal object of the sin; which however does On the contrary, Several species of vice are opposed not derive its species from this point of view, in fact it to each virtue, because “good happens in one way, but evil is a privation. We must therefore reply that the object of in many ways,” according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) unbelief is the First Truth considered as that which unbe- and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now faith is a virtue. lief forsakes, but its formal aspect, considered as that to Therefore several species of vice are opposed to it. which unbelief turns, is the false opinion that it follows: I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 55, a. 4; Ia and it is from this point of view that unbelief derives its IIae, q. 64, a. 1), every virtue consists in following some various species. Hence, even as charity is one, because rule of human knowledge or operation. Now conformity it adheres to the Sovereign Good, while there are various to a rule happens one way in one matter, whereas a breach species of vice opposed to charity, which turn away from of the rule happens in many ways, so that many vices are the Sovereign Good by turning to various temporal goods, opposed to one virtue. The diversity of the vices that are and also in respect of various inordinate relations to God, opposed to each virtue may be considered in two ways, so too, faith is one virtue through adhering to the one First first, with regard to their different relations to the virtue: Truth, yet there are many species of unbelief, because un- and in this way there are determinate species of vices con- believers follow many false opinions. trary to a virtue: thus to a moral virtue one vice is opposed Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers the by exceeding the virtue, and another, by falling short of various species of unbelief according to various points in the virtue. Secondly, the diversity of vices opposed to one which errors occur. virtue may be considered in respect of the corruption of Reply to Objection 3. Since faith is one because it the various conditions required for that virtue. In this way believes in many things in relation to one, so may unbe- an infinite number of vices are opposed to one virtue, e.g. lief, although it errs in many things, be one in so far as all temperance or fortitude, according to the infinite number those things are related to one. Yet nothing hinders one of ways in which the various circumstances of a virtue man from erring in various species of unbelief, even as may be corrupted, so that the rectitude of virtue is for- one man may be subject to various vices, and to various saken. For this reason the Pythagoreans held evil to be bodily diseases. infinite. 1239 Whether the unbelief of pagans or heathens is graver than other kinds? IIa IIae q. 10 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the unbelief of hea- be considered in unbelief. One of these is its relation thens or pagans is graver than other kinds. For just as bod- to faith: and from this point of view, he who resists the ily disease is graver according as it endangers the health faith after accepting it, sins more grievously against faith, of a more important member of the body, so does sin ap- than he who resists it without having accepted it, even pear to be graver, according as it is opposed to that which as he who fails to fulfil what he has promised, sins more holds a more important place in virtue. Now that which is grievously than if he had never promised it. In this way most important in faith, is belief in the unity of God, from the unbelief of heretics, who confess their belief in the which the heathens deviate by believing in many gods. Gospel, and resist that faith by corrupting it, is a more Therefore their unbelief is the gravest of all. grievous sin than that of the Jews, who have never ac- Objection 2. Further, among heresies, the more de- cepted the Gospel faith. Since, however, they accepted testable are those which contradict the truth of faith in the figure of that faith in the Old Law, which they cor- more numerous and more important points: thus, the rupt by their false interpretations, their unbelief is a more heresy of Arius, who severed the Godhead, was more de- grievous sin than that of the heathens, because the latter testable than that of Nestorius who severed the humanity have not accepted the Gospel faith in any way at all. of Christ from the Person of God the Son. Now the hea- The second thing to be considered in unbelief is the thens deny the faith in more numerous and more important corruption of matters of faith. In this respect, since hea- points than Jews and heretics; since they do not accept the thens err on more points than Jews, and these in more faith at all. Therefore their unbelief is the gravest. points than heretics, the unbelief of heathens is more Objection 3. Further, every good diminishes evil. grievous than the unbelief of the Jews, and that of the Jews Now there is some good in the Jews, since they believe in than that of the heretics, except in such cases as that of the the Old Testament as being from God, and there is some Manichees, who, in matters of faith, err even more than good in heretics, since they venerate the New Testament. heathens do. Therefore they sin less grievously than heathens, who re- Of these two gravities the first surpasses the second ceive neither Testament. from the point of view of guilt; since, as stated above (a. 1) On the contrary, It is written (2 Pet. 2:21): “It had unbelief has the character of guilt, from its resisting faith been better for them not to have known the way of justice, rather than from the mere absence of faith, for the latter than after they have known it, to turn back.” Now the hea- as was stated (a. 1) seems rather to bear the character of thens have not known the way of justice, whereas heretics punishment. Hence, speaking absolutely, the unbelief of and Jews have abandoned it after knowing it in some way. heretics is the worst. Therefore theirs is the graver sin. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. I answer that, As stated above (a. 5), two things may Whether one ought to dispute with unbelievers in public? IIa IIae q. 10 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that one ought not to dis- Objection 3. Further, disputations are conducted by pute with unbelievers in public. For the Apostle says (2 means of arguments. But an argument is a reason in set- Tim. 2:14): “Contend not in words, for it is to no profit, tlement of a dubious matter: whereas things that are of but to the subverting of the hearers.” But it is impossible faith, being most certain, ought not to be a matter of doubt. to dispute with unbelievers publicly without contending in Therefore one ought not to dispute in public about matters words. Therefore one ought not to dispute publicly with of faith. unbelievers. On the contrary, It is written (Acts 9:22,29) that Objection 2. Further, the law of Martianus Augustus “Saul increased much more in strength, and confounded confirmed by the canons∗ expresses itself thus: “It is an the Jews,” and that “he spoke. . . to the gentiles and dis- insult to the judgment of the most religious synod, if any- puted with the Greeks.” one ventures to debate or dispute in public about matters I answer that, In disputing about the faith, two things which have once been judged and disposed of.” Now all must be observed: one on the part of the disputant; the matters of faith have been decided by the holy councils. other on the part of his hearers. On the part of the dis- Therefore it is an insult to the councils, and consequently putant, we must consider his intention. For if he were to a grave sin to presume to dispute in public about matters dispute as though he had doubts about the faith, and did of faith. not hold the truth of faith for certain, and as though he in- ∗ De Sum. Trin. Cod. lib. i, leg. Nemo 1240 tended to probe it with arguments, without doubt he would been instructed.” On the other hand, in the second case sin, as being doubtful of the faith and an unbeliever. On it is dangerous to dispute in public about the faith, in the the other hand, it is praiseworthy to dispute about the faith presence of simple people, whose faith for this very rea- in order to confute errors, or for practice. son is more firm, that they have never heard anything dif- On the part of the hearers we must consider whether fering from what they believe. Hence it is not expedient those who hear the disputation are instructed and firm in for them to hear what unbelievers have to say against the the faith, or simple and wavering. As to those who are faith. well instructed and firm in the faith, there can be no dan- Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle does not entirely ger in disputing about the faith in their presence. But as forbid disputations, but such as are inordinate, and consist to simple-minded people, we must make a distinction; be- of contentious words rather than of sound speeches. cause either they are provoked and molested by unbeliev- Reply to Objection 2. That law forbade those public ers, for instance, Jews or heretics, or pagans who strive disputations about the faith, which arise from doubting the to corrupt the faith in them, or else they are not subject faith, but not those which are for the safeguarding thereof. to provocation in this matter, as in those countries where Reply to Objection 3. One ought to dispute about there are not unbelievers. In the first case it is necessary to matters of faith, not as though one doubted about them, dispute in public about the faith, provided there be those but in order to make the truth known, and to confute er- who are equal and adapted to the task of confuting errors; rors. For, in order to confirm the faith, it is necessary since in this way simple people are strengthened in the sometimes to dispute with unbelievers, sometimes by de- faith, and unbelievers are deprived of the opportunity to fending the faith, according to 1 Pet. 3:15: “Being ready deceive, while if those who ought to withstand the per- always to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that verters of the truth of faith were silent, this would tend hope and faith which is in you∗.” Sometimes again, it is to strengthen error. Hence Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 4): necessary, in order to convince those who are in error, ac- “Even as a thoughtless speech gives rise to error, so does cording to Titus 1:9: “That he may be able to exhort in an indiscreet silence leave those in error who might have sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers.” Whether unbelievers ought to be compelled to the faith? IIa IIae q. 10 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that unbelievers ought him that dieth’].” Now we ought to conform our will to by no means to be compelled to the faith. For it is writ- the Divine will, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 19, Aa. 9,10). ten (Mat. 13:28) that the servants of the householder, in Therefore we should not even wish unbelievers to be put whose field cockle had been sown, asked him: “Wilt thou to death. that we go and gather it up?” and that he answered: “No, On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 14:23): “Go out lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root up the wheat into the highways and hedges; and compel them to come also together with it”: on which passage Chrysostom says in.” Now men enter into the house of God, i.e. into Holy (Hom. xlvi in Matth.): “Our Lord says this so as to for- Church, by faith. Therefore some ought to be compelled bid the slaying of men. For it is not right to slay heretics, to the faith. because if you do you will necessarily slay many inno- I answer that, Among unbelievers there are some cent persons.” Therefore it seems that for the same reason who have never received the faith, such as the heathens unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith. and the Jews: and these are by no means to be compelled Objection 2. Further, we read in the Decretals (Dist. to the faith, in order that they may believe, because to xlv can., De Judaeis): “The holy synod prescribes, with believe depends on the will: nevertheless they should be regard to the Jews, that for the future, none are to be compelled by the faithful, if it be possible to do so, so compelled to believe.” Therefore, in like manner, neither that they do not hinder the faith, by their blasphemies, or should unbelievers be compelled to the faith. by their evil persuasions, or even by their open persecu- Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in tions. It is for this reason that Christ’s faithful often wage Joan.) that “it is possible for a man to do other things war with unbelievers, not indeed for the purpose of forc- against his will, but he cannot believe unless he is will- ing them to believe, because even if they were to conquer ing.” Therefore it seems that unbelievers ought not to be them, and take them prisoners, they should still leave them compelled to the faith. free to believe, if they will, but in order to prevent them Objection 4. It is said in God’s person (Ezech. from hindering the faith of Christ. 18:32†): “I desire not the death of the sinner [Vulg.: ‘of On the other hand, there are unbelievers who at some ∗ Vulg.: ‘Of that hope which is in you’ St. Thomas’ reading is apparently taken from Bede † Ezech. 33:11 1241 time have accepted the faith, and professed it, such as Reply to Objection 2. Those Jews who have in no heretics and all apostates: such should be submitted even way received the faith, ought not by no means to be com- to bodily compulsion, that they may fulfil what they have pelled to the faith: if, however, they have received it, they promised, and hold what they, at one time, received. ought to be compelled to keep it, as is stated in the same Reply to Objection 1. Some have understood the au- chapter. thority quoted to forbid, not the excommunication but the Reply to Objection 3. Just as taking a vow is a mat- slaying of heretics, as appears from the words of Chrysos- ter of will, and keeping a vow, a matter of obligation, so tom. Augustine too, says (Ep. ad Vincent. xciii) of him- acceptance of the faith is a matter of the will, whereas self: “It was once my opinion that none should be com- keeping the faith, when once one has received it, is a mat- pelled to union with Christ, that we should deal in words, ter of obligation. Wherefore heretics should be compelled and fight with arguments. However this opinion of mine to keep the faith. Thus Augustine says to the Count Boni- is undone, not by words of contradiction, but by convinc- face (Ep. clxxxv): “What do these people mean by crying ing examples. Because fear of the law was so profitable, out continually: ‘We may believe or not believe just as that many say: Thanks be to the Lord Who has broken our we choose. Whom did Christ compel?’ They should re- chains asunder.” Accordingly the meaning of Our Lord’s member that Christ at first compelled Paul and afterwards words, “Suffer both to grow until the harvest,” must be taught Him.” gathered from those which precede, “lest perhaps gather- Reply to Objection 4. As Augustine says in the same ing up the cockle, you root the wheat also together with letter, “none of us wishes any heretic to perish. But the it.” For, Augustine says (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2) “these house of David did not deserve to have peace, unless his words show that when this is not to be feared, that is to son Absalom had been killed in the war which he had say, when a man’s crime is so publicly known, and so raised against his father. Thus if the Catholic Church gath- hateful to all, that he has no defenders, or none such as ers together some of the perdition of others, she heals the might cause a schism, the severity of discipline should not sorrow of her maternal heart by the delivery of so many slacken.” nations.” Whether it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers? IIa IIae q. 10 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that it is lawful to com- should not come in touch with idolaters or their disciples, municate with unbelievers. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. nor have any dealings with them.” 10:27): “If any of them that believe not, invite you, and I answer that, Communication with a particular per- you be willing to go, eat of anything that is set before son is forbidden to the faithful, in two ways: first, as a you.” And Chrysostom says (Hom. xxv super Epist. ad punishment of the person with whom they are forbidden Heb.): “If you wish to go to dine with pagans, we permit to communicate; secondly, for the safety of those who are it without any reservation.” Now to sit at table with any- forbidden to communicate with others. Both motives can one is to communicate with him. Therefore it is lawful to be gathered from the Apostle’s words (1 Cor. 5:6). For af- communicate with unbelievers. ter he had pronounced sentence of excommunication, he Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:12): adds as his reason: “Know you not that a little leaven cor- “What have I to do to judge them that are without?” Now rupts the whole lump?” and afterwards he adds the reason unbelievers are without. When, therefore, the Church for- on the part of the punishment inflicted by the sentence of bids the faithful to communicate with certain people, it the Church when he says (1 Cor. 5:12): “Do not you judge seems that they ought not to be forbidden to communicate them that are within?” with unbelievers. Accordingly, in the first way the Church does not for- Objection 3. Further, a master cannot employ his ser- bid the faithful to communicate with unbelievers, who vant, unless he communicate with him, at least by word, have not in any way received the Christian faith, viz. with since the master moves his servant by command. Now pagans and Jews, because she has not the right to exer- Christians can have unbelievers, either Jews, or pagans, or cise spiritual judgment over them, but only temporal judg- Saracens, for servants. Therefore they can lawfully com- ment, in the case when, while dwelling among Christians municate with them. they are guilty of some misdemeanor, and are condemned On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 7:2,3): “Thou shalt by the faithful to some temporal punishment. On the other make no league with them, nor show mercy to them; nei- hand, in this way, i.e. as a punishment, the Church forbids ther shalt thou make marriages with them”: and a gloss on the faithful to communicate with those unbelievers who Lev. 15:19, “The woman who at the return of the month,” have forsaken the faith they once received, either by cor- etc. says: “It is so necessary to shun idolatry, that we rupting the faith, as heretics, or by entirely renouncing the 1242 faith, as apostates, because the Church pronounces sen-ment over some of them in the matter of temporal punish- tence of excommunication on both. ment. It is under this head that sometimes the Church, for With regard to the second way, it seems that one ought certain special sins, withdraws the faithful from commu- to distinguish according to the various conditions of per- nication with certain unbelievers. sons, circumstances and time. For some are firm in the Reply to Objection 3. There is more probability that faith; and so it is to be hoped that their communicating a servant who is ruled by his master’s commands, will with unbelievers will lead to the conversion of the latter be converted to the faith of his master who is a believer, rather than to the aversion of the faithful from the faith. than if the case were the reverse: and so the faithful are These are not to be forbidden to communicate with unbe- not forbidden to have unbelieving servants. If, however, lievers who have not received the faith, such as pagans or the master were in danger, through communicating with Jews, especially if there be some urgent necessity for so such a servant, he should send him away, according to doing. But in the case of simple people and those who Our Lord’s command (Mat. 18:8): “If. . . thy foot scandal- are weak in the faith, whose perversion is to be feared as ize thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee.” a probable result, they should be forbidden to communi- With regard to the argument in the contrary∗ sense the cate with unbelievers, and especially to be on very famil- reply is that the Lord gave this command in reference to iar terms with them, or to communicate with them without those nations into whose territory the Jews were about to necessity. enter. For the latter were inclined to idolatry, so that it was This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. to be feared lest, through frequent dealings with those na- Reply to Objection 2. The Church does not exer- tions, they should be estranged from the faith: hence the cise judgment against unbelievers in the point of inflicting text goes on (Dt. 7:4): “For she will turn away thy son spiritual punishment on them: but she does exercise judg- from following Me.” Whether unbelievers may have authority or dominion over the faithful? IIa IIae q. 10 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that unbelievers may have On the contrary, Those who are in authority can pro- authority or dominion over the faithful. For the Apostle nounce judgment on those over whom they are placed. says (1 Tim. 6:1): “Whosoever are servants under the But unbelievers cannot pronounce judgment on the faith- yoke, let them count their masters worthy of all honor”: ful, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:1): “Dare any of you, and it is clear that he is speaking of unbelievers, since he having a matter against another, go to be judged before adds (1 Tim. 6:2): “But they that have believing mas- the unjust,” i.e. unbelievers, “and not before the saints?” ters, let them not despise them.” Moreover it is written Therefore it seems that unbelievers cannot have authority (1 Pet. 2:18): “Servants be subject to your masters with over the faithful. all fear, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the I answer that, That this question may be considered froward.” Now this command would not be contained in in two ways. First, we may speak of dominion or authority the apostolic teaching unless unbelievers could have au- of unbelievers over the faithful as of a thing to be estab- thority over the faithful. Therefore it seems that unbeliev- lished for the first time. This ought by no means to be ers can have authority over the faithful. allowed, since it would provoke scandal and endanger the Objection 2. Further, all the members of a prince’s faith, for subjects are easily influenced by their superiors household are his subjects. Now some of the faithful were to comply with their commands, unless the subjects are of members of unbelieving princes’ households, for we read great virtue: moreover unbelievers hold the faith in con- in the Epistle to the Philippians (4:22): “All the saints tempt, if they see the faithful fall away. Hence the Apos- salute you, especially they that are of Caesar’s house- tle forbade the faithful to go to law before an unbelieving hold,” referring to Nero, who was an unbeliever. There- judge. And so the Church altogether forbids unbelievers fore unbelievers can have authority over the faithful. to acquire dominion over believers, or to have authority Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher over them in any capacity whatever. (Polit. i, 2) a slave is his master’s instrument in matters Secondly, we may speak of dominion or authority, as concerning everyday life, even as a craftsman’s laborer is already in force: and here we must observe that dominion his instrument in matters concerning the working of his and authority are institutions of human law, while the dis- art. Now, in such matters, a believer can be subject to tinction between faithful and unbelievers arises from the an unbeliever, for he may work on an unbeliever’s farm. Divine law. Now the Divine law which is the law of grace, Therefore unbelievers may have authority over the faithful does not do away with human law which is the law of nat- even as to dominion. ural reason. Wherefore the distinction between faithful ∗ The Leonine Edition gives this solution before the Reply obj. 2 1243 and unbelievers, considered in itself, does not do away paid in order to avoid giving scandal. Thus Paul too, after with dominion and authority of unbelievers over the faith- saying that servants should honor their masters, adds, “lest ful. the name of the Lord and His doctrine be blasphemed.” Nevertheless this right of dominion or authority can be This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. justly done away with by the sentence or ordination of the Reply to Objection 2. The authority of Caesar pre- Church who has the authority of God: since unbelievers in ceded the distinction of faithful from unbelievers. Hence virtue of their unbelief deserve to forfeit their power over it was not cancelled by the conversion of some to the faith. the faithful who are converted into children of God. Moreover it was a good thing that there should be a few This the Church does sometimes, and sometimes not. of the faithful in the emperor’s household, that they might For among those unbelievers who are subject, even in tem- defend the rest of the faithful. Thus the Blessed Sebastian poral matters, to the Church and her members, the Church encouraged those whom he saw faltering under torture, made the law that if the slave of a Jew became a Christian, and, the while, remained hidden under the military cloak he should forthwith receive his freedom, without paying in the palace of Diocletian. any price, if he should be a “vernaculus,” i.e. born in slav- Reply to Objection 3. Slaves are subject to their ery; and likewise if, when yet an unbeliever, he had been masters for their whole lifetime, and are subject to their bought for his service: if, however, he had been bought overseers in everything: whereas the craftsman’s laborer for sale, then he should be offered for sale within three is subject to him for certain special works. Hence it months. Nor does the Church harm them in this, because would be more dangerous for unbelievers to have domin- since those Jews themselves are subject to the Church, she ion or authority over the faithful, than that they should can dispose of their possessions, even as secular princes be allowed to employ them in some craft. Wherefore the have enacted many laws to be observed by their subjects, Church permits Christians to work on the land of Jews, be- in favor of liberty. On the other hand, the Church has cause this does not entail their living together with them. not applied the above law to those unbelievers who are Thus Solomon besought the King of Tyre to send master not subject to her or her members, in temporal matters, workmen to hew the trees, as related in 3 Kings 5:6. Yet, although she has the right to do so: and this, in order to if there be reason to fear that the faithful will be perverted avoid scandal, for as Our Lord showed (Mat. 17:25,26) by such communications and dealings, they should be ab- that He could be excused from paying the tribute, because solutely forbidden. “the children are free,” yet He ordered the tribute to be Whether the rites of unbelievers ought to be tolerated? IIa IIae q. 10 a. 11 Objection 1. It would seem that rites of unbelievers On the contrary, Gregory∗ says, speaking of the ought not to be tolerated. For it is evident that unbeliev- Jews: “They should be allowed to observe all their feasts, ers sin in observing their rites: and not to prevent a sin, just as hitherto they and their fathers have for ages ob- when one can, seems to imply consent therein, as a gloss served them.” observes on Rom. 1:32: “Not only they that do them, but I answer that, Human government is derived from the they also that consent to them that do them.” Therefore it Divine government, and should imitate it. Now although is a sin to tolerate their rites. God is all-powerful and supremely good, nevertheless He Objection 2. Further, the rites of the Jews are com- allows certain evils to take place in the universe, which pared to idolatry, because a gloss on Gal. 5:1, “Be not held He might prevent, lest, without them, greater goods might again under the yoke of bondage,” says: “The bondage of be forfeited, or greater evils ensue. Accordingly in human that law was not lighter than that of idolatry.” But it would government also, those who are in authority, rightly tol- not be allowable for anyone to observe the rites of idolatry, erate certain evils, lest certain goods be lost, or certain in fact Christian princes at first caused the temples of idols greater evils be incurred: thus Augustine says (De Or- to be closed, and afterwards, to be destroyed, as Augus- dine ii, 4): “If you do away with harlots, the world will tine relates (De Civ. Dei xviii, 54). Therefore it follows be convulsed with lust.” Hence, though unbelievers sin that even the rites of Jews ought not to be tolerated. in their rites, they may be tolerated, either on account of Objection 3. Further, unbelief is the greatest of sins, some good that ensues therefrom, or because of some evil as stated above (a. 3 ). Now other sins such as adultery, avoided. Thus from the fact that the Jews observe their theft and the like, are not tolerated, but are punishable by rites, which, of old, foreshadowed the truth of the faith law. Therefore neither ought the rites of unbelievers to be which we hold, there follows this good—that our very en- tolerated. emies bear witness to our faith, and that our faith is rep- ∗ Regist. xi, Ep. 15: cf. Decret., dist. xlv, can., Qui sincera 1244 resented in a figure, so to speak. For this reason they are drance to the salvation of those who if they were unmo-tolerated in the observance of their rites. lested might gradually be converted to the faith. For this On the other hand, the rites of other unbelievers, which reason the Church, at times, has tolerated the rites even of are neither truthful nor profitable are by no means to be heretics and pagans, when unbelievers were very numer- tolerated, except perchance in order to avoid an evil, e.g. ous. the scandal or disturbance that might ensue, or some hin- This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. Whether the children of Jews and other unbelievers ought to be baptized against their IIa IIae q. 10 a. 12 parents’ will? Objection 1. It would seem that the children of Jews the gate of heaven. Now if danger ensue through not and of other unbelievers ought to be baptized against their preaching, it is imputed to him who omitted to preach, parents’ will. For the bond of marriage is stronger than the according to the words of Ezech. 33:6 about the man right of parental authority over children, since the right of who “sees the sword coming and sounds not the trumpet.” parental authority can be made to cease, when a son is Much more therefore, if Jewish children are lost through set at liberty; whereas the marriage bond cannot be sev- not being baptized are they accounted guilty of sin, who ered by man, according to Mat. 19:6: “What. . . God hath could have baptized them and did not. joined together let no man put asunder.” And yet the mar- On the contrary, Injustice should be done to no man. riage bond is broken on account of unbelief: for the Apos- Now it would be an injustice to Jews if their children were tle says (1 Cor. 7:15): “If the unbeliever depart, let him to be baptized against their will, since they would lose the depart. For a brother or sister is not under servitude in rights of parental authority over their children as soon as such cases”: and a canon∗ says that “if the unbelieving these were Christians. Therefore these should not be bap- partner is unwilling to abide with the other, without in- tized against their parents’ will. sult to their Creator, then the other partner is not bound to I answer that, The custom of the Church has very cohabitation.” Much more, therefore, does unbelief abro- great authority and ought to be jealously observed in all gate the right of unbelieving parents’ authority over their things, since the very doctrine of catholic doctors derives children: and consequently their children may be baptized its authority from the Church. Hence we ought to abide by against their parents’ will. the authority of the Church rather than by that of an Au- Objection 2. Further, one is more bound to succor a gustine or a Jerome or of any doctor whatever. Now it was man who is in danger of everlasting death, than one who never the custom of the Church to baptize the children of is in danger of temporal death. Now it would be a sin, if the Jews against the will of their parents, although at times one saw a man in danger of temporal death and failed to past there have been many very powerful catholic princes go to his aid. Since, then, the children of Jews and other like Constantine and Theodosius, with whom most holy unbelievers are in danger of everlasting death, should they bishops have been on most friendly terms, as Sylvester be left to their parents who would imbue them with their with Constantine, and Ambrose with Theodosius, who unbelief, it seems that they ought to be taken away from would certainly not have failed to obtain this favor from them and baptized, and instructed in the faith. them if it had been at all reasonable. It seems there- Objection 3. Further, the children of a bondsman are fore hazardous to repeat this assertion, that the children themselves bondsmen, and under the power of his mas- of Jews should be baptized against their parents’ wishes, ter. Now the Jews are bondsmen of kings and princes: in contradiction to the Church’s custom observed hitherto. therefore their children are also. Consequently kings and There are two reasons for this custom. One is on princes have the power to do what they will with Jewish account of the danger to the faith. For children bap- children. Therefore no injustice is committed if they bap- tized before coming to the use of reason, afterwards when tize them against their parents’ wishes. they come to perfect age, might easily be persuaded by Objection 4. Further, every man belongs more to their parents to renounce what they had unknowingly em- God, from Whom he has his soul, than to his carnal fa- braced; and this would be detrimental to the faith. ther, from whom he has his body. Therefore it is not un- The other reason is that it is against natural justice. For just if Jewish children be taken away from their parents, a child is by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is not and consecrated to God in Baptism. distinct from its parents as to its body, so long as it is en- Objection 5. Further, Baptism avails for salvation folded within its mother’s womb; and later on after birth, more than preaching does, since Baptism removes forth- and before it has the use of its free-will, it is enfolded with the stain of sin and the debt of punishment, and opens in the care of its parents, which is like a spiritual womb, ∗ Can. Uxor legitima, and Idololatria, qu. i 1245 for so long as man has not the use of reason, he differs come to the use of reason, if it is willing to be converted. not from an irrational animal; so that even as an ox or a Reply to Objection 2. No one should be snatched horse belongs to someone who, according to the civil law, from natural death against the order of civil law: for in- can use them when he likes, as his own instrument, so, stance, if a man were condemned by the judge to temporal according to the natural law, a son, before coming to the death, nobody ought to rescue him by violence: hence no use of reason, is under his father’s care. Hence it would one ought to break the order of the natural law, whereby be contrary to natural justice, if a child, before coming to a child is in the custody of its father, in order to rescue it the use of reason, were to be taken away from its parents’ from the danger of everlasting death. custody, or anything done to it against its parents’ wish. Reply to Objection 3. Jews are bondsmen of princes As soon, however, as it begins to have the use of its free- by civil bondage, which does not exclude the order of nat- will, it begins to belong to itself, and is able to look after ural or Divine law. itself, in matters concerning the Divine or the natural law, Reply to Objection 4. Man is directed to God by his and then it should be induced, not by compulsion but by reason, whereby he can know Him. Hence a child before persuasion, to embrace the faith: it can then consent to the coming to the use of reason, in the natural order of things, faith, and be baptized, even against its parents’ wish; but is directed to God by its parents’ reason, under whose care not before it comes to the use of reason. Hence it is said it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose of the child of the children of the fathers of old that they were saved in in all matters relating to God. the faith of their parents; whereby we are given to under- Reply to Objection 5. The peril that ensues from the stand that it is the parents’ duty to look after the salvation omission of preaching, threatens only those who are en- of their children, especially before they come to the use of trusted with the duty of preaching. Hence it had already reason. been said (Ezech. 3:17): “I have made thee a watchman to Reply to Objection 1. In the marriage bond, both hus- the children [Vulg.: ‘house’] of Israel.” On the other hand, band and wife have the use of the free-will, and each can to provide the sacraments of salvation for the children of assent to the faith without the other’s consent. But this unbelievers is the duty of their parents. Hence it is they does not apply to a child before it comes to the use of whom the danger threatens, if through being deprived of reason: yet the comparison holds good after the child has the sacraments their children fail to obtain salvation. 1246 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 11 Of Heresy (In Four Articles) We must now consider heresy: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether heresy is a kind of unbelief? (2) Of the matter about which it is; (3) Whether heretics should be tolerated? (4) Whether converts should be received? Whether heresy is a species of unbelief? IIa IIae q. 11 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that heresy is not a species truth, has the character of last end, while those which are of unbelief. For unbelief is in the understanding, as stated secondary truths, have the character of being directed to above (q. 10, a. 2). Now heresy would seem not to pertain the end. to the understanding, but rather to the appetitive power; Now, whoever believes, assents to someone’s words; for Jerome says on Gal. 5:19:∗ “The works of the flesh so that, in every form of unbelief, the person to whose are manifest: Heresy is derived from a Greek word mean- words assent is given seems to hold the chief place and to ing choice, whereby a man makes choice of that school be the end as it were; while the things by holding which which he deems best.” But choice is an act of the appeti- one assents to that person hold a secondary place. Con- tive power, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 13, a. 1). Therefore sequently he that holds the Christian faith aright, assents, heresy is not a species of unbelief. by his will, to Christ, in those things which truly belong Objection 2. Further, vice takes its species chiefly to His doctrine. from its end; hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that Accordingly there are two ways in which a man may “he who commits adultery that he may steal, is a thief deviate from the rectitude of the Christian faith. First, rather than an adulterer.” Now the end of heresy is tempo- because he is unwilling to assent to Christ: and such a ral profit, especially lordship and glory, which belong to man has an evil will, so to say, in respect of the very end. the vice of pride or covetousness: for Augustine says (De This belongs to the species of unbelief in pagans and Jews. Util. Credendi i) that “a heretic is one who either devises Secondly, because, though he intends to assent to Christ, or follows false and new opinions, for the sake of some yet he fails in his choice of those things wherein he as- temporal profit, especially that he may lord and be hon- sents to Christ, because he chooses not what Christ really ored above others.” Therefore heresy is a species of pride taught, but the suggestions of his own mind. rather than of unbelief. Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, belonging to Objection 3. Further, since unbelief is in the under- those who profess the Christian faith, but corrupt its dog- standing, it would seem not to pertain to the flesh. Now mas. heresy belongs to the works of the flesh, for the Apostle Reply to Objection 1. Choice regards unbelief in the says (Gal. 5:19): “The works of the flesh are manifest, same way as the will regards faith, as stated above. which are fornication, uncleanness,” and among the oth- Reply to Objection 2. Vices take their species from ers, he adds, “dissensions, sects,” which are the same as their proximate end, while, from their remote end, they heresies. Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief. take their genus and cause. Thus in the case of adultery On the contrary, Falsehood is contrary to truth. Now committed for the sake of theft, there is the species of a heretic is one who devises or follows false or new opin- adultery taken from its proper end and object; but the ul- ions. Therefore heresy is opposed to the truth, on which timate end shows that the act of adultery is both the result faith is founded; and consequently it is a species of unbe- of the theft, and is included under it, as an effect under lief. its cause, or a species under its genus, as appears from I answer that, The word heresy as stated in the first what we have said about acts in general ( Ia IIae, q. 18, objection denotes a choosing. Now choice as stated above a. 7). Wherefore, as to the case in point also, the proxi- ( Ia IIae, q. 13, a. 3) is about things directed to the end, mate end of heresy is adherence to one’s own false opin- the end being presupposed. Now, in matters of faith, the ion, and from this it derives its species, while its remote will assents to some truth, as to its proper good, as was end reveals its cause, viz. that it arises from pride or cov- shown above (q. 4, a. 3): wherefore that which is the chief etousness. ∗ Cf. Decretals xxiv, qu. iii, cap. 27 1247 Reply to Objection 3. Just as heresy is so called from sire of an undue end in which way it arises from pride or its being a choosing†, so does sect derive its name from covetousness, as stated in the second objection, or some its being a cutting off [secando], as Isidore states (Etym. illusion of the imagination (which gives rise to error, as viii, 3). Wherefore heresy and sect are the same thing, and the Philosopher states in Metaph. iv; Ed. Did. iii, 5), for each belongs to the works of the flesh, not indeed by rea- this faculty has a certain connection with the flesh, in as son of the act itself of unbelief in respect of its proximate much as its act is independent on a bodily organ. object, but by reason of its cause, which is either the de- Whether heresy is properly about matters of faith? IIa IIae q. 11 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that heresy is not properly a. 5), in one way, directly and principally, e.g. the articles about matters of faith. For just as there are heresies and of faith; in another way, indirectly and secondarily, e.g. sects among Christians, so were there among the Jews, those matters, the denial of which leads to the corruption and Pharisees, as Isidore observes (Etym. viii, 3,4,5). of some article of faith; and there may be heresy in either Now their dissensions were not about matters of faith. way, even as there can be faith. Therefore heresy is not about matters of faith, as though Reply to Objection 1. Just as the heresies of the Jews they were its proper matter. and Pharisees were about opinions relating to Judaism or Objection 2. Further, the matter of faith is the thing Pharisaism, so also heresies among Christians are about believed. Now heresy is not only about things, but also matter touching the Christian faith. about works, and about interpretations of Holy Writ. For Reply to Objection 2. A man is said to expound Jerome says on Gal. 5:20 that “whoever expounds the Holy Writ in another sense than that required by the Holy Scriptures in any sense but that of the Holy Ghost by Ghost, when he so distorts the meaning of Holy Writ, that Whom they were written, may be called a heretic, though it is contrary to what the Holy Ghost has revealed. Hence he may not have left the Church”: and elsewhere he it is written (Ezech. 13:6) about the false prophets: “They says that “heresies spring up from words spoken amiss.”∗ have persisted to confirm what they have said,” viz. by Therefore heresy is not properly about the matter of faith. false interpretations of Scripture. Moreover a man pro- Objection 3. Further, we find the holy doctors differ- fesses his faith by the words that he utters, since confes- ing even about matters pertaining to the faith, for example sion is an act of faith, as stated above (q. 3, a. 1 ). Where- Augustine and Jerome, on the question about the cessa- fore inordinate words about matters of faith may lead to tion of the legal observances: and yet this was without corruption of the faith; and hence it is that Pope Leo says any heresy on their part. Therefore heresy is not properly in a letter to Proterius, Bishop of Alexandria: “The ene- about the matter of faith. mies of Christ’s cross lie in wait for our every deed and On the contrary, Augustine says against the word, so that, if we but give them the slightest pretext, Manichees†: “In Christ’s Church, those are heretics, who they may accuse us mendaciously of agreeing with Nesto- hold mischievous and erroneous opinions, and when re- rius.” buked that they may think soundly and rightly, offer a Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (Ep. xliii) stubborn resistance, and, refusing to mend their perni- and we find it stated in the Decretals (xxiv, qu. 3, can. cious and deadly doctrines, persist in defending them.” Dixit Apostolus): “By no means should we accuse of Now pernicious and deadly doctrines are none but those heresy those who, however false and perverse their opin- which are contrary to the dogmas of faith, whereby “the ion may be, defend it without obstinate fervor, and seek just man liveth” (Rom. 1:17). Therefore heresy is about the truth with careful anxiety, ready to mend their opinion, matters of faith, as about its proper matter. when they have found the truth,” because, to wit, they do I answer that, We are speaking of heresy now as de- not make a choice in contradiction to the doctrine of the noting a corruption of the Christian faith. Now it does not Church. Accordingly, certain doctors seem to have dif- imply a corruption of the Christian faith, if a man has a fered either in matters the holding of which in this or that false opinion in matters that are not of faith, for instance, way is of no consequence, so far as faith is concerned, or in questions of geometry and so forth, which cannot be- even in matters of faith, which were not as yet defined by long to the faith by any means; but only when a person the Church; although if anyone were obstinately to deny has a false opinion about things belonging to the faith. them after they had been defined by the authority of the Now a thing may be of the faith in two ways, as stated universal Church, he would be deemed a heretic. This au- above ( Ia, q. 32, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 6, ad 1; Ia IIae, q. 2, thority resides chiefly in the Sovereign Pontiff. For we † From the Greek airein [hairein], to cut off ∗ St. Thomas quotes this saying elsewhere, in Sent. iv, D, 13, and IIIa, q. 16, a. 8, but it is not to be found in St. Jerome’s works. † Cf. De Civ. Dei xviii, 51 1248 read‡: “Whenever a question of faith is in dispute, I think, the Catholic Church. If anything therein has been incor-that all our brethren and fellow bishops ought to refer the rectly or carelessly expressed, we beg that it may be set matter to none other than Peter, as being the source of their aright by you who hold the faith and see of Peter. If how- name and honor, against whose authority neither Jerome ever this, our profession, be approved by the judgment of nor Augustine nor any of the holy doctors defended their your apostleship, whoever may blame me, will prove that opinion.” Hence Jerome says (Exposit. Symbol§): “This, he himself is ignorant, or malicious, or even not a catholic most blessed Pope, is the faith that we have been taught in but a heretic.” Whether heretics ought to be tolerated? IIa IIae q. 11 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that heretics ought to be toler- fore she condemns not at once, but “after the first and ated. For the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:24,25): “The servant second admonition,” as the Apostle directs: after that, if of the Lord must not wrangle. . . with modesty admonish- he is yet stubborn, the Church no longer hoping for his ing them that resist the truth, if peradventure God may conversion, looks to the salvation of others, by excom- give them repentance to know the truth, and they may re- municating him and separating him from the Church, and cover themselves from the snares of the devil.” Now if furthermore delivers him to the secular tribunal to be ex- heretics are not tolerated but put to death, they lose the terminated thereby from the world by death. For Jerome opportunity of repentance. Therefore it seems contrary to commenting on Gal. 5:9, “A little leaven,” says: “Cut off the Apostle’s command. the decayed flesh, expel the mangy sheep from the fold, Objection 2. Further, whatever is necessary in the lest the whole house, the whole paste, the whole body, Church should be tolerated. Now heresies are necessary in the whole flock, burn, perish, rot, die. Arius was but one the Church, since the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:19): “There spark in Alexandria, but as that spark was not at once put must be. . . heresies, that they. . . who are reproved, may be out, the whole earth was laid waste by its flame.” manifest among you.” Therefore it seems that heretics Reply to Objection 1. This very modesty demands should be tolerated. that the heretic should be admonished a first and second Objection 3. Further, the Master commanded his ser- time: and if he be unwilling to retract, he must be reck- vants (Mat. 13:30) to suffer the cockle “to grow until the oned as already “subverted,” as we may gather from the harvest,” i.e. the end of the world, as a gloss explains it. words of the Apostle quoted above. Now holy men explain that the cockle denotes heretics. Reply to Objection 2. The profit that ensues from Therefore heretics should be tolerated. heresy is beside the intention of heretics, for it consists On the contrary, The Apostle says (Titus 3:10,11): in the constancy of the faithful being put to the test, and “A man that is a heretic, after the first and second admo- “makes us shake off our sluggishness, and search the nition, avoid: knowing that he, that is such an one, is sub- Scriptures more carefully,” as Augustine states (De Gen. verted.” cont. Manich. i, 1). What they really intend is the cor- I answer that, With regard to heretics two points must ruption of the faith, which is to inflict very great harm be observed: one, on their own side; the other, on the side indeed. Consequently we should consider what they di- of the Church. On their own side there is the sin, whereby rectly intend, and expel them, rather than what is beside they deserve not only to be separated from the Church by their intention, and so, tolerate them. excommunication, but also to be severed from the world Reply to Objection 3. According to Decret. (xxiv, by death. For it is a much graver matter to corrupt the qu. iii, can. Notandum), “to be excommunicated is not to faith which quickens the soul, than to forge money, which be uprooted.” A man is excommunicated, as the Apostle supports temporal life. Wherefore if forgers of money and says (1 Cor. 5:5) that his “spirit may be saved in the day of other evil-doers are forthwith condemned to death by the Our Lord.” Yet if heretics be altogether uprooted by death, secular authority, much more reason is there for heretics, this is not contrary to Our Lord’s command, which is to as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only be understood as referring to the case when the cockle excommunicated but even put to death. cannot be plucked up without plucking up the wheat, as On the part of the Church, however, there is mercy we explained above (q. 10, a. 8, ad 1), when treating of which looks to the conversion of the wanderer, where- unbelievers in general. ‡ Decret. xxiv, qu. 1, can. Quoties § Among the supposititious works of St. Jerome 1249 Whether the Church should receive those who return from heresy? IIa IIae q. 11 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the Church ought in nal salvation in many, we are not bound out of charity to all cases to receive those who return from heresy. For it wish such a good to that person, rather should we desire is written (Jer. 3:1) in the person of the Lord: “Thou hast him to be without it, both because eternal salvation takes prostituted thyself to many lovers; nevertheless return to precedence of temporal good, and because the good of the Me saith the Lord.” Now the sentence of the Church is many is to be preferred to the good of one. Now if heretics God’s sentence, according to Dt. 1:17: “You shall hear were always received on their return, in order to save their the little as well as the great: neither shall you respect any lives and other temporal goods, this might be prejudicial man’s person, because it is the judgment of God.” There- to the salvation of others, both because they would infect fore even those who are guilty of the prostitution of unbe- others if they relapsed again, and because, if they escaped lief which is spiritual prostitution, should be received all without punishment, others would feel more assured in the same. lapsing into heresy. For it is written (Eccles. 8:11): “For Objection 2. Further, Our Lord commanded Peter because sentence is not speedily pronounced against the (Mat. 18:22) to forgive his offending brother “not” only evil, the children of men commit evils without any fear.” “till seven times, but till seventy times seven times,” which For this reason the Church not only admits to Penance Jerome expounds as meaning that “a man should be for- those who return from heresy for the first time, but also given, as often as he has sinned.” Therefore he ought to safeguards their lives, and sometimes by dispensation, re- be received by the Church as often as he has sinned by stores them to the ecclesiastical dignities which they may falling back into heresy. have had before, should their conversion appear to be sin- Objection 3. Further, heresy is a kind of unbelief. cere: we read of this as having frequently been done for Now other unbelievers who wish to be converted are re- the good of peace. But when they fall again, after having ceived by the Church. Therefore heretics also should be been received, this seems to prove them to be inconstant received. in faith, wherefore when they return again, they are ad- On the contrary, The Decretal Ad abolendam (De mitted to Penance, but are not delivered from the pain of Haereticis, cap. ix) says that “those who are found to death. have relapsed into the error which they had already ab- Reply to Objection 1. In God’s tribunal, those who jured, must be left to the secular tribunal.” Therefore they return are always received, because God is a searcher of should not be received by the Church. hearts, and knows those who return in sincerity. But the I answer that, In obedience to Our Lord’s institution, Church cannot imitate God in this, for she presumes that the Church extends her charity to all, not only to friends, those who relapse after being once received, are not sin- but also to foes who persecute her, according to Mat. 5:44: cere in their return; hence she does not debar them from “Love your enemies; do good to them that hate you.” Now the way of salvation, but neither does she protect them it is part of charity that we should both wish and work our from the sentence of death. neighbor’s good. Again, good is twofold: one is spiri- Reply to Objection 2. Our Lord was speaking to Pe- tual, namely the health of the soul, which good is chiefly ter of sins committed against oneself, for one should al- the object of charity, since it is this chiefly that we should ways forgive such offenses and spare our brother when he wish for one another. Consequently, from this point of repents. These words are not to be applied to sins commit- view, heretics who return after falling no matter how of- ted against one’s neighbor or against God, for it is not left ten, are admitted by the Church to Penance whereby the to our discretion to forgive such offenses, as Jerome says way of salvation is opened to them. on Mat. 18:15, “If thy brother shall offend against thee.” The other good is that which charity considers sec- Yet even in this matter the law prescribes limits according ondarily, viz. temporal good, such as life of the body, as God’s honor or our neighbor’s good demands. worldly possessions, good repute, ecclesiastical or secu- Reply to Objection 3. When other unbelievers, who lar dignity, for we are not bound by charity to wish oth- have never received the faith are converted, they do not as ers this good, except in relation to the eternal salvation yet show signs of inconstancy in faith, as relapsed heretics of them and of others. Hence if the presence of one of do; hence the comparison fails. these goods in one individual might be an obstacle to eter- 1250 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 12 Of Apostasy (In Two Articles) We must now consider apostasy: about which there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief? (2) Whether, on account of apostasy from the faith, subjects are absolved from allegiance to an apostate prince? Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief? IIa IIae q. 12 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that apostasy does not by profession, or from the Holy Order which he had re- pertain to unbelief. For that which is the origin of all sins, ceived: and this is called “apostasy from religious life” does not, seemingly, pertain to unbelief, since many sins or “Orders.” A man may also apostatize from God, by there are without unbelief. Now apostasy seems to be the rebelling in his mind against the Divine commandments: origin of every sin, for it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): “The and though man may apostatize in both the above ways, beginning of the pride of man is apostasy [Douay: ‘to fall he may still remain united to God by faith. off’] from God,” and further on, (Ecclus. 10:15): “Pride But if he give up the faith, then he seems to turn away is the beginning of all sin.” Therefore apostasy does not from God altogether: and consequently, apostasy simply pertain to unbelief. and absolutely is that whereby a man withdraws from the Objection 2. Further, unbelief is an act of the un- faith, and is called “apostasy of perfidy.” In this way apos- derstanding: whereas apostasy seems rather to consist in tasy, simply so called, pertains to unbelief. some outward deed or utterance, or even in some inward Reply to Objection 1. This objection refers to the act of the will, for it is written (Prov. 6:12-14): “A man second kind of apostasy, which denotes an act of the will that is an apostate, an unprofitable man walketh with a in rebellion against God’s commandments, an act that is perverse mouth. He winketh with the eyes, presseth with to be found in every mortal sin. the foot, speaketh with the finger. With a wicked heart he Reply to Objection 2. It belongs to faith not only that deviseth evil, and at all times he soweth discord.” More- the heart should believe, but also that external words and over if anyone were to have himself circumcised, or to deeds should bear witness to the inward faith, for confes- worship at the tomb of Mahomet, he would be deemed an sion is an act of faith. In this way too, certain external apostate. Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief. words or deeds pertain to unbelief, in so far as they are Objection 3. Further, heresy, since it pertains to unbe- signs of unbelief, even as a sign of health is said itself to lief, is a determinate species of unbelief. If then, apostasy be healthy. Now although the authority quoted may be pertained to unbelief, it would follow that it is a deter- understood as referring to every kind of apostate, yet it minate species of unbelief, which does not seem to agree applies most truly to an apostate from the faith. For since with what has been said (q. 10, a. 5). Therefore apostasy faith is the first foundation of things to be hoped for, and does not pertain to unbelief. since, without faith it is “impossible to please God”; when On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 6:67): “Many of his once faith is removed, man retains nothing that may be disciples went back,” i.e. apostatized, of whom Our Lord useful for the obtaining of eternal salvation, for which rea- had said previously (Jn. 6:65): “There are some of you son it is written (Prov. 6:12): “A man that is an apostate, that believe not.” Therefore apostasy pertains to unbelief. an unprofitable man”: because faith is the life of the soul, I answer that, Apostasy denotes a backsliding from according to Rom. 1:17: “The just man liveth by faith.” God. This may happen in various ways according to the Therefore, just as when the life of the body is taken away, different kinds of union between man and God. For, in man’s every member and part loses its due disposition, so the first place, man is united to God by faith; secondly, by when the life of justice, which is by faith, is done away, having his will duly submissive in obeying His command- disorder appears in all his members. First, in his mouth, ments; thirdly, by certain special things pertaining to su- whereby chiefly his mind stands revealed; secondly, in his pererogation such as the religious life, the clerical state, or eyes; thirdly, in the instrument of movement; fourthly, in Holy Orders. Now if that which follows be removed, that his will, which tends to evil. The result is that “he sows which precedes, remains, but the converse does not hold. discord,” endeavoring to sever others from the faith even Accordingly a man may apostatize from God, by with- as he severed himself. drawing from the religious life to which he was bound Reply to Objection 3. The species of a quality or 1251 form are not diversified by the fact of its being the term apostasy does not imply a special kind of unbelief, but “wherefrom” or “whereto” of movement: on the contrary, an aggravating circumstance thereof, according to 2 Pet. it is the movement that takes its species from the terms. 2:21: “It had been better for them not to know the truth Now apostasy regards unbelief as the term “whereto” of [Vulg.: ‘the way of justice’], than after they had known it, the movement of withdrawal from the faith; wherefore to turn back.” Whether a prince forfeits his dominion over his subjects, on account of apostasy from IIa IIae q. 12 a. 2 the faith, so that they no longer owe him allegiance? Objection 1. It would seem that a prince does not ion is a device of the law of nations which is a human law: so forfeit his dominion over his subjects, on account of whereas the distinction between believers and unbelievers apostasy from the faith, that they no longer owe him al- is of Divine right, which does not annul human right. Nev- legiance. For Ambrose∗ says that the Emperor Julian, ertheless a man who sins by unbelief may be sentenced to though an apostate, nevertheless had under him Christian the loss of his right of dominion, as also, sometimes, on soldiers, who when he said to them, “Fall into line for the account of other sins. defense of the republic,” were bound to obey. Therefore Now it is not within the competency of the Church subjects are not absolved from their allegiance to their to punish unbelief in those who have never received the prince on account of his apostasy. faith, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 5:12): Objection 2. Further, an apostate from the faith is “What have I to do to judge them that are without?” She an unbeliever. Now we find that certain holy men served can, however, pass sentence of punishment on the unbe- unbelieving masters; thus Joseph served Pharaoh, Daniel lief of those who have received the faith: and it is fit- served Nabuchodonosor, and Mardochai served Assuerus. ting that they should be punished by being deprived of Therefore apostasy from the faith does not release sub- the allegiance of their subjects: for this same allegiance jects from allegiance to their sovereign. might conduce to great corruption of the faith, since, as Objection 3. Further, just as by apostasy from the was stated above (a. 1, obj. 2), “a man that is an apos- faith, a man turns away from God, so does every sin. Con- tate. . . with a wicked heart deviseth evil, and. . . soweth sequently if, on account of apostasy from the faith, princes discord,” in order to sever others from the faith. Con- were to lose their right to command those of their subjects sequently, as soon as sentence of excommunication is who are believers, they would equally lose it on account of passed on a man on account of apostasy from the faith, other sins: which is evidently not the case. Therefore we his subjects are “ipso facto” absolved from his authority ought not to refuse allegiance to a sovereign on account and from the oath of allegiance whereby they were bound of his apostatizing from the faith. to him. On the contrary, Gregory VII says (Council, Roman Reply to Objection 1. At that time the Church was V): “Holding to the institutions of our holy predecessors, but recently instituted, and had not, as yet, the power of we, by our apostolic authority, absolve from their oath curbing earthly princes; and so she allowed the faithful those who through loyalty or through the sacred bond of to obey Julian the apostate, in matters that were not con- an oath owe allegiance to excommunicated persons: and trary to the faith, in order to avoid incurring a yet greater we absolutely forbid them to continue their allegiance danger. to such persons, until these shall have made amends.” Reply to Objection 2. As stated in the article, it is not Now apostates from the faith, like heretics, are excom-a question of those unbelievers who have never received municated, according to the Decretal†. Therefore princes the faith. should not be obeyed when they have apostatized from the Reply to Objection 3. Apostasy from the faith severs faith. man from God altogether, as stated above (a. 1), which is I answer that, As stated above (q. 10, a. 10), unbelief, not the case in any other sin. in itself, is not inconsistent with dominion, since domin- ∗ St. Augustine, Super Ps. 124:3 † Extra, De Haereticis, cap. Ad abolendam 1252 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 13 Of the Sin of Blasphemy, in General (In Four Articles) We must now consider the sin of blasphemy, which is opposed to the confession of faith; and (1) blasphemy in general, (2) that blasphemy which is called the sin against the Holy Ghost. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith? (2) Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin? (3) Whether blasphemy is the most grievous sin? (4) Whether blasphemy is in the damned? Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith? IIa IIae q. 13 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that blasphemy is not op- Now this may happen in two ways. In the first way it posed to the confession of faith. Because to blaspheme may happen merely in respect of the opinion in the intel- is to utter an affront or insult against the Creator. Now lect; in the second way this opinion is united to a certain this pertains to ill-will against God rather than to unbelief. detestation in the affections, even as, on the other hand, Therefore blasphemy is not opposed to the confession of faith in God is perfected by love of Him. Accordingly this faith. disparagement of the Divine goodness is either in the in- Objection 2. Further, on Eph. 4:31, “Let blas- tellect alone, or in the affections also. If it is in thought phemy. . . be put away from you,” a gloss says, “that which only, it is blasphemy of the heart, whereas if it betrays is committed against God or the saints.” But confession of itself outwardly in speech it is blasphemy is opposed to faith, seemingly, is not about other things than those per- confession of faith. taining to God, Who is the object of faith. Therefore blas- Reply to Objection 1. He that speaks against God, phemy is not always opposed to the confession of faith. with the intention of reviling Him, disparages the Divine Objection 3. Further, according to some, there are goodness, not only in respect of the falsehood in his in- three kinds of blasphemy. The first of these is when tellect, but also by reason of the wickedness of his will, something unfitting is affirmed of God; the second is whereby he detests and strives to hinder the honor due to when something fitting is denied of Him; and the third, God, and this is perfect blasphemy. when something proper to God is ascribed to a creature, Reply to Objection 2. Even as God is praised in His so that, seemingly, blasphemy is not only about God, saints, in so far as praise is given to the works which God but also about His creatures. Now the object of faith is does in His saints, so does blasphemy against the saints, God. Therefore blasphemy is not opposed to confession redound, as a consequence, against God. of faith. Reply to Objection 3. Properly speaking, the sin of On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:12,13): blasphemy is not in this way divided into three species: “I. . . before was a blasphemer and a persecutor,” and af- since to affirm unfitting things, or to deny fitting things terwards, “I did it ignorantly in” my “unbelief.” Hence it of God, differ merely as affirmation and negation. For seems that blasphemy pertains to unbelief. this diversity does not cause distinct species of habits, I answer that, The word blasphemy seems to denote since the falsehood of affirmations and negations is made the disparagement of some surpassing goodness, espe- known by the same knowledge, and it is the same igno- cially that of God. Now God, as Dionysius says (Div. rance which errs in either way, since negatives are proved Nom. i), is the very essence of true goodness. Hence by affirmatives, according to Poster. i, 25. Again to as- whatever befits God, pertains to His goodness, and what- cribe to creatures things that are proper to God, seems ever does not befit Him, is far removed from the perfection to amount to the same as affirming something unfitting of of goodness which is His Essence. Consequently whoever Him, since whatever is proper to God is God Himself: and either denies anything befitting God, or affirms anything to ascribe to a creature, that which is proper to God, is to unbefitting Him, disparages the Divine goodness. assert that God is the same as a creature. 1253 Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 13 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that blasphemy is not al- is a mortal sin, by reason of its genus. ways a mortal sin. Because a gloss on the words, “Now Reply to Objection 1. This gloss is not to be under- lay you also all away,” etc. (Col. 3:8) says: “After pro- stood as meaning that all the sins which follow, are mortal, hibiting greater crimes he forbids lesser sins”: and yet but that whereas all those mentioned previously are more among the latter he includes blasphemy. Therefore blas- grievous sins, some of those mentioned afterwards are less phemy is comprised among the lesser, i.e. venial, sins. grievous; and yet among the latter some more grievous Objection 2. Further, every mortal sin is opposed to sins are included. one of the precepts of the decalogue. But, seemingly, blas- Reply to Objection 2. Since, as stated above (a. 1), phemy is not contrary to any of them. Therefore blas- blasphemy is contrary to the confession of faith, its prohi- phemy is not a mortal sin. bition is comprised under the prohibition of unbelief, ex- Objection 3. Further, sins committed without deliber- pressed by the words: “I am the Lord thy God,” etc. (Ex. ation, are not mortal: hence first movements are not mor- 20:1). Or else, it is forbidden by the words: “Thou shalt tal sins, because they precede the deliberation of the rea- not take the name of. . . God in vain” (Ex. 20:7). Because son, as was shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 74, Aa. 3,10). Now he who asserts something false about God, takes His name blasphemy sometimes occurs without deliberation of the in vain even more than he who uses the name of God in reason. Therefore it is not always a mortal sin. confirmation of a falsehood. On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 24:16): “He that Reply to Objection 3. There are two ways in which blasphemeth the name of the Lord, dying let him die.” blasphemy may occur unawares and without deliberation. Now the death punishment is not inflicted except for a In the first way, by a man failing to advert to the blasphe- mortal sin. Therefore blasphemy is a mortal sin. mous nature of his words, and this may happen through I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 72, a. 5), a his being moved suddenly by passion so as to break out mortal sin is one whereby a man is severed from the first into words suggested by his imagination, without heeding principle of spiritual life, which principle is the charity of to the meaning of those words: this is a venial sin, and is God. Therefore whatever things are contrary to charity, not a blasphemy properly so called. In the second way, by are mortal sins in respect of their genus. Now blasphemy, adverting to the meaning of his words, and to their blas- as to its genus, is opposed to Divine charity, because, as phemous nature: in which case he is not excused from stated above (a. 1), it disparages the Divine goodness, mortal sin, even as neither is he who, in a sudden move- which is the object of charity. Consequently blasphemy ment of anger, kills one who is sitting beside him. Whether the sin of blasphemy is the greatest sin? IIa IIae q. 13 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the sin of blas- opposed to the confession of faith, so that it contains the phemy is not the greatest sin. For, according to Augustine gravity of unbelief: while the sin is aggravated if the will’s (Enchiridion xii), a thing is said to be evil because it does detestation is added thereto, and yet more, if it breaks out harm. Now the sin of murder, since it destroys a man’s into words, even as love and confession add to the praise life, does more harm than the sin of blasphemy, which of faith. can do no harm to God. Therefore the sin of murder is Therefore, since, as stated above (q. 10, a. 3), unbelief more grievous than that of blasphemy. is the greatest of sins in respect of its genus, it follows that Objection 2. Further, a perjurer calls upon God to blasphemy also is a very great sin, through belonging to witness to a falsehood, and thus seems to assert that God the same genus as unbelief and being an aggravated form is false. But not every blasphemer goes so far as to say of that sin. that God is false. Therefore perjury is a more grievous sin Reply to Objection 1. If we compare murder and than blasphemy. blasphemy as regards the objects of those sins, it is clear Objection 3. Further, on Ps. 74:6, “Lift not up your that blasphemy, which is a sin committed directly against horn on high,” a gloss says: “To excuse oneself for sin God, is more grave than murder, which is a sin against is the greatest sin of all.” Therefore blasphemy is not the one’s neighbor. On the other hand, if we compare them greatest sin. in respect of the harm wrought by them, murder is the On the contrary, On Is. 18:2, “To a terrible people,” graver sin, for murder does more harm to one’s neighbor, etc. a gloss says: “In comparison with blasphemy, every than blasphemy does to God. Since, however, the gravity sin is slight.” of a sin depends on the intention of the evil will, rather I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), blasphemy is than on the effect of the deed, as was shown above ( Ia 1254 IIae, q. 73, a. 8), it follows that, as the blasphemer intends about God, as the blasphemer does: but he calls God to to do harm to God’s honor, absolutely speaking, he sins witness to a falsehood, not that he deems God a false wit- more grievously that the murderer. Nevertheless murder ness, but in the hope, as it were, that God will not testify takes precedence, as to punishment, among sins commit- to the matter by some evident sign. ted against our neighbor. Reply to Objection 3. To excuse oneself for sin is a Reply to Objection 2. A gloss on the words, circumstance that aggravates every sin, even blasphemy “Let. . . blasphemy be put away from you” (Eph. 4:31) itself: and it is called the most grievous sin, for as much says: “Blasphemy is worse than perjury.” The reason is as it makes every sin more grievous. that the perjurer does not say or think something false Whether the damned blaspheme? IIa IIae q. 13 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the damned do not phemy. Now those who are in hell retain their wicked blaspheme. Because some wicked men are deterred from will which is turned away from God’s justice, since they blaspheming now, on account of the fear of future punish- love the things for which they are punished, would wish to ment. But the damned are undergoing these punishments, use them if they could, and hate the punishments inflicted so that they abhor them yet more. Therefore, much more on them for those same sins. They regret indeed the sins are they restrained from blaspheming. which they have committed, not because they hate them, Objection 2. Further, since blasphemy is a most but because they are punished for them. Accordingly this grievous sin, it is most demeritorious. Now in the life to detestation of the Divine justice is, in them, the interior come there is no state of meriting or demeriting. There- blasphemy of the heart: and it is credible that after the res- fore there will be no place for blasphemy. urrection they will blaspheme God with the tongue, even Objection 3. Further, it is written (Eccles. 11:3) that as the saints will praise Him with their voices. “the tree. . . in what place soever it shall fall, there shall Reply to Objection 1. In the present life men are de- it be”: whence it clearly follows that, after this life, man terred from blasphemy through fear of punishment which acquires neither merit nor sin, which he did not already they think they can escape: whereas, in hell, the damned possess in this life. Now many will be damned who were have no hope of escape, so that, in despair, they are borne not blasphemous in this life. Neither, therefore, will they towards whatever their wicked will suggests to them. blaspheme in the life to come. Reply to Objection 2. Merit and demerit belong to On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 16:9): “The men the state of a wayfarer, wherefore good is meritorious in were scorched with great heat, and they blasphemed the them, while evil is demeritorious. In the blessed, on the name of God, Who hath power over these plagues,” and other hand, good is not meritorious, but is part of their a gloss on these words says that “those who are in hell, blissful reward, and, in like manner, in the damned, evil is though aware that they are deservedly punished, will nev- not demeritorious, but is part of the punishment of damna- ertheless complain that God is so powerful as to torture tion. them thus.” Now this would be blasphemy in their present Reply to Objection 3. Whoever dies in mortal sin, state: and consequently it will also be in their future state. bears with him a will that detests the Divine justice with I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,3), detestation regard to a certain thing, and in this respect there can be of the Divine goodness is a necessary condition of blas- blasphemy in him. 1255 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 14 Of Blasphemy Against the Holy Ghost (In Four Articles) We must now consider in particular blasphemy against the Holy Ghost: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether blasphemy or the sin against the Holy Ghost is the same as the sin committed through certain malice? (2) Of the species of this sin; (3) Whether it can be forgiven? (4) Whether it is possible to begin by sinning against the Holy Ghost before committing other sins? Whether the sin against the Holy Ghost is the same as the sin committed through IIa IIae q. 14 a. 1 certain malice? Objection 1. It would seem that the sin against the we understand the essential name applicable to the whole Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed through Trinity, each Person of which is a Spirit and is holy, or certain malice. Because the sin against the Holy Ghost the personal name of one of the Persons of the Trinity, in is the sin of blasphemy, according to Mat. 12:32. But which sense blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is distinct not every sin committed through certain malice is a sin of from the blasphemy against the Son of Man (Mat. 12:32), blasphemy: since many other kinds of sin may be commit- for Christ did certain things in respect of His human na- ted through certain malice. Therefore the sin against the ture, by eating, drinking, and such like actions, while He Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed through did others in respect of His Godhead, by casting out dev- certain malice. ils, raising the dead, and the like: which things He did Objection 2. Further, the sin committed through cer- both by the power of His own Godhead and by the opera- tain malice is condivided with sin committed through ig- tion of the Holy Ghost, of Whom He was full, according norance, and sin committed through weakness: whereas to his human nature. Now the Jews began by speaking the sin against the Holy Ghost is condivided with the sin blasphemy against the Son of Man, when they said (Mat. against the Son of Man (Mat. 12:32). Therefore the sin 11:19) that He was “a glutton. . . a wine drinker,” and a against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin commit- “friend of publicans”: but afterwards they blasphemed ted through certain malice, since things whose opposites against the Holy Ghost, when they ascribed to the prince differ, are themselves different. of devils those works which Christ did by the power of Objection 3. Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost His own Divine Nature and by the operation of the Holy is itself a generic sin, having its own determinate species: Ghost. whereas sin committed through certain malice is not a spe- Augustine, however (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi), cial kind of sin, but a condition or general circumstance of says that blasphemy or the sin against the Holy Ghost, is sin, which can affect any kind of sin at all. Therefore the final impenitence when, namely, a man perseveres in mor- sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin com- tal sin until death, and that it is not confined to utterance mitted through certain malice. by word of mouth, but extends to words in thought and On the contrary, The Master says (Sent. ii, D, 43) deed, not to one word only, but to many. Now this word, that “to sin against the Holy Ghost is to take pleasure in in this sense, is said to be uttered against the Holy Ghost, the malice of sin for its own sake.” Now this is to sin because it is contrary to the remission of sins, which is the through certain malice. Therefore it seems that the sin work of the Holy Ghost, Who is the charity both of the committed through certain malice is the same as the sin Father and of the Son. Nor did Our Lord say this to the against the Holy Ghost. Jews, as though they had sinned against the Holy Ghost, I answer that, Three meanings have been given to the since they were not yet guilty of final impenitence, but He sin against the Holy Ghost. For the earlier doctors, viz. warned them, lest by similar utterances they should come Athanasius (Super Matth. xii, 32), Hilary (Can. xii in to sin against the Holy Ghost: and it is in this sense that Matth.), Ambrose (Super Luc. xii, 10), Jerome (Super we are to understand Mark 3:29,30, where after Our Lord Matth. xii), and Chrysostom (Hom. xli in Matth.), say had said: “But he that shall blaspheme against the Holy that the sin against the Holy Ghost is literally to utter a Ghost,” etc. the Evangelist adds, “because they said: He blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, whether by Holy Spirit hath an unclean spirit.” 1256 But others understand it differently, and say that the Reply to Objection 1. Just as the confession of faith sin of blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, is a sin commit- consists in a protestation not only of words but also of ted against that good which is appropriated to the Holy deeds, so blasphemy against the Holy Ghost can be ut- Ghost: because goodness is appropriated to the Holy tered in word, thought and deed. Ghost, just a power is appropriated to the Father, and wis- Reply to Objection 2. According to the third interpre- dom to the Son. Hence they say that when a man sins tation, blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is condivided through weakness, it is a sin “against the Father”; that with blasphemy against the Son of Man, forasmuch as He when he sins through ignorance, it is a sin “against the is also the Son of God, i.e. the “power of God and the Son”; and that when he sins through certain malice, i.e. wisdom of God” (1 Cor. 1:24). Wherefore, in this sense, through the very choosing of evil, as explained above ( Ia the sin against the Son of Man will be that which is com- IIae, q. 78, Aa. 1 ,3), it is a sin “against the Holy Ghost.” mitted through ignorance, or through weakness. Now this may happen in two ways. First by reason of Reply to Objection 3. Sin committed through cer- the very inclination of a vicious habit which we call mal- tain malice, in so far as it results from the inclination of a ice, and, in this way, to sin through malice is not the same habit, is not a special sin, but a general condition of sin: as to sin against the Holy Ghost. In another way it happens whereas, in so far as it results from a special contempt of that by reason of contempt, that which might have pre- an effect of the Holy Ghost in us, it has the character of a vented the choosing of evil, is rejected or removed; thus special sin. According to this interpretation the sin against hope is removed by despair, and fear by presumption, and the Holy Ghost is a special kind of sin, as also according so on, as we shall explain further on (Qq. 20,21). Now to the first interpretation: whereas according to the sec- all these things which prevent the choosing of sin are ef- ond, it is not a species of sin, because final impenitence fects of the Holy Ghost in us; so that, in this sense, to sin may be a circumstance of any kind of sin. through malice is to sin against the Holy Ghost. Whether it is fitting to distinguish six kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost? IIa IIae q. 14 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem unfitting to distinguish Therefore it seems that the species of sins against the Holy six kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, viz. despair, Ghost are insufficiently enumerated. presumption, impenitence, obstinacy, resisting the known On the contrary, Augustine∗ (De Fide ad Petrum iii) truth, envy of our brother’s spiritual good, which are as- says that “those who despair of pardon for their sins, or signed by the Master (Sent. ii, D, 43). For to deny God’s who without merits presume on God’s mercy, sin against justice or mercy belongs to unbelief. Now, by despair, a the Holy Ghost,” and (Enchiridion lxxxiii) that “he who man rejects God’s mercy, and by presumption, His justice. dies in a state of obstinacy is guilty of the sin against the Therefore each of these is a kind of unbelief rather than of Holy Ghost,” and (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that “im- the sin against the Holy Ghost. penitence is a sin against the Holy Ghost,” and (De Serm. Objection 2. Further, impenitence, seemingly, re- Dom. in Monte xxii), that “to resist fraternal goodness gards past sins, while obstinacy regards future sins. Now with the brands of envy is to sin against the Holy Ghost,” past and future time do not diversify the species of virtues and in his book De unico Baptismo (De Bap. contra Do- or vices, since it is the same faith whereby we believe that nat. vi, 35) he says that “a man who spurns the truth, is ei- Christ was born, and those of old believed that He would ther envious of his brethren to whom the truth is revealed, be born. Therefore obstinacy and impenitence should not or ungrateful to God, by Whose inspiration the Church is be reckoned as two species of sin against the Holy Ghost. taught,” and therefore, seemingly, sins against the Holy Objection 3. Further, “grace and truth came by Jesus Ghost. Christ” (Jn. 1:17). Therefore it seem that resistance of the I answer that, The above species are fittingly as- known truth, and envy of a brother’s spiritual good, be- signed to the sin against the Holy Ghost taken in the third long to blasphemy against the Son rather than against the sense, because they are distinguished in respect of the re- Holy Ghost. moval of contempt of those things whereby a man can Objection 4. Further, Bernard says (De Dispens. et be prevented from sinning through choice. These things Praecept. xi) that “to refuse to obey is to resist the Holy are either on the part of God’s judgment, or on the part Ghost.” Moreover a gloss on Lev. 10:16, says that of His gifts, or on the part of sin. For, by consideration “a feigned repentance is a blasphemy against the Holy of the Divine judgment, wherein justice is accompanied Ghost.” Again, schism is, seemingly, directly opposed to with mercy, man is hindered from sinning through choice, the Holy Ghost by Whom the Church is united together. both by hope, arising from the consideration of the mercy ∗ Fulgentius 1257 that pardons sins and rewards good deeds, which hope is 6:21: “What fruit had you therefore then in those things, removed by “despair”; and by fear, arising from the con- of which you are now ashamed?” The consideration of sideration of the Divine justice that punishes sins, which this is wont to prevent man’s will from being hardened fear is removed by “presumption,” when, namely, a man in sin, and this is removed by “obstinacy,” whereby man presumes that he can obtain glory without merits, or par- hardens his purpose by clinging to sin. Of these two it is don without repentance. written (Jer. 8:6): “There is none that doth penance for God’s gifts whereby we are withdrawn from sin, are his sin, saying: What have I done?” as regards the first; two: one is the acknowledgment of the truth, against and, “They are all turned to their own course, as a horse which there is the “resistance of the known truth,” when, rushing to the battle,” as regards the second. namely, a man resists the truth which he has acknowl- Reply to Objection 1. The sins of despair and pre- edged, in order to sin more freely: while the other is the sumption consist, not in disbelieving in God’s justice and assistance of inward grace, against which there is “envy mercy, but in contemning them. of a brother’s spiritual good,” when, namely, a man is en- Reply to Objection 2. Obstinacy and impenitence vious not only of his brother’s person, but also of the in- differ not only in respect of past and future time, but also crease of Divine grace in the world. in respect of certain formal aspects by reason of the di- On the part of sin, there are two things which may verse consideration of those things which may be consid- withdraw man therefrom: one is the inordinateness and ered in sin, as explained above. shamefulness of the act, the consideration of which is Reply to Objection 3. Grace and truth were the work wont to arouse man to repentance for the sin he has com- of Christ through the gifts of the Holy Ghost which He mitted, and against this there is “impenitence,” not as de- gave to men. noting permanence in sin until death, in which sense it Reply to Objection 4. To refuse to obey belongs to was taken above (for thus it would not be a special sin, obstinacy, while a feigned repentance belongs to impeni- but a circumstance of sin), but as denoting the purpose of tence, and schism to the envy of a brother’s spiritual good, not repenting. The other thing is the smallness or brevity whereby the members of the Church are united together. of the good which is sought in sin, according to Rom. Whether the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven? IIa IIae q. 14 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the sin against the humiliation of asking for pardon.” Holy Ghost can be forgiven. For Augustine says (De Verb. I answer that, According to the various interpreta- Dom., Serm. lxxi): “We should despair of no man, so long tions of the sin against the Holy Ghost, there are various as Our Lord’s patience brings him back to repentance.” ways in which it may be said that it cannot be forgiven. But if any sin cannot be forgiven, it would be possible For if by the sin against the Holy Ghost we understand to despair of some sinners. Therefore the sin against the final impenitence, it is said to be unpardonable, since in Holy Ghost can be forgiven. no way is it pardoned: because the mortal sin wherein a Objection 2. Further, no sin is forgiven, except man perseveres until death will not be forgiven in the life through the soul being healed by God. But “no disease to come, since it was not remitted by repentance in this is incurable to an all-powerful physician,” as a gloss says life. on Ps. 102:3, “Who healeth all thy diseases.” Therefore According to the other two interpretations, it is said the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven. to be unpardonable, not as though it is nowise forgiven, Objection 3. Further, the free-will is indifferent to but because, considered in itself, it deserves not to be par- either good or evil. Now, so long as man is a wayfarer, doned: and this in two ways. First, as regards the punish- he can fall away from any virtue, since even an angel fell ment, since he that sins through ignorance or weakness, from heaven, wherefore it is written (Job 4:18,19): “In His deserves less punishment, whereas he that sins through angels He found wickedness: how much more shall they certain malice, can offer no excuse in alleviation of his that dwell in houses of clay?” Therefore, in like manner, a punishment. Likewise those who blasphemed against the man can return from any sin to the state of justice. There- Son of Man before His Godhead was revealed, could have fore the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven. some excuse, on account of the weakness of the flesh On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 12:32): “He that which they perceived in Him, and hence, they deserved shall speak against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven less punishment; whereas those who blasphemed against him, neither in this world, nor in the world to come”: and His very Godhead, by ascribing to the devil the works Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 22) that “so of the Holy Ghost, had no excuse in diminution of their great is the downfall of this sin that it cannot submit to the punishment. Wherefore, according to Chrysostom’s com- 1258 mentary (Hom. xlii in Matth.), the Jews are said not to means of cure, as when it takes away the power of nature, be forgiven this sin, neither in this world nor in the world or causes loathing for food and medicine, although God to come, because they were punished for it, both in the is able to cure such a disease. So too, the sin against the present life, through the Romans, and in the life to come, Holy Ghost is said to be unpardonable, by reason of its na- in the pains of hell. Thus also Athanasius adduces the ex- ture, in so far as it removes those things which are a means ample of their forefathers who, first of all, wrangled with towards the pardon of sins. This does not, however, close Moses on account of the shortage of water and bread; and the way of forgiveness and healing to an all-powerful and this the Lord bore with patience, because they were to be merciful God, Who, sometimes, by a miracle, so to speak, excused on account of the weakness of the flesh: but af- restores spiritual health to such men. terwards they sinned more grievously when, by ascribing Reply to Objection 1. We should despair of no man in to an idol the favors bestowed by God Who had brought this life, considering God’s omnipotence and mercy. But them out of Egypt, they blasphemed, so to speak, against if we consider the circumstances of sin, some are called the Holy Ghost, saying (Ex. 32:4): “These are thy gods, (Eph. 2:2) “children of despair”∗. O Israel, that have brought thee out of the land of Egypt.” Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers the Therefore the Lord both inflicted temporal punishment on question on the part of God’s omnipotence, not on that of them, since “there were slain on that day about three and the circumstances of sin. twenty thousand men” (Ex. 32:28), and threatened them Reply to Objection 3. In this life the free-will does with punishment in the life to come, saying, (Ex. 32:34): indeed ever remain subject to change: yet sometimes it “I, in the day of revenge, will visit this sin . . . of theirs.” rejects that whereby, so far as it is concerned, it can be Secondly, this may be understood to refer to the guilt: turned to good. Hence considered in itself this sin is un- thus a disease is said to be incurable in respect of the na- pardonable, although God can pardon it. ture of the disease, which removes whatever might be a Whether a man can sin first of all against the Holy Ghost? IIa IIae q. 14 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that a man cannot sin fore, conversely, it is possible for a man, according to the first of all against the Holy Ghost, without having previ- malice of the devil who tempts him, to be led to commit ously committed other sins. For the natural order requires the most grievous of sins which is that against the Holy that one should be moved to perfection from imperfec- Ghost. tion. This is evident as regards good things, according to I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), in one way, to Prov. 4:18: “The path of the just, as a shining light, goeth sin against the Holy Ghost is to sin through certain mal- forwards and increases even to perfect day.” Now, in evil ice. Now one may sin through certain malice in two ways, things, the perfect is the greatest evil, as the Philosopher as stated in the same place: first, through the inclination states (Metaph. v, text. 21). Since then the sin against of a habit; but this is not, properly speaking, to sin against the Holy Ghost is the most grievous sin, it seems that man the Holy Ghost, nor does a man come to commit this sin comes to commit this sin through committing lesser sins. all at once, in as much as sinful acts must precede so as Objection 2. Further, to sin against the Holy Ghost to cause the habit that induces to sin. Secondly, one may is to sin through certain malice, or through choice. Now sin through certain malice, by contemptuously rejecting man cannot do this until he has sinned many times; for the things whereby a man is withdrawn from sin. This is, the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6,9) that “although a man properly speaking, to sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated is able to do unjust deeds, yet he cannot all at once do above (a. 1); and this also, for the most part, presupposes them as an unjust man does,” viz. from choice. There- other sins, for it is written (Prov. 18:3) that “the wicked fore it seems that the sin against the Holy Ghost cannot be man, when he is come into the depth of sins, contemneth.” committed except after other sins. Nevertheless it is possible for a man, in his first sin- Objection 3. Further, repentance and impenitence are ful act, to sin against the Holy Ghost by contempt, both about the same object. But there is no repentance, ex- on account of his free-will, and on account of the many cept about past sins. Therefore the same applies to im- previous dispositions, or again, through being vehemently penitence which is a species of the sin against the Holy moved to evil, while but feebly attached to good. Hence Ghost. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost presup- never or scarcely ever does it happen that the perfect sin poses other sins. all at once against the Holy Ghost: wherefore Origen says On the contrary, “It is easy in the eyes of God on a (Peri Archon. i, 3): “I do not think that anyone who stands sudden to make a poor man rich” (Ecclus. 11:23). There- on the highest step of perfection, can fail or fall suddenly; ∗ ‘Filios diffidentiae,’ which the Douay version renders ‘children of unbelief.’ 1259 this can only happen by degrees and bit by bit.” cording to its genus, although it may be imperfect as re- The same applies, if the sin against the Holy Ghost be gards the series of good or evil actions whereby a man taken literally for blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. For progresses in good or evil. such blasphemy as Our Lord speaks of, always proceeds Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers the from contemptuous malice. sin which is committed through certain malice, when it If, however, with Augustine (De Verb. Dom., Serm. proceeds from the inclination of a habit. lxxi) we understand the sin against the Holy Ghost to de- Reply to Objection 3. If by impenitence we under- note final impenitence, it does not regard the question in stand with Augustine (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) per- point, because this sin against the Holy Ghost requires sistence in sin until the end, it is clear that it presupposes persistence in sin until the end of life. sin, just as repentance does. If, however, we take it for Reply to Objection 1. Movement both in good and habitual impenitence, in which sense it is a sin against the in evil is made, for the most part, from imperfect to per- Holy Ghost, it is evident that it can precede sin: for it is fect, according as man progresses in good or evil: and yet possible for a man who has never sinned to have the pur- in both cases, one man can begin from a greater (good pose either of repenting or of not repenting, if he should or evil) than another man does. Consequently, that from happen to sin. which a man begins can be perfect in good or evil ac- 1260 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 15 Of the Vices Opposed to Knowledge and Understanding (In Three Articles) We must now consider the vices opposed to knowledge and understanding. Since, however, we have treated of ignorance which is opposed to knowledge, when we were discussing the causes of sins ( Ia IIae, q. 76), we must now inquire about blindness of mind and dulness of sense, which are opposed to the gift of understanding; and under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether blindness of mind is a sin? (2) Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of mind? (3) Whether these vices arise from sins of the flesh? Whether blindness of mind is a sin? IIa IIae q. 15 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that blindness of mind is q. 84, Aa. 7,8. not a sin. Because, seemingly, that which excuses from Another principle of intellectual sight is a certain ha- sin is not itself a sin. Now blindness of mind excuses bitual light superadded to the natural light of reason, from sin; for it is written (Jn. 9:41): “If you were blind, which light is sometimes forfeit from the soul. This pri- you should not have sin.” Therefore blindness of mind is vation is blindness, and is a punishment, in so far as the not a sin. privation of the light of grace is a punishment. Hence it is Objection 2. Further, punishment differs from guilt. written concerning some (Wis. 2:21): “Their own malice But blindness of mind is a punishment as appears from Is. blinded them.” 6:10, “Blind the heart of this people,” for, since it is an A third principle of intellectual sight is an intelligible evil, it could not be from God, were it not a punishment. principle, through which a man understands other things; Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin. to which principle a man may attend or not attend. That Objection 3. Further, every sin is voluntary, accord- he does not attend thereto happens in two ways. Some- ing to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xiv). Now blindness of times it is due to the fact that a man’s will is deliberately mind is not voluntary, since, as Augustine says (Confess. turned away from the consideration of that principle, ac- x), “all love to know the resplendent truth,” and as we read cording to Ps. 35:4, “He would not understand, that he in Eccles. 11:7, “the light is sweet and it is delightful for might do well”: whereas sometimes it is due to the mind the eyes to see the sun.” Therefore blindness of mind is being more busy about things which it loves more, so as not a sin. to be hindered thereby from considering this principle, ac- On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons cording to Ps. 57:9, “Fire,” i.e. of concupiscence, “hath blindness of mind among the vices arising from lust. fallen on them and they shall not see the sun.” In either of I answer that, Just as bodily blindness is the privation these ways blindness of mind is a sin. of the principle of bodily sight, so blindness of mind is the Reply to Objection 1. The blindness that excuses privation of the principle of mental or intellectual sight. from sin is that which arises from the natural defect of Now this has a threefold principle. One is the light of nat- one who cannot see. ural reason, which light, since it pertains to the species of Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers the the rational soul, is never forfeit from the soul, and yet, second kind of blindness which is a punishment. at times, it is prevented from exercising its proper act, Reply to Objection 3. To understand the truth is, in through being hindered by the lower powers which the itself, beloved by all; and yet, accidentally it may be hate- human intellect needs in order to understand, for instance ful to someone, in so far as a man is hindered thereby from in the case of imbeciles and madmen, as stated in the Ia, having what he loves yet more. Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of mind? IIa IIae q. 15 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that dulness of sense is not a is blindness of mind, since understanding denotes a prin- distinct sin from blindness of mind. Because one thing ciple of sight. Therefore dulness of sense is the same as has one contrary. Now dulness is opposed to the gift of un- blindness of mind. derstanding, according to Gregory (Moral. ii, 49); and so Objection 2. Further, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) in 1261 speaking of dulness describes it as “dullness of sense in sense is in respect of certain primals and extremes, as respect of understanding.” Now dulness of sense in re- stated in Ethic. vi, even as the senses are cognizant of sen- spect of understanding seems to be the same as a defect sible objects as of certain principles of knowledge. Now in understanding, which pertains to blindness of mind. this sense which is connected with understanding, does Therefore dulness of sense is the same as blindness of not perceive its object through a medium of corporeal dis- mind. tance, but through certain other media, as, for instance, Objection 3. Further, if they differ at all, it seems to when it perceives a thing’s essence through a property be chiefly in the fact that blindness of mind is voluntary, as thereof, and the cause through its effect. Consequently stated above (a. 1), while dulness of sense is a natural de- a man is said to have an acute sense in connection with fect. But a natural defect is not a sin: so that, accordingly, his understanding, if, as soon as he apprehends a prop- dulness of sense would not be a sin, which is contrary to erty or effect of a thing, he understands the nature or the what Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), where he reckons it thing itself, and if he can succeed in perceiving its slight- among the sins arising from gluttony. est details: whereas a man is said to have a dull sense in On the contrary, Different causes produce different connection with his understanding, if he cannot arrive at effects. Now Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness knowing the truth about a thing, without many explana- of sense arises from gluttony, and that blindness of mind tions; in which case, moreover, he is unable to obtain a arises from lust. Now these others are different vices. perfect perception of everything pertaining to the nature Therefore those are different vices also. of that thing. I answer that, Dull is opposed to sharp: and a thing Accordingly dulness of sense in connection with un- is said to be sharp because it can pierce; so that a thing derstanding denotes a certain weakness of the mind as to is called dull through being obtuse and unable to pierce. the consideration of spiritual goods; while blindness of Now a bodily sense, by a kind of metaphor, is said to mind implies the complete privation of the knowledge of pierce the medium, in so far as it perceives its object from such things. Both are opposed to the gift of understand- a distance or is able by penetration as it were to perceive ing, whereby a man knows spiritual goods by apprehend- the smallest details or the inmost parts of a thing. Hence in ing them, and has a subtle penetration of their inmost na- corporeal things the senses are said to be acute when they ture. This dulness has the character of sin, just as blind- can perceive a sensible object from afar, by sight, hearing, ness of mind has, that is, in so far as it is voluntary, as or scent, while on the other hand they are said to be dull, evidenced in one who, owing to his affection for carnal through being unable to perceive, except sensible objects things, dislikes or neglects the careful consideration of that are near at hand, or of great power. spiritual things. Now, by way of similitude to bodily sense, we speak This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. of sense in connection with the intellect; and this latter Whether blindness of mind and dulness of sense arise from sins of the flesh? IIa IIae q. 15 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that blindness of mind fore blindness of mind and dulness of sense are caused by and dulness of sense do not arise from sins of the flesh. spiritual rather than by carnal vices. For Augustine (Retract. i, 4) retracts what he had said On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) in his Soliloquies i, 1, “God Who didst wish none but that dulness of sense arises from gluttony and blindness the clean to know the truth,” and says that one might re- of mind from lust. ply that “many, even those who are unclean, know many I answer that, The perfect intellectual operation in truths.” Now men become unclean chiefly by sins of the man consists in an abstraction from sensible phantasms, flesh. Therefore blindness of mind and dulness of sense wherefore the more a man’s intellect is freed from those are not caused by sins of the flesh. phantasms, the more thoroughly will it be able to consider Objection 2. Further, blindness of mind and dulness things intelligible, and to set in order all things sensible. of sense are defects in connection with the intellective part Thus Anaxagoras stated that the intellect requires to be of the soul: whereas carnal sins pertain to the corruption “detached” in order to command, and that the agent must of the flesh. But the flesh does not act on the soul, but have power over matter, in order to be able to move it. rather the reverse. Therefore the sins of the flesh do not Now it is evident that pleasure fixes a man’s attention on cause blindness of mind and dulness of sense. that which he takes pleasure in: wherefore the Philoso- Objection 3. Further, all things are more passive to pher says (Ethic. x, 4,5) that we all do best that which what is near them than to what is remote. Now spiritual we take pleasure in doing, while as to other things, we do vices are nearer the mind than carnal vices are. There- them either not at all, or in a faint-hearted fashion. 1262 Now carnal vices, namely gluttony and lust, are con-derstanding in every book, and wisdom.” cerned with pleasures of touch in matters of food and sex; Reply to Objection 1. Although some who are the and these are the most impetuous of all pleasures of the slaves of carnal vices are at times capable of subtle con- body. For this reason these vices cause man’s attention to siderations about intelligible things, on account of the be very firmly fixed on corporeal things, so that in conse- perfection of their natural genius, or of some habit su- quence man’s operation in regard to intelligible things is peradded thereto, nevertheless, on account of the plea- weakened, more, however, by lust than by gluttony, foras- sures of the body, it must needs happen that their atten- much as sexual pleasures are more vehement than those tion is frequently withdrawn from this subtle contempla- of the table. Wherefore lust gives rise to blindness of tion: wherefore the unclean can know some truths, but mind, which excludes almost entirely the knowledge of their uncleanness is a clog on their knowledge. spiritual things, while dulness of sense arises from glut- Reply to Objection 2. The flesh acts on the intellec- tony, which makes a man weak in regard to the same in- tive faculties, not by altering them, but by impeding their telligible things. On the other hand, the contrary virtues, operation in the aforesaid manner. viz. abstinence and chastity, dispose man very much to Reply to Objection 3. It is owing to the fact that the the perfection of intellectual operation. Hence it is writ- carnal vices are further removed from the mind, that they ten (Dan. 1:17) that “to these children” on account of their distract the mind’s attention to more remote things, so that abstinence and continency, “God gave knowledge and un- they hinder the mind’s contemplation all the more. 1263 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 16 Of the Precepts of Faith, Knowledge and Understanding (In Two Articles) We must now consider the precepts pertaining to the aforesaid, and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) The precepts concerning faith; (2) The precepts concerning the gifts of knowledge and understanding. Whether in the Old Law there should have been given precepts of faith? IIa IIae q. 16 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that, in the Old Law, I answer that, A master does not impose laws on oth- there should have been given precepts of faith. Because ers than his subjects; wherefore the precepts of a law pre- a precept is about something due and necessary. Now it suppose that everyone who receives the law is subject to is most necessary for man that he should believe, accord- the giver of the law. Now the primary subjection of man ing to Heb. 11:6, “Without faith it is impossible to please to God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6: “He that God.” Therefore there was very great need for precepts of cometh to God, must believe that He is.” Hence faith is faith to be given. presupposed to the precepts of the Law: for which rea- Objection 2. Further, the New Testament is contained son (Ex. 20:2) that which is of faith, is set down before in the Old, as the reality in the figure, as stated above ( Ia the legal precepts, in the words, “I am the Lord thy God, IIae, q. 107, a. 3). Now the New Testament contains ex- Who brought thee out of the land of Egypt,” and, likewise plicit precepts of faith, for instance Jn. 14:1: “You believe (Dt. 6:4), the words, “Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy [Vulg.: in God; believe also in Me.” Therefore it seems that some ‘our’] God is one,” precede the recording of the precepts. precepts of faith ought to have been given in the Old Law Since, however, faith contains many things subordi- also. nate to the faith whereby we believe that God is, which is Objection 3. Further, to prescribe the act of a virtue the first and chief of all articles of faith, as stated above comes to the same as to forbid the opposite vices. Now (q. 1, Aa. 1,7), it follows that, if we presuppose faith in the Old Law contained many precepts forbidding unbe- God, whereby man’s mind is subjected to Him, it is pos- lief: thus (Ex. 20:3): “Thou shalt not have strange gods sible for precepts to be given about other articles of faith. before Me,” and (Dt. 13:1-3) they were forbidden to hear Thus Augustine expounding the words: “This is My com- the words of the prophet or dreamer who might wish to mandment” (Jn. 15:12) says (Tract. lxxxiii in Joan.) that turn them away from their faith in God. Therefore pre- we have received many precepts of faith. In the Old Law, cepts of faith should have been given in the Old Law also. however, the secret things of faith were not to be set be- Objection 4. Further, confession is an act of faith, as fore the people, wherefore, presupposing their faith in one stated above (q. 3, a. 1). Now the Old Law contained God, no other precepts of faith were given in the Old Law. precepts about the confession and the promulgation of Reply to Objection 1. Faith is necessary as being the faith: for they were commanded (Ex. 12:27) that, when principle of spiritual life, wherefore it is presupposed be- their children should ask them, they should tell them the fore the receiving of the Law. meaning of the paschal observance, and (Dt. 13:9) they Reply to Objection 2. Even then Our Lord both pre- were commanded to slay anyone who disseminated doc- supposed something of faith, namely belief in one God, trine contrary to faith. Therefore the Old Law should have when He said: “You believe in God,” and commanded contained precepts of faith. something, namely, belief in the Incarnation whereby one Objection 5. Further, all the books of the Old Testa- Person is God and man. This explanation of faith belongs ment are contained in the Old Law; wherefore Our Lord to the faith of the New Testament, wherefore He added: said (Jn. 15:25) that it was written in the Law: “They have “Believe also in Me.” hated Me without cause,” although this is found written Reply to Objection 3. The prohibitive precepts regard in Ps. 34 and 68. Now it is written (Ecclus. 2:8): “Ye sins, which corrupt virtue. Now virtue is corrupted by any that fear the Lord, believe Him.” Therefore the Old Law particular defect, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 4, ad should have contained precepts of faith. 3; Ia IIae, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1, a. 7, ad 3). Therefore faith On the contrary, The Apostle (Rom. 3:27) calls the in one God being presupposed, prohibitive precepts had Old Law the “law of works” which he contrasts with the to be given in the Old Law, so that men might be warned “law of faith.” Therefore the Old Law ought not to have off those particular defects whereby their faith might be contained precepts of faith. corrupted. 1264 Reply to Objection 4. Confession of faith and the it begins, “Ye that fear the Lord,” which is not possible teaching thereof also presuppose man’s submission to without faith. The words which follow—“believe Him”— God by faith: so that the Old Law could contain precepts must be referred to certain special articles of faith, chiefly relating to the confession and teaching of faith, rather than to those things which God promises to them that obey to faith itself. Him, wherefore the passage concludes—“and your re- Reply to Objection 5. In this passage again that faith ward shall not be made void.” is presupposed whereby we believe that God is; hence Whether the precepts referring to knowledge and understanding were fittingly set IIa IIae q. 16 a. 2 down in the Old Law? Objection 1. It would seem that the precepts refer- Now the reception of knowledge or understanding, is by ring to knowledge and understanding were unfittingly set means of teaching and learning, and both are prescribed in down in the Old Law. For knowledge and understanding the Law. For it is written (Dt. 6:6): “These words which pertain to cognition. Now cognition precedes and directs I command thee. . . shall be in thy heart.” This refers to action. Therefore the precepts referring to knowledge and learning, since it is the duty of a disciple to apply his mind understanding should precede the precepts of the Law re- to what is said, while the words that follow—“and thou ferring to action. Since, then, the first precepts of the shalt tell them to thy children”—refer to teaching. Law are those of the decalogue, it seems that precepts of The use of knowledge and understanding is the med- knowledge and understanding should have been given a itation on those things which one knows or understands. place among the precepts of the decalogue. In reference to this, the text goes on: “thou shalt meditate Objection 2. Further, learning precedes teaching, for upon them sitting in thy house,” etc. a man must learn from another before he teaches another. Their preservation is effected by the memory, and, Now the Old Law contains precepts about teaching—both as regards this, the text continues—“and thou shalt bind affirmative precepts as, for example, (Dt. 4:9), “Thou them as a sign on thy hand, and they shall be and shall shalt teach them to thy sons”—and prohibitive precepts, move between thy eyes. And thou shalt write them in as, for instance, (Dt. 4:2), “You shall not add to the word the entry, and on the doors of thy house.” Thus the con- that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it.” tinual remembrance of God’s commandments is signified, Therefore it seems that man ought to have been given also since it is impossible for us to forget those things which some precepts directing him to learn. are continually attracting the notice of our senses, whether Objection 3. Further, knowledge and understanding by touch, as those things we hold in our hands, or by sight, seem more necessary to a priest than to a king, wherefore as those things which are ever before our eyes, or to which it is written (Malachi 2:7): “The lips of the priest shall we are continually returning, for instance, to the house keep knowledge, and they shall seek the law at his mouth,” door. Moreover it is clearly stated (Dt. 4:9): “Forget not and (Osee 4:6): “Because thou hast rejected knowledge, I the words that thy eyes have seen and let them not go out will reject thee, that thou shalt not do the office of priest- of thy heart all the days of thy life.” hood to Me.” Now the king is commanded to learn knowl- We read of these things also being commanded more edge of the Law (Dt. 17:18,19). Much more therefore notably in the New Testament, both in the teaching of the should the Law have commanded the priests to learn the Gospel and in that of the apostles. Law. Reply to Objection 1. According to Dt. 4:6, “this Objection 4. Further, it is not possible while asleep is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of the na- to meditate on things pertaining to knowledge and under- tions.” By this we are given to understand that the wisdom standing: moreover it is hindered by extraneous occupa- and understanding of those who believe in God consist in tions. Therefore it is unfittingly commanded (Dt. 6:7): the precepts of the Law. Wherefore the precepts of the “Thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house, and Law had to be given first, and afterwards men had to be walking on thy journey, sleeping and rising.” Therefore led to know and understand them, and so it was not fit- the precepts relating to knowledge and understanding are ting that the aforesaid precepts should be placed among unfittingly set down in the Law. the precepts of the decalogue which take the first place. On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:6): “That, hear- Reply to Objection 2. There are also in the Law pre- ing all these precepts, they may say, Behold a wise and cepts relating to learning, as stated above. Nevertheless understanding people.” teaching was commanded more expressly than learning, I answer that, Three things may be considered in rela- because it concerned the learned, who were not under any tion to knowledge and understanding: first, the reception other authority, but were immediately under the law, and thereof; secondly, the use; and thirdly, their preservation. to them the precepts of the Law were given. On the other 1265 hand learning concerned the people of lower degree, and pertaining to the law of God. these the precepts of the Law have to reach through the Reply to Objection 4. That precept of the Law does learned. not mean that man should meditate on God’s law of sleep- Reply to Objection 3. Knowledge of the Law is ing, but during sleep, i.e. that he should meditate on the so closely bound up with the priestly office that being law of God when he is preparing to sleep, because this charged with the office implies being charged to know leads to his having better phantasms while asleep, in so the Law: hence there was no need for special precepts far as our movements pass from the state of vigil to the to be given about the training of the priests. On the other state of sleep, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. i, 13). hand, the doctrine of God’s law is not so bound up with the In like manner we are commanded to meditate on the Law kingly office, because a king is placed over his people in in every action of ours, not that we are bound to be always temporal matters: hence it is especially commanded that actually thinking about the Law, but that we should regu- the king should be instructed by the priests about things late all our actions according to it. 1266 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 17 Of Hope, Considered in Itself (In Eight Articles) After treating of faith, we must consider hope and (1) hope itself; (2) the gift of fear; (3) the contrary vices; (4) the corresponding precepts. The first of these points gives rise to a twofold consideration: (1) hope, considered in itself; (2) its subject. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether hope is a virtue? (2) Whether its object is eternal happiness? (3) Whether, by the virtue of hope, one man may hope for another’s happiness? (4) Whether a man may lawfully hope in man? (5) Whether hope is a theological virtue? (6) Of its distinction from the other theological virtues? (7) Of its relation to faith; (8) Of its relation to charity. Whether hope is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 17 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that hope is not a virtue. we have already stated ( Ia IIae, q. 40, a. 1), when we were For “no man makes ill use of a virtue,” as Augustine states treating of the passion of hope, the object of hope is a fu- (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18). But one may make ill use of ture good, difficult but possible to obtain. Now a thing is hope, since the passion of hope, like the other passions, possible to us in two ways: first, by ourselves; secondly, is subject to a mean and extremes. Therefore hope is not by means of others, as stated in Ethic. iii. Wherefore, a virtue. in so far as we hope for anything as being possible to us Objection 2. Further, no virtue results from merits, by means of the Divine assistance, our hope attains God since “God works virtue in us without us,” as Augustine Himself, on Whose help it leans. It is therefore evident states (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. xvii). But hope is caused that hope is a virtue, since it causes a human act to be by grace and merits, according to the Master (Sent. iii, D, good and to attain its due rule. 26). Therefore hope is not a virtue. Reply to Objection 1. In the passions, the mean of Objection 3. Further, “virtue is the disposition of a virtue depends on right reason being attained, wherein perfect thing” (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). But hope is the dis- also consists the essence of virtue. Wherefore in hope position of an imperfect thing, of one, namely, that lacks too, the good of virtue depends on a man’s attaining, by what it hopes to have. Therefore hope is not a virtue. hoping, the due rule, viz. God. Consequently man cannot On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 33) that the make ill use of hope which attains God, as neither can he three daughters of Job signify these three virtues, faith, make ill use of moral virtue which attains the reason, be- hope and charity. Therefore hope is a virtue. cause to attain thus is to make good use of virtue. Never- I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. theless, the hope of which we speak now, is not a passion ii, 6) “the virtue of a thing is that which makes its subject but a habit of the mind, as we shall show further on (a. 5; good, and its work good likewise.” Consequently wher- q. 18, a. 1). ever we find a good human act, it must correspond to some Reply to Objection 2. Hope is said to arise from mer- human virtue. Now in all things measured and ruled, the its, as regards the thing hoped for, in so far as we hope good is that which attains its proper rule: thus we say that to obtain happiness by means of grace and merits; or as a coat is good if it neither exceeds nor falls short of its regards the act of living hope. The habit itself of hope, proper measurement. But, as we stated above (q. 8, a. 3, whereby we hope to obtain happiness, does not flow from ad 3) human acts have a twofold measure; one is proxi- our merits, but from grace alone. mate and homogeneous, viz. the reason, while the other is Reply to Objection 3. He who hopes is indeed imper- remote and excelling, viz. God: wherefore every human fect in relation to that which he hopes to obtain, but has act is good, which attains reason or God Himself. Now the not as yet; yet he is perfect, in so far as he already attains act of hope, whereof we speak now, attains God. For, as his proper rule, viz. God, on Whose help he leans. 1267 Whether eternal happiness is the proper object of hope? IIa IIae q. 17 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that eternal happiness is the infinite good, which is proportionate to the power of not the proper object of hope. For a man does not hope for our divine helper, since it belongs to an infinite power to that which surpasses every movement of the soul, since lead anyone to an infinite good. Such a good is eternal hope itself is a movement of the soul. Now eternal hap- life, which consists in the enjoyment of God Himself. For piness surpasses every movement of the human soul, for we should hope from Him for nothing less than Himself, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:9) that it hath not “entered into since His goodness, whereby He imparts good things to the heart of man.” Therefore happiness is not the proper His creature, is no less than His Essence. Therefore the object of hope. proper and principal object of hope is eternal happiness. Objection 2. Further, prayer is an expression of hope, Reply to Objection 1. Eternal happiness does not en- for it is written (Ps. 36:5): “Commit thy way to the Lord, ter into the heart of man perfectly, i.e. so that it be possible and trust in Him, and He will do it.” Now it is lawful for for a wayfarer to know its nature and quality; yet, under man to pray God not only for eternal happiness, but also the general notion of the perfect good, it is possible for for the goods, both temporal and spiritual, of the present it to be apprehended by a man, and it is in this way that life, and, as evidenced by the Lord’s Prayer, to be deliv- the movement of hope towards it arises. Hence the Apos- ered from evils which will no longer be in eternal happi- tle says pointedly (Heb. 6:19) that hope “enters in, even ness. Therefore eternal happiness is not the proper object within the veil,” because that which we hope for is as yet of hope. veiled, so to speak. Objection 3. Further, the object of hope is something Reply to Objection 2. We ought not to pray God for difficult. Now many things besides eternal happiness are any other goods, except in reference to eternal happiness. difficult to man. Therefore eternal happiness is not the Hence hope regards eternal happiness chiefly, and other proper object of hope. things, for which we pray God, it regards secondarily and On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 6:19) that as referred to eternal happiness: just as faith regards God we have hope “which entereth in,” i.e. maketh us to en- principally, and, secondarily, those things which are re- ter. . . “within the veil,” i.e. into the happiness of heaven, ferred to God, as stated above (q. 1, a. 1). according to the interpretation of a gloss on these words. Reply to Objection 3. To him that longs for some- Therefore the object of hope is eternal happiness. thing great, all lesser things seem small; wherefore to him I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the hope of that hopes for eternal happiness, nothing else appears ar- which we speak now, attains God by leaning on His help duous, as compared with that hope; although, as com- in order to obtain the hoped for good. Now an effect must pared with the capability of the man who hopes, other be proportionate to its cause. Wherefore the good which things besides may be arduous to him, so that he may have we ought to hope for from God properly and chiefly is hope for such things in reference to its principal object. Whether one man may hope for another’s eternal happiness? IIa IIae q. 17 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that one may hope for an- can also hope for another’s eternal salvation. other’s eternal happiness. For the Apostle says (Phil. 1:6): On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) “Being confident of this very thing, that He Who hath be- that “hope is only of such things as belong to him who is gun a good work in you, will perfect it unto the day of supposed to hope for them.” Jesus Christ.” Now the perfection of that day will be eter- I answer that, We can hope for something in two nal happiness. Therefore one man may hope for another’s ways: first, absolutely, and thus the object of hope is al- eternal happiness. ways something arduous and pertaining to the person who Objection 2. Further, whatever we ask of God, we hopes. Secondly, we can hope for something, through hope to obtain from Him. But we ask God to bring others something else being presupposed, and in this way its ob- to eternal happiness, according to James 5:16: “Pray for ject can be something pertaining to someone else. In or- one another that you may be saved.” Therefore we can der to explain this we must observe that love and hope hope for another’s eternal happiness. differ in this, that love denotes union between lover and Objection 3. Further, hope and despair are about the beloved, while hope denotes a movement or a stretching same object. Now it is possible to despair of another’s forth of the appetite towards an arduous good. Now union eternal happiness, else Augustine would have no reason is of things that are distinct, wherefore love can directly for saying (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that we should regard the other whom a man unites to himself by love, not despair of anyone so long as he lives. Therefore one looking upon him as his other self: whereas movement is 1268 always towards its own term which is proportionate to the inasmuch as he is united to him by love, and just as it is subject moved. Therefore hope regards directly one’s own the same virtue of charity whereby a man loves God, him- good, and not that which pertains to another. Yet if we pre- self, and his neighbor, so too it is the same virtue of hope, suppose the union of love with another, a man can hope whereby a man hopes for himself and for another. for and desire something for another man, as for himself; This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. and, accordingly, he can hope for another eternal’s life, Whether a man can lawfully hope in man? IIa IIae q. 17 a. 4 Objection 1. It wold seem that one may lawfully hope hopes to obtain that good, has the character of an efficient in man. For the object of hope is eternal happiness. Now cause. Now in each of these kinds of cause we find a prin- we are helped to obtain eternal happiness by the patronage cipal and a secondary cause. For the principal end is the of the saints, for Gregory says (Dial. i, 8) that “predesti- last end, while the secondary end is that which is referred nation is furthered by the saints’ prayers.” Therefore one to an end. In like manner the principal efficient cause is may hope in man. the first agent, while the secondary efficient cause is the Objection 2. Further, if a man may not hope in an- secondary and instrumental agent. Now hope regards eter- other man, it ought not to be reckoned a sin in a man, that nal happiness as its last end, and the Divine assistance as one should not be able to hope in him. Yet this is reck- the first cause leading to happiness. oned a vice in some, as appears from Jer. 9:4: “Let every Accordingly, just as it is not lawful to hope for any man take heed of his neighbor, and let him not trust in any good save happiness, as one’s last end, but only as some- brother of his.” Therefore it is lawful to trust in a man. thing referred to final happiness, so too, it is unlawful to Objection 3. Further, prayer is the expression of hope, hope in any man, or any creature, as though it were the as stated above (a. 2, obj. 2). But it is lawful to pray to a first cause of movement towards happiness. It is, how- man for something. Therefore it is lawful to trust in him. ever, lawful to hope in a man or a creature as being the On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 17:5): “Cursed be secondary and instrumental agent through whom one is the man that trusteth in man.” helped to obtain any goods that are ordained to happiness. I answer that, Hope, as stated above (a. 1; Ia IIae, It is in this way that we turn to the saints, and that we ask q. 40, a. 7), regards two things, viz. the good which it men also for certain things; and for this reason some are intends to obtain, and the help by which that good is ob- blamed in that they cannot be trusted to give help. tained. Now the good which a man hopes to obtain, has This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. the aspect of a final cause, while the help by which one Whether hope is a theological virtue? IIa IIae q. 17 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that hope is not a theo- virtues. logical virtue. For a theological virtue is one that has God I answer that, Since specific differences, by their very for its object. Now hope has for its object not only God nature, divide a genus, in order to decide under what di- but also other goods which we hope to obtain from God. vision we must place hope, we must observe whence it Therefore hope is not a theological virtue. derives its character of virtue. Objection 2. Further, a theological virtue is not a Now it has been stated above (a. 1) that hope has the mean between two vices, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 64, character of virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme a. 4). But hope is a mean between presumption and de- rule of human actions: and this it attains both as its first spair. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue. efficient cause, in as much as it leans on its assistance, and Objection 3. Further, expectation belongs to longa- as its last final cause, in as much as it expects happiness nimity which is a species of fortitude. Since, then, hope is in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it is evident that God is a kind of expectation, it seems that hope is not a theologi- the principal object of hope, considered as a virtue. Since, cal, but a moral virtue. then, the very idea of a theological virtue is one that has Objection 4. Further, the object of hope is something God for its object, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 62, a. 1), it arduous. But it belongs to magnanimity, which is a moral is evident that hope is a theological virtue. virtue, to tend to the arduous. Therefore hope is a moral, Reply to Objection 1. Whatever else hope expects to and not a theological virtue. obtain, it hopes for it in reference to God as the last end, On the contrary, Hope is enumerated (1 Cor. 13) or as the first efficient cause, as stated above (a. 4). together with faith and charity, which are theological Reply to Objection 2. In things measured and ruled 1269 the mean consists in the measure or rule being attained; mean between two falsehoods. So too, hope has no mean if we go beyond the rule, there is excess, if we fall short or extremes, as regards its principal object, since it is im- of the rule, there is deficiency. But in the rule or measure possible to trust too much in the Divine assistance; yet it itself there is no such thing as a mean or extremes. Now a may have a mean and extremes, as regards those things a moral virtue is concerned with things ruled by reason, and man trusts to obtain, in so far as he either presumes above these things are its proper object; wherefore it is proper to his capability, or despairs of things of which he is capable. it to follow the mean as regards its proper object. On the Reply to Objection 3. The expectation which is men- other hand, a theological virtue is concerned with the First tioned in the definition of hope does not imply delay, as Rule not ruled by another rule, and that Rule is its proper does the expectation which belongs to longanimity. It im- object. Wherefore it is not proper for a theological virtue, plies a reference to the Divine assistance, whether that with regard to its proper object, to follow the mean, al- which we hope for be delayed or not. though this may happen to it accidentally with regard to Reply to Objection 4. Magnanimity tends to some- something that is referred to its principal object. Thus thing arduous in the hope of obtaining something that is faith can have no mean or extremes in the point of trust- within one’s power, wherefore its proper object is the do- ing to the First Truth, in which it is impossible to trust ing of great things. On the other hand hope, as a theolog- too much; whereas on the part of the things believed, it ical virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by may have a mean and extremes; for instance one truth is a another’s help, as stated above (a. 1). Whether hope is distinct from the other theological virtues? IIa IIae q. 17 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that hope is not distinct sake, uniting our minds to God by the emotion of love. from the other theological virtues. For habits are distin- On the other hand, hope and faith make man adhere guished by their objects, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 54, to God as to a principle wherefrom certain things accrue a. 2). Now the object of hope is the same as of the other to us. Now we derive from God both knowledge of truth theological virtues. Therefore hope is not distinct from and the attainment of perfect goodness. Accordingly faith the other theological virtues. makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we derive Objection 2. Further, in the symbol of faith, whereby the knowledge of truth, since we believe that what God we make profession of faith, we say: “I expect the res- tells us is true: while hope makes us adhere to God, as the urrection of the dead and the life of the world to come.” source whence we derive perfect goodness, i.e. in so far Now expectation of future happiness belongs to hope, as as, by hope, we trust to the Divine assistance for obtaining stated above (a. 5). Therefore hope is not distinct from happiness. faith. Reply to Objection 1. God is the object of these Objection 3. Further, by hope man tends to God. But virtues under different aspects, as stated above: and a dif- this belongs properly to charity. Therefore hope is not ferent aspect of the object suffices for the distinction of distinct from charity. habits, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 2). On the contrary, There cannot be number without Reply to Objection 2. Expectation is mentioned in distinction. Now hope is numbered with the other theo- the symbol of faith, not as though it were the proper act of logical virtues: for Gregory says (Moral. i, 16) that the faith, but because the act of hope presupposes the act of three virtues are faith, hope, and charity. Therefore hope faith, as we shall state further on (a. 7). Hence an act of is distinct from the theological virtues. faith is expressed in the act of hope. I answer that, A virtue is said to be theological from Reply to Objection 3. Hope makes us tend to God, as having God for the object to which it adheres. Now one to a good to be obtained finally, and as to a helper strong may adhere to a thing in two ways: first, for its own sake; to assist: whereas charity, properly speaking, makes us secondly, because something else is attained thereby. Ac- tend to God, by uniting our affections to Him, so that we cordingly charity makes us adhere to God for His own live, not for ourselves, but for God. Whether hope precedes faith? IIa IIae q. 17 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that hope precedes faith. are justified. Therefore hope precedes faith. Because a gloss on Ps. 36:3, “Trust in the Lord, and do Objection 2. Further, that which is included in a good,” says: “Hope is the entrance to faith and the begin- definition should precede the thing defined and be more ning of salvation.” But salvation is by faith whereby we known. But hope is included in the definition of faith 1270 (Heb. 11:1): “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped 11:6: “He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, for.” Therefore hope precedes faith. and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.” Therefore it is Objection 3. Further, hope precedes a meritorious act, evident that faith precedes hope. for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:10): “He that plougheth Reply to Objection 1. As the same gloss observes fur- should plough in hope. . . to receive fruit.” But the act of ther on, “hope” is called “the entrance” to faith, i.e. of the faith is meritorious. Therefore hope precedes faith. thing believed, because by hope we enter in to see what On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 1:2): “Abraham we believe. Or we may reply that it is called the “entrance begot Isaac,” i.e. “Faith begot hope,” according to a gloss. to faith,” because thereby man begins to be established I answer that, Absolutely speaking, faith precedes and perfected in faith. hope. For the object of hope is a future good, arduous but Reply to Objection 2. The thing to be hoped for is in- possible to obtain. In order, therefore, that we may hope, cluded in the definition of faith, because the proper object it is necessary for the object of hope to be proposed to us of faith, is something not apparent in itself. Hence it was as possible. Now the object of hope is, in one way, eternal necessary to express it in a circumlocution by something happiness, and in another way, the Divine assistance, as resulting from faith. explained above (a. 2; a. 6, ad 3): and both of these are Reply to Objection 3. Hope does not precede every proposed to us by faith, whereby we come to know that meritorious act; but it suffices for it to accompany or fol- we are able to obtain eternal life, and that for this purpose low it. the Divine assistance is ready for us, according to Heb. Whether charity precedes hope? IIa IIae q. 17 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that charity precedes when someone wishes a person some good for his own hope. For Ambrose says on Lk. 27:6, “If you had faith sake; thus a man loves his friend. Imperfect love is that like to a grain of mustard seed,” etc.: “Charity flows from whereby a man love something, not for its own sake, but faith, and hope from charity.” But faith precedes charity. that he may obtain that good for himself; thus a man loves Therefore charity precedes hope. what he desires. The first love of God pertains to char- Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ity, which adheres to God for His own sake; while hope xiv, 9) that “good emotions and affections proceed from pertains to the second love, since he that hopes, intends to love and holy charity.” Now to hope, considered as an act obtain possession of something for himself. of hope, is a good emotion of the soul. Therefore it flows Hence in the order of generation, hope precedes char- from charity. ity. For just as a man is led to love God, through fear of Objection 3. Further, the Master says (Sent. iii, D, being punished by Him for his sins, as Augustine states 26) that hope proceeds from merits, which precede not (In primam canon. Joan. Tract. ix), so too, hope leads only the thing hoped for, but also hope itself, which, in the to charity, in as much as a man through hoping to be re- order of nature, is preceded by charity. Therefore charity warded by God, is encouraged to love God and obey His precedes hope. commandments. On the other hand, in the order of per- On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): “The fection charity naturally precedes hope, wherefore, with end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and the advent of charity, hope is made more perfect, because a good conscience,” i.e. “from hope,” according to a gloss. we hope chiefly in our friends. It is in this sense that Am- Therefore hope precedes charity. brose states (obj. 1) that charity flows from hope: so that I answer that, Order is twofold. One is the order of this suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. generation and of matter, in respect of which the imperfect Reply to Objection 2. Hope and every movement of precedes the perfect: the other is the order of perfection the appetite proceed from some kind of love, whereby the and form, in respect of which the perfect naturally pre- expected good is loved. But not every kind of hope pro- cedes the imperfect. In respect of the first order hope pre- ceeds from charity, but only the movement of living hope, cedes charity: and this is clear from the fact that hope and viz. that whereby man hopes to obtain good from God, as all movements of the appetite flow from love, as stated from a friend. above ( Ia IIae, q. 27, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 28, a. 6, ad 2; Ia IIae, Reply to Objection 3. The Master is speaking of liv-q. 40, a. 7) in the treatise on the passions. ing hope, which is naturally preceded by charity and the Now there is a perfect, and an imperfect love. Per- merits caused by charity. fect love is that whereby a man is loved in himself, as 1271 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 18 Of the Subject of Hope (In Four Articles) We must now consider the subject of hope, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the virtue of hope is in the will as its subject? (2) Whether it is in the blessed? (3) Whether it is in the damned? (4) Whether there is certainty in the hope of the wayfarer? Whether hope is in the will as its subject? IIa IIae q. 18 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that hope is not in the will And, since there is a twofold appetite in man, namely, the as its subject. For the object of hope is an arduous good, sensitive which is divided into irascible and concupisci- as stated above (q. 17, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 40, a. 1). Now the ble, and the intellective appetite, called the will, as stated arduous is the object, not of the will, but of the irascible. in the Ia, q. 82, a. 5, those movements which occur in Therefore hope is not in the will but in the irascible. the lower appetite, are with passion, while those in the Objection 2. Further, where one suffices it is superflu- higher appetite are without passion, as shown above ( Ia, ous to add another. Now charity suffices for the perfecting q. 87, a. 2, ad 1; Ia IIae, q. 22, a. 3, ad 3). Now the act of of the will, which is the most perfect of the virtues. There- the virtue of hope cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, fore hope is not in the will. since the good which is the principal object of this virtue, Objection 3. Further, the one same power cannot ex- is not a sensible but a Divine good. Therefore hope re- ercise two acts at the same time; thus the intellect cannot sides in the higher appetite called the will, and not in the understand many things simultaneously. Now the act of lower appetite, of which the irascible is a part. hope can be at the same time as an act of charity. Since, Reply to Objection 1. The object of the irascible is then, the act of charity evidently belongs to the will, it fol- an arduous sensible: whereas the object of the virtue of lows that the act of hope does not belong to that power: so hope is an arduous intelligible, or rather superintelligible. that, therefore, hope is not in the will. Reply to Objection 2. Charity perfects the will suffi- On the contrary, The soul is not apprehensive of God ciently with regard to one act, which is the act of loving: save as regards the mind in which is memory, intellect and but another virtue is required in order to perfect it with will, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xiv, 3,6). Now hope regard to its other act, which is that of hoping. is a theological virtue having God for its object. Since Reply to Objection 3. The movement of hope and the therefore it is neither in the memory, nor in the intellect, movement of charity are mutually related, as was shown which belong to the cognitive faculty, it follows that it is above (q. 17, a. 8). Hence there is no reason why both in the will as its subject. movements should not belong at the same time to the same I answer that, As shown above ( Ia, q. 87, a. 2), habits power: even as the intellect can understand many things are known by their acts. Now the act of hope is a move- at the same time if they be related to one another, as stated ment of the appetitive faculty, since its object is a good. in the Ia, q. 85, a. 4. Whether in the blessed there is hope? IIa IIae q. 18 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that in the blessed there in its possession. is hope. For Christ was a perfect comprehensor from the Objection 3. Further, by the virtue of hope, a man first moment of His conception. Now He had hope, since, can hope for happiness, not only for himself, but also for according to a gloss, the words of Ps. 30:2, “In Thee, O others, as stated above (q. 17, a. 3). But the blessed who Lord, have I hoped,” are said in His person. Therefore in are in heaven hope for the happiness of others, else they the blessed there can be hope. would not pray for them. Therefore there can be hope in Objection 2. Further, even as the obtaining of happi- them. ness is an arduous good, so is its continuation. Now, be- Objection 4. Further, the happiness of the saints im- fore they obtain happiness, men hope to obtain it. There- plies not only glory of the soul but also glory of the body. fore, after they have obtained it, they can hope to continue Now the souls of the saints in heaven, look yet for the 1272 glory of their bodies (Apoc. 6:10; Augustine, Gen. ad lit. the body but the enjoyment of God. xii, 35). Therefore in the blessed there can be hope. Reply to Objection 2. The happiness of the saints On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): is called eternal life, because through enjoying God they “What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?” Now the become partakers, as it were, of God’s eternity which sur- blessed enjoy the sight of God. Therefore hope has no passes all time: so that the continuation of happiness does place in them. not differ in respect of present, past and future. Hence I answer that, If what gives a thing its species be the blessed do not hope for the continuation of their hap- removed, the species is destroyed, and that thing cannot piness (for as regards this there is no future), but are in remain the same; just as when a natural body loses its actual possession thereof. form, it does not remain the same specifically. Now hope Reply to Objection 3. So long as the virtue of hope takes its species from its principal object, even as the other lasts, it is by the same hope that one hopes for one’s own virtues do, as was shown above (q. 17, Aa. 5,6; Ia IIae, happiness, and for that of others. But when hope is voided q. 54, a. 2): and its principal object is eternal happiness in the blessed, whereby they hoped for their own happi- as being possible to obtain by the assistance of God, as ness, they hope for the happiness of others indeed, yet not stated above (q. 17, a. 2). by the virtue of hope, but rather by the love of charity. Since then the arduous possible good cannot be an ob- Even so, he that has Divine charity, by that same charity ject of hope except in so far as it is something future, it fol-loves his neighbor, without having the virtue of charity, lows that when happiness is no longer future, but present, but by some other love. it is incompatible with the virtue of hope. Consequently Reply to Objection 4. Since hope is a theological hope, like faith, is voided in heaven, and neither of them virtue having God for its object, its principal object is the can be in the blessed. glory of the soul, which consists in the enjoyment of God, Reply to Objection 1. Although Christ was a compre- and not the glory of the body. Moreover, although the hensor and therefore blessed as to the enjoyment of God, glory of the body is something arduous in comparison nevertheless He was, at the same time, a wayfarer, as re- with human nature, yet it is not so for one who has the gards the passibility of nature, to which He was still sub- glory of the soul; both because the glory of the body is a ject. Hence it was possible for Him to hope for the glory very small thing as compared with the glory of the soul, of impassibility and immortality, yet not so as to the virtue and because one who has the glory of the soul has already of hope, the principal object of which is not the glory of the sufficient cause of the glory of the body. Whether hope is in the damned? IIa IIae q. 18 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that there is hope in sorrow of heart, and shall howl for grief of spirit.” There- the damned. For the devil is damned and prince of the fore no hope is in the damned. damned, according to Mat. 25:41: “Depart. . . you cursed, I answer that, Just as it is a condition of happiness into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil that the will should find rest therein, so is it a condition of and his angels.” But the devil has hope, according to punishment, that what is inflicted in punishment, should Job 40:28, “Behold his hope shall fail him.” Therefore go against the will. Now that which is not known can nei- it seems that the damned have hope. ther be restful nor repugnant to the will: wherefore Au- Objection 2. Further, just as faith is either living or gustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 17) that the angels could dead, so is hope. But lifeless faith can be in the dev- not be perfectly happy in their first state before their con- ils and the damned, according to James 2:19: “The dev- firmation, or unhappy before their fall, since they had no ils. . . believe and tremble.” Therefore it seems that lifeless foreknowledge of what would happen to them. For per-hope also can be in the damned. fect and true happiness requires that one should be certain Objection 3. Further, after death there accrues to man of being happy for ever, else the will would not rest. no merit or demerit that he had not before, according to In like manner, since the everlastingness of damnation Eccles. 11:3, “If the tree fall to the south, or to the north, is a necessary condition of the punishment of the damned, in what place soever it shall fall, there shall it be.” Now it would not be truly penal unless it went against the will; many who are damned, in this life hoped and never de- and this would be impossible if they were ignorant of the spaired. Therefore they will hope in the future life also. everlastingness of their damnation. Hence it belongs to On the contrary, Hope causes joy, according to Rom. the unhappy state of the damned, that they should know 12:12, “Rejoicing in hope.” Now the damned have no joy, that they cannot by any means escape from damnation and but sorrow and grief, according to Is. 65:14, “My servants obtain happiness. Wherefore it is written (Job 15:22): “He shall praise for joyfulness of heart, and you shall cry for believeth not that he may return from darkness to light.” 1273 It is, therefore, evident that they cannot apprehend happi-into his mouth”: this is not, however, the hope of which ness as a possible good, as neither can the blessed appre- we are speaking. hend it as a future good. Consequently there is no hope Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (Enchirid- either in the blessed or in the damned. On the other hand, ion viii), “faith is about things, bad or good, past, present, hope can be in wayfarers, whether of this life or in purga- or future, one’s own or another’s; whereas hope is only tory, because in either case they apprehend happiness as a about good things, future and concerning oneself.” Hence future possible thing. it is possible for lifeless faith to be in the damned, but Reply to Objection 1. As Gregory says (Moral. not hope, since the Divine goods are not for them future xxxiii, 20) this is said of the devil as regards his mem- possible things, but far removed from them. bers, whose hope will fail utterly: or, if it be understood Reply to Objection 3. Lack of hope in the damned of the devil himself, it may refer to the hope whereby he does not change their demerit, as neither does the voiding expects to vanquish the saints, in which sense we read just of hope in the blessed increase their merit: but both these before (Job 40:18): “He trusteth that the Jordan may run things are due to the change in their respective states. Whether there is certainty in the hope of a wayfarer? IIa IIae q. 18 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no certainty is moved infallibly to its end by the cognitive power. In in the hope of a wayfarer. For hope resides in the will. this way we say that nature works with certainty, since it But certainty pertains not to the will but to the intellect. is moved by the Divine intellect which moves everything Therefore there is no certainty in hope. with certainty to its end. In this way too, the moral virtues Objection 2. Further, hope is based on grace and mer- are said to work with greater certainty than art, in as much its, as stated above (q. 17, a. 1). Now it is impossible in as, like a second nature, they are moved to their acts by the this life to know for certain that we are in a state of grace, reason: and thus too, hope tends to its end with certainty, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 112, a. 5). Therefore there is as though sharing in the certainty of faith which is in the no certainty in the hope of a wayfarer. cognitive faculty. Objection 3. Further, there can be no certainty about This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. that which may fail. Now many a hopeful wayfarer fails Reply to Objection 2. Hope does not trust chiefly to obtain happiness. Therefore wayfarer’s hope has no in grace already received, but on God’s omnipotence and certainty. mercy, whereby even he that has not grace, can obtain it, On the contrary, “Hope is the certain expectation of so as to come to eternal life. Now whoever has faith is future happiness,” as the Master states (Sent. iii, D, 26): certain of God’s omnipotence and mercy. and this may be gathered from 2 Tim. 1:12, “I know Reply to Objection 3. That some who have hope Whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able fail to obtain happiness, is due to a fault of the free will to keep that which I have committed to Him.” in placing the obstacle of sin, but not to any deficiency I answer that, Certainty is found in a thing in two in God’s power or mercy, in which hope places its trust. ways, essentially and by participation. It is found essen- Hence this does not prejudice the certainty of hope. tially in the cognitive power; by participation in whatever 1274 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 19 Of the Gift of Fear (In Twelve Articles) We must now consider the gift of fear, about which there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is to be feared? (2) Of the division of fear into filial, initial, servile and worldly; (3) Whether worldly fear is always evil? (4) Whether servile fear is good? (5) Whether it is substantially the same as filial fear? (6) Whether servile fear departs when charity comes? (7) Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom? (8) Whether initial fear is substantially the same as filial fear? (9) Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost? (10) Whether it grows when charity grows? (11) Whether it remains in heaven? (12) Which of the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it? Whether God can be feared? IIa IIae q. 19 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot be feared. ing, is a good. Because, since a thing is said to be good For the object of fear is a future evil, as stated above ( Ia through being ordered to an end, while evil implies lack of IIae, q. 41, Aa. 2,3). But God is free of all evil, since He this order, that which excludes the order to the last end is is goodness itself. Therefore God cannot be feared. altogether evil, and such is the evil of fault. On the other Objection 2. Further, fear is opposed to hope. Now hand the evil of punishment is indeed an evil, in so far as we hope in God. Therefore we cannot fear Him at the it is the privation of some particular good, yet absolutely same time. speaking, it is a good, in so far as it is ordained to the last Objection 3. Further, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. end. ii, 5), “we fear those things whence evil comes to us.” But In relation to God the evil of fault can come to us, if evil comes to us, not from God, but from ourselves, ac- we be separated from Him: and in this way God can and cording to Osee 13:9: “Destruction is thy own, O Israel: ought to be feared. thy help is. . . in Me.” Therefore God is not to be feared. Reply to Objection 1. This objection considers the On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 10:7): “Who shall object of fear as being the evil which a man shuns. not fear Thee, O King of nations?” and (Malachi 1:6): “If Reply to Objection 2. In God, we may consider both I be a master, where is My fear?” His justice, in respect of which He punishes those who I answer that, Just as hope has two objects, one of sin, and His mercy, in respect of which He sets us free: in which is the future good itself, that one expects to obtain, us the consideration of His justice gives rise to fear, but while the other is someone’s help, through whom one ex- the consideration of His mercy gives rise to hope, so that, pects to obtain what one hopes for, so, too, fear may have accordingly, God is the object of both hope and fear, but two objects, one of which is the very evil which a man under different aspects. shrinks from, while the other is that from which the evil Reply to Objection 3. The evil of fault is not from may come. Accordingly, in the first way God, Who is God as its author but from us, in for far as we forsake God: goodness itself, cannot be an object of fear; but He can while the evil of punishment is from God as its author, in be an object of fear in the second way, in so far as there so far as it has character of a good, since it is something may come to us some evil either from Him or in relation just, through being inflicted on us justly; although orig- to Him. inally this is due to the demerit of sin: thus it is written From Him there comes the evil of punishment, but this (Wis. 1:13,16): “God made not death. . . but the wicked is evil not absolutely but relatively, and, absolutely speak- with works and words have called it to them.” 1275 Whether fear is fittingly divided into filial, initial, servile and worldly fear? IIa IIae q. 19 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that fear is unfittingly di- which is between both these fears. As to whether it is pos- vided into filial, initial, servile and worldly fear. For Dam- sible to fear the evil of fault, the question has been treated ascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that there are six kinds above ( Ia IIae, q. 42, a. 3) when we were considering the of fear, viz. “laziness, shamefacedness,” etc. of which we passion of fear. have treated above ( Ia IIae, q. 41, a. 4), and which are Reply to Objection 1. Damascene divides fear as a not mentioned in the division in question. Therefore this passion of the soul: whereas this division of fear is taken division of fear seems unfitting. from its relation to God, as explained above. Objection 2. Further, each of these fears is either Reply to Objection 2. Moral good consists chiefly in good or evil. But there is a fear, viz. natural fear, which turning to God, while moral evil consists chiefly in turn- is neither morally good, since it is in the demons, accord- ing away from Him: wherefore all the fears mentioned ing to James 2:19, “The devils. . . believe and tremble,” nor above imply either moral evil or moral good. Now natural evil, since it is in Christ, according to Mk. 14:33, Jesus fear is presupposed to moral good and evil, and so it is not “began to fear and be heavy.” Therefore the aforesaid di- numbered among these kinds of fear. vision of fear is insufficient. Reply to Objection 3. The relation of servant to mas- Objection 3. Further, the relation of son to father dif- ter is based on the power which the master exercises over fers from that of wife to husband, and this again from that the servant; whereas, on the contrary, the relation of a of servant to master. Now filial fear, which is that of the son to his father or of a wife to her husband is based on son in comparison with his father, is distinct from servile the son’s affection towards his father to whom he submits fear, which is that of the servant in comparison with his himself, or on the wife’s affection towards her husband to master. Therefore chaste fear, which seems to be that of whom she binds herself in the union of love. Hence filial the wife in comparison with her husband, ought to be dis- and chaste fear amount to the same, because by the love tinguished from all these other fears. of charity God becomes our Father, according to Rom. Objection 4. Further, even as servile fear fears pun- 8:15, “You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, ishment, so do initial and worldly fear. Therefore no dis- whereby we cry: Abba [Father]”; and by this same char- tinction should be made between them. ity He is called our spouse, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, “I Objection 5. Further, even as concupiscence is about have espoused you to one husband, that I may present you some good, so is fear about some evil. Now “concupis- as a chaste virgin to Christ”: whereas servile fear has no cence of the eyes,” which is the desire for things of this connection with these, since it does not include charity in world, is distinct from “concupiscence of the flesh,” which its definition. is the desire for one’s own pleasure. Therefore “worldly Reply to Objection 4. These three fears regard fear,” whereby one fears to lose external goods, is distinct punishment but in different ways. For worldly or hu- from “human fear,” whereby one fears harm to one’s own man fear regards a punishment which turns man away person. from God, and which God’s enemies sometimes inflict or On the contrary stands the authority of the Master threaten: whereas servile and initial fear regard a pun- (Sent. iii, D, 34). ishment whereby men are drawn to God, and which is I answer that, We are speaking of fear now, in so far inflicted or threatened by God. Servile fear regards this as it makes us turn, so to speak, to God or away from Him. punishment chiefly, while initial fear regards it secondar- For, since the object of fear is an evil, sometimes, on ac- ily. count of the evils he fears, man withdraws from God, and Reply to Objection 5. It amounts to the same whether this is called human fear; while sometimes, on account of man turns away from God through fear of losing his the evils he fears, he turns to God and adheres to Him. worldly goods, or through fear of forfeiting the well-being This latter evil is twofold, viz. evil of punishment, and of his body, since external goods belong to the body. evil of fault. Hence both these fears are reckoned as one here, although Accordingly if a man turn to God and adhere to Him, they fear different evils, even as they correspond to the de- through fear of punishment, it will be servile fear; but if it sire of different goods. This diversity causes a specific di- be on account of fear of committing a fault, it will be fil- versity of sins, all of which alike however lead man away ial fear, for it becomes a child to fear offending its father. from God. If, however, it be on account of both, it will be initial fear, 1276 Whether worldly fear is always evil? IIa IIae q. 19 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that worldly fear is not is wealth, wherefore covetousness is rightly described as always evil. Because regard for men seems to be a kind of the desire or the love of wealth, and this is evil. Accord- human fear. Now some are blamed for having no regard ingly worldly love is, properly speaking, the love whereby for man, for instance, the unjust judge of whom we read a man trusts in the world as his end, so that worldly love is (Lk. 18:2) that he “feared not God, nor regarded man.” always evil. Now fear is born of love, since man fears the Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always evil. loss of what he loves, as Augustine states (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. Objection 2. Further, worldly fear seems to have ref- 33). Now worldly fear is that which arises from worldly erence to the punishments inflicted by the secular power. love as from an evil root, for which reason worldly fear is Now such like punishments incite us to good actions, ac- always evil. cording to Rom. 13:3, “Wilt thou not be afraid of the Reply to Objection 1. One may have regard for men power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise in two ways. First in so far as there is in them something from the same.” Therefore worldly fear is not always evil. divine, for instance, the good of grace or of virtue, or at Objection 3. Further, it seems that what is in us nat- least of the natural image of God: and in this way those urally, is not evil, since our natural gifts are from God. are blamed who have no regard for man. Secondly, one Now it is natural to man to fear detriment to his body, and may have regard for men as being in opposition to God, loss of his worldly goods, whereby the present life is sup- and thus it is praiseworthy to have no regard for men, ac- ported. Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always cording as we read of Elias or Eliseus (Ecclus. 48:13): “In evil. his days he feared not the prince.” On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 10:28): “Fear Reply to Objection 2. When the secular power in- ye not them that kill the body,” thus forbidding worldly flicts punishment in order to withdraw men from sin, it is fear. Now nothing but what is evil is forbidden by God. acting as God’s minister, according to Rom. 13:4, “For he Therefore worldly fear is evil. is God’s minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him I answer that, As shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 3; that doth evil.” To fear the secular power in this way is Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 2) moral acts and part, not of worldly fear, but of servile or initial fear. habits take their name and species from their objects. Now Reply to Objection 3. It is natural for man to shrink the proper object of the appetite’s movement is the final from detriment to his own body and loss of worldly goods, good: so that, in consequence, every appetitive movement but to forsake justice on that account is contrary to natu- is both specified and named from its proper end. For if ral reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that anyone were to describe covetousness as love of work be- there are certain things, viz. sinful deeds, which no fear cause men work on account of covetousness, this descrip- should drive us to do, since to do such things is worse than tion would be incorrect, since the covetous man seeks to suffer any punishment whatever. work not as end but as a means: the end that he seeks Whether servile fear is good? IIa IIae q. 19 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that servile fear is not opposed to chaste fear. But mercenary love is always evil. good. For if the use of a thing is evil, the thing itself is Therefore servile fear is also. evil. Now the use of servile fear is evil, for according to a On the contrary, Nothing evil is from the Holy Ghost. gloss on Rom. 8:15, “if a man do anything through fear, But servile fear is from the Holy Ghost, since a gloss on although the deed be good, it is not well done.” Therefore Rom. 8:15, “You have not received the spirit of bondage,” servile fear is not good. etc. says: “It is the one same spirit that bestows two fears, Objection 2. Further, no good grows from a sinful viz. servile and chaste fear.” Therefore servile fear is not root. Now servile fear grows from a sinful root, because evil. when commenting on Job 3:11, “Why did I not die in the I answer that, It is owing to its servility that servile womb?” Gregory says (Moral. iv, 25): “When a man fear may be evil. For servitude is opposed to freedom. dreads the punishment which confronts him for his sin Since, then, “what is free is cause of itself” (Metaph. i, and no longer loves the friendship of God which he has 2), a slave is one who does not act as cause of his own lost, his fear is born of pride, not of humility.” Therefore action, but as though moved from without. Now whoever servile fear is evil. does a thing through love, does it of himself so to speak, Objection 3. Further, just as mercenary love is op- because it is by his own inclination that he is moved to act: posed to the love of charity, so is servile fear, apparently, so that it is contrary to the very notion of servility that one 1277 should act from love. Consequently servile fear as such ject or end being directed to a further end. Consequently is contrary to charity: so that if servility were essential to servile fear is substantially good, but is servility is evil. fear, servile fear would be evil simply, even as adultery is Reply to Objection 1. This saying of Augustine is to evil simply, because that which makes it contrary to char- be applied to a man who does something through servile ity belongs to its very species. fear as such, so that he loves not justice, and fears nothing This servility, however, does not belong to the species but the punishment. of servile fear, even as neither does lifelessness to the Reply to Objection 2. Servile fear as to its substance species of lifeless faith. For the species of a moral habit is not born of pride, but its servility is, inasmuch as man or act is taken from the object. Now the object of servile is unwilling, by love, to subject his affections to the yoke fear is punishment, and it is by accident that, either the of justice. good to which the punishment is contrary, is loved as the Reply to Objection 3. Mercenary love is that last end, and that consequently the punishment is feared whereby God is loved for the sake of worldly goods, and as the greatest evil, which is the case with one who is de- this is, of itself, contrary to charity, so that mercenary love void of charity, or that the punishment is directed to God is always evil. But servile fear, as to its substance, implies as its end, and that, consequently, it is not feared as the merely fear of punishment, whether or not this be feared greatest evil, which is the case with one who has charity. as the principal evil. For the species of a habit is not destroyed through its ob- Whether servile fear is substantially the same as filial fear? IIa IIae q. 19 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that servile fear is sub- Now the evil of punishment, from which servile fear stantially the same as filial fear. For filial fear is to servile shrinks, differs specifically from evil of fault, which fil-fear the same apparently as living faith is to lifeless faith, ial fear shuns, as shown above (a. 2). Hence it is evident since the one is accompanied by mortal sin and the other that servile and filial fear are not the same substantially not. Now living faith and lifeless faith are substantially but differ specifically. the same. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially Reply to Objection 1. Living and lifeless faith differ, the same. not as regards the object, since each of them believes God Objection 2. Further, habits are diversified by their and believes in a God, but in respect of something extrin- objects. Now the same thing is the object of servile and of sic, viz. the presence or absence of charity, and so they filial fear, since they both fear God. Therefore servile and do not differ substantially. On the other hand, servile and filial fear are substantially the same. filial fear differ as to their objects: and hence the compar- Objection 3. Further, just as man hopes to enjoy God ison fails. and to obtain favors from Him, so does he fear to be sep- Reply to Objection 2. Servile fear and filial fear do arated from God and to be punished by Him. Now it is not regard God in the same light. For servile fear looks the same hope whereby we hope to enjoy God, and to re- upon God as the cause of the infliction of punishment, ceive other favors from Him, as stated above (q. 17, a. 2, whereas filial fear looks upon Him, not as the active cause ad 2). Therefore filial fear, whereby we fear separation of guilt, but rather as the term wherefrom it shrinks to from God, is the same as servile fear whereby we fear His be separated by guilt. Consequently the identity of ob- punishments. ject, viz. God, does not prove a specific identity of fear, On the contrary, Augustine (In prim. canon. Joan. since also natural movements differ specifically accord- Tract. ix) says that there are two fears, one servile, an- ing to their different relationships to some one term, for other filial or chaste fear. movement from whiteness is not specifically the same as I answer that, The proper object of fear is evil. And movement towards whiteness. since acts and habits are diversified by their objects, as Reply to Objection 3. Hope looks upon God as the shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 2 ), it follows of necessity principle not only of the enjoyment of God, but also of that different kinds of fear correspond to different kinds any other favor whatever. This cannot be said of fear; and of evil. so there is no comparison. 1278 Whether servile fear remains with charity? IIa IIae q. 19 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that servile fear does not for the sake of God and in God. In a third way, it is indeed remain with charity. For Augustine says (In prim. canon. distinct from charity, but is not contrary thereto, as when Joan. Tract. ix) that “when charity takes up its abode, it a man loves himself from the point of view of his own drives away fear which had prepared a place for it.” good, yet not so as to place his end in this his own good: Objection 2. Further, “The charity of God is poured even as one may have another special love for one’s neigh- forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us” bor, besides the love of charity which is founded on God, (Rom. 5:5). Now “where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is when we love him by reason of usefulness, consanguin- liberty” (2 Cor. 3:17). Since then freedom excludes servi- ity, or some other human consideration, which, however, tude, it seems that servile fear is driven away when charity is referable to charity. comes. Accordingly fear of punishment is, in one way, in- Objection 3. Further, servile fear is caused by self- cluded in charity, because separation from God is a pun- love, in so far as punishment diminishes one’s own good. ishment, which charity shuns exceedingly; so that this be- Now love of God drives away self-love, for it makes us longs to chaste fear. In another way, it is contrary to char- despise ourselves: thus Augustine testifies (De Civ. Dei ity, when a man shrinks from the punishment that is op- xiv, 28) that “the love of God unto the contempt of self posed to his natural good, as being the principal evil in builds up the city of God.” Therefore it seems that servile opposition to the good which he loves as an end; and in fear is driven out when charity comes. this way fear of punishment is not consistent with charity. On the contrary, Servile fear is a gift of the Holy In another way fear of punishment is indeed substantially Ghost, as stated above (a. 4). Now the gifts of the Holy distinct from chaste fear, when, to wit, a man fears a penal Ghost are not forfeited through the advent of charity, evil, not because it separates him from God, but because whereby the Holy Ghost dwells in us. Therefore servile it is hurtful to his own good, and yet he does not place fear is not driven out when charity comes. his end in this good, so that neither does he dread this I answer that, Servile fear proceeds from self-love, evil as being the principal evil. Such fear of punishment because it is fear of punishment which is detrimental to is consistent with charity; but it is not called servile, ex- one’s own good. Hence the fear of punishment is consis- cept when punishment is dreaded as a principal evil, as ex- tent with charity, in the same way as self-love is: because plained above (Aa. 2,4). Hence fear considered as servile, it comes to the same that a man love his own good and does not remain with charity, but the substance of servile that he fear to be deprived of it. fear can remain with charity, even as self-love can remain Now self-love may stand in a threefold relationship to with charity. charity. In one way it is contrary to charity, when a man Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of fear places his end in the love of his own good. In another considered as servile: and such is the sense of the two way it is included in charity, when a man loves himself other objections. Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom? IIa IIae q. 19 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that fear is not the be- I answer that, A thing may be called the beginning of ginning of wisdom. For the beginning of a thing is a part wisdom in two ways: in one way because it is the begin- thereof. But fear is not a part of wisdom, since fear is ning of wisdom itself as to its essence; in another way, as seated in the appetitive faculty, while wisdom is in the in- to its effect. Thus the beginning of an art as to its essence tellect. Therefore it seems that fear is not the beginning of consists in the principles from which that art proceeds, wisdom. while the beginning of an art as to its effect is that where- Objection 2. Further, nothing is the beginning of it- from it begins to operate: for instance we might say that self. “Now fear of the Lord, that is wisdom,” according to the beginning of the art of building is the foundation be- Job 28:28. Therefore it seems that fear of God is not the cause that is where the builder begins his work. beginning of wisdom. Now, since wisdom is the knowledge of Divine things, Objection 3. Further, nothing is prior to the begin- as we shall state further on (q. 45, a. 1), it is considered by ning. But something is prior to fear, since faith precedes us in one way, and in another way by philosophers. For, fear. Therefore it seems that fear is not the beginning of seeing that our life is ordained to the enjoyment of God, wisdom. and is directed thereto according to a participation of the On the contrary, It is written in the Ps. 110:10: “The Divine Nature, conferred on us through grace, wisdom, as fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.” we look at it, is considered not only as being cognizant of 1279 God, as it is with the philosophers, but also as directing ning, man must first of all fear God and submit himself human conduct; since this is directed not only by the hu- to Him: for the result will be that in all things he will be man law, but also by the Divine law, as Augustine shows ruled by God. (De Trin. xii, 14). Accordingly the beginning of wisdom Reply to Objection 1. This argument proves that fear as to its essence consists in the first principles of wisdom, is not the beginning of wisdom as to the essence of wis- i.e. the articles of faith, and in this sense faith is said to dom. be the beginning of wisdom. But as regards the effect, the Reply to Objection 2. The fear of God is compared to beginning of wisdom is the point where wisdom begins a man’s whole life that is ruled by God’s wisdom, as the to work, and in this way fear is the beginning of wisdom, root to the tree: hence it is written (Ecclus. 1:25): “The yet servile fear in one way, and filial fear, in another. For root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, for [Vulg.: ‘and’] the servile fear is like a principle disposing a man to wisdom branches thereof are longlived.” Consequently, as the root from without, in so far as he refrains from sin through is said to be virtually the tree, so the fear of God is said to fear of punishment, and is thus fashioned for the effect of be wisdom. wisdom, according to Ecclus. 1:27, “The fear of the Lord Reply to Objection 3. As stated above, faith is the be- driveth out sin.” On the other hand, chaste or filial fear is ginning of wisdom in one way, and fear, in another. Hence the beginning of wisdom, as being the first effect of wis- it is written (Ecclus. 25:16): “The fear of God is the be- dom. For since the regulation of human conduct by the ginning of love: and the beginning of faith is to be fast Divine law belongs to wisdom, in order to make a begin- joined to it.” Whether initial fear differs substantially from filial fear? IIa IIae q. 19 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that initial fear differs they do not possess the perfection of filial fear, because substantially from filial fear. For filial fear is caused by they have not yet attained to the perfection of charity. love. Now initial fear is the beginning of love, according Consequently initial fear stands in the same relation to fil- to Ecclus. 25:16, “The fear of God is the beginning of ial fear as imperfect to perfect charity. Now perfect and love.” Therefore initial fear is distinct from filial fear. imperfect charity differ, not as to essence but as to state. Objection 2. Further, initial fear dreads punishment, Therefore we must conclude that initial fear, as we under- which is the object of servile fear, so that initial and servile stand it here, does not differ essentially from filial fear. fear would seem to be the same. But servile fear is distinct Reply to Objection 1. The fear which is a beginning from filial fear. Therefore initial fear also is substantially of love is servile fear, which is the herald of charity, just distinct from initial fear. as the bristle introduces the thread, as Augustine states Objection 3. Further, a mean differs in the same ratio (Tract. ix in Ep. i Joan.). Or else, if it be referred to initial from both the extremes. Now initial fear is the mean be-fear, this is said to be the beginning of love, not absolutely, tween servile and filial fear. Therefore it differs from both but relatively to the state of perfect charity. filial and servile fear. Reply to Objection 2. Initial fear does not dread pun- On the contrary, Perfect and imperfect do not diver- ishment as its proper object, but as having something of sify the substance of a thing. Now initial and filial fear servile fear connected with it: for this servile fear, as to its differ in respect of perfection and imperfection of char-substance, remains indeed, with charity, its servility being ity, as Augustine states (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix). cast aside; whereas its act remains with imperfect char- Therefore initial fear does not differ substantially from fil- ity in the man who is moved to perform good actions not ial fear. only through love of justice, but also through fear of pun- I answer that, Initial fear is so called because it is a ishment, though this same act ceases in the man who has beginning [initium]. Since, however, both servile and fil- perfect charity, which “casteth out fear,” according to 1 ial fear are, in some way, the beginning of wisdom, each Jn. 4:18. may be called in some way, initial. Reply to Objection 3. Initial fear is a mean between It is not in this sense, however, that we are to under- servile and filial fear, not as between two things of the stand initial fear in so far as it is distinct from servile and same genus, but as the imperfect is a mean between a per-filial fear, but in the sense according to which it belongs fect being and a non-being, as stated in Metaph. ii, for it is to the state of beginners, in whom there is a beginning of the same substantially as the perfect being, while it differs filial fear resulting from a beginning of charity, although altogether from non-being. 1280 Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost? IIa IIae q. 19 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that fear is not a gift of to be amenable to the motion of a certain mover, the first the Holy Ghost. For no gift of the Holy Ghost is opposed condition required is that it be a non-resistant subject of to a virtue, which is also from the Holy Ghost; else the that mover, because resistance of the movable subject to Holy Ghost would be in opposition to Himself. Now fear the mover hinders the movement. This is what filial or is opposed to hope, which is a virtue. Therefore fear is not chaste fear does, since thereby we revere God and avoid a gift of the Holy Ghost. separating ourselves from Him. Hence, according to Au- Objection 2. Further, it is proper to a theological gustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) filial fear holds the virtue to have God for its object. But fear has God for first place, as it were, among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, its object, in so far as God is feared. Therefore fear is not in the ascending order, and the last place, in the descend- a gift, but a theological virtue. ing order. Objection 3. Further, fear arises from love. But love Reply to Objection 1. Filial fear is not opposed to is reckoned a theological virtue. Therefore fear also is a the virtue of hope: since thereby we fear, not that we may theological virtue, being connected with the same matter, fail of what we hope to obtain by God’s help, but lest we as it were. withdraw ourselves from this help. Wherefore filial fear Objection 4. Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) and hope cling together, and perfect one another. that “fear is bestowed as a remedy against pride.” But the Reply to Objection 2. The proper and principal ob- virtue of humility is opposed to pride. Therefore again, ject of fear is the evil shunned, and in this way, as stated fear is a kind of virtue. above (a. 1), God cannot be an object of fear. Yet He is, Objection 5. Further, the gifts are more perfect than in this way, the object of hope and the other theological the virtues, since they are bestowed in support of the virtues, since, by the virtue of hope, we trust in God’s virtues as Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49). Now hope is more help, not only to obtain any other goods, but, chiefly, to perfect than fear, since hope regards good, while fear re- obtain God Himself, as the principal good. The same evi- gards evil. Since, then, hope is a virtue, it should not be dently applies to the other theological virtues. said that fear is a gift. Reply to Objection 3. From the fact that love is the On the contrary, The fear of the Lord is numbered origin of fear, it does not follow that the fear of God is among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost (Is. 11:3). not a distinct habit from charity which is the love of God, I answer that, Fear is of several kinds, as stated above since love is the origin of all the emotions, and yet we are (a. 2). Now it is not “human fear,” according to Augustine perfected by different habits in respect of different emo- (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. xviii), “that is a gift of God”—for tions. Yet love is more of a virtue than fear is, because it was by this fear that Peter denied Christ—but that fear love regards good, to which virtue is principally directed of which it was said (Mat. 10:28): “Fear Him that can by reason of its own nature, as was shown above ( Ia IIae, destroy both soul and body into hell.” q. 55, Aa. 3,4); for which reason hope is also reckoned as Again servile fear is not to be reckoned among the a virtue; whereas fear principally regards evil, the avoid- seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, though it is from Him, be- ance of which it denotes, wherefore it is something less cause according to Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lvii) it than a theological virtue. is compatible with the will to sin: whereas the gifts of Reply to Objection 4. According to Ecclus. 10:14, the Holy Ghost are incompatible with the will to sin, as “the beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God,” they are inseparable from charity, as stated above ( Ia IIae, that is to refuse submission to God, and this is opposed q. 68, a. 5). to filial fear, which reveres God. Thus fear cuts off the It follows, therefore, that the fear of God, which is source of pride for which reason it is bestowed as a rem- numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, is fil- edy against pride. Yet it does not follow that it is the same ial or chaste fear. For it was stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, as the virtue of humility, but that it is its origin. For the Aa. 1,3) that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are certain ha- gifts of the Holy Ghost are the origin of the intellectual bitual perfections of the soul’s powers, whereby these are and moral virtues, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 4), rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost, just while the theological virtues are the origin of the gifts, as as, by the moral virtues, the appetitive powers are ren- stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 69, a. 4, ad 3). dered amenable to the motion of reason. Now for a thing This suffices for the Reply to the Fifth Objection. 1281 Whether fear decreases when charity increases? IIa IIae q. 19 a. 10 Objection 1. It seems that fear decreases when char- is entirely cast out when charity comes, although the fear ity increases. For Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. of punishment remains as to its substance, as stated above Tract. ix): “The more charity increases, the more fear de- (a. 6). This fear decreases as charity increases, chiefly as creases.” regards its act, since the more a man loves God, the less Objection 2. Further, fear decreases when hope in- he fears punishment; first, because he thinks less of his creases. But charity increases when hope increases, as own good, to which punishment is opposed; secondly, be- stated above (q. 17, a. 8). Therefore fear decreases when cause, the faster he clings, the more confident he is of the charity increases. reward, and, consequently the less fearful of punishment. Objection 3. Further, love implies union, whereas Reply to Objection 1. Augustine speaks there of the fear implies separation. Now separation decreases when fear of punishment. union increases. Therefore fear decreases when the love Reply to Objection 2. It is fear of punishment that of charity increases. decreases when hope increases; but with the increase of On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. the latter filial fear increases, because the more certainly a 36) that “the fear of God not only begins but also perfects man expects to obtain a good by another’s help, the more wisdom, whereby we love God above all things, and our he fears to offend him or to be separated from him. neighbor as ourselves.” Reply to Objection 3. Filial fear does not imply sep- I answer that, Fear is twofold, as stated above aration from God, but submission to Him, and shuns sep- (Aa. 2,4); one is filial fear, whereby a son fears to offend aration from that submission. Yet, in a way, it implies his father or to be separated from him; the other is servile separation, in the point of not presuming to equal oneself fear, whereby one fears punishment. to Him, and of submitting to Him, which separation is to Now filial fear must needs increase when charity in- be observed even in charity, in so far as a man loves God creases, even as an effect increases with the increase of its more than himself and more than aught else. Hence the cause. For the more one loves a man, the more one fears increase of the love of charity implies not a decrease but to offend him and to be separated from him. an increase in the reverence of fear. On the other hand servile fear, as regards its servility, Whether fear remains in heaven? IIa IIae q. 19 a. 11 Objection 1. It would seem that fear does not remain perfect; hence, in heaven, it will not have quite the same in heaven. For it is written (Prov. 1:33): “He. . . shall enjoy act as it has now. abundance, without fear of evils,” which is to be under- In order to make this clear, we must observe that the stood as referring to those who already enjoy wisdom in proper object of fear is a possible evil, just as the proper everlasting happiness. Now every fear is about some evil, object of hope is a possible good: and since the movement since evil is the object of fear, as stated above (Aa. 2,5; Ia of fear is like one of avoidance, fear implies avoidance of IIae, q. 42, a. 1). Therefore there will be no fear in heaven. a possible arduous evil, for little evils inspire no fear. Now Objection 2. Further, in heaven men will be con- as a thing’s good consists in its staying in its own order, formed to God, according to 1 Jn. 3:2, “When He shall so a thing’s evil consists in forsaking its order. Again, the appear, we shall be like to Him.” But God fears nothing. order of a rational creature is that it should be under God Therefore, in heaven, men will have no fear. and above other creatures. Hence, just as it is an evil for a Objection 3. Further, hope is more perfect than fear, rational creature to submit, by love, to a lower creature, so since hope regards good, and fear, evil. Now hope will too is it an evil for it, if it submit not to God, by presump- not be in heaven. Therefore neither will there be fear in tuously revolt against Him or contemn Him. Now this heaven. evil is possible to a rational creature considered as to its On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:10): “The fear nature on account of the natural flexibility of the free-will; of the Lord is holy, enduring for ever and ever.” whereas in the blessed, it becomes impossible, by reason I answer that, Servile fear, or fear of punishment, will of the perfection of glory. Therefore the avoidance of this by no means be in heaven, since such a fear is excluded evil that consists in non-subjection to God, and is possi- by the security which is essential to everlasting happiness, ble to nature, but impossible in the state of bliss, will be as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 5, a. 4). in heaven; while in this life there is avoidance of this evil But regard to filial fear, as it increases with the in- as of something altogether possible. Hence Gregory, ex- crease of charity, so is it perfected when charity is made pounding the words of Job (26:11), “The pillars of heaven 1282 tremble, and dread at His beck,” says (Moral. xvii, 29): from the blessed, the fear that denotes solicitude, and anx- “The heavenly powers that gaze on Him without ceasing, iety about evil, but not the fear which is accompanied by tremble while contemplating: but their awe, lest it should security. be of a penal nature, is one not of fear but of wonder,” Reply to Objection 2. As Dionysius says (Div. because, to wit, they wonder at God’s supereminence and Nom. ix) “the same things are both like and unlike God. incomprehensibility. Augustine also (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) They are like by reason of a variable imitation of the in this sense, admits fear in heaven, although he leaves the Inimitable”—that is, because, so far as they can, they imi- question doubtful. “If,” he says, “this chaste fear that en- tate God Who cannot be imitated perfectly—“they are un- dureth for ever and ever is to be in the future life, it will like because they are the effects of a Cause of Whom they not be a fear that is afraid of an evil which might possibly fall short infinitely and immeasurably.” Hence, if there be occur, but a fear that holds fast to a good which we cannot no fear in God (since there is none above Him to whom He lose. For when we love the good which we have acquired, may be subject) it does not follow that there is none in the with an unchangeable love, without doubt, if it is allow- blessed, whose happiness consists in perfect subjection to able to say so, our fear is sure of avoiding evil. Because God. chaste fear denotes a will that cannot consent to sin, and Reply to Objection 3. Hope implies a certain defect, whereby we avoid sin without trembling lest, in our weak- namely the futurity of happiness, which ceases when hap- ness, we fall, and possess ourselves in the tranquillity born piness is present: whereas fear implies a natural defect in of charity. Else, if no kind of fear is possible there, per- a creature, in so far as it is infinitely distant from God, and haps fear is said to endure for ever and ever, because that this defect will remain even in heaven. Hence fear will not which fear will lead us to, will be everlasting.” be cast out altogether. Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted excludes Whether poverty of spirit is the beatitude corresponding to the gift of fear? IIa IIae q. 19 a. 12 Objection 1. It would seem that poverty of spirit is of whom it is said: Blessed are the poor in spirit.” not the beatitude corresponding to the gift of fear. For I answer that, Poverty of spirit properly corresponds fear is the beginning of the spiritual life, as explained to fear. Because, since it belongs to filial fear to show rev- above (a. 7): whereas poverty belongs to the perfection erence and submission to God, whatever results from this of the spiritual life, according to Mat. 19:21, “If thou wilt submission belongs to the gift of fear. Now from the very be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and give to the poor.” fact that a man submits to God, it follows that he ceases Therefore poverty of spirit does not correspond to the gift to seek greatness either in himself or in another but seeks of fear. it only in God. For that would be inconsistent with per- Objection 2. Further, it is written (Ps. 118:120): fect subjection to God, wherefore it is written (Ps. 19:8): “Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear,” whence it seems “Some trust in chariots and some in horses; but we will to follow that it belongs to fear to restrain the flesh. But call upon the name of. . . our God.” It follows that if a man the curbing of the flesh seems to belong rather to the beat- fear God perfectly, he does not, by pride, seek greatness itude of mourning. Therefore the beatitude of mourning either in himself or in external goods, viz. honors and corresponds to the gift of fear, rather than the beatitude of riches. In either case, this proceeds from poverty of spirit, poverty. in so far as the latter denotes either the voiding of a puffed Objection 3. Further, the gift of fear corresponds to up and proud spirit, according to Augustine’s interpreta- the virtue of hope, as stated above (a. 9, ad 1). Now the tion (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4), or the renunciation last beatitude which is, “Blessed are the peacemakers, for of worldly goods which is done in spirit, i.e. by one’s own they shall be called the children of God,” seems above all will, through the instigation of the Holy Spirit, according to correspond to hope, because according to Rom. 5:2, to the expounding of Ambrose on Lk. 6:20 and Jerome on “we. . . glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God.” Mat. 5:3. Therefore that beatitude corresponds to the gift of fear, Reply to Objection 1. Since a beatitude is an act of rather than poverty of spirit. perfect virtue, all the beatitudes belong to the perfection Objection 4. Further, it was stated above ( Ia IIae, of spiritual life. And this perfection seems to require that q. 70, a. 2) that the fruits correspond to the beatitudes. whoever would strive to obtain a perfect share of spir- Now none of the fruits correspond to the gift of fear. Nei- itual goods, needs to begin by despising earthly goods, ther, therefore, does any of the beatitudes. wherefore fear holds the first place among the gifts. Per- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in fection, however, does not consist in the renunciation it- Monte i, 4): “The fear of the Lord is befitting the humble self of temporal goods; since this is the way to perfection: 1283 whereas filial fear, to which the beatitude of poverty cor-Reply to Objection 3. Hope denotes a movement by responds, is consistent with the perfection of wisdom, as way of a relation of tendency to a term, whereas fear im- stated above (Aa. 7,10). plies movement by way of a relation of withdrawal from Reply to Objection 2. The undue exaltation of man a term: wherefore the last beatitude which is the term of either in himself or in another is more directly opposed to spiritual perfection, fittingly corresponds to hope, by way that submission to God which is the result of filial fear, of ultimate object; while the first beatitude, which implies than is external pleasure. Yet this is, in consequence, op- withdrawal from external things which hinder submission posed to fear, since whoever fears God and is subject to to God, fittingly corresponds to fear. Him, takes no delight in things other than God. Neverthe- Reply to Objection 4. As regards the fruits, it seems less, pleasure is not concerned, as exaltation is, with the that those things correspond to the gift of fear, which arduous character of a thing which fear regards: and so pertain to the moderate use of temporal things or to ab- the beatitude of poverty corresponds to fear directly, and stinence therefrom; such are modesty, continency and the beatitude of mourning, consequently. chastity. 1284 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 20 Of Despair (In Four Articles) We must now consider the contrary vices; (1) despair; (2) presumption. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether despair is a sin? (2) Whether it can be without unbelief? (3) Whether it is the greatest of sins? (4) Whether it arises from sloth? Whether despair is a sin? IIa IIae q. 20 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that despair is not a sin. in conformity with the true opinion, is praiseworthy and For every sin includes conversion to a mutable good, to- virtuous, so the contrary movement of despair, which is gether with aversion from the immutable good, as Augus- in conformity with the false opinion about God, is vicious tine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). But despair includes no and sinful. conversion to a mutable good. Therefore it is not a sin. Reply to Objection 1. In every mortal sin there is, in Objection 2. Further, that which grows from a good some way, aversion from the immutable good, and conver- root, seems to be no sin, because “a good tree cannot bring sion to a mutable good, but not always in the same way. forth evil fruit” (Mat. 7:18). Now despair seems to grow Because, since the theological virtues have God for their from a good root, viz. fear of God, or from horror at the object, the sins which are contrary to them, such as hatred greatness of one’s own sins. Therefore despair is not a sin. of God, despair and unbelief, consist principally in aver- Objection 3. Further, if despair were a sin, it would sion from the immutable good; but, consequently, they be a sin also for the damned to despair. But this is not im- imply conversion to a mutable good, in so far as the soul puted to them as their fault but as part of their damnation. that is a deserter from God, must necessarily turn to other Therefore neither is it imputed to wayfarers as their fault, things. Other sins, however, consist principally in con- so that it is not a sin. version to a mutable good, and, consequently, in aversion On the contrary, That which leads men to sin, seems from the immutable good: because the fornicator intends, not only to be a sin itself, but a source of sins. Now such is not to depart from God, but to enjoy carnal pleasure, the despair, for the Apostle says of certain men (Eph. 4:19): result of which is that he departs from God. “Who, despairing, have given themselves up to lascivi- Reply to Objection 2. A thing may grow from a virtu- ousness, unto the working of all uncleanness and [Vulg.: ous root in two ways: first, directly and on the part of the ‘unto’] covetousness.” Therefore despair is not only a sin virtue itself; even as an act proceeds from a habit: and in but also the origin of other sins. this way no sin can grow from a virtuous root, for in this I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. sense Augustine declared (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) that “no vi, 2) affirmation and negation in the intellect correspond man makes evil use of virtue.” Secondly, a thing proceeds to search and avoidance in the appetite; while truth and from a virtue indirectly, or is occasioned by a virtue, and falsehood in the intellect correspond to good and evil in in this way nothing hinders a sin proceeding from a virtue: the appetite. Consequently every appetitive movement thus sometimes men pride themselves of their virtues, ac- which is conformed to a true intellect, is good in itself, cording to Augustine (Ep. ccxi): “Pride lies in wait for while every appetitive movement which is conformed to good works that they may die.” In this way fear of God a false intellect is evil in itself and sinful. Now the true or horror of one’s own sins may lead to despair, in so far opinion of the intellect about God is that from Him comes as man makes evil use of those good things, by allowing salvation to mankind, and pardon to sinners, according to them to be an occasion of despair. Ezech. 18:23, “I desire not the death of the sinner, but Reply to Objection 3. The damned are outside the that he should be converted, and live”∗: while it is a false pale of hope on account of the impossibility of returning opinion that He refuses pardon to the repentant sinner, or to happiness: hence it is not imputed to them that they that He does not turn sinners to Himself by sanctifying hope not, but it is a part of their damnation. Even so, grace. Therefore, just as the movement of hope, which is it would be no sin for a wayfarer to despair of obtaining ∗ Vulg.: ‘Is it My will that a sinner should die. . . and not that he should be converted and live?’ Cf. Ezech. 33:11 1285 that which he had no natural capacity for obtaining, or a physician were to despair of healing some sick man, or which was not due to be obtained by him; for instance, if if anyone were to despair of ever becoming rich. Whether there can be despair without unbelief? IIa IIae q. 20 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that there can be no de- as it is impossible to infer a particular conclusion from an spair without unbelief. For the certainty of hope is derived universal proposition, except through the holding of a par- from faith; and so long as the cause remains the effect is ticular proposition. Hence it is that a man, while having not done away. Therefore a man cannot lose the certainty right faith, in the universal, fails in an appetitive move- of hope, by despairing, unless his faith be removed. ment, in regard to some particular, his particular estimate Objection 2. Further, to prefer one’s own guilt to being corrupted by a habit or a passion, just as the forni- God’s mercy and goodness, is to deny the infinity of God’s cator, by choosing fornication as a good for himself at this goodness and mercy, and so savors of unbelief. But who- particular moment, has a corrupt estimate in a particular ever despairs, prefers his own guilt to the Divine mercy matter, although he retains the true universal estimate ac- and goodness, according to Gn. 4:13: “My iniquity is cording to faith, viz. that fornication is a mortal sin. In greater than that I may deserve pardon.” Therefore who- the same way, a man while retaining in the universal, the ever despairs, is an unbeliever. true estimate of faith, viz. that there is in the Church the Objection 3. Further, whoever falls into a condemned power of forgiving sins, may suffer a movement of de- heresy, is an unbeliever. But he that despairs seems to fall spair, to wit, that for him, being in such a state, there is no into a condemned heresy, viz. that of the Novatians, who hope of pardon, his estimate being corrupted in a particu- say that there is no pardon for sins after Baptism. There- lar matter. In this way there can be despair, just as there fore it seems that whoever despairs, is an unbeliever. can be other mortal sins, without belief. On the contrary, If we remove that which follows, Reply to Objection 1. The effect is done away, not that which precedes remains. But hope follows faith, as only when the first cause is removed, but also when the stated above (q. 17, a. 7). Therefore when hope is re- secondary cause is removed. Hence the movement of moved, faith can remain; so that, not everyone who de- hope can be done away, not only by the removal of the spairs, is an unbeliever. universal estimate of faith, which is, so to say, the first I answer that, Unbelief pertains to the intellect, but cause of the certainty of hope, but also by the removal of despair, to the appetite: and the intellect is about univer- the particular estimate, which is the secondary cause, as it sals, while the appetite is moved in connection with par- were. ticulars, since the appetitive movement is from the soul Reply to Objection 2. If anyone were to judge, in towards things, which, in themselves, are particular. Now universal, that God’s mercy is not infinite, he would be it may happen that a man, while having a right opinion an unbeliever. But he who despairs judges not thus, but in the universal, is not rightly disposed as to his appeti- that, for him in that state, on account of some particular tive movement, his estimate being corrupted in a partic- disposition, there is no hope of the Divine mercy. ular matter, because, in order to pass from the universal The same answer applies to the Third Objection, since opinion to the appetite for a particular thing, it is neces- the Novatians denied, in universal, that there is remission sary to have a particular estimate (De Anima iii, 2), just of sins in the Church. Whether despair is the greatest of sins? IIa IIae q. 20 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that despair is not the Objection 3. Further, in the sin of despair there is greatest of sins. For there can be despair without unbe- nothing but inordinate aversion from God: whereas in lief, as stated above (a. 2). But unbelief is the greatest of other sins there is not only inordinate aversion from God, sins because it overthrows the foundation of the spiritual but also an inordinate conversion. Therefore the sin of edifice. Therefore despair is not the greatest of sins. despair is not more but less grave than other sins. Objection 2. Further, a greater evil is opposed to On the contrary, An incurable sin seems to be most a greater good, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, grievous, according to Jer. 30:12: “Thy bruise is incur- 10). But charity is greater than hope, according to 1 Cor. able, thy wound is very grievous.” Now the sin of despair 13:13. Therefore hatred of God is a greater sin than de- is incurable, according to Jer. 15:18: “My wound is des- spair. perate so as to refuse to be healed.”∗ Therefore despair is ∗ Vulg.: ‘Why is my wound,’ etc. 1286 a most grievous sin. share of God’s goodness. Hence it is clear that unbelief I answer that, Those sins which are contrary to the and hatred of God are against God as He is in Himself, theological virtues are in themselves more grievous than while despair is against Him, according as His good is others: because, since the theological virtues have God partaken of by us. Wherefore strictly speaking it is more for their object, the sins which are opposed to them imply grievous sin to disbelieve God’s truth, or to hate God, than aversion from God directly and principally. Now every not to hope to receive glory from Him. mortal sin takes its principal malice and gravity from the If, however, despair be compared to the other two sins fact of its turning away from God, for if it were possi- from our point of view, then despair is more dangerous, ble to turn to a mutable good, even inordinately, without since hope withdraws us from evils and induces us to seek turning away from God, it would not be a mortal sin. Con- for good things, so that when hope is given up, men rush sequently a sin which, first and of its very nature, includes headlong into sin, and are drawn away from good works. aversion from God, is most grievous among mortal sins. Wherefore a gloss on Prov. 24:10, “If thou lose hope be- Now unbelief, despair and hatred of God are opposed ing weary in the day of distress, thy strength shall be di- to the theological virtues: and among them, if we compare minished,” says: “Nothing is more hateful than despair, hatred of God and unbelief to despair, we shall find that, for the man that has it loses his constancy both in the ev- in themselves, that is, in respect of their proper species, ery day toils of this life, and, what is worse, in the battle they are more grievous. For unbelief is due to a man not of faith.” And Isidore says (De Sum. Bono ii, 14): “To believing God’s own truth; while the hatred of God arises commit a crime is to kill the soul, but to despair is to fall from man’s will being opposed to God’s goodness itself; into hell.” whereas despair consists in a man ceasing to hope for a Whether despair arises from sloth? IIa IIae q. 20 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that despair does not arise goods of no great account, is chiefly due to our affections from sloth. Because different causes do not give rise to being infected with the love of bodily pleasures, among one same effect. Now despair of the future life arises from which, sexual pleasures hold the first place: for the love lust, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore it of those pleasures leads man to have a distaste for spiri- does not arise from sloth. tual things, and not to hope for them as arduous goods. In Objection 2. Further, just as despair is contrary to this way despair is caused by lust. hope, so is sloth contrary to spiritual joy. But spiritual joy On the other hand, the fact that a man deems an ar- arises from hope, according to Rom. 12:12, “rejoicing in duous good impossible to obtain, either by himself or by hope.” Therefore sloth arises from despair, and not vice another, is due to his being over downcast, because when versa. this state of mind dominates his affections, it seems to him Objection 3. Further, contrary effects have contrary that he will never be able to rise to any good. And since causes. Now hope, the contrary of which is despair, seems sloth is a sadness that casts down the spirit, in this way to proceed from the consideration of Divine favors, espe- despair is born of sloth. cially the Incarnation, for Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, Now this is the proper object of hope—that the thing 10): “Nothing was so necessary to raise our hope, than is possible, because the good and the arduous regard other that we should be shown how much God loves us. Now passions also. Hence despair is born of sloth in a more what greater proof could we have of this than that God’s special way: though it may arise from lust, for the reason Son should deign to unite Himself to our nature?” There- given above. fore despair arises rather from the neglect of the above This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. consideration than from sloth. Reply to Objection 2. According to the Philosopher On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons (Rhet. i, 11), just as hope gives rise to joy, so, when a man despair among the effects of sloth. is joyful he has greater hope: and, accordingly, those who I answer that, As stated above (q. 17, a. 1; Ia IIae, are sorrowful fall the more easily into despair, according q. 40, a. 1), the object of hope is a good, difficult but pos- to 2 Cor. 2:7: “Lest. . . such an one be swallowed up by sible to obtain by oneself or by another. Consequently the overmuch sorrow.” Yet, since the object of hope is good, hope of obtaining happiness may be lacking in a person to which the appetite tends naturally, and which it shuns, in two ways: first, through his not deeming it an arduous not naturally but only on account of some supervening good; secondly, through his deeming it impossible to ob- obstacle, it follows that, more directly, hope gives birth to tain either by himself, or by another. Now, the fact that joy, while on the contrary despair is born of sorrow. spiritual goods taste good to us no more, or seem to be Reply to Objection 3. This very neglect to consider 1287 the Divine favors arises from sloth. For when a man is is full of sorrow does not easily think of great and joyful influenced by a certain passion he considers chiefly the things, but only of sad things, unless by a great effort he things which pertain to that passion: so that a man who turn his thoughts away from sadness. 1288 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 21 Of Presumption (In Four Articles) We must now consider presumption, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What is the object in which presumption trusts? (2) Whether presumption is a sin? (3) To what is it opposed? (4) From what vice does it arise? Whether presumption trusts in God or in our own power? IIa IIae q. 21 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that presumption, which relies on his own power, there is presumption if he tends is a sin against the Holy Ghost, trusts, not in God, but to a good as though it were possible to him, whereas it sur- in our own power. For the lesser the power, the more passes his powers, according to Judith 6:15: “Thou hum- grievously does he sin who trusts in it too much. But blest them that presume of themselves.” This presumption man’s power is less than God’s. Therefore it is a more is contrary to the virtue of magnanimity which holds to the grievous sin to presume on human power than to presume mean in this kind of hope. on the power of God. Now the sin against the Holy Ghost But as to the hope whereby a man relies on the power is most grievous. Therefore presumption, which is reck- of God, there may be presumption through immoderation, oned a species of sin against the Holy Ghost, trusts to hu- in the fact that a man tends to some good as though it were man rather than to Divine power. possible by the power and mercy of God, whereas it is Objection 2. Further, other sins arise from the sin not possible, for instance, if a man hope to obtain pardon against the Holy Ghost, for this sin is called malice which without repenting, or glory without merits. This presump- is a source from which sins arise. Now other sins seem tion is, properly, the sin against the Holy Ghost, because, to arise from the presumption whereby man presumes on to wit, by presuming thus a man removes or despises the himself rather than from the presumption whereby he pre- assistance of the Holy Spirit, whereby he is withdrawn sumes on God, since self-love is the origin of sin, accord- from sin. ing to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore it seems Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 20, a. 3; Ia that presumption which is a sin against the Holy Ghost, IIae, q. 73, a. 3) a sin which is against God is, in its genus, relies chiefly on human power. graver than other sins. Hence presumption whereby a man Objection 3. Further, sin arises from the inordinate relies on God inordinately, is a more grievous sin than the conversion to a mutable good. Now presumption is a sin. presumption of trusting in one’s own power, since to rely Therefore it arises from turning to human power, which is on the Divine power for obtaining what is unbecoming to a mutable good, rather than from turning to the power of God, is to depreciate the Divine power, and it is evident God, which is an immutable good. that it is a graver sin to detract from the Divine power than On the contrary, Just as, through despair, a man de- to exaggerate one’s own. spises the Divine mercy, on which hope relies, so, through Reply to Objection 2. The presumption whereby a presumption, he despises the Divine justice, which pun- man presumes inordinately on God, includes self-love, ishes the sinner. Now justice is in God even as mercy is. whereby he loves his own good inordinately. For when Therefore, just as despair consists in aversion from God, we desire a thing very much, we think we can easily pro- so presumption consists in inordinate conversion to Him. cure it through others, even though we cannot. I answer that, Presumption seems to imply immoder- Reply to Objection 3. Presumption on God’s mercy ate hope. Now the object of hope is an arduous possible implies both conversion to a mutable good, in so far as it good: and a thing is possible to a man in two ways: first arises from an inordinate desire of one’s own good, and by his own power; secondly, by the power of God alone. aversion from the immutable good, in as much as it as- With regard to either hope there may be presumption ow- cribes to the Divine power that which is unbecoming to it, ing to lack of moderation. As to the hope whereby a man for thus man turns away from God’s power. 1289 Whether presumption is a sin? IIa IIae q. 21 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that presumption is not to those who cease from good works: and it is to this esti- a sin. For no sin is a reason why man should be heard mate that the movement of presumption is conformed. by God. Yet, through presumption some are heard by Consequently presumption is a sin, but less grave than God, for it is written (Judith 9:17): “Hear me a poor despair, since, on account of His infinite goodness, it is wretch making supplication to Thee, and presuming of more proper to God to have mercy and to spare, than to Thy mercy.” Therefore presumption on God’s mercy is punish: for the former becomes God in Himself, the latter not a sin. becomes Him by reason of our sins. Objection 2. Further, presumption denotes excessive Reply to Objection 1. Presumption sometimes stands hope. But there cannot be excess of that hope which is in for hope, because even the right hope which we have in God, since His power and mercy are infinite. Therefore it God seems to be presumption, if it be measured according seems that presumption is not a sin. to man’s estate: yet it is not, if we look at the immensity Objection 3. Further, that which is a sin does not of the goodness of God. excuse from sin: for the Master says (Sent. ii, D, 22) Reply to Objection 2. Presumption does not denote that “Adam sinned less, because he sinned in the hope of excessive hope, as though man hoped too much in God; pardon,” which seems to indicate presumption. Therefore but through man hoping to obtain from God something presumption is not a sin. unbecoming to Him; which is the same as to hope too lit- On the contrary, It is reckoned a species of sin tle in Him, since it implies a depreciation of His power; against the Holy Ghost. as stated above (a. 1, ad 1). I answer that, As stated above (q. 20, a. 1) with regard Reply to Objection 3. To sin with the intention of per-to despair, every appetitive movement that is conformed severing in sin and through the hope of being pardoned, is to a false intellect, is evil in itself and sinful. Now pre- presumptuous, and this does not diminish, but increases sumption is an appetitive movement, since it denotes an sin. To sin, however, with the hope of obtaining pardon inordinate hope. Moreover it is conformed to a false intel- some time, and with the intention of refraining from sin lect, just as despair is: for just as it is false that God does and of repenting of it, is not presumptuous, but diminishes not pardon the repentant, or that He does not turn sinners sin, because this seems to indicate a will less hardened in to repentance, so is it false that He grants forgiveness to sin. those who persevere in their sins, and that He gives glory Whether presumption is more opposed to fear than to hope? IIa IIae q. 21 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that presumption is more another they are contrary to the same virtue, as timidity opposed to fear than to hope. Because inordinate fear is and audacity are opposed to fortitude. Now the sin of pre- opposed to right fear. Now presumption seems to pertain sumption is contrary to the sin of despair, which is directly to inordinate fear, for it is written (Wis. 17:10): “A trou- opposed to hope. Therefore it seems that presumption also bled conscience always presumes [Douay: ‘forecasteth’] is more directly opposed to hope. grievous things,” and (Wis. 17:11) that “fear is a help to I answer that, As Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, presumption∗.” Therefore presumption is opposed to fear 3), “every virtue not only has a contrary vice manifestly rather than to hope. distinct from it, as temerity is opposed to prudence, but Objection 2. Further, contraries are most distant from also a sort of kindred vice, alike, not in truth but only in its one another. Now presumption is more distant from fear deceitful appearance, as cunning is opposed to prudence.” than from hope, because presumption implies movement This agrees with the Philosopher who says (Ethic. ii, 8) to something, just as hope does, whereas fear denotes that a virtue seems to have more in common with one of movement from a thing. Therefore presumption is con- the contrary vices than with the other, as temperance with trary to fear rather than to hope. insensibility, and fortitude with audacity. Objection 3. Further, presumption excludes fear al- Accordingly presumption appears to be manifestly op- together, whereas it does not exclude hope altogether, but posed to fear, especially servile fear, which looks at the only the rectitude of hope. Since therefore contraries de- punishment arising from God’s justice, the remission of stroy one another, it seems that presumption is contrary to which presumption hopes for; yet by a kind of false like- fear rather than to hope. ness it is more opposed to hope, since it denotes an inor- On the contrary, When two vices are opposed to one dinate hope in God. And since things are more directly ∗ Vulg.: ‘Fear is nothing else but a yielding up of the succours from thought.’ 1290 opposed when they belong to the same genus, than when same genus, which can be either ordinate or inordinate. they belong to different genera, it follows that presump- Hence presumption is more directly opposed to hope than tion is more directly opposed to hope than to fear. For to fear, since it is opposed to hope in respect of its spe- they both regard and rely on the same object, hope inordi- cific difference, as an inordinate thing to an ordinate one, nately, presumption inordinately. whereas it is opposed to fear, in respect of its generic dif- Reply to Objection 1. Just as hope is misused in ference, which is the movement of hope. speaking of evils, and properly applied in speaking of Reply to Objection 3. Presumption is opposed to fear good, so is presumption: it is in this way that inordinate by a generic contrariety, and to the virtue of hope by a spe- fear is called presumption. cific contrariety. Hence presumption excludes fear alto- Reply to Objection 2. Contraries are things that are gether even generically, whereas it does not exclude hope most distant from one another within the same genus. except by reason of its difference, by excluding its ordi- Now presumption and hope denote a movement of the nateness. Whether presumption arises from vainglory? IIa IIae q. 21 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that presumption does not I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), presumption arise from vainglory. For presumption seems to rely most is twofold; one whereby a man relies on his own power, of all on the Divine mercy. Now mercy [misericordia] re- when he attempts something beyond his power, as though gards unhappiness [miseriam] which is contrary to glory. it were possible to him. Such like presumption clearly Therefore presumption does not arise from vainglory. arises from vainglory; for it is owing to a great desire Objection 2. Further, presumption is opposed to de- for glory, that a man attempts things beyond his power, spair. Now despair arises from sorrow, as stated above and especially novelties which call for greater admiration. (q. 20, a. 4, ad 2). Since therefore opposites have opposite Hence Gregory states explicitly that presumption of nov- causes, presumption would seem to arise from pleasure, elties is a daughter of vainglory. and consequently from sins of the flesh, which give the The other presumption is an inordinate trust in the Di- most absorbing pleasure. vine mercy or power, consisting in the hope of obtain- Objection 3. Further, the vice of presumption consists ing glory without merits, or pardon without repentance. in tending to some impossible good, as though it were Such like presumption seems to arise directly from pride, possible. Now it is owing to ignorance that one deems an as though man thought so much of himself as to esteem impossible thing to be possible. Therefore presumption that God would not punish him or exclude him from glory, arises from ignorance rather than from vainglory. however much he might be a sinner. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. “presumption of novelties is a daughter of vainglory.” 1291 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 22 Of the Precepts Relating to Hope and Fear (In Two Articles) We must now consider the precepts relating to hope and fear: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) The precepts relating to hope; (2) The precepts relating to fear. Whether there should be a precept of hope? IIa IIae q. 22 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that no precept should be Law: but, just as the precept of faith had to be given un- given relating to the virtue of hope. For when an effect der the form of an announcement or reminder, as stated is sufficiently procured by one cause, there is no need to above (q. 16, a. 1), so too, the precept of hope, in the first induce it by another. Now man is sufficiently induced by promulgation of the Law, had to be given under the form his natural inclination to hope for good. Therefore there is of a promise. For he who promises rewards to them that no need of a precept of the Law to induce him to do this. obey him, by that very fact, urges them to hope: hence Objection 2. Further, since precepts are given about all the promises contained in the Law are incitements to acts of virtue, the chief precepts are about the acts of the hope. chief virtues. Now the chief of all the virtues are the three Since, however, when once the Law has been given, it theological virtues, viz. hope, faith and charity. Conse- is for a wise man to induce men not only to observe the quently, as the chief precepts of the Law are those of the precepts, but also, and much more, to safeguard the foun- decalogue, to which all others may be reduced, as stated dation of the Law, therefore, after the first promulgation of above ( Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 3), it seems that if any precept of the Law, Holy Writ holds out to man many inducements hope were given, it should be found among the precepts of to hope, even by way of warning or command, and not the decalogue. But it is not to be found there. Therefore it merely by way of promise, as in the Law; for instance, in seems that the Law should contain no precept of hope. the Ps. 61:9: “Hope [Douay: ‘Trust’] in Him all ye con- Objection 3. Further, to prescribe an act of virtue is gregation of the people,” and in many other passages of equivalent to a prohibition of the act of the opposite vice. the Scriptures. Now no precept is to be found forbidding despair which is Reply to Objection 1. Nature inclines us to hope for contrary to hope. Therefore it seems that the Law should the good which is proportionate to human nature; but for contain no precept of hope. man to hope for a supernatural good he had to be induced On the contrary, Augustine says on Jn. 15:12, “This by the authority of the Divine law, partly by promises, is My commandment, that you love one another” (Tract. partly by admonitions and commands. Nevertheless there lxxxiii in Joan.): “How many things are commanded us was need for precepts of the Divine law to be given even about faith! How many relating to hope!” Therefore it is for those things to which natural reason inclines us, such fitting that some precepts should be given about hope. as the acts of the moral virtues, for sake of insuring a I answer that, Among the precepts contained in Holy greater stability, especially since the natural reason of man Writ, some belong to the substance of the Law, others are was clouded by the lusts of sin. preambles to the Law. The preambles to the Law are those Reply to Objection 2. The precepts of the law of the without which no law is possible: such are the precepts re- decalogue belong to the first promulgation of the Law: lating to the act of faith and the act of hope, because the hence there was no need for a precept of hope among the act of faith inclines man’s mind so that he believes the Au- precepts of the decalogue, and it was enough to induce thor of the Law to be One to Whom he owes submission, men to hope by the inclusion of certain promises, as in while, by the hope of a reward, he is induced to observe the case of the first and fourth commandments. the precepts. The precepts that belong to the substance Reply to Objection 3. In those observances to which of the Law are those which relate to right conduct and man is bound as under a duty, it is enough that he receive are imposed on man already subject and ready to obey: an affirmative precept as to what he has to do, wherein is wherefore when the Law was given these precepts were implied the prohibition of what he must avoid doing: thus set forth from the very outset under form of a command. he is given a precept concerning the honor due to parents, Yet the precepts of hope and faith were not to be given but not a prohibition against dishonoring them, except by under the form of a command, since, unless man already the law inflicting punishment on those who dishonor their believed and hoped, it would be useless to give him the parents. And since in order to be saved it is man’s duty to 1292 hope in God, he had to be induced to do so by one of the the prohibition of the opposite. above ways, affirmatively, so to speak, wherein is implied Whether there should have been given a precept of fear? IIa IIae q. 22 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that, in the Law, there secondary precepts of the Law. should not have been given a precept of fear. For the fear Yet, just as wise men and the prophets who, conse- of God is about things which are a preamble to the Law, quently, strove to strengthen man in the observance of the since it is the “beginning of wisdom.” Now things which Law, delivered their teaching about hope under the form are a preamble to the Law do not come under a precept of of admonition or command, so too did they in the matter the Law. Therefore no precept of fear should be given in of fear. the Law. On the other hand filial fear which shows reverence Objection 2. Further, given the cause, the effect is to God, is a sort of genus in respect of the love of God, also given. Now love is the cause of fear, since “every and a kind of principle of all observances connected with fear proceeds from some kind of love,” as Augustine states reverence for God. Hence precepts of filial fear are given (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Therefore given the precept of love, in the Law, even as precepts of love, because each is a it would have been superfluous to command fear. preamble to the external acts prescribed by the Law and Objection 3. Further, presumption, in a way, is op- to which the precepts of the decalogue refer. Hence in the posed to fear. But the Law contains no prohibition against passage quoted in the argument, “On the contrary,” man presumption. Therefore it seems that neither should any is required “to have fear, to walk in God’s ways,” by wor- precept of fear have been given. shipping Him, and “to love Him.” On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 10:12): “And now, Reply to Objection 1. Filial fear is a preamble to the Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that Law, not as though it were extrinsic thereto, but as being thou fear the Lord thy God?” But He requires of us that the beginning of the Law, just as love is. Hence precepts which He commands us to do. Therefore it is a matter of are given of both, since they are like general principles of precept that man should fear God. the whole Law. I answer that, Fear is twofold, servile and filial. Now Reply to Objection 2. From love proceeds filial just as man is induced, by the hope of rewards, to observe fear as also other good works that are done from char- precepts of law, so too is he induced thereto by the fear of ity. Hence, just as after the precept of charity, precepts punishment, which fear is servile. are given of the other acts of virtue, so at the same time And just as according to what has been said (a. 1), precepts are given of fear and of the love of charity, just in the promulgation of the Law there was no need for a as, in demonstrative sciences, it is not enough to lay down precept of the act of hope, and men were to be induced the first principles, unless the conclusions also are given thereto by promises, so neither was there need for a pre- which follow from them proximately or remotely. cept, under form of command, of fear which regards pun- Reply to Objection 3. Inducement to fear suffices to ishment, and men were to be induced thereto by the threat exclude presumption, even as inducement to hope suffices of punishment: and this was realized both in the precepts to exclude despair, as stated above (a. 1, ad 3). of the decalogue, and afterwards, in due sequence, in the 1293 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 23 Of Charity, Considered in Itself (In Eight Articles) In proper sequence, we must consider charity; and (1) charity itself; (2) the corresponding gift of wisdom. The first consideration will be fivefold: (1) Charity itself; (2) The object of charity; (3) Its acts; (4) The opposite vices; (5) The precepts relating thereto. The first of these considerations will be twofold: (1) Charity, considered as regards itself; (2) Charity, considered in its relation to its subject. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether charity is friendship? (2) Whether it is something created in the soul? (3) Whether it is a virtue? (4) Whether it is a special virtue? (5) Whether it is one virtue? (6) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues? (7) Whether any true virtue is possible without it? (8) Whether it is the form of the virtues? Whether charity is friendship? IIa IIae q. 23 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not friend- to wit, we love someone so as to wish good to him. If, ship. For nothing is so appropriate to friendship as to however, we do not wish good to what we love, but wish dwell with one’s friend, according to the Philosopher its good for ourselves, (thus we are said to love wine, or (Ethic. viii, 5). Now charity is of man towards God a horse, or the like), it is love not of friendship, but of a and the angels, “whose dwelling [Douay: ‘conversation’] kind of concupiscence. For it would be absurd to speak of is not with men” (Dan. 2:11). Therefore charity is not having friendship for wine or for a horse. friendship. Yet neither does well-wishing suffice for friendship, Objection 2. Further, there is no friendship without for a certain mutual love is requisite, since friendship return of love (Ethic. viii, 2). But charity extends even to is between friend and friend: and this well-wishing is one’s enemies, according to Mat. 5:44: “Love your ene- founded on some kind of communication. mies.” Therefore charity is not friendship. Accordingly, since there is a communication between Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher man and God, inasmuch as He communicates His happi- (Ethic. viii, 3) there are three kinds of friendship, directed ness to us, some kind of friendship must needs be based respectively towards the delightful, the useful, or the vir- on this same communication, of which it is written (1 Cor. tuous. Now charity is not the friendship for the useful or 1:9): “God is faithful: by Whom you are called unto the delightful; for Jerome says in his letter to Paulinus which fellowship of His Son.” The love which is based on this is to be found at the beginning of the Bible: “True friend- communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that ship cemented by Christ, is where men are drawn together, charity is the friendship of man for God. not by household interests, not by mere bodily presence, Reply to Objection 1. Man’s life is twofold. There not by crafty and cajoling flattery, but by the fear of God, is his outward life in respect of his sensitive and corporeal and the study of the Divine Scriptures.” No more is it nature: and with regard to this life there is no communica- friendship for the virtuous, since by charity we love even tion or fellowship between us and God or the angels. The sinners, whereas friendship based on the virtuous is only other is man’s spiritual life in respect of his mind, and with for virtuous men (Ethic. viii). Therefore charity is not regard to this life there is fellowship between us and both friendship. God and the angels, imperfectly indeed in this present On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 15:15): “I will state of life, wherefore it is written (Phil. 3:20): “Our not now call you servants. . . but My friends.” Now this conversation is in heaven.” But this “conversation” will be was said to them by reason of nothing else than charity. perfected in heaven, when “His servants shall serve Him, Therefore charity is friendship. and they shall see His face” (Apoc. 22:3,4). Therefore I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. charity is imperfect here, but will be perfected in heaven. viii, 2,3) not every love has the character of friendship, Reply to Objection 2. Friendship extends to a person but that love which is together with benevolence, when, in two ways: first in respect of himself, and in this way 1294 friendship never extends but to one’s friends: secondly, it friendship of charity is chiefly directed. extends to someone in respect of another, as, when a man Reply to Objection 3. The friendship that is based on has friendship for a certain person, for his sake he loves the virtuous is directed to none but a virtuous man as the all belonging to him, be they children, servants, or con- principal person, but for his sake we love those who be- nected with him in any way. Indeed so much do we love long to him, even though they be not virtuous: in this way our friends, that for their sake we love all who belong to charity, which above all is friendship based on the virtu- them, even if they hurt or hate us; so that, in this way, the ous, extends to sinners, whom, out of charity, we love for friendship of charity extends even to our enemies, whom God’s sake. we love out of charity in relation to God, to Whom the Whether charity is something created in the soul? IIa IIae q. 23 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not some- Ghost moves the human mind the movement of charity thing created in the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. does not proceed from this motion in such a way that the viii, 7): “He that loveth his neighbor, consequently, loveth human mind be merely moved, without being the princi- love itself.” Now God is love. Therefore it follows that he ple of this movement, as when a body is moved by some loves God in the first place. Again he says (De Trin. xv, extrinsic motive power. For this is contrary to the nature 17): “It was said: God is Charity, even as it was said: God of a voluntary act, whose principle needs to be in itself, as is a Spirit.” Therefore charity is not something created in stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 6, a. 1): so that it would follow the soul, but is God Himself. that to love is not a voluntary act, which involves a con- Objection 2. Further, God is the life of the soul spir- tradiction, since love, of its very nature, implies an act of itually just as the soul is the life of the body, according the will. to Dt. 30:20: “He is thy life.” Now the soul by itself Likewise, neither can it be said that the Holy Ghost quickens the body. Therefore God quickens the soul by moves the will in such a way to the act of loving, as though Himself. But He quickens it by charity, according to 1 Jn. the will were an instrument, for an instrument, though it 3:14: “We know that we have passed from death to life, be a principle of action, nevertheless has not the power because we love the brethren.” Therefore God is charity to act or not to act, for then again the act would cease to itself. be voluntary and meritorious, whereas it has been stated Objection 3. Further, no created thing is of infinite above ( Ia IIae, q. 114, a. 4) that the love of charity is power; on the contrary every creature is vanity. But char- the root of merit: and, given that the will is moved by the ity is not vanity, indeed it is opposed to vanity; and it is Holy Ghost to the act of love, it is necessary that the will of infinite power, since it brings the human soul to the in- also should be the efficient cause of that act. finite good. Therefore charity is not something created in Now no act is perfectly produced by an active power, the soul. unless it be connatural to that power of reason of some On the charity, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, form which is the principle of that action. Wherefore 10): “By charity I mean the movement of the soul towards God, Who moves all things to their due ends, bestowed the enjoyment of God for His own sake.” But a movement on each thing the form whereby it is inclined to the end of the soul is something created in the soul. Therefore appointed to it by Him; and in this way He “ordereth all charity is something created in the soul. things sweetly” (Wis. 8:1). But it is evident that the act I answer that, The Master looks thoroughly into this of charity surpasses the nature of the power of the will, question in q. 17 so that, therefore, unless some form be superadded to the of the First Book, and concludes that charity is not natural power, inclining it to the act of love, this same act something created in the soul, but is the Holy Ghost Him- would be less perfect than the natural acts and the acts of self dwelling in the mind. Nor does he mean to say that the other powers; nor would it be easy and pleasurable to this movement of love whereby we love God is the Holy perform. And this is evidently untrue, since no virtue has Ghost Himself, but that this movement is from the Holy such a strong inclination to its act as charity has, nor does Ghost without any intermediary habit, whereas other vir- any virtue perform its act with so great pleasure. There- tuous acts are from the Holy Ghost by means of the habits fore it is most necessary that, for us to perform the act of of other virtues, for instance the habit of faith or hope or charity, there should be in us some habitual form super- of some other virtue: and this he said on account of the added to the natural power, inclining that power to the act excellence of charity. of charity, and causing it to act with ease and pleasure. But if we consider the matter aright, this would be, on Reply to Objection 1. The Divine Essence Itself is the contrary, detrimental to charity. For when the Holy charity, even as It is wisdom and goodness. Wherefore 1295 just as we are said to be good with the goodness which is formally charity is the life of the soul, even as the soul is God, and wise with the wisdom which is God (since the the life of the body. Consequently we may conclude from goodness whereby we are formally good is a participa- this that just as the soul is immediately united to the body, tion of Divine goodness, and the wisdom whereby we are so is charity to the soul. formally wise, is a share of Divine wisdom), so too, the Reply to Objection 3. Charity works formally. Now charity whereby formally we love our neighbor is a par- the efficacy of a form depends on the power of the agent, ticipation of Divine charity. For this manner of speaking who instills the form, wherefore it is evident that charity is common among the Platonists, with whose doctrines is not vanity. But because it produces an infinite effect, Augustine was imbued; and the lack of adverting to this since, by justifying the soul, it unites it to God, this proves has been to some an occasion of error. the infinity of the Divine power, which is the author of Reply to Objection 2. God is effectively the life both charity. of the soul by charity, and of the body by the soul: but Whether charity is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 23 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not a virtue. person, but under a different aspect from justice. For jus- For charity is a kind of friendship. Now philosophers tice is about works done in respect of another person, un- do not reckon friendship a virtue, as may be gathered der the aspect of the legal due, whereas friendship consid- from Ethic. viii, 1; nor is it numbered among the virtues ers the aspect of a friendly and moral duty, or rather that of whether moral or intellectual. Neither, therefore, is char- a gratuitous favor, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, ity a virtue. 13). Nevertheless it may be admitted that it is not a virtue Objection 2. Further, “virtue is the ultimate limit of distinct of itself from the other virtues. For its praise- power” (De Coelo et Mundo i, 11). But charity is not worthiness and virtuousness are derived merely from its something ultimate, this applies rather to joy and peace. object, in so far, to wit, as it is based on the moral good- Therefore it seems that charity is not a virtue, and that ness of the virtues. This is evident from the fact that not this should be said rather of joy and peace. every friendship is praiseworthy and virtuous, as in the Objection 3. Further, every virtue is an accidental case of friendship based on pleasure or utility. Where- habit. But charity is not an accidental habit, since it is fore friendship for the virtuous is something consequent a more excellent thing than the soul itself: whereas no ac- to virtue rather than a virtue. Moreover there is no com- cident is more excellent than its subject. Therefore charity parison with charity since it is not founded principally on is not a virtue. the virtue of a man, but on the goodness of God. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. Reply to Objection 2. It belongs to the same virtue to xi): “Charity is a virtue which, when our affections are love a man and to rejoice about him, since joy results from perfectly ordered, unites us to God, for by it we love Him.” love, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 25, a. 2) in the treatise on I answer that, Human acts are good according as they the passions: wherefore love is reckoned a virtue, rather are regulated by their due rule and measure. Wherefore than joy, which is an effect of love. And when virtue is human virtue which is the principle of all man’s good described as being something ultimate, we mean that it is acts consists in following the rule of human acts, which last, not in the order of effect, but in the order of excess, is twofold, as stated above (q. 17, a. 1), viz. human reason just as one hundred pounds exceed sixty. and God. Reply to Objection 3. Every accident is inferior to Consequently just as moral virtue is defined as being substance if we consider its being, since substance has “in accord with right reason,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 6, so being in itself, while an accident has its being in another: too, the nature of virtue consists in attaining God, as also but considered as to its species, an accident which results stated above with regard to faith, (q. 4, a. 5) and hope from the principles of its subject is inferior to its subject, (q. 17, a. 1). Wherefore, it follows that charity is a virtue, even as an effect is inferior to its cause; whereas an acci- for, since charity attains God, it unites us to God, as evi- dent that results from a participation of some higher na- denced by the authority of Augustine quoted above. ture is superior to its subject, in so far as it is a likeness Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher (Ethic. viii) of that higher nature, even as light is superior to the di- does not deny that friendship is a virtue, but affirms that it aphanous body. In this way charity is superior to the soul, is “either a virtue or with a virtue.” For we might say that in as much as it is a participation of the Holy Ghost. it is a moral virtue about works done in respect of another 1296 Whether charity is a special virtue? IIa IIae q. 23 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not a spe- above ( Ia IIae, q. 27, a. 1), so that wherever there is a cial virtue. For Jerome says: “Let me briefly define all special aspect of good, there is a special kind of love. But virtue as the charity whereby we love God”∗: and Augus- the Divine good, inasmuch as it is the object of happiness, tine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv)† that “virtue is the order has a special aspect of good, wherefore the love of char- of love.” Now no special virtue is included in the defini- ity, which is the love of that good, is a special kind of love. tion of virtue in general. Therefore charity is not a special Therefore charity is a special virtue. virtue. Reply to Objection 1. Charity is included in the defi- Objection 2. Further, that which extends to all works nition of every virtue, not as being essentially every virtue, of virtue, cannot be a special virtue. But charity extends but because every virtue depends on it in a way, as we to all works of virtue, according to 1 Cor. 13:4: “Charity shall state further on (Aa. 7,8). In this way prudence is in- is patient, is kind,” etc.; indeed it extends to all human ac- cluded in the definition of the moral virtues, as explained tions, according to 1 Cor. 16:14: “Let all your things be in Ethic. ii, vi, from the fact that they depend on prudence. done in charity.” Therefore charity is not a special virtue. Reply to Objection 2. The virtue or art which is Objection 3. Further, the precepts of the Law refer concerned about the last end, commands the virtues or to acts of virtue. Now Augustine says (De Perfect. Hu- arts which are concerned about other ends which are sec- man. Justit. v) that, “Thou shalt love” is “a general com- ondary, thus the military art commands the art of horse- mandment,” and “Thou shalt not covet,” “a general prohi- riding (Ethic. i). Accordingly since charity has for its bition.” Therefore charity is a general virtue. object the last end of human life, viz. everlasting happi- On the contrary, Nothing general is enumerated to- ness, it follows that it extends to the acts of a man’s whole gether with what is special. But charity is enumerated life, by commanding them, not by eliciting immediately together with special virtues, viz. hope and faith, accord- all acts of virtue. ing to 1 Cor. 13:13: “And now there remain faith, hope, Reply to Objection 3. The precept of love is said to charity, these three.” Therefore charity is a special virtue. be a general command, because all other precepts are re- I answer that, Acts and habits are specified by their duced thereto as to their end, according to 1 Tim. 1:5: objects, as shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 54, “The end of the commandment is charity.” a. 2). Now the proper object of love is the good, as stated Whether charity is one virtue? IIa IIae q. 23 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not one I answer that, Charity, as stated above (a. 1) is a kind virtue. For habits are distinct according to their ob- of friendship of man for God. Now the different species jects. Now there are two objects of charity—God and our of friendship are differentiated, first of all, in respect of a neighbor—which are infinitely distant from one another. diversity of end, and in this way there are three species Therefore charity is not one virtue. of friendship, namely friendship for the useful, for the Objection 2. Further, different aspects of the object delightful, and for the virtuous; secondly, in respect of diversify a habit, even though that object be one in real- the different kinds of communion on which friendships ity, as shown above (q. 17, a. 6; Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 2, ad 1). are based; thus there is one species of friendship between Now there are many aspects under which God is an object kinsmen, and another between fellow citizens or fellow of love, because we are debtors to His love by reason of travellers, the former being based on natural communion, each one of His favors. Therefore charity is not one virtue. the latter on civil communion or on the comradeship of Objection 3. Further, charity comprises friendship for the road, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 12). our neighbor. But the Philosopher reckons several species Now charity cannot be differentiated in either of these of friendship (Ethic. viii, 3,11,12). Therefore charity is ways: for its end is one, namely, the goodness of God; not one virtue, but is divided into a number of various and the fellowship of everlasting happiness, on which this species. friendship is based, is also one. Hence it follows that On the contrary, Just as God is the object of faith, charity is simply one virtue, and not divided into several so is He the object of charity. Now faith is one virtue by species. reason of the unity of the Divine truth, according to Eph. Reply to Objection 1. This argument would hold, if 4:5: “One faith.” Therefore charity also is one virtue by God and our neighbor were equally objects of charity. But reason of the unity of the Divine goodness. this is not true: for God is the principal object of charity, ∗ The reference should be to Augustine, Ep. clxvii † De Civ. Dei xv, 22 1297 while our neighbor is loved out of charity for God’s sake. love for Him, or which make it our duty to love Him, are Reply to Objection 2. God is loved by charity for His secondary and result from the first. own sake: wherefore charity regards principally but one Reply to Objection 3. Human friendship of which the aspect of lovableness, namely God’s goodness, which is Philosopher treats has various ends and various forms of His substance, according to Ps. 105:1: “Give glory to the fellowship. This does not apply to charity, as stated above: Lord for He is good.” Other reasons that inspire us with wherefore the comparison fails. Whether charity is the most excellent of the virtues? IIa IIae q. 23 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not the most accrue to us from Him. Hence charity is more excellent excellent of the virtues. Because the higher power has the than faith or hope, and, consequently, than all the other higher virtue even as it has a higher operation. Now the virtues, just as prudence, which by itself attains reason, is intellect is higher than the will, since it directs the will. more excellent than the other moral virtues, which attain Therefore, faith, which is in the intellect, is more excel- reason in so far as it appoints the mean in human opera- lent than charity which is in the will. tions or passions. Objection 2. Further, the thing by which another Reply to Objection 1. The operation of the intellect works seems the less excellent of the two, even as a ser- is completed by the thing understood being in the intel- vant, by whom his master works, is beneath his master. lectual subject, so that the excellence of the intellectual Now “faith. . . worketh by charity,” according to Gal. 5:6. operation is assessed according to the measure of the in- Therefore faith is more excellent than charity. tellect. On the other hand, the operation of the will and Objection 3. Further, that which is by way of addition of every appetitive power is completed in the tendency of to another seems to be the more perfect of the two. Now the appetite towards a thing as its term, wherefore the ex- hope seems to be something additional to charity: for the cellence of the appetitive operation is gauged according to object of charity is good, whereas the object of hope is the thing which is the object of the operation. Now those an arduous good. Therefore hope is more excellent than things which are beneath the soul are more excellent in the charity. soul than they are in themselves, because a thing is con- On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 13:13): “The tained according to the mode of the container (De Causis greater of these is charity.” xii). On the other hand, things that are above the soul, I answer that, Since good, in human acts, depends on are more excellent in themselves than they are in the soul. their being regulated by the due rule, it must needs be that Consequently it is better to know than to love the things human virtue, which is a principle of good acts, consists that are beneath us; for which reason the Philosopher gave in attaining the rule of human acts. Now the rule of human the preference to the intellectual virtues over the moral acts is twofold, as stated above (a. 3), namely, human rea- virtues (Ethic. x, 7,8): whereas the love of the things that son and God: yet God is the first rule, whereby, even hu- are above us, especially of God, ranks before the knowl- man reason must be regulated. Consequently the theolog- edge of such things. Therefore charity is more excellent ical virtues, which consist in attaining this first rule, since than faith. their object is God, are more excellent than the moral, or Reply to Objection 2. Faith works by love, not instru- the intellectual virtues, which consist in attaining human mentally, as a master by his servant, but as by its proper reason: and it follows that among the theological virtues form: hence the argument does not prove. themselves, the first place belongs to that which attains Reply to Objection 3. The same good is the object of God most. charity and of hope: but charity implies union with that Now that which is of itself always ranks before that good, whereas hope implies distance therefrom. Hence which is by another. But faith and hope attain God indeed charity does not regard that good as being arduous, as in so far as we derive from Him the knowledge of truth or hope does, since what is already united has not the charac- the acquisition of good, whereas charity attains God Him- ter of arduous: and this shows that charity is more perfect self that it may rest in Him, but not that something may than hope. 1298 Whether any true virtue is possible without charity? IIa IIae q. 23 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that there can be true is no charity, in so far as it is directed to some particular virtue without charity. For it is proper to virtue to pro- good. But if this particular good is not a true, but an ap- duce a good act. Now those who have not charity, do parent good, it is not a true virtue that is ordered to such a some good actions, as when they clothe the naked, or feed good, but a counterfeit virtue. Even so, as Augustine says the hungry and so forth. Therefore true virtue is possible (Contra Julian. iv, 3), “the prudence of the miser, whereby without charity. he devises various roads to gain, is no true virtue; nor the Objection 2. Further, charity is not possible without miser’s justice, whereby he scorns the property of another faith, since it comes of “an unfeigned faith,” as the Apos- through fear of severe punishment; nor the miser’s tem- tle says (1 Tim. 1:5). Now, in unbelievers, there can be perance, whereby he curbs his desire for expensive plea- true chastity, if they curb their concupiscences, and true sures; nor the miser’s fortitude, whereby as Horace, says, justice, if they judge rightly. Therefore true virtue is pos- ‘he braves the sea, he crosses mountains, he goes through sible without charity. fire, in order to avoid poverty’ ” (Epis. lib, 1; Ep. i, 45). If, Objection 3. Further, science and art are virtues, ac-on the other hand, this particular good be a true good, for cording to Ethic. vi. But they are to be found in sinners instance the welfare of the state, or the like, it will indeed who lack charity. Therefore true virtue can be without be a true virtue, imperfect, however, unless it be referred charity. to the final and perfect good. Accordingly no strictly true On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3): virtue is possible without charity. “If I should distribute all my goods to the poor, and if I Reply to Objection 1. The act of one lacking charity should deliver my body to be burned, and have not char- may be of two kinds; one is in accordance with his lack ity, it profiteth me nothing.” And yet true virtue is very of charity, as when he does something that is referred to profitable, according to Wis. 8:7: “She teacheth temper- that whereby he lacks charity. Such an act is always evil: ance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are thus Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3) that the actions such things as men can have nothing more profitable in which an unbeliever performs as an unbeliever, are always life.” Therefore no true virtue is possible without charity. sinful, even when he clothes the naked, or does any like I answer that, Virtue is ordered to the good, as stated thing, and directs it to his unbelief as end. above ( Ia IIae, q. 55 , a. 4). Now the good is chiefly an There is, however, another act of one lacking char- end, for things directed to the end are not said to be good ity, not in accordance with his lack of charity, but in ac- except in relation to the end. Accordingly, just as the end cordance with his possession of some other gift of God, is twofold, the last end, and the proximate end, so also, whether faith, or hope, or even his natural good, which is is good twofold, one, the ultimate and universal good, the not completely taken away by sin, as stated above (q. 10, other proximate and particular. The ultimate and principal a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 2). In this way it is possible for an good of man is the enjoyment of God, according to Ps. act, without charity, to be generically good, but not per- 72:28: “It is good for me to adhere to God,” and to this fectly good, because it lacks its due order to the last end. good man is ordered by charity. Man’s secondary and, as Reply to Objection 2. Since the end is in practical it were, particular good may be twofold: one is truly good, matters, what the principle is in speculative matters, just because, considered in itself, it can be directed to the prin- as there can be no strictly true science, if a right estimate cipal good, which is the last end; while the other is good of the first indemonstrable principle be lacking, so, there apparently and not truly, because it leads us away from can be no strictly true justice, or chastity, without that due the final good. Accordingly it is evident that simply true ordering to the end, which is effected by charity, however virtue is that which is directed to man’s principal good; rightly a man may be affected about other matters. thus also the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that Reply to Objection 3. Science and art of their very “virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which nature imply a relation to some particular good, and not to is best”: and in this way no true virtue is possible without the ultimate good of human life, as do the moral virtues, charity. which make man good simply, as stated above ( Ia IIae, If, however, we take virtue as being ordered to some q. 56 , a. 3). Hence the comparison fails. particular end, then we speak of virtue being where there 1299 Whether charity is the form of the virtues? IIa IIae q. 23 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not the true from a form of the agent. Consequently, in morals, that form of the virtues. Because the form of a thing is either which gives an act its order to the end, must needs give exemplar or essential. Now charity is not the exemplar the act its form. Now it is evident, in accordance with form of the other virtues, since it would follow that the what has been said (a. 7), that it is charity which directs other virtues are of the same species as charity: nor is it the acts of all other virtues to the last end, and which, con- the essential form of the other virtues, since then it would sequently, also gives the form to all other acts of virtue: not be distinct from them. Therefore it is in no way the and it is precisely in this sense that charity is called the form of the virtues. form of the virtues, for these are called virtues in relation Objection 2. Further, charity is compared to the other to “informed” acts. virtues as their root and foundation, according to Eph. Reply to Objection 1. Charity is called the form of 3:17: “Rooted and founded in charity.” Now a root or the other virtues not as being their exemplar or their es- foundation is not the form, but rather the matter of a thing, sential form, but rather by way of efficient cause, in so far since it is the first part in the making. Therefore charity is as it sets the form on all, in the aforesaid manner. not the form of the virtues. Reply to Objection 2. Charity is compared to the Objection 3. Further, formal, final, and efficient foundation or root in so far as all other virtues draw their causes do not coincide with one another (Phys. ii, 7). Now sustenance and nourishment therefrom, and not in the charity is called the end and the mother of the virtues. sense that the foundation and root have the character of Therefore it should not be called their form. a material cause. On the contrary, Ambrose∗ says that charity is the Reply to Objection 3. Charity is said to be the end form of the virtues. of other virtues, because it directs all other virtues to its I answer that, In morals the form of an act is taken own end. And since a mother is one who conceives within chiefly from the end. The reason of this is that the princi- herself and by another, charity is called the mother of the pal of moral acts is the will, whose object and form, so to other virtues, because, by commanding them, it conceives speak, are the end. Now the form of an act always follows the acts of the other virtues, by the desire of the last end. ∗ Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 23 1300 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 24 Of the Subject of Charity (In Twelve Articles) We must now consider charity in relation to its subject, under which head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether charity is in the will as its subject? (2) Whether charity is caused in man by preceding acts or by a Divine infusion? (3) Whether it is infused according to the capacity of our natural gifts? (4) Whether it increases in the person who has it? (5) Whether it increases by addition? (6) Whether it increases by every act? (7) Whether it increases indefinitely? (8) Whether the charity of a wayfarer can be perfect? (9) Of the various degrees of charity; (10) Whether charity can diminish? (11) Whether charity can be lost after it has been possessed? (12) Whether it is lost through one mortal sin? Whether the will is the subject of charity? IIa IIae q. 24 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not the intellect alone. Therefore the subject of charity is not the subject of charity. For charity is a kind of love. Now, sensitive, but the intellective appetite, i.e. the will. according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii, 3) love is in the Reply to Objection 1. The concupiscible is a part of concupiscible part. Therefore charity is also in the concu- the sensitive, not of the intellective appetite, as proved in piscible and not in the will. the Ia, q. 81, a. 2: wherefore the love which is in the con- Objection 2. Further, charity is the foremost of the cupiscible, is the love of sensible good: nor can the concu- virtues, as stated above (q. 23, a. 6). But the reason is the piscible reach to the Divine good which is an intelligible subject of virtue. Therefore it seems that charity is in the good; the will alone can. Consequently the concupiscible reason and not in the will. cannot be the subject of charity. Objection 3. Further, charity extends to all human Reply to Objection 2. According to the Philosopher acts, according to 1 Cor. 16:14: “Let all your things be (De Anima iii, 9), the will also is in the reason: wherefore done in charity.” Now the principle of human acts is the charity is not excluded from the reason through being in free-will. Therefore it seems that charity is chiefly in the the will. Yet charity is regulated, not by the reason, as hu- free-will as its subject and not in the will. man virtues are, but by God’s wisdom, and transcends the On the contrary, The object of charity is the good, rule of human reason, according to Eph. 3:19: “The char- which is also the object of the will. Therefore charity is in ity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge.” Hence it the will as its subject. is not in the reason, either as its subject, like prudence is, I answer that, Since, as stated in the Ia, q. 80, a. 2, or as its rule, like justice and temperance are, but only by the appetite is twofold, namely the sensitive, and the in- a certain kinship of the will to the reason. tellective which is called the will, the object of each is Reply to Objection 3. As stated in the Ia, q. 83, a. 4, the good, but in different ways: for the object of the sen- the free-will is not a distinct power from the will. Yet sitive appetite is a good apprehended by sense, whereas charity is not in the will considered as free-will, the act the object of the intellective appetite or will is good under of which is to choose. For choice is of things directed to the universal aspect of good, according as it can be appre- the end, whereas the will is of the end itself (Ethic. iii, 2). hended by the intellect. Now the object of charity is not a Hence charity, whose object is the last end, should be de- sensible good, but the Divine good which is known by the scribed as residing in the will rather than in the free-will. 1301 Whether charity is caused in us by infusion? IIa IIae q. 24 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not caused effect does not transcend its cause. in us by infusion. For that which is common to all crea- Therefore charity can be in us neither naturally, nor tures, is in man naturally. Now, according to Dionysius through acquisition by the natural powers, but by the in- (Div. Nom. iv), the “Divine good”, which is the object of fusion of the Holy Ghost, Who is the love of the Father charity, “is for all an object of dilection and love.” There- and the Son, and the participation of Whom in us is cre- fore charity is in us naturally, and not by infusion. ated charity, as stated above (q. 23, a. 2). Objection 2. Further, the more lovable a thing is the Reply to Objection 1. Dionysius is speaking of the easier it is to love it. Now God is supremely lovable, since love of God, which is founded on the fellowship of nat- He is supremely good. Therefore it is easier to love Him ural goods, wherefore it is in all naturally. On the other than other things. But we need no infused habit in order hand, charity is founded on a supernatural fellowship, so to love other things. Neither, therefore, do we need one in the comparison fails. order to love God. Reply to Objection 2. Just as God is supremely Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): knowable in Himself yet not to us, on account of a de- “The end of the commandment is charity from a pure fect in our knowledge which depends on sensible things, heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith.” so too, God is supremely lovable in Himself, in as much Now these three have reference to human acts. Therefore as He is the object of happiness. But He is not supremely charity is caused in us from preceding acts, and not from lovable to us in this way, on account of the inclination of infusion. our appetite towards visible goods. Hence it is evident On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:5): “The that for us to love God above all things in this way, it is charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy necessary that charity be infused into our hearts. Ghost, Who is given to us.” Reply to Objection 3. When it is said that in us char- I answer that, As stated above (q. 23, a. 1), charity ity proceeds from “a pure heart, and a good conscience, is a friendship of man for God, founded upon the fellow- and an unfeigned faith,” this must be referred to the act of ship of everlasting happiness. Now this fellowship is in charity which is aroused by these things. Or again, this is respect, not of natural, but of gratuitous gifts, for, accord- said because the aforesaid acts dispose man to receive the ing to Rom. 6:23, “the grace of God is life everlasting”: infusion of charity. The same remark applies to the say- wherefore charity itself surpasses our natural facilities. ing of Augustine (Tract. ix in prim. canon. Joan.): “Fear Now that which surpasses the faculty of nature, cannot be leads to charity,” and of a gloss on Mat. 1:2: “Faith begets natural or acquired by the natural powers, since a natural hope, and hope charity.” Whether charity is infused according to the capacity of our natural gifts? IIa IIae q. 24 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that charity is infused ac- Now charity and other gratuitous gifts are bestowed on cording to the capacity of our natural gifts. For it is written the angels, according to their natural capacity, as the Mas- (Mat. 25:15) that “He gave to every one according to his ter teaches (Sent. ii, D, 3). Therefore the same apparently own virtue [Douay: ‘proper ability’].” Now, in man, none applies to man. but natural virtue precedes charity, since there is no virtue On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 3:8): “The Spirit without charity, as stated above (q. 23, a. 7). Therefore breatheth where He will,” and (1 Cor. 12:11): “All these God infuses charity into man according to the measure of things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to ev- his natural virtue. ery one according as He will.” Therefore charity is given, Objection 2. Further, among things ordained towards not according to our natural capacity, but according as the one another, the second is proportionate to the first: thus Spirit wills to distribute His gifts. we find in natural things that the form is proportionate to I answer that, The quantity of a thing depends on the the matter, and in gratuitous gifts, that glory is proportion- proper cause of that thing, since the more universal cause ate to grace. Now, since charity is a perfection of nature, produces a greater effect. Now, since charity surpasses the it is compared to the capacity of nature as second to first. proportion of human nature, as stated above (a. 2) it de- Therefore it seems that charity is infused according to the pends, not on any natural virtue, but on the sole grace of capacity of nature. the Holy Ghost Who infuses charity. Wherefore the quan- Objection 3. Further, men and angels partake of hap- tity of charity depends neither on the condition of nature piness according to the same measure, since happiness is nor on the capacity of natural virtue, but only on the will alike in both, according to Mat. 22:30 and Lk. 20:36. of the Holy Ghost Who “divides” His gifts “according as 1302 He will.” Hence the Apostle says (Eph. 4:7): “To every not belong to the same genus, so that the comparison fails. one of us is given grace according to the measure of the Reply to Objection 3. The angel’s is an intellec- giving of Christ.” tual nature, and it is consistent with his condition that Reply to Objection 1. The virtue in accordance with he should be borne wholly whithersoever he is borne, as which God gives His gifts to each one, is a disposition stated in the Ia, q. 61, a. 6. Hence there was a greater ef- or previous preparation or effort of the one who receives fort in the higher angels, both for good in those who per- grace. But the Holy Ghost forestalls even this disposi- severed, and for evil in those who fell, and consequently tion or effort, by moving man’s mind either more or less, those of the higher angels who remained steadfast became according as He will. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. better than the others, and those who fell became worse. 1:12): “Who hath made us worthy to be partakers of the But man’s is a rational nature, with which it is consistent lot of the saints in light.” to be sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in act: so Reply to Objection 2. The form does not surpass the that it is not necessarily borne wholly whithersoever it is proportion of the matter. In like manner grace and glory borne, and where there are greater natural gifts there may are referred to the same genus, for grace is nothing else be less effort, and vice versa. Thus the comparison fails. than a beginning of glory in us. But charity and nature do Whether charity can increase? IIa IIae q. 24 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that charity cannot in- if it could not, all further advance along the way would crease. For nothing increases save what has quantity. Now cease. Hence the Apostle calls charity the way, when he quantity is twofold, namely dimensive and virtual. The says (1 Cor. 12:31): “I show unto you yet a more excellent former does not befit charity which is a spiritual perfec- way.” tion, while virtual quantity regards the objects in respect Reply to Objection 1. Charity is not subject to dimen- of which charity does not increase, since the slightest sive, but only to virtual quantity: and the latter depends charity loves all that is to be loved out of charity. There- not only on the number of objects, namely whether they fore charity does not increase. be in greater number or of greater excellence, but also on Objection 2. Further, that which consists in some- the intensity of the act, namely whether a thing is loved thing extreme receives no increase. But charity consists in more, or less; it is in this way that the virtual quantity of something extreme, being the greatest of the virtues, and charity increases. the supreme love of the greatest good. Therefore charity Reply to Objection 2. Charity consists in an extreme cannot increase. with regard to its object, in so far as its object is the Objection 3. Further, increase is a kind of movement. Supreme Good, and from this it follows that charity is Therefore wherever there is increase there is movement, the most excellent of the virtues. Yet not every charity and if there be increase of essence there is movement of consists in an extreme, as regards the intensity of the act. essence. Now there is no movement of essence save either Reply to Objection 3. Some have said that charity by corruption or generation. Therefore charity cannot in- does not increase in its essence, but only as to its radica- crease essentially, unless it happen to be generated anew tion in its subject, or according to its fervor. or corrupted, which is unreasonable. But these people did not know what they were talk- On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. lxxiv in ing about. For since charity is an accident, its being is to Joan.)∗ that “charity merits increase that by increase it be in something. So that an essential increase of charity may merit perfection.” means nothing else but that it is yet more in its subject, I answer that, The charity of a wayfarer can increase. which implies a greater radication in its subject. Further- For we are called wayfarers by reason of our being on more, charity is essentially a virtue ordained to act, so that the way to God, Who is the last end of our happiness. In an essential increase of charity implies ability to produce this way we advance as we get nigh to God, Who is ap- an act of more fervent love. Hence charity increases es- proached, “not by steps of the body but by the affections sentially, not by beginning anew, or ceasing to be in its of the soul”†: and this approach is the result of charity, subject, as the objection imagines, but by beginning to be since it unites man’s mind to God. Consequently it is es- more and more in its subject. sential to the charity of a wayfarer that it can increase, for ∗ Cf. Ep. clxxxv. † St. Augustine, Tract. in Joan. xxxii 1303 Whether charity increases by addition? IIa IIae q. 24 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that charity increases by It follows therefore that if charity be added to char- addition. For just as increase may be in respect of bodily ity, we must presuppose a numerical distinction between quantity, so may it be according to virtual quantity. Now them, which follows a distinction of subjects: thus white- increase in bodily quantity results from addition; for the ness receives an increase when one white thing is added to Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5) that “increase is addi- another, although such an increase does not make a thing tion to pre-existing magnitude.” Therefore the increase of whiter. This, however, does not apply to the case in point, charity which is according to virtual quantity is by addi- since the subject of charity is none other than the rational tion. mind, so that such like an increase of charity could only Objection 2. Further, charity is a kind of spiritual take place by one rational mind being added to another; light in the soul, according to 1 Jn. 2:10: “He that loveth which is impossible. Moreover, even if it were possible, his brother abideth in the light.” Now light increases in the the result would be a greater lover, but not a more loving air by addition; thus the light in a house increases when one. It follows, therefore, that charity can by no means in- another candle is lit. Therefore charity also increases in crease by addition of charity to charity, as some have held the soul by addition. to be the case. Objection 3. Further, the increase of charity is God’s Accordingly charity increases only by its subject par- work, even as the causing of it, according to 2 Cor. 9:10: taking of charity more and more subject thereto. For this “He will increase the growth of the fruits of your justice.” is the proper mode of increase in a form that is intensified, Now when God first infuses charity, He puts something in since the being of such a form consists wholly in its ad- the soul that was not there before. Therefore also, when hering to its subject. Consequently, since the magnitude He increases charity, He puts something there which was of a thing follows on its being, to say that a form is greater not there before. Therefore charity increases by addition. is the same as to say that it is more in its subject, and not On the contrary, Charity is a simple form. Now noth- that another form is added to it: for this would be the case ing greater results from the addition of one simple thing if the form, of itself, had any quantity, and not in compar- to another, as proved in Phys. iii, text. 59, and Metaph. ii, ison with its subject. Therefore charity increases by being 4. Therefore charity does not increase by addition. intensified in its subject, and this is for charity to increase I answer that, Every addition is of something to in its essence; and not by charity being added to charity. something else: so that in every addition we must at least Reply to Objection 1. Bodily quantity has something presuppose that the things added together are distinct be- as quantity, and something else, in so far as it is an acci- fore the addition. Consequently if charity be added to dental form. As quantity, it is distinguishable in respect of charity, the added charity must be presupposed as distinct position or number, and in this way we have the increase from charity to which it is added, not necessarily by a dis- of magnitude by addition, as may be seen in animals. But tinction of reality, but at least by a distinction of thought. in so far as it is an accidental form, it is distinguishable For God is able to increase a bodily quantity by adding only in respect of its subject, and in this way it has its a magnitude which did not exist before, but was created proper increase, like other accidental forms, by way of at that very moment; which magnitude, though not pre- intensity in its subject, for instance in things subject to existent in reality, is nevertheless capable of being distin- rarefaction, as is proved in Phys. iv, 9. In like manner guished from the quantity to which it is added. Wherefore science, as a habit, has its quantity from its objects, and if charity be added to charity we must presuppose the dis- accordingly it increases by addition, when a man knows tinction, at least logical, of the one charity from the other. more things; and again, as an accidental form, it has a Now distinction among forms is twofold: specific and certain quantity through being in its subject, and in this numeric. Specific distinction of habits follows diversity way it increase in a man who knows the same scientific of objects, while numeric distinction follows distinction truths with greater certainty now than before. In the same of subjects. Consequently a habit may receive increase way charity has a twofold quantity; but with regard to that through extending to objects to which it did not extend which it has from its object, it does not increase, as stated before: thus the science of geometry increases in one who above: hence it follows that it increases solely by being acquires knowledge of geometrical matters which he ig- intensified. nored hitherto. But this cannot be said of charity, for even Reply to Objection 2. The addition of light to light the slightest charity extends to all that we have to love by can be understood through the light being intensified in charity. Hence the addition which causes an increase of the air on account of there being several luminaries giv- charity cannot be understood, as though the added charity ing light: but this distinction does not apply to the case in were presupposed to be distinct specifically from that to point, since there is but one luminary shedding forth the which it is added. light of charity. 1304 Reply to Objection 3. The infusion of charity denotes there that was not there before, but for something to be a change to the state of “having” charity from the state more there that previously was less there. This is what of “not having it,” so that something must needs come God does when He increases charity, that is He makes it which was not there before. On the other hand, the in- to have a greater hold on the soul, and the likeness of the crease of charity denotes a change to “more having” from Holy Ghost to be more perfectly participated by the soul. “less having,” so that there is need, not for anything to be Whether charity increases through every act of charity? IIa IIae q. 24 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that charity increases of that time, as happens in local movement; but for a through every act of charity. For that which can do what certain space of time nature works by disposing for the is more, can do what is less. But every act of charity can increase, without causing any actual increase, and after- merit everlasting life; and this is more than a simple addi- wards brings into effect that to which it had disposed, by tion of charity, since it includes the perfection of charity. giving the animal or plant an actual increase. In like man- Much more, therefore, does every act of charity increase ner charity does not actually increase through every act of charity. charity, but each act of charity disposes to an increase of Objection 2. Further, just as the habits of acquired charity, in so far as one act of charity makes man more virtue are engendered by acts, so too an increase of charity ready to act again according to charity, and this readiness is caused by an act of charity. Now each virtuous act con- increasing, man breaks out into an act of more fervent duces to the engendering of virtue. Therefore also each love, and strives to advance in charity, and then his charity virtuous act of charity conduces to the increase of charity. increases actually. Objection 3. Further, Gregory∗ says that “to stand Reply to Objection 1. Every act of charity merits ev- still in the way to God is to go back.” Now no man goes erlasting life, which, however, is not to be bestowed then back when he is moved by an act of charity. Therefore and there, but at its proper time. In like manner every act whoever is moved by an act of charity goes forward in the of charity merits an increase of charity; yet this increase way to God. Therefore charity increases through every act does not take place at once, but when we strive for that of charity. increase. On the contrary, The effect does not surpass the Reply to Objection 2. Even when an acquired virtue power of its cause. But an act of charity is sometimes done is being engendered, each act does not complete the for- with tepidity or slackness. Therefore it does not conduce mation of the virtue, but conduces towards that effect by to a more excellent charity, rather does it dispose one to a disposing to it, while the last act, which is the most per- lower degree. fect, and acts in virtue of all those that preceded it, reduces I answer that, The spiritual increase of charity is the virtue into act, just as when many drops hollow out a somewhat like the increase of a body. Now bodily in- stone. crease in animals and plants is not a continuous move- Reply to Objection 3. Man advances in the way to ment, so that, to wit, if a thing increase so much in so God, not merely by actual increase of charity, but also by much time, it need to increase proportionally in each part being disposed to that increase. Whether charity increases indefinitely? IIa IIae q. 24 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that charity does not in- ual increase, attain to the quantity of another finite thing crease indefinitely. For every movement is towards some however much greater, unless the amount of its increase end and term, as stated in Metaph. ii, text. 8,9. But the be ever less and less. Thus the Philosopher states (Phys. increase of charity is a movement. Therefore it tends to iii, 6) that if we divide a line into an indefinite number an end and term. Therefore charity does not increase in- of parts, and take these parts away and add them indef- definitely. initely to another line, we shall never arrive at any defi- Objection 2. Further, no form surpasses the capacity nite quantity resulting from those two lines, viz. the one of its subject. But the capacity of the rational creature who from which we subtracted and the one to which we added is the subject of charity is finite. Therefore charity cannot what was subtracted. But this does not occur in the case increase indefinitely. in point: because there is no need for the second increase Objection 3. Further, every finite thing can, by contin- of charity to be less than the first, since rather is it prob- ∗ St. Bernard, Serm. ii in Festo Purif. 1305 able that it would be equal or greater. As, therefore, the increase of man’s charity, while he is in the state of the charity of the blessed is something finite, if the charity wayfarer. For charity itself considered as such has no of the wayfarer can increase indefinitely, it would follow limit to its increase, since it is a participation of the in- that the charity of the way can equal the charity of heaven; finite charity which is the Holy Ghost. In like manner the which is absurd. Therefore the wayfarer’s charity cannot cause of the increase of charity, viz. God, is possessed of increase indefinitely. infinite power. Furthermore, on the part of its subject, no On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): “Not limit to this increase can be determined, because when- as though I had already attained, or were already per- ever charity increases, there is a corresponding increased fect; but I follow after, if I may, by any means appre- ability to receive a further increase. It is therefore evident hend,” on which words a gloss says: “Even if he has made that it is not possible to fix any limits to the increase of great progress, let none of the faithful say: ‘Enough.’ For charity in this life. whosoever says this, leaves the road before coming to his Reply to Objection 1. The increase of charity is di- destination.” Therefore the wayfarer’s charity can ever in- rected to an end, which is not in this, but in a future life. crease more and more. Reply to Objection 2. The capacity of the rational I answer that, A term to the increase of a form may creature is increased by charity, because the heart is en- be fixed in three ways: first by reason of the form itself larged thereby, according to 2 Cor. 6:11: “Our heart is having a fixed measure, and when this has been reached enlarged”; so that it still remains capable of receiving a it is no longer possible to go any further in that form, but further increase. if any further advance is made, another form is attained. Reply to Objection 3. This argument holds good in And example of this is paleness, the bounds of which may, those things which have the same kind of quantity, but not by continual alteration, be passed, either so that whiteness in those which have different kinds: thus however much ensues, or so that blackness results. Secondly, on the part a line may increase it does not reach the quantity of a su- of the agent, whose power does not extend to a further in- perficies. Now the quantity of a wayfarer’s charity which crease of the form in its subject. Thirdly, on the part of follows the knowledge of faith is not of the same kind as the subject, which is not capable of ulterior perfection. the quantity of the charity of the blessed, which follows Now, in none of these ways, is a limit imposed to the open vision. Hence the argument does not prove. Whether charity can be perfect in this life? IIa IIae q. 24 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that charity cannot be I answer that, The perfection of charity may be un- perfect in this life. For this would have been the case with derstood in two ways: first with regard to the object loved, the apostles before all others. Yet it was not so, since the secondly with regard to the person who loves. With re- Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): “Not as though I had already at- gard to the object loved, charity is perfect, if the object be tained, or were already perfect.” Therefore charity cannot loved as much as it is lovable. Now God is as lovable as be perfect in this life. He is good, and His goodness is infinite, wherefore He is Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. infinitely lovable. But no creature can love Him infinitely 36) that “whatever kindles charity quenches cupidity, but since all created power is finite. Consequently no crea- where charity is perfect, cupidity is done away altogether.” ture’s charity can be perfect in this way; the charity of But this cannot be in this world, wherein it is impossible God alone can, whereby He loves Himself. to live without sin, according to 1 Jn. 1:8: “If we say that On the part of the person who loves, charity is perfect, we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.” Now all sin arises when he loves as much as he can. This happens in three from some inordinate cupidity. Therefore charity cannot ways. First, so that a man’s whole heart is always actually be perfect in this life. borne towards God: this is the perfection of the charity of Objection 3. Further, what is already perfect cannot heaven, and is not possible in this life, wherein, by reason be perfected any more. But in this life charity can always of the weakness of human life, it is impossible to think increase, as stated above (a. 7). Therefore charity cannot always actually of God, and to be moved by love towards be perfect in this life. Him. Secondly, so that man makes an earnest endeavor On the contrary, Augustine says (In prim. canon. to give his time to God and Divine things, while scorning Joan. Tract. v) “Charity is perfected by being strength- other things except in so far as the needs of the present life ened; and when it has been brought to perfection, it ex- demand. This is the perfection of charity that is possible claims, ‘I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ.’ ” to a wayfarer; but is not common to all who have char- Now this is possible in this life, as in the case of Paul. ity. Thirdly, so that a man gives his whole heart to God Therefore charity can be perfect in this life. habitually, viz. by neither thinking nor desiring anything 1306 contrary to the love of God; and this perfection is common Reply to Objection 2. This is said on account of ve-to all who have charity. nial sins, which are contrary, not to the habit, but to the Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle denies that he has act of charity: hence they are incompatible, not with the the perfection of heaven, wherefore a gloss on the same perfection of the way, but with that of heaven. passage says that “he was a perfect wayfarer, but had not Reply to Objection 3. The perfection of the way is yet achieved the perfection to which the way leads.” not perfection simply, wherefore it can always increase. Whether charity is rightly distinguished into three degrees, beginning, progress, and IIa IIae q. 24 a. 9 perfection? Objection 1. It would seem unfitting to distinguish cumbent on man to occupy himself chiefly with avoiding three degrees of charity, beginning, progress, and perfec- sin and resisting his concupiscences, which move him in tion. For there are many degrees between the beginning opposition to charity: this concerns beginners, in whom of charity and its ultimate perfection. Therefore it is not charity has to be fed or fostered lest it be destroyed: in the right to put only one. second place man’s chief pursuit is to aim at progress in Objection 2. Further, charity begins to progress as good, and this is the pursuit of the proficient, whose chief soon as it begins to be. Therefore we ought not to distin- aim is to strengthen their charity by adding to it: while guish between charity as progressing and as beginning. man’s third pursuit is to aim chiefly at union with and en- Objection 3. Further, in this world, however perfect joyment of God: this belongs to the perfect who “desire a man’s charity may be, it can increase, as stated above to be dissolved and to be with Christ.” (a. 7). Now for charity to increase is to progress. There- In like manner we observe in local motion that at first fore perfect charity ought not to be distinguished from there is withdrawal from one term, then approach to the progressing charity: and so the aforesaid degrees are un- other term, and thirdly, rest in this term. suitably assigned to charity. Reply to Objection 1. All these distinct degrees On the contrary, Augustine says (In prim. canon. which can be discerned in the increase of charity, are com- Joan. Tract. v) “As soon as charity is born it takes food,” prised in the aforesaid three, even as every division of which refers to beginners, “after taking food, it waxes continuous things is included in these three—the begin- strong,” which refers to those who are progressing, “and ning, the middle, and the end, as the Philosopher states when it has become strong it is perfected,” which refers to (De Coelo i, 1). the perfect. Therefore there are three degrees of charity. Reply to Objection 2. Although those who are begin- I answer that, The spiritual increase of charity may be ners in charity may progress, yet the chief care that besets considered in respect of a certain likeness to the growth of them is to resist the sins which disturb them by their on- the human body. For although this latter growth may be slaught. Afterwards, however, when they come to feel divided into many parts, yet it has certain fixed divisions this onslaught less, they begin to tend to perfection with according to those particular actions or pursuits to which greater security; yet with one hand doing the work, and man is brought by this same growth. Thus we speak of a with the other holding the sword as related in 2 Esdr 4:17 man being an infant until he has the use of reason, after about those who built up Jerusalem. which we distinguish another state of man wherein he be- Reply to Objection 3. Even the perfect make progress gins to speak and to use his reason, while there is again a in charity: yet this is not their chief care, but their aim is third state, that of puberty when he begins to acquire the principally directed towards union with God. And though power of generation, and so on until he arrives at perfec- both the beginner and the proficient seek this, yet their so- tion. licitude is chiefly about other things, with the beginner, In like manner the divers degrees of charity are distin- about avoiding sin, with the proficient, about progressing guished according to the different pursuits to which man in virtue. is brought by the increase of charity. For at first it is in- Whether charity can decrease? IIa IIae q. 24 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that charity can decrease. Objection 2. Further, Augustine, speaking to God, For contraries by their nature affect the same subject. says (Confess. x) “He loves Thee less, who loves aught Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since then besides Thee”: and (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) he says that charity increases, as stated above (a. 4), it seems that it “what kindles charity quenches cupidity.” For this it can also decrease. seems to follow that, on the contrary, what arouses cupid- 1307 ity quenches charity. But cupidity, whereby a man loves we shall state further on (a. 12), and by way of merit, since something besides God, can increase in man. Therefore when, by sinning mortally, a man acts against charity, he charity can decrease. deserves that God should withdraw charity from him. Objection 3. Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad In like manner, neither can venial sin diminish charity lit. viii, 12) “God makes the just man, by justifying him, either effectively or by way of merit. Not effectively, be- but in such a way, that if the man turns away from God, cause it does not touch charity, since charity is about the he no longer retains the effect of the Divine operation.” last end, whereas venial sin is a disorder about things di- From this we may gather that when God preserves char- rected to the end: and a man’s love for the end is none the ity in man, He works in the same way as when He first less through his committing an inordinate act as regards infuses charity into him. Now at the first infusion of char- the things directed to the end. Thus sick people some- ity God infuses less charity into him that prepares himself times, though they love health much, are irregular in keep- less. Therefore also in preserving charity, He preserves ing to their diet: and thus again, in speculative sciences, less charity in him that prepares himself less. Therefore the false opinions that are derived from the principles, do charity can decrease. not diminish the certitude of the principles. So too, ve- On the contrary, In Scripture, charity is compared nial sin does not merit diminution of charity; for when a to fire, according to Cant 8:6: “The lamps thereof,” i.e. man offends in a small matter he does not deserve to be of charity, “are fire and flames.” Now fire ever mounts mulcted in a great matter. For God does not turn away upward so long as it lasts. Therefore as long as charity from man, more than man turns away from Him: where- endures, it can ascend, but cannot descend, i.e. decrease. fore he that is out of order in respect of things directed to I answer that, The quantity which charity has in com- the end, does not deserve to be mulcted in charity whereby parison with its proper object, cannot decrease, even as he is ordered to the last end. neither can it increase, as stated above (a. 4, ad 2). The consequence is that charity can by no means be Since, however, it increases in that quantity which it diminished, if we speak of direct causality, yet whatever has in comparison with its subject, here is the place to disposes to its corruption may be said to conduce indi- consider whether it can decrease in this way. Now, if rectly to its diminution, and such are venial sins, or even it decrease, this must needs be either through an act, or the cessation from the practice of works of charity. by the mere cessation from act. It is true that virtues ac- Reply to Objection 1. Contraries affect the same sub- quired through acts decrease and sometimes cease alto- ject when that subject stands in equal relation to both. But gether through cessation from act, as stated above ( Ia IIae, charity does not stand in equal relation to increase and q. 53, a. 3). Wherefore the Philosopher says, in reference decrease. For it can have a cause of increase, but not of to friendship (Ethic. viii, 5) “that want of intercourse,” decrease, as stated above. Hence the argument does not i.e. the neglect to call upon or speak with one’s friends, prove. “has destroyed many a friendship.” Now this is because Reply to Objection 2. Cupidity is twofold, one the safe-keeping of a thing depends on its cause, and the whereby man places his end in creatures, and this kills cause of human virtue is a human act, so that when hu- charity altogether, since it is its poison, as Augustine man acts cease, the virtue acquired thereby decreases and states (Confess. x). This makes us love God less (i.e. less at last ceases altogether. Yet this does not occur to charity, than we ought to love Him by charity), not indeed by di- because it is not the result of human acts, but is caused by minishing charity but by destroying it altogether. It is thus God alone, as stated above (a. 2). Hence it follows that that we must understand the saying: “He loves Thee less, even when its act ceases, it does not for this reason de- who loves aught beside Thee,” for he adds these words, crease, or cease altogether, unless the cessation involves a “which he loveth not for Thee.” This does not apply to ve- sin. nial sin, but only to mortal sin: since that which we love The consequence is that a decrease of charity cannot in venial sin, is loved for God’s sake habitually though be caused except either by God or by some sinful act. not actually. There is another cupidity, that of venial sin, Now no defect is caused in us by God, except by way which is always diminished by charity: and yet this cupid- of punishment, in so far as He withdraws His grace in ity cannot diminish charity, for the reason given above. punishment of sin. Hence He does not diminish charity Reply to Objection 3. A movement of the free-will except by way of punishment: and this punishment is due is requisite in the infusion of charity, as stated above ( on account of sin. Ia IIae, q. 113, a. 3). Wherefore that which diminishes It follows, therefore, that if charity decrease, the cause the intensity of the free-will conduces dispositively to a of this decrease must be sin either effectively or by way diminution in the charity to be infused. On the other of merit. But mortal sin does not diminish charity, in hand, no movement of the free-will is required for the either of these ways, but destroys it entirely, both effec- safe-keeping of charity, else it would not remain inn us tively, because every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as while we sleep. Hence charity does not decrease on ac- 1308 count of an obstacle on the part of the intensity of the free-will’s movement. Whether we can lose charity when once we have it? IIa IIae q. 24 a. 11 Objection 1. It would seem that we cannot lose char- Thirdly, charity can be considered on the part of its ity when once we have it. For if we lose it, this can only subject, which is changeable on account of the free-will. be through sin. Now he who has charity cannot sin, for it Moreover charity may be compared with this subject, both is written (1 Jn. 3:9): “Whosoever is born of God, com- from the general point of view of form in comparison with mitteth not sin; for His seed abideth in him, and he cannot matter, and from the specific point of view of habit as sin, because he is born of God.” But none save the chil- compared with power. Now it is natural for a form to be in dren of God have charity, for it is this which distinguishes its subject in such a way that it can be lost, when it does “the children of God from the children of perdition,” as not entirely fill the potentiality of matter: this is evident Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17). Therefore he that has in the forms of things generated and corrupted, because charity cannot lose it. the matter of such things receives one form in such a way, Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, that it retains the potentiality to another form, as though 7) that “if love be not true, it should not be called love.” its potentiality were not completely satisfied with the one Now, as he says again in a letter to Count Julian, “char- form. Hence the one form may be lost by the other being ity which can fail was never true.”∗ Therefore it was no received. On the other hand the form of a celestial body charity at all. Therefore, when once we have charity, we which entirely fills the potentiality of its matter, so that cannot lose it. the latter does not retain the potentiality to another form, Objection 3. Further, Gregory says in a homily for is in its subject inseparably. Accordingly the charity of Pentecost (In Evang. xxx) that “God’s love works great the blessed, because it entirely fills the potentiality of the things where it is; if it ceases to work it is not charity.” rational mind, since every actual movement of that mind Now no man loses charity by doing great things. There- is directed to God, is possessed by its subject inseparably: fore if charity be there, it cannot be lost. whereas the charity of the wayfarer does not so fill the Objection 4. Further, the free-will is not inclined to potentiality of its subject, because the latter is not always sin unless by some motive for sinning. Now charity ex- actually directed to God: so that when it is not actually cludes all motives for sinning, both self-love and cupidity, directed to God, something may occur whereby charity is and all such things. Therefore charity cannot be lost. lost. On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 2:4): “I have It is proper to a habit to incline a power to act, and somewhat against thee, because thou hast left thy first this belongs to a habit, in so far as it makes whatever is charity.” suitable to it, to seem good, and whatever is unsuitable, to I answer that, The Holy Ghost dwells in us by char- seem evil. For as the taste judges of savors according to its ity, as shown above (a. 2; Qq. 23,24). We can, accord- disposition, even so does the human mind judge of things ingly, consider charity in three ways: first on the part of to be done, according to its habitual disposition. Hence the Holy Ghost, Who moves the soul to love God, and in the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that “such as a man this respect charity is incompatible with sin through the is, so does the end appear to him.” Accordingly charity is power of the Holy Ghost, Who does unfailingly whatever inseparable from its possessor, where that which pertains He wills to do. Hence it is impossible for these two things to charity cannot appear otherwise than good, and that is to be true at the same time—that the Holy Ghost should in heaven, where God is seen in His Essence, which is will to move a certain man to an act of charity, and that this the very essence of goodness. Therefore the charity of man, by sinning, should lose charity. For the gift of perse- heaven cannot be lost, whereas the charity of the way can, verance is reckoned among the blessings of God whereby because in this state God is not seen in His Essence, which “whoever is delivered, is most certainly delivered,” as Au- is the essence of goodness. gustine says in his book on the Predestination of the saints Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted speaks (De Dono Persev. xiv). from the point of view of the power of the Holy Ghost, Secondly, charity may be considered as such, and by Whose safeguarding, those whom He wills to move thus it is incapable of anything that is against its nature. are rendered immune from sin, as much as He wills. Wherefore charity cannot sin at all, even as neither can Reply to Objection 2. The charity which can fail by heat cool, nor unrighteousness do good, as Augustine says reason of itself is no true charity; for this would be the (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 24). case, were its love given only for a time, and afterwards ∗ The quotation is from De Salutaribus Documentis ad quemdam comitem, vii., among the works of Paul of Friuli, more commonly known as Paul the Deacon, a monk of Monte Cassino. 1309 were to cease, which would be inconsistent with true love. count of the condition of its subject. If, however, charity be lost through the changeableness of Reply to Objection 4. Charity by reason of its act the subject, and against the purpose of charity included in excludes every motive for sinning. But it happens some- its act, this is not contrary to true charity. times that charity is not acting actually, and then it is pos- Reply to Objection 3. The love of God ever works sible for a motive to intervene for sinning, and if we con- great things in its purpose, which is essential to charity; sent to this motive, we lose charity. but it does not always work great things in its act, on ac- Whether charity is lost through one mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 24 a. 12 Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not lost the. . . true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent.” through one mortal sin. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): Now no man can be worthy, at the same time, of eternal “When a man who has mounted to the stage of perfection, life and of eternal death. Therefore it is impossible for a is satiated, I do not think that he will become empty or fall man to have charity with a mortal sin. Therefore charity away suddenly; but he must needs do so gradually and by is destroyed by one mortal sin. little and little.” But man falls away by losing charity. I answer that, That one contrary is removed by the Therefore charity is not lost through only one mortal sin. other contrary supervening. Now every mortal sin is con- Objection 2. Further, Pope Leo in a sermon on the trary to charity by its very nature, which consists in man’s Passion (60) addresses Peter thus: “Our Lord saw in thee loving God above all things, and subjecting himself to not a conquered faith, not an averted love, but constancy Him entirely, by referring all that is his to God. It is there- shaken. Tears abounded where love never failed, and the fore essential to charity that man should so love God as to words uttered in trepidation were washed away by the wish to submit to Him in all things, and always to follow fount of charity.” From this Bernard∗ drew his assertion the rule of His commandments; since whatever is contrary that “charity in Peter was not quenched, but cooled.” But to His commandments is manifestly contrary to charity, Peter sinned mortally in denying Christ. Therefore charity and therefore by its very nature is capable of destroying is not lost through one mortal sin. charity. Objection 3. Further, charity is stronger than an ac- If indeed charity were an acquired habit dependent on quired virtue. Now a habit of acquired virtue is not de- the power of its subject, it would not necessarily be re- stroyed by one contrary sinful act. Much less, therefore, moved by one mortal sin, for act is directly contrary, not is charity destroyed by one contrary mortal sin. to habit but to act. Now the endurance of a habit in its Objection 4. Further, charity denotes love of God and subject does not require the endurance of its act, so that our neighbor. Now, seemingly, one may commit a mortal when a contrary act supervenes the acquired habit is not sin, and yet retain the love of God and one’s neighbor; be- at once done away. But charity, being an infused habit, de- cause an inordinate affection for things directed to the end, pends on the action of God Who infuses it, Who stands in does not remove the love for the end, as stated above (a. 10 relation to the infusion and safekeeping of charity, as the ). Therefore charity towards God can endure, though there sun does to the diffusion of light in the air, as stated above be a mortal sin through an inordinate affection for some (a. 10, obj. 3). Consequently, just as the light would cease temporal good. at once in the air, were an obstacle placed to its being lit Objection 5. Further, the object of a theological virtue up by the sun, even so charity ceases at once to be in the is the last end. Now the other theological virtues, namely soul through the placing of an obstacle to the outpouring faith and hope, are not done away by one mortal sin, in of charity by God into the soul. fact they remain though lifeless. Therefore charity can Now it is evident that through every mortal sin which remain without a form, even when a mortal sin has been is contrary to God’s commandments, an obstacle is placed committed. to the outpouring of charity, since from the very fact that On the contrary, By mortal sin man becomes deserv- a man chooses to prefer sin to God’s friendship, which re- ing of eternal death, according to Rom. 6:23: “The wages quires that we should obey His will, it follows that the of sin is death.” On the other hand whoever has charity habit of charity is lost at once through one mortal sin. is deserving of eternal life, for it is written (Jn. 14:21): Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) that “man is “He that loveth Me, shall be loved by My Father: and enlightened by God’s presence, but he is darkened at once I will love Him, and will manifest Myself to him,” in by God’s absence, because distance from Him is effected which manifestation everlasting life consists, according to not by change of place but by aversion of the will.” Jn. 17:3: “This is eternal life; that they may know Thee Reply to Objection 1. This saying of Origen may be ∗ William of St. Thierry, De Nat. et Dig. Amoris. vi. 1310 understood, in one way, that a man who is in the state of that Peter lost charity; yet he soon recovered it. perfection, does not suddenly go so far as to commit a The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what mortal sin, but is disposed thereto by some previous neg- has been said. ligence, for which reason venial sins are said to be dispo- Reply to Objection 4. Not every inordinate affection sitions to mortal sin, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 88, a. 3). for things directed to the end, i.e., for created goods, con- Nevertheless he falls, and loses charity through the one stitutes a mortal sin, but only such as is directly contrary mortal sin if he commits it. to the Divine will; and then the inordinate affection is con- Since, however, he adds: “If some slight slip should trary to charity, as stated. occur, and he recover himself quickly he does not appear Reply to Objection 5. Charity denotes union with to fall altogether,” we may reply in another way, that when God, whereas faith and hope do not. Now every mortal he speaks of a man being emptied and falling away alto- sin consists in aversion from God, as stated above (Gen. gether, he means one who falls so as to sin through malice; ad lit. viii, 12). Consequently every moral sin is contrary and this does not occur in a perfect man all at once. to charity, but not to faith and hope, but only certain de- Reply to Objection 2. Charity may be lost in two terminate sins, which destroy the habit of faith or of hope, ways; first, directly, by actual contempt, and, in this way, even as charity is destroyed by every moral sin. Hence Peter did not lose charity. Secondly, indirectly, when a sin it is evident that charity cannot remain lifeless, since it is is committed against charity, through some passion of de- itself the ultimate form regarding God under the aspect of sire or fear; it was by sinning against charity in this way, last end as stated above (q. 23, a. 8). 1311 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 25 Of the Object of Charity (In Twelve Articles) We must now consider the object of charity; which consideration will be twofold: (1) The things we ought to love out of charity: (2) The order in which they ought to be loved. Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether we should love God alone, out of charity, or should we love our neighbor also? (2) Whether charity should be loved out of charity? (3) Whether irrational creatures ought to be loved out of charity? (4) Whether one may love oneself out of charity? (5) Whether one’s own body? (6) Whether sinners should be loved out of charity? (7) Whether sinners love themselves? (8) Whether we should love our enemies out of charity? (9) Whether we are bound to show them tokens of friendship? (10) Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity? (11) Whether we ought to love the demons? (12) How to enumerate the things we are bound to love out of charity. Whether the love of charity stops at God, or extends to our neighbor? IIa IIae q. 25 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the love of charity the same act that tends to an aspect of the object, and that stops at God and does not extend to our neighbor. For tends to the object under that aspect: thus it is specifically as we owe God love, so do we owe Him fear, accord- the same visual act whereby we see the light, and whereby ing Dt. 10:12: “And now Israel, what doth the Lord thy we see the color under the aspect of light. God require of thee, but that thou fear. . . and love Him?” Now the aspect under which our neighbor is to be Now the fear with which we fear man, and which is called loved, is God, since what we ought to love in our neighbor human fear, is distinct from the fear with which we fear is that he may be in God. Hence it is clear that it is specif- God, and which is either servile or filial, as is evident from ically the same act whereby we love God, and whereby what has been stated above (q. 10, a. 2). Therefore also we love our neighbor. Consequently the habit of charity the love with which we love God, is distinct from the love extends not only to the love of God, but also to the love of with which we love our neighbor. our neighbor. Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. Reply to Objection 1. We may fear our neighbor, viii, 8) that “to be loved is to be honored.” Now the honor even as we may love him, in two ways: first, on account due to God, which is known as “latria,” is distinct from the of something that is proper to him, as when a man fears honor due to a creature, and known as “dulia.” Therefore a tyrant on account of his cruelty, or loves him by reason again the love wherewith we love God, is distinct from of his own desire to get something from him. Such like that with which we love our neighbor. human fear is distinct from the fear of God, and the same Objection 3. Further, hope begets charity, as a gloss applies to love. Secondly, we fear a man, or love him on states on Mat. 1:2. Now hope is so due to God that it account of what he has of God; as when we fear the sec- is reprehensible to hope in man, according to Jer. 17:5: ular power by reason of its exercising the ministry of God “Cursed be the man that trusteth in man.” Therefore char- for the punishment of evildoers, and love it for its justice: ity is so due to God, as not to extend to our neighbor. such like fear of man is not distinct from fear of God, as On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:21): “This com- neither is such like love. mandment we have from God, that he, who loveth God, Reply to Objection 2. Love regards good in general, love also his brother.” whereas honor regards the honored person’s own good, I answer that, As stated above (q. 17, a. 6; q. 19, a. 3; for it is given to a person in recognition of his own virtue. Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 3) habits are not differentiated except Hence love is not differentiated specifically on account their acts be of different species. For every act of the one of the various degrees of goodness in various persons, so species belongs to the same habit. Now since the species long as it is referred to one good common to all, whereas of an act is derived from its object, considered under its honor is distinguished according to the good belonging to formal aspect, it follows of necessity that it is specifically individuals. Consequently we love all our neighbors with 1312 the same love of charity, in so far as they are referred to though he were the principal author of salvation, but not, one good common to them all, which is God; whereas we to hope in man as helping us ministerially under God. In give various honors to various people, according to each like manner it would be wrong if a man loved his neighbor one’s own virtue, and likewise to God we give the singular as though he were his last end, but not, if he loved him for honor of latria on account of His singular virtue. God’s sake; and this is what charity does. Reply to Objection 3. It is wrong to hope in man as Whether we should love charity out of charity? IIa IIae q. 25 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that charity need not be whose object is the true, understands that it understands, loved out of charity. For the things to be loved out of because this again is something true. Love, however, even charity are contained in the two precepts of charity (Mat. by reason of its own species, is capable of reflecting on 22:37-39): and neither of them includes charity, since itself, because it is a spontaneous movement of the lover charity is neither God nor our neighbor. Therefore charity towards the beloved, wherefore from the moment a man need not be loved out of charity. loves, he loves himself to love. Objection 2. Further, charity is founded on the fel- Yet charity is not love simply, but has the nature of lowship of happiness, as stated above (q. 23, a. 1). But friendship, as stated above (q. 23, a. 1). Now by friend- charity cannot participate in happiness. Therefore charity ship a thing is loved in two ways: first, as the friend for need not be loved out of charity. whom we have friendship, and to whom we wish good Objection 3. Further, charity is a kind of friendship, things: secondly, as the good which we wish to a friend. as stated above (q. 23, a. 1). But no man can have friend- It is in the latter and not in the former way that charity ship for charity or for an accident, since such things can- is loved out of charity, because charity is the good which not return love for love, which is essential to friendship, as we desire for all those whom we love out of charity. The stated in Ethic. viii. Therefore charity need not be loved same applies to happiness, and to the other virtues. out of charity. Reply to Objection 1. God and our neighbor are those On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 8): with whom we are friends, but love of them includes the “He that loves his neighbor, must, in consequence, love loving of charity, since we love both God and our neigh- love itself.” But we love our neighbor out of charity. bor, in so far as we love ourselves and our neighbor to Therefore it follows that charity also is loved out of char- love God, and this is to love charity. ity. Reply to Objection 2. Charity is itself the fellowship I answer that, Charity is love. Now love, by reason of the spiritual life, whereby we arrive at happiness: hence of the nature of the power whose act it is, is capable of it is loved as the good which we desire for all whom we reflecting on itself; for since the object of the will is the love out of charity. universal good, whatever has the aspect of good, can be Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the object of an act of the will: and since to will is itself a friendship as referred to those with whom we are friends. good, man can will himself to will. Even so the intellect, Whether irrational creatures also ought to be loved out of charity? IIa IIae q. 25 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that irrational creatures irrational creatures. also ought to be loved out of charity. For it is chiefly by Objection 3. Further, just as the object of charity charity that we are conformed to God. Now God loves is God. so is the object of faith. Now faith extends irrational creatures out of charity, for He loves “all things to irrational creatures, since we believe that heaven and that are” (Wis. 11:25), and whatever He loves, He loves earth were created by God, that the fishes and birds were by Himself Who is charity. Therefore we also should love brought forth out of the waters, and animals that walk, and irrational creatures out of charity. plants, out of the earth. Therefore charity extends also to Objection 2. Further, charity is referred to God prin- irrational creatures. cipally, and extends to other things as referable to God. On the contrary, The love of charity extends to none Now just as the rational creature is referable to God, in but God and our neighbor. But the word neighbor cannot as much as it bears the resemblance of image, so too, are be extended to irrational creatures, since they have no fel- the irrational creatures, in as much as they bear the re- lowship with man in the rational life. Therefore charity semblance of a trace∗. Therefore charity extends also to does not extend to irrational creatures. ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 45, a. 7 1313 I answer that, According to what has been stated life which is regulated by reason. Hence friendship with above (q. 13, a. 1) charity is a kind of friendship. Now irrational creatures is impossible, except metaphorically the love of friendship is twofold: first, there is the love speaking. The third reason is proper to charity, for char- for the friend to whom our friendship is given, secondly, ity is based on the fellowship of everlasting happiness, to the love for those good things which we desire for our which the irrational creature cannot attain. Therefore we friend. With regard to the first, no irrational creature can cannot have the friendship of charity towards an irrational be loved out of charity; and for three reasons. Two of creature. these reasons refer in a general way to friendship, which Nevertheless we can love irrational creatures out of cannot have an irrational creature for its object: first be- charity, if we regard them as the good things that we de- cause friendship is towards one to whom we wish good sire for others, in so far, to wit, as we wish for their preserthings, while, properly speaking, we cannot wish good vation, to God’s honor and man’s use; thus too does God things to an irrational creature, because it is not compe- love them out of charity. tent, properly speaking, to possess good, this being proper Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident. to the rational creature which, through its free-will, is the Reply to Objection 2. The likeness by way of trace master of its disposal of the good it possesses. Hence the does not confer the capacity for everlasting life, whereas Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 6) that we do not speak of good the likeness of image does: and so the comparison fails. or evil befalling such like things, except metaphorically. Reply to Objection 3. Faith can extend to all that is Secondly, because all friendship is based on some fellow- in any way true, whereas the friendship of charity extends ship in life; since “nothing is so proper to friendship as to only to such things as have a natural capacity for everlast- live together,” as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. viii, 5). ing life; wherefore the comparison fails. Now irrational creatures can have no fellowship in human Whether a man ought to love himself out of charity? IIa IIae q. 25 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that a man is bound to whereas a man is one with himself which is more than be- love himself out of charity. For Gregory says in a homily ing united to another. Hence, just as unity is the principle (In Evang. xvii) that there “can be no charity between less of union, so the love with which a man loves himself is than two.” Therefore no man has charity towards himself. the form and root of friendship. For if we have friendship Objection 2. Further, friendship, by its very nature, with others it is because we do unto them as we do unto implies mutual love and equality (Ethic. viii, 2,7), which ourselves, hence we read in Ethic. ix, 4,8, that “the ori- cannot be of one man towards himself. But charity is a gin of friendly relations with others lies in our relations kind of friendship, as stated above (q. 23, a. 1). Therefore to ourselves.” Thus too with regard to principles we have a man cannot have charity towards himself. something greater than science, namely understanding. Objection 3. Further, anything relating to charity Secondly, we may speak of charity in respect of its cannot be blameworthy, since charity “dealeth not per- specific nature, namely as denoting man’s friendship with versely” (1 Cor. 23:4). Now a man deserves to be blamed God in the first place, and, consequently, with the things for loving himself, since it is written (2 Tim. 3:1,2): “In of God, among which things is man himself who has char- the last days shall come dangerous times, men shall be ity. Hence, among these other things which he loves out of lovers of themselves.” Therefore a man cannot love him- charity because they pertain to God, he loves also himself self out of charity. out of charity. On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 19:18): “Thou Reply to Objection 1. Gregory speaks there of char- shalt love thy friend as thyself.” Now we love our friends ity under the general notion of friendship: and the Second out of charity. Therefore we should love ourselves too out Objection is to be taken in the same sense. of charity. Reply to Objection 3. Those who love themselves are I answer that, Since charity is a kind of friendship, as to be blamed, in so far as they love themselves as regards stated above (q. 23, a. 1), we may consider charity from their sensitive nature, which they humor. This is not to two standpoints: first, under the general notion of friend- love oneself truly according to one’s rational nature, so as ship, and in this way we must hold that, properly speak- to desire for oneself the good things which pertain to the ing, a man is not a friend to himself, but something more perfection of reason: and in this way chiefly it is through than a friend, since friendship implies union, for Diony- charity that a man loves himself. sius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “love is a unitive force,” 1314 Whether a man ought to love his body out of charity? IIa IIae q. 25 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that a man ought not to we love God, we ought to love our bodies also, but we love his body out of charity. For we do not love one with ought not to love the evil effects of sin and the corruption whom we are unwilling to associate. But those who have of punishment; we ought rather, by the desire of charity, charity shun the society of the body, according to Rom. to long for the removal of such things. 7:24: “Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?” Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle did not shrink and Phil. 1:23: “Having a desire to be dissolved and to be from the society of his body, as regards the nature of with Christ.” Therefore our bodies are not to be loved out the body, in fact in this respect he was loth to be de- of charity. prived thereof, according to 2 Cor. 5:4: “We would not Objection 2. Further, the friendship of charity is be unclothed, but clothed over.” He did, however, wish based on fellowship in the enjoyment of God. But the to escape from the taint of concupiscence, which remains body can have no share in that enjoyment. Therefore the in the body, and from the corruption of the body which body is not to be loved out of charity. weighs down the soul, so as to hinder it from seeing God. Objection 3. Further, since charity is a kind of friend- Hence he says expressly: “From the body of this death.” ship it is towards those who are capable of loving in re- Reply to Objection 2. Although our bodies are un- turn. But our body cannot love us out of charity. There- able to enjoy God by knowing and loving Him, yet by the fore it should not be loved out of charity. works which we do through the body, we are able to attain On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. to the perfect knowledge of God. Hence from the enjoy- i, 23,26) that there are four things that we should love out ment in the soul there overflows a certain happiness into of charity, and among them he reckons our own body. the body, viz., “the flush of health and incorruption,” as I answer that, Our bodies can be considered in two Augustine states (Ep. ad Dioscor. cxviii). Hence, since ways: first, in respect of their nature, secondly, in respect the body has, in a fashion, a share of happiness, it can be of the corruption of sin and its punishment. loved with the love of charity. Now the nature of our body was created, not by an evil Reply to Objection 3. Mutual love is found in the principle, as the Manicheans pretend, but by God. Hence friendship which is for another, but not in that which a we can use it for God’s service, according to Rom. 6:13: man has for himself, either in respect of his soul, or in “Present. . . your members as instruments of justice unto respect of his body. God.” Consequently, out of the love of charity with which Whether we ought to love sinners out of charity? IIa IIae q. 25 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to love in, and will the same things. Now charity does not make sinners out of charity. For it is written (Ps. 118:113): us will what sinners will, nor to rejoice in what gives them “I have hated the unjust.” But David had perfect charity. joy, but rather the contrary. Therefore sinners should not Therefore sinners should be hated rather than loved, out be loved out of charity. of charity. Objection 5. Further, it is proper to friends to asso- Objection 2. Further, “love is proved by deeds” as ciate together, according to Ethic. viii. But we ought not Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx). to associate with sinners, according to 2 Cor. 6:17: “Go But good men do no works of the unjust: on the contrary, ye out from among them.” Therefore we should not love they do such as would appear to be works of hate, accord- sinners out of charity. ing to Ps. 100:8: “In the morning I put to death all the On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. wicked of the land”: and God commanded (Ex. 22:18): i, 30) that “when it is said: ‘Thou shalt love thy neigh- “Wizards thou shalt not suffer to live.” Therefore sinners bor,’ it is evident that we ought to look upon every man as should not be loved out of charity. our neighbor.” Now sinners do not cease to be men, for Objection 3. Further, it is part of friendship that one sin does not destroy nature. Therefore we ought to love should desire and wish good things for one’s friends. Now sinners out of charity. the saints, out of charity, desire evil things for the wicked, I answer that, Two things may be considered in the according to Ps. 9:18: “May the wicked be turned into sinner: his nature and his guilt. According to his na- hell∗.” Therefore sinners should not be loved out of char- ture, which he has from God, he has a capacity for happi- ity. ness, on the fellowship of which charity is based, as stated Objection 4. Further, it is proper to friends to rejoice above (a. 3; q. 23, Aa. 1,5), wherefore we ought to love ∗ Douay and A. V.: ‘The wicked shall be,’ etc. See Reply to this Objection. 1315 sinners, out of charity, in respect of their nature. put an end to the sin, because the sinner is thus deprived On the other hand their guilt is opposed to God, and of the power to sin any more. is an obstacle to happiness. Wherefore, in respect of their Reply to Objection 3. Such like imprecations which guilt whereby they are opposed to God, all sinners are to we come across in Holy Writ, may be understood in three be hated, even one’s father or mother or kindred, accord- ways: first, by way of prediction, not by way of wish, ing to Lk. 12:26. For it is our duty to hate, in the sinner, so that the sense is: “May the wicked be,” that is, “The his being a sinner, and to love in him, his being a man ca- wicked shall be, turned into hell.” Secondly, by way of pable of bliss; and this is to love him truly, out of charity, wish, yet so that the desire of the wisher is not referred to for God’s sake. the man’s punishment, but to the justice of the punisher, Reply to Objection 1. The prophet hated the unjust, according to Ps. 57:11: “The just shall rejoice when he as such, and the object of his hate was their injustice, shall see the revenge,” since, according to Wis. 1:13, not which was their evil. Such hatred is perfect, of which he even God “hath pleasure in the destruction of the wicked himself says (Ps. 138:22): “I have hated them with a per- [Vulg.: ‘living’]” when He punishes them, but He rejoices fect hatred.” Now hatred of a person’s evil is equivalent to in His justice, according to Ps. 10:8: “The Lord is just and love of his good. Hence also this perfect hatred belongs hath loved justice.” Thirdly, so that this desire is referred to charity. to the removal of the sin, and not to the punishment itself, Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher observes to the effect, namely, that the sin be destroyed, but that the (Ethic. ix, 3), when our friends fall into sin, we ought man may live. not to deny them the amenities of friendship, so long as Reply to Objection 4. We love sinners out of char- there is hope of their mending their ways, and we ought ity, not so as to will what they will, or to rejoice in what to help them more readily to regain virtue than to recover gives them joy, but so as to make them will what we will, money, had they lost it, for as much as virtue is more akin and rejoice in what rejoices us. Hence it is written (Jer. than money to friendship. When, however, they fall into 15:19): “They shall be turned to thee, and thou shalt not very great wickedness, and become incurable, we ought to be turned to them.” no longer to show them friendliness. It is for this rea- Reply to Objection 5. The weak should avoid associ- son that both Divine and human laws command such like ating with sinners, on account of the danger in which they sinners to be put to death, because there is greater likeli- stand of being perverted by them. But it is commendable hood of their harming others than of their mending their for the perfect, of whose perversion there is no fear, to ways. Nevertheless the judge puts this into effect, not out associate with sinners that they may convert them. For of hatred for the sinners, but out of the love of charity, by thus did Our Lord eat and drink with sinners as related by reason of which he prefers the public good to the life of Mat. 9:11-13. Yet all should avoid the society of sinners, the individual. Moreover the death inflicted by the judge as regards fellowship in sin; in this sense it is written (2 profits the sinner, if he be converted, unto the expiation of Cor. 6:17): “Go out from among them. . . and touch not his crime; and, if he be not converted, it profits so as to the unclean thing,” i.e. by consenting to sin. Whether sinners love themselves? IIa IIae q. 25 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that sinners love them- On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 10:6): “He that selves. For that which is the principle of sin, is most of loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul.” all in the sinner. Now love of self is the principle of sin, I answer that, Love of self is common to all, in one since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that it “builds way; in another way it is proper to the good; in a third up the city of Babylon.” Therefore sinners most of all love way, it is proper to the wicked. For it is common to all themselves. for each one to love what he thinks himself to be. Now Objection 2. Further, sin does not destroy nature. a man is said to be a thing, in two ways: first, in respect Now it is in keeping with nature that every man should of his substance and nature, and, this way all think them- love himself: wherefore even irrational creatures naturally selves to be what they are, that is, composed of a soul and desire their own good, for instance, the preservation of body. In this way too, all men, both good and wicked, love their being, and so forth. Therefore sinners love them- themselves, in so far as they love their own preservation. selves. Secondly, a man is said to be something in respect of Objection 3. Further, good is beloved by all, as some predominance, as the sovereign of a state is spoken Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now many sinners of as being the state, and so, what the sovereign does, the reckon themselves to be good. Therefore many sinners state is said to do. In this way, all do not think themselves love themselves. to be what they are. For the reasoning mind is the pre- 1316 dominant part of man, while the sensitive and corporeal experience no clashing of wills, since their whole soul nature takes the second place, the former of which the tends to one thing. Apostle calls the “inward man,” and the latter, the “out- On the other hand, the wicked have no wish to be pre- ward man” (2 Cor. 4:16). Now the good look upon their served in the integrity of the inward man, nor do they de- rational nature or the inward man as being the chief thing sire spiritual goods for him, nor do they work for that end, in them, wherefore in this way they think themselves to nor do they take pleasure in their own company by en- be what they are. On the other hand, the wicked reckon tering into their own hearts, because whatever they find their sensitive and corporeal nature, or the outward man, there, present, past and future, is evil and horrible; nor do to hold the first place. Wherefore, since they know not they agree with themselves, on account of the gnawings of themselves aright, they do not love themselves aright, but conscience, according to Ps. 49:21: “I will reprove thee love what they think themselves to be. But the good know and set before thy face.” themselves truly, and therefore truly love themselves. In the same manner it may be shown that the wicked The Philosopher proves this from five things that are love themselves, as regards the corruption of the outward proper to friendship. For in the first place, every friend man, whereas the good do not love themselves thus. wishes his friend to be and to live; secondly, he desires Reply to Objection 1. The love of self which is the good things for him; thirdly, he does good things to him; principle of sin is that which is proper to the wicked, and fourthly, he takes pleasure in his company; fifthly, he is reaches “to the contempt of God,” as stated in the passage of one mind with him, rejoicing and sorrowing in almost quoted, because the wicked so desire external goods as to the same things. In this way the good love themselves, despise spiritual goods. as to the inward man, because they wish the preservation Reply to Objection 2. Although natural love is not thereof in its integrity, they desire good things for him, altogether forfeited by wicked men, yet it is perverted in namely spiritual goods, indeed they do their best to ob- them, as explained above. tain them, and they take pleasure in entering into their Reply to Objection 3. The wicked have some share own hearts, because they find there good thoughts in the of self-love, in so far as they think themselves good. Yet present, the memory of past good, and the hope of future such love of self is not true but apparent: and even this is good, all of which are sources of pleasure. Likewise they not possible in those who are very wicked. Whether charity requires that we should love our enemies? IIa IIae q. 25 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that charity does not enemies as such: this is perverse, and contrary to charity, require us to love our enemies. For Augustine says since it implies love of that which is evil in another. (Enchiridion lxxiii) that “this great good,” namely, the Secondly love of one’s enemies may mean that we love of our enemies, is “not so universal in its applica- love them as to their nature, but in general: and in this tion, as the object of our petition when we say: Forgive sense charity requires that we should love our enemies, us our trespasses.” Now no one is forgiven sin without he namely, that in loving God and our neighbor, we should have charity, because, according to Prov. 10:12, “charity not exclude our enemies from the love given to our neigh- covereth all sins.” Therefore charity does not require that bor in general. we should love our enemies. Thirdly, love of one’s enemies may be considered as Objection 2. Further, charity does not do away with specially directed to them, namely, that we should have nature. Now everything, even an irrational being, natu- a special movement of love towards our enemies. Char- rally hates its contrary, as a lamb hates a wolf, and water ity does not require this absolutely, because it does not fire. Therefore charity does not make us love our enemies. require that we should have a special movement of love Objection 3. Further, charity “doth nothing per- to every individual man, since this would be impossible. versely” (1 Cor. 13:4). Now it seems perverse to love Nevertheless charity does require this, in respect of our one’s enemies, as it would be to hate one’s friends: hence being prepared in mind, namely, that we should be ready Joab upbraided David by saying (2 Kings 19:6): “Thou to love our enemies individually, if the necessity were to lovest them that hate thee, and thou hatest them that love occur. That man should actually do so, and love his en- thee.” Therefore charity does not make us love our ene- emy for God’s sake, without it being necessary for him to mies. do so, belongs to the perfection of charity. For since man On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 4:44): “Love loves his neighbor, out of charity, for God’s sake, the more your enemies.” he loves God, the more does he put enmities aside and I answer that, Love of one’s enemies may be under- show love towards his neighbor: thus if we loved a certain stood in three ways. First, as though we were to love our man very much, we would love his children though they 1317 were unfriendly towards us. This is the sense in which their enmity should displease us. They are not, however, Augustine speaks in the passage quoted in the First Ob- contrary to us, as men and capable of happiness: and it is jection, the Reply to which is therefore evident. as such that we are bound to love them. Reply to Objection 2. Everything naturally hates its Reply to Objection 3. It is wrong to love one’s ene- contrary as such. Now our enemies are contrary to us, as mies as such: charity does not do this, as stated above. enemies, wherefore this itself should be hateful to us, for Whether it is necessary for salvation that we should show our enemies the signs and IIa IIae q. 25 a. 9 effects of love? Objection 1. It would seem that charity demands of a precept, that we should inwardly love our enemies in gen- man to show his enemy the signs or effects of love. For eral, but not individually, except as regards the mind being it is written (1 Jn. 3:18): “Let us not love in word nor prepared to do so, as explained above (a. 8). in tongue, but in deed and in truth.” Now a man loves We must accordingly apply this to the showing of the in deed by showing the one he loves signs and effects of effects and signs of love. For some of the signs and fa- love. Therefore charity requires that a man show his ene- vors of love are shown to our neighbors in general, as mies such signs and effects of love. when we pray for all the faithful, or for a whole people, or Objection 2. Further, Our Lord said in the same when anyone bestows a favor on a whole community: and breath (Mat. 5:44): “Love your enemies,” and, “Do good the fulfilment of the precept requires that we should show to them that hate you.” Now charity demands that we love such like favors or signs of love towards our enemies. For our enemies. Therefore it demands also that we should if we did not so, it would be a proof of vengeful spite, “do good to them.” and contrary to what is written (Lev. 19:18): “Seek not Objection 3. Further, not only God but also our neigh- revenge, nor be mindful of the injury of thy citizens.” But bor is the object of charity. Now Gregory says in a homily there are other favors or signs of love, which one shows for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx), that “love of God cannot be to certain persons in particular: and it is not necessary idle for wherever it is it does great things, and if it ceases for salvation that we show our enemies such like favors to work, it is no longer love.” Hence charity towards our and signs of love, except as regards being ready in our neighbor cannot be without producing works. But charity minds, for instance to come to their assistance in a case requires us to love our neighbor without exception, though of urgency, according to Prov. 25:21: “If thy enemy be he be an enemy. Therefore charity requires us to show the hungry, give him to eat; if he thirst, give him. . . drink.” signs and effects of love towards our enemies. Outside cases of urgency, to show such like favors to an On the contrary, A gloss on Mat. 5:44, “Do good to enemy belongs to the perfection of charity, whereby we them that hate you,” says: “To do good to one’s enemies is not only beware, as in duty bound, of being overcome by the height of perfection”∗. Now charity does not require evil, but also wish to overcome evil by good†, which be- us to do that which belongs to its perfection. Therefore longs to perfection: for then we not only beware of being charity does not require us to show the signs and effects drawn into hatred on account of the hurt done to us, but of love to our enemies. purpose to induce our enemy to love us on account of our I answer that, The effects and signs of charity are kindliness. the result of inward love, and are in proportion with it. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. Now it is absolutely necessary, for the fulfilment of the Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity? IIa IIae q. 25 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that we are not bound to Objection 2. Further, dumb animals have more in love the angels out of charity. For, as Augustine says (De common with us than the angels have, since they belong Doctr. Christ. i), charity is a twofold love: the love of to the same proximate genus as we do. But we have not God and of our neighbor. Now love of the angels is not charity towards dumb animals, as stated above (a. 3). Nei- contained in the love of God, since they are created sub- ther, therefore, have we towards the angels. stances; nor is it, seemingly, contained in the love of our Objection 3. Further, nothing is so proper to friends neighbor, since they do not belong with us to a common as companionship with one another (Ethic. viii, 5). But species. Therefore we are not bound to love them out of the angels are not our companions; we cannot even see charity. them. Therefore we are unable to give them the friend- ∗ Augustine, Enchiridion lxxiii † Rom. 12:21 1318 ship of charity. who is united to us in a common species, but also one On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. who is united to us by sharing in the blessings pertaining i, 30): “If the name of neighbor is given either to those to everlasting life, and it is on the latter fellowship that the whom we pity, or to those who pity us, it is evident that friendship of charity is founded. the precept binding us to love our neighbor includes also Reply to Objection 2. Dumb animals are united to the holy angels from whom we receive many merciful fa- us in the proximate genus, by reason of their sensitive na- vors.” ture; whereas we are partakers of everlasting happiness, I answer that, As stated above (q. 23, a. 1), the friend-by reason not of our sensitive nature but of our rational ship of charity is founded upon the fellowship of everlast- mind wherein we associate with the angels. ing happiness, in which men share in common with the Reply to Objection 3. The companionship of the an- angels. For it is written (Mat. 22:30) that “in the resur- gels does not consist in outward fellowship, which we rection. . . men shall be as the angels of God in heaven.” It have in respect of our sensitive nature; it consists in a is therefore evident that the friendship of charity extends fellowship of the mind, imperfect indeed in this life, but also to the angels. perfect in heaven, as stated above (q. 23, a. 1, ad 1). Reply to Objection 1. Our neighbor is not only one Whether we are bound to love the demons out of charity? IIa IIae q. 25 a. 11 Objection 1. It would seem that we ought to love the be loved as the person who is the object of friendship, demons out of charity. For the angels are our neighbors by and thus we cannot have the friendship of charity towards reason of their fellowship with us in a rational mind. But the demons. For it is an essential part of friendship that the demons also share in our fellowship thus, since natu- one should be a well-wisher towards one’s friend; and it ral gifts, such as life and understanding, remain in them is impossible for us, out of charity, to desire the good of unimpaired, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). There- everlasting life, to which charity is referred, for those spir- fore we ought to love the demons out of charity. its whom God has condemned eternally, since this would Objection 2. Further, the demons differ from the be in opposition to our charity towards God whereby we blessed angels in the matter of sin, even as sinners from approve of His justice. just men. Now the just man loves the sinner out of charity. Secondly, we love a thing as being that which we de- Therefore he ought to love the demons also out of charity. sire to be enduring as another’s good. In this way we love Objection 3. Further, we ought, out of charity, to love, irrational creatures out of charity, in as much as we wish as being our neighbors, those from whom we receive fa- them to endure, to give glory to God and be useful to man, vors, as appears from the passage of Augustine quoted as stated above (a. 3): and in this way too we can love the above (a. 9). Now the demons are useful to us in many nature of the demons even out of charity, in as much as things, for “by tempting us they work crowns for us,” as we desire those spirits to endure, as to their natural gifts, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 17). Therefore we ought unto God’s glory. to love the demons out of charity. Reply to Objection 1. The possession of everlasting On the contrary, It is written (Is. 28:18): “Your happiness is not impossible for the angelic mind as it is for league with death shall be abolished, and your covenant the mind of a demon; consequently the friendship of char- with hell shall not stand.” Now the perfection of a peace ity which is based on the fellowship of everlasting life, and covenant is through charity. Therefore we ought not rather than on the fellowship of nature, is possible towards to have charity for the demons who live in hell and com- the angels, but not towards the demons. pass death. Reply to Objection 2. In this life, men who are in sin I answer that, As stated above (a. 6), in the sinner, we retain the possibility of obtaining everlasting happiness: are bound, out of charity, to love his nature, but to hate his not so those who are lost in hell, who, in this respect, are sin. But the name of demon is given to designate a nature in the same case as the demons. deformed by sin, wherefore demons should not be loved Reply to Objection 3. That the demons are useful to out of charity. Without however laying stress on the word, us is due not to their intention but to the ordering of Di- the question as to whether the spirits called demons ought vine providence; hence this leads us to be friends, not with to be loved out of charity, must be answered in accordance them, but with God, Who turns their perverse intention to with the statement made above (Aa. 2,3), that a thing may our profit. be loved out of charity in two ways. First, a thing may 1319 Whether four things are rightly reckoned as to be loved out of charity, viz. God, our IIa IIae q. 25 a. 12 neighbor, our body and ourselves? Objection 1. It would seem that these four things are piness comes by a kind of overflow, namely the human not rightly reckoned as to be loved out of charity, to wit: body. God, our neighbor, our body, and ourselves. For, as Au- Now the source from which happiness flows is lovable gustine states (Tract. super Joan. lxxxiii), “he that loveth by reason of its being the cause of happiness: that which not God, loveth not himself.” Hence love of oneself is in- is a partaker of happiness, can be an object of love for two cluded in the love of God. Therefore love of oneself is not reasons, either through being identified with ourselves, or distinct from the love of God. through being associated with us in partaking of happi- Objection 2. Further, a part ought not to be condi- ness, and in this respect, there are two things to be loved vided with the whole. But our body is part of ourselves. out of charity, in as much as man loves both himself and Therefore it ought not to be condivided with ourselves as his neighbor. a distinct object of love. Reply to Objection 1. The different relations between Objection 3. Further, just as a man has a body, so a lover and the various things loved make a different kind has his neighbor. Since then the love with which a man of lovableness. Accordingly, since the relation between loves his neighbor, is distinct from the love with which a the human lover and God is different from his relation to man loves himself, so the love with which a man loves his himself, these two are reckoned as distinct objects of love, neighbor’s body, ought to be distinct from the love with for the love of the one is the cause of the love of the other, which he loves his own body. Therefore these four things so that the former love being removed the latter is taken are not rightly distinguished as objects to be loved out of away. charity. Reply to Objection 2. The subject of charity is the ra- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. tional mind that can be capable of obtaining happiness, to i, 23): “There are four things to be loved; one which is which the body does not reach directly, but only by a kind above us,” namely God, “another, which is ourselves, a of overflow. Hence, by his reasonable mind which holds third which is nigh to us,” namely our neighbor, “and a the first place in him, man, out of charity, loves himself in fourth which is beneath us,” namely our own body. one way, and his own body in another. I answer that, As stated above (q. 23, Aa. 1,5), the Reply to Objection 3. Man loves his neighbor, both friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of happi- as to his soul and as to his body, by reason of a certain ness. Now, in this fellowship, one thing is considered as fellowship in happiness. Wherefore, on the part of his the principle from which happiness flows, namely God; neighbor, there is only one reason for loving him; and a second is that which directly partakes of happiness, our neighbor’s body is not reckoned as a special object namely men and angels; a third is a thing to which hap- of love. 1320 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 26 Of the Order of Charity (In Thirteen Articles) We must now consider the order of charity, under which head there are thirteen points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is an order in charity? (2) Whether man ought to love God more than his neighbor? (3) Whether more than himself? (4) Whether he ought to love himself more than his neighbor? (5) Whether man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body? (6) Whether he ought to love one neighbor more than another? (7) Whether he ought to love more, a neighbor who is better, or one who is more closely united to him? (8) Whether he ought to love more, one who is akin to him by blood, or one who is united to him by other ties? (9) Whether, out of charity, a man ought to love his son more than his father ? (10) Whether he ought to love his mother more than his father? (11) Whether he ought to love his wife more than his father or mother? (12) Whether we ought to love those who are kind to us more than those whom we are kind to? (13) Whether the order of charity endures in heaven? Whether there is order in charity? IIa IIae q. 26 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no order in erence to the first principle of that love, which is God. charity. For charity is a virtue. But no order is assigned to Reply to Objection 1. Charity tends towards the last the other virtues. Neither, therefore, should any order be end considered as last end: and this does not apply to any assigned to charity. other virtue, as stated above (q. 23, a. 6 ). Now the end Objection 2. Further, just as the object of faith is the has the character of principle in matters of appetite and First Truth, so is the object of charity the Sovereign Good. action, as was shown above (q. 23, a. 7, ad 2; Ia IIae, a. 1, Now no order is appointed for faith, but all things are be- ad 1). Wherefore charity, above all, implies relation to the lieved equally. Neither, therefore, ought there to be any First Principle, and consequently, in charity above all, we order in charity. find an order in reference to the First Principle. Objection 3. Further, charity is in the will: whereas Reply to Objection 2. Faith pertains to the cognitive ordering belongs, not to the will, but to the reason. There- power, whose operation depends on the thing known be- fore no order should be ascribed to charity. ing in the knower. On the other hand, charity is in an ap- On the contrary, It is written (Cant 2:4): “He brought petitive power, whose operation consists in the soul tend- me into the cellar of wine, he set in order charity in me.” ing to things themselves. Now order is to be found in I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, things themselves, and flows from them into our knowl- text. 16), the terms “before” and “after” are used in ref- edge. Hence order is more appropriate to charity than to erence to some principle. Now order implies that certain faith. things are, in some way, before or after. Hence wherever And yet there is a certain order in faith, in so far as it is there is a principle, there must needs be also order of some chiefly about God, and secondarily about things referred kind. But it has been said above (q. 23, a. 1; q. 25, a. 12) to God. that the love of charity tends to God as to the principle Reply to Objection 3. Order belongs to reason as the of happiness, on the fellowship of which the friendship of faculty that orders, and to the appetitive power as to the charity is based. Consequently there must needs be some faculty which is ordered. It is in this way that order is order in things loved out of charity, which order is in ref- stated to be in charity. 1321 Whether God ought to be loved more than our neighbor? IIa IIae q. 26 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that God ought not to Principle, whence it flows to all who are capable of hap- be loved more than our neighbor. For it is written (1 Jn. piness. 4:20): “He that loveth not his brother whom he seeth, how Therefore God ought to be loved chiefly and before all can he love God, Whom he seeth not?” Whence it seems out of charity: for He is loved as the cause of happiness, to follow that the more a thing is visible the more lov- whereas our neighbor is loved as receiving together with able it is, since loving begins with seeing, according to us a share of happiness from Him. Ethic. ix, 5,12. Now God is less visible than our neigh- Reply to Objection 1. A thing is a cause of love in bor. Therefore He is less lovable, out of charity, than our two ways: first, as being the reason for loving. In this way neighbor. good is the cause of love, since each thing is loved accord- Objection 2. Further, likeness causes love, according ing to its measure of goodness. Secondly, a thing causes to Ecclus. 13:19: “Every beast loveth its like.” Now man love, as being a way to acquire love. It is in this way that bears more likeness to his neighbor than to God. There- seeing is the cause of loving, not as though a thing were fore man loves his neighbor, out of charity, more than he lovable according as it is visible, but because by seeing a loves God. thing we are led to love it. Hence it does not follow that Objection 3. Further, what charity loves in a neigh- what is more visible is more lovable, but that as an object bor, is God, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. of love we meet with it before others: and that is the sense i, 22,27). Now God is not greater in Himself than He is of the Apostle’s argument. For, since our neighbor is more in our neighbor. Therefore He is not more to be loved in visible to us, he is the first lovable object we meet with, Himself than in our neighbor. Therefore we ought not to because “the soul learns, from those things it knows, to love God more than our neighbor. love what it knows not,” as Gregory says in a homily (In On the contrary, A thing ought to be loved more, if Evang. xi). Hence it can be argued that, if any man loves others ought to be hated on its account. Now we ought not his neighbor, neither does he love God, not because to hate our neighbor for God’s sake, if, to wit, he leads his neighbor is more lovable, but because he is the first us astray from God, according to Lk. 14:26: “If any man thing to demand our love: and God is more lovable by come to Me and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, reason of His greater goodness. end children, and brethren, and sisters. . . he cannot be My Reply to Objection 2. The likeness we have to God disciple.” Therefore we ought to love God, out of charity, precedes and causes the likeness we have to our neigh- more than our neighbor. bor: because from the very fact that we share along with I answer that, Each kind of friendship regards chiefly our neighbor in something received from God, we become the subject in which we chiefly find the good on the like to our neighbor. Hence by reason of this likeness we fellowship of which that friendship is based: thus civil ought to love God more than we love our neighbor. friendship regards chiefly the ruler of the state, on whom Reply to Objection 3. Considered in His substance, the entire common good of the state depends; hence to God is equally in all, in whomsoever He may be, for He is him before all, the citizens owe fidelity and obedience. not lessened by being in anything. And yet our neighbor Now the friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of does not possess God’s goodness equally with God, for happiness, which consists essentially in God, as the First God has it essentially, and our neighbor by participation. Whether out of charity, man is bound to love God more than himself? IIa IIae q. 26 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that man is not bound, thing are more known. Therefore man loves himself more out of charity, to love God more than himself. For the than any other good loved by him. Therefore he does not Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8) that “a man’s friendly re- love God more than himself. lations with others arise from his friendly relations with Objection 3. Further, a man loves God as much as he himself.” Now the cause is stronger than its effect. There- loves to enjoy God. But a man loves himself as much as fore man’s friendship towards himself is greater than his he loves to enjoy God; since this is the highest good a man friendship for anyone else. Therefore he ought to love can wish for himself. Therefore man is not bound, out of himself more than God. charity, to love God more than himself. Objection 2. Further, one loves a thing in so far as it is On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. one’s own good. Now the reason for loving a thing is more i, 22): “If thou oughtest to love thyself, not for thy own loved than the thing itself which is loved for that reason, sake, but for the sake of Him in Whom is the rightest end even as the principles which are the reason for knowing a of thy love, let no other man take offense if him also thou 1322 lovest for God’s sake.” Now “the cause of a thing being the fellowship of the gifts of grace. such is yet more so.” Therefore man ought to love God Therefore man ought, out of charity, to love God, Who more than himself. is the common good of all, more than himself: since hap- I answer that, The good we receive from God is piness is in God as in the universal and fountain principle twofold, the good of nature, and the good of grace. Now of all who are able to have a share of that happiness. the fellowship of natural goods bestowed on us by God Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking is the foundation of natural love, in virtue of which not of friendly relations towards another person in whom the only man, so long as his nature remains unimpaired, loves good, which is the object of friendship, resides in some God above all things and more than himself, but also ev- restricted way; and not of friendly relations with another ery single creature, each in its own way, i.e. either by an in whom the aforesaid good resides in totality. intellectual, or by a rational, or by an animal, or at least by Reply to Objection 2. The part does indeed love the a natural love, as stones do, for instance, and other things good of the whole, as becomes a part, not however so as bereft of knowledge, because each part naturally loves the to refer the good of the whole to itself, but rather itself to common good of the whole more than its own particular the good of the whole. good. This is evidenced by its operation, since the prin- Reply to Objection 3. That a man wishes to enjoy cipal inclination of each part is towards common action God pertains to that love of God which is love of concu- conducive to the good of the whole. It may also be seen in piscence. Now we love God with the love of friendship civic virtues whereby sometimes the citizens suffer dam- more than with the love of concupiscence, because the age even to their own property and persons for the sake of Divine good is greater in itself, than our share of good in the common good. Wherefore much more is this realized enjoying Him. Hence, out of charity, man simply loves with regard to the friendship of charity which is based on God more than himself. Whether our of charity, man ought to love himself more than his neighbor? IIa IIae q. 26 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that a man ought not, out as stated above (q. 25, Aa. 1,12), God is loved as the prin- of charity, to love himself more than his neighbor. For the ciple of good, on which the love of charity is founded; principal object of charity is God, as stated above (a. 2; while man, out of charity, loves himself by reason of q. 25, Aa. 1,12). Now sometimes our neighbor is more his being a partaker of the aforesaid good, and loves his closely united to God than we are ourselves. Therefore neighbor by reason of his fellowship in that good. Now we ought to love such a one more than ourselves. fellowship is a reason for love according to a certain union Objection 2. Further, the more we love a person, the in relation to God. Wherefore just as unity surpasses more we avoid injuring him. Now a man, out of char- union, the fact that man himself has a share of the Divine ity, submits to injury for his neighbor’s sake, according to good, is a more potent reason for loving than that another Prov. 12:26: “He that neglecteth a loss for the sake of a should be a partner with him in that share. Therefore man, friend, is just.” Therefore a man ought, out of charity, to out of charity, ought to love himself more than his neigh- love his neighbor more than himself. bor: in sign whereof, a man ought not to give way to any Objection 3. Further, it is written (1 Cor. 13:5) “char- evil of sin, which counteracts his share of happiness, not ity seeketh not its own.” Now the thing we love most is even that he may free his neighbor from sin. the one whose good we seek most. Therefore a man does Reply to Objection 1. The love of charity takes its not, out of charity, love himself more than his neighbor. quantity not only from its object which is God, but also On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 19:18, Mat. from the lover, who is the man that has charity, even as 22:39): “Thou shalt love thy neighbor (Lev. 19:18: the quantity of any action depends in some way on the ‘friend’) as thyself.” Whence it seems to follow that man’s subject. Wherefore, though a better neighbor is nearer to love for himself is the model of his love for another. But God, yet because he is not as near to the man who has the model exceeds the copy. Therefore, out of charity, a charity, as this man is to himself, it does not follow that a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor. man is bound to love his neighbor more than himself. I answer that, There are two things in man, his spiri- Reply to Objection 2. A man ought to bear bodily tual nature and his corporeal nature. And a man is said to injury for his friend’s sake, and precisely in so doing he love himself by reason of his loving himself with regard loves himself more as regards his spiritual mind, because to his spiritual nature, as stated above (q. 25, a. 7): so that it pertains to the perfection of virtue, which is a good of accordingly, a man ought, out of charity, to love himself the mind. In spiritual matters, however, man ought not to more than he loves any other person. suffer injury by sinning, in order to free his neighbor from This is evident from the very reason for loving: since, sin, as stated above. 1323 Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says in his Rule dividual than his private good, even as the good of the (Ep. ccxi), the saying, “ ‘charity seeks not her own,’ whole is more lovable to the part, than the latter’s own means that it prefers the common to the private good.” partial good, as stated above (a. 3). Now the common good is always more lovable to the in- Whether a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body? IIa IIae q. 26 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that a man is not bound to in the full participation of happiness which is the reason love his neighbor more than his own body. For his neigh- for loving one’s neighbor, is a greater reason for loving, bor includes his neighbor’s body. If therefore a man ought than the participation of happiness by way of overflow, to love his neighbor more than his own body, it follows which is the reason for loving one’s own body. Therefore, that he ought to love his neighbor’s body more than his as regards the welfare of the soul we ought to love our own. neighbor more than our own body. Objection 2. Further, a man ought to love his own Reply to Objection 1. According to the Philosopher soul more than his neighbor’s, as stated above (a. 4). Now (Ethic. ix, 8) a thing seems to be that which is predomi- a man’s own body is nearer to his soul than his neighbor. nant in it: so that when we say that we ought to love our Therefore we ought to love our body more than our neigh- neighbor more than our own body, this refers to his soul, bor. which is his predominant part. Objection 3. Further, a man imperils that which he Reply to Objection 2. Our body is nearer to our soul loves less for the sake of what he loves more. Now every than our neighbor, as regards the constitution of our own man is not bound to imperil his own body for his neigh- nature: but as regards the participation of happiness, our bor’s safety: this belongs to the perfect, according to Jn. neighbor’s soul is more closely associated with our own 15:13: “Greater love than this no man hath, that a man soul, than even our own body is. lay down his life for his friends.” Therefore a man is not Reply to Objection 3. Every man is immediately con- bound, out of charity, to love his neighbor more than his cerned with the care of his own body, but not with his own body. neighbor’s welfare, except perhaps in cases of urgency: On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. wherefore charity does not necessarily require a man to i, 27) that “we ought to love our neighbor more than our imperil his own body for his neighbor’s welfare, except own body.” in a case where he is under obligation to do so and if a I answer that, Out of charity we ought to love more man of his own accord offer himself for that purpose, this that which has more fully the reason for being loved out of belongs to the perfection of charity. charity, as stated above (a. 2; q. 25, a. 12). Now fellowship Whether we ought to love one neighbor more than another? IIa IIae q. 26 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to love equally. one neighbor more than another. For Augustine says (De On the contrary, One’s obligation to love a person Doctr. Christ. i, 28): “One ought to love all men equally. is proportionate to the gravity of the sin one commits in Since, however, one cannot do good to all, we ought to acting against that love. Now it is a more grievous sin consider those chiefly who by reason of place, time or to act against the love of certain neighbors, than against any other circumstance, by a kind of chance, are more the love of others. Hence the commandment (Lev. 10:9), closely united to us.” Therefore one neighbor ought not to “He that curseth his father or mother, dying let him die,” be loved more than another. which does not apply to those who cursed others than the Objection 2. Further, where there is one and the same above. Therefore we ought to love some neighbors more reason for loving several, there should be no inequality of than others. love. Now there is one and the same reason for loving all I answer that, There have been two opinions on this one’s neighbors, which reason is God, as Augustine states question: for some have said that we ought, out of char- (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27). Therefore we ought to love all ity, to love all our neighbors equally, as regards our affec- our neighbors equally. tion, but not as regards the outward effect. They held that Objection 3. Further, to love a man is to wish him the order of love is to be understood as applying to out- good things, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). Now ward favors, which we ought to confer on those who are to all our neighbors we wish an equal good, viz. ever- connected with us in preference to those who are uncon- lasting life. Therefore we ought to love all our neighbors nected, and not to the inward affection, which ought to be 1324 given equally to all including our enemies. ways: first on the part of the good we wish our friend. In But this is unreasonable. For the affection of charity, this respect we love all men equally out of charity: be- which is the inclination of grace, is not less orderly than cause we wish them all one same generic good, namely the natural appetite, which is the inclination of nature, for everlasting happiness. Secondly love is said to be greater both inclinations flow from Divine wisdom. Now we ob- through its action being more intense: and in this way we serve in the physical order that the natural inclination in ought not to love all equally. each thing is proportionate to the act or movement that Or we may reply that we have unequal love for certain is becoming to the nature of that thing: thus in earth the persons in two ways: first, through our loving some and inclination of gravity is greater than in water, because it not loving others. As regards beneficence we are bound to is becoming to earth to be beneath water. Consequently observe this inequality, because we cannot do good to all: the inclination also of grace which is the effect of charity, but as regards benevolence, love ought not to be thus un- must needs be proportionate to those actions which have equal. The other inequality arises from our loving some to be performed outwardly, so that, to wit, the affection more than others: and Augustine does not mean to ex- of our charity be more intense towards those to whom we clude the latter inequality, but the former, as is evident ought to behave with greater kindness. from what he says of beneficence. We must, therefore, say that, even as regards the af- Reply to Objection 2. Our neighbors are not all fection we ought to love one neighbor more than another. equally related to God; some are nearer to Him, by rea- The reason is that, since the principle of love is God, and son of their greater goodness, and those we ought, out of the person who loves, it must needs be that the affection of charity, to love more than those who are not so near to love increases in proportion to the nearness to one or the Him. other of those principles. For as we stated above (a. 1), Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the wherever we find a principle, order depends on relation to quantity of love on the part of the good which we wish that principle. our friends. Reply to Objection 1. Love can be unequal in two Whether we ought to love those who are better more those who are more closely united IIa IIae q. 26 a. 7 us? Objection 1. It would seem that we ought to love man have not care of his own and especially of those of those who are better more than those who are more closely his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an united to us. For that which is in no way hateful seems infidel.” Now the inward affection of charity ought to cor- more lovable than that which is hateful for some reason: respond to the outward effect. Therefore charity regards just as a thing is all the whiter for having less black mixed those who are nearer to us before those who are better. with it. Now those who are connected with us are hate- I answer that, Every act should be proportionate both ful for some reason, according to Lk. 14:26: “If any man to its object and to the agent. But from its object it takes come to Me, and hate not his father,” etc. On the other its species, while, from the power of the agent it takes hand good men are not hateful for any reason. Therefore the mode of its intensity: thus movement has its species it seems that we ought to love those who are better more from the term to which it tends, while the intensity of its than those who are more closely connected with us. speed arises from the disposition of the thing moved and Objection 2. Further, by charity above all, man is the power of the mover. Accordingly love takes its species likened to God. But God loves more the better man. from its object, but its intensity is due to the lover. Therefore man also, out of charity, ought to love the better Now the object of charity’s love is God, and man is the man more than one who is more closely united to him. lover. Therefore the specific diversity of the love which Objection 3. Further, in every friendship that ought to is in accordance with charity, as regards the love of our be loved most which has most to do with the foundation neighbor, depends on his relation to God, so that, out of that friendship: for, by natural friendship we love most of charity, we should wish a greater good to one who is those who are connected with us by nature, our parents nearer to God; for though the good which charity wishes for instance, or our children. Now the friendship of char- to all, viz. everlasting happiness, is one in itself, yet it ity is founded upon the fellowship of happiness, which has various degrees according to various shares of happi- has more to do with better men than with those who are ness, and it belongs to charity to wish God’s justice to be more closely united to us. Therefore, out of charity, we maintained, in accordance with which better men have a ought to love better men more than those who are more fuller share of happiness. And this regards the species of closely connected with us. love; for there are different species of love according to On the contrary, It is written (1 Tim. 5:8): “If any the different goods that we wish for those whom we love. 1325 On the other hand, the intensity of love is measured which charity is based, it follows that charity commands with regard to the man who loves, and accordingly man each act of another friendship, even as the art which is loves those who are more closely united to him, with more about the end commands the art which is about the means. intense affection as to the good he wishes for them, than Consequently this very act of loving someone because he he loves those who are better as to the greater good he is akin or connected with us, or because he is a fellow- wishes for them. countryman or for any like reason that is referable to the Again a further difference must be observed here: for end of charity, can be commanded by charity, so that, some neighbors are connected with us by their natural ori- out of charity both eliciting and commanding, we love in gin, a connection which cannot be severed, since that ori- more ways those who are more nearly connected with us. gin makes them to be what they are. But the goodness Reply to Objection 1. We are commanded to hate, in of virtue, wherein some are close to God, can come and our kindred, not their kinship, but only the fact of their be- go, increase and decrease, as was shown above (q. 24, ing an obstacle between us and God. In this respect they Aa. 4,10,11). Hence it is possible for one, out of char- are not akin but hostile to us, according to Micah 7:6: “A ity, to wish this man who is more closely united to one, men’s enemies are they of his own household.” to be better than another, and so reach a higher degree of Reply to Objection 2. Charity conforms man to God happiness. proportionately, by making man comport himself towards Moreover there is yet another reason for which, out what is his, as God does towards what is His. For we of charity, we love more those who are more nearly con- may, out of charity, will certain things as becoming to us nected with us, since we love them in more ways. For, which God does not will, because it becomes Him not to towards those who are not connected with us we have no will them, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 19, a. 10), when we other friendship than charity, whereas for those who are were treating of the goodness of the will. connected with us, we have certain other friendships, ac- Reply to Objection 3. Charity elicits the act of love cording to the way in which they are connected. Now not only as regards the object, but also as regards the lover, since the good on which every other friendship of the vir- as stated above. The result is that the man who is more tuous is based, is directed, as to its end, to the good on nearly united to us is more loved. Whether we ought to love more those who are connected with us by ties of blood? IIa IIae q. 26 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to love On the contrary, The commandments of the deca- more those who are more closely united to us by ties of logue contain a special precept about the honor due to our blood. For it is written (Prov. 18:24): “A man amiable in parents (Ex. 20:12). Therefore we ought to love more society, shall be more friendly than a brother.” Again, Va- specially those who are united to us by ties of blood. lerius Maximus says (Fact. et Dict. Memor. iv 7): “The I answer that, As stated above (a. 7), we ought out ties of friendship are most strong and in no way yield to of charity to love those who are more closely united to us the ties of blood.” Moreover it is quite certain and unde- more, both because our love for them is more intense, and niable, that as to the latter, the lot of birth is fortuitous, because there are more reasons for loving them. Now in- whereas we contract the former by an untrammelled will, tensity of love arises from the union of lover and beloved: and a solid pledge. Therefore we ought not to love more and therefore we should measure the love of different per- than others those who are united to us by ties of blood. sons according to the different kinds of union, so that Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 7): a man is more loved in matters touching that particular “I love not less you whom I have begotten in the Gospel, union in respect of which he is loved. And, again, in com- than if I had begotten you in wedlock, for nature is no paring love to love we should compare one union with more eager to love than grace.” Surely we ought to love another. Accordingly we must say that friendship among those whom we expect to be with us for ever more than blood relations is based upon their connection by natu- those who will be with us only in this world. Therefore ral origin, the friendship of fellow-citizens on their civic we should not love our kindred more than those who are fellowship, and the friendship of those who are fighting otherwise connected with us. side by side on the comradeship of battle. Wherefore in Objection 3. Further, “Love is proved by deeds,” as matters pertaining to nature we should love our kindred Gregory states (Hom. in Evang. xxx). Now we are bound most, in matters concerning relations between citizens, we to do acts of love to others than our kindred: thus in the should prefer our fellow-citizens, and on the battlefield army a man must obey his officer rather than his father. our fellow-soldiers. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. Therefore we are not bound to love our kindred most of ix, 2) that “it is our duty to render to each class of people all. such respect as is natural and appropriate. This is in fact 1326 the principle upon which we seem to act, for we invite ters where we are free to do as we choose, for instance in our relations to a wedding. . . It would seem to be a spe- matters of action. Yet the friendship of kindred is more cial duty to afford our parents the means of living. . . and stable, since it is more natural, and preponderates over to honor them.” others in matters touching nature: consequently we are The same applies to other kinds of friendship. more beholden to them in the providing of necessaries. If however we compare union with union, it is evi- Reply to Objection 2. Ambrose is speaking of love dent that the union arising from natural origin is prior to, with regard to favors respecting the fellowship of grace, and more stable than, all others, because it is something namely, moral instruction. For in this matter, a man ought affecting the very substance, whereas other unions super- to provide for his spiritual children whom he has begotten vene and may cease altogether. Therefore the friendship spiritually, more than for the sons of his body, whom he is of kindred is more stable, while other friendships may be bound to support in bodily sustenance. stronger in respect of that which is proper to each of them. Reply to Objection 3. The fact that in the battle a Reply to Objection 1. In as much as the friendship man obeys his officer rather than his father proves, that he of comrades originates through their own choice, love of loves his father less, not simply relatively, i.e. as regards this kind takes precedence of the love of kindred in mat- the love which is based on fellowship in battle. Whether a man ought, out of charity, to love his children more than his father? IIa IIae q. 26 a. 9 Objection 1. It seems that a man ought, out of charity, his father, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii). First, to love his children more than his father. For we ought to because parents love their children as being part of them- love those more to whom we are more bound to do good. selves, whereas the father is not part of his son, so that Now we are more bound to do good to our children than to the love of a father for his children, is more like a man’s our parents, since the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:14): “Nei- love for himself. Secondly, because parents know better ther ought the children to lay up for the parents, but the that so and so is their child than vice versa. Thirdly, be- parents for the children.” Therefore a man ought to love cause children are nearer to their parents, as being part of his children more than his parents. them, than their parents are to them to whom they stand Objection 2. Further, grace perfects nature. But par- in the relation of a principle. Fourthly, because parents ents naturally love their children more than these love have loved longer, for the father begins to love his child them, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 12). Therefore at once, whereas the child begins to love his father after a a man ought to love his children more than his parents. lapse of time; and the longer love lasts, the stronger it is, Objection 3. Further, man’s affections are conformed according to Ecclus. 9:14: “Forsake not an old friend, for to God by charity. But God loves His children more than the new will not be like to him.” they love Him. Therefore we also ought to love our chil- Reply to Objection 1. The debt due to a principle is dren more than our parents. submission of respect and honor, whereas that due to the On the contrary, Ambrose∗ says: “We ought to love effect is one of influence and care. Hence the duty of chil- God first, then our parents, then our children, and lastly dren to their parents consists chiefly in honor: while that those of our household.” of parents to their children is especially one of care. I answer that, As stated above (a. 4, ad 1; a. 7), the Reply to Objection 2. It is natural for a man as father degrees of love may be measured from two standpoints. to love his children more, if we consider them as closely First, from that of the object. In this respect the better a connected with him: but if we consider which is the more thing is, and the more like to God, the more is it to be exalted good, the son naturally loves his father more. loved: and in this way a man ought to love his father more Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Doctr. than his children, because, to wit, he loves his father as Christ. i, 32), God loves us for our good and for His honor. his principle, in which respect he is a more exalted good Wherefore since our father is related to us as principle, and more like God. even as God is, it belongs properly to the father to receive Secondly, the degrees of love may be measured from honor from his children, and to the children to be provided the standpoint of the lover, and in this respect a man loves by their parents with what is good for them. Nevertheless more that which is more closely connected with him, in in cases of necessity the child is bound out of the favors which way a man’s children are more lovable to him than received to provide for his parents before all. ∗ Origen, Hom. ii in Cant. 1327 Whether a man ought to love his mother more than his father? IIa IIae q. 26 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that a man ought to love present question is whether the father as father, ought to his mother more than his father. For, as the Philosopher be loved more than the mother as mother. The reason is says (De Gener. Animal. i, 20), “the female produces that virtue and vice may make such a difference in such the body in generation.” Now man receives his soul, not like matters, that friendship may be diminished or de- from his father, but from God by creation, as stated in the stroyed, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. viii, 7). Hence Ia, q. 90, a. 2; q. 118. Therefore a man receives more Ambrose∗ says: “Good servants should be preferred to from his mother than from his father: and consequently wicked children.” he ought to love her more than him. Strictly speaking, however, the father should be loved Objection 2. Further, where greater love is given, more than the mother. For father and mother are loved as greater love is due. Now a mother loves her child more principles of our natural origin. Now the father is princi- than the father does: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, ple in a more excellent way than the mother, because he is 7) that “mothers have greater love for their children. For the active principle, while the mother is a passive and ma- the mother labors more in child-bearing, and she knows terial principle. Consequently, strictly speaking, the father more surely than the father who are her children.” is to be loved more. Objection 3. Further, love should be more fond to- Reply to Objection 1. In the begetting of man, the wards those who have labored for us more, according to mother supplies the formless matter of the body; and the Rom. 16:6: “Salute Mary, who hath labored much among latter receives its form through the formative power that is you.” Now the mother labors more than the father in giv- in the semen of the father. And though this power cannot ing birth and education to her child; wherefore it is written create the rational soul, yet it disposes the matter of the (Ecclus. 7:29): “Forget not the groanings of thy mother.” body to receive that form. Therefore a man ought to love his mother more than his Reply to Objection 2. This applies to another kind of father. love. For the friendship between lover and lover differs On the contrary, Jerome says on Ezech. 44:25 that specifically from the friendship between child and parent: “man ought to love God the Father of all, and then his while the friendship we are speaking of here, is that which own father,” and mentions the mother afterwards. a man owes his father and mother through being begotten I answer that, In making such comparisons as this, of them. we must take the answer in the strict sense, so that the The Reply to the Third Objection is evident. Whether a man ought to love his wife more than his father and mother? IIa IIae q. 26 a. 11 Objection 1. It would seem that a man ought to love ought to love his body less than his neighbor, as stated his wife more than his father and mother. For no man above (a. 5): and among his neighbors he should love his leaves a thing for another unless he love the latter more. parents most. Therefore he ought to love his parents more Now it is written (Gn. 2:24) that “a man shell leave fa- than his wife. ther and mother” on account of his wife. Therefore a man I answer that, As stated above (a. 9), the degrees of ought to love his wife more than his father and mother. love may be taken from the good (which is loved), or from Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:33) the union between those who love. On the part of the good that a husband should “love his wife as himself.” Now a which is the object loved, a man should love his parents man ought to love himself more than his parents. There- more than his wife, because he loves them as his princi- fore he ought to love his wife also more than his parents. ples and considered as a more exalted good. Objection 2. Further, love should be greater where But on the part of the union, the wife ought to be loved there are more reasons for loving. Now there are more rea- more, because she is united with her husband, as one flesh, sons for love in the friendship of a man towards his wife. according to Mat. 19:6: “Therefore now they are not two, For the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12) that “in this but one flesh.” Consequently a man loves his wife more friendship there are the motives of utility, pleasure, and intensely, but his parents with greater reverence. also of virtue, if husband and wife are virtuous.” There- Reply to Objection 1. A man does not in all respects fore a man’s love for his wife ought to be greater than his leave his father and mother for the sake of his wife: for love for his parents. in certain cases a man ought to succor his parents rather On the contrary, According to Eph. 5:28, “men than his wife. He does however leave all his kinsfolk, and ought to love their wives as their own bodies.” Now a man cleaves to his wife as regards the union of carnal connec- ∗ Origen, Hom. ii in Cant. 1328 tion and co-habitation. those for which a man loves his wife; although the latter Reply to Objection 2. The words of the Apostle do outweigh the former as regards the closeness of the union. not mean that a man ought to love his wife equally with As to the argument in the contrary sense, it must be himself, but that a man’s love for himself is the reason for observed that in the words quoted, the particle “as” de- his love of his wife, since she is one with him. notes not equality of love but the motive of love. For the Reply to Objection 3. There are also several reasons principal reason why a man loves his wife is her being for a man’s love for his father; and these, in a certain re- united to him in the flesh. spect, namely, as regards good, are more weighty than Whether a man ought to love more his benefactor than one he has benefited? IIa IIae q. 26 a. 12 Objection 1. It would seem that a man ought to love these are made manifest in our “action.” Secondly, be- his benefactor more than one he has benefited. For Au- cause we all naturally love that in which we see our own gustine says (De Catech. Rud. iv): “Nothing will incite good. Now it is true that the benefactor has some good another more to love you than that you love him first: for of his in the recipient of his benefaction, and the recipient he must have a hard heart indeed, who not only refuses some good in the benefactor; but the benefactor sees his to love, but declines to return love already given.” Now virtuous good in the recipient, while the recipient sees his a man’s benefactor forestalls him in the kindly deeds of useful good in the benefactor. Now it gives more pleasure charity. Therefore we ought to love our benefactors above to see one’s virtuous good than one’s useful good, both all. because it is more enduring for usefulness quickly flits Objection 2. Further, the more grievously we sin by by, and the pleasure of calling a thing to mind is not like ceasing to love a man or by working against him, the more the pleasure of having it present and because it is more ought we to love him. Now it is a more grievous sin to pleasant to recall virtuous goods than the profit we have cease loving a benefactor or to work against him, than to derived from others. Thirdly, because is it the lover’s part cease loving one to whom one has hitherto done kindly to act, since he wills and works the good of the beloved, actions. Therefore we ought to love our benefactors more while the beloved takes a passive part in receiving good, than those to whom we are kind. so that to love surpasses being loved, for which reason Objection 3. Further, of all things lovable, God is the greater love is on the part of the benefactor. Fourthly to be loved most, and then one’s father, as Jerome says∗. because it is more difficult to give than to receive favors: Now these are our greatest benefactors. Therefore a bene- and we are most fond of things which have cost us most factor should be loved above all others. trouble, while we almost despise what comes easy to us. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7), Reply to Objection 1. It is some thing in the bene- that “benefactors seem to love recipients of their benefac- factor that incites the recipient to love him: whereas the tions, rather than vice versa.” benefactor loves the recipient, not through being incited I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 9,11), a thing is by him, but through being moved thereto of his own ac- loved more in two ways: first because it has the character cord: and what we do of our own accord surpasses what of a more excellent good, secondly by reason of a closer we do through another. connection. In the first way we ought to love our benefac- Reply to Objection 2. The love of the beneficiary for tor most, because, since he is a principle of good to the the benefactor is more of a duty, wherefore the contrary is man he has benefited, he has the character of a more ex- the greater sin. On the other hand, the love of the bene- cellent good, as stated above with regard to one’s father factor for the beneficiary is more spontaneous, wherefore (a. 9). it is quicker to act. In the second way, however, we love those more who Reply to Objection 3. God also loves us more than have received benefactions from us, as the Philosopher we love Him, and parents love their children more than proves (Ethic. ix, 7) by four arguments. First because the these love them. Yet it does not follow that we love all recipient of benefactions is the handiwork of the benefac- who have received good from us, more than any of our tor, so that we are wont to say of a man: “He was made by benefactors. For we prefer such benefactors as God and so and so.” Now it is natural to a man to love his own work our parents, from whom we have received the greatest fa- (thus it is to be observed that poets love their own poems): vors, to those on whom we have bestowed lesser benefits. and the reason is that we love “to be” and “to live,” and ∗ Comment. in Ezechiel xliv, 25 1329 Whether the order of charity endures in heaven? IIa IIae q. 26 a. 13 Objection 1. It would seem that the order of charity his better neighbors, because the intensity of the act of does not endure in heaven. For Augustine says (De Vera love arises on the part of the person who loves, as stated Relig. xlviii): “Perfect charity consists in loving greater above (Aa. 7,9). Moreover it is for this that the gift of goods more, and lesser goods less.” Now charity will be charity is bestowed by God on each one, namely, that he perfect in heaven. Therefore a man will love those who may first of all direct his mind to God, and this pertains are better more than either himself or those who are con- to a man’s love for himself, and that, in the second place, nected with him. he may wish other things to be directed to God, and even Objection 2. Further, we love more him to whom we work for that end according to his capacity. wish a greater good. Now each one in heaven wishes As to the order to be observed among our neighbors, a greater good for those who have more good, else his a man will simply love those who are better, according to will would not be conformed in all things to God’s will: the love of charity. Because the entire life of the blessed and there to be better is to have more good. Therefore consists in directing their minds to God, wherefore the in heaven each one loves more those who are better, and entire ordering of their love will be ruled with respect to consequently he loves others more than himself, and one God, so that each one will love more and reckon to be who is not connected with him, more than one who is. nearer to himself those who are nearer to God. For then Objection 3. Further, in heaven love will be entirely one man will no longer succor another, as he needs to in for God’s sake, for then will be fulfilled the words of 1 the present life, wherein each man has to succor those who Cor. 15:28: “That God may be all in all.” Therefore he are closely connected with him rather than those who are who is nearer God will be loved more, so that a man will not, no matter what be the nature of their distress: hence love a better man more than himself, and one who is not it is that in this life, a man, by the inclination of charity, connected with him, more than one who is. loves more those who are more closely united to him, for On the contrary, Nature is not done away, but per- he is under a greater obligation to bestow on them the ef- fected, by glory. Now the order of charity given above fect of charity. It will however be possible in heaven for (Aa. 2,3,4) is derived from nature: since all things nat- a man to love in several ways one who is connected with urally love themselves more than others. Therefore this him, since the causes of virtuous love will not be ban- order of charity will endure in heaven. ished from the mind of the blessed. Yet all these reasons I answer that, The order of charity must needs remain are incomparably surpassed by that which is taken from in heaven, as regards the love of God above all things. For nighness to God. this will be realized simply when man shall enjoy God Reply to Objection 1. This argument should be perfectly. But, as regards the order between man him- granted as to those who are connected together; but as self and other men, a distinction would seem to be nec- regards man himself, he ought to love himself so much essary, because, as we stated above (Aa. 7,9), the degrees the more than others, as his charity is more perfect, since of love may be distinguished either in respect of the good perfect entire reason of his love, for God is man’s charity which a man desires for another, or according to the inten- directs man to God perfectly, and this belongs to love of sity of love itself. In the first way a man will love better oneself, as stated above. men more than himself, and those who are less good, less Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers the than himself: because, by reason of the perfect conformity order of charity in respect of the degree of good one wills of the human to the Divine will, each of the blessed will the person one loves. desire everyone to have what is due to him according to Reply to Objection 3. God will be to each one the Divine justice. Nor will that be a time for advancing by entire reason of his love, for God is man’s entire good. means of merit to a yet greater reward, as happens now For if we make the impossible supposition that God were while it is possible for a man to desire both the virtue and not man’s good, He would not be man’s reason for lov- the reward of a better man, whereas then the will of each ing. Hence it is that in the order of love man should love one will rest within the limits determined by God. But in himself more than all else after God. the second way a man will love himself more than even 1330 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 27 Of the Principle Act of Charity, Which Is to Love (In Eight Articles) We must now consider the act of charity, and (1) the principal act of charity, which is to love, (2) the other acts or effects which follow from that act. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Which is the more proper to charity, to love or to be loved? (2) Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as goodwill? (3) Whether God should be loved for His own sake? (4) Whether God can be loved immediately in this life? (5) Whether God can be loved wholly? (6) Whether the love of God is according to measure? (7) Which is the better, to love one’s friend, or one’s enemy? (8) Which is the better, to love God, or one’s neighbor? Whether to be loved is more proper to charity than to love? IIa IIae q. 27 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it is more proper to of something else. This can be exemplified in two ways. charity to be loved than to love. For the better charity First, in the fact that friends are more commended for lov- is to be found in those who are themselves better. But ing than for being loved, indeed, if they be loved and yet those who are better should be more loved. Therefore to love not, they are blamed. Secondly, because a mother, be loved is more proper to charity. whose love is the greatest, seeks rather to love than to be Objection 2. Further, that which is to be found in loved: for “some women,” as the Philosopher observes more subjects seems to be more in keeping with nature, (Ethic. viii, 8) “entrust their children to a nurse; they do and, for that reason, better. Now, as the Philosopher says love them indeed, yet seek not to be loved in return, if they (Ethic. viii, 8), “many would rather be loved than love, happen not to be loved.” and lovers of flattery always abound.” Therefore it is bet- Reply to Objection 1. A better man, through being ter to be loved than to love, and consequently it is more in better, is more lovable; but through having more perfect keeping with charity. charity, loves more. He loves more, however, in propor- Objection 3. Further, “the cause of anything being tion to the person he loves. For a better man does not love such is yet more so.” Now men love because they are that which is beneath him less than it ought to be loved: loved, for Augustine says (De Catech. Rud. iv) that “noth- whereas he who is less good fails to love one who is better, ing incites another more to love you than that you love as much as he ought to be loved. him first.” Therefore charity consists in being loved rather Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. than in loving. viii, 8), “men wish to be loved in as much as they wish On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, to be honored.” For just as honor is bestowed on a man 8) that friendship consists in loving rather than in being in order to bear witness to the good which is in him, so loved. Now charity is a kind of friendship. Therefore it by being loved a man is shown to have some good, since consists in loving rather than in being loved. good alone is lovable. Accordingly men seek to be loved I answer that, To love belongs to charity as charity. and to be honored, for the sake of something else, viz. to For, since charity is a virtue, by its very essence it has an make known the good which is in the person loved. On inclination to its proper act. Now to be loved is not the act the other hand, those who have charity seek to love for of the charity of the person loved; for this act is to love: the sake of loving, as though this were itself the good of and to be loved is competent to him as coming under the charity, even as the act of any virtue is that virtue’s good. common notion of good, in so far as another tends towards Hence it is more proper to charity to wish to love than to his good by an act of charity. Hence it is clear that to love wish to be loved. is more proper to charity than to be loved: for that which Reply to Objection 3. Some love on account of being befits a thing by reason of itself and its essence is more loved, not so that to be loved is the end of their loving, but competent to it than that which is befitting to it by reason because it is a kind of way leading a man to love. 1331 Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as goodwill? IIa IIae q. 27 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that to love, considered ing the difference between goodwill and the love which is as an act of charity, is nothing else than goodwill. For the a passion, says (Ethic. ix, 5) that goodwill does not im- Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that “to love is to wish a ply impetuosity or desire, that is to say, has not an eager person well”; and this is goodwill. Therefore the act of inclination, because it is by the sole judgment of his rea- charity is nothing but goodwill. son that one man wishes another well. Again such like Objection 2. Further, the act belongs to the same sub- love arises from previous acquaintance, whereas goodwill ject as the habit. Now the habit of charity is in the power sometimes arises suddenly, as happens to us if we look of the will, as stated above (q. 24, a. 1). Therefore the act on at a boxing-match, and we wish one of the boxers to of charity is also an act of the will. But it tends to good win. But the love, which is in the intellective appetite, only, and this is goodwill. Therefore the act of charity is also differs from goodwill, because it denotes a certain nothing else than goodwill. union of affections between the lover and the beloved, Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher reckons five in as much as the lover deems the beloved as somewhat things pertaining to friendship (Ethic. ix, 4), the first of united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends towards which is that a man should wish his friend well; the sec- him. On the other hand, goodwill is a simple act of the ond, that he should wish him to be and to live; the third, will, whereby we wish a person well, even without pre- that he should take pleasure in his company; the fourth, supposing the aforesaid union of the affections with him. that he should make choice of the same things; the fifth, Accordingly, to love, considered as an act of charity, in- that he should grieve and rejoice with him. Now the first cludes goodwill, but such dilection or love adds union of two pertain to goodwill. Therefore goodwill is the first act affections, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) of charity. that “goodwill is a beginning of friendship.” On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher, by thus defin- 5) that “goodwill is neither friendship nor love, but the ing “to love,” does not describe it fully, but mentions only beginning of friendship.” Now charity is friendship, as that part of its definition in which the act of love is chiefly stated above (q. 23, a. 1). Therefore goodwill is not the manifested. same as to love considered as an act of charity. Reply to Objection 2. To love is indeed an act of the I answer that, Goodwill properly speaking is that act will tending to the good, but it adds a certain union with of the will whereby we wish well to another. Now this act the beloved, which union is not denoted by goodwill. of the will differs from actual love, considered not only as Reply to Objection 3. These things mentioned by the being in the sensitive appetite but also as being in the in- Philosopher belong to friendship because they arise from tellective appetite or will. For the love which is in the sen- a man’s love for himself, as he says in the same passage, sitive appetite is a passion. Now every passion seeks its in so far as a man does all these things in respect of his object with a certain eagerness. And the passion of love is friend, even as he does them to himself: and this belongs not aroused suddenly, but is born of an earnest considera- to the aforesaid union of the affections. tion of the object loved; wherefore the Philosopher, show- Whether out of charity God ought to be loved for Himself? IIa IIae q. 27 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that God is loved out of Objection 3. Further, “hope begets charity” as a gloss charity, not for Himself but for the sake of something else. says on Mat. 1:1, and “fear leads to charity,” according to For Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xi): “The soul Augustine in his commentary on the First Canonical Epis- learns from the things it knows, to love those it knows tle of John (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix). Now hope not,” where by things unknown he means the intelligible looks forward to obtain something from God, while fear and the Divine, and by things known he indicates the ob- shuns something which can be inflicted by God. There- jects of the senses. Therefore God is to be loved for the fore it seems that God is to be loved on account of some sake of something else. good we hope for, or some evil to be feared. Therefore He Objection 2. Further, love follows knowledge. But is not to be loved for Himself. God is known through something else, according to Rom. On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Doctr. 1:20: “The invisible things of God are clearly seen, be- Christ. i), to enjoy is to cleave to something for its own ing understood by the things that are made.” Therefore sake. Now “God is to be enjoyed” as he says in the same He is also loved on account of something else and not for book. Therefore God is to be loved for Himself. Himself. I answer that, The preposition “for” denotes a rela- 1332 tion of causality. Now there are four kinds of cause, viz., all other good things; nor again does goodness accrue to final, formal, efficient, and material, to which a material Him from aught else, but from Him to all other things. In disposition also is to be reduced, though it is not a cause the fourth way, however, He can be loved for something simply but relatively. According to these four different else, because we are disposed by certain things to advance causes one thing is said to be loved for another. In re- in His love, for instance, by favors bestowed by Him, by spect of the final cause, we love medicine, for instance, the rewards we hope to receive from Him, or even by the for health; in respect of the formal cause, we love a man punishments which we are minded to avoid through Him. for his virtue, because, to wit, by his virtue he is for- Reply to Objection 1. From the things it knows the mally good and therefore lovable; in respect of the effi- soul learns to love what it knows not, not as though the cient cause, we love certain men because, for instance, things it knows were the reason for its loving things it they are the sons of such and such a father; and in re- knows not, through being the formal, final, or efficient spect of the disposition which is reducible to the genus of cause of this love, but because this knowledge disposes a material cause, we speak of loving something for that man to love the unknown. which disposed us to love it, e.g. we love a man for the Reply to Objection 2. Knowledge of God is indeed favors received from him, although after we have begun acquired through other things, but after He is known, He to love our friend, we no longer love him for his favors, is no longer known through them, but through Himself, but for his virtue. Accordingly, as regards the first three according to Jn. 4:42: “We now believe, not for thy say- ways, we love God, not for anything else, but for Him- ing: for we ourselves have heard Him, and know that this self. For He is not directed to anything else as to an end, is indeed the Saviour of the world.” but is Himself the last end of all things; nor does He re- Reply to Objection 3. Hope and fear lead to char- quire to receive any form in order to be good, for His very ity by way of a certain disposition, as was shown above substance is His goodness, which is itself the exemplar of (q. 17, a. 8; q. 19, Aa. 4,7,10). Whether God can be loved immediately in this life? IIa IIae q. 27 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot be loved ment of the appetitive power is towards things in respect immediately in this life. For the “unknown cannot be of their own condition, whereas the act of a cognitive loved” as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Now we do power follows the mode of the knower. not know God immediately in this life, since “we see now Now in itself the very order of things is such, that through a glass, in a dark manner” (1 Cor. 13:12). Nei- God is knowable and lovable for Himself, since He is es- ther, therefore, do we love Him immediately. sentially truth and goodness itself, whereby other things Objection 2. Further, he who cannot do what is less, are known and loved: but with regard to us, since our cannot do what is more. Now it is more to love God than knowledge is derived through the senses, those things are to know Him, since “he who is joined” to God by love, knowable first which are nearer to our senses, and the last is “one spirit with Him” (1 Cor. 6:17). But man cannot term of knowledge is that which is most remote from our know God immediately. Therefore much less can he love senses. Him immediately. Accordingly, we must assert that to love which is an Objection 3. Further, man is severed from God by act of the appetitive power, even in this state of life, tends sin, according to Is. 59:2: “Your iniquities have divided to God first, and flows on from Him to other things, and in between you and your God.” Now sin is in the will rather this sense charity loves God immediately, and other things than in the intellect. Therefore man is less able to love through God. On the other hand, with regard to knowl- God immediately than to know Him immediately. edge, it is the reverse, since we know God through other On the contrary, Knowledge of God, through being things, either as a cause through its effects, or by way of mediate, is said to be “enigmatic,” and “falls away” in pre-eminence or negation as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. heaven, as stated in 1 Cor. 13:12. But charity “does not i; cf. fall away” as stated in the same passage (1 Cor. 13:12). Ia, q. 12, a. 12). Therefore the charity of the way adheres to God immedi- Reply to Objection 1. Although the unknown cannot ately. be loved, it does not follow that the order of knowledge I answer that, As stated above ( Ia, q. 82, a. 3; q. 84, is the same as the order of love, since love is the term a. 7), the act of a cognitive power is completed by the of knowledge, and consequently, love can begin at once thing known being in the knower, whereas the act of an where knowledge ends, namely in the thing itself which is appetitive power consists in the appetite being inclined to- known through another thing. wards the thing in itself. Hence it follows that the move- Reply to Objection 2. Since to love God is some- 1333 thing greater than to know Him, especially in this state of tures, tends to God, and love begins with God as the last life, it follows that love of God presupposes knowledge of end, and passes on to creatures. God. And because this knowledge does not rest in crea- Reply to Objection 3. Aversion from God, which is tures, but, through them, tends to something else, love be- brought about by sin, is removed by charity, but not by gins there, and thence goes on to other things by a circular knowledge alone: hence charity, by loving God, unites the movement so to speak; for knowledge begins from crea- soul immediately to Him with a chain of spiritual union. Whether God can be loved wholly? ∗ IIa IIae q. 27 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot be loved in three ways, first so that the qualification “wholly” be wholly. For love follows knowledge. Now God cannot referred to the thing loved, and thus God is to be loved be wholly known by us, since this would imply compre- wholly, since man should love all that pertains to God. hension of Him. Therefore He cannot be wholly loved by Secondly, it may be understood as though “wholly” us. qualified the lover: and thus again God ought to be loved Objection 2. Further, love is a kind of union, as wholly, since man ought to love God with all his might, Dionysius shows (Div. Nom. iv). But the heart of man and to refer all he has to the love of God, according to Dt. cannot be wholly united to God, because “God is greater 6:5: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole than our heart” (1 Jn. 3:20). Therefore God cannot be heart.” loved wholly. Thirdly, it may be understood by way of comparison Objection 3. Further, God loves Himself wholly. If of the lover to the thing loved, so that the mode of the lover therefore He be loved wholly by another, this one will equal the mode of the thing loved. This is impossible: for, love Him as much as God loves Himself. But this is un- since a thing is lovable in proportion to its goodness, God reasonable. Therefore God cannot be wholly loved by a is infinitely lovable, since His goodness is infinite. Now creature. no creature can love God infinitely, because all power of On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): “Thou shalt creatures, whether it be natural or infused, is finite. love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart.” This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, because I answer that, Since love may be considered as some- the first three objections consider the question in this third thing between lover and beloved, when we ask whether sense, while the last takes it in the second sense. God can be wholly loved, the question may be understood Whether in loving God we ought to observe any mode? IIa IIae q. 27 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that we ought to observe mode. some mode in loving God. For the notion of good con- On the contrary, Bernard says (De Dilig. Deum 1) sists in mode, species and order, as Augustine states (De that “God is the cause of our loving God; the measure is Nat. Boni iii, iv). Now the love of God is the best thing to love Him without measure.” in man, according to Col. 3:14: “Above all. . . things, have I answer that, As appears from the words of Augus- charity.” Therefore there ought to be a mode of the love tine quoted above (obj. 3) mode signifies a determination of God. of measure; which determination is to be found both in the Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Morib. measure and in the thing measured, but not in the same Eccl. viii): “Prithee, tell me which is the mode of love. way. For it is found in the measure essentially, because a For I fear lest I burn with the desire and love of my Lord, measure is of itself the determining and modifying rule of more or less than I ought.” But it would be useless to other things; whereas in the things measured, it is found seek the mode of the Divine love, unless there were one. relatively, that is in so far as they attain to the measure. Therefore there is a mode of the love of God. Hence there can be nothing unmodified in the measure Objection 3. Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. whereas the thing measured is unmodified if it fails to at- iv, 3), “the measure which nature appoints to a thing, is tain to the measure, whether by deficiency or by excess. its mode.” Now the measure of the human will, as also Now in all matters of appetite and action the measure of external action, is the reason. Therefore just as it is is the end, because the proper reason for all that we desire necessary for the reason to appoint a mode to the exterior or do should be taken from the end, as the Philosopher effect of charity, according to Rom. 12:1: “Your reason- proves (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore the end has a mode by it- able service,” so also the interior love of God requires a self, while the means take their mode from being propor- ∗ Cf. q. 184, a. 2 1334 tionate to the end. Hence, according to the Philosopher else; and so too, charity, which has a mode as a measure (Polit. i, 3), “in every art, the desire for the end is endless has, stands before the other virtues, which have a mode and unlimited,” whereas there is a limit to the means: thus through being measured . the physician does not put limits to health, but makes it as Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine adds in the same perfect as he possibly can; but he puts a limit to medicine, passage, “the measure of our love for God is to love Him for he does not give as much medicine as he can, but ac- with our whole heart,” that is to love Him as much as He cording as health demands so that if he give too much or can be loved, and this belongs to the mode which is proper too little, the medicine would be immoderate. to the measure. Again, the end of all human actions and affections is Reply to Objection 3. An affection, whose object is the love of God, whereby principally we attain to our last subject to reason’s judgment, should be measured by rea- end, as stated above (q. 23, a. 6), wherefore the mode in son. But the object of the Divine love which is God sur- the love of God, must not be taken as in a thing measured passes the judgment of reason, wherefore it is not mea- where we find too much or too little, but as in the measure sured by reason but transcends it. Nor is there parity be- itself, where there cannot be excess, and where the more tween the interior act and external acts of charity. For the the rule is attained the better it is, so that the more we love interior act of charity has the character of an end, since God the better our love is. man’s ultimate good consists in his soul cleaving to God, Reply to Objection 1. That which is so by its essence according to Ps. 72:28: “It is good for me to adhere to my takes precedence of that which is so through another, God”; whereas the exterior acts are as means to the end, wherefore the goodness of the measure which has the and so have to be measured both according to charity and mode essentially, takes precedence of the goodness of the according to reason. thing measured, which has its mode through something Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than to love a friend? IIa IIae q. 27 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem more meritorious to love to love one’s friend or one’s enemy, these two loves may an enemy than to love a friend. For it is written (Mat. be compared in two ways, first, on the part of our neigh- 5:46): “If you love them that love you, what reward shall bor whom we love, secondly, on the part of the reason for you have?” Therefore it is not deserving of reward to love which we love him. one’s friend: whereas, as the same passage proves, to love In the first way, love of one’s friend surpasses love one’s enemy is deserving of a reward. Therefore it is more of one’s enemy, because a friend is both better and more meritorious to love one’s enemy than to love one’s friend. closely united to us, so that he is a more suitable matter of Objection 2. Further, an act is the more meritori- love and consequently the act of love that passes over this ous through proceeding from a greater charity. But it be- matter, is better, and therefore its opposite is worse, for it longs to the perfect children of God to love their enemies, is worse to hate a friend than an enemy. whereas those also who have imperfect charity love their In the second way, however, it is better to love one’s friends. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one’s en- enemy than one’s friend, and this for two reasons. First, emy than to love one’s friend. because it is possible to love one’s friend for another rea- Objection 3. Further, where there is more effort for son than God, whereas God is the only reason for loving good, there seems to be more merit, since “every man one’s enemy. Secondly, because if we suppose that both shall receive his own reward according to his own labor” are loved for God, our love for God is proved to be all (1 Cor. 3:8). Now a man has to make a greater effort the stronger through carrying a man’s affections to things to love his enemy than to love his friend, because it is which are furthest from him, namely, to the love of his more difficult. Therefore it seems more meritorious to enemies, even as the power of a furnace is proved to be love one’s enemy than to love one’s friend. the stronger, according as it throws its heat to more dis- On the contrary, The better an action is, the more tant objects. Hence our love for God is proved to be so meritorious it is. Now it is better to love one’s friend, much the stronger, as the more difficult are the things we since it is better to love a better man, and the friend who accomplish for its sake, just as the power of fire is so much loves you is better than the enemy who hates you. There- the stronger, as it is able to set fire to a less inflammable fore it is more meritorious to love one’s friend than to love matter. one’s enemy. Yet just as the same fire acts with greater force on what I answer that, God is the reason for our loving our is near than on what is distant, so too, charity loves with neighbor out of charity, as stated above (q. 25, a. 1). When greater fervor those who are united to us than those who therefore it is asked which is better or more meritorious, are far removed; and in this respect the love of friends, 1335 considered in itself, is more ardent and better than the love way that we love not our enemies. On the other hand of one’s enemy. the love of our friends is meritorious, if we love them for Reply to Objection 1. The words of Our Lord must God’s sake, and not merely because they are our friends. be taken in their strict sense: because the love of one’s The Reply to the other Objections is evident from what friends is not meritorious in God’s sight when we love has been said in the article, because the two arguments them merely because they are our friends: and this would that follow consider the reason for loving, while the last seem to be the case when we love our friends in such a considers the question on the part of those who are loved. Whether it is more meritorious to love one’s neighbor than to love God? IIa IIae q. 27 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that it is more meritori- will. . . manifest Myself to him.” Secondly, the compar- ous to love one’s neighbor than to love God. For the more ison may be understood to be between the love of God meritorious thing would seem to be what the Apostle pre- alone on the one side, and the love of one’s neighbor for ferred. Now the Apostle preferred the love of our neigh- God’s sake, on the other. In this way love of our neighbor bor to the love of God, according to Rom. 9:3: “I wished includes love of God, while love of God does not include myself to be an anathema from Christ for my brethren.” love of our neighbor. Hence the comparison will be be- Therefore it is more meritorious to love one’s neighbor tween perfect love of God, extending also to our neighbor, than to love God. and inadequate and imperfect love of God, for “this com- Objection 2. Further, in a certain sense it seems to mandment we have from God, that he, who loveth God, be less meritorious to love one’s friend, as stated above love also his brother” (1 Jn. 4:21). (a. 7). Now God is our chief friend, since “He hath first Reply to Objection 1. According to one gloss, the loved us” (1 Jn. 4:10). Therefore it seems less meritorious Apostle did not desire this, viz. to be severed from Christ to love God. for his brethren, when he was in a state of grace, but had Objection 3. Further, whatever is more difficult seems formerly desired it when he was in a state of unbelief, so to be more virtuous and meritorious since “virtue is about that we should not imitate him in this respect. that which is difficult and good” (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is We may also reply, with Chrysostom (De Compunct. easier to love God than to love one’s neighbor, both be- i, 8)∗ that this does not prove the Apostle to have loved cause all things love God naturally, and because there is his neighbor more than God, but that he loved God more nothing unlovable in God, and this cannot be said of one’s than himself. For he wished to be deprived for a time of neighbor. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one’s the Divine fruition which pertains to love of one self, in neighbor than to love God. order that God might be honored in his neighbor, which On the contrary, That on account of which a thing is pertains to the love of God. such, is yet more so. Now the love of one’s neighbor is not Reply to Objection 2. A man’s love for his friends meritorious, except by reason of his being loved for God’s is sometimes less meritorious in so far as he loves them sake. Therefore the love of God is more meritorious than for their sake, so as to fall short of the true reason for the the love of our neighbor. friendship of charity, which is God. Hence that God be I answer that, This comparison may be taken in two loved for His own sake does not diminish the merit, but is ways. First, by considering both loves separately: and the entire reason for merit. then, without doubt, the love of God is the more meri- Reply to Objection 3. The “good” has, more than torious, because a reward is due to it for its own sake, the “difficult,” to do with the reason of merit and virtue. since the ultimate reward is the enjoyment of God, to Therefore it does not follow that whatever is more diffi- Whom the movement of the Divine love tends: hence a cult is more meritorious, but only what is more difficult, reward is promised to him that loves God (Jn. 14:21): and at the same time better. “He that loveth Me, shall be loved of My Father, and I ∗ Hom. xvi in Ep. ad Rom. 1336 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 28 Of Joy (In Four Articles) WE must now consider the effects which result from the principal act of charity which is love, and (1) the interior effects, (2) the exterior effects. As to the first, three things have to be considered: (1) Joy, (2) Peace, (3) Mercy. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether joy is an effect of charity? (2) Whether this kind of joy is compatible with sorrow? (3) Whether this joy can be full? (4) Whether it is a virtue? Whether joy is effected in us by charity? IIa IIae q. 28 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that joy is not effected in sorrow arises from love, either through the absence of the us by charity. For the absence of what we love causes sor- thing loved, or because the loved object to which we wish row rather than joy. But God, Whom we love by charity, well, is deprived of its good or afflicted with some evil. is absent from us, so long as we are in this state of life, Now charity is love of God, Whose good is unchangeable, since “while we are in the body, we are absent from the since He is His goodness, and from the very fact that He is Lord” (2 Cor. 5:6). Therefore charity causes sorrow in us loved, He is in those who love Him by His most excellent rather than joy. effect, according to 1 Jn. 4:16: “He that abideth in charity, Objection 2. Further, it is chiefly through charity that abideth in God, and God in him.” Therefore spiritual joy, we merit happiness. Now mourning, which pertains to which is about God, is caused by charity. sorrow, is reckoned among those things whereby we merit Reply to Objection 1. So long as we are in the body, happiness, according to Mat. 5:5: “Blessed are they that we are said to be “absent from the Lord,” in comparison mourn, for they shall be comforted.” Therefore sorrow, with that presence whereby He is present to some by the rather than joy, is an effect of charity. vision of “sight”; wherefore the Apostle goes on to say (2 Objection 3. Further, charity is a virtue distinct from Cor. 5:6): “For we walk by faith and not by sight.” Nev- hope, as shown above (q. 17, a. 6). Now joy is the effect ertheless, even in this life, He is present to those who love of hope, according to Rom. 12:12: “Rejoicing in hope.” Him, by the indwelling of His grace. Therefore it is not the effect of charity. Reply to Objection 2. The mourning that merits hap- On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:5): “The char- piness, is about those things that are contrary to happiness. ity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Wherefore it amounts to the same that charity causes this Who is given to us.” But joy is caused in us by the Holy mourning, and this spiritual joy about God, since to re- Ghost according to Rom. 14:17: “The kingdom of God is joice in a certain good amounts to the same as to grieve not meat and drink, but justice and peace, and joy in the for things that are contrary to it. Holy Ghost.” Therefore charity is a cause of joy. Reply to Objection 3. There can be spiritual joy I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 25, about God in two ways. First, when we rejoice in the Di- Aa. 1,2,3), when we were treating of the passions, joy and vine good considered in itself; secondly, when we rejoice sorrow proceed from love, but in contrary ways. For joy in the Divine good as participated by us. The former joy is caused by love, either through the presence of the thing is the better, and proceeds from charity chiefly: while the loved, or because the proper good of the thing loved exists latter joy proceeds from hope also, whereby we look for- and endures in it; and the latter is the case chiefly in the ward to enjoy the Divine good, although this enjoyment love of benevolence, whereby a man rejoices in the well- itself, whether perfect or imperfect, is obtained according being of his friend, though he be absent. On the other hand to the measure of one’s charity. 1337 Whether the spiritual joy, which results from charity, is compatible with an admixture IIa IIae q. 28 a. 2 of sorrow? Objection 1. It would seem that the spiritual joy Divine good considered in itself. This joy of charity is in- that results from charity is compatible with an admix- compatible with an admixture of sorrow, even as the good ture of sorrow. For it belongs to charity to rejoice in which is its object is incompatible with any admixture of our neighbor’s good, according to 1 Cor. 13:4,6: “Char- evil: hence the Apostle says (Phil. 4:4): “Rejoice in the ity. . . rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth.” Lord always.” But this joy is compatible with an admixture of sorrow, ac- The other is the joy of charity whereby we rejoice in cording to Rom. 12:15: “Rejoice with them that rejoice, the Divine good as participated by us. This participation weep with them that weep.” Therefore the spiritual joy of can be hindered by anything contrary to it, wherefore, in charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow. this respect, the joy of charity is compatible with an ad- Objection 2. Further, according to Gregory (Hom. in mixture of sorrow, in so far as a man grieves for that which Evang. xxxiv), “penance consists in deploring past sins, hinders the participation of the Divine good, either in us and in not committing again those we have deplored.” But or in our neighbor, whom we love as ourselves. there is no true penance without charity. Therefore the joy Reply to Objection 1. Our neighbor does not weep of charity has an admixture of sorrow. save on account of some evil. Now every evil implies Objection 3. Further, it is through charity that man lack of participation in the sovereign good: hence charity desires to be with Christ according to Phil. 1:23: “Having makes us weep with our neighbor in so far as he is hin- a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ.” Now this dered from participating in the Divine good. desire gives rise, in man, to a certain sadness, according to Reply to Objection 2. Our sins divide between us Ps. 119:5: “Woe is me that my sojourning is prolonged!” and God, according to Is. 59:2; wherefore this is the rea- Therefore the joy of charity admits of a seasoning of sor- son why we grieve for our past sins, or for those of others, row. in so far as they hinder us from participating in the Divine On the contrary, The joy of charity is joy about the good. Divine wisdom. Now such like joy has no admixture of Reply to Objection 3. Although in this unhappy sorrow, according to Wis. 8:16: “Her conversation hath abode we participate, after a fashion, in the Divine good, no bitterness.” Therefore the joy of charity is incompati- by knowledge and love, yet the unhappiness of this life is ble with an admixture of sorrow. an obstacle to a perfect participation in the Divine good: I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 3), a twofold hence this very sorrow, whereby a man grieves for the de- joy in God arises from charity. One, the more excellent, lay of glory, is connected with the hindrance to a partici- is proper to charity; and with this joy we rejoice in the pation of the Divine good. Whether the spiritual joy which proceeds from charity, can be filled? IIa IIae q. 28 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the spiritual joy 15:11): “That My joy may be in you, and your joy may be which proceeds from charity cannot be filled. For the filled.” more we rejoice in God, the more is our joy in Him filled. I answer that, Fulness of joy can be understood in two But we can never rejoice in Him as much as it is meet that ways; first, on the part of the thing rejoiced in, so that one we should rejoice in God, since His goodness which is in- rejoice in it as much as it is meet that one should rejoice in finite, surpasses the creature’s joy which is finite. There- it, and thus God’s joy alone in Himself is filled, because it fore joy in God can never be filled. is infinite; and this is condignly due to the infinite good- Objection 2. Further, that which is filled cannot be in- ness of God: but the joy of any creature must needs be creased. But the joy, even of the blessed, can be increased, finite. Secondly, fulness of joy may be understood on the since one’s joy is greater than another’s. Therefore joy in part of the one who rejoices. Now joy is compared to de- God cannot be filled in a creature. sire, as rest to movement, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 25, Objection 3. Further, comprehension seems to be Aa. 1,2), when we were treating of the passions: and rest nothing else than the fulness of knowledge. Now, just as is full when there is no more movement. Hence joy is the cognitive power of a creature is finite, so is its appeti- full, when there remains nothing to be desired. But as tive power. Since therefore God cannot be comprehended long as we are in this world, the movement of desire does by any creature, it seems that no creature’s joy in God can not cease in us, because it still remains possible for us be filled. to approach nearer to God by grace, as was shown above On the contrary, Our Lord said to His disciples (Jn. (q. 24, Aa. 4,7). When once, however, perfect happiness 1338 has been attained, nothing will remain to be desired, be-ness of joy in reference to the thing in which we rejoice. cause then there will be full enjoyment of God, wherein Reply to Objection 2. When each one attains to hap- man will obtain whatever he had desired, even with regard piness he will reach the term appointed to him by Divine to other goods, according to Ps. 102:5: “Who satisfieth predestination, and nothing further will remain to which thy desire with good things.” Hence desire will be at rest, he may tend, although by reaching that term, some will not only our desire for God, but all our desires: so that the approach nearer to God than others. Hence each one’s joy joy of the blessed is full to perfection—indeed over-full, will be full with regard to himself, because his desire will since they will obtain more than they were capable of de- be fully set at rest; yet one’s joy will be greater than an- siring: for “neither hath it entered into the heart of man, other’s, on account of a fuller participation of the Divine what things God hath prepared for them that love Him” (1 happiness. Cor. 2:9). This is what is meant by the words of Lk. 6:38: Reply to Objection 3. Comprehension denotes ful- “Good measure and pressed down, and shaken together, ness of knowledge in respect of the thing known, so that it and running over shall they give into your bosom.” Yet, is known as much as it can be. There is however a fulness since no creature is capable of the joy condignly due to of knowledge in respect of the knower, just as we have God, it follows that this perfectly full joy is not taken into said of joy. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:9): “That man, but, on the contrary, man enters into it, according to you may be filled with the knowledge of His will, in all Mat. 25:21: “Enter into the joy of thy Lord.” wisdom and spiritual understanding.” Reply to Objection 1. This argument takes the ful- Whether joy is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 28 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that joy is a virtue. For love is the first affection of the appetitive power, and that vice is contrary to virtue. Now sorrow is set down as a desire and joy follow from it. Hence the same virtuous vice, as in the case of sloth and envy. Therefore joy also habit inclines us to love and desire the beloved good, and should be accounted a virtue. to rejoice in it. But in as much as love is the first of these Objection 2. Further, as love and hope are passions, acts, that virtue takes its name, not from joy, nor from the object of which is “good,” so also is joy. Now love desire, but from love, and is called charity. Hence joy is and hope are reckoned to be virtues. Therefore joy also not a virtue distinct from charity, but an act, or effect, of should be reckoned a virtue. charity: for which reason it is numbered among the Fruits Objection 3. Further, the precepts of the Law are (Gal. 5:22). about acts of virtue. But we are commanded to rejoice Reply to Objection 1. The sorrow which is a vice in the Lord, according to Phil. 4:4: “Rejoice in the Lord is caused by inordinate self-love, and this is not a special always.” Therefore joy is a virtue. vice, but a general source of the vices, as stated above ( Ia On the contrary, It is not numbered among the the- IIae, q. 77, a. 4); so that it was necessary to account certain ological virtues, nor among the moral, nor among the in-particular sorrows as special vices, because they do not tellectual virtues, as is evident from what has been said arise from a special, but from a general vice. On the other above ( Ia IIae, Qq. 57,60,62). hand love of God is accounted a special virtue, namely I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 55, charity, to which joy must be referred, as its proper act, as Aa. 2,4), virtue is an operative habit, wherefore by its very stated above (here and a. 2). nature it has an inclination to a certain act. Now it may Reply to Objection 2. Hope proceeds from love even happen that from the same habit there proceed several or- as joy does, but hope adds, on the part of the object, a spe- dinate and homogeneous acts, each of which follows from cial character, viz. “difficult,” and “possible to obtain”; another. And since the subsequent acts do not proceed for which reason it is accounted a special virtue. On the from the virtuous habit except through the preceding act, other hand joy does not add to love any special aspect, that hence it is that the virtue is defined and named in refer- might cause a special virtue. ence to that preceding act, although those other acts also Reply to Objection 3. The Law prescribes joy, as be- proceed from the virtue. Now it is evident from what we ing an act of charity, albeit not its first act. have said about the passions ( Ia IIae, q. 25, Aa. 2,4) that 1339 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 29 Of Peace (In Four Articles) We must now consider Peace, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether peace is the same as concord? (2) Whether all things desire peace? (3) Whether peace is an effect of charity? (4) Whether peace is a virtue? Whether peace is the same as concord? IIa IIae q. 29 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that peace is the same verse objects of appetite, which it cannot obtain all at the as concord. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): same time: so that there must needs be a clashing of the “Peace among men is well ordered concord.” Now we are movements of the appetite. Now the union of such move- speaking here of no other peace than that of men. There- ments is essential to peace, because man’s heart is not at fore peace is the same as concord. peace, so long as he has not what he wants, or if, having Objection 2. Further, concord is union of wills. Now what he wants, there still remains something for him to the nature of peace consists in such like union, for Diony- want, and which he cannot have at the same time. On the sius says (Div. Nom. xi) that peace unites all, and makes other hand this union is not essential to concord: where- them of one mind. Therefore peace is the same as con- fore concord denotes union of appetites among various cord. persons, while peace denotes, in addition to this union, Objection 3. Further, things whose opposites are the union of the appetites even in one man. identical are themselves identical. Now the one same Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking there thing is opposed to concord and peace, viz. dissension; of that peace which is between one man and another, and hence it is written (1 Cor. 16:33): “God is not the God of he says that this peace is concord, not indeed any kind of dissension but of peace.” Therefore peace is the same as concord, but that which is well ordered, through one man concord. agreeing with another in respect of something befitting to On the contrary, There can be concord in evil be- both of them . For if one man concord with another, not tween wicked men. But “there is no peace to the wicked” of his own accord, but through being forced, as it were, (Is. 48:22). Therefore peace is not the same as concord. by the fear of some evil that besets him, such concord I answer that, Peace includes concord and adds is not really peace, because the order of each concordant something thereto. Hence wherever peace is, there is con- is not observed, but is disturbed by some fear-inspiring cord, but there is not peace, wherever there is concord, if cause. For this reason he premises that “peace is tranquil- we give peace its proper meaning. lity of order,” which tranquillity consists in all the appeti- For concord, properly speaking, is between one man tive movements in one man being set at rest together. and another, in so far as the wills of various hearts agree Reply to Objection 2. If one man consent to the same together in consenting to the same thing. Now the heart of thing together with another man, his consent is neverthe- one man may happen to tend to diverse things, and this in less not perfectly united to himself, unless at the same two ways. First, in respect of the diverse appetitive pow- time all his appetitive movements be in agreement. ers: thus the sensitive appetite tends sometimes to that Reply to Objection 3. A twofold dissension is op- which is opposed to the rational appetite, according to posed to peace, namely dissension between a man and Gal. 5:17: “The flesh lusteth against the spirit.” Secondly, himself, and dissension between one man and another. in so far as one and the same appetitive power tends to di- The latter alone is opposed to concord. Whether all things desire peace? IIa IIae q. 29 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that not all things desire things cannot desire peace. peace. For, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi), peace Objection 2. Further, the appetite does not tend to op- “unites consent.” But there cannot be unity of consent in posite things at the same time. Now many desire war and things which are devoid of knowledge. Therefore such dissension. Therefore all men do not desire peace. 1340 Objection 3. Further, good alone is an object of ap-dissension, desire nothing but peace, which they deem petite. But a certain peace is, seemingly, evil, else Our themselves not to have. For as we stated above, there is no Lord would not have said (Mat. 10:34): “I came not to peace when a man concords with another man counter to send peace.” Therefore all things do not desire peace. what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means Objection 4. Further, that which all desire is, seem- of war to break this concord, because it is a defective ingly, the sovereign good which is the last end. But this peace, in order that they may obtain peace, where noth- is not true of peace, since it is attainable even by a way- ing is contrary to their will. Hence all wars are waged that farer; else Our Lord would vainly command (Mk. 9:49): men may find a more perfect peace than that which they “Have peace among you.” Therefore all things do not de- had heretofore. sire peace. Reply to Objection 3. Peace gives calm and unity to On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, the appetite. Now just as the appetite may tend to what 12,14) that “all things desire peace”: and Dionysius says is good simply, or to what is good apparently, so too, the same (Div. Nom. xi). peace may be either true or apparent. There can be no I answer that, From the very fact that a man desires true peace except where the appetite is directed to what a certain thing it follows that he desires to obtain what he is truly good, since every evil, though it may appear good desires, and, in consequence, to remove whatever may be in a way, so as to calm the appetite in some respect, has, an obstacle to his obtaining it. Now a man may be hin- nevertheless many defects, which cause the appetite to re- dered from obtaining the good he desires, by a contrary main restless and disturbed. Hence true peace is only in desire either of his own or of some other, and both are good men and about good things. The peace of the wicked removed by peace, as stated above. Hence it follows of is not a true peace but a semblance thereof, wherefore it is necessity that whoever desires anything desires peace, in written (Wis. 14:22): “Whereas they lived in a great war so far as he who desires anything, desires to attain, with of ignorance, they call so many and so great evils peace.” tranquillity and without hindrance, to that which he de- Reply to Objection 4. Since true peace is only about sires: and this is what is meant by peace which Augustine good things, as the true good is possessed in two ways, defines (De Civ. Dei xix, 13) “the tranquillity of order.” perfectly and imperfectly, so there is a twofold true peace. Reply to Objection 1. Peace denotes union not only One is perfect peace. It consists in the perfect enjoyment of the intellective or rational appetite, or of the animal ap- of the sovereign good, and unites all one’s desires by giv- petite, in both of which consent may be found, but also of ing them rest in one object. This is the last end of the ra- the natural appetite. Hence Dionysius says that “peace tional creature, according to Ps. 147:3: “Who hath placed is the cause of consent and of connaturalness,” where peace in thy borders.” The other is imperfect peace, which “consent” denotes the union of appetites proceeding from may be had in this world, for though the chief movement knowledge, and “connaturalness,” the union of natural ap- of the soul finds rest in God, yet there are certain things petites. within and without which disturb the peace. Reply to Objection 2. Even those who seek war and Whether peace is the proper effect of charity? IIa IIae q. 29 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that peace is not the be peace.” Therefore it is not the effect of charity. proper effect of charity. For one cannot have charity with- On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 118:165): “Much out sanctifying grace. But some have peace who have not peace have they that love Thy Law.” sanctifying grace, thus heathens sometimes have peace. I answer that, Peace implies a twofold union, as Therefore peace is not the effect of charity. stated above (a. 1). The first is the result of one’s own ap- Objection 2. Further, if a certain thing is caused by petites being directed to one object; while the other results charity, its contrary is not compatible with charity. But from one’s own appetite being united with the appetite of dissension, which is contrary to peace, is compatible with another: and each of these unions is effected by charity— charity, for we find that even holy doctors, such as Jerome the first, in so far as man loves God with his whole heart, and Augustine, dissented in some of their opinions. We by referring all things to Him, so that all his desires tend also read that Paul and Barnabas dissented from one an- to one object—the second, in so far as we love our neigh- other (Acts 15). Therefore it seems that peace is not the bor as ourselves, the result being that we wish to fulfil our effect of charity. neighbor’s will as though it were ours: hence it is reck- Objection 3. Further, the same thing is not the proper oned a sign of friendship if people “make choice of the effect of different things. Now peace is the effect of jus- same things” (Ethic. ix, 4), and Tully says (De Amici- tice, according to Is. 32:17: “And the work of justice shall tia) that friends “like and dislike the same things” (Sallust, 1341 Catilin.) tle account is not contrary to charity: for such a dissen- Reply to Objection 1. Without sin no one falls from a sion proceeds from a difference of opinion, because one state of sanctifying grace, for it turns man away from his man thinks that the particular good, which is the object of due end by making him place his end in something un- dissension, belongs to the good about which they agree, due: so that his appetite does not cleave chiefly to the true while the other thinks that it does not. Accordingly such final good, but to some apparent good. Hence, without like dissension about very slight matters and about opin- sanctifying grace, peace is not real but merely apparent. ions is inconsistent with a state of perfect peace, wherein Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. the truth will be known fully, and every desire fulfilled; ix, 6) friends need not agree in opinion, but only upon but it is not inconsistent with the imperfect peace of the such goods as conduce to life, and especially upon such wayfarer. as are important; because dissension in small matters is Reply to Objection 3. Peace is the “work of justice” scarcely accounted dissension. Hence nothing hinders indirectly, in so far as justice removes the obstacles to those who have charity from holding different opinions. peace: but it is the work of charity directly, since char- Nor is this an obstacle to peace, because opinions concern ity, according to its very nature, causes peace. For love is the intellect, which precedes the appetite that is united by “a unitive force” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): and peace. In like manner if there be concord as to goods of peace is the union of the appetite’s inclinations. importance, dissension with regard to some that are of lit- Whether peace is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 29 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that peace is a virtue. For proceed, as may be seen in corporeal things. For, though nothing is a matter of precept, unless it be an act of virtue. fire by heating, both liquefies and rarefies, there are not But there are precepts about keeping peace, for example: two powers in fire, one of liquefaction, the other of rar- “Have peace among you” (Mk. 9:49). Therefore peace is efaction: and fire produces all such actions by its own a virtue. power of calefaction. Objection 2. Further, we do not merit except by acts Since then charity causes peace precisely because it is of virtue. Now it is meritorious to keep peace, according love of God and of our neighbor, as shown above (a. 3), to Mat. 5:9: “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall there is no other virtue except charity whose proper act is be called the children of God.” Therefore peace is a virtue. peace, as we have also said in reference to joy (q. 28, a. 4). Objection 3. Further, vices are opposed to virtues. Reply to Objection 1. We are commanded to keep But dissensions, which are contrary to peace, are num- peace because it is an act of charity; and for this reason too bered among the vices (Gal. 5:20). Therefore peace is a it is a meritorious act. Hence it is placed among the beati- virtue. tudes, which are acts of perfect virtue, as stated above ( Ia On the contrary, Virtue is not the last end, but the IIae, q. 69, Aa. 1,3). It is also numbered among the fruits, way thereto. But peace is the last end, in a sense, as Au- in so far as it is a final good, having spiritual sweetness. gustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 11). Therefore peace is not This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. a virtue. Reply to Objection 3. Several vices are opposed to I answer that, As stated above (q. 28, a. 4), when a one virtue in respect of its various acts: so that not only number of acts all proceeding uniformly from an agent, is hatred opposed to charity, in respect of its act which is follow one from the other, they all arise from the same love, but also sloth and envy, in respect of joy, and dissen- virtue, nor do they each have a virtue from which they sion in respect of peace. 1342 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 30 Of Mercy∗ (In Four Articles) We must now go on to consider Mercy, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether evil is the cause of mercy on the part of the person pitied? (2) To whom does it belong to pity? (3) Whether mercy is a virtue? (4) Whether it is the greatest of virtues? Whether evil is properly the motive of mercy? IIa IIae q. 30 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that, properly speaking, urally, wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that evil is not the motive of mercy. For, as shown above (q. 19, “pity is sorrow for a visible evil, whether corruptive or dis- a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 79, a. 1, ad 4; Ia, q. 48 , a. 6), fault is an evil tressing.” Secondly, such like evils are yet more provoca-rather than punishment. Now fault provokes indignation tive of pity if they are contrary to deliberate choice, rather than mercy. Therefore evil does not excite mercy. wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that evil ex- Objection 2. Further, cruelty and harshness seem to cites our pity “when it is the result of an accident, as when excel other evils. Now the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) something turns out ill, whereas we hoped well of it.” that “harshness does not call for pity but drives it away.” Thirdly, they cause yet greater pity, if they are entirely Therefore evil, as such, is not the motive of mercy. contrary to the will, as when evil befalls a man who has Objection 3. Further, signs of evils are not true evils. always striven to do well: wherefore the Philosopher says But signs of evils excite one to mercy, as the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 8) that “we pity most the distress of one who states (Rhet. ii, 8). Therefore evil, properly speaking, is suffers undeservedly.” not an incentive to mercy. Reply to Objection 1. It is essential to fault that it On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, be voluntary; and in this respect it deserves punishment 2) that mercy is a kind of sorrow. Now evil is the motive rather than mercy. Since, however, fault may be, in a way, of sorrow. Therefore it is the motive of mercy. a punishment, through having something connected with I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, it that is against the sinner’s will, it may, in this respect, 5), mercy is heartfelt sympathy for another’s distress, im- call for mercy. It is in this sense that we pity and com- pelling us to succor him if we can. For mercy takes its miserate sinners. Thus Gregory says in a homily (Hom. name “misericordia” from denoting a man’s compassion- in Evang. xxxiv) that “true godliness is not disdainful but ate heart [miserum cor] for another’s unhappiness. Now compassionate,” and again it is written (Mat. 9:36) that unhappiness is opposed to happiness: and it is essential Jesus “seeing the multitudes, had compassion on them: to beatitude or happiness that one should obtain what one because they were distressed, and lying like sheep that wishes; for, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiii, 5), have no shepherd.” “happy is he who has whatever he desires, and desires Reply to Objection 2. Since pity is sympathy for an- nothing amiss.” Hence, on the other hand, it belongs to other’s distress, it is directed, properly speaking, towards unhappiness that a man should suffer what he wishes not. another, and not to oneself, except figuratively, like jus- Now a man wishes a thing in three ways: first, by his tice, according as a man is considered to have various natural appetite; thus all men naturally wish to be and parts (Ethic. v, 11). Thus it is written (Ecclus. 30:24): to live: secondly, a man wishes a thing from deliberate “Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God”†. choice: thirdly, a man wishes a thing, not in itself, but in Accordingly just as, properly speaking, a man does its cause, thus, if a man wishes to eat what is bad for him, not pity himself, but suffers in himself, as when we suffer we say that, in a way, he wishes to be ill. cruel treatment in ourselves, so too, in the case of those Accordingly the motive of “mercy,” being something who are so closely united to us, as to be part of ourselves, pertaining to “misery,” is, in the first way, anything con- such as our children or our parents, we do not pity their trary to the will’s natural appetite, namely corruptive or distress, but suffer as for our own sores; in which sense distressing evils, the contrary of which man desires nat- the Philosopher says that “harshness drives pity away.” ∗ the One Latin Word “Misericordia” Signifies Either Pity or Mercy. The Distinction Between These Two Is That Pity May Stand Either for the Act or for the Virtue, Whereas Mercy Stands Only for the Virtue. † Cf. q. 106, a. 3, ad 1 1343 Reply to Objection 3. Just as pleasure results from not so keenly as when they are present to the senses. hope and memory of good things, so does sorrow arise Hence the signs of evil move us to pity, in so far as they from the prospect or the recollection of evil things; though represent as present, the evil that excites our pity. Whether the reason for taking pity is a defect in the person who pities? IIa IIae q. 30 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the reason for taking Secondly, it happens through real union, for instance pity is not a defect in the person who takes pity. For it is when another’s evil comes near to us, so as to pass to us proper to God to be merciful, wherefore it is written (Ps. from him. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that 144:9): “His tender mercies are over all His works.” But men pity such as are akin to them, and the like, because there is no defect in God. Therefore a defect cannot be the it makes them realize that the same may happen to them- reason for taking pity. selves. This also explains why the old and the wise who Objection 2. Further, if a defect is the reason for tak- consider that they may fall upon evil times, as also feeble ing pity, those in whom there is most defect, must needs and timorous persons, are more inclined to pity: whereas take most pity. But this is false: for the Philosopher says those who deem themselves happy, and so far powerful as (Rhet. ii, 8) that “those who are in a desperate state are to think themselves in no danger of suffering any hurt, are pitiless.” Therefore it seems that the reason for taking pity not so inclined to pity. is not a defect in the person who pities. Accordingly a defect is always the reason for taking Objection 3. Further, to be treated with contempt is pity, either because one looks upon another’s defect as to be defective. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) one’s own, through being united to him by love, or on that “those who are disposed to contumely are pitiless.” account of the possibility of suffering in the same way. Therefore the reason for taking pity, is not a defect in the Reply to Objection 1. God takes pity on us through person who pities. love alone, in as much as He loves us as belonging to Him. On the contrary, Pity is a kind of sorrow. But a de- Reply to Objection 2. Those who are already in in- fect is the reason of sorrow, wherefore those who are in finite distress, do not fear to suffer more, wherefore they bad health give way to sorrow more easily, as we shall say are without pity. In like manner this applies to those also further on (q. 35, a. 1, ad 2). Therefore the reason why who are in great fear, for they are so intent on their own one takes pity is a defect in oneself. passion, that they pay no attention to the suffering of oth- I answer that, Since pity is grief for another’s dis- ers. tress, as stated above (a. 1), from the very fact that a per- Reply to Objection 3. Those who are disposed to son takes pity on anyone, it follows that another’s distress contumely, whether through having been contemned, or grieves him. And since sorrow or grief is about one’s own because they wish to contemn others, are incited to anger ills, one grieves or sorrows for another’s distress, in so far and daring, which are manly passions and arouse the hu- as one looks upon another’s distress as one’s own. man spirit to attempt difficult things. Hence they make a Now this happens in two ways: first, through union of man think that he is going to suffer something in the fu- the affections, which is the effect of love. For, since he ture, so that while they are disposed in that way they are who loves another looks upon his friend as another self, pitiless, according to Prov. 27:4: “Anger hath no mercy, he counts his friend’s hurt as his own, so that he grieves nor fury when it breaketh forth.” For the same reason the for his friend’s hurt as though he were hurt himself. Hence proud are without pity, because they despise others, and the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 4) reckons “grieving with one’s think them wicked, so that they account them as suffer- friend” as being one of the signs of friendship, and the ing deservedly whatever they suffer. Hence Gregory says Apostle says (Rom. 12:15): “Rejoice with them that re- (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv) that “false godliness,” i.e. of the joice, weep with them that weep.” proud, “is not compassionate but disdainful.” Whether mercy is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 30 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that mercy is not a virtue. (Catilin.): “All those that take counsel about matters of For the chief part of virtue is choice as the Philosopher doubt, should be free from. . . anger. . . and mercy, because states (Ethic. ii, 5). Now choice is “the desire of what the mind does not easily see aright, when these things has been already counselled” (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore stand in the way.” Therefore mercy is not a virtue. whatever hinders counsel cannot be called a virtue. But Objection 2. Further, nothing contrary to virtue is mercy hinders counsel, according to the saying of Sallust praiseworthy. But nemesis is contrary to mercy, as the 1344 Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9), and yet it is a praisewor-whether we give to the needy or forgive the repentant.” thy passion (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore mercy is not a virtue. And since it is essential to human virtue that the move- Objection 3. Further, joy and peace are not special ments of the soul should be regulated by reason, as was virtues, because they result from charity, as stated above shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 59, Aa. 4,5), it follows that mercy (q. 28, a. 4; q. 29, a. 4). Now mercy, also, results from is a virtue. charity; for it is out of charity that we weep with them Reply to Objection 1. The words of Sallust are to be that weep, as we rejoice with them that rejoice. Therefore understood as applying to the mercy which is a passion mercy is not a special virtue. unregulated by reason: for thus it impedes the counselling Objection 4. Further, since mercy belongs to the ap- of reason, by making it wander from justice. petitive power, it is not an intellectual virtue, and, since Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher is speaking it has not God for its object, neither is it a theological there of pity and nemesis, considered, both of them, as virtue. Moreover it is not a moral virtue, because neither passions. They are contrary to one another on the part is it about operations, for this belongs to justice; nor is it of their respective estimation of another’s evils, for which about passions, since it is not reduced to one of the twelve pity grieves, in so far as it esteems someone to suffer un- means mentioned by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7). There- deservedly, whereas nemesis rejoices, in so far as it es- fore mercy is not a virtue. teems someone to suffer deservedly, and grieves, if things On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): go well with the undeserving: “both of these are praise- “Cicero in praising Caesar expresses himself much better worthy and come from the same disposition of character” and in a fashion at once more humane and more in ac- (Rhet. ii, 9). Properly speaking, however, it is envy which cordance with religious feeling, when he says: ‘Of all thy is opposed to pity, as we shall state further on (q. 36, a. 3). virtues none is more marvelous or more graceful than thy Reply to Objection 3. Joy and peace add nothing to mercy.’ ” Therefore mercy is a virtue. the aspect of good which is the object of charity, where- I answer that, Mercy signifies grief for another’s dis- fore they do not require any other virtue besides charity. tress. Now this grief may denote, in one way, a move- But mercy regards a certain special aspect, namely the ment of the sensitive appetite, in which case mercy is misery of the person pitied. not a virtue but a passion; whereas, in another way, it Reply to Objection 4. Mercy, considered as a virtue, may denote a movement of the intellective appetite, in as is a moral virtue having relation to the passions, and it is much as one person’s evil is displeasing to another. This reduced to the mean called nemesis, because “they both movement may be ruled in accordance with reason, and in proceed from the same character” (Rhet. ii, 9). Now accordance with this movement regulated by reason, the the Philosopher proposes these means not as virtues, but movement of the lower appetite may be regulated. Hence as passions, because, even as passions, they are praise- Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that “this movement worthy. Yet nothing prevents them from proceeding from of the mind” (viz. mercy) “obeys the reason, when mercy some elective habit, in which case they assume the char- is vouchsafed in such a way that justice is safeguarded, acter of a virtue. Whether mercy is the greatest of the virtues? IIa IIae q. 30 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that mercy is the great- Now this is chiefly the result of mercy, since of God is it est of the virtues. For the worship of God seems a most said (Ps. 144:9) that “His tender mercies are over all His virtuous act. But mercy is preferred before the worship works,” and (Lk. 6:36) Our Lord said: “Be ye. . . merciful, of God, according to Osee 6:6 and Mat. 12:7: “I have as your Father also is merciful.” Therefore mercy is the desired mercy and not sacrifice.” Therefore mercy is the greatest of virtues. greatest virtue. On the contrary, The Apostle after saying (Col. Objection 2. Further, on the words of 1 Tim. 4:8: 3:12): “Put ye on. . . as the elect of God. . . the bowels of “Godliness is profitable to all things,” a gloss says: “The mercy,” etc., adds (Col. 3:14): “Above all things have sum total of a Christian’s rule of life consists in mercy and charity.” Therefore mercy is not the greatest of virtues. godliness.” Now the Christian rule of life embraces every I answer that, A virtue may take precedence of oth- virtue. Therefore the sum total of all virtues is contained ers in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in comparison in mercy. with its subject. In itself, mercy takes precedence of other Objection 3. Further, “Virtue is that which makes its virtues, for it belongs to mercy to be bountiful to others, subject good,” according to the Philosopher. Therefore and, what is more, to succor others in their wants, which the more a virtue makes a man like God, the better is that pertains chiefly to one who stands above. Hence mercy virtue: since man is the better for being more like God. is accounted as being proper to God: and therein His om- 1345 nipotence is declared to be chiefly manifested∗. fices, but wishes them to be offered to Him, in order to On the other hand, with regard to its subject, mercy is arouse our devotion and to profit our neighbor. Hence not the greatest virtue, unless that subject be greater than mercy, whereby we supply others’ defects is a sacrifice all others, surpassed by none and excelling all: since for more acceptable to Him, as conducing more directly to him that has anyone above him it is better to be united our neighbor’s well-being, according to Heb. 13:16: “Do to that which is above than to supply the defect of that not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices which is beneath.∗. Hence, as regards man, who has God God’s favor is obtained.” above him, charity which unites him to God, is greater Reply to Objection 2. The sum total of the Christian than mercy, whereby he supplies the defects of his neigh- religion consists in mercy, as regards external works: but bor. But of all the virtues which relate to our neighbor, the inward love of charity, whereby we are united to God mercy is the greatest, even as its act surpasses all others, preponderates over both love and mercy for our neighbor. since it belongs to one who is higher and better to supply Reply to Objection 3. Charity likens us to God by the defect of another, in so far as the latter is deficient. uniting us to Him in the bond of love: wherefore it sur- Reply to Objection 1. We worship God by external passes mercy, which likens us to God as regards similarity sacrifices and gifts, not for His own profit, but for that of of works. ourselves and our neighbor. For He needs not our sacri- ∗ Collect, Tenth Sunday after Pentecost ∗ “The quality of mercy is not strained./‘Tis mightiest in the mightiest: it becomes/The throned monarch better than his crown.” Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Scene i. 1346 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 31 Of Beneficence (In Four Articles) We must now consider the outward acts or effects of charity, (1) Beneficence, (2) Almsdeeds, which are a part of beneficence, (3) Fraternal correction, which is a kind of alms. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether beneficence is an act of charity ? (2) Whether we ought to be beneficent to all? (3) Whether we ought to be more beneficent to those who are more closely united to us? (4) Whether beneficence is a special virtue? Whether beneficence is an act of charity? IIa IIae q. 31 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that beneficence is not an But if the good which one man does another, be con- act of charity. For charity is chiefly directed to God. Now sidered under some special aspect of good, then benefi- we cannot benefit God, according to Job 35:7: “What cence will assume a special character and will belong to shalt thou give Him? or what shall He receive of thy some special virtue. hand?” Therefore beneficence is not an act of charity. Reply to Objection 1. According to Dionysius (Div. Objection 2. Further, beneficence consists chiefly in Nom. iv), “love moves those, whom it unites, to a mu- making gifts. But this belongs to liberality. Therefore tual relationship: it turns the inferior to the superior to be beneficence is an act of liberality and not of charity. perfected thereby; it moves the superior to watch over the Objection 3. Further, what a man gives, he gives ei- inferior:” and in this respect beneficence is an effect of ther as being due, or as not due. But a benefit conferred love. Hence it is not for us to benefit God, but to honor as being due belongs to justice while a benefit conferred Him by obeying Him, while it is for Him, out of His love, as not due, is gratuitous, and in this respect is an act of to bestow good things on us. mercy. Therefore every benefit conferred is either an act Reply to Objection 2. Two things must be observed of justice, or an act of mercy. Therefore it is not an act of in the bestowal of gifts. One is the thing given outwardly, charity. while the other is the inward passion that a man has in the On the contrary, Charity is a kind of friendship, as delight of riches. It belongs to liberality to moderate this stated above (q. 23 , a. 1). Now the Philosopher reckons inward passion so as to avoid excessive desire and love for among the acts of friendship (Ethic. ix, 1) “doing good,” riches; for this makes a man more ready to part with his i.e. being beneficent, “to one’s friends.” Therefore it is an wealth. Hence, if a man makes some great gift, while yet act of charity to do good to others. desiring to keep it for himself, his is not a liberal giving. I answer that, Beneficence simply means doing good On the other hand, as regards the outward gift, the act to someone. This good may be considered in two ways, of beneficence belongs in general to friendship or char- first under the general aspect of good, and this belongs to ity. Hence it does not detract from a man’s friendship, if, beneficence in general, and is an act of friendship, and, through love, he give his friend something he would like consequently, of charity: because the act of love includes to I keep for himself; rather does this prove the perfection goodwill whereby a man wishes his friend well, as stated of his friendship. above (q. 23, a. 1; q. 27 , a. 2). Now the will carries into Reply to Objection 3. Just as friendship or charity effect if possible, the things it wills, so that, consequently, sees, in the benefit bestowed, the general aspect of good, the result of an act of love is that a man is beneficent to his so does justice see therein the aspect of debt, while pity friend. Therefore beneficence in its general acceptation is considers the relieving of distress or defect. an act of friendship or charity. 1347 Whether we ought to do good to all? IIa IIae q. 31 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that we are not bound to cause all acts of virtue must be modified with a view to do good to all. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, their due circumstances. 28) that we “are unable to do good to everyone.” Now Reply to Objection 1. Absolutely speaking it is im- virtue does not incline one to the impossible. Therefore it possible to do good to every single one: yet it is true of is not necessary to do good to all. each individual that one may be bound to do good to him Objection 2. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 12:5) in some particular case. Hence charity binds us, though “Give to the good, and receive not a sinner.” But many not actually doing good to someone, to be prepared in men are sinners. Therefore we need not do good to all. mind to do good to anyone if we have time to spare. There Objection 3. Further, “Charity dealeth not per- is however a good that we can do to all, if not to each in- versely” (1 Cor. 13:4). Now to do good to some is to dividual, at least to all in general, as when we pray for all, deal perversely: for instance if one were to do good to an for unbelievers as well as for the faithful. enemy of the common weal, or if one were to do good to Reply to Objection 2. In a sinner there are two things, an excommunicated person, since, by doing so, he would his guilt and his nature. Accordingly we are bound to suc- be holding communion with him. Therefore, since benef- cor the sinner as to the maintenance of his nature, but not icence is an act of charity, we ought not to do good to all. so as to abet his sin, for this would be to do evil rather On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 6:10): than good. “Whilst we have time, let us work good to all men.” Reply to Objection 3. The excommunicated and the I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 1), benefi- enemies of the common weal are deprived of all benef- cence is an effect of love in so far as love moves the supe- icence, in so far as this prevents them from doing evil rior to watch over the inferior. Now degrees among men deeds. Yet if their nature be in urgent need of succor lest are not unchangeable as among angels, because men are it fail, we are bound to help them: for instance, if they subject to many failings, so that he who is superior in one be in danger of death through hunger or thirst, or suffer respect, is or may be inferior in another. Therefore, since some like distress, unless this be according to the order of the love of charity extends to all, beneficence also should justice. extend to all, but according as time and place require: be- Whether we ought to do good to those rather who are more closely united to us? IIa IIae q. 31 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that we are nor bound to a man ought to be more beneficent to his children, since do good to those rather who are more closely united to “neither ought the children to lay up for the parents,” ac- us. For it is written (Lk. 14:12): “When thou makest a cording to 2 Cor. 12:14. Therefore we are not bound to dinner or a supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren, be more beneficent to those who are more closely united nor thy kinsmen.” Now these are the most closely united to us. to us. Therefore we are not bound to do good to those On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. rather who are more closely united to us, but preferably i, 28): “Since one cannot do good to all, we ought to con- to strangers and to those who are in want: hence the text sider those chiefly who by reason of place, time or any goes on: “But, when thou makest a feast, call the poor, the other circumstance, by a kind of chance are more closely maimed,” etc. united to us.” Objection 2. Further, to help another in the battle is I answer that, Grace and virtue imitate the order of an act of very great goodness. But a soldier on the bat- nature, which is established by Divine wisdom. Now the tlefield is bound to help a fellow-soldier who is a stranger order of nature is such that every natural agent pours forth rather than a kinsman who is a foe. Therefore in doing its activity first and most of all on the things which are acts of kindness we are not bound to give the preference nearest to it: thus fire heats most what is next to it. In to those who are most closely united to us. like manner God pours forth the gifts of His goodness first Objection 3. Further, we should pay what is due be- and most plentifully on the substances which are nearest fore conferring gratuitous favors. But it is a man’s duty to Him, as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii). But the to be good to those who have been good to him. There- bestowal of benefits is an act of charity towards others. fore we ought to do good to our benefactors rather than to Therefore we ought to be most beneficent towards those those who are closely united to us. who are most closely connected with us. Objection 4. Further, a man ought to love his parents Now one man’s connection with another may be mea- more than his children, as stated above (q. 26, a. 9). Yet sured in reference to the various matters in which men are 1348 engaged together; (thus the intercourse of kinsmen is in the goods of the debtor, but rather as belonging to the pernatural matters, that of fellow-citizens is in civic matters, son to whom it is due: for instance, a man may have an- that of the faithful is in spiritual matters, and so forth): other’s goods, whether in money or in kind, either because and various benefits should be conferred in various ways he has stolen them, or because he has received them on according to these various connections, because we ought loan or in deposit or in some other way. In this case a man in preference to bestow on each one such benefits as per- ought to pay what he owes, rather than benefit his con- tain to the matter in which, speaking simply, he is most nections out of it, unless perchance the case be so urgent closely connected with us. And yet this may vary accord- that it would be lawful for him to take another’s property ing to the various requirements of time, place, or matter in in order to relieve the one who is in need. Yet, again, this hand: because in certain cases one ought, for instance, to would not apply if the creditor were in equal distress: in succor a stranger, in extreme necessity, rather than one’s which case, however, the claims on either side would have own father, if he is not in such urgent need. to be weighed with regard to such other conditions as a Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord did not absolutely prudent man would take into consideration, because, on forbid us to invite our friends and kinsmen to eat with us, account of the different particular cases, as the Philoso- but to invite them so that they may invite us in return, pher states (Ethic. ix, 2), it is impossible to lay down a since that would be an act not of charity but of cupidity. general rule. The case may occur, however, that one ought rather to in- The other kind of due is one which is reckoned among vite strangers, on account of their greater want. For it must the goods of the debtor and not of the creditor; for in- be understood that, other things being equal, one ought to stance, a thing may be due, not because justice requires it, succor those rather who are most closely connected with but on account of a certain moral equity, as in the case of us. And if of two, one be more closely connected, and the benefits received gratis. Now no benefactor confers a ben- other in greater want, it is not possible to decide, by any efit equal to that which a man receives from his parents: general rule, which of them we ought to help rather than wherefore in paying back benefits received, we should the other, since there are various degrees of want as well give the first place to our parents before all others, un- as of connection: and the matter requires the judgment of less, on the other side, there be such weightier motives, a prudent man. as need or some other circumstance, for instance the com- Reply to Objection 2. The common good of many is mon good of the Church or state. In other cases we must more Godlike than the good of an individual. Wherefore take to account the connection and the benefit received; it is a virtuous action for a man to endanger even his own and here again no general rule can laid down. life, either for the spiritual or for the temporal common Reply to Objection 4. Parents are like superiors, and good of his country. Since therefore men engage together so a parent’s love tends to conferring benefits, while the in warlike acts in order to safeguard the common weal, children’s love tends to honor their parents. Nevertheless the soldier who with this in view succors his comrade, in a case of extreme urgency it would be lawful to aban- succors him not as a private individual, but with a view to don one’s children rather than one’s parents, to abandon the welfare of his country as a whole: wherefore it is not whom it is by no means lawful, on account of the obliga- a matter for wonder if a stranger be preferred to one who tion we lie under towards them for the benefits we have is a blood relation. received from them, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, Reply to Objection 3. A thing may be due in two 14). ways. There is one which should be reckoned, not among Whether beneficence is a special virtue? IIa IIae q. 31 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that beneficence is a spe- cial virtue. cial virtue. For precepts are directed to virtue, since law- Objection 3. Further, charity is not divided into sev- givers purpose to make men virtuous (Ethic. i 9,13; ii, eral species: whereas there would seem to be several kinds 1). Now beneficence and love are prescribed as distinct of beneficence, according to the various kinds of benefits. from one another, for it is written (Mat. 4:44): “Love Therefore beneficence is a distinct virtue from charity. your enemies, do good to them that hate you.” Therefore On the contrary, The internal and the external act do beneficence is a virtue distinct from charity. not require different virtues. Now beneficence and good- Objection 2. Further, vices are opposed to virtues. will differ only as external and internal act, since benefi- Now there are opposed to beneficence certain vices cence is the execution of goodwill. Therefore as goodwill whereby a hurt is inflicted on our neighbor, for instance, is not a distinct virtue from charity, so neither is benefi- rapine, theft and so forth. Therefore beneficence is a spe- cence. 1349 I answer that, Virtues differ according to the different Reply to Objection 2. Even as all benefits conferred aspects of their objects. Now the formal aspect of the ob- on our neighbor, if we consider them under the common ject of charity and of beneficence is the same, since both aspect of good, are to be traced to love, so all hurts consid- virtues regard the common aspect of good, as explained ered under the common aspect of evil, are to be traced to above (a. 1). Wherefore beneficence is not a distinct virtue hatred. But if we consider these same things under certain from charity, but denotes an act of charity. special aspects of good or of evil, they are to be traced to Reply to Objection 1. Precepts are given, not about certain special virtues or vices, and in this way also there habits but about acts of virtue: wherefore distinction of are various kinds of benefits. precept denotes distinction, not of habits, but of acts. Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. 1350 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 32 Of Almsdeeds (In Ten Articles) We must now consider almsdeeds, under which head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether almsgiving is an act of charity? (2) Of the different kinds of alms; (3) Which alms are of greater account, spiritual or corporal? (4) Whether corporal alms have a spiritual effect? (5) Whether the giving of alms is a matter of precept? (6) Whether corporal alms should be given out of the things we need? (7) Whether corporal alms should be given out of ill-gotten goods? (8) Who can give alms? (9) To whom should we give alms? (10) How should alms be given ? Whether almsgiving is an act of charity? IIa IIae q. 32 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that almsgiving is not an almsgiving is, properly speaking, an act of mercy. This act of charity. For without charity one cannot do acts of appears in its very name, for in Greek eleemosyne it is de-charity. Now it is possible to give alms without having rived from having mercy eleein even as the Latin “miser-charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:3: “If I should distribute atio” is. And since mercy is an effect of charity, as shown all my goods to feed the poor. . . and have not charity, it above (q. 30, a. 2, a. 3, obj. 3 ), it follows that almsgiving profiteth me nothing.” Therefore almsgiving is not an act is an act of charity through the medium of mercy. of charity. Reply to Objection 1. An act of virtue may be taken Objection 2. Further, almsdeeds are reckoned among in two ways: first materially, thus an act of justice is to do works of satisfaction, according to Dan. 4:24: “Redeem what is just; and such an act of virtue can be without the thou thy sins with alms.” Now satisfaction is an act of jus- virtue, since many, without having the habit of justice, do tice. Therefore almsgiving is an act of justice and not of what is just, led by the natural light of reason, or through charity. fear, or in the hope of gain. Secondly, we speak of a thing Objection 3. Further, the offering of sacrifices to God being an act of justice formally, and thus an act of jus- is an act of religion. But almsgiving is offering a sacrifice tice is to do what is just, in the same way as a just man, to God, according to Heb. 13:16: “Do not forget to do i.e. with readiness and delight, and such an act of virtue good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God’s favor is cannot be without the virtue. obtained.” Therefore almsgiving is not an act of charity, Accordingly almsgiving can be materially without but of religion. charity, but to give alms formally, i.e. for God’s sake, Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, with delight and readiness, and altogether as one ought, is l) that to give for a good purpose is an act of liberality. not possible without charity. Now this is especially true of almsgiving. Therefore alms- Reply to Objection 2. Nothing hinders the proper giving is not an act of charity. elicited act of one virtue being commanded by another On the contrary, It is written 2 Jn. 3:17: “He that virtue as commanding it and directing it to this other hath the substance of this world, and shall see his brother virtue’s end. It is in this way that almsgiving is reckoned in need, and shall put up his bowels from him, how doth among works of satisfaction in so far as pity for the one in the charity of God abide in him?” distress is directed to the satisfaction for his sin; and in so I answer that, External acts belong to that virtue far as it is directed to placate God, it has the character of which regards the motive for doing those acts. Now a sacrifice, and thus it is commanded by religion. the motive for giving alms is to relieve one who is in Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. need. Wherefore some have defined alms as being “a deed Reply to Objection 4. Almsgiving belongs to liberal- whereby something is given to the needy, out of compas- ity, in so far as liberality removes an obstacle to that act, sion and for God’s sake,” which motive belongs to mercy, which might arise from excessive love of riches, the result as stated above (q. 30, Aa. 1,2). Hence it is clear that of which is that one clings to them more than one ought. 1351 Whether the different kinds of almsdeeds are suitably enumerated? IIa IIae q. 32 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the different kinds said almsdeeds are suitably enumerated in respect of those of almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated. For we reckon things whereof men have abundance or insufficiency. seven corporal almsdeeds, namely, to feed the hungry, to I answer that, The aforesaid distinction of almsdeeds give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to harbor the is suitably taken from the various needs of our neighbor: harborless, to visit the sick, to ransom the captive, to bury some of which affect the soul, and are relieved by spiritual the dead; all of which are expressed in the following verse: almsdeeds, while others affect the body, and are relieved “To visit, to quench, to feed, to ransom, clothe, harbor or by corporal almsdeeds. For corporal need occurs either bury.” during this life or afterwards. If it occurs during this life, Again we reckon seven spiritual alms, namely, to in- it is either a common need in respect of things needed by struct the ignorant, to counsel the doubtful, to comfort the all, or it is a special need occurring through some accident sorrowful, to reprove the sinner, to forgive injuries, to bear supervening. In the first case, the need is either internal or with those who trouble and annoy us, and to pray for all, external. Internal need is twofold: one which is relieved which are all contained in the following verse: “To coun- by solid food, viz. hunger, in respect of which we have sel, reprove, console, to pardon, forbear, and to pray,” yet “to feed the hungry”; while the other is relieved by liq- so that counsel includes both advice and instruction. uid food, viz. thirst, and in respect of this we have “to And it seems that these various almsdeeds are unsuit- give drink to the thirsty.” The common need with regard ably enumerated. For the purpose of almsdeeds is to suc- to external help is twofold; one in respect of clothing, and cor our neighbor. But a dead man profits nothing by being as to this we have “to clothe the naked”: while the other buried, else Our Lord would not have spoken truly when is in respect of a dwelling place, and as to this we have He said (Mat. 10:28): “Be not afraid of them who kill “to harbor the harborless.” Again if the need be special, the body, and after that have no more that they can do.”∗ it is either the result of an internal cause, like sickness, This explains why Our Lord, in enumerating the works of and then we have “to visit the sick,” or it results from an mercy, made no mention of the burial of the dead (Mat. external cause, and then we have “to ransom the captive.” 25:35,36). Therefore it seems that these almsdeeds are After this life we give “burial to the dead.” unsuitably enumerated. In like manner spiritual needs are relieved by spiritual Objection 2. Further, as stated above (a. 1), the pur- acts in two ways, first by asking for help from God, and pose of giving alms is to relieve our neighbor’s need. Now in this respect we have “prayer,” whereby one man prays there are many needs of human life other than those men- for others; secondly, by giving human assistance, and this tioned above, for instance, a blind man needs a leader, a in three ways. First, in order to relieve a deficiency on lame man needs someone to lean on, a poor man needs the part of the intellect, and if this deficiency be in the riches. Therefore these almsdeeds are unsuitably enumer- speculative intellect, the remedy is applied by “instruct- ated. ing,” and if in the practical intellect, the remedy is applied Objection 3. Further, almsgiving is a work of mercy. by “counselling.” Secondly, there may be a deficiency on But the reproof of the wrong-doer savors, apparently, of the part of the appetitive power, especially by way of sor- severity rather than of mercy. Therefore it ought not to be row, which is remedied by “comforting.” Thirdly, the de- reckoned among the spiritual almsdeeds. ficiency may be due to an inordinate act; and this may be Objection 4. Further, almsgiving is intended for the the subject of a threefold consideration. First, in respect of supply of a defect. But no man is without the defect of the sinner, inasmuch as the sin proceeds from his inordi- ignorance in some matter or other. Therefore, apparently, nate will, and thus the remedy takes the form of “reproof.” each one ought to instruct anyone who is ignorant of what Secondly, in respect of the person sinned against; and if he knows himself. the sin be committed against ourselves, we apply the rem- On the contrary, Gregory says (Nom. in Evang. ix): edy by “pardoning the injury,” while, if it be committed “Let him that hath understanding beware lest he withhold against God or our neighbor, it is not in our power to par- his knowledge; let him that hath abundance of wealth, don, as Jerome observes (Super Matth. xviii, 15). Thirdly, watch lest he slacken his merciful bounty; let him who in respect of the result of the inordinate act, on account of is a servant to art be most solicitous to share his skill and which the sinner is an annoyance to those who live with profit with his neighbor; let him who has an opportunity him, even beside his intention; in which case the remedy of speaking with the wealthy, fear lest he be condemned is applied by “bearing with him,” especially with regard to for retaining his talent, if when he has the chance he plead those who sin out of weakness, according to Rom. 15:1: not with him the cause of the poor.” Therefore the afore- “We that are stronger, ought to bear the infirmities of the ∗ The quotation is from Lk. 12:4. 1352 weak,” and not only as regards their being infirm and con-that to lead the blind, and to support the lame, come to the sequently troublesome on account of their unruly actions, same as visiting the sick. In like manner to assist a man but also by bearing any other burdens of theirs with them, against any distress that is due to an extrinsic cause comes according to Gal. 6:2: “Bear ye one another’s burdens.” to the same as the ransom of captives. And the wealth Reply to Objection 1. Burial does not profit a dead with which we relieve the poor is sought merely for the man as though his body could be capable of perception purpose of relieving the aforesaid needs: hence there was after death. In this sense Our Lord said that those who no reason for special mention of this particular need. kill the body “have no more that they can do”; and for Reply to Objection 3. The reproof of the sinner, as this reason He did not mention the burial of the dead with to the exercise of the act of reproving, seems to imply the the other works of mercy, but those only which are more severity of justice, but, as to the intention of the reprover, clearly necessary. Nevertheless it does concern the de- who wishes to free a man from the evil of sin, it is an act of ceased what is done with his body: both that he may live mercy and lovingkindness, according to Prov. 27:6: “Bet- in the memory of man whose respect he forfeits if he re- ter are the wounds of a friend, than the deceitful kisses of main without burial, and as regards a man’s fondness for an enemy.” his own body while he was yet living, a fondness which Reply to Objection 4. Nescience is not always a de- kindly persons should imitate after his death. It is thus fect, but only when it is about what one ought to know, that some are praised for burying the dead, as Tobias, and and it is a part of almsgiving to supply this defect by in- those who buried Our Lord; as Augustine says (De Cura struction. In doing this however we should observe the pro Mort. iii). due circumstances of persons, place and time, even as in Reply to Objection 2. All other needs are reduced to other virtuous acts. these, for blindness and lameness are kinds of sickness, so Whether corporal alms are of more account than spiritual alms? IIa IIae q. 32 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that corporal alms are thee” (Mat. 5:42): “You should give so as to injure neither of more account than spiritual alms. For it is more praise- yourself nor another, and when you refuse what another worthy to give an alms to one who is in greater want, since asks you must not lose sight of the claims of justice, and an almsdeed is to be praised because it relieves one who send him away empty; at times indeed you will give what is in need. Now the body which is relieved by corporal is better than what is asked for, if you reprove him that alms, is by nature more needy than the spirit which is re- asks unjustly.” Now reproof is a spiritual alms. Therefore lieved by spiritual alms. Therefore corporal alms are of spiritual almsdeeds are preferable to corporal almsdeeds. more account. I answer that, There are two ways of comparing these Objection 2. Further, an alms is less praiseworthy almsdeeds. First, simply; and in this respect, spiritual and meritorious if the kindness is compensated, where- almsdeeds hold the first place, for three reasons. First, be- fore Our Lord says (Lk. 14:12): “When thou makest a cause the offering is more excellent, since it is a spiritual dinner or a supper, call not thy neighbors who are rich, lest gift, which surpasses a corporal gift, according to Prov. perhaps they also invite thee again. Now there is always 4:2: “I will give you a good gift, forsake not My Law.” compensation in spiritual almsdeeds, since he who prays Secondly, on account of the object succored, because the for another, profits thereby, according to Ps. 34:13: “My spirit is more excellent than the body, wherefore, even as prayer shall be turned into my bosom: and he who teaches a man in looking after himself, ought to look to his soul another, makes progress in knowledge, which cannot be more than to his body, so ought he in looking after his said of corporal almsdeeds. Therefore corporal almsdeeds neighbor, whom he ought to love as himself. Thirdly, as are of more account than spiritual almsdeeds. regards the acts themselves by which our neighbor is suc- Objection 3. Further, an alms is to be commended if cored, because spiritual acts are more excellent than cor- the needy one is comforted by it: wherefore it is written poral acts, which are, in a fashion, servile. (Job 31:20): “If his sides have not blessed me,” and the Secondly, we may compare them with regard to some Apostle says to Philemon (verse 7): “The bowels of the particular case, when some corporal alms excels some saints have been refreshed by thee, brother.” Now a cor- spiritual alms: for instance, a man in hunger is to be fed poral alms is sometimes more welcome to a needy man rather than instructed, and as the Philosopher observes than a spiritual alms. Therefore bodily almsdeeds are of (Topic. iii, 2), for a needy man “money is better than phi- more account than spiritual almsdeeds. losophy,” although the latter is better simply. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. Reply to Objection 1. It is better to give to one who in Monte i, 20) on the words, “Give to him that asketh of is in greater want, other things being equal, but if he who 1353 is less needy is better, and is in want of better things, it is Nevertheless the intention of gaining spiritual goods better to give to him: and it is thus in the case in point. does not detract from merit, as the intention of gaining Reply to Objection 2. Compensation does not detract corporal goods. from merit and praise if it be not intended, even as human Reply to Objection 3. The merit of an almsgiver de- glory, if not intended, does not detract from virtue. Thus pends on that in which the will of the recipient rests rea- Sallust says of Cato (Catilin.), that “the less he sought sonably, and not on that in which it rests when it is inor- fame, the more he became famous”: and thus it is with dinate. spiritual almsdeeds. Whether corporal almsdeeds have a spiritual effect? IIa IIae q. 32 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that corporal almsdeeds a man gives a corporal alms out of love for God and his have not a spiritual effect. For no effect exceeds its cause. neighbor, and in this respect they bring forth a spiritual But spiritual goods exceed corporal goods. Therefore cor- fruit, according to Ecclus. 29:13, 14: “Lose thy money poral almsdeeds have no spiritual effect. for thy brother . . . place thy treasure in the command- Objection 2. Further, the sin of simony consists in ments of the Most High, and it shall bring thee more profit giving the corporal for the spiritual, and it is to be utterly than gold.” avoided. Therefore one ought not to give alms in order to Thirdly, with regard to the effect, and in this way receive a spiritual effect. again, they have a spiritual fruit, inasmuch as our neigh- Objection 3. Further, to multiply the cause is to mul- bor, who is succored by a corporal alms, is moved to pray tiply the effect. If therefore corporal almsdeeds cause a for his benefactor; wherefore the above text goes on (Ec- spiritual effect, the greater the alms, the greater the spiri- clus. 29:15): “Shut up alms in the heart of the poor, and it tual profit, which is contrary to what we read (Lk. 21:3) shall obtain help for thee from all evil.” of the widow who cast two brass mites into the treasury, Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers cor- and in Our Lord’s own words “cast in more than. . . all.” poral almsdeeds as to their substance. Therefore bodily almsdeeds have no spiritual effect. Reply to Objection 2. He who gives an alms does rot On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:18): “The intend to buy a spiritual thing with a corporal thing, for alms of a man. . . shall preserve the grace of a man as the he knows that spiritual things infinitely surpass corporal apple of the eye.” things, but he intends to merit a spiritual fruit through the I answer that, Corporal almsdeeds may be considered love of charity. in three ways. First, with regard to their substance, and in Reply to Objection 3. The widow who gave less in this way they have merely a corporal effect, inasmuch as quantity, gave more in proportion; and thus we gather that they supply our neighbor’s corporal needs. Secondly, they the fervor of her charity, whence corporal almsdeeds de- may be considered with regard to their cause, in so far as rive their spiritual efficacy, was greater. Whether almsgiving is a matter of precept? IIa IIae q. 32 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that almsgiving is not a a man would commit a mortal sin unless he gave an alms. matter of precept. For the counsels are distinct from the But it does not appear how this can be so, because it can precepts. Now almsgiving is a matter of counsel, accord- always be deemed probable that the person in need can be ing to Dan. 4:24: “Let my counsel be acceptable to the relieved in some other way, and that what we would spend King; [Vulg.: ‘to thee, and’] redeem thou thy sins with in almsgiving might be needful to ourselves either now or alms.” Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept. in some future time. Therefore it seems that almsgiving is Objection 2. Further, it is lawful for everyone to use not a matter of precept. and to keep what is his own. Yet by keeping it he will Objection 4. Further, every commandment is re- not give alms. Therefore it is lawful not to give alms: and ducible to the precepts of the Decalogue. But these pre- consequently almsgiving is not a matter of precept. cepts contain no reference to almsgiving. Therefore alms- Objection 3. Further, whatever is a matter of precept giving is not a matter of precept. binds the transgressor at some time or other under pain of On the contrary, No man is punished eternally for mortal sin, because positive precepts are binding for some omitting to do what is not a matter of precept. But some fixed time. Therefore, if almsgiving were a matter of pre- are punished eternally for omitting to give alms, as is clear cept, it would be possible to point to some fixed time when from Mat. 25:41-43. Therefore almsgiving is a matter of 1354 precept. was not subject to God’s Law, wherefore such things as I answer that, As love of our neighbor is a matter of were prescribed by the Law which he did not profess, had precept, whatever is a necessary condition to the love of to be counselled to him. Or he may have been speaking in our neighbor is a matter of precept also. Now the love reference to a case in which almsgiving was not a matter of our neighbor requires that not only should we be our of precept. neighbor’s well-wishers, but also his well-doers, accord- Reply to Objection 2. The temporal goods which ing to 1 Jn. 3:18: “Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, God grants us, are ours as to the ownership, but as to the but in deed, and in truth.” And in order to be a person’s use of them, they belong not to us alone but also to such well-wisher and well-doer, we ought to succor his needs: others as we are able to succor out of what we have over this is done by almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is a mat- and above our needs. Hence Basil says‡: “If you acknowl- ter of precept. edge them,” viz. your temporal goods, “as coming from Since, however, precepts are about acts of virtue, it God, is He unjust because He apportions them unequally? follows that all almsgiving must be a matter of precept, in Why are you rich while another is poor, unless it be that so far as it is necessary to virtue, namely, in so far as it you may have the merit of a good stewardship, and he is demanded by right reason. Now right reason demands the reward of patience? It is the hungry man’s bread that that we should take into consideration something on the you withhold, the naked man’s cloak that you have stored part of the giver, and something on the part of the recip- away, the shoe of the barefoot that you have left to rot, the ient. On the part of the giver, it must be noted that he money of the needy that you have buried underground: should give of his surplus, according to Lk. 11:41: “That and so you injure as many as you might help.” Ambrose which remaineth, give alms.” This surplus is to be taken in expresses himself in the same way. reference not only to himself, so as to denote what is un- Reply to Objection 3. There is a time when we sin necessary to the individual, but also in reference to those mortally if we omit to give alms; on the part of the re- of whom he has charge (in which case we have the expres- cipient when we see that his need is evident and urgent, sion “necessary to the person”∗ taking the word “person” and that he is not likely to be succored otherwise—on the as expressive of dignity). Because each one must first of part of the giver, when he has superfluous goods, which all look after himself and then after those over whom he he does not need for the time being, as far as he can judge has charge, and afterwards with what remains relieve the with probability. Nor need he consider every case that needs of others. Thus nature first, by its nutritive power, may possibly occur in the future, for this would be to think takes what it requires for the upkeep of one’s own body, about the morrow, which Our Lord forbade us to do (Mat. and afterwards yields the residue for the formation of an- 6:34), but he should judge what is superfluous and what other by the power of generation. necessary, according as things probably and generally oc- On the part of the recipient it is requisite that he should cur. be in need, else there would be no reason for giving him Reply to Objection 4. All succor given to our neigh- alms: yet since it is not possible for one individual to re- bor is reduced to the precept about honoring our par- lieve the needs of all, we are not bound to relieve all who ents. For thus does the Apostle interpret it (1 Tim. 4:8) are in need, but only those who could not be succored if where he says: “Dutifulness§ [Douay: ‘Godliness’] is we not did succor them. For in such cases the words of profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now Ambrose apply, “Feed him that dies of hunger: if thou is, and of that which is to come,” and he says this be- hast not fed him, thou hast slain him”†. Accordingly we cause the precept about honoring our parents contains the are bound to give alms of our surplus, as also to give alms promise, “that thou mayest be longlived upon the land” to one whose need is extreme: otherwise almsgiving, like (Ex. 20:12): and dutifulness comprises all kinds of alms- any other greater good, is a matter of counsel. giving. Reply to Objection 1. Daniel spoke to a king who Whether one ought to give alms out of what one needs? IIa IIae q. 32 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that one ought not to this order is a matter of precept. Since, then, the order of give alms out of what one needs. For the order of char- charity requires that a man should love himself more than ity should be observed not only as regards the effect of his neighbor, it seems that he would sin if he deprived our benefactions but also as regards our interior affections. himself of what he needed, in order to succor his neigh- Now it is a sin to contravene the order of charity, because bor. ∗ The official necessities of a person in position † Cf. Canon Pasce, dist. lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are taken ‡ Hom. super Luc. xii, 18 § “Pietas,” whence our English word “Piety.” Cf. also inf. q. 101, a. 2. 1355 Objection 2. Further, whoever gives away what he person, since the common good is to be preferred to one’s needs himself, squanders his own substance, and that is to own. be a prodigal, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary, if a man can- But no sinful deed should be done. Therefore we should not without it live in keeping with his social station, as not give alms out of what we need. regards either himself or those of whom he has charge. Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): The “necessary” considered thus is not an invariable quan- “If any man have not care of his own, and especially of tity, for one might add much more to a man’s property, those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse and yet not go beyond what he needs in this way, or one than an infidel.” Now if a man gives of what he needs might take much from him, and he would still have suf- for himself or for his charge, he seems to detract from the ficient for the decencies of life in keeping with his own care he should have for himself or his charge. Therefore it position. Accordingly it is good to give alms of this kind seems that whoever gives alms from what he needs, sins of “necessary”; and it is a matter not of precept but of gravely. counsel. Yet it would be inordinate to deprive oneself of On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): “If one’s own, in order to give to others to such an extent thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to that the residue would be insufficient for one to live in the poor.” Now he that gives all he has to the poor, gives keeping with one’s station and the ordinary occurrences not only what he needs not, but also what he needs. There- of life: for no man ought to live unbecomingly. There fore a man may give alms out of what he needs. are, however, three exceptions to the above rule. The first I answer that, A thing is necessary in two ways: first, is when a man changes his state of life, for instance, by because without it something is impossible, and it is al- entering religion, for then he gives away all his posses- together wrong to give alms out of what is necessary to sions for Christ’s sake, and does the deed of perfection by us in this sense; for instance, if a man found himself in transferring himself to another state. Secondly, when that the presence of a case of urgency, and had merely suffi- which he deprives himself of, though it be required for the cient to support himself and his children, or others under decencies of life, can nevertheless easily be recovered, so his charge, he would be throwing away his life and that that he does not suffer extreme inconvenience. Thirdly, of others if he were to give away in alms, what was then when he is in presence of extreme indigence in an indi- necessary to him. Yet I say this without prejudice to such vidual, or great need on the part of the common weal. For a case as might happen, supposing that by depriving him- in such cases it would seem praiseworthy to forego the self of necessaries a man might help a great personage, requirements of one’s station, in order to provide for a and a support of the Church or State, since it would be greater need. a praiseworthy act to endanger one’s life and the lives of The objections may be easily solved from what has those who are under our charge for the delivery of such a been said. Whether one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods? IIa IIae q. 32 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that one may give alms Objection 3. Further, greater evils should be avoided out of ill-gotten goods. For it is written (Lk. 16:9): “Make more than lesser evils. Now it is less sinful to keep back unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity.” Now mam- another’s property than to commit murder, of which a man mon signifies riches. Therefore it is lawful to make unto is guilty if he fails to succor one who is in extreme need, oneself spiritual friends by giving alms out of ill-gotten as appears from the words of Ambrose who says (Cf. riches. Canon Pasce dist. lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, Objection 2. Further, all filthy lucre seems to be ill- are taken): “Feed him that dies of hunger, if thou hast not gotten. But the profits from whoredom are filthy lucre; fed him, thou hast slain him”. Therefore, in certain cases, wherefore it was forbidden (Dt. 23:18) to offer therefrom it is lawful to give alms of ill-gotten goods. sacrifices or oblations to God: “Thou shalt not offer the On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. hire of a strumpet. . . in the house of. . . thy God.” In like xxxv, 2): “Give alms from your just labors. For you will manner gains from games of chance are ill-gotten, for, as not bribe Christ your judge, not to hear you with the poor the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), “we take such like whom you rob. . . Give not alms from interest and usury: gains from our friends to whom we ought rather to give.” I speak to the faithful to whom we dispense the Body of And most of all are the profits from simony ill-gotten, Christ.” since thereby the Holy Ghost is wronged. Nevertheless I answer that, A thing may be ill-gotten in three ways. out of such gains it is lawful to give alms. Therefore one In the first place a thing is ill-gotten if it be due to the per-may give alms out of ill-gotten goods. son from whom it is gotten, and may not be kept by the 1356 person who has obtained possession of it; as in the case of fluence. rapine, theft and usury, and of such things a man may not Reply to Objection 2. We have already explained give alms since he is bound to restore them. how alms may be given out of the profits of whoredom. Secondly, a thing is ill-gotten, when he that has it may Yet sacrifices and oblations were not made therefrom at not keep it, and yet he may not return it to the person the altar, both on account of the scandal, and through rev- from whom he received it, because he received it unjustly, erence for sacred things. It is also lawful to give alms while the latter gave it unjustly. This happens in simony, out of the profits of simony, because they are not due to wherein both giver and receiver contravene the justice of him who paid, indeed he deserves to lose them. But as to the Divine Law, so that restitution is to be made not to the the profits from games of chance, there would seem to be giver, but by giving alms. The same applies to all similar something unlawful as being contrary to the Divine Law, cases of illegal giving and receiving. when a man wins from one who cannot alienate his prop- Thirdly, a thing is ill-gotten, not because the taking erty, such as minors, lunatics and so forth, or when a man, was unlawful, but because it is the outcome of something with the desire of making money out of another man, en- unlawful, as in the case of a woman’s profits from whore- tices him to play, and wins from him by cheating. In these dom. This is filthy lucre properly so called, because the cases he is bound to restitution, and consequently cannot practice of whoredom is filthy and against the Law of give away his gains in alms. Then again there would seem God, yet the woman does not act unjustly or unlawfully to be something unlawful as being against the positive in taking the money. Consequently it is lawful to keep civil law, which altogether forbids any such profits. Since, and to give in alms what is thus acquired by an unlawful however, a civil law does not bind all, but only those who action. are subject to that law, and moreover may be abrogated Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Verb. through desuetude, it follows that all such as are bound Dom. 2), “Some have misunderstood this saying of Our by these laws are bound to make restitution of such gains, Lord, so as to take another’s property and give thereof to unless perchance the contrary custom prevail, or unless a the poor, thinking that they are fulfilling the command- man win from one who enticed him to play, in which case ment by so doing. This interpretation must be amended. he is not bound to restitution, because the loser does not Yet all riches are called riches of iniquity, as stated in De deserve to be paid back: and yet he cannot lawfully keep Quaest. Ev. ii, 34, because “riches are not unjust save for what he has won, so long as that positive law is in force, those who are themselves unjust, and put all their trust in wherefore in this case he ought to give it away in alms. them. Or, according to Ambrose in his commentary on Reply to Objection 3. All things are common prop- Lk. 16:9, “Make unto yourselves friends,” etc., “He calls erty in a case of extreme necessity. Hence one who is in mammon unjust, because it draws our affections by the such dire straits may take another’s goods in order to suc- various allurements of wealth.” Or, because “among the cor himself, if he can find no one who is willing to give many ancestors whose property you inherit, there is one him something. For the same reason a man may retain who took the property of others unjustly, although you what belongs to another, and give alms thereof; or even know nothing about it,” as Basil says in a homily (Hom. take something if there be no other way of succoring the super Luc. A, 5). Or, all riches are styled riches “of iniq- one who is in need. If however this be possible without uity,” i.e., of “inequality,” because they are not distributed danger, he must ask the owner’s consent, and then succor equally among all, one being in need, and another in af- the poor man who is in extreme necessity. Whether one who is under another’s power can give alms? IIa IIae q. 32 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that one who is under an- Therefore those who are in another’s power can give alms. other’s power can give alms. For religious are under the Objection 2. Further, a wife is under her husband’s power of their prelates to whom they have vowed obe- power (Gn. 3:16). But a wife can give alms since she is dience. Now if it were unlawful for them to give alms, her husband’s partner; hence it is related of the Blessed they would lose by entering the state of religion, for as Lucy that she gave alms without the knowledge of her be- Ambrose∗ says on 1 Tim. 4:8: “ ‘Dutifulness [Douay: trothed† Therefore a person is not prevented from giving ‘godliness’] is profitable to all things’: The sum total of alms, by being under another’s power. the Christian religion consists in doing one’s duty by all,” Objection 3. Further, the subjection of children to and the most creditable way of doing this is to give alms. their parents is founded on nature, wherefore the Apos- ∗ The quotation is from the works of Ambrosiaster. Cf. Index to ecclesiastical authorities quoted by St. Thomas † “Sponsus” The mat- rimonial institutions of the Romans were so entirely different from ours that “sponsus” is no longer accurately rendered either “husband” or “betrothed.” 1357 tle says (Eph. 6:1): “Children, obey your parents in the being commissioned by his superior, he can give alms Lord.” But, apparently, children may give alms out of from the property of his monaster, in accordance with the their parents’ property. For it is their own, since they are terms of his commission; but if he has no such dispensa- the heirs; wherefore, since they can employ it for some tion, since he has nothing of his own, he cannot give alms bodily use, it seems that much more can they use it in giv- without his abbot’s permission either express or presumed ing alms so as to profit their souls. Therefore those who for some probable reason: except in a case of extreme ne- are under another’s power can give alms. cessity, when it would be lawful for him to commit a theft Objection 4. Further, servants are under their mas- in order to give an alms. Nor does it follow that he is ter’s power, according to Titus 2:9: “Exhort servants to worse off than before, because, as stated in De Eccles. be obedient to their masters.” Now they may lawfully do Dogm. lxxi, “it is a good thing to give one’s property to anything that will profit their masters: and this would be the poor little by little, but it is better still to give all at especially the case if they gave alms for them. Therefore once in order to follow Christ, and being freed from care, those who are under another’s power can give alms. to be needy with Christ.” On the contrary, Alms should not be given out of an- Reply to Objection 2. A wife, who has other property other’s property; and each one should give alms out of the besides her dowry which is for the support of the burdens just profit of his own labor as Augustine says (De Verb. of marriage, whether that property be gained by her own Dom. xxxv, 2). Now if those who are subject to anyone industry or by any other lawful means, can give alms, out were to give alms, this would be out of another’s prop- of that property, without asking her husband’s permission: erty. Therefore those who are under another’s power can- yet such alms should be moderate, lest through giving too not give alms. much she impoverish her husband. Otherwise she ought I answer that, Anyone who is under another’s power not to give alms without the express or presumed consent must, as such, be ruled in accordance with the power of of her husband, except in cases of necessity as stated, in his superior: for the natural order demands that the infe- the case of a monk, in the preceding Reply. For though rior should be ruled according to its superior. Therefore the wife be her husband’s equal in the marriage act, yet in those matters in which the inferior is subject to his su- in matters of housekeeping, the head of the woman is perior, his ministrations must be subject to the superior’s the man, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:3). As regards permission. Blessed Lucy, she had a betrothed, not a husband, where- Accordingly he that is under another’s power must not fore she could give alms with her mother’s consent. give alms of anything in respect of which he is subject to Reply to Objection 3. What belongs to the children that other, except in so far as he has been commissioned belongs also to the father: wherefore the child cannot give by his superior. But if he has something in respect of alms, except in such small quantity that one may presume which he is not under the power of his superior, he is no the father to be willing: unless, perchance, the father au- longer subject to another in its regard, being independent thorize his child to dispose of any particular property. The in respect of that particular thing, and he can give alms same applies to servants. Hence the Reply to the Fourth therefrom. Objection is clear. Reply to Objection 1. If a monk be dispensed through Whether one ought to give alms to those rather who are more closely united to us? IIa IIae q. 32 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that one ought not to give when you shall fail, they may receive you into everlasting alms to those rather who are more closely united to us. dwellings, which passage Augustine expounds (De Verb. For it is written (Ecclus. 12:4,6): “Give to the merciful Dom. xxxv, 1): “Who shall have everlasting dwellings and uphold not the sinner. . . Do good to the humble and unless the saints of God? And who are they that shall be give not to the ungodly.” Now it happens sometimes that received by them into their dwellings, if not those who those who are closely united to us are sinful and ungodly. succor them in their needs? Therefore alms should be Therefore we ought not to give alms to them in preference given to the more holy persons rather than to those who to others. are more closely united to us. Objection 2. Further, alms should be given that we Objection 3. Further, man is more closely united to may receive an eternal reward in return, according to Mat. himself. But a man cannot give himself an alms. There- 6:18: “And thy Father Who seeth in secret, will repay fore it seems that we are not bound to give alms to those thee.” Now the eternal reward is gained chiefly by the who are most closely united to us. alms which are given to the saints, according to Lk. 16:9: On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): “If “Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that any man have not care of his own, and especially of those 1358 of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than torious in so far as it observes the order of charity, which an infidel.” requires that, other things being equal, we should, in pref- I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. erence, help those who are more closely connected with i, 28), “it falls to us by lot, as it were, to have to look to us. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): “It is the welfare of those who are more closely united to us.” with commendable liberality that you forget not your kin- Nevertheless in this matter we must employ discretion, dred, if you know them to be in need, for it is better that according to the various degrees of connection, holiness you should yourself help your own family, who would be and utility. For we ought to give alms to one who is much ashamed to beg help from others.” Secondly, almsdeeds holier and in greater want, and to one who is more use- deserve to be rewarded eternally, through the merit of the ful to the common weal, rather than to one who is more recipient, who prays for the giver, and it is in this sense closely united to us, especially if the latter be not very that Augustine is speaking. closely united, and has no special claim on our care then Reply to Objection 3. Since almsdeeds are works and there, and who is not in very urgent need. of mercy, just as a man does not, properly speaking, pity Reply to Objection 1. We ought not to help a sinner himself, but only by a kind of comparison, as stated above as such, that is by encouraging him to sin, but as man, that (q. 30, Aa. 1,2), so too, properly speaking, no man gives is by supporting his nature. himself an alms, unless he act in another’s person; thus Reply to Objection 2. Almsdeeds deserve on two when a man is appointed to distribute alms, he can take counts to receive an eternal reward. First because they are something for himself, if he be in want, on the same rooted in charity, and in this respect an almsdeed is meri- ground as when he gives to others. Whether alms should be given in abundance? IIa IIae q. 32 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that alms should not be in this sense it is praiseworthy to give alms: secondly, by given in abundance. For we ought to give alms to those relieving his need more than sufficiently; this is not praise- chiefly who are most closely connected with us. But we worthy, and it would be better to give to several that are ought not to give to them in such a way that they are likely in need, wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3): “If I to become richer thereby, as Ambrose says (De Officiis i, should distribute. . . to feed the poor,” on which words a 30). Therefore neither should we give abundantly to oth- gloss comments: “Thus we are warned to be careful in ers. giving alms, and to give, not to one only, but to many, that Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, we may profit many.” 30): “We should not lavish our wealth on others all at Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers abun- once, we should dole it out by degrees.” But to give abun- dance of alms as exceeding the needs of the recipient. dantly is to give lavishly. Therefore alms should not be Reply to Objection 2. The passage quoted considers given in abundance. abundance of alms on the part of the giver; but the sense Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 8:13): is that God does not wish a man to lavish all his wealth at “Not that others should be eased,” i.e. should live on once, except when he changes his state of life, wherefore you without working themselves, “and you burthened,” he goes on to say: “Except we imitate Eliseus who slew i.e. impoverished. But this would be the result if alms his oxen and fed the poor with what he had, so that no were given in abundance. Therefore we ought not to give household cares might keep him back” (3 Kings 19:21). alms abundantly. Reply to Objection 3. In the passage quoted the On the contrary, It is written (Tob. 4:93): “If thou words, “not that others should be eased or refreshed,” re- have much, give abundantly.” fer to that abundance of alms which surpasses the need of I answer that, Alms may be considered abundant in the recipient, to whom one should give alms not that he relation either to the giver, or to the recipient: in rela- may have an easy life, but that he may have relief. Never- tion to the giver, when that which a man gives is great theless we must bring discretion to bear on the matter, on as compared with his means. To give thus is praisewor- account of the various conditions of men, some of whom thy, wherefore Our Lord (Lk. 21:3,4) commended the are more daintily nurtured, and need finer food and cloth- widow because “of her want, she cast in all the living that ing. Hence Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): “When you she had.” Nevertheless those conditions must be observed give an alms to a man, you should take into considera- which were laid down when we spoke of giving alms out tion his age and his weakness; and sometimes the shame of one’s necessary goods (a. 9). which proclaims his good birth; and again that perhaps he On the part of the recipient, an alms may be abundant has fallen from riches to indigence through no fault of his in two ways; first, by relieving his need sufficiently, and own.” 1359 With regard to the words that follow, “and you bur-not because it would be better to give in abundance, but dened,” they refer to abundance on the part of the giver. because he fears for the weak, and he admonishes them Yet, as a gloss says on the same passage, “he says this, so to give that they lack not for themselves.” 1360 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 33 Of Fraternal Correction (In Eight Articles) We must now consider Fraternal Correction, under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity? (2) Whether it is a matter of precept? (3) Whether this precept binds all, or only superiors? (4) Whether this precept binds the subject to correct his superior? (5) Whether a sinner may correct anyone? (6) Whether one ought to correct a person who becomes worse through being corrected? (7) Whether secret correction should precede denouncement? (8) Whether witnesses should be called before denouncement? Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity? IIa IIae q. 33 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that fraternal correction Consequently fraternal correction also is an act of charity, is not an act of charity. For a gloss on Mat. 18:15, “If thy because thereby we drive out our brother’s evil, viz. sin, brother shall offend against thee,” says that “a man should the removal of which pertains to charity rather than the re- reprove his brother out of zeal for justice.” But justice is a moval of an external loss, or of a bodily injury, in so much distinct virtue from charity. Therefore fraternal correction as the contrary good of virtue is more akin to charity than is an act, not of charity, but of justice. the good of the body or of external things. Therefore fra- Objection 2. Further, fraternal correction is given by ternal correction is an act of charity rather than the healing secret admonition. Now admonition is a kind of counsel, of a bodily infirmity, or the relieving of an external bodily which is an act of prudence, for a prudent man is one who need. There is another correction which applies a remedy is of good counsel (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore fraternal cor- to the sin of the wrongdoer, considered as hurtful to oth- rection is an act, not of charity, but of prudence. ers, and especially to the common good. This correction Objection 3. Further, contrary acts do not belong to is an act of justice, whose concern it is to safeguard the the same virtue. Now it is an act of charity to bear with rectitude of justice between one man and another. a sinner, according to Gal. 6:2: “Bear ye one another’s Reply to Objection 1. This gloss speaks of the sec- burdens, and so you shall fulfil the law of Christ,” which ond correction which is an act of justice. Or if it speaks is the law of charity. Therefore it seems that the correc- of the first correction, then it takes justice as denoting a tion of a sinning brother, which is contrary to bearing with general virtue, as we shall state further on (q. 58 , a. 5), in him, is not an act of charity. which sense again all “sin is iniquity” (1 Jn. 3:4), through On the contrary, To correct the wrongdoer is a spir- being contrary to justice. itual almsdeed. But almsdeeds are works of charity, as Reply to Objection 2. According to the Philosopher stated above (q. 32, a. 1). Therefore fraternal correction is (Ethic. vi, 12), prudence regulates whatever is directed to an act of charity. the end, about which things counsel and choice are con- I answer that, The correction of the wrongdoer is a cerned. Nevertheless when, guided by prudence, we per- remedy which should be employed against a man’s sin. form some action aright which is directed to the end of Now a man’s sin may be considered in two ways, first as some virtue, such as temperance or fortitude, that action being harmful to the sinner, secondly as conducing to the belongs chiefly to the virtue to whose end it is directed. harm of others, by hurting or scandalizing them, or by be- Since, then, the admonition which is given in fraternal ing detrimental to the common good, the justice of which correction is directed to the removal of a brother’s sin, is disturbed by that man’s sin. which removal pertains to charity, it is evident that this Consequently the correction of a wrongdoer is admonition is chiefly an act of charity, which virtue com- twofold, one which applies a remedy to the sin considered mands it, so to speak, but secondarily an act of prudence, as an evil of the sinner himself. This is fraternal correction which executes and directs the action. properly so called, which is directed to the amendment of Reply to Objection 3. Fraternal correction is not op- the sinner. Now to do away with anyone’s evil is the same posed to forbearance with the weak, on the contrary it re- as to procure his good: and to procure a person’s good is sults from it. For a man bears with a sinner, in so far as an act of charity, whereby we wish and do our friend well. he is not disturbed against him, and retains his goodwill 1361 towards him: the result being that he strives to make him do better. Whether fraternal correction is a matter of precept? IIa IIae q. 33 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that fraternal correction is anyhow, but by observing the due circumstances, which not a matter of precept. For nothing impossible is a matter are requisite in order that an act be virtuous; namely, that of precept, according to the saying of Jerome∗: “Accursed it be done where, when, and how it ought to be done. And be he who says that God has commanded any. thing im- since the disposition of whatever is directed to the end de- possible.” Now it is written (Eccles. 7:14): “Consider the pends on the formal aspect of the end, the chief of these works of God, that no man can correct whom He hath de- circumstances of a virtuous act is this aspect of the end, spised.” Therefore fraternal correction is not a matter of which in this case is the good of virtue. If therefore such precept. a circumstance be omitted from a virtuous act, as entirely Objection 2. Further, all the precepts of the Divine takes away the good of virtue, such an act is contrary to a Law are reduced to the precepts of the Decalogue. But precept. If, however, the circumstance omitted from a vir- fraternal correction does not come under any precept of tuous act be such as not to destroy the virtue altogether, the Decalogue. Therefore it is not a matter of precept. though it does not perfectly attain the good of virtue, it is Objection 3. Further, the omission of a Divine pre- not against a precept. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, cept is a mortal sin, which has no place in a holy man. Yet 9) says that if we depart but little from the mean, it is not holy and spiritual men are found to omit fraternal correc- contrary to the virtue, whereas if we depart much from the tion: since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): “Not only mean virtue is destroyed in its act. Now fraternal correc- those of low degree, but also those of high position, re- tion is directed to a brother’s amendment: so that it is a frain from reproving others, moved by a guilty cupidity, matter of precept, in so far as it is necessary for that end, not by the claims of charity.” Therefore fraternal correc- but not so as we have to correct our erring brother at all tion is not a matter of precept. places and times. Objection 4. Further, whatever is a matter of precept Reply to Objection 1. In all good deeds man’s ac- is something due. If, therefore, fraternal correction is a tion is not efficacious without the Divine assistance: and matter of precept, it is due to our brethren that we correct yet man must do what is in his power. Hence Augustine them when they sin. Now when a man owes anyone a ma- says (De Correp. et Gratia xv): “Since we ignore who is terial due, such as the payment of a sum of money, he must predestined and who is not, charity should so guide our not be content that his creditor come to him, but he should feelings, that we wish all to be saved.” Consequently we seek him out, that he may pay him his due. Hence we ought to do our brethren the kindness of correcting them, should have to go seeking for those who need correction, with the hope of God’s help. in order that we might correct them; which appears to be Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 32, a. 5, ad inconvenient, both on account of the great number of sin- 4), all the precepts about rendering service to our neighbor ners, for whose correction one man could not suffice, and are reduced to the precept about the honor due to parents. because religious would have to leave the cloister in order Reply to Objection 3. Fraternal correction may be to reprove men, which would be unbecoming. Therefore omitted in three ways. fraternal correction is not a matter of precept. First, meritoriously, when out of charity one omits to On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, correct someone. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): 4): “You become worse than the sinner if you fail to cor- “If a man refrains from chiding and reproving wrongdo- rect him.” But this would not be so unless, by this neglect, ers, because he awaits a suitable time for so doing, or be- one omitted to observe some precept. Therefore fraternal cause he fears lest, if he does so, they may become worse, correction is a matter of precept. or hinder, oppress, or turn away from the faith, others who I answer that, Fraternal correction is a matter of pre- are weak and need to be instructed in a life of goodness cept. We must observe, however, that while the negative and virtue, this does not seem to result from covetousness, precepts of the Law forbid sinful acts, the positive pre- but to be counselled by charity.” cepts inculcate acts of virtue. Now sinful acts are evil in Secondly, fraternal correction may be omitted in such themselves, and cannot become good, no matter how, or a way that one commits a mortal sin, namely, “when” (as when, or where, they are done, because of their very na- he says in the same passage) “one fears what people may ture they are connected with an evil end, as stated in Ethic. think, or lest one may suffer grievous pain or death; pro- ii, 6: wherefore negative precepts bind always and for all vided, however, that the mind is so dominated by such times. On the other hand, acts of virtue must not be done things, that it gives them the preference to fraternal char- ∗ Pelagius, Expos. Symb. ad Damas 1362 ity.” This would seem to be the case when a man reckons seek him out, in order to reprove him for a sin. On the that he might probably withdraw some wrongdoer from other hand, we are not bound to seek someone on whom sin, and yet omits to do so, through fear or covetousness. to bestow such favors as are due, not to any certain person, Thirdly, such an omission is a venial sin, when through but to all our neighbors in general, whether those favors be fear or covetousness, a man is loth to correct his brother’s material or spiritual goods, but it suffices that we bestow faults, and yet not to such a degree, that if he saw clearly them when the opportunity occurs; because, as Augustine that he could withdraw him from sin, he would still for- says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), we must look upon this bear from so doing, through fear or covetousness, be- as a matter of chance. For this reason he says (De Verb. cause in his own mind he prefers fraternal charity to these Dom. xvi, 1) that “Our Lord warns us not to be listless things. It is in this way that holy men sometimes omit to in regard of one another’s sins: not indeed by being on correct wrongdoers. the lookout for something to denounce, but by correcting Reply to Objection 4. We are bound to pay that which what we see”: else we should become spies on the lives is due to some fixed and certain person, whether it be a of others, which is against the saying of Prov. 24:19: “Lie material or a spiritual good, without waiting for him to not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of the come to us, but by taking proper steps to find him. Where- just, nor spoil his rest.” It is evident from this that there fore just as he that owes money to a creditor should seek is no need for religious to leave their cloister in order to him, when the time comes, so as to pay him what he owes, rebuke evil-doers. so he that has spiritual charge of some person is bound to Whether fraternal correction belongs only to prelates? IIa IIae q. 33 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that fraternal correc- tice purposing the common good, which is procured not tion belongs to prelates alone. For Jerome∗ says: “Let only by warning one’s brother, but also, sometimes, by priests endeavor to fulfil this saying of the Gospel: ‘If punishing him, that others may, through fear, desist from thy brother sin against thee,’ ” etc. Now prelates having sin. Such a correction belongs only to prelates, whose charge of others were usually designated under the name business it is not only to admonish, but also to correct by of priests. Therefore it seems that fraternal correction be- means of punishments. longs to prelates alone. Reply to Objection 1. Even as regards that fraternal Objection 2. Further, fraternal correction is a spiritual correction which is common to all, prelates have a grave alms. Now corporal almsgiving belongs to those who are responsibility, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): “for placed above others in temporal matters, i.e. to the rich. just as a man ought to bestow temporal favors on those Therefore fraternal correction belongs to those who are especially of whom he has temporal care, so too ought he placed above others in spiritual matters, i.e. to prelates. to confer spiritual favors, such as correction, teaching and Objection 3. Further, when one man reproves another the like, on those who are entrusted to his spiritual care.” he moves him by his rebuke to something better. Now Therefore Jerome does not mean that the precept of frater- in the physical order the inferior is moved by the supe- nal correction concerns priests only, but that it concerns rior. Therefore in the order of virtue also, which follows them chiefly. the order of nature, it belongs to prelates alone to correct Reply to Objection 2. Just as he who has the means inferiors. wherewith to give corporal assistance is rich in this re- On the contrary, It is written (Dist. xxiv, qu. 3, spect, so he whose reason is gifted with a sane judgment, Can. Tam Sacerdotes): “Both priests and all the rest of the so as to be able to correct another’s wrong-doing, is, in faithful should be most solicitous for those who perish, so this respect, to be looked on as a superior. that their reproof may either correct their sinful ways. or, Reply to Objection 3. Even in the physical order cer- if they be incorrigible, cut them off from the Church.” tain things act mutually on one another, through being in I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), correction is some respect higher than one another, in so far as each is twofold. One is an act of charity, which seeks in a special somewhat in act, and somewhat in potentiality with regard way the recovery of an erring brother by means of a sim- to another. In like manner one man can correct another in ple warning: such like correction belongs to anyone who so far as he has a sane judgment in a matter wherein the has charity, be he subject or prelate. other sins, though he is not his superior simply. But there is another correction which is an act of jus- ∗ Origen, Hom. vii in Joan. 1363 Whether a mann is bound to correct his prelate? IIa IIae q. 33 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that no man is bound to says (1 Tim. 5:1): “An ancient man rebuke not, but entreat correct his prelate. For it is written (Ex. 19:12): “The him as a father.” Wherefore Dionysius finds fault with the beast that shall touch the mount shall be stoned,”∗ and monk Demophilus (Ep. viii), for rebuking a priest with (2 Kings 6:7) it is related that the Lord struck Oza for insolence, by striking and turning him out of the church. touching the ark. Now the mount and the ark signify our Reply to Objection 1. It would seem that a subject prelates. Therefore prelates should not be corrected by touches his prelate inordinately when he upbraids him their subjects. with insolence, as also when he speaks ill of him: and this Objection 2. Further, a gloss on Gal. 2:11, “I with- is signified by God’s condemnation of those who touched stood him to the face,” adds: “as an equal.” Therefore, the mount and the ark. since a subject is not equal to his prelate, he ought not to Reply to Objection 2. To withstand anyone in pub- correct him. lic exceeds the mode of fraternal correction, and so Paul Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 8) would not have withstood Peter then, unless he were in that “one ought not to presume to reprove the conduct of some way his equal as regards the defense of the faith. holy men, unless one thinks better of oneself.” But one But one who is not an equal can reprove privately and ought not to think better of oneself than of one’s prelate. respectfully. Hence the Apostle in writing to the Colos- Therefore one ought not to correct one’s prelate. sians (4:17) tells them to admonish their prelate: “Say On the contrary, Augustine says in his Rule: “Show to Archippus: Fulfil thy ministry†.” It must be observed, mercy not only to yourselves, but also to him who, being however, that if the faith were endangered, a subject ought in the higher position among you, is therefore in greater to rebuke his prelate even publicly. Hence Paul, who was danger.” But fraternal correction is a work of mercy. Peter’s subject, rebuked him in public, on account of the Therefore even prelates ought to be corrected. imminent danger of scandal concerning faith, and, as the I answer that, A subject is not competent to adminis- gloss of Augustine says on Gal. 2:11, “Peter gave an ex- ter to his prelate the correction which is an act of justice ample to superiors, that if at any time they should happen through the coercive nature of punishment: but the fra- to stray from the straight path, they should not disdain to ternal correction which is an act of charity is within the be reproved by their subjects.” competency of everyone in respect of any person towards Reply to Objection 3. To presume oneself to be sim- whom he is bound by charity, provided there be something ply better than one’s prelate, would seem to savor of pre- in that person which requires correction. sumptuous pride; but there is no presumption in thinking Now an act which proceeds from a habit or power ex- oneself better in some respect, because, in this life, no tends to whatever is contained under the object of that man is without some fault. We must also remember that power or habit: thus vision extends to all things com- when a man reproves his prelate charitably, it does not fol- prised in the object of sight. Since, however, a virtuous act low that he thinks himself any better, but merely that he needs to be moderated by due circumstances, it follows offers his help to one who, “being in the higher position that when a subject corrects his prelate, he ought to do among you, is therefore in greater danger,” as Augustine so in a becoming manner, not with impudence and harsh- observes in his Rule quoted above. ness, but with gentleness and respect. Hence the Apostle Whether a sinner ought to reprove a wrongdoer? IIa IIae q. 33 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that a sinner ought to re- sin, to refrain from correcting wrongdoers. prove a wrongdoer. For no man is excused from obeying Objection 3. Further, it is written (1 Jn. 1:8): “If we a precept by having committed a sin. But fraternal correc- say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.” Therefore tion is a matter of precept, as stated above (a. 2). There- if, on account of a sin, a man is hindered from reproving fore it seems that a man ought not to forbear from such his brother, there will be none to reprove the wrongdoer. like correction for the reason that he has committed a sin. But the latter proposition is unreasonable: therefore the Objection 2. Further, spiritual almsdeeds are of more former is also. account than corporal almsdeeds. Now one who is in sin On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, ought not to abstain from administering corporal alms. 32): “He that is subject to vice should not correct the vices Much less therefore ought he, on account of a previous of others.” Again it is written (Rom. 2:1): “Wherein thou ∗ Vulg.: ‘Everyone that shall touch the mount, dying he shall die.’ † Vulg.: ‘Take heed to the ministry which thou hast received in the Lord, that thou fulfil it.’ Cf. 2 Tim. 4:5 1364 judgest another, thou condemnest thyself. For thou dost good teaching, and to seek to be praised by men for your the same things which thou judgest.” knowledge.” I answer that, As stated above (a. 3, ad 2), to correct Thirdly, on account of the rebuker’s pride; when, for a wrongdoer belongs to a man, in so far as his reason is instance, a man thinks lightly of his own sins, and, in gifted with right judgment. Now sin, as stated above ( Ia his own heart, sets himself above his neighbor, judging IIae, q. 85, Aa. 1,2), does not destroy the good of nature so the latter’s sins with harsh severity, as though he himself as to deprive the sinner’s reason of all right judgment, and were just man. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in this respect he may be competent to find fault with oth- in Monte ii, 19): “To reprove the faults of others is the ers for committing sin. Nevertheless a previous sin proves duty of good and kindly men: when a wicked man re- somewhat of a hindrance to this correction, for three rea- bukes anyone, his rebuke is the latter’s acquittal.” And sons. First because this previous sin renders a man un- so, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19): worthy to rebuke another; and especially is he unworthy “When we have to find fault with anyone, we should think to correct another for a lesser sin, if he himself has com- whether we were never guilty of his sin; and then we must mitted a greater. Hence Jerome says on the words, “Why remember that we are men, and might have been guilty of seest thou the mote?” etc. (Mat. 7:3): “He is speaking of it; or that we once had it on our conscience, but have it no those who, while they are themselves guilty of mortal sin, longer: and then we should bethink ourselves that we are have no patience with the lesser sins of their brethren.” all weak, in order that our reproof may be the outcome, Secondly, such like correction becomes unseemly, on not of hatred, but of pity. But if we find that we are guilty account of the scandal which ensues therefrom, if the cor- of the same sin, we must not rebuke him, but groan with rector’s sin be well known, because it would seem that him, and invite him to repent with us.” It follows from he corrects, not out of charity, but more for the sake of this that, if a sinner reprove a wrongdoer with humility, ostentation. Hence the words of Mat. 7:4, “How sayest he does not sin, nor does he bring a further condemnation thou to thy brother?” etc. are expounded by Chrysostom∗ on himself, although thereby he proves himself deserving thus: “That is—‘With what object?’ Out of charity, think of condemnation, either in his brother’s or in his own con- you, that you may save your neighbor?” No, “because science, on account of his previous sin. you would look after your own salvation first. What you Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear. want is, not to save others, but to hide your evil deeds with Whether one ought to forbear from correcting someone, through fear lest he become IIa IIae q. 33 a. 6 worse? Objection 1. It would seem that one ought not to for- On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 9:8): “Rebuke bear from correcting someone through fear lest he become not a scorner lest he hate thee,” where a gloss remarks: worse. For sin is weakness of the soul, according to Ps. “You must not fear lest the scorner insult you when you 6:3: “Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak.” Now rebuke him: rather should you bear in mind that by mak- he that has charge of a sick person, must not cease to take ing him hate you, you may make him worse.” Therefore care of him, even if he be fractious or contemptuous, be- one ought to forego fraternal correction, when we fear lest cause then the danger is greater, as in the case of madmen. we may make a man worse. Much more, therefore should one correct a sinner, no mat- I answer that, As stated above (a. 3) the correction of ter how badly he takes it. the wrongdoer is twofold. One, which belongs to prelates, Objection 2. Further, according to Jerome vital truths and is directed to the common good, has coercive force. are not to be foregone on account of scandal. Now God’s Such correction should not be omitted lest the person cor- commandments are vital truths. Since, therefore, fraternal rected be disturbed, both because if he is unwilling to correction is a matter of precept, as stated above (a. 2), it amend his ways of his own accord, he should be made seems that it should not be foregone for fear of scandaliz- to cease sinning by being punished, and because, if he be ing the person to be corrected. incorrigible, the common good is safeguarded in this way, Objection 3. Further, according to the Apostle (Rom. since the order of justice is observed, and others are de- 3:8) we should not do evil that good may come of it. terred by one being made an example of. Hence a judge Therefore, in like manner, good should not be omitted does not desist from pronouncing sentence of condem- lest evil befall. Now fraternal correction is a good thing. nation against a sinner, for fear of disturbing him or his Therefore it should not be omitted for fear lest the person friends. corrected become worse. The other fraternal correction is directed to the amend- ∗ Hom. xvii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom 1365 ment of the wrongdoer, whom it does not coerce, but of precept, in so far as it is an act of virtue, and it will merely admonishes. Consequently when it is deemed be a virtuous act in so far as it is proportionate to the end. probable that the sinner will not take the warning, and will Consequently whenever it is a hindrance to the end, for in- become worse, such fraternal correction should be fore- stance when a man becomes worse through it, it is longer gone, because the means should be regulated according to a vital truth, nor is it a matter precept. the requirements of the end. Reply to Objection 3. Whatever is directed to end, Reply to Objection 1. The doctor uses force towards becomes good through being directed to the end. Hence a madman, who is unwilling to submit to his treatment; whenever fraternal correction hinders the end, namely the and this may be compared with the correction adminis- amendment of our brother, it is no longer good, so that tered by prelates, which has coercive power, but not with when such a correction is omitted, good is not omitted simple fraternal correction. lest evil should befall. Reply to Objection 2. Fraternal correction is a matter Whether the precept of fraternal correction demands that a private admonition IIa IIae q. 33 a. 7 should precede denunciation? Objection 1. It would seem that the precept of frater- gious orders to proclaim this or that one for a fault, with- nal correction does not demand that a private admonition out any previous secret admonition. Therefore it seems should precede denunciation. For, in works of charity, we that this admonition is not required by the precept. should above all follow the example of God, according to Objection 5. Further, religious are bound to obey their Eph. 5:1,2: “Be ye followers of God, as most dear chil- prelates. Now a prelate sometimes commands either all in dren, and walk in love.” Now God sometimes punishes a general, or someone in particular, to tell him if they know man for a sin, without previously warning him in secret. of anything that requires correction. Therefore it would Therefore it seems that there is no need for a private ad- seem that they are bound to tell them this, even before any monition to precede denunciation. secret admonition. Therefore the precept does not require Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine (De secret admonition before public denunciation. Mendacio xv), we learn from the deeds of holy men how On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. we ought to understand the commandments of Holy Writ. xvi, 4) on the words, “Rebuke him between thee and him Now among the deeds of holy men we find that a hidden alone” (Mat. 18:15): “Aiming at his amendment, while sin is publicly denounced, without any previous admoni- avoiding his disgrace: since perhaps from shame he might tion in private. Thus we read (Gn. 37:2) that “Joseph ac- begin to defend his sin; and him whom you thought to cused his brethren to his father of a most wicked crime”: make a better man, you make worse.” Now we are bound and (Acts 5:4,9) that Peter publicly denounced Ananias by the precept of charity to beware lest our brother be- and Saphira who had secretly “by fraud kept back the come worse. Therefore the order of fraternal correction price of the land,” without beforehand admonishing them comes under the precept. in private: nor do we read that Our Lord admonished Ju- I answer that, With regard to the public denunciation das in secret before denouncing him. Therefore the pre- of sins it is necessary to make a distinction: because sins cept does not require that secret admonition should pre- may be either public or secret. In the case of public sins, a cede public denunciation. remedy is required not only for the sinner, that he may be- Objection 3. Further, it is a graver matter to accuse come better, but also for others, who know of his sin, lest than to denounce. Now one may go to the length of they be scandalized. Wherefore such like sins should be accusing a person publicly, without previously admon- denounced in public, according to the saying of the Apos- ishing him in secret: for it is decided in the Decretal tle (1 Tim. 5:20): “Them that sin reprove before all, that (Cap. Qualiter, xiv, De Accusationibus) that “nothing else the rest also may have fear,” which is to be understood need precede accusation except inscription.”∗ Therefore as referring to public sins, as Augustine states (De Verb. it seems that the precept does not require that a secret ad- Dom. xvi, 7). monition should precede public denunciation. On the other hand, in the case of secret sins, the words Objection 4. Further, it does not seem probable that of Our Lord seem to apply (Mat. 18:15): “If thy brother the customs observed by religious in general are contrary shall offend against thee,” etc. For if he offend thee pub- to the precepts of Christ. Now it is customary among reli- licly in the presence of others, he no longer sins against ∗ The accuser was bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation. The effect of this endorsement or inscription was that the accuser bound himself, if he failed to prove the accusation, to suffer the same punishment as the accused would have to suffer if proved guilty. 1366 thee alone, but also against others whom he ‘disturbs. just what public sins are to the judgment of man. Nev- Since, however, a man’s neighbor may take offense even ertheless God does rebuke sinners sometimes by secretly at his secret sins, it seems that we must make yet a fur- admonishing them, so to speak, with an inward inspira- ther distinction. For certain secret sins are hurtful to our tion, either while they wake or while they sleep, according neighbor either in his body or in his soul, as, for instance, to Job 33:15-17: “By a dream in a vision by night, when when a man plots secretly to betray his country to its en- deep sleep falleth upon men. . . then He openeth the ears emies, or when a heretic secretly turns other men away of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to from the faith. And since he that sins thus in secret, sins learn, that He may withdraw a man from the things he is not only against you in particular, but also against others, doing.” it is necessary to take steps to denounce him at once, in or- Reply to Objection 2. Our Lord as God knew the der to prevent him doing such harm, unless by chance you sin of Judas as though it were public, wherefore He could were firmly persuaded that this evil result would be pre- have made it known at once. Yet He did not, but warned vented by admonishing him secretly. On the other hand Judas of his sin in words that were obscure. The sin of there are other sins which injure none but the sinner, and Ananias and Saphira was denounced by Peter acting as the person sinned against, either because he alone is hurt God’s executor, by Whose revelation he knew of their sin. by the sinner, or at least because he alone knows about With regard to Joseph it is probable that he warned his his sin, and then our one purpose should be to succor our brethren, though Scripture does not say so. Or we may sinning brother: and just as the physician of the body say that the sin was public with regard to his brethren, restores the sick man to health, if possible, without cut- wherefore it is stated in the plural that he accused “his ting off a limb, but, if this be unavoidable, cuts off a limb brethren.” which is least indispensable, in order to preserve the life Reply to Objection 3. When there is danger to a great of the whole body, so too he who desires his brother’s number of people, those words of Our Lord do not apply, amendment should, if possible, so amend him as regards because then thy brother does not sin against thee alone. his conscience, that he keep his good name. Reply to Objection 4. Proclamations made in the For a good name is useful, first of all to the sinner chapter of religious are about little faults which do not himself, not only in temporal matters wherein a man suf- affect a man’s good name, wherefore they are reminders fers many losses, if he lose his good name, but also in of forgotten faults rather than accusations or denuncia- spiritual matters, because many are restrained from sin- tions. If, however, they should be of such a nature as to ning, through fear of dishonor, so that when a man finds injure our brother’s good name, it would be contrary to his honor lost, he puts no curb on his sinning. Hence Our Lord’s precept, to denounce a brother’s fault in this Jerome says on Mat. 18:15: “If he sin against thee, thou manner. shouldst rebuke him in private, lest he persist in his sin Reply to Objection 5. A prelate is not to be obeyed if he should once become shameless or unabashed.” Sec- contrary to a Divine precept, according to Acts 5:29: “We ondly, we ought to safeguard our sinning brother’s good ought to obey God rather then men.” Therefore when name, both because the dishonor of one leads to the dis- a prelate commands anyone to tell him anything that he honor of others, according to the saying of Augustine (Ep. knows to need correction, the command rightly under- ad pleb. Hipponens. lxxviii): “When a few of those who stood supports the safeguarding of the order of fraternal bear a name for holiness are reported falsely or proved in correction, whether the command be addressed to all in truth to have done anything wrong, people will seek by general, or to some particular individual. If, on the other busily repeating it to make it believed of all”: and also hand, a prelate were to issue a command in express op- because when one man’s sin is made public others are in- position to this order instituted by Our Lord, both would cited to sin likewise. sin, the one commanding, and the one obeying him, as Since, however, one’s conscience should be preferred disobeying Our Lord’s command. Consequently he ought to a good name, Our Lord wished that we should pub- not to be obeyed, because a prelate is not the judge of se- licly denounce our brother and so deliver his conscience cret things, but God alone is, wherefore he has no power from sin, even though he should forfeit his good name. to command anything in respect of hidden matters, except Therefore it is evident that the precept requires a secret in so far as they are made known through certain signs, admonition to precede public denunciation. as by ill-repute or suspicion; in which cases a prelate can Reply to Objection 1. Whatever is hidden, is known command just as a judge, whether secular or ecclesiasti- to God, wherefore hidden sins are to the judgment of God, cal, can bind a man under oath to tell the truth. 1367 Whether before the public denunciation witnesses ought to be brought forward? IIa IIae q. 33 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that before the public de- der of fraternal correction to demand that we should first nunciation witnesses ought not to be brought forward. For of all rebuke our brother secretly, and that if he listens, it secret sins ought not to be made known to others, because is well; but if he listen not, and his sin be altogether hid- by so doing “a man would betray his brother’s sins instead den, they say that we should go no further in the matter, of correcting them,” as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. whereas if it has already begun to reach the ears of sev- xvi, 7). Now by bringing forward witnesses one makes eral by various signs, we ought to prosecute the matter, known a brother’s sin to others. Therefore in the case of according to Our Lord’s command. But this is contrary secret sins one ought not to bring witnesses forward be- to what Augustine says in his Rule that “we are bound to fore the public denunciation. reveal” a brother’s sin, if it “will cause a worse corrup- Objection 2. Further, man should love his neighbor tion in the heart.” Wherefore we must say otherwise that as himself. Now no man brings in witnesses to prove his when the secret admonition has been given once or several own secret sin. Neither therefore ought one to bring for- times, as long as there is probable hope of his amendment, ward witnesses to prove the secret sin of our brother. we must continue to admonish him in private, but as soon Objection 3. Further, witnesses are brought forward as we are able to judge with any probability that the se- to prove something. But witnesses afford no proof in se- cret admonition is of no avail, we must take further steps, cret matters. Therefore it is useless to bring witnesses for- however secret the sin may be, and call witnesses, unless ward in such cases. perhaps it were thought probable that this would not con- Objection 4. Further, Augustine says in his Rule that duce to our brother’s amendment, and that he would be- “before bringing it to the notice of witnesses. . . it should come worse: because on that account one ought to abstain be put before the superior.” Now to bring a matter before altogether from correcting him, as stated above (a. 6). a superior or a prelate is to tell the Church. Therefore wit- Reply to Objection 2. A man needs no witnesses that nesses should not be brought forward before the public he may amend his own sin: yet they may be necessary denunciation. that we may amend a brother’s sin. Hence the comparison On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 18:16): “Take fails. with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two,” etc. Reply to Objection 3. There may be three reasons for I answer that, The right way to go from one extreme citing witnesses. First, to show that the deed in question is to another is to pass through the middle space. Now Our a sin, as Jerome says: secondly, to prove that the deed was Lord wished the beginning of fraternal correction to be done, if repeated, as Augustine says (in his Rule): thirdly, hidden, when one brother corrects another between this “to prove that the man who rebuked his brother, has done one and himself alone, while He wished the end to be pub- what he could,” as Chrysostom says (Hom. in Matth. lx). lic, when such a one would be denounced to the Church. Reply to Objection 4. Augustine means that the mat- Consequently it is befitting that a citation of witnesses ter ought to be made known to the prelate before it is should be placed between the two extremes, so that at first stated to the witnesses, in so far as the prelate is a pri- the brother’s sin be indicated to a few, who will be of use vate individual who is able to be of more use than others, without being a hindrance, and thus his sin be amended but not that it is to be told him as to the Church, i.e. as without dishonoring him before the public. holding the position of judge. Reply to Objection 1. Some have understood the or- 1368 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 34 Of Hatred (In Six Articles) We must how consider the vices opposed to charity: (1) hatred, which is opposed to love; (2) sloth and envy, which are opposed to the joy of charity; (3) discord and schism, which are contrary to peace; (4) offense and scandal, which are contrary to beneficence and fraternal correction. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is possible to hate God? (2) Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins? (3) Whether hatred of one’s neighbor is always a sin? (4) Whether it is the greatest of all sins against our neighbor? (5) Whether it is a capital sin? (6) From what capital sin does it arise? Whether it is possible for anyone to hate God? IIa IIae q. 34 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that no man can hate God. for it is natural to good to be loved. Hence it is impossible For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “the first good for one who sees God in His Essence, to hate Him. and beautiful is an object of love and dilection to all.” But Moreover some of His effects are such that they can God is goodness and beauty itself. Therefore He is hated nowise be contrary to the human will, since “to be, to live, by none. to understand,” which are effects of God, are desirable and Objection 2. Further, in the Apocryphal books of lovable to all. Wherefore again God cannot be an object 3 Esdras 4:36,39 it is written that “all things call upon of hatred if we consider Him as the Author of such like ef- truth. . . and (all men) do well like of her works.” Now fects. Some of God’s effects, however, are contrary to an God is the very truth according to Jn. 14:6. Therefore all inordinate will, such as the infliction of punishment, and love God, and none can hate Him. the prohibition of sin by the Divine Law. Such like effects Objection 3. Further, hatred is a kind of aversion. are repugnant to a will debased by sin, and as regards the But according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) God draws all consideration of them, God may be an object of hatred to things to Himself. Therefore none can hate Him. some, in so far as they look upon Him as forbidding sin, On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 73:23): “The pride and inflicting punishment. of them that hate Thee ascendeth continually,” and (Jn. Reply to Objection 1. This argument is true of those 15:24): “But now they have both seen and hated both Me who see God’s Essence, which is the very essence of and My Father.” goodness. I answer that, As shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 29, Reply to Objection 2. This argument is true in so far a. 1), hatred is a movement of the appetitive power, as God is apprehended as the cause of such effects as are which power is not set in motion save by something ap- naturally beloved of all, among which are the works of prehended. Now God can be apprehended by man in Truth who reveals herself to men. two ways; first, in Himself, as when He is seen in His Reply to Objection 3. God draws all things to Him- Essence; secondly, in His effects, when, to wit, “the invis- self, in so far as He is the source of being, since all things, ible things” of God. . . “are clearly seen, being understood in as much as they are, tend to be like God, Who is Being by the things that are made” (Rom. 1:20). Now God in itself. His Essence is goodness itself, which no man can hate— Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins? IIa IIae q. 34 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that hatred of God is not may be seen from what has been said above (q. 14, a. 2). the greatest of sins. For the most grievous sin is the sin Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin. against the Holy Ghost, since it cannot be forgiven, ac- Objection 2. Further, sin consists in withdrawing one- cording to Mat. 12:32. Now hatred of God is not reckoned self from God. Now an unbeliever who has not even among the various kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, as knowledge of God seems to be further away from Him 1369 than a believer, who though he hate God, nevertheless xxv, 11), “it is one thing not to do good things, end an-knows Him. Therefore it seems that the sin of unbelief other to hate the giver of good things, even as it is one is graver than the sin of hatred against God. thing to sin indeliberately, and another to sin deliberately.” Objection 3. Further, God is an object of hatred, only This implies that to hate God, the giver of all good things, by reason of those of His effects that are contrary to the is to sin deliberately, and this is a sin against the Holy will: the chief of which is punishment. But hatred of pun- Ghost. Hence it is evident that hatred of God is chiefly a ishment is not the most grievous sin. Therefore hatred of sin against the Holy Ghost, in so far as the sin against the God is not the most grievous sin. Holy Ghost denotes a special kind of sin: and yet it is not On the contrary, The best is opposite to the worst, reckoned among the kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). But hatred because it is universally found in every kind of that sin. of God is contrary to the love of God, wherein man’s best Reply to Objection 2. Even unbelief is not sinful un- consists. Therefore hatred of God is man’s worst sin. less it be voluntary: wherefore the more voluntary it is, I answer that, The defect in sin consists in its aver- the more it is sinful. Now it becomes voluntary by the sion from God, as stated above (q. 10, a. 3): and this aver- fact that a man hates the truth that is proposed to him. sion would not have the character of guilt, were it not vol- Wherefore it is evident that unbelief derives its sinfulness untary. Hence the nature of guilt consists in a voluntary from hatred of God, Whose truth is the object of faith; and aversion from God. hence just as a cause is greater than its effect, so hatred of Now this voluntary aversion from God is directly im- God is a greater sin than unbelief. plied in the hatred of God, but in other sins, by partici- Reply to Objection 3. Not everyone who hates his pation and indirectly. For just as the will cleaves directly punishment, hates God the author of punishments. For to what it loves, so does it directly shun what it hates. many hate the punishments inflicted on them, and yet they Hence when a man hates God, his will is directly averted bear them patiently out of reverence for the Divine jus- from God, whereas in other sins, fornication for instance, tice. Wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x) that God a man turns away from God, not directly, but indirectly, commands us to bear with penal evils, not to love them. in so far, namely, as he desires an inordinate pleasure, to On the other hand, to break out into hatred of God when which aversion from God is connected. Now that which He inflicts those punishments, is to hate God’s very jus- is so by itself, always takes precedence of that which is tice, and that is a most grievous sin. Hence Gregory says so by another. Wherefore hatred of God is more grievous (Moral. xxv, 11): “Even as sometimes it is more grievous than other sins. to love sin than to do it, so is it more wicked to hate justice Reply to Objection 1. According to Gregory (Moral. than, not to have done it.” Whether hatred of one’s neighbor is always a sin? IIa IIae q. 34 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that hatred of one’s neigh- that. . . hateth his brother, is in darkness.” Now spiritual bor is not always a sin. For no sin is commanded or coun- darkness is sin. Therefore there cannot be hatred of one’s selled by God, according to Prov. 8:8: “All My words are neighbor without sin. just, there is nothing wicked nor perverse in them.” Now, I answer that, Hatred is opposed to love, as stated it is written (Lk. 14:26): “If any man come to Me, and above ( Ia IIae, q. 29, a. 2); so that hatred of a thing is evil hate not his father and mother. . . he cannot be My disci-according as the love of that thing is good. Now love is ple.” Therefore hatred of one’s neighbor is not always a due to our neighbor in respect of what he holds from God, sin. i.e. in respect of nature and grace, but not in respect of Objection 2. Further, nothing wherein we imitate God what he has of himself and from the devil, i.e. in respect can be a sin. But it is in imitation of God that we hate cer- of sin and lack of justice. tain people: for it is written (Rom. 1:30): “Detractors, Consequently it is lawful to hate the sin in one’s hateful to God.” Therefore it is possible to hate certain brother, and whatever pertains to the defect of Divine jus- people without committing a sin. tice, but we cannot hate our brother’s nature and grace Objection 3. Further, nothing that is natural is a sin, without sin. Now it is part of our love for our brother that for sin is a “wandering away from what is according to we hate the fault and the lack of good in him, since de- nature,” according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30; sire for another’s good is equivalent to hatred of his evil. iv, 20). Now it is natural to a thing to hate whatever is con- Consequently the hatred of one’s brother, if we consider trary to it, and to aim at its undoing. Therefore it seems it simply, is always sinful. that it is not a sin to hate one’s I enemy. Reply to Objection 1. By the commandment of God On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 2:9): “He (Ex. 20:12) we must honor our parents—as united to us 1370 in nature and kinship. But we must hate them in so far as respect of the goods which they have received from God: they prove an obstacle to our attaining the perfection of wherefore, in this respect, we should love them. But they Divine justice. are opposed to us, in so far as they show hostility towards Reply to Objection 2. God hates the sin which is in us, and this is sinful in them. In this respect we should the detractor, not his nature: so that we can hate detractors hate them, for we should hate in them the fact that they without committing a sin. are hostile to us. Reply to Objection 3. Men are not opposed to us in Whether hatred of our neighbor is the most grievous sin against our neighbor? IIa IIae q. 34 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that hatred of our neigh- oned great in their reward, but little in the transgression.” bor is the most grievous sin against our neighbor. For it Now hatred is an internal movement like anger and de- is written (1 Jn. 3:15): “Whosoever hateth his brother sire. Therefore hatred of one’s brother is a less grievous is a murderer.” Now murder is the most grievous of sins sin than murder. against our neighbor. Therefore hatred is also. I answer that, Sins committed against our neighbor Objection 2. Further, worst is opposed to best. Now are evil on two counts; first by reason of the disorder in the best thing we give our neighbor is love, since all other the person who sins, secondly by reason of the hurt in- things are referable to love. Therefore hatred is the worst. flicted on the person sinned against. On the first count, ha- On the contrary, A thing is said to be evil, because it tred is a more grievous sin than external actions that hurt hurts, as Augustine observes (Enchiridion xii). Now there our neighbor, because hatred is a disorder of man’s will, are sins by which a man hurts his neighbor more than by which is the chief part of man, and wherein is the root of hatred, e.g. theft, murder and adultery. Therefore hatred sin, so that if a man’s outward actions were to be inordi- is not the most grievous sin. nate, without any disorder in his will, they would not be Moreover, Chrysostom∗ commenting on Mat. 5:19, sinful, for instance, if he were to kill a man, through ig- “He that shall break one of these least commandments,” norance or out of zeal for justice: and if there be anything says: “The commandments of Moses, Thou shalt not kill, sinful in a man’s outward sins against his neighbor, it is Thou shalt not commit adultery, count for little in their all to be traced to his inward hatred. reward, but they count for much if they be disobeyed. On the other hand, as regards the hurt inflicted on his On the other hand the commandments of Christ such as, neighbor, a man’s outward sins are worse than his inward Thou shalt not be angry, Thou shalt not desire, are reck- hatred. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. Whether hatred is a capital sin? IIa IIae q. 34 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that hatred is a capital sin. Aa. 3,4), a capital vice is one from which other vices arise For hatred is directly opposed to charity. Now charity is most frequently. Now vice is contrary to man’s nature, the foremost among the virtues, and the mother of all oth- in as much as he is a rational animal: and when a thing ers. Therefore hatred is the chief of the capital sins, and acts contrary to its nature, that which is natural to it is the origin of all others. corrupted little by little. Consequently it must first of all Objection 2. Further, sins arise in us on account of the fail in that which is less in accordance with its nature, and inclinations of our passions, according to Rom. 7:5: “The last of all in that which is most in accordance with its na- passions of sins. . . did work in our members to bring forth ture, since what is first in construction is last in destruc- fruit unto death.” Now all other passions of the soul seem tion. Now that which, first and foremost, is most natural to arise from love and hatred, as was shown above ( Ia to man, is the love of what is good, and especially love of IIae, q. 25, Aa. 1,2). Therefore hatred should be reckoned the Divine good, and of his neighbor’s good. Wherefore one of the capital sins. hatred, which is opposed to this love, is not the first but Objection 3. Further, vice is a moral evil. Now hatred the last thing in the downfall of virtue resulting from vice: regards evil more than any other passion does. Therefore and therefore it is not a capital vice. it seems that hatred should be reckoned a capital sin. Reply to Objection 1. As stated in Phys. vii, text. 18, On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) does not “the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed reckon hatred among the seven capital sins. in accordance with its nature.” Hence what is first and I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 84, foremost in the virtues must be first and foremost in the ∗ Hom. x in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom 1371 natural order. Hence charity is reckoned the foremost of Reply to Objection 3. Evil is twofold. One is a true the virtues, and for the same reason hatred cannot be first evil, for the reason that it is incompatible with one’s natu- among the vices, as stated above. ral good, and the hatred of such an evil may have priority Reply to Objection 2. Hatred of the evil that is con- over the other passions. There is, however, another which trary to one’s natural good, is the first of the soul’s pas- is not a true, but an apparent evil, which, namely, is a true sions, even as love of one’s natural good is. But hatred and connatural good, and yet is reckoned evil on account of one’s connatural good cannot be first, but is something of the corruption of nature: and the hatred of such an evil last, because such like hatred is a proof of an already cor- must needs come last. This hatred is vicious, but the for- rupted nature, even as love of an extraneous good. mer is not. Whether hatred arises from envy? IIa IIae q. 34 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that hatred does not arise from the apprehensive power, reflects on its own acts, it follows envy. For envy is sorrow for another’s good. Now hatred that there is a kind of circular movement in the actions of does not arise from sorrow, for, on the contrary, we grieve the appetitive power. And so according to the first for- for the presence of the evil we hate. Therefore hatred does ward course of the appetitive movement, love gives rise not arise from envy. to desire, whence follows pleasure when one has obtained Objection 2. Further, hatred is opposed to love. Now what one desired. And since the very fact of taking plea- love of our neighbor is referred to our love of God, as sure in the good one loves is a kind of good, it follows that stated above (q. 25, a. 1; q. 26, a. 2). Therefore hatred of pleasure causes love. And in the same way sorrow causes our neighbor is referred to our hatred of God. But hatred hatred. of God does not arise from envy, for we do not envy those Reply to Objection 2. Love and hatred are essentially who are very far removed from us, but rather those who different, for the object of love is good, which flows from seem to be near us, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). God to creatures, wherefore love is due to God in the first Therefore hatred does not arise from envy. place, and to our neighbor afterwards. On the other hand, Objection 3. Further, to one effect there is one cause. hatred is of evil, which has no place in God Himself, but Now hatred is caused by anger, for Augustine says in his only in His effects, for which reason it has been stated Rule that “anger grows into hatred.” Therefore hatred above (a. 1), that God is not an object of hatred, except in does not arise from envy. so far as He is considered in relation to His effects, and On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that consequently hatred is directed to our neighbor before be- “out of envy cometh hatred.” ing directed to God. Therefore, since envy of our neigh- I answer that, As stated above (a. 5), hatred of his bor is the mother of hatred of our neighbor, it becomes, in neighbor is a man’s last step in the path of sin, because it consequence, the cause of hatred towards God. is opposed to the love which he naturally has for his neigh- Reply to Objection 3. Nothing prevents a thing aris- bor. Now if a man declines from that which is natural, it ing from various causes in various respects, and accord- is because he intends to avoid that which is naturally an ingly hatred may arise both from anger and from envy. object to be shunned. Now every animal naturally avoids However it arises more directly from envy, which looks sorrow, just as it desires pleasure, as the Philosopher states upon the very good of our neighbor as displeasing and (Ethic. vii, x). Accordingly just as love arises from plea- therefore hateful, whereas hatred arises from anger by sure, so does hatred arise from sorrow. For just as we are way of increase. For at first, through anger, we desire moved to love whatever gives us pleasure, in as much as our neighbor’s evil according to a certain measure, that is for that very reason it assumes the aspect of good; so we in so far as that evil has the aspect of vengeance: but af- are moved to hate whatever displeases us, in so far as for terwards, through the continuance of anger, man goes so this very reason it assumes the aspect of evil. Wherefore, far as absolutely to desire his neighbor’s evil, which de- since envy is sorrow for our neighbor’s good, it follows sire is part of hatred. Wherefore it is evident that hatred that our neighbor’s good becomes hateful to us, so that is caused by envy formally as regards the aspect of the “out of envy cometh hatred.” object, but dispositively by anger. Reply to Objection 1. Since the appetitive power, like 1372 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 35 Of Sloth (In Four Articles) We must now consider the vices opposed to the joy of charity. This joy is either about the Divine good, and then its contrary is sloth, or about our neighbor’s good, and then its contrary is envy. Wherefore we must consider (1) Sloth and (2) Envy. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether sloth is a sin? (2) Whether it is a special vice? (3) Whether it is a mortal sin? (4) Whether it is a capital sin? Whether sloth is a sin? IIa IIae q. 35 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that sloth is not a sin. For a certain weariness of work, as appears from a gloss on we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions, ac- Ps. 106:18, “Their soul abhorred all manner of meat,” and cording to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now sloth is a from the definition of some who say that sloth is a “slug- passion, since it is a kind of sorrow, according to Dama- gishness of the mind which neglects to begin good.” scene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14), and as we stated above ( Ia Now this sorrow is always evil, sometimes in itself, IIae, q. 35, a. 8 ). Therefore sloth is not a sin. sometimes in its effect. For sorrow is evil in itself when it Objection 2. Further, no bodily failing that occurs at is about that which is apparently evil but good in reality, fixed times is a sin. But sloth is like this, for Cassian says even as, on the other hand, pleasure is evil if it is about that (De Instit. Monast. x,∗): “The monk is troubled with which seems to be good but is, in truth, evil. Since, then, sloth chiefly about the sixth hour: it is like an intermittent spiritual good is a good in very truth, sorrow about spiri- fever, and inflicts the soul of the one it lays low with burn- tual good is evil in itself. And yet that sorrow also which is ing fires at regular and fixed intervals.” Therefore sloth is about a real evil, is evil in its effect, if it so oppresses man not a sin. as to draw him away entirely from good deeds. Hence the Objection 3. Further, that which proceeds from a Apostle (2 Cor. 2:7) did not wish those who repented to good root is, seemingly, no sin. Now sloth proceeds from be “swallowed up with overmuch sorrow.” a good root, for Cassian says (De Instit. Monast. x) that Accordingly, since sloth, as we understand it here, de- “sloth arises from the fact that we sigh at being deprived of notes sorrow for spiritual good, it is evil on two counts, spiritual fruit, and think that other monasteries and those both in itself and in point of its effect. Consequently it which are a long way off are much better than the one we is a sin, for by sin we mean an evil movement of the ap- dwell in”: all of which seems to point to humility. There- petite, as appears from what has been said above (q. 10, fore sloth is not a sin. a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 74, a. 4). Objection 4. Further, all sin is to be avoided, accord- Reply to Objection 1. Passions are not sinful in them- ing to Ecclus. 21:2: “Flee from sins as from the face of selves; but they are blameworthy in so far as they are ap- a serpent.” Now Cassian says (De Instit. Monast. x): plied to something evil, just as they deserve praise in so far “Experience shows that the onslaught of sloth is not to as they are applied to something good. Wherefore sorrow, be evaded by flight but to be conquered by resistance.” in itself, calls neither for praise nor for blame: whereas Therefore sloth is not a sin. moderate sorrow for evil calls for praise, while sorrow On the contrary, Whatever is forbidden in Holy Writ for good, and again immoderate sorrow for evil, call for is a sin. Now such is sloth [acedia]: for it is written blame. It is in this sense that sloth is said to be a sin. (Ecclus. 6:26): “Bow down thy shoulder, and bear her,” Reply to Objection 2. The passions of the sensitive namely spiritual wisdom, “and be not grieved [acedieris] appetite may either be venial sins in themselves, or incline with her bands.” Therefore sloth is a sin. the soul to mortal sin. And since the sensitive appetite has I answer that, Sloth, according to Damascene (De a bodily organ, it follows that on account of some bodily Fide Orth. ii, 14) is an oppressive sorrow, which, to wit, transmutation a man becomes apt to commit some par- so weighs upon man’s mind, that he wants to do noth- ticular sin. Hence it may happen that certain sins may ing; thus acid things are also cold. Hence sloth implies become more insistent, through certain bodily transmu- ∗ De Institutione Caeobiorum 1373 tations occurring at certain fixed times. Now all bodily to disparage those we have received ourselves, because if effects, of themselves, dispose one to sorrow; and thus it we did they would give us sorrow. is that those who fast are harassed by sloth towards mid- Reply to Objection 4. Sin is ever to be shunned, day, when they begin to feel the want of food, and to be but the assaults of sin should be overcome, sometimes by parched by the sun’s heat. flight, sometimes by resistance; by flight when a contin- Reply to Objection 3. It is a sign of humility if a ued thought increases the incentive to sin, as in lust; for man does not think too much of himself, through observ- which reason it is written (1 Cor. 6:18): “Fly fornica- ing his own faults; but if a man contemns the good things tion”; by resistance, when perseverance in the thought di- he has received from God, this, far from being a proof of minishes the incentive to sin, which incentive arises from humility, shows him to be ungrateful: and from such like some trivial consideration. This is the case with sloth, be- contempt results sloth, because we sorrow for things that cause the more we think about spiritual goods, the more we reckon evil and worthless. Accordingly we ought to pleasing they become to us, and forthwith sloth dies away. think much of the goods of others, in such a way as not Whether sloth is a special vice? IIa IIae q. 35 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that sloth is not a special guishes sloth from the other vices. Therefore it is a special vice. For that which is common to all vices does not con- vice. stitute a special kind of vice. But every vice makes a man I answer that, Since sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, sorrowful about the opposite spiritual good: for the lust-if we take spiritual good in a general way, sloth will not ful man is sorrowful about the good of continence, and the be a special vice, because, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 71, glutton about the good of abstinence. Since then sloth is a. 1), every vice shuns the spiritual good of its opposite sorrow for spiritual good, as stated above (a. 1), it seems virtue. Again it cannot be said that sloth is a special vice, that sloth is not a special sin. in so far as it shuns spiritual good, as toilsome, or trouble- Objection 2. Further, sloth, through being a kind of some to the body, or as a hindrance to the body’s pleasure, sorrow, is opposed to joy. Now joy is not accounted one for this again would not sever sloth from carnal vices, special virtue. Therefore sloth should not be reckoned a whereby a man seeks bodily comfort and pleasure. special vice. Wherefore we must say that a certain order exists Objection 3. Further, since spiritual good is a general among spiritual goods, since all the spiritual goods that kind of object, which virtue seeks, and vice shuns, it does are in the acts of each virtue are directed to one spiritual not constitute a special virtue or vice, unless it be deter- good, which is the Divine good, about which there is a mined by some addition. Now nothing, seemingly, except special virtue, viz. charity. Hence it is proper to each toil, can determine it to sloth, if this be a special vice; be- virtue to rejoice in its own spiritual good, which consists cause the reason why a man shuns spiritual goods, is that in its own act, while it belongs specially to charity to have they are toilsome, wherefore sloth is a kind of weariness: that spiritual joy whereby one rejoices in the Divine good. while dislike of toil, and love of bodily repose seem to be In like manner the sorrow whereby one is displeased at due to the same cause, viz. idleness. Hence sloth would the spiritual good which is in each act of virtue, belongs, be nothing but laziness, which seems untrue, for idleness not to any special vice, but to every vice, but sorrow in is opposed to carefulness, whereas sloth is opposed to joy. the Divine good about which charity rejoices, belongs to Therefore sloth is not a special vice. a special vice, which is called sloth. This suffices for the On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) distin- Replies to the Objections. Whether sloth is a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 35 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that sloth is not a mortal which leads to God, else it would be a mortal sin not to sin. For every mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Di- observe the counsels. Therefore it is not a mortal sin to re- vine Law. But sloth seems contrary to no precept, as one frain in thought from such like spiritual works. Therefore may see by going through the precepts of the Decalogue. sloth is not a mortal sin. Therefore sloth is not a mortal sin. Objection 3. Further, no mortal sin is to be found in a Objection 2. Further, in the same genus, a sin of deed perfect man. But sloth is to be found in a perfect man: for is no less grievous than a sin of thought. Now it is not Cassian says (De Instit. Caenob. x, l) that “sloth is well a mortal sin to refrain in deed from some spiritual good known to the solitary, and is a most vexatious and persis- 1374 tent foe to the hermit.” Therefore sloth is not always a than the sensuality is a venial sin, whereas if it reach to the mortal sin. consent of reason, it is a mortal sin. So too, the movement On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. 7:20): “The sor- of sloth is sometimes in the sensuality alone, by reason row of the world worketh death.” But such is sloth; for of the opposition of the flesh to the spirit, and then it is it is not sorrow “according to God,” which is contrasted a venial sin; whereas sometimes it reaches to the reason, with sorrow of the world. Therefore it is a mortal sin. which consents in the dislike, horror and detestation of I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 88, the Divine good, on account of the flesh utterly prevail- Aa. 1,2), mortal sin is so called because it destroys the ing over the spirit. In this case it is evident that sloth is a spiritual life which is the effect of charity, whereby God mortal sin. dwells in us. Wherefore any sin which by its very na- Reply to Objection 1. Sloth is opposed to the precept ture is contrary to charity is a mortal sin by reason of its about hallowing the Sabbath day. For this precept, in so genus. And such is sloth, because the proper effect of far as it is a moral precept, implicitly commands the mind charity is joy in God, as stated above (q. 28, a. 1), while to rest in God: and sorrow of the mind about the Divine sloth is sorrow about spiritual good in as much as it is a good is contrary thereto. Divine good. Therefore sloth is a mortal sin in respect of Reply to Objection 2. Sloth is not an aversion of the its genus. But it must be observed with regard to all sins mind from any spiritual good, but from the Divine good, that are mortal in respect of their genus, that they are not to which the mind is obliged to adhere. Wherefore if a mortal, save when they attain to their perfection. Because man is sorry because someone forces him to do acts of the consummation of sin is in the consent of reason: for virtue that he is not bound to do, this is not a sin of sloth; we are speaking now of human sins consisting in human but when he is sorry to have to do something for God’s acts, the principle of which is the reason. Wherefore if sake. the sin be a mere beginning of sin in the sensuality alone, Reply to Objection 3. Imperfect movements of sloth without attaining to the consent of reason, it is a venial are to be found in holy men, but they do not reach to the sin on account of the imperfection of the act. Thus in the consent of reason. genus of adultery, the concupiscence that goes no further Whether sloth should be accounted a capital vice? IIa IIae q. 35 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that sloth ought not to he says that it gives rise to “spite, faint-heartedness, bit- be accounted a capital vice. For a capital vice is one that terness, despair,” whereas he states that from sloth seven moves a man to sinful acts, as stated above (q. 34, a. 5). things arise, viz. “idleness, drowsiness, uneasiness of the Now sloth does not move one to action, but on the con- mind, restlessness of the body, instability, loquacity, cu- trary withdraws one from it. Therefore it should not be riosity.” Therefore it seems that either Gregory or Isidore accounted a capital sin. has wrongly assigned sloth as a capital sin together with Objection 2. Further, a capital sin is one to which its daughters. daughters are assigned. Now Gregory (Moral. xxxi, On the contrary, The same Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns six daughters to sloth, viz. “malice, spite, 45) states that sloth is a capital sin, and has the daughters faint-heartedness, despair, sluggishness in regard to the aforesaid. commandments, wandering of the mind after unlawful I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 84, things.” Now these do not seem in reality to arise from Aa. 3,4), a capital vice is one which easily gives rise to sloth. For “spite” is, seemingly the same as hatred, which others as being their final cause. Now just as we do many arises from envy, as stated above (q. 34, a. 6); “mal- things on account of pleasure, both in order to obtain it, ice” is a genus which contains all vices, and, in like and through being moved to do something under the im- manner, a “wandering” of the mind after unlawful things pulse of pleasure, so again we do many things on account is to be found in every vice; “sluggishness” about the of sorrow, either that we may avoid it, or through being commandments seems to be the same as sloth, while exasperated into doing something under pressure thereof. “faint-heartedness” and “despair” may arise from any sin. Wherefore, since sloth is a kind of sorrow, as stated above Therefore sloth is not rightly accounted a capital sin. (a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 8), it is fittingly reckoned a capital Objection 3. Further, Isidore distinguishes the vice of sin. sloth from the vice of sorrow, saying (De Summo Bono Reply to Objection 1. Sloth by weighing on the mind, ii, 37) that in so far as a man shirks his duty because it is hinders us from doing things that cause sorrow: neverthe- distasteful and burdensome, it is sorrow, and in so far as less it induces the mind to do certain things, either because he is inclined to undue repose, it is sloth: and of sorrow they are in harmony with sorrow, such as weeping, or be- 1375 cause they are a means of avoiding sorrow. above: and the same applies to the others. Reply to Objection 2. Gregory fittingly assigns the Reply to Objection 3. This distinction between sor- daughters of sloth. For since, according to the Philoso- row and sloth is also given by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. pher (Ethic. viii, 5,6) “no man can be a long time in com- x, 1). But Gregory more fittingly (Moral. xxxi, 45) calls pany with what is painful and unpleasant,” it follows that sloth a kind of sorrow, because, as stated above (a. 2), something arises from sorrow in two ways: first, that man sorrow is not a distinct vice, in so far as a man shirks a shuns whatever causes sorrow; secondly, that he passes to distasteful and burdensome work, or sorrows on account other things that give him pleasure: thus those who find of any other cause whatever, but only in so far as he is no joy in spiritual pleasures, have recourse to pleasures sorry on account of the Divine good, which sorrow be- of the body, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 6). longs essentially to sloth; since sloth seeks undue rest in Now in the avoidance of sorrow the order observed is that so far as it spurns the Divine good. Moreover the things man at first flies from unpleasant objects, and secondly which Isidore reckons to arise from sloth and sorrow, are he even struggles against such things as cause sorrow. reduced to those mentioned by Gregory: for “bitterness” Now spiritual goods which are the object of the sorrow which Isidore states to be the result of sorrow, is an effect of sloth, are both end and means. Avoidance of the end of “spite.” “Idleness” and “drowsiness” are reduced to is the result of “despair,” while avoidance of those goods “sluggishness about the precepts”: for some are idle and which are the means to the end, in matters of difficulty omit them altogether, while others are drowsy and fulfil which come under the counsels, is the effect of “faint- them with negligence. All the other five which he reckons heartedness,” and in matters of common righteousness, as effects of sloth, belong to the “wandering of the mind is the effect of “sluggishness about the commandments.” after unlawful things.” This tendency to wander, if it re- The struggle against spiritual goods that cause sorrow is side in the mind itself that is desirous of rushing after var- sometimes with men who lead others to spiritual goods, ious things without rhyme or reason, is called “uneasiness and this is called “spite”; and sometimes it extends to the of the mind,” but if it pertains to the imaginative power, spiritual goods themselves, when a man goes so far as to it is called “curiosity”; if it affect the speech it is called detest them, and this is properly called “malice.” In so “loquacity”; and in so far as it affects a body that changes far as a man has recourse to eternal objects of pleasure, place, it is called “restlessness of the body,” when, to wit, the daughter of sloth is called “wandering after unlawful a man shows the unsteadiness of his mind, by the inordi- things.” From this it is clear how to reply to the objec- nate movements of members of his body; while if it causes tions against each of the daughters: for “malice” does not the body to move from one place to another, it is called denote here that which is generic to all vices, but must be “instability”; or “instability” may denote changeableness understood as explained. Nor is “spite” taken as synony- of purpose. mous with hatred, but for a kind of indignation, as stated 1376 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 36 Of Envy (In Four Articles) We must now consider envy, and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What is envy? (2) Whether it is a sin? (3) Whether it is a mortal sin? (4) Whether it is a capital sin, and which are its daughters? Whether envy is a kind of sorrow? IIa IIae q. 36 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that envy is not a kind of Secondly, another’s good may be reckoned as being sorrow. For the object of envy is a good, for Gregory says one’s own evil, in so far as it conduces to the lessening of (Moral. v, 46) of the envious man that “self-inflicted pain one’s own good name or excellence. It is in this way that wounds the pining spirit, which is racked by the prosper- envy grieves for another’s good: and consequently men ity of another.” Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow. are envious of those goods in which a good name consists, Objection 2. Further, likeness is a cause, not of sor- and about which men like to be honored and esteemed, as row but rather of pleasure. But likeness is a cause of envy: the Philosopher remarks (Rhet. ii, 10). for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10): “Men are envious Reply to Objection 1. Nothing hinders what is good of such as are like them in genus, in knowledge, in stature, for one from being reckoned as evil for another: and in in habit, or in reputation.” Therefore envy is not a kind of this way it is possible for sorrow to be about good, as sorrow. stated above. Objection 3. Further, sorrow is caused by a defect, Reply to Objection 2. Since envy is about another’s wherefore those who are in great defect are inclined to good name in so far as it diminishes the good name a man sorrow, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 47, a. 3) when we desires to have, it follows that a man is envious of those were treating of the passions. Now those who lack lit- only whom he wishes to rival or surpass in reputation. But tle, and who love honors, and who are considered wise, this does not apply to people who are far removed from are envious, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 10). one another: for no man, unless he be out of his mind, en- Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow. deavors to rival or surpass in reputation those who are far Objection 4. Further, sorrow is opposed to pleasure. above him. Thus a commoner does not envy the king, nor Now opposite effects have not one and the same cause. does the king envy a commoner whom he is far above. Therefore, since the recollection of goods once possessed Wherefore a man envies not those who are far removed is a cause of pleasure, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 32, a. 3) from him, whether in place, time, or station, but those it will not be a cause of sorrow. But it is a cause of envy; who are near him, and whom he strives to rival or surpass. for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that “we envy those For it is against our will that these should be in better re- who have or have had things that befitted ourselves, or pute than we are, and that gives rise to sorrow. On the which we possessed at some time.” Therefore sloth is not other hand, likeness causes pleasure in so far as it is in a kind of sorrow. agreement with the will. On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) Reply to Objection 3. A man does not strive for calls envy a species of sorrow, and says that “envy is sor- mastery in matters where he is very deficient; so that he row for another’s good.” does not envy one who surpasses him in such matters, I answer that, The object of a man’s sorrow is his unless he surpass him by little, for then it seems to him own evil. Now it may happen that another’s good is ap- that this is not beyond him, and so he makes an effort; prehended as one’s own evil, and in this way sorrow can wherefore, if his effort fails through the other’s reputa- be about another’s good. But this happens in two ways: tion surpassing his, he grieves. Hence it is that those who first, when a man is sorry about another’s good, in so far love to be honored are more envious; and in like man- as it threatens to be an occasion of harm to himself, as ner the faint-hearted are envious, because all things are when a man grieves for his enemy’s prosperity, for fear great to them, and whatever good may befall another, they lest he may do him some harm: such like sorrow is not reckon that they themselves have been bested in some- envy, but rather an effect of fear, as the Philosopher states thing great. Hence it is written (Job 5:2): “Envy slayeth (Rhet. ii, 9). the little one,” and Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) that “we 1377 can envy those only whom we think better in some respect belittle our reputation. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. than ourselves.” ii) that the old envy the young, and those who have spent Reply to Objection 4. Recollection of past goods in much in order to get something, envy those who have got so far as we have had them, causes pleasure; in so far as it by spending little, because they grieve that they have we have lost them, causes sorrow; and in so far as others lost their goods, and that others have acquired goods. have them, causes envy, because that, above all, seems to Whether envy is a sin? IIa IIae q. 36 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that envy is not a sin. For we have not: and this, properly speaking, is zeal, as the Jerome says to Laeta about the education of her daughter Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9). And if this zeal be about (Ep. cvii): “Let her have companions, so that she may virtuous goods, it is praiseworthy, according to 1 Cor. learn together with them, envy them, and be nettled when 14:1: “Be zealous for spiritual gifts”: while, if it be about they are praised.” But no one should be advised to commit temporal goods, it may be either sinful or sinless. Thirdly, a sin. Therefore envy is not a sin one may grieve over another’s good, because he who hap- Objection 1. Further, “Envy is sorrow for another’s pens to have that good is unworthy of it. Such sorrow good,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But as this cannot be occasioned by virtuous goods, which this is sometimes praiseworthy: for it is written (Prov. make a man righteous, but, as the Philosopher states, is 29:2): “When the wicked shall bear rule, the people shall about riches, and those things which can accrue to the mourn.” Therefore envy is not always a sin. worthy and the unworthy; and he calls this sorrow neme- Objection 3. Further, envy denotes a kind of zeal. But sis∗, saying that it belongs to good morals. But he says there is a good zeal, according to Ps. 68:10: “The zeal of this because he considered temporal goods in themselves, Thy house hath eaten me up.” Therefore envy is not al- in so far as they may seem great to those who look not ways a sin. to eternal goods: whereas, according to the teaching of Objection 4. Further, punishment is condivided with faith, temporal goods that accrue to those who are unwor- fault. But envy is a kind of punishment: for Gregory thy, are so disposed according to God’s just ordinance, says (Moral. v, 46): “When the foul sore of envy cor- either for the correction of those men, or for their con- rupts the vanquished heart, the very exterior itself shows demnation, and such goods are as nothing in comparison how forcibly the mind is urged by madness. For pale- with the goods to come, which are prepared for good men. ness seizes the complexion, the eyes are weighed down, Wherefore sorrow of this kind is forbidden in Holy Writ, the spirit is inflamed, while the limbs are chilled, there according to Ps. 36:1: “Be not emulous of evil doers, nor is frenzy in the heart, there is gnashing with the teeth.” envy them that work iniquity,” and elsewhere (Ps. 72:2,3): Therefore envy is not a sin. “My steps had well nigh slipped, for I was envious of the On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 5:26): “Let us not wicked, when I saw the prosperity of sinners†.” Fourthly, be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, en- we grieve over a man’s good, in so far as his good sur- vying one another.” passes ours; this is envy properly speaking, and is always I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), envy is sorrow sinful, as also the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 10), be- for another’s good. Now this sorrow may come about in cause to do so is to grieve over what should make us re- four ways. First, when a man grieves for another’s good, joice, viz. over our neighbor’s good. through fear that it may cause harm either to himself, or Reply to Objection 1. Envy there denotes the zeal to some other goods. This sorrow is not envy, as stated with which we ought to strive to progress with those who above (a. 1), and may be void of sin. Hence Gregory are better than we are. says (Moral. xxii, 11): “It very often happens that with- Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers sor- out charity being lost, both the destruction of an enemy row for another’s good in the first sense given above. rejoices us, and again his glory, without any sin of envy, Reply to Objection 3. Envy differs from zeal, as saddens us, since, when he falls, we believe that some are stated above. Hence a certain zeal may be good, whereas deservedly set up, and when he prospers, we dread lest envy is always evil. many suffer unjustly.” Reply to Objection 4. Nothing hinders a sin from be- Secondly, we may grieve over another’s good, not ing penal accidentally, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 87, a. 2) because he has it, but because the good which he has, when we were treating of sins. ∗ The nearest equivalent is “indignation.” The use of the word “nemesis” to signify “revenge” does not represent the original Greek. † Douay: ‘because I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners’ 1378 Whether envy is a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 36 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that envy is not a mortal imperfect movements in the sensuality, which are venial sin. For since envy is a kind of sorrow, it is a passion of sins: such are the first movement of concupiscence, in the sensitive appetite. Now there is no mortal sin in the the genus of adultery, and the first movement of anger, in sensuality, but only in the reason, as Augustine declares the genus of murder, and so in the genus of envy we find (De Trin. xii, 12)∗. Therefore envy is not a mortal sin. sometimes even in perfect men certain first movements, Objection 2. Further, there cannot be mortal sin in in- which are venial sins. fants. But envy can be in them, for Augustine says (Con- Reply to Objection 1. The movement of envy in so fess. i): “I myself have seen and known even a baby envi- far as it is a passion of the sensuality, is an imperfect thing ous, it could not speak, yet it turned pale and looked bitin the genus of human acts, the principle of which is the terly on its foster-brother.” Therefore envy is not a mortal reason, so that envy of that kind is not a mortal sin. The sin. same applies to the envy of little children who have not Objection 3. Further, every mortal sin is contrary to the use of reason: wherefore the Reply to the Second Ob- some virtue. But envy is contrary, not to a virtue but to jection is manifest. nemesis, which is a passion, according to the Philosopher Reply to Objection 3. According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore envy is not a mortal sin. (Rhet. ii, 9), envy is contrary both to nemesis and to On the contrary, It is written (Job 5:2): “Envy slayeth pity, but for different reasons. For it is directly contrary the little one.” Now nothing slays spiritually, except mor- to pity, their principal objects being contrary to one an- tal sin. Therefore envy is a mortal sin. other, since the envious man grieves over his neighbor’s I answer that, Envy is a mortal sin, in respect of its good, whereas the pitiful man grieves over his neighbor’s genus. For the genus of a sin is taken from its object; evil, so that the envious have no pity, as he states in the and envy according to the aspect of its object is contrary same passage, nor is the pitiful man envious. On the other to charity, whence the soul derives its spiritual life, ac- hand, envy is contrary to nemesis on the part of the man cording to 1 Jn. 3:14: “We know that we have passed whose good grieves the envious man, for nemesis is sor-from death to life, because we love the brethren.” Now row for the good of the undeserving according to Ps. 72:3: the object both of charity and of envy is our neighbor’s “I was envious of the wicked, when I saw the prosperity good, but by contrary movements, since charity rejoices in of sinners”†, whereas the envious grieves over the good of our neighbor’s good, while envy grieves over it, as stated those who are deserving of it. Hence it is clear that the above (a. 1). Therefore it is evident that envy is a mortal former contrariety is more direct than the latter. Now pity sin in respect of its genus. is a virtue, and an effect proper to charity: so that envy is Nevertheless, as stated above (q. 35, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 72, contrary to pity and charity. a. 5, ad 1), in every kind of mortal sin we find certain Whether envy is a capital vice? IIa IIae q. 36 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that envy is not a cap- the heart of man, yet in this wickedness the serpent stirs ital vice. For the capital vices are distinct from their his whole bowels and discharges the bane of spite fitted to daughters. Now envy is the daughter of vainglory; for enter deep into the mind.” Therefore envy is not a capital the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that “those who love sin. honor and glory are more envious.” Therefore envy is not Objection 3. Further, it seems that its daughters are a capital vice. unfittingly assigned by Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45), who Objection 2. Further, the capital vices seem to be less says that from envy arise “hatred, tale-bearing, detraction, grave than the other vices which arise from them. For Gre- joy at our neighbor’s misfortunes, and grief for his pros- gory says (Moral. xxxi, 45): “The leading vices seem to perity.” For joy at our neighbor’s misfortunes and grief worm their way into the deceived mind under some kind for his prosperity seem to be the same as envy, as appears of pretext, but those which follow them provoke the soul from what has been said above (a. 3). Therefore these to all kinds of outrage, and confuse the mind with their should not be assigned as daughters of envy. wild outcry.” Now envy is seemingly a most grave sin, for On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory Gregory says (Moral. v, 46): “Though in every evil thing (Moral. xxxi, 45) who states that envy is a capital sin that is done, the venom of our old enemy is infused into and assigns the aforesaid daughters thereto. ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 74, a. 4 † Douay: ‘because I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners’ 1379 I answer that, Just as sloth is grief for a Divine spiri-among the most grievous sins, viz. envy of another’s spiri- tual good, so envy is grief for our neighbor’s good. Now tual good, which envy is a sorrow for the increase of God’s it has been stated above (q. 35, a. 4) that sloth is a capital grace, and not merely for our neighbor’s good. Hence it is vice for the reason that it incites man to do certain things, accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost, because thereby with the purpose either of avoiding sorrow or of satisfying a man envies, as it were, the Holy Ghost Himself, Who is its demands. Wherefore envy is accounted a capital vice glorified in His works. for the same reason. Reply to Objection 3. The number of envy’s daugh- Reply to Objection 1. As Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, ters may be understood for the reason that in the struggle 45), “the capital vices are so closely akin to one another aroused by envy there is something by way of beginning, that one springs from the other. For the first offspring of something by way of middle, and something by way of pride is vainglory, which by corrupting the mind it occu- term. The beginning is that a man strives to lower an- pies begets envy, since while it craves for the power of other’s reputation, and this either secretly, and then we an empty name, it repines for fear lest another should ac- have “tale-bearing,” or openly, and then we have “detrac- quire that power.” Consequently the notion of a capital tion.” The middle consists in the fact that when a man vice does not exclude its originating from another vice, aims at defaming another, he is either able to do so, and but it demands that it should have some principal reason then we have “joy at another’s misfortune,” or he is un- for being itself the origin of several kinds of sin. However able, and then we have “grief at another’s prosperity.” The it is perhaps because envy manifestly arises from vain- term is hatred itself, because just as good which delights glory, that it is not reckoned a capital sin, either by Isidore causes love, so does sorrow cause hatred, as stated above (De Summo Bono) or by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. v, (q. 34, a. 6). Grief at another’s prosperity is in one way 1). the very same as envy, when, to Wit, a man grieves over Reply to Objection 2. It does not follow from the another’s prosperity, in so far as it gives the latter a good passage quoted that envy is the greatest of sins, but that name, but in another way it is a daughter of envy, in so when the devil tempts us to envy, he is enticing us to that far as the envious man sees his neighbor prosper notwith- which has its chief place in his heart, for as quoted further standing his efforts to prevent it. On the other hand, “joy on in the same passage, “by the envy of the devil, death at another’s misfortune” is not directly the same as envy, came into the world” (Wis. 2:24). but is a result thereof, because grief over our neighbor’s There is, however, a kind of envy which is accounted good which is envy, gives rise to joy in his evil. 1380 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 37 Of Discord, Which Is Contrary to Peace (In Two Articles) We must now consider the sins contrary to peace, and first we shall consider discord which is in the heart, secondly contention, which is on the lips, thirdly, those things which consist in deeds, viz. schism, quarrelling, war, and sedition. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether discord is a sin? (2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory? Whether discord is a sin? IIa IIae q. 37 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that discord is not a sin. it is contrary to charity, although the first movements of For to disaccord with man is to sever oneself from an- such discord are venial sins by reason of their being im- other’s will. But this does not seem to be a sin, because perfect acts. God’s will alone, and not our neighbor’s, is the rule of our The accidental in human acts is that which occurs be- own will. Therefore discord is not a sin. side the intention. Hence when several intend a good per- Objection 2. Further, whoever induces another to sin, taining to God’s honor, or our neighbor’s profit, while one sins also himself. But it appears not to be a sin to incite deems a certain thing good, and another thinks contrari- others to discord, for it is written (Acts 23:6) that Paul, wise, the discord is in this case accidentally contrary to knowing that the one part were Sadducees, and the other the Divine good or that of our neighbor. Such like discord Pharisees, cried out in the council: “Men brethren, I am is neither sinful nor against charity, unless it be accompa- a Pharisee, the son of Pharisees, concerning the hope and nied by an error about things necessary to salvation, or by resurrection of the dead I am called in question. And when undue obstinacy, since it has also been stated above (q. 29, he had so said, there arose a dissension between the Phar- Aa. 1,3, ad 2) that the concord which is an effect of char- isees and the Sadducees.” Therefore discord is not a sin. ity, is union of wills not of opinions. It follows from this Objection 3. Further, sin, especially mortal sin, is not that discord is sometimes the sin of one party only, for in-to be found in a holy man. But discord is to be found even stance, when one wills a good which the other knowingly among holy men, for it is written (Acts 15:39): “There resists; while sometimes it implies sin in both parties, as arose a dissension” between Paul and Barnabas, “so that when each dissents from the other’s good, and loves his they departed one from another.” Therefore discord is not own. a sin. and least of all a mortal sin. Reply to Objection 1. One man’s will considered in On the contrary, “Dissensions,” that is, discords, are itself is not the rule of another man’s will; but in so far reckoned among the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20), of as our neighbor’s will adheres to God’s will, it becomes which it is said afterwards (Gal. 5:21) that “they who do in consequence, a rule regulated according to its proper such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God.” Now measure. Wherefore it is a sin to disaccord with such a nothing, save mortal sin, excludes man from the kingdom will, because by that very fact one disaccords with the Di- of God. Therefore discord is a mortal sin. vine rule. I answer that, Discord is opposed to concord. Now, Reply to Objection 2. Just as a man’s will that ad- as stated above (q. 29, Aa. 1,3) concord results from char- heres to God is a right rule, to disaccord with which is a ity, in as much as charity directs many hearts together to sin, so too a man’s will that is opposed to God is a per- one thing, which is chiefly the Divine good, secondarily, verse rule, to disaccord with which is good. Hence to the good of our neighbor. Wherefore discord is a sin, in cause a discord, whereby a good concord resulting from so far as it is opposed to this concord. charity is destroyed, is a grave sin: wherefore it is writ- But it must be observed that this concord is destroyed ten (Prov. 6:16): “Six things there are, which the Lord by discord in two ways: first, directly; secondly, acciden- hateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth,” which sev- tally. Now, human acts and movements are said to be di- enth is stated (Prov. 6:19) to be “him that soweth dis- rect when they are according to one’s intention. Where- cord among brethren.” On the other hand, to arouse a fore a man directly disaccords with his neighbor, when discord whereby an evil concord (i.e. concord in an evil he knowingly and intentionally dissents from the Divine will) is destroyed, is praiseworthy. In this way Paul was good and his neighbor’s good, to which he ought to con- to be commended for sowing discord among those who sent. This is a mortal sin in respect of its genus, because concorded together in evil, because Our Lord also said of 1381 Himself (Mat. 10:34): “I came not to send peace, but the while the other thought something else, which was ow-sword.” ing to human deficiency: for that controversy was not Reply to Objection 3. The discord between Paul and about things necessary to salvation. Moreover all this was Barnabas was accidental and not direct: because each in- ordained by Divine providence, on account of the good tended some good, yet the one thought one thing good, which would ensue. Whether discord is a daughter of vainglory? IIa IIae q. 37 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that discord is not a a man holds to his own way of thinking, and departs from daughter of vainglory. For anger is a vice distinct from that of others, is reckoned to be a daughter of vainglory. vainglory. Now discord is apparently the daughter of Reply to Objection 1. Strife is not the same as dis- anger, according to Prov. 15:18: “A passionate man stir- cord, for strife consists in external deeds, wherefore it is reth up strifes.” Therefore it is not a daughter of vainglory. becoming that it should arise from anger, which incites Objection 2. Further, Augustine expounding the the mind to hurt one’s neighbor; whereas discord consists words of Jn. 7:39, “As yet the Spirit was not given,” says in a divergence in the movements of wills, which arises (Tract. xxxii) “Malice severs, charity unites.” Now dis- from pride or vainglory, for the reason given above. cord is merely a separation of wills. Therefore discord Reply to Objection 2. In discord we may consider arises from malice, i.e. envy, rather than from vainglory. that which is the term “wherefrom,” i.e. another’s will Objection 3. Further, whatever gives rise to many from which we recede, and in this respect it arises from evils, would seem to be a capital vice. Now such is dis- envy; and again we may consider that which is the term cord, because Jerome in commenting on Mat. 12:25, “Ev- “whither,” i.e. something of our own to which we cling, ery kingdom divided against itself shall be made deso- and in this respect it is caused by vainglory. And since in late,” says: “Just as concord makes small things thrive, so every moment the term “whither” is more important than discord brings the greatest things to ruin.” Therefore dis- the term “wherefrom” (because the end is of more account cord should itself be reckoned a capital vice, rather than a than the beginning), discord is accounted a daughter of daughter of vainglory. vainglory rather than of envy, though it may arise from On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory both for different reasons, as stated. (Moral. xxxi, 45). Reply to Objection 3. The reason why concord I answer that, Discord denotes a certain disunion of makes small things thrive, while discord brings the great- wills, in so far, to wit, as one man’s will holds fast to one est to ruin, is because “the more united a force is, the thing, while the other man’s will holds fast to something stronger it is, while the more disunited it is the weaker it else. Now if a man’s will holds fast to its own ground, becomes” (De Causis xvii). Hence it is evident that this is this is due to the act that he prefers what is his own to that part of the proper effect of discord which is a disunion of which belongs to others, and if he do this inordinately, it wills, and in no way indicates that other vices arise from is due to pride and vainglory. Therefore discord, whereby discord, as though it were a capital vice. 1382 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 38 Of Contention (In Two Articles) We must now consider contention, in respect of which there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether contention is a mortal sin? (2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory? Whether contention is a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 38 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that contention is not a says that “it consists in developing a speech from contrary mortal sin. For there is no mortal sin in spiritual men: and things,” for instance: “Adulation has a pleasant beginning, yet contention is to be found in them, according to Lk. and a most bitter end.” 22:24: “And there was also a strife amongst” the disci- Now contrariety of speech may be looked at in two ples of Jesus, “which of them should. . . be the greatest.” ways: first with regard to the intention of the contentious Therefore contention is not a mortal sin. party, secondly, with regard to the manner of contending. Objection 2. Further, no well disposed man should As to the intention, we must consider whether he contends be pleased that his neighbor commit a mortal sin. But the against the truth, and then he is to be blamed, or against Apostle says (Phil. 1:17): “Some out of contention preach falsehood, and then he should be praised. As to the man- Christ,” and afterwards he says (Phil. 1:18): “In this also ner, we must consider whether his manner of contending I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice.” Therefore contention is is in keeping with the persons and the matter in dispute, not a mortal sin. for then it would be praiseworthy, hence Tully says (De Objection 3. Further, it happens that people contend Rhet. ad Heren. iii) that “contention is a sharp speech either in the courts or in disputations, without any spiteful suitable for proof and refutation”—or whether it exceeds purpose, and with a good intention, as, for example, those the demands of the persons and matter in dispute, in which who contend by disputing with heretics. Hence a gloss case it is blameworthy. on 1 Kings 14:1, “It came to pass one day,” etc. says: Accordingly if we take contention as denoting a dis- “Catholics do not raise contentions with heretics, unless claimer of the truth and an inordinate manner, it is a mor- they are first challenged to dispute.” Therefore contention tal sin. Thus Ambrose∗ defines contention: “Contention is not a mortal sin. is a disclaimer of the truth with clamorous confidence.” If, Objection 4. Further, Job seems to have contended however, contention denote a disavowal of what is false, with God, according to Job 39:32: “Shall he that con- with the proper measure of acrimony, it is praiseworthy: tendeth with God be so easily silenced?” And yet Job was whereas, if it denote a disavowal of falsehood, together not guilty of mortal sin, since the Lord said of him (Job with an inordinate manner, it can be a venial sin, unless 42:7): “You have not spoken the thing that is right before the contention be conducted so inordinately, as to give me, as my servant Job hath.” Therefore contention is not scandal to others. Hence the Apostle after saying (2 Tim. always a mortal sin. 2:14): “Contend not in words,” adds, “for it is to no profit, On the contrary, It is against the precept of the Apos- but to the subverting of the hearers.” tle who says (2 Tim. 2:14): “Contend not in words.” Reply to Objection 1. The disciples of Christ con- Moreover (Gal. 5:20) contention is included among the tended together, not with the intention of disclaiming the works of the flesh, and as stated there (Gal. 5:21) “they truth, since each one stood up for what he thought was who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God.” true. Yet there was inordinateness in their contention, be- Now whatever excludes a man from the kingdom of God cause they contended about a matter which they ought not and is against a precept, is a mortal sin. Therefore con- to have contended about, viz. the primacy of honor; for tention is a mortal sin. they were not spiritual men as yet, as a gloss says on the I answer that, To contend is to tend against some one. same passage; and for this reason Our Lord checked them. Wherefore just as discord denotes a contrariety of wills, Reply to Objection 2. Those who preached Christ so contention signifies contrariety of speech. For this rea- “out of contention,” were to be blamed, because, although son when a man contrasts various contrary things in a they did not gainsay the truth of faith, but preached it, yet speech, this is called “contentio,” which Tully calls one they did gainsay the truth, by the fact that they thought of the rhetorical colors (De Rhet. ad Heren. iv), where he they would “raise affliction” to the Apostle who was ∗ Cf. Gloss. Ord. in Rom. i, 29 1383 preaching the truth of faith. Hence the Apostle rejoiced whether in court or in a disputation, it is incomplete, i.e. not in their contention, but in the fruit that would result in respect of the acrimony of speech, it is not always a therefrom, namely that Christ would be made known— mortal sin. since evil is sometimes the occasion of good results. Reply to Objection 4. Contention here denotes an or- Reply to Objection 3. Contention is complete and is dinary dispute. For Job had said (13:3): “I will speak to a mortal sin when, in contending before a judge, a man the Almighty, and I desire to reason with God”: yet he gainsays the truth of justice, or in a disputation, intends intended not to impugn the truth, but to defend it, and in to impugn the true doctrine. In this sense Catholics do seeking the truth thus, he had no wish to be inordinate in not contend against heretics, but the reverse. But when, mind or in speech. Whether contention is a daughter of vainglory? IIa IIae q. 38 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that contention is not when they hold to their own opinion in their hearts, so are a daughter of vainglory. For contention is akin to zeal, they contentious when each defends his own opinion by wherefore it is written (1 Cor. 3:3): “Whereas there is words. Consequently contention is reckoned a daughter among you zeal [Douay: ‘envying’] and contention, are of vainglory for the same reason as discord. you not carnal, and walk according to men?” Now zeal Reply to Objection 1. Contention, like discord, is pertains to envy. Therefore contention arises rather from akin to envy in so far as a man severs himself from the one envy. with whom he is discordant, or with whom he contends, Objection 2. Further, contention is accompanied by but in so far as a contentious man holds to something, it is raising of the voice. But the voice is raised on account of akin to pride and vainglory, because, to wit, he clings to anger, as Gregory declares (Moral. xxxi, 14). Therefore his own opinion, as stated above (q. 37, a. 2, ad 1). contention too arises from anger. Reply to Objection 2. The contention of which we Objection 3. Further, among other things knowledge are speaking puts on a loud voice, for the purpose of im- seems to be the matter of pride and vainglory, according pugning the truth, so that it is not the chief part of con- to 1 Cor. 8:1: “Knowledge puffeth up.” Now contention is tention. Hence it does not follow that contention arises often due to lack of knowledge, and by knowledge we do from the same source as the raising of the voice. not impugn the truth, we know it. Therefore contention is Reply to Objection 3. Pride and vainglory are oc- not a daughter of vainglory. casioned chiefly by goods even those that are contrary to On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory them, for instance, when a man is proud of his humility: (Moral. xxxi, 14). for when a thing arises in this way, it does so not directly I answer that, As stated above (q. 37, a. 2), discord is but accidentally, in which way nothing hinders one cona daughter of vainglory, because each of the disaccording trary from arising out of another. Hence there is no reason parties clings to his own opinion, rather than acquiesce why the “per se” and direct effects of pride or vainglory, with the other. Now it is proper to pride and vainglory to should not result from the contraries of those things which seek one’s own glory. And just as people are discordant are the occasion of pride. 1384 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 39 Of Schism (In Four Articles) We must now consider the vices contrary to peace, which belong to deeds: such are schism, strife, sedition, and war. In the first place, then, about schism, there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether schism is a special sin? (2) Whether it is graver than unbelief? (3) Of the power exercised by schismatics; (4) Of the punishment inflicted on them. Whether schism is a special sin? IIa IIae q. 39 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that schism is not a spe- who, wilfully and intentionally separate themselves from cial sin. For “schism,” as Pope Pelagius I says (Epist. ad the unity of the Church; for this is the chief unity, and Victor. et Pancrat.), “denotes a division.” But every sin the particular unity of several individuals among them- causes a division, according to Is. 59:: “Your sins have selves is subordinate to the unity of the Church, even as divided between you and your God.” Therefore schism is the mutual adaptation of each member of a natural body not a special sin. is subordinate to the unity of the whole body. Now the Objection 2. Further, a man is apparently a schis- unity of the Church consists in two things; namely, in the matic if he disobeys the Church. But every sin makes a mutual connection or communion of the members of the man disobey the commandments of the Church, because Church, and again in the subordination of all the members sin, according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) “is disobe- of the Church to the one head, according to Col. 2:18,19: dience against the heavenly commandments.” Therefore “Puffed up by the sense of his flesh, and not holding the every sin is a schism. Head, from which the whole body, by joints and bands, Objection 3. Further, heresy also divides a man from being supplied with nourishment and compacted, groweth the unity of faith. If, therefore, the word schism denotes a unto the increase of God.” Now this Head is Christ Him- division, it would seem not to differ, as a special sin, from self, Whose viceregent in the Church is the Sovereign the sin of unbelief. Pontiff. Wherefore schismatics are those who refuse to On the contrary, Augustine (Contra Faust. xx, 3; submit to the Sovereign Pontiff, and to hold communion Contra Crescon. ii, 4) distinguishes between schism and with those members of the Church who acknowledge his heresy, for he says that a “schismatic is one who holds supremacy. the same faith, and practises the same worship, as others, Reply to Objection 1. The division between man and and takes pleasure in the mere disunion of the community, God that results from sin is not intended by the sinner: whereas a heretic is one who holds another faith from that it happens beside his intention as a result of his turning of the Catholic Church.” Therefore schism is not a generic inordinately to a mutable good, and so it is not schism sin. properly so called. I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. viii, 3), schism Reply to Objection 2. The essence of schism consists takes its name “from being a scission of minds,” and scis- in rebelliously disobeying the commandments: and I say sion is opposed to unity. Wherefore the sin of schism “rebelliously,” since a schismatic both obstinately scorns is one that is directly and essentially opposed to unity. the commandments of the Church, and refuses to submit For in the moral, as in the physical order, the species is to her judgment. But every sinner does not do this, where- not constituted by that which is accidental. Now, in the fore not every sin is a schism. moral order, the essential is that which is intended, and Reply to Objection 3. Heresy and schism are distin- that which results beside the intention, is, as it were, ac- guished in respect of those things to which each is op- cidental. Hence the sin of schism is, properly speaking, posed essentially and directly. For heresy is essentially a special sin, for the reason that the schismatic intends to opposed to faith, while schism is essentially opposed to sever himself from that unity which is the effect of char- the unity of ecclesiastical charity. Wherefore just as faith ity: because charity unites not only one person to another and charity are different virtues, although whoever lacks with the bond of spiritual love, but also the whole Church faith lacks charity, so too schism and heresy are differ- in unity of spirit. ent vices, although whoever is a heretic is also a schis- Accordingly schismatics properly so called are those matic, but not conversely. This is what Jerome says in 1385 his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians∗: “I con-schism is the road to heresy. Wherefore Jerome adds (In sider the difference between schism and heresy to be that Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10) that “at the outset it is possible, in a heresy holds false doctrine while schism severs a man certain respect, to find a difference between schism and from the Church.” Nevertheless, just as the loss of charity heresy: yet there is no schism that does not devise some is the road to the loss of faith, according to 1 Tim. 1:6: heresy for itself, that it may appear to have had a reason “From which things,” i.e. charity and the like, “some go- for separating from the Church.” ing astray, are turned aside into vain babbling,” so too, Whether schism is a graver sin than unbelief? IIa IIae q. 39 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that schism is a graver sin the question must be understood to refer to the gravity de- than unbelief. For the graver sin meets with a graver pun- rived from the sin’s genus. Now the genus or species of ishment, according to Dt. 25:2: “According to the mea- a sin is taken from its object, as shown above ( Ia IIae, sure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be.” q. 72, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 73, a. 3). Wherefore the sin which Now we find the sin of schism punished more severely is opposed to the greater good is, in respect of its genus, than even the sin of unbelief or idolatry: for we read (Ex. more grievous, for instance a sin committed against God 32:28) that some were slain by the swords of their fellow is graver than a sin committed against one’s neighbor. men on account of idolatry: whereas of the sin of schism Now it is evident that unbelief is a sin committed we read (Num. 16:30): “If the Lord do a new thing, and against God Himself, according as He is Himself the First the earth opening her mouth swallow them down, and all Truth, on which faith is founded; whereas schism is op- things that belong to them, and they go down alive into posed to ecclesiastical unity, which is a participated good, hell, you shall know that they have blasphemed the Lord and a lesser good than God Himself. Wherefore it is man- God.” Moreover the ten tribes who were guilty of schism ifest that the sin of unbelief is generically more grievous in revolting from the rule of David were most severely than the sin of schism, although it may happen that a par- punished (4 Kings 17). Therefore the sin of schism is ticular schismatic sins more grievously than a particular graver than the sin of unbelief. unbeliever, either because his contempt is greater, or be- Objection 2. Further, “The good of the multitude is cause his sin is a source of greater danger, or for some greater and more godlike than the good of the individual,” similar reason. as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 2). Now schism is op- Reply to Objection 1. It had already been declared posed to the good of the multitude, namely, ecclesiastical to that people by the law which they had received that unity, whereas unbelief is contrary to the particular good there was one God, and that no other God was to be wor- of one man, namely the faith of an individual. Therefore shipped by them; and the same had been confirmed among it seems that schism is a graver sin than unbelief. them by many kinds of signs. Consequently there was no Objection 3. Further, a greater good is opposed to need for those who sinned against this faith by falling into a greater evil, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, idolatry, to be punished in an unwonted manner: it was 10). Now schism is opposed to charity, which is a greater enough that they should be punished in the usual way. On virtue than faith to which unbelief is opposed, as shown the other hand, it was not so well known among them that above (q. 10, a. 2; q. 23, a. 6). Therefore schism is a graver Moses was always to be their ruler, and so it behooved sin than unbelief. those who rebelled against his authority to be punished in On the contrary, That which results from an addition a miraculous and unwonted manner. to something else surpasses that thing either in good or in We may also reply by saying that the sin of schism evil. Now heresy results from something being added to was sometimes more severely punished in that people, be- schism, for it adds corrupt doctrine, as Jerome declares in cause they were inclined to seditions and schisms. For the passage quoted above (a. 1, ad 3). Therefore schism is it is written (1 Esdra 4:15): “This city since days gone a less grievous sin than unbelief. by has rebelled against its kings: and seditions and wars I answer that, The gravity of a sin can be considered were raised therein∗.” Now sometimes a more severe pun- in two ways: first, according to the species of that sin, ishment is inflicted for an habitual sin (as stated above, secondly, according to its circumstances. And since par- Ia IIae, q. 105, a. 2, ad 9), because punishments are ticular circumstances are infinite in number, so too they medicines intended to keep man away from sin: so that can be varied in an infinite number of ways: wherefore if where there is greater proneness to sin, a more severe pun- one were to ask in general which of two sins is the graver, ishment ought to be inflicted. As regards the ten tribes, ∗ In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10 ∗ Vulg.: ‘This city is a rebellious city, and hurtful to the kings and provinces, and. . . wars were raised therein of old’ 1386 they were punished not only for the sin of schism, but its principal object and is the Divine goodness, the other also for that of idolatry as stated in the passage quoted. is its secondary object and is our neighbor’s good. Now Reply to Objection 2. Just as the good of the multi- schism and other sins against our neighbor, are opposed to tude is greater than the good of a unit in that multitude, so charity in respect of its secondary good, which is less than is it less than the extrinsic good to which that multitude is the object of faith, for this is God Himself; and so these directed, even as the good of a rank in the army is less than sins are less grievous than unbelief. On the other hand, ha- the good of the commander-in-chief. In like manner the tred of God, which is opposed to charity in respect of its good of ecclesiastical unity, to which schism is opposed, principal object, is not less grievous than unbelief. Never- is less than the good of Divine truth, to which unbelief is theless of all sins committed by man against his neighbor, opposed. the sin of schism would seem to be the greatest, because Reply to Objection 3. Charity has two objects; one is it is opposed to the spiritual good of the multitude. Whether schismatics have any power? IIa IIae q. 39 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that schismatics have consecration. Now all the consecrations of the Church some power. For Augustine says (Contra Donat. i, 1): are immovable so long as the consecrated thing remains: “Just as those who come back to the Church after being as appears even in inanimate things, since an altar, once baptized, are not baptized again, so those who return after consecrated, is not consecrated again unless it has been being ordained, are not ordained again.” Now Order is a broken up. Consequently such a power as this remains, as kind of power. Therefore schismatics have some power to its essence, in the man who has received it by conse- since they retain their Orders. cration, as long as he lives, even if he fall into schism or Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Unico heresy: and this is proved from the fact that if he come Bapt.∗): “One who is separated can confer a sacrament back to the Church, he is not consecrated anew. Since, even as he can have it.” But the power of conferring however, the lower power ought not to exercise its act, ex- a sacrament is a very great power. Therefore schismat- cept in so far as it is moved by the higher power, as may ics who are separated from the Church, have a spiritual be seen also in the physical order, it follows that such per- power. sons lose the use of their power, so that it is not lawful Objection 3. Further, Pope Urban II† says: “We for them to use it. Yet if they use it, this power has its command that persons consecrated by bishops who were effect in sacramental acts, because therein man acts only themselves consecrated according to the Catholic rite, but as God’s instrument, so that sacramental effects are not have separated themselves by schism from the Roman precluded on account of any fault whatever in the person Church, should be received mercifully and that their Or- who confers the sacrament. ders should be acknowledged, when they return to the On the other hand, the power of jurisdiction is that unity of the Church, provided they be of commendable which is conferred by a mere human appointment. Such life and knowledge.” But this would not be so, unless a power as this does not adhere to the recipient immov- spiritual power were retained by schismatics. Therefore ably: so that it does not remain in heretics and schismat- schismatics have spiritual power. ics; and consequently they neither absolve nor excommu- On the contrary, Cyprian says in a letter (Ep. lii, nicate, nor grant indulgence, nor do anything of the kind, quoted vii, qu. 1, can. Novatianus): “He who observes and if they do, it is invalid. neither unity of spirit nor the concord of peace, and sev- Accordingly when it is said that such like persons have ers himself from the bonds of the Church, and from the no spiritual power, it is to be understood as referring ei- fellowship of her priests, cannot have episcopal power or ther to the second power, or if it be referred to the first honor.” power, not as referring to the essence of the power, but to I answer that, Spiritual power is twofold, the one its lawful use. sacramental, the other a power of jurisdiction. The sacra- This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. mental power is one that is conferred by some kind of ∗ De Bap. contra Donat. vi, 5 † Council of Piacenza, cap. x; cf. Can. Ordinationes, ix, qu. 1 1387 Whether it is right that schismatics should be punished with excommunication? IIa IIae q. 39 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that schismatics are not ished” [Vulg.: ‘he is tormented’]. Now a schismatic, rightly punished with excommunication. For excommu- as shown above (a. 1), commits a twofold sin: first by nication deprives a man chiefly of a share in the sacra- separating himself from communion with the members ments. But Augustine says (Contra Donat. vi, 5) that of the Church, and in this respect the fitting punishment “Baptism can be received from a schismatic.” Therefore for schismatics is that they be excommunicated. Sec- it seems that excommunication is not a fitting punishment ondly, they refuse submission to the head of the Church, for schismatics. wherefore, since they are unwilling to be controlled by Objection 2. Further, it is the duty of Christ’s faith- the Church’s spiritual power, it is just that they should be ful to lead back those who have gone astray, wherefore compelled by the secular power. it is written against certain persons (Ezech. 34:4): “That Reply to Objection 1. It is not lawful to receive Bap- which was driven away you have not brought again, nei- tism from a schismatic, save in a case of necessity, since it ther have you sought that which was lost.” Now schis- is better for a man to quit this life, marked with the sign of matics are more easily brought back by such as may hold Christ, no matter from whom he may receive it, whether communion with them. Therefore it seems that they ought from a Jew or a pagan, than deprived of that mark, which not to be excommunicated. is bestowed in Baptism. Objection 3. Further, a double punishment is not in- Reply to Objection 2. Excommunication does not flicted for one and the same sin, according to Nahum 1:9: forbid the intercourse whereby a person by salutary ad- “God will not judge the same twice”∗. Now some receive monitions leads back to the unity of the Church those who a temporal punishment for the sin of schism, according to are separated from her. Indeed this very separation brings q. 23, a. 5, where it is stated: “Both divine and earthly them back somewhat, because through confusion at their laws have laid down that those who are severed from the separation, they are sometimes led to do penance unity of the Church, and disturb her peace, must be pun- Reply to Objection 3. The punishments of the present ished by the secular power.” Therefore they ought not to life are medicinal, and therefore when one punishment be punished with excommunication. does not suffice to compel a man, another is added: just as On the contrary, It is written (Num. 16:26): “Depart physicians employ several body medicines when one has from the tents of these wicked men,” those, to wit, who no effect. In like manner the Church, when excommuni- had caused the schism, “and touch nothing of theirs, lest cation does not sufficiently restrain certain men, employs you be involved in their sins.” the compulsion of the secular arm. If, however, one pun- I answer that, According to Wis. 11:11, “By what ishment suffices, another should not be employed. things a man sinneth, by the same also he should be pun- ∗ Septuagint version 1388 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 40 Of War (In Four Articles) We must now consider war, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether some kind of war is lawful? (2) Whether it is lawful for clerics to fight? (3) Whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes? (4) Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days? Whether it is always sinful to wage war? IIa IIae q. 40 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it is always sinful to ness to watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom wage war. Because punishment is not inflicted except for or province subject to them. And just as it is lawful for sin. Now those who wage war are threatened by Our Lord them to have recourse to the sword in defending that com- with punishment, according to Mat. 26:52: “All that take mon weal against internal disturbances, when they punish the sword shall perish with the sword.” Therefore all wars evil-doers, according to the words of the Apostle (Rom. are unlawful. 13:4): “He beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God’s Objection 2. Further, whatever is contrary to a Divine minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth precept is a sin. But war is contrary to a Divine precept, evil”; so too, it is their business to have recourse to the for it is written (Mat. 5:39): “But I say to you not to resist sword of war in defending the common weal against exter- evil”; and (Rom. 12:19): “Not revenging yourselves, my nal enemies. Hence it is said to those who are in authority dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath.” Therefore war (Ps. 81:4): “Rescue the poor: and deliver the needy out of is always sinful. the hand of the sinner”; and for this reason Augustine says Objection 3. Further, nothing, except sin, is contrary (Contra Faust. xxii, 75): “The natural order conducive to to an act of virtue. But war is contrary to peace. Therefore peace among mortals demands that the power to declare war is always a sin. and counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold Objection 4. Further, the exercise of a lawful thing the supreme authority.” is itself lawful, as is evident in scientific exercises. But Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those warlike exercises which take place in tournaments are for- who are attacked, should be attacked because they de- bidden by the Church, since those who are slain in these serve it on account of some fault. Wherefore Augustine trials are deprived of ecclesiastical burial. Therefore it says (QQ. in Hept., qu. x, super Jos.): “A just war is wont seems that war is a sin in itself. to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on the or state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends son of the centurion∗: “If the Christian Religion forbade for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what war altogether, those who sought salutary advice in the it has seized unjustly.” Gospel would rather have been counselled to cast aside Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should their arms, and to give up soldiering altogether. On the have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advance- contrary, they were told: ‘Do violence to no man. . . and ment of good, or the avoidance of evil. Hence Augus- be content with your pay’†. If he commanded them to be tine says (De Verb. Dom.‡): “True religion looks upon as content with their pay, he did not forbid soldiering.” peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of ag- I answer that, In order for a war to be just, three grandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing things are necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good.” by whose command the war is to be waged. For it is not For it may happen that the war is declared by the legiti- the business of a private individual to declare war, because mate authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered he can seek for redress of his rights from the tribunal of unlawful through a wicked intention. Hence Augustine his superior. Moreover it is not the business of a private says (Contra Faust. xxii, 74): “The passion for inflicting individual to summon together the people, which has to harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and re- be done in wartime. And as the care of the common weal lentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and is committed to those who are in authority, it is their busi- such like things, all these are rightly condemned in war.” ∗ Ep. ad Marcel. cxxxviii † Lk. 3:14 ‡ The words quoted are to be found not in St. Augustine’s works, but Can. Apud. Caus. xxiii, qu. 1 1389 Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (Contra we have to punish with a kindly severity, it is necessary Faust. xxii, 70): “To take the sword is to arm oneself in to handle in many ways against their will. For when we order to take the life of anyone, without the command or are stripping a man of the lawlessness of sin, it is good for permission of superior or lawful authority.” On the other him to be vanquished, since nothing is more hopeless than hand, to have recourse to the sword (as a private person) the happiness of sinners, whence arises a guilty impunity, by the authority of the sovereign or judge, or (as a public and an evil will, like an internal enemy.” person) through zeal for justice, and by the authority, so Reply to Objection 3. Those who wage war justly to speak, of God, is not to “take the sword,” but to use it as aim at peace, and so they are not opposed to peace, ex- commissioned by another, wherefore it does not deserve cept to the evil peace, which Our Lord “came not to send punishment. And yet even those who make sinful use of upon earth” (Mat. 10:34). Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad the sword are not always slain with the sword, yet they Bonif. clxxxix): “We do not seek peace in order to be at always perish with their own sword, because, unless they war, but we go to war that we may have peace. Be peace- repent, they are punished eternally for their sinful use of ful, therefore, in warring, so that you may vanquish those the sword. whom you war against, and bring them to the prosperity Reply to Objection 2. Such like precepts, as Augus- of peace.” tine observes (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19), should Reply to Objection 4. Manly exercises in warlike always be borne in readiness of mind, so that we be ready feats of arms are not all forbidden, but those which are to obey them, and, if necessary, to refrain from resistance inordinate and perilous, and end in slaying or plundering. or self-defense. Nevertheless it is necessary sometimes In olden times warlike exercises presented no such dan- for a man to act otherwise for the common good, or for ger, and hence they were called “exercises of arms” or the good of those with whom he is fighting. Hence Au- “bloodless wars,” as Jerome states in an epistle∗. gustine says (Ep. ad Marcellin. cxxxviii): “Those whom Whether it is lawful for clerics and bishops to fight? IIa IIae q. 40 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem lawful for clerics and qu. 8, can. Hortatu) that Charles went to war with the bishops to fight. For, as stated above (a. 1), wars are law- Lombards at the instance and entreaty of Adrian, bishop ful and just in so far as they protect the poor and the entire of Rome. Therefore they also are allowed to fight. common weal from suffering at the hands of the foe. Now Objection 4. Further, whatever is right and merito- this seems to be above all the duty of prelates, for Gregory rious in itself, is lawful for prelates and clerics. Now it says (Hom. in Ev. xiv): “The wolf comes upon the sheep, is sometimes right and meritorious to make war, for it is when any unjust and rapacious man oppresses those who written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Omni timore) that if “a man die are faithful and humble. But he who was thought to be for the true faith, or to save his country, or in defense of the shepherd, and was not, leaveth the sheep, end flieth, Christians, God will give him a heavenly reward.” There- for he fears lest the wolf hurt him, and dares not stand up fore it is lawful for bishops and clerics to fight. against his injustice.” Therefore it is lawful for prelates On the contrary, It was said to Peter as representing and clerics to fight. bishops and clerics (Mat. 16:52): “Put up again thy sword Objection 2. Further, Pope Leo IV writes (xxiii, qu. into the scabbard [Vulg.: ‘its place’]†.” Therefore it is not 8, can. Igitur): “As untoward tidings had frequently come lawful for them to fight. from the Saracen side, some said that the Saracens would I answer that, Several things are requisite for the come to the port of Rome secretly and covertly; for which good of a human society: and a number of things are done reason we commanded our people to gather together, and better and quicker by a number of persons than by one, as ordered them to go down to the seashore.” Therefore it is the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 1), while certain oc- lawful for bishops to fight. cupations are so inconsistent with one another, that they Objection 3. Further, apparently, it comes to the same cannot be fittingly exercised at the same time; wherefore whether a man does a thing himself, or consents to its be- those who are deputed to important duties are forbidden ing done by another, according to Rom. 1:32: “They who to occupy themselves with things of small importance. do such things, are worthy of death, and not only they Thus according to human laws, soldiers who are deputed that do them, but they also that consent to them that do to warlike pursuits are forbidden to engage in commerce‡. them.” Now those, above all, seem to consent to a thing, Now warlike pursuits are altogether incompatible with who induce others to do it. But it is lawful for bishops the duties of a bishop and a cleric, for two reasons. The and clerics to induce others to fight: for it is written (xxiii, first reason is a general one, because, to wit, warlike pur- ∗ Reference incorrect: cf. Veget., De Re Milit. i † “Scabbard” is the reading in Jn. 18:11 ‡ Cod. xii, 35, De Re Milit. 1390 suits are full of unrest, so that they hinder the mind very Such are salutary warnings, devout prayers, and, for those much from the contemplation of Divine things, the praise who are obstinate, the sentence of excommunication. of God, and prayers for the people, which belong to the Reply to Objection 2. Prelates and clerics may, by the duties of a cleric. Wherefore just as commercial enter- authority of their superiors, take part in wars, not indeed prises are forbidden to clerics, because they unsettle the by taking up arms themselves, but by affording spiritual mind too much, so too are warlike pursuits, according to help to those who fight justly, by exhorting and absolv- 2 Tim. 2:4: “No man being a soldier to God, entangleth ing them, and by other like spiritual helps. Thus in the himself with secular business.” The second reason is a Old Testament (Joshua 6:4) the priests were commanded special one, because, to wit, all the clerical Orders are di- to sound the sacred trumpets in the battle. It was for this rected to the ministry of the altar, on which the Passion purpose that bishops or clerics were first allowed to go to of Christ is represented sacramentally, according to 1 Cor. the front: and it is an abuse of this permission, if any of 11:26: “As often as you shall eat this bread, and drink the them take up arms themselves. chalice, you shall show the death of the Lord, until He Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 23, a. 4, come.” Wherefore it is unbecoming for them to slay or ad 2) every power, art or virtue that regards the end, has shed blood, and it is more fitting that they should be ready to dispose that which is directed to the end. Now, among to shed their own blood for Christ, so as to imitate in deed the faithful, carnal wars should be considered as having what they portray in their ministry. For this reason it has for their end the Divine spiritual good to which clerics are been decreed that those who shed blood, even without sin, deputed. Wherefore it is the duty of clerics to dispose and become irregular. Now no man who has a certain duty to counsel other men to engage in just wars. For they are perform, can lawfully do that which renders him unfit for forbidden to take up arms, not as though it were a sin, but that duty. Wherefore it is altogether unlawful for clerics because such an occupation is unbecoming their person- to fight, because war is directed to the shedding of blood. ality. Reply to Objection 1. Prelates ought to withstand not Reply to Objection 4. Although it is meritorious to only the wolf who brings spiritual death upon the flock, wage a just war, nevertheless it is rendered unlawful for but also the pillager and the oppressor who work bodily clerics, by reason of their being deputed to works more harm; not, however, by having recourse themselves to ma- meritorious still. Thus the marriage act may be meritori- terial arms, but by means of spiritual weapons, according ous; and yet it becomes reprehensible in those who have to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 10:4): “The weapons vowed virginity, because they are bound to a yet greater of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God.” good. Whether it is lawful to lay ambushes in war? IIa IIae q. 40 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that it is unlawful to lay super Jos): “Provided the war be just, it is no concern of ambushes in war. For it is written (Dt. 16:20): “Thou justice whether it be carried on openly or by ambushes”: shalt follow justly after that which is just.” But ambushes, and he proves this by the authority of the Lord, Who com- since they are a kind of deception, seem to pertain to in- manded Joshua to lay ambushes for the city of Hai (Joshua justice. Therefore it is unlawful to lay ambushes even in a 8:2). just war. I answer that, The object of laying ambushes is in or- Objection 2. Further, ambushes and deception seem der to deceive the enemy. Now a man may be deceived to be opposed to faithfulness even as lies are. But since by another’s word or deed in two ways. First, through we are bound to keep faith with all men, it is wrong to lie being told something false, or through the breaking of a to anyone, as Augustine states (Contra Mend. xv). There- promise, and this is always unlawful. No one ought to de- fore, as one is bound to keep faith with one’s enemy, as ceive the enemy in this way, for there are certain “rights Augustine states (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix), it seems that it of war and covenants, which ought to be observed even is unlawful to lay ambushes for one’s enemies. among enemies,” as Ambrose states (De Officiis i). Objection 3. Further, it is written (Mat. 7:12): “What- Secondly, a man may be deceived by what we say or soever you would that men should do to you, do you also do, because we do not declare our purpose or meaning to them”: and we ought to observe this in all our deal- to him. Now we are not always bound to do this, since ings with our neighbor. Now our enemy is our neighbor. even in the Sacred Doctrine many things have to be con- Therefore, since no man wishes ambushes or deceptions cealed, especially from unbelievers, lest they deride it, to be prepared for himself, it seems that no one ought to according to Mat. 7:6: “Give not that which is holy, to carry on war by laying ambushes. dogs.” Wherefore much more ought the plan of campaign On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. in Hept. qu. x to be hidden from the enemy. For this reason among other 1391 things that a soldier has to learn is the art of concealing his Nor can these ambushes be properly called deceptions, purpose lest it come to the enemy’s knowledge, as stated nor are they contrary to justice or to a well-ordered will. in the Book on Strategy∗ by Frontinus. Such like con- For a man would have an inordinate will if he were un- cealment is what is meant by an ambush which may be willing that others should hide anything from him lawfully employed in a just war. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days? IIa IIae q. 40 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem unlawful to fight on holy against him.” days. For holy days are instituted that we may give our I answer that, The observance of holy days is no hin- time to the things of God. Hence they are included in the drance to those things which are ordained to man’s safety, keeping of the Sabbath prescribed Ex. 20:8: for “sabbath” even that of his body. Hence Our Lord argued with the is interpreted “rest.” But wars are full of unrest. Therefore Jews, saying (Jn. 7:23): “Are you angry at Me because I by no means is it lawful to fight on holy days. have healed the whole man on the Sabbath-day?” Hence Objection 2. Further, certain persons are reproached physicians may lawfully attend to their patients on holy (Is. 58:3) because on fast-days they exacted what was ow- days. Now there is much more reason for safeguarding ing to them, were guilty of strife, and of smiting with the the common weal (whereby many are saved from being fist. Much more, therefore, is it unlawful to fight on holy slain, and innumerable evils both temporal and spiritual days. prevented), than the bodily safety of an individual. There- Objection 3. Further, no ill deed should be done to fore, for the purpose of safeguarding the common weal of avoid temporal harm. But fighting on a holy day seems the faithful, it is lawful to carry on a war on holy days, in itself to be an ill deed. Therefore no one should fight provided there be need for doing so: because it would be on a holy day even through the need of avoiding temporal to tempt God, if notwithstanding such a need, one were to harm. choose to refrain from fighting. On the contrary, It is written (1 Mac. 2:41): The Jews However, as soon as the need ceases, it is no longer rightly determined. . . saying: “Whosoever shall come up lawful to fight on a holy day, for the reasons given: where- against us to fight on the Sabbath-day, we will fight fore this suffices for the Replies to the Objections. ∗ Stratagematum i, 1 1392 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 41 Of Strife∗ (In Two Articles) We must now consider strife, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether strife is a sin? (2) Whether it is a daughter of anger? Whether strife is always a sin? IIa IIae q. 41 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that strife is not always a to him, and he defend himself with due moderation, it is sin. For strife seems a kind of contention: hence Isidore no sin, and one cannot say properly that there is strife on says (Etym. x) that the word “rixosus [quarrelsome] is de- his part. But if, on the other hand, his self-defense be in- rived from the snarling [rictu] of a dog, because the quar- spired by vengeance and hatred, it is always a sin. It is relsome man is ever ready to contradict; he delights in a venial sin, if a slight movement of hatred or vengeance brawling, and provokes contention.” Now contention is obtrude itself, or if he does not much exceed moderation not always a sin. Neither, therefore, is strife. in defending himself: but it is a mortal sin if he makes Objection 2. Further, it is related (Gn. 26:21) that the for his assailant with the fixed intention of killing him, or servants of Isaac “digged” another well, “and for that they inflicting grievous harm on him. quarrelled likewise.” Now it is not credible that the house- Reply to Objection 1. Strife is not just the same hold of Isaac quarrelled publicly, without being reproved as contention: and there are three things in the passage by him, supposing it were a sin. Therefore strife is not a quoted from Isidore, which express the inordinate nature sin. of strife. First, the quarrelsome man is always ready to Objection 3. Further, strife seems to be a war between fight, and this is conveyed by the words, “ever ready to individuals. But war is not always sinful. Therefore strife contradict,” that is to say, whether the other man says or is not always a sin. does well or ill. Secondly, he delights in quarrelling itself, On the contrary, Strifes† are reckoned among the and so the passage proceeds, “and delights in brawling.” works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20), and “they who do such Thirdly, “he” provokes others to quarrel, wherefore it goes things shall not obtain the kingdom of God.” Therefore on, “and provokes contention.” strifes are not only sinful, but they are even mortal sins. Reply to Objection 1. The sense of the text is not I answer that, While contention implies a contra- that the servants of Isaac quarrelled, but that the inhab- diction of words, strife denotes a certain contradiction itants of that country quarrelled with them: wherefore of deeds. Wherefore a gloss on Gal. 5:20 says that these sinned, and not the servants of Isaac, who bore the “strifes are when persons strike one another through calumny‡. anger.” Hence strife is a kind of private war, because it Reply to Objection 3. In order for a war to be just it takes place between private persons, being declared not by must be declared by authority of the governing power, as public authority, but rather by an inordinate will. There- stated above (q. 40, a. 1); whereas strife proceeds from a fore strife is always sinful. In fact it is a mortal sin in private feeling of anger or hatred. For if the servants of a the man who attacks another unjustly, for it is not with- sovereign or judge, in virtue of their public authority, at- out mortal sin that one inflicts harm on another even if the tack certain men and these defend themselves, it is not the deed be done by the hands. But in him who defends him- former who are said to be guilty of strife, but those who self, it may be without sin, or it may sometimes involve resist the public authority. Hence it is not the assailants in a venial sin, or sometimes a mortal sin; and this depends this case who are guilty of strife and commit sin, but those on his intention and on his manner of defending himself. who defend themselves inordinately. For if his sole intention be to withstand the injury done ∗ Strife Here Denotes Fighting Between Individuals † The Douay version has ‘quarrels’ ‡ Cf. Gn. 26:20 1393 Whether strife is a daughter of anger? IIa IIae q. 41 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that strife is not a daugh- of vengeance: for the angry man is not content to hurt se- ter of anger. For it is written (James 4:1): “Whence are cretly the object of his anger, he even wishes him to feel wars and contentions? Are they not. . . from your concu- the hurt and know that what he suffers is in revenge for piscences, which war in your members?” But anger is not what he has done, as may be seen from what has been said in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore strife is a daughter, above about the passion of anger ( Ia IIae, q. 46, a. 6, ad not of anger, but of concupiscence. 2). Therefore, properly speaking, strife arises from anger. Objection 2. Further, it is written (Prov. 28:25): “He Reply to Objection 1. As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 25, that boasteth and puffeth up himself, stirreth up quarrels.” Aa. 1,2), all the irascible passions arise from those of the Now strife is apparently the same as quarrel. Therefore it concupiscible faculty, so that whatever is the immediate seems that strife is a daughter of pride or vainglory which outcome of anger, arises also from concupiscence as from makes a man boast and puff himself up. its first root. Objection 3. Further, it is written (Prov. 18:6): “The Reply to Objection 2. Boasting and puffing up of self lips of a fool intermeddle with strife.” Now folly differs which are the result of anger or vainglory, are not the di- from anger, for it is opposed, not to meekness, but to wis- rect but the occasional cause of quarrels or strife, because, dom or prudence. Therefore strife is not a daughter of when a man resents another being preferred to him, his anger. anger is aroused, and then his anger results in quarrel and Objection 4. Further, it is written (Prov. 10:12): “Ha- strife. tred stirreth up strifes.” But hatred arises from envy, ac- Reply to Objection 3. Anger, as stated above ( Ia IIae, cording to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17). Therefore strife is q. 48, a. 3) hinders the judgment of the reason, so that it not a daughter of anger, but of envy. bears a likeness to folly. Hence they have a common ef- Objection 5. Further, it is written (Prov. 17:19): “He fect, since it is due to a defect in the reason that a man that studieth discords, soweth [Vulg.: ‘loveth’] quarrels.” designs to hurt another inordinately. But discord is a daughter of vainglory, as stated above Reply to Objection 4. Although strife sometimes (q. 37, a. 2). Therefore strife is also. arises from hatred, it is not the proper effect thereof, be- On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that cause when one man hates another it is beside his inten- “anger gives rise to strife”; and it is written (Prov. 15:18; tion to hurt him in a quarrelsome and open manner, since 29:22): “A passionate man stirreth up strifes.” sometimes he seeks to hurt him secretly. When, however, I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), strife denotes an he sees himself prevailing, he endeavors to harm him with antagonism extending to deeds, when one man designs to strife and quarrel. But to hurt a man in a quarrel is the harm another. Now there are two ways in which one man proper effect of anger, for the reason given above. may intend to harm another. In one way it is as though Reply to Objection 5. Strifes give rise to hatred and he intended absolutely the other’s hurt, which in this case discord in the hearts of those who are guilty of strife, and is the outcome of hatred, for the intention of hatred is di- so he that “studies,” i.e., intends to sow discord among rected to the hurt of one’s enemy either openly or secretly. others, causes them to quarrel among themselves. Even In another way a man intends to hurt another who knows so any sin may command the act of another sin, by direct- and withstands his intention. This is what we mean by ing it to its own end. This does not, however, prove that strife, and belongs properly to anger which is the desire strife is the daughter of vainglory properly and directly. 1394 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 42 Of Sedition (In Two Articles) We must now consider sedition, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a special sin? (2) Whether it is a mortal sin? Whether sedition is a special sin distinct from other sins? IIa IIae q. 42 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that sedition is not a spe- tions with the intention of fighting. Secondly, they dif- cial sin distinct from other sins. For, according to Isidore fer in that war is, properly speaking, carried on against (Etym. x), “a seditious man is one who sows dissent external foes, being as it were between one people and among minds, and begets discord.” Now, by provoking another, whereas strife is between one individual and an- the commission of a sin, a man sins by no other kind of other, or between few people on one side and few on the sin than that which he provoked. Therefore it seems that other side, while sedition, in its proper sense, is between sedition is not a special sin distinct from discord. mutually dissentient parts of one people, as when one part Objection 2. Further, sedition denotes a kind of divi- of the state rises in tumult against another part. Where- sion. Now schism takes its name from scission, as stated fore, since sedition is opposed to a special kind of good, above (q. 39, a. 1). Therefore, seemingly, the sin of sedi- namely the unity and peace of a people, it is a special kind tion is not distinct from that of schism. of sin. Objection 3. Further, every special sin that is dis- Reply to Objection 1. A seditious man is one who in- tinct from other sins, is either a capital vice, or arises cites others to sedition, and since sedition denotes a kind from some capital vice. Now sedition is reckoned nei- of discord, it follows that a seditious man is one who cre- ther among the capital vices, nor among those vices which ates discord, not of any kind, but between the parts of a arise from them, as appears from Moral. xxxi, 45, where multitude. And the sin of sedition is not only in him who both kinds of vice are enumerated. Therefore sedition is sows discord, but also in those who dissent from one an- not a special sin, distinct from other sins. other inordinately. On the contrary, Seditions are mentioned as distinct Reply to Objection 2. Sedition differs from schism from other sins (2 Cor. 12:20). in two respects. First, because schism is opposed to the I answer that, Sedition is a special sin, having some- spiritual unity of the multitude, viz. ecclesiastical unity, thing in common with war and strife, and differing some- whereas sedition is contrary to the temporal or secular what from them. It has something in common with them, unity of the multitude, for instance of a city or kingdom. in so far as it implies a certain antagonism, and it dif- Secondly, schism does not imply any preparation for a fers from them in two points. First, because war and material fight as sedition does, but only for a spiritual dis- strife denote actual aggression on either side, whereas sent. sedition may be said to denote either actual aggression, Reply to Objection 3. Sedition, like schism, is con- or the preparation for such aggression. Hence a gloss on tained under discord, since each is a kind of discord, not 2 Cor. 12:20 says that “seditions are tumults tending to between individuals, but between the parts of a multitude. fight,” when, to wit, a number of people make prepara- Whether sedition is always a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 42 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that sedition is not al- mortal sin, and sometimes without any sin at all. There- ways a mortal sin. For sedition denotes “a tumult tending fore sedition can be also. to fight,” according to the gloss quoted above (a. 1). But Objection 3. Further, it is praiseworthy to deliver a fighting is not always a mortal sin, indeed it is sometimes multitude from a tyrannical rule. Yet this cannot easily be just and lawful, as stated above (q. 40, a. 1). Much more, done without some dissension in the multitude, if one part therefore, can sedition be without a mortal sin. of the multitude seeks to retain the tyrant, while the rest Objection 2. Further, sedition is a kind of discord, strive to dethrone him. Therefore there can be sedition as stated above (a. 1, ad 3). Now discord can be without without mortal sin. 1395 On the contrary, The Apostle forbids seditions to-he defends himself, as stated above (q. 41, a. 1). gether with other things that are mortal sins (2 Cor. Reply to Objection 1. It is lawful to fight, provided 12:20). it be for the common good, as stated above (q. 40, a. 1). I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 2), sedition is But sedition runs counter to the common good of the mul-contrary to the unity of the multitude, viz. the people of a titude, so that it is always a mortal sin. city or kingdom. Now Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21) Reply to Objection 2. Discord from what is not ev- that “wise men understand the word people to designate idently good, may be without sin, but discord from what not any crowd of persons, but the assembly of those who is evidently good, cannot be without sin: and sedition is are united together in fellowship recognized by law and discord of this kind, for it is contrary to the unity of the for the common good.” Wherefore it is evident that the multitude, which is a manifest good. unity to which sedition is opposed is the unity of law and Reply to Objection 3. A tyrannical government is not common good: whence it follows manifestly that sedition just, because it is directed, not to the common good, but is opposed to justice and the common good. Therefore by to the private good of the ruler, as the Philosopher states reason of its genus it is a mortal sin, and its gravity will (Polit. iii, 5; Ethic. viii, 10). Consequently there is no be all the greater according as the common good which sedition in disturbing a government of this kind, unless it assails surpasses the private good which is assailed by indeed the tyrant’s rule be disturbed so inordinately, that strife. his subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent dis- Accordingly the sin of sedition is first and chiefly in turbance than from the tyrant’s government. Indeed it is its authors, who sin most grievously; and secondly it is in the tyrant rather that is guilty of sedition, since he encour- those who are led by them to disturb the common good. ages discord and sedition among his subjects, that he may Those, however, who defend the common good, and with- lord over them more securely; for this is tyranny, being stand the seditious party, are not themselves seditious, conducive to the private good of the ruler, and to the in- even as neither is a man to be called quarrelsome because jury of the multitude. 1396 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 43 Of Scandal (In Eight Articles) It remains for us to consider the vices which are opposed to beneficence, among which some come under the head of injustice, those, to wit, whereby one harms one’s neighbor unjustly. But scandal seems to be specially opposed to charity. Accordingly we must here consider scandal, under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) What is scandal? (2) Whether scandal is a sin? (3) Whether it is a special sin? (4) Whether it is a mortal sin? (5) Whether the perfect can be scandalized? (6) Whether they can give scandal? (7) Whether spiritual goods are to be foregone on account of scandal? (8) Whether temporal things are to be foregone on account of scandal? Whether scandal is fittingly defined as being something less rightly said or done that IIa IIae q. 43 a. 1 occasions spiritual downfall? Objection 1. It would seem that scandal is unfittingly word,” etc. says: “When we read ‘Whosoever shall scan- defined as “something less rightly said or done that occa- dalize,’ the sense is ‘Whosoever shall, by deed or word, sions spiritual downfall.” For scandal is a sin as we shall occasion another’s spiritual downfall.’ ” state further on (a. 2). Now, according to Augustine (Con- I answer that, As Jerome observes the Greek skan- tra Faust. xxii, 27), a sin is a “word, deed, or desire con- dalon may be rendered offense, downfall, or a stumbling trary to the law of God.” Therefore the definition given against something. For when a body, while moving along above is insufficient, since it omits “thought” or “desire.” a path, meets with an obstacle, it may happen to stumble Objection 2. Further, since among virtuous or right against it, and be disposed to fall down: such an obstacle acts one is more virtuous or more right than another, that is a skandalon. one alone which has perfect rectitude would not seem to In like manner, while going along the spiritual way, a be a “less” right one. If, therefore, scandal is something man may be disposed to a spiritual downfall by another’s “less” rightly said or done, it follows that every virtuous word or deed, in so far, to wit, as one man by his injunc- act except the best of all, is a scandal. tion, inducement or example, moves another to sin; and Objection 3. Further, an occasion is an accidental this is scandal properly so called. cause. But nothing accidental should enter a definition, Now nothing by its very nature disposes a man to spir- because it does not specify the thing defined. Therefore it itual downfall, except that which has some lack of rec- is unfitting, in defining scandal, to say that it is an “occa- titude, since what is perfectly right, secures man against sion.” a fall, instead of conducing to his downfall. Scandal is, Objection 4. Further, whatever a man does may be therefore, fittingly defined as “something less rightly done the occasion of another’s spiritual downfall, because acci- or said, that occasions another’s spiritual downfall.” dental causes are indeterminate. Consequently, if scandal Reply to Objection 1. The thought or desire of evil is something that occasions another’s spiritual downfall, lies hidden in the heart, wherefore it does not suggest it- any deed or word can be a scandal: and this seems unrea- self to another man as an obstacle conducing to his spir- sonable. itual downfall: hence it cannot come under the head of Objection 5. Further, a man occasions his neighbor’s scandal. spiritual downfall when he offends or weakens him. Now Reply to Objection 2. A thing is said to be less right, scandal is condivided with offense and weakness, for the not because something else surpasses it in rectitude, but Apostle says (Rom. 14:21): “It is good not to eat flesh, because it has some lack of rectitude, either through be- and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother ing evil in itself, such as sin, or through having an appear- is offended or scandalized, or weakened.” Therefore the ance of evil. Thus, for instance, if a man were to “sit at aforesaid definition of scandal is unfitting. meat in the idol’s temple” (1 Cor. 8:10), though this is On the contrary, Jerome in expounding Mat. 15:12, not sinful in itself, provided it be done with no evil inten- “Dost thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard this tion, yet, since it has a certain appearance of evil, and a 1397 semblance of worshipping the idol, it might occasion an-itual downfall, wherefore his act is called “active scan- other man’s spiritual downfall. Hence the Apostle says (1 dal.” One man’s word or deed is the accidental cause of Thess. 5:22): “From all appearance of evil refrain your- another’s sin, when he neither intends to lead him into selves.” Scandal is therefore fittingly described as some- sin, nor does what is of a nature to lead him into sin, and thing done “less rightly,” so as to comprise both whatever yet this other one, through being ill-disposed, is led into is sinful in itself, and all that has an appearance of evil. sin, for instance, into envy of another’s good, and then Reply to Objection 3. As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 75, he who does this righteous act, does not, so far as he is Aa. 2,3; Ia IIae, q. 80, a. 1), nothing can be a sufficient concerned, afford an occasion of the other’s downfall, but cause of a man’s spiritual downfall, which is sin, save it is this other one who takes the occasion according to his own will. Wherefore another man’s words or deeds Rom. 7:8: “Sin taking occasion by the commandment can only be an imperfect cause, conducing somewhat to wrought in me all manner of concupiscence.” Wherefore that downfall. For this reason scandal is said to afford this is “passive,” without “active scandal,” since he that not a cause, but an occasion, which is an imperfect, and acts rightly does not, for his own part, afford the occa- not always an accidental cause. Nor is there any reason sion of the other’s downfall. Sometimes therefore it hap- why certain definitions should not make mention of things pens that there is active scandal in the one together with that are accidental, since what is accidental to one, may passive scandal in the other, as when one commits a sin be proper to something else: thus the accidental cause is being induced thereto by another; sometimes there is ac- mentioned in the definition of chance (Phys. ii, 5). tive without passive scandal, for instance when one, by Reply to Objection 4. Another’s words or deed may word or deed, provokes another to sin, and the latter does be the cause of another’s sin in two ways, directly and not consent; and sometimes there is passive without active accidentally. Directly, when a man either intends, by his scandal, as we have already said. evil word or deed, to lead another man into sin, or, if he Reply to Objection 5. “Weakness” denotes proneness does not so intend, when his deed is of such a nature as to scandal; while “offense” signifies resentment against to lead another into sin: for instance, when a man pub- the person who commits a sin, which resentment may be licly commits a sin or does something that has an appear- sometimes without spiritual downfall; and “scandal” is the ance of sin. In this case he that does such an act does, stumbling that results in downfall. properly speaking, afford an occasion of another’s spir- Whether scandal is a sin? IIa IIae q. 43 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that scandal is not a sin. dal is always a sin in the person scandalized; for he is not For sins do not occur from necessity, since all sin is vol- scandalized except in so far as he succumbs to a spiritual untary, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 74, Aa. 1,2). Now it downfall, and that is a sin. is written (Mat. 18:7): “It must needs be that scandals Yet there can be passive scandal, without sin on the come.” Therefore scandal is not a sin. part of the person whose action has occasioned the scan- Objection 2. Further, no sin arises from a sense of dal, as for instance, when a person is scandalized at an- dutifulness, because “a good tree cannot bring forth evil other’s good deed. In like manner active scandal is al- fruit” (Mat. 7:18). But scandal may come from a sense ways a sin in the person who gives scandal, since either of dutifulness, for Our Lord said to Peter (Mat. 16:23): what he does is a sin, or if it only have the appearance of “Thou art a scandal unto Me,” in reference to which words sin, it should always be left undone out of that love for Jerome says that “the Apostle’s error was due to his sense our neighbor which binds each one to be solicitous for his of dutifulness, and such is never inspired by the devil.” neighbor’s spiritual welfare; so that if he persist in doing Therefore scandal is not always a sin. it he acts against charity. Objection 3. Further, scandal denotes a stumbling. Yet there can be active scandal without sin on the part But he that stumbles does not always fall. Therefore scan- of the person scandalized, as stated above (a. 1, ad 4). dal, which is a spiritual fall, can be without sin. Reply to Objection 1. These words, “It must needs On the contrary, Scandal is “something less rightly be that scandals come,” are to be understood to convey, said or done.” Now anything that lacks rectitude is a sin. not the absolute, but the conditional necessity of scandal; Therefore scandal is always with sin. in which sense it is necessary that whatever God foresees I answer that, As already said (a. 1, ad 4), scandal or foretells must happen, provided it be taken conjointly is of two kinds, passive scandal in the person scandalized, with such foreknowledge, as explained in the Ia, q. 14, and active scandal in the person who gives scandal, and so a. 13, ad 3; Ia, q. 23, a. 6, ad 2. occasions a spiritual downfall. Accordingly passive scan- Or we may say that the necessity of scandals occurring 1398 is a necessity of end, because they are useful in order that come, so long as men fail to change their evil mode of “they. . . who are reproved may be made manifest” (1 Cor. living. 11:19). Reply to Objection 2. In that passage scandal de- Or scandals must needs occur, seeing the condition of notes any kind of hindrance: for Peter wished to hinder man who fails to shield himself from sin. Thus a physi- Our Lord’s Passion out of a sense of dutifulness towards cian on seeing a man partaking of unsuitable food might Christ. say that such a man must needs injure his health, which is Reply to Objection 3. No man stumbles spiritually, to be understood on the condition that he does not change without being kept back somewhat from advancing in his diet. In like manner it must needs be that scandals God’s way, and that is at least a venial sin. Whether scandal is a special sin? IIa IIae q. 43 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that scandal is not a in two ways, directly and accidently. The scandal is ac- special sin. For scandal is “something said or done less cidental when it is beside the agent’s intention, as when rightly.” But this applies to every kind of sin. Therefore a man does not intend, by his inordinate deed or word, to every sin is a scandal, and consequently, scandal is not a occasion another’s spiritual downfall, but merely to sat- special sin. isfy his own will. In such a case even active scandal is not Objection 2. Further, every special kind of sin, or a special sin, because a species is not constituted by that every special kind of injustice, may be found separately which is accidental. from other kinds, as stated in Ethic. v, 3,5. But scandal is Active scandal is direct when a man intends, by his in- not to be found separately from other sins. Therefore it is ordinate word or deed, to draw another into sin, and then not a special kind of sin. it becomes a special kind of sin on account of the inten- Objection 3. Further, every special sin is constituted tion of a special kind of end, because moral actions take by something which specifies the moral act. But the no- their species from their end, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 1, tion of scandal consists in its being something done in the a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 18, Aa. 4,6). Hence, just as theft and mur- presence of others: and the fact of a sin being committed der are special kinds of sin, on account of their denoting openly, though it is an aggravating circumstance, does not the intention of doing a special injury to one’s neighbor: seem to constitute the species of a sin. Therefore scandal so too, scandal is a special kind of sin, because thereby is not a special sin. a man intends a special harm to his neighbor, and it is On the contrary, A special virtue has a special sin directly opposed to fraternal correction, whereby a man opposed to it. But scandal is opposed to a special virtue, intends the removal of a special kind of harm. viz. charity. For it is written (Rom. 14:15): “If, because Reply to Objection 1. Any sin may be the matter of of thy meat, thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not now active scandal, but it may derive the formal aspect of a according to charity.” Therefore scandal is a special sin. special sin from the end intended, as stated above. I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), scandal is Reply to Objection 2. Active scandal can be found twofold, active and passive. Passive scandal cannot be separate from other sins, as when a man scandalizes his a special sin, because through another’s word or deed a neighbor by a deed which is not a sin in itself, but has an man may fall into any kind of sin: and the fact that a man appearance of evil. takes occasion to sin from another’s word or deed, does Reply to Objection 3. Scandal does not derive the not constitute a special kind of sin, because it does not species of a special sin from the circumstance in question, imply a special deformity in opposition to a special virtue. but from the intention of the end, as stated above. On the other hand, active scandal may be understood Whether scandal is a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 43 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that scandal is a mortal serves the punishment of eternal damnation, according to sin. For every sin that is contrary to charity is a mortal Mat. 18:6: “He that shall scandalize one of these little sin, as stated above (q. 24, a. 12; q. 35 , a. 3). But scandal ones, that believe in Me, it were better for him that a mill- is contrary to charity, as stated above (Aa. 2,3). Therefore stone should be hanged about his neck, and that he should scandal is a mortal sin. be drowned in the depth of the sea.” For, as Jerome says Objection 2. Further, no sin, save mortal sin, deserves on this passage, “it is much better to receive a brief pun- the punishment of eternal damnation. But scandal de- ishment for a fault, than to await everlasting torments.” 1399 Therefore scandal is a mortal sin. when a person goes so far as to commit a mortal sin Objection 3. Further, every sin committed against through another’s inordinate word or deed. God is a mortal sin, because mortal sin alone turns man Active scandal, if it be accidental, may sometimes be away from God. Now scandal is a sin against God, for a venial sin; for instance, when, through a slight indiscre- the Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:12): “When you wound the tion, a person either commits a venial sin, or does some- weak conscience of the brethren∗, you sin against Christ.” thing that is not a sin in itself, but has some appearance of Therefore scandal is always a mortal sin. evil. On the other hand, it is sometimes a mortal sin, ei- On the contrary, It may be a venial sin to lead a per- ther because a person commits a mortal sin, or because he son into venial sin: and yet this would be to give scandal. has such contempt for his neighbor’s spiritual welfare that Therefore scandal may be a venial sin. he declines, for the sake of procuring it, to forego doing I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), scandal denotes what he wishes to do. But in the case of active direct scan- a stumbling whereby a person is disposed to a spiritual dal, as when a person intends to lead another into sin, if downfall. Consequently passive scandal may sometimes he intends to lead him into mortal sin, his own sin will be be a venial sin, when it consists in a stumbling and noth- mortal; and in like manner if he intends by committing a ing more; for instance, when a person is disturbed by a mortal sin himself, to lead another into venial sin; whereas movement of venial sin occasioned by another’s inordi- if he intends, by committing a venial sin, to lead another nate word or deed: while sometimes it is a mortal sin, into venial sin, there will be a venial sin of scandal. when the stumbling results in a downfall, for instance, And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections. Whether passive scandal may happen even to the perfect? IIa IIae q. 43 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that passive scandal may 1 Cor. 4:16: “Be ye followers of me, as I also am of happen even to the perfect. For Christ was supremely per- Christ.” Wherefore, however much others may appear fect: and yet He said to Peter (Mat. 16:23): “Thou art a to them to conduct themselves ill in word or deed, they scandal to Me.” Much more therefore can other perfect themselves do not stray from their righteousness, accord- men suffer scandal. ing to Ps. 124:1: “They that trust in the Lord shall be as Objection 2. Further, scandal denotes an obstacle Mount Sion: he shall not be moved for ever that dwelleth which is put in a person’s spiritual way. Now even perfect in Jerusalem.” Therefore scandal is not found in those men can be hindered in their progress along the spiritual who adhere to God perfectly by love, according to Ps. way, according to 1 Thess. 2:18: “We would have come 118:165: “Much peace have they that love Thy law, and to you, I Paul indeed, once and again; but Satan hath hin- to them there is no stumbling-block [scandalum].” dered us.” Therefore even perfect men can suffer scandal. Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 2, ad 2), Objection 3. Further, even perfect men are liable to in this passage, scandal is used in a broad sense, to de- venial sins, according to 1 Jn. 1:8: “If we say that we note any kind of hindrance. Hence Our Lord said to Peter: have no sin, we deceive ourselves.” Now passive scan- “Thou art a scandal to Me,” because he was endeavoring dal is not always a mortal sin, but is sometimes venial, to weaken Our Lord’s purpose of undergoing His Passion. as stated above (a. 4). Therefore passive scandal may be Reply to Objection 2. Perfect men may be hindered found in perfect men. in the performance of external actions. But they are not On the contrary, Jerome, in commenting on Mat. hindered by the words or deeds of others, from tending 18:6, “He that shall scandalize one of these little ones,” to God in the internal acts of the will, according to Rom. says: “Observe that it is the little one that is scandalized, 8:38,39: “Neither death, nor life. . . shall be able to sepa- for the elders do not take scandal.” rate us from the love of God.” I answer that, Passive scandal implies that the mind Reply to Objection 3. Perfect men sometimes fall of the person who takes scandal is unsettled in its adher- into venial sins through the weakness of the flesh; but they ence to good. Now no man can be unsettled, who adheres are not scandalized (taking scandal in its true sense), by firmly to something immovable. The elders, i.e. the per- the words or deeds of others, although there can be an ap- fect, adhere to God alone, Whose goodness is unchange- proach to scandal in them, according to Ps. 72:2: “My able, for though they adhere to their superiors, they do feet were almost moved.” so only in so far as these adhere to Christ, according to ∗ Vulg.: ‘When you sin thus against the brethren and wound their weak conscience’ 1400 Whether active scandal can be found in the perfect? IIa IIae q. 43 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that active scandal can all things be done decently and according to order”; and be found in the perfect. For passion is the effect of ac- they are careful to do this in those matters chiefly wherein tion. Now some are scandalized passively by the words or not only would they do wrong, but would also be to oth- deeds of the perfect, according to Mat. 15:12: “Dost thou ers an occasion of wrongdoing. And if indeed they fail know that the Pharisees, when they heard this word, were in this moderation in such words or deeds as come to the scandalized?” Therefore active scandal can be found in knowledge of others, this has its origin in human weak- the perfect. ness wherein they fall short of perfection. Yet they do not Objection 2. Further, Peter, after receiving the Holy fall short so far as to stray far from the order of reason, but Ghost, was in the state of the perfect. Yet afterwards he only a little and in some slight matter: and this is not so scandalized the gentiles: for it is written (Gal. 2:14): grave that anyone can reasonably take therefrom an occa- “When I saw that they walked not uprightly unto the truth sion for committing sin. of the Gospel, I said to Cephas,” i.e. Peter, “before them Reply to Objection 1. Passive scandal is always due all: If thou being a Jew, livest after the manner of the gen- to some active scandal; yet this active scandal is not al- tiles, and not as the Jews do, how dost thou compel the ways in another, but in the very person who is scandalized, gentiles to live as do the Jews?” Therefore active scandal because, to wit, he scandalizes himself. can be in the perfect. Reply to Objection 2. In the opinion of Augustine Objection 3. Further, active scandal is sometimes a (Ep. xxviii, xl, lxxxii) and of Paul also, Peter sinned and venial sin. But venial sins may be in perfect men. There- was to be blamed, in withdrawing from the gentiles in or- fore active scandal may be in perfect men. der to avoid the scandal of the Jews, because he did this On the contrary, Active scandal is more opposed to somewhat imprudently, so that the gentiles who had been perfection, than passive scandal. But passive scandal can- converted to the faith were scandalized. Nevertheless Pe- not be in the perfect. Much less, therefore, can active ter’s action was not so grave a sin as to give others suffi- scandal be in them. cient ground for scandal. Hence they were guilty of pas- I answer that, Active scandal, properly so called, oc- sive scandal, while there was no active scandal in Peter. curs when a man says or does a thing which in itself is Reply to Objection 3. The venial sins of the perfect of a nature to occasion another’s spiritual downfall, and consist chiefly in sudden movements, which being hidden that is only when what he says or does is inordinate. Now cannot give scandal. If, however, they commit any venial it belongs to the perfect to direct all their actions accord- sins even in their external words or deeds, these are so ing to the rule of reason, as stated in 1 Cor. 14:40: “Let slight as to be insufficient in themselves to give scandal. Whether spiritual goods should be foregone on account of scandal? IIa IIae q. 43 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that spiritual goods ought scandal. to be foregone on account of scandal. For Augustine Objection 4. Further, Jerome∗ says that in order to (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2) teaches that “punishment for avoid scandal we should forego whatever it is possible to sin should cease, when the peril of schism is feared.” But omit without prejudice to the threefold truth, i.e. “the truth punishment of sins is a spiritual good, since it is an act of life, of justice and of doctrine.” Now the observance of of justice. Therefore a spiritual good is to be foregone on the counsels, and the bestowal of alms may often be omit- account of scandal. ted without prejudice to the aforesaid threefold truth, else Objection 2. Further, the Sacred Doctrine is a most whoever omitted them would always be guilty of sin, and spiritual thing. Yet one ought to desist therefrom on ac- yet such things are the greatest of spiritual works. There- count of scandal, according to Mat. 7:6: “Give not that fore spiritual works should be omitted on account of scan- which is holy to dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before dal. swine lest. . . turning upon you, they tear you.” Therefore Objection 5. Further, the avoidance of any sin is a a spiritual good should be foregone on account of scandal. spiritual good, since any sin brings spiritual harm to the Objection 3. Further, since fraternal correction is an sinner. Now it seems that one ought sometimes to commit act of charity, it is a spiritual good. Yet sometimes it is a venial sin in order to avoid scandalizing one’s neighbor, omitted out of charity, in order to avoid giving scandal to for instance, when by sinning venially, one would pre- others, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei i, 9). There- vent someone else from committing a mortal sin: because fore a spiritual good should be foregone on account of one is bound to hinder the damnation of one’s neighbor ∗ Hugh de S. Cher., In Matth. xviii; in Luc. xvii, 2 1401 as much as one can without prejudice to one’s own salva-pronounce excommunication. tion, which is not precluded by a venial sin. Therefore one Reply to Objection 2. With regard to a man’s doctrine ought to forego a spiritual good in order to avoid scandal. two points must be considered, namely, the truth which is On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. Super Ezech. taught, and the act of teaching. The first of these is neces- vii): “If people are scandalized at the truth, it is better sary for salvation, to wit, that he whose duty it is to teach to allow the birth of scandal, than to abandon the truth.” should no’ teach what is contrary to the truth, and that Now spiritual goods belong, above all others, to the truth. he should teach the truth according to the requirements of Therefore spiritual goods are not to be foregone on ac- times and persons: wherefore on no account ought he to count of scandal. suppress the truth and teach error in order to avoid any I answer that, Whereas scandal is twofold, active and scandal that might ensue. But the act itself of teaching passive, the present question does not apply to active scan- is one of the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above (q. 32, dal, for since active scandal is “something said or done a. 2), and so the same is to be said of it as of the other less rightly,” nothing ought to be done that implies active works of mercy, of which we shall speak further on (ad scandal. The question does, however, apply to passive 4). scandal, and accordingly we have to see what ought to be Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 33, a. 1), foregone in order to avoid scandal. Now a distinction must fraternal correction aims at the correction of a brother, be made in spiritual goods. For some of them are neces- wherefore it is to be reckoned among spiritual goods in sary for salvation, and cannot be foregone without mortal so far as this end can be obtained, which is not the case if sin: and it is evident that no man ought to commit a mor- the brother be scandalized through being corrected. And tal sin, in order to prevent another from sinning, because so, if the correction be omitted in order to avoid scandal, according to the order of charity, a man ought to love his no spiritual good is foregone. own spiritual welfare more than another’s. Therefore one Reply to Objection 4. The truth of life, of doctrine, ought not to forego that which is necessary for salvation, and of justice comprises not only whatever is necessary in order to avoid giving scandal. for salvation, but also whatever is a means of obtaining Again a distinction seems necessary among spiritual salvation more perfectly, according to 1 Cor. 12:31: “Be things which are not necessary for salvation: because the zealous for the better gifts.” Wherefore neither the coun- scandal which arises from such things sometimes pro- sels nor even the works of mercy are to be altogether omit- ceeds from malice, for instance when a man wishes to hin- ted in order to avoid scandal; but sometimes they should der those spiritual goods by stirring up scandal. This is the be concealed or deferred, on account of the scandal of the “scandal of the Pharisees,” who were scandalized at Our little ones, as stated above. Sometimes, however, the ob- Lord’s teaching: and Our Lord teaches (Mat. 15:14) that servance of the counsels and the fulfilment of the works of we ought to treat such like scandal with contempt. Some- mercy are necessary for salvation. This may be seen in the times scandal proceeds from weakness or ignorance, and case of those who have vowed to keep the counsels, and such is the “scandal of little ones.” In order to avoid this of those whose duty it is to relieve the wants of others, ei- kind of scandal, spiritual goods ought to be either con- ther in temporal matters (as by feeding the hungry), or in cealed, or sometimes even deferred (if this can be done spiritual matters (as by instructing the ignorant), whether without incurring immediate danger), until the matter be- such duties arise from their being enjoined as in the case ing explained the scandal cease. If, however, the scan- of prelates, or from the need on the part of the person in dal continue after the matter has been explained, it would want; and then the same applies to these things as to others seem to be due to malice, and then it would no longer be that are necessary for salvation. right to forego that spiritual good in order to avoid such Reply to Objection 5. Some have said that one ought like scandal. to commit a venial sin in order to avoid scandal. But this Reply to Objection 1. In the infliction of punishment implies a contradiction, since if it ought to be done, it is no it is not the punishment itself that is the end in view, but longer evil or sinful, for a sin cannot be a matter of choice. its medicinal properties in checking sin; wherefore pun- It may happen however that, on account of some circum- ishment partakes of the nature of justice, in so far as it stance, something is not a venial sin, though it would be checks sin. But if it is evident that the infliction of pun- were it not for that circumstance: thus an idle word is a ishment will result in more numerous and more grievous venial sin, when it is uttered uselessly; yet if it be uttered sins being committed, the infliction of punishment will no for a reasonable cause, it is neither idle nor sinful. And longer be a part of justice. It is in this sense that Augus- though venial sin does not deprive a man of grace which tine is speaking, when, to wit, the excommunication of a is his means of salvation, yet, in so far as it disposes him few threatens to bring about the danger of a schism, for to mortal sin, it tends to the loss of salvation. in that case it would be contrary to the truth of justice to 1402 Whether temporal goods should be foregone on account of scandal? IIa IIae q. 43 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that temporal goods wherefore, even as other things that are necessary for sal- should be foregone on account of scandal. For we ought vation, they are not to be foregone on account of scandal. to love our neighbor’s spiritual welfare which is hindered On the other hand, as regards those temporalities of which by scandal, more than any temporal goods whatever. But we have the dominion, sometimes, on account of scandal, we forego what we love less for the sake of what we love we are bound to forego them, and sometimes we are not more. Therefore we should forego temporal goods in or- so bound, whether we forego them by giving them up, if der to avoid scandalizing our neighbor. we have them in our possession, or by omitting to claim Objection 2. Further, according to Jerome’s rule∗, them, if they are in the possession of others. For if the whatever can be foregone without prejudice to the three- scandal arise therefrom through the ignorance or weak- fold truth, should be omitted in order to avoid scandal. ness of others (in which case, as stated above, a. 7, it Now temporal goods can be foregone without prejudice is scandal of the little ones) we must either forego such to the threefold truth. Therefore they should be foregone temporalities altogether, or the scandal must be abated by in order to avoid scandal. some other means, namely, by some kind of admonition. Objection 3. Further, no temporal good is more nec- Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20): essary than food. But we ought to forego taking food on “Thou shouldst give so as to injure neither thyself nor an- account of scandal, according to Rom. 14:15: “Destroy other, as much as thou canst lend, and if thou refusest not him with thy meat for whom Christ died.” Much more what is asked, thou must yet be just to him, indeed thou therefore should all other temporal goods be foregone on wilt give him something better than he asks, if thou re- account of scandal. prove him that asks unjustly.” Sometimes, however, scan- Objection 4. Further, the most fitting way of safe- dal arises from malice. This is scandal of the Pharisees: guarding and recovering temporal goods is the court of and we ought not to forego temporal goods for the sake justice. But it is unlawful to have recourse to justice, es- of those who stir up scandals of this kind, for this would pecially if scandal ensues: for it is written (Mat. 5:40): both be harmful to the common good, since it would give “If a man will contend with thee in judgment, and take wicked men an opportunity of plunder, and would be inju- away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him”; and (1 rious to the plunderers themselves, who would remain in Cor. 6:7): “Already indeed there is plainly a fault among sin as long as they were in possession of another’s prop- you, that you have lawsuits one with another. Why do you erty. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 13): “Sometimes not rather take wrong? why do you not rather suffer your- we ought to suffer those who rob us of our temporalities, selves to be defrauded?” Therefore it seems that we ought while sometimes we should resist them, as far as equity to forego temporal goods on account of scandal. allows, in the hope not only that we may safeguard our Objection 5. Further, we ought, seemingly, to forego property, but also lest those who take what is not theirs least of all those temporal goods which are connected with may lose themselves.” spiritual goods: and yet we ought to forego them on ac- This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. count of scandal. For the Apostle while sowing spiritual Reply to Objection 2. If it were permissible for things did not accept a temporal stipend lest he “should wicked men to rob other people of their property, this give any hindrance to the Gospel of Christ” as we read 1 would tend to the detriment of the truth of life and jus- Cor. 9:12. For a like reason the Church does not demand tice. Therefore we are not always bound to forego our tithes in certain countries, in order to avoid scandal. Much temporal goods in order to avoid scandal. more, therefore, ought we to forego other temporal goods Reply to Objection 3. The Apostle had no intention in order to avoid scandal. of counselling total abstinence from food on account of On the contrary, Blessed Thomas of Canterbury de- scandal, because our welfare requires that we should take manded the restitution of Church property, notwithstand- food: but he intended to counsel abstinence from a partic- ing that the king took scandal from his doing so. ular kind of food, in order to avoid scandal, according to 1 I answer that, A distinction must be made in tempo- Cor. 8:13: “I will never eat flesh, lest I should scandalize ral goods: for either they are ours, or they are consigned my brother.” to us to take care of them for someone else; thus the goods Reply to Objection 4. According to Augustine (De of the Church are consigned to prelates, and the goods of Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19) this precept of Our Lord is the community are entrusted to all such persons as have to be understood of the preparedness of the mind, namely, authority over the common weal. In this latter case the that man should be prepared, if it be expedient, to suffer care of such things (as of things held in deposit) devolves being harmed or defrauded, rather than go to law. But of necessity on those persons to whom they are entrusted, sometimes it is not expedient, as stated above (ad 2). The ∗ Cf. a. 7, obj. 4 1403 same applies to the saying of the Apostle. it for the time being, so that they might be taught first of Reply to Objection 5. The scandal which the Apostle all that such a payment was a duty. For a like reason the avoided, arose from an error of the gentiles who were not Church refrains from demanding tithes in those countries used to this payment. Hence it behooved him to forego where it is not customary to pay them. 1404 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 44 Of the Precepts of Charity (In Eight Articles) We must now consider the Precepts of Charity, under which there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether precepts should be given about charity? (2) Whether there should be one or two? (3) Whether two suffice? (4) Whether it is fittingly prescribed that we should love God, “with thy whole heart”? (5) Whether it is fittingly added: “With thy whole mind,” etc.? (6) Whether it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life? (7) Of the precept: “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself”; (8) Whether the order of charity is included in the precept? Whether any precept should be given about charity? IIa IIae q. 44 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that no precept should be der to heal. Now the end of the spiritual life is that man given about charity. For charity imposes the mode on all be united to God, and this union is effected by charity, acts of virtue, since it is the form of the virtues as stated while all things pertaining to the spiritual life are ordained above (q. 23, a. 8), while the precepts are about the virtues to this union, as to their end. Hence the Apostle says themselves. Now, according to the common saying, the (1 Tim. 1:5): “The end of the commandment is charity mode is not included in the precept. Therefore no pre- from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an un- cepts should be given about charity. feigned faith.” For all the virtues, about whose acts the Objection 2. Further, charity, which “is poured forth precepts are given, are directed either to the freeing of the in our hearts by the Holy Ghost” (Rom. 5:5), makes us heart from the whirl of the passions—such are the virtues free, since “where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is lib- that regulate the passions—or at least to the possession erty” (2 Cor. 3:17). Now the obligation that arises from a of a good conscience—such are the virtues that regulate precept is opposed to liberty, since it imposes a necessity. operations—or to the having of a right faith—such are Therefore no precept should be given about charity. those which pertain to the worship of God: and these three Objection 3. Further, charity is the foremost among things are required of man that he may love God. For an all the virtues, to which the precepts are directed, as impure heart is withdrawn from loving God, on account shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 90, a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 9). of the passion that inclines it to earthly things; an evil If, therefore, any precepts were given about charity, they conscience gives man a horror for God’s justice, through should have a place among the chief precepts which are fear of His punishments; and an untrue faith draws man’s those of the decalogue. But they have no place there. affections to an untrue representation of God, and sepa- Therefore no precepts should be given about charity. rates him from the truth of God. Now in every genus that On the contrary, Whatever God requires of us is in- which is for its own sake takes precedence of that which cluded in a precept. Now God requires that man should is for the sake of another, wherefore the greatest precept love Him, according to Dt. 10:12. Therefore it behooved is that of charity, as stated in Mat. 22:39. precepts to be given about the love of charity, which is the Reply to Objection 1. As stated above ( Ia IIae, love of God. q. 100, a. 10) when we were treating of the command- I answer that, As stated above (q. 16, a. 1; Ia IIae, ments, the mode of love does not come under those pre- q. 99, a. 1), a precept implies the notion of something cepts which are about the other acts of virtue: for instance, due. Hence a thing is a matter of precept, in so far as this precept, “Honor thy father and thy mother,” does not it is something due. Now a thing is due in two ways, prescribe that this should be done out of charity. The act for its own sake, and for the sake of something else. In of love does, however, fall under special precepts. every affair, it is the end that is due for its own sake, Reply to Objection 2. The obligation of a precept because it has the character of a good for its own sake: is not opposed to liberty, except in one whose mind is while that which is directed to the end is due for the sake averted from that which is prescribed, as may be seen in of something else: thus for a physician, it is due for its those who keep the precepts through fear alone. But the own sake, that he should heal, while it is due for the sake precept of love cannot be fulfilled save of one’s own will, of something else that he should give a medicine in or- wherefore it is not opposed to charity. 1405 Reply to Objection 3. All the precepts of the deca-merated among the precepts of the decalogue, since they logue are directed to the love of God and of our neighbor: are included in all of them. and therefore the precepts of charity had not to be enu- Whether there should have been given two precepts of charity? IIa IIae q. 44 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that there should not have to speculative sciences, for in these latter, the conclusions been given two precepts of charity. For the precepts of the are virtually contained in the first principles. Hence who- Law are directed to virtue, as stated above (a. 1, obj. 3). ever knows the principles as to their entire virtual extent Now charity is one virtue, as shown above (q. 33, a. 5). has no need to have the conclusions put separately before Therefore only one precept of charity should have been him. Since, however, some who know the principles are given. unable to consider all that is virtually contained therein, Objection 2. Further, as Augustine says (De Doctr. it is necessary, for their sake, that scientific conclusions Christ. i, 22,27), charity loves none but God in our neigh- should be traced to their principles. Now in practical mat- bor. Now we are sufficiently directed to love God by the ters wherein the precepts of the Law direct us, the end has precept, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God.” Therefore the character of principle, as stated above (q. 23, a. 7, ad 2; there was no need to add the precept about loving our q. 26, a. 1, ad 1): and the love of God is the end to which neighbor. the love of our neighbor is directed. Therefore it behooved Objection 3. Further, different sins are opposed to dif- us to receive precepts not only of the love of God but also ferent precepts. But it is not a sin to put aside the love of of the love of our neighbor, on account of those who are our neighbor, provided we put not aside the love of God; less intelligent, who do not easily understand that one of indeed, it is written (Lk. 15:26): “If any man come to these precepts is included in the other. Me, and hate not his father, and mother. . . he cannot be Reply to Objection 1. Although charity is one virtue, My disciple.” Therefore the precept of the love of God is yet it has two acts, one of which is directed to the other not distinct from the precept of the love of our neighbor. as to its end. Now precepts are given about acts of virtue, Objection 4. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 13:8): and so there had to be several precepts of charity. “He that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the Law.” But Reply to Objection 2. God is loved in our neighbor, a law is not fulfilled unless all its precepts be observed. as the end is loved in that which is directed to the end; and Therefore all the precepts are included in the love of our yet there was need for an explicit precept about both, for neighbor: and consequently the one precept of the love of the reason given above. our neighbor suffices. Therefore there should not be two Reply to Objection 3. The means derive their good- precepts of charity. ness from their relation to the end, and accordingly aver- On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:21): “This com- sion from the means derives its malice from the same mandment we have from God, that he who loveth God, source and from no other love also his brother.” Reply to Objection 4. Love of our neighbor includes I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 91, a. 3; Ia love of God, as the end is included in the means, and vice IIae, q. 94, a. 2) when we were treating of the command- versa: and yet it behooved each precept to be given ex- ments, the precepts are to the Law what propositions are plicitly, for the reason given above. Whether two precepts of charity suffice? IIa IIae q. 44 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that two precepts of char- Objection 3. Further, virtue consists not only in do- ity do not suffice. For precepts are given about acts of ing good but also in avoiding evil. Now we are led by the virtue. Now acts are distinguished by their objects. Since, positive precepts to do good, and by the negative precepts then, man is bound to love four things out of charity, to avoid evil. Therefore there ought to have been not only namely, God, himself, his neighbor and his own body, as positive, but also negative precepts about charity; and so shown above (q. 25, a. 12; q. 26), it seems that there ought two precepts of charity are not sufficient. to be four precepts of charity, so that two are not sufficient. On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 22:40): “On Objection 2. Further, love is not the only act of char- these two commandments dependeth the whole Law and ity, but also joy, peace and beneficence. But precepts the prophets.” should be given about the acts of the virtues. Therefore I answer that, Charity, as stated above (q. 23, a. 1), two precepts of charity do not suffice. is a kind of friendship. Now friendship is between one 1406 person and another, wherefore Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. of love virtually include the precepts about the other acts. xvii): “Charity is not possible between less than two”: And yet we find that, for the sake of the laggards, spe- and it has been explained how one may love oneself out cial precepts were given about each act—about joy (Phil. of charity (q. 25, a. 4). Now since good is the object of 4:4): “Rejoice in the Lord always”—about peace (Heb. dilection and love, and since good is either an end or a 12:14): “Follow peace with all men”—about beneficence means, it is fitting that there should be two precepts of (Gal. 6:10): “Whilst we have time, let us work good to charity, one whereby we are induced to love God as our all men”—and Holy Writ contains precepts about each of end, and another whereby we are led to love our neighbor the parts of beneficence, as may be seen by anyone who for God’s sake, as for the sake of our end considers the matter carefully. Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Doctr. Reply to Objection 3. To do good is more than to Christ. i, 23), “though four things are to be loved out of avoid evil, and therefore the positive precepts virtually in- charity, there was no need of a precept as regards the sec- clude the negative precepts. Nevertheless we find explicit ond and fourth,” i.e. love of oneself and of one’s own precepts against the vices contrary to charity: for, against body. “For however much a man may stray from the truth, hatred it is written (Lev. 12:17): “Thou shalt not hate thy the love of himself and of his own body always remains in brother in thy heart”; against sloth (Ecclus. 6:26): “Be not him.” And yet the mode of this love had to be prescribed grieved with her bands”; against envy (Gal. 5:26): “Let to man, namely, that he should love himself and his own us not be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one an- body in an ordinate manner, and this is done by his loving other, envying one another”; against discord (1 Cor. 1:10): God and his neighbor. “That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 28, a. 4; schisms among you”; and against scandal (Rom. 14:13): q. 29, a. 3), the other acts of charity result from the act “That you put not a stumbling-block or a scandal in your of love as effects from their cause. Hence the precepts brother’s way.” Whether it is fittingly commanded that man should love God with his whole heart? IIa IIae q. 44 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that it is unfittingly com- is adapted to that matter. But God is to be loved as the last manded that man should love God with his whole heart. end, to which all things are to be referred. Therefore some For the mode of a virtuous act is not a matter of precept, kind of totality was to be indicated in connection with the as shown above (a. 1, ad 1; Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 9). Now the precept of the love of God. words “with thy whole heart” signify the mode of the love Reply to Objection 1. The commandment that pre- of God. Therefore it is unfittingly commanded that man scribes an act of virtue does not prescribe the mode which should love God with his whole heart. that virtue derives from another and higher virtue, but it Objection 2. Further, “A thing is whole and perfect does prescribe the mode which belongs to its own proper when it lacks nothing” (Phys. iii, 6). If therefore it is a virtue, and this mode is signified in the words “with thy matter of precept that God be loved with the whole heart, whole heart.” whoever does something not pertaining to the love of God, Reply to Objection 2. To love God with one’s whole acts counter to the precept, and consequently sins mor- heart has a twofold signification. First, actually, so that tally. Now a venial sin does not pertain to the love of God. a man’s whole heart be always actually directed to God: Therefore a venial sin is a mortal sin, which is absurd. this is the perfection of heaven. Secondly, in the sense that Objection 3. Further, to love God with one’s a man’s whole heart be habitually directed to God, so that whole heart belongs to perfection, since according to the it consent to nothing contrary to the love of God, and this Philosopher (Phys. iii, text. 64), “to be whole is to be per- is the perfection of the way. Venial sin is not contrary to fect.” But that which belongs to perfection is not a matter this latter perfection, because it does not destroy the habit of precept, but a matter of counsel. Therefore we ought of charity, since it does not tend to a contrary object, but not to be commanded to love God with our whole heart. merely hinders the use of charity. On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): “Thou shalt Reply to Objection 3. That perfection of charity to love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart.” which the counsels are directed, is between the two per- I answer that, Since precepts are given about acts of fections mentioned in the preceding reply: and it consists virtue, an act is a matter of precept according as it is an in man renouncing, as much as possible, temporal things, act of virtue. Now it is requisite for an act of virtue that even such as are lawful, because they occupy the mind not only should it fall on its own matter, but also that it and hinder the actual movement of the heart towards God. should be endued with its due circumstances, whereby it 1407 Whether to the words, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart,” it IIa IIae q. 44 a. 5 was fitting to add “and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength”? Objection 1. It would seem that it was unfitting to fact that one of them is omitted here or there is due to one the words, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with thy implying another. We must therefore observe that love is whole heart,” to add, “and with thy whole soul, and with an act of the will which is here denoted by the “heart,” thy whole strength” (Dt. 6:5). For heart does not mean because just as the bodily heart is the principle of all the here a part of the body, since to love God is not a bodily movements of the body, so too the will, especially as re- action: and therefore heart is to be taken here in a spiritual gards the intention of the last end which is the object of sense. Now the heart understood spiritually is either the charity, is the principle of all the movements of the soul. soul itself or part of the soul. Therefore it is superfluous Now there are three principles of action that are moved by to mention both heart and soul. the will, namely, the intellect which is signified by “the Objection 2. Further, a man’s strength whether spiri- mind,” the lower appetitive power, signified by “the soul”; tual or corporal depends on the heart. Therefore after the and the exterior executive power signified by “strength,” words, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole “force” or “might.” Accordingly we are commanded to heart,” it was unnecessary to add, “with all thy strength.” direct our whole intention to God, and this is signified Objection 3. Further, in Mat. 22:37 we read: “With by the words “with thy whole heart”; to submit our intel- all thy mind,” which words do not occur here. Therefore lect to God, and this is expressed in the words “with thy it seems that this precept is unfittingly worded in Dt. 6. whole mind”; to regulate our appetite according to God, in On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture. the words “with thy whole soul”; and to obey God in our I answer that, This precept is differently worded in external actions, and this is to love God with our whole various places: for, as we said in the first objection, in Dt. “strength,” “force” or “might.” 6 three points are mentioned: “with thy whole heart,” and Chrysostom†, on the other hand, takes “heart” and “with thy whole soul,” and “with thy whole strength.” In “soul” in the contrary sense; and Augustine (De Doctr. Mat. 22 we find two of these mentioned, viz. “with thy Christ. i, 22) refers “heart” to the thought, “soul” to the whole heart” and “with thy whole soul,” while “with thy manner of life, and “mind” to the intellect. Again some whole strength” is omitted, but “with thy whole mind” explain “with thy whole heart” as denoting the intellect, is added. Yet in Mark 12 we find all four, viz. “with “with thy whole soul” as signifying the will, “with thy thy whole heart,” and “with thy whole soul,” and “with mind” as pointing to the memory. And again, according thy whole mind,” and “with thy whole force” which is the to Gregory of Nyssa (De Hom. Opif. viii), “heart” signi- same as “strength.” Moreover, these four are indicated in fies the vegetative soul, “soul” the sensitive, and “mind” Luke 10, where in place of “strength” or “force” we read the intellective soul, because our nourishment, sensation, “with all thy might.”∗ and understanding ought all to be referred by us to God. Accordingly these four have to be explained, since the This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. Whether it is possible in this life to fulfil this precept of the love of God? IIa IIae q. 44 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that in this life it is possisin, and this is against the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. ble to fulfil this precept of the love of God. For according 1:8): ”(Who also) will confirm you unto the end without to Jerome‡ “accursed is he who says that Cod has com- crime,” and (1 Tim. 3:10): “Let them minister, having no manded anything impossible.” But God gave this com- crime.” mandment, as is clear from Dt. 6:5. Therefore it is possi- Objection 3. Further, precepts are given in order to ble to fulfil this precept in this life. direct man in the way of salvation, according to Ps. 18:9: Objection 2. Further, whoever does not fulfil a pre- “The commandment of the Lord is lightsome, enlighten- cept sins mortally, since according to Ambrose (De Parad. ing the eyes.” Now it is useless to direct anyone to what viii) sin is nothing else than “a transgression of the Divine is impossible. Therefore it is not impossible to fulfill this Law, and disobedience of the heavenly commandments.” precept in this life. If therefore this precept cannot be fulfilled by wayfarers, On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. it follows that in this life no man can be without mortal viii): “In the fulness of heavenly charity this precept will ∗ St. Thomas is explaining the Latin text which reads “ex tota fortitu-dine tua” (Dt.), “ex tota virtue tua” (Mk.), and “ex omnibus tuis” (Lk.), although the Greek in all three cases has ex holes tes ischyos, which the Douay renders “with thy whole strength.” † The quotation is from an anonymous author’s unfinished work (Opus imperf. Hom. xlii, in Matth.) which is included in Chrysostom’s works ‡ Pelagius, Ex- posit. Cath. Fid. 1408 be fulfilled: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God,” etc. For fully and perfectly in heaven; yet it is fulfilled, though im-as long as any carnal concupiscence remains, that can be perfectly, on the way. Nevertheless on the way one man restrained by continence, man cannot love God with all will fulfil it more perfectly than another, and so much the his heart. more, as he approaches by some kind of likeness to the I answer that, A precept can be fulfilled in two ways; perfection of heaven. perfectly, and imperfectly. A precept is fulfilled perfectly, Reply to Objection 1. This argument proves that the when the end intended by the author of the precept is precept can be fulfilled after a fashion on the way, but not reached; yet it is fulfilled, imperfectly however, when al- perfectly. though the end intended by its author is not reached, nev- Reply to Objection 2. Even as the soldier who fights ertheless the order to that end is not departed from. Thus legitimately without conquering is not blamed nor de- if the commander of an army order his soldiers to fight, his serves to be punished for this, so too he that does not fulfil command will be perfectly obeyed by those who fight and this precept on the way, but does nothing against the love conquer the foe, which is the commander’s intention; yet of God, does not sin mortally. it is fulfilled, albeit imperfectly, by those who fight with- Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Perfect. out gaining the victory, provided they do nothing contrary Justit. viii), “why should not this perfection be prescribed to military discipline. Now God intends by this precept to man, although no man attains it in this life? For one that man should be entirely united to Him, and this will be cannot run straight unless one knows whither to run. And realized in heaven, when God will be “all in all,” accord- how would one know this if no precept pointed it out.” ing to 1 Cor. 15:28. Hence this precept will be observed Whether the precept of love of our neighbor is fittingly expressed? IIa IIae q. 44 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the precept of the to the natural image of God, and as to the capacity for love of our neighbor is unfittingly expressed. For the love glory. Nor does it matter whether we say “neighbor,” or of charity extends to all men, even to our enemies, as may “brother” according to 1 Jn. 4:21, or “friend,” according be seen in Mat. 5:44. But the word “neighbor” denotes a to Lev. 19:18, because all these words express the same kind of “nighness” which does not seem to exist towards affinity. all men. Therefore it seems that this precept is unfittingly The mode of love is indicated in the words “as thy- expressed. self.” This does not mean that a man must love his neigh- Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher bor equally as himself, but in like manner as himself, and (Ethic. ix, 8) “the origin of our friendly relations with this in three ways. First, as regards the end, namely, that others lies in our relation to ourselves,” whence it seems he should love his neighbor for God’s sake, even as he to follow that love of self is the origin of one’s love for loves himself for God’s sake, so that his love for his neigh- one’s neighbor. Now the principle is greater than that bor is a “holy” love. Secondly, as regards the rule of love, which results from it. Therefore man ought not to love namely, that a man should not give way to his neighbor his neighbor as himself. in evil, but only in good things, even as he ought to grat- Objection 3. Further, man loves himself, but not his ify his will in good things alone, so that his love for his neighbor, naturally. Therefore it is unfitting that he should neighbor may be a “righteous” love. Thirdly, as regards be commanded to love his neighbor as himself. the reason for loving, namely, that a man should love his On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 22:39): “The sec- neighbor, not for his own profit, or pleasure, but in the ond” commandment “is like to this: Thou shalt love thy sense of wishing his neighbor well, even as he wishes neighbor as thyself.” himself well, so that his love for his neighbor may be a I answer that, This precept is fittingly expressed, “true” love: since when a man loves his neighbor for his for it indicates both the reason for loving and the mode own profit or pleasure, he does not love his neighbor truly, of love. The reason for loving is indicated in the word but loves himself. “neighbor,” because the reason why we ought to love oth- This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. ers out of charity is because they are nigh to us, both as 1409 Whether the order of charity is included in the precept? IIa IIae q. 44 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that the order of charity (q. 25, a. 12; q. 26, Aa. 1,2). It is therefore evident that is not included in the precept. For whoever transgresses a the order of charity must come under the precept. precept does a wrong. But if man loves some one as much Reply to Objection 1. A man gratifies more the per- as he ought, and loves any other man more, he wrongs no son he loves more, so that if he loved less one whom he man. Therefore he does not transgress the precept. There- ought to love more, he would wish to gratify more one fore the order of charity is not included in the precept. whom he ought to gratify less, and so he would do an in- Objection 2. Further, whatever is a matter of precept justice to the one he ought to love more. is sufficiently delivered to us in Holy Writ. Now the or- Reply to Objection 2. The order of those four things der of charity which was given above (q. 26) is nowhere we have to love out of charity is expressed in Holy Writ. indicated in Holy Writ. Therefore it is not included in the For when we are commanded to love God with our “whole precept. heart,” we are given to understand that we must love Him Objection 3. Further, order implies some kind of dis- above all things. When we are commanded to love our tinction. But the love of our neighbor is prescribed with- neighbor “as ourselves,” the love of self is set before love out any distinction, in the words, “Thou shalt love thy of our neighbor. In like manner where we are commanded neighbor as thyself.” Therefore the order of charity is not (1 Jn. 3:16) “to lay down our souls,” i.e. the life of our included in the precept. bodies, “for the brethren,” we are given to understand that On the contrary, Whatever God works in us by His a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body; grace, He teaches us first of all by His Law, according to and again when we are commanded (Gal. 6:10) to “work Jer. 31:33: “I will give My Law in their heart∗.” Now good. . . especially to those who are of the household of God causes in us the order of charity, according to Cant the faith,” and when a man is blamed (1 Tim. 5:8) if he 2:4: “He set in order charity in me.” Therefore the order “have not care of his own, and especially of those of his of charity comes under the precept of the Law. house,” it means that we ought to love most those of our I answer that, As stated above (a. 4, ad 1), the mode neighbors who are more virtuous or more closely united which is essential to an act of virtue comes under the pre- to us. cept which prescribes that virtuous act. Now the order of Reply to Objection 3. It follows from the very words, charity is essential to the virtue, since it is based on the “Thou shalt love thy neighbor” that those who are nearer proportion of love to the thing beloved, as shown above to us are to be loved more. ∗ Vulg.: ‘in their bowels, and I will write it in their heart’ 1410 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 45 Of the Gift of Wisdom (In Six Articles) We must now consider the gift of wisdom which corresponds to charity; and firstly, wisdom itself, secondly, the opposite vice. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost? (2) What is its subject? (3) Whether wisdom is only speculative or also practical? (4) Whether the wisdom that is a gift is compatible with mortal sin? (5) Whether it is in all those who have sanctifying grace? (6) Which beatitude corresponds to it? Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost? IIa IIae q. 45 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that wisdom ought not to may be understood in two ways, either simply or in some be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. For the particular genus. Accordingly he that knows the highest gifts are more perfect than the virtues, as stated above ( Ia cause in any particular genus, and by its means is able to IIae, q. 68, a. 8). Now virtue is directed to the good alone, judge and set in order all the things that belong to that wherefore Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that “no genus, is said to be wise in that genus, for instance in man makes bad use of the virtues.” Much more therefore medicine or architecture, according to 1 Cor. 3:10: “As are the gifts of the Holy Ghost directed to the good alone. a wise architect, I have laid a foundation.” On the other But wisdom is directed to evil also, for it is written (James hand, he who knows the cause that is simply the highest, 3:15) that a certain wisdom is “earthly, sensual, devilish.” which is God, is said to be wise simply, because he is able Therefore wisdom should not be reckoned among the gifts to judge and set in order all things according to Divine of the Holy Ghost. rules. Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine (De Now man obtains this judgment through the Holy Trin. xii, 14) “wisdom is the knowledge of Divine things.” Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 2:15: “The spiritual man jud- Now that knowledge of Divine things which man can geth all things,” because as stated in the same chapter (1 acquire by his natural endowments, belongs to the wis- Cor. 2:10), “the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep dom which is an intellectual virtue, while the supernatu- things of God.” Wherefore it is evident that wisdom is a ral knowledge of Divine things belongs to faith which is a gift of the Holy Ghost. theological virtue, as explained above (q. 4, a. 5; Ia IIae, Reply to Objection 1. A thing is said to be good in q. 62, a. 3). Therefore wisdom should be called a virtue two senses: first in the sense that it is truly good and sim- rather than a gift. ply perfect, secondly, by a kind of likeness, being perfect Objection 3. Further, it is written (Job 28:28): “Be- in wickedness; thus we speak of a good or a perfect thief, hold the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom, and to depart as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. v, text. 21). And from evil, that is understanding.” And in this passage ac- just as with regard to those things which are truly good, cording to the rendering of the Septuagint which Augus- we find a highest cause, namely the sovereign good which tine follows (De Trin. xii, 14; xiv, 1) we read: “Behold is the last end, by knowing which, man is said to be truly piety, that is wisdom.” Now both fear and piety are gifts wise, so too in evil things something is to be found to of the Holy Ghost. Therefore wisdom should not be reck- which all others are to be referred as to a last end, by oned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as though it were knowing which, man is said to be wise unto evil doing, distinct from the others. according to Jer. 4:22: “They are wise to do evils, but On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): “The Spirit to do good they have no knowledge.” Now whoever turns of the Lord shall rest upon Him; the spirit of wisdom and away from his due end, must needs fix on some undue end, of understanding.” since every agent acts for an end. Wherefore, if he fixes I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. his end in external earthly things, his “wisdom” is called i: 2), it belongs to wisdom to consider the highest cause. “earthly,” if in the goods of the body, it is called “sensual By means of that cause we are able to form a most cer- wisdom,” if in some excellence, it is called “devilish wis- tain judgment about other causes, and according thereto dom” because it imitates the devil’s pride, of which it is all things should be set in order. Now the highest cause written (Job 41:25): “He is king over all the children of 1411 pride.” because “a man judges well what he knows” (Ethic. i, 3). Reply to Objection 2. The wisdom which is called a Reply to Objection 3. Just as piety which pertains to gift of the Holy Ghost, differs from that which is an ac- the worship of God is a manifestation of faith, in so far as quired intellectual virtue, for the latter is attained by hu- we make profession of faith by worshipping God, so too, man effort, whereas the latter is “descending from above” piety manifests wisdom. For this reason piety is stated to (James 3:15). In like manner it differs from faith, since be wisdom, and so is fear, for the same reason, because if faith assents to the Divine truth in itself, whereas it be- a man fear and worship God, this shows that he has a right longs to the gift of wisdom to judge according to the Di- judgment about Divine things. vine truth. Hence the gift of wisdom presupposes faith, Whether wisdom is in the intellect as its subject? IIa IIae q. 45 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that wisdom is not in the lectual virtue to pronounce right judgment about Divine intellect as its subject. For Augustine says (Ep. cxx) that things after reason has made its inquiry, but it belongs to “wisdom is the charity of God.” Now charity is in the wisdom as a gift of the Holy Ghost to judge aright about will as its subject, and not in the intellect, as stated above them on account of connaturality with them: thus Diony- (q. 24, a. 1). Therefore wisdom is not in the intellect as its sius says (Div. Nom. ii) that “Hierotheus is perfect in subject. Divine things, for he not only learns, but is patient of, Di- Objection 2. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 6:23): vine things.” “The wisdom of doctrine is according to her name,” for Now this sympathy or connaturality for Divine things wisdom [sapientia] may be described as “sweet-tasting is the result of charity, which unites us to God, accord- science [sapida scientia],” and this would seem to regard ing to 1 Cor. 6:17: “He who is joined to the Lord, is one the appetite, to which it belongs to taste spiritual pleasure spirit.” Consequently wisdom which is a gift, has its cause or sweetness. Therefore wisdom is in the appetite rather in the will, which cause is charity, but it has its essence in than in the intellect. the intellect, whose act is to judge aright, as stated above Objection 3. Further, the intellective power is suffi- ( Ia IIae, q. 14, a. 1). ciently perfected by the gift of understanding. Now it is Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of superfluous to require two things where one suffices for wisdom as to its cause, whence also wisdom [sapientia] the purpose. Therefore wisdom is not in the intellect. takes its name, in so far as it denotes a certain sweet- On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that ness [saporem]. Hence the Reply to the Second Objection “wisdom is contrary to folly.” But folly is in the intellect. is evident, that is if this be the true meaning of the text Therefore wisdom is also. quoted. For, apparently this is not the case, because such I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), wisdom denotes an exposition of the text would only fit the Latin word for a certain rectitude of judgment according to the Eternal wisdom, whereas it does not apply to the Greek and per- Law. Now rectitude of judgment is twofold: first, on ac- haps not in other languages. Hence it would seem that in count of perfect use of reason, secondly, on account of a the text quoted wisdom stands for the renown of doctrine, certain connaturality with the matter about which one has for which it is praised by all. to judge. Thus, about matters of chastity, a man after in- Reply to Objection 3. The intellect exercises a quiring with his reason forms a right judgment, if he has twofold act, perception and judgment. The gift of under- learnt the science of morals, while he who has the habit of standing regards the former; the gift of wisdom regards chastity judges of such matters by a kind of connaturality. the latter according to the Divine ideas, the gift of knowl- Accordingly it belongs to the wisdom that is an intel- edge, according to human ideas. Whether wisdom is merely speculative, or practical also? IIa IIae q. 45 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that wisdom is not prac- matters of operation which are contingent. But wisdom tical but merely speculative. For the gift of wisdom is is about Divine things which are eternal and necessary. more excellent than the wisdom which is an intellectual Therefore wisdom cannot be practical. virtue. But wisdom, as an intellectual virtue, is merely Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) speculative. Much more therefore is wisdom, as a gift, that “in contemplation we seek the Beginning which is speculative and not practical. God, but in action we labor under a mighty bundle of Objection 2. Further, the practical intellect is about wants.” Now wisdom regards the vision of Divine things, 1412 in which there is no toiling under a load, since according Reply to Objection 1. The higher a virtue is, the to Wis. 8:16, “her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her greater the number of things to which it extends, as stated company any tediousness.” Therefore wisdom is merely in De Causis, prop. x, xvii. Wherefore from the very fact contemplative, and not practical or active. that wisdom as a gift is more excellent than wisdom as an On the contrary, It is written (Col. 4:5): “Walk with intellectual virtue, since it attains to God more intimately wisdom towards them that are without.” Now this pertains by a kind of union of the soul with Him, it is able to direct to action. Therefore wisdom is not merely speculative, but us not only in contemplation but also in action. also practical. Reply to Objection 2. Divine things are indeed nec- I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14), essary and eternal in themselves, yet they are the rules of the higher part of the reason is the province of wisdom, the contingent things which are the subject-matter of hu- while the lower part is the domain of knowledge. Now the man actions. higher reason according to the same authority (De Trin. Reply to Objection 3. A thing is considered in itself xii, 7) “is intent on the consideration and consultation of before being compared with something else. Wherefore the heavenly,” i.e. Divine, “types”∗; it considers them, in to wisdom belongs first of all contemplation which is the so far as it contemplates Divine things in themselves, and vision of the Beginning, and afterwards the direction of it consults them, in so far as it judges of human acts by human acts according to the Divine rules. Nor from the Divine things, and directs human acts according to Divine direction of wisdom does there result any bitterness or toil rules. in human acts; on the contrary the result of wisdom is to Accordingly wisdom as a gift, is not merely specula- make the bitter sweet, and labor a rest. tive but also practical. Whether wisdom can be without grace, and with mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 45 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that wisdom can be with- Ghost, as stated above (a. 1), enables us to judge aright of out grace and with mortal sin. For saints glory chiefly in Divine things, or of other things according to Divine rules, such things as are incompatible with mortal sin, accord- by reason of a certain connaturalness or union with Divine ing to 2 Cor. 1:12: “Our glory is this, the testimony of our things, which is the effect of charity, as stated above (a. 2; conscience.” Now one ought not to glory in one’s wis- q. 23, a. 5). Hence the wisdom of which we are speak- dom, according to Jer. 9:23: “Let not the wise man glory ing presupposes charity. Now charity is incompatible with in his wisdom.” Therefore wisdom can be without grace mortal sin, as shown above (q. 24, a. 12). Therefore it fol- and with mortal sin. lows that the wisdom of which we are speaking cannot be Objection 2. Further, wisdom denotes knowledge of together with mortal sin. Divine things, as stated above (a. 1). Now one in mortal Reply to Objection 1. These words are to be under- sin may have knowledge of the Divine truth, according to stood as referring to worldly wisdom, or to wisdom in Rom. 1:18: ”(Those men that) detain the truth of God in Divine things acquired through human reasons. In such injustice.” Therefore wisdom is compatible with mortal wisdom the saints do not glory, according to Prov. 30:2: sin. “The wisdom of men is not with Me”: But they do glory Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, in Divine wisdom according to 1 Cor. 1:30: ”(Who) of 18) while speaking of charity: “Nothing surpasses this God is made unto us wisdom.” gift of God, it is this alone that divides the children of the Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers, not eternal kingdom from the children of eternal perdition.” the wisdom of which we speak but that which is acquired But wisdom is distinct from charity. Therefore it does not by the study and research of reason, and is compatible divide the children of the kingdom from the children of with mortal sin. perdition. Therefore it is compatible with mortal sin. Reply to Objection 3. Although wisdom is distinct On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 1:4): “Wisdom from charity, it presupposes it, and for that very reason will not enter into a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body divides the children of perdition from the children of the subject to sins.” kingdom. I answer that, The wisdom which is a gift of the Holy ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 79, a. 9; Ia IIae, q. 74, a. 7 1413 Whether wisdom is in all who have grace? IIa IIae q. 45 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that wisdom is not in all fairs according to Divine rules, is no more than suffices who have grace. For it is more to have wisdom than to for their salvation. This measure is wanting to none who is hear wisdom. Now it is only for the perfect to hear wis- without mortal sin through having sanctifying grace, since dom, according to 1 Cor. 2:6: “We speak wisdom among if nature does not fail in necessaries, much less does grace the perfect.” Since then not all who have grace are perfect, fail: wherefore it is written (1 Jn. 2:27): ”(His) unction it seems that much less all who have grace have wisdom. teacheth you of all things.” Objection 2. Further, “The wise man sets things in Some, however, receive a higher degree of the gift of order,” as the Philosopher states (Metaph. i, 2): and it is wisdom, both as to the contemplation of Divine things (by written (James 3:17) that the wise man “judges without both knowing more exalted mysteries and being able to dissimulation∗”. Now it is not for all that have grace, to impart this knowledge to others) and as to the direction judge, or put others in order, but only for those in author- of human affairs according to Divine rules (by being able ity. Therefore wisdom is not in all that have grace. to direct not only themselves but also others according to Objection 3. Further, “Wisdom is a remedy against those rules). This degree of wisdom is not common to all folly,” as Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49). Now many that that have sanctifying grace, but belongs rather to the gra- have grace are naturally foolish, for instance madmen who tuitous graces, which the Holy Ghost dispenses as He will, are baptized or those who without being guilty of mortal according to 1 Cor. 12:8: “To one indeed by the Spirit is sin have become insane. Therefore wisdom is not in all given the word of wisdom,” etc. that have grace. Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle speaks there of On the contrary, Whoever is without mortal sin, is wisdom, as extending to the hidden mysteries of Divine beloved of God; since he has charity, whereby he loves things, as indeed he says himself (2 Cor. 1:7): “We speak God, and God loves them that love Him (Prov. 8:17). the wisdom of God in a mystery, a wisdom which is hid- Now it is written (Wis. 7:28) that “God loveth none but den.” him that dwelleth with wisdom.” Therefore wisdom is in Reply to Objection 2. Although it belongs to those all those who have charity and are without mortal sin. alone who are in authority to direct and judge other men, I answer that, The wisdom of which we are speak- yet every man is competent to direct and judge his own ing, as stated above (a. 4), denotes a certain rectitude of actions, as Dionysius declares (Ep. ad Demophil.). judgment in the contemplation and consultation of Divine Reply to Objection 3. Baptized idiots, like little chil- things, and as to both of these men obtain various degrees dren, have the habit of wisdom, which is a gift of the Holy of wisdom through union with Divine things. For the mea- Ghost, but they have not the act, on account of the bodily sure of right judgment attained by some, whether in the impediment which hinders the use of reason in them. contemplation of Divine things or in directing human af- Whether the seventh beatitude corresponds to the gift of wisdom? IIa IIae q. 45 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that the seventh beatitude does ing to Wis. 7:27: “Through nations she conveyeth her- not correspond to the gift of wisdom. For the seventh beat- self into holy souls; she maketh the friends of God and itude is: “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be prophets”: whereas peace and the adoption of sons seem called the children of God.” Now both these things be- to be remote effects, since they result from charity, as long to charity: since of peace it is written (Ps. 118:165): stated above (q. 29, a. 3). Therefore the beatitude cor- “Much peace have they that love Thy law,” and, as the responding to wisdom should be determined in respect of Apostle says (Rom. 5:5), “the charity of God is poured the love of charity rather than in respect of peace. forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to Objection 3. Further, it is written (James 3:17): “The us,” and Who is “the Spirit of adoption of sons, whereby wisdom, that is from above, first indeed is chaste, then we cry: Abba [Father]” (Rom. 8:15). Therefore the sev- peaceable, modest, easy to be persuaded, consenting to enth beatitude ought to be ascribed to charity rather than the good, full of mercy and good fruits, judging without to wisdom. dissimulation†.” Therefore the beatitude corresponding to Objection 2. Further, a thing is declared by its prox- wisdom should not refer to peace rather than to the other imate effect rather than by its remote effect. Now the effects of heavenly wisdom. proximate effect of wisdom seems to be charity, accord- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in ∗ Vulg.: ‘The wisdom that is from above. . . is. . . without judging, without dissimulation’ † Vulg.: ‘without judging, without dissimulation’ 1414 Monte i, 4) that “wisdom is becoming to peacemakers, in longs to wisdom, as a gift, not only to contemplate Di-whom there is no movement of rebellion, but only obedi- vine things, but also to regulate human acts. Now the first ence to reason.” thing, to be effected in this direction of human acts is the I answer that, The seventh beatitude is fittingly as- removal of evils opposed to wisdom: wherefore fear is cribed to the gift of wisdom, both as to the merit and as to said to be “the beginning of wisdom,” because it makes the reward. The merit is denoted in the words, “Blessed us shun evil, while the last thing is like an end, whereby are the peacemakers.” Now a peacemaker is one who all things are reduced to their right order; and it is this makes peace, either in himself, or in others: and in both that constitutes peace. Hence James said with reason that cases this is the result of setting in due order those things “the wisdom that is from above” (and this is the gift of the in which peace is established, for “peace is the tranquil- Holy Ghost) “first indeed is chaste,” because it avoids the lity of order,” according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, corruption of sin, and “then peaceable,” wherein lies the 13). Now it belongs to wisdom to set things in order, as ultimate effect of wisdom, for which reason peace is num- the Philosopher declares (Metaph. i, 2), wherefore peace- bered among the beatitudes. As to the things that follow, ableness is fittingly ascribed to wisdom. The reward is they declare in becoming order the means whereby wis- expressed in the words, “they shall be called the children dom leads to peace. For when a man, by chastity, avoids of God.” Now men are called the children of God in so far the corruption of sin, the first thing he has to do is, as far as they participate in the likeness of the only-begotten and as he can, to be moderate in all things, and in this respect natural Son of God, according to Rom. 8:29, “Whom He wisdom is said to be modest. Secondly, in those matters in foreknew. . . to be made conformable to the image of His which he is not sufficient by himself, he should be guided Son,” Who is Wisdom Begotten. Hence by participating by the advice of others, and as to this we are told further in the gift of wisdom, man attains to the sonship of God. that wisdom is “easy to be persuaded.” These two are con- Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to charity to be at ditions required that man may be at peace with himself. peace, but it belongs to wisdom to make peace by set- But in order that man may be at peace with others it is ting things in order. Likewise the Holy Ghost is called the furthermore required, first that he should not be opposed “Spirit of adoption” in so far as we receive from Him the to their good; this is what is meant by “consenting to the likeness of the natural Son, Who is the Begotten Wisdom. good.” Secondly, that he should bring to his neighbor’s Reply to Objection 2. These words refer to the Un- deficiencies, sympathy in his heart, and succor in his ac- created Wisdom, which in the first place unites itself to tions, and this is denoted by the words “full of mercy and us by the gift of charity, and consequently reveals to us good fruits.” Thirdly, he should strive in all charity to cor- the mysteries the knowledge of which is infused wisdom. rect the sins of others, and this is indicated by the words Hence, the infused wisdom which is a gift, is not the cause “judging without dissimulation∗,” lest he should purpose but the effect of charity. to sate his hatred under cover of correction. Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (a. 3) it be- ∗ Vulg.: ‘The wisdom that is from above. . . is. . . without judging, without dissimulation’ 1415 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 46 Of Folly Which Is Opposed to Wisdom (In Three Articles) We must now consider folly which is opposed to wisdom; and under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether folly is contrary to wisdom? (2) Whether folly is a sin? (3) To which capital sin is it reducible? Whether folly is contrary to wisdom? IIa IIae q. 46 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that folly is not con- For “sapiens” [wise] as Isidore says (Etym. x) “is trary to wisdom. For seemingly unwisdom is directly so named from sapor [savor], because just as the taste opposed to wisdom. But folly does not seem to be the is quick to distinguish between savors of meats, so is a same as unwisdom, for the latter is apparently about Di- wise man in discerning things and causes.” Wherefore it vine things alone, whereas folly is about both Divine and is manifest that “folly” is opposed to “wisdom” as its con- human things. Therefore folly is not contrary to wisdom. trary, while “fatuity” is opposed to it as a pure negation: Objection 2. Further, one contrary is not the way to since the fatuous man lacks the sense of judgment, while arrive at the other. But folly is the way to arrive at wis- the fool has the sense, though dulled, whereas the wise dom, for it is written (1 Cor. 3:18): “If any man among man has the sense acute and penetrating. you seem to be wise in this world, let him become a fool, Reply to Objection 1. According to Isidore (Etym. that he may be wise.” Therefore folly is not opposed to x), “unwisdom is contrary to wisdom because it lacks the wisdom. savor of discretion and sense”; so that unwisdom is seem- Objection 3. Further, one contrary is not the cause of ingly the same as folly. Yet a man would appear to be a the other. But wisdom is the cause of folly; for it is writ- fool chiefly through some deficiency in the verdict of that ten (Jer. 10:14): “Every man is become a fool for knowl- judgment, which is according to the highest cause, for if a edge,” and wisdom is a kind of knowledge. Moreover, it man fails in judgment about some trivial matter, he is not is written (Is. 47:10): “Thy wisdom and thy knowledge, for that reason called a fool. this hath deceived thee.” Now it belongs to folly to be Reply to Objection 2. Just as there is an evil wis- deceived. Therefore folly is not contrary to wisdom. dom, as stated above (q. 45, a. 1, ad 1), called “worldly Objection 4. Further, Isidore says (Etym. x, under the wisdom,” because it takes for the highest cause and last letter S) that “a fool is one whom shame does not incite end some worldly good, so too there is a good folly op- to sorrow, and who is unconcerned when he is injured.” posed to this evil wisdom, whereby man despises worldly But this pertains to spiritual wisdom, according to Gre- things: and it is of this folly that the Apostle speaks. gory (Moral. x, 49). Therefore folly is not opposed to Reply to Objection 3. It is the wisdom of the world wisdom. that deceives and makes us foolish in God’s sight, as is On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that evident from the Apostle’s words (1 Cor. 3:19). “the gift of wisdom is given as a remedy against folly.” Reply to Objection 4. To be unconcerned when one is I answer that, Stultitia [Folly] seems to take its name injured is sometimes due to the fact that one has no taste from “stupor”; wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x, under for worldly things, but only for heavenly things. Hence the letter of S): “A fool is one who through dullness [stu- this belongs not to worldly but to Divine wisdom, as Gre- porem] remains unmoved.” And folly differs from fatu- gory declares (Moral. x, 49). Sometimes however it is the ity, according to the same authority (Etym. x), in that result of a man’s being simply stupid about everything, as folly implies apathy in the heart and dullness in the senses, may be seen in idiots, who do not discern what is injurious while fatuity denotes entire privation of the spiritual sense. to them, and this belongs to folly simply. Therefore folly is fittingly opposed to wisdom. 1416 Whether folly is a sin? IIa IIae q. 46 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that folly is not a sin. For whereby his sense is rendered incapable of perceiving Di- no sin arises in us from nature. But some are fools natu- vine things, according to 1 Cor. 2:14, “The sensual man rally. Therefore folly is not a sin. perceiveth not these things that are of the Spirit of God,” Objection 2. Further, “Every sin is voluntary,” ac- even as sweet things have no savor for a man whose taste cording to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xiv). But folly is is infected with an evil humor: and such like folly is a sin. not voluntary. Therefore it is not a sin. This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. Objection 3. Further, every sin is contrary to a Divine Reply to Objection 2. Though no man wishes to be precept. But folly is not contrary to any precept. There- a fool, yet he wishes those things of which folly is a con- fore folly is not a sin. sequence, viz. to withdraw his sense from spiritual things On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 1:32): “The pros- and to plunge it into earthly things. The same thing hap- perity of fools shall destroy them.” But no man is de- pens in regard to other sins; for the lustful man desires stroyed save for sin. Therefore folly is a sin. pleasure, without which there is no sin, although he does I answer that, Folly, as stated above (a. 1), denotes not desire sin simply, for he would wish to enjoy the plea- dullness of sense in judging, and chiefly as regards the sure without sin. highest cause, which is the last end and the sovereign Reply to Objection 3. Folly is opposed to the pre- good. Now a man may in this respect contract dullness cepts about the contemplation of truth, of which we have in judgment in two ways. First, from a natural indispo- spoken above (q. 16) when we were treating of knowledge sition, as in the case of idiots, and such like folly is no and understanding. sin. Secondly, by plunging his sense into earthly things, Whether folly is a daughter of lust? IIa IIae q. 46 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that folly is not a daugh- which is about the greatest of pleasures; and these absorb ter of lust. For Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) enumerates the mind more than any others. Therefore the folly which the daughters of lust, among which however he makes no is a sin, arises chiefly from lust. mention of folly. Therefore folly does not proceed from Reply to Objection 1. It is part of folly that a man lust. should have a distaste for God and His gifts. Hence Gre- Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:19): gory mentions two daughters of lust, pertaining to folly, “The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God.” Now, namely, “hatred of God” and “despair of the life to come”; according to Gregory (Moral. x, 29) “the wisdom of this thus he divides folly into two parts as it were. world consists in covering the heart with crafty devices;” Reply to Objection 2. These words of the Apostle and this savors of duplicity. Therefore folly is a daughter are to be understood, not causally but essentially, because, of duplicity rather than of lust. to wit, worldly wisdom itself is folly with God. Hence it Objection 3. Further, anger especially is the cause of does not follow that whatever belongs to worldly wisdom, fury and madness in some persons; and this pertains to is a cause of this folly. folly. Therefore folly arises from anger rather than from Reply to Objection 3. Anger by reason of its keen- lust. ness, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 48 , Aa. 2,3,4), pro- On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 7:22): “Imme- duces a great change in the nature of the body, wherefore diately he followeth her,” i.e. the harlot. . . “not knowing it conduces very much to the folly which results from a that he is drawn like a fool to bonds.” bodily impediment. On the other hand the folly which is I answer that, As already stated (a. 2), folly, in so far caused by a spiritual impediment, viz. by the mind be-as it is a sin, is caused by the spiritual sense being dulled, ing plunged into earthly things, arises chiefly from lust, so as to be incapable of judging spiritual things. Now as stated above. man’s sense is plunged into earthly things chiefly by lust, 1417 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 47 Of Prudence, Considered in Itself (In Sixteen Articles) After treating of the theological virtues, we must in due sequence consider the cardinal virtues. In the first place we shall consider prudence in itself; secondly, its parts; thirdly, the corresponding gift; fourthly, the contrary vices; fifthly, the precepts concerning prudence. Under the first head there are sixteen points of inquiry: (1) Whether prudence is in the will or in the reason? (2) If in the reason, whether it is only in the practical, or also in the speculative reason? (3) Whether it takes cognizance of singulars? (4) Whether it is virtue? (5) Whether it is a special virtue? (6) Whether it appoints the end to the moral virtues? (7) Whether it fixes the mean in the moral virtues? (8) Whether its proper act is command? (9) Whether solicitude or watchfulness belongs to prudence? (10) Whether prudence extends to the governing of many? (11) Whether the prudence which regards private good is the same in species as that which regards the common good? (12) Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers? (13) Whether prudence is in the wicked? (14) Whether prudence is in all good men? (15) Whether prudence is in us naturally? (16) Whether prudence is lost by forgetfulness ? Whether prudence is in the cognitive or in the appetitive faculty? IIa IIae q. 47 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is not in the Now sight belongs not to the appetitive but to the cogni- cognitive but in the appetitive faculty. For Augustine says tive faculty. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence be- (De Morib. Eccl. xv): “Prudence is love choosing wisely longs directly to the cognitive, and not to the sensitive between the things that help and those that hinder.” Now faculty, because by the latter we know nothing but what is love is not in the cognitive, but in the appetitive faculty. within reach and offers itself to the senses: while to obtain Therefore prudence is in the appetitive faculty. knowledge of the future from knowledge of the present or Objection 2. Further, as appears from the foregoing past, which pertains to prudence, belongs properly to the definition it belongs to prudence “to choose wisely.” But reason, because this is done by a process of comparison. choice is an act of the appetitive faculty, as stated above It follows therefore that prudence, properly speaking, is in ( Ia IIae, q. 13, a. 1). Therefore prudence is not in the the reason. cognitive but in the appetitive faculty. Reply to Objection 1. As stated above ( Ia, q. 82, a. 4) Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, the will moves all the faculties to their acts. Now the first 5) that “in art it is better to err voluntarily than involuntaract of the appetitive faculty is love, as stated above ( Ia ily, whereas in the case of prudence, as of the virtues, it IIae, q. 25, Aa. 1,2). Accordingly prudence is said to be is worse.” Now the moral virtues, of which he is treating love, not indeed essentially, but in so far as love moves to there, are in the appetitive faculty, whereas art is in the the act of prudence. Wherefore Augustine goes on to say reason. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive rather than that “prudence is love discerning aright that which helps in the rational faculty. from that which hinders us in tending to God.” Now love On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. is said to discern because it moves the reason to discern. 61): “Prudence is the knowledge of what to seek and what Reply to Objection 2. The prudent man considers to avoid.” things afar off, in so far as they tend to be a help or a hin- I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x): “A pru- drance to that which has to be done at the present time. dent man is one who sees as it were from afar, for his Hence it is clear that those things which prudence consid- sight is keen, and he foresees the event of uncertainties.” ers stand in relation to this other, as in relation to the end. 1418 Now of those things that are directed to the end there is sists not in thought merely, but in its application to action, counsel in the reason, and choice in the appetite, of which which is the end of the practical reason. Wherefore if any two, counsel belongs more properly to prudence, since the defect occur in this, it is most contrary to prudence, since, Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5,7,9) that a prudent man the end being of most import in everything, it follows that “takes good counsel.” But as choice presupposes coun- a defect which touches the end is the worst of all. Hence sel, since it is “the desire for what has been already coun- the Philosopher goes on to say (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence selled” (Ethic. iii, 2), it follows that choice can also be is “something more than a merely rational habit,” such as ascribed to prudence indirectly, in so far, to wit, as pru- art is, since, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 57 , a. 4) it in- dence directs the choice by means of counsel. cludes application to action, which application is an act of Reply to Objection 3. The worth of prudence con- the will. Whether prudence belongs to the practical reason alone or also to the speculative IIa IIae q. 47 a. 2 reason? Objection 1. It would seem that prudence belongs not tends. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that just as only to the practical, but also to the speculative reason. he who reasons well for the realization of a particular end, For it is written (Prov. 10:23): “Wisdom is prudence to such as victory, is said to be prudent, not absolutely, but a man.” Now wisdom consists chiefly in contemplation. in a particular genus, namely warfare, so he that reasons Therefore prudence does also. well with regard to right conduct as a whole, is said to be Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): prudent absolutely. Wherefore it is clear that prudence is “Prudence is concerned with the quest of truth, and fills wisdom about human affairs: but not wisdom absolutely, us with the desire of fuller knowledge.” Now this belongs because it is not about the absolutely highest cause, for it to the speculative reason. Therefore prudence resides also is about human good, and this is not the best thing of all. in the speculative reason. And so it is stated significantly that “prudence is wisdom Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher assigns art and for man,” but not wisdom absolutely. prudence to the same part of the soul (Ethic. vi, 1). Now Reply to Objection 2. Ambrose, and Tully also (De art may be not only practical but also speculative, as in Invent. ii, 53) take the word prudence in a broad sense the case of the liberal arts. Therefore prudence also is for any human knowledge, whether speculative or practi- both practical and speculative. cal. And yet it may also be replied that the act itself of the On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) speculative reason, in so far as it is voluntary, is a matter that prudence is right reason applied to action. Now this of choice and counsel as to its exercise; and consequently belongs to none but the practical reason. Therefore pru- comes under the direction of prudence. On the other hand, dence is in the practical reason only. as regards its specification in relation to its object which I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. is the “necessary true,” it comes under neither counsel nor vi, 5) “a prudent man is one who is capable of taking good prudence. counsel.” Now counsel is about things that we have to do Reply to Objection 3. Every application of right rea- in relation to some end: and the reason that deals with son in the work of production belongs to art: but to pru- things to be done for an end is the practical reason. Hence dence belongs only the application of right reason in mat- it is evident that prudence resides only in the practical rea- ters of counsel, which are those wherein there is no fixed son. way of obtaining the end, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Since Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 45, then, the speculative reason makes things such as syllo- Aa. 1,3), wisdom considers the absolutely highest cause: gisms, propositions and the like, wherein the process fol- so that the consideration of the highest cause in any par- lows certain and fixed rules, consequently in respect of ticular genus belongs to wisdom in that genus. Now in such things it is possible to have the essentials of art, but the genus of human acts the highest cause is the common not of prudence; and so we find such a thing as a specula- end of all human life, and it is this end that prudence in- tive art, but not a speculative prudence. Whether prudence takes cognizance of singulars? IIa IIae q. 47 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that prudence does not does not take cognizance except of universals. take cognizance of singulars. For prudence is in the rea- Objection 2. Further, singulars are infinite in number. son, as stated above (Aa. 1,2). But “reason deals with But the reason cannot comprehend an infinite number of universals,” according to Phys. i, 5. Therefore prudence things. Therefore prudence which is right reason, is not 1419 about singulars. rules to particular cases: hence the conclusions of syllo- Objection 3. Further, particulars are known by the gisms are not only universal, but also particular, because senses. But prudence is not in a sense, for many persons the intellect by a kind of reflection extends to matter, as who have keen outward senses are devoid of prudence. stated in De Anima iii. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance of singulars. Reply to Objection 2. It is because the infinite num- On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, ber of singulars cannot be comprehended by human rea- 7) that “prudence does not deal with universals only, but son, that “our counsels are uncertain” (Wis. 9:14). Nev- needs to take cognizance of singulars also.” ertheless experience reduces the infinity of singulars to a I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 3), to pru- certain finite number which occur as a general rule, and dence belongs not only the consideration of the reason, the knowledge of these suffices for human prudence. but also the application to action, which is the end of the Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. practical reason. But no man can conveniently apply one vi, 8), prudence does not reside in the external senses thing to another, unless he knows both the thing to be ap- whereby we know sensible objects, but in the interior plied, and the thing to which it has to be applied. Now ac- sense, which is perfected by memory and experience so tions are in singular matters: and so it is necessary for the as to judge promptly of particular cases. This does not prudent man to know both the universal principles of rea- mean however that prudence is in the interior sense as in son, and the singulars about which actions are concerned. its principle subject, for it is chiefly in the reason, yet by Reply to Objection 1. Reason first and chiefly is con- a kind of application it extends to this sense. cerned with universals, and yet it is able to apply universal Whether prudence is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 47 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is not a without considering it under the aspect of good. On the virtue. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 13) that “pru- other hand those virtues which regard the rectitude of the dence is the science of what to desire and what to avoid.” appetite, have more of the nature of virtue, because they Now science is condivided with virtue, as appears in the consider the good not only materially, but also formally, Predicaments (vi). Therefore prudence is not a virtue. in other words, they consider that which is good under the Objection 2. Further, there is no virtue of a virtue: but aspect of good. “there is a virtue of art,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. Now it belongs to prudence, as stated above (a. 1, ad vi, 5): wherefore art is not a virtue. Now there is pru- 3; a. 3) to apply right reason to action, and this is not done dence in art, for it is written (2 Paralip. ii, 14) concerning without a right appetite. Hence prudence has the nature of Hiram, that he knew “to grave all sort of graving, and to virtue not only as the other intellectual virtues have it, but devise ingeniously [prudenter] all that there may be need also as the moral virtues have it, among which virtues it is of in the work.” Therefore prudence is not a virtue. enumerated. Objection 3. Further, no virtue can be immoderate. Reply to Objection 1. Augustine there takes science But prudence is immoderate, else it would be useless to in the broad sense for any kind of right reason. say (Prov. 23:4): “Set bounds to thy prudence.” There- Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher says that there fore prudence is not a virtue. is a virtue of art, because art does not require rectitude of On the contrary, Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49) the appetite; wherefore in order that a man may make right that prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice are four use of his art, he needs to have a virtue which will rectify virtues. his appetite. Prudence however has nothing to do with I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 55, a. 3; Ia the matter of art, because art is both directed to a partic-IIae, q. 56, a. 1) when we were treating of virtues in gen- ular end, and has fixed means of obtaining that end. And eral, “virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and yet, by a kind of comparison, a man may be said to act his work good likewise.” Now good may be understood in prudently in matters of art. Moreover in certain arts, on a twofold sense: first, materially, for the thing that is good, account of the uncertainty of the means for obtaining the secondly, formally, under the aspect of good. Good, under end, there is need for counsel, as for instance in the arts of the aspect of good, is the object of the appetitive power. medicine and navigation, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Hence if any habits rectify the consideration of reason, Reply to Objection 3. This saying of the wise man without regarding the rectitude of the appetite, they have does not mean that prudence itself should be moderate, less of the nature of a virtue since they direct man to good but that moderation must be imposed on other things ac- materially, that is to say, to the thing which is good, but cording to prudence. 1420 Whether prudence is a special virtue? IIa IIae q. 47 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is not a spe- in the aspect of an object, that requires a difference of cial virtue. For no special virtue is included in the defini- powers, will “a fortiori” require a difference of habits. tion of virtue in general, since virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, Accordingly we must say that since prudence is in the 6) “an elective habit that follows a mean appointed by rea- reason, as stated above (a. 2), it is differentiated from the son in relation to ourselves, even as a wise man decides.” other intellectual virtues by a material difference of ob- Now right reason is reason in accordance with prudence, jects. “Wisdom,” “knowledge” and “understanding” are as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore prudence is not a about necessary things, whereas “art” and “prudence” are special virtue. about contingent things, art being concerned with “things Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, made,” that is, with things produced in external matter, 13) that “the effect of moral virtue is right action as re- such as a house, a knife and so forth; and prudence, be- gards the end, and that of prudence, right action as regards ing concerned with “things done,” that is, with things that the means.” Now in every virtue certain things have to be have their being in the doer himself, as stated above ( Ia done as means to the end. Therefore prudence is in every IIae, q. 57, a. 4). On the other hand prudence is differen- virtue, and consequently is not a special virtue. tiated from the moral virtues according to a formal aspect Objection 3. Further, a special virtue has a special ob- distinctive of powers, i.e. the intellective power, wherein ject. But prudence has not a special object, for it is right is prudence, and the appetitive power, wherein is moral reason “applied to action” (Ethic. vi, 5); and all works virtue. Hence it is evident that prudence is a special virtue, of virtue are actions. Therefore prudence is not a special distinct from all other virtues. virtue. Reply to Objection 1. This is not a definition of On the contrary, It is distinct from and numbered virtue in general, but of moral virtue, the definition of among the other virtues, for it is written (Wis. 8:7): “She which fittingly includes an intellectual virtue, viz., pru- teacheth temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude.” dence, which has the same matter in common with moral I answer that, Since acts and habits take their species virtue; because, just as the subject of moral virtue is some- from their objects, as shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 3; Ia thing that partakes of reason, so moral virtue has the as- IIae, q. 18, a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 2 ), any habit that has a pect of virtue, in so far as it partakes of intellectual virtue. corresponding special object, distinct from other objects, Reply to Objection 2. This argument proves that pru- must needs be a special habit, and if it be a good habit, it dence helps all the virtues, and works in all of them; but must be a special virtue. Now an object is called special, this does not suffice to prove that it is not a special virtue; not merely according to the consideration of its matter, but for nothing prevents a certain genus from containing a rather according to its formal aspect, as explained above ( species which is operative in every other species of that Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 2, ad 1). Because one and the same thing same genus, even as the sun has an influence over all bod- is the subject matter of the acts of different habits, and ies. also of different powers, according to its different formal Reply to Objection 3. Things done are indeed the aspects. Now a yet greater difference of object is requisite matter of prudence, in so far as they are the object of rea- for a difference of powers than for a difference of habits, son, that is, considered as true: but they are the matter of since several habits are found in the same power, as stated the moral virtues, in so far as they are the object of the above ( Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 1). Consequently any difference appetitive power, that is, considered as good. Whether prudence appoints the end to moral virtues? IIa IIae q. 47 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that prudence appoints tures. Now man is the end of irrational creatures, accord- the end to moral virtues. Since prudence is in the reason, ing to Polit. i, 3. Therefore all the other parts of man are while moral virtue is in the appetite, it seems that pru- directed to reason as to their end. But prudence is “right dence stands in relation to moral virtue, as reason to the reason applied to action,” as stated above (a. 2). Therefore appetite. Now reason appoints the end to the appetitive all actions are directed to prudence as their end. Therefore power. Therefore prudence appoints the end to the moral prudence appoints the end to all moral virtues. virtues. Objection 3. Further, it belongs to the virtue, art, or Objection 2. Further, man surpasses irrational beings power that is concerned about the end, to command the by his reason, but he has other things in common with virtues or arts that are concerned about the means. Now them. Accordingly the other parts of man are in relation prudence disposes of the other moral virtues, and com- to his reason, what man is in relation to irrational crea- mands them. Therefore it appoints their end to them. 1421 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, Ia IIae, q. 13, a. 3); while certain things are in the prac-12) that “moral virtue ensures the rectitude of the inten- tical reason by way of conclusions, and such are the means tion of the end, while prudence ensures the rectitude of which we gather from the ends themselves. About these the means.” Therefore it does not belong to prudence to is prudence, which applies universal principles to the par- appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the ticular conclusions of practical matters. Consequently it means. does not belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral I answer that, The end of moral virtues is human virtues, but only to regulate the means. good. Now the good of the human soul is to be in ac- Reply to Objection 1. Natural reason known by the cord with reason, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). name of “synderesis” appoints the end to moral virtues, as Wherefore the ends of moral virtue must of necessity pre- stated above ( Ia, q. 79, a. 12): but prudence does not do exist in the reason. this for the reason given above. Now, just as, in the speculative reason, there are cer- This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. tain things naturally known, about which is “understand- Reply to Objection 3. The end concerns the moral ing,” and certain things of which we obtain knowledge virtues, not as though they appointed the end, but because through them, viz. conclusions, about which is “science,” they tend to the end which is appointed by natural reason. so in the practical reason, certain things pre-exist, as natu- In this they are helped by prudence, which prepares the rally known principles, and such are the ends of the moral way for them, by disposing the means. Hence it follows virtues, since the end is in practical matters what princi- that prudence is more excellent than the moral virtues, and ples are in speculative matters, as stated above (q. 23, a. 7, moves them: yet “synderesis” moves prudence, just as the ad 2; understanding of principles moves science. Whether it belongs to prudence to find the mean in moral virtues? IIa IIae q. 47 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that it does not belong temperance intends that man should not stray from rea- to prudence to find the mean in moral virtues. For the son for the sake of his concupiscences; fortitude, that he achievement of the mean is the end of moral virtues. But should not stray from the right judgment of reason through prudence does not appoint the end to moral virtues, as fear or daring. Moreover this end is appointed to man ac- shown above (a. 6). Therefore it does not find the mean in cording to natural reason, since natural reason dictates to them. each one that he should act according to reason. Objection 2. Further, that which of itself has being, But it belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in would seem to have no cause, but its very being is its what manner and by what means man shall obtain the cause, since a thing is said to have being by reason of its mean of reason in his deeds. For though the attainment cause. Now “to follow the mean” belongs to moral virtue of the mean is the end of a moral virtue, yet this mean by reason of itself, as part of its definition, as shown above is found by the right disposition of these things that are (a. 5, obj. 1). Therefore prudence does not cause the mean directed to the end. in moral virtues. This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. Objection 3. Further, prudence works after the man- Reply to Objection 2. Just as a natural agent makes ner of reason. But moral virtue tends to the mean after form to be in matter, yet does not make that which is es- the manner of nature, because, as Tully states (De Invent. sential to the form to belong to it, so too, prudence ap- Rhet. ii, 53), “virtue is a habit like a second nature in ac- points the mean in passions and operations, and yet does cord with reason.” Therefore prudence does not appoint not make the searching of the mean to belong to virtue. the mean to moral virtues. Reply to Objection 3. Moral virtue after the man- On the contrary, In the foregoing definition of moral ner of nature intends to attain the mean. Since, however, virtue (a. 5, obj. 1) it is stated that it “follows a mean ap- the mean as such is not found in all matters after the same pointed by reason. . . even as a wise man decides.” manner, it follows that the inclination of nature which ever I answer that, The proper end of each moral virtue works in the same manner, does not suffice for this pur- consists precisely in conformity with right reason. For pose, and so the ruling of prudence is required. 1422 Whether command is the chief act of prudence? IIa IIae q. 47 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that command is not the to action the things counselled and judged. And since this chief act of prudence. For command regards the good to act approaches nearer to the end of the practical reason, it be ensued. Now Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9) states that follows that it is the chief act of the practical reason, and it is an act of prudence “to avoid ambushes.” Therefore consequently of prudence. command is not the chief act of prudence. In confirmation of this we find that the perfection of Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, art consists in judging and not in commanding: wherefore 5) that “the prudent man takes good counsel.” Now “to he who sins voluntarily against his craft is reputed a bet- take counsel” and “to command” seem to be different acts, ter craftsman than he who does so involuntarily, because as appears from what has been said above ( Ia IIae, q. 57, the former seems to do so from right judgment, and the a. 6). Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence. latter from a defective judgment. On the other hand it is Objection 3. Further, it seems to belong to the will the reverse in prudence, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5, for it is to command and to rule, since the will has the end for more imprudent to sin voluntarily, since this is to be lack- its object, and moves the other powers of the soul. Now ing in the chief act of prudence, viz. command, than to prudence is not in the will, but in the reason. Therefore sin involuntarily. command is not an act of prudence. Reply to Objection 1. The act of command extends On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 10) both to the ensuing of good and to the avoidance of evil. that “prudence commands.” Nevertheless Augustine ascribes “the avoidance of am- I answer that, Prudence is “right reason applied to ac- bushes” to prudence, not as its chief act, but as an act of tion,” as stated above (a. 2). Hence that which is the chief prudence that does not continue in heaven. act of reason in regard to action must needs be the chief Reply to Objection 2. Good counsel is required in act of prudence. Now there are three such acts. The first is order that the good things discovered may be applied to “to take counsel,” which belongs to discovery, for counsel action: wherefore command belongs to prudence which is an act of inquiry, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 14, a. 1). takes good counsel. The second act is “to judge of what one has discovered,” Reply to Objection 3. Simply to move belongs to the and this is an act of the speculative reason. But the practi- will: but command denotes motion together with a kind cal reason, which is directed to action, goes further, and its of ordering, wherefore it is an act of the reason, as stated third act is “to command,” which act consists in applying above ( Ia IIae, q. 17, a. 1). Whether solicitude belongs to prudence? IIa IIae q. 47 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that solicitude does On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 4:7): “Be pru- not belong to prudence. For solicitude implies disquiet, dent. . . and watch in prayers.” But watchfulness is the wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that “a solicitous man is same as solicitude. Therefore solicitude belongs to pru- a restless man.” Now motion belongs chiefly to the appet- dence. itive power: wherefore solicitude does also. But prudence I answer that, According to Isidore (Etym. x), a man is not in the appetitive power, but in the reason, as stated is said to be solicitous through being shrewd [solers] and above (a. 1). Therefore solicitude does not belong to pru- alert [citus], in so far as a man through a certain shrewd- dence. ness of mind is on the alert to do whatever has to be done. Objection 2. Further, the certainty of truth seems op- Now this belongs to prudence, whose chief act is a com- posed to solicitude, wherefore it is related (1 Kings 9:20) mand about what has been already counselled and judged that Samuel said to Saul: “As for the asses which were lost in matters of action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. three days ago, be not solicitous, because they are found.” vi, 9) that “one should be quick in carrying out the coun- Now the certainty of truth belongs to prudence, since it is sel taken, but slow in taking counsel.” Hence it is that an intellectual virtue. Therefore solicitude is in opposition solicitude belongs properly to prudence, and for this rea- to prudence rather than belonging to it. son Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxiv) that “prudence Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, keeps most careful watch and ward, lest by degrees we be 3) the “magnanimous man is slow and leisurely.” Now deceived unawares by evil counsel.” slowness is contrary to solicitude. Since then prudence is Reply to Objection 1. Movement belongs to the ap- not opposed to magnanimity, for “good is not opposed to petitive power as to the principle of movement, in accor- good,” as stated in the Predicaments (viii) it would seem dance however, with the direction and command of rea- that solicitude does not belong to prudence. son, wherein solicitude consists. 1423 Reply to Objection 2. According to the Philosopher to be “slow and leisurely” not because he is solicitous (Ethic. i, 3), “equal certainty should not be sought in all about nothing, but because he is not over-solicitous about things, but in each matter according to its proper mode.” many things, and is trustful in matters where he ought to And since the matter of prudence is the contingent singu- have trust, and is not over-solicitous about them: for over- lars about which are human actions, the certainty of pru- much fear and distrust are the cause of over-solicitude, dence cannot be so great as to be devoid of all solicitude. since fear makes us take counsel, as stated above ( Ia IIae, Reply to Objection 3. The magnanimous man is said q. 44, a. 2) when we were treating of the passion of fear. Whether solicitude belongs to prudence? IIa IIae q. 47 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that prudence does not obtaining a due end, it is evident that prudence regards extend to the governing of many, but only to the govern- not only the private good of the individual, but also the ment of oneself. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) common good of the multitude. that virtue directed to the common good is justice. But Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking prudence differs from justice. Therefore prudence is not there of moral virtue. Now just as every moral virtue that directed to the common good. is directed to the common good is called “legal” justice, so Objection 2. Further, he seems to be prudent, who the prudence that is directed to the common good is called seeks and does good for himself. Now those who seek the “political” prudence, for the latter stands in the same rela- common good often neglect their own. Therefore they are tion to legal justice, as prudence simply so called to moral not prudent. virtue. Objection 3. Further, prudence is specifically distinct Reply to Objection 2. He that seeks the good of the from temperance and fortitude. But temperance and forti- many, seeks in consequence his own good, for two rea- tude seem to be related only to a man’s own good. There- sons. First, because the individual good is impossible fore the same applies to prudence. without the common good of the family, state, or king- On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 24:45): “Who, dom. Hence Valerius Maximus says∗ of the ancient Ro- thinkest thou, is a faithful and prudent [Douay: ‘wise’] mans that “they would rather be poor in a rich empire than servant whom his lord hath appointed over his family?” rich in a poor empire.” Secondly, because, since man is a I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. part of the home and state, he must needs consider what vi, 8) some have held that prudence does not extend to is good for him by being prudent about the good of the the common good, but only to the good of the individual, many. For the good disposition of parts depends on their and this because they thought that man is not bound to relation to the whole; thus Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8) seek other than his own good. But this opinion is opposed that “any part which does not harmonize with its whole, to charity, which “seeketh not her own” (1 Cor. 13:5): is offensive.” wherefore the Apostle says of himself (1 Cor. 10:33): Reply to Objection 3. Even temperance and fortitude “Not seeking that which is profitable to myself, but to can be directed to the common good, hence there are pre- many, that they may be saved.” Moreover it is contrary cepts of law concerning them as stated in Ethic. v, 1: more to right reason, which judges the common good to be bet- so, however, prudence and justice, since these belong to ter than the good of the individual. the rational faculty which directly regards the universal, Accordingly, since it belongs to prudence rightly to just as the sensitive part regards singulars. counsel, judge, and command concerning the means of Whether prudence about one’s own good is specifically the same as that which extends IIa IIae q. 47 a. 11 to the common good? Objection 1. It seems that prudence about one’s own whom it is architectonic, as it were. Since then prudence good is the same specifically as that which extends to the is a virtue of a good man, it seems that prudence and po- common good. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that litical prudence are the same habit. “political prudence, and prudence are the same habit, yet Objection 3. Further, a habit is not diversified in their essence is not the same.” species or essence by things which are subordinate to one Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, another. But the particular good, which belongs to pru- 2) that “virtue is the same in a good man and in a good dence simply so called, is subordinate to the common ruler.” Now political prudence is chiefly in the ruler, in good, which belongs to political prudence. Therefore pru- ∗ Fact. et Dict. Memor. iv, 6 1424 dence and political prudence differ neither specifically nor Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher means, not essentially. that political prudence is substantially the same habit as On the contrary, “Political prudence,” which is di- any kind of prudence, but that it is the same as the pru- rected to the common good of the state, “domestic econ- dence which is directed to the common good. This is omy” which is of such things as relate to the common called “prudence” in respect of the common notion of pru- good of the household or family, and “monastic economy” dence, i.e. as being right reason applied to action, while which is concerned with things affecting the good of one it is called “political,” as being directed to the common person, are all distinct sciences. Therefore in like manner good. there are different kinds of prudence, corresponding to the Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher declares above differences of matter. (Polit. iii, 2), “it belongs to a good man to be able to rule I answer that, As stated above (a. 5; q. 54, a. 2, ad well and to obey well,” wherefore the virtue of a good 1), the species of habits differ according to the difference man includes also that of a good ruler. Yet the virtue of of object considered in its formal aspect. Now the for- the ruler and of the subject differs specifically, even as the mal aspect of all things directed to the end, is taken from virtue of a man and of a woman, as stated by the same the end itself, as shown above ( Ia IIae, Prolog.; Ia IIae, authority (Polit. iii, 2). q. 102, a. 1), wherefore the species of habits differ by their Reply to Objection 3. Even different ends, one of relation to different ends. Again the individual good, the which is subordinate to the other, diversify the species of good of the family, and the good of the city and kingdom a habit, thus for instance, habits directed to riding, soldier- are different ends. Wherefore there must needs be differ- ing, and civic life, differ specifically although their ends ent species of prudence corresponding to these different are subordinate to one another. In like manner, though the ends, so that one is “prudence” simply so called, which is good of the individual is subordinate to the good of the directed to one’s own good; another, “domestic prudence” many, that does not prevent this difference from making which is directed to the common good of the home; and a the habits differ specifically; but it follows that the habit third, “political prudence,” which is directed to the com- which is directed to the last end is above the other habits mon good of the state or kingdom. and commands them. Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers? IIa IIae q. 47 a. 12 Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is not in fore it is proper to a man to reason and be prudent in so subjects but only in their rulers. For the Philosopher says far as he has a share in ruling and governing. But it is evi- (Polit. iii, 2) that “prudence alone is the virtue proper to dent that the subject as subject, and the slave as slave, are a ruler, while other virtues are common to subjects and not competent to rule and govern, but rather to be ruled rulers, and the prudence of the subject is not a virtue but a and governed. Therefore prudence is not the virtue of a true opinion.” slave as slave, nor of a subject as subject. Objection 2. Further, it is stated in Polit. i, 5 that Since, however, every man, for as much as he is ra- “a slave is not competent to take counsel.” But prudence tional, has a share in ruling according to the judgment of makes a man take good counsel (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore reason, he is proportionately competent to have prudence. prudence is not befitting slaves or subjects. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence is in the ruler “af- Objection 3. Further, prudence exercises command, ter the manner of a mastercraft” (Ethic. vi, 8), but in the as stated above (a. 8). But command is not in the compe- subjects, “after the manner of a handicraft.” tency of slaves or subjects but only of rulers. Therefore Reply to Objection 1. The saying of the Philosopher prudence is not in subjects but only in rulers. is to be understood strictly, namely, that prudence is not On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, the virtue of a subject as such. 8) that there are two kinds of political prudence, one of Reply to Objection 2. A slave is not capable of tak- which is “legislative” and belongs to rulers, while the ing counsel, in so far as he is a slave (for thus he is the other “retains the common name political,” and is about instrument of his master), but he does take counsel in so “individual actions.” Now it belongs also to subjects to far as he is a rational animal. perform these individual actions. Therefore prudence is Reply to Objection 3. By prudence a man commands not only in rulers but also in subjects. not only others, but also himself, in so far as the reason is I answer that, Prudence is in the reason. Now ruling said to command the lower powers. and governing belong properly to the reason; and there- 1425 Whether prudence can be in sinners? IIa IIae q. 47 a. 13 Objection 1. It would seem that there can be prudence a good judgment, even about things concerning life as a in sinners. For our Lord said (Lk. 16:8): “The children whole, but fails to make an effective command. of this world are more prudent [Douay: ‘wiser’] in their The third prudence is both true and perfect, for it takes generation than the children of light.” Now the children counsel, judges and commands aright in respect of the of this world are sinners. Therefore there be prudence in good end of man’s whole life: and this alone is prudence sinners. simply so-called, and cannot be in sinners, whereas the Objection 2. Further, faith is a more excellent virtue first prudence is in sinners alone, while imperfect pru- than prudence. But there can be faith in sinners. Therefore dence is common to good and wicked men, especially that there can be prudence also. which is imperfect through being directed to a particular Objection 3. Further, according to Ethic. vi, 7, “we end, since that which is imperfect on account of a failing say that to be of good counsel is the work of prudent man in the chief act, is only in the wicked. especially.” Now many sinners can take good counsel. Reply to Objection 1. This saying of our Lord is to be Therefore sinners can have prudence. understood of the first prudence, wherefore it is not said On the contrary, The Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, that they are prudent absolutely, but that they are prudent 12) that “it is impossible for a man be prudent unless he be in “their generation.” good.” Now no inner is a good man. Therefore no sinner Reply to Objection 2. The nature of faith consists not is prudent. in conformity with the appetite for certain right actions, I answer that, Prudence is threefold. There is a false but in knowledge alone. On the other hand prudence im- prudence, which takes its name from its likeness to true plies a relation to a right appetite. First because its princi- prudence. For since a prudent man is one who disposes ples are the ends in matters of action; and of such ends well of the things that have to be done for a good end, one forms a right estimate through the habits of moral whoever disposes well of such things as are fitting for an virtue, which rectify the appetite: wherefore without the evil end, has false prudence, in far as that which he takes moral virtues there is no prudence, as shown above ( Ia for an end, is good, not in truth but in appearance. Thus IIae, q. 58, a. 5); secondly because prudence commands man is called “a good robber,” and in this way may speak right actions, which does not happen unless the appetite of “a prudent robber,” by way of similarity, because he be right. Wherefore though faith on account of its object devises fitting ways of committing robbery. This is the is more excellent than prudence, yet prudence, by its very prudence of which the Apostle says (Rom. 8:6): “The nature, is more opposed to sin, which arises from a disor- prudence [Douay: ‘wisdom’] of the flesh is death,” be- der of the appetite. cause, to wit, it places its ultimate end in the pleasures of Reply to Objection 3. Sinners can take good counsel the flesh. for an evil end, or for some particular good, but they do The second prudence is indeed true prudence, because not perfectly take good counsel for the end of their whole it devises fitting ways of obtaining a good end; and yet life, since they do not carry that counsel into effect. Hence it is imperfect, from a twofold source. First, because the they lack prudence which is directed to the good only; and good which it takes for an end, is not the common end of yet in them, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12) all human life, but of some particular affair; thus when a there is “cleverness,”∗ i.e. natural diligence which may man devises fitting ways of conducting business or of sail- be directed to both good and evil; or “cunning,”† which is ing a ship, he is called a prudent businessman, or a pru- directed only to evil, and which we have stated above, to dent sailor; secondly, because he fails in the chief act of be “false prudence” or “prudence of the flesh.” prudence, as when a man takes counsel aright, and forms Whether prudence is in all who have grace? IIa IIae q. 47 a. 14 Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is not in Yet many have grace who do not take good counsel, and all who have grace. Prudence requires diligence, that one need to be guided by the counsel of others. Therefore not may foresee aright what has to be done. But many who all who have grace, have prudence have grace have not this diligence. Therefore not all who Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, have grace have prudence. 2) that “young people are not obviously prudent.” Yet Objection 2. Further, a prudent man is one who takes many young people have grace. Therefore prudence is good counsel, as stated above (a. 8, obj. 2; a. 13, obj. 3). not to be found in all who have grace. ∗ deinotike † panourgia 1426 On the contrary, No man has grace unless he be vir-Reply to Objection 2. Those who require to be tuous. Now no man can be virtuous without prudence, for guided by the counsel of others, are able, if they have Gregory says (Moral. ii, 46) that “the other virtues can- grace, to take counsel for themselves in this point at least, not be virtues at all unless they effect prudently what they that they require the counsel of others and can discern desire to accomplish.” Therefore all who have grace have good from evil counsel. prudence. Reply to Objection 3. Acquired prudence is caused I answer that, The virtues must needs be connected by the exercise of acts, wherefore “its acquisition de- together, so that whoever has one has all, as stated above mands experience and time” (Ethic. ii, 1), hence it can- ( Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 1). Now whoever has grace has charity, not be in the young, neither in habit nor in act. On the so that he must needs have all the other virtues, and hence, other hand gratuitous prudence is caused by divine infu- since prudence is a virtue, as shown above (a. 4), he must, sion. Wherefore, in children who have been baptized but of necessity, have prudence also. have not come to the use of reason, there is prudence as Reply to Objection 1. Diligence is twofold: one is to habit but not as to act, even as in idiots; whereas in merely sufficient with regard to things necessary for sal- those who have come to the use of reason, it is also as to vation; and such diligence is given to all who have grace, act, with regard to things necessary for salvation. This by whom “His unction teacheth of all things” (1 Jn. 2:27). practice merits increase, until it becomes perfect, even as There is also another diligence which is more than suffi- the other virtues. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 5:14) that cient, whereby a man is able to make provision both for “strong meat is for the perfect, for them who by custom himself and for others, not only in matters necessary for have their senses exercised to the discerning of good and salvation, but also in all things relating to human life; and evil.” such diligence as this is not in all who have grace. Whether prudence is in us by nature? IIa IIae q. 47 a. 15 Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is in us by either are known naturally, as shown above (a. 6): except nature. The Philosopher says that things connected with that the common principles of prudence are more connat- prudence “seem to be natural,” namely “synesis, gnome”∗ ural to man; for as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, and the like, but not those which are connected with spec- 7) “the life which is according to the speculative reason ulative wisdom. Now things belonging to the same genus is better than that which is according to man”: whereas have the same kind of origin. Therefore prudence also is the secondary universal principles, whether of the spec- in us from nature. ulative or of the practical reason, are not inherited from Objection 2. Further, the changes of age are accord- nature, but are acquired by discovery through experience, ing to nature. Now prudence results from age, according or through teaching. to Job 12:12: “In the ancient is wisdom, and in length of On the other hand, as regards the knowledge of par- days prudence.” Therefore prudence is natural. ticulars which are the matter of action, we must make a Objection 3. Further, prudence is more consistent further distinction, because this matter of action is either with human nature than with that of dumb animals. Now an end or the means to an end. Now the right ends of there are instances of a certain natural prudence in dumb human life are fixed; wherefore there can be a natural in- animals, according to the Philosopher (De Hist. Anim. clination in respect of these ends; thus it has been stated viii, 1). Therefore prudence is natural. above ( Ia IIae, q. 51, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 63, a. 1) that some, On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) from a natural inclination, have certain virtues whereby that “intellectual virtue is both originated and fostered by they are inclined to right ends; and consequently they also teaching; it therefore demands experience and time.” Now have naturally a right judgment about such like ends. prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above (a. 4). But the means to the end, in human concerns, far from Therefore prudence is in us, not by nature, but by teach- being fixed, are of manifold variety according to the va- ing and experience. riety of persons and affairs. Wherefore since the inclina- I answer that, As shown above (a. 3), prudence in- tion of nature is ever to something fixed, the knowledge of cludes knowledge both of universals, and of the singular those means cannot be in man naturally, although, by rea- matters of action to which prudence applies the univer- son of his natural disposition, one man has a greater apti- sal principles. Accordingly, as regards the knowledge of tude than another in discerning them, just as it happens universals, the same is to be said of prudence as of specu- with regard to the conclusions of speculative sciences. lative science, because the primary universal principles of Since then prudence is not about the ends, but about the ∗ synesis and gnome, Cf. Ia IIae, q. 57, a. 6 1427 means, as stated above (a. 6; Ia IIae, q. 57, a. 5), it follows not only because their natural disposition calms the move-that prudence is not from nature. ment of the sensitive passions, but also because of their Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking long experience. there of things relating to prudence, in so far as they are Reply to Objection 3. Even in dumb animals there directed to ends. Wherefore he had said before (Ethic. are fixed ways of obtaining an end, wherefore we observe vi, 5,11) that “they are the principles of the ou heneka”∗, that all the animals of a same species act in like manner. namely, the end; and so he does not mention euboulia But this is impossible in man, on account of his reason, among them, because it takes counsel about the means. which takes cognizance of universals, and consequently Reply to Objection 2. Prudence is rather in the old, extends to an infinity of singulars. Whether prudence can be lost through forgetfulness? IIa IIae q. 47 a. 16 Objection 1. It would seem that prudence can be lost cipal act is one of command, whereby a man applies the through forgetfulness. For since science is about nec- knowledge he has, to the purpose of appetition and oper- essary things, it is more certain than prudence which is ation. Hence prudence is not taken away directly by for- about contingent matters of action. But science is lost by getfulness, but rather is corrupted by the passions. For the forgetfulness. Much more therefore is prudence. Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that “pleasure and sorrow Objection 2. Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. pervert the estimate of prudence”: wherefore it is writ- ii, 3) “the same things, but by a contrary process, engen- ten (Dan. 13:56): “Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust der and corrupt virtue.” Now the engendering of prudence hath subverted thy heart,” and (Ex. 23:8): “Neither shalt requires experience which is made up “of many memo- thou take bribes which blind even the prudent [Douay: ries,” as he states at the beginning of his Metaphysics (i, ‘wise’].” 1). Therefore since forgetfulness is contrary to memory, Nevertheless forgetfulness may hinder prudence, in so it seems that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness. far as the latter’s command depends on knowledge which Objection 3. Further, there is no prudence without may be forgotten. knowledge of universals. But knowledge of universals Reply to Objection 1. Science is in the reason only: can be lost through forgetfulness. Therefore prudence can hence the comparison fails, as stated above†. also. Reply to Objection 2. The experience required by On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) prudence results not from memory alone, but also from that “forgetfulness is possible to art but not to prudence.” the practice of commanding aright. I answer that, Forgetfulness regards knowledge only, Reply to Objection 3. Prudence consists chiefly, not wherefore one can forget art and science, so as to lose in the knowledge of universals, but in applying them to them altogether, because they belong to the reason. But action, as stated above (a. 3). Wherefore forgetting the prudence consists not in knowledge alone, but also in an knowledge of universals does not destroy the principal act of the appetite, because as stated above (a. 8), its prin- part of prudence, but hinders it somewhat, as stated above. ∗ Literally, ‘for the sake of which’ (are the means) † Cf. Ia IIae, q. 53, a. 1 1428 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 48 Of the Parts of Prudence (In One Article) We must now consider the parts of prudence, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Which are the parts of prudence? (2) Of its integral parts; (3) Of its subjective parts; (4) Of its potential parts. Whether three parts of prudence are fittingly assigned? IIa IIae q. 48 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the parts of pru- tential,” as the nutritive and sensitive powers are parts of dence are assigned unfittingly. Tully (De Invent. Rhet. the soul. Accordingly, parts can be assigned to a virtue in ii, 53) assigns three parts of prudence, namely, “mem- three ways. First, in likeness to integral parts, so that the ory,” “understanding” and “foresight.” Macrobius (In things which need to concur for the perfect act of a virtue, Somn. Scip. i) following the opinion of Plotinus ascribes are called the parts of that virtue. In this way, out of all to prudence six parts, namely, “reasoning,” “understand- the things mentioned above, eight may be taken as parts ing,” “circumspection,” “foresight,” “docility” and “cau- of prudence, namely, the six assigned by Macrobius; with tion.” Aristotle says (Ethic. vi, 9,10,11) that “good coun- the addition of a seventh, viz. “memory” mentioned by sel,” “synesis” and “gnome” belong to prudence. Again Tully; and eustochia or “shrewdness” mentioned by Arisunder the head of prudence he mentions “conjecture,” totle. For the “sense” of prudence is also called “under- “shrewdness,” “sense” and “understanding.” And another standing”: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11): Greek philosopher∗ says that ten things are connected “Of such things one needs to have the sense, and this is with prudence, namely, “good counsel,” “shrewdness,” understanding.” Of these eight, five belong to prudence “foresight,” “regnative†,” “military,” “political” and “do- as a cognitive virtue, namely, “memory,” “reasoning,” mestic prudence,” “dialectics,” “rhetoric” and “physics.” “understanding,” “docility” and “shrewdness”: while the Therefore it seems that one or the other enumeration is three others belong thereto, as commanding and apply- either excessive or deficient. ing knowledge to action, namely, “foresight,” “circum- Objection 2. Further, prudence is specifically distinct spection” and “caution.” The reason of their difference from science. But politics, economics, logic, rhetoric, is seen from the fact that three things may be observed physics are sciences. Therefore they are not parts of pru- in reference to knowledge. In the first place, knowledge dence. itself, which, if it be of the past, is called “memory,” if Objection 3. Further, the parts do not exceed the of the present, whether contingent or necessary, is called whole. Now the intellective memory or intelligence, rea- “understanding” or “intelligence.” Secondly, the acquir- son, sense and docility, belong not only to prudence but ing of knowledge, which is caused either by teaching, to also to all the cognitive habits. Therefore they should not which pertains “docility,” or by “discovery,” and to this be set down as parts of prudence. belongs to eustochia, i.e. “a happy conjecture,” of which Objection 4. Further, just as counselling, judging and “shrewdness” is a part, which is a “quick conjecture of commanding are acts of the practical reason, so also is us- the middle term,” as stated in Poster. i, 9. Thirdly, the ing, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 16, a. 1 ). Therefore, use of knowledge, in as much as we proceed from things just as “eubulia” which refers to counsel, is connected known to knowledge or judgment of other things, and this with prudence, and “synesis” and “gnome” which refer to belongs to “reasoning.” And the reason, in order to com- judgment, so also ought something to have been assigned mand aright, requires to have three conditions. First, to corresponding to use. order that which is befitting the end, and this belongs to Objection 5. Further, solicitude pertains to prudence, “foresight”; secondly, to attend to the circumstances of as stated above (q. 47, a. 9). Therefore solicitude also the matter in hand, and this belongs to “circumspection”; should have been mentioned among the parts of prudence. thirdly, to avoid obstacles, and this belongs to “caution.” I answer that, Parts are of three kinds, namely, “inte- The subjective parts of a virtue are its various species. gral,” as wall, roof, and foundations are parts of a house; In this way the parts of prudence, if we take them prop- “subjective,” as ox and lion are parts of animal; and “po- erly, are the prudence whereby a man rules himself, and ∗ Andronicus; Cf. q. 80, obj. 4 † Regnativa 1429 the prudence whereby a man governs a multitude, which nected with it, which are directed to certain secondary differ specifically as stated above (q. 47, a. 11). Again, acts or matters, not having, as it were, the whole power the prudence whereby a multitude is governed, is divided of the principal virtue. In this way the parts of prudence into various species according to the various kinds of mul- are “good counsel,” which concerns counsel, “synesis,” titude. There is the multitude which is united together for which concerns judgment in matters of ordinary occur- some particular purpose; thus an army is gathered together rence, and “gnome,” which concerns judgment in matters to fight, and the prudence that governs this is called “mil- of exception to the law: while “prudence” is about the itary.” There is also the multitude that is united together chief act, viz. that of commanding. for the whole of life; such is the multitude of a home or Reply to Objection 1. The various enumerations dif- family, and this is ruled by “domestic prudence”: and such fer, either because different kinds of parts are assigned, again is the multitude of a city or kingdom, the ruling prin- or because that which is mentioned in one enumera- ciple of which is “regnative prudence” in the ruler, and tion includes several mentioned in another enumeration. “political prudence,” simply so called, in the subjects. Thus Tully includes “caution” and “circumspection” un- If, however, prudence be taken in a wide sense, as der “foresight,” and “reasoning,” “docility” and “shrewd- including also speculative knowledge, as stated above ness” under “understanding.” (q. 47, a. 2, ad 2) then its parts include “dialectics,” Reply to Objection 2. Here domestic and civic pru- “rhetoric” and “physics,” according to three methods of dence are not to be taken as sciences, but as kinds of pru- prudence in the sciences. The first of these is the attaining dence. As to the other three, the reply may be gathered of science by demonstration, which belongs to “physics” from what has been said. (if physics be understood to comprise all demonstrative Reply to Objection 3. All these things are reckoned sciences). The second method is to arrive at an opinion parts of prudence, not by taking them altogether, but in through probable premises, and this belongs to “dialec- so far as they are connected with things pertaining to pru- tics.” The third method is to employ conjectures in order dence. to induce a certain suspicion, or to persuade somewhat, Reply to Objection 4. Right command and right and this belongs to “rhetoric.” It may be said, however, use always go together, because the reason’s command that these three belong also to prudence properly so called, is followed by obedience on the part of the lower powers, since it argues sometimes from necessary premises, some- which pertain to use. times from probabilities, and sometimes from conjectures. Reply to Objection 5. Solicitude is included under The potential parts of a virtue are the virtues con- foresight. 1430 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 49 Of Each Quasi-Integral Part of Prudence (In Eight Articles) We must now consider each quasi-integral part of prudence, and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Memory; (2) Understanding or Intelligence; (3) Docility; (4) Shrewdness; (5) Reason; (6) Foresight; (7) Circumspection; (8) Caution. Whether memory is a part of prudence? IIa IIae q. 49 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that memory is not a part in our nature, while its perfection comes through practice of prudence. For memory, as the Philosopher proves (De or grace, so too, as Tully says in his Rhetoric†, memory Memor. et Remin. i), is in the sensitive part of the soul: not only arises from nature, but is also aided by art and whereas prudence is in the rational part (Ethic. vi, 5). diligence. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence. There are four things whereby a man perfects his Objection 2. Further, prudence is acquired and per- memory. First, when a man wishes to remember a thing, fected by experience, whereas memory is in us from na- he should take some suitable yet somewhat unwonted il- ture. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence. lustration of it, since the unwonted strikes us more, and Objection 3. Further, memory regards the past, so makes a greater and stronger impression on the mind; whereas prudence regards future matters of action, about the mind; and this explains why we remember better what which counsel is concerned, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2,7. we saw when we were children. Now the reason for the Therefore memory is not a part of prudence. necessity of finding these illustrations or images, is that On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) simple and spiritual impressions easily slip from the mind, places memory among the parts of prudence. unless they be tied as it were to some corporeal image, I answer that, Prudence regards contingent matters because human knowledge has a greater hold on sensible of action, as stated above (q. 47, a. 5). Now in such like objects. For this reason memory is assigned to the sen- matters a man can be directed, not by those things that are sitive part of the soul. Secondly, whatever a man wishes simply and necessarily true, but by those which occur in to retain in his memory he must carefully consider and the majority of cases: because principles must be propor- set in order, so that he may pass easily from one memory tionate to their conclusions, and “like must be concluded to another. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memor. et from like” (Ethic. vi∗). But we need experience to dis- Remin. ii): “Sometimes a place brings memories back to cover what is true in the majority of cases: wherefore the us: the reason being that we pass quickly from the one Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that “intellectual virtue is to the other.” Thirdly, we must be anxious and earnest engendered and fostered by experience and time.” Now about the things we wish to remember, because the more experience is the result of many memories as stated in a thing is impressed on the mind, the less it is liable to Metaph. i, 1, and therefore prudence requires the mem- slip out of it. Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric‡ that ory of many things. Hence memory is fittingly accounted “anxiety preserves the figures of images entire.” Fourthly, a part of prudence. we should often reflect on the things we wish to remem- Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 47, ber. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memoria i) that “re- Aa. 3,6), prudence applies universal knowledge to par- flection preserves memories,” because as he remarks (De ticulars which are objects of sense: hence many things Memoria ii) “custom is a second nature”: wherefore when belonging to the sensitive faculties are requisite for pru- we reflect on a thing frequently, we quickly call it to mind, dence, and memory is one of them. through passing from one thing to another by a kind of Reply to Objection 2. Just as aptitude for prudence is natural order. ∗ Anal. Post. i. 32 † Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii, 16,24 ‡ Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii. 1431 Reply to Objection 3. It behooves us to argue, as it the future. were, about the future from the past; wherefore memory of the past is necessary in order to take good counsel for Whether understanding∗ is a part of prudence? IIa IIae q. 49 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that understanding is not minates, as in a conclusion, in the particular matter of ac- a part of prudence. When two things are members of a di- tion, to which, as stated above (q. 47, Aa. 3,6), it applies vision, one is not part of the other. But intellectual virtue the knowledge of some universal principle. Now a singu- is divided into understanding and prudence, according to lar conclusion is argued from a universal and a singular Ethic. vi, 3. Therefore understanding should not be reck- proposition. Wherefore the reasoning of prudence must oned a part of prudence. proceed from a twofold understanding. The one is cog- Objection 2. Further, understanding is numbered nizant of universals, and this belongs to the understanding among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, and corresponds to which is an intellectual virtue, whereby we know naturally faith, as stated above (q. 8, Aa. 1,8). But prudence is a not only speculative principles, but also practical univer- virtue other than faith, as is clear from what has been said sal principles, such as “One should do evil to no man,” above (q. 4, a. 8; Ia IIae, q. 62, a. 2). Therefore under- as shown above (q. 47, a. 6). The other understanding, standing does not pertain to prudence. as stated in Ethic. vi, 11, is cognizant of an extreme, i.e. Objection 3. Further, prudence is about singular mat- of some primary singular and contingent practical matter, ters of action (Ethic. vi, 7): whereas understanding takes viz. the minor premiss, which must needs be singular in cognizance of universal and immaterial objects (De An- the syllogism of prudence, as stated above (q. 47, Aa. 3,6). ima iii, 4). Therefore understanding is not a part of pru- Now this primary singular is some singular end, as stated dence. in the same place. Wherefore the understanding which is On the contrary, Tully† accounts “intelligence” a part a part of prudence is a right estimate of some particular of prudence, and Macrobius‡ mentions “understanding,” end. which comes to the same. Reply to Objection 2. The understanding which is a I answer that, Understanding denotes here, not the gift of the Holy Ghost, is a quick insight into divine things, intellectual power, but the right estimate about some final as shown above (q. 8, Aa. 1,2). It is in another sense that principle, which is taken as self-evident: thus we are said it is accounted a part of prudence, as stated above. to understand the first principles of demonstrations. Now Reply to Objection 3. The right estimate about a par- every deduction of reason proceeds from certain state- ticular end is called both “understanding,” in so far as its ments which are taken as primary: wherefore every pro- object is a principle, and “sense,” in so far as its object is cess of reasoning must needs proceed from some under- a particular. This is what the Philosopher means when he standing. Therefore since prudence is right reason applied says (Ethic. v, 11): “Of such things we need to have the to action, the whole process of prudence must needs have sense, and this is understanding.” But this is to be under- its source in understanding. Hence it is that understanding stood as referring, not to the particular sense whereby we is reckoned a part of prudence. know proper sensibles, but to the interior sense, whereby Reply to Objection 1. The reasoning of prudence ter- we judge of a particular. Whether docility should be accounted a part of prudence? IIa IIae q. 49 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that docility should not their natural disposition. Therefore it is not a part of pru- be accounted a part of prudence. For that which is a nec- dence. essary condition of every intellectual virtue, should not Objection 3. Further, docility is in the disciple: be appropriated to one of them. But docility is requisite whereas prudence, since it makes precepts, seems rather for every intellectual virtue. Therefore it should not be to belong to teachers, who are also called “preceptors.” accounted a part of prudence. Therefore docility is not a part of prudence. Objection 2. Further, that which pertains to a human On the contrary, Macrobius§ following the opinion virtue is in our power, since it is for things that are in our of Plotinus places docility among the parts of prudence. power that we are praised or blamed. Now it is not in our I answer that, As stated above (a. 2, ad 1; q. 47, a. 3) power to be docile, for this is befitting to some through prudence is concerned with particular matters of action, ∗ Otherwise intuition; Aristotle’s word is nous † De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53 ‡ In Somn. Scip. i, 8 § In Somn. Scip. i, 8 1432 and since such matters are of infinite variety, no one man Reply to Objection 1. Although docility is useful for can consider them all sufficiently; nor can this be done every intellectual virtue, yet it belongs to prudence chiefly, quickly, for it requires length of time. Hence in matters for the reason given above. of prudence man stands in very great need of being taught Reply to Objection 2. Man has a natural aptitude for by others, especially by old folk who have acquired a sane docility even as for other things connected with prudence. understanding of the ends in practical matters. Wherefore Yet his own efforts count for much towards the attainment the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11): “It is right to pay no of perfect docility: and he must carefully, frequently and less attention to the undemonstrated assertions and opin- reverently apply his mind to the teachings of the learned, ions of such persons as are experienced, older than we are, neither neglecting them through laziness, nor despising and prudent, than to their demonstrations, for their expe- them through pride. rience gives them an insight into principles.” Thus it is Reply to Objection 3. By prudence man makes pre- written (Prov. 3:5): “Lean not on thy own prudence,” and cepts not only for others, but also for himself, as stated (Ecclus. 6:35): “Stand in the multitude of the ancients” above (q. 47, a. 12, ad 3). Hence as stated (Ethic. vi, 11), (i.e. the old men), “that are wise, and join thyself from even in subjects, there is place for prudence; to which thy heart to their wisdom.” Now it is a mark of docility docility pertains. And yet even the learned should be to be ready to be taught: and consequently docility is fit- docile in some respects, since no man is altogether self- tingly reckoned a part of prudence sufficient in matters of prudence, as stated above. Whether shrewdness is part of prudence? IIa IIae q. 49 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that shrewdness is not a happy conjecture about any matter, while shrewdness is a part of prudence. For shrewdness consists in easily “an easy and rapid conjecture in finding the middle term” finding the middle term for demonstrations, as stated in (Poster. i, 34). Nevertheless the philosopher† who calls Poster. i, 34. Now the reasoning of prudence is not a shrewdness a part of prudence, takes it for eustochia, in demonstration since it deals with contingencies. There-general, hence he says: “Shrewdness is a habit whereby fore shrewdness does not pertain to prudence. congruities are discovered rapidly.” Objection 2. Further, good counsel pertains to pru- Reply to Objection 1. Shrewdness is concerned with dence according to Ethic. vi, 5,7,9. Now there is no place the discovery of the middle term not only in demonstra- in good counsel for shrewdness∗ which is a kind of eu- tive, but also in practical syllogisms, as, for instance, stochia, i.e. “a happy conjecture”: for the latter is “unrea-when two men are seen to be friends they are reckoned to soning and rapid,” whereas counsel needs to be slow, as be enemies of a third one, as the Philosopher says (Poster. stated in Ethic. vi, 9. Therefore shrewdness should not be i, 34). In this way shrewdness belongs to prudence. accounted a part of prudence. Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher adduces the Objection 3. Further, shrewdness as stated above true reason (Ethic. vi, 9) to prove that euboulia, i.e. good (q. 48) is a “happy conjecture.” Now it belongs to rhetori-counsel, is not eustochia, which is commended for grasp-cians to make use of conjectures. Therefore shrewdness ing quickly what should be done. Now a man may take belongs to rhetoric rather than to prudence. good counsel, though he be long and slow in so doing, On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): “A solici- and yet this does not discount the utility of a happy con- tous man is one who is shrewd and alert [solers citus].” jecture in taking good counsel: indeed it is sometimes a But solicitude belongs to prudence, as stated above (q. 47, necessity, when, for instance, something has to be done a. 9). Therefore shrewdness does also. without warning. It is for this reason that shrewdness is I answer that, Prudence consists in a right estimate fittingly reckoned a part of prudence. about matters of action. Now a right estimate or opinion Reply to Objection 3. Rhetoric also reasons about is acquired in two ways, both in practical and in specu- practical matters, wherefore nothing hinders the same lative matters, first by discovering it oneself, secondly by thing belonging both to rhetoric and prudence. Never- learning it from others. Now just as docility consists in a theless, conjecture is taken here not only in the sense in man being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from which it is employed by rhetoricians, but also as applica- another man, so shrewdness is an apt disposition to ac- ble to all matters whatsoever wherein man is said to con- quire a right estimate by oneself, yet so that shrewdness be jecture the truth. taken for eustochia, of which it is a part. For eustochia is ∗ Ethic. vi, 9; Poster. i, 34 † Andronicus; Cf. q. 48, obj. 1 1433 Whether reason should be reckoned a part of prudence? IIa IIae q. 49 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that reason should not be Reply to Objection 1. Reason denotes here, not the reckoned a part of prudence. For the subject of an acci- power of reason, but its good use. dent is not a part thereof. But prudence is in the reason as Reply to Objection 2. The certitude of reason comes its subject (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore reason should not be from the intellect. Yet the need of reason is from a defect reckoned a part of prudence. in the intellect, since those things in which the intellec- Objection 2. Further, that which is common to many, tive power is in full vigor, have no need for reason, for should not be reckoned a part of any one of them; or if it they comprehend the truth by their simple insight, as do be so reckoned, it should be reckoned a part of that one to God and the angels. On the other hand particular matters which it chiefly belongs. Now reason is necessary in all of action, wherein prudence guides, are very far from the the intellectual virtues, and chiefly in wisdom and science, condition of things intelligible, and so much the farther, as which employ a demonstrative reason. Therefore reason they are less certain and fixed. Thus matters of art, though should not be reckoned a part of prudence they are singular, are nevertheless more fixed and certain, Objection 3. Further, reason as a power does not dif- wherefore in many of them there is no room for counsel fer essentially from the intelligence, as stated above ( Ia, on account of their certitude, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. q. 79, a. 8). If therefore intelligence be reckoned a part of Hence, although in certain other intellectual virtues rea- prudence, it is superfluous to add reason. son is more certain than in prudence, yet prudence above On the contrary, Macrobius∗, following the opinion all requires that man be an apt reasoner, so that he may of Plotinus, numbers reason among the parts of prudence. rightly apply universals to particulars, which latter are var- I answer that, The work of prudence is to take good ious and uncertain. counsel, as stated in Ethic. vi, 7. Now counsel is a re- Reply to Objection 3. Although intelligence and rea- search proceeding from certain things to others. But this is son are not different powers, yet they are named after dif- the work of reason. Wherefore it is requisite for prudence ferent acts. For intelligence takes its name from being an that man should be an apt reasoner. And since the things intimate penetration of the truth†, while reason is so called required for the perfection of prudence are called requisite from being inquisitive and discursive. Hence each is ac- or quasi-integral parts of prudence, it follows that reason counted a part of reason as explained above (a. 2; q. 47, should be numbered among these parts. a. 2 ,3). Whether foresight‡ should be accounted a part of prudence? IIa IIae q. 49 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that foresight should not I answer that, As stated above (q. 47, a. 1, ad 2, be accounted a part of prudence. For nothing is part of Aa. 6,13), prudence is properly about the means to an itself. Now foresight seems to be the same as prudence, end, and its proper work is to set them in due order to because according to Isidore (Etym. x), “a prudent man is the end. And although certain things are necessary for an one who sees from afar [porro videns]”: and this is also end, which are subject to divine providence, yet nothing the derivation of “providentia [foresight],” according to is subject to human providence except the contingent mat- Boethius (De Consol. v). Therefore foresight is not a part ters of actions which can be done by man for an end. Now of prudence. the past has become a kind of necessity, since what has Objection 2. Further, prudence is only practical, been done cannot be undone. In like manner, the present whereas foresight may be also speculative, because “see- as such, has a kind of necessity, since it is necessary that ing,” whence we have the word “to foresee,” has more to Socrates sit, so long as he sits. do with speculation than operation. Therefore foresight is Consequently, future contingents, in so far as they can not a part of prudence. be directed by man to the end of human life, are the mat- Objection 3. Further, the chief act of prudence is to ter of prudence: and each of these things is implied in the command, while its secondary act is to judge and to take word foresight, for it implies the notion of something dis- counsel. But none of these seems to be properly implied tant, to which that which occurs in the present has to be by foresight. Therefore foresight is not part of prudence. directed. Therefore foresight is part of prudence. On the contrary stands the authority of Tully and Mac- Reply to Objection 1. Whenever many things are req- robius, who number foresight among the parts of pru- uisite for a unity, one of them must needs be the principal dence, as stated above (q. 48). to which all the others are subordinate. Hence in every ∗ In Somn. Scip. i † Cf. IIa IIae, q. 8, a. 1 ‡ “Providentia,” which may be translated either “providence” or “foresight.” 1434 whole one part must be formal and predominant, whence tant, since they are everywhere and always, though they the whole has unity. Accordingly foresight is the prin- are distant from us, in so far as we fail to know them. cipal of all the parts of prudence, since whatever else is Hence foresight does not apply properly to speculative, required for prudence, is necessary precisely that some but only to practical matters. particular thing may be rightly directed to its end. Hence Reply to Objection 3. Right order to an end which is it is that the very name of prudence is taken from foresight included in the notion of foresight, contains rectitude of [providentia] as from its principal part. counsel, judgment and command, without which no right Reply to Objection 2. Speculation is about universal order to the end is possible. and necessary things, which, in themselves, are not dis- Whether circumspection can be a part of prudence? IIa IIae q. 49 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that circumspection can- combinations of circumstances, it happens that a thing is not be a part of prudence. For circumspection seems to good in itself and suitable to the end, and nevertheless signify looking at one’s surroundings. But these are of becomes evil or unsuitable to the end, by reason of some infinite number, and cannot be considered by the reason combination of circumstances. Thus to show signs of love wherein is prudence. Therefore circumspection should to someone seems, considered in itself, to be a fitting way not be reckoned a part of prudence. to arouse love in his heart, yet if pride or suspicion of flat- Objection 2. Further, circumstances seem to be the tery arise in his heart, it will no longer be a means suitable concern of moral virtues rather than of prudence. But to the end. Hence the need of circumspection in prudence, circumspection seems to denote nothing but attention to viz. of comparing the means with the circumstances. circumstances. Therefore circumspection apparently be- Reply to Objection 1. Though the number of pos- longs to the moral virtues rather than to prudence. sible circumstances be infinite, the number of actual cir- Objection 3. Further, whoever can see things afar off cumstances is not; and the judgment of reason in matters can much more see things that are near. Now foresight of action is influenced by things which are few in number enables a man to look on distant things. Therefore there is Reply to Objection 2. Circumstances are the con- no need to account circumspection a part of prudence in cern of prudence, because prudence has to fix them; on addition to foresight. the other hand they are the concern of moral virtues, in so On the contrary stands the authority of Macrobius, far as moral virtues are perfected by the fixing of circum- quoted above (q. 48). stances. I answer that, As stated above (a. 6), it belongs to Reply to Objection 3. Just as it belongs to foresight to prudence chiefly to direct something aright to an end; and look on that which is by its nature suitable to an end, so it this is not done aright unless both the end be good, and belongs to circumspection to consider whether it be suit- the means good and suitable. able to the end in view of the circumstances. Now each of Since, however, prudence, as stated above (q. 47, a. 3) these presents a difficulty of its own, and therefore each is is about singular matters of action, which contain many reckoned a distinct part of prudence. Whether caution should be reckoned a part of prudence? IIa IIae q. 49 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that caution should not be impossible. But no man can take precautions against all reckoned a part of prudence. For when no evil is possible, possible evils. Therefore caution does not belong to pru- no caution is required. Now no man makes evil use of dence. virtue, as Augustine declares (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). There- On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:15): “See fore caution does not belong to prudence which directs the how you walk cautiously [Douay: ‘circumspectly’].” virtues. I answer that, The things with which prudence is con- Objection 2. Further, to foresee good and to avoid cerned, are contingent matters of action, wherein, even evil belong to the same faculty, just as the same art gives as false is found with true, so is evil mingled with good, health and cures ill-health. Now it belongs to foresight to on account of the great variety of these matters of action, foresee good, and consequently, also to avoid evil. There- wherein good is often hindered by evil, and evil has the fore caution should not be accounted a part of prudence, appearance of good. Wherefore prudence needs caution, distinct from foresight. so that we may have such a grasp of good as to avoid evil. Objection 3. Further, no prudent man strives for the Reply to Objection 1. Caution is required in moral 1435 acts, that we may be on our guard, not against acts of grasped by reason, and against them caution is directed, virtue, but against the hindrance of acts of virtue. either that they may be avoided altogether, or that they Reply to Objection 2. It is the same in idea, to en- may do less harm. Others there are that occur rarely and sue good and to avoid the opposite evil, but the avoidance by chance, and these, since they are infinite in number, of outward hindrances is different in idea. Hence caution cannot be grasped by reason, nor is man able to take pre- differs from foresight, although they both belong to the cautions against them, although by exercising prudence he one virtue of prudence. is able to prepare against all the surprises of chance, so as Reply to Objection 3. Of the evils which man has to to suffer less harm thereby. avoid, some are of frequent occurrence; the like can be 1436 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 50 Of the Subjective Parts of Prudence (In Four Articles) We must, in due sequence, consider the subjective parts of prudence. And since we have already spoken of the prudence with which a man rules himself (q. 47, seqq.), it remains for us to discuss the species of prudence whereby a multitude is governed. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether a species of prudence is regnative? (2) Whether political and (3) domestic economy are species of prudence? (4) Whether military prudence is? Whether a species of prudence is regnative? IIa IIae q. 50 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that regnative should end. Hence prudence in its special and most perfect sense, not be reckoned a species of prudence. For regnative belongs to a king who is charged with the government of prudence is directed to the preservation of justice, since a city or kingdom: for which reason a species of prudence according to Ethic. v, 6 the prince is the guardian of is reckoned to be regnative. justice. Therefore regnative prudence belongs to justice Reply to Objection 1. All matters connected with rather than to prudence. moral virtue belong to prudence as their guide, wherefore Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher “right reason in accord with prudence” is included in the (Polit. iii, 5) a kingdom [regnum] is one of six species of definition of moral virtue, as stated above (q. 47, a. 5, ad government. But no species of prudence is ascribed to the 1; Ia IIae, q. 58, a. 2, ad 4). For this reason also the exe- other five forms of government, which are “aristocracy,” cution of justice in so far as it is directed to the common “polity,” also called “timocracy”∗, “tyranny,” “oligarchy” good, which is part of the kingly office, needs the guid- and “democracy.” Therefore neither should a regnative ance of prudence. Hence these two virtues—prudence and species be ascribed to a kingdom. justice—belong most properly to a king, according to Jer. Objection 3. Further, lawgiving belongs not only to 23:5: “A king shall reign and shall be wise, and shall ex- kings, but also to certain others placed in authority, and ecute justice and judgment in the earth.” Since, however, even to the people, according to Isidore (Etym. v). Now direction belongs rather to the king, and execution to his the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) reckons a part of prudence to subjects, regnative prudence is reckoned a species of pru- be “legislative.” Therefore it is not becoming to substitute dence which is directive, rather than to justice which is regnative prudence in its place. executive. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 11) Reply to Objection 2. A kingdom is the best of that “prudence is a virtue which is proper to the prince.” all governments, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10: wherefore Therefore a special kind of prudence is regnative. the species of prudence should be denominated rather I answer that, As stated above (q. 47, Aa. 8,10), it be- from a kingdom, yet so as to comprehend under regnative longs to prudence to govern and command, so that wher- all other rightful forms of government, but not perverse ever in human acts we find a special kind of governance forms which are opposed to virtue, and which, accord- and command, there must be a special kind of prudence. ingly, do not pertain to prudence. Now it is evident that there is a special and perfect kind of Reply to Objection 3. The Philosopher names regna- governance in one who has to govern not only himself but tive prudence after the principal act of a king which is to also the perfect community of a city or kingdom; because make laws, and although this applies to the other forms of a government is the more perfect according as it is more government, this is only in so far as they have a share of universal, extends to more matters, and attains a higher kingly government. ∗ Cf. Ethic. viii, 10 1437 Whether political prudence is fittingly accounted a part of prudence? IIa IIae q. 50 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that political prudence is actions, wherefore the rectitude of their government is not not fittingly accounted a part of prudence. For regnative in their power but in the power of their movers. On the is a part of political prudence, as stated above (a. 1). But other hand, men who are slaves or subjects in any sense, a part should not be reckoned a species with the whole. are moved by the commands of others in such a way that Therefore political prudence should not be reckoned a part they move themselves by their free-will; wherefore some of prudence. kind of rectitude of government is required in them, so Objection 2. Further, the species of habits are distin- that they may direct themselves in obeying their superi- guished by their various objects. Now what the ruler has ors; and to this belongs that species of prudence which is to command is the same as what the subject has to exe- called political. cute. Therefore political prudence as regards the subjects, Reply to Objection 1. As stated above, regnative is should not be reckoned a species of prudence distinct from the most perfect species of prudence, wherefore the pru- regnative prudence. dence of subjects, which falls short of regnative prudence, Objection 3. Further, each subject is an individual retains the common name of political prudence, even as in person. Now each individual person can direct himself logic a convertible term which does not denote the essence sufficiently by prudence commonly so called. Therefore of a thing retains the name of “proper.” there is no need of a special kind of prudence called polit- Reply to Objection 2. A different aspect of the object ical. diversifies the species of a habit, as stated above (q. 47, On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) a. 5). Now the same actions are considered by the king, that “of the prudence which is concerned with the state but under a more general aspect, as by his subjects who one kind is a master-prudence and is called legislative; obey: since many obey one king in various departments. another kind bears the common name political, and deals Hence regnative prudence is compared to this political with individuals.” prudence of which we are speaking, as mastercraft to I answer that, A slave is moved by his master, and a handicraft. subject by his ruler, by command, but otherwise than as Reply to Objection 3. Man directs himself by pru- irrational and inanimate beings are set in motion by their dence commonly so called, in relation to his own good, movers. For irrational and inanimate beings are moved but by political prudence, of which we speak, he directs only by others and do not put themselves in motion, since himself in relation to the common good. they have no free-will whereby to be masters of their own Whether a part of prudence should be reckoned to be domestic? IIa IIae q. 50 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that domestic should not ment of a multitude, “one of which is domestic, another be reckoned a part of prudence. For, according to the legislative, and another political.” Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) “prudence is directed to a good I answer that, Different aspects of an object, in re- life in general”: whereas domestic prudence is directed spect of universality and particularity, or of totality and to a particular end, viz. wealth, according to Ethic. i, 1. partiality, diversify arts and virtues; and in respect of such Therefore a species of prudence is not domestic. diversity one act of virtue is principal as compared with Objection 2. Further, as stated above (q. 47, a. 13) another. Now it is evident that a household is a mean be- prudence is only in good people. But domestic prudence tween the individual and the city or kingdom, since just may be also in wicked people, since many sinners are as the individual is part of the household, so is the house- provident in governing their household. Therefore do- hold part of the city or kingdom. And therefore, just as mestic prudence should not be reckoned a species of pru- prudence commonly so called which governs the individ- dence. ual, is distinct from political prudence, so must domestic Objection 3. Further, just as in a kingdom there is a prudence be distinct from both. ruler and subject, so also is there in a household. If there- Reply to Objection 1. Riches are compared to do- fore domestic like political is a species of prudence, there mestic prudence, not as its last end, but as its instrument, should be a paternal corresponding to regnative prudence. as stated in Polit. i, 3. On the other hand, the end of po- Now there is no such prudence. Therefore neither should litical prudence is “a good life in general” as regards the domestic prudence be accounted a species of prudence. conduct of the household. In Ethic. i, 1 the Philosopher On the contrary, The Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, speaks of riches as the end of political prudence, by way 8) that there are various kinds of prudence in the govern- of example and in accordance with the opinion of many. 1438 Reply to Objection 2. Some sinners may be provi-Reply to Objection 3. The father has in his household dent in certain matters of detail concerning the disposition an authority like that of a king, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10, of their household, but not in regard to “a good life in gen-but he has not the full power of a king, wherefore paternal eral” as regards the conduct of the household, for which government is not reckoned a distinct species of prudence, above all a virtuous life is required. like regnative prudence. Whether military prudence should be reckoned a part of prudence? IIa IIae q. 50 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that military prudence to govern each thing in itself, secondly, to withstand out- should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For prudence ward assailants and corruptives: and for this reason she is distinct from art, according to Ethic. vi, 3. Now military has provided animals not only with the concupiscible fac- prudence seems to be the art of warfare, according to the ulty, whereby they are moved to that which is conducive Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore military prudence to their well-being, but also with the irascible power, should not be accounted a species of prudence. whereby the animal withstands an assailant. Therefore Objection 2. Further, just as military business is con- in those things also which are in accordance with reason, tained under political affairs, so too are many other mat- there should be not only “political” prudence, which dis- ters, such as those of tradesmen, craftsmen, and so forth. poses in a suitable manner such things as belong to the But there are no species of prudence corresponding to common good, but also a “military” prudence, whereby other affairs in the state. Neither therefore should any be hostile attacks are repelled. assigned to military business. Reply to Objection 1. Military prudence may be an Objection 3. Further, the soldiers’ bravery counts for art, in so far as it has certain rules for the right use of cer-a great deal in warfare. Therefore military prudence per- tain external things, such as arms and horses, but in so far tains to fortitude rather than to prudence. as it is directed to the common good, it belongs rather to On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 24:6): “War is prudence. managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety where Reply to Objection 2. Other matters in the state are there are many counsels.” Now it belongs to prudence to directed to the profit of individuals, whereas the business take counsel. Therefore there is great need in warfare for of soldiering is directed to the service belongs to fortitude, that species of prudence which is called “military.” but the direction, protection of the entire common good. I answer that, Whatever things are done according to Reply to Objection 3. The execution of military ser- art or reason, should be made to conform to those which vice belongs to fortitude, but the direction, especially in are in accordance with nature, and are established by the so far as it concerns the commander-in-chief, belongs to Divine Reason. Now nature has a twofold tendency: first, prudence. 1439 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 51 Of the Virtues Which Are Connected with Prudence (In Four Articles) In due sequence, we must consider the virtues that are connected with prudence, and which are its quasi-potential parts. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether euboulia, is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a special virtue, distinct from prudence? (3) Whether synesis is a special virtue? (4) Whether gnome is a special virtue? ∗ Whether euboulia (deliberating well) is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 51 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that euboulia (deliberat-euboulia (deliberating well) is a human virtue. ing well) is not a virtue. For, according to Augustine (De Reply to Objection 1. There is no good counsel ei- Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) “no man makes evil use of virtue.” ther in deliberating for an evil end, or in discovering evil Now some make evil use of euboulia (deliberating well) means for attaining a good end, even as in speculative or good counsel, either through devising crafty counsels matters, there is no good reasoning either in coming to in order to achieve evil ends, or through committing sin in a false conclusion, or in coming to a true conclusion from order that they may achieve good ends, as those who rob false premisses through employing an unsuitable middle that they may give alms. Therefore euboulia (deliberating term. Hence both the aforesaid processes are contrary to well) is not a virtue. euboulia (deliberating well), as the Philosopher declares Objection 2. Further, virtue is a perfection, according (Ethic. vi, 9). to Phys. vii. But euboulia (deliberating well) is concerned Reply to Objection 2. Although virtue is essentially a with counsel, which implies doubt and research, and these perfection, it does not follow that whatever is the matter of are marks of imperfection. Therefore euboulia (deliberat-a virtue implies perfection. For man needs to be perfected ing well) is not a virtue. by virtues in all his parts, and this not only as regards the Objection 3. Further, virtues are connected with one acts of reason, of which counsel is one, but also as regards another, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 65). Now euboulia the passions of the sensitive appetite, which are still more (deliberating well) is not connected with the other virtues, imperfect. since many sinners take good-counsel, and many godly It may also be replied that human virtue is a perfection men are slow in taking counsel. Therefore euboulia (de- according to the mode of man, who is unable by simple liberating well) is not a virtue. insight to comprehend with certainty the truth of things, On the contrary, According to the Philosopher especially in matters of action which are contingent. (Ethic. vi, 9) euboulia (deliberating well) “is a right coun-Reply to Objection 3. In no sinner as such is euboulia selling.” Now the perfection of virtue consists in right (deliberating well) to be found: since all sin is contrary to reason. Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is a virtue. taking good counsel. For good counsel requires not only I answer that, As stated above (q. 47, a. 4) the nature the discovery or devising of fit means for the end, but also of a human virtue consists in making a human act good. other circumstances. Such are suitable time, so that one be Now among the acts of man, it is proper to him to take neither too slow nor too quick in taking counsel, and the counsel, since this denotes a research of the reason about mode of taking counsel, so that one be firm in the coun- the actions he has to perform and whereof human life con- sel taken, and other like due circumstances, which sinners sists, for the speculative life is above man, as stated in fail to observe when they sin. On the other hand, every Ethic. x. But euboulia (deliberating well) signifies good-virtuous man takes good counsel in those things which are ness of counsel, for it is derived from the eu, good, and directed to the end of virtue, although perhaps he does not boule, counsel, being “a good counsel” or rather “a distake good counsel in other particular matters, for instance position to take good counsel.” Hence it is evident that in matters of trade, or warfare, or the like. ∗ These three Greek words may be rendered as the faculties of deliberating well euboulia, of judging well according to common law synesis, and of judging well according to general law gnome, respectively. 1440 Whether euboulia (deliberating well) is a special virtue, distinct from prudence? IIa IIae q. 51 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that euboulia (deliberat-wherefore all these belong to the same virtue of charity. ing well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence. For, ac- Now acts of the reason that are ordained to action are cording to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), the “prudent man diverse, nor have they the same kind of goodness: since is, seemingly, one who takes good counsel.” Now this it is owing to different causes that a man acquires good belongs to euboulia (deliberating well) as stated above. counsel, good judgment, or good command, inasmuch as Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is not distinct from these are sometimes separated from one another. Con-prudence. sequently euboulia (deliberating well) which makes man Objection 2. Further, human acts to which human take good counsel must needs be a distinct virtue from virtues are directed, are specified chiefly by their end, as prudence, which makes man command well. And since stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 18, Aa. 4,6). counsel is directed to command as to that which is prin- Now euboulia (deliberating well) and prudence are di- cipal, so euboulia (deliberating well) is directed to pru-rected to the same end, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9, not in- dence as to a principal virtue, without which it would be deed to some particular end, but to the common end of all no virtue at all, even as neither are the moral virtues with- life. Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is not a dis-out prudence, nor the other virtues without charity. tinct virtue from prudence. Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to prudence to take Objection 3. Further, in speculative sciences, research good counsel by commanding it, to euboulia (deliberating and decision belong to the same science. Therefore in well) by eliciting it. like manner these belong to the same virtue in practical Reply to Objection 2. Different acts are directed in matters. Now research belongs to euboulia (deliberating different degrees to the one end which is “a good life in well), while decision belongs to prudence. There euboulia general”∗: for counsel comes first, judgment follows, and (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence. command comes last. The last named has an immediate On the contrary, Prudence is preceptive, according to relation to the last end: whereas the other two acts are Ethic. vi, 10. But this does not apply to euboulia (delib-related thereto remotely. Nevertheless these have certain erating well). Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is a proximate ends of their own, the end of counsel being the distinct virtue from prudence. discovery of what has to be done, and the end of judgment, I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), virtue is prop- certainty. Hence this proves not that euboulia (deliberaterly directed to an act which it renders good; and con- ing well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence, but that it sequently virtues must differ according to different acts, is subordinate thereto, as a secondary to a principal virtue. especially when there is a different kind of goodness in Reply to Objection 3. Even in speculative matters the acts. For, if various acts contained the same kind of the rational science of dialectics, which is directed to re- goodness, they would belong to the same virtue: thus the search and discovery, is distinct from demonstrative sci- goodness of love, desire and joy depends on the same, ence, which decides the truth. Whether synesis (judging well according to common law) is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 51 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that synesis is not a virtue. wicked man errs. If therefore synesis (judging well ac- Virtues are not in us by nature, according to Ethic. ii, cording to common law) be reckoned a virtue directed 1. But synesis (judging well according to common law) to good judgment, it seems that there is no need for any is natural to some, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, other virtue directed to good command: and consequently 11). Therefore synesis (judging well according to com- prudence would be superfluous, which is not reasonable. mon law) is not a virtue. Therefore synesis (judging well according to common Objection 2. Further, as stated in the same book (10), law) is not a virtue. synesis (judging well according to common law) is noth- On the contrary, Judgment is more perfect than coun- ing but “a faculty of judging.” But judgment without com- sel. But euboulia, or good counsel, is a virtue. Much mand can be even in the wicked. Since then virtue is only more, therefore, is synesis (judging well according to in the good, it seems that synesis (judging well according common law) a virtue, as being good judgment. to common law) is not a virtue. I answer that, synesis (judging well according to Objection 3. Further, there is never a defective com-common law) signifies a right judgment, not indeed about mand, unless there be a defective judgment, at least in speculative matters, but about particular practical matters, a particular matter of action; for it is in this that every about which also is prudence. Hence in Greek some, in re- ∗ Ethic. vi, 5 1441 spect of synesis (judging well according to common law) ill disposed, the images therein appear distorted and mis-are said to be synetoi, i.e. “persons of sense,” or eusynetoi, shapen. Now that the cognitive power be well disposed to i.e. “men of good sense,” just as on the other hand, those receive things just as they are in reality, is radically due who lack this virtue are called asynetoi, i.e. “senseless.” to nature, but, as to its consummation, is due to practice Now, different acts which cannot be ascribed to the or to a gift of grace, and this in two ways. First directly, same cause, must correspond to different virtues. And it on the part of the cognitive power itself, for instance, be- is evident that goodness of counsel and goodness of judg- cause it is imbued, not with distorted, but with true and ment are not reducible to the same cause, for many can correct ideas: this belongs to synesis (judging well ac-take good counsel, without having good sense so as to cording to common law) which in this respect is a special judge well. Even so, in speculative matters some are good virtue. Secondly indirectly, through the good disposition at research, through their reason being quick at arguing of the appetitive power, the result being that one judges from one thing to another (which seems to be due to a well of the objects of appetite: and thus a good judgment disposition of their power of imagination, which has a fa- of virtue results from the habits of moral virtue; but this cility in forming phantasms), and yet such persons some- judgment is about the ends, whereas synesis (judging well times lack good judgment (and this is due to a defect in according to common law) is rather about the means. the intellect arising chiefly from a defective disposition Reply to Objection 2. In wicked men there may be of the common sense which fails to judge aright). Hence right judgment of a universal principle, but their judg- there is need, besides euboulia (deliberating well), for an-ment is always corrupt in the particular matter of action, other virtue, which judges well, and this is called synesis as stated above (q. 47, a. 13). (judging well according to common law). Reply to Objection 3. Sometimes after judging aright Reply to Objection 1. Right judgment consists in the we delay to execute or execute negligently or inordinately. cognitive power apprehending a thing just as it is in real- Hence after the virtue which judges aright there is a fur- ity, and this is due to the right disposition of the apprehen- ther need of a final and principal virtue, which commands sive power. Thus if a mirror be well disposed the forms of aright, and this is prudence. bodies are reflected in it just as they are, whereas if it be Whether gnome (judging well according to general law) is a special virtue? IIa IIae q. 51 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that gnome (judging well is a special virtue. according to general law) is not a special virtue distinct I answer that cognitive habits differ according to from synesis (judging well according to common law). higher and lower principles: thus in speculative matters For a man is said, in respect of synesis (judging well ac-wisdom considers higher principles than science does, and cording to common law), to have good judgment. Now no consequently is distinguished from it; and so must it be man can be said to have good judgment, unless he judge also in practical matters. Now it is evident that what is aright in all things. Therefore synesis (judging well ac-beside the order of a lower principle or cause, is some- cording to common law) extends to all matters of judg- times reducible to the order of a higher principle; thus ment, and consequently there is no other virtue of good monstrous births of animals are beside the order of the ac- judgment called gnome (judging well according to gen- tive seminal force, and yet they come under the order of eral law). a higher principle, namely, of a heavenly body, or higher Objection 2. Further, judgment is midway between still, of Divine Providence. Hence by considering the ac- counsel and precept. Now there is only one virtue of good tive seminal force one could not pronounce a sure judg- counsel, viz. euboulia (deliberating well) and only one ment on such monstrosities, and yet this is possible if we virtue of good command, viz. prudence. Therefore there consider Divine Providence. is only one virtue of good judgment, viz. synesis (judging Now it happens sometimes that something has to be well according to common law). done which is not covered by the common rules of ac- Objection 3. Further, rare occurrences wherein there tions, for instance in the case of the enemy of one’s coun- is need to depart from the common law, seem for the most try, when it would be wrong to give him back his deposit, part to happen by chance, and with such things reason is or in other similar cases. Hence it is necessary to judge of not concerned, as stated in Phys. ii, 5. Now all the intel- such matters according to higher principles than the com- lectual virtues depend on right reason. Therefore there is mon laws, according to which synesis (judging according no intellectual virtue about such matters. to common law) judges: and corresponding to such higher On the contrary, The Philosopher concludes (Ethic. principles it is necessary to have a higher virtue of judg- vi, 11) that gnome (judging well according to general law) ment, which is called gnome (judging according to gen-1442 eral law), and which denotes a certain discrimination in which the research of counsel belongs is one for all, but judgment. not so synesis (judging well according to common law) Reply to Objection 1. Synesis (judging well accord-whose act is judicial. Command considers in all matters ing to common law) judges rightly about all actions that the one aspect of good, wherefore prudence also is only are covered by the common rules: but certain things have one. to be judged beside these common rules, as stated above. Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to Divine Provi- Reply to Objection 2. Judgment about a thing should dence alone to consider all things that may happen be- be formed from the proper principles thereof, whereas re- side the common course. On the other hand, among men, search is made by employing also common principles. he who is most discerning can judge a greater number of Wherefore also in speculative matters, dialectics which such things by his reason: this belongs to gnome (judging aims at research proceeds from common principles; while well according to general law), which denotes a certain demonstration which tends to judgment, proceeds from discrimination in judgment. proper principles. Hence euboulia (deliberating well) to 1443 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 52 Of the Gift of Counsel (In Four Articles) We must now consider the gift of counsel which corresponds to prudence. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether counsel should be reckoned among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost? (2) Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence? (3) Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven? (4) Whether the fifth beatitude, “Blessed are the merciful,” etc. corresponds to the gift of counsel? Whether counsel should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost? IIa IIae q. 52 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that counsel should not of the thing moved: thus He moves the corporeal creature be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The gifts through time and place, and the spiritual creature through of the Holy Ghost are given as a help to the virtues, ac- time, but not through place, as Augustine declares (Gen. cording to Gregory (Moral. ii, 49). Now for the pur- ad lit. viii, 20,22). Again, it is proper to the rational crea- pose of taking counsel, man is sufficiently perfected by ture to be moved through the research of reason to perform the virtue of prudence, or even of euboulia (deliberating any particular action, and this research is called counsel. well), as is evident from what has been said (q. 47, a. 1, Hence the Holy Ghost is said to move the rational creature ad 2; q. 51, Aa. 1,2). Therefore counsel should not be by way of counsel, wherefore counsel is reckoned among reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Objection 2. Further, the difference between the Reply to Objection 1. Prudence or euboulia (delib-seven gifts of the Holy Ghost and the gratuitous graces erating well), whether acquired or infused, directs man seems to be that the latter are not given to all, but are di- in the research of counsel according to principles that the vided among various people, whereas the gifts of the Holy reason can grasp; hence prudence or euboulia (deliberat-Ghost are given to all who have the Holy Ghost. But coun- ing well) makes man take good counsel either for himself sel seems to be one of those things which are given by the or for another. Since, however, human reason is unable to Holy Ghost specially to certain persons, according to 1 grasp the singular and contingent things which may occur, Macc. 2:65: “Behold. . . your brother Simon is a man of the result is that “the thoughts of mortal men are fearful, counsel.” Therefore counsel should be numbered among and our counsels uncertain” (Wis. 9:14). Hence in the re- the gratuitous graces rather than among the seven gifts of search of counsel, man requires to be directed by God who the Holy Ghost. comprehends all things: and this is done through the gift Objection 3. Further, it is written (Rom. 8:14): of counsel, whereby man is directed as though counseled “Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons by God, just as, in human affairs, those who are unable to of God.” But counselling is not consistent with being led take counsel for themselves, seek counsel from those who by another. Since then the gifts of the Holy Ghost are are wiser. most befitting the children of God, who “have received Reply to Objection 2. That a man be of such good the spirit of adoption of sons,” it would seem that coun- counsel as to counsel others, may be due to a gratuitous sel should not be numbered among the gifts of the Holy grace; but that a man be counselled by God as to what he Ghost. ought to do in matters necessary for salvation is common On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): ”(The Spirit to all holy persons. of the Lord) shall rest upon him. . . the spirit of counsel, Reply to Objection 3. The children of God are moved and of fortitude.” by the Holy Ghost according to their mode, without prej- I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 1), udice to their free-will which is the “faculty of will and the gifts of the Holy Ghost are dispositions whereby the reason”∗. Accordingly the gift of counsel is befitting the soul is rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy children of God in so far as the reason is instructed by the Ghost. Now God moves everything according to the mode Holy Ghost about what we have to do. ∗ Sent. iii, D, 24 1444 Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to the virtue of prudence? IIa IIae q. 52 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the gift of counsel a higher principle of movement, as a body through being does not fittingly correspond to the virtue of prudence. moved by a spirit. Now it is evident that the rectitude For “the highest point of that which is underneath touches of human reason is compared to the Divine Reason, as a that which is above,” as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. lower motive principle to a higher: for the Eternal Reason vii), even as a man comes into contact with the angel in re- is the supreme rule of all human rectitude. Consequently spect of his intellect. Now cardinal virtues are inferior to prudence, which denotes rectitude of reason, is chiefly the gifts, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 8). Since, then, perfected and helped through being ruled and moved by counsel is the first and lowest act of prudence, while com- the Holy Ghost, and this belongs to the gift of counsel, as mand is its highest act, and judgment comes between, it stated above (a. 1). Therefore the gift of counsel corre- seems that the gift corresponding to prudence is not coun- sponds to prudence, as helping and perfecting it. sel, but rather a gift of judgment or command. Reply to Objection 1. To judge and command be- Objection 2. Further, one gift suffices to help one longs not to the thing moved, but to the mover. Where- virtue, since the higher a thing is the more one it is, as fore, since in the gifts of the Holy Ghost, the position of proved in De Causis. Now prudence is helped by the gift the human mind is of one moved rather than of a mover, of knowledge, which is not only speculative but also prac- as stated above (a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 1), it follows that tical, as shown above (q. 9, a. 3). Therefore the gift of it would be unfitting to call the gift corresponding to pru- counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence. dence by the name of command or judgment rather than Objection 3. Further, it belongs properly to prudence of counsel whereby it is possible to signify that the coun- to direct, as stated above (q. 47, a. 8). But it belongs to selled mind is moved by another counselling it. the gift of counsel that man should be directed by God, as Reply to Objection 2. The gift of knowledge does not stated above (a. 1). Therefore the gift of counsel does not directly correspond to prudence, since it deals with spec- correspond to the virtue of prudence. ulative matters: yet by a kind of extension it helps it. On On the contrary, The gift of counsel is about what the other hand the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence has to be done for the sake of the end. Now prudence is directly, because it is concerned about the same things. about the same matter. Therefore they correspond to one Reply to Objection 3. The mover that is moved, another. moves through being moved. Hence the human mind, I answer that, A lower principle of movement is from the very fact that it is directed by the Holy Ghost, helped chiefly, and is perfected through being moved by is enabled to direct itself and others. Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven? IIa IIae q. 52 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the gift of counsel or not to have won.” does not remain in heaven. For counsel is about what has I answer that, As stated above (a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 68, to be done for the sake of an end. But in heaven nothing a. 1), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected with the will have to be done for the sake of an end, since there motion of the rational creature by God. Now we must man possesses the last end. Therefore the gift of counsel observe two points concerning the motion of the human is not in heaven. mind by God. First, that the disposition of that which is Objection 2. Further, counsel implies doubt, for it is moved, differs while it is being moved from its disposition absurd to take counsel in matters that are evident, as the when it is in the term of movement. Indeed if the mover Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii, 3). Now all doubt will is the principle of the movement alone, when the move- cease in heaven. Therefore there is no counsel in heaven. ment ceases, the action of the mover ceases as regards Objection 3. Further, the saints in heaven are most the thing moved, since it has already reached the term of conformed to God, according to 1 Jn. 3:2, “When He movement, even as a house, after it is built, ceases being shall appear, we shall be like to Him.” But counsel is not built by the builder. On the other hand, when the mover becoming to God, according to Rom. 11:34, “Who hath is cause not only of the movement, but also of the form to been His counsellor?” Therefore neither to the saints in which the movement tends, then the action of the mover heaven is the gift of counsel becoming. does not cease even after the form has been attained: thus On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xvii, 12): the sun lightens the air even after it is lightened. In this “When either the guilt or the righteousness of each na- way, then, God causes in us virtue and knowledge, not tion is brought into the debate of the heavenly Court, the only when we first acquire them, but also as long as we guardian of that nation is said to have won in the conflict, persevere in them: and it is thus that God causes in the 1445 blessed a knowledge of what is to be done, not as though Accordingly the gift of counsel is in the blessed, in they were ignorant, but by continuing that knowledge in so far as God preserves in them the knowledge that they them. have, and enlightens them in their nescience of what has Nevertheless there are things which the blessed, to be done. whether angels or men, do not know: such things are not Reply to Objection 1. Even in the blessed there are essential to blessedness, but concern the government of acts directed to an end, or resulting, as it were, from their things according to Divine Providence. As regards these, attainment of the end, such as the acts of praising God, we must make a further observation, namely, that God or of helping on others to the end which they themselves moves the mind of the blessed in one way, and the mind of have attained, for example the ministrations of the angels, the wayfarer, in another. For God moves the mind of the and the prayers of the saints. In this respect the gift of wayfarer in matters of action, by soothing the pre-existing counsel finds a place in them. anxiety of doubt; whereas there is simple nescience in the Reply to Objection 2. Doubt belongs to counsel ac- mind of the blessed as regards the things they do not know. cording to the present state of life, but not to that counsel From this nescience the angel’s mind is cleansed, accord- which takes place in heaven. Even so neither have the ing to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), nor does there pre- theological virtues quite the same acts in heaven as on the cede in them any research of doubt, for they simply turn way thither. to God; and this is to take counsel of God, for as Augus- Reply to Objection 3. Counsel is in God, not as re- tine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) “the angels take counsel of ceiving but as giving it: and the saints in heaven are con- God about things beneath them”: wherefore the instruc- formed to God, as receivers to the source whence they tion which they receive from God in such matters is called receive. “counsel.” Whether the fifth beatitude, which is that of mercy, corresponds to the gift of counsel? IIa IIae q. 52 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the fifth beatitude, and to give.” which is that of mercy, does not correspond to the gift of I answer that, Counsel is properly about things use- counsel. For all the beatitudes are acts of virtue, as stated ful for an end. Hence such things as are of most use for above ( Ia IIae, q. 69, a. 1). Now we are directed by coun- an end, should above all correspond to the gift of coun- sel in all acts of virtue. Therefore the fifth beatitude does sel. Now such is mercy, according to 1 Tim. 4:8, “Godli- not correspond more than any other to counsel. ness∗ is profitable to all things.” Therefore the beatitude Objection 2. Further, precepts are given about matters of mercy specially corresponds to the gift of counsel, not necessary for salvation, while counsel is given about mat- as eliciting but as directing mercy. ters which are not necessary for salvation. Now mercy is Reply to Objection 1. Although counsel directs in all necessary for salvation, according to James 2:13, “Judg- the acts of virtue, it does so in a special way in works of ment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy.” On mercy, for the reason given above. the other hand poverty is not necessary for salvation, but Reply to Objection 2. Counsel considered as a gift of belongs to the life of perfection, according to Mat. 19:21. the Holy Ghost guides us in all matters that are directed to Therefore the beatitude of poverty corresponds to the gift the end of eternal life whether they be necessary for salva- of counsel, rather than to the beatitude of mercy. tion or not, and yet not every work of mercy is necessary Objection 3. Further, the fruits result from the beati- for salvation. tudes, for they denote a certain spiritual delight resulting Reply to Objection 3. Fruit denotes something ulti- from perfect acts of virtue. Now none of the fruits corre- mate. Now the ultimate in practical matters consists not spond to the gift of counsel, as appears from Gal. 5:22, 23. in knowledge but in an action which is the end. Hence Therefore neither does the beatitude of mercy correspond nothing pertaining to practical knowledge is numbered to the gift of counsel. among the fruits, but only such things as pertain to action, On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in which practical knowledge is the guide. Among these iv): “Counsel is befitting the merciful, because the one we find “goodness” and “benignity” which correspond to remedy is to be delivered from evils so great, to pardon, mercy. ∗ ‘Pietas,’ which our English word ‘pity,’ which is the same as mercy; see note on IIa IIae, q. 30, a. 1 1446 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 53 Of Imprudence (In Six Articles) We must now consider the vices opposed to prudence. For Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3): “There are vices opposed to every virtue, not only vices that are in manifest opposition to virtue, as temerity is opposed to prudence, but also vices which have a kind of kinship and not a true but a spurious likeness to virtue; thus in opposition to prudence we have craftiness.” Accordingly we must consider first of all those vices which are in evident opposition to prudence, those namely which are due to a defect either of prudence or of those things which are requisite for prudence, and secondly those vices which have a false resemblance to prudence, those namely which are due to abuse of the things required for prudence. And since solicitude pertains to prudence, the first of these considerations will be twofold: (1) Of imprudence; (2) Of negligence which is opposed to solicitude. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Concerning imprudence, whether it is a sin? (2) Whether it is a special sin? (3) Of precipitation or temerity; (4) Of thoughtlessness; (5) Of inconstancy; (6) Concerning the origin of these vices. Whether imprudence is a sin? IIa IIae q. 53 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that imprudence is not a for instance, whereas the right reason of prudence acts sin. For every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine∗; by taking counsel, the imprudent man despises counsel, whereas imprudence is not voluntary, since no man wishes and the same applies to the other conditions which re- to be imprudent. Therefore imprudence is not a sin. quire consideration in the act of prudence. In this way Objection 2. Further, none but original sin comes to imprudence is a sin in respect of prudence considered un- man with his birth. But imprudence comes to man with der its proper aspect, since it is not possible for a man his birth, wherefore the young are imprudent; and yet it to act against prudence, except by infringing the rules on is not original sin which is opposed to original justice. which the right reason of prudence depends. Wherefore, if Therefore imprudence is not a sin. this should happen through aversion from the Divine Law, Objection 3. Further, every sin is taken away by re- it will be a mortal sin, as when a man acts precipitately pentance. But imprudence is not taken away by repen- through contempt and rejection of the Divine teaching: tance. Therefore imprudence is not a sin. whereas if he act beside the Law and without contempt, On the contrary, The spiritual treasure of grace is not and without detriment to things necessary for salvation, it taken away save by sin. But it is taken away by impru- will be a venial sin. dence, according to Prov. 21:20, “There is a treasure to Reply to Objection 1. No man desires the deformity be desired, and oil in the dwelling of the just, and the im- of imprudence, but the rash man wills the act of impru- prudent [Douay: ‘foolish’] man shall spend it.” Therefore dence, because he wishes to act precipitately. Hence the imprudence is a sin. Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that “he who sins willingly I answer that, Imprudence may be taken in two ways, against prudence is less to be commended.” first, as a privation, secondly, as a contrary. Properly Reply to Objection 2. This argument takes impru- speaking it is not taken as a negation, so as merely to sig- dence in the negative sense. It must be observed however nify the absence of prudence, for this can be without any that lack of prudence or of any other virtue is included sin. Taken as a privation, imprudence denotes lack of that in the lack of original justice which perfected the entire prudence which a man can and ought to have, and in this soul. Accordingly all such lack of virtue may be ascribed sense imprudence is a sin by reason of a man’s negligence to original sin. in striving to have prudence. Reply to Objection 3. Repentance restores infused Imprudence is taken as a contrary, in so far as the prudence, and thus the lack of this prudence ceases; but movement or act of reason is in opposition to prudence: acquired prudence is not restored as to the habit, although ∗ De Vera Relig. xiv 1447 the contrary act is taken away, wherein properly speaking the sin of imprudence consists. Whether imprudence is a special sin? IIa IIae q. 53 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that imprudence is not a nected with it, and correspond to the several acts of rea- special sin. For whoever sins, acts against right reason, son. Thus, by defect of “counsel” to which euboulia (de-i.e. against prudence. But imprudence consists in acting liberating well) corresponds, “precipitation” or “temerity” against prudence, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore impru- is a species of imprudence; by defect of “judgment,” to dence is not a special sin. which synesis (judging well according to common law) Objection 2. Further, prudence is more akin to moral and gnome (judging well according to general law) re- action than knowledge is. But ignorance which is opposed fer, there is “thoughtlessness”; while “inconstancy” and to knowledge, is reckoned one of the general causes of “negligence” correspond to the “command” which is the sin. Much more therefore should imprudence be reckoned proper act of prudence. Thirdly, this may be taken by op- among those causes. position to those things which are requisite for prudence, Objection 3. Further, sin consists in the corruption which are the quasi-integral parts of prudence. Since how- of the circumstances of virtue, wherefore Dionysius says ever all these things are intended for the direction of the (Div. Nom. iv) that “evil results from each single defect.” aforesaid three acts of reason, it follows that all the op- Now many things are requisite for prudence; for instance, posite defects are reducible to the four parts mentioned reason, intelligence docility, and so on, as stated above above. Thus incautiousness and incircumspection are in- (Qq. 48,49). Therefore there are many species of impru- cluded in “thoughtlessness”; lack of docility, memory, or dence, so that it is not a special sin. reason is referable to “precipitation”; improvidence, lack On the contrary, Imprudence is opposed to prudence, of intelligence and of shrewdness, belong to “negligence” as stated above (a. 1). Now prudence is a special virtue. and “inconstancy.” Therefore imprudence too is one special vice. Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers gen- I answer that, A vice or sin may be styled general erality by participation. in two ways; first, absolutely, because, to wit, it is gen- Reply to Objection 2. Since knowledge is further re- eral in respect of all sins; secondly, because it is general moved from morality than prudence is, according to their in respect of certain vices, which are its species. In the respective proper natures, it follows that ignorance has the first way, a vice may be said to be general on two counts: nature of mortal sin, not of itself, but on account either of first, essentially, because it is predicated of all sins: and in a preceding negligence, or of the consequent result, and this way imprudence is not a general sin, as neither is pru- for this reason it is reckoned one of the general causes of dence a general virtue: since it is concerned with special sin. On the other hand imprudence, by its very nature, de- acts, namely the very acts of reason: secondly, by partic- notes a moral vice; and for this reason it can be called a ipation; and in this way imprudence is a general sin: for, special sin. just as all the virtues have a share of prudence, in so far Reply to Objection 3. When various circumstances as it directs them, so have all vices and sins a share of im- are corrupted for the same motive, the species of sin is prudence, because no sin can occur, without some defect not multiplied: thus it is the same species of sin to take in an act of the directing reason, which defect belongs to what is not one’s own, where one ought not, and when one imprudence. ought not. If, however, there be various motives, there are If, on the other hand, a sin be called general, not sim- various species: for instance, if one man were to take an- ply but in some particular genus, that is, as containing sev- other’s property from where he ought not, so as to wrong a eral species of sin, then imprudence is a general sin. For sacred place, this would constitute the species called sac- it contains various species in three ways. First, by op- rilege, while if another were to take another’s property position to the various subjective parts of prudence, for when he ought not, merely through the lust of possession, just as we distinguish the prudence that guides the in- this would be a case of simple avarice. Hence the lack dividual, from other kinds that govern communities, as of those things which are requisite for prudence, does not stated above (q. 48; q. 50, a. 7 ), so also we distinguish constitute a diversity of species, except in so far as they various kinds of imprudence. Secondly, in respect of the are directed to different acts of reason, as stated above. quasi-potential parts of prudence, which are virtues con- 1448 Whether precipitation is a sin included in imprudence? IIa IIae q. 53 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that precipitation is not a the action performed by the body; while the steps that in- sin included in imprudence. Imprudence is opposed to the tervene by which one ought to descend in orderly fashion virtue of prudence; whereas precipitation is opposed to the are “memory” of the past, “intelligence” of the present, gift of counsel, according to Gregory, who says (Moral. ii, “shrewdness” in considering the future outcome, “reason- 49) that the gift of “counsel is given as a remedy to pre- ing” which compares one thing with another, “docility” cipitation.” Therefore precipitation is not a sin contained in accepting the opinions of others. He that takes coun- under imprudence. sel descends by these steps in due order, whereas if a man Objection 2. Further, precipitation seemingly pertains is rushed into action by the impulse of his will or of a to rashness. Now rashness implies presumption, which passion, without taking these steps, it will be a case of pertains to pride. Therefore precipitation is not a vice con- precipitation. Since then inordinate counsel pertains to tained under imprudence. imprudence, it is evident that the vice of precipitation is Objection 3. Further, precipitation seems to denote contained under imprudence. inordinate haste. Now sin happens in counselling not only Reply to Objection 1. Rectitude of counsel belongs through being over hasty but also through being over slow, to the gift of counsel and to the virtue of prudence; al- so that the opportunity for action passes by, and through beit in different ways, as stated above (q. 52, a. 2), and corruption of other circumstances, as stated in Ethic. vi, consequently precipitation is opposed to both. 9. Therefore there is no reason for reckoning precipitation Reply to Objection 2. Things are said to be done as a sin contained under imprudence, rather than slow- rashly when they are not directed by reason: and this may ness, or something else of the kind pertaining to inordi- happen in two ways; first through the impulse of the will nate counsel. or of a passion, secondly through contempt of the direct- On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 4:19): “The way ing rule; and this is what is meant by rashness properly of the wicked is darksome, they know not where they fall.” speaking, wherefore it appears to proceed from that root Now the darksome ways of ungodliness belong to impru- of pride, which refuses to submit to another’s ruling. But dence. Therefore imprudence leads a man to fall or to be precipitation refers to both, so that rashness is contained precipitate. under precipitation, although precipitation refers rather to I answer that, Precipitation is ascribed metaphori- the first. cally to acts of the soul, by way of similitude to bodily Reply to Objection 3. Many things have to be con- movement. Now a thing is said to be precipitated as re- sidered in the research of reason; hence the Philosopher gards bodily movement, when it is brought down from declares (Ethic. vi, 9) that “one should be slow in taking above by the impulse either of its own movement or of counsel.” Hence precipitation is more directly opposed to another’s, and not in orderly fashion by degrees. Now the rectitude of counsel than over slowness is, for the latter summit of the soul is the reason, and the base is reached in bears a certain likeness to right counsel. Whether thoughtlessness is a special sin included in prudence? IIa IIae q. 53 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that thoughtlessness is not has been counselled, and “command”∗. Now thought pre- a special sin included in imprudence. For the Divine law cedes all these acts, since it belongs also to the specula- does not incite us to any sin, according to Ps. 18:8, “The tive intellect. Therefore thoughtlessness is not a special law of the Lord is unspotted”; and yet it incites us to be sin contained under imprudence. thoughtless, according to Mat. 10:19, “Take no thought On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 4:25): “Let thy how or what to speak.” Therefore thoughtlessness is not a eyes look straight on, and let thine eye-lids go before thy sin. steps.” Now this pertains to prudence, while the contrary Objection 2. Further, whoever takes counsel must pertains to thoughtlessness. Therefore thoughtlessness is needs give thought to many things. Now precipitation a special sin contained under imprudence. is due to a defect of counsel and therefore to a defect I answer that, Thought signifies the act of the in- of thought. Therefore precipitation is contained under tellect in considering the truth about. something. Now thoughtlessness: and consequently thoughtlessness is not just as research belongs to the reason, so judgment be- a special sin. longs to the intellect. Wherefore in speculative matters Objection 3. Further, prudence consists in acts of the a demonstrative science is said to exercise judgment, in practical reason, viz. “counsel,” “judgment” about what so far as it judges the truth of the results of research by ∗ Cf. q. 47, a. 8 1449 tracing those results back to the first indemonstrable prin-we can only turn our eyes to God,” according to 2 Paral ciples. Hence thought pertains chiefly to judgment; and 20:12: else if man, instead of doing what he can, were to consequently the lack of right judgment belongs to the be content with awaiting God’s assistance, he would seem vice of thoughtlessness, in so far, to wit, as one fails to to tempt God. judge rightly through contempt or neglect of those things Reply to Objection 2. All thought about those things on which a right judgment depends. It is therefore evident of which counsel takes cognizance, is directed to the for- that thoughtlessness is a sin. mation of a right judgment, wherefore this thought is Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord did not forbid us to perfected in judgment. Consequently thoughtlessness is take thought, when we have the opportunity, about what above all opposed to the rectitude of judgment. we ought to do or say, but, in the words quoted, He en- Reply to Objection 3. Thoughtlessness is to be taken courages His disciples, so that when they had no opportu- here in relation to a determinate matter, namely, that of nity of taking thought, either through lack of knowledge human action, wherein more things have to be thought or through a sudden call, they should trust in the guid- about for the purpose of right judgment, than in specula- ance of God alone, because “as we know not what to do, tive matters, because actions are about singulars. Whether inconstancy is a vice contained under prudence? IIa IIae q. 53 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that inconstancy is not a fail to do this, it is due to its own weakness in not standing vice contained under imprudence. For inconstancy con- to the good purpose it has conceived; hence inconstancy, sists seemingly in a lack of perseverance in matters of dif- as to its completion, is due to a defect in the reason. Now ficulty. But perseverance in difficult matters belongs to just as all rectitude of the practical reason belongs in some fortitude. Therefore inconstancy is opposed to fortitude degree to prudence, so all lack of that rectitude belongs to rather than to prudence. imprudence. Consequently inconstancy, as to its comple- Objection 2. Further, it is written (James 3:16): tion, belongs to imprudence. And just as precipitation is “Where jealousy [Douay: ‘envy’] and contention are, due to a defect in the act of counsel, and thoughtlessness there are inconstancy and every evil work.” But jealousy to a defect in the act of judgment, so inconstancy arises pertains to envy. Therefore inconstancy pertains not to from a defect in the act of command. For a man is stated imprudence but to envy. to be inconstant because his reason fails in commanding Objection 3. Further, a man would seem to be in- what has been counselled and judged. constant who fails to persevere in what he has proposed Reply to Objection 1. The good of prudence is shared to do. Now this is a mark of “incontinency” in pleasur- by all the moral virtues, and accordingly perseverance in able matters, and of “effeminacy” or “squeamishness” in good belongs to all moral virtues, chiefly, however, to for- unpleasant matters, according to Ethic. vii, 1. Therefore titude, which suffers a greater impulse to the contrary. inconstancy does not pertain to imprudence. Reply to Objection 2. Envy and anger, which are the On the contrary, It belongs to prudence to prefer the source of contention, cause inconstancy on the part of the greater good to the lesser. Therefore to forsake the greater appetite, to which power the origin of inconstancy is due, good belongs to imprudence. Now this is inconstancy. as stated above. Therefore inconstancy belongs to imprudence. Reply to Objection 3. Continency and perseverance I answer that, Inconstancy denotes withdrawal from a seem to be not in the appetitive power, but in the reason. definite good purpose. Now the origin of this withdrawal For the continent man suffers evil concupiscences, and the is in the appetite, for a man does not withdraw from a persevering man suffers grievous sorrows (which points to previous good purpose, except on account of something a defect in the appetitive power); but reason stands firm, in being inordinately pleasing to him: nor is this withdrawal the continent man, against concupiscence, and in the per- completed except through a defect of reason, which is de- severing man, against sorrow. Hence continency and per- ceived in rejecting what before it had rightly accepted. severance seem to be species of constancy which pertains And since it can resist the impulse of the passions, if it to reason; and to this power inconstancy pertains also. 1450 Whether the aforesaid vices arise from lust? IIa IIae q. 53 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the aforesaid vices do dence and of every intellectual virtue consists in abstrac- not arise from lust. For inconstancy arises from envy, as tion from sensible objects. Wherefore, since the aforesaid stated above (a. 5, ad 2). But envy is a distinct vice from vices involve a defect of prudence and of the practical rea- lust. son, as stated above (Aa. 2,5), it follows that they arise Objection 2. Further, it is written (James 1:8): “A chiefly from lust. double-minded man is inconstant in all his ways.” Now Reply to Objection 1. Envy and anger cause incon- duplicity does not seem to pertain to lust, but rather to de- stancy by drawing away the reason to something else; ceitfulness, which is a daughter of covetousness, accord- whereas lust causes inconstancy by destroying the judg- ing to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore the aforesaid ment of reason entirely. Hence the Philosopher says vices do not arise from lust. (Ethic. vii, 6) that “the man who is incontinent through Objection 3. Further, the aforesaid vices are con- anger listens to reason, yet not perfectly, whereas he who nected with some defect of reason. Now spiritual vices is incontinent through lust does not listen to it at all.” are more akin to the reason than carnal vices. Therefore Reply to Objection 2. Duplicity also is something the aforesaid vices arise from spiritual vices rather than resulting from lust, just as inconstancy is, if by duplicity from carnal vices. we understand fluctuation of the mind from one thing to On the contrary, Gregory declares (Moral. xxxi, 45) another. Hence Terence says (Eunuch. act 1, sc. 1) that that the aforesaid vices arise from lust. “love leads to war, and likewise to peace and truce.” I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, Reply to Objection 3. Carnal vices destroy the judg- 5) “pleasure above all corrupts the estimate of prudence,” ment of reason so much the more as they lead us away and chiefly sexual pleasure which absorbs the mind, and from reason. draws it to sensible delight. Now the perfection of pru- 1451 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 54 Of Negligence (In Three Articles) We must now consider negligence, under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether negligence is a special sin? (2) To which virtue is it opposed? (3) Whether negligence is a mortal sin? Whether negligence is a special sin? IIa IIae q. 54 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that negligence is not a sexual matters, while some vices are special on account special sin. For negligence is opposed to diligence. But of their having a special kind of act which extends to all diligence is required in every virtue. Therefore negligence kinds of matter, and such are all vices affecting an act is not a special sin. of reason, since every act of reason extends to any kind Objection 2. Further, that which is common to every of moral matter. Since then solicitude is a special act of sin is not a special sin. Now negligence is common to reason, as stated above (q. 47, a. 9), it follows that negli- every sin, because he who sins neglects that which with- gence, which denotes lack of solicitude, is a special sin. draws him from sin, and he who perseveres in sin neglects Reply to Objection 1. Diligence seems to be the same to be contrite for his sin. Therefore negligence is not a as solicitude, because the more we love [diligimus] a thing special sin. the more solicitous are we about it. Hence diligence, no Objection 3. Further, every special sin had a determi- less than solicitude, is required for every virtue, in so far nate matter. But negligence seems to have no determinate as due acts of reason are requisite for every virtue. matter: since it is neither about evil or indifferent things Reply to Objection 2. In every sin there must needs (for no man is accused of negligence if he omit them), nor be a defect affecting an act of reason, for instance a de- about good things, for if these be done negligently, they fect in counsel or the like. Hence just as precipitation is are no longer good. Therefore it seems that negligence is a special sin on account of a special act of reason which not a special vice. is omitted, namely counsel, although it may be found in On the contrary, Sins committed through negli- any kind of sin; so negligence is a special sin on account gence, are distinguished from those which are committed of the lack of a special act of reason, namely solicitude, through contempt. although it is found more or less in all sins. I answer that, Negligence denotes lack of due solici- Reply to Objection 3. Properly speaking the matter tude. Now every lack of a due act is sinful: wherefore it of negligence is a good that one ought to do, not that it is a is evident that negligence is a sin, and that it must needs good when it is done negligently, but because on account have the character of a special sin according as solicitude of negligence it incurs a lack of goodness, whether a due is the act of a special virtue. For certain sins are spe- act be entirely omitted through lack of solicitude, or some cial through being about a special matter, as lust is about due circumstance be omitted. Whether negligence is opposed to prudence? IIa IIae q. 54 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that negligence is not op- of reason. But negligence does not imply a defect of coun- posed to prudence. For negligence seems to be the same sel, for that is “precipitation,” nor a defect of judgment, as idleness or laziness, which belongs to sloth, according since that is “thoughtlessness,” nor a defect of command, to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Now sloth is not opposed because that is “inconstancy.” Therefore negligence does to prudence, but to charity, as stated above (q. 35, a. 3). not pertain to imprudence. Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence. Objection 4. Further, it is written (Eccles. 7:19): “He Objection 2. Further, every sin of omission seems that feareth God, neglecteth nothing.” But every sin is to be due to negligence. But sins of omission are not excluded by the opposite virtue. Therefore negligence is opposed to prudence, but to the executive moral virtues. opposed to fear rather than to prudence. Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence. On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 20:7): “A bab- Objection 3. Further, imprudence relates to some act bler and a fool [imprudens] will regard no time.” Now this 1452 is due to negligence. Therefore negligence is opposed to nal act, for it consists in failing to perform an act which is prudence. due. Hence it is opposed to justice, and is an effect of neg- I answer that, Negligence is directly opposed to solic- ligence, even as the execution of a just deed is the effect itude. Now solicitude pertains to the reason, and rectitude of right reason. of solicitude to prudence. Hence, on the other hand, negli- Reply to Objection 3. Negligence regards the act of gence pertains to imprudence. This appears from its very command, which solicitude also regards. Yet the negli- name, because, as Isidore observes (Etym. x) “a negligent gent man fails in regard to this act otherwise than the in- man is one who fails to choose [nec eligens]”: and the constant man: for the inconstant man fails in command- right choice of the means belongs to prudence. Therefore ing, being hindered as it were, by something, whereas the negligence pertains to imprudence. negligent man fails through lack of a prompt will. Reply to Objection 1. Negligence is a defect in the Reply to Objection 4. The fear of God helps us to internal act, to which choice also belongs: whereas idle- avoid all sins, because according to Prov. 15:27, “by the ness and laziness denote slowness of execution, yet so that fear of the Lord everyone declineth from evil.” Hence fear idleness denotes slowness in setting about the execution, makes us avoid negligence, yet not as though negligence while laziness denotes remissness in the execution itself. were directly opposed to fear, but because fear incites man Hence it is becoming that laziness should arise from sloth, to acts of reason. Wherefore also it has been stated above ( which is “an oppressive sorrow,” i.e. hindering, the mind Ia IIae, q. 44, a. 2) when we were treating of the passions, from action∗. that “fear makes us take counsel.” Reply to Objection 2. Omission regards the exter- Whether negligence can be a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 54 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that negligence cannot from the charity of God, such negligence is a mortal sin, be a mortal sin. For a gloss of Gregory† on Job 9:28, and this is the case chiefly when negligence is due to con- “I feared all my works,” etc. says that “too little love of tempt. God aggravates the former,” viz. negligence. But wher- But if negligence consists in the omission of an act or ever there is mortal sin, the love of God is done away with circumstance that is not necessary for salvation, it is not a altogether. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin. mortal but a venial sin, provided the negligence arise, not Objection 2. Further, a gloss on Ecclus. 7:34, “For from contempt, but from some lack of fervor, to which thy negligences purify thyself with a few,” says: “Though venial sin is an occasional obstacle. the offering be small it cleanses the negligences of many Reply to Objection 1. Man may be said to love God sins.” Now this would not be, if negligence were a mortal less in two ways. First through lack of the fervor of char- sin. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin. ity, and this causes the negligence that is a venial sin: sec- Objection 3. Further, under the law certain sacrifices ondly through lack of charity itself, in which sense we were prescribed for mortal sins, as appears from the book say that a man loves God less when he loves Him with a of Leviticus. Yet no sacrifice was prescribed for negli- merely natural love; and this causes the negligence that is gence. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin. a mortal sin. On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 19:16): “He that Reply to Objection 2. According to the same author- neglecteth his own life [Vulg.: ‘way’] shall die.” ity (gloss), a small offering made with a humble mind and I answer that, As stated above (a. 2, ad 3), negli- out of pure love, cleanses man not only from venial but gence arises out of a certain remissness of the will, the also from mortal sin. result being a lack of solicitude on the part of the reason Reply to Objection 3. When negligence consists in in commanding what it should command, or as it should the omission of that which is necessary for salvation, it is command. Accordingly negligence may happen to be a drawn to the other more manifest genus of sin. Because mortal sin in two ways. First on the part of that which is those sins that consist of inward actions, are more hidden, omitted through negligence. If this be either an act or a wherefore no special sacrifices were prescribed for them circumstance necessary for salvation, it will be a mortal in the Law, since the offering of sacrifices was a kind of sin. Secondly on the part of the cause: for if the will be public confession of sin, whereas hidden sins should not so remiss about Divine things, as to fall away altogether be confessed in public. ∗ Cf. q. 35, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 35, a. 8 † Moral. ix. 34 1453 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 55 Of Vices Opposed to Prudence by Way of Resemblance (In Eight Articles) We must now consider those vices opposed to prudence, which have a resemblance thereto. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether prudence of the flesh is a sin? (2) Whether it is a mortal sin? (3) Whether craftiness is a special sin? (4) Of guile; (5) Of fraud; (6) Of solicitude about temporal things; (7) Of solicitude about the future; (8) Of the origin of these vices. Whether prudence of the flesh is a sin? IIa IIae q. 55 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that prudence of the flesh dendo], as stated above (q. 47, a. 1; q. 49, a. 6), which can is not a sin. For prudence is more excellent than the other extend to evil things also. Therefore, although prudence is moral virtues, since it governs them all. But no justice or taken simply in a good sense, yet, if something be added, temperance is sinful. Neither therefore is any prudence a it may be taken in a bad sense: and it is thus that prudence sin. of the flesh is said to be a sin. Objection 2. Further, it is not a sin to act prudently Reply to Objection 2. The flesh is on account of the for an end which it is lawful to love. But it is lawful to soul, as matter is on account of the form, and the instru- love the flesh, “for no man ever hated his own flesh” (Eph. ment on account of the principal agent. Hence the flesh is 5:29). Therefore prudence of the flesh is not a sin. loved lawfully, if it be directed to the good of the soul as Objection 3. Further, just as man is tempted by the its end. If, however, a man place his last end in a good of flesh, so too is he tempted by the world and the devil. But the flesh, his love will be inordinate and unlawful, and it no prudence of the world, or of the devil is accounted a is thus that the prudence of the flesh is directed to the love sin. Therefore neither should any prudence of the flesh be of the flesh. accounted among sins. Reply to Objection 3. The devil tempts us, not On the contrary, No man is an enemy to God save for through the good of the appetible object, but by way of wickedness according to Wis. 14:9, “To God the wicked suggestion. Wherefore, since prudence implies direction and his wickedness are hateful alike.” Now it is written to some appetible end, we do not speak of “prudence of (Rom. 8:7): “The prudence [Vulg.: ‘wisdom’] of the flesh the devil,” as of a prudence directed to some evil end, is an enemy to God.” Therefore prudence of the flesh is a which is the aspect under which the world and the flesh sin. tempt us, in so far as worldly or carnal goods are proposed I answer that, As stated above (q. 47, a. 13), pru- to our appetite. Hence we speak of “carnal” and again of dence regards things which are directed to the end of life “worldly” prudence, according to Lk. 16:8, “The children as a whole. Hence prudence of the flesh signifies properly of this world are more prudent [Douay: ‘wiser’] in their the prudence of a man who looks upon carnal goods as generation,” etc. The Apostle includes all in the “pru- the last end of his life. Now it is evident that this is a sin, dence of the flesh,” because we covet the external things because it involves a disorder in man with respect to his of the world on account of the flesh. last end, which does not consist in the goods of the body, We may also reply that since prudence is in a certain as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 2, a. 5). Therefore prudence of sense called “wisdom,” as stated above (q. 47, a. 2, ad 1), the flesh is a sin. we may distinguish a threefold prudence corresponding to Reply to Objection 1. Justice and temperance in- the three kinds of temptation. Hence it is written (James clude in their very nature that which ranks them among 3:15) that there is a wisdom which is “earthly, sensual and the virtues, viz. equality and the curbing of concupis- devilish,” as explained above (q. 45, a. 1, ad 1), when we cence; hence they are never taken in a bad sense. On the were treating of wisdom. other hand prudence is so called from foreseeing [provi- 1454 Whether prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 55 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that prudence of the flesh of the flesh, it is a mortal sin, because he turns away from is a mortal sin. For it is a mortal sin to rebel against the God by so doing, since he cannot have several last ends, Divine law, since this implies contempt of God. Now “the as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 5). prudence [Douay: ‘wisdom’] of the flesh. . . is not subject If, on the other hand, prudence of the flesh be taken as to the law of God” (Rom. 8:7). Therefore prudence of the corresponding to particular prudence, it is a venial sin. For flesh is a mortal sin. it happens sometimes that a man has an inordinate affec- Objection 2. Further, every sin against the Holy tion for some pleasure of the flesh, without turning away Ghost is a mortal sin. Now prudence of the flesh seems from God by a mortal sin; in which case he does not place to be a sin against the Holy Ghost, for “it cannot be sub- the end of his whole life in carnal pleasure. To apply one- ject to the law of God” (Rom. 8:7), and so it seems to be self to obtain this pleasure is a venial sin and pertains to an unpardonable sin, which is proper to the sin against the prudence of the flesh. But if a man actually refers the care Holy Ghost. Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal of the flesh to a good end, as when one is careful about sin. one’s food in order to sustain one’s body, this is no longer Objection 3. Further, the greatest evil is opposed to prudence of the flesh, because then one uses the care of the greatest good, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10. Now pru- the flesh as a means to an end. dence of the flesh is opposed to that prudence which is the Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle is speaking of chief of the moral virtues. Therefore prudence of the flesh that carnal prudence whereby a man places the end of his is chief among mortal sins, so that it is itself a mortal sin. whole life in the goods of the flesh, and this is a mortal On the contrary, That which diminishes a sin has not sin. of itself the nature of a mortal sin. Now the thought- Reply to Objection 2. Prudence of the flesh does not ful quest of things pertaining to the care of the flesh, imply a sin against the Holy Ghost. For when it is stated which seems to pertain to carnal prudence, diminishes that “it cannot be subject to the law of God,” this does sin∗. Therefore prudence of the flesh has not of itself the not mean that he who has prudence of the flesh, cannot nature of a mortal sin. be converted and submit to the law of God, but that car- I answer that, As stated above (q. 47, a. 2, ad 1; a. 13), nal prudence itself cannot be subject to God’s law, even as a man is said to be prudent in two ways. First, simply, i.e. neither can injustice be just, nor heat cold, although that in relation to the end of life as a whole. Secondly, rela- which is hot may become cold. tively, i.e. in relation to some particular end; thus a man Reply to Objection 3. Every sin is opposed to pru- is said to be prudent in business or something else of the dence, just as prudence is shared by every virtue. But it kind. Accordingly if prudence of the flesh be taken as does not follow that every sin opposed to prudence is most corresponding to prudence in its absolute signification, so grave, but only when it is opposed to prudence in some that a man place the last end of his whole life in the care very grave matter. Whether craftiness is a special sin? IIa IIae q. 55 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that craftiness is not a spe- to hide one’s thoughts by artifice, to conceal one’s mean- cial sin. For the words of Holy Writ do not induce anyone ing by words, to represent error as truth, to make out the to sin; and yet they induce us to be crafty, according to truth to be false,” and further on he adds: “This prudence Prov. 1:4, “To give craftiness [Douay: ‘subtlety’] to little is acquired by the young, it is learnt at a price by chil- ones.” Therefore craftiness is not a sin. dren.” Now the above things seem to belong to craftiness. Objection 2. Further, it is written (Prov. 13:16): “The Therefore craftiness is not distinct from carnal or worldly crafty [Douay: ‘prudent’] man doth all things with coun- prudence, and consequently it seems not to be a special sel.” Therefore, he does so either for a good or for an evil sin. end. If for a good end, there is no sin seemingly, and if for On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 4:2): “We an evil end, it would seem to pertain to carnal or worldly renounce the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in prudence. Therefore craftiness is not a special sin distinct craftiness, nor adulterating the word of God.” Therefore from prudence of the flesh. craftiness is a sin. Objection 3. Further, Gregory expounding the words I answer that, Prudence is “right reason applied to of Job 12, “The simplicity of the just man is laughed to action,” just as science is “right reason applied to knowl- scorn,” says (Moral. x, 29): “The wisdom of this world is edge.” In speculative matters one may sin against rec- ∗ Cf. Prov. 6:30 1455 titude of knowledge in two ways: in one way when the Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine observes (Con-reason is led to a false conclusion that appears to be tra Julian. iv, 3) just as prudence is sometimes improperly true; in another way when the reason proceeds from false taken in a bad sense, so is craftiness sometimes taken in premises, that appear to be true, either to a true or to a a good sense, and this on account of their mutual resem- false conclusion. Even so a sin may be against prudence, blance. Properly speaking, however, craftiness is taken in through having some resemblance thereto, in two ways. a bad sense, as the Philosopher states in Ethic. vi, 12. First, when the purpose of the reason is directed to an end Reply to Objection 2. Craftiness can take counsel which is good not in truth but in appearance, and this per- both for a good end and for an evil end: nor should a good tains to prudence of the flesh; secondly, when, in order end be pursued by means that are false and counterfeit to obtain a certain end, whether good or evil, a man uses but by such as are true. Hence craftiness is a sin if it be means that are not true but fictitious and counterfeit, and directed to a good end. this belongs to the sin of craftiness. This is consequently Reply to Objection 3. Under “worldly prudence” a sin opposed to prudence, and distinct from prudence of Gregory included everything that can pertain to false pru- the flesh. dence, so that it comprises craftiness also. Whether guile is a sin pertaining to craftiness? IIa IIae q. 55 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that guile is not a sin per- belongs to prudence. Secondly the adopting of such like taining to craftiness. For sin, especially mortal, has no ways may be considered with regard to their actual exe- place in perfect men. Yet a certain guile is to be found in cution, and in this way it belongs to guile. Hence guile them, according to 2 Cor. 12:16, “Being crafty I caught denotes a certain execution of craftiness, and accordingly you by guile.” Therefore guile is not always a sin. belongs thereto. Objection 2. Further, guile seems to pertain chiefly Reply to Objection 1. Just as craftiness is taken prop- to the tongue, according to Ps. 5:11, “They dealt deceit- erly in a bad sense, and improperly in a good sense, so too fully with their tongues.” Now craftiness like prudence is is guile which is the execution of craftiness. in the very act of reason. Therefore guile does not pertain Reply to Objection 2. The execution of craftiness to craftiness. with the purpose of deceiving, is effected first and fore- Objection 3. Further, it is written (Prov. 12:20): most by words, which hold the chief place among those “Guile [Douay: ‘Deceit’] is in the heart of them that think signs whereby a man signifies something to another man, evil things.” But the thought of evil things does not al- as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), hence guile ways pertain to craftiness. Therefore guile does not seem is ascribed chiefly to speech. Yet guile may happen also in to belong to craftiness. deeds, according to Ps. 104:25, “And to deal deceitfully On the contrary, Craftiness aims at lying in wait, ac- with his servants.” Guile is also in the heart, according to cording to Eph. 4:14, “By cunning craftiness by which Ecclus. 19:23, “His interior is full of deceit,” but this is they lie in wait to deceive”: and guile aims at this also. to devise deceits, according to Ps. 37:13: “They studied Therefore guile pertains to craftiness. deceits all the day long.” I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), it belongs to Reply to Objection 3. Whoever purposes to do some craftiness to adopt ways that are not true but counterfeit evil deed, must needs devise certain ways of attaining his and apparently true, in order to attain some end either purpose, and for the most part he devises deceitful ways, good or evil. Now the adopting of such ways may be whereby the more easily to obtain his end. Nevertheless subjected to a twofold consideration; first, as regards the it happens sometimes that evil is done openly and by vi- process of thinking them out, and this belongs properly to olence without craftiness and guile; but as this is more craftiness, even as thinking out right ways to a due end difficult, it is of less frequent occurrence. Whether fraud pertains to craftiness? IIa IIae q. 55 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that fraud does not pertain fraud does not belong to craftiness. to craftiness. For a man does not deserve praise if he al- Objection 2. Further, fraud seems to consist in un- lows himself to be deceived, which is the object of crafti- lawfully taking or receiving external things, for it is writ- ness; and yet a man deserves praise for allowing himself ten (Acts 5:1) that “a certain man named Ananias with to be defrauded, according to 1 Cor. 6:1, “Why do you Saphira his wife, sold a piece of land, and by fraud kept not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?” Therefore back part of the price of the land.” Now it pertains to 1456 injustice or illiberality to take possession of or retain excution of craftiness, whether this be effected by words, or ternal things unjustly. Therefore fraud does not belong to by deeds, whereas “fraud” belongs more properly to the craftiness which is opposed to prudence. execution of craftiness by deeds. Objection 3. Further, no man employs craftiness Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle does not coun- against himself. But the frauds of some are against them- sel the faithful to be deceived in their knowledge, but to selves, for it is written (Prov. 1:18) concerning some “that bear patiently the effect of being deceived, and to endure they practice frauds [Douay: ‘deceits’] against their own wrongs inflicted on them by fraud. souls.” Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness. Reply to Objection 2. The execution of craftiness On the contrary, The object of fraud is to deceive, may be carried out by another vice, just as the execution according to Job 13:9, “Shall he be deceived as a man, of prudence by the virtues: and accordingly nothing hin- with your fraudulent [Douay: ‘deceitful’] dealings?” Now ders fraud from pertaining to covetousness or illiberality. craftiness is directed to the same object. Therefore fraud Reply to Objection 3. Those who commit frauds, pertains to craftiness. do not design anything against themselves or their own I answer that, Just as “guile” consists in the execu- souls; it is through God’s just judgment that what they tion of craftiness, so also does “fraud.” But they seem to plot against others, recoils on themselves, according to differ in the fact that “guile” belongs in general to the exe- Ps. 7:16, “He is fallen into the hole he made.” Whether it is lawful to be solicitous about temporal matters? IIa IIae q. 55 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem lawful to be solicitous make such things their end, or for the sake of these things about temporal matters. Because a superior should be so- to do whatever they were commanded to do in preaching licitous for his subjects, according to Rom. 12:8, “He that the Gospel.” Secondly, solicitude about temporal things ruleth, with solicitude.” Now according to the Divine or- may be unlawful, through too much earnestness in en- dering, man is placed over temporal things, according to deavoring to obtain temporal things, the result being that Ps. 8:8, “Thou hast subjected all things under his feet,” a man is drawn away from spiritual things which ought to etc. Therefore man should be solicitous about temporal be the chief object of his search, wherefore it is written things. (Mat. 13:22) that “the care of this world. . . chokes up the Objection 2. Further, everyone is solicitous about the word.” Thirdly, through over much fear, when, to wit, a end for which he works. Now it is lawful for a man to man fears to lack necessary things if he do what he ought work for the temporal things whereby he sustains life, to do. Now our Lord gives three motives for laying aside wherefore the Apostle says (2 Thess. 3:10): “If any man this fear. First, on account of the yet greater favors be- will not work, neither let him eat.” Therefore it is lawful stowed by God on man, independently of his solicitude, to be solicitous about temporal things. viz. his body and soul (Mat. 6:26); secondly, on ac- Objection 3. Further, solicitude about works of mercy count of the care with which God watches over animals is praiseworthy, according to 2 Tim. 1:17, “When he was and plants without the assistance of man, according to come to Rome, he carefully sought me.” Now solicitude the requirements of their nature; thirdly, because of Di- about temporal things is sometimes connected with works vine providence, through ignorance of which the gentiles of mercy; for instance, when a man is solicitous to watch are solicitous in seeking temporal goods before all oth- over the interests of orphans and poor persons. Therefore ers. Consequently He concludes that we should be solici- solicitude about temporal things is not unlawful. tous most of all about spiritual goods, hoping that tempo- On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 6:31): “Be not ral goods also may be granted us according to our needs, solicitous. . . saying, What shall we eat, or what shall we if we do what we ought to do. drink, or wherewith shall we be clothed?” And yet such Reply to Objection 1. Temporal goods are subjected things are very necessary. to man that he may use them according to his needs, not I answer that, Solicitude denotes an earnest endeavor that he may place his end in them and be over solicitous to obtain something. Now it is evident that the endeavor about them. is more earnest when there is fear of failure, so that there Reply to Objection 2. The solicitude of a man who is less solicitude when success is assured. Accordingly gains his bread by bodily labor is not superfluous but pro- solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful in three portionate; hence Jerome says on Mat. 6:31, “Be not so- ways. First on the part of the object of solicitude; that is, if licitous,” that “labor is necessary, but solicitude must be we seek temporal things as an end. Hence Augustine says banished,” namely superfluous solicitude which unsettles (De Operibus Monach. xxvi): “When Our Lord said: ‘Be the mind. not solicitous,’ etc.. . . He intended to forbid them either to Reply to Objection 3. In the works of mercy solici-1457 tude about temporal things is directed to charity as its end, wherefore it is not unlawful, unless it be superfluous. Whether we should be solicitous about the future? IIa IIae q. 55 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that we should be solici- itude about the vintage to the time of autumn. Accord- tous about the future. For it is written (Prov. 6:6-8): “Go ingly if a man were solicitous about the vintage during to the ant, O sluggard, and consider her ways and learn the summer, he would be needlessly forestalling the solic- wisdom; which, although she hath no guide, nor mas- itude belonging to a future time. Hence Our Lord forbids ter. . . provideth her meat for herself in the summer, and such like excessive solicitude, saying: “Be. . . not solici- gathereth her food in the harvest.” Now this is to be so- tous for tomorrow,” wherefore He adds, “for the morrow licitous about the future. Therefore solicitude about the will be solicitous for itself,” that is to say, the morrow will future is praiseworthy. have its own solicitude, which will be burden enough for Objection 2. Further, solicitude pertains to prudence. the soul. This is what He means by adding: “Sufficient But prudence is chiefly about the future, since its principal for the day is the evil thereof,” namely, the burden of so- part is “foresight of future things,” as stated above (q. 49, licitude. a. 6, ad 1). Therefore it is virtuous to be solicitous about Reply to Objection 1. The ant is solicitous at a befit- the future. ting time, and it is this that is proposed for our example. Objection 3. Further, whoever puts something by that Reply to Objection 2. Due foresight of the future be- he may keep it for the morrow, is solicitous about the fu- longs to prudence. But it would be an inordinate foresight ture. Now we read (Jn. 12:6) that Christ had a bag for or solicitude about the future, if a man were to seek tem- keeping things in, which Judas carried, and (Acts 4:34- poral things, to which the terms “past” and “future” apply, 37) that the Apostles kept the price of the land, which had as ends, or if he were to seek them in excess of the needs been laid at their feet. Therefore it is lawful to be solici- of the present life, or if he were to forestall the time for tous about the future. solicitude. On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 6:34): “Be Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Serm. not. . . solicitous for tomorrow”; where “tomorrow” stands Dom. in Monte ii, 17), “when we see a servant of God for the future, as Jerome says in his commentary on this taking thought lest he lack these needful things, we must passage. not judge him to be solicitous for the morrow, since even I answer that, No work can be virtuous, unless it be Our Lord deigned for our example to have a purse, and vested with its due circumstances, and among these is the we read in the Acts of the Apostles that they procured the due time, according to Eccles. 8:6, “There is a time and necessary means of livelihood in view of the future on ac- opportunity for every business”; which applies not only count of a threatened famine. Hence Our Lord does not to external deeds but also to internal solicitude. For every condemn those who according to human custom, provide time has its own fitting proper solicitude; thus solicitude themselves with such things, but those who oppose them- about the crops belongs to the summer time, and solic- selves to God for the sake of these things.” Whether these vices arise from covetousness? IIa IIae q. 55 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that these vices do not Objection 3. Further, men make use of stratagems arise from covetousness. As stated above (q. 43, a. 6) lust not only in laying hold of other people’s goods, but is the chief cause of lack of rectitude in the reason. Now also in plotting murders, the former of which pertains these vices are opposed to right reason, i.e. to prudence. to covetousness, and the latter to anger. Now the use of Therefore they arise chiefly from lust; especially since the stratagems pertains to craftiness, guile, and fraud. There- Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that “Venus is full of guile fore the aforesaid vices arise not only from covetousness, and her girdle is many colored” and that “he who is incon- but also from anger. tinent in desire acts with cunning.” On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states Objection 2. Further, these vices bear a certain resem- that fraud is a daughter of covetousness. blance to prudence, as stated above (q. 47, a. 13). Now, I answer that, As stated above (a. 3; q. 47, a. 13), since prudence is in the reason, the more spiritual vices carnal prudence and craftiness, as well as guile and fraud, seem to be more akin thereto, such as pride and vain- bear a certain resemblance to prudence in some kind of glory. Therefore the aforesaid vices seem to arise from use of the reason. Now among all the moral virtues it is pride rather than from covetousness. justice wherein the use of right reason appears chiefly, for 1458 justice is in the rational appetite. Hence the undue use of Reply to Objection 2. To do anything by stratagem reason appears chiefly in the vices opposed to justice, the seems to be due to pusillanimity: because a magnanimous chief of which is covetousness. Therefore the aforesaid man wishes to act openly, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vices arise chiefly from covetousness. iv, 3). Wherefore, as pride resembles or apes magnanim- Reply to Objection 1. On account of the vehemence ity, it follows that the aforesaid vices which make use of of pleasure and of concupiscence, lust entirely suppresses fraud and guile, do not arise directly from pride, but rather the reason from exercising its act: whereas in the afore- from covetousness, which seeks its own profit and sets lit- said vices there is some use of reason, albeit inordinate. tle by excellence. Hence these vices do not arise directly from lust. When Reply to Objection 3. Anger’s movement is sudden, the Philosopher says that “Venus is full of guile,” he is hence it acts with precipitation, and without counsel, con- referring to a certain resemblance, in so far as she car- trary to the use of the aforesaid vices, though these use ries man away suddenly, just as he is moved in deceitful counsel inordinately. That men use stratagems in plotting actions, yet not by means of craftiness but rather by the murders, arises not from anger but rather from hatred, be- vehemence of concupiscence and pleasure; wherefore he cause the angry man desires to harm manifestly, as the adds that “Venus doth cozen the wits of the wisest man”∗. Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2,3)†. ∗ Cf. Iliad xiv, 214-217 † Cf. Ethic. vii, 6 1459 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 56 Of the Precepts Relating to Prudence (In Two Articles) We must now consider the precepts relating to prudence, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) The precepts of prudence; (2) The precepts relating to the opposite vices. Whether the precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept of prudence? IIa IIae q. 56 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the precepts of the ing under the purview of natural reason. Now foremost decalogue should have included a precept of prudence. among the things dictated by natural reason are the ends of For the chief precepts should include a precept of the chief human life, which are to the practical order what naturally virtue. Now the chief precepts are those of the decalogue. known principles are to the speculative order, as shown Since then prudence is the chief of the moral virtues, it above (q. 47, a. 6). Now prudence is not about the end, seems that the precepts of the decalogue should have in- but about the means, as stated above (q. 47, a. 6). Hence cluded a precept of prudence. it was not fitting that the precepts of the decalogue should Objection 2. Further, the teaching of the Gospel con- include a precept relating directly to prudence. And yet tains the Law especially with regard to the precepts of the all the precepts of the decalogue are related to prudence, decalogue. Now the teaching of the Gospel contains a pre- in so far as it directs all virtuous acts. cept of prudence (Mat. 10:16): “Be ye. . . prudent [Douay: Reply to Objection 1. Although prudence is simply ‘wise’] as serpents.” Therefore the precepts of the deca- foremost among all the moral virtues, yet justice, more logue should have included a precept of prudence. than any other virtue, regards its object under the aspect of Objection 3. Further, the other lessons of the Old something due, which is a necessary condition for a pre- Testament are directed to the precepts of the decalogue: cept, as stated above (q. 44, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 99, Aa. 1,5). wherefore it is written (Malach. 4:4): “Remember the law Hence it behooved the chief precepts of the Law, which of Moses My servant, which I commanded him in Horeb.” are those of the decalogue, to refer to justice rather than Now the other lessons of the Old Testament include pre- to prudence. cepts of prudence; for instance (Prov. 3:5): “Lean not Reply to Objection 2. The teaching of the Gospel upon thy own prudence”; and further on (Prov. 4:25): is the doctrine of perfection. Therefore it needed to in- “Let thine eyelids go before thy steps.” Therefore the Law struct man perfectly in all matters relating to right con- also should have contained a precept of prudence, espe- duct, whether ends or means: wherefore it behooved the cially among the precepts of the decalogue. Gospel teaching to contain precepts also of prudence. The contrary however appears to anyone who goes Reply to Objection 3. Just as the rest of the teach- through the precepts of the decalogue. ing of the Old Testament is directed to the precepts of the I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 3; decalogue as its end, so it behooved man to be instructed a. 5, ad 1) when we were treating of precepts, the com- by the subsequent lessons of the Old Testament about the mandments of the decalogue being given to the whole act of prudence which is directed to the means. people, are a matter of common knowledge to all, as com- Whether the prohibitive precepts relating to the vices opposed to prudence are fit-IIa IIae q. 56 a. 2 tingly propounded in the Old Law? Objection 1. It would seem that the prohibitive pre- calumniate thy neighbor,” and (Dt. 25:13): “Thou shalt cepts relating to the vices opposed to prudence are unfit- not have divers weights in thy bag, a greater and a less.” tingly propounded in the Old Law. For such vices as im- Therefore there should have also been prohibitive precepts prudence and its parts which are directly opposed to pru- about the vices directly opposed to prudence. dence are not less opposed thereto, than those which bear Objection 2. Further, there is room for fraud in other a certain resemblance to prudence, such as craftiness and things than in buying and selling. Therefore the Law un- vices connected with it. Now the latter vices are forbidden fittingly forbade fraud solely in buying and selling. in the Law: for it is written (Lev. 19:13): “Thou shalt not Objection 3. Further, there is the same reason for pre- 1460 scribing an act of virtue as for prohibiting the act of a opposed to prudence, do not pertain to injustice in the contrary vice. But acts of prudence are not prescribed in same way as the execution of craftiness, and so they are the Law. Therefore neither should any contrary vices have not forbidden in the Law, as fraud and guile are, which been forbidden in the Law. latter pertain to injustice The contrary, however, appears from the precepts of Reply to Objection 2. All guile and fraud committed the Law which are quoted in the first objection. in matters of injustice, can be understood to be forbidden I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), justice, above in the prohibition of calumny (Lev. 19:13). Yet fraud and all, regards the aspect of something due, which is a neces- guile are wont to be practiced chiefly in buying and sell- sary condition for a precept, because justice tends to ren- ing, according to Ecclus. 26:28, “A huckster shall not be der that which is due to another, as we shall state further justified from the sins of the lips”: and it is for this rea- on (q. 58, a. 2). Now craftiness, as to its execution, is com- son that the Law contained a special precept forbidding mitted chiefly in matters of justice, as stated above (q. 55, fraudulent buying and selling. a. 8): and so it was fitting that the Law should contain Reply to Objection 3. All the precepts of the Law precepts forbidding the execution of craftiness, in so far that relate to acts of justice pertain to the execution of as this pertains to injustice, as when a man uses guile and prudence, even as the precepts prohibitive of stealing, fraud in calumniating another or in stealing his goods. calumny and fraudulent selling pertain to the execution Reply to Objection 1. Those vices that are manifestly of craftiness. 1461 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 57 Of Right (In Four Articles) After considering prudence we must in due sequence consider justice, the consideration of which will be fourfold: (1) Of justice; (2) Of its parts; (3) Of the corresponding gift; (4) Of the precepts relating to justice. Four points will have to be considered about justice: (1) Right; (2) Justice itself; (3) Injustice; (4) Judgment. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether right is the object of justice? (2) Whether right is fittingly divided into natural and positive right? (3) Whether the right of nations is the same as natural right? (4) Whether right of dominion and paternal right are distinct species? Whether right is the object of justice? IIa IIae q. 57 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that right is not the ob- the works of the other virtues, and to which the intention ject of justice. For the jurist Celsus says∗ that “right is the of the virtue tends as to its proper object, depends on its art of goodness and equality.” Now art is not the object relation to the agent only, whereas the right in a work of of justice, but is by itself an intellectual virtue. Therefore justice, besides its relation to the agent, is set up by its right is not the object of justice. relation to others. Because a man’s work is said to be just Objection 2. Further, “Law,” according to Isidore when it is related to some other by way of some kind of (Etym. v, 3), “is a kind of right.” Now law is the ob- equality, for instance the payment of the wage due for a ject not of justice but of prudence, wherefore the Philoso- service rendered. And so a thing is said to be just, as hav- pher† reckons “legislative” as one of the parts of prudence. ing the rectitude of justice, when it is the term of an act Therefore right is not the object of justice. of justice, without taking into account the way in which Objection 3. Further, justice, before all, subjects man it is done by the agent: whereas in the other virtues noth- to God: for Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that ing is declared to be right unless it is done in a certain “justice is love serving God alone, and consequently gov- way by the agent. For this reason justice has its own spe- erning aright all things subject to man.” Now right [jus] cial proper object over and above the other virtues, and does not pertain to Divine things, but only to human af- this object is called the just, which is the same as “right.” fairs, for Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that “ ‘fas’ is the Divine Hence it is evident that right is the object of justice. law, and ‘jus,’ the human law.” Therefore right is not the Reply to Objection 1. It is usual for words to be object of justice. distorted from their original signification so as to mean On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that “ ‘jus’ something else: thus the word “medicine” was first em- [right] is so called because it is just.” Now the “just” is ployed to signify a remedy used for curing a sick person, the object of justice, for the Philosopher declares (Ethic. and then it was drawn to signify the art by which this is v, 1) that “all are agreed in giving the name of justice to done. In like manner the word “jus” [right] was first of all the habit which makes men capable of doing just actions.” used to denote the just thing itself, but afterwards it was I answer that, It is proper to justice, as compared with transferred to designate the art whereby it is known what the other virtues, to direct man in his relations with oth- is just, and further to denote the place where justice is ad- ers: because it denotes a kind of equality, as its very name ministered, thus a man is said to appear “in jure”‡, and implies; indeed we are wont to say that things are adjusted yet further, we say even that a man, who has the office of when they are made equal, for equality is in reference exercising justice, administers the jus even if his sentence of one thing to some other. On the other hand the other be unjust. virtues perfect man in those matters only which befit him Reply to Objection 2. Just as there pre-exists in the in relation to himself. Accordingly that which is right in mind of the craftsman an expression of the things to be ∗ Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 1 † Ethic. vi, 8 ‡ In English we speak of a court of law, a barrister at law, etc. 1462 made externally by his craft, which expression is called Reply to Objection 3. Since justice implies equality, the rule of his craft, so too there pre-exists in the mind and since we cannot offer God an equal return, it follows an expression of the particular just work which the reason that we cannot make Him a perfectly just repayment. For determines, and which is a kind of rule of prudence. If this reason the Divine law is not properly called “jus” but this rule be expressed in writing it is called a “law,” which “fas,” because, to wit, God is satisfied if we accomplish according to Isidore (Etym. v, 1) is “a written decree”: what we can. Nevertheless justice tends to make man re- and so law is not the same as right, but an expression of pay God as much as he can, by subjecting his mind to Him right. entirely. Whether right is fittingly divided into natural right and positive right? IIa IIae q. 57 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that right is not fittingly to another person, or when this is decreed by the prince divided into natural right and positive right. For that who is placed over the people, and acts in its stead, and which is natural is unchangeable, and is the same for all. this is called “positive right.” Now nothing of the kind is to be found in human affairs, Reply to Objection 1. That which is natural to one since all the rules of human right fail in certain cases, nor whose nature is unchangeable, must needs be such al- do they obtain force everywhere. Therefore there is no ways and everywhere. But man’s nature is changeable, such thing as natural right. wherefore that which is natural to man may sometimes Objection 2. Further, a thing is called “positive” when fail. Thus the restitution of a deposit to the depositor is it proceeds from the human will. But a thing is not just, in accordance with natural equality, and if human nature simply because it proceeds from the human will, else a were always right, this would always have to be observed; man’s will could not be unjust. Since then the “just” and but since it happens sometimes that man’s will is unrigh- the “right” are the same, it seems that there is no positive teous there are cases in which a deposit should not be re- right. stored, lest a man of unrighteous will make evil use of the Objection 3. Further, Divine right is not natural right, thing deposited: as when a madman or an enemy of the since it transcends human nature. In like manner, neither common weal demands the return of his weapons. is it positive right, since it is based not on human, but Reply to Objection 2. The human will can, by com- on Divine authority. Therefore right is unfittingly divided mon agreement, make a thing to be just provided it be not, into natural and positive. of itself, contrary to natural justice, and it is in such mat- On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) ters that positive right has its place. Hence the Philosopher that “political justice is partly natural and partly legal,” i.e. says (Ethic. v, 7) that “in the case of the legal just, it does established by law. not matter in the first instance whether it takes one form I answer that, As stated above (a. 1) the “right” or or another, it only matters when once it is laid down.” If, the “just” is a work that is adjusted to another person ac- however, a thing is, of itself, contrary to natural right, the cording to some kind of equality. Now a thing can be human will cannot make it just, for instance by decreeing adjusted to a man in two ways: first by its very nature, that it is lawful to steal or to commit adultery. Hence it is as when a man gives so much that he may receive equal written (Is. 10:1): “Woe to them that make wicked laws.” value in return, and this is called “natural right.” In an- Reply to Objection 3. The Divine right is that which other way a thing is adjusted or commensurated to another is promulgated by God. Such things are partly those that person, by agreement, or by common consent, when, to are naturally just, yet their justice is hidden to man, and wit, a man deems himself satisfied, if he receive so much. partly are made just by God’s decree. Hence also Divine This can be done in two ways: first by private agreement, right may be divided in respect of these two things, even as that which is confirmed by an agreement between pri- as human right is. For the Divine law commands certain vate individuals; secondly, by public agreement, as when things because they are good, and forbids others, because the whole community agrees that something should be they are evil, while others are good because they are pre- deemed as though it were adjusted and commensurated scribed, and others evil because they are forbidden. 1463 Whether the right of nations is the same as the natural right? IIa IIae q. 57 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the right of nations spect of its adaptability to cultivation, and the unmolested is the same as the natural right. For all men do not agree use of the land, it has a certain commensuration to be the save in that which is natural to them. Now all men agree property of one and not of another man, as the Philosopher in the right of nations; since the jurist∗ “the right of na- shows (Polit. ii, 2). tions is that which is in use among all nations.” Therefore Now it belongs not only to man but also to other ani- the right of nations is the natural right. mals to apprehend a thing absolutely: wherefore the right Objection 2. Further, slavery among men is natural, which we call natural, is common to us and other animals for some are naturally slaves according to the Philosopher according to the first kind of commensuration. But the (Polit. i, 2). Now “slavery belongs to the right of nations,” right of nations falls short of natural right in this sense, as as Isidore states (Etym. v, 4). Therefore the right of nathe jurist† says because “the latter is common to all ani- tions is a natural right. mals, while the former is common to men only.” On the Objection 3. Further, right as stated above (a. 2) is other hand to consider a thing by comparing it with what divided into natural and positive. Now the right of nations results from it, is proper to reason, wherefore this same is not a positive right, since all nations never agreed to de- is natural to man in respect of natural reason which dic- cree anything by common agreement. Therefore the right tates it. Hence the jurist Gaius says (Digest. i, 1; De Just. of nations is a natural right. et Jure i, 9): “whatever natural reason decrees among all On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4) that “right men, is observed by all equally, and is called the right of is either natural, or civil, or right of nations,” and conse- nations.” This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. quently the right of nations is distinct from natural right. Reply to Objection 2. Considered absolutely, the fact I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), the natural right that this particular man should be a slave rather than an-or just is that which by its very nature is adjusted to or other man, is based, not on natural reason, but on some commensurate with another person. Now this may hap- resultant utility, in that it is useful to this man to be ruled pen in two ways; first, according as it is considered ab-by a wiser man, and to the latter to be helped by the for- solutely: thus a male by its very nature is commensurate mer, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 2). Wherefore with the female to beget offspring by her, and a parent is slavery which belongs to the right of nations is natural in commensurate with the offspring to nourish it. Secondly a the second way, but not in the first. thing is naturally commensurate with another person, not Reply to Objection 3. Since natural reason dictates according as it is considered absolutely, but according to matters which are according to the right of nations, as im- something resultant from it, for instance the possession of plying a proximate equality, it follows that they need no property. For if a particular piece of land be considered special institution, for they are instituted by natural reason absolutely, it contains no reason why it should belong to itself, as stated by the authority quoted above one man more than to another, but if it be considered in re- Whether paternal right and right of dominion should be distinguished as special IIa IIae q. 57 a. 4 species? Objection 1. It would seem that “paternal right” and master and the father pertain to a household, as stated in “right of dominion” should not be distinguished as spe- Polit. i, 2. cial species. For it belongs to justice to render to each Objection 3. Further, there are many other differences one what is his, as Ambrose states (De Offic. i, 24). Now of degrees among men, for instance some are soldiers, right is the object of justice, as stated above (a. 1). There- some are priests, some are princes. Therefore some spe- fore right belongs to each one equally; and we ought not cial kind of right should be allotted to them. to distinguish the rights of fathers and masters as distinct On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) dis- species. tinguishes right of dominion, paternal right and so on as Objection 2. Further, the law is an expression of what species distinct from civil right. is just, as stated above (a. 1, ad 2). Now a law looks to the I answer that, Right or just depends on commensu- common good of a city or kingdom, as stated above ( Ia ration with another person. Now “another” has a twofold IIae, q. 90, a. 2), but not to the private good of an individ- signification. First, it may denote something that is other ual or even of one household. Therefore there is no need simply, as that which is altogether distinct; as, for exam- for a special right of dominion or paternal right, since the ple, two men neither of whom is subject to the other, and ∗ Ulpian: Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i † Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i 1464 both of whom are subjects of the ruler of the state; and to each one his right, the distinction between individuals between these according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) being presupposed: for if a man gives himself his due, there is the “just” simply. Secondly a thing is said to be this is not strictly called “just.” And since what belongs other from something else, not simply, but as belonging in to the son is his father’s, and what belongs to the slave is some way to that something else: and in this way, as re- his master’s, it follows that properly speaking there is not gards human affairs, a son belongs to his father, since he justice of father to son, or of master to slave. is part of him somewhat, as stated in Ethic. viii, 12, and a Reply to Objection 2. A son, as such, belongs to his slave belongs to his master, because he is his instrument, father, and a slave, as such, belongs to his master; yet as stated in Polit. i, 2‡. Hence a father is not compared to each, considered as a man, is something having separate his son as to another simply, and so between them there is existence and distinct from others. Hence in so far as each not the just simply, but a kind of just, called “paternal.” In of them is a man, there is justice towards them in a way: like manner neither is there the just simply, between mas- and for this reason too there are certain laws regulating the ter and servant, but that which is called “dominative.” A relations of father to his son, and of a master to his slave; wife, though she is something belonging to the husband, but in so far as each is something belonging to another, since she stands related to him as to her own body, as the the perfect idea of “right” or “just” is wanting to them. Apostle declares (Eph. 5:28), is nevertheless more dis- Reply to Objection 3. All other differences between tinct from her husband, than a son from his father, or a one person and another in a state, have an immediate rela- slave from his master: for she is received into a kind of tion to the community of the state and to its ruler, where- social life, that of matrimony, wherefore according to the fore there is just towards them in the perfect sense of jus- Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) there is more scope for justice tice. This “just” however is distinguished according to between husband and wife than between father and son, various offices, hence when we speak of “military,” or or master and slave, because, as husband and wife have “magisterial,” or “priestly” right, it is not as though such an immediate relation to the community of the household, rights fell short of the simply right, as when we speak of as stated in Polit. i, 2,5, it follows that between them there “paternal” right, or right of “dominion,” but for the rea- is “domestic justice” rather than “civic.” son that something proper is due to each class of person Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to justice to render in respect of his particular office. ‡ Cf. Ethic. viii, 11 1465 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 58 Of Justice (In Twelve Articles) We must now consider justice. Under this head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) What is justice? (2) Whether justice is always towards another? (3) Whether it is a virtue? (4) Whether it is in the will as its subject? (5) Whether it is a general virtue? (6) Whether, as a general virtue, it is essentially the same as every virtue? (7) Whether there is a particular justice? (8) Whether particular justice has a matter of its own? (9) Whether it is about passions, or about operations only? (10) Whether the mean of justice is the real mean? (11) Whether the act of justice is to render to everyone his own? (12) Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues? Whether justice is fittingly defined as being the perpetual and constant will to render IIa IIae q. 58 a. 1 to each one his right? Objection 1. It would seem that lawyers have unfit- be defined by means of the good act bearing on the mat- tingly defined justice as being “the perpetual and constant ter proper to that virtue. Now the proper matter of justice will to render to each one his right”∗. For, according to the consists of those things that belong to our intercourse with Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1), justice is a habit which makes other men, as shall be shown further on (a. 2). Hence the a man “capable of doing what is just, and of being just act of justice in relation to its proper matter and object is in action and in intention.” Now “will” denotes a power, indicated in the words, “Rendering to each one his right,” or also an act. Therefore justice is unfittingly defined as since, as Isidore says (Etym. x), “a man is said to be just being a will. because he respects the rights [jus] of others.” Objection 2. Further, rectitude of the will is not the Now in order that an act bearing upon any matter will; else if the will were its own rectitude, it would fol- whatever be virtuous, it requires to be voluntary, stable, low that no will is unrighteous. Yet, according to Anselm and firm, because the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that (De Veritate xii), justice is rectitude. Therefore justice is in order for an act to be virtuous it needs first of all to be not the will. done “knowingly,” secondly to be done “by choice,” and Objection 3. Further, no will is perpetual save God’s. “for a due end,” thirdly to be done “immovably.” Now If therefore justice is a perpetual will, in God alone will the first of these is included in the second, since “what there be justice. is done through ignorance is involuntary” (Ethic. iii, 1). Objection 4. Further, whatever is perpetual is con- Hence the definition of justice mentions first the “will,” stant, since it is unchangeable. Therefore it is needless in order to show that the act of justice must be voluntary; in defining justice, to say that it is both “perpetual” and and mention is made afterwards of its “constancy” and “constant.” “perpetuity” in order to indicate the firmness of the act. Objection 5. Further, it belongs to the sovereign to Accordingly, this is a complete definition of justice; give each one his right. Therefore, if justice gives each save that the act is mentioned instead of the habit, which one his right, it follows that it is in none but the sovereign: takes its species from that act, because habit implies rela-which is absurd. tion to act. And if anyone would reduce it to the proper Objection 6. Further, Augustine says (De Moribus form of a definition, he might say that “justice is a habit Eccl. xv) that “justice is love serving God alone.” There- whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant fore it does not render to each one his right. and perpetual will”: and this is about the same definition I answer that, The aforesaid definition of justice is fit-as that given by the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5) who says ting if understood aright. For since every virtue is a habit that “justice is a habit whereby a man is said to be capable that is the principle of a good act, a virtue must needs of doing just actions in accordance with his choice.” ∗ Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 10 1466 Reply to Objection 1. Will here denotes the act, not requisite that one should have the will to observe justice the power: and it is customary among writers to define at all times and in all cases. habits by their acts: thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. Reply to Objection 4. Since “perpetual” does not im- xl) that “faith is to believe what one sees not.” ply perpetuity of the act of the will, it is not superfluous to Reply to Objection 2. Justice is the same as rectitude, add “constant”: for while the “perpetual will” denotes the not essentially but causally; for it is a habit which rectifies purpose of observing justice always, “constant” signifies the deed and the will. a firm perseverance in this purpose. Reply to Objection 3. The will may be called perpet- Reply to Objection 5. A judge renders to each one ual in two ways. First on the part of the will’s act which what belongs to him, by way of command and direction, endures for ever, and thus God’s will alone is perpetual. because a judge is the “personification of justice,” and Secondly on the part of the subject, because, to wit, a man “the sovereign is its guardian” (Ethic. v, 4). On the other wills to do a certain thing always. and this is a necessary hand, the subjects render to each one what belongs to him, condition of justice. For it does not satisfy the conditions by way of execution. of justice that one wish to observe justice in some partic- Reply to Objection 6. Just as love of God includes ular matter for the time being, because one could scarcely love of our neighbor, as stated above (q. 25, a. 1), so too find a man willing to act unjustly in every case; and it is the service of God includes rendering to each one his due. Whether justice is always towards one another? IIa IIae q. 58 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that justice is not always a. 1) this otherness which justice demands must needs be towards another. For the Apostle says (Rom. 3:22) that between beings capable of action. Now actions belong “the justice of God is by faith of Jesus Christ.” Now faith to supposits∗ and wholes and, properly speaking, not to does not concern the dealings of one man with another. parts and forms or powers, for we do not say properly that Neither therefore does justice. the hand strikes, but a man with his hand, nor that heat Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine (De makes a thing hot, but fire by heat, although such expres- Moribus Eccl. xv), “it belongs to justice that man should sions may be employed metaphorically. Hence, justice direct to the service of God his authority over the things properly speaking demands a distinction of supposits, and that are subject to him.” Now the sensitive appetite is sub- consequently is only in one man towards another. Never- ject to man, according to Gn. 4:7, where it is written: theless in one and the same man we may speak metaphori- “The lust thereof,” viz. of sin, “shall be under thee, and cally of his various principles of action such as the reason, thou shalt have dominion over it.” Therefore it belongs to the irascible, and the concupiscible, as though they were justice to have dominion over one’s own appetite: so that so many agents: so that metaphorically in one and the justice is towards oneself. same man there is said to be justice in so far as the reason Objection 3. Further, the justice of God is eternal. commands the irascible and concupiscible, and these obey But nothing else is co-eternal with God. Therefore justice reason; and in general in so far as to each part of man is is not essentially towards another. ascribed what is becoming to it. Hence the Philosopher Objection 4. Further, man’s dealings with himself (Ethic. v, 11) calls this “metaphorical justice.” need to be rectified no less than his dealings with another. Reply to Objection 1. The justice which faith works Now man’s dealings are rectified by justice, according to in us, is that whereby the ungodly is justified it consists Prov. 11:5, “The justice of the upright shall make his way in the due coordination of the parts of the soul, as stated prosperous.” Therefore justice is about our dealings not above ( Ia IIae, q. 113, a. 1) where we were treating only with others, but also with ourselves. of the justification of the ungodly. Now this belongs to On the contrary, Tully says (De Officiis i, 7) that “the metaphorical justice, which may be found even in a man object of justice is to keep men together in society and who lives all by himself. mutual intercourse.” Now this implies relationship of one This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. man to another. Therefore justice is concerned only about Reply to Objection 3. God’s justice is from eternity our dealings with others. in respect of the eternal will and purpose (and it is chiefly I answer that, As stated above (q. 57, a. 1) since jus- in this that justice consists); although it is not eternal as tice by its name implies equality, it denotes essentially re- regards its effect, since nothing is co-eternal with God. lation to another, for a thing is equal, not to itself, but to Reply to Objection 4. Man’s dealings with himself another. And forasmuch as it belongs to justice to rectify are sufficiently rectified by the rectification of the pas- human acts, as stated above (q. 57, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 113, sions by the other moral virtues. But his dealings with ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 29, a. 2 1467 others need a special rectification, not only in relation to are directed. Hence about such dealings there is a special the agent, but also in relation to the person to whom they virtue, and this is justice. Whether justice is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 58 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that justice is not a virtue. human acts are regulated. Hence, since justice regulates For it is written (Lk. 17:10): “When you shall have done human operations, it is evident that it renders man’s oper- all these things that are commanded you, say: We are un- ations good, and, as Tully declares (De Officiis i, 7), good profitable servants; we have done that which we ought to men are so called chiefly from their justice, wherefore, as do.” Now it is not unprofitable to do a virtuous deed: for he says again (De Officiis i, 7) “the luster of virtue appears Ambrose says (De Officiis ii, 6): “We look to a profit that above all in justice.” is estimated not by pecuniary gain but by the acquisition Reply to Objection 1. When a man does what he of godliness.” Therefore to do what one ought to do, is not ought, he brings no gain to the person to whom he does a virtuous deed. And yet it is an act of justice. Therefore what he ought, but only abstains from doing him a harm. justice is not a virtue. He does however profit himself, in so far as he does what Objection 2. Further, that which is done of necessity, he ought, spontaneously and readily, and this is to act vir- is not meritorious. But to render to a man what belongs tuously. Hence it is written (Wis. 8:7) that Divine wisdom to him, as justice requires, is of necessity. Therefore it is “teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and for- not meritorious. Yet it is by virtuous actions that we gain titude, which are such things as men (i.e. virtuous men) merit. Therefore justice is not a virtue. can have nothing more profitable in life.” Objection 3. Further, every moral virtue is about mat- Reply to Objection 2. Necessity is twofold. One ters of action. Now those things which are wrought exter- arises from “constraint,” and this removes merit, since it nally are not things concerning behavior but concerning runs counter to the will. The other arises from the obliga- handicraft, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix)∗. tion of a “command,” or from the necessity of obtaining Therefore since it belongs to justice to produce externally an end, when, to wit, a man is unable to achieve the end a deed that is just in itself, it seems that justice is not a of virtue without doing some particular thing. The latter moral virtue. necessity does not remove merit, when a man does volun- On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) tarily that which is necessary in this way. It does however that “the entire structure of good works is built on four exclude the credit of supererogation, according to 1 Cor. virtues,” viz. temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice 9:16, “If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me, for a I answer that, A human virtue is one “which renders necessity lieth upon me.” a human act and man himself good”†, and this can be ap- Reply to Objection 3. Justice is concerned about ex- plied to justice. For a man’s act is made good through ternal things, not by making them, which pertains to art, attaining the rule of reason, which is the rule whereby but by using them in our dealings with other men. Whether justice is in the will as its subject? IIa IIae q. 58 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that justice is not in the will as its subject, but in the irascible and concupiscible. will as its subject. For justice is sometimes called truth. On the contrary, Anselm says (De Verit. xii) that But truth is not in the will, but in the intellect. Therefore “justice is rectitude of the will observed for its own sake.” justice is not in the will as its subject. I answer that, The subject of a virtue is the power Objection 2. Further, justice is about our dealings whose act that virtue aims at rectifying. Now justice does with others. Now it belongs to the reason to direct one not aim at directing an act of the cognitive power, for we thing in relation to another. Therefore justice is not in the are not said to be just through knowing something aright. will as its subject but in the reason. Hence the subject of justice is not the intellect or reason Objection 3. Further, justice is not an intellectual which is a cognitive power. But since we are said to be just virtue, since it is not directed to knowledge; wherefore it through doing something aright, and because the proxi- follows that it is a moral virtue. Now the subject of moral mate principle of action is the appetitive power, justice virtue is the faculty which is “rational by participation,” must needs be in some appetitive power as its subject. viz. the irascible and the concupiscible, as the Philoso- Now the appetite is twofold; namely, the will which pher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Therefore justice is not in the is in the reason and the sensitive appetite which follows ∗ Didot ed., viii, 8 † Ethic. ii, 6 1468 on sensitive apprehension, and is divided into the irasci-hence it is that justice sometimes goes by the name of ble and the concupiscible, as stated in the Ia, q. 81, a. 2. truth. Again the act of rendering his due to each man cannot Reply to Objection 2. The will is borne towards proceed from the sensitive appetite, because sensitive ap- its object consequently on the apprehension of reason: prehension does not go so far as to be able to consider wherefore, since the reason directs one thing in relation to the relation of one thing to another; but this is proper to another, the will can will one thing in relation to another, the reason. Therefore justice cannot be in the irascible or and this belongs to justice. concupiscible as its subject, but only in the will: hence the Reply to Objection 3. Not only the irascible and con- Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1) defines justice by an act of the cupiscible parts are “rational by participation,” but the en- will, as may be seen above (a. 1). tire “appetitive” faculty, as stated in Ethic. i, 13, because Reply to Objection 1. Since the will is the rational all appetite is subject to reason. Now the will is contained appetite, when the rectitude of the reason which is called in the appetitive faculty, wherefore it can be the subject of truth is imprinted on the will on account of its nighness moral virtue. to the reason, this imprint retains the name of truth; and Whether justice is a general virtue? IIa IIae q. 58 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that justice is not a gen- good of the whole. It follows therefore that the good of eral virtue. For justice is specified with the other virtues, any virtue, whether such virtue direct man in relation to according to Wis. 8:7, “She teacheth temperance and pru- himself, or in relation to certain other individual persons, dence, and justice, and fortitude.” Now the “general” is is referable to the common good, to which justice directs: not specified or reckoned together with the species con- so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, in so far as tained under the same “general.” Therefore justice is not it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense that a general virtue. justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to Objection 2. Further, as justice is accounted a car- the law to direct to the common good, as stated above ( dinal virtue, so are temperance and fortitude. Now nei- Ia IIae, q. 90, a. 2), it follows that the justice which is in ther temperance nor fortitude is reckoned to be a general this way styled general, is called “legal justice,” because virtue. Therefore neither should justice in any way be thereby man is in harmony with the law which directs the reckoned a general virtue. acts of all the virtues to the common good. Objection 3. Further, justice is always towards others, Reply to Objection 1. Justice is specified or enumer- as stated above (a. 2 ). But a sin committed against one’s ated with the other virtues, not as a general but as a special neighbor cannot be a general sin, because it is condivided virtue, as we shall state further on (Aa. 7,12). with sin committed against oneself. Therefore neither is Reply to Objection 2. Temperance and fortitude are justice a general virtue. in the sensitive appetite, viz. in the concupiscible and iras- On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) cible. Now these powers are appetitive of certain particu- that “justice is every virtue.” lar goods, even as the senses are cognitive of particulars. I answer that, Justice, as stated above (a. 2) directs On the other hand justice is in the intellective appetite as man in his relations with other men. Now this may happen its subject, which can have the universal good as its ob- in two ways: first as regards his relation with individuals, ject, knowledge whereof belongs to the intellect. Hence secondly as regards his relations with others in general, in justice can be a general virtue rather than temperance or so far as a man who serves a community, serves all those fortitude. who are included in that community. Accordingly justice Reply to Objection 3. Things referable to oneself are in its proper acceptation can be directed to another in both referable to another, especially in regard to the common these senses. Now it is evident that all who are included in good. Wherefore legal justice, in so far as it directs to the a community, stand in relation to that community as parts common good, may be called a general virtue: and in like to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a whole, so manner injustice may be called a general sin; hence it is that whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the written (1 Jn. 3:4) that all “sin is iniquity.” 1469 Whether justice, as a general virtue, is essentially the same as all virtue? IIa IIae q. 58 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that justice, as a gen- son that the genus belongs to the essence of the species, eral virtue, is essentially the same as all virtue. For the and forms part of its definition. Secondly a thing is said Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that “virtue and legal jus- to be general “virtually”; thus a universal cause is general tice are the same as all virtue, but differ in their mode of in relation to all its effects, the sun, for instance, in rela- being.” Now things that differ merely in their mode of be- tion to all bodies that are illumined, or transmuted by its ing or logically do not differ essentially. Therefore justice power; and in this sense there is no need for that which is is essentially the same as every virtue. “general” to be essentially the same as those things in re- Objection 2. Further, every virtue that is not essen- lation to which it is general, since cause and effect are not tially the same as all virtue is a part of virtue. Now the essentially the same. Now it is in the latter sense that, ac- aforesaid justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v. cording to what has been said (a. 5), legal justice is said to 1) “is not a part but the whole of virtue.” Therefore the be a general virtue, in as much, to wit, as it directs the acts aforesaid justice is essentially the same as all virtue. of the other virtues to its own end, and this is to move all Objection 3. Further, the essence of a virtue does the other virtues by its command; for just as charity may not change through that virtue directing its act to some be called a general virtue in so far as it directs the acts higher end even as the habit of temperance remains essen- of all the virtues to the Divine good, so too is legal jus- tially the same even though its act be directed to a Divine tice, in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the good. Now it belongs to legal justice that the acts of all common good. Accordingly, just as charity which regards the virtues are directed to a higher end, namely the com- the Divine good as its proper object, is a special virtue mon good of the multitude, which transcends the good of in respect of its essence, so too legal justice is a special one single individual. Therefore it seems that legal justice virtue in respect of its essence, in so far as it regards the is essentially all virtue. common good as its proper object. And thus it is in the Objection 4. Further, every good of a part can be di- sovereign principally and by way of a mastercraft, while rected to the good of the whole, so that if it be not thus it is secondarily and administratively in his subjects. directed it would seem without use or purpose. But that However the name of legal justice can be given to which is in accordance with virtue cannot be so. There- every virtue, in so far as every virtue is directed to fore it seems that there can be no act of any virtue, that the common good by the aforesaid legal justice, which does not belong to general justice, which directs to the though special essentially is nevertheless virtually gen- common good; and so it seems that general justice is es- eral. Speaking in this way, legal justice is essentially the sentially the same as all virtue. same as all virtue, but differs therefrom logically: and it On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) is in this sense that the Philosopher speaks. that “many are able to be virtuous in matters affecting Wherefore the Replies to the First and Second Objec- themselves, but are unable to be virtuous in matters relat- tions are manifest. ing to others,” and (Polit. iii, 2) that “the virtue of the good Reply to Objection 3. This argument again takes leman is not strictly the same as the virtue of the good cit- gal justice for the virtue commanded by legal justice. izen.” Now the virtue of a good citizen is general justice, Reply to Objection 4. Every virtue strictly speak- whereby a man Is directed to the common good. There- ing directs its act to that virtue’s proper end: that it fore general justice is not the same as virtue in general, should happen to be directed to a further end either al- and it is possible to have one without the other. ways or sometimes, does not belong to that virtue consid- I answer that, A thing is said to be “general” in two ered strictly, for it needs some higher virtue to direct it to ways. First, by “predication”: thus “animal” is general in that end. Consequently there must be one supreme virtue relation to man and horse and the like: and in this sense essentially distinct from every other virtue, which directs that which is general must needs be essentially the same all the virtues to the common good; and this virtue is legal as the things in relation to which it is general, for the rea- justice. Whether there is a particular besides a general justice? IIa IIae q. 58 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that there is not a partic- justice. ular besides a general justice. For there is nothing super- Objection 2. Further, the species of a virtue does not fluous in the virtues, as neither is there in nature. Now vary according to “one” and “many.” But legal justice general justice directs man sufficiently in all his relations directs one man to another in matters relating to the mul- with other men. Therefore there is no need for a particular titude, as shown above (Aa. 5,6). Therefore there is not 1470 another species of justice directing one man to another in besides legal justice there is need for particular justice to matters relating to the individual. direct man in his relations to other individuals. Objection 3. Further, between the individual and the Reply to Objection 1. Legal justice does indeed di- general public stands the household community. Conse- rect man sufficiently in his relations towards others. As quently, if in addition to general justice there is a partic- regards the common good it does so immediately, but as ular justice corresponding to the individual, for the same to the good of the individual, it does so mediately. Where- reason there should be a domestic justice directing man fore there is need for particular justice to direct a man im- to the common good of a household: and yet this is not mediately to the good of another individual. the case. Therefore neither should there be a particular Reply to Objection 2. The common good of the realm besides a legal justice. and the particular good of the individual differ not only in On the contrary, Chrysostom in his commentary on respect of the “many” and the “few,” but also under a for- Mat. 5:6, “Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after mal aspect. For the aspect of the “common” good differs justice,” says (Hom. xv in Matth.): “By justice He signi- from the aspect of the “individual” good, even as the as- fies either the general virtue, or the particular virtue which pect of “whole” differs from that of “part.” Wherefore the is opposed to covetousness.” Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that “they are wrong who I answer that, As stated above (a. 6), legal justice is maintain that the State and the home and the like differ not essentially the same as every virtue, and besides le- only as many and few and not specifically.” gal justice which directs man immediately to the common Reply to Objection 3. The household community, ac- good, there is a need for other virtues to direct him imme- cording to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2), differs in respect diately in matters relating to particular goods: and these of a threefold fellowship; namely “of husband and wife, virtues may be relative to himself or to another individual father and son, master and slave,” in each of which one person. Accordingly, just as in addition to legal justice person is, as it were, part of the other. Wherefore between there is a need for particular virtues to direct man in rela- such persons there is not justice simply, but a species of tion to himself, such as temperance and fortitude, so too justice, viz. “domestic” justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 6. Whether particular justice has a special matter? IIa IIae q. 58 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that particular justice passions of the soul, but also external actions, and also has no special matter. Because a gloss on Gn. 2:14, those external things of which man can make use. And yet “The fourth river is Euphrates,” says: “Euphrates signifies it is in respect of external actions and external things by ‘fruitful’; nor is it stated through what country it flows, means of which men can communicate with one another, because justice pertains to all the parts of the soul.” Now that the relation of one man to another is to be consid- this would not be the case, if justice had a special mat- ered; whereas it is in respect of internal passions that we ter, since every special matter belongs to a special power. consider man’s rectitude in himself. Consequently, since Therefore particular justice has no special matter. justice is directed to others, it is not about the entire mat- Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, ter of moral virtue, but only about external actions and qu. 61) that “the soul has four virtues whereby, in this things, under a certain special aspect of the object, in so life, it lives spiritually, viz. temperance, prudence, forti- far as one man is related to another through them. tude and justice;” and he says that “the fourth is justice, Reply to Objection 1. It is true that justice belongs which pervades all the virtues.” Therefore particular jus- essentially to one part of the soul, where it resides as in its tice, which is one of the four cardinal virtues, has no spe-subject; and this is the will which moves by its command cial matter. all the other parts of the soul; and accordingly justice be- Objection 3. Further, justice directs man sufficiently longs to all the parts of the soul, not directly but by a kind in matters relating to others. Now a man can be directed of diffusion. to others in all matters relating to this life. Therefore the Reply to Objection 2. As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 61, matter of justice is general and not special. Aa. 3,4), the cardinal virtues may be taken in two ways: On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons (Ethic. v, first as special virtues, each having a determinate matter; 2) particular justice to be specially about those things secondly, as certain general modes of virtue. In this lat- which belong to social life. ter sense Augustine speaks in the passage quoted: for he I answer that, Whatever can be rectified by reason says that “prudence is knowledge of what we should seek is the matter of moral virtue, for this is defined in refer- and avoid, temperance is the curb on the lust for fleeting ence to right reason, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. pleasures, fortitude is strength of mind in bearing with ii, 6). Now the reason can rectify not only the internal passing trials, justice is the love of God and our neigh- 1471 bor which pervades the other virtues, that is to say, is the directed to another man, which belongs to the specific na-common principle of the entire order between one man ture of justice; yet their effects, i.e. external actions, are and another.” capable of being directed to another man. Consequently Reply to Objection 3. A man’s internal passions it does not follow that the matter of justice is general. which are a part of moral matter, are not in themselves Whether justice is about the passions? IIa IIae q. 58 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that justice is about the the principal end in respect of which we say that this is an passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that evil, and that a good”: and in this way too they belong to “moral virtue is about pleasure and pain.” Now pleasure justice, since “a man is not just unless he rejoice in just or delight, and pain are passions, as stated above∗ when actions” (Ethic. i, 8). we were treating of the passions. Therefore justice, being Reply to Objection 2. External operations are as it a moral virtue, is about the passions. were between external things, which are their matter, and Objection 2. Further, justice is the means of rectifying internal passions, which are their origin. Now it happens a man’s operations in relation to another man. Now such sometimes that there is a defect in one of these, without like operations cannot be rectified unless the passions be there being a defect in the other. Thus a man may steal an- rectified, because it is owing to disorder of the passions other’s property, not through the desire to have the thing, that there is disorder in the aforesaid operations: thus sex- but through the will to hurt the man; or vice versa, a man ual lust leads to adultery, and overmuch love of money may covet another’s property without wishing to steal it. leads to theft. Therefore justice must needs be about the Accordingly the directing of operations in so far as they passions. tend towards external things, belongs to justice, but in so Objection 3. Further, even as particular justice is to- far as they arise from the passions, it belongs to the other wards another person so is legal justice. Now legal justice moral virtues which are about the passions. Hence justice is about the passions, else it would not extend to all the hinders theft of another’s property, in so far as stealing is virtues, some of which are evidently about the passions. contrary to the, equality that should be maintained in ex- Therefore justice is about the passions. ternal things, while liberality hinders it as resulting from On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) an immoderate desire for wealth. Since, however, external that justice is about operations. operations take their species, not from the internal pas- I answer that, The true answer to this question may sions but from external things as being their objects, it be gathered from a twofold source. First from the subject follows that, external operations are essentially the matter of justice, i.e. from the will, whose movements or acts of justice rather than of the other moral virtues. are not passions, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 22, a. 3; Ia Reply to Objection 3. The common good is the end IIae, q. 59, a. 4), for it is only the sensitive appetite whose of each individual member of a community, just as the movements are called passions. Hence justice is not about good of the whole is the end of each part. On the other the passions, as are temperance and fortitude, which are in hand the good of one individual is not the end of another the irascible and concupiscible parts. Secondly, on he part individual: wherefore legal justice which is directed to of the matter, because justice is about man’s relations with the common good, is more capable of extending to the in- another, and we are not directed immediately to another ternal passions whereby man is disposed in some way or by the internal passions. Therefore justice is not about the other in himself, than particular justice which is directed passions. to the good of another individual: although legal justice Reply to Objection 1. Not every moral virtue is about extends chiefly to other virtues in the point of their exter- pleasure and pain as its proper matter, since fortitude is nal operations, in so far, to wit, as “the law commands us about fear and daring: but every moral virtue is directed to perform the actions of a courageous person. . . the ac- to pleasure and pain, as to ends to be acquired, for, as the tions of a temperate person. . . and the actions of a gentle Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11), “pleasure and pain are person” (Ethic. v, 5). ∗ Ia IIae, q. 23, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 31, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 35, a. 1 1472 Whether the mean of justice is the real mean? IIa IIae q. 58 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that the mean of justice thing to another, but merely by comparison with the virtu- is not the real mean. For the generic nature remains entire ous man himself, so that with them the mean is only that in each species. Now moral virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, which is fixed by reason in our regard. 6) to be “an elective habit which observes the mean fixed, On the other hand, the matter of justice is external op- in our regard, by reason.” Therefore justice observes the eration, in so far as an operation or the thing used in that rational and not the real mean. operation is duly proportionate to another person, where- Objection 2. Further, in things that are good simply, fore the mean of justice consists in a certain proportion of there is neither excess nor defect, and consequently nei- equality between the external thing and the external per- ther is there a mean; as is clearly the case with the virtues, son. Now equality is the real mean between greater and according to Ethic. ii, 6. Now justice is about things that less, as stated in Metaph. x∗: wherefore justice observes are good simply, as stated in Ethic. v. Therefore justice the real mean. does not observe the real mean. Reply to Objection 1. This real mean is also the ra- Objection 3. Further, the reason why the other virtues tional mean, wherefore justice satisfies the conditions of a are said to observe the rational and not the real mean, is moral virtue. because in their case the mean varies according to differ- Reply to Objection 2. We may speak of a thing being ent persons, since what is too much for one is too little good simply in two ways. First a thing may be good in for another (Ethic. ii, 6). Now this is also the case in every way: thus the virtues are good; and there is neither justice: for one who strikes a prince does not receive the mean nor extremes in things that are good simply in this same punishment as one who strikes a private individual. sense. Secondly a thing is said to be good simply through Therefore justice also observes, not the real, but the ratio- being good absolutely i.e. in its nature, although it may nal mean. become evil through being abused. Such are riches and On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6; honors; and in the like it is possible to find excess, defi- v, 4) that the mean of justice is to be taken according to ciency and mean, as regards men who can use them well “arithmetical” proportion, so that it is the real mean. or ill: and it is in this sense that justice is about things that I answer that, As stated above (a. 9; Ia IIae, q. 59, are good simply. a. 4), the other moral virtues are chiefly concerned with Reply to Objection 3. The injury inflicted bears a the passions, the regulation of which is gauged entirely different proportion to a prince from that which it bears by a comparison with the very man who is the subject of to a private person: wherefore each injury requires to be those passions, in so far as his anger and desire are vested equalized by vengeance in a different way: and this im- with their various due circumstances. Hence the mean in plies a real and not merely a rational diversity. such like virtues is measured not by the proportion of one Whether the act of justice is to render to each one his own? IIa IIae q. 58 a. 11 Objection 1. It would seem that the act of justice is distribution of things. Therefore the act of justice is not not to render to each one his own. For Augustine (De sufficiently described by saying that it consists in render- Trin. xiv, 9) ascribes to justice the act of succoring the ing to each one his own. needy. Now in succoring the needy we give them what is On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): “It not theirs but ours. Therefore the act of justice does not is justice that renders to each one what is his, and claims consist in rendering to each one his own. not another’s property; it disregards its own profit in order Objection 2. Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7) that to preserve the common equity.” “beneficence which we may call kindness or liberality, be- I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 8,10), the mat- longs to justice.” Now it pertains to liberality to give to ter of justice is an external operation in so far as either another of one’s own, not of what is his. Therefore the it or the thing we use by it is made proportionate to some act of justice does not consist in rendering to each one his other person to whom we are related by justice. Now each own. man’s own is that which is due to him according to equal- Objection 3. Further, it belongs to justice not only to ity of proportion. Therefore the proper act of justice is distribute things duly, but also to repress injurious actions, nothing else than to render to each one his own. such as murder, adultery and so forth. But the rendering Reply to Objection 1. Since justice is a cardinal to each one of what is his seems to belong solely to the virtue, other secondary virtues, such as mercy, liberality ∗ Didot ed., ix, 5; Cf. Ethic. v, 4 1473 and the like are connected with it, as we shall state further is extended to whatever is excessive, and whatever is defion (q. 80, a. 1). Wherefore to succor the needy, which cient is called “loss.” The reason for this is that justice is belongs to mercy or pity, and to be liberally beneficent, first of all and more commonly exercised in voluntary in- which pertains to liberality, are by a kind of reduction as- terchanges of things, such as buying and selling, wherein cribed to justice as to their principal virtue. those expressions are properly employed; and yet they are This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. transferred to all other matters of justice. The same ap- Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher states plies to the rendering to each one of what is his own. (Ethic. v, 4), in matters of justice, the name of “profit” Whether justice stands foremost among all moral virtues? IIa IIae q. 58 a. 12 Objection 1. It would seem that justice does not stand moral virtues are in the sensitive appetite, whereunto ap- foremost among all the moral virtues. Because it belongs pertain the passions which are the matter of the other to justice to render to each one what is his, whereas it be- moral virtues. The second reason is taken from the object, longs to liberality to give of one’s own, and this is more because the other virtues are commendable in respect of virtuous. Therefore liberality is a greater virtue than jus- the sole good of the virtuous person himself, whereas jus- tice. tice is praiseworthy in respect of the virtuous person being Objection 2. Further, nothing is adorned by a less well disposed towards another, so that justice is somewhat excellent thing than itself. Now magnanimity is the or- the good of another person, as stated in Ethic. v, 1. Hence nament both of justice and of all the virtues, according the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9): “The greatest virtues to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is more excellent must needs be those which are most profitable to other than justice. persons, because virtue is a faculty of doing good to oth- Objection 3. Further, virtue is about that which is ers. For this reason the greatest honors are accorded the “difficult” and “good,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. But for- brave and the just, since bravery is useful to others in war- titude is about more difficult things than justice is, since fare, and justice is useful to others both in warfare and in it is about dangers of death, according to Ethic. iii, 6. time of peace.” Therefore fortitude is more excellent than justice. Reply to Objection 1. Although the liberal man gives On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7): “Justice of his own, yet he does so in so far as he takes into con- is the most resplendent of the virtues, and gives its name sideration the good of his own virtue, while the just man to a good man.” gives to another what is his, through consideration of the I answer that, If we speak of legal justice, it is evi- common good. Moreover justice is observed towards all, dent that it stands foremost among all the moral virtues, whereas liberality cannot extend to all. Again liberality for as much as the common good transcends the individ- which gives of a man’s own is based on justice, whereby ual good of one person. In this sense the Philosopher de- one renders to each man what is his. clares (Ethic. v, 1) that “the most excellent of the virtues Reply to Objection 2. When magnanimity is added to would seem to be justice, and more glorious than either justice it increases the latter’s goodness; and yet without the evening or the morning star.” But, even if we speak justice it would not even be a virtue. of particular justice, it excels the other moral virtues for Reply to Objection 3. Although fortitude is about the two reasons. The first reason may be taken from the sub- most difficult things, it is not about the best, for it is only ject, because justice is in the more excellent part of the useful in warfare, whereas justice is useful both in war and soul, viz. the rational appetite or will, whereas the other in peace, as stated above. 1474 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 59 Of Injustice (In Four Articles) We must now consider injustice, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether injustice is a special vice? (2) Whether it is proper to the unjust man to do unjust deeds? (3) Whether one can suffer injustice willingly? (4) Whether injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus? Whether injustice is a special virtue? IIa IIae q. 59 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that injustice is not a spe- sin. Thus too all vices, as being repugnant to the common cial vice. For it is written (1 Jn. 3:4): “All sin is iniq- good, have the character of injustice, as though they arose uity∗.” Now iniquity would seem to be the same as injus- from injustice, in accord with what has been said above tice, because justice is a kind of equality, so that injustice about justice (q. 58, Aa. 5,6). Secondly we speak of in- is apparently the same as inequality or iniquity. Therefore justice in reference to an inequality between one person injustice is not a special sin. and another, when one man wishes to have more goods, Objection 2. Further, no special sin is contrary to all riches for example, or honors, and less evils, such as toil the virtues. But injustice is contrary to all the virtues: for and losses, and thus injustice has a special matter and is a as regards adultery it is opposed to chastity, as regards particular vice opposed to particular justice. murder it is opposed to meekness, and in like manner as Reply to Objection 1. Even as legal justice is referred regards the other sins. Therefore injustice is not a special to human common good, so Divine justice is referred to sin. the Divine good, to which all sin is repugnant, and in this Objection 3. Further, injustice is opposed to justice sense all sin is said to be iniquity. which is in the will. But every sin is in the will, as Augus- Reply to Objection 2. Even particular justice is indi- tine declares (De Duabus Anim. x). Therefore injustice is rectly opposed to all the virtues; in so far, to wit, as even not a special sin. external acts pertain both to justice and to the other moral On the contrary, Injustice is contrary to justice. But virtues, although in different ways as stated above (q. 58, justice is a special virtue. Therefore injustice is a special a. 9, ad 2). vice. Reply to Objection 3. The will, like the reason, ex- I answer that, Injustice is twofold. First there is il- tends to all moral matters, i.e. passions and those external legal injustice which is opposed to legal justice: and this operations that relate to another person. On the other hand is essentially a special vice, in so far as it regards a spe- justice perfects the will solely in the point of its extending cial object, namely the common good which it contemns; to operations that relate to another: and the same applies and yet it is a general vice, as regards the intention, since to injustice. contempt of the common good may lead to all kinds of Whether a man is called unjust through doing an unjust thing? IIa IIae q. 59 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that a man is called unjust a just man is no less capable of doing what is unjust than through doing an unjust thing. For habits are specified by an unjust man. But this opinion would not be false un- their objects, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 2). Now less it were proper to the unjust man to do what is unjust. the proper object of justice is the just, and the proper ob- Therefore a man is to be deemed unjust from the fact that ject of injustice is the unjust. Therefore a man should be he does an unjust thing. called just through doing a just thing, and unjust through Objection 3. Further, every virtue bears the same rela- doing an unjust thing. tion to its proper act, and the same applies to the contrary Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vices. But whoever does what is intemperate, is said to be v, 9) that they hold a false opinion who maintain that it is intemperate. Therefore whoever does an unjust thing, is in a man’s power to do suddenly an unjust thing, and that said to be unjust. ∗ Vulg.: ‘Whosoever committeth sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity’ 1475 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6) arises from a habit, because whenever a man has a habit, that “a man may do an unjust thing without being unjust.” whatever befits that habit is, of itself, pleasant to him. Ac- I answer that, Even as the object of justice is some- cordingly, to do what is unjust intentionally and by choice thing equal in external things, so too the object of injustice is proper to the unjust man, in which sense the unjust man is something unequal, through more or less being assigned is one who has the habit of injustice: but a man may do to some person than is due to him. To this object the habit what is unjust, unintentionally or through passion, with- of injustice is compared by means of its proper act which out having the habit of injustice. is called an injustice. Accordingly it may happen in two Reply to Objection 1. A habit is specified by its ob- ways that a man who does an unjust thing, is not unjust: ject in its direct and formal acceptation, not in its material first, on account of a lack of correspondence between the and indirect acceptation. operation and its proper object. For the operation takes Reply to Objection 2. It is not easy for any man to its species and name from its direct and not from its in- do an unjust thing from choice, as though it were pleasing direct object: and in things directed to an end the direct for its own sake and not for the sake of something else: is that which is intended, and the indirect is what is be- this is proper to one who has the habit, as the Philosopher side the intention. Hence if a man do that which is unjust, declares (Ethic. v, 9). without intending to do an unjust thing, for instance if he Reply to Objection 3. The object of temperance is do it through ignorance, being unaware that it is unjust, not something established externally, as is the object of properly speaking he does an unjust thing, not directly, justice: the object of temperance, i.e. the temperate thing, but only indirectly, and, as it were, doing materially that depends entirely on proportion to the man himself. Con- which is unjust: hence such an operation is not called an sequently what is accidental and unintentional cannot be injustice. Secondly, this may happen on account of a lack said to be temperate either materially or formally. In like of proportion between the operation and the habit. For manner neither can it be called intemperate: and in this an injustice may sometimes arise from a passion, for in- respect there is dissimilarity between justice and the other stance, anger or desire, and sometimes from choice, for moral virtues; but as regards the proportion between op- instance when the injustice itself is the direct object of eration and habit, there is similarity in all respects. one’s complacency. In the latter case properly speaking it Whether we can suffer injustice willingly? IIa IIae q. 59 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that one can suffer injus- I answer that, Action by its very nature proceeds tice willingly. For injustice is inequality, as stated above from an agent, whereas passion as such is from another: (a. 2). Now a man by injuring himself, departs from equal- wherefore the same thing in the same respect cannot be ity, even as by injuring another. Therefore a man can do both agent and patient, as stated in Phys. iii, 1; viii, 5. an injustice to himself, even as to another. But whoever Now the proper principle of action in man is the will, does himself an injustice, does so involuntarily. There- wherefore man does properly and essentially what he does fore a man can voluntarily suffer injustice especially if it voluntarily, and on the other hand a man suffers prop- be inflicted by himself. erly what he suffers against his will, since in so far as Objection 2. Further, no man is punished by the civil he is willing, he is a principle in himself, and so, consid- law, except for having committed some injustice. Now ered thus, he is active rather than passive. Accordingly suicides were formerly punished according to the law of we must conclude that properly and strictly speaking no the state by being deprived of an honorable burial, as the man can do an injustice except voluntarily, nor suffer an Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore a man can injustice save involuntarily; but that accidentally and ma- do himself an injustice, and consequently it may happen terially so to speak, it is possible for that which is unjust that a man suffers injustice voluntarily. in itself either to be done involuntarily (as when a man Objection 3. Further, no man does an injustice save does anything unintentionally), or to be suffered voluntar- to one who suffers that injustice. But it may happen that ily (as when a man voluntarily gives to another more than a man does an injustice to one who wishes it, for instance he owes him). if he sell him a thing for more than it is worth. Therefore Reply to Objection 1. When one man gives voluntar- a man may happen to suffer an injustice voluntarily. ily to another that which he does not owe him, he causes On the contrary, To suffer an injustice and to do an neither injustice nor inequality. For a man’s ownership injustice are contraries. Now no man does an injustice depends on his will, so there is no disproportion if he for- against his will. Therefore on the other hand no man suf- feit something of his own free-will, either by his own or fers an injustice except against his will. by another’s action. 1476 Reply to Objection 2. An individual person may be ternal action. Now in the point of doing and suffering considered in two ways. First, with regard to himself; and injustice, the material element is that which is done exter- thus, if he inflict an injury on himself, it may come under nally, considered in itself, as stated above (a. 2), and the the head of some other kind of sin, intemperance for in- formal and essential element is on the part of the will of stance or imprudence, but not injustice; because injustice agent and patient, as stated above (a. 2). Accordingly we no less than justice, is always referred to another person. must reply that injustice suffered by one man and injustice Secondly, this or that man may be considered as belong- done by another man always accompany one another, in ing to the State as part thereof, or as belonging to God, as the material sense. But if we speak in the formal sense a His creature and image; and thus a man who kills himself, man can do an injustice with the intention of doing an in- does an injury not indeed to himself, but to the State and justice, and yet the other man does not suffer an injustice, to God. Wherefore he is punished in accordance with both because he suffers voluntarily; and on the other hand a Divine and human law, even as the Apostle declares in re- man can suffer an injustice if he suffer an injustice against spect of the fornicator (1 Cor. 3:17): “If any man violate his will, while the man who does the injury unknowingly, the temple of God, him shall God destroy.” does an injustice, not formally but only materially. Reply to Objection 3. Suffering is the effect of ex- Whether whoever does an injustice sins mortally? IIa IIae q. 59 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that not everyone who when we were treating of the distinction of sins, a mortal does an injustice sins mortally. For venial sin is opposed sin is one that is contrary to charity which gives life to the to mortal sin. Now it is sometimes a venial sin to do an soul. Now every injury inflicted on another person is of injury: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 8) in reference itself contrary to charity, which moves us to will the good to those who act unjustly: “Whatever they do not merely of another. And so since injustice always consists in an in ignorance but through ignorance is a venial matter.” injury inflicted on another person, it is evident that to do Therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mor- an injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus. tally. Reply to Objection 1. This saying of the Philoso- Objection 2. Further, he who does an injustice in a pher is to be understood as referring to ignorance of fact, small matter, departs but slightly from the mean. Now this which he calls “ignorance of particular circumstances”†, seems to be insignificant and should be accounted among and which deserves pardon, and not to ignorance of the the least of evils, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. ii, 9). law which does not excuse: and he who does an injustice Therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mor- through ignorance, does no injustice except accidentally, tally. as stated above (a. 2) Objection 3. Further, charity is the “mother of all the Reply to Objection 2. He who does an injustice in virtues”∗, and it is through being contrary thereto that a small matters falls short of the perfection on an unjust sin is called mortal. But not all the sins contrary to the deed, in so far as what he does may be deemed not al- other virtues are mortal. Therefore neither is it always a together contrary to the will of the person who suffers mortal sin to do an injustice. therefrom: for instance, if a man take an apple or some On the contrary, Whatever is contrary to the law of such thing from another man, in which case it is probable God is a mortal sin. Now whoever does an injustice does that the latter is not hurt or displeased. that which is contrary to the law of God, since it amounts Reply to Objection 3. The sins which are contrary either to theft, or to adultery, or to murder, or to something to the other virtues are not always hurtful to another per- of the kind, as will be shown further on (q. 64, seqq.). son, but imply a disorder affecting human passions; hence Therefore whoever does an injustice sins mortally. there is no comparison. I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 12, a. 5), ∗ Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D. 23 † Ethic. iii, 1 1477 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 60 Of Judgment (In Six Articles) In due sequence we must consider judgment, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether judgment is an act of justice? (2) Whether it is lawful to judge? (3) Whether judgment should be based on suspicions? (4) Whether doubts should be interpreted favorably? (5) Whether judgment should always be given according to the written law? (6) Whether judgment is perverted by being usurped? Whether judgment is an act of justice? IIa IIae q. 60 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that judgment is not an who is the personification of justice.” act of justice. The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 3) that Reply to Objection 1. The word “judgment,” from “everyone judges well of what he knows,” so that judg- its original meaning of a right decision about what is just, ment would seem to belong to the cognitive faculty. Now has been extended to signify a right decision in any mat- the cognitive faculty is perfected by prudence. There- ter whether speculative or practical. Now a right judg- fore judgment belongs to prudence rather than to justice, ment in any matter requires two things. The first is the which is in the will, as stated above (q. 58, a. 4). virtue itself that pronounces judgment: and in this way, Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15): judgment is an act of reason, because it belongs to the “The spiritual man judgeth all things.” Now man is made reason to pronounce or define. The other is the disposi- spiritual chiefly by the virtue of charity, which “is poured tion of the one who judges, on which depends his aptness forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us” for judging aright. In this way, in matters of justice, judg- (Rom. 5:5). Therefore judgment belongs to charity rather ment proceeds from justice, even as in matters of forti- than to justice. tude, it proceeds from fortitude. Accordingly judgment is Objection 3. Further, it belongs to every virtue to an act of justice in so far as justice inclines one to judge judge aright of its proper matter, because “the virtuous aright, and of prudence in so far as prudence pronounces man is the rule and measure in everything,” according to judgment: wherefore synesis (judging well according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4). Therefore judgment does common law) which belongs to prudence is said to “judge not belong to justice any more than to the other moral rightly,” as stated above (q. 51, a. 3). virtues. Reply to Objection 2. The spiritual man, by reason Objection 4. Further, judgment would seem to belong of the habit of charity, has an inclination to judge aright of only to judges. But the act of justice is to be found in ev- all things according to the Divine rules; and it is in con- ery just man. Since then judges are not the only just men, formity with these that he pronounces judgment through it seems that judgment is not the proper act of justice. the gift of wisdom: even as the just man pronounces judg- On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 93:15): “Until jus- ment through the virtue of prudence conformably with the tice be turned into judgment.” ruling of the law. I answer that, Judgment properly denotes the act of a Reply to Objection 3. The other virtues regulate man judge as such. Now a judge [judex] is so called because in himself, whereas justice regulates man in his dealings he asserts the right [jus dicens] and right is the object of with others, as shown above (q. 58, a. 2). Now man is justice, as stated above (q. 57, a. 1). Consequently the master in things concerning himself, but not in matters re- original meaning of the word “judgment” is a statement lating to others. Consequently where the other virtues are or decision of the just or right. Now to decide rightly in question, there is no need for judgment other than that about virtuous deeds proceeds, properly speaking, from of a virtuous man, taking judgment in its broader sense, as the virtuous habit; thus a chaste person decides rightly explained above (ad 1). But in matters of justice, there is about matters relating to chastity. Therefore judgment, further need for the judgment of a superior, who is “able to which denotes a right decision about what is just, belongs reprove both, and to put his hand between both”∗. Hence properly to justice. For this reason the Philosopher says judgment belongs more specifically to justice than to any (Ethic. v, 4) that “men have recourse to a judge as to one other virtue. ∗ Job 9:33 1478 Reply to Objection 4. Justice is in the sovereign as a trative virtue. Hence judgment, which denotes a decision master-virtue†, commanding and prescribing what is just; of what is just, belongs to justice, considered as existing while it is in the subjects as an executive and adminis- chiefly in one who has authority. Whether it is lawful to judge? IIa IIae q. 60 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem unlawful to judge. For tive, forms a judgment on some doubtful or hidden mat- nothing is punished except what is unlawful. Now those ter, and then it is called judgment by “suspicion” or “rash” who judge are threatened with punishment, which those judgment. who judge not will escape, according to Mat. 7:1, “Judge Reply to Objection 1. In these words our Lord for- not, and ye shall not be judged.” Therefore it is unlawful bids rash judgment which is about the inward intention, to judge. or other uncertain things, as Augustine states (De Serm. Objection 2. Further, it is written (Rom. 14:4): “Who Dom. in Monte ii, 18). Or else He forbids judgment about art thou that judgest another man’s servant. To his own Divine things, which we ought not to judge, but simply lord he standeth or falleth.” Now God is the Lord of all. believe, since they are above us, as Hilary declares in his Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge. commentary on Mat. 5. Or again according to Chrysos- Objection 3. Further, no man is sinless, according tom∗, He forbids the judgment which proceeds not from to 1 Jn. 1:8, “If we say that we have no sin, we de- benevolence but from bitterness of heart. ceive ourselves.” Now it is unlawful for a sinner to judge, Reply to Objection 2. A judge is appointed as God’s according to Rom. 2:1, “Thou art inexcusable, O man, servant; wherefore it is written (Dt. 1:16): “Judge that whosoever thou art, that judgest; for wherein thou judgest which is just,” and further on (Dt. 1:17), “because it is the another, thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same judgment of God.” things which thou judgest.” Therefore to no man is it law- Reply to Objection 3. Those who stand guilty of ful to judge. grievous sins should not judge those who are guilty of the On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 16:18): “Thou shalt same or lesser sins, as Chrysostom† says on the words of appoint judges and magistrates in all thy gates. . . that they Mat. 7:1, “Judge not.” Above all does this hold when may judge the people with just judgment.” such sins are public, because there would be an occasion I answer that, Judgment is lawful in so far as it is an of scandal arising in the hearts of others. If however they act of justice. Now it follows from what has been stated are not public but hidden, and there be an urgent neces- above (a. 1, ad 1,3) that three conditions are requisite for a sity for the judge to pronounce judgment, because it is judgment to be an act of justice: first, that it proceed from his duty, he can reprove or judge with humility and fear. the inclination of justice; secondly, that it come from one Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19): who is in authority; thirdly, that it be pronounced accord- “If we find that we are guilty of the same sin as another ing to the right ruling of prudence. If any one of these be man, we should groan together with him, and invite him to lacking, the judgment will be faulty and unlawful. First, strive against it together with us.” And yet it is not through when it is contrary to the rectitude of justice, and then it acting thus that a man condemns himself so as to deserve is called “perverted” or “unjust”: secondly, when a man to be condemned once again, but when, in condemning judges about matters wherein he has no authority, and this another, he shows himself to be equally deserving of con- is called judgment “by usurpation”: thirdly, when the rea- demnation on account of another or a like sin. son lacks certainty, as when a man, without any solid mo- Whether it is unlawful to form a judgment from suspicions? IIa IIae q. 60 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not unlawful to judgment would be lawful, if it were not lawful to judge form a judgment from suspicions. For suspicion is seem- from suspicions. ingly an uncertain opinion about an evil, wherefore the Objection 2. Further, a man does his neighbor an Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3) that suspicion is about injury by judging him unlawfully. But an evil suspicion both the true and the false. Now it is impossible to have consists in nothing more than a man’s opinion, and conse- any but an uncertain opinion about contingent singulars. quently does not seem to pertain to the injury of another Since then human judgment is about human acts, which man. Therefore judgment based on suspicion is not un- are about singular and contingent matters, it seems that no lawful. † Cf. q. 58, a. 6 ∗ Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John of the Cross † Hom. xxiv 1479 Objection 3. Further, if it is unlawful, it must needs is contrary to the nature of suspicion. Consequently sus-be reducible to an injustice, since judgment is an act of picion denotes a certain amount of vice, and the further it justice, as stated above (a. 1). Now an injustice is always goes, the more vicious it is. a mortal sin according to its genus, as stated above (q. 59, Now there are three degrees of suspicion. The first a. 4). Therefore a judgment based on suspicion would degree is when a man begins to doubt of another’s good- always be a mortal sin, if it were unlawful. But this is ness from slight indications. This is a venial and a light false, because “we cannot avoid suspicions,” according to sin; for “it belongs to human temptation without which no a gloss of Augustine (Tract. xc in Joan.) on 1 Cor. 4:5, man can go through this life,” according to a gloss on 1 “Judge not before the time.” Therefore a judgment based Cor. 4:5, “Judge not before the time.” The second degree on suspicion would seem not to be unlawful. is when a man, from slight indications, esteems another On the contrary, Chrysostom∗ in comment on the man’s wickedness as certain. This is a mortal sin, if it words of Mat. 7:1, “Judge not,” etc., says: “By this com- be about a grave matter, since it cannot be without con- mandment our Lord does not forbid Christians to reprove tempt of one’s neighbor. Hence the same gloss goes on to others from kindly motives, but that Christian should de- say: “If then we cannot avoid suspicions, because we are spise Christian by boasting his own righteousness, by hat- human, we must nevertheless restrain our judgment, and ing and condemning others for the most part on mere sus- refrain from forming a definite and fixed opinion.” The picion.” third degree is when a judge goes so far as to condemn a I answer that, As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), man on suspicion: this pertains directly to injustice, and suspicion denotes evil thinking based on slight indica- consequently is a mortal sin. tions, and this is due to three causes. First, from a man Reply to Objection 1. Some kind of certainty is found being evil in himself, and from this very fact, as though in human acts, not indeed the certainty of a demonstration, conscious of his own wickedness, he is prone to think but such as is befitting the matter in point, for instance evil of others, according to Eccles. 10:3, “The fool when when a thing is proved by suitable witnesses. he walketh in the way, whereas he himself is a fool, es- Reply to Objection 2. From the very fact that a man teemeth all men fools.” Secondly, this is due to a man thinks evil of another without sufficient cause, he despises being ill-disposed towards another: for when a man hates him unduly, and therefore does him an injury. or despises another, or is angry with or envious of him, he Reply to Objection 3. Since justice and injustice is led by slight indications to think evil of him, because are about external operations, as stated above (q. 58, everyone easily believes what he desires. Thirdly, this is Aa. 8,10,11; q. 59, a. 1, ad 3), the judgment of suspicion due to long experience: wherefore the Philosopher says pertains directly to injustice when it is betrayed by exter- (Rhet. ii, 13) that “old people are very suspicious, for nal action, and then it is a mortal sin, as stated above. The they have often experienced the faults of others.” The first internal judgment pertains to justice, in so far as it is re- two causes of suspicion evidently connote perversity of lated to the external judgment, even as the internal to the the affections, while the third diminishes the nature of sus- external act, for instance as desire is related to fornication, picion, in as much as experience leads to certainty which or anger to murder. Whether doubts should be interpreted for the best? IIa IIae q. 60 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that doubts should not Objection 3. Further, man should love his neighbor as be interpreted for the best. Because we should judge himself. Now with regard to himself, a man should inter- from what happens for the most part. But it happens pret doubtful matters for the worst, according to Job 9:28, for the most part that evil is done, since “the number of “I feared all my works.” Therefore it seems that doubtful fools is infinite” (Eccles. 1:15), “for the imagination and matters affecting one’s neighbor should be interpreted for thought of man’s heart are prone to evil from his youth” the worst. (Gn. 8:21). Therefore doubts should be interpreted for the On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 14:3, “He that worst rather than for the best. eateth not, let him not judge him that eateth,” says: Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. “Doubts should be interpreted in the best sense.” Christ. i, 27) that “he leads a godly and just life who is I answer that, As stated above (a. 3, ad 2), things sound in his estimate of things, and turns neither to this from the very fact that a man thinks ill of another with- side nor to that.” Now he who interprets a doubtful point out sufficient cause, he injures and despises him. Now no for the best, turns to one side. Therefore this should not man ought to despise or in any way injure another man be done. without urgent cause: and, consequently, unless we have ∗ Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John of the Cross 1480 evident indications of a person’s wickedness, we ought to worthy of honor from the very fact that he is judged to be deem him good, by interpreting for the best whatever is good, and deserving of contempt if he is judged to be evil. doubtful about him. For this reason we ought, in this kind of judgment, to aim Reply to Objection 1. He who interprets doubtful at judging a man good, unless there is evident proof of the matters for the best, may happen to be deceived more contrary. And though we may judge falsely, our judgment often than not; yet it is better to err frequently through in thinking well of another pertains to our good feeling thinking well of a wicked man, than to err less frequently and not to the evil of the intellect, even as neither does through having an evil opinion of a good man, because in it pertain to the intellect’s perfection to know the truth of the latter case an injury is inflicted, but not in the former. contingent singulars in themselves. Reply to Objection 2. It is one thing to judge of Reply to Objection 3. One may interpret something things and another to judge of men. For when we judge of for the worst or for the best in two ways. First, by a kind things, there is no question of the good or evil of the thing of supposition; and thus, when we have to apply a rem- about which we are judging, since it will take no harm no edy to some evil, whether our own or another’s, in order matter what kind of judgment we form about it; but there for the remedy to be applied with greater certainty of a is question of the good of the person who judges, if he cure, it is expedient to take the worst for granted, since if judge truly, and of his evil if he judge falsely because “the a remedy be efficacious against a worse evil, much more true is the good of the intellect, and the false is its evil,” as is it efficacious against a lesser evil. Secondly we may stated in Ethic. vi, 2, wherefore everyone should strive to interpret something for the best or for the worst, by de- make his judgment accord with things as they are. On the ciding or determining, and in this case when judging of other hand when we judge of men, the good and evil in our things we should try to interpret each thing according as judgment is considered chiefly on the part of the person it is, and when judging of persons, to interpret things for about whom judgment is being formed; for he is deemed the best as stated above. Whether we should always judge according to the written law? IIa IIae q. 60 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not always laws are written for the purpose of manifesting both these to judge according to the written law. For we ought al- rights, but in different ways. For the written law does in- ways to avoid judging unjustly. But written laws some- deed contain natural right, but it does not establish it, for times contain injustice, according to Is. 10:1, “Woe to the latter derives its force, not from the law but from na- them that make wicked laws, and when they write, write ture: whereas the written law both contains positive right, injustice.” Therefore we ought not always to judge ac- and establishes it by giving it force of authority. cording to the written law. Hence it is necessary to judge according to the written Objection 2. Further, judgment has to be formed law, else judgment would fall short either of the natural or about individual happenings. But no written law can cover of the positive right. each and every individual happening, as the Philosopher Reply to Objection 1. Just as the written law does not declares (Ethic. v, 10). Therefore it seems that we are not give force to the natural right, so neither can it diminish or always bound to judge according to the written law. annul its force, because neither can man’s will change na- Objection 3. Further, a law is written in order that the ture. Hence if the written law contains anything contrary lawgiver’s intention may be made clear. But it happens to the natural right, it is unjust and has no binding force. sometimes that even if the lawgiver himself were present For positive right has no place except where “it matters he would judge otherwise. Therefore we ought not always not,” according to the natural right, “whether a thing be to judge according to the written law. done in one way or in another”; as stated above (q. 57, On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. a. 2, ad 2). Wherefore such documents are to be called, xxxi): “In these earthly laws, though men judge about not laws, but rather corruptions of law, as stated above ( them when they are making them, when once they are es- Ia IIae, q. 95, a. 2): and consequently judgment should tablished and passed, the judges may judge no longer of not be delivered according to them. them, but according to them.” Reply to Objection 2. Even as unjust laws by their I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), judgment is very nature are, either always or for the most part, con- nothing else but a decision or determination of what is trary to the natural right, so too laws that are rightly es- just. Now a thing becomes just in two ways: first by the tablished, fail in some cases, when if they were observed very nature of the case, and this is called “natural right,” they would be contrary to the natural right. Wherefore in secondly by some agreement between men, and this is such cases judgment should be delivered, not according to called “positive right,” as stated above (q. 57, a. 2). Now the letter of the law, but according to equity which the law- 1481 giver has in view. Hence the jurist says∗: “By no reason cases even the lawgiver himself would decide otherwise; of law, or favor of equity, is it allowable for us to interpret and if he had foreseen the case, he might have provided harshly, and render burdensome, those useful measures for it by law. which have been enacted for the welfare of man.” In such This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection. Whether judgment is rendered perverse by being usurped? IIa IIae q. 60 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that judgment is not ren- pronounced by other than the public authority. dered perverse by being usurped. For justice is rectitude Reply to Objection 1. When the truth is declared in matters of action. Now truth is not impaired, no matter there is no obligation to accept it, and each one is free to who tells it, but it may suffer from the person who ought receive it or not, as he wishes. On the other hand judgment to accept it. Therefore again justice loses nothing, no mat- implies an obligation, wherefore it is unjust for anyone to ter who declares what is just, and this is what is meant by be judged by one who has no public authority. judgment. Reply to Objection 2. Moses seems to have slain the Objection 2. Further, it belongs to judgment to pun- Egyptian by authority received as it were, by divine in- ish sins. Now it is related to the praise of some that they spiration; this seems to follow from Acts 7:24, 25, where punished sins without having authority over those whom it is said that “striking the Egyptian. . . he thought that his they punished; such as Moses in slaying the Egyptian (Ex. brethren understood that God by his hand would save Is- 2:12), and Phinees the son of Eleazar in slaying Zambri rael [Vulg.: ‘them’].” Or it may be replied that Moses the son of Salu (Num. 25:7-14), and “it was reputed to slew the Egyptian in order to defend the man who was him unto justice” (Ps. 105:31). Therefore usurpation of unjustly attacked, without himself exceeding the limits of judgment pertains not to injustice. a blameless defence. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. Objection 3. Further, spiritual power is distinct from i, 36) that “whoever does not ward off a blow from a fel- temporal. Now prelates having spiritual power sometimes low man when he can, is as much in fault as the striker”; interfere in matters concerning the secular power. There- and he quotes the example of Moses. Again we may re- fore usurped judgment is not unlawful. ply with Augustine (QQ. Exod. qu. 2)∗ that just as “the Objection 4. Further, even as the judge requires au- soil gives proof of its fertility by producing useless herbs thority in order to judge aright, so also does he need jus- before the useful seeds have grown, so this deed of Moses tice and knowledge, as shown above (a. 1, ad 1,3; a. 2). was sinful although it gave a sign of great fertility,” in so But a judgment is not described as unjust, if he who judges far, to wit, as it was a sign of the power whereby he was lacks the habit of justice or the knowledge of the law. Nei- to deliver his people. ther therefore is it always unjust to judge by usurpation, With regard to Phinees the reply is that he did this i.e. without authority. out of zeal for God by Divine inspiration; or because On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 14:4): “Who art though not as yet high-priest, he was nevertheless the thou that judgest another man’s servant?” high-priest’s son, and this judgment was his concern as I answer that, Since judgment should be pronounced of the other judges, to whom this was commanded†. according to the written law, as stated above (a. 5), he that Reply to Objection 3. The secular power is subject to pronounces judgment, interprets, in a way, the letter of the the spiritual, even as the body is subject to the soul. Con- law, by applying it to some particular case. Now since it sequently the judgment is not usurped if the spiritual au- belongs to the same authority to interpret and to make a thority interferes in those temporal matters that are subject law, just as a law cannot be made save by public author- to the spiritual authority or which have been committed to ity, so neither can a judgment be pronounced except by the spiritual by the temporal authority. public authority, which extends over those who are sub- Reply to Objection 4. The habits of knowledge and ject to the community. Wherefore even as it would be justice are perfections of the individual, and consequently unjust for one man to force another to observe a law that their absence does not make a judgment to be usurped, as was not approved by public authority, so too it is unjust, in the absence of public authority which gives a judgment if a man compels another to submit to a judgment that is its coercive force. ∗ Digest. i, 3; De leg. senatusque consult. 25 ∗ Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 70 † Ex. 22:20; Lev. 20; Dt. 13,17 1482 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 61 Of the Parts of Justice (In Four Articles) We must now consider the parts of justice; (1) the subjective parts, which are the species of justice, i.e. distributive and commutative justice; (2) the quasi-integral parts; (3) the quasi-potential parts, i.e. the virtues connected with justice. The first consideration will be twofold: (1) The parts of justice; (2) their opposite vices. And since restitution would seem to be an act of commutative justice, we must consider (1) the distinction between commutative and distributive justice; (2) restitution. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are two species of justice, viz. distributive and commutative? (2) Whether in either case the mean is take in the same way? (3) Whether their matter is uniform or manifold? (4) Whether in any of these species the just is the same as counter-passion? Whether two species of justice are suitably assigned, viz. commutative and distribu-IIa IIae q. 61 a. 1 tive? Objection 1. It would seem that the two species of tions, the other, commutations.” justice are unsuitably assigned, viz. distributive and com- I answer that, As stated above (q. 58, Aa. 7,8), par- mutative. That which is hurtful to the many cannot be ticular justice is directed to the private individual, who is a species of justice, since justice is directed to the com- compared to the community as a part to the whole. Now mon good. Now it is hurtful to the common good of a twofold order may be considered in relation to a part. In the many, if the goods of the community are distributed the first place there is the order of one part to another, to among many, both because the goods of the commu- which corresponds the order of one private individual to nity would be exhausted, and because the morals of men another. This order is directed by commutative justice, would be corrupted. For Tully says (De Offic. ii, 15): which is concerned about the mutual dealings between “He who receives becomes worse, and the more ready to two persons. In the second place there is the order of expect that he will receive again.” Therefore distribution the whole towards the parts, to which corresponds the or- does not belong to any species of justice. der of that which belongs to the community in relation to Objection 2. Further, the act of justice is to render to each single person. This order is directed by distributive each one what is his own, as stated above (q. 58, a. 2). But justice, which distributes common goods proportionately. when things are distributed, a man does not receive what Hence there are two species of justice, distributive and was his, but becomes possessed of something which be- commutative. longed to the community. Therefore this does not pertain Reply to Objection 1. Just as a private individual is to justice. praised for moderation in his bounty, and blamed for ex- Objection 3. Further, justice is not only in the cess therein, so too ought moderation to be observed in the sovereign, but also in the subject, as stated above (q. 58, distribution of common goods, wherein distributive jus- a. 6). But it belongs exclusively to the sovereign to dis- tice directs. tribute. Therefore distribution does not always belong to Reply to Objection 2. Even as part and whole are justice. somewhat the same, so too that which pertains to the Objection 4. Further, “Distributive justice regards whole, pertains somewhat to the part also: so that when common goods” (Ethic. v, 4). Now matters regarding the the goods of the community are distributed among a num- community pertain to legal justice. Therefore distributive ber of individuals each one receives that which, in a way, justice is a part, not of particular, but of legal justice. is his own. Objection 5. Further, unity or multitude do not Reply to Objection 3. The act of distributing the change the species of a virtue. Now commutative jus- goods of the community, belongs to none but those who tice consists in rendering something to one person, while exercise authority over those goods; and yet distributive distributive justice consists in giving something to many. justice is also in the subjects to whom those goods are Therefore they are not different species of justice. distributed in so far as they are contented by a just distri- On the contrary, The Philosopher assigns two parts bution. Moreover distribution of common goods is some- to justice and says (Ethic. v, 2) that “one directs distribu- times made not to the state but to the members of a family, 1483 and such distribution can be made by authority of a private to particular individuals by way of distribution. individual. Reply to Objection 5. Distributive and commutative Reply to Objection 4. Movement takes its species justice differ not only in respect of unity and multitude, from the term “whereunto.” Hence it belongs to legal jus- but also in respect of different kinds of due: because com- tice to direct to the common good those matters which mon property is due to an individual in one way, and his concern private individuals: whereas on the contrary it personal property in another way. belongs to particular justice to direct the common good Whether the mean is to be observed in the same way in distributive as in commutative IIa IIae q. 61 a. 2 justice? Objection 1. It would seem that the mean in distribu- cal proportion,” wherein equality depends not on quantity tive justice is to be observed in the same way as in com- but on proportion. For example we say that 6 is to 4 as 3 mutative justice. For each of these is a kind of particular is to 2, because in either case the proportion equals 1-1/2; justice, as stated above (a. 1). Now the mean is taken in since the greater number is the sum of the lesser plus its the same way in all the parts of temperance or fortitude. half: whereas the equality of excess is not one of quantity, Therefore the mean should also be observed in the same because 6 exceeds 4 by 2, while 3 exceeds 2 by 1. way in both distributive and commutative justice. On the other hand in commutations something is paid Objection 2. Further, the form of a moral virtue con- to an individual on account of something of his that has sists in observing the mean which is determined in accor- been received, as may be seen chiefly in selling and buy- dance with reason. Since, then, one virtue has one form, ing, where the notion of commutation is found primarily. it seems that the mean for both should be the same. Hence it is necessary to equalize thing with thing, so that Objection 3. Further, in order to observe the mean in the one person should pay back to the other just so much distributive justice we have to consider the various deserts as he has become richer out of that which belonged to the of persons. Now a person’s deserts are considered also in other. The result of this will be equality according to the commutative justice, for instance, in punishments; thus “arithmetical mean” which is gauged according to equal a man who strikes a prince is punished more than one excess in quantity. Thus 5 is the mean between 6 and 4, who strikes a private individual. Therefore the mean is since it exceeds the latter and is exceeded by the former, observed in the same way in both kinds of justice. by 1. Accordingly if, at the start, both persons have 5, and On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3,4) one of them receives 1 out of the other’s belongings, the that the mean in distributive justice is observed accord- one that is the receiver, will have 6, and the other will be ing to “geometrical proportion,” whereas in commutative left with 4: and so there will be justice if both be brought justice it follows “arithmetical proportion.” back to the mean, 1 being taken from him that has 6, and I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), in distributive given to him that has 4, for then both will have 5 which is justice something is given to a private individual, in so far the mean. as what belongs to the whole is due to the part, and in a Reply to Objection 1. In the other moral virtues the quantity that is proportionate to the importance of the po- rational, not the real mean, is to be followed: but justice sition of that part in respect of the whole. Consequently follows the real mean; wherefore the mean, in justice, de- in distributive justice a person receives all the more of the pends on the diversity of things. common goods, according as he holds a more prominent Reply to Objection 2. Equality is the general form position in the community. This prominence in an aristo- of justice, wherein distributive and commutative justice cratic community is gauged according to virtue, in an oli- agree: but in one we find equality of geometrical propor- garchy according to wealth, in a democracy according to tion, whereas in the other we find equality of arithmetical liberty, and in various ways according to various forms of proportion. community. Hence in distributive justice the mean is ob- Reply to Objection 3. In actions and passions a per- served, not according to equality between thing and thing, son’s station affects the quantity of a thing: for it is a but according to proportion between things and persons: greater injury to strike a prince than a private person. in such a way that even as one person surpasses another, Hence in distributive justice a person’s station is consid- so that which is given to one person surpasses that which ered in itself, whereas in commutative justice it is consid- is allotted to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ered in so far as it causes a diversity of things. v, 3,4) that the mean in the latter case follows “geometri- 1484 Whether there is a different matter for both kinds of justice? IIa IIae q. 61 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that there is not a differ- son, or work against his will, and this may be done se- ent matter for both kinds of justice. Diversity of matter cretly by fraud, or openly by violence. In either case the causes diversity of virtue, as in the case of fortitude and offence may be committed against the other man’s chattel temperance. Therefore, if distributive and commutative or person, or against a person connected with him. If the justice have different matters, it would seem that they are offence is against his chattel and this be taken secretly, it not comprised under the same virtue, viz. justice. is called “theft,” if openly, it is called “robbery.” If it be Objection 2. Further, the distribution that has to do against another man’s person, it may affect either the very with distributive justice is one of “wealth or of honors, substance of his person, or his dignity. If it be against the or of whatever can be distributed among the members of substance of his person, a man is injured secretly if he is the community” (Ethic. v, 2), which very things are the treacherously slain, struck or poisoned, and openly, if he subject matter of commutations between one person and is publicly slain, imprisoned, struck or maimed. If it be another, and this belongs to commutative justice. There- against his personal dignity, a man is injured secretly by fore the matters of distributive and commutative justice false witness, detractions and so forth, whereby he is de- are not distinct. prived of his good name, and openly, by being accused Objection 3. Further, if the matter of distributive jus- in a court of law, or by public insult. If it be against a tice differs from that of commutative justice, for the rea- personal connection, a man is injured in the person of his son that they differ specifically, where there is no specific wife, secretly (for the most part) by adultery, in the per- difference, there ought to be no diversity of matter. Now son of his slave, if the latter be induced to leave his mas- the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) reckons commutative jus- ter: which things can also be done openly. The same ap- tice as one species, and yet this has many kinds of matter. plies to other personal connections, and whatever injury Therefore the matter of these species of justice is, seem- may be committed against the principal, may be commit- ingly, not of many kinds. ted against them also. Adultery, however, and inducing a On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. v, 2 that “one slave to leave his master are properly injuries against the kind of justice directs distributions, and another commu- person; yet the latter, since a slave is his master’s chat- tations.” tel, is referred to theft. Voluntary commutations are when I answer that, As stated above (q. 51, Aa. 8,10), jus- a man voluntarily transfers his chattel to another person. tice is about certain external operations, namely distribu- And if he transfer it simply so that the recipient incurs no tion and commutation. These consist in the use of cer- debt, as in the case of gifts, it is an act, not of justice but tain externals, whether things, persons or even works: of of liberality. A voluntary transfer belongs to justice in so things, as when one man takes from or restores to another far as it includes the notion of debt, and this may occur that which is his; of persons, as when a man does an injury in many ways. First when one man simply transfers his to the very person of another, for instance by striking or thing to another in exchange for another thing, as happens insulting him, or even by showing respect for him; and of in selling and buying. Secondly when a man transfers his works, as when a man justly exacts a work of another, or thing to another, that the latter may have the use of it with does a work for him. Accordingly, if we take for the mat- the obligation of returning it to its owner. If he grant the ter of each kind of justice the things themselves of which use of a thing gratuitously, it is called “usufruct” in things the operations are the use, the matter of distributive and that bear fruit; and simply “borrowing” on “loan” in things commutative justice is the same, since things can be dis- that bear no fruit, such as money, pottery, etc.; but if not tributed out of the common property to individuals, and even the use is granted gratis, it is called “letting” or “hir- be the subject of commutation between one person and ing.” Thirdly, a man transfers his thing with the inten- another; and again there is a certain distribution and pay- tion of recovering it, not for the purpose of its use, but ment of laborious works. that it may be kept safe, as in a “deposit,” or under some If, however, we take for the matter of both kinds of jus- obligation, as when a man pledges his property, or when tice the principal actions themselves, whereby we make one man stands security for another. In all these actions, use of persons, things, and works, there is then a dif- whether voluntary or involuntary, the mean is taken in the ference of matter between them. For distributive justice same way according to the equality of repayment. Hence directs distributions, while commutative justice directs all these actions belong to the one same species of jus- commutations that can take place between two persons. tice, namely commutative justice. And this suffices for of these some are involuntary, some voluntary. They are the Replies to the Objections. involuntary when anyone uses another man’s chattel, per- 1485 Whether the just is absolutely the same as retaliation? IIa IIae q. 61 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the just is absolutely on a basis of equality according to the requirements of the same as retaliation. For the judgment of God is abso- commutative justice, namely that the meed of passion be lutely just. Now the judgment of God is such that a man equal to the action. Now there would not always be equal- has to suffer in proportion with his deeds, according to ity if passion were in the same species as the action. Be- Mat. 7:2: “With what measure you judge, you shall be cause, in the first place, when a person injures the person judged: and with what measure you mete, it shall be mea- of one who is greater, the action surpasses any passion of sured to you again.” Therefore the just is absolutely the the same species that he might undergo, wherefore he that same as retaliation. strikes a prince, is not only struck back, but is much more Objection 2. Further, in either kind of justice some- severely punished. In like manner when a man despoils thing is given to someone according to a kind of equal- another of his property against the latter’s will, the ac- ity. In distributive justice this equality regards personal tion surpasses the passion if he be merely deprived of that dignity, which would seem to depend chiefly on what a thing, because the man who caused another’s loss, him- person has done for the good of the community; while in self would lose nothing, and so he is punished by making commutative justice it regards the thing in which a person restitution several times over, because not only did he in- has suffered loss. Now in respect of either equality there jure a private individual, but also the common weal, the is retaliation in respect of the deed committed. Therefore security of whose protection he has infringed. Nor again it would seem that the just is absolutely the same as retal- would there be equality of passion in voluntary commu- iation. tations, were one always to exchange one’s chattel for an- Objection 3. Further, the chief argument against re- other man’s, because it might happen that the other man’s taliation is based on the difference between the voluntary chattel is much greater than our own: so that it becomes and the involuntary; for he who does an injury involun- necessary to equalize passion and action in commutations tarily is less severely punished. Now voluntary and in- according to a certain proportionate commensuration, for voluntary taken in relation to ourselves, do not diversify which purpose money was invented. Hence retaliation the mean of justice since this is the real mean and does is in accordance with commutative justice: but there is not depend on us. Therefore it would seem that the just is no place for it in distributive justice, because in distribu- absolutely the same as retaliation. tive justice we do not consider the equality between thing On the contrary, The Philosopher proves (Ethic. v, and thing or between passion and action (whence the ex- 5) that the just is not always the same as retaliation. pression ‘contrapassum’), but according to proportion be- I answer that, Retaliation [contrapassum] denotes tween things and persons, as stated above (a. 2). equal passion repaid for previous action; and the expres- Reply to Objection 1. This form of the Divine judg- sion applies most properly to injurious passions and ac- ment is in accordance with the conditions of commutative tions, whereby a man harms the person of his neighbor; justice, in so far as rewards are apportioned to merits, and for instance if a man strike, that he be struck back. This punishments to sins. kind of just is laid down in the Law (Ex. 21:23,24): “He Reply to Objection 2. When a man who has served shall render life for life, eye for eye,” etc. And since also the community is paid for his services, this is to be re- to take away what belongs to another is to do an unjust ferred to commutative, not distributive, justice. Because thing, it follows that secondly retaliation consists in this distributive justice considers the equality, not between the also, that whosoever causes loss to another, should suffer thing received and the thing done, but between the thing loss in his belongings. This just loss is also found in the received by one person and the thing received by another Law (Ex. 22:1): “If any man steal an ox or a sheep, and according to the respective conditions of those persons. kill or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox and four Reply to Objection 3. When the injurious action is sheep for one sheep.” Thirdly retaliation is transferred to voluntary, the injury is aggravated and consequently is voluntary commutations, where action and passion are on considered as a greater thing. Hence it requires a greater both sides, although voluntariness detracts from the nature punishment in repayment, by reason of a difference, not of passion, as stated above (q. 59, a. 3). on part, but on the part of the thing. In all these cases, however, repayment must be made 1486 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 62 Of Restitution (In Eight Articles) We must now consider restitution, under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) of what is it an act? (2) Whether it is always of necessity for salvation to restore what one has taken away? (3) Whether it is necessary to restore more than has been taken away? (4) Whether it is necessary to restore what one has not taken away? (5) Whether it is necessary to make restitution to the person from whom something has been taken? (6) Whether the person who has taken something away is bound to restore it? (7) Whether any other person is bound to restitution? (8) Whether one is bound to restore at once? Whether restitution is an act of commutative justice? IIa IIae q. 62 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that restitution is not an Reply to Objection 1. That which is not due to an- act of commutative justice. For justice regards the notion other is not his properly speaking, although it may have of what is due. Now one may restore, even as one may been his at some time: wherefore it is a mere gift rather give, that which is not due. Therefore restitution is not the than a restitution, when anyone renders to another what is act of any part of justice. not due to him. It is however somewhat like a restitution, Objection 2. Further, that which has passed away and since the thing itself is materially the same; yet it is not is no more cannot be restored. Now justice and injustice the same in respect of the formal aspect of justice, which are about certain actions and passions, which are unendur- considers that thing as belonging to this particular man: ing and transitory. Therefore restitution would not seem and so it is not restitution properly so called. to be the act of a part of justice. Reply to Objection 2. In so far as the word restitution Objection 3. Further, restitution is repayment of denotes something done over again, it implies identity of something taken away. Now something may be taken object. Hence it would seem originally to have applied away from a man not only in commutation, but also in chiefly to external things, which can pass from one per- distribution, as when, in distributing, one gives a man less son to another, since they remain the same both substan- than his due. Therefore restitution is not more an act of tially and in respect of the right of dominion. But, even as commutative than of distributive justice. the term “commutation” has passed from such like things On the contrary, Restitution is opposed to taking to those actions and passions which confer reverence or away. Now it is an act of commutative injustice to take injury, harm or profit on another person, so too the term away what belongs to another. Therefore to restore it is “restitution” is applied, to things which though they be an act of that justice which directs commutations. transitory in reality, yet remain in their effect; whether I answer that, To restore is seemingly the same as this touch his body, as when the body is hurt by being to reinstate a person in the possession or dominion of his struck, or his reputation, as when a man remains defamed thing, so that in restitution we consider the equality of jus- or dishonored by injurious words. tice attending the payment of one thing for another, and Reply to Objection 3. Compensation is made by the this belongs to commutative justice. Hence restitution is distributor to the man to whom less was given than his an act of commutative justice, occasioned by one person due, by comparison of thing with thing, when the latter having what belongs to another, either with his consent, receives so much the more according as he received less for instance on loan or deposit, or against his will, as in than his due: and consequently it pertains to commutative robbery or theft. justice. 1487 Whether restitution of what has been taken away is necessary for salvation? IIa IIae q. 62 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not necessary stance if one man has deprived another of a limb, he must to restore what has been taken away. For that which is make compensation either in money or in honor, the con- impossible is not necessary for salvation. But sometimes dition of either party being duly considered according to it is impossible to restore what has been taken, as when the judgment of a good man. a man has taken limb or life. Therefore it does not seem Reply to Objection 2. There are three ways in which necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from one may take away another’s good name. First, by say- another. ing what is true, and this justly, as when a man reveals Objection 2. Further, the commission of a sin is not another’s sin, while observing the right order of so doing, necessary for salvation, for then a man would be in a and then he is not bound to restitution. Secondly, by say- dilemma. But sometimes it is impossible, without sin, to ing what is untrue and unjustly, and then he is bound to restore what has been taken, as when one has taken away restore that man’s good name, by confessing that he told another’s good name by telling the truth. Therefore it is an untruth. Thirdly, by saying what is true, but unjustly, not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken as when a man reveals another’s sin contrarily to the right from another. order of so doing, and then he is bound to restore his good Objection 3. Further, what is done cannot be undone. name as far as he can, and yet without telling an untruth; Now sometimes a man loses his personal honor by being for instance by saying that he spoke ill, or that he defamed unjustly insulted. Therefore that which has been taken him unjustly; or if he be unable to restore his good name, from him cannot be restored to him: so that it is not nec- he must compensate him otherwise, the same as in other essary for salvation to restore what one has taken. cases, as stated above (ad 1). Objection 4. Further, to prevent a person from obtain- Reply to Objection 3. The action of the man who has ing a good thing is seemingly the same as to take it away defamed another cannot be undone, but it is possible, by from him, since “to lack little is almost the same as to lack showing him deference, to undo its effect, viz. the lower- nothing at all,” as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 5). Now ing of the other man’s personal dignity in the opinion of when anyone prevents a man from obtaining a benefice or other men. the like, seemingly he is not bound to restore the benefice, Reply to Objection 4. There are several ways of pre- since this would be sometimes impossible. Therefore it is venting a man from obtaining a benefice. First, justly: for not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken. instance, if having in view the honor of God or the good On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Maced. of the Church, one procures its being conferred on a more cxliii): “Unless a man restore what he has purloined, his worthy subject, and then there is no obligation whatever sin is not forgiven.” to make restitution or compensation. Secondly, unjustly, I answer that, Restitution as stated above (a. 1) is if the intention is to injure the person whom one hinders, an act of commutative justice, and this demands a cer- through hatred, revenge or the like. In this case, if before tain equality. Wherefore restitution denotes the return of the benefice has been definitely assigned to anyone, one the thing unjustly taken; since it is by giving it back that prevents its being conferred on a worthy subject by coun- equality is reestablished. If, however, it be taken away seling that it be not conferred on him, one is bound to justly, there will be equality, and so there will be no need make some compensation, after taking account of the cir- for restitution, for justice consists in equality. Since there- cumstances of persons and things according to the judg- fore the safeguarding of justice is necessary for salvation, ment of a prudent person: but one is not bound in equiv- it follows that it is necessary for salvation to restore what alent, because that man had not obtained the benefice and has been taken unjustly. might have been prevented in many ways from obtaining Reply to Objection 1. When it is impossible to re- it. If, on the other hand, the benefice had already been pay the equivalent, it suffices to repay what one can, as assigned to a certain person, and someone, for some un- in the case of honor due to God and our parents, as the due cause procures its revocation, it is the same as though Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Wherefore when that he had deprived a man of what he already possessed, which has been taken cannot be restored in equivalent, and consequently he would be bound to compensation in compensation should be made as far as possible: for in- equivalent, in proportion, however, to his means. 1488 Whether it suffices to restore the exact amount taken? IIa IIae q. 62 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not sufficient void of injustice, as is the case in loans. The other is the to restore the exact amount taken. For it is written (Ex. sin of injustice, which is consistent with equality on the 22:1): “If a man shall steal an ox or a sheep and kill or part of the thing, as when a person intends to use violence sell it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox, and four sheep but fails. for one sheep.” Now everyone is bound to keep the com- As regards the first, the remedy is applied by making mandments of the Divine law. Therefore a thief is bound restitution, since thereby equality is re-established; and to restore four- or fivefold. for this it is enough that a man restore just so much as Objection 2. Further, “What things soever were writ- he has belonging to another. But as regards the sin, the ten, were written for our learning” (Rom. 15:4). Now remedy is applied by punishment, the infliction of which Zachaeus said (Lk. 19:8) to our Lord: “If I have wronged belongs to the judge: and so, until a man is condemned by any man of any thing, I restore him fourfold.” Therefore a the judge, he is not bound to restore more than he took, man is bound to restore several times over the amount he but when once he is condemned, he is bound to pay the has taken unjustly. penalty. Objection 3. Further, no one can be unjustly deprived Hence it is clear how to answer the First Objection: of what he is not bound to give. Now a judge justly de- because this law fixes the punishment to be inflicted by prives a thief of more than the amount of his theft, under the judge. Nor is this commandment to be kept now, be- the head of damages. Therefore a man is bound to pay cause since the coming of Christ no man is bound to keep it, and consequently it is not sufficient to restore the exact the judicial precepts, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 104, amount. a. 3). Nevertheless the same might be determined by hu- On the contrary, Restitution re-establishes equality man law, and then the same answer would apply. where an unjust taking has caused inequality. Now equal- Reply to Objection 2. Zachaeus said this being will- ity is restored by repaying the exact amount taken. There- ing to do more than he was bound to do; hence he had fore there is no obligation to restore more than the exact said already: “Behold. . . the half of my goods I give to the amount taken. poor.” I answer that, When a man takes another’s thing un- Reply to Objection 3. By condemning the man justly, justly, two things must be considered. One is the inequal- the judge can exact more by way of damages; and yet this ity on the part of the thing, which inequality is sometimes was not due before the sentence. Whether a man is bound to restore what he has not taken? IIa IIae q. 62 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that a man is bound to gather where I have not strewed.” Therefore it is just that restore what he has not taken. For he that has inflicted a one should restore to a man also, something that one has loss on a man is bound to remove that loss. Now it hap- not taken. pens sometimes that the loss sustained is greater than the On the contrary, Restitution belongs to justice, be- thing taken: for instance, if you dig up a man’s seeds, you cause it re-establishes equality. But if one were to restore inflict on the sower a loss equal to the coming harvest, and what one did not take, there would not be equality. There- thus you would seem to be bound to make restitution ac- fore it is not just to make such a restitution. cordingly. Therefore a man is bound to restore what he I answer that, Whoever brings a loss upon another has not taken. person, seemingly, takes from him the amount of the loss, Objection 2. Further, he who retains his creditor’s since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) loss is so money beyond the stated time, would seem to occasion called from a man having “less”∗ than his due. Therefore his loss of all his possible profits from that money, and yet a man is bound to make restitution according to the loss he does not really take them. Therefore it seems that a he has brought upon another. man is bound to restore what he did not take. Now a man suffers a loss in two ways. First, by be- Objection 3. Further, human justice is derived from ing deprived of what he actually has; and a loss of this Divine justice. Now a man is bound to restore to God kind is always to be made good by repayment in equiva- more than he has received from Him, according to Mat. lent: for instance if a man damnifies another by destroying 25:26, “Thou knewest that I reap where I sow not, and his house he is bound to pay him the value of the house. ∗ The derivation is more apparent in English than in Latin, where ‘damnum’ stands for ‘loss,’ and ‘minus’ for ‘less.’ Aristotle merely says that to have more than your own is called ‘gain,’ and to have less than you started with is called ‘loss.’ 1489 Secondly, a man may damnify another by preventing him Objections: because the sower of the seed in the field, has from obtaining what he was on the way to obtain. A loss the harvest, not actually but only virtually. In like manner of this kind need not be made good in equivalent; because he that has money has the profit not yet actually but only to have a thing virtually is less than to have it actually, virtually: and both may be hindered in many ways. and to be on the way to obtain a thing is to have it merely Reply to Objection 3. God requires nothing from us virtually or potentially, and so were he to be indemnified but what He Himself has sown in us. Hence this say- by receiving the thing actually, he would be paid, not the ing is to be understood as expressing either the shameful exact value taken from him, but more, and this is not nec- thought of the lazy servant, who deemed that he had re- essary for salvation, as stated above. However he is bound ceived nothing from the other, or the fact that God expects to make some compensation, according to the condition of from us the fruit of His gifts, which fruit is from Him and persons and things. from us, although the gifts themselves are from God with- From this we see how to answer the First and Second out us. Whether restitution must always be made to the person from whom a thing has been IIa IIae q. 62 a. 5 taken? Objection 1. It would seem that restitution need not On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 13:7): “Ren- always be made to the person from whom a thing has been der. . . to all men their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due, taken. For it is not lawful to injure anyone. Now it would custom to whom custom.” sometimes be injurious to the man himself, or to others, I answer that, Restitution re-establishes the equal- were one to restore to him what has been taken from him; ity of commutative justice, which equality consists in the if, for instance, one were to return a madman his sword. equalizing of thing to thing, as stated above (a. 2; q. 58, Therefore restitution need not always be made to the per- a. 10). Now this equalizing of things is impossible, un- son from whom a thing has been taken. less he that has less than his due receive what is lacking to Objection 2. Further, if a man has given a thing un- him: and for this to be done, restitution must be made to lawfully, he does not deserve to recover it. Now some- the person from whom a thing has been taken. times a man gives unlawfully that which another accepts Reply to Objection 1. When the thing to be restored unlawfully, as in the case of the giver and receiver who are appears to be grievously injurious to the person to whom it guilty of simony. Therefore it is not always necessary to is to be restored, or to some other, it should not be restored make restitution to the person from whom one has taken to him there and then, because restitution is directed to the something. good of the person to whom it is made, since all posses- Objection 3. Further, no man is bound to do what is sions come under the head of the useful. Yet he who re- impossible. Now it is sometimes impossible to make resti- tains another’s property must not appropriate it, but must tution to the person from whom a thing has been taken, either reserve it, that he may restore it at a fitting time, or either because he is dead, or because he is too far away, or hand it over to another to keep it more securely. because he is unknown to us. Therefore restitution need Reply to Objection 2. A person may give a thing un- not always be made to the person from whom a thing has lawfully in two ways. First through the giving itself being been taken. illicit and against the law, as is the case when a man gives Objection 4. Further, we owe more compensation to a thing simoniacally. Such a man deserves to lose what one from whom we have received a greater favor. Now he gave, wherefore restitution should not be made to him: we have received greater favors from others (our parents and, since the receiver acted against the law in receiving, for instance) than from a lender or depositor. Therefore he must not retain the price, but must use it for some pious sometimes we ought to succor some other person rather object. Secondly a man gives unlawfully, through giving than make restitution to one from whom we have taken for an unlawful purpose, albeit the giving itself is not un- something. lawful, as when a woman receives payment for fornica- Objection 5. Further, it is useless to restore a thing tion: wherefore she may keep what she has received. If, which reverts to the restorer by being restored. Now if a however, she has extorted overmuch by fraud or deceit, prelate has unjustly taken something from the Church and she would be bound to restitution. makes restitution to the Church, it reverts into his hands, Reply to Objection 3. If the person to whom resti- since he is the guardian of the Church’s property. There- tution is due is unknown altogether, restitution must be fore he ought not to restore to the Church from whom he made as far as possible, for instance by giving an alms for has taken: and so restitution should not always be made his spiritual welfare (whether he be dead or living): but to the person from whom something has been taken away not without previously making a careful inquiry about his 1490 person. If the person to whom restitution is due be dead, Reply to Objection 5. There are three ways in which restitution should be made to his heir, who is looked upon a prelate can rob the Church of her property. First by lay- as one with him. If he be very far away, what is due to him ing hands on Church property which is committed, not to should be sent to him, especially if it be of great value and him but to another; for instance, if a bishop appropriates can easily be sent: else it should be deposited in a safe the property of the chapter. In such a case it is clear that place to be kept for him, and the owner should be advised he is bound to restitution, by handing it over to those who of the fact. are its lawful owners. Secondly by transferring to another Reply to Objection 4. A man is bound, out of his own person (for instance a relative or a friend) Church prop- property, to succor his parents, or those from whom he has erty committed to himself: in which case he must make received greater benefits; but he ought not to compensate restitution to the Church, and have it under his own care, a benefactor out of what belongs to others; and he would so as to hand it over to his successor. Thirdly, a prelate be doing this if he were to compensate one with what is may lay hands on Church property, merely in intention, due to another. Exception must be made in cases of ex- when, to wit, he begins to have a mind to hold it as his treme need, for then he could and should even take what own and not in the name of the Church: in which case he belongs to another in order to succor a parent. must make restitution by renouncing his intention. Whether he that has taken a thing is always bound to restitution? IIa IIae q. 62 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that he who has taken gain nothing thereby, is bound to compensate the injured a thing is not always bound to restore it. Restitution re- person, so too he that is guilty of theft or robbery, is bound establishes the equality of justice, by taking away from to make compensation for the loss incurred, although he him that has more and giving to him that has less. Now be no better off; and in addition he must be punished for it happens sometimes that he who has taken that which the injustice committed. Secondly, a man takes another’s belongs to another, no longer has it, through its having property for his own profit but without committing an in- passed into another’s hands. Therefore it should be re- jury, i.e. with the consent of the owner, as in the case of a stored, not by the person that took it, but by the one that loan: and then, the taker is bound to restitution, not only has it. by reason of the thing, but also by reason of the taking, Objection 2. Further, no man is bound to reveal his even if he has lost the thing: for he is bound to compen- own crime. But by making restitution a man would some- sate the person who has done him a favor, and he would times reveal his crime, as in the case of theft. Therefore he not be doing so if the latter were to lose thereby. Thirdly, that has taken a thing is not always bound to restitution. a man takes another’s property without injury to the latter Objection 3. Further, the same thing should not be re- or profit to himself, as in the case of a deposit; where- stored several times. Now sometimes several persons take fore he that takes a thing thus, incurs no obligation on ac- a thing at the same time, and one of them restores it in count of the taking, in fact by taking he grants a favor; but its entirety. Therefore he that takes a thing is not always he is bound to restitution on account of the thing taken. bound to restitution. Consequently if this thing be taken from him without any On the contrary, He that has sinned is bound to satis- fault on his part, he is not bound to restitution, although he faction. Now restitution belongs to satisfaction. Therefore would be, if he were to lose the thing through a grievous he that has taken a thing is bound to restore it. fault on his part. I answer that, With regard to a man who has taken an- Reply to Objection 1. The chief end of restitution is, other’s property, two points must be considered: the thing not that he who has more than his due may cease to have taken, and the taking. By reason of the thing taken, he it, but that he who has less than his due may be compen- is bound to restore it as long as he has it in his posses- sated. Wherefore there is no place for restitution in those sion, since the thing that he has in addition to what is his, things which one man may receive from another without should be taken away from him, and given to him who loss to the latter, as when a person takes a light from an- lacks it according to the form of commutative justice. On other’s candle. Consequently although he that has taken the other hand, the taking of the thing that is another’s something from another, may have ceased to have what property, may be threefold. For sometimes it is injurious, he took, through having transferred it to another, yet since i.e. against the will of the owner, as in theft and robbery: that other is deprived of what is his, both are bound to in which case the thief is bound to restitution not only by restitution, he that took the thing, on account of the inju- reason of the thing, but also by reason of the injurious rious taking, and he that has it, on account of the thing. action, even though the thing is no longer in his posses- Reply to Objection 2. Although a man is not bound sion. For just as a man who strikes another, though he to reveal his crime to other men, yet is he bound to reveal 1491 it to God in confession; and so he may make restitution to reason that when he has received sufficient compen-of another’s property through the priest to whom he con- sation from one, the others are not bound to any further fesses. restitution in his regard: rather ought they to refund the Reply to Objection 3. Since restitution is chiefly di- person who has made restitution, who, nevertheless, may rected to the compensation for the loss incurred by the per- excuse them from so doing. son from whom a thing has been taken unjustly, it stands Whether restitution is binding on those who have not taken? IIa IIae q. 62 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that restitution is not are expressed as follows: binding on those who have not taken. For restitution is “By command, by counsel, by consent, by flattery, by a punishment of the taker. Now none should be punished receiving, by participation, by silence, by not preventing, except the one who sinned. Therefore none are bound to by not denouncing.” restitution save the one who has taken. It must be observed, however, that in five of these Objection 2. Further, justice does not bind one to in- cases the cooperator is always bound to restitution. First, crease another’s property. Now if restitution were binding in the case of command: because he that commands is the not only on the man who takes a thing but also on all those chief mover, wherefore he is bound to restitution princi- who cooperate with him in any way whatever, the person pally. Secondly, in the case of consent; namely of one from whom the thing was taken would be the gainer, both without whose consent the robbery cannot take place. because he would receive restitution many times over, and Thirdly, in the case of receiving; when, to wit, a man is because sometimes a person cooperates towards a thing a receiver of thieves, and gives them assistance. Fourthly, being taken away from someone, without its being taken in the case of participation; when a man takes part in the away in effect. Therefore the others are not bound to resti- theft and in the booty. Fifthly, he who does not prevent the tution. theft, whereas he is bound to do so; for instance, persons Objection 3. Further, no man is bound to expose him- in authority who are bound to safeguard justice on earth, self to danger, in order to safeguard another’s property. are bound to restitution, if by their neglect thieves prosper, Now sometimes a man would expose himself to the dan- because their salary is given to them in payment of their ger of death, were he to betray a thief, or withstand him. preserving justice here below. Therefore one is not bound to restitution, through not be- In the other cases mentioned above, a man is not al- traying or withstanding a thief. ways bound to restitution: because counsel and flattery On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 1:32): “They are not always the efficacious cause of robbery. Hence the who do such things are worthy of death, and not only they counsellor or flatterer is bound to restitution, only when that do them, but also they that consent to them that do it may be judged with probability that the unjust taking them.” Therefore in like manner they that consent are resulted from such causes. bound to restitution. Reply to Objection 1. Not only is he bound to resti- I answer that, As stated above (a. 6), a person is tution who commits the sin, but also he who is in any way bound to restitution not only on account of someone else’s cause of the sin, whether by counselling, or by command- property which he has taken, but also on account of the in- ing, or in any other way whatever. jurious taking. Hence whoever is cause of an unjust taking Reply to Objection 2. He is bound chiefly to restitu- is bound to restitution. This happens in two ways, directly tion, who is the principal in the deed; first of all, the “com- and indirectly. Directly, when a man induces another to mander”; secondly, the “executor,” and in due sequence, take, and this in three ways. First, on the part of the tak- the others: yet so that, if one of them make restitution, an- ing, by moving a man to take, either by express command, other is not bound to make restitution to the same person. counsel, or consent, or by praising a man for his courage Yet those who are principals in the deed, and who took in thieving. Secondly, on the part of the taker, by giving possession of the thing, are bound to compensate those him shelter or any other kind of assistance. Thirdly, on the who have already made restitution. When a man com- part of the thing taken, by taking part in the theft or rob- mands an unjust taking that does not follow, no restitution bery, as a fellow evil-doer. Indirectly, when a man does has to be made, since its end is chiefly to restore the prop- not prevent another from evil-doing (provided he be able erty of the person who has been unjustly injured. and bound to prevent him), either by omitting the com- Reply to Objection 3. He that fails to denounce a mand or counsel which would hinder him from thieving thief or does not withstand or reprehend him is not al- or robbing, or by omitting to do what would have hin- ways bound to restitution, but only when he is obliged, dered him, or by sheltering him after the deed. All these in virtue of his office, to do so: as in the case of earthly 1492 princes who do not incur any great danger thereby; for may maintain justice. they are invested with public authority, in order that they Whether a man is bound to immediate restitution, or may he put it off? IIa IIae q. 62 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that a man is not bound to will, is to deprive him of the use of what belongs to him, immediate restitution, and can lawfully delay to restore. and to do him an injury. Now it is clear that it is wrong to For affirmative precepts do not bind for always. Now the remain in sin even for a short time; and one is bound to re- necessity of making restitution is binding through an af- nounce one’s sin at once, according to Ecclus. 21:2, “Flee firmative precept. Therefore a man is not bound to imme- from sin as from the face of a serpent.” Consequently one diate restitution. is bound to immediate restitution, if possible, or to ask for Objection 2. Further, no man is bound to do what is a respite from the person who is empowered to grant the impossible. But it is sometimes impossible to make resti- use of the thing. tution at once. Therefore no man is bound to immediate Reply to Objection 1. Although the precept about the restitution. making of restitution is affirmative in form, it implies a Objection 3. Further, restitution is an act of virtue, negative precept forbidding us to withhold another’s prop- viz. of justice. Now time is one of the circumstances erty. requisite for virtuous acts. Since then the other circum- Reply to Objection 2. When one is unable to restore stances are not determinate for acts of virtue, but are de- at once, this very inability excuses one from immediate terminable according to the dictate of prudence, it seems restitution: even as a person is altogether excused from that neither in restitution is there any fixed time, so that a making restitution if he is altogether unable to make it. man be bound to restore at once. He is, however, bound either himself or through another On the contrary, All matters of restitution seem to to ask the person to whom he owes compensation to grant come under one head. Now a man who hires the services him a remission or a respite. of a wage-earner, must not delay compensation, as ap- Reply to Objection 3. Whenever the omission of a pears from Lev. 19:13, “The wages of him that hath been circumstance is contrary to virtue that circumstance must hired by thee shall not abide with thee until the morning.” be looked upon as determinate, and we are bound to ob- Therefore neither is it lawful, in other cases of restitution, serve it: and since delay of restitution involves a sin of un- to delay, and restitution should be made at once. just detention which is opposed to just detention, it stands I answer that, Even as it is a sin against justice to to reason that the time is determinate in the point of resti- take another’s property, so also is it to withhold it, since, tution being immediate. to withhold the property of another against the owner’s 1493 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 63 Of Respect of Persons (In Four Articles) We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid parts of justice. First we shall consider respect of persons which is opposed to distributive justice; secondly we shall consider the vices opposed to commutative justice. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether respect of persons is a sin? (2) Whether it takes place in the dispensation of spiritualities? (3) Whether it takes place in showing honor? (4) Whether it takes place in judicial sentences? Whether respect of persons is a sin? IIa IIae q. 63 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that respect of persons is worthy of it, but simply because he is this person. And not a sin. For the word “person” includes a reference to any circumstance that does not amount to a reason why personal dignity∗. Now it belongs to distributive justice to this man be worthy of this gift, is to be referred to his per- consider personal dignity. Therefore respect of persons is son: for instance if a man promote someone to a prelacy not a sin. or a professorship, because he is rich or because he is a Objection 2. Further, in human affairs persons are of relative of his, it is respect of persons. It may happen, more importance than things, since things are for the ben- however, that a circumstance of person makes a man wor- efit of persons and not conversely. But respect of things is thy as regards one thing, but not as regards another: thus not a sin. Much less, therefore, is respect of persons. consanguinity makes a man worthy to be appointed heir Objection 3. Further, no injustice or sin can be in to an estate, but not to be chosen for a position of eccle- God. Yet God seems to respect persons, since of two men siastical authority: wherefore consideration of the same circumstanced alike He sometimes upraises one by grace, circumstance of person will amount to respect of persons and leaves the other in sin, according to Mat. 24:40: “Two in one matter and not in another. It follows, accordingly, shall be in a bed [Vulg.: ‘field’†, one shall be taken, and that respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice in one shall be left.” Therefore respect of persons is not a that it fails to observe due proportion. Now nothing but sin. sin is opposed to virtue: and therefore respect of persons On the contrary, Nothing but sin is forbidden in the is a sin. Divine law. Now respect of persons is forbidden, Dt. 1:17: Reply to Objection 1. In distributive justice we con- “Neither shall you respect any man’s person.” Therefore sider those circumstances of a person which result in dig- respect of persons is a sin. nity or right, whereas in respect of persons we consider I answer that, Respect of persons is opposed to dis- circumstances that do not so result. tributive justice. For the equality of distributive justice Reply to Objection 2. Persons are rendered pro- consists in allotting various things to various persons in portionate to and worthy of things which are distributed proportion to their personal dignity. Accordingly, if one among them, by reason of certain things pertaining to cir- considers that personal property by reason of which the cumstances of person, wherefore such conditions ought to thing allotted to a particular person is due to him, this is be considered as the proper cause. But when we consider respect not of the person but of the cause. Hence a gloss the persons themselves, that which is not a cause is con- on Eph. 6:9, “There is no respect of persons with God sidered as though it were; and so it is clear that although [Vulg.: ‘Him’],” says that “a just judge regards causes, persons are more worthy, absolutely speaking, yet they are not persons.” For instance if you promote a man to a pro- not more worthy in this regard. fessorship on account of his having sufficient knowledge, Reply to Objection 3. There is a twofold giving. one you consider the due cause, not the person; but if, in con- belongs to justice, and occurs when we give a man his due: ferring something on someone, you consider in him not in such like givings respect of persons takes place. The the fact that what you give him is proportionate or due to other giving belongs to liberality, when one gives gratis him, but the fact that he is this particular man (e.g. Peter that which is not a man’s due: such is the bestowal of the or Martin), then there is respect of the person, since you gifts of grace, whereby sinners are chosen by God. In such give him something not for some cause that renders him a giving there is no place for respect of persons, because ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 29, a. 3, ad 2 † ‘Bed’ is the reading of Luk. 17:34 1494 anyone may, without injustice, give of his own as much as “Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?. . . Take what is he will, and to whom he will, according to Mat. 20:14,15, thine, and go thy way.” Whether respect of persons takes place in the dispensation of spiritual goods? IIa IIae q. 63 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that respect of persons that the less holy and less learned man may conduce more does not take place in the dispensation of spiritual goods. to the common good, on account of worldly authority or For it would seem to savor of respect of persons if a man activity, or something of the kind. And since the dispen- confers ecclesiastical dignity or benefice on account of sation of spiritualities is directed chiefly to the common consanguinity, since consanguinity is not a cause whereby good, according to 1 Cor. 12:7, “The manifestation of the a man is rendered worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice. Yet Spirit is given to every man unto profit,” it follows that in this apparently is not a sin, for ecclesiastical prelates are the dispensation of spiritualities the simply less good are wont to do so. Therefore the sin of respect of persons does sometimes preferred to the better, without respect of per- not take place in the conferring of spiritual goods. sons, just as God sometimes bestows gratuitous graces on Objection 2. Further, to give preference to a rich man the less worthy. rather than to a poor man seems to pertain to respect of Reply to Objection 1. We must make a distinction persons, according to James 2:2,3. Nevertheless dispensa- with regard to a prelate’s kinsfolk: for sometimes they are tions to marry within forbidden degrees are more readily less worthy, both absolutely speaking, and in relation to granted to the rich and powerful than to others. Therefore the common good: and then if they are preferred to the the sin of respect of persons seems not to take place in the more worthy, there is a sin of respect of persons in the dispensation of spiritual goods. dispensation of spiritual goods, whereof the ecclesiastical Objection 3. Further, according to jurists∗ it suffices superior is not the owner, with power to give them away as to choose a good man, and it is not requisite that one he will, but the dispenser, according to 1 Cor. 4:1, “Let a choose the better man. But it would seem to savor of man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the respect of persons to choose one who is less good for a dispensers of the mysteries of God.” Sometimes however higher position. Therefore respect of persons is not a sin the prelate’s kinsfolk are as worthy as others, and then in spiritual matters. without respect of persons he can lawfully give preference Objection 4. Further, according to the law of the to his kindred since there is at least this advantage, that he Church (Cap. Cum dilectus.) the person to be chosen can trust the more in their being of one mind with him in should be “a member of the flock.” Now this would seem conducting the business of the Church. Yet he would have to imply respect of persons, since sometimes more com- to forego so doing for fear of scandal, if anyone might take petent persons would be found elsewhere. Therefore re- an example from him and give the goods of the Church to spect of persons is not a sin in spiritual matters. their kindred without regard to their deserts. On the contrary, It is written (James 2:1): “Have not Reply to Objection 2. Dispensations for contracting the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ. . . with respect of per- marriage came into use for the purpose of strengthening sons.” On these words a gloss of Augustine says: “Who is treaties of peace: and this is more necessary for the com- there that would tolerate the promotion of a rich man to a mon good in relation to persons of standing, so that there position of honor in the Church, to the exclusion of a poor is no respect of persons in granting dispensations more man more learned and holier?”† readily to such persons. I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), respect of per- Reply to Objection 3. In order that an election be not sons is a sin, in so far as it is contrary to justice. Now rebutted in a court of law, it suffices to elect a good man, the graver the matter in which justice is transgressed, the nor is it necessary to elect the better man, because oth- more grievous the sin: so that, spiritual things being of erwise every election might have a flaw. But as regards greater import than temporal, respect of persons is a more the conscience of an elector, it is necessary to elect one grievous sin in dispensing spiritualities than in dispens- who is better, either absolutely speaking, or in relation to ing temporalities. And since it is respect of persons when the common good. For if it is possible to have one who is something is allotted to a person out of proportion to his more competent for a post, and yet another be preferred, it deserts, it must be observed that a person’s worthiness is necessary to have some cause for this. If this cause have may be considered in two ways. First, simply and abso- anything to do with the matter in point, he who is elected lutely: and in this way the man who abounds the more in will, in this respect, be more competent; and if that which the spiritual gifts of grace is the more worthy. Secondly, is taken for cause have nothing to do with the matter, it in relation to the common good; for it happens at times will clearly be respect of persons. ∗ Cap. Cum dilectus. † Augustine, Ep. ad Hieron. clxvii. 1495 Reply to Objection 4. The man who is taken from this reason it was commanded (Dt. 17:15): “Thou mayest among the members of a particular Church, is generally not make a man of another nation king, who is not thy speaking more useful as regards the common good, since brother.” he loves more the Church wherein he was brought up. For Whether respect of persons takes place in showing honor and respect? IIa IIae q. 63 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that respect of persons ever honors the rich for their riches, sins,” and in like man- does not take place in showing honor and respect. For ner, if a man be honored for other causes that do not render honor is apparently nothing else than “reverence shown to him worthy of honor. Now this savors of respect of per- a person in recognition of his virtue,” as the Philosopher sons. Therefore it is a sin to respect persons in showing states (Ethic. i, 5). Now prelates and princes should be honor. honored although they be wicked, even as our parents, of I answer that, To honor a person is to recognize him whom it is written (Ex. 20:12): “Honor thy father and thy as having virtue, wherefore virtue alone is the due cause mother.” Again masters, though they be wicked, should be of a person being honored. Now it is to be observed that honored by their servants, according to 1 Tim. 6:1: “Who- a person may be honored not only for his own virtue, but ever are servants under the yoke, let them count their mas- also for another’s: thus princes and prelates, although they ters worthy of all honor.” Therefore it seems that it is not be wicked, are honored as standing in God’s place, and as a sin to respect persons in showing honor. representing the community over which they are placed, Objection 2. Further, it is commanded (Lev. 19:32): according to Prov. 26:8, “As he that casteth a stone into “Rise up before the hoary head, and, honor the person of the heap of Mercury, so is he that giveth honor to a fool.” the aged man.” But this seems to savor of respect of per- For, since the gentiles ascribed the keeping of accounts to sons, since sometimes old men are not virtuous; according Mercury, “the heap of Mercury” signifies the casting up of to Dan. 13:5: “Iniquity came out from the ancients of the an account, when a merchant sometimes substitutes a peb- people∗.” Therefore it is not a sin to respect persons in ble‡ for one hundred marks. So too, is a fool honored if he showing honor. stand in God’s place or represent the whole community: Objection 3. Further, on the words of James 2:1, and in the same way parents and masters should be hon- “Have not the faith. . . with respect of persons,” a gloss of ored, on account of their having a share of the dignity of Augustine† says: “If the saying of James, ‘If there shall God Who is the Father and Lord of all. The aged should come into your assembly a man having a golden ring,’ be honored, because old age is a sign of virtue, though etc., refer to our daily meetings, who sins not here, if how- this sign fail at times: wherefore, according to Wis. 4:8,9, ever he sin at all?” Yet it is respect of persons to honor the “venerable old age is not that of long time, nor counted rich for their riches, for Gregory says in a homily (xxviii by the number of years; but the understanding of a man is in Evang.): “Our pride is blunted, since in men we honor, gray hairs, and a spotless life is old age.” The rich ought not the nature wherein they are made to God’s image, but to be honored by reason of their occupying a higher posi- wealth,” so that, wealth not being a due cause of honor, tion in the community: but if they be honored merely for this will savor of respect of persons. Therefore it is not a their wealth, it will be the sin of respect of persons. sin to respect persons in showing honor. Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear. On the contrary, A gloss on James 2:1, says: “Who- Whether the sin of respect of persons takes place in judicial sentences? IIa IIae q. 63 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the sin of respect of pronouncing penalties, since a heavier punishment is in- persons does not take place in judicial sentences. For re- flicted on one who injures the person of a prince than on spect of persons is opposed to distributive justice, as stated one who injures the person of others. Therefore respect of above (a. 1): whereas judicial sentences seem to pertain persons does not take place in judicial sentences. chiefly to commutative justice. Therefore respect of per- Objection 3. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:10): “In sons does not take place in judicial sentences. judging be merciful to the fatherless.” But this seems to Objection 2. Further, penalties are inflicted according imply respect of the person of the needy. Therefore in to a sentence. Now it is not a sin to respect persons in judicial sentences respect of persons is not a sin. ∗ Vulg.: ‘Iniquity came out of Babylon from the ancient judges, that seemed to govern the people.’ † Ep. ad Hieron. clxvii. ‡ ‘Lapillus’ or ‘calculus’ whence the English word ‘calculate’ 1496 On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 18:5): “It is not him. Secondly, it may be considered in view of the form good to accept the person in judgment§.” of judgment, in as much as, even in commutative justice, I answer that, As stated above (q. 60, a. 1), judgment the judge takes from one and gives to another, and this be- is an act of justice, in as much as the judge restores to longs to distributive justice. In this way respect of persons the equality of justice, those things which may cause an may take place in any judgment. opposite inequality. Now respect of persons involves a Reply to Objection 2. When a person is more certain inequality, in so far as something is allotted to a severely punished on account of a crime committed person out of that proportion to him in which the equality against a greater person, there is no respect of persons, be- of justice consists. Wherefore it is evident that judgment cause the very difference of persons causes, in that case, is rendered corrupt by respect of persons. a diversity of things, as stated above (q. 58, a. 10, ad 3; Reply to Objection 1. A judgment may be looked at q. 61, a. 2, ad 3). in two ways. First, in view of the thing judged, and in this Reply to Objection 3. In pronouncing judgment one way judgment is common to commutative and distributive ought to succor the needy as far as possible, yet without justice: because it may be decided by judgment how some prejudice to justice: else the saying of Ex. 23:3 would common good is to be distributed among many, and how apply: “Neither shalt thou favor a poor man in judgment.” one person is to restore to another what he has taken from § Vulg.: ‘It is not good to accept the person of the wicked, to decline from the truth of judgment.’ 1497 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 64 Of Murder (In Eight Articles) In due sequence we must consider the vices opposed to commutative justice. We must consider (1) those sins that are committed in relation to involuntary commutations; (2) those that are committed with regard to voluntary commutations. Sins are committed in relation to involuntary commutations by doing an injury to one’s neighbor against his will: and this can be done in two ways, namely by deed or by word. By deed when one’s neighbor is injured either in his own person, or in a person connected with him, or in his possessions. We must therefore consider these points in due order, and in the first place we shall consider murder whereby a man inflicts the greatest injury on his neighbor. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a sin to kill dumb animals or even plants?(2) Whether it is lawful to kill a sinner? (3) Whether this is lawful to a private individual, or to a public person only? (4) Whether this is lawful to a cleric? (5) Whether it is lawful to kill oneself? (6) Whether it is lawful to kill a just man? (7) Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense? (8) Whether accidental homicide is a mortal sin? Whether it is unlawful to kill any living thing? IIa IIae q. 64 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem unlawful to kill any living lastly a man, so too things, like the plants, which merely thing. For the Apostle says (Rom. 13:2): “They that re- have life, are all alike for animals, and all animals are for sist the ordinance of God purchase to themselves damna- man. Wherefore it is not unlawful if man use plants for tion∗.” Now Divine providence has ordained that all liv- the good of animals, and animals for the good of man, as ing things should be preserved, according to Ps. 146:8,9, the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3). “Who maketh grass to grow on the mountains. . . Who Now the most necessary use would seem to consist in giveth to beasts their food.” Therefore it seems unlawful the fact that animals use plants, and men use animals, for to take the life of any living thing. food, and this cannot be done unless these be deprived of Objection 2. Further, murder is a sin because it de- life: wherefore it is lawful both to take life from plants prives a man of life. Now life is common to all animals for the use of animals, and from animals for the use of and plants. Hence for the same reason it is apparently a men. In fact this is in keeping with the commandment sin to slay dumb animals and plants. of God Himself: for it is written (Gn. 1:29,30): “Behold Objection 3. Further, in the Divine law a special pun- I have given you every herb. . . and all trees. . . to be your ishment is not appointed save for a sin. Now a special meat, and to all beasts of the earth”: and again (Gn. 9:3): punishment had to be inflicted, according to the Divine “Everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat to you.” law, on one who killed another man’s ox or sheep (Ex. Reply to Objection 1. According to the Divine ordi- 22:1). Therefore the slaying of dumb animals is a sin. nance the life of animals and plants is preserved not for On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): themselves but for man. Hence, as Augustine says (De “When we hear it said, ‘Thou shalt not kill,’ we do not Civ. Dei i, 20), “by a most just ordinance of the Creator, take it as referring to trees, for they have no sense, nor to both their life and their death are subject to our use.” irrational animals, because they have no fellowship with Reply to Objection 2. Dumb animals and plants are us. Hence it follows that the words, ‘Thou shalt not kill’ devoid of the life of reason whereby to set themselves in refer to the killing of a man.” motion; they are moved, as it were by another, by a kind of I answer that, There is no sin in using a thing for natural impulse, a sign of which is that they are naturally the purpose for which it is. Now the order of things is enslaved and accommodated to the uses of others. such that the imperfect are for the perfect, even as in the Reply to Objection 3. He that kills another’s ox, sins, process of generation nature proceeds from imperfection not through killing the ox, but through injuring another to perfection. Hence it is that just as in the generation man in his property. Wherefore this is not a species of the of a man there is first a living thing, then an animal, and sin of murder but of the sin of theft or robbery. ∗ Vulg.: ‘He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist, purchase themselves damnation.’ 1498 Whether it is lawful to kill sinners? IIa IIae q. 64 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem unlawful to kill men who Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord commanded them have sinned. For our Lord in the parable (Mat. 13) for- to forbear from uprooting the cockle in order to spare the bade the uprooting of the cockle which denotes wicked wheat, i.e. the good. This occurs when the wicked cannot men according to a gloss. Now whatever is forbidden by be slain without the good being killed with them, either God is a sin. Therefore it is a sin to kill a sinner. because the wicked lie hidden among the good, or because Objection 2. Further, human justice is conformed to they have many followers, so that they cannot be killed Divine justice. Now according to Divine justice sinners without danger to the good, as Augustine says (Contra are kept back for repentance, according to Ezech. 33:11, Parmen. iii, 2). Wherefore our Lord teaches that we “I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked should rather allow the wicked to live, and that vengeance turn from his way and live.” Therefore it seems altogether is to be delayed until the last judgment, rather than that unjust to kill sinners. the good be put to death together with the wicked. When, Objection 3. Further, it is not lawful, for any good however, the good incur no danger, but rather are pro- end whatever, to do that which is evil in itself, according tected and saved by the slaying of the wicked, then the to Augustine (Contra Mendac. vii) and the Philosopher latter may be lawfully put to death. (Ethic. ii, 6). Now to kill a man is evil in itself, since we Reply to Objection 2. According to the order of His are bound to have charity towards all men, and “we wish wisdom, God sometimes slays sinners forthwith in order our friends to live and to exist,” according to Ethic. ix, 4. to deliver the good, whereas sometimes He allows them Therefore it is nowise lawful to kill a man who has sinned. time to repent, according as He knows what is expedient On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:18): “Wizards for His elect. This also does human justice imitate ac- thou shalt not suffer to live”; and (Ps. 100:8): “In the cording to its powers; for it puts to death those who are morning I put to death all the wicked of the land.” dangerous to others, while it allows time for repentance to I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), it is lawful to kill those who sin without grievously harming others. dumb animals, in so far as they are naturally directed to Reply to Objection 3. By sinning man departs from man’s use, as the imperfect is directed to the perfect. Now the order of reason, and consequently falls away from the every part is directed to the whole, as imperfect to perfect, dignity of his manhood, in so far as he is naturally free, wherefore every part is naturally for the sake of the whole. and exists for himself, and he falls into the slavish state of For this reason we observe that if the health of the whole the beasts, by being disposed of according as he is useful body demands the excision of a member, through its being to others. This is expressed in Ps. 48:21: “Man, when he decayed or infectious to the other members, it will be both was in honor, did not understand; he hath been compared praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away. Now to senseless beasts, and made like to them,” and Prov. every individual person is compared to the whole com- 11:29: “The fool shall serve the wise.” Hence, although it munity, as part to whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous be evil in itself to kill a man so long as he preserve his dig- and infectious to the community, on account of some sin, nity, yet it may be good to kill a man who has sinned, even it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in or- as it is to kill a beast. For a bad man is worse than a beast, der to safeguard the common good, since “a little leaven and is more harmful, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 1 corrupteth the whole lump” (1 Cor. 5:6). and Ethic. vii, 6). Whether it is lawful for a private individual to kill a man who has sinned? IIa IIae q. 64 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem lawful for a private indi- is lawful for any private individual to kill a man who has vidual to kill a man who has sinned. For nothing unlawful sinned. is commanded in the Divine law. Yet, on account of the Objection 3. Further, a man, though a private individ- sin of the molten calf, Moses commanded (Ex. 32:27): ual, deserves praise for doing what is useful for the com- “Let every man kill his brother, and friend, and neighbor.” mon good. Now the slaying of evildoers is useful for the Therefore it is lawful for private individuals to kill a sin- common good, as stated above (a. 2). Therefore it is de- ner. serving of praise if even private individuals kill evil-doers. Objection 2. Further, as stated above (a. 2, ad 3), man, On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i)∗: on account of sin, is compared to the beasts. Now it is “A man who, without exercising public authority, kills an lawful for any private individual to kill a wild beast, espe- evil-doer, shall be judged guilty of murder, and all the cially if it be harmful. Therefore for the same reason, it more, since he has dared to usurp a power which God has ∗ Can. Quicumque percutit, caus. xxiii, qu. 8 1499 not given him.” not to have done this themselves, but rather He by whose I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), it is lawful to authority they acted thus: just as a soldier slays the foe by kill an evildoer in so far as it is directed to the welfare the authority of his sovereign, and the executioner slays of the whole community, so that it belongs to him alone the robber by the authority of the judge. who has charge of the community’s welfare. Thus it be- Reply to Objection 2. A beast is by nature distinct longs to a physician to cut off a decayed limb, when he from man, wherefore in the case of a wild beast there is has been entrusted with the care of the health of the whole no need for an authority to kill it; whereas, in the case of body. Now the care of the common good is entrusted to domestic animals, such authority is required, not for their persons of rank having public authority: wherefore they sake, but on account of the owner’s loss. On the other alone, and not private individuals, can lawfully put evil- hand a man who has sinned is not by nature distinct from doers to death. good men; hence a public authority is requisite in order to Reply to Objection 1. The person by whose authority condemn him to death for the common good. a thing is done really does the thing as Dionysius declares Reply to Objection 3. It is lawful for any private in- (Coel. Hier. iii). Hence according to Augustine (De Civ. dividual to do anything for the common good, provided it Dei i, 21), “He slays not who owes his service to one who harm nobody: but if it be harmful to some other, it cannot commands him, even as a sword is merely the instrument be done, except by virtue of the judgment of the person to him that wields it.” Wherefore those who, at the Lord’s to whom it pertains to decide what is to be taken from the command, slew their neighbors and friends, would seem parts for the welfare of the whole. Whether it is lawful for clerics to kill evil-doers? IIa IIae q. 64 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem lawful for clerics to kill two reasons. First, because they are chosen for the min- evil-doers. For clerics especially should fulfil the precept istry of the altar, whereon is represented the Passion of of the Apostle (1 Cor. 4:16): “Be ye followers of me as I Christ slain “Who, when He was struck did not strike also am of Christ,” whereby we are called upon to imitate [Vulg.: ‘When He suffered, He threatened not’]” (1 Pet. God and His saints. Now the very God whom we worship 2:23). Therefore it becomes not clerics to strike or kill: puts evildoers to death, according to Ps. 135:10, “Who for ministers should imitate their master, according to Ec- smote Egypt with their firstborn.” Again Moses made the clus. 10:2, “As the judge of the people is himself, so also Levites slay twenty-three thousand men on account of the are his ministers.” The other reason is because clerics are worship of the calf (Ex. 32), the priest Phinees slew the entrusted with the ministry of the New Law, wherein no Israelite who went in to the woman of Madian (Num. 25), punishment of death or of bodily maiming is appointed: Samuel killed Agag king of Amalec (1 Kings 15), Elias wherefore they should abstain from such things in order slew the priests of Baal (3 Kings 18), Mathathias killed the that they may be fitting ministers of the New Testament. man who went up to the altar to sacrifice (1 Mac. 2); and, Reply to Objection 1. God works in all things with- in the New Testament, Peter killed Ananias and Saphira out exception whatever is right, yet in each one according (Acts 5). Therefore it seems that even clerics may kill to its mode. Wherefore everyone should imitate God in evil-doers. that which is specially becoming to him. Hence, though Objection 2. Further, spiritual power is greater than God slays evildoers even corporally, it does not follow that the secular and is more united to God. Now the secu- all should imitate Him in this. As regards Peter, he did not lar power as “God’s minister” lawfully puts evil-doers to put Ananias and Saphira to death by his own authority or death, according to Rom. 13:4. Much more therefore may with his own hand, but published their death sentence pro- clerics, who are God’s ministers and have spiritual power, nounced by God. The Priests or Levites of the Old Testa- put evil-doers to death. ment were the ministers of the Old Law, which appointed Objection 3. Further, whosoever lawfully accepts an corporal penalties, so that it was fitting for them to slay office, may lawfully exercise the functions of that office. with their own hands. Now it belongs to the princely office to slay evildoers, Reply to Objection 2. The ministry of clerics is con- as stated above (a. 3). Therefore those clerics who are cerned with better things than corporal slayings, namely earthly princes may lawfully slay malefactors. with things pertaining to spiritual welfare, and so it is not On the contrary, It is written (1 Tim. 3:2,3): “It be- fitting for them to meddle with minor matters. hooveth. . . a bishop to be without crime∗. . . not given to Reply to Objection 3. Ecclesiastical prelates accept wine, no striker.” the office of earthly princes, not that they may inflict cap- I answer that, It is unlawful for clerics to kill, for ital punishment themselves, but that this may be carried ∗ Vulg.: ‘blameless.’ ‘Without crime’ is the reading in Tit. 1:7 1500 into effect by others in virtue of their authority. Whether it is lawful to kill oneself? IIa IIae q. 64 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem lawful for a man to kill sentence of death and life, according to Dt. 32:39, “I will himself. For murder is a sin in so far as it is contrary to kill and I will make to live.” justice. But no man can do an injustice to himself, as is Reply to Objection 1. Murder is a sin, not only be- proved in Ethic. v, 11. Therefore no man sins by killing cause it is contrary to justice, but also because it is op- himself. posed to charity which a man should have towards him- Objection 2. Further, it is lawful, for one who exer- self: in this respect suicide is a sin in relation to oneself. cises public authority, to kill evil-doers. Now he who ex- In relation to the community and to God, it is sinful, by ercises public authority is sometimes an evil-doer. There- reason also of its opposition to justice. fore he may lawfully kill himself. Reply to Objection 2. One who exercises public au- Objection 3. Further, it is lawful for a man to suffer thority may lawfully put to death an evil-doer, since he spontaneously a lesser danger that he may avoid a greater: can pass judgment on him. But no man is judge of him- thus it is lawful for a man to cut off a decayed limb even self. Wherefore it is not lawful for one who exercises pub- from himself, that he may save his whole body. Now lic authority to put himself to death for any sin whatever: sometimes a man, by killing himself, avoids a greater evil, although he may lawfully commit himself to the judgment for example an unhappy life, or the shame of sin. There- of others. fore a man may kill himself. Reply to Objection 3. Man is made master of himself Objection 4. Further, Samson killed himself, as re- through his free-will: wherefore he can lawfully dispose lated in Judges 16, and yet he is numbered among the of himself as to those matters which pertain to this life saints (Heb. 11). Therefore it is lawful for a man to kill which is ruled by man’s free-will. But the passage from himself. this life to another and happier one is subject not to man’s Objection 5. Further, it is related (2 Mac. 14:42) that free-will but to the power of God. Hence it is not lawful a certain Razias killed himself, “choosing to die nobly for man to take his own life that he may pass to a happier rather than to fall into the hands of the wicked, and to suf- life, nor that he may escape any unhappiness whatsoever fer abuses unbecoming his noble birth.” Now nothing that of the present life, because the ultimate and most fear- is done nobly and bravely is unlawful. Therefore suicide some evil of this life is death, as the Philosopher states is not unlawful. (Ethic. iii, 6). Therefore to bring death upon oneself in On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): order to escape the other afflictions of this life, is to adopt “Hence it follows that the words ‘Thou shalt not kill’ refer a greater evil in order to avoid a lesser. In like manner it is to the killing of a man—not another man; therefore, not unlawful to take one’s own life on account of one’s hav- even thyself. For he who kills himself, kills nothing else ing committed a sin, both because by so doing one does than a man.” oneself a very great injury, by depriving oneself of the I answer that, It is altogether unlawful to kill one- time needful for repentance, and because it is not lawful self, for three reasons. First, because everything natu- to slay an evildoer except by the sentence of the public rally loves itself, the result being that everything natu- authority. Again it is unlawful for a woman to kill herself rally keeps itself in being, and resists corruptions so far lest she be violated, because she ought not to commit on as it can. Wherefore suicide is contrary to the inclina- herself the very great sin of suicide, to avoid the lesser tion of nature, and to charity whereby every man should sir; of another. For she commits no sin in being violated love himself. Hence suicide is always a mortal sin, as be- by force, provided she does not consent, since “without ing contrary to the natural law and to charity. Secondly, consent of the mind there is no stain on the body,” as the because every part, as such, belongs to the whole. Now Blessed Lucy declared. Now it is evident that fornication every man is part of the community, and so, as such, he and adultery are less grievous sins than taking a man’s, es- belongs to the community. Hence by killing himself he in- pecially one’s own, life: since the latter is most grievous, jures the community, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. because one injures oneself, to whom one owes the great- v, 11). Thirdly, because life is God’s gift to man, and is est love. Moreover it is most dangerous since no time is subject to His power, Who kills and makes to live. Hence left wherein to expiate it by repentance. Again it is not whoever takes his own life, sins against God, even as he lawful for anyone to take his own life for fear he should who kills another’s slave, sins against that slave’s master, consent to sin, because “evil must not be done that good and as he who usurps to himself judgment of a matter not may come” (Rom. 3:8) or that evil may be avoided es- entrusted to him. For it belongs to God alone to pronounce pecially if the evil be of small account and an uncertain 1501 event, for it is uncertain whether one will at some future Reply to Objection 5. It belongs to fortitude that a time consent to a sin, since God is able to deliver man man does not shrink from being slain by another, for the from sin under any temptation whatever. sake of the good of virtue, and that he may avoid sin. But Reply to Objection 4. As Augustine says (De Civ. that a man take his own life in order to avoid penal evils Dei i, 21), “not even Samson is to be excused that he has indeed an appearance of fortitude (for which reason crushed himself together with his enemies under the ru- some, among whom was Razias, have killed themselves ins of the house, except the Holy Ghost, Who had wrought thinking to act from fortitude), yet it is not true fortitude, many wonders through him, had secretly commanded him but rather a weakness of soul unable to bear penal evils, to do this.” He assigns the same reason in the case of cer- as the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7) and Augustine (De Civ. tain holy women, who at the time of persecution took their Dei 22,23) declare. own lives, and who are commemorated by the Church. Whether it is lawful to kill the innocent? IIa IIae q. 64 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that in some cases it is of the community. Therefore it is in no way lawful to slay lawful to kill the innocent. The fear of God is never man- the innocent. ifested by sin, since on the contrary “the fear of the Lord Reply to Objection 1. God is Lord of death and life, driveth out sin” (Ecclus. 1:27). Now Abraham was com- for by His decree both the sinful and the righteous die. mended in that he feared the Lord, since he was willing Hence he who at God’s command kills an innocent man to slay his innocent son. Therefore one may, without sin, does not sin, as neither does God Whose behest he exe- kill an innocent person. cutes: indeed his obedience to God’s commands is a proof Objection 2. Further, among those sins that are com- that he fears Him. mitted against one’s neighbor, the more grievous seem to Reply to Objection 2. In weighing the gravity of a sin be those whereby a more grievous injury is inflicted on we must consider the essential rather than the accidental. the person sinned against. Now to be killed is a greater Wherefore he who kills a just man, sins more grievously injury to a sinful than to an innocent person, because the than he who slays a sinful man: first, because he injures latter, by death, passes forthwith from the unhappiness of one whom he should love more, and so acts more in op- this life to the glory of heaven. Since then it is lawful in position to charity: secondly, because he inflicts an injury certain cases to kill a sinful man, much more is it lawful on a man who is less deserving of one, and so acts more to slay an innocent or a righteous person. in opposition to justice: thirdly, because he deprives the Objection 3. Further, what is done in keeping with community of a greater good: fourthly, because he de- the order of justice is not a sin. But sometimes a man spises God more, according to Lk. 10:16, “He that de- is forced, according to the order of justice, to slay an in- spiseth you despiseth Me.” On the other hand it is acci- nocent person: for instance, when a judge, who is bound dental to the slaying that the just man whose life is taken to judge according to the evidence, condemns to death a be received by God into glory. man whom he knows to be innocent but who is convicted Reply to Objection 3. If the judge knows that man by false witnesses; and again the executioner, who in obe- who has been convicted by false witnesses, is innocent he dience to the judge puts to death the man who has been must, like Daniel, examine the witnesses with great care, unjustly sentenced. so as to find a motive for acquitting the innocent: but if On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 23:7): “The inno- he cannot do this he should remit him for judgment by a cent and just person thou shalt not put to death.” higher tribunal. If even this is impossible, he does not sin I answer that, An individual man may be considered if he pronounce sentence in accordance with the evidence, in two ways: first, in himself; secondly, in relation to for it is not he that puts the innocent man to death, but they something else. If we consider a man in himself, it is who stated him to be guilty. He that carries out the sen- unlawful to kill any man, since in every man though he be tence of the judge who has condemned an innocent man, sinful, we ought to love the nature which God has made, if the sentence contains an inexcusable error, he should and which is destroyed by slaying him. Nevertheless, as not obey, else there would be an excuse for the executions stated above (a. 2) the slaying of a sinner becomes lawful of the martyrs: if however it contain no manifest injus- in relation to the common good, which is corrupted by sin. tice, he does not has no right to discuss the judgment of On the other hand the life of righteous men preserves and his superior; nor is it he who slays the innocent man, but forwards the common good, since they are the chief part the judge whose minister he is. 1502 Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense? IIa IIae q. 64 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that nobody may lawfully according to what is intended, and not according to what kill a man in self-defense. For Augustine says to Publi- is beside the intention, since this is accidental as explained cola (Ep. xlvii): “I do not agree with the opinion that one above (q. 43, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 12, a. 1). Accordingly the act may kill a man lest one be killed by him; unless one be of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of a soldier, exercise a public office, so that one does it not one’s life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. There- for oneself but for others, having the power to do so, pro- fore this act, since one’s intention is to save one’s own life, vided it be in keeping with one’s person.” Now he who is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to kills a man in self-defense, kills him lest he be killed by keep itself in “being,” as far as possible. And yet, though him. Therefore this would seem to be unlawful. proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered Objection 2. Further, he says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the end. Where- “How are they free from sin in sight of Divine providence, fore if a man, in self-defense, uses more than necessary who are guilty of taking a man’s life for the sake of these violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he repel force contemptible things?” Now among contemptible things with moderation his defense will be lawful, because ac- he reckons “those which men may forfeit unwillingly,” as cording to the jurists†, “it is lawful to repel force by force, appears from the context (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): and the chief provided one does not exceed the limits of a blameless de- of these is the life of the body. Therefore it is unlawful for fense.” Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit any man to take another’s life for the sake of the life of his the act of moderate self-defense in order to avoid killing own body. the other man, since one is bound to take more care of Objection 3. Further, Pope Nicolas∗ says in the Dec- one’s own life than of another’s. But as it is unlawful to retals: “Concerning the clerics about whom you have con- take a man’s life, except for the public authority acting for sulted Us, those, namely, who have killed a pagan in self- the common good, as stated above (a. 3), it is not lawful defense, as to whether, after making amends by repenting, for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except they may return to their former state, or rise to a higher for such as have public authority, who while intending to degree; know that in no case is it lawful for them to kill kill a man in self-defense, refer this to the public good, any man under any circumstances whatever.” Now clerics as in the case of a soldier fighting against the foe, and in and laymen are alike bound to observe the moral precepts. the minister of the judge struggling with robbers, although Therefore neither is it lawful for laymen to kill anyone in even these sin if they be moved by private animosity. self-defense. Reply to Objection 1. The words quoted from Augus- Objection 4. Further, murder is a more grievous sin tine refer to the case when one man intends to kill another than fornication or adultery. Now nobody may lawfully to save himself from death. The passage quoted in the commit simple fornication or adultery or any other mortal Second Objection is to be understood in the same sense. sin in order to save his own life; since the spiritual life is Hence he says pointedly, “for the sake of these things,” to be preferred to the life of the body. Therefore no man whereby he indicates the intention. This suffices for the may lawfully take another’s life in self-defense in order to Reply to the Second Objection. save his own life. Reply to Objection 3. Irregularity results from the Objection 5. Further, if the tree be evil, so is the fruit, act though sinless of taking a man’s life, as appears in the according to Mat. 7:17. Now self-defense itself seems case of a judge who justly condemns a man to death. For to be unlawful, according to Rom. 12:19: “Not defend- this reason a cleric, though he kill a man in self-defense, ing [Douay: ‘revenging’] yourselves, my dearly beloved.” is irregular, albeit he intends not to kill him, but to defend Therefore its result, which is the slaying of a man, is also himself. unlawful. Reply to Objection 4. The act of fornication or adul- On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:2): “If a thief tery is not necessarily directed to the preservation of one’s be found breaking into a house or undermining it, and be own life, as is the act whence sometimes results the taking wounded so as to die; he that slew him shall not be guilty of a man’s life. of blood.” Now it is much more lawful to defend one’s Reply to Objection 5. The defense forbidden in this life than one’s house. Therefore neither is a man guilty of passage is that which comes from revengeful spite. Hence murder if he kill another in defense of his own life. a gloss says: “Not defending yourselves—that is, not I answer that, Nothing hinders one act from having striking your enemy back.” two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other Whether one is guilty of murder through killing some- is beside the intention. Now moral acts take their species one by chance? ∗ Nicolas I, Dist. 1, can. De his clericis † Cap. Significasti, De Homicid. volunt. vel casual. 1503 Objection 1. It would seem that one is guilty of mur-Nevertheless it happens that what is not actually and der through killing someone by chance. For we read (Gn. directly voluntary and intended, is voluntary and intended 4:23,24) that Lamech slew a man in mistake for a wild accidentally, according as that which removes an obstacle beast‡, and that he was accounted guilty of murder. There- is called an accidental cause. Wherefore he who does not fore one incurs the guilt of murder through killing a man remove something whence homicide results whereas he by chance. ought to remove it, is in a sense guilty of voluntary homi- Objection 2. Further, it is written (Ex. 21:22): cide. This happens in two ways: first when a man causes “If. . . one strike a woman with child, and she miscarry another’s death through occupying himself with unlawful indeed. . . if her death ensue thereupon, he shall render things which he ought to avoid: secondly, when he does life for life.” Yet this may happen without any intention not take sufficient care. Hence, according to jurists, if a of causing her death. Therefore one is guilty of murder man pursue a lawful occupation and take due care, the re- through killing someone by chance. sult being that a person loses his life, he is not guilty of Objection 3. Further, the Decretals∗ contain several that person’s death: whereas if he be occupied with some- canons prescribing penalties for unintentional homicide. thing unlawful, or even with something lawful, but with- Now penalty is not due save for guilt. Therefore he who out due care, he does not escape being guilty of murder, if kills a man by chance, incurs the guilt of murder. his action results in someone’s death. On the contrary, Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. Reply to Objection 1. Lamech did not take sufficient xlvii): “When we do a thing for a good and lawful pur- care to avoid taking a man’s life: and so he was not ex- pose, if thereby we unintentionally cause harm to anyone, cused from being guilty of homicide. it should by no means be imputed to us.” Now it some- Reply to Objection 2. He that strikes a woman with times happens by chance that a person is killed as a result child does something unlawful: wherefore if there results of something done for a good purpose. Therefore the per- the death either of the woman or of the animated fetus, he son who did it is not accounted guilty. will not be excused from homicide, especially seeing that I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Phys. death is the natural result of such a blow. ii, 6) “chance is a cause that acts beside one’s intention.” Reply to Objection 3. According to the canons a Hence chance happenings, strictly speaking, are neither penalty, is inflicted on those who cause death unintention- intended nor voluntary. And since every sin is voluntary, ally, through doing something unlawful, or failing to take according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xiv) it follows sufficient care. that chance happenings, as such, are not sins. ‡ The text of the Bible does not say so, but this was the Jewish traditional commentary on Gn. 4:23 ∗ Dist. 1 1504 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 65 Of Other Injuries Committed On the Person (In Four Articles) We must now consider other sinful injuries committed on the person. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) The mutilation of members; (2) Blows; (3) Imprisonment; (4) Whether the sins that consist in inflicting such like injuries are aggravated through being perpetrated on persons connected with others? Whether in some cases it may be lawful to maim anyone? IIa IIae q. 65 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that in no case can it be body, it may nevertheless be directed to the good of the lawful to maim anyone. For Damascene says (De Fide community, in so far as it is applied to a person as a pun- Orth. iv, 20) that “sin consists in departing from what is ishment for the purpose of restraining sin. Hence just as according to nature, towards that which is contrary to na- by public authority a person is lawfully deprived of life ture.” Now according to nature it is appointed by God that altogether on account of certain more heinous sins, so is a man’s body should be entire in its members, and it is he deprived of a member on account of certain lesser sins. contrary to nature that it should be deprived of a member. But this is not lawful for a private individual, even with the Therefore it seems that it is always a sin to maim a person. consent of the owner of the member, because this would Objection 2. Further, as the whole soul is to the whole involve an injury to the community, to whom the man and body, so are the parts of the soul to the parts of the body all his parts belong. If, however, the member be decayed (De Anima ii, 1). But it is unlawful to deprive a man of and therefore a source of corruption to the whole body, his soul by killing him, except by public authority. There- then it is lawful with the consent of the owner of the mem- fore neither is it lawful to maim anyone, except perhaps ber, to cut away the member for the welfare of the whole by public authority. body, since each one is entrusted with the care of his own Objection 3. Further, the welfare of the soul is to be welfare. The same applies if it be done with the consent preferred to the welfare of the body. Now it is not law- of the person whose business it is to care for the welfare ful for a man to maim himself for the sake of the soul’s of the person who has a decayed member: otherwise it is welfare: since the council of Nicea∗ punished those who altogether unlawful to maim anyone. castrated themselves that they might preserve chastity. Reply to Objection 1. Nothing prevents that which is Therefore it is not lawful for any other reason to maim contrary to a particular nature from being in harmony with a person. universal nature: thus death and corruption, in the physi- On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 21:24): “Eye for cal order, are contrary to the particular nature of the thing eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.” corrupted, although they are in keeping with universal na- I answer that, Since a member is part of the whole ture. In like manner to maim anyone, though contrary to human body, it is for the sake of the whole, as the imper- the particular nature of the body of the person maimed, is fect for the perfect. Hence a member of the human body is nevertheless in keeping with natural reason in relation to to be disposed of according as it is expedient for the body. the common good. Now a member of the human body is of itself useful to Reply to Objection 2. The life of the entire man is not the good of the whole body, yet, accidentally it may hap- directed to something belonging to man; on the contrary pen to be hurtful, as when a decayed member is a source whatever belongs to man is directed to his life. Hence of corruption to the whole body. Accordingly so long as in no case does it pertain to a person to take anyone’s a member is healthy and retains its natural disposition, it life, except to the public authority to whom is entrusted cannot be cut off without injury to the whole body. But the procuring of the common good. But the removal of as the whole of man is directed as to his end to the whole a member can be directed to the good of one man, and of the community of which he is a part, as stated above consequently in certain cases can pertain to him. (q. 61, a. 1; q. 64, Aa. 2,5), it may happen that although Reply to Objection 3. A member should not be re- the removal of a member may be detrimental to the whole moved for the sake of the bodily health of the whole, un- ∗ P. I, sect. 4, can. i 1505 less otherwise nothing can be done to further the good of stroying evil thoughts, for a man is accursed who maims the whole. Now it is always possible to further one’s spir- himself, since they are murderers who do such things.” itual welfare otherwise than by cutting off a member, be- And further on he says: “Nor is lust tamed thereby, on cause sin is always subject to the will: and consequently the contrary it becomes more importunate, for the seed in no case is it allowable to maim oneself, even to avoid springs in us from other sources, and chiefly from an in- any sin whatever. Hence Chrysostom, in his exposition continent purpose and a careless mind: and temptation is on Mat. 19:12 (Hom. lxii in Matth.), “There are eunuchs curbed not so much by cutting off a member as by curbing who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of one’s thoughts.” heaven,” says: “Not by maiming themselves, but by de- Whether it is lawful for parents to strike their children, or masters their slaves? IIa IIae q. 65 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for parents to subject to his jurisdiction. Therefore it is not lawful for strike their children, or masters their slaves. For the Apos- a man to strike another, unless he have some power over tle says (Eph. 6:4): “You, fathers, provoke not your chil- the one whom he strikes. And since the child is subject to dren to anger”; and further on (Eph. 9:6): “And you, the power of the parent, and the slave to the power of his masters, do the same thing to your slaves [Vulg.: ‘to master, a parent can lawfully strike his child, and a master them’] forbearing threatenings.” Now some are provoked his slave that instruction may be enforced by correction. to anger by blows, and become more troublesome when Reply to Objection 1. Since anger is a desire for threatened. Therefore neither should parents strike their vengeance, it is aroused chiefly when a man deems him- children, nor masters their slaves. self unjustly injured, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, Hence when parents are forbidden to provoke their chil- 9) that “a father’s words are admonitory and not coercive.” dren to anger, they are not prohibited from striking their Now blows are a kind of coercion. Therefore it is unlaw- children for the purpose of correction, but from inflicting ful for parents to strike their children. blows on them without moderation. The command that Objection 3. Further, everyone is allowed to impart masters should forbear from threatening their slaves may correction, for this belongs to the spiritual almsdeeds, as be understood in two ways. First that they should be slow stated above (q. 32, a. 2). If, therefore, it is lawful for par-to threaten, and this pertains to the moderation of correc- ents to strike their children for the sake of correction, for tion; secondly, that they should not always carry out their the same reason it will be lawful for any person to strike threats, that is that they should sometimes by a merciful anyone, which is clearly false. Therefore the same con- forgiveness temper the judgment whereby they threatened clusion follows. punishment. On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 13:24): “He Reply to Objection 2. The greater power should ex- that spareth the rod hateth his son,” and further on (Prov. ercise the greater coercion. Now just as a city is a perfect 23:13): “Withhold not correction from a child, for if thou community, so the governor of a city has perfect coercive strike him with the rod, he shall not die. Thou shalt beat power: wherefore he can inflict irreparable punishments him with the rod, and deliver his soul from hell.” Again such as death and mutilation. On the other hand the father it is written (Ecclus. 33:28): “Torture and fetters are for a and the master who preside over the family household, malicious slave.” which is an imperfect community, have imperfect coer- I answer that, Harm is done a body by striking it, cive power, which is exercised by inflicting lesser punish- yet not so as when it is maimed: since maiming destroys ments, for instance by blows, which do not inflict irrepara- the body’s integrity, while a blow merely affects the sense ble harm. with pain, wherefore it causes much less harm than cut- Reply to Objection 3. It is lawful for anyone to im- ting off a member. Now it is unlawful to do a person a part correction to a willing subject. But to impart it to an harm, except by way of punishment in the cause of justice. unwilling subject belongs to those only who have charge Again, no man justly punishes another, except one who is over him. To this pertains chastisement by blows. 1506 Whether it is lawful to imprison a man? IIa IIae q. 65 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem unlawful to imprison a binding or imprisoning or any kind of detention. man. An act which deals with undue matter is evil in Therefore it is unlawful to imprison or in any way de- its genus, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 2). Now tain a man, unless it be done according to the order of jus- man, having a free-will, is undue matter for imprisonment tice, either in punishment, or as a measure of precaution which is inconsistent with free-will. Therefore it is un- against some evil. lawful to imprison a man. Reply to Objection 1. A man who abuses the power Objection 2. Further, human justice should be ruled entrusted to him deserves to lose it, and therefore when by Divine justice. Now according to Ecclus. 15:14, “God a man by sinning abuses the free use of his members, he left man in the hand of his own counsel.” Therefore it becomes a fitting matter for imprisonment. seems that a man ought not to be coerced by chains or Reply to Objection 2. According to the order of His prisons. wisdom God sometimes restrains a sinner from accom- Objection 3. Further, no man should be forcibly pre- plishing a sin, according to Job 5:12: “Who bringeth to vented except from doing an evil deed; and any man can nought the designs of the malignant, so that their hand lawfully prevent another from doing this. If, therefore, it cannot accomplish what they had begun, while sometimes were lawful to imprison a man, in order to restrain him He allows them to do what they will.” In like manner, from evil deeds, it would be lawful for anyone to put a according to human justice, men are imprisoned, not for man in prison; and this is clearly false. Therefore the same every sin but for certain ones. conclusion follows. Reply to Objection 3. It is lawful for anyone to re- On the contrary, We read in Lev. 24 that a man was strain a man for a time from doing some unlawful deed imprisoned for the sin of blasphemy. there and then: as when a man prevents another from I answer that, In the goods three things may be con- throwing himself over a precipice, or from striking an- sidered in due order. First, the substantial integrity of other. But to him alone who has the right of disposing the body, and this is injured by death or maiming. Sec- in general of the actions and of the life of another does it ondly, pleasure or rest of the senses, and to this striking or belong primarily to imprison or fetter, because by so do- anything causing a sense of pain is opposed. Thirdly, the ing he hinders him from doing not only evil but also good movement or use of the members, and this is hindered by deeds. Whether the sin is aggravated by the fact that the aforesaid injuries are perpetrated IIa IIae q. 65 a. 4 on those who are connected with others? Objection 1. It would seem that the sin is not aggra- the will of the principal person, as in the case of adultery vated by the fact that the aforesaid injuries are perpetrated which pleases the woman but not the husband. Now these on those who are connected with others. Such like in- injuries are sinful in so far as they consist in an involun- juries take their sinful character from inflicting an injury tary commutation. Therefore such like injuries are of a on another against his will. Now the evil inflicted on a less sinful nature. man’s own person is more against his will than that which On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 28:32) as though is inflicted on a person connected with him. Therefore an indicating an aggravating circumstance: “Thy sons and injury inflicted on a person connected with another is less thy daughters shall be given to another people, thy eyes grievous. looking on∗.” Objection 2. Further, Holy Writ reproves those espe- I answer that, Other things being equal, an injury is cially who do injuries to orphans and widows: hence it is a more grievous sin according as it affects more persons; written (Ecclus. 35:17): “He will not despise the prayers and hence it is that it is a more grievous sin to strike or of the fatherless, nor the widow when she poureth out her injure a person in authority than a private individual, be- complaint.” Now the widow and the orphan are not con- cause it conduces to the injury of the whole community, nected with other persons. Therefore the sin is not ag- as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 73, a. 9). Now when an injury gravated through an injury being inflicted on one who is is inflicted on one who is connected in any way with an- connected with others. other, that injury affects two persons, so that, other things Objection 3. Further, the person who is connected being equal, the sin is aggravated by this very fact. It may has a will of his own just as the principal person has, so happen, however, that in view of certain circumstances, a that something may be voluntary for him and yet against sin committed against one who is not connected with any ∗ Vulg.: ‘May thy sons and thy daughters be given,’ etc. 1507 other person, is more grievous, on account of either the such persons is more grievous to them since they have no dignity of the person, or the greatness of the injury. one to turn to for relief. Reply to Objection 1. An injury inflicted on a per- Reply to Objection 3. The fact that the wife volun- son connected with others is less harmful to the persons tarily consents to the adultery, lessens the sin and injury, with whom he is connected, than if it were perpetrated so far as the woman is concerned, for it would be more immediately on them, and from this point of view it is a grievous, if the adulterer oppressed her by violence. But less grievous sin. But all that belongs to the injury of the this does not remove the injury as affecting her husband, person with whom he is connected, is added to the sin of since “the wife hath not power of her own body; but the which a man is guilty through injuring the other one in husband” (1 Cor. 7:4). The same applies to similar cases. himself. of adultery, however, as it is opposed not only to justice Reply to Objection 2. Injuries done to widows and but also to chastity, we shall speak in the treatise on Tem- orphans are more insisted upon both through being more perance (q. 154, a. 8). opposed to mercy, and because the same injury done to 1508 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 66 Of Theft and Robbery (In Nine Articles) We must now consider the sins opposed to justice, whereby a man injures his neighbor in his belongings; namely theft and robbery. Under this head there are nine points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is natural to man to possess external things? (2) Whether it is lawful for a man to possess something as his own? (3) Whether theft is the secret taking of another’s property? (4) Whether robbery is a species of sin distinct from theft? (5) Whether every theft is a sin? (6) Whether theft is a mortal sin? (7) Whether it is lawful to thieve in a case of necessity? (8) Whether every robbery is a mortal sin? (9) Whether robbery is a more grievous sin than theft? Whether it is natural for man to possess external things? IIa IIae q. 66 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not natural for their use, and in this way, man has a natural dominion man to possess external things. For no man should as- over external things, because, by his reason and will, he is cribe to himself that which is God’s. Now the dominion able to use them for his own profit, as they were made on over all creatures is proper to God, according to Ps. 23:1, his account: for the imperfect is always for the sake of the “The earth is the Lord’s,” etc. Therefore it is not natural perfect, as stated above (q. 64, a. 1). It is by this argument for man to possess external things. that the Philosopher proves (Polit. i, 3) that the possession Objection 2. Further, Basil in expounding the words of external things is natural to man. Moreover, this natural of the rich man (Lk. 12:18), “I will gather all things that dominion of man over other creatures, which is competent are grown to me, and my goods,” says∗: “Tell me: which to man in respect of his reason wherein God’s image re- are thine? where did you take them from and bring them sides, is shown forth in man’s creation (Gn. 1:26) by the into being?” Now whatever man possesses naturally, he words: “Let us make man to our image and likeness: and can fittingly call his own. Therefore man does not natu- let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea,” etc. rally possess external things. Reply to Objection 1. God has sovereign dominion Objection 3. Further, according to Ambrose (De Trin. over all things: and He, according to His providence, di- i†) “dominion denotes power.” But man has no power over rected certain things to the sustenance of man’s body. For external things, since he can work no change in their na- this reason man has a natural dominion over things, as re- ture. Therefore the possession of external things is not gards the power to make use of them. natural to man. Reply to Objection 2. The rich man is reproved for On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 8:8): “Thou hast deeming external things to belong to him principally, as subjected all things under his feet.” though he had not received them from another, namely I answer that, External things can be considered in from God. two ways. First, as regards their nature, and this is not Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the subject to the power of man, but only to the power of God dominion over external things as regards their nature. Whose mere will all things obey. Secondly, as regards Such a dominion belongs to God alone, as stated above. Whether it is lawful for a man to possess a thing as his own? IIa IIae q. 66 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for a man to property is contrary to this community of goods. There- possess a thing as his own. For whatever is contrary to fore it is unlawful for any man to appropriate any external the natural law is unlawful. Now according to the natural thing to himself. law all things are common property: and the possession of Objection 2. Further, Basil in expounding the words ∗ Hom. in Luc. xii, 18 † De Fide, ad Gratianum, i, 1 1509 of the rich man quoted above (a. 1, obj. 2), says: “The rich would be confusion if everyone had to look after any one who deem as their own property the common goods they thing indeterminately. Thirdly, because a more peaceful have seized upon, are like to those who by going before- state is ensured to man if each one is contented with his hand to the play prevent others from coming, and appro- own. Hence it is to be observed that quarrels arise more priate to themselves what is intended for common use.” frequently where there is no division of the things pos- Now it would be unlawful to prevent others from obtain- sessed. ing possession of common goods. Therefore it is unlawful The second thing that is competent to man with regard to appropriate to oneself what belongs to the community. to external things is their use. In this respect man ought Objection 3. Further, Ambrose says∗, and his words to possess external things, not as his own, but as common, are quoted in the Decretals†: “Let no man call his own that so that, to wit, he is ready to communicate them to others which is common property”: and by “common” he means in their need. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:17,18): external things, as is clear from the context. Therefore it “Charge the rich of this world. . . to give easily, to commu- seems unlawful for a man to appropriate an external thing nicate to others,” etc. to himself. Reply to Objection 1. Community of goods is as- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Haeres., haer. cribed to the natural law, not that the natural law dictates 40): “The ‘Apostolici’ are those who with extreme ar- that all things should be possessed in common and that rogance have given themselves that name, because they nothing should be possessed as one’s own: but because do not admit into their communion persons who are mar- the division of possessions is not according to the nat- ried or possess anything of their own, such as both monks ural law, but rather arose from human agreement which and clerics who in considerable number are to be found belongs to positive law, as stated above (q. 57, Aa. 2,3). in the Catholic Church.” Now the reason why these peo- Hence the ownership of possessions is not contrary to the ple are heretics was because severing themselves from the natural law, but an addition thereto devised by human rea- Church, they think that those who enjoy the use of the son. above things, which they themselves lack, have no hope Reply to Objection 2. A man would not act unlaw- of salvation. Therefore it is erroneous to maintain that it fully if by going beforehand to the play he prepared the is unlawful for a man to possess property. way for others: but he acts unlawfully if by so doing he I answer that, Two things are competent to man in re- hinders others from going. In like manner a rich man does spect of exterior things. One is the power to procure and not act unlawfully if he anticipates someone in taking pos- dispense them, and in this regard it is lawful for man to session of something which at first was common property, possess property. Moreover this is necessary to human life and gives others a share: but he sins if he excludes others for three reasons. First because every man is more care- indiscriminately from using it. Hence Basil says (Hom. ful to procure what is for himself alone than that which is in Luc. xii, 18): “Why are you rich while another is poor, common to many or to all: since each one would shirk unless it be that you may have the merit of a good stew- the labor and leave to another that which concerns the ardship, and he the reward of patience?” community, as happens where there is a great number of Reply to Objection 3. When Ambrose says: “Let no servants. Secondly, because human affairs are conducted man call his own that which is common,” he is speaking in more orderly fashion if each man is charged with tak- of ownership as regards use, wherefore he adds: “He who ing care of some particular thing himself, whereas there spends too much is a robber.” Whether the essence of theft consists in taking another’s thing secretly? IIa IIae q. 66 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not essential to are embodied in the Decretals§: “It is no less a crime to theft to take another’s thing secretly. For that which di- take from him that has, than to refuse to succor the needy minishes a sin, does not, apparently, belong to the essence when you can and are well off.” Therefore just as theft of a sin. Now to sin secretly tends to diminish a sin, just consists in taking another’s thing, so does it consist in as, on the contrary, it is written as indicating an aggravat- keeping it back. ing circumstance of the sin of some (Is. 3:9): “They have Objection 3. Further, a man may take by stealth from proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not another, even that which is his own, for instance a thing hid it.” Therefore it is not essential to theft that it should that he has deposited with another, or that has been taken consist in taking another’s thing secretly. away from him unjustly. Therefore it is not essential to Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says‡: and his words theft that it should consist in taking another’s thing se- ∗ Serm. lxiv, de temp. † Dist. xlvii., Can. Sicut hi. ‡ Serm. lxiv, de temp., a. 2, obj. 3, Can. Sicut hi. § Dist. xlvii 1510 cretly. secretly.” On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): “ ‘Fur’ Reply to Objection 1. Secrecy is sometimes a cause [thief] is derived from ‘furvus’ and so from ‘fuscus’ of sin, as when a man employs secrecy in order to commit [dark], because he takes advantage of the night.” a sin, for instance in fraud and guile. In this way it does I answer that, Three things combine together to con- not diminish sin, but constitutes a species of sin: and thus stitute theft. The first belongs to theft as being contrary it is in theft. In another way secrecy is merely a circum- to justice, which gives to each one that which is his, so stance of sin, and thus it diminishes sin, both because it is that it belongs to theft to take possession of what is an- a sign of shame, and because it removes scandal. other’s. The second thing belongs to theft as distinct from Reply to Objection 2. To keep back what is due to those sins which are committed against the person, such as another, inflicts the same kind of injury as taking a thing murder and adultery, and in this respect it belongs to theft unjustly: wherefore an unjust detention is included in an to be about a thing possessed: for if a man takes what is unjust taking. another’s not as a possession but as a part (for instance, if Reply to Objection 3. Nothing prevents that which he amputates a limb), or as a person connected with him belongs to one person simply, from belonging to another (for instance, if he carry off his daughter or his wife), it is in some respect: thus a deposit belongs simply to the denot strictly speaking a case of theft. The third difference positor, but with regard to its custody it is the depositary’s, is that which completes the nature of theft, and consists in and the thing stolen is the thief’s, not simply, but as re- a thing being taken secretly: and in this respect it belongs gards its custody. properly to theft that it consists in “taking another’s thing Whether theft and robbery are sins of different species? IIa IIae q. 66 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that theft and robbery justice, in as much as one man does another an injustice. are not sins of different species. For theft and robbery Now “no man suffers an injustice willingly,” as stated in differ as “secret” and “manifest”: because theft is taking Ethic. v, 9. Wherefore theft and robbery derive their sinful something secretly, while robbery is to take something vi- nature, through the taking being involuntary on the part of olently and openly. Now in the other kinds of sins, the the person from whom something is taken. Now the invol- secret and the manifest do not differ specifically. There- untary is twofold, namely, through violence and through fore theft and robbery are not different species of sin. ignorance, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1. Therefore the sinful Objection 2. Further, moral actions take their species aspect of robbery differs from that of theft: and conse- from the end, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 3; q. 18, quently they differ specifically. a. 6). Now theft and robbery are directed to the same end, Reply to Objection 1. In the other kinds of sin the viz. the possession of another’s property. Therefore they sinful nature is not derived from something involuntary, do not differ specifically. as in the sins opposed to justice: and so where there is a Objection 3. Further, just as a thing is taken by force different kind of involuntary, there is a different species of for the sake of possession, so is a woman taken by force sin. for pleasure: wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that “he Reply to Objection 2. The remote end of robbery and who commits a rape is called a corrupter, and the vic- theft is the same. But this is not enough for identity of tim of the rape is said to be corrupted.” Now it is a case species, because there is a difference of proximate ends, of rape whether the woman be carried off publicly or se- since the robber wishes to take a thing by his own power, cretly. Therefore the thing appropriated is said to be taken but the thief, by cunning. by force, whether it be done secretly or publicly. There- Reply to Objection 3. The robbery of a woman can- fore theft and robbery do not differ. not be secret on the part of the woman who is taken: On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) distin- wherefore even if it be secret as regards the others from guishes theft from robbery, and states that theft is done in whom she is taken, the nature of robbery remains on the secret, but that robbery is done openly. part of the woman to whom violence is done. I answer that, Theft and robbery are vices contrary to 1511 Whether theft is always a sin? IIa IIae q. 66 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that theft is not always 13:44) it is said of the finder of the treasure hidden in a a sin. For no sin is commanded by God, since it is writ- field that he bought the field, as though he purposed thus ten (Ecclus. 15:21): “He hath commanded no man to do to acquire the right of possessing the whole treasure. On wickedly.” Yet we find that God commanded theft, for the other Land the treasure-trove may be nearly in some- it is written (Ex. 12:35,36): “And the children of Israel one’s possession: and then if anyone take it with the in- did as the Lord had commanded Moses [Vulg.: ‘as Moses tention, not of keeping it but of returning it to the owner had commanded’]. . . and they stripped the Egyptians.” who does not look upon such things as unappropriated, he Therefore theft is not always a sin. is not guilty of theft. In like manner if the thing found Objection 2. Further, if a man finds a thing that is appears to be unappropriated, and if the finder believes it not his and takes it, he seems to commit a theft, for he to be so, although he keep it, he does not commit a theft§. takes another’s property. Yet this seems lawful according In any other case the sin of theft is committed¶: where- to natural equity, as the jurists hold.∗ Therefore it seems fore Augustine says in a homily (Serm. clxxviii; De Verb. that theft is not always a sin. Apost.): “If thou hast found a thing and not returned it, Objection 3. Further, he that takes what is his own thou hast stolen it” (Dig. xiv, 5, can. Si quid invenisti). does not seem to sin, because he does not act against jus- Reply to Objection 3. He who by stealth takes his tice, since he does not destroy its equality. Yet a man com- own property which is deposited with another man bur- mits a theft even if he secretly take his own property that dens the depositary, who is bound either to restitution, or is detained by or in the safe-keeping of another. Therefore to prove himself innocent. Hence he is clearly guilty of it seems that theft is not always a sin. sin, and is bound to ease the depositary of his burden. On On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 20:15): “Thou the other hand he who, by stealth, takes his own prop- shalt not steal.” erty, if this be unjustly detained by another, he sins in- I answer that, If anyone consider what is meant by deed; yet not because he burdens the retainer, and so he theft, he will find that it is sinful on two counts. First, is not bound to restitution or compensation: but he sins because of its opposition to justice, which gives to each against general justice by disregarding the order of jus- one what is his, so that for this reason theft is contrary to tice and usurping judgment concerning his own property. justice, through being a taking of what belongs to another. Hence he must make satisfaction to God and endeavor to Secondly, because of the guile or fraud committed by the allay whatever scandal he may have given his neighbor by thief, by laying hands on another’s property secretly and acting this way. cunningly. Wherefore it is evident that every theft is a sin. Whether theft is a mortal sin? Reply to Objection 1. It is no theft for a man to take Objection 1. It would seem that theft is not a mortal another’s property either secretly or openly by order of a sin. For it is written (Prov. 6:30): “The fault is not so judge who has commanded him to do so, because it be- great when a man hath stolen.” But every mortal sin is a comes his due by the very fact that it is adjudicated to him great fault. Therefore theft is not a mortal sin. by the sentence of the court. Hence still less was it a theft Objection 2. Further, mortal sin deserves to be pun- for the Israelites to take away the spoils of the Egyptians ished with death. But in the Law theft is punished not by at the command of the Lord, Who ordered this to be done death but by indemnity, according to Ex. 22:1, “If any on account of the ill-treatment accorded to them by the man steal an ox or a sheep. . . he shall restore have oxen Egyptians without any cause: wherefore it is written sig- for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep.” Therefore theft nificantly (Wis. 10:19): “The just took the spoils of the is not a mortal sin. wicked.” Objection 3. Further, theft can be committed in small Reply to Objection 2. With regard to treasure-trove even as in great things. But it seems unreasonable for a a distinction must be made. For some there are that were man to be punished with eternal death for the theft of a never in anyone’s possession, for instance precious stones small thing such as a needle or a quill. Therefore theft is and jewels, found on the seashore, and such the finder is not a mortal sin. allowed to keep†. The same applies to treasure hidden un- On the contrary, No man is condemned by the Divine derground long since and belonging to no man, except that judgment save for a mortal sin. Yet a man is condemned according to civil law the finder is bound to give half to for theft, according to Zech. 5:3, “This is the curse that the owner of the land, if the treasure trove be in the land of goeth forth over the face of the earth; for every thief shall another person‡. Hence in the parable of the Gospel (Mat. be judged as is there written.” Therefore theft is a mortal ∗ See loc. cit. in Reply. † Dig. I, viii, De divis. rerum: Inst. II, i, De rerum divis. ‡ Inst. II, i, 39: Cod. X, xv, De Thesauris § Inst. II, i, 47 ¶ Dig. XLI, i, De acquirend, rerum dominio, 9: Inst. II, i, 48 1512 sin. against sinners “according to truth” (Rom. 2:2). Where- I answer that, As stated above (q. 59, a. 4; Ia IIae, fore, according to the judgment of the present life the q. 72, a. 5), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to char- death punishment is inflicted, not for every mortal sin, but ity as the spiritual life of the soul. Now charity consists only for such as inflict an irreparable harm, or again for principally in the love of God, and secondarily in the love such as contain some horrible deformity. Hence according of our neighbor, which is shown in our wishing and doing to the present judgment the pain of death is not inflicted him well. But theft is a means of doing harm to our neigh- for theft which does not inflict an irreparable harm, except bor in his belongings; and if men were to rob one another when it is aggravated by some grave circumstance, as in habitually, human society would be undone. Therefore the case of sacrilege which is the theft of a sacred thing, of theft, as being opposed to charity, is a mortal sin. peculation, which is theft of common property, as Augus- Reply to Objection 1. The statement that theft is not a tine states (Tract. 1, Super Joan.), and of kidnaping which great fault is in view of two cases. First, when a person is is stealing a man, for which the pain of death is inflicted led to thieve through necessity. This necessity diminishes (Ex. 21:16). or entirely removes sin, as we shall show further on (a. 7). Reply to Objection 3. Reason accounts as nothing Hence the text continues: “For he stealeth to fill his hun- that which is little: so that a man does not consider him- gry soul.” Secondly, theft is stated not to be a great fault in self injured in very little matters: and the person who takes comparison with the guilt of adultery, which is punished such things can presume that this is not against the will of with death. Hence the text goes on to say of the thief that the owner. And if a person take such like very little things, “if he be taken, he shall restore sevenfold. . . but he that is he may be proportionately excused from mortal sin. Yet if an adulterer. . . shall destroy his own soul.” his intention is to rob and injure his neighbor, there may Reply to Objection 2. The punishments of this life be a mortal sin even in these very little things, even as are medicinal rather than retributive. For retribution is there may be through consent in a mere thought. reserved to the Divine judgment which is pronounced Whether it is lawful to steal through stress of need? IIa IIae q. 66 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem unlawful to steal through sion and appropriation of things which are based on hu- stress of need. For penance is not imposed except on one man law, do not preclude the fact that man’s needs have who has sinned. Now it is stated (Extra, De furtis, Cap. Si to be remedied by means of these very things. Hence quis): “If anyone, through stress of hunger or nakedness, whatever certain people have in superabundance is due, steal food, clothing or beast, he shall do penance for three by natural law, to the purpose of succoring the poor. For weeks.” Therefore it is not lawful to steal through stress this reason Ambrose∗ says, and his words are embodied of need. in the Decretals (Dist. xlvii, can. Sicut ii): “It is the hun- Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, gry man’s bread that you withhold, the naked man’s cloak 6) that “there are some actions whose very name implies that you store away, the money that you bury in the earth wickedness,” and among these he reckons theft. Now that is the price of the poor man’s ransom and freedom.” which is wicked in itself may not be done for a good end. Since, however, there are many who are in need, while Therefore a man cannot lawfully steal in order to remedy it is impossible for all to be succored by means of the a need. same thing, each one is entrusted with the stewardship of Objection 3. Further, a man should love his neighbor his own things, so that out of them he may come to the as himself. Now, according to Augustine (Contra Men- aid of those who are in need. Nevertheless, if the need be dac. vii), it is unlawful to steal in order to succor one’s so manifest and urgent, that it is evident that the present neighbor by giving him an alms. Therefore neither is it need must be remedied by whatever means be at hand (for lawful to steal in order to remedy one’s own needs. instance when a person is in some imminent danger, and On the contrary, In cases of need all things are com- there is no other possible remedy), then it is lawful for a mon property, so that there would seem to be no sin in man to succor his own need by means of another’s prop- taking another’s property, for need has made it common. erty, by taking it either openly or secretly: nor is this prop- I answer that, Things which are of human right can- erly speaking theft or robbery. not derogate from natural right or Divine right. Now ac- Reply to Objection 1. This decretal considers cases cording to the natural order established by Divine Provi- where there is no urgent need. dence, inferior things are ordained for the purpose of suc- Reply to Objection 2. It is not theft, properly speak- coring man’s needs by their means. Wherefore the divi- ing, to take secretly and use another’s property in a case ∗ Loc. cit., a. 2, obj. 3 1513 of extreme need: because that which he takes for the sup-Reply to Objection 3. In a case of a like need a man port of his life becomes his own property by reason of that may also take secretly another’s property in order to suc- need. cor his neighbor in need. Whether robbery may be committed without sin? IIa IIae q. 66 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that robbery may be com- either by fighting against the enemy, or against the citi- mitted without sin. For spoils are taken by violence, and zens, by punishing evil-doers: and whatever is taken by this seems to belong to the essence of robbery, accord- violence of this kind is not the spoils of robbery, since it ing to what has been said (a. 4). Now it is lawful to take is not contrary to justice. On the other hand to take other spoils from the enemy; for Ambrose says (De Patriarch. people’s property violently and against justice, in the ex- 4∗): “When the conqueror has taken possession of the ercise of public authority, is to act unlawfully and to be spoils, military discipline demands that all should be re- guilty of robbery; and whoever does so is bound to resti- served for the sovereign,” in order, to wit, that he may tution. distribute them. Therefore in certain cases robbery is law- Reply to Objection 1. A distinction must be made in ful. the matter of spoils. For if they who take spoils from the Objection 2. Further, it is lawful to take from a man enemy, are waging a just war, such things as they seize in what is not his. Now the things which unbelievers have the war become their own property. This is no robbery, so are not theirs, for Augustine says (Ep. ad Vincent. Donat. that they are not bound to restitution. Nevertheless even xciii.): “You falsely call things your own, for you do not they who are engaged in a just war may sin in taking spoils possess them justly, and according to the laws of earthly through cupidity arising from an evil intention, if, to wit, kings you are commanded to forfeit them.” Therefore it they fight chiefly not for justice but for spoil. For Augus- seems that one may lawfully rob unbelievers. tine says (De Verb. Dom. xix; Serm. lxxxii) that “it is Objection 3. Further, earthly princes violently extort a sin to fight for booty.” If, however, those who take the many things from their subjects: and this seems to savor spoil, are waging an unjust war, they are guilty of robbery, of robbery. Now it would seem a grievous matter to say and are bound to restitution. that they sin in acting thus, for in that case nearly every Reply to Objection 2. Unbelievers possess their prince would be damned. Therefore in some cases rob- goods unjustly in so far as they are ordered by the laws bery is lawful. of earthly princes to forfeit those goods. Hence these may On the contrary, Whatever is taken lawfully may be be taken violently from them, not by private but by public offered to God in sacrifice and oblation. Now this can- authority. not be done with the proceeds of robbery, according to Is. Reply to Objection 3. It is no robbery if princes ex- 61:8, “I am the Lord that love judgment, and hate robbery act from their subjects that which is due to them for the in a holocaust.” Therefore it is not lawful to take anything safe-guarding of the common good, even if they use vio- by robbery. lence in so doing: but if they extort something unduly by I answer that, Robbery implies a certain violence and means of violence, it is robbery even as burglary is. Hence coercion employed in taking unjustly from a man that Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 4): “If justice be disre- which is his. Now in human society no man can exer- garded, what is a king but a mighty robber? since what cise coercion except through public authority: and, conse- is a robber but a little king?” And it is written (Ezech. quently, if a private individual not having public authority 22:27): “Her princes in the midst of her, are like wolves takes another’s property by violence, he acts unlawfully ravening the prey.” Wherefore they are bound to restitu- and commits a robbery, as burglars do. As regards princes, tion, just as robbers are, and by so much do they sin more the public power is entrusted to them that they may be the grievously than robbers, as their actions are fraught with guardians of justice: hence it is unlawful for them to use greater and more universal danger to public justice whose violence or coercion, save within the bounds of justice— wardens they are. ∗ De Abraham i, 3 1514 Whether theft is a more grievous sin than robbery? IIa IIae q. 66 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that theft is a more part of the person from whom something is taken: yet grievous sin than robbery. For theft adds fraud and guile so that in theft the involuntariness is due to ignorance, to the taking of another’s property: and these things are whereas in robbery it is due to violence. Now a thing not found in robbery. Now fraud and guile are sinful in is more involuntary through violence than through igno- themselves, as stated above (q. 55, Aa. 4,5). Therefore rance, because violence is more directly opposed to the theft is a more grievous sin than robbery. will than ignorance. Therefore robbery is a more grievous Objection 2. Further, shame is fear about a wicked sin than theft. There is also another reason, since robbery deed, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9. Now men are more ashamed not only inflicts a loss on a person in his things, but also of theft than of robbery. Therefore theft is more wicked conduces to the ignominy and injury of his person, and than robbery. this is of graver import than fraud or guile which belong Objection 3. Further, the more persons a sin injures to theft. Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident. the more grievous it would seem to be. Now the great and Reply to Objection 2. Men who adhere to sensible the lowly may be injured by theft: whereas only the weak things think more of external strength which is evidenced can be injured by robbery, since it is possible to use vio- in robbery, than of internal virtue which is forfeit through lence towards them. Therefore the sin of theft seems to be sin: wherefore they are less ashamed of robbery than of more grievous than the sin of robbery. theft. On the contrary, According to the laws robbery is Reply to Objection 3. Although more persons may more severely punished than theft. be injured by theft than by robbery, yet more grievous in- I answer that, Robbery and theft are sinful, as stated juries may be inflicted by robbery than by theft: for which above (Aa. 4,6), on account of the involuntariness on the reason also robbery is more odious. 1515 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 67 Of the Injustice of a Judge, in Judging (In Four Articles) We must now consider those vices opposed to commutative justice, that consist in words injurious to our neighbors. We shall consider (1) those which are connected with judicial proceedings, and (2) injurious words uttered extrajudicially. Under the first head five points occur for our consideration: (1) The injustice of a judge in judging; (2) The injustice of the prosecutor in accusing; (3) The injustice of the defendant in defending himself; (4) The injustice of the witnesses in giving evidence; (5) The injustice of the advocate in defending. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether a man can justly judge one who is not his subject? (2) Whether it is lawful for a judge, on account of the evidence, to deliver judgment in opposition to the truth which is known to him? (3) Whether a judge can justly sentence a man who is not accused? (4) Whether he can justly remit the punishment? Whether a man can justly judge one who is not subject to his jurisdiction? IIa IIae q. 67 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that a man can justly ment would be of no effect. Now coercive power is not judge one who is not subject to his jurisdiction. For it exercised in human affairs, save by those who hold public is stated (Dan. 13) that Daniel sentenced the ancients who authority: and those who have this authority are accounted were convicted of bearing false witness. But these an- the superiors of those over whom they preside whether by cients were not subject to Daniel; indeed they were judges ordinary or by delegated authority. Hence it is evident of the people. Therefore a man may lawfully judge one that no man can judge others than his subjects and this in that is not subject to his jurisdiction. virtue either of delegated or of ordinary authority. Objection 2. Further, Christ was no man’s subject, Reply to Objection 1. In judging those ancients indeed He was “King of kings and Lord of lords” (Apoc. Daniel exercised an authority delegated to him by Divine 19:16). Yet He submitted to the judgment of a man. instinct. This is indicated where it is said (Dan. 13:45) Therefore it seems that a man may lawfully judge one that that “the Lord raised up the. . . spirit of a young boy.” is not subject to his jurisdiction. Reply to Objection 2. In human affairs a man may Objection 3. Further, according to the law∗ a man submit of his own accord to the judgment of others al- is tried in this or that court according to his kind of of- though these be not his superiors, an example of which is fense. Now sometimes the defendant is not the subject when parties agree to a settlement by arbitrators. Where- of the man whose business it is to judge in that particular fore it is necessary that the arbitrator should be upheld by place, for instance when the defendant belongs to another a penalty, since the arbitrators through not exercising au- diocese or is exempt. Therefore it seems that a man may thority in the case, have not of themselves full power of judge one that is not his subject. coercion. Accordingly in this way did Christ of his own On the contrary, Gregory† in commenting on Dt. accord submit to human judgment: and thus too did Pope 23:25, “If thou go into thy friend’s corn,” etc. says: “Thou Leo‡ submit to the judgment of the emperor§. mayest not put the sickle of judgment to the corn that is Reply to Objection 3. The bishop of the defendant’s entrusted to another.” diocese becomes the latter’s superior as regards the fault I answer that, A judge’s sentence is like a particular committed, even though he be exempt: unless perchance law regarding some particular fact. Wherefore just as a the defendant offend in a matter exempt from the bishop’s general law should have coercive power, as the Philoso- authority, for instance in administering the property of an pher states (Ethic. x, 9), so too the sentence of a judge exempt monastery. But if an exempt person commits a should have coercive power, whereby either party is com- theft, or a murder or the like, he may be justly condemned pelled to comply with the judge’s sentence; else the judg- by the ordinary. ∗ Cap. Licet ratione, de Foro Comp. † Regist. xi, epist. 64 ‡ Leo IV § Can. Nos si incompetenter, caus. ii, qu. 7 1516 Whether it is lawful for a judge to pronounce judgment against the truth that he IIa IIae q. 67 a. 2 knows, on account of evidence to the contrary? Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for a judge to with these things, and not according to his private opinion. pronounce judgment against the truth that he knows, on I answer that, As stated above (a. 1; q. 60, Aa. 2,6) account of evidence to the contrary. For it is written (Dt. it is the duty of a judge to pronounce judgment in as 17:9): “Thou shalt come to the priests of the Levitical much as he exercises public authority, wherefore his judg- race, and to the judge that shall be at that time; and thou ment should be based on information acquired by him, shalt ask of them, and they shall show thee the truth of not from his knowledge as a private individual, but from the judgment.” Now sometimes certain things are alleged what he knows as a public person. Now the latter knowl- against the truth, as when something is proved by means edge comes to him both in general and in particular — of false witnesses. Therefore it is unlawful for a judge in general through the public laws, whether Divine or to pronounce judgment according to what is alleged and human, and he should admit no evidence that conflicts proved in opposition to the truth which he knows. therewith—in some particular matter, through documents Objection 2. Further, in pronouncing judgment a man and witnesses, and other legal means of information, should conform to the Divine judgment, since “it is the which in pronouncing his sentence, he ought to follow judgment of God” (Dt. 1:17). Now “the judgment of God rather than the information he has acquired as a private is according to the truth” (Rom. 2:2), and it was foretold individual. And yet this same information may be of use of Christ (Is. 11:3,4): “He shall not judge according to to him, so that he can more rigorously sift the evidence the sight of the eyes, nor reprove according to the hear- brought forward, and discover its weak points. If, how- ing of the ears. But He shall judge the poor with justice, ever, he is unable to reject that evidence juridically, he and shall reprove with equity for the meek of the earth.” must, as stated above, follow it in pronouncing sentence. Therefore the judge ought not to pronounce judgment ac- Reply to Objection 1. The reason why, in the pas- cording to the evidence before him if it be contrary to what sage quoted, it is stated that the judges should first of all he knows himself. be asked their reasons, is to make it clear that the judges Objection 3. Further, the reason why evidence is re- ought to judge the truth in accordance with the evidence. quired in a court of law, is that the judge may have a faith- Reply to Objection 2. To judge belongs to God in ful record of the truth of the matter, wherefore in matters virtue of His own power: wherefore His judgment is based of common knowledge there is no need of judicial pro- on the truth which He Himself knows, and not on knowl- cedure, according to 1 Tim. 5:24, “Some men’s sins are edge imparted by others: the same is to be said of Christ, manifest, going before to judgment.” Consequently, if the Who is true God and true man: whereas other judges do judge by his personal knowledge is aware of the truth, he not judge in virtue of their own power, so that there is no should pay no heed to the evidence, but should pronounce comparison. sentence according to the truth which he knows. Reply to Objection 3. The Apostle refers to the case Objection 4. Further, the word “conscience” denotes where something is well known not to the judge alone, but application of knowledge to a matter of action as stated in both to him and to others, so that the guilty party can by the Ia, q. 79, a. 13. Now it is a sin to act contrary to one’s no means deny his guilt (as in the case of notorious crim- knowledge. Therefore a judge sins if he pronounces sen- inals), and is convicted at once from the evidence of the tence according to the evidence but against his conscience fact. If, on the other hand, it be well known to the judge, of the truth. but not to others, or to others, but not to the judge, then it On the contrary, Augustine∗ says in his commentary is necessary for the judge to sift the evidence. on the Psalter: “A good judge does nothing according to Reply to Objection 4. In matters touching his own his private opinion but pronounces sentence according to person, a man must form his conscience from his own the law and the right.” Now this is to pronounce judgment knowledge, but in matters concerning the public author- according to what is alleged and proved in court. There- ity, he must form his conscience in accordance with the fore a judge ought to pronounce judgment in accordance knowledge attainable in the public judicial procedure. ∗ Ambrose, Super Ps. 118, serm. 20 1517 Whether a judge may condemn a man who is not accused? IIa IIae q. 67 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that a judge may pass sen- accuser, according to Acts 25:16: “It is not the custom tence on a man who is not accused. For human justice is of the Romans to condemn any man, before that he who derived from Divine justice. Now God judges the sinner is accused have his accusers present, and have liberty to even though there be no accuser. Therefore it seems that make his answer, to clear himself of the crimes” of which a man may pass sentence of condemnation on a man even he is accused. though there be no accuser. Reply to Objection 1. God, in judging man, takes Objection 2. Further, an accuser is required in judi- the sinner’s conscience as his accuser, according to Rom. cial procedure in order that he may relate the crime to the 2:15, “Their thoughts between themselves accusing, or judge. Now sometimes the crime may come to the judge’s also defending one another”; or again, He takes the evi- knowledge otherwise than by accusation; for instance, by dence of the fact as regards the deed itself, according to denunciation, or by evil report, or through the judge him- Gn. 4:10, “The voice of thy brother’s blood crieth to Me self being an eye-witness. Therefore a judge may con- from the earth.” demn a man without there being an accuser. Reply to Objection 2. Public disgrace takes the place Objection 3. Further, the deeds of holy persons are of an accuser. Hence a gloss on Gn. 4:10, “The voice related in Holy Writ, as models of human conduct. Now of thy brother’s blood,” etc. says: “There is no need of Daniel was at the same time the accuser and the judge of an accuser when the crime committed is notorious.” In the wicked ancients (Dan. 13). Therefore it is not contrary a case of denunciation, as stated above (q. 33, a. 7), the to justice for a man to condemn anyone as judge while be- amendment, not the punishment, of the sinner is intended: ing at the same time his accuser. wherefore when a man is denounced for a sin, nothing is On the contrary, Ambrose in his commentary on 1 done against him, but for him, so that no accuser is re- Cor. 5:2, expounding the Apostle’s sentence on the forni- quired. The punishment that is inflicted is on account of cator, says that “a judge should not condemn without an his rebellion against the Church, and since this rebellion accuser, since our Lord did not banish Judas, who was a is manifest, it stands instead of an accuser. The fact that thief, yet was not accused.” the judge himself was an eye-witness, does not authorize I answer that, A judge is an interpreter of justice. him to proceed to pass sentence, except according to the Wherefore, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), “men order of judicial procedure. have recourse to a judge as to one who is the personifica- Reply to Objection 3. God, in judging man, proceeds tion of justice.” Now, as stated above (q. 58, a. 2 ), justice from His own knowledge of the truth, whereas man does is not between a man and himself but between one man not, as stated above (a. 2). Hence a man cannot be accuser, and another. Hence a judge must needs judge between witness and judge at the same time, as God is. Daniel was two parties, which is the case when one is the prosecutor, at once accuser and judge, because he was the executor of and the other the defendant. Therefore in criminal cases the sentence of God, by whose instinct he was moved, as the judge cannot sentence a man unless the latter has an stated above (a. 1, ad 1). Whether the judge can lawfully remit the punishment? IIa IIae q. 67 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the judge can law- guilty man from his punishment. fully remit the punishment. For it is written (James 2:13): On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 13:8,9) concern- “Judgment without mercy” shall be done “to him that hath ing anyone who would persuade a man to serve strange not done mercy.” Now no man is punished for not doing gods: “Neither let thy eye spare him to pity and conceal what he cannot do lawfully. Therefore any judge can law- him, but thou shalt presently put him to death”: and of the fully do mercy by remitting the punishment. murderer it is written (Dt. 19:12,13): “He shall die. Thou Objection 2. Further, human judgment should imitate shalt not pity him.” the Divine judgment. Now God remits the punishment to I answer that, As may be gathered from what has sinners, because He desires not the death of the sinner, ac- been said (Aa. 2,3), with regard to the question in point, cording to Ezech. 18:23. Therefore a human judge also two things may be observed in connection with a judge. may lawfully remit the punishment to one who repents. One is that he has to judge between accuser and defen- Objection 3. Further, it is lawful for anyone to do dant, while the other is that he pronounces the judicial what is profitable to some one and harmful to none. Now sentence, in virtue of his power, not as a private individ- the remission of his punishment profits the guilty man and ual but as a public person. Accordingly on two counts harms nobody. Therefore the judge can lawfully loose a a judge is hindered from loosing a guilty person from his 1518 punishment. First on the part of the accuser, whose right it Reply to Objection 1. There is a place for the judge’s sometimes is that the guilty party should be punished—for mercy in matters that are left to the judge’s discretion, be- instance on account of some injury committed against the cause in like matters a good man is slow to punish as the accuser—because it is not in the power of a judge to remit Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). But in matters that are such punishment, since every judge is bound to give each determined in accordance with Divine or human laws, it man his right. Secondly, he finds a hindrance on the part is not left to him to show mercy. of the commonwealth, whose power he exercises, and to Reply to Objection 2. God has supreme power of whose good it belongs that evil-doers should be punished. judging, and it concerns Him whatever is done sinfully Nevertheless in this respect there is a difference be- against anyone. Therefore He is free to remit the pun- tween judges of lower degree and the supreme judge, i.e. ishment, especially since punishment is due to sin chiefly the sovereign, to whom the entire public authority is en- because it is done against Him. He does not, however, trusted. For the inferior judge has no power to exempt a remit the punishment, except in so far as it becomes His guilty man from punishment against the laws imposed on goodness, which is the source of all laws. him by his superior. Wherefore Augustine in commenting Reply to Objection 3. If the judge were to remit pun- on John 19:11, “Thou shouldst not have any power against ishment inordinately, he would inflict an injury on the Me,” says (Tract. cxvi in Joan.): “The power which God community, for whose good it behooves ill-deeds to be gave Pilate was such that he was under the power of Cae- punished, in order that. men may avoid sin. Hence the sar, so that he was by no means free to acquit the per- text, after appointing the punishment of the seducer, adds son accused.” On the other hand the sovereign who has (Dt. 13:11): “That all Israel hearing may fear, and may do full authority in the commonwealth, can lawfully remit no more anything like this.” He would also inflict harm the punishment to a guilty person, provided the injured on the injured person; who is compensated by having his party consent to the remission, and that this do not seem honor restored in the punishment of the man who has in- detrimental to the public good. jured him. 1519 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 68 Of Matters Concerning Unjust Accusation (In Four Articles) We must now consider matters pertaining to unjust accusation. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether a man is bound to accuse? (2) Whether the accusation should be made in writing? (3) How is an accusation vitiated? (4) How should those be punished who have accused a man wrongfully? Whether a man is bound to accuse? IIa IIae q. 68 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that a man is not bound either to the amendment of the sinner, or to the good of to accuse. For no man is excused on account of sin from the commonwealth whose calm is ensured by the punish- fulfilling a Divine precept, since he would thus profit by ment of evil-doers. The former of these is intended in de- his sin. Yet on account of sin some are disqualified from nunciation, as stated, whereas the second regards properly accusing, such as those who are excommunicate or of evil accusation. Hence in the case of a crime that conduces to fame, or who are accused of grievous crimes and are not the injury of the commonwealth, a man is bound to accu- yet proved to be innocent∗. Therefore a man is not bound sation, provided he can offer sufficient proof, since it is by a Divine precept to accuse. the accuser’s duty to prove: as, for example, when any- Objection 2. Further, every duty depends on charity one’s sin conduces to the bodily or spiritual corruption of which is “the end of the precept”†: wherefore it is written the community. If, however, the sin be not such as to af- (Rom. 13:8): “Owe no man anything, but to love one an- fect the community, or if he cannot offer sufficient proof, other.” Now that which belongs to charity is a duty that a man is not bound to attempt to accuse, since no man is man owes to all both of high and of low degree, both su- bound to do what he cannot duly accomplish. periors and inferiors. Since therefore subjects should not Reply to Objection 1. Nothing prevents a man being accuse their superiors, nor persons of lower degree, those debarred by sin from doing what men are under an obli- of a higher degree, as shown in several chapters (Decret. gation to do: for instance from meriting eternal life, and II, qu. vii), it seems that it is no man’s duty to accuse. from receiving the sacraments of the Church. Nor does Objection 3. Further, no man is bound to act against a man profit by this: indeed it is a most grievous fault to the fidelity which he owes his friend; because he ought fail to do what one is bound to do, since virtuous acts are not to do to another what he would not have others do perfections of man. to him. Now to accuse anyone is sometimes contrary to Reply to Objection 2. Subjects are debarred from ac- the fidelity that one owes a friend; for it is written (Prov. cusing their superiors, “if it is not the affection of charity 11:13): “He that walketh deceitfully, revealeth secrets; but but their own wickedness that leads them to defame and he that is faithful, concealeth the thing committed to him disparage the conduct of their superiors”‡ —or again if the by his friend.” Therefore a man is not bound to accuse. subject who wishes to accuse his superior is himself guilty On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 5:1): “If any one of crime§. Otherwise, provided they be in other respects sin, and hear the voice of one swearing, and is a witness qualified to accuse, it is lawful for subjects to accuse their either because he himself hath seen, or is privy to it: if he superiors out of charity. do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity.” Reply to Objection 3. It is contrary to fidelity to make I answer that, As stated above (q. 33, Aa. 6,7; q. 67, known secrets to the injury of a person; but not if they be a. 3, ad 2), the difference between denunciation and accu- revealed for the good of the community, which should al- sation is that in denunciation we aim at a brother’s amend- ways be preferred to a private good. Hence it is unlawful ment, whereas in accusation we intend the punishment of to receive any secret in detriment to the common good: his crime. Now the punishments of this life are sought, and yet a thing is scarcely a secret when there are suffi- not for their own sake, because this is not the final time of cient witnesses to prove it. retribution, but in their character of medicine, conducing ∗ 1 Tim. 1:5 † Can. Definimus, caus. iv, qu. 1; caus. vi, qu. 1 ‡ Append. Grat. ad can. Sunt nonnulli, caus. ii, qu. 7 § Decret. II, qu. vii, can. Praesumunt. 1520 Whether it is necessary for the accusation to be made in writing? IIa IIae q. 68 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem unnecessary for the ac- been said and with what qualifications, when he comes cusation to be made in writing. For writing was devised to pronounce sentence, unless it were drawn up in writ- as an aid to the human memory of the past. But an ac- ing. Hence it has with reason been established that the ac- cusation is made in the present. Therefore the accusation cusation, as well as other parts of the judicial procedure, needs not to be made in writing. should be put into writing. Objection 2. Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. Reply to Objection 1. Words are so many and so var- viii, can. Per scripta) that “no man may accuse or be ac- ious that it is difficult to remember each one. A proof cused in his absence.” Now writing seems to be useful of this is the fact that if a number of people who have in the fact that it is a means of notifying something to heard the same words be asked what was said, they will one who is absent, as Augustine declares (De Trin. x, 1). not agree in repeating them, even after a short time. And Therefore the accusation need not be in writing: and all since a slight difference of words changes the sense, even the more that the canon declares that “no accusation in though the judge’s sentence may have to be pronounced writing should be accepted.” soon afterwards, the certainty of judgment requires that Objection 3. Further, a man’s crime is made known the accusation be drawn up in writing. by denunciation, even as by accusation. Now writing is Reply to Objection 2. Writing is needed not only on unnecessary in denunciation. Therefore it is seemingly account of the absence of the person who has something unnecessary in accusation. to notify, or of the person to whom something is notified, On the contrary, It is laid down (Decret. II, qu. viii, but also on account of the delay of time as stated above can. Accusatorum) that “the role of accuser must never be (ad 1). Hence when the canon says, “Let no accusation sanctioned without the accusation be in writing.” be accepted in writing” it refers to the sending of an ac- I answer that, As stated above (q. 67, a. 3), when cusation by one who is absent: but it does not exclude the the process in a criminal case goes by way of accusa- necessity of writing when the accuser is present. tion, the accuser is in the position of a party, so that the Reply to Objection 3. The denouncer does not bind judge stands between the accuser and the accused for the himself to give proofs: wherefore he is not punished if he purpose of the trial of justice, wherein it behooves one is unable to prove. For this reason writing is unnecessary to proceed on certainties, as far as possible. Since how- in a denunciation: and it suffices that the denunciation be ever verbal utterances are apt to escape one’s memory, made verbally to the Church, who will proceed, in virtue the judge would be unable to know for certain what had of her office, to the correction of the brother. Whether an accusation is rendered unjust by calumny, collusion or evasion? IIa IIae q. 68 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that an accusation is not accusation.” But this can be done without injustice: for rendered unjust by calumny, collusion or evasion. For it is stated there also: “If a man repent of having made a according to Decret. II, qu. iii∗, “calumny consists in wicked accusation and inscription† in a matter which he falsely charging a person with a crime.” Now sometimes cannot prove, and come to an understanding with the in- one man falsely accuses another of a crime through igno- nocent party whom he has accused, let them acquit one rance of fact which excuses him. Therefore it seems that another.” Therefore evasion does not render an accusation an accusation is not always rendered unjust through being unjust. slanderous. On the contrary, It is stated by the same authority: Objection 2. Further, it is stated by the same authority “The rashness of accusers shows itself in three ways. For that “collusion consists in hiding the truth about a crime.” they are guilty either of calumny, or of collusion, or of But seemingly this is not unlawful, because one is not evasion.” bound to disclose every crime, as stated above (a. 1; q. 33, I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), accusation is or- a. 7). Therefore it seems that an accusation is not rendered dered for the common good which it aims at procuring by unjust by collusion. means of knowledge of the crime. Now no man ought to Objection 3. Further, it is stated by the same authority injure a person unjustly, in order to promote the common that “evasion consists in withdrawing altogether from an good. Wherefore a man may sin in two ways when mak- ∗ Append. Grat. ad can. Si quem poenituerit. † The accuser was bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation. The effect of this endorsement or inscription was that the accuser bound himself, if he failed to prove the accusation, to suffer the same punishment as the accused would have to suffer if proved guilty. 1521 ing an accusation: first through acting unjustly against the on account of an error for which he is not to blame. All accused, by charging him falsely with the commission of these things must be weighed according to the judge’s pru- a crime, i.e. by calumniating him; secondly, on the part of dence, lest he should declare a man to have been guilty of the commonwealth, whose good is intended chiefly in an calumny, who through levity of mind or an error for which accusation, when anyone with wicked intent hinders a sin he is not to be blamed has uttered a false accusation. being punished. This again happens in two ways: first by Reply to Objection 2. Not everyone who hides the having recourse to fraud in making the accusation. This truth about a crime is guilty of collusion, but only he who belongs to collusion [prevaricatio] for “he that is guilty of deceitfully hides the matter about which he makes the ac- collusion is like one who rides astraddle [varicator], be- cusation, by collusion with the defendant, dissembling his cause he helps the other party, and betrays his own side”‡. proofs, and admitting false excuses. Secondly by withdrawing altogether from the accusation. Reply to Objection 3. Evasion consists in withdraw- This is evasion [tergiversatio] for by desisting from what ing altogether from the accusation, by renouncing the in- he had begun he seems to turn his back [tergum vertere]. tention of accusing, not anyhow, but inordinately. There Reply to Objection 1. A man ought not to proceed to are two ways, however, in which a man may rightly desist accuse except of what he is quite certain about, wherein from accusing without committing a sin —in one way, in ignorance of fact has no place. Yet he who falsely charges the very process of accusation, if it come to his knowl- another with a crime is not a calumniator unless he gives edge that the matter of his accusation is false, and then by utterance to false accusations out of malice. For it hap- mutual consent the accuser and the defendant acquit one pens sometimes that a man through levity of mind pro- another—in another way, if the accusation be quashed by ceeds to accuse someone, because he believes too readily the sovereign to whom belongs the care of the common what he hears, and this pertains to rashness; while, on the good, which it is intended to procure by the accusation. other hand sometimes a man is led to make an accusation Whether an accuser who fails to prove his indictment is bound to the punishment of IIa IIae q. 68 a. 4 retaliation? Objection 1. It would seem that the accuser who fails taliation. to prove his indictment is not bound to the punishment of On the contrary, Pope Hadrian I says (Cap. lii): “He retaliation. For sometimes a man is led by a just error to that fails to prove his accusation, must himself suffer the make an accusation, in which case the judge acquit the punishment which his accusation inferred.” accuser, as stated in Decret. II, qu. iii.∗ Therefore the I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), in a case, where accuser who fails to prove his indictment is not bound to the procedure is by way of accusation, the accuser holds the punishment of retaliation. the position of a party aiming at the punishment of the ac- Objection 2. Further, if the punishment of retaliation cused. Now the duty of the judge is to establish the equal- ought to be inflicted on one who has accused unjustly, this ity of justice between them: and the equality of justice will be on account of the injury he has done to someone— requires that a man should himself suffer whatever harm but not on account of any injury done to the person of the he has intended to be inflicted on another, according to accused, for in that case the sovereign could not remit this Ex. 21:24, “Eye for eye, tooth for tooth.” Consequently punishment, nor on account of an injury to the common- it is just that he who by accusing a man has put him in wealth, because then the accused could not acquit him. danger of being punished severely, should himself suffer Therefore the punishment of retaliation is not due to one a like punishment. who has failed to prove his accusation. Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. Objection 3. Further, the one same sin does not de- v, 5) justice does not always require counterpassion, be- serve a twofold punishment, according to Nahum 1:9†: cause it matters considerably whether a man injures an- “God shall not judge the same thing a second time.” But other voluntarily or not. Voluntary injury deserves pun- he who fails to prove his accusation, incurs the punish- ishment, involuntary deserves forgiveness. Hence when ment due to defamation‡, which punishment even the the judge becomes aware that a man has made a false ac- Pope seemingly cannot remit, according to a statement cusation, not with a mind to do harm, but involuntarily of Pope Gelasius§: “Although we are able to save souls through ignorance or a just error, he does not impose the by Penance, we are unable to remove the defamation.” punishment of retaliation. Therefore he is not bound to suffer the punishment of re- Reply to Objection 2. He who accuses wrongfully ‡ Append. Grat. ad can. Si quem poenituerit. ∗ Append. Grat., ad can. Si quem poenituerit. † Septuagint version ‡ Can. Infames, caus. vi, qu. 1 § Callist. I, Epist. ad omn. Gall. episc. 1522 sins both against the person of the accused and against the on the commonwealth: and this cannot be condoned by commonwealth; wherefore he is punished on both counts. the accused, although it can be remitted by the sovereign, This is the meaning of what is written (Dt. 19:18-20): who has charge of the commonwealth. “And when after most diligent inquisition, they shall find Reply to Objection 3. The accuser deserves the pun- that the false witness hath told a lie against his brother: ishment of retaliation in compensation for the harm he at- then shall render to him as he meant to do to his brother,” tempts to inflict on his neighbor: but the punishment of and this refers to the injury done to the person: and after- disgrace is due to him for his wickedness in accusing an- wards, referring to the injury done to the commonwealth, other man calumniously. Sometimes the sovereign remits the text continues: “And thou shalt take away the evil out the punishment, and not the disgrace, and sometimes he of the midst of thee, that others hearing may fear, and may removes the disgrace also: wherefore the Pope also can re- not dare to do such things.” Specially, however, does he move this disgrace. When Pope Gelasius says: “We can- injure the person of the accused, if he accuse him falsely. not remove the disgrace,” he may mean either the disgrace Wherefore the accused, if innocent, may condone the in- attaching to the deed [infamia facti], or that sometimes it jury done to himself, particularly if the accusation were is not expedient to remove it, or again he may be refer- made not calumniously but out of levity of mind. But if ring to the disgrace inflicted by the civil judge, as Gratian the accuser desist from accusing an innocent man, through states (Callist. I, Epist. ad omn. Gall. episc.). collusion with the latter’s adversary, he inflicts an injury 1523 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 69 Of Sins Committed Against Justice On the Part of the Defendant (In Four Articles) We must now consider those sins which are committed against justice on the part of the defendant. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a mortal sin to deny the truth which would lead to one’s condemnation? (2) Whether it is lawful to defend oneself with calumnies? (3) Whether it is lawful to escape condemnation by appealing? (4) Whether it is lawful for one who has been condemned to defend himself by violence if he be able to do so? Whether one can, without a mortal sin, deny the truth which would lead to one’s IIa IIae q. 69 a. 1 condemnation? Objection 1. It would seem one can, without a mortal ity extend. Again, the judge, as stated above (q. 67 , a. 1), sin, deny the truth which would lead to one’s condem- is the superior in relation to the person whom he judges. nation. For Chrysostom says (Hom. xxxi super Ep. ad Therefore the accused is in duty bound to tell the judge Heb.): “I do not say that you should lay bare your guilt the truth which the latter exacts from him according to the publicly, nor accuse yourself before others.” Now if the form of law. Hence if he refuse to tell the truth which he accused were to confess the truth in court, he would lay is under obligation to tell, or if he mendaciously deny it, bare his guilt and be his own accuser. Therefore he is not he sins mortally. If, on the other hand, the judge asks of bound to tell the truth: and so he does not sin mortally if him that which he cannot ask in accordance with the order he tell a lie in court. of justice, the accused is not bound to satisfy him, and he Objection 2. Further, just as it is an officious lie when may lawfully escape by appealing or otherwise: but it is one tells a lie in order to rescue another man from death, not lawful for him to lie. so is it an officious lie when one tells a lie in order to free Reply to Objection 1. When a man is examined by oneself from death, since one is more bound towards one- the judge according to the order of justice, he does not lay self than towards another. Now an officious lie is consid- bare his own guilt, but his guilt is unmasked by another, ered not a mortal but a venial sin. Therefore if the accused since the obligation of answering is imposed on him by denies the truth in court, in order to escape death, he does one whom he is bound to obey. not sin mortally. Reply to Objection 2. To lie, with injury to another Objection 3. Further, every mortal sin is contrary to person, in order to rescue a man from death is not a purely charity, as stated above (q. 24, a. 12). But that the accused officious lie, for it has an admixture of the pernicious lie: lie by denying himself to be guilty of the crime laid to and when a man lies in court in order to exculpate himself, his charge is not contrary to charity, neither as regards the he does an injury to one whom he is bound to obey, since love we owe God, nor as to the love due to our neighbor. he refuses him his due, namely an avowal of the truth. Therefore such a lie is not a mortal sin. Reply to Objection 3. He who lies in court by deny- On the contrary, Whatever is opposed to the glory of ing his guilt, acts both against the love of God to whom God is a mortal sin, because we are bound by precept to judgment belongs, and against the love of his neighbor, “do all to the glory of God” (1 Cor. 10:31). Now it is to and this not only as regards the judge, to whom he refuses the glory of God that the accused confess that which is his due, but also as regards his accuser, who is punished alleged against him, as appears from the words of Josue if he fail to prove his accusation. Hence it is written (Ps. to Achan, “My son, give glory to the Lord God of Israel, 140:4): “Incline not my heart to evil words, to make ex- and confess and tell me what thou hast done, hide it not” cuses in sins”: on which words a gloss says: “Shameless (Joshua 7:19). Therefore it is a mortal sin to lie in order men are wont by lying to deny their guilt when they have to cover one’s guilt. been found out.” And Gregory in expounding Job 31:33, I answer that, Whoever acts against the due order of “If as a man I have hid my sin,” says (Moral. xxii, 15): “It justice, sins mortally, as stated above (q. 59, a. 4). Now it is a common vice of mankind to sin in secret, by lying to belongs to the order of justice that a man should obey his hide the sin that has been committed, and when convicted superior in those matters to which the rights of his author- to aggravate the sin by defending oneself.” 1524 Whether it is lawful for the accused to defend himself with calumnies? IIa IIae q. 69 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem lawful for the accused longs to craftiness, which is exercised by fraud and guile, to defend himself with calumnies. Because, according to as shown above (q. 55, Aa. 3, seqq.). His conduct in civil law (Cod. II, iv, De transact. 18), when a man is the former case is praiseworthy, in the latter sinful. Ac- on trial for his life it is lawful for him to bribe his adver- cordingly it is lawful for the accused to defend himself by sary. Now this is done chiefly by defending oneself with withholding the truth that he is not bound to avow, by suit- calumnies. Therefore the accused who is on trial for his able means, for instance by not answering such questions life does not sin if he defend himself with calumnies. as he is not bound to answer. This is not to defend himself Objection 2. Further, an accuser who is guilty of col- with calumnies, but to escape prudently. But it is unlawful lusion with the accused, is punishable by law (Decret. II, for him, either to utter a falsehood, or to withhold a truth qu. iii, can. Si quem poenit.). Yet no punishment is that he is bound to avow, or to employ guile or fraud, be- imposed on the accused for collusion with the accuser. cause fraud and guile have the force of a lie, and so to use Therefore it would seem lawful for the accused to defend them would be to defend oneself with calumnies. himself with calumnies. Reply to Objection 1. Human laws leave many things Objection 3. Further, it is written (Prov. 14:16): “A unpunished, which according to the Divine judgment are wise man feareth and declineth from evil, the fool leapeth sins, as, for example, simple fornication; because human over and is confident.” Now what is done wisely is no law does not exact perfect virtue from man, for such virtue sin. Therefore no matter how a man declines from evil, he belongs to few and cannot be found in so great a num- does not sin. ber of people as human law has to direct. That a man is On the contrary, In criminal cases an oath has to sometimes unwilling to commit a sin in order to escape be taken against calumnious allegations (Extra, De jura- from the death of the body, the danger of which threatens mento calumniae, cap. Inhaerentes): and this would not the accused who is on trial for his life, is an act of per- be the case if it were lawful to defend oneself with calum- fect virtue, since “death is the most fearful of all temporal nies. Therefore it is not lawful for the accused to defend things” (Ethic. iii, 6). Wherefore if the accused, who is himself with calumnies. on trial for his life, bribes his adversary, he sins indeed by I answer that, It is one thing to withhold the truth, and inducing him to do what is unlawful, yet the civil law does another to utter a falsehood. The former is lawful some- not punish this sin, and in this sense it is said to be lawful. times, for a man is not bound to divulge all truth, but only Reply to Objection 2. If the accuser is guilty of col- such as the judge can and must require of him according to lusion with the accused and the latter is guilty, he incurs the order of justice; as, for instance, when the accused is punishment, and so it is evident that he sins. Wherefore, already disgraced through the commission of some crime, since it is a sin to induce a man to sin, or to take part in or certain indications of his guilt have already been dis- a sin in any way—for the Apostle says (Rom. 1:32), that covered, or again when his guilt is already more or less “they. . . are worthy of death. . . that consent” to those who proven. On the other hand it is never lawful to make a sin—it is evident that the accused also sins if he is guilty false declaration. of collusion with his adversary. Nevertheless according As regards what he may do lawfully, a man can em- to human laws no punishment is inflicted on him, for the ploy either lawful means, and such as are adapted to the reason given above. end in view, which belongs to prudence; or he can use un- Reply to Objection 3. The wise man hides himself lawful means, unsuitable to the proposed end, and this be- not by slandering others but by exercising prudence. Whether it is lawful for the accused to escape judgment by appealing? IIa IIae q. 69 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for the accused is unlawful to appeal from the judges chosen by common to escape judgment by appealing. The Apostle says (Rom. consent. Much less therefore is it lawful to appeal from 13:1): “Let every soul be subject to the higher powers.” ordinary judges. Now the accused by appealing refuses to be subject to a Objection 3. Further, whatever is lawful once is al- higher power, viz. the judge. Therefore he commits a sin. ways lawful. But it is not lawful to appeal after the tenth Objection 2. Further, ordinary authority is more bind- day∗, nor a third time on the same point†. Therefore it ing than that which we choose for ourselves. Now ac- would seem that an appeal is unlawful in itself. cording to the Decretals (II, qu. vi, cap. A judicibus) it On the contrary, Paul appealed to Caesar (Acts 25). ∗ Can. Anteriorum, caus. ii, qu. 6 † Can. Si autem, caus. ii, qu. 6 1525 I answer that, There are two motives for which a unjust.” Hence the Apostle also rebuked those who went man appeals. First through confidence in the justice of his to law before unbelievers (1 Cor. 6:6). cause, seeing that he is unjustly oppressed by the judge, Reply to Objection 2. It is due to a man’s own fault and then it is lawful for him to appeal, because this is a or neglect that, of his own accord, he submits to the judg- prudent means of escape. Hence it is laid down (Decret. ment of one in whose justice he has no confidence. More- II, qu. vi, can. Omnis oppressus): “All those who are over it would seem to point to levity of mind for a man oppressed are free, if they so wish, to appeal to the judg- not to abide by what he has once approved of. Hence it is ment of the priests, and no man may stand in their way.” with reason that the law refuses us the faculty of appealing Secondly, a man appeals in order to cause a delay, lest from the decision of judges of our own choice, who have a just sentence be pronounced against him. This is to de- no power save by virtue of the consent of the litigants. fend oneself calumniously, and is unlawful as stated above On the other hand the authority of an ordinary judge de- (a. 2). For he inflicts an injury both on the judge, whom he pends, not on the consent of those who are subject to his hinders in the exercise of his office, and on his adversary, judgment, but on the authority of the king or prince who whose justice he disturbs as far as he is able. Hence it is appointed him. Hence, as a remedy against his unjust op- laid down (II, qu. vi, can. Omnino puniendus): “Without pression, the law allows one to have recourse to appeal, doubt a man should be punished if his appeal be declared so that even if the judge be at the same time ordinary and unjust.” chosen by the litigants, it is lawful to appeal from his de- Reply to Objection 1. A man should submit to the cision, since seemingly his ordinary authority occasioned lower authority in so far as the latter observes the order of his being chosen as arbitrator. Nor is it to be imputed as the higher authority. If the lower authority departs from a fault to the man who consented to his being arbitrator, the order of the higher, we ought not to submit to it, for without adverting to the fact that he was appointed ordi- instance “if the proconsul order one thing and the emperor nary judge by the prince. another,” according to a gloss on Rom. 13:2. Now when Reply to Objection 3. The equity of the law so guards a judge oppresses anyone unjustly, in this respect he de- the interests of the one party that the other is not op- parts from the order of the higher authority, whereby he is pressed. Thus it allows ten days for appeal to be made, obliged to judge justly. Hence it is lawful for a man who this being considered sufficient time for deliberating on is oppressed unjustly, to have recourse to the authority of the expediency of an appeal. If on the other hand there the higher power, by appealing either before or after sen- were no fixed time limit for appealing, the certainty of tence has been pronounced. And since it is to be presumed judgment would ever be in suspense, so that the other that there is no rectitude where true faith is lacking, it is party would suffer an injury. The reason why it is not unlawful for a Catholic to appeal to an unbelieving judge, allowed to appeal a third time on the same point, is that it according to Decretals II, qu. vi, can. Catholicus: “The is not probable that the judges would fail to judge justly Catholic who appeals to the decision of a judge of another so many times. faith shall be excommunicated, whether his case be just or Whether a man who is condemned to death may lawfully defend himself if he can? IIa IIae q. 69 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that a man who is con- liver them that are led to death: and those that are drawn to demned to death may lawfully defend himself if he can. death forbear not to deliver.” Now a man is under greater For it is always lawful to do that to which nature inclines obligation to himself than to another. Therefore it is law- us, as being of natural right, so to speak. Now, to resist ful for a condemned man to defend himself from being corruption is an inclination of nature not only in men and put to death. animals but also in things devoid of sense. Therefore if he On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 13:2): “He can do so, the accused, after condemnation, may lawfully that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: resist being put to death. and they that resist, purchase to themselves damnation.” Objection 2. Further, just as a man, by resistance, es- Now a condemned man, by defending himself, resists the capes the death to which he has been condemned, so does power in the point of its being ordained by God “for the he by flight. Now it is lawful seemingly to escape death punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of the good”†. by flight, according to Ecclus. 9:18, “Keep thee far from Therefore he sins in defending himself. the man that hath power to kill [and not to quicken]”∗. I answer that, A man may be condemned to death in Therefore it is also lawful for the accused to resist. two ways. First justly, and then it is not lawful for the Objection 3. Further, it is written (Prov. 24:11): “De- condemned to defend himself, because it is lawful for the ∗ The words in the brackets are not in the Vulgate † 1 Pet. 2:14 1526 judge to combat his resistance by force, so that on his part Reply to Objection 2. When a man is condemned the fight is unjust, and consequently without any doubt he to death, he has not to kill himself, but to suffer death: sins. wherefore he is not bound to do anything from which Secondly a man is condemned unjustly: and such death would result, such as to stay in the place whence a sentence is like the violence of robbers, according to he would be led to execution. But he may not resist those Ezech. 22:21, “Her princes in the midst of her are like who lead him to death, in order that he may not suffer wolves ravening the prey to shed blood.” Wherefore even what is just for him to suffer. Even so, if a man were con- as it is lawful to resist robbers, so is it lawful, in a like demned to die of hunger, he does not sin if he partakes case, to resist wicked princes; except perhaps in order to of food brought to him secretly, because to refrain from avoid scandal, whence some grave disturbance might be taking it would be to kill himself. feared to arise. Reply to Objection 3. This saying of the wise man Reply to Objection 1. Reason was given to man that does not direct that one should deliver a man from death he might ensue those things to which his nature inclines, in opposition to the order of justice: wherefore neither not in all cases, but in accordance with the order of rea- should a man deliver himself from death by resisting son. Hence not all self-defense is lawful, but only such as against justice. is accomplished with due moderation. 1527 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 70 Of Injustice with Regard to the Person of the Witness (In Four Articles) We must now consider injustice with regard to the person of the witness. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether a man is bound to give evidence? (2) Whether the evidence of two or three witnesses suffices? (3) Whether a man’s evidence may be rejected without any fault on his part? (4) Whether it is a mortal sin to bear false witness? Whether a man is bound to give evidence? IIa IIae q. 70 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that a man is not bound to is bound to give evidence. Even if his evidence is not give evidence. Augustine say (QQ. Gn. 1:26)∗, that when demanded, he is bound to do what he can to declare the Abraham said of his wife (Gn. 20:2), “She is my sister,” truth to someone who may profit thereby. For it is written he wished the truth to be concealed and not a lie be told. (Ps. 81:4): “Rescue the poor, and deliver the needy from Now, by hiding the truth a man abstains from giving evi- the hand of the sinner”; and (Prov. 24:11): “Deliver them dence. Therefore a man is not bound to give evidence. that are led to death”; and (Rom. 1:32): “They are wor- Objection 2. Further, no man is bound to act deceit- thy of death, not only they that do them, but they also that fully. Now it is written (Prov. 11:13): “He that walketh consent to them that do them,” on which words a gloss deceitfully revealeth secrets, but he that is faithful con- says: “To be silent when one can disprove is to consent.” cealeth the thing committed to him by his friend.” There- In matters pertaining to a man’s condemnation, one is not fore a man is not always bound to give evidence, espe- bound to give evidence, except when one is constrained by cially on matters committed to him as a secret by a friend. a superior in accordance with the order of justice; since if Objection 3. Further, clerics and priests, more than the truth of such a matter be concealed, no particular in- others, are bound to those things that are necessary for jury is inflicted on anyone. Or, if some danger threatens salvation. Yet clerics and priests are forbidden to give ev- the accuser, it matters not since he risked the danger of his idence when a man is on trial for his life. Therefore it is own accord: whereas it is different with the accused, who not necessary for salvation to give evidence. incurs the danger against his will. On the contrary, Augustine† says: “Both he who Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of con- conceals the truth and he who tells a lie are guilty, the for- cealment of the truth in a case when a man is not com- mer because he is unwilling to do good, the latter because pelled by his superior’s authority to declare the truth, and he desires to hurt.” when such concealment is not specially injurious to any I answer that, We must make a distinction in the mat- person. ter of giving evidence: because sometimes a certain man’s Reply to Objection 2. A man should by no means evidence is necessary, and sometimes not. If the necessary give evidence on matters secretly committed to him in evidence is that of a man subject to a superior whom, in confession, because he knows such things, not as man but matters pertaining to justice, he is bound to obey, without as God’s minister: and the sacrament is more binding than doubt he is bound to give evidence on those points which any human precept. But as regards matters committed to are required of him in accordance with the order of justice, man in some other way under secrecy, we must make a for instance on manifest things or when ill-report has pre- distinction. Sometimes they are of such a nature that one ceded. If however he is required to give evidence on other is bound to make them known as soon as they come to points, for instance secret matters, and those of which no our knowledge, for instance if they conduce to the spiri- ill-report has preceded, he is not bound to give evidence. tual or corporal corruption of the community, or to some On the other hand, if his evidence be required by authority grave personal injury, in short any like matter that a man is of a superior whom he is bound to obey, we must make a bound to make known either by giving evidence or by de- distinction: because if his evidence is required in order to nouncing it. Against such a duty a man cannot be obliged deliver a man from an unjust death or any other penalty, to act on the plea that the matter is committed to him under or from false defamation, or some loss, in such cases he secrecy, for he would break the faith he owes to another. ∗ Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 33,34 † Can. Quisquis, caus. xi, qu. 3, cap. Falsidicus; cf. Isidore, Sentent. iii, 55 1528 On the other hand sometimes they are such as one is not ural right. bound to make known, so that one may be under obliga- Reply to Objection 3. It is unbecoming for ministers tion not to do so on account of their being committed to of the altar to slay a man or to cooperate in his slaying, as one under secrecy. In such a case one is by no means stated above (q. 64, a. 4); hence according to the order of bound to make them known, even if the superior should justice they cannot be compelled to give evidence when a command; because to keep faith is of natural right, and a man is on trial for his life. man cannot be commanded to do what is contrary to nat- Whether the evidence of two or three persons suffices? IIa IIae q. 70 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the evidence of two (De Coelo i, 1), “we reckon ‘all’ and ‘whole’ to consist or three persons is not sufficient. For judgment requires of three parts.” Now we have a triple voucher when two certitude. Now certitude of the truth is not obtained by agree with the prosecutor: hence two witnesses are re- the assertions of two or three witnesses, for we read that quired; or for the sake of greater certitude three, which is Naboth was unjustly condemned on the evidence of two the perfect number. Wherefore it is written (Eccles. 4:12): witnesses (3 Kings 21). Therefore the evidence of two or “A threefold cord is not easily broken”: and Augustine, three witnesses does not suffice. commenting on Jn. 8:17, “The testimony of two men is Objection 2. Further, in order for evidence to be cred- true,” says (Tract. xxxvi) that “there is here a mystery by ible it must agree. But frequently the evidence of two or which we are given to understand that Trinity wherein is three disagrees in some point. Therefore it is of no use for perpetual stability of truth.” proving the truth in court. Reply to Objection 1. No matter how great a num- Objection 3. Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. ber of witnesses may be determined, the evidence might iv, can. Praesul.): “A bishop shall not be condemned save sometimes be unjust, since is written (Ex. 23:2): “Thou on the evidence of seventy-two witnesses; nor a cardinal shalt not follow the multitude to do evil.” And yet the fact priest of the Roman Church, unless there be sixty-four that in so many it is not possible to have certitude with- witnesses. Nor a cardinal deacon of the Roman Church, out fear of error, is no reason why we should reject the unless there be twenty-seven witnesses; nor a subdeacon, certitude which can probably be had through two or three an acolyte, an exorcist, a reader or a doorkeeper without witnesses, as stated above. seven witnesses.” Now the sin of one who is of higher dig- Reply to Objection 2. If the witnesses disagree cer- nity is more grievous, and consequently should be treated tain principal circumstances which change the substance more severely. Therefore neither is the evidence of two or of the fact, for instance in time, place, or persons, which three witnesses sufficient for the condemnation of other are chiefly in question, their evidence is of no weight, be- persons. cause if they disagree in such things, each one would seem On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 17:6): “By the to be giving distinct evidence and to be speaking of differ- mouth of two or three witnesses shall he die that is to be ent facts. For instance, one say that a certain thing hap- slain,” and further on (Dt. 19:15): “In the mouth of two or pened at such and such a time or place, while another says three witnesses every word shall stand.” it happened at another time or place, they seem not to be I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. speaking of the same event. The evidence is not weak- i, 3), “we must not expect to find certitude equally in ened if one witness says that he does not remember, while every matter.” For in human acts, on which judgments the other attests to a determinate time or place And if on are passed and evidence required, it is impossible to have such points as these the witness for prosecution and de- demonstrative certitude, because they a about things con- fense disagree altogether, and if they be equal in number tingent and variable. Hence the certitude of probability on either side, and of equal standing, the accused should suffices, such as may reach the truth in the greater num- have the benefit of the doubt, because the judge ought to ber, cases, although it fail in the minority. No it is proba- be more inclined to acquit than to condemn, except per- ble that the assertion of sever witnesses contains the truth haps in favorable suits, such as a pleading for liberty and rather than the assertion of one: and since the accused the like. If, however, the witnesses for the same side dis- is the only one who denies, while several witness affirm agree, the judge ought to use his own discretion in discern- the same as the prosecutor, it is reasonably established ing which side to favor, by considering either the number both by Divine and by human law, that the assertion of of witnesses, or their standing, or the favorableness of the several witnesses should be upheld. Now all multitude suit, or the nature of the business and of the evidence is comprised of three elements, the beginning, the mid- Much more ought the evidence of one witness to be dle and the end. Wherefore, according to the Philosopher rejected if he contradict himself when questioned about 1529 what he has seen and about what he knows; not, however, cernment of the judge. if he contradict himself when questioned about matters of Reply to Objection 3. This passage refers specially opinion and report, since he may be moved to answer dif- to the bishops, priests, deacons and clerics of the Roman ferently according to the different things he has seen and Church, on account of its dignity: and this for three rea- heard. sons. First because in that Church those men ought to be On the other hand if there be discrepancy of evidence promoted whose sanctity makes their evidence of more in circumstances not touching the substance of the fact, weight than that of many witnesses. Secondly, because for instance, whether the weather were cloudy or fine, those who have to judge other men, often have many op- whether the house were painted or not, or such like mat- ponents on account of their justice, wherefore those who ters, such discrepancy does not weaken the evidence, be- give evidence against them should not be believed indis- cause men are not wont to take much notice of such things, criminately, unless they be very numerous. Thirdly, be- wherefore they easily forget them. Indeed, a discrep- cause the condemnation of any one of them would de- ancy of this kind renders the evidence more credible, as tract in public opinion from the dignity and authority of Chrysostom states (Hom. i in Matth.), because if the wit- that Church, a result which would be more fraught with nesses agreed in every point, even in the minutest of de- danger than if one were to tolerate a sinner in that same tails, they would seem to have conspired together to say Church, unless he were very notorious and manifest, so the same thing: but this must be left to the prudent dis- that a grave scandal would arise if he were tolerated. Whether a man’s evidence can be rejected without any fault of his? IIa IIae q. 70 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that a man’s evidence on account of some fault of his, as in the case of unbe- ought not to be rejected except on account of some fault. lievers and persons of evil repute, as well as those who For it a penalty on some that their evidence is inadmis- are guilty of a public crime and who are not allowed even sible, as in the case of those who are branded with in- to accuse; sometimes, without any fault on his part, and famy. Now a penalty must not be inflicted save for a fault. this owing either to a defect in the reason, as in the case Therefore it would seem that no man’s evidence ought to of children, imbeciles and women, or to personal feeling, be rejected save on account of a fault. as in the case of enemies, or persons united by family or Objection 2. Further, “Good is to be presumed of ev- household ties, or again owing to some external condi- ery one, unless the contrary appear”∗. Now it pertains tion, as in the case of poor people, slaves, and those who to a man’s goodness that he should give true evidence. are under authority, concerning whom it is to be presumed Since therefore there can be no proof of the contrary, un- that they might easily be induced to give evidence against less there be some fault of his, it would seem that no man’s the truth. evidence should be rejected save for some fault. Thus it is manifest that a person’s evidence may be Objection 3. Further, no man is rendered unfit for rejected either with or without some fault of his. things necessary for salvation except by some sin. But it Reply to Objection 1. If a person is disqualified from is necessary for salvation to give true evidence, as stated giving evidence this is done as a precaution against false above (a. 1). Therefore no man should be excluded from evidence rather than as a punishment. Hence the argument giving evidence save for some fault. does not prove. On the contrary, Gregory says (Regist. xiii, 44): “As Reply to Objection 2. Good is to be presumed of ev- to the bishop who is said to have been accused by his ser- eryone unless the contrary appear, provided this does not vants, you are to know that they should by no means have threaten injury to another: because, in that case, one ought been heard”: which words are embodied in the Decretals to be careful not to believe everyone readily, according to II, qu. 1, can. Imprimis. 1 Jn. 4:1: “Believe not every spirit.” I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), the author- Reply to Objection 3. To give evidence is necessary ity of evidence is not infallible but probable; and conse- for salvation, provided the witness be competent, and the quently the evidence for one side is weakened by whatever order of justice observed. Hence nothing hinders certain strengthens the probability of the other. Now the reliabil- persons being excused from giving evidence, if they be ity of a person’s evidence is weakened, sometimes indeed considered unfit according to law. ∗ Cap. Dudum, de Praesumpt. 1530 Whether it is always a mortal sin to give false evidence? IIa IIae q. 70 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not always a mor- ness against thy neighbor.” For one does nothing against tal sin to give false evidence. For a person may happen to a man by preventing him from doing someone an injury, give false evidence, through ignorance of fact. Now such but only by taking away his justice. Thirdly, owing to the ignorance excuses from mortal sin. Therefore the giving falsehood itself, by reason of which every lie is a sin: on of false evidence is not always a mortal sin. this account, the giving of false evidence is not always a Objection 2. Further, a lie that benefits someone and mortal sin. hurts no man is officious, and this is not a mortal sin. Reply to Objection 1. In giving evidence a man ought Now sometimes a lie of this kind occurs in false evidence, not to affirm as certain, as though he knew it, that about as when a person gives false evidence in order to save a which he is not certain and he should confess his doubt man from death, or from an unjust sentence which threat- in doubtful terms, and that which he is certain about, in ens him through other false witnesses or a perverse judge. terms of certainty. Owing however to the frailty of the hu- Therefore in such cases it is not a mortal sin to give false man memory, a man sometimes thinks he is certain about evidence. something that is not true; and then if after thinking over Objection 3. Further, a witness is required to take an the matter with due care he deems himself certain about oath in order that he may fear to commit a mortal sin of that false thing, he does not sin mortally if he asserts it, perjury. But this would not be necessary, if it were already because the evidence which he gives is not directly an in- a mortal sin to give false evidence. Therefore the giving tentionally, but accidentally contrary to what he intends. of false evidence is not always mortal sin. Reply to Objection 2. An unjust judgment is not a On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 19:5): “A false judgment, wherefore the false evidence given in an unjust witness shall not be unpunished.” judgment, in order to prevent injustice is not a mortal sin I answer that, False evidence has a threefold defor- by virtue of the judgment, but only by reason of the oath mity. The first is owing to perjury, since witnesses are ad- violated. mitted only on oath and on this count it is always a mor- Reply to Objection 3. Men abhor chiefly those sin tal sin. Secondly, owing to the violation of justice, and that are against God, as being most grievous and among on this account it is a mortal sin generically, even as any them is perjury: whereas they do not abhor so much sins kind of injustice. Hence the prohibition of false evidence against their neighbor. Consequently, for the greater cer- by the precept of the decalogue is expressed in this form titude of evidence, the witness is required to take a oath. when it is said (Ex. 20:16), “Thou shalt not bear false wit- 1531 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 71 Of Injustice in Judgment On the Part of Counsel (In Four Articles) We must now consider the injustice which takes place in judgment on the part of counsel, and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor? (2) Whether certain persons should be prohibited from exercising the office of advocate? (3) Whether an advocate sins by defending an unjust cause? (4) Whether he sins if he accept a fee for defending a suit? Whether an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor? IIa IIae q. 71 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that an advocate is bound other circumstance, by a kind of chance are more closely to defend the suits of the poor. For it is written (Ex. 23:5): united to us.” He says “by reason of place,” because one “If thou see the ass of him that hateth thee lie underneath is not bound to search throughout the world for the needy his burden, thou shalt not pass by, but shall lift him up with that one may succor them; and it suffices to do works of him.” Now no less a danger threatens the poor man whose mercy to those one meets with. Hence it is written (Ex. suit is being unjustly prejudiced, than if his ass were to lie 23:4): “If thou meet thy enemy’s ass going astray, bring it underneath its burden. Therefore an advocate is bound to back to him.” He says also “by reason of time,” because defend the suits of the poor. one is not bound to provide for the future needs of others, Objection 2. Further, Gregory says in a homily (ix and it suffices to succor present needs. Hence it is written in Evang.): “Let him that hath understanding beware lest (1 Jn. 3:17): “He that. . . shall see his brother in need, and he withhold his knowledge; let him that hath abundance shall put up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of wealth watch lest he slacken his merciful bounty; let of God abide in him?” Lastly he says, “or any other cir- him who is a servant to art share his skill with his neigh- cumstance,” because one ought to show kindness to those bor; let him who has an opportunity of speaking with the especially who are by any tie whatever united to us, ac- wealthy plead the cause of the poor: for the slightest gift cording to 1 Tim. 5:8, “If any man have not care of his you have received will be reputed a talent.” Now every own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied man is bound, not to hide but faithfully to dispense the the faith and is worse than an infidel.” talent committed to him; as evidenced by the punishment It may happen however that these circumstances con- inflicted on the servant who hid his talent (Mat. 25:30). cur, and then we have to consider whether this particular Therefore an advocate is bound to plead for the poor. man stands in such a need that it is not easy to see how he Objection 3. Further, the precept about performing can be succored otherwise, and then one is bound to be- works of mercy, being affirmative, is binding according to stow the work of mercy on him. If, however, it is easy to time and place, and this is chiefly in cases of need. Now see how he can be otherwise succored, either by himself, it seems to be a case of need when the suit of a poor man or by some other person still more closely united to him, is being prejudiced. Therefore it seems that in such a case or in a better position to help him, one is not bound so an advocate is bound to defend the poor man’s suit. strictly to help the one in need that it would be a sin not to On the contrary, He that lacks food is no less in need do so: although it would be praiseworthy to do so where than he that lacks an advocate. Yet he that is able to give one is not bound to. Therefore an advocate is not always food is not always bound to feed the needy. Therefore nei- bound to defend the suits of the poor, but only when the ther is an advocate always bound to defend the suits of the aforesaid circumstances concur, else he would have to put poor. aside all other business, and occupy himself entirely in I answer that, Since defense of the poor man’s suit defending the suits of poor people. The same applies to a belongs to the works of mercy, the answer to this inquiry physician with regard to attendance on the sick. is the same as the one given above with regard to the other Reply to Objection 1. So long as the ass lies under works of mercy (q. 32, Aa. 5,9). Now no man is suffi- the burden, there is no means of help in this case, unless cient to bestow a work of mercy on all those who need those who are passing along come to the man’s aid, and it. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, therefore they are bound to help. But they would not be 28), “since one cannot do good to all, we ought to con- so bound if help were possible from another quarter. sider those chiefly who by reason of place, time, or any Reply to Objection 2. A man is bound to make good 1532 use of the talent bestowed on him, according to the oppor-Reply to Objection 3. Not every need is such that it tunities afforded by time, place, and other circumstances, is one’s duty to remedy it, but only such as we have stated as stated above. above. Whether it is fitting that the law should debar certain persons from the office of ad-IIa IIae q. 71 a. 2 vocate? Objection 1. It would seem unfitting for the law to gether debarred from being advocates either in their own debar certain persons from the office of advocate. For no or in another’s cause. The becomingness of exercising man should be debarred from doing works of mercy. Now this office is removed in two ways. First, through a man it belongs to the works of mercy to defend a man’s suit, as being engaged in higher things. Wherefore it is unfitting stated above (a. 1). Therefore no man should be debarred that monks or priests should be advocates in any cause from this office. whatever, or that clerics should plead in a secular court, Objection 2. Further, contrary causes have not, seem- because such persons are engaged in Divine things. Sec- ingly, the same effect. Now to be busy with Divine things ondly, on account of some personal defect, either of body and to be busy about sin are contrary to one another. (for instance a blind man whose attendance in a court of Therefore it is unfitting that some should be debarred from justice would be unbecoming) or of soul, for it ill be- the office of advocate, on account of religion, as monks comes one who has disdained to be just himself, to plead and clerics, while others are debarred on account of sin, for the justice of another. Wherefore it is unbecoming as persons of ill-repute and heretics. that persons of ill repute, unbelievers, and those who have Objection 3. Further, a man should love his neighbor been convicted of grievous crimes should be advocates. as himself. Now it is a duty of love for an advocate to Nevertheless this unbecomingness is outweighed by ne- plead a person’s cause. Therefore it is unfitting that cer- cessity: and for this reason such persons can plead either tain persons should be debarred from pleading the cause their own cause or that of persons closely connected with of others, while they are allowed to advocate their own them. Moreover, clerics can be advocates in the cause of cause. their own church, and monks in the cause of their own On the contrary, According to Decretals III, qu. vii, monastery, if the abbot direct them to do so. can. Infames, many persons are debarred from the office Reply to Objection 1. Certain persons are sometimes of advocate. debarred by unbecomingness, and others by inability from I answer that, In two ways a person is debarred from performing works of mercy: for not all the works of mercy performing a certain act: first because it is impossible are becoming to all persons: thus it ill becomes a fool to to him, secondly because it is unbecoming to him: but, give counsel, or the ignorant to teach. whereas the man to whom a certain act is impossible, is Reply to Objection 2. Just as virtue is destroyed by absolutely debarred from performing it, he to whom an act “too much” and “too little,” so does a person become in- is unbecoming is not debarred altogether, since necessity competent by “more” and “less.” For this reason some, may do away with its unbecomingness. Accordingly some like religious and clerics, are debarred from pleading in are debarred from the office of advocate because it is im- causes, because they are above such an office; and others possible to them through lack of sense—either interior, as because they are less than competent to exercise it, such in the case of madmen and minors—or exterior, as in the as persons of ill-repute and unbelievers. case of the deaf and dumb. For an advocate needs to have Reply to Objection 3. The necessity of pleading the both interior skill so that he may be able to prove the jus- causes of others is not so pressing as the necessity of tice of the cause he defends, and also speech and hearing, pleading one’s own cause, because others are able to help that he may speak and hear what is said to him. Conse- themselves otherwise: hence the comparison fails. quently those who are defective in these points, are alto- Whether an advocate sins by defending an unjust cause? IIa IIae q. 71 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that an advocate does not be praised, if he defends an unjust cause. sin by defending an unjust cause. For just as a physician Objection 2. Further, it is always lawful to desist from proves his skill by healing a desperate disease, so does an committing a sin. Yet an advocate is punished if he throws advocate prove his skill, if he can defend an unjust cause. up his brief (Decret. II, qu. iii, can. Si quem poenit.). Now a physician is praised if he heals a desperate malady. Therefore an advocate does not sin by defending an un- Therefore an advocate also commits no sin, but ought to just cause, when once he has undertaken its defense. 1533 Objection 3. Further, it would seem to be a greater sin cause unknowingly, thinking it just, he is to be excused for an advocate to use unjust means in defense of a just according to the measure in which ignorance is excusable. cause (e.g. by producing false witnesses, or alleging false Reply to Objection 1. The physician injures no man laws), than to defend an unjust cause, since the former is a by undertaking to heal a desperate malady, whereas the sin against the form, the latter against the matter of justice. advocate who accepts service in an unjust cause, unjustly Yet it is seemingly lawful for an advocate to make use of injures the party against whom he pleads unjustly. Hence such underhand means, even as it is lawful for a soldier to the comparison fails. For though he may seem to deserve lay ambushes in a battle. Therefore it would seem that an praise for showing skill in his art, nevertheless he sins by advocate does not sin by defending an unjust cause. reason of injustice in his will, since he abuses his art for On the contrary, It is said (2 Paralip. 19:2): an evil end. “Thou helpest the ungodly. . . and therefore thou didst de- Reply to Objection 2. If an advocate believes from serve. . . the wrath of the Lord.” Now an advocate by de- the outset that the cause is just, and discovers afterwards fending an unjust cause, helps the ungodly. Therefore he while the case is proceeding that it is unjust, he ought not sins and deserves the wrath of the Lord. to throw up his brief in such a way as to help the other I answer that, It is unlawful to cooperate in an evil side, or so as to reveal the secrets of his client to the other deed, by counseling, helping, or in any way consenting, party. But he can and must give up the case, or induce because to counsel or assist an action is, in a way, to do his client to give way, or make some compromise without it, and the Apostle says (Rom. 1:32) that “they. . . are wor- prejudice to the opposing party. thy of death, not only they that do” a sin, “but they also Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 40, a. 3), that consent to them that do” it. Hence it was stated above it is lawful for a soldier, or a general to lay ambushes in (q. 62, a. 7), that all such are bound to restitution. Now a just war, by prudently concealing what he has a mind to it is evident that an advocate provides both assistance and do, but not by means of fraudulent falsehoods, since we counsel to the party for whom he pleads. Wherefore, if should keep faith even with a foe, as Tully says (De offic. knowingly he defends an unjust cause, without doubt he iii, 29). Hence it is lawful for an advocate, in defending sins grievously, and is bound to restitution of the loss un- his case, prudently to conceal whatever might hinder its justly incurred by the other party by reason of the assis- happy issue, but it is unlawful for him to employ any kind tance he has provided. If, however, he defends an unjust of falsehood. Whether it is lawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading? IIa IIae q. 71 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for an advocate and a lawyer his advice.” to take a fee for pleading. Works of mercy should not be I answer that, A man may justly receive payment for done with a view to human remuneration, according to Lk. granting what he is not bound to grant. Now it is evident 14:12, “When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not that an advocate is not always bound to consent to plead, thy friends. . . nor thy neighbors who are rich: lest perhaps or to give advice in other people’s causes. Wherefore, if they also invite thee again, and a recompense be made to he sell his pleading or advice, he does not act against jus- thee.” Now it is a work of mercy to plead another’s cause, tice. The same applies to the physician who attends on a as stated above (a. 1 ). Therefore it is not lawful for an sick person to heal him, and to all like persons; provided, advocate to take payment in money for pleading. however, they take a moderate fee, with due considera- Objection 2. Further, spiritual things are not to be tion for persons, for the matter in hand, for the labor en- bartered with temporal things. But pleading a person’s tailed, and for the custom of the country. If, however, they cause seems to be a spiritual good since it consists in us- wickedly extort an immoderate fee, they sin against jus- ing one’s knowledge of law. Therefore it is not lawful for tice. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.) that an advocate to take a fee for pleading. “it is customary to demand from them restitution of what Objection 3. Further, just as the person of the advo- they have extorted by a wicked excess, but not what has cate concurs towards the pronouncement of the verdict, so been given to them in accordance with a commendable do the persons of the judge and of the witness. Now, ac- custom.” cording to Augustine (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.), “the judge Reply to Objection 1. Man is not bound to do gratu- should not sell a just sentence, nor the witness true ev- itously whatever he can do from motives of mercy: else idence.” Therefore neither can an advocate sell a just no man could lawfully sell anything, since anything may pleading. be given from motives of mercy. But when a man does On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Mace- give a thing out of mercy, he should seek, not a human, don.) that “an advocate may lawfully sell his pleading, but a Divine reward. In like manner an advocate, when 1534 he mercifully pleads the cause of a poor man, should have dence. Now justice and truth do not incline to one side in view not a human but a Divine meed; and yet he is not rather than to the other: and consequently judges receive always bound to give his services gratuitously. out of the public funds a fixed pay for their labor; and Reply to Objection 2. Though knowledge of law is witnesses receive their expenses (not as payment for giv- something spiritual, the use of that knowledge is accom- ing evidence, but as a fee for their labor) either from both plished by the work of the body: hence it is lawful to take parties or from the party by whom they are adduced, be- money in payment of that use, else no craftsman would be cause no man “serveth as a soldier at any time at his own allowed to make profit by his art. charge∗” (1 Cor. 9:7). On the other hand an advocate de- Reply to Objection 3. The judge and witnesses are fends one party only, and so he may lawfully accept fee common to either party, since the judge is bound to pro- from the party he assists. nounce a just verdict, and the witness to give true evi- ∗ Vulg.: ‘Who serveth as a soldier,’ 1535 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 72 Of Reviling (In Four Articles) We must now consider injuries inflicted by words uttered extrajudicially. We shall consider (1) reviling, (2) backbiting, (3) tale bearing, (4) derision, (5) cursing. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What is reviling? (2) Whether every reviling is a mortal sin? (3) Whether one ought to check revilers? (4) Of the origin of reviling. Whether reviling consists in words? IIa IIae q. 72 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that reviling does not con- Wherefore a gloss on Rom. 1:30, “contumelious, proud,” sist in words. Reviling implies some injury inflicted on says: “The contumelious are those who by word or deed one’s neighbor, since it is a kind of injustice. But words revile and shame others.” seem to inflict no injury on one’s neighbor, either in his Reply to Objection 1. Our words, if we consider them person, or in his belongings. Therefore reviling does not in their essence, i.e. as audible sound injure no man, ex- consist in words. cept perhaps by jarring of the ear, as when a person speaks Objection 2. Further, reviling seems to imply dis- too loud. But, considered as signs conveying something honor. But a man can be dishonored or slighted by deeds to the knowledge of others, they may do many kinds of more than by words. Therefore it seems that reviling con- harm. Such is the harm done to a man to the detriment of sists, not in words but in deeds. his honor, or of the respect due to him from others. Hence Objection 3. Further, a dishonor inflicted by words the reviling is greater if one man reproach another in the is called a railing or a taunt. But reviling seems to differ presence of many: and yet there may still be reviling if from railing or taunt. Therefore reviling does not consist he reproach him by himself. in so far as the speaker acts in words. unjustly against the respect due to the hearer. On the contrary, Nothing, save words, is perceived Reply to Objection 2. One man slights another by by the hearing. Now reviling is perceived by the hearing deeds in so far as such deeds cause or signify that which according to Jer. 20:10, “I heard reviling [Douay: ‘con- is against that other man’s honor. In the former case it is tumelies’] on every side.” Therefore reviling consists in not a matter of reviling but of some other kind of injustice, words. of which we have spoken above (Qq. 64,65,66): where as I answer that, Reviling denotes the dishonoring of a in the latter case there is reviling, in so far as deeds have person, and this happens in two ways: for since honor re- the significant force of words. sults from excellence, one person dishonors another, first, Reply to Objection 3. Railing and taunts consist in by depriving him of the excellence for which he is hon- words, even as reviling, because by all of them a man’s ored. This is done by sins of deed, whereof we have spo- faults are exposed to the detriment of his honor. Such ken above (q. 64, seqq.). Secondly, when a man publishes faults are of three kinds. First, there is the fault of guilt, something against another’s honor, thus bringing it to the which is exposed by “reviling” words. Secondly, there knowledge of the latter and of other men. This reviling is the fault of both guilt and punishment, which is ex- properly so called, and is done I some kind of signs. Now, posed by “taunts” [convicium], because “vice” is com- according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), “com- monly spoken of in connection with not only the soul but pared with words all other signs are very few, for words also the body. Hence if one man says spitefully to another have obtained the chief place among men for the purpose that he is blind, he taunts but does not revile him: whereas of expressing whatever the mind conceives.” Hence re- if one man calls another a thief, he not only taunts but also viling, properly speaking consists in words: wherefore, reviles him. Thirdly, a man reproaches another for his in- Isidore says (Etym. x) that a reviler [contumeliosus] “is feriority or indigence, so as to lessen the honor due to him hasty and bursts out [tumet] in injurious words.” Since, for any kind of excellence. This is done by “upbraiding” however, things are also signified by deeds, which on words, and properly speaking, occurs when one spitefully this account have the same significance as words, it fol- reminds a man that one has succored him when he was in lows that reviling in a wider sense extends also to deeds. need. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 20:15): “He will give a 1536 few things and upbraid much.” Nevertheless these terms are sometimes employed one for the other. Whether reviling or railing is a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 72 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that reviling or railing is dishonoring him, but rather perhaps of correcting him or not a mortal sin. For no mortal sin is an act of virtue. Now with some like purpose, he utters a railing or reviling not railing is the act of a virtue, viz. of wittiness eutrapelia∗ formally and essentially, but accidentally and materially, to which it pertains to rail well, according to the Philoso- in so far to wit as he says that which might be a railing pher (Ethic. iv, 8). Therefore railing or reviling is not a or reviling. Hence this may be sometimes a venial sin, mortal sin. and sometimes without any sin at all. Nevertheless there Objection 2. Further, mortal sin is not to be found is need of discretion in such matters, and one should use in perfect men; and yet these sometimes give utterance to such words with moderation, because the railing might be railing or reviling. Thus the Apostle says (Gal. 3:1): “O so grave that being uttered inconsiderately it might dis- senseless Galatians!,” and our Lord said (Lk. 24:25): “O honor the person against whom it is uttered. In such a foolish and slow of heart to believe!” Therefore railing or case a man might commit a mortal sin, even though he reviling is not a mortal sin. did not intend to dishonor the other man: just as were a Objection 3. Further, although that which is a venial man incautiously to injure grievously another by striking sin by reason of its genus may become mortal, that which him in fun, he would not be without blame. is mortal by reason of its genus cannot become venial, as Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to wittiness to utter stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 88, Aa. 4,6). Hence if by reason some slight mockery, not with intent to dishonor or pain of its genus it were a mortal sin to give utterance to railing the person who is the object of the mockery, but rather or reviling, it would follow that it is always a mortal sin. with intent to please and amuse: and this may be without But this is apparently untrue, as may be seen in the case of sin, if the due circumstances be observed. on the other one who utters a reviling word indeliberately or through hand if a man does not shrink from inflicting pain on the slight anger. Therefore reviling or railing is not a mortal object of his witty mockery, so long as he makes others sin, by reason of its genus. laugh, this is sinful, as stated in the passage quoted. On the contrary, Nothing but mortal sin deserves the Reply to Objection 2. Just as it is lawful to strike a eternal punishment of hell. Now railing or reviling de- person, or damnify him in his belongings for the purpose serves the punishment of hell, according to Mat. 5:22, of correction, so too, for the purpose of correction, may “Whosoever shall say to his brother. . . Thou fool, shall be one say a mocking word to a person whom one has to cor- in danger of hell fire.” Therefore railing or reviling is a rect. It is thus that our Lord called the disciples “foolish,” mortal sin. and the Apostle called the Galatians “senseless.” Yet, as I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), words are in- Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19), “sel- jurious to other persons, not as sounds, but as signs, and dom and only when it is very necessary should we have this signification depends on the speaker’s inward inten- recourse to invectives, and then so as to urge God’s ser- tion. Hence, in sins of word, it seems that we ought to vice, not our own.” consider with what intention the words are uttered. Since Reply to Objection 3. Since the sin of railing or revil- then railing or reviling essentially denotes a dishonoring, ing depends on the intention of the utterer, it may happen if the intention of the utterer is to dishonor the other man, to be a venial sin, if it be a slight railing that does not this is properly and essentially to give utterance to rail- inflict much dishonor on a man, and be uttered through ing or reviling: and this is a mortal sin no less than theft lightness of heart or some slight anger, without the fixed or robbery, since a man loves his honor no less than his purpose of dishonoring him, for instance when one in- possessions. If, on the other hand, a man says to another tends by such a word to give but little pain. a railing or reviling word, yet with the intention, not of Whether one ought to suffer oneself to be reviled? IIa IIae q. 72 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that one ought not to suf- reviled, but rather reply to the reviler. fer oneself to be reviled. For he that suffers himself to Objection 2. Further, one ought to love oneself more be reviled, encourages the reviler. But one ought not to than another. Now one ought not to suffer another to be do this. Therefore one ought not to suffer oneself to be reviled, wherefore it is written (Prov. 26:10): “He that ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 60, a. 5 1537 putteth a fool to silence appeaseth anger.” Therefore nei-chiefly for two reasons. First, for the good of the reviler; ther should one suffer oneself to be reviled. namely, that his daring may be checked, and that he may Objection 3. Further, a man is not allowed to revenge not repeat the attempt, according to Prov. 26:5, “Answer himself, for it is said: “Vengeance belongeth to Me, I will a fool according to his folly, lest he imagine himself to be repay”†. Now by submitting to be reviled a man revenges wise.” Secondly, for the good of many who would be pre- himself, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxii, in Ep. ad vented from progressing in virtue on account of our being Rom.): “If thou wilt be revenged, be silent; thou hast dealt reviled. Hence Gregory says (Hom. ix, Super Ezech.): him a fatal blow.” Therefore one ought not by silence to “Those who are so placed that their life should be an ex- submit to reviling words, but rather answer back. ample to others, ought, if possible, to silence their detrac- On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 37:13): “They that tors, lest their preaching be not heard by those who could sought evils to me spoke vain things,” and afterwards (Ps. have heard it, and they continue their evil conduct through 37:14) he says: “But I as a deaf man, heard not; and as a contempt of a good life.” dumb man not opening his mouth.” Reply to Objection 1. The daring of the railing re- I answer that, Just as we need patience in things done viler should be checked with moderation, i.e. as a duty of against us, so do we need it in those said against us. Now charity, and not through lust for one’s own honor. Hence the precepts of patience in those things done against us it is written (Prov. 26:4): “Answer not a fool according to refer to the preparedness of the mind, according to Au- his folly, lest thou be like him.” gustine’s (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19) exposition on Reply to Objection 2. When one man prevents an- our Lord’s precept, “If one strike thee on thy right cheek, other from being reviled there is not the danger of lust for turn to him also the other”∗: that is to say, a man ought one’s own honor as there is when a man defends himself to be prepared to do so if necessary. But he is not always from being reviled: indeed rather would it seem to pro- bound to do this actually: since not even did our Lord do ceed from a sense of charity. so, for when He received a blow, He said: “Why strik- Reply to Objection 3. It would be an act of revenge est thou Me?” (Jn. 18:23). Consequently the same ap- to keep silence with the intention of provoking the reviler plies to the reviling words that are said against us. For we to anger, but it would be praiseworthy to be silent, in order are bound to hold our minds prepared to submit to be re- to give place to anger. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 8:4): viled, if it should be expedient. Nevertheless it sometimes “Strive not with a man that is full of tongue, and heap not behooves us to withstand against being reviled, and this wood upon his fire.” Whether reviling arises from anger? IIa IIae q. 72 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that reviling does not arise viling is closely connected with anger’s end, which is re- from anger. For it is written (Prov. 11:2): “Where pride venge: since the easiest way for the angry man to take is, there shall also be reviling [Douay: ‘reproach’].” But revenge on another is to revile him. Therefore reviling anger is a vice distinct from pride. Therefore reviling does arises chiefly from anger. not arise from anger. Reply to Objection 1. Reviling is not directed to the Objection 2. Further, it is written (Prov. 20:3): “All end of pride which is excellency. Hence reviling does not fools are meddling with revilings [Douay: ‘reproaches’].” arise directly from pride. Nevertheless pride disposes a Now folly is a vice opposed to wisdom, as stated above man to revile, in so far as those who think themselves to (q. 46, a. 1); whereas anger is opposed to meekness. excel, are more prone to despise others and inflict injuries Therefore reviling does not arise from anger. on them, because they are more easily angered, through Objection 3. Further, no sin is diminished by its deeming it an affront to themselves whenever anything is cause. But the sin of reviling is diminished if one gives done against their will. vent to it through anger: for it is a more grievous sin to Reply to Objection 2. According to the Philoso- revile out of hatred than out of anger. Therefore reviling pher (Ethic. vii, 6) “anger listens imperfectly to reason”: does not arise from anger. wherefore an angry man suffers a defect of reason, and in On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that this he is like the foolish man. Hence reviling arises from “anger gives rise to revilings.” folly on account of the latter’s kinship with anger. I answer that, While one sin may arise from various Reply to Objection 3. According to the Philosopher causes, it is nevertheless said to have its source chiefly in (Rhet. ii, 4) “an angry man seeks an open offense, but that one from which it is wont to arise most frequently, he who hates does not worry about this.” Hence reviling through being closely connected with its end. Now re- which denotes a manifest injury belongs to anger rather † Heb. 10:30 ∗ The words as quoted by St. Thomas are a blending of Mat. 5:39 and Lk. 6:29 1538 than to hatred. 1539 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 73 Of Backbiting∗ (In Four Articles) We must now consider backbiting, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What is backbiting? (2) Whether it is a mortal sin? (3) Of its comparison with other sins; (4) Whether it is a sin to listen to backbiting? Whether backbiting is suitably defined as the blackening of another’s character by IIa IIae q. 73 a. 1 secret words? Objection 1. It would seem that backbiting is not as words secretly, he, for his own part, causes his hearers to defined by some†, “the blackening of another’s good name have a bad opinion of the person against whom he speaks. by words uttered in secret.” For “secretly” and “openly” For the backbiter apparently intends and aims at being be- are circumstances that do not constitute the species of a lieved. It is therefore evident that backbiting differs from sin, because it is accidental to a sin that it be known by reviling in two points: first, in the way in which the words many or by few. Now that which does not constitute the are uttered, the reviler speaking openly against someone, species of a sin, does not belong to its essence, and should and the backbiter secretly; secondly, as to the end in view, not be included in its definition. Therefore it does not be- i.e. as regards the injury inflicted, the reviler injuring a long to the essence of backbiting that it should be done by man’s honor, the backbiter injuring his good name. secret words. Reply to Objection 1. In involuntary commutations, Objection 2. Further, the notion of a good name im- to which are reduced all injuries inflicted on our neighbor, plies something known to the public. If, therefore, a per- whether by word or by deed, the kind of sin is differen- son’s good name is blackened by backbiting, this cannot tiated by the circumstances “secretly” and “openly,” be- be done by secret words, but by words uttered openly. cause involuntariness itself is diversified by violence and Objection 3. Further, to detract is to subtract, or to by ignorance, as stated above (q. 65, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 6, diminish something already existing. But sometimes a Aa. 5,8). man’s good name is blackened, even without subtracting Reply to Objection 2. The words of a backbiter are from the truth: for instance, when one reveals the crimes said to be secret, not altogether, but in relation to the per- which a man has in truth committed. Therefore not every son of whom they are said, because they are uttered in his blackening of a good name is backbiting. absence and without his knowledge. On the other hand, On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 10:11): “If the reviler speaks against a man to his face. Wherefore if a serpent bite in silence, he is nothing better that back- a man speaks ill of another in the presence of several, it is biteth.” a case of backbiting if he be absent, but of reviling if he I answer that, Just as one man injures another by deed alone be present: although if a man speak ill of an absent in two ways—openly, as by robbery or by doing him any person to one man alone, he destroys his good name not kind of violence—and secretly, as by theft, or by a crafty altogether but partly. blow, so again one man injures another by words in two Reply to Objection 3. A man is said to backbite [de- ways—in one way, openly, and this is done by reviling trehere] another, not because he detracts from the truth, him, as stated above (q. 72, a. 1)—and in another way se- but because he lessens his good name. This is done some- cretly, and this is done by backbiting. Now from the fact times directly, sometimes indirectly. Directly, in four that one man openly utters words against another man, ways: first, by saying that which is false about him; sec- he would appear to think little of him, so that for this ondly, by stating his sin to be greater than it is; thirdly, by reason he dishonors him, so that reviling is detrimental revealing something unknown about him; fourthly, by as- to the honor of the person reviled. On the other hand, cribing his good deeds to a bad intention. Indirectly, this he that speaks against another secretly, seems to respect is done either by gainsaying his good, or by maliciously rather than slight him, so that he injures directly, not his concealing it, or by diminishing it. honor but his good name, in so far as by uttering such ∗ or Detraction † Albert the Great, Sum. Theol. II, cxvii. 1540 Whether backbiting is a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 73 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that backbiting is not a it happens sometimes that a man utters words, whereby mortal sin. For no act of virtue is a mortal sin. Now, to someone’s good name is tarnished, and yet he does not reveal an unknown sin, which pertains to backbiting, as intend this, but something else. This is not backbiting stated above (a. 1, ad 3), is an act of the virtue of char- strictly and formally speaking, but only materially and ac- ity, whereby a man denounces his brother’s sin in order cidentally as it were. And if such defamatory words be that he may amend: or else it is an act of justice, whereby uttered for the sake of some necessary good, and with at- a man accuses his brother. Therefore backbiting is not a tention to the due circumstances, it is not a sin and cannot mortal sin. be called backbiting. But if they be uttered out of light- Objection 2. Further, a gloss on Prov. 24:21, “Have ness of heart or for some unnecessary motive, it is not a nothing to do with detractors,” says: “The whole human mortal sin, unless perchance the spoken word be of such race is in peril from this vice.” But no mortal sin is to be a grave nature, as to cause a notable injury to a man’s found in the whole of mankind, since many refrain from good name, especially in matters pertaining to his moral mortal sin: whereas they are venial sins that are found in character, because from the very nature of the words this all. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin. would be a mortal sin. And one is bound to restore a man Objection 3. Further, Augustine in a homily On the his good name, no less than any other thing one has taken Fire of Purgatory∗ reckons it a slight sin “to speak ill with- from him, in the manner stated above (q. 62, a. 2) when out hesitation or forethought.” But this pertains to back- we were treating of restitution. biting. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin. Reply to Objection 1. As stated above, it is not back- On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 1:30): “Back- biting to reveal a man’s hidden sin in order that he may biters, hateful to God,” which epithet, according to a mend, whether one denounce it, or accuse him for the gloss, is inserted, “lest it be deemed a slight sin because it good of public justice. consists in words.” Reply to Objection 2. This gloss does not assert I answer that, As stated above (q. 72, a. 2), sins of that backbiting is to be found throughout the whole of word should be judged chiefly from the intention of the mankind, but “almost,” both because “the number of fools speaker. Now backbiting by its very nature aims at black- is infinite,”† and few are they that walk in the way of sal- ening a man’s good name. Wherefore, properly speaking, vation,‡ and because there are few or none at all who do to backbite is to speak ill of an absent person in order to not at times speak from lightness of heart, so as to injure blacken his good name. Now it is a very grave matter someone’s good name at least slightly, for it is written to blacken a man’s good name, because of all temporal (James 3:2): “If any man offend not in word, the same is things a man’s good name seems the most precious, since a perfect man.” for lack of it he is hindered from doing many things well. Reply to Objection 3. Augustine is referring to the For this reason it is written (Ecclus. 41:15): “Take care of case when a man utters a slight evil about someone, not a good name, for this shall continue with thee, more than intending to injure him, but through lightness of heart or a thousand treasures precious and great.” Therefore back- a slip of the tongue. biting, properly speaking, is a mortal sin. Nevertheless Whether backbiting is the gravest of all sins committed against one’s neighbor? IIa IIae q. 73 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that backbiting is the is absolutely the gravest of all. gravest of all sins committed against one’s neighbor. Be- Objection 2. Further, backbiting is apparently a cause a gloss on Ps. 108:4, “Instead of making me a return graver sin than reviling, because a man can withstand re- of love they detracted me,” a gloss says: “Those who de- viling, but not a secret backbiting. Now backbiting is tract Christ in His members and slay the souls of future seemingly a graver sin than adultery, because adultery believers are more guilty than those who killed the flesh unites two persons in one flesh, whereas reviling severs that was soon to rise again.” From this it seems to fol- utterly those who were united. Therefore backbiting is low that backbiting is by so much a graver sin than mur- more grievous than adultery: and yet of all other sins a der, as it is a graver matter to kill the soul than to kill the man commits against his neighbor, adultery is most grave. body. Now murder is the gravest of the other sins that are Objection 3. Further, reviling arises from anger, while committed against one’s neighbor. Therefore backbiting backbiting arises from envy, according to Gregory (Moral. ∗ Serm. civ in the appendix to St. Augustine’s work † Eccles. 1:15 ‡ Cf. Mat. 7:14 1541 xxxi, 45). But envy is a graver sin than anger. Therefore deliberately than if he sins through weakness or careless-backbiting is a graver sin than reviling; and so the same ness. In this respect sins of word have a certain levity, in conclusion follows as before. so far as they are apt to occur through a slip of the tongue, Objection 4. Further, the gravity of a sin is measured and without much forethought. by the gravity of the defect that it causes. Now backbit- Reply to Objection 1. Those who detract Christ by ing causes a most grievous defect, viz. blindness of mind. hindering the faith of His members, disparage His God- For Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 2): “What else do back- head, which is the foundation of our faith. Wherefore this biters but blow on the dust and stir up the dirt into their is not simple backbiting but blasphemy. eyes, so that the more they breathe of detraction, the less Reply to Objection 2. Reviling is a more grievous sin they see of the truth?” Therefore backbiting is the most than backbiting, in as much as it implies greater contempt grievous sin committed against one’s neighbor. of one’s neighbor: even as robbery is a graver sin than On the contrary, It is more grievous to sin by deed theft, as stated above (q. 66, a. 9). Yet reviling is not a than by word. But backbiting is a sin of word, while adul- more grievous sin than adultery. For the gravity of adul- tery, murder, and theft are sins of deed. Therefore back- tery is measured, not from its being a union of bodies, biting is not graver than the other sins committed against but from being a disorder in human generation. More- one’s neighbor. over the reviler is not the sufficient cause of unfriendli- I answer that, The essential gravity of sins commit- ness in another man, but is only the occasional cause of ted against one’s neighbor must be weighed by the injury division among those who were united, in so far, to wit, they inflict on him, since it is thence that they derive their as by declaring the evils of another, he for his own part sinful nature. Now the greater the good taken away, the severs that man from the friendship of other men, though greater the injury. And while man’s good is threefold, they are not forced by his words to do so. Accordingly a namely the good of his soul, the good of his body, and the backbiter is a murderer “occasionally,” since by his words good of external things; the good of the soul, which is the he gives another man an occasion for hating or despising greatest of all, cannot be taken from him by another save his neighbor. For this reason it is stated in the Epistle of as an occasional cause, for instance by an evil persuasion, Clement∗, that “backbiters are murderers,” i.e. occasion- which does not induce necessity. On the other hand the ally; because “he that hateth his brother is a murderer” (1 two latter goods, viz. of the body and of external things, Jn. 3:15). can be taken away by violence. Since, however, the goods Reply to Objection 3. Anger seeks openly to be of the body excel the goods of external things, those sins avenged, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2): wherefore which injure a man’s body are more grievous than those backbiting which takes place in secret, is not the daughter which injure his external things. Consequently, among of anger, as reviling is, but rather of envy, which strives other sins committed against one’s neighbor, murder is the by any means to lessen one’s neighbor’s glory. Nor does most grievous, since it deprives man of the life which he it follow from this that backbiting is more grievous than already possesses: after this comes adultery, which is con- reviling: since a lesser vice can give rise to a greater sin, trary to the right order of human generation, whereby man just as anger gives birth to murder and blasphemy. For the enters upon life. In the last place come external goods, origin of a sin depends on its inclination to an end, i.e. on among which a man’s good name takes precedence of the thing to which the sin turns, whereas the gravity of a wealth because it is more akin to spiritual goods, where- sin depends on what it turns away from. fore it is written (Prov. 22:1): “A good name is better than Reply to Objection 4. Since “a man rejoiceth in the great riches.” Therefore backbiting according to its genus sentence of his mouth” (Prov. 15:23), it follows that a is a more grievous sin than theft, but is less grievous than backbiter more and more loves and believes what he says, murder or adultery. Nevertheless the order may differ by and consequently more and more hates his neighbor, and reason of aggravating or extenuating circumstances. thus his knowledge of the truth becomes less and less. The accidental gravity of a sin is to be considered in This effect however may also result from other sins per- relation to the sinner, who sins more grievously, if he sins taining to hate of one’s neighbor. Whether it is a grave sin for the listener to suffer the backbiter? IIa IIae q. 73 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the listener who suf- Gregory says (Hom. ix, super Ezech): “Just as we ought fers a backbiter does not sin grievously. For a man is not not to incite the tongue of backbiters, lest they perish, so under greater obligations to others than to himself. But it ought we to suffer them with equanimity when they have is praiseworthy for a man to suffer his own backbiters: for been incited by their own wickedness, in order that our ∗ Ad Jacob. Ep. i 1542 merit may be the greater.” Therefore a man does not sin if indeed, but much less than the backbiter, and, as a rule he does not withstand those who backbite others. venially. Sometimes too this may be a mortal sin, either Objection 2. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:30): “In because it is his official duty to cor. rect the backbiter, or no wise speak against the truth.” Now sometimes a per- by reason of some consequent danger; or on account of son tells the truth while backbiting, as stated above (a. 1, the radical reason for which human fear may sometimes ad 3). Therefore it seems that one is not always bound to be a mortal sin, as stated above (q. 19, a. 3). withstand a backbiter. Reply to Objection 1. No man hears himself back- Objection 3. Further, no man should hinder what is bitten, because when a man is spoken evil of in his hear- profitable to others. Now backbiting is often profitable ing, it is not backbiting, properly speaking, but reviling, as to those who are backbitten: for Pope Pius∗ says†: “Not stated above (a. 1, ad 2). Yet it is possible for the detrac- unfrequently backbiting is directed against good persons, tions uttered against a person to come to his knowledge with the result that those who have been unduly exalted through others telling him, and then it is left to his dis- through the flattery of their kindred, or the favor of others, cretion whether he will suffer their detriment to his good are humbled by backbiting.” Therefore one ought not to name, unless this endanger the good of others, as stated withstand backbiters. above (q. 72, a. 3). Wherefore his patience may deserve On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): commendation for as much as he suffers patiently being “Take care not to have an itching tongue, nor tingling ears, detracted himself. But it is not left to his discretion to per- that is, neither detract others nor listen to backbiters.” mit an injury to be done to another’s good name, hence I answer that, According to the Apostle (Rom. 1:32), he is accounted guilty if he fails to resist when he can, for they “are worthy of death. . . not only they that” commit the same reason whereby a man is bound to raise another sins, “but they also that consent to them that do them.” man’s ass lying “underneath his burden,” as commanded Now this happens in two ways. First, directly, when, to in Dt. 21:4‡. wit, one man induces another to sin, or when the sin is Reply to Objection 2. One ought not always to with- pleasing to him: secondly, indirectly, that is, if he does stand a backbiter by endeavoring to convince him of false- not withstand him when he might do so, and this happens hood, especially if one knows that he is speaking the truth: sometimes, not because the sin is pleasing to him, but on rather ought one to reprove him with words, for that he account of some human fear. sins in backbiting his brother, or at least by our pained Accordingly we must say that if a man list ens to back- demeanor show him that we are displeased with his back- biting without resisting it, he seems to consent to the back- biting, because according to Prov. 25:23, “the north wind biter, so that he becomes a participator in his sin. And if driveth away rain, as doth a sad countenance a backbiting he induces him to backbite, or at least if the detraction be tongue.” pleasing to him on account of his hatred of the person de- Reply to Objection 3. The profit one derives from tracted, he sins no less than the detractor, and sometimes being backbitten is due, not to the intention of the back- more. Wherefore Bernard says (De Consid. ii, 13): “It biter, but to the ordinance of God Who produces good out is difficult to say which is the more to be condemned the of every evil. Hence we should none the less withstand backbiter or he that listens to backbiting.” If however the backbiters, just as those who rob or oppress others, even sin is not pleasing to him, and he fails to withstand the though the oppressed and the robbed may gain merit by backbiter, through fear negligence, or even shame, he sins patience. ∗ St. Pius I † Append. Grat. ad can. Oves, caus. vi, qu. 1 ‡ Ex. 23:5 1543 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 74 Of Tale-Bearing∗ (In Two Articles) We must now consider tale-bearing: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting? (2) Which of the two is the more grievous? Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting? IIa IIae q. 74 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that tale-bearing is not a forward those evils especially about his neighbor which distinct sin from backbiting. Isidore says (Etym. x): “The are likely to defame him, or at least to depreciate his good susurro [tale-bearer] takes his name from the sound of his name: whereas a tale-bearer intends to sever friendship, as speech, for he speaks disparagingly not to the face but into appears from the gloss quoted above and from the saying the ear.” But to speak of another disparagingly belongs of Prov. 26:20, “Where the tale-bearer is taken away, con- to backbiting. Therefore tale-bearing is not a distinct sin tentions shall cease.” Hence it is that a tale-bearer speaks from backbiting. such ill about his neighbors as may stir his hearer’s mind Objection 2. Further, it is written (Lev. 19:16): “Thou against them, according to Ecclus. 28:11, “A sinful man shalt not be an informer [Douay: ‘a detractor’] nor a tale- will trouble his friends, and bring in debate in the midst bearer [Douay: ‘whisperer’] among the people.” But an of them that are at peace.” informer is apparently the same as a backbiter. Therefore Reply to Objection 1. A tale-bearer is called a back- neither does tale-bearing differ from backbiting. biter in so far as he speaks ill of another; yet he differs Objection 3. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 28:15): from a backbiter since he intends not to speak ill as such, “The tale-bearer [Douay: ‘whisperer’] and the double- but to say anything that may stir one man against another, tongued is accursed.” But a double-tongued man is appar- though it be good simply, and yet has a semblance of evil ently the same as a backbiter, because a backbiter speaks through being unpleasant to the hearer. with a double tongue, with one in your absence, with an- Reply to Objection 2. An informer differs from a other in your presence. Therefore a tale-bearer is the same tale-bearer and a backbiter, for an informer is one who as a backbiter. charges others publicly with crimes, either by accusing or On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 1:29,30, “Tale- by railing them, which does not apply to a backbiter or bearers, backbiters [Douay: ‘whisperers, detractors’]” tale-bearer. says: “Tale-bearers sow discord among friends; back- Reply to Objection 3. A double-tongued person is biters deny or disparage others’ good points.” properly speaking a tale-bearer. For since friendship is I answer that, The tale-bearer and the backbiter agree between two, the tale-bearer strives to sever friendship on in matter, and also in form or mode of speaking, since both sides. Hence he employs a double tongue towards they both speak evil secretly of their neighbor: and for two persons, by speaking ill of one to the other: wherefore this reason these terms are sometimes used one for the it is written (Ecclus. 28:15): “The tale-bearer [Douay: other. Hence a gloss on Ecclus. 5:16, “Be not called a ‘whisperer’] and the double-tongued is accursed,” and tale-bearer [Douay: ‘whisperer’]” says: “i.e. a backbiter.” then it is added, “for he hath troubled many that were They differ however in end, because the backbiter intends peace.” to blacken his neighbor’s good name, wherefore he brings Whether backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing? IIa IIae q. 74 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that backbiting is a graver they are unpleasant to the hearer. Therefore backbiting is sin than tale-bearing. For sins of word consist in speaking a graver sin than tale-bearing. evil. Now a backbiter speaks of his neighbor things that Objection 2. Further, he that deprives. a man of his are evil simply, for such things lead to the loss or depre- good name, deprives him not merely of one friend, but ciation of his good name: whereas a tale-bearer is only of many, because everyone is minded to scorn the friend- intent on saying what is apparently evil, because to wit ship of a person with a bad name. Hence it is reproached ∗ ‘Susurratio,’ i.e. Whispering † King Josaphat 1544 against a certain individual† (2 Paralip 19:2): “Thou art most necessary to him that he may be fitted for friendship. joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord.” But Therefore tale-bearing is a greater sin than backbiting or tale-bearing deprives one of only one friend. Therefore even reviling, because a friend is better than honor, and backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing. to be loved is better than to be honored, according to the Objection 3. Further, it is written (James Philosopher (Ethic. viii). 4:11): “He that backbiteth [Douay:,‘detracteth’] his Reply to Objection 1. The species and gravity of a brother. . . detracteth the law,” and consequently God the sin depend on the end rather than on the material object, giver of the law. Wherefore the sin of backbiting seems wherefore, by reason of its end, tale-bearing is worse than to be a sin against God, which is most grievous, as stated backbiting, although sometimes the backbiter says worse above (q. 20, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 73, a. 3). On the other hand things. the sin of tale-bearing is against one’s neighbor. Therefore Reply to Objection 2. A good name is a disposition the sin of backbiting is graver than the sin of tale-bearing. for friendship, and a bad name is a disposition for enmity. On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 5:17): “An evil But a disposition falls short of the thing for which it dis- mark of disgrace is upon the double-tongued; but to the poses. Hence to do anything that leads to a disposition tale-bearer [Douay: ‘whisperer’] hatred, and enmity, and for enmity is a less grievous sin than to do what conduces reproach.” directly to enmity. I answer that, As stated above (q. 73, a. 3; Ia IIae, Reply to Objection 3. He that backbites his brother, q. 73, a. 8), sins against one’s neighbor are the more seems to detract the law, in so far as he despises the pre- grievous, according as they inflict a greater injury on him: cept of love for one’s neighbor: while he that strives to and an injury is so much the greater, according to the sever friendship seems to act more directly against this greatness of the good which it takes away. Now of all precept. Hence the latter sin is more specially against one’s external goods a friend takes the first place, since God, because “God is charity” (1 Jn. 4:16), and for this “no man can live without friends,” as the Philosopher de- reason it is written (Prov. 6:16): “Six things there are, clares (Ethic. viii, 1). Hence it is written (Ecclus. 6:15): which the Lord hateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth,” “Nothing can be compared to a faithful friend.” Again, and the seventh is “he (Prov. 6:19) that soweth discord a man’s good name whereof backbiting deprives him, is among brethren.” 1545 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 75 Of Derision∗ (In Two Articles) We must now speak of derision, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether derision is a special sin distinct from the other sins whereby one’s neighbor is injured by words? (2) Whether derision is a mortal sin? Whether derision is a special sin distinct from those already mentioned? IIa IIae q. 75 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that derision is not a spe- of derision is distinct from the foregoing sins. cial sin distinct from those mentioned above. For laughing Reply to Objection 1. Laughing to scorn and deri- to scorn is apparently the same as derision. But laughing sion agree as to the end but differ in mode, because deri- to scorn pertains to reviling. Therefore derision would sion is done with the “mouth,” i.e. by words and laughter, seem not to differ from reviling. while laughing to scorn is done by wrinkling the nose, as Objection 2. Further, no man is derided except for a gloss says on Ps. 2:4, “He that dwelleth in heaven shall something reprehensible which puts him to shame. Now laugh at them”: and such a distinction does not differenti- such are sins; and if they be imputed to a person publicly, ate the species. Yet they both differ from reviling, as being it is a case of reviling, if privately, it amounts to backbit- shamed differs from being dishonored: for to be ashamed ing or tale-bearing. Therefore derision is not distinct from is “to fear dishonor,” as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. the foregoing vices. ii, 15). Objection 3. Further, sins of this kind are distin- Reply to Objection 2. For doing a virtuous deed a guished by the injury they inflict on one’s neighbor. Now man deserves both respect and a good name in the eyes the injury inflicted on a man by derision affects either his of others, and in his own eyes the glory of a good con- honor, or his good name, or is detrimental to his friend- science, according to 2 Cor. 1:12, “Our glory is this, the ship. Therefore derision is not a sin distinct from the fore- testimony of our conscience.” Hence, on the other hand, going. for doing a reprehensible, i.e. a vicious action, a man for- On the contrary, Derision is done in jest, wherefore feits his honor and good name in the eyes of others—and it is described as “making fun.” Now all the foregoing are for this purpose the reviler and the backbiter speak of an- done seriously and not in jest. Therefore derision differs other person—while in his own eyes, he loses the glory from all of them. of his conscience through being confused and ashamed at I answer that, As stated above (q. 72, a. 2), sins of reprehensible deeds being imputed to him—and for this word should be weighed chiefly by the intention of the purpose the derider speaks ill of him. It is accordingly speaker, wherefore these sins are differentiated according evident that derision agrees with the foregoing vices as to to the various intentions of those who speak against an- the matter but differs as to the end. other. Now just as the railer intends to injure the honor Reply to Objection 3. A secure and calm conscience of the person he rails, the backbiter to depreciate a good is a great good, according to Prov. 15:15, “A secure mind name, and the tale-bearer to destroy friendship, so too the is like a continual feast.” Wherefore he that disturbs an- derider intends to shame the person he derides. And since other’s conscience by confounding him inflicts a special this end is distinct from the others, it follows that the sin injury on him: hence derision is a special kind of sin. Whether derision can be a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 75 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that derision cannot be a Objection 2. Further, the greatest derision would ap- mortal sin. Every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But pear to be that which is done as an injury to God. But derision does not seem contrary to charity, for sometimes derision is not always a mortal sin when it tends to the in- it takes place in jest among friends, wherefore it is known jury of God: else it would be a mortal sin to relapse into a as “making fun.” Therefore derision cannot be a mortal venial sin of which one has repented. For Isidore says (De sin. Sum. Bon. ii, 16) that “he who continues to do what he ∗ or Mockery 1546 has repented of, is a derider and not a penitent.” It would and all the more grievous according as a greater respect is likewise follow that all hypocrisy is a mortal sin, because, due to the person derided. according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 15) “the ostrich signi- Consequently it is an exceedingly grievous sin to de- fies the hypocrite, who derides the horse, i.e. the just man, ride God and the things of God, according to Is. 37:23, and his rider, i.e. God.” Therefore derision is not a mortal “Whom hast thou reproached, and whom hast thou blas- sin. phemed, and against whom hast thou exalted thy voice?” Objection 3. Further, reviling and backbiting seem to and he replies: “Against the Holy One of Israel.” In the be graver sins than derision, because it is more to do a second place comes derision of one’s parents, wherefore thing seriously than in jest. But not all backbiting or re- it is written (Prov. 30:17): “The eye that mocketh at his viling is a mortal sin. Much less therefore is derision a father, and that despiseth the labor of his mother in bear- mortal sin. ing him, let the ravens of the brooks pick it out, and the On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 3:34): “He de- young eagles eat it.” Further, the derision of good per- rideth [Vulg.: ‘shall scorn’] the scorners.” But God’s deri- sons is grievous, because honor is the reward of virtue, sion is eternal punishment for mortal sin, as appears from and against this it is written (Job 12:4): “The simplicity the words of Ps. 2:4, “He that dwelleth in heaven shall of the just man is laughed to scorn.” Such like derision laugh at them.” Therefore derision is a mortal sin. does very much harm: because it turns men away from I answer that, The object of derision is always some good deeds, according to Gregory (Moral. xx, 14), “Who evil or defect. Now when an evil is great, it is taken, not when they perceive any good points appearing in the acts in jest, but seriously: consequently if it is taken in jest or of others, directly pluck them up with the hand of a mis- turned to ridicule (whence the terms ‘derision’ and ‘jest- chievous reviling.” ing’), this is because it is considered to be slight. Now an Reply to Objection 1. Jesting implies nothing con- evil may be considered to be slight in two ways: first, in trary to charity in relation to the person with whom one itself, secondly, in relation to the person. When anyone jests, but it may imply something against charity in rela- makes game or fun of another’s evil or defect, because tion to the person who is the object of the jest, on account it is a slight evil in itself, this is a venial sin by reason of contempt, as stated above. of its genus. on the other hand this defect may be con- Reply to Objection 2. Neither he that relapses into sidered as a slight evil in relation to the person, just as a sin of which he has repented, nor a hypocrite, derides we are wont to think little of the defects of children and God explicitly, but implicitly, in so far as either’s behav- imbeciles: and then to make game or fun of a person, is ior is like a derider’s. Nor is it true that to commit a venial to scorn him altogether, and to think him so despicable sin is to relapse or dissimulate altogether, but only dispos- that his misfortune troubles us not one whit, but is held itively and imperfectly. as an object of derision. In this way derision is a mortal Reply to Objection 3. Derision considered in itself sin, and more grievous than reviling, which is also done is less grievous than backbiting or reviling, because it openly: because the reviler would seem to take another’s does not imply contempt, but jest. Sometimes however evil seriously; whereas the derider does so in fun, and so it includes greater contempt than reviling does, as stated would seem the more to despise and dishonor the other above, and then it is a grave sin. man. Wherefore, in this sense, derision is a grievous sin, 1547 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 76 Of Cursing (In Four Articles) We must now consider cursing. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether one may lawfully curse another? (2) Whether one may lawfully curse an irrational creature? (3) Whether cursing is a mortal sin? (4) Of its comparison with other sins. Whether it is lawful to curse anyone? IIa IIae q. 76 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem unlawful to curse any- of cause, and this belongs to God first and foremost, since one. For it is unlawful to disregard the command of the He made all things by His word, according to Ps. 32:9, Apostle in whom Christ spoke, according to 2 Cor. 13:3. “He spoke and they were made”; while secondarily it be- Now he commanded (Rom. 12:14), “Bless and curse not.” longs to man, who, by his word, commands others and Therefore it is not lawful to curse anyone. thus moves them to do something: it is for this purpose Objection 2. Further, all are bound to bless God, ac- that we employ verbs in the imperative mood. Thirdly, cording to Dan. 3:82, “O ye sons of men, bless the Lord.” “speaking” is related to the thing spoken by expressing Now the same mouth cannot both bless God and curse the sentiments of one who desires that which is expressed man, as proved in the third chapter of James. Therefore in words; and for this purpose we employ the verb in the no man may lawfully curse another man. optative mood. Objection 3. Further, he that curses another would Accordingly we may omit the first kind of evil speak- seem to wish him some evil either of fault or of punish- ing which is by way of simple assertion of evil, and con- ment, since a curse appears to be a kind of imprecation. sider the other two kinds. And here we must observe that But it is not lawful to wish ill to anyone, indeed we are to do something and to will it are consequent on one an- bound to pray that all may be delivered from evil. There- other in the matter of goodness and wickedness, as shown fore it is unlawful for any man to curse. above ( Ia IIae, q. 20, a. 3). Hence in these two ways of Objection 4. Further, the devil exceeds all in malice evil speaking, by way of command and by way of desire, on account of his obstinacy. But it is not lawful to curse there is the same aspect of lawfulness and unlawfulness, the devil, as neither is it lawful to curse oneself; for it is for if a man commands or desires another’s evil, as evil, written (Ecclus. 21:30): “While the ungodly curseth the being intent on the evil itself, then evil speaking will be devil, he curseth his own soul.” Much less therefore is it unlawful in both ways, and this is what is meant by curs- lawful to curse a man. ing. On the other hand if a man commands or desires Objection 5. Further, a gloss on Num. 23:8, “How another’s evil under the aspect of good, it is lawful; and it shall I curse whom God hath not cursed?” says: “There may be called cursing, not strictly speaking, but acciden- cannot be a just cause for cursing a sinner if one be igno- tally, because the chief intention of the speaker is directed rant of his sentiments.” Now one man cannot know an- not to evil but to good. other man’s sentiments, nor whether he is cursed by God. Now evil may be spoken, by commanding or desiring Therefore no man may lawfully curse another. it, under the aspect of a twofold good. Sometimes under On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 27:26): “Cursed the aspect of just, and thus a judge lawfully curses a man be he that abideth not in the words of this law.” Moreover whom he condemns to a just penalty: thus too the Church Eliseus cursed the little boys who mocked him (4 Kings curses by pronouncing anathema. In the same way the 2:24). prophets in the Scriptures sometimes call down evils on I answer that, To curse [maledicere] is the same as to sinners, as though conforming their will to Divine justice, speak ill [malum dicere]. Now “speaking” has a threefold although such like imprecation may be taken by way of relation to the thing spoken. First, by way of assertion, foretelling. Sometimes evil is spoken under the aspect of as when a thing is expressed in the indicative mood: in useful, as when one wishes a sinner to suffer sickness or this way “maledicere” signifies simply to tell someone of hindrance of some kind, either that he may himself re- another’s evil, and this pertains to backbiting, wherefore form, or at least that he may cease from harming others. tellers of evil [maledici] are sometimes called backbiters. Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle forbids cursing Secondly, speaking is related to the thing spoken, by way strictly so called with an evil intent: and the same answer 1548 applies to the Second Objection. curses the devil on account of his guilt, for the same rea- Reply to Objection 3. To wish another man evil un- son he judges himself worthy of being cursed; and in this der the aspect of good, is not opposed to the sentiment sense he is said to curse his own soul. whereby one wishes him good simply, in fact rather is it Reply to Objection 5. Although the sinner’s senti- in conformity therewith. ments cannot be perceived in themselves, they can be per- Reply to Objection 4. In the devil both nature and ceived through some manifest sin, which has to be pun- guilt must be considered. His nature indeed is good and is ished. Likewise although it is not possible to know whom from God nor is it lawful to curse it. On the other hand his God curses in respect of final reprobation, it is possible to guilt is deserving of being cursed, according to Job 3:8, know who is accursed of God in respect of being guilty of “Let them curse it who curse the day.” Yet when a sinner present sin. Whether it is lawful to curse an irrational creature? IIa IIae q. 76 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that it is unlawful to curse to the rational creature in several ways. First by way of an irrational creature. Cursing would seem to be lawful ministration, in so far as irrational creatures minister to chiefly in its relation to punishment. Now irrational crea- the needs of man. In this sense the Lord said to man (Gn. tures are not competent subjects either of guilt or of pun- 3:17): “Cursed is the earth in thy work,” so that its bar- ishment. Therefore it is unlawful to curse them. renness would be a punishment to man. Thus also David Objection 2. Further, in an irrational creature there is cursed the mountains of Gelboe, according to Gregory’s nothing but the nature which God made. But it is unlaw- expounding (Moral. iv, 3). Again the irrational creature ful to curse this even in the devil, as stated above (a. 1). is related to the rational creature by way of signification: Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse an irrational crea- and thus our Lord cursed the fig tree in signification of ture. Judea. Thirdly, the irrational creature is related to rational Objection 3. Further, irrational creatures are either creatures as something containing them, namely by way stable, as bodies, or transient, as the seasons. Now, ac- of time or place: and thus Job cursed the day of his birth, cording to Gregory (Moral. iv, 2), “it is useless to curse on account of the original sin which he contracted in birth, what does not exist, and wicked to curse what exists.” and on account of the consequent penalties. In this sense Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse an irrational crea- also we may understand David to have cursed the moun- ture. tains of Gelboe, as we read in 2 Kings 1:21, namely on On the contrary, our Lord cursed the fig tree, as re- account of the people slaughtered there. lated in Mat. 21:19; and Job cursed his day, according to But to curse irrational beings, considered as creatures Job 3:1. of God, is a sin of blasphemy; while to curse them con- I answer that, Benediction and malediction, properly sidered in themselves is idle and vain and consequently speaking, regard things to which good or evil may hap- unlawful. pen, viz. rational creatures: while good and evil are said From this the Replies to the objections may easily be to happen to irrational creatures in relation to the rational gathered. creature for whose sake they are. Now they are related Whether cursing is a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 76 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that cursing is not a mor- On the contrary, Nothing save mortal sin excludes tal sin. For Augustine in a homily On the Fire of Purga- one from the kingdom of God. But cursing excludes from tory∗ reckons cursing among slight sins. But such sins are the kingdom of God, according to 1 Cor. 6:10, “Nor curs- venial. Therefore cursing is not a mortal but a venial Sin. ers [Douay: ‘railers’], nor extortioners shall possess the Objection 2. Further, that which proceeds from a kingdom of God.” Therefore cursing is a mortal sin. slight movement of the mind does not seem to be gener- I answer that, The evil words of which we are speak- ically a mortal sin. But cursing sometimes arises from a ing now are those whereby evil is uttered against someone slight movement. Therefore cursing is not a mortal sin. by way of command or desire. Now to wish evil to another Objection 3. Further, evil deeds are worse than evil man, or to conduce to that evil by commanding it, is, of words. But evil deeds are not always mortal sins. Much its very nature, contrary to charity whereby we love our less therefore is cursing a mortal sin. neighbor by desiring his good. Consequently it is a mor- ∗ Serm. civ in the appendix of St. Augustine’s works 1549 tal sin, according to its genus, and so much the graver, sentiments of the person who utters the curse; because he as the person whom we curse has a greater claim on our may say such words through some slight movement, or in love and respect. Hence it is written (Lev. 20:9): “He that jest, or without deliberation, and sins of word should be curseth his father, or mother, dying let him die.” weighed chiefly with regard to the speaker’s intention, as It may happen however that the word uttered in curs- stated above (q. 72, a. 2). ing is a venial sin either through the slightness of the evil From this the Replies to the Objections may be easily invoked on another in cursing him, or on account of the gathered. Whether cursing is a graver sin than backbiting? IIa IIae q. 76 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that cursing is a graver sin it belongs to the evil-speaker, as we understand it here, to than backbiting. Cursing would seem to be a kind of blas- speak evil of punishment, and not evil of fault except un- phemy, as implied in the canonical epistle of Jude (verse der the aspect of punishment. But the mode of speaking is 9) where it is said that “when Michael the archangel, dis- not the same, for in the case of the four vices mentioned puting with the devil, contended about the body of Moses, above, evil of fault is spoken by way of assertion, whereas he durst not bring against him the judgment of blasphemy in the case of cursing evil of punishment is spoken, either [Douay: ‘railing speech’],” where blasphemy stands for by causing it in the form of a command, or by wishing it. cursing, according to a gloss. Now blasphemy is a graver Now the utterance itself of a person’s fault is a sin, in as sin than backbiting. Therefore cursing is a graver sin than much as it inflicts an injury on one’s neighbor, and it is backbiting. more grievous to inflict an injury, than to wish to inflict it, Objection 2. Further, murder is more grievous than other things being equal. backbiting, as stated above (q. 73, a. 3). But cursing is on Hence backbiting considered in its generic aspect is a a par with the sin of murder; for Chrysostom says (Hom. graver sin than the cursing which expresses a mere desire; xix, super Matth.): “When thou sayest: ‘Curse him down while the cursing which is expressed by way of command, with his house, away with everything,’ you are no better since it has the aspect of a cause, will be more or less than a murderer.” Therefore cursing is graver than back- grievous than backbiting, according as it inflicts an injury biting. more or less grave than the blackening of a man’s good Objection 3. Further, to cause a thing is more than name. Moreover this must be taken as applying to these to signify it. But the curser causes evil by commanding vices considered in their essential aspects: for other ac- it, whereas the backbiter merely signifies an evil already cidental points might be taken into consideration, which existing. Therefore the curser sins more grievously than would aggravate or extenuate the aforesaid vices. the backbiter. Reply to Objection 1. To curse a creature, as such, On the contrary, It is impossible to do well in back- reflects on God, and thus accidentally it has the character biting, whereas cursing may be either a good or an evil of blasphemy; not so if one curse a creature on account of deed, as appears from what has been said (a. 1). There- its fault: and the same applies to backbiting. fore backbiting is graver than cursing. Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (a. 3), cursing, I answer that, As stated in the Ia, q. 48, a. 5, evil is in one way, includes the desire for evil, where if the curser twofold, evil of fault, and evil of punishment; and of the desire the evil of another’s violent death, he does not dif- two, evil of fault is the worse ( Ia, q. 48, a. 6). Hence to fer, in desire, from a murderer, but he differs from him in speak evil of fault is worse than to speak evil of punish- so far as the external act adds something to the act of the ment, provided the mode of speaking be the same. Ac- will. cordingly it belongs to the reviler, the tale-bearer, the Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers curs- backbiter and the derider to speak evil of fault, whereas ing by way of command. 1550 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 77 Of Cheating, Which Is Committed in Buying and Selling (In Four Articles) We must now consider those sins which relate to voluntary commutations. First, we shall consider cheating, which is committed in buying and selling: secondly, we shall consider usury, which occurs in loans. In connection with the other voluntary commutations no special kind of sin is to be found distinct from rapine and theft. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Of unjust sales as regards the price; namely, whether it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth? (2) Of unjust sales on the part of the thing sold; (3) Whether the seller is bound to reveal a fault in the thing sold? (4) Whether it is lawful in trading to sell a thing at a higher price than was paid for it? Whether it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth? IIa IIae q. 77 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it is lawful to sell him. Hence Tully says (De Offic. iii, 15): “Contracts a thing for more than its worth. In the commutations of should be entirely free from double-dealing: the seller human life, civil laws determine that which is just. Now must not impose upon the bidder, nor the buyer upon one according to these laws it is just for buyer and seller to de- that bids against him.” ceive one another (Cod. IV, xliv, De Rescind. Vend. 8,15): But, apart from fraud, we may speak of buying and and this occurs by the seller selling a thing for more than selling in two ways. First, as considered in themselves, its worth, and the buyer buying a thing for less than its and from this point of view, buying and selling seem to worth. Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more than be established for the common advantage of both parties, its worth one of whom requires that which belongs to the other, and Objection 2. Further, that which is common to all vice versa, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3). Now would seem to be natural and not sinful. Now Augustine whatever is established for the common advantage, should relates that the saying of a certain jester was accepted by not be more of a burden to one party than to another, and all, “You wish to buy for a song and to sell at a premium,” consequently all contracts between them should observe which agrees with the saying of Prov. 20:14, “It is naught, equality of thing and thing. Again, the quality of a thing it is naught, saith every buyer: and when he is gone away, that comes into human use is measured by the price given then he will boast.” Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for it, for which purpose money was invented, as stated for more than its worth. in Ethic. v, 5. Therefore if either the price exceed the Objection 3. Further, it does not seem unlawful if quantity of the thing’s worth, or, conversely, the thing ex- that which honesty demands be done by mutual agree- ceed the price, there is no longer the equality of justice: ment. Now, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13), and consequently, to sell a thing for more than its worth, in the friendship which is based on utility, the amount of or to buy it for less than its worth, is in itself unjust and the recompense for a favor received should depend on the unlawful. utility accruing to the receiver: and this utility sometimes Secondly we may speak of buying and selling, consid- is worth more than the thing given, for instance if the re- ered as accidentally tending to the advantage of one party, ceiver be in great need of that thing, whether for the pur- and to the disadvantage of the other: for instance, when pose of avoiding a danger, or of deriving some particular a man has great need of a certain thing, while an other benefit. Therefore, in contracts of buying and selling, it is man will suffer if he be without it. In such a case the just lawful to give a thing in return for more than its worth. price will depend not only on the thing sold, but on the On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 7:12): “All loss which the sale brings on the seller. And thus it will things. . . whatsoever you would that men should do to be lawful to sell a thing for more than it is worth in it- you, do you also to them.” But no man wishes to buy a self, though the price paid be not more than it is worth to thing for more than its worth. Therefore no man should the owner. Yet if the one man derive a great advantage sell a thing to another man for more than its worth. by becoming possessed of the other man’s property, and I answer that, It is altogether sinful to have recourse the seller be not at a loss through being without that thing, to deceit in order to sell a thing for more than its just price, the latter ought not to raise the price, because the advan-because this is to deceive one’s neighbor so as to injure tage accruing to the buyer, is not due to the seller, but to 1551 a circumstance affecting the buyer. Now no man should the Divine law, it is reckoned unlawful if the equality of sell what is not his, though he may charge for the loss he justice be not observed in buying and selling: and he who suffers. has received more than he ought must make compensation On the other hand if a man find that he derives great to him that has suffered loss, if the loss be considerable. I advantage from something he has bought, he may, of his add this condition, because the just price of things is not own accord, pay the seller something over and above: and fixed with mathematical precision, but depends on a kind this pertains to his honesty. of estimate, so that a slight addition or subtraction would Reply to Objection 1. As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 96, not seem to destroy the equality of justice. a. 2) human law is given to the people among whom there Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says “this jester, are many lacking virtue, and it is not given to the virtuous either by looking into himself or by his experience of oth- alone. Hence human law was unable to forbid all that is ers, thought that all men are inclined to wish to buy for contrary to virtue; and it suffices for it to prohibit what- a song and sell at a premium. But since in reality this ever is destructive of human intercourse, while it treats is wicked, it is in every man’s power to acquire that jus- other matters as though they were lawful, not by approv- tice whereby he may resist and overcome this inclination.” ing of them, but by not punishing them. Accordingly, if And then he gives the example of a man who gave the just without employing deceit the seller disposes of his goods price for a book to a man who through ignorance asked for more than their worth, or the buyer obtain them for less a low price for it. Hence it is evident that this common than their worth, the law looks upon this as licit, and pro- desire is not from nature but from vice, wherefore it is vides no punishment for so doing, unless the excess be too common to many who walk along the broad road of sin. great, because then even human law demands restitution Reply to Objection 3. In commutative justice we con- to be made, for instance if a man be deceived in regard to sider chiefly real equality. On the other hand, in friendship more than half the amount of the just price of a thing∗. based on utility we consider equality of usefulness, so that On the other hand the Divine law leaves nothing un- the recompense should depend on the usefulness accruing, punished that is contrary to virtue. Hence, according to whereas in buying it should be equal to the thing bought. Whether a sale is rendered unlawful through a fault in the thing sold? IIa IIae q. 77 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that a sale is not rendered On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 11): unjust and unlawful through a fault in the thing sold. For “It is manifestly a rule of justice that a good man should less account should be taken of the other parts of a thing not depart from the truth, nor inflict an unjust injury on than of what belongs to its substance. Yet the sale of a anyone, nor have any connection with fraud.” thing does not seem to be rendered unlawful through a I answer that, A threefold fault may be found per- fault in its substance: for instance, if a man sell instead of taining to the thing which is sold. One, in respect of the the real metal, silver or gold produced by some chemical thing’s substance: and if the seller be aware of a fault in process, which is adapted to all the human uses for which the thing he is selling, he is guilty of a fraudulent sale, so silver and gold are necessary, for instance in the making that the sale is rendered unlawful. Hence we find it writ- of vessels and the like. Much less therefore will it be an ten against certain people (Is. 1:22), “Thy silver is turned unlawful sale if the thing be defective in other ways. into dross, thy wine is mingled with water”: because that Objection 2. Further, any fault in the thing, affecting which is mixed is defective in its substance. the quantity, would seem chiefly to be opposed to justice Another defect is in respect of quantity which is which consists in equality. Now quantity is known by be- known by being measured: wherefore if anyone know- ing measured: and the measures of things that come into ingly make use of a faulty measure in selling, he is guilty human use are not fixed, but in some places are greater, in of fraud, and the sale is illicit. Hence it is written (Dt. others less, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 7). There- 25:13,14): “Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag, fore just as it is impossible to avoid defects on the part of a greater and a less: neither shall there be in thy house a the thing sold, it seems that a sale is not rendered unlawful greater bushel and a less,” and further on (Dt. 25:16): “For through the thing sold being defective. the Lord. . . abhorreth him that doth these things, and He Objection 3. Further, the thing sold is rendered de- hateth all injustice.” fective by lacking a fitting quality. But in order to know A third defect is on the part of the quality, for instance, the quality of a thing, much knowledge is required that is if a man sell an unhealthy animal as being a healthy one: lacking in most buyers. Therefore a sale is not rendered and if anyone do this knowingly he is guilty of a fraudu- unlawful by a fault (in the thing sold). lent sale, and the sale, in consequence, is illicit. ∗ Cod. IV, xliv, De Rescind. Vend. 2,8 1552 In all these cases not only is the man guilty of a fraud-longer in its condition of purity than counterfeit gold. If ulent sale, but he is also bound to restitution. But if any of however real gold were to be produced by alchemy, it the foregoing defects be in the thing sold, and he knows would not be unlawful to sell it for the genuine article, nothing about this, the seller does not sin, because he does for nothing prevents art from employing certain natural that which is unjust materially, nor is his deed unjust, causes for the production of natural and true effects, as as shown above (q. 59, a. 2). Nevertheless he is bound Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) of things produced by the to compensate the buyer, when the defect comes to his art of the demons. knowledge. Moreover what has been said of the seller Reply to Objection 2. The measures of salable com- applies equally to the buyer. For sometimes it happens modities must needs be different in different places, on that the seller thinks his goods to be specifically of lower account of the difference of supply: because where there value, as when a man sells gold instead of copper, and is greater abundance, the measures are wont to be larger. then if the buyer be aware of this, he buys it unjustly and However in each place those who govern the state must is bound to restitution: and the same applies to a defect in determine the just measures of things salable, with due quantity as to a defect in quality. consideration for the conditions of place and time. Hence Reply to Objection 1. Gold and silver are costly not it is not lawful to disregard such measures as are estab- only on account of the usefulness of the vessels and other lished by public authority or custom. like things made from them, but also on account of the ex- Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Civ. cellence and purity of their substance. Hence if the gold Dei xi, 16) the price of things salable does not depend or silver produced by alchemists has not the true specific on their degree of nature, since at times a horse fetches a nature of gold and silver, the sale thereof is fraudulent higher price than a slave; but it depends on their useful- and unjust, especially as real gold and silver can produce ness to man. Hence it is not necessary for the seller or certain results by their natural action, which the counter- buyer to be cognizant of the hidden qualities of the thing feit gold and silver of alchemists cannot produce. Thus sold, but only of such as render the thing adapted to man’s the true metal has the property of making people joyful, use, for instance, that the horse be strong, run well and and is helpful medicinally against certain maladies. More- so forth. Such qualities the seller and buyer can easily over real gold can be employed more frequently, and lasts discover. Whether the seller is bound to state the defects of the thing sold? IIa IIae q. 77 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the seller is not bound Objection 4. Further, if one were bound to tell the to state the defects of the thing sold. Since the seller does faults of what one offers for sale, this would only be in not bind the buyer to buy, he would seem to leave it to order to lower the price. Now sometimes the price would him to judge of the goods offered for sale. Now judgment be lowered for some other reason, without any defect in about a thing and knowledge of that thing belong to the the thing sold: for instance, if the seller carry wheat to same person. Therefore it does not seem imputable to the a place where wheat fetches a high price, knowing that seller if the buyer be deceived in his judgment, and be hur- many will come after him carrying wheat; because if the ried into buying a thing without carefully inquiring into its buyers knew this they would give a lower price. But ap- condition. parently the seller need not give the buyer this informa- Objection 2. Further, it seems foolish for anyone to tion. Therefore, in like manner, neither need he tell him do what prevents him carrying out his work. But if a man the faults of the goods he is selling. states the defects of the goods he has for sale, he prevents On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 10): their sale: wherefore Tully (De Offic. iii, 13) pictures a “In all contracts the defects of the salable commodity must man as saying: “Could anything be more absurd than for be stated; and unless the seller make them known, al- a public crier, instructed by the owner, to cry: ‘I offer this though the buyer has already acquired a right to them, the unhealthy horse for sale?’ ” Therefore the seller is not contract is voided on account of the fraudulent action.” bound to state the defects of the thing sold. I answer that, It is always unlawful to give anyone an Objection 3. Further, man needs more to know the occasion of danger or loss, although a man need not al- road of virtue than to know the faults of things offered for ways give another the help or counsel which would be for sale. Now one is not bound to offer advice to all or to tell his advantage in any way; but only in certain fixed cases, them the truth about matters pertaining to virtue, though for instance when someone is subject to him, or when he one should not tell anyone what is false. Much less there- is the only one who can assist him. Now the seller who fore is a seller bound to tell the faults of what he offers for offers goods for sale, gives the buyer an occasion of loss sale, as though he were counseling the buyer. or danger, by the very fact that he offers him defective 1553 goods, if such defect may occasion loss or danger to the Reply to Objection 2. There is no need to publish be-buyer—loss, if, by reason of this defect, the goods are forehand by the public crier the defects of the goods one is of less value, and he takes nothing off the price on that offering for sale, because if he were to begin by announc- account—danger, if this defect either hinder the use of the ing its defects, the bidders would be frightened to buy, goods or render it hurtful, for instance, if a man sells a through ignorance of other qualities that might render the lame for a fleet horse, a tottering house for a safe one, rot- thing good and serviceable. Such defect ought to be stated ten or poisonous food for wholesome. Wherefore if such to each individual that offers to buy: and then he will be like defects be hidden, and the seller does not make them able to compare the various points one with the other, the known, the sale will be illicit and fraudulent, and the seller good with the bad: for nothing prevents that which is de- will be bound to compensation for the loss incurred. fective in one respect being useful in many others. On the other hand, if the defect be manifest, for in- Reply to Objection 3. Although a man is not bound stance if a horse have but one eye, or if the goods though strictly speaking to tell everyone the truth about matters useless to the buyer, be useful to someone else, provided pertaining to virtue, yet he is so bound in a case when, un- the seller take as much as he ought from the price, he is less he tells the truth, his conduct would endanger another not bound to state the defect of the goods, since perhaps man in detriment to virtue: and so it is in this case. on account of that defect the buyer might want him to al- Reply to Objection 4. The defect in a thing makes it low a greater rebate than he need. Wherefore the seller of less value now than it seems to be: but in the case cited, may look to his own indemnity, by withholding the defect the goods are expected to be of less value at a future time, of the goods. on account of the arrival of other merchants, which was Reply to Objection 1. Judgment cannot be pro- not foreseen by the buyers. Wherefore the seller, since he nounced save on what is manifest: for “a man judges of sells his goods at the price actually offered him, does not what he knows” (Ethic. i, 3). Hence if the defects of seem to act contrary to justice through not stating what is the goods offered for sale be hidden, judgment of them is going to happen. If however he were to do so, or if he not sufficiently left with the buyer unless such defects be lowered his price, it would be exceedingly virtuous on his made known to him. The case would be different if the part: although he does not seem to be bound to do this as defects were manifest. a debt of justice. Whether, in trading, it is lawful to sell a thing at a higher price than what was paid IIa IIae q. 77 a. 4 for it? Objection 1. It would seem that it is not lawful, in poor has become wealthy, or who, from being a nobody trading, to sell a thing for a higher price than we paid for has become a celebrity.” Now trading would net seem to it. For Chrysostom∗ says on Mat. 21:12: “He that buys be forbidden to clerics except on account of its sinfulness. a thing in order that he may sell it, entire and unchanged, Therefore it is a sin in trading, to buy at a low price and to at a profit, is the trader who is cast out of God’s temple.” sell at a higher price. Cassiodorus speaks in the same sense in his commentary On the contrary, Augustine commenting on Ps. on Ps. 70:15, “Because I have not known learning, or 70:15, “Because I have not known learning,”‡ says: “The trading” according to another version†: “What is trade,” greedy tradesman blasphemes over his losses; he lies and says he, “but buying at a cheap price with the purpose of perjures himself over the price of his wares. But these are retailing at a higher price?” and he adds: “Such were the vices of the man, not of the craft, which can be exercised tradesmen whom Our Lord cast out of the temple.” Now without these vices.” Therefore trading is not in itself un- no man is cast out of the temple except for a sin. There- lawful. fore such like trading is sinful. I answer that, A tradesman is one whose business Objection 2. Further, it is contrary to justice to sell consists in the exchange of things. According to the goods at a higher price than their worth, or to buy them Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), exchange of things is twofold; for less than their value, as shown above (a. 1). Now if one, natural as it were, and necessary, whereby one com- you sell a thing for a higher price than you paid for it, you modity is exchanged for another, or money taken in ex- must either have bought it for less than its value, or sell change for a commodity, in order to satisfy the needs of it for more than its value. Therefore this cannot be done life. Such like trading, properly speaking, does not belong without sin. to tradesmen, but rather to housekeepers or civil servants Objection 3. Further, Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): who have to provide the household or the state with the “Shun, as you would the plague, a cleric who from being necessaries of life. The other kind of exchange is either ∗ Hom. xxxviii in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom † The Septuagint ‡ Cf. obj. 1 1554 that of money for money, or of any commodity for money, as a last end, but for the sake of some other end which is not on account of the necessities of life, but for profit, and necessary or virtuous, as stated above. this kind of exchange, properly speaking, regards trades- Reply to Objection 2. Not everyone that sells at a men, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3). The for- higher price than he bought is a tradesman, but only he mer kind of exchange is commendable because it supplies who buys that he may sell at a profit. If, on the contrary, a natural need: but the latter is justly deserving of blame, he buys not for sale but for possession, and afterwards, because, considered in itself, it satisfies the greed for gain, for some reason wishes to sell, it is not a trade transaction which knows no limit and tends to infinity. Hence trading, even if he sell at a profit. For he may lawfully do this, considered in itself, has a certain debasement attaching either because he has bettered the thing, or because the thereto, in so far as, by its very nature, it does not imply a value of the thing has changed with the change of place or virtuous or necessary end. Nevertheless gain which is the time, or on account of the danger he incurs in transferring end of trading, though not implying, by its nature, any- the thing from one place to another, or again in having it thing virtuous or necessary, does not, in itself, connote carried by another. In this sense neither buying nor selling anything sinful or contrary to virtue: wherefore nothing is unjust. prevents gain from being directed to some necessary or Reply to Objection 3. Clerics should abstain not only even virtuous end, and thus trading becomes lawful. Thus, from things that are evil in themselves, but even from for instance, a man may intend the moderate gain which those that have an appearance of evil. This happens in he seeks to acquire by trading for the upkeep of his house- trading, both because it is directed to worldly gain, which hold, or for the assistance of the needy: or again, a man clerics should despise, and because trading is open to so may take to trade for some public advantage, for instance, many vices, since “a merchant is hardly free from sins of lest his country lack the necessaries of life, and seek gain, the lips”∗ (Ecclus. 26:28). There is also another reason, not as an end, but as payment for his labor. because trading engages the mind too much with worldly Reply to Objection 1. The saying of Chrysostom cares, and consequently withdraws it from spiritual cares; refers to the trading which seeks gain as a last end. This wherefore the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:4): “No man be- is especially the case where a man sells something at a ing a soldier to God entangleth himself with secular busi- higher price without its undergoing any change. For if he nesses.” Nevertheless it is lawful for clerics to engage in sells at a higher price something that has changed for the the first mentioned kind of exchange, which is directed better, he would seem to receive the reward of his labor. to supply the necessaries of life, either by buying or by Nevertheless the gain itself may be lawfully intended, not selling. ∗ ‘A merchant is hardly free from negligence, and a huckster shall not be justified from the sins of the lips’ 1555 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 78 Of the Sin of Usury (In Four Articles) We must now consider the sin of usury, which is committed in loans: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a sin to take money as a price for money lent, which is to receive usury? (2) Whether it is lawful to lend money for any other kind of consideration, by way of payment for the loan? (3) Whether a man is bound to restore just gains derived from money taken in usury? (4) Whether it is lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury? Whether it is a sin to take usury for money lent? IIa IIae q. 78 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not a sin to take On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:25): “If thou usury for money lent. For no man sins through following lend money to any of thy people that is poor, that dwelleth the example of Christ. But Our Lord said of Himself (Lk. with thee, thou shalt not be hard upon them as an extor- 19:23): “At My coming I might have exacted it,” i.e. the tioner, nor oppress them with usuries.” money lent, “with usury.” Therefore it is not a sin to take I answer that, To take usury for money lent is unjust usury for lending money. in itself, because this is to sell what does not exist, and Objection 2. Further, according to Ps. 18:8, “The this evidently leads to inequality which is contrary to jus- law of the Lord is unspotted,” because, to wit, it forbids tice. In order to make this evident, we must observe that sin. Now usury of a kind is allowed in the Divine law, there are certain things the use of which consists in their according to Dt. 23:19,20: “Thou shalt not fenerate to thy consumption: thus we consume wine when we use it for brother money, nor corn, nor any other thing, but to the drink and we consume wheat when we use it for food. stranger”: nay more, it is even promised as a reward for Wherefore in such like things the use of the thing must the observance of the Law, according to Dt. 28:12: “Thou not be reckoned apart from the thing itself, and whoever shalt fenerate∗ to many nations, and shalt not borrow of is granted the use of the thing, is granted the thing itself any one.” Therefore it is not a sin to take usury. and for this reason, to lend things of this kin is to trans- Objection 3. Further, in human affairs justice is de- fer the ownership. Accordingly if a man wanted to sell termined by civil laws. Now civil law allows usury to be wine separately from the use of the wine, he would be taken. Therefore it seems to be lawful. selling the same thing twice, or he would be selling what Objection 4. Further, the counsels are not binding un- does not exist, wherefore he would evidently commit a sin der sin. But, among other counsels we find (Lk. 6:35): of injustice. In like manner he commits an injustice who “Lend, hoping for nothing thereby.” Therefore it is not a lends wine or wheat, and asks for double payment, viz. sin to take usury. one, the return of the thing in equal measure, the other, Objection 5. Further, it does not seem to be in itself the price of the use, which is called usury. sinful to accept a price for doing what one is not bound On the other hand, there are things the use of which to do. But one who has money is not bound in every case does not consist in their consumption: thus to use a house to lend it to his neighbor. Therefore it is lawful for him is to dwell in it, not to destroy it. Wherefore in such things sometimes to accept a price for lending it. both may be granted: for instance, one man may hand Objection 6. Further, silver made into coins does not over to another the ownership of his house while reserv- differ specifically from silver made into a vessel. But it ing to himself the use of it for a time, or vice versa, he is lawful to accept a price for the loan of a silver vessel. may grant the use of the house, while retaining the own- Therefore it is also lawful to accept a price for the loan of ership. For this reason a man may lawfully make a charge a silver coin. Therefore usury is not in itself a sin. for the use of his house, and, besides this, revendicate the Objection 7. Further, anyone may lawfully accept a house from the person to whom he has granted its use, as thing which its owner freely gives him. Now he who ac- happens in renting and letting a house. cepts the loan, freely gives the usury. Therefore he who Now money, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, lends may lawfully take the usury. 5; Polit. i, 3) was invented chiefly for the purpose of ex- ∗ ‘Faeneraberis’—‘Thou shalt lend upon usury.’ The Douay version has simply ‘lend.’ The objection lays stress on the word ‘faeneraberis’: hence the necessity of rendering it by ‘fenerate.’ 1556 change: and consequently the proper and principal use of things according to natural reason and civil law which are money is its consumption or alienation whereby it is sunk consumed by being used, do not admit of usufruct,” and in exchange. Hence it is by its very nature unlawful to that “the senate did not (nor could it) appoint a usufruct to take payment for the use of money lent, which payment such things, but established a quasi-usufruct,” namely by is known as usury: and just as a man is bound to restore permitting usury. Moreover the Philosopher, led by natu- other ill-gotten goods, so is he bound to restore the money ral reason, says (Polit. i, 3) that “to make money by usury which he has taken in usury. is exceedingly unnatural.” Reply to Objection 1. In this passage usury must be Reply to Objection 4. A man is not always bound to taken figuratively for the increase of spiritual goods which lend, and for this reason it is placed among the counsels. God exacts from us, for He wishes us ever to advance in Yet it is a matter of precept not to seek profit by lending: the goods which we receive from Him: and this is for our although it may be called a matter of counsel in compari- own profit not for His. son with the maxims of the Pharisees, who deemed some Reply to Objection 2. The Jews were forbidden to kinds of usury to be lawful, just as love of one’s enemies take usury from their brethren, i.e. from other Jews. By is a matter of counsel. Or again, He speaks here not of this we are given to understand that to take usury from the hope of usurious gain, but of the hope which is put any man is evil simply, because we ought to treat every in man. For we ought not to lend or do any good deed man as our neighbor and brother, especially in the state through hope in man, but only through hope in God. of the Gospel, whereto all are called. Hence it is said Reply to Objection 5. He that is not bound to lend, without any distinction in Ps. 14:5: “He that hath not put may accept repayment for what he has done, but he must out his money to usury,” and (Ezech. 18:8): “Who hath not exact more. Now he is repaid according to equality of not taken usury∗.” They were permitted, however, to take justice if he is repaid as much as he lent. Wherefore if he usury from foreigners, not as though it were lawful, but in exacts more for the usufruct of a thing which has no other order to avoid a greater evil, lest, to wit, through avarice to use but the consumption of its substance, he exacts a price which they were prone according to Is. 56:11, they should of something non-existent: and so his exaction is unjust. take usury from the Jews who were worshippers of God. Reply to Objection 6. The principal use of a silver Where we find it promised to them as a reward, “Thou vessel is not its consumption, and so one may lawfully shalt fenerate to many nations,” etc., fenerating is to be sell its use while retaining one’s ownership of it. On the taken in a broad sense for lending, as in Ecclus. 29:10, other hand the principal use of silver money is sinking it where we read: “Many have refused to fenerate, not out in exchange, so that it is not lawful to sell its use and at of wickedness,” i.e. they would not lend. Accordingly the the same time expect the restitution of the amount lent. Jews are promised in reward an abundance of wealth, so It must be observed, however, that the secondary use of that they would be able to lend to others. silver vessels may be an exchange, and such use may not Reply to Objection 3. Human laws leave certain be lawfully sold. In like manner there may be some sec- things unpunished, on account of the condition of those ondary use of silver money; for instance, a man might who are imperfect, and who would be deprived of many lend coins for show, or to be used as security. advantages, if all sins were strictly forbidden and punish- Reply to Objection 7. He who gives usury does not ments appointed for them. Wherefore human law has per- give it voluntarily simply, but under a certain necessity, in mitted usury, not that it looks upon usury as harmonizing so far as he needs to borrow money which the owner is with justice, but lest the advantage of many should be hin- unwilling to lend without usury. dered. Hence it is that in civil law† it is stated that “those Whether it is lawful to ask for any other kind of consideration for money lent? IIa IIae q. 78 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that one may ask for some straits is to do him a favor for which he should be grate- other kind of consideration for money lent. For everyone ful. Therefore the recipient of a loan, is bound by a natural may lawfully seek to indemnify himself. Now sometimes debt to repay something. Now it does not seem unlawful a man suffers loss through lending money. Therefore he to bind oneself to an obligation of the natural law. There- may lawfully ask for or even exact something else besides fore it is not unlawful, in lending money to anyone, to the money lent. demand some sort of compensation as condition of the Objection 2. Further, as stated in Ethic. v, 5, one is loan. in duty bound by a point of honor, to repay anyone who Objection 3. Further, just as there is real remunera- has done us a favor. Now to lend money to one who is in tion, so is there verbal remuneration, and remuneration by ∗ Vulg.: ‘If a man. . . hath not lent upon money, nor taken any increase. . . he is just.’ † Inst. II, iv, de Usufructu 1557 service, as a gloss says on Is. 33:15, “Blessed is he that also happen that the borrower avoids a greater loss than shaketh his hands from all bribes‡.” Now it is lawful to the lender incurs, wherefore the borrower may repay the accept service or praise from one to whom one has lent lender with what he has gained. But the lender cannot en- money. Therefore in like manner it is lawful to accept any ter an agreement for compensation, through the fact that other kind of remuneration. he makes no profit out of his money: because he must not Objection 4. Further, seemingly the relation of gift to sell that which he has not yet and may be prevented in gift is the same as of loan to loan. But it is lawful to accept many ways from having. money for money given. Therefore it is lawful to accept Reply to Objection 2. Repayment for a favor may repayment by loan in return for a loan granted. be made in two ways. In one way, as a debt of justice; Objection 5. Further, the lender, by transferring his and to such a debt a man may be bound by a fixed con- ownership of a sum of money removes the money fur- tract; and its amount is measured according to the favor ther from himself than he who entrusts it to a merchant or received. Wherefore the borrower of money or any such craftsman. Now it is lawful to receive interest for money thing the use of which is its consumption is not bound to entrusted to a merchant or craftsman. Therefore it is also repay more than he received in loan: and consequently it lawful to receive interest for money lent. is against justice if he be obliged to pay back more. In Objection 6. Further, a man may accept a pledge for another way a man’s obligation to repayment for favor re- money lent, the use of which pledge he might sell for a ceived is based on a debt of friendship, and the nature of price: as when a man mortgages his land or the house this debt depends more on the feeling with which the fa- wherein he dwells. Therefore it is lawful to receive inter- vor was conferred than on the greatness of the favor itself. est for money lent. This debt does not carry with it a civil obligation, involv- Objection 7. Further, it sometimes happens that a man ing a kind of necessity that would exclude the spontaneous raises the price of his goods under guise of loan, or buys nature of such a repayment. another’s goods at a low figure; or raises his price through Reply to Objection 3. If a man were, in return for delay in being paid, and lowers his price that he may be money lent, as though there had been an agreement tacit paid the sooner. Now in all these cases there seems to or expressed, to expect or exact repayment in the shape be payment for a loan of money: nor does it appear to of some remuneration of service or words, it would be the be manifestly illicit. Therefore it seems to be lawful to same as if he expected or exacted some real remuneration, expect or exact some consideration for money lent. because both can be priced at a money value, as may be On the contrary, Among other conditions requisite seen in the case of those who offer for hire the labor which in a just man it is stated (Ezech. 18:17) that he “hath not they exercise by work or by tongue. If on the other hand taken usury and increase.” the remuneration by service or words be given not as an I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. obligation, but as a favor, which is not to be appreciated iv, 1), a thing is reckoned as money “if its value can be at a money value, it is lawful to take, exact, and expect it. measured by money.” Consequently, just as it is a sin Reply to Objection 4. Money cannot be sold for a against justice, to take money, by tacit or express agree- greater sum than the amount lent, which has to be paid ment, in return for lending money or anything else that is back: nor should the loan be made with a demand or ex- consumed by being used, so also is it a like sin, by tacit or pectation of aught else but of a feeling of benevolence express agreement to receive anything whose price can be which cannot be priced at a pecuniary value, and which measured by money. Yet there would be no sin in receiv- can be the basis of a spontaneous loan. Now the obliga- ing something of the kind, not as exacting it, nor yet as tion to lend in return at some future time is repugnant to though it were due on account of some agreement tacit or such a feeling, because again an obligation of this kind expressed, but as a gratuity: since, even before lending the has its pecuniary value. Consequently it is lawful for the money, one could accept a gratuity, nor is one in a worse lender to borrow something else at the same time, but it is condition through lending. unlawful for him to bind the borrower to grant him a loan On the other hand it is lawful to exact compensation at some future time. for a loan, in respect of such things as are not appreciated Reply to Objection 5. He who lends money transfers by a measure of money, for instance, benevolence, and the ownership of the money to the borrower. Hence the love for the lender, and so forth. borrower holds the money at his own risk and is bound to Reply to Objection 1. A lender may without sin enter pay it all back: wherefore the lender must not exact more. an agreement with the borrower for compensation for the On the other hand he that entrusts his money to a mer- loss he incurs of something he ought to have, for this is chant or craftsman so as to form a kind of society, does not to sell the use of money but to avoid a loss. It may not transfer the ownership of his money to them, for it re- ‡ Vulg.: ‘Which of you shall dwell with everlasting burnings?. . . He that shaketh his hands from all bribes.’ 1558 mains his, so that at his risk the merchant speculates with at a higher price than that which is just, so that he may it, or the craftsman uses it for his craft, and consequently wait for the buyer to pay, it is manifestly a case of usury: he may lawfully demand as something belonging to him, because this waiting for the payment of the price has the part of the profits derived from his money. character of a loan, so that whatever he demands beyond Reply to Objection 6. If a man in return for money the just price in consideration of this delay, is like a price lent to him pledges something that can be valued at a for a loan, which pertains to usury. In like manner if a price, the lender must allow for the use of that thing to- buyer wishes to buy goods at a lower price than what is wards the repayment of the loan. Else if he wishes the just, for the reason that he pays for the goods before they gratuitous use of that thing in addition to repayment, it is can be delivered, it is a sin of usury; because again this the same as if he took money for lending, and that is usury, anticipated payment of money has the character of a loan, unless perhaps it were such a thing as friends are wont to the price of which is the rebate on the just price of the lend to one another gratis, as in the case of the loan of a goods sold. On the other hand if a man wishes to allow book. a rebate on the just price in order that he may have his Reply to Objection 7. If a man wish to sell his goods money sooner, he is not guilty of the sin of usury. Whether a man is bound to restore whatever profits he has made out of money gotten IIa IIae q. 78 a. 3 by usury? Objection 1. It would seem that a man is bound to re- some of his own goods be injured through the lender re- store whatever profits he has made out of money gotten by taining them: for then he is bound to make good the loss. usury. For the Apostle says (Rom. 11:16): “If the root be On the other hand, there are certain things whose use holy, so are the branches.” Therefore likewise if the root is not their consumption: such things admit of usufruct, be rotten so are the branches. But the root was infected for instance house or land property and so forth. Where- with usury. Therefore whatever profit is made therefrom fore if a man has by usury extorted from another his house is infected with usury. Therefore he is bound to restore it. or land, he is bound to restore not only the house or land Objection 2. Further, it is laid down (Extra, De but also the fruits accruing to him therefrom, since they Usuris, in the Decretal: ‘Cum tu sicut asseris’): “Prop- are the fruits of things owned by another man and conse- erty accruing from usury must be sold, and the price re- quently are due to him. paid to the persons from whom the usury was extorted.” Reply to Objection 1. The root has not only the char- Therefore, likewise, whatever else is acquired from usuri- acter of matter, as money made by usury has; but has also ous money must be restored. somewhat the character of an active cause, in so far as it Objection 3. Further, that which a man buys with the administers nourishment. Hence the comparison fails. proceeds of usury is due to him by reason of the money Reply to Objection 2. Further, Property acquired he paid for it. Therefore he has no more right to the thing from usury does not belong to the person who paid usury, purchased than to the money he paid. But he was bound but to the person who bought it. Yet he that paid usury to restore the money gained through usury. Therefore he has a certain claim on that property just as he has on the is also bound to restore what he acquired with it. other goods of the usurer. Hence it is not prescribed that On the contrary, A man may lawfully hold what he such property should be assigned to the persons who paid has lawfully acquired. Now that which is acquired by the usury, since the property is perhaps worth more than what proceeds of usury is sometimes lawfully acquired. There- they paid in usury, but it is commanded that the property fore it may be lawfully retained. be sold, and the price be restored, of course according to I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), there are certain the amount taken in usury. things whose use is their consumption, and which do not Reply to Objection 3. The proceeds of money taken admit of usufruct, according to law (ibid., ad 3). Where- in usury are due to the person who acquired them not by fore if such like things be extorted by means of usury, for reason of the usurious money as instrumental cause, but instance money, wheat, wine and so forth, the lender is on account of his own industry as principal cause. Where- not bound to restore more than he received (since what is fore he has more right to the goods acquired with usurious acquired by such things is the fruit not of the thing but of money than to the usurious money itself. human industry), unless indeed the other party by losing 1559 Whether it is lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury? IIa IIae q. 78 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not lawful to his sin of swearing by demons, but to his good compact borrow money under a condition of usury. For the Apos- whereby he kept his word. If however he were to induce tle says (Rom. 1:32) that they “are worthy of death. . . not him to swear by false gods, he would sin. only they that do” these sins, “but they also that consent Accordingly we must also answer to the question in to them that do them.” Now he that borrows money under point that it is by no means lawful to induce a man to lend a condition of usury consents in the sin of the usurer, and under a condition of usury: yet it is lawful to borrow for gives him an occasion of sin. Therefore he sins also. usury from a man who is ready to do so and is a usurer Objection 2. Further, for no temporal advantage by profession; provided the borrower have a good end in ought one to give another an occasion of committing a sin: view, such as the relief of his own or another’s need. Thus for this pertains to active scandal, which is always sinful, too it is lawful for a man who has fallen among thieves to as stated above (q. 43, a. 2). Now he that seeks to borrow point out his property to them (which they sin in taking) from a usurer gives him an occasion of sin. Therefore he is in order to save his life, after the example of the ten men not to be excused on account of any temporal advantage. who said to Ismahel (Jer. 41:8): “Kill us not: for we have Objection 3. Further, it seems no less necessary stores in the field.” sometimes to deposit one’s money with a usurer than to Reply to Objection 1. He who borrows for usury does borrow from him. Now it seems altogether unlawful to not consent to the usurer’s sin but makes use of it. Nor is deposit one’s money with a usurer, even as it would be it the usurer’s acceptance of usury that pleases him, but unlawful to deposit one’s sword with a madman, a maiden his lending, which is good. with a libertine, or food with a glutton. Neither therefore Reply to Objection 2. He who borrows for usury is it lawful to borrow from a usurer. gives the usurer an occasion, not for taking usury, but for On the contrary, He that suffers injury does not sin, lending; it is the usurer who finds an occasion of sin in according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11), wherefore jus- the malice of his heart. Hence there is passive scandal on tice is not a mean between two vices, as stated in the same his part, while there is no active scandal on the part of the book (ch. 5). Now a usurer sins by doing an injury to the person who seeks to borrow. Nor is this passive scandal a person who borrows from him under a condition of usury. reason why the other person should desist from borrowing Therefore he that accepts a loan under a condition of usury if he is in need, since this passive scandal arises not from does not sin. weakness or ignorance but from malice. I answer that, It is by no means lawful to induce a Reply to Objection 3. If one were to entrust one’s man to sin, yet it is lawful to make use of another’s sin for money to a usurer lacking other means of practising usury; a good end, since even God uses all sin for some good, or with the intention of making a greater profit from his since He draws some good from every evil as stated in the money by reason of the usury, one would be giving a sin- Enchiridion (xi). Hence when Publicola asked whether it ner matter for sin, so that one would be a participator in were lawful to make use of an oath taken by a man swear- his guilt. If, on the other hand, the usurer to whom one ing by false gods (which is a manifest sin, for he gives entrusts one’s money has other means of practising usury, Divine honor to them) Augustine (Ep. xlvii) answered there is no sin in entrusting it to him that it may be in safer that he who uses, not for a bad but for a good purpose, the keeping, since this is to use a sinner for a good purpose. oath of a man that swears by false gods, is a party, not to 1560 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 79 Of the Quasi-Integral Parts of Justice (In Four Articles) We must now consider the quasi-integral parts of justice, which are “to do good,” and “to decline from evil,” and the opposite vices. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether these two are parts of justice? (2) Whether transgression is a special sin? (3) Whether omission is a special sin? (4) Of the comparison between omission and transgression. Whether to decline from evil and to do good are parts of justice? IIa IIae q. 79 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that to decline from evil Now these two are said to be quasi-integral parts of and to do good are not parts of justice. For it belongs to general or of special justice, because each is required for every virtue to perform a good deed and to avoid an evil the perfect act of justice. For it belongs to justice to estab- one. But parts do not exceed the whole. Therefore to lish equality in our relations with others, as shown above decline from evil and to do good should not be reckoned (q. 58, a. 2): and it pertains to the same cause to estab- parts of justice, which is a special kind of virtue. lish and to preserve that which it has established. Now a Objection 2. Further, a gloss on Ps. 33:15, “Turn person establishes the equality of justice by doing good, away from evil and do good,” says: “The former,” i.e. to i.e. by rendering to another his due: and he preserves the turn away from evil, “avoids sin, the latter,” i.e. to do already established equality of justice by declining from good, “deserves the life and the palm.” But any part of a evil, that is by inflicting no injury on his neighbor. virtue deserves the life and the palm. Therefore to decline Reply to Objection 1. Good and evil are here con- from evil is not a part of justice. sidered under a special aspect, by which they are appro- Objection 3. Further, things that are so related that priated to justice. The reason why these two are reck- one implies the other, are not mutually distinct as parts oned parts of justice under a special aspect of good and of a whole. Now declining from evil is implied in doing evil, while they are not reckoned parts of any other moral good: since no one does evil and good at the same time. virtue, is that the other moral virtues are concerned with Therefore declining from evil and doing good are not parts the passions wherein to do good is to observe the mean, of justice. which is the same as to avoid the extremes as evils: so On the contrary, Augustine (De Correp. et Grat. i) that doing good and avoiding evil come to the same, with declares that “declining from evil and doing good” belong regard to the other virtues. On the other hand justice is to the justice of the law. concerned with operations and external things, wherein I answer that, If we speak of good and evil in general, to establish equality is one thing, and not to disturb the it belongs to every virtue to do good and to avoid evil: and equality established is another. in this sense they cannot be reckoned parts of justice, ex- Reply to Objection 2. To decline from evil, consid- cept justice be taken in the sense of “all virtue”∗. And yet ered as a part of justice, does not denote a pure negation, even if justice be taken in this sense it regards a certain viz.“not to do evil”; for this does not deserve the palm, but special aspect of good; namely, the good as due in respect only avoids the punishment. But it implies a movement of Divine or human law. of the will in repudiating evil, as the very term “decline” On the other hand justice considered as a special virtue shows. This is meritorious; especially when a person re- regards good as due to one’s neighbor. And in this sense sists against an instigation to do evil. it belongs to special justice to do good considered as due Reply to Objection 3. Doing good is the completive to one’s neighbor, and to avoid the opposite evil, that, act of justice, and the principal part, so to speak, thereof. namely, which is hurtful to one’s neighbor; while it be- Declining from evil is a more imperfect act, and a sec- longs to general justice to do good in relation to the com- ondary part of that virtue. Hence it is a. material part, so munity or in relation to God, and to avoid the opposite to speak, thereof, and a necessary condition of the formal evil. and completive part. ∗ Cf. q. 58, a. 5 1561 Whether transgression is a special sin? IIa IIae q. 79 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that transgression is not a the species of sin, because man transgresses a Divine pre- special sin. For no species is included in the definition of cept by any species of mortal sin. But if we consider it its genus. Now transgression is included in the definition formally, namely under its special aspect of an act against of sin; because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that sin is a negative precept, it is a special sin in two ways. First, “a transgression of the Divine law.” Therefore transgres- in so far as it is opposed to those kinds of sin that are op- sion is not a species of sin. posed to the other virtues: for just as it belongs properly Objection 2. Further, no species is more comprehen- to legal justice to consider a precept as binding, so it be- sive than its genus. But transgression is more compre- longs properly to a transgression to consider a precept as hensive than sin, because sin is a “word, deed or desire an object of contempt. Secondly, in so far as it is distinct against the law of God,” according to Augustine (Contra from omission which is opposed to an affirmative precept. Faust. xxii, 27), while transgression is also against nature, Reply to Objection 1. Even as legal justice is “all or custom. Therefore transgression is not a species of sin. virtue” (q. 58, a. 5) as regards its subject and matter, so Objection 3. Further, no species contains all the parts legal injustice is materially “all sin.” It is in this way that into which its genus is divided. Now the sin of transgres-Ambrose defined sin, considering it from the point of view sion extends to all the capital vices, as well as to sins of of legal injustice. thought, word and deed. Therefore transgression is not a Reply to Objection 2. The natural inclination con- special sin. cerns the precepts of the natural law. Again, a laudable On the contrary, It is opposed to a special virtue, custom has the force of a precept; since as Augustine says namely justice. in an epistle On the Fast of the Sabbath (Ep. xxxvi), “a I answer that, The term transgression is derived from custom of God’s people should be looked upon as law.” bodily movement and applied to moral actions. Now a Hence both sin and transgression may be against a laud- person is said to transgress in bodily movement, when he able custom and against a natural inclination. steps [graditur] beyond [trans] a fixed boundary—and it is Reply to Objection 3. All these species of sin may a negative precept that fixes the boundary that man must include transgression, if we consider them not under their not exceed in his moral actions. Wherefore to transgress, proper aspects, but under a special aspect, as stated above. properly speaking, is to act against a negative precept. The sin of omission, however, is altogether distinct from Now materially considered this may be common to all the sin of transgression. Whether omission is a special sin? IIa IIae q. 79 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that omission is not a a special virtue. But it is not possible to assign any spe- special sin. For every sin is either original or actual. Now cial virtue to which omission is opposed, both because omission is not original sin, for it is not contracted through the good of any virtue can be omitted, and because jus- origin nor is it actual sin, for it may be altogether without tice to which it would seem more particularly opposed, al- act, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 71, a. 5) when we were ways requires an act, even in declining from evil, as stated treating of sins in general. Therefore omission is not a above (a. 1, ad 2), while omission may be altogether with- special sin. out act. Therefore omission is not a special sin. Objection 2. Further, every sin is voluntary. Now On the contrary, It is written (James 4:17): “To omission sometimes is not voluntary but necessary, as him. . . who knoweth to do good and doth it not, to him when a woman is violated after taking a vow of virginity, it is sin.” or when one lose that which one is under an obligation to I answer that, omission signifies the non-fulfilment restore, or when a priest is bound to say Mass, and is pre- of a good, not indeed of any good, but of a good that is vented from doing so. Therefore omission is not always a due. Now good under the aspect of due belongs prop- sin. erly to justice; to legal justice, if the thing due depends Objection 3. Further, it is possible to fix the time on Divine or human law; to special justice, if the due is when any special sin begins. But this is not possible in something in relation to one’s neighbor. Wherefore, in the case of omission, since one is not altered by not doing the same way as justice is a special virtue, as stated above a thing, no matter when the omission occurs, and yet the (q. 58, Aa. 6,7), omission is a special sin distinct from the omission is not always sinful. Therefore omission is not a sins which are opposed to the other virtues; and just as special sin. doing good, which is the opposite of omitting it, is a spe- Objection 4. Further, every special sin is opposed to cial part of justice, distinct from avoiding evil, to which 1562 transgression is opposed, so too is omission distinct from and at that time the sin of omission begins. But it may transgression. happen that then one is unable to do what one ought, and Reply to Objection 2. Omission is not original but if this inability is without any fault on his part, he does not actual sin, not as though it had some act essential to it, omit his duty, as stated above (ad 2; Ia IIae, q. 71, a. 5). but for as much as the negation of an act is reduced to On the other hand if this inability is due to some previous the genus of act, and in this sense non-action is a kind of fault of his (for instance, if a man gets drunk at night, and action, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 71, a. 6, ad 1). cannot get up for matins, as he ought to), some say that Reply to Objection 2. Omission, as stated above, is the sin of omission begins when he engages in an action only of such good as is due and to which one is bound. that is illicit and incompatible with the act to which he Now no man is bound to the impossible: wherefore no is bound. But this does not seem to be true, for suppos- man sins by omission, if he does not do what he cannot. ing one were to rouse him by violence and that he went Accordingly she who is violated after vowing virginity, is to matins, he would not omit to go, so that, evidently, the guilty of an omission, not through not having virginity, previous drunkenness was not an omission, but the cause but through not repenting of her past sin, or through not of an omission. Consequently, we must say that the omis- doing what she can to fulfil her vow by observing conti- sion begins to be imputed to him as a sin, when the time nence. Again a priest is not bound to say Mass, except he comes for the action; and yet this is on account of a pre- have a suitable opportunity, and if this be lacking, there ceding cause by reason of which the subsequent omission is no omission. And in like manner, a person is bound becomes voluntary. to restitution, supposing he has the wherewithal; if he has Reply to Objection 4. Omission is directly opposed not and cannot have it, he is not guilty of an omission, to justice, as stated above; because it is a non-fulfilment of provided he does what he can. The same applies to other a good of virtue, but only under the aspect of due, which similar cases. pertains to justice. Now more is required for an act to be Reply to Objection 3. Just as the sin of transgression virtuous and meritorious than for it to be sinful and de- is opposed to negative precepts which regard the avoid- meritorious, because “good results from an entire cause, ance of evil, so the sin of omission is opposed to affirma- whereas evil arises from each single defect”∗. Wherefore tive precepts, which regard the doing of good. Now affir- the merit of justice requires an act, whereas an omission mative precepts bind not for always, but for a fixed time, does not. Whether a sin of omission is more grievous than a sin of transgression? IIa IIae q. 79 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that a sin of omission of sense, which is inflicted for the sin of transgression, is more grievous than a sin of transgression. For “delic- as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiii super Matth.). Now tum” would seem to signify the same as “derelictum”†, punishment is proportionate to fault. Therefore the sin of and therefore is seemingly the same as an omission. But omission is graver than the sin of transgression. “delictum” denotes a more grievous offence than trans- On the contrary, It is easier to refrain from evil deeds gression, because it deserves more expiation as appears than to accomplish good deeds. Therefore it is a graver from Lev. 5. Therefore the sin of omission is more sin not to refrain from an evil deed, i.e. “to transgress,” grievous than the sin of transgression. than not to accomplish a good deed, which is “to omit.” Objection 2. Further, the greater evil is opposed to the I answer that, The gravity of a sin depends on its re-greater good, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 10). moteness from virtue. Now contrariety is the greatest re- Now to do good is a more excellent part of justice, than moteness, according to Metaph. x‡. Wherefore a thing to decline from evil, to which transgression is opposed, as is further removed from its contrary than from its simple stated above (a. 1, ad 3). Therefore omission is a graver negation; thus black is further removed from white than sin than transgression. not-white is, since every black is not-white, but not con- Objection 3. Further, sins of transgression may be ei- versely. Now it is evident that transgression is contrary ther venial or mortal. But sins of omission seem to be to an act of virtue, while omission denotes the negation always mortal, since they are opposed to an affirmative thereof: for instance it is a sin of omission, if one fail to precept. Therefore omission would seem to be a graver give one’s parents due reverence, while it is a sin of trans- sin than transgression. gression to revile them or injure them in any way. Hence it Objection 4. Further, the pain of loss which consists is evident that, simply and absolutely speaking, transgres- in being deprived of seeing God and is inflicted for the sion is a graver sin than omission, although a particular sin of omission, is a greater punishment than the pain omission may be graver than a particular transgression. ∗ Dionysius, De Div. Nom. iv † Augustine, QQ. in Levit., qu. xx ‡ Didot. ed. ix, 4 1563 Reply to Objection 1. “Delictum” in its widest sense character of mortal sin. Transgression and omission, how-denotes any kind of omission; but sometimes it is taken ever, may be taken broadly for any infringement of an af- strictly for the omission of something concerning God, or firmative or negative precept, disposing to the opposite of for a man’s intentional and as it were contemptuous dere- such precept: and so taking both in a broad sense they liction of duty: and then it has a certain gravity, for which may be venial sins. reason it demands a greater expiation. Reply to Objection 4. To the sin of transgression Reply to Objection 2. The opposite of “doing good” there correspond both the pain of loss on account of the is both “not doing good,” which is an omission, and “do- aversion from God, and the pain of sense, on account of ing evil,” which is a transgression: but the first is opposed the inordinate conversion to a mutable good. In like man- by contradiction, the second by contrariety, which implies ner omission deserves not only the pain of loss, but also greater remoteness: wherefore transgression is the more the pain of sense, according to Mat. 7:19, “Every tree grievous sin. that bringeth not forth good fruit shall be cut down, and Reply to Objection 3. Just as omission is opposed to shall be cast into the fire”; and this on account of the root affirmative precepts, so is transgression opposed to nega- from which it grows, although it does not necessarily im- tive precepts: wherefore both, strictly speaking, have the ply conversion to any mutable good. 1564 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 80 Of the Potential Parts of Justice (In One Article) We must now consider the potential parts of justice, namely the virtues annexed thereto; under which head there are two points of consideration: (1) What virtues are annexed to justice? (2) The individual virtues annexed to justice. Whether the virtues annexed to justice are suitably enumerated? IIa IIae q. 80 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the virtues annexed to dering to another his due according to equality, as stated justice are unsuitably enumerated Tully∗ reckons six, viz. above (q. 58, a. 11). Wherefore in two ways may a virtue “religion, piety, gratitude, revenge, observance, truth.” directed to another person fall short of the perfection of Now revenge is seemingly a species of commutative jus- justice: first, by falling short of the aspect of equality; tice whereby revenge is taken for injuries inflicted, as secondly, by falling short of the aspect of due. For cer- stated above (q. 61, a. 4). Therefore it should not be reck- tain virtues there are which render another his due, but are oned among the virtues annexed to justice. unable to render the equal due. In the first place, what- Objection 2. Further, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. ever man renders to God is due, yet it cannot be equal, i, 8) reckons seven, viz. “innocence, friendship, concord, as though man rendered to God as much as he owes Him, piety, religion, affection, humanity,” several of which are according to Ps. 115:12, “What shall I render to the Lord omitted by Tully. Therefore the virtues annexed to justice for all the things that He hath rendered to me?” In this would seem to be insufficiently enumerated. respect “religion” is annexed to justice since, according to Objection 3. Further, others reckon five parts of jus- Tully (De invent. ii, 53), it consists in offering service and tice, viz. “obedience” in respect of one’s superiors, “disci- ceremonial rites or worship to “some superior nature that pline” with regard to inferiors, “equity” as regards equals, men call divine.” Secondly, it is not possible to make to “fidelity” and “truthfulness” towards all; and of these one’s parents an equal return of what one owes to them, as “truthfulness” alone is mentioned by Tully. Therefore he the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 14); and thus “piety” would seem to have enumerated insufficiently the virtues is annexed to justice, for thereby, as Tully says (De invent. annexed to justice. ii, 53), a man “renders service and constant deference to Objection 4. Further, the peripatetic Andronicus† his kindred and the well-wishers of his country.” Thirdly, reckons nine parts annexed to justice viz. “liberality, kind- according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), man is unable liness, revenge, commonsense,‡ piety, gratitude, holiness, to offer an equal meed for virtue, and thus “observance” is just exchange” and “just lawgiving”; and of all these it is annexed to justice, consisting according to Tully (De in- evident that Tully mentions none but “revenge.” There- vent. ii, 53) in the “deference and honor rendered to those fore he would appear to have made an incomplete enu- who excel in worth.” meration. A falling short of the just due may be considered Objection 5. Further, Aristotle (Ethic. v, 10) men- in respect of a twofold due, moral or legal: wherefore tions epieikeia as being annexed to justice: and yet seem-the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13) assigns a corresponding ingly it is not included in any of the foregoing enumera- twofold just. The legal due is that which one is bound tions. Therefore the virtues annexed to justice are insuffi- to render by reason of a legal obligation; and this due ciently enumerated. is chiefly the concern of justice, which is the principal I answer that, Two points must be observed about virtue. On the other hand, the moral due is that to which the virtues annexed to a principal virtue. The first is that one is bound in respect of the rectitude of virtue: and since these virtues have something in common with the princi- a due implies necessity, this kind of due has two degrees. pal virtue; and the second is that in some respect they fall For one due is so necessary that without it moral rectitude short of the perfection of that virtue. Accordingly since cannot be ensured: and this has more of the character of justice is of one man to another as stated above (q. 58, due. Moreover this due may be considered from the point a. 2), all the virtues that are directed to another person of view of the debtor, and in this way it pertains to this may by reason of this common aspect be annexed to jus- kind of due that a man represent himself to others just tice. Now the essential character of justice consists in ren- as he is, both in word and deed. Wherefore to justice is ∗ De Invent. ii, 53 † De Affectibus ‡ eugnomosyne 1565 annexed “truth,” whereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, because, as stated above, they have little of the nature of a 53), present, past and future things are told without per- due. version. It may also be considered from the point of view Reply to Objection 3. “Obedience” is included in of the person to whom it is due, by comparing the reward observance, which Tully mentions, because both rever- he receives with what he has done—sometimes in good ential honor and obedience are due to persons who ex- things; and then annexed to justice we have “gratitude” cel. “Faithfulness whereby a man’s acts agree with his which “consists in recollecting the friendship and kindli- words”∗, is contained in “truthfulness” as to the obser- ness shown by others, and in desiring to pay them back,” vance of one’s promises: yet “truthfulness” covers a wider as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53)—and sometimes in evil ground, as we shall state further on (q. 109, Aa. 1,3). “Dis- things, and then to justice is annexed “revenge,” whereby, cipline” is not due as a necessary duty, because one is un- as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53), “we resist force, in- der no obligation to an inferior as such, although a supe- jury or anything obscure§ by taking vengeance or by self- rior may be under an obligation to watch over his inferi- defense.” ors, according to Mat. 24:45, “A faithful and wise servant, There is another due that is necessary in the sense that whom his lord hath appointed over his family”: and for it conduces to greater rectitude, although without it recti- this reason it is omitted by Tully. It may, however, be in- tude may be ensured. This due is the concern of “liberal- cluded in humanity mentioned by Macrobius; and equity ity,” “affability” or “friendship,” or the like, all of which under epieikeia or under “friendship.” Tully omits in the aforesaid enumeration because there is Reply to Objection 4. This enumeration contains little of the nature of anything due in them. some belonging to true justice. To particular justice be- Reply to Objection 1. The revenge taken by author- longs “justice of exchange,” which he describes as “the ity of a public power, in accordance with a judge’s sen- habit of observing equality in commutations.” To legal tence, belongs to commutative justice: whereas the re- justice, as regards things to be observed by all, he ascribes venge which a man takes on his own initiative, though “legislative justice,” which he describes as “the science not against the law, or which a man seeks to obtain from of political commutations relating to the community.” As a judge, belongs to the virtue annexed to justice. regards things which have to be done in particular cases Reply to Objection 2. Macrobius appears to have beside the general laws, he mentions “common sense” or considered the two integral parts of justice, namely, “de- “good judgment†,” which is our guide in such like matters, clining from evil,” to which “innocence” belongs, and as stated above (q. 51, a. 4) in the treatise on prudence: “doing good,” to which the six others belong. Of these, wherefore he says that it is a “voluntary justification,” be- two would seem to regard relations between equals, cause by his own free will man observes what is just ac- namely, “friendship” in the external conduct and “con- cording to his judgment and not according to the written cord” internally; two regard our relations toward supe- law. These two are ascribed to prudence as their director, riors, namely, “piety” to parents, and “religion” to God; and to justice as their executor. Eusebeia [piety] means while two regard our relations towards inferiors, namely, “good worship” and consequently is the same as religion, “condescension,” in so far as their good pleases us, and wherefore he says that it is the science of “the service of “humanity,” whereby we help them in their needs. For God” (he speaks after the manner of Socrates who said Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man is said to be “humane, that ‘all the virtues are sciences’)‡: and “holiness” comes through having a feeling of love and pity towards men: to the same, as we shall state further on (q. 81, a. 8). Eu-this gives its name to humanity whereby we uphold one charistia (gratitude) means “good thanksgiving,” and is another.” In this sense “friendship” is understood as di-mentioned by Macrobius: wherefore Isidore says (Etym. recting our external conduct towards others, from which x) that “a kind man is one who is ready of his own accord point of view the Philosopher treats of it in Ethic. iv, 6. to do good, and is of gentle speech”: and Andronicus too “Friendship” may also be taken as regarding properly the says that “kindliness is a habit of voluntary beneficence.” affections, and as the Philosopher describes it in Ethic. “Liberality” would seem to pertain to “humanity.” viii and ix. In this sense three things pertain to friend- Reply to Objection 5. Epieikeia is annexed, not to ship, namely, “benevolence” which is here called “affec-particular but to legal justice, and apparently is the same tion”; “concord,” and “beneficence” which is here called as that which goes by the name of eugnomosyne [common “humanity.” These three, however, are omitted by Tully, sense]. § St. Thomas read ‘obscurum,’ and explains it as meaning ‘derogatory,’ infra q. 108, a. 2. Cicero, however, wrote ‘obfuturum,’ i.e. ‘hurtful.’ ∗ Cicero, De Repub. iv, De Offic. i, 7 † St. Thomas indicates the Greek derivation: eugnomosyne quasi ‘bona gnome.’ ‡ Aristotle, Ethic. vi, 13 1566 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 81 Of Religion (In Eight Articles) We must now consider each of the foregoing virtues, in so far as our present scope demands. We shall consider (1) religion, (2) piety, (3) observance, (4) gratitude, (5) revenge, (6) truth, (7) friendship, (8) liberality, (9) epieikeia. Of the other virtues that have been mentioned we have spoken partly in the treatise on charity, viz. of concord and the like, and partly in this treatise on justice, for instance, of right commutations and of innocence. of legislative justice we spoke in the treatise on prudence. Religion offers a threefold consideration: (1) Religion considered in itself; (2) its acts; (3) the opposite vices. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether religion regards only our relation to God? (2) Whether religion is a virtue? (3) Whether religion is one virtue? (4) Whether religion is a special virtue? (5) Whether religion is a theological virtue? (6) Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues? (7) Whether religion has any external actions? (8) Whether religion is the same as holiness? Whether religion directs man to God alone? IIa IIae q. 81 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that religion does not di- neighbor, according to the saying of Cato∗, “Worship thy rect man to God alone. It is written (James 1:27): “Re- parents.” Therefore religion directs us also to our neigh- ligion clean and undefiled before God and the Father is bor, and not only to God. this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribula- Objection 5. Further, all those who are in the state of tion, and to keep oneself unspotted from this world.” Now grace are subject to God. Yet not all who are in a state of “to visit the fatherless and widows” indicates an order be- grace are called religious, but only those who bind them- tween oneself and one’s neighbor, and “to keep oneself selves by certain vows and observances, and to obedience unspotted from this world” belongs to the order of a man to certain men. Therefore religion seemingly does not de- within himself. Therefore religion does not imply order note a relation of subjection of man to God. to God alone. On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii, 53) that “reli- Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei gion consists in offering service and ceremonial rites to a x, 1) that “since in speaking Latin not only unlettered but superior nature that men call divine.” even most cultured persons ere wont to speak of religion I answer that, as Isidore says (Etym. x), “according as being exhibited, to our human kindred and relations as to Cicero, a man is said to be religious from ‘religio,’ be- also to those who are linked with us by any kind of tie, cause he often ponders over, and, as it were, reads again that term does not escape ambiguity when it is a ques- [relegit], the things which pertain to the worship of God,” tion of Divine worship, so that we be able to say without so that religion would seem to take its name from read- hesitation that religion is nothing else but the worship of ing over those things which belong to Divine worship be- God.” Therefore religion signifies a relation not only to cause we ought frequently to ponder over such things in God but also to our kindred. our hearts, according to Prov. 3:6, “In all thy ways think Objection 3. Further, seemingly “latria” pertains to on Him.” According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3) it religion. Now “latria signifies servitude,” as Augustine may also take its name from the fact that “we ought to seek states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). And we are bound to serve not God again, whom we had lost by our neglect”†. Or again, only God, but also our neighbor, according to Gal. 5:13, religion may be derived from “religare” [to bind together], “By charity of the spirit serve one another.” Therefore re- wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55): “May reli- ligion includes a relation to one’s neighbor also. gion bind us to the one Almighty God.” However, whether Objection 4. Further, worship belongs to religion. religion take its name from frequent reading, or from a re- Now man is said to worship not only God, but also his peated choice of what has been lost through negligence, ∗ Dionysius Cato, Breves Sententiae † St. Augustine plays on the words ‘reeligere,’ i.e. to choose over again, and ‘negligere,’ to neglect or despise. 1567 or from being a bond, it denotes properly a relation to must needs be a special kind of service. Now it is evi-God. For it is He to Whom we ought to be bound as to dent that lordship belongs to God in a special and singular our unfailing principle; to Whom also our choice should way, because He made all things, and has supreme domin- be resolutely directed as to our last end; and Whom we ion over all. Consequently a special kind of service is due lose when we neglect Him by sin, and should recover by to Him, which is known as “latria” in Greek; and therefore believing in Him and confessing our faith. it belongs to religion. Reply to Objection 1. Religion has two kinds of acts. Reply to Objection 4. We are said to worship those Some are its proper and immediate acts, which it elic- whom we honor, and to cultivate∗: a man’s memory or its, and by which man is directed to God alone, for in- presence: we even speak of cultivating things that are be- stance, sacrifice, adoration and the like. But it has other neath us, thus a farmer [agricola] is one who cultivates the acts, which it produces through the medium of the virtues land, and an inhabitant [incola] is one who cultivates the which it commands, directing them to the honor of God, place where he dwells. Since, however, special honor is because the virtue which is concerned with the end, com- due to God as the first principle of all things, to Him also mands the virtues which are concerned with the means. is due a special kind of worship, which in Greek is Euse- Accordingly “to visit the fatherless and widows in their beia or Theosebeia, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, tribulation” is an act of religion as commanding, and an 1). act of mercy as eliciting; and “to keep oneself unspotted Reply to Objection 5. Although the name “religious” from this world” is an act of religion as commanding, but may be given to all in general who worship God, yet in of temperance or of some similar virtue as eliciting. a special way religious are those who consecrate their Reply to Objection 2. Religion is referred to those whole life to the Divine worship, by withdrawing from things one exhibits to one’s human kindred, if we take the human affairs. Thus also the term “contemplative” is ap- term religion in a broad sense, but not if we take it in its plied, not to those who contemplate, but to those who give proper sense. Hence, shortly before the passage quoted, up their whole lives to contemplation. Such men sub- Augustine says: “In a stricter sense religion seems to de- ject themselves to man, not for man’s sake but for God’s note, not any kind of worship, but the worship of God.” sake, according to the word of the Apostle (Gal. 4:14), Reply to Objection 3. Since servant implies relation “You. . . received me as an angel of God, even as Christ to a lord, wherever there is a special kind of lordship there Jesus.” Whether religion is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 81 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that religion is not a q. 55, Aa. 3,4) “a virtue is that which makes its posses- virtue. Seemingly it belongs to religion to pay reverence sor good, and his act good likewise,” wherefore we must to God. But reverence is an act of fear which is a gift, as needs say that every good act belongs to a virtue. Now it stated above (q. 19, a. 9). Therefore religion is not a virtue is evident that to render anyone his due has the aspect of but a gift good, since by rendering a person his due, one becomes Objection 2. Further, every virtue is a free exercise suitably proportioned to him, through being ordered to of the will, wherefore it is described as an “elective” or him in a becoming manner. But order comes under the voluntary “habit”†. Now, as stated above (a. 1, ad 3) “la- aspect of good, just as mode and species, according to tria” belongs to religion, and “latria” denotes a kind of Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii). Since then it belongs to re- servitude. Therefore religion is not a virtue. ligion to pay due honor to someone, namely, to God, it is Objection 3. Further, according to Ethic. ii, 1, apti- evident that religion is a virtue. tude for virtue is in us by nature, wherefore things pertain- Reply to Objection 1. To pay reverence to God is an ing to virtue belong to the dictate of natural reason. Now, act of the gift of fear. Now it belongs to religion to do cer- it belongs to religion “to offer ceremonial worship to the tain things through reverence for God. Hence it follows, Godhead”‡, and ceremonial matters, as stated above ( Ia not that religion is the same as the gift of fear, but that it IIae, q. 99, a. 3, ad 2; Ia IIae, q. 101), do not belong to is referred thereto as to something more excellent; for the the dictate of natural reason. Therefore religion is not a gifts are more excellent than the moral virtues, as stated virtue. above (q. 9, a. 1, ad 3; Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 8). On the contrary, It is enumerated with the other Reply to Objection 2. Even a slave can voluntarily virtues, as appears from what has been said above (q. 80). do his duty by his master, and so “he makes a virtue of I answer that, As stated above (q. 58, a. 3; Ia IIae, necessity”§, by doing his duty voluntarily. In like manner, ∗ In the Latin the same word ‘colere’ stands for ‘worship’ and ‘cultivate’ † Ethic. ii, 6 ‡ Cf. a. 1 § Jerome, Ep. liv, ad Furiam. 1568 to render due service to God may be an act of virtue, in so ence for God. But that he should do this or that determi-far as man does so voluntarily. nate thing does not belong to the dictate of natural reason, Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to the dictate of nat- but is established by Divine or human law. ural reason that man should do something through rever- Whether religion is one virtue? IIa IIae q. 81 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that religion is not one is My honor?” For it belongs to a father to beget and to virtue. Religion directs us to God, as stated above (a. 1). govern. Therefore it is evident that religion is one virtue. Now in God there are three Persons; and also many at- Reply to Objection 1. The three Divine Persons are tributes, which differ at least logically from one another. the one principle of the creation and government of things, Now a logical difference in the object suffices for a differ- wherefore they are served by one religion. The different ence of virtue, as stated above (q. 50, a. 2, ad 2). Therefore aspects of the attributes concur under the aspect of first religion is not one virtue. principle, because God produces all things, and governs Objection 2. Further, of one virtue there is seemingly them by the wisdom, will and power of His goodness. one act, since habits are distinguished by their acts. Now Wherefore religion is one virtue. there are many acts of religion, for instance to worship, Reply to Objection 2. By the one same act man both to serve, to vow, to pray, to sacrifice and many such like. serves and worships God, for worship regards the excel- Therefore religion is not one virtue. lence of God, to Whom reverence is due: while service Objection 3. Further, adoration belongs to religion. regards the subjection of man who, by his condition, is un- Now adoration is paid to images under one aspect, and der an obligation of showing reverence to God. To these under another aspect to God Himself. Since, then, a dif- two belong all acts ascribed to religion, because, by them ference of aspect distinguishes virtues, it would seem that all, man bears witness to the Divine excellence and to his religion is not one virtue. own subjection to God, either by offering something to On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:5): “One God God, or by assuming something Divine. [Vulg.: ‘Lord’], one faith.” Now true religion professes Reply to Objection 3. The worship of religion is paid faith in one God. Therefore religion is one virtue. to images, not as considered in themselves, nor as things, I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 2, ad but as images leading us to God incarnate. Now move-1), habits are differentiated according to a different aspect ment to an image as image does not stop at the image, but of the object. Now it belongs to religion to show reverence goes on to the thing it represents. Hence neither “latria” to one God under one aspect, namely, as the first princi- nor the virtue of religion is differentiated by the fact that ple of the creation and government of things. Wherefore religious worship is paid to the images of Christ. He Himself says (Malach. 1:6): “If. . . I be a father, where Whether religion is a special virtue, distinct from the others? IIa IIae q. 81 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that religion is not a spe- bor. Therefore religion is not a special virtue. cial virtue distinct from the others. Augustine says (De On the contrary, It is reckoned a part of justice, dis- Civ. Dei x, 6): “Any action whereby we are united to tinct from the other parts. God in holy fellowship, is a true sacrifice.” But sacri- I answer that, Since virtue is directed to the good, fice belongs to religion. Therefore every virtuous deed wherever there is a special aspect of good, there must be a belongs to religion; and consequently religion is not a spe- special virtue. Now the good to which religion is directed, cial virtue. is to give due honor to God. Again, honor is due to some- Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): one under the aspect of excellence: and to God a singular “Do all to the glory of God.” Now it belongs to religion excellence is competent, since He infinitely surpasses all to do anything in reverence of God, as stated above (a. 1, things and exceeds them in every way. Wherefore to Him ad 2; a. 2). Therefore religion is not a special virtue. is special honor due: even as in human affairs we see that Objection 3. Further, the charity whereby we love different honor is due to different personal excellences, God is not distinct from the charity whereby we love our one kind of honor to a father, another to the king, and so neighbor. But according to Ethic. viii, 8 “to be honored on. Hence it is evident that religion is a special virtue. is almost to be loved.” Therefore the religion whereby Reply to Objection 1. Every virtuous deed is said to we honor God is not a special virtue distinct from obser- be a sacrifice, in so far as it is done out of reverence of vance, or “dulia,” or piety whereby we honor our neigh- God. Hence this does not prove that religion is a general 1569 virtue, but that it commands all other virtues, as stated but the object of honor and reverence is something excel-above (a. 1, ad 1). lent. Now God’s goodness is communicated to the crea- Reply to Objection 2. Every deed, in so far as it is ture, but the excellence of His goodness is not. Hence done in God’s honor, belongs to religion, not as eliciting the charity whereby God is loved is not distinct from the but as commanding: those belong to religion as eliciting charity whereby our neighbor is loved; whereas the reli- which pertain to the reverence of God by reason of their gion whereby God is honored, is distinct from the virtues specific character. whereby we honor our neighbor. Reply to Objection 3. The object of love is the good, Whether religion is a theological virtue? IIa IIae q. 81 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that religion is a theolog- Now due worship is paid to God, in so far as certain ical virtue. Augustine says (Enchiridion iii) that “God is acts whereby God is worshiped, such as the offering of worshiped by faith, hope and charity,” which are theolog- sacrifices and so forth, are done out of reverence for God. ical virtues. Now it belongs to religion to pay worship to Hence it is evident that God is related to religion not as God. Therefore religion is a theological virtue. matter or object, but as end: and consequently religion is Objection 2. Further, a theological virtue is one that not a theological virtue whose object is the last end, but a has God for its object. Now religion has God for its ob- moral virtue which is properly about things referred to the ject, since it directs us to God alone, as stated above (a. 1). end. Therefore religion is a theological virtue. Reply to Objection 1. The power or virtue whose ac- Objection 3. Further, every virtue is either theolog- tion deals with an end, moves by its command the power ical, or intellectual, or moral, as is clear from what has or virtue whose action deals with matters directed to that been said ( Ia IIae, Qq. 57,58,62). Now it is evident that end. Now the theological virtues, faith, hope and char- religion is not an intellectual virtue, because its perfec- ity have an act in reference to God as their proper object: tion does not depend on the consideration of truth: nor wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of reli- is it a moral virtue, which consists properly in observing gion, which performs certain deeds directed to God: and the mean between too much and too little. for one can- so Augustine says that God is worshiped by faith, hope not worship God too much, according to Ecclus. 43:33, and charity. “Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can; for Reply to Objection 2. Religion directs man to God He is above all praise.” Therefore it remains that it is a not as its object but as its end. theological virtue. Reply to Objection 3. Religion is neither a theologi- On the contrary, It is reckoned a part of justice which cal nor an intellectual, but a moral virtue, since it is a part is a moral virtue. of justice, and observes a mean, not in the passions, but in I answer that, As stated above (a. 4) religion pays due actions directed to God, by establishing a kind of equal- worship to God. Hence two things are to be considered in ity in them. And when I say “equality,” I do not mean religion: first that which it offers to God, viz. worship, absolute equality, because it is not possible to pay God and this is by way of matter and object in religion; sec- as much as we owe Him, but equality in consideration of ondly, that to which something is offered, viz. God, to man’s ability and God’s acceptance. Whom worship is paid. And yet the acts whereby God is And it is possible to have too much in matters pertain- worshiped do not reach out to God himself, as when we ing to the Divine worship, not as regards the circumstance believe God we reach out to Him by believing; for which of quantity, but as regards other circumstances, as when reason it was stated (q. 1, Aa. 1,2,4) that God is the object Divine worship is paid to whom it is not due, or when it is of faith, not only because we believe in a God, but because not due, or unduly in respect of some other circumstance. we believe God. Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues? IIa IIae q. 81 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that religion should not other moral virtues. be preferred to the other moral virtues. The perfection Objection 2. Further, what is offered by one man to of a moral virtue consists in its observing the mean, as another is the more praiseworthy, according as the person stated in Ethic. ii, 6. But religion fails to observe the it is offered to is in greater need: wherefore it is written mean of justice, since it does not render an absolute equal (Is. 57:7): “Deal thy bread to the hungry.” But God needs to God. Therefore religion is not more excellent than the nothing that we can offer Him, according to Ps. 15:2, “I 1570 have said: Thou art my God, for Thou hast no need of my as stated above (a. 5; q. 4, a. 7), are about matters that goods.” Therefore religion would seem less praiseworthy are ordered to God as their end. And religion approaches than the other virtues whereby man’s needs are relieved. nearer to God than the other moral virtues, in so far as its Objection 3. Further, the greater. the obligation to actions are directly and immediately ordered to the honor do a thing, the less praise does it deserve, according to 1 of God. Hence religion excels among the moral virtues. Cor. 9:16, “If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me: Reply to Objection 1. Virtue is praised because of a necessity lieth upon me.” Now the more a thing is due, the will, not because of the ability: and therefore if a man the greater the obligation of paying it. Since, then, what fall short of equality which is the mean of justice, through is paid to God by man is in the highest degree due to Him, lack of ability, his virtue deserves no less praise, provided it would seem that religion is less praiseworthy than the there be no failing on the part of his will. other human virtues. Reply to Objection 2. In offering a thing to a man on On the contrary, The precepts pertaining to religion account of its usefulness to him, the more needy the man are given precedence (Ex. 20) as being of greatest impor- the more praiseworthy the offering, because it is more use- tance. Now the order of precepts is proportionate to the ful: whereas we offer a thing to God not on account of its order of virtues, since the precepts of the Law prescribe usefulness to Him, but for the sake of His glory, and on acts of virtue. Therefore religion is the chief of the moral account of its usefulness to us. virtues. Reply to Objection 3. Where there is an obligation to I answer that, Whatever is directed to an end takes do a thing it loses the luster of supererogation, but not the its goodness from being ordered to that end; so that the merit of virtue, provided it be done voluntarily. Hence the nearer it is to the end the better it is. Now moral virtues, argument proves nothing. Whether religion has an external act? IIa IIae q. 81 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that religion has not an for His sake (because He is of Himself full of glory to external act. It is written (Jn. 4:24): “God is a spirit, which no creature can add anything), but for our own sake, and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in because by the very fact that we revere and honor God, our truth.” Now external acts pertain, not to the spirit but to mind is subjected to Him; wherein its perfection consists, the body. Therefore religion, to which adoration belongs, since a thing is perfected by being subjected to its supe- has acts that are not external but internal. rior, for instance the body is perfected by being quick- Objection 2. Further, the end of religion is to pay God ened by the soul, and the air by being enlightened by the reverence and honor. Now it would savor of irreverence sun. Now the human mind, in order to be united to God, towards a superior, if one were to offer him that which needs to be guided by the sensible world, since “invisible properly belongs to his inferior. Since then whatever man things. . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things offers by bodily actions, seems to be directed properly to that are made,” as the Apostle says (Rom. 1:20). Where- the relief of human needs, or to the reverence of inferior fore in the Divine worship it is necessary to make use of creatures, it would seem unbecoming to employ them in corporeal things, that man’s mind may be aroused thereby, showing reverence to God. as by signs, to the spiritual acts by means of which he is Objection 3. Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) united to God. Therefore the internal acts of religion take commends Seneca for finding fault with those who offered precedence of the others and belong to religion essentially, to idols those things that are wont to be offered to men, be- while its external acts are secondary, and subordinate to cause, to wit, that which befits mortals is unbecoming to the internal acts. immortals. But such things are much less becoming to the Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord is speaking of that true God, Who is “exalted above all gods”∗. Therefore it which is most important and directly intended in the wor- would seem wrong to worship God with bodily actions. ship of God. Therefore religion has no bodily actions. Reply to Objection 2. These external things are of- On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 83:3): “My heart fered to God, not as though He stood in need of them, and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.” Now just as according to Ps. 49:13, “Shall I eat the flesh of bullocks? internal actions belong to the heart, so do external actions or shall I drink the blood of goats?” but as signs of the belong to the members of the flesh. Therefore it seems internal and spiritual works, which are of themselves ac- that God ought to be worshiped not only by internal but ceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, also by external actions. 5): “The visible sacrifice is the sacrament or sacred sign I answer that, We pay God honor and reverence, not of the invisible sacrifice.” ∗ Ps. 94:3 1571 Reply to Objection 3. Idolaters are ridiculed for of-were of themselves acceptable to the idols; and still more fering to idols things pertaining to men, not as signs arous- because they were foolish and wicked. ing them to certain spiritual things, but as though they Whether religion is the same as sanctity? IIa IIae q. 81 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that religion is not the purity is necessary in order that the mind be applied to same as sanctity. Religion is a special virtue, as stated God, since the human mind is soiled by contact with infe- above (a. 4): whereas sanctity is a general virtue, because rior things, even as all things depreciate by admixture with it makes us faithful, and fulfil our just obligations to God, baser things, for instance, silver by being mixed with lead. according to Andronicus∗. Therefore sanctity is not the Now in order for the mind to be united to the Supreme Be- same as religion. ing it must be withdrawn from inferior things: and hence Objection 2. Further, sanctity seems to denote a kind it is that without purity the mind cannot be applied to God. of purity. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii) that “sanc- Wherefore it is written (Heb. 12:14): “Follow peace with tity is free from all uncleanness, and is perfect and alto- all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see gether unspotted purity.” Now purity would seem above God.” Again, firmness is required for the mind to be ap- all to pertain to temperance which repels bodily unclean- plied to God, for it is applied to Him as its last end and ness. Since then religion belongs to justice, it would seem first beginning, and such things must needs be most im- that sanctity is not the same as religion. movable. Hence the Apostle said (Rom. 8:38,39): “I am Objection 3. Further, things that are opposite mem- sure that neither death, nor life. . . shall separate me† from bers of a division are not identified with one another. But the love of God.” in an enumeration given above (q. 80, ad 4) of the parts Accordingly, it is by sanctity that the human mind ap- of justice, sanctity is reckoned as distinct from religion. plies itself and its acts to God: so that it differs from re- Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion. ligion not essentially but only logically. For it takes the On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 1:74,75): name of religion according as it gives God due service in “That. . . we may serve Him. . . in holiness and justice.” matters pertaining specially to the Divine worship, such as Now, “to serve God” belongs to religion, as stated above sacrifices, oblations, and so forth; while it is called sanc- (a. 1, ad 3; a. 3, ad 2). Therefore religion is the same as tity, according as man refers to God not only these but sanctity. also the works of the other virtues, or according as man I answer that, The word “sanctity” seems to have two by means of certain good works disposes himself to the significations. In one way it denotes purity; and this sig- worship of God nification fits in with the Greek, for hagios means “un-Reply to Objection 1. Sanctity is a special virtue ac- soiled.” In another way it denotes firmness, wherefore in cording to its essence; and in this respect it is in a way olden times the term “sancta” was applied to such things identified with religion. But it has a certain generality, as were upheld by law and were not to be violated. Hence in so far as by its command it directs the acts of all the a thing is said to be sacred [sancitum] when it is ratified virtues to the Divine good, even as legal justice is said to by law. Again, in Latin, this word “sanctus” may be con- be a general virtue, in so far as it directs the acts of all the nected with purity, if it be resolved into “sanguine tinc-virtues to the common good. tus, since, in olden times, those who wished to be puri- Reply to Objection 2. Temperance practices purity, fied were sprinkled with the victim’s blood,” according to yet not so as to have the character of sanctity unless it be Isidore (Etym. x). In either case the signification requires referred to God. Hence of virginity itself Augustine says sanctity to be ascribed to those things that are applied to (De Virgin. viii) that “it is honored not for what it is, but the Divine worship; so that not only men, but also the for being consecrated to God.” temple, vessels and such like things are said to be sanc- Reply to Objection 3. Sanctity differs from religion tified through being applied to the worship of God. For as explained above, not really but logically. ∗ De Affectibus † Vulg.: ‘shall be able to separate us’ 1572 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 82 Of Devotion (In Four Articles) We must now consider the acts of religion. First, we shall consider the interior acts, which, as stated above, are its principal acts; secondly, we shall consider its exterior acts, which are secondary. The interior acts of religion are seemingly devotion and prayer. Accordingly we shall treat first of devotion, and afterwards of prayer. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether devotion is a special act? (2) Whether it is an act of religion? (3) Of the cause of devotion? (4) Of its effect? Whether devotion is a special act? IIa IIae q. 82 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that devotion is not a spe- two Decii (Decad. I, viii, 9; x, 28). Hence devotion is cial act. That which qualifies other acts is seemingly not a apparently nothing else but the will to give oneself read- special act. Now devotion seems to qualify other acts, for ily to things concerning the service of God. Wherefore it it is written (2 Paralip 29:31): “All the multitude offered is written (Ex. 35:20,21) that “the multitude of the chil- victims, and praises, and holocausts with a devout mind.” dren of Israel. . . offered first-fruits to the Lord with a most Therefore devotion is not a special act. ready and devout mind.” Now it is evident that the will to Objection 2. Further, no special kind of act is com- do readily what concerns the service of God is a special mon to various genera of acts. But devotion is common to kind of act. Therefore devotion is a special act of the will. various genera of acts, namely, corporal and spiritual acts: Reply to Objection 1. The mover prescribes the mode for a person is said to meditate devoutly and to genuflect of the movement of the thing moved. Now the will moves devoutly. Therefore devotion is not a special act. the other powers of the soul to their acts, and the will, in Objection 3. Further, every special act belongs ei- so far as it regards the end, moves both itself and whatever ther to an appetitive or to a cognitive virtue or power. is directed to the end, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 9, a. 3). But devotion belongs to neither, as may be seen by go- Wherefore, since devotion is an act of the will whereby ing through the various species of acts of either faculty, as a man offers himself for the service of God Who is the enumerated above ( Ia, Qq. 78, seqq.; Ia IIae, q. 23, a. 4). last end, it follows that devotion prescribes the mode to Therefore devotion is not a special act. human acts, whether they be acts of the will itself about On the contrary, Merits are acquired by acts as stated things directed to the end, or acts of the other powers that above ( Ia IIae, q. 21, Aa. 34). But devotion has a special are moved by the will. reason for merit. Therefore devotion is a special act. Reply to Objection 2. Devotion is to be found in var- I answer that, Devotion is derived from “devote”∗; ious genera of acts, not as a species of those genera, but wherefore those persons are said to be “devout” who, in as the motion of the mover is found virtually in the move- a way, devote themselves to God, so as to subject them- ments of the things moved. selves wholly to Him. Hence in olden times among the Reply to Objection 3. Devotion is an act of the ap- heathens a devotee was one who vowed to his idols to suf- petitive part of the soul, and is a movement of the will, as fer death for the safety of his army, as Livy relates of the stated above. Whether devotion is an act of religion? IIa IIae q. 82 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that devotion is not an devotion is an act of charity rather than of religion. act of religion. Devotion, as stated above (a. 1), consists Objection 2. Further, charity precedes religion; and in giving oneself up to God. But this is done chiefly by devotion seems to precede charity; since, in the Scrip- charity, since according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) “the tures, charity is represented by fire, while devotion is sig- Divine love produces ecstasy, for it takes the lover away nified by fatness which is the material of fire†. Therefore from himself and gives him to the beloved.” Therefore devotion is not an act of religion. ∗ The Latin ‘devovere’ means ‘to vow’ † Cant. 8:6; Ps. 52:6 1573 Objection 3. Further, by religion man is directed to Reply to Objection 1. It belongs immediately to char-God alone, as stated above (q. 81, a. 1). But devotion is ity that man should give himself to God, adhering to Him directed also to men; for we speak of people being devout by a union of the spirit; but it belongs immediately to re- to certain holy men, and subjects are said to be devoted to ligion, and, through the medium of religion, to charity their masters; thus Pope Leo says‡ that the Jews “out of which is the principle of religion, that man should give devotion to the Roman laws,” said: “We have no king but himself to God for certain works of Divine worship. Caesar.” Therefore devotion is not an act of religion. Reply to Objection 2. Bodily fatness is produced by On the contrary, Devotion is derived from “devo- the natural heat in the process of digestion, and at the vere,” as stated (a. 1). But a vow is an act of religion. same time the natural heat thrives, as it were, on this fat- Therefore devotion is also an act of religion. ness. In like manner charity both causes devotion (inas- I answer that, It belongs to the same virtue, to will much as love makes one ready to serve one’s friend) and to do something, and to have the will ready to do it, be- feeds on devotion. Even so all friendship is safeguarded cause both acts have the same object. For this reason the and increased by the practice and consideration of friendly Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1): “It is justice whereby men deeds. both will end do just actions.” Now it is evident that to do Reply to Objection 3. Devotion to God’s holy ones, what pertains to the worship or service of God, belongs dead or living, does not terminate in them, but passes on properly to religion, as stated above (q. 81). Wherefore to God, in so far as we honor God in His servants. But the it belongs to that virtue to have the will ready to do such devotion of subjects to their temporal masters is of another things, and this is to be devout. Hence it is evident that kind, just as service of a temporal master differs from the devotion is an act of religion. service of God. Whether contemplation or meditation is the cause of devotion? IIa IIae q. 82 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that contemplation or trinsic cause on our part must needs be meditation or con- meditation is not the cause of devotion. No cause hinders templation. For it was stated above (a. 1) that devotion is its effect. But subtle considerations about abstract matters an act of the will to the effect that man surrenders himself are often a hindrance to devotion. Therefore contempla- readily to the service of God. Now every act of the will tion or meditation is not the cause of devotion. proceeds from some consideration, since the object of the Objection 2. Further, if contemplation were the will is a good understood. Wherefore Augustine says (De proper and essential cause of devotion, the higher ob- Trin. ix, 12; xv, 23) that “the will arises from the intelli- jects of contemplation would arouse greater devotion. But gence.” Consequently meditation must needs be the cause the contrary is the case: since frequently we are urged to of devotion, in so far as through meditation man conceives greater devotion by considering Christ’s Passion and other the thought of surrendering himself to God’s service. In- mysteries of His humanity than by considering the great- deed a twofold consideration leads him thereto. The one ness of His Godhead. Therefore contemplation is not the is the consideration of God’s goodness and loving kind- proper cause of devotion. ness, according to Ps. 72:28, “It is good for me to adhere Objection 3. Further, if contemplation were the to my God, to put my hope in the Lord God”: and this proper cause of devotion, it would follow that those who consideration wakens love∗ which is the proximate cause are most apt for contemplation, are also most apt for de- of devotion. The other consideration is that of man’s own votion. Yet the contrary is to be noticed, for devotion is shortcomings, on account of which he needs to lean on frequently found in men of simplicity and members of the God, according to Ps. 120:1,2, “I have lifted up my eyes female sex, who are defective in contemplation. There- to the mountains, from whence help shall come to me: my fore contemplation is not the proper cause of devotion. help is from the Lord, Who made heaven and earth”; and On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 38:4): “In my med- this consideration shuts out presumption whereby man is itation a fire shall flame out.” But spiritual fire causes de- hindered from submitting to God, because he leans on His votion. Therefore meditation is the cause of devotion. strength. I answer that, The extrinsic and chief cause of devo- Reply to Objection 1. The consideration of such tion is God, of Whom Ambrose, commenting on Lk. 9:55, things as are of a nature to awaken our love† of God, says that “God calls whom He deigns to call, and whom causes devotion; whereas the consideration of foreign He wills He makes religious: the profane Samaritans, had matters that distract the mind from such things is a hin- He so willed, He would have made devout.” But the in- drance to devotion. ‡ Serm. viii, De Pass. Dom. ∗ ‘Dilectio,’ the interior act of charity; cf. q. 27 † ‘Dilectio,’ the interior act of charity; cf. q. 27 1574 Reply to Objection 2. Matters concerning the God-leading us thither as a guiding hand, although devotion head are, in themselves, the strongest incentive to love itself has for its object matters concerning the Godhead. [‘dilectio,’ the interior act of charity; cf. q. 27] and con- Reply to Objection 3. Science and anything else sequently to devotion, because God is supremely lovable. conducive to greatness, is to man an occasion of self- Yet such is the weakness of the human mind that it needs confidence, so that he does not wholly surrender him- a guiding hand, not only to the knowledge, but also to self to God. The result is that such like things some- the love of Divine things by means of certain sensible ob- times occasion a hindrance to devotion; while in simple jects known to us. Chief among these is the humanity souls and women devotion abounds by repressing pride. of Christ, according to the words of the Preface‡, “that If, however, a man perfectly submits to God his science through knowing God visibly, we may be caught up to or any other perfection, by this very fact his devotion is the love of things invisible.” Wherefore matters relating increased. to Christ’s humanity are the chief incentive to devotion, Whether joy is an effect of devotion? IIa IIae q. 82 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that joy is not an effect 41:3, “My soul hath thirsted after the strong living God,” of devotion. As stated above (a. 3, ad 2), Christ’s Passion and afterwards it is said (Ps. 41:4): “My tears have been is the chief incentive to devotion. But the consideration my bread,” etc. Secondarily devotion is caused as stated thereof causes an affliction of the soul, according to Lam. (a. 3), by the consideration of one’s own failings; for this 3:19, “Remember my poverty. . . the wormwood and the consideration regards the term from which man withdraws gall,” which refers to the Passion, and afterwards (Lam. by the movement of his devout will, in that he trusts not 3:20) it is said: “I will be mindful and remember, and my in himself, but subjects himself to God. This consider- soul shall languish within me.” Therefore delight or joy is ation has an opposite tendency to the first: for it is of not the effect of devotion. a nature to cause sorrow directly (when one thinks over Objection 2. Further, devotion consists chiefly in an one’s own failings), and joy accidentally, namely, through interior sacrifice of the spirit. But it is written (Ps. 50:19): hope of the Divine assistance. It is accordingly evident “A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit.” Therefore afflic- that the first and direct effect of devotion is joy, while the tion is the effect of devotion rather than gladness or joy. secondary and accidental effect is that “sorrow which is Objection 3. Further, Gregory of Nyssa says (De according to God”‡. Homine xii)∗ that “just as laughter proceeds from joy, so Reply to Objection 1. In the consideration of Christ’s tears and groans are signs of sorrow.” But devotion makes Passion there is something that causes sorrow, namely, the some people shed tears. Therefore gladness or joy is not human defect, the removal of which made it necessary for the effect of devotion. Christ to suffer§; and there is something that causes joy, On the contrary, We say in the Collect†: “That we namely, God’s loving-kindness to us in giving us such a who are punished by fasting may be comforted by a holy deliverance. devotion.” Reply to Objection 2. The spirit which on the one I answer that, The direct and principal effect of de- hand is afflicted on account of the defects of the present votion is the spiritual joy of the mind, though sorrow is life, on the other hand is rejoiced, by the consideration of its secondary and indirect effect. For it has been stated God’s goodness, and by the hope of the Divine help. (a. 3) that devotion is caused by a twofold consideration: Reply to Objection 3. Tears are caused not only chiefly by the consideration of God’s goodness, because through sorrow, but also through a certain tenderness of this consideration belongs to the term, as it were, of the the affections, especially when one considers something movement of the will in surrendering itself to God, and that gives joy mixed with pain. Thus men are wont to shed the direct result of this consideration is joy, according to tears through a sentiment of piety, when they recover their Ps. 76:4, “I remembered God, and was delighted”; but children or dear friends, whom they thought to have lost. accidentally this consideration causes a certain sorrow in In this way tears arise from devotion. those who do not yet enjoy God fully, according to Ps. ‡ Preface for Christmastide ∗ Orat. funebr. de Placilla Imp. † Thursday after fourth Sunday of Lent ‡ 2 Cor. 7:10 § Lk. 24:25 1575 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 83 Of Prayer (In Seventeen Articles) We must now consider prayer, under which head there are seventeen points of inquiry: (1) Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive or of the cognitive power? (2) Whether it is fitting to pray to God? (3) Whether prayer is an act of religion? (4) Whether we ought to pray to God alone? (5) Whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray? (6) Whether we ought to ask for temporal things when we pray? (7) Whether we ought to pray for others? (8) Whether we ought to pray for our enemies? (9) Of the seven petitions of the Lord’s Prayer; (10) Whether prayer is proper to the rational creature? (11) Whether the saints in heaven pray for us? (12) Whether prayer should be vocal? (13) Whether attention is requisite in prayer? (14) Whether prayer should last a long time? (15) Whether prayer is meritorious?∗ (16) Whether sinners impetrate anything from God by praying?† (17) of the different kinds of prayer. Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive power? IIa IIae q. 83 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that prayer is an act of I answer that, According to Cassiodorus‡ “prayer the appetitive power. It belongs to prayer to be heard. [oratio] is spoken reason [oris ratio].” Now the specula- Now it is the desire that is heard by God, according to Ps. tive and practical reason differ in this, that the speculative 9:38, “The Lord hath heard the desire of the poor.” There- merely apprehends its object, whereas the practical rea- fore prayer is desire. But desire is an act of the appetitive son not only apprehends but causes. Now one thing is the power: and therefore prayer is also. cause of another in two ways: first perfectly, when it ne- Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. cessitates its effect, and this happens when the effect is iii): “It is useful to begin everything with prayer, because wholly subject to the power of the cause; secondly im- thereby we surrender ourselves to God and unite ourselves perfectly, by merely disposing to the effect, for the reason to Him.” Now union with God is effected by love which that the effect is not wholly subject to the power of the belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore prayer belongs cause. Accordingly in this way the reason is cause of cer- to the appetitive power. tain things in two ways: first, by imposing necessity; and Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher states (De An- in this way it belongs to reason, to command not only the ima iii, 6) that there are two operations of the intellective lower powers and the members of the body, but also hu- part. Of these the first is “the understanding of indivisi- man subjects, which indeed is done by commanding; sec- bles,” by which operation we apprehend what a thing is: ondly, by leading up to the effect, and, in a way, disposing while the second is “synthesis” and “analysis,” whereby to it, and in this sense the reason asks for something to be we apprehend that a thing is or is not. To these a third may done by things not subject to it, whether they be its equals be added, namely, “reasoning,” whereby we proceed from or its superiors. Now both of these, namely, to command the known to the unknown. Now prayer is not reducible to and to ask or beseech, imply a certain ordering, seeing that any of these operations. Therefore it is an operation, not man proposes something to be effected by something else, of the intellective, but of the appetitive power. wherefore they pertain to the reason to which it belongs to On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x) that “to pray set in order. For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, is to speak.” Now speech belongs to the intellect. There- 13) that the “reason exhorts us to do what is best.” fore prayer is an act, not of the appetitive, but of the intel- lective power. ∗ Art. 16 † Art. 15 ‡ Comment. in Ps. 38:13 1576 Now in the present instance we are speaking of prayer§ to God through being moved by the will of charity, as it as signifying a beseeching or petition, in which sense Au- were, and this in two ways. First, on the part of the object gustine¶: says (De Verb. Dom.) that “prayer is a petition,” of our petition, because when we pray we ought princi- and Damascene states (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that “to pray pally to ask to be united to God, according to Ps. 26:4, is to ask becoming things of God.” Accordingly it is evi- “One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek af- dent that prayer, as we speak of it now, is an act of reason. ter, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days Reply to Objection 1. The Lord is said to hear the de- of my life.” Secondly, on the part of the petitioner, who sire of the poor, either because desire is the cause of their ought to approach the person whom he petitions, either petition, since a petition is like the interpreter of a desire, locally, as when he petitions a man, or mentally, as when or in order to show how speedily they are heard, since no he petitions God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) sooner do the poor desire something than God hears them that “when we call upon God in our prayers, we unveil our before they put up a prayer, according to the saying of Is. mind in His presence”: and in the same sense Damascene 65:24, “And it shall come to pass, that before they call, I says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that “prayer is the raising up will hear.” of the mind to God.” Reply to Objection 2. As stated above ( Ia, q. 82, Reply to Objection 3. These three acts belong to the a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 9, a. 1, ad 3), the will moves the reason speculative reason, but to the practical reason it belongs to its end: wherefore nothing hinders the act of reason, in addition to cause something by way of command or of under the motion of the will, from tending to an end such petition, as stated above. as charity which is union with God. Now prayer tends Whether it is becoming to pray? IIa IIae q. 83 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that it is unbecoming to vine providence, or through the compelling influence of pray. Prayer seems to be necessary in order that we may the stars, or on account of the connection of causes: and make our needs known to the person to whom we pray. this opinion also excluded the utility of prayer. There was But according to Mat. 6:32, “Your Father knoweth that a third opinion of those who held that human affairs are you have need of all these things.” Therefore it is not be- indeed ruled by Divine providence, and that they do not coming to pray to God. happen of necessity; yet they deemed the disposition of Objection 2. Further, by prayer we bend the mind of Divine providence to be changeable, and that it is changed the person to whom we pray, so that he may do what is by prayers and other things pertaining to the worship of asked of him. But God’s mind is unchangeable and in- God. All these opinions were disproved in the flexible, according to 1 Kings 15:29, “But the Triumpher Ia, q. 19, Aa. 7,8; Ia, q. 22, Aa. 2,4; Ia, q. 115, a. 6; in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repen- Ia, q. 116. Wherefore it behooves us so to account for the tance.” Therefore it is not fitting that we should pray to utility of prayer as neither to impose necessity on human God. affairs subject to Divine providence, nor to imply change- Objection 3. Further, it is more liberal to give to one ableness on the part of the Divine disposition. that asks not, than to one who asks because, according to In order to throw light on this question we must con- Seneca (De Benefic. ii, 1), “nothing is bought more dearly sider that Divine providence disposes not only what ef- than what is bought with prayers.” But God is supremely fects shall take place, but also from what causes and liberal. Therefore it would seem unbecoming to pray to in what order these effects shall proceed. Now among God. other causes human acts are the causes of certain effects. On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 18:1): “We ought Wherefore it must be that men do certain actions. not that always to pray, and not to faint.” thereby they may change the Divine disposition, but that I answer that, Among the ancients there was a three- by those actions they may achieve certain effects accord- fold error concerning prayer. Some held that human af- ing to the order of the Divine disposition: and the same fairs are not ruled by Divine providence; whence it would is to be said of natural causes. And so is it with regard follow that it is useless to pray and to worship God at all: to prayer. For we pray not that we may change the Di- of these it is written (Malach. 3:14): “You have said: He vine disposition, but that we may impetrate that which laboreth in vain that serveth God.” Another opinion held God has disposed to be fulfilled by our prayers in other that all things, even in human affairs, happen of neces- words “that by asking, men may deserve to receive what sity, whether by reason of the unchangeableness of Di- Almighty God from eternity has disposed to give,” as Gre- § This last paragraph refers to the Latin word ‘oratio’ [prayer] which originally signified a speech, being derived in the first instance from ‘os,’ ‘oris’ (the mouth). ¶ Rabanus, De Univ. vi, 14 1577 gory says (Dial. i, 8) on us out of His liberality, even without our asking for Reply to Objection 1. We need to pray to God, not in them: but that He wishes to bestow certain things on us order to make known to Him our needs or desires but that at our asking, is for the sake of our good, namely, that we ourselves may be reminded of the necessity of having we may acquire confidence in having recourse to God, recourse to God’s help in these matters. and that we may recognize in Him the Author of our Reply to Objection 2. As stated above, our motive in goods. Hence Chrysostom says∗: “Think what happiness praying is, not Divine disposition, we may change the Di- is granted thee, what honor bestowed on thee, when thou vine disposition, but that, by our prayers, we may obtain conversest with God in prayer, when thou talkest with what God has appointed. Christ, when thou askest what thou wilt, whatever thou Reply to Objection 3. God bestows many things desirest.” Whether prayer is an act of religion? IIa IIae q. 83 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that prayer is not an act of to Him, and by praying confesses that he needs Him as religion. Since religion is a part of justice, it resides in the the Author of his goods. Hence it is evident that prayer is will as in its subject. But prayer belongs to the intellec- properly an act of religion. tive part, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore prayer seems to Reply to Objection 1. The will moves the other pow- be an act, not of religion, but of the gift of understanding ers of the soul to its end, as stated above (q. 82, a. 1, ad 1), whereby the mind ascends to God. and therefore religion, which is in the will, directs the acts Objection 2. Further, the act of “latria” falls under a of the other powers to the reverence of God. Now among necessity of precept. But prayer does not seem to come the other powers of the soul the intellect is the highest, under a necessity of precept, but to come from the mere and the nearest to the will; and consequently after devo- will, since it is nothing else than a petition for what we tion which belongs to the will, prayer which belongs to the will. Therefore prayer seemingly is not an act of religion. intellective part is the chief of the acts of religion, since by Objection 3. Further, it seems to belong to religion it religion directs man’s intellect to God. that one “offers worship end ceremonial rites to the God- Reply to Objection 2. It is a matter of precept not head”†. But prayer seems not to offer anything to God, but only that we should ask for what we desire, but also that to. ask to obtain something from Him. Therefore prayer we should desire aright. But to desire comes under a pre- is not an act of religion. cept of charity, whereas to ask comes under a precept of On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 140:2): “Let my religion, which precept is expressed in Mat. 7:7, where it prayer be directed as incense in Thy sight”: and a gloss is said: “Ask and ye shall receive”‡. on the passage says that “it was to signify this that under Reply to Objection 3. By praying man surrenders the old Law incense was said to be offered for a sweet his mind to God, since he subjects it to Him with rev- smell to the Lord.” Now this belongs to religion. There- erence and, so to speak, presents it to Him, as appears fore prayer is an act of religion. from the words of Dionysius quoted above (a. 1, obj. 2). I answer that, As stated above (q. 81, Aa. 2,4), it be- Wherefore just as the human mind excels exterior things, longs properly to religion to show honor to God, where- whether bodily members, or those external things that are fore all those things through which reverence is shown to employed for God’s service, so too, prayer surpasses other God, belong to religion. Now man shows reverence to acts of religion. God by means of prayer, in so far as he subjects himself Whether we ought to pray to God alone? IIa IIae q. 83 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that we ought to pray to than by words, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 God alone. Prayer is an act of religion, as stated above Cor. 14:15), “I will pray with the spirit, I will pray also (a. 3). But God alone is to be worshiped by religion. with the understanding”: and again because, as Augus- Therefore we should pray to God alone. tine says (De Cura pro mortuis xiii) the “dead, even the Objection 2. Further, it is useless to pray to one who saints, know not what the living, even their own children, is ignorant of the prayer. But it belongs to God alone to are doing.” Therefore we ought to pray to God alone. know one’s prayer, both because frequently prayer is ut- Objection 3. Further, if we pray to any of the saints, tered by an interior act which God alone knows, rather this is only because they are united to God. Now some ∗ Implicitly [Hom. ii, de Orat.: Hom. xxx in Genes. ]; Cf. Caten. Aur. on Lk. 18 † Cicero, Rhet. ii, 53 ‡ Vulg.: ‘Ask and it shall be given you.’ 1578 yet living in this world, or even some who are in Purga-Reply to Objection 1. To Him alone do we offer re- tory, are closely united to God by grace, and yet we do ligious worship when praying, from Whom we seek to not pray to them. Therefore neither should we pray to the obtain what we pray for, because by so doing we confess saints who are in Paradise. that He is the Author of our goods: but not to those whom On the contrary, It is written (Job 5:1), “Call. . . if we call upon as our advocates in God’s presence. there be any that will answer thee, and turn to some of Reply to Objection 2. The dead, if we consider the saints.” their natural condition, do not know what takes place I answer that, Prayer is offered to a person in two in this world, especially the interior movements of the ways: first, as to be fulfilled by him, secondly, as to be heart. Nevertheless, according to Gregory (Moral. xii, obtained through him. In the first way we offer prayer 21), whatever it is fitting the blessed should know about to God alone, since all our prayers ought to be directed what happens to us, even as regards the interior move- to the acquisition of grace and glory, which God alone ments of the heart, is made known to them in the Word: gives, according to Ps. 83:12, “The Lord will give grace and it is most becoming to their exalted position that they and glory.” But in the second way we pray to the saints, should know the petitions we make to them by word or whether angels or men, not that God may through them thought; and consequently the petitions which we raise to know our petitions, but that our prayers may be effec- them are known to them through Divine manifestation. tive through their prayers and merits. Hence it is written Reply to Objection 3. Those who are in this world or (Apoc. 8:4) that “the smoke of the incense,” namely “the in Purgatory, do not yet enjoy the vision of the Word, so prayers of the saints ascended up before God.” This is also as to be able to know what we think or say. Wherefore we clear from the very style employed by the Church in pray- do not seek their assistance by praying to them, but ask it ing: since we beseech the Blessed Trinity “to have mercy of the living by speaking to them. on us,” while we ask any of the saints “to pray for us.” Whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray? IIa IIae q. 83 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to ask because they at any rate know what is good for each one for anything definite when we pray to God. According whereas when we pray we frequently ask for what it had to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 24), “to pray is to ask been better for us not to obtain.” This opinion is true to a becoming things of God”; wherefore it is useless to pray certain extent, as to those things which may have an evil for what is inexpedient, according to James 4:3, “You ask, result, and which man may use ill or well, such as “riches, and receive not: because you ask amiss.” Now according by which,” as stated by the same authority (Fact. et Dict. to Rom. 8:26, “we know not what we should pray for as Memor. vii, 2), “many have come to an evil end; honors, we ought.” Therefore we ought not to ask for anything which have ruined many; power, of which we frequently definite when we pray. witness the unhappy results; splendid marriages, which Objection 2. Further, those who ask another person sometimes bring about the total wreck of a family.” Nev- for something definite strive to incline his will to do what ertheless there are certain goods which man cannot ill use, they wish themselves. But we ought not to endeavor to because they cannot have an evil result. Such are those make God will what we will; on the contrary, we ought which are the object of beatitude and whereby we merit to strive to will what He wills, according to a gloss on Ps. it: and these the saints seek absolutely when they pray, as 32:1, “Rejoice in the Lord, O ye just.” Therefore we ought in Ps. 79:4, “Show us Thy face, and we shall be saved,” not to ask God for anything definite when we pray. and again in Ps. 118:35, “Lead me into the path of Thy Objection 3. Further, evil things are not to be sought commandments.” from God; and as to good things, God Himself invites us Reply to Objection 1. Although man cannot by him- to take them. Now it is useless to ask a person to give you self know what he ought to pray for, “the Spirit,” as stated what he invites you to take. Therefore we ought not to ask in the same passage, “helpeth our infirmity,” since by in- God for anything definite in our prayers. spiring us with holy desires, He makes us ask for what is On the contrary, our Lord (Mat. 6 and Lk. 11) taught right. Hence our Lord said (Jn. 4:24) that true adorers His disciples to ask definitely for those things which are “must adore. . . in spirit and in truth.” contained in the petitions of the Lord’s Prayer. Reply to Objection 2. When in our prayers we ask I answer that, According to Valerius Maximus∗, for things concerning our salvation, we conform our will “Socrates deemed that we should ask the immortal gods to God’s, of Whom it is written (1 Tim. 2:4) that “He will for nothing else but that they should grant us good things, have all men to be saved.” ∗ Fact. et Dict. Memor. vii, 2 1579 Reply to Objection 3. God so invites us to take good the body, but by pious desires and devout prayers. things, that we may approach to them not by the steps of Whether man ought to ask God for temporal things when he prays? IIa IIae q. 83 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that man ought not to ask towards beatitude, in so far, to wit, as they are the means God for temporal things when he prays. We seek what of supporting the life of the body, and are of service to we ask for in prayer. But we should not seek for tempo- us as instruments in performing acts of virtue, as also the ral things, for it is written (Mat. 6:33): “Seek ye. . . first Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 8). Augustine too says the the kingdom of God, and His justice: and all these things same to Proba (ad Probam, de orando Deum, Ep. cxxx, shall be added unto you,” that is to say, temporal things, 6,7) when he states that “it is not unbecoming for any- which, says He, we are not to seek, but they will be added one to desire enough for a livelihood, and no more; for to what we seek. Therefore temporal things are not to be this sufficiency is desired, not for its own sake, but for the asked of God in prayer. welfare of the body, or that we should desire to be clothed Objection 2. Further, no one asks save for that which in a way befitting one’s station, so as not to be out of keep- he is solicitous about. Now we ought not to have solici- ing with those among whom we have to live. Accordingly tude for temporal things, according to the saying of Mat. we ought to pray that we may keep these things if we have 6:25, “Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat.” them, and if we have them not, that we may gain posses- Therefore we ought not to ask for temporal things when sion of them.” we pray. Reply to Objection 1. We should seek temporal Objection 3. Further, by prayer our mind should be things not in the first but in the second place. Hence Au- raised up to God. But by asking for temporal things, it de- gustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 16): “When He scends to things beneath it, against the saying of the Apos- says that this” (i.e. the kingdom of God) “is to be sought tle (2 Cor. 4:18), “While we look not at the things which first, He implies that the other” (i.e. temporal goods) “is are seen, but at the things which are not seen. For the to be sought afterwards, not in time but in importance, this things which are seen are temporal, but the things which as being our good, the other as our need.” are not seen are eternal.” Therefore man ought not to ask Reply to Objection 2. Not all solicitude about tempo- God for temporal things when he prays. ral things is forbidden, but that which is superfluous and Objection 4. Further, man ought not to ask of God inordinate, as stated above (q. 55, a. 6). other than good and useful things. But sometimes tempo- Reply to Objection 3. When our mind is intent on ral things, when we have them, are harmful, not only in a temporal things in order that it may rest in them, it re- spiritual sense, but also in a material sense. Therefore we mains immersed therein; but when it is intent on them in should not ask God for them in our prayers. relation to the acquisition of beatitude, it is not lowered On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 30:8): “Give me by them, but raises them to a higher level. only the necessaries of life.” Reply to Objection 4. From the very fact that we ask I answer that, As Augustine says (ad Probam, de for temporal things not as the principal object of our peti- orando Deum, Ep. cxxx, 12): “It is lawful to pray for tion, but as subordinate to something else, we ask God for what it is lawful to desire.” Now it is lawful to desire tem- them in the sense that they may be granted to us in so far poral things, not indeed principally, by placing our end as they are expedient for salvation. therein, but as helps whereby we are assisted in tending Whether we ought to pray for others? IIa IIae q. 83 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to pray Father anything in My name He will give it you,” says for others. In praying we ought to conform to the pattern (Tract. cii): “Everyone is heard when he prays for him- given by our Lord. Now in the Lord’s Prayer we make self, not when he prays for all; wherefore He does not say petitions for ourselves, not for others; thus we say: “Give simply ‘He will give it,’ but ‘He will give it you. ’ ” There- us this day our daily bread,” etc. Therefore we should not fore it would seem that we ought not to pray for others, but pray for others. only for ourselves. Objection 2. Further, prayer is offered that it may be Objection 3. Further, we are forbidden to pray for heard. Now one of the conditions required for prayer that others, if they are wicked, according to Jer. 7:16, “There- it may be heard is that one pray for oneself, wherefore fore do not then pray for this people. . . and do not with- Augustine in commenting on Jn. 16:23, “If you ask the stand Me, for I will not hear thee.” On the other hand we 1580 are not bound to pray for the good, since they are heard out of charity, according to Ps. 34:13, “My prayer shall when they pray for themselves. Therefore it would seem be turned into my bosom, i.e. though it profit them not, I that we ought not to pray for others. am not deprived of my reward,” as the gloss expounds it. On the contrary, It is written (James 5:16): “Pray one Reply to Objection 3. We ought to pray even for sin- for another, that you may be saved.” ners, that they may be converted, and for the just that they I answer that, As stated above (a. 6), when we pray may persevere and advance in holiness. Yet those who we ought to ask for what we ought to desire. Now we pray are heard not for all sinners but for some: since they ought to desire good things not only for ourselves, but also are heard for the predestined, but not for those who are for others: for this is essential to the love which we owe foreknown to death; even as the correction whereby we to our neighbor, as stated above (q. 25, Aa. 1,12; q. 27, correct the brethren, has an effect in the predestined but a. 2; q. 31, a. 1). Therefore charity requires us to pray for not in the reprobate, according to Eccles. 7:14, “No man others. Hence Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Matth.)∗: can correct whom God hath despised.” Hence it is writ- “Necessity binds us to pray for ourselves, fraternal char- ten (1 Jn. 5:16): “He that knoweth his brother to sin a sin ity urges us to pray for others: and the prayer that fraternal which is not to death, let him ask, and life shall be given charity proffers is sweeter to God than that which is the to him, who sinneth not to death.” Now just as the benefit outcome of necessity.” of correction must not be refused to any man so long as he Reply to Objection 1. As Cyprian says (De orat. lives here below, because we cannot distinguish the pre- Dom.), “We say ‘Our Father’ and not ‘My Father,’ ‘Give destined from the reprobate, as Augustine says (De Cor- us’ and not ‘Give me,’ because the Master of unity did not rep. et Grat. xv), so too no man should be denied the help wish us to pray privately, that is for ourselves alone, for of prayer. He wished each one to pray for all, even as He Himself We ought also to pray for the just for three reasons: bore all in one.” First, because the prayers of a multitude are more easily Reply to Objection 2. It is a condition of prayer that heard, wherefore a gloss on Rom. 15:30, “Help me in one pray for oneself: not as though it were necessary in your prayers,” says: “The Apostle rightly tells the lesser order that prayer be meritorious, but as being necessary brethren to pray for him, for many lesser ones, if they be in order that prayer may not fail in its effect of impetra- united together in one mind, become great, and it is im- tion. For it sometimes happens that we pray for another possible for the prayers of a multitude not to obtain” that with piety and perseverance, and ask for things relating to which is possible to be obtained by prayer. Secondly, that his salvation, and yet it is not granted on account of some many may thank God for the graces conferred on the just, obstacle on the part of the person we are praying for, ac- which graces conduce to the profit of many, according to cording to Jer. 15:1, “If Moses and Samuel shall stand be- the Apostle (2 Cor. 1:11). Thirdly, that the more perfect fore Me, My soul is not towards this people.” And yet the may not wax proud, seeing that they find that they need prayer will be meritorious for the person who prays thus the prayers of the less perfect. Whether we ought to pray for our enemies? IIa IIae q. 83 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to pray pray for our enemies, but against them. for our enemies. According to Rom. 15:4, “what things Objection 3. Further, man’s deed should not be con- soever were written, were written for our learning.” Now trary to his prayer. Now sometimes men lawfully attack Holy Writ contains many imprecations against enemies; their enemies, else all wars would be unlawful, which is thus it is written (Ps. 6:11): “Let all my enemies be opposed to what we have said above (q. 40, a. 1). There- ashamed and be. . . troubled, let them be ashamed and be fore we should not pray for our enemies. troubled very speedily†.” Therefore we too should pray On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:44): “Pray for against rather than for our enemies. them that persecute and calumniate you.” Objection 2. Further, to be revenged on one’s ene- I answer that, To pray for another is an act of charity, mies is harmful to them. But holy men seek vengeance of as stated above (a. 7). Wherefore we are bound to pray their enemies according to Apoc. 6:10, “How long. . . dost for our enemies in the same manner as we are bound to Thou not. . . revenge our blood on them that dwell on love them. Now it was explained above in the treatise on earth?” Wherefore they rejoice in being revenged on their charity (q. 25, Aa. 8,9), how we are bound to love our en- enemies, according to Ps. 57:11, “The just shall rejoice emies, namely, that we must love in them their nature, not when he shall see the revenge.” Therefore we should not their sin. and that to love our enemies in general is a mat- ∗ Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom † Vulg.: ‘Let them be turned back and be ashamed.’ 1581 ter of precept, while to love them in the individual is not a of sin, with the purpose, to wit, of destroying sin by the matter of precept, except in the preparedness of the mind, correction of men. Fourthly, by way of conformity of our so that a man must be prepared to love his enemy even in will to the Divine justice with regard to the damnation of the individual and to help him in a case of necessity, or if those who are obstinate in sin. his enemy should beg his forgiveness. But to love one’s Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine states in the enemies absolutely in the individual, and to assist them, is same book (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 22), “the mar- an act of perfection. tyrs’ vengeance is the overthrow of the kingdom of sin, In like manner it is a matter of obligation that we because they suffered so much while it reigned”: or as he should not exclude our enemies from the general prayers says again (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. lxviii), “their prayer which we offer up for others: but it is a matter of perfec- for vengeance is expressed not in words but in their minds, tion, and not of obligation, to pray for them individually, even as the blood of Abel cried from the earth.” They re- except in certain special cases. joice in vengeance not for its own sake, but for the sake of Reply to Objection 1. The imprecations contained in Divine justice. Holy Writ may be understood in four ways. First, accord- Reply to Objection 3. It is lawful to attack one’s ene- ing to the custom of the prophets “to foretell the future un- mies, that they may be restrained from sin: and this is for der the veil of an imprecation,” as Augustine states∗. Sec- their own good and for the good of others. Consequently ondly, in the sense that certain temporal evils are some- it is even lawful in praying to ask that temporal evils be times inflicted by God on the wicked for their correction. inflicted on our enemies in order that they may mend their Thirdly, because they are understood to be pronounced, ways. Thus prayer and deed will not be contrary to one not against the men themselves, but against the kingdom another. Whether the seven petitions of the Lord’s Prayer are fittingly assigned? IIa IIae q. 83 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that the seven petitions of Who art in heaven,” which seem to indicate a desire to the Lord’s Prayer are not fittingly assigned. It is useless win God’s benevolence. to ask for that to be hallowed which is always holy. But On the contrary, The authority of Christ, who com- the name of God is always holy, according to Lk. 1:49, posed this prayer, suffices. “Holy is His name.” Again, His kingdom is everlasting, I answer that, The Lord’s Prayer is most perfect, be- according to Ps. 144:13, “Thy kingdom is a kingdom of cause, as Augustine says (ad Probam Ep. cxxx, 12), “if all ages.” Again, God’s will is always fulfilled, according we pray rightly and fittingly, we can say nothing else but to Isa 46:10, “All My will shall be done.” Therefore it is what is contained in this prayer of our Lord.” For since useless to ask for “the name of God to be hallowed,” for prayer interprets our desires, as it were, before God, then “His kingdom to come,” and for “His will to be done.” alone is it right to ask for something in our prayers when it Objection 2. Further, one must withdraw from evil is right that we should desire it. Now in the Lord’s Prayer before attaining good. Therefore it seems unfitting for the not only do we ask for all that we may rightly desire, but petitions relating to the attainment of good to be set forth also in the order wherein we ought to desire them, so that before those relating to the removal of evil. this prayer not only teaches us to ask, but also directs all Objection 3. Further, one asks for a thing that it our affections. Thus it is evident that the first thing to be may be given to one. Now the chief gift of God is the the object of our desire is the end, and afterwards what- Holy Ghost, and those gifts that we receive through Him. ever is directed to the end. Now our end is God towards Therefore the petitions seem to be unfittingly assigned, Whom our affections tend in two ways: first, by our will- since they do not correspond to the gifts of the Holy ing the glory of God, secondly, by willing to enjoy His Ghost. glory. The first belongs to the love whereby we love God Objection 4. Further, according to Luke, only five in Himself, while the second belongs to the love whereby petitions are mentioned in the Lord’s Prayer, as appears we love ourselves in God. Wherefore the first petition is from the eleventh chapter. Therefore it was superfluous expressed thus: “Hallowed be Thy name,” and the second for Matthew to mention seven. thus: “Thy kingdom come,” by which we ask to come to Objection 5. Further, it seems useless to seek to win the glory of His kingdom. the benevolence of one who forestalls us by his benevo- To this same end a thing directs us in two ways: in one lence. Now God forestalls us by His benevolence, since way, by its very nature, in another way, accidentally. Of “He first hath loved us” ( 1 Jn. 4:19). Therefore it is use- its very nature the good which is useful for an end directs less to preface the petitions with the words our “Father us to that end. Now a thing is useful in two ways to that ∗ De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 21 1582 end which is beatitude: in one way, directly and princi-Reply to Objection 2. Since prayer is the interpreter pally, according to the merit whereby we merit beatitude of desire, the order of the petitions corresponds with the by obeying God, and in this respect we ask: “Thy will order, not of execution, but of desire or intention, where be done on earth as it is in heaven”; in another way in- the end precedes the things that are directed to the end, strumentally, and as it were helping us to merit, and in and attainment of good precedes removal of evil. this respect we say: “Give us this day our daily bread,” Reply to Objection 3. Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in whether we understand this of the sacramental Bread, the Monte ii, 11) adapts the seven petitions to the gifts and daily use of which is profitable to man, and in which all beatitudes. He says: “If it is fear God whereby blessed the other sacraments are contained, or of the bread of the are the poor in spirit, let us ask that God’s name be hal- body, so that it denotes all sufficiency of food, as Augus- lowed among men with a chaste fear. If it is piety whereby tine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 11), since the Eucharist blessed are the meek, let us ask that His kingdom may is the chief sacrament, and bread is the chief food: thus come, so that we become meek and no longer resist Him. in the Gospel of Matthew we read, “supersubstantial,” i.e. If it is knowledge whereby blessed are they that mourn, “principal,” as Jerome expounds it. let us pray that His will be done, for thus we shall mourn We are directed to beatitude accidentally by the re- no more. If it is fortitude whereby blessed ere they that moval of obstacles. Now there are three obstacles to our hunger, let us pray that our daily bread be given to us. If it attainment of beatitude. First, there is sin, which directly is counsel whereby blessed are the merciful, let us forgive excludes a man from the kingdom, according to 1 Cor. the trespasses of others that our own may be forgiven. If 6:9,10, “Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, etc., shall pos- it is understanding whereby blessed are the pure in heart, sess the kingdom of God”; and to this refer the words, let us pray lest we have a double heart by seeking after “Forgive us our trespasses.” Secondly, there is temptation worldly things which ere the occasion of our temptations. which hinders us from keeping God’s will, and to this we If it is wisdom whereby blessed are the peacemakers for refer when we say: “And lead us not into temptation,” they shall be called the children of God, let us pray to be whereby we do not ask not to be tempted, but not to be delivered from evil: for if we be delivered we shall by that conquered by temptation, which is to be led into temp- very fact become the free children of God.” tation. Thirdly, there is the present penal state which is Reply to Objection 4. According to Augustine a kind of obstacle to a sufficiency of life, and to this we (Enchiridion cxvi), “Luke included not seven but five pe- refer in the words, “Deliver us from evil.” titions in the Lord’s Prayer, for by omitting it, he shows Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Serm. that the third petition is a kind of repetition of the two that Dom. in Monte ii, 5), when we say, “Hallowed be Thy precede, and thus helps us to understand it”; because, to name, we do not mean that God’s name is not holy, but wit, the will of God tends chiefly to this—that we come to we ask that men may treat it as a holy thing,” and this per- the knowledge of His holiness and to reign together with tains to the diffusion of God’s glory among men. When Him. Again the last petition mentioned by Matthew, “De- we say, “Thy kingdom come, we do not imply that God is liver us from evil,” is omitted by Luke, so that each one not reigning now,” but “we excite in ourselves the desire may know himself to be delivered from evil if he be not for that kingdom, that it may come to us, and that we may led into temptation. reign therein,” as Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, Reply to Objection 5. Prayer is offered up to God, 11). The words, “Thy will be done rightly signify, ‘May not that we may bend Him, but that we may excite in our- Thy commandments be obeyed’ on earth as in heaven, i.e. selves the confidence to ask: which confidence is excited by men as well as by angels” (De Serm. Dom. in Monte in us chiefly by the consideration of His charity in our ii, 6). Hence these three petitions will be perfectly ful- regard, whereby he wills our good—wherefore we say: filled in the life to come; while the other four, according “Our Father”; and of His excellence, whereby He is able to Augustine (Enchiridion cxv), belong to the needs of the to fulfil it—wherefore we say: “Who art in heaven.” present life Whether prayer is proper to the rational creature? IIa IIae q. 83 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that prayer is not proper the Apostle says of the Holy Ghost (Rom. 8:26): “The to the rational creature. Asking and receiving apparently Spirit. . . asketh for us.” belong to the same subject. But receiving is becoming Objection 2. Angels are above rational creatures, also to uncreated Persons, viz. the Son and Holy Ghost. since they are intellectual substances. Now prayer is be- Therefore it is competent to them to pray: for the Son said coming to the angels, wherefore we read in the Ps. 96:7: (Jn. 14:16): “I will ask My [Vulg.: ‘the’] Father,” and “Adore Him, all you His angels.” Therefore prayer is not 1583 proper to the rational creature. Reply to Objection 1. Receiving belongs to the Di- Objection 3. Further, the same subject is fitted to pray vine Persons in respect of their nature, whereas prayer be-as is fitted to call upon God, since this consists chiefly in longs to one who receives through grace. The Son is said prayer. But dumb animals are fitted to call upon God, ac- to ask or pray in respect of His assumed, i.e. His human, cording to Ps. 146:9, “Who giveth to beasts their food and nature and not in respect of His Godhead: and the Holy to the young ravens that call upon Him.” Therefore prayer Ghost is said to ask, because He makes us ask. is not proper to the rational creatures. Reply to Objection 2. As stated in the Ia, q. 79, a. 8, On the contrary, Prayer is an act of reason, as stated intellect and reason are not distinct powers in us: but they above (a. 1). But the rational creature is so called from his differ as the perfect from the imperfect. Hence intellectual reason. Therefore prayer is proper to the rational creature. creatures which are the angels are distinct from rational I answer that, As stated above (a. 1) prayer is an act of creatures, and sometimes are included under them. In this reason, and consists in beseeching a superior; just as com- sense prayer is said to be proper to the rational creature. mand is an act of reason, whereby an inferior is directed Reply to Objection 3. The young ravens are said to to something. Accordingly prayer is properly competent call upon God, on account of the natural desire whereby to one to whom it is competent to have reason, and a su- all things, each in its own way, desire to attain the Divine perior whom he may beseech. Now nothing is above the goodness. Thus too dumb animals are said to obey God, Divine Persons; and dumb animals are devoid of reason. on account of the natural instinct whereby they are moved Therefore prayer is unbecoming both the Divine Persons by God. and dumb animals, and it is proper to the rational creature. Whether the saints in heaven pray for us? IIa IIae q. 83 a. 11 Objection 1. It would seem that the saints in heaven live, we can pray one for another; but that after we are do not pray for us. A man’s action is more meritorious for dead, none of our prayers for others can be heard, see- himself than for others. But the saints in heaven do not ing that not even the martyrs’ prayers are granted when merit for themselves, neither do they pray for themselves, they pray for their blood to be avenged.” But this is abso- since they are already established in the term. Neither lutely false, because, since prayers offered for others pro- therefore do they pray for us. ceed from charity, as stated above (Aa. 7,8), the greater Objection 2. Further, the saints conform their will to the charity of the saints in heaven, the more they pray for God perfectly, so that they will only what God wills. Now wayfarers, since the latter can be helped by prayers: and what God wills is always fulfilled. Therefore it would be the more closely they are united to God, the more are their useless for the saints to pray for us. prayers efficacious: for the Divine order is such that lower Objection 3. Further, just as the saints in heaven are beings receive an overflow of the excellence of the higher, above, so are those in Purgatory, for they can no longer even as the air receives the brightness of the sun. Where- sin. Now those in Purgatory do not pray for us, on the fore it is said of Christ (Heb. 7:25): “Going to God by contrary we pray for them. Therefore neither do the saints His own power. . . to make intercession for us”∗. Hence in heaven pray for us. Jerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6): “If the apostles and mar- Objection 4. Further, if the saints in heaven pray for tyrs while yet in the body and having to be solicitous for us, the prayers of the higher saints would be more effica- themselves, can pray for others, how much more now that cious; and so we ought not to implore the help of the lower they have the crown of victory and triumph.” saints’ prayers but only of those of the higher saints. Reply to Objection 1. The saints in heaven, since Objection 5. Further, the soul of Peter is not Peter. If they are blessed, have no lack of bliss, save that of the therefore the souls of the saints pray for us, so long as they body’s glory, and for this they pray. But they pray for us are separated from their bodies, we ought not to call upon who lack the ultimate perfection of bliss: and their prayers Saint Peter, but on his soul, to pray for us: yet the Church are efficacious in impetrating through their previous mer- does the contrary. The saints therefore do not pray for us, its and through God’s acceptance. at least before the resurrection. Reply to Objection 2. The saints impetrate what ever On the contrary, It is written (2 Macc. 15:14): “This God wishes to take place through their prayers: and they is. . . he that prayeth much for the people, and for all the pray for that which they deem will be granted through holy city, Jeremias the prophet of God.” their prayers according to God’s will. I answer that, As Jerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6), Reply to Objection 3. Those who are in Purgatory the error of Vigilantius consisted in saying that “while we though they are above us on account of their impeccabil- ∗ Vulg.: ‘He is able to save for ever them that come to God by Him, always living to make intercession for us.’ 1584 ity, yet they are below us as to the pains which they suffer: efficacious, either because he is implored with greater de-and in this respect they are not in a condition to pray, but votion, or because God wishes to make known his sanc- rather in a condition that requires us to pray for them. tity. Reply to Objection 4. It is God’s will that inferior Reply to Objection 5. It is because the saints while beings should be helped by all those that are above them, living merited to pray for us, that we invoke them under wherefore we ought to pray not only to the higher but also the names by which they were known in this life, and by to the lower saints; else we should have to implore the which they are better known to us: and also in order to in- mercy of God alone. Nevertheless it happens sometime dicate our belief in the resurrection, according to the say- that prayers addressed to a saint of lower degree are more ing of Ex. 3:6, “I am the God of Abraham,” etc. Whether prayer should be vocal? IIa IIae q. 83 a. 12 Objection 1. It would seem that prayer ought not to be we arouse ourselves more effectively to an increase of vocal. As stated above (a. 4), prayer is addressed chiefly holy desires.” Hence then alone should we use words and to God. Now God knows the language of the heart. There- such like signs when they help to excite the mind inter- fore it is useless to employ vocal prayer. nally. But if they distract or in any way impede the mind Objection 2. Further, prayer should lift man’s mind we should abstain from them; and this happens chiefly to God, as stated above (a. 1, ad 2). But words, like other to those whose mind is sufficiently prepared for devotion sensible objects, prevent man from ascending to God by without having recourse to those signs. Wherefore the contemplation. Therefore we should not use words in our Psalmist (Ps. 26:8) said: “My heart hath said to Thee: prayers. ‘My face hath sought Thee,’ ” and we read of Anna (1 Objection 3. Further, prayer should be offered to Kings 1:13) that “she spoke in her heart.” Secondly, the God in secret, according to Mat. 6:6, “But thou, when voice is used in praying as though to pay a debt, so that thou shalt pray, enter into thy chamber, and having shut man may serve God with all that he has from God, that is the door, pray to thy Father in secret.” But prayer loses to say, not only with his mind, but also with his body: and its secrecy by being expressed vocally. Therefore prayer this applies to prayer considered especially as satisfactory. should not be vocal. Hence it is written (Osee 14:3): “Take away all iniquity, On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 141:2): “I cried to and receive the good: and we will render the calves of our the Lord with my voice, with my voice I made supplica- lips.” Thirdly, we have recourse to vocal prayer, through tion to the Lord.” a certain overflow from the soul into the body, through I answer that, Prayer is twofold, common and indi- excess of feeling, according to Ps. 15:9, “My heart hath vidual. Common prayer is that which is offered to God been glad, and my tongue hath rejoiced.” by the ministers of the Church representing the body of Reply to Objection 1. Vocal prayer is employed, not the faithful: wherefore such like prayer should come to in order to tell God something He does not know, but in the knowledge of the whole people for whom it is offered: order to lift up the mind of the person praying or of other and this would not be possible unless it were vocal prayer. persons to God. Therefore it is reasonably ordained that the ministers of Reply to Objection 2. Words about other matters dis- the Church should say these prayers even in a loud voice, tract the mind and hinder the devotion of those who pray: so that they may come to the knowledge of all. but words signifying some object of devotion lift up the On the other hand individual prayer is that which is mind, especially one that is less devout. offered by any single person, whether he pray for him- Reply to Objection 3. As Chrysostom says∗, “Our self or for others; and it is not essential to such a prayer Lord forbids one to pray in presence of others in order as this that it be vocal. And yet the voice is employed that one may be seen by others. Hence when you pray, do in such like prayers for three reasons. First, in order to nothing strange to draw men’s attention, either by shout- excite interior devotion, whereby the mind of the person ing so as to be heard by others, or by openly striking the praying is raised to God, because by means of external heart, or extending the hands, so as to be seen by many. signs, whether of words or of deeds, the human mind is And yet, “according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in moved as regards apprehension, and consequently also as Monte ii, 3), “it is not wrong to be seen by men, but to do regards the affections. Hence Augustine says (ad Probam. this or that in order to be seen by men.” Ep. cxxx, 9) that “by means of words and other signs ∗ Hom. xiii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom 1585 Whether attention is a necessary condition of prayer? IIa IIae q. 83 a. 13 Objection 1. It would seem that attention is a neces- intention is lacking, prayer lacks both merit and impetra- sary condition of prayer. It is written (Jn. 4:24): “God tion: because, as Gregory‡ says, “God hears not the prayer is a spirit, and they that adore Him must adore Him in of those who pay no attention to their prayer.” The third spirit and in truth.” But prayer is not in spirit unless it be effect of prayer is that which it produces at once; this is attentive. Therefore attention is a necessary condition of the spiritual refreshment of the mind, and for this effect prayer. attention is a necessary condition: wherefore it is written Objection 2. Further, prayer is “the ascent of the mind (1 Cor. 14:14): “If I pray in a tongue. . . my understanding to God”∗. But the mind does not ascend to God if the is without fruit.” prayer is inattentive. Therefore attention is a necessary It must be observed, however, that there are three condition of prayer. kinds of attention that can be brought to vocal prayer: one Objection 3. Further, it is a necessary condition of which attends to the words, lest we say them wrong, an- prayer that it should be altogether sinless. Now if a man other which attends to the sense of the words, and a third, allows his mind to wander while praying he is not free of which attends to the end of prayer, namely, God, and to sin, for he seems to make light of God; even as if he were the thing we are praying for. That last kind of attention is to speak to another man without attending to what he was most necessary, and even idiots are capable of it. More- saying. Hence Basil says† that the “Divine assistance is to over this attention, whereby the mind is fixed on God, is be implored, not lightly, nor with a mind wandering hither sometimes so strong that the mind forgets all other things, and thither: because he that prays thus not only will not as Hugh of St. Victor states§. obtain what he asks, nay rather will he provoke God to Reply to Objection 1. To pray in spirit and in truth is anger.” Therefore it would seem a necessary condition of to set about praying through the instigation of the Spirit, prayer that it should be attentive. even though afterwards the mind wander through weak- On the contrary, Even holy men sometimes suffer ness. from a wandering of the mind when they pray, according Reply to Objection 2. The human mind is unable to Ps. 39:13, “My heart hath forsaken me.” to remain aloft for long on account of the weakness of I answer that, This question applies chiefly to vocal nature, because human weakness weighs down the soul prayer. Accordingly we must observe that a thing is nec- to the level of inferior things: and hence it is that when, essary in two ways. First, a thing is necessary because while praying, the mind ascends to God by contemplation, thereby the end is better obtained: and thus attention is of a sudden it wanders off through weakness. absolutely necessary for prayer. Secondly, a thing is said Reply to Objection 3. Purposely to allow one’s mind to be necessary when without it something cannot obtain to wander in prayer is sinful and hinders the prayer from its effect. Now the effect of prayer is threefold. The first is having fruit. It is against this that Augustine says in his an effect which is common to all acts quickened by char- Rule (Ep. ccxi): “When you pray God with psalms and ity, and this is merit. In order to realize this effect, it is hymns, let your mind attend to that which your lips pro- not necessary that prayer should be attentive throughout; nounce.” But to wander in mind unintentionally does not because the force of the original intention with which one deprive prayer of its fruit. Hence Basil says (De Constit. sets about praying renders the whole prayer meritorious, Monach. i): “If you are so truly weakened by sin that you as is the case with other meritorious acts. The second ef- are unable to pray attentively, strive as much as you can to fect of prayer is proper thereto, and consists in impetra- curb yourself, and God will pardon you, seeing that you tion: and again the original intention, to which God looks are unable to stand in His presence in a becoming manner, chiefly, suffices to obtain this effect. But if the original not through negligence but through frailty.” Whether prayer should last a long time? IIa IIae q. 83 a. 14 Objection 1. It would seem that prayer should not be Now a desire is all the holier according as it is centered continual. It is written (Mat. 6:7): “When you are pray- on one thing, according to Ps. 26:4, “One thing I have ing, speak not much.” Now one who prays a long time asked of the Lord, this will I seek after.” Therefore the needs to speak much, especially if his be vocal prayer. shorter prayer is, the more is it acceptable to God. Therefore prayer should not last a long time. Objection 3. Further, it seems to be wrong to Objection 2. Further, prayer expresses the desire. transgress the limits fixed by God, especially in mat- ∗ Damascene, De Fide Orth. iii, 24 † De Constit. Monach. i ‡ Hugh St. Victor, Expos. in Reg. S. Aug. iii § De Modo Orandi ii 1586 ters concerning Divine worship, according to Ex. 19:21: prayer slacken and languish, through the strain being pro- “Charge the people, lest they should have a mind to pass longed. By so doing they make it sufficiently clear not the limits to see the Lord, and a very great multitude of only that this attention must not be forced if we are un- them should perish.” But God has fixed for us the limits able to keep it up, but also that if we are able to continue, of prayer by instituting the Lord’s Prayer (Mat. 6). There- it should not be broken off too soon.” And just as we must fore it is not right to prolong our prayer beyond its limits. judge of this in private prayers by considering the atten- Objection 4. On the contrary, It would seem that we tion of the person praying, so too, in public prayers we ought to pray continually. For our Lord said (Lk. 18:1): must judge of it by considering the devotion of the peo- “We ought always to pray, and not to faint”: and it is writ- ple. ten (1 Thess. 5:17): “Pray without ceasing.” Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (ad Probam. I answer that, We may speak about prayer in two Ep. cxxx), “to pray with many words is not the same as to ways: first, by considering it in itself; secondly, by con- pray long; to speak long is one thing, to be devout long is sidering it in its cause. The not cause of prayer is the another. For it is written that our Lord passed the whole desire of charity, from which prayer ought to arise: and night in prayer, and that He ‘prayed the longer’ in order this desire ought to be in us continually, either actually to set us an example.” Further on he says: “When pray- or virtually, for the virtue of this desire remains in what- ing say little, yet pray much so long as your attention is ever we do out of charity; and we ought to “do all things fervent. For to say much in prayer is to discuss your need to the glory of God” (1 Cor. 10:31). From this point of in too many words: whereas to pray much is to knock at view prayer ought to be continual: wherefore Augustine the door of Him we pray, by the continuous and devout says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 9): “Faith, hope and char- clamor of the heart. Indeed this business is frequently ity are by themselves a prayer of continual longing.” But done with groans rather than with words, with tears rather prayer, considered in itself, cannot be continual, because than with speech.” we have to be busy about other works, and, as Augustine Reply to Objection 2. Length of prayer consists, not says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9), “we pray to God with our in praying for many things, but in the affections persisting lips at certain intervals and seasons, in order to admon- in the desire of one thing. ish ourselves by means of such like signs, to take note of Reply to Objection 3. Our Lord instituted this prayer, the amount of our progress in that desire, and to arouse not that we might use no other words when we pray, but ourselves more eagerly to an increase thereof.” Now the that in our prayers we might have none but these things in quantity of a thing should be commensurate with its end, view, no matter how we express them or think of them. for instance the quantity of the dose should be commensu- Reply to Objection 4. One may pray continually, ei- rate with health. And so it is becoming that prayer should ther through having a continual desire, as stated above; or last long enough to arouse the fervor of the interior desire: through praying at certain fixed times, though interrupt- and when it exceeds this measure, so that it cannot be con- edly; or by reason of the effect, whether in the person who tinued any longer without causing weariness, it should be prays—because he remains more devout even after pray- discontinued. Wherefore Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. ing, or in some other person—as when by his kindness a cxxx): “It is said that the brethren in Egypt make frequent man incites another to pray for him, even after he himself but very short prayers, rapid ejaculations, as it were, lest has ceased praying. that vigilant and erect attention which is so necessary in Whether prayer is meritorious? IIa IIae q. 83 a. 15 Objection 1. It would seem that prayer is not merito- Objection 3. Further, prayer is based chiefly on faith, rious. All merit proceeds from grace. But prayer precedes according to James 1:6, “But let him ask in faith, nothing grace, since even grace is obtained by means of prayer ac- wavering.” Now faith is not sufficient for merit, as in- cording to Lk. 11:13, ”(How much more) will your Father stanced in those who have lifeless faith. Therefore prayer from heaven give the good Spirit to them that ask Him!” is not a meritorious act. Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act. On the contrary, A gloss on the words of Ps. 34:13, Objection 2. Further, if prayer merits anything, this “My prayer shall be turned into my bosom,” explains them would seem to be chiefly that which is besought in prayer. as meaning, “if my prayer does not profit them, yet shall Yet it does not always merit this, because even the saints’ not I be deprived of my reward.” Now reward is not due prayers are frequently not heard; thus Paul was not heard save to merit. Therefore prayer is meritorious. when he besought the sting of the flesh to be removed I answer that, As stated above (a. 13) prayer, besides from him. Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act. causing spiritual consolation at the time of praying, has a 1587 twofold efficacy in respect of a future effect, namely, effi-sin, which would be an impious prayer. And sometimes cacy in meriting and efficacy in impetrating. Now prayer, it is not necessary for salvation, nor yet manifestly con- like any other virtuous act, is efficacious in meriting, be- trary thereto; and then although he who prays may merit cause it proceeds from charity as its root, the proper ob- eternal life by praying, yet he does not merit to obtain ject of which is the eternal good that we merit to enjoy. what he asks for. Hence Augustine says (Liber. Sentent. Yet prayer proceeds from charity through the medium of Prosperi sent. ccxii): “He who faithfully prays God for religion, of which prayer is an act, as stated above (a. 3), the necessaries of this life, is both mercifully heard, and and with the concurrence of other virtues requisite for the mercifully not heard. For the physician knows better than goodness of prayer, viz. humility and faith. For the of- the sick man what is good for the disease.” For this rea- fering of prayer itself to God belongs to religion, while son, too, Paul was not heard when he prayed for the re- the desire for the thing. that we pray to be accomplished moval of the sting in his flesh, because this was not ex- belongs to charity. Faith is necessary in reference to God pedient. If, however, we pray for something that is useful to Whom we pray; that is, we need to believe that we can for our beatitude, through being conducive to salvation, obtain from Him what we seek. Humility is necessary on we merit it not only by praying, but also by doing other the part of the person praying, because he recognizes his good deeds: therefore without any doubt we receive what neediness. Devotion too is necessary: but this belongs to we ask for, yet when we ought to receive it: “since cer- religion, for it is its first act and a necessary condition of tain things are not denied us, but are deferred that they all its secondary acts, as stated above (q. 82, Aa. 1,2). may be granted at a suitable time,” according to Augus- As to its efficacy in impetrating, prayer derives this tine (Tract. cii in Joan.): and again this may be hindered from the grace of God to Whom we pray, and Who in- if we persevere not in asking for it. Wherefore Basil says stigates us to pray. Wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. (De Constit. Monast. i): “The reason why sometimes Dom., Serm. cv, 1): “He would not urge us to ask, unless thou hast asked and not received, is because thou hast He were willing to give”; and Chrysostom∗ says: “He asked amiss, either inconsistently, or lightly, or because never refuses to grant our prayers, since in His loving- thou hast asked for what was not good for thee, or be- kindness He urged us not to faint in praying.” cause thou hast ceased asking.” Since, however, a man Reply to Objection 1. Neither prayer nor any other cannot condignly merit eternal life for another, as stated virtuous act is meritorious without sanctifying grace. And above ( Ia IIae, q. 114, a. 6), it follows that sometimes yet even that prayer which impetrates sanctifying grace one cannot condignly merit for another things that pertain proceeds from some grace, as from a gratuitous gift, since to eternal life. For this reason we are not always heard the very act of praying is “a gift of God,” as Augustine when we pray for others, as stated above (a. 7, ad 2,3). states (De Persever. xxiii). Hence it is that four conditions are laid down; namely, Reply to Objection 2. Sometimes the merit of prayer to ask—“for ourselves—things necessary for salvation— regards chiefly something distinct from the object of one’s piously—perseveringly”; when all these four concur, we petition. For the chief object of merit is beatitude, whereas always obtain what we ask for. the direct object of the petition of prayer extends some- Reply to Objection 3. Prayer depends chiefly on times to certain other things, as stated above (Aa. 6,7). faith, not for its efficacy in meriting, because thus it de- Accordingly if this other thing that we ask for ourselves be pends chiefly on charity, but for its efficacy in impetrat- not useful for our beatitude, we do not merit it; and some- ing, because it is through faith that man comes to know times by asking for and desiring such things we lose merit of God’s omnipotence and mercy, which are the source for instance if we ask of God the accomplishment of some whence prayer impetrates what it asks for. Whether sinners impetrate anything from God by their prayers? IIa IIae q. 83 a. 16 Objection 1. It would seem that sinners impetrate what they merit, as stated above (a. 15, ad 2). But sinners nothing from God by their prayers. It is written (Jn. 9:31): cannot merit anything since they lack grace and charity “We know that God doth not hear sinners”; and this agrees which is the “power of godliness,” according to a gloss on with the saying of Prov. 28:9, “He that turneth away his 2 Tim. 3:5, “Having an appearance indeed of godliness, ears from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an abomina- but denying the power thereof.” and so their prayer is im- tion.” Now an abominable prayer impetrates nothing from pious, and yet piety it required in order that prayer may God. Therefore sinners impetrate nothing from God. be impetrative, as stated above (a. 15, ad 2). Therefore Objection 2. Further, the just impetrate from God sinners impetrate nothing by their prayers. ∗ Cf. Catena Aurea of St. Thomas on Lk. 18. The words as quoted are not to be found in the words of Chrysostom † Hom. xiv in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom 1588 Objection 3. Further, Chrysostom† says: “The Fa-xliv super Joan.), these words were spoken by the blind ther is unwilling to hear the prayer which the Son has not man before being anointed, i.e. perfectly enlightened, and inspired.” Now in the prayer inspired by Christ we say: consequently lack authority. And yet there is truth in the “Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive them that tres- saying if it refers to a sinner as such, in which sense also pass against us”: and sinners do not fulfil this. Therefore the sinner’s prayer is said to be an abomination. either they lie in saying this, and so are unworthy to be Reply to Objection 2. There can be no godliness in heard, or, if they do not say it, they are not heard, because the sinner’s prayer as though his prayer were quickened they do not observe the form of prayer instituted by Christ. by a habit of virtue: and yet his prayer may be godly in so On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. xliv, super far as he asks for something pertaining to godliness. Even Joan.): “If God were not to hear sinners, the publican so a man who has not the habit of justice is able to will would have vainly said: Lord, be merciful to me a sin- something just, as stated above (q. 59, a. 2). And though ner”; and Chrysostom∗ says: “Everyone that asketh shall his prayer is not meritorious, it can be impetrative, be- receive, that is to say whether he be righteous or sinful.” cause merit depends on justice, whereas impetration rests I answer that, In the sinner, two things are to be con- on grace. sidered: his nature which God loves, and the sin which He Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (a. 7, ad 1) hates. Accordingly when a sinner prays for something as the Lord’s Prayer is pronounced in the common person of sinner, i.e. in accordance with a sinful desire, God hears the whole Church: and so if anyone say the Lord’s Prayer him not through mercy but sometimes through vengeance while unwilling to forgive his neighbor’s trespasses, he when He allows the sinner to fall yet deeper into sin. For lies not, although his words do not apply to him person- “God refuses in mercy what He grants in anger,” as Au- ally: for they are true as referred to the person of the gustine declares (Tract. lxxiii in Joan.). On the other hand Church, from which he is excluded by merit, and con- God hears the sinner’s prayer if it proceed from a good sequently he is deprived of the fruit of his prayer. Some- natural desire, not out of justice, because the sinner does times, however, a sinner is prepared to forgive those who not merit to be heard, but out of pure mercy†, provided have trespassed against him, wherefore his prayers are however he fulfil the four conditions given above, namely, heard, according to Ecclus. 28:2, “Forgive thy neighbor that he beseech for himself things necessary for salvation, if he hath hurt thee, and then shall thy sins be forgiven to piously and perseveringly. thee when thou prayest.” Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine states (Tract. Whether the parts of prayer are fittingly described as supplications, prayers, inter-IIa IIae q. 83 a. 17 cessions, and thanksgivings? Objection 1. It would seem that the parts of prayer proach God Whom he prays: this is signified in the word are unfittingly described as supplications, prayers, inter- “prayer,” because prayer is “the raising up of one’s mind cessions, and thanksgivings. Supplication would seem to to God.” The second is that there should be a petition, be a kind of adjuration. Yet, according to Origen (Super and this is signified in the word “intercession.” In this Matth. Tract. xxxv), “a man who wishes to live according case sometimes one asks for something definite, and then to the gospel need not adjure another, for if it be unlawful some say it is “intercession” properly so called, or we may to swear, it is also unlawful to adjure.” Therefore suppli- ask for some thing indefinitely, for instance to be helped cation is unfittingly reckoned a part of prayer. by God, or we may simply indicate a fact, as in Jn. 11:3, Objection 2. Further, according to Damascene (De “Behold, he whom Thou lovest is sick,” and then they call Fide Orth. iii, 24), “to pray is to ask becoming things it “insinuation.” The third condition is the reason for im- of God.” Therefore it is unfitting to distinguish “prayers” petrating what we ask for: and this either on the part of from “intercessions.” God, or on the part of the person who asks. The reason of Objection 3. Further, thanksgivings regard the past, impetration on the part of God is His sanctity, on account while the others regard the future. But the past precedes of which we ask to be heard, according to Dan. 9:17,18, the future. Therefore thanksgivings are unfittingly placed “For Thy own sake, incline, O God, Thy ear”; and to this after the others. pertains “supplication” [obsecratio] which means a plead- On the contrary, suffices the authority of the Apostle ing through sacred things, as when we say, “Through Thy (1 Tim. 2:1). nativity, deliver us, O Lord.” The reason for impetration I answer that, Three conditions are requisite for on the part of the person who asks is “thanksgiving”; since prayer. First, that the person who prays should ap- “through giving thanks for benefits received we merit to ∗ Hom. xviii of the same Opus Imperfectum † Cf. a. 15, ad 1 1589 receive yet greater benefits,” as we say in the collect‡. ers; thanksgiving is offered by the mind to God in ineffa- Hence a gloss on 1 Tim. 2:1 says that “in the Mass, the ble ecstasy.” The first explanation, however, is the better. consecration is preceded by supplication,” in which cer- Reply to Objection 1. “Supplication” is an adjuration tain sacred things are called to mind; that “prayers are not for the purpose of compelling, for this is forbidden, in the consecration itself,” in which especially the mind but in order to implore mercy. should be raised up to God; and that “intercessions are in Reply to Objection 2. “Prayer” in the general sense the petitions that follow, and thanksgivings at the end.” includes all the things mentioned here; but when distin- We may notice these four things in several of the guished from the others it denotes properly the ascent to Church’s collects. Thus in the collect of Trinity Sunday God. the words, “Almighty eternal God” belong to the offering Reply to Objection 3. Among things that are diverse up of prayer to God; the words, “Who hast given to Thy the past precedes the future; but the one and same thing servants,” etc. belong to thanksgiving; the words, “grant, is future before it is past. Hence thanksgiving for other we beseech Thee,” belong to intercession; and the words benefits precedes intercession: but one and the same ben- at the end, “Through Our Lord,” etc. belong to supplica- efit is first sought, and finally, when it has been received, tion. we give thanks for it. Intercession is preceded by prayer In the “Conferences of the Fathers” (ix, cap. 11, seqq.) whereby we approach Him of Whom we ask: and prayer we read: “Supplication is bewailing one’s sins; prayer is is preceded by supplication, whereby through the consid- vowing something to God; intercession is praying for oth- eration of God’s goodness we dare approach Him. ‡ Ember Friday in September and Postcommunion of the common of a Confessor Bishop 1590 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 84 Of Adoration (In Three Articles) In due sequence we must consider the external acts of latria, and in the first place, adoration whereby one uses one’s body to reverence God; secondly, those acts whereby some external thing is offered to God; thirdly, those acts whereby something belonging to God is assumed. Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether adoration is an act of latria? (2) Whether adoration denotes an internal or an external act? (3) Whether adoration requires a definite place? Whether adoration is an act of latria or religion? IIa IIae q. 84 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that adoration is not an chief is adoration: yet there is one thing which is offered act of latria or religion. The worship of religion is due to God alone, and that is sacrifice. Hence Augustine says to God alone. But adoration is not due to God alone: (De Civ. Dei x, 4): “Many tokens of Divine worship are since we read (Gn. 18:2) that Abraham adored the angels; employed in doing honor to men, either through excessive and (3 Kings 1:23) that the prophet Nathan, when he was humility, or through pernicious flattery; yet so that those come in to king David, “worshiped him bowing down to to whom these honors are given are recognized as being the ground.” Therefore adoration is not an act of religion. men to whom we owe esteem and reverence and even ado- Objection 2. Further, the worship of religion is due ration if they be far above us. But who ever thought it his to God as the object of beatitude, according to Augustine duty to sacrifice to any other than one whom he either (De Civ. Dei x, 3): whereas adoration is due to Him by knew or deemed or pretended to be a God?” Accordingly reason of His majesty, since a gloss on Ps. 28:2, “Adore it was with the reverence due to an excellent creature that ye the Lord in His holy court,” says: “We pass from these Nathan adored David; while it was the reverence due to courts into the court where we adore His majesty.” There- God with which Mardochai refused to adore Aman fear- fore adoration is not an act of latria. ing “lest he should transfer the honor of his God to a man” Objection 3. Further, the worship of one same reli- (Esther 13:14). gion is due to the three Persons. But we do not adore the Again with the reverence due to an excellent creature three Persons with one adoration, for we genuflect at each Abraham adored the angels, as did also Josue (Jos. 5:15): separate invocation of Them∗. Therefore adoration is nol though we may understand them to have adored, with the an act of latria. adoration of latria, God Who appeared and spoke to them On the contrary, are the words quoted Mat. 4:10: in the guise of an angel. It was with the reverence due “The Lord thy God shalt thou adore and Him only shalt to God that John was forbidden to adore the angel (Apoc. thou serve.” 22:9), both to indicate the dignity which he had acquired I answer that, Adoration is directed to the reverence through Christ, whereby man is made equal to an angel: of the person adored. Now it is evident from what we wherefore the same text goes on: “I am thy fellow-servant have said (q. 81, Aa. 2,4) that it is proper to religion to and of thy brethren”; as also to exclude any occasion of show reverence to God. Hence the adoration whereby we idolatry, wherefore the text continues: “Adore God.” adore God is an act of religion. Reply to Objection 2. Every Divine excellency is in- Reply to Objection 1. Reverence is due to God on ac- cluded in His majesty: to which it pertains that we should count of His excellence, which is communicated to certain be made happy in Him as in the sovereign good. creatures not in equal measure, but according to a measure Reply to Objection 3. Since there is one excellence of proportion; and so the reverence which we pay to God, of the three Divine Persons, one honor and reverence is and which belongs to latria, differs from the reverence due to them and consequently one adoration. It is to rep- which we pay to certain excellent creatures; this belongs resent this that where it is related (Gn. 18:2) that three to dulia, and we shall speak of it further on (q. 103). And men appeared to Abraham, we are told that he addressed since external actions are signs of internal reverence, cer- one, saying: “Lord, if I have found favor in thy sight,” etc. tain external tokens significative of reverence are offered The triple genuflection represents the Trinity of Persons, to creatures of excellence, and among these tokens the not a difference of adoration. ∗ At the adoration of the Cross, on Good Friday 1591 Whether adoration denotes an action of the body? IIa IIae q. 84 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that adoration does not in an exterior humbling of the body. And since in all acts denote an act of the body. It is written (Jn. 4:23): “The of latria that which is without is referred to that which is true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth.” within as being of greater import, it follows that exterior Now what is done in spirit has nothing to do with an act adoration is offered on account of interior adoration, in of the body. Therefore adoration does not denote an act of other words we exhibit signs of humility in our bodies in the body. order to incite our affections to submit to God, since it is Objection 2. Further, the word adoration is taken connatural to us to proceed from the sensible to the intel- from “oratio” [prayer]. But prayer consists chiefly in an ligible. interior act, according to 1 Cor. 14:15, “I will pray with Reply to Objection 1. Even bodily adoration is done the spirit, I will pray also with the understanding.” There- in spirit, in so far as it proceeds from and is directed to fore adoration denotes chiefly a spiritual act. spiritual devotion. Objection 3. Further, acts of the body pertain to sensi- Reply to Objection 2. Just as prayer is primarily in ble knowledge: whereas we approach God not by bodily the mind, and secondarily expressed in words, as stated but by spiritual sense. Therefore adoration does not de- above (q. 83, a. 12), so too adoration consists chiefly in note an act of the body. an interior reverence of God, but secondarily in certain On the contrary, A gloss on Ex. 20:5, “Thou shalt bodily signs of humility; thus when we genuflect we sig- not adore them, nor serve them,” says: “Thou shalt nei- nify our weakness in comparison with God, and when we ther worship them in mind, nor adore them outwardly.” prostrate ourselves we profess that we are nothing of our- I answer that, As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, selves. 12), since we are composed of a twofold nature, intel- Reply to Objection 3. Though we cannot reach God lectual and sensible, we offer God a twofold adoration; with the senses, our mind is urged by sensible signs to namely, a spiritual adoration, consisting in the internal de- approach God. votion of the mind; and a bodily adoration, which consists Whether adoration requires a definite place? IIa IIae q. 84 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that adoration does not place is required for adoration, not chiefly, as though it require a definite place. It is written (Jn. 4:21): “The hour were essential thereto, but by reason of a certain fitting- cometh, when you shall neither on this mountain, nor in ness, like other bodily signs. Jerusalem, adore the Father”; and the same reason seems Reply to Objection 1. By these words our Lord fore- to apply to other places. Therefore a definite place is not told the cessation of adoration, both according to the rite necessary for adoration. of the Jews who adored in Jerusalem, and according to Objection 2. Further, exterior adoration is directed to the rite of the Samaritans who adored on Mount Garizim. interior adoration. But interior adoration is shown to God For both these rites ceased with the advent of the spiri- as existing everywhere. Therefore exterior adoration does tual truth of the Gospel, according to which “a sacrifice is not require a definite place. offered to God in every place,” as stated in Malach. 1:11. Objection 3. Further, the same God is adored in the Reply to Objection 2. A definite place is chosen New as in the Old Testament. Now in the Old Testament for adoration, not on account of God Who is adored, as they adored towards the west, because the door of the though He were enclosed in a place, but on account of Tabernacle looked to the east (Ex. 26:18 seqq.). There- the adorers; and this for three reasons. First, because the fore for the same reason we ought now to adore towards place is consecrated, so that those who pray there conceive the west, if any definite place be requisite for adoration. a greater devotion and are more likely to be heard, as may On the contrary, It is written (Is. 56:7): “My house be seen in the prayer of Solomon (3 Kings 8). Secondly, shall be called the house of prayer,” which words are also on account of the sacred mysteries and other signs of ho- quoted (Jn. 2:16). liness contained therein. Thirdly, on account of the con- I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), the chief part of course of many adorers, by reason of which their prayer is adoration is the internal devotion of the mind, while the more likely to be heard, according to Mat. 18:20, “Where secondary part is something external pertaining to bod- there are two or three gathered together in My name, there ily signs. Now the mind internally apprehends God as not am I in the midst of them.” comprised in a place; while bodily signs must of necessity Reply to Objection 3. There is a certain fitting- be in some definite place and position. Hence a definite ness in adoring towards the east. First, because the Di- 1592 vine majesty is indicated in the movement of the heavens Who mounteth above the heaven of heavens to the east which is from the east. Secondly, because Paradise was (Ps. 67:34), and is expected to come from the east, ac- situated in the east according to the Septuagint version of cording to Mat. 24:27, “As lightning cometh out of the Gn. 2:8, and so we signify our desire to return to Par- east, and appeareth even into the west; so shall also the adise. Thirdly, on account of Christ Who is “the light coming of the Son of Man be.” of the world”∗, and is called “the Orient” (Zech. 6:12). ∗ Jn. 8:12; 9:5 1593 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 85 Of Sacrifice (In Four Articles) In due sequence we must consider those acts whereby external things are offered to God. These give rise to a twofold consideration: (1) Of things given to God by the faithful; (2) Of vows, whereby something is promised to Him. Under the first head we shall consider sacrifices, oblations, first-fruits, and tithes. About sacrifices there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether offering a sacrifice to God is of the law of nature? (2) Whether sacrifice should be offered to God alone? (3) Whether the offering of a sacrifice is a special act of virtue? (4) Whether all are bound to offer sacrifice? Whether offering a sacrifice to God is of the law of nature? IIa IIae q. 85 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that offering a sacrifice to to man is that he should employ sensible signs in order to God is not of the natural law. Things that are of the natural signify anything, because he derives his knowledge from law are common among all men. Yet this is not the case sensibles. Hence it is a dictate of natural reason that man with sacrifices: for we read of some, e.g. Melchisedech should use certain sensibles, by offering them to God in (Gn. 14:18), offering bread and wine in sacrifice, and of sign of the subjection and honor due to Him, like those certain animals being offered by some, and others by oth- who make certain offerings to their lord in recognition of ers. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is not of the natu- his authority. Now this is what we mean by a sacrifice, ral law. and consequently the offering of sacrifice is of the natural Objection 2. Further, things that are of the natu- law. ral law were observed by all just men. Yet we do not Reply to Objection 1. As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 95, read that Isaac offered sacrifice; nor that Adam did so, a. 2), certain things belong generically to the natural law, of whom nevertheless it is written (Wis. 10:2) that wis- while their determination belongs to the positive law; thus dom “brought him out of his sin.” Therefore the offering the natural law requires that evildoers should be punished; of sacrifice is not of the natural law. but that this or that punishment should be inflicted on Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, them is a matter determined by God or by man. In like 5,19) that sacrifices are offered in signification of some- manner the offering of sacrifice belongs generically to the thing. Now words which are chief among signs, as he natural law, and consequently all are agreed on this point, again says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), “signify, not by but the determination of sacrifices is established by God nature but by convention,” according to the Philosopher or by man, and this is the reason for their difference. (Peri Herm. i, 2). Therefore sacrifices are not of the natu- Reply to Objection 2. Adam, Isaac and other just men ral law. offered sacrifice to God in a manner befitting the times in On the contrary, At all times and among all nations which they lived, according to Gregory, who says (Moral. there has always been the offering of sacrifices. Now that iv, 3) that in olden times original sin was remitted through which is observed by all is seemingly natural. Therefore the offering of sacrifices. Nor does Scripture mention all the offering of sacrifices is of the natural law. the sacrifices of the just, but only those that have some- I answer that, Natural reason tells man that he is sub- thing special connected with them. Perhaps the reason ject to a higher being, on account of the defects which why we read of no sacrifice being offered by Adam may he perceives in himself, and in which he needs help and be that, as the origin of sin is ascribed to him, the origin direction from someone above him: and whatever this su- of sanctification ought not to be represented as typified perior being may be, it is known to all under the name in him. Isaac was a type of Christ, being himself offered of God. Now just as in natural things the lower are natu- in sacrifice; and so there was no need that he should be rally subject to the higher, so too it is a dictate of natural represented as offering a sacrifice. reason in accordance with man’s natural inclination that Reply to Objection 3. It is natural to man to express he should tender submission and honor, according to his his ideas by signs, but the determination of those signs mode, to that which is above man. Now the mode befitting depends on man’s pleasure. 1594 Whether sacrifice should be offered to God alone? IIa IIae q. 85 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that sacrifice should not as its beginning by creation, and its end by beatification: be offered to the most high God alone. Since sacrifice and according to the true faith God alone is the creator of ought to be offered to God, it would seem that it ought our souls, as stated in the Ia, q. 90, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 118, to be offered to all such as are partakers of the Godhead. a. 2, while in Him alone the beatitude of our soul con- Now holy men are made “partakers of the Divine nature,” sists, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 8; Ia IIae, q. 2, according to 2 Pet. 1:4; wherefore of them is it written a. 8; Ia IIae, q. 3, Aa. 1,7,8). Wherefore just as to God (Ps. 81:6): “I have said, You are gods”: and angels too alone ought we to offer spiritual sacrifice, so too ought are called “sons of God,” according to Job 1:6. Thus sac- we to offer outward sacrifices to Him alone: even so “in rifice should be offered to all these. our prayers and praises we proffer significant words to Objection 2. Further, the greater a person is the Him to Whom in our hearts we offer the things which we greater the honor due to him from man. Now the angels designate thereby,” as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, and saints are far greater than any earthly princes: and yet 19). Moreover we find that in every country the people the subjects of the latter pay them much greater honor, by are wont to show the sovereign ruler some special sign prostrating before them, and offering them gifts, than is of honor, and that if this be shown to anyone else, it is a implied by offering an animal or any other thing in sacri- crime of high-treason. Therefore, in the Divine law, the fice. Much more therefore may one offer sacrifice to the death punishment is assigned to those who offer Divine angels and saints. honor to another than God. Objection 3. Further, temples and altars are raised for Reply to Objection 1. The name of the Godhead is the offering of sacrifices. Yet temples and altars are raised communicated to certain ones, not equally with God, but to angels and saints. Therefore sacrifices also may be of- by participation; hence neither is equal honor due to them. fered to them. Reply to Objection 2. The offering of a sacrifice is On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:20): “He that measured not by the value of the animal killed, but by its sacrificeth to gods shall be put to death, save only to the signification, for it is done in honor of the sovereign Ruler Lord.” of the whole universe. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), a sacrifice is of-Civ. Dei x, 19), “the demons rejoice, not in the stench of fered in order that something may be represented. Now corpses, but in receiving divine honors.” the sacrifice that is offered outwardly represents the in- Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Civ. ward spiritual sacrifice, whereby the soul offers itself to Dei viii, 19), “we do not raise temples and priesthoods to God according to Ps. 50:19, “A sacrifice to God is an af- the martyrs, because not they but their God is our God. flicted spirit,” since, as stated above (q. 81, a. 7; q. 84, Wherefore the priest says not: I offer sacrifice to thee, Pe- a. 2), the outward acts of religion are directed to the in- ter or Paul. But we give thanks to God for their triumphs, ward acts. Again the soul offers itself in sacrifice to God and urge ourselves to imitate them.” Whether the offering of sacrifice is a special act of virtue? IIa IIae q. 85 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the offering of sacri- the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of a definite fice is not a special act of virtue. Augustine says (De Civ. virtue. Dei x, 6): “A true sacrifice is any work done that we may Objection 3. Further, a sacrifice is apparently any- cleave to God in holy fellowship.” But not every good thing offered to God. Now many things are offered to work is a special act of some definite virtue. Therefore God, such as devotion, prayer, tithes, first-fruits, obla- the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of a definite tions, and holocausts. Therefore sacrifice does not appear virtue. to be a special act of a definite virtue. Objection 2. Further, the mortification of the body On the contrary, The law contains special precepts by fasting belongs to abstinence, by continence belongs about sacrifices, as appears from the beginning of Leviti- to chastity, by martyrdom belongs to fortitude. Now all cus. these things seem to be comprised in the offering of sac- I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 18, rifice, according to Rom. 12:1, “Present your bodies a Aa. 6,7), where an act of one virtue is directed to the end living sacrifice.” Again the Apostle says (Heb. 13:16): of another virtue it partakes somewhat of its species; thus “Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sac- when a man thieves in order to commit fornication, his rifices God’s favor is obtained.” Now it belongs to charity, theft assumes, in a sense, the deformity of fornication, so mercy and liberality to do good and to impart. Therefore that even though it were not a sin otherwise, it would be 1595 a sin from the very fact that it was directed to fornication. his body’s good, which is, so to speak, offered to God in Accordingly, sacrifice is a special act deserving of praise martyrdom, and abstinence or continency. The third is the in that it is done out of reverence for God; and for this good which consists of external things: and of these we reason it belongs to a definite virtue, viz. religion. But it offer a sacrifice to God, directly when we offer our pos- happens that the acts of the other virtues are directed to session to God immediately, and indirectly when we share the reverence of God, as when a man gives alms of his them with our neighbor for God’s sake. own things for God’s sake, or when a man subjects his Reply to Objection 3. A “sacrifice,” properly speak- own body to some affliction out of reverence for God; and ing, requires that something be done to the thing which is in this way the acts also of other virtues may be called offered to God, for instance animals were slain and burnt, sacrifices. On the other hand there are acts that are not the bread is broken, eaten, blessed. The very word signi- deserving of praise save through being done out of rever- fies this, since “sacrifice” is so called because a man does ence for God: such acts are properly called sacrifices, and something sacred [facit sacrum]. On the other hand an belong to the virtue of religion. “oblation” is properly the offering of something to God Reply to Objection 1. The very fact that we wish to even if nothing be done thereto, thus we speak of offer- cling to God in a spiritual fellowship pertains to reverence ing money or bread at the altar, and yet nothing is done to for God: and consequently the act of any virtue assumes them. Hence every sacrifice is an oblation, but not con- the character of a sacrifice through being done in order versely. “First-fruits” are oblations, because they were of- that we may cling to God in holy fellowship. fered to God, according to Dt. 26, but they are not a sacri- Reply to Objection 2. Man’s good is threefold. There fice, because nothing sacred was done to them. “Tithes,” is first his soul’s good which is offered to God in a certain however, are neither a sacrifice nor an oblation, prop- inward sacrifice by devotion, prayer and other like inte- erly speaking, because they are not offered immediately rior acts: and this is the principal sacrifice. The second is to God, but to the ministers of Divine worship. Whether all are bound to offer sacrifices? IIa IIae q. 85 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that all are not bound to the New or the Old Law, as for those who were not under offer sacrifices. The Apostle says (Rom. 3:19): “What the Law. For those who are under the Law are bound to things soever the Law speaketh, it speaketh to them that offer certain definite sacrifices according to the precepts are in the Law.” Now the law of sacrifices was not given of the Law, whereas those who were not under the Law to all, but only to the Hebrew people. Therefore all are were bound to perform certain outward actions in God’s not bound to offer sacrifices. honor, as became those among whom they dwelt, but not Objection 2. Further, sacrifices are offered to God in definitely to this or that action. The other outward sacri- order to signify something. But not everyone is capable fice is when the outward actions of the other virtues are of understanding these significations. Therefore not all performed out of reverence for God; some of which are a are bound to offer sacrifices. matter of precept; and to these all are bound, while oth- Objection 3. Further, priests∗ are so called because ers are works of supererogation, and to these all are not they offer sacrifice to God. But all are not priests. There- bound. fore not all are bound to offer sacrifices. Reply to Objection 1. All were not bound to offer On the contrary, The offering of sacrifices of is of those particular sacrifices which were prescribed in the the natural law, as stated above (a. 1). Now all are bound Law: but they were bound to some sacrifices inward or to do that which is of the natural law. Therefore all are outward, as stated above. bound to offer sacrifice to God. Reply to Objection 2. Though all do not know ex- I answer that, Sacrifice is twofold, as stated above plicitly the power of the sacrifices, they know it implicitly, (a. 2). The first and principal is the inward sacrifice, which even as they have implicit faith, as stated above (q. 2, AA all are bound to offer, since all are obliged to offer to God 6,7). a devout mind. The other is the outward sacrifice, and Reply to Objection 3. The priests offer those sacri- this again is twofold. There is a sacrifice which is de- fices which are specially directed to the Divine worship, serving of praise merely through being offered to God in not only for themselves but also for others. But there are protestation of our subjection to God: and the obligation other sacrifices, which anyone can offer to God for him- of offering this sacrifice was not the same for those under self as explained above (Aa. 2,3). ∗ ‘Sacerdotes’: Those who give or administer sacred things (sacra dantes): cf. 1 Cor. 4:1 1596 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 86 Of Oblations and First-Fruits (In Four Articles) We must next consider oblations and first-fruits. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether any oblations are necessary as a matter of precept? (2) To whom are oblations due? (3) of what things they should be made? (4) In particular, as to first-fruits, whether men are bound to offer them? Whether men are under a necessity of precept to make oblations? IIa IIae q. 86 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that men are not bound by tion of sacrifice to the Lord, his offering shall be of fine precept to make oblations. Men are not bound, at the time flour.” If, on the other hand, it be offered with a view to its of the Gospel, to observe the ceremonial precepts of the remaining entire and being deputed to the worship of God Old Law, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 103, Aa. 3 ,4). Now or to the use of His ministers, it will be an oblation and the offering of oblations is one of the ceremonial precepts not a sacrifice. Accordingly it is essential to oblations of of the Old Law, since it is written (Ex. 23:14): “Three this kind that they be offered voluntarily, according to Ex. times every year you shall celebrate feasts with Me,” and 25:2, of “every man that offereth of his own accord you further on (Ex. 23:15): “Thou shalt not appear empty be- shall take them.” Nevertheless it may happen in four ways fore Me.” Therefore men are not now under a necessity of that one is bound to make oblations. First, on account precept to make oblations. of a previous agreement: as when a person is granted a Objection 2. Further, before they are made, oblations portion of Church land, that he may make certain obla- depend on man’s will, as appears from our Lord’s say- tions at fixed times, although this has the character of rent. ing (Mat. 5:23), “If. . . thou offer thy gift at the altar,” as Secondly, by reason of a previous assignment or promise; though this were left to the choice of the offerer: and when as when a man offers a gift among the living, or by will once oblations have been made, there is no way of offer- bequeaths to the Church something whether movable or ing them again. Therefore in no way is a man under a immovable to be delivered at some future time. Thirdly, necessity of precept to make oblations. on account of the need of the Church, for instance if her Objection 3. Further, if anyone is bound to give a ministers were without means of support. Fourthly, on certain thing to the Church, and fails to give it, he can account of custom; for the faithful are bound at certain be compelled to do so by being deprived of the Church’s solemn feasts to make certain customary oblations. In the sacraments. But it would seem unlawful to refuse the last two cases, however, the oblation remains voluntary, as sacraments of the Church to those who refuse to make regards, to wit, the quantity or kind of the thing offered. oblations according to a decree of the sixth council∗, Reply to Objection 1. Under the New Law men are quoted I, qu. i, can. Nullus: “Let none who dispense not bound to make oblations on account of legal solemni- Holy Communion exact anything of the recipient, and if ties, as stated in Exodus, but on account of certain other they exact anything let them be deposed.” Therefore it is reasons, as stated above. not necessary that men should make oblations. Reply to Objection 2. Some are bound to make obla- On the contrary, Gregory says†: “Let every Christian tions, both before making them, as in the first, third, and. take care that he offer something to God at the celebration fourth cases, and after they have made them by assign- of Mass.” ment or promise: for they are bound to offer in reality that I answer that, As stated above (q. 85, a. 3, ad 3), which has been already offered to the Church by way of the term “oblation” is common to all things offered for assignment. the Divine worship, so that if a thing be offered to be de- Reply to Objection 3. Those who do not make the stroyed in worship of God, as though it were being made oblations they are bound to make may be punished by be- into something holy, it is both an oblation and a sacrifice. ing deprived of the sacraments, not by the priest himself to Wherefore it is written (Ex. 29:18): “Thou shalt offer the whom the oblations should be made, lest he seem to exact, whole ram for a burnt-offering upon the altar; it is an obla- something for bestowing the sacraments, but by someone tion to the Lord, a most sweet savor of the victim of the superior to him. Lord”; and (Lev. 2:1): “When anyone shall offer an obla- ∗ Can. Trullan, xxiii † Gregory VII; Concil. Roman. v, can. xii 1597 Whether oblations are due to priests alone? IIa IIae q. 86 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that oblations are not due the people offer to God concern the priests, not only as to priests alone. For chief among oblations would seem regards their turning them to their own use, but also as re- to be those that are deputed to the sacrifices of victims. gards the faithful dispensation thereof, by spending them Now whatever is given to the poor is called a “victim in partly on things appertaining to the Divine worship, partly Scripture according to Heb. 13:16, “Do not forget to do on things touching their own livelihood (since they that good and to impart, for by such victims [Douay: ‘sacri- serve the altar partake with the altar, according to 1 Cor. fices’] God’s favor is obtained. Much more therefore are 9:13), and partly for the good of the poor, who, as far as oblations due to the poor. possible, should be supported from the possessions of the Objection 2. Further, in many parishes monks have a Church: for our Lord had a purse for the use of the poor, share in the oblations. Now “the case of clerics is distinct as Jerome observes on Mat. 17:26, “That we may not from the case of monks,” as Jerome states∗. Therefore scandalize them.” oblations art not due to priests alone. Reply to Objection 1. Whatever is given to the poor Objection 3. Further, lay people with the consent of is not a sacrifice properly speaking; yet it is called a sacri- the Church buy oblations such as loaves and so forth, and fice in so far as it is given to them for God’s sake. In like they do so for no other reason than that they may make use manner, and for the same reason, it can be called an obla- thereof themselves. Therefore oblations may have refer- tion, though not properly speaking, since it is not given ence to the laity. immediately to God. Oblations properly so called fall to On the contrary, A canon of Pope Damasus† quoted the use of the poor, not by the dispensation of the offerers, X, qu. i‡, says: “None but the priests whom day by day but by the dispensation of the priests. we see serving the Lord may eat and drink of the obla- Reply to Objection 2. Monks or other religious may tions which are offered within the precincts of the Holy receive oblations under three counts. First, as poor, ei- Church: because in the Old Testament the Lord forbade ther by the dispensation of the priests, or by ordination of the children of Israel to eat the sacred loaves, with the ex- the Church; secondly, through being ministers of the altar, ception of Aaron and his sons” (Lev. 24:8,9). and then they can accept oblations that are freely offered; I answer that, The priest is appointed mediator and thirdly, if the parishes belong to them, and they can accept stands, so to speak, “between” the people and God, as we oblations, having a right to them as rectors of the Church. read of Moses (Dt. 5:5), wherefore it belongs to him to set Reply to Objection 3. Oblations when once they are forth the Divine teachings and sacraments before the peo- consecrated, such as sacred vessels and vestments, cannot ple; and besides to offer to the Lord things appertaining be granted to the use of the laity: and this is the mean- to the people, their prayers, for instance, their sacrifices ing of the words of Pope Damasus. But those which are and oblations. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 5:1): “Every unconsecrated may be allowed to the use of layfolk by high priest taken from among men is ordained for men permission of the priests, whether by way of gift or by in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up way of sale. gifts and sacrifices for sins.” Hence the oblations which Whether a man may make oblations of whatever he lawfully possesses? IIa IIae q. 86 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that a man may not make a dog he has lawfully sold. Therefore it is not lawful to oblations of whatever he lawfully possesses. According to make an oblation of whatever we possess lawfully. human law§ “the whore’s is a shameful trade in what she Objection 3. Further, it is written (Malachi 1:8): “If does but not in what she takes,” and consequently what you offer the lame and the sick, is it not evil?” Yet an ani- she takes she possesses lawfully. Yet it is not lawful for mal though lame or sick is a lawful possession. Therefore her to make an oblation with her gains, according to Dt. it would seem that not of every lawful possession may one 23:18, “Thou shalt not offer the hire of a strumpet. . . in the make an oblation. house of the Lord thy God.” Therefore it is not lawful to On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 3:9): “Honor the make an oblation of whatever one possesses lawfully. Lord with thy substance.” Now whatever a man possesses Objection 2. Further, in the same passage it is for- lawfully belongs to his substance. Therefore he may make bidden to offer “the price of a dog” in the house of God. oblations of whatever he possesses lawfully. But it is evident that a man possesses lawfully the price of I answer that, As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. ∗ Ep. xiv, ad Heliod. † Damasus I ‡ Can. Hanc consuetudinem § Dig. xii, v, de Condict. ob. turp. vel iniust. caus. 4 1598 Serm. cxiii), “shouldst thou plunder one weaker than Reply to Objection 2. According to the Law, a dog thyself and give some of the spoil to the judge, if he was deemed an unclean animal. Yet other unclean animals should pronounce in thy favor, such is the force of jus- were redeemed and their price could be offered, according tice that even thou wouldst not be pleased with him: and to Lev. 27:27, “If it be an unclean animal, he that offer- if this should not please thee, neither does it please thy eth it shall redeem it.” But a dog was neither offered nor God.” Hence it is written (Ecclus. 34:21): “The offer- redeemed, both because idolaters used dogs in sacrifices ing of him that sacrificeth of a thing wrongfully gotten to their idols, and because they signify robbery, the pro- is stained.” Therefore it is evident that an oblation must ceeds of which cannot be offered in oblation. However, not be made of things unjustly acquired or possessed. In this prohibition ceased under the New Law. the Old Law, however, wherein the figure was predomi- Reply to Objection 3. The oblation of a blind or lame nant, certain things were reckoned unclean on account of animal was declared unlawful for three reasons. First, on their signification, and it was forbidden to offer them. But account of the purpose for which it was offered, wherefore in the New Law all God’s creatures are looked upon as it is written (Malach. 1:8): “If you offer the blind in sacri- clean, as stated in Titus 1:15: and consequently anything fice, is it not evil?” and it behooved sacrifices to be with- that is lawfully possessed, considered in itself, may be of- out blemish. Secondly, on account of contempt, where- fered in oblation. But it may happen accidentally that one fore the same text goes on (Malach. 1:12): “You have pro- may not make an oblation of what one possesses lawfully; faned” My name, “in that you say: The table of the Lord is for instance if it be detrimental to another person, as in the defiled and that which is laid thereupon is contemptible.” case of a son who offers to God the means of supporting Thirdly, on account of a previous vow, whereby a man his father (which our Lord condemns, Mat. 15:5), or if it has bound himself to offer without blemish whatever he give rise to scandal or contempt, or the like. has vowed: hence the same text says further on (Malach. Reply to Objection 1. In the Old Law it was forbid- 1:14): “Cursed is the deceitful man that hath in his flock den to make an offering of the hire of a strumpet on ac- a male, and making a vow offereth in sacrifice that which count of its uncleanness, and in the New Law, on account is feeble to the Lord.” The same reasons avail still in the of scandal, lest the Church seem to favor sin if she accept New Law, but when they do not apply the unlawfulness oblations from the profits of sin. ceases. Whether men are bound to pay first-fruits? IIa IIae q. 86 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that men are not bound taking the basket containing the first-fruits from the hand to pay first-fruits. After giving the law of the first-born of him that bringeth the first-fruits, shall set it before the the text continues (Ex. 13:9): “It shall be as a sign in altar of the Lord thy God,” and further on (Dt. 26:10) he thy hand,” so that, apparently, it is a ceremonial precept. is commanded to say: “Therefore now I offer the first- But ceremonial precepts are not to be observed in the New fruits of the land, which the Lord hath given me.” Now Law. Neither therefore ought first-fruits to be paid. the first-fruits were offered for a special reason, namely, Objection 2. Further, first-fruits were offered to the in recognition of the divine favor, as though man acknowl- Lord for a special favor conferred on that people, where- edged that he had received the fruits of the earth from fore it is written (Dt. 26:2,3): “Thou shalt take the first of God, and that he ought to offer something to God in re- all thy fruits. . . and thou shalt go to the priest that shall be turn, according to 1 Paral 29:14, “We have given Thee in those days, and say to him: I profess this day before the what we received of Thy hand.” And since what we offer Lord thy God, that I am come into the land, for which He God ought to be something special, hence it is that man swore to our fathers, that He would give it us.” Therefore was commanded to offer God his first-fruits, as being a other nations are not bound to pay first-fruits. special part of the fruits of the earth: and since a priest Objection 3. That which one is bound to do should be is “ordained for the people “in the things that appertain to something definite. But neither in the New Law nor in the God” (Heb. 5:1), the first-fruits offered by the people were Old do we find mention of a definite amount of first-fruits. granted to the priest’s use.” Wherefore it is written (Num. Therefore one is not bound of necessity to pay them. 18:8): “The Lord said to Aaron: Behold I have given thee On the contrary, It is laid down (16, qu. vii, can. the charge of My first-fruits.” Now it is a point of natural Decimas): “We confirm the right of priests to tithes and law that man should make an offering in God’s honor out first-fruits, and everybody must pay them.” of the things he has received from God, but that the offer- I answer that, First-fruits are a kind of oblation, be- ing should be made to any particular person, or out of his cause they are offered to God with a certain profession first-fruits, or in such or such a quantity, was indeed deter- (Dt. 26); where the same passage continues: “The priest mined in the Old Law by divine command; but in the New 1599 Law it is fixed by the declaration of the Church, in virtue which the Lord hath given me,” which second motive is of which men are bound to pay first-fruits according to common among all people. We may also reply that just the custom of their country and the needs of the Church’s as God granted the land of promise to the Jews by a spe- ministers. cial favor, so by a general favor He bestowed the lordship Reply to Objection 1. The ceremonial observances of the earth on the whole of mankind, according to Ps. were properly speaking signs of the future, and conse- 113:24, “The earth He has given to the children of men.” quently they ceased when the foreshadowed truth was ac- Reply to Objection 3. As Jerome says∗: “According tually present. But the offering of first-fruits was for a to the tradition of the ancients the custom arose for those sign of a past favor, whence arises the duty of acknowl- who had most to give the priests a fortieth part, and those edgment in accordance with the dictate of natural reason. who had least, one sixtieth, in lieu of first-fruits.” Hence Hence taken in a general sense this obligation remains. it would seem that first-fruits should vary between these Reply to Objection 2. First-fruits were offered in the limits according to the custom of one’s country. And it Old Law, not only on account of the favor of the promised was reasonable that the amount of first-fruits should not land given by God, but also on account of the favor of the be fixed by law, since, as stated above, first-fruits are of- fruits of the earth, which were given by God. Hence it fered by way of oblation, a condition of which is that it is written (Dt. 26:10): “I offer the first-fruits of the land should be voluntary. ∗ Comment. in Ezech. 45:13,14; cf. Cap. Decimam, de Decim. Primit. et Oblat. 1600 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 87 Of Tithes (In Four Articles) Next we must consider tithes, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether men are bound by precept to pay tithes? (2) Of what things ought tithes to be paid? (3) To whom ought they to be paid? (4) Who ought to pay tithes? Whether men are bound to pay tithes under a necessity of precept? IIa IIae q. 87 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that men are not bound Objection 4. Further, in the Old Law men were by precept to pay tithes. The commandment to pay tithes bound to pay three kinds of tithe. For it is written (Num. is contained in the Old Law (Lev. 27:30), “All tithes of 18:23,24): “The sons of Levi. . . shall. . . be content with the land, whether of corn or of the fruits of trees, are the the oblation of tithes, which I have separated for their uses Lord’s,” and further on (Lev. 27:32): “Of all the tithes and necessities.” Again, there were other tithes of which of oxen and sheep and goats, that pass under the shep- we read (Dt. 14:22,23): “Every year thou shalt set aside herd’s rod, every tenth that cometh shall be sanctified to the tithes of all thy fruits, that the earth bringeth forth year the Lord.” This cannot be reckoned among the moral pre-by year; and thou shalt eat before the Lord thy God in the cepts, because natural reason does not dictate that one place which He shall choose.” And there were yet other ought to give a tenth part, rather than a ninth or eleventh. tithes, of which it is written (Dt. 14:28): “The third year Therefore it is either a judicial or a ceremonial precept. thou shalt separate another tithe of all things that grow Now, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 103, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 104, to thee at that time, and shalt lay it up within thy gates. a. 3), during the time of grace men are hound neither to And the Levite that hath no other part nor possession with the ceremonial nor to the judicial precepts of the Old Law. thee, and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow, Therefore men are not bound now to pay tithes. that are within thy gates, shall. . . eat and be filled.” Now Objection 2. Further, during the time of grace men during the time of grace men are not bound to pay the sec- are bound only to those things which were commanded ond and third tithes. Neither therefore are they bound to by Christ through the Apostles, according to Mat. 28:20, pay the first. “Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have Objection 5. Further, a debt that is due without any commanded you”; and Paul says (Acts 20:27): “I have time being fixed for its payment, must be paid at once un- not spared to declare unto you all the counsel of God.” der pain of sin. Accordingly if during the time of grace Now neither in the teaching of Christ nor in that of the men are bound, under necessity of precept, to pay tithes apostles is there any mention of the paying of tithes: for in those countries where tithes are not paid, they would the saying of our Lord about tithes (Mat. 23:23), “These all be in a state of mortal sin, and so would also be the things you ought to have done” seems to refer to the past ministers of the Church for dissembling. But this seems time of legal observance: thus Hilary says (Super Matth. unreasonable. Therefore during the time of grace men are can. xxiv): “The tithing of herbs, which was useful in not bound under necessity of precept to pay tithes. foreshadowing the future, was not to be omitted.” There- On the contrary, Augustine∗, whose words are fore during the time of grace men are not bound to pay quoted 16, qu. i†, says: “It is a duty to pay tithes, and tithes. whoever refuses to pay them takes what belongs to an- Objection 3. Further, during the time of grace, men other.” are not more bound to the legal observances than before I answer that, In the Old Law tithes were paid for the Law. But before the Law tithes were given, by reason the sustenance of the ministers of God. Hence it is writ- not of a precept but of a vow. For we read (Gn. 28:20,22) ten (Malach. 3:10): “Bring all the tithes into My [Vulg.: that Jacob “made a vow” saying: “If God shall be with ‘the’] store-house that there may be meat in My house.” me, and shall keep me in the way by which I walk. . . of Hence the precept about the paying of tithes was partly all the things that Thou shalt give to me, I will offer tithes moral and instilled in the natural reason; and partly judi- to Thee.” Neither, therefore, during the time of grace are cial, deriving its force from its divine institution. Because men bound to pay tithes. natural reason dictates that the people should administer ∗ Append. Serm. cclxxcii † Can. Decimae 1601 the necessaries of life to those who minister the divine Law the authority of the Church has established the pay-worship for the welfare of the whole people even as it is ment of tithe; thus showing a certain kindliness, lest the the people’s duty to provide a livelihood for their rulers people of the New Law should give less to the ministers and soldiers and so forth. Hence the Apostle proves this of the New Testament than did the people of the Old Law from human custom, saying (1 Cor. 9:7): “Who serveth to the ministers of the Old Testament; for the people of as a soldier at any time at his own charge? Who planteth the New Law are under greater obligations, according to a vineyard and eateth not of the fruit thereof?” But the Mat. 5:20, “Unless your justice abound more than that fixing of the proportion to be offered to the ministers of of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the divine worship does not belong to the natural law, but kingdom of heaven,” and, moreover, the ministers of the was determined by divine institution, in accordance with New Testament are of greater dignity than the ministers of the condition of that people to whom the law was be- the Old Testament, as the Apostle shows (2 Cor. 3:7,8). ing given. For they were divided into twelve tribes, and Accordingly it is evident that man’s obligation to pay the twelfth tribe, namely that of Levi, was engaged ex- tithes arises partly from natural law, partly from the insti- clusively in the divine ministry and had no possessions tution of the Church; who, nevertheless, in consideration whence to derive a livelihood: and so it was becomingly of the requirements of time and persons might ordain the ordained that the remaining eleven tribes should give one- payment of some other proportion. tenth part of their revenues to the Levites‡ that the latter This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. might live respectably; and also because some, through Reply to Objection 2. The precept about paying negligence, would disregard this precept. Hence, so far tithes, in so far as it was a moral precept, was given in the as the tenth part was fixed, the precept was judicial, since Gospel by our Lord when He said (Mat. 10:10)∗: “The all institutions established among this people for the spe- workman is worthy of his hire,” and the Apostle says the cial purpose of preserving equality among men, in ac- same (1 Cor. 9:4 seqq.). But the fixing of the particular cordance with this people’s condition, are called “judicial proportion is left to the ordinance of the Church. precepts.” Nevertheless by way of consequence these in- Reply to Objection 3. Before the time of the Old Law stitutions foreshadowed something in the future, even as the ministry of the divine worship was not entrusted to everything else connected with them, according to 1 Cor. any particular person; although it is stated that the first- 12, “All these things happened to them in figure.” In this born were priests, and that they received a double portion. respect they had something in common with the “cere- For this very reason no particular portion was directed monial precepts,” which were instituted chiefly that they to be given to the ministers of the divine worship: but might be signs of the future. Hence the precept about pay- when they met with one, each man of his own accord gave ing tithes foreshadowed something in the future. For ten him what he deemed right. Thus Abraham by a kind of is, in a way, the perfect number (being the first numeri- prophetic instinct gave tithes to Melchisedech, the priest cal limit, since the figures do not go beyond ten but begin of the Most High God, according to Gn. 14:20, and again over again from one), and therefore he that gave a tenth, Jacob made a vow to give tithes†, although he appears to which is the sign of perfection, reserving the nine other have vowed to do so, not by paying them to ministers, but parts for himself, acknowledged by a sign that imperfec- for the purpose of the divine worship, for instance for the tion was his part, and that the perfection which was to fulfilling of sacrifices, hence he said significantly: “I will come through Christ was to be hoped for from God. Yet offer tithes to Thee.” this proves it to be, not a ceremonial but a judicial precept, Reply to Objection 4. The second kind of tithe, which as stated above. was reserved for the offering of sacrifices, has no place in There is this difference between the ceremonial and the New Law, since the legal victims had ceased. But the judicial precepts of the Law, as we stated above ( Ia IIae, third kind of tithe which they had to eat with the poor, is q. 104, a. 3), that it is unlawful to observe the ceremo- increased in the New Law, for our Lord commanded us nial precepts at the time of the New Law, whereas there to give to the poor not merely the tenth part, but all our is no sin in keeping the judicial precepts during the time surplus, according to Lk. 11:41: “That which remaineth, of grace although they are not binding. Indeed they are give alms.” Moreover the tithes that are given to the min- bound to be observed by some, if they be ordained by the isters of the Church should be dispensed by them for the authority of those who have power to make laws. Thus it use of the poor. was a judicial precept of the Old Law that he who stole Reply to Objection 5. The ministers of the Church a sheep should restore four sheep (Ex. 22:1), and if any ought to be more solicitous for the increase of spiritual king were to order this to be done his subjects would be goods in the people, than for the amassing of temporal bound to obey. In like manner during the time of the New goods: and hence the Apostle was unwilling to make use ‡ Num. 18:21 ∗ The words as quoted are from Lk. 10:7: Matthew has ‘meat’ instead of ‘hire’ † Gn. 28:20 1602 of the right given him by the Lord of receiving his liveli-mand them without scandal, on account of their having hood from those to whom he preached the Gospel, lest he fallen into desuetude, or for some other reason. Never- should occasion a hindrance to the Gospel of Christ‡. Nor theless those who do not give tithes in places where the did they sin who did not contribute to his upkeep, else the Church does not demand them are not in a state of damna- Apostle would not have omitted to reprove them. In like tion, unless they be obstinate, and unwilling to pay even manner the ministers of the Church rightly refrain from if tithes were demanded of them. demanding the Church’s tithes, when they could not de- Whether men are bound to pay tithes of all things? IIa IIae q. 87 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that men are not bound tithes must be paid on whatever one possesses. to give tithes of all things. The paying of tithes seems Reply to Objection 1. In accordance with the condi- to be an institution of the Old Law. Now the Old Law tion of that people there was a special reason why the Old contains no precept about personal tithes, viz. those that Law did not include a precept about personal tithes; be- are payable on property acquired by one’s own act, for in- cause, to wit, all the other tribes had certain possessions stance by commerce or soldiering. Therefore no man is wherewith they were able to provide a sufficient liveli- bound to pay tithes on such things. hood for the Levites who had no possessions, but were not Objection 2. Further, it is not right to make oblations forbidden to make a profit out of other lawful occupations of that which is ill-gotten, as stated above (q. 86, a. 3). as the other Jews did. On the other hand the people of the Now oblations, being offered to God immediately, seem New Law are spread abroad throughout the world, and to be more closely connected with the divine worship than many of them have no possessions, but live by trade, and tithes which are offered to the ministers. Therefore neither these would contribute nothing to the support of God’s should tithes be paid on ill-gotten goods. ministers if they did not pay tithes on their trade profits. Objection 3. Further, in the last chapter of Leviticus Moreover the ministers of the New Law are more strictly (30,32) the precept of paying tithes refers only to “corn, forbidden to occupy themselves in money-making trades, fruits of trees” and animals “that pass under the shep- according to 2 Tim. 2:4, “No man being a soldier to God, herd’s rod.” But man derives a revenue from other smaller entangleth himself with secular business.” Wherefore in things, such as the herbs that grow in his garden and so the New Law men are bound to pay personal tithes, ac- forth. Therefore neither on these things is a man bound to cording to the custom of their country and the needs of pay tithes. the ministers: hence Augustine, whose words are quoted Objection 4. Further, man cannot pay except what is 16, qu. 1, cap. Decimae, says†: “Tithes must be paid on in his power. Now a man does not always remain in pos- the profits of soldiering, trade or craft.” session of all his profit from land and stock, since some- Reply to Objection 2. Things are ill-gotten in two times he loses them by theft or robbery; sometimes they ways. First, because the getting itself was unjust: such, are transferred to another person by sale; sometimes they for instance, are things gotten by robbery, theft or usury: are due to some other person, thus taxes are due to princes, and these a man is bound to restore, and not to pay tithes and wages due to workmen. Therefore one ought not to on them. If, however, a field be bought with the profits pay tithes on such like things. of usury, the usurer is bound to pay tithes on the produce, On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 28:22): “Of all because the latter is not gotten usuriously but given by things that Thou shalt give to me, I will offer tithes to God. On the other hand certain things are said to be ill- Thee.” gotten, because they are gotten of a shameful cause, for I answer that, In judging about a thing we should instance of whoredom or stage-playing, and the like. Such look to its principle. Now the principle of the payment things a man is not bound to restore, and consequently he of tithes is the debt whereby carnal things are due to those is bound to pay tithes on them in the same way as other who sow spiritual things, according to the saying of the personal tithes. Nevertheless the Church must not accept Apostle (1 Cor. 9:11), “If we have sown unto you spiritual the tithe so long as those persons remain in sin, lest she things, is it a great matter if we reap your carnal things?” appear to have a share in their sins: but when they have [thus implying that on the contrary “it is no great matter done penance, tithes may be accepted from them on these if we reap your carnal things”]∗. For this debt is the prin- things. ciple on which is based the commandment of the Church Reply to Objection 3. Things directed to an end must about the payment of tithes. Now whatever man possesses be judged according to their fittingness to the end. Now comes under the designation of carnal things. Therefore the payment of tithes is due not for its own sake, but for ‡ 1 Cor. 9:12 ∗ The phrase in the brackets is omitted in the Leonine edition † Append. Serm. cclxxvii 1603 the sake of the ministers, to whose dignity it is unbecom-except perhaps by reason of the custom of one’s country. ing that they should demand minute things with careful Reply to Objection 4. A man is not bound to pay exactitude, for this is reckoned sinful according to the tithes on what he has lost by theft or robbery, before he Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 2). Hence the Old Law did not recovers his property: unless he has incurred the loss order the payment of tithes on such like minute things, through his own fault or neglect, because the Church but left it to the judgment of those who are willing to pay, ought not to be the loser on that account. If he sell wheat because minute things are counted as nothing. Wherefore that has not been tithed, the Church can command the the Pharisees who claimed for themselves the perfect jus- tithes due to her, both from the buyer who has a thing tice of the Law, paid tithes even on these minute things: due to the Church, and from the seller, because so far nor are they reproved by our Lord on that account, but as he is concerned he has defrauded the Church: yet if only because they despised greater, i.e. spiritual, precepts; one pays, the other is not bound. Tithes are due on the and rather did He show them to be deserving of praise in fruits of the earth, in so far as these fruits are the gift of this particular, when He said (Mat. 23:23): “These things God. Wherefore tithes do not come under a tax, nor are you ought to have done,” i.e. during the time of the Law, they subject to workmen’s wages. Hence it is not right to according to Chrysostom’s‡ commentary. This also seems deduct one’s taxes and the wages paid to workmen, before to denote fittingness rather than obligation. Therefore now paying tithes: but tithes must be paid before anything else too men are not bound to pay tithes on such minute things, on one’s entire produce. Whether tithes should be paid to the clergy? IIa IIae q. 87 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that tithes should not be regard to tithes: namely, the right to receive tithes, and paid to the clergy. Tithes were paid to the Levites in the the things given in the name of tithes. The right to re- Old Testament, because they had no portion in the peo- ceive tithes is a spiritual thing, for it arises from the debt ple’s possessions, according to Num. 18:23,24. But in in virtue of which the ministers of the altar have a right the New Testament the clergy have possessions not only to the expenses of their ministry, and temporal things are ecclesiastical, but sometimes also patrimonial: moreover due to those who sow spiritual things. This debt concerns they receive first-fruits, and oblations for the living and none but the clergy who have care of souls, and so they the dead. Therefore it is unnecessary to pay tithes to them. alone are competent to have this right. Objection 2. Further, it sometimes happens that a man On the other hand the things given in the name of dwells in one parish, and farms in another; or a shepherd tithes are material, wherefore they may come to be used may take his flock within the bounds of one parish during by anyone, and thus it is that they fall into the hands of the one part of the year, and within the bounds of one parish laity. during one part of the year, and within the bounds of an- Reply to Objection 1. In the Old Law, as stated above other parish during the other part of the year; or he may (a. 1, ad 4), special tithes were earmarked for the assis- have his sheepfold in one parish, and graze the sheep in tance of the poor. But in the New Law the tithes are given another. Now in all these and similar cases it seems im- to the clergy, not only for their own support, but also that possible to decide to which clergy the tithes ought to be the clergy may use them in assisting the poor. Hence they paid. Therefore it would seem that no fixed tithe ought to are not unnecessary; indeed Church property, oblations be paid to the clergy. and first-fruits as well as tithes are all necessary for this Objection 3. Further, it is the general custom in cer- same purpose. tain countries for the soldiers to hold the tithes from the Reply to Objection 2. Personal tithes are due to the Church in fee; and certain religious receive tithes. There- church in whose parish a man dwells, while predial tithes fore seemingly tithes are not due only to those of the seem more reasonably to belong to the church within clergy who have care of souls. whose bounds the land is situated. The law, however, pre- On the contrary, It is written (Num. 18:21): “I have scribes that in this matter a custom that has obtained for given to the sons of Levi all the tithes of Israel for a pos- a long time must be observed∗. The shepherd who grazes session, for the ministry wherewith they serve Me in the his flock at different seasons in two parishes, should pay Tabernacle.” Now the clergy are the successors of the sons tithe proportionately to both churches. And since the fruit of Levi in the New Testament. Therefore tithes are due to of the flock is derived from the pasture, the tithe of the the clergy alone. flock is due to the church in whose lands the flock grazes, I answer that, Two things have to be considered with rather than to the church on whose land the fold is situ- ‡ Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom ∗ Cap. Cum sint, and Cap. Ad apostolicae, de Decimis, etc. 1604 ated. through being granted to them in fee by the Church, or it Reply to Objection 3. Just as the Church can hand may be the succoring of the poor; thus certain tithes have over to a layman the things she receives under the title of been granted by way of alms to certain lay religious, or to tithe, so too can she allow him to receive tithes that are yet those that have no care of souls. Some religious, however, to be paid, the right of receiving being reserved to the min- are competent to receive tithes, because they have care of isters of the Church. The motive may be either the need souls. of the Church, as when tithes are due to certain soldiers Whether the clergy also are bound to pay tithes? IIa IIae q. 87 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that clerics also are bound ing ecclesiastical property, are not bound to pay tithes; to pay tithes. By common law∗ the parish church should whereas from some other cause through holding property receive the tithes on the lands which are in its territory. in their own right, either by inheriting it from their kin- Now it happens sometimes that the clergy have certain dred, or by purchase, or in any other similar manner, they lands of their own on the territory of some parish church, are bound to the payment of tithes. or that one church has ecclesiastical property on the terri- Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear, be- tory of another. Therefore it would seem that the clergy cause the clergy like anyone else are bound to pay tithes are bound to pay predial tithes. on their own lands to the parish church, even though they Objection 2. Further, some religious are clerics; and be the clergy of that same church, because to possess a yet they are bound to pay tithes to churches on account of thing as one’s private property is not the same as possess- the lands which they cultivate even with their own hands†. ing it in common. But church lands are not tithable, even Therefore it would seem that the clergy are not immune though they be within the boundaries of another parish. from the payment of tithes. Reply to Objection 2. Religious who are clerics, if Objection 3. Further, in the eighteenth chapter of they have care of souls, and dispense spiritual things to Numbers (26,28), it is prescribed not only that the Levites the people, are not bound to pay tithes, but they may re- should receive tithes from the people, but also that they ceive them. Another reason applies to other religious, who should themselves pay tithes to the high-priest. Therefore though clerics do not dispense spiritual things to the peo- the clergy are bound to pay tithes to the Sovereign Pontiff, ple; for according to the ordinary law they are bound to no less than the laity are bound to pay tithes to the clergy. pay tithes, but they are somewhat exempt by reason of Objection 4. Further, tithes should serve not only for various concessions granted by the Apostolic See¶. the support of the clergy, but also for the assistance of Reply to Objection 3. In the Old Law first-fruits were the poor. Therefore, if the clergy are exempt from pay- due to the priests, and tithes to the Levites; and since ing tithes, so too are the poor. Yet the latter is not true. the Levites were below the priests, the Lord commanded Therefore the former is false. that the former should pay the high-priest “the tenth part On the contrary, A decretal of Pope Paschal‡ says: of the tenth”k instead of first-fruits: wherefore for the “It is a new form of exaction when the clergy demand same reason the clergy are bound now to pay tithes to the tithes from the clergy”§. Sovereign Pontiff, if he demanded them. For natural rea- I answer that, The cause of giving cannot be the cause son dictates that he who has charge of the common estate of receiving, as neither can the cause of action be the cause of a multitude should be provided with all goods, so that of passion; yet it happens that one and the same person is he may be able to carry out whatever is necessary for the giver and receiver, even as agent and patient, on account common welfare. of different causes and from different points of view. Now Reply to Objection 4. Tithes should be employed for tithes are due to the clergy as being ministers of the altar the assistance of the poor, through the dispensation of the and sowers of spiritual things among the people. Where- clergy. Hence the poor have no reason for accepting tithes, fore those members of the clergy as such, i.e. as hav- but they are bound to pay them. ∗ Cap. Cum homines, de Decimis, etc. † Cap. Ex parte, and Cap. Nuper. ‡ Paschal II § Cap. Novum genus, de Decimis, etc. ¶ Cap. Ex multiplici, Ex parte, and Ad audientiam, de Decimis, etc. k Num. 18:26 1605 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 88 Of Vows (In Twelve Articles) We must now consider vows, whereby something is promised to God. Under this head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) What is a vow? (2) What is the matter of a vow? (3) Of the obligation of vows; (4) Of the use of taking vows; (5) Of what virtue is it an act? (6) Whether it is more meritorious to do a thing from a vow, than without a vow? (7) Of the solemnizing of a vow; (8) Whether those who are under another’s power can take vows? (9) Whether children may be bound by vow to enter religion? (10) Whether a vow is subject to dispensation or commutation? (11) Whether a dispensation can be granted in a solemn vow of continence? (12) Whether the authority of a superior is required in a dispensation from a vow? Whether a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will? IIa IIae q. 88 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that a vow consists in some particular thing. Now one man binds himself to an- nothing but a purpose of the will. According to some∗, “a other by means of a promise, which is an act of the reason vow is a conception of a good purpose after a firm delib- to which faculty it belongs to direct. For just as a man by eration of the mind, whereby a man binds himself before commanding or praying, directs, in a fashion, what others God to do or not to do a certain thing.” But the concep- are to do for him, so by promising he directs what he him- tion of a good purpose and so forth, may consist in a mere self is to do for another. Now a promise between man and movement of the will. Therefore a vow consists in a mere man can only be expressed in words or any other outward purpose of the will. signs; whereas a promise can be made to God by the mere Objection 2. Further, the very word vow seems to be inward thought, since according to 1 Kings 16:7, “Man derived from “voluntas” [will], for one is said to do a thing seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the “proprio voto” [by one’s own vow] when one does it vol- heart.” Yet we express words outwardly sometimes, ei- untarily. Now to “purpose” is an act of the will, while to ther to arouse ourselves, as was stated above with regard “promise” is an act of the reason. Therefore a vow con- to prayer (q. 83, a. 12), or to call others to witness, so that sists in a mere act of the will. one may refrain from breaking the vow, not only through Objection 3. Further, our Lord said (Lk. 9:62): “No fear of God, but also through respect of men. Now a man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is promise is the outcome from a purpose of doing some- fit for the kingdom of God.” Now from the very fact that a thing: and a purpose presupposes deliberation, since it is man has a purpose of doing good, he puts his hand to the the act of a deliberate will. Accordingly three things are plough. Consequently, if he look back by desisting from essential to a vow: the first is deliberation. the second is a his good purpose, he is not fit for the kingdom of God. purpose of the will; and the third is a promise, wherein is Therefore by a mere good purpose a man is bound before completed the nature of a vow. Sometimes, however, two God, even without making a promise; and consequently it other things are added as a sort of confirmation of the vow, would seem that a vow consists in a mere purpose of the namely, pronouncement by word of mouth, according to will. Ps. 65:13, “I will pay Thee my vows which my lips have On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:3): “If thou uttered”; and the witnessing of others. Hence the Master hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an un- says (Sent. iv, D, 38) that a vow is “the witnessing of a faithful and foolish promise displeaseth Him.” Therefore spontaneous promise and ought to be made to God and to vow is to promise, and a vow is a promise. about things relating to God”: although the “witnessing” I answer that, A vow denotes a binding to do or omit may strictly refer to the inward protestation. ∗ William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, xxviii, qu. 1; Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38 1606 Reply to Objection 1. The conceiving of a good pur-Reply to Objection 3. He that puts his hand to the pose is not confirmed by the deliberation of the mind, un- plough does something already; while he that merely pur- less the deliberation lead to a promise. poses to do something does nothing so far. When, how- Reply to Objection 2. Man’s will moves the reason ever, he promises, he already sets about doing, although to promise something relating to things subject to his will, he does not yet fulfil his promise: even so, he that puts his and a vow takes its name from the will forasmuch as it hand to the plough does not plough yet, nevertheless he proceeds from the will as first mover. stretches out his hand for the purpose of ploughing. Whether a vow should always be about a better good? IIa IIae q. 88 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that a vow need not be lutely but on the supposition of an end—for instance if always about a better good. A greater good is one that salvation be unattainable without it—it may be the matter pertains to supererogation. But vows are not only about of a vow in so far as it is done voluntarily, but not in so far matters of supererogation, but also about matters of salva-as there is a necessity for doing it. But that which is not tion: thus in Baptism men vow to renounce the devil and necessary, neither absolutely, nor on the supposition of an his pomps, and to keep the faith, as a gloss observes on end, is altogether voluntary, and therefore is most prop- Ps. 75:12, “Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God”; and erly the matter of a vow. And this is said to be a greater Jacob vowed (Gn. 28:21) that the Lord should be his God. good in comparison with that which is universally neces- Now this above all is necessary for salvation. Therefore sary for salvation. Therefore, properly speaking, a vow is vows are not only about a better good. said to be about a better good. Objection 2. Further, Jephte is included among the Reply to Objection 1. Renouncing the devil’s pomps saints (Heb. 11:32). Yet he killed his innocent daughter and keeping the faith of Christ are the matter of baptismal on account of his vow (Judges 11). Since, then, the slay- vows, in so far as these things are done voluntarily, al- ing of an innocent person is not a better good, but is in though they are necessary for salvation. The same answer itself unlawful, it seems that a vow may be made not only applies to Jacob’s vow: although it may also be explained about a better good, but also about something unlawful. that Jacob vowed that he would have the Lord for his God, Objection 3. Further, things that tend to be harmful by giving Him a special form of worship to which he was to the person, or that are quite useless, do not come under not bound, for instance by offering tithes and so forth as the head of a better good. Yet sometimes vows are made mentioned further on in the same passage. about immoderate vigils or fasts which tend to injure the Reply to Objection 2. Certain things are good, what- person: and sometimes vows are about indifferent matters ever be their result; such are acts of virtue, and these can and such as are useful to no purpose. Therefore a vow is be, absolutely speaking, the matter of a vow: some are not always about a better good. evil, whatever their result may be; as those things which On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 23:22): “If thou are sins in themselves, and these can nowise be the matter wilt not promise thou shalt be without sin.” of a vow: while some, considered in themselves, are good, I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), a vow is a and as such may be the matter of a vow, yet they may have promise made to God. Now a promise is about some- an evil result, in which case the vow must not be kept. It thing that one does voluntarily for someone else: since it was thus with the vow of Jephte, who as related in Judges would be not a promise but a threat to say that one would 11:30,31, “made a vow to the Lord, saying: If Thou wilt do something against someone. In like manner it would deliver the children of Ammon into my hands, whosoever be futile to promise anyone something unacceptable to shall first come forth out of the doors of my house, and him. Wherefore, as every sin is against God, and since no shall meet me when I return in peace. . . the same will I work is acceptable to God unless it be virtuous, it follows offer a holocaust to the Lord.” For this could have an evil that nothing unlawful or indifferent, but only some act of result if, as indeed happened, he were to be met by some virtue, should be the matter of a vow. But as a vow denotes animal which it would be unlawful to sacrifice, such as an a voluntary promise, while necessity excludes voluntari- ass or a human being. Hence Jerome says∗: “In vowing ness, whatever is absolutely necessary, whether to be or he was foolish, through lack of discretion, and in keep- not to be, can nowise be the matter of a vow. For it would ing his vow he was wicked.” Yet it is premised (Judges be foolish to vow that one would die or that one would not 11:29) that “the Spirit of the Lord came upon him,” be- fly. cause his faith and devotion, which moved him to make On the other hand, if a thing be necessary. not abso- that vow, were from the Holy Ghost; and for this reason ∗ Implicitly 1 Contra Jovin.: Comment. in Micheam vi, viii: Comment. in Jerem. vii. The quotation is from Peter Comestor, Hist. Scholast. 1607 he is reckoned among the saints, as also by reason of the “Present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing to victory which he obtained, and because it is probable that God,” adds, “your reasonable service.” Since, however, he repented of his sinful deed, which nevertheless fore- man is easily mistaken in judging of matters concerning shadowed something good. himself, such vows as these are more fittingly kept or dis- Reply to Objection 3. The mortification of one’s own regarded according to the judgment of a superior, yet so body, for instance by vigils and fasting, is not acceptable that, should a man find that without doubt he is seriously to God except in so far as it is an act of virtue; and this burdened by keeping such a vow, and should he be un- depends on its being done with due discretion, namely, able to appeal to his superior, he ought not to keep it. that concupiscence be curbed without overburdening na- As to vows about vain and useless things they should be ture. on this condition such things may be the matter ridiculed rather than kept. of a vow. Hence the Apostle after saying (Rom. 12:1), Whether all vows are binding? IIa IIae q. 88 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that vows are not all bind- displeaseth Him”§. ing. For man needs things that are done by another, more Reply to Objection 1. Honesty demands that a man than God does, since He has no need for our goods (Ps. should keep any promise he makes to another man, and 15:2). Now according to the prescription of human laws∗ this obligation is based on the natural law. But for a man a simple promise made to a man is not binding; and this to be under a civil obligation through a promise he has seems to be prescribed on account of the changeableness made, other conditions are requisite. And although God of the human will. Much less binding therefore is a simple needs not our goods, we are under a very great obligation promise made to God, which we call a vow. to Him: so that a vow made to Him is most binding. Objection 2. Further, no one is bound to do what is Reply to Objection 2. If that which a man has vowed impossible. Now sometimes that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him through any cause whatsoever, becomes impossible to him, either because it depends on he must do what he can, so that he have at least a will another’s decision, as when, for instance, a man vows to ready to do what he can. Hence if a man has vowed to en- enter a monastery, the monks of which refuse to receive ter a monastery, he must endeavor to the best of his power him: or on account of some defect arising, for instance to be received there. And if his intention was chiefly to when a woman vows virginity, and afterwards is deflow- bind himself to enter the religious life, so that, in conse- ered; or when a man vows to give a sum of money, and quence, he chose this particular form of religious life, or afterwards loses it. Therefore a vow is not always bind- this place, as being most agreeable to him, he is bound, ing. should he be unable to be received there, to enter the re- Objection 3. Further, if a man is bound to pay some- ligious life elsewhere. But if his principal intention is to thing, he must do so at once. But a man is not bound to bind himself to this particular kind of religious life, or to pay his vow at once, especially if it be taken under a con- this particular place, because the one or the other pleases dition to be fulfilled in the future. Therefore a vow is not him in some special way, he is not bound to enter another always binding. religious house, if they are unwilling to receive him into On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:3,4): “What- this particular one. on the other hand, if he be rendered soever thou hast vowed, pay it; and it is much better not to incapable of fulfilling his vow through his own fault, he vow, than after a vow not to perform the things promised.” is bound over and above to do penance for his past fault: I answer that, For one to be accounted faithful one thus if a woman has vowed virginity and is afterwards vi- must keep one’s promises. Wherefore, according to Au- olated, she is bound not only to observe what is in her gustine† faith takes its name “from a man’s deed agreeing power, namely, perpetual continency, but also to repent of with his word”‡. Now man ought to be faithful to God what she has lost by sinning. above all, both on account of God’s sovereignty, and on Reply to Objection 3. The obligation of a vow is account of the favors he has received from God. Hence caused by our own will and intention, wherefore it is writ- man is obliged before all to fulfill the vows he has made ten (Dt. 23:23): “That which is once gone out of thy lips, to God, since this is part of the fidelity he owes to God. thou shalt observe, and shalt do as thou hast promised to On the other hand, the breaking of a vow is a kind of in- the Lord thy God, and hast spoken with thy own will and fidelity. Wherefore Solomon gives the reason why vows with thy own mouth.” Wherefore if in taking a vow, it is should be paid to God, because “an unfaithful. . . promise one’s intention and will to bind oneself to fulfil it at once, ∗ Dig. L. xii, de pollicitat., i † Ep. xxxii, 2: De Mendac. xx ‡ ‘Fides. . . fiunt dicta’ Cicero gives the same etymology (De Offic. i, 7) § Eccles. 5:3 1608 one is bound to fulfil it immediately. But if one intend to it is written (Dt. 23:21): “When thou hast made a vow to fulfil it at a certain time, or under a certain condition, one the Lord thy God thou shalt not delay to pay it: because is not bound to immediate fulfilment. And yet one ought the Lord thy God will require it; and if thou delay, it shall not to delay longer than one intended to bind oneself, for be imputed to thee for a sin.” Whether it is expedient to take vows? IIa IIae q. 88 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not expedient to gustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.), so also take vows. It is not expedient to anyone to deprive him- a promise whereby we vow something to God, does not self of the good that God has given him. Now one of the conduce to His profit, nor does He need to be assured by greatest goods that God has given man is liberty whereof us, but it conduces to our profit, in so far as by vowing we he seems to be deprived by the necessity implicated in a fix our wills immovably on that which it is expedient to vow. Therefore it would seem inexpedient for man to take do. Hence it is expedient to take vows. vows. Reply to Objection 1. Even as one’s liberty is not Objection 2. Further, no one should expose himself to lessened by one being unable to sin, so, too, the necessity danger. But whoever takes a vow exposes himself to dan- resulting from a will firmly fixed to good does not lessen ger, since that which, before taking a vow, he could omit the liberty, as instanced in God and the blessed. Such is without danger, becomes a source of danger to him if he the necessity implied by a vow, bearing a certain resem- should not fulfil it after taking the vow. Hence Augustine blance to the confirmation of the blessed. Hence, Augus- says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): “Since thou hast tine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.) that “happy vowed, thou hast bound thyself, thou canst not do oth- is the necessity that compels us to do the better things.” erwise. If thou dost not what thou hast vowed thou wilt Reply to Objection 2. When danger arises from the not be as thou wouldst have been hadst thou not vowed. deed itself, this deed is not expedient, for instance that one For then thou wouldst have been less great, not less good: cross a river by a tottering bridge: but if the danger arise whereas now if thou breakest faith with God (which God through man’s failure in the deed, the latter does not cease forbid) thou art the more unhappy, as thou wouldst have to be expedient: thus it is expedient to mount on horse- been happier, hadst thou kept thy vow.” Therefore it is not back, though there be the danger of a fall from the horse: expedient to take vows. else it would behoove one to desist from all good things, Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16): that may become dangerous accidentally. Wherefore it is “Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ.” But we do written (Eccles. 11:4): “He that observeth the wind shall not read that either Christ or the Apostles took any vows. not sow, and he that considereth the clouds shall never Therefore it would seem inexpedient to take vows. reap.” Now a man incurs danger, not from the vow itself, On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 75:12): “Vow ye but from his fault, when he changes his mind by breaking and pay to the Lord your God.” his vow. Hence, Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,2), a vow is a et Paulin.): “Repent not of thy vow: thou shouldst rather promise made to God. Now one makes a promise to a man rejoice that thou canst no longer do what thou mightest under one aspect, and to God under another. Because we lawfully have done to thy detriment.” promise something to a man for his own profit; since it Reply to Objection 3. It was incompetent for Christ, profits him that we should be of service to him, and that by His very nature, to take a vow, both because He was we should at first assure him of the future fulfilment of God, and because, as man, His will was firmly fixed on the that service: whereas we make promises to God not for good, since He was a “comprehensor.” By a kind of simil- His but for our own profit. Hence Augustine says (Ep. itude, however, He is represented as saying (Ps. 21:26): cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): “He is a kind and not a “I will pay my vows in the sight of them that fear Him,” needy exactor, for he does not grow rich on our payments, when He is speaking of His body, which is the Church. but makes those who pay Him grow rich in Him.” And The apostles are understood to have vowed things per- just as what we give God is useful not to Him but to us, taining to the state of perfection when “they left all things since “what is given Him is added to the giver,” as Au- and followed Christ.” 1609 Whether a vow is an act of latria or religion? IIa IIae q. 88 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that a vow is not an act a promise is nothing else than a directing of the thing of latria or religion. Every act of virtue is matter for a promised to the person to whom the promise is made. vow. Now it would seem to pertain to the same virtue to Hence a vow is a directing of the thing vowed to the wor- promise a thing and to do it. Therefore a vow pertains to ship or service of God. And thus it is clear that to take a any virtue and not to religion especially. vow is properly an act of latria or religion. Objection 2. Further, according to Tully (De Invent. Reply to Objection 1. The matter of a vow is some- ii, 53) it belongs to religion to offer God worship and cer- times the act of another virtue, as, for instance, keeping emonial rites. But he who takes a vow does not yet offer the fast or observing continency; while sometimes it is something to God, but only promises it. Therefore, a vow an act of religion, as offering a sacrifice or praying. But is not an act of religion. promising either of them to God belongs to religion, for Objection 3. Further, religious worship should be of- the reason given above. Hence it is evident that some fered to none but God. But a vow is made not only to God, vows belong to religion by reason only of the promise but also to the saints and to one’s superiors, to whom re- made to God, which is the essence of a vow, while oth- ligious vow obedience when they make their profession. ers belong thereto by reason also of the thing promised, Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion. which is the matter of the vow. On the contrary, It is written (Is. 19:21): ”(The Reply to Objection 2. He who promises something Egyptians) shall worship Him with sacrifices and offer- gives it already in as far as he binds himself to give it: even ings and they shall make vows to the Lord, and perform as a thing is said to be made when its cause is made, be- them.” Now, the worship of God is properly the act of cause the effect is contained virtually in its cause. This is religion or latria. Therefore, a vow is an act of latria or why we thank not only a giver, but also one who promises religion. to give. I answer that, As stated above (q. 81, a. 1, ad 1), ev- Reply to Objection 3. A vow is made to God alone, ery act of virtue belongs to religion or latria by way of whereas a promise may be made to a man also: and this command, in so far as it is directed to the reverence of very promise of good, which is fore made to a man, may God which is the proper end of latria. Now the direction be the matter of a vow, and in so far as it is a virtuous of other actions to their end belongs to the commanding act. This is how we are to understand vows whereby we virtue, not to those which are commanded. Therefore the vow something to the saints or to one’s superiors: so that direction of the acts of any virtue to the service of God is the promise made to the saints or to one’s superiors is the the proper act of latria. matter of the vow, in so far as one vows to God to fulfil Now, it is evident from what has been said above what one has promised to the saints or one’s superiors. (Aa. 1,2) that a vow is a promise made to God, and that Whether it is more praiseworthy and meritorious to do something in fulfilment of a IIa IIae q. 88 a. 6 vow, than without a vow? Objection 1. It would seem that it is more praisewor- v∗. Therefore, it is better to do something without a vow, thy and meritorious to do a thing without a vow than in than in fulfilment of a vow. fulfilment of a vow. Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. ii): Objection 3. Further, a vow is necessary for the pur- “We should abstain or fast without putting ourselves un- pose of fixing the will on that which is vowed, as stated der the necessity of fasting, lest that which we are free to above (a. 4). But the will cannot be more fixed on a thing do be done without devotion and unwillingly.” Now he than when it actually does that thing. Therefore it is no who vows to fast puts himself under the necessity of fast- better to do a thing in fulfilment of a vow than without a ing. Therefore it would be better for him to fast without vow. taking the vow. On the contrary, A gloss on the words of Ps. 75:12, Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 9:7): “Vow ye and pay,” says: “Vows are counseled to the will.” “Everyone as he hath determined in his heart, not with But a counsel is about none but a better good. Therefore sadness, or of necessity: for God loveth a cheerful giver.” it is better to do a deed in fulfilment of a vow than without Now some fulfil sorrowfully what they have vowed: and a vow: since he that does it without a vow fulfils only one this seems to be due to the necessity arising from the vow, counsel, viz. the counsel to do it, whereas he that does it for necessity is a cause of sorrow according to Metaph. with a vow, fulfils two counsels, viz. the counsel to vow ∗ Ed. Did. iv, 5 1610 and the counsel to do it. Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted should I answer that, For three reasons it is better and more be understood as referring to necessity of coercion which meritorious to do one and the same deed with a vow than causes an act to be involuntary and excludes devotion. without. First, because to vow, as stated above (a. 5) is an Hence he says pointedly: “Lest that which we are free act of religion which is the chief of the moral virtues. Now to do be done without devotion and unwillingly.” On the the more excellent the virtue the better and more merito- other hand the necessity resulting from a vow is caused rious the deed. Wherefore the act of an inferior virtue is by the immobility of the will, wherefore it strengthens the the better the more meritorious for being commanded by a will and increases devotion. Hence the argument does not superior virtue, whose act it becomes through being com- conclude. manded by it, just as the act of faith or hope is better if it Reply to Objection 2. According to the Philosopher, be commanded by charity. Hence the works of the other necessity of coercion, in so far as it is opposed to the will, moral virtues (for instance, fasting, which is an act of ab- causes sorrow. But the necessity resulting from a vow, stinence; and being continent, which is an act of chastity) in those who are well disposed, in so far as it strength- are better and more meritorious, if they be done in fulfil- ens the will, causes not sorrow but joy. Hence Augustine ment of a vow, since thus they belong to the divine wor- says (Ep. ad Arment. et Paulin. cxxcii): “Repent not ship, being like sacrifices to God. Wherefore Augustine of thy vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that thou canst says (De Virg. viii) that “not even is virginity honorable no longer do what thou mightest lawfully have done to as such, but only when it is consecrated to God, and cher- thy detriment.” If, however, the very deed, considered in ished by godly continence.” itself, were to become disagreeable and involuntary after Secondly, because he that vows something and does one has taken the vow, the will to fulfil it remaining withal, it, subjects himself to God more than he that only does it; it is still more meritorious than if it were done without the for he subjects himself to God not only as to the act, but vow, since the fulfilment of a vow is an act of religion also as to the power, since in future he cannot do some- which is a greater virtue than abstinence, of which fasting thing else. Even so he gives more who gives the tree with is an act. its fruit, than he that gives the fruit only, as Anselm∗ ob- Reply to Objection 3. He who does something with- serves (De Simil. viii). For this reason, we thank even out having vowed it has an immovable will as regards the those who promise, as stated above (a. 5, ad 2). individual deed which he does and at the time when he Thirdly, because a vow fixes the will on the good im- does it; but his will does not remain altogether fixed for movably and to do anything of a will that is fixed on the the time to come, as does the will of one who makes a good belongs to the perfection of virtue, according to the vow: for the latter has bound his will to do something, Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 4), just as to sin with an obstinate both before he did that particular deed, and perchance to mind aggravates the sin, and is called a sin against the do it many times. Holy Ghost, as stated above (q. 14, a. 2). Whether a vow is solemnized by the reception of holy orders, and by the profession of IIa IIae q. 88 a. 7 a certain rule? Objection 1. It would seem that a vow is not solem- or in the profession of a certain rule does not belong to the nized by the reception of holy orders and by the profes- condition of a vow. sion of a certain rule. As stated above (a. 1), a vow is Objection 3. Further, a solemn vow seems to be the a promise made to God. Now external actions pertain- same as a public vow. Now many other vows may be ing to solemnity seem to be directed, not to God, but to made in public besides that which is pronounced in re- men. Therefore they are related to vows accidentally: and ceiving holy orders or in professing a certain rule; which consequently a solemnization of this kind is not a proper latter, moreover, may be made in private. Therefore not circumstance of a vow. only these vows are solemn. Objection 2. Further, whatever belongs to the con- On the contrary, These vows alone are an impedi- dition of a thing, would seem to be applicable to all in ment to the contract of marriage, and annul marriage if it which that thing is found. Now many things may be the be contracted, which is the effect of a solemn vow, as we subject of a vow, which have no connection either with shall state further on in the Third Part of this work†. holy orders, or to any particular rule: as when a man vows I answer that, The manner in which a thing is solem- a pilgrimage, or something of the kind. Therefore the sol- nized depends on its nature [conditio]: thus when a man emnization that takes place in the reception of holy orders takes up arms he solemnizes the fact in one way, namely, ∗ Eadmer † Suppl., q. 53, a. 2 1611 with a certain display of horses and arms and a concourse God is the author, though man is the minister, according of soldiers, while a marriage is solemnized in another way, to Num. 6:27, “They shall invoke My name upon the chil- namely, the array of the bridegroom and bride and the dren of Israel, and I will bless them.” Hence a solemn gathering of their kindred. Now a vow is a promise made vow is more binding with God than a simple vow, and he to God: wherefore, the solemnization of a vow consists in who breaks a solemn vow sins more grievously. When it something spiritual pertaining to God; i.e. in some spir- is said that a simple vow is no less binding than a solemn itual blessing or consecration which, in accordance with vow, this refers to the fact that the transgressor of either the institution of the apostles, is given when a man makes commits a mortal sin. profession of observing a certain rule, in the second de- Reply to Objection 2. It is not customary to solem- gree after the reception of holy orders, as Dionysius states nize particular acts, but the embracing of a new state, as (Eccl. Hier. vi). The reason of this is that solemniza- we have said above. Hence when a man vows particular tion is not wont to be employed, save when a man gives deeds, such as a pilgrimage, or some special fast, such a himself up entirely to some particular thing. For the nup- vow is not competent to be solemnized, but only such as tial solemnization takes place only when the marriage is the vow whereby a man entirely devotes himself to the di- celebrated, and when the bride and bridegroom mutually vine ministry or service: and yet many particular works deliver the power over their bodies to one another. In like are included under this vow as under a universal. manner a vow is solemnized when a man devotes himself Reply to Objection 3. Through being pronounced in to the divine ministry by receiving holy orders, or em- public vows may have a certain human solemnity, but not braces the state of perfection by renouncing the world and a spiritual and divine solemnity, as the aforesaid vows his own will by the profession of a certain rule. have, even when they are pronounced before a few per- Reply to Objection 1. This kind of solemnization re- sons. Hence the publicity of a vow differs from its solem- gards not only men but also God in so far as it is accom- nization. panied by a spiritual consecration or blessing, of which Whether those who are subject to another’s power are hindered from taking vows? IIa IIae q. 88 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that those who are sub- power cannot bind themselves by vow. ject to another’s power are not hindered from taking vows. I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), a vow is a The lesser bond is surpassed by the greater. Now the obli- promise made to God. Now no man can firmly bind him- gation of one man subject to another is a lesser bond than self by a promise to do what is in another’s power, but only a vow whereby one is under an obligation to God. There- to that which is entirely in his own power. Now whoever fore those who are subject to another’s power are not hin- is subject to another, as to the matter wherein he is subject dered from taking vows. to him, it does not lie in his power to do as he will, but Objection 2. Further, children are under their parents’ it depends on the will of the other. And therefore without power. Yet children may make religious profession even the consent of his superior he cannot bind himself firmly without the consent of their parents. Therefore one is not by a vow in those matters wherein he is subject to another. hindered from taking vows, through being subject to an- Reply to Objection 1. Nothing but what is virtuous other’s power. can be the subject of a promise made to God, as stated Objection 3. Further, to do is more than to promise. above (a. 2). Now it is contrary to virtue for a man to of- But religious who are under the power of their superiors fer to God that which belongs to another, as stated above can do certain things such as to say some psalms, or ab- (q. 86, a. 3). Hence the conditions necessary for a vow stain from certain things. Much more therefore seemingly are not altogether ensured, when a man who is under an- can they promise such things to God by means of vows. other’s power vows that which is in that other’s power, ex- Objection 4. Further, whoever does what he cannot cept under the condition that he whose power it concerns do lawfully sins. But subjects do not sin by taking vows, does not gainsay it. since nowhere do we find this forbidden. Therefore it Reply to Objection 2. As soon as a man comes of age, would seem that they can lawfully take vows. if he be a freeman he is in his own power in all matters On the contrary, It is commanded (Num. 30:4-6) that concerning his person, for instance with regard to binding “if a woman vow any thing. . . being in her father’s house, himself by vow to enter religion, or with regard to con- and yet but a girl in age,” she is not bound by the vow, un- tracting marriage. But he is not in his own power as re- less her father consent: and the same is said there (Num. gards the arrangements of the household, so that in these 30:7-9) of the woman that has a husband. Therefore in matters he cannot vow anything that shall be valid without like manner other persons that are subject to another’s the consent of his father. 1612 A slave, through being in his master’s power, even as thing, no vow of a religious stands without the consent of regards his personal deeds, cannot bind himself by vow his superior, as neither does the vow of a girl while in (her to enter religion, since this would withdraw him from his father’s) house without his consent; nor of a wife, without master’s service. the consent of her husband. Reply to Objection 3. A religious is subject to his Reply to Objection 4. Although the vow of one who superior as to his actions connected with his profession is subject to another’s power does not stand without the of his rule. Wherefore even though one may be able to consent of the one to whom he is subject, he does not sin do something now and then, when one is not being occu- by vowing; because his vow is understood to contain the pied with other things by one’s superior, yet since there is requisite condition, providing, namely, that his superior no time when his superior cannot occupy him with some- approve or do not gainsay it. Whether children can bind themselves by vow to enter religion? IIa IIae q. 88 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that children cannot bind of madness or imbecility. Secondly, through the maker of themselves by vow to enter religion. Since a vow re- a vow being subject to another’s power, as stated above quires deliberation of the mind, it is fitting that those alone (a. 8). Now these two circumstances concur in children should vow who have the use of reason. But this is lacking before the age of puberty, because in most instances they in children just as in imbeciles and madmen. Therefore are lacking in reason, and besides are naturally under the just as imbeciles and madmen cannot bind themselves to care of their parents, or guardians in place of their parents: anything by vow, so neither, seemingly, can children bind wherefore in both events their vows are without force. It themselves by vow to enter religion. happens, however, through a natural disposition which is Objection 2. Further, that which can be validly done not subject to human laws, that the use of reason is accel- by one cannot be annulled by another. Now a vow to en- erated in some, albeit few, who on this account are said to ter religion made by a boy or girl before the age of pu- be capable of guile: and yet they are not, for this reason, berty can be revoked by the parents or guardian (20, qu. exempt in any way from the care of their parents; for this ii, cap. Puella). Therefore it seems that a boy or girl can- care is subject to human law, which takes into account that not validly make a vow before the age of fourteen. which is of most frequent occurrence. Objection 3. Further, according to the rule of Blessed Accordingly we must say that boys or girls who have Benedict∗ and a statute of Innocent IV, a year’s probation not reached the years of puberty and have not attained the is granted to those who enter religion, so that probation use of reason can nowise bind themselves to anything by may precede the obligation of the vow. Therefore it seems vow. If, however, they attain the use of reason, before unlawful, before the year of probation, for children to be reaching the years of puberty, they can for their own part, bound by vow to enter religion. bind themselves by vow; but their vows can be annulled On the contrary, That which is not done aright is in- by their parents, under whose care they are still subject. valid without being annulled by anyone. But the vow pro- Yet no matter how much they be capable of guile nounced by a maiden, even before attaining the age of pu- before the years of puberty, they cannot be bound by a berty, is valid, unless it be annulled by her parents within solemn religious vow, on account of the Church’s decree† a year (20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore even before which considers the majority of cases. But after the years attaining to puberty children can lawfully and validly be of puberty have been reached, they can bind themselves bound by a vow to enter religion. by religious vows, simple or solemn, without the consent I answer that, As may be gathered from what has of their parents. been said above (a. 7), vows are of two kinds, simple Reply to Objection 1. This argument avails in the and solemn. And since, as stated in the same article, case of children who have not yet reached the use of rea- the solemnization of a vow consists in a spiritual bless- son: for their vows then are invalid, as stated above. ing and consecration bestowed through the ministry of Reply to Objection 2. The vows of persons subject the Church, it follows that it comes under the Church’s to another’s power contain an implied condition, namely, dispensation. Now a simple vow takes its efficacy from that they be not annulled by the superior. This condi- the deliberation of the mind, whereby one intends to put tion renders them licit and valid if it be fulfilled, as stated oneself under an obligation. That such an obligation be above. of no force may happen in two ways. First, through de- Reply to Objection 3. This argument avails in the fect of reason, as in madmen and imbeciles, who cannot case of solemn vows which are taken in profession. bind themselves by vow so long as they remain in a state ∗ Ch. 58 † Sext. Decret. cap. Is qui, de Reg. et transeunt. ad Relig. 1613 Whether vows admit of dispensation? IIa IIae q. 88 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that vows are not subject as is clear from what has been said above (a. 2). There- to dispensation. It is less to have a vow commuted than to fore it is necessary, in such a case, to decide that the vow be dispensed from keeping it. But a vow cannot be com- is not to be observed. And if it be decided absolutely that muted, according to Lev. 27:9,10, “A beast that may be a particular vow is not to be observed, this is called a “dis- sacrificed to the Lord, if anyone shall vow, shall be holy, pensation” from that vow; but if some other obligation be and cannot be changed, neither a better for a worse, nor a imposed in lieu of that which was to have been observed, worse for a better.” Much less, therefore, do vows admit the vow is said to be “commuted.” Hence it is less to com- of dispensation. mute a vow than to dispense from a vow: both, however, Objection 2. Further, no man can grant a dispensation are in the power of the Church. in matters concerning the natural law and in the Divine Reply to Objection 1. An animal that could be law- precepts, especially those of the First Table, since these fully sacrificed was deemed holy from the very moment aim directly at the love of God, which is the last end of that it was the subject of a vow, being, as it were, dedi- the precepts. Now the fulfilment of a vow is a matter of cated to the worship of God: and for this reason it could the natural law, and is commanded by the Divine law, as not be changed: even so neither may one now exchange shown above (a. 3), and belongs to the precepts of the First for something better, or worse, that which one has vowed, Table since it is an act of religion. Therefore vows do not if it be already consecrated, e.g. a chalice or a house. admit of dispensation. On the other hand, an animal that could not be sacrificed, Objection 3. Further, the obligation of a vow is based through not being the lawful matter of a sacrifice, could on the fidelity which a man owes to God, as stated above and had to be bought back, as the law requires. Even so, (a. 3). But no man can dispense in such a matter as this. vows can be commuted now, if no consecration has inter- Neither, therefore, can any one grant a dispensation from vened. a vow. Reply to Objection 2. Even as man is bound by nat- On the contrary, That which proceeds from the com- ural law and Divine precept to fulfil his vow, so, too, is mon will of many has apparently greater stability than that he bound under the same heads to obey the law or com- which proceeds from the individual will of some one per- mands of his superiors. And yet when he is dispensed son. Now the law which derives its force from the com- from keeping a human law, this does not involve disobe- mon will admits of dispensation by a man. Therefore it dience to that human law, for this would be contrary to the seems that vows also admit of dispensation by a man. natural law and the Divine command; but it amounts to I answer that, The dispensation from a vow is to be this—that what was law is not law in this particular case. taken in the same sense as a dispensation given in the ob- Even so, when a superior grants a dispensation, that which servance of a law because, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 96, was contained under a vow is by his authority no longer so a. 6; Ia IIae, q. 97, a. 4), a law is made with an eye to that contained, in so far as he decides that in this case such and which is good in the majority of instances. But since, in such a thing is not fitting matter for a vow. Consequently certain cases this is not good, there is need for someone to when an ecclesiastical superior dispenses someone from decide that in that particular case the law is not to be ob- a vow, he does not dispense him from keeping a precept served. This is properly speaking to dispense in the law: of the natural or of the Divine law, but he pronounces a for a dispensation would seem to denote a commensurate decision on a matter to which a man had bound himself of distribution or application of some common thing to those his own accord, and of which he was unable to consider that are contained under it, in the same way as a person is every circumstance. said to dispense food to a household. Reply to Objection 3. The fidelity we owe to God In like manner a person who takes a vow makes a law does not require that we fulfil that which it would be for himself as it were, and binds himself to do something wrong or useless to vow, or which would be an obstacle which in itself and in the majority of cases is a good. But to the greater good whereunto the dispensation from that it may happen that in some particular case this is simply vow would conduce. Hence the dispensation from a vow evil, or useless, or a hindrance to a greater good: and this is not contrary to the fidelity due to God. is essentially contrary to that which is the matter of a vow, 1614 Whether it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency? IIa IIae q. 88 a. 11 Objection 1. It would seem that it is possible to be man overcomes a foe within himself, or to the fact that dispensed from a solemn vow of continency. As stated by continency man is perfectly conformed to Christ in re- above, one reason for granting a dispensation from a vow spect of purity of both body and soul. But this reason is if it be an obstacle to a greater good. But a vow of con- does not seem to be cogent since the goods of the soul, tinency, even though it be solemn, may be an obstacle to such as contemplation and prayer, far surpass the goods a greater good, since the common good is more God-like of the body and still more conform us to God, and yet one than the good of an individual. Now one man’s conti- may be dispensed from a vow of prayer or contemplation. nency may be an obstacle to the good of the whole com- Therefore, continency itself absolutely considered seems munity, for instance, in the case where, if certain persons no reason why the solemn vow thereof cannot be a matter who have vowed continency were to marry, the peace of of dispensation; especially seeing that the Apostle (1 Cor. their country might be procured. Therefore it seems that 7:34) exhorts us to be continent on account of contempla- it is possible to be dispensed even from a solemn vow of tion, when he says that the unmarried woman. . . “thinketh continency. on the things of God [Vulg.: ‘the Lord’],” and since the Objection 2. Further, religion is a more excellent end is of more account than the means. virtue than chastity. Now if a man vows an act of religion, Consequently others† find the reason for this in the e.g. to offer sacrifice to God he can be dispensed from that perpetuity and universality of this vow. For they assert vow. Much more, therefore, can he be dispensed from the that the vow of continency cannot be canceled, save by vow of continency which is about an act of chastity. something altogether contrary thereto, which is never law- Objection 3. Further, just as the observance of a vow ful in any vow. But this is evidently false, because just as of abstinence may be a source of danger to the person, so the practice of carnal intercourse is contrary to continency, too may be the observance of a vow of continency. Now so is eating flesh or drinking wine contrary to abstinence one who takes a vow of abstinence can be dispensed from from such things, and yet these latter vows may be a mat- that vow if it prove a source of danger to his body. There- ter for dispensation. fore for the same reason one may be dispensed from a vow For this reason others‡ maintain that one may be dis- of continency. pensed even from a solemn vow of continency, for the Objection 4. Further, just as the vow of continency is sake of some common good or common need, as in the part of the religious profession, whereby the vow is sol- case of the example given above (obj. 1), of a country emnized, so also are the vows of poverty and obedience. being restored to peace through a certain marriage to be But it is possible to be dispensed from the vows of poverty contracted. Yet since the Decretal quoted says explic- and obedience, as in the case of those who are appointed itly that “not even the Sovereign Pontiff can dispense a bishops after making profession. Therefore it seems that monk from keeping chastity,” it follows seemingly, that it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of conti- we must maintain that, as stated above (a. 10, ad 1; cf. nency. Lev. 27:9,10,28), whatsoever has once been sanctified to On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 26:20): “No the Lord cannot be put to any other use. For no ecclesi- price is worthy of a continent soul.” astical prelate can make that which is sanctified to lose its Further, (Extra, De Statu Monach.) at the end of consecration, not even though it be something inanimate, the Decretal, Cum ad Monasterium it is stated that the for instance a consecrated chalice to be not consecrated, “renouncing of property, like the keeping of chastity, is so long as it remains entire. Much less, therefore, can a so bound up with the monastic rule, that not even the prelate make a man that is consecrated to God cease to Sovereign Pontiff can disperse from its observance.” be consecrated, so long as he lives. Now the solemnity I answer that, Three things may be considered in a of a vow consists in a kind of consecration or blessing solemn vow of continency: first, the matter of the vow, of the person who takes the vow, as stated above (a. 7). namely, continency; secondly, the perpetuity of the vow, Hence no prelate of the Church can make a man, who has namely, when a person binds himself by vow to the per- pronounced a solemn vow, to be quit of that to which he petual observance of chastity: thirdly, the solemnity of was consecrated, e.g. one who is a priest, to be a priest the vow. Accordingly, some∗ say that the solemn vow no more, although a prelate may, for some particular rea- cannot be a matter of dispensation, on account of the con- son, inhibit him from exercising his order. In like manner tinency itself for which no worthy price can be found, as the Pope cannot make a man who has made his religious is stated by the authority quoted above. The reason for profession cease to be a religious, although certain jurists this is assigned by some to the fact that by continency have ignorantly held the contrary. ∗ William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III. vii. 1, qu. 5 † Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38 ‡ Innocent IV, on the above decretal 1615 We must therefore consider whether continency is es-poral prayer or of temporal abstinence. But the fact that sentially bound up with the purpose for which the vow is no dispensation can be granted from a vow of continency solemnized. because if not, the solemnity of the conse- solemnized by profession is due, not to its being an act of cration can remain without the obligation of continency, chastity, but because through the religious profession it is but not if continency is essentially bound up with that for already an act of religion. which the vow is solemnized. Now the obligation of ob- Reply to Objection 3. Food is directly ordered to the serving continency is connected with Holy orders, not es- upkeep of the person, therefore abstinence from food may sentially but by the institution of the Church; wherefore it be a direct source of danger to the person: and so on this seems that the Church can grant a dispensation from the count a vow of abstinence is a matter of dispensation. On vow of continency solemnized by the reception of Holy the other hand sexual intercourse is directly ordered to the Orders. on the other hand the obligation of observing; upkeep not of the person but of the species, wherefore to continency is an essential condition of the religious state, abstain from such intercourse by continency does not en- whereby a man renounces the world and binds himself danger the person. And if indeed accidentally it prove a wholly to God’s service, for this is incompatible with mat- source of danger to the person, this danger may be obvi- rimony, in which state a man is under the obligation of ated by some other means, for instance by abstinence, or taking to himself a wife, of begetting children, of looking other corporal remedies. after his household, and of procuring whatever is neces- Reply to Objection 4. A religious who is made a sary for these purposes. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 bishop is no more absolved from his vow of poverty than Cor. 7:33) that “he that is with a wife, is solicitous for the from his vow of continency, since he must have nothing of things of the world, how he may please his wife; and he is his own and must hold himself as being the dispenser of divided.” Hence the “monk” takes his name from “unity”§ the common goods of the Church. In like manner neither in contrast with this division. For this reason the Church is he dispensed from his vow of obedience; it is an acci- cannot dispense from a vow solemnized by the religious dent that he is not bound to obey if he have no superior; profession; and the reason assigned by the Decretal is be- just as the abbot of a monastery, who nevertheless is not cause “chastity is bound up with the monastic rule.” dispensed from his vow of obedience. Reply to Objection 1. Perils occasioned by human af- The passage of Ecclesiasticus, which is put forward in fairs should be obviated by human means, not by turning the contrary sense, should be taken as meaning that nei- divine things to a human use. Now a professed religious is ther fruitfulness of the of the flesh nor any bodily good is dead to the world and lives to God, and so he must not be to be compared with continency, which is reckoned one called back to the human life on the pretext of any human of the goods of the soul, as Augustine declares (De Sanct. contingency. Virg. viii). Wherefore it is said pointedly “of a continent Reply to Objection 2. A vow of temporal continency soul,” not “of a continent body.” can be a matter of dispensation, as also a vow of tem- Whether the authority of a prelate is required for commutation or the dispensation of IIa IIae q. 88 a. 12 a vow? Objection 1. It would seem that the authority of a when anyone rightly determines of his own authority that prelate is not required for the commutation or dispensa- in his case a vow is not to be kept, he would seem not to tion of a vow. A person may enter religion without the be bound; since a vow need not be kept if it have an evil authority of a superior prelate. Now by entering religion result (a. 2, ad 2). Therefore the Authority of a prelate is one is absolved from the vows he made in the world, even not required that one may be dispensed from a vow. from the vow of making a pilgrimage to the Holy Land∗. Objection 3. Further, if it belongs to a prelate’s power Therefore the commutation or dispensation of a vow is to grant dispensations from vows, on the same count it is possible without the authority of a superior prelate. competent to all prelates, but it does not belong to all to Objection 2. Further, to dispense anyone from a vow dispense from every vow. Therefore it does not belong to seems to consist in deciding in what circumstances he the power of a prelate to dispense from vows. need not keep that vow. But if the prelate is at fault in On the contrary, A vow binds one to do something, his decision, the person who took the vow does not seem even as a law does. Now the superior’s authority is requi- to be absolved from his vow, since no prelate can grant a site for a dispensation from a precept of the law, as stated dispensation contrary to the divine precept about keeping above ( Ia IIae, q. 96, a. 6; Ia IIae, q. 97, a. 4). Therefore one’s vows, as stated above (a. 10, ad 2; a. 11). Likewise, it is likewise required in a dispensation from a vow. § The Greek monos ∗ Cap. Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt. 1616 I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,2), a vow is a of conscience, whenever his superior tells him to. promise made to God about something acceptable to Him. But this opinion is based on a false supposition: be- Now if you promise something to anyone it depends on cause a spiritual prelate being, not a master, but a dis- his decision whether he accept what you promise. Again penser, his power is given “unto edification, not for de- in the Church a prelate stands in God’s place. Therefore a struction” (2 Cor. 10:8), and consequently, just as he can- commutation or dispensation of vows requires the author- not command that which is in itself displeasing to God, ity of a prelate who in God’s stead declares what is accept- namely, sin, so neither can he forbid what is in itself pleas- able to God, according to 2 Cor. 2:10: “For. . . have par- ing to God, namely, works of virtue. Therefore absolutely doned. . . for your sakes. . . in the person of Christ.” And speaking man can vow them. But it does belong to a he says significantly “for your sakes,” since whenever we prelate to decide what is the more virtuous and the more ask a prelate for a dispensation we should do so to honor acceptable to God. Consequently in matters presenting Christ in Whose person he dispenses, or to promote the no difficulty, the prelate’s dispensation would not excuse interests of the Church which is His Body. one from sin: for instance, if a prelate were to dispense Reply to Objection 1. All other vows are about some a person from a vow to enter the religious life, without particular works, whereas by the religious life a man con- any apparent cause to prevent him from fulfilling his vow. secrates his whole life to God’s service. Now the particu- But if some cause were to appear, giving rise, at least, to lar is included in the universal, wherefore a Decretal∗ says doubt, he could hold to the prelate’s decision whether of that “a man is not deemed a vow-breaker if he exchange commutation or of dispensation. He could not, however, a temporal service for the perpetual service of religion.” follow his own judgment in the matter, because he does And yet a man who enters religion is not bound to ful- not stand in the place of God; except perhaps in the case fil the vows, whether of fasting or of praying or the like, when the thing he has vowed is clearly unlawful, and he which he made when in the world, because by entering is unable to have recourse to the prelate. religion he dies to his former life, and it is unsuitable to Reply to Objection 3. Since the Sovereign Pontiff the religious life that each one should have his own ob- holds the place of Christ throughout the whole Church, he servances, and because the burden of religion is onerous exercises absolute power of dispensing from all vows that enough without requiring the addition of other burdens. admit of dispensation. To other and inferior prelates is the Reply to Objection 2. Some have held that prelates power committed of dispensing from those vows that are can dispense from vows at their will, for the reason that commonly made and frequently require dispensation, in every vow supposes as a condition that the superior prelate order that men may easily have recourse to someone; such be willing; thus it was stated above (a. 8) that the vow of a are the vows of pilgrimage (Cap. de Peregin., de Voto et subject, e.g. of a slave or a son, supposes this condition, if Voti redempt.), fasting and the like, and of pilgrimage to “the father or master consent,” or “does not dissent.” And the Holy Land, are reserved to the Sovereign Pontiff†. thus a subject might break his vow without any remorse ∗ Cap. Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt. † Cap. Ex multa 1617 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 89 Of Oaths (In Ten Articles) We must now consider those external acts of religion, whereby something Divine is taken by man: and this is either a sacrament or the Name of God. The place for treating of the taking of a sacrament will be in the Third Part of this work: of the taking of God’s Name we shall treat now. The Name of God is taken by man in three ways. First, by way of oath in order to confirm one’s own assertion: secondly, by way of adjuration as an inducement to others: thirdly, by way of invocation for the purpose of prayer or praise. Accordingly we must first treat of oaths: and under this head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) What is an oath? (2) Whether it is lawful? (3) What are the accompanying conditions of an oath? (4) Of what virtue is it an act? (5) Whether oaths are desirable, and to be employed frequently as something useful and good? (6) Whether it is lawful to swear by a creature? (7) Whether an oath is binding? (8) Which is more binding, an oath or a vow? (9) Whether an oath is subject to dispensation? (10) Who may lawfully swear, and when? Whether to swear is to call God to witness? IIa IIae q. 89 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that to swear is not to call true. But particular contingent facts regarding man can- God to witness. Whoever invokes the authority of Holy not be confirmed by a necessary reason, wherefore propo- Writ calls God to witness, since it is His word that Holy sitions regarding such things are wont to be confirmed by Writ contains. Therefore, if to swear is to call God to wit- witnesses. Now a human witness does not suffice to con- ness, whoever invoked the authority of Holy Writ would firm such matters for two reasons. First, on account of swear. But this is false Therefore the antecedent is false man’s lack of truth, for many give way to lying, accord- also. ing to Ps. 16:10, “Their mouth hath spoken lies [Vulg.: Objection 2. Further, one does not pay anything to ‘proudly’].” Secondly, on account of this lack of knowl- a person by calling him to witness. But he who swears edge, since he can know neither the future, nor secret by God pays something to Him for it is written (Mat. thoughts, nor distant things: and yet men speak about such 5:33): “Thou shall pay [Douay: ‘perform’] thy oaths to things, and our everyday life requires that we should have the Lord”; and Augustine says∗ that to swear [jurare] is some certitude about them. Hence the need to have re- “to pay the right [jus reddere] of truth to God.” Therefore course to a Divine witness, for neither can God lie, nor is to swear is not to call God to witness. anything hidden from Him. Now to call God to witness Objection 3. Further, the duties of a judge differ from is named “jurare” [to swear] because it is established as the duties of a witness, as shown above (Qq. 67,70). Now though it were a principle of law [jure] that what a man as- sometimes a man, by swearing, implores the Divine judg- serts under the invocation of God as His witness should be ment, according to Ps. 7:5, “If I have rendered to them accepted as true. Now sometimes God is called to witness that repaid me evils, let me deservedly fall empty before when we assert present or past events, and this is termed my enemies.” Therefore to swear is not to call God to a “declaratory oath”; while sometimes God is called to witness. witness in confirmation of something future, and this is On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on per- termed a “promissory oath.” But oaths are not employed jury (Serm. clxxx): “When a man says: ‘By God,’ what in order to substantiate necessary matters, and such as else does he mean but that God is his witness?” come under the investigation of reason; for it would seem I answer that, As the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16), oaths absurd in a scientific discussion to wish to prove one’s are taken for the purpose of confirmation. Now specula- point by an oath. tive propositions receive confirmation from reason, which Reply to Objection 1. It is one thing to employ a proceeds from principles known naturally and infallibly Divine witness already given, as when one adduces the ∗ Serm. clxxx 1618 authority of Holy Scripture; and another to implore God In one way He reveals the truth simply, either by inward to bear witness, as in an oath. inspiration, or by unveiling the facts, namely, by making Reply to Objection 2. A man is said to pay his oaths public what was hitherto secret: in another way by pun- to God because he performs what he swears to do, or be- ishing the lying witness, and then He is at once judge and cause, from the very fact that he calls upon God to wit- witness, since by punishing the liar He makes known his ness, he recognizes Him as possessing universal knowl- lie. Hence oaths are of two kinds: one is a simple contes- edge and unerring truth. tation of God, as when a man says “God is my witness,” Reply to Objection 3. A person is called to give wit- or, “I speak before God,” or, “By God,” which has the ness, in order that he may make known the truth about same meaning, as Augustine states∗; the other is by curs- what is alleged. Now there are two ways in which God ing, and consists in a man binding himself or something makes known whether the alleged facts are true or not. of his to punishment if what is alleged be not true. Whether it is lawful to swear? IIa IIae q. 89 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not lawful to good man in this manner. Moreover, he is in danger of swear. Nothing forbidden in the Divine Law is lawful. committing perjury, because man easily offends in words, Now swearing is forbidden (Mat. 5:34), “But I say to you according to James 3:2, “If any man offend not in word, not to swear at all”; and (James 5:12), “Above all things, the same is a perfect man.” Wherefore it is written (Ec- my brethren, swear not.” Therefore swearing is unlawful. clus. 23:9): “Let not thy mouth be accustomed to swear- Objection 2. Further, whatever comes from an evil ing, for in it there are many falls.” seems to be unlawful, because according to Mat. 7:18, Reply to Objection 1. Jerome, commenting on Mat. “neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit.” Now 5:34, says: “Observe that our Saviour forbade us to swear, swearing comes from an evil, for it is written (Mat. 5:37): not by God, but by heaven and earth. For it is known that “But let your speech be: Yea, yea: No, no. And that which the Jews have this most evil custom of swearing by the el- is over and above these is of evil.” Therefore swearing is ements.” Yet this answer does not suffice, because James apparently unlawful. adds, “nor by any other oath.” Wherefore we must reply Objection 3. Further, to seek a sign of Divine Prov- that, as Augustine states (De Mendacio xv), “when the idence is to tempt God, and this is altogether unlawful, Apostle employs an oath in his epistles, he shows how we according to Dt. 6:16, “Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy are to understand the saying, ‘I say to you, not to swear at God.” Now he that swears seems to seek a sign of Divine all’; lest, to wit, swearing lead us to swear easily and from Providence, since he asks God to bear witness, and this swearing easily, we contract the habit, and, from swear- must be by some evident effect. Therefore it seems that ing habitually, we fall into perjury. Hence we find that he swearing is altogether unlawful. swore only when writing, because thought brings caution On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:13): “Thou shalt and avoids hasty words.” fear the Lord thy God. . . and shalt swear by His name.” Reply to Objection 2. According to Augustine (De I answer that, Nothing prevents a thing being good Serm. Dom. in Monte i. 17): “If you have to swear, note in itself, and yet becoming a source of evil to one who that the necessity arises from the infirmity of those whom makes use thereof unbecomingly: thus to receive the Eu- you convince, which infirmity is indeed an evil. Accord- charist is good, and yet he that receives it “unworthily, ingly He did not say: ‘That which is over and above is eateth and drinketh judgment to himself” (1 Cor. 11:29). evil,’ but ‘is of evil.’ For you do no evil; since you make Accordingly in answer to the question in point it must be good use of swearing, by persuading another to a useful stated that an oath is in itself lawful and commendable. purpose: yet it ‘comes of the evil’ of the person by whose This is proved from its origin and from its end. From its infirmity you are forced to swear.” origin, because swearing owes its introduction to the faith Reply to Objection 3. He who swears tempts not whereby man believes that God possesses unerring truth God, because it is not without usefulness and necessity and universal knowledge and foresight of all things: and that he implores the Divine assistance. Moreover, he does from its end, since oaths are employed in order to justify not expose himself to danger, if God be unwilling to bear men, and to put an end to controversy (Heb. 6:16). witness there and then: for He certainly will bear witness Yet an oath becomes a source of evil to him that makes at some future time, when He “will bring to light the hid- evil use of it, that is who employs it without necessity and den things of darkness, and will make manifest the coun- due caution. For if a man calls God as witness, for some sels of hearts” (1 Cor. 4:5). And this witness will be lack- trifling reason, it would seemingly prove him to have but ing to none who swears, neither for nor against him. little reverence for God, since he would not treat even a ∗ See argument On the contrary 1619 Whether three accompanying conditions of an oath are suitably assigned, namely, IIa IIae q. 89 a. 3 justice, judgment, and truth? Objection 1. It would seem that justice, judgment and good except for one who makes good use of it. Now two truth are unsuitably assigned as the conditions accompa- conditions are required for the good use of an oath. First, nying an oath. Things should not be enumerated as di- that one swear, not for frivolous, but for urgent reasons, verse, if one of them includes the other. Now of these and with discretion; and this requires judgment or discre- three, one includes another, since truth is a part of justice, tion on the part of the person who swears. Secondly, as according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53): and judgment regards the point to be confirmed by oath, that it be nei- is an act of justice, as stated above (q. 60, a. 1). Therefore ther false, nor unlawful, and this requires both truth, so the three accompanying conditions of an oath are unsuit- that one employ an oath in order to confirm what is true, ably assigned. and justice, so that one confirm what is lawful. A rash oath Objection 2. Further, many other things are required lacks judgment, a false oath lacks truth, and a wicked or for an oath, namely, devotion, and faith whereby we be- unlawful oath lacks justice. lieve that God knows all things and cannot lie. Therefore Reply to Objection 1. Judgment does not signify here the accompanying conditions of an oath are insufficiently the execution of justice, but the judgment of discretion, as enumerated. stated above. Nor is truth here to be taken for the part of Objection 3. Further, these three are requisite in justice, but for a condition of speech. man’s every deed: since he ought to do nothing contrary Reply to Objection 2. Devotion, faith and like con- to justice and truth, or without judgment, according to 1 ditions requisite for the right manner of swearing are im- Tim. 5:21, “Do nothing without prejudice,” i.e. without plied by judgment: for the other two regard the things previous judgment∗. Therefore these three should not be sworn to as stated above. We might also reply that justice associated with an oath any more than with other human regards the reason for swearing. actions. Reply to Objection 3. There is great danger in swear- On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 4:2): “Thou shalt ing, both on account of the greatness of God Who is called swear: As the Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and upon to bear witness, and on account of the frailty of the in justice”: which words Jerome expounds, saying: “Ob- human tongue, the words of which are confirmed by oath. serve that an oath must be accompanied by these condi- Hence these conditions are more requisite for an oath than tions, truth, judgment and justice.” for other human actions. I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), an oath is not Whether an oath is an act of religion or latria? IIa IIae q. 89 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that an oath is not an I answer that, As appears from what has been said act of religion, or latria. Acts of religion are about holy above (a. 1), he that swears calls God to witness in con- and divine things. But oaths are employed in connection firmation of what he says. Now nothing is confirmed save with human disputes, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 6:16). by what is more certain and more powerful. Therefore in Therefore swearing is not an act of religion or latria. the very fact that a man swears by God, he acknowledges Objection 2. Further, it belongs to religion to give God to be more powerful, by reason of His unfailing truth worship to God, as Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). and His universal knowledge; and thus in a way he shows But he who swears offers nothing to God, but calls God to reverence to God. For this reason the Apostle says (Heb. be his witness. Therefore swearing is not an act of religion 6:16) that “men swear by one greater than themselves,” or latria. and Jerome commenting on Mat. 5:34, says that “he who Objection 3. Further, the end of religion or latria is to swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he show reverence to God. But the end of an oath is not this, swears.” The Philosopher, too, states (Metaph. i, 3) that but rather the confirmation of some assertion. Therefore “to swear is to give very great honor.” Now to show rev- swearing is not an act of religion. erence to God belongs to religion or latria. wherefore it is On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:13): “Thou shalt evident that an oath is an act of religion or latria. fear the Lord thy God, and shalt serve Him only, and thou Reply to Objection 1. Two things may be observed shalt swear by His name.” Now he speaks there of the in an oath. The witness adduced, and this is Divine: and servitude of religion. Therefore swearing is an act of reli- the thing witnessed to, or that which makes it necessary to gion. call the witness, and this is human. Accordingly an oath ∗ Vulg.: ‘Observe these things without prejudice, doing nothing by declining to either side.’ 1620 belongs to religion by reason of the former, and not of the Reply to Objection 3. Whatsoever we do, we should latter. do it in honor of God: wherefore there is no hindrance, if Reply to Objection 2. In the very fact that a man by intending to assure a man, we show reverence to God. takes God as witness by way of an oath, he acknowledges For we ought so to perform our actions in God’s honor Him to be greater: and this pertains to the reverence and that they may conduce to our neighbor’s good, since God honor of God, so that he offers something to God, namely, also works for His own glory and for our good. reverence and honor. Whether oaths are desirable and to be used frequently as something useful and good? IIa IIae q. 89 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that oaths are desirable this life; and such things are used unduly whenever they and to be used frequently as something useful and good. are used outside the bounds of necessity. For this reason Just as a vow is an act of religion, so is an oath. Now Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 17): “He it is commendable and more meritorious to do a thing by who understands that swearing is not to be held as a good vow, because a vow is an act of religion, as stated above thing,” i.e. desirable for its own sake, “restrains himself (q. 88, a. 5). Therefore for the same reason, to do or say as far as he can from uttering oaths, unless there be urgent a thing with an oath is more commendable, and conse- need.” quently oaths are desirable as being good essentially. Reply to Objection 1. There is no parity between a Objection 2. Further, Jerome, commenting on Mat. vow and an oath: because by a vow we direct something 5:34, says that “he who swears either reveres or loves the to the honor of God, so that for this very reason a vow person by whom he swears.” Now reverence and love of is an act of religion. On the other hand, in an oath rev- God are desirable as something good essentially. There- erence for the name of God is taken in confirmation of a fore swearing is also. promise. Hence what is confirmed by oath does not, for Objection 3. Further, swearing is directed to the pur- this reason, become an act of religion, since moral acts pose of confirming or assuring. But it is a good thing for take their species from the end. a man to confirm his assertion. Therefore an oath is desir- Reply to Objection 2. He who swears does indeed able as a good thing. make use of his reverence or love for the person by whom On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 23:12): “A he swears: he does not, however, direct his oath to the rev- man that sweareth much shall be filled with iniquity”: and erence or love of that person, but to something else that is Augustine says (De Mendacio xv) that “the Lord forbade necessary for the present life. swearing, in order that for your own part you might not Reply to Objection 3. Even as a medicine is useful be fond of it, and take pleasure in seeking occasions of for healing, and yet, the stronger it is, the greater harm it swearing, as though it were a good thing.” does if it be taken unduly, so too an oath is useful indeed I answer that, Whatever is required merely as a rem- as a means of confirmation, yet the greater the reverence it edy for an infirmity or a defect, is not reckoned among demands the more dangerous it is, unless it be employed those things that are desirable for their own sake, but aright; for, as it is written (Ecclus. 23:13), “if he make among those that are necessary: this is clear in the case of it void,” i.e. if he deceive his brother, “his sin shall be medicine which is required as a remedy for sickness. Now upon him: and if he dissemble it,” by swearing falsely, an oath is required as a remedy to a defect, namely, some and with dissimulation, “he offendeth double,” [because, man’s lack of belief in another man. Wherefore an oath is to wit, “pretended equity is a twofold iniquity,” as Augus- not to be reckoned among those things that are desirable tine∗ declares]: “and if he swear in vain,” i.e. without due for their own sake, but among those that are necessary for cause and necessity, “he shall not be justified.” Whether it is lawful to swear by creatures? IIa IIae q. 89 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not lawful to and earth,” etc. swear by creatures. It is written (Mat. 5:34-36): “I say Objection 2. Further, punishment is not due save for a to you not to swear at all, neither by heaven. . . nor by fault. Now a punishment is appointed for one who swears the earth. . . nor by Jerusalem. . . nor by thy head”: and by creatures: for it is written (22, qu. i, can. Clericum): Jerome, expounding these words, says: “Observe that the “If a cleric swears by creatures he must be very severely Saviour does not forbid swearing by God, but by heaven rebuked: and if he shall persist in this vicious habit we ∗ Enarr. in Ps. lxiii, 7 1621 wish that he be excommunicated.” Therefore it is unlaw-call God to witness upon my soul.” ful to swear by creatures. As to Joseph’s oath by the health of Pharaoh this may Objection 3. Further, an oath is an act of religion, as be understood in both ways: either by way of a curse, as stated above (a. 4). But religious worship is not due to any though he pledged Pharao’s health to God; or by way of creature, according to Rom. 1:23,25. Therefore it is not contestation, as though he appealed to the truth of God’s lawful to swear by a creature. justice which the princes of the earth are appointed to ex- On the contrary, Joseph swore “by the health of ecute. Pharaoh” (Gn. 42:16). Moreover it is customary to swear Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord forbade us to swear by the Gospel, by relics, and by the saints. by creatures so as to give them the reverence due to God. I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 3), there are Hence Jerome adds that “the Jews, through swearing by two kinds of oath. One is uttered a simple contestation or the angels and the like, worshipped creatures with a Di- calling God as witness: and this kind of oath, like faith, is vine honor.” based on God’s truth. Now faith is essentially and chiefly In the same sense a cleric is punished, according to the about God Who is the very truth, and secondarily about canons (22, qu. i, can. Clericum, obj. 2), for swearing by creatures in which God’s truth is reflected, as stated above a creature, for this savors of the blasphemy of unbelief. (q. 1, a. 1). In like manner an oath is chiefly referred to Hence in the next chapter, it is said: “If any one swears by God Whose testimony is invoked; and secondarily an ap- God’s hair or head, or otherwise utter blasphemy against peal by oath is made to certain creatures considered, not God, and he be in ecclesiastical orders, let him be de- in themselves, but as reflecting the Divine truth. Thus we graded.” swear by the Gospel, i.e. by God Whose truth is made This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. known in the Gospel; and by the saints who believed this Reply to Objection 3. Religious worship is shown truth and kept it. to one whose testimony is invoked by oath: hence the The other way of swearing is by cursing and in this prohibition (Ex. 23:13): “By the name of strange gods kind of oath a creature is adduced that the judgment of you shall not swear.” But religious worship is not given God may be wrought therein. Thus a man is wont to swear to creatures employed in an oath in the ways mentioned by his head, or by his son, or by some other thing that he above. loves, even as the Apostle swore (2 Cor. 1:23), saying: “I Whether an oath has a binding force? IIa IIae q. 89 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that an oath has no bind- On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:33): “Thou ing force. An oath is employed in order to confirm the shalt perform thy oaths to the Lord.” truth of an assertion. But when a person makes an asser- I answer that, An obligation implies something to tion about the future his assertion is true, though it may be done or omitted; so that apparently it regards neither not be verified. Thus Paul lied not (2 Cor. 1:15, seqq.) the declaratory oath (which is about something present or though he went not to Corinth, as he had said he would (1 past), nor such oaths as are about something to be effected Cor. 16:5). Therefore it seems that an oath is not binding. by some other cause (as, for example, if one were to swear Objection 2. Further, virtue is not contrary to virtue that it would rain tomorrow), but only such as are about (Categ. viii, 22). Now an oath is an act of virtue, as stated things to be done by the person who swears. above (a. 4). But it would sometimes be contrary to virtue, Now just as a declaratory oath, which is about the fu- or an obstacle thereto, if one were to fulfil what one has ture or the present, should contain the truth, so too ought sworn to do: for instance, if one were to swear to commit the oath which is about something to be done by us in a sin, or to desist from some virtuous action. Therefore an the future. Yet there is a difference: since, in the oath oath is not always binding. that is about the past or present, this obligation affects, Objection 3. Further, sometimes a man is compelled not the thing that already has been or is, but the action of against his will to promise something under oath. Now, the swearer, in the point of his swearing to what is or was “such a person is loosed by the Roman Pontiffs from the already true; whereas, on the contrary, in the oath that is bond of his oath” (Extra, De Jurejur., cap. Verum in ea made about something to be done by us, the obligation quaest., etc.). Therefore an oath is not always binding. falls on the thing guaranteed by oath. For a man is bound Objection 4. Further, no person can be under two op- to make true what he has sworn, else his oath lacks truth. posite obligations. Yet sometimes the person who swears Now if this thing be such as not to be in his power, and the person to whom he swears have opposite inten- his oath is lacking in judgment of discretion: unless per- tions. Therefore an oath cannot always be binding. chance what was possible when he swore become impos- 1622 sible to him through some mishap. as when a man swore new and unforeseen emergency. An instance is the oath to pay a sum of money, which is subsequently taken from of Herod, who swore to the damsel, who danced before him by force or theft. For then he would seem to be ex- him, that he would give her what she would ask of him. cused from fulfilling his oath, although he is bound to do For this oath could be lawful from the outset, supposing it what he can, as, in fact, we have already stated with re- to have the requisite conditions, namely, that the damsel gard to the obligation of a vow (q. 88, a. 3, ad 2). If, on asked what it was right to grant. but the fulfilment of the the other hand, it be something that he can do, but ought oath was unlawful. Hence Ambrose says (De Officiis i, not to, either because it is essentially evil, or because it is 50): “Sometimes it is wrong to fulfil a promise, and to a hindrance to a good, then his oath is lacking in justice: keep an oath; as Herod, who granted the slaying of John, wherefore an oath must not be kept when it involves a sin rather than refuse what he had promised.” or a hindrance to good. For in either case “its result is Reply to Objection 3. There is a twofold obliga- evil”∗ tion in the oath which a man takes under compulsion: Accordingly we must conclude that whoever swears to one, whereby he is beholden to the person to whom he do something is bound to do what he can for the fulfilment promises something; and this obligation is cancelled by of truth; provided always that the other two accompanying the compulsion, because he that used force deserves that conditions be present, namely, judgment and justice. the promise made to him should not be kept. The other is Reply to Objection 1. It is not the same with a simple an obligation whereby a man is beholden to God, in virtue assertion, and with an oath wherein God is called to wit- of which he is bound to fulfil what he has promised in His ness: because it suffices for the truth of an assertion, that name. This obligation is not removed in the tribunal of a person say what he proposes to do, since it is already conscience, because that man ought rather to suffer tem- true in its cause, namely, the purpose of the doer. But poral loss, than violate his oath. He can, however, seek an oath should not be employed, save in a matter about in a court of justice to recover what he has paid, or de- which one is firmly certain: and, consequently, if a man nounce the matter to his superior even if he has sworn to employ an oath, he is bound, as far as he can, to make the contrary, because such an oath would lead to evil re- true what he has sworn, through reverence of the Divine sults since it would be contrary to public justice. The Ro- witness invoked, unless it leads to an evil result, as stated. man Pontiffs, in absolving men from oaths of this kind, Reply to Objection 2. An oath may lead to an evil did not pronounce such oaths to be unbinding, but relaxed result in two ways. First, because from the very outset the obligation for some just cause. it has an evil result, either through being evil of its very Reply to Objection 4. When the intention of the nature (as, if a man were to swear to commit adultery), swearer is not the same as the intention of the person to or through being a hindrance to a greater good, as if a whom he swears, if this be due to the swearer’s guile, he man were to swear not to enter religion, or not to become must keep his oath in accordance with the sound under- a cleric, or that he would not accept a prelacy, suppos- standing of the person to whom the oath is made. Hence ing it would be expedient for him to accept, or in sim- Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 31): “However artful a ilar cases. For oaths of this kind are unlawful from the man may be in wording his oath, God Who witnesses his outset: yet with a difference: because if a man swear to conscience accepts his oath as understood by the person commit a sin, he sinned in swearing, and sins in keeping to whom it is made.” And that this refers to the deceitful his oath: whereas if a man swear not to perform a greater oath is clear from what follows: “He is doubly guilty who good, which he is not bound to do withal, he sins indeed in both takes God’s name in vain, and tricks his neighbor by swearing (through placing an obstacle to the Holy Ghost, guile.” If, however, the swearer uses no guile, he is bound Who is the inspirer of good purposes), yet he does not sin in accordance with his own intention. Wherefore Gregory in keeping his oath, though he does much better if he does says (Moral. xxvi, 7): “The human ear takes such like not keep it. words in their natural outward sense, but the Divine judg- Secondly, an oath leads to an evil result through some ment interprets them according to our inward intention.” Whether an oath is more binding than a vow? IIa IIae q. 89 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that an oath is more bind- firmed by the stronger. Now a vow is sometimes con- ing than a vow. A vow is a simple promise: whereas an firmed by an oath. Therefore an oath is stronger than a oath includes, besides a promise, an appeal to God as wit- vow. ness. Therefore an oath is more binding than a vow. Objection 3. Further, the obligation of a vow arises Objection 2. Further, the weaker is wont to be con- from the deliberation of the mind, a stated above (q. 88, ∗ Cf. Bede, Homil. xix, in Decoll. S. Joan. Bapt. 1623 a. 1); while the obligation of an oath results from the promise in His name. Now every act of infidelity includes truth of God Whose testimony is invoked. Since therefore an irreverence, but not conversely, because the infidelity God’s truth is something greater than human deliberation, of a subject to his lord would seem to be the greatest ir- it seems that the obligation of an oath is greater than that reverence. Hence a vow by its very nature is more binding of a vow. than an oath. On the contrary, A vow binds one to God while an Reply to Objection 1. A vow is not any kind of oath sometimes binds one to man. Now one is more bound promise, but a promise made to God; and to be unfaith- to God than to man. Therefore a vow is more binding than ful to God is most grievous. an oath. Reply to Objection 2. An oath is added to a vow not I answer that, The obligation both of vow and of an because it is more stable, but because greater stability re- oath arises from something Divine; but in different ways. sults from “two immutable things”∗. For the obligation of a vow arises from the fidelity we owe Reply to Objection 3. Deliberation of the mind gives God, which binds us to fulfil our promises to Him. On the a vow its stability, on the part of the person who takes the other hand, the obligation of an oath arises from the rev- vow: but it has a greater cause of stability on the part of erence we owe Him which binds us to make true what we God, to Whom the vow is offered. Whether anyone can dispense from an oath? IIa IIae q. 89 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that no one can dispense tion. from an oath. Just as truth is required for a declaratory Reply to Objection 1. A dispensation from an oath oath, which is about the past or the present, so too is it does not imply a permission to do anything against the required for a promissory oath, which is about the future. oath: for this is impossible, since the keeping of an oath Now no one can dispense a man from swearing to the truth comes under a Divine precept, which does not admit of about present or past things. Therefore neither can any- dispensation: but it implies that what hitherto came under one dispense a man from making truth that which he has an oath no longer comes under it, as not being due mat- promised by oath to do in the future. ter for an oath, just as we have said with regard to vows Objection 2. Further, a promissory oath is used for (q. 88, a. 10, ad 2). Now the matter of a declaratory oath, the benefit of the person to whom the promise is made. which is about something past or present, has already ac- But, apparently, he cannot release the other from his oath, quired a certain necessity, and has become unchangeable, since it would be contrary to the reverence of God. Much wherefore the dispensation will regard not the matter but less therefore can a dispensation from this oath be granted the act itself of the oath: so that such a dispensation would by anyone. be directly contrary to the Divine precept. On the other Objection 3. Further, any bishop can grant a dispensa- hand, the matter of a promissory oath is something future, tion from a vow, except certain vows reserved to the Pope which admits of change, so that, to wit, in certain emer- alone, as stated above (q. 88, a. 12, ad 3). Therefore in gencies, it may be unlawful or hurtful, and consequently like manner, if an oath admits of dispensation, any bishop undue matter for an oath. Therefore a promissory oath ad- can dispense from an oath. And yet seemingly this is to mits of dispensation, since such dispensation regards the be against the law†. Therefore it would seem that an oath matter of an oath, and is not contrary to the Divine precept does not admit of dispensation. about the keeping of oaths. On the contrary, A vow is more binding than an oath, Reply to Objection 2. One man may promise some- as stated above (a. 8). But a vow admits of dispensation thing under oath to another in two ways. First, when he and therefore an oath does also. promises something for his benefit: for instance, if he I answer that, As stated above (q. 88, a. 10), the ne- promise to serve him, or to give him money: and from cessity of a dispensation both from the law and from a such a promise he can be released by the person to whom vow arises from the fact that something which is useful he made it: for he is understood to have already kept his and morally good in itself and considered in general, may promise to him when he acts towards him according to be morally evil and hurtful in respect of some particular his will. Secondly, one man promises another something emergency: and such a case comes under neither law nor pertaining to God’s honor or to the benefit of others: for vow. Now anything morally evil or hurtful is incompati- instance, if a man promise another under oath that he will ble with the matter of an oath: for if it be morally evil it enter religion, or perform some act of kindness. In this is opposed to justice, and if it be hurtful it is contrary to case the person to whom the promise is made cannot re- judgment. Therefore an oath likewise admits of dispensa- lease him that made the promise, because it was made ∗ Heb. 6:18 † Caus. XV, qu. 6, can. Auctoritatem, seqq.: Cap. Si vero, de Jurejurando 1624 principally not to him but to God: unless perchance it in-promised under oath is manifestly lawful and beneficial. cluded some condition, for instance, “provided he give his An oath of this kind seemingly admits not of dispensation consent” or some such like condition. but of commutation, when there occurs something better Reply to Objection 3. Sometimes that which is made to be done for the common good, in which case the matter the matter of a promissory oath is manifestly opposed to would seem to belong chiefly to the power of the Pope, justice, either because it is a sin, as when a man swears to who has charge over the whole Church; and even of ab- commit a murder, or because it is an obstacle to a greater solute relaxation, for this too belongs in general to the good, as when a man swears not to enter a religion: and Pope in all matters regarding the administration of things such an oath requires no dispensation. But in the former ecclesiastical. Thus it is competent to any man to can- case a man is bound not to keep such an oath, while in the cel an oath made by one of his subjects in matters that latter it is lawful for him to keep or not to keep the oath, come under his authority: for instance, a father may an- as stated above (a. 7, ad 2). Sometimes what is promised nul his daughter’s oath, and a husband his wife’s (Num. on oath is doubtfully right or wrong, useful or harmful, 30:6, seqq.), as stated above with regard to vows (q. 88, either in itself or under the circumstance. In this case any Aa. 8,9). bishop can dispense. Sometimes, however, that which is Whether an oath is voided by a condition of person or time? IIa IIae q. 89 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that an oath is not voided secration,’ instead of being put on his oath”: and (22, qu. by a condition of person or time. An oath, according to the v, can. Nullus): “Let no one in ecclesiastical orders dare Apostle (Heb. 6:16), is employed for the purpose of con- to swear on the Holy Gospels to a layman.” firmation. Now it is competent to anyone to confirm his I answer that, Two things are to be considered in an assertion, and at any time. Therefore it would seem that oath. One is on the part of God, whose testimony is in- an oath is not voided by a condition of person or time. voked, and in this respect we should hold an oath in the Objection 2. Further, to swear by God is more than to greatest reverence. For this reason children before the age swear by the Gospels: wherefore Chrysostom∗ says: “If of puberty are debarred from taking oaths†, and are not there is a reason for swearing, it seems a small thing to called upon to swear, because they have not yet attained swear by God, but a great thing to swear by the Gospels. the perfect use of reason, so as to be able to take a oath To those who think thus, it must be said: Nonsense! the with due reverence. Perjurers also are debarred from tak- Scriptures were made for God’s sake, not God for the sake ing an oath, because it is presumed from their antecedents of the Scriptures.” Now men of all conditions and at all that they will not treat an oath with the reverence due to it. times are wont to swear by God. Much more, therefore, is For this same reason, in order that oaths might be treated it lawful to swear by the Gospels. with due reverence the law says (22, qu. v, can. Hones- Objection 3. Further, the same effect does not pro- tum): “It is becoming that he who ventures to swear on ceed from contrary causes, since contrary causes produce holy things should do so fasting, with all propriety and contrary effects. Now some are debarred from swearing fear of God.” on account of some personal defect; children, for instance, The other thing to be considered is on the part of the before the age of fourteen, and persons who have already man, whose assertion is confirmed by oath. For a man’s committed perjury. Therefore it would seem that a person assertion needs no confirmation save because there is a ought not to be debarred from swearing either on account doubt about it. Now it derogates from a person’s dig- of his dignity, as clerics, or on account of the solemnity of nity that one should doubt about the truth of what he the time. says, wherefore “it becomes not persons of great dignity Objection 4. Further, in this world no living man is to swear.” For this reason the law says (II, qu. v, can. Si equal in dignity to an angel: for it is written (Mat. 11:11) quis presbyter) that “priests should not swear for trifling that “he that is the lesser in the kingdom of heaven is reasons.” Nevertheless it is lawful for them to swear if greater than he,” namely than John the Baptist, while yet there be need for it, or if great good may result therefrom. living. Now an angel is competent to swear, for it is writ- Especially is this the case in spiritual affairs, when more- ten (Apoc. 10:6) that the angel “swore by Him that liveth over it is becoming that they should take oath on days of for ever and ever.” Therefore no man ought to be excused solemnity, since they ought then to devote themselves to from swearing, on account of his dignity. spiritual matters. Nor should they on such occasions take On the contrary, It is stated (II, qu. v, can. Si quis oaths temporal matters, except perhaps in cases grave ne- presbyter): “Let a priest be examined ‘by his sacred con- cessity. ∗ Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom † Caus. XXII, qu. 5, can. Parvuli 1625 Reply to Objection 1. Some are unable to confirm thing from arising out of contrary causes, by way of su-their own assertions on account of their own defect: and perabundance and defect. It is in this way that some are some there are whose words should be so certain that they debarred from swearing, through being of so great author- need no confirmation. ity that it is unbecoming for them to swear; while others Reply to Objection 2. The greater the thing sworn are of such little authority that their oaths have no stand- by, the holier and the more binding is the oath, consid- ing. ered in itself, as Augustine states (Ad Public., Ep. xlvii): Reply to Objection 4. The angel’s oath is adduced and accordingly is a graver matter to swear by God than not on account of any defect in the angel, as though one the Gospels. Yet the contrary may be the case on account ought not to credit his mere word, but in order to show of the manner of swearing for instance, an oath by the that the statement made issues from God’s infallible dis- Gospels might be taken with deliberation and solemnity, position. Thus too God is sometimes spoken of by Scrip- and an oath by God frivolously and without deliberation. ture as swearing, in order to express the immutability of Reply to Objection 3. Nothing prevents the same His word, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 6:17). 1626 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 90 Of the Taking of God’s Name by Way of Adjuration (In Three Articles) We must now consider the taking of God’s name by way of adjuration: under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is lawful to adjure a man? (2) Whether it is lawful to adjure the demons? (3) Whether it is lawful to adjure irrational creatures? Whether it is lawful to adjure a man? IIa IIae q. 90 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not lawful to obligation by invoking the Divine name, whereas he can- adjure a man. Origen says (Tract. xxxv super Matth.): not put others under such an obligation unless they be his “I deem that a man who wishes to live according to the subjects, whom he can compel on the strength of the oath Gospel should not adjure another man. For if, according they have taken. to the Gospel mandate of Christ, it be unlawful to swear, Therefore, if a man by invoking the name of God, or it is evident that neither is it lawful to adjure: and conse- any holy thing, intends by this adjuration to put one who quently it is manifest that the high-priest unlawfully ad- is not his subject under an obligation to do a certain thing, jured Jesus by the living God.” in the same way as he would bind himself by oath, such Objection 2. Further, whoever adjures a man, com- an adjuration is unlawful, because he usurps over another pels him after a fashion. But it is unlawful to compel a a power which he has not. But superiors may bind their man against his will. Therefore seemingly it is also un- inferiors by this kind of adjuration, if there be need for it. lawful to adjure a man. If, however, he merely intend, through reverence of Objection 3. Further, to adjure is to induce a person the Divine name or of some holy thing, to obtain some- to swear. Now it belongs to man’s superior to induce him thing from the other man without putting him under any to swear, for the superior imposes an oath on his subject. obligation, such an adjuration may be lawfully employed Therefore subjects cannot adjure their superiors. in respect of anyone. On the contrary, Even when we pray God we implore Reply to Objection 1. Origen is speaking of an ad- Him by certain holy things: and the Apostle too besought juration whereby a man intends to put another under an the faithful “by the mercy of God” (Rom. 12:1): and this obligation, in the same way as he would bind himself by seems to be a kind of adjuration. Therefore it is lawful to oath: for thus did the high-priest presume to adjure our adjure. Lord Jesus Christ∗. I answer that, A man who utters a promissory oath, Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers the swearing by his reverence for the Divine name, which he adjuration which imposes an obligation. invokes in confirmation of his promise, binds himself to Reply to Objection 3. To adjure is not to induce a do what he has undertaken, and so orders himself un- man to swear, but to employ terms resembling an oath in changeably to do a certain thing. Now just as a man can order to provoke another to do a certain thing. order himself to do a certain thing, so too can he order Moreover, we adjure God in one way and man in an- others, by beseeching his superiors, or by commanding other; because when we adjure a man we intend to alter his inferiors, as stated above (q. 83, a. 1). Accordingly his will by appealing to his reverence for a holy thing: when either of these orderings is confirmed by something and we cannot have such an intention in respect of God Divine it is an adjuration. Yet there is this difference be- Whose will is immutable. If we obtain something from tween them, that man is master of his own actions but not God through His eternal will, it is due, not to our merits, of those of others; wherefore he can put himself under an but to His goodness. ∗ Mat. 26:63 1627 Whether it is lawful to adjure the demons? IIa IIae q. 90 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem unlawful to adjure the angels, because, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), “the demons. Origen says (Tract. xxxv, super Matth.): “To ad- rebel spirit is ruled by the just spirit.” Accordingly we jure the demons is not accordance with the power given may repulse the demons, as being our enemies, by adjur- by our Saviour: for this is a Jewish practice.” Now rather ing them through the power of God’s name, lest they do than imitate the rites of the Jews, we should use the power us harm of soul or body, in accord with the Divine power given by Christ. Therefore it is not lawful to adjure the given by Christ, as recorded by Lk. 10:19: “Behold, I demons. have given you power to tread upon serpents and scorpi- Objection 2. Further, many make use of necromantic ons, and upon all the power of the enemy: and nothing incantations when invoking the demons by something Di- shall hurt you.” vine: and this is an adjuration. Therefore, if it be lawful It is not, however, lawful to adjure them for the pur- to adjure the demons, it is lawful to make use of necro- pose of learning something from them, or of obtaining mantic incantations, which is evidently false. Therefore something through them, for this would amount to hold- the antecedent is false also. ing fellowship with them: except perhaps when certain Objection 3. Further, whoever adjures a person, by holy men, by special instinct or Divine revelation, make that very fact associates himself with him. Now it is not use of the demons’ actions in order to obtain certain re- lawful to have fellowship with the demons, according to sults: thus we read of the Blessed James∗ that he caused 1 Cor. 10:20, “I would not that you should be made par- Hermogenes to be brought to him, by the instrumentality takers with devils.” Therefore it is not lawful to adjure the of the demons. demons. Reply to Objection 1. Origen is speaking of adjura- On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 16:17): “In My tion made, not authoritatively by way of compulsion, but name they shall cast out devils.” Now to induce anyone to rather by way of a friendly appeal. do a certain thing for the sake of God’s name is to adjure. Reply to Objection 2. Necromancers adjure and in- Therefore it is lawful to adjure the demons. voke the demons in order to obtain or learn something I answer that, As stated in the preceding article, there from them: and this is unlawful, as stated above. Where-are two ways of adjuring: one by way of prayer or induce- fore Chrysostom, commenting on our Lord’s words to the ment through reverence of some holy thing: the other by unclean spirit (Mk. 1:25), “Speak no more, and go out way of compulsion. In the first way it is not lawful to of the man,” says: “A salutary teaching is given us here, adjure the demons because such a way seems to savor of lest we believe the demons, however much they speak the benevolence or friendship, which it is unlawful to bear to- truth.” wards the demons. As to the second kind of adjuration, Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the which is by compulsion, we may lawfully use it for some adjuration whereby the demon’s help is besought in do- purposes, and not for others. For during the course of this ing or learning something: for this savors of fellowship life the demons are our adversaries: and their actions are with them. On the other hand, to repulse the demons by not subject to our disposal but to that of God and the holy adjuring them, is to sever oneself from their fellowship. Whether it is lawful to adjure an irrational creature? IIa IIae q. 90 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem unlawful to adjure an ir- since they are not masters of their own actions. The other rational creature. An adjuration consists of spoken words. kind of adjuration is by way of compulsion: and, seem- But it is useless to speak to one that understands not, such ingly, neither is it lawful to use this towards them, because as an irrational creature. Therefore it is vain and unlawful we have not the power to command irrational creatures, to adjure an irrational creature. but only He of Whom it was said (Mat. 8:27): “For the Objection 2. Further, seemingly wherever adjuration winds and the sea obey Him.” Therefore in no way, ap- is admissible, swearing is also admissible. But swearing parently, is it lawful to adjure irrational creatures. is not consistent with an irrational creature. Therefore it On the contrary, Simon and Jude are related to have would seem unlawful to employ adjuration towards one. adjured dragons and to have commanded them to with- Objection 3. Further, there are two ways of adjuring, draw into the desert.† as explained above (Aa. 1,2). One is by way of appeal; I answer that, Irrational creatures are directed to their and this cannot be employed towards irrational creatures, own actions by some other agent. Now the action of what ∗ the Greater; cf. Apocrypha, N.T., Hist. Certam. Apost. vi, 19 † From the apocryphal Historiae Certam. Apost. vi. 19. 1628 is directed and moved is also the action of the director and so that it be referred to the director and mover of the ir-mover: thus the movement of the arrow is an operation of rational creature, and in this sense a creature of this kind the archer. Wherefore the operation of the irrational crea- may be adjured in two ways. First, by way of appeal made ture is ascribed not only to it, but also and chiefly to God, to God, and this relates to those who work miracles by Who disposes the movements of all things. It is also as- calling on God: secondly, by way of compulsion, which cribed to the devil, who, by God’s permission, makes use relates to the devil, who uses the irrational creature for our of irrational creatures in order to inflict harm on man. harm. This is the kind of adjuration used in the exorcisms Accordingly the adjuration of an irrational creature of the Church, whereby the power of the demons is ex- may be of two kinds. First, so that the adjuration is re- pelled from an irrational creature. But it is not lawful to ferred to the irrational creature in itself: and in this way it adjure the demons by beseeching them to help us. would be vain to adjure an irrational creature. Secondly, This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. 1629 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 91 Of Taking the Divine Name for the Purpose of Invoking It by Means of Praise (In Two Articles) We must now consider the taking of the Divine name for the purpose of invoking it by prayer or praise. Of prayer we have already spoken (q. 83 ). Wherefore we must speak now of praise. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether God should be praised with the lips? (2) Whether God should be praised with song? Whether God should be praised with the lips? IIa IIae q. 91 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that God should not be Consequently we need to praise God with our lips, not praised with the lips. The Philosopher says (Ethic. 1,12): indeed for His sake, but for our own sake; since by prais- “The best of men ere accorded not praise, but something ing Him our devotion is aroused towards Him, according greater.” But God transcends the very best of all things. to Ps. 49:23: “The sacrifice of praise shall glorify Me, and Therefore God ought to be given, not praise, but some- there is the way by which I will show him the salvation of thing greater than praise: wherefore He is said (Ecclus. God.” And forasmuch as man, by praising God, ascends 43:33) to be “above all praise.” in his affections to God, by so much is he withdrawn from Objection 2. Further, divine praise is part of divine things opposed to God, according to Is. 48:9, “For My worship, for it is an act of religion. Now God is worshiped praise I will bridle thee lest thou shouldst perish.” The with the mind rather than with the lips: wherefore our praise of the lips is also profitable to others by inciting Lord quoted against certain ones the words of Is. 29:13, their affections towards God, wherefore it is written (Ps. “This people. . . honors [Vulg.: ‘glorifies’] Me with their 33:2): “His praise shall always be in my mouth,” and far- lips, but their heart is far from Me.” Therefore the praise ther on: “Let the meek hear and rejoice. O magnify the of God lies in the heart rather than on the lips. Lord with me.” Objection 3. Further, men are praised with the lips Reply to Objection 1. We may speak of God in two that they may be encouraged to do better: since just as ways. First, with regard to His essence; and thus, since He being praised makes the wicked proud, so does it incite is incomprehensible and ineffable, He is above all praise. the good to better things. Wherefore it is written (Prov. In this respect we owe Him reverence and the honor of 27:21): “As silver is tried in the fining-pot. . . so a man is latria; wherefore Ps. 64:2 is rendered by Jerome in his tried by the mouth of him that praiseth.” But God is not Psalter∗: “Praise to Thee is speechless, O God,” as re- incited to better things by man’s words, both because He gards the first, and as to the second, “A vow shall be paid is unchangeable, and because He is supremely good, and to Thee.” Secondly, we may speak of God as to His ef- it is not possible for Him to grow better. Therefore God fects which are ordained for our good. In this respect we should not be praised with the lips. owe Him praise; wherefore it is written (Is. 63:7): “I will On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 62:6): “My mouth remember the tender mercies of the Lord, the praise of shall praise Thee with joyful lips.” the Lord for all the things that the Lord hath bestowed I answer that, We use words, in speaking to God, for upon us.” Again, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): “Thou one reason, and in speaking to man, for another reason. wilt find that all the sacred hymns,” i.e. divine praises “of For when speaking to man we use words in order to tell the sacred writers, are directed respectively to the Blessed him our thoughts which are unknown to him. Wherefore Processions of the Thearchy,” i.e. of the Godhead, “show- we praise a man with our lips, in order that he or others ing forth and praising the names of God.” may learn that we have a good opinion of him: so that in Reply to Objection 2. It profits one nothing to praise consequence we may incite him to yet better things; and with the lips if one praise not with the heart. For the heart that we may induce others, who hear him praised, to think speaks God’s praises when it fervently recalls “the glori- well of him, to reverence him, and to imitate him. On ous things of His works”†. Yet the outward praise of the the other hand we employ words, in speaking to God, not lips avails to arouse the inward fervor of those who praise, indeed to make known our thoughts to Him Who is the and to incite others to praise God, as stated above. searcher of hearts, but that we may bring ourselves and Reply to Objection 3. We praise God, not for His our hearers to reverence Him. benefit, but for ours as stated. ∗ Translated from the Hebrew † Cf. Ecclus. 17:7,8 1630 Whether God should be praised with song? IIa IIae q. 91 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that God should not be Philosopher state (Polit. viii, 5), and also Boethius (De praised with song. For the Apostle says (Col. 3:16): Musica, prologue). Hence the use of music in the divine “Teaching and admonishing one another in psalms, hymns praises is a salutary institution, that the souls of the faint- and spiritual canticles.” Now we should employ nothing hearted may be the more incited to devotion. Wherefore in the divine worship, save what is delivered to us on the Augustine say (Confess. x, 33): “I am inclined to approve authority of Scripture. Therefore it would seem that, in of the usage of singing in the church, that so by the de- praising God, we should employ, not corporal but spiri- light of the ears the faint-hearted may rise to the feeling tual canticles. of devotion”: and he says of himself (Confess. ix, 6): “I Objection 2. Further, Jerome in his commentary on wept in Thy hymns and canticles, touched to the quick by Eph. 5:19, “Singing and making melody in your hearts the voices of Thy sweet-attuned Church.” to the Lord,” says: “Listen, young men whose duty it Reply to Objection 1. The name of spiritual canticle is to recite the office in church: God is to be sung not may be given not only to those that are sung inwardly in with the voice but with the heart. Nor should you, like spirit, but also to those that are sung outwardly with the play-actors, ease your throat and jaws with medicaments, lips, inasmuch as such like canticles arouse spiritual de- and make the church resound with theatrical measures and votion. airs.” Therefore God should not be praised with song. Reply to Objection 2. Jerome does not absolutely Objection 3. Further, the praise of God is competent condemn singing, but reproves those who sing theatrically to little and great, according to Apoc. 14, “Give praise in church not in order to arouse devotion, but in order to to our God, all ye His servants; and you that fear Him, show off, or to provoke pleasure. Hence Augustine says little and great.” But the great, who are in the church, (Confess. x, 33): “When it befalls me to be more moved ought not to sing: for Gregory says (Regist. iv, ep. 44): “I by the voice than by the words sung, I confess to have hereby ordain that in this See the ministers of the sacred sinned penally, and then had rather not hear the singer.” altar must not sing” (Cf. Decret., dist. xcii., cap. In sancta Reply to Objection 3. To arouse men to devotion by Romana Ecclesia). Therefore singing is unsuitable to the teaching and preaching is a more excellent way than by divine praises. singing. Wherefore deacons and prelates, whom it be- Objection 4. Further, in the Old Law God was praised comes to incite men’s minds towards God by means of with musical instruments and human song, according to preaching and teaching, ought not to be instant in singing, Ps. 32:2,3: “Give praise to the Lord on the harp, sing to lest thereby they be withdrawn from greater things. Hence Him with the psaltery, the instrument of ten strings. Sing Gregory says (Regist. iv, ep. 44): “It is a most discred- to Him a new canticle.” But the Church does not make itable custom for those who have been raised to the dia- use of musical instruments such as harps and psalteries, in conate to serve as choristers, for it behooves them to give the divine praises, for fear of seeming to imitate the Jews. their whole time to the duty of preaching and to taking Therefore in like manner neither should song be used in charge of the alms.” the divine praises. Reply to Objection 4. As the Philosopher says (Polit. Objection 5. Further, the praise of the heart is more viii, 6), “Teaching should not be accompanied with a flute important than the praise of the lips. But the praise of the or any artificial instrument such as the harp or anything heart is hindered by singing, both because the attention else of this kind: but only with such things as make good of the singers is distracted from the consideration of what hearers.” For such like musical instruments move the soul they are singing, so long as they give all their attention to to pleasure rather than create a good disposition within it. the chant, and because others are less able to understand In the Old Testament instruments of this description were the thing that are sung than if they were recited without employed, both because the people were more coarse and chant. Therefore chants should not be employed in the carnal—so that they needed to be aroused by such instru- divine praises. ments as also by earthly promises—and because these ma- On the contrary, Blessed Ambrose established terial instruments were figures of something else. singing in the Church of Milan, a Augustine relates (Con- Reply to Objection 5. The soul is distracted from that fess. ix). which is sung by a chant that is employed for the purpose I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the praise of of giving pleasure. But if the singer chant for the sake of the voice is necessary in order to arouse man’s devotion devotion, he pays more attention to what he says, both be- towards God. Wherefore whatever is useful in conducing cause he lingers more thereon, and because, as Augustine to this result is becomingly adopted in the divine praises. remarks (Confess. x, 33), “each affection of our spirit, Now it is evident that the human soul is moved in vari- according to its variety, has its own appropriate measure ous ways according to various melodies of sound, as the in the voice, and singing, by some hidden correspondence 1631 wherewith it is stirred.” The same applies to the hearers, they understand why it is sung, namely, for God’s glory: for even if some of them understand not what is sung, yet and this is enough to arouse their devotion. 1632 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 92 Of Superstition (In Two Articles) In due sequence we must consider the vices that are opposed to religion. First we shall consider those which agree with religion in giving worship to God; secondly, we shall treat of those vices which are manifestly contrary to religion, through showing contempt of those things that pertain to the worship of God. The former come under the head of superstition, the latter under that of irreligion. Accordingly we must consider in the first place, superstition and its parts, and afterwards irreligion and its parts. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether superstition is a vice opposed to religion? (2) Whether it has several parts or species? Whether superstition is a vice contrary to religion? IIa IIae q. 92 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that superstition is not a not through tending to something greater than the virtue, vice contrary to religion. One contrary is not included in but possibly to something less, and yet it goes beyond the the definition of the other. But religion is included in the mean of virtue, through doing something to whom it ought definition of superstition: for the latter is defined as being not, or when it ought not, and in like manner as regards “immoderate observance of religion,” according to a gloss other circumstances, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. iv, on Col. 2:23, “Which things have indeed a show of wis- 1,2,3). dom in superstition.” Therefore superstition is not a vice Accordingly superstition is a vice contrary to religion contrary to religion. by excess, not that it offers more to the divine worship Objection 2. Further, Isidore says (Etym. x): “Ci- than true religion, but because it offers divine worship ei- cero∗ states that the superstitious were so called because ther to whom it ought not, or in a manner it ought not. they spent the day in praying and offering sacrifices that Reply to Objection 1. Just as we speak metaphor- their children might survive [superstites] them.” But this ically of good among evil things—thus we speak of a may be done even in accordance with true religious wor- good thief—so too sometimes the names of the virtues ship. Therefore superstition is not a vice opposed to reli- are employed by transposition in an evil sense. Thus pru- gion. dence is sometimes used instead of cunning, according to Objection 3. Further, superstition seems to denote an Lk. 16:8, “The children of this world are more prudent excess. But religion admits of no excess, since, as stated [Douay: ‘wiser’] in their generation than the children of above (q. 81, a. 5, ad 3), there is no possibility of render- light.” It is in this way that superstition is described as ing to God, by religion, the equal of what we owe Him. religion. Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary to religion. Reply to Objection 2. The etymology of a word dif- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Decem Chord. fers from its meaning. For its etymology depends on what Serm. ix): “Thou strikest the first chord in the worship of it is taken from for the purpose of signification: whereas one God, and the beast of superstition hath fallen.” Now its meaning depends on the thing to which it is applied the worship of one God belongs to religion. Therefore for the purpose of signifying it. Now these things differ superstition is contrary to religion. sometimes: for “lapis” [a stone] takes its name from hurt- I answer that, As stated above (q. 81, a. 5), religion is ing the foot [laedere pedem], but this is not its meaning, a moral virtue. Now every moral virtue observes a mean, else iron, since it hurts the foot, would be a stone. In like as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 64, a. 1). Therefore a twofold manner it does not follow that “superstition” means that vice is opposed to a moral virtue. One by way of excess, from which the word is derived. the other by way of deficiency. Again, the mean of virtue Reply to Objection 3. Religion does not admit of may be exceeded, not only with regard to the circum- excess, in respect of absolute quantity, but it does admit stance called “how much,” but also with regard to other of excess in respect of proportionate quantity, in so far, circumstances: so that, in certain virtues such as magna- to wit, as something may be done in divine worship that nimity and magnificence; vice exceeds the mean of virtue, ought not to be done. ∗ De Natura Deorum ii, 28 1633 Whether there are various species of superstition? IIa IIae q. 92 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that there are not vari- in the first place to give reverence to God, and in this re- ous species of superstition. According to the Philosopher spect the first species of this genus is “idolatry,” which (Topic. i, 13), “if one contrary includes many kinds, so unduly gives divine honor to a creature. The second end does the other.” Now religion, to which superstition is of religion is that man may be taught by God Whom he contrary, does not include various species; but all its acts worships; and to this must be referred “divinatory” su- belong to the one species. Therefore neither has supersti- perstition, which consults the demons through compacts tion various species. made with them, whether tacit or explicit. Thirdly, the Objection 2. Further, opposites relate to one same end of divine worship is a certain direction of human acts thing. But religion, to which superstition is opposed, re- according to the precepts of God the object of that wor- lates to those things whereby we are directed to God, as ship: and to this must be referred the superstition of cer- stated above (q. 81, a. 1). Therefore superstition, which tain “observances.” is opposed to religion, is not specified according to div- Augustine alludes to these three (De Doctr. Christ. inations of human occurrences, or by the observances of ii, 20), where he says that “anything invented by man for certain human actions. making and worshipping idols is superstitious,” and this Objection 3. Further, a gloss on Col. 2:23, “Which refers to the first species. Then he goes on to say, “or things have. . . a show of wisdom in superstition,” adds: any agreement or covenant made with the demons for the “that is to say in a hypocritical religion.” Therefore purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens,” which hypocrisy should be reckoned a species of superstition. refers to the second species; and a little further on he adds: On the contrary, Augustine assigns the various “To this kind belong all sorts of amulets and such like,” species of superstition (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20). and this refers to the third species. I answer that, As stated above, sins against religion Reply to Objection 1. As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. consist in going beyond the mean of virtue in respect of iv), “good results from a cause that is one and entire, certain circumstances (a. 1). For as we have stated ( Ia whereas evil arises from each single defect.” Wherefore IIae, q. 72, a. 9), not every diversity of corrupt circum- several vices are opposed to one virtue, as stated above stances differentiates the species of a sin, but only that (a. 1; q. 10, a. 5). The saying of the Philosopher is true of which is referred to diverse objects, for diverse ends: since opposites wherein there is the same reason of multiplicity. it is in this respect that moral acts are diversified specif- Reply to Objection 2. Divinations and certain obser- ically, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 18, vances come under the head of superstition, in so far as Aa. 2,6). they depend on certain actions of the demons: and thus Accordingly the species of superstition are differenti- they pertain to compacts made with them. ated, first on the part of the mode, secondly on the part of Reply to Objection 3. Hypocritical religion is taken the object. For the divine worship may be given either to here for “religion as applied to human observances,” as whom it ought to be given, namely, to the true God, but the gloss goes on to explain. Wherefore this hypocritical “in an undue mode,” and this is the first species of super- religion is nothing else than worship given to God in an stition; or to whom it ought not to be given, namely, to any undue mode: as, for instance, if a man were, in the time creature whatsoever, and this is another genus of supersti- of grace, to wish to worship God according to the rite of tion, divided into many species in respect of the various the Old Law. It is of religion taken in this sense that the ends of divine worship. For the end of divine worship is gloss speaks literally. 1634 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 93 Of Superstition Consisting in Undue Worship of the True God (In Two Articles) We must now consider the species of superstition. We shall treat (1) Of the superstition which consists in giving undue worship to the true God; (2) Of the superstition of idolatry; (3) of divinatory superstition; (4) of the superstition of observances. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God? (2) Whether there can be anything superfluous therein? Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God? IIa IIae q. 93 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be any- this worship will be pernicious. thing pernicious in the worship of the true God. It is writ- Now this happens in two ways. In the first place, it ten (Joel 2:32): “Everyone that shall call upon the name happens on the part of the thing signified, through the of the Lord shall be saved.” Now whoever worships God worship signifying something discordant therefrom: and calls upon His name. Therefore all worship of God is con- in this way, at the time of the New Law, the mysteries ducive to salvation, and consequently none is pernicious. of Christ being already accomplished, it is pernicious to Objection 2. Further, it is the same God that is wor- make use of the ceremonies of the Old Law whereby the shiped by the just in any age of the world. Now before mysteries of Christ were foreshadowed as things to come: the giving of the Law the just worshiped God in what- just as it would be pernicious for anyone to declare that ever manner they pleased, without committing mortal sin: Christ has yet to suffer. In the second place, falsehood in wherefore Jacob bound himself by his own vow to a spe- outward worship occurs on the part of the worshiper, and cial kind of worship, as related in Genesis 28. Therefore especially in common worship which is offered by min- now also no worship of God is pernicious. isters impersonating the whole Church. For even as he Objection 3. Further, nothing pernicious is tolerated would be guilty of falsehood who would, in the name of in the Church. Yet the Church tolerates various rites of another person, proffer things that are not committed to divine worship: wherefore Gregory, replying to Augus- him, so too does a man incur the guilt of falsehood who, tine, bishop of the English (Regist. xi, ep. 64), who stated on the part of the Church, gives worship to God contrary that there existed in the churches various customs in the to the manner established by the Church or divine author- celebration of Mass, wrote: “I wish you to choose care- ity, and according to ecclesiastical custom. Hence Am- fully whatever you find likely to be most pleasing to God, brose† says: “He is unworthy who celebrates the mystery whether in the Roman territory, or in the land of the Gauls, otherwise than Christ delivered it.” For this reason, too, or in any part of the Church.” Therefore no way of wor- a gloss on Col. 2:23 says that superstition is “the use of shiping God is pernicious. human observances under the name of religion.” On the contrary, Augustine∗ in a letter to Jerome Reply to Objection 1. Since God is truth, to invoke (and the words are quoted in a gloss on Gal. 2:14) says God is to worship Him in spirit and truth, according to Jn. that “after the Gospel truth had been preached the legal 4:23. Hence a worship that contains falsehood, is incon- observances became deadly,” and yet these observances sistent with a salutary calling upon God. belonged to the worship of God. Therefore there can be Reply to Objection 2. Before the time of the Law the something deadly in the divine worship. just were instructed by an inward instinct as to the way I answer that, As Augustine states (Cont. Mendac. of worshiping God, and others followed them. But after- xiv), “a most pernicious lie is that which is uttered in mat- wards men were instructed by outward precepts about this ters pertaining to Christian religion.” Now it is a lie if one matter, and it is wicked to disobey them. signify outwardly that which is contrary to the truth. But Reply to Objection 3. The various customs of the just as a thing is signified by word, so it is by deed: and Church in the divine worship are in no way contrary to it is in this signification by deed that the outward worship the truth: wherefore we must observe them, and to disre- of religion consists, as shown above (q. 81, a. 7). Conse- gard them is unlawful. quently, if anything false is signified by outward worship, ∗ Jerome (Ep. lxxv, ad Aug.) See Opp. August. Ep. lxxxii † Comment. in 1 ad1 Cor. 11:27, quoted in the gloss of Peter Lombard 1635 Whether there can be any excess in the worship of God? IIa IIae q. 93 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be ex- a man may do conducing to God’s glory, and subjecting cess in the worship of God. It is written (Ecclus. 43:32): his mind to God, and his body, too, by a moderate curb- “Glorify the Lord as much as ever you can, for He will ing of the concupiscences, is not excessive in the divine yet far exceed.” Now the divine worship is directed to the worship, provided it be in accordance with the command- glorification of God. Therefore there can be no excess in ments of God and of the Church, and in keeping with the it. customs of those among whom he lives. Objection 2. Further, outward worship is a profes- On the other hand if that which is done be, in itself, sion of inward worship, “whereby God is worshiped with not conducive to God’s glory, nor raise man’s mind to faith, hope, and charity,” as Augustine says (Enchiridion God, nor curb inordinate concupiscence, or again if it be iii). Now there can be no excess in faith, hope, and charity. not in accordance with the commandments of God and of Neither, therefore, can there be in the worship of God. the Church, or if it be contrary to the general custom— Objection 3. Further, to worship God consists in of- which, according to Augustine∗, “has the force of law”— fering to Him what we have received from Him. But we all this must be reckoned excessive and superstitious, be- have received all our goods from God. Therefore if we do cause consisting, as it does, of mere externals, it has no all that we possibly can for God’s honor, there will be no connection with the internal worship of God. Hence Au- excess in the divine worship. gustine (De Vera Relig. iii) quotes the words of Lk. 17:21, On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. “The kingdom of God is within you,” against the “super- ii, 18) “that the good and true Christian rejects also super- stitious,” those, to wit, who pay more attention to exter- stitious fancies, from Holy Writ.” But Holy Writ teaches nals. us to worship God. Therefore there can be superstition by Reply to Objection 1. The glorification of God im- reason of excess even in the worship of God. plies that what is done is done for God’s glory: and this I answer that, A thing is said to be in excess in two excludes the excess denoted by superstition. ways. First, with regard to absolute quantity, and in this Reply to Objection 2. Faith, hope and charity subject way there cannot be excess in the worship of God, because the mind to God, so that there can be nothing excessive in whatever man does is less than he owes God. Secondly, them. It is different with external acts, which sometimes a thing is in excess with regard to quantity of proportion, have no connection with these virtues. through not being proportionate to its end. Now the end Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers ex- of divine worship is that man may give glory to God, and cess by way of absolute quantity. submit to Him in mind and body. Consequently, whatever ∗ Ad Casulan. Ep. xxxvi 1636 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 94 Of Idolatry (In Four Articles) We must now consider idolatry: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether idolatry is a species of superstition? (2) Whether it is a sin? (3) Whether it is the gravest sin? (4) Of the cause of this sin. Whether idolatry is rightly reckoned a species of superstition? IIa IIae q. 94 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that idolatry is not rightly to superstition to exceed the due mode of divine worship, reckoned a species of superstition. Just as heretics are and this is done chiefly when divine worship is given to unbelievers, so are idolaters. But heresy is a species of whom it should not be given. Now it should be given to unbelief, as stated above (q. 11, a. 1). Therefore idolatry the most high uncreated God alone, as stated above (q. 81, is also a species of unbelief and not of superstition. a. 1) when we were treating of religion. Therefore it is su- Objection 2. Further, latria pertains to the virtue of re-perstition to give worship to any creature whatsoever. ligion to which superstition is opposed. But latria, appar- Now just as this divine worship was given to sensi- ently, is univocally applied to idolatry and to that which ble creatures by means of sensible signs, such as sacri- belongs to the true religion. For just as we speak univo- fices, games, and the like, so too was it given to a crea- cally of the desire of false happiness, and of the desire of ture represented by some sensible form or shape, which true happiness, so too, seemingly, we speak univocally of is called an “idol.” Yet divine worship was given to idols the worship of false gods, which is called idolatry, and of in various ways. For some, by means of a nefarious art, the worship of the true God, which is the latria of true re- constructed images which produced certain effects by the ligion. Therefore idolatry is not a species of superstition. power of the demons: wherefore they deemed that the im- Objection 3. Further, that which is nothing cannot be ages themselves contained something God-like, and con- the species of any genus. But idolatry, apparently, is noth- sequently that divine worship was due to them. This was ing: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:4): “We know that the opinion of Hermes Trismegistus∗, as Augustine states an idol is nothing in the world,” and further on (1 Cor. (De Civ. Dei viii, 23): while others gave divine worship 10:19): “What then? Do I say that what is offered in sac- not to the images, but to the creatures represented thereby. rifice to idols is anything? Or that the idol is anything?” The Apostle alludes to both of these (Rom. 1:23,25). For, implying an answer in the negative. Now offering things as regards the former, he says: “They changed the glory to idols belongs properly to idolatry. Therefore since idol- of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of atry is like to nothing, it cannot be a species of supersti- a corruptible man, and of birds, and of four-footed beasts, tion. and of creeping things,” and of the latter he says: “Who Objection 4. Further, it belongs to superstition to give worshipped and served the creature rather than the Cre-divine honor to whom that honor is not due. Now di- ator.” vine honor is undue to idols, just as it is undue to other These latter were of three ways of thinking. For some creatures, wherefore certain people are reproached (Rom. deemed certain men to have been gods, whom they wor- 1:25) for that they “worshipped and served the creature shipped in the images of those men: for instance, Jupiter, rather than the Creator.” Therefore this species of super- Mercury, and so forth. Others again deemed the whole stition is unfittingly called idolatry, and should rather be world to be one god, not by reason of its material sub- named “worship of creatures.” stance, but by reason of its soul, which they believed to be On the contrary, It is related (Acts 17:16) that when God, for they held God to be nothing else than a soul gov- Paul awaited Silas and Timothy at Athens, “his spirit was erning the world by movement and reason: even as a man stirred within him seeing the whole city given to idola- is said to be wise in respect not of his body but of his soul. try,” and further on (Acts 17:22) he says: “Ye men of Hence they thought that divine worship ought to be given Athens, I perceive that in all things you are too supersti- to the whole world and to all its parts, heaven, air, water, tious.” Therefore idolatry belongs to superstition. and to all such things: and to these they referred the names I answer that, As stated above (q. 92, a. 2), it belongs of their gods, as Varro asserted, and Augustine relates (De ∗ De Natura Deorum, ad Asclep 1637 Civ. Dei vii, 5). Lastly, others, namely, the Platonists, said heresy is a species of unbelief, but idolatry is a species of that there is one supreme god, the cause of all things. Af- superstition. ter him they placed certain spiritual substances created by Reply to Objection 2. The term latria may be taken in the supreme god. These they called “gods,” on account of two senses. In one sense it may denote a human act per- their having a share of the godhead; but we call them “an- taining to the worship of God: and then its signification gels.” After these they placed the souls of the heavenly remains the same, to whomsoever it be shown, because, bodies, and beneath these the demons which they stated in this sense, the thing to which it is shown is not included to be certain animal denizens of the air, and beneath these in its definition. Taken thus latria is applied univocally, again they placed human souls, which they believed to be whether to true religion or to idolatry, just as the payment taken up into the fellowship of the gods or of the demons of a tax is univocally the same, whether it is paid to the by reason of the merit of their virtue. To all these they true or to a false king. In another sense latria denotes the gave divine worship, as Augustine relates (De Civ . . Dei same as religion, and then, since it is a virtue, it is essen- xviii, 14). tial thereto that divine worship be given to whom it ought The last two opinions were held to belong to “natu- to be given; and in this way latria is applied equivocally to ral theology” which the philosophers gathered from their the latria of true religion, and to idolatry: just as prudence study of the world and taught in the schools: while the is applied equivocally to the prudence that is a virtue, and other, relating to the worship of men, was said to belong to that which is carnal. to “mythical theology” which was wont to be represented Reply to Objection 3. The saying of the Apostle that on the stage according to the fancies of poets. The re- “an idol is nothing in the world” means that those images maining opinion relating to images was held to belong to which were called idols, were not animated, or possessed “civil theology,” which was celebrated by the pontiffs in of a divine power, as Hermes maintained, as though they the temples∗. were composed of spirit and body. In the same sense we Now all these come under the head of the superstition must understand the saying that “what is offered in sacri- of idolatry. Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. fice to idols is not anything,” because by being thus sac- ii, 20): “Anything invented by man for making and wor- rificed the sacrificial flesh acquired neither sanctification, shipping idols, or for giving Divine worship to a creature as the Gentiles thought, nor uncleanness, as the Jews held. or any part of a creature, is superstitious.” Reply to Objection 4. It was owing to the general Reply to Objection 1. Just as religion is not faith, custom among the Gentiles of worshipping any kind of but a confession of faith by outward signs, so superstition creature under the form of images that the term “idola- is a confession of unbelief by external worship. Such a try” was used to signify any worship of a creature, even confession is signified by the term idolatry, but not by the without the use of images. term heresy, which only means a false opinion. Therefore Whether idolatry is a sin? IIa IIae q. 94 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that idolatry is not a sin. faith inwardly. Therefore it seems that we may worship Nothing is a sin that the true faith employs in worshipping idols outwardly without prejudice to the divine worship. God. Now the true faith employs images for the divine On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 20:5): “Thou shalt worship: since both in the Tabernacle were there images not adore them,” i.e. outwardly, “nor serve them,” i.e. in- of the cherubim, as related in Ex. 25, and in the Church wardly, as a gloss explains it: and it is a question of graven are images set up which the faithful worship. Therefore things and images. Therefore it is a sin to worship idols idolatry, whereby idols are worshipped, is not a sin. whether outwardly or inwardly. Objection 2. Further, reverence should be paid to ev- I answer that, There has been a twofold error in this ery superior. But the angels and the souls of the blessed matter. For some† have thought that to offer sacrifices and are our superiors. Therefore it will be no sin to pay them other things pertaining to latria, not only to God but also reverence by worship, of sacrifices or the like. to the others aforesaid, is due and good in itself, since they Objection 3. Further, the most high God should be held that divine honor should be paid to every superior na- honored with an inward worship, according to Jn. 4:24, ture, as being nearer to God. But this is unreasonable. For “God. . . they must adore. . . in spirit and in truth”: and Au- though we ought to revere all superiors, yet the same rev- gustine says (Enchiridion iii), that “God is worshipped by erence is not due to them all: and something special is due faith, hope and charity.” Now a man may happen to wor- to the most high God Who excels all in a singular manner: ship idols outwardly, and yet not wander from the true and this is the worship of latria. ∗ De Civ. Dei vi, 5 † The School of Plato 1638 Nor can it be said, as some have maintained, that gods, and the sovereign good.” This error was embraced “these visible sacrifices are fitting with regard to other also by certain heretics∗, who affirmed that it is not wrong gods, and that to the most high God, as being better than for one who is seized in time of persecution to worship those others, better sacrifices, namely, the service of a idols outwardly so long as he keeps the faith in his heart. pure mind, should be offered”‡. The reason is that, as But this is evidently false. For since outward worship Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 19), “external sacrifices is a sign of the inward worship, just as it is a wicked lie to are signs of internal, just as audible words are signs of affirm the contrary of what one holds inwardly of the true things. Wherefore, just as by prayer and praise we utter faith so too is it a wicked falsehood to pay outward wor- significant words to Him, and offer to Him in our hearts ship to anything counter to the sentiments of one’s heart. the things they signify, so too in our sacrifices we ought to Wherefore Augustine condemns Seneca (De Civ. Dei vi, realize that we should offer a visible sacrifice to no other 10) in that “his worship of idols was so much the more than to Him Whose invisible sacrifice we ourselves should infamous forasmuch as the things he did dishonestly were be in our hearts.” so done by him that the people believed him to act hon- Others held that the outward worship of latria should estly.” be given to idols, not as though it were something good Reply to Objection 1. Neither in the Tabernacle or or fitting in itself, but as being in harmony with the gen- Temple of the Old Law, nor again now in the Church are eral custom. Thus Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) quotes images set up that the worship of latria may be paid to Seneca as saying: “We shall adore,” says he, “in such a them, but for the purpose of signification, in order that way as to remember that our worship ss in accordance belief in the excellence of angels and saints may be im- with custom rather than with the reality”: and (De Vera pressed and confirmed in the mind of man. It is different Relig. v) Augustine says that “we must not seek religion with the image of Christ, to which latria is due on account from the philosophers, who accepted the same things for of His Divinity, as we shall state in the IIIa, q. 25, a. 3. sacred, as did the people; and gave utterance in the schools The Replies to the Second and Third Objections are to various and contrary opinions about the nature of their evident from what has been said above. Whether idolatry is the gravest of sins? IIa IIae q. 94 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that idolatry is not the vice of heretical depravity is more grievous than idolatry. gravest of sins. The worst is opposed to the best (Ethic. Objection 5. Further, a gloss of Jerome on Gal. 4:9, viii, 10). But interior worship, which consists of faith, “How turn you again to the weak and needy elements?” hope and charity, is better than external worship. There- says: “The observance of the Law, to which they were fore unbelief, despair and hatred of God, which are op- then addicted, was a sin almost equal to the worship of posed to internal worship, are graver sins than idolatry, idols, to which they had been given before their conver- which is opposed to external worship. sion.” Therefore idolatry is not the most grievous sin. Objection 2. Further, the more a sin is against God On the contrary, A gloss on the saying of Lev. 15:25, the more grievous it is. Now, seemingly, a man acts more about the uncleanness of a woman suffering from an issue directly against God by blaspheming, or denying the faith, of blood, says: “Every sin is an uncleanness of the soul, than by giving God’s worship to another, which pertains but especially idolatry.” to idolatry. Therefore blasphemy and denial of the faith I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be consid- are more grievous sins than idolatry. ered in two ways. First, on the part of the sin itself, and Objection 3. Further, it seems that lesser evils are thus idolatry is the most grievous sin. For just as the most punished with greater evils. But the sin of idolatry was heinous crime in an earthly commonwealth would seem punished with the sin against nature, as stated in Rom. to be for a man to give royal honor to another than the 1:26. Therefore the sin against nature is a graver sin than true king, since, so far as he is concerned, he disturbs idolatry. the whole order of the commonwealth, so, in sins that are Objection 4. Further, Augustine says (Contra Faust. committed against God, which indeed are the greater sins, xx, 5): “Neither do we say that you,” viz. the Manichees, the greatest of all seems to be for a man to give God’s “are pagans, or a sect of pagans, but that you bear a certain honor to a creature, since, so far as he is concerned, he likeness to them since you worship many gods: and yet sets up another God in the world, and lessens the divine you are much worse than they are, for they worship things sovereignty. Secondly, the gravity of a sin may be con- that exist, but should not be worshiped as gods, whereas sidered on the part of the sinner. Thus the sin of one that you worship things that exist not at all.” Therefore the sins knowingly is said to be graver than the sin of one that ‡ Augustine, as quoted below ∗ The Helcesaitae 1639 sins through ignorance: and in this way nothing hinders against nature is less grievous than the sin of idolatry. But heretics, if they knowingly corrupt the faith which they since it is more manifest, it is assigned as a fitting pun- have received, from sinning more grievously than idol- ishment of the sin of idolatry, in order that, as by idolatry aters who sin through ignorance. Furthermore other sins man abuses the order of the divine honor, so by the sin may be more grievous on account of greater contempt on against nature he may suffer confusion from the abuse of the part of the sinner. his own nature. Reply to Objection 1. Idolatry presupposes internal Reply to Objection 4. Even as to the genus of the unbelief, and to this it adds undue worship. But in a case sin, the Manichean heresy is more grievous than the sin of of external idolatry without internal unbelief, there is an other idolaters, because it is more derogatory to the divine additional sin of falsehood, as stated above (a. 2). honor, since they set up two gods in opposition to one Reply to Objection 2. Idolatry includes a grievous another, and hold many vain and fabulous fancies about blasphemy, inasmuch as it deprives God of the singleness God. It is different with other heretics, who confess their of His dominion and denies the faith by deeds. belief in one God and worship Him alone. Reply to Objection 3. Since it is essential to punish- Reply to Objection 5. The observance of the Law ment that it be against the will, a sin whereby another sin during the time of grace is not quite equal to idolatry as is punished needs to be more manifest, in order that it may to the genus of the sin, but almost equal, because both are make the man more hateful to himself and to others; but species of pestiferous superstition. it need not be a more grievous sin: and in this way the sin Whether the cause of idolatry was on the part of man? IIa IIae q. 94 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the cause of idola- man. try was not on the part of man. In man there is nothing On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 14:14): “By the but either nature, virtue, or guilt. But the cause of idola- vanity of men they,” i.e. idols, “came into the world.” try could not be on the part of man’s nature, since rather I answer that, Idolatry had a twofold cause. One was does man’s natural reason dictate that there is one God, a dispositive cause; this was on the part of man, and in and that divine worship should not be paid to the dead or three ways. First, on account of his inordinate affections, to inanimate beings. Likewise, neither could idolatry have forasmuch as he gave other men divine honor, through its cause in man on the part of virtue, since “a good tree either loving or revering them too much. This cause is cannot bring forth evil fruit,” according to Mat. 7:18: nor assigned (Wis. 14:15): “A father being afflicted with bit- again could it be on the part of guilt, because, according to ter grief, made to himself the image of his son, who was Wis. 14:27, “the worship of abominable idols is the cause quickly taken away: and him who then had died as a man and the beginning and end of all evil.” Therefore idolatry he began to worship as a god.” The same passage goes has no cause on the part of man. on to say (Wis. 14:21) that “men serving either their af- Objection 2. Further, those things which have a cause fection, or their kings, gave the incommunicable name in man are found among men at all times. Now idola- [Vulg.: ‘names’],” i.e. of the Godhead, “to stones and try was not always, but is stated∗ to have been originated wood.” Secondly, because man takes a natural pleasure either by Nimrod, who is related to have forced men to in representations, as the Philosopher observes (Poet. iv), worship fire, or by Ninus, who caused the statue of his fa- wherefore as soon as the uncultured man saw human im- ther Bel to be worshiped. Among the Greeks, as related ages skillfully fashioned by the diligence of the crafts- by Isidore (Etym. viii, 11), Prometheus was the first to set man, he gave them divine worship; hence it is written up statues of men: and the Jews say that Ismael was the (Wis. 13:11-17): “If an artist, a carpenter, hath cut down first to make idols of clay. Moreover, idolatry ceased to a tree, proper for his use, in the wood. . . and by the skill a great extent in the sixth age. Therefore idolatry had no of his art fashioneth it, and maketh it like the image of a cause on the part of man. man. . . and then maketh prayer to it, inquiring concerning Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei his substance, and his children, or his marriage.” Thirdly, xxi, 6): “It was not possible to learn, for the first time, ex- on account of their ignorance of the true God, inasmuch cept from their” (i.e. the demons’) “teaching, what each as through failing to consider His excellence men gave of them desired or disliked, and by what name to invite or divine worship to certain creatures, on account of their compel him: so as to give birth to the magic arts and their beauty or power, wherefore it is written (Wis. 13:1,2): professors”: and the same observation seems to apply to “All men. . . neither by attending to the works have ac- idolatry. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the part of knowledged who was the workman, but have imagined ∗ Peter Comestor, Hist. Genes. xxxvii, xl 1640 either the fire, or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of produce at some time, either through leading expressly the stars, or the great water, or the sun and the moon, to to that sin by causing it, or through being an occasion be the gods that rule the world.” thereof, either as a beginning or as an end, in so far as The other cause of idolatry was completive, and this certain sins were employed in the worship of idols; such was on the part of the demons, who offered themselves as homicides, mutilations, and so forth. Nevertheless cer- to be worshipped by men, by giving answers in the idols, tain sins may precede idolatry and dispose man thereto. and doing things which to men seemed marvelous. Hence Reply to Objection 2. There was no idolatry in the it is written (Ps. 95:5): “All the gods of the Gentiles are first age, owing to the recent remembrance of the creation devils.” of the world, so that man still retained in his mind the Reply to Objection 1. The dispositive cause of idol- knowledge of one God. In the sixth age idolatry was ban- atry was, on the part of man, a defect of nature, either ished by the doctrine and power of Christ, who triumphed through ignorance in his intellect, or disorder in his affec- over the devil. tions, as stated above; and this pertains to guilt. Again, Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the idolatry is stated to be the cause, beginning and end of all consummative cause of idolatry. sin, because there is no kind of sin that idolatry does not 1641 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 95 Of Superstition in Divinations (In Eight Articles) We must now consider superstition in divinations, under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether divination is a sin? (2) Whether it is a species of superstition? (3) Of the species of divination; (4) Of divination by means of demons; (5) Of divination by the stars; (6) Of divination by dreams; (7) Of divination by auguries and like observances; (8) Of divination by lots. Whether divination is a sin? IIa IIae q. 95 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that divination is not a tell things concerning rains and droughts, and physicians, sin. Divination is derived from something “divine”: and concerning health and death. Again, other causes, consid- things that are divine pertain to holiness rather than to sin. ered in themselves, are indifferent; and this is chiefly the Therefore it seems that divination is not a sin. case in the rational powers, which stand in relation to op- Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. posites, according to the Philosopher∗. Such like effects, i, 1): “Who dares to say that learning is an evil?” and as also those which ensue from natural causes by chance again: “I could nowise admit that intelligence can be an and in the minority of instances, cannot be foreknown evil.” But some arts are divinatory, as the Philosopher from a consideration of their causes, because these causes states (De Memor. i): and divination itself would seem to have no determinate inclination to produce these effects. pertain to a certain intelligence of the truth. Therefore it Consequently such like effects cannot be foreknown un- seems that divination is not a sin. less they be considered in themselves. Now man cannot Objection 3. Further, there is no natural inclination consider these effects in themselves except when they are to evil; because nature inclines only to its like. But men present, as when he sees Socrates running or walking: the by natural inclination seek to foreknow future events; and consideration of such things in themselves before they oc- this belongs to divination. Therefore divination is not a cur is proper to God, Who alone in His eternity sees the sin. future as though it were present, as stated in the Ia, q. 14, On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10,11): “Nei- a. 13; Ia, q. 57, a. 3; Ia, q. 86, a. 4. Hence it is written ther let there be found among you. . . any one that consul- (Is. 41:23): “Show the things that are to come hereafter, teth pythonic spirits, or fortune tellers”: and it is stated in and we shall know that ye are gods.” Therefore if anyone the Decretals (26, qu. v, can. Qui divinationes): “Those presume to foreknow or foretell such like future things by who seek for divinations shall be liable to a penance any means whatever, except by divine revelation, he man- of five years’ duration, according to the fixed grades of ifestly usurps what belongs to God. It is for this reason penance.” that certain men are called divines: wherefore Isidore says I answer that, Divination denotes a foretelling of the (Etym. viii, 9): “They are called divines, as though they future. The future may be foreknown in two ways: first in were full of God. For they pretend to be filled with the its causes, secondly in itself. Now the causes of the future Godhead, and by a deceitful fraud they forecast the future are threefold: for some produce their effects, of necessity to men.” and always; and such like future effects can be foreknown Accordingly it is not called divination, if a man fore- and foretold with certainty, from considering their causes, tells things that happen of necessity, or in the majority of even as astrologers foretell a coming eclipse. Other causes instances, for the like can be foreknown by human reason: produce their effects, not of necessity and always, but for nor again if anyone knows other contingent future things, the most part, yet they rarely fail: and from such like through divine revelation: for then he does not divine, i.e. causes their future effects can be foreknown, not indeed cause something divine, but rather receives something di- with certainty, but by a kind of conjecture, even as as- vine. Then only is a man said to divine, when he usurps trologers by considering the stars can foreknow and fore- to himself, in an undue manner, the foretelling of future ∗ Metaph. viii, 2,5,8 1642 events: and this is manifestly a sin. Consequently divina-foreknowledge of future events that occur of necessity or tion is always a sin; and for this reason Jerome says in his frequently, and these do not pertain to divination. But commentary on Mic. 3:9, seqq. that “divination is always there are no true arts or sciences for the knowledge of taken in an evil sense.” other future events, but only vain inventions of the devil’s Reply to Objection 1. Divination takes its name not deceit, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 8). from a rightly ordered share of something divine, but from Reply to Objection 3. Man has a natural inclination an undue usurpation thereof, as stated above. to know the future by human means, but not by the undue Reply to Objection 2. There are certain arts for the means of divination. Whether divination is a species of superstition? IIa IIae q. 95 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that divination is not pressly invoked that the future may be made known, or be- a species of superstition. The same thing cannot be a cause the demons thrust themselves into futile searchings species of diverse genera. Now divination is apparently of the future, in order to entangle men’s minds with vain a species of curiosity, according to Augustine (De Vera conceits. Of this kind of vanity it is written (Ps. 39:5): Relig. xxxviii)∗. Therefore it is not, seemingly, a species “Who hath not regard to vanities and lying follies.” Now of superstition. it is vain to seek knowledge of the future, when one tries Objection 2. Further, just as religion is due worship, to get it from a source whence it cannot be foreknown. so is superstition undue worship. But divination does not Therefore it is manifest that divination is a species of su- seem to pertain to undue worship. Therefore it does not perstition. pertain to superstition. Reply to Objection 1. Divination is a kind of curios- Objection 3. Further, superstition is opposed to reli- ity with regard to the end in view, which is foreknowledge gion. But in true religion nothing is to be found corre- of the future; but it is a kind of superstition as regards the sponding as a contrary to divination. Therefore divination mode of operation. is not a species of superstition. Reply to Objection 2. This kind of divination pertains On the contrary, Origen says in his Peri Archon†: to the worship of the demons, inasmuch as one enters into “There is an operation of the demons in the administer- a compact, tacit or express with the demons. ing of foreknowledge, comprised, seemingly, under the Reply to Objection 3. In the New Law man’s mind is head of certain arts exercised by those who have enslaved restrained from solicitude about temporal things: where- themselves to the demons, by means of lots, omens, or the fore the New Law contains no institution for the fore- observance of shadows. I doubt not that all these things knowledge of future events in temporal matters. On are done by the operation of the demons.” Now, according the other hand in the Old Law, which contained earthly to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20,23), “whatever re- promises, there were consultations about the future in sults from fellowship between demons and men is super- connection with religious matters. Hence where it is writ- stitious.” Therefore divination is a species of superstition. ten (Is. 8:19): “And when they shall say to you: Seek I answer that, As stated above (a. 1; Qq. 92,94), su- of pythons and of diviners, who mutter in their enchant- perstition denotes undue divine worship. Now a thing per- ments,” it is added by way of answer: “Should not the tains to the worship of God in two ways: in one way, it is people seek of their God, a vision for the living and the something offered to God; as a sacrifice, an oblation, or dead?‡” something of the kind: in another way, it is something In the New Testament, however, there were some pos- divine that is assumed, as stated above with regard to an sessed of the spirit of prophecy, who foretold many things oath (q. 89, a. 4, ad 2). Wherefore superstition includes about future events. not only idolatrous sacrifices offered to demons, but also In the New Testament, however, there were some pos- recourse to the help of the demons for the purpose of do- sessed of the spirit of prophecy, who foretold many things ing or knowing something. But all divination results from about future events. the demons’ operation, either because the demons are ex- ∗ Cf. De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23,24; De Divin. Daem. 3 † The quotation is from his sixteenth homily on the Book of Numbers ‡ Vulg.: ‘seek of their God, for the living of the dead?’ 1643 Whether we ought to distinguish several species of divination? IIa IIae q. 95 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that we should not distin- vocation of the demons is of two kinds. The first is when, guish several species of divination. Where the formality with a view to obtain knowledge of the future, we take ob- of sin is the same, there are not seemingly several species servations in the disposition of certain things. If one en- of sin. Now there is one formality of sin in all divina- deavor to know the future by observing the position and tions, since they consist in entering into compact with the movements of the stars, this belongs to “astrologers,” who demons in order to know the future. Therefore there are are also called “genethliacs,” because they take note of not several species of divination. the days on which people are born. If one observe the Objection 2. Further, a human act takes it species movements and cries of birds or of any animals, or the from its end, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 3; Ia IIae, sneezing of men, or the sudden movements of limbs, this q. 18, a. 6). But all divination is directed to one end, belongs in general to “augury,” which is so called from namely, the foretelling of the future. Therefore all div- the chattering of birds [avium garritu], just as “auspice” is inations are of one species. derived from watching birds [avium inspectione]. These Objection 3. Further, signs do not vary the species are chiefly wont to be observed in birds, the former by the of a sin, for whether one detracts by word writing or ges- ear, the latter by the eye. If, however, these observations tures, it is the same species of sin. Now divinations seem have for their object men’s words uttered unintentionally, to differ merely according to the various signs whence the which someone twist so as to apply to the future that he foreknowledge of the future is derived. Therefore there wishes to foreknow, then it is called an “omen”: and as are not several species of divination. Valerius Maximus∗ remarks, “the observing of omens has On the contrary, Isidore enumerates various species a touch of religion mingled with it, for it is believed to be of divination (Etym. viii, 9). founded not on a chance movement, but on divine prov- I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), all divinations idence. It was thus that when the Romans were deliber- seek to acquire foreknowledge of future events, by means ating whether they would change their position, a centu- of some counsel and help of a demon, who is either ex- rion happened to exclaim at the time: ‘Standard-bearer, pressly called upon to give his help, or else thrusts him- fix the banner, we had best stand here’: and on hearing self in secretly, in order to foretell certain future things these words they took them as an omen, and abandoned unknown to men, but known to him in such manners as their intention of advancing further.” If, however, the ob- have been explained in the Ia, q. 57, a. 3. When demons servation regards the dispositions, that occur to the eye, of are expressly invoked, they are wont to foretell the future figures in certain bodies, there will be another species of in many ways. Sometimes they offer themselves to hu- divination: for the divination that is taken from observing man sight and hearing by mock apparitions in order to the lines of the hand is called “chiromancy,” i.e. divination foretell the future: and this species is called “prestigia- of the hand (because cheir is the Greek for hand): while tion” because man’s eyes are blindfolded [praestringun-the divination which is taken from signs appearing in the tur]. Sometimes they make use of dreams, and this is shoulder-blades of an animal is called “spatulamancy.” called “divination by dreams”: sometimes they employ To this second species of divination, which is with- apparitions or utterances of the dead, and this species out express invocation of the demons, belongs that which is called “necromancy,” for as Isidore observes (Etym. is practiced by observing certain things done seriously by viii) in Greek, nekron “means dead and manteia divina-men in the research of the occult, whether by drawing lots, tion, because after certain incantations and the sprinkling which is called “geomancy”; or by observing the shapes of blood, the dead seem to come to life, to divine and resulting from molten lead poured into water; or by ob- to answer questions.” Sometimes they foretell the future serving which of several sheets of paper, with or without through living men, as in the case of those who are pos- writing upon them, a person may happen to draw; or by sessed: this is divination by “pythons,” of whom Isidore holding out several unequal sticks and noting who takes says that “pythons are so called from Pythius Apollo, who the greater or the lesser. or by throwing dice, and observ- was said to be the inventor of divination.” Sometimes they ing who throws the highest score; or by observing what foretell the future by means of shapes or signs which ap- catches the eye when one opens a book, all of which are pear in inanimate beings. If these signs appear in some named “sortilege.” earthly body such as wood, iron or polished stone, it is Accordingly it is clear that there are three kinds of div- called “geomancy,” if in water “hydromancy,” if in the air ination. The first is when the demons are invoked openly, “aeromancy,” if in fire “pyromancy,” if in the entrails of this comes under the head of “necromancy”; the second animals sacrificed on the altars of demons, “aruspicy.” is merely an observation of the disposition or movement The divination which is practiced without express in- of some other being, and this belongs to “augury”; while ∗ De Dict. Fact. Memor. i, 5 1644 the third consists in doing something in order to discover its general formality. But the various species are distin-the occult; and this belongs to “sortilege.” Under each of guished by their proper objects or matters, according as these many others are contained, as explained above. the knowledge of the occult is sought in various things. Reply to Objection 1. In all the aforesaid there is the Reply to Objection 3. The things observed by divin- same general, but not the same special, character of sin: ers are considered by them, not as signs expressing what for it is much more grievous to invoke the demons than to they already know, as happens in detraction, but as prin- do things that deserve the demons’ interference. ciples of knowledge. Now it is evident that diversity of Reply to Objection 2. Knowledge of the future or principles diversifies the species, even in demonstrative of the occult is the ultimate end whence divination takes sciences. Whether divination practiced by invoking the demons is unlawful? IIa IIae q. 95 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that divination practiced something prejudicial to the salvation of mankind. Hence by invoking the demons is not unlawful. Christ did noth- Athanasius, commenting on the words of Lk. 4:35, “He ing unlawful, according to 1 Pet. 2:22, “Who did no sin.” rebuked him, saying: Hold thy peace,” says: “Although Yet our Lord asked the demon: “What is thy name?” and the demon confessed the truth, Christ put a stop to his the latter replied: “My name is Legion, for we are many” speech, lest together with the truth he should publish his (Mk. 5:9). Therefore it seems lawful to question the wickedness and accustom us to care little for such things, demons about the occult. however much he may seem to speak the truth. For it Objection 2. Further, the souls of the saints do not en- is wicked, while we have the divine Scriptures, to seek courage those who ask unlawfully. Yet Samuel appeared knowledge from the demons.” to Saul when the latter inquired of the woman that had a Reply to Objection 1. According to Bede’s commen- divining spirit, concerning the issue of the coming war (1 tary on Lk. 8:30, “Our Lord inquired, not through igno- Kings 28:8, sqq.). Therefore the divination that consists rance, but in order that the disease, which he tolerated, in questioning demons is not unlawful. being made public, the power of the Healer might shine Objection 3. Further, it seems lawful to seek the truth forth more graciously.” Now it is one thing to question from one who knows, if it be useful to know it. But it a demon who comes to us of his own accord (and it is is sometimes useful to know what is hidden from us, and lawful to do so at times for the good of others, especially can be known through the demons, as in the discovery of when he can be compelled, by the power of God, to tell thefts. Therefore divination by questioning demons is not the truth) and another to invoke a demon in order to gain unlawful. from him knowledge of things hidden from us. On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10,11): “Nei- Reply to Objection 2. According to Augustine (Ad ther let there be found among you. . . anyone that consul- Simplic. ii, 3), “there is nothing absurd in believing that teth soothsayers. . . nor. . . that consulteth pythonic spirits.” the spirit of the just man, being about to smite the king I answer that, All divination by invoking demons with the divine sentence, was permitted to appear to him, is unlawful for two reasons. The first is gathered from not by the sway of magic art or power, but by some oc- the principle of divination, which is a compact made ex- cult dispensation of which neither the witch nor Saul was pressly with a demon by the very fact of invoking him. aware. Or else the spirit of Samuel was not in reality This is altogether unlawful; wherefore it is written against aroused from his rest, but some phantom or mock appari- certain persons (Is. 28:15): “You have said: We have tion formed by the machinations of the devil, and styled entered into a league with death, and we have made a by Scripture under the name of Samuel, just as the im- covenant with hell.” And still more grievous would it be ages of things are wont to be called by the names of those if sacrifice were offered or reverence paid to the demon things.” invoked. The second reason is gathered from the result. Reply to Objection 3. No temporal utility can com- For the demon who intends man’s perdition endeavors, by pare with the harm to spiritual health that results from the his answers, even though he sometimes tells the truth, to research of the unknown by invoking the demon. accustom men to believe him, and so to lead him on to 1645 Whether divination by the stars is unlawful? IIa IIae q. 95 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that divination by the stars they be ascribed to some common higher cause of a cor- is not unlawful. It is lawful to foretell effects by observ- poreal nature, although they are referable to a common ing their causes: thus a physician foretells death from the higher cause, which is divine providence. on the con- disposition of the disease. Now the heavenly bodies are trary the appointment of the movements and positions of the cause of what takes place in the world, according to the heavenly bodies by divine providence is on a differ- Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore divination by the ent principle from the appointment of the occurrence of stars is not unlawful. future contingencies, because the former are appointed on Objection 2. Further, human science originates from a principle of necessity, so that they always occur in the experiments, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, same way, whereas the latter are appointed on a principle 1). Now it has been discovered through many experi- of contingency, so that the manner of their occurrence is ments that the observation of the stars is a means whereby variable. Consequently it is impossible to acquire fore- some future events may be known beforehand. Therefore knowledge of the future from an observation of the stars, it would seem not unlawful to make use of this kind of except in so far as effects can be foreknown from their divination. causes. Objection 3. Further, divination is declared to be un- Now two kinds of effects escape the causality of heav- lawful in so far as it is based on a compact made with the enly bodies. In the first place all effects that occur acci- demons. But divination by the stars contains nothing of dentally, whether in human affairs or in the natural or- the kind, but merely an observation of God’s creatures. der, since, as it is proved in Metaph. vi∗, an acciden- Therefore it would seem that this species of divination is tal being has no cause, least of all a natural cause, such not unlawful. as is the power of a heavenly body, because what occurs On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 3): accidentally, neither is a “being” properly speaking, nor “Those astrologers whom they call mathematicians, I con- is “one”—for instance, that an earthquake occur when a sulted without scruple; because they seemed to use no stone falls, or that a treasure be discovered when a man sacrifice, nor to pray to any spirit for their divinations digs a grave—for these and like occurrences are not one which art, however, Christian and true piety rejects and thing, but are simply several things. Whereas the opera- condemns.” tion of nature has always some one thing for its term, just I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,2), the operation as it proceeds from some one principle, which is the form of the demon thrusts itself into those divinations which are of a natural thing. based on false and vain opinions, in order that man’s mind In the second place, acts of the free-will, which is the may become entangled in vanity and falsehood. Now one faculty of will and reason, escape the causality of heav- makes use of a vain and false opinion if, by observing enly bodies. For the intellect or reason is not a body, nor the stars, one desires to foreknow the future that cannot the act of a bodily organ, and consequently neither is the be forecast by their means. Wherefore we must consider will, since it is in the reason, as the Philosopher shows what things can be foreknown by observing the stars: and (De Anima iii, 4,9). Now no body can make an impres- it is evident that those things which happen of necessity sion on an incorporeal body. Wherefore it is impossible can be foreknown by this mean,: even so astrologers fore- for heavenly bodies to make a direct impression on the in- cast a future eclipse. tellect and will: for this would be to deny the difference However, with regard to the foreknowledge of future between intellect and sense, with which position Aristotle events acquired by observing the stars there have been var- reproaches (De Anima iii, 3) those who held that “such is ious opinions. For some have stated that the stars signify the will of man, as is the day which the father of men and rather than cause the things foretold by means of their ob- of gods,” i.e. the sun or the heavens, “brings on”†. servation. But this is an unreasonable statement: since Hence the heavenly bodies cannot be the direct cause every corporeal sign is either the effect of that for which of the free-will’s operations. Nevertheless they can be a it stands (thus smoke signifies fire whereby it is caused), dispositive cause of an inclination to those operations, in or it proceeds from the same cause, so that by signify- so far as they make an impression on the human body, and ing the cause, in consequence it signifies the effect (thus consequently on the sensitive powers which are acts of a rainbow is sometimes a sign of fair weather, in so far bodily organs having an inclination for human acts. Since, as its cause is the cause of fair weather). Now it cannot however, the sensitive powers obey reason, as the Philoso- be said that the dispositions and movements of the heav- pher shows (De Anima iii, 11; Ethic. i, 13), this does not enly bodies are the effect of future events; nor again can impose any necessity on the free-will, and man is able, by ∗ Ed. Did. v, 3 † Odyssey xviii, 135 1646 his reason, to act counter to the inclination of the heavenly tion of the heavenly bodies: while there are few, namely, bodies. the wise alone, who moderate these inclinations by their Accordingly if anyone take observation of the stars in reason. The result is that astrologers in many cases foretell order to foreknow casual or fortuitous future events, or to the truth, especially in public occurrences which depend know with certitude future human actions, his conduct is on the multitude. Secondly, because of the interference of based on a false and vain opinion; and so the operation of the demons. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 17): the demon introduces itself therein, wherefore it will be a “When astrologers tell the truth, it must be allowed that superstitious and unlawful divination. On the other hand this is due to an instinct that, unknown to man, lies hidden if one were to apply the observation of the stars in order to in his mind. And since this happens through the action of foreknow those future things that are caused by heavenly unclean and lying spirits who desire to deceive man for bodies, for instance, drought or rain and so forth, it will they are permitted to know certain things about temporal be neither an unlawful nor a superstitious divination. affairs.” Wherefore he concludes: “Thus a good Christian Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident. should beware of astrologers, and of all impious diviners, Reply to Objection 2. That astrologers not unfre- especially of those who tell the truth, lest his soul become quently forecast the truth by observing the stars may be the dupe of the demons and by making a compact of part- explained in two ways. First, because a great number of nership with them enmesh itself in their fellowship.” men follow their bodily passions, so that their actions are This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection. for the most part disposed in accordance with the inclina- Whether divination by dreams is unlawful? IIa IIae q. 95 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that divination by dreams signs of future happenings, in so far as they are referable is not unlawful. It is not unlawful to make use of divine to some common cause of both dreams and future occur- instruction. Now men are instructed by God in dreams, rences, and in this way the future is frequently known for it is written (Job 33:15,16): “By a dream in a vision from dreams. We must, then, consider what is the cause by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, and they are of dreams, and whether it can be the cause of future oc- sleeping in their beds, then He,” God to wit, “openeth the currences, or be cognizant of them. ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they Accordingly it is to be observed that the cause of are to learn.” Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of dreams is sometimes in us and sometimes outside us. The divination by dreams. inward cause of dreams is twofold: one regards the soul, Objection 2. Further, those who interpret dreams, in so far as those things which have occupied a man’s properly speaking, make use of divination by dreams. thoughts and affections while awake recur to his imagi- Now we read of holy men interpreting dreams: thus nation while asleep. A such like cause of dreams is not Joseph interpreted the dreams of Pharaoh’s butler and of a cause of future occurrences, so that dreams of this kind his chief baker (Gn. 40), and Daniel interpreted the dream are related accidentally to future occurrences, and if at any of the king of Babylon (Dan. 2,4). Therefore divination time they concur it will be by chance. But sometimes the by dreams is not unlawful. inward cause of dreams regards the body: because the in- Objection 3. Further, it is unreasonable to deny the ward disposition of the body leads to the formation of a common experiences of men. Now it is the experience of movement in the imagination consistent with that disposi- all that dreams are significative of the future. Therefore it tion; thus a man in whom there is abundance of cold hu- is useless to deny the efficacy of dreams for the purpose mors dreams that he is in the water or snow: and for this of divination, and it is lawful to listen to them. reason physicians say that we should take note of dreams On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10): “Neither in order to discover internal dispositions. let there be found among you any one that. . . observeth In like manner the outward cause of dreams is twofold, dreams.” corporal and spiritual. It is corporal in so far as the I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 2,6), divination sleeper’s imagination is affected either by the surround- is superstitious and unlawful when it is based on a false ing air, or through an impression of a heavenly body, so opinion. Wherefore we must consider what is true in that certain images appear to the sleeper, in keeping with the matter of foreknowing the future from dreams. Now the disposition of the heavenly bodies. The spiritual cause dreams are sometimes the cause of future occurrences; for is sometimes referable to God, Who reveals certain things instance, when a person’s mind becomes anxious through to men in their dreams by the ministry of the angels, ac- what it has seen in a dream and is thereby led to do some- cording Num. 12:6, “If there be among you a prophet of thing or avoid something: while sometimes dreams are the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to 1647 him in a dream.” Sometimes, however, it is due to the aclation, or to some natural cause inward or outward, and so tion of the demons that certain images appear to persons in far as the efficacy of that cause extends. But it will be an their sleep, and by this means they, at times, reveal certain unlawful and superstitious divination if it be caused by a future things to those who have entered into an unlawful revelation of the demons, with whom a compact has been compact with them. made, whether explicit, through their being invoked for Accordingly we must say that there is no unlawful div- the purpose, or implicit, through the divination extending ination in making use of dreams for the foreknowledge of beyond its possible limits. the future, so long as those dreams are due to divine reve- This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. Whether divination by auguries, omens, and by like observations of external things is IIa IIae q. 95 a. 7 unlawful? Objection 1. It would seem that divination by au- since dumb animals have naught but a sensitive soul, ev- guries, omens, and by like observations of external things ery power of which is the act of a bodily organ, their soul is not unlawful. If it were unlawful holy men would not is subject to the disposition of surrounding bodies, and make use thereof. Now we read of Joseph that he paid primarily to that of the heavenly bodies. Hence nothing attention to auguries, for it is related (Gn. 44:5) that prevents some of their actions from being signs of the fu- Joseph’s steward said: “The cup which you have stolen ture, in so far as they are conformed to the dispositions of is that in which my lord drinketh and in which he is wont the heavenly bodies and of the surrounding air, to which to divine [augurari]”: and he himself afterwards said to certain future events are due. Yet in this matter we must his brethren (Gn. 44:15): “Know you not that there is no observe two things: first, that such observations must not one like me in the science of divining?” Therefore it is not be applied to the foreknowledge of future things other unlawful to make use of this kind of divination. than those which can be foreknown from the movements Objection 2. Further, birds naturally know certain of heavenly bodies, as stated above (Aa. 5,6): secondly, things regarding future occurrences of the seasons, ac- that they be not applied to other matters than those which cording to Jer. 8:7, “The kite in the air hath known her in some way may have reference to these animals (since time; the turtle, the swallow, and the stork have observed they acquire through the heavenly bodies a certain natu- the time of their coming.” Now natural knowledge is in- ral knowledge and instinct about things necessary for their fallible and comes from God. Therefore it seems not un- life—such as changes resulting from rain and wind and so lawful to make use of the birds’ knowledge in order to forth). know the future, and this is divination by augury. In the second place, this instinct is produced by a spir- Objection 3. Further, Gedeon is numbered among itual cause, namely, either by God, as may be seen in the the saints (Heb. 11:32). Yet Gedeon made use of an dove that descended upon Christ, the raven that fed Elias, omen, when he listened to the relation and interpreting of and the whale that swallowed and vomited Jonas, or by a dream (Judges 7:15): and Eliezer, Abraham’s servant, demons, who make use of these actions of dumb animals acted in like manner (Gn. 24). Therefore it seems that in order to entangle our minds with vain opinions. This this kind of divination is not unlawful. seems to be true of all such like things; except omens, be- On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10): “Neither cause human words which are taken for an omen are not let there be found among you anyone. . . that observeth subject to the disposition of the stars, yet are they ordered omens.” according to divine providence and sometimes according I answer that, The movements or cries of birds, and to the action of the demons. whatever dispositions one may consider in such things, Accordingly we must say that all such like divinations are manifestly not the cause of future events: wherefore are superstitious and unlawful, if they be extended beyond the future cannot be known therefrom as from its cause. the limits set according to the order of nature or of divine It follows therefore that if anything future can be known providence. from them, it will be because the causes from which they Reply to Objection 1. According to Augustine∗, proceed are also the causes of future occurrences or are when Joseph said that there was no one like him in the cognizant of them. Now the cause of dumb animals’ ac- science of divining, he spoke in joke and not seriously, re- tions is a certain instinct whereby they are inclined by a ferring perhaps to the common opinion about him: in this natural movement, for they are not masters of their ac- sense also spoke his steward. tions. This instinct may proceed from a twofold cause. Reply to Objection 2. The passage quoted refers to In the first place it may be due to a bodily cause. For the knowledge that birds have about things concerning ∗ QQ. in Genes., qu. cxlv 1648 them; and in order to know these things it is not unlaw-and interpretation of a dream, seeing therein an omen, or- ful to observe their cries and movements: thus from the dered by divine providence for his instruction. In like frequent cawing of crows one might say that it will rain manner Eliezer listened to the damsel’s words, having pre- soon. viously prayed to God. Reply to Objection 3. Gedeon listened to the recital Whether divination by drawing lots is unlawful? IIa IIae q. 95 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that divination by draw- tation”; if one seeks to know what is going to happen, ing lots is not unlawful, because a gloss of Augustine on it is called “sortilege of divination.” Now the actions of Ps. 30:16, “My lots are in Thy hands,” says: “It is not man that are required for sortilege and their results are not wrong to cast lots, for it is a means of ascertaining the subject to the dispositions of the stars. Wherefore if any- divine will when a man is in doubt.” one practicing sortilege is so minded as though the hu- Objection 2. There is, seemingly, nothing unlawful man acts requisite for sortilege depended for their result in the observances which the Scriptures relate as being on the dispositions of the stars, his opinion is vain and practiced by holy men. Now both in the Old and in the false, and consequently is not free from the interference New Testament we find holy men practicing the casting of the demons, so that a divination of this kind is supersti- of lots. For it is related (Jos. 7:14, sqq.) that Josue, at the tious and unlawful. Lord’s command, pronounced sentence by lot on Achan Apart from this cause, however, the result of sortile- who had stolen of the anathema. Again Saul, by drawing gious acts must needs be ascribed to chance, or to some lots, found that his son Jonathan had eaten honey (1 Kings directing spiritual cause. If we ascribe it to chance, and 14:58, sqq.): Jonas, when fleeing from the face of the this can only take place in “sortilege of allotment,” it does Lord, was discovered and thrown into the sea (Jonah 1:7, not seem to imply any vice other than vanity, as in the sqq.): Zacharias was chosen by lot to offer incense (Lk. case of persons who, being unable to agree upon the di- 1:9): and the apostles by drawing lots elected Matthias to vision of something or other, are willing to draw lots for the apostleship (Acts 1:26). Therefore it would seem that its division, thus leaving to chance what portion each is to divination by lots is not unlawful. receive. Objection 3. Further, fighting with the fists, or If, on the other hand, the decision by lot be left to a “monomachy,” i.e. single combat as it is called, and trial spiritual cause, it is sometimes ascribed to demons. Thus by fire and water, which are called “popular” trials, seem we read (Ezech. 21:21) that “the king of Babylon stood in to come under the head of sortilege, because something the highway, at the head of two ways, seeking divination, unknown is sought by their means. Yet these practices shuffling arrows; he inquired of the idols, and consulted seem to be lawful, because David is related to have en- entrails”: sortilege of this kind is unlawful, and forbidden gaged in single combat with the Philistine (1 Kings 17:32, by the canons. sqq.). Therefore it would seem that divination by lot is not Sometimes, however, the decision is left to God, ac- unlawful. cording to Prov. 16:33, “Lots are cast into the lap, but On the contrary, It is written in the Decretals (XXVI, they are disposed of by the Lord”: sortilege of this kind is qu. v, can. Sortes): “We decree that the casting of lots, by not wrong in itself, as Augustine declares∗. which means you make up your mind in all your undertak- Yet this may happen to be sinful in four ways. First, ings, and which the Fathers have condemned, is nothing if one have recourse to lots without any necessity: for this but divination and witchcraft. For which reason we wish would seem to amount to tempting God. Hence Ambrose, them to be condemned altogether, and henceforth not to commenting on the words of Lk. 1:8, says: “He that is be mentioned among Christians, and we forbid the prac- chosen by lot is not bound by the judgment of men.” Sec- tice thereof under pain of anathema.” ondly, if even in a case of necessity one were to have re- I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), sortilege con- course to lots without reverence. Hence, on the Acts of the sists, properly speaking, in doing something, that by ob- Apostles, Bede says (Super Act. Apost. i): “But if any- serving the result one may come to the knowledge of one, compelled by necessity, thinks that he ought, after something unknown. If by casting lots one seeks to know the apostles’ example, to consult God by casting lots, let what is to be given to whom, whether it be a possession, him take note that the apostles themselves did not do so, an honor, a dignity, a punishment, or some action or other, except after calling together the assembly of the brethren it is called “sortilege of allotment”; if one seeks to know and pouring forth prayer to God.” Thirdly, if the Divine what ought to be done, it is called “sortilege of consul- oracles be misapplied to earthly business. Hence Augus- ∗ Enarr. ii in Ps. xxx, serm. 2; cf. obj. 1 1649 tine says (ad inquisit. Januar. ii; Ep. lv): “Those who tell on thee, thou couldst not act more justly than in choosing fortunes from the Gospel pages, though it is to be hoped by lot to whom thou shalt give that which thou canst not that they do so rather than have recourse to consulting the give to both.” demons, yet does this custom also displease me, that any- This suffices for the Reply to the First and Second Ob- one should wish to apply the Divine oracles to worldly jections. matters and to the vain things of this life.” Fourthly, if Reply to Objection 3. The trial by hot iron or boiling anyone resort to the drawing of lots in ecclesiastical elec- water is directed to the investigation of someone’s hidden tions, which should be carried out by the inspiration of the sin, by means of something done by a man, and in this it Holy Ghost. Wherefore, as Bede says (Super Act. Apost. agrees with the drawing of lots. But in so far as a miracu- i): “Before Pentecost the ordination of Matthias was de- lous result is expected from God, it surpasses the common cided by lot,” because as yet the fulness of the Holy Ghost generality of sortilege. Hence this kind of trial is rendered was not yet poured forth into the Church: “whereas the unlawful, both because it is directed to the judgment of same deacons were ordained not by lot but by the choice the occult, which is reserved to the divine judgment, and of the disciples.” It is different with earthly honors, which because such like trials are not sanctioned by divine au- are directed to the disposal of earthly things: in elections thority. Hence we read in a decree of Pope Stephen V∗: of this kind men frequently have recourse to lots, even as “The sacred canons do not approve of extorting a con- in the distribution of earthly possessions. fession from anyone by means of the trial by hot iron or If, however, there be urgent necessity it is lawful to boiling water, and no one must presume, by a supersti- seek the divine judgment by casting lots, provided due tious innovation, to practice what is not sanctioned by the reverence be observed. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad teaching of the holy fathers. For it is allowable that public Honor. ccxxviii), “If, at a time of persecution, the minis- crimes should be judged by our authority, after the cul- ters of God do not agree as to which of them is to remain prit has made spontaneous confession, or when witnesses at his post lest all should flee, and which of them is to have been approved, with due regard to the fear of God; flee, lest all die and the Church be forsaken, should there but hidden and unknown crimes must be left to Him Who be no other means of coming to an agreement, so far as I alone knows the hearts of the children of men.” The same can see, they must be chosen by lot.” Again he says (De would seem to apply to the law concerning duels, save Doctr. Christ. xxviii): “If thou aboundest in that which that it approaches nearer to the common kind of sortilege, it behooves thee to give to him who hath not, and which since no miraculous effect is expected thereupon, unless cannot be given to two; should two come to you, neither of the combatants be very unequal in strength or skill. whom surpasses the other either in need or in some claim ∗ II, qu. v., can. Consuluist i 1650 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 96 Of Superstition in Observances (In Four Articles) We must now consider superstition in observances, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Of observances for acquiring knowledge, which are prescribed by the magic art; (2) Of observances for causing alterations in certain bodies; (3) Of observances practiced in fortune-telling; (4) Of wearing sacred words at the neck. Whether it be unlawful to practice the observances of the magic art? IIa IIae q. 96 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not unlawful to tain shapes, and muttering certain strange words, and so practice the observances of the magic art. A thing is said forth. Wherefore this art does not make use of these to be unlawful in two ways. First, by reason of the genus things as causes, but as signs; not however as signs in- of the deed, as murder and theft: secondly, through being stituted by God, as are the sacramental signs. It follows, directed to an evil end, as when a person gives an alms for therefore, that they are empty signs, and consequently a the sake of vainglory. Now the observances of the magic kind of “agreement or covenant made with the demons for art are not evil as to the genus of the deed, for they consist the purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens”‡. in certain fasts and prayers to God; moreover, they are di- Wherefore the magic art is to be absolutely repudiated and rected to a good end, namely, the acquisition of science. avoided by Christian, even as other arts of vain and nox- Therefore it is not unlawful to practice these observances. ious superstition, as Augustine declares (De Doctr. Christ. Objection 2. Further, it is written (Dan. 1:17) that ii, 23). This art is also useless for the acquisition of sci- “to the children” who abstained, “God gave knowledge, ence. For since it is not intended by means of this art to and understanding in every book, and wisdom.” Now the acquire science in a manner connatural to man, namely, observances of the magic art consist in certain fasts and by discovery and instruction, the consequence is that this abstinences. Therefore it seems that this art achieves its effect is expected either from God or from the demons. results through God: and consequently it is not unlawful Now it is certain that some have received wisdom and sci- to practice it. ence infused into them by God, as related of Solomon (3 Objection 3. Further, seemingly, as stated above Kings 3 and 2 Paralip 1). Moreover, our Lord said to His (a. 1), the reason why it is wrong to inquire of the demons disciples (Lk. 21:15): “I will give you a mouth and wis- concerning the future is because they have no knowledge dom, which all your adversaries shall not be able to resist of it, this knowledge being proper to God. Yet the demons and gainsay.” However, this gift is not granted to all, or in know scientific truths: because sciences are about things connection with any particular observance, but according necessary and invariable, and such things are subject to to the will of the Holy Ghost, as stated in 1 Cor. 12:8, human knowledge, and much more to the knowledge of “To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, demons, who are of keener intellect, as Augustine says∗. to another the word of knowledge, according to the same Therefore it seems to be no sin to practice the magic art, Spirit,” and afterwards it is said (1 Cor. 12:11): “All these even though it achieve its result through the demons. things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every- On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10,11): one according as He will.” On the other hand it does not “Neither let there be found among you. . . anyone. . . that belong to the demons to enlighten the intellect, as stated seeketh the truth from the dead”: which search relies on in the Ia, q. 109, a. 3. Now the acquisition of knowledge the demons’ help. Now through the observances of the and wisdom is effected by the enlightening of the intellect, magic art, knowledge of the truth is sought “by means of wherefore never did anyone acquire knowledge by means certain signs agreed upon by compact with the demons”†. of the demons. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 9): Therefore it is unlawful to practice the notary art. “Porphyry confesses that the intellectual soul is in no way I answer that, The magic art is both unlawful and cleansed by theurgic inventions,” i.e. the operations “of futile. It is unlawful, because the means it employs for the demons, so as to be fitted to see its God, and discern acquiring knowledge have not in themselves the power what is true,” such as are all scientific conclusions. The to cause science, consisting as they do in gazing cer- demons may, however, be able by speaking to men to ex- ∗ Gen. ad lit. ii, 17; De Divin. Daemon. 3,4 † Augustine, De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20; see above q. 92, a. 2 ‡ Augustine, De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20; see above q. 92, a. 2 1651 press in words certain teachings of the sciences, but this Gentiles. Hence as a reward for their obedience they re-is not what is sought by means of magic. ceived knowledge from God, according to Ps. 118:100, Reply to Objection 1. It is a good thing to acquire “I have had understanding above the ancients, because I knowledge, but it is not good to acquire it by undue have sought Thy commandments.” means, and it is to this end that the magic art tends. Reply to Objection 3. To seek knowledge of the fu- Reply to Objection 2. The abstinence of these chil- ture from the demons is a sin not only because they are dren was not in accordance with a vain observance of ignorant of the future, but also on account of the fellow- the notary art, but according to the authority of the di- ship entered into with them, which also applies to the case vine law, for they refused to be defiled by the meat of in point. Whether observances directed to the alteration of bodies, as for the purpose of acquir-IIa IIae q. 96 a. 2 ing health or the like, are unlawful? Objection 1. It would seem that observances directed Civ. Dei xxi, 6): “The demons are allured by means of to the alteration of bodies, as for the purpose of acquiring creatures, which were made, not by them, but by God. health, or the like, are lawful. It is lawful to make use They are enticed by various objects differing according to of the natural forces of bodies in order to produce their the various things in which they delight, not as animals proper effects. Now in the physical order things have cer- by meat, but as spirits by signs, such as are to each one’s tain occult forces, the reason of which man is unable to as- liking, by means of various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, sign; for instance that the magnet attracts iron, and many animals, songs and rites.” like instances, all of which Augustine enumerates (De Civ. Reply to Objection 1. There is nothing superstitious Dei xxi, 5,7). Therefore it would seem lawful to employ or unlawful in employing natural things simply for the such like forces for the alteration of bodies. purpose of causing certain effects such as they are thought Objection 2. Further, artificial bodies are subject to to have the natural power of producing. But if in addition the heavenly bodies, just as natural bodies are. Now nat- there be employed certain characters, words, or any other ural bodies acquire certain occult forces resulting from vain observances which clearly have no efficacy by nature, their species through the influence of the heavenly bod- it will be superstitious and unlawful. ies. Therefore artificial bodies, e.g. images, also acquire Reply to Objection 2. The natural forces of natural from the heavenly bodies a certain occult force for the bodies result from their substantial forms which they ac- production of certain effects. Therefore it is not unlawful quire through the influence of heavenly bodies; where- to make use of them and of such like things. fore through this same influence they acquire certain ac- Objection 3. Further, the demons too are able to alter tive forces. On the other hand the forms of artificial bod- bodies in many ways, as Augustine states (De Trin. iii, ies result from the conception of the craftsman; and since 8,9). But their power is from God. Therefore it is lawful they are nothing else but composition, order and shape, to make use of their power for the purpose of producing as stated in Phys. i, 5, they cannot have a natural active these alterations. force. Consequently, no force accrues to them from the On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. influence of heavenly bodies, in so far as they are arti- ii, 20) that “to superstition belong the experiments of ficial, but only in respect of their natural matter. Hence magic arts, amulets and nostrums condemned by the med- it is false, what Porphyry held, according to Augustine ical faculty, consisting either of incantations or of certain (De Civ. Dei x, 11), that “by herbs, stones, animals, cer- cyphers which they call characters, or of any kind of thing tain particular sounds, words, shapes and devices, or again worn or fastened on.” by certain movements of the stars observed in the course I answer that, In things done for the purpose of pro- of the heavens it is possible for men to fashion on earth ducing some bodily effect we must consider whether they forces capable of carrying into effect the various disposi- seem able to produce that effect naturally: for if so it will tions of the stars,” as though the results of the magic arts not be unlawful to do so, since it is lawful to employ nat- were to be ascribed to the power of the heavenly bodies. ural causes in order to produce their proper effects. But, In fact as Augustine adds (De Civ. Dei x, 11), “all these if they seem unable to produce those effects naturally, it things are to be ascribed to the demons, who delude the follows that they are employed for the purpose of produc- souls that are subject to them.” ing those effects, not as causes but only as signs, so that Wherefore those images called astronomical also de- they come under the head of “compact by tokens entered rive their efficacy from the actions of the demons: a sign into with the demons”∗. Wherefore Augustine says (De of this is that it is requisite to inscribe certain characters on ∗ Augustine, De Doctr. Christ.; see above q. 92, a. 2 1652 them which do not conduce to any effect naturally, since Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to the domain of the shape is not a principle of natural action. Yet astronom- divine majesty, to Whom the demons are subject, that God ical images differ from necromantic images in this, that should employ them to whatever purpose He will. But the latter include certain explicit invocations and trick- man has not been entrusted with power over the demons, ery, wherefore they come under the head of explicit agree- to employ them to whatsoever purpose he will; on the con- ments made with the demons: whereas in the other images trary, it is appointed that he should wage war against the there are tacit agreements by means of tokens in certain demons. Hence in no way is it lawful for man to make use shapes or characters. of the demons’ help by compacts either tacit or express. Whether observances directed to the purpose of fortune-telling are unlawful? IIa IIae q. 96 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that observances directed malice of the demons, who strive to entangle men’s minds to the purpose of fortune-telling are not unlawful. Sick- with such like trifles. Accordingly it is evident that all ness is one of the misfortunes that occur to man. Now these observances are superstitious and unlawful: they are sickness in man is preceded by certain symptoms, which apparently remains of idolatry, which authorized the ob- the physician observes. Therefore it seems not unlawful servance of auguries, of lucky and unlucky days which is to observe such like signs. allied to divination by the stars, in respect of which one Objection 2. Further, it is unreasonable to deny that day differentiated from another: except that these obser- which nearly everybody experiences. Now nearly every- vances are devoid of reason and art, wherefore they are one experiences that certain times, or places, hearing of yet more vain and superstitious. certain words meetings of men or animals, uncanny or Reply to Objection 1. The causes of sickness are ungainly actions, are presages of good or evil to come. seated in us, and they produce certain signs of sickness Therefore it seems not unlawful to observe these things. to come, which physicians lawfully observe. Wherefore Objection 3. Further, human actions and occurrences it is not unlawful to consider a presage of future events as are disposed by divine providence in a certain order: and proceeding from its cause; as when a slave fears a flogging this order seems to require that precedent events should when he sees his master’s anger. Possibly the same might be signs of subsequent occurrences: wherefore, according be said if one were to fear for child lest it take harm from to the Apostle (1 Cor. 10:6), the things that happened to the evil eye, of which we have spoken in the Ia, q. 117, the fathers of old are signs of those that take place in our a. 3, ad 2. But this does not apply to this kind of obser- time. Now it is not unlawful to observe the order that pro- vances. ceeds from divine providence. Therefore it is seemingly Reply to Objection 2. That men have at first expe- not unlawful to observe these presages. rienced a certain degree of truth in these observances is On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. due to chance. But afterwards when a man begins to ii, 20) that “a thousand vain observances are comprised entangle his mind with observances of this kind, many under the head of compacts entered into with the demons: things occur in connection with them through the trick- for instance, the twitching of a limb; a stone, a dog, or ery of the demons, “so that men, through being entangled a boy coming between friends walking together; kicking in these observances, become yet more curious, and more the door-post when anyone passes in front of one’s house; and more embroiled in the manifold snares of a pernicious to go back to bed if you happen to sneeze while putting on error,” as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23). your shoes; to return home if you trip when going forth; Reply to Objection 3. Among the Jewish people of when the rats have gnawed a hole in your clothes, to fear whom Christ was to be born, not only words but also superstitiously a future evil rather than to regret the actual deeds were prophetic, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. damage.” iv, 2; xxii, 24). Wherefore it is lawful to apply those deeds I answer that, Men attend to all these observances, to our instruction, as signs given by God. Not all things, not as causes but as signs of future events, good or evil. however, that occur through divine providence are ordered Nor do they observe them as signs given by God, since so as to be signs of the future. Hence the argument does these signs are brought forward, not on divine authority, not prove. but rather by human vanity with the cooperation of the 1653 Whether it is unlawful to wear divine words at the neck? IIa IIae q. 96 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not unlawful something unlawful. Hence Chrysostom says† that “many to wear divine words at the neck. Divine words are no now after the example of the Pharisees who enlarged their less efficacious when written than when uttered. But it fringes, invent and write Hebrew names of angels, and is lawful to utter sacred words for the purpose of pro- fasten them to their persons. Such things seem fearsome ducing certain effects; (for instance, in order to heal the to those who do not understand them.” Again, one should sick), such as the “Our Father” or the “Hail Mary,” or in take care lest it contain anything false, because in that case any way whatever to call on the Lord’s name, according also the effect could not be ascribed to God, Who does not to Mk. 16:17,18, “In My name they shall cast out dev- bear witness to a falsehood. ils, they shall speak with new tongues, they shall take up In the second place, one should beware lest besides serpents.” Therefore it seems to be lawful to wear sacred the sacred words it contain something vain, for instance words at one’s neck, as a remedy for sickness or for any certain written characters, except the sign of the Cross; or kind of distress. if hope be placed in the manner of writing or fastening, Objection 2. Further, sacred words are no less effica- or in any like vanity, having no connection with reverence cious on the human body than on the bodies of serpents for God, because this would be pronounced superstitious: and other animals. Now certain incantations are effica- otherwise, however, it is lawful. Hence it is written in the cious in checking serpents, or in healing certain other an- Decretals (XXVI, qu. v, cap. Non liceat Christianis): “In imals: wherefore it is written (Ps. 57:5): “Their madness blending together medicinal herbs, it is not lawful to make is according to the likeness of a serpent, like the deaf asp use of observances or incantations, other than the divine that stoppeth her ears, which will not hear the voice of the symbol, or the Lord’s Prayer, so as to give honor to none charmers, nor of the wizard that charmeth wisely.” There- but God the Creator of all.” fore it is lawful to wear sacred words as a remedy for men. Reply to Objection 1. It is indeed lawful to pro- Objection 3. Further, God’s word is no less holy than nounce divine words, or to invoke the divine name, if one the relics of the saints; wherefore Augustine says (Lib. L. do so with a mind to honor God alone, from Whom the Hom. xxvi) that “God’s word is of no less account than result is expected: but it is unlawful if it be done in con- the Body of Christ.” Now it is lawful for one to wear the nection with any vain observance. relics of the saints at one’s neck, or to carry them about Reply to Objection 2. Even in the case of incantations one in any way for the purpose of self-protection. There- of serpents or any animals whatever, if the mind attend ex- fore it is equally lawful to have recourse to the words of clusively to the sacred words and to the divine power, it Holy Writ, whether uttered or written, for one’s protec- will not be unlawful. Such like incantations, however, of- tion. ten include unlawful observances, and rely on the demons Objection 4. On the other hand, Chrysostom says for their result, especially in the case of serpents, because (Hom. xliii in Matth.)∗: “Some wear round their necks a the serpent was the first instrument employed by the devil passage in writing from the Gospel. Yet is not the Gospel in order to deceive man. Hence a gloss on the passage read in church and heard by all every day? How then, if it quoted says: “Note that Scripture does not commend ev- does a man no good to have the Gospels in his ears, will erything whence it draws its comparisons, as in the case of he find salvation by wearing them round his neck? More- the unjust judge who scarcely heard the widow’s request.” over, where is the power of the Gospel? In the shapes of Reply to Objection 3. The same applies to the wear- the letters or in the understanding of the sense? If in the ing of relics, for if they be worn out of confidence in God, shapes, you do well to wear them round your neck; if in and in the saints whose relics they are, it will not be un- the understanding, you will then do better to bear them in lawful. But if account were taken in this matter of some your heart than to wear them round your neck.” vain circumstance (for instance that the casket be three- I answer that, In every incantation or wearing of writ- cornered, or the like, having no bearing on the reverence ten words, two points seem to demand caution. The first due to God and the saints), it would be superstitious and is the thing said or written, because if it is connected with unlawful. invocation of the demons it is clearly superstitious and un- Reply to Objection 4. Chrysostom is speaking the lawful. In like manner it seems that one should beware case in which more attention is paid the written characters lest it contain strange words, for fear that they conceal than to the understanding of the words. ∗ Cf. the Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum, among St. Chrysostom’s works, and falsely ascribed to him † Cf. the Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum, among St. Chrysostom’s works, falsely ascribed to him 1654 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 97 Of the Temptation of God (In Four Articles) We must now consider the vices that are opposed to religion, through lack of religion, and which are manifestly contrary thereto, so that they come under the head of irreligion. Such are the vices which pertain to contempt or irreverence for God and holy things. Accordingly we shall consider: (1) Vices pertaining directly to irreverence for God; (2) Vices pertaining to irreverence for holy things. With regard to the first we shall consider the temptation whereby God is tempted, and perjury, whereby God’s name is taken with irreverence. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) In what the temptation of God consists; (2) Whether it is a sin? (3) To what virtue it is opposed; (4) Of its comparison with other vices. Whether the temptation of God consists in certain deeds, wherein the expected result IIa IIae q. 97 a. 1 is ascribed to the power of God alone? Objection 1. It would seem that the temptation of tempt God when it has to strive to escape from that which God does not consist in certain deeds wherein the result it needs to avoid.” From this it would seem that the temp- is expected from the power of God alone. Just as God tation of God consists in omitting to do what one can in is tempted by man so is man tempted by God, man, and order to escape from danger, and relying on the assistance demons. But when man is tempted the result is not al- of God alone. ways expected from his power. Therefore neither is God I answer that, Properly speaking, to tempt is to test tempted when the result is expected from His power alone. the person tempted. Now we put a person to the test Objection 2. Further, all those who work miracles by by words or by deeds. By words, that we may find out invoking the divine name look for an effect due to God’s whether he knows what we ask, or whether he can and power alone. Therefore, if the temptation of God con- will grant it: by deeds, when, by what we do, we probe sisted in such like deeds, all who work miracles would another’s prudence, will or power. Either of these may tempt God. happen in two ways. First, openly, as when one declares Objection 3. Further, it seems to belong to man’s oneself a tempter: thus Samson (Judges 14:12) proposed perfection that he should put aside human aids and put a riddle to the Philistines in order to tempt them. In the his hope in God alone. Hence Ambrose, commenting on second place it may be done with cunning and by stealth, Lk. 9:3, “Take nothing for your journey,” etc. says: “The as the Pharisees tempted Christ, as we read in Mat. 22:15, Gospel precept points out what is required of him that an- sqq. Again this is sometimes done explicitly, as when any- nounces the kingdom of God, namely, that he should not one intends, by word or deed, to put some person to the depend on worldly assistance, and that, taking assurance test; and sometimes implicitly, when, to wit, though he from his faith, he should hold himself to be the more able does not intend to test a person, yet that which he does to provide for himself, the less he seeks these things.” And or says can seemingly have no other purpose than putting the Blessed Agatha said: “I have never treated my body him to a test. with bodily medicine, I have my Lord Jesus Christ, Who Accordingly, man tempts God sometimes by words, restores all things by His mere word.”∗ But the temptation sometimes by deeds. Now we speak with God in words of God does not consist in anything pertaining to perfec- when we pray. Hence a man tempts God explicitly in his tion. Therefore the temptation of God does not consist prayers when he asks something of God with the intention in such like deeds, wherein the help of God alone is ex- of probing God’s knowledge, power or will. He tempts pected. God explicitly by deeds when he intends, by whatever he On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, does, to experiment on God’s power, good will or wis- 36): “Christ who gave proof of God’s power by teaching dom. But He will tempt God implicitly, if, though he does and reproving openly, yet not allowing the rage of His en- not intend to make an experiment on God, yet he asks for emies to prevail against Him, nevertheless by fleeing and or does something which has no other use than to prove hiding, instructed human weakness, lest it should dare to God’s power, goodness or knowledge. Thus when a man ∗ Office of St. Agatha, eighth Responsory (Dominican Breviary). 1655 wishes his horse to gallop in order to escape from the en-Reply to Objection 2. When saints work miracles by emy, this is not giving the horse a trial: but if he make their prayers, they are moved by a motive of necessity or the horse gallop with out any useful purpose, it seems to usefulness to ask for that which is an effect of the divine be nothing else than a trial of the horse’s speed; and the power. same applies to all other things. Accordingly when a man Reply to Objection 3. The preachers of God’s king- in his prayers or deeds entrusts himself to the divine assis- dom dispense with temporal aids, so as to be freer to give tance for some urgent or useful motive, this is not to tempt their time to the word of God: wherefore if they depend God: for it is written (2 Paralip 20:12): “As we know not on God alone, it does not follow that they tempt God. But what to do, we can only turn our eyes to Thee.” But if if they were to neglect human assistance without any use- this be done without any useful or urgent motive, this is ful or urgent motive, they would be tempting God. Hence to tempt God implicitly. Wherefore a gloss on Dt. 6:16, Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 36) says that “Paul fled, “Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God,” says: “A man not through ceasing to believe in God, but lest he should tempts God, if having the means at hand, without reason tempt God, were he not to flee when he had the means he chooses a dangerous course, trying whether he can be of flight.” The Blessed Agatha had experience of God’s delivered by God.” kindness towards her, so that either she did not suffer such Reply to Objection 1. Man also is sometimes tempted sickness as required bodily medicine, or else she felt her- by means of deeds, to test his ability or knowledge or will self suddenly cured by God. to uphold or oppose those same deeds. Whether it is a sin to tempt God? IIa IIae q. 97 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not a sin to tempt I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), to tempt a per-God. For God has not commanded sin. Yet He has com- son is to put him to a test. Now one never tests that of manded men to try, which is the same as to tempt, Him: which one is certain. Wherefore all temptation proceeds for it is written (Malach. 3:10): “Bring all the tithes into from some ignorance or doubt, either in the tempter (as the storehouse, that there may be meat in My house; and when one tests a thing in order to know its qualities), or try Me in this, saith the Lord, if I open not unto you the in others (as when one tests a thing in order to prove it flood-gates of heaven.” Therefore it seems not to be a sin to others), and in this latter way God is said to tempt us. to tempt God. Now it is a sin to be ignorant of or to doubt that which Objection 2. Further, a man is tempted not only in pertains to God’s perfection. Wherefore it is evident that order to test his knowledge and his power, but also to try it is a sin to tempt God in order that the tempter himself his goodness or his will. Now it is lawful to test the di- may know God’s power. vine goodness or will, for it is written (Ps. 33:9): “O taste On the other hand, if one were to test that which per- and see that the Lord is sweet,” and (Rom. 12:2): “That tains to the divine perfection, not in order to know it one- you may prove what is the good, and the acceptable, and self, but to prove it to others: this is not tempting God, the perfect will of God.” Therefore it is not a sin to tempt provided there be just motive of urgency, or a pious mo- God. tive of usefulness, and other requisite conditions. For thus Objection 3. Further, Scripture never blames a man did the apostles ask the Lord that signs might be wrought for ceasing from sin, but rather for committing a sin. Now in the name of Jesus Christ, as related in Acts 4:30, in or- Achaz is blamed because when the Lord said: “Ask thee a der, to wit, that Christ’s power might be made manifest to sign of the Lord thy God,” he replied: “I will not ask, and unbelievers. I will not tempt the Lord,” and then it was said to him: “Is Reply to Objection 1. The paying of tithes was pre- it a small thing for you to be grievous to men, that you are scribed in the Law, as stated above (q. 87, a. 1). Hence grievous to my God also?” (Is. 7:11-13). And we read of there was a motive of urgency to pay it, through the obli- Abraham (Gn. 15:8) that he said to the Lord: “Whereby gation of the Law, and also a motive of usefulness, as may I know that I shall possess it?” namely, the land stated in the text quoted—“that there may be meat in which God had promised him. Again Gedeon asked God God’s house”: wherefore they did not tempt God by pay- for a sign of the victory promised to him (Judges 6:36, ing tithes. The words that follow, “and try Me,” are not to sqq.). Yet they were not blamed for so doing. Therefore it be understood causally, as though they had to pay tithes is not a sin to tempt God. in order to try if “God would open the flood-gates of On the contrary, It is forbidden in God’s Law, for it heaven,” but consecutively, because, to wit, if they paid is written (Dt. 6:10): “Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy tithes, they would prove by experience the favors which God.” God would shower upon them. 1656 Reply to Objection 2. There is a twofold knowledge him to do so, and because it was a matter relating to the of God’s goodness or will. One is speculative and as to common good. Abraham asked for a sign through the this it is not lawful to doubt or to prove whether God’s will divine instinct, and so he did not sin. Gedeon seems to be good, or whether God is sweet. The other knowledge have asked a sign through weakness of faith, wherefore of God’s will or goodness is effective or experimental and he is not to be excused from sin, as a gloss observes: thereby a man experiences in himself the taste of God’s just as Zachary sinned in saying to the angel (Lk. 1:18): sweetness, and complacency in God’s will, as Dionysius “Whereby shall I know this?” so that he was punished for says of Hierotheos (Div. Nom. ii) that “he learnt divine his unbelief. thing through experience of them.” It is in this way that we It must be observed, however, that there are two ways are told to prove God’s will, and to taste His sweetness. of asking God for a sign: first in order to test God’s power Reply to Objection 3. God wished to give a sign to or the truth of His word, and this of its very nature per- Achaz, not for him alone, but for the instruction of the tains to the temptation of God. Secondly, in order to be whole people. Hence he was reproved because, by re- instructed as to what is God’s pleasure in some particular fusing to ask a sign, he was an obstacle to the common matter; and this nowise comes under the head of tempta- welfare. Nor would he have tempted God by asking, both tion of God. because he would have asked through God commanding Whether temptation of God is opposed to the virtue of religion? IIa IIae q. 97 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the temptation of God opposed to religion. Now it is evident that to tempt a per- is not opposed to the virtue of religion. The temptation of son pertains to irreverence for him: since no one presumes God is sinful, because a man doubts God, as stated above to tempt one of whose excellence he is sure. Hence it is (a. 2). Now doubt about God comes under the head of un- manifest that to tempt God is a sin opposed to religion. belief, which is opposed to faith. Therefore temptation of Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 81, a. 7), it God is opposed to faith rather than to religion. belongs to religion to declare one’s faith by certain signs Objection 2. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 18:23): indicative of reverence towards God. Consequently it be- “Before prayer prepare thy soul, and be not as a man that longs to irreligion that, through doubtful faith, a man does tempteth God. Such a man,” that is, who tempts God, things indicative of irreverence towards God. To tempt says the interlinear gloss, “prays for what God taught him God is one of these; wherefore it is a species of irreligion. to pray for, yet does not what God has commanded him to Reply to Objection 2. He that prepares not his soul do.” Now this pertains to imprudence which is opposed to before prayer by forgiving those against whom he has any- hope. Therefore it seems that temptation of God is a sin thing, or in some other way disposing himself to devotion, opposed to hope. does not do what he can to be heard by God, wherefore he Objection 3. Further, a gloss on Ps. 77:18, “And they tempts God implicitly as it were. And though this im- tempted God in their hearts,” says that “to tempt God is to plicit temptation would seem to arise from presumption pray to Him deceitfully, with simplicity in our words and or indiscretion, yet the very fact that a man behaves pre- wickedness in our hearts.” Now deceit is opposed to the sumptuously and without due care in matters relating to virtue of truth. Therefore temptation of God is opposed, God implies irreverence towards Him. For it is written not to religion, but to truth. (1 Pet. 5:6): “Be you humbled. . . under the mighty hand On the contrary, According to the gloss quoted above of God,” and (2 Tim. 2:15): “Carefully study to present “to tempt God is to pray to Him inordinately.” Now to thyself approved unto God.” Therefore also this kind of pray to God becomingly is an act of religion as stated temptation is a species of irreligion. above (q. 83, a. 15). Therefore to tempt God is a sin op- Reply to Objection 3. A man is said to pray deceit- posed to religion. fully, not in relation to God, Who knows the secrets of the I answer that, As clearly shown above (q. 81, a. 5), heart, but in relation to man. Wherefore deceit is acciden- the end of religion is to pay reverence to God. Where- tal to the temptation of God, and consequently it does not fore whatever pertains directly to irreverence for God is follow that to tempt God is directly opposed to the truth. 1657 Whether the temptation of God is a graver sin than superstition? IIa IIae q. 97 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the temptation of God more grievous is that which is the more opposed to the is a graver sin than superstition. The greater sin receives reverence due to God. Now it is less opposed to this rev- the greater punishment. Now the sin of tempting God was erence that one should doubt the divine excellence than more severely punished in the Jews than was the sin of that one should hold the contrary for certain. For just as idolatry; and yet the latter is the chief form of superstition: a man is more of an unbeliever if he be confirmed in his since for the sin of idolatry three thousand men of their error, than if he doubt the truth of faith, so, too, a man acts number were slain, as related in Ex. 32:28∗, whereas for more against the reverence due to God, if by his deeds he the sin of temptation they all without exception perished professes an error contrary to the divine excellence, than in the desert, and entered not into the land of promise, if he expresses a doubt. Now the superstitious man pro- according to Ps. 94:9, “Your fathers tempted Me,” and fesses an error, as shown above (q. 94, a. 1, ad 1), whereas further on, “so I swore in My wrath that they should not he who tempts God by words or deeds expresses a doubt enter into My rest.” Therefore to tempt God is a graver sin of the divine excellence, as stated above (a. 2). Therefore than superstition. the sin of superstition is graver than the sin of tempting Objection 2. Further, the more a sin is opposed to God. virtue the graver it would seem to be. Now irreligion, Reply to Objection 1. The sin of idolatry was not of which the temptation of God is a species, is more op- punished in the above manner, as though it were a suffi- posed to the virtue of religion, than superstition which cient punishment; because a more severe punishment was bears some likeness to religion. Therefore to tempt God reserved in the future for that sin, for it is written (Ex. is a graver sin than superstition. 32:34): “And I, in the day of revenge, will visit this sin Objection 3. Further, it seems to be a greater sin to also of theirs.” behave disrespectfully to one’s parents, than to pay others Reply to Objection 2. Superstition bears a likeness to the respect we owe to our parents. Now God should be religion, as regards the material act which it pays just as honored by us as the Father of all (Malach. 1:6). There- religion does. But, as regards the end, it is more contrary fore. temptation of God whereby we behave irreverently to religion than the temptation of God, since it implies to God, seems to be a greater sin than idolatry, whereby greater irreverence for God, as stated. we give to a creature the honor we owe to God. Reply to Objection 3. It belongs essentially to the On the contrary, A gloss on Dt. 17:2, “When there divine excellence that it is singular and incommunicable. shall be found among you,” etc. says: “The Law detests Consequently to give divine reverence to another is the error and idolatry above all: for it is a very great sin to same as to do a thing opposed to the divine excellence. give to a creature the honor that belongs to the Creator.” There is no comparison with the honor due to our parents, I answer that, Among sins opposed to religion, the which can without sin be given to others. ∗ Septuagint version. The Vulgate has “twenty-three thousand.” 1658 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 98 Of Perjury (In Four Articles) We must now consider perjury: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether falsehood is necessary for perjury? (2) Whether perjury is always a sin? (3) Whether it is always a mortal sin? (4) Whether it is a sin to enjoin an oath on a perjurer? Whether it is necessary for perjury that the statement confirmed on oath be false? IIa IIae q. 98 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not necessary from falsehood. Consequently falsehood is essential to for perjury that the statement confirmed on oath be false. perjury. As stated above (q. 89, a. 3), an oath should be accompa- Reply to Objection 1. As Jerome says on Jer. 4:2, nied by judgment and justice no less than by truth. Since “whichever of these three be lacking, there is perjury,” therefore perjury is incurred through lack of truth, it is but in different order. For first and chiefly perjury con- incurred likewise through lack of judgment, as when one sists in a lack of truth, for the reason stated in the Article. swears indiscreetly, and through lack of justice, as when Secondly, there is perjury when justice is lacking, for in one swears to something unjust. whatever way a man swears to that which is unlawful, for Objection 2. Further, that which confirms is more this very reason he is guilty of falsehood, since he is under weighty than the thing confirmed thereby: thus in a syllo- an obligation to do the contrary. Thirdly, there is perjury gism the premises are more weighty than the conclusion. when judgment is lacking, since by the very fact that a Now in an oath a man’s statement is confirmed by calling man swears indiscreetly, he incurs the danger of lapsing on the name of God. Therefore perjury seems to consist into falsehood. in swearing by false gods rather than in a lack of truth in Reply to Objection 2. In syllogisms the premises are the human statement which is confirmed on oath. of greater weight, since they are in the position of active Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Verb. principle, as stated in Phys. ii, 3: whereas in moral matters Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): “Men swear falsely both in the end is of greater importance than the active principle. deceiving others and when they are deceived themselves”; Hence though it is a perverse oath when a man swears to and he gives three examples. The first is: “Supposing the truth by false gods, yet perjury takes its name from a man to swear, thinking that what he swears to is true, that kind of perversity in an oath, that deprives the oath of whereas it is false”; the second is: “Take the instance of its end, by swearing what is false. another who knows the statement to be false, and swears Reply to Objection 3. Moral acts proceed from the to it as though it were true”; and the third is: “Take an- will, whose object is the apprehended good. Wherefore other, who thinks his statement false, and swears to its if the false be apprehended as true, it will be materially being true, while perhaps it is true,” of whom he says af- false, but formally true, as related to the will. If some- terwards that he is a perjurer. Therefore one may be a thing false be apprehended as false, it will be false both perjurer while swearing to the truth. Therefore falsehood materially and formally. If that which is true be appre- is not necessary for perjury. hended as false, it will be materially true, and formally On the contrary, Perjury is defined “a falsehood con- false. Hence in each of these cases the conditions required firmed by oath”∗. for perjury are to be found in some way, on account of I answer that, As stated above (q. 92, a. 2), moral acts some measure of falsehood. Since, however, that which take their species from their end. Now the end of an oath is formal in anything is of greater importance than that is the confirmation of a human assertion. To this confirma- which is material, he that swears to a falsehood thinking tion falsehood is opposed: since an assertion is confirmed it true is not so much of a perjurer as he that swears to by being firmly shown to be true; and this cannot happen the truth thinking it false. For Augustine says (De Verb. to that which is false. Hence falsehood directly annuls Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): “It depends how the asser- the end of an oath: and for this reason, that perversity in tion proceeds from the mind, for the tongue is not guilty swearing, which is called perjury, takes its species chiefly except the mind be guilty.” ∗ Hugh of St. Victor, Sum. Sent. iv, 5 1659 Whether all perjury is sinful? IIa IIae q. 98 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that not all perjury is sin- to call Him to witness to a falsehood, because by so doing ful. Whoever does not fulfil what he has confirmed on one implies either that God ignores the truth or that He is oath is seemingly a perjurer. Yet sometimes a man swears willing to bear witness to a falsehood. Therefore perjury he will do something unlawful (adultery, for instance, or is manifestly a sin opposed to religion, to which it belongs murder): and if he does it, he commits a sin. If there- to show reverence to God. fore he would commit a sin even if he did it not, it would Reply to Objection 1. He that swears to do what is follow that he is perplexed. unlawful is thereby guilty of perjury through lack of jus- Objection 2. Further, no man sins by doing what is tice: though, if he fails to keep his oath, he is not guilty best. Yet sometimes by committing a perjury one does of perjury in this respect, since that which he swore to do what is best: as when a man swears not to enter religion, was not a fit matter of an oath. or not to do some kind of virtuous deed. Therefore not all Reply to Objection 2. A person who swears not to perjury is sinful. enter religion, or not to give an alms, or the like, is guilty Objection 3. Further, he that swears to do another’s of perjury through lack of judgment. Hence when he does will would seem to be guilty of perjury unless he do it. that which is best it is not an act of perjury, but contrary Yet it may happen sometimes that he sins not, if he do not thereto: for the contrary of that which he is doing could the man’s will: for instance, if the latter order him to do not be a matter of an oath. something too hard and unbearable. Therefore seemingly Reply to Objection 3. When one man swears or not all perjury is sinful. promises to do another’s will, there is to be understood Objection 4. Further, a promissory oath extends to fu- this requisite condition—that the thing commanded be ture, just as a declaratory oath extends to past and present lawful and virtuous, and not unbearable or immoderate. things. Now the obligation of an oath may be removed Reply to Objection 4. An oath is a personal act, and by some future occurrence: thus a state may swear to ful- so when a man becomes a citizen of a state, he is not fil some obligation, and afterwards other citizens come bound, as by oath, to fulfil whatever the state has sworn on the scene who did not take the oath; or a canon may to do. Yet he is bound by a kind of fidelity, the nature swear to keep the statutes of a certain church, and after- of which obligation is that he should take his share of the wards new statutes are made. Therefore seemingly he that state’s burdens if he takes a share of its goods. breaks an oath does not sin. The canon who swears to keep the statutes that have On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. force in some particular “college” is not bound by his oath Jacobi; Serm. cxxx), in speaking of perjury: “See how to keep any that may be made in the future, unless he in- you should detest this horrible beast and exterminate it tends to bind himself to keep all, past and future. Never- from all human business.” theless he is bound to keep them by virtue of the statutes I answer that, As stated above (q. 89, a. 1), to swear themselves, since they are possessed of coercive force, as is to call God as witness. Now it is an irreverence to God stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 96, a. 4). Whether all perjury is a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 98 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that not all perjury is a thing to swear by God than by the Gospels.” Now it is not mortal sin. It is laid down (Extra, De Jurejur, cap. Verum): always a mortal sin to swear by God to something false; “Referring to the question whether an oath is binding on for instance, if we were to employ such an oath in fun or those who have taken one in order to safeguard their life by a slip of the tongue in the course of an ordinary conver- and possessions, we have no other mind than that which sation. Therefore neither is it always a mortal sin to break our predecessors the Roman Pontiffs are known to have an oath that has been taken solemnly on the Gospels. had, and who absolved such persons from the obligations Objection 3. Further, according to the Law a man in- of their oath. Henceforth, that discretion may be observed, curs infamy through committing perjury (VI, qu. i, cap. and in order to avoid occasions of perjury, let them not be Infames). Now it would seem that infamy is not incurred told expressly not to keep their oath: but if they should through any kind of perjury, as it is prescribed in the case not keep it, they are not for this reason to be punished as of a declaratory oath violated by perjury†. Therefore, for a mortal sin.” Therefore not all perjury is a mortal sin. seemingly, not all perjury is a mortal sin. obj. 2. Further, as Chrysostom∗ says, “it is a greater On the contrary, Every sin that is contrary to a divine ∗ Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum on St. Matthew, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom † Cap. Cum dilectus, de Ord. Cognit. 1660 precept is a mortal sin. Now perjury is contrary to a diment is to be inflicted on them. vine precept, for it is written (Lev. 19:12): “Thou shalt Reply to Objection 2. He that swears falsely in fun is not swear falsely by My name.” Therefore it is a mortal nonetheless irreverent to God, indeed, in a way, he is more sin. so, and consequently is not excused from mortal sin. He I answer that, According to the teaching of the that swears falsely by a slip of tongue, if he adverts to the Philosopher (Poster. i, 2), “that which causes a thing to be fact that he is swearing, and that he is swearing to some- such is yet more so.” Now we know that an action which thing false, is not excused from mortal sin, as neither is is, by reason of its very nature, a venial sin, or even a good he excused from contempt of God. If, however, he does action, is a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt of God. not advert to this, he would seem to have no intention of Wherefore any action that of its nature, implies contempt swearing, and consequently is excused from the sin of per- of God is a mortal sin. Now perjury, of its very nature jury. implies contempt of God, since, as stated above (a. 2), the It is, however, a more grievous sin to swear solemnly reason why it is sinful is because it is an act of irreverence by the Gospels, than to swear by God in ordinary conver- towards God. Therefore it is manifest that perjury, of its sation, both on account of scandal and on account of the very nature, is a mortal sin. greater deliberation. But if we consider them equally in Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 89, a. 7, comparison with one another, it is more grievous to com- ad 3), coercion does not deprive a promissory oath of its mit perjury in swearing by God than in swearing by the binding force, as regards that which can be done law- Gospels. fully. Wherefore he who fails to fulfil an oath which he Reply to Objection 3. Not every sin makes a man in- took under coercion is guilty of perjury and sins mortally. famous in the eye of the law. Wherefore, if a man who Nevertheless the Sovereign Pontiff can, by his authority, has sworn falsely in a declaratory oath be not infamous in absolve a man from an obligation even of an oath, espe- the eye of the law, but only when he has been so declared cially if the latter should have been coerced into taking the by sentence in a court of law, it does not follow that he oath through such fear as may overcome a high-principled has not sinned mortally. The reason why the law attaches man. infamy rather to one who breaks a promissory oath taken When, however, it is said that these persons are not to solemnly is that he still has it in his power after he has be punished as for a mortal sin, this does not mean that sworn to substantiate his oath, which is not the case in a they are not guilty of mortal sin, but that a lesser punish- declaratory oath. Whether he sins who demands an oath of a perjurer? IIa IIae q. 98 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that he who demands an swear falsely so is it to swear by false gods. Yet it is law- oath of a perjurer commits a sin. Either he knows that ful to take advantage of an oath of one who has sworn he swears truly, or he knows that he swears falsely. If he by false gods, as Augustine says (ad Public. Ep. xlvii). knows him to swear truly, it is useless for him to demand Therefore it is lawful to demand an oath from one who an oath: and if he believes him to swear falsely, for his swears falsely. own part he leads him into sin. Therefore nowise seem- I answer that, As regards a person who demands an ingly should one enjoin an oath on another person. oath from another, a distinction would seem to be neces- Objection 2. Further, to receive an oath from a person sary. For either he demands the oath on his own account is less than to impose an oath on him. Now it would seem and of his own accord, or he demands it on account of unlawful to receive an oath from a person, especially if the exigencies of a duty imposed on him. If a man de- he swear falsely, because he would then seem to consent mands an oath on his own account as a private individual, in his sin. Much less therefore would it seem lawful to we must make a distinction, as does Augustine (de Per- impose an oath on one who swears falsely. juriis. serm. clxxx): “For if he knows not that the man Objection 3. Further, it is written (Lev. 5:1): “If any- will swear falsely, and says to him accordingly: ‘Swear one sin, and hear the voice of one swearing falsely∗, and is to me’ in order that he may be credited, there is no sin: a witness either because he himself hath seen, or is privy yet it is a human temptation” (because, to wit, it proceeds to it: if he do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity.” Hence from his weakness in doubting whether the man will speak it would seem that when a man knows another to be swear- the truth). “This is the evil whereof Our Lord says (Mat. ing falsely, he is bound to denounce him. Therefore it is 5:37): That which is over and above these, is of evil. But not lawful to demand an oath of such a man. if he knows the man to have done so,” i.e. the contrary Objection 4. On the other hand, Just as it is a sin to of what he swears to, “and yet forces him to swear, he is ∗ ‘Falsely’ is not in the Vulgate’ 1661 a murderer: for the other destroys himself by his perjury, Lev, qu. i), Moses in the passage quoted did not state to but it is he who urged the hand of the slayer.” whom one man had to denounce another’s perjury: where- If, on the other hand, a man demands an oath as a pub- fore it must be understood that the matter had to be de- lic person, in accordance with the requirements of the law, nounced “to those who would do the perjurer good rather on the requisition of a third person: he does not seem to than harm.” Again, neither did he state in what order be at fault, if he demands an oath of a person, whether he the denunciation was to be made: wherefore seemingly knows that he will swear falsely or truly, because seem- the Gospel order should be followed, if the sin of perjury ingly it is not he that exacts the oath but the person at should be hidden, especially when it does not tend to an- whose instance he demands it. other person’s injury: because if it did, the Gospel order Reply to Objection 1. This argument avails in the would not apply to the case, as stated above (q. 33, a. 7; case of one who demands an oath on his own account. Yet q. 68, a. 1). he does not always know that the other will swear truly or Reply to Objection 4. It is lawful to make use of an falsely, for at times he has doubts about the fact, and be- evil for the sake of good, as God does, but it is not lawful lieves he will swear truly. In such a case he exacts an oath to lead anyone to do evil. Consequently it is lawful to ac- in order that he may be more certain. cept the oath of one who is ready to swear by false gods, Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (ad Public. but it is not lawful to induce him to swear by false gods. serm. xlvii), “though we are forbidden to swear, I do not Yet it seems to be different in the case of one who swears remember ever to have read in the Holy Scriptures that we falsely by the true God, because an oath of this kind lacks must not accept oaths from others.” Hence he that accepts the good of faith, which a man makes use of in the oath an oath does not sin, except perchance when of his own of one who swears truly by false gods, as Augustine says accord he forces another to swear, knowing that he will (ad Public. Ep. xlvii). Hence when a man swears falsely swear falsely. by the true God his oath seems to lack any good that one Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (QQ. Super may use lawfully. 1662 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 99 Of Sacrilege (In Four Articles) We must now consider the vices which pertain to irreligion, whereby sacred things are treated with irreverence. We shall consider (1) Sacrilege; (2) Simony. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What is sacrilege? (2) Whether it is a special sin? (3) Of the species of sacrilege; (4) Of the punishment of sacrilege. Whether sacrilege is the violation of a sacred thing? IIa IIae q. 99 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that sacrilege is not fore whatever pertains to irreverence for sacred things is the violation of a sacred thing. It is stated (XVII, qu. an injury to God, and comes under the head of sacrilege. iv∗): “They are guilty of sacrilege who disagree about the Reply to Objection 1. According to the Philosopher sovereign’s decision, and doubt whether the person cho- (Ethic. i, 2) the common good of the nation is a divine sen by the sovereign be worthy of honor.” Now this seems thing, wherefore in olden times the rulers of a common- to have no connection with anything sacred. Therefore wealth were called divines, as being the ministers of di- sacrilege does not denote the violation of something sa- vine providence, according to Wis. 6:5, “Being minis- cred. ters of His kingdom, you have not judged rightly.” Hence Objection 2. Further, it is stated further on† that if any by an extension of the term, whatever savors of irrever-man shall allow the Jews to hold public offices, “he must ence for the sovereign, such as disputing his judgment, be excommunicated as being guilty of sacrilege.” Yet pub- and questioning whether one ought to follow it, is called lic offices have nothing to do with anything sacred. There- sacrilege by a kind of likeness. fore it seems that sacrilege does not denote the violation Reply to Objection 2. Christians are sanctified by of a sacred thing. faith and the sacraments of Christ, according to 1 Cor. Objection 3. Further, God’s power is greater than 6:11, “But you are washed, but you are sanctified.” man’s. Now sacred things receive their sacred character Wherefore it is written (1 Pet. 2:9): “You are a chosen from God. Therefore they cannot be violated by man: and generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased so a sacrilege would not seem to be the violation of a sa- people.” Therefore any injury inflicted on the Christian cred thing. people, for instance that unbelievers should be put in au- On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x) that “a man thority over it, is an irreverence for a sacred thing, and is is said to be sacrilegious because he selects,” i.e. steals, reasonably called a sacrilege. “sacred things.” Reply to Objection 3. Violation here means any kind I answer that, As stated above (q. 81, a. 5; Ia IIae, of irreverence or dishonor. Now as “honor is in the person q. 101, a. 4), a thing is called “sacred” through being de- who honors and not in the one who is honored” (Ethic. i, puted to the divine worship. Now just as a thing acquires 5), so again irreverence is in the person who behaves ir- an aspect of good through being deputed to a good end, so reverently even though he do no harm to the object of his does a thing assume a divine character through being de- irreverence. Hence, so far he is concerned, he violates the puted to the divine worship, and thus a certain reverence sacred thing, though the latter be not violated in itself. is due to it, which reverence is referred to God. There- Whether sacrilege is a special sin? IIa IIae q. 99 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that sacrilege not a special in every sin, because sin is “a word, deed or desire con- sin. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv) “They are guilty of sacrilege trary to the law of God,” according to Augustine (Contra who through ignorance sin against the sanctity of the law, Faust. xxi, 27). Therefore sacrilege is a general sin. violate and defile it by their negligence.” But this is done Objection 2. Further, no special sin is comprised un- ∗ Append. Gratian, on can. Si quis suadente † Append. Gratian, on can. Constituit. 1663 der different kinds of sin. Now sacrilege comprised under Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 3), “When the purple has different kinds of sin, for instance under murder, if one been made into a royal robe, we pay it honor and homage, kill a priest under lust, as the violation of a consecrate vir- and if anyone dishonor it he is condemned to death,” as gin, or of any woman in a sacred place under theft, if one acting against the king: and in the same way if a man vio- steal a sacred thing. Therefore sacrilege is not a special late a sacred thing, by so doing his behavior is contrary to sin. the reverence due to God and consequently he is guilty of Objection 3. Further, every special sin is to found irreligion. apart from other sins as the Philosopher states, in speak- Reply to Objection 1. Those are said to sin against ing of special justice (Ethic. v, 11). But, seemingly, sac- the sanctity of the divine law who assail God’s law, as rilege is not to be found apart from other sins; for it is heretics and blasphemers do. These are guilty of unbelief, sometimes united to theft, sometimes to murder, as stated through not believing in God; and of sacrilege, through in the preceding objection. Therefore it is not a special perverting the words of the divine law. sin. Reply to Objection 2. Nothing prevents one specific On the contrary, That which is opposed to a special kind of sin being found in various generic kinds of sin, virtue is a special sin. But sacrilege is opposed to a special inasmuch as various sins are directed to the end of one virtue, namely religion, to which it belongs to reverence sin, just as happens in the case of virtues commanded by God and divine things. Therefore sacrilege is a special one virtue. In this way, by whatever kind of sin a man acts sin. counter to reverence due to sacred things, he commits a I answer that, Wherever we find a special aspect of sacrilege formally; although his act contains various kinds deformity, there must needs be a special sin; because the of sin materially. species of a thing is derived chiefly from its formal as- Reply to Objection 3. Sacrilege is sometimes found pect, and not from its matter or subject. Now in sacrilege apart from other sins, through its act having no other de- we find a special aspect of deformity, namely, the viola- formity than the violation of a sacred thing: for instance, tion of a sacred thing by treating it irreverently. Hence it if a judge were to take a person from a sacred place for he is a special sin. might lawfully have taken him from elsewhere. Moreover, it is opposed to religion. For according to Whether the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the sacred things? IIa IIae q. 99 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the species of sacri- by their objects. Now the sacred thing is the object of lege are not distinguished according to the sacred things. sacrilege, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore the species of Material diversity does not differentiate species, if the for- sacrilege are distinguished according to the sacred things. mal aspect remains the same. Now there would seem to I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the sin of sacri- be the same formal aspect of sin in all violations of sa- lege consists in the irreverent treatment of a sacred thing. cred things, and that the only difference is one of matter. Now reverence is due to a sacred thing by reason of its Therefore the species of sacrilege are not distinguished holiness: and consequently the species of sacrilege must thereby. needs be distinguished according to the different aspects Objection 2. Further, it does not seem possible that of sanctity in the sacred things which are treated irrever- things belonging to the same species should at the same ently: for the greater the holiness ascribed to the sacred time differ specifically. Now murder, theft, and unlawful thing that is sinned against, the more grievous the sacri- intercourse, are different species of sin. Therefore they lege. cannot belong to the one same species of sacrilege: and Now holiness is ascribed, not only to sacred persons, consequently it seems that the species of sacrilege are dis- namely, those who are consecrated to the divine worship, tinguished in accordance with the species of other sins, but also to sacred places and to certain other sacred things. and not according to the various sacred things. And the holiness of a place is directed to the holiness of Objection 3. Further, among sacred things sacred per- man, who worships God in a holy place. For it is written sons are reckoned. If, therefore, one species of sacrilege (2 Macc. 5:19): “God did not choose the people for the arises from the violation of a sacred person, it would fol- place’s sake, but the place for the people’s sake.” Hence low that every sin committed by a sacred person is a sac- sacrilege committed against a sacred person is a graver sin rilege, since every sin violates the person of the sinner. than that which is committed against a sacred place. Yet Therefore the species of sacrilege are not reckoned ac- in either species there are various degrees of sacrilege, ac- cording to the sacred things. cording to differences of sacred persons and places. On the contrary, Acts and habits are distinguished In like manner the third species of sacrilege, which 1664 is committed against other sacred things, has various difference. degrees, according to the differences of sacred things. Reply to Objection 2. Nothing hinders two things Among these the highest place belongs to the sacraments from belonging to one species in one respect, and to whereby man is sanctified: chief of which is the sacrament different species in another respect. Thus Socrates and of the Eucharist, for it contains Christ Himself. Wherefore Plato belong to the one species, “animal,” but differ in the sacrilege that is committed against this sacrament is the species “colored thing,” if one be white and the other the gravest of all. The second place, after the sacraments, black. In like manner it is possible for two sins to differ belongs to the vessels consecrated for the administration specifically as to their material acts, and to belong to the of the sacraments; also sacred images, and the relics of the same species as regards the one formal aspect of sacri- saints, wherein the very persons of the saints, so to speak, lege: for instance, the violation of a nun by blows or by are reverenced and honored. After these come things con- copulation. nected with the apparel of the Church and its ministers; Reply to Objection 3. Every sin committed by a sa- and those things, whether movable or immovable, that are cred person is a sacrilege materially and accidentally as it deputed to the upkeep of the ministers. And whoever sins were. Hence Jerome∗ says that “a trifle on a priest’s lips against any one of the aforesaid incurs the crime of sacri- is a sacrilege or a blasphemy.” But formally and properly lege. speaking a sin committed by a sacred person is a sacri- Reply to Objection 1. There is not the same aspect lege only when it is committed against his holiness, for of holiness in all the aforesaid: wherefore the diversity instance if a virgin consecrated to God be guilty of forni- of sacred things is not only a material, but also a formal cation: and the same is to be said of other instances. Whether the punishment of sacrilege should be pecuniary? IIa IIae q. 99 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the punishment of neth by the same. . . he may be tormented” (Wis. 11:17). sacrilege should not be pecuniary. A pecuniary punish- In this respect the fitting punishment of one guilty of sac- ment is not wont to be inflicted for a criminal fault. But rilege, since he has done an injury to a sacred thing, is sacrilege is a criminal fault, wherefore it is punished by excommunication§ whereby sacred things are withheld capital sentence according to civil law†. Therefore sacri- from him. The second point to be considered is utility. lege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment. For punishments are inflicted as medicines, that men be- Objection 2. Further, the same sin should not receive ing deterred thereby may desist from sin. Now it would a double punishment, according to Nahum 1:9, “There seem that the sacrilegious man, who reverences not sacred shall not rise a double affliction.” But sacrilege is pun- things, is not sufficiently deterred from sinning by sacred ished with excommunication; major excommunication, things being withheld from him, since he has no care for for violating a sacred person, and for burning or destroy- them. Wherefore according to human laws he is sentenced ing a church, and minor excommunication for other sacri- to capital punishment, and according to the statutes of the leges. Therefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecu- Church, which does not inflict the death of the body, a pe- niary punishment. cuniary punishment is inflicted, in order that men may be Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:5): deterred from sacrilege, at least by temporal punishments. “Neither have we taken an occasion of covetousness.” But Reply to Objection 1. The Church inflicts not the it seems to involve an occasion of covetousness that a pe- death of the body, but excommunication in its stead. cuniary punishment should be exacted for the violation of Reply to Objection 2. When one punishment is not a sacred thing. Therefore this does not seem to be a fitting sufficient to deter a man from sin, a double punishment punishment of sacrilege. must be inflicted. Wherefore it was necessary to inflict On the contrary, It is written‡: “If anyone contuma- some kind of temporal punishment in addition to the pun- ciously or arrogantly take away by force an escaped slave ishment of excommunication, in order to coerce those from the confines of a church he shall pay nine hundred who despise spiritual things. soldi”: and again further on (XVII, qu. iv, can. Quisquis Reply to Objection 3. If money were exacted with- inventus, can. 21): “Whoever is found guilty of sacrilege out a reasonable cause, this would seem to involve an oc- shall pay thirty pounds of tried purest silver.” casion of covetousness. But when it is exacted for the I answer that, In the award of punishments two points purpose of man’s correction, it has a manifest utility, and must be considered. First equality, in order that the pun- consequently involves no occasion of avarice. ishment may be just, and that “by what things a man sin- ∗ The quotation is from St. Bernard, De Consideration, ii, 13 † Dig. xlviii, 13; Cod. i, 3, de Episc. et Cleric. ‡ XVII, qu. iv, can. Si quis contumax § Append. Gratian. on can. Si quis contumax, quoted above 1665 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 100 On Simony (In Six Articles) We must now consider simony, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) What is simony? (2) Whether it is lawful to accept money for the sacraments? (3) Whether it is lawful to accept money for spiritual actions? (4) Whether it is lawful to sell things connected with spirituals? (5) Whether real remuneration alone makes a man guilty of simony, or also oral remuneration or remuneration by service? (6) Of the punishment of simony. Whether simony is an intentional will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected IIa IIae q. 100 a. 1 with a spiritual thing? Objection 1. It would seem that simony is not “an ex- simony is defined insufficiently. press will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected Objection 6. Further, anything connected with spiri- with a spiritual thing.” Simony is heresy, since it is writ- tual things is itself spiritual. Therefore it is superfluous to ten (I, qu. i∗): “The impious heresy of Macedonius and add “or connected with spiritual things.” of those who with him impugned the Holy Ghost, is more Objection 7. Further, according to some, the Pope endurable than that of those who are guilty of simony: cannot commit simony: yet he can buy or sell something since the former in their ravings maintained that the Holy spiritual. Therefore simony is not the will to buy or sell Spirit of Father and Son is a creature and the slave of God, something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing. whereas the latter make the same Holy Spirit to be their On the contrary, Gregory VII says (Regist.‡): “None own slave. For every master sells what he has just as he of the faithful is ignorant that buying or selling altars, wills, whether it be his slave or any other of his posses- tithes, or the Holy Ghost is the heresy of simony.” sions.” But unbelief, like faith, is an act not of the will but I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 2) of the intellect, as shown above (q. 10, a. 2). Therefore an act is evil generically when it bears on undue matter. simony should not be defined as an act of the will. Now a spiritual thing is undue matter for buying and sell- Objection 2. Further, to sin intentionally is to sin ing for three reasons. First, because a spiritual thing can- through malice, and this is to sin against the Holy Ghost. not be appraised at any earthly price, even as it is said Therefore, if simony is an intentional will to sin, it would concerning wisdom (Prov. 3:15), “she is more precious seem that it is always a sin against the Holy Ghost. than all riches, and all things that are desired, are not to Objection 3. Further, nothing is more spiritual than be compared with her”: and for this reason Peter, in con- the kingdom of heaven. But it is lawful to buy the king- demning the wickedness of Simon in its very source, said dom of heaven: for Gregory says in a homily (v, in Ev.): (Acts 8:20): “Keep thy money to thyself to perish with “The kingdom of heaven is worth as much as you pos- thee, because thou hast thought that the gift of God may sess.” Therefore simony does not consist in a will to buy be purchased with money.” something spiritual. Secondly, because a thing cannot be due matter for Objection 4. Further, simony takes its name from Si- sale if the vendor is not the owner thereof, as appears from mon the magician, of whom we read (Acts 8:18,19) that the authority quoted (obj. 1). Now ecclesiastical superiors “he offered the apostles money” that he might buy a spir- are not owners, but dispensers of spiritual things, accord- itual power, in order, to wit, “that on whomsoever he im- ing to 1 Cor. 4:1, “Let a man so account of us as of the posed his hand they might receive the Holy Ghost.” But ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the ministers of we do not read that he wished to sell anything. Therefore God.” simony is not the will to sell a spiritual thing. Thirdly, because sale is opposed to the source of spir- Objection 5. Further, there are many other volun- itual things, since they flow from the gratuitous will of tary commutations besides buying and selling, such as ex- God. Wherefore Our Lord said (Mat. 10:8): “Freely have change and transaction†. Therefore it would seem that you received, freely give.” ∗ Can. Eos qui per pecunias. † A kind of legal compromise—Oxford Dictionary ‡ Caus. I, qu. i, can. Presbyter, qu. iii, can. Altare 1666 Therefore by buying or selling a spiritual thing, a man buy a spiritual power in order that afterwards he might sell treats God and divine things with irreverence, and conse- it. For it is written (I, qu. iii∗), that “Simon the magician quently commits a sin of irreligion. wished to buy the gift of the Holy Ghost, in order that he Reply to Objection 1. Just as religion consists in a might make money by selling the signs to be wrought by kind of protestation of faith, without, sometimes, faith be- him.” Hence those who sell spiritual things are likened in ing in one’s heart, so too the vices opposed to religion intention to Simon the magician: while those who wish include a certain protestation of unbelief without, some- to buy them are likened to him in act. Those who sell times, unbelief being in the mind. Accordingly simony is them imitate, in act, Giezi the disciple of Eliseus, of whom said to be a “heresy,” as regards the outward protestation, we read (4 Kings 5:20-24) that he received money from since by selling a gift of the Holy Ghost a man declares, the leper who was healed: wherefore the sellers of spir- in a way, that he is the owner of a spiritual gift; and this is itual things may be called not only “simoniacs” but also heretical. It must, however, be observed that Simon Ma- “giezites.” gus, besides wishing the apostles to sell him a grace of Reply to Objection 5. The terms “buying” and “sell- the Holy Ghost for money, said that the world was not ing” cover all kinds of non-gratuitous contracts. Where- created by God, but by some heavenly power, as Isidore fore it is impossible for the exchange or agency of states (Etym. viii, 5): and so for this reason simoniacs are prebends or ecclesiastical benefices to be made by author- reckoned with other heretics, as appears from Augustine’s ity of the parties concerned without danger of committing book on heretics. simony, as laid down by law†. Nevertheless the superior, Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 58, a. 4), in virtue of his office, can cause these exchanges to be justice, with all its parts, and consequently all the oppo- made for useful or necessary reasons. site vices, is in the will as its subject. Hence simony is Reply to Objection 6. Even as the soul lives by itself, fittingly defined from its relation to the will. This act is while the body lives through being united to the soul; so, furthermore described as “express,” in order to signify that too, certain things are spiritual by themselves, such as the it proceeds from choice, which takes the principal part in sacraments and the like, while others are called spiritual, virtue and vice. Nor does everyone sin against the Holy through adhering to those others. Hence (I, qu. iii, cap. Ghost that sins from choice, but only he who chooses sin Siquis objecerit) it is stated that “spiritual things do not through contempt of those things whereby man is wont to progress without corporal things, even as the soul has no be withdrawn from sin, as stated above (q. 14, a. 1). bodily life without the body.” Reply to Objection 3. The kingdom of heaven is said Reply to Objection 7. The Pope can be guilty of the to be bought when a man gives what he has for God’s vice of simony, like any other man, since the higher a sake. But this is to employ the term “buying” in a wide man’s position the more grievous is his sin. For although sense, and as synonymous with merit: nor does it reach to the possessions of the Church belong to him as dispenser the perfect signification of buying, both because neither in chief, they are not his as master and owner. Therefore, “the sufferings of this time,” nor any gift or deed of ours, were he to accept money from the income of any church “are worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that in exchange for a spiritual thing, he would not escape be- shall be revealed in us” (Rom. 8:18), and because merit ing guilty of the vice of simony. In like manner he might consists chiefly, not in an outward gift, action or passion, commit simony by accepting from a layman moneys not but in an inward affection. belonging to the goods of the Church. Reply to Objection 4. Simon the magician wished to Whether it is always unlawful to give money for the sacraments? IIa IIae q. 100 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not always un- priests receive a prebend or money for singing masses. lawful to give money for the sacraments. Baptism is the Much more therefore is it lawful to buy or sell the other door of the sacraments, as we shall state in the IIIa, q. 68, sacraments. a. 6; IIIa, q. 73, a. 3. But seemingly it is lawful in cer- Objection 3. Further, the sacrament of Penance is a tain cases to give money for Baptism, for instance if a necessary sacrament consisting chiefly in the absolution. priest were unwilling to baptize a dying child without be- But some persons demand money when absolving from ing paid. Therefore it is not always unlawful to buy or sell excommunication. Therefore it is not always unlawful to the sacraments. buy or sell a sacrament. Objection 2. Further, the greatest of the sacraments is Objection 4. Further, custom makes that which oth- the Eucharist, which is consecrated in the Mass. But some erwise were sinful to be not sinful; thus Augustine says ∗ Can. Salvator † Cap. Quaesitum, de rerum Permutat.; cap. Super, de Transact. 1667 (Contra Faust. xxii, 47) that “it was no crime to have sev-the water from the priest, because it is merely a bodily eral wives, so long as it was the custom.” Now it is the element. But if it were an adult in danger of death that custom in some places to give something in the conse- wished to be baptized, and the priest were unwilling to cration of bishops, blessings of abbots, ordinations of the baptize him without being paid, he ought, if possible, to clergy, in exchange for the chrism, holy oil, and so forth. be baptized by someone else. And if he is unable to have Therefore it would seem that it is not unlawful. recourse to another, he must by no means pay a price for Objection 5. Further, it happens sometimes that Baptism, and should rather die without being baptized, someone maliciously hinders a person from obtaining a because for him the baptism of desire would supply the bishopric or some like dignity. But it is lawful for a man lack of the sacrament. to make good his grievance. Therefore it is lawful, seem- Reply to Objection 2. The priest receives money, not ingly, in such a case to give money for a bishopric or a as the price for consecrating the Eucharist, or for singing like ecclesiastical dignity. the Mass (for this would be simoniacal), but as payment Objection 6. Further, marriage is a sacrament. But for his livelihood, as stated above. sometimes money is given for marriage. Therefore it is Reply to Objection 3. The money exacted of the per- lawful to sell a sacrament. son absolved is not the price of his absolution (for this On the contrary, It is written (I, qu. i∗): “Whosoever would be simoniacal), but a punishment of a past crime shall consecrate anyone for money, let him be cut off from for which he was excommunicated. the priesthood.” Reply to Objection 4. As stated above, “custom does I answer that, The sacraments of the New Law are of not prevail over natural or divine law” whereby simony is all things most spiritual, inasmuch as they are the cause of forbidden. Wherefore the custom, if such there be, of de- spiritual grace, on which no price can be set, and which manding anything as the price of a spiritual thing, with the is essentially incompatible with a non-gratuitous giving. intention of buying or selling it, is manifestly simoniacal, Now the sacraments are dispensed through the ministers especially when the demand is made of a person unwill- of the Church, whom the people are bound to support, ac- ing to pay. But if the demand be made in payment of a cording to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:13), “Know stipend recognized by custom it is not simoniacal, pro- you not, that they who work in the holy place, eat the vided there be no intention of buying or selling, but only things that are of the holy place; and they that serve the of doing what is customary, and especially if the demand altar, partake with the altar?” be acceded to voluntarily. In all these cases, however, one Accordingly we must answer that to receive money for must beware of anything having an appearance of simony the spiritual grace of the sacraments, is the sin of simony, or avarice, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Thess. which cannot be excused by any custom whatever, since 5:22), “From all appearance of evil restrain yourselves.” “custom does not prevail over natural or divine law”†. Reply to Objection 5. It would be simoniacal to buy Now by money we are to understand anything that has off the opposition of one’s rivals, before acquiring the a pecuniary value, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 1). right to a bishopric or any dignity or prebend, by elec- On the other hand, to receive anything for the support of tion, appointment or presentation, since this would be to those who administer the sacraments, in accordance with use money as a means of obtaining a spiritual thing. But the statutes of the Church and approved customs, is not it is lawful to use money as a means of removing unjust simony, nor is it a sin. For it is received not as a price of opposition, after one has already acquired that right. goods, but as a payment for their need. Hence a gloss of Reply to Objection 6. Some‡ say that it is lawful to Augustine on 1 Tim. 5:17, “Let the priests that rule well,” give money for Matrimony because no grace is conferred says: “They should look to the people for a supply to their thereby. But this is not altogether true, as we shall state need, but to the Lord for the reward of their ministry.” in the Third Part of the work§. Wherefore we must re- Reply to Objection 1. In a case of necessity any- ply that Matrimony is not only a sacrament of the Church, one may baptize. And since nowise ought one to sin, if but also an office of nature. Consequently it is lawful to the priest be unwilling to baptize without being paid, one give money for Matrimony considered as an office of na- must act as though there were no priest available for the ture, but unlawful if it be considered as a sacrament of the baptism. Hence the person who is in charge of the child Church. Hence, according to the law¶, it is forbidden to can, in such a case, lawfully baptize it, or cause it to be demand anything for the Nuptial Blessing. baptized by anyone else. He could, however, lawfully buy ∗ Can. Qui per pecunias † Cap. Cum tanto, de Consuetud.; cf. Ia IIae, q. 97, a. 3 ‡ Innocent IV on Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia § Suppl., q. 42, a. 3 ¶ Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia 1668 Whether it is lawful to give and receive money for spiritual actions? IIa IIae q. 100 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that it is lawful to give and re- for then there would be an appearance of simony. But af- ceive money for spiritual actions. The use of prophecy is a ter the spiritual things have been freely bestowed, then the spiritual action. But something used to be given of old for statutory and customary offerings and other dues may be the use of prophecy, as appears from 1 Kings 9:7,8, and exacted from those who are unwilling but able to pay, if 3 Kings 14:3. Therefore it would seem that it is lawful to the superior authorize this to be done. give and receive money for a spiritual action. Reply to Objection 1. As Jerome says in his com- Objection 2. Further, prayer, preaching, divine praise, mentary on Mic. 3:9, certain gifts were freely offered to are most spiritual actions. Now money is given to holy the good prophets, for their livelihood, but not as a price persons in order to obtain the assistance of their prayers, for the exercise of their gift of prophecy. Wicked prophets, according to Lk. 16:9, “Make unto you friends of the however, abused this exercise by demanding payment for mammon of iniquity.” To preachers also, who sow spiri- it. tual things, temporal things are due according to the Apos- Reply to Objection 2. Those who give alms to the tle (1 Cor. 9:14). Moreover, something is given to those poor in order to obtain from them the assistance of their who celebrate the divine praises in the ecclesiastical of- prayers do not give with the intent of buying their prayers; fice, and make processions: and sometimes an annual in- but by their gratuitous beneficence inspire the poor with come is assigned to them. Therefore it is lawful to receive the mind to pray for them freely and out of charity. Tem- something for spiritual actions. poral things are due to the preacher as means for his sup- Objection 3. Further, science is no less spiritual than port, not as a price of the words he preaches. Hence a power. Now it is lawful to receive money for the use of gloss on 1 Tim. 5:11, “Let the priests that rule well,” science: thus a lawyer may sell his just advocacy, a physi- says: “Their need allows them to receive the wherewithal cian his advice for health, and a master the exercise of his to live, charity demands that this should be given to them: teaching. Therefore in like manner it would seem lawful yet the Gospel is not for sale, nor is a livelihood the ob- for a prelate to receive something for the use of his spiri- ject of preaching: for if they sell it for this purpose, they tual power, for instance, for correction, dispensation, and sell a great thing for a contemptible price.” In like manner so forth. temporal things are given to those who praise God by cel- Objection 4. Further, religion is the state of spiritual ebrating the divine office whether for the living or for the perfection. Now in certain monasteries something is de- dead, not as a price but as a means of livelihood; and the manded from those who are received there. Therefore it same purpose is fulfilled when alms are received for mak- is lawful to demand something for spiritual things. ing processions in funerals. Yet it is simoniacal to do such On the contrary, It is stated (I, qu. i∗): “It is abso- things by contract, or with the intention of buying or sell- lutely forbidden to make a charge for what is acquired by ing. Hence it would be an unlawful ordinance if it were the consolation of invisible grace, whether by demanding decreed in any church that no procession would take place a price or by seeking any kind of return whatever.” Now at a funeral unless a certain sum of money were paid, be- all these spiritual things are acquired through an invisible cause such an ordinance would preclude the free granting grace. Therefore it is not lawful to charge a price or return of pious offices to any person. The ordinance would be for them. more in keeping with the law, if it were decreed that this I answer that, Just as the sacraments are called spiri- honor would be accorded to all who gave a certain alms, tual, because they confer a spiritual grace, so, too, certain because this would not preclude its being granted to oth- other things are called spiritual, because they flow from ers. Moreover, the former ordinance has the appearance spiritual grace and dispose thereto. And yet these things of an exaction, whereas the latter bears a likeness to a gra- are obtainable through the ministry of men, according to tuitous remuneration. 1 Cor. 9:7, “Who serveth as a soldier at any time at his Reply to Objection 3. A person to whom a spiritual own charges? Who feedeth the flock, and eateth not of the power is entrusted is bound by virtue of his office to ex- milk of the flock?” Hence it is simoniacal to sell or buy ercise the power entrusted to him in dispensing spiritual that which is spiritual in such like actions; but to receive or things. Moreover, he receives a statutory payment from give something for the support of those who minister spir- the funds of the Church as a means of livelihood. There- itual things in accordance with the statutes of the Church fore, if he were to accept anything for the exercise of his and approved customs is lawful, yet in such wise that there spiritual power, this would imply, not a hiring of his la- be no intention of buying or selling, and that no pressure bor (which he is bound to give, as a duty arising out of be brought to bear on those who are unwilling to give, by the office he has accepted), but a sale of the very use of withholding spiritual things that ought to be administered, a spiritual grace. For this reason it is unlawful for him to ∗ Can. Quidquid invisibilis 1669 receive anything for any dispensing whatever, or for al-any feasts. lowing someone else to take his duty, or for correcting his Reply to Objection 4. It is unlawful to exact or re- subjects, or for omitting to correct them. On the other ceive anything as price for entering a monastery: but, hand it is lawful for him to receive “procurations,” when in the case of small monasteries, that are unable to sup- he visits his subjects, not as a price for correcting them, port so many persons, it is lawful, while entrance to the but as a means of livelihood. He that is possessed of sci- monastery is free, to accept something for the support of ence, without having taken upon himself the obligation those who are about to be received into the monastery, if of using it for the benefit of others can lawfully receive its revenues are insufficient. In like manner it is lawful to a price for his learning or advice, since this is not a sale be easier in admitting to a monastery a person who has of truth or science, but a hiring of labor. If, on the other proved his regard for that monastery by the generosity of hand, he be so bound by virtue of his office, this would his alms: just as, on the other hand, it is lawful to incite amount to a sale of the truth, and consequently he would a person’s regard for a monastery by means of temporal sin grievously. For instance, those who in certain churches benefits, in order that he may thereby be induced to enter are appointed to instruct the clerics of that church and the monastery; although it is unlawful to agree to give or other poor persons, and are in receipt of an ecclesiastical receive something for entrance into a monastery (I, qu. ii, benefice for so doing, are not allowed to receive anything cap. Quam pio). in return, either for teaching, or for celebrating or omitting Whether it is lawful to receive money for things annexed to spiritual things? IIa IIae q. 100 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem lawful to receive money I answer that, A thing may be annexed to spiritual for things annexed to spiritual things. Seemingly all tem- things in two ways. First, as being dependent on spiri- poral things are annexed to spiritual things, since temporal tual things. Thus to have to spiritual things, because it things ought to be sought for the sake of spiritual things. is not competent save to those who hold a clerical of- If, therefore, it is unlawful to sell what is annexed to spir- fice. Hence such things can by no means exist apart from itual things, it will be unlawful to sell anything temporal, spiritual things. Consequently it is altogether unlawful and this is clearly false. to sell such things, because the sale thereof implies the Objection 2. Further, nothing would seem to be more sale of things spiritual. Other things are annexed to spir- annexed to spiritual things than consecrated vessels. Yet itual things through being directed thereto, for instance it is lawful to sell a chalice for the ransom of prisoners, the right of patronage, which is directed to the presen- according to Ambrose (De Offic. ii, 28). Therefore it is tation of clerics to ecclesiastical benefices; and sacred lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things. vessels, which are directed to the use of the sacraments. Objection 3. Further, things annexed to spiritual Wherefore such things as these do not presuppose spiri- things include right of burial, right of patronage, and, ac- tual things, but precede them in the order of time. Hence cording to ancient writers, right of the first-born (because in a way they can be sold, but not as annexed to spiritual before the Lord the first-born exercised the priestly of- things. fice), and the right to receive tithes. Now Abraham bought Reply to Objection 1. All things temporal are an- from Ephron a double cave for a burying-place (Gn. 23:8, nexed to spiritual things, as to their end, wherefore it is sqq.), and Jacob bought from Esau the right of the first- lawful to sell temporal things, but their relation to spiri- born (Gn. 25:31, sqq.). Again the right of patronage tual things cannot be the matter of a lawful sale. is transferred with the property sold, and is granted “in Reply to Objection 2. Sacred vessels also are an- fee.” Tithes are granted to certain soldiers, and can be re- nexed to spiritual things as to their end, wherefore their deemed. Prelates also at times retain for themselves the consecration cannot be sold. Yet their material can be sold revenues of prebends of which they have the presentation, for the needs of the Church or of the poor provided they although a prebend is something annexed to a spiritual first be broken, after prayer has been said over them, since thing. Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spir- when once broken, they are considered to be no longer sa- itual things. cred vessels but mere metal: so that if like vessels were to On the contrary, Pope Paschal∗ says (cf. I, qu. iii, be made out of the same material they would have to be cap. Si quis objecerit): “Whoever sells one of two such consecrated again. things, that the one is unproductive without the other, Reply to Objection 3. We have no authority for sup- leaves neither unsold. Wherefore let no person sell a posing that the double cave which Abraham bought for church, or a prebend, or anything ecclesiastical.” a burial place was consecrated for that purpose: where- ∗ Paschal II 1670 fore Abraham could lawfully buy that site to be used for sinned by selling his birthright, yet Jacob sinned not in burial, in order to turn it into a sepulchre: even so it would buying, because he is understood to have freed himself of be lawful now to buy an ordinary field as a site for a ceme- his grievance. tery or even a church. Nevertheless because even among The right of patronage cannot be the matter of a direct the Gentiles burial places are looked upon as religious, sale, nor can it be granted “in fee,” but is transferred with if Ephron intended to accept the price as payment for a the property sold or granted. burial place, he sinned in selling, though Abraham did not The spiritual right of receiving tithes is not granted to sin in buying, because he intended merely to buy an or- layfolk, but merely the temporal commodities which are dinary plot of ground. Even now, it is lawful in a case granted in the name of tithe, as stated above (q. 87, a. 3). of necessity to sell or buy land on which there has previ- With regard to the granting of benefices it must, how- ously been a church, as we have also said with regard to ever, be observed, that it is not unlawful for a bishop, be- sacred vessels (Reply obj. 2). Or again, Abraham is to be fore presenting a person to a benefice, to decide, for some excused because he thus freed himself of a grievance. For reason, to retain part of the revenues of the benefice in although Ephron offered him the burial place for nothing, question, and to spend it on some pious object. But, on Abraham deemed that he could not accept it gratis without the other hand, if he were to require part of the revenues prejudice to himself. of that benefice to be given to him by the beneficiary, it The right of the first-born was due to Jacob by rea- would be the same as though he demanded payment from son of God’s choice, according to Malach. 1:2,3, “I him, and he would not escape the guilt of simony. have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau.” Wherefore Esau Whether it is lawful to grant spiritual things in return for an equivalent of service, or IIa IIae q. 100 a. 5 for an oral remuneration? Objection 1. It would seem that it is lawful to grant I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), the term spiritual things in return for an equivalent of service, or an “money” denotes “anything that can have a pecuniary oral remuneration. Gregory says (Regist. iii, ep. 18): “It value.” Now it is evident that a man’s service is directed is right that those who serve the interests of the Church to some kind of usefulness, which has a pecuniary value, should be rewarded.” Now an equivalent of service de- wherefore servants are hired for a money wage. There- notes serving the interests of the Church. Therefore it fore to grant a spiritual thing for a service rendered or to seems lawful to confer ecclesiastical benefices for ser- be rendered is the same as to grant it for the money, re- vices received. ceived or promised, at which that service could be valued. Objection 2. Further, to confer an ecclesiastical If likewise, to grant a person’s request for the bestowal of benefice for service received seems to indicate a carnal a temporary favor is directed to some kind of usefulness intention, no less than to do so on account of kinship. Yet which has a pecuniary value. Wherefore just as a man the latter seemingly is not simoniacal since it implies no contracts the guilt of simony by accepting money or any buying or selling. Therefore neither is the former simoni- eternal thing which comes under the head of “real remu- acal. neration,” so too does he contract it, by receiving “oral Objection 3. Further, that which is done only at an- remuneration” or an “equivalent in service rendered.” other’s request would seem to be done gratis: so that ap- Reply to Objection 1. If a cleric renders a prelate a parently it does not involve simony, which consists in buy- lawful service, directed to spiritual things (e.g. to the good ing or selling. Now oral remuneration denotes the confer- of the Church, or benefit of her ministers), he becomes ring of an ecclesiastical benefice at some person’s request. worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice by reason of the de- Therefore this is not simoniacal. votion that led him to render the service, as he would by Objection 4. Further, hypocrites perform spiritual reason of any other good deed. Hence this is not a case of deeds in order that they may receive human praise, which remuneration for service rendered, such as Gregory has in seems to imply oral remuneration: and yet hypocrites are mind. But if the service be unlawful, or directed to car- not said to be guilty of simony. Therefore oral remunera- nal things (e.g. a service rendered to the prelate for the tion does not entail simony. profit of his kindred, or the increase of his patrimony, or On the contrary, Pope Urban∗ says: “Whoever grants the like), it will be a case of remuneration for service ren- or acquires ecclesiastical things, not for the purpose for dered, and this will be simony. which they were instituted but for his own profit, in con- Reply to Objection 2. The bestowal of a spiritual sideration of an oral remuneration or of an equivalent in thing gratis on a person by reason of kinship or of any service rendered or money received, is guilty of simony.” carnal affection is unlawful and carnal, but not simonia- ∗ Urban II, Ep. xvii ad Lucium 1671 cal: since nothing is received in return, wherefore it does account of which a spiritual thing is granted to the person not imply a contract of buying and selling, on which si- for whom the request is made. Nevertheless there may be mony is based. But to present a person to an ecclesias- simony in the intention, if one look, not to the worthiness tical benefice with the understanding or intention that he of the person, but to human favor. If, however, a person provide for one’s kindred from the revenue is manifest si- asks for himself, that he may obtain the cure of souls, his mony. very presumption renders him unworthy, and so his re- Reply to Objection 3. Oral remuneration denotes ei- quest is made for an unworthy person. But, if one be in ther praise that pertains to human favor, which has its need, one may lawfully seek for oneself an ecclesiastical price, or a request whereby man’s favor is obtained or the benefice without the cure of souls. contrary avoided. Hence if one intend this chiefly one Reply to Objection 4. A hypocrite does not give a commits simony. Now to grant a request made for an un- spiritual thing for the sake of praise, he only makes a show worthy person implies, seemingly, that this is one’s chief of it, and under false pretenses stealthily purloins rather intention wherefore the deed itself is simoniacal. But if than buys human praise: so that seemingly the hypocrite the request be made for a worthy person, the deed itself is is not guilty of simony. not simoniacal, because it is based on a worthy cause, on Whether those who are guilty of simony are fittingly punished by being deprived of IIa IIae q. 100 a. 6 what they have acquired by simony? Objection 1. It would seem that those who are guilty mission to a monastery by simony, and there takes the of simony are not fittingly punished by being deprived of solemn vow of profession. But no one should be freed what they have acquired by simony. Simony is commit- from the obligation of a vow on account of a fault he has ted by acquiring spiritual things in return for a remuner- committed. Therefore he should not be expelled from the ation. Now certain spiritual things cannot be lost when monastic state which he has acquired by simony. once acquired, such as all characters that are imprinted by Objection 6. Further, in this world external punish- a consecration. Therefore it is not a fitting punishment for ment is not inflicted for the internal movements of the a person to be deprived of what he has acquired simonia- heart, whereof God alone is the judge. Now simony is cally. committed in the mere intention or will, wherefore it is Objection 2. Further, it sometimes happens that one defined in reference to the will, as stated above (a. 1, ad who has obtained the episcopate by simony commands a 2). Therefore a person should not always be deprived of subject of his to receive orders from him: and apparently what he has acquired by simony. the subject should obey, so long as the Church tolerates Objection 7. Further, to be promoted to greater dig- him. Yet no one ought to receive from him that has not nity is much less than to retain that which one has already the power to give. Therefore a bishop does not lose his received. Now sometimes those who are guilty of simony episcopal power, if he has acquired it by simony. are, by dispensation, promoted to greater dignity. There- Objection 3. Further, no one should be punished fore they should not always be deprived of what they have for what was done without his knowledge and consent, received. since punishment is due for sin which is voluntary, as was On the contrary, It is written (I, qu. i, cap. Si quis shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 74, Aa. 1,2; Ia IIae, q. 77, a. 7). Episcopus): “He that has been ordained shall profit noth- Now it happens sometimes that a person acquires some- ing from his ordination or promotion that he has acquired thing spiritual, which others have procured for him with- by the bargain, but shall forfeit the dignity or cure that he out his knowledge and consent. Therefore he should not has acquired with his money.” be punished by being deprived of what has been bestowed I answer that, No one can lawfully retain that which on him. he has acquired against the owner’s will. For instance, Objection 4. Further, no one should profit by his own if a steward were to give some of his lord’s property to sin. Yet, if a person who has acquired an ecclesiastical a person, against his lord’s will and orders, the recipi- benefice by simony, were to restore what he has received, ent could not lawfully retain what he received. Now Our this would sometimes turn to the profit of those who had Lord, Whose stewards and ministers are the prelates of a share in his simony; for instance, when a prelate and his churches, ordered spiritual things to be given gratis, ac- entire chapter have consented to the simony. Therefore cording to Mat. 10:8, “Freely have you received, freely that which has been acquired by simony ought not always give.” Wherefore whosoever acquires spiritual things in to be restored. return for a remuneration cannot lawfully retain them. Objection 5. Further, sometimes a person obtains ad- Moreover, those who are guilty of simony, by either sell- 1672 ing or buying spiritual things, as well as those who act as one buys a thing of a person who cannot sell it. Where-go-between, are sentenced to other punishments, namely, fore if a man, knowingly and spontaneously, receives Or- infamy and deposition, if they be clerics, and excommu- ders or an ecclesiastical benefice simoniacally, not only nication if they be laymen, as stated qu. i, cap. Si quis is he deprived of what he has received, by forfeiting the Episcopus∗. exercise of his order, and resigning the benefice and the Reply to Objection 1. He that has received a sacred fruits acquired therefrom, but also in addition to this he is Order simoniacally, receives the character of the Order on punished by being marked with infamy. Moreover, he is account of the efficacy of the sacrament: but he does not bound to restore not only the fruit actually acquired, but receive the grace nor the exercise of the Order, because he also such as could have been acquired by a careful posses- has received the character by stealth as it were, and against sor (which, however, is to be understood of the net fruits, the will of the Supreme Lord. Wherefore he is suspended, allowance being made for expenses incurred on account of by virtue of the law, both as regards himself, namely, that the fruits), excepting those fruits that have been expended he should not busy himself about exercising his Order, and for the good of the Church. as regards others, namely, that no one may communicate On the other hand, if a man’s promotion be procured with him in the exercise of his Order, whether his sin be simoniacally by others, without his knowledge and con- public or secret. Nor may he reclaim the money which he sent, he forfeits the exercise of his Order, and is bound to basely gave, although the other party unjustly retains it. resign the benefice obtained together with fruits still ex- Again, a man who is guilty of simony, through having tant; but he is not bound to restore the fruits which he has conferred Orders simoniacally, or through having simoni- consumed, since he possessed them in good faith. Excep- acally granted or received a benefice, or through having tion must be made in the case when his promotion has been a go-between in a simoniacal transaction, if he has been deceitfully procured by an enemy of his; or when he done so publicly, is suspended by virtue of the law, as re- expressly opposes the transaction, for then he is not bound gards both himself and others; but if he has acted in secret to resign, unless subsequently he agree to the transaction, he is suspended by virtue of the law, as regards himself by paying what was promised. alone, and not as regards others. Reply to Objection 4. Money, property, or fruits si- Reply to Objection 2. One ought not to receive Or- moniacally received, must be restored to the Church that ders from a bishop one knows to have been promoted has incurred loss by their transfer, notwithstanding the simoniacally, either on account of his command or for fact that the prelate or a member of the chapter of that fear of his excommunication: and such as receive Orders church was at fault, since others ought not to be the losers from him do not receive the exercise of their Orders, even by his sin: in suchwise, however, that, as far as possible, though they are ignorant of his being guilty of simony; the guilty parties be not the gainers. But if the prelate and and they need to receive a dispensation. Some, however, the entire chapter be at fault, restitution must be made, maintain that one ought to receive Orders in obedience to with the consent of superior authority, either to the poor his command unless one can prove him to be guilty of or to some other church. simony, but that one ought not to exercise the Order with- Reply to Objection 5. If there are any persons who out a dispensation. But this is an unreasonable statement, have been simoniacally admitted into a monastery, they because no one should obey a man to the extent of com- must quit: and if the simony was committed with their municating with him in an unlawful action. Now he that knowledge since the holding of the General Council∗, is, by virtue of the law, suspended as regards both him- they must be expelled from their monastery without hope self and others, confers Orders unlawfully: wherefore no of return, and do perpetual penance under a stricter rule, one should communicate with him, by receiving Orders or in some house of the same order, if a stricter one be from him for any cause whatever. If, however, one be not not found. If, however, this took place before the Council, certain on the point, one ought not to give credence to an- they must be placed in other houses of the same order. If other’s sin, and so one ought with a good conscience to re- this cannot be done, they must be received into monaster- ceive Orders from him. And if the bishop has been guilty ies of the same order, by way of compensation, lest they of simony otherwise than by a simoniacal promotion, and wander about the world, but they must not be admitted to the fact be a secret, one can receive Orders from him be- their former rank, and must be assigned a lower place. cause he is not suspended as regards others, but only as On the other hand, if they were received simonia- regards himself, as stated above (ad 1). cally, without their knowledge, whether before or after the Reply to Objection 3. To be deprived of what one Council, then after quitting they may be received again, has received is not only the punishment of a sin, but is their rank being changed as stated. also sometimes the effect of acquiring unjustly, as when Reply to Objection 6. In God’s sight the mere will ∗ Qu. iii, can. Si quis praebendas ∗ Fourth Lateran Council, A.D. 1215, held by Innocent III 1673 makes a man guilty of simony; but as regards the external he has received simoniacally, so that he will receive either ecclesiastical punishment he is not punished as a simo- the lesser dispensation allowing him to communicate with niac, by being obliged to resign, but is bound to repent of the laity, or a greater dispensation, allowing him after do- his evil intention. ing penance to retain his order in some other Church; or Reply to Objection 7. The Pope alone can grant a dis- again a greater dispensation, allowing him to remain in pensation to one who has knowingly received a benefice the same Church, but in minor orders; or a full dispensa- (simoniacally). In other cases the bishop also can dis- tion allowing him to exercise even the major orders in the pense, provided the beneficiary first of all renounce what same Church, but not to accept a prelacy. 1674 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 101 Of Piety (In Four Articles) After religion we must consider piety, the consideration of which will render the opposite vices manifest. Accordingly four points of inquiry arise with regard to piety: (1) To whom does piety extend? (2) What does piety make one offer a person? (3) Whether piety is a special virtue? (4) Whether the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of religion? Whether piety extends to particular human individuals? IIa IIae q. 101 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that piety does not extend to are our parents and our country, that have given us birth particular human individuals. For Augustine says (De Civ. and nourishment. Consequently man is debtor chiefly to Dei x) that piety denotes, properly speaking, the worship his parents and his country, after God. Wherefore just as of God, which the Greeks designate by the term eusebeia. it belongs to religion to give worship to God, so does it But the worship of God does not denote relation to man, belong to piety, in the second place, to give worship to but only to God. Therefore piety does not extend defi- one’s parents and one’s country. nitely to certain human individuals. The worship due to our parents includes the worship Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral. i): “Piety, given to all our kindred, since our kinsfolk are those who on her day, provides a banquet, because she fills the in- descend from the same parents, according to the Philoso- most recesses of the heart with works of mercy.” Now the pher (Ethic. viii, 12). The worship given to our country works of mercy are to be done to all, according to Augus- includes homage to all our fellow-citizens and to all the tine (De Doctr. Christ. i). Therefore piety does not extend friends of our country. Therefore piety extends chiefly to definitely to certain special persons. these. Objection 3. Further, in human affairs there are many Reply to Objection 1. The greater includes the lesser: other mutual relations besides those of kindred and citi- wherefore the worship due to God includes the worship zenship, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 11,12), and due to our parents as a particular. Hence it is written on each of them is founded a kind of friendship, which (Malach. 1:6): “If I be a father, where is My honor?” would seem to be the virtue of piety, according to a gloss Consequently the term piety extends also to the divine on 2 Tim. 3:5, “Having an appearance indeed of piety worship. [Douay: ‘godliness’].” Therefore piety extends not only Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Civ. to one’s kindred and fellow-citizens. Dei x), “the term piety is often used in connection with On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that works of mercy, in the language of the common people; “it is by piety that we do our duty towards our kindred the reason for which I consider to be the fact that God and well-wishers of our country and render them faithful Himself has declared that these works are more pleasing service.” to Him than sacrifices. This custom has led to the appli- I answer that, Man becomes a debtor to other men cation of the word ‘pious’ to God Himself.” in various ways, according to their various excellence and Reply to Objection 3. The relations of a man with the various benefits received from them. on both counts his kindred and fellow-citizens are more referable to the God holds first place, for He is supremely excellent, and principles of his being than other relations: wherefore the is for us the first principle of being and government. In the term piety is more applicable to them. second place, the principles of our being and government Whether piety provides support for our parents? IIa IIae q. 101 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that piety does not provide fore it does not belong to piety to provide support for one’s support for our parents. For, seemingly, the precept of parents. the decalogue, “Honor thy father and mother,” belongs to Objection 2. Further, a man is bound to lay up for piety. But this prescribes only the giving of honor. There- those whom he is bound to support. Now according to the 1675 Apostle (2 Cor. 12:14), “neither ought the children to lay reverence or honor, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. up for the parents.” Therefore piety does not oblige them Dei x), “we are said to give homage to those whose mem- to support their parents. ory or presence we honor.” Objection 3. Further, piety extends not only to one’s Reply to Objection 1. According to our Lord’s in- parents, but also to other kinsmen and to one’s fellow- terpretation (Mat. 15:3-6) the honor due to our parents citizens, as stated above (a. 1). But one is not bound to includes whatever support we owe them; and the reason support all one’s kindred and fellow-citizens. Therefore for this is that support is given to one’s father because it is neither is one bound to support one’s parents. due to him as to one greater. On the contrary, our Lord (Mat. 15:3-6) reproved Reply to Objection 2. Since a father stands in the re- the Pharisees for hindering children from supporting their lation of principle, and his son in the relation of that which parents. is from a principle, it is essentially fitting for a father to I answer that, We owe something to our parents in support his son: and consequently he is bound to support two ways: that is to say, both essentially, and accidentally. him not only for a time, but for all his life, and this is to lay We owe them essentially that which is due to a father as by. On the other hand, for the son to bestow something on such: and since he is his son’s superior through being the his father is accidental, arising from some momentary ne- principle of his being, the latter owes him reverence and cessity, wherein he is bound to support him, but not to lay service. Accidentally, that is due to a father, which it befits by as for a long time beforehand, because naturally par-him to receive in respect of something accidental to him, ents are not the successors of their children, but children for instance, if he be ill, it is fitting that his children should of their parents. visit him and see to his cure; if he be poor, it is fitting that Reply to Objection 3. As Tully says (De Invent. they should support him; and so on in like instance, all of Rhet. ii), “we offer homage and duty to all our kindred which come under the head of service due. Hence Tully and to the well-wishers of our country”; not, however, says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that “piety gives both duty and equally to all, but chiefly to our parents, and to others ac- homage”: “duty” referring to service, and “homage” to cording to our means and their personal claims. Whether piety is a special virtue distinct from other virtues? IIa IIae q. 101 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that piety is not a special virtue much as it pays duty and homage to our parents and coun-distinct from other virtues. For the giving of service and try, and to those who are related thereto. Therefore piety homage to anyone proceeds from love. But it belongs to is a special virtue. piety. Therefore piety is not a distinct virtue from charity. Reply to Objection 1. Just as religion is a protesta- Objection 2. Further, it is proper to religion to give tion of faith, hope and charity, whereby man is primar- worship to God. But piety also gives worship to God, ac- ily directed to God, so again piety is a protestation of the cording to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x). Therefore piety is charity we bear towards our parents and country. not distinct from religion. Reply to Objection 2. God is the principle of our be- Objection 3. Further, piety, whereby we give our ing and government in a far more excellent manner than country worship and duty, seems to be the same as le- one’s father or country. Hence religion, which gives wor- gal justice, which looks to the common good. But legal ship to God, is a distinct virtue from piety, which pays justice is a general virtue, according to the Philosopher homage to our parents and country. But things relat- (Ethic. v, 1,2). Therefore piety is not a special virtue. ing to creatures are transferred to God as the summit of On the contrary, It is accounted by Tully (De Invent. excellence and causality, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. Rhet. ii) as a part of justice. i): wherefore, by way of excellence, piety designates the I answer that, A special virtue is one that regards an worship of God, even as God, by way of excellence, is object under a special aspect. Since, then, the nature of called “Our Father.” justice consists in rendering another person his due, wher- Reply to Objection 3. Piety extends to our country ever there is a special aspect of something due to a person, in so far as the latter is for us a principle of being: but there is a special virtue. Now a thing is indebted in a spe- legal justice regards the good of our country, considered cial way to that which is its connatural principle of being as the common good: wherefore legal justice has more of and government. And piety regards this principle, inas- the character of a general virtue than piety has. 1676 Whether the duties of piety towards one’s parents should be omitted for the sake of IIa IIae q. 101 a. 4 religion? Objection 1. It seems that the duties of piety towards to piety to pay duty and homage to one’s parents accord- one’s parents should be omitted for the sake of religion. ing to the due mode. But it is not the due mode that man For Our Lord said (Lk. 14:26): “If any man come to Me, should tend to worship his father rather than God, but, as and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and chil- Ambrose says on Lk. 12:52, “the piety of divine religion dren, and brethren, and sisters, yea and his own life also, takes precedence of the claims of kindred.” he cannot be My disciple.” Hence it is said in praise of Accordingly, if the worship of one’s parents take one James and John (Mat. 4:22) that they left “their nets and away from the worship of God it would no longer be an act father, and followed” Christ. Again it is said in praise of of piety to pay worship to one’s parents to the prejudice of the Levites (Dt. 33:9): “Who hath said to his father, and God. Hence Jerome says (Ep. ad Heliod.): “Though thou to his mother: I do not know you; and to his brethren: trample upon thy father, though thou spurn thy mother, I know you not; and their own children they have not turn not aside, but with dry eyes hasten to the standard of known. These have kept Thy word.” Now a man who the cross; it is the highest degree of piety to be cruel in knows not his parents and other kinsmen, or who even this matter.” Therefore in such a case the duties of piety hates them, must needs omit the duties of piety. There- towards one’s parents should be omitted for the sake of fore the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of the worship religion gives to God. If, however, by pay- religion. ing the services due to our parents, we are not withdrawn Objection 2. Further, it is written (Lk. 9:59,60) that in from the service of God, then will it be an act of piety, answer to him who said: “Suffer me first to go and bury and there will be no need to set piety aside for the sake of my father,” Our Lord replied: “Let the dead bury their religion. dead: but go thou, and preach the kingdom of God.” Now Reply to Objection 1. Gregory expounding this say- the latter pertains to religion, while it is a duty of piety ing of our Lord says (Hom. xxxvii in Ev.) that “when we to bury one’s father. Therefore a duty of piety should be find our parents to be a hindrance in our way to God, we omitted for the sake of religion. must ignore them by hating and fleeing from them.” For Objection 3. Further, God is called “Our Father” by if our parents incite us to sin, and withdraw us from the excellence. Now just as we worship our parents by pay- service of God, we must, as regards this point, abandon ing them the duties of piety so do we worship God by and hate them. It is in this sense that the Levites are said religion. Therefore the duties of piety should be omitted to have not known their kindred, because they obeyed the for the sake of the worship of religion. Lord’s command, and spared not the idolaters (Ex. 32). Objection 4. Further, religious are bound by a vow James and John are praised for leaving their parents and which they may not break to fulfil the observances of reli- following our Lord, not that their father incited them to gion. Now in accordance with those observances they are evil, but because they deemed it possible for him to find hindered from supporting their parents, both on the score another means of livelihood, if they followed Christ. of poverty, since they have nothing of their own, and on Reply to Objection 2. Our Lord forbade the disci- the score of obedience, since they may not leave the clois- ple to bury his father because, according to Chrysostom ter without the permission of their superior. Therefore the (Hom. xxviii in Matth.), “Our Lord by so doing saved duties of piety towards one’s parents should be omitted him from many evils, such as the sorrows and worries for the sake of religion. and other things that one anticipates under these circum- On the contrary, Our Lord reproved the Pharisees stances. For after the burial the will had to be read, the (Mat. 15:3-6) who taught that for the sake of religion one estate had to be divided, and so forth: but chiefly, because ought to refrain from paying one’s parents the honor we there were others who could see to the funeral.” Or, ac- owe them. cording to Cyril’s commentary on Lk. 9, “this disciple’s I answer that, Religion and piety are two virtues. request was, not that he might bury a dead father, but that Now no virtue is opposed to another virtue, since accord- he might support a yet living father in the latter’s old age, ing to the Philosopher, in his book on the Categories (Cap. until at length he should bury him. This is what Our Lord De oppos.), “good is not opposed to good.” Therefore it did not grant, because there were others, bound by the du- is impossible that religion and piety mutually hinder one ties of kindred, to take care of him.” another, so that the act of one be excluded by the act of Reply to Objection 3. Whatever we give our parents the other. Now, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 7, a. 2; Ia out of piety is referred by us to God; just as other works of IIae, q. 18, a. 3), the act of every virtue is limited by the mercy which we perform with regard to any of our neigh- circumstances due thereto, and if it overstep them it will bors are offered to God, according to Mat. 25:40: “As be an act no longer of virtue but of vice. Hence it belongs long as you did it to one of. . . My least. . . you did it to 1677 Me.” Accordingly, if our carnal parents stand in need of ered aright, would be to tempt God: since, while having our assistance, so that they have no other means of sup- human means at hand, he would be exposing his parents port, provided they incite us to nothing against God, we to danger, in the hope of God’s assistance. on the other must not abandon them for the sake of religion. But if we hand, if the parents can find means of livelihood with- cannot devote ourselves to their service without sin, or if out him, it is lawful for him to abandon them and enter they can be supported without our assistance, it is lawful religion, because children are not bound to support their to forego their service, so as to give more time to religion. parents except in cases of necessity, as stated above. He Reply to Objection 4. We must speak differently of that has already made his profession in religion is deemed one who is yet in the world, and of one who has made his to be already dead to the world: wherefore he ought not, profession in religion. For he that is in the world, if he under pretext of supporting his parents, to leave the clois- has parents unable to find support without him, he must ter where he is buried with Christ, and busy himself once not leave them and enter religion, because he would be more with worldly affairs. Nevertheless he is bound, sav- breaking the commandment prescribing the honoring of ing his obedience to his superiors, and his religious state parents. Some say, however, that even then he might aban- withal, to make points efforts for his parents’ support. don them, and leave them in God’s care. But this, consid- 1678 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 102 Of Observance, Considered in Itself, and of Its Parts (In Three Articles) We must now consider observance and its parts, the considerations of which will manifest the contrary vices. Under the head of observance there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues? (2) What does observance offer? (3) Of its comparison with piety. Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues? IIa IIae q. 102 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that observance is not a special of government with regard to certain things: for instance, virtue, distinct from other virtues. For virtues are distin- the governor of a state in civil matters, the commander of guished by their objects. But the object of observance is an army in matters of warfare, a professor in matters of not distinct from the object of piety: for Tully says (De learning, and so forth. Hence it is that all such persons are Invent. Rhet. ii) that “it is by observance that we pay designated as “fathers,” on account of their being charged worship and honor to those who excel in some kind of with like cares: thus the servants of Naaman said to him (4 dignity.” But worship and honor are paid also by piety to Kings 5:13): “Father, if the prophet had bid thee do some our parents, who excel in dignity. Therefore observance great thing,” etc. is not a distinct virtue from piety. Therefore, just as, in a manner, religion, whereby wor- Objection 2. Further, just as honor and worship are ship is given to find piety, whereby we worship our so un- due to those that are in a position of dignity, so also are der piety we find observance, whereby worship and honor they due to those who excel in science and virtue. But are paid to persons in positions of dignity. there is no special virtue whereby we pay honor and wor- Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 101, a. 3, ad ship to those who excel in science and virtue. Therefore 2), religion goes by the name of piety by way of superem- observance, whereby we pay worship and honor to those inence, although piety properly so called is distinct from who excel in dignity, is not a special virtue distinct from religion; and in the same way piety can be called obser- other virtues. vance by way of excellence, although observance properly Objection 3. Further, we have many duties towards speaking is distinct from piety. those who are in a position of dignity, the fulfilment of Reply to Objection 2. By the very fact of being in a which is required by law, according to Rom. 13:7, “Ren- position of dignity a man not only excels as regards his der. . . to all men their dues: tribute to whom tribute is position, but also has a certain power of governing sub- due,” etc. Now the fulfilment of the requirements of the jects, wherefore it is fitting that he should be considered law belongs to legal justice, or even to special justice. as a principle inasmuch as he is the governor of others. Therefore observance is not by itself a special virtue dis- On the other hand, the fact that a man has perfection of tinct from other virtues. science and virtue does not give him the character of a On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons principle in relation to others, but merely a certain excel- observance along with the other parts of justice, which are lence in himself. Wherefore a special virtue is appointed special virtues. for the payment of worship and honor to persons in po- I answer that, As explained above (q. 101, Aa. 1,3; sitions of dignity. Yet, forasmuch as science, virtue and q. 80), according to the various excellences of those per- all like things render a man fit for positions of dignity, the sons to whom something is due, there must needs be a respect which is paid to anyone on account of any excel- corresponding distinction of virtues in a descending or- lence whatever belongs to the same virtue. der. Now just as a carnal father partakes of the character Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to special justice, of principle in a particular way, which character is found properly speaking, to pay the equivalent to those to whom in God in a universal way, so too a person who, in some we owe anything. Now this cannot be done to the vir- way, exercises providence in one respect, partakes of the tuous, and to those who make good use of their posi- character of father in a particular way, since a father is the tion of dignity, as neither can it be done to God, nor to principle of generation, of education, of learning and of our parents. Consequently these matters belong to an an- whatever pertains to the perfection of human life: while nexed virtue, and not to special justice, which is a princi- a person who is in a position of dignity is as a principle pal virtue. 1679 Legal justice extends to the acts of all the virtues, as stated above (q. 58, a. 6). Whether it belongs to observance to pay worship and honor to those who are in posi-IIa IIae q. 102 a. 2 tions of dignity? Objection 1. It seems that it does not belong to obser- cellence and power over that which is moved. Wherefore, vance to pay worship and honor to persons in positions of a person in a position of dignity is an object of twofold dignity. For according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x), we consideration: first, in so far as he obtains excellence of are said to worship those persons whom we hold in honor, position, together with a certain power over subjects: sec- so that worship and honor would seem to be the same. ondly, as regards the exercise of his government. In re- Therefore it is unfitting to define observance as paying spect of his excellence there is due to him honor, which worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity. is the recognition of some kind of excellence; and in re- Objection 2. Further, it belongs to justice that we pay spect of the exercise of his government, there is due to him what we owe: wherefore this belongs to observance also, worship, consisting in rendering him service, by obeying since it is a part of justice. Now we do not owe worship his commands, and by repaying him, according to one’s and honor to all persons in positions of dignity, but only faculty, for the benefits we received from him. to those who are placed over us. Therefore observance is Reply to Objection 1. Worship includes not only unfittingly defined as giving worship and honor to all. honor, but also whatever other suitable actions are con- Objection 3. Further, not only do we owe honor to nected with the relations between man and man. persons of dignity who are placed over us; we owe them Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 80), debt also fear and a certain payment of remuneration, accord- is twofold. One is legal debt, to pay which man is com- ing to Rom. 13:7, “Render. . . to all men their dues; tribute pelled by law; and thus man owes honor and worship to to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to those persons in positions of dignity who are placed over whom fear; honor to whom honor.” Moreover, we owe him. The other is moral debt, which is due by reason of a them reverence and subjection, according to Heb. 13:17, certain honesty: it is in this way that we owe worship and “Obey your prelates, and be subject to them.” Therefore honor to persons in positions of dignity even though we observance is not fittingly defined as paying worship and be not their subjects. honor. Reply to Objection 3. Honor is due to the excel- On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) lence of persons in positions of dignity, on account of that “it is by observance that we pay worship and honor to their higher rank: while fear is due to them on account of those who excel in some kind of dignity.” their power to use compulsion: and to the exercise of their I answer that, It belongs to persons in positions of government there is due both obedience, whereby subjects dignity to govern subjects. Now to govern is to move cer- are moved at the command of their superiors, and tributes, tain ones to their due end: thus a sailor governs his ship which are a repayment of their labor. by steering it to port. But every mover has a certain ex- Whether observance is a greater virtue than piety? IIa IIae q. 102 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that observance is a greater than piety, which pays worship to one’s kindred. virtue than piety. For the prince to whom worship is paid Objection 3. Further honor and reverence are due to by observance is compared to a father who is worshiped the virtuous in the first place after God. Now honor and by piety, as a universal to a particular governor; because reverence are paid to the virtuous by the virtue of obser- the household which a father governs is part of the state vance, as stated above (a. 1, ad 3). Therefore observance which is governed by the prince. Now a universal power is takes the first place after religion. greater, and inferiors are more subject thereto. Therefore On the contrary, The precepts of the Law prescribe observance is a greater virtue than piety. acts of virtue. Now, immediately after the precepts of re- Objection 2. Further, persons in positions of dignity ligion, which belong to the first table, follows the precept take care of the common good. Now our kindred pertain of honoring our parents which refers to piety. Therefore to the private good, which we ought to set aside for the piety follows immediately after religion in the order of common good: wherefore it is praiseworthy to expose excellence. oneself to the danger of death for the sake of the com- I answer that, Something may be paid to persons in mon good. Therefore observance, whereby worship is positions of dignity in two ways. First, in relation to paid to persons in positions of dignity, is a greater virtue the common good, as when one serves them in the ad- 1680 ministration of the affairs of the state. This no longer father as a universal to a particular power, as regards ex-belongs to observance, but to piety, which pays worship ternal government, but not as regards the father being a not only to one’s father but also to one’s fatherland. Sec- principle of generation: for in this way the father should ondly, that which is paid to persons in positions of dignity be compared with the divine power from which all things refers specially to their personal usefulness or renown, derive their being. and this belongs properly to observance, as distinct from Reply to Objection 2. In so far as persons in po- piety. Therefore in comparing observance with piety we sitions of dignity are related to the common good, their must needs take into consideration the different relations worship does not pertain to observance, but to piety, as in which other persons stand to ourselves, which relations stated above. both virtues regard. Now it is evident that the persons Reply to Objection 3. The rendering of honor or wor- of our parents and of our kindred are more substantially ship should be proportionate to the person to whom it is akin to us than persons in positions of dignity, since birth paid not only as considered in himself, but also as com- and education, which originate in the father, belong more pared to those who pay them. Wherefore, though virtu- to one’s substance than external government, the princi- ous persons, considered in themselves, are more worthy ple of which is seated in those who are in positions of of honor than the persons of one’s parents, yet children dignity. For this reason piety takes precedence of obser- are under a greater obligation, on account of the benefits vance, inasmuch as it pays worship to persons more akin they have received from their parents and their natural kin- to us, and to whom we are more strictly bound. ship with them, to pay worship and honor to their parents Reply to Objection 1. The prince is compared to the than to virtuous persons who are not of their kindred. 1681 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 103 Of Dulia (In Four Articles) We must now consider the parts of observance. We shall consider (1) dulia, whereby we pay honor and other things pertaining thereto to those who are in a higher position; (2) obedience, whereby we obey their commands. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether honor is a spiritual or a corporal thing? (2) Whether honor is due to those only who are in a higher position? (3) Whether dulia, which pays honor and worship to those who are above us, is a special virtue, distinct from latria? (4) Whether it contains several species? Whether honor denotes something corporal? IIa IIae q. 103 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that honor does not denote bowing, saluting, and so forth, or by external things, as by something corporal. For honor is showing reverence in offering gifts, erecting statues, and the like. Accordingly acknowledgment of virtue, as may be gathered from the honor consists of signs, external and corporal. Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5). Now showing reverence is Reply to Objection 1. Reverence is not the same as something spiritual, since to revere is an act of fear, as honor: but on the one hand it is the primary motive for stated above (q. 81, a. 2, ad 1). Therefore honor is some- showing honor, in so far as one man honors another out of thing spiritual. the reverence he has for him; and on the other hand, it is Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher the end of honor, in so far as a person is honored in order (Ethic. iv, 3), “honor is the reward of virtue.” Now, since that he may be held in reverence by others. virtue consists chiefly of spiritual things, its reward is not Reply to Objection 2. According to the Philosopher something corporal, for the reward is more excellent than (Ethic. iv, 3), honor is not a sufficient reward of virtue: the merit. Therefore honor does not consist of corporal yet nothing in human and corporal things can be greater things. than honor, since these corporal things themselves are em- Objection 3. Further, honor is distinct from praise, as ployed as signs in acknowledgment of excelling virtue. It also from glory. Now praise and glory consist of exter- is, however, due to the good and the beautiful, that they nal things. Therefore honor consists of things internal and may be made known, according to Mat. 5:15, “Neither do spiritual. men light a candle, and put it under a bushel, but upon a On the contrary, Jerome in his exposition of 1 Tim. candlestick, that it may shine to all that are in the house.” 5:3, “Honor widows that are widows indeed,” and (1 Tim. In this sense honor is said to be the reward of virtue. 5:17), “let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of Reply to Objection 3. Praise is distinguished from double honor” etc. says (Ep. ad Ageruch.): “Honor here honor in two ways. First, because praise consists only of stands either for almsgiving or for remuneration.” Now verbal signs, whereas honor consists of any external signs, both of these pertain to spiritual things. Therefore honor so that praise is included in honor. Secondly, because by consists of corporal things. paying honor to a person we bear witness to a person’s ex- I answer that, Honor denotes a witnessing to a per- celling goodness absolutely, whereas by praising him we son’s excellence. Therefore men who wish to be hon- bear witness to his goodness in reference to an end: thus ored seek a witnessing to their excellence, according to we praise one that works well for an end. On the other the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5; viii, 8). Now witness is borne hand, honor is given even to the best, which is not referred either before God or before man. Before God, Who is the to an end, but has already arrived at the end, according to searcher of hearts, the witness of one’s conscience suf- the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5). fices. wherefore honor, so far as God is concerned, may Glory is the effect of honor and praise, since the re- consist of the mere internal movement of the heart, for sult of our bearing witness to a person’s goodness is that instance when a man acknowledges either God’s excel- his goodness becomes clear to the knowledge of many. lence or another man’s excellence before God. But, as The word “glory” signifies this, for “glory” is the same as regards men, one cannot bear witness, save by means of kleria, wherefore a gloss of Augustine on Rom. 16:27 signs, either by words, as when one proclaims another’s observes that glory is “clear knowledge together with excellence by word of mouth, or by deeds, for instance by praise.” 1682 Whether honor is properly due to those who are above us? IIa IIae q. 103 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that honor is not properly due to more excellent than they, but also in itself, or in relation those who are above us. For an angel is above any human to other persons, and in this way honor is always due to a wayfarer, according to Mat. 11:11, “He that is lesser in person, on account of some excellence or superiority. the kingdom of heaven is greater than John the Baptist.” For the person honored has no need to be more excel- Yet an angel forbade John when the latter wished to honor lent than those who honor him; it may suffice for him to him (Apoc. 22:10). Therefore honor is not due to those be more excellent than some others, or again he may be who are above us. more excellent than those who honor him in some respect Objection 2. Further, honor is due to a person in ac- and not simply. knowledgment of his virtue, as stated above (a. 1; q. 63, Reply to Objection 1. The angel forbade John to pay a. 3). But sometimes those who are above us are not vir- him, not any kind of honor, but the honor of adoration and tuous. Therefore honor is not due to them, as neither is it latria, which is due to God. Or again, he forbade him to due to the demons, who nevertheless are above us in the pay the honor of dulia, in order to indicate the dignity of order of nature. John himself, for which Christ equaled him to the angels Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 12:10): “according to the hope of glory of the children of God”: “With honor preventing one another,” and we read (1 Pet. wherefore he refused to be honored by him as though he 2:17): “Honor all men.” But this would not be so if honor were superior to him. were due to those alone who are above us. Therefore Reply to Objection 2. A wicked superior is honored honor is not due properly to those who are above us. for the excellence, not of his virtue but of his dignity, as Objection 4. Further, it is written (Tob. 1:16) that being God’s minister, and because the honor paid to him is Tobias “had ten talents of silver of that which he had paid to the whole community over which he presides. As been honored by the king”: and we read (Esther 6:11) for the demons, they are wicked beyond recall, and should that Assuerus honored Mardochaeus, and ordered it to be be looked upon as enemies, rather than treated with honor. proclaimed in his presence: “This honor is he worthy of Reply to Objection 3. In every man is to be found whom the king hath a mind to honor.” Therefore honor something that makes it possible to deem him better than is paid to those also who are beneath us, and it seems, in ourselves, according to Phil. 2:3, “In humility, let each consequence, that honor is not due properly to those who esteem others better than themselves,” and thus, too, we are above us. should all be on the alert to do honor to one another. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 12) Reply to Objection 4. Private individuals are some- that “honor is due to the best.” times honored by kings, not that they are above them in I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), honor is nothing the order of dignity but on account of some excellence but an acknowledgment of a person’s excelling goodness. of their virtue: and in this way Tobias and Mardochaeus Now a person’s excellence may be considered, not only in were honored by kings. relation to those who honor him, in the point of his being Whether dulia is a special virtue distinct from latria? IIa IIae q. 103 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that dulia is not a special virtue whereby one is moved towards the thing represented by distinct from latria. For a gloss on Ps. 7:1, “O Lord my the image. Now by dulia we honor a man as being made God, in Thee have I put my trust,” says: “Lord of all by to the image of God. For it is written of the wicked (Wis. His power, to Whom dulia is due; God by creation, to 2:22,23) that “they esteemed not the honor of holy souls, Whom we owe latria.” Now the virtue directed to God as for God created man incorruptible, and to the image of Lord is not distinct from that which is directed to Him as His own likeness He made him.” Therefore dulia is not a God. Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria. distinct virtue from latria whereby God is honored. Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), (Ethic. viii, 8), “to be loved is like being honored.” Now that “the homage due to man, of which the Apostle spoke the charity with which we love God is the same as that when he commanded servants to obey their masters and whereby we love our neighbor. Therefore dulia whereby which in Greek is called dulia, is distinct from latria which we honor our neighbor is not a distinct virtue from latria denotes the homage that consists in the worship of God.” with which we honor God. I answer that, According to what has been stated Objection 3. Further, the movement whereby one is above (q. 101, a. 3), where there are different aspects of moved towards an image is the same as the movement that which is due, there must needs be different virtues 1683 to render those dues. Now servitude is due to God and neighbor is God, since that which we love in our neighbor to man under different aspects: even as lordship is com- through charity is God alone. Wherefore the charity with petent to God and to man under different aspects. For which we love God is the same as that with which we love God has absolute and paramount lordship over the crea- our neighbor. Yet there are other friendships distinct from ture wholly and singly, which is entirely subject to His charity, in respect of the other reasons for which a man is power: whereas man partakes of a certain likeness to the loved. In like manner, since there is one reason for serv- divine lordship, forasmuch as he exercises a particular ing God and another for serving man, and for honoring the power over some man or creature. Wherefore dulia, which one or the other, latria and dulia are not the same virtue. pays due service to a human lord, is a distinct virtue from Reply to Objection 3. Movement towards an image latria, which pays due service to the lordship of God. It is, as such is referred to the thing represented by the image: moreover, a species of observance, because by observance yet not every movement towards an image is referred to we honor all those who excel in dignity, while dulia prop- the image as such, and consequently sometimes the move- erly speaking is the reverence of servants for their master, ment to the image differs specifically from the movement dulia being the Greek for servitude. to the thing. Accordingly we must reply that the honor or Reply to Objection 1. Just as religion is called piety subjection of dulia regards some dignity of a man abso- by way of excellence, inasmuch as God is our Father by lutely. For though, in respect of that dignity, man is made way of excellence, so again latria is called dulia by way to the image or likeness of God, yet in showing reverence of excellence, inasmuch as God is our Lord by way of ex- to a person, one does not always refer this to God actually. cellence. Now the creature does not partake of the power Or we may reply that the movement towards an image to create by reason of which latria is due to God: and so is, after a fashion, towards the thing, yet the movement to- this gloss drew a distinction, by ascribing latria to God in wards the thing need not be towards its image. Wherefore respect of creation, which is not communicated to a crea- reverence paid to a person as the image of God redounds ture, but dulia in respect of lordship, which is communi- somewhat to God: and yet this differs from the reverence cated to a creature. that is paid to God Himself, for this in no way refers to Reply to Objection 2. The reason why we love our His image. Whether dulia has various species? IIa IIae q. 103 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that dulia has various species. fore is dulia. For by dulia we show honor to our neighbor. Now dif- I answer that, Dulia may be taken in two ways. In one ferent neighbors are honored under different aspects, for way it may be taken in a wide sense as denoting reverence instance king, father and master, as the Philosopher states paid to anyone on account of any kind of excellence, and (Ethic. ix, 2). Since this difference of aspect in the object thus it comprises piety and observance, and any similar differentiates the species of virtue, it seems that dulia is virtue whereby reverence is shown towards a man. Taken divided into specifically different virtues. in this sense it will have parts differing specifically from Objection 2. Further, the mean differs specifically one another. In another way it may be taken in a strict from the extremes, as pale differs from white and black. sense as denoting the reverence of a servant for his lord, Now hyperdulia is apparently a mean between latria and for dulia signifies servitude, as stated above (a. 3). Taken dulia: for it is shown towards creatures having a special in this sense it is not divided into different species, but is affinity to God, for instance to the Blessed Virgin as being one of the species of observance, mentioned by Tully (De the mother of God. Therefore it seems that there are dif- Invent. Rhet. ii), for the reason that a servant reveres his ferent species of dulia, one being simply dulia, the other lord under one aspect, a soldier his commanding officer hyperdulia. under another, the disciple his master under another, and Objection 3. Further, just as in the rational creature so on in similar cases. we find the image of God, for which reason it is honored, Reply to Objection 1. This argument takes dulia in a so too in the irrational creature we find the trace of God. wide sense. Now the aspect of likeness denoted by an image differs Reply to Objection 2. Hyperdulia is the highest from the aspect conveyed by a trace. Therefore we must species of dulia taken in a wide sense, since the greatest distinguish a corresponding difference of dulia: and all the reverence is that which is due to a man by reason of his more since honor is shown to certain irrational creatures, having an affinity to God. as, for instance, to the wood of the Holy Cross. Reply to Objection 3. Man owes neither subjection On the contrary, Dulia is condivided with latria. But nor honor to an irrational creature considered in itself, in- latria is not divided into different species. Neither there- deed all such creatures are naturally subject to man. As 1684 to the Cross of Christ, the honor we pay to it is the same ceives the same honor as the king himself, according to as that which we pay to Christ, just as the king’s robe re- Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv). 1685 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 104 Of Obedience (In Six Articles) We must now consider obedience, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether one man is bound to obey another? (2) Whether obedience is a special virtue? (3) Of its comparison with other virtues; (4) Whether God must be obeyed in all things? (5) Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things? (6) Whether the faithful are bound to obey the secular power? Whether one man is bound to obey another? IIa IIae q. 104 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that one man is not bound to order the lower natural things need to be subject to the obey another. For nothing should be done contrary to the movement of the higher, so too in human affairs, in virtue divine ordinance. Now God has so ordered that man is of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors are bound ruled by his own counsel, according to Ecclus. 15:14, to obey their superiors. “God made man from the beginning, and left him in the Reply to Objection 1. God left man in the hand of hand of his own counsel.” Therefore one man is not bound his own counsel, not as though it were lawful to him to to obey another. do whatever he will, but because, unlike irrational crea- Objection 2. Further, if one man were bound to obey tures, he is not compelled by natural necessity to do what another, he would have to look upon the will of the per- he ought to do, but is left the free choice proceeding from son commanding him, as being his rule of conduct. Now his own counsel. And just as he has to proceed on his God’s will alone, which is always right, is a rule of human own counsel in doing other things, so too has he in the conduct. Therefore man is bound to obey none but God. point of obeying his superiors. For Gregory says (Moral. Objection 3. Further, the more gratuitous the service xxxv), “When we humbly give way to another’s voice, we the more is it acceptable. Now what a man does out of overcome ourselves in our own hearts.” duty is not gratuitous. Therefore if a man were bound Reply to Objection 2. The will of God is the first in duty to obey others in doing good deeds, for this very rule whereby all rational wills are regulated: and to this reason his good deeds would be rendered less acceptable rule one will approaches more than another, according to through being done out of obedience. Therefore one man a divinely appointed order. Hence the will of the one man is not bound to obey another. who issues a command may be as a second rule to the will On the contrary, It is prescribed (Heb. 13:17): “Obey of this other man who obeys him. your prelates and be subject to them.” Reply to Objection 3. A thing may be deemed gra- I answer that, Just as the actions of natural things tuitous in two ways. In one way on the part of the deed proceed from natural powers, so do human actions pro- itself, because, to wit, one is not bound to do it; in another ceed from the human will. In natural things it behooved way, on the part of the doer, because he does it of his own the higher to move the lower to their actions by the excel- free will. Now a deed is rendered virtuous, praiseworthy lence of the natural power bestowed on them by God: and and meritorious, chiefly according as it proceeds from the so in human affairs also the higher must move the lower will. Wherefore although obedience be a duty, if one obey by their will in virtue of a divinely established authority. with a prompt will, one’s merit is not for that reason di- Now to move by reason and will is to command. Where- minished, especially before God, Who sees not only the fore just as in virtue of the divinely established natural outward deed, but also the inward will. Whether obedience is a special virtue? IIa IIae q. 104 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that obedience is not a special fore obedience is not a special virtue. virtue. For disobedience is contrary to obedience. But Objection 2. Further, every special virtue is either disobedience is a general sin, because Ambrose says (De theological or moral. But obedience is not a theological Parad. viii) that “sin is to disobey the divine law.” There- virtue, since it is not comprised under faith, hope or char- 1686 ity. Nor is it a moral virtue, since it does not hold the mean a precept; and for disobedience that one treat the precept between excess and deficiency, for the more obedient one with actual contempt. On the other hand, if obedience be is the more is one praised. Therefore obedience is not a taken in a wide sense for the performance of any action special virtue. that may be a matter of precept, and disobedience for the Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) omission of that action through any intention whatever, that “obedience is the more meritorious and praiseworthy, then obedience will be a general virtue, and disobedience the less it holds its own.” But every special virtue is the a general sin. more to be praised the more it holds its own, since virtue Reply to Objection 2. Obedience is not a theologi- requires a man to exercise his will and choice, as stated in cal virtue, for its direct object is not God, but the precept Ethic. ii, 4. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue. of any superior, whether expressed or inferred, namely, a Objection 4. Further, virtues differ in species accord- simple word of the superior, indicating his will, and which ing to their objects. Now the object of obedience would the obedient subject obeys promptly, according to Titus seem to be the command of a superior, of which, appar- 3:1, “Admonish them to be subject to princes, and to obey ently, there are as many kinds as there are degrees of su- at a word,” etc. periority. Therefore obedience is a general virtue, com- It is, however, a moral virtue, since it is a part of jus- prising many special virtues. tice, and it observes the mean between excess and defi- On the contrary, obedience is reckoned by some to ciency. Excess thereof is measured in respect, not of quan- be a part of justice, as stated above (q. 80). tity, but of other circumstances, in so far as a man obeys I answer that, A special virtue is assigned to all good either whom he ought not, or in matters wherein he ought deeds that have a special reason of praise: for it belongs not to obey, as we have stated above regarding religion properly to virtue to render a deed good. Now obedience (q. 92, a. 2). We may also reply that as in justice, ex- to a superior is due in accordance with the divinely estab- cess is in the person who retains another’s property, and lished order of things, as shown above (a. 1), and there- deficiency in the person who does not receive his due, ac- fore it is a good, since good consists in mode, species and cording to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4), so too obedience order, as Augustine states (De Natura Boni iii)∗. Again, observes the mean between excess on the part of him who this act has a special aspect of praiseworthiness by rea- fails to pay due obedience to his superior, since he exceeds son of its object. For while subjects have many obliga- in fulfilling his own will, and deficiency on the part of the tions towards their superiors, this one, that they are bound superior, who does not receive obedience. Wherefore in to obey their commands, stands out as special among the this way obedience will be a mean between two forms of rest. Wherefore obedience is a special virtue, and its spe- wickedness, as was stated above concerning justice (q. 58, cific object is a command tacit or express, because the su- a. 10). perior’s will, however it become known, is a tacit precept, Reply to Objection 3. Obedience, like every virtue and a man’s obedience seems to be all the more prompt, requires the will to be prompt towards its proper object, forasmuch as by obeying he forestalls the express com- but not towards that which is repugnant to it. Now the mand as soon as he understands his superior’s will. proper object of obedience is a precept, and this proceeds Reply to Objection 1. Nothing prevents the one from another’s will. Wherefore obedience make a man’s same material object from admitting two special aspects will prompt in fulfilling the will of another, the maker, to which two special virtues correspond: thus a soldier, namely, of the precept. If that which is prescribed to him by defending his king’s fortress, fulfils both an act of for- is willed by him for its own sake apart from its being pre- titude, by facing the danger of death for a good end, and scribed, as happens in agreeable matters, he tends towards an act of justice, by rendering due service to his lord. it at once by his own will and seems to comply, not on ac- Accordingly the aspect of precept, which obedience con- count of the precept, but on account of his own will. But if siders, occurs in acts of all virtues, but not in all acts of that which is prescribed is nowise willed for its own sake, virtue, since not all acts of virtue are a matter of precept, but, considered in itself, repugnant to his own will, as hap- as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 96, a. 3). Moreover, certain pens in disagreeable matters, then it is quite evident that things are sometimes a matter of precept, and pertain to it is not fulfilled except on account of the precept. Hence no other virtue, such things for instance as are not evil Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that “obedience perishes or except because they are forbidden. Wherefore, if obedi- diminishes when it holds its own in agreeable matters,” ence be taken in its proper sense, as considering formally because, to wit, one’s own will seems to tend principally, and intentionally the aspect of precept, it will be a special not to the accomplishment of the precept, but to the ful- virtue, and disobedience a special sin: because in this way filment of one’s own desire; but that “it increases in dis- it is requisite for obedience that one perform an act of jus- agreeable or difficult matters,” because there one’s own tice or of some other virtue with the intention of fulfilling will tends to nothing beside the precept. Yet this must ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 5, a. 5 1687 be understood as regards outward appearances: for, on according to the various aspects of excellence. Obedi-the other hand, according to the judgment of God, Who ence, on the other hand, regards the precept of the person searches the heart, it may happen that even in agreeable that excels, and therefore admits of only one aspect. And matters obedience, while holding its own, is nonetheless since obedience is due to a person’s precept on account praiseworthy, provided the will of him that obeys tend no of reverence to him, it follows that obedience to a man is less devotedly† to the fulfilment of the precept. of one species, though the causes from which it proceeds Reply to Objection 4. Reverence regards directly the differ specifically. person that excels: wherefore it admits a various species Whether obedience is the greatest of the virtues? IIa IIae q. 104 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that obedience is the greatest dle place, and the highest are the goods of the soul; and of the virtues. For it is written (1 Kings 15:22): “Obedi- among these the chief, in a way, is the will, in so far as, ence is better than sacrifices.” Now the offering of sacri- by his will, man makes use of all other goods. There- fices belongs to religion, which is the greatest of all moral fore, properly speaking, the virtue of obedience, whereby virtues, as shown above (q. 81, a. 6). Therefore obedience we contemn our own will for God’s sake, is more praise- is the greatest of all virtues. worthy than the other moral virtues, which contemn other Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) goods for the sake of God. that “obedience is the only virtue that ingrafts virtues in Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that “obedience the soul and protects them when ingrafted.” Now the is rightly preferred to sacrifices, because by sacrifices an- cause is greater than the effect. Therefore obedience is other’s body is slain whereas by obedience we slay our greater than all the virtues. own will.” Wherefore even any other acts of virtue are Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) meritorious before God through being performed out of that “evil should never be done out of obedience: yet obedience to God’s will. For were one to suffer even mar- sometimes for the sake of obedience we should lay aside tyrdom, or to give all one’s goods to the poor, unless one the good we are doing.” Now one does not lay aside a directed these things to the fulfilment of the divine will, thing except for something better. Therefore obedience, which pertains directly to obedience, they could not be for whose sake the good of other virtues is set aside, is meritorious: as neither would they be if they were done better than other virtues. without charity, which cannot exist apart from obedience. On the contrary, obedience deserves praise because For it is written (1 Jn. 2:4,5): “He who saith that he it proceeds from charity: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) knoweth God, and keepeth not His commandments, is a that “obedience should be practiced, not out of servile liar. . . but he that keepeth His word, in him in very deed fear, but from a sense of charity, not through fear of pun- the charity of God is perfected”: and this because friends ishment, but through love of justice.” Therefore charity is have the same likes and dislikes. a greater virtue than obedience. Reply to Objection 1. Obedience proceeds from rev- I answer that, Just as sin consists in man contemn- erence, which pays worship and honor to a superior, and ing God and adhering to mutable things, so the merit of in this respect it is contained under different virtues, al- a virtuous act consists in man contemning created goods though considered in itself, as regarding the aspect of pre- and adhering to God as his end. Now the end is greater cept, it is one special virtue. Accordingly, in so far as it than that which is directed to the end. Therefore if a man proceeds from reverence for a superior, it is contained, in a contemns created goods in order that he may adhere to way, under observance; while in so far as it proceeds from God, his virtue derives greater praise from his adhering reverence for one’s parents, it is contained under piety; to God than from his contemning earthly things. And so and in so far as it proceeds from reverence for God, it those, namely the theological, virtues whereby he adheres comes under religion, and pertains to devotion, which is to God in Himself, are greater than the moral virtues, the principal act of religion. Wherefore from this point whereby he holds in contempt some earthly thing in or- of view it is more praiseworthy to obey God than to of- der to adhere to God. fer sacrifice, as well as because, “in a sacrifice we slay Among the moral virtues, the greater the thing which another’s body, whereas by obedience we slay our own a man contemns that he may adhere to God, the greater will,” as Gregory says (Moral. xxxv). As to the special the virtue. Now there are three kinds of human goods that case in which Samuel spoke, it would have been better for man may contemn for God’s sake. The lowest of these Saul to obey God than to offer in sacrifice the fat animals are external goods, the goods of the body take the mid- of the Amalekites against the commandment of God. † Cf. q. 82, a. 2 1688 Reply to Objection 2. All acts of virtue, in so far as virtuous acts: and in this way obedience is not prior to all they come under a precept, belong to obedience. Where- virtues, neither in point of time nor by nature. fore according as acts of virtue act causally or disposi- Reply to Objection 3. There are two kinds of good. tively towards their generation and preservation, obedi- There is that to which we are bound of necessity, for in- ence is said to ingraft and protect all virtues. And yet stance to love God, and so forth: and by no means may it does not follow that obedience takes precedence of all such a good be set aside on account of obedience. But virtues absolutely, for two reasons. First, because though there is another good to which man is not bound of ne- an act of virtue come under a precept, one may never- cessity, and this good we ought sometimes to set aside for theless perform that act of virtue without considering the the sake of obedience to which we are bound of necessity, aspect of precept. Consequently, if there be any virtue, since we ought not to do good by falling into sin. Yet as whose object is naturally prior to the precept, that virtue Gregory remarks (Moral. xxxv), “he who forbids his sub- is said to be naturally prior to obedience. Such a virtue jects any single good, must needs allow them many others, is faith, whereby we come to know the sublime nature of lest the souls of those who obey perish utterly from star- divine authority, by reason of which the power to com- vation, through being deprived of every good.” Thus the mand is competent to God. Secondly, because infusion of loss of one good may be compensated by obedience and grace and virtues may precede, even in point of time, all other goods. Whether God ought to be obeyed in all things? IIa IIae q. 104 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that God need not be obeyed in bound to obey the divine command. all things. For it is written (Mat. 9:30,31) that our Lord Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord in telling the blind after healing the two blind men commanded them, saying: men to conceal the miracle had no intention of binding “See that no man know this. But they going out spread His them with the force of a divine precept, but, as Gregory fame abroad in all that country.” Yet they are not blamed says (Moral. xix), “gave an example to His servants who for so doing. Therefore it seems that we are not bound to follow Him that they might wish to hide their virtue and obey God in all things. yet that it should be proclaimed against their will, in order Objection 2. Further, no one is bound to do anything that others might profit by their example.” contrary to virtue. Now we find that God commanded cer- Reply to Objection 2. Even as God does nothing con- tain things contrary to virtue: thus He commanded Abra- trary to nature (since “the nature of a thing is what God ham to slay his innocent son (Gn. 22); and the Jews does therein,” according to a gloss on Rom. 11), and yet to steal the property of the Egyptians (Ex. 11), which does certain things contrary to the wonted course of na- things are contrary to justice; and Osee to take to himself ture; so to God can command nothing contrary to virtue a woman who was an adulteress (Osee 3), and this is con- since virtue and rectitude of human will consist chiefly in trary to chastity. Therefore God is not to be obeyed in all conformity with God’s will and obedience to His com- things. mand, although it be contrary to the wonted mode of Objection 3. Further, whoever obeys God conforms virtue. Accordingly, then, the command given to Abra- his will to the divine will even as to the thing willed. But ham to slay his innocent son was not contrary to justice, we are not bound in all things to conform our will to the since God is the author of life an death. Nor again was divine will as to the thing willed, as stated above ( Ia IIae, it contrary to justice that He commanded the Jews to take q. 19, a. 10). Therefore man is not bound to obey God in things belonging to the Egyptians, because all things are all things. His, and He gives them to whom He will. Nor was it On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 24:7): “All things contrary to chastity that Osee was commanded to take an that the Lord hath spoken we will do, and we will be obe- adulteress, because God Himself is the ordainer of hu- dient.” man generation, and the right manner of intercourse with I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), he who obeys woman is that which He appoints. Hence it is evident that is moved by the command of the person he obeys, just as the persons aforesaid did not sin, either by obeying God natural things are moved by their motive causes. Now just or by willing to obey Him. a God is the first mover of all things that are moved nat- Reply to Objection 3. Though man is not always urally, so too is He the first mover of all wills, as shown bound to will what God wills, yet he is always bound to above ( Ia IIae, q. 9, a. 6). Therefore just as all natural will what God wills him to will. This comes to man’s things are subject to the divine motion by a natural neces- knowledge chiefly through God’s command, wherefore sity so too all wills, by a kind of necessity of justice, are man is bound to obey God’s commands in all things. 1689 Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things? IIa IIae q. 104 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that subjects are bound to obey regard the former and serve the latter? Therefore if the their superiors in all things. For the Apostle says (Col. emperor commands one thing and God another, you must 3:20): “Children, obey your parents in all things,” and disregard the former and obey God.” Secondly, a subject farther on (Col. 3:22): “Servants, obey in all things your is not bound to obey his superior if the latter command masters according to the flesh.” Therefore in like man- him to do something wherein he is not subject to him. For ner other subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all Seneca says (De Beneficiis iii): “It is wrong to suppose things. that slavery falls upon the whole man: for the better part Objection 2. Further, superiors stand between God of him is excepted.” His body is subjected and assigned to and their subjects, according to Dt. 5:5, “I was the me- his master but his soul is his own. Consequently in mat- diator and stood between the Lord and you at that time, ters touching the internal movement of the will man is not to show you His words.” Now there is no going from ex- bound to obey his fellow-man, but God alone. treme to extreme, except through that which stands be- Nevertheless man is bound to obey his fellow-man in tween. Therefore the commands of a superior must be things that have to be done externally by means of the esteemed the commands of God, wherefore the Apostle body: and yet, since by nature all men are equal, he is not says (Gal. 4:14): “You. . . received me as an angel of God, bound to obey another man in matters touching the nature even as Christ Jesus” and (1 Thess. 2:13): “When you of the body, for instance in those relating to the support had received of us the word of the hearing of God, you of his body or the begetting of his children. Wherefore received it, not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the servants are not bound to obey their masters, nor children word of God.” Therefore as man is bound to obey God in their parents, in the question of contracting marriage or of all things, so is he bound to obey his superiors. remaining in the state of virginity or the like. But in mat- Objection 3. Further, just as religious in making their ters concerning the disposal of actions and human affairs, profession take vows of chastity and poverty, so do they a subject is bound to obey his superior within the sphere of also vow obedience. Now a religious is bound to observe his authority; for instance a soldier must obey his general chastity and poverty in all things. Therefore he is also in matters relating to war, a servant his master in matters bound to obey in all things. touching the execution of the duties of his service, a son On the contrary, It is written (Acts 5:29): “We ought his father in matters relating to the conduct of his life and to obey God rather than men.” Now sometimes the things the care of the household; and so forth. commanded by a superior are against God. Therefore su- Reply to Objection 1. When the Apostle says “in all periors are not to be obeyed in all things. things,” he refers to matters within the sphere of a father’s I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,4), he who or master’s authority. obeys is moved at the bidding of the person who com- Reply to Objection 2. Man is subject to God simply mands him, by a certain necessity of justice, even as a as regards all things, both internal and external, wherefore natural thing is moved through the power of its mover by he is bound to obey Him in all things. On the other hand, a natural necessity. That a natural thing be not moved by inferiors are not subject to their superiors in all things, but its mover, may happen in two ways. First, on account of a only in certain things and in a particular way, in respect of hindrance arising from the stronger power of some other which the superior stands between God and his subjects, mover; thus wood is not burnt by fire if a stronger force whereas in respect of other matters the subject is imme- of water intervene. Secondly, through lack of order in the diately under God, by Whom he is taught either by the movable with regard to its mover, since, though it is sub- natural or by the written law. ject to the latter’s action in one respect, yet it is not sub- Reply to Objection 3. Religious profess obedience ject thereto in every respect. Thus, a humor is sometimes as to the regular mode of life, in respect of which they subject to the action of heat, as regards being heated, but are subject to their superiors: wherefore they are bound not as regards being dried up or consumed. In like man- to obey in those matters only which may belong to the ner there are two reasons, for which a subject may not be regular mode of life, and this obedience suffices for sal- bound to obey his superior in all things. First on account vation. If they be willing to obey even in other matters, of the command of a higher power. For as a gloss says on this will belong to the superabundance of perfection; pro- Rom. 13:2, “They that resist [Vulg.: ‘He that resisteth’] vided, however, such things be not contrary to God or to the power, resist the ordinance of God” (cf. St. Augus- the rule they profess, for obedience in this case would be tine, De Verb. Dom. viii). “If a commissioner issue an unlawful. order, are you to comply, if it is contrary to the bidding Accordingly we may distinguish a threefold obedi- of the proconsul? Again if the proconsul command one ence; one, sufficient for salvation, and consisting in obey- thing, and the emperor another, will you hesitate, to dis- ing when one is bound to obey: secondly, perfect obedi- 1690 ence, which obeys in all things lawful: thirdly, indiscreet obedience, which obeys even in matters unlawful. Whether Christians are bound to obey the secular powers? IIa IIae q. 104 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that Christians are not bound to I answer that, Faith in Christ is the origin and cause obey the secular power. For a gloss on Mat. 17:25, “Then of justice, according to Rom. 3:22, “The justice of God the children are free,” says: “If in every kingdom the chil- by faith of Jesus Christ:” wherefore faith in Christ does dren of the king who holds sway over that kingdom are not void the order of justice, but strengthens it.” Now the free, then the children of that King, under Whose sway order of justice requires that subjects obey their superiors, are all kingdoms, should be free in every kingdom.” Now else the stability of human affairs would cease. Hence Christians, by their faith in Christ, are made children of faith in Christ does not excuse the faithful from the obli- God, according to Jn. 1:12: “He gave them power to be gation of obeying secular princes. made the sons of God, to them that believe in His name.” Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 5), sub- Therefore they are not bound to obey the secular power. jection whereby one man is bound to another regards the Objection 2. Further, it is written (Rom. 7:4): body; not the soul, which retains its liberty. Now, in this “You. . . are become dead to the law by the body of Christ,” state of life we are freed by the grace of Christ from de- and the law mentioned here is the divine law of the Old fects of the soul, but not from defects of the body, as the Testament. Now human law whereby men are subject to Apostle declares by saying of himself (Rom. 7:23) that the secular power is of less account than the divine law of in his mind he served the law of God, but in his flesh the the Old Testament. Much more, therefore, since they have law of sin. Wherefore those that are made children of become members of Christ’s body, are men freed from the God by grace are free from the spiritual bondage of sin, law of subjection, whereby they were under the power of but not from the bodily bondage, whereby they are held secular princes. bound to earthly masters, as a gloss observes on 1 Tim. Objection 3. Further, men are not bound to obey rob- 6:1, “Whosoever are servants under the yoke,” etc. bers, who oppress them with violence. Now, Augustine Reply to Objection 2. The Old Law was a figure of says (De Civ. Dei iv): “Without justice, what else is a the New Testament, and therefore it had to cease on the kingdom but a huge robbery?” Since therefore the author- advent of truth. And the comparison with human law does ity of secular princes is frequently exercised with injus- not stand because thereby one man is subject to another. tice, or owes its origin to some unjust usurpation, it seems Yet man is bound by divine law to obey his fellow-man. that Christians ought not to obey secular princes. Reply to Objection 3. Man is bound to obey secu- On the contrary, It is written (Titus 3:1): “Admon- lar princes in so far as this is required by order of jus- ish them to be subject to princes and powers,” and (1 Pet. tice. Wherefore if the prince’s authority is not just but 2:13,14): “Be ye subject. . . to every human creature for usurped, or if he commands what is unjust, his subjects God’s sake: whether it be to the king as excelling, or to are not bound to obey him, except perhaps accidentally, governors as sent by him.” in order to avoid scandal or danger. 1691 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 105 Of Disobedience (In Two Articles) We must now consider disobedience, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a mortal sin? (2) Whether it is the most grievous of sins? Whether disobedience is a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 105 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that disobedience is not a mor- the commands of a superior is a mortal sin, as being con- tal sin. For every sin is a disobedience, as appears from trary to the love of God, according to Rom. 13:2, “He that Ambrose’s definition given above (q. 104, a. 2, obj. 1). resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God.” It is Therefore if disobedience were a mortal sin, every sin also contrary to the love of our neighbor, as it withdraws would be mortal. from the superior who is our neighbor the obedience that Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that is his due. disobedience is born of vainglory. But vainglory is not a Reply to Objection 1. The definition given by Am- mortal sin. Neither therefore is disobedience. brose refers to mortal sin, which has the character of per- Objection 3. Further, a person is said to be disobe- fect sin. Venial sin is not disobedience, because it is not dient when he does not fulfil a superior’s command. But contrary to a precept, but beside it. Nor again is every superiors often issue so many commands that it is seldom, mortal sin disobedience, properly and essentially, but only if ever, possible to fulfil them. Therefore if disobedience when one contemns a precept, since moral acts take their were a mortal sin, it would follow that man cannot avoid species from the end. And when a thing is done contrary mortal sin, which is absurd. Wherefore disobedience is to a precept, not in contempt of the precept, but with some not a mortal sin. other purpose, it is not a sin of disobedience except mate- On the contrary, The sin of disobedience to parents rially, and belongs formally to another species of sin. is reckoned (Rom. 1:30; 2 Tim. 3:2) among other mortal Reply to Objection 2. Vainglory desires display of sins. excellence. And since it seems to point to a certain ex- I answer that, As stated above (q. 24, a. 12; Ia IIae, cellence that one be not subject to another’s command, it q. 72, a. 5; Ia IIae, q. 88, a. 1), a mortal sin is one that follows that disobedience arises from vainglory. But there is contrary to charity which is the cause of spiritual life. is nothing to hinder mortal sin from arising out of venial Now by charity we love God and our neighbor. The char- sin, since venial sin is a disposition to mortal. ity of God requires that we obey His commandments, as Reply to Objection 3. No one is bound to do the im- stated above (q. 24, a. 12). Therefore to be disobedient to possible: wherefore if a superior makes a heap of precepts the commandments of God is a mortal sin, because it is and lays them upon his subjects, so that they are unable to contrary to the love of God. fulfil them, they are excused from sin. Wherefore superi- Again, the commandments of God contain the precept ors should refrain from making a multitude of precepts. of obedience to superiors. Wherefore also disobedience to Whether disobedience is the most grievous of sins? IIa IIae q. 105 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that disobedience is the most sinning. Therefore disobedience is a sin against the Holy grievous of sins. For it is written (1 Kings 15:23): “It Ghost, and consequently is the most grievous of sins. is like the sin of witchcraft to rebel, and like the crime Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 5:19) of idolatry to refuse to obey.” But idolatry is the most that “by the disobedience of one man, many were made grievous of sins, as stated above (q. 94, a. 3). Therefore sinners.” Now the cause is seemingly greater than its ef- disobedience is the most grievous of sins. fect. Therefore disobedience seems to be a more grievous Objection 2. Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost sin than the others that are caused thereby. is one that removes the obstacles of sin, as stated above On the contrary, Contempt of the commander is a (q. 14, a. 2). Now disobedience makes a man contemn a more grievous sin than contempt of his command. Now precept which, more than anything, prevents a man from some sins are against the very person of the commander, 1692 such as blasphemy and murder. Therefore disobedience is God’s precept, from the very nature of disobedience is not the most grievous of sins. more grievous than a sin committed against a man, apart I answer that, Not every disobedience is equally a from the latter being a disobedience to God. And I say sin: for one disobedience may be greater than another, in this because whoever sins against his neighbor acts also two ways. First, on the part of the superior commanding, against God’s commandment. And if the divine precept since, although a man should take every care to obey each be contemned in a yet graver matter, the sin is still more superior, yet it is a greater duty to obey a higher than a grievous. The disobedience that contains contempt of a lower authority, in sign of which the command of a lower man’s precept is less grievous than the sin which con- authority is set aside if it be contrary to the command of temns the man who made the precept, because reverence a higher authority. Consequently the higher the person for the person commanding should give rise to reverence who commands, the more grievous is it to disobey him: for his command. In like manner a sin that directly in- so that it is more grievous to disobey God than man. Sec- volves contempt of God, such as blasphemy, or the like, is ondly, on the part of the things commanded. For the per- more grievous (even if we mentally separate the disobedi- son commanding does not equally desire the fulfilment of ence from the sin) than would be a sin involving contempt all his commands: since every such person desires above of God’s commandment alone. all the end, and that which is nearest to the end. Where- Reply to Objection 1. This comparison of Samuel is fore disobedience is the more grievous, according as the one, not of equality but of likeness, because disobedience unfulfilled commandment is more in the intention of the redounds to the contempt of God just as idolatry does, person commanding. As to the commandments of God, it though the latter does so more. is evident that the greater the good commanded, the more Reply to Objection 2. Not every disobedience is sin grievous the disobedience of that commandment, because against the Holy Ghost, but only that which obstinacy is since God’s will is essentially directed to the good, the added: for it is not the contempt of any obstacle to sin that greater the good the more does God wish it to be fulfilled. constitutes sin against the Holy Ghost, else the contempt Consequently he that disobeys the commandment of the of any good would be a sin against the Holy Ghost, since love of God sins more grievously than one who disobeys any good may hinder a man from committing sin. The sin the commandment of the love of our neighbor. On the against the Holy Ghost consists in the contempt of those other hand, man’s will is not always directed to the greater goods which lead directly to repentance and the remission good: hence, when we are bound by a mere precept of of sins. man, a sin is more grievous, not through setting aside a Reply to Objection 3. The first sin of our first par- greater good, but through setting aside that which is more ent, from which sin was transmitted to a men, was not in the intention of the person commanding. disobedience considered as a special sin, but pride, from Accordingly the various degrees of disobedience must which then man proceeded to disobey. Hence the Apostle correspond with the various degrees of precepts: be- in these words seems to take disobedience in its relation cause the disobedience in which there is contempt of to every sin. 1693 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 106 Of Thankfulness or Gratitude (In Six Articles) We must now consider thankfulness or gratitude, and ingratitude. Concerning thankfulness there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether thankfulness is a special virtue distinct from other virtues? (2) Who owes more thanks to God, the innocent or the penitent? (3) Whether man is always bound to give thanks for human favors? (4) Whether thanksgiving should be deferred? (5) Whether thanksgiving should be measured according to the favor received or the disposition of the giver? (6) Whether one ought to pay back more than one has received? Whether thankfulness is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues? IIa IIae q. 106 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that thankfulness is not a spe- fourthly it is found in a benefactor, from whom we have cial virtue, distinct from other virtue. For we have re- received particular and private favors, on account of which ceived the greatest benefits from God, and from our par- we are under particular obligation to him. ents. Now the honor which we pay to God in return be- Accordingly, since what we owe God, or our father, longs to the virtue of religion, and the honor with which or a person excelling in dignity, is not the same as what we repay our parents belongs to the virtue of piety. There- we owe a benefactor from whom we have received some fore thankfulness or gratitude is not distinct from the other particular favor, it follows that after religion, whereby we virtues. pay God due worship, and piety, whereby we worship Objection 2. Further, proportionate repayment be- our parents, and observance, whereby we worship per- longs to commutative justice, according to the Philoso- sons excelling in dignity, there is thankfulness or grati- pher (Ethic. v, 4). Now the purpose of giving thanks is tude, whereby we give thanks to our benefactors. And repayment (Ethic. 5,4). Therefore thanksgiving, which it is distinct from the foregoing virtues, just as each of belongs to gratitude, is an act of justice. Therefore grati- these is distinct from the one that precedes, as falling short tude is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtues. thereof. Objection 3. Further, acknowledgment of favor re- Reply to Objection 1. Just as religion is superex- ceived is requisite for the preservation of friendship, ac- celling piety, so is it excelling thankfulness or grati- cording to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13; ix, 1). Now tude: wherefore giving thanks to God was reckoned above friendship is associated with all the virtues, since they are (q. 83, a. 17) among things pertaining to religion. the reason for which man is loved. Therefore thankfulness Reply to Objection 2. Proportionate repayment be- or gratitude, to which it belongs to repay favors received, longs to commutative justice, when it answers to the legal is not a special virtue. due; for instance when it is contracted that so much be On the contrary, Tully reckons thankfulness a special paid for so much. But the repayment that belongs to the part of justice (De Invent. Rhet. ii). virtue of thankfulness or gratitude answers to the moral I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 60, a. 3), debt, and is paid spontaneously. Hence thanksgiving is the nature of the debt to be paid must needs vary accord- less thankful when compelled, as Seneca observes (De ing to various causes giving rise to the debt, yet so that Beneficiis iii). the greater always includes the lesser. Now the cause of Reply to Objection 3. Since true friendship is based debt is found primarily and chiefly in God, in that He is on virtue, whatever there is contrary to virtue in a friend the first principle of all our goods: secondarily it is found is an obstacle to friendship, and whatever in him is virtu- in our father, because he is the proximate principle of our ous is an incentive to friendship. In this way friendship is begetting and upbringing: thirdly it is found in the person preserved by repayment of favors, although repayment of that excels in dignity, from whom general favors proceed; favors belongs specially to the virtue of gratitude. 1694 Whether the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent? IIa IIae q. 106 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that the innocent is more bound than the penitent. to give thanks to God than the penitent. For the greater On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 7:43): “To whom the gift one has received from God, the more one is bound more is forgiven, he loveth more∗.” Therefore for the to give Him thanks. Now the gift of innocence is greater same reason he is bound to greater thanksgiving. than that of justice restored. Therefore it seems that the I answer that, Thanksgiving [gratiarum actio] in the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the recipient corresponds to the favor [gratia] of the giver: so penitent. that when there is greater favor on the part of the giver, Objection 2. Further, a man owes love to his bene- greater thanks are due on the part of the recipient. Now factor just as he owes him gratitude. Now Augustine says a favor is something bestowed “gratis”: wherefore on the (Confess. ii): “What man, weighing his own infirmity, part of the giver the favor may be greater on two counts. would dare to ascribe his purity and innocence to his own First, owing to the quantity of the thing given: and in this strength; that so he should love Thee the less, as if he way the innocent owes greater thanksgiving, because he had less needed Thy mercy, whereby Thou remittest sins receives a greater gift from God, also, absolutely speak- to those that turn to Thee?” And farther on he says: “And ing, a more continuous gift, other things being equal. Sec- for this let him love Thee as much, yea and more, since by ondly, a favor may be said to be greater, because it is Whom he sees me to have been recovered from such deep given more gratuitously; and in this sense the penitent torpor of sin, by Him he sees himself to have been from is more bound to give thanks than the innocent, because the like torpor of sin preserved.” Therefore the innocent what he receives from God is more gratuitously given: is also more bound to give thanks than the penitent. since, whereas he was deserving of punishment, he has Objection 3. Further, the more a gratuitous favor is received grace. Wherefore, although the gift bestowed continuous, the greater the thanksgiving due for it. Now on the innocent is, considered absolutely, greater, yet the the favor of divine grace is more continuous in the inno- gift bestowed on the penitent is greater in relation to him: cent than in the penitent. For Augustine says (Confess. even as a small gift bestowed on a poor man is greater to iii): “To Thy grace I ascribe it, and to Thy mercy, that him than a great gift is to a rich man. And since actions Thou hast melted away my sins as it were ice. To Thy are about singulars, in matters of action, we have to take grace I ascribe also whatsoever I have not done of evil; note of what is such here and now, rather than of what is for what might I not have done?. . . Yea, all I confess to such absolutely, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii) in have been forgiven me, both what evils I committed by treating of the voluntary and the involuntary. my own wilfulness, and what by Thy guidance committed This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. not.” Therefore the innocent is more bound to give thanks Whether a man is bound to give thanks to every benefactor? IIa IIae q. 106 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that the a man is not bound to does a good turn to his master. Therefore gratitude is not give thanks to every benefactor. For a man may benefit due to every benefactor . himself just as he may harm himself, according to Ec- Objection 5. Further, no one is bound to do what he clus. 14:5, “He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be cannot do equitably and advantageously. Now it happens good?” But a man cannot thank himself, since thanksgiv- at times that the benefactor is very well off, and it would ing seems to pass from one person to another. Therefore be of no advantage to him to be repaid for a favor he has thanksgiving is not due to every benefactor. bestowed. Again it happens sometimes that the benefactor Objection 2. Further, gratitude is a repayment of an from being virtuous has become wicked, so that it would act of grace. But some favors are granted without grace, not seem equitable to repay him. Also the recipient of a and are rudely, slowly and grudgingly given. Therefore favor may be a poor man, and is quite unable to repay. gratitude is not always due to a benefactor. Therefore seemingly a man is not always bound to repay- Objection 3. Further, no thanks are due to one who ment for favors received. works for his own profit. But sometimes people bestow Objection 6. Further, no one is bound to do for an- favors for their own profit. Therefore thanks are not due other what is inexpedient and hurtful to him. Now some- to them. times it happens that repayment of a favor would be hurt- Objection 4. Further, no thanks are due to a slave, for ful or useless to the person repaid. Therefore favors are all that he is belongs to his master. Yet sometimes a slave not always to be repaid by gratitude. ∗ Vulg.: ‘To whom less is forgiven, he loveth less’ Lk. 7:47 1695 On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. 5:18): “In all a kindness, unless the giver has been the loser thereby.” things give thanks.” Reply to Objection 4. As Seneca observes (De Benef. I answer that, Every effect turns naturally to its cause; iii), “when a slave does what is wont to be demanded of a wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that “God turns slave, it is part of his service: when he does more than a all things to Himself because He is the cause of all”: for slave is bound to do, it is a favor: for as soon as he does the effect must needs always be directed to the end of the anything from a motive of friendship, if indeed that be his agent. Now it is evident that a benefactor, as such, is cause motive, it is no longer called service.” Wherefore grati- of the beneficiary. Hence the natural order requires that tude is due even to a slave, when he does more than his he who has received a favor should, by repaying the fa- duty. vor, turn to his benefactor according to the mode of each. Reply to Objection 5. A poor man is certainly not And, as stated above with regard to a father (q. 31, a. 3; ungrateful if he does what he can. For since kindness de- q. 101, a. 2), a man owes his benefactor, as such, honor pends on the heart rather than on the deed, so too grat- and reverence, since the latter stands to him in the relation itude depends chiefly the heart. Hence Seneca says (De of principle; but accidentally he owes him assistance or Benef. ii): “Who receives a favor gratefully, has already support, if he need it. begun to pay it back: and that we are grateful for favors Reply to Objection 1. In the words of Seneca (1 received should be shown by the outpourings of the heart, Benef. v), “just as a man is liberal who gives not to him- not only in his hearing but everywhere.” From this it is ev- self but to others, and gracious who forgives not himself ident that however well off a man may be, it is possible to but others, and merciful who is moved, not by his own thank him for his kindness by showing him reverence and misfortunes but by another’s, so too, no man confers a fa- honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14): vor on himself, he is but following the bent of his nature, “He that abounds should be repaid with honor, he that is which moves him to resist what hurts him, and to seek in want should be repaid with money”: and Seneca writes what is profitable.” Wherefore in things that one does for (De Benef. vi): “There are many ways of repaying those oneself, there is no place for gratitude or ingratitude, since who are well off, whatever we happen to owe them; such a man cannot deny himself a thing except by keeping it. as good advice, frequent fellowship, affable and pleasant Nevertheless things which are properly spoken of in rela- conversation without flattery.” Therefore there is no need tion to others are spoken of metaphorically in relation to for a man to desire neediness or distress in his benefac- oneself, as the Philosopher states regarding justice (Ethic. tor before repaying his kindness, because, as Seneca says v, 11), in so far, to wit, as the various parts of man are (De Benef. vi), “it were inhuman to desire this in one from considered as though they were various persons. whom you have received no favor; how much more so to Reply to Objection 2. It is the mark of a happy dispo- desire it in one whose kindness has made you his debtor!” sition to see good rather than evil. Wherefore if someone If, however, the benefactor has lapsed from virtue, has conferred a favor, not as he ought to have conferred nevertheless he should be repaid according to his state, it, the recipient should not for that reason withhold his that he may return to virtue if possible. But if he be so thanks. Yet he owes less thanks, than if the favor had wicked as to be incurable, then his heart has changed, been conferred duly, since in fact the favor is less, for, as and consequently no repayment is due for his kindness, Seneca remarks (De Benef. ii.) “promptness enhances, as heretofore. And yet, as far as it possible without sin, delay discounts a favor.” the kindness he has shown should be held in memory, as Reply to Objection 3. As Seneca observes (De Benef. the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3). vi), “it matters much whether a person does a kindness to Reply to Objection 6. As stated in the preceding re- us for his own sake, or for ours, or for both his and ours. ply, repayment of a favor depends chiefly on the affection He that considers himself only, and benefits because can- of the heart: wherefore repayment should be made in such not otherwise benefit himself, seems to me like a man who a way as to prove most beneficial. If, however, through the seeks fodder for his cattle.” And farther on: “If he has benefactor’s carelessness it prove detrimental to him, this done it for me in common with himself, having both of us is not imputed to the person who repays him, as Seneca in his mind, I am ungrateful and not merely unjust, unless observes (De Benef. vii): “It is my duty to repay, and not I rejoice that what was profitable to him is profitable to me to keep back and safeguard my repayment.” also. It is the height of malevolence to refuse to recognize 1696 Whether a man is bound to repay a favor at once? IIa IIae q. 106 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that a man is bound to repay a (De Benef. ii): “Do you wish to repay a favor? Receive favor at once. For we are bound to restore at once what it graciously.” As regards the gift, one ought to wait un- we owe, unless the term be fixed. Now there is no term til such a time as will be convenient to the benefactor. In prescribed for the repayment of favors, and yet this repay- fact, if instead of choosing a convenient time, one wished ment is a duty, as stated above (a. 3). Therefore a man is to repay at once, favor for favor, it would not seem to be a bound to repay a favor at once. virtuous, but a constrained repayment. For, as Seneca ob- Objection 2. Further, a good action would seem to serves (De Benef. iv), “he that wishes to repay too soon, be all the more praiseworthy according as it is done with is an unwilling debtor, and an unwilling debtor is ungrate- greater earnestness. Now earnestness seems to make a ful.” man do his duty without any delay. Therefore it is appar- Reply to Objection 1. A legal debt must be paid at ently more praiseworthy to repay a favor at once. once, else the equality of justice would not be preserved, Objection 3. Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii) that if one kept another’s property without his consent. But “it is proper to a benefactor to act freely and quickly.” a moral debt depends on the equity of the debtor: and Now repayment ought to equal the favor received. There- therefore it should be repaid in due time according as the fore it should be done at once. rectitude of virtue demands. On the contrary, Seneca says (De Benef. iv): “He Reply to Objection 2. Earnestness of the will is not that hastens to repay, is animated with a sense, not of grat- virtuous unless it be regulated by reason; wherefore it itude but of indebtedness.” is not praiseworthy to forestall the proper time through I answer that, Just as in conferring a favor two things earnestness. are to be considered, namely, the affection of the heart and Reply to Objection 3. Favors also should be con- the gift, so also must these things be considered in repay- ferred at a convenient time and one should no longer de- ing the favor. As regards the affection of the heart, re- lay when the convenient time comes; and the same is to payment should be made at once, wherefore Seneca says be observed in repaying favors. Whether in giving thanks we should look at the benefactor’s disposition or at the IIa IIae q. 106 a. 5 deed? Objection 1. It seems that in repaying favors we On the other hand, repayment of a favor belongs, should not look at the benefactor’s disposition but at the though in different ways, to friendship and likewise to the deed. For repayment is due to beneficence, and benefi- virtue of gratitude when it has the character of a moral cence consists in deeds, as the word itself denotes. There- debt. For in the repayment of friendship we have to con- fore in repaying favors we should look at the deed. sider the cause of friendship; so that in the friendship that Objection 2. Further, thanksgiving, whereby we re- is based on the useful, repayment should be made accord- pay favors, is a part of justice. But justice considers equal- ing to the usefulness accruing from the favor conferred, ity between giving and taking. Therefore also in repaying and in the friendship based on virtue repayment should be favors we should consider the deed rather than the dispo- made with regard for the choice or disposition of the giver, sition of the benefactor. since this is the chief requisite of virtue, as stated in Ethic. Objection 3. Further, no one can consider what he viii, 13. And likewise, since gratitude regards the favor does not know. Now God alone knows the interior dispo- inasmuch as it is bestowed gratis, and this regards the dis- sition. Therefore it is impossible to repay a favor accord- position of the giver, it follows again that repayment of a ing to the benefactor’s disposition. favor depends more on the disposition of the giver than on On the contrary, Seneca says (De Benef. i): “We the effect. are sometimes under a greater obligation to one who has Reply to Objection 1. Every moral act depends on the given little with a large heart, and has bestowed a small will. Hence a kindly action, in so far as it is praiseworthy favor, yet willingly.” and is deserving of gratitude, consists materially in the I answer that, The repayment of a favor may belong thing done, but formally and chiefly in the will. Hence to three virtues, namely, justice, gratitude and friendship. Seneca says (De Benef. i): “A kindly action consists not It belongs to justice when the repayment has the charac- in deed or gift, but in the disposition of the giver or doer.” ter of a legal debt, as in a loan and the like: and in such Reply to Objection 2. Gratitude is a part of justice, cases repayment must be made according to the quantity not indeed as a species is part of a genus, but by a kind of received. reduction to the genus of justice, as stated above (q. 80). 1697 Hence it does not follow that we shall find the same kind man also can know it. It is thus that a benefactor’s dis-of debt in both virtues. position is known by the way in which he does the kindly Reply to Objection 3. God alone sees man’s disposi- action, for instance through his doing it joyfully and read- tion in itself: but in so far as it is shown by certain signs, ily. Whether the repayment of gratitude should surpass the favor received? IIa IIae q. 106 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that there is no need for the re- Wherefore the beneficiary is under a moral obligation to payment of gratitude to surpass the favor received. For it bestow something gratis in return. Now he does not seem is not possible to make even equal repayment to some, for to bestow something gratis, unless he exceeds the quantity instance, one’s parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. of the favor received: because so long as he repays less or viii, 14). Now virtue does not attempt the impossible. an equivalent, he would seem to do nothing gratis, but Therefore gratitude for a favor does not tend to something only to return what he has received. Therefore gratitude yet greater. always inclines, as far as possible, to pay back something Objection 2. Further, if one person repays another more. more than he has received by his favor, by that very fact Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 3, ad 5; he gives him something his turn, as it were. But the lat- a. 5), in repaying favors we must consider the disposition ter owes him repayment for the favor which in his turn rather than the deed. Accordingly, if we consider the ef- the former has conferred on him. Therefore he that first fect of beneficence, which a son receives from his parents conferred a favor will be bound to a yet greater repay- namely, to be and to live, the son cannot make an equal ment, and so on indefinitely. Now virtue does not strive repayment, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). But at the indefinite, since “the indefinite removes the nature if we consider the will of the giver and of the repayer, then of good” (Metaph. ii, text. 8). Therefore repayment of it is possible for the son to pay back something greater to gratitude should not surpass the favor received. his father, as Seneca declares (De Benef. iii). If, however, Objection 3. Further, justice consists in equality. But he were unable to do so, the will to pay back would be “more” is excess of equality. Since therefore excess is sufficient for gratitude. sinful in every virtue, it seems that to repay more than the Reply to Objection 2. The debt of gratitude flows favor received is sinful and opposed to justice. from charity, which the more it is paid the more it is due, On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5): according to Rom. 13:8, “Owe no man anything, but to “We should repay those who are gracious to us, by be- love one another.” Wherefore it is not unreasonable if the ing gracious to them return,” and this is done by repaying obligation of gratitude has no limit. more than we have received. Therefore gratitude should Reply to Objection 3. As in injustice, which is a car- incline to do something greater. dinal virtue, we consider equality of things, so in gratitude I answer that, As stated above (a. 5), gratitude regards we consider equality of wills. For while on the one hand the favor received according the intention of the benefac- the benefactor of his own free-will gave something he was tor; who seems be deserving of praise, chiefly for having not bound to give, so on the other hand the beneficiary re- conferred the favor gratis without being bound to do so. pays something over and above what he has received. 1698 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 107 Of Ingratitude (In Four Articles) We must now consider ingratitude, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether ingratitude is always a sin? (2) Whether ingratitude is a special sin? (3) Whether every act of ingratitude is a mortal sin? (4) Whether favors should be withdrawn from the ungrateful? Whether ingratitude is always a sin? IIa IIae q. 107 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that ingratitude is not always a Wherefore it is evident that every ingratitude is a sin. sin. For Seneca says (De Benef. iii) that “he who does Reply to Objection 1. Gratitude regards a favor re- not repay a favor is ungrateful.” But sometimes it is im- ceived: and he that helps another to commit a sin does possible to repay a favor without sinning, for instance if him not a favor but an injury: and so no thanks are due one man has helped another to commit a sin. Therefore, to him, except perhaps on account of his good will, sup- since it is not a sin to refrain from sinning, it seems that posing him to have been deceived, and to have thought to ingratitude is not always a sin. help him in doing good, whereas he helped him to sin. In Objection 2. Further, every sin is in the power of the such a case the repayment due to him is not that he should person who commits it: because, according to Augustine be helped to commit a sin, because this would be repaying (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i), “no man sins in what he not good but evil, and this is contrary to gratitude. cannot avoid.” Now sometimes it is not in the power of Reply to Objection 2. No man is excused from in- the sinner to avoid ingratitude, for instance when he has gratitude through inability to repay, for the very reason not the means of repaying. Again forgetfulness is not in that the mere will suffices for the repayment of the debt of our power, and yet Seneca declares (De Benef. iii) that “to gratitude, as stated above (q. 106, a. 6, ad 1). forget a kindness is the height of ingratitude.” Therefore Forgetfulness of a favor received amounts to ingrati- ingratitude is not always a sin. tude, not indeed the forgetfulness that arises from a natu- Objection 3. Further, there would seem to be no re- ral defect, that is not subject to the will, but that which payment in being unwilling to owe anything, according to arises from negligence. For, as Seneca observes (De the Apostle (Rom. 13:8), “Owe no man anything.” Yet Benef. iii), “when forgetfulness of favors lays hold of a “an unwilling debtor is ungrateful,” as Seneca declares man, he has apparently given little thought to their repay- (De Benef. iv). Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin. ment.” On the contrary, Ingratitude is reckoned among other Reply to Objection 3. The debt of gratitude flows sins (2 Tim. 3:2), where it is written: “Disobedient to par- from the debt of love, and from the latter no man should ents, ungrateful, wicked.” etc. wish to be free. Hence that anyone should owe this debt I answer that, As stated above (q. 106, a. 4, ad 1, a. 6) unwillingly seems to arise from lack of love for his benea debt of gratitude is a moral debt required by virtue. Now factor. a thing is a sin from the fact of its being contrary to virtue. Whether ingratitude is a special sin? IIa IIae q. 107 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that ingratitude is not a spe- Objection 3. Further, Seneca writes (De Benef. iii): cial sin. For whoever sins acts against God his sovereign “It is ungrateful to take no notice of a kindness, it is un- benefactor. But this pertains to ingratitude. Therefore in- grateful not to repay one, but it is the height of ingratitude gratitude is not a special sin. to forget it.” Now these do not seem to belong to the same Objection 2. Further, no special sin is contained under species of sin. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin. different kinds of sin. But one can be ungrateful by com- On the contrary, Ingratitude is opposed to gratitude mitting different kinds of sin, for instance by calumny, or thankfulness, which is a special virtue. Therefore it is theft, or something similar committed against a benefac- a special sin. tor. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin. I answer that, Every vice is denominated from a de- 1699 ficiency of virtue, because deficiency is more opposed to is first in the order of destruction, it follows that the first virtue: thus illiberality is more opposed to liberality than degree of ingratitude is when a man fails to repay a fa- prodigality is. Now a vice may be opposed to the virtue vor, the second when he declines to notice or indicate that of gratitude by way of excess, for instance if one were to he has received a favor, while the third and supreme de- show gratitude for things for which gratitude is not due, gree is when a man fails to recognize the reception of a or sooner than it is due, as stated above (q. 106, a. 4). favor, whether by forgetting it or in any other way. More- But still more opposed to gratitude is the vice denoting over, since opposite affirmation includes negation, it fol- deficiency of gratitude, because the virtue of gratitude, lows that it belongs to the first degree of ingratitude to as stated above (q. 106, a. 6), inclines to return some- return evil for good, to the second to find fault with a fa- thing more. Wherefore ingratitude is properly denomi- vor received, and to the third to esteem kindness as though nated from being a deficiency of gratitude. Now every it were unkindness. deficiency or privation takes its species from the opposite Reply to Objection 1. In every sin there is material habit: for blindness and deafness differ according to the ingratitude to God, inasmuch as a man does something difference of sight and hearing. Therefore just as gratitude that may pertain to ingratitude. But formal ingratitude is or thankfulness is one special virtue, so also is ingratitude when a favor is actually contemned, and this is a special one special sin. sin. It has, however, various degrees corresponding in their Reply to Objection 2. Nothing hinders the formal as- order to the things required for gratitude. The first of pect of some special sin from being found materially in these is to recognize the favor received, the second to ex- several kinds of sin, and in this way the aspect of ingrati- press one’s appreciation and thanks, and the third to repay tude is to be found in many kinds of sin. the favor at a suitable place and time according to one’s Reply to Objection 3. These three are not different means. And since what is last in the order of generation species but different degrees of one special sin. Whether ingratitude is always a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 107 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that ingratitude is always a mor- above (a. 2), a man may be ungrateful in two ways: first, tal sin. For one ought to be grateful to God above all. But by mere omission, for instance by failing to recognize the one is not ungrateful to God by committing a venial sin: favor received, or to express his appreciation of it or to else every man would be guilty of ingratitude. Therefore pay something in return, and this is not always a mortal no ingratitude is a venial sin. sin, because, as stated above (q. 106, a. 6), the debt of Objection 2. Further, a sin is mortal through being gratitude requires a man to make a liberal return, which, contrary to charity, as stated above (q. 24, a. 12). But in- however, he is not bound to do; wherefore if he fail to do gratitude is contrary to charity, since the debt of gratitude so, he does not sin mortally. It is nevertheless a venial sin, proceeds from that virtue, as stated above (q. 106, a. 1, ad because it arises either from some kind of negligence or 3; a. 6, ad 2). Therefore ingratitude is always a mortal sin. from some disinclination to virtue in him. And yet ingrati- Objection 3. Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii): tude of this kind may happen to be a mortal sin, by reason “Between the giver and the receiver of a favor there is this either of inward contempt, or of the kind of thing with- law, that the former should forthwith forget having given, held, this being needful to the benefactor, either simply, and the latter should never forget having received.” Now, or in some case of necessity. seemingly, the reason why the giver should forget is that Secondly, a man may be ungrateful, because he not he may be unaware of the sin of the recipient, should the only omits to pay the debt of gratitude, but does the con- latter prove ungrateful; and there would be no necessity trary. This again is sometimes mortal and sometimes a for that if ingratitude were a slight sin. Therefore ingrati- venial sin, according to the kind of thing that is done. tude is always a mortal sin. It must be observed, however, that when ingratitude Objection 4. On the contrary, No one should be put arises from a mortal sin, it has the perfect character of in- in the way of committing a mortal sin. Yet, according gratitude, and when it arises from venial sin, it has the to Seneca (De Benef. ii), “sometimes it is necessary to imperfect character. deceive the person who receives assistance, in order that Reply to Objection 1. By committing a venial sin one he may receive without knowing from whom he has re- is not ungrateful to God to the extent of incurring the guilt ceived.” But this would seem to put the recipient in the of perfect ingratitude: but there is something of ingrati- way of ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not always a tude in a venial sin, in so far as it removes a virtuous act mortal sin. of obedience to God. I answer that, As appears from what we have said Reply to Objection 2. When ingratitude is a venial 1700 sin it is not contrary to, but beside charity: since it does Reply to Objection 4. He that is unaware of a fa-not destroy the habit of charity, but excludes some act vor conferred on him is not ungrateful, if he fails to re- thereof. pay it, provided he be prepared to do so if he knew. It Reply to Objection 3. Seneca also says (De Benef. is nevertheless commendable at times that the object of a vii): “When we say that a man after conferring a favor favor should remain in ignorance of it, both in order to should forget about it, it is a mistake to suppose that we avoid vainglory, as when Blessed Nicolas threw gold into mean him to shake off the recollection of a thing so very a house secretly, wishing to avoid popularity: and because praiseworthy. When we say: He must not remember it, we the kindness is all the greater through the benefactor wish- mean that he must not publish it abroad and boast about ing not to shame the person on whom he is conferring the it.” favor. Whether favors should be withheld from the ungrateful? IIa IIae q. 107 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that favors should withheld be deprived of our favor. The second is, what ought his from the ungrateful. For it is written (Wis. 16:29): “The benefactor to do? For in the first place he should not eas- hope of the unthankful shall melt away as the winter’s ily judge him to be ungrateful, since, as Seneca remarks ice.” But this hope would not melt away unless favors (De Benef. iii), “a man is often grateful although he re- were withheld from him. Therefore favors should be with- pays not,” because perhaps he has not the means or the held from the ungrateful. opportunity of repaying. Secondly, he should be inclined Objection 2. Further, no one should afford another an to turn his ungratefulness into gratitude, and if he does not occasion of committing sin. But the ungrateful in receiv- achieve this by being kind to him once, he may by being ing a favor is given an occasion of ingratitude. Therefore so a second time. If, however, the more he repeats his fa- favors should not be bestowed on the ungrateful. vors, the more ungrateful and evil the other becomes, he Objection 3. Further, “By what things a man sinneth, should cease from bestowing his favors upon him. by the same also he is tormented” (Wis. 11:17). Now he Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted speaks of that is ungrateful when he receives a favor sins against the what the ungrateful man deserves to suffer. favor. Therefore he should be deprived of the favor. Reply to Objection 2. He that bestows a favor on an On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 6:35) that “the ungrateful person affords him an occasion not of sin but Highest. . . is kind to the unthankful, and to the evil.” Now of gratitude and love. And if the recipient takes therefrom we should prove ourselves His children by imitating Him an occasion of ingratitude, this is not to be imputed to the (Lk. 6:36). Therefore we should not withhold favors from bestower. the ungrateful. Reply to Objection 3. He that bestows a favor must I answer that, There are two points to be considered not at once act the part of a punisher of ingratitude, but with regard to an ungrateful person. The first is what he rather that of a kindly physician, by healing the ingrati- deserves to suffer and thus it is certain that he deserves to tude with repeated favors. 1701 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 108 Of Vengeance (In Four Articles) We must now consider vengeance, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether vengeance is lawful? (2) Whether it is a special virtue? (3) Of the manner of taking vengeance; (4) On whom should vengeance be taken? Whether vengeance is lawful? IIa IIae q. 108 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that vengeance is not lawful. day and night?” as if to say: “He will indeed.” Therefore For whoever usurps what is God’s sins. But vengeance vengeance is not essentially evil and unlawful. belongs to God, for it is written (Dt. 32:35, Rom. I answer that, Vengeance consists in the infliction of 12:19): “Revenge to Me, and I will repay.” Therefore all a penal evil on one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the vengeance is unlawful. matter of vengeance, we must consider the mind of the Objection 2. Further, he that takes vengeance on a avenger. For if his intention is directed chiefly to the evil man does not bear with him. But we ought to bear with of the person on whom he takes vengeance and rests there, the wicked, for a gloss on Cant 2:2, “As the lily among the then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because to take thorns,” says: “He is not a good man that cannot bear with pleasure in another’s evil belongs to hatred, which is con- a wicked one.” Therefore we should not take vengeance trary to the charity whereby we are bound to love all men. on the wicked. Nor is it an excuse that he intends the evil of one who Objection 3. Further, vengeance is taken by inflicting has unjustly inflicted evil on him, as neither is a man ex- punishment, which is the cause of servile fear. But the cused for hating one that hates him: for a man may not sin New Law is not a law of fear, but of love, as Augustine against another just because the latter has already sinned states (Contra Adamant. xvii). Therefore at least in the against him, since this is to be overcome by evil, which New Testament all vengeance is unlawful. was forbidden by the Apostle, who says (Rom. 12:21): Objection 4. Further, a man is said to avenge himself “Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good.” when he takes revenge for wrongs inflicted on himself. If, however, the avenger’s intention be directed chiefly But, seemingly, it is unlawful even for a judge to punish to some good, to be obtained by means of the punishment those who have wronged him: for Chrysostom∗ says: “Let of the person who has sinned (for instance that the sinner us learn after Christ’s example to bear our own wrongs may amend, or at least that he may be restrained and oth- with magnanimity, yet not to suffer God’s wrongs, not ers be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and God even by listening to them.” Therefore vengeance seems honored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided other to be unlawful. due circumstances be observed. Objection 5. Further, the sin of a multitude is more Reply to Objection 1. He who takes vengeance on harmful than the sin of only one: for it is written (Ecclus. the wicked in keeping with his rank and position does not 26:5-7): “Of three things my heart hath been afraid. . . the usurp what belongs to God but makes use of the power accusation of a city, and the gathering together of the granted him by God. For it is written (Rom. 13:4) of the people, and a false calumny.” But vengeance should not earthly prince that “he is God’s minister, an avenger to ex- be taken on the sin of a multitude, for a gloss on Mat. ecute wrath upon him that doeth evil.” If, however, a man 13:29,30, “Lest perhaps. . . you root up the wheat. . . suffer takes vengeance outside the order of divine appointment, both to grow,” says that “a multitude should not be excom- he usurps what is God’s and therefore sins. municated, nor should the sovereign.” Neither therefore is Reply to Objection 2. The good bear with the wicked any other vengeance lawful. by enduring patiently, and in due manner, the wrongs they On the contrary, We should look to God for noth- themselves receive from them: but they do not bear with ing save what is good and lawful. But we are to look to them as to endure the wrongs they inflict on God and their God for vengeance on His enemies: for it is written (Lk. neighbor. For Chrysostom† says: “It is praiseworthy to 18:7): “Will not God revenge His elect who cry to Him be patient under our own wrongs, but to overlook God’s ∗ Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth., falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom † Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth., falsely as- cribed to St. Chrysostom 1702 wrongs is most wicked.” in the Red Sea while they were pursuing the children of Reply to Objection 3. The law of the Gospel is the Israel (Ex. 14), and the people of Sodom were entirely de- law of love, and therefore those who do good out of love, stroyed (Gn. 19)—or as regards part of the multitude, as and who alone properly belong to the Gospel, ought not may be seen in the punishment of those who worshipped to be terrorized by means of punishment, but only those the calf. who are not moved by love to do good, and who, though Sometimes, however, if there is hope of many mak- they belong to the Church outwardly, do not belong to it ing amends, the severity of vengeance should be brought in merit. to bear on a few of the principals, whose punishment fills Reply to Objection 4. Sometimes a wrong done to the rest with fear; thus the Lord (Num 25) commanded a person reflects on God and the Church: and then it is the princes of the people to be hanged for the sin of the the duty of that person to avenge the wrong. For exam- multitude. ple, Elias made fire descend on those who were come to On the other hand, if it is not the whole but only a seize him (4 Kings 1); likewise Eliseus cursed the boys part of the multitude that has sinned, then if the guilty that mocked him (4 Kings 2); and Pope Sylverius excom- can be separated from the innocent, vengeance should be municated those who sent him into exile (XXIII, Q. iv, wrought on them: provided, however, that this can be Cap. Guilisarius). But in so far as the wrong inflicted done without scandal to others; else the multitude should on a man affects his person, he should bear it patiently if be spared and severity foregone. The same applies to the this be expedient. For these precepts of patience are to sovereign, whom the multitude follow. For his sin should be understood as referring to preparedness of the mind, as be borne with, if it cannot be punished without scandal Augustine states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i). to the multitude: unless indeed his sin were such, that it Reply to Objection 5. When the whole multitude would do more harm to the multitude, either spiritually sins, vengeance must be taken on them, either in respect or temporally, than would the scandal that was feared to of the whole multitude—thus the Egyptians were drowned arise from his punishment. Whether vengeance is a special virtue? IIa IIae q. 108 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that vengeance is not a special for which reason animals have the irascible power distinct and distinct virtue. For just as the good are rewarded for from the concupiscible. Man resists harm by defending their good deeds, so are the wicked punished for their evil himself against wrongs, lest they be inflicted on him, or he deeds. Now the rewarding of the good does not belong avenges those which have already been inflicted on him, to a special virtue, but is an act of commutative justice. with the intention, not of harming, but of removing the Therefore in the same way vengeance should not be ac- harm done. And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully says counted a special virtue. (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that by “vengeance we resist force, or Objection 2. Further, there is no need to appoint a wrong, and in general whatever is obscure”∗ ”(i.e. deroga- special virtue for an act to which a man is sufficiently dis- tory), either by self-defense or by avenging it.” Therefore posed by the other virtues. Now man is sufficiently dis- vengeance is a special virtue. posed by the virtues of fortitude or zeal to avenge evil. Reply to Objection 1. Just as repayment of a legal Therefore vengeance should not be reckoned a special debt belongs to commutative justice, and as repayment virtue. of a moral debt, arising from the bestowal of a particular Objection 3. Further, there is a special vice opposed favor, belongs to the virtue of gratitude, so too the punish- to every special virtue. But seemingly no special vice is ment of sins, so far as it is the concern of public justice, opposed to vengeance. Therefore it is not a special virtue. is an act of commutative justice; while so far as it is con- On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons cerned in defending the rights of the individual by whom it a part of justice. a wrong is resisted, it belongs to the virtue of revenge. I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, Reply to Objection 2. Fortitude disposes to 1), aptitude to virtue is in us by nature, but the comple- vengeance by removing an obstacle thereto, namely, fear ment of virtue is in us through habituation or some other of an imminent danger. Zeal, as denoting the fervor of cause. Hence it is evident that virtues perfect us so that we love, signifies the primary root of vengeance, in so far as follow in due manner our natural inclinations, which be- a man avenges the wrong done to God and his neighbor, long to the natural right. Wherefore to every definite nat- because charity makes him regard them as his own. Now ural inclination there corresponds a special virtue. Now every act of virtue proceeds from charity as its root, since, there is a special inclination of nature to remove harm, according to Gregory (Hom. xxvii in Ev.), “there are no ∗ ‘Obscurum’ Cicero wrote ‘obfuturum’ but the sense is the same as St. Thomas gives in the parenthesis 1703 green leaves on the bough of good works, unless charity while the other is a vice by way of deficiency and consists be the root.” in being remiss in punishing, wherefore it is written (Prov. Reply to Objection 3. Two vices are opposed to 13:24): “He that spareth the rod hateth his son.” But the vengeance: one by way of excess, namely, the sin of cru- virtue of vengeance consists in observing the due measure elty or brutality, which exceeds the measure in punishing: of vengeance with regard to all the circumstances. Whether vengeance should be wrought by means of punishments customary among IIa IIae q. 108 a. 3 men? Objection 1. It seems that vengeance should not be such as riches, his country and his good name. Where- wrought by means of punishments customary among men. fore, according to Augustine’s reckoning (De Civ. Dei For to put a man to death is to uproot him. But our Lord xxi), “Tully writes that the laws recognize eight kinds forbade (Mat. 13:29) the uprooting of the cockle, whereby of punishment”: namely, “death,” whereby man is de- the children of the wicked one are signified. Therefore prived of life; “stripes,” “retaliation,” or the loss of eye sinners should not be put to death. for eye, whereby man forfeits his bodily safety; “slavery,” Objection 2. Further, all who sin mortally seem to and “imprisonment,” whereby he is deprived of freedom; be deserving of the same punishment. Therefore if some “exile” whereby he is banished from his country; “fines,” who sin mortally are punished with death, it seems that whereby he is mulcted in his riches; “ignominy,” whereby all such persons should be punished with death: and this he loses his good name. is evidently false. Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord forbids the uproot- Objection 3. Further, to punish a man publicly for his ing of the cockle, when there is fear lest the wheat be up- sin seems to publish his sin: and this would seem to have rooted together with it. But sometimes the wicked can be a harmful effect on the multitude, since the example of sin uprooted by death, not only without danger, but even with is taken by them as an occasion for sin. Therefore it seems great profit, to the good. Wherefore in such a case the that the punishment of death should not be inflicted for a punishment of death may be inflicted on sinners. sin. Reply to Objection 2. All who sin mortally are de- On the contrary, These punishments are fixed by the serving of eternal death, as regards future retribution, divine law as appears from what we have said above ( Ia which is in accordance with the truth of the divine judg- IIae, q. 105, a. 2). ment. But the punishments of this life are more of a I answer that, Vengeance is lawful and virtuous so medicinal character; wherefore the punishment of death far as it tends to the prevention of evil. Now some who is inflicted on those sins alone which conduce to the grave are not influenced by motive of virtue are prevented from undoing of others. committing sin, through fear of losing those things which Reply to Objection 3. The very fact that the punish- they love more than those they obtain by sinning, else fear ment, whether of death or of any kind that is fearsome to would be no restraint to sin. Consequently vengeance man, is made known at the same time as the sin, makes for sin should be taken by depriving a man of what he man’s will avers to sin: because the fear of punishment is loves most. Now the things which man loves most are greater than the enticement of the example of sin. life, bodily safety, his own freedom, and external goods Whether vengeance should be taken on those who have sinned involuntarily? IIa IIae q. 108 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that vengeance should be taken people of Israel were delivered into the hands of their en- on those who have sinned involuntarily. For the will of emies for the sin of Achan, and that the same people were one man does not follow from the will of another. Yet overthrown by the Philistines on account of the sin of the one man is punished for another, according to Ex. 20:5, sons of Heli (1 Kings 4). Therefore a person is to be pun- “I am. . . God. . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers ished without having deserved it voluntarily. upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation.” Objection 2. Further, nothing is voluntary except Thus for the sin of Cham, his son Chanaan was curse (Gn. what is in a man’s power. But sometimes a man is pun- 9:25) and for the sin of Giezi, his descendants were struck ished for what is not in his power; thus a man is removed with leprosy (4 Kings 5). Again the blood of Christ lays from the administration of the Church on account of being the descendants of the Jews under the ban of punishment, infected with leprosy; and a Church ceases to be an epis- for they said (Mat. 27:25): “His blood be upon us and copal see on account of the depravity or evil of the people. upon our children.” Moreover we read (Josue 7) that the Therefore vengeance is taken not only for voluntary sins. 1704 Objection 3. Further, ignorance makes an act invol-Reply to Objection 1. A man is never condemned untary. Now vengeance is sometimes taken on the igno- to a spiritual punishment for another man’s sin, because rant. Thus the children of the people of Sodom, though spiritual punishment affects the soul, in respect of which they were in invincible ignorance, perished with their par- each man is master of himself. But sometimes a man is ents (Gn. 19). Again, for the sin of Dathan and Ab- condemned to punishment in temporal matters for the sin iron their children were swallowed up together with them of another, and this for three reasons. First, because one (Num 16). Moreover, dumb animals, which are devoid of man may be the temporal goods of another, and so he may reason, were commanded to be slain on account of the sin be punished in punishment of the latter: thus children, as of the Amalekites (1 Kings 15). Therefore vengeance is to the body, are a belonging of their father, and slaves are sometimes taken on those who have deserved it involun- a possession of their master. Secondly, when one person’s tarily. sin is transmitted to another, either by “imitation,” as chil- Objection 4. Further, compulsion is most opposed dren copy the sins of their parents, and slaves the sins of to voluntariness. But a man does not escape the debt of their masters, so as to sin with greater daring; or by way punishment through being compelled by fear to commit of “merit,” as the sinful subjects merit a sinful superior, a sin. Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those according to Job 34:30, “Who maketh a man that is a hyp- who have deserved it involuntarily. ocrite to reign for the sins of the people?” Hence the peo- Objection 5. Further Ambrose says on Lk. 5 that “the ple of Israel were punished for David’s sin in numbering ship in which Judas was, was in distress”; wherefore “Pe- the people (2 Kings 24). This may also happen through ter, who was calm in the security of his own merits, was in some kind of “consent” or “connivance”: thus sometimes distress about those of others.” But Peter did not will the even the good are punished in temporal matters together sin of Judas. Therefore a person is sometimes punished with the wicked, for not having condemned their sins, as without having voluntarily deserved it. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9). Thirdly, in order to On the contrary, Punishment is due to sin. But every mark the unity of human fellowship, whereby one man is sin is voluntary according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; bound to be solicitous for another, lest he sin; and in or- Retract. i). Therefore vengeance should be taken only on der to inculcate horror of sin, seeing that the punishment those who have deserved it voluntarily. of one affects all, as though all were one body, as Augus- I answer that, Punishment may be considered in two tine says in speaking of the sin of Achan (QQ. sup. Josue ways. First, under the aspect of punishment, and in this viii). The saying of the Lord, “Visiting the iniquity of the way punishment is not due save for sin, because by means fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth gener- of punishment the equality of justice is restored, in so far ation,” seems to belong to mercy rather than to severity, as he who by sinning has exceeded in following his own since He does not take vengeance forthwith, but waits for will suffers something that is contrary to this will. Where- some future time, in order that the descendants at least fore, since every sin is voluntary, not excluding original may mend their ways; yet should the wickedness of the sin, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 81, a. 1), it follows that descendants increase, it becomes almost necessary to take no one is punished in this way, except for something done vengeance on them. voluntarily. Secondly, punishment may be considered as Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine states (QQ. sup. a medicine, not only healing the past sin, but also pre- Josue viii), human judgment should conform to the divine serving from future sin, or conducing to some good, and judgment, when this is manifest, and God condemns men in this way a person is sometimes punished without any spiritually for their own sins. But human judgment can- fault of his own, yet not without cause. not be conformed to God’s hidden judgments, whereby It must, however, be observed that a medicine never He punishes certain persons in temporal matters without removes a greater good in order to promote a lesser; thus any fault of theirs, since man is unable to grasp the rea- the medicine of the body never blinds the eye, in order to sons of these judgments so as to know what is expedient repair the heel: yet sometimes it is harmful in lesser things for each individual. Wherefore according to human judg- that it may be helpful in things of greater consequence. ment a man should never be condemned without fault of And since spiritual goods are of the greatest consequence, his own to an inflictive punishment, such as death, muti- while temporal goods are least important, sometimes a lation or flogging. But a man may be condemned, even person is punished in his temporal goods without any fault according to human judgment, to a punishment of forfei- of his own. Such are many of the punishments inflicted by ture, even without any fault on his part, but not without God in this present life for our humiliation or probation. cause: and this in three ways. But no one is punished in spiritual goods without any fault First, through a person becoming, without any fault of on his part, neither in this nor in the future life, because his, disqualified for having or acquiring a certain good: in the latter punishment is not medicinal, but a result of thus for being infected with leprosy a man is removed spiritual condemnation. from the administration of the Church: and for bigamy, or 1705 through pronouncing a death sentence a man is hindered person, and because this is for their good lest, should from receiving sacred orders. they be spared, they might imitate the sins of their par- Secondly, because the particular good that he forfeits ents, and thus deserve to be punished still more severely. is not his own but common property: thus that an episco- Vengeance is wrought on dumb animals and any other ir- pal see be attached to a certain church belongs to the good rational creatures, because in this way their owners are of the whole city, and not only to the good of the clerics. punished; and also in horror of sin. Thirdly, because the good of one person may depend Reply to Objection 4. An act done through compul- on the good of another: thus in the crime of high treason sion of fear is not involuntary simply, but has an admixture a son loses his inheritance through the sin of his parent. of voluntariness, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 6, Aa. 5,6). Reply to Objection 3. By the judgment of God Reply to Objection 5. The other apostles were dis- children are punished in temporal matters together with tressed about the sin of Judas, in the same way as the mul- their parents, both because they are a possession of their titude is punished for the sin of one, in commendation of parents, so that their parents are punished also in their unity, as state above (Reply obj. 1,2). 1706 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 109 Of Truth (In Four Articles) We must now consider truth and the vices opposed thereto. Concerning truth there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether truth is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a special virtue? (3) Whether it is a part of justice? (4) Whether it inclines to that which is less? Whether truth is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 109 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that truth is not a virtue. For be a virtue, because to say what is true is a good act: and the first of virtues is faith, whose object is truth. Since virtue is “that which makes its possessor good, and ren- then the object precedes the habit and the act, it seems ders his action good.” that truth is not a virtue, but something prior to virtue. Reply to Objection 1. This argument takes truth in Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher the first sense. (Ethic. iv, 7), it belongs to truth that a man should state Reply to Objection 2. To state that which concerns things concerning himself to be neither more nor less than oneself, in so far as it is a statement of what is true, is they are. But this is not always praiseworthy—neither in good generically. Yet this does not suffice for it to be an good things, since according to Prov. 27:2, “Let another act of virtue, since it is requisite for that purpose that it praise thee, and not thy own mouth”—nor even in evil should also be clothed with the due circumstances, and if things, because it is written in condemnation of certain these be not observed, the act will be sinful. Accordingly people (Is. 3:9): “They have proclaimed abroad their sin it is sinful to praise oneself without due cause even for that as Sodom, and they have not hid it.” Therefore truth is not which is true: and it is also sinful to publish one’s sin, by a virtue. praising oneself on that account, or in any way proclaim- Objection 3. Further, every virtue is either theolog- ing it uselessly. ical, or intellectual, or moral. Now truth is not a theo- Reply to Objection 3. A person who says what is logical virtue, because its object is not God but temporal true, utters certain signs which are in conformity with things. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that by “truth things; and such signs are either words, or external ac- we faithfully represent things as they are were, or will be.” tions, or any external thing. Now such kinds of things are Likewise it is not one of the intellectual virtues, but their the subject-matter of the moral virtues alone, for the latter end. Nor again is it a moral virtue, since it is not a mean are concerned with the use of the external members, in so between excess and deficiency, for the more one tells the far as this use is put into effect at the command of the will. truth, the better it is. Therefore truth is not a virtue. Wherefore truth is neither a theological, nor an intellec- On the contrary, The Philosopher both in the Second tual, but a moral virtue. And it is a mean between excess and in the Fourth Book of Ethics places truth among the and deficiency in two ways. First, on the part of the ob- other virtues. ject, secondly, on the part of the act. On the part of the ob- I answer that, Truth can be taken in two ways. First, ject, because the true essentially denotes a kind of equal- for that by reason of which a thing is said to be true, and ity, and equal is a mean between more and less. Hence for thus truth is not a virtue, but the object or end of a virtue: the very reason that a man says what is true about him- because, taken in this way, truth is not a habit, which is the self, he observes the mean between one that says more genus containing virtue, but a certain equality between the than the truth about himself, and one that says less than understanding or sign and the thing understood or signi- the truth. On the part of the act, to observe the mean is to fied, or again between a thing and its rule, as stated in the tell the truth, when one ought, and as one ought. Excess Ia, q. 16, a. 1; consists in making known one’s own affairs out of season, Ia, q. 21, a. 2. Secondly, truth may stand for that by and deficiency in hiding them when one ought to make which a person says what is true, in which sense one is them known. said to be truthful. This truth or truthfulness must needs 1707 Whether truth is a special virtue? IIa IIae q. 109 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that truth is not a special virtue. vertible as to subject, since every true thing is good, and For the true and the good are convertible. Now goodness every good thing is true. But considered logically, they is not a special virtue, in fact every virtue is goodness, be- exceed one another, even as the intellect and will exceed cause “it makes its possessor good.” Therefore truth is not one another. For the intellect understands the will and a special virtue. many things besides, and the will desires things pertain- Objection 2. Further, to make known what belongs to ing to the intellect, and many others. Wherefore the “true” oneself is an act of truth as we understand it here. But this considered in its proper aspect as a perfection of the intel- belongs to every virtue, since every virtuous habit is made lect is a particular good, since it is something appetible: known by its own act. Therefore truth is not a special and in like manner the “good” considered in its proper as- virtue. pect as the end of the appetite is something true, since it Objection 3. Further, the truth of life is the truth is something intelligible. Therefore since virtue includes whereby one lives aright, and of which it is written (Is. the aspect of goodness, it is possible for truth to be a spe- 38:3): “I beseech Thee. . . remember how I have walked cial virtue, just as the “true” is a special good; yet it is not before Thee in truth, and with a perfect heart.” Now one possible for goodness to be a special virtue, since rather, lives aright by any virtue, as follows from the definition considered logically, it is the genus of virtue. of virtue given above ( Ia IIae, q. 55, a. 4). Therefore truth Reply to Objection 2. The habits of virtue and vice is not a special virtue. take their species from what is directly intended, and not Objection 4. Further, truth seems to be the same as from that which is accidental and beside the intention. simplicity, since hypocrisy is opposed to both. But sim- Now that a man states that which concerns himself, be- plicity is not a special virtue, since it rectifies the inten- longs to the virtue of truth, as something directly intended: tion, and that is required in every virtue. Therefore neither although it may belong to other virtues consequently and is truth a special virtue. beside his principal intention. For the brave man intends On the contrary, It is numbered together with other to act bravely: and that he shows his fortitude by acting virtues (Ethic. ii, 7). bravely is a consequence beside his principal intention. I answer that, The nature of human virtue consists in Reply to Objection 3. The truth of life is the truth making a man’s deed good. Consequently whenever we whereby a thing is true, not whereby a person says what find a special aspect of goodness in human acts, it is nec- is true. Life like anything else is said to be true, from the essary that man be disposed thereto by a special virtue. fact that it attains its rule and measure, namely, the divine And since according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii) good law; since rectitude of life depends on conformity to that consists in order, it follows that a special aspect of good law. This truth or rectitude is common to every virtue. will be found where there is a special order. Now there Reply to Objection 4. Simplicity is so called from is a special order whereby our externals, whether words its opposition to duplicity, whereby, to wit, a man shows or deeds, are duly ordered in relation to some thing, as one thing outwardly while having another in his heart: so sign to thing signified: and thereto man is perfected by that simplicity pertains to this virtue. And it rectifies the the virtue of truth. Wherefore it is evident that truth is a intention, not indeed directly (since this belongs to every special virtue. virtue), but by excluding duplicity, whereby a man pre- Reply to Objection 1. The true and the good are con- tends one thing and intends another. Whether truth is a part of justice? IIa IIae q. 109 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that truth is not a part of justice. For truth of life comprises all virtues, as stated above (a. 2, For it seems proper to justice to give another man his due. ad 3): truth of justice is the same as justice, so that it is But, by telling the truth, one does not seem to give an- not one of its parts; and truth of doctrine belongs rather to other man his due, as is the case in all the foregoing parts the intellectual virtues. Therefore truth is nowise a part of of justice. Therefore truth is not a part of justice. justice. Objection 2. Further, truth pertains to the intellect: On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons whereas justice is in the will, as stated above (q. 58, a. 4). truth among the parts of justice. Therefore truth is not a part of justice. I answer that, As stated above (q. 80), a virtue is Objection 3. Further, according to Jerome truth is annexed to justice, as secondary to a principal virtue, threefold, namely, “truth of life,” “truth of justice,” and through having something in common with justice, while “truth of doctrine.” But none of these is a part of justice. falling short from the perfect virtue thereof. Now the 1708 virtue of truth has two things in common with justice. In tude regulated according to the rule of the divine law; and the first place it is directed to another, since the manifesta- in this way the truth of justice differs from the truth of life, tion, which we have stated to be an act of truth, is directed because by the truth of life a man lives aright in himself, to another, inasmuch as one person manifests to another whereas by the truth of justice a man observes the recti- the things that concern himself. In the second place, jus- tude of the law in those judgments which refer to another tice sets up a certain equality between things, and this the man: and in this sense the truth of justice has nothing to virtue of truth does also, for it equals signs to the things do with the truth of which we speak now, as neither has which concern man himself. Nevertheless it falls short of the truth of life. In another way the truth of justice may the proper aspect of justice, as to the notion of debt: for be understood as referring to the fact that, out of justice, a this virtue does not regard legal debt, which justice con- man manifests the truth, as for instance when a man con- siders, but rather the moral debt, in so far as, out of equity, fesses the truth, or gives true evidence in a court of justice. one man owes another a manifestation of the truth. There- This truth is a particular act of justice, and does not per- fore truth is a part of justice, being annexed thereto as a tain directly to this truth of which we are now speaking, secondary virtue to its principal. because, to wit, in this manifestation of the truth a man’s Reply to Objection 1. Since man is a social animal, chief intention is to give another man his due. Hence the one man naturally owes another whatever is necessary for Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) in describing this virtue: the preservation of human society. Now it would be im- “We are not speaking of one who is truthful in his agree- possible for men to live together, unless they believed one ments, nor does this apply to matters in which justice or another, as declaring the truth one to another. Hence the injustice is questioned.” virtue of truth does, in a manner, regard something as be- The truth of doctrine consists in a certain manifesta- ing due. tion of truths relating to science wherefore neither does Reply to Objection 2. Truth, as known, belongs to this truth directly pertain to this virtue, but only that truth the intellect. But man, by his own will, whereby he uses whereby a man, both in life and in speech, shows himself both habits and members, utters external signs in order to to be such as he is, and the things that concern him, not manifest the truth, and in this way the manifestation of the other, and neither greater nor less, than they are. Never- truth is an act of the will. theless since truths of science, as known by us, are some- Reply to Objection 3. The truth of which we are thing concerning us, and pertain to this virtue, in this sense speaking now differs from the truth of life, as stated in the truth of doctrine may pertain to this virtue, as well as the preceding a. 2, ad 3. any other kind of truth whereby a man manifests, by word We speak of the truth of justice in two ways. In one or deed, what he knows. way we refer to the fact that justice itself is a certain recti-Whether the virtue of truth inclines rather to that which is less? IIa IIae q. 109 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that the virtue of truth does not for that which is greater seems to amount to an addition incline to that which is less. For as one incurs falsehood thereto. Now to deny the truth is more repugnant to truth by saying more, so does one by saying less: thus it is no than to add something to it, because truth is incompatible more false that four are five, than that four are three. But with the denial of truth, whereas it is compatible with ad- “every falsehood is in itself evil, and to be avoided,” as the dition. Therefore it seems that truth should incline to that Philosopher declares (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore the virtue of which is greater rather than to that which is less. truth does not incline to that which is less rather than to On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that which is greater. that “by this virtue a man declines rather from the truth Objection 2. Further, that a virtue inclines to the one towards that which is less.” extreme rather than to the other, is owing to the fact that I answer that, There are two ways of declining from the virtue’s mean is nearer to the one extreme than to the the truth to that which is less. First, by affirming, as when other: thus fortitude is nearer to daring than to timidity. a man does not show the whole good that is in him, for But the mean of truth is not nearer to one extreme than instance science, holiness and so forth. This is done with- to the other; because truth, since it is a kind of equality, out prejudice to truth, since the lesser is contained in the holds to the exact mean. Therefore truth does not more greater: and in this way this virtue inclines to what is less. incline to that which is less. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), “this seems to Objection 3. Further, to forsake the truth for that be more prudent because exaggerations give annoyance.” which is less seems to amount to a denial of the truth, For those who represent themselves as being greater than since this is to subtract therefrom; and to forsake the truth they are, are a source of annoyance to others, since they 1709 seem to wish to surpass others: whereas those who make would imply falsehood. And yet this would be less repug-less account of themselves are a source of pleasure, since nant to the truth, not indeed as regards the proper aspect of they seem to defer to others by their moderation. Hence truth, but as regards the aspect of prudence, which should the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:6): “Though I should have a be safeguarded in all the virtues. For since it is fraught mind to glory, I shall not be foolish: for I will say the truth. with greater danger and is more annoying to others, it is But I forbear, lest any man should think of me above that more repugnant to prudence to think or boast that one has which he seeth in me or anything he heareth from me.” what one has not, than to think or say that one has not Secondly, one may incline to what is less by denying, what one has. so as to say that what is in us is not. In this way it does not This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. belong to this virtue to incline to what is less, because this 1710 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 110 Of the Vices Opposed to Truth, and First of Lying (In Four Articles) We must now consider the vices opposed to truth, and (1) lying: (2) dissimulation or hypocrisy: (3) boasting and the opposite vice. Concerning lying there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether lying, as containing falsehood, is always opposed to truth? (2) Of the species of lying; (3) Whether lying is always a sin? (4) Whether it is always a mortal sin? Whether lying is always opposed to truth? IIa IIae q. 110 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that lying is not always opposed is the result. But when this manifestation or statement is to truth. For opposites are incompatible with one another. a moral act, it must needs be voluntary, and dependent But lying is compatible with truth, since that speaks the on the intention of the will. Now the proper object of a truth, thinking it to be false, lies, according to Augustine manifestation or statement is the true or the false. And (Lib. De Mendac. iii). Therefore lying is not opposed to the intention of a bad will may bear on two things: one of truth. which is that a falsehood may be told; while the other is Objection 2. Further, the virtue of truth applies not the proper effect of a false statement, namely, that some- only to words but also to deeds, since according to the one may be deceived. Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) by this virtue one tells the truth Accordingly if these three things concur, namely, both in one’s speech and in one’s life. But lying applies falsehood of what is said, the will to tell a falsehood, and only to words, for Augustine says (Contra Mend. xii) that finally the intention to deceive, then there is falsehood— “a lie is a false signification by words.” Accordingly, it materially, since what is said is false, formally, on account seems that lying is not directly opposed to the virtue of of the will to tell an untruth, and effectively, on account of truth. the will to impart a falsehood. Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Men- However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from dac. iii) that the “liar’s sin is the desire to deceive.” But formal falsehood, from the fact namely, that a person in- this is not opposed to truth, but rather to benevolence or tends to say what is false; wherefore also the word “men- justice. Therefore lying is not opposed to truth. dacium” [lie] is derived from its being in opposition to the On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mend. x): “mind.” Consequently if one says what is false, thinking it “Let no one doubt that it is a lie to tell a falsehood in or- to be true, it is false materially, but not formally, because der to deceive. Wherefore a false statement uttered with the falseness is beside the intention of the speaker so that intent to deceive is a manifest lie.” But this is opposed to it is not a perfect lie, since what is beside the speaker’s truth. Therefore lying is opposed to truth. intention is accidental for which reason it cannot be a spe- I answer that, A moral act takes its species from two cific difference. If, on the other hand, one utters’ false- things, its object, and its end: for the end is the object of hood formally, through having the will to deceive, even if the will, which is the first mover in moral acts. And the what one says be true, yet inasmuch as this is a voluntary power moved by the will has its own object, which is the and moral act, it contains falseness essentially and truth proximate object of the voluntary act, and stands in rela- accidentally, and attains the specific nature of a lie. tion to the will’s act towards the end, as material to formal, That a person intends to cause another to have a false as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 18, Aa. 6,7). opinion, by deceiving him, does not belong to the species Now it has been said above (q. 109, a. 1, ad 3) that the of lying, but to perfection thereof, even as in the physical virtue of truth—and consequently the opposite vices— order, a thing acquires its species if it has its form, even regards a manifestation made by certain signs: and this though the form’s effect be lacking; for instance a heavy manifestation or statement is an act of reason comparing body which is held up aloft by force, lest it come down sign with the thing signified; because every representa- in accordance with the exigency of its form. Therefore it tion consists in comparison, which is the proper act of the is evident that lying is directly an formally opposed to the reason. Wherefore though dumb animals manifest some- virtue of truth. thing, yet they do not intend to manifest anything: but Reply to Objection 1. We judge of a thing according they do something by natural instinct, and a manifestation to what is in it formally and essentially rather than accord- 1711 ing to what is in it materially and accidentally. Hence it is And so when it is said that “a lie is a false signification more in opposition to truth, considered as a moral virtue, by words,” the term “words” denotes every kind of sign. to tell the truth with the intention of telling a falsehood Wherefore if a person intended to signify something false than to tell a falsehood with the intention of telling the by means of signs, he would not be excused from lying. truth. Reply to Objection 3. The desire to deceive belongs Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Doctr. to the perfection of lying, but not to its species, as neither Christ. ii), words hold the chief place among other signs. does any effect belong to the species of its cause. Whether lies are sufficiently divided into officious, jocose, and mischievous lies? IIa IIae q. 110 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that lies are not sufficiently di- kinds, namely, the lie which goes beyond the truth, and vided into “officious,” “jocose” and “mischievous” lies. this belongs to “boasting,” and the lie which stops short For a division should be made according to that which of the truth, and this belongs to “irony.” This division is pertains to a thing by reason of its nature, as the Philoso- an essential division of lying itself, because lying as such pher states (Metaph. vii, text. 43; De Part. Animal i, 3). is opposed to truth, as stated in the preceding Article: and But seemingly the intention of the effect resulting from a truth is a kind of equality, to which more and less are in moral act is something beside and accidental to the species essential opposition. of that act, so that an indefinite number of effects can re- Secondly, lies may be divided with respect to their na- sult from one act. Now this division is made according ture as sins, and with regard to those things that aggravate to the intention of the effect: for a “jocose” lie is told in or diminish the sin of lying, on the part of the end in- order to make fun, an “officious” lie for some useful pur- tended. Now the sin of lying is aggravated, if by lying a pose, and a “mischievous” lie in order to injure someone. person intends to injure another, and this is called a “mis- Therefore lies are unfittingly divided in this way. chievous” lie, while the sin of lying is diminished if it be Objection 2. Further, Augustine (Contra Mendac. directed to some good—either of pleasure and then it is a xiv) gives eight kinds of lies. The first is “in religious “jocose” lie, or of usefulness, and then we have the “offi- doctrine”; the second is “a lie that profits no one and in- cious” lie, whereby it is intended to help another person, jures someone”; the third “profits one party so as to injure or to save him from being injured. In this way lies are another”; the fourth is “told out of mere lust of lying and divided into the three kinds aforesaid. deceiving”; the fifth is “told out of the desire to please”; Thirdly, lies are divided in a more general way, with the sixth “injures no one, and profits /someone in saving respect to their relation to some end, whether or not this his money”; the seventh “injures no one and profits some- increase or diminish their gravity: and in this way the divi- one in saving him from death”; the eighth “injures no one, sion comprises eight kinds, as stated in the Second Objec- and profits someone in saving him from defilement of the tion. Here the first three kinds are contained under “mis- body.” Therefore it seems that the first division of lies is chievous” lies, which are either against God, and then we insufficient. have the lie “in religious doctrine,” or against man, and Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) this either with the sole intention of injuring him, and then divides lying into “boasting,” which exceeds the truth in it is the second kind of lie, which “profits no one, and in- speech, and “irony,” which falls short of the truth by say- jures someone”; or with the intention of injuring one and ing something less: and these two are not contained under at the same time profiting another, and this is the third any one of the kinds mentioned above. Therefore it seems kind of lie, “which profits one, and injures another.” Of that the aforesaid division of lies is inadequate. these the first is the most grievous, because sins against On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 5:7, “Thou wilt de- God are always more grievous, as stated above ( Ia IIae, stroy all that speak a lie,” says “that there are three kinds q. 73, a. 3): and the second is more grievous than the third, of lies; for some are told for the wellbeing and conve- since the latter’s gravity is diminished by the intention of nience of someone; and there is another kind of lie that is profiting another. told in fun; but the third kind of lie is told out of malice.” After these three, which aggravate the sin of lying, we The first of these is called an officious lie, the second a have a fourth, which has its own measure of gravity with- jocose lie, the third a mischievous lie. Therefore lies are out addition or diminution; and this is the lie which is told divided into these three kinds. “out of mere lust of lying and deceiving.” This proceeds I answer that, Lies may be divided in three ways. from a habit, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) First, with respect to their nature as lies: and this is the that “the liar, when he lies from habit, delights in lying.” proper and essential division of lying. In this way, ac- The four kinds that follow lessen the gravity of the cording to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), lies are of two sin of lying. For the fifth kind is the jocose lie, which is 1712 told “with a desire to please”: and the remaining three are Now it is evident that the greater the good intended, comprised under the officious lie, wherein something use- the more is the sin of lying diminished in gravity. Where- ful to another person is intended. This usefulness regards fore a careful consideration of the matter will show that either external things, and then we have the sixth kind of these various kinds of lies are enumerated in their order lie, which “profits someone in saving his money”; or his of gravity: since the useful good is better than the plea- body, and this is the seventh kind, which “saves a man surable good, and life of the body than money, and virtue from death”; or the morality of his virtue, and this is the than the life of the body. eighth kind, which “saves him from unlawful defilement This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. of his body.” Whether every lie is a sin? IIa IIae q. 110 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that not every lie is a sin. For it we find hyperbolical expressions in Holy Writ. Therefore is evident that the evangelists did not sin in the writing of not every lie is a sin. the Gospel. Yet they seem to have told something false: On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 7:14): “Be not since their accounts of the words of Christ and of others willing to make any manner of lie.” often differ from one another: wherefore seemingly one I answer that, An action that is naturally evil in re- of them must have given an untrue account. Therefore not spect of its genus can by no means be good and lawful, every lie is a sin. since in order for an action to be good it must be right Objection 2. Further, no one is rewarded by God for in every respect: because good results from a complete sin. But the midwives of Egypt were rewarded by God cause, while evil results from any single defect, as Diony- for a lie, for it is stated that “God built them houses” (Ex. sius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now a lie is evil in respect 1:21). Therefore a lie is not a sin. of its genus, since it is an action bearing on undue matter. Objection 3. Further, the deeds of holy men are re- For as words are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is lated in Sacred Writ that they may be a model of human unnatural and undue for anyone to signify by words some- life. But we read of certain very holy men that they lied. thing that is not in his mind. Hence the Philosopher says Thus (Gn. 12 and 20) we are told that Abraham said of (Ethic. iv, 7) that “lying is in itself evil and to be shunned, his wife that she was his sister. Jacob also lied when he while truthfulness is good and worthy of praise.” There- said that he was Esau, and yet he received a blessing (Gn. fore every lie is a sin, as also Augustine declares (Contra 27:27-29). Again, Judith is commended (Judith 15:10,11) Mend. i). although she lied to Holofernes. Therefore not every lie is Reply to Objection 1. It is unlawful to hold that a sin. any false assertion is contained either in the Gospel or in Objection 4. Further, one ought to choose the lesser any canonical Scripture, or that the writers thereof have evil in order to avoid the greater: even so a physician cuts told untruths, because faith would be deprived of its cer- off a limb, lest the whole body perish. Yet less harm is titude which is based on the authority of Holy Writ. That done by raising a false opinion in a person’s mind, than the words of certain people are variously reported in the by someone slaying or being slain. Therefore a man may Gospel and other sacred writings does not constitute a lie. lawfully lie, to save another from committing murder, or Hence Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. ii): “He that another from being killed. has the wit to understand that in order to know the truth it Objection 5. Further, it is a lie not to fulfill what is necessary to get at the sense, will conclude that he must one has promised. Yet one is not bound to keep all one’s not be the least troubled, no matter by what words that promises: for Isidore says (Synonym. ii): “Break your sense is expressed.” Hence it is evident, as he adds (De faith when you have promised ill.” Therefore not every lie Consens. Evang. ii), that “we must not judge that some- is a sin. one is lying, if several persons fail to describe in the same Objection 6. Further, apparently a lie is a sin because way and in the same words a thing which they remember thereby we deceive our neighbor: wherefore Augustine to have seen or heard.” says (Lib. De Mend. xxi): “Whoever thinks that there is Reply to Objection 2. The midwives were rewarded, any kind of lie that is not a sin deceives himself shame- not for their lie, but for their fear of God, and for their fully, since he deems himself an honest man when he de- good-will, which latter led them to tell a lie. Hence it is ceives others.” Yet not every lie is a cause of deception, expressly stated (Ex. 2:21): “And because the midwives since no one is deceived by a jocose lie; seeing that lies of feared God, He built them houses.” But the subsequent lie this kind are told, not with the intention of being believed, was not meritorious. but merely for the sake of giving pleasure. Hence again Reply to Objection 3. In Holy Writ, as Augustine ob- 1713 serves (Lib. De Mend. v), the deeds of certain persons are not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any related as examples of perfect virtue: and we must not be- danger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth lieve that such persons were liars. If, however, any of their prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra statements appear to be untruthful, we must understand Mend. x). such statements to have been figurative and prophetic. Reply to Objection 5. A man does not lie, so long Hence Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v): “We must be- as he has a mind to do what he promises, because he lieve that whatever is related of those who, in prophetical does not speak contrary to what he has in mind: but if times, are mentioned as being worthy of credit, was done he does not keep his promise, he seems to act without and said by them prophetically.” As to Abraham “when he faith in changing his mind. He may, however, be excused said that Sara was his sister, he wished to hide the truth, for two reasons. First, if he has promised something ev- not to tell a lie, for she is called his sister since she was the idently unlawful, because he sinned in promise, and did daughter of his father,” Augustine says (QQ. Super. Gen. well to change his mind. Secondly, if circumstances have xxvi; Contra Mend. x; Contra Faust. xxii). Wherefore changed with regard to persons and the business in hand. Abraham himself said (Gn. 20:12): “She is truly my sis- For, as Seneca states (De Benef. iv), for a man to be bound ter, the daughter of my father, and not the daughter of my to keep a promise, it is necessary for everything to remain mother,” being related to him on his father’s side. Jacob’s unchanged: otherwise neither did he lie in promising— assertion that he was Esau, Isaac’s first-born, was spoken since he promised what he had in his mind, due circum- in a mystical sense, because, to wit, the latter’s birthright stances being taken for granted—nor was he faithless in was due to him by right: and he made use of this mode not keeping his promise, because circumstances are no of speech being moved by the spirit of prophecy, in order longer the same. Hence the Apostle, though he did not to signify a mystery, namely, that the younger people, i.e. go to Corinth, whither he had promised to go (2 Cor. 1), the Gentiles, should supplant the first-born, i.e. the Jews. did not lie, because obstacles had arisen which prevented Some, however, are commended in the Scriptures, not him. on account of perfect virtue, but for a certain virtuous Reply to Objection 6. An action may be considered disposition, seeing that it was owing to some praisewor- in two ways. First, in itself, secondly, with regard to the thy sentiment that they were moved to do certain undue agent. Accordingly a jocose lie, from the very genus of things. It is thus that Judith is praised, not for lying to the action, is of a nature to deceive; although in the in- Holofernes, but for her desire to save the people, to which tention of the speaker it is not told to deceive, nor does it end she exposed herself to danger. And yet one might also deceive by the way it is told. Nor is there any similarity say that her words contain truth in some mystical sense. in the hyperbolical or any kind of figurative expressions, Reply to Objection 4. A lie is sinful not only because with which we meet in Holy Writ: because, as Augus- it injures one’s neighbor, but also on account of its inordi- tine says (Lib. De Mend. v), “it is not a lie to do or say nateness, as stated above in this Article. Now it is not al- a thing figuratively: because every statement must be re- lowed to make use of anything inordinate in order to ward ferred to the thing stated: and when a thing is done or said off injury or defects from another: as neither is it lawful figuratively, it states what those to whom it is tendered to steal in order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case understand it to signify.” of necessity when all things are common. Therefore it is Whether every lie is a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 110 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that every lie is a mortal sin. For he lies to him: and whoever breaks his faith is guilty of it is written (Ps. 6:7): “Thou wilt destroy all that speak a iniquity.” Now no one is said to break his faith or “to be lie,” and (Wis. 1:11): “The mouth that belieth killeth the guilty of iniquity,” for a venial sin. Therefore no lie is a soul.” Now mortal sin alone causes destruction and death venial sin. of the soul. Therefore every lie is a mortal sin. Objection 4. Further, the eternal reward is not lost Objection 2. Further, whatever is against a precept of save for a mortal sin. Now, for a lie the eternal reward the decalogue is a mortal sin. Now lying is against this was lost, being exchanged for a temporal meed. For Gre- precept of the decalogue: “Thou shalt not bear false wit- gory says (Moral. xviii) that “we learn from the reward ness.” Therefore every lie is a mortal sin. of the midwives what the sin of lying deserves: since the Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. reward which they deserved for their kindness, and which Christ. i, 36): “Every liar breaks his faith in lying, since they might have received in eternal life, dwindled into a forsooth he wishes the person to whom he lies to have temporal meed on account of the lie of which they were faith in him, and yet he does not keep faith with him, when guilty.” Therefore even an officious lie, such as was that 1714 of the midwives, which seemingly is the least of lies, is a scandal or any other injury resulting therefrom: and thus mortal sin. again it will be a mortal sin, for instance if a man were not Objection 5. Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. deterred through scandal from lying publicly. xvii) that “it is a precept of perfection, not only not to lie Reply to Objection 1. The passages quoted refer to at all, but not even to wish to lie.” Now it is a mortal sin the mischievous lie, as a gloss explains the words of Ps. to act against a precept. Therefore every lie of the per- 5:7, “Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie.” fect is a mortal sin: and consequently so also is a lie told Reply to Objection 2. Since all the precepts of the by anyone else, otherwise the perfect would be worse off decalogue are directed to the love of God and our neigh- than others. bor, as stated above (q. 44, a. 1, ad 3; Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 5, On the contrary, Augustine says on Ps. 5:7, “Thou ad 1), a lie is contrary to a precept of the decalogue, in wilt destroy,” etc.: “There are two kinds of lie, that are not so far as it is contrary to the love of God and our neigh- grievously sinful yet are not devoid of sin, when we lie bor. Hence it is expressly forbidden to bear false witness either in joking, or for the sake of our neighbor’s good.” against our neighbor. But every mortal sin is grievous. Therefore jocose and Reply to Objection 3. Even a venial sin can be called officious lies are not mortal sins. “iniquity” in a broad sense, in so far as it is beside the I answer that, A mortal sin is, properly speaking, one equity of justice; wherefore it is written (1 Jn. 3:4): “Ev- that is contrary to charity whereby the soul lives in union ery sin is iniquity∗.” It is in this sense that Augustine is with God, as stated above (q. 24, a. 12; q. 35, a. 3). Now a speaking. lie may be contrary to charity in three ways: first, in itself; Reply to Objection 4. The lie of the midwives may secondly, in respect of the evil intended; thirdly, acciden- be considered in two ways. First as regards their feel- tally. ing of kindliness towards the Jews, and their reverence A lie may be in itself contrary to charity by reason of and fear of God, for which their virtuous disposition is its false signification. For if this be about divine things, it commended. For this an eternal reward is due. Whereis contrary to the charity of God, whose truth one hides or fore Jerome (in his exposition of Is. 65:21, ‘And they corrupts by such a lie; so that a lie of this kind is opposed shall build houses’) explains that God “built them spiritual not only to the virtue of charity, but also to the virtues of houses.” Secondly, it may be considered with regard to faith and religion: wherefore it is a most grievous and a the external act of lying. For thereby they could merit, not mortal sin. If, however, the false signification be about indeed eternal reward, but perhaps some temporal meed, something the knowledge of which affects a man’s good, the deserving of which was not inconsistent with the de- for instance if it pertain to the perfection of science or to formity of their lie, though this was inconsistent with their moral conduct, a lie of this description inflicts an injury on meriting an eternal reward. It is in this sense that we must one’s neighbor, since it causes him to have a false opin- understand the words of Gregory, and not that they mer- ion, wherefore it is contrary to charity, as regards the love ited by that lie to lose the eternal reward as though they of our neighbor, and consequently is a mortal sin. On the had already merited it by their preceding kindliness, as other hand, if the false opinion engendered by the lie be the objection understands the words to mean. about some matter the knowledge of which is of no con- Reply to Objection 5. Some say that for the perfect sequence, then the lie in question does no harm to one’s every lie is a mortal sin. But this assertion is unreasonable. neighbor; for instance, if a person be deceived as to some For no circumstance causes a sin to be infinitely more contingent particulars that do not concern him. Wherefore grievous unless it transfers it to another species. Now a a lie of this kind, considered in itself, is not a mortal sin. circumstance of person does not transfer a sin to another As regards the end in view, a lie may be contrary to species, except perhaps by reason of something annexed charity, through being told with the purpose of injuring to that person, for instance if it be against his vow: and God, and this is always a mortal sin, for it is opposed to this cannot apply to an officious or jocose lie. Wherefore religion; or in order to injure one’s neighbor, in his per- an officious or a jocose lie is not a mortal sin in perfect son, his possessions or his good name, and this also is a men, except perhaps accidentally on account of scandal. mortal sin, since it is a mortal sin to injure one’s neighbor, We may take in this sense the saying of Augustine that and one sins mortally if one has merely the intention of “it is a precept of perfection not only not to lie at all, but committing a mortal sin. But if the end intended be not not even to wish to lie”: although Augustine says this not contrary to charity, neither will the lie, considered under positively but dubiously, for he begins by saying: “Unless this aspect, be a mortal sin, as in the case of a jocose lie, perhaps it is a precept,” etc. Nor does it matter that they where some little pleasure is intended, or in an officious are placed in a position to safeguard the truth: because lie, where the good also of one’s neighbor is intended. they are bound to safeguard the truth by virtue of their of- Accidentally a lie may be contrary to charity by reason of fice in judging or teaching, and if they lie in these matters ∗ Vulg.: ‘And sin is iniquity.’ 1715 their lie will be a mortal sin: but it does not follow that they sin mortally when they lie in other matters. 1716 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 111 Of Dissimulation and Hypocrisy (In Four Articles) In due sequence we must consider dissimulation and hypocrisy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether all dissimulation is a sin? (2) Whether hypocrisy is dissimulation? (3) Whether it is opposed to truth? (4) Whether it is a mortal sin? Whether all dissimulation is a sin? IIa IIae q. 111 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that not all dissimulation is a also is it contrary to truth to employ signs of deeds or sin. For it is written (Lk. 24:28) that our Lord “pretended things to signify the contrary of what is in oneself, and [Douay: ‘made as though’] he would go farther”; and Am- this is what is properly denoted by dissimulation. Con- brose in his book on the Patriarchs (De Abraham i) says sequently dissimulation is properly a lie told by the signs of Abraham that he “spoke craftily to his servants, when of outward deeds. Now it matters not whether one lie in he said” (Gn. 22:5): “I and the boy will go with speed as word or in any other way, as stated above (q. 110, a. 1, far as yonder, and after we have worshipped, will return obj. 2). Wherefore, since every lie is a sin, as stated above to you.” Now to pretend and to speak craftily savor of dis- (q. 110, a. 3), it follows that also all dissimulation is a sin. simulation: and yet it is not to be said that there was sin Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De QQ. in Christ or Abraham. Therefore not all dissimulation is a Evang. ii), “To pretend is not always a lie: but only when sin. the pretense has no signification, then it is a lie. When, Objection 2. Further, no sin is profitable. But accord- however, our pretense refers to some signification, there ing to Jerome, in his commentary on Gal. 2:11, “When is no lie, but a representation of the truth.” And he cites Peter [Vulg.: ‘Cephas’] was come to Antioch:—The ex- figures of speech as an example, where a thing is “pre- ample of Jehu, king of Israel, who slew the priest of Baal, tended,” for we do not mean it to be taken literally but pretending that he desired to worship idols, should teach as a figure of something else that we wish to say. In this us that dissimulation is useful and sometimes to be em- way our Lord “pretended He would go farther,” because ployed”; and David “changed his countenance before” He acted as if wishing to go farther; in order to signify Achis, king of Geth (1 Kings 21:13). Therefore not all something figuratively either because He was far from dissimulation is a sin. their faith, according to Gregory (Hom. xxiii in Ev.); or, Objection 3. Further, good is contrary to evil. There- as Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii), because, “as He fore if it is evil to simulate good, it is good to simulate was about to go farther away from them by ascending into evil. heaven, He was, so to speak, held back on earth by their Objection 4. Further, it is written in condemnation of hospitality.” certain people (Is. 3:9): “They have proclaimed abroad Abraham also spoke figuratively. Wherefore Ambrose their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid it.” Now it per- (De Abraham i) says that Abraham “foretold what he tains to dissimulation to hide one’s sin. Therefore it is knew not”: for he intended to return alone after sacrificing reprehensible sometimes not to simulate. But it is never his son: but by his mouth the Lord expressed what He was reprehensible to avoid sin. Therefore dissimulation is not about to do. It is evident therefore that neither dissembled. a sin. Reply to Objection 2. Jerome employs the term “sim- On the contrary, A gloss on Is. 16:14, “In three ulation” in a broad sense for any kind of pretense. David’s years,” etc., says: “Of the two evils it is less to sin openly change of countenance was a figurative pretense, as a than to simulate holiness.” But to sin openly is always a gloss observes in commenting on the title of Ps. 33, “I sin. Therefore dissimulation is always a sin. will bless the Lord at all times.” There is no need to ex- I answer that, As stated above (q. 109, a. 3; q. 110, cuse Jehu’s dissimulation from sin or lie, because he was a. 1), it belongs to the virtue of truth to show oneself a wicked man, since he departed not from the idolatry of outwardly by outward signs to be such as one is. Now Jeroboam (4 Kings 10:29,31). And yet he is praised withal outward signs are not only words, but also deeds. Ac- and received an earthly reward from God, not for his dis- cordingly just as it is contrary to truth to signify by words simulation, but for his zeal in destroying the worship of something different from that which is in one’s mind, so Baal. 1717 Reply to Objection 3. Some say that no one may pre-Reply to Objection 4. Just as a man lies when he sig- tend to be wicked, because no one pretends to be wicked nifies by word that which he is not, yet lies not when he by doing good deeds, and if he do evil deeds, he is evil. refrains from saying what he is, for this is sometimes law- But this argument proves nothing. Because a man might ful; so also does a man dissemble, when by outward signs pretend to be evil, by doing what is not evil in itself but of deeds or things he signifies that which he is not, yet he has some appearance of evil: and nevertheless this dissim- dissembles not if he omits to signify what he is. Hence ulation is evil, both because it is a lie, and because it gives one may hide one’s sin without being guilty of dissimu-scandal; and although he is wicked on this account, yet lation. It is thus that we must understand the saying of his wickedness is not the wickedness he simulates. And Jerome on the words of Isa. 3:9, that the “second remedy because dissimulation is evil in itself, its sinfulness is not after shipwreck is to hide one’s sin,” lest, to wit, others be derived from the thing simulated, whether this be good or scandalized thereby. evil. Whether hypocrisy is the same as dissimulation? IIa IIae q. 111 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that hypocrisy is not the same plexion of the person they simulate, at one time under the as dissimulation. For dissimulation consists in lying by guise of a man, at another under the guise of a woman, so deeds. But there may be hypocrisy in showing outwardly as to deceive the people in their acting.” Hence Augus- what one does inwardly, according to Mat. 6:2, “When tine says (De Serm. Dom. ii) that “just as hypocrites by thou dost an alms-deed sound not a trumpet before thee, simulating other persons act the parts of those they are not as the hypocrites do.” Therefore hypocrisy is not the same (since he that acts the part of Agamemnon is not that man as dissimulation. himself but pretends to be), so too in the Church and in Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7): every department of human life, whoever wishes to seem “Some there are who wear the habit of holiness, yet are what he is not is a hypocrite: for he pretends to be just unable to attain the merit of perfection. We must by no without being so in reality.” means deem these to have joined the ranks of the hyp- We must conclude, therefore, that hypocrisy is dissim- ocrites, since it is one thing to sin from weakness, and ulation, not, however, any form of dissimulation, but only another to sin from malice.” Now those who wear the when one person simulates another, as when a sinner sim- habit of holiness, without attaining the merit of perfection, ulates the person of a just man. are dissemblers, since the outward habit signifies works Reply to Objection 1. The outward deed is a natural of perfection. Therefore dissimulation is not the same as sign of the intention. Accordingly when a man does good hypocrisy. works pertaining by their genus to the service of God, and Objection 3. Further, hypocrisy consists in the mere seeks by their means to please, not God but man, he sim- intention. For our Lord says of hypocrites (Mat. 23:5) that ulates a right intention which he has not. Wherefore Gre- “all their works they do for to be seen of men”: and Gre- gory says (Moral.) that “hypocrites make God’s interests gory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that “they never consider what subservient to worldly purposes, since by making a show it is that they do, but how by their every action they may of saintly conduct they seek, not to turn men to God, but please men.” But dissimulation consists, not in the mere to draw to themselves the applause of their approval:” and intention, but in the outward action: wherefore a gloss on so they make a lying pretense of having a good intention, Job 36:13, “Dissemblers and crafty men prove the wrath which they have not, although they do not pretend to do a of God,” says that “the dissembler simulates one thing good deed without doing it. and does another: he pretends chastity, and delights in Reply to Objection 2. The habit of holiness, for in- lewdness, he makes a show of poverty and fills his purse.” stance the religious or the clerical habit, signifies a state Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation. whereby one is bound to perform works of perfection. On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): And so when a man puts on the habit of holiness, with “ ‘Hypocrite’ is a Greek word corresponding to the Latin the intention of entering the state of perfection, if he fail ‘simulator,’ for whereas he is evil within,” he “shows him- through weakness, he is not a dissembler or a hypocrite, self outwardly as being good; hypo denoting falsehood, because he is not bound to disclose his sin by laying aside and krisis, judgment.” the habit of holiness. If, however, he were to put on the I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x), “the word habit of holiness in order to make a show of righteousness, hypocrite is derived from the appearance of those who he would be a hypocrite and a dissembler. come on to the stage with a disguised face, by changing Reply to Objection 3. In dissimulation, as in a lie, the color of their complexion, so as to imitate the com- there are two things: one by way of sign, the other by 1718 way of thing signified. Accordingly the evil intention in or any sensible objects are considered in every dissimula-hypocrisy is considered as a thing signified, which does tion and lie as a sign. not tally with the sign: and the outward words, or deeds, Whether hypocrisy is contrary to the virtue of truth? IIa IIae q. 111 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that hypocrisy is not contrary to The indirect opposition or contrariety of hypocrisy the virtue of truth. For in dissimulation or hypocrisy there may be considered in relation to any accident, for instance is a sign and a thing signified. Now with regard to neither a remote end, or an instrument of action, or anything else of these does it seem to be opposed to any special virtue: of that kind. for a hypocrite simulates any virtue, and by means of any Reply to Objection 1. The hypocrite in simulating virtuous deeds, such as fasting, prayer and alms deeds, as a virtue regards it as his end, not in respect of its exis- stated in Mat. 6:1-18. Therefore hypocrisy is not specially tence, as though he wished to have it, but in respect of opposed to the virtue of truth. appearance, since he wishes to seem to have it. Hence Objection 2. Further, all dissimulation seems to pro- his hypocrisy is not opposed to that virtue, but to truth, ceed from guile, wherefore it is opposed to simplicity. inasmuch as he wishes to deceive men with regard to that Now guile is opposed to prudence as above stated (q. 55, virtue. And he performs acts of that virtue, not as intend- a. 4). Therefore, hypocrisy which is dissimulation is not ing them for their own sake, but instrumentally, as signs opposed to truth, but rather to prudence or simplicity. of that virtue, wherefore his hypocrisy has not, on that Objection 3. Further, the species of moral acts is account, a direct opposition to that virtue. taken from their end. Now the end of hypocrisy is the Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 55, acquisition of gain or vainglory: wherefore a gloss on Aa. 3,4,5), the vice directly opposed to prudence is cun- Job 27:8, “What is the hope of the hypocrite, if through ning, to which it belongs to discover ways of achieving covetousness he take by violence,” says: “A hypocrite a purpose, that are apparent and not real: while it ac- or, as the Latin has it, a dissimulator, is a covetous thief: complishes that purpose, by guile in words, and by fraud for through desire of being honored for holiness, though in deeds: and it stands in relation to prudence, as guile guilty of wickedness, he steals praise for a life which is and fraud to simplicity. Now guile and fraud are directed not his.”∗ Therefore since covetousness or vainglory is not chiefly to deception, and sometimes secondarily to injury. directly opposed to truth, it seems that neither is hypocrisy Wherefore it belongs directly to simplicity to guard one- or dissimulation. self from deception, and in this way the virtue of sim- On the contrary, All dissimulation is a lie, as stated plicity is the same as the virtue of truth as stated above above (a. 1). Now a lie is directly opposed to truth. There- (q. 109, a. 2, ad 4). There is, however, a mere logical fore dissimulation or hypocrisy is also. difference between them, because by truth we mean the I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. concordance between sign and thing signified, while sim- text. 13, 24, x), “contrariety is opposition as regards plicity indicates that one does not tend to different things, form,” i.e. the specific form. Accordingly we must re- by intending one thing inwardly, and pretending another ply that dissimulation or hypocrisy may be opposed to a outwardly. virtue in two ways, in one way directly, in another way Reply to Objection 3. Gain or glory is the remote indirectly. Its direct opposition or contrariety is to be con- end of the dissembler as also of the liar. Hence it does sidered with regard to the very species of the act, and this not take its species from this end, but from the proximate species depends on that act’s proper object. Wherefore end, which is to show oneself other than one is. Where- since hypocrisy is a kind of dissimulation, whereby a man fore it sometimes happens to a man to pretend great things simulates a character which is not his, as stated in the pre- of himself, for no further purpose than the mere lust of ceding article, it follows that it is directly opposed to truth hypocrisy, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), and as whereby a man shows himself in life and speech to be also we have said above with regard to lying (q. 110, a. 2). what he is, as stated in Ethic. iv, 7. ∗ The quotation is from St. Gregory’s Moralia, Bk XVIII. 1719 Whether hypocrisy is always a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 111 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that hypocrisy is always a mor- says (Moral. xxxi, 17). But vainglory is not always a tal sin. For Jerome says on Is. 16:14: “Of the two evils mortal sin. Neither therefore is hypocrisy. it is less to sin openly than to simulate holiness”: and a I answer that, There are two things in hypocrisy, lack gloss on Job 1:21∗, “As it hath pleased the Lord,” etc., of holiness, and simulation thereof. Accordingly if by a says that “pretended justice is no justice, but a twofold hypocrite we mean a person whose intention is directed sin”: and again a gloss on Lam. 4:6, “The iniquity. . . of to both the above, one, namely, who cares not to be holy my people is made greater than the sin of Sodom,” says: but only to appear so, in which sense Sacred Scripture is “He deplores the sins of the soul that falls into hypocrisy, wont to use the term, it is evident that hypocrisy is a mor- which is a greater iniquity than the sin of Sodom.” Now tal sin: for no one is entirely deprived of holiness save the sins of Sodom are mortal sin. Therefore hypocrisy is through mortal sin. But if by a hypocrite we mean one always a mortal sin. who intends to simulate holiness, which he lacks through Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, mortal sin, then, although he is in mortal sin, whereby he 8) that hypocrites sin out of malice. But this is most is deprived of holiness, yet, in his case, the dissimulation grievous, for it pertains to the sin against the Holy Ghost. itself is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes a venial Therefore a hypocrite always sins mortally. sin. This will depend on the end in view; for if this be Objection 3. Further, no one deserves the anger contrary to the love of God or of his neighbor, it will be of God and exclusion from seeing God, save on ac- a mortal sin: for instance if he were to simulate holiness count of mortal sin. Now the anger of God is deserved in order to disseminate false doctrine, or that he may ob- through hypocrisy according to Job 36:13, “Dissemblers tain ecclesiastical preferment, though unworthy, or that he and crafty men prove the wrath of God”: and the hypocrite may obtain any temporal good in which he fixes his end. is excluded from seeing God, according to Job 13:16, If, however, the end intended be not contrary to charity, “No hypocrite shall come before His presence.” There- it will be a venial sin, as for instance when a man takes fore hypocrisy is always a mortal sin. pleasure in the pretense itself: of such a man it is said in On the contrary, Hypocrisy is lying by deed since it Ethic. iv, 7 that “he would seem to be vain rather than is a kind of dissimulation. But it is not always a mortal sin evil”; for the same applies to simulation as to a lie. to lie by deed. Neither therefore is all hypocrisy a mortal It happens also sometimes that a man simulates the sin. perfection of holiness which is not necessary for spiritual Further, the intention of a hypocrite is to appear to welfare. Simulation of this kind is neither a mortal sin be good. But this is not contrary to charity. Therefore always, nor is it always associated with mortal sin. hypocrisy is not of itself a mortal sin. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. Further, hypocrisy is born of vainglory, as Gregory ∗ St. Augustine on Ps. 63:7 1720 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 112 Of Boasting (In Two Articles) We must now consider boasting and irony, which are parts of lying according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). Under the first head, namely, boasting, there are two points of inquiry: (1) To which virtue is it opposed? (2) Whether it is a mortal sin? Whether boasting is opposed to the virtue of truth? IIa IIae q. 112 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that boasting is not opposed to of me.” In another way a man uplifts himself in words, the virtue of truth. For lying is opposed to truth. But it by speaking of himself above that which he is in reality. is possible to boast even without lying, as when a man And since we should judge of things as they are in them- makes a show of his own excellence. Thus it is written selves, rather than as others deem them to be, it follows (Esther 1:3,4) that Assuerus “made a great feast. . . that he that boasting denotes more properly the uplifting of self might show the riches of the glory” and “of his kingdom, above what one is in oneself, than the uplifting of self and the greatness and boasting of his power.” Therefore above what others think of one: although in either case it boasting is not opposed to the virtue of truth. may be called boasting. Hence boasting properly so called Objection 2. Further, boasting is reckoned by Gre- is opposed to truth by way of excess. gory (Moral. xxiii, 4) to be one of the four species of Reply to Objection 1. This argument takes boasting pride, “when,” to wit, “a man boasts of having what he has as exceeding men’s opinion. not.” Hence it is written (Jer. 48:29,30): “We have heard Reply to Objection 2. The sin of boasting may be the pride of Moab, he is exceeding proud: his haughti- considered in two ways. First, with regard to the species ness, and his arrogancy, and his pride, and the loftiness of of the act, and thus it is opposed to truth; as stated (in the his heart. I know, saith the Lord, his boasting, and that the body of the article and q. 110, a. 2). Secondly, with re- strength thereof is not according to it.” Moreover, Gregory gard to its cause, from which more frequently though not says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that boasting arises from vainglory. always it arises: and thus it proceeds from pride as its in- Now pride and vainglory are opposed to the virtue of hu- wardly moving and impelling cause. For when a man is mility. Therefore boasting is opposed, not to truth, but to uplifted inwardly by arrogance, it often results that out- humility. wardly he boasts of great things about himself; though Objection 3. Further, boasting seems to be occa- sometimes a man takes to boasting, not from arrogance, sioned by riches; wherefore it is written (Wis. 5:8): “What but from some kind of vanity, and delights therein, be- hath pride profited us? or what advantage hath the boast- cause he is a boaster by habit. Hence arrogance, which is ing of riches brought us?” Now excess of riches seems an uplifting of self above oneself, is a kind of pride; yet it to belong to the sin of covetousness, which is opposed to is not the same as boasting, but is very often its cause. For justice or liberality. Therefore boasting is not opposed to this reason Gregory reckons boasting among the species truth. of pride. Moreover, the boaster frequently aims at ob- On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; taining glory through his boasting, and so, according to iv, 7), that boasting is opposed to truth. Gregory, it arises from vainglory considered as its end. I answer that, “Jactantia” [boasting] seems properly Reply to Objection 3. Wealth also causes boasting, to denote the uplifting of self by words: since if a man in two ways. First, as an occasional cause, inasmuch as wishes to throw [jactare] a thing far away, he lifts it up a man prides himself on his riches. Hence (Prov. 8:18) high. And to uplift oneself, properly speaking, is to talk “riches” are significantly described as “proud” [Douay: of oneself above oneself∗. This happens in two ways. For ‘glorious’]. Secondly, as being the end of boasting, since sometimes a man speaks of himself, not above what he is according to Ethic. iv, 7, some boast, not only for the sake in himself, but above that which he is esteemed by men of glory, but also for the sake of gain. Such people invent to be: and this the Apostle declines to do when he says stories about themselves, so as to make profit thereby; for (2 Cor. 12:6): “I forbear lest any man should think of me instance, they pretend to be skilled in medicine, wisdom, above that which he seeth in me, or anything he heareth or divination. ∗ Or ‘tall-talking’ as we should say in English 1721 Whether boasting is a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 112 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that boasting is a mortal sin. For as told of the Pharisee who said (Lk. 18:11): “I am not it is written (Prov. 28:25): “He that boasteth, and puffeth as the rest of men, extortioners, unjust, adulterers, as also himself, stirreth up quarrels.” Now it is a mortal sin to is this publican.” Sometimes it is a venial sin, when, to stir up quarrels, since God hates those that sow discord, wit, a man boasts of things that are against neither God according to Prov. 6:19. Therefore boasting is a mortal nor his neighbor. Secondly, it may be considered with re- sin. gard to its cause, namely, pride, or the desire of gain or of Objection 2. Further, whatever is forbidden in God’s vainglory: and then if it proceeds from pride or from such law is a mortal sin. Now a gloss on Ecclus. 6:2, “Extol vainglory as is a mortal sin, then the boasting will also be not thyself in the thoughts of thy soul,” says: “This is a a mortal sin: otherwise it will be a venial sin. Sometimes, prohibition of boasting and pride.” Therefore boasting is however, a man breaks out into boasting through desire of a mortal sin. gain, and for this very reason he would seem to be aim- Objection 3. Further, boasting is a kind of lie. But it is ing at the deception and injury of his neighbor: wherefore neither an officious nor a jocose lie. This is evident from boasting of this kind is more likely to be a mortal sin. the end of lying; for according to the Philosopher (Ethic. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that “a man who iv, 7), “the boaster pretends to something greater than he boasts for the sake of gain, is viler than one who boasts for is, sometimes for no further purpose, sometimes for the the sake of glory or honor.” Yet it is not always a mortal sake of glory or honor, sometimes for the sake of money.” sin because the gain may be such as not to injure another Thus it is evident that it is neither an officious nor a jo- man. cose lie, and consequently it must be a mischievous lie. Reply to Objection 1. To boast in order to stir quar- Therefore seemingly it is always a mortal sin. rels is a mortal sin. But it happens sometimes that boasts On the contrary, Boasting arises from vainglory, ac- are the cause of quarrels, not intentionally but acciden- cording to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17). Now vainglory tally: and consequently boasting will not be a mortal sin is not always a mortal sin, but is sometimes a venial sin on that account. which only the very perfect avoid. For Gregory says Reply to Objection 2. This gloss speaks of boasting (Moral. viii, 30) that “it belongs to the very perfect, as arising from pride that is a mortal sin. by outward deeds so to seek the glory of their author, Reply to Objection 3. Boasting does not always in- that they are not inwardly uplifted by the praise awarded volve a mischievous lie, but only where it is contrary to them.” Therefore boasting is not always a mortal sin. the love of God or our neighbor, either in itself or in its I answer that, As stated above (q. 110, a. 4), a mortal cause. That a man boast, through mere pleasure in boast- sin is one that is contrary to charity. Accordingly boast- ing, is an inane thing to do, as the Philosopher remarks ing may be considered in two ways. First, in itself, as a (Ethic. iv, 7): wherefore it amounts to a jocose lie. Unless lie, and thus it is sometimes a mortal, and sometimes a perchance he were to prefer this to the love of God, so as venial sin. It will be a mortal sin when a man boasts of to contemn God’s commandments for the sake of boast- that which is contrary to God’s glory—thus it is said in ing: for then it would be against the charity of God, in the person of the king of Tyre (Ezech. 28:2): “Thy heart Whom alone ought our mind to rest as in its last end. is lifted up, and thou hast said: I am God”—or contrary To boast for the sake of glory or gain seen to involve to the love of our neighbor, as when a man while boast- an officious lie: provided it be do without injury to others, ing of himself breaks out into invectives against others, for then it would once become a mischievous lie. 1722 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 113 Irony∗ (In Two Articles) We must now consider irony, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether irony is a sin? (2) Of its comparison with boasting. Whether irony is a sin? IIa IIae q. 113 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that irony, which consists in to irony, and is always a sin. belittling oneself, is not a sin. For no sin arises from Reply to Objection 1. There is a twofold wisdom one’s being strengthened by God: and yet this leads one and a twofold folly. For there is a wisdom according to to belittle oneself, according to Prov. 30:1,2: “The vi- God, which has human or worldly folly annexed to it, ac- sion which the man spoke, with whom is God, and who cording to 1 Cor. 3:18, “If any man among you seem to being strengthened by God, abiding with him, said, I am be wise in this world, let him become a fool that he may the most foolish of men.” Also it is written (Amos 7:14): be wise.” But there is another wisdom that is worldly, “Amos answered. . . I am not a prophet.” Therefore irony, which as the same text goes on to say, “is foolishness with whereby a man belittles himself in words, is not a sin. God.” Accordingly, he that is strengthened by God ac- Objection 2. Further, Gregory says in a letter to Au- knowledges himself to be most foolish in the estimation gustine, bishop of the English (Regist. xii): “It is the mark of men, because, to wit, he despises human things, which of a well-disposed mind to acknowledge one’s fault when human wisdom seeks. Hence the text quoted continues, one is not guilty.” But all sin is inconsistent with a well- “and the wisdom of men is not with me,” and farther on, disposed mind. Therefore irony is not a sin. “and I have known the science of the saints”†. Objection 3. Further, it is not a sin to shun pride. It may also be replied that “the wisdom of men” is that But “some belittle themselves in words, so as to avoid which is acquired by human reason, while the “wisdom of pride,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). There- the saints” is that which is received by divine inspiration. fore irony is not a sin. Amos denied that he was a prophet by birth, since, to On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost., wit, he was not of the race of prophets: hence the text goes Serm. xxix): “If thou liest on account of humility, if thou on, “nor am I the son of a prophet.” wert not a sinner before lying, thou hast become one by Reply to Objection 2. It belongs to a well-disposed lying.” mind that a man tend to perfect righteousness, and con- I answer that, To speak so as to belittle oneself may sequently deem himself guilty, not only if he fall short of occur in two ways. First so as to safeguard truth, as when common righteousness, which is truly a sin, but also if he a man conceals the greater things in himself, but discov- fall short of perfect righteousness, which sometimes is not ers and asserts lesser things of himself the presence of a sin. But he does not call sinful that which he does not which in himself he perceives. To belittle oneself in this acknowledge to be sinful: which would be a lie of irony. way does not belong to irony, nor is it a sin in respect of Reply to Objection 3. A man should not commit one its genus, except through corruption of one of its circum- sin in order to avoid another: and so he ought not to lie in stances. Secondly, a person belittles himself by forsaking any way at all in order to avoid pride. Hence Augustine the truth, for instance by ascribing to himself something says (Tract. xliii in Joan.): “Shun not arrogance so as to mean the existence of which in himself he does not per- forsake truth”: and Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 3) that “it ceive, or by denying something great of himself, which is a reckless humility that entangles itself with lies.” nevertheless he perceives himself to possess: this pertains ∗ Irony Here Must Be Given the Signification of the Greek Eironia, Whence It Is Derived: Dissimulation of One’s Own Good Points. † Vulg.: ‘and I have not known the science of the saints’ 1723 Whether irony is a less grievous sin than boasting? IIa IIae q. 113 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that irony is not a less grievous spect the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that “boasting is sin than boasting. For each of them is a sin through for- a more grievous sin than irony.” saking truth, which is a kind of equality. But one does Sometimes, however, it happens that a man belittles not forsake truth by exceeding it any more than by dimin- himself for some other motive, for instance that he may ishing it. Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin than deceive cunningly: and then irony is more grievous. boasting. Reply to Objection 1. This argument applies to Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher irony and boasting, according as a lie is considered to be (Ethic. iv, 7), irony sometimes is boasting. But boasting grievous in itself or on account of its matter: for it has is not irony. Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin than been said that in this way they are equal. boasting. Reply to Objection 2. Excellence is twofold: one Objection 3. Further, it is written (Prov. 26:25): is in temporal, the other in spiritual things. Now it hap- “When he shall speak low, trust him not: because there pens at times that a person, by outward words or signs, are seven mischiefs in his heart.” Now it belongs to irony pretends to be lacking in external things, for instance by to speak low. Therefore it contains a manifold wicked- wearing shabby clothes, or by doing something of the ness. kind, and that he intends by so doing to make a show On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7): of some spiritual excellence. Thus our Lord said of cer- “Those who speak with irony and belittle themselves are tain men (Mat. 6:16) that “they disfigure their faces that more gracious, seemingly, in their manners.” they may appear unto men to fast.” Wherefore such per- I answer that, As stated above (q. 110, Aa. 2,4), one sons are guilty of both vices, irony and boasting, although lie is more grievous than another, sometimes on account in different respects, and for this reason they sin more of the matter which it is about—thus a lie about a matter grievously. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that of religious doctrine is most grievous—and sometimes on it is “the practice of boasters both to make overmuch of account of the motive for sinning; thus a mischievous lie themselves, and to make very little of themselves”: and is more grievous than an officious or jocose lie. Now irony for the same reason it is related of Augustine that he was and boasting lie about the same matter, either by words, unwilling to possess clothes that were either too costly or or by any other outward signs, namely, about matters af- too shabby, because by both do men seek glory. fecting the person: so that in this respect they are equal. Reply to Objection 3. According to the words of But for the most part boasting proceeds from a viler Ecclus. 19:23, “There is one that humbleth himself motive, namely, the desire of gain or honor: whereas irony wickedly, and his interior is full of deceit,” and it is in arises from a man’s averseness, albeit inordinate, to be this sense that Solomon speaks of the man who, through disagreeable to others by uplifting himself: and in this re- deceitful humility, “speaks low” wickedly. 1724 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 114 Of the Friendliness Which Is Called Affability (In Two Articles) We must now consider the friendliness which is called affability, and the opposite vices which are flattery and quarreling. Concerning friendliness or affability, there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a special virtue? (2) Whether it is a part of justice? Whether friendliness is a special virtue? IIa IIae q. 114 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that friendliness is not a special the affection whereby one man loves another and may re-virtue. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 3) that “the sult from any virtue. We have stated above, in treating of perfect friendship is that which is on account of virtue.” charity (q. 23, a. 1, a. 3, ad 1; Qq. 25,26), what things be- Now any virtue is the cause of friendship: “since the good long to this kind of friendship. But he mentions another is lovable to all,” as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). friendliness, which consists merely in outward words or Therefore friendliness is not a special virtue, but a conse- deeds; this has not the perfect nature of friendship, but quence of every virtue. bears a certain likeness thereto, in so far as a man behaves Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, in a becoming manner towards those with whom he is in 6) of this kind of friend that he “takes everything in a right contact. manner both from those he loves and from those who are Reply to Objection 2. Every man is naturally every not his friends.” Now it seems to pertain to simulation that man’s friend by a certain general love; even so it is written a person should show signs of friendship to those whom (Ecclus. 13:19) that “every beast loveth its like.” This love he loves not, and this is incompatible with virtue. There- is signified by signs of friendship, which we show out- fore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue. wardly by words or deeds, even to those who are strangers Objection 3. Further, virtue “observes the mean ac- or unknown to us. Hence there is no dissimulation in this: cording as a wise man decides” (Ethic. ii, 6). Now it because we do not show them signs of perfect friendship, is written (Eccles. 7:5): “The heart of the wise is where for we do not treat strangers with the same intimacy as there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there is those who are united to us by special friendship. mirth”: wherefore “it belongs to a virtuous man to be Reply to Objection 3. When it is said that “the heart most wary of pleasure” (Ethic. ii, 9). Now this kind of of the wise is where there is mourning” it is not that he friendship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), “is may bring sorrow to his neighbor, for the Apostle says essentially desirous of sharing pleasures, but fears to give (Rom. 14:15): “If, because of thy meat, thy brother be pain.” Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue. grieved, thou walkest not now according to charity”: but On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about that he may bring consolation to the sorrowful, accord- acts of virtue. Now it is written (Ecclus. 4:7): “Make ing to Ecclus. 7:38, “Be not wanting in comforting them thyself affable to the congregation of the poor.” There- that weep, and walk with them that mourn.” Again, “the fore affability, which is what we mean by friendship, is a heart of fools is where there is mirth,” not that they may special virtue. gladden others, but that they may enjoy others’ gladness. I answer that, As stated above (q. 109, a. 2; Ia IIae, Accordingly, it belongs to the wise man to share his plea- q. 55, a. 3), since virtue is directed to good, wherever there sures with those among whom he dwells, not lustful plea- is a special kind of good, there must needs be a special sures, which virtue shuns, but honest pleasures, according kind of virtue. Now good consists in order, as stated above to Ps. 132:1, “Behold how good and how pleasant it is for (q. 109, a. 2). And it behooves man to be maintained in brethren to dwell together in unity.” a becoming order towards other men as regards their mu- Nevertheless, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6), tual relations with one another, in point of both deeds and for the sake of some good that will result, or in order words, so that they behave towards one another in a be- to avoid some evil, the virtuous man will sometimes not coming manner. Hence the need of a special virtue that shrink from bringing sorrow to those among whom he maintains the becomingness of this order: and this virtue lives. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:8): “Although is called friendliness. I made you sorrowful by my epistle, I do not repent,” and Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher speaks of a further on (2 Cor. 7:9), “I am glad; not because you were twofold friendship in his Ethics. One consists chiefly in made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful 1725 unto repentance.” For this reason we should not show a written (Ecclus. 7:26): “Hast thou daughters? Have a care cheerful face to those who are given to sin, in order that of their body, and show not thy countenance gay towards we may please them, lest we seem to consent to their sin, them.” and in a way encourage them to sin further. Hence it is Whether this kind of friendship is a part of justice? IIa IIae q. 114 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that this kind of friendship is we behave pleasantly to those among whom we dwell, un- not a part of justice. For justice consists in giving another less at times, for some reason, it be necessary to displease man his due. But this virtue does not consist in doing that, them for some good purpose. but in behaving agreeably towards those among whom we Reply to Objection 1. As we have said above (q. 109, live. Therefore this virtue is not a part of justice. a. 3, ad 1), because man is a social animal he owes his Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher fellow-man, in equity, the manifestation of truth without (Ethic. iv, 6), this virtue is concerned about the joys and which human society could not last. Now as man could sorrows of those who dwell in fellowship. Now it belongs not live in society without truth, so likewise, not with- to temperance to moderate the greatest pleasures, as stated out joy, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii), no above ( Ia IIae, q. 60, a. 5; Ia IIae, q. 61, a. 3). Therefore one could abide a day with the sad nor with the joyless. this virtue is a part of temperance rather than of justice. Therefore, a certain natural equity obliges a man to live Objection 3. Further, to give equal things to those agreeably with his fellow-men; unless some reason should who are unequal is contrary to justice, as stated above oblige him to sadden them for their good. (q. 59, Aa. 1,2). Now, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. Reply to Objection 2. It belongs to temperance to iv, 6), this virtue “treats in like manner known and un- curb pleasures of the senses. But this virtue regards the known, companions and strangers.” Therefore this virtue pleasures of fellowship, which have their origin in the rea- rather than being a part of justice is opposed thereto. son, in so far as one man behaves becomingly towards an- On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somno Scip. i) ac- other. Such pleasures need not to be curbed as though they counts friendship a part of justice. were noisome. I answer that, This virtue is a part of justice, being Reply to Objection 3. This saying of the Philosopher annexed to it as to a principal virtue. Because in common does not mean that one ought to converse and behave in with justice it is directed to another person, even as jus- the same way with acquaintances and strangers, since, as tice is: yet it falls short of the notion of justice, because he says (Ethic. iv, 6), “it is not fitting to please and dis- it lacks the full aspect of debt, whereby one man is bound please intimate friends and strangers in the same way.” to another, either by legal debt, which the law binds him This likeness consists in this, that we ought to behave to- to pay, or by some debt arising out of a favor received. wards all in a fitting manner. For it regards merely a certain debt of equity, namely, that 1726 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 115 Of Flattery (In Two Articles) We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid virtue: (1) Flattery, and (2) Quarreling. Concerning flattery there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether flattery is a sin? (2) Whether it is a mortal sin? Whether flattery is a sin? IIa IIae q. 115 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that flattery is not a sin. For all who wish to exceed the mode of virtue in pleasing oth- flattery consists in words of praise offered to another in ers by words or deeds in their ordinary behavior towards order to please him. But it is not a sin to praise a person, their fellows. according to Prov. 31:28, “Her children rose up and called Reply to Objection 1. One may praise a person both her blessed: her husband, and he praised her.” Moreover, well and ill, according as one observes or omits the due there is no evil in wishing to please others, according to 1 circumstances. For if while observing other due circum- Cor. 10:33, “I. . . in all things please all men.” Therefore stances one were to wish to please a person by praising flattery is not a sin. him, in order thereby to console him, or that he may strive Objection 2. Further, evil is contrary to good, and to make progress in good, this will belong to the aforesaid blame to praise. But it is not a sin to blame evil. Neither, virtue of friendship. But it would belong to flattery, if one then, is it a sin to praise good, which seems to belong to wished to praise a person for things in which he ought not flattery. Therefore flattery is not a sin. to be praised; since perhaps they are evil, according to Ps. Objection 3. Further, detraction is contrary to flattery. 9:24, “The sinner is praised in the desires of his soul”; or Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 5) that detraction is they may be uncertain, according to Ecclus. 27:8, “Praise a remedy against flattery. “It must be observed,” says he, not a man before he speaketh,” and again (Ecclus. 11:2), “that by the wonderful moderation of our Ruler, we are “Praise not a man for his beauty”; or because there may often allowed to be rent by detractions but are uplifted be fear lest human praise should incite him to vainglory, by immoderate praise, so that whom the voice of the flat- wherefore it is written, (Ecclus. 11:30), “Praise not any terer upraises, the tongue of the detractor may humble.” man before death.” Again, in like manner it is right to But detraction is an evil, as stated above (q. 73, Aa. 2,3). wish to please a man in order to foster charity, so that he Therefore flattery is a good. may make spiritual progress therein. But it would be sin- On the contrary, A gloss on Ezech. 13:18, “Woe to ful to wish to please men for the sake of vainglory or gain, them that sew cushions under every elbow,” says, “that is or to please them in something evil, according to Ps. 52:6, to say, sweet flattery.” Therefore flattery is a sin. “God hath scattered the bones of them that please men,” I answer that, As stated above (q. 114, a. 1, ad 3), and according to the words of the Apostle (Gal. 1:10), “If although the friendship of which we have been speaking, I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of Christ.” or affability, intends chiefly the pleasure of those among Reply to Objection 2. Even to blame evil is sinful, whom one lives, yet it does not fear to displease when it if due circumstances be not observed; and so too is it to is a question of obtaining a certain good, or of avoiding a praise good. certain evil. Accordingly, if a man were to wish always Reply to Objection 3. Nothing hinders two vices be- to speak pleasantly to others, he would exceed the mode ing contrary to one another. Wherefore even as detraction of pleasing, and would therefore sin by excess. If he do is evil, so is flattery, which is contrary thereto as regards this with the mere intention of pleasing he is said to be what is said, but not directly as regards the end. Because “complaisant,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, flattery seeks to please the person flattered, whereas the 6): whereas if he do it with the intention of making some detractor seeks not the displeasure of the person defamed, gain out of it, he is called a “flatterer” or “adulator.” As a since at times he defames him in secret, but seeks rather rule, however, the term “flattery” is wont to be applied to his defamation. 1727 Whether flattery is a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 115 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that flattery is a mortal sin. For, and contrary to the love of his neighbor, whom he encour-according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), “a thing is evil ages to sin. Wherefore this is a mortal sin, according to because it is harmful.” But flattery is most harmful, ac- Is. 5:20. “Woe to you that call evil good.” Secondly, by cording to Ps. 9:24, “For the sinner is praised in the de- reason of the intention, as when one man flatters another, sires of his soul, and the unjust man is blessed. The sinner so that by deceiving him he may injure him in body or in hath provoked the Lord.” Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. ad soul; this is also a mortal sin, and of this it is written (Prov. Celant): “Nothing so easily corrupts the human mind as 27:6): “Better are the wounds of a friend than the deceit- flattery”: and a gloss on Ps. 69:4, “Let them be presently ful kisses of an enemy.” Thirdly, by way of occasion, as turned away blushing for shame that say to me: ‘Tis well, when the praise of a flatterer, even without his intending ‘Tis well,” says: “The tongue of the flatterer harms more it, becomes to another an occasion of sin. In this case it is than the sword of the persecutor.” Therefore flattery is a necessary to consider, whether the occasion were given or most grievous sin. taken, and how grievous the consequent downfall, as may Objection 2. Further, whoever does harm by words, be understood from what has been said above concerning harms himself no less than others: wherefore it is written scandal (q. 43, Aa. 3,4). If, however, one man flatters an- (Ps. 36:15): “Let their sword enter into their own hearts.” other from the mere craving to please others, or again in Now he that flatters another induces him to sin mortally: order to avoid some evil, or to acquire something in a case hence a gloss on Ps. 140:5, “Let not the oil of the sinner of necessity, this is not contrary to charity. Consequently fatten my head,” says: “The false praise of the flatterer it is not a mortal but a venial sin. softens the mind by depriving it of the rigidity of truth Reply to Objection 1. The passages quoted speak of and renders it susceptive of vice.” Much more, therefore, the flatterer who praises another’s sin. Flattery of this does the flatterer sin in himself. kind is said to harm more than the sword of the perse- Objection 3. Further, it is written in the Decretals (D. cutor, since it does harm to goods that are of greater con- XLVI, Cap. 3): “The cleric who shall be found to spend sequence. namely, spiritual goods. Yet it does not harm his time in flattery and treachery shall be degraded from so efficaciously, since the sword of the persecutor slays his office.” Now such a punishment as this is not inflicted effectively, being a sufficient cause of death; whereas no save for mortal sin. Therefore flattery is a mortal sin. one by flattering can be a sufficient cause of another’s sin- On the contrary, Augustine in a sermon on Purgatory ning, as was shown above (q. 43, a. 1, ad 3; Ia IIae, q. 73, (xli, de Sanctis) reckons among slight sins, “if one desire a. 8, ad 3; Ia IIae, q. 80, a. 1). to flatter any person of higher standing, whether of one’s Reply to Objection 2. This argument applies to one own choice, or out of necessity.” that flatters with the intention of doing harm: for such a I answer that, As stated above (q. 112, a. 2), a mortal man harms himself more than others, since he harms him- sin is one that is contrary to charity. Now flattery is some- self, as the sufficient cause of sinning, whereas he is only times contrary to charity and sometimes not. It is contrary the occasional cause of the harm he does to others. to charity in three ways. First, by reason of the very mat- Reply to Objection 3. The passage quoted refers to ter, as when one man praises another’s sin: for this is con- the man who flatters another treacherously, in order to de- trary to the love of God, against Whose justice he speaks, ceive him. 1728 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 116 Of Quarreling (In Two Articles) We must now consider quarreling; concerning which there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is opposed to the virtue of friendship? (2) Of its comparison with flattery? Whether quarreling is opposed to the virtue of friendship or affability? IIa IIae q. 116 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that quarreling is not opposed to and this seems to pertain to discord, which is contrary the virtue of friendship or affability. For quarreling seems to charity. Whereas at times contradiction arises by rea- to pertain to discord, just as contention does. But discord son of the speaker being a person to whom someone is opposed to charity, as stated above (q. 37, a. 1). There- does not fear to be disagreeable: whence arises quarrel- fore quarreling is also. ing, which is opposed to the aforesaid friendship or af- Objection 2. Further, it is written (Prov. 26:21): “An fability, to which it belongs to behave agreeably towards angry man stirreth up strife.” Now anger is opposed to those among whom we dwell. Hence the Philosopher says meekness. Therefore strife or quarreling is also. (Ethic. iv, 6) that “those who are opposed to everything Objection 3. Further, it is written (James 4:1): “From with the intent of being disagreeable, and care for nobody, whence are wars and quarrels [Douay: ‘contentions’] are said to be peevish and quarrelsome.” among you? Are they not hence, from your concupis- Reply to Objection 1. Contention pertains rather to cences which war in your members?” Now it would the contradiction of discord, while quarreling belongs to seem contrary to temperance to follow one’s concupis- the contradiction which has the intention of displeasing. cences. Therefore it seems that quarreling is opposed not Reply to Objection 2. The direct opposition of virtues to friendship but to temperance. to vices depends, not on their causes, since one vice may On the contrary, The Philosopher opposes quarreling arise from many causes, but on the species of their acts. to friendship (Ethic. iv, 6). And although quarreling arises at times from anger, it may I answer that, Quarreling consists properly in words, arise from many other causes, hence it does not follow that when, namely, one person contradicts another’s words. it is directly opposed to meekness. Now two things may be observed in this contradiction. Reply to Objection 3. James speaks there of con- For sometimes contradiction arises on account of the per- cupiscence considered as a general evil whence all vices son who speaks, the contradictor refusing to consent with arise. Thus, a gloss on Rom. 7:7 says: “The law is good, him from lack of that love which unites minds together, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evil.” Whether quarreling is a more grievous sin than flattery? IIa IIae q. 116 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that quarreling is a less grievous Objection 3. Further, shame is fear of what is vile, sin than the contrary vice, viz. adulation or flattery. For according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9). But a man is the more harm a sin does the more grievous it seems to more ashamed to be a flatterer than a quarreler. Therefore be. Now flattery does more harm than quarreling, for it quarreling is a less grievous sin than flattery. is written (Is. 3:12): “O My people, they that call thee On the contrary, The more a sin is inconsistent with blessed, the same deceive thee, and destroy the way of the spiritual state, the more it appears to be grievous. Now thy steps.” Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarreling seems to be more inconsistent with the spiritual quarreling. state: for it is written (1 Tim. 3:2,3) that it “behooveth a Objection 2. Further, there appears to be a certain bishop to be. . . not quarrelsome”; and (2 Tim. 3:24): “The amount of deceit in flattery, since the flatterer says one servant of the Lord must not wrangle.” Therefore quarrel- thing, and thinks another: whereas the quarrelsome man ing seems to be a more grievous sin than flattery. is without deceit, for he contradicts openly. Now he that I answer that, We can speak of each of these sins in sins deceitfully is a viler man, according to the Philoso- two ways. In one way we may consider the species of ei- pher (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore flattery is a more grievous ther sin, and thus the more a vice is at variance with the sin than quarreling. opposite virtue the more grievous it is. Now the virtue 1729 of friendship has a greater tendency to please than to dis-ness of a man has its source in his reason: wherefore please: and so the quarrelsome man, who exceeds in giv- the sins of the flesh, whereby the flesh enslaves the rea- ing displeasure sins more grievously than the adulator or son, are viler, although spiritual sins are more grievous, flatterer, who exceeds in giving pleasure. In another way since they proceed from greater contempt. In like man- we may consider them as regards certain external motives, ner, sins that are committed through deceit are viler, in and thus flattery sometimes more grievous, for instance so far as they seem to arise from a certain weakness, and when one intends by deception to acquire undue honor or from a certain falseness of the reason, although sins that gain: while sometimes quarreling is more grievous; for are committed openly proceed sometimes from a greater instance, when one intends either to deny the truth, or to contempt. Hence flattery, through being accompanied by hold up the speaker to contempt. deceit, seems to be a viler sin; while quarreling, through Reply to Objection 1. Just as the flatterer may do proceeding from greater contempt, is apparently more harm by deceiving secretly, so the quarreler may do harm grievous. sometimes by assailing openly. Now, other things being Reply to Objection 3. As stated in the objection, equal, it is more grievous to harm a person openly, by vi- shame regards the vileness of a sin; wherefore a man is olence as it were, than secretly. Wherefore robbery is a not always more ashamed of a more grievous sin, but of a more grievous sin than theft, as stated above (q. 66, a. 9). viler sin. Hence it is that a man is more ashamed of flattery Reply to Objection 2. In human acts, the more than of quarreling, although quarreling is more grievous. grievous is not always the more vile. For the comeli- 1730 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 117 Of Liberality (In Six Articles) We must now consider liberality and the opposite vices, namely, covetousness and prodigality. Concerning liberality there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether liberality is a virtue? (2) What is its matter? (3) Of its act; (4) Whether it pertains thereto to give rather than to take? (5) Whether liberality is a part of justice? (6) Of its comparison with other virtues. Whether liberality is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 117 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that liberality is not a virtue. suffices for one man to have few things. Wherefore the For no virtue is contrary to a natural inclination. Now it liberal man commendably spends more on others than on is a natural inclination for one to provide for oneself more himself. Nevertheless we are bound to be more provident than for others: and yet it pertains to the liberal man to do for ourselves in spiritual goods, in which each one is able the contrary, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. to look after himself in the first place. And yet it does not iv, 1), “it is the mark of a liberal man not to look to him- belong to the liberal man even in temporal things to attend self, so that he leaves for himself the lesser things.” There- so much to others as to lose sight of himself and those be- fore liberality is not a virtue. longing to him. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i): Objection 2. Further, man sustains life by means “It is a commendable liberality not to neglect your rela- of riches, and wealth contributes to happiness instrumen- tives if you know them to be in want.” tally, as stated in Ethic. i, 8. Since, then, every virtue is Reply to Objection 2. It does not belong to a lib- directed to happiness, it seems that the liberal man is not eral man so to give away his riches that nothing is left virtuous, for the Philosopher says of him (Ethic. iv, 1) that for his own support, nor the wherewithal to perform those “he is inclined neither to receive nor to keep money, but acts of virtue whereby happiness is acquired. Hence the to give it away.” Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that “the liberal man does Objection 3. Further, the virtues are connected with not neglect his own, wishing thus to be of help to certain one another. But liberality does not seem to be connected people”; and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that “Our Lord with the other virtues: since many are virtuous who can- does not wish a man to pour out his riches all at once, but not be liberal, for they have nothing to give; and many to dispense them: unless he do as Eliseus did, who slew give or spend liberally who are not virtuous otherwise. his oxen and fed the poor, that he might not be bound by Therefore liberality is not a virtue. any household cares.” For this belongs to the state of per- On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that “the fection, of which we shall speak farther on (q. 184, q. 186, Gospel contains many instances in which a just liberality a. 3). is inculcated.” Now in the Gospel nothing is taught that It must be observed, however, that the very act of giv- does not pertain to virtue. Therefore liberality is a virtue. ing away one’s possessions liberally, in so far as it is an I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, act of virtue, is directed to happiness. 19), “it belongs to virtue to use well the things that we Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. can use ill.” Now we may use both well and ill, not only iv, 1), “those who spend much on intemperance are not the things that are within us, such as the powers and the liberal but prodigal”; and likewise whoever spends what passions of the soul, but also those that are without, such he has for the sake of other sins. Hence Ambrose says (De as the things of this world that are granted us for our liveli- Offic. i): “If you assist to rob others of their possessions, hood. Wherefore since it belongs to liberality to use these your honesty is not to be commended, nor is your liberal- things well, it follows that liberality is a virtue. ity genuine if you give for the sake of boasting rather than Reply to Objection 1. According to Ambrose (Serm. of pity.” Wherefore those who lack other virtues, though lxiv de Temp.) and Basil (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18) ex- they spend much on certain evil works, are not liberal. cess of riches is granted by God to some, in order that Again, nothing hinders certain people from spending they may obtain the merit of a good stewardship. But it much on good uses, without having the habit of liberal- 1731 ity: even as men perform works of other virtues, before (Ethic. iv, 1): “Liberality is proportionate to a man’s sub-having the habit of virtue, though not in the same way as stance,” i.e. his means, “for it consists, not in the quantity virtuous people, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 1). In given, but in the habit of the giver”: and Ambrose says like manner nothing prevents a virtuous man from being (De Offic. i) that “it is the heart that makes a gift rich or liberal, although he be poor. Hence the Philosopher says poor, and gives things their value.” Whether liberality is about money? IIa IIae q. 117 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that liberality is not about ship, and shows his mind to be free of attachment thereto. money. For every moral virtue is about operations and Now those things which are the subject of a man’s free- passions. Now it is proper to justice to be about opera- handedness towards others are the goods he possesses, tions, as stated in Ethic. v, 1. Therefore, since liberality which are denoted by the term “money.” Therefore the is a moral virtue, it seems that it is about passions and not proper matter of liberality is money. about money. Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 1, ad 3), Objection 2. Further, it belongs to a liberal man to liberality depends not on the quantity given, but on the make use of any kind of wealth. Now natural riches are heart of the giver. Now the heart of the giver is disposed more real than artificial riches, according to the Philoso- according to the passions of love and desire, and conse- pher (Polit. i, 5,6). Therefore liberality is not chiefly about quently those of pleasure and sorrow, towards the things money. given. Hence the interior passions are the immediate mat- Objection 3. Further, different virtues have different ter of liberality, while exterior money is the object of those matter, since habits are distinguished by their objects. But same passions. external things are the matter of distributive and commu- Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says in his book tative justice. Therefore they are not the matter of liberal- De Disciplina Christi (Tract. de divers, i), everything ity. whatsoever man has on earth, and whatsoever he owns, On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, goes by the name of “ ‘pecunia’ [money], because in olden 1) that “liberality seems to be a mean in the matter of times men’s possessions consisted entirely of ‘pecora’ money.” [flocks].” And the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): “We I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. give the name of money to anything that can be valued in iv, 1) it belongs to the liberal man to part with things. currency.” Hence liberality is also called open-handedness [largitas], Reply to Objection 3. Justice establishes equality in because that which is open does not withhold things but external things, but has nothing to do, properly speaking, parts of them. The term “liberality” seems also to al- with the regulation of internal passions: wherefore money lude to this, since when a man quits hold of a thing he is in one way the matter of liberality, and in another way frees it [liberat], so to speak, from his keeping and owner- of justice. Whether using money is the act of liberality? IIa IIae q. 117 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that using money is not the act of money belongs to liberality. of liberality. For different virtues have different acts. But On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): using money is becoming to other virtues, such as justice “In whatever matter a man is virtuous, he will make the and magnificence. Therefore it is not the proper act of best use of that matter: Therefore he that has the virtue liberality. with regard to money will make the best use of riches.” Objection 2. Further, it belongs to a liberal man, not Now such is the liberal man. Therefore the good use of only to give but also to receive and keep. But receiving money is the act of liberality. and keeping do not seem to be connected with the use of I answer that, The species of an act is taken from its money. Therefore using money seems to be unsuitably object, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 2). Now the assigned as the proper act of liberality. object or matter of liberality is money and whatever has Objection 3. Further, the use of money consists not a money value, as stated in the foregoing Article (ad 2). only in giving it but also in spending it. But the spending And since every virtue is consistent with its object, it fol- of money refers to the spender, and consequently is not an lows that, since liberality is a virtue, its act is consistent act of liberality: for Seneca says (De Benef. v): “A man is with money. Now money comes under the head of useful not liberal by giving to himself.” Therefore not every use goods, since all external goods are directed to man’s use. 1732 Hence the proper act of liberality is making use of money order to make fitting use of it. or riches. Reply to Objection 3. As stated (a. 2, ad 1), the inter- Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to liberality to make nal passions whereby man is affected towards money are good use of riches as such, because riches are the proper the proximate matter of liberality. Hence it belongs to lib- matter of liberality. On the other hand it belongs to justice erality before all that a man should not be prevented from to make use of riches under another aspect, namely, that of making any due use of money through an inordinate affec- debt, in so far as an external thing is due to another. And tion for it. Now there is a twofold use of money: one con- it belongs to magnificence to make use of riches under a sists in applying it to one’s own use, and would seem to special aspect, in so far, to wit, as they are employed for come under the designation of costs or expenditure; while the fulfilment of some great deed. Hence magnificence the other consists in devoting it to the use of others, and stands in relation to liberality as something in addition comes under the head of gifts. Hence it belongs to liber- thereto, as we shall explain farther on (q. 134). ality that one be not hindered by an immoderate love of Reply to Objection 2. It belongs to a virtuous man money, either from spending it becomingly, or from mak- not only to make good use of his matter or instrument, but ing suitable gifts. Therefore liberality is concerned with also to provide opportunities for that good use. Thus it be- giving and spending, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. longs to a soldier’s fortitude not only to wield his sword iv, 1). The saying of Seneca refers to liberality as regards against the foe, but also to sharpen his sword and keep it giving: for a man is not said to be liberal for the reason in its sheath. Thus, too, it belongs to liberality not only to that he gives something to himself. use money, but also to keep it in preparation and safety in Whether it belongs to a liberal man chiefly to give? IIa IIae q. 117 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that it does not belong to a lib- than use: while the keeping of money, in so far as it is eral man chiefly to give. For liberality, like all other moral directed to facilitate the use of money, is like a habit. virtues, is regulated by prudence. Now it seems to be- Now in parting with a thing —for instance, when we long very much to prudence that a man should keep his throw something—the farther we put it away the greater riches. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that the force [virtus] employed. Hence parting with money “those who have not earned money, but have received the by giving it to others proceeds from a greater virtue than money earned by others, spend it more liberally, because when we spend it on ourselves. But it is proper to a virtue they have not experienced the want of it.” Therefore it as such to tend to what is more perfect, since “virtue is a seems that giving does not chiefly belong to the liberal kind of perfection” (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). Therefore a man. liberal man is praised chiefly for giving. Objection 2. Further, no man is sorry for what he in- Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to prudence to keep tends chiefly to do, nor does he cease from doing it. But a money, lest it be stolen or spent uselessly. But to spend it liberal man is sometimes sorry for what he has given, nor usefully is not less but more prudent than to keep it use- does he give to all, as stated in Ethic. iv, 1. Therefore it fully: since more things have to be considered in money’s does not belong chiefly to a liberal man to give. use, which is likened to movement, than in its keeping, Objection 3. Further, in order to accomplish what he which is likened to rest. As to those who, having received intends chiefly, a man employs all the ways he can. Now money that others have earned, spend it more liberally, a liberal man is not a beggar, as the Philosopher observes through not having experienced the want of it, if their in- (Ethic. iv, 1); and yet by begging he might provide him- experience is the sole cause of their liberal expenditure self with the means of giving to others. Therefore it seems they have not the virtue of liberality. Sometimes, how- that he does not chiefly aim at giving. ever, this inexperience merely removes the impediment Objection 4. Further, man is bound to look after him- to liberality, so that it makes them all the more ready to self rather than others. But by spending he looks after act liberally, because, not unfrequently, the fear of want himself, whereas by giving he looks after others. There- that results from the experience of want hinders those who fore it belongs to a liberal man to spend rather than to have acquired money from using it up by acting with lib- give. erality; as does likewise the love they have for it as being On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) their own effect, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, that “it belongs to a liberal man to surpass in giving.” 1). I answer that, It is proper to a liberal man to use Reply to Objection 2. As stated in this and the pre- money. Now the use of money consists in parting with ceding Article, it belongs to liberality to make fitting use it. For the acquisition of money is like generation rather of money, and consequently to give it in a fitting manner, 1733 since this is a use of money. Again, every virtue is grieved same thing is not the principle of both action and passion. by whatever is contrary to its act, and avoids whatever hin- Hence, since liberality is a principle of giving, it does not ders that act. Now two things are opposed to suitable giv- belong to the liberal man to be ready to receive, and still ing; namely, not giving what ought suitably to be given, less to beg. Hence the verse: and giving something unsuitably. Wherefore the liberal ‘In this world he that wishes to be pleasing to many man is grieved at both: but especially at the former, since Should give often, take seldom, ask never.’ But he makes it is more opposed to his proper act. For this reason, too, provision in order to give certain things according as lib- he does not give to all: since his act would be hindered erality requires; such are the fruits of his own possessions, were he to give to everyone: for he would not have the for he is careful about realizing them that he may make a means of giving to those to whom it were fitting for him liberal use thereof. to give. Reply to Objection 4. To spend on oneself is an incli- Reply to Objection 3. Giving and receiving are re- nation of nature; hence to spend money on others belongs lated to one another as action and passion. Now the properly to a virtue. Whether liberality is a part of justice? IIa IIae q. 117 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that liberality is not a part of concerned with external things, and so is justice, albeit justice. For justice regards that which is due. Now the under a different aspect, a stated in this Article and above more a thing is due the less liberally is it given. Therefore (a. 2, ad 3). Hence it is that liberality is reckoned by some liberality is not a part of justice, but is incompatible with to be a part of justice, being annexed thereto as to a prin- it. cipal virtue. Objection 2. Further, justice is about operation as Reply to Objection 1. Although liberality does no stated above (q. 58, a. 9; Ia IIae, q. 60, Aa. 2,3): whereas consider the legal due that justice considers, it considers a liberality is chiefly about the love and desire of money, certain moral due. This due is based on a certain fitting- which are passions. Therefore liberality seems to belong ness and not on an obligation: so that it answers to the to temperance rather than to justice. idea of due in the lowest degree. Objection 3. Further, it belongs chiefly to liberality to Reply to Objection 2. Temperance is about concu-give becomingly, as stated (a. 4). But giving becomingly piscence in pleasures of the body. But the concupiscence belongs to beneficence and mercy, which pertain to char- and delight in money is not referable to the body but rather ity, as state above (Qq. 30,31). Therefore liberality is a to the soul. Hence liberality does not properly pertain to part of charity rather than of justice. temperance. On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): “Justice Reply to Objection 3. The giving of beneficence and has to do with the fellowship of mankind. For the notion mercy proceeds from the fact that a man has a certain af- of fellowship is divided into two parts, justice and benef- fection towards the person to whom he gives: wherefore icence, also called liberality or kind-heartedness.” There- this giving belongs to charity or friendship. But the giv- fore liberality pertains to justice. ing of liberality arises from a person being affected in a I answer that, Liberality is not a species of justice, certain way towards money, in that he desires it not nor since justice pays another what is his whereas liberality loves it: so that when it is fitting he gives it not only to his gives another what is one’s own. There are, however, two friends but also to those whom he knows not. Hence it be- points in which it agrees with justice: first, that it is di- long not to charity, but to justice, which is about external rected chiefly to another, as justice is; secondly, that it is things. Whether liberality is the greatest of the virtues? IIa IIae q. 117 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that liberality is the greatest of be greatest is to be best.” Now the nature of goodness the virtues. For every virtue of man is a likeness to the di- seems to pertain mostly to liberality, since “the good is vine goodness. Now man is likened chiefly by liberality to self-communicative,” according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. God, “Who giveth to all men abundantly, and upbraideth iv). Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that “justice re- not” (James 1:5). Therefore liberality is the greatest of the clines to severity, liberality to goodness.” Therefore liber- virtues. ality is the greatest of virtues. Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine (De Objection 3. Further, men are honored and loved on Trin. vi, 8), “in things that are great, but not in bulk, to account of virtue. Now Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that 1734 “bounty above all makes a man famous”: and the Philoso-ality is ordained to a good consequently, and in this way pher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that “among the virtuous the liberal it is directed to all the aforesaid goods. For by reason of are the most beloved.” Therefore liberality is the greatest his not being a lover of money, it follows that a man read- of virtues. ily makes use of it, whether for himself. Or for the good On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that of others, or for God’s glory. Thus it derives a certain “justice seems to be more excellent than liberality, al- excellence from being useful in many ways. Since, how- though liberality is more pleasing.” The Philosopher also ever, we should judge of things according to that which says (Rhet. i, 9) that “brave and just men are honored is competent to them primarily and in respect of their na- chiefly and, after them, those who are liberal.” ture, rather than according to that which pertains to them I answer that, Every virtue tends towards a good; consequently, it remains to be said that liberality is not the wherefore the greater virtue is that which tends towards greatest of virtues. the greater good. Now liberality tends towards a good in Reply to Objection 1. God’s giving proceeds from two ways: in one way, primarily and of its own nature; His love for those to whom He gives, not from His af- in another way, consequently. Primarily and of its very fection towards the things He gives, wherefore it seems nature it tends to set in order one’s own affection towards to pertain to charity, the greatest of virtues, rather than to the possession and use of money. In this way temperance, liberality. which moderates desires and pleasures relating to one’s Reply to Objection 2. Every virtue shares the nature own body, takes precedence of liberality: and so do for- of goodness by giving forth its own act: and the acts of titude and justice, which, in a manner, are directed to the certain other virtues are better than money which liberal- common good, one in time of peace, the other in time of ity gives forth. war: while all these are preceded by those virtues which Reply to Objection 3. The friendship whereby a lib- are directed to the Divine good. For the Divine good eral man is beloved is not that which is based on virtue, as surpasses all manner of human good; and among human though he were better than others, but that which is based goods the public good surpasses the good of the individ- on utility, because he is more useful in external goods, ual; and of the last named the good of the body surpasses which as a rule men desire above all others. For the same those goods that consist of external things. Again, liber- reason he becomes famous. 1735 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 118 Of the Vices Opposed to Liberality, and in the First Place, of Covetousness (In Eight Articles) We must now consider the vices opposed to liberality: and (1) covetousness; (2) prodigality. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether covetousness is a sin? (2) Whether it is a special sin? (3) To which virtue it is opposed; (4) Whether it is a mortal sin? (5) Whether it is the most grievous of sins? (6) Whether it is a sin of the flesh or a spiritual sin? (7) Whether it is a capital vice? (8) Of its daughters. Whether covetousness is a sin? IIa IIae q. 118 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not aa whatever is directed to an end must needs be commensu- sin. For covetousness [avaritia] denotes a certain greed rate with the end, as, for instance, medicine is commen- for gold [aeris aviditas∗], because, to wit, it consists in surate with health, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, a desire for money, under which all external goods may 6). External goods come under the head of things use- be comprised. . Now it is not a sin to desire external ful for an end, as stated above (q. 117, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 2 goods: since man desires them naturally, both because , a. 1). Hence it must needs be that man’s good in their they are naturally subject to man, and because by their respect consists in a certain measure, in other words, that means man’s life is sustained (for which reason they are man seeks, according to a certain measure, to have exter- spoken of as his substance). Therefore covetousness is not nal riches, in so far as they are necessary for him to live a sin. in keeping with his condition of life. Wherefore it will be Objection 2. Further, every sin is against either God, a sin for him to exceed this measure, by wishing to ac- or one’s neighbor, or oneself, as stated above ( Ia IIae, quire or keep them immoderately. This is what is meant q. 72, a. 4). But covetousness is not, properly speaking, by covetousness, which is defined as “immoderate love of a sin against God: since it is opposed neither to religion possessing.” It is therefore evident that covetousness is a nor to the theological virtues, by which man is directed to sin. God. Nor again is it a sin against oneself, for this pertains Reply to Objection 1. It is natural to man to desire properly to gluttony and lust, of which the Apostle says external things as means to an end: wherefore this desire (1 Cor. 6:18): “He that committeth fornication sinneth is devoid of sin, in so far as it is held in check by the against his own body.” In like manner neither is it appar- rule taken from the nature of the end. But covetousness ently a sin against one’s neighbor, since a man harms no exceeds this rule, and therefore is a sin. one by keeping what is his own. Therefore covetousness Reply to Objection 2. Covetousness may signify im- is not a sin. moderation about external things in two ways. First, so as Objection 3. Further, things that occur naturally are to regard immediately the acquisition and keeping of such not sins. Now covetousness comes naturally to old age things, when, to wit, a man acquires or keeps them more and every kind of defect, according to the Philosopher than is due. In this way it is a sin directly against one’s (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore covetousness is not a sin. neighbor, since one man cannot over-abound in external On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 13:5): “Let your riches, without another man lacking them, for temporal manners be without covetousness, contented with such goods cannot be possessed by many at the same time. Sec- things as you have.” ondly, it may signify immoderation in the internal affec- I answer that, In whatever things good consists in a tion which a man has for riches when, for instance, a man due measure, evil must of necessity ensue through excess loves them, desires them, or delights in them, immoder- or deficiency of that measure. Now in all things that are ately. In this way by covetousness a man sins against him- for an end, the good consists in a certain measure: since self, because it causes disorder in his affections, though ∗ The Latin for covetousness “avaritia” is derived from “aveo” to desire; but the Greek philargyria signifies literally “love of money”: and it is to this that St. Thomas is alluding (cf. a. 2, obj. 2) 1736 not in his body as do the sins of the flesh. power in human nature. Hence though old people seek As a consequence, however, it is a sin against God, more greedily the aid of external things, just as everyone just as all mortal sins, inasmuch as man contemns things that is in need seeks to have his need supplied, they are eternal for the sake of temporal things. not excused from sin if they exceed this due measure of Reply to Objection 3. Natural inclinations should reason with regard to riches. be regulated according to reason, which is the governing Whether covetousness is a special sin? IIa IIae q. 118 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not a spe- the useful good differs in aspect from the delightful good. cial sin. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): “Cov- And riches, as such, come under the head of useful good, etousness, which in Greek is called philargyria, applies since they are desired under the aspect of being useful to not only to silver or money, but also to anything that is man. Consequently covetousness is a special sin, foras- desired immoderately.” Now in every sin there is immod- much as it is an immoderate love of having possessions, erate desire of something, because sin consists in turning which are comprised under the name of money, whence away from the immutable good, and adhering to mutable covetousness [avaritia] is denominated. goods, as state above ( Ia IIae, q. 71, a. 6, obj. 3). There- Since, however, the verb “to have,” which seems to fore covetousness is a general sin. have been originally employed in connection with pos- Objection 2. Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x), sessions whereof we are absolute masters, is applied to “the covetous [avarus] man” is so called because he is many other things (thus a man is said to have health, a “greedy for brass [avidus aeris],” i.e. money: wherefore wife, clothes, and so forth, as stated in De Praedicamen- in Greek covetousness is called philargyria, i.e. “love of tis), consequently the term “covetousness” has been am-silver.” Now silver, which stands for money, signifies all plified to denote all immoderate desire for having any- external goods the value of which can be measured by thing whatever. Thus Gregory says in a homily (xvi in money, as stated above (q. 117, a. 2, ad 2). Therefore Ev.) that “covetousness is a desire not only for money, but covetousness is a desire for any external thing: and con- also for knowledge and high places, when prominence is sequently seems to be a general sin. immoderately sought after.” In this way covetousness is Objection 3. Further, a gloss on Rom. 7:7, “For I had not a special sin: and in this sense Augustine speaks of not known concupiscence,” says: “The law is good, since covetousness in the passage quoted in the First Objection. by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evil.” Now the Wherefore this suffices for the Reply to the First Objec- law seems to forbid especially the concupiscence of cov- tion. etousness: hence it is written (Ex. 20:17): “Thou shalt Reply to Objection 2. All those external things that not covet thy neighbor’s goods.” Therefore the concupis- are subject to the uses of human life are comprised under cence of covetousness is all evil, and so covetousness is a the term “money,” inasmuch as they have the aspect of general sin. useful good. But there are certain external goods that can On the contrary, Covetousness is numbered together be obtained by money, such as pleasures, honors, and so with other special sins (Rom. 1:29), where it is written: forth, which are desirable under another aspect. Where- “Being filled with all iniquity, malice, fornication, cov- fore the desire for such things is not properly called cov- etousness” [Douay: ‘avarice’], etc. etousness, in so far as it is a special vice. I answer that, Sins take their species from their ob- Reply to Objection 3. This gloss speaks of the inor- jects, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 72, a. 1). Now the object dinate concupiscence for anything whatever. For it is easy of a sin is the good towards which an inordinate appetite to understand that if it is forbidden to covet another’s pos- tends. Hence where there is a special aspect of good in- sessions it is also forbidden to covet those things that can ordinately desired, there is a special kind of sin. Now be obtained by means of those possessions. Whether covetousness is opposed to liberality? IIa IIae q. 118 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not op- etousness is opposed: and the Philosopher says the same posed to liberality. For Chrysostom, commenting on Mat. (Ethic. v, 2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to 5:6, “Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice,” liberality. says, (Hom. xv in Matth.) that there are two kinds of Objection 2. Further, the sin of covetousness consists justice, one general, and the other special, to which cov- in a man’s exceeding the measure in the things he pos- 1737 sesses. But this measure is appointed by justice. There-way covetousness is opposed to liberality, which moder- fore covetousness is directly opposed to justice and not to ates these affections, as stated above (q. 117, a. 2, ad 3, liberality. a. 3, ad 3, a. 6). In this sense covetousness is spoken Objection 3. Further, liberality is a virtue that ob- of (2 Cor. 9:5): “That they would. . . prepare this bless- serves the mean between two contrary vices, as the ing before promised, to be ready, so as a blessing, not as Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 7; iv, 1). But covetousness covetousness,” where a gloss observes: “Lest they should has no contrary and opposite sin, according to the Philoso- regret what they had given, and give but little.” pher (Ethic. v, 1,2). Therefore covetousness is not op- Reply to Objection 1. Chrysostom and the Philoso- posed to liberality. pher are speaking of covetousness in the first sense: cov- On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:9): “A cov- etousness in the second sense is called illiberality∗ by the etous man shall not be satisfied with money, and he that Philosopher. loveth riches shall have no fruits from them.” Now not to Reply to Objection 2. It belongs properly to justice be satisfied with money and to love it inordinately are op- to appoint the measure in the acquisition and keeping of posed to liberality, which observes the mean in the desire riches from the point of view of legal due, so that a man of riches. Therefore covetousness is opposed to liberality. should neither take nor retain another’s property. But lib- I answer that, Covetousness denotes immoderation erality appoints the measure of reason, principally in the with regard to riches in two ways. First, immediately in interior affections, and consequently in the exterior taking respect of the acquisition and keeping of riches. In this and keeping of money, and in the spending of the same, in way a man obtains money beyond his due, by stealing so far as these proceed from the interior affection, looking or retaining another’s property. This is opposed to jus- at the matter from the point of view not of the legal but of tice, and in this sense covetousness is mentioned (Ezech. the moral debt, which latter depends on the rule of reason. 22:27): “Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves Reply to Objection 3. Covetousness as opposed to ravening the prey to shed blood. . . and to run after gains justice has no opposite vice: since it consists in having through covetousness.” Secondly, it denotes immodera- more than one ought according to justice, the contrary of tion in the interior affections for riches; for instance, when which is to have less than one ought, and this is not a sin a man loves or desires riches too much, or takes too much but a punishment. But covetousness as opposed to liber- pleasure in them, even if he be unwilling to steal. In this ality has the vice of prodigality opposed to it. Whether covetousness is always a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 118 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is always covetousness, which is lust for money, is a mortal sin. a mortal sin. For no one is worthy of death save for a On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 3:12, “If any man mortal sin. But men are worthy of death on account of build upon this foundation,” says (cf. St. Augustine, De covetousness. For the Apostle after saying (Rom. 1:29): Fide et Oper. xvi) that “he builds wood, hay, stubble, who “Being filled with all iniquity. . . fornication, covetousness thinks in the things of the world, how he may please the [Douay: ‘avarice’],” etc. adds (Rom. 1:32): “They who world,” which pertains to the sin of covetousness. Now he do such things are worthy of death.” Therefore covetous- that builds wood, hay, stubble, sins not mortally but ve- ness is a mortal sin. nially, for it is said of him that “he shall be saved, yet so Objection 2. Further, the least degree of covetous- as by fire.” Therefore covetousness is some times a venial ness is to hold to one’s own inordinately. But this seem- sin. ingly is a mortal sin: for Basil says (Serm. super. Luc. I answer that, As stated above (a. 3) covetousness is xii, 18): “It is the hungry man’s bread that thou keepest twofold. In one way it is opposed to justice, and thus it back, the naked man’s cloak that thou hoardest, the needy is a mortal sin in respect of its genus. For in this sense man’s money that thou possessest, hence thou despoilest covetousness consists in the unjust taking or retaining of as many as thou mightest succor.” another’s property, and this belongs to theft or robbery, Now it is a mortal sin to do an injustice to another, which are mortal sins, as stated above (q. 66, Aa. 6,8). since it is contrary to the love of our neighbor. Much more Yet venial sin may occur in this kind of covetousness by therefore is all covetousness a mortal sin. reason of imperfection of the act, as stated above (q. 66, Objection 3. Further, no one is struck with spiritual a. 6, ad 3), when we were treating of theft. blindness save through a mortal sin, for this deprives a In another way covetousness may be take as opposed man of the light of grace. But, according to Chrysostom†, to liberality: in which sense it denotes inordinate love “Lust for money brings darkness on the soul.” Therefore of riches. Accordingly if the love of riches becomes so ∗ aneleutheria † Hom. xv in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom 1738 great as to be preferred to charity, in such wise that a man, gether with mortal sins, by reason of the aspect under through love of riches, fear not to act counter to the love which it is a mortal sin. of God and his neighbor, covetousness will then be a mor- Reply to Objection 2. Basil is speaking of a case tal sin. If, on the other hand, the inordinate nature of his wherein a man is bound by a legal debt to give of his goods love stops short of this, so that although he love riches too to the poor, either through fear of their want or on account much, yet he does not prefer the love of them to the love of of his having too much. God, and is unwilling for the sake of riches to do anything Reply to Objection 3. Lust for riches, properly speak- in opposition to God or his neighbor, then covetousness is ing, brings darkness on the soul, when it puts out the light a venial sin. of charity, by preferring the love of riches to the love of Reply to Objection 1. Covetousness is numbered to- God. Whether covetousness is the greatest of sins? IIa IIae q. 118 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is the great- man’s use, and this seems to belong to covetousness. Sec- est of sins. For it is written (Ecclus. 10:9): “Nothing is ondly, the degrees of sin may be considered on the part of more wicked than a covetous man,” and the text continues: the good to which the human appetite is inordinately sub- “There is not a more wicked thing than to love money: for jected; and then the lesser the good, the more deformed such a one setteth even his own soul to sale.” Tully also is the sin: for it is more shameful to be subject to a lower says (De Offic. i, under the heading, ‘True magnanimity than to a higher good. Now the good of external things is is based chiefly on two things’): “Nothing is so narrow or the lowest of human goods: since it is less than the good of little minded as to love money.” But this pertains to cov- the body, and this is less than the good of the soul, which is etousness. Therefore covetousness is the most grievous of less than the Divine good. From this point of view the sin sins. of covetousness, whereby the human appetite is subjected Objection 2. Further, the more a sin is opposed to even to external things, has in a way a greater deformity. charity, the more grievous it is. Now covetousness is most Since, however, corruption or privation of good is the for- opposed to charity: for Augustine says (Qq. 83, qu. 36) mal element in sin, while conversion to a mutable good is that “greed is the bane of charity.” Therefore covetousness the material element, the gravity of the sin is to be judged is the greatest of sins. from the point of view of the good corrupted, rather than Objection 3. Further, the gravity of a sin is indicated from that of the good to which the appetite is subjected. by its being incurable: wherefore the sin against the Holy Hence we must assert that covetousness is not simply the Ghost is said to be most grievous, because it is irremis- most grievous of sins. sible. But covetousness is an incurable sin: hence the Reply to Objection 1. These authorities speak of cov- Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that “old age and help- etousness on the part of the good to which the appetite is lessness of any kind make men illiberal.” Therefore cov- subjected. Hence (Ecclus. 10:10) it is given as a rea- etousness is the most grievous of sins. son that the covetous man “setteth his own soul to sale”; Objection 4. Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:5) because, to wit, he exposes his soul—that is, his life— that covetousness is “a serving of idols.” Now idolatry is to danger for the sake of money. Hence the text contin- reckoned among the most grievous sins. Therefore cov- ues: “Because while he liveth he hath cast away”—that etousness is also. is, despised—“his bowels,” in order to make money. Tully On the contrary, Adultery is a more grievous sin also adds that it is the mark of a “narrow mind,” namely, than theft, according to Prov. 6:30. But theft pertains that one be willing to be subject to money. to covetousness. Therefore covetousness is not the most Reply to Objection 2. Augustine is taking greed gen- grievous of sins. erally, in reference to any temporal good, not in its special I answer that, Every sin, from the very fact that it acceptation for covetousness: because greed for any tem- is an evil, consists in the corruption or privation of some poral good is the bane of charity, inasmuch as a man turns good: while, in so far as it is voluntary, it consists in the away from the Divine good through cleaving to a temporal desire of some good. Consequently the order of sins may good. be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the good Reply to Objection 3. The sin against the Holy Ghost that is despised or corrupted by sin, and then the greater is incurable in one way, covetousness in another. For the good the graver the sin. From this point of view a sin the sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable by reason of that is against God is most grievous; after this comes a sin contempt: for instance, because a man contemns God’s that is committed against a man’s person, and after this mercy, or His justice, or some one of those things whereby comes a sin against external things, which are deputed to man’s sins are healed: wherefore incurability of this kind 1739 points to the greater gravity of the sin. on the other hand, idolatry on account of a certain likeness that it bears to covetousness is incurable on the part of a human defect; it: because the covetous man, like the idolater, subjects a thing which human nature ever seeks to remedy, since himself to an external creature, though not in the same the more deficient one is the more one seeks relief from way. For the idolater subjects himself to an external crea- external things, and consequently the more one gives way ture by paying it Divine honor, whereas the covetous man to covetousness. Hence incurability of this kind is an indi- subjects himself to an external creature by desiring it im- cation not of the sin being more grievous, but of its being moderately for use, not for worship. Hence it does not somewhat more dangerous. follow that covetousness is as grievous a sin as idolatry. Reply to Objection 4. Covetousness is compared to Whether covetousness is a spiritual sin? IIa IIae q. 118 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not a spiri- are those which are consummated in the mere apprehen- tual sin. For spiritual sins seem to regard spiritual goods. sion of the soul. Accordingly, sins of the flesh are those But the matter of covetousness is bodily goods, namely, which are consummated in carnal pleasures, while spiri- external riches. Therefore covetousness is not a spiritual tual sins are consummated in pleasures of the spirit with- sin. out pleasure of the flesh. Such is covetousness: for the Objection 2. Further, spiritual sin is condivided with covetous man takes pleasure in the consideration of him- sin of the flesh. Now covetousness is seemingly a sin of self as a possessor of riches. Therefore covetousness is a the flesh, for it results from the corruption of the flesh, as spiritual sin. instanced in old people who, through corruption of carnal Reply to Objection 1. Covetousness with regard to a nature, fall into covetousness. Therefore covetousness is bodily object seeks the pleasure, not of the body but only not a spiritual sin. of the soul, forasmuch as a man takes pleasure in the fact Objection 3. Further, a sin of the flesh is one by which that he possesses riches: wherefore it is not a sin of the man’s body is disordered, according to the saying of the flesh. Nevertheless by reason of its object it is a mean be- Apostle (1 Cor. 6:18), “He that committeth fornication tween purely spiritual sins, which seek spiritual pleasure sinneth against his own body.” Now covetousness disturbs in respect of spiritual objects (thus pride is about excel- man even in his body; wherefore Chrysostom (Hom. xxix lence), and purely carnal sins, which seek a purely bodily in Matth.) compares the covetous man to the man who pleasure in respect of a bodily object. was possessed by the devil (Mk. 5) and was troubled in Reply to Objection 2. Movement takes its species body. Therefore covetousness seems not to be a spiritual from the term “whereto” and not from the term “where- sin. from.” Hence a vice of the flesh is so called from its tend- On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers ing to a pleasure of the flesh, and not from its originating covetousness among spiritual vices. in some defect of the flesh. I answer that, Sins are seated chiefly in the affections: Reply to Objection 3. Chrysostom compares a cov-and all the affections or passions of the soul have their etous man to the man who was possessed by the devil, not term in pleasure and sorrow, according to the Philosopher that the former is troubled in the flesh in the same way (Ethic. ii, 5). Now some pleasures are carnal and some as the latter, but by way of contrast, since while the pos- spiritual. Carnal pleasures are those which are consum- sessed man, of whom we read in Mk. 5, stripped himself, mated in the carnal senses—for instance, the pleasures of the covetous man loads himself with an excess of riches. the table and sexual pleasures: while spiritual pleasures Whether covetousness is a capital vice? IIa IIae q. 118 a. 7 Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not a cap- But this does not apply to covetousness: since riches have ital vice. For covetousness is opposed to liberality as the the aspect, not of an end, but rather of something directed mean, and to prodigality as extreme. But neither is liberal- to an end, as stated in Ethic. i, 5. Therefore covetousness ity a principal virtue, nor prodigality a capital vice. There- is not a capital vice. fore covetousness also should not be reckoned a capital Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Moral. xv), that vice. “covetousness arises sometimes from pride, sometimes Objection 2. Further, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 84, from fear. For there are those who, when they think that Aa. 3,4), those vices are called capital which have prin- they lack the needful for their expenses, allow the mind cipal ends, to which the ends of other vices are directed. to give way to covetousness. And there are others who, 1740 wishing to be thought more of, are incited to greed for dance with reason, but vice is perfected in accordance other people’s property.” Therefore covetousness arises with the inclination of the sensitive appetite. Now reason from other vices instead of being a capital vice in respect and sensitive appetite do not belong chiefly to the same of other vices. genus, and consequently it does not follow that principal On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) reckons cov- vice is opposed to principal virtue. Wherefore, although etousness among the capital vices. liberality is not a principal virtue, since it does not re- I answer that, As stated in the Second Objection, a gard the principal good of the reason, yet covetousness is capital vice is one which under the aspect of end gives rise a principal vice, because it regards money, which occu- to other vices: because when an end is very desirable, the pies a principal place among sensible goods, for the rea- result is that through desire thereof man sets about doing son given in the Article. many things either good or evil. Now the most desirable On the other hand, prodigality is not directed to an end end is happiness or felicity, which is the last end of human that is desirable principally, indeed it seems rather to re- life, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 1, Aa. 4,7,8): wherefore sult from a lack of reason. Hence the Philosopher says the more a thing is furnished with the conditions of hap- (Ethic. iv, 1) that “a prodigal man is a fool rather than a piness, the more desirable it is. Also one of the conditions knave.” of happiness is that it be self-sufficing, else it would not Reply to Objection 2. It is true that money is directed set man’s appetite at rest, as the last end does. Now riches to something else as its end: yet in so far as it is useful give great promise of self-sufficiency, as Boethius says for obtaining all sensible things, it contains, in a way, all (De Consol. iii): the reason of which, according to the things virtually. Hence it has a certain likeness to happi- Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), is that we “use money in token ness, as stated in the Article. of taking possession of something,” and again it is writ- Reply to Objection 3. Nothing prevents a capital vice ten (Eccles. 10:19): “All things obey money.” Therefore from arising sometimes out of other vices, as stated above covetousness, which is desire for money, is a capital vice. (q. 36, a. 4, ad 1; Ia IIae, q. 84, a. 4), provided that itself Reply to Objection 1. Virtue is perfected in accor-be frequently the source of others. Whether treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and insensibility IIa IIae q. 118 a. 8 to mercy are daughters of covetousness? Objection 1. It seems that the daughters of cov- usurers, gamblers, despoilers of the dead, and robbers.” etousness are not as commonly stated, namely, “treach- Therefore it seems that the aforesaid enumeration is in- ery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and sufficient. insensibility to mercy.” For covetousness is opposed to Objection 5. Further, tyrants use much violence liberality, as stated above (a. 3). Now treachery, fraud, against their subjects. But the Philosopher says (Ethic. and falsehood are opposed to prudence, perjury to reli- iv, 1) that “tyrants who destroy cities and despoil sacred gion, restlessness to hope, or to charity which rests in the places are not to be called illiberal,” i.e. covetous. There- beloved object, violence to justice, insensibility to mercy. fore violence should not be reckoned a daughter of cov- Therefore these vices have no connection with covetous- etousness. ness. On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) assigns to Objection 2. Further, treachery, fraud and falsehood covetousness the daughters mentioned above. seem to pertain to the same thing, namely, the deceiving I answer that, The daughters of covetousness are the of one’s neighbor. Therefore they should not be reckoned vices which arise therefrom, especially in respect of the as different daughters of covetousness. desire of an end. Now since covetousness is excessive Objection 3. Further, Isidore (Comment. in Deut.) love of possessing riches, it exceeds in two things. For enumerates nine daughters of covetousness; which are in the first place it exceeds in retaining, and in this re- “lying, fraud, theft, perjury, greed of filthy lucre, false spect covetousness gives rise to “insensibility to mercy,” witnessing, violence, inhumanity, rapacity.” Therefore the because, to wit, a man’s heart is not softened by mercy former reckoning of daughters is insufficient. to assist the needy with his riches‡. In the second place Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) it belongs to covetousness to exceed in receiving, and in mentions many kinds of vices as belonging to covetous- this respect covetousness may be considered in two ways. ness which he calls illiberality, for he speaks of those who First as in the thought [affectu]. In this way it gives rise to are “sparing, tight-fisted, skinflints∗, misers†, who do il- “restlessness,” by hindering man with excessive anxiety liberal deeds,” and of those who “batten on whoredom, and care, for “a covetous man shall not be satisfied with ∗ kyminopristes † kimbikes ‡ See q. 30, a. 1 1741 money” (Eccles. 5:9). Secondly, it may be considered in same as insensibility to mercy. the execution [effectu]. In this way the covetous man, in Reply to Objection 4. The vices mentioned by Aris- acquiring other people’s goods, sometimes employs force, totle are species rather than daughters of illiberality or which pertains to “violence,” sometimes deceit, and then covetousness. For a man may be said to be illiberal or if he has recourse to words, it is “falsehood,” if it be mere covetous through a defect in giving. If he gives but little words, “perjury” if he confirm his statement by oath; if he is said to be “sparing”; if nothing, he is “tightfisted”: he has recourse to deeds, and the deceit affects things, we if he gives with great reluctance, he is said to be kymino- have “fraud”; if persons, then we have “treachery,” as in pristes [skinflint], a cumin-seller, as it were, because he the case of Judas, who betrayed Christ through covetous-makes a great fuss about things of little value. Some- ness. times a man is said to be illiberal or covetous, through Reply to Objection 1. There is no need for the daugh- an excess in receiving, and this in two ways. In one way, ters of a capital sin to belong to that same kind of vice: through making money by disgraceful means, whether in because a sin of one kind allows of sins even of a different performing shameful and servile works by means of illib- kind being directed to its end; seeing that it is one thing for eral practices, or by acquiring more through sinful deeds, a sin to have daughters, and another for it to have species. such as whoredom or the like, or by making a profit where Reply to Objection 2. These three are distinguished one ought to have given gratis, as in the case of usury, or as stated in the Article. by laboring much to make little profit. In another way, Reply to Objection 3. These nine are reducible to the in making money by unjust means, whether by using vi- seven aforesaid. For lying and false witnessing are com- olence on the living, as robbers do, or by despoiling the prised under falsehood, since false witnessing is a special dead, or by preying on one’s friends, as gamblers do. kind of lie, just as theft is a special kind of fraud, where- Reply to Objection 5. Just as liberality is about mod- fore it is comprised under fraud; and greed of filthy lucre erate sums of money, so is illiberality. Wherefore tyrants belongs to restlessness; rapacity is comprised under vio- who take great things by violence, are said to be, not illib- lence, since it is a species thereof; and inhumanity is the eral, but unjust. 1742 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 119 Of Prodigality (In Three Articles) We must now consider prodigality, under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness? (2) Whether prodigality is a sin? (3) Whether it is a graver sin that covetousness? Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness? IIa IIae q. 119 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that prodigality is not oppo- Reply to Objection 1. Nothing prevents opposites site to covetousness. For opposites cannot be together in from being in the same subject in different respects. For a the same subject. But some are at the same time prodi- thing is denominated more from what is in it principally. gal and covetous. Therefore prodigality is not opposite to Now just as in liberality, which observes the mean, the covetousness. principal thing is giving, to which receiving and retain- Objection 2. Further, opposites relate to one same ing are subordinate, so, too, covetousness and prodigality thing. But covetousness, as opposed to liberality, re- regard principally giving. Wherefore he who exceeds in lates to certain passions whereby man is affected towards giving is said to be “prodigal,” while he who is deficient money: whereas prodigality does not seem to relate to in giving is said to be “covetous.” Now it happens some- any passions of the soul, since it is not affected towards times that a man is deficient in giving, without exceeding money, or to anything else of the kind. Therefore prodi- in receiving, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1). gality is not opposite to covetousness. And in like manner it happens sometimes that a man ex- Objection 3. Further, sin takes its species chiefly from ceeds in giving, and therefore is prodigal, and yet at the its end, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 62, a. 3). Now prodi- same time exceeds in receiving. This may be due either gality seems always to be directed to some unlawful end, to some kind of necessity, since while exceeding in giv- for the sake of which the prodigal squanders his goods. ing he is lacking in goods of his own, so that he is driven Especially is it directed to pleasures, wherefore it is stated to acquire unduly, and this pertains to covetousness; or it (Lk. 15:13) of the prodigal son that he “wasted his sub- may be due to inordinateness of the mind, for he gives not stance living riotously.” Therefore it seems that prodigal- for a good purpose, but, as though despising virtue, cares ity is opposed to temperance and insensibility rather than not whence or how he receives. Wherefore he is prodigal to covetousness and liberality. and covetous in different respects. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; Reply to Objection 2. Prodigality regards passions iv, 1) that prodigality is opposed to liberality, and illiber- in respect of money, not as exceeding, but as deficient in ality, to which we give here the name of covetousness. them. I answer that, In morals vices are opposed to one an- Reply to Objection 3. The prodigal does not always other and to virtue in respect of excess and deficiency. exceed in giving for the sake of pleasures which are the Now covetousness and prodigality differ variously in re- matter of temperance, but sometimes through being so spect of excess and deficiency. Thus, as regards affection disposed as not to care about riches, and sometimes on for riches, the covetous man exceeds by loving them more account of something else. More frequently, however, he than he ought, while the prodigal is deficient, by being less inclines to intemperance, both because through spending careful of them than he ought: and as regards external ac- too much on other things he becomes fearless of spending tion, prodigality implies excess in giving, but deficiency in on objects of pleasure, to which the concupiscence of the retaining and acquiring, while covetousness, on the con- flesh is more prone; and because through taking no plea- trary, denotes deficiency in giving, but excess in acquiring sure in virtuous goods, he seeks for himself pleasures of and retaining. Hence it is evident that prodigality is op- the body. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) “that posed to covetousness. many a prodigal ends in becoming intemperate.” 1743 Whether prodigality is a sin? IIa IIae q. 119 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that prodigality is not a sin. For the prodigal seeks to acquire some temporal good inor-the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:10): “Covetousness [Douay: dinately, namely, to give pleasure to others, or at least to ‘desire of money’] is the root of all evils.” But it is not the satisfy his own will in giving. But to one that reviews the root of prodigality, since this is opposed to it. Therefore passage correctly, it is evident that the Apostle is speaking prodigality is not a sin. literally of the desire of riches, for he had said previously Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. (1 Tim. 6:9): “They that will become rich,” etc. In this 6:17,18): “Charge the rich of this world. . . to give easily, sense covetousness is said to be “the root of all evils,” not to communicate to others.” Now this is especially what that all evils always arise from covetousness, but because prodigal persons do. Therefore prodigality is not a sin. there is no evil that does not at some time arise from cov- Objection 3. Further, it belongs to prodigality to etousness. Wherefore prodigality sometimes is born of exceed in giving and to be deficient in solicitude about covetousness, as when a man is prodigal in going to great riches. But this is most becoming to the perfect, who fulfil expense in order to curry favor with certain persons from the words of Our Lord (Mat. 6:34), “Be not. . . solicitous whom he may receive riches. for tomorrow,” and (Mat. 19:21), “Sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] Reply to Objection 2. The Apostle bids the rich to be thou hast, and give to the poor.” Therefore prodigality is ready to give and communicate their riches, according as not a sin. they ought. The prodigal does not do this: since, as the On the contrary, The prodigal son is held to blame Philosopher remarks (Ethic. iv, 1), “his giving is neither for his prodigality. good, nor for a good end, nor according as it ought to be. I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the opposition For sometimes they give much to those who ought to be between prodigality and covetousness is one of excess and poor, namely, to buffoons and flatterers, whereas to the deficiency; either of which destroys the mean of virtue. good they give nothing.” Now a thing is vicious and sinful through corrupting the Reply to Objection 3. The excess in prodigality con- good of virtue. Hence it follows that prodigality is a sin. sists chiefly, not in the total amount given, but in the Reply to Objection 1. Some expound this saying of amount over and above what ought to be given. Hence the Apostle as referring, not to actual covetousness, but sometimes the liberal man gives more than the prodigal to a kind of habitual covetousness, which is the concu- man, if it be necessary. Accordingly we must reply that piscence of the “fomes”∗, whence all sins arise. Others those who give all their possessions with the intention of say that he is speaking of a general covetousness with following Christ, and banish from their minds all solic- regard to any kind of good: and in this sense also it is itude for temporal things, are not prodigal but perfectly evident that prodigality arises from covetousness; since liberal. Whether prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness? IIa IIae q. 119 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that prodigality is a more we ascribe prodigality to those who are intemperate, as the grievous sin than covetousness. For by covetousness a Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore prodigality man injures his neighbor by not communicating his goods is a more grievous sin than covetousness. to him, whereas by prodigality a man injures himself, be- Objection 3. Further, prudence is chief among the cause the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that “the wasting moral virtues, as stated above (q. 56, a. 1, ad 1; Ia IIae, of riches, which are the means whereby a man lives, is an q. 61, a. 2, ad 1). Now prodigality is more opposed to pru- undoing of his very being.” Now he that injures himself dence than covetousness is: for it is written (Prov. 21:20): sins more grievously, according to Ecclus. 14:5, “He that “There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?” Therefore of the just; and the foolish man shall spend it”: and the prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness. Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that “it is the mark of a Objection 2. Further, a disorder that is accompanied fool to give too much and receive nothing.” Therefore by a laudable circumstance is less sinful. Now the disor- prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness. der of covetousness is sometimes accompanied by a laud- On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) able circumstance, as in the case of those who are unwill- that “the prodigal seems to be much better than the illib- ing to spend their own, lest they be driven to accept from eral man.” others: whereas the disorder of prodigality is accompa- I answer that, Prodigality considered in itself is a nied by a circumstance that calls for blame, inasmuch as less grievous sin than covetousness, and this for three rea- ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 81, a. 3, ad 2 1744 sons. First, because covetousness differs more from the against himself, through deficiency in spending: where-opposite virtue: since giving, wherein the prodigal ex- fore it is written (Eccles. 6:2): “A man to whom God ceeds, belongs to liberality more than receiving or retain- hath given riches. . . yet doth not give him the power to eat ing, wherein the covetous man exceeds. Secondly, be- thereof.” Nevertheless the prodigal man exceeds in this, cause the prodigal man is of use to the many to whom that he injures both himself and others yet so as to profit he gives, while the covetous man is of use to no one, not some; whereas the covetous man profits neither others nor even to himself, as stated in Ethic. iv, 6. Thirdly, because himself, since he does not even use his own goods for his prodigality is easily cured. For not only is the prodigal on own profit. the way to old age, which is opposed to prodigality, but Reply to Objection 2. In speaking of vices in general, he is easily reduced to a state of want, since much use- we judge of them according to their respective natures: less spending impoverishes him and makes him unable to thus, with regard to prodigality we note that it consumes exceed in giving. Moreover, prodigality is easily turned riches to excess, and with regard to covetousness that it into virtue on account of its likeness thereto. On the other retains them to excess. That one spend too much for the hand, the covetous man is not easily cured, for the reason sake of intemperance points already to several additional given above (q. 118, a. 5, ad 3). sins, wherefore the prodigal of this kind is worse, as stated Reply to Objection 1. The difference between the in Ethic. iv, 1. That an illiberal or covetous man refrain prodigal and the covetous man is not that the former sins from taking what belongs to others, although this appears against himself and the latter against another. For the in itself to call for praise, yet on account of the motive for prodigal sins against himself by spending that which is which he does so it calls for blame, since he is unwilling his, and his means of support, and against others by spend- to accept from others lest he be forced to give to others. ing the wherewithal to help others. This applies chiefly to Reply to Objection 3. All vices are opposed to pru- the clergy, who are the dispensers of the Church’s goods, dence, even as all virtues are directed by prudence: where- that belong to the poor whom they defraud by their prodi- fore if a vice be opposed to prudence alone, for this very gal expenditure. In like manner the covetous man sins reason it is deemed less grievous. against others, by being deficient in giving; and he sins 1745 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 120 Of “Epikeia” or Equity (In Two Articles) We must now consider “epikeia,” under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether “epikeia” is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a part of justice? Whether “epikeia” ∗ is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 120 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that “epikeia” is not a virtue. tain cases it will frustrate the equality of justice and be For no virtue does away with another virtue. Yet “epikeia” injurious to the common good, which the law has in view. does away with another virtue, since it sets aside that Thus the law requires deposits to be restored, because in which is just according to law, and seemingly is opposed the majority of cases this is just. Yet it happens sometimes to severity. Therefore “epikeia” is not a virtue. to be injurious—for instance, if a madman were to put his Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Vera Re- sword in deposit, and demand its delivery while in a state lig. xxxi): “With regard to these earthly laws, although of madness, or if a man were to seek the return of his de- men pass judgment on them when they make them, yet, posit in order to fight against his country. In these and when once they are made and established, the judge must like cases it is bad to follow the law, and it is good to set pronounce judgment not on them but according to them.” aside the letter of the law and to follow the dictates of jus- But seemingly “epikeia” pronounces judgment on the law, tice and the common good. This is the object of “epikeia” when it deems that the law should not be observed in some which we call equity. Therefore it is evident that “epikeia” particular case. Therefore “epikeia” is a vice rather than a is a virtue. virtue. Reply to Objection 1. “Epikeia” does not set aside Objection 3. Further, apparently it belongs to that which is just in itself but that which is just as by law “epikeia” to consider the intention of the lawgiver, as established. Nor is it opposed to severity, which follows the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). But it belongs to the letter of the law when it ought to be followed. To fol- the sovereign alone to interpret the intention of the law- low the letter of the law when it ought not to be followed is giver, wherefore the Emperor says in the Codex of Laws sinful. Hence it is written in the Codex of Laws and Con- and Constitutions, under Law i: “It is fitting and lawful stitutions under Law v: “Without doubt he transgresses that We alone should interpret between equity and law.” the law who by adhering to the letter of the law strives to Therefore the act of “epikeia” is unlawful: and conse- defeat the intention of the lawgiver.” quently “epikeia” is not a virtue. Reply to Objection 2. It would be passing judgment On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) states on a law to say that it was not well made; but to say that it to be a virtue. the letter of the law is not to be observed in some partic- I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 96, a. 6), ular case is passing judgment not on the law, but on some when we were treating of laws, since human actions, with particular contingency. which laws are concerned, are composed of contingent Reply to Objection 3. Interpretation is admissible in singulars and are innumerable in their diversity, it was not doubtful cases where it is not allowed to set aside the let- possible to lay down rules of law that would apply to ev- ter of the law without the interpretation of the sovereign. ery single case. Legislators in framing laws attend to what But when the case is manifest there is need, not of inter- commonly happens: although if the law be applied to cer- pretation, but of execution. Whether “epikeia” is a part of justice? IIa IIae q. 120 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that “epikeia” is not a part of justice, since its operation is beside that which is estab- justice. For, as stated above (q. 58, a. 7), justice is twofold, lished by law. Therefore it seems that “epikeia” is not a particular and legal. Now “epikeia” is not a part of partic- part of justice. ular justice, since it extends to all virtues, even as legal Objection 2. Further, a more principal virtue is not as- justice does. In like manner, neither is it a part of legal signed as the part of a less principal virtue: for it is to the ∗ epieikeia 1746 cardinal virtue, as being principal, that secondary virtues legal justice is subject to the direction of “epikeia.” Hence are assigned as parts. Now “epikeia” seems to be a more “epikeia” is by way of being a higher rule of human ac- principal virtue than justice, as implied by its name: for it tions. is derived from epi, i.e. “above,” and dikaion, i.e. “just.” Reply to Objection 1. Epikeia corresponds properly Therefore “epikeia” is not a part of justice. to legal justice, and in one way is contained under it, and Objection 3. Further, it seems that “epikeia” is the in another way exceeds it. For if legal justice denotes that same as modesty. For where the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5), which complies with the law, whether as regards the let- “Let your modesty be known to all men,” the Greek has ter of the law, or as regards the intention of the lawgiver, epieikeia∗. Now, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), which is of more account, then “epikeia” is the more immodesty is a part of temperance. Therefore “epikeia” is portant part of legal justice. But if legal justice denote not a part of justice. merely that which complies with the law with regard to On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 10) the letter, then “epikeia” is a part not of legal justice but that “epikeia is a kind of justice.” of justice in its general acceptation, and is condivided with I answer that, As stated above (q. 48), a virtue has legal justice, as exceeding it. three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. A Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher states subjective part is one of which the whole is predicated es- (Ethic. v, 10), “epikeia is better than a certain,” namely, sentially, and it is less than the whole. This may happen legal, “justice,” which observes the letter of the law: yet in two ways. For sometimes one thing is predicated of since it is itself a kind of justice, it is not better than all many in one common ratio, as animal of horse and ox: justice. and sometimes one thing is predicated of many according Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to “epikeia” to mod- to priority and posteriority, as “being” of substance and erate something, namely, the observance of the letter of accident. the law. But modesty, which is reckoned a part of tem- Accordingly, “epikeia” is a part of justice taken in a perance, moderates man’s outward life—for instance, in general sense, for it is a kind of justice, as the Philosopher his deportment, dress or the like. Possibly also the term states (Ethic. v, 10). Wherefore it is evident that “epikeia” epieikeia is applied in Greek by a similitude to all kinds is a subjective part of justice; and justice is predicated of of moderation. it with priority to being predicated of legal justice, since ∗ to epieikes 1747 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 121 Of Piety (In Two Articles) We must now consider the gift that corresponds to justice; namely, piety. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a gift of the Holy Ghost? (2) Which of the beatitudes and fruits corresponds to it? Whether piety is a gift? IIa IIae q. 121 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that piety is not a gift. For the to God as our Father, is a gift of the Holy Ghost. gifts differ from the virtues, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, Reply to Objection 1. The piety that pays duty and a. 1). But piety is a virtue, as stated above (q. 101, a. 3). worship to a father in the flesh is a virtue: but the piety Therefore piety is not a gift. that is a gift pays this to God as Father. Objection 2. Further, the gifts are more excellent than Reply to Objection 2. To pay worship to God as the virtues, above all the moral virtues, as above ( Ia IIae, Creator, as religion does, is more excellent than to pay q. 68, a. 8). Now among the parts of justice religion is worship to one’s father in the flesh, as the piety that is greater than piety. Therefore if any part of justice is to a virtue does. But to pay worship to God as Father is be accounted a gift, it seems that religion should be a gift yet more excellent than to pay worship to God as Creator rather than piety. and Lord. Wherefore religion is greater than the virtue of Objection 3. Further, the gifts and their acts remain in piety: while the gift of piety is greater than religion. heaven, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 6). But the act of Reply to Objection 3. As by the virtue of piety man piety cannot remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. pays duty and worship not only to his father in the flesh, i) that “piety fills the inmost recesses of the heart with but also to all his kindred on account of their being re- works of mercy”: and so there will be no piety in heaven lated to his father so by the gift of piety he pays worship since there will be no unhappiness∗. Therefore piety is and duty not only to God, but also to all men on account not a gift. of their relationship to God. Hence it belongs to piety On the contrary, It is reckoned among the gifts in the to honor the saints, and not to contradict the Scriptures eleventh chapter of Isaias (verse 2) [Douay: ‘godliness’]† whether one understands them or not, as Augustine says I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 1; Ia (De Doctr. Christ. ii). Consequently it also assists those IIae, q. 69, Aa. 1,3), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habit- who are in a state of unhappiness. And although this act ual dispositions of the soul, rendering it amenable to the has no place in heaven, especially after the Day of Judg- motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost moves us ment, yet piety will exercise its principal act, which is to to this effect among others, of having a filial affection to- revere God with filial affection: for it is then above all wards God, according to Rom. 8:15, “You have received that this act will be fulfilled, according to Wis. 5:5, “Be- the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Fa- hold how they are numbered among the children of God.” ther).” And since it belongs properly to piety to pay duty The saints will also mutually honor one another. Now, and worship to one’s father, it follows that piety, whereby, however, before the Judgment Day, the saints have pity at the Holy Ghost’s instigation, we pay worship and duty on those also who are living in this unhappy state. Whether the second beatitude, “Blessed are the meek,” corresponds to the gift of IIa IIae q. 121 a. 2 piety? Objection 1. It seems that the second beatitude, (a. 1, obj. 3), the works of mercy belong to piety. There- “Blessed are the meek,” does not correspond to the gift fore the second beatitude does not pertain to the gift of of piety. For piety is the gift corresponding to justice, to piety. which rather belongs the fourth beatitude, “Blessed are Objection 2. Further, the gift of piety is directed by they that hunger and thirst after justice,” or the fifth beat- the gift of knowledge, which is united to it in the enumer- itude, “Blessed are the merciful,” since as stated above ation of the gifts (Is. 11). Now direction and execution ∗ Cf. q. 30, a. 1 † “Pietas,” whence our English word “pity,” which is the same as mercy. 1748 extend to the same matter. Since, then, the third beati-congruity may be observed in keeping with the special na- tude, “Blessed are they that mourn,” corresponds to the ture of each gift and beatitude. In this way one must adapt gift of knowledge, it seems that the second beatitude cor- the beatitudes to the gifts according to their objects and responds to piety. acts: and thus the fourth and fifth beatitudes would cor- Objection 3. Further, the fruits correspond to the beat- respond to piety, rather than the second. Yet the second itudes and gifts, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 70, a. 2). Now beatitude has a certain congruity with piety, inasmuch as among the fruits, goodness and benignity seem to agree meekness removes the obstacles to acts of piety. with piety rather than mildness, which pertains to meek- This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. ness. Therefore the second beatitude does not correspond Reply to Objection 2. Taking the beatitudes and gifts to the gift of piety. according to their proper natures, the same beatitude must On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in needs correspond to knowledge and piety: but taking them Monte i): “Piety is becoming to the meek.” according to their order, different beatitudes correspond I answer that, In adapting the beatitudes to the gifts to them, although a certain congruity may be observed, as a twofold congruity may be observed. One is according stated above. to the order in which they are given, and Augustine seems Reply to Objection 3. In the fruits goodness and be- to have followed this: wherefore he assigns the first beati- nignity may be directly ascribed to piety; and mildness tude to the lowest gift, namely, fear, and the second beati- indirectly in so far as it removes obstacles to acts of piety, tude, “Blessed are the meek,” to piety, and so on. Another as stated above. 1749 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 122 Of the Precepts of Justice (In Six Articles) We must now consider the precepts of justice, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice? (2) Of the first precept of the decalogue; (3) Of the second; (4) Of the third; (5) Of the fourth; (6) Of the other six. Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice? IIa IIae q. 122 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that the precepts of the deca- is essential to a precept, appears in justice, which is of logue are not precepts of justice. For the intention of a one towards another. Because in those matters that relate lawgiver is “to make the citizens virtuous in respect of to himself it would seem at a glance that man is master of every virtue,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. Wherefore, accord- himself, and that he may do as he likes: whereas in mat- ing to Ethic. v, 1, “the law prescribes about all acts of ters that refer to another it appears manifestly that a man is all virtues.” Now the precepts of the decalogue are the under obligation to render to another that which is his due. first. principles of the whole Divine Law. Therefore the Hence the precepts of the decalogue must needs pertain to precepts of the decalogue do not pertain to justice alone. justice. Wherefore the first three precepts are about acts Objection 2. Further, it would seem that to justice of religion, which is the chief part of justice; the fourth belong especially the judicial precepts, which are condi- precept is about acts of piety, which is the second part of vided with the moral precepts, as stated above ( Ia IIae, justice; and the six remaining are about justice commonly q. 99, a. 4). But the precepts of the decalogue are moral so called, which is observed among equals. precepts, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 3). Therefore Reply to Objection 1. The intention of the law is to the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice. make all men virtuous, but in a certain order, namely, by Objection 3. Further, the Law contains chiefly pre- first of all giving them precepts about those things where cepts about acts of justice regarding the common good, the notion of duty is most manifest, as stated above. for instance about public officers and the like. But there Reply to Objection 2. The judicial precepts are de- is no mention of these in the precepts of the decalogue. terminations of the moral precepts, in so far as these are Therefore it seems that the precepts of the decalogue do directed to one’s neighbor, just as the ceremonial precepts not properly belong to justice. are determinations of the moral precepts in so far as these Objection 4. Further, the precepts of the decalogue are directed to God. Hence neither precepts are contained are divided into two tables, corresponding to the love of in the decalogue: and yet they are determinations of the God and the love of our neighbor, both of which regard the precepts of the decalogue, and therefore pertain to justice. virtue of charity. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue Reply to Objection 3. Things that concern the com- belong to charity rather than to justice. mon good must needs be administered in different ways On the contrary, Seemingly justice is the sole virtue according to the difference of men. Hence they were to whereby we are directed to another. Now we are directed be given a place not among the precepts of the decalogue, to another by all the precepts of the decalogue, as is evi- but among the judicial precepts. dent if one consider each of them. Therefore all the pre- Reply to Objection 4. The precepts of the decalogue cepts of the decalogue pertain to justice. pertain to charity as their end, according to 1 Tim. 1:5, I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are the “The end of the commandment is charity”: but they be- first principles of the Law: and the natural reason assents long to justice, inasmuch as they refer immediately to acts to them at once, as to principles that are most evident. of justice. Now it is altogether evident that the notion of duty, which 1750 Whether the first precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed? IIa IIae q. 122 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that the first precept of the decaduly directed to God, Who is the last end of man’s will. logue is unfittingly expressed. For man is more bound to The second thing to be observed in the order of gener- God than to his father in the flesh, according to Heb. 12:9, ation is that in the first place contraries and obstacles have “How much more shall we [Vulg.: ‘shall we not much to be removed. Thus the farmer first purifies the soil, and more’] obey the Father of spirits and live?” Now the pre- afterwards sows his seed, according to Jer. 4:3, “Break cept of piety, whereby man honors his father, is expressed up anew your fallow ground, and sow not upon thorns.” affirmatively in these words: “Honor thy father and thy Hence it behooved man, first of all to be instructed in re- mother.” Much more, therefore, should the first precept ligion, so as to remove the obstacles to true religion. Now of religion, whereby all honor God, be expressed affirma- the chief obstacle to religion is for man to adhere to a false tively, especially as affirmation is naturally prior to nega- god, according to Mat. 6:24, “You cannot serve God and tion. mammon.” Therefore in the first precept of the Law the Objection 2. Further, the first precept of the deca- worship of false gods is excluded. logue pertains to religion, as stated above (a. 1). Now reli- Reply to Objection 1. In point of fact there is one gion, since it is one virtue, has one act. Yet in the first pre-affirmative precept about religion, namely: “Remember cept three acts are forbidden: since we read first: “Thou that thou keep holy the Sabbath Day.” Still the negative shalt not have strange gods before Me”; secondly, “Thou precepts had to be given first, so that by their means the shalt not make to thyself any graven thing”; and thirdly, obstacles to religion might be removed. For though af- “Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them.” Therefore firmation naturally precedes negation, yet in the process the first precept is unfittingly expressed. of generation, negation, whereby obstacles are removed, Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De decem comes first, as stated in the Article. Especially is this true chord. ix) that “the first precept forbids the sin of super- in matters concerning God, where negation is preferable stition.” But there are many wicked superstitions besides to affirmation, on account of our insufficiency, as Diony- idolatry, as stated above (q. 92, a. 2). Therefore it was sius observes (Coel. Hier. ii). insufficient to forbid idolatry alone. Reply to Objection 2. People worshiped strange gods On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture. in two ways. For some served certain creatures as gods I answer that, It pertains to law to make men good, without having recourse to images. Hence Varro says that wherefore it behooved the precepts of the Law to be set for a long time the ancient Romans worshiped gods with- in order according to the order of generation, the order, out using images: and this worship is first forbidden by to wit, of man’s becoming good. Now two things must the words, “Thou shalt not have strange gods.” Among be observed in the order of generation. The first is that others the worship of false gods was observed by using the first part is the first thing to be established; thus in the certain images: and so the very making of images was generation of an animal the first thing to be formed is the fittingly forbidden by the words, “Thou shalt not make heart, and in building a home the first thing to be set up to thyself any graven thing,” as also the worship of those is the foundation: and in the goodness of the soul the first same images, by the words, “Thou shalt not adore them,” part is goodness of the will, the result of which is that a etc. man makes good use of every other goodness. Now the Reply to Objection 3. All other kinds of supersti- goodness of the will depends on its object, which is its tion proceed from some compact, tacit or explicit, with end. Wherefore since man was to be directed to virtue the demons; hence all are understood to be forbidden by by means of the Law, the first thing necessary was, as it the words, “Thou shalt not have strange gods.” were, to lay the foundation of religion, whereby man is Whether the second precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed? IIa IIae q. 122 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that the second precept of as though they forbade a false confession of faith, which, the decalogue is unfittingly expressed. For this precept, like error, is an act of unbelief. Now unbelief precedes su- “Thou shalt not take the name of thy God in vain” is thus perstition, as faith precedes religion. Therefore this pre- explained by a gloss on Ex. 20:7: “Thou shalt not deem cept should have preceded the first, whereby superstition the Son of God to be a creature,” so that it forbids an error is forbidden. against faith. Again, a gloss on the words of Dt. 5:11, Objection 2. Further, the name of God is taken for “Thou shalt not take the name of. . . thy God in vain, ” many purposes —for instance, those of praise, of work- adds, i.e. “by giving the name of God to wood or stone,” ing miracles, and generally speaking in conjunction with 1751 all we say or do, according to Col. 3:17, “All whatso-we have acknowledged. ever you do in word or in work. . . do ye in the name of For this reason the precept forbidding superstition is the Lord.” Therefore the precept forbidding the taking of placed before the second precept, which forbids perjury God’s name in vain seems to be more universal than the that pertains to irreligion. precept forbidding superstition, and thus should have pre- Reply to Objection 1. These expositions are mys- ceded it. tical. The literal explanation is that which is given Dt. Objection 3. Further, a gloss on Ex. 20:7 expounds 5:11: “Thou shalt not take the name of. . . thy God in vain,” the precept, “Thou shalt not take the name of. . . thy God namely, “by swearing on that which is not∗.” in vain,” namely, by swearing to nothing. Hence this pre- Reply to Objection 2. This precept does not forbid cept would seem to forbid useless swearing, that is to say, all taking of the name of God, but properly the taking of swearing without judgment. But false swearing, which God’s name in confirmation of a man’s word by way of an is without truth, and unjust swearing, which is without oath, because men are wont to take God’s name more fre- justice, are much more grievous. Therefore this precept quently in this way. Nevertheless we may understand that should rather have forbidden them. in consequence all inordinate taking of the Divine name Objection 4. Further, blasphemy or any word or deed is forbidden by this precept: and it is in this sense that we that is an insult to God is much more grievous than per- are to take the explanation quoted in the First Objection. jury. Therefore blasphemy and other like sins should Reply to Objection 3. To swear to nothing means to rather have been forbidden by this precept. swear to that which is not. This pertains to false swear- Objection 5. Further, God’s names are many. There- ing, which is chiefly called perjury, as stated above (q. 98, fore it should not have been said indefinitely: “Thou shalt a. 1, ad 3). For when a man swears to that which is false, not take the name of. . . thy God in vain.” his swearing is vain in itself, since it is not supported by On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture. the truth. on the other hand, when a man swears without I answer that, In one who is being instructed in virtue judgment, through levity, if he swear to the truth, there is it is necessary to remove obstacles to true religion before no vanity on the part of the oath itself, but only on the part establishing him in true religion. Now a thing is opposed of the swearer. to true religion in two ways. First, by excess, when, to Reply to Objection 4. Just as when we instruct a man wit, that which belongs to religion is given to others than in some science, we begin by putting before him certain to whom it is due, and this pertains to superstition. Sec- general maxims, even so the Law, which forms man to ondly, by lack, as it were, of reverence, when, to wit, God virtue by instructing him in the precepts of the decalogue, is contemned, and this pertains to the vice of irreligion, as which are the first of all precepts, gave expression, by pro- stated above (q. 97, in the preamble, and in the Article that hibition or by command, to those things which are of most follows). Now superstition hinders religion by preventing common occurrence in the course of human life. Hence man from acknowledging God so as to worship Him: and the precepts of the decalogue include the prohibition of when a man’s mind is engrossed in some undue worship, perjury, which is of more frequent occurrence than blas- he cannot at the same time give due worship to God, ac- phemy, since man does not fall so often into the latter sin. cording to Is. 28:20, “The bed is straitened, so that one Reply to Objection 5. Reverence is due to the Divine must fall out,” i.e. either the true God or a false god must names on the part of the thing signified, which is one, and fall out from man’s heart, “and a short covering cannot not on the part of the signifying words, which are many. cover both.” On the other hand, irreligion hinders reli- Hence it is expressed in the singular: “Thou shalt not take gion by preventing man from honoring God after he has the name of. . . thy God in vain”: since it matters not in acknowledged Him. Now one must first of all acknowl- which of God’s names perjury is committed. edge God with a view to worship, before honoring Him Whether the third precept of the decalogue, concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, IIa IIae q. 122 a. 4 is fittingly expressed? Objection 1. It seems that the third precept of the forbids, not to heal man on the Sabbath, but to do servile decalogue, concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is works,” i.e. “to burden oneself with sin.” Taken literally it unfittingly expressed. For this, understood spiritually, is a is a ceremonial precept, for it is written (Ex. 31:13): “See general precept: since Bede in commenting on Lk. 13:14, that you keep My Sabbath: because it is a sign between “The ruler of the synagogue being angry that He had Me and you in your generations.” Now the precepts of healed on the Sabbath,” says (Comment. iv): “The Law the decalogue are both spiritual and moral. Therefore it is ∗ Vulg.: ‘for he shall not be unpunished that taketh His name upon a vain thing’ 1752 unfittingly placed among the precepts of the decalogue. earth. . . and rested on the seventh day.” Objection 2. Further, the ceremonial precepts of the Reply to Objection 1. The precept about hallowing Law contain “sacred things, sacrifices, sacraments and ob- the Sabbath, understood literally, is partly oral and partly servances,” as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 101, a. 4). Now ceremonial. It is a moral precept in the point of com- sacred things comprised not only sacred days, but also sa- manding man to aside a certain time to be given to Divine cred places and sacred vessels, and so on. Moreover, there things. For there is in man a natural inclination to set aside were many sacred days other than the Sabbath. Therefore a certain time for each necessary thing, such as refresh- it was unfitting to omit all other ceremonial observances ment of the body, sleep, and so forth. Hence according and to mention only that of the Sabbath. to the dictate of reason, man sets aside a certain time for Objection 3. Further, whoever breaks a precept of spiritual refreshment, by which man’s mind is refreshed the decalogue, sins. But in the Old Law some who broke in God. And thus to have a certain time set aside for occu- the observances of the Sabbath did not sin—for instance, pying oneself with Divine things is the matter of a moral those who circumcised their sons on the eighth day, and precept. But, in so far as this precept specializes the time the priests who worked in the temple on the Sabbath. Also as a sign representing the Creation of the world, it is a cer- Elias (3 Kings 19), who journeyed for forty days unto the emonial precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its mount of God, Horeb, must have traveled on a Sabbath: allegorical signification, as representative of Christ’s rest the priests also who carried the ark of the Lord for seven in the tomb on the seventh day: also in its moral signifi- days, as related in Josue 7, must be understood to have cation, as representing cessation from all sinful acts, and carried it on a Sabbath. Again it is written (Lk. 13:15): the mind’s rest in God, in which sense, too, it is a general “Doth not every one of you on the Sabbath day loose his precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its analogical ox or his ass. . . and lead them to water?” Therefore it is signification, as foreshadowing the enjoyment of God in unfittingly placed among the precepts of the decalogue. heaven. Hence the precept about hallowing the Sabbath is Objection 4. Further, the precepts of the decalogue placed among the precepts of the decalogue, as a moral, have to be observed also under the New Law. Yet in the but not as a ceremonial precept. New Law this precept is not observed, neither in the point Reply to Objection 2. The other ceremonies of the of the Sabbath day, nor as to the Lord’s day, on which Law are signs of certain particular Divine works: but the men cook their food, travel, fish, and do many like things. observance of the Sabbath is representative of a general Therefore the precept of the observance of the Sabbath is boon, namely, the production of all creatures. Hence it unfittingly expressed. was fitting that it should be placed among the general pre- On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture. cepts of the decalogue, rather than any other ceremonial I answer that, The obstacles to true religion being re- precept of the Law. moved by the first and second precepts of the decalogue, Reply to Objection 3. Two things are to be observed as stated above (Aa. 2,3), it remained for the third precept in the hallowing of the Sabbath. One of these is the end: to be given whereby man is established in true religion. and this is that man occupy himself with Divine things, Now it belongs to religion to give worship to God: and and is signified in the words: “Remember that thou keep just as the Divine scriptures teach the interior worship un- holy the Sabbath day.” For in the Law those things are der the guise of certain corporal similitudes, so is external said to be holy which are applied to the Divine worship. worship given to God under the guise of sensible signs. The other thing is cessation from work, and is signified in And since for the most part man is induced to pay interior the words (Ex. 20:11), “On the seventh day. . . thou shalt worship, consisting in prayer and devotion, by the inte- do no work.” The kind of work meant appears from Lev. rior prompting of the Holy Ghost, a precept of the Law 23:3, “You shall do no servile work on that day∗.” Now as necessary respecting the exterior worship that consists servile work is so called from servitude: and servitude is in sensible signs. Now the precepts of the decalogue are, threefold. One, whereby man is the servant of sin, accord- so to speak, first and common principles of the Law, and ing to Jn. 8:34, “Whosoever committeth sin is the servant consequently the third precept of the decalogue describes of sin,” and in this sense all sinful acts are servile. An- the exterior worship of God as the sign of a universal boon other servitude is whereby one man serves another. Now that concerns all. This universal boon was the work of the one man serves another not with his mind but with his Creation of the world, from which work God is stated to body, as stated above (q. 104, Aa. 5,6, ad 1). Wherefore have rested on the seventh day: and sign of this we are in this respect those works are called servile whereby one commanded to keep holy seventh day—that is, to set it man serves another. The third is the servitude of God; and aside as a day to be given to God. Hence after the pre- in this way the work of worship, which pertains to the ser- cept about the hallowing of the Sabbath the reason for vice of God, may be called a servile work. In this sense it is given: “For in six days the Lord made heaven and servile work is not forbidden on the Sabbath day, because ∗ Vulg.: ‘You shall do no work on that day’ 1753 that would be contrary to the end of the Sabbath obser- “Deliver them that are led to death”: secondarily as re- vance: since man abstains from other works on the Sab- gards avoiding damage to one’s property, according to Dt. bath day in order that he may occupy himself with works 22:1, “Thou shalt not pass by if thou seest thy brother’s connected with God’s service. For this reason, according ox or his sheep go astray, but thou shalt bring them back to Jn. 7:23, “a man† receives circumcision on the Sab- to thy brother.” Hence a corporal work pertaining to the bath day, that the law of Moses may not be broken”: and preservation of one’s own bodily well-being does not pro- for this reason too we read (Mat. 12:5), that “on the Sab- fane the Sabbath: for it is not against the observance of the bath days the priests in the temple break the Sabbath,” Sabbath to eat and do such things as preserve the health i.e. do corporal works on the Sabbath, “and are without of the body. For this reason the Machabees did not pro- blame.” Accordingly, the priests in carrying the ark on the fane the Sabbath when they fought in self-defense on the Sabbath did not break the precept of the Sabbath obser- Sabbath day (1 Macc. 2), nor Elias when he fled from the vance. In like manner it is not contrary to the observance face of Jezabel on the Sabbath. For this same reason our of the Sabbath to exercise any spiritual act, such as teach- Lord (Mat. 12:3) excused His disciples for plucking the ing by word or writing. Wherefore a gloss on Num 28 ears of corn on account of the need which they suffered. says that “smiths and like craftsmen rest on the Sabbath In like manner a bodily work that is directed to the bodily day, but the reader or teacher of the Divine law does not well-being of another is not contrary to the observance of cease from his work. Yet he profanes not the Sabbath, the Sabbath: wherefore it is written (Jn. 7:23): “Are you even as the priests in the temple break the Sabbath, and angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the are without blame.” On the other hand, those works that Sabbath day?” And again, a bodily work that is done to are called servile in the first or second way are contrary avoid an imminent damage to some external thing does to the observance of the Sabbath, in so far as they hinder not profane the Sabbath, wherefore our Lord says (Mat. man from applying himself to Divine things. And since 12:11): “What man shall there be among you, that hath man is hindered from applying himself to Divine things one sheep, and if the same fall into a pit on the Sabbath rather by sinful than by lawful albeit corporal works, it day, will he not take hold on it and lift it up?” follows that to sin on a feast day is more against this pre- Reply to Objection 4. In the New Law the observance cept than to do some other but lawful bodily work. Hence of the Lord’s day took the place of the observance of the Augustine says (De decem chord. iii): “It would be better Sabbath, not by virtue of the precept but by the institution if the Jew did some useful work on his farm than spent of the Church and the custom of Christian people. For this his time seditiously in the theatre: and their womenfolk observance is not figurative, as was the observance of the would do better to be making linen on the Sabbath than to Sabbath in the Old Law. Hence the prohibition to work be dancing lewdly all day in their feasts of the new moon.” on the Lord’ day is not so strict as on the Sabbath: and It is not, however, against this precept to sin venially on certain works are permitted on the Lord’s day which were the Sabbath, because venial sin does not destroy holiness. forbidden on the Sabbath, such as the cooking of food and Again, corporal works, not pertaining to the spiritual so forth. And again in the New Law, dispensation is more worship of God, are said to be servile in so far as they easily granted than in the Old, in the matter of certain for- belong properly to servants; while they are not said to be bidden works, on account of their necessity, because the servile, in so far as they are common to those who serve figure pertains to the protestation of truth, which it is un- and those who are free. Moreover, everyone, be he servant lawful to omit even in small things; while works, consid- or free, is bound to provide necessaries both for himself ered in themselves, are changeable in point of place and and for his neighbor, chiefly in respect of things pertaining time. to the well-being of the body, according to Prov. 24:11, Whether the fourth precept, about honoring one’s parents, is fittingly expressed? IIa IIae q. 122 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that the fourth precept, about one’s parents, but also to one’s country, and also to other honoring one’s parents, is unfittingly expressed. For this blood kindred, and to the well-wishers of our country, as is the precept pertaining to piety. Now, just as piety is stated above (q. 101, Aa. 1,2). Therefore it was unfitting a part of justice, so are observance, gratitude, and others for this precept to mention only the honoring of one’s fa- of which we have spoken (Qq. 101,102, seq.). Therefore ther and mother. it seems that there should not have been given a special Objection 3. Further, we owe our parents not merely precept of piety, as none is given regarding the others. honor but also support. Therefore the mere honoring of Objection 2. Further, piety pays worship not only to one’s parents is unfittingly prescribed. † Vulg.: ‘If a man,’ etc. 1754 Objection 4. Further, sometimes those who honor one’s parents as such, whereas support and so forth are their parents die young, and on the contrary those who due to them accidentally, for instance, because they are honor them not live a long time. Therefore it was unfit- in want, in slavery, or the like, as stated above (q. 101, ting to supplement this precept with the promise, “That a. 2 ). And since that which belongs to a thing by nature thou mayest be long-lived upon earth.” precedes that which is accidental, it follows that among On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture. the first precepts of the Law, which are the precepts of I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are di- the decalogue, there is a special precept of honoring our rected to the love of God and of our neighbor. Now to our parents: and this honor, as a kind of principle, is under- parents, of all our neighbors, we are under the greatest stood to comprise support and whatever else is due to our obligation. Hence, immediately after the precepts direct- parents. ing us to God, a place is given to the precept directing Reply to Objection 4. A long life is promised to those us to our parents, who are the particular principle of our who honor their parents not only as to the life to come, but being, just as God is the universal principle: so that this also as to the present life, according to the saying of the precept has a certain affinity to the precepts of the First Apostle (1 Tim. 4:8): “Piety [Douay: ‘godliness’] is prof- Table. itable to all things, having promise of the life that now is Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 101, a. 2), and of that which is to come.” And with reason. Because piety directs us to pay the debt due to our parents, a debt the man who is grateful for a favor deserves, with a certain which is common to all. Hence, since the precepts of congruity, that the favor should be continued to him, and the decalogue are general precepts, they ought to contain he who is ungrateful for a favor deserves to lose it. Now some reference to piety rather than to the other parts of we owe the favor of bodily life to our parents after God: justice, which regard some special debt. wherefore he that honors his parents deserves the prolon- Reply to Objection 2. The debt to one’s parents pre- gation of his life, because he is grateful for that favor: cedes the debt to one’s kindred and country since it is while he that honors not his parents deserves to be de- because we are born of our parents that our kindred and prived of life because he is ungrateful for the favor. How- country belong to us. Hence, since the precepts of the ever, present goods or evils are not the subject of merit decalogue are the first precepts of the Law, they direct or demerit except in so far as they are directed to a future man to his parents rather than to his country and other kin- reward, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 114, a. 12). Where- dred. Nevertheless this precept of honoring our parents is fore sometimes in accordance with the hidden design of understood to command whatever concerns the payment the Divine judgments, which regard chiefly the future re- of debt to any person, as secondary matter included in the ward, some, who are dutiful to their parents, are sooner principal matter. deprived of life, while others, who are undutiful to their Reply to Objection 3. Reverential honor is due to parents, live longer. Whether the other six precepts of the decalogue are fittingly expressed? IIa IIae q. 122 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that the other six precepts of the and contentions among you? Are they not. . . from your decalogue are unfittingly expressed. For it is not sufficient concupiscences which war in your members?” Now the for salvation that one refrain from injuring one’s neigh- concupiscence of the sensuality is not forbidden by a pre- bor; but it is required that one pay one’s debts, according cept of the decalogue, otherwise first movements would to Rom. 13:7, “Render. . . to all men their dues.” Now the be mortal sins, as they would be against a precept of the last six precepts merely forbid one to injure one’s neigh- decalogue. Nor is the concupiscence of the will forbidden, bor. Therefore these precepts are unfittingly expressed. since it is included in every sin. Therefore it is unfitting Objection 2. Further, these precepts forbid mur- for the precepts of the decalogue to include some that for- der, adultery, stealing and bearing false witness. But bid concupiscence. many other injuries can be inflicted on one’s neighbor, Objection 4. Further, murder is a more grievous sin as appears from those which have been specified above than adultery or theft. But there is no precept forbidding (Qq. 72, seq.). Therefore it seems that the aforesaid pre- the desire of murder. Therefore neither was it fitting to cepts are unfittingly expressed. have precepts forbidding the desire of theft and of adul- Objection 3. Further, concupiscence may be taken in tery. two ways. First as denoting an act of the will, as in Wis. On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture. 6:21, “The desire [concupiscentia] of wisdom bringeth to I answer that, Just as by the parts of justice a man the everlasting kingdom”: secondly, as denoting an act of pays that which is due to certain definite persons, to whom the sensuality, as in James 4:1, “From whence are wars he is bound for some special reason, so too by justice 1755 properly so called he pays that which is due to all in gen-principal of all. Those that are inflicted on a person con- eral. Hence, after the three precepts pertaining to religion, nected with one’s neighbor, especially by way of lust, are whereby man pays what is due God, and after the fourth understood to be forbidden together with adultery: those precept pertaining to piety, whereby he pays what is due that come under the head of damage done to property are to his parents—which duty includes the paying of all that understood to be forbidden together with theft: and those is due for any special reason—it was necessary in due se- that are comprised under speech, such as detractions, in- quence to give certain precepts pertaining to justice prop- sults, and so forth, are understood to be forbidden together erly so called, which pays to all indifferently what is due with the bearing of false witness, which is more directly to them. opposed to justice. Reply to Objection 1. Man is bound towards all per- Reply to Objection 3. The precepts forbidding con- sons in general to inflict injury on no one: hence the nega- cupiscence do not include the prohibition of first move- tive precepts, which forbid the doing of those injuries that ments of concupiscence, that do not go farther than the can be inflicted on one’s neighbor, had to be given a place, bounds of sensuality. The direct object of their prohibi- as general precepts, among the precepts of the decalogue. tion is the consent of the will, which is directed to deed or On the other hand, the duties we owe to our neighbor are pleasure. paid in different ways to different people: hence it did not Reply to Objection 4. Murder in itself is an object behoove to include affirmative precepts about those duties not of concupiscence but of horror, since it has not in it- among the precepts of the decalogue. self the aspect of good. On the other hand, adultery has Reply to Objection 2. All other injuries that are in- the aspect of a certain kind of good, i.e. of something flicted on our neighbor are reducible to those that are for- pleasurable, and theft has an aspect of good, i.e. of some- bidden by these precepts, as taking precedence of others thing useful: and good of its very nature has the aspect in point of generality and importance. For all injuries that of something concupiscible. Hence the concupiscence of are inflicted on the person of our neighbor are understood theft and adultery had to be forbidden by special precepts, to be forbidden under the head of murder as being the but not the concupiscence of murder. 1756 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 123 Of Fortitude (In Twelve Articles) After considering justice we must in due sequence consider fortitude. We must (1) consider the virtue itself of fortitude; (2) its parts; (3) the gift corresponding thereto; (4) the precepts that pertain to it. Concerning fortitude three things have to be considered: (1) Fortitude itself; (2) its principal act, viz. martyrdom; (3) the vices opposed to fortitude. Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether fortitude is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a special virtue? (3) Whether fortitude is only about fear and daring? (4) Whether it is only about fear of death? (5) Whether it is only in warlike matters? (6) Whether endurance is its chief act? (7) Whether its action is directed to its own good? (8) Whether it takes pleasure in its own action? (9) Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences? (10) Whether it makes use of anger in its action? (11) Whether it is a cardinal virtue? (12) Of its comparison with the other cardinal virtues. Whether fortitude is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 123 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not a virtue. renders his work good.” Hence human virtue, of which we For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:9): “Virtue is perfected in are speaking now, is that which makes a man good, and infirmity.” But fortitude is contrary to infirmity. Therefore tenders his work good. Now man’s good is to be in accor- fortitude is not a virtue. dance with reason, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, Objection 2. Further, if it is a virtue, it is either the-22). Wherefore it belongs to human virtue to make man ological, intellectual, or moral. Now fortitude is not con- good, to make his work accord with reason. This happens tained among the theological virtues, nor among the in- in three ways: first, by rectifying reason itself, and this is tellectual virtues, as may be gathered from what we have done by the intellectual virtues; secondly, by establishing said above ( Ia IIae, q. 57, a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 62, a. 3). Nei- the rectitude of reason in human affairs, and this belongs ther, apparently, is it contained among the moral virtues, to justice; thirdly, by removing the obstacles to the es- since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7,8): “Some tablishment of this rectitude in human affairs. Now the seem to be brave through ignorance; or through experi- human will is hindered in two ways from following the ence, as soldiers,” both of which cases seem to pertain to rectitude of reason. First, through being drawn by some act rather than to moral virtue, “and some are called brave object of pleasure to something other than what the rec- on account of certain passions”; for instance, on account titude of reason requires; and this obstacle is removed by of fear of threats, or of dishonor, or again on account of the virtue of temperance. Secondly, through the will be- sorrow, anger, or hope. But moral virtue does not act from ing disinclined to follow that which is in accordance with passion but from choice, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 55, reason, on account of some difficulty that presents itself. a. 4). Therefore fortitude is not a virtue. In order to remove this obstacle fortitude of the mind is Objection 3. Further, human virtue resides chiefly in requisite, whereby to resist the aforesaid difficulty even the soul, since it is a “good quality of the mind,” as stated as a man, by fortitude of body, overcomes and removes above (Ethic. iii, 7,8). But fortitude, seemingly, resides in bodily obstacles. the body, or at least results from the temperament of the Hence it is evident that fortitude is a virtue, in so far body. Therefore it seems that fortitude is not a virtue. as it conforms man to reason. On the contrary, Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv, xxi, Reply to Objection 1. The virtue of the soul is per- xxii) numbers fortitude among the virtues. fected, not in the infirmity of the soul, but in the infirmity I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. of the body, of which the Apostle was speaking. Now ii, 6) “virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and it belongs to fortitude of the mind to bear bravely with 1757 infirmities of the flesh, and this belongs to the virtue of think little of the dangers of battle, as they reckon them-patience or fortitude, as also to acknowledge one’s own selves capable of defending themselves against them; thus infirmity, and this belongs to the perfection that is called Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i), “No man fears to do what humility. he is confident of having learned to do well.” Secondly, Reply to Objection 2. Sometimes a person performs a man performs an act of fortitude without having the the exterior act of a virtue without having the virtue, and virtue, through the impulse of a passion, whether of sor- from some other cause than virtue. Hence the Philoso- row that he wishes to cast off, or again of anger. Thirdly, pher (Ethic. iii, 8) mentions five ways in which people through choice, not indeed of a due end, but of some tem- are said to be brave by way of resemblance, through per- poral advantage to be obtained, such as honor, pleasure, forming acts of fortitude without having the virtue. This or gain, or of some disadvantage to be avoided, such as may be done in three ways. First, because they tend to blame, pain, or loss. that which is difficult as though it were not difficult: and Reply to Objection 3. The fortitude of the soul which this again happens in three ways, for sometimes this is is reckoned a virtue, as explained in the Reply to the First owing to ignorance, through not perceiving the greatness Objection, is so called from its likeness to fortitude of the of the danger; sometimes it is owing to the fact that one is body. Nor is it inconsistent with the notion of virtue, that hopeful of overcoming dangers—when, for instance, one a man should have a natural inclination to virtue by rea- has often experienced escape from danger; and sometimes son of his natural temperament, as stated above ( Ia IIae, this is owing to a certain science and art, as in the case of q. 63, a. 1). soldiers who, through skill and practice in the use of arms, Whether fortitude is a special virtue? IIa IIae q. 123 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not a special only in bearing and withstanding those things wherein it virtue. For it is written (Wis. 7:7): “She teacheth tem- is most difficult to be firm, namely in certain grave dan- perance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude,” where gers. Therefore Tully says (Rhet. ii), that “fortitude is the text has “virtue” for “fortitude.” Since then the term deliberate facing of dangers and bearing of toils.” In this “virtue” is common to all virtues, it seems that fortitude is sense fortitude is reckoned a special virtue, because it has a general virtue. a special matter. Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): Reply to Objection 1. According to the Philosopher “Fortitude is not lacking in courage, for alone she defends (De Coelo i, 116) the word virtue refers to the extreme the honor of the virtues and guards their behests. She it limit of a power. Now a natural power is, in one sense, the is that wages an inexorable war on all vice, undeterred by power of resisting corruptions, and in another sense is a toil, brave in face of dangers, steeled against pleasures, principle of action, as stated in Metaph. v, 17. And since unyielding to lusts, avoiding covetousness as a deformity this latter meaning is the more common, the term “virtue,” that weakens virtue”; and he says the same further on in as denoting the extreme limit of such a power, is a com- connection with other vices. Now this cannot apply to any mon term, for virtue taken in a general sense is nothing special virtue. Therefore fortitude is not a special virtue. else than a habit whereby one acts well. But as denoting Objection 3. Further, fortitude would seem to derive the extreme limit of power in the first sense, which sense is its name from firmness. But it belongs to every virtue to more specific, it is applied to a special virtue, namely for- stand firm, as stated in Ethic. ii. Therefore fortitude is a titude, to which it belongs to stand firm against all kinds general virtue. of assaults. On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxii) numbers it Reply to Objection 2. Ambrose takes fortitude in a among the other virtues. broad sense, as denoting firmness of mind in face of as- I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 61, saults of all kinds. Nevertheless even as a special virtue Aa. 3,4), the term “fortitude” can be taken in two ways. with a determinate matter, it helps to resist the assaults First, as simply denoting a certain firmness of mind, and of all vices. For he that can stand firm in things that are in this sense it is a general virtue, or rather a condition most difficult to bear, is prepared, in consequence, to re- of every virtue, since as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii), sist those which are less difficult. it is requisite for every virtue to act firmly and immov- Reply to Objection 3. This objection takes fortitude ably. Secondly, fortitude may be taken to denote firmness in the first sense. 1758 Whether fortitude is about fear and dying? IIa IIae q. 123 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not about fear but also moderately to withstand them, when, to wit, it is and daring. For Gregory says (Moral. vii): “The forti- necessary to dispel them altogether in order to free one- tude of the just man is to overcome the flesh, to withstand self therefrom for the future, which seems to come under self-indulgence, to quench the lusts of the present life.” the notion of daring. Therefore fortitude is about fear and Therefore fortitude seems to be about pleasures rather daring, as curbing fear and moderating daring. than about fear and daring. Reply to Objection 1. Gregory is speaking then of the Objection 2. Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), fortitude of the just man, as to its common relation to all that it belongs to fortitude to face dangers and to bear toil. virtues. Hence he first of all mentions matters pertaining But this seemingly has nothing to do with the passions of to temperance, as in the words quoted, and then adds that fear and daring, but rather with a man’s toilsome deeds which pertains properly to fortitude as a special virtue, by and external dangers. Therefore fortitude is not about fear saying: “To love the trials of this life for the sake of an and daring. eternal reward.” Objection 3. Further, not only daring, but also hope, Reply to Objection 2. Dangers and toils do not with- is opposed to fear, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 45, a. 1, ad draw the will from the course of reason, except in so far 2) in the treatise on passions. Therefore fortitude should as they are an object of fear. Hence fortitude needs to be not be about daring any more than about hope. immediately about fear and daring, but mediately about On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; dangers and toils, these being the objects of those pas- iii, 9) that fortitude is about fear and daring. sions. I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), it belongs to Reply to Objection 3. Hope is opposed to fear on the the virtue of fortitude to remove any obstacle that with- part of the object, for hope is of good, fear of evil: whereas draws the will from following the reason. Now to be with- daring is about the same object, and is opposed to fear by drawn from something difficult belongs to the notion of way of approach and withdrawal, as stated above ( Ia IIae, fear, which denotes withdrawal from an evil that entails q. 45, a. 1). And since fortitude properly regards those difficulty, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 42, Aa. 3,5) in the temporal evils that withdraw one from virtue, as appears treatise on passions. Hence fortitude is chiefly about fear from Tully’s definition quoted in the Second Objection, of difficult things, which can withdraw the will from fol- it follows that fortitude properly is about fear and daring lowing the reason. And it behooves one not only firmly and not about hope, except in so far as it is connected with to bear the assault of these difficulties by restraining fear, daring, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 45, a. 2). Whether fortitude is only about dangers of death? IIa IIae q. 123 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not only about drawn from the good of reason through fear of bodily dangers of death. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. evil. Now it behooves one to hold firmly the good of rea- xv) that “fortitude is love bearing all things readily for the son against every evil whatsoever, since no bodily good sake of the object beloved”: and (Music. vi) he says that is equivalent to the good of the reason. Hence fortitude fortitude is “the love which dreads no hardship, not even of soul must be that which binds the will firmly to the death.” Therefore fortitude is not only about danger of good of reason in face of the greatest evils: because he death, but also about other afflictions. that stands firm against great things, will in consequence Objection 2. Further, all the passions of the soul need stand firm against less things, but not conversely. More- to be reduced to a mean by some virtue. Now there is no over it belongs to the notion of virtue that it should regard other virtue reducing fears to a mean. Therefore fortitude something extreme: and the most fearful of all bodily evils is not only about fear of death, but also about other fears. is death, since it does away all bodily goods. Wherefore Objection 3. Further, no virtue is about extremes. But Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxii) that “the soul is fear of death is about an extreme, since it is the greatest shaken by its fellow body, with fear of toil and pain, lest of fears, as stated in Ethic. iii. Therefore the virtue of the body be stricken and harassed with fear of death lest fortitude is not about fear of death. it be done away and destroyed.” Therefore the virtue of On the contrary, Andronicus says that “fortitude is a fortitude is about the fear of dangers of death. virtue of the irascible faculty that is not easily deterred by Reply to Objection 1. Fortitude behaves well in bear- the fear of death.” ing all manner of adversity: yet a man is not reckoned I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), it belongs to the brave simply through bearing any kind of adversity, but virtue of fortitude to guard the will against being with- only through bearing well even the greatest evils; while 1759 through bearing others he is said to be brave in a restricted the case with temperance and other virtues. But to love sense. one’s own life is natural: and hence the necessity of a spe- Reply to Objection 2. Since fear is born of love, any cial virtue modifying the fear of death. virtue that moderates the love of certain goods must in Reply to Objection 3. In virtues the extreme con- consequence moderate the fear of contrary evils: thus lib- sists in exceeding right reason: wherefore to undergo the erality, which moderates the love of money, as a conse- greatest dangers in accordance with reason is not contrary quence, moderates the fear of losing it, and the same is to virtue. Whether fortitude is properly about dangers of death in battle? IIa IIae q. 123 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not properly by a just fight. Now a just fight is of two kinds. First, there about dangers of death in battle. For martyrs above all are is the general combat, for instance, of those who fight in commended for their fortitude. But martyrs are not com- battle; secondly, there is the private combat, as when a mended in connection with battle. Therefore fortitude is judge or even private individual does not refrain from giv- not properly about dangers of death in battle. ing a just judgment through fear of the impending sword, Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that or any other danger though it threaten death. Hence it be- “fortitude is applicable both to warlike and to civil mat- longs to fortitude to strengthen the mind against dangers ters”: and Tully (De Offic. i), under the heading, “That it of death, not only such as arise in a general battle, but also pertains to fortitude to excel in battle rather than in civil such as occur in singular combat, which may be called by life,” says: “Although not a few think that the business of the general name of battle. Accordingly it must be granted war is of greater importance than the affairs of civil life, that fortitude is properly about dangers of death occurring this opinion must be qualified: and if we wish to judge in battle. the matter truly, there are many things in civil life that are Moreover, a brave man behaves well in face of danger more important and more glorious than those connected of any other kind of death; especially since man may be with war.” Now greater fortitude is about greater things. in danger of any kind of death on account of virtue: thus Therefore fortitude is not properly concerned with death may a man not fail to attend on a sick friend through fear in battle. of deadly infection, or not refuse to undertake a journey Objection 3. Further, war is directed to the preser- with some godly object in view through fear of shipwreck vation of a country’s temporal peace: for Augustine says or robbers. (De Civ. Dei xix) that “wars are waged in order to insure Reply to Objection 1. Martyrs face the fight that is peace.” Now it does not seem that one ought to expose waged against their own person, and this for the sake of oneself to the danger of death for the temporal peace of the sovereign good which is God; wherefore their forti- one’s country, since this same peace is the occasion of tude is praised above all. Nor is it outside the genus of much license in morals. Therefore it seems that the virtue fortitude that regards warlike actions, for which reason of fortitude is not about the danger of death in battle. they are said to have been valiant in battle.∗ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) Reply to Objection 2. Personal and civil business is that fortitude is chiefly about death in battle. differentiated from the business of war that regards gen- I answer that, As stated above (a. 4), fortitude eral wars. However, personal and civil affairs admit of strengthens a man’s mind against the greatest danger, dangers of death arising out of certain conflicts which are which is that of death. Now fortitude is a virtue; and it private wars, and so with regard to these also there may is essential to virtue ever to tend to good; wherefore it is be fortitude properly so called. in order to pursue some good that man does not fly from Reply to Objection 3. The peace of the state is good the danger of death. But the dangers of death arising out in itself, nor does it become evil because certain persons of sickness, storms at sea, attacks from robbers, and the make evil use of it. For there are many others who make like, do not seem to come on a man through his pursuing good use of it; and many evils prevented by it, such as some good. on the other hand, the dangers of death which murders and sacrileges, are much greater than those which occur in battle come to man directly on account of some are occasioned by it, and which belong chiefly to the sins good, because, to wit, he is defending the common good of the flesh. ∗ Office of Martyrs, ex. Heb. xi. 34. 1760 Whether endurance is the chief act of fortitude? IIa IIae q. 123 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that endurance is not the chief fear. Therefore the principal act of fortitude is endurance, act of fortitude. For virtue “is about the difficult and the that is to stand immovable in the midst of dangers rather good” (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is more difficult to attack than to attack them. than to endure. Therefore endurance is not the chief act of Reply to Objection 1. Endurance is more difficult fortitude. than aggression, for three reasons. First, because en- Objection 2. Further, to be able to act on another durance seemingly implies that one is being attacked by seems to argue greater power than not to be changed by a stronger person, whereas aggression denotes that one is another. Now to attack is to act on another, and to endure attacking as though one were the stronger party; and it is to persevere unchangeably. Since then fortitude denotes is more difficult to contend with a stronger than with a perfection of power, it seems that it belongs to fortitude to weaker. Secondly, because he that endures already feels attack rather than to endure. the presence of danger, whereas the aggressor looks upon Objection 3. Further, one contrary is more distant danger as something to come; and it is more difficult to from the other than its mere negation. Now to endure is be unmoved by the present than by the future. Thirdly, merely not to fear, whereas to attack denotes a movement because endurance implies length of time, whereas ag- contrary to that of fear, since it implies pursuit. Since then gression is consistent with sudden movements; and it is fortitude above all withdraws the mind from fear, it seems more difficult to remain unmoved for a long time, than that it regards attack rather than endurance. to be moved suddenly to something arduous. Hence the On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that “some hurry to meet that “certain persons are” said to be brave chiefly because danger, yet fly when the danger is present; this is not the they endure affliction. behavior of a brave man.” I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), and according Reply to Objection 2. Endurance denotes indeed a to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 9), “fortitude is more con- passion of the body, but an action of the soul cleaving cerned to allay fear, than to moderate daring.” For it is most resolutely [fortissime] to good, the result being that more difficult to allay fear than to moderate daring, since it does not yield to the threatening passion of the body. the danger which is the object of daring and fear, tends by Now virtue concerns the soul rather than the body. its very nature to check daring, but to increase fear. Now Reply to Objection 3. He that endures fears not, to attack belongs to fortitude in so far as the latter mod- though he is confronted with the cause of fear, whereas erates daring, whereas to endure follows the repression of this cause is not present to the aggressor. Whether the brave man acts for the sake of the good of his habit? IIa IIae q. 123 a. 7 Objection 1. It seems that the brave man does not act than what is directed to the end. Therefore the brave man for the sake of the good of his habit. For in matters of does not act for the sake of the good of his habit. action the end, though first in intention, is last in execu- On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) tion. Now the act of fortitude, in the order of execution, that “to the brave man fortitude itself is a good”: and such follows the habit of fortitude. Therefore it is impossible is his end. for the brave man to act for the sake of the good of his I answer that, An end is twofold: proximate and ul- habit. timate. Now the proximate end of every agent is to intro- Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): duce a likeness of that agent’s form into something else: “We love virtues for the sake of happiness, and yet some thus the end of fire in heating is to introduce the like- make bold to counsel us to be virtuous,” namely by saying ness of its heat into some passive matter, and the end of that we should desire virtue for its own sake, “without lov- the builder is to introduce into matter the likeness of his ing happiness. If they succeed in their endeavor, we shall art. Whatever good ensues from this, if it be intended, surely cease to love virtue itself, since we shall no longer may be called the remote end of the agent. Now just as love that for the sake of which alone we love virtue.” But in things made, external matter is fashioned by art, so in fortitude is a virtue. Therefore the act of fortitude is di- things done, human deeds are fashioned by prudence. Ac- rected not to fortitude but to happiness. cordingly we must conclude that the brave man intends as Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Morib. his proximate end to reproduce in action a likeness of his Eccl. xv) that “fortitude is love ready to bear all things habit, for he intends to act in accordance with his habit: for God’s sake.” Now God is not the habit of fortitude, but his remote end is happiness or God. but something better, since the end must needs be better This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the 1761 First Objection proceeds as though the very essence of a act, as stated. The other two objections consider the ulti-habit were its end, instead of the likeness of the habit in mate end. Whether the brave man delights in his act? IIa IIae q. 123 a. 8 Objection 1. It seems that the brave man delights in thought of losing his life, and for bodily pain. Hence we his act. For “delight is the unhindered action of a connat- read (2 Macc. 6:30) that Eleazar said: “I suffer grievous ural habit” (Ethic. x, 4,6,8). Now the brave deed proceeds pains in body: but in soul am well content to suffer these from a habit which acts after the manner of nature. There- things because I fear Thee.” fore the brave man takes pleasure in his act. Now the sensible pain of the body makes one insen- Objection 2. Further, Ambrose, commenting on Gal. sible to the spiritual delight of virtue, without the copi- 5:22, “But the fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace,” ous assistance of God’s grace, which has more strength to says that deeds of virtue are called “fruits because they raise the soul to the Divine things in which it delights, than refresh man’s mind with a holy and pure delight.” Now bodily pains have to afflict it. Thus the Blessed Tiburtius, the brave man performs acts of virtue. Therefore he takes while walking barefoot on the burning coal, said that he pleasure in his act. felt as though he were walking on roses. Objection 3. Further, the weaker is overcome by the Yet the virtue of fortitude prevents the reason from be- stronger. Now the brave man has a stronger love for the ing entirely overcome by bodily pain. And the delight good of virtue than for his own body, which he exposes to of virtue overcomes spiritual sorrow, inasmuch as a man the danger of death. Therefore the delight in the good of prefers the good of virtue to the life of the body and to virtue banishes the pain of the body; and consequently the whatever appertains thereto. Hence the Philosopher says brave man does all things with pleasure. (Ethic. ii, 3; iii, 9) that “it is not necessary for a brave man On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) to delight so as to perceive his delight, but it suffices for that “the brave man seems to have no delight in his act.” him not to be sad.” I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 31, Reply to Objection 1. The vehemence of the action or Aa. 3,4,5) where we were treating of the passions, plea- passion of one power hinders the action of another power: sure is twofold; one is bodily, resulting from bodily con- wherefore the pain in his senses hinders the mind of the tact, the other is spiritual, resulting from an apprehension brave man from feeling delight in its proper operation. of the soul. It is the latter which properly results from Reply to Objection 2. Deeds of virtue are delightful deeds of virtue, since in them we consider the good of chiefly on account of their end; yet they can be painful by reason. Now the principal act of fortitude is to endure, their nature, and this is principally the case with fortitude. not only certain things that are unpleasant as apprehended Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that “to perform by the soul—for instance, the loss of bodily life, which deeds with pleasure does not happen in all virtues, except the virtuous man loves not only as a natural good, but in so far as one attains the end.” also as being necessary for acts of virtue, and things con- Reply to Objection 3. In the brave man spiritual sor- nected with them—but also to endure things unpleasant row is overcome by the delight of virtue. Yet since bodily in respect of bodily contact, such as wounds and blows. pain is more sensible, and the sensitive apprehension is Hence the brave man, on one side, has something that af- more in evidence to man, it follows that spiritual pleasure fords him delight, namely as regards spiritual pleasure, in in the end of virtue fades away, so to speak, in the pres- the act itself of virtue and the end thereof: while, on the ence of great bodily pain. other hand, he has cause for both spiritual sorrow, in the Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences? IIa IIae q. 123 a. 9 Objection 1. It seems that fortitude does not deal happen; he takes measures beforehand, and looks out as chiefly with sudden occurrences. For it would seem that from the conning-tower of his mind, so as to encounter the things occur suddenly when they are unforeseen. But future by his forethought, lest he should say afterwards: Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that “fortitude is the de- This befell me because I did not think it could possibly liberate facing of danger, and bearing of toil.” Therefore happen.” But it is not possible to be prepared for the future fortitude does not deal chiefly with sudden happenings. in the case of sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): of fortitude is not concerned with sudden happenings. “The brave man is not unmindful of what may be likely to Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1762 8) that the “brave man is of good hope.” But hope looks edge.” The other thing to be considered in the operation of forward to the future, which is inconsistent with sudden fortitude regards the display of the virtuous habit: and in occurrences. Therefore the operation of fortitude is not this way fortitude is chiefly about sudden occurrences, be- concerned with sudden happenings. cause according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) the habit On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) of fortitude is displayed chiefly in sudden dangers: since a that “fortitude is chiefly about sudden dangers of death.” habit works by way of nature. Wherefore if a person with- I answer that, Two things must be considered in the out forethought does that which pertains to virtue, when operation of fortitude. One is in regard to its choice: and necessity urges on account of some sudden danger, this is thus fortitude is not about sudden occurrences: because a very strong proof that habitual fortitude is firmly seated the brave man chooses to think beforehand of the dan- in his mind. gers that may arise, in order to be able to withstand them, Yet is it possible for a person even without the habit of or to bear them more easily: since according to Gregory fortitude, to prepare his mind against danger by long fore- (Hom. xxv in Evang.), “the blow that is foreseen strikes thought: in the same way as a brave man prepares himself with less force, and we are able more easily to bear earthly when necessary. This suffices for the Replies to the Ob- wrongs, if we are forearmed with the shield of foreknowl- jections. Whether the brave man makes use of anger in his action? IIa IIae q. 123 a. 10 Objection 1. It seems that the brave man does not use to virtuous men both anger and the other passions of the anger in his action. For no one should employ as an in- soul albeit modified by reason. And possibly they differed strument of his action that which he cannot use at will. not in reality but in their way of speaking. For the Peri- Now man cannot use anger at will, so as to take it up and patetics, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 2), gave the lay it aside when he will. For, as the Philosopher says name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive ap- (De Memoria ii), when a bodily passion is in movement, petite, however they may comport themselves. And since it does not rest at once just as one wishes. Therefore a the sensitive appetite is moved by the command of reason, brave man should not employ anger for his action. so that it may cooperate by rendering action more prompt, Objection 2. Further, if a man is competent to do they held that virtuous persons should employ both anger a thing by himself, he should not seek the assistance of and the other passions of the soul, modified according to something weaker and more imperfect. Now the rea- the dictate of reason. On the other hand, the Stoics gave son is competent to achieve by itself deeds of fortitude, the name of passions to certain immoderate emotions of wherein anger is impotent: wherefore Seneca says (De Ira the sensitive appetite, wherefore they called them sick- i): “Reason by itself suffices not only to make us prepared nesses or diseases, and for this reason severed them alto- for action but also to accomplish it. In fact is there greater gether from virtue. folly than for reason to seek help from anger? the stead- Accordingly the brave man employs moderate anger fast from the unstaid, the trusty from the untrustworthy, for his action, but not immoderate anger. the healthy from the sick?” Therefore a brave man should Reply to Objection 1. Anger that is moderated in ac- not make use of anger. cordance with reason is subject to the command of reason: Objection 3. Further, just as people are more earnest so that man uses it at his will, which would not be the case in doing deeds of fortitude on account of anger, so are they were it immoderate. on account of sorrow or desire; wherefore the Philosopher Reply to Objection 2. Reason employs anger for its says (Ethic. iii, 8) that wild beasts are incited to face dan- action, not as seeking its assistance, but because it uses ger through sorrow or pain, and adulterous persons dare the sensitive appetite as an instrument, just as it uses the many things for the sake of desire. Now fortitude em- members of the body. Nor is it unbecoming for the instru- ploys neither sorrow nor desire for its action. Therefore ment to be more imperfect than the principal agent, even in like manner it should not employ anger. as the hammer is more imperfect than the smith. More- On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) over, Seneca was a follower of the Stoics, and the above that “anger helps the brave.” words were aimed by him directly at Aristotle. I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 2), Reply to Objection 3. Whereas fortitude, as stated concerning anger and the other passions there was a dif- above (a. 6), has two acts, namely endurance and aggres- ference of opinion between the Peripatetics and the Sto- sion, it employs anger, not for the act of endurance, be- ics. For the Stoics excluded anger and all other passions cause the reason by itself performs this act, but for the act of the soul from the mind of a wise or good man: whereas of aggression, for which it employs anger rather than the the Peripatetics, of whom Aristotle was the chief, ascribed other passions, since it belongs to anger to strike at the 1763 cause of sorrow, so that it directly cooperates with forti-I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 61, tude in attacking. On the other hand, sorrow by its very Aa. 3,4), those virtues are said to be cardinal or princi- nature gives way to the thing that hurts; though acciden- pal which have a foremost claim to that which belongs to tally it helps in aggression, either as being the cause of the virtues in common. And among other conditions of anger, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 47, a. 3), or as making virtue in general one is that it is stated to “act steadfastly,” a person expose himself to danger in order to escape from according to Ethic. ii, 4. Now fortitude above all lays sorrow. In like manner desire, by its very nature, tends to claim to praise for steadfastness. Because he that stands a pleasurable good, to which it is directly contrary to with- firm is so much the more praised, as he is more strongly stand danger: yet accidentally sometimes it helps one to impelled to fall or recede. Now man is impelled to recede attack, in so far as one prefers to risk dangers rather than from that which is in accordance with reason, both by the lack pleasure. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): pleasing good and the displeasing evil. But bodily pain “Of all the cases in which fortitude arises from a passion, impels him more strongly than pleasure. For Augustine the most natural is when a man is brave through anger, says (Qq. 83, qu. 36): “There is none that does not shun making his choice and acting for a purpose,” i.e. for a due pain more than he desires pleasure. For we perceive that end; “this is true fortitude.” even the most untamed beasts are deterred from the great- Whether fortitude is a cardinal virtue? est pleasures by the fear of pain.” And among the pains of Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not a cardinal the mind and dangers those are mostly feared which lead virtue. For, as stated above (a. 10), anger is closely allied to death, and it is against them that the brave man stands with fortitude. Now anger is not accounted a principal firm. Therefore fortitude is a cardinal virtue. passion; nor is daring which belongs to fortitude. There- Reply to Objection 1. Daring and anger do not co- fore neither should fortitude be reckoned a cardinal virtue. operate with fortitude in its act of endurance, wherein its Objection 2. Further, the object of virtue is good. But steadfastness is chiefly commended: for it is by that act the direct object of fortitude is not good, but evil, for it is that the brave man curbs fear, which is a principal pas-endurance of evil and toil, as Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. sion, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 25, a. 4). ii). Therefore fortitude is not a cardinal virtue. Reply to Objection 2. Virtue is directed to the good Objection 3. Further, the cardinal virtues are about of reason which it behooves to safeguard against the on- those things upon which human life is chiefly occupied, slaught of evils. And fortitude is directed to evils of the just as a door turns upon a hinge [cardine]. But fortitude body, as contraries which it withstands, and to the good of is about dangers of death which are of rare occurrence in reason, as the end, which it intends to safeguard. human life. Therefore fortitude should not be reckoned a Reply to Objection 3. Though dangers of death are of cardinal or principal virtue. rare occurrence, yet the occasions of those dangers occur On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxii), Ambrose in frequently, since on account of justice which he pursues, his commentary on Lk. 6:20, and Augustine (De Moribus and also on account of other good deeds, man encounters Eccl. xv), number fortitude among the four cardinal or mortal adversaries. principal virtues. Whether fortitude excels among all other virtues? IIa IIae q. 123 a. 11 Objection 1. It seems that fortitude excels among all Objection 5. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, other virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i): “Fortitude 19): “Those virtues must needs be greatest which are most is higher, so to speak, than the rest.” profitable to others.” Now liberality seems to be more use- Objection 2. Further, virtue is about that which is ful than fortitude. Therefore it is a greater virtue. difficult and good. But fortitude is about most difficult I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. vi), “In things. Therefore it is the greatest of the virtues. things that are great, but not in bulk, to be great is to be Objection 3. Further, the person of a man is more ex- good”: wherefore the better a virtue the greater it is. Now cellent than his possessions. But fortitude is about a man’s reason’s good is man’s good, according to Dionysius (Div. person, for it is this that a man exposes to the danger of Nom. iv) prudence, since it is a perfection of reason, has death for the good of virtue: whereas justice and the other the good essentially: while justice effects this good, since moral virtues are about other and external things. There- it belongs to justice to establish the order of reason in all fore fortitude is the chief of the moral virtues. human affairs: whereas the other virtues safeguard this Objection 4. On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i): good, inasmuch as they moderate the passions, lest they “Justice is the most resplendent of the virtues and gives its lead man away from reason’s good. As to the order of the name to a good man.” latter, fortitude holds the first place, because fear of dan- 1764 gers of death has the greatest power to make man recede good rather than the difficult. Hence the greatness of a from the good of reason: and after fortitude comes tem- virtue is measured according to its goodness rather than perance, since also pleasures of touch excel all others in its difficulty. hindering the good of reason. Now to be a thing essen- Reply to Objection 3. A man does not expose his tially ranks before effecting it, and the latter ranks before person to dangers of death except in order to safeguard safeguarding it by removing obstacles thereto. Wherefore justice: wherefore the praise awarded to fortitude depends among the cardinal virtues, prudence ranks first, justice somewhat on justice. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i) second, fortitude third, temperance fourth, and after these that “fortitude without justice is an occasion of injustice; the other virtues. since the stronger a man is the more ready is he to oppress Reply to Objection 1. Ambrose places fortitude be- the weaker.” fore the other virtues, in respect of a certain general utility, The Fourth argument is granted. inasmuch as it is useful both in warfare, and in matters re- Reply to Objection 5. Liberality is useful in confer- lating to civil or home life. Hence he begins by saying ring certain particular favors: whereas a certain general (De Offic. i): “Now we come to treat of fortitude, which utility attaches to fortitude, since it safeguards the whole being higher so to speak than the others, is applicable both order of justice. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) to warlike and to civil matters.” that “just and brave men are most beloved, because they Reply to Objection 2. Virtue essentially regards the are most useful in war and peace.” 1765 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 124 Of Martyrdom (In Five Articles) We must now consider martyrdom, under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue? (2) Of what virtue is it the act? (3) Concerning the perfection of this act; (4) The pain of martyrdom; (5) Its cause. Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue? IIa IIae q. 124 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that martyrdom is not an act tarily. Since, however, Scripture contains no proof of this, of virtue. For all acts of virtue are voluntary. But mar- it is better to say that these babes in being slain obtained tyrdom is sometimes not voluntary, as in the case of the by God’s grace the glory of martyrdom which others ac- Innocents who were slain for Christ’s sake, and of whom quire by their own will. For the shedding of one’s blood Hillary says (Super Matth. i) that “they attained the ripe for Christ’s sake takes the place of Baptism. Wherefore age of eternity through the glory of martyrdom.” There- just as in the case of baptized children the merit of Christ fore martyrdom is not an act of virtue. is conducive to the acquisition of glory through the bap- Objection 2. Further, nothing unlawful is an act of tismal grace, so in those who were slain for Christ’s sake virtue. Now it is unlawful to kill oneself, as stated above the merit of Christ’s martyrdom is conducive to the acqui- (q. 64, a. 5), and yet martyrdom is achieved by so do- sition of the martyr’s palm. Hence Augustine says in a ing: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) that “during sermon on the Epiphany (De Diversis lxvi), as though he persecution certain holy women, in order to escape from were addressing them: “A man that does not believe that those who threatened their chastity, threw themselves into children are benefited by the baptism of Christ will doubt a river, and so ended their lives, and their martyrdom is of your being crowned in suffering for Christ. You were honored in the Catholic Church with most solemn vener- not old enough to believe in Christ’s future sufferings, but ation.” Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue. you had a body wherein you could endure suffering of Objection 3. Further, it is praiseworthy to offer one- Christ Who was to suffer.” self to do an act of virtue. But it is not praiseworthy to Reply to Objection 2. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) court martyrdom, rather would it seem to be presumptu- that “possibly the Church was induced by certain credible ous and rash. Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue. witnesses of Divine authority thus to honor the memory On the contrary, The reward of beatitude is not due of those holy women∗.” save to acts of virtue. Now it is due to martyrdom, since Reply to Objection 3. The precepts of the Law are it is written (Mat. 5:10): “Blessed are they that suffer about acts of virtue. Now it has been stated ( Ia IIae, persecution for justice’ sake, for theirs is the kingdom of q. 108, a. 1, ad 4) that some of the precepts of the Divine heaven.” Therefore martyrdom is an act of virtue. Law are to be understood in reference to the preparation of I answer that, As stated above (q. 123, Aa. 1,3), it the mind, in the sense that man ought to be prepared to do belongs to virtue to safeguard man in the good of reason. such and such a thing, whenever expedient. In the same Now the good of reason consists in the truth as its proper way certain things belong to an act of virtue as regards the object, and in justice as its proper effect, as shown above preparation of the mind, so that in such and such a case a (q. 109, Aa. 1,2; q. 123, a. 12). And martyrdom consists man should act according to reason. And this observation essentially in standing firmly to truth and justice against would seem very much to the point in the case of martyr- the assaults of persecution. Hence it is evident that mar- dom, which consists in the right endurance of sufferings tyrdom is an act of virtue. unjustly inflicted. Nor ought a man to give another an oc- Reply to Objection 1. Some have said that in the case casion of acting unjustly: yet if anyone act unjustly, one of the Innocents the use of their free will was miraculously ought to endure it in moderation. accelerated, so that they suffered martyrdom even volun- ∗ Cf. q. 64, a. 1, ad 2 1766 Whether martyrdom is an act of fortitude? IIa IIae q. 124 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that martyrdom is not an act of to faith and justice notwithstanding the threatening dan- fortitude. For the Greek martyr signifies a witness. Now ger of death, the imminence of which is moreover due to witness is borne to the faith of Christ. according to Acts a kind of particular contest with his persecutors. Hence 1:8, “You shall be witnesses unto Me,” etc. and Maximus Cyprian says in a sermon (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii): “The says in a sermon: “The mother of martyrs is the Catholic crowd of onlookers wondered to see an unearthly battle, faith which those glorious warriors have sealed with their and Christ’s servants fighting erect, undaunted in speech, blood.” Therefore martyrdom is an act of faith rather than with souls unmoved, and strength divine.” Wherefore it of fortitude. is evident that martyrdom is an act of fortitude; for which Objection 2. Further, a praiseworthy act belongs reason the Church reads in the office of Martyrs: They chiefly to the virtue which inclines thereto, is manifested “became valiant in battle”∗. thereby, and without which the act avails nothing. Now Reply to Objection 1. Two things must be considered charity is the chief incentive to martyrdom: Thus Max- in the act of fortitude. one is the good wherein the brave imus says in a sermon: “The charity of Christ is victorious man is strengthened, and this is the end of fortitude; the in His martyrs.” Again the greatest proof of charity lies other is the firmness itself, whereby a man does not yield in the act of martyrdom, according to Jn. 15:13, “Greater to the contraries that hinder him from achieving that good, love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for and in this consists the essence of fortitude. Now just as his friends.” Moreover without charity martyrdom avails civic fortitude strengthens a man’s mind in human jus- nothing, according to 1 Cor. 13:3, “If I should deliver my tice, for the safeguarding of which he braves the danger body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me of death, so gratuitous fortitude strengthens man’s soul nothing.” Therefore martyrdom is an act of charity rather in the good of Divine justice, which is “through faith in than of fortitude. Christ Jesus,” according to Rom. 3:22. Thus martyrdom Objection 3. Further, Augustine says in a sermon on is related to faith as the end in which one is strengthened, St. Cyprian: “It is easy to honor a martyr by singing his but to fortitude as the eliciting habit. praises, but it is a great thing to imitate his faith and pa- Reply to Objection 2. Charity inclines one to the act tience.” Now that which calls chiefly for praise in a vir- of martyrdom, as its first and chief motive cause, being the tuous act, is the virtue of which it is the act. Therefore virtue commanding it, whereas fortitude inclines thereto martyrdom is an act of patience rather than of fortitude. as being its proper motive cause, being the virtue that elic- On the contrary, Cyprian says (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. its it. Hence martyrdom is an act of charity as command- ii): “Blessed martyrs, with what praise shall I extol you? ing, and of fortitude as eliciting. For this reason also it Most valiant warriors, how shall I find words to proclaim manifests both virtues. It is due to charity that it is meri- the strength of your courage?” Now a person is praised torious, like any other act of virtue: and for this reason it on account of the virtue whose act he performs. There- avails not without charity. fore martyrdom is an act of fortitude. Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 123, a. 6), I answer that, As stated above (q. 123, a. 1, seqq.), the chief act of fortitude is endurance: to this and not it belongs to fortitude to strengthen man in the good of to its secondary act, which is aggression, martyrdom be- virtue, especially against dangers, and chiefly against dan- longs. And since patience serves fortitude on the part of gers of death, and most of all against those that occur its chief act, viz. endurance, hence it is that martyrs are in battle. Now it is evident that in martyrdom man is also praised for their patience. firmly strengthened in the good of virtue, since he cleaves Whether martyrdom is an act of the greatest perfection? IIa IIae q. 124 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that martyrdom is not an act of lay down our lives for the brethren.” Therefore martyrdom the greatest perfection. For seemingly that which is a mat- does not pertain to perfection. ter of counsel and not of precept pertains to perfection, be- Objection 2. Further, it seems to point to greater per- cause, to wit, it is not necessary for salvation. But it would fection that a man give his soul to God, which is done by seem that martyrdom is necessary for salvation, since the obedience, than that he give God his body, which is done Apostle says (Rom. 10:10), “With the heart we believe by martyrdom: wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto that “obedience is preferable to all sacrifices.” Therefore salvation,” and it is written (1 Jn. 3:16), that “we ought to martyrdom is not an act of the greatest perfection. ∗ Heb. 11:34 1767 Objection 3. Further, it would seem better to do good life itself most, and on the other hand he hates death more to others than to maintain oneself in good, since the “good than anything, especially when it is accompanied by the of the nation is better than the good of the individual,” pains of bodily torment, “from fear of which even dumb according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). Now he that animals refrain from the greatest pleasures,” as Augustine suffers martyrdom profits himself alone, whereas he that observes (Qq. 83, qu. 36). And from this point of view it teaches does good to many. Therefore the act of teach- is clear that martyrdom is the most perfect of human acts ing and guiding subjects is more perfect than the act of in respect of its genus, as being the sign of the greatest martyrdom. charity, according to Jn. 15:13: “Greater love than this no On the contrary, Augustine (De Sanct. Virgin. xlvi) man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends.” prefers martyrdom to virginity which pertains to perfec- Reply to Objection 1. There is no act of perfection, tion. Therefore martyrdom seems to belong to perfection which is a matter of counsel, but what in certain cases is a in the highest degree. matter of precept, as being necessary for salvation. Thus I answer that, We may speak of an act of virtue in Augustine declares (De Adult. Conjug. xiii) that a man two ways. First, with regard to the species of that act, as is under the obligation of observing continency, through compared to the virtue proximately eliciting it. In this way the absence or sickness of his wife. Hence it is not con- martyrdom, which consists in the due endurance of death, trary to the perfection of martyrdom if in certain cases it cannot be the most perfect of virtuous acts, because en- be necessary for salvation, since there are cases when it durance of death is not praiseworthy in itself, but only in is not necessary for salvation to suffer martyrdom; thus so far as it is directed to some good consisting in an act of we read of many holy martyrs who through zeal for the virtue, such as faith or the love of God, so that this act of faith or brotherly love gave themselves up to martyrdom virtue being the end is better. of their own accord. As to these precepts, they are to be A virtuous act may be considered in another way, in understood as referring to the preparation of the mind. comparison with its first motive cause, which is the love of Reply to Objection 2. Martyrdom embraces the high- charity, and it is in this respect that an act comes to belong est possible degree of obedience, namely obedience unto to the perfection of life, since, as the Apostle says (Col. death; thus we read of Christ (Phil. 2:8) that He became 3:14), that “charity. . . is the bond of perfection.” Now, of “obedient unto death.” Hence it is evident that martyrdom all virtuous acts martyrdom is the greatest proof of the is of itself more perfect than obedience considered abso- perfection of charity: since a man’s love for a thing is lutely. proved to be so much the greater, according as that which Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers mar- he despises for its sake is more dear to him, or that which tyrdom according to the proper species of its act, whence he chooses to suffer for its sake is more odious. But it is it derives no excellence over all other virtuous acts; thus evident that of all the goods of the present life man loves neither is fortitude more excellent than all virtues. Whether death is essential to martyrdom? IIa IIae q. 124 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that death is not essential to the name of martyr should be accorded to a woman who martyrdom. For Jerome says in a sermon on the Assump- forfeits the integrity of the flesh for the sake of Christ’s tion (Epist. ad Paul. et Eustoch.): “I should say rightly faith, rather than if she were to forfeit even the life of the that the Mother of God was both virgin and martyr, al- body: wherefore also Lucy said: “If thou causest me to though she ended her days in peace”: and Gregory says be violated against my will, my chastity will gain me a (Hom. iii in Evang.): “Although persecution has ceased to twofold crown.” offer the opportunity, yet the peace we enjoy is not with- Objection 3. Further, martyrdom is an act of forti- out its martyrdom, since even if we no longer yield the life tude. But it belongs to fortitude to brave not only death of the body to the sword, yet do we slay fleshly desires in but also other hardships, as Augustine declares (Music. the soul with the sword of the spirit.” Therefore there can vi). Now there are many other hardships besides death, be martyrdom without suffering death. which one may suffer for Christ’s faith, namely imprison- Objection 2. Further, we read of certain women as ment, exile, being stripped of one’s goods, as mentioned commended for despising life for the sake of safeguard- in Heb. 10:34, for which reason we celebrate the mar- ing the integrity of the flesh: wherefore seemingly the in- tyrdom of Pope Saint Marcellus, notwithstanding that he tegrity of chastity is preferable to the life of the body. Now died in prison. Therefore it is not essential to martyrdom sometimes the integrity of the flesh has been forfeited or that one suffer the pain of death. has been threatened in confession of the Christian faith, Objection 4. Further, martyrdom is a meritorious act, as in the case of Agnes and Lucy. Therefore it seems that as stated above (a. 2, ad 1; a. 3). Now it cannot be a mer- 1768 itorious act after death. Therefore it is before death; and tegrity of the flesh, or is condemned to forfeit it under pre-consequently death is not essential to martyrdom. text of the Christian faith, it is not evident to men whether On the contrary, Maximus says in a sermon on the she suffers this for love of the Christian faith, or rather martyrs that “in dying for the faith he conquers who would through contempt of chastity. Wherefore in the sight of have been vanquished in living without faith.” men her testimony is not held to be sufficient, and conse- I answer that As stated above (a. 2), a martyr is so quently this is not martyrdom properly speaking. In the called as being a witness to the Christian faith, which sight of God, however, Who searcheth the heart, this may teaches us to despise things visible for the sake of things be deemed worthy of a reward, as Lucy said. invisible, as stated in Heb. 11. Accordingly it belongs to Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 123, martyrdom that a man bear witness to the faith in showing Aa. 4,5), fortitude regards danger of death chiefly, and by deed that he despises all things present, in order to ob- other dangers consequently; wherefore a person is not tain invisible goods to come. Now so long as a man retains called a martyr merely for suffering imprisonment, or ex- the life of the body he does not show by deed that he de- ile, or forfeiture of his wealth, except in so far as these spises all things relating to the body. For men are wont to result in death. despise both their kindred and all they possess, and even Reply to Objection 4. The merit of martyrdom is to suffer bodily pain, rather than lose life. Hence Satan not after death, but in the voluntary endurance of death, testified against Job (Job 2:4): “Skin for skin, and all that namely in the fact that a person willingly suffers being put a man hath he will give for his soul” [Douay: ‘life’] i.e. to death. It happens sometimes, however, that a man lives for the life of his body. Therefore the perfect notion of for some time after being mortally wounded for Christ’s martyrdom requires that a man suffer death for Christ’s sake, or after suffering for the faith of Christ any other sake. kind of hardship inflicted by persecution and continued Reply to Objection 1. The authorities quoted, and the until death ensues. The act of martyrdom is meritorious like that one may meet with, speak of martyrdom by way while a man is in this state, and at the very time that he is of similitude. suffering these hardships. Reply to Objection 2. When a woman forfeits the in- Whether faith alone is the cause of martyrdom? IIa IIae q. 124 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that faith alone is the cause of Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom. martyrdom. For it is written (1 Pet. 4:15,16): “Let none of On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:10): “Blessed you suffer as a murderer, or a thief, or a railer, or a coveter are they that suffer persecution for justice’ sake,” which of other men’s things. But if as a Christian, let him not pertains to martyrdom, according to a gloss, as well as be ashamed, but let him glorify God in this name.” Now Jerome’s commentary on this passage. Now not only faith a man is said to be a Christian because he holds the faith but also the other virtues pertain to justice. Therefore of Christ. Therefore only faith in Christ gives the glory of other virtues can be the cause of martyrdom. martyrdom to those who suffer. I answer that, As stated above (a. 4), martyrs are so Objection 2. Further, a martyr is a kind of witness. called as being witnesses, because by suffering in body But witness is borne to the truth alone. Now one is not unto death they bear witness to the truth; not indeed to any called a martyr for bearing witness to any truth, but only truth, but to the truth which is in accordance with godli- for witnessing to the Divine truth, otherwise a man would ness, and was made known to us by Christ: wherefore be a martyr if he were to die for confessing a truth of ge- Christ’s martyrs are His witnesses. Now this truth is the ometry or some other speculative science, which seems truth of faith. Wherefore the cause of all martyrdom is the ridiculous. Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyr- truth of faith. dom. But the truth of faith includes not only inward belief, Objection 3. Further, those virtuous deeds would but also outward profession, which is expressed not only seem to be of most account which are directed to the com- by words, whereby one confesses the faith, but also by mon good, since “the good of the nation is better than deeds, whereby a person shows that he has faith, accord- the good of the individual,” according to the Philosopher ing to James 2:18, “I will show thee, by works, my faith.” (Ethic. i, 2). If, then, some other good were the cause of Hence it is written of certain people (Titus 1:16): “They martyrdom, it would seem that before all those would be profess that they know God but in their works they deny martyrs who die for the defense of their country. Yet this Him.” Thus all virtuous deeds, inasmuch as they are re- is not consistent with Church observance, for we do not ferred to God, are professions of the faith whereby we celebrate the martyrdom of those who die in a just war. come to know that God requires these works of us, and 1769 rewards us for them: and in this way they can be the head of witnessing to the faith. cause of martyrdom. For this reason the Church celebrates Reply to Objection 2. The truth of other sciences has the martyrdom of Blessed John the Baptist, who suffered no connection with the worship of the Godhead: hence death, not for refusing to deny the faith, but for reproving it is not called truth according to godliness, and conse- adultery. quently the confession thereof cannot be said to be the Reply to Objection 1. A Christian is one who is direct cause of martyrdom. Yet, since every lie is a sin, Christ’s. Now a person is said to be Christ’s, not only as stated above (q. 110, Aa. 3,4), avoidance of a lie, to through having faith in Christ, but also because he is ac- whatever truth it may be contrary, may be the cause of tuated to virtuous deeds by the Spirit of Christ, according martyrdom inasmuch as a lie is a sin against the Divine to Rom. 8:9, “If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he Law. is none of His”; and again because in imitation of Christ Reply to Objection 3. The good of one’s country is he is dead to sins, according to Gal. 5:24, “They that are paramount among human goods: yet the Divine good, Christ’s have crucified their flesh with the vices and con- which is the proper cause of martyrdom, is of more ac- cupiscences.” Hence to suffer as a Christian is not only to count than human good. Nevertheless, since human good suffer in confession of the faith, which is done by words, may become Divine, for instance when it is referred to but also to suffer for doing any good work, or for avoiding God, it follows that any human good in so far as it is re- any sin, for Christ’s sake, because this all comes under the ferred to God, may be the cause of martyrdom. 1770 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 125 Of Fear∗ (In Four Articles) We must now consider the vices opposed to fortitude: (1) Fear; (2) Fearlessness; (3) Daring. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether fear is a sin? (2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude? (3) Whether it is a mortal sin? (4) Whether it excuses from sin, or diminishes it? Whether fear is a sin? IIa IIae q. 125 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that fear is not a sin. For fear is to be shunned more than others; and among things to be a passion, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 23, a. 4; q. 42). Now sought after, that some are to be sought after more than we are neither praised nor blamed for passions, as stated others. Moreover, the more a good is to be sought after, in Ethic. ii. Since then every sin is blameworthy, it seems the more is the opposite evil to be shunned. The result that fear is not a sin. is that reason dictates that certain goods are to be sought Objection 2. Further, nothing that is commanded in after more than certain evils are to be avoided. Accord- the Divine Law is a sin: since the “law of the Lord is ingly when the appetite shuns what the reason dictates that unspotted” (Ps. 18:8). Yet fear is commanded in God’s we should endure rather than forfeit others that we should law, for it is written (Eph. 6:5): “Servants, be obedient to rather seek for, fear is inordinate and sinful. On the other them that are your lords according to the flesh, with fear hand, when the appetite fears so as to shun what reason and trembling.” Therefore fear is not a sin. requires to be shunned, the appetite is neither inordinate Objection 3. Further, nothing that is naturally in man nor sinful. is a sin, for sin is contrary to nature according to Dam- Reply to Objection 1. Fear in its generic acceptation ascene (De Fide Orth. iii). Now fear is natural to man: denotes avoidance in general. Hence in this way it does wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that “a man not include the notion of good or evil: and the same ap- would be insane or insensible to pain, if nothing, not even plies to every other passion. Wherefore the Philosopher earthquakes nor deluges, inspired him with fear.” There- says that passions call for neither praise nor blame, be- fore fear is not a sin. . cause, to wit, we neither praise nor blame those who are On the contrary, our Lord said (Mat. 10:28): “Fear angry or afraid, but only those who behave thus in an or- ye not them that kill the body,” and it is written (Ezech. dinate or inordinate manner. 2:6): “Fear not, neither be thou afraid of their words.” Reply to Objection 2. The fear which the Apostle I answer that, A human act is said to be a sin on ac- inculcates is in accordance with reason, namely that ser- count of its being inordinate, because the good of a hu- vants should fear lest they be lacking in the service they man act consists in order, as stated above (q. 109, a. 2; owe their masters. q. 114, a. 1). Now this due order requires that the appetite Reply to Objection 3. Reason dictates that we should be subject to the ruling of reason. And reason dictates shun the evils that we cannot withstand, and the endurance that certain things should be shunned and some sought af- of which profits us nothing. Hence there is no sin in fear- ter. Among things to be shunned, it dictates that some are ing them. Whether the sin of fear is contrary to fortitude? IIa IIae q. 125 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that the sin of fear is not con- Lord,” says that “it is human fear whereby we dread to trary to fortitude: because fortitude is about dangers of suffer carnal dangers, or to lose worldly goods.” Again a death, as stated above (q. 123, Aa. 4,5). But the sin of gloss on Mat. 27:44, “He prayed the third time, saying fear is not always connected with dangers of death, for the selfsame word,” says that “evil fear is threefold, fear a gloss on Ps. 127:1, “Blessed are all they that fear the of death, fear of pain, and fear of contempt.” Therefore ∗ St. Thomas Calls This Vice Indifferently ‘Fear’ or ‘Timidity.’ the Translation Requires One to Adhere to These Terms On Account of the Connection with the Passion of Fear. Otherwise ‘Cowardice’ Would Be a Better Rendering. 1771 the sin of fear is not contrary to fortitude. this fear is opposed to fortitude which regards dangers of Objection 2. Further, the chief reason why a man is death. For this reason timidity is said to be antonomasti- commended for fortitude is that he exposes himself to the cally∗ opposed to fortitude. danger of death. Now sometimes a man exposes himself Reply to Objection 1. The passages quoted refer to to death through fear of slavery or shame. Thus Augustine inordinate fear in its generic acceptation, which can be relates (De Civ. Dei i) that Cato, in order not to be Cae- opposed to various virtues. sar’s slave, gave himself up to death. Therefore the sin of Reply to Objection 2. Human acts are estimated fear bears a certain likeness to fortitude instead of being chiefly with reference to the end, as stated above ( Ia IIae, opposed thereto. q. 1, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 6): and it belongs to a brave Objection 3. Further, all despair arises from fear. But man to expose himself to danger of death for the sake of a despair is opposed not to fortitude but to hope, as stated good. But a man who exposes himself to danger of death above (q. 20, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 40, a. 4). Neither therefore is in order to escape from slavery or hardships is overcome the sin of fear opposed to fortitude. by fear, which is contrary to fortitude. Hence the Philoso- On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 7) pher says (Ethic. iii, 7), that “to die in order to escape states that timidity is opposed to fortitude. poverty, lust, or something disagreeable is an act not of I answer that, As stated above (q. 19, a. 3; Ia IIae, fortitude but of cowardice: for to shun hardships is a mark q. 43, a. 1), all fear arises from love; since no one fears of effeminacy.” save what is contrary to something he loves. Now love Reply to Objection 3. As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 45, is not confined to any particular kind of virtue or vice: a. 2), fear is the beginning of despair even as hope is the but ordinate love is included in every virtue, since every beginning of daring. Wherefore, just as fortitude which virtuous man loves the good proper to his virtue; while in- employs daring in moderation presupposes hope, so on ordinate love is included in every sin, because inordinate the other hand despair proceeds from some kind of fear. love gives use to inordinate desire. Hence in like manner It does not follow, however, that any kind of despair re- inordinate fear is included in every sin; thus the covetous sults from any kind of fear, but that only from fear of the man fears the loss of money, the intemperate man the loss same kind. Now the despair that is opposed to hope is re- of pleasure, and so on. But the greatest fear of all is that ferred to another kind, namely to Divine things; whereas which has the danger of death for its object, as we find the fear that is opposed to fortitude regards dangers of proved in Ethic. iii, 6. Wherefore the inordinateness of death. Hence the argument does not prove. Whether fear is a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 125 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that fear is not a mortal sin. For, On the contrary, For mortal sin alone is the pain as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 23, a. 1), fear is in the irasci- of hell due: and yet this is due to the fearful, accord- ble faculty which is a part of the sensuality. Now there is ing to Apoc. 21:8, “But the fearful and unbelieving and none but venial sin in the sensuality, as stated above ( Ia the abominable,” etc., “shall have their portion in the IIae, q. 74, a. 4). Therefore fear is not a mortal sin. pool burning with fire and brimstone which is the second Objection 2. Further, every mortal sin turns the heart death.” Therefore fear is a mortal sin. wholly from God. But fear does not this, for a gloss on I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), fear is a sin Judges 7:3, “Whosoever is fearful,” etc., says that “a man through being inordinate, that is to say, through shunning is fearful when he trembles at the very thought of conflict; what ought not to be shunned according to reason. Now yet he is not so wholly terrified at heart, but that he can sometimes this inordinateness of fear is confined to the rally and take courage.” Therefore fear is not a mortal sin. sensitive appetites, without the accession of the rational Objection 3. Further, mortal sin is a lapse not only appetite’s consent: and then it cannot be a mortal, but from perfection but also from a precept. But fear does not only a venial sin. But sometimes this inordinateness of make one lapse from a precept, but only from perfection; fear reaches to the rational appetite which is called the for a gloss on Dt. 20:8, “What man is there that is fearful will, which deliberately shuns something against the dic- and fainthearted?” says: “We learn from this that no man tate of reason: and this inordinateness of fear is sometimes can take up the profession of contemplation or spiritual a mortal, sometimes a venial sin. For if a man through fear warfare, if he still fears to be despoiled of earthly riches.” of the danger of death or of any other temporal evil is so Therefore fear is not a mortal sin. disposed as to do what is forbidden, or to omit what is ∗ Antonomasia is the figure of speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term; e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle: and so timidity, which is inordinate fear of any evil, is employed to denote inordinate fear of the danger of death. 1772 commanded by the Divine law, such fear is a mortal sin: fied that one cannot be persuaded to put fear aside: thus otherwise it is a venial sin. sometimes a man sins mortally by consenting to concu- Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers fear piscence, and is turned aside from accomplishing what he as confined to the sensuality. purposed doing. Reply to Objection 2. This gloss also can be under- Reply to Objection 3. This gloss speaks of the fear stood as referring to the fear that is confined within the that turns man aside from a good that is necessary, not sensuality. Or better still we may reply that a man is terri- for the fulfilment of a precept, but for the perfection of a fied with his whole heart when fear banishes his courage counsel. Such like fear is not a mortal sin, but is some- beyond remedy. Now even when fear is a mortal sin, it times venial: and sometimes it is not a sin, for instance may happen nevertheless that one is not so wilfully terri- when one has a reasonable cause for fear. Whether fear excuses from sin? IIa IIae q. 125 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that fear does not excuse from through fear a man were to avoid evils which according to sin. For fear is a sin, as stated above (a. 1). But sin does reason are less to be avoided, and so incur evils which ac- not excuse from sin, rather does it aggravate it. Therefore cording to reason are more to be avoided, he could not be fear does not excuse from sin. wholly excused from sin, because such like fear would be Objection 2. Further, if any fear excuses from sin, inordinate. Now the evils of the soul are more to be feared most of all would this be true of the fear of death, to than the evils of the body. and evils of the body more than which, as the saying is, a courageous man is subject. Yet evils of external things. Wherefore if one were to incur this fear, seemingly, is no excuse, because, since death evils of the soul, namely sins, in order to avoid evils of the comes, of necessity, to all, it does not seem to be an ob- body, such as blows or death, or evils of external things, ject of fear. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin. such as loss of money; or if one were to endure evils of Objection 3. Further, all fear is of evil, either tempo- the body in order to avoid loss of money, one would not ral or spiritual. Now fear of spiritual evil cannot excuse be wholly excused from sin. Yet one’s sin would be ex- sin, because instead of inducing one to sin, it withdraws tenuated somewhat, for what is done through fear is less one from sin: and fear of temporal evil does not excuse voluntary, because when fear lays hold of a man he is un- from sin, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, der a certain necessity of doing a certain thing. Hence the 6), “one should not fear poverty, nor sickness, nor any- Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) says that these things that are thing that is not a result of one’s own wickedness.” There- done through fear are not simply voluntary, but a mixture fore it seems that in no sense does fear excuse from sin. of voluntary and involuntary. On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (I, q. 1, Reply to Objection 1. Fear excuses, not in the point Cap. Constat.): “A man who has been forcibly and un- of its sinfulness, but in the point of its involuntariness. willingly ordained by heretics, has an ostensible excuse.” Reply to Objection 2. Although death comes, of ne- I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), fear is sinful cessity, to all, yet the shortening of temporal life is an evil in so far as it runs counter to the order of reason. Now and consequently an object of fear. reason judges certain evils to be shunned rather than oth- Reply to Objection 3. According to the opinion of ers. Wherefore it is no sin not to shun what is less to be Stoics, who held temporal goods not to be man’s goods, it shunned in order to avoid what reason judges to be more follows in consequence that temporal evils are not man’s avoided: thus death of the body is more to be avoided than evils, and that therefore they are nowise to be feared. But the loss of temporal goods. Hence a man would be ex- according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii) these temporal cused from sin if through fear of death he were to promise things are goods of the least account, and this was also the or give something to a robber, and yet he would be guilty opinion of the Peripatetics. Hence their contraries are in- of sin were he to give to sinners, rather than to the good to deed to be feared; but not so much that one ought for their whom he should give in preference. On the other hand, if sake to renounce that which is good according to virtue. 1773 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 126 Of Fearlessness (In Two Articles) We must now consider the vice of fearlessness: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a sin to be fearless? (2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude? Whether fearlessness is a sin? IIa IIae q. 126 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that fearlessness is not a sin. desire to free from present stress. Hence it may happen For that which is reckoned to the praise of a just man is that a man fears death and other temporal evils less than not a sin. Now it is written in praise of the just man (Prov. he ought, for the reason that he loves them∗ less than he 28:1): “The just, bold as a lion, shall be without dread.” ought. But that he fear none of these things cannot result Therefore it is not a sin to be without fear. from an entire lack of love, but only from the fact that he Objection 2. Further, nothing is so fearful as death, thinks it impossible for him to be afflicted by the evils con- according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6). Yet one ought trary to the goods he loves. This is sometimes the result of not to fear even death, according to Mat. 10:28, “Fear ye pride of soul presuming on self and despising others, ac- not them that kill the body,” etc., nor anything that can be cording to the saying of Job 41:24,25: “He [Vulg.: ‘who’] inflicted by man, according to Is. 51:12, “Who art thou, was made to fear no one, he beholdeth every high thing”: that thou shouldst be afraid of a mortal man?” Therefore and sometimes it happens through a defect in the reason; it is not a sin to be fearless. thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that the “Celts, Objection 3. Further, fear is born of love, as stated through lack of intelligence, fear nothing.”† It is therefore above (q. 125, a. 2). Now it belongs to the perfection of evident that fearlessness is a vice, whether it result from virtue to love nothing earthly, since according to Augus- lack of love, pride of soul, or dullness of understanding: tine (De Civ. Dei xiv), “the love of God to the abasement yet the latter is excused from sin if it be invincible. of self makes us citizens of the heavenly city.” Therefore Reply to Objection 1. The just man is praised for be- it is seemingly not a sin to fear nothing earthly. ing without fear that withdraws him from good; not that On the contrary, It is said of the unjust judge (Lk. he is altogether fearless, for it is written (Ecclus. 1:28): 18:2) that “he feared not God nor regarded man.” “He that is without fear cannot be justified.” I answer that, Since fear is born of love, we must Reply to Objection 2. Death and whatever else can be seemingly judge alike of love and fear. Now it is here a inflicted by mortal man are not to be feared so that they question of that fear whereby one dreads temporal evils, make us forsake justice: but they are to be feared as hin- and which results from the love of temporal goods. And dering man in acts of virtue, either as regards himself, or every man has it instilled in him by nature to love his as regards the progress he may cause in others. Hence it is own life and whatever is directed thereto; and to do so written (Prov. 14:16): “A wise man feareth and declineth in due measure, that is, to love these things not as plac- from evil.” ing his end therein, but as things to be used for the sake Reply to Objection 3. Temporal goods are to be de- of his last end. Hence it is contrary to the natural incli- spised as hindering us from loving and serving God, and nation, and therefore a sin, to fall short of loving them on the same score they are not to be feared; wherefore it in due measure. Nevertheless, one never lapses entirely is written (Ecclus. 34:16): “He that feareth the Lord shall from this love: since what is natural cannot be wholly lost: tremble at nothing.” But temporal goods are not to be de- for which reason the Apostle says (Eph. 5:29): “No man spised, in so far as they are helping us instrumentally to ever hated his own flesh.” Wherefore even those that slay attain those things that pertain to Divine fear and love. themselves do so from love of their own flesh, which they ∗ Viz. the contrary goods. One would expect ‘se’ instead of ‘ea.’ We should then read: For the reason that he loves himself less than he ought. † “A man would deserve to be called insane and senseless if there were nothing that he feared, not even an earthquake nor a storm at sea, as is said to be the case with the Celts.” 1774 Whether fearlessness is opposed to fortitude? IIa IIae q. 126 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that fearlessness is not opposed about which it is concerned. Hence it belongs to forti- to fortitude. For we judge of habits by their acts. Now tude that man should moderate his fear according to rea- no act of fortitude is hindered by a man being fearless: son, namely that he should fear what he ought, and when since if fear be removed, one is both brave to endure, and he ought, and so forth. Now this mode of reason may be daring to attack. Therefore fearlessness is not opposed to corrupted either by excess or by deficiency. Wherefore fortitude. just as timidity is opposed to fortitude by excess of fear, Objection 2. Further, fearlessness is a vice, either in so far as a man fears what he ought not, and as he ought through lack of due love, or on account of pride, or by not, so too fearlessness is opposed thereto by deficiency reason of folly. Now lack of due love is opposed to char- of fear, in so far as a man fears not what he ought to fear. ity, pride is contrary to humility, and folly to prudence or Reply to Objection 1. The act of fortitude is to en- wisdom. Therefore the vice of fearlessness is not opposed dure death without fear, and to be aggressive, not anyhow, to fortitude. but according to reason: this the fearless man does not do. Objection 3. Further, vices are opposed to virtue and Reply to Objection 2. Fearlessness by its specific na- extremes to the mean. But one mean has only one extreme ture corrupts the mean of fortitude, wherefore it is op- on the one side. Since then fortitude has fear opposed to posed to fortitude directly. But in respect of its causes it on the one side and daring on the other, it seems that nothing hinders it from being opposed to other virtues. fearlessness is not opposed thereto. Reply to Objection 3. The vice of daring is opposed On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iii) reckons to fortitude by excess of daring, and fearlessness by defi- fearlessness to be opposed to fortitude. ciency of fear. Fortitude imposes the mean on each pas- I answer that, As stated above (q. 123, a. 3), for- sion. Hence there is nothing unreasonable in its having titude is concerned about fear and daring. Now every different extremes in different respects. moral virtue observes the rational mean in the matter 1775 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 127 Of Daring∗ (In Two Articles) We must now consider daring; and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether daring is a sin? (2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude? Whether daring is a sin? IIa IIae q. 127 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that daring is not a sin. For account the passion is sinful. Again, the names of the pas- it is written (Job 39:21) concerning the horse, by which sions are sometimes employed in the sense of excess, thus according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi) the godly preacher is we speak of anger meaning not any but excessive anger, denoted, that “he goeth forth boldly to meet armed men†.” in which case it is sinful, and in the same way daring as But no vice redounds to a man’s praise. Therefore it is not implying excess is accounted a sin. a sin to be daring. Reply to Objection 1. The daring spoken of there is Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher that which is moderated by reason, for in that sense it be- (Ethic. vi, 9), “one should take counsel in thought, and longs to the virtue of fortitude. do quickly what has been counseled.” But daring helps Reply to Objection 2. It is praiseworthy to act quickly this quickness in doing. Therefore daring is not sinful but after taking counsel, which is an act of reason. But to praiseworthy. wish to act quickly before taking counsel is not praise- Objection 3. Further, daring is a passion caused by worthy but sinful; for this would be to act rashly, which is hope, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 45, a. 2) when we were a vice contrary to prudence, as stated above (q. 58, a. 3). treating of the passions. But hope is accounted not a sin Wherefore daring which leads one to act quickly is so far but a virtue. Neither therefore should daring be accounted praiseworthy as it is directed by reason. a sin. Reply to Objection 3. Some vices are unnamed, On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 8:18): “Go not and so also are some virtues, as the Philosopher remarks on the way with a bold man, lest he burden thee with his (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 4,5,6). Hence the names of certain pas- evils.” Now no man’s fellowship is to be avoided save on sions have to be applied to certain vices and virtues: and in account of sin. Therefore daring is a sin. order to designate vices we employ especially the names I answer that, Daring, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 23, of those passions the object of which is an evil, as in the a. 1; q. 55), is a passion. Now a passion is sometimes case of hatred, fear, anger and daring. But hope and love moderated according to reason, and sometimes it lacks have a good for this object, and so we use them rather to moderation, either by excess or by deficiency, and on this designate virtues. Whether daring is opposed to fortitude? IIa IIae q. 127 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that daring is not opposed to Objection 3. Further, fortitude is concerned about fortitude. For excess of daring seems to result from pre- fear and daring, as stated above (q. 123, a. 3). Now since sumption of mind. But presumption pertains to pride timidity is opposed to fortitude in respect of an excess of which is opposed to humility. Therefore daring is opposed fear, there is another vice opposed to timidity in respect of to humility rather than to fortitude. a lack of fear. If then, daring is opposed to fortitude, in the Objection 2. Further, daring does not seem to call for point of excessive daring, there will likewise be a vice op- blame, except in so far as it results in harm either to the posed to it in the point of deficient daring. But there is no daring person who puts himself in danger inordinately, or such vice. Therefore neither should daring be accounted to others whom he attacks with daring, or exposes to dan- a vice in opposition to fortitude. ger. But this seemingly pertains to injustice. Therefore On the contrary, The Philosopher in both the Second daring, as designating a sin, is opposed, not to fortitude and Third Books of Ethics accounts daring to be opposed but to justice. to fortitude. ∗ Excessive Daring or Foolhardiness † Vulg.: ‘he pranceth boldly, he goeth forth to meet armed men’ 1776 I answer that, As stated above (q. 126, a. 2), it be-Reply to Objection 2. Just as the direct opposition longs to a moral virtue to observe the rational mean in the of a vice does not depend on its cause, so neither does it matter about which it is concerned. Wherefore every vice depend on its effect. Now the harm done by daring is its that denotes lack of moderation in the matter of a moral effect. Wherefore neither does the opposition of daring virtue is opposed to that virtue, as immoderate to mod- depend on this. erate. Now daring, in so far as it denotes a vice, implies Reply to Objection 3. The movement of daring con- excess of passion, and this excess goes by the name of dar- sists in a man taking the offensive against that which is ing. Wherefore it is evident that it is opposed to the virtue in opposition to him: and nature inclines him to do this of fortitude which is concerned about fear and daring, as except in so far as such inclination is hindered by the fear stated above (q. 122, a. 3). of receiving harm from that source. Hence the vice which Reply to Objection 1. Opposition between vice and exceeds in daring has no contrary deficiency, save only virtue does not depend chiefly on the cause of the vice but timidity. Yet daring does not always accompany so great on the vice’s very species. Wherefore it is not necessary a lack of timidity, for as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, that daring be opposed to the same virtue as presumption 7), “the daring are precipitate and eager to meet danger, which is its cause. yet fail when the danger is present,” namely through fear. 1777 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 128 Of the Parts of Fortitude (In One Article) We must now consider the parts of fortitude; first we shall consider what are the parts of fortitude; and secondly we shall treat of each part. Whether the parts of fortitude are suitably assigned? IIa IIae q. 128 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that the parts of fortitude are to overcome; the fifth is the fortitude which makes a man unsuitably assigned. For Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) act bravely through being unaccustomed to danger. Now assigns four parts to fortitude, namely “magnificence,” these kinds of fortitude are not comprised under any of the “confidence,” “patience,” and “perseverance.” Now mag- above enumerations. Therefore these enumerations of the nificence seems to pertain to liberality; since both are con- parts of fortitude are unfitting. cerned about money, and “a magnificent man must needs I answer that, As stated above (q. 48), a virtue can be liberal,” as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 2). But have three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and poten- liberality is a part of justice, as stated above (q. 117, a. 5). tial. But fortitude, taken as a special virtue, cannot have Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of subjective parts, since it is not divided into several specif- fortitude. ically distinct virtues, for it is about a very special matter. Objection 2. Further, confidence is apparently the However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts same as hope. But hope does not seem to pertain to forti- assigned to it: integral parts, with regard to those things tude, but is rather a virtue by itself. Therefore confidence the concurrence of which is requisite for an act of forti- should not be reckoned a part of fortitude. tude; and potential parts, because what fortitude practices Objection 3. Further, fortitude makes a man behave in face of the greatest hardships, namely dangers of death, aright in face of danger. But magnificence and confidence certain other virtues practice in the matter of certain mi- do not essentially imply any relation to danger. Therefore nor hardships and these virtues are annexed to fortitude they are not suitably reckoned as parts of fortitude. as secondary virtues to the principal virtue. As stated Objection 4. Further, according to Tully (De Invent. above (q. 123, Aa. 3,6), the act of fortitude is twofold, Rhet. ii) patience denotes endurance of hardships, and he aggression and endurance. Now two things are required ascribes the same to fortitude. Therefore patience is the for the act of aggression. The first regards preparation of same as fortitude and not a part thereof. the mind, and consists in one’s having a mind ready for Objection 5. Further, that which is a requisite to ev- aggression. In this respect Tully mentions “confidence,” ery virtue should not be reckoned a part of a special virtue. of which he says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that “with this But perseverance is required in every virtue: for it is writ- the mind is much assured and firmly hopeful in great and ten (Mat. 24:13): “He that shall persevere to the end he honorable undertakings.” The second regards the accom- shall be saved.” Therefore perseverance should not be ac- plishment of the deed, and consists in not failing to ac- counted a part of fortitude. complish what one has confidently begun. In this respect Objection 6. Further, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) Tully mentions “magnificence,” which he describes as be- reckons seven parts of fortitude, namely “magnanimity, ing “the discussion and administration,” i.e. accomplish- confidence, security, magnificence, constancy, forbear- ment “of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad ance, stability.” Andronicus also reckons seven virtues and noble purpose of mind,” so as to combine execution annexed to fortitude, and these are, “courage, strength with greatness of purpose. Accordingly if these two be of will, magnanimity, manliness, perseverance, magnifi- confined to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to dan- cence.” Therefore it seems that Tully’s reckoning of the gers of death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, be- parts of fortitude is incomplete. cause without them there can be no fortitude; whereas if Objection 7. Further, Aristotle (Ethic. iii) reckons they be referred to other matters involving less hardship, five parts of fortitude. The first is “civic” fortitude, which they will be virtues specifically distinct from fortitude, but produces brave deeds through fear of dishonor or punish- annexed thereto as secondary virtues to principal: thus ment; the second is “military” fortitude, which produces “magnificence” is referred by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv) brave deeds as a result of warlike art or experience; the to great expenses, and “magnanimity,” which seems to be third is the fortitude which produces brave deeds resulting the same as confidence, to great honors. Again, two things from passion, especially anger; the fourth is the fortitude are requisite for the other act of fortitude, viz. endurance. which makes a man act bravely through being accustomed The first is that the mind be not broken by sorrow, and fall 1778 away from its greatness, by reason of the stress of threat-appetite stretching forth to great things by desire, and this ening evil. In this respect he mentions “patience,” which belongs to magnanimity. For it has been stated above ( Ia he describes as “the voluntary and prolonged endurance IIae, q. 40, a. 2) that hope presupposes love and desire of of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or the thing hoped for. profit.” The other is that by the prolonged suffering of A still better reply is that confidence pertains to the hardships man be not wearied so as to lose courage, ac- certitude of hope; while magnanimity refers to the mag- cording to Heb. 12:3, “That you be not wearied, fainting nitude of the thing hoped for. Now hope has no firm- in your minds.” In this respect he mentions “persever- ness unless its contrary be removed, for sometimes one, ance,” which accordingly he describes as “the fixed and for one’s own part, would hope for something, but hope continued persistence in a well considered purpose.” If is avoided on account of the obstacle of fear, since fear these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, is somewhat contrary to hope, as stated above, ( Ia IIae, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if they be re- q. 40, a. 4, ad 1). Hence Macrobius adds security, which ferred to any kind of hardship they will be virtues distinct banishes fear. He adds a third, namely constancy, which from fortitude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to prin- may be comprised under magnificence. For in performing cipal. deeds of magnificence one needs to have a constant mind. Reply to Objection 1. Magnificence in the matter of For this reason Tully says that magnificence consists not liberality adds a certain greatness: this is connected with only in accomplishing great things, but also in discussing the notion of difficulty which is the object of the irascible them generously in the mind. Constancy may also per- faculty, that is perfected chiefly by fortitude: and to this tain to perseverance, so that one may be called persevering virtue, in this respect, it belongs. through not desisting on account of delays, and constant Reply to Objection 2. Hope whereby one confides through not desisting on account of any other obstacles. in God is accounted a theological virtue, as stated above Those that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to (q. 17, a. 5; Ia IIae, q. 62, a. 3). But by confidence which amount to the same as the above. For with Tully and Mac- here is accounted a part of fortitude, man hopes in him- robius he mentions “perseverance” and “magnificence,” self, yet under God withal. and with Macrobius, “magnanimity.” “Strength of will” Reply to Objection 3. To venture on anything great is the same as patience or forbearance, for he says that seems to involve danger, since to fail in such things is very “strength of will is a habit that makes one ready to at- disastrous. Wherefore although magnificence and confi- tempt what ought to be attempted, and to endure what rea- dence are referred to the accomplishment of or venturing son says should be endured”—i.e. good courage seems to on any other great things, they have a certain connection be the same as assurance, for he defines it as “strength with fortitude by reason of the imminent danger. of soul in the accomplishment of its purpose.” Manli- Reply to Objection 4. Patience endures not only dan- ness is apparently the same as confidence, for he says gers of death, with which fortitude is concerned, without that “manliness is a habit of self-sufficiency in matters of excessive sorrow, but also any other hardships or dangers. virtue.” Besides magnificence he mentions andragathia, In this respect it is accounted a virtue annexed to forti- i.e. manly goodness which we may render “strenuous- tude: but as referred to dangers of death, it is an integral ness.” For magnificence consists not only in being con- part thereof. stant in the accomplishment of great deeds, which be- Reply to Objection 5. Perseverance as denoting per- longs to constancy, but also in bringing a certain manly sistence in a good deed unto the end, may be a circum- prudence and solicitude to that accomplishment, and this stance of every virtue, but it is reckoned a part of fortitude belongs to andragathia, strenuousness: wherefore he says in the sense stated in the body of the Article. that andragathia is the virtue of a man, whereby he thinks Reply to Objection 6. Macrobius reckons the four out profitable works. aforesaid mentioned by Tully, namely “confidence, mag- Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be nificence, forbearance,” which he puts in the place of pa- reduced to the four principal parts mentioned by Tully. tience, and “firmness,” which he substitutes for persever- Reply to Objection 7. The five mentioned by Aristo- ance. And he adds three, two of which, namely “magna- tle fall short of the true notion of virtue, for though they nimity” and “security,” are comprised by Tully under the concur in the act of fortitude, they differ as to motive, as head of confidence. But Macrobius is more specific in his stated above (q. 123, a. 1, ad 2); wherefore they are not enumeration. Because confidence denotes a man’s hope reckoned parts but modes of fortitude. for great things: and hope for anything presupposes an 1779 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 129 Of Magnanimity∗ (In Eight Articles) We must now consider each of the parts of fortitude, including, however, the other parts under those mentioned by Tully, with the exception of confidence, for which we shall substitute magnanimity, of which Aristotle treats. Accordingly we shall consider (1) Magnanimity; (2) Magnificence; (3) Patience; (4) Perseverance. As regards the first we shall treat (1) of magnanimity; (2) of its contrary vices. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether magnanimity is about honors? (2) Whether magnanimity is only about great honors? (3) Whether it is a virtue? (4) Whether it is a special virtue? (5) Whether it is a part of fortitude? (6) Of its relation to confidence; (7) Of its relation to assurance; (8) Of its relation to goods of fortune. Whether magnanimity is about honors? IIa IIae q. 129 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not about two ways: in one way proportionately, in another abso- honors. For magnanimity is in the irascible faculty, as lutely. An act may be called great proportionately, even its very name shows, since “magnanimity” signifies great- if it consist in the use of some small or ordinary thing, if, ness of mind, and “mind” denotes the irascible part, as ap- for instance, one make a very good use of it: but an act pears from De Anima iii, 42, where the Philosopher says is simply and absolutely great when it consists in the best that “in the sensitive appetite are desire and mind,” i.e. use of the greatest thing. the concupiscible and irascible parts. But honor is a con- The things which come into man’s use are external cupiscible good since it is the reward of virtue. Therefore things, and among these honor is the greatest simply, both it seems that magnanimity is not about honors. because it is the most akin to virtue, since it is an attesta- Objection 2. Further, since magnanimity is a moral tion to a person’s virtue, as stated above (q. 103, Aa. 1,2); virtue, it must needs be about either passions or opera- and because it is offered to God and to the best; and again tions. Now it is not about operations, for then it would because, in order to obtain honor even as to avoid shame, be a part of justice: whence it follows that it is about pas- men set aside all other things. Now a man is said to be sions. But honor is not a passion. Therefore magnanimity magnanimous in respect of things that are great absolutely is not about honors. and simply, just as a man is said to be brave in respect of Objection 3. Further, the nature of magnanimity things that are difficult simply. It follows therefore that seems to regard pursuit rather than avoidance, for a man is magnanimity is about honors. said to be magnanimous because he tends to great things. Reply to Objection 1. Good and evil absolutely con- But the virtuous are praised not for desiring honors, but sidered regard the concupiscible faculty, but in so far as for shunning them. Therefore magnanimity is not about the aspect of difficult is added, they belong to the irasci- honors. ble. Thus it is that magnanimity regards honor, inasmuch, On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) to wit, as honor has the aspect of something great or diffi- that “magnanimity is about honor and dishonor.” cult. I answer that, Magnanimity by its very name denotes Reply to Objection 2. Although honor is neither a stretching forth of the mind to great things. Now virtue passion nor an operation, yet it is the object of a passion, bears a relationship to two things, first to the matter about namely hope, which tends to a difficult good. Wherefore which is the field of its activity, secondly to its proper act, magnanimity is immediately about the passions of hope, which consists in the right use of such matter. And since and mediately about honor as the object of hope: even so, a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly from its act, a man we have stated (q. 123, Aa. 4,5) with regard to fortitude is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is minded that it is about dangers of death in so far as they are the to do some great act. Now an act may be called great in object of fear and daring. ∗ Not in the Ordinary Restricted Sense but As Explained by the Author 1780 Reply to Objection 3. Those are worthy of praise who ing of blame. Accordingly magnanimity is about honors despise riches in such a way as to do nothing unbecoming in the sense that a man strives to do what is deserving of in order to obtain them, nor have too great a desire for honor, yet not so as to think much of the honor accorded them. If, however, one were to despise honors so as not to by man. care to do what is worthy of honor, this would be deserv- Whether magnanimity is essentially about great honors? IIa IIae q. 129 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not essen- appetite, which is the seat of the passions, is naturally sub- tially about great honors. For the proper matter of mag- ject to reason. Hence the resisting virtues that are about nanimity is honor, as stated above (a. 1). But great and these passions regard only that which is great in such pas- little are accidental to honor. Therefore it is not essential sions: thus fortitude is about very great fear and daring; to magnanimity to be about great honors. temperance about the concupiscence of the greatest plea- Objection 2. Further, just as magnanimity is about sures, and likewise meekness about the greatest anger. On honor, so is meekness about anger. But it is not essential the other hand, some passions have great power of resis- to meekness to be about either great or little anger. There- tance to reason arising from the external things themselves fore neither is it essential to magnanimity to be about great that are the objects of those passions: such are the love or honor. desire of money or of honor. And for these it is necessary Objection 3. Further, small honor is less aloof from to have a virtue not only regarding that which is greatest great honor than is dishonor. But magnanimity is well or- in those passions, but also about that which is ordinary or dered in relation to dishonor, and consequently in relation little: because things external, though they be little, are to small honors also. Therefore it is not only about great very desirable, as being necessary for human life. Hence honors. with regard to the desire of money there are two virtues, On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) one about ordinary or little sums of money, namely lib- that magnanimity is about great honors. erality, and another about large sums of money, namely I answer that According to the Philosopher (Phys. vii, “magnificence.” 17, 18), virtue is a perfection, and by this we are to un- In like manner there are two virtues about honors, one derstand the perfection of a power, and that it regards the about ordinary honors. This virtue has no name, but is extreme limit of that power, as stated in De Coelo i, 116. denominated by its extremes, which are philotimia, i.e. Now the perfection of a power is not perceived in every love of honor, and aphilotimia, i.e. without love of honor: operation of that power, but in such operations as are great for sometimes a man is commended for loving honor, and or difficult: for every power, however imperfect, can ex- sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as both tend to ordinary and trifling operations. Hence it is essen- these things may be done in moderation. But with regard tial to a virtue to be about the difficult and the good, as to great honors there is “magnanimity.” Wherefore we stated in Ethic. ii, 3. must conclude that the proper matter of magnanimity is Now the difficult and the good (which amount to the great honor, and that a magnanimous man tends to such same) in an act of virtue may be considered from two things as are deserving of honor. points of view. First, from the point of view of reason, Reply to Objection 1. Great and little are accidental in so far as it is difficult to find and establish the ratio- to honor considered in itself: but they make a great dif- nal means in some particular matter: and this difficulty is ference in their relation to reason, the mode of which has found only in the act of intellectual virtues, and also of to be observed in the use of honor, for it is much more justice. The other difficulty is on the part of the matter, difficult to observe it in great than in little honors. which may involve a certain opposition to the moderation Reply to Objection 2. In anger and other matters only of reason, which moderation has to be applied thereto: that which is greatest presents any notable difficulty, and and this difficulty regards chiefly the other moral virtues, about this alone is there any need of a virtue. It is different which are about the passions, because the passions resist with riches and honors which are things existing outside reason as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv, 4). the soul. Now as regards the passions it is to be observed that Reply to Objection 3. He that makes good use of the greatness of this power of resistance to reason arises great things is much more able to make good use of little chiefly in some cases from the passions themselves, and things. Accordingly the magnanimous man looks upon in others from the things that are the objects of the pas- great honors as a thing of which he is worthy, or even sions. The passions themselves have no great power of little honors as something he deserves, because, to wit, resistance, unless they be violent, because the sensitive man cannot sufficiently honor virtue which deserves to be 1781 honored by God. Hence he is not uplifted by great honors, tle. In like manner he is not cast down by dishonor, but because he does not deem them above him; rather does he despises it, since he recognizes that he does not deserve despise them, and much more such as are ordinary or lit- it. Whether magnanimity is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 129 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not a Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher again says virtue. For every moral virtue observes the mean. But (Ethic. iv, 3), “the magnanimous in point of quantity goes magnanimity observes not the mean but the greater ex- to extremes,” in so far as he tends to what is greatest, treme: because the “magnanimous man deems himself “but in the matter of becomingness, he follows the mean,” worthy of the greatest things” (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore because he tends to the greatest things according to rea- magnanimity is not a virtue. son, for “he deems himself worthy in accordance with his Objection 2. Further, he that has one virtue has them worth” (Ethic. iv, 3), since his aims do not surpass his all, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 1). But one may have deserts. a virtue without having magnanimity: since the Philoso- Reply to Objection 2. The mutual connection of pher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that “whosoever is worthy of little the virtues does not apply to their acts, as though every things and deems himself worthy of them, is temperate, one were competent to practice the acts of all the virtues. but he is not magnanimous.” Therefore magnanimity is Wherefore the act of magnanimity is not becoming to ev- not a virtue. ery virtuous man, but only to great men. on the other hand, Objection 3. Further, “Virtue is a good quality of the as regards the principles of virtue, namely prudence and mind,” as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 55, a. 4). But mag- grace, all virtues are connected together, since their habits nanimity implies certain dispositions of the body: for the reside together in the soul, either in act or by way of a Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) of “a magnanimous man proximate disposition thereto. Thus it is possible for one that his gait is slow, his voice deep, and his utterance to whom the act of magnanimity is not competent, to have calm.” Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue. the habit of magnanimity, whereby he is disposed to prac- Objection 4. Further, no virtue is opposed to another tice that act if it were competent to him according to his virtue. But magnanimity is opposed to humility, since state. “the magnanimous deems himself worthy of great things, Reply to Objection 3. The movements of the body and despises others,” according to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore are differentiated according to the different apprehensions magnanimity is not a virtue. and emotions of the soul. And so it happens that to mag- Objection 5. Further, the properties of every virtue nanimity there accrue certain fixed accidents by way of are praiseworthy. But magnanimity has certain properties bodily movements. For quickness of movement results that call for blame. For, in the first place, the magnani- from a man being intent on many things which he is in mous is unmindful of favors; secondly, he is remiss and a hurry to accomplish, whereas the magnanimous is in- slow of action; thirdly, he employs irony∗ towards many; tent only on great things; these are few and require great fourthly, he is unable to associate with others; fifthly, be- attention, wherefore they call for slow movement. Like- cause he holds to the barren things rather than to those that wise shrill and rapid speaking is chiefly competent to are fruitful. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue. those who are quick to quarrel about anything, and this On the contrary, It is written in praise of certain men becomes not the magnanimous who are busy only about (2 Macc. 15:18): “Nicanor hearing of the valor of Judas’ great things. And just as these dispositions of bodily companions, and the greatness of courage [animi magni- movements are competent to the magnanimous man ac- tudinem] with which they fought for their country, was cording to the mode of his emotions, so too in those who afraid to try the matter by the sword.” Now, only deeds of are naturally disposed to magnanimity these conditions virtue are worthy of praise. Therefore magnanimity which are found naturally. consists in greatness of courage is a virtue. Reply to Objection 4. There is in man something I answer that, The essence of human virtue con- great which he possesses through the gift of God; and sists in safeguarding the good of reason in human affairs, something defective which accrues to him through the for this is man’s proper good. Now among external hu- weakness of nature. Accordingly magnanimity makes a man things honors take precedence of all others, as stated man deem himself worthy of great things in consideration above (a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 11, a. 2, obj. 3). Therefore magna- of the gifts he holds from God: thus if his soul is endowed nimity, which observes the mode of reason in great hon- with great virtue, magnanimity makes him tend to perfect ors, is a virtue. works of virtue; and the same is to be said of the use of ∗ Cf. q. 113 1782 any other good, such as science or external fortune. On the to excel, even as in the acts of other virtues. Again, in other hand, humility makes a man think little of himself the second place, it is said that he is remiss and slow of in consideration of his own deficiency, and magnanimity action, not that he is lacking in doing what becomes him, makes him despise others in so far as they fall away from but because he does not busy himself with all kinds of God’s gifts: since he does not think so much of others as to works, but only with great works, such as are becoming do anything wrong for their sake. Yet humility makes us to him. He is also said, in the third place, to employ irony, honor others and esteem them better than ourselves, in so not as opposed to truth, and so as either to say of him- far as we see some of God’s gifts in them. Hence it is writ- self vile things that are not true, or deny of himself great ten of the just man (Ps. 14:4): “In his sight a vile person things that are true, but because he does not disclose all his is contemned†,” which indicates the contempt of magna- greatness, especially to the large number of those who are nimity, “but he honoreth them that fear the Lord,” which beneath him, since, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, points to the reverential bearing of humility. It is therefore 3), “it belongs to a magnanimous man to be great towards evident that magnanimity and humility are not contrary to persons of dignity and affluence, and unassuming towards one another, although they seem to tend in contrary direc- the middle class.” In the fourth place, it is said that he tions, because they proceed according to different consid- cannot associate with others: this means that he is not at erations. home with others than his friends: because he altogether Reply to Objection 5. These properties in so far as shuns flattery and hypocrisy, which belong to littleness of they belong to a magnanimous man call not for blame, mind. But he associates with all, both great and little, ac- but for very great praise. For in the first place, when it is cording as he ought, as stated above (ad 1). It is also said, said that the magnanimous is not mindful of those from fifthly, that he prefers to have barren things, not indeed whom he has received favors, this points to the fact that any, but good, i.e. virtuous; for in all things he prefers the he takes no pleasure in accepting favors from others un- virtuous to the useful, as being greater: since the useful less he repay them with yet greater favor; this belongs to is sought in order to supply a defect which is inconsistent the perfection of gratitude, in the act of which he wishes with magnanimity. Whether magnanimity is a special virtue? IIa IIae q. 129 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not a spe- I answer that, As stated above (q. 123, a. 2), it be- cial virtue. For no special virtue is operative in every longs to a special virtue to establish the mode of reason in virtue. But the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 3) that “what- a determinate matter. Now magnanimity establishes the ever is great in each virtue belongs to the magnanimous.” mode of reason in a determinate matter, namely honors, Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue. as stated above (Aa. 1,2): and honor, considered in itself, Objection 2. Further, the acts of different virtues are is a special good, and accordingly magnanimity consid- not ascribed to any special virtue. But the acts of differ- ered in itself is a special virtue. ent virtues are ascribed to the magnanimous man. For it Since, however, honor is the reward of every virtue, as is stated in Ethic. iv, 3 that “it belongs to the magnani- stated above (q. 103, a. 1, ad 2), it follows that by reason mous not to avoid reproof” (which is an act of prudence), of its matter it regards all the virtues. “nor to act unjustly” (which is an act of justice), “that he Reply to Objection 1. Magnanimity is not about any is ready to do favors” (which is an act of charity), “that he kind of honor, but great honor. Now, as honor is due to gives his services readily” (which is an act of liberality), virtue, so great honor is due to a great deed of virtue. that “he is truthful” (which is an act of truthfulness), and Hence it is that the magnanimous is intent on doing great that “he is not given to complaining” (which is an act of deeds in every virtue, in so far, to wit, as he tends to what patience). Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue. is worthy of great honors. Objection 3. Further, every virtue is a special orna- Reply to Objection 2. Since the magnanimous tends ment of the soul, according to the saying of Is. 61:10, to great things, it follows that he tends chiefly to things “He hath clothed me with the garments of salvation,” and that involve a certain excellence, and shuns those that im- afterwards he adds, “and as a bride adorned with her jew- ply defect. Now it savors of excellence that a man is els.” But magnanimity is the ornament of all the virtues, beneficent, generous and grateful. Wherefore he shows as stated in Ethic. iv. Therefore magnanimity is a general himself ready to perform actions of this kind, but not as virtue. acts of the other virtues. on the other hand, it is a proof of On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) dis- defect, that a man thinks so much of certain external goods tinguishes it from the other virtues. or evils, that for their sake he abandons and gives up jus- † Douay: ‘The malignant is brought to nothing, but he glorifieth,’ etc. 1783 tice or any virtue whatever. Again, all concealment of the they are contrary to his excellence or greatness. truth indicates a defect, since it seems to be the outcome Reply to Objection 3. Every virtue derives from its of fear. Also that a man be given to complaining denotes a species a certain luster or adornment which is proper to defect, because by so doing the mind seems to give way to each virtue: but further adornment results from the very external evils. Wherefore these and like things the mag- greatness of a virtuous deed, through magnanimity which nanimous man avoids under a special aspect, inasmuch as makes all virtues greater as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Whether magnanimity is a part of fortitude? IIa IIae q. 129 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not a part because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal. of fortitude. For a thing is not a part of itself. But mag- Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. nanimity appears to be the same as fortitude. For Seneca v, 1,3), “to lack evil is looked upon as a good,” wherefore says (De Quat. Virtut.): “If magnanimity, which is also not to be overcome by a grievous evil, such as the danger called fortitude, be in thy soul, thou shalt live in great as- of death, is looked upon as though it were the obtaining surance”: and Tully says (De Offic. i): “If a man is brave of a great good, the former belonging to fortitude, and the we expect him to be magnanimous, truth-loving, and far latter to magnanimity: in this sense fortitude and magna- removed from deception.” Therefore magnanimity is not nimity may be considered as identical. Since, however, a part of fortitude. there is a difference as regards the difficulty on the part of Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) either of the aforesaid, it follows that properly speaking says that a magnanimous man is not philokindynos, that is, magnanimity, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), a lover of danger. But it belongs to a brave man to expose is a distinct virtue from fortitude. himself to danger. Therefore magnanimity has nothing in Reply to Objection 2. A man is said to love danger common with fortitude so as to be called a part thereof. when he exposes himself to all kinds of dangers, which Objection 3. Further, magnanimity regards the great seems to be the mark of one who thinks “many” the same in things to be hoped for, whereas fortitude regards the as “great.” This is contrary to the nature of a magnani- great in things to be feared or dared. But good is of more mous man, for no one seemingly exposes himself to dan- import than evil. Therefore magnanimity is a more impor- ger for the sake of a thing that he does not deem great. But tant virtue than fortitude. Therefore it is not a part thereof. for things that are truly great, a magnanimous man is most On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and ready to expose himself to danger, since he does some- Andronicus reckon magnanimity as a part of fortitude. thing great in the act of fortitude, even as in the acts of the I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 61, a. 3), other virtues. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) a principal virtue is one to which it belongs to establish a that the magnanimous man is not mikrokindynos, i.e. en- general mode of virtue in a principal matter. Now one of dangering himself for small things, but megalokindynos, the general modes of virtue is firmness of mind, because i.e. endangering himself for great things. And Seneca “a firm standing is necessary in every virtue,” according to says (De Quat. Virtut.): “Thou wilt be magnanimous if Ethic. ii. And this is chiefly commended in those virtues thou neither seekest dangers like a rash man, nor fearest that tend to something difficult, in which it is most dif- them like a coward. For nothing makes the soul a coward ficult to preserve firmness. Wherefore the more difficult save the consciousness of a wicked life.” it is to stand firm in some matter of difficulty, the more Reply to Objection 3. Evil as such is to be avoided: principal is the virtue which makes the mind firm in that and that one has to withstand it is accidental; in so far, matter. to wit, as one has to suffer an evil in order to safeguard Now it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of a good. But good as such is to be desired, and that one death, wherein fortitude confirms the mind, than in hop- avoids it is only accidental, in so far, to wit, as it is deemed ing for or obtaining the greatest goods, wherein the mind to surpass the ability of the one who desires it. Now that is confirmed by magnanimity, for, as man loves his life which is so essentially is always of more account than above all things, so does he fly from dangers of death more that which is so accidentally. Wherefore the difficult in than any others. Accordingly it is clear that magnanimity evil things is always more opposed to firmness of mind agrees with fortitude in confirming the mind about some than the difficult in good things. Hence the virtue of for- difficult matter; but it falls short thereof, in that it con- titude takes precedence of the virtue of magnanimity. For firms the mind about a matter wherein it is easier to stand though good is simply of more import than evil, evil is of firm. Hence magnanimity is reckoned a part of fortitude, more import in this particular respect. 1784 Whether confidence belongs to magnanimity? IIa IIae q. 129 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that confidence does not belong hope arising from some observation which gives one a to magnanimity. For a man may have assurance not only strong opinion that one will obtain a certain good, it fol- in himself, but also in another, according to 2 Cor. 3:4,5, lows that confidence belongs to magnanimity. “Such confidence we have, through Christ towards God, Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, iv, 3), it belongs to the “magnanimous to need nothing,” as of ourselves.” But this seems inconsistent with the idea for need is a mark of the deficient. But this is to be under- of magnanimity. Therefore confidence does not belong to stood according to the mode of a man, hence he adds “or magnanimity. scarcely anything.” For it surpasses man to need nothing Objection 2. Further, confidence seems to be opposed at all. For every man needs, first, the Divine assistance, to fear, according to Is. 12:2, “I will deal confidently and secondly, even human assistance, since man is naturally will not fear.” But to be without fear seems more akin to a social animal, for he is sufficient by himself to provide fortitude. Therefore confidence also belongs to fortitude for his own life. Accordingly, in so far as he needs others, rather than to magnanimity. it belongs to a magnanimous man to have confidence in Objection 3. Further, reward is not due except to others, for it is also a point of excellence in a man that he virtue. But a reward is due to confidence, according to should have at hand those who are able to be of service to Heb. 3:6, where it is said that we are the house of Christ, him. And in so far as his own ability goes, it belongs to a “if we hold fast the confidence and glory of hope unto the magnanimous man to be confident in himself. end.” Therefore confidence is a virtue distinct from mag- Reply to Objection 2. As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 23, nanimity: and this is confirmed by the fact that Macrobius a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 40, a. 4), when we were treating of the enumerates it with magnanimity (In Somn. Scip. i). passions, hope is directly opposed to despair, because the On the contrary, Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii) seems to latter is about the same object, namely good. But as re- substitute confidence for magnanimity, as stated above in gards contrariety of objects it is opposed to fear, because the preceding Question (ad 6) and in the prologue to this. the latter’s object is evil. Now confidence denotes a cer- I answer that, Confidence takes its name from “fides” tain strength of hope, wherefore it is opposed to fear even [faith]: and it belongs to faith to believe something and in as hope is. Since, however, fortitude properly strengthens somebody. But confidence belongs to hope, according to a man in respect of evil, and magnanimity in respect of Job 11:18, “Thou shalt have confidence, hope being set the obtaining of good, it follows that confidence belongs before thee.” Wherefore confidence apparently denotes more properly to magnanimity than to fortitude. Yet be- chiefly that a man derives hope through believing the word cause hope causes daring, which belongs to fortitude, it of one who promises to help him. Since, however, faith follows in consequence that confidence pertains to forti- signifies also a strong opinion, and since one may come tude. to have a strong opinion about something, not only on ac- Reply to Objection 3. Confidence, as stated above, count of another’s statement, but also on account of some- denotes a certain mode of hope: for confidence is hope thing we observe in another, it follows that confidence strengthened by a strong opinion. Now the mode applied may denote the hope of having something, which hope we to an affection may call for commendation of the act, so conceive through observing something either in oneself— that it become meritorious, yet it is not this that draws for instance, through observing that he is healthy, a man it to a species of virtue, but its matter. Hence, properly is confident that he will live long. or in another, for in- speaking, confidence cannot denote a virtue, though it stance, through observing that another is friendly to him may denote the conditions of a virtue. For this reason and powerful, a man is confident that he will receive help it is reckoned among the parts of fortitude, not as an an- from him. nexed virtue, except as identified with magnanimity by Now it has been stated above (a. 1, ad 2) that mag- Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii), but as an integral part, as stated nanimity is chiefly about the hope of something difficult. in the preceding Question. Wherefore, since confidence denotes a certain strength of Whether security belongs to magnanimity? IIa IIae q. 129 a. 7 Objection 1. It seems that security does not belong seemingly the same as fortitude. But fortitude does not to magnanimity. For security, as stated above (q. 128, ad belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is the case. Nei- 6), denotes freedom from the disturbance of fear. But for- ther therefore does security belong to magnanimity. titude does this most effectively. Wherefore security is Objection 2. Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a 1785 man “is said to be secure because he is without care.” Now, as hope directly belongs to magnanimity, so fear di- But this seems to be contrary to virtue, which has a care rectly regards fortitude. Wherefore as confidence belongs for honorable things, according to 2 Tim. 2:15, “Care- immediately to magnanimity, so security belongs imme- fully study to present thyself approved unto God.” There- diately to fortitude. fore security does not belong to magnanimity, which does It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause great things in all the virtues. of daring, so is fear the cause of despair, as stated above Objection 3. Further, virtue is not its own reward. when we were treating of the passion ( Ia IIae, q. 45, a. 2). But security is accounted the reward of virtue, according Wherefore as confidence belongs indirectly to fortitude, to Job 11:14,18, “If thou wilt put away from thee the in- in so far as it makes use of daring, so security belongs iquity that is in thy hand. . . being buried thou shalt sleep indirectly to magnanimity, in so far as it banishes despair. secure.” Therefore security does not belong to magnanim- Reply to Objection 1. Fortitude is chiefly com- ity or to any other virtue, as a part thereof. mended, not because it banishes fear, which belongs to On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) under the security, but because it denotes a firmness of mind in the heading: “Magnanimity consists of two things,” that “it matter of the passion. Wherefore security is not the same belongs to magnanimity to give way neither to a troubled as fortitude, but is a condition thereof. mind, nor to man, nor to fortune.” But a man’s security Reply to Objection 2. Not all security is worthy of consists in this. Therefore security belongs to magnanim- praise but only when one puts care aside, as one ought, ity. and in things when one should not fear: in this way it is a I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), condition of fortitude and of magnanimity. “fear makes a man take counsel,” because, to wit he takes Reply to Objection 3. There is in the virtues a cer- care to avoid what he fears. Now security takes its name tain likeness to, and participation of, future happiness, as from the removal of this care, of which fear is the cause: stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 5, Aa. 3,7). Hence nothing hin- wherefore security denotes perfect freedom of the mind ders a certain security from being a condition of a virtue, from fear, just as confidence denotes strength of hope. although perfect security belongs to virtue’s reward. Whether goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity? IIa IIae q. 129 a. 8 Objection 1. It seems that goods of fortune do not plishment of something great as its end. Now goods of conduce to magnanimity. For according to Seneca (De Ira fortune conduce to both these things. For since honor is i: De vita beata xvi): “virtue suffices for itself.” Now mag- conferred on the virtuous, not only by the wise, but also nanimity takes every virtue great, as stated above (a. 4, ad by the multitude who hold these goods of fortune in the 3). Therefore goods of fortune do not conduce to magna- highest esteem, the result is that they show greater honor nimity. to those who possess goods of fortune. Likewise goods of Objection 2. Further, no virtuous man despises what fortune are useful organs or instruments of virtuous deeds: is helpful to him. But the magnanimous man despises since we can easily accomplish things by means of riches, whatever pertains to goods of fortune: for Tully says (De power and friends. Hence it is evident that goods of for- Offic. i) under the heading: “Magnanimity consists of tune conduce to magnanimity. two things,” that “a great soul is commended for despis- Reply to Objection 1. Virtue is said to be sufficient ing external things.” Therefore a magnanimous man is not for itself, because it can be without even these external helped by goods of fortune. goods; yet it needs them in order to act more expedi- Objection 3. Further, Tully adds (De Offic. i) that tiously. “it belongs to a great soul so to bear what seems trouble- Reply to Objection 2. The magnanimous man de- some, as nowise to depart from his natural estate, or from spises external goods, inasmuch as he does not think them the dignity of a wise man.” And Aristotle says (Ethic. so great as to be bound to do anything unbecoming for iv, 3) that “a magnanimous man does not grieve at mis- their sake. Yet he does not despise them, but that he fortune.” Now troubles and misfortunes are opposed to esteems them useful for the accomplishment of virtuous goods of fortune, for every one grieves at the loss of what deeds. is helpful to him. Therefore external goods of fortune do Reply to Objection 3. If a man does not think much not conduce to magnanimity. of a thing, he is neither very joyful at obtaining it, nor On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) very grieved at losing it. Wherefore, since the magnani- that “good fortune seems to conduce to magnanimity.” mous man does not think much of external goods, that is I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), magnanimity goods of fortune, he is neither much uplifted by them if regards two things: honor as its matter, and the accom- he has them, nor much cast down by their loss. 1786 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 130 Of Presumption (In Two Articles) We must now consider the vices opposed to magnanimity; and in the first place, those that are opposed thereto by excess. These are three, namely, presumption, ambition, and vainglory. Secondly, we shall consider pusillanimity which is opposed to it by way of deficiency. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether presumption is a sin? (2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess? Whether presumption is a sin? IIa IIae q. 130 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that presumption is not a sin. ity. Hence it is vicious and sinful, as being contrary to the For the Apostle says: “Forgetting the things that are be- natural order, that any one should assume to do what is hind, I stretch forth [Vulg.: ‘and stretching forth’] myself above his power: and this is what is meant by presump- to those that are before.” But it seems to savor of pre- tion, as its very name shows. Wherefore it is evident that sumption that one should tend to what is above oneself. presumption is a sin. Therefore presumption is not a sin. Reply to Objection 1. Nothing hinders that which Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, is above the active power of a natural thing, and yet not 7) “we should not listen to those who would persuade above the passive power of that same thing: thus the air us to relish human things because we are men, or mor- is possessed of a passive power by reason of which it can tal things because we are mortal, but we should relish be so changed as to obtain the action and movement of those that make us immortal”: and (Metaph. i) “that man fire, which surpass the active power of air. Thus too it should pursue divine things as far as possible.” Now di- would be sinful and presumptuous for a man while in a vine and immortal things are seemingly far above man. state of imperfect virtue to attempt the immediate accom- Since then presumption consists essentially in tending to plishment of what belongs to perfect virtue. But it is not what is above oneself, it seems that presumption is some- presumptuous or sinful for a man to endeavor to advance thing praiseworthy, rather than a sin. towards perfect virtue. In this way the Apostle stretched Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:5): himself forth to the things that were before him, namely “Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, continually advancing forward. as of ourselves.” If then presumption, by which one strives Reply to Objection 2. Divine and immortal things at that for which one is not sufficient, be a sin, it seems that surpass man according to the order of nature. Yet man man cannot lawfully even think of anything good: which is possessed of a natural power, namely the intellect, is absurd. Therefore presumption is not a sin. whereby he can be united to immortal and Divine things. On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 37:3): “O In this respect the Philosopher says that “man ought to wicked presumption, whence camest thou?” and a gloss pursue immortal and divine things,” not that he should do answers: “From a creature’s evil will.” Now all that comes what it becomes God to do, but that he should be united of the root of an evil will is a sin. Therefore presumption to Him in intellect and will. is a sin. Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. I answer that, Since whatever is according to nature, iii, 3), “what we can do by the help of others we can do is ordered by the Divine Reason, which human reason by ourselves in a sense.” Hence since we can think and ought to imitate, whatever is done in accordance with hu- do good by the help of God, this is not altogether above man reason in opposition to the order established in gen- our ability. Hence it is not presumptuous for a man to at- eral throughout natural things is vicious and sinful. Now tempt the accomplishment of a virtuous deed: but it would it is established throughout all natural things, that every be presumptuous if one were to make the attempt without action is commensurate with the power of the agent, nor confidence in God’s assistance. does any natural agent strive to do what exceeds its abil- 1787 Whether presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess? IIa IIae q. 130 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that presumption is not opposed charity, or rather to the gift of fear, whereby we revere to magnanimity by excess. For presumption is accounted God. Nevertheless, in so far as this contempt exceeds the a species of the sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above proportion to one’s own ability, it can be opposed to mag- (q. 14, a. 2; q. 21, a. 1). But the sin against the Holy Ghost nanimity. is not opposed to magnanimity, but to charity. Neither Reply to Objection 2. Presumption, like magnanim- therefore is presumption opposed to magnanimity. ity, seems to tend to something great. For we are not, as Objection 2. Further, it belongs to magnanimity that a rule, wont to call a man presumptuous for going beyond one should deem oneself worthy of great things. But a his powers in something small. If, however, such a man man is said to be presumptuous even if he deem himself be called presumptuous, this kind of presumption is not worthy of small things, if they surpass his ability. There- opposed to magnanimity, but to that virtue which is about fore presumption is not directly opposed to magnanimity. ordinary honor, as stated above (q. 129, a. 2). Objection 3. Further, the magnanimous man looks Reply to Objection 3. No one attempts what is above upon external goods as little things. Now according to the his ability, except in so far as he deems his ability greater Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), “on account of external fortune than it is. In this one may err in two ways. First only the presumptuous disdain and wrong others, because they as regards quantity, as when a man thinks he has greater deem external goods as something great.” Therefore pre- virtue, or knowledge, or the like, than he has. Secondly, sumption is opposed to magnanimity, not by excess, but as regards the kind of thing, as when he thinks himself only by deficiency. great, and worthy of great things, by reason of something On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; that does not make him so, for instance by reason of riches iv, 3) that the “vain man,” i.e. a vaporer or a wind-bag, or goods of fortune. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. which with us denotes a presumptuous man, “is opposed iv, 3), “those who have these things without virtue, nei- to the magnanimous man by excess.” ther justly deem themselves worthy of great things, nor I answer that, As stated above (q. 129, a. 3, ad 1), are rightly called magnanimous.” magnanimity observes the means, not as regards the quan- Again, the thing to which a man sometimes tends in tity of that to which it tends, but in proportion to our own excess of his ability, is sometimes in very truth something ability: for it does not tend to anything greater than is be- great, simply as in the case of Peter, whose intent was to coming to us. suffer for Christ, which has exceeded his power; while Now the presumptuous man, as regards that to which sometimes it is something great, not simply, but only in he tends, does not exceed the magnanimous, but some- the opinion of fools, such as wearing costly clothes, de- times falls far short of him: but he does exceed in pro- spising and wronging others. This savors of an excess portion to his own ability, whereas the magnanimous man of magnanimity, not in any truth, but in people’s opin- does not exceed his. It is in this way that presumption is ion. Hence Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.) that “when opposed to magnanimity by excess. magnanimity exceeds its measure, it makes a man high- Reply to Objection 1. It is not every presumption handed, proud, haughty restless, and bent on excelling in that is accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost, but that all things, whether in words or in deeds, without any con- by which one contemns the Divine justice through inor- siderations of virtue.” Thus it is evident that the presump- dinate confidence in the Divine mercy. The latter kind of tuous man sometimes falls short of the magnanimous in presumption, by reason of its matter, inasmuch, to wit, as reality, although in appearance he surpasses him. it implies contempt of something Divine, is opposed to 1788 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 131 Of Ambition (In Two Articles) We must now consider ambition: and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a sin? (2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess? Whether ambition is a sin? IIa IIae q. 131 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that ambition is not a sin. For lence which he has not: this is to desire more than his ambition denotes the desire of honor. Now honor is in share of honor. Secondly, when a man desires honor for itself a good thing, and the greatest of external goods: himself without referring it to God. Thirdly, when a man’s wherefore those who care not for honor are reproved. appetite rests in honor itself, without referring it to the Therefore ambition is not a sin; rather is it something de- profit of others. Since then ambition denotes inordinate serving of praise, in so far as a good is laudably desired. desire of honor, it is evident that it is always a sin. Objection 2. Further, anyone may, without sin, desire Reply to Objection 1. The desire for good should be what is due to him as a reward. Now honor is the reward regulated according to reason, and if it exceed this rule it of virtue, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 12; iv, 3; viii, will be sinful. In this way it is sinful to desire honor in dis-14). Therefore ambition of honor is not a sin. accord with the order of reason. Now those are reproved Objection 3. Further, that which heartens a man to who care not for honor in accordance with reason’s dictate do good and disheartens him from doing evil, is not a sin. that they should avoid what is contrary to honor. Now honor heartens men to do good and to avoid evil; Reply to Objection 2. Honor is not the reward of thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that “with the virtue, as regards the virtuous man, in this sense that he bravest men, cowards are held in dishonor, and the brave should seek for it as his reward: since the reward he seeks in honor”: and Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that “honor is happiness, which is the end of virtue. But it is said to fosters the arts.” Therefore ambition is not a sin. be the reward of virtue as regards others, who have noth- On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 13:5) that “char- ing greater than honor whereby to reward the virtuous; ity is not ambitious, seeketh not her own.” Now nothing which honor derives greatness from the very fact that it is contrary to charity, except sin. Therefore ambition is a bears witness to virtue. Hence it is evident that it is not an sin. adequate reward, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. I answer that, As stated above (q. 103, Aa. 1,2), Reply to Objection 3. Just as some are heartened to honor denotes reverence shown to a person in witness of do good and disheartened from doing evil, by the desire of his excellence. Now two things have to be considered with honor, if this be desired in due measure; so, if it be desired regard to man’s honor. The first is that a man has not from inordinately, it may become to man an occasion of doing himself the thing in which he excels, for this is, as it were, many evil things, as when a man cares not by what means something Divine in him, wherefore on this count honor is he obtains honor. Wherefore Sallust says (Catilin.) that due principally, not to him but to God. The second point “the good as well as the wicked covet honors for them- that calls for observation is that the thing in which man selves, but the one,” i.e. the good, “go about it in the right excels is given to him by God, that he may profit others way,” whereas “the other,” i.e. the wicked, “through lack thereby: wherefore a man ought so far to be pleased that of the good arts, make use of deceit and falsehood.” Yet others bear witness to his excellence, as this enables him they who, merely for the sake of honor, either do good or to profit others. avoid evil, are not virtuous, according to the Philosopher Now the desire of honor may be inordinate in three (Ethic. iii, 8), where he says that they who do brave things ways. First, when a man desires recognition of an excel- for the sake of honor are not truly brave. 1789 Whether ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess? IIa IIae q. 131 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that ambition is not opposed nanimity as the inordinate to that which is well ordered. to magnanimity by excess. For one mean has only one Reply to Objection 1. Magnanimity regards two extreme opposed to it on the one side. Now presump- things. It regards one as its end, in so far as it is some great tion is opposed to magnanimity by excess as stated above deed that the magnanimous man attempts in proportion to (q. 130, a. 2). Therefore ambition is not opposed to it by his ability. In this way presumption is opposed to mag- excess. nanimity by excess: because the presumptuous man at- Objection 2. Further, magnanimity is about honors; tempts great deeds beyond his ability. The other thing that whereas ambition seems to regard positions of dignity: for magnanimity regards is its matter, viz. honor, of which it it is written (2 Macc. 4:7) that “Jason ambitiously sought makes right use: and in this way ambition is opposed to the high priesthood.” Therefore ambition is not opposed magnanimity by excess. Nor is it impossible for one mean to magnanimity. to be exceeded in various respects. Objection 3. Further, ambition seems to regard out- Reply to Objection 2. Honor is due to those who are ward show: for it is written (Acts 25:27) that “Agrippa in a position of dignity, on account of a certain excellence and Berenice. . . with great pomp [ambitione]. . . had en- of their estate: and accordingly inordinate desire for po- tered into the hall of audience”∗, and (2 Para. 16:14) that sitions of dignity pertains to ambition. For if a man were when Asa died they “burned spices and. . . ointments over to have an inordinate desire for a position of dignity, not his body” with very great pomp [ambitione]. But magna- for the sake of honor, but for the sake of a right use of a nimity is not about outward show. Therefore ambition is dignity exceeding his ability, he would not be ambitious not opposed to magnanimity. but presumptuous. On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) that “the Reply to Objection 3. The very solemnity of out- more a man exceeds in magnanimity, the more he desires ward worship is a kind of honor, wherefore in such cases himself alone to dominate others.” But this pertains to honor is wont to be shown. This is signified by the words ambition. Therefore ambition denotes an excess of mag- of James 2:2,3: “If there shall come into your assem- nanimity. bly a man having a golden ring, in fine apparel. . . and I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), ambition signi- you. . . shall say to him: Sit thou here well,” etc. Where- fies inordinate love of honor. Now magnanimity is about fore ambition does not regard outward worship, except in honors and makes use of them in a becoming manner. so far as this is a kind of honor. Wherefore it is evident that ambition is opposed to mag- ∗ ‘Praetorium.’ The Vulgate has ‘auditorium,’ but the meaning is the same 1790 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 132 Of Vainglory (In Five Articles) We must now consider vainglory: under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether desire of glory is a sin? (2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity? (3) Whether it is a mortal sin? (4) Whether it is a capital vice? (5) Of its daughters. Whether the desire of glory is a sin? IIa IIae q. 132 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that the desire of glory is not a is clear simply can be seen by many, and by those who are sin. For no one sins in being likened to God: in fact we far away, it follows that the word glory properly denotes are commanded (Eph. 5:1): “Be ye. . . followers of God, that somebody’s good is known and approved by many, as most dear children.” Now by seeking glory man seems according to the saying of Sallust (Catilin.)†: “I must not to imitate God, Who seeks glory from men: wherefore it boast while I am addressing one man.” is written (Is. 43:6,7): “Bring My sons from afar, and My But if we take the word glory in a broader sense, it not daughters from the ends of the earth. And every one that only consists in the knowledge of many, but also in the calleth on My name, I have created him for My glory.” knowledge of few, or of one, or of oneself alone, as when Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin. one considers one’s own good as being worthy of praise. Objection 2. Further, that which incites a mar to do Now it is not a sin to know and approve one’s own good: good is apparently not a sin. Now the desire of glory in- for it is written (1 Cor. 2:12): “Now we have received cites men to do good. For Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God that “glory inflames every man to strive his utmost”: and that we may know the things that are given us from God.” in Holy Writ glory is promised for good works, according Likewise it is not a sin to be willing to approve one’s own to Rom. 2:7: “To them, indeed, who according to patience good works: for it is written (Mat. 5:16): “Let your light in good work. . . glory and honor”∗. Therefore the desire shine before men.” Hence the desire for glory does not, for glory is not a sin. of itself, denote a sin: but the desire for empty or vain Objection 3. Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) glory denotes a sin: for it is sinful to desire anything vain, that glory is “consistent good report about a person, to- according to Ps. 4:3, “Why do you love vanity, and seek gether with praise”: and this comes to the same as what after lying?” Augustine says (Contra Maximin. iii), viz. that glory is, Now glory may be called vain in three ways. First, on “as it were, clear knowledge with praise.” Now it is no sin the part of the thing for which one seeks glory: as when to desire praiseworthy renown: indeed, it seems itself to a man seeks glory for that which is unworthy of glory, for call for praise, according to Ecclus. 41:15, “Take care of a instance when he seeks it for something frail and perish- good name,” and Rom. 12:17, “Providing good things not able: secondly, on the part of him from whom he seeks only in the sight of God, but also in the sight of all men.” glory, for instance a man whose judgment is uncertain: Therefore the desire of vainglory is not a sin. thirdly, on the part of the man himself who seeks glory, On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v): for that he does not refer the desire of his own glory to a “He is better advised who acknowledges that even the love due end, such as God’s honor, or the spiritual welfare of of praise is sinful.” his neighbor. I answer that, Glory signifies a certain clarity, where- Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says on Jn. fore Augustine says (Tract. lxxxii, c, cxiv in Joan.) that 13:13, “You call Me Master and Lord; and you say well” to be “glorified is the same as to be clarified.” Now clar- (Tract. lviii in Joan.): “Self-complacency is fraught with ity and comeliness imply a certain display: wherefore the danger of one who has to beware of pride. But He Who word glory properly denotes the display of something as is above all, however much He may praise Himself, does regards its seeming comely in the sight of men, whether it not uplift Himself. For knowledge of God is our need, not be a bodily or a spiritual good. Since, however, that which His: nor does any man know Him unless he be taught of ∗ Vulg.: ‘Who will render to every man according to his works, to them indeed who . . . seek glory and honor and incorruption, eternal life.’ † The quotation is from Livy: Hist., Lib. XXII C, 39 1791 Him Who knows.” It is therefore evident that God seeks proves (De Civ. Dei v). glory, not for His own sake, but for ours. In like man- Reply to Objection 3. It is requisite for man’s perfec- ner a man may rightly seek his own glory for the good of tion that he should know himself; but not that he should be others, according to Mat. 5:16, “That they may see your known by others, wherefore it is not to be desired in itself. good works, and glorify your Father Who is in heaven.” It may, however, be desired as being useful for something, Reply to Objection 2. That which we receive from either in order that God may be glorified by men, or that God is not vain but true glory: it is this glory that is men may become better by reason of the good they know promised as a reward for good works, and of which it to be in another man, or in order that man, knowing by the is written (2 Cor. 10:17,18): “He that glorieth let him testimony of others’ praise the good which is in him, may glory in the Lord, for not he who commendeth himself himself strive to persevere therein and to become better. is approved, but he whom God commendeth.” It is true In this sense it is praiseworthy that a man should “take that some are heartened to do works of virtue, through de- care of his good name,” and that he should “provide good sire for human glory, as also through the desire for other things in the sight of God and men”: but not that he should earthly goods. Yet he is not truly virtuous who does vir- take an empty pleasure in human praise. tuous deeds for the sake of human glory, as Augustine Whether vainglory is opposed to magnanimity? IIa IIae q. 132 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that vainglory is not opposed in moderation. Wherefore inordinate desire of glory is di- to magnanimity. For, as stated above (a. 1), vainglory rectly opposed to magnanimity. consists in glorying in things that are not, which per- Reply to Objection 1. To think so much of little tains to falsehood; or in earthly and perishable things, things as to glory in them is itself opposed to magnanim- which pertains to covetousness; or in the testimony of ity. Wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic. men, whose judgment is uncertain, which pertains to im- iv) that honor is of little account to him. In like manner prudence. Now these vices are not contrary to magnanim- he thinks little of other things that are sought for honor’s ity. Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity. sake, such as power and wealth. Likewise it is inconsistent Objection 2. Further, vainglory is not, like pusilla- with magnanimity to glory in things that are not; where- nimity, opposed to magnanimity by way of deficiency, fore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that he for this seems inconsistent with vainglory. Nor is it op- cares more for truth than for opinion. Again it is incom- posed to it by way of excess, for in this way presumption patible with magnanimity for a man to glory in the testi- and ambition are opposed to magnanimity, as stated above mony of human praise, as though he deemed this some- (q. 130, a. 2; q. 131, a. 2): and these differ from vainglory. thing great; wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity. (Ethic. iv), that he cares not to be praised. And so, when Objection 3. Further, a gloss on Phil. 2:3, “Let noth- a man looks upon little things as though they were great, ing be done through contention, neither by vainglory,” nothing hinders this from being contrary to magnanimity, says: “Some among them were given to dissension and as well as to other virtues. restlessness, contending with one another for the sake of Reply to Objection 2. He that is desirous of vainglory vainglory.” But contention∗ is not opposed to magnanim- does in truth fall short of being magnanimous, because he ity. Neither therefore is vainglory. glories in what the magnanimous man thinks little of, as On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) under the stated in the preceding Reply. But if we consider his es- heading, “Magnanimity consists in two things: We should timate, he is opposed to the magnanimous man by way beware of the desire for glory, since it enslaves the mind, of excess, because the glory which he seeks is something which a magnanimous man should ever strive to keep un- great in his estimation, and he tends thereto in excess of trammeled.” Therefore it is opposed to magnanimity. his deserts. I answer that, As stated above (q. 103, a. 1, ad 3), Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 127, a. 2, glory is an effect of honor and praise: because from the ad 2), the opposition of vices does not depend on their fact that a man is praised, or shown any kind of rever- effects. Nevertheless contention, if done intentionally, is ence, he acquires charity in the knowledge of others. And opposed to magnanimity: since no one contends save for since magnanimity is about honor, as stated above (q. 129, what he deems great. Wherefore the Philosopher says Aa. 1,2), it follows that it also is about glory: seeing that (Ethic. iv, 3) that the magnanimous man is not con- as a man uses honor moderately, so too does he use glory tentious, because nothing is great in his estimation. ∗ Cf. q. 38 1792 Whether vainglory is a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 132 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that vainglory is a mortal sin. not received it?” Or again when a man prefers to God the For nothing precludes the eternal reward except a mortal temporal good in which he glories: for this is forbidden sin. Now vainglory precludes the eternal reward: for it (Jer. 9:23,24): “Let not the wise man glory in his wis- is written (Mat. 6:1): “Take heed, that you do not give dom, and let not the strong man glory in his strength, and justice before men, to be seen by them: otherwise you let not the rich man glory in his riches. But let him that shall not have a reward of your Father Who is in heaven.” glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin. Me.” Or again when a man prefers the testimony of man Objection 2. Further, whoever appropriates to himself to God’s; thus it is written in reproval of certain people that which is proper to God, sins mortally. Now by desir- (Jn. 12:43): “For they loved the glory of men more than ing vainglory, a man appropriates to himself that which is the glory of God.” proper to God. For it is written (Is. 42:8): “I will not give In another way vainglory may be contrary to charity, My glory to another,” and (1 Tim. 1:17): “To. . . the only on the part of the one who glories, in that he refers his God be honor and glory.” Therefore vainglory is a mortal intention to glory as his last end: so that he directs even sin. virtuous deeds thereto, and, in order to obtain it, forbears Objection 3. Further, apparently a sin is mortal if it not from doing even that which is against God. In this way be most dangerous and harmful. Now vainglory is a sin of it is a mortal sin. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei this kind, because a gloss of Augustine on 1 Thess. 2:4, v, 14) that “this vice,” namely the love of human praise, “God, Who proveth our hearts,” says: “Unless a man war “is so hostile to a godly faith, if the heart desires glory against the love of human glory he does not perceive its more than it fears or loves God, that our Lord said (Jn. baneful power, for though it be easy for anyone not to de- 5:44): How can you believe, who receive glory one from sire praise as long as one does not get it, it is difficult not to another, and the glory which is from God alone, you do take pleasure in it, when it is given.” Chrysostom also says not seek?” (Hom. xix in Matth.) that “vainglory enters secretly, and If, however, the love of human glory, though it be robs us insensibly of all our inward possessions.” There- vain, be not inconsistent with charity, neither as regards fore vainglory is a mortal sin. the matter gloried in, nor as to the intention of him that On the contrary, Chrysostom says∗ that “while other seeks glory, it is not a mortal but a venial sin. vices find their abode in the servants of the devil, vain- Reply to Objection 1. No man, by sinning, merits glory finds a place even in the servants of Christ.” Yet in eternal life: wherefore a virtuous deed loses its power to the latter there is no mortal sin. Therefore vainglory is not merit eternal life, if it be done for the sake of vainglory, a mortal sin. even though that vainglory be not a mortal sin. On the I answer that, As stated above (q. 24, a. 12; q. 110, other hand when a man loses the eternal reward simply a. 4; q. 112, a. 2 ), a sin is mortal through being contrary through vainglory, and not merely in respect of one act, to charity. Now the sin of vainglory, considered in itself, vainglory is a mortal sin. does not seem to be contrary to charity as regards the love Reply to Objection 2. Not every man that is desirous of one’s neighbor: yet as regards the love of God it may of vainglory, desires the excellence which belongs to God be contrary to charity in two ways. In one way, by reason alone. For the glory due to God alone differs from the of the matter about which one glories: for instance when glory due to a virtuous or rich man. one glories in something false that is opposed to the rev- Reply to Objection 3. Vainglory is stated to be a dan- erence we owe God, according to Ezech. 28:2, “Thy heart gerous sin, not only on account of its gravity, but also be- is lifted up, and Thou hast said: I am God,” and 1 Cor. cause it is a disposition to grave sins, in so far as it renders 4:7, “What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if man presumptuous and too self-confident: and so it grad- thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst ually disposes a man to lose his inward goods. Whether vainglory is a capital vice? IIa IIae q. 132 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that vainglory is not a capital Objection 2. Further, honor would seem to take vice. For a vice that always arises from another vice is precedence of glory, for this is its effect. Now ambition seemingly not capital. But vainglory always arises from which is inordinate desire of honor is not a capital vice. pride. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice. Neither therefore is the desire of vainglory. ∗ Hom. xiii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom 1793 Objection 3. Further, a capital vice has a certain good is naturally loved and honored by all. Wherefore, prominence. But vainglory seems to have no prominence, just as by the glory which is in God’s sight man acquires neither as a sin, because it is not always a mortal sin, nor honor in Divine things, so too by the glory which is in considered as an appetible good, since human glory is ap- the sight of man he acquires excellence in human things. parently a frail thing, and is something outside man him- Hence on account of its close connection with excellence, self. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice. which men desire above all, it follows that it is most de- On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers sirable. And since many vices arise from the inordinate vainglory among the seven capital vices. desire thereof, it follows that vainglory is a capital vice. I answer that, The capital vices are enumerated in Reply to Objection 1. It is not impossible for a cap- two ways. For some reckon pride as one of their number: ital vice to arise from pride, since as stated above (in the and these do not place vainglory among the capital vices. body of the Article and Ia IIae, q. 84, a. 2) pride is the Gregory, however (Moral. xxxi), reckons pride to be the queen and mother of all the vices. queen of all the vices, and vainglory, which is the immedi- Reply to Objection 2. Praise and honor, as stated ate offspring of pride, he reckons to be a capital vice: and above (a. 2), stand in relation to glory as the causes from not without reason. For pride, as we shall state farther on which it proceeds, so that glory is compared to them as (q. 152, Aa. 1,2), denotes inordinate desire of excellence. their end. For the reason why a man loves to be honored But whatever good one may desire, one desires a certain and praised is that he thinks thereby to acquire a certain perfection and excellence therefrom: wherefore the end of renown in the knowledge of others. every vice is directed to the end of pride, so that this vice Reply to Objection 3. Vainglory stands prominent seems to exercise a kind of causality over the other vices, under the aspect of desirability, for the reason given and ought not to be reckoned among the special sources above, and this suffices for it to be reckoned a capital vice. of vice, known as the capital vices. Now among the goods Nor is it always necessary for a capital vice to be a mortal that are the means whereby man acquires honor, glory sin; for mortal sin can arise from venial sin, inasmuch as seems to be the most conducive to that effect, inasmuch venial sin can dispose man thereto. as it denotes the manifestation of a man’s goodness: since Whether the daughters of vainglory are suitably reckoned to be disobedience, boast-IIa IIae q. 132 a. 5 fulness, hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy, discord, and love of novelties? Objection 1. It seems that the daughters of vainglory a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 84, Aa. 3,4), the vices which by their are unsuitably reckoned to be “disobedience, boastful- very nature are such as to be directed to the end of a cer- ness, hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy, discord, and ec- tain capital vice, are called its daughters. Now the end of centricity∗.” For according to Gregory (Moral. xxiii) vainglory is the manifestation of one’s own excellence, as boastfulness is numbered among the species of pride. stated above (Aa. 1,4): and to this end a man may tend in Now pride does not arise from vainglory, rather is it two ways. In one way directly, either by words, and this is the other way about, as Gregory says (Moral. xxxi). boasting, or by deeds, and then if they be true and call for Therefore boastfulness should not be reckoned among the astonishment, it is love of novelties which men are wont daughters of vainglory. to wonder at most; but if they be false, it is hypocrisy. Objection 2. Further, contention and discord seem to In another way a man strives to make known his excel- be the outcome chiefly of anger. But anger is a capital lence by showing that he is not inferior to another, and vice condivided with vainglory. Therefore it seems that this in four ways. First, as regards the intellect, and thus they are not the daughters of vainglory. we have “obstinacy,” by which a man is too much attached Objection 3. Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xix to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe one that is in Matth.) that vainglory is always evil, but especially in better. Secondly, as regards the will, and then we have philanthropy, i.e. mercy. And yet this is nothing new, for “discord,” whereby a man is unwilling to give up his own it is an established custom among men. Therefore eccen- will, and agree with others. Thirdly, as regards “speech,” tricity should not be specially reckoned as a daughter of and then we have “contention,” whereby a man quarrels vainglory. noisily with another. Fourthly as regards deeds, and this On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory is “disobedience,” whereby a man refuses to carry out the (Moral. xxxi), who there assigns the above daughters to command of his superiors. vainglory. Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 112, a. 1, I answer that, As stated above (q. 34, a. 5; q. 35, ad 2), boasting is reckoned a kind of pride, as regards its ∗ Praesumptio novitatum, literally ‘presumption of novelties’ 1794 interior cause, which is arrogance: but outward boasting, to the will and words of others. according to Ethic. iv, is directed sometimes to gain, but Reply to Objection 3. Vainglory is reproved in con- more often to glory and honor, and thus it is the result of nection with almsdeeds on account of the lack of charity vainglory. apparent in one who prefers vainglory to the good of his Reply to Objection 2. Anger is not the cause of dis- neighbor, seeing that he does the latter for the sake of the cord and contention, except in conjunction with vainglory, former. But a man is not reproved for presuming to give in that a man thinks it a glorious thing for him not to yield alms as though this were something novel. 1795 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 133 Of Pusillanimity (In Two Articles) We must now consider pusillanimity. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether pusillanimity is a sin? (2) To what virtue is it opposed? Whether pusillanimity is a sin? IIa IIae q. 133 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that pusillanimity is not a sin. buried in the earth the money he had received from his For every sin makes a man evil, just as every virtue makes master, and did not trade with it through fainthearted fear, a man good. But a fainthearted man is not evil, as the was punished by his master (Mat. 25; Lk. 19). Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore pusillanimity is Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher calls those not a sin. evil who injure their neighbor: and accordingly the faint- Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, hearted is said not to be evil, because he injures no one, 3) that “a fainthearted man is especially one who is wor- save accidentally, by omitting to do what might be prof- thy of great goods, yet does not deem himself worthy of itable to others. For Gregory says (Pastoral. i) that if “they them.” Now no one is worthy of great goods except the who demur to do good to their neighbor in preaching be virtuous, since as the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, 3), judged strictly, without doubt their guilt is proportionate “none but the virtuous are truly worthy of honor.” There- to the good they might have done had they been less retir- fore the fainthearted are virtuous: and consequently pusil- ing.” lanimity is not a sin. Reply to Objection 2. Nothing hinders a person who Objection 3. Further, “Pride is the beginning of all has a virtuous habit from sinning venially and without sin” (Ecclus. 10:15). But pusillanimity does not pro- losing the habit, or mortally and with loss of the habit ceed from pride, since the proud man sets himself above of gratuitous virtue. Hence it is possible for a man, by what he is, while the fainthearted man withdraws from reason of the virtue which he has, to be worthy of doing the things he is worthy of. Therefore pusillanimity is not certain great things that are worthy of great honor, and a sin. yet through not trying to make use of his virtue, he sins Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, sometimes venially, sometimes mortally. 3) that “he who deems himself less worthy than he is, is Again it may be replied that the fainthearted is wor- said to be fainthearted.” Now sometimes holy men deem thy of great things in proportion to his ability for virtue, themselves less worthy than they are; for instance, Moses ability which he derives either from a good natural dispo- and Jeremias, who were worthy of the office God chose sition, or from science, or from external fortune, and if he them for, which they both humbly declined (Ex. 3:11; Jer. fails to use those things for virtue, he becomes guilty of 1:6). Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin. pusillanimity. On the contrary, Nothing in human conduct is to be Reply to Objection 3. Even pusillanimity may in avoided save sin. Now pusillanimity is to be avoided: for some way be the result of pride: when, to wit, a man it is written (Col. 3:21): “Fathers, provoke not your chil- clings too much to his own opinion, whereby he thinks dren to indignation, lest they be discouraged.” Therefore himself incompetent for those things for which he is com- pusillanimity is a sin. petent. Hence it is written (Prov. 26:16): “The sluggard I answer that, Whatever is contrary to a natural in- is wiser in his own conceit than seven men that speak sen- clination is a sin, because it is contrary to a law of nature. tences.” For nothing hinders him from depreciating him- Now everything has a natural inclination to accomplish an self in some things, and having a high opinion of him- action that is commensurate with its power: as is evident self in others. Wherefore Gregory says (Pastoral. i) of in all natural things, whether animate or inanimate. Now Moses that “perchance he would have been proud, had he just as presumption makes a man exceed what is propor- undertaken the leadership of a numerous people without tionate to his power, by striving to do more than he can, misgiving: and again he would have been proud, had he so pusillanimity makes a man fall short of what is pro- refused to obey the command of his Creator.” portionate to his power, by refusing to tend to that which Reply to Objection 4. Moses and Jeremias were wor- is commensurate thereto. Wherefore as presumption is a thy of the office to which they were appointed by God, but sin, so is pusillanimity. Hence it is that the servant who their worthiness was of Divine grace: yet they, consider- 1796 ing the insufficiency of their own weakness, demurred; though not obstinately lest they should fall into pride. Whether pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity? IIa IIae q. 133 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that pusillanimity is not op- same subject. For just as the magnanimous man tends posed to magnanimity. For the Philosopher says (Ethic., to great things out of greatness of soul, so the pusillan- 3) that “the fainthearted man knows not himself: for he imous man shrinks from great things out of littleness of would desire the good things, of which he is worthy, if soul. Secondly, it may be considered in reference to its he knew himself.” Now ignorance of self seems opposed cause, which on the part of the intellect is ignorance of to prudence. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to pru- one’s own qualification, and on the part of the appetite dence. is the fear of failure in what one falsely deems to exceed Objection 2. Further our Lord calls the servant one’s ability. Thirdly, it may be considered in reference wicked and slothful who through pusillanimity refused to to its effect, which is to shrink from the great things of make use of the money. Moreover the Philosopher says which one is worthy. But, as stated above (q. 132, a. 2, (Ethic. iv, 3) that the fainthearted seem to be slothful. ad 3), opposition between vice and virtue depends rather Now sloth is opposed to solicitude, which is an act of pru- on their respective species than on their cause or effect. dence, as stated above (q. 47, a. 9). Therefore pusillanim- Hence pusillanimity is directly opposed to magnanimity. ity is not opposed to magnanimity. Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers pusil- Objection 3. Further, pusillanimity seems to proceed lanimity as proceeding from a cause in the intellect. Yet from inordinate fear: hence it is written (Is. 35:4): “Say it cannot be said properly that it is opposed to prudence, to the fainthearted: Take courage and fear not.” It also even in respect of its cause: because ignorance of this kind seems to proceed from inordinate anger, according to Col. does not proceed from indiscretion but from laziness in 3:21, “Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, considering one’s own ability, according to Ethic. iv, 3, or lest they be discouraged.” Now inordinate fear is opposed in accomplishing what is within one’s power. to fortitude, and inordinate anger to meekness. Therefore Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers pusil- pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity. lanimity from the point of view of its effect. Objection 4. Further, the vice that is in opposition to Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the a particular virtue is the more grievous according as it is point of view of cause. Nor is the fear that causes pusilla- more unlike that virtue. Now pusillanimity is more unlike nimity always a fear of the dangers of death: wherefore it magnanimity than presumption is. Therefore if pusilla- does not follow from this standpoint that pusillanimity is nimity is opposed to magnanimity, it follows that it is a opposed to fortitude. As regards anger, if we consider it more grievous sin than presumption: yet this is contrary under the aspect of its proper movement, whereby a man to the saying of Ecclus. 37:3, “O wicked presumption, is roused to take vengeance, it does not cause pusillanim- whence camest thou?” Therefore pusillanimity is not op- ity, which disheartens the soul; on the contrary, it takes it posed to magnanimity. away. If, however, we consider the causes of anger, which On the contrary, Pusillanimity and magnanimity dif- are injuries inflicted whereby the soul of the man who suf- fer as greatness and littleness of soul, as their very names fers them is disheartened, it conduces to pusillanimity. denote. Now great and little are opposites. Therefore Reply to Objection 4. According to its proper species pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity. pusillanimity is a graver sin than presumption, since I answer that, Pusillanimity may be considered in thereby a man withdraws from good things, which is a three ways. First, in itself; and thus it is evident that by very great evil according to Ethic. iv. Presumption, how- its very nature it is opposed to magnanimity, from which ever, is stated to be “wicked” on account of pride whence it differs as great and little differ in connection with the it proceeds. 1797 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 134 Of Magnificence (In Four Articles) We must now consider magnificence and the vices opposed to it. With regard to magnificence there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether magnificence is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a special virtue? (3) What is its matter? (4) Whether it is a part of fortitude? Whether magnificence is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 134 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that magnificence is not a whence magnificence takes its name, belongs properly to virtue. For whoever has one virtue has all the virtues, as the very notion of virtue. Hence magnificence denotes a stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 1). But one may have the virtue. other virtues without having magnificence: because the Reply to Objection 1. Not every liberal man is mag- Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that “not every liberal man nificent as regards his actions, because he lacks the where- is magnificent.” Therefore magnificence is not a virtue. withal to perform magnificent deeds. Nevertheless every Objection 2. Further, moral virtue observes the mean, liberal man has the habit of magnificence, either actually according to Ethic. ii, 6. But magnificence does not seem- or in respect of a proximate disposition thereto, as ex- ingly observe the mean, for it exceeds liberality in great- plained above (q. 129, a. 3, ad 2), as also ( Ia IIae, q. 65, ness. Now “great” and “little” are opposed to one another a. 1) when we were treating of the connection of virtues. as extremes, the mean of which is “equal,” as stated in Reply to Objection 2. It is true that magnificence ob- Metaph. x. Hence magnificence observes not the mean, serves the extreme, if we consider the quantity of the thing but the extreme. Therefore it is not a virtue. done: yet it observes the mean, if we consider the rule of Objection 3. Further, no virtue is opposed to a nat- reason, which it neither falls short of nor exceeds, as we ural inclination, but on the contrary perfects it, as stated have also said of magnanimity (q. 129, a. 3, ad 1). above (q. 108, a. 2; q. 117, a. 1, obj. 1). Now according to Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to magnificence the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 2) the “magnificent man is not to do something great. But that which regards a man’s lavish towards himself”: and this is opposed to the nat- person is little in comparison with that which regards Di- ural inclination one has to look after oneself. Therefore vine things, or even the affairs of the community at large. magnificence is not a virtue. Wherefore the magnificent man does not intend princi- Objection 4. Further, according to the Philosopher pally to be lavish towards himself, not that he does not (Ethic. vi, 4) “act is right reason about things to be made.” seek his own good, but because to do so is not something Now magnificence is about things to be made, as its very great. Yet if anything regarding himself admits of great- name denotes∗. Therefore it is an act rather than a virtue. ness, the magnificent man accomplishes it magnificently: On the contrary, Human virtue is a participation of for instance, things that are done once, such as a wedding, Divine power. But magnificence [virtutis] belongs to Di- or the like; or things that are of a lasting nature; thus it vine power, according to Ps. 47:35: “His magnificence belongs to a magnificent man to provide himself with a and His power is in the clouds.” Therefore magnificence suitable dwelling, as stated in Ethic. iv. is a virtue. Reply to Objection 4. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. I answer that, According to De Coelo i, 16, “we vi, 5) “there must needs be a virtue of act,” i.e. a moral speak of virtue in relation to the extreme limit of a thing’s virtue, whereby the appetite is inclined to make good use power,” not as regards the limit of deficiency, but as re- of the rule of act: and this is what magnificence does. gards the limit of excess, the very nature of which de- Hence it is not an act but a virtue. notes something great. Wherefore to do something great, ∗ Magnificence= magna facere—i.e. to make great things 1798 Whether magnificence is a special virtue? IIa IIae q. 134 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that magnificence is not a spe- special virtue. cial virtue. For magnificence would seem to consist in If, on the other hand, magnificence take its name from doing something great. But it may belong to any virtue to doing something great, the doing [facere] being under- do something great, if the virtue be great: as in the case stood in a broad sense, it is not a special virtue. of one who has a great virtue of temperance, for he does a Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to every perfect great work of temperance. Therefore, magnificence is not virtue to do something great in the genus of that virtue, a special virtue, but denotes a perfect degree of any virtue. if “doing” [facere] be taken in the broad sense, but not if Objection 2. Further, seemingly that which tends to a it be taken strictly, for this is proper to magnificence. thing is the same as that which does it. But it belongs to Reply to Objection 2. It belongs to magnanimity not magnanimity to tend to something great, as stated above only to tend to something great, but also to do great works (q. 129, Aa. 1,2). Therefore it belongs to magnanimity in all the virtues, either by making [faciendo], or by any likewise to do something great. Therefore magnificence kind of action, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3: yet so that mag- is not a special virtue distinct from magnanimity. nanimity, in this respect, regards the sole aspect of great, Objection 3. Further, magnificence seems to belong while the other virtues which, if they be perfect, do some- to holiness, for it is written (Ex. 15:11): “Magnificent thing great, direct their principal intention, not to some- [Douay: ‘glorious’] in holiness,” and (Ps. 95:6): “Holi- thing great, but to that which is proper to each virtue: and ness and magnificence [Douay: ‘Majesty’] in His sanc- the greatness of the thing done is sometimes consequent tuary.” Now holiness is the same as religion, as stated upon the greatness of the virtue. above (q. 81, a. 8). Therefore magnificence is apparently On the other hand, it belongs to magnificence not only the same as religion. Therefore it is not a special virtue, to do something great, “doing” [facere] being taken in the distinct from the others. strict sense, but also to tend with the mind to the doing of On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons it with great things. Hence Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that other special virtues (Ethic. ii, 7; iv 2). “magnificence is the discussing and administering of great I answer that, It belongs to magnificence to do and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble [facere] something great, as its name implies [magnifi- purpose of mind, discussion” referring to the inward in- cence= magna facere—i.e. to make great things]. Now tention, and “administration” to the outward accomplish- “facere” may be taken in two ways, in a strict sense, and in ment. Wherefore just as magnanimity intends something a broad sense. Strictly “facere” means to work something great in every matter, it follows that magnificence does in external matter, for instance to make a house, or some- the same in every work that can be produced in external thing of the kind; in a broad sense “facere” is employed to matter [factibili]. denote any action, whether it passes into external matter, Reply to Objection 3. The intention of magnificence as to burn or cut, or remain in the agent, as to understand is the production of a great work. Now works done by or will. men are directed to an end: and no end of human works Accordingly if magnificence be taken to denote the is so great as the honor of God: wherefore magnificence doing of something great, the doing [factio] being under- does a great work especially in reference to the Divine stood in the strict sense, it is then a special virtue. For the honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that work done is produced by act: in the use of which it is “the most commendable expenditure is that which is di- possible to consider a special aspect of goodness, namely rected to Divine sacrifices”: and this is the chief object of that the work produced [factum] by the act is something magnificence. For this reason magnificence is connected great, namely in quantity, value, or dignity, and this is with holiness, since its chief effect is directed to religion what magnificence does. In this way magnificence is a or holiness. Whether the matter of magnificence is great expenditure? IIa IIae q. 134 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that the matter of magnificence than about expenditure. Therefore magnificence also is is not great expenditure. For there are not two virtues not chiefly about expenditure, but about gifts. about the same matter. But liberality is about expenditure, Objection 3. Further, it belongs to magnificence to as stated above (q. 117, a. 2). Therefore magnificence is produce an external work. But not even great expendi- not about expenditure. ture is always the means of producing an external work, Objection 2. Further, “every magnificent man is lib- for instance when one spends much in sending presents. eral” (Ethic. iv, 2). But liberality is about gifts rather Therefore expenditure is not the proper matter of magnif- 1799 icence. culty besides arising from the greatness of that same thing. Objection 4. Further, only the rich are capable of Hence the need for two virtues, concerned about money great expenditure. But the poor are able to possess all the and its use; namely, liberality, which regards the use of virtues, since “the virtues do not necessarily require exter- money in general, and magnificence, which regards that nal fortune, but are sufficient for themselves,” as Seneca which is great in the use of money. says (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi). Therefore magnificence Reply to Objection 2. The use of money regards is not about great expenditure. the liberal man in one way and the magnificent man in On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, another. For it regards the liberal man, inasmuch as it 2) that “magnificence does not extend, like liberality, to proceeds from an ordinate affection in respect of money; all transactions in money, but only to expensive ones, wherefore all due use of money (such as gifts and expen- wherein it exceeds liberality in scale.” Therefore it is only diture), the obstacles to which are removed by a moder- about great expenditure. ate love of money, belongs to liberality. But the use of I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), it belongs to money regards the magnificent man in relation to some magnificence to intend doing some great work. Now for great work which has to be produced, and this use is im- the doing of a great work, proportionate expenditure is possible without expenditure or outlay. necessary, for great works cannot be produced without Reply to Objection 3. The magnificent man also great expenditure. Hence it belongs to magnificence to makes gifts of presents, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2, but not spend much in order that some great work may be accom- under the aspect of gift, but rather under the aspect of ex- plished in becoming manner. Wherefore the Philosopher penditure directed to the production of some work, for in- says (Ethic. iv, 2) that “a magnificent man will produce stance in order to honor someone, or in order to do some- a more magnificent work with equal,” i.e. proportionate, thing which will reflect honor on the whole state: as when “expenditure.” Now expenditure is the outlay of a sum he brings to effect what the whole state is striving for. of money; and a man may be hindered from making that Reply to Objection 4. The chief act of virtue is the in- outlay if he love money too much. Hence the matter of ward choice, and a virtue may have this without outward magnificence may be said to be both this expenditure it- fortune: so that even a poor man may be magnificent. But self, which the magnificent man uses to produce a great goods of fortune are requisite as instruments to the ex- work, and also the very money which he employs in going ternal acts of virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot to great expense, and as well as the love of money, which accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that love the magnificent man moderates, lest he be hindered are great simply. Perhaps, however, he may be able to do from spending much. so in things that are great by comparison to some partic- Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 129, a. 2), ular work; which, though little in itself, can nevertheless those virtues that are about external things experience a be done magnificently in proportion to its genus: for little certain difficulty arising from the genus itself of the thing and great are relative terms, as the Philosopher says (De about which the virtue is concerned, and another diffi- Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.). Whether magnificence is a part of fortitude? IIa IIae q. 134 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that magnificence is not a part robius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon mag- of fortitude. For magnificence agrees in matter with liber- nificence to be a part of fortitude. ality, as stated above (a. 3). But liberality is a part, not of I answer that, Magnificence, in so far as it is a special fortitude, but of justice. Therefore magnificence is not a virtue, cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude, part of fortitude. since it does not agree with this virtue in the point of mat- Objection 2. Further, fortitude is about fear and dar- ter: but it is reckoned a part thereof, as being annexed to ings. But magnificence seems to have nothing to do with it as secondary to principal virtue. fear, but only with expenditure, which is a kind of action. In order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue, Therefore magnificence seems to pertain to justice, which two things are necessary, as stated above (q. 80). The one is about actions, rather than to fortitude. is that the secondary virtue agree with the principal, and Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. the other is that in some respect it be exceeded thereby. iv, 2) that “the magnificent man is like the man of sci- Now magnificence agrees with fortitude in the point that ence.” Now science has more in common with prudence as fortitude tends to something arduous and difficult, so than with fortitude. Therefore magnificence should not be also does magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is seated, reckoned a part of fortitude. like fortitude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence falls short On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) and Mac- of fortitude, in that the arduous thing to which fortitude 1800 tends derives its difficulty from a danger that threatens the determinate matter, namely expenditure: wherefore mag-person, whereas the arduous thing to which magnificence nificence, like magnanimity, is apparently in the irascible tends, derives its difficulty from the dispossession of one’s part. property, which is of much less account than danger to Reply to Objection 2. Although magnificence does one’s person. Wherefore magnificence is accounted a part not agree with fortitude in matter, it agrees with it as the of fortitude. condition of its matter: since it tends to something diffi- Reply to Objection 1. Justice regards operations in cult in the matter of expenditure, even as fortitude tends themselves, as viewed under the aspect of something due: to something difficult in the matter of fear. but liberality and magnificence regard sumptuary opera- Reply to Objection 3. Magnificence directs the use of tions as related to the passions of the soul, albeit in dif- art to something great, as stated above and in the preced- ferent ways. For liberality regards expenditure in refer- ing Article. Now art is in the reason. Wherefore it belongs ence to the love and desire of money, which are passions to the magnificent man to use his reason by observing pro- of the concupiscible faculty, and do not hinder the lib- portion of expenditure to the work he has in hand. This is eral man from giving and spending: so that this virtue especially necessary on account of the greatness of both is in the concupiscible. On the other hand, magnificence those things, since if he did not take careful thought, he regards expenditure in reference to hope, by attaining to would incur the risk of a great loss. the difficulty, not simply, as magnanimity does, but in a 1801 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 135 Of Meanness∗ (In Two Articles) We must now consider the vices opposed to magnificence: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether meanness is a vice? (2) Of the vice opposed to it. Whether meanness is a vice? IIa IIae q. 135 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that meanness is not a vice. For he does not shrink from producing a little work, so long just as vice moderates great things, so does it moderate lit- as he spends little. Wherefore the Philosopher says that tle things: wherefore both the liberal and the magnificent “the mean man after going to great expense forfeits the do little things. But magnificence is a virtue. Therefore good” of the magnificent work, “for the trifle” that he is likewise meanness is a virtue rather than a vice. unwilling to spend. Therefore it is evident that the mean Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, man fails to observe the proportion that reason demands 2) that “careful reckoning is mean.” But careful reckon- between expenditure and work. Now the essence of vice ing is apparently praiseworthy, since man’s good is to be is that it consists in failing to do what is in accordance in accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. with reason. Hence it is manifest that meanness is a vice. iv, 4). Therefore meanness is not a vice. Reply to Objection 1. Virtue moderates little things, Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, according to the rule of reason: from which rule the mean 2) that “a mean man is loth to spend money.” But this be- man declines, as stated in the Article. For he is called longs to covetousness or illiberality. Therefore meanness mean, not for moderating little things, but for declining is not a distinct vice from the others. from the rule of reason in moderating great or little things: On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii) accounts hence meanness is a vice. meanness a special vice opposed to magnificence. Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (Rhet. I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 3; Ia ii, 5), “fear makes us take counsel”: wherefore a mean IIae, q. 18, a. 6), moral acts take their species from their man is careful in his reckonings, because he has an inor- end, wherefore in many cases they are denominated from dinate fear of spending his goods, even in things of the that end. Accordingly a man is said to be mean [parvifi- least account. Hence this is not praiseworthy, but sinful cus] because he intends to do something little [parvum]. and reprehensible, because then a man does not regulate Now according to the Philosopher (De Praedic. Cap. Ad his affections according to reason, but, on the contrary, aliquid.) great and little are relative terms: and when we makes use of his reason in pursuance of his inordinate af- say that a mean man intends to do something little, this fections. must be understood in relation to the kind of work he does. Reply to Objection 3. Just as the magnificent man This may be little or great in two ways: in one way as has this in common with the liberal man, that he spends regards the work itself to be done, in another as regards his money readily and with pleasure, so too the mean man the expense. Accordingly the magnificent man intends in common with the illiberal or covetous man is loth and principally the greatness of his work, and secondarily he slow to spend. Yet they differ in this, that illiberality re- intends the greatness of the expense, which he does not gards ordinary expenditure, while meanness regards great shirk, so that he may produce a great work. Wherefore expenditure, which is a more difficult accomplishment: the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 4) that “the magnificent wherefore meanness is less sinful than illiberality. Hence man with equal expenditure will produce a more magnif- the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that “although mean- icent result.” On the other hand, the mean man intends ness and its contrary vice are sinful, they do not bring principally to spend little, wherefore the Philosopher says shame on a man, since neither do they harm one’s neigh- (Ethic. iv, 2) that “he seeks how he may spend least.” As bor, nor are they very disgraceful.” a result of this he intends to produce a little work, that is, ∗ “Parvificentia,” or Doing Mean Things, Just As “Magnificentia” Is Doing Great Things. 1802 Whether there is a vice opposed to meanness? IIa IIae q. 135 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that there is no vice opposed spend less than his work is worth, and thus fails to observe to meanness. For great is opposed to little. Now, mag- due proportion between his expenditure and his work, has nificence is not a vice, but a virtue. Therefore no vice is a vice opposed to it, whereby a man exceeds this same opposed to meanness. proportion, by spending more than is proportionate to his Objection 2. Further, since meanness is a vice by de- work. This vice is called in Greek banausia, so called ficiency, as stated above (a. 1), it seems that if any vice is from the Greek baunos, because, like the fire in the fur-opposed to meanness, it would merely consist in excessive nace, it consumes everything. It is also called apyrokalia, spending. But those who spend much, where they ought to i.e. lacking good fire, since like fire it consumes all, but spend little, spend little where they ought to spend much, not for a good purpose. Hence in Latin it may be called according to Ethic. iv, 2, and thus they have something of “consumptio” [waste]. meanness. Therefore there is not a vice opposed to mean- Reply to Objection 1. Magnificence is so called from ness. the great work done, but not from the expenditure being Objection 3. Further, moral acts take their species in excess of the work: for this belongs to the vice which from their end, as stated above (a. 1). Now those who is opposed to meanness. spend excessively, do so in order to make a show of their Reply to Objection 2. To the one same vice there is wealth, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2. But this belongs to vain- opposed the virtue which observes the mean, and a con- glory, which is opposed to magnanimity, as stated above trary vice. Accordingly, then, the vice of waste is opposed (q. 131, a. 2 ). Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness. to meanness in that it exceeds in expenditure the value of On the contrary, stands the authority of the Philoso- the work, by spending much where it behooved to spend pher who (Ethic. ii, 8; iv, 2) places magnificence as a little. But it is opposed to magnificence on the part of mean between two opposite vices. the great work, which the magnificent man intends prin- I answer that, Great is opposed to little. Also little cipally, in so far as when it behooves to spend much, it and great are relative terms, as stated above (a. 1). Now spends little or nothing. just as expenditure may be little in comparison with the Reply to Objection 3. Wastefulness is opposed to work, so may it be great in comparison with the work meanness by the very species of its act, since it exceeds in that it exceeds the proportion which reason requires to the rule of reason, whereas meanness falls short of it. Yet exist between expenditure and work. Hence it is mani- nothing hinders this from being directed to the end of an- fest that the vice of meanness, whereby a man intends to other vice, such as vainglory or any other. 1803 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 136 Of Patience (In Five Articles) We must now consider patience. Under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether patience is a virtue? (2) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues? (3) Whether it can be had without grace? (4) Whether it is a part of fortitude? (5) Whether it is the same as longanimity? Whether patience is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 136 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that patience is not a virtue. For equal mind,” i.e. without being disturbed by sorrow, “lest the virtues are most perfect in heaven, as Augustine says he abandon with an unequal mind the goods whereby he (De Trin. xiv). Yet patience is not there, since no evils may advance to better things.” It is therefore evident that have to be borne there, according to Is. 49:10 and Apoc. patience is a virtue. 7:16, “They shall not hunger nor thirst, neither shall the Reply to Objection 1. The moral virtues do not re- heat nor the sun strike them.” Therefore patience is not a main in heaven as regards the same act that they have on virtue. the way, in relation, namely, to the goods of the present Objection 2. Further, no virtue can be found in the life, which will not remain in heaven: but they will re- wicked, since virtue it is “that makes its possessor good.” main in their relation to the end, which will be in heaven. Yet patience is sometimes found in wicked men; for in- Thus justice will not be in heaven in relation to buying and stance, in the covetous, who bear many evils patiently selling and other matters pertaining to the present life, but that they may amass money, according to Eccles. 5:16, it will remain in the point of being subject to God. In like “All the days of his life he eateth in darkness, and in many manner the act of patience, in heaven, will not consist in cares, and in misery and in sorrow.” Therefore patience is bearing things, but in enjoying the goods to which we had not a virtue. aspired by suffering. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei Objection 3. Further, the fruits differ from the virtues, xiv) that “patience itself will not be in heaven, since there as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 70, a. 1, ad 3). But patience is is no need for it except where evils have to be borne: yet reckoned among the fruits (Gal. 5:22). Therefore patience that which we shall obtain by patience will be eternal.” is not a virtue. Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Patien- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Patientia i): tia ii; v) “properly speaking those are patient who would “The virtue of the soul that is called patience, is so great a rather bear evils without inflicting them, than inflict them gift of God, that we even preach the patience of Him who without bearing them. As for those who bear evils that bestows it upon us.” they may inflict evil, their patience is neither marvelous I answer that, As stated above (q. 123, a. 1), the moral nor praiseworthy, for it is no patience at all: we may mar-virtues are directed to the good, inasmuch as they safe- vel at their hardness of heart, but we must refuse to call guard the good of reason against the impulse of the pas- them patient.” sions. Now among the passions sorrow is strong to hinder Reply to Objection 3. As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 11, the good of reason, according to 2 Cor. 7:10, “The sorrow a. 1), the very notion of fruit denotes pleasure. And works of the world worketh death,” and Ecclus. 30:25, “Sad- of virtue afford pleasure in themselves, as stated in Ethic. ness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it.” Hence i, 8. Now the names of the virtues are wont to be applied the necessity for a virtue to safeguard the good of reason to their acts. Wherefore patience as a habit is a virtue. but against sorrow, lest reason give way to sorrow: and this as to the pleasure which its act affords, it is reckoned a patience does. Wherefore Augustine says (De Patientia fruit, especially in this, that patience safeguards the mind ii): “A man’s patience it is whereby he bears evil with an from being overcome by sorrow. 1804 Whether patience is the greatest of the virtues? IIa IIae q. 136 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that patience is the greatest of among those that are a check on things that withdraw man the virtues. For in every genus that which is perfect is the from good, the greater virtue is the one which is a check greatest. Now “patience hath a perfect work” (James 1:4). on a greater obstacle to good. But dangers of death, about Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues. which is fortitude, and pleasures of touch, with which Objection 2. Further, all the virtues are directed to temperance is concerned, withdraw man from good more the good of the soul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to than any kind of hardship, which is the object of patience. patience; for it is written (Lk. 21:19): “In your patience Therefore patience is not the greatest of the virtues, but you shall possess your souls.” Therefore patience is the falls short, not only of the theological virtues, and of pru- greatest of the virtues. dence and justice which directly establish man in good, Objection 3. Further, seemingly that which is the but also of fortitude and temperance which withdraw him safeguard and cause of other things is greater than they from greater obstacles to good. are. But according to Gregory (Hom. xxxv in Evang.) Reply to Objection 1. Patience is said to have a per- “patience is the root and safeguard of all the virtues.” fect work in bearing hardships: for these give rise first Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues. to sorrow, which is moderated by patience; secondly, to On the contrary, It is not reckoned among the four anger, which is moderated by meekness; thirdly, to hatred, virtues which Gregory (Moral. xxii) and Augustine (De which charity removes; fourthly, to unjust injury, which Morib. Eccl. xv) call principal. justice forbids. Now that which removes the principle is I answer that, Virtues by their very nature are di- the most perfect. rected to good. For it is virtue that “makes its possessor Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in good, and renders the latter’s work good” (Ethic. ii, 6). this respect, that it is more perfect simply. Hence it follows that a virtue’s superiority and prepon- Reply to Objection 2. Possession denotes undis- derance over other virtues is the greater according as it turbed ownership; wherefore man is said to possess his inclines man to good more effectively and directly. Now soul by patience, in so far as it removes by the root the those virtues which are effective of good, incline a man passions that are evoked by hardships and disturb the soul. more directly to good than those which are a check on Reply to Objection 3. Patience is said to be the root the things which lead man away from good: and just as and safeguard of all the virtues, not as though it caused among those that are effective of good, the greater is that and preserved them directly, but merely because it re- which establishes man in a greater good (thus faith, hope, moves their obstacles. and charity /are greater than prudence and justice); so too Whether it is possible to have patience without grace? IIa IIae q. 136 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that it is possible to have pa- through much trouble and pain in order to regain health tience without grace. For the more his reason inclines to of the body. Now the health of the soul is not less de- a thing, the more is it possible for the rational creature to sirable than bodily health. Therefore in like manner one accomplish it. Now it is more reasonable to suffer evil may, without the help of grace, endure many evils for the for the sake of good than for the sake of evil. Yet some health of the soul, and this is to be truly patient. suffer evil for evil’s sake, by their own virtue and with- On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 61:6): “From Him,” out the help of grace; for Augustine says (De Patientia iii) i.e. from God, “is my patience.” that “men endure many toils and sorrows for the sake of I answer that, As Augustine says (De Patientia iv), the things they love sinfully.” Much more, therefore, is it “the strength of desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: possible for man, without the help of grace, to bear evil and no one willingly undertakes to bear what is painful, for the sake of good, and this is to be truly patient. save for the sake of that which gives pleasure.” The rea- Objection 2. Further, some who are not in a state of son of this is because sorrow and pain are of themselves grace have more abhorrence for sinful evils than for bod- displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose ily evils: hence some heathens are related to have endured to suffer them for their own sake, but only for the sake many hardships rather than betray their country or com- of an end. Hence it follows that the good for the sake of mit some other misdeed. Now this is to be truly patient. which one is willing to endure evils, is more desired and Therefore it seems that it is possible to have patience with- loved than the good the privation of which causes the sor- out the help of grace. row that we bear patiently. Now the fact that a man prefers Objection 3. Further, it is quite evident that some go the good of grace to all natural goods, the loss of which 1805 may cause sorrow, is to be referred to charity, which loves dance with reason: and yet it is this that pertains to true God above all things. Hence it is evident that patience, as patience. a virtue, is caused by charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, Reply to Objection 2. The good of a social virtue∗ is “Charity is patient.” commensurate with human nature; and consequently the But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity human will can tend thereto without the help of sanctify- save through grace, according to Rom. 5:5, “The charity ing grace, yet not without the help of God’s grace†. On of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost the other hand, the good of grace is supernatural, where- Who is given to us.” Therefore it is clearly impossible to fore man cannot tend thereto by a natural virtue. Hence have patience without the help of grace. the comparison fails. Reply to Objection 1. The inclination of reason Reply to Objection 3. Even the endurance of those would prevail in human nature in the state of integrity. evils which a man bears for the sake of his body’s health, But in corrupt nature the inclination of concupiscence pre- proceeds from the love a man naturally has for his own vails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is more flesh. Hence there is no comparison between this en- prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which the con- durance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural cupiscence delights here and now, than to endure evils for love. the sake of goods to come, which are desired in accor- Whether patience is a part of fortitude? IIa IIae q. 136 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that patience is not a part of brave (Sent. 811). fortitude. For a thing is not part of itself. Now patience is Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to fortitude to en- apparently the same as fortitude: because, as stated above dure, not anything indeed, but that which is most difficult (q. 123, a. 6), the proper act of fortitude is to endure; and to endure, namely dangers of death: whereas it may per- this belongs also to patience. For it is stated in the Liber tain to patience to endure any kind of evil. Sententiarum Prosperi‡ that “patience consists in endur- Reply to Objection 2. The act of fortitude consists ing evils inflicted by others.” Therefore patience is not a not only in holding fast to good against the fear of future part of fortitude. dangers, but also in not failing through sorrow or pain oc- Objection 2. Further, fortitude is about fear and dar- casioned by things present; and it is in the latter respect ing, as stated above (q. 123, a. 3), and thus it is in the iras-that patience is akin to fortitude. Yet fortitude is chiefly cible. But patience seems to be about sorrow, and conse- about fear, which of itself evokes flight which fortitude quently would seem to be in the concupiscible. Therefore avoids; while patience is chiefly about sorrow, for a man patience is not a part of fortitude but of temperance. is said to be patient, not because he does not fly, but be- Objection 3. Further, the whole cannot be without its cause he behaves in a praiseworthy manner by suffering part. Therefore if patience is a part of fortitude, there can [patiendo] things which hurt him here and now, in such a be no fortitude without patience. Yet sometimes a brave way as not to be inordinately saddened by them. Hence man does not endure evils patiently, but even attacks the fortitude is properly in the irascible, while patience is in person who inflicts the evil. Therefore patience is not a the concupiscible faculty. part of fortitude. Nor does this hinder patience from being a part of for- On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons titude, because the annexing of virtue to virtue does not re- it a part of fortitude. gard the subject, but the matter or the form. Nevertheless I answer that, Patience is a quasi-potential part of forpatience is not to be reckoned a part of temperance, al- titude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to prin- though both are in the concupiscible, because temperance cipal virtue. For it belongs to patience “to suffer with an is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures equal mind the evils inflicted by others,” as Gregory says of touch, such as arise through abstinence from pleasures in a homily (xxxv in Evang.). Now of those evils that are of food and sex: whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows inflicted by others, foremost and most difficult to endure inflicted by other persons. Moreover it belongs to temper- are those that are connected with the danger of death, and ance to control these sorrows besides their contrary plea- about these evils fortitude is concerned. Hence it is clear sures: whereas it belongs to patience that a man forsake that in this matter fortitude has the principal place, and not the good of virtue on account of such like sorrows, that it lays claim to that which is principal in this matter. however great they be. Wherefore patience is annexed to fortitude as secondary Reply to Objection 3. It may be granted that patience to principal virtue, for which reason Prosper calls patience in a certain respect is an integral part of justice, if we ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 61, a. 5 † Cf. Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 2 ‡ The quotation is from St. Gregory, Hom. xxxv in Evang. 1806 consider the fact that a man may patiently endure evils God’s wrongs patiently is most wicked”: and Augustine pertaining to dangers of death; and it is from this point says in a letter to Marcellinus (Ep. cxxxviii) that “the pre- of view that the objection argues. Nor is it inconsistent cepts of patience are not opposed to the good of the com- with patience that a man should, when necessary, rise up monwealth, since in order to ensure that good we fight against the man who inflicts evils on him; for Chrysos- against our enemies.” But in so far as patience regards all tom§ says on Mat. 4:10, “Begone Satan,” that “it is praise- kinds of evils, it is annexed to fortitude as secondary to worthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to endure principal virtue. Whether patience is the same as longanimity? ∗ IIa IIae q. 136 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that patience is the same as lon- because the very delay of the good we hope for, is of a ganimity. For Augustine says (De Patientia i) that “we nature to cause sorrow, according to Prov. 13:12, “Hope speak of patience in God, not as though any evil made that is deferred afflicteth the soul.” Hence there may be Him suffer, but because He awaits the wicked, that they patience in bearing this trial, as in enduring any other sor- may be converted.” Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 5:4): rows. Accordingly longanimity and constancy are both “The Most High is a patient rewarder.” Therefore it seems comprised under patience, in so far as both the delay of that patience is the same as longanimity. the hoped for good (which regards longanimity) and the Objection 2. Further, the same thing is not contrary toil which man endures in persistently accomplishing a to two things. But impatience is contrary to longanimity, good work (which regards constancy) may be considered whereby one awaits a delay: for one is said to be impa- under the one aspect of grievous evil. tient of delay, as of other evils. Therefore it seems that For this reason Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) in defin- patience is the same as longanimity. ing patience, says that “patience is the voluntary and pro- Objection 3. Further, just as time is a circumstance of longed endurance of arduous and difficult things for the wrongs endured, so is place. But no virtue is distinct from sake of virtue or profit.” By saying “arduous” he refers patience on the score of place. Therefore in like manner to constancy in good; when he says “difficult” he refers longanimity which takes count of time, in so far as a per- to the grievousness of evil, which is the proper object of son waits for a long time, is not distinct from patience. patience; and by adding “continued” or “long lasting,” he Objection 4. On the contrary, a gloss† on Rom. 2:4, refers to longanimity, in so far as it has something in com- “Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and pa- mon with patience. tience, and longsuffering?” says: “It seems that longa- This suffices for the Replies to the First and Second nimity differs from patience, because those who offend Objections. from weakness rather than of set purpose are said to be Reply to Objection 3. That which is a long way off borne with longanimity: while those who take a deliber- as to place, though distant from us, is not simply distant ate delight in their crimes are said to be borne patiently.” from things in nature, as that which is a long way off in I answer that, Just as by magnanimity a man has a point of time: hence the comparison fails. Moreover, what mind to tend to great things, so by longanimity a man is remote as to place offers no difficulty save in the point has a mind to tend to something a long way off. Where- of time, since what is placed a long way from us is a long fore as magnanimity regards hope, which tends to good, time coming to us. rather than daring, fear, or sorrow, which have evil as their We grant the fourth argument. We must observe, how- object, so also does longanimity. Hence longanimity has ever, that the reason for the difference assigned by this more in common with magnanimity than with patience. gloss is that it is hard to bear with those who sin through Nevertheless it may have something in common with weakness, merely because they persist a long time in evil, patience, for two reasons. First, because patience, like wherefore it is said that they are borne with longanimity: fortitude, endures certain evils for the sake of good, and if whereas the very fact of sinning through pride seems to this good is awaited shortly, endurance is easier: whereas be unendurable; for which reason those who sin through if it be delayed a long time, it is more difficult. Secondly, pride are stated to be borne with patience. § Homily v. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom ∗ Longsuffering. It is necessary to preserve the Latin word, on account of the comparison with magnanimity. † Origen, Comment. in Ep. ad Rom. ii 1807 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 137 Of Perseverance (In Four Articles) We must now consider perseverance and the vices opposed to it. Under the head of perseverance there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether perseverance is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a part of fortitude? (3) Of its relation to constancy; (4) Whether it needs the help of grace? Whether perseverance is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 137 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that perseverance is not a virtue. self), so perseverance is a special virtue, since it consists For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), conti- in enduring delays in the above or other virtuous deeds, so nency is greater than perseverance. But continency is not far as necessity requires. a virtue, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9. Therefore perseverance Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is taking per- is not a virtue. severance there, as it is found in one who bears those Objection 2. Further, “by virtue man lives aright,” things which are most difficult to endure long. Now it according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Now ac- is difficult to endure, not good, but evil. And evils that cording to the same authority (De Persever. i), no one can involve danger of death, for the most part are not en- be said to have perseverance while living, unless he per- dured for a long time, because often they soon pass away: severe until death. Therefore perseverance is not a virtue. wherefore it is not on this account that perseverance has its Objection 3. Further, it is requisite of every virtue chief title to praise. Among other evils foremost are those that one should persist unchangeably in the work of that which are opposed to pleasures of touch, because evils of virtue, as stated in Ethic. ii, 4. But this is what we under- this kind affect the necessaries of life: such are the lack of stand by perseverance: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) food and the like, which at times call for long endurance. that “perseverance is the fixed and continued persistence Now it is not difficult to endure these things for a long in a well-considered purpose.” Therefore perseverance is time for one who grieves not much at them, nor delights not a special virtue, but a condition of every virtue. much in the contrary goods; as in the case of the temperate On the contrary, Andronicus∗ says that “persever- man, in whom these passions are not violent. But they are ance is a habit regarding things to which we ought to most difficult to bear for one who is strongly affected by stand, and those to which we ought not to stand, as well such things, through lacking the perfect virtue that moder- as those that are indifferent.” Now a habit that directs us ates these passions. Wherefore if perseverance be taken in to do something well, or to omit something, is a virtue. this sense it is not a perfect virtue, but something imper- Therefore perseverance is a virtue. fect in the genus of virtue. On the other hand, if we take I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. perseverance as denoting long persistence in any kind of ii, 3), “virtue is about the difficult and the good”; and so difficult good, it is consistent in one who has even per- where there is a special kind of difficulty or goodness, fect virtue: for even if it is less difficult for him to persist, there is a special virtue. Now a virtuous deed may involve yet he persists in the more perfect good. Wherefore such goodness or difficulty on two counts. First, from the act’s like perseverance may be a virtue, because virtue derives very species, which is considered in respect of the proper perfection from the aspect of good rather than from the object of that act: secondly, from the length of time, since aspect of difficulty. to persist long in something difficult involves a special dif- Reply to Objection 2. Sometimes a virtue and its act ficulty. Hence to persist long in something good until it is go by the same name: thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. accomplished belongs to a special virtue. lxxix): “Faith is to believe without seeing.” Yet it is pos- Accordingly just as temperance and fortitude are spe- sible to have a habit of virtue without performing the act: cial virtues, for the reason that the one moderates plea- thus a poor man has the habit of magnificence without sures of touch (which is of itself a difficult thing), while exercising the act. Sometimes, however, a person who the other moderates fear and daring in connection with has the habit, begins to perform the act, yet does not ac- dangers of death (which also is something difficult in it- complish it, for instance a builder begins to build a house, ∗ Chrysippus: in De Affect. 1808 but does not complete it. Accordingly we must reply that man. Wherefore as regards these which are the principal the term “perseverance” is sometimes used to denote the virtues, the act of perseverance is not accomplished until habit whereby one chooses to persevere, sometimes for the end of life. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of the act of persevering: and sometimes one who has the perseverance as denoting the consummate act of persever- habit of perseverance chooses to persevere and begins to ance. carry out his choice by persisting for a time, yet completes Reply to Objection 3. Unchangeable persistence may not the act, through not persisting to the end. Now the end belong to a virtue in two ways. First, on account of the in- is twofold: one is the end of the work, the other is the tended end that is proper to that virtue; and thus to persist end of human life. Properly speaking it belongs to perse- in good for a long time until the end, belongs to a special verance to persevere to the end of the virtuous work, for virtue called perseverance, which intends this as its spe- instance that a soldier persevere to the end of the fight, cial end. Secondly, by reason of the relation of the habit and the magnificent man until his work be accomplished. to its subject: and thus unchangeable persistence is conse- There are, however, some virtues whose acts must en- quent upon every virtue, inasmuch as virtue is a “quality dure throughout the whole of life, such as faith, hope, and difficult to change.” charity, since they regard the last end of the entire life of Whether perseverance is a part of fortitude? IIa IIae q. 137 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that perseverance is not a part necessity that every virtue which has a title to praise for of fortitude. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, the firm endurance of something difficult must be annexed 7), “perseverance is about pains of touch.” But these be- to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue. Now the en- long to temperance. Therefore perseverance is a part of durance of difficulty arising from delay in accomplishing temperance rather than of fortitude. a good work gives perseverance its claim to praise: nor Objection 2. Further, every part of a moral virtue is is this so difficult as to endure dangers of death. There- about certain passions which that virtue moderates. Now fore perseverance is annexed to fortitude, as secondary to perseverance does not imply moderation of the passions: principal virtue. since the more violent the passions, the more praisewor- Reply to Objection 1. The annexing of secondary to thy is it to persevere in accordance with reason. Therefore principal virtues depends not only on the matter∗, but also it seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue, on the mode, because in everything form is of more ac- but rather of prudence which perfects the reason. count than matter. Wherefore although, as to matter, per- Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i) severance seems to have more in common with temper- that no one can lose perseverance; whereas one can lose ance than with fortitude, yet, in mode, it has more in com- the other virtues. Therefore perseverance is greater than mon with fortitude, in the point of standing firm against all the other virtues. Now a principal virtue is greater than the difficulty arising from length of time. its part. Therefore perseverance is not a part of a virtue, Reply to Objection 2. The perseverance of which the but is itself a principal virtue. Philosopher speaks (Ethic. vii, 4,7) does not moderate On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons any passions, but consists merely in a certain firmness of perseverance as a part of fortitude. reason and will. But perseverance, considered as a virtue, I answer that, As stated above (q. 123, a. 2; Ia IIae, moderates certain passions, namely fear of weariness or q. 61, Aa. 3,4), a principal virtue is one to which is prin- failure on account of the delay. Hence this virtue, like cipally ascribed something that lays claim to the praise fortitude, is in the irascible. of virtue, inasmuch as it practices it in connection with Reply to Objection 3. Augustine speaks there of per- its own matter, wherein it is most difficult of accomplish- severance, as denoting, not a virtuous habit, but a virtuous ment. In accordance with this it has been stated (q. 123, act sustained to the end, according to Mat. 24:13, “He that a. 2) that fortitude is a principal virtue, because it observes shall persevere to the end, he shall be saved.” Hence it is firmness in matters wherein it is most difficult to stand incompatible with such like perseverance for it to be lost, firm, namely in dangers of death. Wherefore it follows of since it would no longer endure to the end. ∗ Cf. q. 136, a. 4, ad 2 1809 Whether constancy pertains to perseverance? IIa IIae q. 137 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that constancy does not pertain ance properly makes man persist firmly in good, against to perseverance. For constancy pertains to patience, as the difficulty that arises from the very continuance of the stated above (q. 137, a. 5): and patience differs from per- act: whereas constancy makes him persist firmly in good severance. Therefore constancy does not pertain to perse- against difficulties arising from any other external hin- verance. drances. Hence perseverance takes precedence of con- Objection 2. Further, “virtue is about the difficult and stancy as a part of fortitude, because the difficulty arising the good.” Now it does not seem difficult to be constant from continuance of action is more intrinsic to the act of in little works, but only in great deeds, which pertain to virtue than that which arises from external obstacles. magnificence. Therefore constancy pertains to magnifi- Reply to Objection 1. External obstacles to persis- cence rather than to perseverance. tence in good are especially those which cause sorrow. Objection 3. Further, if constancy pertained to per- Now patience is about sorrow, as stated above (q. 136, severance, it would seem nowise to differ from it, since a. 1). Hence constancy agrees with perseverance as to end: both denote a kind of unchangeableness. Yet they dif- while it agrees with patience as to those things which oc- fer: for Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) condivides con- casion difficulty. Now the end is of most account: where- stancy with firmness by which he indicates perseverance, fore constancy pertains to perseverance rather than to pa- as stated above (q. 128 , a. 6). Therefore constancy does tience. not pertain to perseverance. Reply to Objection 2. It is more difficult to persist On the contrary, One is said to be constant because in great deeds: yet in little or ordinary deeds, it is diffi- one stands to a thing. Now it belongs to perseverance cult to persist for any length of time, if not on account of to stand to certain things, as appears from the definition the greatness of the deed which magnificence considers, given by Andronicus. Therefore constancy belongs to per- yet from its very continuance which perseverance regards. severance. Hence constancy may pertain to both. I answer that, Perseverance and constancy agree as Reply to Objection 3. Constancy pertains to perse- to end, since it belongs to both to persist firmly in some verance in so far as it has something in common with it: good: but they differ as to those things which make it dif- but it is not the same thing in the point of their difference, ficult to persist in good. Because the virtue of persever- as stated in the Article. Whether perseverance needs the help of grace? ∗ IIa IIae q. 137 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that perseverance does not need hold that perseverance is a gift of God, whereby we per- the help of grace. For perseverance is a virtue, as stated severe unto the end, in Christ.” above (a. 1). Now according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 2; a. 2, ad 3), virtue acts after the manner of nature. Therefore the sole perseverance has a twofold signification. First, it denotes inclination of virtue suffices for perseverance. Therefore the habit of perseverance, considered as a virtue. In this this does not need the help of grace. way it needs the gift of habitual grace, even as the other Objection 2. Further, the gift of Christ’s grace is infused virtues. Secondly, it may be taken to denote the greater than the harm brought upon us by Adam, as ap- act of perseverance enduring until death: and in this sense pears from Rom. 5:15, seqq. Now “before sin man was it needs not only habitual grace, but also the gratuitous so framed that he could persevere by means of what he help of God sustaining man in good until the end of life, had received,” as Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi). as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 10), when we were Much more therefore can man, after being repaired by the treating of grace. Because, since the free-will is change- grace of Christ, persevere without the help of a further able by its very nature, which changeableness is not taken grace. away from it by the habitual grace bestowed in the present Objection 3. Further, sinful deeds are sometimes life, it is not in the power of the free-will, albeit repaired more difficult than deeds of virtue: hence it is said in by grace, to abide unchangeably in good, though it is in its the person of the wicked (Wis. 5:7): “We. . . have walked power to choose this: for it is often in our power to choose through hard ways.” Now some persevere in sinful deeds yet not to accomplish. without the help of another. Therefore man can also per- Reply to Objection 1. The virtue of perseverance, so severe in deeds of virtue without the help of grace. far as it is concerned, inclines one to persevere: yet since On the contrary, Augustine says (De Persev. i): “We it is a habit, and a habit is a thing one uses at will, it does ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 10 1810 not follow that a person who has the habit of virtue uses it great a facility of avoiding sin: whereas these, although unchangeably until death. the world rage against their constancy, have persevered in Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Correp. faith.” et Grat. xi), “it was given to the first man, not to persevere, Reply to Objection 3. Man is able by himself to fall but to be able to persevere of his free-will: because then into sin, but he cannot by himself arise from sin without no corruption was in human nature to make perseverance the help of grace. Hence by falling into sin, so far as he difficult. Now, however, by the grace of Christ, the pre- is concerned man makes himself to be persevering in sin, destined receive not only the possibility of persevering, unless he be delivered by God’s grace. On the other hand, but perseverance itself. Wherefore the first man whom by doing good he does not make himself to be persevering no man threatened, of his own free-will rebelling against in good, because he is able, by himself, to sin: wherefore a threatening God, forfeited so great a happiness and so he needs the help of grace for that end. 1811 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 138 Of the Vices Opposed to Perseverance (In Two Articles) We must now consider the vices opposed to perseverance; under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Of effeminacy; (2) Of pertinacity. Whether effeminacy∗ is opposed to perseverance? IIa IIae q. 138 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that effeminacy is not opposed who has proved himself unbeaten by toil, to yield to plea- to perseverance. For a gloss on 1 Cor. 6:9,10, “Nor adul- sure.” Moreover, pleasure itself is a stronger motive of terers, nor the effeminate, nor liers with mankind,” ex- attraction than sorrow, for the lack of pleasure is a motive pounds the text thus: “Effeminate—i.e. obscene, given to of withdrawal, since lack of pleasure is a pure privation. unnatural vice.” But this is opposed to chastity. Therefore Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), effeminacy is not a vice opposed to perseverance. properly speaking an effeminate man is one who with- Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, draws from good on account of sorrow caused by lack of 7) that “delicacy is a kind of effeminacy.” But to be deli- pleasure, yielding as it were to a weak motion. cate seems akin to intemperance. Therefore effeminacy is Reply to Objection 1. This effeminacy is caused in not opposed to perseverance but to temperance. two ways. In one way, by custom: for where a man Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, is accustomed to enjoy pleasures, it is more difficult for 7) that “the man who is fond of amusement is effeminate.” him to endure the lack of them. In another way, by nat- Now immoderate fondness of amusement is opposed to ural disposition, because, to wit, his mind is less perse- eutrapelia, which is the virtue about pleasures of play, as vering through the frailty of his temperament. This is stated in Ethic. iv, 8. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed how women are compared to men, as the Philosopher to perseverance. says (Ethic. vii, 7): wherefore those who are passively On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) sodomitical are said to be effeminate, being womanish that “the persevering man is opposed to the effeminate.” themselves, as it were. I answer that, As stated above (q. 137, Aa. 1,2), per- Reply to Objection 2. Toil is opposed to bodily plea- severance is deserving of praise because thereby a man sure: wherefore it is only toilsome things that are a hin- does not forsake a good on account of long endurance of drance to pleasures. Now the delicate are those who can- difficulties and toils: and it is directly opposed to this, not endure toils, nor anything that diminishes pleasure. seemingly, for a man to be ready to forsake a good on ac- Hence it is written (Dt. 28:56): “The tender and deli- count of difficulties which he cannot endure. This is what cate woman, that could not go upon the ground, nor set we understand by effeminacy, because a thing is said to be down her foot for. . . softness [Douay: ‘niceness’].” Thus “soft” if it readily yields to the touch. Now a thing is not delicacy is a kind of effeminacy. But properly speaking declared to be soft through yielding to a heavy blow, for effeminacy regards lack of pleasures, while delicacy re- walls yield to the battering-ram. Wherefore a man is not gards the cause that hinders pleasure, for instance toil or said to be effeminate if he yields to heavy blows. Hence the like. the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that “it is no won- Reply to Objection 3. In play two things may be con- der, if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming sidered. In the first place there is the pleasure, and thus pleasures or sorrows; but he is to be pardoned if he strug- inordinate fondness of play is opposed to eutrapelia. Sec-gles against them.” Now it is evident that fear of danger ondly, we may consider the relaxation or rest which is op- is more impelling than the desire of pleasure: wherefore posed to toil. Accordingly just as it belongs to effeminacy Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading “True magna- to be unable to endure toilsome things, so too it belongs nimity consists of two things: It is inconsistent for one thereto to desire play or any other relaxation inordinately. who is not cast down by fear, to be defeated by lust, or ∗ Mollities, literally ‘softness’ 1812 Whether pertinacity is opposed to perseverance? IIa IIae q. 138 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that pertinacity is not opposed pose until he is victorious: for the ancients called ‘vicia’ to perseverance. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that per- what we call victory.” These the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, tinacity arises from vainglory. But vainglory is not op- 9) calls ischyrognomones, that is “head-strong,” or idio-posed to perseverance but to magnanimity, as stated above gnomones, that is “self-opinionated,” because they abide (q. 132, a. 2). Therefore pertinacity is not opposed to per-by their opinions more than they should; whereas the ef- severance. feminate man does so less than he ought, and the persever- Objection 2. Further, if it is opposed to persever- ing man, as he ought. Hence it is clear that perseverance ance, this is so either by excess or by deficiency. Now is commended for observing the mean, while pertinacity it is not opposed by excess: because the pertinacious also is reproved for exceeding the mean, and effeminacy for yield to certain pleasure and sorrow, since according to falling short of it. the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) “they rejoice when they Reply to Objection 1. The reason why a man is too prevail, and grieve when their opinions are rejected.” And persistent in his own opinion, is that he wishes by this if it be opposed by deficiency, it will be the same as ef- means to make a show of his own excellence: wherefore feminacy, which is clearly false. Therefore pertinacity is this is the result of vainglory as its cause. Now it has been nowise opposed to perseverance. stated above (q. 127, a. 2, ad 1; q. 133, a. 2), that opposi- Objection 3. Further, just as the persevering man per- tion of vices to virtues depends, not on their cause, but on sists in good against sorrow, so too do the continent and their species. the temperate against pleasures, the brave against fear, and Reply to Objection 2. The pertinacious man exceeds the meek against anger. But pertinacity is over-persistence by persisting inordinately in something against many dif- in something. Therefore pertinacity is not opposed to per- ficulties: yet he takes a certain pleasure in the end, just severance more than to other virtues. as the brave and the persevering man. Since, however, On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) this pleasure is sinful, seeing that he desires it too much, that pertinacity is to perseverance as superstition is to re- and shuns the contrary pain, he is like the incontinent or ligion. But superstition is opposed to religion, as stated effeminate man. above (q. 92, a. 1). Therefore pertinacity is opposed to Reply to Objection 3. Although the other virtues per- perseverance. sist against the onslaught of the passions, they are not I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) “a per- commended for persisting in the same way as persever- son is said to be pertinacious who holds on impudently, ance is. As to continence, its claim to praise seems to as being utterly tenacious.” “Pervicacious” has the same lie rather in overcoming pleasures. Hence pertinacity is meaning, for it signifies that a man “perseveres in his pur- directly opposed to perseverance. 1813 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 139 Of the Gift of Fortitude (In Two Articles) We must next consider the gift corresponding to fortitude, and this is the gift of fortitude. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether fortitude is a gift? (2) Which among the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it? Whether fortitude is a gift? IIa IIae q. 139 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not a gift. For Ghost, in order that he may attain the end of each work the virtues differ from the gifts: and fortitude is a virtue. begun, and avoid whatever perils may threaten. This sur- Therefore it should not be reckoned a gift. passes human nature: for sometimes it is not in a man’s Objection 2. Further, the acts of the gift remain in power to attain the end of his work, or to avoid evils or heaven, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 6). But the dangers, since these may happen to overwhelm him in act of fortitude does not remain in heaven: for Gregory death. But the Holy Ghost works this in man, by bring- says (Moral. i) that “fortitude encourages the fainthearted ing him to everlasting life, which is the end of all good against hardships, which will be altogether absent from deeds, and the release from all perils. A certain confi- heaven.” Therefore fortitude is not a gift. dence of this is infused into the mind by the Holy Ghost Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Who expels any fear of the contrary. It is in this sense that Christ. ii) that “it is a sign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift fortitude is reckoned a gift of the Holy Ghost. For it has from all the deadly pleasures of the passing show.” Now been stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, Aa. 1,2) that the gifts noisome pleasures and delights are the concern of tem- regard the motion of the mind by the Holy Ghost. perance rather than of fortitude. Therefore it seems that Reply to Objection 1. Fortitude, as a virtue, perfects fortitude is not the gift corresponding to the virtue of for- the mind in the endurance of all perils whatever; but it titude. does not go so far as to give confidence of overcoming all On the contrary, Fortitude is reckoned among the dangers: this belongs to the fortitude that is a gift of the other gifts of the Holy Ghost (Is. 11:2). Holy Ghost. I answer that, Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of Reply to Objection 2. The gifts have not the same mind, as stated above (q. 123, a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 61, a. 3): acts in heaven as on the way: for they exercise acts in and this firmness of mind is required both in doing good connection with the enjoyment of the end. Hence the act and in enduring evil, especially with regard to goods or of fortitude there is to enjoy full security from toil and evils that are difficult. Now man, according to his proper evil. and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness in both Reply to Objection 3. The gift of fortitude regards the these respects, so as not to forsake the good on account of virtue of fortitude not only because it consists in enduring difficulties, whether in accomplishing an arduous work, or dangers, but also inasmuch as it consists in accomplish- in enduring grievous evil. In this sense fortitude denotes a ing any difficult work. Wherefore the gift of fortitude is special or general virtue, as stated above (q. 123, a. 2). directed by the gift of counsel, which seems to be con- Yet furthermore man’s mind is moved by the Holy cerned chiefly with the greater goods. Whether the fourth beatitude: “Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice,” IIa IIae q. 139 a. 2 corresponds to the gift of fortitude? Objection 1. It seems that the fourth beatitude, Objection 2. Further, hunger and thirst after justice “Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice,” does imply a desire for good. Now this belongs properly to not correspond to the gift of fortitude. For the gift of piety charity, to which the gift of wisdom, and not the gift of and not the gift of fortitude corresponds to the virtue of fortitude, corresponds, as stated above (q. 45). Therefore justice. Now hungering and thirsting after justice pertain this beatitude corresponds, not to the gift of fortitude, but to the act of justice. Therefore this beatitude corresponds to the gift of wisdom. to the gift of piety rather than to the gift of fortitude. Objection 3. Further, the fruits are consequent upon 1814 the beatitudes, since delight is essential to beatitude, ac-receive the common designation of works of justice, but cording to Ethic. i, 8. Now the fruits, apparently, include furthermore to do them with an unsatiable desire, which none pertaining to fortitude. Therefore neither does any may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice. beatitude correspond to it. Reply to Objection 1. As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Matth.), we may understand here not only particular, in Monte i): “Fortitude becomes the hungry and thirsty: but also universal justice, which is related to all virtuous since those who desire to enjoy true goods, and wish to deeds according to Ethic. v, 1, wherein whatever is hard avoid loving earthly and material things, must toil.” is the object of that fortitude which is a gift. I answer that, As stated above (q. 121, a. 2), Au- Reply to Objection 2. Charity is the root of all the gustine makes the beatitudes correspond to the gifts ac- virtues and gifts, as stated above (q. 23, a. 8, ad 3; Ia IIae, cording to the order in which they are set forth, observ-q. 68, a. 4, ad 3). Hence whatever pertains to fortitude ing at the same time a certain fittingness between them. may also be referred to charity. Wherefore he ascribes the fourth beatitude, concerning Reply to Objection 3. There are two of the fruits the hunger and thirst for justice, to the fourth gift, namely which correspond sufficiently to the gift of fortitude: fortitude. namely, patience, which regards the enduring of evils: and Yet there is a certain congruity between them, because, longanimity, which may regard the long delay and accom- as stated (a. 1 ), fortitude is about difficult things. Now it plishment of goods. is very difficult, not merely to do virtuous deeds, which 1815 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 140 Of the Precepts of Fortitude (In Two Articles) We must next consider the precepts of fortitude: (1) The precepts of fortitude itself; (2) The precepts of its parts. Whether the precepts of fortitude are suitably given in the Divine Law? IIa IIae q. 140 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that the precepts of fortitude are cording to the requirements of those goods. not suitably given in the Divine Law. For the New Law is Reply to Objection 1. The Old Testament contained more perfect than the Old Law. Yet the Old Law contains temporal promises, while the promises of the New Tes- precepts of fortitude (Dt. 20). Therefore precepts of forti- tament are spiritual and eternal, according to Augustine tude should have been given in the New Law also. (Contra Faust. iv). Hence in the Old Law there was need Objection 2. Further, affirmative precepts are of for the people to be taught how to fight, even in a bodily greater import than negative precepts, since the affirma- contest, in order to obtain an earthly possession. But in tive include the negative, but not vice versa. Therefore it the New Testament men were to be taught how to come is unsuitable for the Divine Law to contain none but neg- to the possession of eternal life by fighting spiritually, ac- ative precepts in prohibition of fear. cording to Mat. 11:12, “The kingdom of heaven suffer- Objection 3. Further, fortitude is one of the principal eth violence, and the violent bear it away.” Hence Peter virtues, as stated above (q. 123, a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 61, a. 2). commands (1 Pet. 5:8,9): “Your adversary the devil, as a Now the precepts are directed to the virtues as to their end: roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour: wherefore they should be proportionate to them. There- whom resist ye, strong in faith,” as also James 4:7: “Re- fore the precepts of fortitude should have been placed sist the devil, and he will fly from you.” Since, however, among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the chief men while tending to spiritual goods may be withdrawn precepts of the Law. from them by corporal dangers, precepts of fortitude had On the contrary, stands Holy Writ which contains to be given even in the New Law, that they might bravely these precepts. endure temporal evils, according to Mat. 10:28, “Fear ye I answer that, Precepts of law are directed to the end not them that kill the body.” intended by the lawgiver. Wherefore precepts of law must Reply to Objection 2. The law gives general direc- needs be framed in various ways according to the various tions in its precepts. But the things that have to be done ends intended by lawgivers, so that even in human affairs in cases of danger are not, like the things to be avoided, there are laws of democracies, others of kingdoms, and reducible to some common thing. Hence the precepts of others again of tyrannical governments. Now the end of fortitude are negative rather than affirmative. the Divine Law is that man may adhere to God: where- Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 122, a. 1), fore the Divine Law contains precepts both of fortitude the precepts of the decalogue are placed in the Law, as and of the other virtues, with a view to directing the mind first principles, which need to be known to all from the to God. For this reason it is written (Dt. 20:3,4): “Fear outset. Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue had to be ye them not: because the Lord your God is in the midst of chiefly about those acts of justice in which the notion of you, and will fight for you against your enemies.” duty is manifest, and not about acts of fortitude, because As to human laws, they are directed to certain earthly it is not so evident that it is a duty for a person not to fear goods, and among them we find precepts of fortitude ac-dangers of death. Whether the precepts of the parts of fortitude are suitably given in the Divine Law? IIa IIae q. 140 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that the precept of the parts the Divine Law, as also of perseverance. Therefore there of fortitude are unsuitably given in the Divine Law. For should also have been precepts of magnificence and mag- just as patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude, so nanimity. also are magnificence, magnanimity, and confidence, as Objection 2. Further, patience is a very necessary stated above (q. 128). Now we find precepts of patience in virtue, since it is the guardian of the other virtues, as Gre- 1816 gory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxv). Now the other virtues cellence come under the counsels of perfection rather than are commanded absolutely. Therefore patience should under precepts of obligation. Wherefore, there was need not have been commanded merely, as Augustine says (De of counsels, rather than of precepts about magnificence Serm. Dom. in Monte i), as to the preparedness of the and magnanimity. On the other hand, the hardships and mind. toils of the present life pertain to patience and persever- Objection 3. Further, patience and perseverance are ance, not by reason of any greatness observable in them, parts of fortitude, as stated above (q. 128; q. 136, a. 4; but on account of the very nature of those virtues. Hence q. 137, a. 2). Now the precepts of fortitude are not the need of precepts of patience and perseverance. affirmative but only negative, as stated above (a. 1, ad Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 3, a. 2), 2). Therefore the precepts of patience and perseverance although affirmative precepts are always binding, they are should have been negative and not affirmative. not binding for always, but according to place and time. The contrary, however, follows from the way in which Wherefore just as the affirmative precepts about the other they are given by Holy Writ. virtues are to be understood as to the preparedness of the I answer that, The Divine Law instructs man per- mind, in the sense that man be prepared to fulfil them fectly about such things as are necessary for right liv- when necessary, so too are the precepts of patience to be ing. Now in order to live aright man needs not only understood in the same way. the principal virtues, but also the secondary and annexed Reply to Objection 3. Fortitude, as distinct from virtues. Wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts not patience and perseverance, is about the greatest dangers only about the acts of the principal virtues, but also about wherein one must proceed with caution; nor is it neces- the acts of the secondary and annexed virtues. sary to determine what is to be done in particular. On Reply to Objection 1. Magnificence and magnanim- the other hand, patience and perseverance are about mi- ity do not belong to the genus of fortitude, except by rea- nor hardships and toils, wherefore there is less danger in son of a certain excellence of greatness which they regard determining, especially in general, what is to be done in in their respective matters. Now things pertaining to ex- such cases. 1817 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 141 Of Temperance (In Eight Articles) In the next place we must consider temperance: (1) Temperance itself; (2) its parts; (3) its precepts. With regard to temperance we must consider (1) temperance itself; (2) the contrary vices. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether temperance is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a special virtue? (3) Whether it is only about desires and pleasures? (4) Whether it is only about pleasures of touch? (5) Whether it is about pleasures of taste, as such, or only as a kind of touch? (6) What is the rule of temperance? (7) Whether it is a cardinal, or principal, virtue? (8) Whether it is the greatest of virtues ? Whether temperance is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 141 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that temperance is not a virtue. sures are becoming to man which are in accordance with For no virtue goes against the inclination of nature, since reason. From such pleasures temperance does not with- “there is in us a natural aptitude for virtue,” as stated in draw him, but from those which are contrary to reason. Ethic. ii, 1. Now temperance withdraws us from plea- Wherefore it is clear that temperance is not contrary to sures to which nature inclines, according to Ethic. ii, 3,8. the inclination of human nature, but is in accord with it. Therefore temperance is not a virtue. It is, however, contrary to the inclination of the animal Objection 2. Further, virtues are connected with one nature that is not subject to reason. another, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 1). But some Reply to Objection 2. The temperance which fulfils people have temperance without having the other virtues: the conditions of perfect virtue is not without prudence, for we find many who are temperate, and yet covetous or while this is lacking to all who are in sin. Hence those timid. Therefore temperance is not a virtue. who lack other virtues, through being subject to the op- Objection 3. Further, to every virtue there is a corre- posite vices, have not the temperance which is a virtue, sponding gift, as appears from what we have said above ( though they do acts of temperance from a certain natural Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 4). But seemingly no gift corresponds to disposition, in so far as certain imperfect virtues are ei- temperance, since all the gifts have been already ascribed ther natural to man, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 63, a. 1), to the other virtues (Qq. 8,9,19,45,52, 71,139). Therefore or acquired by habituation, which virtues, through lack of temperance is not a virtue. prudence, are not perfected by reason, as stated above ( Ia On the contrary, Augustine says (Music. vi, 15): IIae, q. 65, a. 1). “Temperance is the name of a virtue.” Reply to Objection 3. Temperance also has a cor- I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 55, a. 3), responding gift, namely, fear, whereby man is withheld it is essential to virtue to incline man to good. Now the from the pleasures of the flesh, according to Ps. 118:120: good of man is to be in accordance with reason, as Diony- “Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear.” The gift of fear has sius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence human virtue is that for its principal object God, Whom it avoids offending, which inclines man to something in accordance with rea- and in this respect it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as son. Now temperance evidently inclines man to this, since stated above (q. 19, a. 9, ad 1). But it may have for its its very name implies moderation or temperateness, which secondary object whatever a man shuns in order to avoid reason causes. Therefore temperance is a virtue. offending God. Now man stands in the greatest need of Reply to Objection 1. Nature inclines everything to the fear of God in order to shun those things which are whatever is becoming to it. Wherefore man naturally de- most seductive, and these are the matter of temperance: sires pleasures that are becoming to him. Since, however, wherefore the gift of fear corresponds to temperance also. man as such is a rational being, it follows that those plea- 1818 Whether temperance is a special virtue? IIa IIae q. 141 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that temperance is not a On the other hand, if we take temperance antonomasti- special virtue. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) cally, as withholding the appetite from those things which that “it belongs to temperance to preserve one’s integrity are most seductive to man, it is a special virtue, for thus it and freedom from corruption for God’s sake.” But this is has, like fortitude, a special matter. common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a Reply to Objection 1. Man’s appetite is corrupted special virtue. chiefly by those things which seduce him into forsaking Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 42) the rule of reason and Divine law. Wherefore integrity, that “what we observe and seek most in temperance is which Augustine ascribes to temperance, can, like the lat- tranquillity of soul.” But this is common to every virtue. ter, be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense, and Therefore temperance is not a special virtue. secondly in a sense of excellence. Objection 3. Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) that Reply to Objection 2. The things about which tem- “we cannot separate the beautiful from the virtuous,” and perance is concerned have a most disturbing effect on the that “whatever is just is beautiful.” Now the beautiful is soul, for the reason that they are natural to man, as we considered as proper to temperance, according to the same shall state further on (Aa. 4,5). Hence tranquillity of soul authority (Tully, De Offic. i, 27). Therefore temperance is is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence, although not a special virtue. it is a common property of all the virtues. On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, Reply to Objection 3. Although beauty is becoming 10) reckons it a special virtue. to every virtue, it is ascribed to temperance, by way of ex- I answer that, It is customary in human speech to em- cellence, for two reasons. First, in respect of the generic ploy a common term in a restricted sense in order to des- notion of temperance, which consists in a certain moder- ignate the principal things to which that common term is ate and fitting proportion, and this is what we understand applicable: thus the word “city” is used antonomastically∗ by beauty, as attested by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Sec- to designate Rome. . Accordingly the word “temperance” ondly, because the things from which temperance with- has a twofold acceptation. First, in accordance with its holds us, hold the lowest place in man, and are becoming common signification: and thus temperance is not a spe- to him by reason of his animal nature, as we shall state cial but a general virtue, because the word “temperance” further on (Aa. 4,5; q. 142, a. 4), wherefore it is natural signifies a certain temperateness or moderation, which that such things should defile him. In consequence beauty reason appoints to human operations and passions: and is a foremost attribute of temperance which above all hin- this is common to every moral virtue. Yet there is a logical ders man from being defiled. In like manner honesty† is difference between temperance and fortitude, even if we a special attribute of temperance: for Isidore says (Etym. take them both as general virtues: since temperance with- x): “An honest man is one who has no defilement, for draws man from things which seduce the appetite from honesty means an honorable state.” This is most applica- obeying reason, while fortitude incites him to endure or ble to temperance, which withstands the vices that bring withstand those things on account of which he forsakes most dishonor on man, as we shall state further on (q. 142, the good of reason. a. 4). Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures? IIa IIae q. 141 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that temperance is not moderate desires and pleasures, which are despised on only about desires and pleasures. For Tully says (De In- account of deadly pains and dangers, according to Augus- vent. Rhet. ii, 54) that “temperance is reason’s firm and tine (Qq. 83, qu. 36). Therefore it seems that the virtue of moderate mastery of lust and other wanton emotions of temperance is not chiefly about desires and pleasures. the mind.” Now all the passions of the soul are called Objection 3. Further, according to Ambrose (De emotions of the mind. Therefore it seems that temperance Offic. i, 43) “the grace of moderation belongs to temper- is not only about desires and pleasures. ance”: and Tully says (De Offic. ii, 27) that “it is the con- Objection 2. Further, “Virtue is about the difficult cern of temperance to calm all disturbances of the mind and the good”‡. Now it seems more difficult to temper and to enforce moderation.” Now moderation is needed, fear, especially with regard to dangers of death, than to not only in desires and pleasures, but also in external acts ∗ Antonomasia is the figure of speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term; e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle † Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum ‡ Ethic. ii, 3 1819 and whatever pertains to the exterior. Therefore temper-the passion, viz. fear, which regards flight from bodily ance is not only about desires and pleasures. evils, and consequently with daring, which attacks the On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym.)∗: that “it is objects of fear in the hope of attaining some good, so, temperance whereby lust and desire are kept under con- too, temperance, which denotes a kind of moderation, is trol.” chiefly concerned with those passions that tend towards I answer that, As stated above (q. 123, a. 12; q. 136, sensible goods, viz. desire and pleasure, and consequently a. 1), it belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of with the sorrows that arise from the absence of those plea- reason against the passions that rebel against reason. Now sures. For just as daring presupposes objects of fear, so the movement of the soul’s passions is twofold, as stated too such like sorrow arises from the absence of the afore- above ( Ia IIae, q. 23, a. 2), when we were treating of the said pleasures. passions: the one, whereby the sensitive appetite pursues Reply to Objection 1. As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 23, sensible and bodily goods, the other whereby it flies from Aa. 1,2; Ia IIae, q. 25, a. 1), when we were treating of sensible and bodily evils. the passions, those passions which pertain to avoidance of The first of these movements of the sensitive ap- evil, presuppose the passions pertaining to the pursuit of petite rebels against reason chiefly by lack of moderation. good; and the passions of the irascible presuppose the pas- Because sensible and bodily goods, considered in their sions of the concupiscible. Hence, while temperance di- species, are not in opposition to reason, but are subject rectly moderates the passions of the concupiscible which to it as instruments which reason employs in order to at- tend towards good, as a consequence, it moderates all the tain its proper end: and that they are opposed to reason other passions, inasmuch as moderation of the passions is owing to the fact that the sensitive appetite fails to tend that precede results in moderation of the passions that fol- towards them in accord with the mode of reason. Hence low: since he that is not immoderate in desire is moderate it belongs properly to moral virtue to moderate those pas- in hope, and grieves moderately for the absence of the sions which denote a pursuit of the good. things he desires. On the other hand, the movement of the sensitive ap- Reply to Objection 2. Desire denotes an impulse of petite in flying from sensible evil is mostly in opposition the appetite towards the object of pleasure and this im- to reason, not through being immoderate, but chiefly in pulse needs control, which belongs to temperance. on the respect of its flight: because, when a man flies from sen- other hand fear denotes a withdrawal of the mind from sible and bodily evils, which sometimes accompany the certain evils, against which man needs firmness of mind, good of reason, the result is that he flies from the good which fortitude bestows. Hence temperance is properly of reason. Hence it belongs to moral virtue to make man about desires, and fortitude about fears. while flying from evil to remain firm in the good of rea- Reply to Objection 3. External acts proceed from the son. internal passions of the soul: wherefore their moderation Accordingly, just as the virtue of fortitude, which by depends on the moderation of the internal passions. its very nature bestows firmness, is chiefly concerned with Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures of touch? IIa IIae q. 141 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that temperance is not sires of pleasures of touch. only about desires and pleasures of touch. For Augustine Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, says (De Morib. Eccl. xix) that “the function of temper- 3) that “one who is worthy of small things and deems him- ance is to control and quell the desires which draw us to self worthy of them is temperate, but he is not magnifi- the things which withdraw us from the laws of God and cent.” Now honors, whether small or great, of which he is from the fruit of His goodness”; and a little further on he speaking there, are an object of pleasure, not of touch, but adds that “it is the duty of temperance to spurn all bodily in the soul’s apprehension. Therefore temperance is not allurements and popular praise.” Now we are withdrawn only about desires for pleasures of touch. from God’s laws not only by the desire for pleasures of Objection 3. Further, things that are of the same touch, but also by the desire for pleasures of the other genus would seem to pertain to the matter of a particu- senses, for these, too, belong to the bodily allurements, lar virtue under one same aspect. Now all pleasures of and again by the desire for riches or for worldly glory: sense are apparently of the same genus. Therefore they wherefore it is written (1 Tim. 6:10). “Desire† is the root all equally belong to the matter of temperance. of all evils.” Therefore temperance is not only about de- Objection 4. Further, spiritual pleasures are greater ∗ The words quoted do not occur in the work referred to; Cf. his De Summo Bono xxxvii, xlii, and De Different. ii, 39 † ‘Cupiditas,’ which is the Douay version following the Greek philargyria renders ‘desire of money’ 1820 than the pleasures of the body, as stated above ( Ia IIae, much more can he control lesser ones. Wherefore it be-q. 31, a. 5) in the treatise on the passions. Now sometimes longs chiefly and properly to temperance to moderate de- men forsake God’s laws and the state of virtue through sires and pleasures of touch, and secondarily other plea- desire for spiritual pleasures, for instance, through curios- sures. ity in matters of knowledge: wherefore the devil promised Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher takes temper- man knowledge, saying (Gn. 3:5): “Ye shall be as Gods, ance as denoting moderation in external things, when, to knowing good and evil.” Therefore temperance is not only wit, a man tends to that which is proportionate to him, but about pleasures of touch. not as denoting moderation in the soul’s emotions, which Objection 5. Further, if pleasures of touch were the pertains to the virtue of temperance. proper matter of temperance, it would follow that temper- Reply to Objection 3. The pleasures of the other ance is about all pleasures of touch. But it is not about all, senses play a different part in man and in other animals. for instance, about those which occur in games. There- For in other animals pleasures do not result from the other fore pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of tem- senses save in relation to sensibles of touch: thus the lion perance. is pleased to see the stag, or to hear its voice, in relation to On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) his food. On the other hand man derives pleasure from the that “temperance is properly about desires of pleasures of other senses, not only for this reason, but also on account touch.” of the becomingness of the sensible object. Wherefore I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), temperance is temperance is about the pleasures of the other senses, in about desires and pleasures in the same way as fortitude is relation to pleasures of touch, not principally but conse- about fear and daring. Now fortitude is about fear and dar- quently: while in so far as the sensible objects of the other ing with respect to the greatest evils whereby nature itself senses are pleasant on account of their becomingness, as is dissolved; and such are dangers of death. Wherefore in when a man is pleased at a well-harmonized sound, this like manner temperance must needs be about desires for pleasure has nothing to do with the preservation of nature. the greatest pleasures. And since pleasure results from a Hence these passions are not of such importance that tem- natural operation, it is so much the greater according as perance can be referred to them antonomastically. it results from a more natural operation. Now to animals Reply to Objection 4. Although spiritual pleasures the most natural operations are those which preserve the are by their nature greater than bodily pleasures, they are nature of the individual by means of meat and drink, and not so perceptible to the senses, and consequently they the nature of the species by the union of the sexes. Hence do not so strongly affect the sensitive appetite, against temperance is properly about pleasures of meat and drink whose impulse the good of reason is safeguarded by moral and sexual pleasures. Now these pleasures result from the virtue. We may also reply that spiritual pleasures, strictly sense of touch. Wherefore it follows that temperance is speaking, are in accordance with reason, wherefore they about pleasures of touch. need no control, save accidentally, in so far as one spir- Reply to Objection 1. In the passage quoted Augus- itual pleasure is a hindrance to another greater and more tine apparently takes temperance, not as a special virtue binding. having a determinate matter, but as concerned with the Reply to Objection 5. Not all pleasures of touch re- moderation of reason, in any matter whatever: and this gard the preservation of nature, and consequently it does is a general condition of every virtue. However, we may not follow that temperance is about all pleasures of touch. also reply that if a man can control the greatest pleasures, Whether temperance is about the pleasures proper to the taste? IIa IIae q. 141 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that temperance is about regards the very substance of the food, whereas “savor” pleasures proper to the taste. For pleasures of the taste which is the proper object of the taste, is “the pleasing result from food and drink, which are more necessary to quality of the food.” Therefore temperance is about the man’s life than sexual pleasures, which regard the touch. taste rather than about the touch. But according to what has been said (a. 4), temperance Objection 3. Further, according to Ethic. vii, 4,7: is about pleasures in things that are necessary to human “temperance and intemperance are about the same things, life. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to and so are continence and incontinence, perseverance, and the taste rather than about those proper to the touch. effeminacy,” to which delicacy pertains. Now delicacy Objection 2. Further, temperance is about the pas- seems to regard the delight taken in savors which are the sions rather than about things themselves. Now, accord- object of the taste. Therefore temperance is about plea- ing to De Anima ii, 3, “the touch is the sense of food,” as sures proper to the taste. 1821 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) touch. Secondarily, however, temperance and intemper-that “seemingly temperance and intemperance have little ance are about pleasures of the taste, smell, or sight, inas- if anything to do with the taste.” much as the sensible objects of these senses conduce to I answer that, As stated above (a. 4), temperance the pleasurable use of the necessary things that have rela- is about the greatest pleasures, which chiefly regard the tion to the touch. But since the taste is more akin to the preservation of human life either in the species or in the touch than the other senses are, it follows that temperance individual. In these matters certain things are to be con- is more about the taste than about the other senses. sidered as principal and others as secondary. The prin- Reply to Objection 1. The use of food and the plea- cipal thing is the use itself of the necessary means, of sure that essentially results therefrom pertain to the touch. the woman who is necessary for the preservation of the Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3) that “touch species, or of food and drink which are necessary for the is the sense of food, for food is hot or cold, wet or dry.” To preservation of the individual: while the very use of these the taste belongs the discernment of savors, which make necessary things has a certain essential pleasure annexed the food pleasant to eat, in so far as they are signs of its thereto. being suitable for nourishment. In regard to either use we consider as secondary what- Reply to Objection 2. The pleasure resulting from ever makes the use more pleasurable, such as beauty and savor is additional, so to speak, whereas the pleasure of adornment in woman, and a pleasing savor and likewise touch results essentially from the use of food and drink. odor in food. Hence temperance is chiefly about the plea- Reply to Objection 3. Delicacy regards principally sure of touch, that results essentially from the use of these the substance of the food, but secondarily it regards its necessary things, which use is in all cases attained by the delicious savor and the way in which it is served. Whether the rule of temperance depends on the need of the present life? IIa IIae q. 141 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the rule of temper- Now the principal order of reason is that by which it di- ance does not depend on the needs of the present life. For rects certain things towards their end, and the good of rea- higher things are not regulated according to lower. Now, son consists chiefly in this order; since good has the aspect as temperance is a virtue of the soul, it is above the needs of end, and the end is the rule of whatever is directed to the of the body. Therefore the rule of temperance does not end. Now all the pleasurable objects that are at man’s dis- depend on the needs of the body. posal, are directed to some necessity of this life as to their Objection 2. Further, whoever exceeds a rule sins. end. Wherefore temperance takes the need of this life, as Therefore if the needs of the body were the rule of tem- the rule of the pleasurable objects of which it makes use, perance, it would be a sin against temperance to indulge and uses them only for as much as the need of this life in any other pleasure than those required by nature, which requires. is content with very little. But this would seem unreason- Reply to Objection 1. As stated above, the need of able. this life is regarded as a rule in so far as it is an end. Now Objection 3. Further, no one sins in observing a rule. it must be observed that sometimes the end of the worker Therefore if the need of the body were the rule of temper- differs from the end of the work, thus it is clear that the ance, there would be no sin in using any pleasure for the end of building is a house, whereas sometimes the end of needs of the body, for instance, for the sake of health. But the builder is profit. Accordingly the end and rule of tem- this is apparently false. Therefore the need of the body is perance itself is happiness; while the end and rule of the not the rule of temperance. thing it makes use of is the need of human life, to which On the contrary, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. whatever is useful for life is subordinate. xxi): “In both Testaments the temperate man finds confir- Reply to Objection 2. The need of human life may mation of the rule forbidding him to love the things of this be taken in two ways. First, it may be taken in the sense life, or to deem any of them desirable for its own sake, and in which we apply the term “necessary” to that without commanding him to avail himself of those things with the which a thing cannot be at all; thus food is necessary to an moderation of a user not the attachment of a lover, in so animal. Secondly, it may be taken for something without far as they are requisite for the needs of this life and of his which a thing cannot be becomingly. Now temperance station.” regards not only the former of these needs, but also the I answer that, As stated above (a. 1; q. 109, a. 2; latter. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11) that q. 123, a. 12), the good of moral virtue consists chiefly in “the temperate man desires pleasant things for the sake the order of reason: because “man’s good is to be in ac- of health, or for the sake of a sound condition of body.” cord with reason,” as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Other things that are not necessary for this purpose may 1822 be divided into two classes. For some are a hindrance regards need according to the requirements of life, and to health and a sound condition of body; and these tem- this depends not only on the requirements of the body, perance makes not use of whatever, for this would be a but also on the requirements of external things, such as sin against temperance. But others are not a hindrance to riches and station, and more still on the requirements of those things, and these temperance uses moderately, ac- good conduct. Hence the Philosopher adds (Ethic. iii, 11) cording to the demands of place and time, and in keeping that “the temperate man makes use of pleasant things pro- with those among whom one dwells. Hence the Philoso- vided that not only they be not prejudicial to health and a pher (Ethic. iii, 11) says that the “temperate man also de- sound bodily condition, but also that they be not inconsis- sires other pleasant things,” those namely that are not nec- tent with good,” i.e. good conduct, nor “beyond his sub- essary for health or a sound condition of body, “so long as stance,” i.e. his means. And Augustine says (De Morib. they are not prejudicial to these things.” Eccl. xxi) that the “temperate man considers the need” Reply to Objection 3. As stated (ad 2), temperance not only “of this life” but also “of his station.” Whether temperance is a cardinal virtue? IIa IIae q. 141 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that temperance is not a serves praise principally in pleasures of touch, with which cardinal virtue. For the good of moral virtue depends on temperance is concerned, both because these pleasures are reason. But temperance is about those things that are fur- most natural to us, so that it is more difficult to abstain thest removed from reason, namely about pleasures com- from them, and to control the desire for them, and be- mon to us and the lower animals, as stated in Ethic. iii, cause their objects are more necessary to the present life, 10. Therefore temperance, seemingly, is not a principal as stated above (a. 4). For this reason temperance is reck- virtue. oned a principal or cardinal virtue. Objection 2. Further, the greater the impetus the more Reply to Objection 1. The longer the range of its op- difficult is it to control. Now anger, which is controlled by eration, the greater is the agent’s power [virtus] shown to meekness, seems to be more impetuous than desire, which be: wherefore the very fact that the reason is able to mod- is controlled by temperance. For it is written (Prov. 27:4): erate desires and pleasures that are furthest removed from “Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth; it, proves the greatness of reason’s power. This is how and who can bear the violence [impetum] of one pro- temperance comes to be a principal virtue. voked?” Therefore meekness is a principal virtue rather Reply to Objection 2. The impetuousness of anger is than temperance. caused by an accident, for instance, a painful hurt; where- Objection 3. Further, hope as a movement of the soul fore it soon passes, although its impetus be great. On the takes precedence of desire and concupiscence, as stated other hand, the impetuousness of the desire for pleasures above ( Ia IIae, q. 25, a. 4). But humility controls the pre- of touch proceeds from a natural cause, wherefore it is sumption of immoderate hope. Therefore, seemingly, hu- more lasting and more general, and consequently its con- mility is a principal virtue rather than temperance which trol regards a more principal virtue. controls concupiscence. Reply to Objection 3. The object of hope is higher On the contrary, Gregory reckons temperance among than the object of desire, wherefore hope is accounted the the principal virtues (Moral. ii, 49). principal passion in the irascible. But the objects of de- I answer that, As stated above (q. 123, a. 11; q. 61, sires and pleasures of touch move the appetite with greater a. 3), a principal or cardinal virtue is so called because it force, since they are more natural. Therefore temperance, has a foremost claim to praise on account of one of those which appoints the mean in such things, is a principal things that are requisite for the notion of virtue in general. virtue. Now moderation, which is requisite in every virtue, de- Whether temperance is the greatest of the virtues? IIa IIae q. 141 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that temperance is the greatest of the virtues. greatest of the virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, Objection 2. Further, the more difficult the deed the 43) that “what we observe and seek most in temperance greater the virtue. Now it is more difficult to control de- is the safeguarding of what is honorable, and the regard sires and pleasures of touch than to regulate external ac- for what is beautiful.” Now virtue deserves praise for be- tions, the former pertaining to temperance and the latter ing honorable and beautiful. Therefore temperance is the to justice. Therefore temperance is a greater virtue than 1823 justice. justice and fortitude are more excellent virtues than tem- Objection 3. Further, seemingly the more general a perance: while prudence and the theological virtues are thing is, the more necessary and the better it is. Now forti- more excellent still. tude is about dangers of death which occur less frequently Reply to Objection 1. Honor and beauty are espe- than pleasures of touch, for these occur every day; so that cially ascribed to temperance, not on account of the ex- temperance is in more general use than fortitude. There- cellence of the good proper to temperance, but on account fore temperance is a more excellent virtue than fortitude. of the disgrace of the contrary evil from which it with- On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) draws us, by moderating the pleasures common to us and that the “greatest virtues are those which are most prof- the lower animals. itable to others, for which reason we give the greatest Reply to Objection 2. Since virtue is about the diffi- honor to the brave and the just.” cult and the good, the excellence of a virtue is considered I answer that, As the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, more under the aspect of good, wherein justice excels, 2) “the good of the many is more of the godlike than the than under the aspect of difficult, wherein temperance ex- good of the individual,” wherefore the more a virtue re- cels. gards the good of the many, the better it is. Now jus- Reply to Objection 3. That which is general because tice and fortitude regard the good of the many more than it regards the many conduces more to the excellence of temperance does, since justice regards the relations be- goodness than that which is general because it occurs fre- tween one man and another, while fortitude regards dan- quently: fortitude excels in the former way, temperance gers of battle which are endured for the common weal: in the latter. Hence fortitude is greater simply, although whereas temperance moderates only the desires and plea- in some respects temperance may be described as greater sures which affect man himself. Hence it is evident that not only than fortitude but also than justice. 1824 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 142 Of the Vices Opposed to Temperance (In Four Articles) We must now consider the vices opposed to temperance. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether insensibility is a sin? (2) Whether intemperance is a childish sin? (3) Of the comparison between intemperance and timidity; (4) Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of vices? Whether insensibility is a vice? IIa IIae q. 142 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that insensibility is not a It must, however, be observed that it is sometimes vice. For those are called insensible who are deficient with praiseworthy, and even necessary for the sake of an end, regard to pleasures of touch. Now seemingly it is praise- to abstain from such pleasures as result from these opera- worthy and virtuous to be altogether deficient in such mat- tions. Thus, for the sake of the body’s health, certain per- ters: for it is written (Dan. 10:2,3): “In those days Daniel sons refrain from pleasures of meat, drink, and sex; as also mourned the days of three weeks, I ate no desirable bread, for the fulfilment of certain engagements: thus athletes and neither flesh nor wine entered my mouth, neither was and soldiers have to deny themselves many pleasures, in I anointed with ointment.” Therefore insensibility is not a order to fulfil their respective duties. In like manner pen- sin. itents, in order to recover health of soul, have recourse Objection 2. Further, “man’s good is to be in accord to abstinence from pleasures, as a kind of diet, and those with reason,” according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). who are desirous of giving themselves up to contempla- Now abstinence from all pleasures of touch is most con- tion and Divine things need much to refrain from carnal ducive to man’s progress in the good of reason: for it is things. Nor do any of these things pertain to the vice of written (Dan. 1:17) that “to the children” who took pulse insensibility, because they are in accord with right reason. for their food (Dan. 1:12), “God gave knowledge, and Reply to Objection 1. Daniel abstained thus from understanding in every book and wisdom.” Therefore in- pleasures, not through any horror of pleasure as though sensibility, which rejects these pleasures altogether, is not it were evil in itself, but for some praiseworthy end, in sinful. order, namely, to adapt himself to the heights of contem- Objection 3. Further, that which is a very effective plation by abstaining from pleasures of the body. Hence means of avoiding sin would seem not to be sinful. Now the text goes on to tell of the revelation that he received the most effective remedy in avoiding sin is to shun plea- immediately afterwards. sures, and this pertains to insensibility. For the Philoso- Reply to Objection 2. Since man cannot use his rea- pher says (Ethic. ii, 9) that “if we deny ourselves plea- son without his sensitive powers. which need a bodily sures we are less liable to sin.” Therefore there is nothing organ. as stated in the Ia, q. 84, Aa. 7,8, man needs to sus- vicious in insensibility. tain his body in order that he may use his reason. Now the On the contrary, Nothing save vice is opposed to body is sustained by means of operations that afford plea- virtue. Now insensibility is opposed to the virtue of tem- sure: wherefore the good of reason cannot be in a man if perance according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 11). he abstain from all pleasures. Yet this need for using plea- Therefore insensibility is a vice. sures of the body will be greater or less, according as man I answer that, Whatever is contrary to the natural or- needs more or less the powers of his body in accomplish- der is vicious. Now nature has introduced pleasure into ing the act of reason. Wherefore it is commendable for the operations that are necessary for man’s life. Where- those who undertake the duty of giving themselves to con- fore the natural order requires that man should make use templation, and of imparting to others a spiritual good, by of these pleasures, in so far as they are necessary for man’s a kind of spiritual procreation, as it were, to abstain from well-being, as regards the preservation either of the in- many pleasures, but not for those who are in duty bound dividual or of the species. Accordingly, if anyone were to bodily occupations and carnal procreation. to reject pleasure to the extent of omitting things that are Reply to Objection 3. In order to avoid sin, pleasure necessary for nature’s preservation, he would sin, as act- must be shunned, not altogether, but so that it is not sought ing counter to the order of nature. And this pertains to the more than necessity requires. vice of insensibility. 1825 Whether intemperance is a childish sin? IIa IIae q. 142 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that intemperance is not to the remedy which is applied to both. For a child is a childish sin. For Jerome in commenting on Mat. 18:3, corrected by being restrained; hence it is written (Prov. “Unless you be converted, and become as little children,” 23:13,14): “Withhold not correction from a child. . . Thou says that “a child persists not in anger, is unmindful of in- shalt beat him with a rod, and deliver his soul from Hell.” juries, takes no pleasure in seeing a beautiful woman,” all In like manner by resisting concupiscence we moderate it of which is contrary to intemperance. Therefore intem- according to the demands of virtue. Augustine indicates perance is not a childish sin. this when he says (Music. vi, 11) that if the mind be lifted Objection 2. Further, children have none but natural up to spiritual things, and remain fixed “thereon, the im- desires. Now “in respect of natural desires few sin by in- pulse of custom,” i.e. carnal concupiscence, “is broken, temperance,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11). and being suppressed is gradually weakened: for it was Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin. stronger when we followed it, and though not wholly de- Objection 3. Further, children should be fos- stroyed, it is certainly less strong when we curb it.” Hence tered and nourished: whereas concupiscence and plea- the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that “as a child ought sure, about which intemperance is concerned, are al- to live according to the direction of his tutor, so ought the ways to be thwarted and uprooted, according to Col. concupiscible to accord with reason.” 3:5, “Mortify. . . your members upon the earth, which Reply to Objection 1. This argument takes the term are. . . concupiscence”∗, etc. Therefore intemperance is “childish” as denoting what is observed in children. It is not a childish sin. not in this sense that the sin of intemperance is said to be On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) childish, but by way of likeness, as stated above. that “we apply the term intemperance† to childish faults.” Reply to Objection 2. A desire may be said to be I answer that, A thing is said to be childish for two natural in two ways. First, with regard to its genus, and reasons. First, because it is becoming to children, and the thus temperance and intemperance are about natural de- Philosopher does not mean that the sin of intemperance is sires, since they are about desires of food and sex, which childish in this sense. Secondly. by way of likeness, and are directed to the preservation of nature. Secondly, a de- it is in this sense that sins of intemperance are said to be sire may be called natural with regard to the species of the childish. For the sin of intemperance is one of unchecked thing that nature requires for its own preservation; and in concupiscence, which is likened to a child in three ways. this way it does not happen often that one sins in the mat- First, as rewards that which they both desire, for like a ter of natural desires, for nature requires only that which child concupiscence desires something disgraceful. This supplies its need, and there is no sin in desiring this, save is because in human affairs a thing is beautiful according only where it is desired in excess as to quantity. This is as it harmonizes with reason. Wherefore Tully says (De the only way in which sin can occur with regard to natural Offic. i, 27) under the heading “Comeliness is twofold,” desires, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11). that “the beautiful is that which is in keeping with man’s There are other things in respect of which sins fre- excellence in so far as his nature differs from other ani- quently occur, and these are certain incentives to desire mals.” Now a child does not attend to the order of reason; devised by human curiosity‡, such as the nice [curiosa] and in like manner “concupiscence does not listen to rea- preparation of food, or the adornment of women. And son,” according to Ethic. vii, 6. Secondly, they are alike though children do not affect these things much, yet in- as to the result. For a child, if left to his own will, be- temperance is called a childish sin for the reason given comes more self-willed: hence it is written (Ecclus. 30:8): above. “A horse not broken becometh stubborn, and a child left Reply to Objection 3. That which regards nature to himself will become headstrong.” So, too, concupis- should be nourished and fostered in children, but that cence, if indulged, gathers strength: wherefore Augustine which pertains to the lack of reason in them should not says (Confess. viii, 5): “Lust served became a custom, be fostered, but corrected, as stated above. and custom not resisted became necessity.” Thirdly, as ∗ Vulg.: ‘your members which are upon the earth, fornication. . . concupiscence’ † Akolasia which Aristotle refers to kolazo to punish, so that its original sense would be ‘impunity’ or ‘unrestraint.’ ‡ Cf. q. 167 1826 Whether cowardice∗ is a greater vice than intemperance? IIa IIae q. 142 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that cowardice is a greater origin in the compulsion of an external agent, so that they vice than intemperance. For a vice deserves reproach are not simply voluntary but mixed, as stated in Ethic. iii, through being opposed to the good of virtue. Now cow- 1, whereas actions done for the sake of pleasure are sim- ardice is opposed to fortitude, which is a more excellent ply voluntary. The second reason is because the actions of virtue than temperance, as stated above (a. 2; q. 141, a. 8). an intemperate man are more voluntary individually and Therefore cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance. less voluntary generically. For no one would wish to be Objection 2. Further, the greater the difficulty to be intemperate, yet man is enticed by individual pleasures surmounted, the less is a man to be reproached for failure, which make of him an intemperate man. Hence the most wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that “it is no effective remedy against intemperance is not to dwell on wonder, in fact it is pardonable, if a man is mastered by the consideration of singulars. It is the other way about strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains.” Now seem- in matters relating to cowardice: because the particular ingly it is more difficult to control pleasures than other action that imposes itself on a man is less voluntary, for passions; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3, that “it is more instance to cast aside his shield, and the like, whereas the difficult to contend against pleasure than against anger, general purpose is more voluntary, for instance to save which would seem to be stronger than fear.” Therefore himself by flight. Now that which is more voluntary in intemperance, which is overcome by pleasure, is a less the particular circumstances in which the act takes place, grievous sin than cowardice, which is overcome by fear. is simply more voluntary. Wherefore intemperance, being Objection 3. Further, it is essential to sin that it be simply more voluntary than cowardice, is a greater vice. voluntary. Now cowardice is more voluntary than intem- Thirdly, because it is easier to find a remedy for intem- perance, since no man desires to be intemperate, whereas perance than for cowardice, since pleasures of food and some desire to avoid dangers of death, which pertains to sex, which are the matter of intemperance, are of every- cowardice. Therefore cowardice is a more grievous sin day occurrence, and it is possible for man without danger than intemperance. by frequent practice in their regard to become temperate; On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) whereas dangers of death are of rare occurrence, and it is that “intemperance seems more akin to voluntary action more dangerous for man to encounter them frequently in than cowardice.” Therefore it is more sinful. order to cease being a coward. I answer that, one may be compared with another in Reply to Objection 1. The excellence of fortitude in two ways. First, with regard to the matter or object; sec- comparison with temperance may be considered from two ondly, on the part of the man who sins: and in both ways standpoints. First, with regard to the end, which has the intemperance is a more grievous sin than cowardice. aspect of good: because fortitude is directed to the com- First, as regards the matter. For cowardice shuns dan- mon good more than temperance is. And from this point gers of death, to avoid which the principal motive is the of view cowardice has a certain precedence over intem- necessity of preserving life. On the other hand, intem- perance, since by cowardice some people forsake the de- perance is about pleasures, the desire of which is not so fense of the common good. Secondly, with regard to the necessary for the preservation of life, because, as stated difficulty, because it is more difficult to endure dangers above (a. 2, ad 2), intemperance is more about certain an- of death than to refrain from any pleasures whatever: and nexed pleasures or desires than about natural desires or from this point of view there is no need for cowardice to pleasures. Now the more necessary the motive of sin the take precedence of intemperance. For just as it is a greater less grievous the sin. Wherefore intemperance is a more strength that does not succumb to a stronger force, so on grievous vice than cowardice, on the part of the object or the other hand to be overcome by a stronger force is proof motive matter. of a lesser vice, and to succumb to a weaker force, is the In like manner again, on the part of the man who sins, proof of a greater vice. and this for three reasons. First, because the more sound- Reply to Objection 2. Love of self-preservation, for minded a man is, the more grievous his sin, wherefore sins the sake of which one shuns perils of death, is much more are not imputed to those who are demented. Now grave connatural than any pleasures whatever of food and sex fear and sorrow, especially in dangers of death, stun the which are directed to the preservation of life. Hence it is human mind, but not so pleasure which is the motive of more difficult to overcome the fear of dangers of death, intemperance. Secondly, because the more voluntary a sin than the desire of pleasure in matters of food and sex: the graver it is. Now intemperance has more of the vol- although the latter is more difficult to resist than anger, untary in it than cowardice has, and this for two reasons. sorrow, and fear, occasioned by certain other evils. The first is because actions done through fear have their Reply to Objection 3. The voluntary, in cowardice, ∗ Cf. q. 125 1827 depends rather on a general than on a particular consider-simply but in a restricted sense. ation: wherefore in such cases we have the voluntary not Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of sins? IIa IIae q. 142 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that intemperance is not and the lower animals, as stated above (q. 141, Aa. 2,3). the most disgraceful of sins. As honor is due to virtue so Wherefore it is written (Ps. 48:21): “Man, when he was is disgrace due to sin. Now some sins are more grievous in honor, did not understand: he hath been compared to than intemperance: for instance murder, blasphemy, and senseless beasts, and made like to them.” Secondly, be- the like. Therefore intemperance is not the most disgrace- cause it is most repugnant to man’s clarity or beauty; inas- ful of sins. much as the pleasures which are the matter of intemper- Objection 2. Further, those sins which are the more ance dim the light of reason from which all the clarity and common are seemingly less disgraceful, since men are beauty of virtue arises: wherefore these pleasures are de- less ashamed of them. Now sins of intemperance are most scribed as being most slavish. common, because they are about things connected with Reply to Objection 1. As Gregory says∗, “the sins of the common use of human life, and in which many hap- the flesh,” which are comprised under the head of intem- pen to sin. Therefore sins of intemperance do not seem to perance, although less culpable, are more disgraceful. The be most disgraceful. reason is that culpability is measured by inordinateness in Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, respect of the end, while disgrace regards shamefulness, 6) temperance and intemperance are about human desires which depends chiefly on the unbecomingness of the sin and pleasures. Now certain desires and pleasures are more in respect of the sinner. shameful than human desires and pleasures; such are bru- Reply to Objection 2. The commonness of a sin di- tal pleasures and those caused by disease as the Philoso- minishes the shamefulness and disgrace of a sin in the pher states (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore intemperance is not opinion of men, but not as regards the nature of the vices the most disgraceful of sins. themselves. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) Reply to Objection 3. When we say that intemper- that “intemperance is justly more deserving of reproach ance is most disgraceful, we mean in comparison with hu- than other vices.” man vices, those, namely, that are connected with human I answer that, Disgrace is seemingly opposed to passions which to a certain extent are in conformity with honor and glory. Now honor is due to excellence, as stated human nature. But those vices which exceed the mode above (q. 103, a. 1), and glory denotes clarity (q. 103, a. 1, of human nature are still more disgraceful. Nevertheless ad 3). Accordingly intemperance is most disgraceful for such vices are apparently reducible to the genus of intem- two reasons. First, because it is most repugnant to hu- perance, by way of excess: for instance, if a man delight man excellence, since it is about pleasures common to us in eating human flesh, or in committing the unnatural vice. ∗ Moral. xxxiii. 12 1828 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 143 Of the Parts of Temperance, in General (In One Article) We must now consider the parts of temperance: we shall consider these same parts (1) in general; (2) each of them in particular. Whether the parts of temperance are rightly assigned? IIa IIae q. 143 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that Tully (De Invent. to the power of procreation, and in these as regards the Rhet. ii, 54) unbecomingly assigns the parts of temper- principal pleasure of the act itself of procreation, there is ance, when he asserts them to be “continence, mildness, “chastity,” and as to the pleasures incidental to the act, re- and modesty.” For continence is reckoned to be distinct sulting, for instance, from kissing, touching, or fondling, from virtue (Ethic. vii, 1): whereas temperance is com- we have “purity.” prised under virtue. Therefore continence is not a part of The potential parts of a principal virtue are called sec- temperance. ondary virtues: for while the principal virtue observes the Objection 2. Further, mildness seemingly softens ha- mode in some principal matter, these observe the mode in tred or anger. But temperance is not about these things, some other matter wherein moderation is not so difficult. but about pleasures of touch, as stated above (q. 141, a. 4). Now it belongs to temperance to moderate pleasures of Therefore mildness is not a part of temperance. touch, which are most difficult to moderate. Wherefore Objection 3. Further, modesty concerns external ac- any virtue that is effective of moderation in some matter tion, wherefore the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5): “Let your or other, and restrains the appetite in its impulse towards modesty be known to all men.” Now external actions are something, may be reckoned a part of temperance, as a the matter of justice, as stated above (q. 58, a. 8). There- virtue annexed thereto. fore modesty is a part of justice rather than of temperance. This happens in three ways: first, in the inward move- Objection 4. Further, Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i, 8) ments of the soul; secondly, in the outward movements reckons many more parts of temperance: for he says that and actions of the body; thirdly, in outward things. Now “temperance results in modesty, shamefacedness, absti- besides the movement of concupiscence, which temper- nence, chastity, honesty, moderation, lowliness, sobriety, ance moderates and restrains, we find in the soul three purity.” Andronicus also says∗ that “the companions of movements towards a particular object. In the first place temperance are gravity, continence, humility, simplicity, there is the movement of the will when stirred by the im- refinement, method, contentment.”† Therefore it seems pulse of passion: and this movement is restrained by “con- that Tully insufficiently reckoned the parts of temperance. tinence,” the effect of which is that, although a man suffer I answer that, As stated above (Qq. 48,128), a cardi- immoderate concupiscences, his will does not succumb to nal virtue may have three kinds of parts, namely integral, them. Another inward movement towards something is subjective, and potential. The integral parts of a virtue the movement of hope, and of the resultant daring, and are the conditions the concurrence of which are neces- this is moderated or restrained by “humility.” The third sary for virtue: and in this respect there are two integral movement is that of anger, which tends towards revenge, parts of temperance, “shamefacedness,” whereby one re- and this is restrained by “meekness” or “mildness.” coils from the disgrace that is contrary to temperance, and With regard to bodily movements and actions, moder- “honesty,” whereby one loves the beauty of temperance. ation and restraint is the effect of “modesty,” which, ac- For, as stated above (q. 141, a. 2, ad 3), temperance more cording to Andronicus, has three parts. The first of these than any other virtue lays claim to a certain comeliness, enables one to discern what to do and what not to do, and and the vices of intemperance excel others in disgrace. to observe the right order, and to persevere in what we The subjective parts of a virtue are its species: and do: this he assigns to “method.” The second is that a man the species of a virtue have to be differentiated accord- observe decorum in what he does, and this he ascribes to ing to the difference of matter or object. Now temper- “refinement.” The third has to do with the conversation or ance is about pleasures of touch, which are of two kinds. any other intercourse between a man and his friends, and For some are directed to nourishment: and in these as this is called “gravity.” regards meat, there is “abstinence,” and as regards drink With regard to external things, a twofold moderation properly there is “sobriety.” Other pleasures are directed has to be observed. First, we must not desire too many, ∗ De Affectibus † ‘Per-se-sufficientiam’ which could be rendered ‘self-sufficiency,’ but for the fact that this is taken in a bad sense. See q. 169, a. 1. 1829 and to this Macrobius assigns “lowliness,” and Androni-Reply to Objection 2. Mildness or meekness is reck- cus “contentment”; secondly, we must not be too nice in oned a part of temperance not because of a likeness of our requirements, and to this Macrobius ascribes “moder- matter, but because they agree as to the mode of restraint ation,” Andronicus “simplicity.” and moderation as stated above. Reply to Objection 1. It is true that continence dif- Reply to Objection 3. In the matter of external action fers from virtue, just as imperfect differs from perfect, as justice considers what is due to another. Modesty does not we shall state further on (q. 165, a. 1); and in this sense consider this, but only a certain moderation. Hence it is it is condivided with virtue. Yet it has something in com- reckoned a part not of justice but of temperance. mon with temperance both as to matter, since it is about Reply to Objection 4. Under modesty Tully includes pleasures of touch, and as to mode, since it is a kind of whatever pertains to the moderation of bodily movements restraint. Hence it is suitably assigned as a part of temper- and external things, as well as the moderation of hope ance. which we reckoned as pertaining to humility. 1830 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 144 Of Shamefacedness (In Four Articles) We must now consider the parts of temperance in particular: and in the first place the integral parts, which are shamefacedness and honesty. With regard to shamefacedness there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether shamefacedness is a virtue? (2) What is its object? (3) Who are the cause of a man being ashamed? (4) What kind of people are ashamed? Whether shamefacedness is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 144 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that shamefacedness is a virtue. iv, 9) that shamefacedness is not a virtue. For it is proper to a virtue “to observe the mean as fixed I answer that, Virtue is taken in two ways, in a strict by reason”: this is clear from the definition of virtue given sense and in a broad sense. Taken strictly virtue is a per- in Ethic. ii, 6. Now shamefacedness observes the mean in fection, as stated in Phys. vii, 17,18. Wherefore any- this way, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ii, 7). There- thing that is inconsistent with perfection, though it be fore shamefacedness is a virtue. good, falls short of the notion of virtue. Now shame- Objection 2. Further, whatever is praiseworthy is ei- facedness is inconsistent with perfection, because it is the ther a virtue or something connected with virtue. Now fear of something base, namely of that which is disgrace- shamefacedness is praiseworthy. But it is not part of a ful. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that virtue. For it is not a part of prudence, since it is not in the “shamefacedness is fear of a base action.” Now just as reason but in the appetite; nor is it a part of justice. since hope is about a possible and difficult good, so is fear about shamefacedness implies a certain passion, whereas justice a possible and arduous evil, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 40, is not about the passions; nor again is it a part of fortitude, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 41, a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 42, a. 3), when we were because it belongs to fortitude to be persistent and aggres-treating of the passions. But one who is perfect as to a sive, while it belongs to shamefacedness to recoil from virtuous habit, does not apprehend that which would be something; nor lastly is it a part of temperance, since the disgraceful and base to do, as being possible and arduous, latter is about desires, whereas shamefacedness is a kind that is to say difficult for him to avoid; nor does he actually of fear according as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 9) do anything base, so as to be in fear of disgrace. Therefore and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15). Hence it follows shamefacedness, properly speaking, is not a virtue, since that shamefacedness is a virtue. it falls short of the perfection of virtue. Objection 3. Further, the honest and the virtuous are Taken, however, in a broad sense virtue denotes what- convertible according to Tully (De Offic. i, 27). Now ever is good and praiseworthy in human acts or passions; shamefacedness is a part of honesty: for Ambrose says and in this way /shamefacedness is sometimes called a (De Offic. i, 43) that “shamefacedness is the companion virtue, since it is a praiseworthy passion. and familiar of the restful mind, averse to wantonness, a Reply to Objection 1. Observing the mean is not suf- stranger to any kind of excess, the friend of sobriety and ficient for the notion of virtue, although it is one of the the support of what is honest, a seeker after the beautiful.” conditions included in virtue’s definition: but it is requi- Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue. site, in addition to this, that it be “an elective habit,” that Objection 4. Further, every vice is opposed to a is to say, operating from choice. Now shamefacedness virtue. Now certain vices are opposed to shamefacedness, denotes, not a habit but a passion, nor does its movement namely shamelessness and inordinate prudery. Therefore result from choice, but from an impulse of passion. Hence shamefacedness is a virtue. it falls short of the notion of virtue. Objection 5. Further, “like acts beget like habits,” ac- Reply to Objection 2. As stated above, shamefaced- cording to Ethic. ii, 1. Now shamefacedness implies a ness is fear of baseness and disgrace. Now it has been praiseworthy act; wherefore from many such acts a habit stated (q. 142, a. 4) that the vice of intemperance is most results. But a habit of praiseworthy deeds is a virtue, base and disgraceful. Wherefore shamefacedness pertains according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore more to temperance than to any other virtue, by reason shamefacedness is a virtue. of its motive cause, which is a base action though not ac- On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; cording to the species of the passion, namely fear. Never- 1831 theless in so far as the vices opposed to other virtues are a virtue, as regards its origin. Hence shamelessness, in so base and disgraceful, shamefacedness may also pertain to far as it results from excessive love of disgraceful things, other virtues. is opposed to temperance. Reply to Objection 3. Shamefacedness fosters hon- Reply to Objection 5. Being frequently ashamed esty, by removing that which is contrary thereto, but not causes the habit of an acquired virtue whereby one avoids so as to attain to the perfection of honesty. disgraceful things which are the object of shamefaced- Reply to Objection 4. Every defect causes a vice, but ness, without continuing to be ashamed in their regard: not every good is sufficient for the notion of virtue. Con- although as a consequence of this acquired virtue, a man sequently it does not follow that whatever is directly op- would be more ashamed, if confronted with the matter of posed to vice is a virtue, although every vice is opposed to shamefacedness. Whether shamefacedness is about a disgraceful action? IIa IIae q. 144 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that shamefacedness is and for this reason the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that not about a disgraceful action. For the Philosopher says such evils are not a matter of fear. (Ethic. iv, 9) that “shamefacedness is fear of disgrace.” The other kind of disgrace is penal so to speak, and Now sometimes those who do nothing wrong suffer ig- it consists in the reproach that attaches to a person, just nominy, according to Ps. 67:8, “For thy sake I have as the clarity of glory consists in a person being honored. borne reproach, shame hath covered my face.” Therefore And since this reproach has the character of an arduous shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action. evil, just as honor has the character of an arduous good, Objection 2. Further, nothing apparently is disgrace- shamefacedness, which is fear of disgrace, regards first ful but what is sinful. Yet man is ashamed of things that and foremost reproach or ignominy. And since reproach are not sins, for instance when he performs a menial oc- is properly due to vice, as honor is due to virtue, it follows cupation. Therefore it seems that shamefacedness is not that shamefacedness regards also the disgrace inherent to properly about a disgraceful action. vice. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that “a man Objection 3. Further, virtuous deeds are not disgrace- is less ashamed of those defects which are not the result ful but most beautiful according to Ethic. i, 8. Yet some- of any fault of his own.” times people are ashamed to do virtuous deeds, accord- Now shamefacedness regards fault in two ways. In ing to Lk. 9:26, “He that shall be ashamed of Me and one way a man refrains from vicious acts through fear of My words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed,” etc. reproach: in another way a man while doing a disgraceful Therefore shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful ac- deed avoids the public eye through fear of reproach. In tion. the former case, according to Gregory of Nyssa (Neme- Objection 4. Further, if shamefacedness were prop- sius, De Nat. Hom. xx), we speak of a person “blushing,” erly about a disgraceful action, it would follow that the in the latter we say that he is “ashamed.” Hence he says more disgraceful the action the more ashamed would one that “the man who is ashamed acts in secret, but he who be. Yet sometimes a man is more ashamed of lesser sins, blushes fears to be disgraced.” while he glories in those which are most grievous, accord- Reply to Objection 1. Shamefacedness properly re- ing to Ps. 51:3, “Why dost thou glory in malice?” There- gards disgrace as due to sin which is a voluntary defect. fore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that “a man is action. more ashamed of those things of which he is the cause.” On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) Now the virtuous man despises the disgrace to which he is and Gregory of Nyssa∗ say that “shamefacedness is fear subject on account of virtue, because he does not deserve of doing a disgraceful deed or of a disgraceful deed done.” it; as the Philosopher says of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 41, a. 2; Ia 3). Thus we find it said of the apostles (Acts 5:41) that IIae, q. 42, a. 3), when we were treating of the passions, “they (the apostles) went from the presence of the coun- fear is properly about an arduous evil, one, namely, that is cil, rejoicing that they were accounted worthy to suffer difficult to avoid. Now disgrace is twofold. There is the reproach for the name of Jesus.” It is owing to imper- disgrace inherent to vice, which consists in the deformity fection of virtue that a man is sometimes ashamed of the of a voluntary act: and this, properly speaking, has not the reproaches which he suffers on account of virtue, since character of an arduous evil. For that which depends on the more virtuous a man is, the more he despises external the will alone does not appear to be arduous and above things, whether good or evil. Wherefore it is written (Is. man’s ability: wherefore it is not apprehended as fearful, 51:7): “Fear ye not the reproach of men.” ∗ Nemesius, (De Nat. Hom. xx) 1832 Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 63, a. 3), upon them as vicious according to human opinion, or be-though honor is not really due save to virtue alone, yet cause he is afraid of being marked as presumptuous or it regards a certain excellence: and the same applies to hypocritical for doing virtuous deeds. reproach, for though it is properly due to sin alone, yet, Reply to Objection 4. Sometimes more grievous sins at least in man’s opinion, it regards any kind of defect. are less shameful, either because they are less disgraceful, Hence a man is ashamed of poverty, disrepute, servitude, as spiritual sins in comparison with sins of the flesh, or be- and the like. cause they connote a certain abundance of some temporal Reply to Objection 3. Shamefacedness does not re- good; thus a man is more ashamed of cowardice than of gard virtuous deeds as such. Yet it happens accidentally daring, of theft than of robbery, on account of a semblance that a man is ashamed of them either because he looks of power. The same applies to other sins. Whether man is more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him? IIa IIae q. 144 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that man is not more person ashamed. Now a person’s attestation may be con- shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with sidered as being more weighty, either because he is cer- him. For it is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that “men are more tain of the truth or because of its effect. Certitude of the shamefaced of those from whom they desire approbation.” truth attaches to a person’s attestations for two reasons. Now men desire this especially from people of the better First on account of the rectitude of his judgement, as in sort who are sometimes not connected with them. There- the case of wise and virtuous men, by whom man is more fore man is not more shamefaced of those who are more desirous of being honored and by whom he is brought to a closely connected with him. greater sense of shame. Hence children and the lower ani- Objection 2. Further, seemingly those are more mals inspire no one with shame, by reason of their lack of closely connected who perform like deeds. Now man is judgment. Secondly, on account of his knowledge of the not made ashamed of his sin by those whom he knows to matter attested, because “everyone judges well of what is be guilty of the same sin, because according to Rhet. ii, known to him”∗. In this way we are more liable to be 6, “a man does not forbid his neighbor what he does him- made ashamed by persons connected with us, since they self.” Therefore he is not more shamefaced of those who are better acquainted with our deeds: whereas strangers are most closely connected with him. and persons entirely unknown to us, who are ignorant of Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, what we do, inspire us with no shame at all. 6) that “men take more shame from those who retail their An attestation receives weight from its effect by rea- information to many, such as jokers and fable-tellers.” But son of some advantage or harm resulting therefrom; those who are more closely connected with a man do not wherefore men are more desirous of being honored by retail his vices. Therefore one should not take shame those who can be of use to them, and are more liable to chiefly from them. be made ashamed by those who are able to do them some Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, harm. And for this reason again, in a certain respect, per- 6) that “men are most liable to be made ashamed by those sons connected with us make us more ashamed, since we among whom they have done nothing amiss; by those are to be continually in their society, as though this en- of whom they ask something for the first time; by those tailed a continual harm to us: whereas the harm that comes whose friends they wish to become.” Now these are less from strangers and passersby ceases almost at once. closely connected with us. Therefore man is not made Reply to Objection 1. People of the better sort make most ashamed by those who are more closely united to us ashamed for the same reason as those who are more him. closely connected with us; because just as the attestation On the contrary, It is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that “man of the better men carries more weight since they have a is made most ashamed by those who are to be continually more universal knowledge of things, and in their judg- with him.” ments hold fast to the truth: so, too, the attestation of I answer that, Since reproach is opposed to honor, those among whom we live is more cogent since they just as honor denotes attestation to someone’s excellence, know more about our concerns in detail. especially the excellence which is according to virtue, so Reply to Objection 2. We fear not the attestation of too reproach, the fear of which is shamefacedness, de- those who are connected with us in the likeness of sin, be- notes attestation to a person’s defect, especially that which cause we do not think that they look upon our defect as results from sin. Hence the more weighty a person’s attes- disgraceful. tation is considered to be, the more does he make another Reply to Objection 3. Tale-bearers make us ashamed ∗ Ethic. i, 3 1833 on account of the harm they do by making many think ill seems greater, so that when a man notices something dis-of us. graceful in one whom he esteemed good, he apprehends Reply to Objection 4. Even those among whom we it as being the more disgraceful. The reason why we are have done no wrong, make us more ashamed, on account made more ashamed by those of whom we ask something of the harm that would follow, because, to wit, we should for the first time, or whose friends we wish to be, is that forfeit the good opinion they had of us: and again because we fear to suffer some injury, by being disappointed in our when contraries are put in juxtaposition their opposition request, or by failing to become their friends. Whether even virtuous men can be ashamed? IIa IIae q. 144 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that even virtuous men them. Secondly, because they apprehend disgrace as im- can be ashamed. For contraries have contrary effects. possible to themselves, or as easy to avoid. In this way the Now those who excel in wickedness are not ashamed, ac- old and the virtuous are not shamefaced. Yet they are so cording to Jer. 3:3, “Thou hadst a harlot’s forehead, thou disposed, that if there were anything disgraceful in them wouldst not blush.” Therefore those who are virtuous are they would be ashamed of it. Wherefore the Philosopher more inclined to be ashamed. says (Ethic. iv, 9) that “shame is in the virtuous hypothet- Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, ically.” 6) that “men are ashamed not only of vice, but also of Reply to Objection 1. Lack of shame occurs in the the signs of evil”: and this happens also in the virtuous. best and in the worst men through different causes, as Therefore virtuous men can be ashamed. stated in the Article. In the average men it is found, in Objection 3. Further, shamefacedness is “fear of dis- so far as they have a certain love of good, and yet are not grace”∗. Now virtuous people may happen to be ignomin- altogether free from evil. ious, for instance if they are slandered, or if they suffer Reply to Objection 2. It belongs to the virtuous man reproach undeservedly. Therefore a virtuous man can be to avoid not only vice, but also whatever has the sem- ashamed. blance of vice, according to 1 Thess. 5:22, “From all Objection 4. Further, shamefacedness is a part of tem- appearance of evil refrain yourselves.” The Philosopher, perance, as stated above (q. 143). Now a part is not sepa- too, says (Ethic. iv, 9) that the virtuous man should avoid rated from its whole. Since then temperance is in a virtu- “not only what is really evil, but also those things that are ous man, it means that shamefacedness is also. regarded as evil.” On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (a. 1, ad that a “virtuous man is not shamefaced.” 1) the virtuous man despises ignominy and reproach, as I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,2) shamefaced- being things he does not deserve, wherefore he is not ness is fear of some disgrace. Now it may happen in two much ashamed of them. Nevertheless, to a certain extent, ways that an evil is not feared: first, because it is not reck- shame, like the other passions, may forestall reason. oned an evil; secondly because one reckons it impossible Reply to Objection 4. Shamefacedness is a part of with regard to oneself, or as not difficult to avoid. temperance, not as though it entered into its essence, but Accordingly shame may be lacking in a person in two as a disposition to it: wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. ways. First, because the things that should make him i, 43) that “shamefacedness lays the first foundation of ashamed are not deemed by him to be disgraceful; and in temperance,” by inspiring man with the horror of what- this way those who are steeped in sin are without shame, ever is disgraceful. for instead of disapproving of their sins, they boast of ∗ Ethic. iv, 9 1834 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 145 Of Honesty∗ (In Four Articles) We must now consider honesty, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) The relation between the honest and the virtuous; (2) Its relation with the beautiful†; (3) Its relation with the useful and the pleasant; (4) Whether honesty is a part of temperance? Whether honesty is the same as virtue? IIa IIae q. 145 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that honesty is not the for the sake of something else, such as happiness which same as virtue. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) is the last end; while some are desired, not only for their that “the honest is what is desired for its own sake.” Now own sake, inasmuch as they have an aspect of goodness in virtue is desired, not for its own sake, but for the sake themselves, even if no further good accrued to us through of happiness, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9) that them, but also for the sake of something else, inasmuch as “happiness is the reward and the end of virtue.” Therefore they are conducive to some more perfect good. It is thus honesty is not the same as virtue. that the virtues are desirable for their own sake: where- Objection 2. Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x) fore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52) that “some things “honesty means an honorable state.” Now honor is due to allure us by their own force, and attract us by their own many things besides virtue, since “it is praise that is the worth, such as virtue, truth, knowledge.” And this suffices proper due of virtue” (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore honesty is to give a thing the character of honest. not the same as virtue. Reply to Objection 2. Some of the things which Objection 3. Further, the “principal part of virtue is are honored besides virtue are more excellent than virtue, the interior choice,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, namely God and happiness, and such like things are not so 13). But honesty seems to pertain rather to exterior con- well known to us by experience as virtue which we prac- duct, according to 1 Cor. 14:40, “Let all things be done tice day by day. Hence virtue has a greater claim to the decently [honeste] and according to order” among you. name of honesty. Other things which are beneath virtue Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue. are honored, in so far as they are a help to the practice Objection 4. Further, honesty apparently consists of virtue, such as rank, power, and riches§. For as the in external wealth. According to Ecclus. 11:14, “good Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that these things “are hon- things and evil, life and death [poverty and riches] are ored by some people, but in truth it is only the good man from God”‡. But virtue does not consist in external who is worthy of honor.” Now a man is good in respect wealth. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue. of virtue. Wherefore praise is due to virtue in so far as On the contrary, Tully (De Offic. i, 5; Rhet. ii, 53) the latter is desirable for the sake of something else, while divides honesty into the four principal virtues, into which honor is due to virtue for its own sake: and it is thus that virtue is also divided. Therefore honesty is the same as virtue has the character of honesty. virtue. Reply to Objection 3. As we have stated honest de- I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) “honesty notes that to which honor is due. Now honor is an attes- means an honorable state,” wherefore a thing may be said tation to someone’s excellence, as stated above (q. 103, to be honest through being worthy of honor. Now honor, Aa. 1,2). But one attests only to what one knows; and as stated above (q. 144, a. 2, ad 2), is due to excellence: the internal choice is not made known save by external and the excellence of a man is gauged chiefly according to actions. Wherefore external conduct has the character of his virtue, as stated in Phys. vii, 17. Therefore, properly honesty, in so far as it reflects internal rectitude. For this speaking, honesty refers to the same thing as virtue. reason honesty consists radically in the internal choice, Reply to Objection 1. According to the Philosopher but its expression lies in the external conduct. (Ethic. i, 7), of those things that are desired for their own Reply to Objection 4. It is because the excellence of sake, some are desired for their own sake alone, and never wealth is commonly regarded as making a man deserving ∗ Honesty Must Be Taken Here in Its Broad Sense As Synonymous with Moral Goodness, From the Point of View of Decorum. † As honesty here denotes moral goodness, so beauty stands for moral beauty ‡ The words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine edition. For riches the Vulgate has ‘honestas’ § Ethic. i, 8 1835 of honor, that sometimes the name of honesty is given to external prosperity. Whether the honest is the same as the beautiful? IIa IIae q. 145 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the honest is not the the spiritual clarity of reason. Now this is what is meant same as the beautiful. For the aspect of honest is derived by honesty, which we have stated (a. 1) to be the same from the appetite, since the honest is “what is desirable for as virtue; and it is virtue that moderates according to rea- its own sake”∗. But the beautiful regards rather the faculty son all that is connected with man. Wherefore “honesty of vision to which it is pleasing. Therefore the beautiful is the same as spiritual beauty.” Hence Augustine says is not the same as the honest. (Qq. 83, qu. 30): “By honesty I mean intelligible beauty, Objection 2. Further, beauty requires a certain clar- which we properly designate as spiritual,” and further on ity, which is characteristic of glory: whereas the honest he adds that “many things are beautiful to the eye, which regards honor. Since then honor and glory differ, as stated it would be hardly proper to call honest.” above (q. 103, a. 1, ad 3), it seems also that the honest and Reply to Objection 1. The object that moves the ap- the beautiful differ. petite is an apprehended good. Now if a thing is perceived Objection 3. Further, honesty is the same as virtue, to be beautiful as soon as it is apprehended, it is taken as stated above (a. 1). But a certain beauty is contrary to to be something becoming and good. Hence Dionysius virtue, wherefore it is written (Ezech. 16:15): “Trusting in says (Div. Nom. iv) that “the beautiful and the good are thy beauty thou playest the harlot because of thy renown.” beloved by all.” Wherefore the honest, inasmuch as it im- Therefore the honest is not the same as the beautiful. plies spiritual beauty, is an object of desire, and for this On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:23,24): reason Tully says (De Offic. i, 5): “Thou perceivest the “Those that are our uncomely [inhonesta] parts, have form and the features, so to speak, of honesty; and were it more abundant comeliness [honestatem], but our comely to be seen with the eye, would, as Plato declares, arouse a [honesta] parts have no need.” Now by uncomely parts he wondrous love of wisdom.” means the baser members, and by comely parts the beau- Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 103, a. 1, tiful members. Therefore the honest and the beautiful are ad 3), glory is the effect of honor: because through being apparently the same. honored or praised, a person acquires clarity in the eyes I answer that, As may be gathered from the words of of others. Wherefore, just as the same thing makes a man Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), beauty or comeliness results honorable and glorious, so is the same thing honest and from the concurrence of clarity and due proportion. For beautiful. he states that God is said to be beautiful, as being “the Reply to Objection 3. This argument applies to the cause of the harmony and clarity of the universe.” Hence beauty of the body: although it might be replied that to the beauty of the body consists in a man having his bodily be proud of one’s honesty is to play the harlot because of limbs well proportioned, together with a certain clarity of one’s spiritual beauty, according to Ezech. 28:17, “Thy color. In like manner spiritual beauty consists in a man’s heart was lifted up with thy beauty, thou hast lost thy wis- conduct or actions being well proportioned in respect of dom in thy beauty.” Whether the honest differs from the useful and the pleasant? IIa IIae q. 145 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the honest does not riches come under the head of honesty, for it is written differ from the useful and the pleasant. For the honest is (Ecclus. 11:14): “Poverty and riches [honestas] are from “what is desirable for its own sake”†. Now pleasure is God,” and (Ecclus. 13:2): “He shall take a burden upon desired for its own sake, for “it seems ridiculous to ask him that hath fellowship with one more honorable,” i.e. a man why he wishes to be pleased,” as the Philosopher richer, “than himself.” Therefore the honest differs not remarks (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore the honest does not differ from the useful. from the pleasant. Objection 3. Further, Tully proves (De Offic. ii, 3) Objection 2. Further, riches are comprised under the that nothing can be useful unless it be honest: and Am- head of useful good: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, brose makes the same statement (De Offic. ii, 6). There- 52): “There is a thing that attracts the desire not by any fore the useful differs not from the honest. force of its own, nor by its very nature, but on account On the contrary, Augustine says (q. 83, qu. 30): “The of its fruitfulness and utility”: and “that is money.” Now honest is that which is desirable for its own sake: the use- ∗ Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53 † Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53 1836 ful implies reference to something else.” referred to something else. The pleasant, however, ex- I answer that, The honest concurs in the same subject tends to more things than the useful and the honest: since with the useful and the pleasant, but it differs from them whatever is useful and honest is pleasing in some respect, in aspect. For, as stated above (a. 2), a thing is said to be whereas the converse does not hold (Ethic. ii, 3). honest, in so far as it has a certain beauty through being Reply to Objection 1. A thing is said to be honest, regulated by reason. Now whatever is regulated in accor- if it is desired for its own sake by the rational appetite. dance with reason is naturally becoming to man. Again, it which tends to that which is in accordance with reason: is natural for a thing to take pleasure in that which is be- while a thing is said to be pleasant if it is desired for its coming to it. Wherefore an honest thing is naturally pleas- own sake by the sensitive appetite. ing to man: and the Philosopher proves this with regard to Reply to Objection 2. Riches are denominated hon- acts of virtue (Ethic. i, 8). Yet not all that is pleasing is esty according of the opinion of the many who honor honest, since a thing may be becoming according to the wealth: or because they are intended to be the instruments senses, but not according to reason. A pleasing thing of of virtuous deeds, as stated above (a. 1, ad 2). this kind is beside man’s reason which perfects his nature. Reply to Objection 3. Tully and Ambrose mean to Even virtue itself, which is essentially honest, is referred say that nothing incompatible with honesty can be sim- to something else as its end namely happiness. Accord- ply and truly useful, since it follows that it is contrary to ingly the honest the useful, and the pleasant concur in the man’s last end, which is a good in accordance with rea- one subject. son; although it may perhaps be useful in some respect, Nevertheless they differ in aspect. For a thing is said with regard to a particular end. But they do not mean to to be honest as having a certain excellence deserving of say that every useful thing as such may be classed among honor on account of its spiritual beauty: while it is said those that are honest. to be pleasing, as bringing rest to desire, and useful, as Whether honesty should be reckoned a part of temperance? IIa IIae q. 145 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that honesty should not to temperance, since the latter repels that which is most be reckoned a part of temperance. For it is not possible disgraceful and unbecoming to man, namely animal lusts. for a thing to be part and whole in respect of one same Hence by its very name temperance is most significative thing. Now “temperance is a part of honesty,” according of the good of reason to which it belongs to moderate to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). Therefore honesty is and temper evil desires. Accordingly honesty, as being not a part of temperance. ascribed for a special reason to temperance, is reckoned Objection 2. Further, it is stated (3 Esdra 3:21) as a part thereof, not as a subjective part, nor as an an- that “wine. . . makes all thoughts honest.” But the use of nexed virtue, but as an integral part or condition attaching wine, especially in excess, in which sense the passage thereto. quoted should seemingly be taken, pertains to intemper- Reply to Objection 1. Temperance is accounted a ance rather than to temperance. Therefore honesty is not subjective part of honesty taken in a wide sense: it is not a part of temperance. thus that the latter is reckoned a part of temperance. Objection 3. Further, the honest is that which is de- Reply to Objection 2. When a man is intoxicated, serving of honor. Now “it is the just and the brave who “the wine makes his thoughts honest” according to his receive most honor,” according to the Philosopher (Rhet. own reckoning because he deems himself great and de- i, 9). Therefore honesty pertains, not to temperance, but serving of honor†. rather to justice and fortitude: wherefore Eleazar said as Reply to Objection 3. Greater honor is due to jus- related in 2 Macc. 6:28: “I suffer an honorable [honesta] tice and fortitude than to temperance, because they excel death, for the most venerable and most holy laws.” in the point of a greater good: yet greater honor is due On the contrary, Macrobius∗ reckons honesty a part to temperance, because the vices which it holds in check of temperance, and Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) ascribes are the most deserving of reproach, as stated above. Thus honesty as pertaining especially to temperance. honesty is more to be ascribed to temperance according I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), honesty is a to the rule given by the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:23) when he kind of spiritual beauty. Now the disgraceful is opposed says that “our uncomely parts have more abundant come- to the beautiful: and opposites are most manifest of one liness,” which, namely, destroys whatever is uncomely. another. Wherefore seemingly honesty belongs especially ∗ In Somn. Scip. i † Cf. q. 148, a. 6 1837 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 146 Of Abstinence (In Two Articles) We must now consider the subjective parts of temperance: first, those which are about pleasures of food; secondly, those which are about pleasures of sex. The first consideration will include abstinence, which is about meat and drink, and sobriety, which is specifically about drink. With regard to abstinence three points have to be considered: (1) Abstinence itself; (2) its act which is fasting; (3) its opposite vice which is gluttony. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether abstinence is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a special virtue? Whether abstinence is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 146 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that abstinence is not a virtue. a virtuous act, but something indifferent. Secondly, it may For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:20): “The kingdom of God be taken as regulated by reason, and then it signifies either is not in speech but in power [virtute].” Now the king- a virtuous habit or a virtuous act. This is the meaning of dom of God does not consist in abstinence, for the Apos- Peter’s words quoted above, where he says that we ought tle says (Rom. 14:17): “The kingdom of God is not meat “to join abstinence with knowledge,” namely that in ab- and drink,” where a gloss∗ observes that “justice consists staining from food a man should act with due regard for neither in abstaining nor in eating.” Therefore abstinence those among whom he lives, for his own person, and for is not a virtue. the requirements of health. Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Confess. x, Reply to Objection 1. The use of and abstinence from 11) addressing himself to God: “This hast Thou taught food, considered in themselves, do not pertain to the king- me, that I should set myself to take food as physic.” Now dom of God, since the Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:8): “Meat it belongs not to virtue, but to the medical art to regu- doth not commend us to God. For neither, if we eat not†, late medicine. Therefore, in like manner, to regulate one’s shall we have the less, nor if we eat, shall we have the food, which belongs to abstinence, is an act not of virtue more,” i.e. spiritually. Nevertheless they both belong to but of art. the kingdom of God, in so far as they are done reasonably Objection 3. Further, every virtue “observes the through faith and love of God. mean,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 6,7. But abstinence seem- Reply to Objection 2. The regulation of food, in ingly inclines not to the mean but to deficiency, since it de- the point of quantity and quality, belongs to the art of notes retrenchment. Therefore abstinence is not a virtue. medicine as regards the health of the body: but in the Objection 4. Further, no virtue excludes another point of internal affections with regard to the good of rea- virtue. But abstinence excludes patience: for Gregory son, it belongs to abstinence. Hence Augustine says (QQ. says (Pastor. iii, 19) that “impatience not unfrequently Evang. ii, qu. 11): “It makes no difference whatever to dislodges the abstainer’s mind from its peaceful seclu- virtue what or how much food a man takes, so long as he sion.” Likewise he says (Pastor. iii, 19) that “sometimes does it with due regard for the people among whom he the sin of pride pierces the thoughts of the abstainer,” so lives, for his own person, and for the requirements of his that abstinence excludes humility. Therefore abstinence is health: but it matters how readily and uncomplainingly not a virtue. he does without food when bound by duty or necessity to On the contrary, It is written (2 Pet. 1:5,6): “Join abstain.” with your faith virtue, and with virtue knowledge, and Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to temperance to bri- with knowledge abstinence”; where abstinence is num- dle the pleasures which are too alluring to the soul, just as bered among other virtues. Therefore abstinence is a it belongs to fortitude to strengthen the soul against fears virtue. that deter it from the good of reason. Wherefore, just as I answer that, Abstinence by its very name denotes fortitude is commended on account of a certain excess, retrenchment of food. Hence the term abstinence may be from which all the parts of fortitude take their name, so taken in two ways. First, as denoting retrenchment of food temperance is commended for a kind of deficiency, from absolutely, and in this way it signifies neither a virtue nor which all its parts are denominated. Hence abstinence, ∗ Cf. St. Augustine, QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 11 † Vulg.: ‘Neither if we eat. . . nor if we eat not’ 1838 since it is a part of temperance, is named from deficiency, stinence in so far as it is not in accord with right reason. and yet it observes the mean, in so far as it is in accord For right reason makes one abstain as one ought, i.e. with with right reason. gladness of heart, and for the due end, i.e. for God’s glory Reply to Objection 4. Those vices result from ab- and not one’s own. Whether abstinence is a special virtue? IIa IIae q. 146 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that abstinence is not reason, there is need of a special virtue. Now pleasures of a special virtue. For every virtue is praiseworthy by it- the table are of a nature to withdraw man from the good of self. But abstinence is not praiseworthy by itself; for Gre- reason, both because they are so great, and because food gory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that “the virtue of abstinence is is necessary to man who needs it for the maintenance of praised only on account of the other virtues.” Therefore life, which he desires above all other things. Therefore abstinence is not a special virtue. abstinence is a special virtue. Objection 2. Further, Augustine∗ says (De Fide ad Reply to Objection 1. Virtues are of necessity con- Pet. xlii) that “the saints abstain from meat and drink, nected together, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 1). not that any creature of God is evil, but merely in order Wherefore one virtue receives help and commendation to chastise the body.” Now this belongs to chastity, as its from another, as justice from fortitude. Accordingly in very name denotes. Therefore abstinence is not a special this way the virtue of abstinence receives commendation virtue distinct from chastity. on account of the other virtues. Objection 3. Further, as man should be content with Reply to Objection 2. The body is chastised by moderate meat, so should he be satisfied with moder- means of abstinence, not only against the allurements of ate clothes, according to 1 Tim. 6:8, “Having food, and lust, but also against those of gluttony: since by abstain- wherewith to be covered, with these we should be [Vulg.: ing a man gains strength for overcoming the onslaughts ‘are’] content.” Now there is no special virtue in being of gluttony, which increase in force the more he yields to content with moderate clothes. Neither, therefore, is there them. Yet abstinence is not prevented from being a special in abstinence which moderates food. virtue through being a help to chastity, since one virtue On the contrary, Macrobius† reckons abstinence as a helps another. special part of temperance. Reply to Objection 3. The use of clothing was de- I answer that, As stated above (q. 136, a. 1; q. 141, vised by art, whereas the use of food is from nature. a. 3) moral virtue maintains the good of reason against Hence it is more necessary to have a special virtue for the the onslaught of the passions: hence whenever we find a moderation of food than for the moderation of clothing. special motive why a passion departs from the good of ∗ Fulgentius † In Somn. Scip. i, 8 1839 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 147 Of Fasting (In Eight Articles) We must now consider fasting: under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether fasting is an act of virtue? (2) Of what virtue is it the act? (3) Whether it is a matter of precept? (4) Whether anyone is excused from fulfilling this precept? (5) The time of fasting; (6) Whether it is requisite for fasting to eat but once? (7) The hour of eating for those who fast; (8) The meats from which it is necessary to abstain. Whether fasting is an act of virtue? IIa IIae q. 147 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that fasting is not an act Thirdly, in order to satisfy for sins: wherefore it is writ- of virtue. For every act of virtue is acceptable to God. But ten (Joel 2:12): “Be converted to Me with all your heart, fasting is not always acceptable to God, according to Is. in fasting and in weeping and in mourning.” The same is 58:3, “Why have we fasted and Thou hast not regarded?” declared by Augustine in a sermon (De orat. et Jejun.‡): Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue. “Fasting cleanses the soul, raises the mind, subjects one’s Objection 2. Further, no act of virtue forsakes the flesh to the spirit, renders the heart contrite and humble, mean of virtue. Now fasting forsakes the mean of virtue, scatters the clouds of concupiscence, quenches the fire of which in the virtue of abstinence takes account of the ne- lust, kindles the true light of chastity.” cessity of supplying the needs of nature, whereas by fast- Reply to Objection 1. An act that is virtuous generi- ing something is retrenched therefrom: else those who do cally may be rendered vicious by its connection with cer- not fast would not have the virtue of abstinence. Therefore tain circumstances. Hence the text goes on to say: “Be- fasting is not an act of virtue. hold in the day of your fast your own will is founded,” Objection 3. Further, that which is competent to all, and a little further on (Is. 58:4): “You fast for debates and both good and evil, is not an act of virtue. Now such is strife and strike with the fist wickedly.” These words are fasting, since every one is fasting before eating. There- expounded by Gregory (Pastor. iii, 19) as follows: “The fore fasting is not an act of virtue. will indicates joy and the fist anger. In vain then is the On the contrary, It is reckoned together with other flesh restrained if the mind allowed to drift to inordinate virtuous acts (2 Cor. 6:5,6) where the Apostle says: “In movements be wrecked by vice.” And Augustine says fasting, in knowledge, in chastity, etc. [Vulg.: ‘in chastity, (in the same sermon) that “fasting loves not many words, in knowledge’].” deems wealth superfluous, scorns pride, commends hu- I answer that, An act is virtuous through being di- mility, helps man to perceive what is frail and paltry.” rected by reason to some virtuous [honestum]∗ good. Reply to Objection 2. The mean of virtue is measured Now this is consistent with fasting, because fasting is not according to quantity but according to right reason, as practiced for a threefold purpose. First, in order to bri- stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Now reason judges it expedient, dle the lusts of the flesh, wherefore the Apostle says (2 on account of some special motive, for a man to take less Cor. 6:5,6): “In fasting, in chastity,” since fasting is the food than would be becoming to him under ordinary cir- guardian of chastity. For, according to Jerome† “Venus cumstances, for instance in order to avoid sickness, or in is cold when Ceres and Bacchus are not there,” that is to order to perform certain bodily works with greater ease: say, lust is cooled by abstinence in meat and drink. Sec- and much more does reason direct this to the avoidance ondly, we have recourse to fasting in order that the mind of spiritual evils and the pursuit of spiritual goods. Yet may arise more freely to the contemplation of heavenly reason does not retrench so much from one’s food as to things: hence it is related (Dan. 10) of Daniel that he re- refuse nature its necessary support: thus Jerome says:§ “It ceived a revelation from God after fasting for three weeks. matters not whether thou art a long or a short time in de- ∗ Cf. q. 145, a. 1 † Contra Jov. ii. ‡ Serm. lxxii (ccxxx, de Tempore) § The quotation is from the Corpus of Canon Law (Cap. Non mediocriter, De Consecrationibus, dist. 5). Gratian there ascribes the quotation to St. Jerome, but it is not to be found in the saint’s works. 1840 stroying thyself, since to afflict the body immoderately, Reply to Objection 3. The fasting of nature, in re-whether by excessive lack of nourishment, or by eating or spect of which a man is said to be fasting until he partakes sleeping too little, is to offer a sacrifice of stolen goods.” of food, consists in a pure negation, wherefore it cannot In like manner right reason does not retrench so much be reckoned a virtuous act. Such is only the fasting of one from a man’s food as to render him incapable of fulfill- who abstains in some measure from food for a reasonable ing his duty. Hence Jerome says (in the same reference) purpose. Hence the former is called natural fasting [jeju- “Rational man forfeits his dignity, if he sets fasting before nium jejunii]∗: while the latter is called the faster’s fast, chastity, or night-watchings before the well-being of his because he fasts for a purpose. senses.” Whether fasting is an act of abstinence? IIa IIae q. 147 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that fasting is not an act mean is appointed by abstinence. Wherefore it is evident of abstinence. For Jerome† commenting on Mat. 17:20, that fasting is an act of abstinence. “This kind of devil” says: “To fast is to abstain not only Reply to Objection 1. Properly speaking fasting con- from food but also from all manner of lusts.” Now this be- sists in abstaining from food, but speaking metaphorically longs to every virtue. Therefore fasting is not exclusively it denotes abstinence from anything harmful, and such es- an act of abstinence. pecially is sin. Objection 2. Further, Gregory says in a Lenten We may also reply that even properly speaking fast- Homily (xvi in Evang.) that “the Lenten fast is a tithe of ing is abstinence from all manner of lust, since, as stated the whole year.” Now paying tithes is an act of religion, above (a. 1, ad 1), an act ceases to be virtuous by the con- as stated above (q. 87, a. 1). Therefore fasting is an act of junction of any vice. religion and not of abstinence. Reply to Objection 2. Nothing prevents the act of one Objection 3. Further, abstinence is a part of temper- virtue belonging to another virtue, in so far as it is directed ance, as stated above (Qq. 143,146, a. 1, ad 3). Now to the end of that virtue, as explained above (q. 32, a. 1, ad temperance is condivided with fortitude, to which it be- 2; q. 85, a. 3). Accordingly there is no reason why fasting longs to endure hardships, and this seems very applicable should not be an act of religion, or of chastity, or of any to fasting. Therefore fasting is not an act of abstinence. other virtue. On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to fortitude as a spe- “fasting is frugality of fare and abstinence from food.” cial virtue, to endure, not any kind of hardship, but only I answer that, Habit and act have the same matter. those connected with the danger of death. To endure hard- Wherefore every virtuous act about some particular mat- ships resulting from privation of pleasure of touch, be- ter belongs to the virtue that appoints the mean in that longs to temperance and its parts: and such are the hard- matter. Now fasting is concerned with food, wherein the ships of fasting. Whether fasting is a matter of precept? IIa IIae q. 147 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that fasting is not a mat- tian people, that is, of the free multitude, should be bound ter of precept. For precepts are not given about works of together in subjection to one God.” Now the liberty of the supererogation which are a matter of counsel. Now fast- Christian people seems to be hindered by a great number ing is a work of supererogation: else it would have to be of observances no less than by a great number of sacra- equally observed at all places and times. Therefore fasting ments. For Augustine says (Ad inquis. Januar., Ep. lv) is not a matter of precept. that “whereas God in His mercy wished our religion to be Objection 2. Further, whoever infringes a precept distinguished by its freedom and the evidence and small commits a mortal sin. Therefore if fasting were a mat- number of its solemn sacraments, some people render it ter of precept, all who do not fast would sin mortally, and oppressive with slavish burdens.” Therefore it seems that a widespreading snare would be laid for men. the Church should not have made fasting a matter of pre- Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. cept. 17) that “the Wisdom of God having taken human nature, On the contrary, Jerome (Ad Lucin., Ep. lxxi) speak- and called us to a state of freedom, instituted a few most ing of fasting says: “Let each province keep to its own salutary sacraments whereby the community of the Chris- practice, and look upon the commands of the elders as ∗ Literally the ‘fast of fasting’ † The quotation is from the Ordinary Gloss, where the reference is lacking 1841 though they were laws of the apostles.” Therefore fasting appoint certain fasts to be kept by all in common. In do-is a matter of precept. ing this the Church does not make a precept of a matter of I answer that, Just as it belongs to the secular au- supererogation, but particularizes in detail that which is of thority to make legal precepts which apply the natural general obligation. law to matters of common weal in temporal affairs, so it Reply to Objection 2. Those commandments which belongs to ecclesiastical superiors to prescribe by statute are given under the form of a general precept, do not bind those things that concern the common weal of the faithful all persons in the same way, but subject to the require- in spiritual goods. ments of the end intended by the lawgiver. It will be a Now it has been stated above (a. 1) that fasting is use- mortal sin to disobey a commandment through contempt ful as atoning for and preventing sin, and as raising the of the lawgiver’s authority, or to disobey it in such a way mind to spiritual things. And everyone is bound by the as to frustrate the end intended by him: but it is not a mor- natural dictate of reason to practice fasting as far as it is tal sin if one fails to keep a commandment, when there is necessary for these purposes. Wherefore fasting in gen- a reasonable motive, and especially if the lawgiver would eral is a matter of precept of the natural law, while the not insist on its observance if he were present. Hence it is fixing of the time and manner of fasting as becoming and that not all, who do not keep the fasts of the Church, sin profitable to the Christian people, is a matter of precept mortally. of positive law established by ecclesiastical authority: the Reply to Objection 3. Augustine is speaking there latter is the Church fast, the former is the fast prescribed of those things “that are neither contained in the author- by nature. ities of Holy Scripture, nor found among the ordinances Reply to Objection 1. Fasting considered in itself de- of bishops in council, nor sanctioned by the custom of notes something not eligible but penal: yet it becomes el- the universal Church.” On the other hand, the fasts that igible in so far as it is useful to some end. Wherefore are of obligation are appointed by the councils of bishops considered absolutely it is not binding under precept, but and are sanctioned by the custom of the universal Church. it is binding under precept to each one that stands in need Nor are they opposed to the freedom of the faithful, rather of such a remedy. And since men, for the most part, need are they of use in hindering the slavery of sin, which is this remedy, both because “in many things we all offend” opposed to spiritual freedom, of which it is written (Gal. (James 3:2), and because “the flesh lusteth against the 5:13): “You, brethren, have been called unto liberty; only spirit” (Gal. 5:17), it was fitting that the Church should make not liberty an occasion to the flesh.” Whether all are bound to keep the fasts of the Church? IIa IIae q. 147 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that all are bound to keep of the Church ought not to be omitted on account of a pil- the fasts of the Church. For the commandments of the grimage, or bodily works. Church are binding even as the commandments of God, Objection 4. Further, it is better to do a thing will- according to Lk. 10:16, “He that heareth you heareth Me.” ingly than through necessity, as stated in 2 Cor. 9:7. Now Now all are bound to keep the commandments of God. the poor are wont to fast through necessity, owing to lack Therefore in like manner all are bound to keep the fasts of food. Much more therefore ought they to fast willingly. appointed by the Church. On the contrary, It seems that no righteous man is Objection 2. Further, children especially are seem- bound to fast. For the commandments of the Church are ingly not exempt from fasting, on account of their age: not binding in opposition to Christ’s teaching. But our for it is written (Joel 2:15): “Sanctify a fast,” and further Lord said (Lk. 5:34) that “the children of the bridegroom on (Joel 2:16): “Gather together the little ones, and them cannot fast whilst the bridegroom is with them∗.” Now He that suck the breasts.” Much more therefore are all others is with all the righteous by dwelling in them in a special bound to keen the fasts. manner†, wherefore our Lord said (Mat. 28:20): “Behold Objection 3. Further, spiritual things should be pre- I am with you. . . even to the consummation of the world.” ferred to temporal, and necessary things to those that are Therefore the righteous are not bound by the command- not necessary. Now bodily works are directed to temporal ment of the Church to fast. gain; and pilgrimages, though directed to spiritual things, I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 90, a. 2; Ia are not a matter of necessity. Therefore, since fasting is IIae, q. 98, Aa. 2,6), general precepts are framed accord- directed to a spiritual gain, and is made a necessary thing ing to the requirements of the many. Wherefore in making by the commandment of the Church, it seems that the fasts such precepts the lawgiver considers what happens gener- ∗ Vulg.: ‘Can you make the children of the bridegroom fast, whilst the bridegroom is with them?’ † Cf. Ia, q. 8, a. 3 1842 ally and for the most part, and he does not intend the pre-under the necessity of starting on the pilgrimage at once, cept to be binding on a person in whom for some special and of making long stages, or of doing much work, either reason there is something incompatible with observance for one’s bodily livelihood, or for some need of the spir- of the precept. Yet discretion must be brought to bear on itual life, and it be impossible at the same time to keep the point. For if the reason be evident, it is lawful for a the fasts of the Church, one is not bound to fast: because man to use his own judgment in omitting to fulfil the pre- in ordering fasts the Church would not seem to have in- cept, especially if custom be in his favor, or if it be difficult tended to prevent other pious and more necessary under-for him to have recourse to superior authority. on the other takings. Nevertheless, in such cases one ought seemingly, hand, if the reason be doubtful, one should have recourse to seek the superior’s dispensation; except perhaps when to the superior who has power to grant a dispensation in the above course is recognized by custom, since when su- such cases. And this must be done in the fasts appointed periors are silent they would seem to consent. by the Church, to which all are bound in general, unless Reply to Objection 4. Those poor who can pro- there be some special obstacle to this observance. vide themselves with sufficient for one meal are not ex- Reply to Objection 1. The commandments of God cused, on account of poverty, from keeping the fasts of are precepts of the natural law, which are, of themselves, the Church. On the other hand, those would seem to be necessary for salvation. But the commandments of the exempt who beg their food piecemeal, since they are un- Church are about matters which are necessary for salva- able at any one time to have a sufficiency of food. tion, not of themselves, but only through the ordinance of Reply to Objection 5. This saying of our Lord may the Church. Hence there may be certain obstacles on ac- be expounded in three ways. First, according to Chrysos- count of which certain persons are not bound to keep the tom (Hom. xxx in Matth.), who says that “the disciples, fasts in question. who are called children of the bridegroom, were as yet of Reply to Objection 2. In children there is a most a weakly disposition, wherefore they are compared to an evident reason for not fasting, both on account of their old garment.” Hence while Christ was with them in body natural weakness, owing to which they need to take food they were to be fostered with kindness rather than drilled frequently, and not much at a time, and because they with the harshness of fasting. According to this interpre- need much nourishment owing to the demands of growth, tation, it is fitting that dispensations should be granted to which results from the residuum of nourishment. Where- the imperfect and to beginners, rather than to the elders fore as long as the stage of growth lasts, which as a rule and the perfect, according to a gloss on Ps. 130:2, “As lasts until they have completed the third period of seven a child that is weaned is towards his mother.” Secondly, years, they are not bound to keep the Church fasts: and we may say with Jerome∗ that our Lord is speaking here yet it is fitting that even during that time they should ex- of the fasts of the observances of the Old Law. Wherefore ercise themselves in fasting, more or less, in accordance our Lord means to say that the apostles were not to be held with their age. Nevertheless when some great calamity back by the old observances, since they were to be filled threatens, even children are commanded to fast, in sign of with the newness of grace. Thirdly, according to Augus- more severe penance, according to Jonah 3:7, “Let neither tine (De Consensu Evang. ii, 27), who states that fasting men nor beasts. . . taste anything. . . nor drink water.” is of two kinds. one pertains to those who are humbled Reply to Objection 3. Apparently a distinction by disquietude, and this is not befitting perfect men, for should be made with regard to pilgrims and working peo- they are called “children of the bridegroom”; hence when ple. For if the pilgrimage or laborious work can be conve- we read in Luke: “The children of the bridegroom cannot niently deferred or lessened without detriment to the bod- fast†,” we read in Mat. 9:15: “The children of the bride- ily health and such external conditions as are necessary groom cannot mourn‡.” The other pertains to the mind for the upkeep of bodily or spiritual life, there is no rea- that rejoices in adhering to spiritual things: and this fast- son for omitting the fasts of the Church. But if one be ing is befitting the perfect. Whether the times for the Church fast are fittingly ascribed? IIa IIae q. 147 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the times for the Christ.” Therefore we ought to fast immediately after the Church fast are unfittingly appointed. For we read (Mat. Epiphany when Christ’s baptism is celebrated. 4) that Christ began to fast immediately after being bap- Objection 2. Further, it is unlawful in the New Law to tized. Now we ought to imitate Christ, according to 1 observe the ceremonies of the Old Law. Now it belongs to Cor. 4:16, “Be ye followers of me, as I also am of the solemnities of the Old Law to fast in certain particular ∗ Bede, Comment. in Luc. v † Hom. xiii, in Matth. ‡ Vulg.: ‘Can the children of the bridegroom mourn?’ 1843 months: for it is written (Zech. 8:19): “The fast of the body through whose lusts we transgress the Lord’s com-fourth month and the fast of the fifth, and the fast of the mandments which are delivered to us in the Decalogue. seventh, and the fast of the tenth shall be to the house of Wherefore it is fitting we should punish that same body Judah, joy and gladness and great solemnities.” Therefore forty times. or, because, just as under the Law it was com- the fast of certain months, which are called Ember days, manded that tithes should be paid of things, so we strive are unfittingly kept in the Church. to pay God a tithe of days, for since a year is composed of Objection 3. Further, according to Augustine (De three hundred and sixty-six days, by punishing ourselves Consensu Evang. ii, 27), just as there is a fast “of sorrow,” for thirty-six days” (namely, the fasting days during the so is there a fast “of joy.” Now it is most becoming that the six weeks of Lent) “we pay God a tithe of our year.” Ac- faithful should rejoice spiritually in Christ’s Resurrection. cording to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 16) a fourth Therefore during the five weeks which the Church solem- reason may be added. For the Creator is the “Trinity,” nizes on account of Christ’s Resurrection, and on Sundays Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: while the number “three” which commemorate the Resurrection, fasts ought to be refers to the invisible creature, since we are commanded appointed. to love God, with our whole heart, with our whole soul, On the contrary, stands the general custom of the and with our whole mind: and the number “four” refers to Church. the visible creature, by reason of heat, cold, wet and dry. I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,3), fasting is di- Thus the number “ten”‡ signifies all things, and if this be rected to two things, the deletion of sin, and the raising of multiplied by four which refers to the body whereby we the mind to heavenly things. Wherefore fasting ought to make use of things, we have the number forty. be appointed specially for those times, when it behooves Each fast of the Ember days is composed of three days, man to be cleansed from sin, and the minds of the faithful on account of the number of months in each season: or on to be raised to God by devotion: and these things are par- account of the number of Holy orders which are conferred ticularly requisite before the feast of Easter, when sins are at these times. loosed by baptism, which is solemnly conferred on Easter- Reply to Objection 1. Christ needed not baptism for eve, on which day our Lord’s burial is commemorated, His own sake, but in order to commend baptism to us. because “we are buried together with Christ by baptism Wherefore it was competent for Him to fast, not before, unto death” (Rom. 6:4). Moreover at the Easter festival but after His baptism, in order to invite us to fast before the mind of man ought to be devoutly raised to the glory our baptism. of eternity, which Christ restored by rising from the dead, Reply to Objection 2. The Church keeps the Ember and so the Church ordered a fast to be observed immedi- fasts, neither at the very same time as the Jews, nor for the ately before the Paschal feast; and for the same reason, on same reasons. For they fasted in July, which is the fourth the eve of the chief festivals, because it is then that one month from April (which they count as the first), because ought to make ready to keep the coming feast devoutly. it was then that Moses coming down from Mount Sinai Again it is the custom in the Church for Holy orders to be broke the tables of the Law (Ex. 32), and that, accord- conferred every quarter of the year (in sign whereof our ing to Jer. 39:2, “the walls of the city were first broken Lord fed four thousand men with seven loaves, which sig- through.” In the fifth month, which we call August, they nify the New Testament year as Jerome says∗): and then fasted because they were commanded not to go up on to both the ordainer, and the candidates for ordination, and the mountain, when the people had rebelled on account even the whole people, for whose good they are ordained, of the spies (Num. 14): also in this month the temple of need to fast in order to make themselves ready for the or- Jerusalem was burnt down by Nabuchodonosor (Jer. 52) dination. Hence it is related (Lk. 6:12) that before choos- and afterwards by Titus. In the seventh month which we ing His disciples our Lord “went out into a mountain to call October, Godolias was slain, and the remnants of the pray”: and Ambrose† commenting on these words says: people were dispersed (Jer. 51). In the tenth month, which “What shouldst thou do, when thou desirest to undertake we call January, the people who were with Ezechiel in some pious work, since Christ prayed before sending His captivity heard of the destruction of the temple (Ezech. apostles?” 4). With regard to the forty day’s fast, according to Gre- Reply to Objection 3. The “fasting of joy” proceeds gory (Hom. xvi in Evang.) there are three reasons for from the instigation of the Holy Ghost Who is the Spirit the number. First, “because the power of the Decalogue of liberty, wherefore this fasting should not be a mat- is accomplished in the four books of the Holy Gospels: ter of precept. Accordingly the fasts appointed by the since forty is the product of ten multiplied by four.” Or commandment of the Church are rather “fasts of sorrow” “because we are composed of four elements in this mortal which are inconsistent with days of joy. For this reason ∗ Comment. in Marc. viii † Exposit. in Luc. ‡ Ten is the sum of three, three, and four 1844 fasting is not ordered by the Church during the whole of opinion (thus the Manichees fast, because they deem such the Paschal season, nor on Sundays: and if anyone were to fasting to be of obligation)—he would not be free from fast at these times in contradiction to the custom of Chris- sin. Nevertheless fasting considered in itself is commend- tian people, which as Augustine declares (Ep. xxxvi) “is able at all times; thus Jerome wrote (Ad Lucin., Ep. lxxi): to be considered as law,” or even through some erroneous “Would that we might fast always.” Whether it is requisite for fasting that one eat but once? IIa IIae q. 147 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not requisite for take one meal in the day. fasting that one eat but once. For, as stated above (a. 2), Reply to Objection 1. It was not possible to fix the fasting is an act of the virtue of abstinence, which ob- same quantity of food for all, on account of the vari- serves due quantity of food not less than the number of ous bodily temperaments, the result being that one person meals. Now the quantity of food is not limited for those needs more, and another less food: whereas, for the most who fast. Therefore neither should the number of meals part, all are able to satisfy nature by only one meal. be limited. Reply to Objection 2. Fasting is of two kinds∗. One Objection 2. Further, Just as man is nourished by is the natural fast, which is requisite for receiving the Eu- meat, so is he by drink: wherefore drink breaks the fast, charist. This is broken by any kind of drink, even of wa- and for this reason we cannot receive the Eucharist after ter, after which it is not lawful to receive the Eucharist. drinking. Now we are not forbidden to drink at various The fast of the Church is another kind and is called the hours of the day. Therefore those who fast should not be “fasting of the faster,” and this is not broken save by such forbidden to eat several times. things as the Church intended to forbid in instituting the Objection 3. Further, digestives are a kind of food: fast. Now the Church does not intend to command ab- and yet many take them on fasting days after eating. stinence from drink, for this is taken more for bodily re- Therefore it is not essential to fasting to take only one freshment, and digestion of the food consumed, although meal. it nourishes somewhat. It is, however, possible to sin and On the contrary, stands the common custom of the lose the merit of fasting, by partaking of too much drink: Christian people. as also by eating immoderately at one meal. I answer that, Fasting is instituted by the Church in Reply to Objection 3. Although digestives nourish order to bridle concupiscence, yet so as to safeguard na- somewhat they are not taken chiefly for nourishment, but ture. Now only one meal is seemingly sufficient for this for digestion. Hence one does not break one’s fast by tak- purpose, since thereby man is able to satisfy nature; and ing them or any other medicines, unless one were to take yet he withdraws something from concupiscence by min- digestives, with a fraudulent intention, in great quantity imizing the number of meals. Therefore it is appointed by and by way of food. the Church, in her moderation, that those who fast should Whether the ninth hour is suitably fixed for the faster’s meal? IIa IIae q. 147 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the ninth hour is not Objection 3. Further, fasting is an act of the virtue of suitably fixed for the faster’s meal. For the state of the abstinence, as stated above (a. 2). Now the mean of moral New Law is more perfect than the state of the Old Law. virtue does not apply in the same way to all, since what Now in the Old Testament they fasted until evening, for it is much for one is little for another, as stated in Ethic. ii, is written (Lev. 23:32): “It is a sabbath. . . you shall afflict 6. Therefore the ninth hour should not be fixed for those your souls,” and then the text continues: “From evening who fast. until evening you shall celebrate your sabbaths.” Much On the contrary, The Council of Chalons† says: more therefore under the New Testament should the fast “During Lent those are by no means to be credited with be ordered until the evening. fasting who eat before the celebration of the office of Ves- Objection 2. Further, the fast ordered by the Church pers,” which in the Lenten season is said after the ninth is binding on all. But all are not able to know exactly the hour. Therefore we ought to fast until the ninth hour. ninth hour. Therefore it seems that the fixing of the ninth I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,3,5), fasting is hour should not form part of the commandment to fast. directed to the deletion and prevention of sin. Hence it ∗ Cf. a. 1, ad 3 † The quotation is from the Capitularies (Cap. 39) of Theodulf, bishop of Orleans (760-821) and is said to be found in the Corpus Juris, Cap. Solent, dist. 1, De Consecratione 1845 ought to add something to the common custom, yet so as Reply to Objection 1. The state of the Old Testament not to be a heavy burden to nature. Now the right and is compared to the night, while the state of the New Tes- common custom is for men to eat about the sixth hour: tament is compared to the day, according to Rom. 13:12, both because digestion is seemingly finished (the natu- “The night is passed and the day is at hand.” Therefore ral heat being withdrawn inwardly at night-time on ac- in the Old Testament they fasted until night, but not in the count of the surrounding cold of the night), and the humor New Testament. spread about through the limbs (to which result the heat of Reply to Objection 2. Fasting requires a fixed hour the day conduces until the sun has reached its zenith), and based, not on a strict calculation, but on a rough estimate: again because it is then chiefly that the nature of the hu- for it suffices that it be about the ninth hour, and this is man body needs assistance against the external heat that easy for anyone to ascertain. is in the air, lest the humors be parched within. Hence, in Reply to Objection 3. A little more or a little less canorder that those who fast may feel some pain in satisfac- not do much harm. Now it is not a long space of time from tion for their sins, the ninth hour is suitably fixed for their the sixth hour at which men for the most part are wont to meal. eat, until the ninth hour, which is fixed for those who fast. Moreover, this hour agrees with the mystery of Wherefore the fixing of such a time cannot do much harm Christ’s Passion, which was brought to a close at the ninth to anyone, whatever his circumstances may be. If however hour, when “bowing His head, He gave up the ghost” (Jn. this were to prove a heavy burden to a man on account of 19:30): because those who fast by punishing their flesh, sickness, age, or some similar reason, he should be dis- are conformed to the Passion of Christ, according to Gal. pensed from fasting, or be allowed to forestall the hour by 5:24, “They that are Christ’s, have crucified their flesh a little. with the vices and concupiscences.” Whether it is fitting that those who fast should be bidden to abstain from flesh meat, IIa IIae q. 147 a. 8 eggs, and milk foods? Objection 1. It would seem unfitting that those who great incentive to lust. Such are the flesh of animals that fast should be bidden to abstain from flesh meat, eggs, take their rest on the earth, and of those that breathe the and milk foods. For it has been stated above (a. 6) that air and their products, such as milk from those that walk fasting was instituted as a curb on the concupiscence of on the earth, and eggs from birds. For, since such like an- the flesh. Now concupiscence is kindled by drinking wine imals are more like man in body, they afford greater plea- more than by eating flesh; according to Prov. 20:1, “Wine sure as food, and greater nourishment to the human body, is a luxurious thing,” and Eph. 5:18, “Be not drunk with so that from their consumption there results a greater sur- wine, wherein is luxury.” Since then those who fast are plus available for seminal matter, which when abundant not forbidden to drink wine, it seems that they should not becomes a great incentive to lust. Hence the Church has be forbidden to eat flesh meat. bidden those who fast to abstain especially from these Objection 2. Further, some fish are as delectable to foods. eat as the flesh of certain animals. Now “concupiscence is Reply to Objection 1. Three things concur in the act desire of the delectable,” as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 30, of procreation, namely, heat, spirit∗, and humor. Wine and a. 1). Therefore since fasting which was instituted in or- other things that heat the body conduce especially to heat: der to bridle concupiscence does not exclude the eating of flatulent foods seemingly cooperate in the production of fish, neither should it exclude the eating of flesh meat. the vital spirit: but it is chiefly the use of flesh meat which Objection 3. Further, on certain fasting days people is most productive of nourishment, that conduces to the make use of eggs and cheese. Therefore one can likewise production of humor. Now the alteration occasioned by make use of them during the Lenten fast. heat, and the increase in vital spirits are of short duration, On the contrary, stands the common custom of the whereas the substance of the humor remains a long time. faithful. Hence those who fast are forbidden the use of flesh meat I answer that, As stated above (a. 6), fasting was rather than of wine or vegetables which are flatulent foods. instituted by the Church in order to bridle the concupis- Reply to Objection 2. In the institution of fasting, the cences of the flesh, which regard pleasures of touch in Church takes account of the more common occurrences. connection with food and sex. Wherefore the Church for- Now, generally speaking, eating flesh meat affords more bade those who fast to partake of those foods which both pleasure than eating fish, although this is not always the afford most pleasure to the palate, and besides are a very case. Hence the Church forbade those who fast to eat flesh ∗ Cf. P. I., Q. 118, a. 1, ad 3 1846 meat, rather than to eat fish. flesh meat is forbidden in every fast, while the Lenten fast Reply to Objection 3. Eggs and milk foods are for- lays a general prohibition even on eggs and milk foods. bidden to those who fast, for as much as they originate As to the use of the latter things in other fasts the custom from animals that provide us with flesh: wherefore the varies among different people, and each person is bound prohibition of flesh meat takes precedence of the prohibi- to conform to that custom which is in vogue with those tion of eggs and milk foods. Again the Lenten fast is the among whom he is dwelling. Hence Jerome says†: “Let most solemn of all, both because it is kept in imitation of each province keep to its own practice, and look upon the Christ, and because it disposes us to celebrate devoutly the commands of the elders as though they were the laws of mysteries of our redemption. For this reason the eating of the apostles.” † Augustine, De Lib. Arb. iii, 18; cf. De Nat. et Grat. lxvii 1847 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 148 Of Gluttony (In Six Articles) We must now consider gluttony. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether gluttony is a sin? (2) Whether it is a mortal sin? (3) Whether it is the greatest of sins? (4) Its species; (5) Whether it is a capital sin? (6) Its daughters. Whether gluttony is a sin? IIa IIae q. 148 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that gluttony is not a sin. Reply to Objection 1. That which goes into man by For our Lord said (Mat. 15:11): “Not that which goeth way of food, by reason of its substance and nature, does into the mouth defileth a man.” Now gluttony regards food not defile a man spiritually. But the Jews, against whom which goes into a man. Therefore, since every sin defiles our Lord is speaking, and the Manichees deemed certain a man, it seems that gluttony is not a sin. foods to make a man unclean, not on account of their sig- Objection 2. Further, “No man sins in what he can- nification, but by reason of their nature†. It is the inordi- not avoid”∗. Now gluttony is immoderation in food; and nate desire of food that defiles a man spiritually. man cannot avoid this, for Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): Reply to Objection 2. As stated above, the vice of “Since in eating pleasure and necessity go together, we gluttony does not regard the substance of food, but in the fail to discern between the call of necessity and the seduc- desire thereof not being regulated by reason. Wherefore tion of pleasure,” and Augustine says (Confess. x, 31): if a man exceed in quantity of food, not from desire of “Who is it, Lord, that does not eat a little more than nec- food, but through deeming it necessary to him, this per- essary?” Therefore gluttony is not a sin. tains, not to gluttony, but to some kind of inexperience. It Objection 3. Further, in every kind of sin the first is a case of gluttony only when a man knowingly exceeds movement is a sin. But the first movement in taking food the measure in eating, from a desire for the pleasures of is not a sin, else hunger and thirst would be sinful. There- the palate. fore gluttony is not a sin. Reply to Objection 3. The appetite is twofold. There On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18) is the natural appetite, which belongs to the powers of the that “unless we first tame the enemy dwelling within us, vegetal soul. In these powers virtue and vice are impos- namely our gluttonous appetite, we have not even stood sible, since they cannot be subject to reason; wherefore up to engage in the spiritual combat.” But man’s inward the appetitive power is differentiated from the powers of enemy is sin. Therefore gluttony is a sin. secretion, digestion, and excretion, and to it hunger and I answer that, Gluttony denotes, not any desire of eat- thirst are to be referred. Besides this there is another, the ing and drinking, but an inordinate desire. Now desire is sensitive appetite, and it is in the concupiscence of this said to be inordinate through leaving the order of reason, appetite that the vice of gluttony consists. Hence the first wherein the good of moral virtue consists: and a thing is movement of gluttony denotes inordinateness in the sen- said to be a sin through being contrary to virtue. Where- sitive appetite, and this is not without sin. fore it is evident that gluttony is a sin. Whether gluttony is a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 148 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that gluttony is not a mor- charity, as stated above (q. 132, a. 3). But gluttony is not tal sin. For every mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the opposed to charity, neither as regards the love of God, nor Decalogue: and this, apparently, does not apply to glut- as regards the love of one’s neighbor. Therefore gluttony tony. Therefore gluttony is not a mortal sin. is never a mortal sin. Objection 2. Further, every mortal sin is contrary to Objection 3. Further, Augustine says in a sermon on ∗ Ep. lxxi, ad Lucin. † Cf. Ia IIae, q. 102, a. 6, ad 1 1848 Purgatory‡: “Whenever a man takes more meat and drink tony be found to affect only such things as are directed to than is necessary, he should know that this is one of the the end, for instance when a man has too great a desire for lesser sins.” But this pertains to gluttony. Therefore glut- the pleasures of the palate, yet would not for their sake do tony is accounted among the lesser, that is to say venial, anything contrary to God’s law, it is a venial sin. sins. Reply to Objection 1. The vice of gluttony becomes Objection 4. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. a mortal sin by turning man away from his last end: and xxx, 18): “As long as the vice of gluttony has a hold on accordingly, by a kind of reduction, it is opposed to the a man, all that he has done valiantly is forfeited by him: precept of hallowing the sabbath, which commands us to and as long as the belly is unrestrained, all virtue comes to rest in our last end. For mortal sins are not all directly naught.” But virtue is not done away save by mortal sin. opposed to the precepts of the Decalogue, but only those Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin. which contain injustice: because the precepts of the Deca- I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the vice of glut- logue pertain specially to justice and its parts, as stated tony properly consists in inordinate concupiscence. Now above (q. 122, a. 1). the order of reason in regulating the concupiscence may Reply to Objection 2. In so far as it turns man away be considered from two points of view. First, with re- from his last end, gluttony is opposed to the love of God, gard to things directed to the end, inasmuch as they may who is to be loved, as our last end, above all things: and be incommensurate and consequently improportionate to only in this respect is gluttony a mortal sin. the end; secondly, with regard to the end itself, inasmuch Reply to Objection 3. This saying of Augustine refers as concupiscence turns man away from his due end. Ac- to gluttony as denoting inordinate concupiscence merely cordingly, if the inordinate concupiscence in gluttony be in regard of things directed to the end. found to turn man away from the last end, gluttony will Reply to Objection 4. Gluttony is said to bring virtue be a mortal sin. This is the case when he adheres to the to naught, not so much on its own account, as on account pleasure of gluttony as his end, for the sake of which he of the vices which arise from it. For Gregory says (Pas- contemns God, being ready to disobey God’s command- tor. iii, 19): “When the belly is distended by gluttony, the ments, in order to obtain those pleasures. On the other virtues of the soul are destroyed by lust.” hand, if the inordinate concupiscence in the vice of glut- Whether gluttony is the greatest of sins? IIa IIae q. 148 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that gluttony is the great- gory (Moral. xxxiii). est of sins. For the grievousness of a sin is measured by I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be measured the grievousness of the punishment. Now the sin of glut- in three ways. First and foremost it depends on the matter tony is most grievously punished, for Chrysostom says∗: in which the sin is committed: and in this way sins com- “Gluttony turned Adam out of Paradise, gluttony it was mitted in connection with Divine things are the greatest. that drew down the deluge at the time of Noah.” Accord- From this point of view gluttony is not the greatest sin, for ing to Ezech. 16:49, “This was the iniquity of Sodom, thy it is about matters connected with the nourishment of the sister. . . fulness of bread,” etc. Therefore the sin of glut- body. Secondly, the gravity of a sin depends on the person tony is the greatest of all. who sins, and from this point of view the sin of gluttony Objection 2. Further, in every genus the cause is the is diminished rather than aggravated, both on account of most powerful. Now gluttony is apparently the cause of the necessity of taking food, and on account of the diffi- other sins, for a gloss on Ps. 135:10, “Who smote Egypt culty of proper discretion and moderation in such matters. with their first-born,” says: “Lust, concupiscence, pride Thirdly, from the point of view of the result that follows, are the first-born of gluttony.” Therefore gluttony is the and in this way gluttony has a certain gravity, inasmuch as greatest of sins. certain sins are occasioned thereby. Objection 3. Further, man should love himself in the Reply to Objection 1. These punishments are to be first place after God, as stated above (q. 25, a. 4). Now referred to the vices that resulted from gluttony, or to the man, by the vice of gluttony, inflicts an injury on him- root from which gluttony sprang, rather than to gluttony self: for it is written (Ecclus. 37:34): “By surfeiting many itself. For the first man was expelled from Paradise on have perished.” Therefore gluttony is the greatest of sins, account of pride, from which he went on to an act of glut- at least excepting those that are against God. tony: while the deluge and the punishment of the people On the contrary, The sins of the flesh, among which of Sodom were inflicted for sins occasioned by gluttony. gluttony is reckoned, are less culpable according to Gre- Reply to Objection 2. This objection argues from the ‡ Cf. Append. to St. Augustine’s works: Serm. civ (xli, de sanctis) ∗ Hom. xiii in Matth. 1849 standpoint of the sins that result from gluttony. Nor is harm to his body, but the pleasure of eating: and if injury a cause necessarily more powerful, unless it be a direct results to his body, this is accidental. Hence this does not cause: and gluttony is not the direct cause but the acci- directly affect the gravity of gluttony, the guilt of which is dental cause, as it were, and the occasion of other vices. nevertheless aggravated, if a man incur some bodily injury Reply to Objection 3. The glutton intends, not the through taking too much food. Whether the species of gluttony are fittingly distinguished? IIa IIae q. 148 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that the species of gluttony cence may be considered in two ways. First, with regard are unfittingly distinguished by Gregory who says (Moral. to the food consumed: and thus, as regards the substance xxx, 18): “The vice of gluttony tempts us in five ways. or species of food a man seeks “sumptuous”—i.e. costly Sometimes it forestalls the hour of need; sometimes it food; as regards its quality, he seeks food prepared too seeks costly meats; sometimes it requires the food to be nicely—i.e. “daintily”; and as regards quantity, he ex- daintily cooked; sometimes it exceeds the measure of re- ceeds by eating “too much.” freshment by taking too much; sometimes we sin by the Secondly, the inordinate concupiscence is considered very heat of an immoderate appetite”—which are con- as to the consumption of food: either because one fore- tained in the following verse: “Hastily, sumptuously, too stalls the proper time for eating, which is to eat “hastily,” much, greedily, daintily.” or one fails to observe the due manner of eating, by eating For the above are distinguished according to diversity “greedily.” of circumstance. Now circumstances, being the accidents Isidore∗ comprises the first and second under one of an act, do not differentiate its species. Therefore the heading, when he says that the glutton exceeds in “what” species of gluttony are not distinguished according to the he eats, or in “how much,” “how” or “when he eats.” aforesaid. Reply to Objection 1. The corruption of various Objection 2. Further, as time is a circumstance, so is circumstances causes the various species of gluttony, on place. If then gluttony admits of one species in respect account of the various motives, by reason of which the of time, it seems that there should likewise be others in species of moral things are differentiated. For in him that respect of place and other circumstances. seeks sumptuous food, concupiscence is aroused by the Objection 3. Further, just as temperance observes due very species of the food; in him that forestalls the time circumstances, so do the other moral virtues. Now the concupiscence is disordered through impatience of delay, species of the vices opposed to the other moral virtues and so forth. are not distinguished according to various circumstances. Reply to Objection 2. Place and other circumstances Neither, therefore, are the species of gluttony distin- include no special motive connected with eating, that can guished thus. cause a different species of gluttony. On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory Reply to Objection 3. In all other vices, whenever quoted above. different circumstances correspond to different motives, I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), gluttony denotes the difference of circumstances argues a specific differ- inordinate concupiscence in eating. Now two things are ence of vice: but this does not apply to all circumstances, to be considered in eating, namely the food we eat, and as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 72, a. 9). the eating thereof. Accordingly, the inordinate concupis- Whether gluttony is a capital vice? IIa IIae q. 148 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that gluttony is not a cap- parently the least of sins, seeing that it is most akin to what ital vice. For capital vices denote those whence, under is in respect of its genus, is apparently the least gluttony the aspect of final cause, other vices originate. Now food, is not a capital vice. which is the matter of gluttony, has not the aspect of end, Objection 3. Further, sin results from a man forsak- since it is sought, not for its own sake, but for the body’s ing the food of virtue on account of something useful to nourishment. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice. the present life, or pleasing to the senses. Now as regards Objection 2. Further, a capital vice would seem to goods having the aspect of utility, there is but one capital have a certain pre-eminence in sinfulness. But this does vice, namely covetousness. Therefore, seemingly, there not apply to gluttony, which, in respect of its genus, is ap- would be but one capital vice in respect of pleasures: and ∗ De Summo Bon. ii, 42 1850 this is lust, which is a greater vice than gluttony, and is is directed thereto, according to Eccles. 6:7, “All the labor about greater pleasures. Therefore gluttony is not a capi- of man is for his mouth.” Yet gluttony seems to be about tal vice. pleasures of food rather than about food itself; wherefore, On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. liii), “with such food gluttony among the capital vices. as is good for the worthless body, men desire to be fed,” I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 84, a. 3), wherein namely the pleasure consists, “rather than to be a capital vice denotes one from which, considered as fi- filled: since the whole end of that desire is this—not to nal cause, i.e. as having a most desirable end, other vices thirst and not to hunger.” originate: wherefore through desiring that end men are in- Reply to Objection 2. In sin the end is ascertained cited to sin in many ways. Now an end is rendered most with respect to the conversion, while the gravity of sin is desirable through having one of the conditions of happi- determined with regard to the aversion. Wherefore it does ness which is desirable by its very nature: and pleasure is not follow that the capital sin which has the most desirable essential to happiness, according to Ethic. i, 8; x, 3,7,8. end surpasses the others in gravity. Therefore the vice of gluttony, being about pleasures of Reply to Objection 3. That which gives pleasure is touch which stand foremost among other pleasures, is fit- desirable in itself: and consequently corresponding to its tingly reckoned among the capital vices. diversity there are two capital vices, namely gluttony and Reply to Objection 1. It is true that food itself is di- lust. On the other hand, that which is useful is desirable, rected to something as its end: but since that end, namely not in itself, but as directed to something else: wherefore the sustaining of life, is most desirable and whereas life seemingly in all useful things there is one aspect of desir- cannot be sustained without food, it follows that food too ability. Hence there is but one capital vice, in respect of is most desirable: indeed, nearly all the toil of man’s life such things. Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to gluttony? IIa IIae q. 148 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that six daughters are un- ther on the part of the soul or on the part of the body. on fittingly assigned to gluttony, to wit, “unseemly joy, scur- the part of the soul these results are of four kinds. First, as rility, uncleanness, loquaciousness, and dullness of mind regards the reason, whose keenness is dulled by immod- as regards the understanding.” For unseemly joy results erate meat and drink, and in this respect we reckon as a from every sin, according to Prov. 2:14, “Who are glad daughter of gluttony, “dullness of sense in the understand- when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked ing,” on account of the fumes of food disturbing the brain. things.” Likewise dullness of mind is associated with ev- Even so, on the other hand, abstinence conduces to the ery sin, according to Prov. 14:22, “They err that work penetrating power of wisdom, according to Eccles. 2:3, “I evil.” Therefore they are unfittingly reckoned to be daugh- thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I ters of gluttony. might turn my mind in wisdom.” Secondly, as regards the. Objection 2. Further, the uncleanness which is partic- appetite, which is disordered in many ways by immoder- ularly the result of gluttony would seem to be connected ation in eating and drinking, as though reason were fast with vomiting, according to Is. 28:8, “All tables were full asleep at the helm, and in this respect “unseemly joy” is of vomit and filth.” But this seems to be not a sin but reckoned, because all the other inordinate passions are di- a punishment; or even a useful thing that is a matter of rected to joy or sorrow, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. To this we counsel, according to Ecclus. 31:25, “If thou hast been must refer the saying of 3 Esdra 3:20, that “wine. . . gives forced to eat much, arise, go out, and vomit; and it shall every one a confident and joyful mind.” Thirdly, as re- refresh thee.” Therefore it should not be reckoned among gards inordinate words, and thus we have “loquacious- the daughters of gluttony. ness,” because as Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19), “unless Objection 3. Further, Isidore (QQ. in Deut. xvi) reck- gluttons were carried away by immoderate speech, that ons scurrility as a daughter of lust. Therefore it should not rich man who is stated to have feasted sumptuously ev- be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony. ery day would not have been so tortured in his tongue.” On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns Fourthly, as regards inordinate action, and in this way we these daughters to gluttony. have “scurrility,” i.e. a kind of levity resulting from lack of I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,2,3), gluttony reason, which is unable not only to bridle the speech, but consists properly in an immoderate pleasure in eating and also to restrain outward behavior. Hence a gloss on Eph. drinking. Wherefore those vices are reckoned among the 5:4, “Or foolish talking or scurrility,” says that “fools call daughters of gluttony, which are the results of eating and this geniality—i.e. jocularity, because it is wont to raise drinking immoderately. These may be accounted for ei- a laugh.” Both of these, however, may be referred to the 1851 words which may happen to be sinful, either by reason of meat or drink. In like manner, we reply that dullness of excess which belongs to “loquaciousness,” or by reason sense as regards matters of choice is common to all sin, of unbecomingness, which belongs to “scurrility.” whereas dullness of sense in speculative matters arises On the part of the body, mention is made of “unclean- chiefly from gluttony, for the reason given above. ness,” which may refer either to the inordinate emission Reply to Objection 2. Although it does one good to of any kind of superfluities, or especially to the emission vomit after eating too much, yet it is sinful to expose one- of the semen. Hence a gloss on Eph. 5:3, “But fornication self to its necessity by immoderate meat or drink. How- and all uncleanness,” says: “That is, any kind of inconti- ever, it is no sin to procure vomiting as a remedy for sick- nence that has reference to lust.” ness if the physician prescribes it. Reply to Objection 1. Joy in the act or end of sin re- Reply to Objection 3. Scurrility proceeds from the sults from every sin, especially the sin that proceeds from act of gluttony, and not from the lustful act, but from the habit, but the random riotous joy which is described as lustful will: wherefore it may be referred to either vice. “unseemly” arises chiefly from immoderate partaking of 1852 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 149 Of Sobriety (In Four Articles) We must now consider sobriety and the contrary vice, namely drunkenness. As regards sobriety there are four points of inquiry: (1) What is the matter of sobriety? (2) Whether it is a special virtue? (3) Whether the use of wine is lawful? (4) To whom especially is sobriety becoming? Whether drink is the matter of sobriety? IIa IIae q. 149 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that drink is not the matter of the measure is most deserving of praise. Such mat- proper to sobriety. For it is written (Rom. 12:3): “Not to ter is the drinking of intoxicants, because the measured be more wise than it behooveth to be wise, but to be wise use thereof is most profitable, while immoderate excess unto sobriety.” Therefore sobriety is also about wisdom, therein is most harmful, since it hinders the use of rea- and not only about drink. son even more than excessive eating. Hence it is writ- Objection 2. Further, concerning the wisdom of God, ten (Ecclus. 31:37,38): “Sober drinking is health to soul it is written (Wis. 8:7) that “she teacheth sobriety [Douay: and body; wine drunken with excess raiseth quarrels, and ‘temperance’], and prudence, and justice, and fortitude,” wrath and many ruins.” For this reason sobriety is es- where sobriety stands for temperance. Now temperance pecially concerned with drink, not any kind of drink, but is not only about drink, but also about meat and sexual that which by reason of its volatility is liable to disturb the matters. Therefore sobriety is not only about drink. brain, such as wine and all intoxicants. Nevertheless, so- Objection 3. Further, sobriety would seem to take its briety may be employed in a general sense so as to apply name from “measure”∗. Now we ought to be guided by to any matter, as stated above (q. 123, a. 2; q. 141, a. 2) the measure in all things appertaining to us: for it is writ- with regard to fortitude and temperance. ten (Titus 2:12): “We should live soberly and justly and Reply to Objection 1. Just as the material wine intox- godly,” where a gloss remarks: “Soberly, in ourselves”; icates a man as to his body, so too, speaking figuratively, and (1 Tim. 2:9): “Women. . . in decent apparel, adorn- the consideration of wisdom is said to be an inebriating ing themselves with modesty and sobriety.” Consequently draught, because it allures the mind by its delight, ac- it would seem that sobriety regards not only the inte- cording to Ps. 22:5, “My chalice which inebriateth me, rior man, but also things appertaining to external apparel. how goodly is it!” Hence sobriety is applied by a kind of Therefore drink is not the matter proper to sobriety. metaphor in speaking of the contemplation of wisdom. On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 31:32): “Wine Reply to Objection 2. All the things that belong prop- taken with sobriety is equal life to men; if thou drink it erly to temperance are necessary to the present life, and moderately, thou shalt be sober.” their excess is harmful. Wherefore it behooves one to ap- I answer that, When a virtue is denominated from ply a measure in all such things. This is the business of some condition common to the virtues, the matter spe- sobriety: and for this reason sobriety is used to designate cially belonging to it is that in which it is most difficult temperance. Yet slight excess is more harmful in drink and most commendable to satisfy that condition of virtue: than in other things, wherefore sobriety is especially con- thus fortitude is about dangers of death, and temperance cerned with drink. about pleasures of touch. Now sobriety takes its name Reply to Objection 3. Although a measure is needful from “measure,” for a man is said to be sober because he in all things, sobriety is not properly employed in connec- observes the “bria,” i.e. the measure. Wherefore sobriety tion with all things, but only in those wherein there is most lays a special claim to that matter wherein /the observance need for a measure. ∗ ‘Bria,’ a measure, a cup; Cf. Facciolati and Forcellini’s Lexicon 1853 Whether sobriety is by itself a special virtue? IIa IIae q. 149 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that sobriety is not by we find a special hindrance to reason, there must needs be itself a special virtue. For abstinence is concerned with a special virtue to remove it. Now intoxicating drink is a both meat and drink. Now there is no special virtue about special kind of hindrance to the use of reason, inasmuch meat. Therefore neither is sobriety, which is about drink, as it disturbs the brain by its fumes. Wherefore in order to a special virtue. remove this hindrance to reason a special virtue, which is Objection 2. Further, abstinence and gluttony are sobriety, is requisite. about pleasures of touch as sensitive to food. Now meat Reply to Objection 1. Meat and drink are alike ca- and drink combine together to make food, since an animal pable of hindering the good of reason, by embroiling the needs a combination of wet and dry nourishment. There- reason with immoderate pleasure: and in this respect ab- fore sobriety, which is about drink, is not a. special virtue. stinence is about both meat and drink alike. But intoxicat- Objection 3. Further, just as in things pertaining to ing drink is a special kind of hindrance, as stated above, nourishment, drink is distinguished from meat, so are wherefore it requires a special virtue. there various kinds of meats and of drinks. Therefore if Reply to Objection 2. The virtue of abstinence is sobriety is by itself a special virtue, seemingly there will about meat and drink, considered, not as food but as a be a special virtue corresponding to each different kind of hindrance to reason. Hence it does not follow that special meat or drink, which is unreasonable. Therefore it would kinds of virtue correspond to different kinds of food. seem that sobriety is not a special virtue. Reply to Objection 3. In all intoxicating drinks there On the contrary, Macrobius∗ reckons sobriety to be is one kind of hindrance to the use of reason: so that the a special part of temperance. difference of drinks bears an accidental relation to virtue. I answer that, As stated above (q. 146, a. 2), it be- Hence this difference does not call for a difference of longs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason virtue. The same applies to the difference of meats. against those things which may hinder it. Hence wherever Whether the use of wine is altogether unlawful? IIa IIae q. 149 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the use of wine is (Ecclus. 31:36): “Wine drunken with moderation is the altogether unlawful. For without wisdom, a man cannot joy of the soul and the heart.” be in the state of salvation: since it is written (Wis. 7:28): I answer that, No meat or drink, considered in itself, “God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom,” is unlawful, according to Mat. 15:11, “Not that which and further on (Wis. 9:19): “By wisdom they were healed, goeth into the mouth defileth a man.” Wherefore it is whosoever have pleased Thee, O Lord, from the begin- not unlawful to drink wine as such. Yet it may become ning.” Now the use of wine is a hindrance to wisdom, unlawful accidentally. This is sometimes owing to a cir- for it is written (Eccles. 2:3): “I thought in my heart to cumstance on the part of the drinker, either because he is withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind easily the worse for taking wine, or because he is bound to wisdom.” Therefore wine-drinking is altogether unlaw- by a vow not to drink wine: sometimes it results from the ful. mode of drinking, because to wit he exceeds the measure Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 14:21): in drinking: and sometimes it is on account of others who “It is good not to eat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor would be scandalized thereby. anything whereby thy brother is offended or scandalized, Reply to Objection 1. A man may have wisdom in or made weak.” Now it is sinful to forsake the good of two ways. First, in a general way, according as it is suffi- virtue, as likewise to scandalize one’s brethren. Therefore cient for salvation: and in this way it is required, in order it is unlawful to make use of wine. to have wisdom, not that a man abstain altogether from Objection 3. Further, Jerome says† that “after the del- wine, but that he abstain from its immoderate use. Sec- uge wine and flesh were sanctioned: but Christ came in ondly, a man may have wisdom in some degree of per- the last of the ages and brought back the end into line with fection: and in this way, in order to receive wisdom per- the beginning.” Therefore it seems unlawful to use wine fectly, it is requisite for certain persons that they abstain under the Christian law. altogether from wine, and this depends on circumstances On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:23): of certain persons and places. “Do not still drink water, but use a little wine for thy stom- Reply to Objection 2. The Apostle does not declare ach’s sake, and thy frequent infirmities”; and it is written simply that it is good to abstain from wine, but that it is ∗ In Somno Scip. i, 8 † Contra Jovin. i 1854 good in the case where this would give scandal to certain ing obstacles to perfection. It is in the latter way that he people. withdraws some from the use of wine, that they may aim Reply to Objection 3. Christ withdraws us from some at perfection, even as from riches and the like. things as being altogether unlawful, and from others as be- Whether sobriety is more requisite in persons of greater standing? IIa IIae q. 149 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that sobriety is more req- (Titus 2:6) “Young men in like manner exhort that they uisite in persons of greater standing. For old age gives a be sober.” man a certain standing; wherefore honor and reverence I answer that, Virtue includes relationship to two are due to the old, according to Lev. 19:32, “Rise up things, to the contrary vices which it removes, and to the before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged end to which it leads. Accordingly a particular virtue is man.” Now the Apostle declares that old men especially more requisite in certain persons for two reasons. First, should be exhorted to sobriety, according to Titus 2:2, because they are more prone to the concupiscences which “That the aged man be sober.” Therefore sobriety is most need to be restrained by virtue, and to the vices which are requisite in persons of standing. removed by virtue. In this respect, sobriety is most req- Objection 2. Further, a bishop has the highest degree uisite in the young and in women, because concupiscence in the Church: and the Apostle commands him to be sober, of pleasure thrives in the young on account of the heat according to 1 Tim. 3:2, “It behooveth. . . a bishop to be of youth, while in women there is not sufficient strength blameless, the husband of one wife, sober, prudent,” etc. of mind to resist concupiscence. Hence, according to Therefore sobriety is chiefly required in persons of high Valerius Maximus∗ among the ancient Romans women standing. drank no wine. Secondly, sobriety is more requisite in Objection 3. Further, sobriety denotes abstinence certain persons, as being more necessary for the opera- from wine. Now wine is forbidden to kings, who hold the tions proper to them. Now immoderate use of wine is a highest place in human affairs: while it is allowed to those notable obstacle to the use of reason: wherefore sobriety who are in a state of affliction, according to Prov. 31:4, is specially prescribed to the old, in whom reason should “Give not wine to kings,” and further on (Prov. 31:6), be vigorous in instructing others: to bishops and all minis- “Give strong drink to them that are sad, and wine to them ters of the Church, who should fulfil their spiritual duties that are grieved in mind.” Therefore sobriety is more req- with a devout mind; and to kings, who should rule their uisite in persons of standing. subjects with wisdom. On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:11): This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. “The women in like manner, chaste. . . sober,” etc., and ∗ Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1 1855 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 150 Of Drunkenness (In Four Articles) We must now consider drunkenness. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether drunkenness is a sin? (2) Whether it is a mortal sin? (3) Whether it is the most grievous sin? (4) Whether it excuses from sin? Whether drunkenness is a sin? IIa IIae q. 150 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that drunkenness is not a another way drunkenness may result from inordinate con- sin. For every sin has a corresponding contrary sin, thus cupiscence and use of wine: in this way it is accounted timidity is opposed to daring, and presumption to pusilla- a sin, and is comprised under gluttony as a species un- nimity. But no sin is opposed to drunkenness. Therefore der its genus. For gluttony is divided into “surfeiting drunkenness is not a sin. [Douay:,‘rioting’] and drunkenness,” which are forbidden Objection 2. Further, every sin is voluntary∗. But no by the Apostle (Rom. 13:13). man wishes to be drunk, since no man wishes to be de- Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. prived of the use of reason. Therefore drunkenness is not iii, 11), insensibility which is opposed to temperance “is a sin. not very common,” so that like its species which are op- Objection 3. Further, whoever causes another to sin, posed to the species of intemperance it has no name. sins himself. Therefore, if drunkenness were a sin, it Hence the vice opposed to drunkenness is unnamed; and would follow that it is a sin to ask a man to drink that yet if a man were knowingly to abstain from wine to the which makes him drunk, which would seem very hard. extent of molesting nature grievously, he would not be Objection 4. Further, every sin calls for correction. free from sin. But correction is not applied to drunkards: for Gregory† Reply to Objection 2. This objection regards the re- says that “we must forbear with their ways, lest they be- sulting defect which is involuntary: whereas immoderate come worse if they be compelled to give up the habit.” use of wine is voluntary, and it is in this that the sin con- Therefore drunkenness is not a sin. sists. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 13:13): Reply to Objection 3. Even as he that is drunk is ex- “Not in rioting and drunkenness.” cused if he knows not the strength of the wine, so too is I answer that, Drunkenness may be understood in two he that invites another to drink excused from sin, if he be ways. First, it may signify the defect itself of a man result- unaware that the drinker is the kind of person to be made ing from his drinking much wine, the consequence being drunk by the drink offered. But if ignorance be lacking that he loses the use of reason. In this sense drunken- neither is excused from sin. ness denotes not a sin, but a penal defect resulting from a Reply to Objection 4. Sometimes the correction of fault. Secondly, drunkenness may denote the act by which a sinner is to be foregone, as stated above (q. 33, a. 6). a man incurs this defect. This act may cause drunken- Hence Augustine says in a letter (Ad Aurel. Episc. Ep. ness in two ways. In one way, through the wine being too xxii), “Meseems, such things are cured not by bitterness, strong, without the drinker being cognizant of this: and severity, harshness, but by teaching rather than command- in this way too, drunkenness may occur without sin, es- ing, by advice rather than threats. Such is the course to be pecially if it is not through his negligence, and thus we followed with the majority of sinners: few are they whose believe that Noah was made drunk as related in Gn. 9. In sins should be treated with severity.” ∗ Augustine, De Vera Relig. xiv † Cf. Canon Denique, dist. 4 where Gratian refers to a letter of St. Gregory to St. Augustine of Canterbury 1856 Whether drunkenness is a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 150 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that drunkenness is not a accidentally and beside the intention, but from that which mortal sin. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory∗ is directly intended. In this way drunkenness is a mor- that “drunkenness if indulged in assiduously, is a mortal tal sin, because then a man willingly and knowingly de- sin.” Now assiduity denotes a circumstance which does prives himself of the use of reason, whereby he performs not change the species of a sin; so that it cannot aggravate virtuous deeds and avoids sin, and thus he sins mortally a sin infinitely, and make a mortal sin of a venial sin, as by running the risk of falling into sin. For Ambrose says shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 88, a. 5). Therefore if drunken- (De Patriarch.‡): “We learn that we should shun drunken- ness /is not a mortal sin for some other reason, neither is ness, which prevents us from avoiding grievous sins. For it for this. the things we avoid when sober, we unknowingly commit Objection 2. Further, Augustine says†: “Whenever through drunkenness.” Therefore drunkenness, properly a man takes more meat and drink than is necessary, he speaking, is a mortal sin. should know that this is one of the lesser sins.” Now Reply to Objection 1. Assiduity makes drunkenness the lesser sins are called venial. Therefore drunkenness, a mortal sin, not on account of the mere repetition of the which is caused by immoderate drink, is a venial sin. act, but because it is impossible for a man to become Objection 3. Further, no mortal sin should be commit- drunk assiduously, without exposing himself to drunken- ted on the score of medicine. Now some drink too much ness knowingly and willingly, since he has many times at the advice of the physician, that they may be purged experienced the strength of wine and his own liability to by vomiting; and from this excessive drink drunkenness drunkenness. ensues. Therefore drunkenness is not a mortal sin. Reply to Objection 2. To take more meat or drink On the contrary, We read in the Canons of the apos- than is necessary belongs to the vice of gluttony, which is tles (Can. xli, xlii): “A bishop, priest or deacon who not always a mortal sin: but knowingly to take too much is given to drunkenness or gambling, or incites others drink to the point of being drunk, is a mortal sin. Hence thereto, must either cease or be deposed; a subdeacon, Augustine says (Confess. x, 31): “Drunkenness is far reader or precentor who does these things must either give from me: Thou wilt have mercy, that it come not near me. them up or be excommunicated; the same applies to the But full feeding sometimes hath crept upon Thy servant.” laity.” Now such punishments are not inflicted save for Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 141, a. 6), mortal sins. Therefore drunkenness is a mortal sin. meat and drink should be moderate in accordance with the I answer that, The sin of drunkenness, as stated in demands of the body’s health. Wherefore, just as it hap- the foregoing Article, consists in the immoderate use and pens sometimes that the meat and drink which are moder- concupiscence of wine. Now this may happen to a man ate for a healthy man are immoderate for a sick man, so in three ways. First, so that he knows not the drink to too it may happen conversely, that what is excessive for a be immoderate and intoxicating: and then drunkenness healthy man is moderate for one that is ailing. In this way may be without sin, as stated above (a. 1). Secondly, so when a man eats or drinks much at the physician’s advice that he perceives the drink to be immoderate, but without in order to provoke vomiting, he is not to be deemed to knowing it to be intoxicating, and then drunkenness may have taken excessive meat or drink. There is, however, no involve a venial sin. Thirdly, it may happen that a man need for intoxicating drink in order to procure vomiting, is well aware that the drink is immoderate and intoxicat- since this is caused by drinking lukewarm water: where- ing, and yet he would rather be drunk than abstain from fore this is no sufficient cause for excusing a man from drink. Such a man is a drunkard properly speaking, be- drunkenness. cause morals take their species not from things that occur Whether drunkenness is the gravest of sins? IIa IIae q. 150 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that drunkenness is the by the clergy, for it foments and fosters all the vices.” gravest of sins. For Chrysostom says (Hom. lviii in Objection 2. Further, from the very fact that a thing Matth.) that “nothing gains the devil’s favor so much as excludes the good of reason, it is a sin. Now this is espe- drunkenness and lust, the mother of all the vices.” And it cially the effect of drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is is written in the Decretals (Dist. xxxv, can. Ante omnia): the greatest of sins. “Drunkenness, more than anything else, is to be avoided Objection 3. Further, the gravity of a sin is shown by ∗ Serm. civ in the Appendix to St. Augustine’s works † Serm. civ in the Appendix to St. Augustine’s works ‡ De Abraham i. 1857 the gravity of its punishment. Now seemingly drunken-are said to find greatest favor with the devil, not for be- ness is punished most severely; for Ambrose says§ that ing graver than other sins, but because they occur more “there would be no slavery, were there no drunkards.” frequently among men. Therefore drunkenness is the greatest of sins. Reply to Objection 2. The good of reason is hindered On the contrary, According to Gregory (Moral. in two ways: in one way by that which is contrary to rea- xxxiii, 12), spiritual vices are greater than carnal vices. son, in another by that which takes away the use of rea- Now drunkenness is one of the carnal vices. Therefore it son. Now that which is contrary to reason has more the is not the greatest of sins. character of an evil, than that which takes away the use of I answer that, A thing is said to be evil because it re- reason for a time, since the use of reason, which is taken moves a good. Wherefore the greater the good removed away by drunkenness, may be either good or evil, whereas by an evil, the graver the evil. Now it is evident that a the goods of virtue, which are taken away by things that Divine good is greater than a human good. Wherefore the are contrary to reason, are always good. sins that are directly against God are graver than the sin Reply to Objection 3. Drunkenness was the occa- of drunkenness, which is directly opposed to the good of sional cause of slavery, in so far as Cham brought the human reason. curse of slavery on to his descendants, for having laughed Reply to Objection 1. Man is most prone to sins of at his father when the latter was made drunk. But slavery intemperance, because such like concupiscences and plea- was not the direct punishment of drunkenness. sures are connatural to us, and for this reason these sins Whether drunkenness excuses from sin? IIa IIae q. 150 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that drunkenness does through the voluntariness of the preceding act, inasmuch not excuse from sin. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. as it was through doing something unlawful that he fell iii, 5) that “the drunkard deserves double punishment.” into the subsequent sin. Nevertheless, the resulting sin is Therefore drunkenness aggravates a sin instead of excus- diminished, even as the character of voluntariness is di- ing from it. minished. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, Objection 2. Further, one sin does not excuse another, 44) that “Lot’s guilt is to be measured, not by the incest, but increases it. Now drunkenness is a sin. Therefore it is but by his drunkenness.” not an excuse for sin. Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher does not say Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, that the drunkard deserves more severe punishment, but 3) that just as man’s reason is tied by drunkenness, so is that he deserves double punishment for his twofold sin. it by concupiscence. But concupiscence is not an excuse Or we may reply that he is speaking in view of the law of for sin: neither therefore is drunkenness. a certain Pittacus, who, as stated in Polit. ii, 9, ordered On the contrary, According to Augustine (Contra “those guilty of assault while drunk to be more severely Faust. xxii, 43), Lot was to be excused from incest on punished than if they had been sober, because they do account of drunkenness. wrong in more ways than one.” In this, as Aristotle ob- I answer that, Two things are to be observed in drunk- serves (Polit. ii, 9), “he seems to have considered the ad- enness, as stated above (a. 1), namely the resulting defect vantage,” namely of the prevention of wrong, “rather than and the preceding act. on the part of the resulting defect the leniency which one should have for drunkards,” seeing whereby the use of reason is fettered, drunkenness may that they are not in possession of their faculties. be an excuse for sin, in so far as it causes an act to be Reply to Objection 2. Drunkenness may be an excuse involuntary through ignorance. But on the part of the pre- for sin, not in the point of its being itself a sin, but in the ceding act, a distinction would seem necessary; because, point of the defect that results from it, as stated above. if the drunkenness that results from that act be without Reply to Objection 3. Concupiscence does not alto- sin, the subsequent sin is entirely excused from fault, as gether fetter the reason, as drunkenness does, unless per- perhaps in the case of Lot. If, however, the preceding act chance it be so vehement as to make a man insane. Yet the was sinful, the person is not altogether excused from the passion of concupiscence diminishes sin, because it is less subsequent sin, because the latter is rendered voluntary grievous to sin through weakness than through malice. § De Elia et de Jejunio v 1858 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 151 Of Chastity (In Four Articles) We must next consider chastity: (1) The virtue itself of chastity: (2) virginity, which is a part of chastity: (3) lust, which is the contrary vice. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether chastity is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a general virtue? (3) Whether it is a virtue distinct from abstinence? (4) Of its relation to purity. Whether chastity is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 151 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that chastity is not a a. 1). Therefore it is evident that chastity is a virtue. virtue. For here we are treating of virtues of the soul. Reply to Objection 1. Chastity does indeed reside in But chastity, seemingly, belongs to the body: for a person the soul as its subject, though its matter is in the body. For is said to be chaste because he behaves in a certain way it belongs to chastity that a man make moderate use of as regards the use of certain parts of the body. Therefore bodily members in accordance with the judgment of his chastity is not a virtue. reason and the choice of his will. Objection 2. Further, virtue is “a voluntary habit,” as Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Civ. stated in Ethic. ii, 6. But chastity, apparently, is not volun- Dei i, 18), “so long as her mind holds to its purpose, tary, since it can be taken away by force from a woman to whereby she has merited to be holy even in body, not whom violence is done. Therefore it seems that chastity even the violence of another’s lust can deprive her body is not a virtue. of its holiness, which is safeguarded by her persevering Objection 3. Further, there is no virtue in unbelievers. continency.” He also says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that “in the Yet some unbelievers are chaste. Therefore chastity is not mind there is a virtue which is the companion of fortitude, a virtue. whereby it is resolved to suffer any evil whatsoever rather Objection 4. Further, the fruits are distinct from the than consent to evil.” virtues. But chastity is reckoned among the fruits (Gal. Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (Contra Ju- 5:23). Therefore chastity is not a virtue. lian. iv, 3), “it is impossible to have any true virtue unless On the contrary, Augustine says (De Decem one be truly just; nor is it possible to be just unless one Chord.∗): “Whereas thou shouldst excel thy wife in live by faith.” Whence he argues that in unbelievers there virtue, since chastity is a virtue, thou yieldest to the first is neither true chastity, nor any other virtue, because, to onslaught of lust, while thou wishest thy wife to be victo- wit, they are not referred to the due end, and as he adds rious.” (Contra Julian. iv, 3) “virtues are distinguished from vices I answer that, Chastity takes its name from the fact not by their functions,” i.e. their acts, “but by their ends.” that reason “chastises” concupiscence, which, like a child, Reply to Objection 4. Chastity is a virtue in so far needs curbing, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12). as it works in accordance with reason, but in so far as it Now the essence of human virtue consists in being some- delights in its act, it is reckoned among the fruits. thing moderated by reason, as shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 64, Whether chastity is a general virtue? IIa IIae q. 151 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that chastity is a gen- “chastisement”†. Now every movement of the appeti- eral virtue. For Augustine says (De Mendacio xx) that tive part should be chastised by reason. Since, then, ev- “chastity of the mind is the well-ordered movement of the ery moral virtue curbs some movement of the appetite, it mind that does not prefer the lesser to the greater things.” seems that every moral virtue is chastity. But this belongs to every virtue. Therefore chastity is a Objection 3. Further, chastity is opposed to fornica- general virtue. tion. But fornication seems to belong to every kind of sin: Objection 2. Further, “Chastity” takes its name from for it is written (Ps. 72:27): “Thou shalt destroy [Vulg.: ∗ Serm. ix de Tempore † Cf. a. 1 1859 ‘hast destroyed’] all them that go awhoring from [Douay: cording to Jer. 3:1, “But thou hast prostituted thyself to ‘are disloyal to’] Thee.” Therefore chastity is a general many lovers.” Taking chastity in this sense, it is a general virtue. virtue, because every virtue withdraws the human mind On the contrary, Macrobius∗ reckons it to be a part from delighting in a union with unlawful things. Never- of temperance. theless, the essence of this chastity consists principally in I answer that, The word “chastity” is employed in charity and the other theological virtues, whereby the hu- two ways. First, properly; and thus it is a special virtue man mind is united to God. having a special matter, namely the concupiscences relat- Reply to Objection 1. This argument takes chastity ing to venereal pleasures. Secondly, the word “chastity” is in the metaphorical sense. employed metaphorically: for just as a mingling of bodies Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (a. 1; q. 142, conduces to venereal pleasure which is the proper matter a. 2), the concupiscence of that which gives pleasure is of chastity and of lust its contrary vice, so too the spiritual especially likened to a child, because the desire of plea-union of the mind with certain things conduces to a plea- sure is connatural to us, especially of pleasures of touch sure which is the matter of a spiritual chastity metaphor- which are directed to the maintenance of nature. Hence it ically speaking, as well as of a spiritual fornication like- is that if the concupiscence of such pleasures be fostered wise metaphorically so called. For if the human mind de- by consenting to it, it will wax very strong, as in the case light in the spiritual union with that to which it behooves of a child left to his own will. Wherefore the concupis- it to be united, namely God, and refrains from delighting cence of these pleasures stands in very great need of being in union with other things against the requirements of the chastised: and consequently chastity is applied antono- order established by God, this may be called a spiritual mastically to such like concupiscences, even as fortitude chastity, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, “I have espoused you is about those matters wherein we stand in the greatest to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste vir- need of strength of mind. gin to Christ.” If, on the other hand, the mind be united Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers spir- to any other things whatsoever, against the prescription of itual fornication metaphorically so called, which is op- the Divine order, it will be called spiritual fornication, ac- posed to spiritual chastity, as stated. Whether chastity is a distinct virtue from abstinence? IIa IIae q. 151 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that chastity is not a dis- virtues. tinct virtue from abstinence. Because where the matter is On the contrary, The Apostle (2 Cor. 6:5,6) reckons generically the same, one virtue suffices. Now it would “chastity” together with “fastings” which pertain to absti- seem that things pertaining to the same sense are of one nence. genus. Therefore, since pleasures of the palate which are I answer that, As stated above (q. 141, a. 4), tem- the matter of abstinence, and venereal pleasures which are perance is properly about the concupiscences of the plea- the matter of chastity, pertain to the touch, it seems that sures of touch: so that where there are different kinds of chastity is not a distinct virtue from abstinence. pleasure, there are different virtues comprised under tem- Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12) perance. Now pleasures are proportionate to the actions likens all vices of intemperance to childish sins, which whose perfections they are, as stated in Ethic. ix, 4,5: and need chastising. Now “chastity” takes its name from it is evident that actions connected with the use of food “chastisement” of the contrary vices. Since then certain whereby the nature of the individual is maintained differ vices are bridled by abstinence, it seems that abstinence is generically from actions connected with the use of matters chastity. venereal, whereby the nature of the species is preserved. Objection 3. Further, the pleasures of the other senses Therefore chastity, which is about venereal pleasures, is a are the concern of temperance in so far as they refer to distinct virtue from abstinence, which is about pleasures pleasures of touch; which are the matter of temperance. of the palate. Now pleasures of the palate, which are the matter of ab- Reply to Objection 1. Temperance is chiefly about stinence, are directed to venereal pleasures, which are the pleasures of touch, not as regards the sense’s judgment matter of chastity: wherefore Jerome says†, commenting concerning the objects of touch. which judgment is of on Titus 1:7, “Not given to wine, no striker,” etc.: “The uniform character concerning all such objects, but as re- belly and the organs of generation are neighbors, that the gards the use itself of those objects, as stated in Ethic. iii, neighborhood of the organs may indicate their complicity 10. Now the uses of meats, drinks, and venereal matters in vice.” Therefore abstinence and chastity are not distinct differ in character. Wherefore there must needs be differ- ∗ In Somn. Scip. i, 8 † Ep. cxlvii ad Amand. Cf. Gratian, Dist. xliv. 1860 ent virtues, though they regard the one sense. Reply to Objection 3. The pleasures of the other Reply to Objection 2. Venereal pleasures are more senses do not pertain to the maintenance of man’s nature, impetuous, and are more oppressive on the reason than the except in so far as they are directed to pleasures of touch. pleasures of the palate: and therefore they are in greater Wherefore in the matter of such pleasures there is no other need of chastisement and restraint, since if one consent to virtue comprised under temperance. But the pleasures of them this increases the force of concupiscence and weak- the palate, though directed somewhat to venereal plea- ens the strength of the mind. Hence Augustine says (So- sures, are essentially directed to the preservation of man’s liloq. i, 10): “I consider that nothing so casts down the life: wherefore by their very nature they have a special manly mind from its heights as the fondling of women, virtue, although this virtue which is called abstinence di- and those bodily contacts which belong to the married rects its act to chastity as its end. state.” Whether purity belongs especially to chastity? IIa IIae q. 151 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that purity does not be- ashamed of venereal acts, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. long especially to chastity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 18), so much so that even the conjugal act, which Dei i, 18) that “purity is a virtue of the soul.” Therefore is adorned by the honesty† of marriage, is not devoid of it is not something belonging to chastity, but is of itself a shame: and this because the movement of the organs of virtue distinct from chastity. generation is not subject to the command of reason, as are Objection 2. Further, “pudicitia” [purity] is derived the movements of the other external members. Now man from “pudor,” which is equivalent to shame. Now shame, is ashamed not only of this sexual union but also of all the according to Damascene∗, is about a disgraceful act, and signs thereof, as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 6). this is common to all sinful acts. Therefore purity belongs Consequently purity regards venereal matters properly, no more to chastity than to the other virtues. and especially the signs thereof, such as impure looks, Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, kisses, and touches. And since the latter are more wont 12) that “every kind of intemperance is most deserving to be observed, purity regards rather these external signs, of reproach.” Now it would seem to belong to purity to while chastity regards rather sexual union. Therefore pu- avoid all that is deserving of reproach. Therefore purity rity is directed to chastity, not as a virtue distinct there- belongs to all the parts of temperance, and not especially from, but as expressing a circumstance of chastity. Never- to chastity. theless the one is sometimes used to designate the other. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perseverantia Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is here speaking of xx): “We must give praise to purity, that he who has ears purity as designating chastity. to hear, may put to none but a lawful use the organs in- Reply to Objection 2. Although every vice has a cer- tended for procreation.” Now the use of these organs is tain disgrace, the vices of intemperance are especially dis- the proper matter of chastity. Therefore purity belongs graceful, as stated above (q. 142, a. 4). properly to chastity. Reply to Objection 3. Among the vices of intemper- I answer that, As stated above (obj. 2), “pudici- ance, venereal sins are most deserving of reproach, both tia” [purity] takes its name from “pudor,” which signifies on account of the insubordination of the genital organs, shame. Hence purity must needs be properly about the and because by these sins especially, the reason is ab- things of which man is most ashamed. Now men are most sorbed. ∗ De Fide Orth. ii, 15 † Cf. q. 145 1861 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 152 Of Virginity (In Five Articles) We must now consider virginity: and under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) In what does virginity consist? (2) Whether it is lawful? (3) Whether it is a virtue? (4) Of its excellence in comparison with marriage; (5) Of its excellence in comparison with the other virtues. Whether virginity consists in integrity of the flesh? IIa IIae q. 152 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that virginity does not the person possessed thereof is unseared by the heat consist in integrity of the flesh. For Augustine says (De of concupiscence which is experienced in achieving the Nup. et Concup.)∗ that “virginity is the continual medi- greatest bodily pleasure which is that of sexual inter- tation on incorruption in a corruptible flesh.” But medita- course. Hence, Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 5) that “vir- tion does not concern the flesh. Therefore virginity is not ginal chastity is integrity free of pollution.” situated in the flesh. Now venereal pleasures offer three points for consid- Objection 2. Further, virginity denotes a kind of pu- eration. The first is on the part of the body, viz. the rity. Now Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that “purity violation of the seal of virginity. The second is the link dwells in the soul.” Therefore virginity is not incorruption between that which concerns the soul and that which con- of the flesh. cerns the body, and this is the resolution of the semen, Objection 3. Further, the integrity of the flesh would causing sensible pleasure. The third is entirely on the part seem to consist in the seal of virginal purity. Yet some- of the soul, namely the purpose of attaining this pleasure. times the seal is broken without loss of virginity. For Au- Of these three the first is accidental to the moral act, which gustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that “those organs may as such must be considered in reference to the soul. The be injured through being wounded by mischance. Physi- second stands in the relation of matter to the moral act, cians, too, sometimes do for the sake of health that which since the sensible passions are the matters of moral acts. makes one shudder to see: and a midwife has been known But the third stands in the position of form and comple- to destroy by touch the proof of virginity that she sought.” ment, because the essence of morality is perfected in that And he adds: “Nobody, I think, would be so foolish as which concerns the reason. Since then virginity consists to deem this maiden to have forfeited even bodily sanc- in freedom from the aforesaid corruption, it follows that tity, though she lost the integrity of that organ.” Therefore the integrity of the bodily organ is accidental to virginity; virginity does not consist in incorruption of the flesh. while freedom from pleasure in resolution of the semen is Objection 4. Further, corruption of the flesh consists related thereto materially; and the purpose of perpetually chiefly in resolution of the semen: and this may take place abstaining from this pleasure is the formal and completive without copulation, whether one be asleep or awake. Yet element in virginity. seemingly virginity is not lost without copulation: for Au- Reply to Objection 1. This definition of Augustine’s gustine says (De Virgin. xiii) that “virginal integrity and expresses directly that which is formal in virginity. For holy continency that refrains from all sexual intercourse is “meditation” denotes reason’s purpose; and the addition the portion of angels.” Therefore virginity does not con- “perpetual” does not imply that a virgin must always re- sist in incorruption of the flesh. tain this meditation actually, but that she should bear in On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that mind the purpose of always persevering therein. The ma- “virginity is continence whereby integrity of the flesh is terial element is expressed indirectly by the words “on in- vowed, consecrated and observed in honor of the Creator corruption in a corruptible body.” This is added to show of both soul and flesh.” the difficulty of virginity: for if the flesh were incorrupt- I answer that, Virginity takes its name apparently ible, it would not be difficult to maintain a perpetual med- from “viror” [freshness], and just as a thing is described itation on incorruption. as fresh and retaining its freshness, so long as it is not Reply to Objection 2. It is true that purity, as to its parched by excessive heat, so too, virginity denotes that essence, is in the soul; but as to its matter, it is in the ∗ The quotation is from De Sancta Virgin. xiii 1862 body: and it is the same with virginity. Wherefore Augus-tion of semen may arise in two ways. If this be the result tine says (De Virgin. viii) that “although virginity resides of the mind’s purpose, it destroys virginity, whether cop- in the flesh,” and for this reason is a bodily quality, “yet ulation takes place or not. Augustine, however, mentions it is a spiritual thing, which a holy continency fosters and copulation, because such like resolution is the ordinary preserves.” and natural result thereof. In another way this may hap- Reply to Objection 3. As stated above, the integrity pen beside the purpose of the mind, either during sleep, of a bodily organ is accidental to virginity, in so far as a or through violence and without the mind’s consent, al- person, through purposely abstaining from venereal plea- though the flesh derives pleasure from it, or again through sure, retains the integrity of a bodily organ. Hence if the weakness of nature, as in the case of those who are subject organ lose its integrity by chance in some other way, this to a flow of semen. In such cases virginity is not forfeit, is no more prejudicial to virginity than being deprived of because such like pollution is not the result of impurity a hand or foot. which excludes virginity. Reply to Objection 4. Pleasure resulting from resolu- Whether virginity is unlawful? IIa IIae q. 152 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that virginity is unlawful. portionate to that end. Again, man’s good is threefold as For whatever is contrary to a precept of the natural law is stated in Ethic. i, 8; one consisting in external things, for unlawful. Now just as the words of Gn. 2:16, “Of every instance riches; another, consisting in bodily goods; the tree” that is in “paradise, thou shalt eat,” indicate a pre- third, consisting in the goods of the soul among which cept of the natural law, in reference to the preservation of the goods of the contemplative life take precedence of the the individual, so also the words of Gn. 1:28, “Increase goods of the active life, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. and multiply, and fill the earth,” express a precept of the x, 7), and as our Lord declared (Lk. 10:42), “Mary hath natural law, in reference to the preservation of the species. chosen the better part.” Of these goods those that are ex- Therefore just as it would be a sin to abstain from all food, ternal are directed to those which belong to the body, and as this would be to act counter to the good of the individ- those which belong to the body are directed to those which ual, so too it is a sin to abstain altogether from the act belong to the soul; and furthermore those which belong to of procreation, for this is to act against the good of the the active life are directed to those which belong to the life species. of contemplation. Accordingly, right reason dictates that Objection 2. Further, whatever declines from the one use external goods in a measure proportionate to the mean of virtue is apparently sinful. Now virginity de- body, and in like manner as regards the rest. Wherefore if clines from the mean of virtue, since it abstains from all a man refrain from possessing certain things (which oth- venereal pleasures: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2), erwise it were good for him to possess), for the sake of that “he who revels in every pleasure, and abstains from his body’s good, or of the contemplation of truth, this is not even one, is intemperate: but he who refrains from not sinful, but in accord /with right reason. In like man- all is loutish and insensible.” Therefore virginity is some- ner if a man abstain from bodily pleasures, in order more thing sinful. freely to give himself to the contemplation of truth, this Objection 3. Further, punishment is not due save for is in accordance with the rectitude of reason. Now holy a vice. Now in olden times those were punished who led virginity refrains from all venereal pleasure in order more a celibate life, as Valerius Maximus asserts∗. Hence ac- freely to have leisure for Divine contemplation: for the cording to Augustine (De Vera Relig. iii) Plato “is said to Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:34): “The unmarried woman and have sacrificed to nature, in order that he might atone for the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord: that she may his perpetual continency as though it were a sin.” There- be holy in both body and in spirit. But she that is married fore virginity is a sin. thinketh on the things of the world, how she may please On the contrary, No sin is a matter of direct counsel. her husband.” Therefore it follows that virginity instead But virginity is a matter of direct counsel: for it is written of being sinful is worthy of praise. (1 Cor. 7:25): “Concerning virgins I have no command- Reply to Objection 1. A precept implies a duty, as ment of the Lord: but I give counsel.” Therefore virginity stated above (q. 122, a. 1). Now there are two kinds of is not an unlawful thing. duty. There is the duty that has to be fulfilled by one per- I answer that, In human acts, those are sinful which son; and a duty of this kind cannot be set aside without are against right reason. Now right reason requires that sin. The other duty has to be fulfilled by the multitude, things directed to an end should be used in a measure pro- and the fulfilment of this kind of duty is not binding on ∗ Dict. Fact. Mem. ii, 9 1863 each one of the multitude. For the multitude has many dictate of right reason, abstains from all pleasures through obligations which cannot be discharged by the individ- aversion, as it were, for pleasure as such, is insensible as ual; but are fulfilled by one person doing this, and an- a country lout. But a virgin does not refrain from ev- other doing that. Accordingly the precept of natural law ery pleasure, but only from that which is venereal: and which binds man to eat must needs be fulfilled by each abstains therefrom according to right reason, as stated individual, otherwise the individual cannot be sustained. above. Now the mean of virtue is fixed with reference, On the other hand, the precept of procreation regards the not to quantity but to right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6: whole multitude of men, which needs not only to multi-wherefore it is said of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3) that ply in body, but also to advance spiritually. Wherefore “in point of quantity he goes to the extreme, but in point sufficient provision is made for the human multitude, if of becomingness he follows the mean.” some betake themselves to carnal procreation, while oth- Reply to Objection 3. Laws are framed according to ers abstaining from this betake themselves to the contem- what occurs more frequently. Now it seldom happened in plation of Divine things, for the beauty and welfare of the olden times that anyone refrained from all venereal plea- whole human race. Thus too in an army, some take sentry sure through love of the contemplation of truth: as Plato duty, others are standard-bearers, and others fight with the alone is related to have done. Hence it was not through sword: yet all these things are necessary for the multitude, thinking this a sin, that he offered sacrifice, but “because although they cannot be done by one person. he yielded to the false opinion of his fellow countrymen,” Reply to Objection 2. The person who, beside the as Augustine remarks (De Vera Relig. iii). Whether virginity is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 152 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that virginity is not a in order to have leisure for Divine things: while the ma- virtue. For “no virtue is in us by nature,” as the Philoso- terial element in virginity is integrity of the flesh free of pher says (Ethic. ii, 1). Now virginity is in us by nature, all experience of venereal pleasure. Now it is manifest since all are virgins when born. Therefore virginity is not that where a good action has a special matter through hav- a virtue. ing a special excellence, there is a special kind of virtue: Objection 2. Further, whoever has one virtue has all for example, magnificence which is about great expendi- virtues, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 1). Yet some ture is for this reason a special virtue distinct from liber- have other virtues without having virginity: else, since ality, which is about all uses of money in general. Now to none can go to the heavenly kingdom without virtue, no keep oneself free from the experience of venereal pleasure one could go there without virginity, which would involve has an excellence of its own deserving of greater praise the condemnation of marriage. Therefore virginity is not than keeping oneself free from inordinate venereal plea- a virtue. sure. Wherefore virginity is a special virtue being related Objection 3. Further, every virtue is recovered by to chastity as magnificence to liberality. penance. But virginity is not recovered by penance: Reply to Objection 1. Men have from their birth that wherefore Jerome says∗: “Other things God can do, but which is material in virginity, namely integrity of the flesh He cannot restore the virgin after her downfall.” There- and freedom from venereal experience. But they have not fore seemingly virginity is not a virtue. that which is formal in virginity, namely the purpose of Objection 4. Further, no virtue is lost without sin. Yet safeguarding this integrity for God’s sake, which purpose virginity is lost without sin, namely by marriage. There- gives virginity its character of virtue. Hence Augustine fore virginity is not a virtue. says (De Virgin. xi): “Nor do we praise virgins for being Objection 5. Further, virginity is condivided with virgins, but, because their virginity is consecrated to God widowhood and conjugal purity. But neither of these is by holy continency.” a virtue. Therefore virginity is not a virtue. Reply to Objection 2. Virtues are connected together On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 3): by reason of that which is formal in them, namely charity, “Love of virginity moves us to say something about vir- or by reason of prudence, as stated above (q. 129, a. 3, ad ginity, lest by passing it over we should seem to cast a 2), but not by reason of that which is material in them. For slight on what is a virtue of high degree.” nothing hinders a virtuous man from providing the matter I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the formal and of one virtue, and not the matter of another virtue: thus completive element in virginity is the purpose of abstain- a poor man has the matter of temperance, but not that of ing from venereal pleasure, which purpose is rendered magnificence. It is in this way that one who has the other praiseworthy by its end, in so far, to wit, as this is done virtues lacks the matter of virginity, namely the aforesaid ∗ Ep. xxii ad Eustoch. 1864 integrity of the flesh: nevertheless he can have that which even by miracle, to wit, that one who has experienced is formal in virginity, his mind being so prepared that he venereal lust should cease to have had that experience. has the purpose of safeguarding this same integrity of the For God cannot make that which is done not to have been flesh, should it be fitting for him to do so: even as a poor done, as stated in the Ia, q. 25 , a. 4. man may be so prepared in mind as to have the purpose Reply to Objection 4. Virginity as a virtue denotes of being magnificent in his expenditure, were he in a posi- the purpose, confirmed by vow, of observing perpetual tion to do so: or again as a prosperous man is so prepared integrity. For Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that “by in mind as to purpose bearing misfortune with equanim- virginity, integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated and ity: without which preparedness of the mind no man can observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and flesh.” be virtuous. Hence virginity, as a virtue, is never lost without sin. Reply to Objection 3. Virtue can be recovered by Reply to Objection 5. Conjugal chastity is deserv- penance as regards that which is formal in virtue, but not ing of praise merely because it abstains from unlawful as to that which is material therein. For if a magnificent pleasures: hence no excellence attaches to it above that man has squandered all his wealth he does not recover his of chastity in general. Widowhood, however, adds some- riches by repenting of his sin. In like manner a person thing to chastity in general; but it does not attain to that who has lost virginity by sin, recovers by repenting, not which is perfect in this matter, namely to entire free- the matter of virginity but the purpose of virginity. dom from venereal pleasure; virginity alone achieves this. As regards the matter of virginity there is that which Wherefore virginity alone is accounted a virtue above can be miraculously restored by God, namely the integrity chastity, even as magnificence is reckoned above liberal- of the organ, which we hold to be accidental to virginity: ity. while there is something else which cannot be restored Whether virginity is more excellent than marriage? IIa IIae q. 152 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that virginity is not more be preferable to marriage. This error is refuted above all excellent than marriage. For Augustine says (De Bono by the example of Christ Who both chose a virgin for His Conjug. xxi): “Continence was equally meritorious in mother, and remained Himself a virgin, and by the teach- John who remained unmarried and Abraham who begot ing of the Apostle who (1 Cor. 7) counsels virginity as the children.” Now a greater virtue has greater merit. There- greater good. It is also refuted by reason, both because a fore virginity is not a greater virtue than conjugal chastity. Divine good takes precedence of a human good, and be- Objection 2. Further, the praise accorded a virtu- cause the good of the soul is preferable to the good of the ous man depends on his virtue. If, then, virginity were body, and again because the good of the contemplative preferable to conjugal continence, it would seem to fol- life is better than that of the active life. Now virginity is low that every virgin is to be praised more than any mar- directed to the good of the soul in respect of the contem- ried woman. But this is untrue. Therefore virginity is not plative life, which consists in thinking “on the things of preferable to marriage. God” [Vulg.: ‘the Lord’], whereas marriage is directed to Objection 3. Further, the common good takes prece- the good of the body, namely the bodily increase of the dence of the private good, according to the Philosopher human race, and belongs to the active life, since the man (Ethic. i, 2). Now marriage is directed to the common and woman who embrace the married life have to think good: for Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): “What “on the things of the world,” as the Apostle says (1 Cor. food is to a man’s wellbeing, such is sexual intercourse to 7:34). Without doubt therefore virginity is preferable to the welfare of the human race.” On the other hand, virgin- conjugal continence. ity is ordered to the individual good, namely in order to Reply to Objection 1. Merit is measured not only avoid what the Apostle calls the “tribulation of the flesh,” by the kind of action, but still more by the mind of the to which married people are subject (1 Cor. 7:28). There- agent. Now Abraham had a mind so disposed, that he was fore virginity is not greater than conjugal continence. prepared to observe virginity, if it were in keeping with On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. xix): the times for him to do so. Wherefore in him conjugal “Both solid reason and the authority of Holy Writ show continence was equally meritorious with the virginal con- that neither is marriage sinful, nor is it to be equaled to tinence of John, as regards the essential reward, but not as the good of virginal continence or even to that of widow- regards the accidental reward. Hence Augustine says (De hood.” Bono Conjug. xxi) that both “the celibacy of John and I answer that, According to Jerome (Contra Jovin. i) the marriage of Abraham fought Christ’s battle in keep- the error of Jovinian consisted in holding virginity not to ing with the difference of the times: but John was conti- 1865 nent even in deed, whereas Abraham was continent only (De Virgin. xliv): “Whence does a virgin know the things in habit.” that belong to the Lord, however solicitous she be about Reply to Objection 2. Though virginity is better than them, if perchance on account of some mental fault she be conjugal continence, a married person may be better than not yet ripe for martyrdom, whereas this woman to whom a virgin for two reasons. First, on the part of chastity it- she delighted in preferring herself is already able to drink self; if to wit, the married person is more prepared in mind the chalice of the Lord?” to observe virginity, if it should be expedient, than the one Reply to Objection 3. The common good takes prece- who is actually a virgin. Hence Augustine (De Bono Con- dence of the private good, if it be of the same genus: but it jug. xxii) charges the virgin to say: “I am no better than may be that the private good is better generically. It is thus Abraham, although the chastity of celibacy is better than that the virginity that is consecrated to God is preferable the chastity of marriage.” Further on he gives the reason to carnal fruitfulness. Hence Augustine says (De Virgin. for this: “For what I do now, he would have done better, ix): “It must be confessed that the fruitfulness of the flesh, if it were fitting for him to do it then; and what they did I even of those women who in these times seek naught else would even do now if it behooved me now to do it.” Sec- from marriage but children in order to make them servants ondly, because perhaps the person who is not a virgin has of Christ, cannot compensate for lost virginity.” some more excellent virtue. Wherefore Augustine says Whether virginity is the greatest of virtues? IIa IIae q. 152 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that virginity is the great- i, 7): “Can anyone esteem any beauty greater than a vir- est of virtues. For Cyprian says (De Virgin.∗): “We ad- gin’s, since she is beloved of her King, approved by her dress ourselves now to the virgins. Sublime is their glory, Judge, dedicated to her Lord, consecrated to her God?” but no less exalted is their vocation. They are a flower of Secondly, a thing may be most excellent simply, and in the Church’s sowing, the pride and ornament of spiritual this way virginity is not the most excellent of the virtues. grace, the most honored portion of Christ’s flock.” Because the end always excels that which is directed to Objection 2. Further, a greater reward is due to the the end; and the more effectively a thing is directed to greater virtue. Now the greatest reward is due to virginity, the end, the better it is. Now the end which renders vir- namely the hundredfold fruit, according to a gloss on Mat. ginity praiseworthy is that one may have leisure for Di- 13:23. Therefore virginity is the greatest of the virtues. vine things, as stated above (a. 4). Wherefore the theo- Objection 3. Further, the more a virtue conforms us to logical virtues as well as the virtue of religion, the acts Christ, the greater it is. Now virginity above all conforms of which consist in being occupied about Divine things, us to Christ; for it is declared in the Apocalypse 14:4 that are preferable to virginity. Moreover, martyrs work more virgins “follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth,” and mightily in order to cleave to God—since for this end they (Apoc. 14:3) that they sing “a new canticle,” which “no” hold their own life in contempt; and those who dwell in other “man” could say. Therefore virginity is the greatest monasteries—since for this end they give up their own of the virtues. will and all that they may possess—than virgins who re- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. xlvi): nounce venereal pleasure for that same purpose. There- “No one, methinks, would dare prefer virginity to martyr- fore virginity is not simply the greatest of virtues. dom,” and (De Virgin. xlv): “The authority of the Church Reply to Objection 1. Virgins are “the more honored informs the faithful in no uncertain manner, so that they portion of Christ’s flock,” and “their glory more sublime” know in what place the martyrs and the holy virgins who in comparison with widows and married women. have departed this life are commemorated in the Sacra- Reply to Objection 2. The hundredfold fruit is as- ment of the Altar.” By this we are given to understand that cribed to virginity, according to Jerome†, on account of martyrdom, and also the monastic state, are preferable to its superiority to widowhood, to which the sixtyfold fruit virginity. is ascribed, and to marriage, to which is ascribed the thir- I answer that, A thing may excel all others in two tyfold fruit. But according to Augustine (De QQ. Evang. ways. First, in some particular genus: and thus virginity i, 9), “the hundredfold fruit is given to martyrs, the six- is most excellent, namely in the genus of chastity, since tyfold to virgins, and the thirtyfold to married persons.” it surpasses the chastity both of widowhood and of mar- Wherefore it does not follow that virginity is simply the riage. And because comeliness is ascribed to chastity greatest of virtues, but only in comparison with other de- antonomastically, it follows that surpassing beauty is as- grees of chastity. cribed to chastity. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Virgin. Reply to Objection 3. Virgins “follow the Lamb ∗ De Habitu Virg. † Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch. 1866 whithersoever He goeth,” because they imitate Christ, by follow more closely, because other virtues make us cleave integrity not only of the mind but also of the flesh, as Au- to God more closely by imitation of the mind. The “new gustine says (De Virgin. xxvii). Wherefore they follow hymn” which virgins alone sing, is their joy at having pre- the Lamb in more ways, but this does not imply that they served integrity of the flesh. 1867 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 153 Of Lust (In Five Articles) We must next consider the vice of lust which is opposed to chastity: (1) Lust in general; (2) its species. Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: (1) What is the matter of lust? (2) Whether all copulation is unlawful? (3) Whether lust is a mortal sin? (4) Whether lust is a capital vice? (5) Concerning its daughters. Whether the matter of lust is only venereal desires and pleasures? IIa IIae q. 153 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the matter of lust is real pleasures above all debauch a man’s mind. Therefore not only venereal desires and pleasures. For Augustine lust is especially concerned with such like pleasures. says (Confess. ii, 6) that “lust affects to be called surfeit Reply to Objection 1. Even as temperance chiefly and abundance.” But surfeit regards meat and drink, while and properly applies to pleasures of touch, yet conse- abundance refers to riches. Therefore lust is not properly quently and by a kind of likeness is referred to other about venereal desires and pleasures. matters, so too, lust applies chiefly to venereal pleasures, Objection 2. Further, it is written (Prov. 20:1): “Wine which more than anything else work the greatest havoc in is a lustful [Douay: ‘luxurious’] thing.” Now wine is con- a man’s mind, yet secondarily it applies to any other mat- nected with pleasure of meat and drink. Therefore these ters pertaining to excess. Hence a gloss on Gal. 5:19 says would seem to be the matter of lust. “lust is any kind of surfeit.” Objection 3. Further, lust is defined “as the desire of Reply to Objection 2. Wine is said to be a lustful wanton pleasure”∗. But wanton pleasure regards not only thing, either in the sense in which surfeit in any matter venereal matters but also many others. Therefore lust is is ascribed to lust, or because the use of too much wine not only about venereal desires and pleasures. affords an incentive to venereal pleasure. On the contrary, To the lustful it is said (De Vera Re- Reply to Objection 3. Although wanton pleasure ap- lig. iii†): “He that soweth in the flesh, of the flesh shall plies to other matters, the name of lust has a special appli- reap corruption.” Now the sowing of the flesh refers to cation to venereal pleasures, to which also wantonness is venereal pleasures. Therefore these belong to lust. specially applicable, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. xiv, I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x), “a lustful 15,16). man is one who is debauched with pleasures.” Now vene- Whether no venereal act can be without sin? IIa IIae q. 153 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that no venereal act can ble with the act of understanding,” as the Philosopher ob- be without sin. For nothing but sin would seem to hin- serves (Ethic. vii, 11); and as Jerome‡ states, rendered der virtue. Now every venereal act is a great hindrance to the hearts of the prophets, for the moment, insensible to virtue. For Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): “I consider the spirit of prophecy. Therefore no venereal act can be that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its height without sin. as the fondling of a woman, and those bodily contacts.” Objection 3. Further, the cause is more powerful than Therefore, seemingly, no venereal act is without sin. its effect. Now original sin is transmitted to children by Objection 2. Further, any excess that makes one for- concupiscence, without which no venereal act is possible, sake the good of reason is sinful, because virtue is cor- as Augustine declares (De Nup. et Concup. i, 24). There- rupted by “excess” and “deficiency” as stated in Ethic. fore no venereal act can be without sin. ii, 2. Now in every venereal act there is excess of plea- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. sure, since it so absorbs the mind, that “it is incompati- xxv): “This is a sufficient answer to heretics, if only they ∗ Alexander of Hales, Summ. Theol. ii, cxvli † Written by St. Augustine ‡ Origen, Hom. vi in Num.; Cf. Jerome, Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch. 1868 will understand that no sin is committed in that which is Bono Conjug. viii): “Just as that was good which Martha against neither nature, nor morals, nor a commandment”: did when busy about serving holy men, yet better still that and he refers to the act of sexual intercourse between the which Mary did in hearing the word of God: so, too, we patriarchs of old and their several wives. Therefore not praise the good of Susanna’s conjugal chastity, yet we pre- every venereal act is a sin. fer the good of the widow Anna, and much more that of I answer that, A sin, in human acts, is that which is the Virgin Mary.” against the order of reason. Now the order of reason con- Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 152, a. 2, sists in its ordering everything to its end in a fitting man- ad 2; Ia IIae, q. 64, a. 2), the mean of virtue depends not ner. Wherefore it is no sin if one, by the dictate of reason, on quantity but on conformity with right reason: and con- makes use of certain things in a fitting manner and order sequently the exceeding pleasure attaching to a venereal for the end to which they are adapted, provided this end act directed according to reason, is not opposed to the be something truly good. Now just as the preservation of mean of virtue. Moreover, virtue is not concerned with the the bodily nature of one individual is a true good, so, too, amount of pleasure experienced by the external sense, as is the preservation of the nature of the human species a this depends on the disposition of the body; what matters very great good. And just as the use of food is directed is how much the interior appetite is affected by that plea- to the preservation of life in the individual, so is the use sure. Nor does it follow that the act in question is contrary of venereal acts directed to the preservation of the whole to virtue, from the fact that the free act of reason in con- human race. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. sidering spiritual things is incompatible with the aforesaid xvi): “What food is to a man’s well being, such is sex- pleasure. For it is not contrary to virtue, if the act of rea- ual intercourse to the welfare of the whole human race.” son be sometimes interrupted for something that is done Wherefore just as the use of food can be without sin, if in accordance with reason, else it would be against virtue it be taken in due manner and order, as required for the for a person to set himself to sleep. That venereal concu- welfare of the body, so also the use of venereal acts can piscence and pleasure are not subject to the command and be without sin, provided they be performed in due manner moderation of reason, is due to the punishment of the first and order, in keeping with the end of human procreation. sin, inasmuch as the reason, for rebelling against God, de- Reply to Objection 1. A thing may be a hindrance to served that its body should rebel against it, as Augustine virtue in two ways. First, as regards the ordinary degree says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13). of virtue, and as to this nothing but sin is an obstacle to Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Civ. virtue. Secondly, as regards the perfect degree of virtue, Dei xiii, 13), “the child, shackled with original sin, is born and as to this virtue may be hindered by that which is not of fleshly concupiscence (which is not imputed as sin to a sin, but a lesser good. In this way sexual intercourse the regenerate) as of a daughter of sin.” Hence it does not casts down the mind not from virtue, but from the height, follow that the act in question is a sin, but that it contains i.e. the perfection of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De something penal resulting from the first sin. Whether the lust that is about venereal acts can be a sin? IIa IIae q. 153 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that lust about venereal with wine wherein is lust [Douay: ‘luxury’].” Therefore acts cannot be a sin. For the venereal act consists in the lust is forbidden. emission of semen which is the surplus from food, accord- Further, it is numbered among the works of the flesh: ing to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. i, 18). But there Gal. 5:19 [Douay: ‘luxury’]. is no sin attaching to the emission of other superfluities. I answer that, The more necessary a thing is, the Therefore neither can there be any sin in venereal acts. more it behooves one to observe the order of reason in Objection 2. Further, everyone can lawfully make its regard; wherefore the more sinful it becomes if the or- what use he pleases of what is his. But in the venereal der of reason be forsaken. Now the use of venereal acts, act a man uses only what is his own, except perhaps in as stated in the foregoing Article, is most necessary for adultery or rape. Therefore there can be no sin in venereal the common good, namely the preservation of the human acts, and consequently lust is no sin. race. Wherefore there is the greatest necessity for observ- Objection 3. Further, every sin has an opposite vice. ing the order of reason in this matter: so that if anything But, seemingly, no vice is opposed to lust. Therefore lust be done in this connection against the dictate of reason’s is not a sin. ordering, it will be a sin. Now lust consists essentially in On the contrary, The cause is more powerful than its exceeding the order and mode of reason in the matter of effect. Now wine is forbidden on account of lust, accord- venereal acts. Wherefore without any doubt lust is a sin. ing to the saying of the Apostle (Eph. 5:18), “Be not drunk Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher says in 1869 the same book (De Gener. Anim. i, 18), “the semen is great price: glorify and bear God in your body.” Wherea surplus that is needed.” For it is said to be superflu- fore by inordinately using the body through lust a man ous, because it is the residue from the action of the nu- wrongs God Who is the Supreme Lord of our body. Hence tritive power, yet it is needed for the work of the gen- Augustine says (De Decem. Chord. 10∗): “God Who thus erative power. But the other superfluities of the human governs His servants for their good, not for His, made this body are such as not to be needed, so that it matters not order and commandment, lest unlawful pleasures should how they are emitted, provided one observe the decencies destroy His temple which thou hast begun to be.” of social life. It is different with the emission of semen, Reply to Objection 3. The opposite of lust is not which should be accomplished in a manner befitting the found in many, since men are more inclined to pleasure. end for which it is needed. Yet the contrary vice is comprised under insensibility, and Reply to Objection 2. As the Apostle says (1 Cor. occurs in one who has such a dislike for sexual intercourse 6:20) in speaking against lust, “You are bought with a as not to pay the marriage debt. Whether lust is a capital vice? IIa IIae q. 153 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that lust is not a capital vice. of lust is venereal pleasure, which is very great. Where- For lust is apparently the same as “uncleanness,” accord- fore this pleasure is very desirable as regards the sensitive ing to a gloss on Eph. 5:3 (Cf. 2 Cor. 12:21). But un- appetite, both on account of the intensity of the pleasure, cleanness is a daughter of gluttony, according to Gregory and because such like concupiscence is connatural to man. (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore lust is not a capital vice. Therefore it is evident that lust is a capital vice. Objection 2. Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 148, a. 6), ii, 39) that “as pride of mind leads to the depravity of according to some, the uncleanness which is reckoned a lust, so does humility of mind safeguard the chastity of daughter of gluttony is a certain uncleanness of the body, the flesh.” Now it is seemingly contrary to the nature of and thus the objection is not to the point. If, however, it a capital vice to arise from another vice. Therefore lust is denote the uncleanness of lust, we must reply that it is not a capital vice. caused by gluttony materially—in so far as gluttony pro- Objection 3. Further, lust is caused by despair, ac- vides the bodily matter of lust—and not under the aspect cording to Eph. 4:19, “Who despairing, have given them- of final cause, in which respect chiefly the capital vices selves up to lasciviousness.” But despair is not a capital are said to be the cause of others. vice; indeed, it is accounted a daughter of sloth, as stated Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 132, a. 4, above (q. 35, a. 4, ad 2). Much less, therefore, is lust a ad 1), when we were treating of vainglory, pride is ac- capital vice. counted the common mother of all sins, so that even the On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places capital vices originate therefrom. lust among the capital vices. Reply to Objection 3. Certain persons refrain from I answer that, As stated above (q. 148, a. 5; Ia IIae, lustful pleasures chiefly through hope of the glory to q. 84, Aa. 3,4), a capital vice is one that has a very de- come, which hope is removed by despair, so that the latter sirable end, so that through desire for that end, a man is a cause of lust, as removing an obstacle thereto, not as proceeds to commit many sins, all of which are said to its direct cause; whereas this is seemingly necessary for a arise from that vice as from a principal vice. Now the end capital vice. Whether the daughters of lust are fittingly described? IIa IIae q. 153 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the daughters of Objection 2. Further, constancy is reckoned a part of lust are unfittingly reckoned to be “blindness of mind, fortitude, as stated above (q. 128, ad 6; q. 137, a. 3). But thoughtlessness, inconstancy, rashness, self-love, hatred lust is contrary, not to fortitude but to temperance. There- of God, love of this world and abhorrence or despair of a fore inconstancy is not a daughter of lust. future world.” For mental blindness, thoughtlessness and Objection 3. Further, “Self-love extending to the con- rashness pertain to imprudence, which is to be found in tempt of God” is the origin of every sin, as Augustine every sin, even as prudence is in every virtue. Therefore says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore it should not be they should not be reckoned especially as daughters of accounted a daughter of lust. lust. Objection 4. Further, Isidore† mentions four, namely, ∗ Serm. ix (xcvi de Temp.) † QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi 1870 “obscene,” “scurrilous,” “wanton” and “foolish talking.” hand there is “despair of a future world,” because through There the aforesaid enumeration would seem to be super- being held back by carnal pleasures he cares not to obtain fluous. spiritual pleasures, since they are distasteful to him. On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory Reply to Objection 1. According to the Philosopher (Moral. xxxi, 45). (Ethic. vi, 5), intemperance is the chief corruptive of I answer that, When the lower powers are strongly prudence: wherefore the vices opposed to prudence arise moved towards their objects, the result is that the higher chiefly from lust, which is the principal species of intem- powers are hindered and disordered in their acts. Now the perance. effect of the vice of lust is that the lower appetite, namely Reply to Objection 2. The constancy which is a part the concupiscible, is most vehemently intent on its object, of fortitude regards hardships and objects of fear; but con- to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of the vehemence stancy in refraining from pleasures pertains to continence of the pleasure. Consequently the higher powers, namely which is a part of temperance, as stated above (q. 143). the reason and the will, are most grievously disordered by Hence the inconstancy which is opposed thereto is to be lust. reckoned a daughter of lust. Nevertheless even the first Now the reason has four acts in matters of action. First named inconstancy arises from lust, inasmuch as the latter there is simple understanding, which apprehends some enfeebles a man’s heart and renders it effeminate, accord- end as good, and this act is hindered by lust, according ing to Osee 4:11, “Fornication and wine and drunkenness to Dan. 13:56, “Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath take away the heart [Douay: ‘understanding’].” Vegetius, perverted thy heart.” In this respect we have “blindness too, says (De Re Milit. iii) that “the less a man knows of of mind.” The second act is counsel about what is to be the pleasures of life, the less he fears death.” Nor is there done for the sake of the end: and this is also hindered by any need, as we have repeatedly stated, for the daughters the concupiscence of lust. Hence Terence says (Eunuch., of a capital vice to agree with it in matter (cf. q. 35, a. 4, act 1, sc. 1), speaking of lecherous love: “This thing ad- ad 2; q. 118, a. 8, ad 1; q. 148, a. 6). mits of neither counsel nor moderation, thou canst not Reply to Objection 3. Self-love in respect of any control it by counseling.” In this respect there is “rash- goods that a man desires for himself is the common ori- ness,” which denotes absence of counsel, as stated above gin of all sins; but in the special point of desiring carnal (q. 53, a. 3). The third act is judgment about the things pleasures for oneself, it is reckoned a daughter of lust. to be done, and this again is hindered by lust. For it Reply to Objection 4. The sins mentioned by Isidore is said of the lustful old men (Dan. 13:9): “They per- are inordinate external acts, pertaining in the main to verted their own mind. . . that they might not. . . remember speech; wherein there is a fourfold inordinateness. First, just judgments.” In this respect there is “thoughtlessness.” on account of the matter, and to this we refer “obscene The fourth act is the reason’s command about the thing words”: for since “out of the abundance of the heart the to be done, and this also is impeded by lust, in so far as mouth speaketh” (Mat. 12:34), the lustful man, whose through being carried away by concupiscence, a man is heart is full of lewd concupiscences, readily breaks out hindered from doing what his reason ordered to be done. into lewd words. Secondly, on account of the cause: for, [To this “inconstancy” must be referred.]∗ Hence Terence since lust causes thoughtlessness and rashness, the result says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1) of a man who declared that he is that it makes a man speak without weighing or giving a would leave his mistress: “One little false tear will undo thought to his words. which are described as “scurrilous.” those words.” Thirdly, on account of the end: for since the lustful man On the part of the will there results a twofold inordi- seeks pleasure, he directs his speech thereto, and so gives nate act. One is the desire for the end, to which we re- utterance to “wanton words.” Fourthly, on account of the fer “self-love,” which regards the pleasure which a man sentiments expressed by his words, for through causing desires inordinately, while on the other hand there is “ha- blindness of mind, lust perverts a man’s sentiments, and tred of God,” by reason of His forbidding the desired plea- so he gives way “to foolish talking,” for instance, by ex- sure. The other act is the desire for the things directed to pressing a preference for the pleasures he desires to any- the end. With regard to this there is “love of this world,” thing else. whose pleasures a man desires to enjoy, while on the other ∗ The sentence in brackets is omitted in the Leonine edition. 1871 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 154 Of the Parts of Lust (In Twelve Articles) We must now consider the parts of lust, under which head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Into what parts is lust divided? (2) Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin? (3) Whether it is the greatest of sins? (4) Whether there is mortal sin in touches, kisses and such like seduction? (5) Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin? (6) Of seduction; (7) Of rape; (8) Of adultery; (9) Of incest; (10) Of sacrilege; (11) Of the sin against nature; (12) Of the order of gravity in the aforesaid sins. Whether six species are fittingly assigned to lust? IIa IIae q. 154 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that six species are unfit- lasciviousness that they have committed.” Therefore it tingly assigned to lust, namely, “simple fornication, adul- seems that also uncleanness and lasciviousness should be tery, incest, seduction, rape, and the unnatural vice.” For reckoned species of lust, as well as fornication. diversity of matter does not diversify the species. Now the Objection 6. Further, the thing divided is not to be aforesaid division is made with regard to diversity of mat- reckoned among its parts. But lust is reckoned together ter, according as the woman with whom a man has inter- with the aforesaid: for it is written (Gal. 5:19): “The course is married or a virgin, or of some other condition. works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, un- Therefore it seems that the species of lust are diversified cleanness, immodesty, lust [Douay: ‘luxury’].” Therefore in this way. it seems that fornication is unfittingly reckoned a species Objection 2. Further, seemingly the species of one of lust. vice are not differentiated by things that belong to another On the contrary, The aforesaid division is given in vice. Now adultery does not differ from simple fornica- the Decretals 36, qu. i∗. tion, save in the point of a man having intercourse with I answer that As stated above (q. 153, a. 3), the sin one who is another’s, so that he commits an injustice. of lust consists in seeking venereal pleasure not in accor- Therefore it seems that adultery should not be reckoned dance with right reason. This may happen in two ways. a species of lust. First, in respect of the matter wherein this pleasure is Objection 3. Further, just as a man may happen to sought; secondly, when, whereas there is due matter, other have intercourse with a woman who is bound to another due circumstances are not observed. And since a cir- man by marriage, so may it happen that a man has in- cumstance, as such, does not specify a moral act, whose tercourse with a woman who is bound to God by vow. species is derived from its object which is also its matter, Therefore sacrilege should be reckoned a species of lust, it follows that the species of lust must be assigned with even as adultery is. respect to its matter or object. Objection 4. Further, a married man sins not only Now this same matter may be discordant with right if he be with another woman, but also if he use his own reason in two ways. First, because it is inconsistent with wife inordinately. But the latter sin is comprised under the end of the venereal act. In this way, as hindering the lust. Therefore it should be reckoned among the species begetting of children, there is the “vice against nature,” thereof. which attaches to every venereal act from which genera- Objection 5. Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:21): tion cannot follow; and, as hindering the due upbringing “Lest again, when I come, God humble me among you, and advancement of the child when born, there is “sim- and I mourn many of them /that sinned before, and have ple fornication,” which is the union of an unmarried man not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication and with an unmarried woman. Secondly, the matter wherein ∗ Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa 1872 the venereal act is consummated may be discordant with is comprised under lust and injustice. Nor is this defor-right reason in relation to other persons; and this in two mity of injustice altogether accidental to lust: since the ways. First, with regard to the woman, with whom a man lust that obeys concupiscence so far as to lead to injustice, has connection, by reason of due honor not being paid is thereby shown to be more grievous. to her; and thus there is “incest,” which consists in the Reply to Objection 3. Since a woman, by vow- misuse of a woman who is related by consanguinity or ing continence, contracts a spiritual marriage with God, affinity. Secondly, with regard to the person under whose the sacrilege that is committed in the violation of such a authority the woman is placed: and if she be under the au- woman is a spiritual adultery. In like manner, the other thority of a husband, it is “adultery,” if under the authority kinds of sacrilege pertaining to lustful matter are reduced of her father, it is “seduction,” in the absence of violence, to other species of lust. and “rape” if violence be employed. Reply to Objection 4. The sin of a husband with his These species are differentiated on the part of the wife is not connected with undue matter, but with other woman rather than of the man, because in the venereal circumstances, which do not constitute the species of a act the woman is passive and is by way of matter, whereas moral act, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 2). the man is by way of agent; and it has been stated above Reply to Objection 5. As a gloss says on this pas- (obj. 1) that the aforesaid species are assigned with regard sage, “uncleanness” stands for lust against nature, while to a difference of matter. “lasciviousness” is a man’s abuse of boys, wherefore it Reply to Objection 1. The aforesaid diversity of mat- would appear to pertain to seduction. We may also reply ter is connected with a formal difference of object, which that “lasciviousness” relates to certain acts circumstantial difference results from different modes of opposition to to the venereal act, for instance kisses, touches, and so right reason, as stated above. forth. Reply to Objection 2. As stated above ( Ia IIae, Reply to Objection 6. According to a gloss on this q. 18, a. 7), nothing hinders the deformities of different passage “lust” there signifies any kind of excess. vices concurring in the one act, and in this way adultery Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 154 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that simple fornication is ity, neither as regards the love of God, since it is not a not a mortal sin. For things that come under the same head sin directly against. God, nor as regards the love of our would seem to be on a par with one another. Now forni- neighbor, since thereby no one is injured. Therefore sim- cation comes under the same head as things that are not ple fornication is not a mortal sin. mortal sins: for it is written (Acts 15:29): “That you ab- Objection 5. Further, every mortal sin leads to eternal stain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and perdition. But simple fornication has not this result: be- from things strangled, and from fornication.” But there is cause a gloss of Ambrose∗ on 1 Tim. 4:8, “Godliness not mortal sin in these observances, according to 1 Tim. is profitable to all things,” says: “The whole of Chris- 4:4, “Nothing is rejected that is received with thanksgiv- tian teaching is summed up in mercy and godliness: if a ing.” Therefore fornication is not a mortal sin. man conforms to this, even though he gives way to the in- Objection 2. Further, no mortal sin is the matter of a constancy of the flesh, doubtless he will be punished, but Divine precept. But the Lord commanded (Osee 1:2): “Go he will not perish.” Therefore simple fornication is not a take thee a wife of fornications, and have of her children mortal sin. of fornications.” Therefore fornication is not a mortal sin. Objection 6. Further, Augustine says (De Bono Con- Objection 3. Further, no mortal sin is mentioned in jug. xvi) that “what food is to the well-being of the body, Holy Writ without disapprobation. Yet simple fornication such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the human is mentioned without disapprobation by Holy Writ in con- race.” But inordinate use of food is not always a mortal nection with the patriarchs. Thus we read (Gn. 16:4) that sin. Therefore neither is all inordinate sexual intercourse; Abraham went in to his handmaid Agar; and further on and this would seem to apply especially to simple fornica- (Gn. 30:5,9) that Jacob went in to Bala and Zelpha the tion, which is the least grievous of the aforesaid species. handmaids of his wives; and again (Gn. 38:18) that Juda On the contrary, It is written (Tob. 4:13): “Take heed was with Thamar whom he thought to be a harlot. There- to keep thyself. . . from all fornication, and beside thy wife fore simple fornication is not a mortal sin. never endure to know a crime.” Now crime denotes a Objection 4. Further, every mortal sin is contrary to mortal sin. Therefore fornication and all intercourse with charity. But simple fornication is not contrary to char- other than one’s wife is a mortal sin. ∗ The quotation is from the Gloss of Peter Lombard, who refers it to St. Ambrose: whereas it is from Hilary the deacon 1873 Further, nothing but mortal sin debars a man from and consequently it is a mortal sin. God’s kingdom. But fornication debars him, as shown Nor does it matter if a man having knowledge of a by the words of the Apostle (Gal. 5:21), who after men- woman by fornication, make sufficient provision for the tioning fornication and certain other vices, adds: “They upbringing of the child: because a matter that comes un- who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God.” der the determination of the law is judged according to Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin. what happens in general, and not according to what may Further, it is written in the Decretals (XXII, qu. i, happen in a particular case. can. Praedicandum): “They should know that the same Reply to Objection 1. Fornication is reckoned in con- penance is to be enjoined for perjury as for adultery, for- junction with these things, not as being on a par with nication, and wilful murder and other criminal offenses.” them in sinfulness, but because the matters mentioned Therefore simple fornication is a criminal or mortal sin. there were equally liable to cause dispute between Jews I answer that, Without any doubt we must hold sim- and Gentiles, and thus prevent them from agreeing unan- ple fornication to be a mortal sin, notwithstanding that a imously. For among the Gentiles, fornication was not gloss∗ on Dt. 23:17, says: “This is a prohibition against deemed unlawful, on account of the corruption of natu- going with whores, whose vileness is venial.” For instead ral reason: whereas the Jews, taught by the Divine law, of “venial” it should be “venal,” since such is the wan- considered it to be unlawful. The other things mentioned ton’s trade. In order to make this evident, we must take were loathsome to the Jews through custom introduced by note that every sin committed directly against human life the law into their daily life. Hence the Apostles forbade is a mortal sin. Now simple fornication implies an inordi- these things to the Gentiles, not as though they were un- nateness that tends to injure the life of the offspring to be lawful in themselves, but because they were loathsome to born of this union. For we find in all animals where the the Jews, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 103, a. 4, ad 3). upbringing of the offspring needs care of both male and Reply to Objection 2. Fornication is said to be a sin, female, that these come together not indeterminately, but because it is contrary to right reason. Now man’s reason is the male with a certain female, whether one or several; right, in so far as it is ruled by the Divine Will, the first and such is the case with all birds: while, on the other hand, supreme rule. Wherefore that which a man does by God’s among those animals, where the female alone suffices for will and in obedience to His command, is not contrary to the offspring’s upbringing, the union is indeterminate, as right reason, though it may seem contrary to the general in the case of dogs and like animals. Now it is evident order of reason: even so, that which is done miraculously that the upbringing of a human child requires not only the by the Divine power is not contrary to nature, though it mother’s care for his nourishment, but much more the care be contrary to the usual course of nature. Therefore just of his father as guide and guardian, and under whom he as Abraham did not sin in being willing to slay his inno- progresses in goods both internal and external. Hence hu- cent son, because he obeyed God, although considered in man nature rebels against an indeterminate union of the itself it was contrary to right human reason in general, so, sexes and demands that a man should be united to a deter- too, Osee sinned not in committing fornication by God’s minate woman and should abide with her a long time or command. Nor should such a copulation be strictly called even for a whole lifetime. Hence it is that in the human fornication, though it be so called in reference to the gen- race the male has a natural solicitude for the certainty of eral course of things. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iii, offspring, because on him devolves the upbringing of the 8): “When God commands a thing to be done against the child: and this certainly would cease if the union of sexes customs or agreement of any people, though it were never were indeterminate. done by them heretofore, it is to be done”; and afterwards This union with a certain definite woman is called mat- he adds: “For as among the powers of human society, the rimony; which for the above reason is said to belong to greater authority is obeyed in preference to the lesser, so the natural law. Since, however, the union of the sexes is must God in preference to all.” directed to the common good of the whole human race, Reply to Objection 3. Abraham and Jacob went in and common goods depend on the law for their determi- to their handmaidens with no purpose of fornication, as nation, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 90, a. 2), it follows that we shall show further on when we treat of matrimony ( this union of man and woman, which is called matrimony, Suppl., q. 65, a. 5, ad 2). As to Juda there is no need to is determined by some law. What this determination is for excuse him, for he also caused Joseph to be sold. us will be stated in the Third Part of this work ( Suppl., Reply to Objection 4. Simple fornication is contrary q. 50, seqq.), where we shall treat of the sacrament of mat- to the love of our neighbor, because it is opposed to the rimony. Wherefore, since fornication is an indeterminate good of the child to be born, as we have shown, since it is union of the sexes, as something incompatible with matri- an act of generation accomplished in a manner disadvan- mony, it is opposed to the good of the child’s upbringing, tageous to the future child. ∗ St. Augustine, QQ. in Deut., qu. 37 1874 Reply to Objection 5. A person, who, while given to as to the very genus of the act, and not only as to the inor-works of piety, yields to the inconstancy of the flesh, is dinateness of concupiscence. On the other hand, one meal freed from eternal loss, in so far as these works dispose does not hinder the good of a man’s whole life, where- him to receive the grace to repent, and because by such fore the act of gluttony is not a mortal sin by reason of works he makes satisfaction for his past inconstancy; but its genus. It would, however, be a mortal sin, if a man not so as to be freed by pious works, if he persist in carnal were knowingly to partake of a food which would alter the inconstancy impenitent until death. whole condition of his life, as was the case with Adam. Reply to Objection 6. One copulation may result in Nor is it true that fornication is the least of the sins the begetting of a man, wherefore inordinate copulation, comprised under lust, for the marriage act that is done out which hinders the good of the future child, is a mortal sin of sensuous pleasure is a lesser sin. Whether fornication is the most grievous of sins? IIa IIae q. 154 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that fornication is the gravates a sin is that which is in the inclination of the will. most grievous of sins. For seemingly a sin is the more But the sensual pleasure that is in the sensitive appetite, grievous according as it proceeds from a greater sensuous lessens sin, because a sin is the less grievous according as pleasure. Now the greatest sensuous pleasure is in for- it is committed under the impulse of a greater passion. It nication, for a gloss on 1 Cor. 7:9 says that the “flame is in this way that the greatest sensual pleasure is in for- of sensuous pleasure is most fierce in lust.” Therefore it nication. Hence Augustine says (De Agone Christiano∗) seems that fornication is the gravest of sins. that of all a Christian’s conflicts, the most difficult com- Objection 2. Further, a sin is the more grievous that bats are those of chastity; wherein the fight is a daily one, is committed against a person more closely united to the but victory rare: and Isidore declares (De Summo Bono sinner: thus he sins more grievously who strikes his fa- ii, 39) that “mankind is subjected to the devil by carnal ther than one who strikes a stranger. Now according to 1 lust more than by anything else,” because, to wit, the ve- Cor. 6:18, “He that committeth fornication sinneth against hemence of this passion is more difficult to overcome. his own body,” which is most intimately connected with Reply to Objection 2. The fornicator is said to sin a man. Therefore it seems that fornication is the most against his own body, not merely because the pleasure of grievous of sins. fornication is consummated in the flesh, which is also the Objection 3. Further, the greater a good is, the graver case in gluttony, but also because he acts against the good would seem to be the sin committed against it. Now the of his own body by an undue resolution and defilement sin of fornication is seemingly opposed to the good of the thereof, and an undue association with another. Nor does whole human race, as appears from what was said in the it follow from this that fornication is the most grievous sin, foregoing Article. It is also against Christ, according to because in man reason is of greater value than the body, 1 Cor. 6:15, “Shall I. . . take the members of Christ, and wherefore if there be a sin more opposed to reason, it will make them the members of a harlot?” Therefore fornica- be more grievous. tion is the most grievous of sins. Reply to Objection 3. The sin of fornication is con- On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 12) trary to the good of the human race, in so far as it is preju- that the sins of the flesh are less grievous than spiritual dicial to the individual begetting of the one man that may sins. be born. Now one who is already an actual member of I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be measured the human species attains to the perfection of the species in two ways, first with regard to the sin in itself, secondly more than one who is a man potentially, and from this with regard to some accident. The gravity of a sin is mea- point of view murder is a more grievous sin than fornica- sured with regard to the sin itself, by reason of its species, tion and every kind of lust, through being more opposed which is determined according to the good to which that to the good of the human species. Again, a Divine good sin is opposed. Now fornication is contrary to the good is greater than the good of the human race: and therefore of the child to be born. Wherefore it is a graver sin, as to those sins also that are against God are more grievous. its species, than those sins which are contrary to external Moreover, fornication is a sin against God, not directly as goods, such as theft and the like; while it is less grievous though the fornicator intended to offend God, but conse- than those which are directly against God, and sins that quently, in the same way as all mortal sins. And just as are injurious to the life of one already born, such as mur- the members of our body are Christ’s members, so too, der. our spirit is one with Christ, according to 1 Cor. 6:17, Reply to Objection 1. The sensual pleasure that ag- “He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit.” Wherefore ∗ Serm. ccxciii; ccl de Temp.; see Appendix to St. Augustine’s works 1875 also spiritual sins are more against Christ than fornication is. Whether there can be mortal sin in touches and kisses? IIa IIae q. 154 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no mortal their disgrace and crime.” Therefore by doing these things sin in touches and kisses. For the Apostle says (Eph. a man is guilty of a crime, that is, of mortal sin. 5:3): “Fornication and all uncleanness, or covetousness, I answer that, A thing is said to be a mortal works. let it not so much as be named among you, as becometh /sin in two ways. First, by reason of its species, and in this saints,” then he adds: “Or obscenity” (which a gloss refers way a kiss, caress, or touch does not, of its very nature, to “kissing and fondling”), “or foolish talking” (as “soft imply a mortal sin, for it is possible to do such things with- speeches”), “or scurrility” (which “fools call geniality— out lustful pleasure, either as being the custom of one’s i.e. jocularity”), and afterwards he continues (Eph. 5:5): country, or on account of some obligation or reasonable “For know ye this and understand that no fornicator, or un- cause. Secondly, a thing is said to be a mortal sin by rea- clean, or covetous person (which is the serving of idols), son of its cause: thus he who gives an alms, in order to hath inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God,” lead someone into heresy, sins mortally on account of his thus making no further mention of obscenity, as neither of corrupt intention. Now it has been stated above ( Ia IIae, foolish talking or scurrility. Therefore these are not mortal q. 74, a. 8), that it is a mortal sin not only to consent to sins. the act, but also to the delectation of a mortal sin. Where- Objection 2. Further, fornication is stated to be a mor- fore since fornication is a mortal sin, and much more so tal sin as being prejudicial to the good of the future child’s the other kinds of lust, it follows that in such like sins not begetting and upbringing. But these are not affected by only consent to the act but also consent to the pleasure kisses and touches or blandishments. Therefore there is is a mortal sin. Consequently, when these kisses and ca- no mortal sin in these. resses are done for this delectation, it follows that they are Objection 3. Further, things that are mortal sins in mortal sins, and only in this way are they said to be lust- themselves can never be good actions. Yet kisses, touches, ful. Therefore in so far as they are lustful, they are mortal and the like can be done sometimes without sin. Therefore sins. they are not mortal sins in themselves. Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle makes no further On the contrary, A lustful look is less than a touch, a mention of these three because they are not sinful except caress or a kiss. But according to Mat. 5:28, “Whosoever as directed to those that he had mentioned before. shall look on a woman to lust after her hath already com- Reply to Objection 2. Although kisses and touches mitted adultery with her in his heart.” Much more there- do not by their very nature hinder the good of the human fore are lustful kisses and other like things mortal sins. offspring, they proceed from lust, which is the source of Further, Cyprian says (Ad Pompon, de Virgin., Ep. this hindrance: and on this account they are mortally sin- lxii), “By their very intercourse, their blandishments, their ful. converse, their embraces, those who are associated in a Reply to Objection 3. This argument proves that such sleep that knows neither honor nor shame, acknowledge things are not mortal sins in their species. Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 154 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that nocturnal pollution is ing to another. Therefore one may sin while asleep, so that a sin. For the same things are the matter of merit and de- nocturnal pollution is not prevented by sleep from being a merit. Now a man may merit while he sleeps, as was the sin, seeing that it is a sin according to its genus. case with Solomon, who while asleep obtained the gift of Objection 3. Further, it is useless to reprove and in- wisdom from the Lord (3 Kings 3:2, Par. 1). Therefore a struct one who cannot act according to or against rea- man may demerit while asleep; and thus nocturnal pollu- son. Now man, while asleep, is instructed and reproved tion would seem to be a sin. by God, according to Job 33:15,16, “By a dream in a Objection 2. Further, whoever has the use of reason vision by night, when deep sleep is wont to lay hold of can sin. Now a man has the use of reason while asleep, men∗. . . Then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching since in our sleep we frequently discuss matters, choose instructeth them in what they are to learn.” Therefore a this rather than that, consenting to one thing, or dissent- man, while asleep, can act according to or against his rea- ∗ Vulg.: ‘When deep sleep falleth upon men.’ St. Thomas is apparently quoting from memory, as the passage is given correctly above, q. 95, a. 6, obj. 1 1876 son, and this is to do good or sinful actions, and thus it acts productive of pollution. In this sense the Philosopher seems that nocturnal pollution is a sin. says (Ethic. i, 13) that “in so far as certain movements in On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, some degree pass” from the waking state to the state of 15): “When the same image that comes into the mind of sleep, “the dreams of good men are better than those of a speaker presents itself to the mind of the sleeper, so that any other people”: and Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, the latter is unable to distinguish the imaginary from the 15) that “even during sleep, the soul may have conspicu- real union of bodies, the flesh is at once moved, with the ous merit on account of its good disposition.” Thus it is result that usually follows such motions; and yet there is evident that nocturnal pollution may be sinful on the part as little sin in this as there is in speaking and therefore of its cause. on the other hand, it may happen that noc- thinking about such things while one is awake.” turnal pollution ensues after thoughts about carnal acts, I answer that, Nocturnal pollution may be considered though they were speculative, or accompanied by abhor- in two ways. First, in itself; and thus it has not the char- rence, and then it is not sinful, neither in itself nor in its acter of a sin. For every sin depends on the judgment of cause. reason, since even the first movement of the sensuality has The third cause is spiritual and external; for instance nothing sinful in it, except in so far as it can be suppressed when by the work of a devil the sleeper’s phantasms are by reason; wherefore in the absence of reason’s judgment, disturbed so as to induce the aforesaid result. Sometimes there is no sin in it. Now during sleep reason has not a free this is associated with a previous sin, namely the neglect judgment. For there is no one who while sleeping does not to guard against the wiles of the devil. Hence the words of regard some of the images formed by his imagination as the hymn at even: “Our enemy repress, that so our bodies though they were real, as stated above in the Ia, q. 84, a. 8, no uncleanness know”∗. ad 2. Wherefore what a man does while he sleeps and is On the other hand, this may occur without any fault on deprived of reason’s judgment, is not imputed to him as a man’s part, and through the wickedness of the devil alone. sin, as neither are the actions of a maniac or an imbecile. Thus we read in the Collationes Patrum (Coll. xxii, 6) of a Secondly, nocturnal pollution may be considered with man who was ever wont to suffer from nocturnal pollution reference to its cause. This may be threefold. One is a on festivals, and that the devil brought this about in order bodily cause. For when there is excess of seminal hu- to prevent him from receiving Holy Communion. Hence mor in the body, or when the humor is disintegrated ei- it is manifest that nocturnal pollution is never a sin, but is ther through overheating of the body or some other distur- sometimes the result of a previous sin. bance, the sleeper dreams things that are connected with Reply to Objection 1. Solomon did not merit to re- the discharge of this excessive or disintegrated humor: the ceive wisdom from God while he was asleep. He received same thing happens when nature is cumbered with other it in token of his previous desire. It is for this reason that superfluities, so that phantasms relating to the discharge of his petition is stated to have been pleasing to God (3 Kings those superfluities are formed in the imagination. Accord- 3:10), as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15). ingly if this excess of humor be due to a sinful cause (for Reply to Objection 2. The use of reason is more or instance excessive eating or drinking), nocturnal pollution less hindered in sleep, according as the inner sensitive has the character of sin from its cause: whereas if the ex- powers are more or less overcome by sleep, on account of cess or disintegration of these superfluities be not due to the violence or attenuation of the evaporations. Neverthe- a sinful cause, nocturnal pollution is not sinful, neither in less it is always hindered somewhat, so as to be unable to itself nor in its cause. elicit a judgment altogether free, as stated in the Ia, q. 84, A second cause of nocturnal pollution is on the part of a. 8, ad 2. Therefore what it does then is not imputed to it the soul and the inner man: for instance when it happens as a sin. to the sleeper on account of some previous thought. For Reply to Objection 3. Reason’s apprehension is not the thought which preceded while he was awake, is some- hindered during sleep to the same extent as its judgment, times purely speculative, for instance when one thinks for this is accomplished by reason turning to sensible ob- about the sins of the flesh for the purpose of discussion; jects, which are the first principles of human thought. while sometimes it is accompanied by a certain emotion Hence nothing hinders man’s reason during sleep from ap- either of concupiscence or of abhorrence. Now noctur- prehending anew something arising out of the traces left nal pollution is more apt to arise from thinking about car- by his previous thoughts and phantasms presented to him, nal sins with concupiscence for such pleasures, because or again through Divine revelation, or the interference of this leaves its trace and inclination in the soul, so that the a good or bad angel. sleeper is more easily led in his imagination to consent to ∗ Translation W. K. Blount 1877 Whether seduction should be reckoned a species of lust? IIa IIae q. 154 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that seduction should not power. Moreover, the seal of virginity is a special ob- be reckoned a species of lust. For seduction denotes the stacle to the intercourse of fornication, in that it should be unlawful violation of a virgin, according to the Decretals removed by marriage only. Hence seduction is not sim- (XXXVI, qu. 1)∗. But this may occur between an un- ple fornication, since the latter is intercourse with harlots, married man and an unmarried woman, which pertains to women, namely, who are no longer virgins, as a gloss ob- fornication. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned serves on 2 Cor. 12:, “And have not done penance for the a species of lust, distinct from fornication. uncleanness and fornication,” etc. Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Patriarch.†): Reply to Objection 2. Ambrose here takes seduction “Let no man be deluded by human laws: all seduction is in another sense, as applicable in a general way to any adultery.” Now a species is not contained under another sin of lust. Wherefore seduction, in the words quoted, that is differentiated in opposition to it. Therefore since signifies the intercourse between a married man and any adultery is a species of lust, it seems that seduction should woman other than his wife. This is clear from his adding: not be reckoned a species of lust. “Nor is it lawful for the husband to do what the wife may Objection 3. Further, to do a person an injury would not.” In this sense, too, we are to understand the words seem to pertain to injustice rather than to lust. Now the of Num. 5:13: “If [Vulg.: ‘But’] the adultery is secret, seducer does an injury to another, namely the violated and cannot be provided by witnesses, because she was not maiden’s father, who “can take the injury as personal to found in adultery [stupro].” himself”‡, and sue the seducer for damages. Therefore Reply to Objection 3. Nothing prevents a sin from seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust. having a greater deformity through being united to an- On the contrary, Seduction consists properly in the other sin. Now the sin of lust obtains a greater defor- venereal act whereby a virgin is violated. Therefore, since mity from the sin of injustice, because the concupiscence lust is properly about venereal actions, it would seem that would seem to be more inordinate, seeing that it refrains seduction is a species of lust. not from the pleasurable object so that it may avoid an in- I answer that, When the matter of a vice has a special justice. In fact a twofold injustice attaches to it. One is on deformity, we must reckon it to be a determinate species the part of the virgin, who, though not violated by force, of that vice. Now lust is a sin concerned with venereal is nevertheless seduced, and thus the seducer is bound to matter, as stated above (q. 153, a. 1). And a special de- compensation. Hence it is written (Ex. 22:16,17): “If a formity attaches to the violation of a virgin who is un- man seduce a virgin not yet espoused, and lie with her, he der her father’s care: both on the part of the maid, who shall endow her and have her to wife. If the maid’s father through being violated without any previous compact of will not give her to him, he shall give money according to marriage is both hindered from contracting a lawful mar- the dowry, which virgins are wont to receive.” The other riage and is put on the road to a wanton life from which injury is done to the maid’s father: wherefore the seducer she was withheld lest she should lose the seal of virginity: is bound by the Law to a penalty in his regard. For it is and on the part of the father, who is her guardian, accord- written (Dt. 22:28,29): “If a man find a damsel that is a ing to Ecclus. 42:11, “Keep a sure watch over a shame- virgin, who is not espoused, and taking her, lie with her, less daughter, lest at any time she make thee become a and the matter come to judgment: he that lay with her laughing-stock to thy enemies.” Therefore it is evident shall give to the father of the maid fifty sicles of silver, that seduction which denotes the unlawful violation of a and shall have her to wife, and because he hath humbled virgin, while still under the guardianship of her parents, is her, he may not put her away all the days of his life”: and a determinate species of lust. this, lest he should prove to have married her in mockery, Reply to Objection 1. Although a virgin is free from as Augustine observes.§ the bond of marriage, she is not free from her father’s Whether rape is a species of lust, distinct from seduction? IIa IIae q. 154 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that rape is not a species causing corruption: wherefore he that is guilty of rape is a of lust, distinct from seduction. For Isidore says (Etym. seducer.” Therefore it seems that rape should not be reck- v, 26) that “seduction [stuprum], or rape, properly speak- oned a species of lust distinct from seduction. ing, is unlawful intercourse, and takes its name from its Objection 2. Further, rape, apparently, implies vio- ∗ Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa † De Abraham i, 4 ‡ Gratian, ad can. Lex illa § QQ. in Dt., qu. xxxiv. ¶ Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa 1878 lence. For it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1¶) “We abhor abductors whether of widows or of virgins on that “rape is committed when a maid is taken away by account of the heinousness of their crime.” force from her father’s house that after being violated she There is seduction without rape when a man, without may be taken to wife.” But the employment of force is employing force, violates a virgin unlawfully. accidental to lust, for this essentially regards the pleasure Reply to Objection 1. Since rape frequently coin- of intercourse. Therefore it seems that rape should not be cides with seduction, the one is sometimes used to signify reckoned a determinate species of lust. the other. Objection 3. Further, the sin of lust is curbed by mar- Reply to Objection 2. The employment of force riage: for it is written (1 Cor. 7:2): “For fear of fornica- would seem to arise from the greatness of concupiscence, tion, let every man have his own wife.” Now rape is an the result being that a man does not fear to endanger him- obstacle to subsequent marriage, for it was enacted in the self by offering violence. council of Meaux: “We decree that those who are guilty Reply to Objection 3. The rape of a maiden who is of rape, or of abducting or seducing women, should not promised in marriage is to be judged differently from that have those women in marriage, although they should have of one who is not so promised. For one who is promised subsequently married them with the consent of their par- in marriage must be restored to her betrothed, who has a ents.” Therefore rape is not a determinate species of lust right to her in virtue of their betrothal: whereas one that is distinct from seduction. not promised to another must first of all be restored to her Objection 4. Further, a man may have knowledge of father’s care, and then the abductor may lawfully marry his newly married wife without committing a sin of lust. her with her parents’ consent. Otherwise the marriage is Yet he may commit rape if he take her away by force unlawful, since whosoever steals a thing he is bound to re- from her parents’ house, and have carnal knowledge of store it. Nevertheless rape does not dissolve a marriage al- her. Therefore rape should not be reckoned a determinate ready contracted, although it is an impediment to its being species of lust. contracted. As to the decree of the council in question, it On the contrary, Rape is unlawful sexual intercourse, was made in abhorrence of this crime, and has been abro- as Isidore states (Etym. v, 26). But this pertains to the sin gated. Wherefore Jerome† declares the contrary: “Three of lust. Therefore rape is a species of lust. kinds of lawful marriage,” says he, “are mentioned in I answer that, Rape, in the sense in which we speak Holy Writ. The first is that of a chaste maiden given away of it now, is a species of lust: and sometimes it coincides lawfully in her maidenhood to a man. The second is when with seduction; sometimes there is rape without seduc- a man finds a maiden in the city, and by force has carnal tion, and sometimes seduction without rape. knowledge of her. If the father be willing, the man shall They coincide when a man employs force in order un- endow her according to the father’s estimate, and shall pay lawfully to violate a virgin. This force is employed some- the price of her purity‡. The third is, when the maiden is times both towards the virgin and towards her father; and taken away from such a man, and is given to another at sometimes towards the father and not to the virgin, for in- the father’s will.” stance if she allows herself to be taken away by force from We may also take this decree to refer to those who are her father’s house. Again, the force employed in rape dif- promised to others in marriage, especially if the betrothal fers in another way, because sometimes a maid is taken be expressed by words in the present tense. away by force from her parents’ house, and is forcibly vi- Reply to Objection 4. The man who is just married olated: while sometimes, though taken away by force, she has, in virtue of the betrothal, a certain right in her: where- is not forcibly violated, but of her own consent, whether fore, although he sins by using violence, he is not guilty by act of fornication or by the act of marriage: for the con- of the crime of rape. Hence Pope Gelasius says§: “This ditions of rape remain no matter how force is employed. law of bygone rulers stated that rape was committed when There is rape without seduction if a man abduct a widow a maiden, with regard to whose marriage nothing had so or one who is not a virgin. Hence Pope Symmachus says∗, far been decided, was taken away by force.” Whether adultery is determinate species of lust, distinct from the other species? IIa IIae q. 154 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that adultery is not a de- ing to a gloss¶ on Ex. 20:14. Now a woman who is not terminate species of lust, distinct from the other species. one’s own may be of various conditions, namely either a For adultery takes its name from a man having intercourse virgin, or under her father’s care, or a harlot, or of any “with a woman who is not his own [ad alteram],” accord- other description. Therefore it seems that adultery is not ∗ Ep. v ad Caesarium; Cf. can. Raptores xxxvi, qu. 2 † The quo- tation is from Can. Tria. xxxvi, qu. 2 ‡ Cf. Dt. 22:23-29 § Can. Lex illa, xxvii, qu. 2; xxxvi, qu. 1 ¶ St. Augustine: Serm. li, 13 de Divers. lxiii 1879 a species of lust distinct from the others. hath fornicated in adultery, and hath gotten children of an- Objection 2. Further, Jerome says∗: “It matters not other man,” which is contrary to the good of her offspring. for what reason a man behaves as one demented. Hence The first of these, however, is common to all mortal sins, Sixtus the Pythagorean says in his Maxims: He that is in- while the two others belong especially to the deformity of satiable of his wife is an adulterer,” and in like manner adultery. Hence it is manifest that adultery is a determi- one who is over enamored of any woman. Now every nate species of lust, through having a special deformity in kind of lust includes a too ardent love. Therefore adultery venereal acts. is in every kind of lust: and consequently it should not be Reply to Objection 1. If a married man has inter- reckoned a species of lust. course with another woman, his sin may be denominated Objection 3. Further, where there is the same kind either with regard to him, and thus it is always adultery, of deformity, there would seem to be the same species of since his action is contrary to the fidelity of marriage, or sin. Now, apparently, there is the same kind of deformity with regard to the woman with whom he has intercourse; in seduction and adultery: since in either case a woman is and thus sometimes it is adultery, as when a married man violated who is under another person’s authority. There- has intercourse with another’s wife; and sometimes it has fore adultery is not a determinate species of lust, distinct the character of seduction, or of some other sin, according from the others. to various conditions affecting the woman with whom he On the contrary, Pope Leo† says that “adultery is has intercourse: and it has been stated above (a. 1) that sexual intercourse with another man or woman in con- the species of lust correspond to the various conditions of travention of the marriage compact, whether through the women. impulse of one’s own lust, or with the consent of the Reply to Objection 2. Matrimony is specially or- other party.” Now this implies a special deformity of lust. dained for the good of human offspring, as stated above Therefore adultery is a determinate species of lust. (a. 2). But adultery is specially opposed to matrimony, I answer that, Adultery, as its name implies, “is ac- in the point of breaking the marriage faith which is due cess to another’s marriage-bed [ad alienum torum]”‡. By between husband and wife. And since the man who is so doing a man is guilty of a twofold offense against too ardent a lover of his wife acts counter to the good chastity and the good of human procreation. First, by of marriage if he use her indecently, although he be not accession to a woman who is not joined to him in mar- unfaithful, he may in a sense be called an adulterer; and riage, which is contrary to the good of the upbringing of even more so than he that is too ardent a lover of another his own children. Secondly, by accession to a woman who woman. is united to another in marriage, and thus he hinders the Reply to Objection 3. The wife is under her hus- good of another’s children. The same applies to the mar- band’s authority, as united to him in marriage: whereas ried woman who is corrupted by adultery. Wherefore it is the maid is under her father’s authority, as one who is to written (Ecclus. 23:32,33): “Every woman. . . that leaveth be married by that authority. Hence the sin of adultery her husband. . . shall be guilty of sin. For first she hath is contrary to the good of marriage in one way, and the been unfaithful to the law of the Most High” (since there it sin of seduction in another; wherefore they are reckoned is commanded: “Thou shalt not commit adultery”); “and to differ specifically. Of other matters concerning adul- secondly, she hath offended against her husband,” by mak- tery we shall speak in the Third Part§, when we treat of ing it uncertain that the children are his: “thirdly, she matrimony. Whether incest is a determinate species of lust? IIa IIae q. 154 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that incest is not a deter- not one but several species of lust. minate species of lust. For incest¶ takes its name from Objection 3. Further, that which does not, of it- being a privation of chastity. But all kinds of lust are op- self, imply a deformity, does not constitute a determinate posed to chastity. Therefore it seems that incest is not a species of vice. But intercourse between those who are re- species of lust, but is lust itself in general. lated by consanguinity or affinity does not, of itself, con- Objection 2. Further, it is stated in the Decretals tain any deformity, else it would never have been lawful. (XXXVI, qu. 1k) that “incest is intercourse between a Therefore incest is not a determinate species of lust. man and a woman related by consanguinity or affinity.” On the contrary, The species of lust are distinguished Now affinity differs from consanguinity. Therefore it is according to the various conditions of women with whom ∗ Contra Jovin. i † St. Augustine, De Bono Conjug. iv; Cf. Append. Grat. ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 5 ‡ Cf. Append. Gratian, ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 1 § Suppl., q. 59, a. 3; Suppl., Qq. 60,62 ¶ ‘Incestus’ is equivalent to ‘in-castus = ‘unchaste’ k Cf. Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa 1880 a man has unlawful intercourse. Now incest implies a spe-together in a useful and becoming amity; nor should one cial condition on the part of the woman, because it is un- man have many relationships in one, but each should have lawful intercourse with a woman related by consanguinity one.” or affinity as stated (obj. 2). Therefore incest is a determi- Aristotle adds another reason (2 Polit. ii): for since it nate species of lust. is natural that a man should have a liking for a woman of I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,6) wherever we his kindred, if to this be added the love that has its origin find something incompatible with the right use of vene- in venereal intercourse, his love would be too ardent and real actions, there must needs be a determinate species of would become a very great incentive to lust: and this is lust. Now sexual intercourse with women related by con- contrary to chastity. Hence it is evident that incest is a sanguinity or affinity is unbecoming to venereal union on determinate species of lust. three counts. First, because man naturally owes a certain Reply to Objection 1. Unlawful intercourse between respect to his parents and therefore to his other blood re- persons related to one another would be most prejudicial lations, who are descended in near degree from the same to chastity, both on account of the opportunities it affords, parents: so much so indeed that among the ancients, as and because of the excessive ardor of love, as stated in the Valerius Maximus relates∗, it was not deemed right for a Article. Wherefore the unlawful intercourse between such son to bathe with his father, lest they should see one an- persons is called “incest” antonomastically. other naked. Now from what has been said (q. 142, a. 4: Reply to Objection 2. Persons are related by affinity q. 151, a. 4), it is evident that in venereal acts there is through one who is related by consanguinity: and there- a certain shamefulness inconsistent with respect, where- fore since the one depends on the other, consanguinity and fore men are ashamed of them. Wherefore it is unseemly affinity entail the same kind of unbecomingness. that such persons should be united in venereal intercourse. Reply to Objection 3. There is something essentially This reason seems to be indicated (Lev. 18:7) where unbecoming and contrary to natural reason in sexual in- we read: “She is thy mother, thou shalt not uncover her tercourse between persons related by blood, for instance nakedness,” and the same is expressed further on with re- between parents and children who are directly and imme- gard to others. diately related to one another, since children naturally owe The second reason is because blood relations must their parents honor. Hence the Philosopher instances a needs live in close touch with one another. Wherefore horse (De Animal. ix, 47) which covered its own mother if they were not debarred from venereal union, opportu- by mistake and threw itself over a precipice as though nities of venereal intercourse would be very frequent and horrified at what it had done, because some animals even thus men’s minds would be enervated by lust. Hence in have a natural respect for those that have begotten them. the Old Law† the prohibition was apparently directed spe- There is not the same essential unbecomingness attach- cially to those persons who must needs live together. ing to other persons who are related to one another not The third reason is, because this would hinder a man directly but through their parents: and, as to this, becom- from having many friends: since through a man taking a ingness or unbecomingness varies according to custom, stranger to wife, all his wife’s relations are united to him and human or Divine law: because, as stated above (a. 2), by a special kind of friendship, as though they were of the sexual intercourse, being directed to the common good, same blood as himself. Wherefore Augustine says (De is subject to law. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Civ. Civ. Dei xv, 16): “The demands of charity are most per- Dei xv, 16), whereas the union of brothers and sisters goes fectly satisfied by men uniting together in the bonds that back to olden times, it became all the more worthy of con- the various ties of friendship require, so that they may live demnation when religion forbade it. Whether sacrilege can be a species of lust? IIa IIae q. 154 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that sacrilege cannot be species of lust. a species of lust. For the same species is not contained Objection 3. Further, something derogatory to a sa- under different genera that are not subalternated to one cred thing may be done by the other kinds of vice, as another. Now sacrilege is a species of irreligion, as stated well as by lust. But sacrilege is not reckoned a species above (q. 99, a. 2). Therefore sacrilege cannot be reck- of gluttony, or of any other similar vice. Therefore neither oned a species of lust. should it be reckoned a species of lust. Objection 2. Further, the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1‡), On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, do not place sacrilege among other sins which are reck- 16) that “if it is wicked, through covetousness, to go be- oned species of lust. Therefore it would seem not to be a yond one’s earthly bounds, how much more wicked is it ∗ Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1 † Lev. 18 ‡ Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa 1881 through venereal lust to transgress the bounds of morals!” it is directed to another vice as its end, and may coin- Now to go beyond one’s earthly bounds in sacred matters cide with the various species of lust. For unlawful inter- is a sin of sacrilege. Therefore it is likewise a sin of sacri- course between persons mutually united by spiritual rela- lege to overthrow the bounds of morals through venereal tionship, is a sacrilege after the manner of incest. Inter- desire in sacred matters. But venereal desire pertains to course with a virgin consecrated to God, inasmuch as she lust. Therefore sacrilege is a species of lust. is the spouse of Christ, is sacrilege resembling adultery. If I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 18, the maiden be under her father’s authority, it will be spiri- Aa. 6,7), the act of a virtue or vice, that is directed to the tual seduction; and if force be employed it will be spiritual end of another virtue or vice, assumes the latter’s species: rape, which kind of rape even the civil law punishes more thus, theft committed for the sake of adultery, passes into severely than others. Thus the Emperor Justinian says∗: the species of adultery. Now it is evident that as Augustine “If any man dare, I will not say to rape, but even to tempt states (De Virgin. 8), the observance of chastity, by being a consecrated virgin with a view to marriage, he shall be directed to the worship of God, becomes an act of religion, liable to capital punishment.” as in the case of those who vow and keep chastity. Where- Reply to Objection 3. Sacrilege is committed on a fore it is manifest that lust also, by violating something consecrated thing. Now a consecrated thing is either a pertaining to the worship of God, belongs to the species consecrated person, who is desired for sexual intercourse, of sacrilege: and in this way sacrilege may be accounted and thus it is a kind of lust, or it is desired for possession, a species of lust. and thus it is a kind of injustice. Sacrilege may also come Reply to Objection 1. Lust, by being directed to an- under the head of anger, for instance, if through anger an other vice as its end, becomes a species of that vice: and injury be done to a consecrated person. Again, one may so a species of lust may be also a species of irreligion, as commit a sacrilege by partaking gluttonously of sacred of a higher genus. food. Nevertheless, sacrilege is ascribed more specially Reply to Objection 2. The enumeration referred to, to lust which is opposed to chastity for the observance of includes those sins which are species of lust by their very which certain persons are specially consecrated. nature: whereas sacrilege is a species of lust in so far as Whether the unnatural vice is a species of lust? IIa IIae q. 154 a. 11 Objection 1. It would seem that the unnatural vice is mon to all lustful vices; secondly, because, in addition, not a species of lust. For no mention of the vice against it is contrary to the natural order of the venereal act as nature is made in the enumeration given above (a. 1, becoming to the human race: and this is called “the un- obj. 1). Therefore it is not a species of lust. natural vice.” This may happen in several ways. First, by Objection 2. Further, lust is contrary to virtue; and procuring pollution, without any copulation, for the sake so it is comprised under vice. But the unnatural vice is of venereal pleasure: this pertains to the sin of “unclean- comprised not under vice, but under bestiality, according ness” which some call “effeminacy.” Secondly, by copula- to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore the unnatural tion with a thing of undue species, and this is called “bes- vice is not a species of lust. tiality.” Thirdly, by copulation with an undue sex, male Objection 3. Further, lust regards acts directed to hu- with male, or female with female, as the Apostle states man generation, as stated above (q. 153, a. 2): Whereas (Rom. 1:27): and this is called the “vice of sodomy.” the unnatural vice concerns acts from which generation Fourthly, by not observing the natural manner of copu- cannot follow. Therefore the unnatural vice is not a lation, either as to undue means, or as to other monstrous species of lust. and bestial manners of copulation. On the contrary, It is reckoned together with the Reply to Objection 1. There we enumerated the other species of lust (2 Cor. 12:21) where we read: “And species of lust that are not contrary to human nature: have not done penance for the uncleanness, and fornica- wherefore the unnatural vice was omitted. tion, and lasciviousness,” where a gloss says: “Lascivi- Reply to Objection 2. Bestiality differs from vice, for ousness, i.e., unnatural lust.” the latter is opposed to human virtue by a certain excess I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 6,9) wherever in the same matter as the virtue, and therefore is reducible there occurs a special kind of deformity whereby the vene- to the same genus. real act is rendered unbecoming, there is a determinate Reply to Objection 3. The lustful man intends not species of lust. This may occur in two ways: First, human generation but venereal pleasures. It is possible through being contrary to right reason, and this is com- to have this without those acts from which human genera- ∗ Cod. i, iii de Episc. et Cler. 5 1882 tion follows: and it is that which is sought in the unnatural vice. Whether the unnatural vice is the greatest sin among the species of lust? IIa IIae q. 154 a. 12 Objection 1. It would seem that the unnatural vice is stated above (a. 9), is contrary to the natural respect which not the greatest sin among the species of lust. For the more we owe persons related to us. a sin is contrary to charity the graver it is. Now adultery, With regard to the other species of lust they imply a seduction and rape which are injurious to our neighbor transgression merely of that which is determined by right are seemingly more contrary to the love of our neighbor, reason, on the presupposition, however, of natural prin- than unnatural sins, by which no other person is injured. ciples. Now it is more against reason to make use of Therefore the unnatural sin is not the greatest among the the venereal act not only with prejudice to the future off- species of lust. spring, but also so as to injure another person besides. Objection 2. Further, sins committed against God Wherefore simple fornication, which is committed with- would seem to be the most grievous. Now sacrilege is out injustice to another person, is the least grave among committed directly against God, since it is injurious to the the species of lust. Then, it is a greater injustice to have Divine worship. Therefore sacrilege is a graver sin than intercourse with a woman who is subject to another’s au- the unnatural vice. thority as regards the act of generation, than as regards Objection 3. Further, seemingly, a sin is all the more merely her guardianship. Wherefore adultery is more grievous according as we owe a greater love to the per- grievous than seduction. And both of these are aggra- son against whom that sin is committed. Now the order of vated by the use of violence. Hence rape of a virgin is charity requires that a man love more those persons who graver than seduction, and rape of a wife than adultery. are united to him—and such are those whom he defiles And all these are aggravated by coming under the head of by incest—than persons who are not connected with him, sacrilege, as stated above (a. 10, ad 2). and whom in certain cases he defiles by the unnatural vice. Reply to Objection 1. Just as the ordering of right Therefore incest is a graver sin than the unnatural vice. reason proceeds from man, so the order of nature is Objection 4. Further, if the unnatural vice is most from God Himself: wherefore in sins contrary to nature, grievous, the more it is against nature the graver it would whereby the very order of nature is violated, an injury is seem to be. Now the sin of uncleanness or effeminacy done to God, the Author of nature. Hence Augustine says would seem to be most contrary to nature, since it would (Confess. iii, 8): “Those foul offenses that are against na- seem especially in accord with nature that agent and pa- ture should be everywhere and at all times detested and tient should be distinct from one another. Hence it would punished, such as were those of the people of Sodom, follow that uncleanness is the gravest of unnatural vices. which should all nations commit, they should all stand But this is not true. Therefore unnatural vices are not the guilty of the same crime, by the law of God which hath most grievous among sins of lust. not so made men that they should so abuse one another. On the contrary, Augustine says (De adult. conjug.∗) For even that very intercourse which should be between that “of all these,” namely the sins belonging to lust, “that God and us is violated, when that same nature, of which which is against nature is the worst.” He is the Author, is polluted by the perversity of lust.” I answer that, In every genus, worst of all is the cor- Reply to Objection 2. Vices against nature are also ruption of the principle on which the rest depend. Now the against God, as stated above (ad 1), and are so much more principles of reason are those things that are according to grievous than the depravity of sacrilege, as the order im- nature, because reason presupposes things as determined pressed on human nature is prior to and more firm than by nature, before disposing of other things according as it any subsequently established order. is fitting. This may be observed both in speculative and Reply to Objection 3. The nature of the species is in practical matters. Wherefore just as in speculative mat- more intimately united to each individual, than any other ters the most grievous and shameful error is that which individual is. Wherefore sins against the specific nature is about things the knowledge of which is naturally be- are more grievous. stowed on man, so in matters of action it is most grave and Reply to Objection 4. Gravity of a sin depends more shameful to act against things as determined by nature. on the abuse of a thing than on the omission of the right Therefore, since by the unnatural vices man transgresses use. Wherefore among sins against nature, the lowest that which has been determined by nature with regard to place belongs to the sin of uncleanness, which consists in the use of venereal actions, it follows that in this matter the mere omission of copulation with another. While the this sin is gravest of all. After it comes incest, which, as most grievous is the sin of bestiality, because use of the ∗ The quotation is from Cap. Adulterii xxxii, qu. 7. Cf. Augustine, De Bono Conjugali, viii. 1883 due species is not observed. Hence a gloss on Gn. 37:2, Lastly comes the sin of not observing the right manner of “He accused his brethren of a most wicked crime,” says copulation, which is more grievous if the abuse regards that “they copulated with cattle.” After this comes the sin the “vas” than if it affects the manner of copulation in re- of sodomy, because use of the right sex is not observed. spect of other circumstances. 1884 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 155 Of Continence (In Four Articles) We must next consider the potential parts of temperance: (1) continence; (2) clemency; (3) modesty. Under the first head we must consider continence and incontinence. With regard to continence there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether continence is a virtue? (2) What is its matter? (3) What is its subject? (4) Of its comparison with temperance. Whether continence is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 155 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that continence is not a firm in opposition to the passions, lest it be led astray by virtue. For species and genus are not co-ordinate mem- them: yet it does not attain to the perfect nature of a moral bers of the same division. But continence is co-ordinated virtue, by which even the sensitive appetite is subject to with virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1,9). reason so that vehement passions contrary to reason do Therefore continence is not a virtue. not arise in the sensitive appetite. Hence the Philosopher Objection 2. Further, no one sins by using a virtue, says (Ethic. iv, 9) that “continence is not a virtue but since, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19), a mixture,” inasmuch as it has something of virtue, and “a virtue is a thing that no one makes ill use of.” Yet one somewhat falls short of virtue. may sin by containing oneself: for instance, if one desire If, however, we take virtue in a broad sense, for any to do a good, and contain oneself from doing it. Therefore principle of commendable actions, we may say that conti- continence is not a virtue. nence is a virtue. Objection 3. Further, no virtue withdraws man from Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher includes con- that which is lawful, but only from unlawful things: for tinence in the same division with virtue in so far as the a gloss on Gal. 5:23, “Faith, modesty,” etc., says that by former falls short of virtue. continence a man refrains even from things that are law- Reply to Objection 2. Properly speaking, man is that ful. Therefore continence is not a virtue. which is according to reason. Wherefore from the very On the contrary, Every praiseworthy habit would fact that a man holds [tenet se] to that which is in accord seem to be a virtue. Now such is continence, for An- with reason, he is said to contain himself. Now whatever dronicus says∗ that “continence is a habit unconquered by pertains to perversion of reason is not according to reason. pleasure.” Therefore continence is a virtue. Hence he alone is truly said to be continent who stands to I answer that, The word “continence” is taken by var- that which is in accord with right reason, and not to that ious people in two ways. For some understand continence which is in accord with perverse reason. Now evil desires to denote abstention from all venereal pleasure: thus the are opposed to right reason, even as good desires are op- Apostle joins continence to chastity (Gal. 5:23). In this posed to perverse reason. Wherefore he is properly and sense perfect continence is virginity in the first place, and truly continent who holds to right reason, by abstaining widowhood in the second. Wherefore the same applies to from evil desires, and not he who holds to perverse rea- continence understood thus, as to virginity which we have son, by abstaining from good desires: indeed, the latter stated above (q. 152, a. 3 ) to be a virtue. Others, however, should rather be said to be obstinate in evil. understand continence as signifying that whereby a man Reply to Objection 3. The gloss quoted takes conti- resists evil desires, which in him are vehement. In this nence in the first sense, as denoting a perfect virtue, which sense the Philosopher takes continence (Ethic. vii, 7), and refrains not merely from unlawful goods, but also from thus also it is used in the Conferences of the Fathers (Col- certain lawful things that are lesser goods, in order to give lat. xii, 10,11). In this way continence has something of its whole attention to the more perfect goods. the nature of a virtue, in so far, to wit, as the reason stands ∗ De Affectibus 1885 Whether desires for pleasures of touch are the matter of continence? IIa IIae q. 155 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that desires for pleasures is to be observed that natural inclinations are the princi- of touch are not the matter of continence. For Ambrose ples of all supervening inclinations, as stated above ( Ia, says (De Offic. i, 46): “General decorum by its consistent q. 60, a. 2). Wherefore the more they follow the inclina- form and the perfection of what is virtuous is restrained∗ tion of nature, the more strongly do the passions urge to in its every action.” . the pursuance of an object. Now nature inclines chiefly to Objection 2. Further, continence takes its name from those things that are necessary to it, whether for the main- a man standing for the good of right reason, as stated tenance of the individual, such as food, or for the main- above (a. 1, ad 2). Now other passions lead men astray tenance of the species, such as venereal acts, the plea- from right reason with greater vehemence than the desire sures of which pertain to the touch. Therefore continence for pleasures of touch: for instance, the fear of mortal dan- and incontinence refer properly to desires for pleasures of gers, which stupefies a man, and anger which makes him touch. behave like a madman, as Seneca remarks†. Therefore Reply to Objection 1. Just as temperance may be continence does not properly regard the desires for plea- used in a general sense in connection with any matter; sures of touch. but is properly applied to that matter wherein it is best Objection 3. Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. for man to be curbed: so, too, continence properly speak- ii, 54): “It is continence that restrains cupidity with the ing regards that matter wherein it is best and most difficult guiding hand of counsel.” Now cupidity is generally used to contain oneself, namely desires for pleasures of touch, to denote the desire for riches rather than the desire for and yet in a general sense and relatively may be applied pleasures of touch, according to 1 Tim. 6:10, “Cupidity to any other matter: and in this sense Ambrose speaks of [Douay: ‘The desire of money’] ( philargyria), is the root continence. of all evils.” Therefore continence is not properly about Reply to Objection 2. Properly speaking we do not the desires for pleasures of touch speak of continence in relation to fear, but rather of firm- Objection 4. Further, there are pleasures of touch not ness of mind which fortitude implies. As to anger, it is only in venereal matters but also in eating. But continence true that it begets an impulse to the pursuit of something, is wont to be applied only to the use of venereal matters. but this impulse follows an apprehension of the soul— Therefore the desire for pleasures of touch is not its proper in so far as a man apprehends that someone has injured matter. him—rather than an inclination of nature. Wherefore a Objection 5. Further, among pleasures of touch some man may be said to be continent of anger, relatively but are not human but bestial, both as regards food—for in- not simply. stance, the pleasure of eating human flesh; and as regards Reply to Objection 3. External goods, such as hon- venereal matters—for instance the abuse of animals or ors, riches and the like, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. boys. But continence is not about such like things, as vii, 4), seem to be objects of choice in themselves in- stated in Ethic. vii, 5. Therefore desires for pleasures deed, but not as being necessary for the maintenance of of touch are not the proper matter of continence. nature. Wherefore in reference to such things we speak On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, of a person as being continent or incontinent, not simply, 4) that “continence and incontinence are about the same but relatively, by adding that they are continent or incon- things as temperance and intemperance.” Now temper- tinent in regard to wealth, or honor and so forth. Hence ance and intemperance are about the desires for pleasures Tully either understood continence in a general sense, as of touch, as stated above (q. 141, a. 4). Therefore conti- including relative continence, or understood cupidity in a nence and incontinence are also about that same matter. restricted sense as denoting desire for pleasures of touch. I answer that, Continence denotes, by its very name, Reply to Objection 4. Venereal pleasures are more a certain curbing, in so far as a man contains himself from vehement than pleasures of the palate: wherefore we are following his passions. Hence continence is properly said wont to speak of continence and incontinence in reference in reference to those passions which urge a man towards to venereal matters rather than in reference to food; al- the pursuit of something, wherein it is praiseworthy that though according to the Philosopher they are applicable reason should withhold man from pursuing: whereas it is to both. not properly about those passions, such as fear and the Reply to Objection 5. Continence is a good of the like, which denote some kind of withdrawal: since in human reason: wherefore it regards those passions which these it is praiseworthy to remain firm in pursuing what can be connatural to man. Hence the Philosopher says reason dictates, as stated above (q. 123, Aa. 3,4). Now it (Ethic. vii, 5) that “if a man were to lay hold of a child ∗ “Continentem” according to St. Thomas’ reading; St. Ambrose wrote “concinentem = harmonious” † De Ira i, 1 1886 with desire of eating him or of satisfying an unnatural pas-be continent‡, not absolutely, but relatively.” sion whether he follow up his desire or not, he is said to Whether the subject of continence is the concupiscible power? IIa IIae q. 155 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the subject of con- who is continent and in one who is incontinent, since tinence is the concupiscible power. For the subject of a in both of them it breaks out into vehement evil desires. virtue should be proportionate to the virtue’s matter. Now Wherefore it is manifest that continence is not in the con- the matter of continence, as stated (a. 2), is desires for cupiscible as its subject. Again the reason has the same the pleasures of touch, which pertain to the concupisci- disposition in both, since both the continent and the incon- ble power. Therefore continence is in the concupiscible tinent have right reason, and each of them, while undis- power. turbed by passion, purposes not to follow his unlawful Objection 2. Further, “Opposites are referred to one desires. Now the primary difference between them is same thing”∗. But incontinence is in the concupiscible, to be found in their choice: since the continent man, whose passions overcome reason, for Andronicus says† though subject to vehement desires, chooses not to fol- that “incontinence is the evil inclination of the concupis- low them, because of his reason; whereas the incontinent cible, by following which it chooses wicked pleasures in man chooses to follow them, although his reason forbids. disobedience to reason.” Therefore continence is likewise Hence continence must needs reside in that power of the in the concupiscible. soul, whose act it is to choose; and that is the will, as Objection 3. Further, the subject of a human virtue stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 13, a. 1). is either the reason, or the appetitive power, which is di- Reply to Objection 1. Continence has for its matter vided into the will, the concupiscible and the irascible. the desires for pleasures of touch, not as moderating them Now continence is not in the reason, for then it would (this belongs to temperance which is in the concupisci- be an intellectual virtue; nor is it in the will, since conti- ble), but its business with them is to resist them. For this nence is about the passions which are not in the will; nor reason it must be in another power, since resistance is of again is it in the irascible, because it is not properly about one thing against another. the passions of the irascible, as stated above (a. 2, ad 2). Reply to Objection 2. The will stands between reason Therefore it follows that it is in the concupiscible. and the concupiscible, and may be moved by either. In the On the contrary, Every virtue residing in a certain continent man it is moved by the reason, in the incontinent power removes the evil act of that power. But conti- man it is moved by the concupiscible. Hence continence nence does not remove the evil act of the concupiscible: may be ascribed to the reason as to its first mover, and since “the continent man has evil desires,” according to incontinence to the concupiscible power: though both be- the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9). Therefore continence is long immediately to the will as their proper subject. not in the concupiscible power. Reply to Objection 3. Although the passions are not I answer that, Every virtue while residing in a sub- in the will as their subject, yet it is in the power of the will ject, makes that subject have a different disposition from to resist them: thus it is that the will of the continent man that which it has while subjected to the opposite vice. resists desires. Now the concupiscible has the same disposition in one Whether continence is better than temperance? IIa IIae q. 155 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that continence is better things are not vehement. Therefore continence is a greater than temperance. For it is written (Ecclus. 26:20): “No virtue than temperance. price is worthy of a continent soul.” Therefore no virtue Objection 3. Further, the will is a more excellent can be equalled to continence. power than the concupiscible. But continence is in the Objection 2. Further, the greater the reward a virtue will, whereas temperance is in the concupiscible, as stated merits, the greater the virtue. Now continence apparently above (a. 3). Therefore continence is a greater virtue than merits the greater reward; for it is written (2 Tim. 2:5): temperance. “He. . . is not crowned, except he strive lawfully,” and the On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) and continent man, since he is subject to vehement evil de- Andronicus‡ reckon continence to be annexed to temper- sires, strives more than the temperate man, in whom these ance, as to a principal virtue. ‡ See a. 4 ∗ Categ. viii † De Affectibus ‡ De Affectibus 1887 I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), continence has abstinence from things unlawful: and thus it means that a twofold signification. In one way it denotes cessation “no price is worthy of a continent soul,” because its value from all venereal pleasures; and if continence be taken in is not measured with gold or silver, which are appreciable this sense, it is greater than temperance considered ab- according to weight. solutely, as may be gathered from what we said above Reply to Objection 2. The strength or weakness of (q. 152, a. 5) concerning the preeminence of virginity over concupiscence may proceed from two causes. For some- chastity considered absolutely. In another way continence times it is owing to a bodily cause: because some peo- may be taken as denoting the resistance of the reason to ple by their natural temperament are more prone to con- evil desires when they are vehement in a man: and in this cupiscence than others; and again opportunities for plea- sense temperance is far greater than continence, because sure which inflame the concupiscence are nearer to hand the good of a virtue derives its praise from that which is for some people than for others. Such like weakness of in accord with reason. Now the good of reason flourishes concupiscence diminishes merit, whereas strength of con- more in the temperate man than in the continent man, be- cupiscence increases it. on the other hand, weakness or cause in the former even the sensitive appetite is obedient strength of concupiscence arises from a praiseworthy spir- to reason, being tamed by reason so to speak, whereas in itual cause, for instance the vehemence of charity, or the the continent man the sensitive appetite strongly resists strength of reason, as in the case of a temperate man. reason by its evil desires. Hence continence is compared In this way weakness of concupiscence, by reason of its to temperance, as the imperfect to the perfect. cause, increases merit, whereas strength of concupiscence Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted may be diminishes it. understood in two ways. First in reference to the sense Reply to Objection 3. The will is more akin to the in which continence denotes abstinence from all things reason than the concupiscible power is. Wherefore the venereal: and thus it means that “no price is worthy of a good of reason—on account of which virtue is praised by continent soul,” in the genus of chastity the fruitfulness the very fact that it reaches not only to the will but also of the flesh is the purpose of marriage is equalled to the to the concupiscible power, as happens in the temperate continence of virginity or of widowhood, as stated above man—is shown to be greater than if it reach only to the (q. 152, Aa. 4,5). Secondly it may be understood in refer- will, as in the case of one who is continent. ence to the general sense in which continence denotes any 1888 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 156 Of Incontinence (In Four Articles) We must now consider incontinence: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body? (2) Whether incontinence is a sin? (3) The comparison between incontinence and intemperance; (4) Which is the worse, incontinence in anger, or incontinence in desire? Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body? IIa IIae q. 156 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that incontinence pertains such people do not retain the judgment of reason, which not to the soul but to the body. For sexual diversity comes the continent man follows and the incontinent forsakes. not from the soul but from the body. Now sexual diversity From this it follows that the direct cause of incontinence causes diversity of incontinence: for the Philosopher says is on the part of the soul, which fails to resist a passion (Ethic. vii, 5) that women are not described either as con- by the reason. This happens in two ways, according to the tinent or as incontinent. Therefore incontinence pertains Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7): first, when the soul yields to not to the soul but to the body. the passions, before the reason has given its counsel; and Objection 2. Further, that which pertains to the soul this is called “unbridled incontinence” or “impetuosity”: does not result from the temperament of the body. But in- secondly, when a man does not stand to what has been continence results from the bodily temperament: for the counselled, through holding weakly to reason’s judgment; Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that “it is especially peo- wherefore this kind of incontinence is called “weakness.” ple of a quick or choleric and atrabilious temper whose Hence it is manifest that incontinence pertains chiefly to incontinence is one of unbridled desire.” Therefore in- the soul. continence regards the body. Reply to Objection 1. The human soul is the form Objection 3. Further, victory concerns the victor of the body, and has certain powers which make use of rather than the vanquished. Now a man is said to be incon- bodily organs. The operations of these organs conduce tinent, because “the flesh lusteth against the spirit,” and somewhat to those operations of the soul which are ac- overcomes it. Therefore incontinence pertains to the flesh complished without bodily instruments, namely to the acts rather than to the soul. of the intellect and of the will, in so far as the intellect On the contrary, Man differs from beast chiefly as receives from the senses, and the will is urged by pas- regards the soul. Now they differ in respect of conti- sions of the sensitive appetite. Accordingly, since woman, nence and incontinence, for we ascribe neither continence as regards the body, has a weak temperament, the re- nor incontinence to the beasts, as the Philosopher states sult is that for the most part, whatever she holds to, she (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore incontinence is chiefly on the holds to it weakly; although in /rare cases the opposite oc- part of the soul. curs, according to Prov. 31:10, “Who shall find a valiant I answer that, Things are ascribed to their direct woman?” And since small and weak things “are ac- causes rather than to those which merely occasion them. counted as though they were not”∗ the Philosopher speaks Now that which is on the part of the body is merely an of women as though they had not the firm judgment of occasional cause of incontinence; since it is owing to a reason, although the contrary happens in some women. bodily disposition that vehement passions can arise in the Hence he states that “we do not describe women as being sensitive appetite which is a power of the organic body. continent, because they are vacillating” through being un- Yet these passions, however vehement they be, are not the stable of reason, and “are easily led” so that they follow sufficient cause of incontinence, but are merely the occa- their passions readily. sion thereof, since, so long as the use of reason remains, Reply to Objection 2. It is owing to the impulse of man is always able to resist his passions. If, however, the passion that a man at once follows his passion before his passions gain such strength as to take away the use of rea- reason counsels him. Now the impulse of passion may son altogether—as in the case of those who become insane arise either from its quickness, as in bilious persons†, or through the vehemence of their passions—the essential from its vehemence, as in the melancholic, who on ac- conditions of continence or incontinence cease, because count of their earthy temperament are most vehemently ∗ Aristotle, Phys. ii, 5 † Cf. Ia IIae, q. 46, a. 5 1889 aroused. Even so, on the other hand, a man fails to stand to the bodily temperament is an occasional but not a suffi-that which is counselled, because he holds to it in weakly cient cause of incontinence, as stated above. fashion by reason of the softness of his temperament, as Reply to Objection 3. In the incontinent man concu- we have stated with regard to woman (ad 1). This is also piscence of the flesh overcomes the spirit, not necessarily, the case with phlegmatic temperaments, for the same rea- but through a certain negligence of the spirit in not resist- son as in women. And these results are due to the fact that ing strongly. Whether incontinence is a sin? IIa IIae q. 156 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that incontinence is not reason—but not simply; for instance when a man does a sin. For as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): “No not observe the mode of reason in his desire for honor, man sins in what he cannot avoid.” Now no man can by riches, and so forth, which seem to be good in themselves. himself avoid incontinence, according to Wis. 8:21, “I About such things there is incontinence, not simply but know [Vulg.: ‘knew’] that I could not. . . be continent, ex- relatively, even as we have said above in reference to con- cept God gave it.” Therefore incontinence is not a sin. tinence (q. 155, a. 2, ad 3). In this way incontinence is a Objection 2. Further, apparently every sin originates sin, not from the fact that one gives way to wicked desires, in the reason. But the judgment of reason is overcome in but because one fails to observe the mode of reason even the incontinent man. Therefore incontinence is not a sin. in the desire for things that are of themselves desirable. Objection 3. Further, no one sins in loving God ve- Thirdly, incontinence is said to be about a matter, not hemently. Now a man becomes incontinent through the properly, but metaphorically. for instance about the de- vehemence of divine love: for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. sires for things of which one cannot make an evil use, iv) that “Paul, through incontinence of divine love, ex- such as the desire for virtue. A man may be said to be claimed: I live, now not I” (Gal. 2:20). Therefore incon- incontinent in these matters metaphorically, because just tinence is not a sin. as the incontinent man is entirely led by his evil desire, On the contrary, It is numbered together with other even so is a man entirely led by his good desire which is sins (2 Tim. 3:3) where it is written: “Slanderers, inconti- in accord with reason. Such like incontinence is no sin, nent, unmerciful,” etc. Therefore incontinence is a sin. but pertains to the perfection of virtue. I answer that, Incontinence about a matter may be Reply to Objection 1. Man can avoid sin and do considered in two ways. First it may be considered prop- good, yet not without God’s help, according to Jn. 15:5: erly and simply: and thus incontinence is about concu- “Without Me you can do nothing.” Wherefore the fact that piscences of pleasures of touch, even as intemperance man needs God’s help in order to be continent, does not is, as we have said in reference to continence (q. 155, show incontinence to be no sin, for, as stated in Ethic. iii, a. 2 ). In this way incontinence is a sin for two rea- 3, “what we can do by means of a friend we do, in a way, sons: first, because the incontinent man goes astray from ourselves.” that which is in accord with reason; secondly, because Reply to Objection 2. The judgment of reason is he plunges into shameful pleasures. Hence the Philoso- overcome in the incontinent man, not necessarily, for then pher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that “incontinence is censurable he would commit no sin, but through a certain negligence not only because it is wrong”—that is, by straying from on account of his not standing firm in resisting the passion reason—“but also because it is wicked”—that is, by fol- by holding to the judgment formed by his reason. lowing evil desires. Secondly, incontinence about a matter Reply to Objection 3. This argument takes inconti- is considered, properly—inasmuch as it is a straying from nence metaphorically and not properly. Whether the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate? IIa IIae q. 156 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the incontinent man tinent man, though knowing how wicked are the things he sins more gravely than the intemperate. For, seemingly, desires, nevertheless acts through passion, whereas the in- the more a man acts against his conscience, the more temperate man judges what he desires to be good. There- gravely he sins, according to Lk. 12:47, “That servant fore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the in- who knew the will of his lord. . . and did not. . . shall be temperate. beaten with many stripes.” Now the incontinent man Objection 2. Further, apparently, the graver a sin is, would seem to act against his conscience more than the the more incurable it is: wherefore the sins against the intemperate because, according to Ethic. vii, 3, the incon- Holy Ghost, being most grave, are declared to be unpar- 1890 donable. Now the sin of incontinence would appear to be inclined to something, either by passion, as in the incon-more incurable than the sin of intemperance. For a per- tinent, or by habit, as in the intemperate. Nevertheless son’s sin is cured by admonishment and correction, which greater ignorance results thus in the intemperate than in seemingly are no good to the incontinent man, since he the incontinent. In one respect as regards duration, since knows he is doing wrong, and does wrong notwithstand- in the incontinent man this ignorance lasts only while the ing: whereas it seems to the intemperate man that he is passion endures, just as an attack of intermittent fever lasts doing well, so that it were good for him to be admon- as long as the humor is disturbed: whereas the ignorance ished. Therefore it would appear that the incontinent man of the intemperate man endures without ceasing, on ac- sins more gravely than the intemperate. count of the endurance of the habit, wherefore it is likened Objection 3. Further, the more eagerly man sins, the to phthisis or any chronic disease, as the Philosopher says more grievous his sin. Now the incontinent sins more (Ethic. vii, 8). In another respect the ignorance of the in- eagerly than the intemperate, since the incontinent man temperate man is greater as regards the thing ignored. For has vehement passions and desires, which the intemper- the ignorance of the incontinent man regards some partic- ate man does not always have. Therefore the incontinent ular detail of choice (in so far as he deems that he must man sins more gravely than the intemperate. choose this particular thing now): whereas the intemper- On the contrary, Impenitence aggravates every sin: ate man’s ignorance is about the end itself, inasmuch as wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. serm. xi, he judges this thing good, in order that he may follow his 12,13) that “impenitence is a sin against the Holy Ghost.” desires without being curbed. Hence the Philosopher says Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) “the in- (Ethic. vii, 7,8) that “the incontinent man is better than temperate man is not inclined to be penitent, for he holds the intemperate, because he retains the best principle‡,” to on to his choice: but every incontinent man is inclined wit, the right estimate of the end. to repentance.” Therefore the intemperate man sins more Reply to Objection 2. Mere knowledge does not suf- gravely than the incontinent. fice to cure the incontinent man, for he needs the inward I answer that, According to Augustine∗ sin is chiefly assistance of grace which quenches concupiscence, be- an act of the will, because “by the will we sin and live sides the application of the external remedy of admonish- aright”†. Consequently where there is a greater inclina- ment and correction, which induce him to begin to resist tion of the will to sin, there is a graver sin. Now in his desires, so that concupiscence is weakened, as stated the intemperate man, the will is inclined to sin in virtue above (q. 142, a. 2 ). By these same means the intem- of its own choice, which proceeds from a habit acquired perate man can be cured. But his curing is more difficult, through custom: whereas in the incontinent man, the will for two reasons. The first is on the part of reason, which is is inclined to sin through a passion. And since passion corrupt as regards the estimate of the last end, which holds soon passes, whereas a habit is “a disposition difficult to the same position as the principle in demonstrations. Now remove,” the result is that the incontinent man repents at it is more difficult to bring back to the truth one who errs once, as soon as the passion has passed; but not so the as to the principle; and it is the same in practical matters intemperate man; in fact he rejoices in having sinned, be- with one who errs in regard to the end. The other rea- cause the sinful act has become connatural to him by rea- son is on the part of the inclination of the appetite: for in son of his habit. Wherefore in reference to such persons it the intemperate man this proceeds from a habit, which is is written (Prov. 2:14) that “they are glad when they have difficult to remove, whereas the inclination of the incon- done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things.” Hence it tinent man proceeds from a passion, which is more easily follows that “the intemperate man is much worse than the suppressed. incontinent,” as also the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, Reply to Objection 3. The eagerness of the will, 7). which increases a sin, is greater in the intemperate man Reply to Objection 1. Ignorance in the intellect than in the incontinent, as explained above. But the ea- sometimes precedes the inclination of the appetite and gerness of concupiscence in the sensitive appetite is some- causes it, and then the greater the ignorance, the more times greater in the incontinent man, because he does not does it diminish or entirely excuse the sin, in so far as it sin except through vehement concupiscence, whereas the renders it involuntary. On the other hand, ignorance in the intemperate man sins even through slight concupiscence reason sometimes follows the inclination of the appetite, and sometimes forestalls it. Hence the Philosopher says and then such like ignorance, the greater it is, the graver (Ethic. vii, 7) that we blame more the intemperate man, the sin, because the inclination of the appetite is shown “because he pursues pleasure without desiring it or with thereby to be greater. Now in both the incontinent and the calm,” i.e. slight desire. “For what would he have done if intemperate man, ignorance arises from the appetite being he had desired it with passion?” ∗ De Duab. Anim. x, xi † Retract. i, 9 ‡ To beltiston, e arche, ‘the best thing, i.e. the principle’ 1891 Whether the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire? IIa IIae q. 156 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the incontinent in reason dictates this in a certain degree. Yet he does not anger is worse than the incontinent in desire. For the more tend thereto perfectly, because he does not intend the due difficult it is to resist the passion, the less grievous, ap- mode of vengeance. on the other hand, the movement of parently is incontinence: wherefore the Philosopher says desire is altogether in accord with sense and nowise in (Ethic. vii, 7): “It is not wonderful, indeed it is pardon- accord with reason. Secondly, because the movement of able if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming anger results more from the bodily temperament owing to pleasures or pains.” Now, “as Heraclitus says, it is more the quickness of the movement of the bile which tends to difficult to resist desire than anger”∗. Therefore inconti- anger. Hence one who by bodily temperament is disposed nence of desire is less grievous than incontinence of anger. to anger is more readily angry than one who is disposed Objection 2. Further, one is altogether excused from to concupiscence is liable to be concupiscent: wherefore sin if the passion be so vehement as to deprive one of the also it happens more often that the children of those who judgment of reason, as in the case of one who becomes are disposed to anger are themselves disposed to anger, demented through passion. Now he that is incontinent in than that the children of those who are disposed to con- anger retains more of the judgment of reason, than one cupiscence are also disposed to concupiscence. Now that who is incontinent in desire: since “anger listens to reason which results from the natural disposition of the body is somewhat, but desire does not” as the Philosopher states deemed more deserving of pardon. Thirdly, because anger (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore the incontinent in anger is worse seeks to work openly, whereas concupiscence is fain to than the incontinent in desire. disguise itself and creeps in by stealth. Fourthly, because Objection 3. Further, the more dangerous a sin the he who is subject to concupiscence works with pleasure, more grievous it is. Now incontinence of anger would whereas the angry man works as though forced by a cer- seem to be more dangerous, since it leads a man to a tain previous displeasure. greater sin, namely murder, for this is a more grievous Secondly, the sin of incontinence may be considered sin than adultery, to which incontinence of desire leads. with regard to the evil into which one falls through for- Therefore incontinence of anger is graver than inconti- saking reason; and thus incontinence of anger is, for the nence of desire. most part, more grievous, because it leads to things that On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) are harmful to one’s neighbor. that “incontinence of anger is less disgraceful than incon- Reply to Objection 1. It is more difficult to resist tinence of desire.” pleasure perseveringly than anger, because concupiscence I answer that, The sin of incontinence may be consid- is enduring. But for the moment it is more difficult to re- ered in two ways. First, on the part of the passion which sist anger, on account of its impetuousness. occasions the downfall of reason. In this way incontinence Reply to Objection 2. Concupiscence is stated to be of desire is worse than incontinence of anger, because the without reason, not as though it destroyed altogether the movement of desire is more inordinate than the movement judgment of reason, but because nowise does it follow the of anger. There are four reasons for this, and the Philoso- judgment of reason: and for this reason it is more dis- pher indicates them, Ethic. vii, 6: First, because the graceful. movement of anger partakes somewhat of reason, since Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers in- the angry man tends to avenge the injury done to him, and continence with regard to its result. ∗ Ethic. ii. 3 1892 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 157 Of Clemency and Meekness (In Four Articles) We must next consider clemency and meekness, and the contrary vices. Concerning the virtues themselves there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether clemency and meekness are altogether identical? (2) Whether each of them is a virtue? (3) Whether each is a part of temperance? (4) Of their comparison with the other virtues. Whether clemency and meekness are absolutely the same? IIa IIae q. 157 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that clemency and meek- because through the passion of anger a man is provoked to ness are absolutely the same. For meekness moderates inflict a too severe punishment, while it belongs directly to anger, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5). Now clemency to mitigate punishment, and this might be pre- anger is “desire of vengeance”∗. Since, then, clemency “is vented by excessive anger. leniency of a superior in inflicting punishment on an infe- Consequently meekness, in so far as it restrains the rior,” as Seneca states (De Clementia ii, 3), and vengeance onslaught of anger, concurs with clemency towards the is taken by means of punishment, it would seem that same effect; yet they differ from one another, inasmuch clemency and meekness are the same. as clemency moderates external punishment, while meek- Objection 2. Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ness properly mitigates the passion of anger. ii, 54) that “clemency is a virtue whereby the mind is re- Reply to Objection 1. Meekness regards properly the strained by kindness when unreasonably provoked to ha- desire itself of vengeance; whereas clemency regards the tred of a person,” so that apparently clemency moderates punishment itself which is applied externally for the pur- hatred. Now, according to Augustine†, hatred is caused by pose of vengeance. anger; and this is the matter of meekness and clemency. Reply to Objection 2. Man’s affections incline to the Therefore seemingly clemency and meekness are abso- moderation of things that are unpleasant to him in them- lutely the same. selves. Now it results from one man loving another that he Objection 3. Further, the same vice is not opposed to takes no pleasure in the latter’s punishment in itself, but different virtues. But the same vice, namely cruelty, is op- only as directed to something else, for instance justice, or posed to meekness and clemency. Therefore it seems that the correction of the person punished. Hence love makes meekness and clemency are absolutely the same. one quick to mitigate punishment —and this pertains to On the contrary, According to the aforesaid defini- clemency—while hatred is an obstacle to such mitiga- tion of Seneca (obj. 1 ) “clemency is leniency of a supe- tion. For this reason Tully says that “the mind provoked rior towards an inferior”: whereas meekness is not merely to hatred” that is to punish too severely, “is restrained by of superior to inferior, but of each to everyone. Therefore clemency,” from inflicting too severe a punishment, so meekness and clemency are not absolutely the same. that clemency directly moderates not hatred but punish- I answer that, As stated in Ethic. ii, 3, a moral virtue ment. is “about passions and actions.” Now internal passions are Reply to Objection 3. The vice of anger, which de- principles of external actions, and are likewise obstacles notes excess in the passion of anger, is properly opposed thereto. Wherefore virtues that moderate passions, to a to meekness, which is directly concerned with the pas- certain extent, concur towards the same effect as virtues sion of anger; while cruelty denotes excess in punishing. that moderate actions, although they differ specifically. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that “those Thus it belongs properly to justice to restrain man from are called cruel who have reason for punishing, but lack theft, whereunto he is inclined by immoderate love or de- moderation in punishing.” Those who delight in a man’s sire of money, which is restrained by liberality; so that punishment for its own sake may be called savage or bru- liberality concurs with justice towards the effect, which tal, as though lacking the human feeling that leads one is abstention from theft. This applies to the case in point; man to love another. ∗ Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 2 † Ep. ccxi 1893 Whether both clemency and meekness are virtues? IIa IIae q. 157 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that neither clemency nor ing, as stated above (a. 1). Yet they are not really opposed meekness is a virtue. For no virtue is opposed to another to one another, since they are both according to right rea- virtue. Yet both of these are apparently opposed to sever- son. For severity is inflexible in the infliction of punish- ity, which is a virtue. Therefore neither clemency nor ment when right reason requires it; while clemency miti- meekness is a virtue. gates punishment also according to right reason, when and Objection 2. Further, “Virtue is destroyed by ex- where this is requisite. Wherefore they are not opposed to cess and defect”∗. But both clemency and meekness con- one another as they are not about the same thing. sist in a certain decrease; for clemency decreases punish- Reply to Objection 2. According to the Philosopher ment, and meekness decreases anger. Therefore neither (Ethic. iv, 5), “the habit that observes the mean in anger clemency nor meekness is a virtue. is unnamed; so that the virtue is denominated from the Objection 3. Further, meekness or mildness is in- diminution of anger, and is designated by the name of cluded (Mat. 5:4) among the beatitudes, and (Gal. 5:23) meekness.” For the virtue is more akin to diminution among the fruits. Now the virtues differ from the beati- than to excess, because it is more natural to man to desire tudes and fruits. Therefore they are not comprised under vengeance for injuries done to him, than to be lacking in virtue. that desire, since “scarcely anyone belittles an injury done On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 5): to himself,” as Sallust observes†. As to clemency, it miti- “Every good man is conspicuous for his clemency and gates punishment, not in respect of that which is according meekness.” Now it is virtue properly that belongs to a to right reason, but as regards that which is according to good man, since “virtue it is that makes its possessor common law, which is the object of legal justice: yet on good, and renders his works good also” (Ethic. ii, 6). account of some particular consideration, it mitigates the Therefore clemency and meekness are virtues. punishment, deciding, as it were, that a man is not to be I answer that, The nature of moral virtue consists in punished any further. Hence Seneca says (De Clementia the subjection of appetite to reason, as the Philosopher de- ii, 1): “Clemency grants this, in the first place, that those clares (Ethic. i, 13). Now this is verified both in clemency whom she sets free are declared immune from all further and in meekness. For clemency, in mitigating punishment, punishment; and remission of punishment due amounts to “is guided by reason,” according to Seneca (De Clementia a pardon.” Wherefore it is clear that clemency is related to ii, 5), and meekness, likewise, moderates anger according severity as equity [the Greek ‘epieikeia’‡] to legal justice, to right reason, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. Wherefore it is whereof severity is a part, as regards the infliction of pun- manifest that both clemency and meekness are virtues. ishment in accordance with the law. Yet clemency differs Reply to Objection 1. Meekness is not directly op- from equity, as we shall state further on (a. 3, ad 1). posed to severity; for meekness is about anger. On the Reply to Objection 3. The beatitudes are acts of other hand, severity regards the external infliction of pun- virtue: while the fruits are delights in virtuous acts. ishment, so that accordingly it would seem rather to be Wherefore nothing hinders meekness being reckoned both opposed to clemency, which also regards external punish- virtue, and beatitude and fruit. Whether the aforesaid virtues are parts of temperance? IIa IIae q. 157 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the aforesaid virtues clemency and meekness. Since then an unsound mind is are not parts of temperance. For clemency mitigates pun- opposed to prudence, it seems that clemency and meek- ishment, as stated above (a. 2). But the Philosopher ness are parts of prudence rather than of temperance. (Ethic. v, 10) ascribes this to equity, which pertains to jus- On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) tice, as stated above (q. 120, a. 2). Therefore seemingly that “clemency is temperance of the soul in exercising the clemency is not a part of temperance. power of taking revenge.” Tully also (De Invent. Rhet. ii, Objection 2. Further, temperance is concerned with 54) reckons clemency a part of temperance. concupiscences; whereas meekness and clemency regard, I answer that, Parts are assigned to the principal not concupiscences, but anger and vengeance. Therefore virtues, in so far as they imitate them in some sec- they should not be reckoned parts of temperance. ondary matter as to the mode whence the virtue derives Objection 3. Further, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, its praise and likewise its name. Thus the mode and 4): “A man may be said to be of unsound mind when name of justice consist in a certain “equality,” those of he takes pleasure in cruelty.” Now this is opposed to fortitude in a certain “strength of mind,” those of tem- ∗ Ethic. ii, 2 † Cf. q. 120 ‡ Cf. q. 120 1894 perance in a certain “restraint,” inasmuch as it restrains ness of soul in one who fears not to pain others. the most vehement concupiscences of the pleasures of Reply to Objection 2. The annexation of secondary touch. Now clemency and meekness likewise consist in to principal virtues depends on the mode of virtue, which a certain restraint, since clemency mitigates punishment, is, so to speak, a kind of form of the virtue, rather than while meekness represses anger, as stated above (Aa. 1,2). on the matter. Now meekness and clemency agree with Therefore both clemency and meekness are annexed to temperance in mode, as stated above, though they agree temperance as principal virtue, and accordingly are reck- not in matter. oned to be parts thereof. Reply to Objection 3. “Unsoundness” is corruption Reply to Objection 1. Two points must be considered of “soundness.” Now just as soundness of body is cor- in the mitigation of punishment. one is that punishment rupted by the body lapsing from the condition due to the should be mitigated in accordance with the lawgiver’s in- human species, so unsoundness of mind is due to the mind tention, although not according to the letter of the law; and lapsing from the disposition due to the human species. in this respect it pertains to equity. The other point is a cerThis occurs both in respect of the reason, as when a man tain moderation of a man’s inward disposition, so that he loses the use of reason, and in respect of the appetitive does not exercise his power of inflicting punishment. This power, as when a man loses that humane feeling whereby belongs properly to clemency, wherefore Seneca says (De “every man is naturally friendly towards all other men” Clementia ii, 3) that “it is temperance of the soul in ex- (Ethic. viii, 1). The unsoundness of mind that excludes ercising the power of taking revenge.” This moderation the use of reason is opposed to prudence. But that a man of soul comes from a certain sweetness of disposition, who takes pleasure in the punishment of others is said to whereby a man recoils from anything that may be painful be of unsound mind, is because he seems on this account to another. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) to be devoid of the humane feeling which gives rise to that “clemency is a certain smoothness of the soul”; for, clemency. on the other hand, there would seem to be a certain rough- Whether clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues? IIa IIae q. 157 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that clemency and meek- Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Serm. ness are the greatest virtues. For virtue is deserving of Dom. in Monte i, 2) that “the meek are they who yield praise chiefly because it directs man to happiness that to reproaches, and resist not evil, but overcome evil by consists in the knowledge of God. Now meekness above good.” Now this seems to pertain to mercy or piety which all directs man to the knowledge of God: for it is writ- would seem to be the greatest of virtues: because a gloss ten (James 1:21): “With meekness receive the ingrafted of Ambrose† on 1 Tim. 4:8, “Piety [Douay: ‘Godliness’] word,” and (Ecclus. 5:13): “Be meek to hear the word” is profitable to all things,” observes that “piety is the sum of God. Again, Dionysius says (Ep. viii ad Demophil.) total of the Christian religion.” Therefore meekness and that “Moses was deemed worthy of the Divine apparition clemency are the greatest virtues. on account of his great meekness.” Therefore meekness is On the contrary, They are not reckoned as princi- the greatest of virtues. pal virtues, but are annexed to another, as to a principal, Objection 2. Further, seemingly a virtue is all the virtue. greater according as it is more acceptable to God and men. I answer that, Nothing prevents certain virtues from Now meekness would appear to be most acceptable to being greatest, not indeed simply, nor in every respect, God. For it is written (Ecclus. 1:34,35): “That which but in a particular genus. It is impossible for clemency or is agreeable” to God is “faith and meekness”; wherefore meekness to be absolutely the greatest virtues, since they Christ expressly invites us to be meek like unto Himself owe their praise to the fact that they withdraw a man from (Mat. 11:29), where He says: “Learn of Me, because I evil, by mitigating anger or punishment. Now it is more am meek and humble of heart”; and Hilary declares∗ that perfect to obtain good than to lack evil. Wherefore those “Christ dwells in us by our meekness of soul.” Again, it virtues like faith, hope, charity, and likewise prudence and is most acceptable to men; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. justice, which direct one to good simply, are absolutely 3:19): “My son, do thy works in meekness, and thou shalt greater virtues than clemency and meekness. be beloved above the glory of men”: for which reason Yet nothing prevents clemency and meekness from it is also declared (Prov. 20:28) that the King’s “throne having a certain restricted excellence among the virtues is strengthened by clemency.” Therefore meekness and which resist evil inclinations. For anger, which is mit- clemency are the greatest of virtues. igated by meekness, is, on account of its impetuous- ∗ Comment. in Matth. iv, 3 † Hilary the deacon 1895 ness, a very great obstacle to man’s free judgment of it not, as though we might know better and have a clearer truth: wherefore meekness above all makes a man self- insight of the truth.” possessed. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 10:31): “My son, Reply to Objection 2. Meekness and clemency make keep thy soul in meekness.” Yet the concupiscences of the us acceptable to God and men, in so far as they concur pleasures of touch are more shameful, and harass more with charity, the greatest of the virtues, towards the same incessantly, for which reason temperance is more rightly effect, namely the mitigation of our neighbor’s evils. reckoned as a principal virtue. as stated above (q. 141, Reply to Objection 3. Mercy and piety agree indeed a. 7, ad 2). As to clemency, inasmuch as it mitigates pun- with meekness and clemency by concurring towards the ishment, it would seem to approach nearest to charity, the same effect, namely the mitigation of our neighbor’s evils. greatest of the virtues, since thereby we do good towards Nevertheless they differ as to motive. For piety relieves a our neighbor, and hinder his evil. neighbor’s evil through reverence for a superior, for in- Reply to Objection 1. Meekness disposes man to the stance God or one’s parents: mercy relieves a neighbor’s knowledge of God, by removing an obstacle; and this in evil, because this evil is displeasing to one, in so far as two ways. First, because it makes man self-possessed by one looks upon it as affecting oneself, as stated above mitigating his anger, as stated above; secondly, because (q. 30, a. 2): and this results from friendship which makes it pertains to meekness that a man does not contradict the friends rejoice and grieve for the same things: meekness words of truth, which many do through being disturbed by does this, by removing anger that urges to vengeance, and anger. Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7): clemency does this through leniency of soul, in so far as “To be meek is not to contradict Holy Writ, whether we it judges equitable that a person be no further punished. understand it, if it condemn our evil ways, or understand 1896 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 158 Of Anger (In Eight Articles) We must next consider the contrary vices: (1) Anger that is opposed to meekness; (2) Cruelty that is opposed to clemency. Concerning anger there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is lawful to be angry? (2) Whether anger is a sin? (3) Whether it is a mortal sin? (4) Whether it is the most grievous of sins? (5) Of its species; (6) Whether anger is a capital vice? (7) Of its daughters; (8) Whether it has a contrary vice? Whether it is lawful to be angry? IIa IIae q. 158 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it cannot be lawful the sensitive appetite, and gives its name to the irascible to be angry. For Jerome in his exposition on Mat. 5:22, power, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 46, a. 1) when we were “Whosoever is angry with his brother,” etc. says: “Some treating of the passions. Now with regard to the passions codices add ‘without cause.’ However, in the genuine of the soul, it is to be observed that evil may be found in codices the sentence is unqualified, and anger is forbid- them in two ways. First by reason of the passion’s very den altogether.” Therefore it is nowise lawful to be angry. species, which is derived from the passion’s object. Thus Objection 2. Further, according to Dionysius (Div. envy, in respect of its species, denotes an evil, since it is Nom. iv) “The soul’s evil is to be without reason.” Now displeasure at another’s good, and such displeasure is in anger is always without reason: for the Philosopher says itself contrary to reason: wherefore, as the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6) that “anger does not listen perfectly to rea- remarks (Ethic. ii, 6), “the very mention of envy denotes son”; and Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that “when anger something evil.” Now this does not apply to anger, which sunders the tranquil surface of the soul, it mangles and is the desire for revenge, since revenge may be desired rends it by its riot”; and Cassian says (De Inst. Caenob. both well and ill. Secondly, evil is found in a passion in viii, 6): “From whatever cause it arises, the angry passion respect of the passion’s quantity, that is in respect of its boils over and blinds the eye of the mind.” Therefore it is excess or deficiency; and thus evil may be found in anger, always evil to be angry. when, to wit, one is angry, more or less than right rea- Objection 3. Further, anger is “desire for son demands. But if one is angry in accordance with right vengeance”∗ according to a gloss on Lev. 19:17, “Thou reason, one’s anger is deserving of praise. shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart.” Now it would Reply to Objection 1. The Stoics designated anger seem unlawful to desire vengeance, since this should be and all the other passions as emotions opposed to the or- left to God, according to Dt. 32:35, “Revenge is Mine.” der of reason; and accordingly they deemed anger and Therefore it would seem that to be angry is always an evil. all other passions to be evil, as stated above ( Ia IIae, Objection 4. Further, all that makes us depart from q. 24, a. 2 ) when we were treating of the passions. It likeness to God is evil. Now anger always makes us depart is in this sense that Jerome considers anger; for he speaks from likeness to God, since God judges with tranquillity of the anger whereby one is angry with one’s neighbor, according to Wis. 12:18. Therefore to be angry is always with the intent of doing him a wrong.—But, according to an evil. the Peripatetics, to whose opinion Augustine inclines (De On the contrary, Chrysostom† says: “He that is angry Civ. Dei ix, 4), anger and the other passions of the soul without cause, shall be in danger; but he that is angry with are movements of the sensitive appetite, whether they be cause, shall not be in danger: for without anger, teaching moderated or not, according to reason: and in this sense will be useless, judgments unstable, crimes unchecked.” anger is not always evil. Therefore to be angry is not always an evil. Reply to Objection 2. Anger may stand in a twofold I answer that, Properly speaking anger is a passion of relation to reason. First, antecedently; in this way it with- ∗ Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 2 † Hom. xi in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom 1897 draws reason from its rectitude, and has therefore the char-Reply to Objection 3. It is unlawful to desire acter of evil. Secondly, consequently, inasmuch as the vengeance considered as evil to the man who is to be pun- movement of the sensitive appetite is directed against vice ished, but it is praiseworthy to desire vengeance as a cor- and in accordance with reason, this anger is good, and is rective of vice and for the good of justice; and to this the called “zealous anger.” Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. sensitive appetite can tend, in so far as it is moved thereto v, 45): “We must beware lest, when we use anger as an by the reason: and when revenge is taken in accordance instrument of virtue, it overrule the mind, and go before with the order of judgment, it is God’s work, since he who it as its mistress, instead of following in reason’s train, has power to punish “is God’s minister,” as stated in Rom. ever ready, as its handmaid, to obey.” This latter anger, 13:4. although it hinder somewhat the judgment of reason in Reply to Objection 4. We can and ought to be like the execution of the act, does not destroy the rectitude of to God in the desire for good; but we cannot be alto- reason. Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that “zeal- gether likened to Him in the mode of our desire, since ous anger troubles the eye of reason, whereas sinful anger in God there is no sensitive appetite, as in us, the move- blinds it.” Nor is it incompatible with virtue that the delib- ment of which has to obey reason. Wherefore Gregory eration of reason be interrupted in the execution of what says (Moral. v, 45) that “anger is more firmly erect in reason has deliberated: since art also would be hindered in withstanding vice, when it bows to the command of rea- its act, if it were to deliberate about what has to be done, son.” while having to act. Whether anger is a sin? IIa IIae q. 158 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that anger is not a sin. der of reason, in regard to anger, may be considered in For we demerit by sinning. But “we do not demerit by the relation to two things. First, in relation to the appetible passions, even as neither do we incur blame thereby,” as object to which anger tends, and that is revenge. Where- stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Consequently no passion is a sin. fore if one desire revenge to be taken in accordance with Now anger is a passion as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 46, the order of reason, the desire of anger is praiseworthy, a. 1) in the treatise on the passions. Therefore anger is not and is called “zealous anger”¶. On the other hand, if one a sin. desire the taking of vengeance in any way whatever con- Objection 2. Further, in every sin there is conversion trary to the order of reason, for instance if he desire the to some mutable good. But in anger there is conversion punishment of one who has not deserved it, or beyond his not to a mutable good, but to a person’s evil. Therefore deserts, or again contrary to the order prescribed by law, anger is not a sin. or not for the due end, namely the maintaining of justice Objection 3. Further, “No man sins in what he can- and the correction of defaults, then the desire of anger will not avoid,” as Augustine asserts∗. But man cannot avoid be sinful, and this is called sinful anger. anger, for a gloss on Ps. 4:5, “Be ye angry and sin Secondly, the order of reason in regard to anger may not,” says: “The movement of anger is not in our power.” be considered in relation to the mode of being angry, Again, the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. vii, 6) that “the an- namely that the movement of anger should not be im- gry man acts with displeasure.” Now displeasure is con- moderately fierce, neither internally nor externally; and trary to the will. Therefore anger is not a sin. if this condition be disregarded, anger will not lack sin, Objection 4. Further, sin is contrary to nature, accord- even though just vengeance be desired. ing to Damascene†. But it is not contrary to man’s nature Reply to Objection 1. Since passion may be either to be angry, and it is the natural act of a power, namely regulated or not regulated by reason, it follows that a pas- the irascible; wherefore Jerome says in a letter‡ that “to sion considered absolutely does not include the notion of be angry is the property of man.” Therefore it is not a sin merit or demerit, of praise or blame. But as regulated by to be angry. reason, it may be something meritorious and deserving of On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:31): “Let praise; while on the other hand, as not regulated by reason, all indignation and anger§. . . be put away from you.” it may be demeritorious and blameworthy. Wherefore the I answer that, Anger, as stated above (a. 1), is prop- Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that “it is he who is angry erly the name of a passion. A passion of the sensitive ap- in a certain way, that is praised or blamed.” petite is good in so far as it is regulated by reason, whereas Reply to Objection 2. The angry man desires the evil it is evil if it set the order of reason aside. Now the or- of another, not for its own sake but for the sake of revenge, ∗ De Lib. Arb. iii, 18 † De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30 ‡ Ep. xii ad Anton. Monach. § Vulg.: ‘Anger and indignation’ ¶ Cf. Greg., Moral. v, 45 1898 towards which his appetite turns as to a mutable good. The statement of the Philosopher that “the angry man acts Reply to Objection 3. Man is master of his actions with displeasure,” means that he is displeased, not with through the judgment of his reason, wherefore as to the his being angry, but with the injury which he deems done movements that forestall that judgment, it is not in man’s to himself: and through this displeasure he is moved to power to prevent them as a whole, i.e. so that none of them seek vengeance. arise, although his reason is able to check each one, if it Reply to Objection 4. The irascible power in man is arise. Accordingly it is stated that the movement of anger naturally subject to his reason, wherefore its act is natural is not in man’s power, to the extent namely that no such to man, in so far as it is in accord with reason, and in so movement arise. Yet since this movement is somewhat far as it is against reason, it is contrary to man’s nature. in his power, it is not entirely sinless if it be inordinate. Whether all anger is a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 158 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that all anger is a mortal of vengeance, as when the movement of anger forestalls sin. For it is written (Job 5:2): “Anger killeth the fool- the judgment of his reason; or in relation to the desired ob- ish man∗,” and he speaks of the spiritual killing, whence ject, as when one desires to be avenged in a trifling matter, mortal sin takes its name. Therefore all anger is a mortal which should be deemed of no account, so that even if one sin. proceeded to action, it would not be a mortal sin, for in- Objection 2. Further, nothing save mortal sin is de- stance by pulling a child slightly by the hair, or by some serving of eternal condemnation. Now anger deserves other like action. Secondly, the movement of anger may eternal condemnation; for our Lord said (Mat. 5:22): be inordinate in the mode of being angry, for instance, if “Whosoever is angry with his brother shall be in danger of one be too fiercely angry inwardly, or if one exceed in the the judgment”: and a gloss on this passage says that “the outward signs of anger. In this way anger is not a mortal three things mentioned there, namely judgment, council, sin in the point of its genus; yet it may happen to be a mor- and hell-fire, signify in a pointed manner different abodes tal sin, for instance if through the fierceness of his anger a in the state of eternal damnation corresponding to various man fall away from the love of God and his neighbor. sins.” Therefore anger is a mortal sin. Reply to Objection 1. It does not follow from the Objection 3. Further, whatsoever is contrary to char- passage quoted that all anger is a mortal sin, but that the ity is a mortal sin. Now anger is of itself contrary to char- foolish are killed spiritually by anger, because, through ity, as Jerome declares in his commentary on Mat. 5:22, not checking the movement of anger by their reason, they “Whosoever is angry with his brother,” etc. where he says fall into mortal sins, for instance by blaspheming God or that this is contrary to the love of your neighbor. There- by doing injury to their neighbor. fore anger is a mortal sin. Reply to Objection 2. Our Lord said this of anger, On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 4:5, “Be ye angry by way of addition to the words of the Law: “Whosoever and sin not,” says: “Anger is venial if it does not proceed shall kill shall be in danger of the judgment” (Mat. 5:21). to action.” Consequently our Lord is speaking here of the movement I answer that, The movement of anger may be inor- of anger wherein a man desires the killing or any grave dinate and sinful in two ways, as stated above (a. 2). First, injury of his neighbor: and should the consent of reason on the part of the appetible object, as when one desires be given to this desire, without doubt it will be a mortal unjust revenge; and thus anger is a mortal sin in the point sin. of its genus, because it is contrary to charity and justice. Reply to Objection 3. In the case where anger is con- Nevertheless such like anger may happen to be a venial sin trary to charity, it is a mortal sin, but it is not always so, by reason of the imperfection of the act. This imperfec- as appears from what we have said. tion is considered either in relation to the subject desirous Whether anger is the most grievous sin? IIa IIae q. 158 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that anger is the most uglier than a ruthless‡ face, and most of all than a cruel grievous sin. For Chrysostom says† that “nothing is more soul.” . Therefore anger is the most grievous sin. repulsive than the look of an angry man, and nothing Objection 2. Further, the more hurtful a sin is, the ∗ Vulg.: ‘Anger indeed killeth the foolish’ † Hom. xlviii in Joan. ‡ ‘Severo’. The correct text is ‘Si vero.’ The translation would then run thus. . . ‘and nothing uglier.’ And if his ‘face is ugly, how much uglier is his soul!’ 1899 worse it would seem to be; since, according to Augus-of justice. On the part of the good, under the aspect of tine (Enchiridion xii), “a thing is said to be evil because which the angry man desires an evil, anger concurs with it hurts.” Now anger is most hurtful, because it deprives the sin of concupiscence that tends to a good. In this re- man of his reason, whereby he is master of himself; for spect again, absolutely speaking. the sin of anger is appar- Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii in Joan.) that “anger dif- ently less grievous than that of concupiscence, according fers in no way from madness; it is a demon while it lasts, as the good of justice, which the angry man desires, is bet- indeed more troublesome than one harassed by a demon.” ter than the pleasurable or useful good which is desired by Therefore anger is the most grievous sin. the subject of concupiscence. Wherefore the Philosopher Objection 3. Further, inward movements are judged says (Ethic. vii, 4) that “the incontinent in desire is more according to their outward effects. Now the effect of anger disgraceful than the incontinent in anger.” is murder, which is a most grievous sin. Therefore anger On the other hand, as to the inordinateness which is a most grievous sin. regards the mode of being angry, anger would seem to On the contrary, Anger is compared to hatred as the have a certain pre-eminence on account of the strength mote to the beam; for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. and quickness of its movement, according to Prov. 27:4, ccxi): “Lest anger grow into hatred and a mote become a “Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth: beam.” Therefore anger is not the most grievous sin. and who can bear the violence of one provoked?” Hence I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,2), the inor- Gregory says (Moral. v, 45): “The heart goaded by dinateness of anger is considered in a twofold respect, the pricks of anger is convulsed, the body trembles, the namely with regard to an undue object, and with regard to tongue entangles itself, the face is inflamed, the eyes an undue mode of being angry. As to the appetible object are enraged and fail utterly to recognize those whom we which it desires, anger would seem to be the least of sins, know: the tongue makes sounds indeed, but there is no for anger desires the evil of punishment for some person, sense in its utterance.” under the aspect of a good that is vengeance. Hence on Reply to Objection 1. Chrysostom is alluding to the the part of the evil which it desires the sin of anger agrees repulsiveness of the outward gestures which result from with those sins which desire the evil of our neighbor, such the impetuousness of anger. as envy and hatred; but while hatred desires absolutely an- Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers the other’s evil as such, and the envious man desires another’s inordinate movement of anger, that results from its im- evil through desire of his own glory, the angry man desires petuousness, as stated above. another’s evil under the aspect of just revenge. Wherefore Reply to Objection 3. Murder results from hatred and it is evident that hatred is more grievous than envy, and envy no less than from anger: yet anger is less grievous, envy than anger: since it is worse to desire evil as an evil, inasmuch as it considers the aspect of justice, as stated than as a good; and to desire evil as an external good such above. as honor or glory, than under the aspect of the rectitude Whether the Philosopher suitably assigns the species of anger? IIa IIae q. 158 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the species of anger grees of anger, when He says (Mat. 5:22): “Whosoever are unsuitably assigned by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judg- where he says that some angry persons are “choleric,” ment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall some “sullen,” and some “ill-tempered” or “stern.” Ac- be in danger of the council, and whosoever shall say” to cording to him, a person is said to be “sullen” whose anger his brother, “Thou fool.” But these degrees are not refer- “is appeased with difficulty and endures a long time.” able to the aforesaid species. Therefore it seems that the But this apparently pertains to the circumstance of time. above division of anger is not fitting. Therefore it seems that anger can be differentiated specif- On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa∗ says “there are ically in respect also of the other circumstances. three species of irascibility,” namely, “the anger which is Objection 2. Further, he says (Ethic. iv, 5) that “ill- called wrath†,” and “ill-will” which is a disease of the tempered” or “stern” persons “are those whose anger is mind, and “rancour.” Now these three seem to coincide not appeased without revenge, or punishment.” Now this with the three aforesaid. For “wrath” he describes as also pertains to the unquenchableness of anger. Therefore “having beginning and movement,” and the Philosopher seemingly the ill-tempered is the same as bitterness. (Ethic. iv, 5) ascribes this to “choleric” persons: “ill-will” Objection 3. Further, our Lord mentions three de- he describes as “an anger that endures and grows old,” and ∗ Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi † ‘Fellea,’ i.e. like gall. But in Ia IIae, q. 46, a. 8, St. Thomas quoting the same authority has Cholos which we render ‘wrath’ 1900 this the Philosopher ascribes to “sullenness”; while he de-account of an abiding displeasure, which he holds locked scribes “rancour” as “reckoning the time for vengeance,” in his breast; and as he does not break forth into the out- which tallies with the Philosopher’s description of the “ill- ward signs of anger, others cannot reason him out of it, tempered.” The same division is given by Damascene (De nor does he of his own accord lay aside his anger, except Fide Orth. ii, 16). Therefore the aforesaid division as- his displeasure wear away with time and thus his anger signed by the Philosopher is not unfitting. cease. On the other hand, the anger of “ill-tempered” per- I answer that, The aforesaid distinction may be re- sons is long-lasting on account of their intense desire for ferred either to the passion, or to the sin itself of anger. revenge, so that it does not wear out with time, and can be We have already stated when treating of the passions ( Ia quelled only by revenge. IIae, q. 46, a. 8) how it is to be applied to the passion of Reply to Objection 3. The degrees of anger men- anger. And it would seem that this is chiefly what Gre- tioned by our Lord do not refer to the different species gory of Nyssa and Damascene had in view. Here, how- of anger, but correspond to the course of the human act∗. ever, we have to take the distinction of these species in For the first degree is an inward conception, and in ref- its application to the sin of anger, and as set down by the erence to this He says: “Whosoever is angry with his Philosopher. brother.” The second degree is when the anger is man- For the inordinateness of anger may be considered in ifested by outward signs, even before it breaks out into relation to two things. First, in relation to the origin of effect; and in reference to this He says: “Whosoever shall anger, and this regards “choleric” persons, who are angry say to his brother, Raca!” which is an angry exclama- too quickly and for any slight cause. Secondly, in relation tion. The third degree is when the sin conceived inwardly to the duration of anger, for that anger endures too long; breaks out into effect. Now the effect of anger is another’s and this may happen in two ways. In one way, because hurt under the aspect of revenge; and the least of hurts is the cause of anger, to wit, the inflicted injury, remains too that which is done by a mere word; wherefore in refer- long in a man’s memory, the result being that it gives rise ence to this He says: “Whosoever shall say to his brother to a lasting displeasure, wherefore he is “grievous” and Thou fool!” Consequently it is clear that the second adds “sullen” to himself. In another way, it happens on the part to the first, and the third to both the others; so that, if the of vengeance, which a man seeks with a stubborn desire: first is a mortal sin, in the case referred to by our Lord, this applies to “ill-tempered” or “stern” people, who do as stated above (a. 3, ad 2), much more so are the oth- not put aside their anger until they have inflicted punish- ers. Wherefore some kind of condemnation is assigned ment. as corresponding to each one of them. In the first case Reply to Objection 1. It is not time, but a man’s “judgment” is assigned, and this is the least severe, for propensity to anger, or his pertinacity in anger, that is the as Augustine says†, “where judgment is to be delivered, chief point of consideration in the aforesaid species. there is an opportunity for defense”: in the second case Reply to Objection 2. Both “sullen” and “ill- “council” is assigned, “whereby the judges deliberate to- tempered” people have a long-lasting anger, but for differ- gether on the punishment to be inflicted”: to the third case ent reasons. For a “sullen” person has an abiding anger on is assigned “hell-fire,” i.e. “decisive condemnation.” Whether anger should be reckoned among the capital vices? IIa IIae q. 158 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that anger should not be anger should not be reckoned among the capital vices. reckoned among the capital sins. For anger is born of sor- On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places row which is a capital vice known by the name of sloth. anger among the capital vices. Therefore anger should not be reckoned a capital vice. I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 84, a. 3,4), Objection 2. Further, hatred is a graver sin than anger. a capital vice is defined as one from which many vices Therefore it should be reckoned a capital vice rather than arise. Now there are two reasons for which many vices anger. can arise from anger. The first is on the part of its ob- Objection 3. Further, a gloss on Prov. 29:22, “An an- ject which has much of the aspect of desirability, in so far gry [Douay: ‘passionate’] man provoketh quarrels,” says: as revenge is desired under the aspect of just or honest‡, “Anger is the door to all vices: if it be closed, peace is which is attractive by its excellence, as stated above (a. 4). ensured within to all the virtues; if it be opened, the soul . The second is on the part of its impetuosity, whereby it is armed for every crime.” Now no capital vice is the ori- precipitates the mind into all kinds of inordinate action. gin of all sins, but only of certain definite ones. Therefore Therefore it is evident that anger is a capital vice. ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 46, a. 8, obj. 3 † Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 9 ‡ Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum; Cf. q. 145, a. 1 1901 Reply to Objection 1. The sorrow whence anger has a more desirable end than hatred has, since the latter arises is not, for the most part, the vice of sloth, but the desires evil under the aspect of evil: wherefore anger is passion of sorrow, which results from an injury inflicted. more a capital vice than hatred is. Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 118, a. 7; Reply to Objection 3. Anger is stated to be the door q. 148, a. 5; q. 153, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 84, a. 4), it belongs to to the vices accidentally, that is by removing obstacles, to the notion of a capital vice to have a most desirable end, so wit by hindering the judgment of reason, whereby man is that many sins are committed through the desire thereof. withdrawn from evil. It is, however, directly the cause of Now anger, which desires evil under the aspect of good, certain special sins, which are called its daughters. Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to anger? IIa IIae q. 158 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that six daughters are un- speech, as stated above (a. 5, ad 3) of the man who says fittingly assigned to anger, namely “quarreling, swelling to his brother, “Raca”: and this refers to “clamor,” which of the mind, contumely, clamor, indignation and blas- denotes disorderly and confused speech. The other disor- phemy.” For blasphemy is reckoned by Isidore∗ to be a der is when a man breaks out into injurious words, and if daughter of pride. Therefore it should not be accounted a these be against God, it is “blasphemy,” if against one’s daughter of anger. neighbor, it is “contumely.” Objection 2. Further, hatred is born of anger, as Au- Thirdly, anger may be considered as proceeding to gustine says in his rule (Ep. ccxi). Therefore it should be deeds; and thus anger gives rise to “quarrels,” by which placed among the daughters of anger. we are to understand all manner of injuries inflicted on Objection 3. Further, “a swollen mind” would seem one’s neighbor through anger. to be the same as pride. Now pride is not the daughter Reply to Objection 1. The blasphemy into which a of a vice, but “the mother of all vices,” as Gregory states man breaks out deliberately proceeds from pride, whereby (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore swelling of the mind should a man lifts himself up against God: since, according to Ec- not be reckoned among the daughters of anger. clus. 10:14, “the beginning of the pride of man is to fall On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns off from God,” i.e. to fall away from reverence for Him these daughters to anger. is the first part of pride†; and this gives rise to blasphemy. I answer that, Anger may be considered in three But the blasphemy into which a man breaks out through a ways. First, as consisting in thought, and thus two vices disturbance of the mind, proceeds from anger. arise from anger. one is on the part of the person with Reply to Objection 2. Although hatred sometimes whom a man is angry, and whom he deems unworthy [in- arises from anger, it has a previous cause, from which it dignum] of acting thus towards him, and this is called “in- arises more directly, namely displeasure, even as, on the dignation.” The other vice is on the part of the man him- other hand, love is born of pleasure. Now through dis- self, in so far as he devises various means of vengeance, pleasure, a man is moved sometimes to anger, sometimes and with such like thoughts fills his mind, according to to hatred. Wherefore it was fitting to reckon that hatred Job 15:2, “Will a wise man. . . fill his stomach with burn- arises from sloth rather than from anger. ing heat?” And thus we have “swelling of the mind.” Reply to Objection 3. Swelling of the mind is not Secondly, anger may be considered, as expressed in taken here as identical with pride, but for a certain effort words: and thus a twofold disorder arises from anger. or daring attempt to take vengeance; and daring is a vice One is when a man manifests his anger in his manner of opposed to fortitude. Whether there is a vice opposed to anger resulting from lack of anger? IIa IIae q. 158 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that there. is not a vice for no purpose, as Seneca proves in the book he wrote on opposed to anger, resulting from lack of anger. For no anger (De Ira i, 9, seqq.). Therefore it seems that lack of vice makes us like to God. Now by being entirely with- anger is not a vice. out anger, a man becomes like to God, Who judges “with Objection 3. Further, according to Dionysius (Div. tranquillity” (Wis. 12:18). Therefore seemingly it is not a Nom. iv), “man’s evil is to be without reason.” Now vice to be altogether without anger. the judgment of reason remains unimpaired, if all move- Objection 2. Further, it is not a vice to lack what is ment of anger be done away. Therefore no lack of anger altogether useless. But the movement of anger is useful amounts to a vice. ∗ QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi † Cf. q. 162, a. 7, ad 2 1902 On the contrary, Chrysostom‡ says: “He who is not there be an obstacle. Hence the movement of anger in the angry, whereas he has cause to be, sins. For unreasonable sensitive appetite cannot be lacking altogether, unless the patience is the hotbed of many vices, it fosters negligence, movement of the will be altogether lacking or weak. Con- and incites not only the wicked but even the good to do sequently lack of the passion of anger is also a vice, even wrong.” as the lack of movement in the will directed to punishment I answer that, Anger may be understood in two ways. by the judgment of reason. In one way, as a simple movement of the will, whereby Reply to Objection 1. He that is entirely without one inflicts punishment, not through passion, but in virtue anger when he ought to be angry, imitates God as to lack of a judgment of the reason: and thus without doubt lack of passion, but not as to God’s punishing by judgment. of anger is a sin. This is the sense in which anger is taken Reply to Objection 2. The passion of anger, like all in the saying of Chrysostom, for he says (Hom. xi in other movements of the sensitive appetite, is useful, as be- Matth., in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. ing conducive to the more prompt execution∗ of reason’s John Chrysostom): “Anger, when it has a cause, is not dictate: else, the sensitive appetite in man would be to anger but judgment. For anger, properly speaking, de- no purpose, whereas “nature does nothing without pur- notes a movement of passion”: and when a man is angry pose”†. with reason, his anger is no longer from passion: where- Reply to Objection 3. When a man acts inordinately, fore he is said to judge, not to be angry. In another way the judgment of his reason is cause not only of the sim- anger is taken for a movement of the sensitive appetite, ple movement of the will but also of the passion in the which is with passion resulting from a bodily transmuta- sensitive appetite, as stated above. Wherefore just as the tion. This movement is a necessary sequel, in man, to the removal of the effect is a sign that the cause is removed, movement of his will, since the lower appetite necessar- so the lack of anger is a sign that the judgment of reason ily follows the movement of the higher appetite, unless is lacking. ‡ Hom. xi in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 3 † Aristotle, De Coelo i, 4 1903 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 159 Of Cruelty (In Two Articles) We must now consider cruelty, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency? (2) Of its comparison with savagery or brutality. Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency? IIa IIae q. 159 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that cruelty is not op- that clemency denotes a certain smoothness or sweetness posed to clemency. For Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) of soul, whereby one is inclined to mitigate punishment. that “those are said to be cruel who exceed in punishing,” Hence cruelty is directly opposed to clemency. which is contrary to justice. Now clemency is reckoned Reply to Objection 1. Just as it belongs to equity a part, not of justice but of temperance. Therefore appar- to mitigate punishment according to reason, while the ently cruelty is not opposed to clemency. sweetness of soul which inclines one to this belongs to Objection 2. Further, it is written (Jer. 6:23): “They clemency: so too, excess in punishing, as regards the ex- are cruel, and will have no mercy”; so that cruelty would ternal action, belongs to injustice; but as regards the hard- seem opposed to mercy. Now mercy is not the same as ness of heart, which makes one ready to increase punish- clemency, as stated above (q. 157, a. 4, ad 3). Therefore ment, belongs to cruelty. cruelty is not opposed to clemency. Reply to Objection 2. Mercy and clemency concur Objection 3. Further, clemency is concerned with the in this, that both shun and recoil from another’s unhappi- infliction of punishment, as stated above (q. 157, a. 1): ness, but in different ways. For it belongs to mercy∗ to re- whereas cruelty applies to the withdrawal of beneficence, lieve another’s unhappiness by a beneficent action, while according to Prov. 11:17, “But he that is cruel casteth off it belongs to clemency to mitigate another’s unhappiness even his own kindred.” Therefore cruelty is not opposed by the cessation of punishment. And since cruelty denotes to clemency. excess in exacting punishment, it is more directly opposed On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) to clemency than to mercy; yet on account of the mutual that “the opposite of clemency is cruelty, which is nothing likeness of these virtues, cruelty is sometimes taken for else but hardness of heart in exacting punishment.” mercilessness. I answer that, Cruelty apparently takes its name from Reply to Objection 3. Cruelty is there taken for mer- “cruditas” [rawness]. Now just as things when cooked cilessness, which is lack of beneficence. We may also and prepared are wont to have an agreeable and sweet sa- reply that withdrawal of beneficence is in itself a punish- vor, so when raw they have a disagreeable and bitter taste. ment. Now it has been stated above (q. 157, a. 3, ad 1; a. 4, ad 3) Whether cruelty differs from savagery or brutality? IIa IIae q. 159 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that cruelty differs not Objection 3. Further, just as there is a vice opposed from savagery or brutality. For seemingly one vice is op- to a virtue by way of excess, so is there a vice opposed posed in one way to one virtue. Now both savagery and to it by way of deficiency, which latter is opposed both cruelty are opposed to clemency by way of excess. There- to the virtue which is the mean, and to the vice which is fore it would seem that savagery and cruelty are the same. in excess. Now the same vice pertaining to deficiency is Objection 2. Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that opposed to both cruelty and savagery, namely remission “severity is as it were savagery with verity, because it or laxity. For Gregory says (Moral. xx, 5): “Let there be holds to justice without attending to piety”: so that sav- love, but not that which enervates, let there be severity, agery would seem to exclude that mitigation of punish- but without fury, let there be zeal without unseemly sav- ment in delivering judgment which is demanded by piety. agery, let there be piety without undue clemency.” There- Now this has been stated to belong to cruelty (a. 1, ad 1). fore savagery is the same as cruelty. Therefore cruelty is the same as savagery. On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) ∗ Cf. q. 30, a. 1 1904 that “a man who is angry without being hurt, or with one Reply to Objection 1. Clemency is a human virtue; who has not offended him, is not said to be cruel, but to wherefore directly opposed to it is cruelty which is a form be brutal or savage.” of human wickedness. But savagery or brutality is com- I answer that, “Savagery” and “brutality” take their prised under bestiality, wherefore it is directly opposed names from a likeness to wild beasts which are also de- not to clemency, but to a more excellent virtue, which the scribed as savage. For animals of this kind attack man that Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5) calls “heroic” or “god-like,” they may feed on his body, and not for some motive of jus- which according to us, would seem to pertain to the gifts tice the consideration of which belongs to reason alone. of the Holy Ghost. Consequently we may say that sav- Wherefore, properly speaking, brutality or savagery ap- agery is directly opposed to the gift of piety. plies to those who in inflicting punishment have not in Reply to Objection 2. A severe man is not said to be view a default of the person punished, but merely the plea- simply savage, because this implies a vice; but he is said sure they derive from a man’s torture. Consequently it is to be “savage as regards the truth,” on account of some evident that it is comprised under bestiality: for such like likeness to savagery which is not inclined to mitigate pun- pleasure is not human but bestial, and resulting as it does ishment. either from evil custom, or from a corrupt nature, as do Reply to Objection 3. Remission of punishment is other bestial emotions. On the other hand, cruelty not not a vice, except it disregard the order of justice, which only regards the default of the person punished, but ex- requires a man to be punished on account of his offense, ceeds in the mode of punishing: wherefore cruelty differs and which cruelty exceeds. On the other hand, cruelty from savagery or brutality, as human wickedness differs disregards this order altogether. Wherefore remission of from bestiality, as stated in Ethic. vii, 5. punishment is opposed to cruelty, but not to savagery. 1905 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 160 Of Modesty (In Two Articles) We must now consider modesty: and (1) Modesty in general; (2) Each of its species. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether modesty is a part of temperance? (2) What is the matter of modesty? Whether modesty is a part of temperance? IIa IIae q. 160 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that modesty is not a there is a special virtue about some matter of very great part of temperance. For modesty is denominated from moment, there must needs be another virtue about matters mode. Now mode is requisite in every virtue: since virtue of lesser import: because the life of man requires to be is directed to good; and “good,” according to Augustine regulated by the virtues with regard to everything: thus it (De Nat. Boni 3), “consists in mode, species, and order.” was stated above (q. 134, a. 3, ad 1), that while magnifi- Therefore modesty is a general virtue, and consequently cence is about great expenditure, there is need in addition should not be reckoned a part of temperance. for liberality, which is concerned with ordinary expendi- Objection 2. Further, temperance would seem to be ture. Hence there is need for a virtue to moderate other deserving of praise chiefly on account of its moderation. lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult. This Now this gives modesty its name. Therefore modesty is virtue is called modesty, and is annexed to temperance as the same as temperance, and not one of its parts. its principal. Objection 3. Further, modesty would seem to re- Reply to Objection 1. When a name is common to gard the correction of our neighbor, according to 2 Tim. many it is sometimes appropriated to those of the low- 2:24,25, “The servant of the Lord must not wrangle, but be est rank; thus the common name of angel is appropriated mild towards all men. . . with modesty admonishing them to the lowest order of angels. In the same way, mode that resist the truth.” Now admonishing wrong-doers is an which is observed by all virtues in common, is specially act of justice or of charity, as stated above (q. 33, a. 1). appropriated to the virtue which prescribes the mode in Therefore seemingly modesty is a part of justice rather the slightest things. than of temperance. Reply to Objection 2. Some things need tempering On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reck- on account of their strength, thus we temper strong wine. ons modesty as a part of temperance. But moderation is necessary in all things: wherefore tem- I answer that, As stated above (q. 141, a. 4; q. 157, perance is more concerned with strong passions, and mod- a. 3), temperance brings moderation into those things esty about weaker passions. wherein it is most difficult to be moderate, namely the Reply to Objection 3. Modesty is to be taken there for concupiscences of pleasures of touch. Now whenever the general moderation which is necessary in all virtues. Whether modesty is only about outward actions? IIa IIae q. 160 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that modesty is only about to the moral virtues—and about things pertaining to outward actions. For the inward movements of the pas- knowledge—which is proper to the intellectual virtues— sions cannot be known to other persons. Yet the Apostle and again about things pertaining to the irascible and con- enjoins (Phil. 4:5): “Let your modesty be known to all cupiscible faculties. Therefore, if modesty be one virtue, men.” Therefore modesty is only about outward actions. it cannot be about all these things. Objection 2. Further, the virtues that are about the On the contrary, In all these things it is necessary passions are distinguished from justice which is about op- to observe the “mode” whence modesty takes its name. erations. Now modesty is seemingly one virtue. There- Therefore modesty is about all of them. fore, if it be about outward works, it will not be concerned I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), modesty dif- with inward passions. fers from temperance, in that temperance moderates those Objection 3. Further, no one same virtue is both matters where restraint is most difficult, while modesty about things pertaining to the appetite—which is proper moderates those that present less difficulty. Authorities 1906 seem to have had various opinions about modesty. For tions “meekness, simplicity, humility,” and other kindred wherever they found a special kind of good or a spe- virtues, of which we have spoken above (q. 143); while cial difficulty of moderation, they withdrew it from the Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) assigned eutrapelia to pleasures in province of modesty, which they confined to lesser mat-games, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 60, a. 5). All these ters. Now it is clear to all that the restraint of pleasures are comprised under modesty as understood by Tully; and of touch presents a special difficulty: wherefore all distin- in this way modesty regards not only outward but also in- guished temperance from modesty. ward actions. In addition to this, moreover, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle speaks of mod- ii, 54) considered that there was a special kind of good esty as regarding externals. Nevertheless the moderation in the moderation of punishment; wherefore he severed of the inner man may be shown by certain outward signs. clemency also from modesty, and held modesty to be Reply to Objection 2. Various virtues assigned by about the remaining ordinary matters that require mod- various authorities are comprised under modesty. Where- eration. These seemingly are of four kinds. one is the fore nothing prevents modesty from regarding matters movement of the mind towards some excellence, and this which require different virtues. Yet there is not so great a is moderated by “humility.” The second is the desire of difference between the various parts of modesty, as there things pertaining to knowledge, and this is moderated by is between justice, which is about operations, and tem- “studiousness” which is opposed to curiosity. The third perance, which is about passions, because in actions and regards bodily movements and actions, which require to passions that present no great difficulty on the part of the be done becomingly and honestly∗, whether we act seri- matter, but only on the part of moderation, there is but one ously or in play. The fourth regards outward show, for virtue, one namely for each kind of moderation. instance in dress and the like. Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection also is To some of these matters, however, other authorities clear. appointed certain special virtues: thus Andronicus† men- ∗ Cf. q. 145, a. 1 † De Affectibus 1907 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 161 Of Humility (In Six Articles) We must consider next the species of modesty: (1) Humility, and pride which is opposed to it; (2) Studiousness, and its opposite, Curiosity; (3) Modesty as affecting words or deeds; (4) Modesty as affecting outward attire. Concerning humility there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether humility is a virtue? (2) Whether it resides in the appetite, or in the judgment of reason? (3) Whether by humility one ought to subject oneself to all men? (4) Whether it is a part of modesty or temperance? (5) Of its comparison with the other virtues; (6) Of the degrees of humility. Whether humility is a virtue? IIa IIae q. 161 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that humility is not a of the latter, the movement of despair. Now it has been virtue. For virtue conveys the notion of a penal evil, ac- stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 61, a. 2) that for those appetitive cording to Ps. 104:18, “They humbled his feet in fetters.” movements which are a kind of impulse towards an object, Therefore humility is not a virtue. there is need of a moderating and restraining moral virtue, Objection 2. Further, virtue and vice are mutually op- while for those which are a kind of recoil, there is need, posed. Now humility seemingly denotes a vice, for it is on the part of the appetite, of a moral virtue to strengthen written (Ecclus. 19:23): “There is one that humbleth him- it and urge it on. Wherefore a twofold virtue is necessary self wickedly.” Therefore humility is not a virtue. with regard to the difficult good: one, to temper and re- Objection 3. Further, no virtue is opposed to another strain the mind, lest it tend to high things immoderately; virtue. But humility is apparently opposed to the virtue of and this belongs to the virtue of humility: and another to magnanimity, which aims at great things, whereas humil- strengthen the mind against despair, and urge it on to the ity shuns them. Therefore it would seem that humility is pursuit of great things according to right reason; and this not a virtue. is magnanimity. Therefore it is evident that humility is a Objection 4. Further, virtue is “the disposition of that virtue. which is perfect” (Phys. vii, text. 17). But humility seem- Reply to Objection 1. As Isidore observes (Etym. ingly belongs to the imperfect: wherefore it becomes not x), “a humble man is so called because he is, as it were, God to be humble, since He can be subject to none. There- ‘humo acclinis’ ”∗, i.e. inclined to the lowest place. This fore it seems that humility is not a virtue. may happen in two ways. First, through an extrinsic prin- Objection 5. Further, every moral virtue is about ac- ciple, for instance when one is cast down by another, and tions and passions, according to Ethic. ii, 3. But humil- thus humility is a punishment. Secondly, through an in- ity is not reckoned by the Philosopher among the virtues trinsic principle: and this may be done sometimes well, that are about passions, nor is it comprised under justice for instance when a man, considering his own failings, as- which is about actions. Therefore it would seem not to be sumes the lowest place according to his mode: thus Abra- a virtue. ham said to the Lord (Gn. 18:27), “I will speak to my On the contrary, Origen commenting on Lk. 1:48, Lord, whereas I am dust and ashes.” In this way humility “He hath regarded the humility of His handmaid,” says is a virtue. Sometimes, however, this may be ill-done, for (Hom. viii in Luc.): “One of the virtues, humility, is par- instance when man, “not understanding his honor, com- ticularly commended in Holy Writ; for our Saviour said: pares himself to senseless beasts, and becomes like to ‘Learn of Me, because I am meek, and humble of heart.’ ” them” (Ps. 48:13). I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 23, a. 2) Reply to Objection 2. As stated (ad 1), humility, in so when we were treating of the passions, the difficult good far as it is a virtue, conveys the notion of a praiseworthy has something attractive to the appetite, namely the aspect self-abasement to the lowest place. Now this is sometimes of good, and likewise something repulsive to the appetite, done merely as to outward signs and pretense: wherefore namely the difficulty of obtaining it. In respect of the for- this is “false humility,” of which Augustine says in a letter mer there arises the movement of hope, and in respect (Ep. cxlix) that it is “grievous pride,” since to wit, it would ∗ Literally, ‘bent to the ground’ 1908 seem to aim at excellence of glory. Sometimes, however, ting, not as regards His Divine nature, but only as regards this is done by an inward movement of the soul, and in His assumed nature. Secondly, a thing may be said to be this way, properly speaking, humility is reckoned a virtue, perfect in a restricted sense, for instance in respect of its because virtue does not consist externals, but chiefly in nature or state or time. Thus a virtuous man is perfect: the inward choice of the mind, as the Philosopher states although in comparison with God his perfection is found (Ethic. ii, 5). wanting, according to the word of Is. 40:17, “All nations Reply to Objection 3. Humility restrains the appetite are before Him as if they had no being at all.” In this way from aiming at great things against right reason: while humility may be competent to every man. magnanimity urges the mind to great things in accord with Reply to Objection 5. The Philosopher intended to right reason. Hence it is clear that magnanimity is not op- treat of virtues as directed to civic life, wherein the sub- posed to humility: indeed they concur in this, that each is jection of one man to another is defined according to the according to right reason. ordinance of the law, and consequently is a matter of le- Reply to Objection 4. A thing is said to be perfect in gal justice. But humility, considered as a special virtue, two ways. First absolutely; such a thing contains no de- regards chiefly the subjection of man to God, for Whose fect, neither in its nature nor in respect of anything else, sake he humbles himself by subjecting himself to others. and thus God alone is perfect. To Him humility is fit- Whether humility has to do with the appetite? IIa IIae q. 161 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that humility concerns, On the contrary, Augustine says (De Poenit.†) that not the appetite but the judgment of reason. Because hu- “the humble man is one who chooses to be an abject in mility is opposed to pride. Now pride concerns things the house of the Lord, rather than to dwell in the tents pertaining to knowledge: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, of sinners.” But choice concerns the appetite. Therefore 22) that “pride, when it extends outwardly to the body, is humility has to do with the appetite rather than with the first of all shown in the eyes”: wherefore it is written (Ps. estimative power. 130:1), “Lord, my heart is not exalted, nor are my eyes I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), it belongs prop- lofty.” Now eyes are the chief aids to knowledge. There- erly to humility, that a man restrain himself from being fore it would seem that humility is chiefly concerned with borne towards that which is above him. For this purpose knowledge, whereby one thinks little of oneself. he must know his disproportion to that which surpasses Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. his capacity. Hence knowledge of one’s own deficiency xxxi) that “almost the whole of Christian teaching is belongs to humility, as a rule guiding the appetite. Nev- humility.” Consequently nothing contained in Christian ertheless humility is essentially in the appetite itself; and teaching is incompatible with humility. Now Christian consequently it must be said that humility, properly speak- teaching admonishes us to seek the better things, accord- ing, moderates the movement of the appetite. ing to 1 Cor. 12:31, “Be zealous for the better gifts.” Reply to Objection 1. Lofty eyes are a sign of pride, Therefore it belongs to humility to restrain not the desire inasmuch as it excludes respect and fear: for fearing and of difficult things but the estimate thereof. respectful persons are especially wont to lower the eyes, Objection 3. Further, it belongs to the same virtue as though not daring to compare themselves with others. both to restrain excessive movement, and to strengthen But it does not follow from this that humility is essentially the soul against excessive withdrawal: thus fortitude both concerned with knowledge. curbs daring and fortifies the soul against fear. Now it Reply to Objection 2. It is contrary to humility to aim is magnanimity that strengthens the soul against the dif- at greater things through confiding in one’s own powers: ficulties that occur in the pursuit of great things. There- but to aim at greater things through confidence in God’s fore if humility were to curb the desire of great things, help, is not contrary to humility; especially since the more it would follow that humility is not a distinct virtue from one subjects oneself to God, the more is one exalted in magnanimity, which is evidently false. Therefore humil- God’s sight. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi): ity is concerned, not with the desire but with the estimate “It is one thing to raise oneself to God, and another to of great things. raise oneself up against God. He that abases himself be- Objection 4. Further, Andronicus∗ assigns humility fore Him, him He raiseth up; he that raises himself up to outward show; for he says that humility is “the habit of against Him, him He casteth down.” avoiding excessive expenditure and parade.” Therefore it Reply to Objection 3. In fortitude there is the same is not concerned with the movement of the appetite. reason for restraining daring and for strengthening the ∗ De Affectibus † Serm. cccli 1909 soul against fear: since the reason in both cases is that humility, which he understands by poverty of spirit, to the man should set the good of reason before dangers of death. gift of fear whereby man reveres God. Hence it follows But the reason for restraining presumptuous hope which that the relation of fortitude to daring differs from that of pertains to humility is not the same as the reason for humility to hope. Because fortitude uses daring more than strengthening the soul against despair. Because the rea- it suppresses it: so that excess of daring is more like for- son for strengthening the soul against despair is the ac- titude than lack of daring is. On the other hand, humility quisition of one’s proper good lest man, by despair, ren- suppresses hope or confidence in self more than it uses it; der himself unworthy of a good which was competent to wherefore excessive self-confidence is more opposed to him; while the chief reason for suppressing presumptu- humility than lack of confidence is. ous hope is based on divine reverence, which shows that Reply to Objection 4. Excess in outward expenditure man ought not to ascribe to himself more than is compe- and parade is wont to be done with a view of boasting, tent to him according to the position in which God has which is suppressed by humility. Accordingly humility placed him. Wherefore humility would seem to denote in has to do, in a secondary way, with externals, as signs of the first place man’s subjection to God; and for this rea- the inward movement of the appetite. son Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) ascribes Whether one ought, by humility, to subject oneself to all men? IIa IIae q. 161 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that one ought not, by hu- the latter has of God’s: but humility does not require a mility, to subject oneself to all men. For, as stated above man to subject what he has of God’s to that which may (a. 2, ad 3), humility consists chiefly in man’s subjection seem to be God’s in another. For those who have a share to God. Now one ought not to offer to a man that which of God’s gifts know that they have them, according to 1 is due to God, as is the case with all acts of religious wor- Cor. 2:12: “That we may know the things that are given ship. Therefore, by humility, one ought not to subject one- us from God.” Wherefore without prejudice to humility self to man. they may set the gifts they have received from God above Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Nat. et Gra- those that others appear to have received from Him; thus tia xxxiv): “Humility should take the part of truth, not of the Apostle says (Eph. 3:5): ”(The mystery of Christ) falsehood.” Now some men are of the highest rank, who was not known to the sons of men as it is now revealed cannot, without falsehood, subject themselves to their in- to His holy apostles.” In like manner. humility does not feriors. Therefore one ought not, by humility, to subject require a man to subject that which he has of his own to oneself to all men. that which his neighbor has of man’s: otherwise each one Objection 3. Further no one ought to do that which would have to esteem himself a greater sinner than any- conduces to the detriment of another’s spiritual welfare. one else: whereas the Apostle says without prejudice to But if a man subject himself to another by humility, this humility (Gal. 2:15): “We by nature are Jews, and not is detrimental to the person to whom he subjects himself; of the Gentiles, sinners.” Nevertheless a man may esteem for the latter might wax proud, or despise the other. Hence his neighbor to have some good which he lacks himself, Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): “Lest through ex- or himself to have some evil which another has not: by cessive humility the superior lose his authority.” There- reason of which, he may subject himself to him with hu- fore a man ought not, by humility, to subject himself to mility. all. Reply to Objection 1. We must not only revere God On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:3): “In humil- in Himself, but also that which is His in each one, al- ity, let each esteem others better than themselves.” though not with the same measure of reverence as we re- I answer that, We may consider two things in man, vere God. Wherefore we should subject ourselves with namely that which is God’s, and that which is man’s. humility to all our neighbors for God’s sake, according to Whatever pertains to defect is man’s: but whatever per- 1 Pet. 2:13, “Be ye subject. . . to every human creature for tains to man’s welfare and perfection is God’s, according God’s sake”; but to God alone do we owe the worship of to the saying of Osee 13:9, “Destruction is thy own, O latria. Israel; thy help is only in Me.” Now humility, as stated Reply to Objection 2. If we set what our neighbor above (a. 1, ad 5; a. 2, ad 3), properly regards the rev- has of God’s above that which we have of our own, we erence whereby man is subject to God. Wherefore every cannot incur falsehood. Wherefore a gloss∗ on Phil. 2:3, man, in respect of that which is his own, ought to sub- “Esteem others better than themselves,” says: “We must ject himself to every neighbor, in respect of that which not esteem by pretending to esteem; but we should in truth ∗ St. Augustine, QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 71 1910 think it possible for another person to have something that Rule (Ep. ccxi): “With fear, the superior should prostrate is hidden to us and whereby he is better than we are, al- himself at your feet in the sight of God.” On the other though our own good whereby we are apparently better hand, due moderation must be observed in the outward than he, be not hidden.” acts of humility even as of other virtues, lest they conduce Reply to Objection 3. Humility, like other virtues, re- to the detriment of others. If, however, a man does as he sides chiefly inwardly in the soul. Consequently a man, by ought, and others take therefrom an occasion of sin, this an inward act of the soul, may subject himself to another, is not imputed to the man who acts with humility; since without giving the other man an occasion of detriment to he does not give scandal, although others take it. his spiritual welfare. This is what Augustine means in his Whether humility is a part of modesty or temperance? IIa IIae q. 161 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that humility is not a part of the emotions, are reckoned parts of temperance. Now of modesty or temperance. For humility regards chiefly just as meekness suppresses the movement of anger, so the reverence whereby one is subject to God, as stated does humility suppress the movement of hope, which is above (a. 3). Now it belongs to a theological virtue to have the movement of a spirit aiming at great things. Where- God for its object. Therefore humility should be reckoned fore, like meekness, humility is accounted a part of tem- a theological virtue rather than a part of temperance or perance. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) modesty. says that a man who aims at small things in proportion to Objection 2. Further, temperance is in the concupis- his mode is not magnanimous but “temperate,” and such a cible, whereas humility would seem to be in the irascible, man we may call humble. Moreover, for the reason given just as pride which is opposed to it, and whose object is above (q. 160, a. 2), among the various parts of temper- something difficult. Therefore apparently humility is not ance, the one under which humility is comprised is mod- a part of temperance or modesty. esty as understood by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54), Objection 3. Further, humility and magnanimity are inasmuch as humility is nothing else than a moderation of about the same object, as stated above (a. 1, ad 3). But spirit: wherefore it is written (1 Pet. 3:4): “In the incor- magnanimity is reckoned a part, not of temperance but of ruptibility of a quiet and meek spirit.” fortitude, as stated above (q. 129, a. 5). Therefore it would Reply to Objection 1. The theological virtues, whose seem that humility is not a part of temperance or modesty. object is our last end, which is the first principle in matters On the contrary, Origen says (Hom. viii super Luc.): of appetite, are the causes of all the other virtues. Hence “If thou wilt hear the name of this virtue, and what it was the fact that humility is caused by reverence for God does called by the philosophers, know that humility which God not prevent it from being a part of modesty or temperance. regards is the same as what they called metriotes, i.e. mea-Reply to Objection 2. Parts are assigned to a prin- sure or moderation.” Now this evidently pertains to mod- cipal virtue by reason of a sameness, not of subject or esty or temperance. Therefore humility is a part of mod- matter, but of formal mode, as stated above (q. 137, a. 2, esty or temperance. ad 1; q. 157, a. 3, ad 2). Consequently, although humility I answer that, As stated above (q. 137, a. 2, ad 1; is in the irascible as its subject, it is assigned as a part of q. 157, a. 3, ad 2), in assigning parts to a virtue we con-modesty or temperance by reason of its mode. sider chiefly the likeness that results from the mode of the Reply to Objection 3. Although humility and magna- virtue. Now the mode of temperance, whence it chiefly nimity agree as to matter, they differ as to mode, by reason derives its praise, is the restraint or suppression of the im- of which magnanimity is reckoned a part of fortitude, and petuosity of a passion. Hence whatever virtues restrain or humility a part of temperance. suppress, and the actions which moderate the impetuosity Whether humility is the greatest of the virtues? IIa IIae q. 161 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that humility is the great- will stand among the angels by the judgment seat of God.” est of the virtues. For Chrysostom, expounding the story Hence it is clear that humility is set above justice. Now of the Pharisee and the publican (Lk. 18), says∗ that “if justice is either the most exalted of all the virtues, or in- humility is such a fleet runner even when hampered by sin cludes all virtues, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, that it overtakes the justice that is the companion of pride, 1). Therefore humility is the greatest of the virtues. whither will it not reach if you couple it with justice? It Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Verb. ∗ Eclog. hom. vii de Humil. Animi. 1911 Dom., Serm.†): “Are you thinking of raising the great fab-Reply to Objection 2. Just as the orderly assembly ric of spirituality? Attend first of all to the foundation of of virtues is, by reason of a certain likeness, compared to humility.” Now this would seem to imply that humility a building, so again that which is the first step in the ac- is the foundation of all virtue. Therefore apparently it is quisition of virtue is likened to the foundation, which is greater than the other virtues. first laid before the rest of the building. Now the virtues Objection 3. Further, the greater virtue deserves the are in truth infused by God. Wherefore the first step in greater reward. Now the greatest reward is due to humil- the acquisition of virtue may be understood in two ways. ity, since “he that humbleth himself shall be exalted” (Lk. First by way of removing obstacles: and thus humility 14:11). Therefore humility is the greatest of virtues. holds the first place, inasmuch as it expels pride, which Objection 4. Further, according to Augustine (De “God resisteth,” and makes man submissive and ever open Vera Relig. 16), “Christ’s whole life on earth was a les- to receive the influx of Divine grace. Hence it is written son in moral conduct through the human nature which He (James 4:6): “God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace to assumed.” Now He especially proposed His humility for the humble.” In this sense humility is said to be the foun- our example, saying (Mat. 11:29): “Learn of Me, because dation of the spiritual edifice. Secondly, a thing is first I am meek and humble of heart.” Moreover, Gregory says among virtues directly, because it is the first step towards (Pastor. iii, 1) that the “lesson proposed to us in the mys- God. Now the first step towards God is by faith, according tery of our redemption is the humility of God.” Therefore to Heb. 11:6, “He that cometh to God must believe.” In humility would seem to be the greatest of virtues. this sense faith is the foundation in a more excellent way On the contrary, Charity is set above all the virtues, than humility. according to Col. 3:14, “Above all. . . things have charity.” Reply to Objection 3. To him that despises earthly Therefore humility is not the greatest of virtues. things, heavenly things are promised: thus heavenly trea- I answer that, The good of human virtue pertains to sures are promised to those who despise earthly riches, the order of reason: which order is considered chiefly in according to Mat. 6:19,20, “Lay not up to yourselves reference to the end: wherefore the theological virtues are treasures on earth. . . but lay up to yourselves treasures in the greatest because they have the last end for their object. heaven.” Likewise heavenly consolations are promised to Secondarily, however, it is considered in reference to the those who despise worldly joys, according to Mat. 4:5, ordering of the means to the end. This ordinance, as to “Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be com- its essence, is in the reason itself from which it issues, but forted.” In the same way spiritual uplifting is promised to by participation it is in the appetite ordered by the reason; humility, not that humility alone merits it, but because it and this ordinance is the effect of justice, especially of le- is proper to it to despise earthly uplifting. Wherefore Au- gal justice. Now humility makes a man a good subject to gustine says (De Poenit.†): “Think not that he who hum- ordinance of all kinds and in all matters; while every other bles himself remains for ever abased, for it is written: ‘He virtue has this effect in some special matter. Therefore shall be exalted.’ And do not imagine that his exaltation after the theological virtues, after the intellectual virtues in men’s eyes is effected by bodily uplifting.” which regard the reason itself, and after justice, especially Reply to Objection 4. The reason why Christ chiefly legal justice, humility stands before all others. proposed humility to us, was because it especially re- Reply to Objection 1. Humility is not set before jus- moves the obstacle to man’s spiritual welfare consisting in tice, but before that justice which is coupled with pride, man’s aiming at heavenly and spiritual things, in which he and is no longer a virtue; even so, on the other hand, sin is hindered by striving to become great in earthly things. is pardoned through humility: for it is said of the publi- Hence our Lord, in order to remove an obstacle to our spir- can (Lk. 18:14) that through the merit of his humility “he itual welfare, showed by giving an example of humility, went down into his house justified.” Hence Chrysostom that outward exaltation is to be despised. Thus humility says∗: “Bring me a pair of two-horse chariots: in the one is, as it were, a disposition to man’s untrammeled access harness pride with justice, in the other sin with humility: to spiritual and divine goods. Accordingly as perfection and you will see that sin outrunning justice wins not by its is greater than disposition, so charity, and other virtues own strength, but by that of humility: while you will see whereby man approaches God directly, are greater than the other pair beaten, not by the weakness of justice, but humility. by the weight and size of pride.” † S. 10, C[1] ∗ De incompr. Nat. Dei, Hom. v † Serm. cccli 1912 Whether twelve degrees of humility are fittingly distinguished in the Rule of the IIa IIae q. 161 a. 6 Blessed Benedict? Objection 1. It would seem that the twelve degrees Objection 5. Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. of humility that are set down in the Rule of the Blessed xxxi): “The measure of humility is apportioned to each Benedict∗ are unfittingly distinguished. The first is to be one according to his rank. It is imperiled by pride, for the “humble not only in heart, but also to show it in one’s greater a man is the more liable is he to be entrapped.” very person, one’s eyes fixed on the ground”; the second Now the measure of a man’s greatness cannot be fixed is “to speak few and sensible words, and not to be loud according to a definite number of degrees. Therefore it of voice”; the third is “not to be easily moved, and dis- would seem that it is not possible to assign the aforesaid posed to laughter”; the fourth is “to maintain silence un- degrees to humility. til one is asked”; the fifth is “to do nothing but to what I answer that, As stated above (a. 2) humility has one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery”; essentially to do with the appetite, in so far as a man the sixth is “to believe and acknowledge oneself viler restrains the impetuosity of his soul, from tending in- than all”; the seventh is “to think oneself worthless and ordinately to great things: yet its rule is in the cogni- unprofitable for all purposes”; the eighth is “to confess tive faculty, in that we should not deem ourselves to be one’s sin”; the ninth is “to embrace patience by obeying above what we are. Also, the principle and origin of both under difficult and contrary circumstances”; the tenth is these things is the reverence we bear to God. Now the “to subject oneself to a superior”; the eleventh is “not inward disposition of humility leads to certain outward to delight in fulfilling one’s own desires”; the twelfth signs in words, deeds, and gestures, which manifest that is “to fear God and to be always mindful of everything which is hidden within, as happens also with the other that God has commanded.” For among these there are virtues. For “a man is known by his look, and a wise some things pertaining to the other virtues, such as obe- man, when thou meetest him, by his countenance” (Ec- dience and patience. Again there are some that seem to clus. 19:26). Wherefore the aforesaid degrees of humility involve a false opinion—and this is inconsistent with any include something regarding the root of humility, namely virtue—namely to declare oneself more despicable than the twelfth degree, “that a man fear God and bear all His all men, and to confess and believe oneself to be in all commandments in mind.” ways worthless and unprofitable. Therefore these are un- Again, they include certain things with regard to the fittingly placed among the degrees of humility. appetite, lest one aim inordinately at one’s own excel- Objection 2. Further, humility proceeds from within lence. This is done in three ways. First, by not follow- to externals, as do other virtues. Therefore in the afore- ing one’s own will, and this pertains to the eleventh de- said degrees, those which concern outward actions are un- gree; secondly, by regulating it according to one’s supe- fittingly placed before those which pertain to inward ac- rior judgment, and this applies to the tenth degree; thirdly, tions. by not being deterred from this on account of the difficul- Objection 3. Further, Anselm (De Simil. ci, seqq.) ties and hardships that come in our way, and this belongs gives seven degrees of humility, the first of which is to the ninth degree. “to acknowledge oneself contemptible”; the second, “to Certain things also are included referring to the esti- grieve for this”; the third, “to confess it”; the fourth, “to mate a man forms in acknowledging his own deficiency, convince others of this, that is to wish them to believe it”; and this in three ways. First by acknowledging and avow- the fifth, “to bear patiently that this be said of us”; the ing his own shortcomings; this belongs to the eighth de- sixth, “to suffer oneself to be treated with contempt”; the gree: secondly, by deeming oneself incapable of great seventh, “to love being thus treated.” Therefore the afore- things, and this pertains to the seventh degree: thirdly, said degrees would seem to be too numerous. that in this respect one should put others before oneself, Objection 4. Further, a gloss on Mat. 3:15 says: “Per- and this belongs to the sixth degree. fect humility has three degrees. The first is to subject our- Again, some things are included that refer to outward selves to those who are above us, and not to set ourselves signs. One of these regards deeds, namely that in one’s above our equals: this is sufficient. The second is to sub- work one should not depart from the ordinary way; this mit to our equals, and not to set ourselves before our infe- applies to the fifth degree. Two others have reference to riors; this is called abundant humility. The third degree is words, namely that one should not be in a hurry to speak, to subject ourselves to inferiors, and in this is perfect righ- which pertains to the fourth degree, and that one be not teousness.” Therefore the aforesaid degrees would seem immoderate in speech, which refers to the second. The to be too numerous. others have to do with outward gestures, for instance in ∗ St. Thomas gives these degrees in the reverse order to that followed by St. Benedict 1913 restraining haughty looks, which regards the first, and in Anselm are reducible to knowledge, avowal, and desire outwardly checking laughter and other signs of senseless of one’s own abasement. For the first degree belongs to mirth, and this belongs to the third degree. the knowledge of one’s own deficiency; but since it would Reply to Objection 1. It is possible, without false- be wrong for one to love one’s own failings, this is ex- hood, to deem and avow oneself the most despicable of cluded by the second degree. The third and fourth de- men, as regards the hidden faults which we acknowledge grees regard the avowal of one’s own deficiency; namely in ourselves, and the hidden gifts of God which others that not merely one simply assert one’s failing, but that have. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. lii): “Bethink one convince another of it. The other three degrees have you that some persons are in some hidden way better than to do with the appetite, which seeks, not outward excel- you, although outwardly you are better than they.” Again, lence, but outward abasement, or bears it with equanimity, without falsehood one may avow and believe oneself in whether it consist of words or deeds. For as Gregory says all ways unprofitable and useless in respect of one’s own (Regist. ii, 10, Ep. 36), “there is nothing great in being capability, so as to refer all one’s sufficiency to God, ac- humble towards those who treat us with regard, for even cording to 2 Cor. 3:5, “Not that we are sufficient to think worldly people do this: but we should especially be hum- anything of ourselves as of ourselves: but our sufficiency ble towards those who make us suffer,” and this belongs is from God.” And there is nothing unbecoming in ascrib- to the fifth and sixth degrees: or the appetite may even go ing to humility those things that pertain to other virtues, so far as lovingly to embrace external abasement, and this since, just as one vice arises from another, so, by a natural pertains to the seventh degree; so that all these degrees are sequence, the act of one virtue proceeds from the act of comprised under the sixth and seventh mentioned above. another. Reply to Objection 4. These degrees refer, not to the Reply to Objection 2. Man arrives at humility in two thing itself, namely the nature of humility, but to the de- ways. First and chiefly by a gift of grace, and in this way grees among men, who are either of higher or lower or of the inner man precedes the outward man. The other way is equal degree. by human effort, whereby he first of all restrains the out- Reply to Objection 5. This argument also considers ward man, and afterwards succeeds in plucking out the the degrees of humility not according to the nature of the inward root. It is according to this order that the degrees thing, in respect of which the aforesaid degrees are as- of humility are here enumerated. signed, but according to the various conditions of men. Reply to Objection 3. All the degrees mentioned by 1914 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 162 Of Pride (In Eight Articles) We must next consider pride, and (1) pride in general; (2) the first man’s sin, which we hold to have been pride. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether pride is a sin? (2) Whether it is a special vice? (3) Wherein does it reside as in its subject? (4) Of its species; (5) Whether it is a mortal sin? (6) Whether it is the most grievous of all sins? (7) Of its relation to other sins; (8) Whether it should be reckoned a capital vice? Whether pride is a sin? IIa IIae q. 162 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that pride is not a sin. For stood in two ways. First, as overpassing [supergreditur] no sin is the object of God’s promise. For God’s promises the rule of reason, and in this sense we say that it is a sin. refer to what He will do; and He is not the author of sin. Secondly, it may simply denominate “super-abundance”; Now pride is numbered among the Divine promises: for in which sense any super-abundant thing may be called it is written (Is. 60:15): “I will make thee to be an ever- pride: and it is thus that God promises pride as signifi- lasting pride [Douay: ‘glory’], a joy unto generation and cant of super-abundant good. Hence a gloss of Jerome on generation.” Therefore pride is not a sin. the same passage (Is. 61:6) says that “there is a good and Objection 2. Further, it is not a sin to wish to be an evil pride”; or “a sinful pride which God resists, and a like unto God: for every creature has a natural desire for pride that denotes the glory which He bestows.” this; and especially does this become the rational creature It may also be replied that pride there signifies abun- which is made to God’s image and likeness. Now it is dance of those things in which men may take pride. said in Prosper’s Lib. Sent. 294, that “pride is love of Reply to Objection 2. Reason has the direction of one’s own excellence, whereby one is likened to God who those things for which man has a natural appetite; so that is supremely excellent.” Hence Augustine says (Confess. if the appetite wander from the rule of reason, whether by ii, 6): “Pride imitates exaltedness; whereas Thou alone art excess or by default, it will be sinful, as is the case with God exalted over all.” Therefore pride is not a sin. the appetite for food which man desires naturally. Now Objection 3. Further, a sin is opposed not only to a pride is the appetite for excellence in excess of right rea- virtue but also to a contrary vice, as the Philosopher states son. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13) that (Ethic. ii, 8). But no vice is found to be opposed to pride. pride is the “desire for inordinate exaltation”: and hence it Therefore pride is not a sin. is that, as he asserts (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13; xix, 12), “pride On the contrary, It is written (Tob. 4:14): “Never imitates God inordinately: for it hath equality of fellow- suffer pride to reign in thy mind or in thy words.” ship under Him, and wishes to usurp Hi. dominion over I answer that, Pride [superbia] is so called because our fellow-creatures.” a man thereby aims higher [supra] than he is; wherefore Reply to Objection 3. Pride is directly opposed to Isidore says (Etym. x): “A man is said to be proud, be- the virtue of humility, which, in a way, is concerned about cause he wishes to appear above (super) what he really the same matter as magnanimity, as stated above (q. 161, is”; for he who wishes to overstep beyond what he is, is a. 1, ad 3). Hence the vice opposed to pride by default proud. Now right reason requires that every man’s will is akin to the vice of pusillanimity, which is opposed by should tend to that which is proportionate to him. There- default to magnanimity. For just as it belongs to magna- fore it is evident that pride denotes something opposed to nimity to urge the mind to great things against despair, so right reason, and this shows it to have the character of sin, it belongs to humility to withdraw the mind from the in- because according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 4), “the ordinate desire of great things against presumption. Now soul’s evil is to be opposed to reason.” Therefore it is evi- pusillanimity, if we take it for a deficiency in pursuing dent that pride is a sin. great things, is properly opposed to magnanimity by de- Reply to Objection 1. Pride [superbia] may be under- fault; but if we take it for the mind’s attachment to things 1915 beneath what is becoming to a man, it is opposed to hu-to great things inordinately. Since, however, pride implies mility by default; since each proceeds from a smallness a certain elation, it is more directly opposed to humility, of mind. In the same way, on the other hand, pride may even as pusillanimity, which denotes littleness of soul in be opposed by excess, both to magnanimity and humility, tending towards great things, is more directly opposed to from different points of view: to humility, inasmuch as it magnanimity. scorns subjection, to magnanimity, inasmuch as it tends Whether pride is a special sin? IIa IIae q. 162 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that pride is not a special sired. Secondly, indirectly and accidentally as it were, sin. For Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that “you that is by removing an obstacle, since pride makes a man will find no sin that is not labelled pride”; and Prosper despise the Divine law which hinders him from sinning, says (De Vita Contempl. iii, 2) that “without pride no sin according to Jer. 2:20, “Thou hast broken My yoke, thou is, or was, or ever will be possible.” Therefore pride is a hast burst My bands, and thou saidst: I will not serve.” general sin. It must, however, be observed that this generic char- Objection 2. Further, a gloss on Job 33:17, “That acter of pride admits of the possibility of all vices arising He may withdraw man from wickedness∗,” says that “a from pride sometimes, but it does not imply that all vices man prides himself when he transgresses His command- originate from pride always. For though one may break ments by sin.” Now according to Ambrose†, “every sin the commandments of the Law by any kind of sin, through is a transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience contempt which pertains to pride, yet one does not always of the heavenly commandments.” Therefore every sin is break the Divine commandments through contempt, but pride. sometimes through ignorance. and sometimes through Objection 3. Further, every special sin is opposed to weakness: and for this reason Augustine says (De Nat. a special virtue. But pride is opposed to all the virtues, et Grat. xxix) that “many things are done amiss which are for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23): “Pride is by no not done through pride.” means content with the destruction of one virtue; it raises Reply to Objection 1. These words are introduced itself up against all the powers of the soul, and like an by Augustine into his book De Nat. et Grat., not as be- all-pervading and poisonous disease corrupts the whole ing his own, but as those of someone with whom he is body”; and Isidore says (Etym.‡) that it is “the downfall arguing. Hence he subsequently disproves the assertion, of all virtues.” Therefore pride is not a special sin. and shows that not all sins are committed through pride. Objection 4. Further, every special sin has a special We might, however, reply that these authorities must be matter. Now pride has a general matter, for Gregory says understood as referring to the outward effect of pride, (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that “one man is proud of his gold, an- namely the breaking of the commandments, which applies other of his eloquence: one is elated by mean and earthly to every sin, and not to the inward act of pride, namely things, another by sublime and heavenly virtues.” There- contempt of the commandment. For sin is committed, not fore pride is not a special but a general sin. always through contempt, but sometimes through igno- On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. rance, sometimes through weakness, as stated above. xxix): “If he look into the question carefully, he will find Reply to Objection 2. A man may sometimes com- that, according to God’s law, pride is a very different sin mit a sin effectively, but not affectively; thus he who, in from other vices.” Now the genus is not different from its ignorance, slays his father, is a parricide effectively, but species. Therefore pride is not a general but a special sin. not affectively, since he did not intend it. Accordingly I answer that, The sin of pride may be considered in he who breaks God’s commandment is said to pride him- two ways. First with regard to its proper species, which it self against God, effectively always, but not always affec- has under the aspect of its proper object. In this way pride tively. is a special sin, because it has a special object: for it is Reply to Objection 3. A sin may destroy a virtue in inordinate desire of one’s own excellence, as stated (a. 1, two ways. In one way by direct contrariety to a virtue, and ad 2). Secondly, it may be considered as having a certain thus pride does not corrupt every virtue, but only humil- influence towards other sins. In this way it has somewhat ity; even as every special sin destroys the special virtue of a generic character, inasmuch as all sins may arise from opposed to it, by acting counter thereto. In another way pride, in two ways. First directly, through other sins being a sin destroys a virtue, by making ill use of that virtue: directed to the end of pride which is one’s own excellence, and thus pride destroys every virtue, in so far as it finds an to which may be directed anything that is inordinately de- occasion of pride in every virtue, just as in everything else ∗ Vulg.: ‘From the things that he is doing, and may deliver him from pride’ † De Parad. viii ‡ De Summo Bono ii, 38 1916 pertaining to excellence. Hence it does not follow that it in its object, which aspect may be found in various matis a general sin. ters: for it is inordinate love of one’s excellence, and ex- Reply to Objection 4. Pride regards a special aspect cellence may be found in various things. Whether the subject of pride is the irascible faculty? IIa IIae q. 162 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the subject of pride Consequently if the difficult thing which is the object is not the irascible faculty. For Gregory says (Moral. of pride, were merely some sensible object, whereto the xxiii, 17): “A swollen mind is an obstacle to truth, for sensitive appetite might tend, pride would have to be in the the swelling shuts out the light.” Now the knowledge of irascible which is part of the sensitive appetite. But since truth pertains, not to the irascible but to the rational fac- the difficult thing which pride has in view is common ulty. Therefore pride is not in the irascible. both to sensible and to spiritual things, we must needs say Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 8) that the subject of pride is the irascible not only strictly that “the proud observe other people’s conduct not so as to so called, as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also in set themselves beneath them with humility, but so as to set its wider acceptation, as applicable to the intellective ap- themselves above them with pride”: wherefore it would petite. Wherefore pride is ascribed also to the demons. seem that pride originates in undue observation. Now ob- Reply to Objection 1. Knowledge of truth is twofold. servation pertains not to the irascible but to the rational One is purely speculative, and pride hinders this indirectly faculty. by removing its cause. For the proud man subjects not his Objection 3. Further. pride seeks pre-eminence not intellect to God, that he may receive the knowledge of only in sensible things, but also in spiritual and intelligi- truth from Him, according to Mat. 11:25, “Thou hast hid ble things: while it consists essentially in the contempt of these things from the wise and the prudent,” i.e. from the God, according to Ecclus. 10:14, “The beginning of the proud, who are wise and prudent in their own eyes, “and pride of man is to fall off from God.” Now the irascible, hast revealed them to little ones,” i.e. to the humble. since it is a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot extend to Nor does he deign to learn anything from man, God and things intelligible. Therefore pride cannot be in whereas it is written (Ecclus. 6:34): “If thou wilt incline the irascible. thy ear, thou shalt receive instruction.” The other knowl- Objection 4. Further, as stated in Prosper’s Liber Sen- edge of truth is affective, and this is directly hindered by tentiarum, sent. 294, “Pride is love of one’s own excel- pride, because the proud, through delighting in their own lence.” But love is not in the irascible, but in the concu- excellence, disdain the excellence of truth; thus Gregory piscible. Therefore pride is not in the irascible. says (Moral. xxiii, 17) that “the proud, although certain On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. ii, 49) opposes hidden truths be conveyed to their understanding, cannot pride to the gift of fear. Now fear belongs to the irasci- realize their sweetness: and if they know of them they can- ble. Therefore pride is in the irascible. not relish them.” Hence it is written (Prov. 11:2): “Where I answer that, The subject of any virtue or vice is humility is there also is wisdom.” to be ascertained from its proper object: for the object Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 161, Aa. 2, of a habit or act cannot be other than the object of the 6), humility observes the rule of right reason whereby a power, which is the subject of both. Now the proper object man has true self-esteem. Now pride does not observe of pride is something difficult, for pride is the desire of this rule of right reason, for he esteems himself greater one’s own excellence, as stated above (Aa. 1,2). Where- than he is: and this is the outcome of an inordinate desire fore pride must needs pertain in some way to the irascible for his own excellence, since a man is ready to believe faculty. Now the irascible may be taken in two ways. First what he desires very much, the result being that his ap- in a strict sense, and thus it is a part of the sensitive ap- petite is borne towards things higher than what become petite, even as anger, strictly speaking, is a passion of the him. Consequently whatsoever things lead a man to in- sensitive appetite. Secondly, the irascible may be taken ordinate self-esteem lead him to pride: and one of those in a broader sense, so as to belong also to the intellective is the observing of other people’s failings, just as, on the appetite, to which also anger is sometimes ascribed. It other hand, in the words of Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 17), is thus that we attribute anger to God and the angels, not “holy men, by a like observation of other people’s virtues, as a passion, but as denoting the sentence of justice pro- set others above themselves.” Accordingly the conclusion nouncing judgment. Nevertheless the irascible understood is not that pride is in the rational faculty, but that one of in this broad sense is not distinct from the concupiscible its causes is in the reason. power, as stated above in the Ia, q. 59, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 82, Reply to Objection 3. Pride is in the irascible, not a. 5, ad 1 and 2. only as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also as having 1917 a more general signification, as stated above. denote any of the other emotions. It is in this sense that Reply to Objection 4. According to Augustine (De pride is said to be “love of one’s own excellence,” inas- Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), “love precedes all other emotions of the much as love makes a man presume inordinately on his soul, and is their cause,” wherefore it may be employed to superiority over others, and this belongs properly to pride. Whether the four species of pride are fittingly assigned by Gregory? IIa IIae q. 162 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that the four species of pride are First, in itself. For it is evident that the greater the good unfittingly assigned by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxiii, that one has, the greater the excellence that one derives 6): “There are four marks by which every kind of pride from it. Hence when a man ascribes to himself a good of the arrogant betrays itself; either when they think that greater than what he has, it follows that his appetite tends their good is from themselves, or if they believe it to be to his own excellence in a measure exceeding his compe- from above, yet they think that it is due to their own mer- tency: and thus we have the third species of pride, namely its; or when they boast of having what they have not, or “boasting of having what one has not.” despise others and wish to appear the exclusive posses- Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its sors of what they have.” For pride is a vice distinct from cause, in so far as to have a thing of oneself is more excel- unbelief, just as humility is a distinct virtue from faith. lent than to have it of another. Hence when a man esteems Now it pertains to unbelief, if a man deem that he has not the good he has received of another as though he had it of received his good from God, or that he has the good of himself, the result is that his appetite is borne towards his grace through his own merits. Therefore this should not own excellence immoderately. Now one is cause of one’s be reckoned a species of pride. own good in two ways, efficiently and meritoriously: and Objection 2. Further, the same thing should not be thus we have the first two species of pride, namely “when reckoned a species of different genera. Now boasting is a man thinks he has from himself that which he has from reckoned a species of lying, as stated above (q. 110, a. 2; God,” or “when he believes that which he has received q. 112). Therefore it should not be accounted a species of from above to be due to his own merits.” pride. Thirdly, it may be considered with regard to the man- Objection 3. Further, some other things apparently ner of having it, in so far as a man obtains greater ex- pertain to pride, which are not mentioned here. For cellence through possessing some good more excellently Jerome∗ says that “nothing is so indicative of pride as to than other men; the result again being that his appetite is show oneself ungrateful”: and Augustine says (De Civ. borne inordinately towards his own excellence: and thus Dei xiv, 14) that “it belongs to pride to excuse oneself of a we have the fourth species of pride, which is “when a man sin one has committed.” Again, presumption whereby one despises others and wishes to be singularly conspicuous.” aims at having what is above one, would seem to have Reply to Objection 1. A true judgment may be de- much to do with pride. Therefore the aforesaid division stroyed in two ways. First, universally: and thus in mat- does not sufficiently account for the different species of ters of faith, a true judgment is destroyed by unbelief. pride. Secondly, in some particular matter of choice, and unbe- Objection 4. Further, we find other divisions of pride. lief does not do this. Thus a man who commits forni- For Anselm† divides the uplifting of pride, saying that cation, judges that for the time being it is good for him there is “pride of will, pride of speech, end pride of deed.” to commit fornication; yet he is not an unbeliever, as he Bernard‡ also reckons twelve degrees of pride, namely would be, were he to say that universally fornication is “curiosity, frivolity of mind, senseless mirth, boasting, good. It is thus in the question in point: for it pertains to singularity, arrogance, presumption, defense of one’s sins, unbelief to assert universally that there is a good which is deceitful confession, rebelliousness, license, sinful habit.” not from God, or that grace is given to men for their mer- Now these apparently are not comprised under the species its, whereas, properly speaking, it belongs to pride and not mentioned by Gregory. Therefore the latter would seem to to unbelief, through inordinate desire of one’s own excel- be assigned unfittingly. lence, to boast of one’s goods as though one had them of On the contrary, The authority of Gregory suffices. oneself, or of one’s own merits. I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,2,3), pride de- Reply to Objection 2. Boasting is reckoned a species notes immoderate desire of one’s own excellence, a de- of lying, as regards the outward act whereby a man falsely sire, to wit, that is not in accord with right reason. Now it ascribes to himself what he has not: but as regards the in- must be observed that all excellence results from a good ward arrogance of the heart it is reckoned by Gregory to possessed. Such a good may be considered in three ways. be a species of pride. ∗ Reference unknown † Eadmer, De Similit. xxii, seqq. ‡ De Grad. Humil. et Superb. x, seqq. 1918 Reply to Objection 3. The ungrateful man ascribes to opposed “boasting”. The fifth degree of humility is “to himself what he has from another: wherefore the first two do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common species of pride pertain to ingratitude. To excuse oneself rule of the monastery,” to which is opposed “singularity,” of a sin one has committed, belongs to the third species, whereby a man wishes to seem more holy than others. since by so doing a man ascribes to himself the good of The sixth degree of humility is “to believe and acknowl- innocence which he has not. To aim presumptuously at edge oneself viler than all,” to which is opposed “arro- what is above one, would seem to belong chiefly to the gance,” whereby a man sets himself above others. The fourth species, which consists in wishing to be preferred seventh degree of humility is “to think oneself worthless to others. and unprofitable for all purposes,” to which is opposed Reply to Objection 4. The three mentioned by “presumption,” whereby a man thinks himself capable of Anselm correspond to the progress of any particular sin: things that are above him. The eighth degree of humility for it begins by being conceived in thought, then is uttered is “to confess one’s sins,” to which is opposed “defense in word, and thirdly is accomplished in deed. of one’s sins.” The ninth degree is “to embrace patience The twelve degrees mentioned by Bernard are reck- by obeying under difficult and contrary circumstances,” to oned by way of opposition to the twelve degrees of hu- which is opposed “deceitful confession,” whereby a man mility, of which we have spoken above (q. 161, a. 6). For being unwilling to be punished for his sins confesses them the first degree of humility is to “be humble in heart, and deceitfully. The tenth degree of humility is “obedience,” to show it in one’s very person, one’s eyes fixed on the to which is opposed “rebelliousness.” The eleventh de- ground”: and to this is opposed “curiosity,” which con- gree of humility is “not to delight in fulfilling one’s own sists in looking around in all directions curiously and in- desires”; to this is opposed “license,” whereby a man de- ordinately. The second degree of humility is “to speak lights in doing freely whatever he will. The last degree of few and sensible words, and not to be loud of voice”: humility is “fear of God”: to this is opposed “the habit of to this is opposed “frivolity of mind,” by which a man sinning,” which implies contempt of God. is proud of speech. The third degree of humility is “not In these twelve degrees not only are the species of to be easily moved and disposed to laughter,” to which is pride indicated, but also certain things that precede and opposed “senseless mirth.” The fourth degree of humil- follow them, as we have stated above with regard to hu- ity is “to maintain silence until one is asked,” to which is mility (q. 161, a. 6). Whether pride is a mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 162 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that pride is not a mortal mility properly regards the subjection of man to God, as sin. For a gloss on Ps. 7:4, “O Lord my God, if I have stated above (q. 161, a. 1, ad 5). Hence pride properly done this thing,” says: “Namely, the universal sin which regards lack of this subjection, in so far as a man raises is pride.” Therefore if pride were a mortal sin, so would himself above that which is appointed to him according every sin be. to the Divine rule or measure, against the saying of the Objection 2. Further, every mortal sin is contrary to Apostle (2 Cor. 10:13), “But we will not glory beyond our charity. But pride is apparently not contrary to charity, measure; but according to the measure of the rule which neither as to the love of God, nor as to the love of one’s God hath measured to us.” Wherefore it is written (Ec- neighbor, because the excellence which, by pride, one de- clus. 10:14): “The beginning of the pride of man is to fall sires inordinately, is not always opposed to God’s honor, off from God” because, to wit, the root of pride is found to or our neighbor’s good. Therefore pride is not a mortal consist in man not being, in some way, subject to God and sin. His rule. Now it is evident that not to be subject to God is Objection 3. Further, every mortal sin is opposed to of its very nature a mortal sin, for this consists in turning virtue. But pride is not opposed to virtue; on the contrary, away from God: and consequently pride is, of its genus, it arises therefrom, for as Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, a mortal sin. Nevertheless just as in other sins which are 23), “sometimes a man is elated by sublime and heavenly mortal by their genus (for instance fornication and adul- virtues.” Therefore pride is not a mortal sin. tery) there are certain motions that are venial by reason of On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) their imperfection (through forestalling the judgment of that “pride is a most evident sign of the reprobate, and reason, and being without its consent), so too in the mat- contrariwise, humility of the elect.” But men do not be- ter of pride it happens that certain motions of pride are come reprobate on account of venial sins. Therefore pride venial sins, when reason does not consent to them. is not a venial but a mortal sin. Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 2) pride is I answer that, Pride is opposed to humility. Now hu- a general sin, not by its essence but by a kind of influence, 1919 in so far as all sins may have their origin in pride. Hence this again is a transgression of the Divine rule, which has it does not follow that all sins are mortal, but only such established order among men, so that one ought to be sub- as arise from perfect pride, which we have stated to be a ject to another. mortal sin. Reply to Objection 3. Pride arises from virtue, not as Reply to Objection 2. Pride is always contrary to the from its direct cause, but as from an accidental cause, in love of God, inasmuch as the proud man does not subject so far as a man makes a virtue an occasion for pride. And himself to the Divine rule as he ought. Sometimes it is nothing prevents one contrary from being the accidental also contrary to the love of our neighbor; when, namely, cause of another, as stated in Phys. viii, 1. Hence some a man sets himself inordinately above his neighbor: and are even proud of their humility. Whether pride is the most grievous of sins? IIa IIae q. 162 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that pride is not the most a consequence as it were in other sins, belongs to pride grievous of sins. For the more difficult a sin is to avoid, the by its very nature, for its act is the contempt of God. And less grievous it would seem to be. Now pride is most dif- since that which belongs to a thing by its nature is always ficult to avoid; for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), of greater weight than that which belongs to it through “Other sins find their vent in the accomplishment of evil something else, it follows that pride is the most grievous deeds, whereas pride lies in wait for good deeds to destroy of sins by its genus, because it exceeds in aversion which them.” Therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins. is the formal complement of sin. Objection 2. Further, “The greater evil is opposed to Reply to Objection 1. A sin is difficult to avoid in the greater good,” as the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. viii, two ways. First, on account of the violence of its on- 10). Now humility to which pride is opposed is not the slaught; thus anger is violent in its onslaught on account greatest of virtues, as stated above (q. 61, a. 5). There- of its impetuosity; and “still more difficult is it to resist fore the vices that are opposed to greater virtues, such as concupiscence, on account of its connaturality,” as stated unbelief, despair, hatred of God, murder, and so forth, are in Ethic. ii, 3,9. A difficulty of this kind in avoiding more grievous sins than pride. sin diminishes the gravity of the sin; because a man sins Objection 3. Further, the greater evil is not punished the more grievously, according as he yields to a less im- by a lesser evil. But pride is sometimes punished by other petuous temptation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, sins according to Rom. 1:28, where it is stated that on 12,15). account of their pride of heart, men of science were de- Secondly, it is difficult to avoid a sin, on account of livered “to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are its being hidden. In this way it is difficult to avoid pride, not convenient.” Therefore pride is not the most grievous since it takes occasion even from good deeds, as stated of sins. (a. 5, ad 3). Hence Augustine says pointedly that it “lies On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 118:51, “The proud in wait for good deeds”; and it is written (Ps. 141:4): did iniquitously,” says: “The greatest sin in man is pride.” “In the way wherein I walked, the proud† [Vulg.: ‘they’] I answer that, Two things are to be observed in sin, have hidden a snare for me.” Hence no very great gravity conversion to a mutable good, and this is the material attaches to the movement of pride while creeping in se- part of sin; and aversion from the immutable good, and cretly, and before it is discovered by the judgment of rea- this gives sin its formal aspect and complement. Now on son: but once discovered by reason, it is easily avoided, the part of the conversion, there is no reason for pride both by considering one’s own infirmity, according to Ec- being the greatest of sins, because uplifting which pride clus. 10:9, “Why is earth and ashes proud?” and by con- covets inordinately, is not essentially most incompatible sidering God’s greatness, according to Job 15:13, “Why with the good of virtue. But on the part of the aver- doth thy spirit swell against God?” as well as by consid- sion, pride has extreme gravity, because in other sins man ering the imperfection of the goods on which man prides turns away from God, either through ignorance or through himself, according to Is. 40:6, “All flesh is grass, and all weakness, or through desire for any other good whatever; the glory thereof as the flower of the field”; and farther on whereas pride denotes aversion from God simply through (Is. 64:6), “all our justices” are become “like the rag of a being unwilling to be subject to God and His rule. Hence menstruous woman.” Boethius∗ says that “while all vices flee from God, pride Reply to Objection 2. Opposition between a vice and alone withstands God”; for which reason it is specially a virtue is inferred from the object, which is considered stated (James 4:6) that “God resisteth the proud.” Where- on the part of conversion. In this way pride has no claim fore aversion from God and His commandments, which is to be the greatest of sins, as neither has humility to be ∗ Cf. Cassian, de Caenob. Inst. xii, 7 † Cf. Ps. 139:6, ‘The proud have hidden a net for me.’ 1920 the greatest of virtues. But it is the greatest on the part those who are of highest and foremost rank, or because it of aversion, since it brings greatness upon other sins. For originates from just and virtuous deeds, so that its guilt is unbelief, by the very fact of its arising out of proud con- less perceptible. on the other hand, carnal lust is apparent tempt, is rendered more grievous than if it be the outcome to all, because from the outset it is of a shameful nature: of ignorance or weakness. The same applies to despair and yet, under God’s dispensation, it is less grievous than and the like. pride. For he who is in the clutches of pride and feels it Reply to Objection 3. Just as in syllogisms that lead not, falls into the lusts of the flesh, that being thus hum- to an impossible conclusion one is sometimes convinced bled he may rise from his abasement.” by being faced with a more evident absurdity, so too, in or- From this indeed the gravity of pride is made mani- der to overcome their pride, God punishes certain men by fest. For just as a wise physician, in order to cure a worse allowing them to fall into sins of the flesh, which though disease, allows the patient to contract one that is less dan- they be less grievous are more evidently shameful. Hence gerous, so the sin of pride is shown to be more grievous Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 38) that “pride is the by the very fact that, as a remedy, God allows men to fall worst of all vices; whether because it is appropriate to into other sins. Whether pride is the first sin of all? IIa IIae q. 162 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that pride is not the first pride, but because any kind of sin is naturally liable to sin of all. For the first is maintained in all that follows. arise from pride. Now pride does not accompany all sins, nor is it the origin Reply to Objection 2. To fall off from God is said of all: for Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xx) that many to be the beginning of pride, not as though it were a dis- things are done “amiss which are not done with pride.” tinct sin from pride, but as being the first part of pride. Therefore pride is not the first sin of all. For it has been said above (a. 5) that pride regards chiefly Objection 2. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 10:14) that subjection to God which it scorns, and in consequence it the “beginning of. . . pride is to fall off from God.” There- scorns to be subject to a creature for God’s sake. fore falling away from God precedes pride. Reply to Objection 3. There is no need for the or- Objection 3. Further, the order of sins would seem to der of virtues to be the same as that of vices. For vice is be according to the order of virtues. Now, not humility corruptive of virtue. Now that which is first to be gen- but faith is the first of all virtues. Therefore pride is not erated is the last to be corrupted. Wherefore as faith is the first sin of all. the first of virtues, so unbelief is the last of sins, to which Objection 4. Further, it is written (2 Tim. 3:13): sometimes man is led by other sins. Hence a gloss on Ps. “Evil men and seducers shall grow worse and worse”; so 136:7, “Rase it, rase it, even to the foundation thereof,” that apparently man’s beginning of wickedness is not the says that “by heaping vice upon vice a man will lapse into greatest of sins. But pride is the greatest of sins as stated unbelief,” and the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:19) that “some in the foregoing Article. Therefore pride is not the first rejecting a good conscience have made shipwreck con- sin. cerning the faith.” Objection 5. Further, resemblance and pretense come Reply to Objection 4. Pride is said to be the most after the reality. Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) grievous of sins because that which gives sin its gravity that “pride apes fortitude and daring.” Therefore the vice is essential to pride. Hence pride is the cause of gravity of daring precedes the vice of pride. in other sins. Accordingly previous to pride there may be On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): “Pride certain less grievous sins that are committed through igno- is the beginning of all sin.” rance or weakness. But among the grievous sins the first is I answer that, The first thing in every genus is that pride, as the cause whereby other sins are rendered more which is essential. Now it has been stated above (a. 6) grievous. And as that which is the first in causing sins is that aversion from God, which is the formal complement the last in the withdrawal from sin, a gloss on Ps. 18:13, of sin, belongs to pride essentially, and to other sins, con- “I shall be cleansed from the greatest sin,” says: “Namely sequently. Hence it is that pride fulfils the conditions of from the sin of pride, which is the last in those who return a first thing, and is “the beginning of all sins,” as stated to God, and the first in those who withdraw from God.” above ( Ia IIae, q. 84, a. 2), when we were treating of the Reply to Objection 5. The Philosopher associates causes of sin on the part of the aversion which is the chief pride with feigned fortitude, not that it consists precisely part of sin. in this, but because man thinks he is more likely to be Reply to Objection 1. Pride is said to be “the begin- uplifted before men, if he seem to be daring or brave. ning of all sin,” not as though every sin originated from 1921 Whether pride should be reckoned a capital vice? IIa IIae q. 162 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that pride should be reck- fore some, considering pride in the light of a special sin, oned a capital vice, since Isidore∗ and Cassian† number numbered it together with the other capital vices. But pride among the capital vices. Gregory, taking into consideration its general influence Objection 2. Further, pride is apparently the same as towards all vices, as explained above (a. 2, obj. 3), did vainglory, since both covet excellence. Now vainglory is not place it among the capital vices, but held it to be reckoned a capital vice. Therefore pride also should be the “queen and mother of all the vices.” Hence he says reckoned a capital vice. (Moral. xxxi, 45): “Pride, the queen of vices, when it has Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. vanquished and captured the heart, forthwith delivers it xxxi) that “pride begets envy, nor is it ever without this into the hands of its lieutenants the seven principal vices, companion.” Now envy is reckoned a capital vice, as that they may despoil it and produce vices of all kinds.” stated above (q. 36, a. 4). Much more therefore is pride a This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. capital vice. Reply to Objection 2. Pride is not the same as vain- On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) does not glory, but is the cause thereof: for pride covets excellence include pride among the capital vices. inordinately: while vainglory covets the outward show of I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 2,5, ad 1) pride excellence. may be considered in two ways; first in itself, as being Reply to Objection 3. The fact that envy, which is a a special sin; secondly, as having a general influence to- capital vice, arises from pride, does not prove that pride wards all sins. Now the capital vices are said to be certain is a capital vice, but that it is still more principal than the special sins from which many kinds of sin arise. Where-capital vices themselves. ∗ Comment. in Deut. xvi † De Inst. Caenob. v, 1: Collat. v, 2 1922 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 163 Of the First Man’s Sin (In Four Articles) We must now consider the first man’s sin which was pride: and (1) his sin; (2) its punishment; (3) the temptation whereby he was led to sin. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether pride was the first man’s first sin? (2) What the first man coveted by sinning? (3) Whether his sin was more grievous than all other sins? (4) Which sinned more grievously, the man or the woman? Whether pride was the first man’s first sin? IIa IIae q. 163 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that pride was not the first which inordinateness is first found. And it is evident that man’s first sin. For the Apostle says (Rom. 5:19) that “by inordinateness is in the inward movement of the soul be- the disobedience of one man many were made sinners.” fore being in the outward act of the body; since, as Augus- Now the first man’s first sin is the one by which all men tine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), the sanctity of the body is not were made sinners in the point of original sin. Therefore forfeited so long as the sanctity of the soul remains. Also, disobedience, and not pride, was the first man’s first sin. among the inward movements, the appetite is moved to- Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says, commenting on wards the end before being moved towards that which is Lk. 4:3, “And the devil said to Him,” that the devil in desired for the sake of the end; and consequently man’s tempting Christ observed the same order as in overcoming first sin was where it was possible for his appetite to be the first man. Now Christ was first tempted to gluttony, as directed to an inordinate end. Now man was so appointed appears from Mat. 4:3, where it was said to Him: “If thou in the state of innocence, that there was no rebellion of be the Son of God, command that these stones be made the flesh against the spirit. Wherefore it was not possible bread.” Therefore the first man’s first sin was not pride for the first inordinateness in the human appetite to result but gluttony. from his coveting a sensible good, to which the concu- Objection 3. Further, man sinned at the devil’s sug- piscence of the flesh tends against the order of reason. It gestion. Now the devil in tempting man promised him remains therefore that the first inordinateness of the hu- knowledge (Gn. 3:5). Therefore inordinateness in man man appetite resulted from his coveting inordinately some was through the desire of knowledge, which pertains to spiritual good. Now he would not have coveted it inordi- curiosity. Therefore curiosity, and not pride, was the first nately, by desiring it according to his measure as estab- sin. lished by the Divine rule. Hence it follows that man’s first Objection 4. Further, a gloss∗ on 1 Tim. 2:14, “The sin consisted in his coveting some spiritual good above his woman being seduced was in the transgression,” says: measure: and this pertains to pride. Therefore it is evident “The Apostle rightly calls this seduction, for they were that man’s first sin was pride. persuaded to accept a falsehood as being true; namely Reply to Objection 1. Man’s disobedience to the Di- that God had forbidden them to touch that tree, because vine command was not willed by man for his own sake, He knew that if they touched it, they would be like gods, for this could not happen unless one presuppose inordi- as though He who made them men, begrudged them the nateness in his will. It remains therefore that he willed godhead. . . ” Now it pertains to unbelief to believe such it for the sake of something else. Now the first thing he a thing. Therefore man’s first sin was unbelief and not coveted inordinately was his own excellence; and conse- pride. quently his disobedience was the result of his pride. This On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): “Pride agrees with the statement of Augustine, who says (Ad is the beginning of all sin.” Now man’s first sin is the be- Oros†) that “man puffed up with pride obeyed the ser- ginning of all sin, according to Rom. 5:12, “By one man pent’s prompting, and scorned God’s commands.” sin entered into this world.” Therefore man’s first sin was Reply to Objection 2. Gluttony also had a place in pride. the sin of our first parents. For it is written (Gn. 3:6): I answer that, Many movements may concur towards “The woman saw that the tree was good to eat, and fair to one sin, and the character of sin attaches to that one in the eyes, and delightful to behold, and she took of the fruit ∗ St. Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xi † Dial. QQ. lxv, qu. 4 1923 thereof, and did eat.” Yet the very goodness and beauty of Reply to Objection 4. According to Augustine (Gen. the fruit was not their first motive for sinning, but the per- ad lit. xi, 30), “the woman had not believed the serpent’s suasive words of the serpent, who said (Gn. 3:5): “Your statement that they were debarred by God from a good and eyes shall be opened and you shall be as Gods”: and it was useful thing, were her mind not already filled with the love by coveting this that the woman fell into pride. Hence the of her own power, and a certain proud self-presumption.” sin of gluttony resulted from the sin of pride. This does not mean that pride preceded the promptings of Reply to Objection 3. The desire for knowledge re- the serpent, but that as soon as the serpent had spoken his sulted in our first parents from their inordinate desire for words of persuasion, her mind was puffed up, the result excellence. Hence the serpent began by saying: “You being that she believed the demon to have spoken truly. shall be as Gods,” and added: “Knowing good and evil.” Whether the first man’s pride consisted in his coveting God’s likeness? IIa IIae q. 163 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the first man’s pride ing as an effect falls short of its cause.” Now every good did not consist in his coveting the Divine likeness. For no existing in a creature is a participated likeness of the first one sins by coveting that which is competent to him ac- good. cording to his nature. Now God’s likeness is competent to Wherefore from the very fact that man coveted a spir- man according to his nature: for it is written (Gn. 1:26): itual good above his measure, as stated in the foregoing “Let us make man to our image and likeness.” Therefore Article, it follows that he coveted God’s likeness inordi- he did not sin by coveting God’s likeness. nately. Objection 2. Further, it would seem that man coveted It must, however, be observed that the proper object of God’s likeness in order that he might obtain knowledge of the appetite is a thing not possessed. Now spiritual good, good and evil: for this was the serpent’s suggestion: “You in so far as the rational creature participates in the Divine shall be as Gods knowing good and evil.” Now the desire likeness, may be considered in reference to three things. of knowledge is natural to man, according to the saying of First, as to natural being: and this likeness was imprinted the Philosopher at the beginning of his Metaphysics i, 1: from the very outset of their creation, both on man—of “All men naturally desire knowledge.” Therefore he did whom it is written (Gn. 1:26) that God made man “to not sin by coveting God’s likeness. His image and likeness”—and on the angel, of whom it Objection 3. Further, no wise man chooses the im- is written (Ezech. 28:12): “Thou wast the seal of resem- possible. Now the first man was endowed with wisdom, blance.” Secondly, as to knowledge: and this likeness was according to Ecclus. 17:5, “He filled them with the knowl- bestowed on the angel at his creation, wherefore immedi- edge of understanding.” Since then every sin consists in ately after the words just quoted, “Thou wast the seal of a deliberate act of the appetite, namely choice, it would resemblance,” we read: “Full of wisdom.” But the first seem that the first man did not sin by coveting something man, at his creation, had not yet received this likeness ac- impossible. But it is impossible for man to be like God, tually but only in potentiality. Thirdly, as to the power of according to the saying of Ex. 15:11, “Who is like to Thee operation: and neither angel nor man received this like- among the strong, O Lord?” Therefore the first man did ness actually at the very outset of his creation, because not sin by coveting God’s likeness. to each there remained something to be done whereby to On the contrary, Augustine commenting on Ps. obtain happiness. 68:5∗, “Then did I restore [Douay: ‘pay’] that which I Accordingly, while both (namely the devil and the took not away,” says: “Adam and Eve wished to rob the first man) coveted God’s likeness inordinately, neither of Godhead and they lost happiness.” them sinned by coveting a likeness of nature. But the I answer that, likeness is twofold. One is a likeness first man sinned chiefly by coveting God’s likeness as re- of absolute equality†: and such a likeness to God our first gards “knowledge of good and evil,” according to the ser- parents did not covet, since such a likeness to God is not pent’s instigation, namely that by his own natural power conceivable to the mind, especially of a wise man. he might decide what was good, and what was evil for The other is a likeness of imitation, such as is possible him to do; or again that he should of himself foreknow for a creature in reference to God, in so far as the creature what good and what evil would befall him. Secondarily participates somewhat of God’s likeness according to its he sinned by coveting God’s likeness as regards his own measure. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): “The same power of operation, namely that by his own natural power things are like and unlike to God; like, according as they he might act so as to obtain happiness. Hence Augustine imitate Him, as far as He can be imitated; unlike, accord- says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that “the woman’s mind was ∗ Enarr. in Ps. 68 † Cf. Ia, q. 93, a. 1 1924 filled with love of her own power.” On the other hand, the likeness as to knowledge, absolutely; but to covet this devil sinned by coveting God’s likeness, as regards power. likeness inordinately, that is, above one’s measure, this Wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 13) that “he is a sin. Hence Augustine commenting on Ps. 70:18, “O wished to enjoy his own power rather than God’s.” Nev- God, who is like Thee?” says: “He who desires to be of ertheless both coveted somewhat to be equal to God, in so himself, even as God is of no one, wishes wickedly to be far as each wished to rely on himself in contempt of the like God. Thus did the devil, who was unwilling to be order of the Divine rule. subject to Him, and man who refused to be, as a servant, Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers the bound by His command.” likeness of nature: and man did not sin by coveting this, Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the as stated. likeness of equality. Reply to Objection 2. It is not a sin to covet God’s Whether the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins? IIa IIae q. 163 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the sin of our first is more essential to sin and is of greater moment: hence parents was more grievous than other sins. For Augustine a sin is said to be grave in respect of this gravity rather says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15): “Great was the wickedness in than of the other. Accordingly we must say that the first sinning, when it was so easy to avoid sin.” Now it was man’s sin was not graver than all other sins of men, as re- very easy for our first parents to avoid sin, because they gards the species of the sin. For though pride, of its genus, had nothing within them urging them to sin. Therefore the has a certain pre-eminence over other sins, yet the pride sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins. whereby one denies or blasphemes God is greater than Objection 2. Further, punishment is proportionate to the pride whereby one covets God’s likeness inordinately, guilt. Now the sin of our first parents was most severely such as the pride of our first parents, as stated (a. 2). punished, since by it “death entered into this world,” as But if we consider the circumstances of the persons the Apostle says (Rom. 5:12). Therefore that sin was who sinned, that sin was most grave on account of the more grievous than other sins. perfection of their state. We must accordingly conclude Objection 3. Further, the first in every genus is seem- that this sin was most grievous relatively but not simply. ingly the greatest (Metaph. ii, 4∗). Now the sin of our first Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers the parents was the first among sins of men. Therefore it was gravity of sin as resulting from the person of the sinner. the greatest. Reply to Objection 2. The severity of the punishment On the contrary, Origen says†: “I think that a man awarded to that first sin corresponds to the magnitude of who stands on the highest step of perfection cannot fail or the sin, not as regards its species but as regards its being fall suddenly: this can happen only by degrees and little the first sin: because it destroyed the innocence of our by little.” Now our first parents were established on the original state, and by robbing it of innocence brought dis- highest and perfect grade. Therefore their first sin was not order upon the whole human nature. the greatest of all sins. Reply to Objection 3. Where things are directly sub- I answer that, There is a twofold gravity to be ob- ordinate, the first must needs be the greatest. Such is not served in sin. one results from the very species of the sin: the order among sins, for one follows from another acci- thus we say that adultery is a graver sin than simple for- dentally. And thus it does not follow that the first sin is nication. The other gravity of sin results from some cir- the greatest. cumstance of place, person, or time. The former gravity Whether Adam’s sin was more grievous than Eve’s? IIa IIae q. 163 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Adam’s sin was more of his lord. . . and did not according to his will, shall be grievous than Eve’s. For it is written (1 Tim. 2:14): beaten with many stripes: but he that knew not, and did “Adam was not seduced, but the woman being seduced things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes.” was in the transgression”: and so it would seem that the Therefore Adam’s sin was more grievous than Eve’s. woman sinned through ignorance, but the man through Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Decem assured knowledge. Now the latter is the graver sin, ac- Chordis 3‡): “If the man is the head, he should live bet- cording to Lk. 12:47,48, “That servant who knew the will ter, and give an example of good deeds to his wife, that ∗ Ed. Diel. i, 1 † Peri Archon i, 3 ‡ Serm. ix; xcvi de Temp. 1925 she may imitate him.” Now he who ought to do better, of desiring to obtain something against God’s will. On the sins more grievously, if he commit a sin. Therefore Adam other hand, the man did not believe this to be true; where- sinned more grievously than Eve. fore he did not wish to attain to God’s likeness against Objection 3. Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost God’s will: but his pride consisted in wishing to attain would seem to be the most grievous. Now Adam, appar- thereto by his own power. Secondly, the woman not only ently, sinned against the Holy Ghost, because while sin- herself sinned, but suggested sin to the man; wherefore ning he relied on God’s mercy∗, and this pertains to the she sinned against both God and her neighbor. Thirdly, sin of presumption. Therefore it seems that Adam sinned the man’s sin was diminished by the fact that, as Augus- more grievously than Eve. tine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 42), “he consented to the sin out On the contrary, Punishment corresponds to guilt. of a certain friendly good-will, on account of which a man Now the woman was more grievously punished than the sometimes will offend God rather than make an enemy of man, as appears from Gn. 3. Therefore she sinned more his friend. That he ought not to have done so is shown by grievously than the man. the just issue of the Divine sentence.” I answer that, As stated (a. 3), the gravity of a sin It is therefore evident that the woman’s sin was more depends on the species rather than on a circumstance of grievous than the man’s. that sin. Accordingly we must assert that, if we consider Reply to Objection 1. The woman was deceived be- the condition attaching to these persons, the man’s sin is cause she was first of all puffed up with pride. Wherefore the more grievous, because he was more perfect than the her ignorance did not excuse, but aggravated her sin, in woman. so far as it was the cause of her being puffed up with still As regards the genus itself of the sin, the sin of each greater pride. is considered to be equal, for each sinned by pride. Hence Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers the Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 35): “Eve in excusing circumstance of personal condition, on account of which herself betrays disparity of sex, though parity of pride.” the man’s sin was more grievous than the woman’s. But as regards the species of pride, the woman sinned Reply to Objection 3. The man’s reliance on God’s more grievously, for three reasons. First, because she was mercy did not reach to contempt of God’s justice, wherein more puffed up than the man. For the woman believed in consists the sin against the Holy Ghost, but as Augustine the serpent’s persuasive words, namely that God had for- says (Gen. ad lit. xi†), it was due to the fact that, “having bidden them to eat of the tree, lest they should become like had no experience of God’s severity, he thought the sin to to Him; so that in wishing to attain to God’s likeness by be venial,” i.e. easily forgiven‡. eating of the forbidden fruit, her pride rose to the height ∗ Cf. q. 21, a. 2, obj. 3. St. Thomas is evidently alluding to the words of Peter Lombard quoted there † De Civ. Dei xiv, 11 ‡ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 89, a. 3, ad 1 1926 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 164 Of the Punishments of the First Man’s Sin (In Two Articles) We must now consider the punishments of the first sin; and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Death, which is the common punishment; (2) the other particular punishments mentioned in Genesis. Whether death is the punishment of our first parents’ sin? IIa IIae q. 164 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that death is not the pun- On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): “By ishment of our first parents’ sin. For that which is natural one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death.” to man cannot be called a punishment of sin, because sin I answer that, If any one, on account of his fault, does not perfect nature but vitiates it. Now death is natu- be deprived of a favor bestowed on him the privation of ral to man: and this is evident both from the fact that his that favor is a punishment of that fault. Now as we stated body is composed of contraries, and because “mortal” is in the Ia, q. 95, a. 1; Ia, q. 97, a. 1, God bestowed this included in the definition of man. Therefore death is not a favor on man, in his primitive state, that as long as his punishment of our first parents’ sin. mind was subject to God, the lower powers of his soul Objection 2. Further, death and other bodily defects would be subject to his rational mind, and his body to his are similarly found in man as well as in other animals, ac- soul. But inasmuch as through sin man’s mind withdrew cording to Eccles. 3:19, “The death of man and of beasts from subjection to God, the result was that neither were is one, and the condition of them both equal.” But in dumb his lower powers wholly subject to his reason, whence animals death is not a punishment of sin. Therefore nei- there followed so great a rebellion of the carnal appetite ther is it so in men. against the reason: nor was the body wholly subject to the Objection 3. Further, the sin of our first parents was soul; whence arose death and other bodily defects. For life the sin of particular individuals: whereas death affects the and soundness of body depend on the body being subject entire human nature. Therefore it would seem that it is not to the soul, as the perfectible is subject to its perfection. a punishment of our first parents’ sin. Consequently, on the other hand, death, sickness, and all Objection 4. Further, all are equally descended from defects of the body are due to the lack of the body’s sub- our first parents. Therefore if death were the punishment jection to the soul. of our first parents’ sin, it would follow that all men would It is therefore evident that as the rebellion of the car- suffer death in equal measure. But this is clearly untrue, nal appetite against the spirit is a punishment of our first since some die sooner, and some more painfully, than oth- parents’ sin, so also are death and all defects of the body. ers. Therefore death is not the punishment of the first sin. Reply to Objection 1. A thing is said to be natural if Objection 5. Further, the evil of punishment is from it proceeds from the principles of nature. Now the essen- God, as stated above ( Ia, q. 48, a. 6; Ia, q. 49, a. 2). But tial principles of nature are form and matter. The form death, apparently, is not from God: for it is written (Wis. of man is his rational soul, which is, of itself, immor- 1:13): “God made not death.” Therefore death is not the tal: wherefore death is not natural to man on the part of punishment of the first sin. his form. The matter of man is a body such as is com- Objection 6. Further, seemingly, punishments are not posed of contraries, of which corruptibility is a necessary meritorious, since merit is comprised under good, and consequence, and in this respect death is natural to man. punishment under evil. Now death is sometimes meritori- Now this condition attached to the nature of the human ous, as in the case of a martyr’s death. Therefore it would body results from a natural necessity, since it was nec- seem that death is not a punishment. essary for the human body to be the organ of touch, and Objection 7. Further, punishment would seem to be consequently a mean between objects of touch: and this painful. But death apparently cannot be painful, since was impossible, were it not composed of contraries, as the man does not feel it when he is dead, and he cannot feel it Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 11). On the other hand, when he is not dying. Therefore death is not a punishment this condition is not attached to the adaptability of mat- of sin. ter to form because, if it were possible, since the form is Objection 8. Further, if death were a punishment of incorruptible, its matter should rather be incorruptible. In sin, it would have followed sin immediately. But this is the same way a saw needs to be of iron, this being suitable not true, for our first parents lived a long time after their to its form and action, so that its hardness may make it fit sin (Gn. 5:5). Therefore, seemingly, death is not a pun- for cutting. But that it be liable to rust is a necessary result ishment of sin. of such a matter and is not according to the agent’s choice; 1927 for, if the craftsman were able, of the iron he would make the Ia, q. 90, a. 4; Ia, q. 118, a. 3, namely that the soul a saw that would not rust. Now God Who is the author of is not created before the body: but either in punishment man is all-powerful, wherefore when He first made man, of their parents’ sins, inasmuch as the child is something He conferred on him the favor of being exempt from the belonging to the father, wherefore parents are often pun- necessity resulting from such a matter: which favor, how- ished in their children; or again it is for a remedy intended ever, was withdrawn through the sin of our first parents. for the spiritual welfare of the person who suffers these Accordingly death is both natural on account of a condi- penalties, to wit that he may thus be turned away from his tion attaching to matter, and penal on account of the loss sins, or lest he take pride in his virtues, and that he may of the Divine favor preserving man from death∗. be crowned for his patience. Reply to Objection 2. This likeness of man to other Reply to Objection 5. Death may be considered in animals regards a condition attaching to matter, namely two ways. First, as an evil of human nature, and thus it is the body being composed of contraries. But it does not not of God, but is a defect befalling man through his fault. regard the form, for man’s soul is immortal, whereas the Secondly, as having an aspect of good, namely as being a souls of dumb animals are mortal. just punishment, and thus it is from God. Wherefore Au- Reply to Objection 3. Our first parents were made by gustine says (Retract. i, 21) that God is not the author of God not only as particular individuals, but also as princi- death, except in so far as it is a punishment. ples of the whole human nature to be transmitted by them Reply to Objection 6. As Augustine says (De Civ. to their posterity, together with the Divine favor preserv- Dei xiii, 5), “just as the wicked abuse not only evil but ing them from death. Hence through their sin the entire also good things, so do the righteous make good use not human nature, being deprived of that favor in their poster- only of good but also of evil things. Hence it is that ity, incurred death. both evil men make evil use of the law, though the law Reply to Objection 4. A twofold defect arises from is good, while good men die well, although death is an sin. One is by way of a punishment appointed by a judge: evil.” Wherefore inasmuch as holy men make good use of and such a defect should be equal in those to whom the death, their death is to them meritorious. sin pertains equally. The other defect is that which re- Reply to Objection 7. Death may be considered in sults accidentally from this punishment; for instance, that two ways. First, as the privation of life, and thus death one who has been deprived of his sight for a sin he has cannot be felt, since it is the privation of sense and life. committed, should fall down in the road. Such a defect In this way it involves not pain of sense but pain of loss. is not proportionate to the sin, nor does a human judge Secondly, it may be considered as denoting the corruption take it into account, since he cannot foresee chance hap- which ends in the aforesaid privation. Now we may speak penings. Accordingly, the punishment appointed for the of corruption even as of generation in two ways: in one first sin and proportionately corresponding thereto, was way as being the term of alteration, and thus in the first the withdrawal of the Divine favor whereby the rectitude instant in which life departs, death is said to be present. and integrity of human nature was maintained. But the In this way also death has no pain of sense. In another defects resulting from this withdrawal are death and other way corruption may be taken as including the previous al- penalties of the present life. Wherefore these punishments teration: thus a person is said to die, when he is in motion need not be equal in those to whom the first sin equally towards death; just as a thing is said to be engendered, appertains. Nevertheless, since God foreknows all fu- while in motion towards the state of having been engen- ture events, Divine providence has so disposed that these dered: and thus death may be painful. penalties are apportioned in different ways to various peo- Reply to Objection 8. According to Augustine (Gen. ple. This is not on account of any merits or demerits pre- ad lit.†), “although our first parents lived thereafter many vious to this life, as Origen held∗: for this is contrary to years, they began to die on the day when they heard the the words of Rom. 9:11, “When they. . . had not done any death-decree, condemning them to decline to old age.” good or evil”; and also contrary to statements made in Whether the particular punishments of our first parents are suitably appointed in IIa IIae q. 164 a. 2 Scripture? Objection 1. It would seem that the particular pun- Now seemingly there would have been “pain in child- ishments of our first parents are unsuitably appointed in bearing,” even had there been no sin: for the disposition Scripture. For that which would have occurred even with- of the female sex is such that offspring cannot be born out sin should not be described as a punishment for sin. without pain to the bearer. Likewise the “subjection of ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 6 ∗ Peri Archon ii, 9 † De Pecc. Mer. et Rem. i, 16. Cf. Gen. ad lit. ii. 32 1928 woman to man” results from the perfection of the male, outweighs in good all the penal evils which are stated to and the imperfection of the female sex. Again it belongs have resulted from sin. Therefore the punishments result- to the nature of the earth “to bring forth thorns and this- ing from our first parents’ sin are unsuitably described. tles,” and this would have occurred even had there been On the contrary, These punishments were appointed no sin. Therefore these are unsuitable punishments of the by God, Who does all things, “in number, weight, and first sin. measure∗” (Wis. 11:21). Objection 2. Further, that which pertains to a per- I answer that, As stated in the foregoing Article, on son’s dignity does not, seemingly, pertain to his punish- account of their sin, our first parents were deprived of the ment. But the “multiplying of conceptions” pertains to a Divine favor, whereby the integrity of human nature was woman’s dignity. Therefore it should not be described as maintained in them, and by the withdrawal of this favor the woman’s punishment. human nature incurred penal defects. Hence they were Objection 3. Further, the punishment of our first par- punished in two ways. In the first place by being deprived ents’ sin is transmitted to all, as we have stated with regard of that which was befitting the state of integrity, namely to death (a. 1). But all “women’s conceptions” are not the place of the earthly paradise: and this is indicated (Gn. “multiplied,” nor does “every man eat bread in the sweat 3:23) where it is stated that “God sent him out of the par- of his face.” Therefore these are not suitable punishments adise of pleasure.” And since he was unable, of himself, of the first sin. to return to that state of original innocence, it was fit- Objection 4. Further, the place of paradise was made ting that obstacles should be placed against his recovering for man. Now nothing in the order of things should be those things that were befitting his original state, namely without purpose. Therefore it would seem that the exclu- food (lest he should take of the tree of life) and place; for sion of man from paradise was not a suitable punishment “God placed before. . . paradise. . . Cherubim, and a flam- of man. ing sword.” Secondly, they were punished by having Objection 5. Further, this place of the earthly par- appointed to them things befitting a nature bereft of the adise is said to be naturally inaccessible. Therefore it was aforesaid favor: and this as regards both the body and useless to put other obstacles in the way lest man should the soul. With regard to the body, to which pertains the return thither, to wit the cherubim, and the “flaming sword distinction of sex, one punishment was appointed to the turning every way.” woman and another to the man. To the woman punish- Objection 6. Further, immediately after his sin man ment was appointed in respect of two things on account was subject to the necessity of dying, so that he could not of which she is united to the man; and these are the beget- be restored to immortality by the beneficial tree of life. ting of children, and community of works pertaining to Therefore it was useless to forbid him to eat of the tree family life. As regards the begetting of children, she was of life, as instanced by the words of Gn. 3:22: “See, lest punished in two ways: first in the weariness to which she perhaps he. . . take. . . of the tree of life. . . and live for ever.” is subject while carrying the child after conception, and Objection 7. Further, to mock the unhappy seems in- this is indicated in the words (Gn. 3:16), “I will multiply consistent with mercy and clemency, which are most of thy sorrows, and thy conceptions”; secondly, in the pain all ascribed to God in Scripture, according to Ps. 144:9, which she suffers in giving birth, and this is indicated by “His tender mercies are over all His works.” Therefore the words (Gn. 3:16), “In sorrow shalt thou bring forth.” God is unbecomingly described as mocking our first par- As regards family life she was punished by being sub- ents, already reduced through sin to unhappy straits, in jected to her husband’s authority, and this is conveyed in the words of Gn. 3:22, “Behold Adam is become as one the words (Gn. 3:16), “Thou shalt be under thy husband’s of Us, knowing good and evil.” power.” Objection 8. Further, clothes are necessary to man, Now, just as it belongs to the woman to be subject to like food, according to 1 Tim. 6:8, “Having food, and her husband in matters relating to the family life, so it wherewith to be covered, with these we are content.” belongs to the husband to provide the necessaries of that Therefore just as food was appointed to our first parents life. In this respect he was punished in three ways. First, before their sin, so also should clothing have been as- by the barrenness of the earth, in the words (Gn. 3:17), cribed to them. Therefore after their sin it was unsuitable “Cursed is the earth in thy work.” Secondly, by the cares to say that God made for them garments of skin. of his toil, without which he does not win the fruits of the Objection 9. Further, the punishment inflicted for a earth; hence the words (Gn. 3:17), “With labor and toil sin should outweigh in evil the gain realized through the shalt thou eat thereof all the days of thy life.” Thirdly, by sin: else the punishment would not deter one from sin- the obstacles encountered by the tillers of the soil, where- ning. Now through sin our first parents gained in this, that fore it is written (Gn. 3:18), “Thorns and thistles shall it their eyes were opened, according to Gn. 3:7. But this bring forth to thee.” ∗ Vulg.: ‘Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight.’ 1929 Likewise a triple punishment is ascribed to them on Reply to Objection 4. Although the place of the the part of the soul. First, by reason of the confusion earthly paradise avails not man for his use, it avails him they experienced at the rebellion of the flesh against the for a lesson; because he knows himself deprived of that spirit; hence it is written (Gn. 3:7): “The eyes of them place on account of sin, and because by the things that both were opened; and. . . they perceived themselves to be have a bodily existence in that paradise, he is instructed naked.” Secondly, by the reproach for their sin, indicated in things pertaining to the heavenly paradise, the way to by the words (Gn. 3:22), “Behold Adam is become as one which is prepared for man by Christ. of Us.” Thirdly, by the reminder of their coming death, Reply to Objection 5. Apart from the mysteries of when it was said to him (Gn. 3:19): “Dust thou art and the spiritual interpretation, this place would seem to be into dust thou shalt return.” To this also pertains that God inaccessible, chiefly on account of the extreme heat in the made them garments of skin, as a sign of their mortality. middle zone by reason of the nighness of the sun. This Reply to Objection 1. In the state of innocence child- is denoted by the “flaming sword,” which is described as bearing would have been painless: for Augustine says (De “turning every way,” as being appropriate to the circular Civ. Dei xiv, 26): “Just as, in giving birth, the mother movement that causes this heat. And since the movements would then be relieved not by groans of pain, but by the of corporal creatures are set in order through the ministry instigations of maturity, so in bearing and conceiving the of the angels, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4), union of both sexes would be one not of lustful desire but it was fitting that, besides the sword turning every way, of deliberate action”∗. there should be cherubim “to keep the way of the tree of The subjection of the woman to her husband is to be life.” Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 40): “It is to understood as inflicted in punishment of the woman, not be believed that even in the visible paradise this was done as to his headship (since even before sin the man was the by heavenly powers indeed, so that there was a fiery guard “head” and governor “of the woman”), but as to her hav- set there by the ministry of angels.” ing now to obey her husband’s will even against her own. Reply to Objection 6. After sin, if man had ate of If man had not sinned, the earth would have brought the tree of life, he would not thereby have recovered im- forth thorns and thistles to be the food of animals, but not mortality, but by means of that beneficial food he might to punish man, because their growth would bring no la- have prolonged his life. Hence in the words “And live for bor or punishment for the tiller of the soil, as Augustine ever,” “for ever” signifies “for a long time.” For it was not says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 18). Alcuin†, however, holds that, expedient for man to remain longer in the unhappiness of before sin, the earth brought forth no thorns and thistles, this life. whatever: but the former opinion is the better. Reply to Objection 7. According to Augustine (Gen. Reply to Objection 2. The multiplying of her con- ad lit. xi, 39), “these words of God are not so much a ceptions was appointed as a punishment to the woman, mockery of our first parents as a deterrent to others, for not on account of the begetting of children, for this would whose benefit these things are written, lest they be proud have been the same even before sin, but on account of likewise, because Adam not only failed to become that the numerous sufferings to which the woman is subject, which he coveted to be, but did not keep that to which he through carrying her offspring after conception. Hence it was made.” is expressly stated: “I will multiply thy sorrows, and thy Reply to Objection 8. Clothing is necessary to man conceptions.” in his present state of unhappiness for two reasons. First, Reply to Objection 3. These punishments affect all to supply a deficiency in respect of external harm caused somewhat. For any woman who conceives must needs by, for instance, extreme heat or cold. Secondly, to hide suffer sorrows and bring forth her child with pain: except his ignominy and to cover the shame of those members the Blessed Virgin, who “conceived without corruption, wherein the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit is most and bore without pain”‡, because her conceiving was not manifest. Now these two motives do not apply to the according to the law of nature, transmitted from our first primitive state. because then man’s body could not be parents. And if a woman neither conceives nor bears, she hurt by any outward thing, as stated in the Ia, q. 97, a. 2, suffers from the defect of barrenness, which outweighs nor was there in man’s body anything shameful that would the aforesaid punishments. Likewise whoever tills the soil bring confusion on him. Hence it is written (Gn. 2:23): must needs eat his bread in the sweat of his brow: while “And they were both naked, to wit Adam and his wife, those who do not themselves work on the land, are bus- and were not ashamed.” The same cannot be said of food, ied with other labors, for “man is born to labor” (Job 5:7): which is necessary to entertain the natural heat, and to and thus they eat the bread for which others have labored sustain the body. in the sweat of their brow. Reply to Objection 9. As Augustine says (Gen. ad ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 98, a. 2 † Interrog. et Resp. in Gen. lxxix ‡ St. Bernard, Serm. in Dom. inf. oct. Assum. B. V. M. 1930 lit. xi, 31), “We must not imagine that our first parents they saw and thought on things which had not occurred to were created with their eyes closed, especially since it is their minds before, this was a mutual concupiscence such stated that the woman saw that the tree was fair, and good as they had not hitherto.” to eat. Accordingly the eyes of both were opened so that 1931 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 165 Of Our First Parents’ Temptation (In Two Articles) We must now consider our first parents’ temptation, concerning which there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil? (2) Of the manner and order of that temptation. Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil? IIa IIae q. 165 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting for of grace, it was granted him that no creature outside him- man to be tempted by the devil. For the same final punish- self could harm him against his own will, whereby he was ment is appointed to the angels’ sin and to man’s, accord- able even to resist the temptation of the demon. ing to Mat. 25:41, “Go [Vulg.: ‘Depart from Me’] you Reply to Objection 1. Above the human nature there cursed into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the is another that admits of the possibility of the evil of fault: devil and his angels.” Now the angels’ first sin did not fol-but there is not above the angelic nature. Now only one low a temptation from without. Therefore neither should that is already become evil through sin can tempt by lead- man’s first sin have resulted from an outward temptation. ing another into evil. Hence it was fitting that by an evil Objection 2. Further, God, Who foreknows the fu- angel man should be tempted to sin, even as according ture, knew that through the demon’s temptation man to the order of nature he is moved forward to perfection would fall into sin, and thus He knew full well that it was by means of a good angel. An angel could be perfected not expedient for man to be tempted. Therefore it would in good by something above him, namely by God, but he seem unfitting for God to allow him to be tempted. could not thus be led into sin, because according to James Objection 3. Further, it seems to savor of punishment 1:13, “God is not a tempter of evils.” that anyone should have an assailant, just as on the other Reply to Objection 2. Just as God knew that man, hand the cessation of an assault is akin to a reward. Now through being tempted, would fall into sin, so too He punishment should not precede fault. Therefore it was un- knew that man was able, by his free will, to resist the fitting for man to be tempted before he sinned. tempter. Now the condition attaching to man’s nature re- On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 34:11): “He quired that he should be left to his own will, according to that hath not been tempted [Douay: ‘tried’], what manner Ecclus. 15:14, “God left” man “in the hand of his own of things doth he know?” counsel.” Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 4): “It I answer that, God’s wisdom “orders all things seems to me that man would have had no prospect of any sweetly” (Wis. 8:1), inasmuch as His providence appoints special praise, if he were able to lead a good life simply to each one that which is befitting it according to its na- because there was none to persuade him to lead an evil ture. For as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), “it belongs to life; since both by nature he had the power, and in his providence not to destroy, but to maintain, nature.” Now power he had the will, not to consent to the persuader.” it is a condition attaching to human nature that one crea- Reply to Objection 3. An assault is penal if it be dif- ture can be helped or impeded by another. Wherefore it ficult to resist it: but, in the state of innocence, man was was fitting that God should both allow man in the state of able, without any difficulty, to resist temptation. Con- innocence to be tempted by evil angels, and should cause sequently the tempter’s assault was not a punishment to him to be helped by good angels. And by a special favor man. Whether the manner and order of the first temptation was fitting? IIa IIae q. 165 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the manner and order way about. of the first temptation was not fitting. For just as in the Objection 2. Further, the temptation of our first par- order of nature the angel was above man, so was the man ents was by suggestion. Now the devil is able to make above the woman. Now sin came upon man through an suggestions to man without making use of an outward sen- angel: therefore in like manner it should have come upon sible creature. Since then our first parents were endowed the woman through the man; in other words the woman with a spiritual mind, and adhered less to sensible than should have been tempted by the man, and not the other to intelligible things, it would have been more fitting for 1932 man to be tempted with a merely spiritual, instead of an ward suggestion, a change is wrought merely on an out-outward, temptation. ward creature. Now the devil had a minimum of power Objection 3. Further, one cannot fittingly suggest an against man before sin, wherefore he was unable to tempt evil except through some apparent good. But many other him by inward suggestion, but only by outward sugges- animals have a greater appearance of good than the ser- tion. pent has. Therefore man was unfittingly tempted by the Reply to Objection 3. According to Augustine (Gen. devil through a serpent. ad lit. xi, 3), “we are not to suppose that the devil chose Objection 4. Further, the serpent is an irrational an- the serpent as his means of temptation; but as he was pos- imal. Now wisdom, speech, and punishment are not be- sessed of the lust of deceit, he could only do so by the fitting an irrational animal. Therefore the serpent is unfit- animal he was allowed to use for that purpose.” tingly described (Gn. 3:1) as “more subtle than any of the Reply to Objection 4. According to Augustine (Gen. beasts of the earth,” or as “the most prudent of all beasts” ad lit. xi, 29), “the serpent is described as most prudent according to another version∗: and likewise is unfittingly or subtle, on account of the cunning of the devil, who stated to have spoken to the woman, and to have been pun- wrought his wiles in it: thus, we speak of a prudent or ished by God. cunning tongue, because it is the instrument of a prudent On the contrary, That which is first in any genus or cunning man in advising something prudently or cun- should be proportionate to all that follow it in that genus. ningly. Nor indeed (Gen. ad lit. xi, 28) did the serpent Now in every kind of sin we find the same order as in the understand the sounds which were conveyed through it to first temptation. For, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, the woman; nor again are we to believe that its soul was 12), it begins with the concupiscence of sin in the sensu- changed into a rational nature, since not even men, who ality, signified by the serpent; extends to the lower reason, are rational by nature, know what they say when a demon by pleasure, signified by the woman; and reaches to the speaks in them. Accordingly (Gen. ad lit. xi, 29) the ser- higher reason by consent in the sin, signified by the man. pent spoke to man, even as the ass on which Balaam sat Therefore the order of the first temptation was fitting. spoke to him, except that the former was the work of a I answer that, Man is composed of a twofold na- devil, whereas the latter was the work of an angel. Hence ture, intellective and sensitive. Hence the devil, in tempt- (Gen. ad lit. xi, 36) the serpent was not asked why it had ing man, made use of a twofold incentive to sin: one on done this, because it had not done this in its own nature, the part of the intellect, by promising the Divine likeness but the devil in it, who was already condemned to ever- through the acquisition of knowledge which man naturally lasting fire on account of his sin: and the words addressed desires to have; the other on the part of sense. This he to the serpent were directed to him who wrought through did by having recourse to those sensible things, which are the serpent.” most akin to man, partly by tempting the man through the Moreover, as again Augustine says (Super Gen. con- woman who was akin to him in the same species; partly tra Manich. ii, 17,18), “his, that is, the devil’s, punish- by tempting the woman through the serpent, who was akin ment mentioned here is that for which we must be on our to them in the same genus; partly by suggesting to them guard against him, not that which is reserved till the last to eat of the forbidden fruit, which was akin to them in the judgment. For when it was said to him: ‘Thou art cursed proximate genus. among all cattle and beasts of the earth,’ the cattle are Reply to Objection 1. In the act of tempting the set above him, not in power, but in the preservation of devil was by way of principal agent; whereas the woman their nature, since the cattle lost no heavenly bliss, seeing was employed as an instrument of temptation in bringing that they never had it, but they continue to live in the na- about the downfall of the man, both because the woman ture which they received.” It is also said to him: “ ‘Upon was weaker than the man, and consequently more liable thy breast and belly shalt thou creep,’ ” according to an- to be deceived, and because, on account of her union with other version‡ “Here the breast signifies pride, because it man, the devil was able to deceive the man especially is there that the impulse of the soul dominates, while the through her. Now there is no parity between principal belly denotes carnal desire, because this part of the body agent and instrument, because the principal agent must is softest to the touch: and on these he creeps to those exceed in power, which is not requisite in the instrumen- whom he wishes to deceive.” The words, “ ‘Earth shalt tal agent. thou eat all the days of thy life’ may be understood in two Reply to Objection 2. A suggestion whereby the ways. Either ‘Those shall belong to thee, whom thou shalt devil suggests something to man spiritually, shows the deceive by earthly lust,’ namely sinners who are signified devil to have more power against man than outward sug- under the name of earth, or a third kind of temptation, gestion has, since by an inward suggestion, at least, man’s namely curiosity, is signified by these words: for to eat imagination is changed by the devil†; whereas by an out- earth is to look into things deep and dark.” The putting ∗ The Septuagint † Cf. Ia, q. 91, a. 3 ‡ The Septuagint 1933 of enmities between him and the woman “means that we tation to evil is resisted. Wherefore the serpent lies in wait cannot be tempted by the devil, except through that part of for the woman’s heel, that if at any time she fall away to- the soul which bears or reflects the likeness of a woman. wards what is unlawful, pleasure may seize hold of her: The seed of the devil is the temptation to evil, the seed of and she watches his head that she may shut him out at the the woman is the fruit of good works, whereby the temp- very outset of the evil temptation.” 1934 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 166 Of Studiousness (In Two Articles) We must next consider studiousness and its opposite, curiosity. Concerning studiousness there are two points of inquiry: (1) What is the matter of studiousness? (2) Whether it is a part of temperance? Whether the proper matter of studiousness is knowledge? IIa IIae q. 166 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that knowledge is not the fore the mind’s application to knowledge precedes its ap- proper matter of studiousness. For a person is said to be plication to those things to which man is directed by his studious because he applies study to certain things. Now knowledge. Hence study regards knowledge in the first a man ought to apply study to every matter, in order to do place, and as a result it regards any other things the work- aright what has to be done. Therefore seemingly knowl- ing of which requires to be directed by knowledge. Now edge is not the special matter of studiousness. the virtues lay claim to that matter about which they are Objection 2. Further, studiousness is opposed to cu- first and foremost; thus fortitude is concerned about dan- riosity. Now curiosity, which is derived from “cura” gers of death, and temperance about pleasures of touch. [care], may also refer to elegance of apparel and other Therefore studiousness is properly ascribed to knowledge. such things, which regard the body; wherefore the Apos- Reply to Objection 1. Nothing can be done aright tle says (Rom. 13:14): “Make not provision [curam] for as regards other matters, except in so far as is previ- the flesh in its concupiscences.” ously directed by the knowing reason. Hence studious- Objection 3. Further it is written (Jer. 6:13): “From ness, to whatever matter it be applied, has a prior regard the least of them even to the greatest, all study [Douay: for knowledge. ‘are given to’] covetousness.” Now covetousness is not Reply to Objection 2. Man’s mind is drawn, on ac- properly about knowledge, but rather about the posses- count of his affections, towards the things for which he sion of wealth, as stated above (q. 118, a. 2). Therefore has an affection, according to Mat. 6:21, “Where thy trea- studiousness, which is derived from “study,” is not prop- sure is, there is thy heart also.” And since man has special erly about knowledge. affection for those things which foster the flesh, it follows On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 27:11): “Study that man’s thoughts are concerned about things that fos- wisdom, my son, and make my heart joyful, that thou ter his flesh, so that man seeks to know how he may best mayest give an answer to him that reproacheth.” Now sustain his body. Accordingly curiosity is accounted to study, which is commended as a virtue, is the same as be about things pertaining to the body by reason of things that to which the Law urges. Therefore studiousness is pertaining to knowledge. properly about “knowledge.” Reply to Objection 3. Covetousness craves the acqui- I answer that, Properly speaking, study denotes keen sition of gain, and for this it is very necessary to be skilled application of the mind to something. Now the mind is not in earthly things. Accordingly studiousness is ascribed to applied to a thing except by knowing that thing. Where- things pertaining to covetousness. Whether studiousness is a part of temperance? IIa IIae q. 166 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that studiousness is not ance. a part of temperance. For a man is said to be studious Objection 2. Further, studiousness, as stated (a. 1), by reason of his studiousness. Now all virtuous persons pertains to knowledge. But knowledge has no connec- without exception are called studious according to the tion with the moral virtues which are in the appetitive part Philosopher, who frequently employs the term “studious” of the soul, and pertains rather to the intellectual virtues ( spoudaios) in this sense (Ethic. ix, 4,8,9).∗ Therefore which are in the cognitive part: wherefore solicitude is an studiousness is a general virtue, and not a part of temper- act of prudence as stated above (q. 47, a. 9). Therefore ∗ In the same sense Aristotle says in Ethic. iii, 2, that “every vicious person is ignorant of what he ought to do.” 1935 studiousness is not a part of temperance. regards knowledge, is applied to all the virtues. Objection 3. Further, a virtue that is ascribed as part Reply to Objection 2. The act of a cognitive power of a principal virtue resembles the latter as to mode. Now is commanded by the appetitive power, which moves all studiousness does not resemble temperance as to mode, the powers, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 9, a. 1). Where- because temperance takes its name from being a kind of fore knowledge regards a twofold good. One is connected restraint, wherefore it is more opposed to the vice that is with the act of knowledge itself; and this good pertains to in excess: whereas studiousness is denominated from be- the intellectual virtues, and consists in man having a true ing the application of the mind to something, so that it estimate about each thing. The other good pertains to the would seem to be opposed to the vice that is in default, act of the appetitive power, and consists in man’s appetite namely, neglect of study, rather than to the vice which is being directed aright in applying the cognitive power in in excess, namely curiosity. wherefore, on account of its this or that way to this or that thing. And this belongs to resemblance to the latter, Isidore says (Etym. x) that “a the virtue of seriousness. Wherefore it is reckoned among studious man is one who is curious to study.” Therefore the moral virtues. studiousness is not a part of temperance. Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. ii, 93) in order to be virtuous we must avoid those things 21): “We are forbidden to be curious: and this is a great to which we are most naturally inclined. Hence it is that, gift that temperance bestows.” Now curiosity is prevented since nature inclines us. chiefly to fear dangers of death, by moderate studiousness. Therefore studiousness is a and to seek pleasures of the flesh, fortitude is chiefly com- part of temperance. mended for a certain steadfast perseverance against such I answer that, As stated above (q. 141, Aa. 3,4,5), it dangers, and temperance for a certain restraint from plea- belongs to temperance to moderate the movement of the sures of the flesh. But as regards knowledge, man has appetite, lest it tend excessively to that which is desired contrary inclinations. For on the part of the soul, he is in- naturally. Now just as in respect of his corporeal nature clined to desire knowledge of things; and so it behooves man naturally desires the pleasures of food and sex, so, him to exercise a praiseworthy restraint on this desire, lest in respect of his soul, he naturally desires to know some- he seek knowledge immoderately: whereas on the part of thing; thus the Philosopher observes at the beginning of his bodily nature, man is inclined to avoid the trouble of his Metaphysics i, 1: “All men have a natural desire for seeking knowledge. Accordingly, as regards the first in- knowledge.” clination studiousness is a kind of restraint, and it is in The moderation of this desire pertains to the virtue of this sense that it is reckoned a part of temperance. But studiousness; wherefore it follows that studiousness is a as to the second inclination, this virtue derives its praise potential part of temperance, as a subordinate virtue an- from a certain keenness of interest in seeking knowledge nexed to a principal virtue. Moreover, it is comprised un- of things; and from this it takes its name. The former der modesty for the reason given above (q. 160, a. 2). is more essential to this virtue than the latter: since the Reply to Objection 1. Prudence is the complement desire to know directly regards knowledge, to which stu- of all the moral virtues, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Conse- diousness is directed, whereas the trouble of learning is quently, in so far as the knowledge of prudence pertains an obstacle to knowledge, wherefore it is regarded by this to all the virtues, the term “studiousness,” which properly virtue indirectly, as by that which removes an obstacle. 1936 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 167 Of Curiosity (In Two Articles) We must next consider curiosity, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether the vice of curiosity can regard intellective knowledge? (2) Whether it is about sensitive knowledge? Whether curiosity can be about intellective knowledge? IIa IIae q. 167 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that curiosity cannot be art, the student of natural science whose gaze pierces the about intellective knowledge. Because, according to the heavens, walks in vanity of understanding and darkness Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), there can be no mean and ex- of mind?” Now vanity of understanding and darkness of tremes in things which are essentially good. Now intellec- mind are sinful. Therefore curiosity about intellective sci- tive knowledge is essentially good: because man’s perfec- ences may be sinful. tion would seem to consist in his intellect being reduced I answer that, As stated above (q. 166, a. 2, ad 2) stu- from potentiality to act, and this is done by the knowl- diousness is directly, not about knowledge itself, but about edge of truth. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the desire and study in the pursuit of knowledge. Now “the good of the human soul is to be in accordance with we must judge differently of the knowledge itself of truth, reason,” whose perfection consists in knowing the truth. and of the desire and study in the pursuit of the knowledge Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be about intellec- of truth. For the knowledge of truth, strictly speaking, is tive knowledge. good, but it may be evil accidentally, by reason of some Objection 2. Further, that which makes man like to result, either because one takes pride in knowing the truth, God, and which he receives from God, cannot be an evil. according to 1 Cor. 8:1, “Knowledge puffeth up,” or be- Now all abundance of knowledge is from God, accord- cause one uses the knowledge of truth in order to sin. ing to Ecclus. 1:1, “All wisdom is from the Lord God,” On the other hand, the desire or study in pursuing the and Wis. 7:17, “He hath given me the true knowledge knowledge of truth may be right or wrong. First, when of things that are, to know the disposition of the whole one tends by his study to the knowledge of truth as hav- world, and the virtues of the elements,” etc. Again, by ing evil accidentally annexed to it, for instance those who knowing the truth man is likened to God, since “all things study to know the truth that they may take pride in their are naked and open to His eyes” (Heb. 4:13), and “the knowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21): Lord is a God of all knowledge” (1 Kings 2:3). There- “Some there are who forsaking virtue, and ignorant of fore however abundant knowledge of truth may be, it is what God is, and of the majesty of that nature which not evil but good. Now the desire of good is not sinful. ever remains the same, imagine they are doing something Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be about the intel- great, if with surpassing curiosity and keenness they ex- lective knowledge of truth. plore the whole mass of this body which we call the world. Objection 3. Further, if the vice of curiosity can be So great a pride is thus begotten, that one would think they about any kind of intellective knowledge, it would be dwelt in the very heavens about which they argue.” In like chiefly about the philosophical sciences. But, seemingly, manner, those who study to learn something in order to there is no sin in being intent on them: for Jerome says sin are engaged in a sinful study, according to the saying (Super Daniel 1:8): “Those who refused to partake of the of Jer. 9:5, “They have taught their tongue to speak lies, king’s meat and wine, lest they should be defiled, if they they have labored to commit iniquity.” had considered the wisdom and teaching of the Babylo- Secondly, there may be sin by reason of the appetite nians to be sinful, would never have consented to learn or study directed to the learning of truth being itself inor- that which was unlawful”: and Augustine says (De Doctr. dinate; and this in four ways. First, when a man is with- Christ. ii, 40) that “if the philosophers made any true drawn by a less profitable study from a study that is an statements, we must claim them for our own use, as from obligation incumbent on him; hence Jerome says†: “We unjust possessors.” Therefore curiosity about intellective see priests forsaking the gospels and the prophets, reading knowledge cannot be sinful. stage-plays, and singing the love songs of pastoral idylls.” On the contrary, Jerome∗ says: “Is it not evident Secondly, when a man studies to learn of one, by whom it that a man who day and night wrestles with the dialectic is unlawful to be taught, as in the case of those who seek ∗ Comment. in Ep. ad Ephes. iv, 17 † Epist. xxi ad Damas 1937 to know the future through the demons. This is super- (Ethic. x, 7,8). Hence there may be sin in the knowledge stitious curiosity, of which Augustine says (De Vera Re- of certain truths, in so far as the desire of such knowl- lig. 4): “Maybe, the philosophers were debarred from the edge is not directed in due manner to the knowledge of faith by their sinful curiosity in seeking knowledge from the sovereign truth, wherein supreme happiness consists. the demons.” Reply to Objection 2. Although this argument shows Thirdly, when a man desires to know the truth about that the knowledge of truth is good in itself, this does not creatures, without referring his knowledge to its due end, prevent a man from misusing the knowledge of truth for namely, the knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says an evil purpose, or from desiring the knowledge of truth (De Vera Relig. 29) that “in studying creatures, we must inordinately, since even the desire for good should be reg- not be moved by empty and perishable curiosity; but we ulated in due manner. should ever mount towards immortal and abiding things.” Reply to Objection 3. The study of philosophy is in Fourthly, when a man studies to know the truth above itself lawful and commendable, on account of the truth the capacity of his own intelligence, since by so doing which the philosophers acquired through God revealing it men easily fall into error: wherefore it is written (Ec- to them, as stated in Rom. 1:19. Since, however, certain clus. 3:22): “Seek not the things that are too high for philosophers misuse the truth in order to assail the faith, thee, and search not into things above thy ability. . . and in the Apostle says (Col. 2:8): “Beware lest any man cheat many of His works be not curious,” and further on (Ec- you by philosophy and vain deceit, according to the tra- clus. 3:26), “For. . . the suspicion of them hath deceived dition of men. . . and not according to Christ”: and Diony- many, and hath detained their minds in vanity.” sius says (Ep. vii ad Polycarp.) of certain philosophers Reply to Objection 1. Man’s good consists in the that “they make an unholy use of divine things against knowledge of truth; yet man’s sovereign good consists, that which is divine, and by divine wisdom strive to de- not in the knowledge of any truth, but in the perfect knowl- stroy the worship of God.” edge of the sovereign truth, as the Philosopher states Whether the vice of curiosity is about sensitive knowledge? IIa IIae q. 167 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the vice of curiosity that “concupiscence of the eyes makes men curious.” Now is not about sensitive knowledge. For just as some things according to Bede (Comment. in 1 Jn. 2:16) “concupis- are known by the sense of sight, so too are some things cence of the eyes refers not only to the learning of magic known by the senses of touch and taste. Now the vice arts, but also to sight-seeing, and to the discovery and dis- concerned about objects of touch and taste is not curios- praise of our neighbor’s faults,” and all these are partic- ity but lust or gluttony. Therefore seemingly neither is the ular objects of sense. Therefore since concupiscence of vice of curiosity about things known by the sight. the eves is a sin, even as concupiscence of the flesh and Objection 2. Further, curiosity would seem to refer to pride of life, which are members of the same division (1 watching games; wherefore Augustine says (Confess. vi, Jn. 2:16), it seems that the vice of curiosity is about the 8) that when “a fall occurred in the fight, a mighty cry of knowledge of sensible things. the whole people struck him strongly, and overcome by I answer that, The knowledge of sensible things is curiosity Alypius opened his eyes.” But it does not seem directed to two things. For in the first place, both in man to be sinful to watch games, because it gives pleasure on and in other animals, it is directed to the upkeep of the account of the representation, wherein man takes a natural body, because by knowledge of this kind, man and other delight, as the Philosopher states (Poet. vi). Therefore the animals avoid what is harmful to them, and seek those vice of curiosity is not about the knowledge of sensible things that are necessary for the body’s sustenance. In the objects. second place, it is directed in a manner special to man, to Objection 3. Further, it would seem to pertain to cu- intellective knowledge, whether speculative or practical. riosity to inquire into our neighbor’s actions, as Bede ob- Accordingly to employ study for the purpose of knowing serves∗. Now, seemingly, it is not a sin to inquire into sensible things may be sinful in two ways. First, when the actions of others, because according to Ecclus. 17:12, the sensitive knowledge is not directed to something use- God “gave to every one of them commandment concern- ful, but turns man away from some useful consideration. ing his neighbor.” Therefore the vice of curiosity does Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 35), “I go no more to not regard the knowledge of such like particular sensible see a dog coursing a hare in the circus; but in the open objects. country, if I happen to be passing, that coursing haply On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 38) will distract me from some weighty thought, and draw ∗ Comment. in 1 Jn. 2:16 1938 me after it. . . and unless Thou, having made me see my trial’s sake, seeketh even the contraries of these, not for weakness, didst speedily admonish me, I become fool- the sake of suffering annoyance, but out of the lust of ex- ishly dull.” Secondly, when the knowledge of sensible periment and knowledge.” things is directed to something harmful, as looking on a Reply to Objection 2. Sight-seeing becomes sinful, woman is directed to lust: even so the busy inquiry into when it renders a man prone to the vices of lust and cru- other people’s actions is directed to detraction. on the elty on account of things he sees represented. Hence other hand, if one be ordinately intent on the knowledge Chrysostom says∗ that such sights make men adulterers of sensible things by reason of the necessity of sustaining and shameless. nature, or for the sake of the study of intelligible truth, Reply to Objection 3. One may watch other people’s this studiousness about the knowledge of sensible things actions or inquire into them, with a good intent, either for is virtuous. one’s own good—that is in order to be encouraged to bet- Reply to Objection 1. Lust and gluttony are about ter deeds by the deeds of our neighbor—or for our neigh- pleasures arising from the use of objects of touch, whereas bor’s good—that is in order to correct him, if he do any- curiosity is about pleasures arising from the knowledge thing wrong, according to the rule of charity and the duty acquired through all the senses. According to Augustine of one’s position. This is praiseworthy, according to Heb. (Confess. x, 35) “it is called concupiscence of the eyes” 10:24, “Consider one another to provoke unto charity and because “the sight is the sense chiefly used for obtaining to good works.” But to observe our neighbor’s faults with knowledge, so that all sensible things are said to be seen,” the intention of looking down upon them, or of detracting and as he says further on: “By this it may more evidently them, or even with no further purpose than that of disturb- be discerned wherein pleasure and wherein curiosity is the ing them, is sinful: hence it is written (Prov. 24:15), “Lie object of the senses; for pleasure seeketh objects beau- not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of the tiful, melodious, fragrant, savory, soft; but curiosity, for just, nor spoil his rest.” ∗ Hom. vi in Matth. 1939 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 168 Of Modesty As Consisting in the Outward Movements of the Body (In Four Articles) We must next consider modesty as consisting in the outward movements of the body, and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in the outward movements of the body that are done seriously? (2) Whether there can be a virtue about playful actions? (3) Of the sin consisting in excess of play; (4) Of the sin consisting in lack of play. Whether any virtue regards the outward movements of the body? IIa IIae q. 168 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that no virtue regards the ward movement. outward movements of the body. For every virtue pertains I answer that, Moral virtue consists in the things per- to the spiritual beauty of the soul, according to Ps. 44:14, taining to man being directed by his reason. Now it is “All the glory of the king’s daughter is within,” and a gloss manifest that the outward movements of man are dirigible adds, “namely, in the conscience.” Now the movements of by reason, since the outward members are set in motion at the body are not within, but without. Therefore there can the command of reason. Hence it is evident that there is a be no virtue about them. moral virtue concerned with the direction of these move- Objection 2. Further, “Virtues are not in us by na- ments. ture,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1). But outward Now the direction of these movements may be con- bodily movements are in man by nature, since it is by na- sidered from a twofold standpoint. First, in respect of fit- ture that some are quick, and some slow of movement, and tingness to the person; secondly, in respect of fittingness the same applies to other differences of outward move- to externals, whether persons, business, or place. Hence ments. Therefore there is no virtue about movements of Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): “Beauty of conduct con- this kind. sists in becoming behavior towards others, according to Objection 3. Further, every moral virtue is either their sex and person,” and this regards the first. As to the about actions directed to another person, as justice, or second, he adds: “This is the best way to order our behav- about passions, as temperance and fortitude. Now out- ior, this is the polish becoming to every action.” ward bodily movements are not directed to another per- Hence Andronicus† ascribes two things to these out- son, nor are they passions. Therefore no virtue is con- ward movements: namely “taste” [ornatus] which regards nected with them. what is becoming to the person, wherefore he says that it Objection 4. Further, study should be applied to all is the knowledge of what is becoming in movement and works of virtue, as stated above (q. 166, a. 1, obj. 1; a. 2, behavior; and “methodicalness” [bona ordinatio] which ad 1). Now it is censurable to apply study to the order- regards what is becoming to the business in hand, and ing of one’s outward movements: for Ambrose says (De to one’s surroundings, wherefore he calls it “the practical Offic. i, 18): “A becoming gait is one that reflects the car- knowledge of separation,” i.e. of the distinction of “acts.” riage of authority, has the tread of gravity, and the foot- Reply to Objection 1. Outward movements are signs print of tranquillity: yet so that there be neither study nor of the inward disposition, according to Ecclus. 19:27, affectation, but natural and artless movement.” Therefore “The attire of the body, and the laughter of the teeth, and seemingly there is no virtue about the style of outward the gait of the man, show what he is”; and Ambrose says movements. (De Offic. i, 18) that “the habit of mind is seen in the On the contrary, The beauty of honesty∗ pertains to gesture of the body,” and that “the body’s movement is an virtue. Now the style of outward movements pertains to index of the soul.” the beauty of honesty. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): Reply to Objection 2. Although it is from natural “The sound of the voice and the gesture of the body are disposition that a man is inclined to this or that style of distasteful to me, whether they be unduly soft and nerve- outward movement, nevertheless what is lacking to nature less, or coarse and boorish. Let nature be our model; her can be supplied by the efforts of reason. Hence Ambrose reflection is gracefulness of conduct and beauty of hon- says (De Offic. i, 18): “Let nature guide the movement: esty.” Therefore there is a virtue about the style of out- and if nature fail in any respect, surely effort will supply ∗ Cf. q. 145, a. 1 † De Affectibus 1940 the defect.” ward movements may be reduced to two virtues, which Reply to Objection 3. As stated (ad 1) outward move- the Philosopher mentions in Ethic. iv, 6,7. For, in so far ments are indications of the inward disposition, and this as by outward movements we are directed to other per- regards chiefly the passions of the soul. Wherefore Am- sons, the moderation of our outward movements belongs brose says (De Offic. i, 18) that “from these things,” i.e. to “friendliness or affability”∗. This regards pleasure or the outward movements, “the man that lies hidden in our pain which may arise from words or deeds in reference hearts is esteemed to be either frivolous, or boastful, or to others with whom a man comes in contact. And, in so impure, or on the other hand sedate, steady, pure, and free far as outward movements are signs of our inward dispo- from blemish.” It is moreover from our outward move- sition, their moderation belongs to the virtue of truthful- ments that other men form their judgment about us, ac- ness†, whereby a man, by word and deed, shows himself cording to Ecclus. 19:26, “A man is known by his look, to be such as he is inwardly. and a wise man, when thou meetest him, is known by Reply to Objection 4. It is censurable to study the his countenance.” Hence moderation of outward move- style of one’s outward movements, by having recourse to ments is directed somewhat to other persons, according pretense in them, so that they do not agree with one’s in- to the saying of Augustine in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), “In all ward disposition. Nevertheless it behooves one to study your movements, let nothing be done to offend the eye them, so that if they be in any way inordinate, this may of another, but only that which is becoming to the ho- be corrected. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): “Let liness of your state.” Wherefore the moderation of out- them be without artifice, but not without correction.” Whether there can be a virtue about games? IIa IIae q. 168 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be a amount of labor, so too is it with his soul, whose power virtue about games. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 23): is also finite and equal to a fixed amount of work. Con- “Our Lord said: ‘Woe to you who laugh, for you shall sequently when he goes beyond his measure in a certain weep.’ Wherefore I consider that all, and not only exces- work, he is oppressed and becomes weary, and all the sive, games should be avoided.” Now that which can be more since when the soul works, the body is at work like- done virtuously is not to be avoided altogether. Therefore wise, in so far as the intellective soul employs forces that there cannot be a virtue about games. operate through bodily organs. Now sensible goods are Objection 2. Further, “Virtue is that which God forms connatural to man, and therefore, when the soul arises in us, without us,” as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 55, a. 4). above sensibles, through being intent on the operations of Now Chrysostom says‡: “It is not God, but the devil, that reason, there results in consequence a certain weariness of is the author of fun. Listen to what happened to those who soul, whether the operations with which it is occupied be played: ‘The people sat down to eat and drink, and they those of the practical or of the speculative reason. Yet this rose up to play.’ ” Therefore there can be no virtue about weariness is greater if the soul be occupied with the work games. of contemplation, since thereby it is raised higher above Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. sensible things; although perhaps certain outward works x, 6) that “playful actions are not directed to something of the practical reason entail a greater bodily labor. In else.” But it is a requisite of virtue that the agent in choos- either case, however, one man is more soul-wearied than ing should “direct his action to something else,” as the another, according as he is more intensely occupied with Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4). Therefore there can be works of reason. Now just as weariness of the body is dis- no virtue about games. pelled by resting the body, so weariness of the soul must On the contrary, Augustine says (Music. ii, 15): “I needs be remedied by resting the soul: and the soul’s rest pray thee, spare thyself at times: for it becomes a wise is pleasure, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 25, a. 2; Ia IIae, man sometimes to relax the high pressure of his attention q. 31, a. 1, ad 2). Consequently, the remedy for weariness to work.” Now this relaxation of the mind from work con- of soul must needs consist in the application of some plea- sists in playful words or deeds. Therefore it becomes a sure, by slackening the tension of the reason’s study. Thus wise and virtuous man to have recourse to such things at in the Conferences of the Fathers xxiv, 21, it is related of times. Moreover the Philosopher§ assigns to games the Blessed John the Evangelist, that when some people were virtue of eutrapelia, which we may call “pleasantness.” scandalized on finding him playing together with his dis- I answer that, Just as man needs bodily rest for ciples, he is said to have told one of them who carried a the body’s refreshment, because he cannot always be at bow to shoot an arrow. And when the latter had done this work, since his power is finite and equal to a certain fixed several times, he asked him whether he could do it indef- ∗ Cf. q. 114, a. 1 † Cf. q. 9 ‡ Hom. vi in Matth. § Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8 1941 initely, and the man answered that if he continued doing and a man is said to be pleasant through having a happy it, the bow would break. Whence the Blessed John drew turn∗ of mind, whereby he gives his words and deeds a the inference that in like manner man’s mind would break cheerful turn: and inasmuch as this virtue restrains a man if its tension were never relaxed. from immoderate fun, it is comprised under modesty. . Now such like words or deeds wherein nothing fur- Reply to Objection 1. As stated above, fun should ther is sought than the soul’s delight, are called playful or fit with business and persons; wherefore Tully says (De humorous. Hence it is necessary at times to make use of Invent. Rhet. i, 17) that “when the audience is weary, it them, in order to give rest, as it were, to the soul. This is will be useful for the speaker to try something novel or in agreement with the statement of the Philosopher (Ethic. amusing, provided that joking be not incompatible with iv, 8) that “in the intercourse of this life there is a kind of the gravity of the subject.” Now the sacred doctrine is rest that is associated with games”: and consequently it is concerned with things of the greatest moment, accord- sometimes necessary to make use of such things. ing to Prov. 8:6, “Hear, for I will speak of great things.” Nevertheless it would seem that in this matter there Wherefore Ambrose does not altogether exclude fun from are three points which require especial caution. The first human speech, but from the sacred doctrine; hence he be- and chief is that the pleasure in question should not be gins by saying: “Although jokes are at times fitting and sought in indecent or injurious deeds or words. Where- pleasant, nevertheless they are incompatible with the ec- fore Tully says (De Offic. i, 29) that “one kind of joke clesiastical rule; since how can we have recourse to things is discourteous, insolent, scandalous, obscene.” Another which are not to be found in Holy Writ?” thing to be observed is that one lose not the balance of Reply to Objection 2. This saying of Chrysostom one’s mind altogether. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, refers to the inordinate use of fun, especially by those who 20): “We should beware lest, when we seek relaxation of make the pleasure of games their end; of whom it is writ- mind, we destroy all that harmony which is the concord ten (Wis. 15:12): “They have accounted our life a pas- of good works”: and Tully says (De Offic. i, 29), that, time.” Against these Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): “We are “just as we do not allow children to enjoy absolute free- so begotten by nature that we appear to be made not for dom in their games, but only that which is consistent with play and fun, but rather for hardships, and for occupations good behavior, so our very fun should reflect something of greater gravity and moment.” of an upright mind.” Thirdly, we must be careful, as in Reply to Objection 3. Playful actions themselves all other human actions, to conform ourselves to persons, considered in their species are not directed to an end: but time, and place, and take due account of other circum- the pleasure derived from such actions is directed to the stances, so that our fun “befit the hour and the man,” as recreation and rest of the soul, and accordingly if this be Tully says (De Offic. i, 29). done with moderation, it is lawful to make use of fun. Now these things are directed according to the rule of Hence Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): “It is indeed lawful to reason: and a habit that operates according to reason is make use of play and fun, but in the same way as we have virtue. Therefore there can be a virtue about games. The recourse to sleep and other kinds of rest, then only when Philosopher gives it the name of wittiness ( eutrapelia), we have done our duty by grave and serious matters.” Whether there can be sin in the excess of play? IIa IIae q. 168 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be sin would be in a state of sin; moreover all those who em- in the excess of play. For that which is an excuse for sin ploy them, as well as those who make them any payment, is not held to be sinful. Now play is sometimes an excuse would sin as accomplices of their sin. But this would seem for sin, for many things would be grave sins if they were untrue; for it is related in the Lives of the Fathers (ii. 16; done seriously, whereas if they be done in fun, are either viii. 63) that is was revealed to the Blessed Paphnutius no sin or but slightly sinful. Therefore it seems that there that a certain jester would be with him in the life to come. is no sin in excessive play. On the contrary, A gloss on Prov. 14:13, “Laughter Objection 2. Further, all other vices are reducible to shall be mingled with sorrow and mourning taketh hold the seven capital vices, as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, of the end of joy,” remarks: “A mourning that will last for 17). But excess of play does not seem reducible to any of ever.” Now there is inordinate laughter and inordinate joy the capital vices. Therefore it would seem not to be a sin. in excessive play. Therefore there is mortal sin therein, Objection 3. Further, comedians especially would since mortal sin alone is deserving of everlasting mourn- seem to exceed in play, since they direct their whole life to ing. playing. Therefore if excess of play were a sin, all actors I answer that, In all things dirigible according to rea- ∗ Eutrapelia is derived from trepein = ‘to turn’ 1942 son, the excessive is that which goes beyond, and the de-scandalous and obscene. ficient is that which falls short of the rule of reason. Now Reply to Objection 2. Excessive play pertains to it has been stated (a. 2) that playful or jesting words or senseless mirth, which Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) calls deeds are dirigible according to reason. Wherefore exces- a daughter of gluttony. Wherefore it is written (Ex. 32:6): sive play is that which goes beyond the rule of reason: and “The people sat down to eat and drink, and they rose up this happens in two ways. First, on account of the very to play.” species of the acts employed for the purpose of fun, and Reply to Objection 3. As stated (a. 2), play is neces- this kind of jesting, according to Tully (De Offic. i, 29), is sary for the intercourse of human life. Now whatever is stated to be “discourteous, insolent, scandalous, and ob- useful to human intercourse may have a lawful employ- scene,” when to wit a man, for the purpose of jesting, em- ment ascribed to it. Wherefore the occupation of play- ploys indecent words or deeds, or such as are injurious to actors, the object of which is to cheer the heart of man, his neighbor, these being of themselves mortal sins. And is not unlawful in itself; nor are they in a state of sin pro- thus it is evident that excessive play is a mortal sin. vided that their playing be moderated, namely that they Secondly, there may be excess in play, through lack use no unlawful words or deeds in order to amuse, and that of due circumstances: for instance when people make use they do not introduce play into undue matters and seasons. of fun at undue times or places, or out of keeping with And although in human affairs, they have no other occu- the matter in hand, or persons. This may be sometimes pation in reference to other men, nevertheless in reference a mortal sin on account of the strong attachment to play, to themselves, and to God, they perform other actions both when a man prefers the pleasure he derives therefrom to serious and virtuous, such as prayer and the moderation the love of God, so as to be willing to disobey a command- of their own passions and operations, while sometimes ment of God or of the Church rather than forego, such like they give alms to the poor. Wherefore those who maintain amusements. Sometimes, however, it is a venial sin, for them in moderation do not sin but act justly, by rewarding instance where a man is not so attached to amusement as them for their services. on the other hand, if a man spends to be willing for its sake to do anything in disobedience to too much on such persons, or maintains those comedians God. who practice unlawful mirth, he sins as encouraging them Reply to Objection 1. Certain things are sinful on in their sin. Hence Augustine says (Tract. c. in Joan.) that account of the intention alone, because they are done in “to give one’s property to comedians is a great sin, not a order to injure someone. Such an intention is excluded virtue”; unless by chance some play-actor were in extreme by their being done in fun, the intention of which is to need, in which case one would have to assist him, for Am- please, not to injure: in these cases fun excuses from sin, brose says (De Offic.∗): “Feed him that dies of hunger; for or diminishes it. Other things, however, are sins accord- whenever thou canst save a man by feeding him, if thou ing to their species, such as murder, fornication, and the hast not fed him, thou hast slain him.” like: and fun is no excuse for these; in fact they make fun Whether there is a sin in lack of mirth? IIa IIae q. 168 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no sin in of conversation. Now this pertains to the lack of mirth. lack of mirth. For no sin is prescribed to a penitent. But Therefore the lack of mirth is virtuous rather than sinful. Augustine speaking of a penitent says (De Vera et Falsa On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8) Poenit. 15)†: “Let him refrain from games and the sights reckons the lack of mirth to be a vice. of the world, if he wishes to obtain the grace of a full par- I answer that, In human affairs whatever is against don.” Therefore there is no sin in lack of mirth. reason is a sin. Now it is against reason for a man to be Objection 2. Further, no sin is included in the praise burdensome to others, by offering no pleasure to others, given to holy men. But some persons are praised for hav- and by hindering their enjoyment. Wherefore Seneca‡ ing refrained from mirth; for it is written (Jer. 15:17): says (De Quat. Virt., cap. De Continentia): “Let your “I sat not in the assembly of jesters,” and (Tobias 3:17): conduct be guided by wisdom so that no one will think “Never have I joined myself with them that play; neither you rude, or despise you as a cad.” Now a man who is have I made myself partaker with them that walk in light- without mirth, not only is lacking in playful speech, but ness.” Therefore there can be no sin in the lack of mirth. is also burdensome to others, since he is deaf to the mod- Objection 3. Further, Andronicus counts austerity erate mirth of others. Consequently they are vicious, and to be one of the virtues, and he describes it as a habit are said to be boorish or rude, as the Philosopher states whereby a man neither gives nor receives the pleasures (Ethic. iv, 8). ∗ Quoted in Canon Pasce, dist. 86 † Spurious ‡ Martin of Braga, Formula Vitae Honestae: cap. De Continentia 1943 Since, however, mirth is useful for the sake of the rest dance with the times, the state of which required that man and pleasures it affords; and since, in human life, pleasure should mourn; wherefore he adds: “I sat alone, because and rest are not in quest for their own sake, but for the Thou hast filled me with threats.” The words of Tobias sake of operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 6, it follows that 3 refer to excessive mirth; and this is evident from his “lack of mirth is less sinful than excess thereof.” Hence adding: “Neither have I made myself partaker with them the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 10): “We should make that walk in lightness.” few friends for the sake of pleasure, since but little sweet- Reply to Objection 3. Austerity, as a virtue, does not ness suffices to season life, just as little salt suffices for exclude all pleasures, but only such as are excessive and our meat.” inordinate; wherefore it would seem to pertain to affabil- Reply to Objection 1. Mirth is forbidden the penitent ity, which the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6) calls “friendli- because he is called upon to mourn for his sins. Nor does ness,” or eutrapelia, otherwise wittiness. Nevertheless he this imply a vice in default, because this very diminish-names and defines it thus in respect of its agreement with ment of mirth in them is in accordance with reason. temperance, to which it belongs to restrain pleasure. Reply to Objection 2. Jeremias speaks there in accor- 1944 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 169 Of Modesty in the Outward Apparel (In Two Articles) We must now consider modesty as connected with the outward apparel, and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward apparel? (2) Whether women sin mortally by excessive adornment? Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward apparel? IIa IIae q. 169 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be virtue selves which man uses, that there is vice, but on the part of and vice in connection with outward apparel. For outward man who uses them immoderately. This lack of modera- adornment does not belong to us by nature, wherefore it tion occurs in two ways. First, in comparison with the cus- varies according to different times and places. Hence Au- toms of those among whom one lives; wherefore Augus- gustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12) that “among the tine says (Confess. iii, 8): “Those offenses which are con- ancient Romans it was scandalous for one to wear a cloak trary to the customs of men, are to be avoided according with sleeves and reaching to the ankles, whereas now it is to the customs generally prevailing, so that a thing agreed scandalous for anyone hailing from a reputable place to be upon and confirmed by custom or law of any city or na- without them.” Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. tion may not be violated at the lawless pleasure of any, ii, 1) there is in us a natural aptitude for the virtues. There-whether citizen or foreigner. For any part, which harmo- fore there is no virtue or vice about such things. nizeth not with its whole, is offensive.” Secondly, the lack Objection 2. Further, if there were virtue and vice of moderation in the use of these things may arise from the in connection with outward attire, excess in this matter inordinate attachment of the user, the result being that a would be sinful. Now excess in outward attire is not ap- man sometimes takes too much pleasure in using them, ei- parently sinful, since even the ministers of the altar use ther in accordance with the custom of those among whom most precious vestments in the sacred ministry. Likewise he dwells or contrary to such custom. Hence Augustine it would seem not to be sinful to be lacking in this, for it is says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): “We must avoid excessive said in praise of certain people (Heb. 11:37): “They wan- pleasure in the use of things, for it leads not only wickedly dered about in sheepskins and in goatskins.” Therefore it to abuse the customs of those among whom we dwell, but seems that there cannot be virtue and vice in this matter. frequently to exceed their bounds, so that, whereas it lay Objection 3. Further, every virtue is either theologi- hidden, while under the restraint of established morality, cal, or moral, or intellectual. Now an intellectual virtue is it displays its deformity in a most lawless outbreak.” not conversant with matter of this kind, since it is a perfec- In point of excess, this inordinate attachment occurs in tion regarding the knowledge of truth. Nor is there a theo- three ways. First when a man seeks glory from excessive logical virtue connected therewith, since that has God for attention to dress; in so far as dress and such like things its object; nor are any of the moral virtues enumerated by are a kind of ornament. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xl in the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), connected with it. Therefore Ev.): “There are some who think that attention to finery it seems that there cannot be virtue and vice in connection and costly dress is no sin. Surely, if this were no fault, with this kind of attire. the word of God would not say so expressly that the rich On the contrary, Honesty∗ pertains to virtue. Now man who was tortured in hell had been clothed in purple a certain honesty is observed in the outward apparel; for and fine linen. No one, forsooth, seeks costly apparel” Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 19): “The body should be (such, namely, as exceeds his estate) “save for vainglory.” bedecked naturally and without affectation, with simplic- Secondly, when a man seeks sensuous pleasure from ex- ity, with negligence rather than nicety, not with costly cessive attention to dress, in so far as dress is directed to and dazzling apparel, but with ordinary clothes, so that the body’s comfort. Thirdly, when a man is too solicitous† nothing be lacking to honesty and necessity, yet nothing in his attention to outward apparel. be added to increase its beauty.” Therefore there can be Accordingly Andronicus‡ reckons three virtues in virtue and vice in the outward attire. connection with outward attire; namely “humility,” which I answer that, It is not in the outward things them- excludes the seeking of glory, wherefore he says that hu- ∗ Cf. q. 145 † Cf. q. 55, a. 6 ‡ De Affectibus § Cf. q. 143, obj. 4 1945 mility is “the habit of avoiding excessive expenditure and attired in more costly apparel than others, not for the sake parade”; “contentment”§, which excludes the seeking of of their own glory, but to indicate the excellence of their sensuous pleasure, wherefore he says that “contentedness office or of the Divine worship: wherefore this is not sin- is the habit that makes a man satisfied with what is suit- ful in them. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, able, and enables him to determine what is becoming in 12): “Whoever uses outward things in such a way as to his manner of life” (according to the saying of the Apostle, exceed the bounds observed by the good people among 1 Tim. 6:8): “Having food and wherewith to be covered, whom he dwells, either signifies something by so doing, with these let us be content;”—and “simplicity,” which or is guilty of sin, inasmuch as he uses these things for excludes excessive solicitude about such things, where- sensual pleasure or ostentation.” fore he says that “simplicity is a habit that makes a man Likewise there may be sin on the part of deficiency: contented with what he has.” although it is not always a sin to wear coarser clothes than In the point of deficiency there may be inordinate at- other people. For, if this be done through ostentation or tachment in two ways. First, through a man’s neglect to pride, in order to set oneself above others, it is a sin of su- give the requisite study or trouble to the use of outward perstition; whereas, if this be done to tame the flesh, or to apparel. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) humble the spirit, it belongs to the virtue of temperance. that “it is a mark of effeminacy to let one’s cloak trail Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): “Who- on the ground to avoid the trouble of lifting it up.” Sec- ever uses transitory things with greater restraint than is ondly, by seeking glory from the very lack of attention to customary with those among whom he dwells, is either outward attire. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in temperate or superstitious.” Especially, however, is the Monte ii, 12) that “not only the glare and pomp of outward use of coarse raiment befitting to those who by word and things, but even dirt and the weeds of mourning may be a example urge others to repentance, as did the prophets subject of ostentation, all the more dangerous as being a of whom the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted. decoy under the guise of God’s service”; and the Philoso- Wherefore a gloss on Mat. 3:4, says: “He who preaches pher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that “both excess and inordinate penance, wears the garb of penance.” defect are a subject of ostentation.” Reply to Objection 3. This outward apparel is an Reply to Objection 1. Although outward attire does indication of man’s estate; wherefore excess, deficiency, not come from nature, it belongs to natural reason to mod- and mean therein, are referable to the virtue of truthful- erate it; so that we are naturally inclined to be the recipi- ness, which the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) assigns to deeds ents of the virtue that moderates outward raiment. and words, which are indications of something connected Reply to Objection 2. Those who are placed in a po- with man’s estate. sition of dignity, or again the ministers of the altar, are Whether the adornment of women is devoid of mortal sin? IIa IIae q. 169 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the adornment of that alters the natural features.” And afterwards he adds: women is not devoid of mortal sin. For whatever is con- “They lay hands on God, when they strive to reform what trary to a precept of the Divine law is a mortal sin. Now He has formed. This is an assault on the Divine handi- the adornment of women is contrary to a precept of the Di- work, a distortion of the truth. Thou shalt not be able to vine law; for it is written (1 Pet. 3:3): “Whose,” namely see God, having no longer the eyes that God made, but women’s, “adorning, let it not be the outward plaiting of those the devil has unmade; with him shalt thou burn on the hair, or the wearing of gold, or the putting on of ap- whose account thou art bedecked.” But this is not due ex- parel.” Wherefore a gloss of Cyprian says: “Those who cept to mortal sin. Therefore the adornment of women is are clothed in silk and purple cannot sincerely put on not devoid of mortal sin. Christ: those who are bedecked with gold and pearls and Objection 3. Further, just as it is unbecoming for a trinkets have forfeited the adornments of mind and body.” woman to wear man’s clothes, so is it unbecoming for her Now this is not done without a mortal sin. Therefore the to adorn herself inordinately. Now the former is a sin, for adornment of women cannot be devoid of mortal sin. it is written (Dt. 22:5): “A woman shall not be clothed Objection 2. Further, Cyprian says (De Habit. Virg.): with man’s apparel, neither shall a man use woman’s ap- “I hold that not only virgins and widows, but also wives parel.” Therefore it seems that also the excessive adorn- and all women without exception, should be admonished ment of women is a mortal sin. that nowise should they deface God’s work and fabric, the Objection 4. On the contrary, If this were true it clay that He has fashioned, with the aid of yellow pig- would seem that the makers of these means of adornment ments, black powders or rouge, or by applying any dye sin mortally. 1946 I answer that, As regards the adornment of women, I doubt whether even their husbands are willing to be de-we must bear in mind the general statements made above ceived by it, by whom alone” (i.e. the husbands) “are they (a. 1) concerning outward apparel, and also something to be permitted, but not ordered, to adorn themselves.” special, namely that a woman’s apparel may incite men to However, such painting does not always involve a mor- lust, according to Prov. 7:10, “Behold a woman meeteth tal sin, but only when it is done for the sake of sensuous him in harlot’s attire, prepared to deceive souls.” pleasure or in contempt of God, and it is to like cases that Nevertheless a woman may use means to please her Cyprian refers. husband, lest through despising her he fall into adultery. It must, however, be observed that it is one thing to Hence it is written (1 Cor. 7:34) that the woman “that counterfeit a beauty one has not, and another to hide a is married thinketh on the things of the world, how she disfigurement arising from some cause such as sickness or may please her husband.” Wherefore if a married woman the like. For this is lawful, since according to the Apostle adorn herself in order to please her husband she can do (1 Cor. 12:23), “such as we think to be the less honorable this without sin. members of the body, about these we put more abundant But those women who have no husband nor wish to honor.” have one, or who are in a state of life inconsistent with Reply to Objection 3. As stated in the foregoing Ar- marriage, cannot without sin desire to give lustful plea- ticle, outward apparel should be consistent with the estate sure to those men who see them, because this is to incite of the person, according to the general custom. Hence it them to sin. And if indeed they adorn themselves with this is in itself sinful for a woman to wear man’s clothes, or intention of provoking others to lust, they sin mortally; vice versa; especially since this may be a cause of sensu- whereas if they do so from frivolity, or from vanity for ous pleasure; and it is expressly forbidden in the Law (Dt. the sake of ostentation, it is not always mortal, but some- 22) because the Gentiles used to practice this change of times venial. And the same applies to men in this respect. attire for the purpose of idolatrous superstition. Neverthe- Hence Augustine says (Ep. ccxlv ad Possid.): “I do not less this may be done sometimes without sin on account of wish you to be hasty in forbidding the wearing of gold or some necessity, either in order to hide oneself from ene- costly attire except in the case of those who being neither mies, or through lack of other clothes, or for some similar married nor wishful to marry, should think how they may motive. please God: whereas the others think on the things of the Reply to Objection 4. In the case of an art directed world, either husbands how they may please their wives, to the production of goods which men cannot use without or wives how they may please their husbands, except that sin, it follows that the workmen sin in making such things, it is unbecoming for women though married to uncover as directly affording others an occasion of sin; for in- their hair, since the Apostle commands them to cover the stance, if a man were to make idols or anything pertaining head.” Yet in this case some might be excused from sin, to idolatrous worship. But in the case of an art the prod- when they do this not through vanity but on account of ucts of which may be employed by man either for a good some contrary custom: although such a custom is not to or for an evil use, such as swords, arrows, and the like, the be commended. practice of such an art is not sinful. These alone should Reply to Objection 1. As a gloss says on this pas- be called arts; wherefore Chrysostom says∗: “The name sage, “The wives of those who were in distress despised of art should be applied to those only which contribute to- their husbands, and decked themselves that they might wards and produce necessaries and mainstays of life.” In please other men”: and the Apostle forbids this. Cyprian the case of an art that produces things which for the most is speaking in the same sense; yet he does not forbid mar- part some people put to an evil use, although such arts ried women to adorn themselves in order to please their are not unlawful in themselves, nevertheless, according husbands, lest the latter be afforded an occasion of sin to the teaching of Plato, they should be extirpated from with other women. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:9): the State by the governing authority. Accordingly, since “Women. . . in ornate [Douay: ‘decent’] apparel, adorning women may lawfully adorn themselves, whether to main- themselves with modesty and sobriety, not with plaited tain the fitness of their estate, or even by adding some- hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly attire”: whence we are thing thereto, in order to please their husbands, it follows given to understand that women are not forbidden to adorn that those who make such means of adornment do not sin themselves soberly and moderately but to do so exces- in the practice of their art, except perhaps by inventing sively, shamelessly, and immodestly. means that are superfluous and fantastic. Hence Chrysos- Reply to Objection 2. Cyprian is speaking of women tom says (Super Matth.) that “even the shoemakers’ and painting themselves: this is a kind of falsification, which clothiers’ arts stand in need of restraint, for they have lent cannot be devoid of sin. Wherefore Augustine says (Ep. their art to lust, by abusing its needs, and debasing art by ccxlv ad Possid.): “To dye oneself with paints in order to art.” have a rosier or a paler complexion is a lying counterfeit. ∗ Hom. xlix super Matth. 1947 1948 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 170 Of the Precepts of Temperance (In Two Articles) We must next consider the precepts of temperance: (1) The precepts of temperance itself; (2) The precepts of its parts. Whether the precepts of temperance are suitably given in the Divine law? IIa IIae q. 170 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the precepts of tem- those precepts which tend more directly to the love of God perance are unsuitably given in the Divine law. Because and of our neighbor. Now among the vices opposed to fortitude is a greater virtue than temperance, as stated temperance, adultery would seem most of all opposed to above (q. 123, a. 12; q. 141, a. 8; Ia IIae, q. 66, a. 4 ). the love of our neighbor, since thereby a man lays hold of Now there is no precept of fortitude among the precepts another’s property for his own use, by abusing his neigh- of the decalogue, which are the most important among the bor’s wife. Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue in- precepts of the Law. Therefore it was unfitting to include clude a special prohibition of adultery, not only as com- among the precepts of the decalogue the prohibition of mitted in deed, but also as desired in thought. adultery, which is contrary to temperance, as stated above Reply to Objection 1. Among the species of vices (q. 154, Aa. 1,8). opposed to fortitude there is not one that is so directly op- Objection 2. Further, temperance is not only about posed to the love of our neighbor as adultery, which is a venereal matters, but also about pleasures of meat and species of lust that is opposed to temperance. And yet the drink. Now the precepts of the decalogue include no vice of daring, which is opposed to fortitude, is wont to be prohibition of a vice pertaining to pleasures of meat and sometimes the cause of murder, which is forbidden by one drink, or to any other species of lust. Neither, therefore, of the precepts of the decalogue: for it is written (Ecclus. should they include a precept prohibiting adultery, which 8:18): “Go not on the way with a bold man lest he burden pertains to venereal pleasure. thee with his evils.” Objection 3. Further, in the lawgiver’s intention in- Reply to Objection 2. Gluttony is not directly op- ducement to virtue precedes the prohibition of vice, since posed to the love of our neighbor, as adultery is. Nor vices are forbidden in order that obstacles to virtue may indeed is any other species of lust, for a father is not so be removed. Now the precepts of the decalogue are the wronged by the seduction of the virgin over whom he has most important in the Divine law. Therefore the precepts no connubial right, as is the husband by the adultery of of the decalogue should have included an affirmative pre- his wife, for he, not the wife herself, has power over her cept directly prescribing the virtue of temperance, rather body∗. than a negative precept forbidding adultery which is di- Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 122, rectly opposed thereto. Aa. 1,4) the precepts of the decalogue are universal prin- On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture in ciples of the Divine law; hence they need to be common the decalogue (Ex. 20:14,17). precepts. Now it was not possible to give any common I answer that, As the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5), “the affirmative precepts of temperance, because the practice end of the commandment is charity,” which is enjoined of temperance varies according to different times, as Au- upon us in the two precepts concerning the love of God gustine remarks (De Bono Conjug. xv, 7), and according and of our neighbor. Wherefore the decalogue contains to different human laws and customs. Whether the precepts of the virtues annexed to temperance are suitably given in the IIa IIae q. 170 a. 2 Divine law? Objection 1. It would seem that the precepts of the whole Divine law. Now “pride is the beginning of all sin,” virtues annexed to temperance are unsuitably given in the according to Ecclus. 10:15. Therefore among the precepts Divine law. For the precepts of the Decalogue, as stated of the Decalogue there should have been one forbidding above (a. 1, ad 3), are certain universal principles of the pride. ∗ 1 Cor. 7:4 1949 Objection 2. Further, a place before all should have bor; rather do they regard a certain moderation of things been given in the decalogue to those precepts by which pertaining to man himself. But considered in their effects, men are especially induced to fulfil the Law, because these they may regard the love of God or of our neighbor: and in would seem to be the most important. Now since humil- this respect the decalogue contains precepts that relate to ity subjects man to God, it would seem most of all to dis- the prohibition of the effects of the vices opposed to the pose man to the fulfilment of the Divine law; wherefore parts of temperance. Thus the effect of anger, which is obedience is accounted one of the degrees of humility, opposed to meekness, is sometimes that a man goes on to as stated above (q. 161, a. 6); and the same apparently commit murder (and this is forbidden in the Decalogue), applies to meekness, the effect of which is that a man and sometimes that he refuses due honor to his parents, does not contradict the Divine Scriptures, as Augustine which may also be the result of pride, which leads many observes (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7). Therefore it seems that to transgress the precepts of the first table. the Decalogue should have contained precepts of humility Reply to Objection 1. Pride is the beginning of sin, and meekness. but it lies hidden in the heart; and its inordinateness is not Objection 3. Further, it was stated in the foregoing perceived by all in common. Hence there was no place Article that adultery is forbidden in the decalogue, be- for its prohibition among the precepts of the Decalogue, cause it is contrary to the love of our neighbor. But in- which are like first self-evident principles. ordinateness of outward movements, which is contrary to Reply to Objection 2. Those precepts which are es- modesty, is opposed to neighborly love: wherefore Au- sentially an inducement to the observance of the Law pre- gustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxii): “In all your move- suppose the Law to be already given, wherefore they can- ments let nothing be done to offend the eye of any person not be first precepts of the Law so as to have a place in the whatever.” Therefore it seems that this kind of inordinate- Decalogue. ness should also have been forbidden by a precept of the Reply to Objection 3. Inordinate outward move- Decalogue. ment is not injurious to one’s neighbor, if we consider the On the contrary, suffices the authority of Scripture. species of the act, as are murder, adultery, and theft, which I answer that, The virtues annexed to temperance are forbidden in the decalogue; but only as being signs of may be considered in two ways: first, in themselves; sec- an inward inordinateness, as stated above (q. 168, a. 1, ad ondly, in their effects. Considered in themselves they have 1,3). no direct connection with the love of God or of our neigh- 1950 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 171 Of Prophecy (In Six Articles) After treating individually of all the virtues and vices that pertain to men of all conditions and estates, we must now consider those things which pertain especially to certain men. Now there is a triple difference between men as regards things connected with the soul’s habits and acts. First, in reference to the various gratuitous graces, according to 1 Cor. 12:4,7: “There are diversities of graces. . . and to one. . . by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge,” etc. Another difference arises from the diversities of life, namely the active and the contemplative life, which correspond to diverse purposes of operation, wherefore it is stated (1 Cor. 12:4,7) that “there are diversities of operations.” For the purpose of operation in Martha, who “was busy about much serving,” which pertains to the active life, differed from the purpose of operation in Mary, “who sitting. . . at the Lord’s feet, heard His word” (Lk. 10:39,40), which pertains to the contemplative life. A third difference corresponds to the various duties and states of life, as expressed in Eph. 4:11, “And He gave some apostles; and some prophets; and other some evangelists; and other some pastors and doctors”: and this pertains to diversity of ministries, of which it is written (1 Cor. 12:5): “There are diversities of ministries.” With regard to gratuitous graces, which are the first object to be considered, it must be observed that some of them pertain to knowledge, some to speech, and some to operation. Now all things pertaining to knowledge may be comprised under “prophecy,” since prophetic revelation extends not only to future events relating to man, but also to things relating to God, both as to those which are to be believed by all and are matters of “faith,” and as to yet higher mysteries, which concern the perfect and belong to “wisdom.” Again, prophetic revelation is about things pertaining to spiritual substances, by whom we are urged to good or evil; this pertains to the “discernment of spirits.” Moreover it extends to the direction of human acts, and this pertains to “knowledge,” as we shall explain further on (q. 177). Accordingly we must first of all consider prophecy, and rapture which is a degree of prophecy. Prophecy admits of four heads of consideration: (1) its essence; (2) its cause; (3) the mode of prophetic knowledge; (4) the division of prophecy. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge? (2) Whether it is a habit? (3) Whether it is only about future contingencies? (4) Whether a prophet knows all possible matters of prophecy? (5) Whether a prophet distinguishes that which he perceives by the gift of God, from that which he perceives by his own spirit? (6) Whether anything false can be the matter of prophecy? Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge? IIa IIae q. 171 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that prophecy does not Israel, that the prophet was foolish and mad∗.” Therefore pertain to knowledge. For it is written (Ecclus. 48:14) prophecy is not a cognitive perfection. that after death the body of Eliseus prophesied, and fur- Objection 4. Further, just as revelation regards the in- ther on (Ecclus. 49:18) it is said of Joseph that “his bones tellect, so inspiration regards, apparently, the affections, were visited, and after death they prophesied.” Now no since it denotes a kind of motion. Now prophecy is de- knowledge remains in the body or in the bones after death. scribed as “inspiration” or “revelation,” according to Cas- Therefore prophecy does not pertain to knowledge. siodorus†. Therefore it would seem that prophecy does Objection 2. Further, it is written (1 Cor. 14:3): “He not pertain to the intellect more than to the affections. that prophesieth, speaketh to men unto edification.” Now On the contrary, It is written (1 Kings 9:9): “For speech is not knowledge itself, but its effect. Therefore it he that is now called a prophet, in time past was called would seem that prophecy does not pertain to knowledge. a seer.” Now sight pertains to knowledge. Therefore Objection 3. Further, every cognitive perfection ex- prophecy pertains to knowledge. cludes folly and madness. Yet both of these are consistent I answer that, Prophecy first and chiefly consists in with prophecy; for it is written (Osee 9:7): “Know ye, O knowledge, because, to wit, prophets know things that are ∗ Vulg.: ‘the spiritual man was mad’ † Prolog. super Psalt. i 1951 far [procul] removed from man’s knowledge. Wherefore unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face, in all the they may be said to take their name from phanos, “appari-signs and wonders.” tion,” because things appear to them from afar. Where- Reply to Objection 1. These passages speak of fore, as Isidore states (Etym. vii, 8), “in the Old Tes- prophecy in reference to the third point just mentioned, tament, they were called Seers, because they saw what which regards the proof of prophecy. others saw not, and surveyed things hidden in mystery.” Reply to Objection 2. The Apostle is speaking there Hence among heathen nations they were known as “vates, of the prophetic utterances. on account of their power of mind [vi mentis],”‡ (Etym. Reply to Objection 3. Those prophets who are de- viii, 7). scribed as foolish and mad are not true but false prophets, Since, however, it is written (1 Cor. 12:7): “The man- of whom it is said (Jer. 3:16): “Hearken not to the words ifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit,” of the prophets that prophesy to you, and deceive you; and further on (1 Cor. 14:12): “Seek to abound unto the they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the edification of the Church,” it follows that prophecy con- mouth of the Lord,” and (Ezech. 13:3): “Woe to the fool- sists secondarily in speech, in so far as the prophets de- ish prophets, that follow their own spirit, and see nothing.” clare for the instruction of others, the things they know Reply to Objection 4. It is requisite to prophecy that through being taught of God, according to the saying of the intention of the mind be raised to the perception of Is. 21:10, “That which I have heard of the Lord of hosts, Divine things: wherefore it is written (Ezech. 2:1): “Son the God of Israel, I have declared unto you.” Accord- of man, stand upon thy feet, and I will speak to thee.” ingly, as Isidore says (Etym. viii, 7), “prophets” may be This raising of the intention is brought about by the mo- described as “proefatores [foretellers], because they tell tion of the Holy Ghost, wherefore the text goes on to say: from afar [porro fantur],” that is, speak from a distance, “And the Spirit entered into me. . . and He set me upon my “and foretell the truth about things to come.” feet.” After the mind’s intention has been raised to heav- Now those things above human ken which are revealed enly things, it perceives the things of God; hence the text by God cannot be confirmed by human reason, which they continues: “And I heard Him speaking to me.” Accord- surpass as regards the operation of the Divine power, ac- ingly inspiration is requisite for prophecy, as regards the cording to Mk. 16:20, “They. . . preached everywhere, the raising of the mind, according to Job 32:8, “The inspira- Lord working withal and confirming the word with signs tion of the Almighty giveth understanding”: while revela- that followed.” Hence, thirdly, prophecy is concerned tion is necessary, as regards the very perception of Divine with the working of miracles, as a kind of confirmation things, whereby prophecy is completed; by its means the of the prophetic utterances. Wherefore it is written (Dt. veil of darkness and ignorance is removed, according to 34:10,11): “There arose no more a prophet in Israel like Job 12:22, “He discovereth great things out of darkness.” Whether prophecy is a habit? IIa IIae q. 171 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that prophecy is a habit. a. 2). Therefore prophecy is a habit. For according to Ethic. ii, 5, “there are three things in the On the contrary, A habit is something “whereby we soul, power, passion, and habit.” Now prophecy is not a act when we will,” as the Commentator∗ says (De An- power, for then it would be in all men, since the powers ima iii). But a man cannot make use of prophecy when of the soul are common to them. Again it is not a pas- he will, as appears in the case of Eliseus (4 Kings 3:15), sion, since the passions belong to the appetitive faculty, as “who on Josaphat inquiring of him concerning the future, stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 22 , a. 2); whereas prophecy per- and the spirit of prophecy failing him, caused a minstrel tains principally to knowledge, as stated in the foregoing to be brought to him, that the spirit of prophecy might Article. Therefore prophecy is a habit. come down upon him through the praise of psalmody, and Objection 2. Further, every perfection of the soul, fill his mind with things to come,” as Gregory observes which is not always in act, is a habit. Now prophecy is (Hom. i super Ezech.). Therefore prophecy is not a habit. a perfection of the soul; and it is not always in act, else a I answer that, As the Apostle says (Eph. 5:13), “all prophet could not be described as asleep. Therefore seem- that is made manifest is light,” because, to wit, just as ingly prophecy is a habit. the manifestation of the material sight takes place through Objection 3. Further, prophecy is reckoned among the material light, so too the manifestation of intellectual sight gratuitous graces. Now grace is something in the soul, af- takes place through intellectual light. Accordingly mani- ter the manner of a habit, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 110, festation must be proportionate to the light by means of ‡ The Latin ‘vates’ is from the Greek phates, and may be rendered ‘soothsayer’ ∗ Averroes or Ibn Roshd, 1120-1198 1952 which it takes place, even as an effect is proportionate such a prophet,” or that “the word of the Lord,” or “the to its cause. Since then prophecy pertains to a knowl- hand of the Lord was made upon him.” edge that surpasses natural reason, as stated above (a. 1), But a habit is an abiding form. Wherefore it is evident it follows that prophecy requires an intellectual light sur- that, properly speaking, prophecy is not a habit. passing the light of natural reason. Hence the saying Reply to Objection 1. This division of the Philoso- of Micah 7:8: “When I sit in darkness, the Lord is my pher’s does not comprise absolutely all that is in the soul, light.” Now light may be in a subject in two ways: first, but only such as can be principles of moral actions, which by way of an abiding form, as material light is in the are done sometimes from passion, sometimes from habit, sun, and in fire; secondly, by way of a passion, or pass- sometimes from mere power, as in the case of those who ing impression, as light is in the air. Now the prophetic perform an action from the judgment of their reason be- light is not in the prophet’s intellect by way of an abiding fore having the habit of that action. form, else a prophet would always be able to prophesy, However, prophecy may be reduced to a passion, pro- which is clearly false. For Gregory says (Hom. i super vided we understand passion to denote any kind of receiv- Ezech.): “Sometimes the spirit of prophecy is lacking to ing, in which sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) the prophet, nor is it always within the call of his mind, that “to understand is, in a way, to be passive.” For just as, yet so that in its absence he knows that its presence is due in natural knowledge, the possible intellect is passive to to a gift.” Hence Eliseus said of the Sunamite woman (4 the light of the active intellect, so too in prophetic knowl- Kings 4:27): “Her soul is in anguish, and the Lord hath edge the human intellect is passive to the enlightening of hid it from me, and hath not told me.” The reason for this the Divine light. is that the intellectual light that is in a subject by way of an Reply to Objection 2. Just as in corporeal things, abiding and complete form, perfects the intellect chiefly when a passion ceases, there remains a certain aptitude to the effect of knowing the principle of the things man- to a repetition of the passion—thus wood once ignited is ifested by that light; thus by the light of the active intel- more easily ignited again, so too in the prophet’s intellect, lect the intellect knows chiefly the first principles of all after the actual enlightenment has ceased, there remains things known naturally. Now the principle of things per- an aptitude to be enlightened anew—thus when the mind taining to supernatural knowledge, which are manifested has once been aroused to devotion, it is more easily re- by prophecy, is God Himself, Whom the prophets do not called to its former devotion. Hence Augustine says (De see in His essence, although He is seen by the blessed in orando Deum. Ep. cxxx, 9) that our prayers need to be heaven, in whom this light is by way of an abiding and frequent, “lest devotion be extinguished as soon as it is complete form, according to Ps. 35:10, “In Thy light we kindled.” shall see light.” We might, however, reply that a person is called a It follows therefore that the prophetic light is in the prophet, even while his prophetic enlightenment ceases prophet’s soul by way of a passion or transitory impres- to be actual, on account of his being deputed by God, ac- sion. This is indicated Ex. 33:22: “When my glory shall cording to Jer. 1:5, “And I made thee a prophet unto the pass, I will set thee in a hole of the rock,” etc., and 3 Kings nations.” 19:11: “Go forth and stand upon the mount before the Reply to Objection 3. Every gift of grace raises man Lord; and behold the Lord passeth,” etc. Hence it is that to something above human nature, and this may happen even as the air is ever in need of a fresh enlightening, so in two ways. First, as to the substance of the act—for in- too the prophet’s mind is always in need of a fresh revela- stance, the working of miracles, and the knowledge of the tion; thus a disciple who has not yet acquired the princi- uncertain and hidden things of Divine wisdom—and for ples of an art needs to have every detail explained to him. such acts man is not granted a habitual gift of grace. Sec- Wherefore it is written (Is. 1:4): “In the morning He wak- ondly, a thing is above human nature as to the mode but eneth my ear, so that I may hear Him as a master.” This is not the substance of the act—for instance to love God and also indicated by the very manner in which prophecies are to know Him in the mirror of His creatures—and for this uttered: thus it is stated that “the Lord spake to such and a habitual gift of grace is bestowed. Whether prophecy is only about future contingencies? IIa IIae q. 171 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that prophecy is only issues pertain to future contingencies. Therefore the about future contingencies. For Cassiodorus says∗ that prophetic revelation is about future contingencies alone. “prophecy is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announc- Objection 2. Further, according to 1 Cor. 12, the ing the issue of things with unchangeable truth.” Now grace of prophecy is differentiated from wisdom and faith, ∗ Prol. super Psalt. i 1953 which are about Divine things; and from the discernment ther sensitive or intellective, of some particular man, but of spirits, which is about created spirits; and from knowl- not from the knowledge of all men; thus a particular man edge, which is about human things. Now habits and acts knows by sense things present to him locally, which an- are differentiated by their objects, as stated above ( Ia IIae, other man does not know by human sense, since they are q. 54, a. 2). Therefore it seems that the object of prophecy removed from him. Thus Eliseus knew prophetically what is not connected with any of the above. Therefore it fol- his disciple Giezi had done in his absence (4 Kings 5:26), lows that it is about future contingencies alone. and in like manner the secret thoughts of one man are Objection 3. Further, difference of object causes dif- manifested prophetically to another, according to 1 Cor. ference of species, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 2). 14:25; and again in this way what one man knows by Therefore, if one prophecy is about future contingencies, demonstration may be revealed to another prophetically. and another about other things, it would seem to follow The second degree comprises those things which sur- that these are different species of prophecy. pass the knowledge of all men without exception, not On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) that they are in themselves unknowable, but on account that some prophecies are “about the future, for instance of a defect in human knowledge; such as the mystery of (Is. 7:14), ‘Behold a virgin shall conceive, and bear a the Trinity, which was revealed by the Seraphim saying: son’ ”; some are “about the past, as (Gn. 1:1), ‘In the be- “Holy, Holy, Holy,” etc. (Is. 6:3). ginning God created heaven and earth’ ”; some are “about The last degree comprises things remote from the the present,” as (1 Cor. 14:24,25), “If all prophesy, and knowledge of all men, through being in themselves un- there come in one that believeth not. . . the secrets of his knowable; such are future contingencies, the truth of heart are made manifest.” Therefore prophecy is not about which is indeterminate. And since that which is pred- future contingencies alone. icated universally and by its very nature, takes prece- I answer that, A manifestation made by means of a dence of that which is predicated in a limited and relative certain light can extend to all those things that are subject sense, it follows that revelation of future events belongs to that light: thus the body’s sight extends to all colors, most properly to prophecy, and from this prophecy appar- and the soul’s natural knowledge extends to whatever is ently takes its name. Hence Gregory says (Hom. i su- subject to the light of the active intellect. Now prophetic per Ezech.): “And since a prophet is so called because he knowledge comes through a Divine light, whereby it is foretells the future, his name loses its significance when possible to know all things both Divine and human, both he speaks of the past or present.” spiritual and corporeal; and consequently the prophetic Reply to Objection 1. Prophecy is there defined ac- revelation extends to them all. Thus by the ministry of cording to its proper signification; and it is in this sense spirits a prophetic revelation concerning the perfections that it is differentiated from the other gratuitous graces. of God and the angels was made to Is. 6:1, where it is Reply to Objection 2. This is evident from what written, “I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high and has just been said. We might also reply that all those elevated.” Moreover his prophecy contains matters re- things that are the matter of prophecy have the common ferring to natural bodies, according to the words of Is. aspect of being unknowable to man except by Divine rev- 40:12, “Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of elation; whereas those that are the matter of “wisdom,” His hand,” etc. It also contains matters relating to human “knowledge,” and the “interpretation of speeches,” can be conduct, according to Is. 58:1, “Deal thy bread to the known by man through natural reason, but are manifested hungry,” etc.; and besides this it contains things pertain- in a higher way through the enlightening of the Divine ing to future events, according to Is. 47:9, “Two things light. As to “faith,” although it is about things invisible to shall come upon thee suddenly in one day, barrenness and man, it is not concerned with the knowledge of the things widowhood.” believed, but with a man’s certitude of assent to things Since, however, prophecy is about things remote from known by others. our knowledge, it must be observed that the more remote Reply to Objection 3. The formal element in things are from our knowledge the more pertinent they are prophetic knowledge is the Divine light, which being one, to prophecy. Of such things there are three degrees. One gives unity of species to prophecy, although the things degree comprises things remote from the knowledge, ei- prophetically manifested by the Divine light are diverse. 1954 Whether by the Divine revelation a prophet knows all that can be known propheti-IIa IIae q. 171 a. 4 cally? Objection 1. It would seem that by the Divine revela- ciple perfectly, as regards all to which its virtue extends, tion a prophet knows all that can be known prophetically. knows at the same time all that can be known through that For it is written (Amos 3:7): “The Lord God doth nothing principle; whereas if the common principle is unknown, without revealing His secret to His servants the prophets.” or known only in a general way, it does not follow that Now whatever is revealed prophetically is something done one knows all those things at the same time, but each of by God. Therefore there is not one of them but what is re- them has to be manifested by itself, so that consequently vealed to the prophet. some of them may be known, and some not. Objection 2. Further, “God’s works are perfect” (Dt. Now the principle of those things that are prophet- 32:4). Now prophecy is a “Divine revelation,” as stated ically manifested by the Divine light is the first truth, above (a. 3). Therefore it is perfect; and this would not which the prophets do not see in itself. Wherefore there be so unless all possible matters of prophecy were re- is no need for their knowing all possible matters of vealed prophetically, since “the perfect is that which lacks prophecy; but each one knows some of them according nothing” (Phys. iii, 6). Therefore all possible matters of to the special revelation of this or that matter. prophecy are revealed to the prophet. Reply to Objection 1. The Lord reveals to the Objection 3. Further, the Divine light which causes prophets all things that are necessary for the instruction prophecy is more powerful than the right of natural reason of the faithful; yet not all to every one, but some to one, which is the cause of human science. Now a man who has and some to another. acquired a science knows whatever pertains to that sci- Reply to Objection 2. Prophecy is by way of being ence; thus a grammarian knows all matters of grammar. something imperfect in the genus of Divine revelation: Therefore it would seem that a prophet knows all matters hence it is written (1 Cor. 13:8) that “prophecies shall of prophecy. be made void,” and that “we prophesy in part,” i.e. im- On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super perfectly. The Divine revelation will be brought to its per- Ezech.) that “sometimes the spirit of prophecy indicates fection in heaven; wherefore the same text continues (1 the present to the prophet’s mind and nowise the future; Cor. 113:10): “When that which is perfect is come, that and sometimes it points not to the present but to the fu- which is in part shall be done away.” Consequently it does ture.” Therefore the prophet does not know all matters of not follow that nothing is lacking to prophetic revelation, prophecy. but that it lacks none of those things to which prophecy is I answer that, Things which differ from one another directed. need not exist simultaneously, save by reason of some one Reply to Objection 3. He who has a science knows thing in which they are connected and on which they de- the principles of that science, whence whatever is perti- pend: thus it has been stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 65, Aa. 1,2) nent to that science depends; wherefore to have the habit that all the virtues must needs exist simultaneously on ac- of a science perfectly, is to know whatever is pertinent to count of prudence and charity. Now all the things that are that science. But God Who is the principle of prophetic known through some principle are connected in that prin- knowledge is not known in Himself through prophecy; ciple and depend thereon. Hence he who knows a prin- wherefore the comparison fails. Whether the prophet always distinguishes what he says by his own spirit from what IIa IIae q. 171 a. 5 he says by the prophetic spirit? Objection 1. It would seem that the prophet always Objection 2. Further, God commands nothing im- distinguishes what he says by his own spirit from what he possible, as Jerome∗ says. Now the prophets were com- says by the prophetic spirit. For Augustine states (Con- manded (Jer. 23:28): “The prophet that hath a dream, fess. vi, 13) that his mother said “she could, through let him tell a dream; and he that hath My word, let him a certain feeling, which in words she could not express, speak My word with truth.” Therefore the prophet can dis- discern betwixt Divine revelations, and the dreams of her tinguish what he has through the spirit of prophecy from own soul.” Now prophecy is a Divine revelation, as stated what he sees otherwise. above (a. 3). Therefore the prophet always distinguishes Objection 3. Further, the certitude resulting from a what he says by the spirit of prophecy, from what he says Divine light is greater than that which results from the by his own spirit. light of natural reason. Now he that has science, by the ∗ Pelagius. Ep. xvi, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome 1955 light of natural reason knows for certain that he has it. titude may be gathered from the fact that Abraham being Therefore he that has prophecy by a Divine light is much admonished in a prophetic vision, prepared to sacrifice his more certain that he has it. only-begotten son, which he nowise would have done had On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super he not been most certain of the Divine revelation. Ezech.): “It must be observed that sometimes the holy On the other hand, his position with regard to the prophets, when consulted, utter certain things by their things he knows by instinct is sometimes such that he is own spirit, through being much accustomed to prophesy- unable to distinguish fully whether his thoughts are con- ing, and think they are speaking by the prophetic spirit.” ceived of Divine instinct or of his own spirit. And those I answer that, The prophet’s mind is instructed by things which we know by Divine instinct are not all man- God in two ways: in one way by an express revelation, in ifested with prophetic certitude, for this instinct is some- another way by a most mysterious instinct to “which the thing imperfect in the genus of prophecy. It is thus that we human mind is subjected without knowing it,” as Augus- are to understand the saying of Gregory. Lest, however, tine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 17). Accordingly the prophet has this should lead to error, “they are very soon set aright by the greatest certitude about those things which he knows the Holy Ghost∗, and from Him they hear the truth, so by an express revelation, and he has it for certain that they that they reproach themselves for having said what was are revealed to him by God; wherefore it is written (Jer. untrue,” as Gregory adds (Hom. i super Ezech.). 26:15): “In truth the Lord sent me to you, to speak all The arguments set down in the first place consider the these words in your hearing.” Else, were he not certain revelation that is made by the prophetic spirit; wherefore about this, the faith which relies on the utterances of the the answer to all the objections is clear. prophet would not be certain. A sign of the prophet’s cer- Whether things known or declared prophetically can be false? IIa IIae q. 171 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that things known or de- tecedent of this conditional proposition is absolutely nec- clared prophetically can be false. For prophecy is about essary, since it is about the past. Therefore the consequent future contingencies, as stated above (a. 3 ). Now future is also necessary absolutely; yet this is unfitting, for then contingencies may possibly not happen; else they would prophecy would not be about contingencies. Therefore it happen of necessity. Therefore the matter of prophecy can is untrue that the matter of prophecy cannot be false. be false. On the contrary, Cassiodorus says† that “prophecy is Objection 2. Further, Isaias prophesied to Ezechias a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue of saying (Is. 38:1): “Take order with thy house, for thou things with invariable truth.” Now the truth of prophecy shalt surely die, and shalt not live,” and yet fifteen years would not be invariable, if its matter could be false. There- were added to his life (4 Kings 20:6). Again the Lord fore nothing false can come under prophecy. said (Jer. 18:7,8): “I will suddenly speak against a nation I answer that, As may be gathered from what has and against a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and been said (Aa. 1,3,5), prophecy is a kind of knowledge to destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken impressed under the form of teaching on the prophet’s in- shall repent of their evil, I also will repent of the evil that tellect, by Divine revelation. Now the truth of knowledge I have thought to do them.” This is instanced in the ex- is the same in disciple and teacher since the knowledge of ample of the Ninevites, according to Jn. 3:10: “The Lord the disciple is a likeness of the knowledge of the teacher, [Vulg.: ‘God’] had mercy with regard to the evil which even as in natural things the form of the thing generated He had said that He would do to them, and He did it not.” is a likeness of the form of the generator. Jerome speaks Therefore the matter of prophecy can be false. in this sense when he says‡ that “prophecy is the seal of Objection 3. Further, in a conditional proposition, the Divine foreknowledge.” Consequently the same truth whenever the antecedent is absolutely necessary, the con- must needs be in prophetic knowledge and utterances, as sequent is absolutely necessary, because the consequent in the Divine knowledge, under which nothing false can of a conditional proposition stands in the same relation to possibly come, as stated in the Ia, q. 16, a. 8. Therefore the antecedent, as the conclusion to the premises in a syl- nothing false can come under prophecy. logism, and a syllogism whose premises are necessary al- Reply to Objection 1. As stated in the Ia, q. 14, a. 13 ways leads to a necessary conclusion, as we find proved in the certitude of the Divine foreknowledge does not ex- I Poster. 6. But if the matter of a prophecy cannot be false, clude the contingency of future singular events, because the following conditional proposition must needs be true: that knowledge regards the future as present and already “If a thing has been prophesied, it will be.” Now the an- determinate to one thing. Wherefore prophecy also, which ∗ For instance, cf. 2 Kings 7:3 seqq. † Prol. in Psalt. i ‡ Comment. in Daniel ii, 10 1956 is an “impressed likeness” or “seal of the Divine fore-the event is otherwise than foretold. Yet the prophecy does knowledge,” does not by its unchangeable truth exclude not cover a falsehood, for the meaning of the prophecy the contingency of future things. is that inferior causes, whether they be natural causes or Reply to Objection 2. The Divine foreknowledge re- human acts, are so disposed as to lead to such a result. gards future things in two ways. First, as they are in them- In this way we are to understand the saying of Is. 38:1: selves, in so far, to wit, as it sees them in their presential- “Thou shalt die, and not live”; in other words, “The dis- ity: secondly, as in their causes, inasmuch as it sees the position of thy body has a tendency to death”: and the order of causes in relation to their effects. And though saying of Jonah 3:4, “Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall future contingencies, considered as in themselves, are de- be destroyed,” that is to say, “Its merits demand that it terminate to one thing, yet, considered as in their causes, should be destroyed.” God is said “to repent,” metaphor- they are not so determined but that they can happen oth- ically, inasmuch as He bears Himself after the manner of erwise. Again, though this twofold knowledge is always one who repents, by “changing His sentence, although He united in the Divine intellect, it is not always united in the changes not His counsel”∗. prophetic revelation, because an imprint made by an ac- Reply to Objection 3. Since the same truth of tive cause is not always on a par with the virtue of that prophecy is the same as the truth of Divine foreknowl- cause. Hence sometimes the prophetic revelation is an edge, as stated above, the conditional proposition: “If this imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge, in so far was prophesied, it will be,” is true in the same way as as the latter regards future contingencies in themselves: the proposition: “If this was foreknown, it will be”: for and such things happen in the same way as foretold, for in both cases it is impossible for the antecedent not to example this saying of Is. 7:14: “Behold a virgin shall be. Hence the consequent is necessary, considered, not conceive.” Sometimes, however, the prophetic revelation as something future in our regard, but as being present to is an imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge as the Divine foreknowledge, as stated in the Ia, q. 14, a. 13, knowing the order of causes to effects; and then at times ad 2. ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 19, a. 7, ad 2 1957 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 172 Of the Cause of Prophecy (In Six Articles) We must now consider the cause of prophecy. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether prophecy is natural? (2) Whether it is from God by means of the angels? (3) Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy? (4) Whether a good life is requisite? (5) Whether any prophecy is from the demons? (6) Whether prophets of the demons ever tell what is true? Whether prophecy can be natural? IIa IIae q. 172 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that prophecy can be nat- prophetic foreknowledge may regard future things in two ural. For Gregory says (Dial. iv, 26) that “sometimes the ways: in one way, as they are in themselves; in another mere strength of the soul is sufficiently cunning to fore- way, as they are in their causes. Now, to foreknow future see certain things”: and Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, things, as they are in themselves, is proper to the Divine 13) that the human soul, according as it is withdrawn from intellect, to Whose eternity all things are present, as stated the sense of the body, is able to foresee the future∗. Now in the Ia, q. 14, a. 13. Wherefore such like foreknowledge this pertains to prophecy. Therefore the soul can acquire of the future cannot come from nature, but from Divine prophecy naturally. revelation alone. On the other hand, future things can be Objection 2. Further, the human soul’s knowledge is foreknown in their causes with a natural knowledge even more alert while one wakes than while one sleeps. Now by man: thus a physician foreknows future health or death some, during sleep, naturally foresee the future, as the in certain causes, through previous experimental knowl- Philosopher asserts (De Somn. et Vigil.†). Much more edge of the order of those causes to such effects. Such therefore can a man naturally foreknow the future. like knowledge of the future may be understood to be in a Objection 3. Further, man, by his nature, is more per- man by nature in two ways. In one way that the soul, from fect than dumb animals. Yet some dumb animals have that which it holds, is able to foreknow the future, and thus foreknowledge of future things that concern them. Thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): “Some have deemed ants foreknow the coming rains, which is evident from the human soul to contain a certain power of divination.” their gathering grain into their nest before the rain com- This seems to be in accord with the opinion of Plato§, who mences; and in like manner fish foreknow a coming storm, held that our souls have knowledge of all things by partic- as may be gathered from their movements in avoiding ipating in the ideas; but that this knowledge is obscured in places exposed to storm. Much more therefore can men them by union with the body; yet in some more, in others foreknow the future that concerns themselves, and of such less, according to a difference in bodily purity. Accord- things is prophecy. Therefore prophecy comes from na- ing to this it might be said that men, whose souls are not ture. much obscured through union with the body, are able to Objection 4. Further, it is written (Prov. 29:18): foreknow such like future things by their own knowledge. “When prophecy shall fail, the people shall be scattered Against this opinion Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): abroad”; wherefore it is evident that prophecy is neces- “How is it that the soul cannot always have this power of sary for the stability of the human race. Now “nature does divination, since it always wishes to have it?” not fail in necessaries”‡. Therefore it seems that prophecy Since, however, it seems truer, according to the opin- is from nature. ion of Aristotle, that the soul acquires knowledge from On the contrary, It is written (2 Pet. 1:21): “For sensibles, as stated in the Ia, q. 84, a. 6, it is better to have prophecy came not by the will of man at any time, but recourse to another explanation, and to hold that men have the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost.” no such foreknowledge of the future, but that they can ac- Therefore prophecy comes not from nature, but through quire it by means of experience, wherein they are helped the gift of the Holy Ghost. by their natural disposition, which depends on the perfec- I answer that, As stated above (q. 171, a. 6, ad 2) tion of a man’s imaginative power, and the clarity of his ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 86, a. 4, ad 2 † De Divinat. per Somn. ii, which is annexed to the work quoted ‡ Aristotle, de Anima iii, 9 § Phaed. xxvii; Civit. vi 1958 understanding. be able to foreknow the future whenever it willed,” which Nevertheless this latter foreknowledge of the future is clearly false. differs in two ways from the former, which comes through Objection 2. Knowledge of the future by means of Divine revelation. First, because the former can be about dreams, comes either from the revelation of spiritual sub- any events whatever, and this infallibly; whereas the lat- stances, or from a corporeal cause, as stated above (q. 95, ter foreknowledge, which can be had naturally, is about a. 6), when we were treating of divination. Now both these certain effects, to which human experience may extend. causes are more applicable to a person while asleep than Secondly, because the former prophecy is “according to while awake, because, while awake, the soul is occupied the unchangeable truth”¶, while the latter is not, and can with external sensibles, so that it is less receptive of the cover a falsehood. Now the former foreknowledge, and subtle impressions either of spiritual substances, or even not the latter, properly belongs to prophecy, because, as of natural causes; although as regards the perfection of stated above (q. 171, a. 3), prophetic knowledge is of judgment, the reason is more alert in waking than in sleep- things which naturally surpass human knowledge. Conse- ing. quently we must say that prophecy strictly so called can- Reply to Objection 3. Even dumb animals have not be from nature, but only from Divine revelation. no foreknowledge of future events, except as these are Reply to Objection 1. When the soul is withdrawn foreknown in their causes, whereby their imagination is from corporeal things, it becomes more adapted to receive moved more than man’s, because man’s imagination, es- the influence of spiritual substances∗, and also is more in- pecially in waking, is more disposed according to reason clined to receive the subtle motions which take place in than according to the impression of natural causes. Yet the human imagination through the impression of natural reason effects much more amply in man, that which the causes, whereas it is hindered from receiving them while impression of natural causes effects in dumb animals; and occupied with sensible things. Hence Gregory says (Dial. Divine grace by inspiring the prophecy assists man still iv, 26) that “the soul, at the approach of death, foresees more. certain future things, by reason of the subtlety of its na- Reply to Objection 4. The prophetic light extends ture,” inasmuch as it is receptive even of slight impres- even to the direction of human acts; and in this way sions. Or again, it knows future things by a revelation of prophecy is requisite for the government of a people, es- the angels; but not by its own power, because according to pecially in relation to Divine worship; since for this nature Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13), “if this were so, it would is not sufficient, and grace is necessary. Whether prophetic revelation comes through the angels? IIa IIae q. 172 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that prophetic revela- prophetic visions. Therefore prophetic revelation is con- tion does not come through the angels. For it is writ- veyed by means of the angels. ten (Wis. 7:27) that Divine wisdom “conveyeth herself I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1), into holy souls,” and “maketh the friends of God, and the “Things that are of God are well ordered‡.” Now the Di- prophets.” Now wisdom makes the friends of God imme- vine ordering, according to Dionysius§, is such that the diately. Therefore it also makes the prophets immediately, lowest things are directed by middle things. Now the an- and not through the medium of the angels. gels hold a middle position between God and men, in that Objection 2. Further, prophecy is reckoned among they have a greater share in the perfection of the Divine the gratuitous graces. But the gratuitous graces are from goodness than men have. Wherefore the Divine enlight- the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 12:4, “There are di- enments and revelations are conveyed from God to men versities of graces, but the same Spirit.” Therefore the by the angels. Now prophetic knowledge is bestowed by prophetic revelation is not made by means of an angel. Divine enlightenment and revelation. Therefore it is evi- Objection 3. Further, Cassiodorus† says that dent that it is conveyed by the angels. prophecy is a “Divine revelation”: whereas if it were con- Reply to Objection 1. Charity which makes man a veyed by the angels, it would be called an angelic revela- friend of God, is a perfection of the will, in which God tion. Therefore prophecy is not bestowed by means of the alone can form an impression; whereas prophecy is a per- angels. fection of the intellect, in which an angel also can form an On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): impression, as stated in the Ia, q. 111, a. 1, wherefore the “Our glorious fathers received Divine visions by means comparison fails between the two. of the heavenly powers”; and he is speaking there of Reply to Objection 2. The gratuitous graces are as- ¶ q. 171, a. 3, obj. 1 ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 88, a. 4, ad 2 † Prol. in Psalt. i ‡ Vulg.: ‘Those that are, are ordained of God.’ § Coel. Hier. iv; Eccl. Hier. v 1959 cribed to the Holy Ghost as their first principle: yet He strument acts. And since a minister is like an instrument, works grace of this kind in men by means of the angels. prophetic revelation, which is conveyed by the ministry of Reply to Objection 3. The work of the instrument the angels, is said to be Divine. is ascribed to the principal agent by whose power the in- Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy? IIa IIae q. 172 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that a natural disposi- it is written (1 Cor. 12:2): “All these things, one and the tion is requisite for prophecy. For prophecy is received same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as by the prophet according to the disposition of the recipi- He will.” ent, since a gloss of Jerome on Amos 1:2, “The Lord will I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), prophecy in roar from Sion,” says: “Anyone who wishes to make a its true and exact sense comes from Divine inspiration; comparison naturally turns to those things of which he while that which comes from a natural cause is not called has experience, and among which his life is spent. For prophecy except in a relative sense. Now we must observe example, sailors compare their enemies to the winds, and that as God Who is the universal efficient cause requires their losses to a shipwreck. In like manner Amos, who neither previous matter nor previous disposition of matter was a shepherd, likens the fear of God to that which is in- in His corporeal effects, for He is able at the same instant spired by the lion’s roar.” Now that which is received by to bring into being matter and disposition and form, so a thing according to the mode of the recipient requires a neither does He require a previous disposition in His spir- natural disposition. Therefore prophecy requires a natural itual effects, but is able to produce both the spiritual effect disposition. and at the same time the fitting disposition as requisite ac- Objection 2. Further, the considerations of prophecy cording to the order of nature. More than this, He is able are more lofty than those of acquired science. Now nat- at the same time, by creation, to produce the subject, so ural indisposition hinders the considerations of acquired as to dispose a soul for prophecy and give it the prophetic science, since many are prevented by natural indisposi- grace, at the very instant of its creation. tion from succeeding to grasp the speculations of science. Reply to Objection 1. It matters not to prophecy by Much more therefore is a natural disposition requisite for what comparisons the thing prophesied is expressed; and the contemplation of prophecy. so the Divine operation makes no change in a prophet in Objection 3. Further, natural indisposition is a much this respect. Yet if there be anything in him incompatible greater obstacle than an accidental impediment. Now with prophecy, it is removed by the Divine power. the considerations of prophecy are hindered by an acci- Reply to Objection 2. The considerations of science dental occurrence. For Jerome says in his commentary proceed from a natural cause, and nature cannot work on Matthew∗ that “at the time of the marriage act, the without a previous disposition in matter. This cannot be presence of the Holy Ghost will not be vouchsafed, even said of God Who is the cause of prophecy. though it be a prophet that fulfils the duty of procreation.” Reply to Objection 3. A natural indisposition, if not Much more therefore does a natural indisposition hinder removed, might be an obstacle to prophetic revelation, for prophecy; and thus it would seem that a good natural dis- instance if a man were altogether deprived of the natu- position is requisite for prophecy. ral senses. In the same way a man might be hindered On the contrary, Gregory says in a homily for Pen- from the act of prophesying by some very strong passion, tecost (xxx in Ev.): “He,” namely the Holy Ghost, “fills whether of anger, or of concupiscence as in coition, or by the boy harpist and makes him a Psalmist; He fills the any other passion. But such a natural indisposition as this herdsman plucking wild figs, and makes him a prophet.” is removed by the Divine power, which is the cause of Therefore prophecy requires no previous disposition, but prophecy. depends on the will alone of the Holy Ghost, of Whom Whether a good life is requisite for prophecy? IIa IIae q. 172 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that a good life is requi- Now there can be no holiness without a good life and site for prophecy. For it is written (Wis. 7:27) that the wis- sanctifying grace. Therefore prophecy cannot be without dom of God “through nations conveyeth herself into holy a good life and sanctifying grace. souls,” and “maketh the friends of God, and prophets.” Objection 2. Further, secrets are not revealed save ∗ The quotation is from Origen, Hom. vi in Num. 1960 to a friend, according to Jn. 15:15, “But I have called man’s affections to God, which is the purpose of charity. you friends, because all things whatsoever I have heard Therefore prophecy can be without a good life, as regards of My Father, I have made known to you.” Now God re- the first root of this goodness. veals His secrets to the prophets (Amos 3:7). Therefore If, however, we consider a good life, with regard to it would seem that the prophets are the friends of God; the passions of the soul, and external actions, from this which is impossible without charity. Therefore seemingly point of view an evil life is an obstacle to prophecy. For prophecy cannot be without charity; and charity is impos- prophecy requires the mind to be raised very high in or- sible without sanctifying grace. der to contemplate spiritual things, and this is hindered Objection 3. Further, it is written (Mat. 7:15): “Be- by strong passions, and the inordinate pursuit of external ware of false prophets, who come to you in the clothing things. Hence we read of the sons of the prophets (4 Kings of sheep, but inwardly they are ravening wolves.” Now all 4:38) that they “dwelt together with [Vulg.: ‘before’]” who are without grace are likened inwardly to a ravening Eliseus, leading a solitary life, as it were, lest worldly em- wolf, and consequently all such are false prophets. There- ployment should be a hindrance to the gift of prophecy. fore no man is a true prophet except he be good by grace. Reply to Objection 1. Sometimes the gift of prophecy Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher says (De Somn. is given to a man both for the good of others, and in order et Vigil.∗) that “if interpretation of dreams is from God, to enlighten his own mind; and such are those whom Di- it is unfitting for it to be bestowed on any but the best.” vine wisdom, “conveying itself” by sanctifying grace to Now it is evident that the gift of prophecy is from God. their minds, “maketh the friends of God, and prophets.” Therefore the gift of prophecy is vouchsafed only to the Others, however, receive the gift of prophecy merely for best men. the good of others. Hence Jerome commenting on Mat. On the contrary, To those who had said, “Lord, have 7:22, says: “Sometimes prophesying, the working of mir- we not prophesied in Thy name?” this reply is made: “I acles, and the casting out of demons are accorded not to never knew you” (Mat. 7:22,23). Now “the Lord knoweth the merit of those who do these things, but either to the who are His” (2 Tim. 2:19). Therefore prophecy can be invoking the name of Christ, or to the condemnation of in those who are not God’s by grace. those who invoke, and for the good of those who see and I answer that, A good life may be considered from hear.” two points of view. First, with regard to its inward root, Reply to Objection 2. Gregory† expounding this pas- which is sanctifying grace. Secondly, with regard to the sage‡ says: “Since we love the lofty things of heaven as inward passions of the soul and the outward actions. Now soon as we hear them, we know them as soon as we love sanctifying grace is given chiefly in order that man’s soul them, for to love is to know. Accordingly He had made all may be united to God by charity. Wherefore Augustine things known to them, because having renounced earthly says (De Trin. xv, 18): “A man is not transferred from desires they were kindled by the torches of perfect love.” the left side to the right, unless he receive the Holy Ghost, In this way the Divine secrets are not always revealed to by Whom he is made a lover of God and of his neigh- prophets. bor.” Hence whatever can be without charity can be with- Reply to Objection 3. Not all wicked men are raven- out sanctifying grace, and consequently without goodness ing wolves, but only those whose purpose is to injure oth- of life. Now prophecy can be without charity; and this ers. For Chrysostom says§ that “Catholic teachers, though is clear on two counts. First, on account of their respec- they be sinners, are called slaves of the flesh, but never tive acts: for prophecy pertains to the intellect, whose act ravening wolves, because they do not purpose the destruc- precedes the act of the will, which power is perfected by tion of Christians.” And since prophecy is directed to the charity. For this reason the Apostle (1 Cor. 13) reck- good of others, it is manifest that such are false prophets, ons prophecy with other things pertinent to the intellect, because they are not sent for this purpose by God. that can be had without charity. Secondly, on account of Reply to Objection 4. God’s gifts are not always be- their respective ends. For prophecy like other gratuitous stowed on those who are simply the best, but sometimes graces is given for the good of the Church, according to 1 are vouchsafed to those who are best as regards the receiv- Cor. 12:7, “The manifestation of the Spirit is given to ev- ing of this or that gift. Accordingly God grants the gift of ery man unto profit”; and is not directly intended to unite prophecy to those whom He judges best to give it to. ∗ Cf. De Divinat. per Somn. i, which is annexed to the work quoted † Hom. xxvii in Ev. ‡ Jn. 15:15 § Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix, among the works of St. John Chrysostom, and falsely ascribed to him 1961 Whether any prophecy comes from the demons? IIa IIae q. 172 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that no prophecy comes ural knowledge, know certain things remote from men’s from the demons. For prophecy is “a Divine revelation,” knowledge, which they can reveal to men: although those according to Cassiodorus∗. But that which is done by a things which God alone knows are remote simply and demon is not Divine. Therefore no prophecy can be from most of all. a demon. Accordingly prophecy, properly and simply, is con- Objection 2. Further, some kind of enlightenment is veyed by Divine revelations alone; yet the revelation requisite for prophetic knowledge, as stated above (q. 171, which is made by the demons may be called prophecy in Aa. 2,3). Now the demons do not enlighten the human in- a restricted sense. Wherefore those men to whom some- tellect, as stated above in the Ia, q. 119, a. 3. Therefore no thing is revealed by the demons are styled in the Scriptures prophecy can come from the demons. as prophets, not simply, but with an addition, for instance Objection 3. Further, a sign is worthless if it beto- as “false prophets,” or “prophets of idols.” Hence Au- kens contraries. Now prophecy is a sign in confirma- gustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19): “When the evil spirit tion of faith; wherefore a gloss on Rom. 12:6, “Either lays hold of a man for such purposes as these,” namely prophecy to be used according to the rule of faith,” says: visions, “he makes him either devilish, or possessed, or a “Observe that in reckoning the graces, he begins with false prophet.” prophecy, which is the first proof of the reasonableness of Reply to Objection 1. Cassiodorus is here defining our faith; since believers, after receiving the Spirit, proph- prophecy in its proper and simple acceptation. esied.” Therefore prophecy cannot be bestowed by the Reply to Objection 2. The demons reveal what they demons. know to men, not by enlightening the intellect, but by an On the contrary, It is written (3 Kings 18:19): imaginary vision, or even by audible speech; and in this “Gather unto me all Israel unto mount Carmel, and the way this prophecy differs from true prophecy. prophets of Baal four hundred and fifty, and the prophets Reply to Objection 3. The prophecy of the demons of the grove four hundred, who eat at Jezebel’s table.” can be distinguished from Divine prophecy by certain, and Now these were worshippers of demons. Therefore it even outward, signs. Hence Chrysostom says† that “some would seem that there is also a prophecy from the demons. prophesy by the spirit of the devil, such as diviners, but I answer that, As stated above (q. 171, a. 1), prophecy they may be discerned by the fact that the devil sometimes denotes knowledge far removed from human knowledge. utters what is false, the Holy Ghost never.” Wherefore it is Now it is evident that an intellect of a higher order can written (Dt. 18:21,22): “If in silent thought thou answer: know some things that are far removed from the knowl- How shall I know the word that the Lord hath spoken? edge of an inferior intellect. Again, above the human Thou shalt have this sign: Whatsoever that same prophet intellect there is not only the Divine intellect, but also foretelleth in the name of the Lord, and it come not to the intellects of good and bad angels according to the pass, that thing the Lord hath not spoken.” order of nature. Hence the demons, even by their nat- Whether the prophets of the demons ever foretell the truth? IIa IIae q. 172 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the prophets of the never speak false, as stated above (q. 111, a. 6). Therefore demons never foretell the truth. For Ambrose‡ says that the prophets of the demons never speak truth. “Every truth, by whomsoever spoken, is from the Holy Objection 3. Further, it is said of the devil (Jn. 8:44) Ghost.” Now the prophets of the demons do not speak that “when he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own, for from the Holy Ghost, because “there is no concord be- the devil is a liar, and the father thereof,” i.e. of lying. tween Christ and Belial§” (2 Cor. 6:15). Therefore it Now by inspiring his prophets, the devil speaks only of would seem that they never foretell the truth. his own, for he is not appointed God’s minister to declare Objection 2. Further, just as true prophets are inspired the truth, since “light hath no fellowship with darkness¶” by the Spirit of truth, so the prophets of the demons are in- (2 Cor. 6:14). Therefore the prophets of the demons never spired by the spirit of untruth, according to 3 Kings 22:22, foretell the truth. “I will go forth, and be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his On the contrary, A gloss on Num. 22:14, says that prophets.” Now the prophets inspired by the Holy Ghost “Balaam was a diviner, for he sometimes foreknew the ∗ Prol. in Psalt. i † Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix, falsely as- cribed to St. John Chrysostom ‡ Hilary the Deacon (Ambrosiaster) on 1 Cor. 12:3 § ‘What concord hath Christ with Belial?’ ¶ Vulg.: ‘What fellowship hath light with darkness?’ 1962 future by help of the demons and the magic art.” Now he more credible, since even its foes bear witness to it, and foretold many true things, for instance that which is to be also in order that men, by believing such men, may be found in Num. 24:17: “A star shall rise out of Jacob, and more easily led on to truth. Wherefore also the Sibyls a scepter shall spring up from Israel.” Therefore even the foretold many true things about Christ. prophets of the demons foretell the truth. Yet even when the demons’ prophets are instructed by I answer that, As the good is in relation to things, so the demons, they foretell the truth, sometimes by virtue of is the true in relation to knowledge. Now in things it is im- their own nature, the author of which is the Holy Ghost, possible to find one that is wholly devoid of good. Where- and sometimes by revelation of the good spirits, as Augus- fore it is also impossible for any knowledge to be wholly tine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19): so that even then this false, without some mixture of truth. Hence Bede says∗ truth which the demons proclaim is from the Holy Ghost. that “no teaching is so false that it never mingles truth with Reply to Objection 2. A true prophet is always in- falsehood.” Hence the teaching of the demons, with which spired by the Spirit of truth, in Whom there is no false- they instruct their prophets, contains some truths whereby hood, wherefore He never says what is not true; whereas it is rendered acceptable. For the intellect is led astray to a false prophet is not always instructed by the spirit of falsehood by the semblance of truth, even as the will is untruth, but sometimes even by the Spirit of truth. Even seduced to evil by the semblance of goodness. Wherefore the very spirit of untruth sometimes declares true things, Chrysostom says†: “The devil is allowed sometimes to sometimes false, as stated above. speak true things, in order that his unwonted truthfulness Reply to Objection 3. Those things are called the may gain credit for his lie.” demons’ own, which they have of themselves, namely lies Reply to Objection 1. The prophets of the demons do and sins; while they have, not of themselves but of God, not always speak from the demons’ revelation, but some- those things which belong to them by nature: and it is times by Divine inspiration. This was evidently the case by virtue of their own nature that they sometimes foretell with Balaam, of whom we read that the Lord spoke to him the truth, as stated above (ad 1). Moreover God makes (Num. 22:12), though he was a prophet of the demons, use of them to make known the truth which is to be ac- because God makes use even of the wicked for the profit complished through them, by revealing Divine mysteries of the good. Hence He foretells certain truths even by to them through the angels, as already stated (Gen. ad lit. the demons’ prophets, both that the truth may be rendered xii, 19; Ia, q. 109, a. 4, ad 1). ∗ Comment. in Luc. xvii, 12; Cf. Augustine, QQ. Evang. ii, 40 † Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom 1963 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 173 Of the Manner in Which Prophetic Knowledge Is Conveyed (In Four Articles) We must now consider the manner in which prophetic knowledge is conveyed, and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the prophets see God’s very essence? (2) Whether the prophetic revelation is effected by the infusion of certain species, or by the infusion of Divine light alone? (3) Whether prophetic revelation is always accompanied by abstraction from the sense? (4) Whether prophecy is always accompanied by knowledge of the things prophesied? Whether the prophets see the very essence of God? IIa IIae q. 173 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the prophets see the God (which they call the “mirror of eternity”)∗, not, how- very essence of God, for a gloss on Is. 38:1, “Take or- ever, in the way in which it is the object of the blessed, der with thy house, for thou shalt die and not live,” says: but as containing the types† of future events. But this is “Prophets can read in the book of God’s foreknowledge in altogether impossible. For God is the object of bliss in which all things are written.” Now God’s foreknowledge His very essence, according to the saying of Augustine is His very essence. Therefore prophets see God’s very (Confess. v, 4): “Happy whoso knoweth Thee, though he essence. know not these,” i.e. creatures. Now it is not possible Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 7) to see the types of creatures in the very essence of God that “in that eternal truth from which all temporal things without seeing It, both because the Divine essence is It- are made, we see with the mind’s eye the type both of our self the type of all things that are made—the ideal type being and of our actions.” Now, of all men, prophets have adding nothing to the Divine essence save only a relation- the highest knowledge of Divine things. Therefore they, ship to the creature—and because knowledge of a thing especially, see the Divine essence. in itself—and such is the knowledge of God as the object Objection 3. Further, future contingencies are fore- of heavenly bliss—precedes knowledge of that thing in its known by the prophets “with unchangeable truth.” Now relation to something else—and such is the knowledge of future contingencies exist thus in God alone. Therefore God as containing the types of things. Consequently it is the prophets see God Himself. impossible for prophets to see God as containing the types On the contrary, The vision of the Divine essence of creatures, and yet not as the object of bliss. Therefore is not made void in heaven; whereas “prophecy is made we must conclude that the prophetic vision is not the vi- void” (1 Cor. 13:8). Therefore prophecy is not conveyed sion of the very essence of God, and that the prophets do by a vision of the Divine essence. not see in the Divine essence Itself the things they do see, I answer that, Prophecy denotes Divine knowledge but that they see them in certain images, according as they as existing afar off. Wherefore it is said of the prophets are enlightened by the Divine light. (Heb. 11:13) that “they were beholding. . . afar off.” But Wherefore Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv), in speaking those who are in heaven and in the state of bliss see, not as of prophetic visions, says that “the wise theologian calls from afar off, but rather, as it were, from near at hand, ac- that vision divine which is effected by images of things cording to Ps. 139:14, “The upright shall dwell with Thy lacking a bodily form through the seer being rapt in di- countenance.” Hence it is evident that prophetic knowl- vine things.” And these images illumined by the Divine edge differs from the perfect knowledge, which we shall light have more of the nature of a mirror than the Divine have in heaven, so that it is distinguished therefrom as the essence: since in a mirror images are formed from other imperfect from the perfect, and when the latter comes the things, and this cannot be said of God. Yet the prophet’s former is made void, as appears from the words of the mind thus enlightened may be called a mirror, in so far Apostle (1 Cor. 13:10). as a likeness of the truth of the Divine foreknowledge is Some, however, wishing to discriminate between formed therein, for which reason it is called the “mirror of prophetic knowledge and the knowledge of the blessed, eternity,” as representing God’s foreknowledge, for God have maintained that the prophets see the very essence of in His eternity sees all things as present before Him, as ∗ Cf. De Veritate, xii, 6; Sent. II, D, XI, part 2, art. 2, ad 4 † Cf. Ia, q. 15 1964 stated above (q. 172, a. 1). the First Truth shines forth on man’s mind, so that he is Reply to Objection 1. The prophets are said to read able to know himself. the book of God’s foreknowledge, inasmuch as the truth Reply to Objection 3. From the very fact that future is reflected from God’s foreknowledge on the prophet’s contingencies are in God according to unalterable truth, mind. it follows that God can impress a like knowledge on the Reply to Objection 2. Man is said to see in the First prophet’s mind without the prophet seeing God in His Truth the type of his existence, in so far as the image of essence. Whether, in prophetic revelation, new species of things are impressed on the prophet’s IIa IIae q. 173 a. 2 mind, or merely a new light? Objection 1. It would seem that in prophetic rev- the passive intellect, and these are changed by the species elation no new species of things are impressed on the derived from the phantasms, which change results from prophet’s mind, but only a new light. For a gloss of the enlightening action of the active intellect. Now in the Jerome on Amos 1:2 says that “prophets draw compar- imagination there are the forms of sensible things not only isons from things with which they are conversant.” But if as received from the senses, but also transformed in var- prophetic vision were effected by means of species newly ious ways, either on account of some bodily transforma- impressed, the prophet’s previous experience of things tion (as in the case of people who are asleep or out of their would be inoperative. Therefore no new species are im- senses), or through the coordination of the phantasms, at pressed on the prophet’s soul, but only the prophetic light. the command of reason, for the purpose of understanding Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine (Gen. something. For just as the various arrangements of the ad lit. xii, 9), “it is not imaginative but intellective vision letters of the alphabet convey various ideas to the under-that makes the prophet”; wherefore it is declared (Dan. standing, so the various coordinations of the phantasms 10:1) that “there is need of understanding in a vision.” produce various intelligible species of the intellect. Now intellective vision, as stated in the same book (Gen. As to the judgment formed by the human mind, it de- ad lit. xii, 6) is not effected by means of images, but by pends on the power of the intellectual light. the very truth of things. Therefore it would seem that Now the gift of prophecy confers on the human mind prophetic revelation is not effected by impressing species something which surpasses the natural faculty in both on the soul. these respects, namely as to the judgment which depends Objection 3. Further, by the gift of prophecy the Holy on the inflow of intellectual light, and as to the acceptance Ghost endows man with something that surpasses the fac- or representation of things, which is effected by means ulty of nature. Now man can by his natural faculties form of certain species. Human teaching may be likened to all kinds of species of things. Therefore it would seem prophetic revelation in the second of these respects, but that in prophetic revelation no new species of things are not in the first. For a man represents certain things to his impressed, but merely an intellectual light. disciple by signs of speech, but he cannot enlighten him On the contrary, It is written (Osee 12:10): “I have inwardly as God does. multiplied” their “visions, and I have used similitudes, by But it is the first of these two that holds the chief place the ministry of the prophets.” Now multiplicity of visions in prophecy, since judgment is the complement of knowl- results, not from a diversity of intellectual light, which is edge. Wherefore if certain things are divinely represented common to every prophetic vision, but from a diversity to any man by means of imaginary likenesses, as hap- of species, whence similitudes also result. Therefore it pened to Pharaoh (Gn. 41:1-7) and to Nabuchodonosor seems that in prophetic revelation new species of things (Dan. 4:1-2), or even by bodily likenesses, as happened to are impressed, and not merely an intellectual light. Balthasar (Dan. 5:5), such a man is not to be considered a I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, prophet, unless his mind be enlightened for the purpose of 9), “prophetic knowledge pertains most of all to the intel- judgment; and such an apparition is something imperfect lect.” Now two things have to be considered in connec- in the genus of prophecy. Wherefore some∗ have called tion with the knowledge possessed by the human mind, this “prophetic ecstasy,” and such is divination by dreams. namely the acceptance or representation of things, and the And yet a man will be a prophet, if his intellect be enlight- judgment of the things represented. Now things are repre- ened merely for the purpose of judging of things seen in sented to the human mind under the form of species: and imagination by others, as in the case of Joseph who inter- according to the order of nature, they must be represented preted Pharaoh’s dream. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad first to the senses, secondly to the imagination, thirdly to lit. xii, 9), “especially is he a prophet who excels in both ∗ Rabbi Moyses, Doct. Perplex. II, xxxvi 1965 respects, so,” to wit, “as to see in spirit likenesses sig-was their leader.” nificant of things corporeal, and understand them by the Hence it is evident that prophetic revelation is con- quickness of his intellect.” veyed sometimes by the mere infusion of light, sometimes Now sensible forms are divinely presented to the by imprinting species anew, or by a new coordination of prophet’s mind, sometimes externally by means of the species. senses—thus Daniel saw the writing on the wall (Dan. Reply to Objection 1. As stated above, sometimes in 5:25)—sometimes by means of imaginary forms, either prophetic revelation imaginary species previously derived of exclusively Divine origin and not received through the from the senses are divinely coordinated so as to accord senses (for instance, if images of colors were imprinted with the truth to be revealed, and then previous experience on the imagination of one blind from birth), or divinely is operative in the production of the images, but not when coordinated from those derived from the senses—thus they are impressed on the mind wholly from without. Jeremiah saw the “boiling caldron. . . from the face of the Reply to Objection 2. Intellectual vision is not ef- north” (Jer. 1:13)—or by the direct impression of intel- fected by means of bodily and individual images, but by ligible species on the mind, as in the case of those who an intelligible image. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. receive infused scientific knowledge or wisdom, such as ix, 11) that “the soul possesses a certain likeness of the Solomon or the apostles. species known to it.” Sometimes this intelligible image is, But intellectual light is divinely imprinted on the hu- in prophetic revelation, imprinted immediately by God, man mind—sometimes for the purpose of judging of sometimes it results from pictures in the imagination, by things seen by others, as in the case of Joseph, quoted the aid of the prophetic light, since a deeper truth is gath- above, and of the apostles whose understanding our ered from these pictures in the imagination by means of Lord opened “that they might understand the scriptures” the enlightenment of the higher light. (Lk. 24:45); and to this pertains the “interpretation of Reply to Objection 3. It is true that man is able by his speeches”—sometimes for the purpose of judging accord-natural powers to form all kinds of pictures in the imag- ing to Divine truth, of the things which a man apprehends ination, by simply considering these pictures, but not so in the ordinary course of nature—sometimes for the pur- that they be directed to the representation of intelligible pose of discerning truthfully and efficaciously what is to truths that surpass his intellect, since for this purpose he be done, according to Is. 63:14, “The Spirit of the Lord needs the assistance of a supernatural light. Whether the prophetic vision is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses? IIa IIae q. 173 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the prophetic vision sary for prophetic revelation to be always accompanied by is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses. abstraction from the senses. For it is written (Num. 12:6): “If there be among you Objection 4. On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, 14:32): “The spirits of the prophets are subject to the or I will speak to him in a dream.” Now a gloss says at prophets.” Now this were impossible if the prophet were the beginning of the Psalter, “a vision that takes place by not in possession of his faculties, but abstracted from his dreams and apparitions consists of things which seem to senses. Therefore it would seem that prophetic vision is be said or done.” But when things seem to be said or done, not accompanied by abstraction from the senses. which are neither said nor done, there is abstraction from I answer that, As stated in the foregoing Article, the the senses. Therefore prophecy is always accompanied by prophetic revelation takes place in four ways: namely, by abstraction from the senses. the infusion of an intelligible light, by the infusion of in- Objection 2. Further, when one power is very intent telligible species, by impression or coordination of pic- on its own operation, other powers are drawn away from tures in the imagination, and by the outward presentation theirs; thus men who are very intent on hearing some- of sensible images. Now it is evident that there is no ab- thing fail to see what takes place before them. Now in the straction from the senses, when something is presented prophetic vision the intellect is very much uplifted, and in- to the prophet’s mind by means of sensible species— tent on its act. Therefore it seems that the prophetic vision whether these be divinely formed for this special purpose, is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses. as the bush shown to Moses (Ex. 3:2), and the writing Objection 3. Further, the same thing cannot, at the shown to Daniel (Dan. 5:)—or whether they be produced same time, tend in opposite directions. Now in the by other causes; yet so that they are ordained by Divine prophetic vision the mind tends to the acceptance of things providence to be prophetically significant of something, from above, and consequently it cannot at the same time as, for instance, the Church was signified by the ark of tend to sensible objects. Therefore it would seem neces- Noah. 1966 Again, abstraction from the external senses is not ren-Ezechiel 1:3: “The hand of the Lord was upon him.” dered necessary when the prophet’s mind is enlightened Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted refers to by an intellectual light, or impressed with intelligible prophets in whom imaginary pictures were formed or co- species, since in us the perfect judgment of the intellect ordinated, either while asleep, which is denoted by the is effected by its turning to sensible objects, which are the word “dream,” or while awake, which is signified by the first principles of our knowledge, as stated in the Ia, q. 84, word “vision.” a. 6. Reply to Objection 2. When the mind is intent, in its When, however, prophetic revelation is conveyed by act, upon distant things which are far removed from the images in the imagination, abstraction from the senses is senses, the intensity of its application leads to abstraction necessary lest the things thus seen in imagination be taken from the senses; but when it is intent, in its act, upon the for objects of external sensation. Yet this abstraction from coordination of or judgment concerning objects of sense, the senses is sometimes complete, so that a man perceives there is no need for abstraction from the senses. nothing with his senses; and sometimes it is incomplete, Reply to Objection 3. The movement of the prophetic so that he perceives something with his senses, yet does mind results not from its own power, but from a power act- not fully discern the things he perceives outwardly from ing on it from above. Hence there is no abstraction from those he sees in imagination. Hence Augustine says (Gen. the senses when the prophet’s mind is led to judge or coor- ad lit. xii, 12): “Those images of bodies which are formed dinate matters relating to objects of sense, but only when in the soul are seen just as bodily things themselves are the mind is raised to the contemplation of certain more seen by the body, so that we see with our eyes one who lofty things. is present, and at the same time we see with the soul one Reply to Objection 4. The spirit of the prophets who is absent, as though we saw him with our eyes.” is said to be subject to the prophets as regards the Yet this abstraction from the senses takes place in the prophetic utterances to which the Apostle refers in the prophets without subverting the order of nature, as is the words quoted; because, to wit, the prophets in declar- case with those who are possessed or out of their senses; ing what they have seen speak their own mind, and are but is due to some well-ordered cause. This cause may be not thrown off their mental balance, like persons who are natural—for instance, sleep—or spiritual—for instance, possessed, as Priscilla and Montanus maintained. But as the intenseness of the prophets’ contemplation; thus we regards the prophetic revelation itself, it would be more read of Peter (Acts 10:9) that while he was praying in the correct to say that the prophets are subject to the. spirit of supper-room∗ “he fell into an ecstasy”—or he may be car- prophecy, i.e. to the prophetic gift. ried away by the Divine power, according to the saying of Whether prophets always know the things which they prophesy? IIa IIae q. 173 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the prophets always in itself. Therefore it would seem that the prophet is first know the things which they prophesy. For, as Augus- enlightened so as to know what he declares to others. tine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9), “those to whom signs On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 11:51): “And this were shown in spirit by means of the likenesses of bod- he” (Caiphas) “spoke, not of himself, but being the High ily things, had not the gift of prophecy, unless the mind Priest of that year, he prophesied that Jesus should die for was brought into action, so that those signs were also un- the nation,” etc. Now Caiphas knew this not. Therefore derstood by them.” Now what is understood cannot be not every prophet knows what he prophesies. unknown. Therefore the prophet is not ignorant of what I answer that, In prophetic revelation the prophet’s he prophesies. mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, as an instrument that Objection 2. Further, the light of prophecy surpasses is deficient in regard to the principal agent. Now the the light of natural reason. Now one who possesses a prophet’s mind is moved not only to apprehend some- science by his natural light, is not ignorant of his scien- thing, but also to speak or to do something; sometimes tific acquirements. Therefore he who utters things by the indeed to all these three together, sometimes to two, some- prophetic light cannot ignore them. times to one only, and in each case there may be a defect Objection 3. Further, prophecy is directed for man’s in the prophet’s knowledge. For when the prophet’s mind enlightenment; wherefore it is written (2 Pet. 1:19): “We is moved to think or apprehend a thing, sometimes he is have the more firm prophetical word, whereunto you do led merely to apprehend that thing, and sometimes he is well to attend, as to a light that shineth in a dark place.” further led to know that it is divinely revealed to him. Now nothing can enlighten others unless it be lightsome Again, sometimes the prophet’s mind is moved to ∗ Vulg.: ‘the house-top’ or ‘upper-chamber’ 1967 speak something, so that he understands what the Holy Accordingly, when a man knows that he is being Ghost means by the words he utters; like David who said moved by the Holy Ghost to think something, or sig- (2 Kings 23:2): “The Spirit of the Lord hath spoken by nify something by word or deed, this belongs properly to me”; while, on the other hand, sometimes the person prophecy; whereas when he is moved, without his know- whose mind is moved to utter certain words knows not ing it, this is not perfect prophecy, but a prophetic instinct. what the Holy Ghost means by them, as was the case with Nevertheless it must be observed that since the prophet’s Caiphas (Jn. 11:51). mind is a defective instrument, as stated above, even true Again, when the Holy Ghost moves a man’s mind to prophets know not all that the Holy Ghost means by the do something, sometimes the latter understands the mean- things they see, or speak, or even do. ing of it, like Jeremias who hid his loin-cloth in the Eu- And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections, phrates (Jer. 13:1-11); while sometimes he does not un- since the arguments given at the beginning refer to true derstand it—thus the soldiers, who divided Christ’s gar- prophets whose minds are perfectly enlightened from ments, understood not the meaning of what they did. above. 1968 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 174 Of the Division of Prophecy (In Six Articles) We must now consider the division of prophecy, and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) The division of prophecy into its species; (2) Whether the more excellent prophecy is that which is without imaginative vision? (3) The various degrees of prophecy; (4) Whether Moses was the greatest of the prophets? (5) Whether a comprehensor can be a prophet? (6) Whether prophecy advanced in perfection as time went on? Whether prophecy is fittingly divided into the prophecy of divine predestination, of IIa IIae q. 174 a. 1 foreknowledge, and of denunciation? Objection 1. It would seem that prophecy is unfit- The fourth kind is from the midst of a cloud: thus God tingly divided according to a gloss on Mat. 1:23, “Be- spake to Moses. The fifth kind is a voice from heaven, as hold a virgin shall be with child,” where it is stated that that which called to Abraham saying (Gn. 22:11): ‘Lay “one kind of prophecy proceeds from the Divine predes- not thy hand upon the boy.’ The sixth kind is taking up a tination, and must in all respects be accomplished so that parable, as in the example of Balaam (Num. 23:7; 24:15). its fulfillment is independent of our will, for instance the The seventh kind is the fullness of the Holy Ghost, as in one in question. Another prophecy proceeds from God’s the case of nearly all the prophets.” Further, he mentions foreknowledge: and into this our will enters. And another three kinds of vision; “one by the eyes of the body, an- prophecy is called denunciation, which is significative of other by the soul’s imagination, a third by the eyes of the God’s disapproval.” For that which results from every mind.” Now these are not included in the aforesaid divi- prophecy should not be reckoned a part of prophecy. Now sion. Therefore it is insufficient. all prophecy is according to the Divine foreknowledge, On the contrary, stands the authority of Jerome to since the prophets “read in the book of foreknowledge,” whom the gloss above quoted is ascribed. as a gloss says on Is. 38:1. Therefore it would seem that I answer that, The species of moral habits and acts prophecy according to foreknowledge should not be reck- are distinguished according to their objects. Now the ob- oned a species of prophecy. ject of prophecy is something known by God and surpass- Objection 2. Further, just as something is foretold ing the faculty of man. Wherefore, according to the dif- in denunciation, so is something foretold in promise, and ference of such things, prophecy is divided into various both of these are subject to alteration. For it is written species, as assigned above. Now it has been stated above (Jer. 18:7,8): “I will suddenly speak against a nation and (q. 71, a. 6, ad 2) that the future is contained in the Divine against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to knowledge in two ways. First, as in its cause: and thus we destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall have the prophecy of “denunciation,” which is not always repent of their evil, I also will repent”—and this pertains fulfilled. but it foretells the relation of cause to effect, to the prophecy of denunciation, and afterwards the text which is sometimes hindered by some other occurrence continues in reference to the prophecy of promise (Jer. supervening. Secondly, God foreknows certain things in 18:9,10): “I will suddenly speak of a nation and of a king- themselves—either as to be accomplished by Himself, dom, to build up and plant it. If it shall do evil in My and of such things is the prophecy of “predestination,” sight. . . I will repent of the good that I have spoken to do since, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 30), unto it.” Therefore as there is reckoned to be a prophecy “God predestines things which are not in our power”— of denunciation, so should there be a prophecy of promise. or as to be accomplished through man’s free-will, and of Objection 3. Further, Isidore says (Etym. vii, 8): such is the prophecy of “foreknowledge.” This may regard “There are seven kinds of prophecy. The first is an ec- either good or evil, which does not apply to the prophecy stasy, which is the transport of the mind: thus Peter saw a of predestination, since the latter regards good alone. And vessel descending from heaven with all manner of beasts since predestination is comprised under foreknowledge, therein. The second kind is a vision, as we read in Isa- the gloss in the beginning of the Psalter assigns only two ias, who says (Is. 6:1): ‘I saw the Lord sitting,’ etc. The species to prophecy, namely of “foreknowledge,” and of third kind is a dream: thus Jacob in a dream, saw a ladder. “denunciation.” 1969 Reply to Objection 1. Foreknowledge, properly prophetic current is received. Thus as regards the enlight- speaking, denotes precognition of future events in them- ening of the intellect there is the “fullness of the Holy selves, and in this sense it is reckoned a species of Ghost” which he mentions in the seventh place. As to prophecy. But in so far as it is used in connection with fu- the imprinting of pictures on the imagination he mentions ture events, whether as in themselves, or as in their causes, three, namely “dreams,” to which he gives the third place; it is common to every species of prophecy. “vision,” which occurs to the prophet while awake and re- Reply to Objection 2. The prophecy of promise is gards any kind of ordinary object, and this he puts in the included in the prophecy of denunciation, because the as- second place; and “ecstasy,” which results from the mind pect of truth is the same in both. But it is denominated being uplifted to certain lofty things, and to this he as- in preference from denunciation, because God is more signs the first place. As regards sensible signs he reckons inclined to remit punishment than to withdraw promised three kinds of prophecy, because a sensible sign is—either blessings. a corporeal thing offered externally to the sight, such as Reply to Objection 3. Isidore divides prophecy ac- “a cloud,” which he mentions in the fourth place—or a cording to the manner of prophesying. Now we may dis- “voice” sounding from without and conveyed to man’s tinguish the manner of prophesying—either according to hearing—this he puts in the fifth place—or a voice pro- man’s cognitive powers, which are sense, imagination, ceeding from a man, conveying something under a simili- and intellect, and then we have the three kinds of vision tude, and this pertains to the “parable” to which he assigns mentioned both by him and by Augustine (Gen. ad lit. the sixth place. xii, 6,7)—or according to the different ways in which the Whether the prophecy which is accompanied by intellective and imaginative vision is IIa IIae q. 174 a. 2 more excellent than that which is accompanied by intellective vision alone? Objection 1. It would seem that the prophecy which cred veils.” Now the prophetic revelation is conveyed by has intellective and imaginative vision is more excellent the infusion of the divine ray. Therefore it seems that it than that which is accompanied by intellective vision cannot be without the veils of phantasms. alone. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9): “He is On the contrary, A gloss says at the beginning of less a prophet, who sees in spirit nothing but the signs the Psalter that “the most excellent manner of prophecy representative of things, by means of the images of things is when a man prophesies by the mere inspiration of the corporeal: he is more a prophet, who is merely endowed Holy Ghost, apart from any outward assistance of deed, with the understanding of these signs; but most of all is word, vision, or dream.” he a prophet, who excels in both ways,” and this refers to I answer that, The excellence of the means is mea- the prophet who has intellective together with imaginative sured chiefly by the end. Now the end of prophecy is vision. Therefore this kind of prophecy is more excellent. the manifestation of a truth that surpasses the faculty of Objection 2. Further, the greater a thing’s power man. Wherefore the more effective this manifestation is, is, the greater the distance to which it extends. Now the more excellent the prophecy. But it is evident that the the prophetic light pertains chiefly to the mind, as stated manifestation of divine truth by means of the bare contem- above (q. 173, a. 2). Therefore apparently the prophecy plation of the truth itself, is more effective than that which that extends to the imagination is greater than that which is conveyed under the similitude of corporeal things, for is confined to the intellect. it approaches nearer to the heavenly vision whereby the Objection 3. Further, Jerome (Prol. in Lib. Reg.) dis- truth is seen in God’s essence. Hence it follows that the tinguishes the “prophets” from the “sacred writers.” Now prophecy whereby a supernatural truth is seen by intellec- all those whom he calls prophets (such as Isaias, Jeremias, tual vision, is more excellent than that in which a super- and the like) had intellective together with imaginative vi- natural truth is manifested by means of the similitudes of sion: but not those whom he calls sacred writers, as writ- corporeal things in the vision of the imagination. ing by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost (such as Job, Moreover the prophet’s mind is shown thereby to be David, Solomon, and the like). Therefore it would seem more lofty: even as in human teaching the hearer, who more proper to call prophets those who had intellective is able to grasp the bare intelligible truth the master pro- together with imaginative vision, than those who had in- pounds, is shown to have a better understanding than one tellective vision alone. who needs to be taken by the hand and helped by means of Objection 4. Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) examples taken from objects of sense. Hence it is said in that “it is impossible for the Divine ray to shine on us, commendation of David’s prophecy (2 Kings 23:3): “The except as screened round about by the many-colored sa- strong one of Israel spoke to me,” and further on (2 Kings 1970 23:4): “As the light of the morning, when the sun riseth, excellent than the knowledge of the wayfarer, although shineth in the morning without clouds.” faith is more properly predicated of the latter knowledge, Reply to Objection 1. When a particular supernatural because faith implies an imperfection of knowledge. In truth has to be revealed by means of corporeal images, he like manner prophecy implies a certain obscurity, and re- that has both, namely the intellectual light and the imag- moteness from the intelligible truth; wherefore the name inary vision, is more a prophet than he that has only one, of prophet is more properly applied to those who see by because his prophecy is more perfect; and it is in this sense imaginary vision. And yet the more excellent prophecy is that Augustine speaks as quoted above. Nevertheless the that which is conveyed by intellectual vision, provided the prophecy in which the bare intelligible truth is revealed is same truth be revealed in either case. If, however, the in- greater than all. tellectual light be divinely infused in a person, not that he Reply to Objection 2. The same judgment does not may know some supernatural things, but that he may be apply to things that are sought for their own sake, as to able to judge, with the certitude of divine truth, of things things sought for the sake of something else. For in things that can be known by human reason, such intellectual sought for their own sake, the agent’s power is the more prophecy is beneath that which is conveyed by an imag- effective according as it extends to more numerous and inary vision leading to a supernatural truth. It was this more remote objects; even so a physician is thought more kind of prophecy that all those had who are included in the of, if he is able to heal more people, and those who are ranks of the prophets, who moreover were called prophets further removed from health. on the other hand, in things for the special reason that they exercised the prophetic sought only for the sake of something else, that agent calling officially. Hence they spoke as God’s representa- would seem to have greater power, who is able to achieve tives, saying to the people: “Thus saith the Lord”: but not his purpose with fewer means and those nearest to hand: so the authors of the “sacred writings,” several of whom thus more praise is awarded the physician who is able to treated more frequently of things that can be known by heal a sick person by means of fewer and more gentle human reason, not in God’s name, but in their own, yet remedies. Now, in the prophetic knowledge, imaginary with the assistance of the Divine light withal. vision is required, not for its own sake, but on account Reply to Objection 4. In the present life the enlight- of the manifestation of the intelligible truth. Wherefore enment by the divine ray is not altogether without any veil prophecy is all the more excellent according as it needs it of phantasms, because according to his present state of life less. it is unnatural to man not to understand without a phan- Reply to Objection 3. The fact that a particular predi- tasm. Sometimes, however, it is sufficient to have phan- cate is applicable to one thing and less properly to another, tasms abstracted in the usual way from the senses with- does not prevent this latter from being simply better than out any imaginary vision divinely vouchsafed, and thus the former: thus the knowledge of the blessed is more prophetic vision is said to be without imaginary vision. Whether the degrees of prophecy can be distinguished according to the imaginary IIa IIae q. 174 a. 3 vision? Objection 1. It would seem that the degrees of consists of words, deeds, dreams, and visions. Therefore prophecy cannot be distinguished according to the imag- the degrees of prophecy should not be distinguished ac- inary vision. For the degrees of a thing bear relation to cording to imaginary vision, to which vision and dreams something that is on its own account, not on account of pertain, rather than according to words and deeds. something else. Now, in prophecy, intellectual vision is On the contrary, The medium differentiates the de- sought on its own account, and imaginary vision on ac- grees of knowledge: thus science based on direct† proofs count of something else, as stated above (a. 2, ad 2). is more excellent than science based on indirect‡ premises Therefore it would seem that the degrees of prophecy are or than opinion, because it comes through a more ex- distinguished not according to imaginary, but only accord- cellent medium. Now imaginary vision is a kind of ing to intellectual, vision. medium in prophetic knowledge. Therefore the degrees Objection 2. Further, seemingly for one prophet there of prophecy should be distinguished according to imagi- is one degree of prophecy. Now one prophet receives rev- nary vision. elation through various imaginary visions. Therefore a I answer that, As stated above (q. 173, a. 2), the difference of imaginary visions does not entail a differ- prophecy wherein, by the intelligible light, a supernatural ence of prophecy. truth is revealed through an imaginary vision, holds the Objection 3. Further, according to a gloss∗, prophecy mean between the prophecy wherein a supernatural truth ∗ Cassiodorus, super Prolog. Hieron. in Psalt. † “Propter quid” ‡ “Quia” 1971 is revealed without imaginary vision, and that wherein excellent, according as the signs are more expressive, for through the intelligible light and without an imaginary instance when Jeremias saw the burning of the city un- vision, man is directed to know or do things pertaining der the figure of a boiling cauldron (Jer. 1:13). Thirdly, to human conduct. Now knowledge is more proper to it is evidently a still higher degree of prophecy when a prophecy than is action; wherefore the lowest degree of prophet not only sees signs of words or deeds, but also, prophecy is when a man, by an inward instinct, is moved either awake or asleep, sees someone speaking or show- to perform some outward action. Thus it is related of ing something to him, since this proves the prophet’s mind Samson (Judges 15:14) that “the Spirit of the Lord came to have approached nearer to the cause of the revelation. strongly upon him, and as the flax§ is wont to be con- Fourthly, the height of a degree of prophecy may be mea- sumed at the approach of fire, so the bands with which sured according to the appearance of the person seen: for he was bound were broken and loosed.” The second de- it is a higher degree of prophecy, if he who speaks or gree of prophecy is when a man is enlightened by an shows something to the waking or sleeping prophet be inward light so as to know certain things, which, how- seen by him under the form of an angel, than if he be seen ever, do not go beyond the bounds of natural knowledge: by him under the form of man: and higher still is it, if he thus it is related of Solomon (3 Kings 4:32,33) that “he be seen by the prophet whether asleep or awake, under the spoke. . . parables. . . and he treated about trees from the appearance of God, according to Is. 6:1, “I saw the Lord cedar that is in Libanus unto the hyssop that cometh out of sitting.” the wall, and he discoursed of beasts and of fowls, and of But above all these degrees there is a third kind of creeping things and of fishes”: and all of this came from prophecy, wherein an intelligible and supernatural truth divine inspiration, for it was stated previously (3 Kings is shown without any imaginary vision. However, this 4:29): “God gave to Solomon wisdom and understanding goes beyond the bounds of prophecy properly so called, exceeding much.” as stated above (a. 2, ad 3); and consequently the degrees Nevertheless these two degrees are beneath prophecy of prophecy are properly distinguished according to imag- properly so called, because they do not attain to super- inary vision. natural truth. The prophecy wherein supernatural truth is Reply to Objection 1. We are unable to know how to manifested through imaginary vision is differentiated first distinguish the intellectual light, except by means of imag- according to the difference between dreams which occur inary or sensible signs. Hence the difference in the intel- during sleep, and vision which occurs while one is awake. lectual light is gathered from the difference in the things The latter belongs to a higher degree of prophecy, since presented to the imagination. the prophetic light that draws the soul away to supernat- Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 171, a. 2), ural things while it is awake and occupied with sensible prophecy is by way, not of an abiding habit, but of a tran- things would seem to be stronger than that which finds a sitory passion; wherefore there is nothing inconsistent if man’s soul asleep and withdrawn from objects of sense. one and the same prophet, at different times, receive vari- Secondly the degrees of this prophecy are differentiated ous degrees of prophetic revelation. according to the expressiveness of the imaginary signs Reply to Objection 3. The words and deeds men- whereby the intelligible truth is conveyed. And since tioned there do not pertain to the prophetic revelation, words are the most expressive signs of intelligible truth, but to the announcement, which is made according to the it would seem to be a higher degree of prophecy when disposition of those to whom that which is revealed to the prophet, whether awake or asleep, hears words ex- the prophet is announced; and this is done sometimes by pressive of an intelligible truth, than when he sees things words, sometimes by deeds. Now this announcement, and significative of truth, for instance “the seven full ears of the working of miracles, are something consequent upon corn” signified “seven years of plenty” (Gn. 41:22,26). prophecy, as stated above (q. 171, a. 1). In such like signs prophecy would seem to be the more Whether Moses was the greatest of the prophets? IIa IIae q. 174 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Moses was not the by Josue, who made the sun and moon to stand still (Josh. greatest of the prophets. For a gloss at the beginning of 10:12-14), and by Isaias, who made the sun to turn back the Psalter says that “David is called the prophet by way (Is. 38:8), than by Moses, who divided the Red Sea (Ex. of excellence.” Therefore Moses was not the greatest of 14:21). In like manner greater miracles were wrought all. by Elias, of whom it is written (Ecclus. 48:4,5): “Who Objection 2. Further, greater miracles were wrought can glory like to thee? Who raisedst up a dead man § ‘Lina.’ St. Thomas apparently read ‘ligna’ (‘wood’) 1972 from below.” Therefore Moses was not the greatest of the to his friend.” Thirdly, as regards the working of mira-prophets. cles which he wrought on a whole nation of unbelievers. Objection 3. Further, it is written (Mat. 11:11) that Wherefore it is written (Dt. 34:10,11): “There arose no “there hath not risen, among them that are born of women, more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord a greater than John the Baptist.” Therefore Moses was not knew face to face: in all the signs and wonders, which He greater than all the prophets. sent by him, to do in the land of Egypt to Pharaoh, and to On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 34:10): “There all his servants, and to his whole land.” arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses.” Reply to Objection 1. The prophecy of David ap- I answer that, Although in some respect one or other proaches near to the vision of Moses, as regards the in- of the prophets was greater than Moses, yet Moses was tellectual vision, because both received a revelation of in- simply the greatest of all. For, as stated above (a. 3; telligible and supernatural truth, without any imaginary q. 171, a. 1), in prophecy we may consider not only the vision. Yet the vision of Moses was more excellent as re- knowledge, whether by intellectual or by imaginary vi- gards the knowledge of the Godhead; while David more sion, but also the announcement and the confirmation by fully knew and expressed the mysteries of Christ’s incar- miracles. Accordingly Moses was greater than the other nation. prophets. First, as regards the intellectual vision, since he Reply to Objection 2. These signs of the prophets saw God’s very essence, even as Paul in his rapture did, mentioned were greater as to the substance of the thing according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27). Hence it done; yet the miracles of Moses were greater as regards is written (Num. 12:8) that he saw God “plainly and not the way in which they were done, since they were wrought by riddles.” Secondly, as regards the imaginary vision, on a whole people. which he had at his call, as it were, for not only did he hear Reply to Objection 3. John belongs to the New Tes- words, but also saw one speaking to him under the form tament, whose ministers take precedence even of Moses, of God, and this not only while asleep, but even when he since they are spectators of a fuller revelation, as stated in was awake. Hence it is written (Ex. 33:11) that “the Lord 2 Cor. 3. spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak Whether there is a degree of prophecy in the blessed? IIa IIae q. 174 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that there is a degree in two ways. First, on the part of the knowledge itself, of prophecy in the blessed. For, as stated above (a. 4), because, to wit, the supernatural truth is not known in it- Moses saw the Divine essence, and yet he is called a self, but in some of its effects; and this truth will be more prophet. Therefore in like manner the blessed can be remote if it be known by means of images of corporeal called prophets. things, than if it be known in its intelligible effects; and Objection 2. Further, prophecy is a “divine revela- such most of all is the prophetic vision, which is conveyed tion.” Now divine revelations are made even to the blessed by images and likenesses of corporeal things. Secondly, angels. Therefore even blessed angels can be prophets. vision is remote on the part of the seer, because, to wit, he Objection 3. Further, Christ was a comprehensor has not yet attained completely to his ultimate perfection, from the moment of His conception; and yet He calls according to 2 Cor. 5:6, “While we are in the body, we Himself a prophet (Mat. 13:57), when He says: “A are absent from the Lord.” prophet is not without honor, save in his own country.” Now in neither of these ways are the blessed remote; Therefore even comprehensors and the blessed can be wherefore they cannot be called prophets. called prophets. Reply to Objection 1. This vision of Moses was in- Objection 4. Further, it is written of Samuel (Ecclus. terrupted after the manner of a passion, and was not per- 46:23): “He lifted up his voice from the earth in prophecy manent like the beatific vision, wherefore he was as yet a to blot out the wickedness of the nation.” Therefore other seer from afar. For this reason his vision did not entirely saints can likewise be called prophets after they have died. lose the character of prophecy. On the contrary, The prophetic word is compared (2 Reply to Objection 2. The divine revelation is made Pet. 1:19) to a “light that shineth in a dark place.” Now to the angels, not as being far distant, but as already there is no darkness in the blessed. Therefore they cannot wholly united to God; wherefore their revelation has not be called prophets. the character of prophecy. I answer that, Prophecy denotes vision of some su- Reply to Objection 3. Christ was at the same time pernatural truth as being far remote from us. This happens comprehensor and wayfarer∗. Consequently the notion of ∗ Cf. IIIa, Qq. 9, seqq. 1973 prophecy is not applicable to Him as a comprehensor, but be done by the power of God, so that when the demon is only as a wayfarer. consulted, God Himself declares the truth by His messen- Reply to Objection 4. Samuel had not yet attained ger: even as He gave a true answer by Elias to the King’s to the state of blessedness. Wherefore although by God’s messengers who were sent to consult the god of Accaron will the soul itself of Samuel foretold to Saul the issue of (4 Kings 1). the war as revealed to him by God, this pertains to the na- It might also be replied∗ that it was not the soul of ture of prophecy. It is not the same with the saints who are Samuel, but a demon impersonating him; and that the now in heaven. Nor does it make any difference that this wise man calls him Samuel, and describes his prediction is stated to have been brought about by the demons’ art, as prophetic, in accordance with the thoughts of Saul and because although the demons are unable to evoke the soul the bystanders who were of this opinion. of a saint, or to force it to do any particular thing, this can Whether the degrees of prophecy change as time goes on? IIa IIae q. 174 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the degrees of true knowledge of God, according to Heb. 11:6, “He that prophecy change as time goes on. For prophecy is di- cometh to God must believe that He is”; secondly, in the rected to the knowledge of Divine things, as stated above mystery of Christ’s incarnation, according to Jn. 14:1, (a. 2). Now according to Gregory (Hom. in Ezech.), “You believe in God, believe also in Me.” Accordingly, “knowledge of God went on increasing as time went on.” if we speak of prophecy as directed to the Godhead as Therefore degrees of prophecy should be distinguished its end, it progressed according to three divisions of time, according to the process of time. namely before the law, under the law, and under grace. Objection 2. Further, prophetic revelation is con- For before the law, Abraham and the other patriarchs were veyed by God speaking to man; while the prophets de- prophetically taught things pertinent to faith in the God- clared both in words and in writing the things revealed to head. Hence they are called prophets, according to Ps. them. Now it is written (1 Kings 3:1) that before the time 104:15, “Do no evil to My prophets,” which words are of Samuel “the word of the Lord was precious,” i.e. rare; said especially on behalf of Abraham and Isaac. Under and yet afterwards it was delivered to many. In like man- the Law prophetic revelation of things pertinent to faith in ner the books of the prophets do not appear to have been the Godhead was made in a yet more excellent way than written before the time of Isaias, to whom it was said (Is. hitherto, because then not only certain special persons or 8:1): “Take thee a great book and write in it with a man’s families but the whole people had to be instructed in these pen,” after which many prophets wrote their prophecies. matters. Hence the Lord said to Moses (Ex. 6:2,3): “I am Therefore it would seem that in course of time the degree the Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Ja- of prophecy made progress. cob, by the name of God almighty, and My name Adonai Objection 3. Further, our Lord said (Mat. 11:13): I did not show to them”; because previously the patriarchs “The prophets and the law prophesied until John”; and af- had been taught to believe in a general way in God, one terwards the gift of prophecy was in Christ’s disciples in a and Almighty, while Moses was more fully instructed in much more excellent manner than in the prophets of old, the simplicity of the Divine essence, when it was said to according to Eph. 3:5, “In other generations” the mystery him (Ex. 3:14): “I am Who am”; and this name is sig- of Christ “was not known to the sons of men, as it is now nified by Jews in the word “Adonai” on account of their revealed to His holy apostles and prophets in the Spirit.” veneration for that unspeakable name. Afterwards in the Therefore it would seem that in course of time the degree time of grace the mystery of the Trinity was revealed by of prophecy advanced. the Son of God Himself, according to Mat. 28:19: “Go- On the contrary, As stated above (a. 4), Moses was ing. . . teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the greatest of the prophets, and yet he preceded the other the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.” prophets. Therefore prophecy did not advance in degree In each state, however, the most excellent revelation as time went on. was that which was given first. Now the first revelation, I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), prophecy is di- before the Law, was given to Abraham, for it was at that rected to the knowledge of Divine truth, by the contem- time that men began to stray from faith in one God by plation of which we are not only instructed in faith, but turning aside to idolatry, whereas hitherto no such rev- also guided in our actions, according to Ps. 42:3, “Send elation was necessary while all persevered in the wor- forth Thy light and Thy truth: they have conducted me.” ship of one God. A less excellent revelation was made Now our faith consists chiefly in two things: first, in the to Isaac, being founded on that which was made to Abra- ∗ The Book of Ecclesiasticus was not as yet declared by the Church to be Canonical Scripture; Cf. Ia, q. 89, a. 8, ad 2 1974 ham. Wherefore it was said to him (Gn. 26:24): “I am the Whom were to be fulfilled the promises made through the God of Abraham thy father,” and in like manner to Jacob prophetic oracles testifying in word and writing to that (Gn. 28:13): “I am the God of Abraham thy father, and the great event to come,” the promises, namely, which were God of Isaac.” Again in the state of the Law the first reve- made to Abraham. “For while prophets were scarcely ever lation which was given to Moses was more excellent, and lacking to the people of Israel from the time that they be- on this revelation all the other revelations to the prophets gan to have kings, it was exclusively for their benefit, not were founded. And so, too, in the time of grace the entire for that of the nations. But when those prophetic writings faith of the Church is founded on the revelation vouch- were being set up with greater publicity, which at some safed to the apostles, concerning the faith in one God and future time were to benefit the nations, it was fitting to be- three Persons, according to Mat. 16:18, “On this rock,” gin when this city,” Rome to wit, “was being built, which i.e. of thy confession, “I will build My Church.” was to govern the nations.” As to the faith in Christ’s incarnation, it is evident The reason why it behooved that nation to have a num- that the nearer men were to Christ, whether before or af- ber of prophets especially at the time of the kings, was that ter Him, the more fully, for the most part, were they in- then it was not over-ridden by other nations, but had its structed on this point, and after Him more fully than be- own king; wherefore it behooved the people, as enjoying fore, as the Apostle declares (Eph. 3:5). liberty, to have prophets to teach them what to do. As regards the guidance of human acts, the prophetic Reply to Objection 3. The prophets who foretold the revelation varied not according to the course of time, but coming of Christ could not continue further than John, according as circumstances required, because as it is writ- who with his finger pointed to Christ actually present. ten (Prov. 29:18), “When prophecy shall fail, the people Nevertheless as Jerome says on this passage, “This does shall be scattered abroad.” Wherefore at all times men not mean that there were no more prophets after John. For were divinely instructed about what they were to do, ac- we read in the Acts of the apostles that Agabus and the cording as it was expedient for the spiritual welfare of the four maidens, daughters of Philip, prophesied.” John, too, elect. wrote a prophetic book about the end of the Church; and at Reply to Objection 1. The saying of Gregory is to be all times there have not been lacking persons having the referred to the time before Christ’s incarnation, as regards spirit of prophecy, not indeed for the declaration of any the knowledge of this mystery. new doctrine of faith, but for the direction of human acts. Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Civ. Thus Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 26) that “the em- Dei xviii, 27), “just as in the early days of the Assyrian peror Theodosius sent to John who dwelt in the Egyptian kingdom promises were made most explicitly to Abra- desert, and whom he knew by his ever-increasing fame to ham, so at the outset of the western Babylon,” which be endowed with the prophetic spirit: and from him he is Rome, “and under its sway Christ was to come, in received a message assuring him of victory.” 1975 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 175 Of Rapture (In Six Articles) We must now consider rapture. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the soul of man is carried away to things divine? (2) Whether rapture pertains to the cognitive or to the appetitive power? (3) Whether Paul when in rapture saw the essence of God? (4) Whether he was withdrawn from his senses? (5) Whether, when in that state, his soul was wholly separated from his body? (6) What did he know, and what did he not know about this matter? Whether the soul of man is carried away to things divine? IIa IIae q. 175 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of man is Accordingly man’s soul also is said to be carried away, not carried away to things divine. For some define rap- in a twofold manner, to that which is contrary to its nature: ture as “an uplifting by the power of a higher nature, from in one way, as regards the term of transport—as when it that which is according to nature to that which is above is carried away to punishment, according to Ps. 49:22, nature”∗. Now it is in accordance with man’s nature that “Lest He snatch you away, and there be none to deliver he be uplifted to things divine; for Augustine says at the you”; in another way, as regards the manner connatural to beginning of his Confessions: “Thou madest us, Lord, man, which is that he should understand the truth through for Thyself, and our heart is restless, till it rest in Thee.” sensible things. Hence when he is withdrawn from the Therefore man’s soul is not carried away to things divine. apprehension of sensibles, he is said to be carried away, Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii) even though he be uplifted to things whereunto he is di- that “God’s justice is seen in this that He treats all things rected naturally: provided this be not done intentionally, according to their mode and dignity.” But it is not in ac- as when a man betakes himself to sleep which is in ac- cordance with man’s mode and worth that he be raised cordance with nature, wherefore sleep cannot be called above what he is according to nature. Therefore it would rapture, properly speaking. seem that man’s soul is not carried away to things divine. This withdrawal, whatever its term may be, may arise Objection 3. Further, rapture denotes violence of from a threefold cause. First, from a bodily cause, as some kind. But God rules us not by violence or force, happens to those who suffer abstraction from the senses as Damascene says†. Therefore man’s soul is not carried through weakness: secondly, by the power of the demons, away to things divine. as in those who are possessed: thirdly, by the power of On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:2): “I God. In this last sense we are now speaking of rapture, know a man in Christ. . . rapt even to the third heaven.” On whereby a man is uplifted by the spirit of God to things which words a gloss says: “Rapt, that is to say, uplifted supernatural, and withdrawn from his senses, according contrary to nature.” to Ezech. 8:3, “The spirit lifted me up between the earth I answer that, Rapture denotes violence of a kind as and the heaven, and brought me in the vision of God into stated above (obj. 3); and “the violent is that which has Jerusalem.” its principle without, and in which he that suffers violence It must be observed, however, that sometimes a person concurs not at all” (Ethic. iii, 1). Now everything concurs is said to be carried away, not only through being with- in that to which it tends in accordance with its proper incli- drawn from his senses, but also through being withdrawn nation, whether voluntary or natural. Wherefore he who from the things to which he was attending, as when a per- is carried away by some external agent, must be carried son’s mind wanders contrary to his purpose. But this is to to something different from that to which his inclination use the expression in a less proper signification. tends. This difference arises in two ways: in one way from Reply to Objection 1. It is natural to man to tend the end of the inclination—for instance a stone, which is to divine things through the apprehension of things sen- naturally inclined to be borne downwards, may be thrown sible, according to Rom. 1:20, “The invisible things of upwards; in another way from the manner of tending—for God. . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things instance a stone may be thrown downwards with greater that are made.” But the mode, whereby a man is uplifted velocity than consistent with its natural movement. to divine things and withdrawn from his senses, is not nat- ∗ Reference unknown; Cf. De Veritate xiii, 1 † De Fide Orth. ii, 30 1976 ural to man. Reply to Objection 3. The saying of Damascene Reply to Objection 2. It belongs to man’s mode and refers to those things which a man does by himself. But dignity that he be uplifted to divine things, from the very as to those things which are beyond the scope of the free- fact that he is made to God’s image. And since a divine will, man needs to be uplifted by a stronger operation, good infinitely surpasses the faculty of man in order to at- which in a certain respect may be called force if we con- tain that good, he needs the divine assistance which is be- sider the mode of operation, but not if we consider its term stowed on him in every gift of grace. Hence it is not con- to which man is directed both by nature and by his inten- trary to nature, but above the faculty of nature that man’s tion. mind be thus uplifted in rapture by God. Whether rapture pertains to the cognitive rather than to the appetitive power? IIa IIae q. 175 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that rapture pertains to the petitive power. For from the very fact that the appetite is appetitive rather than to the cognitive power. For Diony- strongly affected towards something, it may happen, ow- sius says (Div. Nom. iv): “The Divine love causes ec- ing to the violence of his affection, that a man is carried stasy.” Now love pertains to the appetitive power. There- away from everything else. Moreover, it has an effect on fore so does ecstasy or rapture. the appetitive power, when for instance a man delights in Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 3) that the things to which he is rapt. Hence the Apostle said that “he who fed the swine debased himself by a dissipated he was rapt, not only “to the third heaven”—which per- mind and an unclean life; whereas Peter, when the angel tains to the contemplation of the intellect—but also into delivered him and carried him into ecstasy, was not beside “paradise,” which pertains to the appetite. himself, but above himself.” Now the prodigal son sank Reply to Objection 1. Rapture adds something to ec- into the depths by his appetite. Therefore in those also stasy. For ecstasy means simply a going out of oneself who are carried up into the heights it is the appetite that is by being placed outside one’s proper order†; while rap- affected. ture denotes a certain violence in addition. Accordingly Objection 3. Further, a gloss on Ps. 30:1, “In Thee, O ecstasy may pertain to the appetitive power, as when a Lord, have I hoped, let me never be confounded,” says in man’s appetite tends to something outside him, and in explaining the title∗: ” Ekstasis in Greek signifies in Latin this sense Dionysius says that “the Divine love causes ec- ‘excessus mentis,’ an aberration of the mind. This hap- stasy,” inasmuch as it makes man’s appetite tend to the pens in two ways, either through dread of earthly things object loved. Hence he says afterwards that “even God or through the mind being rapt in heavenly things and for- Himself, the cause of all things, through the overflow of getful of this lower world.” Now dread of earthly things His loving goodness, goes outside Himself in His provi- pertains to the appetite. Therefore rapture of the mind in dence for all beings.” But even if this were said expressly heavenly things, being placed in opposition to this dread, of rapture, it would merely signify that love is the cause also pertains to the appetite. of rapture. On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 115:2, “I said in my Reply to Objection 2. There is a twofold appetite in excess: Every man is a liar,” says: “We speak of ecstasy, man; to wit, the intellective appetite which is called the not when the mind wanders through fear, but when it is will, and the sensitive appetite known as the sensuality. carried aloft on the wings of revelation.” Now revelation Now it is proper to man that his lower appetite be subject pertains to the intellective power. Therefore ecstasy or to the higher appetite, and that the higher move the lower. rapture does also. Hence man may become outside himself as regards the I answer that, We can speak of rapture in two ways. appetite, in two ways. In one way, when a man’s intellec- First, with regard to the term of rapture, and thus, prop- tive appetite tends wholly to divine things, and takes no erly speaking, rapture cannot pertain to the appetitive, but account of those things whereto the sensitive appetite in- only to the cognitive power. For it was stated (a. 1) that clines him; thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “Paul rapture is outside the inclination of the person who is rapt; being in ecstasy through the vehemence of Divine love” whereas the movement of the appetitive power is an incli- exclaimed: “I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me.” nation to an appetible good. Wherefore, properly speak- In another way, when a man tends wholly to things ing, in desiring something, a man is not rapt, but is moved pertaining to the lower appetite, and takes no account of by himself. his higher appetite. It is thus that “he who fed the swine Secondly, rapture may be considered with regard to its debased himself”; and this latter kind of going out of one- cause, and thus it may have a cause on the part of the ap- self, or being beside oneself, is more akin than the former ∗ Unto the end, a psalm for David, in an ecstasy † Cf. Ia IIae, q. 28, a. 3 1977 to the nature of rapture because the higher appetite is more affecting the appetite may cause an excess in the cognitive proper to man. Hence when through the violence of his power, either because the mind is carried away to certain lower appetite a man is withdrawn from the movement of intelligible objects, through being drawn away from ob- his higher appetite, it is more a case of being withdrawn jects of sense, or because it is caught up into some imagi- from that which is proper to him. Yet, because there is no nary vision or fanciful apparition. violence therein, since the will is able to resist the passion, Reply to Objection 3. Just as love is a movement of it falls short of the true nature of rapture, unless perchance the appetite with regard to good, so fear is a movement the passion be so strong that it takes away entirely the use of the appetite with regard to evil. Wherefore either of of reason, as happens to those who are mad with anger or them may equally cause an aberration of mind; and all the love. more since fear arises from love, as Augustine says (De It must be observed. however, that both these excesses Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9). Whether Paul, when in rapture, saw the essence of God? IIa IIae q. 175 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Paul, when in rap- which it is not granted unto man to utter”: and such would ture, did not see the essence of God. For just as we read seem to be words pertaining to the vision of the blessed, of Paul that he was rapt to the third heaven, so we read which transcends the state of the wayfarer, according to of Peter (Acts 10:10) that “there came upon him an ec- Is. 64:4, “Eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what stasy of mind.” Now Peter, in his ecstasy, saw not God’s things Thou hast prepared for them that love [Vulg.: ‘wait essence but an imaginary vision. Therefore it would seem for’] Thee”∗. Therefore it is more becoming to hold that that neither did Paul see the essence of God. he saw God in His essence. Objection 2. Further, the vision of God is beatific. Reply to Objection 1. Man’s mind is rapt by God to But Paul, in his rapture, was not beatified; else he would the contemplation of divine truth in three ways. First, so never have returned to the unhappiness of this life, but his that he contemplates it through certain imaginary pictures, body would have been glorified by the overflow from his and such was the ecstasy that came upon Peter. Secondly, soul, as will happen to the saints after the resurrection, so that he contemplates the divine truth through its intel- and this clearly was not the case. Therefore Paul when in ligible effects; such was the ecstasy of David, who said rapture saw not the essence of God. (Ps. 115:11): “I said in my excess: Every man is a liar.” Objection 3. Further, according to 1 Cor. 13:10-12, Thirdly, so that he contemplates it in its essence. Such faith and hope are incompatible with the vision of the Di- was the rapture of Paul, as also of Moses†; and not with- vine essence. But Paul when in this state had faith and out reason, since as Moses was the first Teacher of the hope. Therefore he saw not the essence of God. Jews, so was Paul the first “Teacher of the gentiles”‡. Objection 4. Further, as Augustine states (Gen. ad Reply to Objection 2. The Divine essence cannot be lit. xii, 6,7), “pictures of bodies are seen in the imaginary seen by a created intellect save through the light of glory, vision.” Now Paul is stated (2 Cor. 12:2,4) to have seen of which it is written (Ps. 35:10): “In Thy light we shall certain pictures in his rapture, for instance of the “third see light.” But this light can be shared in two ways. First heaven” and of “paradise.” Therefore he would seem to by way of an abiding form, and thus it beatifies the saints have been rapt to an imaginary vision rather than to the in heaven. Secondly, by way of a transitory passion, as vision of the Divine essence. stated above (q. 171 , a. 2) of the light of prophecy; and On the contrary, Augustine (Ep. CXLVII, 13; in this way that light was in Paul when he was in rap- ad Paulin., de videndo Deum) concludes that “possibly ture. Hence this vision did not beatify him simply, so as God’s very substance was seen by some while yet in this to overflow into his body, but only in a restricted sense. life: for instance by Moses, and by Paul who in rapture Consequently this rapture pertains somewhat to prophecy. heard unspeakable words, which it is not granted unto Reply to Objection 3. Since, in his rapture, Paul was man to utter.” beatified not as to the habit, but only as to the act of the I answer that, Some have said that Paul, when in rap- blessed, it follows that he had not the act of faith at the ture, saw “not the very essence of God, but a certain re- same time, although he had the habit. flection of His clarity.” But Augustine clearly comes to Reply to Objection 4. In one way by the third heaven an opposite decision, not only in his book (De videndo we may understand something corporeal, and thus the Deum), but also in Gen. ad lit. xii, 28 (quoted in a gloss third heaven denotes the empyrean§, which is described on 2 Cor. 12:2). Indeed the words themselves of the Apos- as the “third,” in relation to the aerial and starry heav- tle indicate this. For he says that “he heard secret words, ens, or better still, in relation to the aqueous and crys- ∗ 1 Cor. 2:9 † Cf. q. 174, a. 4 ‡ Cf. Ia, q. 68, a. 4 § 1 Tim. 2:7; Cf. Ia, q. 12, a. 11, ad 2 1978 talline heavens. Moreover Paul is stated to be rapt to the and the third heaven would denote an intellectual vision “third heaven,” not as though his rapture consisted in the according to Augustine’s explanation (Gen. ad lit. xii, vision of something corporeal, but because this place is 26,28,34). Secondly, the third heaven may be taken ac- appointed for the contemplation of the blessed. Hence the cording to the order of things knowable, the first heaven gloss on 2 Cor. 12 says that the “third heaven is a spiri- being “the knowledge of heavenly bodies, the second the tual heaven, where the angels and the holy souls enjoy the knowledge of heavenly spirits, the third the knowledge of contemplation of God: and when Paul says that he was God Himself.” Thirdly, the third heaven may denote the rapt to this heaven he means that God showed him the life contemplation of God according to the degrees of knowl- wherein He is to be seen forevermore.” edge whereby God is seen. The first of these degrees be- In another way the third heaven may signify a supra- longs to the angels of the lowest hierarchy∗, the second to mundane vision. Such a vision may be called the third the angels of the middle hierarchy, the third to the angels heaven in three ways. First, according to the order of the of the highest hierarchy, according to the gloss on 2 Cor. cognitive powers. In this way the first heaven would indi- 12. cate a supramundane bodily vision, conveyed through the And since the vision of God cannot be without delight, senses; thus was seen the hand of one writing on the wall he says that he was not only “rapt to the third heaven” by (Dan. 5:5); the second heaven would be an imaginary reason of his contemplation, but also into “Paradise” by vision such as Isaias saw, and John in the Apocalypse; reason of the consequent delight. Whether Paul, when in rapture, was withdrawn from his senses? IIa IIae q. 175 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Paul, when in rap- vision.†” ture, was not withdrawn from his senses. For Augustine I answer that, The Divine essence cannot be seen by says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 28): “Why should we not believe man through any cognitive power other than the intellect. that when so great an apostle, the teacher of the gentiles, Now the human intellect does not turn to intelligible ob- was rapt to this most sublime vision, God was willing to jects except by means of the phantasms‡ which it takes vouchsafe him a glimpse of that eternal life which is to from the senses through the intelligible species; and it is take the place of the present life?” Now in that future in considering these phantasms that the intellect judges of life after the resurrection the saints will see the Divine and coordinates sensible objects. Hence in any operation essence without being withdrawn from the senses of the that requires abstraction of the intellect from phantasms, body. Therefore neither did such a withdrawal take place there must be also withdrawal of the intellect from the in Paul. senses. Now in the state of the wayfarer it is necessary for Objection 2. Further, Christ was truly a wayfarer, man’s intellect, if it see God’s essence, to be withdrawn and also enjoyed an uninterrupted vision of the Divine from phantasms. For God’s essence cannot be seen by essence, without, however, being withdrawn from His means of a phantasm, nor indeed by any created intelli- senses. Therefore there was no need for Paul to be with- gible species§, since God’s essence infinitely transcends drawn from his senses in order for him to see the essence not only all bodies, which are represented by phantasms, of God. but also all intelligible creatures. Now when man’s in- Objection 3. Further, after seeing God in His essence, tellect is uplifted to the sublime vision of God’s essence, Paul remembered what he had seen in that vision; hence it is necessary that his mind’s whole attention should be he said (2 Cor. 12:4): “He heard secret words, which it summoned to that purpose in such a way that he under- is not granted to man to utter.” Now the memory belongs stand naught else by phantasms, and be absorbed entirely to the sensitive faculty according to the Philosopher (De in God. Therefore it is impossible for man while a way- Mem. et Remin. i). Therefore it seems that Paul, while farer to see God in His essence without being withdrawn seeing the essence of God, was not withdrawn from his from his senses. senses. Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 3, obj. 2), On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, after the resurrection, in the blessed who see God in His 27): “Unless a man in some way depart this life, whether essence, there will be an overflow from the intellect to the by going altogether out of his body or by turning away lower powers and even to the body. Hence it is in keeping and withdrawing from his carnal senses, so that he truly with the rule itself of the divine vision that the soul will knows not as the Apostle said, whether he be in the body turn towards phantasms and sensible objects. But there is or out of the body, he is not rapt and caught up into that no such overflow in those who are raptured, as stated (a. 3, ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 108, a. 1 † The text of St. Augustine reads: “when he is rapt,” etc. ‡ Cf. Ia, q. 84, a. 7 § Cf. Ia, q. 12, a. 2 1979 obj. 2, ad 2), and consequently the comparison fails. other wayfarers. Reply to Objection 2. The intellect of Christ’s soul Reply to Objection 3. Paul, after seeing God in His was glorified by the habit of the light of glory, whereby essence, remembered what he had known in that vision, He saw the Divine essence much more fully than an angel by means of certain intelligible species that remained in or a man. He was, however, a wayfarer on account of the his intellect by way of habit; even as in the absence of passibility of His body, in respect of which He was “made the sensible object, certain impressions remain in the soul a little lower than the angels” (Heb. 2:9), by dispensation, which it recollects when it turns to the phantasms. And so and not on account of any defect on the part of His in- this was the knowledge that he was unable wholly to think tellect. Hence there is no comparison between Him and over or express in words. Whether, while in this state, Paul’s soul was wholly separated from his body? IIa IIae q. 175 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that, while in this state, that which is above nature.” Wherefore two things have to Paul’s soul was wholly separated from his body. For the be considered: first, what pertains to man according to na- Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6,7): “While we are in the body ture; secondly, what has to be done by God in man above we are absent from the Lord. For we walk by faith, and his nature. Now, since the soul is united to the body as its not by sight”∗. Now, while in that state, Paul was not ab- natural form, it belongs to the soul to have a natural dis- sent from the Lord, for he saw Him by a species, as stated position to understand by turning to phantasms; and this above (a. 3). Therefore he was not in the body. is not withdrawn by the divine power from the soul in rap- Objection 2. Further, a power of the soul cannot ture, since its state undergoes no change, as stated above be uplifted above the soul’s essence wherein it is rooted. (a. 3, ad 2,3). Yet, this state remaining, actual conversion Now in this rapture the intellect, which is a power of the to phantasms and sensible objects is withdrawn from the soul, was withdrawn from its bodily surroundings through soul, lest it be hindered from being uplifted to that which being uplifted to divine contemplation. Much more there- transcends all phantasms, as stated above (a. 4). Therefore fore was the essence of the soul separated from the body. it was not necessary that his soul in rapture should be so Objection 3. Further, the forces of the vegetative soul separated from the body as to cease to be united thereto are more material than those of the sensitive soul. Now in as its form; and yet it was necessary for his intellect to be order for him to be rapt to the vision of God, it was neces- withdrawn from phantasms and the perception of sensible sary for him to be withdrawn from the forces of the sen- objects. sitive soul, as stated above (a. 4). Much more, therefore, Reply to Objection 1. In this rapture Paul was absent was it necessary for him to be withdrawn from the forces from the Lord as regards his state, since he was still in the of the vegetative soul. Now when these forces cease to op- state of a wayfarer, but not as regards the act by which he erate, the soul is no longer in any way united to the body. saw God by a species, as stated above (a. 3, ad 2,3). Therefore it would seem that in Paul’s rapture it was nec- Reply to Objection 2. A faculty of the soul is not essary for the soul to be wholly separated from the body. uplifted by the natural power above the mode becoming On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. CXLVII, 13, ad the essence of the soul; but it can be uplifted by the divine Paulin.; de videndo Deum): “It is not incredible that this power to something higher, even as a body by the violence sublime revelation” (namely, that they should see God in of a stronger power is lifted up above the place befitting it His essence) “was vouchsafed certain saints, without their according to its specific nature. departing this life so completely as to leave nothing but Reply to Objection 3. The forces of the vegetative a corpse for burial.” Therefore it was not necessary for soul do not operate through the soul being intent thereon, Paul’s soul, when in rapture, to be wholly separated from as do the sensitive forces, but by way of nature. Hence his body. in the case of rapture there is no need for withdrawal I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, obj. 1), in the from them, as from the sensitive powers, whose opera- rapture of which we are speaking now, man is uplifted by tions would lessen the intentness of the soul on intellective God’s power, “from that which is according to nature to knowledge. ∗ ‘Per speciem,’ i.e. by an intelligible species 1980 Did Paul know whether his soul were separated from his body? IIa IIae q. 175 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that Paul was not igno- Now if he knew it to be really the third heaven, it follows rant whether his soul were separated from his body. For that either he knew it to be something spiritual and incor- he says (2 Cor. 12:2): “I know a man in Christ rapt even poreal, and then his body could not be rapt thither; or he to the third heaven.” Now man denotes something com- knew it to be something corporeal, and then his soul could posed of soul and body; and rapture differs from death. not be rapt thither without his body, unless it were sepa- Seemingly therefore he knew that his soul was not sepa- rated from his body. Consequently we must explain the rated from his body by death, which is the more probable matter otherwise, by saying that the Apostle knew him- seeing that this is the common opinion of the Doctors. self to be rapt both in soul and body, but that he ignored Objection 2. Further, it appears from the same words how his soul stood in relation to his body, to wit, whether of the Apostle that he knew whither he was rapt, since it it were accompanied by his body or not. was “to the third heaven.” Now this shows that he knew Here we find a diversity of opinions. For some say whether he was in the body or not, for if he knew the third that the Apostle knew his soul to be united to his body heaven to be something corporeal, he must have known as its form, but ignored whether it were abstracted from that his soul was not separated from his body, since a cor- its senses, or again whether it were abstracted from the poreal thing cannot be an object of sight save through the operations of the vegetative soul. But he could not but body. Therefore it would seem that he was not ignorant know that it was abstracted from the senses, seeing that whether his soul were separated from his body. he knew himself to be rapt; and as to his being abstracted Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, from the operation of the vegetative soul, this was not 28) that “when in rapture, he saw God with the same vi- of such importance as to require him to be so careful in sion as the saints see Him in heaven.” Now from the very mentioning it. It follows, then, that the Apostle ignored fact that the saints see God, they know whether their soul whether his soul were united to his body as its form, or is separated from their body. Therefore Paul too knew separated from it by death. Some, however, granting this this. say that the Apostle did not consider the matter while he On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. 12:3): “Whether was in rapture, because he was wholly intent upon God, in the body, or out of the body, I know not, God knoweth.” but that afterwards he questioned the point, when taking I answer that, The true answer to this question must cognizance of what he had seen. But this also is contrary be gathered from the Apostle’s very words, whereby he to the Apostle’s words, for he there distinguishes between says he knew something, namely that he was “rapt even to the past and what happened subsequently, since he states the third heaven,” and that something he knew not, namely that at the present time he knows that he was rapt “four- “whether” he were “in the body or out of the body.” This teen years ago,” and that at the present time he knows not may be understood in two ways. First, the words “whether “whether he was in the body or out of the body.” in the body or out of the body” may refer not to the very Consequently we must assert that both before and af- being of the man who was rapt (as though he knew not ter he ignored whether his soul were separated from his whether his soul were in his body or not), but to the mode body. Wherefore Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 5), after dis- of rapture, so that he ignored whether his body besides his cussing the question at length, concludes: “Perhaps then soul, or, on the other hand, his soul alone, were rapt to the we must infer that he ignored whether, when he was rapt third heaven. Thus Ezechiel is stated (Ezech. 8:3) to have to the third heaven, his soul was in his body (in the same been “brought in the vision of God into Jerusalem.” This way as the soul is in the body, when we speak of a living was the explanation of a certain Jew according to Jerome body either of a waking or of a sleeping man, or of one (Prolog. super Daniel.), where he says that “lastly our that is withdrawn from his bodily senses during ecstasy), Apostle” (thus said the Jew) “durst not assert that he was or whether his soul went out of his body altogether, so that rapt in his body, but said: ‘Whether in the body or out of his body lay dead.” the body, I know not.’ ” Reply to Objection 1. Sometimes by the figure of Augustine, however, disapproves of this explanation synecdoche a part of man, especially the soul which is the (Gen. ad lit. xii, 3 seqq.) for this reason that the principal part, denotes a man. or again we might take this Apostle states that he knew he was rapt even to the third to mean that he whom he states to have been rapt was a heaven. Wherefore he knew it to be really the third heaven man not at the time of his rapture, but fourteen years af- to which he was rapt, and not an imaginary likeness of terwards: for he says “I know a man,” not “I know a rapt the third heaven: otherwise if he gave the name of third man.” Again nothing hinders death brought about by God heaven to an imaginary third heaven, in the same way he being called rapture; and thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. might state that he was rapt in the body, meaning, by body, xii, 3): “If the Apostle doubted the matter, who of us will an image of his body, such as appears in one’s dreams. dare to be certain about it?” Wherefore those who have 1981 something to say on this subject speak with more conjec-spect, namely as to the mode of seeing, because he saw ture than certainty. not so perfectly as do the saints in heaven. Hence Augus- Reply to Objection 2. The Apostle knew that ei- tine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 36): “Although, when the Apos- ther the heaven in question was something incorporeal, tle was rapt from his carnal senses to the third heaven, he or that he saw something incorporeal in that heaven; yet lacked that full and perfect knowledge of things which is this could be done by his intellect, even without his soul in the angels, in that he knew not whether he was in the being separated from his body. body, or out of the body, this will surely not be lacking af- Reply to Objection 3. Paul’s vision, while he was in ter reunion with the body in the resurrection of the dead, rapture, was like the vision of the blessed in one respect, when this corruptible will put on incorruption.” namely as to the thing seen; and, unlike, in another re- 1982 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 176 Of the Grace of Tongues (In Two Articles) We must now consider those gratuitous graces that pertain to speech, and (1) the grace of tongues; (2) the grace of the word of wisdom and knowledge. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether by the grace of tongues a man acquires the knowledge of all languages? (2) Of the comparison between this gift and the grace of prophecy. Whether those who received the gift of tongues spoke in every language? IIa IIae q. 176 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that those who received the I answer that, Christ’s first disciples were chosen gift of tongues did not speak in every language. For that by Him in order that they might disperse throughout the which is granted to certain persons by the divine power is whole world, and preach His faith everywhere, according the best of its kind: thus our Lord turned the water into to Mat. 28:19, “Going. . . teach ye all nations.” Now it good wine, as stated in Jn. 2:10. Now those who had the was not fitting that they who were being sent to teach oth- gift of tongues spoke better in their own language; since ers should need to be taught by others, either as to how a gloss on Heb. 1, says that “it is not surprising that the they should speak to other people, or as to how they were epistle to the Hebrews is more graceful in style than the to understand those who spoke to them; and all the more other epistles, since it is natural for a man to have more seeing that those who were being sent were of one nation, command over his own than over a strange language. For that of Judea, according to Is. 27:6, “When they shall rush the Apostle wrote the other epistles in a foreign, namely out from Jacob†. . . they shall fill the face of the world with the Greek, idiom; whereas he wrote this in the Hebrew seed.” Moreover those who were being sent were poor and tongue.” Therefore the apostles did not receive the knowl- powerless; nor at the outset could they have easily found edge of all languages by a gratuitous grace. someone to interpret their words faithfully to others, or Objection 2. Further, nature does not employ many to explain what others said to them, especially as they means where one is sufficient; and much less does God were sent to unbelievers. Consequently it was necessary, Whose work is more orderly than nature’s. Now God in this respect, that God should provide them with the gift could make His disciples to be understood by all, while of tongues; in order that, as the diversity of tongues was speaking one tongue: hence a gloss on Acts 2:6, “Ev- brought upon the nations when they fell away to idolatry, ery man heard them speak in his own tongue,” says that according to Gn. 11, so when the nations were to be re- “they spoke in every tongue, or speaking in their own, called to the worship of one God a remedy to this diversity namely the Hebrew language, were understood by all, as might be applied by the gift of tongues. though they spoke the language proper to each.” There- Reply to Objection 1. As it is written (1 Cor. 12:7), fore it would seem that they had not the knowledge to “the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto speak in all languages. profit”; and consequently both Paul and the other apos- Objection 3. Further, all graces flow from Christ to tles were divinely instructed in the languages of all na- His body, which is the Church, according to Jn. 1:16, “Of tions sufficiently for the requirements of the teaching of His fullness we all have received.” Now we do not read the faith. But as regards the grace and elegance of style that Christ spoke more than one language, nor does each which human art adds to a language, the Apostle was in- one of the faithful now speak save in one tongue. There- structed in his own, but not in a foreign tongue. Even so fore it would seem that Christ’s disciples did not receive they were sufficiently instructed in wisdom and scientific the grace to the extent of speaking in all languages. knowledge, as required for teaching the faith, but not as On the contrary, It is written (Acts 2:4) that “they to all things known by acquired science, for instance the were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and they began to conclusions of arithmetic and geometry. speak with divers tongues, according as the Holy Ghost Reply to Objection 2. Although either was possible, gave them to speak”; on which passage a gloss of Gre- namely that, while speaking in one tongue they should be gory∗ says that “the Holy Ghost appeared over the disci- understood by all, or that they should speak in all tongues, ples under the form of fiery tongues, and gave them the it was more fitting that they should speak in all tongues, knowledge of all tongues.” because this pertained to the perfection of their knowl- ∗ Hom. xxx in Ev. † Vulg.: ‘When they shall rush in unto Jacob,’ etc. 1983 edge, whereby they were able not only to speak, but also Reply to Objection 3. Christ in His own person pur-to understand what was said by others. Whereas if their posed preaching to only one nation, namely the Jews. one language were intelligible to all, this would either Consequently, although without any doubt He possessed have been due to the knowledge of those who understood most perfectly the knowledge of all languages, there was their speech, or it would have amounted to an illusion, no need for Him to speak in every tongue. And therefore, since a man’s words would have had a different sound in as Augustine says (Tract. xxxii in Joan.), “whereas even another’s ears, from that with which they were uttered. now the Holy Ghost is received, yet no one speaks in the Hence a gloss says on Acts 2:6 that “it was a greater mira- tongues of all nations, because the Church herself already cle that they should speak all kinds of tongues”; and Paul speaks the languages of all nations: since whoever is not says (1 Cor. 14:18): “I thank my God I speak with all your in the Church, receives not the Holy Ghost.” tongues.” Whether the gift of tongues is more excellent than the grace of prophecy? IIa IIae q. 176 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the gift of tongues “Greater is he that prophesieth than he that speaketh with is more excellent than the grace of prophecy. For, seem- tongues.” ingly, better things are proper to better persons, accord- I answer that, The gift of prophecy surpasses the ing to the Philosopher (Topic. iii, 1). Now the gift of gift of tongues, in three ways. First, because the gift of tongues is proper to the New Testament, hence we sing tongues regards the utterance of certain words, which sig- in the sequence of Pentecost∗: “On this day Thou gavest nify an intelligible truth, and this again is signified by the Christ’s apostles an unwonted gift, a marvel to all time”: phantasms which appear in an imaginary vision; where- whereas prophecy is more pertinent to the Old Testament, fore Augustine compares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 8) the gift of according to Heb. 1:1, “God Who at sundry times and tongues to an imaginary vision. On the other hand, it has in divers manners spoke in times past to the fathers by the been stated above (q. 173, a. 2) that the gift of prophecy prophets.” Therefore it would seem that the gift of tongues consists in the mind itself being enlightened so as to know is more excellent than the gift of prophecy. an intelligible truth. Wherefore, as the prophetic enlight- Objection 2. Further, that whereby we are directed enment is more excellent than the imaginary vision, as to God is seemingly more excellent than that whereby we stated above (q. 174, a. 2), so also is prophecy more ex- are directed to men. Now, by the gift of tongues, man is cellent than the gift of tongues considered in itself. Sec- directed to God, whereas by prophecy he is directed to ondly, because the gift of prophecy regards the knowledge man; for it is written (1 Cor. 14:2,3): “He that speaketh of things, which is more excellent than the knowledge of in a tongue, speaketh not unto men, but unto God. . . but words, to which the gift of tongues pertains. he that prophesieth, speaketh unto men unto edification.” Thirdly, because the gift of prophecy is more prof- Therefore it would seem that the gift of tongues is more itable. The Apostle proves this in three ways (1 Cor. 14); excellent than the gift of prophecy. first, because prophecy is more profitable to the edifica- Objection 3. Further, the gift of tongues abides like a tion of the Church, for which purpose he that speaketh in habit in the person who has it, and “he can use it when he tongues profiteth nothing, unless interpretation follow (1 will”; wherefore it is written (1 Cor. 14:18): “I thank my Cor. 14:4,5). Secondly, as regards the speaker himself, God I speak with all your tongues.” But it is not so with for if he be enabled to speak in divers tongues without un- the gift of prophecy, as stated above (q. 171, a. 2). There- derstanding them, which pertains to the gift of prophecy, fore the gift of tongues would seem to be more excellent his own mind would not be edified (1 Cor. 14:7-14). than the gift of prophecy. Thirdly, as to unbelievers for whose especial benefit the Objection 4. Further, the “interpretation of speeches” gift of tongues seems to have been given; since perchance would seem to be contained under prophecy, because the they might think those who speak in tongues to be mad Scriptures are expounded by the same Spirit from Whom (1 Cor. 14:23), for instance the Jews deemed the apos- they originated. Now the interpretation of speeches is tles drunk when the latter spoke in various tongues (Acts placed after “divers kinds of tongues” (1 Cor. 12:10). 2:13): whereas by prophecies the unbeliever is convinced, Therefore it seems that the gift of tongues is more excel- because the secrets of his heart are made manifest (Acts lent than the gift of prophecy, particularly as regards a part 2:25). of the latter. Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 174, a. 3, On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:5): ad 1), it belongs to the excellence of prophecy that a man ∗ The sequence: ‘Sancti Spiritus adsit nobis gratia’ ascribed to King Robert of France, the reputed author of the ‘Veni Sancte Spiritus.’ Cf. Migne, Patr. Lat. tom. CXLI 1984 is not only enlightened by an intelligible light, but also life it cannot be had perfectly by way of habit, but only that he should perceive an imaginary vision: and so again imperfectly by way of passion. on the other hand, the gift it belongs to the perfection of the Holy Ghost’s operation, of tongues is confined to a certain particular knowledge, not only to fill the mind with the prophetic light, and the namely of human words; wherefore it is not inconsistent imagination with the imaginary vision, as happened in the with the imperfection of this life, that it should be had Old Testament, but also to endow the tongue with exter- perfectly and by way of habit. nal erudition, in the utterance of various signs of speech. Reply to Objection 4. The interpretation of speeches All this is done in the New Testament, according to 1 Cor. is reducible to the gift of prophecy, inasmuch as the mind 14:26, “Every one of you hath a psalm, hath a doctrine, is enlightened so as to understand and explain any obscu- hath a tongue, hath a revelation,” i.e. a prophetic revela- rities of speech arising either from a difficulty in the things tion. signified, or from the words uttered being unknown, or Reply to Objection 2. By the gift of prophecy man is from the figures of speech employed, according to Dan. directed to God in his mind, which is more excellent than 5:16, “I have heard of thee, that thou canst interpret ob- being directed to Him in his tongue. “He that speaketh scure things, and resolve difficult things.” Hence the in- in a tongue “is said to speak “not unto men,” i.e. to men’s terpretation of speeches is more excellent than the gift of understanding or profit, but unto God’s understanding and tongues, as appears from the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. praise. On the other hand, by prophecy a man is directed 14:5), “Greater is he that prophesieth than he that speaketh both to God and to man; wherefore it is the more perfect with tongues; unless perhaps he interpret.” Yet the inter- gift. pretation of speeches is placed after the gift of tongues, Reply to Objection 3. Prophetic revelation extends to because the interpretation of speeches extends even to the the knowledge of all things supernatural; wherefore from interpretation of divers kinds of tongues. its very perfection it results that in this imperfect state of 1985 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 177 Of the Gratuitous Grace Consisting in Words (In Two Articles) We must now consider the gratuitous grace that attaches to words; of which the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8): “To one. . . by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge.” Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words? (2) To whom is the grace becoming? Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words? IIa IIae q. 177 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that a gratuitous grace effect, and this pertains to the grace “of the word.” does not attach to words. For grace is given for that which This happens in three ways. First, in order to instruct surpasses the faculty of nature. But natural reason has de- the intellect, and this is the case when a man speaks so as vised the art of rhetoric whereby a man is able to speak so “to teach.” Secondly, in order to move the affections, so as to teach, please, and persuade, as Augustine says (De that a man willingly hearkens to the word of God. This is Doctr. Christ. iv, 12). Now this belongs to the grace of the case when a man speaks so as “to please” his hearers, words. Therefore it would seem that the grace of words is not indeed with a view to his own favor, but in order to not a gratuitous grace. draw them to listen to God’s word. Thirdly, in order that Objection 2. Further, all grace pertains to the king- men may love that which is signified by the word, and de- dom of God. But the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:20): “The sire to fulfill it, and this is the case when a man so speaks kingdom of God is not in speech, but in power.” There- as “to sway” his hearers. In order to effect this the Holy fore there is no gratuitous grace connected with words. Ghost makes use of the human tongue as of an instrument; Objection 3. Further, no grace is given through merit, but He it is Who perfects the work within. Hence Gregory since “if by grace, it is not now of works” (Rom. 11:6). says in a homily for Pentecost (Hom. xxx in Ev.): “Unless But the word is sometimes given to a man on his merits. the Holy Ghost fill the hearts of the hearers, in vain does For Gregory says (Moral. xi, 15) in explanation of Ps. the voice of the teacher resound in the ears of the body.” 118:43, “Take not Thou the word of truth utterly out of Reply to Objection 1. Even as by a miracle God my mouth” that “the word of truth is that which Almighty sometimes works in a more excellent way those things God gives to them that do it, and takes away from them which nature also can work, so too the Holy Ghost effects that do it not.” Therefore it would seem that the gift of the more excellently by the grace of words that which art can word is not a gratuitous grace. effect in a less efficient manner. Objection 4. Further, it behooves man to declare in Reply to Objection 2. The Apostle is speaking there words things pertaining to the virtue of faith, no less than of the word that relies on human eloquence without the those pertaining to the gift of wisdom or of knowledge. power of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore he says just before Therefore if the word of wisdom and the word of knowl- (1 Cor. 4:19): “I. . . will know, not the speech of them that edge are reckoned gratuitous graces, the word of faith are puffed up, but the power”: and of himself he had al- should likewise be placed among the gratuitous graces. ready said (1 Cor. 2:4): “My speech and my preaching On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 6:5): “A gra- was not in the persuasive words of human wisdom, but in cious tongue in a good man shall abound [Vulg.: ‘abound- the showing of the spirit and power.” eth’].” Now man’s goodness is by grace. Therefore gra- Reply to Objection 3. As stated above, the grace of ciousness in words is also by grace. the word is given to a man for the profit of others. Hence I answer that, The gratuitous graces are given for the it is withdrawn sometimes through the fault of the hearer, profit of others, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 111, Aa. 1,4). and sometimes through the fault of the speaker. The good Now the knowledge a man receives from God cannot be works of either of them do not merit this grace directly, but turned to another’s profit, except by means of speech. And only remove the obstacles thereto. For sanctifying grace since the Holy Ghost does not fail in anything that pertains also is withdrawn on account of a person’s fault, and yet to the profit of the Church, He provides also the members he does not merit it by his good works, which, however, of the Church with speech; to the effect that a man not remove the obstacles to grace. only speaks so as to be understood by different people, Reply to Objection 4. As stated above, the grace of which pertains to the gift of tongues, but also speaks with the word is directed to the profit of others. Now if a man 1986 communicates his faith to others this is by the word of Apostle means by knowledge.” Hence it was not neces-knowledge or of wisdom. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. sary for him to mention the word of faith, but it was suf- xiv, 1) that “to know how faith may profit the godly and ficient for him to mention the word of knowledge and of be defended against the ungodly, is apparently what the wisdom. Whether the grace of the word of wisdom and knowledge is becoming to women? IIa IIae q. 177 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the grace of the word ing oneself to the whole church, and this is not permitted of wisdom and knowledge is becoming even to women. to women. First and chiefly, on account of the condition For teaching is pertinent to this grace, as stated in the fore- attaching to the female sex, whereby woman should be going Article. Now it is becoming to a woman to teach; subject to man, as appears from Gn. 3:16. Now teaching for it is written (Prov. 4:3,4): “I was an only son in the and persuading publicly in the church belong not to sub- sight of my mother, and she taught me∗.” Therefore this jects but to the prelates (although men who are subjects grace is becoming to women. may do these things if they be so commissioned, because Objection 2. Further, the grace of prophecy is greater their subjection is not a result of their natural sex, as it than the grace of the word, even as the contemplation of is with women, but of some thing supervening by acci- truth is greater than its utterance. But prophecy is granted dent). Secondly, lest men’s minds be enticed to lust, for to women, as we read of Deborah (Judges 4:4), and of it is written (Ecclus. 9:11): “Her conversation burneth as Holda the prophetess, the wife of Sellum (4 Kings 22:14), fire.” Thirdly, because as a rule women are not perfected and of the four daughters of Philip (Acts 21:9). Moreover in wisdom, so as to be fit to be intrusted with public teach- the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:5): “Every woman praying ing. or prophesying,” etc. Much more therefore would it seem Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted speaks of that the grace of the word is becoming to a woman. private teaching whereby a father instructs his son. Objection 3. Further, it is written (1 Pet. 4:10): “As Reply to Objection 2. The grace of prophecy con- every man hath received grace ministering the same one sists in God enlightening the mind, on the part of which to another.” Now some women receive the grace of wis- there is no difference of sex among men, according to Col. dom and knowledge, which they cannot minister to others 3:10,11, “Putting on the new” man, “him who is renewed except by the grace of the word. Therefore the grace of unto knowledge, according to the image of Him that cre- the word is becoming to women. ated him, where there is neither male nor female†.” Now On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:34): the grace of the word pertains to the instruction of men “Let women keep silence in the churches,” and (1 Tim. among whom the difference of sex is found. Hence the 2:12): “I suffer not a woman to teach.” Now this pertains comparison fails. especially to the grace of the word. Therefore the grace of Reply to Objection 3. The recipients of a divinely the word is not becoming to women. conferred grace administer it in different ways according I answer that, Speech may be employed in two ways: to their various conditions. Hence women, if they have in one way privately, to one or a few, in familiar conver- the grace of wisdom or of knowledge, can administer it sation, and in this respect the grace of the word may be by teaching privately but not publicly. becoming to women; in another way, publicly, address- ∗ Vulg.: ‘I was my father’s son, tender, and as an only son in the sight of my mother. And he taught me.’ † Vulg.: ‘Neither Gentile nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian nor Scythian, bond nor free.’ Cf. Ia, q. 93, a. 6, ad 2 footnote 1987 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 178 Of the Grace of Miracles (In Two Articles) We must next consider the grace of miracles, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles? (2) To whom is it becoming? Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles? IIa IIae q. 178 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that no gratuitous grace “the grace of healing. . . to another, the working of mira- is directed to the working of miracles. For every grace cles.” puts something in the one to whom it is given (Cf. Ia I answer that, As stated above (q. 177, a. 1), the IIae, q. 90, a. 1). Now the working of miracles puts noth- Holy Ghost provides sufficiently for the Church in mat- ing in the soul of the man who receives it since miracles ters profitable unto salvation, to which purpose the gra- are wrought at the touch even of a dead body. Thus we tuitous graces are directed. Now just as the knowledge read (4 Kings 13:21) that “some. . . cast the body into the which a man receives from God needs to be brought to sepulchre of Eliseus. And when it had touched the bones the knowledge of others through the gift of tongues and of Eliseus, the man came to life, and stood upon his feet.” the grace of the word, so too the word uttered needs to Therefore the working of miracles does not belong to a be confirmed in order that it be rendered credible. This is gratuitous grace. done by the working of miracles, according to Mk. 16:20, Objection 2. Further, the gratuitous graces are from “And confirming the word with signs that followed”: and the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 12:4, “There are di- reasonably so. For it is natural to man to arrive at the in- versities of graces, but the same Spirit.” Now the working telligible truth through its sensible effects. Wherefore just of miracles is effected even by the unclean spirit, accord- as man led by his natural reason is able to arrive at some ing to Mat. 24:24, “There shall arise false Christs and knowledge of God through His natural effects, so is he false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders.” brought to a certain degree of supernatural knowledge of Therefore it would seem that the working of miracles does the objects of faith by certain supernatural effects which not belong to a gratuitous grace. are called miracles. Therefore the working of miracles Objection 3. Further, miracles are divided into belongs to a gratuitous grace. “signs,” “wonders” or “portents,” and “virtues.”∗. There- Reply to Objection 1. Just as prophecy extends to fore it is unreasonable to reckon the “working of miracles” whatever can be known supernaturally, so the working of a gratuitous grace, any more than the “working of signs” miracles extends to all things that can be done supernatu- and “wonders.” rally; the cause whereof is the divine omnipotence which Objection 4. Further, the miraculous restoring to cannot be communicated to any creature. Hence it is im- health is done by the power of God. Therefore the grace possible for the principle of working miracles to be a qual- of healing should not be distinguished from the working ity abiding as a habit in the soul. On the other hand, just as of miracles. the prophet’s mind is moved by divine inspiration to know Objection 5. Further, the working of miracles results something supernaturally, so too is it possible for the mind from faith—either of the worker, according to 1 Cor. 13:2, of the miracle worker to be moved to do something re- “If I should have all faith, so that I could remove moun- sulting in the miraculous effect which God causes by His tains,” or of other persons for whose sake miracles are power. Sometimes this takes place after prayer, as when wrought, according to Mat. 13:58, “And He wrought not Peter raised to life the dead Tabitha (Acts 9:40): some- many miracles there, because of their unbelief.” There- times without any previous prayer being expressed, as fore, if faith be reckoned a gratuitous grace, it is superflu- when Peter by upbraiding the lying Ananias and Saphira ous to reckon in addition the working of signs as another delivered them to death (Acts 5:4,9). Hence Gregory says gratuitous grace. (Dial. ii, 30) that “the saints work miracles, sometimes by On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. 12:9,10) says authority, sometimes by prayer.” In either case, however, that among other gratuitous graces, “to another” is given God is the principal worker, for He uses instrumentally ∗ Cf. 2 Thess. 2:9, where the Douay version renders ‘virtus’ by ‘power.’ The use of the word ‘virtue’ in the sense of a miracle is now obsolete, and the generic term ‘miracle’ is elsewhere used in its stead: Cf. 1 Cor. 12:10,28; Heb. 2:4; Acts 2:22 1988 either man’s inward movement, or his speech, or some man’s profit. outward action, or again the bodily contact of even a dead Reply to Objection 3. Two things may be considered body. Thus when Josue had said as though authoritatively in miracles. One is that which is done: this is something (Josh. 10:12): “Move not, O sun, toward Gabaon,” it is surpassing the faculty of nature, and in this respect mira- said afterwards (Josh. 10:14): “There was not before or cles are called “virtues.” The other thing is the purpose for after so long a day, the Lord obeying the voice of a man.” which miracles are wrought, namely the manifestation of Reply to Objection 2. Our Lord is speaking there of something supernatural, and in this respect they are com- the miracles to be wrought at the time of Antichrist, of monly called “signs”: but on account of some excellence which the Apostle says (2 Thess. 2:9) that the coming of they receive the name of “wonder” or “prodigy,” as show- Antichrist will be “according to the working of Satan, in ing something from afar [procul]. all power, and signs, and lying wonders.” To quote the Reply to Objection 4. The “grace of healing” is men- words of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 19), “it is a matter tioned separately, because by its means a benefit, namely of debate whether they are called signs and lying wonders, bodily health, is conferred on man in addition to the com- because he will deceive the senses of mortals by imag- mon benefit bestowed in all miracles, namely the bringing inary visions, in that he will seem to do what he does of men to the knowledge of God. not, or because, though they be real wonders, they will Reply to Objection 5. The working of miracles is seduce into falsehood them that believe.” They are said ascribed to faith for two reasons. First, because it is di- to be real, because the things themselves will be real, just rected to the confirmation of faith, secondly, because it as Pharaoh’s magicians made real frogs and real serpents; proceeds from God’s omnipotence on which faith relies. but they will not be real miracles, because they will be Nevertheless, just as besides the grace of faith, the grace done by the power of natural causes, as stated in the Ia, of the word is necessary that people may be instructed in q. 114, a. 4; whereas the working of miracles which is as- the faith, so too is the grace of miracles necessary that cribed to a gratuitous grace, is done by God’s power for people may be confirmed in their faith. Whether the wicked can work miracles? IIa IIae q. 178 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the wicked cannot I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, work miracles. For miracles are wrought through prayer, and have not charity, I am nothing.” Now whosoever has as stated above (a. 1, ad 1). Now the prayer of a sinner not charity is wicked, because “this gift alone of the Holy is not granted, according to Jn. 9:31, “We know that God Ghost distinguishes the children of the kingdom from the doth not hear sinners,” and Prov. 28:9, “He that turneth children of perdition,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, away his ear from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an 18). Therefore it would seem that even the wicked can abomination.” Therefore it would seem that the wicked work miracles. cannot work miracles. I answer that, Some miracles are not true but imag- Objection 2. Further, miracles are ascribed to faith, inary deeds, because they delude man by the appearance according to Mat. 17:19, “If you have faith as a grain of that which is not; while others are true deeds, yet they of mustard seed you shall say to this mountain: Remove have not the character of a true miracle, because they are from hence hither, and it shall remove.” Now “faith with- done by the power of some natural cause. Both of these out works is dead,” according to James 2:20, so that, can be done by the demons, as stated above (a. 1, ad 2). seemingly, it is devoid of its proper operation. Therefore True miracles cannot be wrought save by the power it would seem that the wicked, since they do not good of God, because God works them for man’s benefit, and works, cannot work miracles. this in two ways: in one way for the confirmation of truth Objection 3. Further, miracles are divine attestations, declared, in another way in proof of a person’s holiness, according to Heb. 2:4, “God also bearing them witness which God desires to propose as an example of virtue. In by signs and wonders and divers miracles”: wherefore in the first way miracles can be wrought by any one who the Church the canonization of certain persons is based on preaches the true faith and calls upon Christ’s name, as the attestation of miracles. Now God cannot bear witness even the wicked do sometimes. In this way even the to a falsehood. Therefore it would seem that wicked men wicked can work miracles. Hence Jerome commenting on cannot work miracles. Mat. 7:22, “Have not we prophesied in Thy name?” says: Objection 4. Further, the good are more closely “Sometimes prophesying, the working of miracles, and united to God than the wicked. But the good do not all the casting out of demons are accorded not to the merit of work miracles. Much less therefore do the wicked. those who do these things, but to the invoking of Christ’s On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:2): “If name, that men may honor God, by invoking Whom such 1989 great miracles are wrought.” Reply to Objection 2. Faith without works is said In the second way miracles are not wrought except by to be dead, as regards the believer, who lives not, by the saints, since it is in proof of their holiness that mira- faith, with the life of grace. But nothing hinders a living cles are wrought during their lifetime or after death, either thing from working through a dead instrument, as a man by themselves or by others. For we read (Acts 19:11,12) through a stick. It is thus that God works while employing that “God wrought by the hand of Paul. . . miracles” and instrumentally the faith of a sinner. “even there were brought from his body to the sick, hand- Reply to Objection 3. Miracles are always true wit- kerchiefs. . . and the diseases departed from them.” In this nesses to the purpose for which they are wrought. Hence way indeed there is nothing to prevent a sinner from work- wicked men who teach a false doctrine never work true ing miracles by invoking a saint; but the miracle is as- miracles in confirmation of their teaching, although some- cribed not to him, but to the one in proof of whose holi- times they may do so in praise of Christ’s name which ness such things are done. they invoke, and by the power of the sacraments which Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 83, a. 16) they administer. If they teach a true doctrine, some- when we were treating of prayer, the prayer of impetra- times they work true miracles as confirming their teach- tion relies not on merit but on God’s mercy, which ex- ing, but not as an attestation of holiness. Hence Augus- tends even to the wicked, wherefore the prayers even of tine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79): “Magicians work miracles sinners are sometimes granted by God. Hence Augustine in one way, good Christians in another, wicked Chris- says (Tract. xliv in Joan.) that “the blind man spoke these tians in another. Magicians by private compact with the words before he was anointed,” that is, before he was per- demons, good Christians by their manifest righteousness, fectly enlightened; “since God does hear sinners.” When evil Christians by the outward signs of righteousness.” it is said that the prayer of one who hears not the law is an Reply to Objection 4. As Augustine says (QQ. abomination, this must be understood so far as the sinner’s lxxxiii, qu. 79), “the reason why these are not granted merit is concerned; yet it is sometimes granted, either for to all holy men is lest by a most baneful error the weak be the spiritual welfare of the one who prays—as the publi- deceived into thinking such deeds to imply greater gifts can was heard (Lk. 18:14)—or for the good of others and than the deeds of righteousness whereby eternal life is ob- for God’s glory. tained.” 1990 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 179 Of the Division of Life Into Active and Contemplative (In Two Articles) We must next consider active and contemplative life. This consideration will be fourfold: (1) Of the division of life into active and contemplative; (2) Of the contemplative life; (3) Of the active life; (4) Of the comparison between the active and the contemplative life. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative? (2) Whether this is an adequate division? Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative? IIa IIae q. 179 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that life is not fittingly which it is most inclined. Thus the life of plants is said to divided into active and contemplative. For the soul is the consist in nourishment and generation; the life of animals principle of life by its essence: since the Philosopher says in sensation and movement; and the life of men in their (De Anima ii, 4) that “in living things to live is to be.” understanding and acting according to reason. Wherefore Now the soul is the principle of action and contemplation also in men the life of every man would seem to be that by its powers. Therefore it would seem that life is not wherein he delights most, and on which he is most in- fittingly divided into active and contemplative. tent; thus especially does he wish “to associate with his Objection 2. Further, the division of that which comes friends” (Ethic. ix, 12). afterwards is unfittingly applied to that which comes Accordingly since certain men are especially intent on first. Now active and contemplative, or “speculative” and the contemplation of truth, while others are especially in- “practical,” are differences of the intellect (De Anima iii, tent on external actions, it follows that man’s life is fit- 10); while “to live” comes before “to understand,” since tingly divided into active and contemplative. “to live” comes first to living things through the vegetative Reply to Objection 1. Each thing’s proper form that soul, as the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore makes it actually “to be” is properly that thing’s principle life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative. of operation. Hence “to live” is, in living things, “to be,” Objection 3. Further, the word “life” implies move- because living things through having “being” from their ment, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vi): whereas form, act in such and such a way. contemplation consists rather in rest, according to Wis. Reply to Objection 2. Life in general is not divided 8:16: “When I enter into my house, I shall repose myself into active and contemplative, but the life of man, who de- with her.” Therefore it would seem that life is unfittingly rives his species from having an intellect, wherefore the divided into active and contemplative. same division applies to intellect and human life. On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv super Reply to Objection 3. It is true that contemplation en- Ezech.): “There is a twofold life wherein Almighty God joys rest from external movements. Nevertheless to con- instructs us by His holy word, the active life and the con- template is itself a movement of the intellect, in so far templative.” as every operation is described as a movement; in which I answer that, Properly speaking, those things are sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that sensa- said to live whose movement or operation is from within tion and understanding are movements of a kind, in so far themselves. Now that which is proper to a thing and to as movement is defined “the act of a perfect thing.” In this which it is most inclined is that which is most becoming to way Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) ascribes three movements it from itself; wherefore every living thing gives proof of to the soul in contemplation, namely, “straight,” “circu- its life by that operation which is most proper to it, and to lar,” and “oblique”∗. ∗ Cf. q. 180, a. 6 1991 Whether life is adequately divided into active and contemplative? IIa IIae q. 179 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that life is not adequately tive, since the end of intellective knowledge is either the divided into active and contemplative. For the Philoso- knowledge itself of truth, which pertains to the contem- pher says (Ethic. i, 5) that there are three most promi- plative intellect, or some external action, which pertains nent kinds of life, the life of “pleasure,” the “civil” which to the practical or active intellect. Therefore life too is would seem to be the same as the active, and the “contem- adequately divided into active and contemplative. plative” life. Therefore the division of life into active and Reply to Objection 1. The life of pleasure places its contemplative would seem to be inadequate. end in pleasures of the body, which are common to us and Objection 2. Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, dumb animals; wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. 1,2,3,19) mentions three kinds of life, namely the life of Ethic. i, 5), it is the life “of a beast.” Hence it is not in- “leisure” which pertains to the contemplative, the “busy” cluded in this division of the life of a man into active and life which pertains to the active, and a third “composed of contemplative. both.” Therefore it would seem that life is inadequately Reply to Objection 2. A mean is a combination of divided into active and contemplative. extremes, wherefore it is virtually contained in them, as Objection 3. Further, man’s life is diversified accord- tepid in hot and cold, and pale in white and black. In like ing to the divers actions in which men are occupied. Now manner active and contemplative comprise that which is there are more than two occupations of human actions. composed of both. Nevertheless as in every mixture one Therefore it would seem that life should be divided into of the simples predominates, so too in the mean state of more kinds than the active and the contemplative. life sometimes the contemplative, sometimes the active On the contrary, These two lives are signified by the element, abounds. two wives of Jacob; the active by Lia, and the contempla- Reply to Objection 3. All the occupations of human tive by Rachel: and by the two hostesses of our Lord; the actions, if directed to the requirements of the present life contemplative life by Mary, and the active life by Martha, in accord with right reason, belong to the active life which as Gregory declares (Moral. vi, 37∗). Now this signifi- provides for the necessities of the present life by means of cation would not be fitting if there were more than two well-ordered activity. If, on the other hand, they minis- lives. Therefore life is adequately divided into active and ter to any concupiscence whatever, they belong to the life contemplative. of pleasure, which is not comprised under the active life. I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 2), this divi- Those human occupations that are directed to the consid- sion applies to the human life as derived from the intellect. eration of truth belong to the contemplative life. Now the intellect is divided into active and contempla- ∗ Hom. xiv in Ezech. 1992 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 180 Of the Contemplative Life (In Eight Articles) We must now consider the contemplative life, under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the contemplative life pertains to the intellect only, or also to the affections? (2) Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life? (3) Whether the contemplative life consists in one action or in several? (4) Whether the consideration of any truth whatever pertains to the contemplative life? (5) Whether the contemplative life of man in this state can arise to the vision of God? (6) Of the movements of contemplation assigned by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv); (7) Of the pleasure of contemplation; (8) Of the duration of contemplation. Whether the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections, and pertains IIa IIae q. 180 a. 1 wholly to the intellect? Objection 1. It would seem that the contemplative life the contemplative life, as regards the essence of the ac- has nothing to do with the affections and pertains wholly tion, pertains to the intellect, but as regards the motive to the intellect. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, text. cause of the exercise of that action it belongs to the will, 3∗) that “the end of contemplation is truth.” Now truth which moves all the other powers, even the intellect, to pertains wholly to the intellect. Therefore it would seem their actions, as stated above ( Ia, q. 82, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 9, that the contemplative life wholly regards the intellect. a. 1). Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37; Now the appetitive power moves one to observe things Hom. xix in Ezech.) that “Rachel, which is interpreted either with the senses or with the intellect, sometimes for ‘vision of the principle’†, signifies the contemplative life.” love of the thing seen because, as it is written (Mat. 6:21), Now the vision of a principle belongs properly to the in- “where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also,” sometimes tellect. Therefore the contemplative life belongs properly for love of the very knowledge that one acquires by ob- to the intellect. servation. Wherefore Gregory makes the contemplative Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in life to consist in the “love of God,” inasmuch as through Ezech.) that it belongs to the contemplative life, “to rest loving God we are aflame to gaze on His beauty. And from external action.” Now the affective or appetitive since everyone delights when he obtains what he loves, power inclines to external actions. Therefore it would it follows that the contemplative life terminates in delight, seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with which is seated in the affective power, the result being that the appetitive power. love also becomes more intense. On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) Reply to Objection 1. From the very fact that truth is that “the contemplative life is to cling with our whole the end of contemplation, it has the aspect of an appetible mind to the love of God and our neighbor, and to desire good, both lovable and delightful, and in this respect it nothing beside our Creator.” Now desire and love pertain pertains to the appetitive power. to the affective or appetitive power, as stated above ( Ia Reply to Objection 2. We are urged to the vision IIae, q. 25, a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 26, a. 2). Therefore the con- of the first principle, namely God, by the love thereof; templative life has also something to do with the affective wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that “the or appetitive power. contemplative life tramples on all cares and longs to see I answer that, As stated above (q. 179, a. 1) theirs is the face of its Creator.” said to be the contemplative who are chiefly intent on the Reply to Objection 3. The appetitive power moves contemplation of truth. Now intention is an act of the will, not only the bodily members to perform external actions, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 12, a. 1), because intention is but also the intellect to practice the act of contemplation, of the end which is the object of the will. Consequently as stated above. ∗ Ed Did. ia, 1 † Or rather, ‘One seeing the principle,’ if derived from rah and irzn; Cf. Jerome, De Nom. Hebr. 1993 Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life? IIa IIae q. 180 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the moral virtues per- On the other hand, the moral virtues belong to the con- tain to the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv templative life dispositively. For the act of contempla- in Ezech.) that “the contemplative life is to cling to the tion, wherein the contemplative life essentially consists, love of God and our neighbor with the whole mind.” Now is hindered both by the impetuosity of the passions which all the moral virtues, since their acts are prescribed by the withdraw the soul’s intention from intelligible to sensi- precepts of the Law, are reducible to the love of God and ble things, and by outward disturbances. Now the moral of our neighbor, for “love. . . is the fulfilling of the Law” virtues curb the impetuosity of the passions, and quell the (Rom. 13:10). Therefore it would seem that the moral disturbance of outward occupations. Hence moral virtues virtues belong to the contemplative life. belong dispositively to the contemplative life. Objection 2. Further, the contemplative life is chiefly Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 1), the con- directed to the contemplation of God; for Gregory says templative life has its motive cause on the part of the affec- (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that “the mind tramples on all cares tions, and in this respect the love of God and our neighbor and longs to gaze on the face of its Creator.” Now no one is requisite to the contemplative life. Now motive causes can accomplish this without cleanness of heart, which is do not enter into the essence of a thing, but dispose and a result of moral virtue∗. For it is written (Mat. 5:8): perfect it. Wherefore it does not follow that the moral “Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God”: virtues belong essentially to the contemplative life. and (Heb. 12:14): “Follow peace with all men, and holi- Reply to Objection 2. Holiness or cleanness of heart ness, without which no man shall see God.” Therefore it is caused by the virtues that are concerned with the pas- would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the contem- sions which hinder the purity of the reason; and peace is plative life. caused by justice which is about operations, according to Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Is. 32:17, “The work of justice shall be peace”: since he Ezech.) that “the contemplative life gives beauty to the who refrains from wronging others lessens the occasions soul,” wherefore it is signified by Rachel, of whom it of quarrels and disturbances. Hence the moral virtues dis- is said (Gn. 29:17) that she was “of a beautiful coun- pose one to the contemplative life by causing peace and tenance.” Now the beauty of the soul consists in the cleanness of heart. moral virtues, especially temperance, as Ambrose says Reply to Objection 3. Beauty, as stated above (q. 145, (De Offic. i, 43,45,46). Therefore it seems that the moral a. 2), consists in a certain clarity and due proportion. Now virtues pertain to the contemplative life. each of these is found radically in the reason; because On the contrary, The moral virtues are directed to both the light that makes beauty seen, and the establishing external actions. Now Gregory says (Moral. vi†) that it of due proportion among things belong to reason. Hence belongs to the contemplative life “to rest from external since the contemplative life consists in an act of the rea- action.” Therefore the moral virtues do not pertain to the son, there is beauty in it by its very nature and essence; contemplative life. wherefore it is written (Wis. 8:2) of the contemplation of I answer that, A thing may belong to the contem- wisdom: “I became a lover of her beauty.” plative life in two ways, essentially or dispositively. The On the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by moral virtues do not belong to the contemplative life es- participation, in so far as they participate in the order of sentially, because the end of the contemplative life is reason; and especially is it in temperance, which restrains the consideration of truth: and as the Philosopher states the concupiscences which especially darken the light of (Ethic. ii, 4), “knowledge,” which pertains to the consid- reason. Hence it is that the virtue of chastity most of eration of truth, “has little influence on the moral virtues”: all makes man apt for contemplation, since venereal plea- wherefore he declares (Ethic. x, 8) that the moral virtues sures most of all weigh the mind down to sensible objects, pertain to active but not to contemplative happiness. as Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10). Whether there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life? IIa IIae q. 180 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that there are various ac- to contemplation. Therefore it would seem that there are tions pertaining to the contemplative life. For Richard of various actions pertaining to the contemplative life. St. Victor‡ distinguishes between “contemplation,” “med- Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:18): itation,” and “cogitation.” Yet all these apparently pertain “But we. . . beholding [speculantes] the glory of the Lord ∗ Cf. q. 8, a. 7 † Hom. xiv in Ezech.; Cf. a. 1, obj. 3 ‡ De Grat. Contempl. i, 3,4 § Vulg.: ‘into the same image from glory to glory.’ 1994 with open face, are transformed into the same clarity§.” not only the perceptions of the senses in taking cognizance Now this belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore in of certain effects, but also the imaginations. and again the addition to the three aforesaid, vision [speculatio] belongs reason’s discussion of the various signs or of anything that to the contemplative life. conduces to the truth in view: although, according to Au- Objection 3. Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, gustine (De Trin. xiv, 7), cogitation may signify any ac- 14) that “the first and greatest contemplation is admira- tual operation of the intellect. “Meditation” would seem tion of the Majesty.” Now according to Damascene (De to be the process of reason from certain principles that Fide Orth. ii, 15) admiration is a kind of fear. Therefore it lead to the contemplation of some truth: and “consider- would seem that several acts are requisite for the contem- ation” has the same meaning, according to Bernard (De plative life. Consid. ii, 2), although, according to the Philosopher (De Objection 4. Further, “Prayer,” “reading,” and “med- Anima ii, 1), every operation of the intellect may be called itation”∗ are said to belong to the contemplative life. “consideration.” But “contemplation” regards the simple Again, “hearing” belongs to the contemplative life: since act of gazing on the truth; wherefore Richard says again it is stated that Mary (by whom the contemplative life is (De Grat. Contempl. i, 4) that “contemplation is the soul’s signified) “sitting. . . at the Lord’s feet, heard His word” clear and free dwelling upon the object of its gaze; medita- (Lk. 10:39). Therefore it would seem that several acts are tion is the survey of the mind while occupied in searching requisite for the contemplative life. for the truth: and cogitation is the mind’s glance which is On the contrary, Life signifies here the operation on prone to wander.” which a man is chiefly intent. Wherefore if there are sev- Reply to Objection 2. According to a gloss† of Au- eral operations of the contemplative life, there will be, not gustine on this passage, “beholding” [speculatio] denotes one, but several contemplative lives. “seeing in a mirror [speculo], not from a watch-tower I answer that, We are now speaking of the contempla- [specula].” Now to see a thing in a mirror is to see a cause tive life as applicable to man. Now according to Diony- in its effect wherein its likeness is reflected. Hence “be- sius (Div. Nom. vii) between man and angel there is this holding” would seem to be reducible to meditation. difference, that an angel perceives the truth by simple ap- Reply to Objection 3. Admiration is a kind of fear prehension, whereas man arrives at the perception of a resulting from the apprehension of a thing that surpasses simple truth by a process from several premises. Accord- our faculties: hence it results from the contemplation of ingly, then, the contemplative life has one act wherein it the sublime truth. For it was stated above (a. 1) that con- is finally completed, namely the contemplation of truth, templation terminates in the affections. and from this act it derives its unity. Yet it has many acts Reply to Objection 4. Man reaches the knowledge whereby it arrives at this final act. Some of these pertain of truth in two ways. First, by means of things received to the reception of principles, from which it proceeds to from another. In this way, as regards the things he receives the contemplation of truth; others are concerned with de- from God, he needs “prayer,” according to Wis. 7:7, “I ducing from the principles, the truth, the knowledge of called upon” God, “and the spirit of wisdom came upon which is sought; and the last and crowning act is the con- me”: while as regards the things he receives from man, he templation itself of the truth. needs “hearing,” in so far as he receives from the spoken Reply to Objection 1. According to Richard of St. word, and “reading,” in so far as he receives from the tra- Victor “cogitation” would seem to regard the considera- dition of Holy Writ. Secondly, he needs to apply himself tion of the many things from which a person intends to by his personal study, and thus he requires “meditation.” gather one simple truth. Hence cogitation may comprise Whether the contemplative life consists in the mere contemplation of God, or also in IIa IIae q. 180 a. 4 the consideration of any truth whatever? Objection 1. It would seem that the contemplative Objection 2. Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) life consists not only in the contemplation of God, but that “contemplation consists in admiration first of God’s also in the consideration of any truth. For it is written majesty, secondly of His judgments, thirdly of His bene- (Ps. 138:14): “Wonderful are Thy works, and my soul fits, fourthly of His promises.” Now of these four the first knoweth right well.” Now the knowledge of God’s works alone regards the divine truth, and the other three pertain is effected by any contemplation of the truth. Therefore to His effects. Therefore the contemplative life consists it would seem that it pertains to the contemplative life to not only in the contemplation of the divine truth, but also contemplate not only the divine truth, but also any other. in the consideration of truth regarding the divine effects. ∗ Hugh of St. Victor, Alleg. in N.T. iii, 4 † Cf. De Trin. xv, 8 ‡ De Grat. Contempl. i, 6 1995 Objection 3. Further, Richard of St. Victor‡ distin-contemplation of God Himself, according to Rom. 1:20, guishes six species of contemplation. The first belongs to “The invisible things of God. . . are clearly seen, being un- “the imagination alone,” and consists in thinking of cor- derstood by the things that are made,” it follows that the poreal things. The second is in “the imagination guided contemplation of the divine effects also belongs to the by reason,” and consists in considering the order and dis- contemplative life, inasmuch as man is guided thereby to position of sensible objects. The third is in “the reason the knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera based on the imagination”; when, to wit, from the consid- Relig. xxix) that “in the study of creatures we must not eration of the visible we rise to the invisible. The fourth exercise an empty and futile curiosity, but should make is in “the reason and conducted by the reason,” when the them the stepping-stone to things unperishable and ever- mind is intent on things invisible of which the imagina- lasting.” tion has no cognizance. The fifth is “above the reason,” Accordingly it is clear from what has been said but not contrary to reason, when by divine revelation we (Aa. 1,2,3) that four things pertain, in a certain order, to become cognizant of things that cannot be comprehended the contemplative life; first, the moral virtues; secondly, by the human reason. The sixth is “above reason and con- other acts exclusive of contemplation; thirdly, contempla- trary to reason”; when, to wit, by the divine enlightening tion of the divine effects; fourthly, the complement of all we know things that seem contrary to human reason, such which is the contemplation of the divine truth itself. as the doctrine of the mystery of the Trinity. Now only Reply to Objection 1. David sought the knowledge the last of these would seem to pertain to the divine truth. of God’s works, so that he might be led by them to God; Therefore the contemplation of truth regards not only the wherefore he says elsewhere (Ps. 142:5,6): “I meditated divine truth, but also that which is considered in creatures. on all Thy works: I meditated upon the works of Thy Objection 4. Further, in the contemplative life the hands: I stretched forth my hands to Thee.” contemplation of truth is sought as being the perfection Reply to Objection 2. By considering the divine of man. Now any truth is a perfection of the human in- judgments man is guided to the consideration of the di- tellect. Therefore the contemplative life consists in the vine justice; and by considering the divine benefits and contemplation of any truth. promises, man is led to the knowledge of God’s mercy or On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that goodness, as by effects already manifested or yet to be “in contemplation we seek the principle which is God.” vouchsafed. I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), a thing may be- Reply to Objection 3. These six denote the steps long to the contemplative life in two ways: principally, whereby we ascend by means of creatures to the con- and secondarily, or dispositively. That which belongs templation of God. For the first step consists in the mere principally to the contemplative life is the contemplation consideration of sensible objects; the second step consists of the divine truth, because this contemplation is the end in going forward from sensible to intelligible objects; the of the whole human life. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. third step is to judge of sensible objects according to intel- i, 8) that “the contemplation of God is promised us as be- ligible things; the fourth is the absolute consideration of ing the goal of all our actions and the everlasting perfec- the intelligible objects to which one has attained by means tion of our joys.” This contemplation will be perfect in the of sensibles; the fifth is the contemplation of those intelli- life to come, when we shall see God face to face, where- gible objects that are unattainable by means of sensibles, fore it will make us perfectly happy: whereas now the but which the reason is able to grasp; the sixth step is the contemplation of the divine truth is competent to us im- consideration of such intelligible things as the reason can perfectly, namely “through a glass” and “in a dark man- neither discover nor grasp, which pertain to the sublime ner” (1 Cor. 13:12). Hence it bestows on us a certain in- contemplation of divine truth, wherein contemplation is choate beatitude, which begins now and will be continued ultimately perfected. in the life to come; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. x, Reply to Objection 4. The ultimate perfection of the 7) places man’s ultimate happiness in the contemplation human intellect is the divine truth: and other truths perfect of the supreme intelligible good. the intellect in relation to the divine truth. Since, however, God’s effects show us the way to the Whether in the present state of life the contemplative life can reach to the vision of the IIa IIae q. 180 a. 5 Divine essence? Objection 1. It would seem that in the present state Now the vision of God’s face is the vision of the Divine of life the contemplative life can reach to the vision of the essence. Therefore it would seem that in the present life Divine essence. For, as stated in Gn. 32:30, Jacob said: “I one may come, by means of contemplation, to see God in have seen God face to face, and my soul has been saved.” His essence. 1996 Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) contemplation of the present life can attain to the vision that “contemplative men withdraw within themselves in of the Divine essence. Consequently the highest degree order to explore spiritual things, nor do they ever carry of contemplation in the present life is that which Paul had with them the shadows of things corporeal, or if these in rapture, whereby he was in a middle state between the follow them they prudently drive them away: but being present life and the life to come. desirous of seeing the incomprehensible light, they sup- Reply to Objection 1. As Dionysius says (Ep. i ad press all the images of their limited comprehension, and Caium. Monach.), “if anyone seeing God, understood through longing to reach what is above them, they over- what he saw, he saw not God Himself, but something be- come that which they are.” Now man is not hindered from longing to God.” And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): seeing the Divine essence, which is the incomprehensible “By no means is God seen now in His glory; but the soul light, save by the necessity of turning to corporeal phan- sees something of lower degree, and is thereby refreshed tasms. Therefore it would seem that the contemplation of so that afterwards it may attain to the glory of vision.” Ac- the present life can extend to the vision of the incompre- cordingly the words of Jacob, “I saw God face to face” do hensible light in its essence. not imply that he saw God’s essence, but that he saw some Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 35): “All shape∗, imaginary of course, wherein God spoke to him. creatures are small to the soul that sees its Creator: where- Or, “since we know a man by his face, by the face of God fore when the man of God,” the blessed Benedict, to wit, he signified his knowledge of Him,” according to a gloss “saw a fiery globe in the tower and angels returning to of Gregory on the same passage. heaven, without doubt he could only see such things by Reply to Objection 2. In the present state of life hu- the light of God.” Now the blessed Benedict was still in man contemplation is impossible without phantasms, be- this life. Therefore the contemplation of the present life cause it is connatural to man to see the intelligible species can extend to the vision of the essence of God. in the phantasms, as the Philosopher states (De Anima On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): iii, 7). Yet intellectual knowledge does not consist in the “As long as we live in this mortal flesh, no one reaches phantasms themselves, but in our contemplating in them such a height of contemplation as to fix the eyes of his the purity of the intelligible truth: and this not only in nat- mind on the ray itself of incomprehensible light.” ural knowledge, but also in that which we obtain by reve- I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, lation. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that “the Divine 27), “no one seeing God lives this mortal life wherein the glory shows us the angelic hierarchies under certain sym- bodily senses have their play: and unless in some way bolic figures, and by its power we are brought back to the he depart this life, whether by going altogether out of his single ray of light,” i.e. to the simple knowledge of the body, or by withdrawing from his carnal senses, he is not intelligible truth. It is in this sense that we must under- caught up into that vision.” This has been carefully dis- stand the statement of Gregory that “contemplatives do cussed above (q. 175, Aa. 4,5), where we spoke of rapture, not carry along with them the shadows of things corpo- and in the Ia, q. 12, a. 2, where we treated of the vision of real,” since their contemplation is not fixed on them, but God. on the consideration of the intelligible truth. Accordingly we must state that one may be in this life Reply to Objection 3. By these words Gregory does in two ways. First, with regard to act, that is to say by not imply that the blessed Benedict, in that vision, saw actually making use of the bodily senses, and thus con- God in His essence, but he wishes to show that because templation in the present life can nowise attain to the vi- “all creatures are small to him that sees God,” it follows sion of God’s essence. Secondly, one may be in this life that all things can easily be seen through the enlighten- potentially and not with regard to act, that is to say, when ment of the Divine light. Wherefore he adds: “For how- the soul is united to the mortal body as its form, yet so as ever little he may see of the Creator’s light, all created to make use neither of the bodily senses, nor even of the things become petty to him.” imagination, as happens in rapture; and in this way the Whether the operation of contemplation is fittingly divided into a threefold movement, IIa IIae q. 180 a. 6 circular, straight and oblique? Objection 1. It would seem that the operation of con- cording to Wis. 8:16, “When I go into my house, I shall templation is unfittingly divided into a threefold move- repose myself with her.” Now movement is opposed to ment, “circular,” “straight,” and “oblique” (Div. Nom. rest. Therefore the operations of the contemplative life iv). For contemplation pertains exclusively to rest, ac- should not be described as movements. ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 12, a. 11, ad 1 1997 Objection 2. Further, the action of the contemplative for there is the “circular” movement, by which a thing life pertains to the intellect, whereby man is like the an- moves uniformly round one point as center, another is gels. Now Dionysius describes these movements as being the “straight” movement, by which a thing goes from one different in the angels from what they are in the soul. For point to another; the third is “oblique,” being composed he says (Div. Nom. iv) that the “circular” movement in as it were of both the others. Consequently, in intelligi- the angel is “according to his enlightenment by the beau- ble operations, that which is simply uniform is compared tiful and the good.” On the other hand, he assigns the cir- to circular movement; the intelligible operation by which cular movement of the soul to several things: the first of one proceeds from one point to another is compared to the which is the “withdrawal of the soul into itself from exter- straight movement; while the intelligible operation which nals”; the second is “a certain concentration of its powers, unites something of uniformity with progress to various whereby it is rendered free of error and of outward occu- points is compared to the oblique movement. pation”; and the third is “union with those things that are Reply to Objection 1. External bodily movements are above it.” Again, he describes differently their respective opposed to the quiet of contemplation, which consists in straight movements. For he says that the straight move- rest from outward occupations: but the movements of in- ment of the angel is that by which he proceeds to the care tellectual operations belong to the quiet of contemplation. of those things that are beneath him. On the other hand, Reply to Objection 2. Man is like the angels in intel- he describes the straight movement of the soul as being lect generically, but the intellective power is much higher twofold: first, “its progress towards things that are near in the angel than in man. Consequently these movements it”; secondly, “its uplifting from external things to simple must be ascribed to souls and angels in different ways, ac- contemplation.” Further, he assigns a different oblique cording as they are differently related to uniformity. For movement to each. For he assigns the oblique movement the angelic intellect has uniform knowledge in two re- of the angels to the fact that “while providing for those spects. First, because it does not acquire intelligible truth who have less they remain unchanged in relation to God”: from the variety of composite objects; secondly, because whereas he assigns the oblique movement of the soul to it understands the truth of intelligible objects not discur- the fact that “the soul is enlightened in Divine knowl- sively, but by simple intuition. On the other hand, the edge by reasoning and discoursing.” Therefore it would intellect of the soul acquires intelligible truth from sensi- seem that the operations of contemplation are unfittingly ble objects, and understands it by a certain discoursing of assigned according to the ways mentioned above. the reason. Objection 3. Further, Richard of St. Victor (De Con- Wherefore Dionysius assigns the “circular” movement templ. i, 5) mentions many other different movements in of the angels to the fact that their intuition of God is uni- likeness to the birds of the air. “For some of these rise form and unceasing, having neither beginning nor end: at one time to a great height, at another swoop down to even as a circular movement having neither beginning nor earth, and they do so repeatedly; others fly now to the end is uniformly around the one same center. But on the right, now to the left again and again; others go forwards part of the soul, ere it arrive at this uniformity, its twofold or lag behind many times; others fly in a circle now more lack of uniformity needs to be removed. First, that which now less extended; and others remain suspended almost arises from the variety of external things: this is removed immovably in one place.” Therefore it would seem that by the soul withdrawing from externals, and so the first there are only three movements of contemplation. thing he mentions regarding the circular movement of the On the contrary, stands the authority of Dionysius soul is “the soul’s withdrawal into itself from external ob- (Div. Nom. iv). jects.” Secondly, another lack of uniformity requires to be I answer that, As stated above (q. 119, a. 1, ad 3), removed from the soul, and this is owing to the discours- the operation of the intellect, wherein contemplation es- ing of reason. This is done by directing all the soul’s oper- sentially consists, is called a movement, in so far as move- ations to the simple contemplation of the intelligible truth, ment is the act of a perfect thing, according to the Philoso- and this is indicated by his saying in the second place that pher (De Anima iii, 1). Since, however, it is through “the soul’s intellectual powers must be uniformly concen- sensible objects that we come to the knowledge of intel- trated,” in other words that discoursing must be laid aside ligible things, and since sensible operations do not take and the soul’s gaze fixed on the contemplation of the one place without movement, the result is that even intelligi- simple truth. In this operation of the soul there is no error, ble operations are described as movements, and are differ- even as there is clearly no error in the understanding of entiated in likeness to various movements. Now of bod- first principles which we know by simple intuition. Af- ily movements, local movements are the most perfect and terwards these two things being done, he mentions thirdly come first, as proved in Phys. viii, 7; wherefore the fore- the uniformity which is like that of the angels, for then all most among intelligible operations are described by being things being laid aside, the soul continues in the contem- likened to them. These movements are of three kinds; plation of God alone. This he expresses by saying: “Then 1998 being thus made uniform unitedly,” i.e. conformably, “by Reply to Objection 3. These varieties of movement the union of its powers, it is conducted to the good and that are taken from the distinction between above and be- the beautiful.” The “straight” movement of the angel can- low, right and left, forwards and backwards, and from not apply to his proceeding from one thing to another varying circles, are all comprised under either straight and by considering them, but only to the order of his provi- oblique movement, because they all denote discursions dence, namely to the fact that the higher angel enlightens of reason. For if the reason pass from the genus to the the lower angels through the angels that are intermediate. species, or from the part to the whole, it will be, as he He indicates this when he says: “The angel’s movement explains, from above to below: if from one opposite to takes a straight line when he proceeds to the care of things another, it will be from right to left; if from the cause to subject to him, taking in his course whatever things are the effect, it will be backwards and forwards; if it be about direct,” i.e. in keeping with the dispositions of the direct accidents that surround a thing near at hand or far remote, order. Whereas he ascribes the “straight” movement in the movement will be circular. The discoursing of reason the soul to the soul’s proceeding from exterior sensibles from sensible to intelligible objects, if it be according to to the knowledge of intelligible objects. The “oblique” the order of natural reason, belongs to the straight move- movement in the angels he describes as being composed ment; but if it be according to the Divine enlightenment, it of the straight and circular movements, inasmuch as their will belong to the oblique movement as explained above care for those beneath them is in accordance with their (ad 2). That alone which he describes as immobility be- contemplation of God: while the “oblique” movement in longs to the circular movement. the soul he also declares to be partly straight and partly Wherefore it is evident that Dionysius describes the circular, in so far as in reasoning it makes use of the light movement of contemplation with much greater fulness received from God. and depth. Whether there is delight in contemplation? IIa IIae q. 180 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no delight ness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and glad- in contemplation. For delight belongs to the appetitive ness”: and Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that “the power; whereas contemplation resides chiefly in the intel- contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable.” lect. Therefore it would seem that there is no delight in I answer that, There may be delight in any partic- contemplation. ular contemplation in two ways. First by reason of the Objection 2. Further, all strife and struggle is a hin- operation itself∗, because each individual delights in the drance to delight. Now there is strife and struggle in con- operation which befits him according to his own nature or templation. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that habit. Now contemplation of the truth befits a man ac- “when the soul strives to contemplate God, it is in a state cording to his nature as a rational animal: the result be- of struggle; at one time it almost overcomes, because by ing that “all men naturally desire to know,” so that conse- understanding and feeling it tastes something of the in- quently they delight in the knowledge of truth. And more comprehensible light, and at another time it almost suc- delightful still does this become to one who has the habit cumbs, because even while tasting, it fails.” Therefore of wisdom and knowledge, the result of which is that he there is no delight in contemplation. contemplates without difficulty. Secondly, contemplation Objection 3. Further, delight is the result of a perfect may be delightful on the part of its object, in so far as operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 4. Now the contempla- one contemplates that which one loves; even as bodily vi- tion of wayfarers is imperfect, according to 1 Cor. 13:12, sion gives pleasure, not only because to see is pleasurable “We see now through a glass in a dark manner.” Therefore in itself, but because one sees a person whom one loves. seemingly there is no delight in the contemplative life. Since, then, the contemplative life consists chiefly in the Objection 4. Further, a lesion of the body is an obsta- contemplation of God, of which charity is the motive, as cle to delight. Now contemplation causes a lesion of the stated above (Aa. 1,2, ad 1), it follows that there is delight body; wherefore it is stated (Gn. 32) that after Jacob had in the contemplative life, not only by reason of the con- said (Gn. 32:30), “ ‘I have seen God face to face’. . . he templation itself, but also by reason of the Divine love. halted on his foot (Gn. 32:31). . . because he touched the In both respects the delight thereof surpasses all hu- sinew of his thigh and it shrank” (Gn. 32:32). Therefore man delight, both because spiritual delight is greater than seemingly there is no delight in contemplation. carnal pleasure, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 31, a. 5), when On the contrary, It is written of the contemplation of we were treating of the passions, and because the love wisdom (Wis. 8:16): “Her conversation hath no bitter- whereby God is loved out of charity surpasses all love. ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 3, a. 5 1999 Hence it is written (Ps. 33:9): “O taste and see that the the Apostle (Rom. 7:24): “Unhappy man that I am, who Lord is sweet.” shall deliver me from the body of this death?” Wherefore Reply to Objection 1. Although the contemplative Gregory say (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): “When God is once life consists chiefly in an act of the intellect, it has its beknown by desire and understanding, He withers all carnal ginning in the appetite, since it is through charity that one pleasure in us.” is urged to the contemplation of God. And since the end Reply to Objection 3. The contemplation of God in corresponds to the beginning, it follows that the term also this life is imperfect in comparison with the contempla- and the end of the contemplative life has its being in the tion in heaven; and in like manner the delight of the way- appetite, since one delights in seeing the object loved, and farer’s contemplation is imperfect as compared with the the very delight in the object seen arouses a yet greater delight of contemplation in heaven, of which it is written love. Wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that (Ps. 35:9): “Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent “when we see one whom we love, we are so aflame as of Thy pleasure.” Yet, though the contemplation of Di- to love him more.” And this is the ultimate perfection of vine things which is to be had by wayfarers is imperfect, the contemplative life, namely that the Divine truth be not it is more delightful than all other contemplation however only seen but also loved. perfect, on account of the excellence of that which is con- Reply to Objection 2. Strife or struggle arising from templated. Hence the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal. the opposition of an external thing, hinders delight in that i, 5): “We may happen to have our own little theories thing. For a man delights not in a thing against which he about those sublime beings and godlike substances, and strives: but in that for which he strives; when he has ob- though we grasp them but feebly, nevertheless so elevat- tained it, other things being equal, he delights yet more: ing is the knowledge that they give us more delight than wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3) that “the more any of those things that are round about us”: and Gre- peril there was in the battle, the greater the joy in the tri- gory says in the same sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): “The umph.” But there is no strife or struggle in contempla- contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable; for tion on the part of the truth which we contemplate, though it carries the soul away above itself, it opens heaven and there is on the part of our defective understanding and our discovers the spiritual world to the eyes of the mind.” corruptible body which drags us down to lower things, Reply to Objection 4. After contemplation Jacob according to Wis. 9:15, “The corruptible body ss a load halted with one foot, “because we need to grow weak in upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the love of the world ere we wax strong in the love of the mind that museth upon many things.” Hence it is that God,” as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.). “Thus when when man attains to the contemplation of truth, he loves we have known the sweetness of God, we have one foot it yet more, while he hates the more his own deficiency sound while the other halts; since every one who halts on and the weight of his corruptible body, so as to say with one foot leans only on that foot which is sound.” Whether the contemplative life is continuous? IIa IIae q. 180 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that the contemplative tinuous. life is not continuous. For the contemplative life consists Objection 3. Further, that which is not connatural to essentially in things pertaining to the intellect. Now all man cannot be continuous. Now the contemplative life, the intellectual perfections of this life will be made void, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 7), “is better than according to 1 Cor. 13:8, “Whether prophecies shall be the life which is according to man.” Therefore seemingly made void, or tongues shall cease, or knowledge shall be the contemplative life is not continuous. destroyed.” Therefore the contemplative life is made void. On the contrary, our Lord said (Lk. 10:42): “Mary Objection 2. Further, a man tastes the sweetness hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away of contemplation by snatches and for a short time only: from her,” since as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.), wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x, 40), “Thou ad- “the contemplative life begins here so that it may be per- mittest me to a most unwonted affection in my inmost fected in our heavenly home.” soul, to a strange sweetness. . . yet through my grievous I answer that, A thing may be described as continu- weight I sink down again.” Again, Gregory commenting ous in two ways: first, in regard to its nature; secondly, in on the words of Job 4:15, “When a spirit passed before regard to us. It is evident that in regard to itself contem- me,” says (Moral. v, 33): “The mind does not remain long plative life is continuous for two reasons: first, because it at rest in the sweetness of inward contemplation, for it is is about incorruptible and unchangeable things; secondly, recalled to itself and beaten back by the very immensity because it has no contrary, for there is nothing contrary to of the light.” Therefore the contemplative life is not con- the pleasure of contemplation, as stated in Topic. i, 13. 2000 But even in our regard contemplative life is continuous— with a yet greater love when we see Him Whom we love.” both because it is competent to us in respect of the incor- Reply to Objection 2. No action can last long at its ruptible part of the soul, namely the intellect, wherefore it highest pitch. Now the highest point of contemplation is can endure after this life—and because in the works of the to reach the uniformity of Divine contemplation, accord- contemplative life we work not with our bodies, so that we ing to Dionysius∗, and as we have stated above (a. 6, ad are the more able to persevere in the works thereof, as the 2). Hence although contemplation cannot last long in this Philosopher observes (Ethic. x, 7). respect, it can be of long duration as regards the other con- Reply to Objection 1. The manner of contemplation templative acts. is not the same here as in heaven: yet the contemplative Reply to Objection 3. The Philosopher declares the life is said to remain by reason of charity, wherein it has contemplative life to be above man, because it befits us both its beginning and its end. Gregory speaks in this “so far as there is in us something divine” (Ethic. x, 7), sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): “The contemplative life be- namely the intellect, which is incorruptible and impassi- gins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home, be- ble in itself, wherefore its act can endure longer. cause the fire of love which begins to burn here is aflame ∗ Cf. Coel. Hier. iii 2001 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 181 Of the Active Life (In Four Articles) We must now consider the active life, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether all the works of the moral virtues pertain to the active life? (2) Whether prudence pertains to the active life? (3) Whether teaching pertains to the active life? (4) Of the duration of the active life. Whether all the actions of the moral virtues pertain to the active life? IIa IIae q. 181 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the acts of the moral I answer that, As stated above (q. 179, a. 1) the active virtues do not all pertain to the active life. For seemingly and the contemplative life differ according to the different the active life regards only our relations with other per- occupations of men intent on different ends: one of which sons: hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that “the occupations is the consideration of the truth; and this is active life is to give bread to the hungry,” and after men- the end of the contemplative life, while the other is exter- tioning many things that regard our relations with other nal work to which the active life is directed. people he adds finally, “and to give to each and every one Now it is evident that the moral virtues are directed whatever he needs.” Now we are directed in our relations chiefly, not to the contemplation of truth but to operation. to others, not by all the acts of moral virtues, but only Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that “for by those of justice and its parts, as stated above (q. 58, virtue knowledge is of little or no avail.” Hence it is clear Aa. 2,8; Ia IIae, q. 60, Aa. 2,3). Therefore the acts of the that the moral virtues belong essentially to the active life; moral virtues do not all pertain to the active life. for which reason the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 8) subordi- Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in nates the moral virtues to active happiness. Ezech.) that Lia who was blear-eyed but fruitful signi- Reply to Objection 1. The chief of the moral virtues fies the active life: which “being occupied with work, is justice by which one man is directed in his relations sees less, and yet since it urges one’s neighbor both by towards another, as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. v, 1). word and example to its imitation it begets a numerous Hence the active life is described with reference to our offspring of good deeds.” Now this would seem to belong relations with other people, because it consists in these to charity, whereby we love our neighbor, rather than to things, not exclusively, but principally. the moral virtues. Therefore seemingly the acts of moral Reply to Objection 2. It is possible, by the acts of all virtue do not pertain to the active life. the moral virtues, for one to direct one’s neighbor to good Objection 3. Further, as stated above (q. 180, a. 2), by example: and this is what Gregory here ascribes to the the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative life. active life. Now disposition and perfection belong to the same thing. Reply to Objection 3. Even as the virtue that is di- Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues do not per- rected to the end of another virtue passes, as it were, into tain to the active life. the species of the latter virtue, so again when a man makes On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, use of things pertaining to the active life, merely as dispo- 15): “In the active life all vices must first of all be extir- sitions to contemplation, such things are comprised un- pated by the practice of good works, in order that in the der the contemplative life. On the other hand, when we contemplative life the mind’s eye being purified one may practice the works of the moral virtues, as being good in advance to the contemplation of the Divine light.” Now all themselves, and not as dispositions to the contemplative vices are not extirpated save by acts of the moral virtues. life, the moral virtues belong to the active life. Therefore the acts of the moral virtues pertain to the active It may also be replied, however, that the active life is life. a disposition to the contemplative life. 2002 Whether prudence pertains to the active life? IIa IIae q. 181 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that prudence does not contemplative life, so the knowledge of prudence, which pertain to the active life. For just as the contemplative life is of itself directed to the works of the moral virtues, be- belongs to the cognitive power, so the active life belongs longs directly to the active life, provided we take prudence to the appetitive power. Now prudence belongs not to the in its proper sense as the Philosopher speaks of it. appetitive but to the cognitive power. Therefore prudence If, however, we take it in a more general sense, as com- does not belong to the active life. prising any kind of human knowledge, then prudence, as Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in regards a certain part thereof, belongs to the contempla- Ezech.) that the “active life being occupied with work, tive life. In this sense Tully (De Offic. i, 5) says that “the sees less,” wherefore it is signified by Lia who was blear- man who is able most clearly and quickly to grasp the eyed. But prudence requires clear eyes, so that one may truth and to unfold his reasons, is wont to be considered judge aright of what has to be done. Therefore it seems most prudent and wise.” that prudence does not pertain to the active life. Reply to Objection 1. Moral works take their species Objection 3. Further, prudence stands between the from their end, as stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 18, Aa. 4,6), moral and the intellectual virtues. Now just as the moral wherefore the knowledge pertaining to the contemplative virtues belong to the active life, as stated above (a. 1), so life is that which has its end in the very knowledge of do the intellectual virtues pertain to the contemplative life. truth; whereas the knowledge of prudence, through hav- Therefore it would seem that prudence pertains neither to ing its end in an act of the appetitive power, belongs to the the active nor to the contemplative life, but to an interme- active life. diate kind of life, of which Augustine makes mention (De Reply to Objection 2. External occupation makes a Civ. Dei xix, 2,3,19). man see less in intelligible things, which are separated On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) from sensible objects with which the works of the active that prudence pertains to active happiness, to which the life are concerned. Nevertheless the external occupation moral virtues belong. of the active life enables a man to see more clearly in judg- I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 3; Ia IIae, ing of what is to be done, which belongs to prudence, both q. 18, a. 6), if one thing be directed to another as its end, it on account of experience, and on account of the mind’s at-is drawn, especially in moral matters, to the species of the tention, since “brains avail when the mind is attentive” as thing to which it is directed: for instance “he who commits Sallust observes∗. adultery that he may steal, is a thief rather than an adul- Reply to Objection 3. Prudence is said to be inter- terer,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2). Now it mediate between the intellectual and the moral virtues is evident that the knowledge of prudence is directed to because it resides in the same subject as the intellectual the works of the moral virtues as its end, since it is “right virtues, and has absolutely the same matter as the moral reason applied to action” (Ethic. vi, 5); so that the ends virtues. But this third kind of life is intermediate between of the moral virtues are the principles of prudence, as the the active and the contemplative life as regards the things Philosopher says in the same book. Accordingly, as it was about which it is occupied, because it is occupied some- stated above (a. 1, ad 3) that the moral virtues in one who times with the contemplation of the truth, sometimes with directs them to the quiet of contemplation belong to the eternal things. Whether teaching is a work of the active or of the contemplative life? IIa IIae q. 181 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that teaching is a work that “to be able to teach is an indication of knowledge.” not of the active but of the contemplative life. For Gre- Therefore since wisdom or knowledge pertain to the con- gory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that “the perfect who have templative life, it would seem that teaching also belongs been able to contemplate heavenly goods, at least through to the contemplative life. a glass, proclaim them to their brethren, whose minds they Objection 3. Further, prayer, no less than contempla- inflame with love for their hidden beauty.” But this per- tion, is an act of the contemplative life. Now prayer, even tains to teaching. Therefore teaching is a work of the con- when one prays for another, belongs to the contemplative templative life. life. Therefore it would seem that it belongs also to the Objection 2. Further, act and habit would seem to contemplative life to acquaint another, by teaching him, be referable to the same kind of life. Now teaching is an of the truth we have meditated. act of wisdom: for the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1) On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): ∗ Bell. Catilin., LI 2003 “The active life is to give bread to the hungry, to teach the The other object of teaching is on the part of the ignorant the words of wisdom.” speech heard, and thus the object of teaching is the hearer. I answer that, The act of teaching has a twofold ob- As to this object all doctrine belongs to the active life to ject. For teaching is conveyed by speech, and speech is the which external actions pertain. audible sign of the interior concept. Accordingly one ob- Reply to Objection 1. The authority quoted speaks ject of teaching is the matter or object of the interior con- expressly of doctrine as to its matter, in so far as it is con- cept; and as to this object teaching belongs sometimes to cerned with the consideration and love of truth. the active, sometimes to the contemplative life. It belongs Reply to Objection 2. Habit and act have a common to the active life, when a man conceives a truth inwardly, object. Hence this argument clearly considers the matter so as to be directed thereby in his outward action; but it of the interior concept. For it pertains to the man having belongs to the contemplative life when a man conceives wisdom and knowledge to be able to teach, in so far as he an intelligible truth, in the consideration and love whereof is able to express his interior concept in words, so as to he delights. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. bring another man to understand the truth. civ, 1): “Let them choose for themselves the better part,” Reply to Objection 3. He who prays for another does namely the contemplative life, “let them be busy with the nothing towards the man for whom he prays, but only to- word, long for the sweetness of teaching, occupy them- wards God Who is the intelligible truth; whereas he who selves with salutary knowledge,” thus stating clearly that teaches another does something in his regard by external teaching belongs to the contemplative life. action. Hence the comparison fails. Whether the active life remains after this life? IIa IIae q. 181 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the active life remains to contemplation as their end. For, as Augustine says at after this life. For the acts of the moral virtues belong to the end of De Civitate Dei xxii, 30, “there we shall rest the active life, as stated above (a. 1). But the moral virtues and we shall see, we shall see and love, we shall love and endure after this life according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, praise.” And he had said before (De Civ. Dei xxii, 30) 9). Therefore the active life remains after this life. that “there God will be seen without end, loved without Objection 2. Further, teaching others belongs to the wearying, praised without tiring: such will be the occupa- active life, as stated above (a. 3). But in the life to tion of all, the common love, the universal activity.” come when “we shall be like the angels,” teaching will Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 136, a. 1, be possible: even as apparently it is in the angels of ad 1), the moral virtues will remain not as to those actions whom one “enlightens, cleanses, and perfects”∗ another, which are about the means, but as to the actions which which refers to the “receiving of knowledge,” according are about the end. Such acts are those that conduce to the to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore it would seem quiet of contemplation, which in the words quoted above that the active life remains after this life. Augustine denotes by “rest,” and this rest excludes not Objection 3. Further, the more lasting a thing is in only outward disturbances but also the inward disturbance itself, the more is it able to endure after this life. But the of the passions. active life is seemingly more lasting in itself: for Gregory Reply to Objection 2. The contemplative life, as says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that “we can remain fixed in stated above (q. 180, a. 4), consists chiefly in the contem- the active life, whereas we are nowise able to maintain an plation of God, and as to this, one angel does not teach attentive mind in the contemplative life.” Therefore the another, since according to Mat. 18:10, “the little ones’ active life is much more able than the contemplative to angels,” who belong to the lower order, “always see the endure after this life. face of the Father”; and so, in the life to come, no man On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): will teach another of God, but “we shall” all “see Him as “The active life ends with this world, but the contem- He is” (1 Jn. 3:2). This is in keeping with the saying of plative life begins here, to be perfected in our heavenly Jeremiah 31:34: “They shall teach no more every man his home.” neighbor. . . saying: Know the Lord: for all shall know me, I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the active life from the least of them even to the greatest.” has its end in external actions: and if these be referred to But as regards things pertaining to the “dispensation the quiet of contemplation, for that very reason they be- of the mysteries of God,” one angel teaches another by long to the contemplative life. But in the future life of the cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting him: and thus they blessed the occupation of external actions will cease, and have something of the active life so long as the world lasts, if there be any external actions at all, these will be referred from the fact that they are occupied in administering to the ∗ Coel. Hier. iii, viii 2004 creatures below them. This is signified by the fact that Ja-petent to us not by reason of our natural order, as it is to cob saw angels “ascending” the ladder—which refers to the angels, but by reason of our seeing God. contemplation—and “descending” —which refers to ac- Reply to Objection 3. That the durability of the active tion. Nevertheless, as Gregory remarks (Moral. ii, 3), life in the present state surpasses the durability of the con- “they do not wander abroad from the Divine vision, so templative life arises not from any property of either life as to be deprived of the joys of inward contemplation.” considered in itself, but from our own deficiency, since Hence in them the active life does not differ from the con- we are withheld from the heights of contemplation by the templative life as it does in us for whom the works of the weight of the body. Hence Gregory adds (Moral. ii, 3) active life are a hindrance to contemplation. that “the mind through its very weakness being repelled Nor is the likeness to the angels promised to us as re- from that immense height recoils on itself.” gards the administering to lower creatures, for this is com- 2005 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 182 Of the Active Life in Comparison with the Contemplative Life (In Four Articles) We must now consider the active life in comparison with the contemplative life, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Which of them is of greater import or excellence? (2) Which of them has the greater merit? (3) Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life? (4) Of their order. Whether the active life is more excellent than the contemplative? IIa IIae q. 182 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the active life is more sons (Ethic. x, 7,8). The first is, because the contempla- excellent than the contemplative. For “that which belongs tive life becomes man according to that which is best in to better men would seem to be worthier and better,” as him, namely the intellect, and according to its proper ob- the Philosopher says (Top. iii, 1). Now the active life be- jects, namely things intelligible; whereas the active life longs to persons of higher rank, namely prelates, who are is occupied with externals. Hence Rachael, by whom the placed in a position of honor and power; wherefore Au- contemplative life is signified, is interpreted “the vision gustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that “in our actions we of the principle,”† whereas as Gregory says (Moral. vi, must not love honor or power in this life.” Therefore it 37) the active life is signified by Lia who was blear-eyed. would seem that the active life is more excellent than the The second reason is because the contemplative life can contemplative. be more continuous, although not as regards the highest Objection 2. Further, in all habits and acts, direction degree of contemplation, as stated above (q. 180, a. 8, ad belongs to the more important; thus the military art, being 2; q. 181, a. 4, ad 3), wherefore Mary, by whom the con- the more important, directs the art of the bridle-maker∗. templative life is signified, is described as “sitting” all the Now it belongs to the active life to direct and command time “at the Lord’s feet.” Thirdly, because the contempla- the contemplative, as appears from the words addressed tive life is more delightful than the active; wherefore Au- to Moses (Ex. 19:21), “Go down and charge the people, gustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. ciii) that “Martha was lest they should have a mind to pass the” fixed “limits to troubled, but Mary feasted.” Fourthly, because in the con- see the Lord.” Therefore the active life is more excellent templative life man is more self-sufficient, since he needs than the contemplative. fewer things for that purpose; wherefore it was said (Lk. Objection 3. Further, no man should be taken away 10:41): “Martha, Martha, thou art careful and art troubled from a greater thing in order to be occupied with lesser about many things.” Fifthly, because the contemplative things: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:31): “Be zealous life is loved more for its own sake, while the active life is for the better gifts.” Now some are taken away from the directed to something else. Hence it is written (Ps. 36:4): state of the contemplative life to the occupations of the ac- “One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after, tive life, as in the case of those who are transferred to the that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of state of prelacy. Therefore it would seem that the active my life, that I may see the delight of the Lord.” Sixthly, life is more excellent than the contemplative. because the contemplative life consists in leisure and rest, On the contrary, Our Lord said (Lk. 10:42): “Mary according to Ps. 45:11, “Be still and see that I am God.” hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away Seventhly, because the contemplative life is according to from her.” Now Mary figures the contemplative life. Divine things, whereas active life is according to human Therefore the contemplative life is more excellent than the things; wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. active. civ): “ ‘In the beginning was the Word’: to Him was Mary I answer that, Nothing prevents certain things being hearkening: ‘The Word was made flesh’: Him was Martha more excellent in themselves, whereas they are surpassed serving.” Eighthly, because the contemplative life is ac- by another in some respect. Accordingly we must reply cording to that which is most proper to man, namely his that the contemplative life is simply more excellent than intellect; whereas in the works of the active life the lower the active: and the Philosopher proves this by eight rea- powers also, which are common to us and brutes, have ∗ Ethic. i, 1 † Or rather, ‘One seeing the principle,’ if derived from rah and irzn; Cf. Jerome, De Nom. Hebr. 2006 their part; wherefore (Ps. 35:7) after the words, “Men and nal things.” And Boethius says (De Consol. v, 2): “The beasts Thou wilt preserve, O Lord,” that which is special soul of man must needs be more free while it continues to man is added (Ps. 35:10): “In Thy light we shall see to gaze on the Divine mind, and less so when it stoops light.” to bodily things.” Wherefore it is evident that the ac- Our Lord adds a ninth reason (Lk. 10:42) when He tive life does not directly command the contemplative life, says: “Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not but prescribes certain works of the active life as disposi- be taken away from her,” which words Augustine (De tions to the contemplative life; which it accordingly serves Verb. Dom. Serm. ciii) expounds thus: “Not—Thou hast rather than commands. Gregory refers to this when he chosen badly but—She has chosen better. Why better? says (Hom. iii in Ezech.) that “the active life is bondage, Listen—because it shall not be taken away from her. But whereas the contemplative life is freedom.” the burden of necessity shall at length be taken from thee: Reply to Objection 3. Sometimes a man is called whereas the sweetness of truth is eternal.” away from the contemplative life to the works of the active Yet in a restricted sense and in a particular case one life, on account of some necessity of the present life, yet should prefer the active life on account of the needs of the not so as to be compelled to forsake contemplation alto- present life. Thus too the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2): gether. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): “The “It is better to be wise than to be rich, yet for one who is love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity in need, it is better to be rich. . . ” undertake an honest toil,” the work namely of the active Reply to Objection 1. Not only the active life con- life. “If no one imposes this burden upon us we must de- cerns prelates, they should also excel in the contemplative vote ourselves to the research and contemplation of truth, life; hence Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 1): “A prelate should but if it be imposed on us, we must bear it because charity be foremost in action, more uplifted than others in con- demands it of us. Yet even then we must not altogether templation.” forsake the delights of truth, lest we deprive ourselves of Reply to Objection 2. The contemplative life consists its sweetness, and this burden overwhelm us.” Hence it is in a certain liberty of mind. For Gregory says (Hom. iii clear that when a person is called from the contemplative in Ezech.) that “the contemplative life obtains a certain life to the active life, this is done by way not of subtraction freedom of mind, for it thinks not of temporal but of eter-but of addition. Whether the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative? IIa IIae q. 182 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the active life is of active, but more of the character of reward. greater merit than the contemplative. For merit implies Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Hom. xii in relation to meed; and meed is due to labor, according to Ezech.) that “no sacrifice is more acceptable to God than 1 Cor. 3:8, “Every man shall receive his own reward ac- zeal for souls.” Now by the zeal for souls a man turns to cording to his own labor.” Now labor is ascribed to the the occupations of the active life. Therefore it would seem active life, and rest to the contemplative life; for Gregory that the contemplative life is not of greater merit than the says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): “Whosoever is converted to active. God must first of all sweat from labor, i.e. he must take On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): Lia, that afterwards he may rest in the embraces of Rachel “Great are the merits of the active life, but greater still so as to see the principle.” Therefore the active life is of those of the contemplative.” greater merit than the contemplative. I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 114, a. 4), Objection 2. Further, the contemplative life is a be-the root of merit is charity; and, while, as stated above ginning of the happiness to come; wherefore Augustine (q. 25, a. 1), charity consists in the love of God and our commenting on Jn. 21:22, “So I will have him to re- neighbor, the love of God is by itself more meritorious main till I come,” says (Tract. cxxiv in Joan.): “This than the love of our neighbor, as stated above (q. 27, a. 8). may be expressed more clearly: Let perfect works fol- Wherefore that which pertains more directly to the love of low Me conformed to the example of My passion, and God is generically more meritorious than that which per- let contemplation begun here remain until I come, that it tains directly to the love of our neighbor for God’s sake. may be perfected when I shall come.” And Gregory says Now the contemplative life pertains directly and imme- (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that “contemplation begins here, so diately to the love of God; for Augustine says (De Civ. as to be perfected in our heavenly home.” Now the life Dei xix, 19) that “the love of” the Divine “truth seeks a to come will be a state not of meriting but of receiving holy leisure,” namely of the contemplative life, for it is the reward of our merits. Therefore the contemplative life that truth above all which the contemplative life seeks, as would seem to have less of the character of merit than the stated above (q. 181, a. 4, ad 2). On the other hand, the 2007 active life is more directly concerned with the love of our plation. neighbor, because it is “busy about much serving” (Lk. Reply to Objection 2. In the state of future happiness 10:40). Wherefore the contemplative life is generically man has arrived at perfection, wherefore there is no room of greater merit than the active life. This is moreover as- for advancement by merit; and if there were, the merit serted by Gregory (Hom. iii in Ezech.): “The contempla- would be more efficacious by reason of the greater char- tive life surpasses in merit the active life, because the lat- ity. But in the present life contemplation is not without ter labors under the stress of present work,” by reason of some imperfection, and can always become more perfect; the necessity of assisting our neighbor, “while the former wherefore it does not remove the idea of merit, but causes with heartfelt relish has a foretaste of the coming rest,” i.e. a yet greater merit on account of the practice of greater the contemplation of God. Divine charity. Nevertheless it may happen that one man merits more Reply to Objection 3. A sacrifice is rendered to God by the works of the active life than another by the works of spiritually when something is offered to Him; and of all the contemplative life. For instance through excess of Di- man’s goods, God specially accepts that of the human soul vine love a man may now and then suffer separation from when it is offered to Him in sacrifice. Now a man ought to the sweetness of Divine contemplation for the time be- offer to God, in the first place, his soul, according to Ec- ing, that God’s will may be done and for His glory’s sake. clus. 30:24, “Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God”; in Thus the Apostle says (Rom. 9:3): “I wished myself to be the second place, the souls of others, according to Apoc. an anathema from Christ, for my brethren”; which words 22:17, “He that heareth, let him say: Come.” And the Chrysostom expounds as follows (De Compunct. i, 7∗): more closely a man unites his own or another’s soul to “His mind was so steeped in the love of Christ that, al- God, the more acceptable is his sacrifice to God; where- though he desired above all to be with Christ, he despised fore it is more acceptable to God that one apply one’s own even this, because thus he pleased Christ.” soul and the souls of others to contemplation than to ac- Reply to Objection 1. External labor conduces to the tion. Consequently the statement that “no sacrifice is more increase of the accidental reward; but the increase of merit acceptable to God than zeal for souls,” does not mean that with regard to the essential reward consists chiefly in char- the merit of the active life is preferable to the merit of the ity, whereof external labor borne for Christ’s sake is a contemplative life, but that it is more meritorious to offer sign. Yet a much more expressive sign thereof is shown to God one’s own soul and the souls of others, than any when a man, renouncing whatsoever pertains to this life, other external gifts. delights to occupy himself entirely with Divine contem- Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life? IIa IIae q. 182 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the contemplative life On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): is hindered by the active life. For the contemplative life re- “Those who wish to hold the fortress of contemplation, quires a certain stillness of mind, according to Ps. 45:11, must first of all train in the camp of action.” “Be still, and see that I am God”; whereas the active life I answer that, The active life may be considered from involves restlessness, according to Lk. 10:41, “Martha, two points of view. First, as regards the attention to and Martha, thou art careful and troubled about many things.” practice of external works: and thus it is evident that the Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative. active life hinders the contemplative, in so far as it is im- Objection 2. Further, clearness of vision is a requisite possible for one to be busy with external action, and at for the contemplative life. Now active life is a hindrance the same time give oneself to Divine contemplation. Sec- to clear vision; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that ondly, active life may be considered as quieting and di- it “is blear-eyed and fruitful, because the active life, being recting the internal passions of the soul; and from this occupied with work, sees less.” Therefore the active life point of view the active life is a help to the contempla- hinders the contemplative. tive, since the latter is hindered by the inordinateness of Objection 3. Further, one contrary hinders the other. the internal passions. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi, Now the active and the contemplative life are apparently 37): “Those who wish to hold the fortress of contempla- contrary to one another, since the active life is busy about tion must first of all train in the camp of action. Thus many things, while the contemplative life attends to the after careful study they will learn whether they no longer contemplation of one; wherefore they differ in opposition wrong their neighbor, whether they bear with equanim- to one another. Therefore it would seem that the contem- ity the wrongs their neighbors do to them, whether their plative life is hindered by the active. soul is neither overcome with joy in the presence of tem- ∗ Ad Demetr. de Compunct. Cordis. 2008 poral goods, nor cast down with too great a sorrow when plative, by quelling the interior passions which give rise those goods are withdrawn. In this way they will known to the phantasms whereby contemplation is hindered. when they withdraw within themselves, in order to ex- This suffices for the Replies to the Objections; for plore spiritual things, whether they no longer carry with these arguments consider the occupation itself of exter- them the shadows of the things corporeal, or, if these nal actions, and not the effect which is the quelling of the follow them, whether they prudently drive them away.” passions. Hence the work of the active life conduces to the contem- Whether the active life precedes the contemplative? IIa IIae q. 182 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the active life does rected to the love of God, not of any degree, but to that not precede the contemplative. For the contemplative life which is perfect; whereas the active life is necessary for pertains directly to the love of God; while the active life any degree of the love of our neighbor. Hence Gregory pertains to the love of our neighbor. Now the love of says (Hom. iii in Ezech.): “Without the contemplative God precedes the love of our neighbor, since we love our life it is possible to enter the heavenly kingdom, provided neighbor for God’s sake. Seemingly therefore the con- one omit not the good actions we are able to do; but we templative life also precedes the active life. cannot enter therein without the active life, if we neglect Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in to do the good we can do.” Ezech.): “It should be observed that while a well-ordered From this it is also evident that the active precedes the life proceeds from action to contemplation, sometimes it contemplative life, as that which is common to all pre- is useful for the soul to turn from the contemplative to the cedes, in the order of generation, that which is proper to active life.” Therefore the active is not simply prior to the the perfect. contemplative. Reply to Objection 2. Progress from the active to Objection 3. Further, it would seem that there is not the contemplative life is according to the order of genera- necessarily any order between things that are suitable to tion; whereas the return from the contemplative life to the different subjects. Now the active and the contemplative active is according to the order of direction, in so far as life are suitable to different subjects; for Gregory says the active life is directed by the contemplative. Even thus (Moral. vi, 37): “Often those who were able to contem- habit is acquired by acts, and by the acquired habit one plate God so long as they were undisturbed have fallen acts yet more perfectly, as stated in Ethic. ii, 7. when pressed with occupation; and frequently they who Reply to Objection 3. He that is prone to yield to might live advantageously occupied with the service of his passions on account of his impulse to action is simply their fellow-creatures are killed by the sword of their in- more apt for the active life by reason of his restless spirit. action.” Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that “there be some I answer that, A thing is said to precede in two ways. so restless that when they are free from labor they labor all First, with regard to its nature; and in this way the con- the more, because the more leisure they have for thought, templative life precedes the active, inasmuch as it applies the worse interior turmoil they have to bear.” Others, on itself to things which precede and are better than others, the contrary, have the mind naturally pure and restful, so wherefore it moves and directs the active life. For the that they are apt for contemplation, and if they were to higher reason which is assigned to contemplation is com- apply themselves wholly to action, this would be detri- pared to the lower reason which is assigned to action, and mental to them. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) the husband is compared to his wife, who should be ruled that “some are so slothful of mind that if they chance to by her husband, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3,7,12). have any hard work to do they give way at the very out- Secondly, a thing precedes with regard to us, because set.” Yet, as he adds further on, “often. . . love stimulates it comes first in the order of generation. In this way the slothful souls to work, and fear restrains souls that are dis- active precedes the contemplative life, because it disposes turbed in contemplation.” Consequently those who are one to it, as stated above (a. 1; q. 181, a. 1, ad 3); and, more adapted to the active life can prepare themselves for in the order of generation, disposition precedes form, al- the contemplative by the practice of the active life; while though the latter precedes simply and according to its na- none the less, those who are more adapted to the contem- ture. plative life can take upon themselves the works of the ac- Reply to Objection 1. The contemplative life is di- tive life, so as to become yet more apt for contemplation. 2009 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 183 Of Man’s Various Duties and States in General (In Four Articles) We must next consider man’s various states and duties. We shall consider (1) man’s duties and states in general; (2) the state of the perfect in particular. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What constitutes a state among men? (2) Whether among men there should be various states and duties? (3) Of the diversity of duties; (4) Of the diversity of states. Whether the notion of a state denotes a condition of freedom or servitude? IIa IIae q. 183 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the notion of a state it is natural to man that his head should be directed up- does not denote a condition of freedom or servitude. For wards, his feet set firmly on the ground, and his other “state” takes its name from “standing.” Now a person is intermediate members disposed in becoming order; and said to stand on account of his being upright; and Gre- this is not the case if he lie down, sit, or recline, but only gory says (Moral. vii, 17): “To fall by speaking harm- when he stands upright: nor again is he said to stand, if ful words is to forfeit entirely the state of righteousness.” he move, but only when he is still. Hence it is again that But a man acquires spiritual uprightness by submitting his even in human acts, a matter is said to have stability [sta- will to God; wherefore a gloss on Ps. 32:1, “Praise be- tum] in reference to its own disposition in the point of cometh the upright,” says: “The upright are those who a certain immobility or restfulness. Consequently mat- direct their heart according to God’s will.” Therefore it ters which easily change and are extrinsic to them do not would seem that obedience to the Divine commandments constitute a state among men, for instance that a man be suffices alone for the notion of a state. rich or poor, of high or low rank, and so forth. Where- Objection 2. Further, the word “state” seems to de- fore in the civil law∗ (Lib. Cassius ff. De Senatoribus) note immobility according to 1 Cor. 15:48, “Be ye stead- it is said that if a man be removed from the senate, he is fast [stabiles] and immovable”; wherefore Gregory says deprived of his dignity rather than of his state. But that (Hom. xxi in Ezech.): “The stone is foursquare, and is alone seemingly pertains to a man’s state, which regards stable on all sides, if no disturbance will make it fall.” an obligation binding his person, in so far, to wit, as a man Now it is virtue that enables us “to act with immobility,” is his own master or subject to another, not indeed from according to Ethic. ii, 4. Therefore it would seem that a any slight or unstable cause, but from one that is firmly state is acquired by every virtuous action. established; and this is something pertaining to the nature Objection 3. Further, the word “state” seems to in- of freedom or servitude. Therefore state properly regards dicate height of a kind; because to stand is to be raised freedom or servitude whether in spiritual or in civil mat- upwards. Now one man is made higher than another by ters. various duties; and in like manner men are raised upwards Reply to Objection 1. Uprightness as such does not in various ways by various grades and orders. Therefore pertain to the notion of state, except in so far as it is con- the mere difference of grades, orders, or duties suffices for natural to man with the addition of a certain restfulness. a difference of states. Hence other animals are said to stand without its being re- On the contrary, It is thus laid down in the Decretals quired that they should be upright; nor again are men said (II, qu. vi, can. Si Quando): “Whenever anyone intervene to stand, however upright their position be, unless they be in a cause where life or state is at stake he must do so, still. not by a proxy, but in his own person”; and “state” here Reply to Objection 2. Immobility does not suffice for has reference to freedom or servitude. Therefore it would the notion of state; since even one who sits or lies down is seem that nothing differentiates a man’s state, except that still, and yet he is not said to stand. which refers to freedom or servitude. Reply to Objection 3. Duty implies relation to act; I answer that, “State,” properly speaking, denotes a while grades denote an order of superiority and inferior- kind of position, whereby a thing is disposed with a cer- ity. But state requires immobility in that which regards a tain immobility in a manner according with its nature. For condition of the person himself. ∗ Dig. I, IX, De Senatoribus 2010 Whether there should be different duties or states in the Church? IIa IIae q. 183 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that there should not be 12:4,5), “As in one body we have many members, but all different duties or states in the Church. For distinction is the members have not the same office, so we being many opposed to unity. Now the faithful of Christ are called to are one body in Christ.” Thirdly, this belongs to the dig- unity according to Jn. 17:21,22: “That they. . . may be one nity and beauty of the Church, which consist in a certain in Us. . . as We also are one.” Therefore there should not order; wherefore it is written (3 Kings 10:4,5) that “when be a distinction of duties and states in the Church. the queen of Saba saw all the wisdom of Solomon. . . and Objection 2. Further, nature does not employ many the apartments of his servants, and the order of his min- means where one suffices. But the working of grace is isters. . . she had no longer any spirit in her.” Hence the much more orderly than the working of nature. Therefore Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:20) that “in a great house there are it were more fitting for things pertaining to the operations not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of grace to be administered by the same persons, so that of earth.” there would not be a distinction of duties and states in the Reply to Objection 1. The distinction of states and Church. duties is not an obstacle to the unity of the Church, for Objection 3. Further, the good of the Church seem- this results from the unity of faith, charity, and mutual ser- ingly consists chiefly in peace, according to Ps. 147:3, vice, according to the saying of the Apostle (Eph. 4:16): “Who hath placed peace in thy borders,” and 2 Cor. 13:11, “From whom the whole body being compacted,” namely “Have peace, and the God of peace. . . shall be with you.” by faith, “and fitly joined together,” namely by charity, Now distinction is a hindrance to peace, for peace would “by what every joint supplieth,” namely by one man serv- seem to result from likeness, according to Ecclus. 13:19, ing another. “Every beast loveth its like,” while the Philosopher says Reply to Objection 2. Just as nature does not employ (Polit. vii, 5) that “a little difference causes dissension in many means where one suffices, so neither does it con- a state.” Therefore it would seem that there ought not to fine itself to one where many are required, according to be a distinction of states and duties in the Church. the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:17), “If the whole On the contrary, It is written in praise of the Church body were the eye, where would be the hearing?” Hence (Ps. 44:10) that she is “surrounded with variety”: and a there was need in the Church, which is Christ’s body, for gloss on these words says that “the Queen,” namely the the members to be differentiated by various duties, states, Church, “is bedecked with the teaching of the apostles, and grades. the confession of martyrs, the purity of virgins, the sor- Reply to Objection 3. Just as in the natural body the rowings of penitents.” various members are held together in unity by the power I answer that, The difference of states and duties in of the quickening spirit, and are dissociated from one an- the Church regards three things. In the first place it re- other as soon as that spirit departs, so too in the Church’s gards the perfection of the Church. For even as in the body the peace of the various members is preserved by order of natural things, perfection, which in God is sim- the power of the Holy Spirit, Who quickens the body of ple and uniform, is not to be found in the created uni- the Church, as stated in Jn. 6:64. Hence the Apostle says verse except in a multiform and manifold manner, so too, (Eph. 4:3): “Careful to keep the unity of the Spirit in the the fulness of grace, which is centered in Christ as head, bond of peace.” Now a man departs from this unity of flows forth to His members in various ways, for the per- spirit when he seeks his own; just as in an earthly king- fecting of the body of the Church. This is the meaning dom peace ceases when the citizens seek each man his of the Apostle’s words (Eph. 4:11,12): “He gave some own. Besides, the peace both of mind and of an earthly apostles, and some prophets, and other some evangelists, commonwealth is the better preserved by a distinction of and other some pastors and doctors for the perfecting of duties and states, since thereby the greater number have the saints.” Secondly, it regards the need of those actions a share in public actions. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 which are necessary in the Church. For a diversity of ac- Cor. 12:24,25) that “God hath tempered [the body] to- tions requires a diversity of men appointed to them, in gether that there might be no schism in the body, but the order that all things may be accomplished without delay members might be mutually careful one for another.” or confusion; and this is indicated by the Apostle (Rom. 2011 Whether duties differ according to their actions? IIa IIae q. 183 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that duties do not differ appointed to various actions. A third distinction regards according to their actions. For there are infinite varieties the order of ecclesiastical beauty: and thus we distinguish of human acts both in spirituals and in temporals. Now various grades according as in the same state or duty one there can be no certain distinction among things that are person is above another. Hence according to a variant infinite in number. Therefore human duties cannot be dif- text∗ it is written (Ps. 47:4): “In her grades shall God ferentiated according to a difference of acts. be known.” Objection 2. Further, the active and the contemplative Reply to Objection 1. The material diversity of hu- life differ according to their acts, as stated above (q. 179, man acts is infinite. It is not thus that duties differ, but by a. 1). But the distinction of duties seems to be other than their formal diversity which results from diverse species the distinction of lives. Therefore duties do not differ ac- of acts, and in this way human acts are not infinite. cording to their acts. Reply to Objection 2. Life is predicated of a thing Objection 3. Further, even ecclesiastical orders, absolutely: wherefore diversity of acts which are becom- states, and grades seemingly differ according to their acts. ing to man considered in himself. But efficiency, whence If, then, duties differ according to their acts it would seem we have the word “office” (as stated above), denotes ac- that duties, grades, and states differ in the same way. Yet tion tending to something else according to Metaph. ix, this is not true, since they are divided into their respec- text. 16†. Hence offices differ properly in respect of acts tive parts in different ways. Therefore duties do not differ that are referred to other persons; thus a teacher is said to according to their acts. have an office, and so is a judge, and so forth. Wherefore On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that “of- Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that “to have an office is to be ficium [duty] takes its name from ‘efficere’ [to effect], as officious,” i.e. harmful “to no one, but to be useful to all.” though it were instead of ‘efficium,’ by the change of one Reply to Objection 3. Differences of state, offices letter for the sake of the sound.” But effecting pertains to and grades are taken from different things, as stated above action. Therefore duties differ according to their acts. (a. 1, ad 3). Yet these three things may concur in the same I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), difference subject: thus when a person is appointed to a higher ac- among the members of the Church is directed to three tion, he attains thereby both office and grade, and some- things: perfection, action, and beauty; and according to times, besides this, a state of perfection, on account of these three we may distinguish a threefold distinction the sublimity of the act, as in the case of a bishop. The among the faithful. One, with regard to perfection, and ecclesiastical orders are particularly distinct according to thus we have the difference of states, in reference to which divine offices. For Isidore says (Etym. vi): “There are some persons are more perfect than others. Another dis- various kinds of offices; but the foremost is that which tinction regards action and this is the distinction of duties: relates to sacred and Divine things.” for persons are said to have various duties when they are Whether the difference of states applies to those who are beginning, progressing, or IIa IIae q. 183 a. 4 perfect? Objection 1. It would seem that the difference of progress, and perfection seems to refer to “more” and states does not apply to those who are beginning, pro- “less,” and this seemingly implies the notion of grades. gressing, or perfect. For “diverse genera have diverse But the distinction of grades differs from that of states, species and differences”‡. Now this difference of begin- as we have said above (Aa. 2,3). Therefore state is unfit- ning, progress, and perfection is applied to the degrees tingly divided according to beginning, progress, and per- of charity, as stated above (q. 24, a. 9), where we were fection. treating of charity. Therefore it would seem that the dif- On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 11): ferences of states should not be assigned in this manner. “There are three states of the converted, the beginning, Objection 2. Further, as stated above (a. 1), state re- the middle, and the perfection”; and (Hom. xv in Ezech.): gards a condition of servitude or freedom, which appar- “Other is the beginning of virtue, other its progress, and ently has no connection with the aforesaid difference of other still its perfection.” beginning, progress, and perfection. Therefore it is unfit- I answer that, As stated above (a. 1) state regards ting to divide state in this way. freedom or servitude. Now in spiritual things there is Objection 3. Further, the distinction of beginning, a twofold servitude and a twofold freedom: for there is ∗ The Septuagint † Ed. Did. viii, 8 ‡ Aristotle, Categ. ii 2012 the servitude of sin and the servitude of justice; and there unto justice.” Now in every human effort we can distinis likewise a twofold freedom, from sin, and from jus- guish a beginning, a middle, and a term; and consequently tice, as appears from the words of the Apostle (Rom. the state of spiritual servitude and freedom is differenti- 6:20,22), “When you were the servants of sin, you were ated according to these things, namely, the beginning— free men to justice. . . but now being made free from sin,” to which pertains the state of beginners—the middle, to you are. . . “become servants to God.” which pertains the state of the proficient—and the term, Now the servitude of sin or justice consists in being to which belongs the state of the perfect. inclined to evil by a habit of sin, or inclined to good by Reply to Objection 1. Freedom from sin results from a habit of justice: and in like manner freedom from sin is charity which “is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy not to be overcome by the inclination to sin, and freedom Ghost, Who is given to us” (Rom. 5:5). Hence it is writ- from justice is not to be held back from evil for the love of ten (2 Cor. 3:17): “Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there justice. Nevertheless, since man, by his natural reason, is is liberty.” Wherefore the same division applies to charity inclined to justice, while sin is contrary to natural reason, as to the state of those who enjoy spiritual freedom. it follows that freedom from sin is true freedom which is Reply to Objection 2. Men are said to be beginners, united to the servitude of justice, since they both incline proficient, and perfect (so far as these terms indicate dif- man to that which is becoming to him. In like manner true ferent states), not in relation to any occupation whatever, servitude is the servitude of sin, which is connected with but in relation to such occupations as pertain to spiritual freedom from justice, because man is thereby hindered freedom or servitude, as stated above (a. 1). from attaining that which is proper to him. That a man be- Reply to Objection 3. As already observed (a. 3, ad come the servant of justice or sin results from his efforts, 3), nothing hinders grade and state from concurring in the as the Apostle declares (Rom. 6:16): “To whom you yield same subject. For even in earthly affairs those who are yourselves servants to obey, his servants you are whom free, not only belong to a different state from those who you obey, whether it be of sin unto death, or of obedience are in service, but are also of a different grade. 2013 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 184 Of the State of Perfection in General (In Eight Articles) We must now consider those things that pertain to the state of perfection whereto the other states are directed. For the consideration of offices in relation to other acts belongs to the legislator; and in relation to the sacred ministry it comes under the consideration of orders of which we shall treat in the Third Part∗. Concerning the state of the perfect, a three-fold consideration presents itself: (1) The state of perfection in general; (2) Things relating to the perfection of bishops; (3) Things relating to the perfection of religious. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether perfection bears any relation to charity? (2) Whether one can be perfect in this life? (3) Whether the perfection of this life consists chiefly in observing the counsels or the commandments? (4) Whether whoever is perfect is in the state of perfection? (5) Whether especially prelates and religious are in the state of perfection? (6) Whether all prelates are in the state of perfection? (7) Which is the more perfect, the episcopal or the religious state? (8) The comparison between religious and parish priests and archdeacons. Whether the perfection of the Christian life consists chiefly in charity? IIa IIae q. 184 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the perfection of the senses would seem to consist chiefly in their concurring Christian life does not consist chiefly in charity. For the together in the unity of truth, according to 1 Cor. 1:10, Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:20): “In malice be children, but “That you be perfect in the same mind [sensu], and in the in sense be perfect.” But charity regards not the senses but same judgment.” Now this is effected by charity which the affections. Therefore it would seem that the perfection operates consent in us men. Wherefore even the perfec- of the Christian life does not chiefly consist in charity. tion of the senses consists radically in the perfection of Objection 2. Further,‘it is written (Eph. 6:13): “Take charity. unto you the armor of God, that you may be able to resist Reply to Objection 2. A man may be said to be per- in the evil day, and to stand in all things perfect”; and the fect in two ways. First, simply: and this perfection regards text continues (Eph. 6:14,16), speaking of the armor of that which belongs to a thing’s nature, for instance an ani- God: “Stand therefore having your loins girt about with mal may be said to be perfect when it lacks nothing in the truth, and having on the breast-plate of justice. . . in all disposition of its members and in such things as are nec- things taking the shield of faith.” Therefore the perfec- essary for an animal’s life. Secondly, a thing is said to be tion of the Christian life consists not only in charity, but perfect relatively: and this perfection regards something also in other virtues. connected with the thing externally, such as whiteness or Objection 3. Further, virtues like other habits, are blackness or something of the kind. Now the Christian life specified by their acts. Now it is written (James 1:4) that consists chiefly in charity whereby the soul is united to “patience hath a perfect work.” Therefore seemingly the God; wherefore it is written (1 Jn. 3:14): “He that loveth state of perfection consists more specially in patience. not abideth in death.” Hence the perfection of the Chris- On the contrary, It is written (Col. 3:14): “Above all tian life consists simply in charity, but in the other virtues things have charity, which is the bond of perfection,” be- relatively. And since that which is simply, is paramount cause it binds, as it were, all the other virtues together in and greatest in comparison with other things, it follows perfect unity. that the perfection of charity is paramount in relation to I answer that, A thing is said to be perfect in so far the perfection that regards the other virtues. as it attains its proper end, which is the ultimate perfec- Reply to Objection 3. Patience is stated to have a per- tion thereof. Now it is charity that unites us to God, Who fect work in relation to charity, in so far as it is an effect is the last end of the human mind, since “he that abideth of the abundance of charity that a man bears hardships pa- in charity abideth in God, and God in him” (1 Jn. 4:16). tiently, according to Rom. 8:35, “Who. . . shall separate us Therefore the perfection of the Christian life consists rad- from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation? Or distress?” ically in charity. etc. Reply to Objection 1. The perfection of the human ∗ Suppl., q. 34 2014 Whether any one can be perfect in this life? IIa IIae q. 184 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that none can be perfect tine says (QQ. LXXXIII, qu. 36) that “carnal desire is the in this life. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10): “When bane of charity; to have no carnal desires is the perfec- that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall tion of charity.” Such perfection as this can be had in this be done away.” Now in this life that which is in part is life, and in two ways. First, by the removal from man’s not done away; for in this life faith and hope, which are in affections of all that is contrary to charity, such as mortal part, remain. Therefore none can be perfect in this life. sin; and there can be no charity apart from this perfec- Objection 2. Further, “The perfect is that which lacks tion, wherefore it is necessary for salvation. Secondly, nothing” (Phys. iii, 6). Now there is no one in this life by the removal from man’s affections not only of what- who lacks nothing; for it is written (James 3:2): “In many ever is contrary to charity, but also of whatever hinders things we all offend”; and (Ps. 138:16): “Thy eyes did the mind’s affections from tending wholly to God. Char- see my imperfect being.” Therefore none is perfect in this ity is possible apart from this perfection, for instance in life. those who are beginners and in those who are proficient. Objection 3. Further, the perfection of the Christian Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle is speaking there life, as stated (a. 1), relates to charity, which comprises of heavenly perfection which is not possible to those who the love of God and of our neighbor. Now, neither as to are on the way. the love of God can one have perfect charity in this life, Reply to Objection 2. Those who are perfect in this since according to Gregory (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) “the life are said to “offend in many things” with regard to ve- furnace of love which begins to burn here, will burn more nial sins, which result from the weakness of the present fiercely when we see Him Whom we love”; nor as to the life: and in this respect they have an “imperfect being” in love of our neighbor, since in this life we cannot love all comparison with the perfection of heaven. our neighbors actually, even though we love them habit- Reply to Objection 3. As the conditions of the ually; and habitual love is imperfect. Therefore it seems present life do not allow of a man always tending actu- that no one can be perfect in this life. ally to God, so neither does it allow of his tending actu- On the contrary, The Divine law does not prescribe ally to each individual neighbor; but it suffices for him to the impossible. Yet it prescribes perfection according to tend to all in common and collectively, and to each indi- Mat. 5:48, “Be you. . . perfect, as also your heavenly Fa- vidual habitually and according to the preparedness of his ther is perfect.” Therefore seemingly one can be perfect mind. Now in the love of our neighbor, as in the love of in this life. God we may observe a twofold perfection: one without I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the perfection which charity is impossible, and consisting in one’s hav- of the Christian life consists in charity. Now perfection ing in one’s affections nothing that is contrary to the love implies a certain universality because according to Phys. of one’s neighbor; and another without which it is possi- iii, 6, “the perfect is that which lacks nothing.” Hence we ble to have charity. The latter perfection may be consid- may consider a threefold perfection. One is absolute, and ered in three ways. First, as to the extent of love, through answers to a totality not only on the part of the lover, but a man loving not only his friends and acquaintances but also on the part of the object loved, so that God be loved also strangers and even his enemies, for as Augustine says as much as He is lovable. Such perfection as this is not (Enchiridion lxxiii) this is a mark of the perfect children possible to any creature, but is competent to God alone, in of God. Secondly, as to the intensity of love, which is Whom good is wholly and essentially. shown by the things which man despises for his neigh- Another perfection answers to an absolute totality on bor’s sake, through his despising not only external goods the part of the lover, so that the affective faculty always for the sake of his neighbor, but also bodily hardships and actually tends to God as much as it possibly can; and such even death, according to Jn. 15:13, “Greater love than this perfection as this is not possible so long as we are on the no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends.” way, but we shall have it in heaven. Thirdly, as to the effect of love, so that a man will sur- The third perfection answers to a totality neither on render not only temporal but also spiritual goods and even the part of the object served, nor on the part of the lover himself, for his neighbor’s sake, according to the words of as regards his always actually tending to God, but on the the Apostle (2 Cor. 12:15), “But I most gladly will spend part of the lover as regards the removal of obstacles to the and be spent myself for your souls.” movement of love towards God, in which sense Augus- 2015 Whether, in this life, perfection consists in the observance of the commandments or of IIa IIae q. 184 a. 3 the counsels? Objection 1. It would seem that, in this life, perfec- self most. The reason of this is that “the end of the com- tion consists in the observance not of the commandments mandment is charity,” according to the Apostle (1 Tim. but of the counsels. For our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): “If 1:5); and the end is not subject to a measure, but only such thou wilt be perfect, go sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] thou hast, things as are directed to the end, as the Philosopher ob- and give to the poor. . . and come, follow Me.” Now this is serves (Polit. i, 3); thus a physician does not measure the a counsel. Therefore perfection regards the counsels and amount of his healing, but how much medicine or diet he not the precepts. shall employ for the purpose of healing. Consequently it Objection 2. Further, all are bound to the observance is evident that perfection consists essentially in the obser- of the commandments, since this is necessary for salva- vance of the commandments; wherefore Augustine says tion. Therefore, if the perfection of the Christian life con- (De Perf. Justit. viii): “Why then should not this perfec- sists in observing the commandments, it follows that per- tion be prescribed to man, although no man has it in this fection is necessary for salvation, and that all are bound life?” thereto; and this is evidently false. Secondarily and instrumentally, however, perfection Objection 3. Further, the perfection of the Christian consists in the observance of the counsels, all of which, life is gauged according to charity, as stated above (a. 1). like the commandments, are directed to charity; yet not Now the perfection of charity, seemingly, does not consist in the same way. For the commandments, other than the in the observance of the commandments, since the per- precepts of charity, are directed to the removal of things fection of charity is preceded both by its increase and by contrary to charity, with which, namely, charity is incom- its beginning, as Augustine says (Super Canonic. Joan. patible, whereas the counsels are directed to the removal Tract. ix). But the beginning of charity cannot precede of things that hinder the act of charity, and yet are not the observance of the commandments, since according to contrary to charity, such as marriage, the occupation of Jn. 14:23, “If any one love Me, he will keep My word.” worldly business, and so forth. Hence Augustine says Therefore the perfection of life regards not the command- (Enchiridion cxxi): “Whatever things God commands, for ments but the counsels. instance, ‘Thou shalt not commit adultery,’ and whatever On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): “Thou shalt are not commanded, yet suggested by a special counsel, love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart,” and (Lev. for instance, ‘It is good for a man not to touch a woman,’ 19:18): “Thou shalt love thy neighbor [Vulg.: ‘friend’] as are then done aright when they are referred to the love thyself”; and these are the commandments of which our of God, and of our neighbor for God’s sake, both in this Lord said (Mat. 22:40): “On these two commandments world and in the world to come.” Hence it is that in the dependeth the whole law and the prophets.” Now the per- Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, cap. vii) the ab- fection of charity, in respect of which the Christian life bot Moses says: “Fastings, watchings, meditating on the is said to be perfect, consists in our loving God with our Scriptures, penury and loss of all one’s wealth, these are whole heart, and our neighbor as ourselves. Therefore it not perfection but means to perfection, since not in them would seem that perfection consists in the observance of does the school of perfection find its end, but through the precepts. them it achieves its end,” and he had already said that I answer that, Perfection is said to consist in a thing “we endeavor to ascend by these steps to the perfection in two ways: in one way, primarily and essentially; in of charity.” another, secondarily and accidentally. Primarily and es- Reply to Objection 1. In this saying of our Lord sentially the perfection of the Christian life consists in something is indicated as being the way to perfection by charity, principally as to the love of God, secondarily as the words, “Go, sell all thou hast, and give to the poor”; to the love of our neighbor, both of which are the matter and something else is added wherein perfection consists, of the chief commandments of the Divine law, as stated when He said, “And follow Me.” Hence Jerome in his above. Now the love of God and of our neighbor is not commentary on Mat. 19:27, says that “since it is not commanded according to a measure, so that what is in enough merely to leave, Peter added that which is perfect: excess of the measure be a matter of counsel. This is ev- ‘And have followed Thee’ ”; and Ambrose, commenting ident from the very form of the commandment, pointing, on Lk. 5:27, “Follow Me,” says: “He commands him to as it does, to perfection—for instance in the words, “Thou follow, not with steps of the body, but with devotion of the shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart”: since soul, which is the effect of charity.” Wherefore it is evi- “the whole” is the same as “the perfect,” according to the dent from the very way of speaking that the counsels are Philosopher (Phys. iii, 6), and in the words, “Thou shalt means of attaining to perfection, since it is thus expressed: love thy neighbor as thyself,” since every one loves him- “If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell,” etc., as though He said: 2016 “By so doing thou shalt accomplish this end.” the Divine love, which cannot be fulfilled so long as we Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Perf. are on the way, as stated above (a. 2), and it is evident that Justit. viii) “the perfection of charity is prescribed to man to fail from this is not to be a transgressor of the precept; in this life, because one runs not right unless one knows and in like manner one does not transgress the precept, if whither to run. And how shall we know this if no com- one does not attain to the intermediate degrees of perfec- mandment declares it to us?” And since that which is a tion, provided one attain to the lowest. matter of precept can be fulfilled variously, one does not Reply to Objection 3. Just as man has a certain per- break a commandment through not fulfilling it in the best fection of his nature as soon as he is born, which per- way, but it is enough to fulfil it in any way whatever. Now fection belongs to the very essence of his species, while the perfection of Divine love is a matter of precept for all there is another perfection which he acquires by growth, without exception, so that even the perfection of heaven so again there is a perfection of charity which belongs to is not excepted from this precept, as Augustine says (De the very essence of charity, namely that man love God Perf. Justit. viii∗), and one escapes transgressing the pre- above all things, and love nothing contrary to God, while cept, in whatever measure one attains to the perfection of there is another perfection of charity even in this life, Divine love. The lowest degree of Divine love is to love whereto a man attains by a kind of spiritual growth, for nothing more than God, or contrary to God, or equally instance when a man refrains even from lawful things, in with God, and whoever fails from this degree of perfec- order more freely to give himself to the service of God. tion nowise fulfils the precept. There is another degree of Whether whoever is perfect is in the state of perfection? IIa IIae q. 184 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that whoever is perfect is in two ways: first, with respect to his internal actions; sec- in the state of perfection. For, as stated above (a. 3, ad 3), ondly, with respect to his external actions. And since ac- just as bodily perfection is reached by bodily growth, so cording to 1 Kings 16:7, “man seeth those things that ap- spiritual perfection is acquired by spiritual growth. Now pear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart,” it follows that with after bodily growth one is said to have reached the state regard to man’s internal disposition we consider his spir- of perfect age. Therefore seemingly also after spiritual itual state in relation to the Divine judgment, while with growth, when one has already reached spiritual perfec- regard to his external actions we consider man’s spiritual tion, one is in the state of perfection. state in relation to the Church. It is in this latter sense Objection 2. Further, according to Phys. v, 2, move- that we are now speaking of states, namely in so far as ment “from one contrary to another” has the same aspect the Church derives a certain beauty from the variety of as “movement from less to more.” Now when a man is states†. changed from sin to grace, he is said to change his state, Now it must be observed, that so far as men are con- in so far as the state of sin differs from the state of grace. cerned, in order that any one attain to a state of freedom Therefore it would seem that in the same manner, when or servitude there is required first of all an obligation or one progresses from a lesser to a greater grace, so as to a release. For the mere fact of serving someone does not reach the perfect degree, one is in the state of perfection. make a man a slave, since even the free serve, according Objection 3. Further, a man acquires a state by being to Gal. 5:13, “By charity of the spirit serve one another”: freed from servitude. But one is freed from the servitude nor again does the mere fact of ceasing to serve make a of sin by charity, because “charity covereth all sins” (Prov. man free, as in the case of a runaway slave; but properly 10:12). Now one is said to be perfect on account of char- speaking a man is a slave if he be bound to serve, and a ity, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore, seemingly, whoever man is free if he be released from service. Secondly, it is has perfection, for this very reason has the state of perfec- required that the aforesaid obligation be imposed with a tion. certain solemnity; even as a certain solemnity is observed On the contrary, Some are in the state of perfection, in other matters which among men obtain a settlement in who are wholly lacking in charity and grace, for instance perpetuity. wicked bishops or religious. Therefore it would seem that Accordingly, properly speaking, one is said to be in on the other hand some have the perfection of life, who the state of perfection, not through having the act of per- nevertheless have not the state of perfection. fect love, but through binding himself in perpetuity and I answer that, As stated above (q. 183, a. 1), state with a certain solemnity to those things that pertain to properly regards a condition of freedom or servitude. Now perfection. Moreover it happens that some persons bind spiritual freedom or servitude may be considered in man themselves to that which they do not keep, and some ful- ∗ Cf. De Spir. et Lit. XXXVI † Cf. q. 183, a. 2 2017 fil that to which they have not bound themselves, as in relation to the Divine judgment. But as regards the dis-the case of the two sons (Mat. 21:28,30), one of whom tinctions of ecclesiastical states, a man does not reach the when his father said: “Work in my vineyard,” answered: state of perfection except by growth in respect of external “I will not,” and “afterwards. . . he went,” while the other actions. “answering said: I go. . . and he went not.” Wherefore Reply to Objection 2. This argument also regards the nothing hinders some from being perfect without being in interior state. Yet when a man passes from sin to grace, he the state of perfection, and some in the state of perfection passes from servitude to freedom; and this does not result without being perfect. from a mere progress in grace, except when a man binds Reply to Objection 1. By bodily growth a man pro- himself to things pertaining to grace. gresses in things pertaining to nature, wherefore he attains Reply to Objection 3. Again this argument considers to the state of nature; especially since “what is according the interior state. Nevertheless, although charity causes to nature is,” in a way, “unchangeable”∗, inasmuch as na- the change of condition from spiritual servitude to spiri- ture is determinate to one thing. In like manner by inward tual freedom, an increase of charity has not the same ef- spiritual growth a man reaches the state of perfection in fect. Whether religious and prelates are in the state of perfection? IIa IIae q. 184 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that prelates and religious religious and bishops. For religious bind themselves by are not in the state of perfection. For the state of perfection vow to refrain from worldly affairs, which they might law-differs from the state of the beginners and the proficient. fully use, in order more freely to give themselves to God, Now no class of men is specially assigned to the state of wherein consists the perfection of the present life. Hence the proficient or of the beginners. Therefore it would seem Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi), speaking of religious: that neither should any class of men be assigned to the “Some call them therapeutai,” i.e. servants, “on account state of perfection. of their rendering pure service and homage to God; oth- Objection 2. Further, the outward state should answer ers call them monachoi”†, “on account of the indivisible to the inward, else one is guilty of lying, “which consists and single-minded life which by their being wrapped in,” not only in false words, but also in deceitful deeds,” ac- i.e. contemplating, “indivisible things, unites them in a cording to Ambrose in one of his sermons (xxx de Tem- Godlike union and a perfection beloved of God”‡. More- pore). Now there are many prelates and religious who over, the obligation in both cases is undertaken with a cer- have not the inward perfection of charity. Therefore, if tain solemnity of profession and consecration; wherefore all religious and prelates are in the state of perfection, it Dionysius adds (Eccl. Hier. vi): “Hence the holy legis- would follow that all of them that are not perfect are in lation in bestowing perfect grace on them accords them a mortal sin, as deceivers and liars. hallowing invocation.” Objection 3. Further, as stated above (a. 1), perfec- In like manner bishops bind themselves to things per- tion is measured according to charity. Now the most per- taining to perfection when they take up the pastoral duty, fect charity would seem to be in the martyrs, according to which it belongs that a shepherd “lay down his life for to Jn. 15:13, “Greater love than this no man hath, that his sheep,” according to Jn. 10:15. Wherefore the Apos- a man lay down his life for his friends”: and a gloss on tle says (1 Tim. 6:12): “Thou. . . hast confessed a good Heb. 12:4, “For you have not yet resisted unto blood,” confession before many witnesses,” that is to say, “when says: “In this life no love is more perfect than that to he was ordained,” as a gloss says on this passage. Again, which the holy martyrs attained, who strove against sin a certain solemnity of consecration is employed together even unto blood.” Therefore it would seem that the state with the aforesaid profession, according to 2 Tim. 1:6: of perfection should be ascribed to the martyrs rather than “Stir up the grace of God which is in thee by the imposi- to religious and bishops. tion of my hands,” which the gloss ascribes to the grace On the contrary, Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) ascribes of the episcopate. And Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v) perfection to bishops as being perfecters, and (Eccl. Hier. that “when the high priest,” i.e. the bishop, “is ordained, vi) to religious (whom he calls monks or therapeutai, i.e. he receives on his head the most holy imposition of the servants of God) as being perfected. sacred oracles, whereby it is signified that he is a partici- I answer that, As stated above (a. 4), there is re- pator in the whole and entire hierarchical power, and that quired for the state of perfection a perpetual obligation not only is he the enlightener in all things pertaining to his to things pertaining to perfection, together with a certain holy discourses and actions, but that he also confers this solemnity. Now both these conditions are competent to on others.” ∗ Ethic. v, 7 † i.e. solitaries; whence the English word ‘monk’ ‡ Cf. q. 180, a. 6 2018 Reply to Objection 1. Beginning and increase are terwards (Phil. 3:15): “Let us therefore as many as are sought not for their own sake, but for the sake of perfec- perfect, be thus minded.” Hence a man who takes up the tion; hence it is only to the state of perfection that some state of perfection is not guilty of lying or deceit through are admitted under certain obligations and with solemnity. not being perfect, but through withdrawing his mind from Reply to Objection 2. Those who enter the state of the intention of reaching perfection. perfection do not profess to be perfect, but to tend to per- Reply to Objection 3. Martyrdom is the most perfect fection. Hence the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): “Not as act of charity. But an act of perfection does not suffice to though I had already attained, or were already perfect; but make the state of perfection, as stated above (a. 4). I follow after, if I may by any means apprehend”: and af- Whether all ecclesiastical prelates are in the state of perfection? IIa IIae q. 184 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that all ecclesiastical pertaining to perfection, except in so far as in the Western prelates are in a state of perfection. For Jerome com- Church the receiving of a sacred order includes the taking menting on Titus 1:5, “Ordain. . . in every city,” etc. says: of a vow of continence, which is one of the things pertain- “Formerly priest was the same as bishop,” and afterwards ing to perfection, as we shall state further on (q. 186, a. 4). he adds: “Just as priests know that by the custom of the Therefore it is clear that from the fact that a man receives Church they are subject to the one who is placed over a sacred order a man is not placed simply in the state of them, so too, bishops should recognize that, by custom perfection, although inward perfection is required in order rather than by the very ordinance of our Lord, they are that one exercise such acts worthily. above the priests, and are together the rightful governors In like manner, neither are they placed in the state of of the Church.” Now bishops are in the state of perfec- perfection on the part of the cure which they take upon tion. Therefore those priests also are who have the cure of themselves. For they are not bound by this very fact un- souls. der the obligation of a perpetual vow to retain the cure of Objection 2. Further, just as bishops together with souls; but they can surrender it—either by entering reli- their consecration receive the cure of souls, so also do gion, even without their bishop’s permission (cf. Decret. parish priests and archdeacons, of whom a gloss on Acts xix, qu. 2, can. Duae sunt)—or again an archdeacon may 6:3, “Brethren, look ye out. . . seven men of good rep- with his bishop’s permission resign his arch-deaconry or utation,” says: “The apostles decided here to appoint parish, and accept a simple prebend without cure, which throughout the Church seven deacons, who were to be of would be nowise lawful, if he were in the state of perfec- a higher degree, and as it were the supports of that which tion; for “no man putting his hand to the plough and look- is nearest to the altar.” Therefore it would seem that these ing back is fit for the kingdom of God” (Lk. 9:62). On also are in the state of perfection. the other hand bishops, since they are in the state of per- Objection 3. Further, just as bishops are bound to “lay fection, cannot abandon the episcopal cure, save by the down their life for their sheep,” so too are parish priests authority of the Sovereign Pontiff (to whom alone it be- and archdeacons. But this belongs to the perfection of longs also to dispense from perpetual vows), and this for charity, as stated above (a. 2, ad 3). Therefore it would certain causes, as we shall state further on (q. 185, a. 4). seem that parish priests and archdeacons also are in the Wherefore it is manifest that not all prelates are in the state of perfection. state of perfection, but only bishops. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v): Reply to Objection 1. We may speak of priest and “The order of pontiffs is consummative and perfecting, bishop in two ways. First, with regard to the name: and that of the priests is illuminative and light-giving, that of thus formerly bishops and priests were not distinct. For the ministers is cleansing and discretive.” Hence it is evi- bishops are so called “because they watch over others,” dent that perfection is ascribed to bishops only. as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei xix, 19); while the I answer that, In priests and deacons having cure of priests according to the Greek are “elders.”∗ Hence the souls two things may be considered, namely their order Apostle employs the term “priests” in reference to both, and their cure. Their order is directed to some act in the when he says (1 Tim. 5:17): “Let the priests that rule Divine offices. Wherefore it has been stated above (q. 183, well be esteemed worthy of double honor”; and again a. 3, ad 3) that the distinction of orders is comprised un- he uses the term “bishops” in the same way, wherefore der the distinction of offices. Hence by receiving a certain addressing the priests of the Church of Ephesus he says order a man receives the power of exercising certain sa- (Acts 20:28): “Take heed to yourselves” and “to the whole cred acts, but he is not bound on this account to things flock, wherein the Holy Ghost hath placed you bishops, to ∗ Referring to the Greek episkopos and presbyteros from which the English ‘bishop’ and ‘priest’ are derived. 2019 rule the church of God.” instruct the people”: and Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v) But as regards the thing signified by these terms, there that “just as we see the whole hierarchy culminating in was always a difference between them, even at the time Jesus, so each office culminates in its respective godlike of the apostles. This is clear on the authority of Diony- hierarch or bishop.” Also it is said (XVI, qu. i, can. Cunc- sius (Eccl. Hier. v), and of a gloss on Lk. 10:1, “After tis): “Priests and deacons must all take care not to do any- these things the Lord appointed,” etc. which says: “Just thing without their bishop’s permission.” Wherefore it is as the apostles were made bishops, so the seventy-two evident that they stand in relation to their bishop as war- disciples were made priests of the second order.” Subse- dens or mayors to the king; and for this reason, just as quently, however, in order to avoid schism, it became nec- in earthly governments the king alone receives a solemn essary to distinguish even the terms, by calling the higher blessing, while others are appointed by simple commis- ones bishops and the lower ones priests. But to assert that sion, so too in the Church the episcopal cure is conferred priests nowise differ from bishops is reckoned by Augus- with the solemnity of consecration, while the archdeacon tine among heretical doctrines (De Heres. liii), where he or parish priest receives his cure by simple appointment; says that the Arians maintained that “no distinction ex- although they are consecrated by receiving orders before isted between a priest and a bishop.” having a cure. Reply to Objection 2. Bishops have the chief cure Reply to Objection 3. As parish priests and archdea- of the sheep of their diocese, while parish priests and cons have not the chief cure, but a certain ministry as com- archdeacons exercise an inferior ministry under the bish- mitted to them by the bishop, so the pastoral office does ops. Hence a gloss on 1 Cor. 12:28, “to one, helps, to not belong to them in chief, nor are they bound to lay another, governments∗,” says: “Helps, namely assistants down their life for the sheep, except in so far as they have to those who are in authority,” as Titus was to the Apostle, a share in their cure. Hence we should say that they have or as archdeacons to the bishop; “governments, namely an office pertaining to perfection rather than that they at- persons of lesser authority, such as priests who have to tain the state of perfection. Whether the religious state is more perfect than that of prelates? IIa IIae q. 184 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the religious state the office of preaching, whereas Jeremias, who was fain is more perfect than that of prelates. For our Lord said to hold fast to the love of his Creator, exclaimed against (Mat. 19:21): “If thou wilt be perfect, go” and “sell” all being sent to preach.” Therefore it would seem that the [Vulg.: ‘what’] “thou hast, and give to the poor”; and re- religious state is more perfect than the episcopal state. ligious do this. But bishops are not bound to do so; for On the contrary, It is not lawful for anyone to pass it is said (XII, qu. i, can. Episcopi de rebus): “Bishops, from a more excellent to a less excellent state; for this if they wish, may bequeath to their heirs their personal or would be to look back‡. Yet a man may pass from the re- acquired property, and whatever belongs to them person- ligious to the episcopal state, for it is said (XVIII, qu. i, ally.” Therefore religious are in a more perfect state than can. Statutum) that “the holy ordination makes a monk to bishops. be a bishop.” Therefore the episcopal state is more perfect Objection 2. Further, perfection consists more espe- than the religious. cially in the love of God than in the love of our neigh- I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, bor. Now the religious state is directly ordered to the 16), “the agent is ever more excellent than the patient.” love of God, wherefore it takes its name from “service Now in the genus of perfection according to Dionysius and homage to God,” as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi);† (Eccl. Hier. v, vi), bishops are in the position of “per- whereas the bishop’s state would seem to be ordered to the fecters,” whereas religious are in the position of being love of our neighbor, of whose cure he is the “warden,” “perfected”; the former of which pertains to action, and and from this he takes his name, as Augustine observes the latter to passion. Whence it is evident that the state of (De Civ. Dei. xix, 19). Therefore it would seem that the perfection is more excellent in bishops than in religious. religious state is more perfect than that of bishops. Reply to Objection 1. Renunciation of one’s pos- Objection 3. Further, the religious state is directed to sessions may be considered in two ways. First, as be-the contemplative life, which is more excellent than the ing actual: and thus it is not essential, but a means, to active life to which the episcopal state is directed. For perfection, as stated above (a. 3). Hence nothing hinders Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7) that “Isaias wishing to be of the state of perfection from being without renunciation of profit to his neighbor by means of the active life desired one’s possessions, and the same applies to other outward ∗ Vulg.: ‘God hath set some in the church. . . helps, governments,’ etc. † Quoted above a. 5 ‡ Cf. Lk. 9:62 2020 practices. Secondly, it may be considered in relation to asked Peter first of all whether he loved Him, and after-one’s preparedness, in the sense of being prepared to re- wards committed the care of His flock to him. And Gre- nounce or give away all: and this belongs directly to per- gory says (Pastor. i, 5): “If the pastoral care is a proof of fection. Hence Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii, qu. love, he who refuses to feed God’s flock, though having 11): “Our Lord shows that the children of wisdom un- the means to do so, is convicted of not loving the supreme derstand righteousness to consist neither in eating nor in Pastor.” And it is a sign of greater love if a man devotes abstaining, but in bearing want patiently.” Wherefore the himself to others for his friend’s sake, than if he be willing Apostle says (Phil. 4:12): “I know. . . both to abound and only to serve his friend. to suffer need.” Now bishops especially are bound to de- Reply to Objection 3. As Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 1), spise all things for the honor of God and the spiritual wel- “a prelate should be foremost in action, and more uplifted fare of their flock, when it is necessary for them to do so, than others in contemplation,” because it is incumbent on either by giving to the poor of their flock, or by suffering him to contemplate, not only for his own sake, but also for “with joy the being stripped of” their “own goods”§. the purpose of instructing others. Hence Gregory applies Reply to Objection 2. That bishops are busy about (Hom. v in Ezech.) the words of Ps. 144:7, “They shall things pertaining to the love of their neighbor, arises out publish the memory. . . of Thy sweetness,” to perfect men of the abundance of their love of God. Hence our Lord returning after their contemplation. Whether parish priests and archdeacons are more perfect than religious? IIa IIae q. 184 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that also parish priests become worse thereby,” namely by leaving the monastic and archdeacons are more perfect than religious. For state. Therefore it would seem that those who are in the Chrysostom says in his Dialogue (De Sacerdot. vi): “Take clerical state are more perfect than religious. for example a monk, such as Elias, if I may exaggerate Objection 4. Further, it is not lawful to pass from a somewhat, he is not to be compared with one who, cast more perfect to a less perfect state. Yet it is lawful to pass among the people and compelled to carry the sins of many, from the monastic state to a priestly office with a cure at- remains firm and strong.” A little further on he says: “If tached, as appears (XVI, qu. i, can. Si quis monachus) I were given the choice, where would I prefer to please, from a decree of Pope Gelasius, who says: “If there be in the priestly office, or in the monastic solitude, without a monk, who by the merit of his exemplary life is wor- hesitation I should choose the former.” Again in the same thy of the priesthood, and the abbot under whose author- book (ch. 5) he says: “If you compare the toils of this ity he fights for Christ his King, ask that he be made a project, namely of the monastic life, with a well-employed priest, the bishop shall take him and ordain him in such priesthood, you will find them as far distant from one an- place as he shall choose fitting.” And Jerome says (Ad other as a common citizen is from a king.” Therefore it Rustic. Monach., Ep. cxxv): “In the monastery so live would seem that priests who have the cure of souls are as to deserve to be a clerk.” Therefore parish priests and more perfect than religious. archdeacons are more perfect than religious. Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (ad Valerium, Objection 5. Further, bishops are in a more perfect Ep. xxi): “Let thy religious prudence observe that in state than religious, as shown above (a. 7). But parish this life, and especially at these times, there is nothing priests and archdeacons. through having cure of souls, are so difficult, so onerous, so perilous as the office of bishop, more like bishops than religious are. Therefore they are priest, or deacon; while in God’s sight there is no greater more perfect. blessing, if one engage in the fight as ordered by our Objection 6. Further, virtue “is concerned with the Commander-in-chief.” Therefore religious are not more difficult and the good” (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is more dif- perfect than priests or deacons. ficult to lead a good life in the office of parish priest or Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Ep. lx, ad archdeacon than in the religious state. Therefore parish Aurel.): “It would be most regrettable, were we to exalt priests and archdeacons have more perfect virtue than re- monks to such a disastrous degree of pride, and deem the ligious. clergy deserving of such a grievous insult,” as to assert On the contrary, It is stated (XIX, qu. ii, cap. Duce): that ‘a bad monk is a good clerk,’ “since sometimes even “If a man while governing the people in his church un- a good monk makes a bad clerk.” And a little before this der the bishop and leading a secular life is inspired by he says that “God’s servants,” i.e. monks, “must not be the Holy Ghost to desire to work out his salvation in a allowed to think that they may easily be chosen for some- monastery or under some canonical rule, since he is led thing better,” namely the clerical state, “if they should by a private law, there is no reason why he should be con- § Heb. 10:34 2021 strained by a public law.” Now a man is not led by the law of the strictness of religious observance. If, however, the of the Holy Ghost, which is here called a “private law,” ex- religious is also without orders, as in the case of religious cept to something more perfect. Therefore it would seem lay brethren, then it is evident that the pre-eminence of that religious are more perfect than archdeacons or parish order excels in the point of dignity, since by holy orders priests. a man is appointed to the most august ministry of serv- I answer that, When we compare things in the point ing Christ Himself in the sacrament of the altar. For this of super-eminence, we look not at that in which they requires a greater inward holiness than that which is req- agree, but at that wherein they differ. Now in parish priests uisite for the religious state, since as Dionysius says (Eccl. and archdeacons three things may be considered, their Hier. vi) the monastic order must follow the priestly or- state, their order, and their office. It belongs to their state ders, and ascend to Divine things in imitation of them. that they are seculars, to their order that they are priests Hence, other things being equal, a cleric who is in holy or deacons, to their office that they have the cure of souls orders, sins more grievously if he do something contrary committed to them. to holiness than a religious who is not in holy orders: al- Accordingly, if we compare these with one who is a though a religious who is not in orders is bound to regular religious by state, a deacon or priest by order, having the observance to which persons in holy orders are not bound. cure of souls by office, as many monks and canons regu- Reply to Objection 1. We might answer briefly these lar have, this one will excel in the first point, and in the quotations from Chrysostom by saying that he speaks not other points he will be equal. But if the latter differ from of a priest of lesser order who has the cure of souls, but the former in state and office, but agree in order, such as of a bishop, who is called a high-priest; and this agrees religious priests and deacons not having the cure of souls, with the purpose of that book wherein he consoles him- it is evident that the latter will be more excellent than the self and Basil in that they were chosen to be bishops. We former in state, less excellent in office, and equal in order. may, however, pass this over and reply that he speaks in We must therefore consider which is the greater, pre- view of the difficulty. For he had already said: “When eminence of state or of office; and here, seemingly, we the pilot is surrounded by the stormy sea and is able to should take note of two things, goodness and difficulty. bring the ship safely out of the tempest, then he deserves Accordingly, if we make the comparison with a view to be acknowledged by all as a perfect pilot”; and after- to goodness, the religious state surpasses the office of wards he concludes, as quoted, with regard to the monk, parish priest or archdeacon, because a religious pledges “who is not to be compared with one who, cast among the his whole life to the quest of perfection, whereas the people. . . remains firm”; and he gives the reason why, be- parish priest or archdeacon does not pledge his whole cause “both in the calm end in the storm he piloted himself life to the cure of souls, as a bishop does, nor is it com- to safety.” This proves nothing more than that the state of petent to him, as it is to a bishop, to exercise the cure one who has the cure of souls is fraught with more dan- of souls in chief, but only in certain particulars regard- ger than the monastic state; and to keep oneself innocent ing the cure of souls committed to his charge, as stated in face of a greater peril is proof of greater virtue. on the above (a. 6, ad 2). Wherefore the comparison of their re- other hand, it also indicates greatness of virtue if a man ligious state with their office is like the comparisons of avoid dangers by entering religion; hence he does not say the universal with the particular, and of a holocaust with a that “he would prefer the priestly office to the monastic sacrifice which is less than a holocaust according to Gre- solitude,” but that “he would rather please” in the former gory (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Hence it is said (XIX, qu. i, than in the latter, since this is a proof of greater virtue. can. Clerici qui monachorum.): “Clerics who wish to take Reply to Objection 2. This passage quoted from Au- the monastic vows through being desirous of a better life gustine also clearly refers to the question of difficulty must be allowed by their bishops the free entrance into the which proves the greatness of virtue in those who lead monastery.” a good life, as stated above (ad 1). This comparison, however, must be considered as re- Reply to Objection 3. Augustine there compares garding the genus of the deed; for as regards the charity of monks with clerics as regards the pre-eminence of order, the doer it happens sometimes that a deed which is of less not as regards the distinction between religious and secu- account in its genus is of greater merit if it be done out of lar life. greater charity. Reply to Objection 4. Those who are taken from the On the other hand, if we consider the difficulty of lead- religious state to receive the cure of souls, being already ing a good life in religion, and in the office of one having in sacred orders, attain to something they had not hith- the cure of souls, in this way it is more difficult to lead a erto, namely the office of the cure, yet they do not put good life together with the exercise of the cure of souls, on aside what they had already. For it is said in the Decretals account of outward dangers: although the religious life is (XVI, qu. i, can. De Monachis): “With regard to those more difficult as regards the genus of the deed, by reason monks who after long residence in a monastery attain to 2022 the order of clerics, we bid them not to lay aside their for-Reply to Objection 6. The difficulty that arises from mer purpose.” the arduousness of the deed adds to the perfection of On the other hand, parish priests and archdeacons, virtue; but the difficulty that results from outward obsta- when they enter religion, resign their cure, in order to en- cles sometimes lessens the perfection of virtue—for in- ter the state of perfection. This very fact shows the excel- stance, when a man loves not virtue so much as to wish to lence of the religious life. When religious who are not in avoid the obstacles to virtue, according to the saying of the orders are admitted to the clerical state and to the sacred Apostle (1 Cor. 9:25), “Everyone that striveth for the mas- orders, they are clearly promoted to something better, as tery refraineth himself from all things”: and sometimes it stated: this is indicated by the very way in which Jerome is a sign of perfect virtue—for instance, when a man for- expresses himself: “So live in the monastery as to deserve sakes not virtue, although he is hindered in the practice to be a clerk.” of virtue unawares or by some unavoidable cause. In the Reply to Objection 5. Parish priests and archdeacons religious state there is greater difficulty arising from the are more like bishops than religious are, in a certain re- arduousness of deeds; whereas for those who in any way spect, namely as regards the cure of souls which they have at all live in the world, there is greater difficulty resulting subordinately; but as regards the obligation in perpetuity, from obstacles to virtue, which obstacles the religious has religious are more like a bishop, as appears from what we had the foresight to avoid. have said above (Aa. 5,6). 2023 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 185 Of Things Pertaining to the Episcopal State (In Eight Articles) We must now consider things pertaining to the episcopal state. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is lawful to desire the office of a bishop? (2) Whether it is lawful to refuse the office of bishop definitively? (3) Whether the better man should be chosen for the episcopal office? (4) Whether a bishop may pass over to the religious state? (5) Whether he may lawfully abandon his subjects in a bodily manner? (6) Whether he can have anything of his own? (7) Whether he sins mortally by not distributing ecclesiastical goods to the poor? (8) Whether religious who are appointed to the episcopal office are bound to religious observances? Whether it is lawful to desire the office of a bishop? IIa IIae q. 185 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it is lawful to desire above others, according to Mat. 24:45, “A faithful and a the office of a bishop. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:1): wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his fam- “He that desires [Vulg.: ‘If a man desire’] the office of a ily.” The third is something resulting from these, namely bishop, he desireth a good work.” Now it is lawful and reverence, honor, and a sufficiency of temporalities, ac- praiseworthy to desire a good work. Therefore it is even cording to 1 Tim. 5:17, “Let the priests that rule well be praiseworthy to desire the office of a bishop. esteemed worthy of double honor.” Accordingly, to desire Objection 2. Further, the episcopal state is more per- the episcopal office on account of these incidental goods fect than the religious, as we have said above (q. 184, a. 7). is manifestly unlawful, and pertains to covetousness or But it is praiseworthy to desire to enter the religious state. ambition. Wherefore our Lord said against the Pharisees Therefore it is also praiseworthy to desire promotion to (Mat. 23:6,7): “They love the first places at feasts, and the episcopal state. the first chairs in the synagogues, and salutations in the Objection 3. Further, it is written (Prov. 11:26): “He market-place, and to be called by men, Rabbi.” As re- that hideth up corn shall be cursed among the people; but gards the second, namely the height of degree, it is pre- a blessing upon the head of them that sell.” Now a man sumptuous to desire the episcopal office. Hence our Lord who is apt, both in manner of life and by knowledge, for reproved His disciples for seeking precedence, by saying the episcopal office, would seem to hide up the spiritual to them (Mat. 20:25): “You know that the princes of the corn, if he shun the episcopal state, whereas by accepting gentiles lord it over them.” Here Chrysostom says (Hom. the episcopal office he enters the state of a dispenser of lxv in Matth.) that in these words “He points out that it spiritual corn. Therefore it would seem praiseworthy to is heathenish to seek precedence; and thus by comparing desire the office of a bishop, and blameworthy to refuse it. them to the gentiles He converted their impetuous soul.” Objection 4. Further, the deeds of the saints related On the other hand, to desire to do good to one’s neigh- in Holy Writ are set before us as an example, according to bor is in itself praiseworthy, and virtuous. Nevertheless, Rom. 15:4, “What things soever were written, were writ- since considered as an episcopal act it has the height of ten for our learning.” Now we read (Is. 6:8) that Isaias degree attached to it, it would seem that, unless there be offered himself for the office of preacher, which belongs manifest and urgent reason for it, it would be presumptu- chiefly to bishops. Therefore it would seem praiseworthy ous for any man to desire to be set over others in order to desire the office of a bishop. to do them good. Thus Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8) that On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, “it was praiseworthy to seek the office of a bishop when 19): “The higher place, without which the people cannot it was certain to bring one into graver dangers.” Where- be ruled, though it be filled becomingly, is unbecomingly fore it was not easy to find a person to accept this bur- desired.” den, especially seeing that it is through the zeal of charity I answer that, Three things may be considered in the that one divinely instigated to do so, according to Gre- episcopal office. One is principal and final, namely the gory, who says (Pastor. i, 7) that “Isaias being desirous of bishop’s work, whereby the good of our neighbor is in- profiting his neighbor, commendably desired the office of tended, according to Jn. 21:17, “Feed My sheep.” An- preacher.” other thing is the height of degree, for a bishop is placed Nevertheless, anyone may, without presumption, de- 2024 sire to do such like works if he should happen to be in that tend to perfection. Secondly, because he who enters the office, or to be worthy of doing them; so that the object religious state subjects himself to others for the sake of a of his desire is the good work and not the precedence in spiritual profit, and anyone may lawfully do this. Where- dignity. Hence Chrysostom∗ says: “It is indeed good to fore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): “No man is desire a good work, but to desire the primacy of honor is debarred from striving for the knowledge of truth, since vanity. For primacy seeks one that shuns it, and abhors this pertains to a praiseworthy ease.” On the other hand, one that desires it.” he who enters the episcopal state is raised up in order to Reply to Objection 1. As Gregory says (Pastor. i, watch over others, and no man should seek to be raised 8), “when the Apostle said this he who was set over the thus, according to Heb. 5:4, “Neither doth any man take people was the first to be dragged to the torments of mar- the honor to himself, but he that is called by God”: and tyrdom,” so that there was nothing to be desired in the Chrysostom says: “To desire supremacy in the Church is episcopal office, save the good work. Wherefore Augus- neither just nor useful. For what wise man seeks of his tine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that when the Apostle own accord to submit to such servitude and peril, as to said, “ ‘Whoever desireth the office of bishop, desireth a have to render an account of the whole Church? None good work,’ he wished to explain what the episcopacy save him who fears not God’s judgment, and makes a sec- is: for it denotes work and not honor: since skopos sig-ular abuse of his ecclesiastical authority, by turning it to nifies ‘watching.’ Wherefore if we like we may render secular uses.” episkopein by the Latin ‘superintendere’ [to watch over]: Reply to Objection 3. The dispensing of spiritual thus a man may know himself to be no bishop if he loves corn is not to be carried on in an arbitrary fashion, but to precede rather than to profit others.” For, as he observed chiefly according to the appointment and disposition of shortly before, “in our actions we should seek, not honor God, and in the second place according to the appoint- nor power in this life, since all things beneath the sun are ment of the higher prelates, in whose person it is said (1 vanity, but the work itself which that honor or power en- Cor. 4:1): “Let a man so account of us as of the ministers ables us to do.” Nevertheless, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God.” 8), “while praising the desire” (namely of the good work) Wherefore a man is not deemed to hide spiritual corn if “he forthwith turns this object of praise into one of fear, he avoids governing or correcting others, and is not com- when he adds: It behooveth. . . a bishop to be blameless,” petent to do so, neither in virtue of his office nor of his as though to say: “I praise what you seek, but learn first superior’s command; thus alone is he deemed to hide it, what it is you seek.” when he neglects to dispense it while under obligation to Reply to Objection 2. There is no parity between the do so in virtue of his office, or obstinately refuses to ac- religious and the episcopal state, for two reasons. First, cept the office when it is imposed on him. Hence Augus- because perfection of life is a prerequisite of the episco- tine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): “The love of truth seeks a pal state, as appears from our Lord asking Peter if he loved holy leisure, the demands of charity undertake an honest Him more than the others, before committing the pastoral labor. If no one imposes this burden upon us, we must de- office to him, whereas perfection is not a prerequisite of vote ourselves to the research and contemplation of truth, the religious state, since the latter is the way to perfection. but if it be imposed on us, we must bear it because charity Hence our Lord did not say (Mat. 19:21): “If thou art per- demands it of us.” fect, go, sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] thou hast,” but “If thou Reply to Objection 4. As Gregory says (Pastor. i, wilt be perfect.” The reason for this difference is because, 7), “Isaias, who wishing to be sent, knew himself to be al- according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. vi), perfection per- ready cleansed by the live coal taken from the altar, shows tains actively to the bishop, as the “perfecter,” but to the us that no one should dare uncleansed to approach the sa- monk passively as one who is “perfected”: and one needs cred ministry. Since, then, it is very difficult for anyone to to be perfect in order to bring others to perfection, but not be able to know that he is cleansed, it is safer to decline in order to be brought to perfection. Now it is presumptu- the office of preacher.” ous to think oneself perfect, but it is not presumptuous to Whether it is lawful for a man to refuse absolutely an appointment to the episcopate? IIa IIae q. 185 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that it is lawful to refuse fice of preaching, whereas Jeremias who was fain to hold absolutely an appointment to the episcopate. For as Gre- fast to the love of his Creator by contemplation exclaimed gory says (Pastor. i, 7), “Isaias wishing to be of profit to against being sent to preach.” Now no man sins by be- his neighbor by means of the active life, desired the of- ing unwilling to forgo better things in order to adhere to ∗ The quotation is from the Opus Imperfectum in Matth. (Hom. xxxv), falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom. 2025 things that are not so good. Since then the love of God of our neighbor, yet, on the other hand, the good of the surpasses the love of our neighbor, and the contemplative many should be preferred to the good of the individual. life is preferable to the active, as shown above (q. 25, a. 1; Wherefore Augustine says in the passage quoted above: q. 26, a. 2; q. 182, a. 1) it would seem that a man sins not “Nor prefer your own ease to the needs of the Church,” if he refuse absolutely the episcopal office. and all the more since it belongs to the love of God that a Objection 2. Further, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7), man undertake the pastoral care of Christ’s sheep. Hence “it is very difficult for anyone to be able to know that he Augustine, commenting on Jn. 21:17, “Feed My sheep,” is cleansed: nor should anyone uncleansed approach the says (Tract. cxxiii in Joan.): “Be it the task of love to feed sacred ministry.” Therefore if a man perceives that he is the Lord’s flock, even as it was the mark of fear to deny not cleansed, however urgently the episcopal office be en- the Shepherd.” joined him, he ought not to accept it. Moreover prelates are not transferred to the active life, Objection 3. Further, Jerome (Prologue, super Marc.) so as to forsake the contemplative; wherefore Augustine says that “it is related of the Blessed Mark∗ that after re- says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that “if the burden of the pas- ceiving the faith he cut off his thumb that he might be toral office be imposed, we must not abandon the delights excluded from the priesthood.” Likewise some take a vow of truth,” which are derived from contemplation. never to accept a bishopric. Now to place an obstacle to a Reply to Objection 2. No one is bound to obey his thing amounts to the same as refusing it altogether. There- superior by doing what is unlawful, as appears from what fore it would seem that one may, without sin, refuse the was said above concerning obedience (q. 104, a. 5). Ac- episcopal office absolutely. cordingly it may happen that he who is appointed to the On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. xlviii ad Eu- office of prelate perceive something in himself on account dox.): “If Mother Church requires your service, neither of which it is unlawful for him to accept a prelacy. But accept with greedy conceit, nor refuse with fawning indo- this obstacle may sometimes be removed by the very per- lence”; and afterwards he adds: “Nor prefer your ease to son who is appointed to the pastoral cure—for instance, if the needs of the Church: for if no good men were willing he have a purpose to sin, he may abandon it—and for this to assist her in her labor, you would seek in vain how we reason he is not excused from being bound to obey def- could be born of her.” initely the superior who has appointed him. Sometimes, I answer that, Two things have to be considered in the however, he is unable himself to remove the impediment acceptance of the episcopal office: first, what a man may that makes the pastoral office unlawful to him, yet the fittingly desire according to his own will; secondly, what prelate who appoints him can do so—for instance, if he it behooves a man to do according to the will of another. be irregular or excommunicate. In such a case he ought to As regards his own will it becomes a man to look chiefly make known his defect to the prelate who has appointed to his own spiritual welfare, whereas that he look to the him; and if the latter be willing to remove the impediment, spiritual welfare of others becomes a man according to the he is bound humbly to obey. Hence when Moses had said appointment of another having authority, as stated above (Ex. 4:10): “I beseech thee, Lord, I am not eloquent from (a. 1, ad 3). Hence just as it is a mark of an inordinate yesterday, and the day before,” the Lord answered (Ex. will that a man of his own choice incline to be appointed 4:12): “I will be in thy mouth, and I will teach thee what to the government of others, so too it indicates an inordi- thou shalt speak.” At other times the impediment cannot nate will if a man definitively refuse the aforesaid office be removed, neither by the person appointing nor by the of government in direct opposition to the appointment of one appointed—for instance, if an archbishop be unable his superior: and this for two reasons. to dispense from an irregularity; wherefore a subject, if First, because this is contrary to the love of our neigh- irregular, would not be bound to obey him by accepting bor, for whose good a man should offer himself accord- the episcopate or even sacred orders. ing as place and time demand: hence Augustine says (De Reply to Objection 3. It is not in itself necessary for Civ. Dei xix, 19) that “the demands of charity undertake salvation to accept the episcopal office, but it becomes an honest labor.” Secondly, because this is contrary to necessary by reason of the superior’s command. Now one humility, whereby a man submits to his superior’s com- may lawfully place an obstacle to things thus necessary mands: hence Gregory says (Pastor. i, 6): “In God’s sight for salvation, before the command is given; else it would humility is genuine when it does not obstinately refuse to not be lawful to marry a second time, lest one should thus submit to what is usefully prescribed.” incur an impediment to the episcopate or holy orders. But Reply to Objection 1. Although simply and abso- this would not be lawful in things necessary for salvation. lutely speaking the contemplative life is more excellent Hence the Blessed Mark did not act against a precept by than the active, and the love of God better than the love cutting off his finger, although it is credible that he did ∗ This prologue was falsely ascribed to St. Jerome, and the passage quoted refers, not to St. Mark the Evangelist, but to a hermit of that name. (Cf. Baronius, Anno Christi, 45, num. XLIV) 2026 this by the instigation of the Holy Ghost, without which he intend to bind himself, so far as it lies with him, not it would be unlawful for anyone to lay hands on himself. to seek the episcopal office, nor to accept it except under If a man take a vow not to accept the bishop’s office, and urgent necessity, his vow is lawful, because he vows to do by this intend to bind himself not even to accept it in obe- what it becomes a man to do. dience to his superior prelate, his vow is unlawful; but if Whether he that is appointed to the episcopate ought to be better than others? IIa IIae q. 185 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that one who is appointed not to say worse than this, have succeeded by means of to the episcopate ought to be better than others. For our gifts in being made clerics.” Lord, when about to commit the pastoral office to Peter, Now this pertains to the respect of persons, which in asked him if he loved Him more than the others. Now a such matters is a grave sin. Wherefore a gloss of Augus- man is the better through loving God the more. Therefore tine† on James 2:1, “Brethren, have not. . . with respect of it would seem that one ought not to be appointed to the persons,” says: “If this distinction of sitting and standing episcopal office except he be better than others. be referred to ecclesiastical honors, we must not deem it Objection 2. Further, Pope Symmachus says (can. a slight sin to ‘have the faith of the Lord of glory with re- Vilissimus I, qu. 1): “A man is of very little worth who spect of persons.’ For who would suffer a rich man to be though excelling in dignity, excels not in knowledge and chosen for the Church’s seat of honor, in despite of a poor holiness.” Now he who excels in knowledge and holiness man who is better instructed and holier?” is better. Therefore a man ought not to be appointed to the On the part of the person appointed, it is not required episcopate unless he be better than others. that he esteem himself better than others, for this would Objection 3. Further, in every genus the lesser are be proud and presumptuous; but it suffices that he per- governed by the greater, as corporeal things are governed ceive nothing in himself which would make it unlawful by things spiritual, and the lower bodies by the higher, for him to take up the office of prelate. Hence although as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 3). Now a bishop is ap- Peter was asked by our Lord if he loved Him more than pointed to govern others. Therefore he should be better the others, he did not, in his reply, set himself before the than others. others, but answered simply that he loved Christ. On the contrary, The Decretal∗ says that “it suffices Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord knew that, by His to choose a good man, nor is it necessary to choose the own bestowal, Peter was in other respects fitted to gov- better man.” ern the Church: wherefore He questioned him about his I answer that, In designating a man for the episco- greater love, to show that when we find a man otherwise pal office, something has to be considered on the part of fitted for the government of the Church, we must look the person designate, and something on the part of the chiefly to his pre-eminence in the love of God. designator. For on the part of the designator, whether by Reply to Objection 2. This statement refers to the election or by appointment, it is required that he choose pursuits of the man who is placed in authority. For he such a one as will dispense the divine mysteries faithfully. should aim at showing himself to be more excellent than These should be dispensed for the good of the Church, others in both knowledge and holiness. Wherefore Gre- according to 1 Cor. 14:12, “Seek to abound unto the ed- gory says (Pastor. ii, 1) “the occupations of a prelate ought ifying of the Church”; and the divine mysteries are not to excel those of the people, as much as the shepherd’s life committed to men for their own meed, which they should excels that of his flock.” But he is not to be blamed and await in the life to come. Consequently he who has to looked upon as worthless if he excelled not before being choose or appoint one for a bishop is not bound to take raised to the prelacy. one who is best simply, i.e. according to charity, but one Reply to Objection 3. According to 1 Cor. 12:4 who is best for governing the Church, one namely who is seqq., “there are diversities of graces. . . and. . . of min- able to instruct, defend, and govern the Church peacefully. istries. . . and. . . of operations.” Hence nothing hinders one Hence Jerome, commenting on Titus 1:5, says against from being more fitted for the office of governing, who certain persons that “some seek to erect as pillars of the does not excel in the grace of holiness. It is otherwise Church, not those whom they know to be more useful to in the government of the natural order, where that which the Church, but those whom they love more, or those by is higher in the natural order is for that very reason more whose obsequiousness they have been cajoled or undone, fitted to dispose of those that are lower. or for whom some person in authority has spoken, and, ∗ Can. Cum dilectus, de Electione † Ep. clxvii ad Hieron. 2027 Whether a bishop may lawfully forsake the episcopal cure, in order to enter religion? IIa IIae q. 185 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that a bishop cannot lawfully ther of conscience (for instance if he be guilty of murder forsake his episcopal cure in order to enter religion. For or simony), or of body (for example if he be old or in- no one can lawfully pass from a more perfect to a less firm), or of irregularity arising, for instance, from bigamy. perfect state; since this is “to look back,” which is con- Sometimes he is hindered through some defect in his sub- demned by the words of our Lord (Lk. 9:62), “No man jects, whom he is unable to profit. Hence Gregory says putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for (Dial. ii, 3): “The wicked must be borne patiently, when the kingdom of God.” Now the episcopal state is more there are some good who can be succored, but when there perfect than the religious, as shown above (q. 184, a. 7). is no profit at all for the good, it is sometimes useless to la-Therefore just as it is unlawful to return to the world from bor for the wicked. Wherefore the perfect when they find the religious state, so is it unlawful to pass from the epis- that they labor in vain are often minded to go elsewhere in copal to the religious state. order to labor with fruit.” Sometimes again this hindrance Objection 2. Further, the order of grace is more con- arises on the part of others, as when scandal results from gruous than the order of nature. Now according to nature a certain person being in authority: for the Apostle says a thing is not moved in contrary directions; thus if a stone (1 Cor. 8:13): “If meat scandalize my brother, I will never be naturally moved downwards, it cannot naturally return eat flesh”: provided, however, the scandal is not caused upwards from below. But according to the order of grace it by the wickedness of persons desirous of subverting the is lawful to pass from the religious to the episcopal state. faith or the righteousness of the Church; because the pas- Therefore it is not lawful to pass contrariwise from the toral cure is not to be laid aside on account of scandal episcopal to the religious state. of this kind, according to Mat. 15:14, “Let them alone,” Objection 3. Further, in the works of grace nothing those namely who were scandalized at the truth of Christ’s should be inoperative. Now when once a man is conse- teaching, “they are blind, and leaders of the blind.” crated bishop he retains in perpetuity the spiritual power Nevertheless just as a man takes upon himself the of giving orders and doing like things that pertain to the charge of authority at the appointment of a higher supe- episcopal office: and this power would seemingly remain rior, so too it behooves him to be subject to the latter’s au- inoperative in one who gives up the episcopal cure. There- thority in laying aside the accepted charge for the reasons fore it would seem that a bishop may not forsake the epis- given above. Hence Innocent III says (Extra, de Renunt., copal cure and enter religion. cap. Nisi cum pridem): “Though thou hast wings where- On the contrary, No man is compelled to do what with thou art anxious to fly away into solitude, they are so is in itself unlawful. Now those who seek to resign their tied by the bonds of authority, that thou art not free to fly episcopal cure are compelled to resign (Extra, de Renunt. without our permission.” For the Pope alone can dispense cap. Quidam). Therefore apparently it is not unlawful to from the perpetual vow, by which a man binds himself to give up the episcopal cure. the care of his subjects, when he took upon himself the I answer that, The perfection of the episcopal state episcopal office. consists in this that for love of God a man binds himself Reply to Objection 1. The perfection of religious and to work for the salvation of his neighbor, wherefore he that of bishops are regarded from different standpoints. is bound to retain the pastoral cure so long as he is able For it belongs to the perfection of a religious to occupy to procure the spiritual welfare of the subjects entrusted oneself in working out one’s own salvation, whereas it to his care: a matter which he must not neglect—neither belongs to the perfection of a bishop to occupy oneself for the sake of the quiet of divine contemplation, since in working for the salvation of others. Hence so long as the Apostle, on account of the needs of his subjects, suf- a man can be useful to the salvation of his neighbor, he fered patiently to be delayed even from the contemplation would be going back, if he wished to pass to the religious of the life to come, according to Phil. 1:22-25, “What I state, to busy himself only with his own salvation, since shall choose I know not, but I am straitened between two, he has bound himself to work not only for his own but also having a desire to be dissolved, and to be with Christ, a for others’ salvation. Wherefore Innocent III says in the thing by far better. But to abide still in the flesh is needful Decretal quoted above that “it is more easily allowable for for you. And having this confidence, I know that I shall a monk to ascend to the episcopacy, than for a bishop to abide”; nor for the sake of avoiding any hardships or of ac- descend to the monastic life. If, however, he be unable to quiring any gain whatsoever, because as it is written (Jn. procure the salvation of others it is meet he should seek 10:11), “the good shepherd giveth his life for his sheep.” his own.” At times, however, it happens in several ways that a Reply to Objection 2. On account of no obstacle bishop is hindered from procuring the spiritual welfare of should a man forego the work of his own salvation, which his subjects. Sometimes on account of his own defect, ei- pertains to the religious state. But there may be an ob- 2028 stacle to the procuring of another’s salvation; wherefore fined in a monastery that he may do penance, he cannot a monk may be raised to the episcopal state wherein he be reappointed to a bishopric. Hence it is stated (VII, qu. is able also to work out his own salvation. And a bishop, i, can. Hoc nequaquam): “The holy synod orders that any if he be hindered from procuring the salvation of others, man who has been degraded from the episcopal dignity to may enter the religious life, and may return to his bish- the monastic life and a place of repentance, should by no opric should the obstacle cease, for instance by the cor- means rise again to the episcopate.” rection of his subjects, cessation of the scandal, healing Reply to Objection 3. Even in natural things power of his infirmity, removal of his ignorance by sufficient remains inactive on account of a supervening obstacle, for instruction. Again, if he owed his promotion to simony instance the act of sight ceases through an affliction of the of which he was in ignorance, and resigning his episco- eye. So neither is it unreasonable if, through the occur- pate entered the religious life, he can be reappointed to rence of some obstacle from without, the episcopal power another bishopric∗. On the other hand, if a man be de- remain without the exercise of its act. posed from the episcopal office for some sin, and con- Whether it is lawful for a bishop on account of bodily persecution to abandon the IIa IIae q. 185 a. 5 flock committed to his care? Objection 1. It would seem that it is unlawful for a I answer that, In any obligation the chief thing to be bishop, on account of some temporal persecution, to with- considered is the end of the obligation. Now bishops bind draw his bodily presence from the flock committed to his themselves to fulfil the pastoral office for the sake of the care. For our Lord said (Jn. 10:12) that he is a hireling salvation of their subjects. Consequently when the salva- and no true shepherd, who “seeth the wolf coming, and tion of his subjects demands the personal presence of the leaveth the sheep and flieth”: and Gregory says (Hom. pastor, the pastor should not withdraw his personal pres- xiv in Ev.) that “the wolf comes upon the sheep when any ence from his flock, neither for the sake of some temporal man by his injustice and robbery oppresses the faithful advantage, nor even on account of some impending dan- and the humble.” Therefore if, on account of the perse- ger to his person, since the good shepherd is bound to lay cution of a tyrant, a bishop withdraws his bodily presence down his life for his sheep. from the flock entrusted to his care, it would seem that he On the other hand, if the salvation of his subjects can is a hireling and not a shepherd. be sufficiently provided for by another person in the ab- Objection 2. Further, it is written (Prov. 6:1): “My sence of the pastor, it is lawful for the pastor to withdraw son, if thou be surety for thy friend, thou hast engaged his bodily presence from his flock, either for the sake of fast thy hand to a stranger,” and afterwards (Prov. 6:3): some advantage to the Church, or on account of some dan- “Run about, make haste, stir up thy friend.” Gregory ex- ger to his person. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ccxxviii ad pounds these words and says (Pastor. iii, 4): “To be surety Honorat.): “Christ’s servants may flee from one city to for a friend, is to vouch for his good conduct by engaging another, when one of them is specially sought out by per- oneself to a stranger. And whoever is put forward as an secutors: in order that the Church be not abandoned by example to the lives of others, is warned not only to watch others who are not so sought for. When, however, the but even to rouse his friend.” Now he cannot do this if same danger threatens all, those who stand in need of oth- he withdraw his bodily presence from his flock. There- ers must not be abandoned by those whom they need.” For fore it would seem that a bishop should not on account of “if it is dangerous for the helmsman to leave the ship when persecution withdraw his bodily presence from his flock. the sea is calm, how much more so when it is stormy,” as Objection 3. Further, it belongs to the perfection of Pope Nicholas I says (cf. VII, qu. i, can. Sciscitaris). the bishop’s state that he devote himself to the care of his Reply to Objection 1. To flee as a hireling is to prefer neighbor. Now it is unlawful for one who has professed temporal advantage or one’s bodily welfare to the spiritual the state of perfection to forsake altogether the things that welfare of one’s neighbor. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv pertain to perfection. Therefore it would seem unlawful in Ev.): “A man cannot endanger himself for the sake of for a bishop to withdraw his bodily presence from the ex- his sheep, if he uses his authority over them not through ecution of his office, except perhaps for the purpose of love of them but for the sake of earthly gain: wherefore devoting himself to works of perfection in a monastery. he fears to stand in the way of danger lest he lose what On the contrary, our Lord commanded the apostles, he loves.” But he who, in order to avoid danger, leaves whose successors bishops are (Mat. 10:23): “When they the flock without endangering the flock, does not flee as a shall persecute you in this city, flee into another.” hireling. ∗ Cap. Post translat., de Renunt. 2029 Reply to Objection 2. If he who is surety for another one kind of perfection; and if he be hindered from the be unable to fulfil his engagement, it suffices that he fulfil practice thereof, he is not bound to another kind of per- it through another. Hence if a superior is hindered from fection, so as to be obliged to enter the religious state. attending personally to the care of his subjects, he fulfils Yet he is under the obligation of retaining the intention his obligation if he do so through another. of devoting himself to his neighbor’s salvation, should an Reply to Objection 3. When a man is appointed to a opportunity offer, and necessity require it of him. bishopric, he embraces the state of perfection as regards Whether it is lawful for a bishop to have property of his own? IIa IIae q. 185 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not lawful for wilt be perfect go sell” all “that thou hast, and give to the a bishop to have property of his own. For our Lord said poor” (Mat. 19:17,21). Bishops, however, do not bind (Mat. 19:21): “If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all [Vulg.: themselves at their ordination to live without possessions ‘what] thou hast, and give to the poor. . . and come, fol- of their own; nor indeed does the pastoral office, to which low Me”; whence it would seem to follow that voluntary they bind themselves, make it necessary for them to live poverty is requisite for perfection. Now bishops are in the without anything of their own. Therefore bishops are not state of perfection. Therefore it would seem unlawful for bound to live without possessions of their own. them to possess anything as their own. Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 184, a. 3, Objection 2. Further, bishops take the place of the ad 1) the perfection of the Christian life does not essen- apostles in the Church, according to a gloss on Lk. 10:1. tially consist in voluntary poverty, but voluntary poverty Now our Lord commanded the apostles to possess noth- conduces instrumentally to the perfection of life. Hence it ing of their own, according to Mat. 10:9, “Do not possess does not follow that where there is greater poverty there is gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses”; wherefore Pe- greater perfection; indeed the highest perfection is com- ter said for himself and the other apostles (Mat. 19:27): patible with great wealth, since Abraham, to whom it was “Behold we have left all things and have followed Thee.” said (Gn. 17:1): “Walk before Me and be perfect,” is Therefore it would seem that bishops are bound to keep stated to have been rich (Gn. 13:2). this command, and to possess nothing of their own. Reply to Objection 2. This saying of our Lord can Objection 3. Further, Jerome says (Ep. lii ad Nepo- be understood in three ways. First, mystically, that we tian.): “The Greek kleros denotes the Latin ‘sors.’ Hence should possess neither gold nor silver means that the clerics are so called either because they are of the Lord’s preacher should not rely chiefly on temporal wisdom and estate, or because the Lord Himself is the estate, i.e. por- eloquence; thus Jerome expounds the passage. tion of clerics. Now he that possesses the Lord, can have Secondly, according to Augustine’s explanation (De nothing besides God; and if he have gold and silver, pos- Consens. Ev. ii, 30), we are to understand that our Lord sessions, and chattels of all kinds, with such a portion the said this not in command but in permission. For he per- Lord does not vouchsafe to be his portion also.” There- mitted them to go preaching without gold or silver or other fore it would seem that not only bishops but even clerics means, since they were to receive the means of livelihood should have nothing of their own. from those to whom they preached; wherefore He added: On the contrary, It is stated (XII, qu. i, can. Epis- “For the workman is worthy of his meat.” And yet if any- copi de rebus): “Bishops, if they wish, may bequeath to one were to use his own means in preaching the Gospel, their heirs their personal or acquired property, and what- this would be a work of supererogation, as Paul says in ever belongs to them personally.” reference to himself (1 Cor. 9:12,15). I answer that, No one is bound to works of su- Thirdly, according to the exposition of Chrysostom∗, pererogation, unless he binds himself specially thereto by we are to understand that our Lord laid these commands vow. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Paulin. et Ar- on His disciples in reference to the mission on which they ment.): “Since you have taken the vow, you have already were sent to preach to the Jews, so that they might be en- bound yourself, you can no longer do otherwise. Before couraged to trust in His power, seeing that He provided for you were bound by the vow, you were free to submit.” their wants without their having means of their own. But Now it is evident that to live without possessing anything it does not follow from this that they, or their successors, is a work of supererogation, for it is a matter not of pre- were obliged to preach the Gospel without having means cept but of counsel. Wherefore our Lord after saying to of their own: since we read of Paul (2 Cor. 11:8) that he the young man: “If thou wilt enter into life, keep the com- “received wages” of other churches for preaching to the mandments,” said afterwards by way of addition: “If thou Corinthians, wherefore it is clear that he possessed some- ∗ Hom. ii in Rom. xvi, 3 2030 thing sent to him by others. And it seems foolish to say with God, if he becomes less intent on things pertaining to that so many holy bishops as Athanasius, Ambrose, and God by occupying himself with things of the world. Now Augustine would have disobeyed these commandments if neither bishops nor clerics ought thus to possess means they believed themselves bound to observe them. of their own, that while busy with their own they neglect Reply to Objection 3. Every part is less than the those that concern the worship of God. whole. Accordingly a man has other portions together Whether bishops sin mortally if they distribute not to the poor the ecclesiastical goods IIa IIae q. 185 a. 7 which accrue to them? Objection 1. It would seem that bishops sin mor- goods; wherefore from the very nature of the case they tally if they distribute not to the poor the ecclesiastical are not bound to give these things to others, and may ei- goods which they acquire. For Ambrose∗ expounding Lk. ther keep them for themselves or bestow them on others 12:16, “The land of a certain. . . man brought forth plenty at will. Nevertheless they may sin in this disposal by in- of fruits,” says: “Let no man claim as his own that which ordinate affection, which leads them either to accumulate he has taken and obtained by violence from the common more than they should, or not to assist others, in accor- property in excess of his requirements”; and afterwards dance with the demands of charity; yet they are not bound he adds: “It is not less criminal to take from him who has, to restitution, because such things are entrusted to their than, when you are able and have plenty to refuse him who ownership. has not.” Now it is a mortal sin to take another’s property On the other hand, they hold ecclesiastical goods as by violence. Therefore bishops sin mortally if they give dispensers or trustees. For Augustine says (Ep. clxxxv not to the poor that which they have in excess. ad Bonif.): “If we possess privately what is enough for Objection 2. Further, a gloss of Jerome on Is. 3:14, us, other things belong not to us but to the poor, and we “The spoil of the poor is in your house,” says that “eccle- have the dispensing of them; but we can claim ownership siastical goods belong to the poor.” Now whoever keeps of them only by wicked theft.” Now dispensing requires for himself or gives to others that which belongs to an- good faith, according to 1 Cor. 4:2, “Here now it is re- other, sins mortally and is bound to restitution. Therefore quired among the dispensers that a man be found faithful.” if bishops keep for themselves, or give to their relations Moreover ecclesiastical goods are to be applied not only or friends, their surplus of ecclesiastical goods, it would to the good of the poor, but also to the divine worship and seem that they are bound to restitution. the needs of its ministers. Hence it is said (XII, qu. ii, can. Objection 3. Further, much more may one take what de reditibus): “Of the Church’s revenues or the offerings is necessary for oneself from the goods of the Church, of the faithful only one part is to be assigned to the bishop, than accumulate a surplus therefrom. Yet Jerome says in a two parts are to be used by the priest, under pain of sus- letter to Pope Damasus†: “It is right that those clerics who pension, for the ecclesiastical fabric, and for the benefit receive no goods from their parents and relations should of the poor; the remaining part is to be divided among be supported from the funds of the Church. But those the clergy according to their respective merits.” Accord- who have sufficient income from their parents and their ingly if the goods which are assigned to the use of the own possessions, if they take what belongs to the poor, bishop are distinct from those which are appointed for the they commit and incur the guilt of sacrilege.” Wherefore use of the poor, or the ministers, or for the ecclesiastical the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:16): “If any of the faithful worship, and if the bishop keeps back for himself part of have widows, let him minister to them, and let not the that which should be given to the poor, or to the ministers Church be charged, that there may be sufficient for them for their use, or expended on the divine worship, without that are widows indeed.” Much more therefore do bishops doubt he is an unfaithful dispenser, sins mortally, and is sin mortally if they give not to the poor the surplus of their bound to restitution. ecclesiastical goods. But as regards those goods which are deputed to his On the contrary, Many bishops do not give their sur- private use, the same apparently applies as to his own plus to the poor, but would seem commendably to lay it property, namely that he sins through immoderate attach- out so as to increase the revenue of the Church. ment thereto or use thereof, if he exceeds moderation in I answer that, The same is not to be said of their what he keeps for himself, and fails to assist others ac- own goods which bishops may possess, and of ecclesi- cording to the demands of charity. astical goods. For they have real dominion over their own On the other hand, if no distinction is made in the ∗ Basil, Serm. lxiv, de Temp., among the supposititious works of St. Jerome † Cf. Can. Clericos, cause. i, qu. 2; Can. Quoniam; cause. xvi, qu. 1; Regul. Monach. iv, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome 2031 aforesaid goods, their distribution is entrusted to his good cleric wish to deprive himself of that which is assigned to faith; and if he fail or exceed in a slight degree, this may his own use, and give it to his relations or others, he sins happen without prejudice to his good faith, because in not so long as he observes moderation, so, to wit, that they such matters a man cannot possibly decide precisely what cease to be in want without becoming the richer thereby. ought to be done. On the other hand, if the excess be Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30): “It is a commend- very great he cannot be ignorant of the fact; consequently able liberality if you overlook not your kindred when you he would seem to be lacking in good faith, and is guilty know them to be in want; yet not so as to wish to make of mortal sin. For it is written (Mat. 24:48-51) that “if them rich with what you can give to the poor.” that evil servant shall say in his heart: My lord is long a- Reply to Objection 3. The goods of churches should coming,” which shows contempt of God’s judgment, “and not all be given to the poor, except in a case of necessity: shall begin to strike his fellow-servants,” which is a sign for then, as Ambrose says (De Offic. ii, 28), even the ves- of pride, “and shall eat and drink with drunkards,” which sels consecrated to the divine worship are to be sold for proceeds from lust, “the lord of that servant shall come in the ransom of prisoners, and other needs of the poor. In a day that he hopeth not. . . and shall separate him,” namely such a case of necessity a cleric would sin if he chose to from the fellowship of good men, “and appoint his portion maintain himself on the goods of the Church, always sup- with hypocrites,” namely in hell. posing him to have a patrimony of his own on which to Reply to Objection 1. This saying of Ambrose refers support himself. to the administration not only of ecclesiastical things but Reply to Objection 4. The goods of the churches also of any goods whatever from which a man is bound, should be employed for the good of the poor. Conse- as a duty of charity, to provide for those who are in need. quently a man is to be commended if, there being no But it is not possible to state definitely when this need is present necessity for helping the poor, he spends the sur- such as to impose an obligation under pain of mortal sin, plus from the Church revenue, in buying property, or lays as is the case in other points of detail that have to be con- it by for some future use connected with the Church or sidered in human acts: for the decision in such matters is the needs of the poor. But if there be a pressing need for left to human prudence. helping the poor, to lay by for the future is a superfluous Reply to Objection 2. As stated above the goods of and inordinate saving, and is forbidden by our Lord Who the Church have to be employed not only for the use of said (Mat. 6:34): “Be. . . not solicitous for the morrow.” the poor, but also for other purposes. Hence if a bishop or Whether religious who are raised to the episcopate are bound to religious obser-IIa IIae q. 185 a. 8 vances? Objection 1. It would seem that religious who are are above them; nor apparently are they bound to poverty, raised to the episcopate are not bound to religious obser- since according to the decree quoted above (obj. 1) “when vances. For it is said (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that the holy ordination has made of a monk a bishop he enjoys a “canonical election loosens a monk from the yoke im- the right, as the lawful heir, of claiming his paternal inher- posed by the rule of the monastic profession, and the holy itance.” Moreover they are sometimes allowed to make a ordination makes of a monk a bishop.” Now the regu- will. Much less therefore are they bound to other regular lar observances pertain to the yoke of the rule. Therefore observances. religious who are appointed bishops are not bound to reli- On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XVI, qu. gious observances. i, can. De Monachis): “With regard to those who after Objection 2. Further, he who ascends from a lower long residence in a monastery attain to the order of cler- to a higher degree is seemingly not bound to those things ics, we bid them not to lay aside their former purpose.” which pertain to the lower degree: thus it was stated above I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 2) the re- (q. 88, a. 12, ad 1) that a religious is not bound to keep the ligious state pertains to perfection, as a way of tending vows he made in the world. But a religious who is ap- to perfection, while the episcopal state pertains to perfec- pointed to the episcopate ascends to something greater, as tion, as a professorship of perfection. Hence the religious stated above (q. 84, a. 7). Therefore it would seem that a state is compared to the episcopal state, as the school to bishop is not bound to those things whereto he was bound the professorial chair, and as disposition to perfection. in the state of religion. Now the disposition is not voided at the advent of per- Objection 3. Further, religious would seem to be fection, except as regards what perchance is incompatible bound above all to obedience, and to live without property with perfection, whereas as to that wherein it is in accord of their own. But religious who are appointed bishops, are with perfection, it is confirmed the more. Thus when the not bound to obey the superiors of their order, since they scholar has become a professor it no longer becomes him 2032 to be a listener, but it becomes him to read and meditate whereas the disposition is still necessary when perfection even more than before. Accordingly we must assert that has been attained. if there be among religious observances any that instead Reply to Objection 3. It is accidental that religious of being an obstacle to the episcopal office, are a safe- who are bishops are not bound to obey the superiors of guard of perfection, such as continence, poverty, and so their order, because, to wit, they have ceased to be their forth, a religious, even after he has been made a bishop, subjects; even as those same religious superiors. Never- remains bound to observe these, and consequently to wear theless the obligation of the vow remains virtually, so that the habit of his order, which is a sign of this obligation. if any person be lawfully set above them, they would be On the other hand, a man is not bound to keep such bound to obey them, inasmuch as they are bound to obey religious observances as may be incompatible with the both the statutes of their rule in the way mentioned above, episcopal office, for instance solitude, silence, and cer- and their superiors if they have any. tain severe abstinences or watchings and such as would As to property they can nowise have it. For they claim render him bodily unable to exercise the episcopal office. their paternal inheritance not as their own, but as due to For the rest he may dispense himself from them, accord- the Church. Hence it is added (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statu- ing to the needs of his person or office, and the manner of tum) that after he has been ordained bishop at the altar to life of those among whom he dwells, in the same way as which he is consecrated and appointed according to the religious superiors dispense themselves in such matters. holy canons, he must restore whatever he may acquire. Reply to Objection 1. He who from being a monk be- Nor can he make any testament at all, because he is comes a bishop is loosened from the yoke of the monastic entrusted with the sole administration of things ecclesias- profession, not in everything, but in those that are incom- tical, and this ends with his death, after which a testament patible with the episcopal office, as stated above. comes into force according to the Apostle (Heb. 9:17). If, Reply to Objection 2. The vows of those who are however, by the Pope’s permission he make a will, he is living in the world are compared to the vows of religion not to be understood to bequeath property of his own, but as the particular to the universal, as stated above (q. 88, we are to understand that by apostolic authority the power a. 12, ad 1). But the vows of religion are compared to of his administration has been prolonged so as to remain the episcopal dignity as disposition to perfection. Now in force after his death. the particular is superfluous when one has the universal, 2033 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 186 Of Those Things in Which the Religious State Properly Consists (In Ten Articles) We must now consider things pertaining to the religious state: which consideration will be fourfold. In the first place we shall consider those things in which the religious state consists chiefly; secondly, those things which are lawfully befitting to religious; thirdly, the different kinds of religious orders; fourthly, the entrance into the religious state. Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether the religious state is perfect? (2) Whether religious are bound to all the counsels? (3) Whether voluntary poverty is required for the religious state? (4) Whether continency is necessary? (5) Whether obedience is necessary? (6) Whether it is necessary that these should be the matter of a vow? (7) Of the sufficiency of these vows; (8) Of their comparison one with another; (9) Whether a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses a statute of his rule? (10) Whether, other things being equal, a religious sins more grievously by the same kind of sin than a secular person? Whether religion implies a state of perfection? IIa IIae q. 186 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that religion does not tance is opposed to the state of perfection; hence Diony- imply a state of perfection. For that which is necessary sius (Eccl. Hier. vi) places penitents in the lowest place, for salvation does not seemingly pertain to perfection. namely among those who are to be cleansed. Therefore it But religion is necessary for salvation, whether because would seem that religion is not the state of perfection. “thereby we are bound [religamur] to the one almighty On the contrary, In the Conferences of the Fathers God,” as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55), or because (Collat. i, 7) abbot Moses speaking of religious says: it takes its name from “our returning [religimus] to God “We must recognize that we have to undertake the hunger Whom we had lost by neglecting Him”∗, according to Au- of fasting, watchings, bodily toil, privation, reading, and gustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3). Therefore it would seem that other acts of virtue, in order by these degrees to mount religion does not denote the state of perfection. to the perfection of charity.” Now things pertaining to hu- Objection 2. Further, religion according to Tully (De man acts are specified and denominated from the intention Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) is that “which offers worship and cer- of the end. Therefore religious belong to the state of per- emony to the Divine nature.” Now the offering of worship fection. and ceremony to God would seem to pertain to the min- Moreover Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi) that those istry of holy orders rather than to the diversity of states, as who are called servants of God, by reason of their renderstated above (q. 40, a. 2; q. 183, a. 3). Therefore it would ing pure service and subjection to God, are united to the seem that religion does not denote the state of perfection. perfection beloved of Him. Objection 3. Further, the state of perfection is distinct I answer that, As stated above (q. 141, a. 2) that from the state of beginners and that of the proficient. But which is applicable to many things in common is ascribed in religion also some are beginners, and some are profi- antonomastically to that to which it is applicable by way cient. Therefore religion does not denote the state of per- of excellence. Thus the name of “fortitude” is claimed fection. by the virtue which preserves the firmness of the mind in Objection 4. Further, religion would seem a place regard to most difficult things, and the name of “temper- of repentance; for it is said in the Decrees (VII, qu. i, ance,” by that virtue which tempers the greatest pleasures. can. Hoc nequaquam): “The holy synod orders that any Now religion as stated above (q. 81 , a. 2; a. 3, ad 2) is man who has been degraded from the episcopal dignity to a virtue whereby a man offers something to the service the monastic life and a place of repentance, should by no and worship of God. Wherefore those are called religious means rise again to the episcopate.” Now a place of repen- antonomastically, who give themselves up entirely to the ∗ Cf. q. 81, a. 1 2034 divine service, as offering a holocaust to God. Hence Gre-Aa. 4,6) religion denotes the state of perfection by rea- gory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.): “Some there are who keep son of the end intended. Hence it does not follow that nothing for themselves, but sacrifice to almighty God their whoever is in the state of perfection is already perfect, but tongue, their senses, their life, and the property they pos- that he tends to perfection. Hence Origen commenting on sess.” Now the perfection of man consists in adhering Mat. 19:21, “If thou wilt be perfect,” etc., says (Tract. viii wholly to God, as stated above (q. 184, a. 2), and in this in Matth.) that “he who has exchanged riches for poverty sense religion denotes the state of perfection. in order to become perfect does not become perfect at the Reply to Objection 1. To offer something to the wor- very moment of giving his goods to the poor; but from ship of God is necessary for salvation, but to offer oneself that day the contemplation of God will begin to lead him wholly, and one’s possessions to the worship of God be- to all the virtues.” Thus all are not perfect in religion, but longs to perfection. some are beginners, some proficient. Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 81, a. 1, ad Reply to Objection 4. The religious state was insti- 1; a. 4, ad 1,2; q. 85, a. 3) when we were treating of the tuted chiefly that we might obtain perfection by means of virtue of religion, religion has reference not only to the certain exercises, whereby the obstacles to perfect charity offering of sacrifices and other like things that are proper are removed. By the removal of the obstacles of perfect to religion, but also to the acts of all the virtues which in charity, much more are the occasions of sin cut off, for sin so far as these are referred to God’s service and honor be- destroys charity altogether. Wherefore since it belongs to come acts of religion. Accordingly if a man devotes his penance to cut out the causes of sin, it follows that the whole life to the divine service, his whole life belongs to religious state is a most fitting place for penance. Hence religion, and thus by reason of the religious life that they (XXXIII, qu. ii, cap. Admonere) a man who had killed his lead, those who are in the state of perfection are called wife is counseled to enter a monastery which is described religious. as “better and lighter,” rather than to do public penance Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 184, while remaining in the world. Whether every religious is bound to keep all the counsels? IIa IIae q. 186 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that every religious is I answer that, A thing pertains to perfection in three bound to keep all the counsels. For whoever professes a ways. First, essentially, and thus, as stated above (q. 184, certain state of life is bound to observe whatever belongs a. 3) the perfect observance of the precepts of charity be- to that state. Now each religious professes the state of per- longs to perfection. Secondly, a thing belongs to perfec- fection. Therefore every religious is bound to keep all the tion consequently: such are those things that result from counsels that pertain to the state of perfection. the perfection of charity, for instance to bless them that Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Hom. xx in curse you (Lk. 6:27), and to keep counsels of a like kind, Ezech.) that “he who renounces this world, and does all which though they be binding as regards the preparedness the good he can, is like one who has gone out of Egypt of the mind, so that one has to fulfil them when neces- and offers sacrifice in the wilderness.” Now it belongs sity requires; yet are sometimes fulfilled, without there specially to religious to renounce the world. Therefore it being any necessity, through superabundance of charity. belongs to them also to do all the good they can. and so Thirdly, a thing belongs to perfection instrumentally and it would seem that each of them is bound to fulfil all the dispositively, as poverty, continence, abstinence, and the counsels. like. Objection 3. Further, if it is not requisite for the Now it has been stated (a. 1) that the perfection of state of perfection to fulfil all the counsels, it would seem charity is the end of the religious state. And the religious enough to fulfil some of them. But this is false, since some state is a school or exercise for the attainment of perfec- who lead a secular life fulfil some of the counsels, for in- tion, which men strive to reach by various practices, just stance those who observe continence. Therefore it would as a physician may use various remedies in order to heal. seem that every religious who is in the state of perfection But it is evident that for him who works for an end it is not is bound to fulfil whatever pertains to perfection: and such necessary that he should already have attained the end, but are the counsels. it is requisite that he should by some means tend thereto. On the contrary, one is not bound, unless one bind Hence he who enters the religious state is not bound to oneself, to do works of supererogation. But every reli- have perfect charity, but he is bound to tend to this, and gious does not bind himself to keep all the counsels, but use his endeavors to have perfect charity. to certain definite ones, some to some, others to others. For the same reason he is not bound to fulfil those Therefore all are not bound to keep all of them. things that result from the perfection of charity, although 2035 he is bound to intend to fulfil them: against which inten-out sin (q. 184, a. 2, ad 3), provided there be no con- tion he acts if he contemns them, wherefore he sins not by tempt, as stated above (ad 1), so too, all, both religious omitting them but by contempt of them. and seculars, are bound, in a certain measure, to do what- In like manner he is not bound to observe all the prac- ever good they can, for to all without exception it is said tices whereby perfection may be attained, but only those (Eccles. 9:10): “Whatsoever thy hand is able to do, do it which are definitely prescribed to him by the rule which earnestly.” Yet there is a way of fulfilling this precept, so he has professed. as to avoid sin, namely if one do what one can as required Reply to Objection 1. He who enters religion does by the conditions of one’s state of life: provided there be not make profession to be perfect, but he professes to no contempt of doing better things, which contempt sets endeavor to attain perfection; even as he who enters the the mind against spiritual progress. schools does not profess to have knowledge, but to study Reply to Objection 3. There are some counsels such in order to acquire knowledge. Wherefore as Augustine that if they be omitted, man’s whole life would be taken says (De Civ. Dei viii, 2), Pythagoras was unwilling to up with secular business; for instance if he have property profess to be a wise man, but acknowledged himself, “a of his own, or enter the married state, or do something of lover of wisdom.” Hence a religious does not violate his the kind that regards the essential vows of religion them- profession if he be not perfect, but only if he despises to selves; wherefore religious are bound to keep all such like tend to perfection. counsels. Other counsels there are, however, about cer- Reply to Objection 2. Just as, though all are bound tain particular better actions, which can be omitted with- to love God with their whole heart, yet there is a certain out one’s life being taken up with secular actions; where- wholeness of perfection which cannot be omitted without fore there is no need for religious to be bound to fulfil all sin, and another wholeness which can be omitted with- of them. Whether poverty is required for religious perfection? IIa IIae q. 186 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that poverty is not re- Objection 3. Further, “Virtue observes the mean,” as quired for religious perfection. For that which it is un- stated in Ethic. ii, 6. But he who renounces all by vol- lawful to do does not apparently belong to the state of untary poverty seems to go to the extreme rather than to perfection. But it would seem to be unlawful for a man to observe the mean. Therefore he does not act virtuously: give up all he possesses; since the Apostle (2 Cor. 8:12) and so this does not pertain to the perfection of life. lays down the way in which the faithful are to give alms Objection 4. Further, the ultimate perfection of man saying: “If the will be forward, it is accepted according to consists in happiness. Now riches conduce to happiness; that which a man hath,” i.e. “you should keep back what for it is written (Ecclus. 31:8): “Blessed is the rich man you need,” and afterwards he adds (2 Cor. 8:13): “For I that is found without blemish,” and the Philosopher says mean not that others should be eased, and you burthened,” (Ethic. i, 8) that “riches contribute instrumentally to hap- i.e. “with poverty,” according to a gloss. Moreover a gloss piness.” Therefore voluntary poverty is not requisite for on 1 Tim. 6:8, “Having food, and wherewith to be cov- religious perfection. ered,” says: “Though we brought nothing, and will carry Objection 5. Further, the episcopal state is more per- nothing away, we must not give up these temporal things fect than the religious state. But bishops may have prop- altogether.” Therefore it seems that voluntary poverty is erty, as stated above (q. 185, a. 6). Therefore religious not requisite for religious perfection. may also. Objection 2. Further, whosoever exposes himself Objection 6. Further, almsgiving is a work most ac- to danger sins. But he who renounces all he has and ceptable to God, and as Chrysostom says (Hom. ix in Ep. embraces voluntary poverty exposes himself to danger— ad Hebr.) “is a most effective remedy in repentance.” Now not only spiritual, according to Prov. 30:9, “Lest per- poverty excludes almsgiving. Therefore it would seem haps. . . being compelled by poverty, I should steal and for- that poverty does not pertain to religious perfection. swear the name of my God,” and Ecclus. 27:1, “Through On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. viii, 26): poverty many have sinned”—but also corporal, for it is “There are some of the righteous who bracing themselves written (Eccles. 7:13): “As wisdom is a defense, so money up to lay hold of the very height of perfection, while they is a defense,” and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that aim at higher objects within, abandon all things without.” “the waste of property appears to be a sort of ruining of Now, as stated above, (Aa. 1,2), it belongs properly to re- one’s self, since thereby man lives.” Therefore it would ligious to brace themselves up in order to lay hold of the seem that voluntary poverty is not requisite for the perfec- very height of perfection. Therefore it belongs to them to tion of religious life. abandon all outward things by voluntary poverty. 2036 I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), the religious by anxiety lest they lack what is necessary.” state is an exercise and a school for attaining to the perfec- Reply to Objection 3. According to the Philosopher tion of charity. For this it is necessary that a man wholly (Ethic. ii, 6), the mean of virtue is taken according to withdraw his affections from worldly things; since Au- right reason, not according to the quantity of a thing. gustine says (Confess. x, 29), speaking to God: “Too Consequently whatever may be done in accordance with little doth he love Thee, who loves anything with Thee, right reason is not rendered sinful by the greatness of the which he loveth not for Thee.” Wherefore he says (QQ. quantity, but all the more virtuous. It would, however, lxxxiii, qu. 36) that “greater charity means less cupidity, be against right reason to throw away all one’s posses- perfect charity means no cupidity.” Now the possession sions through intemperance, or without any useful pur- of worldly things draws a man’s mind to the love of them: pose; whereas it is in accordance with right reason to re- hence Augustine says (Ep. xxxi ad Paulin. et Theras.) nounce wealth in order to devote oneself to the contem- that “we are more firmly attached to earthly things when plation of wisdom. Even certain philosophers are said to we have them than when we desire them: since why did have done this; for Jerome says (Ep. xlviii ad Paulin.): that young man go away sad, save because he had great “The famous Theban, Crates, once a very wealthy man, wealth? For it is one thing not to wish to lay hold of what when he was going to Athens to study philosophy, cast one has not, and another to renounce what one already away a large amount of gold; for he considered that he has; the former are rejected as foreign to us, the latter are could not possess both gold and virtue at the same time.” cut off as a limb.” And Chrysostom says (Hom. lxiii in Much more therefore is it according to right reason for Matth.) that “the possession of wealth kindles a greater a man to renounce all he has, in order perfectly to fol- flame and the desire for it becomes stronger.” low Christ. Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rust. Hence it is that in the attainment of the perfection of Monach.): “Poor thyself, follow Christ poor.” charity the first foundation is voluntary poverty, whereby Reply to Objection 4. Happiness or felicity is a man lives without property of his own, according to the twofold. One is perfect, to which we look forward in the saying of our Lord (Mat. 19:21), “If thou wilt be per- life to come; the other is imperfect, in respect of which fect, go, sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] thou hast, and give to the some are said to be happy in this life. The happiness of poor. . . and come, follow Me.” this life is twofold, one is according to the active life, the Reply to Objection 1. As the gloss adds, “when the other according to the contemplative life, as the Philoso- Apostle said this (namely “not that you should be bur- pher asserts (Ethic. x, 7,8). Now wealth conduces in- thened,” i.e. with poverty),” he did not mean that “it were strumentally to the happiness of the active life which con- better not to give: but he feared for the weak, whom he sists in external actions, because as the Philosopher says admonished so to give as not to suffer privation.” Hence (Ethic. i, 8) “we do many things by friends, by riches, in like manner the other gloss means not that it is unlaw- by political influence, as it were by instruments.” On the ful to renounce all one’s temporal goods, but that this is other hand, it does not conduce to the happiness of the not required of necessity. Wherefore Ambrose says (De contemplative life, rather is it an obstacle thereto, inas- Offic. i, 30): “Our Lord does not wish,” namely does not much as the anxiety it involves disturbs the quiet of the command us “to pour out our wealth all at once, but to soul, which is most necessary to one who contemplates. dispense it; or perhaps to do as did Eliseus who slew his Hence it is that the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. x, 8) that oxen, and fed the poor with that which was his own so that “for actions many things are needed, but the contempla- no household care might hold him back.” tive man needs no such things,” namely external goods, Reply to Objection 2. He who renounces all his pos- “for his operation; in fact they are obstacles to his con- sessions for Christ’s sake exposes himself to no danger, templation.” neither spiritual nor corporal. For spiritual danger en- Man is directed to future happiness by charity; and sues from poverty when the latter is not voluntary; be- since voluntary poverty is an efficient exercise for the at- cause those who are unwillingly poor, through the desire taining of perfect charity, it follows that it is of great avail of money-getting, fall into many sins, according to 1 Tim. in acquiring the happiness of heaven. Wherefore our Lord 6:9, “They that will become rich, fall into temptation and said (Mat. 19:21): “Go, sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] thou into the snare of the devil.” This attachment is put away hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure by those who embrace voluntary poverty, but it gathers in heaven.” Now riches once they are possessed are in strength in those who have wealth, as stated above. Again themselves of a nature to hinder the perfection of charity, bodily danger does not threaten those who, intent on fol- especially by enticing and distracting the mind. Hence it lowing Christ, renounce all their possessions and entrust is written (Mat. 13:22) that “the care of this world and the themselves to divine providence. Hence Augustine says deceitfulness of riches choketh up the word” of God, for (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17): “Those who seek first as Gregory says (Hom. xv in Ev.) by “preventing the good the kingdom of God and His justice are not weighed down desire from entering into the heart, they destroy life at its 2037 very outset.” Consequently it is difficult to safeguard char-governing Christ’s flock, that they have nothing of their ity amidst riches: wherefore our Lord said (Mat. 19:23) own, whereas it is required of religious who make profes- that “a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of sion of learning to obtain perfection. heaven,” which we must understand as referring to one Reply to Objection 6. The renouncement of one’s who actually has wealth, since He says that this is impos- own wealth is compared to almsgiving as the universal to sible for him who places his affection in riches, according the particular, and as the holocaust to the sacrifice. Hence to the explanation of Chrysostom (Hom. lxiii in Matth.), Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.) that those who as- for He adds (Mat. 19:24): “It is easier for a camel to pass sist “the needy with the things they possess, by their good through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter deeds offer sacrifice, since they offer up something to God into the kingdom of heaven.” Hence it is not said simply and keep back something for themselves; whereas those that the “rich man” is blessed, but “the rich man that is who keep nothing for themselves offer a holocaust which found without blemish, and that hath not gone after gold,” is greater than a sacrifice.” Wherefore Jerome also says and this because he has done a difficult thing, wherefore (Contra Vigilant.): “When you declare that those do bet- the text continues (Mat. 19:9): “Who is he? and we will ter who retain the use of their possessions, and dole out praise him; for he hath done wonderful things in his life,” the fruits of their possessions to the poor, it is not I but namely by not loving riches though placed in the midst of the Lord Who answers you; If thou wilt be perfect,” etc., them. and afterwards he goes on to say: “This man whom you Reply to Objection 5. The episcopal state is not di- praise belongs to the second and third degree, and we too rected to the attainment of perfection, but rather to the commend him: provided we acknowledge the first as to be effect that, in virtue of the perfection which he already preferred to the second and third.” For this reason in or- has, a man may govern others, by administering not only der to exclude the error of Vigilantius it is said (De Eccl. spiritual but also temporal things. This belongs to the ac- Dogm. xxxviii): “It is a good thing to give away one’s tive life, wherein many things occur that may be done by goods by dispensing them to the poor: it is better to give means of wealth as an instrument, as stated (ad 4). Where- them away once for all with the intention of following the fore it is not required of bishops, who make profession of Lord, and, free of solicitude, to be poor with Christ.” Whether perpetual continence is required for religious perfection? IIa IIae q. 186 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that perpetual continence body and in spirit’].” Therefore religious perfection re- is not required for religious perfection. For all perfection quires continence. of the Christian life began with Christ’s apostles. Now the I answer that, The religious state requires the removal apostles do not appear to have observed continence, as of whatever hinders man from devoting himself entirely evidenced by Peter, of whose mother-in-law we read Mat. to God’s service. Now the use of sexual union hinders 8:14. Therefore it would seem that perpetual continence the mind from giving itself wholly to the service of God, is not requisite for religious perfection. and this for two reasons. First, on account of its vehement Objection 2. Further, the first example of perfection delectation, which by frequent repetition increases concu- is shown to us in the person of Abraham, to whom the piscence, as also the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii, 12): Lord said (Gn. 17:1): “Walk before Me, and be perfect.” and hence it is that the use of venery withdraws the mind Now the copy should not surpass the example. Therefore from that perfect intentness on tending to God. Augustine perpetual continence is not requisite for religious perfec- expresses this when he says (Solil. i, 10): “I consider that tion. nothing so casts down the manly mind from its height as Objection 3. Further, that which is required for reli- the fondling of women, and those bodily contacts which gious perfection is to be found in every religious order. belong to the married state.” Secondly, because it involves Now there are some religious who lead a married life. man in solicitude for the control of his wife, his children, Therefore religious perfection does not require perpetual and his temporalities which serve for their upkeep. Hence continence. the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:32,33): “He that is without a On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:1): “Let wife is solicitous for the things that belong to the Lord, us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and how he may please God: but he that is with a wife is so- of the spirit, perfecting sanctification in the fear of God.” licitous for the things of the world, how he may please his Now cleanness of flesh and spirit is safeguarded by conti- wife.” nence, for it is said (1 Cor. 7:34): “The unmarried woman Therefore perpetual continence, as well as voluntary and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord that she poverty, is requisite for religious perfection. Wherefore may be holy both in spirit and in body [Vulg.: ‘both in just as Vigilantius was condemned for equaling riches to 2038 poverty, so was Jovinian condemned for equaling mar-both of them in habit. For he lived chastely, and he might riage to virginity. have been chaste without marrying, but it was not requi- Reply to Objection 1. The perfection not only of site then.” Nevertheless if the patriarchs of old had per- poverty but also of continence was introduced by Christ fection of mind together with wealth and marriage, which Who said (Mat. 19:12): “There are eunuchs who have is a mark of the greatness of their virtue, this is no rea- made themselves eunuchs, for the kingdom of heaven,” son why any weaker person should presume to have such and then added: “He that can take, let him take it.” great virtue that he can attain to perfection though rich and And lest anyone should be deprived of the hope of at- married; as neither does a man unarmed presume to attack taining perfection, he admitted to the state of perfection his enemy, because Samson slew many foes with the jaw- those even who were married. Now the husbands could bone of an ass. For those fathers, had it been seasonable not without committing an injustice forsake their wives, to observe continence and poverty, would have been most whereas men could without injustice renounce riches. careful to observe them. Wherefore Peter whom He found married, He severed not Reply to Objection 3. Such ways of living as admit from his wife, while “He withheld from marriage John of the use of marriage are not the religious life simply and who wished to marry”∗. absolutely speaking, but in a restricted sense, in so far as Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Bono they have a certain share in those things that belong to the Conjug. xxii), “the chastity of celibacy is better than the religious state. chastity of marriage, one of which Abraham had in use, Whether obedience belongs to religious perfection? IIa IIae q. 186 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that obedience does not Objection 5. Further, those services are most accept- belong to religious perfection. For those things seem- able to God which are done freely and not of necessity, ingly belong to religious perfection, which are works of according to 2 Cor. 9:7, “Not with sadness or of neces- supererogation and are not binding upon all. But all are sity.” Now that which is done out of obedience is done bound to obey their superiors, according to the saying of of necessity of precept. Therefore those good works are the Apostle (Heb. 13:17), “Obey your prelates, and be more deserving of praise which are done of one’s own ac- subject to them.” Therefore it would seem that obedience cord. Therefore the vow of obedience is unbecoming to does not belong to religious perfection. religion whereby men seek to attain to that which is bet- Objection 2. Further, obedience would seem to be- ter. long properly to those who have to be guided by the sense On the contrary, Religious perfection consists chiefly of others, and such persons are lacking in discernment. in the imitation of Christ, according to Mat. 19:21, “If Now the Apostle says (Heb. 5:14) that “strong meat is for thou wilt be perfect, go sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] thou hast, the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses ex- and give to the poor, and follow Me.” Now in Christ obe- ercised to the discerning of good and evil.” Therefore it dience is commended above all according to Phil. 2:8, would seem that obedience does not belong to the state of “He became [Vulg.: ‘becoming’] obedient unto death.” the perfect. Therefore seemingly obedience belongs to religious per- Objection 3. Further, if obedience were requisite for fection. religious perfection, it would follow that it is befitting to I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 2,3) the religious all religious. But it is not becoming to all; since some reli- state is a school and exercise for tending to perfection. gious lead a solitary life, and have no superior whom they Now those who are being instructed or exercised in order obey. Again religious superiors apparently are not bound to attain a certain end must needs follow the direction of to obedience. Therefore obedience would seem not to per- someone under whose control they are instructed or exer- tain to religious perfection. cised so as to attain that end as disciples under a master. Objection 4. Further, if the vow of obedience were Hence religious need to be placed under the instruction requisite for religion, it would follow that religious are and command of someone as regards things pertaining to bound to obey their superiors in all things, just as they are the religious life; wherefore it is said (VII, qu. i, can. bound to abstain from all venery by their vow of conti- Hoc nequaquam): “The monastic life denotes subjection nence. But they are not bound to obey them in all things, and discipleship.” Now one man is subjected to another’s as stated above (q. 104, a. 5), when we were treating of command and instruction by obedience: and consequently the virtue of obedience. Therefore the vow of obedience obedience is requisite for religious perfection. is not requisite for religion. Reply to Objection 1. To obey one’s superiors in mat- ∗ Prolog. in Joan. among the supposititious works of St. Jerome 2039 ters that are essential to virtue is not a work of supereroga-pertain specially to religious discipline. tion, but is common to all: whereas to obey in matters Reply to Objection 4. The vow of obedience taken by pertaining to the practice of perfection belongs properly religious, extends to the disposition of a man’s whole life, to religious. This latter obedience is compared to the for- and in this way it has a certain universality, although it mer as the universal to the particular. For those who live does not extend to all individual acts. For some of these do in the world, keep something for themselves, and offer not belong to religion, through not being of those things something to God; and in the latter respect they are under that concern the love of God and of our neighbor, such as obedience to their superiors: whereas those who live in rubbing one’s beard, lifting a stick from the ground and religion give themselves wholly and their possessions to so forth, which do not come under a vow nor under obedi- God, as stated above (Aa. 1,3). Hence their obedience is ence; and some are contrary to religion. Nor is there any universal. comparison with continence whereby acts are excluded Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. which are altogether contrary to religion. ii, 1,2), by performing actions we contract certain habits, Reply to Objection 5. The necessity of coercion and when we have acquired the habit we are best able makes an act involuntary and consequently deprives it of to perform the actions. Accordingly those who have the character of praise or merit; whereas the necessity not attained to perfection, acquire perfection by obey- which is consequent upon obedience is a necessity not of ing, while those who have already acquired perfection are coercion but of a free will, inasmuch as a man is willing to most ready to obey, not as though they need to be directed obey, although perhaps he would not be willing to do the to the acquisition of perfection, but as maintaining them- thing commanded considered in itself. Wherefore since selves by this means in that which belongs to perfection. by the vow of obedience a man lays himself under the ne- Reply to Objection 3. The subjection of religious cessity of doing for God’s sake certain things that are not is chiefly in reference to bishops, who are compared to pleasing in themselves, for this very reason that which he them as perfecters to perfected, as Dionysius states (Eccl. does is the more acceptable to God, though it be of less ac- Hier. vi), where he also says that the “monastic order is count, because man can give nothing greater to God, than subjected to the perfecting virtues of the bishops, and is by subjecting his will to another man’s for God’s sake. taught by their godlike enlightenment.” Hence neither Hence in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xviii, 7) it hermits nor religious superiors are exempt from obedi- is stated that “the Sarabaitae are the worst class of monks, ence to bishops; and if they be wholly or partly exempt because through providing for their own needs without be- from obedience to the bishop of the diocese, they are nev- ing subject to superiors, they are free to do as they will; ertheless bound to obey the Sovereign Pontiff, not only in and yet day and night they are more busily occupied in matters affecting all in common, but also in those which work than those who live in monasteries.” Whether it is requisite for religious perfection that poverty, continence, and obedience IIa IIae q. 186 a. 6 should come under a vow? Objection 1. It would seem that it is not requisite Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Ad Pollent., de for religious perfection that the three aforesaid, namely Adult. Conjug. i, 14): “The services we render are more poverty, continence, and obedience, should come under a pleasing when we might lawfully not render them, yet do vow. For the school of perfection is founded on the princi- so out of love.” Now it is lawful not to render a service ples laid down by our Lord. Now our Lord in formulating which we have not vowed, whereas it is unlawful if we perfection (Mat. 19:21) said: “If thou wilt be perfect, go, have vowed to render it. Therefore seemingly it is more sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] thou hast, and give to the poor,” pleasing to God to keep poverty, continence, and obedi- without any mention of a vow. Therefore it would seem ence without a vow. Therefore a vow is not requisite for that a vow is not necessary for the school of religion. religious perfection. Objection 2. Further, a vow is a promise made to On the contrary, In the Old Law the Nazareans were God, wherefore (Eccles. 5:3) the wise man after saying: consecrated by vow according to Num. 6:2, “When a man “If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it,” or woman shall make a vow to be sanctified and will con- adds at once, “for an unfaithful and foolish promise dis- secrate themselves to the Lord,” etc. Now these were a pleaseth Him.” But when a thing is being actually given figure of those “who attain the summit of perfection,” as a there is no need for a promise. Therefore it suffices for re- gloss∗ of Gregory states. Therefore a vow is requisite for ligious perfection that one keep poverty, continence, and religious perfection. obedience without. vowing them. I answer that, It belongs to religious to be in the state ∗ Cf. Moral. ii 2040 of perfection, as shown above (q. 174, a. 5). Now the lowed Him after drawing their boats on to the beach, not state of perfection requires an obligation to whatever be- as though they purposed to return, but as following Him at longs to perfection: and this obligation consists in binding His command.” Now this unwavering following of Christ oneself to God by means of a vow. But it is evident from is made fast by a vow: wherefore a vow is requisite for what has been said (Aa. 3,4,5) that poverty, continence, religious perfection. and obedience belong to the perfection of the Christian Reply to Objection 2. As Gregory says (Moral. ii) re- life. Consequently the religious state requires that one be ligious perfection requires that a man give “his whole life” bound to these three by vow. Hence Gregory says (Hom. to God. But a man cannot actually give God his whole xx in Ezech.): “When a man vows to God all his posses- life, because that life taken as a whole is not simultaneous sions, all his life, all his knowledge, it is a holocaust”; and but successive. Hence a man cannot give his whole life to afterwards he says that this refers to those who renounce God otherwise than by the obligation of a vow. the present world. Reply to Objection 3. Among other services that we Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord declared that it be- can lawfully give, is our liberty, which is dearer to man longs to the perfection of life that a man follow Him, not than aught else. Consequently when a man of his own anyhow, but in such a way as not to turn back. Wherefore accord deprives himself by vow of the liberty of abstain- He says again (Lk. 9:62): “No man putting his hand to the ing from things pertaining to God’s service, this is most plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God.” acceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii And though some of His disciples went back, yet when ad Paulin. et Arment.): “Repent not of thy vow; rejoice our Lord asked (Jn. 6:68,69), “Will you also go away?” rather that thou canst no longer do lawfully, what thou Peter answered for the others: “Lord, to whom shall we mightest have done lawfully but to thy own cost. Happy go?” Hence Augustine says (De Consensu Ev. ii, 17) the obligation that compels to better things.” that “as Matthew and Mark relate, Peter and Andrew fol- Whether it is right to say that religious perfection consists in these three vows? IIa IIae q. 186 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not right to say and the renouncing of property are affixed to the monastic that religious perfection consists in these three vows. For rule.” the perfection of life consists of inward rather than of I answer that, The religious state may be considered outward acts, according to Rom. 14:17, “The Kingdom in three ways. First, as being a practice of tending to of God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace and the perfection of charity: secondly, as quieting the human joy in the Holy Ghost.” Now the religious vow binds a mind from outward solicitude, according to 1 Cor. 7:32: man to things belonging to perfection. Therefore vows “I would have you to be without solicitude”: thirdly, as of inward actions, such as contemplation, love of God a holocaust whereby a man offers himself and his pos- and our neighbor, and so forth, should pertain to the re- sessions wholly to God; and in corresponding manner the ligious state, rather than the vows of poverty, continence, religious state is constituted by these three vows. and obedience which refer to outward actions. First, as regards the practice of perfection a man is re- Objection 2. Further, the three aforesaid come under quired to remove from himself whatever may hinder his the religious vow, in so far as they belong to the practice affections from tending wholly to God, for it is in this of tending to perfection. But there are many other things that the perfection of charity consists. Such hindrances that religious practice, such as abstinence, watchings, and are of three kinds. First, the attachment to external goods, the like. Therefore it would seem that these three vows which is removed by the vow of poverty; secondly, the are incorrectly described as pertaining to the state of per- concupiscence of sensible pleasures, chief among which fection. are venereal pleasures, and these are removed by the vow Objection 3. Further, by the vow of obedience a man of continence; thirdly, the inordinateness of the human is bound to do according to his superior’s command what- will, and this is removed by the vow of obedience. In ever pertains to the practice of perfection. Therefore the like manner the disquiet of worldly solicitude is aroused vow of obedience suffices without the two other vows. in man in reference especially to three things. First, as re- Objection 4. Further, external goods comprise not gards the dispensing of external things, and this solicitude only riches but also honors. Therefore, if religious, by the is removed from man by the vow of poverty; secondly, vow of poverty, renounce earthly riches, there should be as regards the control of wife and children, which is cut another vow whereby they may despise worldly honors. away by the vow of continence; thirdly, as regards the dis- On the contrary, It is stated (Extra, de Statu Monach., posal of one’s own actions, which is eliminated by the cap. Cum ad monasterium) that “the keeping of chastity vow of obedience, whereby a man commits himself to the 2041 disposal of another. rected to the end of religion, namely the love of God and Again, “a holocaust is the offering to God of all that his neighbor (such as reading, prayer, visiting the sick, one has,” according to Gregory (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Now and the like), are comprised under the vow of obedience man has a threefold good, according to the Philosopher that applies to the will, which directs its actions to the end (Ethic. i, 8). First, the good of external things, which according to the ordering of another person. The distinc- he wholly offers to God by the vow of voluntary poverty: tion of habit belongs to all three vows, as a sign of being secondly, the good of his own body, and this good he of- bound by them: wherefore the religious habit is given or fers to God especially by the vow of continence, whereby blessed at the time of profession. he renounces the greatest bodily pleasures. the third is the Reply to Objection 3. By obedience a man offers to good of the soul, which man wholly offers to God by the God his will, to which though all human affairs are sub- vow of obedience, whereby he offers God his own will by ject, yet some are subject to it alone in a special manner, which he makes use of all the powers and habits of the namely human actions, since passions belong also to the soul. Therefore the religious state is fittingly constituted sensitive appetite. Wherefore in order to restrain the pas- by the three vows. sions of carnal pleasures and of external objects of ap- Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 1), the petite, which hinder the perfection of life, there was need end whereunto the religious vow is directed is the perfec- for the vows of continence and poverty; but for the order- tion of charity, since all the interior acts of virtue belong ing of one’s own actions accordingly as the state of per- to charity as to their mother, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, fection requires, there was need for the vow of obedience. “Charity is patient, is kind,” etc. Hence the interior acts of Reply to Objection 4. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. virtue, for instance humility, patience, and so forth, do not iv, 3), strictly and truly speaking honor is not due save to come under the religious vow, but this is directed to them virtue. Since, however, external goods serve instrumen- as its end. tally for certain acts of virtue, the consequence is that a Reply to Objection 2. All other religious observances certain honor is given to their excellence especially by the are directed to the three aforesaid principal vows; for if common people who acknowledge none but outward ex- any of them are ordained for the purpose of procuring a cellence. Therefore since religious tend to the perfection livelihood, such as labor, questing, and so on, they are of virtue it becomes them not to renounce the honor which to be referred to poverty; for the safeguarding of which God and all holy men accord to virtue, according to Ps. religious seek a livelihood by these means. Other obser- 138:17, “But to me Thy friends, O God, are made exceed- vances whereby the body is chastised, such as watching, ingly honorable.” On the other hand, they renounce the fasting, and the like, are directly ordained for the obser- honor that is given to outward excellence, by the very fact vance of the vow of continence. And such religious ob- that they withdraw from a worldly life: hence no special servances as regard human actions whereby a man is di- vow is needed for this. Whether the vow of obedience is the chief of the three religious vows? IIa IIae q. 186 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that the vow of obedience from obeying his superior. Therefore it would seem that is not the chief of the three religious vows. For the perfec- the vow of obedience is less than the vow of poverty and tion of the religious life was inaugurated by Christ. Now continence. Christ gave a special counsel of poverty; whereas He is On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv, 14): not stated to have given a special counsel of obedience. “Obedience is rightly placed before victims, since by vic- Therefore the vow of poverty is greater than the vow of tims another’s flesh, but by obedience one’s own will, is obedience. sacrificed.” Now the religious vows are holocausts, as Objection 2. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 26:20) that stated above (Aa. 1,3, ad 6). Therefore the vow of obe- “no price is worthy of a continent soul.” Now the vow of dience is the chief of all religious vows. that which is more worthy is itself more excellent. There- I answer that, The vow of obedience is the chief of fore the vow of continence is more excellent than the vow the three religious vows, and this for three reasons. of obedience. First, because by the vow of obedience man offers God Objection 3. Further, the greater a vow the more in- something greater, namely his own will; for this is of more dispensable it would seem to be. Now the vows of poverty account than his own body, which he offers God by con- and continence “are so inseparable from the monastic rule, tinence, and than external things, which he offers God by that not even the Sovereign Pontiff can allow them to be the vow of poverty. Wherefore that which is done out of broken,” according to a Decretal (De Statu Monach., cap. obedience is more acceptable to God than that which is Cum ad monasterium): yet he can dispense a religious done of one’s own will, according to the saying of Jerome 2042 (Ep. cxxv ad Rustic Monach.): “My words are intended to “No one, methinks, would prefer virginity to the monastic teach you not to rely on your own judgment”: and a little life.”∗. further on he says: “You may not do what you will; you Reply to Objection 1. The counsel of obedience was must eat what you are bidden to eat, you may possess as included in the very following of Christ, since to obey much as you receive, clothe yourself with what is given to is to follow another’s will. Consequently it is more per- you.” Hence fasting is not acceptable to God if it is done tinent to perfection than the vow of poverty, because as of one’s own will, according to Is. 58:3, “Behold in the Jerome, commenting on Mat. 19:27, “Behold we have day of your fast your own will is found.” left all things,” observes, “Peter added that which is per- Secondly, because the vow of obedience includes the fect when he said: And have followed Thee.” other vows, but not vice versa: for a religious, though Reply to Objection 2. The words quoted mean that bound by vow to observe continence and poverty, yet continence is to be preferred, not to all other acts of virtue, these also come under obedience, as well as many other but to conjugal chastity, or to external riches of gold and things besides the keeping of continence and poverty. silver which are measured by weight†. Or again conti- Thirdly, because the vow of obedience extends prop- nence is taken in a general sense for abstinence from ali erly to those acts that are closely connected with the end evil, as stated above (q. 155, a. 4, ad 1). of religion; and the more closely a thing is connected with Reply to Objection 3. The Pope cannot dispense a the end, the better it is. religious from his vow of obedience so as to release him It follows from this that the vow of obedience is more from obedience to every superior in matters relating to the essential to the religious life. For if a man without taking a perfection of life, for he cannot exempt him from obedi- vow of obedience were to observe, even by vow, voluntary ence to himself. He can, however, exempt him from sub- poverty and continence, he would not therefore belong to jection to a lower superior, but this is not to dispense him the religious state, which is to be preferred to virginity ob- from his vow of obedience. served even by vow; for Augustine says (De Virgin. xlvi): Whether a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses the things contained in IIa IIae q. 186 a. 9 his rule? Objection 1. It would seem that a religious sins mor- religious in mortal sin, the religious life would be fraught tally whenever he transgresses the things contained in his with danger of account of its multitude of observances. rule. For to break a vow is a sin worthy of condemna- Therefore not every transgression of the things contained tion, as appears from 1 Tim. 5:11,12, where the Apostle in the rule is a mortal sin. says that widows who “will marry have [Vulg.: ‘having’] I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 1,2), a thing damnation, because they have made void their first faith.” is contained in the rule in two ways. First, as the end of But religious are bound to a rule by the vows of their pro- the rule, for instance things that pertain to the acts of the fession. Therefore they sin mortally by transgressing the virtues; and the transgression of these, as regards those things contained in their rule. which come under a common precept, involves a mortal Objection 2. Further, the rule is enjoined upon a reli- sin; but as regards those which are not included in the gious in the same way as a law. Now he who transgresses common obligation of a precept, the transgression thereof a precept of law sins mortally. Therefore it would seem does not involve a mortal sin, except by reason of con- that a monk sins mortally if he transgresses the things con- tempt, because, as stated above (a. 2), a religious is not tained in his rule. bound to be perfect, but to tend to perfection, to which the Objection 3. Further, contempt involves a mortal sin. contempt of perfection is opposed. Now whoever repeatedly does what he ought not to do Secondly, a thing is contained in the rule through per- seems to sin from contempt. Therefore it would seem that taining to the outward practice, such as all external ob- a religious sins mortally by frequently transgressing the servances, to some of which a religious is bound by the things contained in his rule. vow of his profession. Now the vow of profession re- On the contrary, The religious state is safer than the gards chiefly the three things aforesaid, namely poverty, secular state; wherefore Gregory at the beginning of his continence, and obedience, while all others are directed to Morals‡ compares the secular life to the stormy sea, and these. Consequently the transgression of these three in- the religious life to the calm port. But if every transgres- volves a mortal sin, while the transgression of the others sion of the things contained in his rule were to involve a does not involve a mortal sin, except either by reason of ∗ St. Augustine wrote not ‘monasterio’ but ‘martyrio’—to ‘martyrdom’; and St. Thomas quotes the passage correctly above, q. 124, a. 3 and q. 152, a. 5 † ‘Pondere,’ referring to the Latin ‘ponderatio’ in the Vulgate, which the Douay version renders ‘price.’ ‡ Epist. Missoria, ad Leand. Episc. i 2043 contempt of the rule (since this is directly contrary to the nial; but they bind one to suffer the punishment affixed profession whereby a man vows to live according to the thereto, because it is in this way that they are bound to rule), or by reason of a precept, whether given orally by observe such things. Nevertheless they may sin venially a superior, or expressed in the rule, since this would be to or mortally through neglect, concupiscence, or contempt. act contrary to the vow of obedience. Reply to Objection 2. Not all the contents of the law Reply to Objection 1. He who professes a rule does are set forth by way of precept; for some are expressed un- not vow to observe all the things contained in the rule, but der the form of ordinance or statute binding under pain of he vows the regular life which consists essentially in the a fixed punishment. Accordingly, just as in the civil law three aforesaid things. Hence in certain religious orders the transgression of a legal statute does not always ren- precaution is taken to profess, not the rule, but to live ac- der a man deserving of bodily death, so neither in the law cording to the rule, i.e. to tend to form one’s conduct in of the Church does every ordinance or statute bind under accordance with the rule as a kind of model; and this is mortal sin; and the same applies to the statutes of the rule. set aside by contempt. Yet greater precaution is observed Reply to Objection 3. An action or transgression pro- in some religious orders by professing obedience accord- ceeds from contempt when a man’s will refuses to submit ing to the rule, so that only that which is contrary to a to the ordinance of the law or rule, and from this he pro- precept of the rule is contrary to the profession, while the ceeds to act against the law or rule. on the other hand, he transgression or omission of other things binds only un- does not sin from contempt, but from some other cause, der pain of venial sin, because, as stated above (a. 7, ad when he is led to do something against the ordinance of 2), such things are dispositions to the chief vows. And ve- the law or rule through some particular cause such as con- nial sin is a disposition to mortal, as stated above ( Ia IIae, cupiscence or anger, even though he often repeat the same q. 88, a. 3), inasmuch as it hinders those things whereby a kind of sin through the same or some other cause. Thus man is disposed to keep the chief precepts of Christ’s law, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that “not all sins namely the precepts of charity. are committed through proud contempt.” Nevertheless There is also a religious order, that of the Friars the frequent repetition of a sin leads dispositively to con- Preachers, where such like transgressions or omissions do tempt, according to the words of Prov. 18:3, “The wicked not, by their very nature, involve sin, either mortal or ve- man, when he is come into the depth of sins, contemneth.” Whether a religious sins more grievously than a secular by the same kind of sin? IIa IIae q. 186 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that a religious does not low that religious are worse off than seculars: and con- sin more grievously than a secular by the same kind of sin. sequently it would not be a wholesome counsel to enter For it is written (2 Paralip 30:18,19): “The Lord Who is religion. good will show mercy to all them who with their whole On the contrary, The greater the evil the more it heart seek the Lord the God of their fathers, and will not would seem to be deplored. But seemingly the sins of impute it to them that they are not sanctified.” Now reli- those who are in the state of holiness and perfection are gious apparently follow the Lord the God of their fathers the most deplorable, for it is written (Jer. 23:9): “My heart with their whole heart rather than seculars, who partly is broken within me,” and afterwards (Jer. 23:11): “For give themselves and their possessions to God and reserve the prophet and the priest are defiled; and in My house part for themselves, as Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.). I have found their wickedness.” Therefore religious and Therefore it would seem that it is less imputed to them if others who are in the state of perfection, other things be- they fall short somewhat of their sanctification. ing equal, sin more grievously. Objection 2. Further, God is less angered at a man’s I answer that, A sin committed by a religious may sins if he does some good deeds, according to 2 Paralip be in three ways more grievous than a like sin committed 19:2,3, “Thou helpest the ungodly, and thou art joined by a secular. First, if it be against his religious vow; for in friendship with them that hate the Lord, and therefore instance if he be guilty of fornication or theft, because by thou didst deserve indeed the wrath of the Lord: but good fornication he acts against the vow of continence, and by works are found in thee.” Now religious do more good theft against the vow of poverty; and not merely against works than seculars. Therefore if they commit any sins, a precept of the divine law. Secondly, if he sin out of God is less angry with them. contempt, because thereby he would seem to be the more Objection 3. Further, this present life is not carried ungrateful for the divine favors which have raised him through without sin, according to James 3:2, “In many to the state of perfection. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. things we all offend.” Therefore if the sins of religious 10:29) that the believer “deserveth worse punishments” were more grievous than those of seculars it would fol- who through contempt tramples under foot the Son of 2044 God. Hence the Lord complains (Jer. 11:15): “What is woman and desired her knew to say: ‘I have sinned and the meaning that My beloved hath wrought much wicked- done evil before Thee.’ ” Secondly, he is assisted by his ness in My house?” Thirdly, the sin of a religious may be fellow-religious to rise again, according to Eccles. 4:10, greater on account of scandal, because many take note of “If one fall he shall be supported by the other: woe to him his manner of life: wherefore it is written (Jer. 23:14): “I that is alone, for when he falleth he hath none to lift him have seen the likeness of adulterers, and the way of lying up.” in the Prophets of Jerusalem; and they strengthened the Reply to Objection 1. The words quoted refer to hands of the wicked, that no man should return from his things done through weakness or ignorance, but not to evil doings.” those that are done out of contempt. On the other hand, if a religious, not out of contempt, Reply to Objection 2. Josaphat also, to whom these but out of weakness or ignorance, commit a sin that is not words were addressed, sinned not out of contempt, but out against the vow of his profession, without giving scan- of a certain weakness of human affection. dal (for instance if he commit it in secret) he sins less Reply to Objection 3. The just sin not easily out of grievously in the same kind of sin than a secular, because contempt; but sometimes they fall into a sin through igno- his sin if slight is absorbed as it were by his many good rance or weakness from which they easily arise. If, how- works, and if it be mortal, he more easily recovers from ever, they go so far as to sin out of contempt, they become it. First, because he has a right intention towards God, most wicked and incorrigible, according to the word of and though it be intercepted for the moment, it is easily Jer. 2:20: “Thou hast broken My yoke, thou hast burst restored to its former object. Hence Origen commenting My bands, and thou hast said: ‘I will not serve.’ For on on Ps. 36:24, “When he shall fall he shall not be bruised,” every high hill and under every green tree thou didst pros- says (Hom. iv in Ps. 36): “The wicked man, if he sin, titute thyself.” Hence Augustine says (Ep. lxxviii ad Pleb. repents not, and fails to make amends for his sin. But the Hippon.): “From the time I began to serve God, even as I just man knows how to make amends and recover himself; scarcely found better men than those who made progress even as he who had said: ‘I know not the man,’ shortly af- in monasteries, so have I not found worse than those who terwards when the Lord had looked on him, knew to shed in the monastery have fallen.” most bitter tears, and he who from the roof had seen a 2045 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 187 Of Those Things That Are Competent to Religious (In Six Articles) We must now consider the things that are competent to religious; and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is lawful for them to teach, preach, and do like things? (2) Whether it is lawful for them to meddle in secular business? (3) Whether they are bound to manual labor? (4) Whether it is lawful for them to live on alms? (5) Whether it is lawful for them to quest? (6) Whether it is lawful for them to wear coarser clothes than other persons? Whether it is lawful for religious to teach, preach, and the like? IIa IIae q. 187 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for religious our office, be it lawful to monk priests who are configured to teach, preach, and the like. For it is said (VII, qu. i, to the apostles, to preach, baptize, give communion, pray can. Hoc nequaquam) in an ordinance of a synod of Con- for sinners, impose penance, and absolve from sin.” stantinople∗: “The monastic life is one of subjection and I answer that, A thing is declared to be unlawful to discipleship, not of teaching, authority, or pastoral care.” a person in two ways. First, because there is something And Jerome says (ad Ripar. et Desider.†): “A monk’s duty in him contrary to that which is declared unlawful to him: is not to teach but to lament.” Again Pope Leo‡: says thus to no man is it lawful to sin, because each man has in “Let none dare to preach save the priests of the Lord, be himself reason and an obligation to God’s law, to which he monk or layman, and no matter what knowledge he things sin is contrary. And in this way it is said to be may boast of having.” Now it is not lawful to exceed the unlawful for a person to preach, teach, or do like things, bounds of one’s office or transgress the ordinance of the because there is in him something incompatible with these Church. Therefore seemingly it is unlawful for religious things, either by reason of a precept—thus those who are to teach, preach, and the like. irregular by ordinance of the Church may not be raised to Objection 2. Further, in an ordinance of the Council the sacred orders—or by reason of sin, according to Ps. of Nicea (cf. XVI, qu. i, can. Placuit) it is laid down 49:16, “But to the sinner God hath said: Why dost thou as follows: “It is our absolute and peremptory command declare My justice?” addressed to all that monks shall not hear confessions ex- In this way it is not unlawful for religious to preach, cept of one another, as is right, that they shall not bury the teach, and do like things, both because they are bound dead except those dwelling with them in the monastery, or neither by vow nor by precept of their rule to abstain from if by chance a brother happen to die while on a visit.” But these things, and because they are not rendered less apt just as the above belong to the duty of clerics, so also do for these things by any sin committed, but on the contrary preaching and teaching. Therefore since “the business of they are the more apt through having taken upon them- a monk differs from that of a cleric,” as Jerome says (Ep. selves the practice of holiness. For it is foolish to say that xiv ad Heliod.), it would seem unlawful for religious to a man is rendered less fit for spiritual duties through ad- preach, teach, and the like. vancing himself in holiness; and consequently it is foolish Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Regist. v, Ep. 1): to declare that the religious state is an obstacle to the ful- “No man can fulfil ecclesiastical duties, and keep consis- filment of such like duties. This error is rejected by Pope tently to the monastic rule”: and this is quoted XVI, qu. i, Boniface§ for the reasons given above. His words which can. Nemo potest. Now monks are bound to keep consis- are quoted (XVI, qu. i, can. Sunt. nonnulli) are these: tently to the monastic rule. Therefore it would seem that “There are some who without any dogmatic proof, and they cannot fulfil ecclesiastical duties, whereof teaching with extreme daring, inspired with a zeal rather of bitter- and preaching are a part. Therefore seemingly it is unlaw- ness than of love, assert that monks though they be dead ful for them to preach, teach, and do similar things. to the world and live to God, are unworthy of the power On the contrary, Gregory is quoted (XVI, qu. i, can. of the priestly office, and that they cannot confer penance, Ex auctoritate) as saying: “By authority of this decree nor christen, nor absolve in virtue of the power divinely framed in virtue of our apostolic power and the duty of bestowed on them in the priestly office. But they are alto- ∗ Pseudosynod held by Photius in the year 879 † Contra Vigilant. xvi ‡ Leo I, Ep. cxx ad Theodoret., 6, cf. XVI, qu. i, can. Adjicimus § Boniface IV 2046 gether wrong.” He proves this first because it is not con-power to do these things. They can, however, do them if trary to the rule; thus he continues: “For neither did the they receive orders, or ordinary jurisdiction, or if matters Blessed Benedict the saintly teacher of monks forbid this of jurisdiction be delegated to them. in any way,” nor is it forbidden in other rules. Secondly, he Reply to Objection 1. It results from the words refutes the above error from the usefulness of the monks, quoted that the fact of their being monks does not give when he adds at the end of the same chapter: “The more monks the power to do these things, yet it does not in- perfect a man is, the more effective is he in these, namely volve in them anything contrary to the performance of in spiritual works.” these acts. Secondly, a thing is said to be unlawful for a man, Reply to Objection 2. Again, this ordinance of the not on account of there being in him something contrary Council of Nicea forbids monks to claim the power of ex- thereto, but because he lacks that which enables him to do ercising those acts on the ground of their being monks, it: thus it is unlawful for a deacon to say mass, because he but it does not forbid those acts being delegated to them. is not in priestly orders; and it is unlawful for a priest to Reply to Objection 3. These two things are incompat- deliver judgment because he lacks the episcopal authority. ible, namely, the ordinary cure of ecclesiastical duties, and Here, however, a distinction must be made. Because those the observance of the monastic rule in a monastery. But things which are a matter of an order, cannot be deputed to this does not prevent monks and other religious from be- one who has not the order, whereas matters of jurisdiction ing sometimes occupied with ecclesiastical duties through can be deputed to those who have not ordinary jurisdic- being deputed thereto by superiors having ordinary cure; tion: thus the delivery of a judgment is deputed by the especially members of religious orders that are especially bishop to a simple priest. In this sense it is said to be un- instituted for that purpose, as we shall say further on lawful for monks and other religious to preach, teach, and (q. 188, a. 4). so forth, because the religious state does not give them the Whether it is lawful for religious to occupy themselves with secular business? IIa IIae q. 187 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for religious to On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 16:1): “I occupy themselves with secular business. For in the de- commend to you Phoebe our Sister,” and further on (Rom. cree quoted above (a. 1) of Pope Boniface it is said that the 16:2), “that you assist her in whatsoever business she shall “Blessed Benedict bade them to be altogether free from have need of you.” secular business; and this is most explicitly prescribed by I answer that, As stated above (q. 186, Aa. 1,7, ad the apostolic doctrine and the teaching of all the Fathers, 1), the religious state is directed to the attainment of the not only to religious, but also to all the canonical clergy,” perfection of charity, consisting principally in the love of according to 2 Tim. 2:4, “No man being a soldier to God, God and secondarily in the love of our neighbor. Conse- entangleth himself with secular business.” Now it is the quently that which religious intend chiefly and for its own duty of all religious to be soldiers of God. Therefore it sake is to give themselves to God. Yet if their neighbor be is unlawful for them to occupy themselves with secular in need, they should attend to his affairs out of charity, ac- business. cording to Gal. 6:2, “Bear ye one another’s burthens: and Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (1 Thess. so you shall fulfil the law of Christ,” since through serv- 4:11): “That you use your endeavor to be quiet, and that ing their neighbor for God’s sake, they are obedient to the you do your own business,” which a gloss explains thus— divine love. Hence it is written (James 1:27): “Religion “by refraining from other people’s affairs, so as to be the clean and undefiled before God and the Father, is this: to better able to attend to the amendment of your own life.” visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation,” which Now religious devote themselves in a special way to the means, according to a gloss, to assist the helpless in their amendment of their life. Therefore they should not oc- time of need. cupy themselves with secular business. We must conclude therefore that it is unlawful for ei- Objection 3. Further, Jerome, commenting on Mat. ther monks or clerics to carry on secular business from 11:8, “Behold they that are clothed in soft garments are in motives of avarice; but from motives of charity, and with the houses of kings,” says: “Hence we gather that an aus- their superior’s permission, they may occupy themselves tere life and severe preaching should avoid the palaces of with due moderation in the administration and direction kings and the mansions of the voluptuous.” But the needs of secular business. Wherefore it is said in the Decre- of secular business induce men to frequent the palaces of tals (Dist. xxxviii, can. Decrevit): “The holy synod de- kings. Therefore it is unlawful for religious to occupy crees that henceforth no cleric shall buy property or oc- themselves with secular business. cupy himself with secular business, save with a view to 2047 the care of the fatherless, orphans, or widows, or when but charity. the bishop of the city commands him to take charge of Reply to Objection 3. To haunt the palaces of kings the business connected with the Church.” And the same from motives of pleasure, glory, or avarice is not becom- applies to religious as to clerics, because they are both ing to religious, but there is nothing unseemly in their vis- debarred from secular business on the same grounds, as iting them from motives of piety. Hence it is written (4 stated above. Kings 4:13): “Hast thou any business, and wilt thou that Reply to Objection 1. Monks are forbidden to occupy I speak to the king or to the general of the army?” Like- themselves with secular business from motives of avarice, wise it becomes religious to go to the palaces of kings to but not from motives of charity. rebuke and guide them, even as John the Baptist rebuked Reply to Objection 2. To occupy oneself with secular Herod, as related in Mat. 14:4. business on account of another’s need is not officiousness Whether religious are bound to manual labor? IIa IIae q. 187 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that religious are bound say: “Those who say they are occupied in reading, do they to manual labor. For religious are not exempt from the not find there what the Apostle commanded? What sort of observance of precepts. Now manual labor is a matter of perverseness is this, to wish to read but not to obey what precept according to 1 Thess. 4:11, “Work with your own one reads?” Fourthly, he adds in reference to preaching†: hands as we commanded you”; wherefore Augustine says “If one has to speak, and is so busy that he cannot spare (De oper. Monach. xxx): “But who can allow these in- time for manual work, can all in the monastery do this? solent men,” namely religious that do no work, of whom And since all cannot do this, why should all make this a he is speaking there, “who disregard the most salutary ad- pretext for being exempt? And even if all were able, they monishment of the Apostle, not merely to be borne with should do so by turns, not only so that the others may be as being weaker than others, but even to preach as though occupied in other works, but also because it suffices that they were holier than others.” Therefore it would seem one speak while many listen.” Therefore it would seem that religious are bound to manual labor. that religious should not desist from manual labor on ac- Objection 2. Further, a gloss∗ on 2 Thess. 3:10, “If count of such like spiritual works to which they devote any man will not work, neither let him eat,” says: “Some themselves. say that this command of the Apostle refers to spiritual Objection 4. Further, a gloss on Lk. 12:33, “Sell what works, and not to the bodily labor of the farmer or crafts- you possess,” says: “Not only give your clothes to the man”; and further on: “But it is useless for them to try to poor, but sell what you possess, that having once for all hide from themselves and from others the fact that they renounced all your possessions for the Lord’s sake, you are unwilling not only to fulfil, but even to understand the may henceforth work with the labor of your hands, so as useful admonishments of charity”; and again: “He wishes to have wherewith to live or to give alms.” Now it belongs God’s servants to make a living by working with their properly to religious to renounce all they have. Therefore bodies.” Now religious especially are called servants of it would seem likewise to belong to them to live and give God, because they give themselves entirely to the service alms through the labor of their hands. of God, as Dionysius asserts (Eccl. Hier. vi). Therefore it Objection 5. Further, religious especially would seem would seem that they are bound to manual labor. to be bound to imitate the life of the apostles, since they Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De oper. profess the state of perfection. Now the apostles worked Monach. xvii): “I would fain know how they would oc- with their own hands, according to 1 Cor. 4:12: “We la- cupy themselves, who are unwilling to work with their bor, working with our own hands.” Therefore it would body. We occupy our time, say they, with prayers, psalms, seem that religious are bound to manual labor. reading, and the word of God.” Yet these things are no ex- On the contrary, Those precepts that are commonly cuse, and he proves this, as regards each in particular. For enjoined upon all are equally binding on religious and sec- in the first place, as to prayer, he says: “One prayer of the ulars. But the precept of manual labor is enjoined upon obedient man is sooner granted than ten thousand prayers all in common, as appears from 2 Thess. 3:6, “Withdraw of the contemptuous”: meaning that those are contemp- yourselves from every brother walking disorderly,” etc. tuous and unworthy to be heard who work not with their (for by brother he signifies every Christian, according to 1 hands. Secondly, as to the divine praises he adds: “Even Cor. 7:12, “If any brother have a wife that believeth not”). while working with their hands they can easily sing hymns Now it is written in the same passage (2 Thess. 3:10): “If to God.” Thirdly, with regard to reading, he goes on to any man will not work, neither let him eat.” Therefore ∗ St. Augustine, (De oper. Monach. xxi) † Cap. xviii 2048 religious are not bound to manual labor any more than “not so much in his capacity of teacher as on account of seculars are. the faults of the people.” I answer that, Manual labor is directed to four things. It must, however, be observed that under manual la- First and principally to obtain food; wherefore it was said bor are comprised all those human occupations whereby to the first man (Gn. 3:19): “In the sweat of thy face shalt man can lawfully gain a livelihood, whether by using his thou eat bread,” and it is written (Ps. 127:2): “For thou hands, his feet, or his tongue. For watchmen, couriers, shalt eat the labors of thy hands.” Secondly, it is directed and such like who live by their labor, are understood to to the removal of idleness whence arise many evils; hence live by their handiwork: because, since the hand is “the it is written (Ecclus. 33:28,29): “Send” thy slave “to organ of organs”†, handiwork denotes all kinds of work, work, that he be not idle, for idleness hath taught much whereby a man may lawfully gain a livelihood. evil.” Thirdly, it is directed to the curbing of concupis- In so far as manual labor is directed to the removal of cence, inasmuch as it is a means of afflicting the body; idleness, or the affliction of the body, it does not come un- hence it is written (2 Cor. 6:5,6): “In labors, in watch- der a necessity of precept if we consider it in itself, since ings, in fastings, in chastity.” Fourthly, it is directed to there are many other means besides manual labor of af- almsgiving, wherefore it is written (Eph. 4:28): “He that flicting the body or of removing idleness: for the flesh stole, let him now steal no more; but rather let him labor, is afflicted by fastings and watchings, and idleness is re- working with his hands the thing which is good, that he moved by meditation on the Holy Scriptures and by the may have something to give to him that suffereth need.” divine praises. Hence a gloss on Ps. 118:82, “My eyes Accordingly, in so far as manual labor is directed to ob- have failed for Thy word,” says: “He is not idle who med- taining food, it comes under a necessity of precept in so itates only on God’s word; nor is he who works abroad far as it is necessary for that end: since that which is di- any better than he who devotes himself to the study of rected to an end derives its necessity from that end, being, knowing the truth.” Consequently for these reasons reli- in effect, so far necessary as the end cannot be obtained gious are not bound to manual labor, as neither are secu- without it. Consequently he who has no other means of lars, except when they are so bound by the statutes of their livelihood is bound to work with his hands, whatever his order. Thus Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustic Monach.): condition may be. This is signified by the words of the “The Egyptian monasteries are wont to admit none un- Apostle: “If any man will not work, neither let him eat,” less they work or labor, not so much for the necessities as though to say: “The necessity of manual labor is the ne- of life, as for the welfare of the soul, lest it be led astray cessity of meat.” So that if one could live without eating, by wicked thoughts.” But in so far as manual labor is di- one would not be bound to work with one’s hands. The rected to almsgiving, it does not come under the necessity same applies to those who have no other lawful means of precept, save perchance in some particular case, when a of livelihood: since a man is understood to be unable to man is under an obligation to give alms, and has no other do what he cannot do lawfully. Wherefore we find that means of having the wherewithal to assist the poor: for in the Apostle prescribed manual labor merely as a remedy such a case religious would be bound as well as seculars for the sin of those who gained their livelihood by un- to do manual labor. lawful means. For the Apostle ordered manual labor first Reply to Objection 1. This command of the Apostle of all in order to avoid theft, as appears from Eph. 4:28, is of natural law: wherefore a gloss on 2 Thess. 3:6, “That “He that stole, let him now steal no more; but rather let you withdraw yourselves from every brother walking dis- him labor, working with his hands.” Secondly, to avoid orderly,” says, “otherwise than the natural order requires,” the coveting of others’ property, wherefore it is written (1 and he is speaking of those who abstained from manual Thess. 4:11): “Work with your own hands, as we com- labor. Hence nature has provided man with hands instead manded you, and that you walk honestly towards them of arms and clothes, with which she has provided other that are without.” Thirdly, to avoid the discreditable pur- animals, in order that with his hands he may obtain these suits whereby some seek a livelihood. Hence he says (2 and all other necessaries. Hence it is clear that this pre- Thess. 3:10-12): “When we were with you, this we de- cept, even as all the precepts of the natural law, is binding clared to you: that if any man will not work, neither let on both religious and seculars alike. Yet not everyone sins him eat. For we have heard that there are some among that works not with his hands, because those precepts of you who walk disorderly, working not at all, but curiously the natural law which regard the good of the many are not meddling” (namely, as a gloss explains it, “who make a binding on each individual, but it suffices that one person living by meddling in unlawful things). Now we charge apply himself to this business and another to that; for in- them that are such, and beseech them. . . that working with stance, that some be craftsmen, others husbandmen, oth- silence, they would eat their own bread.” Hence Jerome ers judges, and others teachers, and so forth, according to states (Super epist. ad Galat.∗) that the Apostle said this the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:17), “If the whole ∗ Preface to Bk. ii of Commentary † De Anima iii, 8 2049 body were the eye, where would be the hearing? If the what he says of reading and prayer is to be referred to the whole were the hearing, where would be the smelling?” private prayer and reading which even lay people do at Reply to Objection 2. This gloss is taken from Au- times, and not to those who perform public prayers in the gustine’s De operibus Monachorum, cap. 21, where he church, or give public lectures in the schools. Hence he speaks against certain monks who declared it to be un- does not say: “Those who say they are occupied in teach- lawful for the servants of God to work with their hands, ing and instructing,” but: “Those who say they are occu- on account of our Lord’s saying (Mat. 6:25): “Be not pied in reading.” Again he speaks of that preaching which solicitous for your life, what you shall eat.” Neverthe- is addressed, not publicly to the people, but to one or a less his words do not imply that religious are bound to few in particular by way of private admonishment. Hence work with their hands, if they have other means of liveli- he says expressly: “If one has to speak.” For according hood. This is clear from his adding: “He wishes the ser- to a gloss on 1 Cor. 2:4, “Speech is addressed privately, vants of God to make a living by working with their bod- preaching to many.” ies.” Now this does not apply to religious any more than Reply to Objection 4. Those who despise all for to seculars, which is evident for two reasons. First, on God’s sake are bound to work with their hands, when account of the way in which the Apostle expresses him- they have no other means of livelihood, or of almsgiving self, by saying: “That you withdraw yourselves from ev- (should the case occur where almsgiving were a matter of ery brother walking disorderly.” For he calls all Christians precept), but not otherwise, as stated in the Article. It is brothers, since at that time religious orders were not as yet in this sense that the gloss quoted is to be understood. founded. Secondly, because religious have no other obli- Reply to Objection 5. That the apostles worked with gations than what seculars have, except as required by the their hands was sometimes a matter of necessity, some- rule they profess: wherefore if their rule contain nothing times a work of supererogation. It was of necessity when about manual labor, religious are not otherwise bound to they failed to receive a livelihood from others. Hence a manual labor than seculars are. gloss on 1 Cor. 4:12, “We labor, working with our own Reply to Objection 3. A man may devote himself in hands,” adds, “because no man giveth to us.” It was su- two ways to all the spiritual works mentioned by Augus- pererogation, as appears from 1 Cor. 9:12, where the tine in the passage quoted: in one way with a view to the Apostle says that he did not use the power he had of liv- common good, in another with a view to his private advan- ing by the Gospel. The Apostle had recourse to this su- tage. Accordingly those who devote themselves publicly pererogation for three motives. First, in order to deprive to the aforesaid spiritual works are thereby exempt from the false apostles of the pretext for preaching, for they manual labor for two reasons: first, because it behooves preached merely for a temporal advantage; hence he says them to be occupied exclusively with such like works; (2 Cor. 11:12): “But what I do, that I will do that I may secondly, because those who devote themselves to such cut off the occasion from them,” etc. Secondly, in order works have a claim to be supported by those for whose to avoid burdening those to whom he preached; hence he advantage they work. says (2 Cor. 12:13): “What is there that you have had less On the other hand, those who devote themselves to than the other churches, but that I myself was not bur- such works not publicly but privately as it were, ought thensome to you?” Thirdly, in order to give an example not on that account to be exempt from manual labor, nor of work to the idle; hence he says (2 Thess. 3:8,9): “We have they a claim to be supported by the offerings of the worked night and day. . . that we might give ourselves a faithful, and it is of these that Augustine is speaking. For pattern unto you, to imitate us.” However, the Apostle when he says: “They can sing hymns to God even while did not do this in places like Athens where he had facili- working with their hands; like the craftsmen who give ties for preaching daily, as Augustine observes (De oper. tongue to fable telling without withdrawing their hands Monach. xviii). Yet religious are not for this reason bound from their work,” it is clear that he cannot refer to those to imitate the Apostle in this matter, since they are not who sing the canonical hours in the church, but to those bound to all works of supererogation: wherefore neither who tell psalms or hymns as private prayers. Likewise did the other apostles work with their hands. Whether it is lawful for religious to live on alms? IIa IIae q. 187 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for religious to alms of the Church, so that the Church may have “suffi- live on alms. For the Apostle (1 Tim. 5:16) forbids those cient for them that are widows indeed.” And Jerome says widows who have other means of livelihood to live on the to Pope Damasus∗ that “those who have sufficient income ∗ Cf. Cf. Can. Clericos, cause. i, qu. 2; Can. Quoniam, cause xvi, qu. 1; Regul. Monach. iv among the supposititious works of St. Jerome 2050 from their parents and their own possessions, if they take though he was able-bodied, we do not read that he sought what belongs to the poor they commit and incur the guilt to live by the labor of his hands. Therefore religious may of sacrilege, and by the abuse of such things they eat and lawfully live on alms. drink judgment to themselves.” Now religious if they be I answer that, A man may lawfully live on what is able-bodied can support themselves by the work of their his or due to him. Now that which is given out of lib- hands. Therefore it would seem that they sin if they con- erality becomes the property of the person to whom it is sume the alms belonging to the poor. given. Wherefore religious and clerics whose monasteries Objection 2. Further, to live at the expense of the or churches have received from the munificence of princes faithful is the stipend appointed to those who preach the or of any of the faithful any endowment whatsoever for Gospel in payment of their labor or work, according to their support, can lawfully live on such endowment with- Mat. 10:10: “The workman is worthy of his meat.” Now out working with their hands, and yet without doubt they it belongs not to religious to preach the Gospel, but chiefly live on alms. Wherefore in like manner if religious receive to prelates who are pastors and teachers. Therefore reli- movable goods from the faithful they can lawfully live on gious cannot lawfully live on the alms of the faithful. them. For it is absurd to say that a person may accept an Objection 3. Further, religious are in the state of per- alms of some great property but not bread or some small fection. But it is more perfect to give than to receive alms; sum of money. Nevertheless since these gifts would seem for it is written (Acts 20:35): “It is a more blessed thing to be bestowed on religious in order that they may have to give, rather than to receive.” Therefore they should more leisure for religious works, in which the donors of not live on alms, but rather should they give alms of their temporal goods wish to have a share, the use of such gifts handiwork. would become unlawful for them if they abstained from Objection 4. Further, it belongs to religious to avoid religious works, because in that case, so far as they are obstacles to virtue and occasions of sin. Now the receiv- concerned, they would be thwarting the intention of those ing of alms offers an occasion of sin, and hinders an act who bestowed those gifts. of virtue; hence a gloss on 2 Thess. 3:9, “That we might A thing is due to a person in two ways. First, on ac- give ourselves a pattern unto you,” says: “He who through count of necessity, which makes all things common, as idleness eats often at another’s table, must needs flatter the Ambrose∗ asserts. Consequently if religious be in need one who feeds him.” It is also written (Ex. 23:8): “Neither they can lawfully live on alms. Such necessity may occur shalt thou take bribes which . . . blind the wise, and pervert in three ways. First, through weakness of body, the re- the words of the just,” and (Prov. 22:7): “The borrower is sult being that they are unable to make a living by work- servant to him that lendeth.” This is contrary to religion, ing with their hands. Secondly, because that which they wherefore a gloss on 2 Thess. 3:9, “That we might give gain by their handiwork is insufficient for their livelihood: ourselves a pattern,” etc., says, “our religion calls men to wherefore Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xvii) that liberty.” Therefore it would seem that religious should not “the good works of the faithful should not leave God’s live on alms. servants who work with their hands without a supply of Objection 5. Further, religious especially are bound necessaries, that when the hour comes for them to nourish to imitate the perfection of the apostles; wherefore the their souls, so as to make it impossible for them to do these Apostle says (Phil. 3:15): “Let us. . . as many as are per- corporal works, they be not oppressed by want.” Thirdly, fect, be thus minded.” But the Apostle was unwilling to because of the former mode of life of those who were un- live at the expense of the faithful, either in order to cut off wont to work with their hands: wherefore Augustine says the occasion from the false apostles as he himself says (2 (De oper. Monach. xxi) that “if they had in the world Cor. 11:12), or to avoid giving scandal to the weak, as the wherewithal easily to support this life without work- appears from 1 Cor. 9:12. It would seem therefore that ing, and gave it to the needy when they were converted to religious ought for the same reasons to refrain from living God, we must credit their weakness and bear with it.” For on alms. Hence Augustine says (De oper. Monach. 28): those who have thus been delicately brought up are wont “Cut off the occasion of disgraceful marketing whereby to be unable to bear the toil of bodily labor. you lower yourselves in the esteem of others, and give In another way a thing becomes due to a person scandal to the weak: and show men that you seek not an through his affording others something whether tempo- easy livelihood in idleness, but the kingdom of God by the ral or spiritual, according to 1 Cor. 9:11, “If we have narrow and strait way.” sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great matter if we On the contrary, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 1): The reap your carnal things?” And in this sense religious may Blessed Benedict after leaving his home and parents dwelt live on alms as being due to them in four ways. First, if for three years in a cave, and while there lived on the food they preach by the authority of the prelates. Secondly, if brought to him by a monk from Rome. Nevertheless, al- they be ministers of the altar, according to 1 Cor. 9:13,14, ∗ Basil, Serm. de Temp. lxiv, among the supposititious works of St. Ambrose 2051 “They that serve the altar partake with the altar. So also that in a life wherein senators become laborers, laborers the lord ordained that they who preach the Gospel should should become idle, and that where the lords of the manor live by the Gospel.” Hence Augustine says (De oper. have come after renouncing their ease, the serfs should Monach. xxi): “If they be gospelers, I allow, they have” live in comfort.” (a claim to live at the charge of the faithful): “if they be Reply to Objection 1. These authorities must be un- ministers of the altar and dispensers of the sacraments, derstood as referring to cases of necessity, that is to say, they need not insist on it, but it is theirs by perfect right.” when there is no other means of succoring the poor: for The reason for this is because the sacrament of the al- then they would be bound not only to refrain from accept- tar wherever it be offered is common to all the faithful. ing alms, but also to give what they have for the support Thirdly, if they devote themselves to the study of Holy of the needy. Writ to the common profit of the whole Church. Where- Reply to Objection 2. Prelates are competent to fore Jerome says (Contra Vigil. xiii): “It is still the custom preach in virtue of their office, but religious may be com- in Judea, not only among us but also among the Hebrews, petent to do so in virtue of delegation; and thus when they for those who meditate on the law of the Lord day and work in the field of the Lord, they may make their living night, end have no other share on earth but God alone, to thereby, according to 2 Tim. 2:6, “The husbandman that be supported by the subscriptions of the synagogues and laboreth must first partake of the fruits,” which a gloss ex- of the whole world.” Fourthly, if they have endowed the plains thus, “that is to say, the preacher, who in the field of monastery with the goods they possessed, they may live the Church tills the hearts of his hearers with the plough on the alms given to the monastery. Hence Augustine says of God’s word.” Those also who minister to the preach- (De oper. Monach. xxv) that “those who renouncing or ers may live on alms. Hence a gloss on Rom. 15:27, distributing their means, whether ample or of any amount “If the Gentiles have been made partakers of their spiri- whatever, have desired with pious and salutary humility tual things, they ought also in carnal things to minister to to be numbered among the poor of Christ, have a claim on them,” says, “namely, to the Jews who sent preachers from the community and on brotherly love to receive a liveli- Jerusalem.” There are moreover other reasons for which a hood in return. They are to be commended indeed if they person has a claim to live at the charge of the faithful, as work with their hands, but if they be unwilling, who will stated above. dare to force them? Nor does it matter, as he goes on to Reply to Objection 3. Other things being equal, it is say, to which monasteries, or in what place any one of more perfect to give than to receive. Nevertheless to give them has bestowed his goods on his needy brethren; for or to give up all one’s possessions for Christ’s sake, and all Christians belong to one commonwealth.” to receive a little for one’s livelihood is better than to give On the other hand, in the default of any necessity, or to the poor part by part, as stated above (q. 186, a. 3, ad of their affording any profit to others, it is unlawful for 6). religious to wish to live in idleness on the alms given to Reply to Objection 4. To receive gifts so as to in- the poor. Hence Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxii): crease one’s wealth, or to accept a livelihood from another “Sometimes those who enter the profession of God’s ser- without having a claim to it, and without profit to others vice come from a servile condition of life, from tilling the or being in need oneself, affords an occasion of sin. But soil or working at some trade or lowly occupation. In their this does not apply to religious, as stated above. case it is not so clear whether they came with the purpose Reply to Objection 5. Whenever there is evident of serving God, or of evading a life of want and toil with necessity for religious living on alms without doing any a view to being fed and clothed in idleness, and further- manual work, as well as an evident profit to be derived by more to being honored by those by whom they were wont others, it is not the weak who are scandalized, but those to be despised and downtrodden. Such persons surely can- who are full of malice like the Pharisees, whose scan- not excuse themselves from work on the score of bodily dal our Lord teaches us to despise (Mat. 15:12-14). If, weakness, for their former mode of life is evidence against however, these motives of necessity and profit be lacking, them.” And he adds further on (De oper. Monach. xxv): the weak might possibly be scandalized thereby; and this “If they be unwilling to work, neither let them eat. For if should be avoided. Yet the same scandal might be occa- the rich humble themselves to piety, it is not that the poor sioned through those who live in idleness on the common may be exalted to pride; since it is altogether unseemly revenues. 2052 Whether it is lawful for religious to beg? IIa IIae q. 187 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for religious to a servant,’ ” and further on: “A beggar is one who entreats beg. For Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxviii): “The another, and a poor man is one who has not enough for most cunning foe has scattered on all sides a great number himself.” Again it is written (Ps. 69:6): “I am needy and of hypocrites wearing the monastic habit, who go wander- poor”; where a gloss says: “ ‘Needy,’ that is a suppliant; ing about the country,” and afterwards he adds: “They all ‘and poor,’ that is, not having enough for myself, because ask, they all demand to be supported in their profitable I have no worldly wealth.” And Jerome says in a letter†: penury, or to be paid for a pretended holiness.” Therefore “Beware lest whereas thy Lord,” i.e. Christ, “begged, thou it would seem that the life of mendicant religious is to be amass other people’s wealth.” Therefore it becomes reli- condemned. gious to beg. Objection 2. Further, it is written (1 Thess. 4:11): I answer that, Two things may be considered in ref- “That you. . . work with your own hands as we com- erence to mendicancy. The first is on the part of the act manded you, and that you walk honestly towards them itself of begging, which has a certain abasement attach- that are without: and that you want nothing of any man’s”: ing to it; since of all men those would seem most abased and a gloss on this passage says: “You must work and not who are not only poor, but are so needy that they have be idle, because work is both honorable and a light to the to receive their meat from others. In this way some de- unbeliever: and you must not covet that which belongs serve praise for begging out of humility, just as they abase to another and much less beg or take anything.” Again a themselves in other ways, as being the most efficacious gloss∗ on 2 Thess. 3:10, “If any man will not work,” etc. remedy against pride which they desire to quench either says: “He wishes the servants of God to work with the in themselves or in others by their example. For just as body, so as to gain a livelihood, and not be compelled by a disease that arises from excessive heat is most effica- want to ask for necessaries.” Now this is to beg. There- ciously healed by things that excel in cold, so proneness fore it would seem unlawful to beg while omitting to work to pride is most efficaciously healed by those things which with one’s hands. savor most of abasement. Hence it is said in the Decretals Objection 3. Further, that which is forbidden by law (II, cap. Si quis semel, de Paenitentia): “To condescend to and contrary to justice, is unbecoming to religious. Now the humblest duties, and to devote oneself to the lowliest begging is forbidden in the divine law; for it is written (Dt. service is an exercise of humility; for thus one is able to 15:4): “There shall be no poor nor beggar among you,” heal the disease of pride and human glory.” Hence Jerome and (Ps. 36:25): “I have not seen the just forsaken, nor his praises Fabiola (Ep. lxxvii ad ocean.) for that she de- seed seeking bread.” Moreover an able-bodied mendicant sired “to receive alms, having poured forth all her wealth is punished by civil law, according to the law (XI, xxvi, de for Christ’s sake.” The Blessed Alexis acted in like man- Valid. Mendicant.). Therefore it is unfitting for religious ner, for, having renounced all his possessions for Christ’s to beg. sake he rejoiced in receiving alms even from his own ser- Objection 4. Further, “Shame is about that which is vants. It is also related of the Blessed Arsenius in the disgraceful,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15). Lives of the Fathers (v, 6) that he gave thanks because Now Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30) that “to be ashamed he was forced by necessity to ask for alms. Hence it is to beg is a sign of good birth.” Therefore it is disgraceful enjoined to some people as a penance for grievous sins to beg: and consequently this is unbecoming to religious. to go on a pilgrimage begging. Since, however, humil- Objection 5. Further, according to our Lord’s com- ity like the other virtues should not be without discretion, mand it is especially becoming to preachers of the Gospel it behooves one to be discreet in becoming a mendicant to live on alms, as stated above (a. 4). Yet it is not be- for the purpose of humiliation, lest a man thereby incur coming that they should beg, since a gloss on 2 Tim. 2:6, the mark of covetousness or of anything else unbecom- “The husbandman, that laboreth,” etc. says: “The Apostle ing. Secondly, mendicancy may be considered on the part wishes the gospeler to understand that to accept neces- of that which one gets by begging: and thus a man may saries from those among whom he labors is not mendi- be led to beg by a twofold motive. First, by the desire to cancy but a right.” Therefore it would seem unbecoming have wealth or meat without working for it, and such like for religious to beg. mendicancy is unlawful; secondly, by a motive of neces- On the contrary, It becomes religious to live in imi- sity or usefulness. The motive is one of necessity if a man tation of Christ. Now Christ was a mendicant, according has no other means of livelihood save begging; and it is to Ps. 39:18, “But I am a beggar and poor”; where a gloss a motive of usefulness if he wishes to accomplish some- says: “Christ said this of Himself as bearing the ‘form of thing useful, and is unable to do so without the alms of ∗ St. Augustine, (De oper. Monach. iii) † Reference unknown 2053 the faithful. Thus alms are besought for the building of a does not forbid anyone to beg, but it forbids the rich to bridge, or church, or for any other work whatever that is be so stingy that some are compelled by necessity to beg. conducive to the common good: thus scholars may seek The civil law imposes a penalty on able-bodied mendi- alms that they may devote themselves to the study of wis- cants who beg from motives neither of utility nor of ne- dom. In this way mendicancy is lawful to religious no less cessity. than to seculars. Reply to Objection 4. Disgrace is twofold; one arises Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking there from lack of honesty∗, the other from an external defect, explicitly of those who beg from motives of covetousness. thus it is disgraceful for a man to be sick or poor. Such Reply to Objection 2. The first gloss speaks of beg- like uncomeliness of mendicancy does not pertain to sin, ging from motives of covetousness, as appears from the but it may pertain to humility, as stated above. words of the Apostle; while the second gloss speaks of Reply to Objection 5. Preachers have the right to be those who without effecting any useful purpose, beg their fed by those to whom they preach: yet if they wish to seek livelihood in order to live in idleness. on the other hand, this by begging so as to receive it as a free gift and not as he lives not idly who in any way lives usefully. a right this will be a mark of greater humility. Reply to Objection 3. This precept of the divine law Whether it is lawful for religious to wear coarser clothes than others? IIa IIae q. 187 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for religious to On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:37): wear coarser clothes than others. For according to the “They wandered about in sheep-skins in goat-skins,” and Apostle (1 Thess. 5:22) we ought to “refrain from all a gloss adds—“as Elias and others.” Moreover it is said appearance of evil.” Now coarseness of clothes has an in the Decretal XXI, qu. iv, can. Omnis jactantia: “If any appearance of evil; for our Lord said (Mat. 7:15): “Be- persons be found to deride those who wear coarse and re- ware of false prophets who come to you in the clothing of ligious apparel they must be reproved. For in the early sheep”: and a gloss on Apoc. 6:8, “Behold a pale horse,” times all those who were consecrated to God went about says: “The devil finding that he cannot succeed, neither in common and coarse apparel.” by outward afflictions nor by manifest heresies, sends in I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. advance false brethren, who under the guise of religion iii, 12), “in all external things, it is not the use but the assume the characteristics of the black and red horses by intention of the user that is at fault.” In order to judge corrupting the faith.” Therefore it would seem that reli- of this it is necessary to observe that coarse and homely gious should not wear coarse clothes. apparel may be considered in two ways. First, as being Objection 2. Further, Jerome says (Ep. lii ad Nepo- a sign of a man’s disposition or condition, because ac- tian.): “Avoid somber,” i.e. black, “equally with glitter- cording to Ecclus. 19:27, “the attire. . . of the man” shows ing apparel. Fine and coarse clothes are equally to be “what he is.” In this way coarseness of attire is sometimes shunned, for the one exhales pleasure, the other vain- a sign of sorrow: wherefore those who are beset with sor- glory.” Therefore, since vainglory is a graver sin than the row are wont to wear coarser clothes, just as on the other use of pleasure, it would seem that religious who should hand in times of festivity and joy they wear finer clothes. aim at what is more perfect ought to avoid coarse rather Hence penitents make use of coarse apparel, for example, than fine clothes. the king (Jonah 3:6) who “was clothed with sack-cloth,” Objection 3. Further, religious should aim especially and Achab (3 Kings 21:27) who “put hair-cloth upon his at doing works of penance. Now in works of penance flesh.” Sometimes, however, it is a sign of the contempt we should use, not outward signs of sorrow, but rather of riches and worldly ostentation. Wherefore Jerome says signs of joy; for our Lord said (Mat. 6:16): “When you (Ep. cxxv ad Rustico Monach.): “Let your somber attire fast, be not, as the hypocrites, sad,” and afterwards He indicate your purity of mind, your coarse robe prove your added: “But thou, when thou fastest, anoint thy head and contempt of the world, yet so that your mind be not in- wash thy face.” Augustine commenting on these words flated withal, lest your speech belie your habit.” In both (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12): “In this chapter we these ways it is becoming for religious to wear coarse at- must observe that not only the glare and pomp of outward tire, since religion is a state of penance and of contempt things, but even the weeds of mourning may be a subject of worldly glory. of ostentation, all the more dangerous as being a decoy But that a person wish to signify this to others arises under the guise of God’s service.” Therefore seemingly from three motives. First, in order to humble himself: religious ought not to wear coarse clothes. for just as a man’s mind is uplifted by fine clothes, so ∗ Cf. q. 145, a. 1 2054 is it humbled by lowly apparel. Hence speaking of Achab Reply to Objection 2. Jerome is speaking there of the who “put hair-cloth on his flesh,” the Lord said to Elias: coarse attire that is worn on account of human glory. “Hast thou not seen Achab humbled before Me?” (3 Reply to Objection 3. According to our Lord’s teach- Kings 21:29). Secondly, in order to set an example to oth- ing men should do no deeds of holiness for the sake of ers; wherefore a gloss on Mat. 3:4, ”(John) had his gar- show: and this is especially the case when one does some- ments of camel’s hair,” says: “He who preaches penance thing strange. Hence Chrysostom∗ says: “While pray- is clothed in the habit of penance.” Thirdly, on account of ing a man should do nothing strange, so as to draw the vainglory; thus Augustine says (cf. obj. 3) that “even the gaze of others, either by shouting or striking his breast, or weeds of mourning may be a subject of ostentation.” casting up his hands,” because the very strangeness draws Accordingly in the first two ways it is praiseworthy to people’s attention to him. Yet blame does not attach to wear humble apparel, but in the third way it is sinful. all strange behavior that draws people’s attention, for it Secondly, coarse and homely attire may be considered may be done well or ill. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. as the result of covetousness or negligence, and thus also Dom. in Monte ii, 12) that “in the practice of the Chris- it is sinful. tian religion when a man draws attention to himself by Reply to Objection 1. Coarseness of attire has not unwonted squalor and shabbiness, since he acts thus vol- of itself the appearance of evil, indeed it has more the untarily and not of necessity, we can gather from his other appearance of good, namely of the contempt of worldly deeds whether his behavior is motivated by contempt of glory. Hence it is that wicked persons hide their wicked- excessive dress or by affectation.” Religious, however, ness under coarse clothing. Hence Augustine says (De would especially seem not to act thus from affectation, Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 24) that “the sheep should not since they wear a coarse habit as a sign of their profession dislike their clothing for the reason that the wolves some- whereby they profess contempt of the world. times hide themselves under it.” ∗ Hom. xiii in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom 2055 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 188 Of the Different Kinds of Religious Life (In Eight Articles) We must now consider the different kinds of religious life, and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are different kinds of religious life or only one? (2) Whether a religious order can be established for the works of the active life? (3) Whether a religious order can be directed to soldiering? (4) Whether a religious order can be established for preaching and the exercise of like works? (5) Whether a religious order can be established for the study of science? (6) Whether a religious order that is directed to the contemplative life is more excellent than one that is directed to the active life? (7) Whether religious perfection is diminished by possessing something in common? (8) Whether the religious life of solitaries is to be preferred to the religious life of those who live in community? Whether there is only one religious order? IIa IIae q. 188 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there is but one reli- aims by practice at the perfection of charity. Now there are gious order. For there can be no diversity in that which various works of charity to which a man may devote him- is possessed wholly and perfectly; wherefore there can self; and there are also various kinds of exercise. Where- be only one sovereign good, as stated in the Ia, q. 6 , fore religious orders may be differentiated in two ways. Aa. 2,3,4. Now as Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.), First, according to the different things to which they may “when a man vows to Almighty God all that he has, all his be directed: thus one may be directed to the lodging of life, all his knowledge, it is a holocaust,” without which pilgrims, another to visiting or ransoming captives. Sec- there is no religious life. Therefore it would seem that ondly, there may be various religious orders according to there are not many religious orders but only one. the diversity of practices; thus in one religious order the Objection 2. Further, things which agree in essen- body is chastised by abstinence in food, in another by the tials differ only accidentally. Now there is no religious or- practice of manual labor, scantiness of clothes, or the like. der without the three essential vows of religion, as stated Since, however, the end imports most in every matter,† above (q. 186, Aa. 6,7). Therefore it would seem that reli- religious orders differ more especially according to their gious orders differ not specifically, but only accidentally. various ends than according to their various practices. Objection 3. Further, the state of perfection is com- Reply to Objection 1. The obligation to devote one- petent both to religious and to bishops, as stated above self wholly to God’s service is common to every reli- (q. 185, Aa. 5,7). Now the episcopate is not diversified gious order; hence religious do not differ in this respect, specifically, but is one wherever it may be; wherefore as though in one religious order a person retained some Jerome says (Ep. cxlvi ad Evan.): “Wherever a bishop one thing of his own, and in another order some other is, whether at Rome, or Gubbio, or Constantinople, or thing. But the difference is in respect of the different Reggio, he has the same excellence, the same priesthood.” things wherein one may serve God, and whereby a man Therefore in like manner there is but one religious order. may dispose himself to the service of God. Objection 4. Further, anything that may lead to con- Reply to Objection 2. The three essential vows of fusion should be removed from the Church. Now it would religion pertain to the practice of religion as principles seem that a diversity of religious orders might confuse to which all other matters are reduced, as stated above the Christian people, as stated in the Decretal de Statu (q. 186, a. 7). But there are various ways of disposing Monach. et Canon. Reg.∗. Therefore seemingly there oneself to the observance of each of them. For instance ought not to be different religious orders. one disposes oneself to observe the vow of continence, On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 44:10) that it per- by solitude of place, by abstinence, by mutual fellowship, tains to the adornment of the queen that she is “surrounded and by many like means. Accordingly it is evident that with variety.” the community of the essential vows is compatible with I answer that, As stated above (q. 186, A, 7; q. 187, diversity of religious life, both on account of the differ- a. 2), the religious state is a training school wherein one ent dispositions and on account of the different ends, as ∗ Cap. Ne Nimia, de Relig. Dom. † Arist., Topic. vi 8 2056 explained above. Reply to Objection 4. Confusion is opposed to dis- Reply to Objection 3. In matters relating to perfec- tinction and order. Accordingly the multitude of religious tion, the bishop stands in the position of agent, and the orders would lead to confusion, if different religious or- religious as passive, as stated above (q. 184, a. 7). Now ders were directed to the same end and in the same way, the agent, even in natural things, the higher it is, is so without necessity or utility. Wherefore to prevent this hap- much the more one, whereas the things that are passive pening it has been wholesomely forbidden to establish a are various. Hence with reason the episcopal state is one, new religious order without the authority of the Sovereign while religious orders are many. Pontiff. Whether a religious order should be established for the works of the active life? IIa IIae q. 188 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that no religious order templative life which seeks to devote itself to God alone should be established for the works of the active life. For belongs directly to the love of God, while the active life, every religious order belongs to the state of perfection, as which ministers to our neighbor’s needs, belongs directly stated above (q. 184, a. 5; q. 186, a. 1). Now the perfection to the love of one’s neighbor. And just as out of charity of the religious state consists in the contemplation of di- we love our neighbor for God’s sake, so the services we vine things. For Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi) that they render our neighbor redound to God, according to Mat. are “called servants of God by reason of their rendering 25:40, “What you have done [Vulg.: ‘As long as you did pure service and subjection to God, and on account of the it’] to one of these My least brethren, you did it to Me.” indivisible and singular life which unites them by holy re- Consequently those services which we render our neigh- flections,” i.e. contemplations, “on invisible things, to the bor, in so far as we refer them to God, are described as Godlike unity and the perfection beloved of God.” There- sacrifices, according to Heb. 13:16, “Do not forget to do fore seemingly no religious order should be established good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God’s favor is for the works of the active life. obtained.” And since it belongs properly to religion to Objection 2. Further, seemingly the same judgment offer sacrifice to God, as stated above (q. 81, a. 1, ad 1; applies to canons regular as to monks, according to Extra, a. 4, ad 1), it follows that certain religious orders are fit- De Postul., cap. Ex parte; and De Statu Monach., cap. tingly directed to the works of the active life. Wherefore Quod Dei timorem: for it is stated that “they are not con- in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xiv, 4) the Abbot sidered to be separated from the fellowship of monks”: Nesteros in distinguishing the various aims of religious and the same would seem to apply to all other religious. orders says: “Some direct their intention exclusively to Now the monastic rule was established for the purpose of the hidden life of the desert and purity of heart; some are the contemplative life; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. lviii occupied with the instruction of the brethren and the care ad Paulin.): “If you wish to be what you are called, a of the monasteries; while others delight in the service of monk,” i.e. a solitary, “what business have you in a city?” the guesthouse,” i.e. in hospitality. The same is found stated in Extra, De Renuntiatione, cap. Reply to Objection 1. Service and subjection ren- Nisi cum pridem; and De Regular., cap. Licet quibusdam. dered to God are not precluded by the works of the active Therefore it would seem that every religious order is di- life, whereby a man serves his neighbor for God’s sake, as rected to the contemplative life, and none to the active life. stated in the Article. Nor do these works preclude singu- Objection 3. Further, the active life is concerned with larity of life; not that they involve man’s living apart from the present world. Now all religious are said to renounce his fellow-men, but in the sense that each man individ- the world; wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.): ually devotes himself to things pertaining to the service “He who renounces this world, and does all the good he of God; and since religious occupy themselves with the can, is like one who has gone out of Egypt and offers sac- works of the active life for God’s sake, it follows that their rifice in the wilderness.” Therefore it would seem that no action results from their contemplation of divine things. religious order can be directed to the active life. Hence they are not entirely deprived of the fruit of the On the contrary, It is written (James 1:27): “Religion contemplative life. clean and undefiled before God and the Father, is this: to Reply to Objection 2. The same judgment applies to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation.” Now monks and to all other religious, as regards things com- this belongs to the active life. Therefore religious life can mon to all religious orders: for instance as regards their be fittingly directed to the active life. devoting themselves wholly to the divine service, their I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the religious observance of the essential vows of religion, and their re- state is directed to the perfection of charity, which extends fraining from worldly business. But it does not follow to the love of God and of our neighbor. Now the con- that this likeness extends to other things that are proper 2057 to the monastic profession, and are directed especially to the world,” and yet speaking of them to His Father He the contemplative life. Hence in the aforesaid Decretal, said (Jn. 17:11): “These are in the world, and I come to De Postulando, it is not simply stated that “the same judg- Thee.” Although, then, religious who are occupied with ment applies to canons regular” as “to monks,” but that it the works of the active life are in the world as to the pres- applies “in matters already mentioned,” namely that “they ence of the body, they are not in the world as regards are not to act as advocates in lawsuits.” Again the Dec- their bent of mind, because they are occupied with ex- retal quoted, De Statu Monach., after the statement that ternal things, not as seeking anything of the world, but “canons regular are not considered to be separated from merely for the sake of serving God: for “they. . . use this the fellowship of monks,” goes on to say: “Nevertheless world, as if they used it not,” to quote 1 Cor. 7:31. Hence they obey an easier rule.” Hence it is evident that they are (James 1:27) after it is stated that “religion clean and un- not bound to all that monks are bound. defiled. . . is. . . to visit the fatherless and widows in their Reply to Objection 3. A man may be in the world tribulation,” it is added, “and to keep one’s self unspot- in two ways: in one way by his bodily presence, in an- ted from this world,” namely to avoid being attached to other way by the bent of his mind. Hence our Lord said worldly things. to His disciples (Jn. 15:19): “I have chosen you out of Whether a religious order can be directed to soldiering? IIa IIae q. 188 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that no religious order can please God. Therefore nothing hinders the establishing be directed to soldiering. For all religious orders belong of a religious order for the purpose of soldiering. to the state of perfection. Now our Lord said with refer- I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), a religious order ence to the perfection of Christian life (Mat. 5:39): “I say may be established not only for the works of the contem- to you not to resist evil; but if one strike thee on the right plative life, but also for the works of the active life, in so cheek, turn to him also the other,” which is inconsistent far as they are concerned in helping our neighbor and in with the duties of a soldier. Therefore no religious order the service of God, but not in so far as they are directed to can be established for soldiering. a worldly object. Now the occupation of soldiering may Objection 2. Further, the bodily encounter of the bat- be directed to the assistance of our neighbor, not only as tlefield is more grievous than the encounter in words that regards private individuals, but also as regards the defense takes place between counsel at law. Yet religious are for- of the whole commonwealth. Hence it is said of Judas bidden to plead at law, as appears from the Decretal De Machabeus (1 Macc. 3:2,3) that “he [Vulg.: ‘they’] fought Postulando quoted above (a. 2, obj. 2). Therefore it is with cheerfulness the battle of Israel, and he got his peo- much less seemly for a religious order to be established ple great honor.” It can also be directed to the upkeep of for soldiering. divine worship, wherefore (1 Macc. 3:21) Judas is stated Objection 3. Further, the religious state is a state of to have said: “We will fight for our lives and our laws,” penance, as we have said above (q. 187, a. 6). Now ac- and further on (1 Macc. 13:3) Simon said: “You know cording to the code of laws soldiering is forbidden to pen- what great battles I and my brethren, and the house of my itents. for it is said in the Decretal De Poenit., Dist. v, cap. father, have fought for the laws and the sanctuary.” 3: “It is altogether opposed to the rules of the Church, to Hence a religious order may be fittingly established return to worldly soldiering after doing penance.” There- for soldiering, not indeed for any worldly purpose, but for fore it is unfitting for any religious order to be established the defense of divine worship and public safety, or also for soldiering. of the poor and oppressed, according to Ps. 81:4: “Res- Objection 4. Further, no religious order may be es- cue the poor, and deliver the needy out of the hand of the tablished for an unjust object. But as Isidore says (Etym. sinner.” xviii, 1), “A just war is one that is waged by order of the Reply to Objection 1. Not to resist evil may be un- emperor.” Since then religious are private individuals, it derstood in two ways. First, in the sense of forgiving the would seem unlawful for them to wage war; and conse- wrong done to oneself, and thus it may pertain to per- quently no religious order may be established for this pur- fection, when it is expedient to act thus for the spiritual pose. welfare of others. Secondly, in the sense of tolerating On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. clxxxix; ad patiently the wrongs done to others: and this pertains to Bonifac.), “Beware of thinking that none of those can imperfection, or even to vice, if one be able to resist the please God who handle war-like weapons. Of such was wrongdoer in a becoming manner. Hence Ambrose says holy David to whom the Lord gave great testimony.” Now (De Offic. i, 27): “The courage whereby a man in bat- religious orders are established in order that men may tle defends his country against barbarians, or protects the 2058 weak at home, or his friends against robbers is full of is to buy property or occupy himself with secular busi-justice”: even so our Lord says in the passage quoted∗, ness, save with a view to the care of the fatherless. . . and ”. . . thy goods, ask them not again.” If, however, a man widows.” Likewise to be a soldier for the sake of some were not to demand the return of that which belongs to worldly object is contrary to all religious life, but this does another, he would sin if it were his business to do so: for it not apply to those who are soldiers for the sake of God’s is praiseworthy to give away one’s own, but not another’s service. property. And much less should the things of God be ne- Reply to Objection 3. Worldly soldiering is forbid- glected, for as Chrysostom† says, “it is most wicked to den to penitents, but the soldiering which is directed to overlook the wrongs done to God.” the service of God is imposed as a penance on some peo- Reply to Objection 2. It is inconsistent with any reli- ple, as in the case of those upon whom it is enjoined to gious order to act as counsel at law for a worldly object, take arms in defense of the Holy Land. but it is not inconsistent to do so at the orders of one’s Reply to Objection 4. The establishment of a reli- superior and in favor of one’s monastery, as stated in the gious order for the purpose of soldiering does not imply same Decretal, or for the defense of the poor and widows. that the religious can wage war on their own authority; but Wherefore it is said in the Decretals (Dist. lxxxviii, cap. they can do so only on the authority of the sovereign or of 1): “The holy synod has decreed that henceforth no cleric the Church. Whether a religious order can be established for preaching or hearing confessions? IIa IIae q. 188 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that no religious order as stated in Luke 10. Moreover, according to the gloss of may be established for preaching, or hearing confessions. Bede on “And after these things” (Lk. 10:1), “the apostles For it is said (VII, qu. i∗): “The monastic life is one of are represented by the bishops, the seventy-two disciples subjection and discipleship, not of teaching, authority, or by the lesser priests,” i.e. the parish priests. Therefore pastoral care,” and the same apparently applies to reli- in addition to bishops and parish priests, no religious or- gious. Now preaching and hearing confessions are the der should be established for the purpose of preaching and actions of a pastor and teacher. Therefore a religious or- hearing confessions. der should not be established for this purpose. On the contrary, In the Conferences of the Fathers Objection 2. Further, the purpose for which a reli- (Coll. xiv, 4), Abbot Nesteros, speaking of the various gious order is established would seem to be something kinds of religious orders, says: “Some choosing the care most proper to the religious life, as stated above (a. 1). of the sick, others devoting themselves to the relief of the Now the aforesaid actions are not proper to religious but afflicted and oppressed, or applying themselves to teach- to bishops. Therefore a religious order should not be es- ing, or giving alms to the poor, have been most highly es- tablished for the purpose of such actions. teemed on account of their devotion and piety.” Therefore Objection 3. Further, it seems unfitting that the au- just as a religious order may be established for the care of thority to preach and hear confessions should be commit- the sick, so also may one be established for teaching the ted to an unlimited number of men; and there is no fixed people by preaching and like works. number of those who are received into a religious order. I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), it is fitting for a Therefore it is unfitting for a religious order to be estab-religious order to be established for the works of the active lished for the purpose of the aforesaid actions. life, in so far as they are directed to the good of our neigh- Objection 4. Further, preachers have a right to receive bor, the service of God, and the upkeep of divine worship. their livelihood from the faithful of Christ, according to 1 Now the good of our neighbor is advanced by things per- Cor. 9. If then the office of preaching be committed to taining to the spiritual welfare of the soul rather than by a religious order established for that purpose, it follows things pertaining to the supplying of bodily needs, in pro- that the faithful of Christ are bound to support an unlim- portion to the excellence of spiritual over corporal things. ited number of persons, which would be a heavy burden Hence it was stated above (q. 32, a. 3) that spiritual works on them. Therefore a religious order should not be estab- of mercy surpass corporal works of mercy. Moreover this lished for the exercise of these actions. is more pertinent to the service of God, to Whom no sacri- Objection 5. Further, the organization of the Church fice is more acceptable than zeal for souls, as Gregory says should be in accordance with Christ’s institution. Now (Hom. xii in Ezech.). Furthermore, it is a greater thing to Christ sent first the twelve apostles to preach, as related in employ spiritual arms in defending the faithful against the Luke 9, and afterwards He sent the seventy-two disciples, errors of heretics and the temptations of the devil, than to ∗ Lk. 6:30 “Of him that taketh away thy goods, ask them not again”; Cf. Mat. 5:40 † Hom. v in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom ∗ Cap. Hoc nequaquam; Cf. q. 187, a. 1, obj. 1 2059 protect the faithful by means of bodily weapons. There-nary prelates, who receive the tithes and offerings of the fore it is most fitting for a religious order to be established faithful for that purpose, as well as other ecclesiastical for preaching and similar works pertaining to the salvation revenues. But if some men are willing to minister to the of souls. faithful by exercising the aforesaid acts gratuitously, and Reply to Objection 1. He who works by virtue of without demanding payment as of right, the faithful are another, acts as an instrument. And a minister is like an not burdened thereby because their temporal contributions “animated instrument,” as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, can be liberally repaid by those men, nor are they bound 2∗). Hence if a man preach or do something similar by the by law to contribute, but by charity, and yet not so that authority of his superiors, he does not rise above the de- they be burdened thereby and others eased, as stated in 2 gree of “discipleship” or “subjection,” which is competent Cor. 8:13. If, however, none be found to devote them- to religious. selves gratuitously to services of this kind, the ordinary Reply to Objection 2. Some religious orders are prelate is bound, if he cannot suffice by himself, to seek established for soldiering, to wage war, not indeed on other suitable persons and support them himself. their own authority, but on that of the sovereign or of the Reply to Objection 5. The seventy-two disciples are Church who are competent to wage war by virtue of their represented not only by the parish priests, but by all those office, as stated above (a. 3, ad 4). In the same way certain of lower order who in any way assist the bishops in their religious orders are established for preaching and hearing office. For we do not read that our Lord appointed the confessions, not indeed by their own authority, but by the seventy-two disciples to certain fixed parishes, but that authority of the higher and lower superiors, to whom these “He sent them two and two before His face into every things belong by virtue of their office. Consequently to city and place whither He Himself was to come.” It was assist one’s superiors in such a ministry is proper to a re- fitting, however, that in addition to the ordinary prelates ligious order of this kind. others should be chosen for these duties on account of the Reply to Objection 3. Bishops do not allow these multitude of the faithful, and the difficulty of finding a suf- religious severally and indiscriminately to preach or hear ficient number of persons to be appointed to each locality, confessions, but according to the discretion of the reli- just as it was necessary to establish religious orders for gious superiors, or according to their own appointment. military service, on account of the secular princes being Reply to Objection 4. The faithful are not bound by unable to cope with unbelievers in certain countries. law to contribute to the support of other than their ordi- Whether a religious order should be established for the purpose of study? IIa IIae q. 188 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that a religious order known as professors of certain sciences. Therefore the should not be established for the purpose of study. For it study of letters does not become religious. is written (Ps. 70:15,16): “Because I have not known let- On the contrary, Jerome (Ep. liii ad Paulin.) urges ters [Douay: ‘learning’], I will enter into the powers of the him to acquire learning in the monastic state, saying: “Let Lord,” i.e. “Christian virtue,” according to a gloss. Now us learn on earth those things the knowledge of which will the perfection of Christian virtue, seemingly, pertains es- remain in heaven,” and further on: “Whatever you seek to pecially to religious. Therefore it is not for them to apply know, I will endeavor to know with you.” themselves to the study of letters. I answer that As stated above (a. 2), religion may be Objection 2. Further, that which is a source of dissent ordained to the active and to the contemplative life. Now is unbecoming to religious, who are gathered together in chief among the works of the active life are those which the unity of peace. Now study leads to dissent: where- are directly ordained to the salvation of souls, such as fore different schools of thought arose among the philoso- preaching and the like. Accordingly the study of letters phers. Hence Jerome (Super Epist. ad Tit. 1:5) says: “Be- is becoming to the religious life in three ways. First, as fore a diabolical instinct brought study into religion, and regards that which is proper to the contemplative life, to people said: I am of Paul, I of Apollo, I of Cephas,” etc. which the study of letters helps in a twofold manner. In Therefore it would seem that no religious order should be one way by helping directly to contemplate, namely by established for the purpose of study. enlightening the intellect. For the contemplative life of Objection 3. Further, those who profess the Chris- which we are now speaking is directed chiefly to the con- tian religion should profess nothing in common with the sideration of divine things, as stated above (q. 180, a. 4), to Gentiles. Now among the Gentiles were some who pro-which consideration man is directed by study; for which fessed philosophy, and even now some secular persons are reason it is said in praise of the righteous (Ps. 1:2) that “he ∗ Cf. Ethic. viii, 11 2060 shall meditate day and night” on the law of the Lord, and nothing in comparison with her,” and (1 Macc. 12:9): (Ecclus. 39:1): “The wise man will seek out the wisdom “We needed none of these things,” namely assistance from of all the ancients, and will be occupied in the prophets.” without, “having for our comfort the holy books that are In another way the study of letters is a help to the contem- in our hands.” It also helps to teach obedience, wherefore plative life indirectly, by removing the obstacles to con- Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xvii): “What sort of templation, namely the errors which in the contemplation perverseness is this, to wish to read, but not to obey what of divine things frequently beset those who are ignorant one reads?” Hence it is clearly fitting that a religious order of the scriptures. Thus we read in the Conferences of the be established for the study of letters. Fathers (Coll. x, 3) that the Abbot Serapion through sim- Reply to Objection 1. This commentary of the gloss plicity fell into the error of the Anthropomorphites, who is an exposition of the Old Law of which the Apostle says thought that God had a human shape. Hence Gregory (2 Cor. 3:6): “The letter killeth.” Hence not to know let- says (Moral. vi) that “some through seeking in contem- ters is to disapprove of the circumcision of the “letter” and plation more than they are able to grasp, fall away into other carnal observances. perverse doctrines, and by failing to be the humble dis- Reply to Objection 2. Study is directed to knowledge ciples of truth become the masters of error.” Hence it is which, without charity, “puffeth up,” and consequently written (Eccles. 2:3): “I thought in my heart to withdraw leads to dissent, according to Prov. 13:10, “Among the my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind to wisdom proud there are always dissensions”: whereas, with char- and might avoid folly.” ity, it “edifieth and begets concord.” Hence the Apostle Secondly, the study of letters is necessary in those re- after saying (1 Cor. 1:5): “You are made rich. . . in all ut- ligious orders that are founded for preaching and other terance and in all knowledge,” adds (1 Cor. 1:10): “That like works; wherefore the Apostle (Titus 1:9), speaking of you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms bishops to whose office these acts belong, says: “Embrac- among you.” But Jerome is not speaking here of the study ing that faithful word which is according to doctrine, that of letters, but of the study of dissensions which heretics he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince and schismatics have brought into the Christian religion. the gainsayers.” Nor does it matter that the apostles were Reply to Objection 3. The philosophers professed the sent to preach without having studied letters, because, as study of letters in the matter of secular learning: whereas Jerome says (Ep. liii ad Paulin.), “whatever others acquire it becomes religious to devote themselves chiefly to the by exercise and daily meditation in God’s law, was taught study of letters in reference to the doctrine that is “accord- them by the Holy Ghost.” ing to godliness” (Titus 1:1). It becomes not religious, Thirdly, the study of letters is becoming to religious as whose whole life is devoted to the service of God, to seek regards that which is common to all religious orders. For for other learning, save in so far as it is referred to the it helps us to avoid the lusts of the flesh; wherefore Jerome sacred doctrine. Hence Augustine says at the end of De says (Ep. cxxv ad Rust. Monach.): “Love the science of Musica vi, 17: “Whilst we think that we should not over- the Scriptures and thou shalt have no love for carnal vice.” look those whom heretics delude by the deceitful assur- For it turns the mind away from lustful thoughts, and ance of reason and knowledge, we are slow to advance in tames the flesh on account of the toil that study entails ac- the consideration of their methods. Yet we should not be cording to Ecclus. 31:1, “Watching for riches∗ consumeth praised for doing this, were it not that many holy sons of the flesh.” . It also helps to remove the desire of riches, their most loving mother the Catholic Church had done wherefore it is written (Wis. 7:8): “I. . . esteemed riches the same under the necessity of confounding heretics.” Whether a religious order that is devoted to the contemplative life is more excellent IIa IIae q. 188 a. 6 than on that is given to the active life? Objection 1. It would seem that a religious order is directed to the greater good is better. Therefore it would which is devoted to the contemplative life is not more seem that those religious orders that are directed to the ac- excellent than one which is given to the active life. For tive life are more excellent than those which are directed it is said (Extra, de Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., to the contemplative life. cap. Licet), quoting the words of Innocent III: “Even as a Objection 2. Further, every religious order is directed greater good is preferred to a lesser, so the common profit to the perfection of charity, as stated above (Aa. 1,2). Now takes precedence of private profit: and in this case teach- a gloss on Heb. 12:4, “For you have not yet resisted unto ing is rightly preferred to silence, responsibility to con- blood,” says: “In this life there is no more perfect love templation, work to rest.” Now the religious order which than that to which the holy martyrs attained, who fought ∗ Vigilia honestatis St. Thomas would seem to have taken ‘honestas’ in the sense of virtue 2061 against sin unto blood.” Now to fight unto blood is beare less excellent than the works of contemplation, ex- coming those religious who are directed to military ser- cept in cases of necessity, as stated above (q. 182, a. 1). vice, and yet this pertains to the active life. Therefore it Accordingly the highest place in religious orders is held would seem that religious orders of this kind are the most by those which are directed to teaching and preaching, excellent. which, moreover, are nearest to the episcopal perfection, Objection 3. Further, seemingly the stricter a reli- even as in other things “the end of that which is first is in gious order is, the more excellent it is. But there is no rea- conjunction with the beginning of that which is second,” son why certain religious orders directed to the active life as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. vii). The second place should not be of stricter observance than those directed to belongs to those which are directed to contemplation, and the contemplative life. Therefore they are more excellent. the third to those which are occupied with external ac- On the contrary, our Lord said (Lk. 10:42) that the tions. “best part” was Mary’s, by whom the contemplative life Moreover, in each of these degrees it may be noted is signified. that one religious order excels another through being di- I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the difference rected to higher action in the same genus; thus among the between one religious order and another depends chiefly works of the active life it is better to ransom captives than on the end, and secondarily on the exercise. And since to receive guests, and among the works of the contempla- one thing cannot be said to be more excellent than an- tive life prayer is better than study. Again one will excel other save in respect of that in which it differs therefrom, another if it be directed to more of these actions than an- it follows that the excellence of one religious order over other, or if it have statutes more adapted to the attainment another depends chiefly on their ends, and secondarily of the end in view. on their respective exercises. Nevertheless each of these Reply to Objection 1. This Decretal refers to the ac- comparisons is considered in a different way. For the tive life as directed to the salvation of souls. comparison with respect to the end is absolute, since the Reply to Objection 2. Those religious orders that are end is sought for its own sake; whereas the comparison established for the purpose of military service aim more with respect to exercise is relative, since exercise is sought directly at shedding the enemy’s blood than at the shed- not for its own sake, but for the sake of the end. Hence a ding of their own, which latter is more properly compe- religious order is preferable to another, if it be directed to tent to martyrs. Yet there is no reason why religious of an end that is absolutely more excellent either because it this description should not acquire the merit of martyr- is a greater good or because it is directed to more goods. dom in certain cases, and in this respect stand higher than If, however, the end be the same, the excellence of one re- other religious; even as in some cases the works of the ligious order over another depends secondarily, not on the active life take precedence of contemplation. amount of exercise, but on the proportion of the exercise Reply to Objection 3. Strictness of observances, as to the end in view. Wherefore in the Conferences of the the Blessed Antony remarks (Conferences of the Fathers; Fathers (Coll. ii, 2) Blessed Antony is quoted, as prefer- Coll. ii, 2), is not the chief object of commendation in a ring discretion whereby a man moderates all his actions, religious order; and it is written (Is. 58:5): “Is this such to fastings, watchings, and all such observances. a fast as I have chosen, for a man to afflict his soul for a Accordingly we must say that the work of the active day?” Nevertheless it is adopted in religious life as be- life is twofold. one proceeds from the fulness of contem- ing necessary for taming the flesh, “which if done with- plation, such as teaching and preaching. Wherefore Gre- out discretion, is liable to make us fail altogether,” as the gory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that the words of Ps. 144:7, Blessed Antony observes. Wherefore a religious order is “They shall publish the memory of. . . Thy sweetness,” re- not more excellent through having stricter observances, fer “to perfect men returning from their contemplation.” but because its observances are directed by greater discre- And this work is more excellent than simple contempla- tion to the end of religion. Thus the taming of the flesh tion. For even as it is better to enlighten than merely to is more efficaciously directed to continence by means of shine, so is it better to give to others the fruits of one’s con-abstinence in meat and drink, which pertain to hunger and templation than merely to contemplate. The other work of thirst, than by the privation of clothing, which pertains to the active life consists entirely in outward occupation, for cold and nakedness, or by bodily labor. instance almsgiving, receiving guests, and the like, which 2062 Whether religious perfection is diminished by possessing something in common? IIa IIae q. 188 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that religious perfection thing whether for oneself or for the common use. is diminished by possessing something in common. For On the contrary, Prosper† says (De Vita Contempl. our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): “If thou wilt be perfect, go ix) and his words are quoted (XII, qu. 1, can. Expedit): sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] thou hast and give to the poor.” “It is sufficiently clear both that for the sake of perfec- Hence it is clear that to lack worldly wealth belongs to the tion one should renounce having anything of one’s own, perfection of Christian life. Now those who possess some- and that the possession of revenues, which are of course thing in common do not lack worldly wealth. Therefore it common property, is no hindrance to the perfection of the would seem that they do not quite reach to the perfection Church.” of Christian life. I answer that, As stated above (q. 184, a. 3, ad 1; Objection 2. Further, the perfection of the counsels q. 185, a. 6, ad 1), perfection consists, essentially, not in requires that one should be without worldly solicitude; poverty, but in following Christ, according to the saying wherefore the Apostle in giving the counsel of virginity of Jerome (Super Matth. xix, 27): “Since it is not enough said (1 Cor. 7:32): “I would have you to be without so- to leave all, Peter adds that which is perfect, namely, ‘We licitude.” Now it belongs to the solicitude of the present have followed Thee,’ ” while poverty is like an instrument life that certain people keep something to themselves for or exercise for the attainment of perfection. Hence in the the morrow; and this solicitude was forbidden His disci- Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, 7) the abbot Moses ples by our Lord (Mat. 6:34) saying: “Be not . . . solicitous says: “Fastings, watchings, meditating on the Scriptures, for tomorrow.” Therefore it would seem that the perfec- poverty, and privation of all one’s possessions are not per- tion of Christian life is diminished by having something fection, but means of perfection.” in common. Now the privation of one’s possessions, or poverty, Objection 3. Further, possessions held in common is a means of perfection, inasmuch as by doing away belong in some way to each member of the community; with riches we remove certain obstacles to charity; and wherefore Jerome (Ep. lx ad Heliod. Episc.) says in refer- these are chiefly three. The first is the cares which riches ence to certain people: “They are richer in the monastery bring with them; wherefore our Lord said (Mat. 13:22): than they had been in the world; though serving the poor “That which was sown [Vulg.: ‘He that received the seed’] Christ they have wealth which they had not while serving among thorns, is he that heareth the word, and the care the rich devil; the Church rejects them now that they are of this world, and the deceitfulness of riches, choketh up rich, who in the world were beggars.” But it is deroga- the word.” The second is the love of riches, which in- tory to religious perfection that one should possess wealth creases with the possession of wealth; wherefore Jerome of one’s own. Therefore it is also derogatory to religious says (Super Matth. xix, 23) that “since it is difficult to perfection to possess anything in common. despise riches when we have them, our Lord did not say: Objection 4. Further, Gregory (Dial. iii, 14) relates ‘It is impossible for a rich man to enter the kingdom of of a very holy man named Isaac, that “when his disciples heaven,’ but: ‘It is difficult.’ ” The third is vainglory or humbly signified that he should accept the possessions of- elation which results from riches, according to Ps. 48:7, fered to him for the use of the monastery, he being solici- “They that trust in their own strength, and glory in the tous for the safeguarding of his poverty, held firmly to his multitude of their riches.” opinion, saying: A monk who seeks earthly possessions Accordingly the first of these three cannot be alto- is no monk at all”: and this refers to possessions held in gether separated from riches whether great or small. For common, and which were offered him for the common man must needs take a certain amount of care in acquiring use of the monastery. Therefore it would seem destructive or keeping external things. But so long as external things of religious perfection to possess anything in common. are sought or possessed only in a small quantity, and as Objection 5. Further, our Lord in prescribing reli- much as is required for a mere livelihood, such like care gious perfection to His disciples, said (Mat. 10:9,10): “Do does not hinder one much; and consequently is not incon- not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses, sistent with the perfection of Christian life. For our Lord nor script for your journey.” By these words, as Jerome did not forbid all care, but only such as is excessive and says in his commentary, “He reproves those philosophers hurtful; wherefore Augustine, commenting on Mat. 6:25, who are commonly called Bactroperatae∗, who as despis- “Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat,” says ing the world and valuing all things at naught carried their (De Serm. in Monte‡): “In saying this He does not forbid pantry about with them.” Therefore it would seem deroga- them to procure these things in so far as they needed them, tory to religious perfection that one should keep some- but to be intent on them, and for their sake to do whatever ∗ i.e. staff and scrip bearers † Julianus Pomerius, among the works of Prosper ‡ The words quoted are from De Operibus Monach. xxvi 2063 they are bidden to do in preaching the Gospel.” Yet the for the purpose of contemplating and of giving to others possession of much wealth increases the weight of care, the fruits of one’s contemplation by teaching and preach- which is a great distraction to man’s mind and hinders ing, requires greater care of spiritual things than one that him from giving himself wholly to God’s service. The is established for contemplation only. Wherefore it be- other two, however, namely the love of riches and taking comes a religious order of this kind to embrace a poverty pride or glorying in riches, result only from an abundance that burdens one with the least amount of care. Again it is of wealth. clear that to keep what one has acquired at a fitting time Nevertheless it makes a difference in this matter if for one’s necessary use involves the least burden of care. riches, whether abundant or moderate, be possessed in pri- Wherefore a threefold degree of poverty corresponds to vate or in common. For the care that one takes of one’s the three aforesaid degrees of religious life. For it is fit- own wealth, pertains to love of self, whereby a man loves ting that a religious order which is directed to the bod- himself in temporal matters; whereas the care that is given ily actions of the active life should have an abundance of to things held in common pertains to the love of charity riches in common; that the common possession of a re- which “seeketh not her own,” but looks to the common ligious order directed to contemplation should be more good. And since religion is directed to the perfection of moderate, unless the said religious be bound, either them- charity, and charity is perfected in “the love of God ex- selves or through others, to give hospitality or to assist tending to contempt of self”∗, it is contrary to religious the poor; and that those who aim at giving the fruits of perfection to possess anything in private. But the care that their contemplation to others should have their life most is given to common goods may pertain to charity, although exempt from external cares; this being accomplished by it may prove an obstacle to some higher act of charity, their laying up the necessaries of life procured at a fitting such as divine contemplation or the instructing of one’s time. This, our Lord, the Founder of poverty, taught by neighbor. Hence it is evident that to have excessive riches His example. For He had a purse which He entrusted to in common, whether in movable or in immovable prop- Judas, and in which were kept the things that were offered erty, is an obstacle to perfection, though not absolutely in- to Him, as related in Jn. 12:6. compatible with it; while it is not an obstacle to religious Nor should it be argued that Jerome (Super Matth. perfection to have enough external things, whether mov- xvii, 26) says: “If anyone object that Judas carried money ables or immovables, as suffice for a livelihood, if we con- in the purse, we answer that He deemed it unlawful to sider poverty in relation to the common end of religious spend the property of the poor on His own uses,” namely orders, which is to devote oneself to the service of God. by paying the tax—because among those poor His dis- But if we consider poverty in relation to the special end ciples held a foremost place, and the money in Christ’s of any religious order, then this end being presupposed, a purse was spent chiefly on their needs. For it is stated greater or lesser degree of poverty is adapted to that re- (Jn. 4:8) that “His disciples were gone into the city to buy ligious order; and each religious order will be the more meats,” and (Jn. 13:29) that the disciples “thought, be- perfect in respect of poverty, according as it professes a cause Judas had the purse, that Jesus had said to him: But poverty more adapted to its end. For it is evident that for those things which we have need of for the festival day, the purpose of the outward and bodily works of the active or that he should give something to the poor.” From this life a man needs the assistance of outward things, whereas it is evident that to keep money by, or any other common few are required for contemplation. Hence the Philoso- property for the support of religious of the same order, pher says (Ethic. x, 8) that “many things are needed for or of any other poor, is in accordance with the perfection action, and the more so, the greater and nobler the actions which Christ taught by His example. Moreover, after the are. But the contemplative man requires no such things resurrection, the disciples from whom all religious orders for the exercise of his act: he needs only the necessaries; took their origin kept the price of the lands, and distributed other things are an obstacle to his contemplation.” Ac- it according as each one had need (Acts 4:34,35). cordingly it is clear that a religious order directed to the Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 184, a. 3, bodily actions of the active life, such as soldiering or the ad 1), this saying of our Lord does not mean that poverty lodging of guests, would be imperfect if it lacked common itself is perfection, but that it is the means of perfection. riches; whereas those religious orders which are directed Indeed, as shown above (q. 186, a. 8), it is the least of the to the contemplative life are the more perfect, according three chief means of perfection; since the vow of conti- as the poverty they profess burdens them with less care nence excels the vow of poverty, and the vow of obedience for temporal things. And the care of temporal things is so excels them both. Since, however, the means are sought much a greater obstacle to religious life as the religious not for their own sake, but for the sake of the end, a thing life requires a greater care of spiritual things. is better, not for being a greater instrument, but for being Now it is manifest that a religious order established more adapted to the end. Thus a physician does not heal ∗ Augustine, De Civ. Dei xiv, 28 2064 the more the more medicine he gives, but the more the future being uncertain, let us leave it to God”: according medicine is adapted to the disease. Accordingly it does to Chrysostom∗, “It is enough to endure the toil for nec- not follow that a religious order is the more perfect, ac- essary things, labor not in excess for unnecessary things”: cording as the poverty it professes is more perfect, but according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17): according as its poverty is more adapted to the end both “When we do any good action, we should bear in mind common and special. Granted even that the religious or- not temporal things which are denoted by the morrow, but der which exceeds others in poverty be more perfect in so eternal things.” far as it is poorer, this would not make it more perfect sim- Reply to Objection 3. The saying of Jerome applies ply. For possibly some other religious order might surpass where there are excessive riches, possessed in private as it it in matters relating to continence, or obedience, and thus were, or by the abuse of which even the individual mem- be more perfect simply, since to excel in better things is bers of a community wax proud and wanton. But they do to be better simply. not apply to moderate wealth, set by for the common use, Reply to Objection 2. Our Lord’s words (Mat. 6:34), merely as a means of livelihood of which each one stands “Be not solicitous for tomorrow,” do not mean that we are in need. For it amounts to the same that each one makes to keep nothing for the morrow; for the Blessed Antony use of things pertaining to the necessaries of life, and that shows the danger of so doing, in the Conferences of the these things be set by for the common use. Fathers (Coll. ii, 2), where he says: “It has been our expe- Reply to Objection 4. Isaac refused to accept the of- rience that those who have attempted to practice the pri- fer of possessions, because he feared lest this should lead vation of all means of livelihood, so as not to have the him to have excessive wealth, the abuse of which would be wherewithal to procure themselves food for one day, have an obstacle to religious perfection. Hence Gregory adds been deceived so unawares that they were unable to finish (Dial. iii, 14): “He was as afraid of forfeiting the security properly the work they had undertaken.” And, as Augus- of his poverty, as the rich miser is careful of his perish- tine says (De oper. Monach. xxiii), “if this saying of our able wealth.” It is not, however, related that he refused Lord, ‘Be not solicitous for tomorrow,’ means that we are to accept such things as are commonly necessary for the to lay nothing by for the morrow, those who shut them- upkeep of life. selves up for many days from the sight of men, and apply Reply to Objection 5. The Philosopher says (Polit. their whole mind to a life of prayer, will be unable to pro- i, 5,6) that bread, wine, and the like are natural riches, vide themselves with these things.” Again he adds after- while money is artificial riches. Hence it is that certain wards: “Are we to suppose that the more holy they are, the philosophers declined to make use of money, and em- less do they resemble the birds?” And further on (De oper. ployed other things, living according to nature. Wherefore Monach. xxiv): “For if it be argued from the Gospel that Jerome shows by the words of our Lord, Who equally for- they should lay nothing by, they answer rightly: Why then bade both, that it comes to the same to have money and did our Lord have a purse, wherein He kept the money that to possess other things necessary for life. And though our was collected? Why, in days long gone by, when famine Lord commanded those who were sent to preach not to was imminent, was grain sent to the holy fathers? Why carry these things on the way, He did not forbid them to did the apostles thus provide for the needs of the saints?” be possessed in common. How these words of our Lord Accordingly the saying: “Be not solicitous for tomor- should be understood has been shown above (q. 185, a. 6 row,” according to Jerome (Super Matth.) is to be ren- , ad 2; Ia IIae, q. 108, a. 2, ad 3). dered thus: “It is enough that we think of the present; the Whether the religious life of those who live in community is more perfect than that of IIa IIae q. 188 a. 8 those who lead a solitary life? Objection 1. It would seem that the religious life of name, there am I in the midst of them.” But nothing can those who live in community is more perfect than that of be better than the fellowship of Christ. Therefore it would those who lead a solitary life. For it is written (Eccles. seem better to live in community than in solitude. 4:9): “It is better. . . that two should be together, than one; Objection 3. Further, the vow of obedience is more for they have the advantage of their society.” Therefore excellent than the other religious vows; and humility is the religious life of those who live in community would most acceptable to God. Now obedience and humility are seem to be more perfect. better observed in company than in solitude; for Jerome Objection 2. Further, it is written (Mat. 18:20): says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustic. Monach.): “In solitude pride “Where there are two or three gathered together in My quickly takes man unawares, he sleeps as much as he will, ∗ Hom. xvi in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom 2065 he does what he likes”; whereas when instructing one who evil.” lives in community, he says: “You may not do what you Now man is assisted in this practice by the fellowship will, you must eat what you are bidden to eat, you may of others in two ways. First, as regards his intellect, to possess so much as you receive, you must obey one you the effect of his being instructed in that which he has to prefer not to obey, you must be a servant to your brethren, contemplate; wherefore Jerome says (ad Rustic. Monach., you must fear the superior of the monastery as God, love Ep. cxxv): “It pleases me that you have the fellowship of him as a father.” Therefore it would seem that the reli- holy men, and teach not yourself. Secondly, as regards gious life of those who live in community is more perfect the affections, seeing that man’s noisome affections are than that of those who lead a solitary life. restrained by the example and reproof which he receives Objection 4. Further, our Lord said (Lk. 11:33): “No from others; for as Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 23), com- man lighteth a candle and putteth it in a hidden place, nor menting on the words, “To whom I have given a house in under a bushel.” Now those who lead a solitary life are the wilderness” (Job 39:6), “What profits solitude of the seemingly in a hidden place, and to be doing no good to body, if solitude of the heart be lacking?” Hence a so- any man. Therefore it would seem that their religious life cial life is necessary for the practice of perfection. Now is not more perfect. solitude befits those who are already perfect; wherefore Objection 5. Further, that which is in accord with Jerome says (ad Rustic. Monach., Ep. cxxv): “Far from man’s nature is apparently more pertinent to the perfec- condemning the solitary life, we have often commended tion of virtue. But man is naturally a social animal, as the it. But we wish the soldiers who pass from the monastic Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1). Therefore it would seem school to be such as not to be deterred by the hard novi- that to lead a solitary life is not more perfect than to lead ciate of the desert, and such as have given proof of their a community life. conduct for a considerable time. On the contrary, Augustine says (De oper. Monach. Accordingly, just as that which is already perfect sur- xxiii) that “those are holier who keep themselves aloof passes that which is being schooled in perfection, so the from the approach of all, and give their whole mind to a life of the solitaries, if duly practiced, surpasses the com- life of prayer.” munity life. But if it be undertaken without the aforesaid I answer that, Solitude, like poverty, is not the practice, it is fraught with very great danger, unless the essence of perfection, but a means thereto. Hence in the grace of God supply that which others acquire by prac- Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, 7) the Abbot Moses tice, as in the case of the Blessed Antony and the Blessed says that “solitude,” even as fasting and other like things, Benedict. is “a sure means of acquiring purity of heart.” Now it Reply to Objection 1. Solomon shows that two are is evident that solitude is a means adapted not to action better than one, on account of the help which one affords but to contemplation, according to Osee 2:14, “I. . . will the other either by “lifting him” up, or by “warming him,” lead her into solitude [Douay: ‘the wilderness’]; and I will i.e. giving him spiritual heat (Eccles. 4:10,11). But those speak to her heart.” Wherefore it is not suitable to those who have already attained to perfection do not require this religious orders that are directed to the works whether cor- help. poral or spiritual of the active life; except perhaps for a Reply to Objection 2. According to 1 Jn. 4:16, “He time, after the example of Christ, Who as Luke relates that abideth in charity abideth in God and God in him.” (6:12), “went out into a mountain to pray; and He passed Wherefore just as Christ is in the midst of those who are the whole night in the prayer of God.” On the other hand, united together in the fellowship of brotherly love, so does it is suitable to those religious orders that are directed to He dwell in the heart of the man who devotes himself to contemplation. divine contemplation through love of God. It must, however, be observed that what is solitary Reply to Objection 3. Actual obedience is required of should be self-sufficing by itself. Now such a thing is one those who need to be schooled according to the direction “that lacks nothing,” and this belongs to the idea of a per- of others in the attainment of perfection; but those who are fect thing∗. Wherefore solitude befits the contemplative already perfect are sufficiently “led by the spirit of God” who has already attained to perfection. This happens in so that they need not to obey others actually. Nevertheless two ways: in one way by the gift only of God, as in the they have obedience in the preparedness of the mind. case of John the Baptist, who was “filled with the Holy Reply to Objection 4. As Augustine says (De Civ. Ghost even from his mother’s womb” (Lk. 1:11), so that Dei xix, 19), “no one is forbidden to seek the knowl- he was in the desert even as a boy; in another way by edge of truth, for this pertains to a praiseworthy leisure.” the practice of virtuous action, according to Heb. 5:14: That a man be placed “on a candlestick,” does not con- “Strong meat is for the perfect; for them who by custom cern him but his superiors, and “if this burden is not have their senses exercised to the discerning of good and placed on us,” as Augustine goes on to say (De Civ. Dei ∗ Aristotle, Phys. iii, 6 2066 xix, 19), “we must devote ourselves to the contempla-example to us is the life of those whom we are forbidden tion of truth,” for which purpose solitude is most help- to see in the body.” ful. Nevertheless, those who lead a solitary life are most Reply to Objection 5. A man may lead a solitary life useful to mankind. Hence, referring to them, Augustine for two motives. one is because he is unable, as it were, says (De Morib. Eccl. xxxi): “They dwell in the most to bear with human fellowship on account of his uncouth- lonely places, content to live on water and the bread that ness of mind; and this is beast-like. The other is with a is brought to them from time to time, enjoying colloquy view to adhering wholly to divine things; and this is su- with God to whom they have adhered with a pure mind. perhuman. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that To some they seem to have renounced human intercourse “he who associates not with others is either a beast or a more than is right: but these understand not how much god,” i.e. a godly man. such men profit us by the spirit of their prayers, what an 2067 SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART, QUESTION 189 Of the Entrance Into Religious Life (In Ten Articles) We must now consider the entrance into religious life. Under this head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether those who are not practiced in the observance of the commandments should enter religion? (2) Whether it is lawful for a person to be bound by vow to enter religion? (3) Whether those who are bound by vow to enter religion are bound to fulfil their vow? (4) Whether those who vow to enter religion are bound to remain there in perpetuity? (5) Whether children should be received into religion? (6) Whether one should be withheld from entering religion through deference to one’s parents? (7) Whether parish priests or archdeacons may enter religion? (8) Whether one may pass from one religious order to another? (9) Whether one ought to induce others to enter religion? (10) Whether serious deliberation with one’s relations and friends is requisite for entrance into religion? Whether those who are not practiced in keeping the commandments should enter IIa IIae q. 189 a. 1 religion? Objection 1. It would seem that none should enter that is weaned is towards his mother,” says: “First we are religion but those who are practiced in the observance of conceived in the womb of Mother Church, by being taught the commandments. For our Lord gave the counsel of per- the rudiments of faith. Then we are nourished as it were fection to the young man who said that he had kept the in her womb, by progressing in those same elements. Af- commandments “from his youth.” Now all religious or- terwards we are brought forth to the light by being regen- ders originate from Christ. Therefore it would seem that erated in baptism. Then the Church bears us as it were in none should be allowed to enter religion but those who are her hands and feeds us with milk, when after baptism we practiced in the observance of the commandments. are instructed in good works and are nourished with the Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Hom. xv in milk of simple doctrine while we progress; until having Ezech., and Moral. xxii): “No one comes suddenly to the grown out of infancy we leave our mother’s milk for a fa- summit; but he must make a beginning of a good life in the ther’s control, that is to say, we pass from simple doctrine, smallest matters, so as to accomplish great things.” Now by which we are taught the Word made flesh, to the Word the great things are the counsels which pertain to the per- that was in the beginning with God.” Afterwards it goes fection of life, while the lesser things are the command- on to say: “For those who are just baptized on Holy Sat- ments which belong to common righteousness. Therefore urday are borne in the hands of the Church as it were and it would seem that one ought not to enter religion for the fed with milk until Pentecost, during which time nothing purpose of keeping the counsels, unless one be already arduous is prescribed, no fasts, no rising at midnight. Af- practiced in the observance of the precepts. terwards they are confirmed by the Paraclete Spirit, and Objection 3. Further, the religious state, like the holy being weaned so to speak, begin to fast and keep other orders, has a place of eminence in the Church. Now, difficult observances. Many, like the heretics and schis- as Gregory writes to the bishop Siagrius∗, “order should matics, have perverted this order by being weaned before be observed in ascending to orders. For he seeks a fall the time. Hence they have come to naught.” Now this or- who aspires to mount to the summit by overpassing the der is apparently perverted by those who enter religion, or steps.”†. “For we are well aware that walls when built re- induce others to enter religion, before they are practiced ceive not the weight of the beams until the new fabric is rid in the easier observance of the commandments. Therefore of its moisture, lest if they should be burdened with weight they would seem to be heretics or schismatics. before they are seasoned they bring down the whole build- Objection 5. Further, one should proceed from that ing” (Dist. xlviii, can. Sicut neophytus). Therefore it which precedes to that which follows after. Now the com- would seem that one should not enter religion unless one mandments precede the counsels, because they are more be practiced in the observance of the precepts. universal, for “the implication of the one by the other is Objection 4. Further, a gloss on Ps. 130:2, “As a child not convertible”‡, since whoever keeps the counsels keeps ∗ Regist. ix, Ep. 106 † The rest of the quotation is from Regist. v, Ep. 53, ad Virgil. Episc. ‡ Categor. ix 2068 the commandments, but the converse does not hold. See-it is impossible to fulfil the commandment which says, ing then that the right order requires one to pass from that Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, and to be rich, es- which comes first to that which comes after, it follows that pecially to have such great wealth.” This also refers to the one ought not to pass to the observance of the counsels in perfect fulfilment of this precept. on the other hand, it is religion, without being first of all practiced in the obser- true that he kept the commandments imperfectly and in a vance of the commandments. general way. For perfection consists chiefly in the obser- On the contrary, Matthew the publican who was vance of the precepts of charity, as stated above (q. 184, not practiced in the observance of the commandments a. 3). Wherefore in order to show that the perfection of the was called by our Lord to the observance of the coun- counsels is useful both to the innocent and to sinners, our sels. For it is stated (Lk. 5:28) that “leaving all things Lord called not only the innocent youth but also the sin- he. . . followed Him.” Therefore it is not necessary for a ner Matthew. Yet Matthew obeyed His call, and the youth person to be practiced in the observance of the command- obeyed not, because sinners are converted to the religious ments before passing to the perfection of the counsels. life more easily than those who presume on their inno- I answer that, As shown above (q. 188, a. 1), the re- cency. It is to the former that our Lord says (Mat. 21:31): ligious state is a spiritual schooling for the attainment of “The publicans and the harlots shall go into the kingdom the perfection of charity. This is accomplished through of God before you.” the removal of the obstacles to perfect charity by religious Reply to Objection 2. The highest and the lowest observances; and these obstacles are those things which place can be taken in three ways. First, in reference to the attach man’s affections to earthly things. Now the attach- same state and the same man; and thus it is evident that ment of man’s affections to earthly things is not only an no one comes to the summit suddenly, since every man obstacle to the perfection of charity, but sometimes leads that lives aright, progresses during the whole course of his to the loss of charity, when through turning inordinately life, so as to arrive at the summit. Secondly, in compari- to temporal goods man turns away from the immutable son with various states; and thus he who desires to reach good by sinning mortally. Hence it is evident that the ob- to a higher state need not begin from a lower state: for in- servances of the religious state, while removing the obsta- stance, if a man wish to be a cleric he need not first of all cles to perfect charity, remove also the occasions of sin: be practiced in the life of a layman. Thirdly, in compari- for instance, it is clear that fasting, watching, obedience, son with different persons; and in this way it is clear that and the like withdraw man from sins of gluttony and lust one man begins straightway not only from a higher state, and all other manner of sins. but even from a higher degree of holiness, than the highest Consequently it is right that not only those who are degree to which another man attains throughout his whole practiced in the observance of the commandments should life. Hence Gregory says (Dial. ii, 1): “All are agreed enter religion in order to attain to yet greater perfection, that the boy Benedict began at a high degree of grace and but also those who are not practiced, in order the more perfection in his daily life.” easily to avoid sin and attain to perfection. Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 184, a. 6) Reply to Objection 1. Jerome (Super Matth. xix, 20) the holy orders prerequire holiness, whereas the religious says: “The young man lies when he says: ‘All these have state is a school for the attainment of holiness. Hence the I kept from my youth.’ For if he had fulfilled this com- burden of orders should be laid on the walls when these mandment, ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,’ why are already seasoned with holiness, whereas the burden of did he go away sad when he heard: Go, sell all thou hast religion seasons the walls, i.e. men, by drawing out the and give to the poor?” But this means that he lied as to the damp of vice. perfect observance of this commandment. Hence Origen Reply to Objection 4. It is manifest from the words says (Tract. viii super Matth.) that “it is written in the of this gloss that it is chiefly a question of the order of Gospel according to the Hebrews that when our Lord had doctrine, in so far as one has to pass from easy matter said to him: ‘Go, sell all thou hast,’ the rich man began to that which is more difficult. Hence it is clear from to scratch his head; and that our Lord said to him: How what follows that the statement that certain “heretics” and sayest thou: I have fulfilled the law and the prophets, see- “schismatics have perverted this order” refers to the order ing that it is written in the law: Thou shalt love thy neigh- of doctrine. For it continues thus: “But he says that he bor as thyself? Behold many of thy brethren, children of has kept these things, namely the aforesaid order, bind- Abraham, are clothed in filth, and die of hunger, whilst ing himself by an oath∗. Thus I was humble not only thy house is full of all manner of good things, and nothing in other things but also in knowledge, for ‘I was humbly whatever hath passed thence to them. And thus our Lord minded’; because I was first of all fed with milk, which reproves him saying: If thou wilt be perfect, go, etc. For is the Word made flesh, so that I grew up to partake of ∗ Referring to the last words of the verse, and taking ‘retributio,’ which Douay renders ‘reward,’ as meaning ‘punishment’ 2069 the bread of angels, namely the Word that is in the be-less one observe them it is altogether impossible to keep ginning with God.” The example which is given in proof, the precepts of charity. Accordingly in the intention the of the newly baptized not being commanded to fast until perfect observance of the precepts of charity precedes the Pentecost, shows that no difficult things are to be laid on counsels, and yet sometimes it follows them in point of them as an obligation before the Holy Ghost inspires them time. For such is the order of the end in relation to things inwardly to take upon themselves difficult things of their directed to the end. But the observance in a general way own choice. Hence after Pentecost and the receiving of of the precepts of charity together with the other precepts, the Holy Ghost the Church observes a fast. Now the Holy is compared to the counsels as the common to the proper, Ghost, according to Ambrose (Super Luc. 1:15), “is not because one can observe the precepts without observing confined to any particular age; He ceases not when men the counsels, but not vice versa. Hence the common ob- die, He is not excluded from the maternal womb.” Gre- servance of the precepts precedes the counsels in the order gory also in a homily for Pentecost (xxx in Ev.) says: “He of nature; but it does not follow that it precedes them in fills the boy harpist and makes him a psalmist: He fills the point of time, for a thing is not in the genus before being boy abstainer and makes him a wise judge†,” and after- in one of the species. But the observance of the precepts wards he adds: “No time is needed to learn whatsoever He apart from the counsels is directed to the observance of will, for He teaches the mind by the merest touch.” Again the precepts together with the counsels; as an imperfect to it is written (Eccles. 8:8), “It is not in man’s power to a perfect species, even as the irrational to the rational an- stop the Spirit,” and the Apostle admonishes us (1 Thess. imal. Now the perfect is naturally prior to the imperfect, 5:19): “Extinguish not the Spirit,” and (Acts 7:51) it is since “nature,” as Boethius says (De Consol. iii, 10), “be- said against certain persons: “You always resist the Holy gins with perfect things.” And yet it is not necessary for Ghost.” the precepts first of all to be observed without the coun- Reply to Objection 5. There are certain chief pre- sels, and afterwards with the counsels, just as it is not nec- cepts which are the ends, so to say, of the commandments essary for one to be an ass before being a man, or married and counsels. These are the precepts of charity, and the before being a virgin. In like manner it is not necessary counsels are directed to them, not that these precepts can- for a person first of all to keep the commandments in the not be observed without keeping the counsels, but that the world before entering religion; especially as the worldly keeping of the counsels conduces to the better observance life does not dispose one to religious perfection, but is of the precepts. The other precepts are secondary and are more an obstacle thereto. directed to the precepts of charity; in such a way that un- Whether one ought to be bound by vow to enter religion? IIa IIae q. 189 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that one ought not to be through being bound by vow to enter religion it often hap- bound by vow to enter religion. For in making his pro- pens that people fall into despair and various sins. There- fession a man is bound by the religious vow. Now before fore it would seem that one ought not to be bound by vow profession a year of probation is allowed, according to the to enter religion. rule of the Blessed Benedict (lviii) and according to the On the contrary, It is written, (Ps. 75:12): “Vow ye, decree of Innocent IV∗ who moreover forbade anyone to and pay to the Lord your God”; and a gloss of Augus- be bound to the religious life by profession before com- tine says that “some vows concern the individual, such as pleting the year of probation. Therefore it would seem vows of chastity, virginity, and the like.” Consequently that much less ought anyone while yet in the world to be Holy Scripture invites us to vow these things. But Holy bound by vow to enter religion. Scripture invites us only to that which is better. Therefore Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. it is better to bind oneself by vow to enter religion. 15): Jews “should be persuaded to be converted, not by I answer that, As stated above (q. 88, a. 6), when we compulsion but of their own free will” (Dist. xlv, can. were treating of vows, one and the same work done in ful- De Judaeis). Now one is compelled to fulfil what one has filment of a vow is more praiseworthy than if it be done vowed. Therefore no one should be bound by vow to enter apart from a vow, both because to vow is an act of religion, religion. which has a certain pre-eminence among the virtues, and Objection 3. Further, no one should give another an because a vow strengthens a man’s will to do good; and occasion of falling; wherefore it is written (Ex. 21:33,34): just as a sin is more grievous through proceeding from a “If a man open a pit. . . and an ox or an ass fall into it, the will obstinate in evil, so a good work is the more praise-owner of the pit shall pay the price of the beasts.” Now worthy through proceeding from a will confirmed in good † Dan. 1:8-17 ∗ Sext. Decret., cap. Non solum., de Regular. et Transeunt, ad Relig. 2070 by means of a vow. Therefore it is in itself praiseworthy after such a vow one cannot attain to the end of salvation to bind oneself by vow to enter religion. unless one fulfil that vow. Such a necessity is not to be Reply to Objection 1. The religious vow is twofold. avoided; indeed, as Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Ar- One is the solemn vow which makes a man a monk or mentar. et Paulin.), “happy is the necessity that compels a brother in some other religious order. This is called the us to better things.” profession, and such a vow should be preceded by a year’s Reply to Objection 3. The vow to enter religion is probation, as the objection proves. The other is the simple a strengthening of the will for better things, and conse- vow which does not make a man a monk or a religious, quently, considered in itself, instead of giving a man an but only binds him to enter religion, and such a vow need occasion of falling, withdraws him from it. But if one not be preceded by a year’s probation. who breaks a vow falls more grievously, this does not Reply to Objection 2. The words quoted from Gre- derogate from the goodness of the vow, as neither does gory must be understood as referring to absolute violence. it derogate from the goodness of Baptism that some sin But the compulsion arising from the obligation of a vow more grievously after being baptized. is not absolute necessity, but a necessity of end, because Whether one who is bound by a vow to enter religion is under an obligation of entering IIa IIae q. 189 a. 3 religion? Objection 1. It would seem that one who is bound by says: “To vow depends on the will: but after the vow has the vow to enter religion is not under an obligation of en- been taken the fulfilment is of obligation.” tering religion. For it is said in the Decretals (XVII, qu. I answer that, As stated above (q. 88, a. 1), when we ii, can. Consaldus): “Consaldus, a priest under pressure were treating of vows, a vow is a promise made to God in of sickness and emotional fervour, promised to become a matters concerning God. Now, as Gregory says in a letter monk. He did not, however, bind himself to a monastery to Boniface∗: “If among men of good faith contracts are or abbot; nor did he commit his promise to writing, but wont to be absolutely irrevocable, how much more shall he renounced his benefice in the hands of a notary; and the breaking of this promise given to God be deserving when he was restored to health he refused to become a of punishment!” Therefore a man is under an obligation monk.” And afterwards it is added: “We adjudge and by to fulfil what he has vowed, provided this be something apostolic authority we command that the aforesaid priest pertaining to God. be admitted to his benefice and sacred duties, and that he Now it is evident that entrance into religion pertains be allowed to retain them in peace.” Now this would not very much to God, since thereby man devotes himself en- be if he were bound to enter religion. Therefore it would tirely to the divine service, as stated above (q. 186, a. 1). seem that one is not bound to keep one’s vow of entering Hence it follows that he who binds himself to enter reli- religion. gion is under an obligation to enter religion according as Objection 2. Further, no one is bound to do what is he intends to bind himself by his vow: so that if he in- not in his power. Now it is not in a person’s power to enter tend to bind himself absolutely, he is obliged to enter as religion, since this depends on the consent of those whom soon as he can, through the cessation of a lawful imped- he wishes to join. Therefore it would seem that a man is iment; whereas if he intend to bind himself to a certain not obliged to fulfil the vow by which he bound himself fixed time, or under a certain fixed condition, he is bound to enter religion. to enter religion when the time comes or the condition is Objection 3. Further, a less useful vow cannot remit a fulfilled. more useful one. Now the fulfilment of a vow to enter re- Reply to Objection 1. This priest had made, not a ligion might hinder the fulfilment of a vow to take up the solemn, but a simple vow. Hence he was not a monk in ef- cross in defense of the Holy Land; and the latter appar- fect, so as to be bound by law to dwell in a monastery and ently is the more useful vow, since thereby a man obtains renounce his cure. However, in the court of conscience the forgiveness of his sins. Therefore it would seem that one ought to advise him to renounce all and enter reli- the vow by which a man has bound himself to enter reli- gion. Hence (Extra, De Voto et Voti Redemptione, cap. gion is not necessarily to be fulfilled. Per tuas) the Bishop of Grenoble, who had accepted the On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:3): “If thou episcopate after vowing to enter religion, without having hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an un- fulfilled his vow, is counseled that if “he wish to heal his faithful and foolish promise displeaseth him”; and a gloss conscience he should renounce the government of his see on Ps. 75:12, “Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God,” and pay his vows to the Most High.” ∗ Innoc. I, Epist. ii, Victricio Epo. Rotomag., cap. 14; Cf. can. Viduas: cause. xxvii, qu. 1 2071 Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 88, a. 3, Moreover it may be reasonably stated that also by en-ad 2), when we were treating of vows, he who has bound trance into religion a man obtains remission of all his sins. himself by vow to enter a certain religious order is bound For if by giving alms a man may forthwith satisfy for his to do what is in his power in order to be received in that sins, according to Dan. 4:24, “Redeem thou thy sins with order; and if he intend to bind himself simply to enter the alms,” much more does it suffice to satisfy for all his sins religious life, if he be not admitted to one, he is bound to that a man devote himself wholly to the divine service by go to another; whereas if he intend to bind himself only entering religion, for this surpasses all manner of satisfac- to one particular order, he is bound only according to the tion, even that of public penance, according to the Dec- measure of the obligation to which he has engaged him- retals (XXXIII, qu. i, cap. Admonere) just as a holo- self. caust exceeds a sacrifice, as Gregory declares (Hom. xx Reply to Objection 3. The vow to enter religion being in Ezech.). Hence we read in the Lives of the Fathers (vi, perpetual is greater than the vow of pilgrimage to the Holy 1) that by entering religion one receives the same grace as Land, which is a temporal vow; and as Alexander III says by being baptized. And yet even if one were not thereby (Extra, De Voto et Voti Redemptione, cap. Scripturae), absolved from all debt of punishment, nevertheless the en- “he who exchanges a temporary service for the perpet- trance into religion is more profitable than a pilgrimage to ual service of religion is in no way guilty of breaking his the Holy Land, as regards the advancement in good, which vow.” is preferable to absolution from punishment. Whether he who has vowed to enter religion is bound to remain in religion in perpe-IIa IIae q. 189 a. 4 tuity? Objection 1. It would seem that he who has vowed it seems that he who vows to enter religion is not for that to enter religion, is bound in perpetuity to remain in re- reason bound to remain there in perpetuity. ligion. For it is better not to enter religion than to leave I answer that, The obligation of a vow proceeds from after entering, according to 2 Pet. 2:21, “It had been bet- the will: because “to vow is an act of the will” accord- ter for them not to have known the way of justice, than ing to Augustine∗. Consequently the obligation of a vow after they have known it to turn back,” and Lk. 9:62, “No extends as far as the will and intention of the person who man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is takes the vow. Accordingly if in vowing he intend to bind fit for the kingdom of God.” But he who bound himself himself not only to enter religion, but also to remain there by the vow to enter religion, is under the obligation to en- evermore, he is bound to remain in perpetuity. If, on the ter, as stated above (a. 3). Therefore he is also bound to other hand, he intend to bind himself to enter religion for remain for always. the purpose of trial, while retaining the freedom to remain Objection 2. Further, everyone is bound to avoid that or not remain, it is clear that he is not bound to remain. which gives rise to scandal, and is a bad example to oth- If, however, in vowing he thought merely of entering re- ers. Now by leaving after entering religion a man gives a ligion, without thinking of being free to leave, or of re- bad example and is an occasion of scandal to others, who maining in perpetuity, it would seem that he is bound to are thereby withdrawn from entering or incited to leave. enter religion according to the form prescribed by com- Therefore it seems that he who enters religion in order to mon law, which is that those who enter should be given a fulfil a vow which he had previously taken, is bound to year’s probation. Wherefore he is not bound to remain for remain evermore. ever. Objection 3. Further, the vow to enter religion is ac- Reply to Objection 1. It is better to enter religion counted a perpetual vow: wherefore it is preferred to tem- with the purpose of making a trial than not to enter at all, poral vows, as stated above (a. 3, ad 3; q. 88, a. 12, ad because by so doing one disposes oneself to remain al- 1). But this would not be so if a person after vowing to ways. Nor is a person accounted to turn or to look back, enter religion were to enter with the intention of leaving. save when he omits to do that which he engaged to do: It seems, therefore, that he who vows to enter religion is else whoever does a good work for a time, would be unfit bound also to remain in perpetuity. for the kingdom of God, unless he did it always, which is On the contrary, The vow of religious profession, evidently false. for the reason that it binds a man to remain in religion Reply to Objection 2. A man who has entered re- for evermore, has to be preceded by a year of proba- ligion gives neither scandal nor bad example by leaving, tion; whereas this is not required before the simple vow especially if he do so for a reasonable motive; and if oth- whereby a man binds himself to enter religion. Therefore ers are scandalized, it will be passive scandal on their part, ∗ Gloss of Peter Lombard on Ps. 75:12 2072 and not active scandal on the part of the person leaving, pose of leaving forthwith, does not seem to fulfil his vow, since in doing so, he has done what was lawful, and ex- since this was not his intention in vowing. Hence he must pedient on account of some reasonable motive, such as change that purpose, at least so as to wish to try whether it sickness, weakness, and the like. is good for him to remain in religion, but he is not bound Reply to Objection 3. He who enters with the pur- to remain for evermore. Whether children should be received in religion? IIa IIae q. 189 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that children ought not ficacy from the divine law. Nevertheless it may encounter to be received in religion. Because it is said (Extra, De a twofold obstacle. First, through lack of deliberation, as Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Nullus): “No one in the case of the insane, whose vows are not binding§. should be tonsured unless he be of legal age and willing.” The same applies to children who have not reached the But children, seemingly, are not of legal age; nor have required use of reason, so as to be capable of guile, which they a will of their own, not having perfect use of reason. use boys attain, as a rule, at about the age of fourteen, and Therefore it seems that they ought not to be received in girls at the age of twelve, this being what is called “the age religion. of puberty,” although in some it comes earlier and in oth- Objection 2. Further, the state of religion would seem ers it is delayed, according to the various dispositions of to be a state of repentance; wherefore religion is derived∗ nature. Secondly, the efficacy of a simple vow encounters from “religare” [to bind] or from “re-eligere” [to choose an obstacle, if the person who makes a vow to God is not again], as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 3†). But repen- his own master; for instance, if a slave, though having the tance does not become children. Therefore it seems that use of reason, vows to enter religion, or even is ordained, they should not enter religion. without the knowledge of his master: for his master can Objection 3. Further, the obligation of a vow is like annul this, as stated in the Decretals (Dist. LIV, cap. Si that of an oath. But children under the age of fourteen servus). And since boys and girls under the age of pu- ought not to be bound by oath (Decret. XXII, qu. v, cap. berty are naturally in their father’s power as regards the Pueri and cap. Honestum.). Therefore it would seem that disposal of their manner of life, their father may either neither should they be bound by vow. cancel or approve their vow, if it please him to do so, as it Objection 4. Further, it is seemingly unlawful to bind is expressly said with regard to a woman (Num. 30:4). a person to an obligation that can be justly canceled. Now Accordingly if before reaching the age of puberty a if any persons of unripe age bind themselves to religion, child makes a simple vow, not yet having full use of rea- they can be withdrawn by their parents or guardians. For son, he is not bound in virtue of the vow; but if he has it is written in the Decretals (XX, qu. ii, can. Puella) that the use of reason before reaching the age of puberty, he “if a maid under twelve years of age shall take the sacred is bound, so far as he is concerned, by his vow; yet this veil of her own accord, her parents or guardians, if they obligation may be removed by his father’s authority, un- choose, can at once declare the deed null and void.” It is der whose control he still remains, because the ordinance therefore unlawful for children, especially of unripe age, of the law whereby one man is subject to another consid- to be admitted or bound to religion. ers what happens in the majority of cases. If, however, On the contrary, our Lord said (Mat. 19:14): “Suf- the fer the little children, and forbid them not to come to Me.” child has passed the age of puberty, his vow cannot be Expounding these words Origen says (Tract. vii in Matth.) annulled by the authority of his parents; though if he has that “the disciples of Jesus before they have been taught not the full use of reason, he would not be bound in the the conditions of righteousness‡, rebuke those who offer sight of God. children and babes to Christ: but our Lord urges His dis- The other is the solemn vow which makes a man a ciples to stoop to the service of children. We must there- monk or a religious. Such a vow is subject to the ordi- fore take note of this, lest deeming ourselves to excel in nance of the Church, on account of the solemnity attached wisdom we despise the Church’s little ones, as though we to it. And since the Church considers what happens in the were great, and forbid the children to come to Jesus.” majority of cases, a profession made before the age of I answer that, As stated above (a. 2, ad 1), the reli- puberty, however much the person who makes profession gious vow is twofold. One is the simple vow consisting in may have the use of reason, or be capable of guile, does a mere promise made to God, and proceeding from the in- not take effect so as to make him a religious (Extra, De terior deliberation of the mind. Such a vow derives its ef- Regular., etc. cap. Significatum est.). ∗ Cf. q. 81, a. 1 † Cf. De Vera Relig. lv ‡ Cf. Mat. 19:16-30 § Extra, De Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Sicut tenor 2073 Nevertheless, although they cannot be professed be-directed to the attachment of perfection, as stated above fore the age of puberty, they can, with the consent of their (q. 186, a. 1, ad 4); and accordingly it is becoming to chil- parents, be received into religion to be educated there: dren, who are easily drawn to it. But as a consequence it thus it is related of John the Baptist (Lk. 1:80) that “the is called a state of repentance, inasmuch as occasions of child grew and was strengthened in spirit, and was in the sin are removed by religious observances, as stated above deserts.” Hence, as Gregory states (Dial. ii, 3), “the Ro- (q. 186, a. 1, ad 4). man nobles began to give their sons to the blessed Bene- Reply to Objection 3. Even as children are not bound dict to be nurtured for Almighty God”; and this is most fit- to take oaths (as the canon states), so are they not bound ting, according to Lam. 3:27, “It is good for a man when to take vows. If, however, they bind themselves by vow he has borne the yoke from his youth.” It is for this reason or oath to do something, they are bound in God’s sight, if that by common custom children are made to apply them- they have the use of reason, but they are not bound in the selves to those duties or arts with which they are to pass sight of the Church before reaching the age of fourteen. their lives. Reply to Objection 4. A woman who has not reached Reply to Objection 1. The legal age for receiving the the age of puberty is not rebuked (Num. 30:4) for tak- tonsure and taking the solemn vow of religion is the age of ing a vow without her parents’ consent: but the vow can puberty, when a man is able to make use of his own will; be made void by her parents. Hence it is evident that she but before the age of puberty it is possible to have reached does not sin in vowing. But we are given to understand the lawful age to receive the tonsure and be educated in a that she binds herself by vow, so far as she may, without religious house. prejudice to her parents’ authority. Reply to Objection 2. The religious state is chiefly Whether one ought to be withdrawn from entering religion through deference to one’s IIa IIae q. 189 a. 6 parents? Objection 1. It would seem that one ought to be with- enter religion in despite of their duty to their parents. drawn from entering religion through deference to one’s On the contrary, It is related (Mat. 4:22) that James parents. For it is not lawful to omit that which is of obliga- and John “left their nets and father, and followed our tion in order to do that which is optional. Now deference Lord.” By this, says Hilary (Can. iii in Matth.), “we learn to one’s parents comes under an obligation of the pre- that we who intend to follow Christ are not bound by the cept concerning the honoring of our parents (Ex. 20:12); cares of the secular life, and by the ties of home.” wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:4): “If any widow I answer that, As stated above (q. 101, a. 2, ad 2) have children or grandchildren, let her learn first to gov- when we were treating of piety, parents as such have the ern her own house, and to make a return of duty to her character of a principle, wherefore it is competent to them parents.” But the entrance to religion is optional. There- as such to have the care of their children. Hence it is un- fore it would seem that one ought not to omit deference to lawful for a person having children to enter religion so as one’s parents for the sake of entering religion. altogether to set aside the care for their children, namely Objection 2. Further, seemingly the subjection of a without providing for their education. For it is written (1 son to his father is greater than that of a slave to his mas- Tim. 5:8) that “if any man have not care of his own. . . he ter, since sonship is natural, while slavery results from the hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel.” curse of sin, as appears from Gn. 9:25. Now a slave can- Nevertheless it is accidentally competent to parents to not set aside the service of his master in order to enter re- be assisted by their children, in so far, to wit, as they are ligion or take holy orders, as stated in the Decretals (Dist. placed in a condition of necessity. Consequently we must LIV, cap. Si servus). Much less therefore can a son set say that when their parents are in such need that they can- aside the deference due to his father in order to enter reli- not fittingly be supported otherwise than by the help of gion. their children, these latter may not lawfully enter religion Objection 3. Further, a man is more indebted to his in despite of their duty to their parents. If, however, the parents than to those to whom he owes money. Now per- parents’ necessity be not such as to stand in great need sons who owe money to anyone cannot enter religion. of their children’s assistance, the latter may, in despite of For Gregory says (Regist. viii, Ep. 5) that “those who the duty they owe their parents, enter religion even against are engaged in trade must by no means be admitted into their parents’ command, because after the age of puberty a monastery, when they seek admittance, unless first of every freeman enjoys freedom in things concerning the or- all they withdraw from public business” (Dist. liii, can. dering of his state of life, especially in such as belong to Legem.). Therefore seemingly much less may children the service of God, and “we should more obey the Father 2074 of spirits that we may live∗,” as says the Apostle (Heb. from freely disposing of his person by transferring him- 12:9), than obey our parents. Hence as we read (Mat. self to the service of God; which is most conducive to 8:22; Lk. 9:62) our Lord rebuked the disciple who was man’s good. unwilling to follow him forthwith on account of his fa- Reply to Objection 3. He who is under a certain fixed ther’s burial: for there were others who could see to this, obligation cannot lawfully set it aside so long as he is able as Chrysostom remarks†. to fulfil it. Wherefore if a person is under an obligation Reply to Objection 1. The commandment of honor- to give an account to someone or to pay a certain fixed ing our parents extends not only to bodily but also to spir- debt, he cannot lawfully evade this obligation in order to itual service, and to the paying of deference. Hence even enter religion. If, however, he owes a sum of money, and those who are in religion can fulfil the commandment of has not wherewithal to pay the debt, he must do what he honoring their parents, by praying for them and by rever- can, namely by surrendering his goods to his creditor. Ac- ing and assisting them, as becomes religious, since even cording to civil law† money lays an obligation not on the those who live in the world honor their parents in different person of a freeman, but on his property, because the per- ways as befits their condition. son of a freeman “is above all pecuniary consideration”‡. Reply to Objection 2. Since slavery was imposed Hence, after surrendering his property, he may lawfully in punishment of sin, it follows that by slavery man for- enter religion, nor is he bound to remain in the world in feits something which otherwise he would be competent order to earn the means of paying the debt. to have, namely the free disposal of his person, for “a slave On the other hand, he does not owe his father a special belongs wholly to his master”∗. On the other hand, the debt, except as may arise in a case of necessity, as stated son, through being subject to his father, is not hindered above. Whether parish priests may lawfully enter religion? IIa IIae q. 189 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that parish priests can- ular life, is inspired by the Holy Ghost to desire to work not lawfully enter religion. For Gregory says (Past. iii, out his salvation in a monastery or under some canonical 4) that “he who undertakes the cure of souls, receives an rule, even though his bishop withstand him, we authorize awful warning in the words: ‘My son, if thou be surety for him to go freely.” thy friend, thou hast engaged fast thy hand to a stranger’ ” I answer that, As stated above (a. 3, ad 3; q. 88, a. 12, (Prov. 6:1); and he goes on to say, “because to be surety ad 1), the obligation of a perpetual vow stands before ev- for a friend is to take charge of the soul of another on the ery other obligation. Now it belongs properly to bish- surety of one’s own behavior.” Now he who is under an ops and religious to be bound by perpetual vow to devote obligation to a man for a debt, cannot enter religion, un- themselves to the divine service§, while parish priests and less he pay what he owes, if he can. Since then a priest is archdeacons are not, as bishops are, bound by a perpet- able to fulfil the cure of souls, to which obligation he has ual and solemn vow to retain the cure of souls. Where- pledged his soul, it would seem unlawful for him to lay fore bishops “cannot lay aside their bishopric for any pre- aside the cure of souls in order to enter religion. text whatever, without the authority of the Roman Pon- Objection 2. Further, what is lawful to one is likewise tiff” (Extra, De Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. lawful to all. But if all priests having cure of souls were to Licet.): whereas archdeacons and parish priests are free enter religion, the people would be left without a pastor’s to renounce in the hands of the bishop the cure entrusted care, which would be unfitting. Therefore it seems that to them, without the Pope’s special permission, who alone parish priests cannot lawfully enter religion. can dispense from perpetual vows. Therefore it is evident Objection 3. Further, chief among the acts to which that archdeacons and parish priests may lawfully enter re- religious orders are directed are those whereby a man ligion. gives to others the fruit of his contemplation. Now such Reply to Objection 1. Parish priests and archdeacons acts are competent to parish priests and archdeacons, have bound themselves to the care of their subjects, as whom it becomes by virtue of their office to preach and long as they retain their archdeaconry or parish, but they hear confessions. Therefore it would seem unlawful for a did not bind themselves to retain their archdeaconry or parish priest or archdeacon to pass over to religion. parish for ever. On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XIX, qu. Reply to Objection 2. As Jerome says (Contra ii, cap. Duce sunt leges.): “If a man, while governing the Vigil.): “Although they,” namely religious, “are sorely people in his church under the bishop and leading a sec- smitten by thy poisonous tongue, about whom you argue, ∗ ‘Shall we not much more obey the Father of Spirits, and live?’ † Hom. xxvii in Matth. ∗ Aristotle, Polit. i, 2 † Cod. IV, x, de Oblig. et Action, 12 ‡ Dig. L, xvii, de div. reg. Jur. ant. 106,176 § Cf. q. 184, a. 5 2075 saying; ‘If all shut themselves up and live in solitude, who the human race will perish. Virtue is rare, and is not de-will go to church? who will convert worldlings? who will sired by many.” It is therefore evident that this is a foolish be able to urge sinners to virtue?’ If this holds true, if all alarm; thus might a man fear to draw water lest the river are fools with thee, who can be wise? Nor will virgin- run dry.¶ ity be commendable, for if all be virgins, and none marry, Whether it is lawful to pass from one religious order to another? IIa IIae q. 189 a. 8 Objection 1. It seems unlawful to pass from one reli- ligious order to which one is accustomed than in one to gious order to another, even a stricter one. For the Apostle which one is not habituated. Hence in the Conferences of says (Heb. 10:25): “Not forsaking our assembly, as some the Fathers (Coll. xiv, 5) Abbot Nesteros says: “It is best are accustomed”; and a gloss observes: “Those namely for each one that he should, according to the resolve he who yield through fear of persecution, or who presuming has made, hasten with the greatest zeal and care to reach on themselves withdraw from the company of sinners or the perfection of the work he has undertaken, and nowise of the imperfect, that they may appear to be righteous.” forsake the profession he has chosen.” And further on he Now those who pass from one religious order to another adds (cap. 6) by way of reason: “For it is impossible that more perfect one would seem to do this. Therefore this is one and the same man should excel in all the virtues at seemingly unlawful. once, since if he endeavor to practice them equally, he will Objection 2. Further, the profession of monks is of necessity, while trying to attain them all, end in acquir- stricter than that of canons regular (Extra, De Statu ing none of them perfectly”: because the various religious Monach. et Canonic. Reg., cap. Quod Dei timorem). But orders excel in respect of various works of virtue. it is unlawful for anyone to pass from the state of canon Nevertheless one may commendably pass from one re- regular to the monastic state. For it is said in the Dec- ligious order to another for three reasons. First, through retals (XIX, qu. iii, can. Mandamus): “We ordain and zeal for a more perfect religious life, which excellence de- without any exception forbid any professed canon regu- pends, as stated above (q. 188, a. 6), not merely on sever- lar to become a monk, unless (which God forbid) he have ity, but chiefly on the end to which a religious order is fallen into public sin.” Therefore it would seem unlawful directed, and secondarily on the discretion whereby the for anyone to pass from one religious order to another of observances are proportionate to the due end. Secondly, higher rank. on account of a religious order falling away from the per- Objection 3. Further, a person is bound to fulfil what fection it ought to have: for instance, if in a more severe he has vowed, as long as he is able lawfully to do so; thus religious order, the religious begin to live less strictly, it if a man has vowed to observe continence, he is bound, is commendable for one to pass even to a less severe re- even after contracting marriage by words in the present ligious order if the observance is better. Hence in the tense, to fulfil his vow so long as the marriage is not con- Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xix, 3,5,6) Abbot John summated, because he can fulfil the vow by entering re- says of himself that he had passed from the solitary life, ligion. Therefore if a person may lawfully pass from one in which he was professed, to a less severe life, namely religious order to another, he will be bound to do so if he of those who lived in community, because the hermetical vowed it previously while in the world. But this would life had fallen into decline and laxity. Thirdly, on account seem objectionable, since in many cases it might give rise of sickness or weakness, the result of which sometimes to scandal. Therefore a religious may not pass from one is that one is unable to keep the ordinances of a more se- religious order to another stricter one. vere religious order, though able to observe those of a less On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XX, qu. strict religion. iv, can. Virgines): “If sacred virgins design for the good There is, however, a difference in these three cases. of their soul to pass to another monastery on account of For in the first case one ought, on account of humility, to a stricter life, and decide to remain there, the holy synod seek permission: yet this cannot be denied, provided it allows them to do so”: and the same would seem to apply be certain that this other religion is more severe. “And if to any religious. Therefore one may lawfully pass from there be a probable doubt about this, one should ask one’s one religious order to another. superior to decide” (Extra, De Regular. et Transeunt. ad I answer that, It is not commendable to pass from one Relig., cap. Licet.). In like manner the superior’s decision religious order to another: both because this frequently should be sought in the second case. In the third case it is gives scandal to those who remain; and because, other also necessary to have a dispensation. things being equal, it is easier to make progress in a re- Reply to Objection 1. Those who pass to a stricter re- ¶ St. Thomas gives no reply to the third objection, which is sufficiently solved in the body of the article. 2076 ligious order, do so not out of presumption that they may come a cleric”; but not conversely, as expressed in the appear righteous, but out of devotion, that they may be- Decretal quoted (XIX, qu. iii). If, however, the monks come more righteous. be clerics devoting themselves to the sacred ministry, they Reply to Objection 2. Religious orders whether of have this in common with canons regular coupled with monks or of canons regular are destined to the works of greater severity, and consequently it will be lawful to pass the contemplative life. Chief among these are those which from an order of canons regular to a monastic order, pro- are performed in the divine mysteries, and these are the di- vided withal that one seek the superior’s permission (XIX, rect object of the orders of canons regular, the members of qu. iii; cap. Statuimus). which are essentially religious clerics. On the other hand, Reply to Objection 3. The solemn vow whereby a monastic religious are not essentially clerics, according person is bound to a less strict order, is more binding than to the Decretals (XVI, qu. i, cap. Alia causa). Hence the simple vow whereby a person is bound to a stricter or- although monastic orders are more severe, it would be der. For if after taking a simple vow a person were to be lawful, supposing the members to be lay monks, to pass married, his marriage would not be invalid, as it would be from the monastic order to an order of canons regular, ac- after his taking a solemn vow. Consequently a person who cording to the statement of Jerome (Ep. cxxv, ad Rustic. is professed in a less severe order is not bound to fulfil a Monach.): “So live in the monastery as to deserve to be- simple vow he has taken on entering a more severe order. Whether one ought to induce others to enter religion? IIa IIae q. 189 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that no one ought to in- person persuade another simoniacally to enter religion, by duce others to enter religion. For the blessed Benedict giving him presents: and this is forbidden in the Decretal prescribes in his Rule (lviii) that “those who seek to enter (I, qu. ii, cap. Quam pio). But this does not apply to the religion must not easily be admitted, but spirits must be case where one provides a poor person with necessaries by tested whether they be of God”; and Cassian has the same educating him in the world for the religious life; or when instruction (De Inst. Caenob. iv, 3). Much less therefore without any compact one gives a person little presents for is it lawful to induce anyone to enter religion. the sake of good fellowship. Thirdly, if one person entices Objection 2. Further, our Lord said (Mat. 23:15): another by lies: for it is to be feared that the person thus “Woe to you. . . because you go round about the sea and enticed may turn back on finding himself deceived, and the land to make one proselyte, and when he is made you thus “the last state of that man” may become “worse than make him the child of hell twofold more than yourselves.” the first” (Lk. 11:26). Now thus would seem to do those who induce persons to Reply to Objection 1. Those who are induced to enter enter religion. Therefore this would seem blameworthy. religion have still a time of probation wherein they make a Objection 3. Further, no one should induce another to trial of the hardships of religion, so that they are not easily do what is to his prejudice. But those who are induced to admitted to the religious life. enter religion, sometimes take harm therefrom, for some- Reply to Objection 2. According to Hilary (Can. times they are under obligation to enter a stricter religion. xxiv in Matth.) this saying of our Lord was a forecast Therefore it would not seem praiseworthy to induce others of the wicked endeavors of the Jews, after the preaching to enter religion. of Christ, to draw Gentiles or even Christians to observe On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 26:3, seqq.∗): “Let the Jewish ritual, thereby making them doubly children of one curtain draw the other.” Therefore one man should hell, because, to wit, they were not forgiven the former draw another to God’s service. sins which they committed while adherents of Judaism, I answer that, Those who induce others to enter re- and furthermore they incurred the guilt of Jewish perfidy; ligion not only do not sin, but merit a great reward. For and thus interpreted these words have nothing to do with it is written (James 5:20): “He who causeth a sinner to the case in point. be converted from the error of his way, shall save his soul According to Jerome, however, in his commentary on from death, and shall cover a multitude of sins”; and (Dan. this passage of Matthew, the reference is to the Jews even 12:3): “They that instruct many to justice shall be as stars at the time when it was yet lawful to keep the legal obser- for all eternity.” vances, in so far as he whom they converted to Judaism Nevertheless such inducement may be affected by a “from paganism, was merely misled; but when he saw the threefold inordinateness. First, if one person force another wickedness of his teachers, he returned to his vomit, and by violence to enter religion: and this is forbidden in the becoming a pagan deserved greater punishment for his Decretals (XX, qu. iii, cap. Praesens). Secondly, if one treachery.” Hence it is manifest that it is not blamewor- ∗ St. Thomas quotes the sense, not the words 2077 thy to draw others to the service of God or to the religious a greater one. unless there be some special obstacle, such life, but only when one gives a bad example to the person as ill-health, or the hope of making greater progress in the converted, whence he becomes worse. lesser order. On the other hand, one who is bound by vow Reply to Objection 3. The lesser is included in the or oath to enter a greater order, cannot be lawfully induced greater. Wherefore a person who is bound by vow or oath to enter a lesser order, except for some special and evident to enter a lesser order, may be lawfully induced to enter motive, and then with the superior’s dispensation. Whether it is praiseworthy to enter religion without taking counsel of many, and pre-IIa IIae q. 189 a. 10 viously deliberating for a long time? Objection 1. It would not seem praiseworthy to en- good, and to doubt about this is to disparage Christ Who ter religion without taking counsel of many, and previ- gave this counsel. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., ously deliberating for a long time. For it is written (1 Jn. Serm. c, 2): “The East,” that is Christ, “calleth thee, and 4:1): “Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits if they thou turnest to the West,” namely mortal and fallible man. be of God.” Now sometimes a man’s purpose of enter- Secondly, the entrance into religion may be considered in ing religion is not of God, since it often comes to naught relation to the strength of the person who intends to en- through his leaving the religious life; for it is written (Acts ter. And here again there is no room for doubt about the 5:38,39): “If this counsel or this work be of God, you can- entrance to religion, since those who enter religion trust not overthrow it.” Therefore it would seem that one ought not to be able to stay by their own power, but by the assis- to make a searching inquiry before entering religion. tance of the divine power, according to Is. 40:31, “They Objection 2. Further, it is written (Prov. 25:9): “Treat that hope in the Lord shall renew their strength, they shall thy cause with thy friend.” Now a man’s cause would take wings as eagles, they shall run and not be weary, they seem to be especially one that concerns a change in his shall walk and not faint.” Yet if there be some special ob- state of life. Therefore seemingly one ought not to enter stacle (such as bodily weakness, a burden of debts, or the religion without discussing the matter with one’s friends. like) in such cases a man must deliberate and take coun- Objection 3. Further, our Lord (Lk. 14:28) in making sel with such as are likely to help and not hinder him. a comparison with a man who has a mind to build a tower, Hence it is written (Ecclus. 37:12): “Treat with a man says that he doth “first sit down and reckon the charges without religion concerning holiness∗, with an unjust man that are necessary, whether he have wherewithal to finish concerning justice,” meaning that one should not do so, it,” lest he become an object of mockery, for that “this wherefore the text goes on (Ecclus. 37:14,15), “Give no man began to build and was not able to finish.” Now the heed to these in any matter of counsel, but be continually wherewithal to build the tower, as Augustine says (Ep. ad with a holy man.” In these matters, however, one should Laetum ccxliii), is nothing less than that “each one should not take long deliberation. Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. renounce all his possessions.” Yet it happens sometimes and Paulin. liii): “Hasten, I pray thee, cut off rather than that many cannot do this, nor keep other religious obser- loosen the rope that holds the boat to the shore.” Thirdly, vances; and in signification of this it is stated (1 Kings we may consider the way of entering religion, and which 17:39) that David could not walk in Saul’s armor, for he order one ought to enter, and about such matters also one was not used to it. Therefore it would seem that one ought may take counsel of those who will not stand in one’s way. not to enter religion without long deliberation beforehand Reply to Objection 1. The saying: “Try the spir- and taking counsel of many. its, if they be of God,” applies to matters admitting of On the contrary, It is stated (Mat. 4:20) that upon doubt whether the spirits be of God; thus those who are our Lord’s calling them, Peter and Andrew “immediately already in religion may doubt whether he who offers him- leaving their nets, followed Him.” Here Chrysostom says self to religion be led by the spirit of God, or be moved by (Hom. xiv in Matth.): “Such obedience as this does Christ hypocrisy. Wherefore they must try the postulant whether require of us, that we delay not even for a moment.” he be moved by the divine spirit. But for him who seeks to I answer that, Long deliberation and the advice of enter religion there can be no doubt but that the purpose many are required in great matters of doubt, as the of entering religion to which his heart has given birth is Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3); while advice is unnec- from the spirit of God, for it is His spirit “that leads” man essary in matters that are certain and fixed. Now with re- “into the land of uprightness” (Ps. 142:10). gard to entering religion three points may be considered. Nor does this prove that it is not of God that some turn First, the entrance itself into religion, considered by itself; back; since not all that is of God is incorruptible: else cor-and thus it is certain that entrance into religion is a greater ruptible creatures would not be of God, as the Manicheans ∗ The Douay version supplies the negative: ‘Treat not. . . nor with. . . ’ 2078 hold, nor could some who have grace from God lose it, the text goes on to state, be Christ’s disciple, and this is to which is also heretical. But God’s “counsel” whereby He build the tower. makes even things corruptible and changeable, is imper- The misgiving of those who hesitate as to whether they ishable according to Is. 46:10, “My counsel shall stand may be able to attain to perfection by entering religion is and all My will shall be done.” Hence the purpose of en- shown by many examples to be unreasonable. Hence Au- tering religion needs not to be tried whether it be of God, gustine says (Confess. viii, 11): “On that side whither I because “it requires no further demonstration,” as a gloss had set my face, and whither I trembled to go, there ap- says on 1 Thess. 5:21, “Prove all things.” peared to me the chaste dignity of continency. . . honestly Reply to Objection 2. Even as “the flesh lusteth alluring me to come and doubt not, and stretching forth to against the spirit” (Gal. 5:17), so too carnal friends often receive and embrace me, her holy hands full of multitudes thwart our spiritual progress, according to Mic. 7:6, “A of good examples. There were so many young men and man’s enemies are they of his own household.” Wherefore maidens here, a multitude of youth and every age, grave Cyril expounding Lk. 9:61, “Let me first take my leave of widows and aged virgins. . . And she smiled at me with a them that are at my house,” says∗: “By asking first to take persuasive mockery as though to say: Canst not thou what his leave of them that were at his house, he shows he was these youths and these maidens can? Or can they either in somewhat of two minds. For to communicate with his themselves, and not rather in the Lord their God?. . . Why neighbors, and consult those who are unwilling to relish standest thou in thyself, and so standest not? Cast thyself righteousness, is an indication of weakness and turning upon Him; fear not, He will not withdraw Himself that back. Hence he hears our Lord say: ‘No man putting his thou shouldst fall. Cast thyself fearlessly upon Him: He hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the king- will receive and will heal thee.” dom of God,’ because he looks back who seeks delay in The example quoted of David is not to the point, be- order to go home and confer with his kinsfolk.” cause “the arms of Saul,” as a gloss on the passage ob- Reply to Objection 3. The building of the tower sig- serves, “are the sacraments of the Law, as being burden- nifies the perfection of Christian life; and the renunciation some”: whereas religion is the sweet yoke of Christ, for of one’s possessions is the wherewithal to build this tower. as Gregory says (Moral. iv, 33), “what burden does He lay Now no one doubts or deliberates about wishing to have on the shoulders of the mind, Who commands us to shun the wherewithal, or whether he is able to build the tower all troublesome desires, Who warns us to turn aside from if he have the wherewithal, but what does come under de- the rough paths of this world?” liberation is whether one has the wherewithal. Again it To those indeed who take this sweet yoke upon them- need not be a matter of deliberation whether one ought selves He promises the refreshment of the divine fruition to renounce all that one has, or whether by so doing one and the eternal rest of their souls. may be able to attain to perfection; whereas it is a matter To which may He Who made this promise bring us, Je- of deliberation whether that which one is doing amounts sus Christ our Lord, “Who is over all things God blessed to the renunciation of all that he has, since unless he does for ever. Amen.” renounce (which is to have the wherewithal) he cannot, as ∗ Cf. St. Thomas’s Catena Aurea 2079 THIRD PART PROLOGUE Forasmuch as our Saviour the Lord Jesus Christ, in order to “save His people from their sins” (Mat. 1:21), as the angel announced, showed unto us in His own Person the way of truth, whereby we may attain to the bliss of eternal life by rising again, it is necessary, in order to complete the work of theology, that after considering the last end of human life, and the virtues and vices, there should follow the consideration of the Saviour of all, and of the benefits bestowed by Him on the human race. Concerning this we must consider (1) the Saviour Himself; (2) the sacraments by which we attain to our salvation; (3) the end of immortal life to which we attain by the resurrection. Concerning the first, a double consideration occurs: the first, about the mystery of the Incarnation itself, whereby God was made man for our salvation; the second, about such things as were done and suffered by our Saviour—i.e. God incarnate. THIRD PART, QUESTION 1 Of the Fitness of the Incarnation (In Six Articles) Concerning the first, three things occur to be considered: first, the fitness of the Incarnation; secondly, the mode of union of the Word Incarnate; thirdly, what follows this union. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is fitting for God to become incarnate? (2) Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race? (3) Whether if there had been no sin God would have become incarnate? (4) Whether He became incarnate to take away original sin rather than actual? (5) Whether it was fitting for God to become incarnate from the beginning of the world? (6) Whether His Incarnation ought to have been deferred to the end of the world? Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate? IIIa q. 1 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting for highest uncreated spirit should assume a body. God to become incarnate. Since God from all eternity is Objection 4. Further, it is not becoming that He the very essence of goodness, it was best for Him to be Who surpassed the greatest things should be contained as He had been from all eternity. But from all eternity He in the least, and He upon Whom rests the care of great had been without flesh. Therefore it was most fitting for things should leave them for lesser things. But God— Him not to be united to flesh. Therefore it was not fitting Who takes care of the whole world—the whole universe for God to become incarnate. of things cannot contain. Therefore it would seem unfit- Objection 2. Further, it is not fitting to unite things ting that “He should be hid under the frail body of a babe that are infinitely apart, even as it would not be a fitting in swathing bands, in comparison with Whom the whole union if one were “to paint a figure in which the neck of universe is accounted as little; and that this Prince should a horse was joined to the head of a man”∗. But God and quit His throne for so long, and transfer the government of flesh are infinitely apart; since God is most simple, and the whole world to so frail a body,” as Volusianus writes flesh is most composite—especially human flesh. There- to Augustine (Ep. cxxxv). fore it was not fitting that God should be united to human On the contrary, It would seem most fitting that by flesh. visible things the invisible things of God should be made Objection 3. Further, a body is as distant from the known; for to this end was the whole world made, as is highest spirit as evil is from the highest good. But it clear from the word of the Apostle (Rom. 1:20): “For the was wholly unfitting that God, Who is the highest good, invisible things of God. . . are clearly seen, being under- should assume evil. Therefore it was not fitting that the stood by the things that are made.” But, as Damascene ∗ Horace, Ars. Poet., line 1 2080 says (De Fide Orth. iii, 1), by the mystery of the Incar-the creature began to be, although it had not been before, nation are made known at once the goodness, the wis- so likewise, not having been previously united to God in dom, the justice, and the power or might of God—“His Person, it was afterwards united to Him. goodness, for He did not despise the weakness of His own Reply to Objection 2. To be united to God in unity handiwork; His justice, since, on man’s defeat, He caused of person was not fitting to human flesh, according to its the tyrant to be overcome by none other than man, and yet natural endowments, since it was above its dignity; nev- He did not snatch men forcibly from death; His wisdom, ertheless, it was fitting that God, by reason of His infinite for He found a suitable discharge for a most heavy debt; goodness, should unite it to Himself for man’s salvation. His power, or infinite might, for there is nothing greater Reply to Objection 3. Every mode of being wherein than for God to become incarnate. . . ” any creature whatsoever differs from the Creator has been I answer that, To each things, that is befitting which established by God’s wisdom, and is ordained to God’s belongs to it by reason of its very nature; thus, to reason goodness. For God, Who is uncreated, immutable, and in- befits man, since this belongs to him because he is of a corporeal, produced mutable and corporeal creatures for rational nature. But the very nature of God is goodness, His own goodness. And so also the evil of punishment as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i). Hence, what was established by God’s justice for God’s glory. But evil belongs to the essence of goodness befits God. But it be- of fault is committed by withdrawing from the art of the longs to the essence of goodness to communicate itself to Divine wisdom and from the order of the Divine good- others, as is plain from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Hence ness. And therefore it could be fitting to God to assume a it belongs to the essence of the highest good to communi- nature created, mutable, corporeal, and subject to penalty, cate itself in the highest manner to the creature, and this but it did not become Him to assume the evil of fault. is brought about chiefly by “His so joining created nature Reply to Objection 4. As Augustine replies (Ep. to Himself that one Person is made up of these three—the ad Volusian. cxxxvii): “The Christian doctrine nowhere Word, a soul and flesh,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii). holds that God was so joined to human flesh as either to Hence it is manifest that it was fitting that God should be- desert or lose, or to transfer and as it were, contract within come incarnate. this frail body, the care of governing the universe. This is Reply to Objection 1. The mystery of the Incarna- the thought of men unable to see anything but corporeal tion was not completed through God being changed in any things. . . God is great not in mass, but in might. Hence the way from the state in which He had been from eternity, greatness of His might feels no straits in narrow surround- but through His having united Himself to the creature in ings. Nor, if the passing word of a man is heard at once a new way, or rather through having united it to Himself. by many, and wholly by each, is it incredible that the abid- But it is fitting that a creature which by nature is muta- ing Word of God should be everywhere at once?” Hence ble, should not always be in one way. And therefore, as nothing unfitting arises from God becoming incarnate. Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race that the Word of God IIIa q. 1 a. 2 should become incarnate? Objection 1. It would seem that it was not necessary Objection 3. Further, to revere God pertains espe- for the reparation of the human race that the Word of God cially to man’s salvation; hence it is written (Mal. 1:6): should become incarnate. For since the Word of God is “If, then, I be a father, where is my honor? and if I be a perfect God, as has been said ( Ia, q. 4, Aa. 1,2), no power master, where is my fear?” But men revere God the more was added to Him by the assumption of flesh. Therefore, by considering Him as elevated above all, and far beyond if the incarnate Word of God restored human nature. He man’s senses, hence (Ps. 112:4) it is written: “The Lord is could also have restored it without assuming flesh. high above all nations, and His glory above the heavens”; Objection 2. Further, for the restoration of human and farther on: “Who is as the Lord our God?” which per- nature, which had fallen through sin, nothing more is re- tains to reverence. Therefore it would seem unfitting to quired than that man should satisfy for sin. Now man can man’s salvation that God should be made like unto us by satisfy, as it would seem, for sin; for God cannot require assuming flesh. from man more than man can do, and since He is more On the contrary, What frees the human race from inclined to be merciful than to punish, as He lays the act perdition is necessary for the salvation of man. But the of sin to man’s charge, so He ought to credit him with mystery of the Incarnation is such; according to Jn. 3:16: the contrary act. Therefore it was not necessary for the “God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten restoration of human nature that the Word of God should Son, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but become incarnate. may have life everlasting.” Therefore it was necessary for 2081 man’s salvation that God should become incarnate. xvi): “God has proved to us how high a place human na- I answer that, A thing is said to be necessary for a ture holds amongst creatures, inasmuch as He appeared certain end in two ways. First, when the end cannot be to men as a true man.” And Pope Leo says in a sermon without it; as food is necessary for the preservation of hu- on the Nativity (xxi): “Learn, O Christian, thy worth; and man life. Secondly, when the end is attained better and being made a partner of the Divine nature, refuse to re- more conveniently, as a horse is necessary for a journey. turn by evil deeds to your former worthlessness.” Thirdly, In the first way it was not necessary that God should be- because, “in order to do away with man’s presumption, come incarnate for the restoration of human nature. For the grace of God is commended in Jesus Christ, though God with His omnipotent power could have restored hu- no merits of ours went before,” as Augustine says (De man nature in many other ways. But in the second way it Trin. xiii, 17). Fourthly, because “man’s pride, which is was necessary that God should become incarnate for the the greatest stumbling-block to our clinging to God, can restoration of human nature. Hence Augustine says (De be convinced and cured by humility so great,” as Augus- Trin. xii, 10): “We shall also show that other ways were tine says in the same place. Fifthly, in order to free man not wanting to God, to Whose power all things are equally from the thraldom of sin, which, as Augustine says (De subject; but that there was not a more fitting way of heal- Trin. xiii, 13), “ought to be done in such a way that the ing our misery.” devil should be overcome by the justice of the man Je- Now this may be viewed with respect to our “fur- sus Christ,” and this was done by Christ satisfying for us. therance in good.” First, with regard to faith, which Now a mere man could not have satisfied for the whole is made more certain by believing God Himself Who human race, and God was not bound to satisfy; hence it speaks; hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 2): “In behooved Jesus Christ to be both God and man. Hence order that man might journey more trustfully toward the Pope Leo says in the same sermon: “Weakness is assumed truth, the Truth itself, the Son of God, having assumed by strength, lowliness by majesty, mortality by eternity, in human nature, established and founded faith.” Secondly, order that one and the same Mediator of God and men with regard to hope, which is thereby greatly strength- might die in one and rise in the other—for this was our ened; hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): “Nothing was fitting remedy. Unless He was God, He would not have so necessary for raising our hope as to show us how deeply brought a remedy; and unless He was man, He would not God loved us. And what could afford us a stronger proof have set an example.” of this than that the Son of God should become a partner And there are very many other advantages which ac- with us of human nature?” Thirdly, with regard to charity, crued, above man’s apprehension. which is greatly enkindled by this; hence Augustine says Reply to Objection 1. This reason has to do with the (De Catech. Rudib. iv): “What greater cause is there of first kind of necessity, without which we cannot attain to the Lord’s coming than to show God’s love for us?” And the end. he afterwards adds: “If we have been slow to love, at least Reply to Objection 2. Satisfaction may be said to be let us hasten to love in return.” Fourthly, with regard to sufficient in two ways—first, perfectly, inasmuch as it is well-doing, in which He set us an example; hence Augus- condign, being adequate to make good the fault commit- tine says in a sermon (xxii de Temp.): “Man who might be ted, and in this way the satisfaction of a mere man cannot seen was not to be followed; but God was to be followed, be sufficient for sin, both because the whole of human na- Who could not be seen. And therefore God was made ture has been corrupted by sin, whereas the goodness of man, that He Who might be seen by man, and Whom man any person or persons could not be made up adequately might follow, might be shown to man.” Fifthly, with re- for the harm done to the whole of the nature; and also gard to the full participation of the Divinity, which is the because a sin committed against God has a kind of infin- true bliss of man and end of human life; and this is be- ity from the infinity of the Divine majesty, because the stowed upon us by Christ’s humanity; for Augustine says greater the person we offend, the more grievous the of- in a sermon (xiii de Temp.): “Go was made man, that man fense. Hence for condign satisfaction it was necessary might be made God.” that the act of the one satisfying should have an infinite ef- So also was this useful for our “withdrawal from evil.” ficiency, as being of God and man. Secondly, man’s satis- First, because man is taught by it not to prefer the devil faction may be termed sufficient, imperfectly—i.e. in the to himself, nor to honor him who is the author of sin; acceptation of him who is content with it, even though it is hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): “Since human not condign, and in this way the satisfaction of a mere man nature is so united to God as to become one person, let is sufficient. And forasmuch as every imperfect presup- not these proud spirits dare to prefer themselves to man, poses some perfect thing, by which it is sustained, hence because they have no bodies.” Secondly, because we are it is that satisfaction of every mere man has its efficiency thereby taught how great is man’s dignity, lest we should from the satisfaction of Christ. sully it with sin; hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. Reply to Objection 3. By taking flesh, God did not 2082 lessen His majesty; and in consequence did not lessen the much as He wished to draw nigh to us by taking flesh, He reason for reverencing Him, which is increased by the in- greatly drew us to know Him. crease of knowledge of Him. But, on the contrary, inas- Whether, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate? IIIa q. 1 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that if man had not would not have come.” And on 1 Tim. 1:15, “Christ Jesus sinned, God would still have become incarnate. For the came into this world to save sinners,” a gloss says, “There cause remaining, the effect also remains. But as Augus- was no cause of Christ’s coming into the world, except to tine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): “Many other things are to save sinners. Take away diseases, take away wounds, and be considered in the Incarnation of Christ besides abso- there is no need of medicine.” lution from sin”; and these were discussed above (a. 2). I answer that, There are different opinions about this Therefore if man had not sinned, God would have become question. For some say that even if man had not sinned, incarnate. the Son of Man would have become incarnate. Others as- Objection 2. Further, it belongs to the omnipotence sert the contrary, and seemingly our assent ought rather to of the Divine power to perfect His works, and to mani- be given to this opinion. fest Himself by some infinite effect. But no mere crea- For such things as spring from God’s will, and beyond ture can be called an infinite effect, since it is finite of the creature’s due, can be made known to us only through its very essence. Now, seemingly, in the work of the In- being revealed in the Sacred Scripture, in which the Di- carnation alone is an infinite effect of the Divine power vine Will is made known to us. Hence, since everywhere manifested in a special manner by which power things in- in the Sacred Scripture the sin of the first man is assigned finitely distant are united, inasmuch as it has been brought as the reason of the Incarnation, it is more in accordance about that man is God. And in this work especially the with this to say that the work of the Incarnation was or- universe would seem to be perfected, inasmuch as the last dained by God as a remedy for sin; so that, had sin not creature—viz. man—is united to the first principle—viz. existed, the Incarnation would not have been. And yet God. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would the power of God is not limited to this; even had sin not have become incarnate. existed, God could have become incarnate. Objection 3. Further, human nature has not been Reply to Objection 1. All the other causes which are made more capable of grace by sin. But after sin it is assigned in the preceding article have to do with a remedy capable of the grace of union, which is the greatest grace. for sin. For if man had not sinned, he would have been en- Therefore, if man had not sinned, human nature would dowed with the light of Divine wisdom, and would have have been capable of this grace; nor would God have been perfected by God with the righteousness of justice withheld from human nature any good it was capable of. in order to know and carry out everything needful. But Therefore, if man had not sinned, God would have be- because man, on deserting God, had stooped to corporeal come incarnate. things, it was necessary that God should take flesh, and Objection 4. Further, God’s predestination is eternal. by corporeal things should afford him the remedy of sal- But it is said of Christ (Rom. 1:4): “Who was predes- vation. Hence, on Jn. 1:14, “And the Word was made tined the Son of God in power.” Therefore, even before flesh,” St. Augustine says (Tract. ii): “Flesh had blinded sin, it was necessary that the Son of God should become thee, flesh heals thee; for Christ came and overthrew the incarnate, in order to fulfil God’s predestination. vices of the flesh.” Objection 5. Further, the mystery of the Incarnation Reply to Objection 2. The infinity of Divine power is was revealed to the first man, as is plain from Gn. 2:23. shown in the mode of production of things from nothing. “This now is bone of my bones,” etc. which the Apostle Again, it suffices for the perfection of the universe that the says is “a great sacrament. . . in Christ and in the Church,” creature be ordained in a natural manner to God as to an as is plain from Eph. 5:32. But man could not be fore- end. But that a creature should be united to God in person conscious of his fall, for the same reason that the angels exceeds the limits of the perfection of nature. could not, as Augustine proves (Gen. ad lit. xi, 18). Reply to Objection 3. A double capability may be Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would have remarked in human nature: one, in respect of the order of become incarnate. natural power, and this is always fulfilled by God, Who On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. apportions to each according to its natural capability; the viii, 2), expounding what is set down in Lk. 19:10, “For other in respect to the order of the Divine power, which the Son of Man is come to seek and to save that which was all creatures implicitly obey; and the capability we speak lost”; “Therefore, if man had not sinned, the Son of Man of pertains to this. But God does not fulfil all such capa- 2083 bilities, otherwise God could do only what He has done foreknowledge of future things; and hence, as God pre-in creatures, and this is false, as stated above ( Ia, q. 105, destines the salvation of anyone to be brought about by a. 6). But there is no reason why human nature should not the prayers of others, so also He predestined the work of have been raised to something greater after sin. For God the Incarnation to be the remedy of human sin. allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater good Reply to Objection 5. Nothing prevents an effect therefrom; hence it is written (Rom. 5:20): “Where sin from being revealed to one to whom the cause is not re- abounded, grace did more abound.” Hence, too, in the vealed. Hence, the mystery of the Incarnation could be blessing of the Paschal candle, we say: “O happy fault, revealed to the first man without his being fore-conscious that merited such and so great a Redeemer!” of his fall. For not everyone who knows the effect knows Reply to Objection 4. Predestination presupposes the the cause. Whether God became incarnate in order to take away actual sin, rather than to take IIIa q. 1 a. 4 away original sin? Objection 1. It would seem that God became incar- Moreover, the more grievous the sin, the more partic- nate as a remedy for actual sins rather than for original ularly did Christ come to blot it out. But “greater” is said sin. For the more grievous the sin, the more it runs counter in two ways: in one way “intensively,” as a more intense to man’s salvation, for which God became incarnate. But whiteness is said to be greater, and in this way actual sin actual sin is more grievous than original sin; for the light- is greater than original sin; for it has more of the nature est punishment is due to original sin, as Augustine says of voluntary, as has been shown ( Ia IIae, q. 81, a. 1). In (Contra Julian. v, 11). Therefore the Incarnation of Christ another way a thing is said to be greater “extensively,” as is chiefly directed to taking away actual sins. whiteness on a greater superficies is said to be greater; and Objection 2. Further, pain of sense is not due to orig- in this way original sin, whereby the whole human race is inal sin, but merely pain of loss, as has been shown ( Ia infected, is greater than any actual sin, which is proper to IIae, q. 87, a. 5). But Christ came to suffer the pain of one person. And in this respect Christ came principally to sense on the Cross in satisfaction for sins—and not the take away original sin, inasmuch as “the good of the race pain of loss, for He had no defect of either the beatific vi- is a more Divine thing than the good of an individual,” as sion or fruition. Therefore He came in order to take away is said Ethic. i, 2. actual sin rather than original sin. Reply to Objection 1. This reason looks to the inten- Objection 3. Further, as Chrysostom says (De Com- sive greatness of sin. punctione Cordis ii, 3): “This must be the mind of the Reply to Objection 2. In the future award the pain of faithful servant, to account the benefits of his Lord, which sense will not be meted out to original sin. Yet the penal- have been bestowed on all alike, as though they were be- ties, such as hunger, thirst, death, and the like, which we stowed on himself alone. For as if speaking of himself suffer sensibly in this life flow from original sin. And alone, Paul writes to the Galatians 2:20: ‘Christ. . . loved hence Christ, in order to satisfy fully for original sin, me and delivered Himself for me.’ ” But our individual wished to suffer sensible pain, that He might consume sins are actual sins; for original sin is the common sin. death and the like in Himself. Therefore we ought to have this conviction, so as to be- Reply to Objection 3. Chrysostom says (De Com- lieve that He has come chiefly for actual sins. punctione Cordis ii, 6): “The Apostle used these words, On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:29): “Behold not as if wishing to diminish Christ’s gifts, ample as they the Lamb of God, behold Him Who taketh away the sins are, and spreading throughout the whole world, but that [Vulg.: ‘sin’] of the world.” he might account himself alone the occasion of them. For I answer that, It is certain that Christ came into this what does it matter that they are given to others, if what world not only to take away that sin which is handed on are given to you are as complete and perfect as if none of originally to posterity, but also in order to take away all them were given to another than yourself?” And hence, sins subsequently added to it; not that all are taken away although a man ought to account Christ’s gifts as given to (and this is from men’s fault, inasmuch as they do not ad- himself, yet he ought not to consider them not to be given here to Christ, according to Jn. 3:19: “The light is come to others. And thus we do not exclude that He came to into the world, and men loved darkness rather than the wipe away the sin of the whole nature rather than the sin of light”), but because He offered what was sufficient for one person. But the sin of the nature is as perfectly healed blotting out all sins. Hence it is written (Rom. 5:15-16): in each one as if it were healed in him alone. Hence, on “But not as the offense, so also the gift. . . For judgment in- account of the union of charity, what is vouchsafed to all deed was by one unto condemnation, but grace is of many ought to be accounted his own by each one. offenses unto justification.” 2084 Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate in the beginning of the hu-IIIa q. 1 a. 5 man race? Objection 1. It would seem that it was fitting that words in Gal. 3:19, “Being ordained by angels in the hand God should become incarnate in the beginning of the hu- of a mediator,” a gloss says: “With great wisdom was it man race. For the work of the Incarnation sprang from so ordered that the Son of Man should not be sent imme- the immensity of Divine charity, according to Eph. 2:4,5: diately after man’s fall. For first of all God left man under “But God (Who is rich in mercy), for His exceeding char- the natural law, with the freedom of his will, in order that ity wherewith He loved us. . . even when we were dead in he might know his natural strength; and when he failed sins, hath quickened us together in Christ.” But charity in it, he received the law; whereupon, by the fault, not of does not tarry in bringing assistance to a friend who is the law, but of his nature, the disease gained strength; so suffering need, according to Prov. 3:28: “Say not to thy that having recognized his infirmity he might cry out for a friend: Go, and come again, and tomorrow I will give to physician, and beseech the aid of grace.” thee, when thou canst give at present.” Therefore God Secondly, on account of the order of furtherance in ought not to have put off the work of the Incarnation, but good, whereby we proceed from imperfection to perfec- ought thereby to have brought relief to the human race tion. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46,47): “Yet that from the beginning. was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; Objection 2. Further, it is written (1 Tim. 1:15): afterwards that which is spiritual. . . The first man was of “Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners.” But the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly.” more would have been saved had God become incarnate Thirdly, on account of the dignity of the incarnate at the beginning of the human race; for in the various cen- Word, for on the words (Gal. 4:4), “But when the ful- turies very many, through not knowing God, perished in ness of the time was come,” a gloss says: “The greater the their sin. Therefore it was fitting that God should become judge who was coming, the more numerous was the band incarnate at the beginning of the human race. of heralds who ought to have preceded him.” Objection 3. Further, the work of grace is not less Fourthly, lest the fervor of faith should cool by the orderly than the work of nature. But nature takes its rise length of time, for the charity of many will grow cold at with the more perfect, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii). the end of the world. Hence (Lk. 18:8) it is written: “But Therefore the work of Christ ought to have been perfect yet the Son of Man, when He cometh, shall He find think from the beginning. But in the work of the Incarnation we you, faith on earth?” see the perfection of grace, according to Jn. 1:14: “The Reply to Objection 1. Charity does not put off bring- Word was made flesh”; and afterwards it is added: “Full of ing assistance to a friend: always bearing in mind the cir- grace and truth.” Therefore Christ ought to have become cumstances as well as the state of the persons. For if the incarnate at the beginning of the human race. physician were to give the medicine at the very outset of On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 4:4): “But when the ailment, it would do less good, and would hurt rather the fulness of the time was come, God sent His Son, made than benefit. And hence the Lord did not bestow upon the of a woman, made under the law”: upon which a gloss human race the remedy of the Incarnation in the begin- says that “the fulness of the time is when it was decreed by ning, lest they should despise it through pride, if they did God the Father to send His Son.” But God decreed every- not already recognize their disease. thing by His wisdom. Therefore God became incarnate at Reply to Objection 2. Augustine replies to this the most fitting time; and it was not fitting that God should (De Sex Quest. Pagan., Ep. cii), saying (q. 2) that become incarnate at the beginning of the human race. “Christ wished to appear to man and to have His doctrine I answer that, Since the work of the Incarnation is preached to them when and where He knew those were principally ordained to the restoration of the human race who would believe in Him. But in such times and places by blotting out sin, it is manifest that it was not fitting as His Gospel was not preached He foresaw that not all, for God to become incarnate at the beginning of the hu- indeed, but many would so bear themselves towards His man race before sin. For medicine is given only to the preaching as not to believe in His corporeal presence, even sick. Hence our Lord Himself says (Mat. 9:12,13): “They were He to raise the dead.” But the same Augustine, tak- that are in health need not a physician, but they that are ing exception to this reply in his book (De Perseverantia ill. . . For I am not come to call the just, but sinners.” ix), says: “How can we say the inhabitants of Tyre and Nor was it fitting that God should become incarnate Sidon would not believe when such great wonders were immediately after sin. First, on account of the manner of wrought in their midst, or would not have believed had man’s sin, which had come of pride; hence man was to they been wrought, when God Himself bears witness that be liberated in such a manner that he might be humbled, they would have done penance with great humility if these and see how he stood in need of a deliverer. Hence on the signs of Divine power had been wrought in their midst?” 2085 And he adds in answer (De Perseverantia xi): “Hence, as Reply to Objection 3. Perfection is prior to imperfec-the Apostle says (Rom. 9:16), ‘it is not of him that willeth tion, both in time and nature, in things that are different nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy’; (for what brings others to perfection must itself be per- Who (succors whom He will of) those who, as He fore- fect); but in one and the same, imperfection is prior in saw, would believe in His miracles if wrought amongst time though posterior in nature. And thus the eternal per- them, (while others) He succors not, having judged them fection of God precedes in duration the imperfection of in His predestination secretly yet justly. Therefore let us human nature; but the latter’s ultimate perfection in union unshrinkingly believe His mercy to be with those who are with God follows. set free, and His truth with those who are condemned.”∗. Whether the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world? IIIa q. 1 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the work of the In- carnation human nature is raised to its highest perfection; carnation ought to have been put off till the end of the and in this way it was not becoming that the Incarnation world. For it is written (Ps. 91:11): “My old age in plen- should take place at the beginning of the human race. And tiful mercy”—i.e. “in the last days,” as a gloss says. But the Word incarnate is the efficient cause of the perfection the time of the Incarnation is especially the time of mercy, of human nature, according to Jn. 1:16: “Of His fulness according to Ps. 101:14: “For it is time to have mercy on we have all received”; and hence the work of the Incar- it.” Therefore the Incarnation ought to have been put off nation ought not to have been put off till the end of the till the end of the world. world. But the perfection of glory to which human nature Objection 2. Further, as has been said (a. 5, ad 3), in is to be finally raised by the Word Incarnate will be at the the same subject, perfection is subsequent in time to im- end of the world. perfection. Therefore, what is most perfect ought to be Secondly, from the effect of man’s salvation; for, as the very last in time. But the highest perfection of human is said Qq. Vet et Nov. Test., qu. 83, “it is in the power nature is in the union with the Word, because “in Christ it of the Giver to have pity when, or as much as, He wills. hath pleased the Father that all the fulness of the Godhead Hence He came when He knew it was fitting to succor, should dwell,” as the Apostle says (Col. 1:19, and 2:9). and when His boons would be welcome. For when by the Therefore the Incarnation ought to have been put off till feebleness of the human race men’s knowledge of God be- the end of the world. gan to grow dim and their morals lax, He was pleased to Objection 3. Further, what can be done by one ought choose Abraham as a standard of the restored knowledge not to be done by two. But the one coming of Christ at the of God and of holy living; and later on when reverence end of the world was sufficient for the salvation of human grew weaker, He gave the law to Moses in writing; and be- nature. Therefore it was not necessary for Him to come cause the gentiles despised it and would not take it upon beforehand in His Incarnation; and hence the Incarnation themselves, and they who received it would not keep it, ought to have been put off till the end of the world. being touched with pity, God sent His Son, to grant to all On the contrary, It is written (Hab. 3:2): “In the remission of their sin and to offer them, justified, to God midst of the years Thou shalt make it known.” Therefore the Father.” But if this remedy had been put off till the end the mystery of the Incarnation which was made known to of the world, all knowledge and reverence of God and all the world ought not to have been put off till the end of the uprightness of morals would have been swept away from world. the earth. I answer that, As it was not fitting that God should Thirdly, this appears fitting to the manifestation of the become incarnate at the beginning of the world, so also it Divine power, which has saved men in several ways—not was not fitting that the Incarnation should be put off till only by faith in some future thing, but also by faith in the end of the world. And this is shown first from the something present and past. union of the Divine and human nature. For, as it has been Reply to Objection 1. This gloss has in view the said (a. 5, ad 3), perfection precedes imperfection in time mercy of God, which leads us to glory. Nevertheless, if in one way, and contrariwise in another way imperfection it is referred to the mercy shown the human race by the precedes perfection. For in that which is made perfect Incarnation of Christ, we must reflect that, as Augustine from being imperfect, imperfection precedes perfection in says (Retract. i), the time of the Incarnation may be com- time, whereas in that which is the efficient cause of per- pared to the youth of the human race, “on account of the fection, perfection precedes imperfection in time. Now in strength and fervor of faith, which works by charity”; and the work of the Incarnation both concur; for by the In- to old age—i.e. the sixth age—on account of the num- ∗ The words in brackets are not in the text of St. Augustine 2086 ber of centuries, for Christ came in the sixth age. And to be viewed not as merely the terminus of a movement although youth and old age cannot be together in a body, from imperfection to perfection, but also as a principle of yet they can be together in a soul, the former on account perfection to human nature, as has been said. of quickness, the latter on account of gravity. And hence Reply to Objection 3. As Chrysostom says on Jn. Augustine says elsewhere (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 44) that “it 3:11, “For God sent not His Son into the world to judge was not becoming that the Master by Whose imitation the the world” (Hom. xxviii): “There are two comings of human race was to be formed to the highest virtue should Christ: the first, for the remission of sins; the second, to come from heaven, save in the time of youth.” But in an- judge the world. For if He had not done so, all would have other work (De Gen. cont. Manich. i, 23) he says: that perished together, since all have sinned and need the glory Christ came in the sixth age—i.e. in the old age—of the of God.” Hence it is plain that He ought not to have put human race. off the coming in mercy till the end of the world. Reply to Objection 2. The work of the Incarnation is 2087 THIRD PART, QUESTION 2 Of the Mode of Union of the Word Incarnate (In Twelve Articles) Now we must consider the mode of union of the Incarnate Word; and, first, the union itself; secondly, the Person assuming; thirdly, the nature assumed. Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature? (2) Whether it took place in the Person? (3) Whether it took place in the suppositum or hypostasis? (4) Whether the Person or hypostasis of Christ is composite after the Incarnation? (5) Whether any union of body and soul took place in Christ? (6) Whether the human nature was united to the Word accidentally? (7) Whether the union itself is something created? (8) Whether it is the same as assumption? (9) Whether the union of the two natures is the greatest union? (10) Whether the union of the two natures in Christ was brought about by grace? (11) Whether any merits preceded it? (12) Whether the grace of union was natural to the man Christ? Whether the Union of the Incarnate Word took place in the nature? IIIa q. 2 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the Union of the the word “nature” comes from nativity. Hence this word Word Incarnate took place in the nature. For Cyril says was used first of all to signify the begetting of living be- (he is quoted in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, part ings, which is called “birth” or “sprouting forth,” the word ii, act. 1): “We must understand not two natures, but one “natura” meaning, as it were, “nascitura.” Afterwards this incarnate nature of the Word of God”; and this could not word “nature” was taken to signify the principle of this be unless the union took place in the nature. Therefore the begetting; and because in living things the principle of union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature. generation is an intrinsic principle, this word “nature” was Objection 2. Further, Athanasius says that, as the ra- further employed to signify any intrinsic principle of mo- tional soul and the flesh together form the human nature, tion: thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that “nature is so God and man together form a certain one nature; there- the principle of motion in that in which it is essentially fore the union took place in the nature. and not accidentally.” Now this principle is either form or Objection 3. Further, of two natures one is not de- matter. Hence sometimes form is called nature, and some- nominated by the other unless they are to some extent times matter. And because the end of natural generation, mutually transmuted. But the Divine and human natures in that which is generated, is the essence of the species, in Christ are denominated one by the other; for Cyril says which the definition signifies, this essence of the species (quoted in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, part ii, is called the “nature.” And thus Boethius defines nature act. 1) that the Divine nature “is incarnate”; and Gregory (De Duab. Nat.): “Nature is what informs a thing with Nazianzen says (Ep. i ad Cledon.) that the human nature its specific difference,”—i.e. which perfects the specific is “deified,” as appears from Damascene (De Fide Orth. definition. But we are now speaking of nature as it signi- iii, 6,11). Therefore from two natures one seems to have fies the essence, or the “what-it-is,” or the quiddity of the resulted. species. On the contrary, It is said in the declaration of the Now, if we take nature in this way, it is impossible that Council of Chalcedon: “We confess that in these latter the union of the Incarnate Word took place in the nature. times the only-begotten Son of God appeared in two na- For one thing is made of two or more in three ways. First, tures, without confusion, without change, without divi- from two complete things which remain in their perfec- sion, without separation—the distinction of natures not tion. This can only happen to those whose form is com- having been taken away by the union.” Therefore the position, order, or figure, as a heap is made up of many union did not take place in the nature. stones brought together without any order, but solely with I answer that, To make this question clear we must juxtaposition; and a house is made of stones and beams ar- consider what is “nature.” Now it is to be observed that ranged in order, and fashioned to a figure. And in this way 2088 some said the union was by manner of confusion (which of form and matter, for the Divine Nature cannot be the is without order) or by manner of commensuration (which form of anything, especially of anything corporeal, since is with order). But this cannot be. First, because neither it would follow that the species resulting therefrom would composition nor order nor figure is a substantial form, but be communicable to several, and thus there would be sev- accidental; and hence it would follow that the union of the eral Christs. Thirdly, because Christ would exist neither Incarnation was not essential, but accidental, which will in human nature nor in the Divine Nature: since any dif- be disproved later on (a. 6). Secondly, because thereby ference varies the species, as unity varies number, as is we should not have an absolute unity, but relative only, said (Metaph. viii, text. 10). for there remain several things actually. Thirdly, because Reply to Objection 1. This authority of Cyril is ex- the form of such is not a nature, but an art, as the form of pounded in the Fifth Synod (i.e. Constantinople II, coll. a house; and thus one nature would not be constituted in viii, can. 8) thus: “If anyone proclaiming one nature of Christ, as they wish. the Word of God to be incarnate does not receive it as Secondly, one thing is made up of several things, per- the Fathers taught, viz. that from the Divine and human fect but changed, as a mixture is made up of its elements; natures (a union in subsistence having taken place) one and in this way some have said that the union of the In- Christ results, but endeavors from these words to intro- carnation was brought about by manner of combination. duce one nature or substance of the Divinity and flesh of But this cannot be. First, because the Divine Nature is al- Christ, let such a one be anathema.” Hence the sense is together immutable, as has been said ( Ia, q. 9, Aa. 1,2), not that from two natures one results; but that the Nature hence neither can it be changed into something else, since of the Word of God united flesh to Itself in Person. it is incorruptible; nor can anything else be changed into Reply to Objection 2. From the soul and body a it, for it cannot be generated. Secondly, because what is double unity, viz. of nature and person—results in each mixed is of the same species with none of the elements; individual—of nature inasmuch as the soul is united to the for flesh differs in species from any of its elements. And body, and formally perfects it, so that one nature springs thus Christ would be of the same nature neither with His from the two as from act and potentiality or from matter Father nor with His Mother. Thirdly, because there can and form. But the comparison is not in this sense, for the be no mingling of things widely apart; for the species of Divine Nature cannot be the form of a body, as was proved one of them is absorbed, e.g. if we were to put a drop of ( Ia, q. 3, a. 8). Unity of person results from them, how- water in a flagon of wine. And hence, since the Divine ever, inasmuch as there is an individual subsisting in flesh Nature infinitely exceeds the human nature, there could and soul; and herein lies the likeness, for the one Christ be no mixture, but the Divine Nature alone would remain. subsists in the Divine and human natures. Thirdly, a thing is made up of things not mixed nor Reply to Objection 3. As Damascene says (De Fide changed, but imperfect; as man is made up of soul and Orth. iii, 6,11), the Divine Nature is said to be incarnate body, and likewise of divers members. But this cannot because It is united to flesh personally, and not that It is be said of the mystery of the Incarnation. First, because changed into flesh. So likewise the flesh is said to be dei- each nature, i.e. the Divine and the human, has its spe- fied, as he also says (De Fide Orth. 15,17), not by change, cific perfection. Secondly, because the Divine and hu- but by union with the Word, its natural properties still re- man natures cannot constitute anything after the manner maining, and hence it may be considered as deified, inas- of quantitative parts, as the members make up the body; much as it becomes the flesh of the Word of God, but not for the Divine Nature is incorporeal; nor after the manner that it becomes God. Whether the union of the Incarnate Word took place in the Person? IIIa q. 2 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the union of the In- sonality. carnate Word did not take place in the person. For the Objection 3. Further, as Boethius says (De Duab. Person of God is not distinct from His Nature, as we said Nat.), a person is an individual substance of rational na- ( Ia, q. 39, a. 1). If, therefore, the union did not take place ture. But the Word of God assumed an individual human in the nature, it follows that it did not take place in the nature, for “universal human nature does not exist of it- person. self, but is the object of pure thought,” as Damascene says Objection 2. Further, Christ’s human nature has no (De Fide Orth. iii, 11). Therefore the human nature of less dignity than ours. But personality belongs to dignity, Christ has its personality. Hence it does not seem that the as was stated above ( Ia, q. 29, a. 3, ad 2). Hence, since union took place in the person. our human nature has its proper personality, much more On the contrary, We read in the Synod of Chalcedon reason was there that Christ’s should have its proper per- (Part ii, act. 5): “We confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is 2089 not parted or divided into two persons, but is one and the Person are not really distinct, yet they have distinct mean-same only-Begotten Son and Word of God.” Therefore ings, as was said above, inasmuch as person signifies after the union took place in the person. the manner of something subsisting. And because human I answer that, Person has a different meaning from nature is united to the Word, so that the Word subsists in “nature.” For nature, as has been said (a. 1), designates it, and not so that His Nature receives therefrom any addi- the specific essence which is signified by the definition. tion or change, it follows that the union of human nature And if nothing was found to be added to what belongs to the Word of God took place in the person, and not in to the notion of the species, there would be no need to the nature. distinguish the nature from the suppositum of the nature Reply to Objection 2. Personality pertains of neces- (which is the individual subsisting in this nature), because sity to the dignity of a thing, and to its perfection so far every individual subsisting in a nature would be altogether as it pertains to the dignity and perfection of that thing one with its nature. Now in certain subsisting things we to exist by itself (which is understood by the word “per- happen to find what does not belong to the notion of the son”). Now it is a greater dignity to exist in something species, viz. accidents and individuating principles, which nobler than oneself than to exist by oneself. Hence the appears chiefly in such as are composed of matter and human nature of Christ has a greater dignity than ours, form. Hence in such as these the nature and the sup- from this very fact that in us, being existent by itself, it positum really differ; not indeed as if they were wholly has its own personality, but in Christ it exists in the Per- separate, but because the suppositum includes the nature, son of the Word. Thus to perfect the species belongs to and in addition certain other things outside the notion of the dignity of a form, yet the sensitive part in man, on ac- the species. Hence the suppositum is taken to be a whole count of its union with the nobler form which perfects the which has the nature as its formal part to perfect it; and species, is more noble than in brutes, where it is itself the consequently in such as are composed of matter and form form which perfects. the nature is not predicated of the suppositum, for we do Reply to Objection 3. The Word of God “did not as- not say that this man is his manhood. But if there is a thing sume human nature in general, but ‘in atomo’ ”—that is, in which there is nothing outside the species or its nature in an individual—as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, (as in God), the suppositum and the nature are not really 11) otherwise every man would be the Word of God, even distinct in it, but only in our way of thinking, inasmuch as Christ was. Yet we must bear in mind that not every it is called “nature” as it is an essence, and a “supposi- individual in the genus of substance, even in rational na- tum” as it is subsisting. And what is said of a supposi- ture, is a person, but that alone which exists by itself, and tum is to be applied to a person in rational or intellectual not that which exists in some more perfect thing. Hence creatures; for a person is nothing else than “an individ- the hand of Socrates, although it is a kind of individual, ual substance of rational nature,” according to Boethius. is not a person, because it does not exist by itself, but in Therefore, whatever adheres to a person is united to it in something more perfect, viz. in the whole. And hence, person, whether it belongs to its nature or not. Hence, if too, this is signified by a “person” being defined as “an the human nature is not united to God the Word in person, individual substance,” for the hand is not a complete sub- it is nowise united to Him; and thus belief in the Incar- stance, but part of a substance. Therefore, although this nation is altogether done away with, and Christian faith human nature is a kind of individual in the genus of sub- wholly overturned. Therefore, inasmuch as the Word has stance, it has not its own personality, because it does not a human nature united to Him, which does not belong to exist separately, but in something more perfect, viz. in the His Divine Nature, it follows that the union took place in Person of the Word. Therefore the union took place in the the Person of the Word, and not in the nature. person. Reply to Objection 1. Although in God Nature and Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the suppositum or hypostasis? IIIa q. 2 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the union of the injuries.” But “one” [aliud] and “the other” [aliud] differ Word Incarnate did not take place in the suppositum or hy- in suppositum. Therefore the union of the Word Incarnate postasis. For Augustine says (Enchiridion xxxv, xxxviii): did not take place in the suppositum. “Both the Divine and human substance are one Son of Objection 2. Further, hypostasis is nothing more God, but they are one thing [aliud] by reason of the Word than a “particular substance,” as Boethius says (De Duab. and another thing [aliud] by reason of the man.” And Pope Nat.). But it is plain that in Christ there is another par- Leo says in his letter to Flavian (Ep. xxviii): “One of ticular substance beyond the hypostasis of the Word, viz. these is glorious with miracles, the other succumbs under the body and the soul and the resultant of these. Therefore 2090 there is another hypostasis in Him besides the hypostasis lies [supponitur] whatever belongs to man and receives its of the Word. predication. Therefore, if there is any hypostasis in Christ Objection 3. Further, the hypostasis of the Word is besides the hypostasis of the Word, it follows that what- not included in any genus or species, as is plain from Ia, ever pertains to man is verified of some other than the q. 3, a. 5. But Christ, inasmuch as He is made man, is Word, e.g. that He was born of a Virgin, suffered, was contained under the species of man; for Dionysius says crucified, was buried. And this, too, was condemned with (Div. Nom. 1): “Within the limits of our nature He came, the approval of the Council of Ephesus (part iii, can. 4) in Who far surpasses the whole order of nature supersubstan- these words: “If anyone ascribes to two persons or subsis- tially.” Now nothing is contained under the human species tences such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic unless it be a hypostasis of the human species. Therefore Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the saints, or in Christ there is another hypostasis besides the hyposta- by Himself of Himself, and, moreover, applies some of sis of the Word of God; and hence the same conclusion them to the man, taken as distinct from the Word of God, follows as above. and some of them (as if they could be used of God alone) On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, only to the Word of God the Father, let him be anathema.” 3,4,5): “In our Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two na- Therefore it is plainly a heresy condemned long since by tures and one hypostasis.” the Church to say that in Christ there are two hypostases, I answer that, Some who did not know the relation or two supposita, or that the union did not take place in of hypostasis to person, although granting that there is but the hypostasis or suppositum. Hence in the same Synod one person in Christ, held, nevertheless, that there is one (can. 2) it is said: “If anyone does not confess that the hypostasis of God and another of man, and hence that the Word was united to flesh in subsistence, and that Christ union took place in the person and not in the hypostasis. with His flesh is both—to wit, God and man—let him be Now this, for three reasons, is clearly erroneous. First, anathema.” because person only adds to hypostasis a determinate na- Reply to Objection 1. As accidental difference makes ture, viz. rational, according to what Boethius says (De a thing “other” [alterum], so essential difference makes Duab. Nat.), “a person is an individual substance of ratio- “another thing” [aliud]. Now it is plain that the “oth- nal nature”; and hence it is the same to attribute to the hu- erness” which springs from accidental difference may man nature in Christ a proper hypostasis and a proper per- pertain to the same hypostasis or suppositum in created son. And the holy Fathers, seeing this, condemned both things, since the same thing numerically can underlie dif- in the Fifth Council held at Constantinople, saying: “If ferent accidents. But it does not happen in created things anyone seeks to introduce into the mystery of the Incar- that the same numerically can subsist in divers essences nation two subsistences or two persons, let him be anath- or natures. Hence just as when we speak of “otherness” in ema. For by the incarnation of one of the Holy Trinity, regard to creatures we do not signify diversity of supposi- God the Word, the Holy Trinity received no augment of tum, but only diversity of accidental forms, so likewise person or subsistence.” Now “subsistence” is the same as when Christ is said to be one thing or another thing, we the subsisting thing, which is proper to hypostasis, as is do not imply diversity of suppositum or hypostasis, but plain from Boethius (De Duab. Nat.). Secondly, because diversity of nature. Hence Gregory Nazianzen says in a if it is granted that person adds to hypostasis something letter to Chelidonius (Ep. ci): “In the Saviour we may in which the union can take place, this something is noth- find one thing and another, yet He is not one person and ing else than a property pertaining to dignity; according another. And I say ‘one thing and another’; whereas, on as it is said by some that a person is a “hypostasis distin- the contrary, in the Trinity we say one Person and another guished by a property pertaining to dignity.” If, therefore, (so as not to confuse the subsistences), but not one thing the union took place in the person and not in the hyposta- and another.” sis, it follows that the union only took place in regard to Reply to Objection 2. Hypostasis signifies a particu- some dignity. And this is what Cyril, with the approval lar substance, not in every way, but as it is in its comple- of the Council of Ephesus (part iii, can. 3), condemned in ment. Yet as it is in union with something more complete, these terms: “If anyone after the uniting divides the sub- it is not said to be a hypostasis, as a hand or a foot. So like-sistences in the one Christ, only joining them in a union wise the human nature in Christ, although it is a particular of dignity or authority or power, and not rather in a con- substance, nevertheless cannot be called a hypostasis or course of natural union, let him be anathema.” Thirdly, suppositum, seeing that it is in union with a completed because to the hypostasis alone are attributed the opera- thing, viz. the whole Christ, as He is God and man. But tions and the natural properties, and whatever belongs to the complete being with which it concurs is said to be a the nature in the concrete; for we say that this man rea- hypostasis or suppositum. sons, and is risible, and is a rational animal. So likewise Reply to Objection 3. In created things a singular this man is said to be a suppositum, because he under- thing is placed in a genus or species, not on account of 2091 what belongs to its individuation, but on account of its na-that Christ is in the human species by reason of the nature ture, which springs from its form, and in composite things assumed, and not by reason of the hypostasis. individuation is taken more from matter. Hence we say Whether after the Incarnation the Person or Hypostasis of Christ is composite? IIIa q. 2 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the Person of Christ tures, but one hypostasis composed from both.” is not composite. For the Person of Christ is naught else I answer that, The Person or hypostasis of Christ may than the Person or hypostasis of the Word, as appears from be viewed in two ways. First as it is in itself, and thus what has been said (a. 2). But in the Word, Person and Na- it is altogether simple, even as the Nature of the Word. ture do not differ, as appears from Ia, q. 39, a. 1. There- Secondly, in the aspect of person or hypostasis to which fore since the Nature of the Word is simple, as was shown it belongs to subsist in a nature; and thus the Person of above ( Ia, q. 3, a. 7), it is impossible that the Person of Christ subsists in two natures. Hence though there is one Christ be composite. subsisting being in Him, yet there are different aspects of Objection 2. Further, all composition requires parts. subsistence, and hence He is said to be a composite per- But the Divine Nature is incompatible with the notion of son, insomuch as one being subsists in two. a part, for every part implicates the notion of imperfec- And thereby the solution to the first is clear. tion. Therefore it is impossible that the Person of Christ Reply to Objection 2. This composition of a person be composed of two natures. from natures is not so called on account of parts, but by Objection 3. Further, what is composed of others reason of number, even as that in which two things concur would seem to be homogeneous with them, as from bod- may be said to be composed of them. ies only a body can be composed. Therefore if there is Reply to Objection 3. It is not verified in every com- anything in Christ composed of the two natures, it follows position, that the thing composed is homogeneous with that this will not be a person but a nature; and hence the its component parts, but only in the parts of a continuous union in Christ will take place in the nature, which is con- thing; for the continuous is composed solely of continu- trary to a. 2. ous [parts]. But an animal is composed of soul and body, On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, and neither of these is an animal. 3,4,5), “In the Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two na- Whether in Christ there is any union of soul and body? IIIa q. 2 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was save from its union with the soul. Now the body of Christ no union of soul and body. For from the union of soul is said to be animated, as the Church chants: “Taking an and body in us a person or a human hypostasis is caused. animate body, He deigned to be born of a Virgin”∗. There- Hence if the soul and body were united in Christ, it fol- fore in Christ there was a union of soul and body. lows that a hypostasis resulted from their union. But this I answer that, Christ is called a man univocally with was not the hypostasis of God the Word, for It is eternal. other men, as being of the same species, according to the Therefore in Christ there would be a person or hypostasis Apostle (Phil. 2:7), “being made in the likeness of a man.” besides the hypostasis of the Word, which is contrary to Now it belongs essentially to the human species that the Aa. 2,3. soul be united to the body, for the form does not constitute Objection 2. Further, from the union of soul and body the species, except inasmuch as it becomes the act of mat- results the nature of the human species. But Damascene ter, and this is the terminus of generation through which says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3), that “we must not conceive nature intends the species. Hence it must be said that in a common species in the Lord Jesus Christ.” Therefore Christ the soul was united to the body; and the contrary is there was no union of soul and body in Him. heretical, since it destroys the truth of Christ’s humanity. Objection 3. Further, the soul is united to the body for Reply to Objection 1. This would seem to be the reathe sole purpose of quickening it. But the body of Christ son which was of weight with such as denied the union of could be quickened by the Word of God Himself, seeing the soul and body in Christ, viz. lest they should thereby He is the fount and principle of life. Therefore in Christ be forced to admit a second person or hypostasis in Christ, there was no union of soul and body. since they saw that the union of soul and body in mere On the contrary, The body is not said to be animated men resulted in a person. But this happens in mere men ∗ Feast of the Circumcision, Ant. ii, Lauds 2092 because the soul and body are so united in them as to ex-written (Lk. 24:39), “A spirit hath not flesh and bones as ist by themselves. But in Christ they are united together, you see Me to have.” Neither can it be said that the Son of so as to be united to something higher, which subsists in God assumed human nature as it is in all the individuals the nature composed of them. And hence from the union of the same species, otherwise He would have assumed all of the soul and body in Christ a new hypostasis or person men. Therefore it remains, as Damascene says further on does not result, but what is composed of them is united (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that He assumed human nature “in to the already existing hypostasis or Person. Nor does it atomo,” i.e. in an individual; not, indeed, in another in- therefore follow that the union of the soul and body in dividual which is a suppositum or a person of that nature, Christ is of less effect than in us, for its union with some- but in the Person of the Son of God. thing nobler does not lessen but increases its virtue and Secondly, this saying of Damascene may be taken not worth; just as the sensitive soul in animals constitutes the as referring to human nature, as if from the union of soul species, as being considered the ultimate form, yet it does and body one common nature (viz. human) did not result, not do so in man, although it is of greater effect and dig- but as referring to the union of the two natures Divine and nity, and this because of its union with a further and nobler human: which do not combine so as to form a third some- perfection, viz. the rational soul, as has been said above thing that becomes a common nature, for in this way it (a. 2, ad 2). would become predicable of many, and this is what he is Reply to Objection 2. This saying of Damascene may aiming at, since he adds: “For there was not generated, be taken in two ways: First, as referring to human nature, neither will there ever be generated, another Christ, Who which, as it is in one individual alone, has not the nature from the Godhead and manhood, and in the Godhead and of a common species, but only inasmuch as either it is ab- manhood, is perfect God and perfect man.” stracted from every individual, and considered in itself by Reply to Objection 3. There are two principles of the mind, or according as it is in all individuals. Now the corporeal life: one the effective principle, and in this way Son of God did not assume human nature as it exists in the the Word of God is the principle of all life; the other, the pure thought of the intellect, since in this way He would formal principle of life, for since “in living things to be is not have assumed human nature in reality, unless it be said to live,” as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), just as that human nature is a separate idea, just as the Platonists everything is formally by its form, so likewise the body conceived of man without matter. But in this way the Son lives by the soul: in this way a body could not live by the of God would not have assumed flesh, contrary to what is Word, Which cannot be the form of a body. Whether the human nature was united to the Word of God accidentally? IIIa q. 2 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the human nature was Godhead in Christ, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. united to the Word of God accidentally. For the Apostle iii, 15), that “the flesh of Christ is the instrument of the says (Phil. 2:7) of the Son of God, that He was “in habit Godhead.” Therefore it seems that the human nature was found as a man.” But habit is accidentally associated with united to the Son of God accidentally. that to which it pertains, whether habit be taken for one of On the contrary, Whatever is predicated accidentally, the ten predicaments or as a species of quality. Therefore predicates, not substance, but quantity, or quality, or some human nature is accidentally united to the Son of God. other mode of being. If therefore the human nature ac- Objection 2. Further, whatever comes to a thing that crues accidentally, when we say Christ is man, we do not is complete in being comes to it accidentally, for an acci- predicate substance, but quality or quantity, or some other dent is said to be what can come or go without the subject mode of being, which is contrary to the Decretal of Pope being corrupted. But human nature came to Christ in time, Alexander III, who says (Conc. Later. iii): “Since Christ Who had perfect being from eternity. Therefore it came is perfect God and perfect man, what foolhardiness have to Him accidentally. some to dare to affirm that Christ as man is not a sub- Objection 3. Further, whatever does not pertain to the stance?” nature or the essence of a thing is its accident, for what- I answer that, In evidence of this question we must ever is, is either a substance or an accident. But human know that two heresies have arisen with regard to the nature does not pertain to the Divine Essence or Nature mystery of the union of the two natures in Christ. The of the Son of God, for the union did not take place in the first confused the natures, as Eutyches and Dioscorus, nature, as was said above (a. 1). Hence the human nature who held that from the two natures one nature resulted, must have accrued accidentally to the Son of God. so that they confessed Christ to be “from” two natures Objection 4. Further, an instrument accrues acciden- (which were distinct before the union), but not “in” two tally. But the human nature was the instrument of the natures (the distinction of nature coming to an end after 2093 the union). The second was the heresy of Nestorius and what came together” (i.e. destroying both natures), “con-Theodore of Mopsuestia, who separated the persons. For fess a union by mingling; but the followers of Theodore they held the Person of the Son of God to be distinct from and Nestorius, maintaining division, introduce a union of the Person of the Son of man, and said these were mutu- purpose. But the Holy Church of God, rejecting the impi- ally united: first, “by indwelling,” inasmuch as the Word ety of both these treasons, confesses a union of the Word of God dwelt in the man, as in a temple; secondly, “by of God with flesh, by composition, which is in subsis- unity of intention,” inasmuch as the will of the man was tence.” Therefore it is plain that the second of the three always in agreement with the will of the Word of God; opinions, mentioned by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6), which thirdly, “by operation,” inasmuch as they said the man was holds one hypostasis of God and man, is not to be called the instrument of the Word of God; fourthly, “by greatness an opinion, but an article of Catholic faith. So likewise of honor,” inasmuch as all honor shown to the Son of God the first opinion which holds two hypostases, and the third was equally shown to the Son of man, on account of His which holds an accidental union, are not to be styled opin- union with the Son of God; fifthly, “by equivocation,” i.e. ions, but heresies condemned by the Church in Councils. communication of names, inasmuch as we say that this Reply to Objection 1. As Damascene says (De Fide man is God and the Son of God. Now it is plain that these Orth. iii, 26): “Examples need not be wholly and at all modes imply an accidental union. points similar, for what is wholly similar is the same, and But some more recent masters, thinking to avoid these not an example, and especially in Divine things, for it is heresies, through ignorance fell into them. For some impossible to find a wholly similar example in the The- conceded one person in Christ, but maintained two hy- ology,” i.e. in the Godhead of Persons, “and in the Dis- postases, or two supposita, saying that a man, composed pensation,” i.e. the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence the of body and soul, was from the beginning of his concep- human nature in Christ is likened to a habit, i.e. a garment, tion assumed by the Word of God. And this is the first not indeed in regard to accidental union, but inasmuch as opinion set down by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6). But oth- the Word is seen by the human nature, as a man by his ers desirous of keeping the unity of person, held that the garment, and also inasmuch as the garment is changed, soul of Christ was not united to the body, but that these for it is shaped according to the figure of him who puts it two were mutually separate, and were united to the Word on, and yet he is not changed from his form on account accidentally, so that the number of persons might not be of the garment. So likewise the human nature assumed by increased. And this is the third opinion which the Master the Word of God is ennobled, but the Word of God is not sets down (Sent. iii, D, 6). changed, as Augustine says (Qq. 83, qu. 73). But both of these opinions fall into the heresy of Reply to Objection 2. Whatever accrues after the Nestorius; the first, indeed, because to maintain two hy- completion of the being comes accidentally, unless it be postases or supposita in Christ is the same as to maintain taken into communion with the complete being, just as in two persons, as was shown above (a. 3). And if stress the resurrection the body comes to the soul which pre- is laid on the word “person,” we must have in mind that exists, yet not accidentally, because it is assumed unto even Nestorius spoke of unity of person on account of the same being, so that the body has vital being through the unity of dignity and honor. Hence the fifth Council the soul; but it is not so with whiteness, for the being of (Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 5) directs an anath- whiteness is other than the being of man to which white- ema against such a one as holds “one person in dignity, ness comes. But the Word of God from all eternity had honor and adoration, as Theodore and Nestorius foolishly complete being in hypostasis or person; while in time the wrote.” But the other opinion falls into the error of Nesto- human nature accrued to it, not as if it were assumed unto rius by maintaining an accidental union. For there is no one being inasmuch as this is of the nature (even as the difference in saying that the Word of God is united to the body is assumed to the being of the soul), but to one being Man Christ by indwelling, as in His temple (as Nesto- inasmuch as this is of the hypostasis or person. Hence the rius said), or by putting on man, as a garment, which human nature is not accidentally united to the Son of God. is the third opinion; rather it says something worse than Reply to Objection 3. Accident is divided against Nestorius—to wit, that the soul and body are not united. substance. Now substance, as is plain from Metaph. v, Now the Catholic faith, holding the mean between the 25, is taken in two ways: first, for essence or nature; aforesaid positions, does not affirm that the union of God secondly, for suppositum or hypostasis—hence the union and man took place in the essence or nature, nor yet in having taken place in the hypostasis, is enough to show something accidental, but midway, in a subsistence or hy- that it is not an accidental union, although the union did postasis. Hence in the fifth Council (Constantinople II, not take place in the nature. coll. viii, can. 5) we read: “Since the unity may be un- Reply to Objection 4. Not everything that is assumed derstood in many ways, those who follow the impiety of as an instrument pertains to the hypostasis of the one who Apollinaris and Eutyches, professing the destruction of assumes, as is plain in the case of a saw or a sword; yet 2094 nothing prevents what is assumed into the unity of the hy-Son of God, but His instrument. Hence Cyril says (Epist. postasis from being as an instrument, even as the body ad Monach. Aegyptii): “The Scripture does not affirm that of man or his members. Hence Nestorius held that the this Emmanuel,” i.e. Christ, “was assumed for the office human nature was assumed by the Word merely as an in- of an instrument, but as God truly humanized,” i.e. made strument, and not into the unity of the hypostasis. And man. But Damascene held that the human nature in Christ therefore he did not concede that the man was really the is an instrument belonging to the unity of the hypostasis. Whether the union of the Divine nature and the human is anything created? IIIa q. 2 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the union of the Di- son of the Son of God. Now, as was said above ( Ia, q. 13, vine and human natures is not anything created. For there a. 7), every relation which we consider between God and can be nothing created in God, because whatever is in God the creature is really in the creature, by whose change the is God. But the union is in God, for God Himself is united relation is brought into being; whereas it is not really in to human nature. Therefore it seems that the union is not God, but only in our way of thinking, since it does not anything created. arise from any change in God. And hence we must say Objection 2. Further, the end holds first place in ev- that the union of which we are speaking is not really in erything. But the end of the union is the Divine hypostasis God, except only in our way of thinking; but in the human or Person in which the union is terminated. Therefore it nature, which is a creature, it is really. Therefore we must seems that this union ought chiefly to be judged with ref- say it is something created. erence to the dignity of the Divine hypostasis, which is not Reply to Objection 1. This union is not really in anything created. Therefore the union is nothing created. God, but only in our way of thinking, for God is said to Objection 3. Further, “That which is the cause of a be united to a creature inasmuch as the creature is really thing being such is still more so” (Poster. i). But man united to God without any change in Him. is said to be the Creator on account of the union. There- Reply to Objection 2. The specific nature of a rela- fore much more is the union itself nothing created, but the tion, as of motion, depends on the subject. And since this Creator. union has its being nowhere save in a created nature, as On the contrary, Whatever has a beginning in time is was said above, it follows that it has a created being. created. Now this union was not from eternity, but began Reply to Objection 3. A man is called Creator and is in time. Therefore the union is something created. God because of the union, inasmuch as it is terminated in I answer that, The union of which we are speaking is the Divine hypostasis; yet it does not follow that the union a relation which we consider between the Divine and the itself is the Creator or God, because that a thing is said to human nature, inasmuch as they come together in one Per- be created regards its being rather than its relation. Whether union is the same as assumption? IIIa q. 2 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that union is the same does not determine the end of copulation. Therefore it as assumption. For relations, as motions, are specified by seems that union is the same as assumption. their termini. Now the term of assumption and union is On the contrary, The Divine Nature is said to be one and the same, viz. the Divine hypostasis. Therefore it united, not assumed. seems that union and assumption are not different. I answer that, As was stated above (a. 7), union Objection 2. Further, in the mystery of the Incarna- implies a certain relation of the Divine Nature and the tion the same thing seems to be what unites and what as- human, according as they come together in one Person. sumes, and what is united and what is assumed. But union Now all relations which begin in time are brought about and assumption seem to follow the action and passion of by some change; and change consists in action and pas- the thing uniting and the united, of the thing assuming and sion. Hence the “first” and principal difference between the assumed. Therefore union seems to be the same as as- assumption and union must be said to be that union im- sumption. plies the relation: whereas assumption implies the ac- Objection 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. tion, whereby someone is said to assume, or the passion, iii, 11): “Union is one thing, incarnation is another; for whereby something is said to be assumed. Now from this union demands mere copulation, and leaves unsaid the difference another “second” difference arises, for assump- end of the copulation; but incarnation and humanation de- tion implies “becoming,” whereas union implies “having termine the end of copulation.” But likewise assumption become,” and therefore the thing uniting is said to be 2095 united, but the thing assuming is not said to be assumed. the Divine Person subsists in human nature. For the human nature is taken to be in the terminus of as- Reply to Objection 1. Union and assumption have sumption unto the Divine hypostasis when man is spoken not the same relation to the term, but a different relation, of; and hence we can truly say that the Son of God, Who as was said above. assumes human nature unto Himself, is man. But human Reply to Objection 2. What unites and what assumes nature, considered in itself, i.e. in the abstract, is viewed are not the same. For whatsoever Person assumes unites, as assumed; and we do not say the Son of God is hu- and not conversely. For the Person of the Father united the man nature. From this same follows a “third” difference, human nature to the Son, but not to Himself; and hence He which is that a relation, especially one of equiparance, is is said to unite and not to assume. So likewise the united no more to one extreme than to the other, whereas action and the assumed are not identical, for the Divine Nature and passion bear themselves differently to the agent and is said to be united, but not assumed. the patient, and to different termini. And hence assump- Reply to Objection 3. Assumption determines with tion determines the term whence and the term whither; for whom the union is made on the part of the one assum- assumption means a taking to oneself from another. But ing, inasmuch as assumption means taking unto oneself union determines none of these things. hence it may be [ad se sumere], whereas incarnation and humanation (de- said indifferently that the human nature is united with the termine with whom the union is made) on the part of the Divine, or conversely. But the Divine Nature is not said thing assumed, which is flesh or human nature. And thus to be assumed by the human, but conversely, because the assumption differs logically both from union and from in- human nature is joined to the Divine personality, so that carnation or humanation. Whether the union of the two natures in Christ is the greatest of all unions? IIIa q. 2 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that the union of the two tion may be taken in two ways: first, in regard to the natures in Christ is not the greatest of all unions. For what things united; secondly, in regard to that in which they are is united falls short of the unity of what is one, since what united. And in this regard this union has a pre-eminence is united is by participation, but one is by essence. Now over other unions; for the unity of the Divine Person, in in created things there are some that are simply one, as is which the two natures are united, is the greatest. But it shown especially in unity itself, which is the principle of has no pre-eminence in regard to the things united. number. Therefore the union of which we are speaking Reply to Objection 1. The unity of the Divine Per- does not imply the greatest of all unions. son is greater than numerical unity, which is the principle Objection 2. Further, the greater the distance between of number. For the unity of a Divine Person is an uncre- things united, the less the union. Now, the things united by ated and self-subsisting unity, not received into another by this union are most distant—namely, the Divine and hu- participation. Also, it is complete in itself, having in itself man natures; for they are infinitely apart. Therefore their whatever pertains to the nature of unity; and therefore it is union is the least of all. not compatible with the nature of a part, as in numerical Objection 3. Further, from union there results one. unity, which is a part of number, and which is shared in by But from the union of soul and body in us there arises the things numbered. And hence in this respect the union what is one in person and nature; whereas from the union of the Incarnation is higher than numerical unity by rea- of the Divine and human nature there results what is one son of the unity of the Divine Person, and not by reason in person only. Therefore the union of soul and body is of the human nature, which is not the unity of the Divine greater than that of the Divine and human natures; and Person, but is united to it. hence the union of which we speak does not imply the Reply to Objection 2. This reason regards the things greatest unity. united, and not the Person in Whom the union takes place. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 10) that Reply to Objection 3. The unity of the Divine Per- “man is in the Son of God, more than the Son in the Fa- son is greater than the unity of person and nature in us; ther.” But the Son is in the Father by unity of essence, and and hence the union of the Incarnation is greater than the man is in the Son by the union of the Incarnation. There- union of soul and body in us. fore the union of the Incarnation is greater than the unity And because what is urged in the argument “on the of the Divine Essence, which nevertheless is the greatest contrary” rests upon what is untrue—namely, that the union; and thus the union of the Incarnation implies the union of the Incarnation is greater than the unity of the greatest unity. Divine Persons in Essence—we must say to the authority I answer that, Union implies the joining of several of Augustine that the human nature is not more in the Son in some one thing. Therefore the union of the Incarna- of God than the Son of God in the Father, but much less. 2096 But the man in some respects is more in the Son than the and when I say “Son of God”; whereas it is not the same Son in the Father—namely, inasmuch as the same sup- suppositum of Father and Son. positum is signified when I say “man,” meaning Christ, Whether the union of the Incarnation took place by grace? IIIa q. 2 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that the union of the In- as the will of God gratuitously doing something or reput- carnation did not take place by grace. For grace is an ac- ing anything as well-pleasing or acceptable to Him, the cident, as was shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 110, a. 2). But union of the Incarnation took place by grace, even as the the union of the human nature to the Divine did not take union of the saints with God by knowledge and love. But place accidentally, as was shown above (a. 6). Therefore it if grace be taken as the free gift of God, then the fact that seems that the union of the Incarnation did not take place the human nature is united to the Divine Person may be by grace. called a grace, inasmuch as it took place without being Objection 2. Further, the subject of grace is the preceded by any merits—but not as though there were an soul. But it is written (Col. 2:9): “In Christ [Vulg.: habitual grace, by means of which the union took place. ‘Him’] dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corpore- Reply to Objection 1. The grace which is an accident ally.” Therefore it seems that this union did not take place is a certain likeness of the Divinity participated by man. by grace. But by the Incarnation human nature is not said to have Objection 3. Further, every saint is united to God by participated a likeness of the Divine nature, but is said to grace. If, therefore, the union of the Incarnation was by be united to the Divine Nature itself in the Person of the grace, it would seem that Christ is said to be God no more Son. Now the thing itself is greater than a participated than other holy men. likeness of it. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. Reply to Objection 2. Habitual grace is only in the xv): “By the same grace every man is made a Christian, soul; but the grace, i.e. the free gift of God, of being from the beginning of his faith, as this man from His be- united to the Divine Person belongs to the whole human ginning was made Christ.” But this man became Christ nature, which is composed of soul and body. And hence it by union with the Divine Nature. Therefore this union is said that the fulness of the Godhead dwelt corporeally was by grace. in Christ because the Divine Nature is united not merely I answer that, As was said above ( Ia IIae, q. 110, to the soul, but to the body also. Although it may also a. 1), grace is taken in two ways:–first, as the will of God be said that it dwelt in Christ corporeally, i.e. not as in gratuitously bestowing something; secondly, as the free a shadow, as it dwelt in the sacraments of the old law, of gift of God. Now human nature stands in need of the gra- which it is said in the same place (Col. 2:17) that they tuitous will of God in order to be lifted up to God, since are the “shadow of things to come but the body is Christ” this is above its natural capability. Moreover, human na- [Vulg.: ‘Christ’s’], inasmuch as the body is opposed to ture is lifted up to God in two ways: first, by operation, as the shadow. And some say that the Godhead is said to the saints know and love God; secondly, by personal be- have dwelt in Christ corporeally, i.e. in three ways, just as ing, and this mode belongs exclusively to Christ, in Whom a body has three dimensions: first, by essence, presence, human nature is assumed so as to be in the Person of the and power, as in other creatures; secondly, by sanctifying Son of God. But it is plain that for the perfection of oper- grace, as in the saints; thirdly, by personal union, which is ation the power needs to be perfected by a habit, whereas proper to Christ. that a nature has being in its own suppositum does not take Hence the reply to the third is manifest, viz. because place by means of a habit. the union of the Incarnation did not take place by habitual And hence we must say that if grace be understood grace alone, but in subsistence or person. Whether any merits preceded the union of the Incarnation? IIIa q. 2 a. 11 Objection 1. It would seem that the union of the In- Objection 2. Further, whoever merits anything merits carnation followed upon certain merits, because upon Ps. that without which it cannot be. But the ancient Fathers 32:22, “Let Thy mercy, o Lord, be upon us, as,” etc. a merited eternal life, to which they were able to attain only gloss says: “Here the prophet’s desire for the Incarnation by the Incarnation; for Gregory says (Moral. xiii): “Those and its merited fulfilment are hinted at.” Therefore the who came into this world before Christ’s coming, whatso- Incarnation falls under merit. ever eminency of righteousness they may have had, could 2097 not, on being divested of the body, at once be admitted which is the reward of virtue, and consists in the full en-into the bosom of the heavenly country, seeing that He joyment of God. Whereas the union of the Incarnation, had not as yet come Who, by His own descending, should inasmuch as it is in the personal being, transcends the place the souls of the righteous in their everlasting seat.” union of the beatified mind with God, which is by the Therefore it would seem that they merited the Incarnation. act of the soul in fruition; and therefore it cannot fall Objection 3. Further, of the Blessed Virgin it is sung under merit. Secondly, because grace cannot fall under that “she merited to bear the Lord of all”∗, and this took merit, for the principle of merit does not fall under merit; place through the Incarnation. Therefore the Incarnation and therefore neither does grace, for it is the principle of falls under merit. merit. Hence, still less does the Incarnation fall under On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. merit, since it is the principle of grace, according to Jn. xv): “Whoever can find merits preceding the singular gen- 1:17: “Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.” Thirdly, eration of our Head, may also find merits preceding the because the Incarnation is for the reformation of the en- repeated regeneration of us His members.” But no merits tire human nature, and therefore it does not fall under the preceded our regeneration, according to Titus 3:5: “Not merit of any individual man, since the goodness of a mere by the works of justice which we have done, but according man cannot be the cause of the good of the entire nature. to His mercy He saved us, by the laver of regeneration.” Yet the holy Fathers merited the Incarnation congruously Therefore no merits preceded the generation of Christ. by desiring and beseeching; for it was becoming that God I answer that, With regard to Christ Himself, it is should harken to those who obeyed Him. clear from the above (a. 10) that no merits of His could And thereby the reply to the First Objection is mani- have preceded the union. For we do not hold that He was fest. first of all a mere man, and that afterwards by the merits of Reply to Objection 2. It is false that under merit falls a good life it was granted Him to become the Son of God, everything without which there can be no reward. For as Photinus held; but we hold that from the beginning of there is something pre-required not merely for reward, but His conception this man was truly the Son of God, see- also for merit, as the Divine goodness and grace and the ing that He had no other hypostasis but that of the Son of very nature of man. And again, the mystery of the Incar- God, according to Luke 1:35: “The Holy which shall be nation is the principle of merit, because “of His fulness born of thee shall be called the Son of God.” And hence we all have received” (Jn. 1:16). every operation of this man followed the union. There- Reply to Objection 3. The Blessed Virgin is said to fore no operation of His could have been meritorious of have merited to bear the Lord of all; not that she merited the union. His Incarnation, but because by the grace bestowed upon Neither could the needs of any other man whatsoever her she merited that grade of purity and holiness, which have merited this union condignly: first, because the mer- fitted her to be the Mother of God. itorious works of man are properly ordained to beatitude, Whether the grace of union was natural to the man Christ? IIIa q. 2 a. 12 Objection 1. It would seem that the grace of union cording to the human nature, otherwise it would belong to was not natural to the man Christ. For the union of the all men, since they are of the same nature as He. Therefore Incarnation did not take place in the nature, but in the Per- it would seem that the grace of union is nowise natural to son, as was said above (a. 2). Now a thing is denominated Christ. from its terminus. Therefore this grace ought rather to be On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xl): called personal than natural. “In the assumption of human nature, grace itself became Objection 2. Further, grace is divided against nature, somewhat natural to that man, so as to leave no room for even as gratuitous things, which are from God, are distin- sin in Him.” guished from natural things, which are from an intrinsic I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. principle. But if things are divided in opposition to one v, 5), nature designates, in one way, nativity; in another, another, one is not denominated by the other. Therefore the essence of a thing. Hence natural may be taken in the grace of Christ was not natural to Him. two ways: first, for what is only from the essential princi- Objection 3. Further, natural is that which is accord- ples of a thing, as it is natural to fire to mount; secondly, ing to nature. But the grace of union is not natural to we call natural to man what he has had from his birth, Christ in regard to the Divine Nature, otherwise it would according to Eph. 2:3: “We were by nature children of belong to the other Persons; nor is it natural to Him ac- wrath”; and Wis. 12:10: “They were a wicked generation, ∗ Little Office of B. V. M., Dominican Rite, Ant. at Benedictus 2098 and their malice natural.” Therefore the grace of Christ, grace and natural in the same respect; for it is called grace whether of union or habitual, cannot be called natural as inasmuch as it is not from merit; and it is said to be natural if caused by the principles of the human nature of Christ, inasmuch as by the power of the Divine Nature it was in although it may be called natural, as if coming to the hu- the humanity of Christ from His nativity. man nature of Christ by the causality of His Divine Na- Reply to Objection 3. The grace of union is not nat- ture. But these two kinds of grace are said to be natural to ural to Christ according to His human nature, as if it were Christ, inasmuch as He had them from His nativity, since caused by the principles of the human nature, and hence from the beginning of His conception the human nature it need not belong to all men. Nevertheless, it is natural was united to the Divine Person, and His soul was filled to Him in regard to the human nature on account of the with the gift of grace. “property” of His birth, seeing that He was conceived by Reply to Objection 1. Although the union did not the Holy Ghost, so that He might be the natural Son of take place in the nature, yet it was caused by the power of God and of man. But it is natural to Him in regard to the the Divine Nature, which is truly the nature of Christ, and Divine Nature, inasmuch as the Divine Nature is the ac- it, moreover, belonged to Christ from the beginning of His tive principle of this grace; and this belongs to the whole nativity. Trinity—to wit, to be the active principle of this grace. Reply to Objection 2. The union is not said to be 2099 THIRD PART, QUESTION 3 Of the Mode of Union On the Part of the Person Assuming (In Eight Articles) We must now consider the union on the part of the Person assuming, and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether to assume is befitting to a Divine Person? (2) Whether it is befitting to the Divine Nature? (3) Whether the Nature abstracted from the Personality can assume? (4) Whether one Person can assume without another? (5) Whether each Person can assume? (6) Whether several Persons can assume one individual nature? (7) Whether one Person can assume two individual natures? (8) Whether it was more fitting for the Person of the Son of God to assume human nature than for another Divine Person? Whether it is befitting for a Divine Person to assume? IIIa q. 3 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not befitting to as was said above (q. 2, Aa. 1 ,2), the union took place in a Divine Person to assume a created nature. For a Divine the Person, and not in the nature. Hence it is plain that to Person signifies something most perfect. Now no addition assume a nature is most properly befitting to a Person. can be made to what is perfect. Therefore, since to assume Reply to Objection 1. Since the Divine Person is in- is to take to oneself, and consequently what is assumed is finite, no addition can be made to it: Hence Cyril says†: added to the one who assumes, it does not seem to be be- “We do not conceive the mode of conjunction to be ac- fitting to a Divine Person to assume a created nature. cording to addition”; just as in the union of man with Objection 2. Further, that to which anything is as- God, nothing is added to God by the grace of adoption, sumed is communicated in some degree to what is as- but what is Divine is united to man; hence, not God but sumed to it, just as dignity is communicated to whosoever man is perfected. is assumed to a dignity. But it is of the nature of a person Reply to Objection 2. A Divine Person is said to be to be incommunicable, as was said above ( Ia, q. 29, a. 1). incommunicable inasmuch as It cannot be predicated of Therefore it is not befitting to a Divine Person to assume, several supposita, but nothing prevents several things be- i.e. to take to Himself. ing predicated of the Person. Hence it is not contrary to Objection 3. Further, person is constituted by nature. the nature of person to be communicated so as to sub- But it is repugnant that the thing constituted should as- sist in several natures, for even in a created person several sume the constituent, since the effect does not act on its natures may concur accidentally, as in the person of one cause. Hence it is not befitting to a Person to assume a man we find quantity and quality. But this is proper to a nature. Divine Person, on account of its infinity, that there should On the contrary, Augustine∗ says (De Fide ad Petrum be a concourse of natures in it, not accidentally, but in ii): “This God, i.e. the only-Begotten one, took the form,” subsistence. i.e. the nature, “of a servant to His own Person.” But the Reply to Objection 3. As was said above (q. 2, a. 1), only-Begotten God is a Person. Therefore it is befitting to the human nature constitutes a Divine Person, not simply, a Person to take, i.e. to assume a nature. but forasmuch as the Person is denominated from such a I answer that, In the word “assumption” are implied nature. For human nature does not make the Son of Man two things, viz. the principle and the term of the act, for to be simply, since He was from eternity, but only to be to assume is to take something to oneself. Now of this as- man. It is by the Divine Nature that a Divine Person is sumption a Person is both the principle and the term. The constituted simply. Hence the Divine Person is not said principle—because it properly belongs to a person to act, to assume the Divine Nature, but to assume the human and this assuming of flesh took place by the Divine action. nature. Likewise a Person is the term of this assumption, because, ∗ Fulgentius † Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 26 2100 Whether it is befitting to the Divine Nature to assume? IIIa q. 3 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not befitting to ered to be. Hence a Person is primarily and more properly the Divine Nature to assume. Because, as was said above said to assume, but it may be said secondarily that the Na- (a. 1), to assume is to take to oneself. But the Divine ture assumed a nature to Its Person. And after the same Nature did not take to Itself human nature, for the union manner the Nature is also said to be incarnate, not that it did not take place in the nature, as was said above (q. 2, is changed to flesh, but that it assumed the nature of flesh. Aa. 1,3). Hence it is not befitting to the Divine Nature to Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6): “Following assume human nature. the blessed Athanasius and Cyril we say that the Nature Objection 2. Further, the Divine Nature is common to of God is incarnate.” the three Persons. If, therefore, it is befitting to the Divine Reply to Objection 1. “Oneself” is reciprocal, and Nature to assume, it consequently is befitting to the three points to the same suppositum. But the Divine Nature is Persons; and thus the Father assumed human nature even not a distinct suppositum from the Person of the Word. as the Son, which is erroneous. Hence, inasmuch as the Divine Nature took human nature Objection 3. Further, to assume is to act. But to act to the Person of the Word, It is said to take it to Itself. befits a person, not a nature, which is rather taken to be the But although the Father takes human nature to the Person principle by which the agent acts. Therefore to assume is of the Word, He did not thereby take it to Himself, for not befitting to the nature. the suppositum of the Father and the Son is not one. and On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius) says (De hence it cannot properly be said that the Father assumes Fide ad Petrum ii): “That nature which remains eternally human nature. begotten of the Father” (i.e. which is received from the Reply to Objection 2. What is befitting to the Divine Father by eternal generation) “took our nature free of sin Nature in Itself is befitting to the three Persons, as good- from His Mother.” ness, wisdom, and the like. But to assume belongs to It by I answer that, As was said above (a. 1), in the word reason of the Person of the Word, as was said above, and assumption two things are signified—to wit, the principle hence it is befitting to that Person alone. and the term of the action. Now to be the principle of the Reply to Objection 3. As in God “what is” and assumption belongs to the Divine Nature in itself, because “whereby it is” are the same, so likewise in Him “what the assumption took place by Its power; but to be the term acts” and “whereby it acts” are the same, since everything of the assumption does not belong to the Divine Nature in acts, inasmuch as it is a being. Hence the Divine Nature is itself, but by reason of the Person in Whom It is consid- both that whereby God acts, and the very God Who acts. Whether the Nature abstracted from the Personality can assume? IIIa q. 3 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that if we abstract the Filiation and Procession, as was said above ( Ia, q. 30, Personality by our mind, the Nature cannot assume. For a. 2). Now if we mentally abstract these, there still re- it was said above (a. 1) that it belongs to the Nature to as- mains the omnipotence of God, by which the Incarnation sume by reason of the Person. But what belongs to one was wrought, as the angel says (Lk. 1:37): “No word by reason of another cannot belong to it if the other is shall be impossible with God.” Therefore it seems that removed; as a body, which is visible by reason of color, if the Personality be removed, the Divine Nature can still without color cannot be seen. Hence if the Personality be assume. mentally abstracted, the Nature cannot assume. I answer that, The intellect stands in two ways to- Objection 2. Further, assumption implies the term of wards God. First, to know God as He is, and in this union, as was said above (a. 1). But the union cannot take manner it is impossible for the intellect to circumscribe place in the nature, but only in the Person. Therefore, if something in God and leave the rest, for all that is in God the Personality be abstracted, the Divine Nature cannot is one, except the distinction of Persons; and as regards assume. these, if one is removed the other is taken away, since Objection 3. Further, it has been said above ( Ia, q. 40, they are distinguished by relations only which must be a. 3) that in the Godhead if the Personality is abstracted, together at the same time. Secondly, the intellect stands nothing remains. But the one who assumes is something. towards God, not indeed as knowing God as He is, but in Therefore, if the Personality is abstracted, the Divine Na- its own way, i.e. understanding manifoldly and separately ture cannot assume. what in God is one: and in this way our intellect can un- On the contrary, In the Godhead Personality signifies derstand the Divine goodness and wisdom, and the like, a personal property; and this is threefold, viz. Paternity, which are called essential attributes, without understand- 2101 ing Paternity or Filiation, which are called Personalities. Reply to Objection 2. Even if the personal properties And hence if we abstract Personality by our intellect, we of the three Persons are abstracted by our mind, neverthe- may still understand the Nature assuming. less there will remain in our thoughts the one Personality Reply to Objection 1. Because in God “what is,” and of God, as the Jews consider. And the assumption can “whereby it is,” are one, if any one of the things which be terminated in It, as we now say it is terminated in the are attributed to God in the abstract is considered in itself, Person of the Word. abstracted from all else, it will still be something subsist- Reply to Objection 3. If we mentally abstract the Per- ing, and consequently a Person, since it is an intellectual sonality, it is said that nothing remains by way of resolu- nature. Hence just as we now say three Persons, on ac- tion, i.e. as if the subject of the relation and the relation count of holding three personal properties, so likewise if itself were distinct because all we can think of in God is we mentally exclude the personal properties there will still considered as a subsisting suppositum. However, some remain in our thought the Divine Nature as subsisting and of the things predicated of God can be understood with- as a Person. And in this way It may be understood to out others, not by way of resolution, but by the way men- assume human nature by reason of Its subsistence or Per- tioned above. sonality. Whether one Person without another can assume a created nature? IIIa q. 3 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that one Person cannot but the term of the assumption is a Person, as stated above assume a created nature without another assuming it. For (a. 2). Hence what has to do with action in the assumption “the works of the Trinity are inseparable,” as Augustine is common to the three Persons; but what pertains to the says (Enchiridion xxxviii). But as the three Persons have nature of term belongs to one Person in such a manner as one essence, so likewise They have one operation. Now not to belong to another; for the three Persons caused the to assume is an operation. Therefore it cannot belong to human nature to be united to the one Person of the Son. one without belonging to another. Reply to Objection 1. This reason regards the oper- Objection 2. Further, as we say the Person of the Son ation, and the conclusion would follow if it implied this became incarnate, so also did the Nature; for “the whole operation only, without the term, which is a Person. Divine Nature became incarnate in one of Its hypostases,” Reply to Objection 2. The Nature is said to be incar- as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6). But the Nature nate, and to assume by reason of the Person in Whom the is common to the three Persons. Therefore the assumption union is terminated, as stated above (Aa. 1,2), and not as is. it is common to the three Persons. Now “the whole Divine Objection 3. Further, as the human nature in Christ Nature is” said to be “incarnate”; not that It is incarnate in is assumed by God, so likewise are men assumed by Him all the Persons, but inasmuch as nothing is wanting to the through grace, according to Rom. 14:3: “God hath taken perfection of the Divine Nature of the Person incarnate, as him to Him.” But this assumption pertains to all the Per- Damascene explains there. sons; therefore the first also. Reply to Objection 3. The assumption which takes On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that place by the grace of adoption is terminated in a certain the mystery of the Incarnation pertains to “discrete theol- participation of the Divine Nature, by an assimilation to ogy,” i.e. according to which something “distinct” is said Its goodness, according to 2 Pet. 1:4: “That you may be of the Divine Persons. made partakers of the Divine Nature”; and hence this as- I answer that, As was said above (a. 1), assumption sumption is common to the three Persons, in regard to the implies two things, viz. the act of assuming and the term principle and the term. But the assumption which is by of assumption. Now the act of assumption proceeds from the grace of union is common on the part of the principle, the Divine power, which is common to the three Persons, but not on the part of the term, as was said above. Whether each of the Divine Persons could have assumed human nature? IIIa q. 3 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that no other Divine Per- to be a Son; for this would tend to the confusion of the Di- son could have assumed human nature except the Person vine Persons. Therefore the Father and Holy Ghost could of the Son. For by this assumption it has been brought not have assumed flesh. about that God is the Son of Man. But it was not becom- Objection 2. Further, by the Divine Incarnation men ing that either the Father or the Holy Ghost should be said have come into possession of the adoption of sons, ac- 2102 cording to Rom. 8:15: “For you have not received the vine power could have united human nature to the Person spirit of bondage again in fear, but the spirit of adoption of the Father or of the Holy Ghost, as It united it to the of sons.” But sonship by adoption is a participated like- Person of the Son. And hence we must say that the Father ness of natural sonship which does not belong to the Fa- or the Holy Ghost could have assumed flesh even as the ther nor the Holy Ghost; hence it is said (Rom. 8:29): Son. “For whom He foreknew He also predestinated to be made Reply to Objection 1. The temporal sonship, conformable to the image of His Son.” Therefore it seems whereby Christ is said to be the Son of Man, does not that no other Person except the Person of the Son could constitute His Person, as does the eternal Sonship; but is have become incarnate. something following upon the temporal nativity. Hence, if Objection 3. Further, the Son is said to be sent and the name of son were transferred to the Father or the Holy to be begotten by the temporal nativity, inasmuch as He Ghost in this manner, there would be no confusion of the became incarnate. But it does not belong to the Father to Divine Persons. be sent, for He is innascible, as was said above ( Ia, q. 32, Reply to Objection 2. Adoptive sonship is a certain a. 3; Ia, q. 43, a. 4). Therefore at least the Person of the participation of natural sonship; but it takes place in us, Father cannot become incarnate. by appropriation, by the Father, Who is the principle of On the contrary, Whatever the Son can do, so can natural sonship, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost, Who the Father and the Holy Ghost, otherwise the power of the is the love of the Father and Son, according to Gal. 4:6: three Persons would not be one. But the Son was able “God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts cry- to become incarnate. Therefore the Father and the Holy ing, Abba, Father.” And therefore, even as by the Incar- Ghost were able to become incarnate. nation of the Son we receive adoptive sonship in the like- I answer that, As was said above (Aa. 1,2,4), assump- ness of His natural sonship, so likewise, had the Father tion implies two things, viz. the act of the one assuming become incarnate, we should have received adoptive son- and the term of the assumption. Now the principle of the ship from Him, as from the principle of the natural son- act is the Divine power, and the term is a Person. But ship, and from the Holy Ghost as from the common bond the Divine power is indifferently and commonly in all the of Father and Son. Persons. Moreover, the nature of Personality is common Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to the Father to be to all the Persons, although the personal properties are dif- innascible as to eternal birth, and the temporal birth would ferent. Now whenever a power regards several things in- not destroy this. But the Son of God is said to be sent in differently, it can terminate its action in any of them in- regard to the Incarnation, inasmuch as He is from another, differently, as is plain in rational powers, which regard without which the Incarnation would not suffice for the opposites, and can do either of them. Therefore the Di- nature of mission. Whether several Divine Persons can assume one and the same individual nature? IIIa q. 3 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that two Divine Persons versely. Hence, if three Persons were to assume one hu- cannot assume one and the same individual nature. For, man nature, it would follow that whatever is said of each this being granted, there would either be several men or of the three Persons would be said of the man; and con- one. But not several, for just as one Divine Nature in sev- versely, what was said of the man could be said of each of eral Persons does not make several gods, so one human the three Persons. Therefore what is proper to the Father, nature in several persons does not make several men. Nor viz. to beget the Son, would be said of the man, and con- would there be only one man, for one man is “this man,” sequently would be said of the Son of God; and this could which signifies one person; and hence the distinction of not be. Therefore it is impossible that the three Persons three Divine Persons would be destroyed, which cannot should assume one human nature. be allowed. Therefore neither two nor three Persons can On the contrary, The Incarnate Person subsists in two take one human nature. natures. But the three Persons can subsist in one Divine Objection 2. Further, the assumption is terminated in Nature. Therefore they can also subsist in one human na- the unity of Person, as has been said above (a. 2). But the ture in such a way that the human nature be assumed by Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are not one Person. There- the three Persons. fore the three Persons cannot assume one human nature. I answer that, As was said above (q. 2, a. 5, ad 1), Objection 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. by the union of the soul and body in Christ neither a new iii, 3,4), and Augustine (De Trin. i, 11,12,13), that from person is made nor a new hypostasis, but one human na- the Incarnation of God the Son it follows that whatever is ture is assumed to the Divine Person or hypostasis, which, said of the Son of God is said of the Son of Man, and con- indeed, does not take place by the power of the human na- 2103 ture, but by the power of the Divine Person. Now such is by inherence one spirit results,” according to 1 Cor. 6:17: the characteristic of the Divine Persons that one does not “He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit.” exclude another from communicating in the same nature, Reply to Objection 2. In this supposition the human but only in the same Person. Hence, since in the mystery nature would be assumed to the unity, not indeed of one of the Incarnation “the whole reason of the deed is the Person, but to the unity of each Person, so that even as power of the doer,” as Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum the Divine Nature has a natural unity with each Person, cxxxvii), we must judge of it in regard to the quality of the so also the human nature would have a unity with each Divine Person assuming, and not according to the quality Person by assumption. of the human nature assumed. Therefore it is not impos- Reply to Objection 3. In the mystery of the Incar- sible that two or three Divine Persons should assume one nation, there results a communication of the properties human nature, but it would be impossible for them to as- belonging to the nature, because whatever belongs to the sume one human hypostasis or person; thus Anselm says nature can be predicated of the Person subsisting in that in the book De Concep. Virg. (Cur Deus Homo ii, 9), that nature, no matter to which of the natures it may apply. “several Persons cannot assume one and the same man to Hence in this hypothesis, of the Person of the Father may unity of Person.” be predicated what belongs to the human nature and what Reply to Objection 1. In the hypothesis that three belongs to the Divine; and likewise of the Person of the Persons assume one human nature, it would be true to say Son and of the Holy Ghost. But what belongs to the Per- that the three Persons were one man, because of the one son of the Father by reason of His own Person could not human nature. For just as it is now true to say the three be attributed to the Person of the Son or Holy Ghost on Persons are one God on account of the one Divine Nature, account of the distinction of Persons which would still re- so it would be true to say they are one man on account main. Therefore it might be said that as the Father was un- of the one human nature. Nor would “one” imply unity begotten, so the man was unbegotten, inasmuch as “man” of person, but unity in human nature; for it could not be stood for the Person of the Father. But if one were to go on argued that because the three Persons were one man they to say, “The man is unbegotten; the Son is man; therefore were one simply. For nothing hinders our saying that men, the Son is unbegotten,” it would be the fallacy of figure who are many simply, are in some respect one, e.g. one of speech or of accident; even as we now say God is un- people, and as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 3): “The Spirit begotten, because the Father is unbegotten, yet we cannot of God and the spirit of man are by nature different, but conclude that the Son is unbegotten, although He is God. Whether one Divine Person can assume two human natures? IIIa q. 3 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that one Divine Person natures cannot be wholly united together, inasmuch as the cannot assume two human natures. For the nature as- soul of one would be united to the body of the other; and, sumed in the mystery of the Incarnation has no other sup- again, two bodies would be together, which would give positum than the suppositum of the Divine Person, as is rise to confusion of natures. Therefore it is not possibly plain from what has been stated above (q. 2, Aa. 3,6). for one Divine Person to assume two human natures. Therefore, if we suppose one Person to assume two hu- On the contrary, Whatever the Father can do, that man natures, there would be one suppositum of two na- also can the Son do. But after the Incarnation the Father tures of the same species; which would seem to imply a can still assume a human nature distinct from that which contradiction, for the nature of one species is only multi- the Son has assumed; for in nothing is the power of the plied by distinct supposita. Father or the Son lessened by the Incarnation of the Son. Objection 2. Further, in this hypothesis it could not be Therefore it seems that after the Incarnation the Son can said that the Divine Person incarnate was one man, seeing assume another human nature distinct from the one He has that He would not have one human nature; neither could it assumed. be said that there were several, for several men have dis- I answer that, What has power for one thing, and no tinct supposita, whereas in this case there would be only more, has a power limited to one. Now the power of a one suppositum. Therefore the aforesaid hypothesis is im- Divine Person is infinite, nor can it be limited by any cre- possible. ated thing. Hence it may not be said that a Divine Person Objection 3. Further, in the mystery of the Incarna- so assumed one human nature as to be unable to assume tion the whole Divine Nature is united to the whole nature another. For it would seem to follow from this that the assumed, i.e. to every part of it, for Christ is “perfect God Personality of the Divine Nature was so comprehended by and perfect man, complete God and complete man,” as one human nature as to be unable to assume another to its Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 7). But two human Personality; and this is impossible, for the Uncreated can- 2104 not be comprehended by any creature. Hence it is plain qualities is designated in the singular as “such by reason that, whether we consider the Divine Person in regard to of the two qualities.” Now the assumed nature is, as it His power, which is the principle of the union, or in re- were, a garment, although this similitude does not fit at all gard to His Personality, which is the term of the union, it points, as has been said above (q. 2, a. 6, ad 1). And hence, has to be said that the Divine Person, over and beyond the if the Divine Person were to assume two human natures, human nature which He has assumed, can assume another He would be called, on account of the unity of supposi- distinct human nature. tum, one man having two human natures. Now many men Reply to Objection 1. A created nature is completed are said to be one people, inasmuch as they have some in its essentials by its form, which is multiplied according one thing in common, and not on account of the unity of to the division of matter. And hence, if the composition suppositum. So likewise, if two Divine Persons were to of matter and form constitutes a new suppositum, the con- assume one singular human nature, they would be said sequence is that the nature is multiplied by the multipli- to be one man, as stated (a. 6, ad 1), not from the unity cation of supposita. But in the mystery of the Incarnation of suppositum, but because they have some one thing in the union of form and matter, i.e. of soul and body, does common. not constitute a new suppositum, as was said above (a. 6). Reply to Objection 3. The Divine and human natures Hence there can be a numerical multitude on the part of do not bear the same relation to the one Divine Person, the nature, on account of the division of matter, without but the Divine Nature is related first of all thereto, inas- distinction of supposita. much as It is one with It from eternity; and afterwards the Reply to Objection 2. It might seem possible to reply human nature is related to the Divine Person, inasmuch that in such a hypothesis it would follow that there were as it is assumed by the Divine Person in time, not indeed two men by reason of the two natures, just as, on the con- that the nature is the Person, but that the Person of God trary, the three Persons would be called one man, on ac- subsists in human nature. For the Son of God is His God- count of the one nature assumed, as was said above (a. 6, head, but is not His manhood. And hence, in order that the ad 1). But this does not seem to be true; because we must human nature may be assumed by the Divine Person, the use words according to the purpose of their signification, Divine Nature must be united by a personal union with the which is in relation to our surroundings. Consequently, in whole nature assumed, i.e. in all its parts. Now in the two order to judge of a word’s signification or co-signification, natures assumed there would be a uniform relation to the we must consider the things which are around us, in which Divine Person, nor would one assume the other. Hence it a word derived from some form is never used in the plural would not be necessary for one of them to be altogether unless there are several supposita. For a man who has on united to the other, i.e. all the parts of one with all the two garments is not said to be “two persons clothed,” but parts of the other. “one clothed with two garments”; and whoever has two Whether it was more fitting that the Person of the Son rather than any other Divine IIIa q. 3 a. 8 Person should assume human nature? Objection 1. It would seem that it was not more fit- would seem to be, as it were, a second creation of human ting that the Son of God should become incarnate than the nature, according to Gal. 6:15: “For in Christ Jesus nei- Father or the Holy Ghost. For by the mystery of the Incar- ther circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, nation men are led to the true knowledge of God, accord- but a new creature.” But the power of creation is appro- ing to Jn. 18:37: “For this was I born, and for this came I priated to the Father. Therefore it would have been more into the world, to give testimony to the truth.” But by the becoming to the Father than to the Son to become incar- Person of the Son of God becoming incarnate many have nate. been kept back from the true knowledge of God, since Objection 3. Further, the Incarnation is ordained to they referred to the very Person of the Son what was said the remission of sins, according to Mat. 1:21: “Thou shalt of the Son in His human nature, as Arius, who held an in- call His name Jesus. For He shall save His people from equality of Persons, according to what is said (Jn. 14:28): their sins.” Now the remission of sins is attributed to the “The Father is greater than I.” Now this error would not Holy Ghost according to Jn. 20:22,23: “Receive ye the have arisen if the Person of the Father had become incar- Holy Ghost. Whose sins you shall forgive, they are for- nate, for no one would have taken the Father to be less given them.” Therefore it became the Person of the Holy than the Son. Hence it seems fitting that the Person of Ghost rather than the Person of the Son to become incar- the Father, rather than the Person of the Son, should have nate. become incarnate. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. Objection 2. Further, the effect of the Incarnation iii, 1): “In the mystery of the Incarnation the wisdom 2105 and power of God are made known: the wisdom, for He inheritance, which is bestowed only on sons, according found a most suitable discharge for a most heavy debt; the to Rom. 8:17: “If sons, heirs also.” Hence it was fitting power, for He made the conquered conquer.” But power that by Him Who is the natural Son, men should share this and wisdom are appropriated to the Son, according to 1 likeness of sonship by adoption, as the Apostle says in the Cor. 1:24: “Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of same chapter (Rom. 8:29): “For whom He foreknew, He God.” Therefore it was fitting that the Person of the Son also predestinated to be made conformable to the image should become incarnate. of His Son.” I answer that, It was most fitting that the Person of Thirdly, the reason for this fitness may be taken from the Son should become incarnate. First, on the part of the the sin of our first parent, for which the Incarnation sup- union; for such as are similar are fittingly united. Now the plied the remedy. For the first man sinned by seeking Person of the Son, Who is the Word of God, has a certain knowledge, as is plain from the words of the serpent, common agreement with all creatures, because the word promising to man the knowledge of good and evil. Hence of the craftsman, i.e. his concept, is an exemplar likeness it was fitting that by the Word of true knowledge man of whatever is made by him. Hence the Word of God, might be led back to God, having wandered from God Who is His eternal concept, is the exemplar likeness of through an inordinate thirst for knowledge. all creatures. And therefore as creatures are established in Reply to Objection 1. There is nothing which human their proper species, though movably, by the participation malice cannot abuse, since it even abuses God’s goodness, of this likeness, so by the non-participated and personal according to Rom. 2:4: “Or despisest thou the riches of union of the Word with a creature, it was fitting that the His goodness?” Hence, even if the Person of the Father creature should be restored in order to its eternal and un- had become incarnate, men would have been capable of changeable perfection; for the craftsman by the intelligi- finding an occasion of error, as though the Son were not ble form of his art, whereby he fashioned his handiwork, able to restore human nature. restores it when it has fallen into ruin. Moreover, He has Reply to Objection 2. The first creation of things was a particular agreement with human nature, since the Word made by the power of God the Father through the Word; is a concept of the eternal Wisdom, from Whom all man’s hence the second creation ought to have been brought wisdom is derived. And hence man is perfected in wis- about through the Word, by the power of God the Father, dom (which is his proper perfection, as he is rational) by in order that restoration should correspond to creation ac- participating the Word of God, as the disciple is instructed cording to 2 Cor. 5:19: “For God indeed was in Christ by receiving the word of his master. Hence it is said (Ec- reconciling the world to Himself.” clus. 1:5): “The Word of God on high is the fountain of Reply to Objection 3. To be the gift of the Father and wisdom.” And hence for the consummate perfection of the Son is proper to the Holy Ghost. But the remission of man it was fitting that the very Word of God should be sins is caused by the Holy Ghost, as by the gift of God. personally united to human nature. And hence it was more fitting to man’s justification that Secondly, the reason of this fitness may be taken from the Son should become incarnate, Whose gift the Holy the end of the union, which is the fulfilling of predesti- Ghost is. nation, i.e. of such as are preordained to the heavenly 2106 THIRD PART, QUESTION 4 Of the Mode of Union On the Part of the Human Nature (In Six Articles) We must now consider the union on the part of what was assumed. About which we must consider first what things were assumed by the Word of God; secondly, what were co-assumed, whether perfections or defects. Now the Son of God assumed human nature and its parts. Hence a threefold consideration arises. First, with regard to the nature; secondly, with regard to its parts; thirdly, with regard to the order of the assumption. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether human nature was more capable of being assumed than any other nature? (2) Whether He assumed a person? (3) Whether He assumed a man? (4) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature abstracted from all individuals? (5) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature in all its individuals? (6) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature in any man begotten of the stock of Adam? Whether human nature was more assumable by the Son of God than any other na-IIIa q. 4 a. 1 ture? Objection 1. It would seem that human nature is not ness in the union of the Son of God with human nature. more capable of being assumed by the Son of God than I answer that, A thing is said to be assumable as be- any other nature. For Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum ing capable of being assumed by a Divine Person, and this cxxxvii): “In deeds wrought miraculously the whole rea- capability cannot be taken with reference to the natural son of the deed is the power of the doer.” Now the power passive power, which does not extend to what transcends of God Who wrought the Incarnation, which is a most the natural order, as the personal union of a creature with miraculous work, is not limited to one nature, since the God transcends it. Hence it follows that a thing is said to power of God is infinite. Therefore human nature is not be assumable according to some fitness for such a union. more capable of being assumed than any other creature. Now this fitness in human nature may be taken from two Objection 2. Further, likeness is the foundation of things, viz. according to its dignity, and according to its the fittingness of the Incarnation of the Divine Person, as need. According to its dignity, because human nature, as above stated (q. 3, a. 8). But as in rational creatures we being rational and intellectual, was made for attaining to find the likeness of image, so in irrational creatures we the Word to some extent by its operation, viz. by know- find the image of trace. Therefore the irrational creature ing and loving Him. According to its need—because it was as capable of assumption as human nature. stood in need of restoration, having fallen under original Objection 3. Further, in the angelic nature we find sin. Now these two things belong to human nature alone. a more perfect likeness than in human nature, as Gregory For in the irrational creature the fitness of dignity is want- says: (Hom. de Cent. Ovib.; xxxiv in Ev.), where he intro- ing, and in the angelic nature the aforesaid fitness of need duces Ezech. 28:12: “Thou wast the seal of resemblance.” is wanting. Hence it follows that only human nature was And sin is found in angels, even as in man, according assumable. to Job 4:18: “And in His angels He found wickedness.” Reply to Objection 1. Creatures are said to be “such” Therefore the angelic nature was as capable of assump- with reference to their proper causes, not with reference to tion as the nature of man. what belongs to them from their first and universal causes; Objection 4. Further, since the highest perfection be- thus we call a disease incurable, not that it cannot be cured longs to God, the more like to God a thing is, the more by God, but that it cannot be cured by the proper princi- perfect it is. But the whole universe is more perfect than ples of the subject. Therefore a creature is said to be not its parts, amongst which is human nature. Therefore the assumable, not as if we withdrew anything from the power whole universe is more capable of being assumed than hu- of God, but in order to show the condition of the creature, man nature. which has no capability for this. On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 8:31) by the mouth Reply to Objection 2. The likeness of image is found of Begotten Wisdom: “My delights were to be with the in human nature, forasmuch as it is capable of God, viz. children of men”; and hence there would seem some fit- by attaining to Him through its own operation of knowl- 2107 edge and love. But the likeness of trace regards only a personality be destroyed, and this does not befit the in-representation by Divine impression, existing in the crea- corruptibility of their nature nor the goodness of the one ture, and does not imply that the irrational creature, in assuming, to Whom it does not belong to corrupt any per- which such a likeness is, can attain to God by its own op- fection in the creature assumed. But this would not seem eration alone. For what does not come up to the less, has totally to disprove the fitness of the angelic nature for be- no fitness for the greater; as a body which is not fitted to ing assumed. For God by producing a new angelic nature be perfected by a sensitive soul is much less fitted for an could join it to Himself in unity of Person, and in this way intellectual soul. Now much greater and more perfect is nothing pre-existing would be corrupted in it. But as was the union with God in personal being than the union by said above, there is wanting the fitness of need, because, operation. And hence the irrational creature which falls although the angelic nature in some is the subject of sin, short of the union with God by operation has no fitness to their sin is irremediable, as stated above ( Ia, q. 64, a. 2). be united with Him in personal being. Reply to Objection 4. The perfection of the universe Reply to Objection 3. Some say that angels are not is not the perfection of one person or suppositum, but of assumable, since they are perfect in their personality from something which is one by position or order, whereof very the beginning of their creation, inasmuch as they are not many parts are not capable of assumption, as was said subject to generation and corruption; hence they cannot above. Hence it follows that only human nature is capable be assumed to the unity of a Divine Person, unless their of being assumed. Whether the Son of God assumed a person? IIIa q. 4 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God as- which case it was useless; or it remains after the union— sumed a person. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. and thus there would be two persons, one assuming and iii, 11) that the Son of God “assumed human nature ‘in the other assumed, which is false, as was shown above atomo,’ ” i.e. in an individual. But an individual in ratio- (q. 2, a. 6). Hence it follows that the Son of God nowise nal nature is a person, as is plain from Boethius (De Duab. assumed a human person. Nat.). Therefore the Son of God assumed a person. Reply to Objection 1. The Son of God assumed hu- Objection 2. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. man nature “in atomo,” i.e. in an individual, which is no iii, 6) that the Son of God “assumed what He had sown in other than the uncreated suppositum, the Person of the our nature.” But He sowed our personality there. There- Son of God. Hence it does not follow that a person was fore the Son of God assumed a person. assumed. Objection 3. Further, nothing is absorbed unless it ex- Reply to Objection 2. Its proper personality is not ist. But Innocent III∗ says in a Decretal that “the Person wanting to the nature assumed through the loss of any- of God absorbed the person of man.” Therefore it would thing pertaining to the perfection of the human nature but seem that the person of man existed previous to its being through the addition of something which is above human assumed. nature, viz. the union with a Divine Person. On the contrary, Augustine† says (De Fide ad Petrum Reply to Objection 3. Absorption does not here im- ii) that “God assumed the nature, not the person, of man.” ply the destruction of anything pre-existing, but the hin- I answer that, A thing is said to be assumed inasmuch dering what might otherwise have been. For if the human as it is taken into another. Hence, what is assumed must be nature had not been assumed by a Divine Person, the hu- presupposed to the assumption, as what is moved locally man nature would have had its own personality; and in is presupposed to the motion. Now a person in human this way is it said, although improperly, that the Person nature is not presupposed to assumption; rather, it is the “absorbed the person,” inasmuch as the Divine Person by term of the assumption, as was said (q. 3, Aa. 1,2). For if it His union hindered the human nature from having its per- were presupposed, it must either have been corrupted—in sonality. Whether the Divine Person assumed a man? IIIa q. 4 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the Divine Person Christ. xi): “The Son of God assumed a man, and in him assumed a man. For it is written (Ps. 64:5): “Blessed is bore things human.” he whom Thou hast chosen and taken to Thee,” which a Objection 2. Further, the word “man” signifies a hu- gloss expounds of Christ; and Augustine says (De Agone man nature. But the Son of God assumed a human nature. ∗ Paschas. Diac., De Spiritu Sanct. ii † Fulgentius 2108 Therefore He assumed a man. said that the Son assumed a man, granted (as it must be, Objection 3. Further, the Son of God is a man. But in fact) that in Christ there is but one suppositum and one He is not one of the men He did not assume, for with equal hypostasis. But according to such as hold that there are reason He would be Peter or any other man. Therefore He two hypostases or two supposita in Christ, it may fittingly is the man whom He assumed. and properly be said that the Son of God assumed a man. On the contrary, Is the authority of Felix, Pope and Hence the first opinion quoted in Sent. iii, D. 6, grants Martyr, which is quoted by the Council of Ephesus: “We that a man was assumed. But this opinion is erroneous, as believe in our Lord Jesus Christ, born of the Virgin Mary, was said above (q. 2, a. 6). because He is the Eternal Son and Word of God, and not Reply to Objection 1. These phrases are not to be a man assumed by God, in such sort that there is another taken too literally, but are to be loyally explained, wher- besides Him. For the Son of God did not assume a man, ever they are used by holy doctors; so as to say that a man so that there be another besides Him.” was assumed, inasmuch as his nature was assumed; and I answer that, As has been said above (a. 2), what is because the assumption terminated in this—that the Son assumed is not the term of the assumption, but is presup- of God is man. posed to the assumption. Now it was said (q. 3, Aa. 1,2) Reply to Objection 2. The word “man” signifies hu- that the individual to Whom the human nature is assumed man nature in the concrete, inasmuch as it is in a supposi- is none other than the Divine Person, Who is the term of tum; and hence, since we cannot say a suppositum was the assumption. Now this word “man” signifies human assumed, so we cannot say a man was assumed. nature, as it is in a suppositum, because, as Damascene Reply to Objection 3. The Son of God is not the says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4,11), this word God signifies Him man whom He assumed, but the man whose nature He Who has human nature. And hence it cannot properly be assumed. Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature abstracted from all IIIa q. 4 a. 4 individuals? Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God ought Therefore the Son of God did not assume human nature, to have assumed human nature abstracted from all indi- as it is separated from individuals. viduals. For the assumption of human nature took place I answer that, The nature of man or of any other sen- for the common salvation of all men; hence it is said of sible thing, beyond the being which it has in individuals, Christ (1 Tim. 4:10) that He is “the Saviour of all men, may be taken in two ways: first, as if it had being of itself, especially of the faithful.” But nature as it is in individ- away from matter, as the Platonists held; secondly, as ex- uals withdraws from its universality. Therefore the Son isting in an intellect either human or Divine. Now it can- of God ought to have assumed human nature as it is ab- not subsist of itself, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. stracted from all individuals. vii, 26,27,29,51), because sensible matter belongs to the Objection 2. Further, what is noblest in all things specific nature of sensible things, and is placed in its defi- ought to be attributed to God. But in every genus what nition, as flesh and bones in the definition of man. Hence is of itself is best. Therefore the Son of God ought to have human nature cannot be without sensible matter. Nev- assumed self-existing [per se] man, which, according to ertheless, if human nature were subsistent in this way, it Platonists, is human nature abstracted from its individu- would not be fitting that it should be assumed by the Word als. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed this. of God. First, because this assumption is terminated in a Objection 3. Further, human nature was not assumed Person, and it is contrary to the nature of a common form by the Son of God in the concrete as is signified by the to be thus individualized in a person. Secondly, because word “man,” as was said above (a. 3). Now in this way to a common nature can only be attributed common and it signifies human nature as it is in individuals, as is plain universal operations, according to which man neither mer- from what has been said (a. 3). Therefore the Son of God its nor demerits, whereas, on the contrary, the assumption assumed human nature as it is separated from individuals. took place in order that the Son of God, having assumed On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, our nature, might merit for us. Thirdly, because a nature 11): “God the Word Incarnate did not assume a nature so existing would not be sensible, but intelligible. But the which exists in pure thought; for this would have been no Son of God assumed human nature in order to show Him- Incarnation, but a false and fictitious Incarnation.” But self in men’s sight, according to Baruch 3:38: “Afterwards human nature as it is separated or abstracted from indi- He was seen upon earth, and conversed with men.” viduals is “taken to be a pure conception, since it does not Likewise, neither could human nature have been as- exist in itself,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11). sumed by the Son of God, as it is in the Divine intellect, 2109 since it would be none other than the Divine Nature; and, the incarnate Son of God is the universal cause of human according to this, human nature would be in the Son of salvation. God from eternity. Neither can we say that the Son of Reply to Objection 2. Self-existing [per se] man is God assumed human nature as it is in a human intellect, not to be found in nature in such a way as to be out- for this would mean nothing else but that He is understood side the singular, as the Platonists held, although some to assume a human nature; and thus if He did not assume it say Plato believed that the separate man was only in the in reality, this would be a false understanding; nor would Divine intellect. And hence it was not necessary for it to this assumption of the human nature be anything but a fic- be assumed by the Word, since it had been with Him from titious Incarnation, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, eternity. 11). Reply to Objection 3. Although human nature was Reply to Objection 1. The incarnate Son of God is the not assumed in the concrete, as if the suppositum were common Saviour of all, not by a generic or specific com- presupposed to the assumption, nevertheless it is assumed munity, such as is attributed to the nature separated from in an individual, since it is assumed so as to be in an indi- the individuals, but by a community of cause, whereby vidual. Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature in all individuals? IIIa q. 4 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God ought if there was no human nature except what was assumed, to have assumed human nature in all individuals. For what it would follow that there was but one suppositum of hu- is assumed first and by itself is human nature. But what man nature, which is the Person assuming. Secondly, be- belongs essentially to a nature belongs to all who exist cause this would have been derogatory to the dignity of in the nature. Therefore it was fitting that human nature the incarnate Son of God, as He is the First-born of many should be assumed by the Word of God in all its supposita. brethren, according to the human nature, even as He is Objection 2. Further, the Divine Incarnation pro- the First-born of all creatures according to the Divine, for ceeded from Divine Love; hence it is written (Jn. 3:16): then all men would be of equal dignity. Thirdly, because “God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten it is fitting that as one Divine suppositum is incarnate, so Son.” But love makes us give ourselves to our friends He should assume one human nature, so that on both sides as much as we can, and it was possible for the Son of God unity might be found. to assume several human natures, as was said above (q. 3, Reply to Objection 1. To be assumed belongs to the a. 7), and with equal reason all. Hence it was fitting for the human nature of itself, because it does not belong to it Son of God to assume human nature in all its supposita. by reason of a person, as it belongs to the Divine Nature Objection 3. Further, a skilful workman completes to assume by reason of the Person; not, however, that it his work in the shortest manner possible. But it would belongs to it of itself as if belonging to its essential prin- have been a shorter way if all men had been assumed to ciples, or as its natural property in which manner it would the natural sonship than for one natural Son to lead many belong to all its supposita. to the adoption of sons, as is written Gal. 4:5 (cf. Heb. Reply to Objection 2. The love of God to men is 2:10). Therefore human nature ought to have been as- shown not merely in the assumption of human nature, but sumed by God in all its supposita. especially in what He suffered in human nature for other On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, men, according to Rom. 5:8: “But God commendeth His 11) that the Son of God “did not assume human nature as charity towards us; because when as yet we were sin- a species, nor did He assume all its hypostases.” ners. . . Christ died for us,” which would not have taken I answer that, It was unfitting for human nature to place had He assumed human nature in all its supposita. be assumed by the Word in all its supposita. First, be- Reply to Objection 3. In order to shorten the way, cause the multitude of supposita of human nature, which which every skilful workman does, what can be done by are natural to it, would have been taken away. For since one must not be done by many. Hence it was most fitting we must not see any other suppositum in the assumed na- that by one man all the rest should be saved. ture, except the Person assuming, as was said above (a. 3), 2110 Whether it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature of the stock of IIIa q. 4 a. 6 Adam? Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting for the stock conquered by the devil. Thirdly, because God’s the Son of God to assume human nature of the stock of power is thereby made more manifest, since, from a cor- Adam, for the Apostle says (Heb. 7:26): “For it was fit- rupt and weakened nature, He assumed that which was ting that we should have such a high priest. . . separated raised to such might and glory. from sinners.” But He would have been still further sep- Reply to Objection 1. Christ ought to be separated arated from sinners had He not assumed human nature of from sinners as regards sin, which He came to overthrow, the stock of Adam, a sinner. Hence it seems that He ought and not as regards nature which He came to save, and in not to have assumed human nature of the stock of Adam. which “it behooved Him in all things to be made like to Objection 2. Further, in every genus the principle His brethren,” as the Apostle says (Heb. 2:17). And in this is nobler than what is from the principle. Hence, if He is His innocence the more wonderful, seeing that though wished to assume human nature, He ought to have as- assumed from a mass tainted by sin, His nature was en- sumed it in Adam himself. dowed with such purity. Objection 3. Further, the Gentiles were greater sin- Reply to Objection 2. As was said above (ad 1) it be- ners than the Jews, as a gloss says on Gal. 2:15: “For hooved Him Who came to take away sins to be separated we by nature are Jews, and not of the Gentiles, sinners.” from sinners as regards sin, to which Adam was subject, Hence, if He wished to assume human nature from sin- whom Christ “brought out of his sin,” as is written (Wis. ners, He ought rather to have assumed it from the Gentiles 10:2). For it behooved Him Who came to cleanse all, not than from the stock of Abraham, who was just. to need cleansing Himself; just as in every genus of mo- On the contrary, (Lk. 3), the genealogy of our Lord tion the first mover is immovable as regards that motion, is traced back to Adam. and the first to alter is itself unalterable. Hence it was I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 18): not fitting that He should assume human nature in Adam “God was able to assume human nature elsewhere than himself. from the stock of Adam, who by his sin had fettered the Reply to Objection 3. Since Christ ought especially whole human race; yet God judged it better to assume to be separated from sinners as regards sin, and to pos- human nature from the vanquished race, and thus to van- sess the highest innocence, it was fitting that between the quish the enemy of the human race.” And this for three first sinner and Christ some just men should stand mid- reasons: First, because it would seem to belong to jus- way, in whom certain forecasts of (His) future holiness tice that he who sinned should make amends; and hence should shine forth. And hence, even in the people from that from the nature which he had corrupted should be as- whom Christ was to be born, God appointed signs of ho- sumed that whereby satisfaction was to be made for the liness, which began in Abraham, who was the first to re- whole nature. Secondly, it pertains to man’s greater dig- ceive the promise of Christ, and circumcision, as a sign nity that the conqueror of the devil should spring from that the covenant should be kept, as is written (Gn. 17:11). 2111 THIRD PART, QUESTION 5 Of the Parts of Human Nature Which Were Assumed (In Four Articles) We must now consider the assumption of the parts of human nature; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body? (2) Whether He ought to have assumed an earthly body, i.e. one of flesh and blood? (3) Whether He ought to have assumed a soul? (4) Whether He ought to have assumed an intellect? Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body? IIIa q. 5 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God did is taken from the dignity of the Person assuming, Whom not assume a true body. For it is written (Phil. 2:7), it did not become to have anything fictitious in His work, that He was “made in the likeness of men.” But what is since He is the Truth. Hence our Lord Himself deigned to something in truth is not said to be in the likeness thereof. refute this error (Lk. 24:37,39), when the disciples, “trou- Therefore the Son of God did not assume a true body. bled and frighted, supposed that they saw a spirit,” and not Objection 2. Further, the assumption of a body in no a true body; wherefore He offered Himself to their touch, way diminishes the dignity of the Godhead; for Pope Leo saying: “Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and says (Serm. de Nativ.) that “the glorification did not ab- bones, as you see Me to have.” sorb the lesser nature, nor did the assumption lessen the Reply to Objection 1. This likeness indicates the higher.” But it pertains to the dignity of God to be alto- truth of the human nature in Christ—just as all that truly gether separated from bodies. Therefore it seems that by exist in human nature are said to be like in species—and the assumption God was not united to a body. not a mere imaginary likeness. In proof of this the Apostle Objection 3. Further, signs ought to correspond to the subjoins (Phil. 2:8) that He became “obedient unto death, realities. But the apparitions of the Old Testament which even to the death of the cross”; which would have been were signs of the manifestation of Christ were not in a real impossible, had it been only an imaginary likeness. body, but by visions in the imagination, as is plain from Is. Reply to Objection 2. By assuming a true body the 60:1: “I saw the Lord sitting,” etc. Hence it would seem dignity of the Son of God is nowise lessened. Hence Au- that the apparition of the Son of God in the world was not gustine∗ says (De Fide ad Petrum ii): “He emptied Him- in a real body, but only in imagination. self, taking the form of a servant, that He might become On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. a servant; yet did He not lose the fulness of the form of 13): “If the body of Christ was a phantom, Christ deceived God.” For the Son of God assumed a true body, not so as us, and if He deceived us, He is not the Truth. But Christ is to become the form of a body, which is repugnant to the the Truth. Therefore His body was not a phantom.” Hence Divine simplicity and purity—for this would be to assume it is plain that He assumed a true body. a body to the unity of the nature, which is impossible, as I answer that, As is said (De Eccles. Dogm. ii). The is plain from what has been stated above (q. 2, a. 1): but, Son of God was not born in appearance only, as if He had the natures remaining distinct, He assumed a body to the an imaginary body; but His body was real. The proof of unity of Person. this is threefold. First, from the essence of human nature Reply to Objection 3. The figure ought to corre- to which it pertains to have a true body. Therefore granted, spond to the reality as regards the likeness and not as re- as already proved (q. 4, a. 1), that it was fitting for the Son gards the truth of the thing. For if they were alike in all of God to assume human nature, He must consequently points, it would no longer be a likeness but the reality it- have assumed a real body. The second reason is taken self, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26). Hence it from what was done in the mystery of the Incarnation. was more fitting that the apparitions of the old Testament For if His body was not real but imaginary, He neither un- should be in appearance only, being figures; and that the derwent a real death, nor of those things which the Evan- apparition of the Son of God in the world should be in gelists recount of Him, did He do any in very truth, but a real body, being the thing prefigured by these figures. only in appearance; and hence it would also follow that Hence the Apostle says (Col. 2:17): “Which are a shadow the real salvation of man has not taken place; since the ef- of things to come, but the body is Christ’s.” fect must be proportionate to the cause. The third reason ∗ Fulgentius 2112 Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a carnal or earthly body? IIIa q. 5 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ had not a car- from God’s truthfulness. For since the Son of God showed nal or earthly, but a heavenly body. For the Apostle says (1 Himself to men, as if He had a carnal and earthly body, the Cor. 15:41): “The first man was of the earth, earthy; the manifestation would have been false, had He had a heav- second man from heaven, heavenly.” But the first man, enly body. Hence (De Eccles. Dogm. ii) it is said: “The i.e. Adam, was of the earth as regards his body, as is plain Son of God was born, taking flesh of the Virgin’s body, from Gn. 1. Therefore the second man, i.e. Christ, was of and not bringing it with Him from heaven.” heaven as regards the body. Reply to Objection 1. Christ is said in two ways to Objection 2. Further, it is said (1 Cor. 15:50): “Flesh have come down from heaven. First, as regards His Di- and blood shall not [Vulg.: ‘cannot’] possess the kingdom vine Nature; not indeed that the Divine Nature ceased to of God.” But the kingdom of God is in Christ chiefly. be in heaven, but inasmuch as He began to be here below Therefore there is no flesh or blood in Him, but rather a in a new way, viz. by His assumed. nature, according heavenly body. to Jn. 3:13: “No man hath ascended into heaven, but He Objection 3. Further, whatever is best is to be at- that descended from heaven, the Son of Man, Who is in tributed to God. But of all bodies a heavenly body is the heaven.” best. Therefore it behooved Christ to assume such a body. Secondly, as regards His body, not indeed that the very On the contrary, our Lord says (Lk. 24:39): “A spirit substance of the body of Christ descended from heaven, hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have.” Now but that His body was formed by a heavenly power, i.e. flesh and bones are not of the matter of heavenly bodies, by the Holy Ghost. Hence Augustine, explaining the pas- but are composed of the inferior elements. Therefore the sage quoted, says (Ad Orosium∗): “I call Christ a heav- body of Christ was not a heavenly, but a carnal and earthly enly man because He was not conceived of human seed.” body. And Hilary expounds it in the same way (De Trin. x). I answer that, By the reasons which proved that the Reply to Objection 2. Flesh and blood are not taken body of Christ was not an imaginary one, it may also be here for the substance of flesh and blood, but for the cor- shown that it was not a heavenly body. First, because even ruption of flesh, which was not in Christ as far as it was as the truth of the human nature of Christ would not have sinful; but as far as it was a punishment; thus, for a time, been maintained had His body been an imaginary one, it was in Christ, that He might carry through the work of such as Manes supposed, so likewise it would not have our redemption. been maintained if we supposed, as did Valentine, that it Reply to Objection 3. It pertains to the greatest glory was a heavenly body. For since the form of man is a nat- of God to have raised a weak and earthly body to such ural thing, it requires determinate matter, to wit, flesh and sublimity. Hence in the General Council of Ephesus (P. bones, which must be placed in the definition of man, as II, Act. I) we read the saying of St. Theophilus: “Just as is plain from the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 39). Secondly, the best workmen are esteemed not merely for displaying because this would lessen the truth of such things as Christ their skill in precious materials, but very often because did in the body. For since a heavenly body is impassible by making use of the poorest. . . lay and commonest earth, and incorruptible, as is proved De Coel. i, 20, if the Son they show the power of their craft; so the best of all work- of God had assumed a heavenly body, He would not have men, the Word of God, did not come down to us by tak- truly hungered or thirsted, nor would he have undergone ing a heavenly body of some most precious matter, but His passion and death. Thirdly, this would have detracted shewed the greatness of His skill in clay.” Whether the Son of God assumed a soul? IIIa q. 5 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God did body of Christ, as it would seem, for of the Word of God not assume a soul. For John has said, teaching the mys- it is written (Ps. 35:10): Lord, “with Thee is the fountain tery of the Incarnation (Jn. 1:14): “The Word was made of life.” Therefore it would seem altogether superfluous flesh”—no mention being made of a soul. Now it is not for the soul to be there, when the Word was present. But said that “the Word was made flesh” as if changed to flesh, “God and nature do nothing uselessly,” as the Philosopher but because He assumed flesh. Therefore He seems not to says (De Coel. i, 32; ii, 56). Therefore the Word would have assumed a soul. seem not to have assumed a soul. Objection 2. Further, a soul is necessary to the body, Objection 3. Further, by the union of soul and body in order to quicken it. But this was not necessary for the is constituted the common nature, which is the human ∗ Dial. Qq. lxv, qu. 4, work of an unknown author 2113 species. But “in the Lord Jesus Christ we are not to look given to merit. Is He to be considered to understand the for a common species,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. cause of the soul, Who seeks to separate it from the sin iii, 3). Therefore He did not assume a soul. of wilful transgression, enabled as it is to receive the law On the contrary, Augustine says (De Agone Christ. by the endowment of the habit of reason? Or how can His xxi): “Let us not hearken to such as say that only a hu- generosity be known to any one who says it was despised man body was assumed by the Word of God; and take on account of its ignoble sinfulness? If you look at its ‘the Word was made flesh’ to mean that the man had no origin, the substance of the soul is more precious than the soul nor any other part of a man, save flesh.” body: but if at the sin of transgression, on account of its I answer that, As Augustine says (De Haeres. 69,55), intelligence it is worse than the body. Now I know and de- it was first of all the opinion of Arius and then of Apol- clare that Christ is perfect wisdom, nor have I any doubt linaris that the Son of God assumed only flesh, without a that He is most loving; and because of the first of these He soul, holding that the Word took the place of a soul to the did not despise what was better and more capable of pru- body. And consequently it followed that there were not dence; and because of the second He protected what was two natures in Christ, but only one; for from a soul and most wounded.” Thirdly, this position is against the truth body one human nature is constituted. But this opinion of the Incarnation. For flesh and the other parts of man cannot hold, for three reasons. First, because it is counter receive their species through the soul. Hence, if the soul to the authority of Scripture, in which our Lord makes is absent, there are no bones nor flesh, except equivocally, mention of His soul, Mat. 26:38: “My soul is sorrow- as is plain from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9; Metaph. ful even unto death”; and Jn. 10:18: “I have power to vii, 34). lay down My soul [animam meam: Douay: ‘My life’].” Reply to Objection 1. When we say, “The Word was But to this Apollinaris replied that in these words soul is made flesh,” “flesh” is taken for the whole man, as if we taken metaphorically, in which way mention is made in were to say, “The Word was made man,” as Is. 40:5: the Old Testament of the soul of God (Is. 1:14): “My soul “All flesh together shall see that the mouth of the Lord hateth your new moons and your solemnities.” But, as hath spoken.” And the whole man is signified by flesh, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80), the Evangelists re- because, as is said in the authority quoted, the Son of late how Jesus wondered, was angered, sad, and hungry. God became visible by flesh; hence it is subjoined: “And Now these show that He had a true soul, just as that He we saw His glory.” Or because, as Augustine says (Qq. ate, slept and was weary shows that He had a true human lxxxiii, qu. 80), “in all that union the Word is the highest, body: otherwise, if these things are a metaphor, because and flesh the last and lowest. Hence, wishing to commend the like are said of God in the Old Testament, the trust- the love of God’s humility to us, the Evangelist mentioned worthiness of the Gospel story is undermined. For it is the Word and flesh, leaving the soul on one side, since it one thing that things were foretold in a figure, and an- is less than the Word and nobler than flesh.” Again, it was other that historical events were related in very truth by reasonable to mention flesh, which, as being farther away the Evangelists. Secondly, this error lessens the utility of from the Word, was less assumable, as it would seem. the Incarnation, which is man’s liberation. For Augus- Reply to Objection 2. The Word is the fountain of tine∗ argues thus (Contra Felician. xiii): “If the Son of life, as the first effective cause of life; but the soul is the God in taking flesh passed over the soul, either He knew principle of the life of the body, as its form. Now the form its sinlessness, and trusted it did not need a remedy; or is the effect of the agent. Hence from the presence of the He considered it unsuitable to Him, and did not bestow Word it might rather have been concluded that the body on it the boon of redemption; or He reckoned it altogether was animated, just as from the presence of fire it may be incurable, and was unable to heal it; or He cast it off as concluded that the body, in which fire adheres, is warm. worthless and seemingly unfit for any use. Now two of Reply to Objection 3. It is not unfitting, indeed it these reasons imply a blasphemy against God. For how is necessary to say that in Christ there was a nature which shall we call Him omnipotent, if He is unable to heal what was constituted by the soul coming to the body. But Dam- is beyond hope? Or God of all, if He has not made our ascene denied that in Jesus Christ there was a common soul. And as regards the other two reasons, in one the species, i.e. a third something resulting from the Godhead cause of the soul is ignored, and in the other no place is and the humanity. ∗ Vigilius Tapsensis 2114 Whether the Son of God assumed a human mind or intellect? IIIa q. 5 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God did as is said Metaph. i, 2. Secondly, it is inconsistent with not assume a human mind or intellect. For where a thing the purpose of the Incarnation, which is the justification is present, its image is not required. But man is made to of man from sin. For the human soul is not capable of sin God’s image, as regards his mind, as Augustine says (De nor of justifying grace except through the mind. Hence Trin. xiv, 3,6). Hence, since in Christ there was the pres- it was especially necessary for the mind to be assumed. ence of the Divine Word itself, there was no need of a Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that “the human mind. Word of God assumed a body and an intellectual and ratio- Objection 2. Further, the greater light dims the lesser. nal soul,” and adds afterwards: “The whole was united to But the Word of God, Who is “the light, which enlight- the whole, that He might bestow salvation on me wholly; eneth every man that cometh into this world,” as is written for what was not assumed is not curable.” Thirdly, it is Jn. 1:9, is compared to the mind as the greater light to the against the truth of the Incarnation. For since the body is lesser; since our mind is a light, being as it were a lamp proportioned to the soul as matter to its proper form, it is enkindled by the First Light (Prov. 20:27): “The spirit of not truly human flesh if it is not perfected by human, i.e. a man is the lamp of the Lord.” Therefore in Christ Who a rational soul. And hence if Christ had had a soul with- is the Word of God, there is no need of a human mind. out a mind, He would not have had true human flesh, but Objection 3. Further, the assumption of human na- irrational flesh, since our soul differs from an animal soul ture by the Word of God is called His Incarnation. But by the mind alone. Hence Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, the intellect or human mind is nothing carnal, either in its qu. 80) that from this error it would have followed that substance or in its act. for it is not the act of a body, as is the Son of God “took an animal with the form of a human proved De Anima iii, 6. Hence it would seem that the Son body,” which, again, is against the Divine truth, which of God did not assume a human mind. cannot suffer any fictitious untruth. On the contrary, Augustine∗ says (De Fide ad Petrum Reply to Objection 1. Where a thing is by its pres- xiv): “Firmly hold and nowise doubt that Christ the Son of ence, its image is not required to supply the place of the God has true flesh and a rational soul of the same kind as thing, as where the emperor is the soldiers do not pay ours, since of His flesh He says (Lk. 24:39): ‘Handle, and homage to his image. Yet the image of a thing is required see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me together with its presence, that it may be perfected by the to have.’ And He proves that He has a soul, saying (Jn. presence of the thing, just as the image in the wax is per- 10:17): ‘I lay down My soul [Douay: ‘life’] that I may fected by the impression of the seal, and as the image of take it again.’ And He proves that He has an intellect, say- man is reflected in the mirror by his presence. Hence in ing (Mat. 11:29): ‘Learn of Me, because I am meek and order to perfect the human mind it was necessary that the humble of heart.’ And God says of Him by the prophet Word should unite it to Himself. (Is. 52:13): ‘Behold my servant shall understand.’ ” Reply to Objection 2. The greater light dims the I answer that, As Augustine says (De Haeres. 49,50), lesser light of another luminous body; but it does not dim, “the Apollinarists thought differently from the Catholic rather it perfects the light of the body illuminated—at the Church concerning the soul of Christ, saying with the Ar- presence of the sun the light of the stars is put out, but the ians, that Christ took flesh alone, without a soul; and on light of the air is perfected. Now the intellect or mind of being overcome on this point by the Gospel witness, they man is, as it were, a light lit up by the light of the Divine went on to say that the mind was wanting to Christ’s soul, Word; and hence by the presence of the Word the mind of but that the Word supplied its place.” But this position man is perfected rather than overshadowed. is refuted by the same arguments as the preceding. First, Reply to Objection 3. Although the intellective because it runs counter to the Gospel story, which relates power is not the act of a body, nevertheless the essence how He marveled (as is plain from Mat. 8:10). Now mar- of the human soul, which is the form of the body, requires veling cannot be without reason, since it implies the col- that it should be more noble, in order that it may have the lation of effect and cause, i.e. inasmuch as when we see power of understanding; and hence it is necessary that a an effect and are ignorant of its cause, we seek to know it, better disposed body should correspond to it. ∗ Fulgentius 2115 THIRD PART, QUESTION 6 Of the Order of Assumption (In Six Articles) We must now consider the order of the foregoing assumption, and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul? (2) Whether He assumed the soul through the medium of the spirit or mind? (3) Whether the soul was assumed previous to the flesh? (4) Whether the flesh of Christ was assumed by the Word previous to being united to the soul? (5) Whether the whole human nature was assumed through the medium of the parts? (6) Whether it was assumed through the medium of grace? Whether the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul? IIIa q. 6 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God did taken in two ways: first, as regards rank of dignity, as we not assume flesh through the medium of the soul. For the say the angels are midway between man and God; sec- mode in which the Son of God is united to human nature ondly, as regards the idea of causality, as we say a cause and its parts, is more perfect than the mode whereby He is midway between the first cause and the last effect. And is in all creatures. But He is in all creatures immediately this second order follows the first to some extent; for as by essence, power and presence. Much more, therefore, is Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiii), God acts upon the more the Son of God united to flesh without the medium of the remote substances through the less remote. Hence if we soul. consider the rank of dignity, the soul is found to be mid- Objection 2. Further, the soul and flesh are united to way between God and flesh; and in this way it may be said the Word of God in unity of hypostasis or person. But that the Son of God united flesh to Himself, through the the body pertains immediately to the human hypostasis or medium of the soul. But even as regards the second order person, even as the soul. Indeed, the human body, since of causality the soul is to some extent the cause of flesh it is matter, would rather seem to be nearer the hyposta- being united to the Son of God. For the flesh would not sis than the soul, which is a form, since the principle of have been assumable, except by its relation to the rational individuation, which is implied in the word “hypostasis,” soul, through which it becomes human flesh. For it was would seem to be matter. Hence the Son of God did not said above (q. 4, a. 1) that human nature was assumable assume flesh through the medium of the soul. before all others. Objection 3. Further, take away the medium and you Reply to Objection 1. We may consider a twofold or- separate what were joined by the medium; for example, der between creatures and God: the first is by reason of if the superficies be removed color would leave the body, creatures being caused by God and depending on Him as since it adheres to the body through the medium of the on the principle of their being; and thus on account of the superficies. But though the soul was separated from the infinitude of His power God touches each thing immedi- body by death, yet there still remained the union of the ately, by causing and preserving it, and so it is that God is Word to the flesh, as will be shown (q. 50, Aa. 2,3). Hence in all things by essence, presence and power. But the sec- the Word was not joined to flesh through the medium of ond order is by reason of things being directed to God as the soul. to their end; and it is here that there is a medium between On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum the creature and God, since lower creatures are directed cxxxvi): “The greatness of the Divine power fitted to it- to God by higher, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v); and self a rational soul, and through it a human body, so as to to this order pertains the assumption of human nature by raise the whole man to something higher.” the Word of God, Who is the term of the assumption; and I answer that, A medium is in reference to a begin- hence it is united to flesh through the soul. ning and an end. Hence as beginning and end imply or- Reply to Objection 2. If the hypostasis of the Word der, so also does a medium. Now there is a twofold or- of God were constituted simply by human nature, it would der: one, of time; the other, of nature. But in the mystery follow that the body was nearest to it, since it is matter of the Incarnation nothing is said to be a medium in the which is the principle of individuation; even as the soul, order of time, for the Word of God united the whole hu- being the specific form, would be nearer the human na- man nature to Himself at the same time, as will appear ture. But because the hypostasis of the Word is prior to (q. 30, a. 3). An order of nature between things may be and more exalted than the human nature, the more exalted 2116 any part of the human nature is, the nearer it is to the hy-when it is in being it no longer depends on it, just as a postasis of the Word. And hence the soul is nearer the friendship brought about by some other may endure when Word of God than the body is. the latter has gone; or as a woman is taken in marriage on Reply to Objection 3. Nothing prevents one thing account of her beauty, which makes a woman’s fittingness being the cause of the aptitude and congruity of another, for the marriage tie, yet when her beauty passes away, the and yet if it be taken away the other remains; because al- marriage tie still remains. So likewise, when the soul was though a thing’s becoming may depend on another, yet separated, the union of the Word with flesh still endured. Whether the Son of God assumed a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind? IIIa q. 6 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God did intellect, which is called the spirit, if we compare it with not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit or the other parts of the soul. For the soul is assumed congru- mind. For nothing is a medium between itself and an- ously only inasmuch as it has a capacity for God, being in other. But the spirit is nothing else in essence but the soul His likeness: which is in respect of the mind that is called itself, as was said above ( Ia, q. 77, a. 1, ad 1). Therefore the spirit, according to Eph. 4:23: “Be renewed in the the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium spirit of your mind.” So, too, the intellect is the highest of the spirit or mind. and noblest of the parts of the soul, and the most like to Objection 2. Further, what is the medium of the as- God, and hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that sumption is itself more assumable. But the spirit or mind “the Word of God is united to flesh through the medium is not more assumable than the soul; which is plain from of the intellect; for the intellect is the purest part of the the fact that angelic spirits are not assumable, as was said soul, God Himself being an intellect.” above (q. 4, a. 1). Hence it seems that the Son of God did Reply to Objection 1. Although the intellect is not not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit. distinct from the soul in essence, it is distinct from the Objection 3. Further, that which comes later is as- other parts of the soul as a power; and it is in this way that sumed by the first through the medium of what comes be- it has the nature of a medium. fore. But the soul implies the very essence, which nat- Reply to Objection 2. Fitness for assumption is want- urally comes before its power—the mind. Therefore it ing to the angelic spirits, not from any lack of dignity, but would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul because of the irremediableness of their fall, which cannot through the medium of the spirit or mind. be said of the human spirit, as is clear from what has been On the contrary, Augustine says (De Agone Christ. said above ( Ia, q. 62, a. 8; Ia, q. 64, a. 2). xviii): “The invisible and unchangeable Truth took a soul Reply to Objection 3. The soul, between which and by means of the spirit, and a body by means of the soul.” the Word of God the intellect is said to be a medium, does I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the Son of God not stand for the essence of the soul, which is common to is said to have assumed flesh through the medium of the all the powers, but for the lower powers, which are com- soul, on account of the order of dignity, and the congruity mon to every soul. of the assumption. Now both these may be applied to the Whether the soul was assumed before the flesh by the Son of God? IIIa q. 6 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ of Christ ever had any hypostasis save the hypostasis of was assumed before the flesh by the Word. For the Son the Word.” Therefore it would seem that the soul was as- of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul, as sumed before the flesh, which was conceived in the womb was said above (a. 1). Now the medium is reached be- of the Virgin. fore the end. Therefore the Son of God assumed the soul Objection 3. Further, it is written (Jn. 1:14): “We before the body. saw Him [Vulg.: ‘His glory’] full of grace and truth,” Objection 2. Further, the soul of Christ is nobler than and it is added afterwards that “of His fulness we have the angels, according to Ps. 96:8: “Adore Him, all you all received” (Jn. 1:16), i.e. all the faithful of all time, His angels.” But the angels were created in the beginning, as Chrysostom expounds it (Hom. xiii in Joan.). Now as was said above ( Ia, q. 46, a. 3). Therefore the soul of this could not have been unless the soul of Christ had all Christ also (was created in the beginning). But it was not fulness of grace and truth before all the saints, who were created before it was assumed, for Damascene says (De from the beginning of the world, for the cause is not sub- Fide Orth. iii, 2,3,9), that “neither the soul nor the body sequent to the effect. Hence since the fulness of grace and 2117 truth was in the soul of Christ from union with the Word, flesh with the Word, in the order of nature; but it does not according to what is written in the same place: “We saw follow from this that it was the medium in the order of His glory, the glory as it were of the Only-begotten of the time. Father, full of grace and truth,” it would seem in conse- Reply to Objection 2. As Pope Leo says in the same quence that from the beginning of the world the soul of Epistle, Christ’s soul excels our soul “not by diversity of Christ was assumed by the Word of God. genus, but by sublimity of power”; for it is of the same On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, genus as our souls, yet excels even the angels in “fulness 6): “The intellect was not, as some untruthfully say, united of grace and truth.” But the mode of creation is in har- to the true God, and henceforth called Christ, before the mony with the generic property of the soul; and since it is Incarnation which was of the Virgin.” the form of the body, it is consequently created at the same I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon i, 7,8; ii, 8) main- time that it is infused into and united with the body; which tained that all souls, amongst which he placed Christ’s does not happen to angels, since they are substances en- soul, were created in the beginning. But this is not fit- tirely free from matter. ting, if we suppose that it was first of all created, but not Reply to Objection 3. Of the fulness of Christ all at once joined to the Word, since it would follow that this men receive according to the faith they have in Him; for soul once had its proper subsistence without the Word; it is written (Rom. 3:22) that “the justice of God is by and thus, since it was assumed by the Word, either the faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that be- union did not take place in the subsistence, or the pre- lieve in Him.” Now just as we believe in Him as already existing subsistence of the soul was corrupted. So like- born; so the ancients believed in Him as about to be born, wise it is not fitting to suppose that this soul was united since “having the same spirit of faith. . . we also believe,” to the Word from the beginning, and that it afterwards be- as it is written (2 Cor. 4:13). But the faith which is in came incarnate in the womb of the Virgin; for thus His Christ has the power of justifying by reason of the pur- soul would not seem to be of the same nature as ours, pose of the grace of God, according to Rom. 4:5: “But to which are created at the same time that they are infused him that worketh not, yet believeth in Him that justifieth into bodies. Hence Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Julian. xxxv) the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice according to the that “Christ’s flesh was not of a different nature to ours, purpose of the grace of God.” Hence because this purpose nor was a different soul infused into it in the beginning is eternal, there is nothing to hinder some from being jus- than into other men.” tified by the faith of Jesus Christ, even before His soul was Reply to Objection 1. As was said above (a. 1), the full of grace and truth. soul of Christ is said to be the medium in the union of the Whether the flesh of Christ was assumed by the Word before being united to the soul? IIIa q. 6 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the flesh of Christ Word before being united to the soul. was assumed by the Word before being united to the soul. Objection 3. Further, as is said (De Causis), the first For Augustine∗ says (De Fide ad Petrum xviii): “Most cause excels the second in bringing about the effect, and firmly hold, and nowise doubt that the flesh of Christ was precedes it in its union with the effect. But the soul of not conceived in the womb of the Virgin without the God- Christ is compared to the Word as a second cause to a head before it was assumed by the Word.” But the flesh first. Hence the Word was united to the flesh before it was of Christ would seem to have been conceived before being to the soul. united to the rational soul, because matter or disposition is On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, prior to the completive form in order of generation. There- 2): “At the same time the Word of God was made flesh, fore the flesh of Christ was assumed before being united and flesh was united to a rational and intellectual soul.” to the soul. Therefore the union of the Word with the flesh did not Objection 2. Further, as the soul is a part of human precede the union with the soul. nature, so is the body. But the human soul in Christ had no I answer that, The human flesh is assumable by the other principle of being than in other men, as is clear from Word on account of the order which it has to the rational the authority of Pope Leo, quoted above (a. 3 ). Therefore soul as to its proper form. Now it has not this order before it would seem that the body of Christ had no other princi- the rational soul comes to it, because when any matter be- ple of being than we have. But in us the body is begotten comes proper to any form, at the same time it receives that before the rational soul comes to it. Therefore it was the form; hence the alteration is terminated at the same instant same in Christ; and thus the flesh was assumed by the in which the substantial form is introduced. And hence it ∗ Fulgentius 2118 is that the flesh ought not to have been assumed before the dissimilarity between our origin and Christ’s origin, it was human flesh; and this happened when the rational inasmuch as we are conceived before being animated, and soul came to it. Therefore since the soul was not assumed Christ’s flesh is not, is by reason of what precedes the per- before the flesh, inasmuch as it is against the nature of fection of the nature, viz. that we are conceived from the the soul to be before it is united to the body, so likewise seed of man, and Christ is not. But a difference which the flesh ought not to have been assumed before the soul, would be with reference to the origin of the soul, would since it is not human flesh before it has a rational soul. bespeak a diversity of nature. Reply to Objection 1. Human flesh depends upon Reply to Objection 3. The Word of God is understood the soul for its being; and hence, before the coming of to be united to the flesh before the soul by the common the soul, there is no human flesh, but there may be a dis- mode whereby He is in the rest of creatures by essence, position towards human flesh. Yet in the conception of power, and presence. Yet I say “before,” not in time, but Christ, the Holy Ghost, Who is an agent of infinite might, in nature; for the flesh is understood as a being, which it disposed the matter and brought it to its perfection at the has from the Word, before it is understood as animated, same time. which it has from the soul. But by the personal union we Reply to Objection 2. The form actually gives the understand the flesh as united to the soul before it is united species; but the matter in itself is in potentiality to the to the Word, for it is from its union with the soul that it is species. And hence it would be against the nature of a capable of being united to the Word in Person; especially form to exist before the specific nature. And therefore since a person is found only in the rational nature Whether the whole human nature was assumed through the medium of the parts? IIIa q. 6 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God as- time in order to constitute the human nature of the Word. sumed the whole human nature through the medium of its But it is order of nature that is signified. Hence by what parts. For Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xviii) that is prior in nature, that is assumed which is posterior in na- “the invisible and unchangeable Truth assumed the soul ture. Now a thing is prior in nature in two ways: First on through the medium of the spirit, and the body through the part of the agent, secondly on the part of the matter; the medium of the soul, and in this way the whole man.” for these two causes precede the thing. On the part of the But the spirit, soul, and body are parts of the whole man. agent—that is simply first, which is first included in his Therefore He assumed all, through the medium of the intention; but that is relatively first, with which his opera- parts. tion begins—and this because the intention is prior to the Objection 2. Further, the Son of God assumed flesh operation. On the part of the matter—that is first which through the medium of the soul because the soul is more exists first in the transmutation of the matter. Now in the like to God than the body. But the parts of human nature, Incarnation the order depending on the agent must be par- since they are simpler than the body, would seem to be ticularly considered, because, as Augustine says (Ep. ad more like to God, Who is most simple, than the whole. Volusianum cxxxvii), “in such things the whole reason of Therefore He assumed the whole through the medium of the deed is the power of the doer.” But it is manifest that, the parts. according to the intention of the doer, what is complete is Objection 3. Further, the whole results from the union prior to what is incomplete, and, consequently, the whole of parts. But the union is taken to be the term of the as- to the parts. Hence it must be said that the Word of God sumption, and the parts are presupposed to the assump- assumed the parts of human nature, through the medium tion. Therefore He assumed the whole by the parts. of the whole; for even as He assumed the body on account On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, of its relation to the rational soul, so likewise He assumed 16): “In our Lord Jesus Christ we do not behold parts of a body and soul on account of their relation to human na- parts, but such as are immediately joined, i.e. the God- ture. head and the manhood.” Now the humanity is a whole, Reply to Objection 1. From these words nothing may which is composed of soul and body, as parts. Therefore be gathered, except that the Word, by assuming the parts the Son of God assumed the parts through the medium of of human nature, assumed the whole human nature. And the whole. thus the assumption of parts is prior in the order of the I answer that, When anything is said to be a medium intellect, if we consider the operation, but not in order of in the assumption of the Incarnation, we do not signify or- time; whereas the assumption of the nature is prior if we der of time, because the assumption of the whole and the consider the intention: and this is to be simply first, as was parts was simultaneous. For it has been shown (Aa. 3 ,4) said above. that the soul and body were mutually united at the same Reply to Objection 2. God is so simple that He is 2119 also most perfect; and hence the whole is more like to the assumption is terminated, not a union of nature, which God than the parts, inasmuch as it is more perfect. springs from a conjunction of parts. Reply to Objection 3. It is a personal union wherein Whether the human nature was assumed through the medium of grace? IIIa q. 6 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God as- the habitual grace pertaining to the spiritual holiness of sumed human nature through the medium of grace. For the man is an effect following the union, according to by grace we are united to God. But the human nature Jn. 1:14: “We saw His glory. . . as it were of the Only- in Christ was most closely united to God. Therefore the begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth”—by which union took place by grace. we are given to understand that because this Man (as a re- Objection 2. Further, as the body lives by the soul, sult of the union) is the Only-begotten of the Father, He which is its perfection, so does the soul by grace. But the is full of grace and truth. But if by grace we understand human nature was fitted for the assumption by the soul. the will of God doing or bestowing something gratis, the Therefore the Son of God assumed the soul through the union took place by grace, not as a means, but as the effi- medium of grace. cient cause. Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, Reply to Objection 1. Our union with God is by oper- 11) that the incarnate Word is like our spoken word. But ation, inasmuch as we know and love Him; and hence this our word is united to our speech by means of “breathing” union is by habitual grace, inasmuch as a perfect opera- [spiritus]. Therefore the Word of God is united to flesh by tion proceeds from a habit. Now the union of the human means of the Holy Spirit, and hence by means of grace, nature with the Word of God is in personal being, which which is attributed to the Holy Spirit, according to 1 Cor. depends not on any habit, but on the nature itself. 12:4: “Now there are diversities of graces, but the same Reply to Objection 2. The soul is the substantial per- Spirit.” fection of the body; grace is but an accidental perfection On the contrary, Grace is an accident in the soul, as of the soul. Hence grace cannot ordain the soul to per- was shown above ( Ia IIae, q. 110, a. 2). Now the union sonal union, which is not accidental, as the soul ordains of the Word with human nature took place in the subsis- the body. tence, and not accidentally, as was shown above (q. 2, Reply to Objection 3. Our word is united to our a. 6). Therefore the human nature was not assumed by speech, by means of breathing [spiritus], not as a formal means of grace. medium, but as a moving medium. For from the word I answer that, In Christ there was the grace of union conceived within, the breathing proceeds, from which the and habitual grace. Therefore grace cannot be taken to speech is formed. And similarly from the eternal Word be the medium of the assumption of the human nature, proceeds the Holy Spirit, Who formed the body of Christ, whether we speak of the grace of union or of habitual as will be shown (q. 32, a. 1). But it does not follow from grace. For the grace of union is the personal being that is this that the grace of the Holy Spirit is the formal medium given gratis from above to the human nature in the Person in the aforesaid union. of the Word, and is the term of the assumption. Whereas 2120 THIRD PART, QUESTION 7 Of the Grace of Christ As an Individual Man (In Thirteen Articles) We must now consider such things as were co-assumed by the Son of God in human nature; and first what belongs to perfection; secondly, what belongs to defect. Concerning the first, there are three points of consideration: (1) The grace of Christ; (2) His knowledge; (3) His power. With regard to His grace we must consider two things: (1) His grace as He is an individual man; (2) His grace as He is the Head of the Church. Of the grace of union we have already spoken (q. 2). Under the first head there are thirteen points of inquiry: (1) Whether in the soul of Christ there was any habitual grace? (2) Whether in Christ there were virtues? (3) Whether He had faith? (4) Whether He had hope? (5) Whether in Christ there were the gifts? (6) Whether in Christ there was the gift of fear? (7) Whether in Christ there were any gratuitous graces? (8) Whether in Christ there was prophecy? (9) Whether there was the fulness of grace in Him? (10) Whether such fulness was proper to Christ? (11) Whether the grace of Christ was infinite? (12) Whether it could have been increased? (13) How this grace stood towards the union? Whether in the Soul of Christ there was any habitual grace? IIIa q. 7 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem there was no habitual On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): “The Spirit grace in the soul assumed by the Word. For grace is a of the Lord shall rest upon Him”—which (Spirit), indeed, certain partaking of the Godhead by the rational creature, is said to be in man by habitual grace, as was said above according to 2 Pet. 1:4: “By Whom He hath given us ( Ia, q. 8, a. 3; Ia, q. 43, Aa. 3,6). Therefore there was most great and precious promises, that by these you may habitual grace in Christ. be made partakers of the Divine Nature.” Now Christ is I answer that, It is necessary to suppose habitual God not by participation, but in truth. Therefore there was grace in Christ for three reasons. First, on account of the no habitual grace in Him. union of His soul with the Word of God. For the nearer Objection 2. Further, grace is necessary to man, that any recipient is to an inflowing cause, the more does it par- he may operate well, according to 1 Cor. 15:10: “I have take of its influence. Now the influx of grace is from God, labored more abundantly than all they; yet not I, but the according to Ps. 83:12: “The Lord will give grace and grace of God with me”; and in order that he may reach glory.” And hence it was most fitting that His soul should eternal life, according to Rom. 6:23: “The grace of God receive the influx of Divine grace. Secondly, on account (is) life everlasting.” Now the inheritance of everlasting of the dignity of this soul, whose operations were to attain life was due to Christ by the mere fact of His being the so closely to God by knowledge and love, to which it is natural Son of God; and by the fact of His being the Word, necessary for human nature to be raised by grace. Thirdly, by Whom all things were made, He had the power of do- on account of the relation of Christ to the human race. For ing all things well. Therefore His human nature needed Christ, as man, is the “Mediator of God and men,” as is no further grace beyond union with the Word. written, 1 Tim. 2:5; and hence it behooved Him to have Objection 3. Further, what operates as an instrument grace which would overflow upon others, according to Jn. does not need a habit for its own operations, since habits 1:16: “And of His fulness we have all received, and grace are rooted in the principal agent. Now the human nature for grace.” in Christ was “as the instrument of the Godhead,” as Dam- Reply to Objection 1. Christ is the true God in Di- ascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 15). Therefore there was vine Person and Nature. Yet because together with unity no need of habitual grace in Christ. of person there remains distinction of natures, as stated 2121 above (q. 2, Aa. 1,2), the soul of Christ. is not essentially doing all things well by the Divine operation. And be-Divine. Hence it behooves it to be Divine by participation, cause it is necessary to admit a human operation, distinct which is by grace. from the Divine operation, as will be shown (q. 19, a. 1), Reply to Objection 2. To Christ, inasmuch as He it was necessary for Him to have habitual grace, whereby is the natural Son of God, is due an eternal inheritance, this operation might be perfect in Him. which is the uncreated beatitude through the uncreated act Reply to Objection 3. The humanity of Christ is the of knowledge and love of God, i.e. the same whereby the instrument of the Godhead—not, indeed, an inanimate in- Father knows and loves Himself. Now the soul was not strument, which nowise acts, but is merely acted upon; capable of this act, on account of the difference of natures. but an instrument animated by a rational soul, which is so Hence it behooved it to attain to God by a created act of acted upon as to act. And hence the nature of the action fruition which could not be without grace. Likewise, inas- demanded that he should have habitual grace. much as He was the Word of God, He had the power of Whether in Christ there were virtues? IIIa q. 7 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there were fects some of these by itself—as to make him pleasing to no virtues. For Christ had the plenitude of grace. Now God, and the like; and some others through the medium grace is sufficient for every good act, according to 2 Cor. of the virtues which proceed from grace. 12:9: “My grace is sufficient for thee.” Therefore there Reply to Objection 2. A heroic or godlike habit only were no virtues in Christ. differs from virtue commonly so called by a more perfect Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher mode, inasmuch as one is disposed to good in a higher (Ethic. vii, 1), virtue is contrasted with a “certain heroic way than is common to all. Hence it is not hereby proved or godlike habit” which is attributed to godlike men. But that Christ had not the virtues, but that He had them most this belongs chiefly to Christ. Therefore Christ had not perfectly beyond the common mode. In this sense Ploti- virtues, but something higher than virtue. nus gave to a certain sublime degree of virtue the name of Objection 3. Further, as was said above ( Ia IIae, “virtue of the purified soul” (cf. Ia IIae, q. 61 , a. 5). q. 65, Aa. 1,2), all the virtues are bound together. But Reply to Objection 3. Liberality and magnificence it was not becoming for Christ to have all the virtues, as is are praiseworthy in regard to riches, inasmuch as any- clear in the case of liberality and magnificence, for these one does not esteem wealth to the extent of wishing to have to do with riches, which Christ spurned, according retain it, so as to forego what ought to be done. But he to Mat. 8:20: “The Son of man hath not where to lay His esteems them least who wholly despises them, and casts head.” Temperance and continence also regard wicked de- them aside for love of perfection. And hence by alto- sires, from which Christ was free. Therefore Christ had gether contemning all riches, Christ showed the highest not the virtues. kind of liberality and magnificence; although He also per- On the contrary, on Ps. 1:2, “But His will is in the formed the act of liberality, as far as it became Him, by law of the Lord,” a gloss says: “This refers to Christ, Who causing to be distributed to the poor what was given to is full of all good.” But a good quality of the mind is a Himself. Hence, when our Lord said to Judas (Jn. 13:21), virtue. Therefore Christ was full of all virtue. “That which thou dost do quickly,” the disciples under- I answer that, As was said above ( Ia IIae, q. 110, stood our Lord to have ordered him to give something to Aa. 3,4), as grace regards the essence of the soul, so does the poor. But Christ had no evil desires whatever, as will virtue regard its power. Hence it is necessary that as the be shown (q. 15, Aa. 1,2); yet He was not thereby pre- powers of the soul flow from its essence, so do the virtues vented from having temperance, which is the more perfect flow from grace. Now the more perfect a principle is, the in man, as he is without evil desires. Hence, according to more it impresses its effects. Hence, since the grace of the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9), the temperate man dif- Christ was most perfect, there flowed from it, in conse- fers from the continent in this—that the temperate has not quence, the virtues which perfect the several powers of the evil desires which the continent suffers. Hence, tak- the soul for all the soul’s acts; and thus Christ had all the ing continence in this sense, as the Philosopher takes it, virtues. Christ, from the very fact that He had all virtue, had not Reply to Objection 1. Grace suffices a man for all continence, since it is not a virtue, but something less than whereby he is ordained to beatitude; nevertheless, it ef- virtue. 2122 Whether in Christ there was faith? IIIa q. 7 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that there was faith in the object. Hence, if we deny that the Divine thing was not Christ. For faith is a nobler virtue than the moral virtues, seen, we exclude the very essence of faith. Now from the e.g. temperance and liberality. Now these were in Christ, first moment of His conception Christ saw God’s Essence as stated above (a. 2). Much more, therefore, was there fully, as will be made clear (q. 34, a. 1). Hence there could faith in Him. be no faith in Him. Objection 2. Further, Christ did not teach virtues Reply to Objection 1. Faith is a nobler virtue than the which He had not Himself, according to Acts 1:1: “Je- moral virtues, seeing that it has to do with nobler matter; sus began to do and to teach.” But of Christ it is said nevertheless, it implies a certain defect with regard to that (Heb. 12:2) that He is “the author and finisher of our matter; and this defect was not in Christ. And hence there faith.” Therefore there was faith in Him before all oth- could be no faith in Him, although the moral virtues were ers. in Him, since in their nature they imply no defect with Objection 3. Further, everything imperfect is ex- regard to their matter. cluded from the blessed. But in the blessed there is faith; Reply to Objection 2. The merit of faith consists in for on Rom. 1:17, “the justice of God is revealed therein this—that man through obedience assents to what things from faith to faith,” a gloss says: “From the faith of words he does not see, according to Rom. 1:5: “For obedience and hope to the faith of things and sight.” Therefore it to the faith in all nations for His name.” Now Christ had would seem that in Christ also there was faith, since it most perfect obedience to God, according to Phil. 2:8: implies nothing imperfect. “Becoming obedient unto death.” And hence He taught On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:1): “Faith is nothing pertaining to merit which He did not fulfil more the evidence of things that appear not.” But there was perfectly Himself. nothing that did not appear to Christ, according to what Reply to Objection 3. As a gloss says in the same Peter said to Him (Jn. 21:17): “Thou knowest all things.” place, faith is that “whereby such things as are not seen Therefore there was no faith in Christ. are believed.” But faith in things seen is improperly so I answer that, As was said above ( IIa IIae, q. 1, a. 4), called, and only after a certain similitude with regard to the object of faith is a Divine thing not seen. Now the the certainty and firmness of the assent. habit of virtue, as every other habit, takes its species from Whether in Christ there was hope? IIIa q. 7 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that there was hope in I answer that, As it is of the nature of faith that one Christ. For it is said in the Person of Christ (Ps. 30:1): assents to what one sees not, so is it of the nature of hope “In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped.” But the virtue of hope is that one expects what as yet one has not; and as faith, that whereby a man hopes in God. Therefore the virtue of forasmuch as it is a theological virtue, does not regard ev- hope was in Christ. erything unseen, but only God; so likewise hope, as a the- Objection 2. Further, hope is the expectation of the ological virtue, has God Himself for its object, the fruition bliss to come, as was shown above ( IIa IIae, q. 17, a. 5, of Whom man chiefly expects by the virtue of hope; yet, ad 3). But Christ awaited something pertaining to bliss, in consequence, whoever has the virtue of hope may ex- viz. the glorifying of His body. Therefore it seems there pect the Divine aid in other things, even as he who has the was hope in Him. virtue of faith believes God not only in Divine things, but Objection 3. Further, everyone may hope for what even in whatsoever is divinely revealed. Now from the be- pertains to his perfection, if it has yet to come. But there ginning of His conception Christ had the Divine fruition was something still to come pertaining to Christ’s per- fully, as will be shown (q. 34, a. 4), and hence he had not fection, according to Eph. 4:12: “For the perfecting of the virtue of hope. Nevertheless He had hope as regards the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the building such things as He did not yet possess, although He had not up [Douay: ‘edifying’] of the body of Christ.” Hence it faith with regard to anything; because, although He knew seems that it befitted Christ to have hope. all things fully, wherefore faith was altogether wanting to On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 8:24): “What a Him, nevertheless He did not as yet fully possess all that man seeth, why doth he hope for?” Thus it is clear that pertained to His perfection, viz. immortality and glory of as faith is of the unseen, so also is hope. But there was the body, which He could hope for. no faith in Christ, as was said above (a. 1): neither, conse- Reply to Objection 1. This is said of Christ with ref- quently, was there hope. erence to hope, not as a theological virtue, but inasmuch 2123 as He hoped for some other things not yet possessed, as fruition. was said above. Reply to Objection 3. The building up of the church Reply to Objection 2. The glory of the body does by the conversion of the faithful does not pertain to the not pertain to beatitude as being that in which beatitude perfection of Christ, whereby He is perfect in Himself, principally consists, but by a certain outpouring from the but inasmuch as it leads others to a share of His perfec- soul’s glory, as was said above ( Ia IIae, q. 4, a. 6). Hence tion. And because hope properly regards what is expected hope, as a theological virtue, does not regard the bliss of by him who hopes, the virtue of hope cannot properly be the body but the soul’s bliss, which consists in the Divine said to be in Christ, because of the aforesaid reason. Whether in Christ there were the gifts? IIIa q. 7 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the gifts were not moved by the Holy Ghost, according to Luke 4:1: “And in Christ. For, as is commonly said, the gifts are given to Jesus, being full of the Holy Ghost, returned from the Jor- help the virtues. But what is perfect in itself does not need dan, and was led by the Spirit into the desert.” Hence it an exterior help. Therefore, since the virtues of Christ is manifest that in Christ the gifts were in a pre-eminent were perfect, it seems there were no gifts in Him. degree. Objection 2. Further, to give and to receive gifts Reply to Objection 1. What is perfect in the order of would not seem to belong to the same; since to give per- its nature needs to be helped by something of a higher na- tains to one who has, and to receive pertains to one who ture; as man, however perfect, needs to be helped by God. has not. But it belongs to Christ to give gifts according to And in this way the virtues, which perfect the powers of Ps. 67:19. “Thou hast given gifts to men [Vulg.: ‘Thou the soul, as they are controlled by reason, no matter how hast received gifts in men’].” Therefore it was not becom- perfect they are, need to be helped by the gifts, which per- ing that Christ should receive gifts of the Holy Ghost. fect the soul’s powers, inasmuch as these are moved by Objection 3. Further, four gifts would seem to pertain the Holy Ghost. to the contemplation of earth, viz. wisdom, knowledge, Reply to Objection 2. Christ is not a recipient and understanding, and counsel which pertains to prudence; a giver of the gifts of the Holy Ghost, in the same re- hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3) enumerates these with spect; for He gives them as God and receives them as the intellectual virtues. But Christ had the contemplation man. Hence Gregory says (Moral. ii) that “the Holy Ghost of heaven. Therefore He had not these gifts. never quitted the human nature of Christ, from Whose Di- On the contrary, It is written (Is. 4:1): “Seven vine nature He proceedeth.” women shall take hold of one man”: on which a gloss Reply to Objection 3. In Christ there was not only says: “That is, the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost shall take heavenly knowledge, but also earthly knowledge, as will hold of Christ.” be said (q. 15, a. 10). And yet even in heaven the gifts of I answer that, As was said above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 1), the Holy Ghost will still exist, in a certain manner, as was the gifts, properly, are certain perfections of the soul’s said above ( Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 6). powers, inasmuch a[9] these have a natural aptitude to be Whether in Christ there was the gift of fear? IIIa q. 7 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was impossible for Him to sin, as will be said (q. 15, Aa. 1,2). not the gift of fear. For hope would seem to be stronger Now fear is not of the impossible. Therefore in Christ than fear; since the object of hope is goodness, and of fear, there was not the gift of fear. evil. as was said above ( Ia IIae, q. 40, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 42, Objection 3. Further, it is written (1 Jn. 4:18) that a. 1). But in Christ there was not the virtue of hope, as “perfect charity casteth out fear.” But in Christ there was was said above (a. 4). Hence, likewise, there was not the most perfect charity, according to Eph. 3:19: “The charity gift of fear in Him. of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge.” Therefore in Objection 2. Further, by the gift of fear we fear ei- Christ there was not the gift of fear. ther to be separated from God, which pertains to “chaste” On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:3): “And He fear—or to be punished by Him, which pertains to shall be filled with the spirit of the fear of the Lord.” “servile” fear, as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. ix). But I answer that, As was said above ( Ia IIae, q. 42, a. 1), Christ did not fear being separated from God by sin, nor fear regards two objects, one of which is an evil causing being punished by Him on account of a fault, since it was terror; the other is that by whose power an evil can be in- 2124 flicted, as we fear the king inasmuch as he has the power regard goodness properly and of themselves; but evil, con-of putting to death. Now whoever can hurt would not be sequently; since it pertains to the nature of virtue to render feared unless he had a certain greatness of might, to which acts good, as is said Ethic. ii, 6. And hence the nature of resistance could not easily be offered; for what we easily the gift of fear regards not that evil which fear is con- repel we do not fear. And hence it is plain that no one is cerned with, but the pre-eminence of that goodness, viz. feared except for some pre-eminence. And in this way it is of God, by Whose power evil may be inflicted. on the said that in Christ there was the fear of God, not indeed as other hand, hope, as a virtue, regards not only the author it regards the evil of separation from God by fault, nor as of good, but even the good itself, as far as it is not yet pos- it regards the evil of punishment for fault; but inasmuch as sessed. And hence to Christ, Who already possessed the it regards the Divine pre-eminence, on account of which perfect good of beatitude, we do not attribute the virtue of the soul of Christ, led by the Holy Spirit, was borne to- hope, but we do attribute the gift of fear. wards God in an act of reverence. Hence it is said (Heb. Reply to Objection 2. This reason is based on fear in 5:7) that in all things “he was heard for his reverence.” For so far as it regards the evil object. Christ as man had this act of reverence towards God in a Reply to Objection 3. Perfect charity casts out servile fuller sense and beyond all others. And hence Scripture fear, which principally regards punishment. But this kind attributes to Him the fulness of the fear of the Lord. of fear was not in Christ. Reply to Objection 1. The habits of virtues and gifts Whether the gratuitous graces were in Christ? IIIa q. 7 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the gratuitous graces trine clear; otherwise his doctrine would be useless. Now were not in Christ. For whoever has anything in its ful- Christ is the first and chief teacher of spiritual doctrine and ness, to him it does not pertain to have it by participation. faith, according to Heb. 2:3,4: “Which having begun to be Now Christ has grace in its fulness, according to Jn. 1:14: declared by the Lord was confirmed unto us by them that “Full of grace and truth.” But the gratuitous graces would heard Him, God also bearing them witness by signs and seem to be certain participations, bestowed distributively wonders.” Hence it is clear that all the gratuitous graces and particularly upon divers subjects, according to 1 Cor. were most excellently in Christ, as in the first and chief 12:4: “Now there are diversities of graces.” Therefore it teacher of the faith. would seem that there were no gratuitous graces in Christ. Reply to Objection 1. As sanctifying grace is or- Objection 2. Further, what is due to anyone would not dained to meritorious acts both interior and exterior, so seem to be gratuitously bestowed on him. But it was due likewise gratuitous grace is ordained to certain exterior to the man Christ that He should abound in the word of acts manifestive of the faith, as the working of miracles, wisdom and knowledge, and to be mighty in doing won- and the like. Now of both these graces Christ had the ful- derful works and the like, all of which pertain to gratuitous ness. since inasmuch as His soul was united to the God- graces: since He is “the power of God and the wisdom of head, He had the perfect power of effecting all these acts. God,” as is written 1 Cor. 1:24. Therefore it was not fitting But other saints who are moved by God as separated and for Christ to have the gratuitous graces. not united instruments, receive power in a particular man- Objection 3. Further, gratuitous graces are ordained ner in order to bring about this or that act. And hence in to the benefit of the faithful. But it does not seem that a other saints these graces are divided, but not in Christ. habit which a man does not use is for the benefit of others, Reply to Objection 2. Christ is said to be the power according to Ecclus. 20:32: “Wisdom that is hid and trea- of God and the wisdom of God, inasmuch as He is the sure that is not seen: what profit is there in them both?” Eternal Son of God. But in this respect it does not per- Now we do not read that Christ made use of these gra- tain to Him to have grace, but rather to be the bestower of tuitously given graces, especially as regards the gift of grace. but it pertains to Him in His human nature to have tongues. Therefore not all the gratuitous graces were in grace. Christ. Reply to Objection 3. The gift of tongues was be- On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Dardan. stowed on the apostles, because they were sent to teach cclxxxvii) that “as in the head are all the senses, so in all nations; but Christ wished to preach personally only Christ were all the graces.” in the one nation of the Jews, as He Himself says (Mat. I answer that, As was said above ( Ia IIae, q. 3, 15:24): “I was not sent but to the sheep that are lost of the Aa. 1,4), the gratuitous graces are ordained for the man- house of Israel”; and the Apostle says (Rom. 15:8): “I say ifestation of faith and spiritual doctrine. For it behooves that Christ Jesus was minister of the circumcision.” And him who teaches to have the means of making his doc- hence it was not necessary for Him to speak several lan- 2125 guages. Yet was a knowledge of all languages not want-shown (q. 10, a. 2). Nor was this knowledge uselessly ing to Him, since even the secrets of hearts, of which all possessed. just as it is not useless to have a habit, which words are signs, were not hidden from Him, as will be we do not use when there is no occasion. Whether in Christ there was the gift of prophecy? IIIa q. 7 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was Kings 5:26) how the man had leaped down from his char- not the gift of prophecy. For prophecy implies a cer- iot to meet him. But if anyone living in Syria were to tain obscure and imperfect knowledge, according to Num. announce what things were there, it would not be prophet- 12:6: “If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I ical. And the same appears in regard to time. For it was will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him prophetical of Isaias to announce that Cyrus, King of the in a dream.” But Christ had full and unveiled knowl- Persians, would rebuild the temple of God, as is clear from edge, much more than Moses, of whom it is subjoined that Is. 44:28. But it was not prophetical of Esdras to write “plainly and not by riddles and figures doth he see God” it, in whose time it took place. Hence if God or angels, (Num. 6:8). Therefore we ought not to admit prophecy in or even the blessed, know and announce what is beyond Christ. our knowing, this does not pertain to prophecy, since they Objection 2. Further, as faith has to do with what nowise touch our state. Now Christ before His passion is not seen, and hope with what is not possessed, so touched our state, inasmuch as He was not merely a “com- prophecy has to do with what is not present, but distant; prehensor,” but a “wayfarer.” Hence it was prophetical in for a prophet means, as it were, a teller of far-off things. Him to know and announce what was beyond the knowl- But in Christ there could be neither faith nor hope, as was edge of other “wayfarers”: and for this reason He is called said above (Aa. 3,4). Hence prophecy also ought not to be a prophet. admitted in Christ. Reply to Objection 1. These words do not prove that Objection 3. Further, a prophet is in an inferior or- enigmatical knowledge, viz. by dream and vision, belongs der to an angel; hence Moses, who was the greatest of the to the nature of prophecy; but the comparison is drawn prophets, as was said above ( IIa IIae, q. 174, a. 4) is said between other prophets, who saw Divine things in dreams (Acts 7:38) to have spoken with an angel in the desert. and visions, and Moses, who saw God plainly and not by But Christ was “made lower than the angels,” not as to the riddles, and who yet is called a prophet, according to Dt. knowledge of His soul, but only as regards the sufferings 24:10: “And there arose no more a prophet in Israel like of His body, as is shown Heb. 2:9. Therefore it seems that unto Moses.” Nevertheless it may be said that although Christ was not a prophet. Christ had full and unveiled knowledge as regards the in- On the contrary, It is written of Him (Dt. 18:15): tellective part, yet in the imaginative part He had certain “Thy God will raise up to thee a prophet of thy nation and similitudes, in which Divine things could be viewed, inas- of thy brethren,” and He says of Himself (Mat. 13:57; Jn. much as He was not only a “comprehensor,” but a “way- 4:44): “A prophet is not without honor, save in his own farer.” country.” Reply to Objection 2. Faith regards such things as I answer that, A prophet means, as it were, a teller are unseen by him who believes; and hope, too, is of such or seer of far-off things, inasmuch as he knows and an- things as are not possessed by the one who hopes; but nounces what things are far from men’s senses, as Augus- prophecy is of such things as are beyond the sense of men, tine says (Contra Faust. xvi, 18). Now we must bear in with whom the prophet dwells and converses in this state mind that no one can be called a prophet for knowing and of life. And hence faith and hope are repugnant to the announcing what is distant from others, with whom he is perfection of Christ’s beatitude; but prophecy is not. not. And this is clear in regard to place and time. For Reply to Objection 3. Angels, being “comprehen- if anyone living in France were to know and announce sors,” are above prophets, who are merely “wayfarers”; to others living in France what things were transpiring in but not above Christ, Who was both a “comprehensor” Syria, it would be prophetical, as Eliseus told Giezi (4 and a “wayfarer.” 2126 Whether in Christ there was the fulness of grace? IIIa q. 7 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was a manner, it is poured out from it upon others. And hence not the fulness of grace. For the virtues flow from grace, it behooved Him to have the greatest grace; as fire which as was said above ( Ia IIae, q. 110, a. 4). But in Christ is the cause of heat in other hot things, is of all things the there were not all the virtues; for there was neither faith hottest. nor hope in Him, as was shown above (Aa. 3,4). Therefore Likewise, as regards the “virtue” of grace, He had in Christ there was not the fulness of grace. grace fully, since He had it for all the operations and ef- Objection 2. Further, as is plain from what was said fects of grace; and this, because grace was bestowed on above ( Ia IIae, q. 111, a. 2), grace is divided into oper- Him, as upon a universal principle in the genus of such as ating and cooperating. Now operating grace signifies that have grace. Now the virtue of the first principle of a genus whereby the ungodly is justified, which has no place in universally extends itself to all the effects of that genus; Christ, Who never lay under any sin. Therefore in Christ thus the force of the sun, which is the universal cause of there was not the fulness of grace. generation, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), extends to Objection 3. Further, it is written (James 1:17): “Ev- all things that come under generation. Hence the second ery best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming fulness of grace is seen in Christ inasmuch as His grace down from the Father of lights.” But what comes thus is extends to all the effects of grace, which are the virtues, possessed partially, and not fully. Therefore no creature, gifts, and the like. not even the soul of Christ, can have the fulness of the Reply to Objection 1. Faith and hope signify effects gifts of grace. of grace with certain defects on the part of the recipient On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:14): “We saw of grace, inasmuch as faith is of the unseen, and hope of Him [Vulg.: ‘His glory’] full of grace and truth.” what is not yet possessed. Hence it was not necessary that I answer that, To have fully is to have wholly and in Christ, Who is the author of grace, there should be any perfectly. Now totality and perfection can be taken in two defects such as faith and hope imply; but whatever perfec- ways: First as regards their “intensive” quantity; for in- tion is in faith and hope was in Christ most perfectly; as stance, I may say that some man has whiteness fully, be- in fire there are not all the modes of heat which are defec- cause he has as much of it as can naturally be in him; sec- tive by the subject’s defect, but whatever belongs to the ondly, “as regards power”; for instance, if anyone be said perfection of heat. to have life fully, inasmuch as he has it in all the effects or Reply to Objection 2. It pertains essentially to oper-works of life; and thus man has life fully, but senseless an- ating grace to justify; but that it makes the ungodly to be imals or plants have not. Now in both these ways Christ just is accidental to it on the part of the subject, in which has the fulness of grace. First, since He has grace in its sin is found. Therefore the soul of Christ was justified by highest degree, in the most perfect way it can be had. And operating grace, inasmuch as it was rendered just and holy this appears, first, from the nearness of Christ’s soul to the by it from the beginning of His conception; not that it was cause of grace. For it was said above (a. 1) that the nearer until then sinful, or even not just. a recipient is to the inflowing cause, the more it receives. Reply to Objection 3. The fulness of grace is at- And hence the soul of Christ, which is more closely united tributed to the soul of Christ according to the capacity of to God than all other rational creatures, receives the great- the creature and not by comparison with the infinite ful- est outpouring of His grace. Secondly, in His relation to ness of the Divine goodness. the effect. For the soul of Christ so received grace, that, in Whether the fulness of grace is proper to Christ? IIIa q. 7 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that the fulness of grace through Christ, since the Apostle says (Eph. 3:19): “That is not proper to Christ. For what is proper to anyone be- you may be filled unto all the fulness of God.” Therefore longs to him alone. But to be full of grace is attributed the fulness of grace is not proper to Christ. to some others; for it was said to the Blessed Virgin (Lk. Objection 3. Further, the state of the wayfarer seems 1:28): “Hail, full of grace”; and again it is written (Acts to be proportioned to the state of the comprehensor. But 6:8): “Stephen, full of grace and fortitude.” Therefore the in the state of the comprehensor there will be a certain ful- fulness of grace is not proper to Christ. ness, since “in our heavenly country with its fulness of all Objection 2. Further, what can be communicated to good, although some things are bestowed in a pre-eminent others through Christ does not seem to be proper to Christ. way, yet nothing is possessed singularly,” as is clear from But the fulness of grace can be communicated to others Gregory (Hom. De Cent. Ovib.; xxxiv in Ev.). Therefore 2127 in the state of the comprehensor the fulness of grace is Reply to Objection 1. The Blessed Virgin is said to possessed by everyone, and hence the fulness of grace is be full of grace, not on the part of grace itself—since she not proper to Christ. on the contrary, The fulness of grace had not grace in its greatest possible excellence—nor for is attributed to Christ inasmuch as He is the only-begotten all the effects of grace; but she is said to be full of grace of the Father, according to Jn. 1:14: “We saw Him [Vulg.: in reference to herself, i.e. inasmuch as she had sufficient ‘His glory’] as it were. . . the Only-begotten of the Father, grace for the state to which God had chosen her, i.e. to be full of grace and truth.” But to be the Only-begotten of the the mother of His Only-begotten. So, too, Stephen is said Father is proper to Christ. Therefore it is proper to Him to to be full of grace, since he had sufficient grace to be a fit be full of grace and truth. minister and witness of God, to which office he had been I answer that, The fulness of grace may be taken in called. And the same must be said of others. Of these two ways: First, on the part of grace itself, or secondly fulnesses one is greater than another, according as one is on the part of the one who has grace. Now on the part of divinely pre-ordained to a higher or lower state. grace itself there is said to be the fulness of grace when Reply to Objection 2. The Apostle is there speaking the limit of grace is attained, as to essence and power, of that fulness which has reference to the subject, in com- inasmuch as grace is possessed in its highest possible ex- parison with what man is divinely pre-ordained to; and cellence and in its greatest possible extension to all its ef- this is either something in common, to which all the saints fects. And this fulness of grace is proper to Christ. But are pre-ordained, or something special, which pertains to on the part of the subject there is said to be the fulness the pre-eminence of some. And in this manner a certain of grace when anyone fully possesses grace according to fulness of grace is common to all the saints, viz. to have his condition—whether as regards intensity, by reason of grace enough to merit eternal life, which consists in the grace being intense in him, to the limit assigned by God, enjoyment of God. And this is the fulness of grace which according to Eph. 4:1: “But to every one of us is given the Apostle desires for the faithful to whom he writes. grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ”— Reply to Objection 3. These gifts which are in com- or “as regards power,” by reason of a man having the help mon in heaven, viz.: vision, possession and fruition, and of grace for all that belongs to his office or state, as the the like, have certain gifts corresponding to them in this Apostle says (Eph. 3:8): “To me, the least of all the saints, life which are also common to all the saints. Yet there are is given this grace. . . to enlighten all men.” And this ful- certain prerogatives of saints, both in heaven and on earth, ness of grace is not proper to Christ, but is communicated which are not possessed by all. to others by Christ. Whether the grace of Christ is infinite? IIIa q. 7 a. 11 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s grace is in- infinite. finite. For everything immeasurable is infinite. But the On the contrary, Grace is something created in the grace of Christ is immeasurable; since it is written (Jn. soul. But every created thing is finite, according to Wis. 3:34): “For God doth not give the Spirit by measure to 11:21: “Thou hast ordered all things in measure and num- His Son∗, namely Christ.” Therefore the grace of Christ ber and weight.” Therefore the grace of Christ is not infi- is infinite. nite. Objection 2. Further, an infinite effect betokens an I answer that, As was made clear above (q. 2, a. 10), infinite power which can only spring from an infinite a twofold grace may be considered in Christ; the first be- essence. But the effect of Christ’s grace is infinite, since ing the grace of union, which, as was said (q. 6, a. 6), is it extends to the salvation of the whole human race; for for Him to be personally united to the Son of God, which He is the propitiation for our sins. . . and for those of the union has been bestowed gratis on the human nature; and whole world, as is said (1 Jn. 2:2). Therefore the grace of it is clear that this grace is infinite, as the Person of God Christ is infinite. is infinite. The second is habitual grace; which may be Objection 3. Further, every finite thing by addition taken in two ways: first as a being, and in this way it must can attain to the quantity of any other finite thing. There- be a finite being, since it is in the soul of Christ, as in a fore if the grace of Christ is finite the grace of any other subject, and Christ’s soul is a creature having a finite ca- man could increase to such an extent as to reach to an pacity; hence the being of grace cannot be infinite, since equality with Christ’s grace, against what is written (Job it cannot exceed its subject. Secondly it may be viewed 28:17): “Gold nor crystal cannot equal it,” as Gregory ex- in its specific nature of grace; and thus the grace of Christ pounds it (Moral. xviii). Therefore the grace of Christ is can be termed infinite, since it is not limited, i.e. it has ∗ ‘To His Son’ is lacking in the Vulgate 2128 whatsoever can pertain to the nature of grace, and what to human nature.” Thirdly, it may be referred to habitual pertains to the nature of grace is not bestowed on Him in grace, inasmuch as the grace of Christ extends to what- a fixed measure; seeing that “according to the purpose” of ever belongs to grace. Hence Augustine expounding this God to Whom it pertains to measure grace, it is bestowed (Tract. xiv in Joan.) says: “The division of the gifts is a on Christ’s soul as on a universal principle for bestowing measurement. For to one indeed by the Spirit is given the grace on human nature, according to Eph. 1:5,6, “He hath word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge.” But graced us in His beloved Son”; thus we might say that Christ the giver does not receive by measure. the light of the sun is infinite, not indeed in being, but in Reply to Objection 2. The grace of Christ has an infi- the nature of light, as having whatever can pertain to the nite effect, both because of the aforesaid infinity of grace, nature of light. and because of the unity∗ of the Divine Person, to Whom Reply to Objection 1. When it is said that the Fa- Christ’s soul is united. ther “doth not give the Spirit by measure,” it may be ex- Reply to Objection 3. The lesser can attain by aug- pounded of the gift which God the Father from all eternity ment to the quantity of the greater, when both have the gave the Son, viz. the Divine Nature, which is an infinite same kind of quantity. But the grace of any man is com- gift. Hence the comment of a certain gloss: “So that the pared to the grace of Christ as a particular to a universal Son may be as great as the Father is.” Or again, it may power; hence as the force of fire, no matter how much it be referred to the gift which is given the human nature, to increases, can never equal the sun’s strength, so the grace be united to the Divine Person, and this also is an infinite of a man, no matter how much it increases, can never gift. Hence a gloss says on this text: “As the Father begot equal the grace of Christ. a full and perfect Word, it is united thus full and perfect Whether the grace of Christ could increase? IIIa q. 7 a. 12 Objection 1. It would seem that the grace of Christ the form, the possibility of increase is excluded when a could increase. For to every finite thing addition can be subject reaches the utmost perfection which this form can made. But the grace of Christ was finite. Therefore it have by nature, e.g. if we say the heat of fire cannot be could increase. increased because there cannot be a more perfect grade of Objection 2. Further, it is by Divine power that grace heat than that to which fire attains. Now the proper mea- is increased, according to 2 Cor. 9:8: “And God is able sure of grace, like that of other forms, is determined by to make all grace abound in you.” But the Divine power, the Divine wisdom, according to Wis. 11:21: “Thou hast being infinite, is confined by no limits. Therefore it seems ordered all things in number, weight and measure.” And that the grace of Christ could have been greater. it is with reference to its end that a measure is set to every Objection 3. Further, it is written (Lk. 2:52) that the form. as there is no greater gravity than that of the earth, child “Jesus advanced in wisdom and age and grace with because there is no lower place than that of the earth. Now God and men.” Therefore the grace of Christ could in- the end of grace is the union of the rational creature with crease. God. But there can neither be nor be thought a greater On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:14): “We saw union of the rational creature with God than that which is Him [Vulg.: ‘His glory’] as it were. . . the Only-begotten in the Person. And hence the grace of Christ reached the of the Father, full of grace and truth.” But nothing can be highest measure of grace. Hence it is clear that the grace or can be thought greater than that anyone should be the of Christ cannot be increased on the part of grace. But Only-begotten of the Father. Therefore no greater grace neither can it be increased on the part of the subject, since can be or can be thought than that of which Christ was Christ as man was a true and full comprehensor from the full. first instant of His conception. Hence there could have I answer that, For a form to be incapable of increase been no increase of grace in Him, as there could be none happens in two ways: First on the part of the subject; in the rest of the blessed, whose grace could not increase, secondly, on the part of the form itself. On the part of seeing that they have reached their last end. But as re- the subject, indeed, when the subject reaches the utmost gards men who are wholly wayfarers, their grace can be limit wherein it partakes of this form, after its own man- increased not merely on the part of the form, since they ner, e.g. if we say that air cannot increase in heat, when have not attained the highest degree of grace, but also on it has reached the utmost limit of heat which can exist in the part of the subject, since they have not yet attained the nature of air, although there may be greater heat in their end. actual existence, viz. the heat of fire. But on the part of Reply to Objection 1. If we speak of mathematical ∗ Perhaps we should read ‘infinity’—Ed. 2129 quantity, addition can be made to any finite quantity, since grace of Christ, yet it could not make it to be ordained to there is nothing on the part of finite quantity which is re- anything greater than the personal union with the Only- pugnant to addition. But if we speak of natural quantity, begotten Son of the Father; and to this union, by the pur- there may be repugnance on the part of the form to which pose of the Divine wisdom, the measure of grace is suffi- a determined quantity is due, even as other accidents are cient. determined. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, Reply to Objection 3. Anyone may increase in wis- 41) that “there is naturally a term of all things, and a fixed dom and grace in two ways. First inasmuch as the very limit of magnitude and increase.” And hence to the quan- habits of wisdom and grace are increased; and in this way tity of the whole there can be no addition. And still more Christ did not increase. Secondly, as regards the effects, must we suppose a term in the forms themselves, beyond i.e. inasmuch as they do wiser and greater works; and in which they may not go. Hence it is not necessary that ad- this way Christ increased in wisdom and grace even as dition should be capable of being made to Christ’s grace, in age, since in the course of time He did more perfect although it is finite in its essence. works, to prove Himself true man, both in the things of Reply to Objection 2. Although the Divine power God, and in the things of man. can make something greater and better than the habitual Whether the habitual grace of Christ followed after the union? IIIa q. 7 a. 13 Objection 1. It would seem that the habitual grace grace, which is given with charity, is the Holy Ghost, Who did not follow after the union. For nothing follows it- is said to be sent inasmuch as He dwells in the mind by self. But this habitual grace seems to be the same as the charity. Now the mission of the Son is prior, in the order grace of union; for Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. of nature, to the mission of the Holy Ghost, even as in the xv): “Every man becomes a Christian from the beginning order of nature the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, and of his belief, by the same grace whereby this Man from love from wisdom. Hence the personal union, according His beginning became Christ”; and of these two the first to which the mission of the Son took place, is prior in the pertains to habitual grace and the second to the grace of order of nature to habitual grace, according to which the union. Therefore it would seem that habitual grace did not mission of the Holy Ghost takes place. Secondly, the rea- follow upon the union. son of this order may be taken from the relation of grace Objection 2. Further, disposition precedes perfection, to its cause. For grace is caused in man by the presence if not in time, at least in thought. But the habitual grace of the Godhead, as light in the air by the presence of the seems to be a disposition in human nature for the personal sun. Hence it is written (Ezech. 43:2): “The glory of the union. Therefore it seems that the habitual grace did not God of Israel came in by the way of the east. . . and the follow but rather preceded the union. earth shone with His majesty.” But the presence of God Objection 3. Further, the common precedes the in Christ is by the union of human nature with the Divine proper. But habitual grace is common to Christ and other Person. Hence the habitual grace of Christ is understood men; and the grace of union is proper to Christ. Therefore to follow this union, as light follows the sun. Thirdly, the habitual grace is prior in thought to the union. Therefore reason of this union can be taken from the end of grace, it does not follow it. since it is ordained to acting rightly, and action belongs to On the contrary, It is written (Is. 42:1): “Behold the suppositum and the individual. Hence action and, in my servant, I will uphold Him. . . “and farther on: “I have consequence, grace ordaining thereto, presuppose the hy- given My Spirit upon Him”; and this pertains to the gift postasis which operates. Now the hypostasis did not exist of habitual grace. Hence it remains that the assumption in the human nature before the union, as is clear from q. 4, of human nature to the unity of the Person preceded the a. 2. Therefore the grace of union precedes, in thought, habitual grace of Christ. habitual grace. I answer that, The union of the human nature with the Reply to Objection 1. Augustine here means by grace Divine Person, which, as we have said above (q. 2, a. 10; the gratuitous will of God, bestowing benefits gratis; and q. 6, a. 6), is the grace of union, precedes the habitual hence every man is said to be made a Christian by the grace of Christ, not in order of time, but by nature and in same grace whereby a Man became Christ, since both take thought; and this for a triple reason: First, with reference place by the gratuitous will of God without merits. to the order of the principles of both. For the principle of Reply to Objection 2. As disposition in the order of the union is the Person of the Son assuming human na- generation precedes the perfection to which it disposes, ture, Who is said to be sent into the world, inasmuch as in such things as are gradually perfected; so it naturally He assumed human nature; but the principle of habitual follows the perfection which one has already obtained; as 2130 heat, which was a disposition to the form of fire, is an ef-proper, when both are of the same genus; but when they fect flowing from the form of already existing fire. Now are of divers genera, there is nothing to prevent the proper the human nature in Christ is united to the Person of the being prior to the common. Now the grace of union is Word from the beginning without succession. Hence ha- not in the same genus as habitual grace; but is above all bitual grace is not understood to have preceded the union, genera even as the Divine Person Himself. Hence there is but to have followed it; as a natural property. Hence, as nothing to prevent this proper from being before the com- Augustine says (Enchiridion xl): “Grace is in a manner mon since it does not result from something being added natural to the Man Christ.” to the common, but is rather the principle and source of Reply to Objection 3. The common precedes the that which is common. 2131 THIRD PART, QUESTION 8 Of the Grace of Christ, As He Is the Head of the Church (In Eight Articles) We must now consider the grace of Christ as the Head of the Church; and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ is the Head of the Church? (2) Whether He is the Head of men as regards their bodies or only as regards their souls? (3) Whether He is the Head of all men? (4) Whether He is the Head of the angels? (5) Whether the grace of Christ as Head of the Church is the same as His habitual grace as an individual man? (6) Whether to be Head of the Church is proper to Christ? (7) Whether the devil is the head of all the wicked? (8) Whether Anti-christ can be called the head of all the wicked? Whether Christ is the Head of the Church? IIIa q. 8 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it does not belong them in their acts, is from the head, by reason of the sen- to Christ as man to be Head of the Church. For the head sitive and motive power there ruling; hence the ruler is imparts sense and motion to the members. Now spiritual called the head of a people, according to 1 Kings 15:17: sense and motion which are by grace, are not imparted “When thou wast a little one in thy own eyes, wast thou to us by the Man Christ, because, as Augustine says (De not made the head of the tribes of Israel?” Now these three Trin. i, 12; xv, 24), “not even Christ, as man, but only things belong spiritually to Christ. First, on account of His as God, bestows the Holy Ghost.” Therefore it does not nearness to God His grace is the highest and first, though belong to Him as man to be Head of the Church. not in time, since all have received grace on account of His Objection 2. Further, it is not fitting for the head to grace, according to Rom. 8:29: “For whom He foreknew, have a head. But God is the Head of Christ, as man, He also predestinated to be made conformable to the im- according to 1 Cor. 11:3, “The Head of Christ is God.” age of His Son; that He might be the first-born amongst Therefore Christ Himself is not a head. many brethren.” Secondly, He had perfection as regards Objection 3. Furthermore, the head of a man is a the fulness of all graces, according to Jn. 1:14, “We saw particular member, receiving an influx from the heart. Him [Vulg.: ‘His glory’]. . . full of grace and truth,” as was But Christ is the universal principle of the whole Church. shown, q. 7, a. 9. Thirdly, He has the power of bestowing Therefore He is not the Head of the Church. grace on all the members of the Church, according to Jn. On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 1:22): “And 1:16: “Of His fulness we have all received.” And thus it is He. . . hath made Him head over all the Church.” plain that Christ is fittingly called the Head of the Church. I answer that, As the whole Church is termed one Reply to Objection 1. To give grace or the Holy mystic body from its likeness to the natural body of a man, Ghost belongs to Christ as He is God, authoritatively; but which in divers members has divers acts, as the Apostle instrumentally it belongs also to Him as man, inasmuch teaches (Rom. 12; 1 Cor. 12), so likewise Christ is called as His manhood is the instrument of His Godhead. And the Head of the Church from a likeness with the human hence by the power of the Godhead His actions were ben- head, in which we may consider three things, viz. order, eficial, i.e. by causing grace in us, both meritoriously and perfection, and power: “Order,” indeed; for the head is efficiently. But Augustine denies that Christ as man gives the first part of man, beginning from the higher part; and the Holy Ghost authoritatively. Even other saints are said hence it is that every principle is usually called a head ac- to give the Holy Ghost instrumentally, or ministerially, ac- cording to Ezech. 16:25: “At every head of the way, thou cording to Gal. 3:5: “He. . . who giveth to you the Spirit.” hast set up a sign of thy prostitution”—“Perfection,” inas- Reply to Objection 2. In metaphorical speech we much as in the head dwell all the senses, both interior and must not expect a likeness in all respects; for thus there exterior, whereas in the other members there is only touch, would be not likeness but identity. Accordingly a natu- and hence it is said (Is. 9:15): “The aged and honorable, ral head has not another head because one human body he is the head”—“Power,” because the power and move- is not part of another; but a metaphorical body, i.e. an ment of the other members, together with the direction of ordered multitude, is part of another multitude as the do- 2132 mestic multitude is part of the civil multitude; and hence eminence over the other exterior members; but the heart the father who is head of the domestic multitude has a has a certain hidden influence. And hence the Holy Ghost head above him, i.e. the civil governor. And hence there is likened to the heart, since He invisibly quickens and is no reason why God should not be the Head of Christ, unifies the Church; but Christ is likened to the Head in although Christ Himself is Head of the Church. His visible nature in which man is set over man. Reply to Objection 3. The head has a manifest pre- Whether Christ is the Head of men as to their bodies or only as to their souls? IIIa q. 8 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ is not the Head that the manhood of Christ had the power of “influence,” of men as to their bodies. For Christ is said to be the Head inasmuch as it is united to the Word of God, to Whom of the Church inasmuch as He bestows spiritual sense and His body is united through the soul, as stated above (q. 6, the movement of grace on the Church. But a body is not a. 1). Hence the whole manhood of Christ, i.e. according capable of this spiritual sense and movement. Therefore to soul and body, influences all, both in soul and body; Christ is not the Head of men as regards their bodies. but principally the soul, and secondarily the body: First, Objection 2. Further, we share bodies with the brutes. inasmuch as the “members of the body are presented as in- If therefore Christ was the Head of men as to their bodies, struments of justice” in the soul that lives through Christ, it would follow that He was the Head of brute animals; as the Apostle says (Rom. 6:13): secondly, inasmuch as and this is not fitting. the life of glory flows from the soul on to the body, ac- Objection 3. Further, Christ took His body from other cording to Rom. 8:11: “He that raised up Jesus from the men, as is clear from Mat. 1 and Luke 3. But the head is dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies, because of the first of the members, as was said above (a. 1, ad 3). His Spirit that dwelleth in you.” Therefore Christ is not the Head of the Church as regards Reply to Objection 1. The spiritual sense of grace bodies. does not reach to the body first and principally, but secon- On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 3:21): “Who will darily and instrumentally, as was said above. reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of Reply to Objection 2. The body of an animal has no His glory.” relation to a rational soul, as the human body has. Hence I answer that, The human body has a natural rela- there is no parity. tion to the rational soul, which is its proper form and mo- Reply to Objection 3. Although Christ drew the mat- tor. Inasmuch as the soul is its form, it receives from the ter of His body from other men, yet all draw from Him soul life and the other properties which belong specifically the immortal life of their body, according to 1 Cor. 15:22: to man; but inasmuch as the soul is its motor, the body “And as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made serves the soul instrumentally. Therefore we must hold alive.” Whether Christ is the Head of all men? IIIa q. 8 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ is not the Head Heb. 8:5: “Who serve unto the example and shadow of of all men. For the head has no relation except to the mem- heavenly things.” Hence they did not pertain to Christ’s bers of its body. Now the unbaptized are nowise members body, and therefore Christ is not the Head of all men. of the Church which is the body of Christ, as it is written On the contrary, It is written (1 Tim. 4:10): “Who is (Eph. 1:23). Therefore Christ is not the Head of all men. the Saviour of all men, especially of the faithful,” and (1 Objection 2. Further, the Apostle writes to the Eph- Jn. 2:2): “He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for esians (5:25,27): “Christ delivered Himself up for” the ours only, but also for those of the whole world.” Now to Church “that He might present it to Himself a glorious save men and to be a propitiation for their sins belongs to Church, not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing.” But Christ as Head. Therefore Christ is the Head of all men. there are many of the faithful in whom is found the spot I answer that, This is the difference between the nat- or the wrinkle of sin. Therefore Christ is not the Head of ural body of man and the Church’s mystical body, that all the faithful. the members of the natural body are all together, and the Objection 3. Further, the sacraments of the Old Law members of the mystical are not all together—neither as are compared to Christ as the shadow to the body, as is regards their natural being, since the body of the Church written (Col. 2:17). But the fathers of the Old Testament is made up of the men who have been from the beginning in their day served unto these sacraments, according to of the world until its end—nor as regards their supernat- 2133 ural being, since, of those who are at any one time, some cient for the salvation of the whole human race; secondly, there are who are without grace, yet will afterwards obtain in free-will. it, and some have it already. We must therefore consider Reply to Objection 2. To be “a glorious Church not the members of the mystical body not only as they are in having spot or wrinkle” is the ultimate end to which we act, but as they are in potentiality. Nevertheless, some are are brought by the Passion of Christ. Hence this will be in in potentiality who will never be reduced to act, and some heaven, and not on earth, in which “if we say we have no are reduced at some time to act; and this according to the sin, we deceive ourselves,” as is written (1 Jn. 1:8). Nev- triple class, of which the first is by faith, the second by the ertheless, there are some, viz. mortal, sins from which charity of this life, the third by the fruition of the life to they are free who are members of Christ by the actual come. Hence we must say that if we take the whole time union of charity; but such as are tainted with these sins of the world in general, Christ is the Head of all men, but are not members of Christ actually, but potentially; ex- diversely. For, first and principally, He is the Head of such cept, perhaps, imperfectly, by formless faith, which unites as are united to Him by glory; secondly, of those who are to God, relatively but not simply, viz. so that man partake actually united to Him by charity; thirdly, of those who are of the life of grace. For, as is written (James 2:20): “Faith actually united to Him by faith; fourthly, of those who are without works is dead.” Yet such as these receive from united to Him merely in potentiality, which is not yet re- Christ a certain vital act, i.e. to believe, as if a lifeless duced to act, yet will be reduced to act according to Divine limb were moved by a man to some extent. predestination; fifthly, of those who are united to Him in Reply to Objection 3. The holy Fathers made use of potentiality, which will never be reduced to act; such are the legal sacraments, not as realities, but as images and those men existing in the world, who are not predestined, shadows of what was to come. Now it is the same motion who, however, on their departure from this world, wholly to an image as image, and to the reality, as is clear from cease to be members of Christ, as being no longer in po- the Philosopher (De Memor. et Remin. ii). Hence the tentiality to be united to Christ. ancient Fathers, by observing the legal sacraments, were Reply to Objection 1. Those who are unbaptized, borne to Christ by the same faith and love whereby we though not actually in the Church, are in the Church po- also are borne to Him, and hence the ancient Fathers be- tentially. And this potentiality is rooted in two things— long to the same Church as we. first and principally, in the power of Christ, which is suffi- Whether Christ is the Head of the angels? IIIa q. 8 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ as man is not is the head of all Principality and Power,” and the same the head of the angels. For the head and members are of reason holds good with the other orders of angels. There- one nature. But Christ as man is not of the same nature fore Christ is the Head of the angels. with the angels, but only with men, since, as is written I answer that, As was said above (a. 1, ad 2), where (Heb. 2:16): “For nowhere doth He take hold of the an- there is one body we must allow that there is one head. gels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold.” There- Now a multitude ordained to one end, with distinct acts fore Christ as man is not the head of the angels. and duties, may be metaphorically called one body. But it Objection 2. Further, Christ is the head of such as be- is manifest that both men and angels are ordained to one long to the Church, which is His Body, as is written (Eph. end, which is the glory of the Divine fruition. Hence the 1:23). But the angels do not belong to the Church. For mystical body of the Church consists not only of men but the Church is the congregation of the faithful: and in the of angels. Now of all this multitude Christ is the Head, angels there is no faith, for they do not “walk by faith” since He is nearer God, and shares His gifts more fully, but “by sight,” otherwise they would be “absent from the not only than man, but even than angels; and of His in- Lord,” as the Apostle argues (2 Cor. 5:6,7). Therefore fluence not only men but even angels partake, since it is Christ as man is not head of the angels. written (Eph. 1:20-22): that God the Father set “Him,” Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Tract. xix; namely Christ, “on His right hand in the heavenly places, xxiii in Joan.), that as “the Word” which “was in the be- above all Principality and Power and Virtue and Domin- ginning with the Father” quickens souls, so the “Word ion and every name that is named not only in this world, made flesh” quickens bodies, which angels lack. But the but also in that which is to come. And He hath subjected Word made flesh is Christ as man. Therefore Christ as all things under His feet.” Therefore Christ is not only the man does not give life to angels, and hence as man He is Head of men, but of angels. Hence we read (Mat. 4:11) not the head of the angels. that “angels came and ministered to Him.” On the contrary, The Apostle says (Col. 2:10), “Who Reply to Objection 1. Christ’s influence over men is 2134 chiefly with regard to their souls; wherein men agree with having grace and glory most fully. angels in generic nature, though not in specific nature. By Reply to Objection 3. Augustine here uses the simili- reason of this agreement Christ can be said to be the Head tude of cause and effect, i.e. inasmuch as corporeal things of the angels, although the agreement falls short as regards act on bodies, and spiritual things on spiritual things. Nev- the body. ertheless, the humanity of Christ, by virtue of the spiritual Reply to Objection 2. The Church, on earth, is the nature, i.e. the Divine, can cause something not only in congregation of the faithful; but, in heaven, it is the con- the spirits of men, but also in the spirits of angels, on gregation of comprehensors. Now Christ was not merely account of its most close conjunction with God, i.e. by a wayfarer, but a comprehensor. And therefore He is the personal union. Head not merely of the faithful, but of comprehensors, as Whether the grace of Christ, as Head of the Church, is the same as His habitual grace, IIIa q. 8 a. 5 inasmuch as He is Man? Objection 1. It would seem that the grace whereby ers by reason of a certain pre-eminence. Now it was said Christ is Head of the Church and the individual grace of above (a. 1; q. 7, a. 9) grace was received by the soul the Man are not the same. For the Apostle says (Rom. of Christ in the highest way; and therefore from this pre- 5:15): “If by the offense of one many died, much more eminence of grace which He received, it is from Him that the grace of God and the gift, by the grace of one man, Je- this grace is bestowed on others—and this belongs to the sus Christ, hath abounded unto many.” But the actual sin nature of head. Hence the personal grace, whereby the of Adam is distinct from original sin which he transmitted soul of Christ is justified, is essentially the same as His to his posterity. Hence the personal grace which is proper grace, as He is the Head of the Church, and justifies oth- to Christ is distinct from His grace, inasmuch as He is the ers; but there is a distinction of reason between them. Head of the Church, which flows to others from Him. Reply to Objection 1. Original sin in Adam, which Objection 2. Further, habits are distinguished by acts. is a sin of the nature, is derived from his actual sin, which But the personal grace of Christ is ordained to one act, is a personal sin, because in him the person corrupted the viz. the sanctification of His soul; and the capital grace is nature; and by means of this corruption the sin of the first ordained to another, viz. to sanctifying others. Therefore man is transmitted to posterity, inasmuch as the corrupt the personal grace of Christ is distinct from His grace as nature corrupts the person. Now grace is not vouchsafed He is the Head of the Church. us by means of human nature, but solely by the personal Objection 3. Further, as was said above (q. 6, a. 6), action of Christ Himself. Hence we must not distinguish a in Christ we distinguish a threefold grace, viz. the grace twofold grace in Christ, one corresponding to the nature, of union, capital grace, and the individual grace of the the other to the person as in Adam we distinguish the sin Man. Now the individual grace of Christ is distinct from of the nature and of the person. the grace of union. Therefore it is also distinct from the Reply to Objection 2. Different acts, one of which capital grace. is the reason and the cause of the other, do not diversify a On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:16): “Of His habit. Now the act of the personal grace which is formally fulness we all have received.” Now He is our Head, inas- to sanctify its subject, is the reason of the justification of much as we receive from Him. Therefore He is our Head, others, which pertains to capital grace. Hence it is that the inasmuch as He has the fulness of grace. Now He had the essence of the habit is not diversified by this difference. fulness of grace, inasmuch as personal grace was in Him Reply to Objection 3. Personal and capital grace are in its perfection, as was said above (q. 7, a. 9). Hence His ordained to an act; but the grace of union is not ordained capital and personal grace are not distinct. to an act, but to the personal being. Hence the personal I answer that, Since everything acts inasmuch as it is and the capital grace agree in the essence of the habit; but a being in act, it must be the same act whereby it is in act the grace of union does not, although the personal grace and whereby it acts, as it is the same heat whereby fire can be called in a manner the grace of union, inasmuch as is hot and whereby it heats. Yet not every act whereby it brings about a fitness for the union; and thus the grace anything is in act suffices for its being the principle of act- of union, the capital, and the personal grace are one in ing upon others. For since the agent is nobler than the essence, though there is a distinction of reason between patient, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16) and the them. Philosopher (De Anima iii, 19), the agent must act on oth- 2135 Whether it is proper to Christ to be Head of the Church? IIIa q. 8 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that it is not proper to Christ to belong to others; and in this way others may be called be Head of the Church. For it is written (1 Kings 15:17): heads of the Church, according to Amos 6:1, “Ye great “When thou wast a little one in thy own eyes, wast thou men, heads of the people”; differently, however, from not made the head of the tribes of Israel?” Now there is Christ. First, inasmuch as Christ is the Head of all who but one Church in the New and the Old Testament. There- pertain to the Church in every place and time and state; fore it seems that with equal reason any other man than but all other men are called heads with reference to cer- Christ might be head of the Church. tain special places, as bishops of their Churches. Or with Objection 2. Further, Christ is called Head of the reference to a determined time as the Pope is the head of Church from His bestowing grace on the Church’s mem- the whole Church, viz. during the time of his Pontificate, bers. But it belongs to others also to grant grace to others, and with reference to a determined state, inasmuch as they according to Eph. 4:29: “Let no evil speech proceed from are in the state of wayfarers. Secondly, because Christ is your mouth; but that which is good to the edification of the Head of the Church by His own power and authority; faith, that it may administer grace to the hearers.” There- while others are called heads, as taking Christ’s place, ac- fore it seems to belong also to others than Christ to be cording to 2 Cor. 2:10, “For what I have pardoned, if I head of the Church. have pardoned anything, for your sakes I have done it in Objection 3. Further, Christ by His ruling over the the person of Christ,” and 2 Cor. 5:20, “For Christ there- Church is not only called “Head,” but also “Shepherd” fore we are ambassadors, God, as it were, exhorting by and “Foundation.” Now Christ did not retain for Himself us.” alone the name of Shepherd, according to 1 Pet. 5:4, “And Reply to Objection 1. The word “head” is employed when the prince of pastors shall appear, you shall receive in that passage in regard to exterior government; as a king a never-fading crown of glory”; nor the name of Founda- is said to be the head of his kingdom. tion, according to Apoc. 21:14: “And the wall of the city Reply to Objection 2. Man does not distribute grace had twelve foundations.” Therefore it seems that He did by interior influx, but by exteriorly persuading to the ef- not retain the name of Head for Himself alone. fects of grace. On the contrary, It is written (Col. 2:19): “The head” Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (Tract. xlvi of the Church is that “from which the whole body, by in Joan.): “If the rulers of the Church are Shepherds, how joints and bands being supplied with nourishment and is there one Shepherd, except that all these are members of compacted groweth unto the increase of God.” But this one Shepherd?” So likewise others may be called founda- belongs only to Christ. Therefore Christ alone is Head of tions and heads, inasmuch as they are members of the one the Church. Head and Foundation. Nevertheless, as Augustine says I answer that, The head influences the other members (Tract. xlvii), “He gave to His members to be shepherds; in two ways. First, by a certain intrinsic influence, inas- yet none of us calleth himself the Door. He kept this for much as motive and sensitive force flow from the head to Himself alone.” And this because by door is implied the the other members; secondly, by a certain exterior guid- principal authority, inasmuch as it is by the door that all ance, inasmuch as by sight and the senses, which are enter the house; and it is Christ alone by “Whom also we rooted in the head, man is guided in his exterior acts. Now have access. . . into this grace, wherein we stand” (Rom. the interior influx of grace is from no one save Christ, 5:2); but by the other names above-mentioned there may Whose manhood, through its union with the Godhead, has be implied not merely the principal but also the secondary the power of justifying; but the influence over the mem- authority. bers of the Church, as regards their exterior guidance, can Whether the devil is the head of all the wicked? IIIa q. 8 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the devil is not the But not every sin is from the devil; and this is plain as head of the wicked. For it belongs to the head to diffuse regards the demons, who did not sin through the persua- sense and movement into the members, as a gloss says, sion of another; so likewise not every sin of man proceeds on Eph. 1:22, “And made Him head,” etc. But the devil from the devil, for it is said (De Eccles. Dogm. lxxxii): has no power of spreading the evil of sin, which proceeds “Not all our wicked thoughts are always raised up by the from the will of the sinner. Therefore the devil cannot be suggestion of the devil; but sometimes they spring from called the head of the wicked. the movement of our will.” Therefore the devil is not the Objection 2. Further, by every sin a man is made evil. head of all the wicked. 2136 Objection 3. Further, one head is placed on one body. the appearance of liberty, according to Jer. 2:20: “Of old But the whole multitude of the wicked do not seem to have time thou hast broken my yoke, thou hast burst my bands, anything in which they are united, for evil is contrary to and thou saidst, ‘I will not serve.’ ” Hence, inasmuch as evil and springs from divers defects, as Dionysius says some are brought to this end by sinning, they fall under (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore the devil cannot be called the the rule and government of the devil, and therefore he is head of all the wicked. called their head. On the contrary, A gloss∗ on Job 18:17, “Let the Reply to Objection 1. Although the devil does not memory of him perish from the earth,” says: “This is said influence the rational mind interiorly, yet he beguiles it to of every evil one, yet so as to be referred to the head,” i.e. evil by persuasion. the devil. Reply to Objection 2. A governor does not always I answer that, As was said above (a. 6), the head not suggest to his subjects to obey his will; but proposes to only influences the members interiorly, but also governs all the sign of his will, in consequence of which some are them exteriorly, directing their actions to an end. Hence incited by inducement, and some of their own free-will, it may be said that anyone is the head of a multitude, ei- as is plain in the leader of an army, whose standard all the ther as regards both, i.e. by interior influence and exterior soldiers follow, though no one persuades them. Therefore governance, and thus Christ is the Head of the Church, as in the same way, the first sin of the devil, who “sinneth was stated (a. 6); or as regards exterior governance, and from the beginning” (1 Jn. 3:8), is held out to all to be thus every prince or prelate is head of the multitude sub- followed, and some imitate at his suggestion, and some ject to him. And in this way the devil is head of all the of their own will without any suggestion. And hence the wicked. For, as is written (Job 41:25): “He is king over devil is the head of all the wicked, inasmuch as they imi- all the children of pride.” Now it belongs to a governor to tate Him, according to Wis. 2:24,25: “By the envy of the lead those whom he governs to their end. But the end of devil, death came into the world. And they follow him the devil is the aversion of the rational creature from God; that are of his side.” hence from the beginning he has endeavored to lead man Reply to Objection 3. All sins agree in aversion from obeying the Divine precept. But aversion from God from God, although they differ by conversion to different has the nature of an end, inasmuch as it is sought for under changeable goods. Whether Anti-christ may be called the head of all the wicked? IIIa q. 8 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that Antichrist is not the him were not beguiled into wickedness by him nor have head of the wicked. For there are not several heads of one imitated his wickedness. Hence he cannot be called the body. But the devil is the head of the multitude of the head of all the wicked in this way, but of some. Therefore wicked. Therefore Anti-christ is not their head. it remains to be said that he is the head of all the wicked Objection 2. Further, Anti-christ is a member of the by reason of the perfection of his wickedness. Hence, on 2 devil. Now the head is distinguished from the members. Thess. 2:4, “Showing himself as if he were God,” a gloss Therefore Anti-christ is not the head of the wicked. says: “As in Christ dwelt the fulness of the Godhead, so Objection 3. Further, the head has an influence over in Anti-christ the fulness of all wickedness.” Not indeed the members. But Anti-christ has no influence over the as if his humanity were assumed by the devil into unity of wicked who have preceded him. Therefore Anti-christ is person, as the humanity of Christ by the Son of God; but not the head of the wicked. that the devil by suggestion infuses his wickedness more On the contrary, A gloss† on Job 21:29, “Ask any of copiously into him than into all others. And in this way all them that go by the way,” says: “Whilst he was speak- the wicked who have gone before are signs of Anti-christ, ing of the body of all the wicked, suddenly he turned his according to 2 Thess. 2:7, “For the mystery of iniquity speech to Anti-christ the head of all evil-doers.” already worketh.” I answer that, As was said above (a. 1), in the head Reply to Objection 1. The devil and Anti-christ are are found three things: order, perfection, and the power not two heads, but one; since Anti-christ is called the of influencing. But as regards the order of the body, Anti- head, inasmuch as the wickedness of the devil is most christ is not said to be the head of the wicked as if his sin fully impressed on him. Hence, on 2 Thess. 2:4, “Show- had preceded, as the sin of the devil preceded. So likewise ing himself as if he were God,” a gloss says: “The head of he is not called the head of the wicked from the power of all the wicked, namely the devil, who is king over all the influencing, although he will pervert some in his day by children of pride will be in him.” Now he is said to be in exterior persuasion; nevertheless those who were before him not by personal union, nor by indwelling, since “the ∗ St. Gregory, Moral. xiv † St. Gregory, Moral. xv 2137 Trinity alone dwells in the mind” (as is said De Eccles. Reply to Objection 3. Anti-christ is said to be the Dogm. lxxxiii), but by the effect of wickedness. head of all the wicked not by a likeness of influence, but Reply to Objection 2. As the head of Christ is God, by a likeness of perfection. For in him the devil, as it and yet He is the Head of the Church, as was said above were, brings his wickedness to a head, in the same way (a. 1, ad 2), so likewise Anti-christ is a member of the that anyone is said to bring his purpose to a head when he devil and yet is head of the wicked. executes it. 2138 THIRD PART, QUESTION 9 Of Christ’s Knowledge in General (In Four Articles) We must now consider Christ’s knowledge; concerning which the consideration will be twofold. First, of Christ’s knowledge in general; secondly, of each particular kind of knowledge He had. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ had any knowledge besides the Divine? (2) Whether He had the knowledge which the blessed or comprehensors have? (3) Whether He had an imprinted or infused knowledge? (4) Whether He had any acquired knowledge? Whether Christ had any knowledge besides the Divine? IIIa q. 9 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was human race was to be brought back to perfection by its no knowledge except the Divine. For knowledge is neces- means. Hence it behooved the soul of Christ to be per- sary that things may be known thereby. But by His Divine fected by a knowledge, which would be its proper per- knowledge Christ knew all things. Therefore any other fection. And therefore it was necessary that there should knowledge would have been superfluous in Him. be another knowledge in Christ besides the Divine knowl- Objection 2. Further, the lesser light is dimmed by the edge, otherwise the soul of Christ would have been more greater. But all created knowledge in comparison with the imperfect than the souls of the rest of men. Secondly, be- uncreated knowledge of God is as the lesser to the greater cause, since everything is on account of its operation, as light. Therefore there shone in Christ no other knowledge stated De Coel. ii, 17, Christ would have had an intellec- except the Divine. tive soul to no purpose if He had not understood by it; and Objection 3. Further, the union of the human nature this pertains to created knowledge. Thirdly, because some with the Divine took place in the Person, as is clear from created knowledge pertains to the nature of the human q. 2, a. 2. Now, according to some there is in Christ a cer- soul, viz. that whereby we naturally know first principles; tain “knowledge of the union,” whereby Christ knew what since we are here taking knowledge for any cognition of belongs to the mystery of the Incarnation more fully than the human intellect. Now nothing natural was wanting to anyone else. Hence, since the personal union contains two Christ, since He took the whole human nature, as stated natures, it would seem that there are not two knowledges above (q. 5). And hence the Sixth Council∗ condemned in Christ, but one only, pertaining to both natures. the opinion of those who denied that in Christ there are On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Incarnat. vii): two knowledges or wisdoms. “God assumed the perfection of human nature in the flesh; Reply to Objection 1. Christ knew all things with the He took upon Himself the sense of man, but not the Divine knowledge by an uncreated operation which is the swollen sense of the flesh.” But created knowledge per- very Essence of God; since God’s understanding is His tains to the sense of man. Therefore in Christ there was substance, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. xii, text. created knowledge. 39). Hence this act could not belong to the human soul of I answer that, As said above (q. 5), the Son of God Christ, seeing that it belongs to another nature. Therefore, assumed an entire human nature, i.e. not only a body, if there had been no other knowledge in the soul of Christ, but also a soul, and not only a sensitive, but also a ra- it would have known nothing; and thus it would have been tional soul. And therefore it behooved Him to have cre- assumed to no purpose, since everything is on account of ated knowledge, for three reasons. First, on account of its operation. the soul’s perfection. For the soul, considered in itself, is Reply to Objection 2. If the two lights are sup- in potentiality to knowing intelligible things. since it is posed to be in the same order, the lesser is dimmed by the like “a tablet on which nothing is written,” and yet it may greater, as the light of the sun dims the light of a candle, be written upon through the possible intellect, whereby it both being in the class of illuminants. But if we suppose may become all things, as is said De Anima iii, 18. Now two lights, one of which is in the class of illuminants and what is in potentiality is imperfect unless reduced to act. the other in the class of illuminated, the lesser light is not But it was fitting that the Son of God should assume, not dimmed by the greater, but rather is strengthened, as the an imperfect, but a perfect human nature, since the whole light of the air by the light of the sun. And in this man- ∗ Third Council of Constantinople, Act. 4 2139 ner the light of knowledge is not dimmed, but rather is union whereby there is one hypostasis of God and man, heightened in the soul of Christ by the light of the Divine the things of God are attributed to man, and the things knowledge, which is “the true light which enlighteneth of man are attributed to God, as was said above (q. 3, every man that cometh into this world,” as is written Jn. Aa. 1,6). But on the part of the union itself we cannot ad- 1:9. mit any knowledge in Christ. For this union is in personal Reply to Objection 3. On the part of what are united being, and knowledge belongs to person only by reason of we hold there is a knowledge in Christ, both as to His Di- a nature. vine and as to His human nature; so that, by reason of the Whether Christ had the knowledge which the blessed or comprehensors have? IIIa q. 9 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was is ordained to it as to an end; since the rational creature not the knowledge of the blessed or comprehensors. For is capable of that blessed knowledge, inasmuch as he is the knowledge of the blessed is a participation of Divine made in the image of God. Now men are brought to this light, according to Ps. 35:10: “In Thy light we shall see end of beatitude by the humanity of Christ, according to light.” Now Christ had not a participated light, but He had Heb. 2:10: “For it became Him, for Whom are all things, the Godhead Itself substantially abiding in Him, accord- and by Whom are all things, Who had brought many chil- ing to Col. 2:9: “For in Him dwelleth all the fulness of dren unto glory, to perfect the author of their salvation by the Godhead corporeally.” Therefore in Christ there was His passion.” And hence it was necessary that the beatific not the knowledge of the blessed. knowledge, which consists in the vision of God, should Objection 2. Further, the knowledge of the blessed belong to Christ pre-eminently, since the cause ought al- makes them blessed, according to Jn. 17:3: “This is eter- ways to be more efficacious than the effect. nal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Reply to Objection 1. The Godhead is united to the Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent.” But this Man was manhood of Christ in Person, not in essence or nature; yet blessed through being united to God in person, according with the unity of Person remains the distinction of natures. to Ps. 64:5: “Blessed is He Whom Thou hast chosen and And therefore the soul of Christ, which is a part of human taken to Thee.” Therefore it is not necessary to suppose nature, through a light participated from the Divine Na- the knowledge of the blessed in Him. ture, is perfected with the beatific knowledge whereby it Objection 3. Further, to man belongs a double sees God in essence. knowledge—one by nature, one above nature. Now the Reply to Objection 2. By the union this Man is knowledge of the blessed, which consists in the vision of blessed with the uncreated beatitude, even as by the union God, is not natural to man, but above his nature. But in He is God; yet besides the uncreated beatitude it was nec- Christ there was another and much higher supernatural essary that there should be in the human nature of Christ knowledge, i.e. the Divine knowledge. Therefore there a created beatitude, whereby His soul was established in was no need of the knowledge of the blessed in Christ. the last end of human nature. On the contrary, The knowledge of the blessed con- Reply to Objection 3. The beatific vision and knowl- sists in the knowledge of God. But He knew God fully, edge are to some extent above the nature of the rational even as He was man, according to Jn. 8:55: “I do know soul, inasmuch as it cannot reach it of its own strength; Him, and do keep His word.” Therefore in Christ there but in another way it is in accordance with its nature, inas- was the knowledge of the blessed. much as it is capable of it by nature, having been made to I answer that, What is in potentiality is reduced to act the likeness of God, as stated above. But the uncreated by what is in act; for that whereby things are heated must knowledge is in every way above the nature of the human itself be hot. Now man is in potentiality to the knowledge soul. of the blessed, which consists in the vision of God; and Whether Christ had an imprinted or infused knowledge? IIIa q. 9 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that there was not in the enigmatical vision of faith, as is plain from 1 Cor. Christ another infused knowledge besides the beatific 13:10,12. Since, therefore, in Christ there was the beatific knowledge. For all other knowledge compared to the knowledge, as stated above (a. 2), it would seem that there beatific knowledge is like imperfect to perfect. But im- could not be any other imprinted knowledge. perfect knowledge is removed by the presence of per- Objection 2. Further, an imperfect mode of cogni- fect knowledge, as the clear “face-to-face” vision removes tion disposes towards a more perfect, as opinion, the re- 2140 sult of dialectical syllogisms, disposes towards science, besides the Divine and uncreated knowledge in Christ, which results from demonstrative syllogisms. Now, when there is in His soul a beatific knowledge, whereby He perfection is reached, there is no further need of the dis- knows the Word, and things in the Word; and an infused or position, even as on reaching the end motion is no longer imprinted knowledge, whereby He knows things in their necessary. Hence, since every created cognition is com- proper nature by intelligible species proportioned to the pared to beatific cognition, as imperfect to perfect and as human mind. disposition to its term, it seems that since Christ had be- Reply to Objection 1. The imperfect vision of faith atific knowledge, it was not necessary for Him to have any is essentially opposed to manifest vision, seeing that it is other knowledge. of the essence of faith to have reference to the unseen, as Objection 3. Further, as corporeal matter is in po- was said above ( IIa IIae, q. 1, a. 4). But cognition by in- tentiality to sensible forms, so the possible intellect is in fused species includes no opposition to beatific cognition. potentiality to intelligible forms. Now corporeal matter Therefore there is no parity. cannot receive two forms at once! one more perfect and Reply to Objection 2. Disposition is referred to per- the other less perfect. Therefore neither can the soul re- fection in two ways: first, as a way leading to perfection; ceive a double knowledge at once, one more perfect and secondly, as an effect proceeding from perfection; thus the other less perfect; and hence the same conclusion as matter is disposed by heat to receive the form of fire, and, above. when this comes, the heat does not cease, but remains as On the contrary, It is written (Col. 2:3) that in Christ an effect of this form. So, too, opinion caused by a dialec- “are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.” tical syllogism is a way to knowledge, which is acquired I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), it was fitting that by demonstration, yet, when this has been acquired, there the human nature assumed by the Word of God should not may still remain the knowledge gained by the dialectical be imperfect. Now everything in potentiality is imperfect syllogism, following, so to say, the demonstrative knowl- unless it be reduced to act. But the passive intellect of edge, which is based on the cause, since he who knows man is in potentiality to all intelligible things. and it is the cause is thereby enabled the better to understand the reduced to act by intelligible species, which are its com- probable signs from which dialectical syllogisms proceed. pletive forms, as is plain from what is said De Anima iii, So likewise in Christ, together with the beatific knowl- 32,38. And hence we must admit in the soul of Christ edge, there still remains infused knowledge, not as a way an infused knowledge, inasmuch as the Word of God im- to beatitude, but as strengthened by beatitude. printed upon the soul of Christ, which is personally united Reply to Objection 3. The beatific knowledge is not to Him, intelligible species of all things to which the pos- by a species, that is a similitude of the Divine Essence, or sible intellect is in potentiality; even as in the beginning of whatever is known in the Divine Essence, as is plain of the creation of things, the Word of God imprinted in- from what has been said in the Ia, q. 12, a. 2; but it is a telligible species upon the angelic mind, as is clear from knowledge of the Divine Essence immediately, inasmuch Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). And therefore, even as as the Divine Essence itself is united to the beatified mind in the angels, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, as an intelligible to an intelligent being; and the Divine 22,24,30), there is a double knowledge—one the morning Essence is a form exceeding the capacity of any creature knowledge, whereby they know things in the Word; the whatsoever. Hence, together with this super-exceeding other the evening knowledge, whereby they know things form, there is nothing to hinder from being in the ratio- in their proper natures by infused species; so likewise, nal mind, intelligible species, proportioned to its nature. Whether Christ had any acquired knowledge? IIIa q. 9 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was no ligible species divinely infused, as was said above (A. 3). empiric and acquired knowledge. For whatever befitted Therefore no acquired species could accrue to His soul. Christ, He had most perfectly. Now Christ did not possess Objection 3. Further, he who already has the habit acquired knowledge most perfectly, since He did not de- of knowledge, acquires no new habit, through what he re- vote Himself to the study of letters, by which knowledge ceives from the senses (otherwise two forms of the same is acquired in its perfection; for it is said (Jn. 7:15): “The species would be in the same thing together); but the habit Jews wondered, saying: How doth this Man know letters, which previously existed is strengthened and increased. having never learned?” Therefore it seems that in Christ Therefore, since Christ had the habit of infused knowl- there was no acquired knowledge. edge, it does not seem that He acquired a new knowledge Objection 2. Further, nothing can be added to what is through what He perceived by the senses. full. But the power of Christ’s soul was filled with intel- On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 5:8): 2141 “Whereas. . . He was the Son of God, He learned obedi-the very Essence of God is seen, is proper and natural to ence by the things which He suffered,” i.e. “experienced,” God alone, as was said in the Ia, q. 12, a. 4. says a gloss. Therefore there was in the soul of Christ an Reply to Objection 1. Since there is a twofold empiric knowledge, which is acquired knowledge. way of acquiring knowledge—by discovery and by being I answer that, As is plain from a. 1, nothing that God taught—the way of discovery is the higher, and the way planted in our nature was wanting to the human nature as- of being taught is secondary. Hence it is said (Ethic. i, 4): sumed by the Word of God. Now it is manifest that God “He indeed is the best who knows everything by himself: planted in human nature not only a passive, but an ac- yet he is good who obeys him that speaks aright.” And tive intellect. Hence it is necessary to say that in the soul hence it was more fitting for Christ to possess a knowl- of Christ there was not merely a passive, but also an ac- edge acquired by discovery than by being taught, espe- tive intellect. But if in other things God and nature make cially since He was given to be the Teacher of all, accord- nothing in vain, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 31; ing to Joel 2:23: “Be joyful in the Lord your God, because ii, 59), still less in the soul of Christ is there anything in He hath given you a Teacher of justice.” vain. Now what has not its proper operation is useless, as Reply to Objection 2. The human mind has two is said in De Coel. ii, 17. Now the proper operation of relations—one to higher things, and in this respect the the active intellect is to make intelligible species in act, soul of Christ was full of the infused knowledge. The by abstracting them from phantasms; hence, it is said (De other relation is to lower things, i.e. to phantasms, which Anima iii, 18) that the active intellect is that “whereby ev- naturally move the human mind by virtue of the active in- erything is made actual.” And thus it is necessary to say tellect. Now it was necessary that even in this respect the that in Christ there were intelligible species received in soul of Christ should be filled with knowledge, not that the the passive intellect by the action of the active intellect— first fulness was insufficient for the human mind in itself, which means that there was acquired knowledge in Him, but that it behooved it to be also perfected with regard to which some call empiric. And hence, although I wrote phantasms. differently (Sent. iii, D, xiv, a. 3; D, xviii, a. 3), it must be Reply to Objection 3. Acquired and infused habits said that in Christ there was acquired knowledge, which are not to be classed together; for the habit of knowledge is properly knowledge in a human fashion, both as re- is acquired by the relation of the human mind to phan- gards the subject receiving and as regards the active cause. tasms; hence, another habit of the same kind cannot be For such knowledge springs from Christ’s active intellect, again acquired. But the habit of infused knowledge is of a which is natural to the human soul. But infused knowl- different nature, as coming down to the soul from on high, edge is attributed to the soul, on account of a light infused and not from phantasms. And hence there is no parity be- from on high, and this manner of knowing is proportioned tween these habits. to the angelic nature. But the beatific knowledge, whereby 2142 THIRD PART, QUESTION 10 Of the Beatific Knowledge of Christ’s Soul (In Four Articles) Now we must consider each of the aforesaid knowledges. Since, however, we have treated of the Divine knowledge in the Ia, q. 14, it now remains to speak of the three others: (1) of the beatific knowledge; (2) of the infused knowledge; (3) of the acquired knowledge. But again, because much has been said in the Ia, q. 12, of the beatific knowledge, which consists in the vision of God, we shall speak here only of such things as belong properly to the soul of Christ. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the soul of Christ comprehended the Word or the Divine Essence? (2) Whether it knew all things in the Word? (3) Whether the soul of Christ knew the infinite in the Word? (4) Whether it saw the Word or the Divine Essence clearer than did any other creature? Whether the soul of Christ comprehended the Word or the Divine Essence? IIIa q. 10 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4). Now it is impos- comprehended and comprehends the Word or Divine sible for any creature to comprehend the Divine Essence, Essence. For Isidore says (De Summo Bono i, 3) that “the as was shown in the Ia, q. 12, Aa. 1,4,7, seeing that the Trinity is known only to Itself and to the Man assumed.” infinite is not comprehended by the finite. And hence it Therefore the Man assumed communicates with the Holy must be said that the soul of Christ nowise comprehends Trinity in that knowledge of Itself which is proper to the Divine Essence. the Trinity. Now this is the knowledge of comprehen- Reply to Objection 1. The Man assumed is reckoned sion. Therefore the soul of Christ comprehends the Divine with the Divine Trinity in the knowledge of Itself, not in- Essence. deed as regards comprehension, but by reason of a certain Objection 2. Further, to be united to God in personal most excellent knowledge above the rest of creatures. being is greater than to be united by vision. But as Dam- Reply to Objection 2. Not even in the union by per- ascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6), “the whole Godhead sonal being does the human nature comprehend the Word in one Person is united to the human nature in Christ.” of God or the Divine Nature, for although it was wholly Therefore much more is the whole Divine Nature seen by united to the human nature in the one Person of the Son, the soul of Christ; and hence it would seem that the soul yet the whole power of the Godhead was not circum- of Christ comprehended the Divine Essence. scribed by the human nature. Hence Augustine says (Ep. Objection 3. Further, what belongs by nature to the ad Volusian. cxxxvii): “I would have you know that it is Son of God belongs by grace to the Son of Man, as Augus- not the Christian doctrine that God was united to flesh in tine says (De Trin. i, 13). But to comprehend the Divine such a manner as to quit or lose the care of the world’s Essence belongs by nature to the Son of God. Therefore government, neither did Ne narrow or reduce it when He it belongs by grace to the Son of Man; and thus it seems transferred it to that little body.” So likewise the soul of that the soul of Christ comprehended the Divine Essence Christ sees the whole Essence of God, yet does not com- by grace. prehend It; since it does not see It totally, i.e. not as per- On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. fectly as It is knowable, as was said in the Ia, q. 12, a. 7. 14): “Whatsoever comprehends itself is finite to itself.” Reply to Objection 3. This saying of Augustine is to But the Divine Essence is not finite with respect to the be understood of the grace of union, by reason of which soul of Christ, since It infinitely exceeds it. Therefore the all that is said of the Son of God in His Divine Nature is soul of Christ does not comprehend the Word. also said of the Son of Man on account of the identity of I answer that, As is plain from q. 2, Aa. 1,6, the union suppositum. And in this way it may be said that the Son of the two natures in the Person of Christ took place in of Man is a comprehensor of the Divine Essence, not in- such a way that the properties of both natures remained deed by His soul, but in His Divine Nature; even as we unconfused, i.e. “the uncreated remained uncreated, and may also say that the Son of Man is the Creator. the created remained within the limits of the creature,” as 2143 Whether the Son of God knew all things in the Word? IIIa q. 10 a. 2 Objection 2. It would seem that the soul of Christ ery creature, and, consequently, its power and virtue, and does not know all things in the Word. For it is written all things that are in the power of the creature. (Mk. 13:32): “But of that day or hour no man knoweth, Reply to Objection 1. Arius and Eunomius under- neither the angels in heaven nor the Son, but the Father.” stood this saying, not of the knowledge of the soul, which Therefore He does not know all things in the Word. they did not hold to be in Christ, as was said above (q. 9, Objection 2. Further, the more perfectly anyone a. 1), but of the Divine knowledge of the Son, Whom they knows a principle the more he knows in the principle. held to be less than the Father as regards knowledge. But But God sees His Essence more perfectly than the soul this will not stand, since all things were made by the Word of Christ does. Therefore He knows more than the soul of God, as is said Jn. 1:3, and, amongst other things, all of Christ knows in the Word. Therefore the soul of Christ times were made by Him. Now He is not ignorant of any- does not know all things in the Word. thing that was made by Him. Objection 3. Further, the extent depends on the num- He is said, therefore, not to know the day and the hour ber of things known. If, therefore, the soul of Christ knew of the Judgment, for that He does not make it known, in the Word all that the Word knows, it would follow that since, on being asked by the apostles (Acts 1:7), He was the knowledge of the soul of Christ would equal the Di- unwilling to reveal it; and, on the contrary, we read (Gn. vine knowledge, i.e. the created would equal the uncre- 22:12): “Now I know that thou fearest God,” i.e. “Now I ated, which is impossible. have made thee know.” But the Father is said to know, be- On the contrary, on Apoc. 5:12, “The Lamb that was cause He imparted this knowledge to the Son. Hence, by slain is worthy to receive. . . divinity and wisdom,” a gloss saying but the Father, we are given to understand that the says, i.e. “the knowledge of all things.” Son knows, not merely in the Divine Nature, but also in I answer that, When it is inquired whether Christ the human, because, as Chrysostom argues (Hom. lxxviii knows all things in the Word, “all things” may be taken in in Matth.), if it is given to Christ as man to know how to two ways: First, properly, to stand for all that in any way judge—which is greater—much more is it given to Him to whatsoever is, will be, or was done, said, or thought, by know the less, viz. the time of Judgment. Origen, however whomsoever and at any time. And in this way it must be (in Matth. Tract. xxx), expounds it of His body, which is said that the soul of Christ knows all things in the Word. the Church, which is ignorant of this time. Lastly, some For every created intellect knows in the Word, not all sim- say this is to be understood of the adoptive, and not of the ply, but so many more things the more perfectly it sees natural Son of God. the Word. Yet no beatified intellect fails to know in the Reply to Objection 2. God knows His Essence so Word whatever pertains to itself. Now to Christ and to much the more perfectly than the soul of Christ, as He His dignity all things to some extent belong, inasmuch as comprehends it. And hence He knows all things, not all things are subject to Him. Moreover, He has been ap- merely whatever are in act at any time, which things He is pointed Judge of all by God, “because He is the Son of said to know by knowledge of vision, but also what ever Man,” as is said Jn. 5:27; and therefore the soul of Christ He Himself can do, which He is said to know by simple knows in the Word all things existing in whatever time, intelligence, as was shown in the Ia, q. 14, a. 9. There- and the thoughts of men, of which He is the Judge, so that fore the soul of Christ knows all things that God knows in what is said of Him (Jn. 2:25), “For He knew what was in Himself by the knowledge of vision, but not all that God man,” can be understood not merely of the Divine knowl- knows in Himself by knowledge of simple intelligence; edge, but also of His soul’s knowledge, which it had in and thus in Himself God knows many more things than the Word. Secondly, “all things” may be taken widely, as the soul of Christ. extending not merely to such things as are in act at some Reply to Objection 3. The extent of knowledge de- time, but even to such things as are in potentiality, and pends not merely on the number of knowable things, but never have been nor ever will be reduced to act. Now also on the clearness of the knowledge. Therefore, al- some of these are in the Divine power alone, and not all though the knowledge of the soul of Christ which He has of these does the soul of Christ know in the Word. For in the Word is equal to the knowledge of vision as regards this would be to comprehend all that God could do, which the number of things known, nevertheless the knowledge would be to comprehend the Divine power, and, conse- of God infinitely exceeds the knowledge of the soul of quently, the Divine Essence. For every power is known Christ in clearness of cognition, since the uncreated light from the knowledge of all it can do. Some, however, are of the Divine intellect infinitely exceeds any created light not only in the power of God, but also in the power of the received by the soul of Christ; although, absolutely speak- creature; and all of these the soul of Christ knows in the ing, the Divine knowledge exceeds the knowledge of the Word; for it comprehends in the Word the essence of ev- soul of Christ, not only as regards the mode of knowing, 2144 but also as regards the number of things known, as was stated above. Whether the soul of Christ can know the infinite in the Word? IIIa q. 10 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ form, and thus we have the negatively infinite, i.e. a form cannot know the infinite in the Word. For that the infinite or act not limited by being received into matter or a sub- should be known is repugnant to the definition of the in- ject; and this infinite of itself is most knowable on account finite which (Phys. iii, 63) is said to be that “from which, of the perfection of the act, although it is not comprehensi- however much we may take, there always remains some- ble by the finite power of the creature; for thus God is said thing to be taken.” But it is impossible for the definition to be infinite. And this infinite the soul of Christ knows, to be separated from the thing defined, since this would yet does not comprehend. Secondly, there is the infinite as mean that contradictories exist together. Therefore it is regards matter, which is taken privatively, i.e. inasmuch as impossible that the soul of Christ knows the infinite. it has not the form it ought naturally to have, and in this Objection 2. Further, the knowledge of the infinite way we have infinite in quantity. Now such an infinite of is infinite. But the knowledge of the soul of Christ cannot itself, is unknown: inasmuch as it is, as it were, matter be infinite, because its capacity is finite, since it is created. with privation of form as is said Phys. iii, 65. But all Therefore the soul of Christ cannot know the infinite. knowledge is by form or act. Therefore if this infinite is Objection 3. Further, there can be nothing greater to be known according to its mode of being, it cannot be than the infinite. But more is contained in the Divine known. For its mode is that part be taken after part, as is knowledge, absolutely speaking, than in the knowledge said Phys. iii, 62,63. And in this way it is true that, if we of Christ’s soul, as stated above (a. 2). Therefore the soul take something from it, i.e. taking part after part, there of Christ does not know the infinite. always remains something to be taken. But as material On the contrary, The soul of Christ knows all its things can be received by the intellect immaterially, and power and all it can do. Now it can cleanse infinite sins, many things unitedly, so can infinite things be received by according to 1 Jn. 2:2: “He is the propitiation for our the intellect, not after the manner of infinite, but finitely; sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole and thus what are in themselves infinite are, in the intel- world.” Therefore the soul of Christ knows the infinite. lect of the knower, finite. And in this way the soul of I answer that, Knowledge regards only being, since Christ knows an infinite number of things, inasmuch as it being and truth are convertible. Now a thing is said to knows them not by discoursing from one to another, but be a being in two ways: First, simply, i.e. whatever is a in a certain unity, i.e. in any creature in whose potentiality being in act; secondly, relatively, i.e. whatever is a be- infinite things exist, and principally in the Word Himself. ing in potentiality. And because, as is said Metaph. ix, Reply to Objection 2. There is nothing to hinder 20, everything is known as it is in act, and not as it is in a thing from being infinite in one way and finite in an- potentiality, knowledge primarily and essentially regards other, as when in quantities we imagine a surface infinite being in act, and secondarily regards being in potential- in length and finite in breadth. Hence, if there were an in- ity, which is not knowable of itself, but inasmuch as that finite number of men, they would have a relative infinity, in whose power it exists is known. Hence, with regard to i.e. in multitude; but, as regards the essence, they would the first mode of knowledge, the soul of Christ does not be finite, since the essence of all would be limited to one know the infinite. Because there is not an infinite number specific nature. But what is simply infinite in its essence in act, even though we were to reckon all that are in act is God, as was said in the Ia, q. 7, a. 2. Now the proper at any time whatsoever, since the state of generation and object of the intellect is “what a thing is,” as is said De corruption will not last for ever: consequently there is a Anima iii, 26, to which pertains the notion of the species. certain number not only of things lacking generation and And thus the soul of Christ, since it has a finite capacity, corruption, but also of things capable of generation and attains to, but does not comprehend, what is simply infi- corruption. But with regard to the other mode of know- nite in essence, as stated above (a. 1 ). But the infinite ing, the soul of Christ knows infinite things in the Word, in potentiality which is in creatures can be comprehended for it knows, as stated above (a. 2), all that is in the power by the soul of Christ, since it is compared to that soul ac- of the creature. Hence, since in the power of the creature cording to its essence, in which respect it is not infinite. there is an infinite number of things, it knows the infinite, For even our intellect understands a universal—for exam- as it were, by a certain knowledge of simple intelligence, ple, the nature of a genus or species, which in a manner and not by a knowledge of vision. has infinity, inasmuch as it can be predicated of an infinite Reply to Objection 1. As we said in the Ia, q. 8, a. 1, number. the infinite is taken in two ways. First, on the part of a Reply to Objection 3. That which is infinite in ev- 2145 ery way can be but one. Hence the Philosopher says (De Therefore of necessity in this particular line there is noth-Coel. i, 2,3,) that, since bodies have dimensions in every ing greater than all these infinite parts; yet in another or part, there cannot be several infinite bodies. Yet if any- a third line there will be more infinite parts besides these. thing were infinite in one way only, nothing would hinder We observe this in numbers also, for the species of even the existence of several such infinite things; as if we were numbers are infinite, and likewise the species of odd num- to suppose several lines of infinite length drawn on a sur- bers are infinite; yet there are more even and odd numbers face of finite breadth. Hence, because infinitude is not a than even. And thus it must be said that nothing is greater substance, but is accidental to things that are said to be in- than the simply and in every way infinite; but than the in- finite, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, 37,38); as the in- finite which is limited in some respect, nothing is greater finite is multiplied by different subjects, so, too, a property in that order; yet we may suppose something greater out-of the infinite must be multiplied, in such a way that it be- side that order. In this way, therefore, there are infinite longs to each of them according to that particular subject. things in the potentiality of the creature, and yet there are Now it is a property of the infinite that nothing is greater more in the power of God than in the potentiality of the than it. Hence, if we take one infinite line, there is nothing creature. So, too, the soul of Christ knows infinite things greater in it than the infinite; so, too, if we take any one of by the knowledge of simple intelligence; yet God knows other infinite lines, it is plain that each has infinite parts. more by this manner of knowledge or understanding. Whether the soul of Christ sees the Word or the Divine Essence more clearly than IIIa q. 10 a. 4 does any other creature? Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ light which is shed upon them from the fountain of the does not see the Word more perfectly than does any other Word of God, according to Ecclus. 1:5: “The Word of creature. For the perfection of knowledge depends upon God on high is the fountain of Wisdom.” Now the soul the medium of knowing; as the knowledge we have by of Christ, since it is united to the Word in person, is more means of a demonstrative syllogism is more perfect than closely joined to the Word of God than any other crea- that which we have by means of a probable syllogism. But ture. Hence it more fully receives the light in which God all the blessed see the Word immediately in the Divine is seen by the Word Himself than any other creature. And Essence Itself, as was said in the Ia, q. 12, a. 2. Therefore therefore more perfectly than the rest of creatures it sees the soul of Christ does not see the Word more perfectly the First Truth itself, which is the Essence of God; hence than any other creature. it is written (Jn. 1:14): “And we saw His glory, the glory Objection 2. Further, the perfection of vision does not as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father,” “full” not exceed the power of seeing. But the rational power of a only of “grace” but also of “truth.” soul such as is the soul of Christ is below the intellective Reply to Objection 1. Perfection of knowledge, on power of an angel, as is plain from Dionysius (Coel. Hier. the part of the thing known, depends on the medium; but iv). Therefore the soul of Christ did not see the Word more as regards the knower, it depends on the power or habit. perfectly than the angels. And hence it is that even amongst men one sees a con- Objection 3. Further, God sees His Word infinitely clusion in a medium more perfectly than another does. more perfectly than does the soul of Christ. Hence there And in this way the soul of Christ, which is filled with are infinite possible mediate degrees between the manner a more abundant light, knows the Divine Essence more in which God sees His Word, and the manner in which the perfectly than do the other blessed, although all see the soul of Christ sees the Word. Therefore we cannot assert Divine Essence in itself. that the soul of Christ sees the Word or the Divine Essence Reply to Objection 2. The vision of the Divine more perfectly than does every other creature. Essence exceeds the natural power of any creature, as was On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 1:20,21) said in the Ia, q. 12, a. 4. And hence the degrees thereof that God set Christ “on His right hand in the heavenly depend rather on the order of grace in which Christ is places, above all principality and power and virtue and supreme, than on the order of nature, in which the angelic dominion and every name that is named not only in this nature is placed before the human. world, but also in that which is to come.” But in that heav- Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 7, a. 12), enly glory the higher anyone is the more perfectly does he there cannot be a greater grace than the grace of Christ know God. Therefore the soul of Christ sees God more with respect to the union with the Word; and the same perfectly than does any other creature. is to be said of the perfection of the Divine vision; al- I answer that, The vision of the Divine Essence is though, absolutely speaking, there could be a higher and granted to all the blessed by a partaking of the Divine more sublime degree by the infinity of the Divine power. 2146 THIRD PART, QUESTION 11 Of the Knowledge Imprinted or Infused in the Soul of Christ (In Six Articles) We must now consider the knowledge imprinted or infused in the soul of Christ, and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ knows all things by this knowledge? (2) Whether He could use this knowledge by turning to phantasms? (3) Whether this knowledge was collative? (4) Of the comparison of this knowledge with the angelic knowledge; (5) Whether it was a habitual knowledge? (6) Whether it was distinguished by various habits? Whether by this imprinted or infused knowledge Christ knew all things? IIIa q. 11 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that by this knowledge be borne in mind that in the human soul, as in every crea- Christ did not know all things. For this knowledge is im- ture, there is a double passive power: one in comparison printed upon Christ for the perfection of the passive in- with a natural agent; the other in comparison with the first tellect. Now the passive intellect of the human soul does agent, which can reduce any creature to a higher act than not seem to be in potentiality to all things simply, but only a natural agent can reduce it, and this is usually called to those things with regard to which it can be reduced to the obediential power of a creature. Now both powers act by the active intellect, which is its proper motor; and of Christ’s soul were reduced to act by this divinely im- these are knowable by natural reason. Therefore by this printed knowledge. And hence, by it the soul of Christ knowledge Christ did not know what exceeded the natural knew: First, whatever can be known by force of a man’s reason. active intellect, e.g. whatever pertains to human sciences; Objection 2. Further, phantasms are to the human in- secondly, by this knowledge Christ knew all things made tellect as colors to sight, as is said De Anima iii, 18,31,39. known to man by Divine revelation, whether they belong But it does not pertain to the perfection of the power of to the gift of wisdom or the gift of prophecy, or any other seeing to know what is without color. Therefore it does gift of the Holy Ghost; since the soul of Christ knew these not pertain to the perfection of human intellect to know things more fully and completely than others. Yet He did things of which there are no phantasms, such as separate not know the Essence of God by this knowledge, but by substances. Hence, since this knowledge was in Christ for the first alone, of which we spoke above (q. 10). the perfection of His intellective soul, it seems that by this Reply to Objection 1. This reason refers to the nat- knowledge He did not know separate substances. ural power of an intellective soul in comparison with its Objection 3. Further, it does not belong to the per- natural agent, which is the active intellect. fection of the intellect to know singulars. Hence it would Reply to Objection 2. The human soul in the state seem that by this knowledge the soul of Christ did not of this life, since it is somewhat fettered by the body, so know singulars. as to be unable to understand without phantasms, cannot On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2) that “the Spirit understand separate substances. But after the state of this of wisdom and understanding, of knowledge and counsel life the separated soul will be able, in a measure, to know shall fill Him∗,” under which are included all that may be separate substances by itself, as was said in the Ia, q. 89, known; for the knowledge of all Divine things belongs to Aa. 1,2, and this is especially clear as regards the souls wisdom, the knowledge of all immaterial things to under- of the blessed. Now before His Passion, Christ was not standing, the knowledge of all conclusions to knowledge merely a wayfarer but also a comprehensor; hence His [scientia], the knowledge of all practical things to coun- soul could know separate substances in the same way that sel. Hence it would seem that by this knowledge Christ a separated soul could. had the knowledge of all things. Reply to Objection 3. The knowledge of singu- I answer that, As was said above (q. 9, a. 1), it was lars pertains to the perfection of the intellective soul, fitting that the soul of Christ should be wholly perfected not in speculative knowledge, but in practical knowl- by having each of its powers reduced to act. Now it must edge, which is imperfect without the knowledge of sin- ∗ Vulg.: ‘The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him, the Spirit of wisdom and understanding, the Spirit of counsel. . . the Spirit of knowledge. . . ’; cf. Ecclus. 15:5 2147 gulars, in which operations exist, as is said Ethic. vi, 7. Christ had the fulness of prudence by the gift of counsel, Hence for prudence are required the remembrance of past He consequently knew all singular things—present, past, things, knowledge of present things, and foresight of fu- and future. ture things, as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Therefore, since Whether Christ could use this knowledge by turning to phantasms? IIIa q. 11 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ inates it. Hence after the resurrection glory will flow from could not understand by this knowledge except by turning the soul to the body. But the soul of man on earth needs to to phantasms, because, as is stated De Anima iii, 18,31,39, turn to phantasms, because it is fettered by the body and phantasms are compared to man’s intellective soul as col- in a measure subject to and dependent upon it. And hence ors to sight. But Christ’s power of seeing could not be- the blessed both before and after the resurrection can un- come actual save by turning to colors. Therefore His in- derstand without turning to phantasms. And this must be tellective soul could understand nothing except by turning said of the soul of Christ, which had fully the capabilities to phantasms. of a comprehensor. Objection 2. Further, Christ’s soul is of the same Reply to Objection 1. This likeness which the nature as ours. otherwise He would not be of the same Philosopher asserts is not with regard to everything. For it species as we, contrary to what the Apostle says (Phil. is manifest that the end of the power of seeing is to know 2:7) ”. . . being made in the likeness of men.” But our colors; but the end of the intellective power is not to know soul cannot understand except by turning to phantasms. phantasms, but to know intelligible species, which it ap- Hence, neither can Christ’s soul otherwise understand. prehends from and in phantasms, according to the state of Objection 3. Further, senses are given to man to help the present life. Therefore there is a likeness in respect his intellect. Hence, if the soul of Christ could understand of what both powers regard, but not in respect of that in without turning to phantasms, which arise in the senses, which the condition of both powers is terminated. Now it would follow that in the soul of Christ the senses were nothing prevents a thing in different states from reaching useless, which is not fitting. Therefore it seems that the its end by different ways: albeit there is never but one soul of Christ can only understand by turning to phan- proper end of a thing. Hence, although the sight knows tasms. nothing without color; nevertheless in a certain state the On the contrary, The soul of Christ knew certain intellect can know without phantasms, but not without in- things which could not be known by the senses, viz. sep- telligible species. arate substances. Therefore it could understand without Reply to Objection 2. Although the soul of Christ turning to phantasms. was of the same nature as our souls, yet it had a state I answer that, In the state before His Passion Christ which our souls have not yet in fact, but only in hope, was at the same time a wayfarer and a comprehensor, as i.e. the state of comprehension. will be more clearly shown (q. 15, a. 10). Especially had Reply to Objection 3. Although the soul of Christ He the conditions of a wayfarer on the part of the body, could understand without turning to phantasms, yet it which was passible; but the conditions of a comprehensor could also understand by turning to phantasms. Hence He had chiefly on the part of the soul. Now this is the con- the senses were not useless in it; especially as the senses dition of the soul of a comprehensor, viz. that it is nowise are not afforded to man solely for intellectual knowledge, subject to its body, or dependent upon it, but wholly dom- but for the need of animal life. Whether this knowledge is collative? IIIa q. 11 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ soul of Christ knew everything, as was said above (q. 10, had not this knowledge by way of comparison. For Dam- a. 2). Hence there was no discursive or collative knowl- ascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14): “We do not uphold edge in Him. counsel or choice in Christ.” Now these things are with- Objection 3. Further, the knowledge in Christ’s soul held from Christ only inasmuch as they imply comparison was like that of comprehensors, who are likened to the and discursion. Therefore it seems that there was no colla- angels, according to Mat. 22:30. Now there is no colla- tive or discursive knowledge in Christ. tive or discursive knowledge in the angels, as Dionysius Objection 2. Further, man needs comparison and dis- shows (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore there was no discursive cursion of reason in order to find out the unknown. But the or collative knowledge in the soul of Christ. 2148 On the contrary, Christ had a rational soul, as was soul could be collative or discursive; since it could con-shown (q. 5, a. 4). Now the proper operation of a ratio- clude one thing from another, as it pleased, as in Mat. nal soul consists in comparison and discursion from one 17:24,25, when our Lord asked Peter: “Of whom do the thing to another. Therefore there was collative and discur- kings of the earth receive tribute, of their own children, sive knowledge in Christ. or of strangers?” On Peter replying: “Of strangers,” He I answer that, Knowledge may be discursive or colla- concluded: “Then the children are free.” tive in two ways. First, in the acquisition of the knowl- Reply to Objection 1. From Christ is excluded that edge, as happens to us, who proceed from one thing to counsel which is with doubt; and consequently choice, the knowledge of another, as from causes to effects, and which essentially includes such counsel; but the practice conversely. And in this way the knowledge in Christ’s of using counsel is not excluded from Christ. soul was not discursive or collative, since this knowledge Reply to Objection 2. This reason rests upon discur- which we are now considering was divinely infused, and sion and comparison, as used to acquire knowledge. not acquired by a process of reasoning. Secondly, knowl- Reply to Objection 3. The blessed are likened to the edge may be called discursive or collative in use; as at angels in the gifts of graces; yet there still remains the times those who know, reason from cause to effect, not difference of natures. And hence to use comparison and in order to learn anew, but wishing to use the knowledge discursion is connatural to the souls of the blessed, but not they have. And in this way the knowledge in Christ’s to angels. Whether in Christ this knowledge was greater than the knowledge of the angels? IIIa q. 11 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that this knowledge was we see Jesus, Who was made a little lower than the angels, not greater in Christ than in the angels. For perfection is for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honor”; proportioned to the thing perfected. But the human soul from which it is plain that Christ is said to be lower than in the order of nature is below the angelic nature. There- the angels only in regard to the suffering of death. And fore since the knowledge we are now speaking of is im- hence, not in knowledge. printed upon Christ’s soul for its perfection, it seems that I answer that, The knowledge imprinted on Christ’s this knowledge is less than the knowledge by which the soul may be looked at in two ways: First, as regards what angelic nature is perfected. it has from the inflowing cause; secondly, as regards what Objection 2. Further, the knowledge of Christ’s soul it has from the subject receiving it. Now with regard to was in a measure comparative and discursive, which can- the first, the knowledge imprinted upon the soul of Christ not be said of the angelic knowledge. Therefore the was more excellent than the knowledge of the angels, both knowledge of Christ’s soul was less than the knowledge in the number of things known and in the certainty of the of the angels. knowledge; since the spiritual light, which is imprinted on Objection 3. Further, the more immaterial knowl- the soul of Christ, is much more excellent than the light edge is, the greater it is. But the knowledge of the angels which pertains to the angelic nature. But as regards the is more immaterial than the knowledge of Christ’s soul, second, the knowledge imprinted on the soul of Christ is since the soul of Christ is the act of a body, and turns to less than the angelic knowledge, in the manner of know- phantasms, which cannot be said of the angels. Therefore ing that is natural to the human soul, i.e. by turning to the knowledge of angels is greater than the knowledge of phantasms, and by comparison and discursion. Christ’s soul. And hereby the reply to the objections is made clear. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 2:9): “For Whether this knowledge was habitual? IIIa q. 11 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was a habitual knowledge which is never reduced to act would no habitual knowledge. For it has been said (q. 9, a. 1) seem useless. Now, since Christ knew all things, as was that the highest perfection of knowledge befitted Christ’s said q. 10, a. 2, He could not have considered all things soul. But the perfection of an actually existing knowledge actually, thinking over one after another, since the infinite is greater than that of a potentially or habitually existing cannot be passed over by enumeration. Therefore the ha- knowledge. Therefore it was fitting for Him to know all bitual knowledge of certain things would have been use- things actually. Therefore He had not habitual knowledge. less to Him—which is unfitting. Therefore He had an ac- Objection 2. Further, since habits are ordained to acts, tual and not a habitual knowledge of what He knew. 2149 Objection 3. Further, habitual knowledge is a per-ual, but actual with respect to everything He knew in this fection of the knower. But perfection is more noble than way. But the second knowledge was in Christ in a man- the thing perfected. If, therefore, in the soul of Christ ner proportioned to human nature, i.e. inasmuch as He there was any created habit of knowledge, it would follow knew things by species divinely imprinted upon Him, and that this created thing was nobler than the soul of Christ. of this knowledge we are now speaking. Now this knowl- Therefore there was no habitual knowledge in Christ’s edge was not most perfect, simply, but merely in the genus soul. of human knowledge; hence it did not behoove it to be al- On the contrary, The knowledge of Christ we are ways in act. now speaking about was univocal with our knowledge, Reply to Objection 2. Habits are reduced to act by even as His soul was of the same species as ours. But our the command of the will, since a habit is that “with which knowledge is in the genus of habit. Therefore the knowl- we act when we wish.” Now the will is indeterminate in edge of Christ was habitual. regard to infinite things. Yet it is not useless, even when it I answer that, As stated above (a. 4), the mode of the does not actually tend to all; provided it actually tends to knowledge impressed on the soul of Christ befitted the everything in fitting place and time. And hence neither is subject receiving it. For the received is in the recipient a habit useless, even if all that it extends to is not reduced after the mode of the recipient. Now the connatural mode to act; provided that that which befits the due end of the of the human soul is that it should understand sometimes will be reduced to act according as the matter in hand and actually, and sometimes potentially. But the medium be- the time require. tween a pure power and a completed act is a habit: and Reply to Objection 3. Goodness and being are taken extremes and medium are of the same genus. Thus it is in two ways: First, simply; and thus a substance, which plain that it is the connatural mode of the human soul to subsists in its being and goodness, is a good and a being; receive knowledge as a habit. Hence it must be said that secondly, being and goodness are taken relatively, and in the knowledge imprinted on the soul of Christ was habit- this way an accident is a being and a good, not that it has ual, for He could use it when He pleased. being and goodness, but that its subject is a being and a Reply to Objection 1. In Christ’s soul there was a good. And hence habitual knowledge is not simply better twofold knowledge—each most perfect of its kind: the or more excellent than the soul of Christ; but relatively, first exceeding the mode of human nature, as by it He saw since the whole goodness of habitual knowledge is added the Essence of God, and other things in It, and this was to the goodness of the subject. the most perfect, simply. Nor was this knowledge habit- Whether this knowledge was distinguished by divers habits? IIIa q. 11 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that in the soul of Christ that in Christ there were several habits of knowledge. there was only one habit of knowledge. For the more per- I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 4,5), the knowl- fect knowledge is, the more united it is; hence the higher edge imprinted on Christ’s soul has a mode connatural to angels understand by the more universal forms, as was a human soul. Now it is connatural to a human soul to said in the Ia, q. 55, a. 3. Now Christ’s knowledge was receive species of a lesser universality than the angels re- most perfect. Therefore it was most one. Therefore it was ceive; so that it knows different specific natures by dif- not distinguished by several habits. ferent intelligible species. But it so happens that we have Objection 2. Further, our faith is derived from different habits of knowledge, because there are different Christ’s knowledge; hence it is written (Heb. 12:2): classes of knowable things, inasmuch as what are in one “Looking on Jesus the author and finisher of faith.” But genus are known by one habit; thus it is said (Poster. i, 42) there is only one habit of faith about all things believed, as that “one science is of one class of object.” And hence the was said in the IIa IIae, q. 4, a. 6. Much more, therefore, knowledge imprinted on Christ’s soul was distinguished was there only one habit of knowledge in Christ. by different habits. Objection 3. Further, knowledge is distinguished by Reply to Objection 1. As was said (a. 4), the knowl- the divers formalities of knowable things. But the soul of edge of Christ’s soul is most perfect, and exceeds the Christ knew everything under one formality, i.e. by a di- knowledge of angels with regard to what is in it on the vinely infused light. Therefore in Christ there was only part of God’s gift; but it is below the angelic knowledge one habit of knowledge. as regards the mode of the recipient. And it pertains to On the contrary, It is written (Zech. 3:9) that on this mode that this knowledge is distinguished by various “one” stone, i.e. Christ, “there are seven eyes.” Now by habits, inasmuch as it regards more particular species. the eye is understood knowledge. Therefore it would seem Reply to Objection 2. Our faith rests upon the First 2150 Truth; and hence Christ is the author of our faith by the to what is naturally known. Hence, in the soul of Christ Divine knowledge, which is simply one. there must be the proper species of singular things, in or- Reply to Objection 3. The divinely infused light is der to know each with proper knowledge; and in this way the common formality for understanding what is divinely there must be divers habits of knowledge in Christ’s soul, revealed, as the light of the active intellect is with regard as stated above. 2151 THIRD PART, QUESTION 12 Of the Acquired or Empiric Knowledge of Christ’s Soul (In Four Articles) We must now consider the acquired or empiric knowledge of Christ’s soul; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ knew all things by this knowledge? (2) Whether He advanced in this knowledge? (3) Whether He learned anything from man? (4) Whether He received anything from angels? Whether Christ knew all things by this acquired or empiric knowledge? IIIa q. 12 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ did not know sive intellect is in any way in potentiality, so by acquired everything by this knowledge. For this knowledge is ac- knowledge it knew whatever can be known by the action quired by experience. But Christ did not experience ev- of the active intellect. erything. Therefore He did not know everything by this Reply to Objection 1. The knowledge of things may knowledge. be acquired not merely by experiencing the things them- Objection 2. Further, man acquires knowledge selves, but by experiencing other things; since by virtue through the senses. But not all sensible things were sub- of the light of the active intellect man can go on to un- jected to Christ’s bodily senses. Therefore Christ did not derstand effects from causes, and causes from effects, know everything by this knowledge. like from like, contrary from contrary. Therefore Christ, Objection 3. Further, the extent of knowledge de- though He did not experience all things, came to the pends on the things knowable. Therefore if Christ knew knowledge of all things from what He did experience. all things by this knowledge, His acquired knowledge Reply to Objection 2. Although all sensible things would have been equal to His infused and beatific knowl- were not subjected to Christ’s bodily senses, yet other edge; which is not fitting. Therefore Christ did not know sensible things were subjected to His senses; and from all things by this knowledge. this He could come to know other things by the most ex- On the contrary, Nothing imperfect was in Christ’s cellent force of His reason, in the manner described in soul. Now this knowledge of His would have been imper- the previous reply; just as in seeing heavenly bodies He fect if He had not known all things by it, since the imper- could comprehend their powers and the effects they have fect is that to which addition may be made. Hence Christ upon things here below, which were not subjected to His knew all things by this knowledge. senses; and for the same reason, from any other things I answer that, Acquired knowledge is held to be in whatsoever, He could come to the knowledge of yet other Christ’s soul, as we have said q. 9, a. 4, by reason of the things. active intellect, lest its action, which is to make things ac- Reply to Objection 3. By this knowledge the soul of tually intelligible, should be wanting; even as imprinted Christ did not know all things simply, but all such as are or infused knowledge is held to be in Christ’s soul for the knowable by the light of man’s active intellect. Hence by perfection of the passive intellect. Now as the passive in- this knowledge He did not know the essences of separate tellect is that by which “all things are in potentiality,” so substances, nor past, present, or future singulars, which, the active intellect is that by which “all are in act,” as is nevertheless, He knew by infused knowledge, as was said said De Anima iii, 18. And hence, as the soul of Christ above (q. 11). knew by infused knowledge all things to which the pas- Whether Christ advanced in acquired or empiric knowledge? IIIa q. 12 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ did not ad- knowledges. Therefore neither in this. vance in this knowledge. For even as Christ knew all Objection 2. Further, to advance belongs to the im- things by His beatific and His infused knowledge, so also perfect, since the perfect cannot be added to. Now we did He by this acquired knowledge, as is plain from what cannot suppose an imperfect knowledge in Christ. There- has been said (a. 1). But He did not advance in these fore Christ did not advance in this knowledge. 2152 Objection 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. maintain that Christ’s knowledge grew in experience, e.g. iii, 22): “Whoever say that Christ advanced in wisdom by comparing the infused intelligible species with what and grace, as if receiving additional sensations, do not He received through the senses for the first time. But be- venerate the union which is in hypostasis.” But it is impi- cause it seems unfitting that any natural intelligible action ous not to venerate this union. Therefore it is impious to should be wanting to Christ, and because to extract intelli- say that His knowledge received increase. gible species from phantasms is a natural action of man’s On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 2:52): “Jesus ad- active intellect, it seems becoming to place even this ac- vanced in wisdom and age and grace with God and men”; tion in Christ. And it follows from this that in the soul and Ambrose says (De Incar. Dom. vii) that “He ad- of Christ there was a habit of knowledge which could in- vanced in human wisdom.” Now human wisdom is that crease by this abstraction of species; inasmuch as the ac- which is acquired in a human manner, i.e. by the light tive intellect, after abstracting the first intelligible species of the active intellect. Therefore Christ advanced in this from phantasms, could abstract others, and others again. knowledge. Reply to Objection 1. Both the infused knowledge I answer that, There is a twofold advancement in and the beatific knowledge of Christ’s soul were the ef- knowledge: one in essence, inasmuch as the habit of fects of an agent of infinite power, which could produce knowledge is increased; the other in effect—e.g. if some- the whole at once; and thus in neither knowledge did one were with one and the same habit of knowledge to Christ advance; since from the beginning He had them prove to someone else some minor truths at first, and af- perfectly. But the acquired knowledge of Christ is caused terwards greater and more subtle conclusions. Now in by the active intellect which does not produce the whole this second way it is plain that Christ advanced in knowl- at once, but successively; and hence by this knowledge edge and grace, even as in age, since as His age increased Christ did not know everything from the beginning, but He wrought greater deeds, and showed greater knowledge step by step, and after a time, i.e. in His perfect age; and and grace. this is plain from what the Evangelist says, viz. that He But as regards the habit of knowledge, it is plain that increased in “knowledge and age” together. His habit of infused knowledge did not increase, since Reply to Objection 2. Even this knowledge was al- from the beginning He had perfect infused knowledge of ways perfect for the time being, although it was not al- all things; and still less could His beatific knowledge in- ways perfect, simply and in comparison to the nature; crease; while in the Ia, q. 14, a. 15, we have already said hence it could increase. that His Divine knowledge could not increase. Therefore, Reply to Objection 3. This saying of Damascene re- if in the soul of Christ there was no habit of acquired gards those who say absolutely that addition was made to knowledge, beyond the habit of infused knowledge, as ap- Christ’s knowledge, i.e. as regards any knowledge of His, pears to some∗, and sometime appeared to me (Sent. iii, and especially as regards the infused knowledge which is D, xiv), no knowledge in Christ increased in essence, but caused in Christ’s soul by union with the Word; but it does merely by experience, i.e. by comparing the infused in- not regard the increase of knowledge caused by the natural telligible species with phantasms. And in this way they agent. Whether Christ learned anything from man? IIIa q. 12 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ learned some- Objection 3. Further, by empiric knowledge Christ thing from man. For it is written (Lk. 2:46,47) that, “They did not know everything from the beginning, but advanced found Him in the temple in the midst of the doctors, hear- in it, as was said above (a. 2). But anyone hearing words ing them, and asking them questions.” But to ask ques- which mean something, may learn something he does not tions and to reply pertains to a learner. Therefore Christ know. Therefore Christ could learn from men something learned something from man. He did not know by this knowledge. Objection 2. Further, to acquire knowledge from a On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 45:4): “Behold, I man’s teaching seems more noble than to acquire it from have given Him for a witness to the people, for a leader sensible things, since in the soul of the man who teaches and a master to the Gentiles.” Now a master is not taught, the intelligible species are in act; but in sensible things the but teaches. Therefore Christ did not receive any knowl-intelligible species are only in potentiality. Now Christ re- edge by the teaching of any man. ceived empiric knowledge from sensible things, as stated I answer that, In every genus that which is the first above (a. 2). Much more, therefore, could He receive mover is not moved according to the same species of knowledge by learning from men. movement; just as the first alterative is not itself al- ∗ Blessed Albert the Great, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure 2153 tered. Now Christ is established by God the Head of the formed by a man are signs of his intellectual knowledge; Church—yea, of all men, as was said above (q. 8, a. 3), so so are creatures, formed by God, signs of His wisdom. that not only all might receive grace through Him, but that Hence it is written (Ecclus. 1:10) that God “poured” wis- all might receive the doctrine of Truth from Him. Hence dom “out upon all His works.” Hence, just as it is better He Himself says (Jn. 18:37): “For this was I born, and to be taught by God than by man, so it is better to receive for this came I into the world; that I should give testimony our knowledge from sensible creatures and not by man’s to the truth.” And thus it did not befit His dignity that He teaching. should be taught by any man. Reply to Objection 3. Jesus advanced in empiric Reply to Objection 1. As Origen says (Hom. xix in knowledge, as in age, as stated above (a. 2). Now as a fit- Luc.): “Our Lord asked questions not in order to learn ting age is required for a man to acquire knowledge by dis- anything, but in order to teach by questioning. For from covery, so also that he may acquire it by being taught. But the same well of knowledge came the question and the our Lord did nothing unbecoming to His age; and hence wise reply.” Hence the Gospel goes on to say that “all He did not give ear to hearing the lessons of doctrine un- that heard Him were astonished at His wisdom and His til such time as He was able to have reached that grade answers.” of knowledge by way of experience. Hence Gregory says Reply to Objection 2. Whoever learns from man does (Sup. Ezech. Lib. i, Hom. ii): “In the twelfth year of not receive knowledge immediately from the intelligible His age He deigned to question men on earth, since in the species which are in his mind, but through sensible words, course of reason, the word of doctrine is not vouchsafed which are signs of intelligible concepts. Now as words before the age of perfection.” Whether Christ received knowledge from the angels? IIIa q. 12 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ received fected naturally in two ways. First by knowledge received knowledge from the angels. For it is written (Lk. from sensible things; secondly, by knowledge imprinted 22:43) that “there appeared to Him an angel from heaven, or infused by the illumination of spiritual substances. strengthening Him.” But we are strengthened by the com- Now in both these ways the soul of Christ was perfected; forting words of a teacher, according to Job 4:3,4: “Be- first by empirical knowledge of sensible things, for which hold thou hast taught many and hast strengthened the there is no need of angelic light, since the light of the ac- weary hand. Thy words have confirmed them that were tive intellect suffices; secondly, by the higher impression staggering.” Therefore Christ was taught by angels. of infused knowledge, which He received directly from Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. God. For as His soul was united to the Word above the iv): “For I see that even Jesus—the super-substantial common mode, in unity of person, so above the common substance of supercelestial substances—when without manner of men was it filled with knowledge and grace by change He took our substance upon Himself, was subject the Word of God Himself; and not by the medium of an- in obedience to the instructions of the Father and God by gels, who in their beginning received the knowledge of the angels.” Hence it seems that even Christ wished to be things by the influence of the Word, as Augustine says subject to the ordinations of the Divine law, whereby men (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). are taught by means of angels. Reply to Objection 1. This strengthening by the angel Objection 3. Further, as in the natural order the hu- was for the purpose not of instructing Him, but of prov- man body is subject to the celestial bodies, so likewise is ing the truth of His human nature. Hence Bede says (on the human mind to angelic minds. Now Christ’s body was Lk. 22:43): “In testimony of both natures are the angels subject to the impressions of the heavenly bodies, for He said to have ministered to Him and to have strengthened felt the heat in summer and the cold in winter, and other Him. For the Creator did not need help from His creature; human passions. Therefore His human mind was subject but having become man, even as it was for our sake that to the illuminations of supercelestial spirits. He was sad, so was it for our sake that He was strength- On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that ened,” i.e. in order that our faith in the Incarnation might “the highest angels question Jesus, and learn the knowl- be strengthened. edge of His Divine work, and of the flesh assumed for us; Reply to Objection 2. Dionysius says that Christ was and Jesus teaches them directly.” Now to teach and to be subject to the angelic instructions, not by reason of Him- taught do not belong to the same. Therefore Christ did not self, but by reason of what happened at His Incarnation, receive knowledge from the angels. and as regards the care of Him whilst He was a child. I answer that, Since the human soul is midway be- Hence in the same place he adds that “Jesus’ withdrawal tween spiritual substances and corporeal things, it is per- to Egypt decreed by the Father is announced to Joseph by 2154 angels, and again His return to Judaea from Egypt.” a. 4). Hence His body was rightly subject to the impres- Reply to Objection 3. The Son of God assumed a sion of heavenly bodies; but His soul was not subject to passible body (as will be said hereafter (q. 14, a. 1)) and the impression of heavenly spirits. a soul perfect in knowledge and grace (q. 14 , a. 1, ad 1; 2155 THIRD PART, QUESTION 13 Of the Power of Christ’s Soul (In Four Articles) We must now consider the power of Christ’s soul; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether He had omnipotence simply? (2) Whether He had omnipotence with regard to corporeal creatures? (3) Whether He had omnipotence with regard to His own body? (4) Whether He had omnipotence as regards the execution of His own will? Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence? IIIa q. 13 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ power over such things as the perfection of its nature ex- had omnipotence. For Ambrose∗ says on Lk. 1:32: “The tends to; as what is hot gives heat. Therefore since the power which the Son of God had naturally, the Man was soul of Christ is a part of human nature, it cannot possibly about to receive in time.” Now this would seem to re- have omnipotence. gard the soul principally, since it is the chief part of man. Reply to Objection 1. By union with the Person, the Hence since the Son of God had omnipotence from all Man receives omnipotence in time, which the Son of God eternity, it would seem that the soul of Christ received had from eternity; the result of which union is that as the omnipotence in time. Man is said to be God, so is He said to be omnipotent; not Objection 2. Further, as the power of God is infinite, that the omnipotence of the Man is distinct (as neither is so is His knowledge. But the soul of Christ in a man- His Godhead) from that of the Son of God, but because ner had the knowledge of all that God knows, as was said there is one Person of God and man. above (q. 10, a. 2). Therefore He had all power; and thus Reply to Objection 2. According to some, knowledge He was omnipotent. and active power are not in the same ratio; for an active Objection 3. Further, the soul of Christ has all knowl- power flows from the very nature of the thing, inasmuch edge. Now knowledge is either practical or specula- as action is considered to come forth from the agent; but tive. Therefore He has a practical knowledge of what He knowledge is not always possessed by the very essence or knows, i.e. He knew how to do what He knows; and thus form of the knower, since it may be had by assimilation it seems that He can do all things. of the knower to the thing known by the aid of received On the contrary, What is proper to God cannot be- species. But this reason seems not to suffice, because long to any creature. But it is proper to God to be om- even as we may understand by a likeness obtained from nipotent, according to Ex. 15:2,3: “He is my God and I another, so also may we act by a form obtained from an- will glorify Him,” and further on, “Almighty is His name.” other, as water or iron heats, by heat borrowed from fire. Therefore the soul of Christ, as being a creature, has not Hence there would be no reason why the soul of Christ, omnipotence. as it can know all things by the similitudes of all things I answer that, As was said above (q. 2, a. 1; q. 10, impressed upon it by God, cannot do these things by the a. 1) in the mystery of the Incarnation the union in person same similitudes. so took place that there still remained the distinction of na- It has, therefore, to be further considered that what tures, each nature still retaining what belonged to it. Now is received in the lower nature from the higher is pos- the active principle of a thing follows its form, which is sessed in an inferior manner; for heat is not received by the principle of action. But the form is either the very na- water in the perfection and strength it had in fire. There- ture of the thing, as in simple things; or is the constituent fore, since the soul of Christ is of an inferior nature to the of the nature of the thing; as in such as are composed of Divine Nature, the similitudes of things are not received matter and form. in the soul of Christ in the perfection and strength they And it is in this way that omnipotence flows, so to say, had in the Divine Nature. And hence it is that the knowl- from the Divine Nature. For since the Divine Nature is edge of Christ’s soul is inferior to Divine knowledge as the very uncircumscribed Being of God, as is plain from regards the manner of knowing, for God knows (things) Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), it has an active power over ev- more perfectly than the soul of Christ; and also as regards erything that can have the nature of being; and this is to the number of things known, since the soul of Christ does have omnipotence; just as every other thing has an active not know all that God can do, and these God knows by ∗ Gloss, Ord. 2156 the knowledge of simple intelligence; although it knows create itself. all things present, past, and future, which God knows by Reply to Objection 3. Christ’s soul has practical the knowledge of vision. So, too, the similitudes of things and speculative knowledge; yet it is not necessary that infused into Christ’s soul do not equal the Divine power it should have practical knowledge of those things of in acting, i.e. so as to do all that God can do, or to do in which it has speculative knowledge. Because for spec- the same manner as God does, Who acts with an infinite ulative knowledge a mere conformity or assimilation of might whereof the creature is not capable. Now there is the knower to the thing known suffices; whereas for prac- no thing, to know which in some way an infinite power is tical knowledge it is required that the forms of the things needed, although a certain kind of knowledge belongs to in the intellect should be operative. Now to have a form an infinite power; yet there are things which can be done and to impress this form upon something else is more than only by an infinite power, as creation and the like, as is merely to have the form; as to be lightsome and to en- plain from what has been said in the Ia, q. 45. Hence lighten is more than merely to be lightsome. Hence the Christ’s soul which, being a creature, is finite in might, soul of Christ has a speculative knowledge of creation (for can know, indeed, all things, but not in every way; yet it it knows the mode of God’s creation), but it has no prac- cannot do all things, which pertains to the nature of om- tical knowledge of this mode, since it has no knowledge nipotence; and, amongst other things, it is clear it cannot operative of creation. Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of crea-IIIa q. 13 a. 2 tures? Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ this does not belong to Christ’s soul. had omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of crea- I answer that, Two distinctions are here needed. of tures. For He Himself says (Mat. 28:18): “All power is these the first is with respect to the transmutation of crea- given to Me in heaven and on earth.” Now by the words tures, which is three-fold. The first is natural, being “heaven and earth” are meant all creatures, as is plain brought about by the proper agent naturally; the second is from Gn. 1:1: “In the beginning God created heaven and miraculous, being brought about by a supernatural agent earth.” Therefore it seems that the soul of Christ had om- above the wonted order and course of nature, as to raise nipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures. the dead; the third is inasmuch as every creature may be Objection 2. Further, the soul of Christ is the most brought to nothing. perfect of all creatures. But every creature can be moved The second distinction has to do with Christ’s soul, by another creature; for Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) which may be looked at in two ways: first in its proper na- that “even as the denser and lower bodies are ruled in a ture and with its power of nature or of grace; secondly, as fixed way by the subtler and stronger bodies; so are all it is the instrument of the Word of God, personally united bodies by the spirit of life, and the irrational spirit of life to Him. Therefore if we speak of the soul of Christ in by the rational spirit of life, and the truant and sinful ratioits proper nature and with its power of nature or of grace, nal spirit of life by the rational, loyal, and righteous spirit it had power to cause those effects proper to a soul (e.g. of life.” But the soul of Christ moves even the highest to rule the body and direct human acts, and also, by the spirits, enlightening them, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. fulness of grace and knowledge to enlighten all rational vii). Therefore it seems that the soul of Christ has om- creatures falling short of its perfection), in a manner be- nipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures. fitting a rational creature. But if we speak of the soul of Objection 3. Further, Christ’s soul had in its highest Christ as it is the instrument of the Word united to Him, degree the “grace of miracles” or works of might. But ev- it had an instrumental power to effect all the miraculous ery transmutation of the creature can belong to the grace transmutations ordainable to the end of the Incarnation, of miracles; since even the heavenly bodies were mirac- which is “to re-establish all things that are in heaven and ulously changed from their course, as Dionysius proves on earth”∗. But the transmutation of creatures, inasmuch (Ep. ad Polycarp). Therefore Christ’s soul had omnipo- as they may be brought to nothing, corresponds to their tence with regard to the transmutation of creatures. creation, whereby they were brought from nothing. And On the contrary, To transmute creatures belongs to hence even as God alone can create, so, too, He alone can Him Who preserves them. Now this belongs to God alone, bring creatures to nothing, and He alone upholds them in according to Heb. 1:3: “Upholding all things by the word being, lest they fall back to nothing. And thus it must of His power.” Therefore God alone has omnipotence be said that the soul of Christ had not omnipotence with with regard to the transmutation of creatures. Therefore regard to the transmutation of creatures. ∗ Eph. 1:10 2157 Reply to Objection 1. As Jerome says (on the text tations can be made by God alone. Yet all transmutations quoted): “Power is given Him,” i.e. to Christ as man, that can be made in creatures can be made by the soul of “Who a little while before was crucified, buried in the Christ, as the instrument of the Word, but not in its proper tomb, and afterwards rose again.” But power is said to nature and power, since some of these transmutations per- have been given Him, by reason of the union whereby it tain to the soul neither in the order of nature nor in the was brought about that a Man was omnipotent, as was said order of grace. above (a. 1, ad 1). And although this was made known to Reply to Objection 3. As was said in the IIa IIae, the angels before the Resurrection, yet after the Resur- q. 178, a. 1, ad 1, the grace of mighty works or miracles rection it was made known to all men, as Remigius says is given to the soul of a saint, so that these miracles are (cf. Catena Aurea). Now, “things are said to happen when wrought not by his own, but by Divine power. Now this they are made known”†. Hence after the Resurrection our grace was bestowed on Christ’s soul most excellently, i.e. Lord says “that all power is given” to Him “in heaven and not only that He might work miracles, but also that He on earth.” might communicate this grace to others. Hence it is writ- Reply to Objection 2. Although every creature is ten (Mat. 10:1) that, “having called His twelve disciples transmutable by some other creature, except, indeed, the together, He gave them power over unclean spirits, to cast highest angel, and even it can be enlightened by Christ’s them out, and to heal all manner of diseases, and all man- soul; yet not every transmutation that can be made in a ner of infirmities.” creature can be made by a creature; since some transmu- Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to His own body? IIIa q. 13 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s soul had om- ject in Christ. Therefore Christ’s soul was not omnipotent nipotence with regard to His own body. For Damascene with regard to His own body. says (De Fide Orth. iii, 20,23) that “all natural things were I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), Christ’s soul voluntary to Christ; He willed to hunger, He willed to may be viewed in two ways. First, in its proper nature and thirst, He willed to fear, He willed to die.” Now God is power; and in this way, as it was incapable of making ex- called omnipotent because “He hath done all things what- terior bodies swerve from the course and order of nature, soever He would” (Ps. 113:11). Therefore it seems that so, too, was it incapable of changing its own body from Christ’s soul had omnipotence with regard to the natural its natural disposition, since the soul, of its own nature, operations of the body. has a determinate relation to its body. Secondly, Christ’s Objection 2. Further, human nature was more perfect soul may be viewed as an instrument united in person to in Christ than in Adam, who had a body entirely subject to God’s Word; and thus every disposition of His own body the soul, so that nothing could happen to the body against was wholly subject to His power. Nevertheless, since the the will of the soul—and this on account of the original power of an action is not properly attributed to the instru- justice which it had in the state of innocence. Much more, ment, but to the principal agent, this omnipotence is at- therefore, had Christ’s soul omnipotence with regard to tributed to the Word of God rather than to Christ’s soul. His body. Reply to Objection 1. This saving of Damascene Objection 3. Further, the body is naturally changed by refers to the Divine will of Christ, since, as he says in the the imaginations of the soul; and so much more changed, preceding chapter (De Fide Orth. xix, 14,15), it was by the stronger the soul’s imagination, as was said in the Ia, the consent of the Divine will that the flesh was allowed q. 117, a. 3, ad 3. Now the soul of Christ had most per- to suffer and do what was proper to it. fect strength as regards both the imagination and the other Reply to Objection 2. It was no part of the original powers. Therefore the soul of Christ was omnipotent with justice which Adam had in the state of innocence that a regard to His own body. man’s soul should have the power of changing his own On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 2:17) that “it body to any form, but that it should keep it from any hurt. behooved Him in all things to be made like unto His Yet Christ could have assumed even this power if He had brethren,” and especially as regards what belongs to the wished. But since man has three states—viz. innocence, condition of human nature. But it belongs to the condition sin, and glory, even as from the state of glory He assumed of human nature that the health of the body and its nour- comprehension and from the state of innocence, freedom ishment and growth are not subject to the bidding of rea- from sin—so also from the state of sin did He assume the son or will, since natural things are subject to God alone necessity of being under the penalties of this life, as will Who is the author of nature. Therefore they were not sub- be said (q. 14, a. 2). † Hugh of St. Victor: Qq. in Ep. ad Philip. 2158 Reply to Objection 3. If the imagination be strong, wherewith the heart is moved, naturally follow the imag-the body obeys naturally in some things, e.g. as regards ination, and thus by commotion of the spirits the whole falling from a beam set on high, since the imagination was body is altered. But the other corporeal dispositions which formed to be a principle of local motion, as is said De An- have no natural relation to the imagination are not trans- ima iii, 9,10. So, too, as regards alteration in heat and muted by the imagination, however strong it is, e.g. the cold, and their consequences; for the passions of the soul, shape of the hand, or foot, or such like. Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence as regards the execution of His will? IIIa q. 13 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ had as was said above (a. 2). not omnipotence as regards the execution of His own will. Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (Qq. Nov. For it is written (Mk. 7:24) that “entering into a house, He et Vet. Test., qu. 77): “What came to pass, this Christ would that no man should know it, and He could not be must be said to have willed. For it must be remarked that hid.” Therefore He could not carry out the purpose of His this happened in the country of the Gentiles, to whom it will in all things. was not yet time to preach. Yet it would have been in- Objection 2. Further, a command is a sign of will, vidious not to welcome such as came spontaneously for as was said in the Ia, q. 19, a. 12. But our Lord com- the faith. Hence He did not wish to be heralded by His manded certain things to be done, and the contrary came own, and yet He wished to be sought; and so it came to to pass, for it is written (Mat. 9:30, 31) that Jesus strictly pass.” Or it may be said that this will of Christ was not charged them whose eyes had been opened, saying: “See with regard to what was to be carried out by it, but with that no man know this. But they going out spread His regard to what was to be done by others, which did not fame abroad in all that country.” Therefore He could not come under His human will. Hence in the letter of Pope carry out the purpose of His will in everything. Agatho, which was approved in the Sixth Council∗, we Objection 3. Further, a man does not ask from an- read: “When He, the Creator and Redeemer of all, wished other for what he can do himself. But our Lord besought to be hid and could not, must not this be referred only to the Father, praying for what He wished to be done, for His human will which He deigned to assume in time?” it is written (Lk. 6:12): “He went out into a mountain to Reply to Objection 2. As Gregory says (Moral. xix), pray, and He passed the whole night in the prayer of God.” by the fact that “Our Lord charged His mighty works to Therefore He could not carry out the purpose of His will be kept secret, He gave an example to His servants com- in all things. ing after Him that they should wish their miracles to be On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. Nov. et Vet. hidden; and yet, that others may profit by their example, Test., qu. 77): “It is impossible for the will of the Saviour they are made public against their will.” And thus this not to be fulfilled: nor is it possible for Him to will what command signified His will to fly from human glory, ac- He knows ought not to come to pass.” cording to Jn. 8:50, “I seek not My own glory.” Yet He I answer that, Christ’s soul willed things in two ways. wished absolutely, and especially by His Divine will, that First, what was to be brought about by Himself; and it the miracle wrought should be published for the good of must be said that He was capable of whatever He willed others. thus, since it would not befit His wisdom if He willed to Reply to Objection 3. Christ prayed both for things do anything of Himself that was not subject to His will. that were to be brought about by the Divine power, and for Secondly, He wished things to be brought about by the what He Himself was to do by His human will, since the Divine power, as the resurrection of His own body and power and operation of Christ’s soul depended on God, such like miraculous deeds, which He could not effect by “Who works in all [Vulg.: ‘you’], both to will and to ac- His own power, except as the instrument of the Godhead, complish” (Phil. 2:13). ∗ Third Council of Constantinople, Act. iv 2159 THIRD PART, QUESTION 14 Of the Defects of Body Assumed by the Son of God (In Four Articles) We must now consider the defects Christ assumed in the human nature; and first, of the defects of body; secondly, of the defects of soul. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the Son of God should have assumed in human nature defects of body? (2) Whether He assumed the obligation of being subject to these defects? (3) Whether He contracted these defects? (4) Whether He assumed all these defects? Whether the Son of God in human nature ought to have assumed defects of body? IIIa q. 14 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God ought the Son of God assumed human nature with infirmities or not to have assumed human nature with defects of body. defects of body. For as His soul is personally united to the Word of God, On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 2:18): “For in so also is His body. But the soul of Christ had every per- that, wherein He Himself hath suffered and been tempted, fection, both of grace and truth, as was said above (q. 7, He is able to succor them also that are tempted.” Now He a. 9; q. 9, seqq.). Hence, His body also ought to have been came to succor us. hence David said of Him (Ps. 120:1): in every way perfect, not having any imperfection in it. “I have lifted up my eyes to the mountains, from whence Objection 2. Further, the soul of Christ saw the Word help shall come to me.” Therefore it was fitting for the of God by the vision wherein the blessed see, as was said Son of God to assume flesh subject to human infirmities, above (q. 9, a. 2), and thus the soul of Christ was blessed. in order to suffer and be tempted in it and so bring succor Now by the beatification of the soul the body is glorified; to us. since, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dios. cxviii), “God made I answer that, It was fitting for the body assumed by the soul of a nature so strong that from the fulness of its the Son of God to be subject to human infirmities and de- blessedness there pours over even into the lower nature” fects; and especially for three reasons. First, because it (i.e. the body), “not indeed the bliss proper to the be- was in order to satisfy for the sin of the human race that atific fruition and vision, but the fulness of health” (i.e. the Son of God, having taken flesh, came into the world. the vigor of incorruptibility). Therefore the body of Christ Now one satisfies for another’s sin by taking on himself was incorruptible and without any defect. the punishment due to the sin of the other. But these bod- Objection 3. Further, penalty is the consequence of ily defects, to wit, death, hunger, thirst, and the like, are fault. But there was no fault in Christ, according to 1 the punishment of sin, which was brought into the world Pet. 2:22: “Who did no guile.” Therefore defects of body, by Adam, according to Rom. 5:12: “By one man sin en- which are penalties, ought not to have been in Him. tered into this world, and by sin death.” Hence it was Objection 4. Further, no reasonable man assumes useful for the end of the Incarnation that He should as- what keeps him from his proper end. But by such like sume these penalties in our flesh and in our stead, accord- bodily defects, the end of the Incarnation seems to be hin- ing to Is. 53:4, “Surely He hath borne our infirmities.” dered in many ways. First, because by these infirmities Secondly, in order to cause belief in the Incarnation. For men were kept back from knowing Him, according to Is. since human nature is known to men only as it is subject 53:2,3: ”[There was no sightliness] that we should be de- to these defects, if the Son of God had assumed human sirous of Him. Despised and the most abject of men, a nature without these defects, He would not have seemed man of sorrows and acquainted with infirmity, and His to be true man, nor to have true, but imaginary, flesh, look was, as it were, hidden and despised, whereupon we as the Manicheans held. And so, as is said, Phil. 2:7: esteemed Him not.” Secondly, because the de. sire of the “He. . . emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, be- Fathers would not seem to be fulfilled, in whose person it ing made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a is written (Is. 51:9): “Arise, arise, put on Thy strength, man.” Hence, Thomas, by the sight of His wounds, was O Thou Arm of the Lord.” Thirdly, because it would recalled to the faith, as related Jn. 20:26. Thirdly, in order seem more fitting for the devil’s power to be overcome to show us an example of patience by valiantly bearing and man’s weakness healed, by strength than by weak- up against human passibility and defects. Hence it is said ness. Therefore it does not seem to have been fitting that (Heb. 12:3) that He “endured such opposition from sin- 2160 ners against Himself, that you be not wearied. fainting in what belongs to a passible nature; thus Damascene says your minds.” (De Fide Orth. iii, 15) that, “it was by the consent of the Reply to Objection 1. The penalties one suffers for Divine will that the flesh was allowed to suffer and do another’s sin are the matter, as it were, of the satisfac- what belonged to it.” tion for that sin; but the principle is the habit of soul, Reply to Objection 3. Punishment always follows sin whereby one is inclined to wish to satisfy for another, and actual or original, sometimes of the one punished, some- from which the satisfaction has its efficacy, for satisfaction times of the one for whom he who suffers the punishment would not be efficacious unless it proceeded from charity, satisfies. And so it was with Christ, according to Is. 53:5: as will be explained ( Suppl., q. 14, a. 2). Hence, it be- “He was wounded for our iniquities, He was bruised for hooved the soul of Christ to be perfect as regards the habit our sins.” of knowledge and virtue, in order to have the power of Reply to Objection 4. The infirmity assumed by satisfying; but His body was subject to infirmities, that Christ did not impede, but greatly furthered the end of the matter of satisfaction should not be wanting. the Incarnation, as above stated. And although these in- Reply to Objection 2. From the natural relationship firmities concealed His Godhead, they made known His which is between the soul and the body, glory flows into Manhood, which is the way of coming to the Godhead, the body from the soul’s glory. Yet this natural relation- according to Rom. 5:1,2: “By Jesus Christ we have ac- ship in Christ was subject to the will of His Godhead, and cess to God.” Moreover, the ancient Fathers did not desire thereby it came to pass that the beatitude remained in the bodily strength in Christ, but spiritual strength, wherewith soul, and did not flow into the body; but the flesh suffered He vanquished the devil and healed human weakness. Whether Christ was of necessity subject to these defects? IIIa q. 14 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ was not of ne- results from the matter, Christ’s body was subject to the cessity subject to these defects. For it is written (Is. 53:7): necessity of death and other like defects, since, as was “He was offered because it was His own will”; and the said (a. 1, ad 2), “it was by the consent of the Divine will prophet is speaking of the offering of the Passion. But that the flesh was allowed to do and suffer what belonged will is opposed to necessity. Therefore Christ was not of to it.” And this necessity results from the principles of necessity subject to bodily defects. human nature, as was said above in this article. But if Objection 2. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. we speak of necessity of constraint, as repugnant to the iii, 20): “Nothing obligatory is seen in Christ: all is volun- bodily nature, thus again was Christ’s body in its own nat- tary.” Now what is voluntary is not necessary. Therefore ural condition subject to necessity in regard to the nail that these defects were not of necessity in Christ. pierced and the scourge that struck. Yet inasmuch as such Objection 3. Further, necessity is induced by some- necessity is repugnant to the will, it is clear that in Christ thing more powerful. But no creature is more powerful these defects were not of necessity as regards either the than the soul of Christ, to which it pertained to preserve Divine will, or the human will of Christ considered abso- its own body. Therefore these defects were not of neces- lutely, as following the deliberation of reason; but only as sity in Christ. regards the natural movement of the will, inasmuch as it On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 8:3) that naturally shrinks from death and bodily hurt. “God” sent “His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh.” Reply to Objection 1. Christ is said to be “offered Now it is a condition of sinful flesh to be under the ne- because it was His own will,” i.e. Divine will and de- cessity of dying, and suffering other like passions. There- liberate human will; although death was contrary to the fore the necessity of suffering these defects was in Christ’s natural movement of His human will, as Damascene says flesh. (De Fide Orth. iii, 23,24). I answer that, Necessity is twofold. one is a necessity Reply to Objection 2. This is plain from what has of “constraint,” brought about by an external agent; and been said. this necessity is contrary to both nature and will, since Reply to Objection 3. Nothing was more powerful these flow from an internal principle. The other is “nat- than Christ’s soul, absolutely; yet there was nothing to ural” necessity, resulting from the natural principles— hinder a thing being more powerful in regard to this or either the form (as it is necessary for fire to heat), or the that effect, as a nail for piercing. And this I say, in so far matter (as it is necessary for a body composed of con- as Christ’s soul is considered in its own proper nature and traries to be dissolved). Hence, with this necessity, which power. 2161 Whether Christ contracted these defects? IIIa q. 14 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ contracted cometh from above, is above all,” says: “Christ came from bodily defects. For we are said to contract what we de- above, i.e. from the height of human nature, which it had rive with our nature from birth. But Christ, together with before the fall of the first man.” For He received human human nature, derived His bodily defects and infirmities nature without sin, in the purity which it had in the state of through His birth from His mother, whose flesh was sub- innocence. In the same way He might have assumed hu- ject to these defects. Therefore it seems that He contracted man nature without defects. Thus it is clear that Christ did these defects. not contract these defects as if taking them upon Himself Objection 2. Further, what is caused by the principles as due to sin, but by His own will. of nature is derived together with nature, and hence is con- Reply to Objection 1. The flesh of the Virgin was tracted. Now these penalties are caused by the principles conceived in original sin,† and therefore contracted these of human nature. Therefore Christ contracted them. defects. But from the Virgin, Christ’s flesh assumed the Objection 3. Further, Christ is likened to other men nature without sin, and He might likewise have assumed in these defects, as is written Heb. 2:17. But other men the nature without its penalties. But He wished to bear its contract these defects. Therefore it seems that Christ con- penalties in order to carry out the work of our redemption, tracted these defects. as stated above (a. 1). Therefore He had these defects— On the contrary, These defects are contracted not that He contracted them, but that He assumed them. through sin, according to Rom. 5:12: “By one man sin Reply to Objection 2. The cause of death and other entered into this world and by sin, death.” Now sin had corporeal defects of human nature is twofold: the first is no place in Christ. Therefore Christ did not contract these remote, and results from the material principles of the hu- defects. man body, inasmuch as it is made up of contraries. But I answer that, In the verb “to contract” is under- this cause was held in check by original justice. Hence the stood the relation of effect to cause, i.e. that is said to proximate cause of death and other defects is sin, whereby be contracted which is derived of necessity together with original justice is withdrawn. And thus, because Christ its cause. Now the cause of death and such like defects was without sin, He is said not to have contracted these in human nature is sin, since “by sin death entered into defects, but to have assumed them. this world,” according to Rom. 5:12. And hence they who Reply to Objection 3. Christ was made like to other incur these defects, as due to sin, are properly said to con- men in the quality and not in the cause of these defects; tract them. Now Christ had not these defects, as due to and hence, unlike others, He did not contract them. sin, since, as Augustine∗, expounding Jn. 3:31, “He that Whether Christ ought to have assumed all the bodily defects of men? IIIa q. 14 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ ought to have sumed human defects in order to satisfy for the sin of hu- assumed all the bodily defects of men. For Damascene man nature, and for this it was necessary for Him to have says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6,18): “What is unassumable is the fulness of knowledge and grace in His soul. Hence incurable.” But Christ came to cure all our defects. There- Christ ought to have assumed those defects which flow fore He ought to have assumed all our defects. from the common sin of the whole nature, yet are not in- Objection 2. Further it was said (a. 1), that in order to compatible with the perfection of knowledge and grace. satisfy for us, Christ ought to have had perfective habits And thus it was not fitting for Him to assume all human of soul and defects of body. Now as regards the soul, He defects or infirmities. For there are some defects that are assumed the fulness of all grace. Therefore as regards the incompatible with the perfection of knowledge and grace, body, He ought to have assumed all defects. as ignorance, a proneness towards evil, and a difficulty Objection 3. Further, amongst all bodily defects death in well-doing. Some other defects do not flow from the holds the chief place. Now Christ assumed death. Much whole of human nature in common on account of the sin more, therefore, ought He to have assumed other defects. of our first parent, but are caused in some men by certain On the contrary, Contraries cannot take place simul- particular causes, as leprosy, epilepsy, and the like; and taneously in the same. Now some infirmities are contrary these defects are sometimes brought about by the fault of to each other, being caused by contrary principles. Hence the man, e.g. from inordinate eating; sometimes by a de- it could not be that Christ assumed all human infirmities. fect in the formative power. Now neither of these per- I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,2), Christ as- tains to Christ, since His flesh was conceived of the Holy ∗ Alcuin in the Gloss, Ord. † See introductory note to q. 27 2162 Ghost, Who has infinite wisdom and power, and cannot by assuming it, He consequently healed all other defects. err or fail; and He Himself did nothing wrong in the order Reply to Objection 2. The fulness of all grace and of His life. But there are some third defects, to be found knowledge was due to Christ’s soul of itself, from the amongst all men in common, by reason of the sin of our fact of its being assumed by the Word of God; and hence first parent, as death, hunger, thirst, and the like; and all Christ assumed all the fulness of knowledge and wisdom these defects Christ assumed, which Damascene (De Fide absolutely. But He assumed our defects economically, in Orth. i, 11; iii, 20) calls “natural and indetractible pas- order to satisfy for our sin, and not that they belonged to sions” —natural, as following all human nature in com- Him of Himself. Hence it was not necessary for Him to mon; indetractible, as implying no defect of knowledge assume them all, but only such as sufficed to satisfy for or grace. the sin of the whole nature. Reply to Objection 1. All particular defects of men Reply to Objection 3. Death comes to all men from are caused by the corruptibility and passibility of the body, the sin of our first parent; but not other defects, although some particular causes being added; and hence, since they are less than death. Hence there is no parity. Christ healed the passibility and corruptibility of our body 2163 THIRD PART, QUESTION 15 Of the Defects of Soul Assumed by Christ (In Ten Articles) We must now consider the defects pertaining to the soul; and under this head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether there was sin in Christ? (2) Whether there was the “fomes” of sin in Him? (3) Whether there was ignorance? (4) Whether His soul was passible? (5) Whether in Him there was sensible pain? (6) Whether there was sorrow? (7) Whether there was fear? (8) Whether there was wonder? (9) Whether there was anger? (10) Whether He was at once wayfarer and comprehensor? Whether there was sin in Christ? IIIa q. 15 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there was sin in assumed the defect of sin. First, because sin nowise works Christ. For it is written (Ps. 21:2): “O God, My our satisfaction; rather, it impedes the power of satisfying, God. . . why hast Thou forsaken Me? Far from My sal- since, as it is written (Ecclus. 34:23), “The Most High ap- vation are the words of My sins.” Now these words are proveth not the gifts of the wicked.” Secondly, the truth said in the person of Christ Himself, as appears from His of His human nature is not proved by sin, since sin does having uttered them on the cross. Therefore it would seem not belong to human nature, whereof God is the cause; but that in Christ there were sins. rather has been sown in it against its nature by the devil, as Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 5:12) Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 20). Thirdly, because that “in Adam all have sinned”—namely, because all were by sinning He could afford no example of virtue, since in Adam by origin. Now Christ also was in Adam by ori- sin is opposed to virtue. Hence Christ nowise assumed gin. Therefore He sinned in him. the defect of sin—either original or actual—according to Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (Heb. 2:18) what is written (1 Pet. 2:22): “Who did no sin, neither that “in that, wherein He Himself hath suffered and been was guile found in His mouth.” tempted, He is able to succor them also that are tempted.” Reply to Objection 1. As Damascene says (De Fide Now above all do we require His help against sin. There- Orth. iii, 25), things are said of Christ, first, with refer- fore it seems that there was sin in Him. ence to His natural and hypostatic property, as when it Objection 4. Further, it is written (2 Cor. 5:21) that is said that God became man, and that He suffered for us; “Him that knew no sin” (i.e. Christ), “for us” God “hath secondly, with reference to His personal and relative prop- made sin.” But that really is, which has been made by erty, when things are said of Him in our person which no- God. Therefore there was really sin in Christ. wise belong to Him of Himself. Hence, in the seven rules Objection 5. Further, as Augustine says (De Agone of Tichonius which Augustine quotes in De Doctr. Christ. Christ. xi), “in the man Christ the Son of God gave Him- iii, 31, the first regards “Our Lord and His Body,” since self to us as a pattern of living.” Now man needs a pattern “Christ and His Church are taken as one person.” And not merely of right living, but also of repentance for sin. thus Christ, speaking in the person of His members, says Therefore it seems that in Christ there ought to have been (Ps. 21:2): “The words of My sins”—not that there were sin, that He might repent of His sin, and thus afford us a any sins in the Head. pattern of repentance. Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. On the contrary, He Himself says (Jn. 8:46): “Which x, 20), Christ was in Adam and the other fathers not alto- of you shall convince Me of sin?” gether as we were. For we were in Adam as regards both I answer that, As was said above (q. 14, a. 1), Christ seminal virtue and bodily substance, since, as he goes on assumed our defects that He might satisfy for us, that He to say: “As in the seed there is a visible bulk and an in- might prove the truth of His human nature, and that He visible virtue, both have come from Adam. Now Christ might become an example of virtue to us. Now it is plain took the visible substance of His flesh from the Virgin’s that by reason of these three things He ought not to have flesh; but the virtue of His conception did not spring from 2164 the seed of man, but far otherwise—from on high.” Hence indeed, in such sort that He had sin, but that He made Him He was not in Adam according to seminal virtue, but only a sacrifice for sin: even as it is written (Osee 4:8): “They according to bodily substance. And therefore Christ did shall eat the sins of My people”—they, i.e. the priests, not receive human nature from Adam actively, but only who by the law ate the sacrifices offered for sin. And in materially—and from the Holy Ghost actively; even as that way it is written (Is. 53:6) that “the Lord hath laid Adam received his body materially from the slime of the on Him the iniquity of us all” (i.e. He gave Him up to be earth—actively from God. And thus Christ did not sin in a victim for the sins of all men); or “He made Him sin” Adam, in whom He was only as regards His matter. (i.e. made Him to have “the likeness of sinful flesh”), as Reply to Objection 3. In His temptation and passion is written (Rom. 8:3), and this on account of the passible Christ has succored us by satisfying for us. Now sin does and mortal body He assumed. not further satisfaction, but hinders it, as has been said. Reply to Objection 5. A penitent can give a praise- Hence, it behooved Him not to have sin, but to be wholly worthy example, not by having sinned, but by freely bear- free from sin; otherwise the punishment He bore would ing the punishment of sin. And hence Christ set the high- have been due to Him for His own sin. est example to penitents, since He willingly bore the pun- Reply to Objection 4. God “made Christ sin”—not, ishment, not of His own sin, but of the sins of others. Whether there was the “fomes” of sin in Christ? IIIa q. 15 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was make it subject to reason, and so much the more as the the “fomes” of sin. For the “fomes” of sin, and the pas- virtue is more perfect; thus, temperance controls the con- sibility and mortality of the body spring from the same cupiscible appetite, fortitude and meekness the irascible principle, to wit, from the withdrawal of original justice, appetite, as was said in the Ia IIae, q. 56, a. 4. But there whereby the inferior powers of the soul were subject to belongs to the very nature of the “fomes” of sin an incli- the reason, and the body to the soul. Now passibility and nation of the sensual appetite to what is contrary to rea- mortality of body were in Christ. Therefore there was also son. And hence it is plain that the more perfect the virtues the “fomes” of sin. are in any man, the weaker the “fomes” of sin becomes Objection 2. Further, as Damascene says (De Fide in him. Hence, since in Christ the virtues were in their Orth. iii, 19), “it was by consent of the Divine will that the highest degree, the “fomes” of sin was nowise in Him; flesh of Christ was allowed to suffer and do what belonged inasmuch, also, as this defect cannot be ordained to satis- to it.” But it is proper to the flesh to lust after its pleasures. faction, but rather inclined to what is contrary to satisfac- Now since the “fomes” of sin is nothing more than concu- tion. piscence, as the gloss says on Rom. 7:8, it seems that in Reply to Objection 1. The inferior powers pertaining Christ there was the “fomes” of sin. to the sensitive appetite have a natural capacity to be obe- Objection 3. Further, it is by reason of the “fomes” dient to reason; but not the bodily powers, nor those of of sin that “the flesh lusteth against the spirit,” as is writ- the bodily humors, nor those of the vegetative soul, as is ten (Gal. 5:17). But the spirit is shown to be so much made plain Ethic. i, 13. And hence perfection of virtue, the stronger and worthier to be crowned according as the which is in accordance with right reason, does not exclude more completely it overcomes its enemy—to wit, the con- passibility of body; yet it excludes the “fomes” of sin, the cupiscence of the flesh, according to 2 Tim. 2:5, he “is nature of which consists in the resistance of the sensitive not crowned except he strive lawfully.” Now Christ had appetite to reason. a most valiant and conquering spirit, and one most wor- Reply to Objection 2. The flesh naturally seeks what thy of a crown, according to Apoc. 6:2: “There was a is pleasing to it by the concupiscence of the sensitive ap- crown given Him, and He went forth conquering that He petite; but the flesh of man, who is a rational animal, seeks might conquer.” Therefore it would especially seem that this after the manner and order of reason. And thus with the “fomes” of sin ought to have been in Christ. the concupiscence of the sensitive appetite Christ’s flesh On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 1:20): “That naturally sought food, drink, and sleep, and all else that which is conceived in her is of the Holy Ghost.” Now is sought in right reason, as is plain from Damascene (De the Holy Ghost drives out sin and the inclination to sin, Fide Orth. iii, 14). Yet it does not therefore follow that which is implied in the word “fomes.” Therefore in Christ in Christ there was the “fomes” of sin, for this implies the there ought not to have been the “fomes” of sin. lust after pleasurable things against the order of reason. I answer that, As was said above (q. 7, Aa. 2,9), Reply to Objection 3. The spirit gives evidence of Christ had grace and all the virtues most perfectly. Now fortitude to some extent by resisting that concupiscence moral virtues, which are in the irrational part of the soul, of the flesh which is opposed to it; yet a greater forti- 2165 tude of spirit is shown, if by its strength the flesh is thor-suffered no internal assault on the part of the “fomes” of oughly overcome, so as to be incapable of lusting against sin, He sustained an external assault on the part of the the spirit. And hence this belonged to Christ, whose spirit world and the devil, and won the crown of victory by over- reached the highest degree of fortitude. And although He coming them. Whether in Christ there was ignorance? IIIa q. 15 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that there was ignorance things.” Secondly, it may be considered with regard to in Christ. For that is truly in Christ which belongs to Him what it has from its union with the Divine hypostasis, from in His human nature, although it does not belong to Him which it has the fulness of knowledge and grace, accord- in His Divine Nature, as suffering and death. But igno- ing to Jn. 1:14: “We saw Him [Vulg.: ‘His glory’] as it rance belongs to Christ in His human nature; for Dama- were the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and scene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 21) that “He assumed an truth”; and in this way the human nature in Christ was not ignorant and enslaved nature.” Therefore ignorance was affected with ignorance. truly in Christ. Reply to Objection 2. Christ is said not to have Objection 2. Further, one is said to be ignorant known sin, because He did not know it by experience; but through defect of knowledge. Now some kind of knowl- He knew it by simple cognition. edge was wanting to Christ, for the Apostle says (2 Cor. Reply to Objection 3. The prophet is speaking in this 5:21) “Him that knew no sin, for us He hath made sin.” passage of the human knowledge of Christ; thus he says: Therefore there was ignorance in Christ. “Before the Child” (i.e. in His human nature) “know to Objection 3. Further, it is written (Is. 8:4): “For be- call His father” (i.e. Joseph, who was His reputed father), fore the child know to call his Father and his mother, the “and His mother” (i.e. Mary), “the strength of Damas- strength of Damascus. . . shall be taken away.” Therefore cus. . . shall be taken away.” Nor are we to understand this in Christ there was ignorance of certain things. as if He had been some time a man without knowing it; but On the contrary, Ignorance is not taken away by ig- “before He know” (i.e. before He is a man having human norance. But Christ came to take away our ignorance; for knowledge)—literally, “the strength of Damascus and the “He came to enlighten them that sit in darkness and in spoils of Samaria shall be taken away by the King of the the shadow of death” (Lk. 1:79). Therefore there was no Assyrians”—or spiritually, “before His birth He will save ignorance in Christ. His people solely by invocation,” as a gloss expounds it. I answer that, As there was the fulness of grace and Augustine however (Serm. xxxii de Temp.) says that this virtue in Christ, so too there was the fulness of all knowl- was fulfilled in the adoration of the Magi. For he says: edge, as is plain from what has been said above (q. 7, a. 9; “Before He uttered human words in human flesh, He re- q. 9). Now as the fulness of grace and virtue in Christ ex- ceived the strength of Damascus, i.e. the riches which cluded the “fomes” of sin, so the fulness of knowledge ex- Damascus vaunted (for in riches the first place is given cluded ignorance, which is opposed to knowledge. Hence, to gold). They themselves were the spoils of Samaria. even as the “fomes” of sin was not in Christ, neither was Because Samaria is taken to signify idolatry; since this there ignorance in Him. people, having turned away from the Lord, turned to the Reply to Objection 1. The nature assumed by Christ worship of idols. Hence these were the first spoils which may be viewed in two ways. First, in its specific na- the child took from the domination of idolatry.” And in ture, and thus Damascene calls it “ignorant and enslaved”; this way “before the child know” may be taken to mean hence he adds: “For man’s nature is a slave of Him” (i.e. “before he show himself to know.” God) “Who made it; and it has no knowledge of future Whether Christ’s soul was passible? IIIa q. 15 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ soul could not suffer at the hands of any creature; and was not passible. For nothing suffers except by reason of hence it was not passible; for its capability of suffering something stronger; since “the agent is greater than the would have been to no purpose if it could not have suf- patient,” as is clear from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), fered at the hands of anything. and from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5). Now no crea- Objection 2. Further, Tully (De Tusc. Quaes. iii) says ture was stronger than Christ’s soul. Therefore Christ’s that the soul’s passions are ailments∗. But Christ’s soul ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 2 2166 had no ailment; for the soul’s ailment results from sin, as Christ otherwise than in us, in three ways. First, as regards is plain from Ps. 40:5: “Heal my soul, for I have sinned the object, since in us these passions very often tend to- against Thee.” Therefore in Christ’s soul there were no wards what is unlawful, but not so in Christ. Secondly, as passions. regards the principle, since these passions in us frequently Objection 3. Further, the soul’s passions would seem forestall the judgment of reason; but in Christ all move- to be the same as the “fomes” of sin, hence the Apostle ments of the sensitive appetite sprang from the disposition (Rom. 7:5) calls them the “passions of sins.” Now the of the reason. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, “fomes” of sin was not in Christ, as was said a. 2. There- 9), that “Christ assumed these movements, in His human fore it seems that there were no passions in His soul; and soul, by an unfailing dispensation, when He willed; even hence His soul was not passible. as He became man when He willed.” Thirdly, as regards On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 87:4) in the per- the effect, because in us these movements, at times, do not son of Christ: “My soul is filled with evils”—not sins, remain in the sensitive appetite, but deflect the reason; but indeed, but human evils, i.e. “pains,” as a gloss expounds not so in Christ, since by His disposition the movements it. Hence the soul of Christ was passible. that are naturally becoming to human flesh so remained I answer that, A soul placed in a body may suffer in in the sensitive appetite that the reason was nowise hin- two ways: first with a bodily passion; secondly, with an dered in doing what was right. Hence Jerome says (on animal passion. It suffers with a bodily passion through Mat. 26:37) that “Our Lord, in order to prove the reality bodily hurt; for since the soul is the form of the body, soul of the assumed manhood, ‘was sorrowful’ in very deed; and body have but one being; and hence, when the body yet lest a passion should hold sway over His soul, it is by is disturbed by any bodily passion, the soul, too, must be a propassion that He is said to have ‘begun to grow sor- disturbed, i.e. in the being which it has in the body. There- rowful and to be sad’ ”; so that it is a perfect “passion” fore, since Christ’s body was passible and mortal, as was when it dominates the soul, i.e. the reason; and a “propas- said above (q. 14, a. 2), His soul also was of necessity pas- sion” when it has its beginning in the sensitive appetite, sible in like manner. But the soul suffers with an animal but goes no further. passion, in its operations—either in such as are proper to Reply to Objection 1. The soul of Christ could have the soul, or in such as are of the soul more than of the prevented these passions from coming upon it, and espe- body. And although the soul is said to suffer in this way cially by the Divine power; yet of His own will He sub- through sensation and intelligence, as was said in the Ia jected Himself to these corporeal and animal passions. IIae, q. 22, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 41, a. 1; nevertheless the af- Reply to Objection 2. Tully is speaking there accord- fections of the sensitive appetite are most properly called ing to the opinions of the Stoics, who did not give the passions of the soul. Now these were in Christ, even as name of passions to all, but only to the disorderly move- all else pertaining to man’s nature. Hence Augustine says ments of the sensitive appetite. Now, it is manifest that (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9): “Our Lord having deigned to live passions like these were not in Christ. in the form of a servant, took these upon Himself when- Reply to Objection 3. The “passions of sins” are ever He judged they ought to be assumed; for there was movements of the sensitive appetite that tend to unlaw- no false human affection in Him Who had a true body and ful things; and these were not in Christ, as neither was the a true human soul.” “fomes” of sin. Nevertheless we must know that the passions were in Whether there was sensible pain in Christ? IIIa q. 15 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that there was no true sen- flesh conceived in original sin, to be subject to the neces- sible pain in Christ. For Hilary says (De Trin. x): “Since sity of pain. But the flesh of Christ was not conceived in with Christ to die was life, what pain may He be supposed sin, but of the Holy Ghost in the Virgin’s womb. There- to have suffered in the mystery of His death, Who bestows fore it lay under no necessity of suffering pain. life on such as die for Him?” And further on he says: “The Objection 3. Further, the delight of the contemplation Only-begotten assumed human nature, not ceasing to be of Divine things dulls the sense of pain; hence the martyrs God; and although blows struck Him and wounds were in- in their passions bore up more bravely by thinking of the flicted on Him, and scourges fell upon Him, and the cross Divine love. But Christ’s soul was in the perfect enjoy- lifted Him up, yet these wrought in deed the vehemence ment of contemplating God, Whom He saw in essence, as of the passion, but brought no pain; as a dart piercing the was said above (q. 9, a. 2). Therefore He could feel no water.” Hence there was no true pain in Christ. pain. Objection 2. Further, it would seem to be proper to On the contrary, It is written (Is. 53:4): “Surely He 2167 hath borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows.” der the necessity of these defects, in the sense that there I answer that, As is plain from what has been said in was no sin in it. Hence he adds: “For He” (i.e. Christ) the Ia IIae, q. 35, a. 7, for true bodily pain are required “had a body—one proper to His origin, which did not ex- bodily hurt and the sense of hurt. Now Christ’s body was ist through the unholiness of our conception, but subsisted able to be hurt, since it was passible and mortal, as above in the form of our body by the strength of His power.” But stated (q. 14, Aa. 1,2); neither was the sense of hurt want- as regards the proximate cause of these defects, which is ing to it, since Christ’s soul possessed perfectly all natural composition of contraries, the flesh of Christ lay under the powers. Therefore no one should doubt but that in Christ necessity of these defects, as was said above (q. 14 , a. 2). there was true pain. Reply to Objection 2. Flesh conceived in sin is sub- Reply to Objection 1. In all these and similar words, ject to pain, not merely on account of the necessity of its Hilary does not intend to exclude the reality of the pain, natural principles, but from the necessity of the guilt of but the necessity of it. Hence after the foregoing he adds: sin. Now this necessity was not in Christ; but only the “Nor, when He thirsted, or hungered, or wept, was the necessity of natural principles. Lord seen to drink, or eat, or grieve. But in order to prove Reply to Objection 3. As was said above (q. 14, a. 1, the reality of the body, the body’s customs were assumed, ad 2), by the power of the Godhead of Christ the beatitude so that the custom of our body was atoned for by the cus- was economically kept in the soul, so as not to overflow tom of our nature. Or when He took drink or food, He into the body, lest His passibility and mortality should be acceded, not to the body’s necessity, but to its custom.” taken away; and for the same reason the delight of con- And he uses the word “necessity” in reference to the first templation was so kept in the mind as not to overflow into cause of these defects, which is sin, as above stated (q. 14, the sensitive powers, lest sensible pain should thereby be Aa. 1,3), so that Christ’s flesh is said not to have lain un- prevented. Whether there was sorrow in Christ? IIIa q. 15 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was vine dispensation the joy of contemplation remained in no sorrow. For it is written of Christ (Is. 42:4): “He shall Christ’s mind so as not to overflow into the sensitive pow- not be sad nor troublesome.” ers, and thereby shut out sensible pain. Now even as sen- Objection 2. Further, it is written (Prov. 12:21): sible pain is in the sensitive appetite, so also is sorrow. “Whatever shall befall the just man, it shall not make him But there is a difference of motive or object; for the ob- sad.” And the reason of this the Stoics asserted to be that ject and motive of pain is hurt perceived by the sense of no one is saddened save by the loss of his goods. Now touch, as when anyone is wounded; but the object and the just man esteems only justice and virtue as his goods, motive of sorrow is anything hurtful or evil interiorly, ap- and these he cannot lose; otherwise the just man would be prehended by the reason or the imagination, as was said subject to fortune if he was saddened by the loss of the in the Ia IIae, q. 35, Aa. 2,7, as when anyone grieves over goods fortune has given him. But Christ was most just, the loss of grace or money. Now Christ’s soul could ap- according to Jer. 23:6: “This is the name that they shall prehend things as hurtful either to Himself, as His passion call Him: The Lord, our just one.” Therefore there was no and death—or to others, as the sin of His disciples, or of sorrow in Him. the Jews that killed Him. And hence, as there could be Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, true pain in Christ, so too could there be true sorrow; oth- 13,14) that all sorrow is “evil, and to be shunned.” But in erwise, indeed, than in us, in the three ways above stated Christ there was no evil to be shunned. Therefore there (a. 4), when we were speaking of the passions of Christ’s was no sorrow in Christ. soul in general. Objection 4. Furthermore, as Augustine says (De Civ. Reply to Objection 1. Sorrow was not in Christ, as Dei xiv, 6): “Sorrow regards the things we suffer unwill- a perfect passion; yet it was inchoatively in Him as a ingly.” But Christ suffered nothing against His will, for it “propassion.” Hence it is written (Mat. 26:37): “He began is written (Is. 53:7): “He was offered because it was His to grow sorrowful and to be sad.” For “it is one thing to own will.” Hence there was no sorrow in Christ. be sorrowful and another to grow sorrowful,” as Jerome On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 26:38): “My says, on this text. soul is sorrowful even unto death.” And Ambrose says Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Civ. (De Trin. ii.) that “as a man He had sorrow; for He bore Dei xiv, 8), “for the three passions”—desire, joy, and my sorrow. I call it sorrow, fearlessly, since I preach the fear—the Stoics held three eupatheias i.e. good passions, cross.” in the soul of the wise man, viz. for desire, will—for joy, I answer that, As was said above (a. 5, ad 3), by Di- delight—for fear, caution. But as regards sorrow, they 2168 denied it could be in the soul of the wise man, for sor-tune. And thus Christ’s sorrow was a propassion, and not row regards evil already present, and they thought that a passion. no evil could befall a wise man; and for this reason, be- Reply to Objection 3. All sorrow is an evil of punish- cause they believed that only the virtuous is good, since ment; but it is not always an evil of fault, except only when it makes men good, and that nothing is evil, except what it proceeds from an inordinate affection. Hence Augustine is sinful, whereby men become wicked. Now although says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9): “Whenever these affections fol- what is virtuous is man’s chief good, and what is sinful low reason, and are caused when and where needed, who is man’s chief evil, since these pertain to reason which is will dare to call them diseases or vicious passions?” supreme in man, yet there are certain secondary goods of Reply to Objection 4. There is no reason why a thing man, which pertain to the body, or to the exterior things may not of itself be contrary to the will, and yet be willed that minister to the body. And hence in the soul of the by reason of the end, to which it is ordained, as bitter wise man there may be sorrow in the sensitive appetite by medicine is not of itself desired, but only as it is ordained his apprehending these evils; without this sorrow disturb- to health. And thus Christ’s death and passion were of ing the reason. And in this way are we to understand that themselves involuntary, and caused sorrow, although they “whatsoever shall befall the just man, it shall not make were voluntary as ordained to the end, which is the re- him sad,” because his reason is troubled by no misfor- demption of the human race. Whether there was fear in Christ? IIIa q. 15 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that there was no fear in fear may be considered in two ways. First, inasmuch as Christ. For it is written (Prov. 28:1): “The just, bold as the sensitive appetite naturally shrinks from bodily hurt, a lion, shall be without dread.” But Christ was most just. by sorrow if it is present, and by fear if it is future; and Therefore there was no fear in Christ. thus fear was in Christ, even as sorrow. Secondly, fear Objection 2. Further, Hilary says (De Trin. x): “I may be considered in the uncertainty of the future event, ask those who think thus, does it stand to reason that He as when at night we are frightened at a sound, not know- should dread to die, Who by expelling all dread of death ing what it is; and in this way there was no fear in Christ, from the Apostles, encouraged them to the glory of mar- as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23). tyrdom?” Therefore it is unreasonable that there should Reply to Objection 1. The just man is said to be be fear in Christ. “without dread,” in so far as dread implies a perfect pas- Objection 3. Further, fear seems only to regard what sion drawing man from what reason dictates. And thus a man cannot avoid. Now Christ could have avoided both fear was not in Christ, but only as a propassion. Hence the evil of punishment which He endured, and the evil of it is said (Mk. 14:33) that Jesus “began to fear and to fault which befell others. Therefore there was no fear in be heavy,” with a propassion, as Jerome expounds (Mat. Christ. 26:37). On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 4:33): Jesus “be- Reply to Objection 2. Hilary excludes fear from gan to fear and to be heavy.” Christ in the same way that he excludes sorrow, i.e. as I answer that, As sorrow is caused by the apprehen- regards the necessity of fearing. And yet to show the re- sion of a present evil, so also is fear caused by the appre- ality of His human nature, He voluntarily assumed fear, hension of a future evil. Now the apprehension of a fu- even as sorrow. ture evil, if the evil be quite certain, does not arouse fear. Reply to Objection 3. Although Christ could have Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that we do not avoided future evils by the power of His Godhead, yet fear a thing unless there is some hope of avoiding it. For they were unavoidable, or not easily avoidable by the when there is no hope of avoiding it the evil is considered weakness of the flesh. present, and thus it causes sorrow rather than fear. Hence Whether there was wonder in Christ? IIIa q. 15 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was Therefore there was no wonder in Christ. no wonder. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2) that Objection 2. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. wonder results when we see an effect without knowing ii, 15) that “wonder is fear springing from the imagina- its cause; and thus wonder belongs only to the ignorant. tion of something great”; and hence the Philosopher says Now there was no ignorance in Christ, as was said a. 3. (Ethic. iv, 3) that the “magnanimous man does not won- 2169 der.” But Christ was most magnanimous. Therefore there knowledge, wonder could be in Him; and He assumed was no wonder in Christ. this affection for our instruction, i.e. in order to teach us Objection 3. Further, no man wonders at what he to wonder at what He Himself wondered at. Hence Au- himself can do. Now Christ could do whatsoever was gustine says (Super Gen. Cont. Manich. i, 8): “Our Lord great. Therefore it seems that He wondered at nothing. wondered in order to show us that we, who still need to On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 8:10): “Jesus be so affected, must wonder. Hence all these emotions are hearing this,” i.e. the words of the centurion, “marveled.” not signs of a disturbed mind, but of a master teaching.” I answer that, Wonder properly regards what is new Reply to Objection 1. Although Christ was ignorant and unwonted. Now there could be nothing new and un- of nothing, yet new things might occur to His empiric wonted as regards Christ’s Divine knowledge, whereby knowledge, and thus wonder would be caused. He saw things in the Word; nor as regards the human Reply to Objection 2. Christ did not marvel at the knowledge, whereby He saw things by infused species. Centurion’s faith as if it was great with respect to Him- Yet things could be new and unwonted with regard to His self, but because it was great with respect to others. empiric knowledge, in regard to which new things could Reply to Objection 3. He could do all things by the occur to Him day by day. Hence, if we speak of Christ Divine power, for with respect to this there was no won- with respect to His Divine knowledge, and His beatific der in Him, but only with respect to His human empiric and even His infused knowledge, there was no wonder in knowledge, as was said above. Christ. But if we speak of Him with respect to empiric Whether there was anger in Christ? IIIa q. 15 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that there was no anger Augustine says (on Jn. 2:17) that “he is eaten up by zeal in Christ. For it is written (James 1:20): “The anger of for the house of God, who seeks to better whatever He man worketh not the justice of God.” Now whatever was sees to be evil in it, and if he cannot right it, bears with it in Christ pertained to the justice of God, since of Him it and sighs.” Such was the anger that was in Christ. is written (1 Cor. 1:30): “For He [Vulg.: ‘Who’] of God Reply to Objection 1. As Gregory says (Moral. v), is made unto us. . . justice.” Therefore it seems that there anger is in man in two ways—sometimes it forestalls rea- was no anger in Christ. son, and causes it to operate, and in this way it is properly Objection 2. Further, anger is opposed to meekness, said to work, for operations are attributed to the principal as is plain from Ethic. iv, 5. But Christ was most meek. agent. It is in this way that we must understand that “the Therefore there was no anger in Him. anger of man worketh not the justice of God.” Sometimes Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that anger follows reason, and is, as it were, its instrument, “anger that comes of evil blinds the eye of the mind, but and then the operation, which pertains to justice, is not anger that comes of zeal disturbs it.” Now the mind’s eye attributed to anger but to reason. in Christ was neither blinded nor disturbed. Therefore in Reply to Objection 2. It is the anger which outsteps Christ there was neither sinful anger nor zealous anger. the bounds of reason that is opposed to meekness, and On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 2:17) that the words not the anger which is controlled and brought within its of Ps. 58:10, “the zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up,” proper bounds by reason, for meekness holds the mean in were fulfilled in Him. anger. I answer that, As was said in the Ia IIae, q. 46, a. 3, Reply to Objection 3. In us the natural order is that ad 3, and IIa IIae, q. 158, a. 2, ad 3, anger is an effect of the soul’s powers mutually impede each other, i.e. if the sorrow. or when sorrow is inflicted upon someone, there operation of one power is intense, the operation of the arises within him a desire of the sensitive appetite to repel other is weakened. This is the reason why any movement this injury brought upon himself or others. Hence anger is whatsoever of anger, even if it be tempered by reason, a passion composed of sorrow and the desire of revenge. dims the mind’s eye of him who contemplates. But in Now it was said (a. 6) that sorrow could be in Christ. As Christ, by control of the Divine power, “every faculty was to the desire of revenge it is sometimes with sin, i.e. when allowed to do what was proper to it,” and one power was anyone seeks revenge beyond the order of reason: and not impeded by another. Hence, as the joy of His mind in this way anger could not be in Christ, for this kind of in contemplation did not impede the sorrow or pain of the anger is sinful. Sometimes, however, this desire is with- inferior part, so, conversely, the passions of the inferior out sin—nay, is praiseworthy, e.g. when anyone seeks re- part no-wise impeded the act of reason. venge according to justice, and this is zealous anger. For 2170 Whether Christ was at once a wayfarer and a comprehensor? IIIa q. 15 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ was not at in both soul and body, as stated in the Ia IIae, q. 4, a. 6. In once a wayfarer and a comprehensor. For it belongs to a the soul, as regards what is proper to it, inasmuch as the wayfarer to be moving toward the end of beatitude, and to mind sees and enjoys God; in the body, inasmuch as the a comprehensor it belongs to be resting in the end. Now body “will rise spiritual in power and glory and incorrup- to be moving towards the end and to be resting in the end tion,” as is written 1 Cor. 15:42. Now before His passion cannot belong to the same. Therefore Christ could not be Christ’s mind saw God fully, and thus He had beatitude at once wayfarer and comprehensor. as far as it regards what is proper to the soul; but beati- Objection 2. Further, to tend to beatitude, or to ob- tude was wanting with regard to all else, since His soul tain it, does not pertain to man’s body, but to his soul; was passible, and His body both passible and mortal, as is hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dios. cxviii) that “upon clear from the above (a. 4; q. 14, Aa. 1,2). Hence He was the inferior nature, which is the body, there overflows, not at once comprehensor, inasmuch as He had the beatitude indeed the beatitude which belongs to such as enjoy and proper to the soul, and at the same time wayfarer, inas- understand, the fulness of health, i.e. the vigor of incor- much as He was tending to beatitude, as regards what was ruption.” Now although Christ had a passible body, He wanting to His beatitude. fully enjoyed God in His mind. Therefore Christ was not Reply to Objection 1. It is impossible to be moving a wayfarer but a comprehensor. towards the end and resting in the end, in the same re- Objection 3. Further, the Saints, whose souls are in spect; but there is nothing against this under a different heaven and whose bodies are in the tomb, enjoy beatitude respect—as when a man is at once acquainted with what in their souls, although their bodies are subject to death, he already knows, and yet is a learner with regard to what yet they are called not wayfarers, but only comprehensors. he does not know. Hence, with equal reason, would it seem that Christ was a Reply to Objection 2. Beatitude principally and prop- pure comprehensor and nowise a wayfarer, since His mind erly belongs to the soul with regard to the mind, yet sec- enjoyed God although His body was mortal. ondarily and, so to say, instrumentally, bodily goods are On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 14:8): “Why wilt required for beatitude; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, Thou be as a stranger in the land, and as a wayfaring man 8), that exterior goods minister “organically” to beatitude. turning in to lodge?” Reply to Objection 3. There is no parity between the I answer that, A man is called a wayfarer from tend- soul of a saint and of Christ, for two reasons: first, be- ing to beatitude, and a comprehensor from having already cause the souls of saints are not passible, as Christ’s soul obtained beatitude, according to 1 Cor. 9:24: “So run was; secondly, because their bodies do nothing by which that you may comprehend [Douay: ‘obtain’]”; and Phil. they tend to beatitude, as Christ by His bodily sufferings 3:12: “I follow after, if by any means I may comprehend tended to beatitude as regards the glory of His body. [Douay: ‘obtain’]”. Now man’s perfect beatitude consists 2171 THIRD PART, QUESTION 16 Of Those Things Which Are Applicable to Christ in His Being and Becoming (In Twelve Articles) We must now consider the consequences of the union; and first as to what belongs to Christ in Himself; secondly, as to what belongs to Christ in relation with His Father; thirdly, as to what belongs to Christ in relation to us. Concerning the first, there occurs a double consideration. The first is about such things as belong to Christ in being and becoming; the second regards such things as belong to Christ by reason of unity. Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether this is true: “God is man”? (2) Whether this is true: “Man is God”? (3) Whether Christ may be called a lordly man? (4) Whether what belongs to the Son of Man may be predicated of the Son of God, and conversely? (5) Whether what belongs to the Son of Man may be predicated of the Divine Nature, and what belongs to the Son of God of the human nature? (6) Whether this is true: “The Son of God was made man”? (7) Whether this is true: “Man became God”? (8) Whether this is true: “Christ is a creature”? (9) Whether this is true: “This man,” pointing out Christ, “began to be”? or “always was”? (10) Whether this is true: “Christ as man is a creature”? (11) Whether this is true: “Christ as man is God”? (12) Whether this is true: “Christ as man is a hypostasis or person”? Whether this is true: “God is man”? IIIa q. 16 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that this is false: “God is in habit found as a man”; and thus He Who is in the form man.” For every affirmative proposition of remote matter of God is man. Now He Who is in the form of God is is false. Now this proposition, “God is man,” is on remote God. Therefore God is man. matter, since the forms signified by the subject and predi- I answer that, This proposition “God is man,” is ad- cate are most widely apart. Therefore, since the aforesaid mitted by all Christians, yet not in the same way by all. proposition is affirmative, it would seem to be false. For some admit the proposition, but not in the proper ac- Objection 2. Further, the three Divine Persons are in ceptation of the terms. Thus the Manicheans say the Word greater mutual agreement than the human nature and the of God is man, not indeed true, but fictitious man, inas- Divine. But in the mystery of the Incarnation one Person much as they say that the Son of God assumed an imagi- is not predicated of another; for we do not say that the Fa- nary body, and thus God is called man as a bronze figure is ther is the Son, or conversely. Therefore it seems that the called man if it has the figure of a man. So, too, those who human nature ought not to be predicated of God by saying held that Christ’s body and soul were not united, could not that God is man. say that God is true man, but that He is figuratively called Objection 3. Further, Athanasius says (Symb. Fid.) man by reason of the parts. Now both these opinions were that, “as the soul and the flesh are one man, so are God disproved above (q. 2, a. 5; q. 5, a. 1). and man one Christ.” But this is false: “The soul is the Some, on the contrary, hold the reality on the part of body.” Therefore this also is false: “God is man.” man, but deny the reality on the part of God. For they Objection 4. Further, it was said in the Ia, q. 39, say that Christ, Who is God and man, is God not natu- a. 4 that what is predicated of God not relatively but ab- rally, but by participation, i.e. by grace; even as all other solutely, belongs to the whole Trinity and to each of the holy men are called gods—Christ being more excellently Persons. But this word “man” is not relative, but absolute. so than the rest, on account of His more abundant grace. Hence, if it is predicated of God, it would follow that the And thus, when it is said that “God is man,” God does not whole Trinity and each of the Persons is man; and this is stand for the true and natural God. And this is the heresy clearly false. of Photinus, which was disproved above (q. 2, Aa. 10,11). On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:6,7): “Who But some admit this proposition, together with the real- being in the form of God. . . emptied Himself, taking the ity of both terms, holding that Christ is true God and true form of a servant, being made in the likeness of man, and man; yet they do not preserve the truth of the predica- 2172 tion. For they say that man is predicated of God by reason not come together in one suppositum, the proposition is of a certain conjunction either of dignity, or of authority, necessarily in remote matter, the subject signifying one or of affection or indwelling. It was thus that Nestorius form and the predicate another. But when two forms can held God to be man—nothing further being meant than come together in one suppositum, the matter is not re- that God is joined to man by such a conjunction that man mote, but natural or contingent, as when I say: “Some- is dwelt in by God, and united to Him in affection, and thing white is musical.” Now the Divine and human na- in a share of the Divine authority and honor. And into tures, although most widely apart, nevertheless come to- the same error fall those who suppose two supposita or gether by the mystery of the Incarnation in one supposi- hypostases in Christ, since it is impossible to understand tum, in which neither exists accidentally, but [both] es- how, of two things distinct in suppositum or hypostasis, sentially. Hence this proposition is neither in remote nor one can be properly predicated of the other: unless merely in contingent, but in natural matter; and man is not predi- by a figurative expression, inasmuch as they are united in cated of God accidentally, but essentially, as being predi- something, as if we were to say that Peter is John because cated of its hypostasis—not, indeed, by reason of the form they are somehow mutually joined together. And these signified by this word “God,” but by reason of the supposi- opinions also were disproved above (q. 2, Aa. 3,6). tum, which is a hypostasis of human nature. Hence, supposing the truth of the Catholic belief, that Reply to Objection 2. The three Divine Persons agree the true Divine Nature is united with true human nature in one Nature, and are distinguished in suppositum; and not only in person, but also in suppositum or hypostasis; hence they are not predicated one of another. But in the we say that this proposition is true and proper, “God is mystery of the Incarnation the natures, being distinct, are man”—not only by the truth of its terms, i.e. because not predicated one of the other, in the abstract. For the Christ is true God and true man, but by the truth of the Divine Nature is not the human nature. But because they predication. For a word signifying the common nature in agree in suppositum, they are predicated of each other in the concrete may stand for all contained in the common the concrete. nature, as this word “man” may stand for any individual Reply to Objection 3. “Soul” and “flesh” are taken man. And thus this word “God,” from its very mode of in the abstract, even as Godhead and manhood; but in the signification, may stand for the Person of the Son of God, concrete we say “animate” and “carnal” or “corporeal,” as was said in the Ia, q. 39, a. 4. Now of every suppositum as, on the other hand, “God” and “man.” Hence in both of any nature we may truly and properly predicate a word cases the abstract is not predicated of the abstract, but only signifying that nature in the concrete, as “man” may prop- the concrete of the concrete. erly and truly be predicated of Socrates and Plato. Hence, Reply to Objection 4. This word “man” is predicated since the Person of the Son of God for Whom this word of God, because of the union in person, and this union “God” stands, is a suppositum of human nature this word implies a relation. Hence it does not follow the rule of man may be truly and properly predicated of this word those words which are absolutely predicated of God from “God,” as it stands for the Person of the Son of God. eternity. Reply to Objection 1. When different forms can- Whether this is true: “Man is God”? IIIa q. 16 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that this is false: “Man is “Man is God.” God.” For God is an incommunicable name; hence (Wis. On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 9:5): “Of whom 13:10; 14:21) idolaters are rebuked for giving the name is Christ according to the flesh, Who is over all things, of God, which is incommunicable, to wood and stones. God blessed for ever.” Now Christ, according to the flesh, Hence with equal reason does it seem unbecoming that is man. Therefore this is true: “Man is God.” this word “God” should be predicated of man. I answer that, Granted the reality of both natures, i.e. Objection 2. Further, whatever is predicated of the Divine and human, and of the union in person and hy- predicate may be predicated of the subject. But this is postasis, this is true and proper: “Man is God,” even as true: “God is the Father,” or “God is the Trinity.” There- this: “God is man.” For this word “man” may stand for fore, if it is true that “Man is God,” it seems that this also any hypostasis of human nature; and thus it may stand for is true: “Man is the Father,” or “Man is the Trinity.” But the Person of the Son of God, Whom we say is a hyposta- these are false. Therefore the first is false. sis of human nature. Now it is manifest that the word Objection 3. Further, it is written (Ps. 80:10): “There “God” is truly and properly predicated of the Person of shall be no new God in thee.” But man is something new; the Son of God, as was said in the for Christ was not always man. Therefore this is false: Ia, q. 39, a. 4. Hence it remains that this is true and 2173 proper: “Man is God.” sequently, it is not necessary that this word “Father” be Reply to Objection 1. Idolaters attributed the name predicated of this word “Man,” of which the Word “God” of the Deity to stones and wood, considered in their own is predicated, inasmuch as “Man” stands for the Person of nature, because they thought there was something divine the Son. in them. But we do not attribute the name of the Deity to Reply to Objection 3. Although the human nature in the man in His human nature, but in the eternal supposi- Christ is something new, yet the suppositum of the hu- tum, which by union is a suppositum of human nature, as man nature is not new, but eternal. And because this word stated above. “God” is predicated of man not on account of the human Reply to Objection 2. This word “Father” is predi- nature, but by reason of the suppositum, it does not fol- cated of this word “God,” inasmuch as this word “God” low that we assert a new God. But this would follow, if stands for the Person of the Father. And in this way it is we held that “Man” stands for a created suppositum: even not predicated of the Person of the Son, because the Per- as must be said by those who assert that there are two sup- son of the Son is not the Person of the Father. And, con- posita in Christ∗. Whether Christ can be called a lordly man? IIIa q. 16 a. 3 †. of Divine honor, as the Nestorians said. And, even in this Objection 1. It would seem that Christ can be called a way, the human nature is not called “divine” by essence, lordly man. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that but “deified”—not, indeed, by its being converted into the “we are to be counseled to hope for the goods that were in Divine Nature, but by its conjunction with the Divine Na- the Lordly Man”; and he is speaking of Christ. Therefore ture in one hypostasis, as is plain from Damascene (De it seems that Christ was a lordly man. Fide Orth. iii, 11,17). Objection 2. Further, as lordship belongs to Christ by Reply to Objection 1. Augustine retracts these and reason of His Divine Nature, so does manhood belong to the like words (Retract. i, 19); hence, after the foregoing the human nature. Now God is said to be “humanized,” words (Retract. i, 19), he adds: “Wherever I have said as is plain from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 11), where this,” viz. that Christ Jesus is a lordly man, “I wish it un- he says that “being humanized manifests the conjunction said, having afterwards seen that it ought not to be said with man.” Hence with like reason may it be said denom- although it may be defended with some reason,” i.e. be- inatively that this man is lordly. cause one might say that He was called a lordly man by Objection 3. Further, as “lordly” is derived from reason of the human nature, which this word “man” sig- “lord,” so is Divine derived from “Deus” [God]. But nifies, and not by reason of the suppositum. Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iv) calls Christ the “most Divine Reply to Objection 2. This one suppositum, which Jesus.” Therefore with like reason may Christ be called a is of the human and Divine natures, was first of the Di- lordly man. vine Nature, i.e. from eternity. Afterwards in time it was On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 19): “I made a suppositum of human nature by the Incarnation. do not see that we may rightly call Jesus Christ a lordly And for this reason it is said to be “humanized”—not that man, since He is the Lord Himself.” it assumed a man, but that it assumed human nature. But I answer that, As was said above (a. 2, ad 3), when the converse of this is not true, viz. that a suppositum of we say “the Man Christ Jesus,” we signify the eternal sup- human nature assumed the Divine Nature; hence we may positum, which is the Person of the Son of God, because not say a “deified” or “lordly” man. there is only one suppositum of both natures. Now “God” Reply to Objection 3. This word Divine is wont to be and “Lord” are predicated essentially of the Son of God; predicated even of things of which the word God is pred- and hence they ought not to be predicated denominatively, icated essentially; thus we say that “the Divine Essence is since this is derogatory to the truth of the union. Hence, God,” by reason of identity; and that “the Essence belongs since we say “lordly” denominatively from lord, it can- to God,” or is “Divine,” on account of the different way of not truly and properly be said that this Man is lordly, but signifying; and we speak of the “Divine Word,” though rather that He is Lord. But if, when we say “the Man the Word is God. So, too, we say “a Divine Person,” just Christ Jesus,” we mean a created suppositum, as those as we say “the person of Plato,” on account of its different who assert two supposita in Christ, this man might be mode of signification. But “lordly” is not predicated of called lordly, inasmuch as he is assumed to a participation those of which “lord” is predicated; for we are not wont ∗ Cf. q. 2, Aa. 3,6 † The question is hardly apposite in English. St. Thomas explains why we can say in Latin, e.g. ‘oratio dominica’ (the Lord’s Prayer) or ‘passio dominica’ (Our Lord’s Passion), but not speak of our Lord as ‘homo dominicus’ (a lordly man) 2174 to call a man who is a lord, lordly; but whatsoever be-man Christ, Who is our Lord, cannot be called lordly; yet longs to a lord is called lordly, as the “lordly will,” or the His flesh can be called “lordly flesh” and His passion the “lordly hand,” or the “lordly possession.” And hence the “lordly passion.” Whether what belongs to the human nature can be predicated of God? IIIa q. 16 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that what belongs to the name of either nature. Thus whether we say “man” or human nature cannot be said of God. For contrary things “God,” the hypostasis of Divine and human nature is sig- cannot be said of the same. Now, what belongs to human nified. And hence, of the Man may be said what belongs nature is contrary to what is proper to God, since God is to the Divine Nature, as of a hypostasis of the Divine Na- uncreated, immutable, and eternal, and it belongs to the ture; and of God may be said what belongs to the human human nature to be created temporal and mutable. There- nature, as of a hypostasis of human nature. fore what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that in a propo- God. sition in which something is predicated of another, we Objection 2. Further, to attribute to God what is de- must not merely consider what the predicate is predicated fective seems to be derogatory to the Divine honor, and to of, but also the reason of its being predicated. Thus, al- be a blasphemy. Now what pertains to the human nature though we do not distinguish things predicated of Christ, contains a kind of defect, as to suffer, to die, and the like. yet we distinguish that by reason of which they are predi- Hence it seems that what pertains to the human nature can cated, since those things that belong to the Divine Nature nowise be said of God. are predicated of Christ in His Divine Nature, and those Objection 3. Further, to be assumed pertains to the that belong to the human nature are predicated of Christ in human nature; yet it does not pertain to God. Therefore His human nature. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. i, 11): what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of God. “We must distinguish what is said by Scripture in refer- On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, ence to the form of God, wherein He is equal to the Father, 4) that “God assumed the idioms,” i.e. the properties, “of and what in reference to the form of a servant, wherein He flesh, since God is said to be passible, and the God of is less than the Father”: and further on he says (De Trin. i, glory was crucified.” 13): “The prudent, careful, and devout reader will discern I answer that, On this question there was a differ- the reason and point of view of what is said.” ence of opinion between Nestorians and Catholics. The Reply to Objection 1. It is impossible for contraries Nestorians wished to divide words predicated of Christ, to be predicated of the same in the same respects, but in this way, viz. that such as pertained to human nature nothing prevents their being predicated of the same in should not be predicated of God, and that such as per- different aspects. And thus contraries are predicated of tained to the Divine Nature should not be predicated of Christ, not in the same, but in different natures. the Man. Hence Nestorius said: “If anyone attempt to Reply to Objection 2. If the things pertaining to de- attribute sufferings to the Word, let him be anathema”∗. fect were attributed to God in His Divine Nature, it would But if there are any words applicable to both natures, of be a blasphemy, since it would be derogatory to His honor. them they predicated what pertained to both natures, as But there is no kind of wrong done to God if they are at- “Christ” or “Lord.” Hence they granted that Christ was tributed to Him in His assumed nature. Hence in a dis- born of a Virgin, and that He was from eternity; but they course of the Council of Ephesus‡ it is said: “God ac- did not say that God was born of a virgin, or that the Man counts nothing a wrong which is the occasion of man’s was from eternity. Catholics on the other hand maintained salvation. For no lowliness that He assumed for us injures that words which are said of Christ either in His Divine that Nature which can be subject to no injury, yet makes or in His human nature may be said either of God or of lower things Its own, to save our nature. Therefore, since man. Hence Cyril says†: “If anyone ascribes to two per- these lowly and worthless things do no harm to the Di- sons or substances,” i.e. hypostases, “such words as are vine Nature, but bring about our salvation, how dost thou in the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures, or have been maintain that what was the cause of our salvation was the said of Christ by the Saints, or by Himself of Himself, and occasion of harm to God?” believes that some are to be applied to the Man, and ap- Reply to Objection 3. To be assumed pertains to hu- portions some to the Word alone—let him be anathema.” man nature, not in its suppositum, but in itself; and thus it And the reason of this is that, since there is one hyposta- does not belong to God. sis of both natures, the same hypostasis is signified by the ∗ Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 29 † Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 26 ‡ Part III, ch. 10 2175 Whether what belongs to the human nature can be predicated of the Divine Nature? IIIa q. 16 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that what belongs to the by which is signified “both the Godhead anointing and human nature can be said of the Divine Nature. For what the manhood anointed”; or to the Divine Nature alone, as belongs to the human nature is predicated of the Son of this word “God” or “the Son of God”; or to the manhood God, and of God. But God is His own Nature. Therefore, alone, as this word “Man” or “Jesus.” Hence Pope Leo what belongs to the human nature may be predicated of says (Ep. ad Palaest. cxxiv): “It is of no consequence the Divine Nature. from what substance we name Christ; because since the Objection 2. Further, the flesh pertains to human na- unity of person remains inseparably, one and the same is ture. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6), “we altogether Son of Man by His flesh, and altogether Son of say, after the blessed Athanasius and Cyril, that the Na- God by the Godhead which He has with the Father.” ture of the Word was incarnate.” Therefore it would seem Reply to Objection 1. In God, Person and Nature are with equal reason that what belongs to the human nature really the same; and by reason of this identity the Divine may be said of the Divine Nature. Nature is predicated of the Son of God. Nevertheless, its Objection 3. Further, what belongs to the Divine Na- mode of predication is different; and hence certain things ture belongs to Christ’s human nature; such as to know are said of the Son of God which are not said of the Divine future things and to possess saving power. Therefore it Nature; thus we say that the Son of God is born, yet we do would seem with equal reason that what belongs to the not say that the Divine Nature is born; as was said in the human may be said of the Divine Nature. Ia, q. 39, a. 5. So, too, in the mystery of the Incarnation On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, we say that the Son of God suffered, yet we do not say 4): “When we mention the Godhead we do not predicate that the Divine Nature suffered. of it the idioms,” i.e. the properties, “of the humanity; for Reply to Objection 2. Incarnation implies union with we do not say that the Godhead is passible or creatable.” flesh, rather than any property of flesh. Now in Christ Now the Godhead is the Divine Nature. Therefore what is each nature is united to the other in person; and by reason proper to the human nature cannot be said of the Divine of this union the Divine Nature is said to be incarnate and Nature. the human nature deified, as stated above (q. 2, a. 1, ad 3). I answer that, What belongs to one cannot be said of Reply to Objection 3. What belongs to the Divine another, unless they are both the same; thus “risible” can Nature is predicated of the human nature—not, indeed, as be predicated only of man. Now in the mystery of the In- it belongs essentially to the Divine Nature, but as it is par- carnation the Divine and human natures are not the same; ticipated by the human nature. Hence, whatever cannot but the hypostasis of the two natures is the same. And be participated by the human nature (as to be uncreated hence what belongs to one nature cannot be predicated of and omnipotent), is nowise predicated of the human na- the other if they are taken in the abstract. Now concrete ture. But the Divine Nature received nothing by partici- words stand for the hypostasis of the nature; and hence of pation from the human nature; and hence what belongs to concrete words we may predicate indifferently what be- the human nature can nowise be predicated of the Divine longs to either nature—whether the word of which they Nature. are predicated refers to one nature, as the word “Christ,” Whether this is true: “God was made man”? IIIa q. 16 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that this is false: “God On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:14): “The Word was made man.” For since man signifies a substance, to was made flesh”: and as Athanasius says (Ep. ad Epicte- be made man is to be made simply. But this is false: “God tum), “when he said, ‘The Word was made flesh,’ it is as was made simply.” Therefore this is false: “God was made if it were said that God was made man.” man.” I answer that, A thing is said to be made that which Objection 2. Further, to be made man is to be begins to be predicated of it for the first time. Now to be changed. But God cannot be the subject of change, ac- man is truly predicated of God, as stated above (a. 1), yet cording to Malachi 3:6: “I am the Lord, and I change not.” in such sort that it pertains to God to be man, not from Hence this is false: “God was made man.” eternity, but from the time of His assuming human nature. Objection 3. Further, man as predicated of Christ Hence, this is true, “God was made man”; though it is un- stands for the Person of the Son of God. But this is false: derstood differently by some: even as this, “God is man,” “God was made the Person of the Son of God.” Therefore as we said above (a. 1). this is false: “God was made man.” Reply to Objection 1. To be made man is to be made 2176 simply, in all those in whom human nature begins to be in on whose left side he was. Hence in such cases, not all a newly created suppositum. But God is said to have been that is said to be made is changed, since it may happen made man, inasmuch as the human nature began to be in by the change of something else. And it is thus we say an eternally pre-existing suppositum of the Divine Nature. of God: “Lord, Thou art made [Douay: ‘hast been’] our And hence for God to be made man does not mean that refuge” (Ps. 89:1). Now to be man belongs to God by God was made simply. reason of the union, which is a relation. And hence to be Reply to Objection 2. As stated above, to be made man is newly predicated of God without any change in implies that something. is newly predicated of another. Him, by a change in the human nature, which is assumed Hence, whenever anything is predicated of another, and to a Divine Person. And hence, when it is said, “God was there is a change in that of which it is predicated, then to made man,” we understand no change on the part of God, be made is to be changed; and this takes place in what- but only on the part of the human nature. ever is predicated absolutely, for whiteness or greatness Reply to Objection 3. Man stands not for the bare cannot newly affect anything, unless it be newly changed Person of the Son of God, but inasmuch as it subsists in to whiteness or greatness. But whatever is predicated rel- human nature. Hence, although this is false, “God was atively can be newly predicated of anything without its made the Person of the Son of God,” yet this is true: “God change, as a man may be made to be on the right side was made man” by being united to human nature. without being changed and merely by the change of him Whether this is true: “Man was made God”? IIIa q. 16 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that this is true: “Man made, as will be said (Aa. 8,9). And in the same sense was made God.” For it is written (Rom. 1:2,3): “Which this is false: “God was made man.” But it is not of this He had promised before by His prophets in the holy Scrip- sense that we are now speaking. Secondly, it may be so tures, concerning His Son Who was made to Him of the understood that the word “made” determines the compo- seed of David according to the flesh.” Now Christ, as man, sition, with this meaning: “Man was made God, i.e. it was is of the seed of David according to the flesh. Therefore brought about that Man is God.” And in this sense both man was made the Son of God. are true, viz. that “Man was made God” and that “God Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 13) was made Man.” But this is not the proper sense of these that “such was this assumption, which made God man, phrases; unless, indeed, we are to understand that “man” and man God.” But by reason of this assumption this is has not a personal but a simple supposition. For although true: “God was made man.” Therefore, in like manner, “this man” was not made God, because this suppositum, this is true: “Man was made God.” viz. the Person of the Son of God, was eternally God, yet Objection 3. Further, Gregory Nazianzen says (Ep. man, speaking commonly, was not always God. Thirdly, ad Chelid. ci): “God was humanized and man was dei- properly understood, this participle “made” attaches mak- fied, or whatever else one may like to call it.” Now God is ing to man with relation to God, as the term of the making. said to be humanized by being made man. Therefore with And in this sense, granted that the Person or hypostasis in equal reason man is said to be deified by being made God; Christ are the same as the suppositum of God and Man, and thus it is true that “Man was made God.” as was shown (q. 2, Aa. 2,3), this proposition is false, be- Objection 4. Further, when it is said that “God was cause, when it is said, “Man was made God,” “man” has made man,” the subject of the making or uniting is not a personal suppositum: because, to be God is not verified God, but human nature, which the word “man” signifies. of the Man in His human nature, but in His suppositum. Now that seems to be the subject of the making, to which Now the suppositum of human nature, of Whom “to be the making is attributed. Hence “Man was made God” is God” is verified, is the same as the hypostasis or Person truer than “God was made man.” of the Son of God, Who was always God. Hence it cannot On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, be said that this Man began to be God, or is made God, or 2): “We do not say that man was deified, but that God was that He was made God. humanized.” Now to be made God is the same as to be But if there were a different hypostasis of God and deified. Hence this is false: “Man was made God.” man, so that “to be God” was predicated of the man, I answer that, This proposition, Man was made God, and, conversely, by reason of a certain conjunction of may be understood in three ways. First, so that the par- supposita, or of personal dignity, or of affection or in- ticiple “made” absolutely determines either the subject or dwelling, as the Nestorians said, then with equal reason the predicate; and in this sense it is false, since neither might it be said that Man was made God, i.e. joined to the Man of Whom it is predicated was made, nor is God God, and that God was made Man, i.e. joined to man. 2177 Reply to Objection 1. In these words of the Apostle is taken materially, i.e. for the suppositum; placed in the the relative “Who” which refers to the Person of the Son predicate it is taken formally, i.e. for the nature signified. of God ought not to be considered as affecting the predi- Hence when it is said that “Man was made God,” the be- cate, as if someone already existing of the “seed of David ing made is not attributed to the human nature but to the according to the flesh” was made the Son of God—and it suppositum of the human nature, Which is God from eter- is in this sense that the objection takes it. But it ought to nity, and hence it does not befit Him to be made God. But be taken as affecting the subject, with this meaning—that when it is said that “God was made Man,” the making is the “Son of God was made to Him (‘namely to the honor taken to be terminated in the human nature. Hence, prop- of the Father,’ as a gloss expounds it), being of the seed of erly speaking, this is true: “God was made Man,” and this David according to the flesh,” as if to say “the Son of God is false: “Man was made God”; even as if Socrates, who having flesh of the seed of David to the honor of God.” was already a man, were made white, and were pointed Reply to Objection 2. This saying of Augustine is out, this would be true: “This man was made white to- to be taken in the sense that by the assumption that took day,” and this would be false; “This white thing was made place in the Incarnation it was brought about that Man is man today.” Nevertheless, if on the part of the subject God and God is Man; and in this sense both sayings are there is added some word signifying human nature in the true as stated above. abstract, it might be taken in this way for the subject of The same is to be said in reply to the third, since to be the making, e.g. if it were said that “human nature was deified is the same as to be made God. made the Son of God’s.” Reply to Objection 4. A term placed in the subject Whether this is true: “Christ is a creature”? IIIa q. 16 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that this is true: “Christ man nature, but even in His Divine Person. And hence we is a creature.” For Pope Leo says∗: “A new and unheard must not say absolutely that Christ is a “creature” or “less of covenant: God Who is and was, is made a creature.” than the Father”; but with a qualification, viz. “in His hu- Now we may predicate of Christ whatever the Son of God man nature.” But such things as could not be considered became by the Incarnation. Therefore this is true; Christ to belong to the Divine Person in Itself may be predicated is a creature. simply of Christ by reason of His human nature; thus we Objection 2. Further, the properties of both natures say simply that Christ suffered, died and was buried: even may be predicated of the common hypostasis of both na- as in corporeal and human beings, things of which we may tures, no matter by what word they are signified, as stated doubt whether they belong to the whole or the part, if they above (a. 5). But it is the property of human nature to be are observed to exist in a part, are not predicated of the created, as it is the property of the Divine Nature to be whole simply, i.e. without qualification, for we do not say Creator. Hence both may be said of Christ, viz. that He is that the Ethiopian is white but that he is white as regards a creature and that he is uncreated and Creator. his teeth; but we say without qualification that he is curly, Objection 3. Further, the principal part of a man is since this can only belong to him as regards his hair. the soul rather than the body. But Christ, by reason of the Reply to Objection 1. Sometimes, for the sake of body which He took from the Virgin, is said simply to be brevity, the holy doctors use the word “creature” of Christ, born of the Virgin. Therefore by reason of the soul which without any qualifying term; we should however take as is created by God, it ought simply to be said that He is a understood the qualification, “as man.” creature. Reply to Objection 2. All the properties of the hu- On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Trin. i): “Was man, just as of the Divine Nature, may be predicated Christ made by a word? Was Christ created by a com- equally of Christ. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. mand?” as if to say: “No!” Hence he adds: “How can iii, 4) that “Christ Who God and Man, is called created there be a creature in God? For God has a simple not a and uncreated, passible and impassible.” Nevertheless composite Nature.” Therefore it must not be granted that things of which we may doubt to what nature they belong, “Christ is a creature.” are not to be predicated without a qualification. Hence he I answer that, As Jerome† says, “words spoken amiss afterwards adds (De Fide Orth. iv, 5) that “the one hy- lead to heresy”; hence with us and heretics the very words postasis,” i.e. of Christ, “is uncreated in its Godhead and ought not to be in common, lest we seem to countenance created in its manhood”: even so conversely, we may not their error. Now the Arian heretics said that Christ was say without qualification, “Christ is incorporeal” or “im- a creature and less than the Father, not only in His hu- passible”; in order to avoid the error of Manes, who held ∗ Cf. Append. Opp. August., Serm. xii de Nativ. † Gloss, Ord. in Osee 2:16 2178 that Christ had not a true body, nor truly suffered, but we birth from the Virgin applies to the Person of the Son of must say, with a qualification, that Christ was incorporeal God, as there can be in the case of creation; and hence and impassible “in His Godhead.” there is no parity. Reply to Objection 3. There can be no doubt how the Whether this Man, i.e. Christ, began to be? IIIa q. 16 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that this Man, i.e. Christ, terially so as to signify the suppositum, as was said (a. 1, began to be. For Augustine says (Tract. cv in Joan.) that ad 4). Secondly, because even if this proposition were “before the world was, neither were we, nor the Media- true, it ought not to be made use of without qualification; tor of God and men—the Man Jesus Christ.” But what in order to avoid the heresy of Arius, who, since he pre- was not always, has begun to be. Therefore this Man, i.e. tended that the Person of the Son of God is a creature, and Christ, began to be. less than the Father, so he maintained that He began to be, Objection 2. Further, Christ began to be Man. But to saying “there was a time when He was not.” be man is to be simply. Therefore this man began to be, Reply to Objection 1. The words quoted must be simply. qualified, i.e. we must say that the Man Jesus Christ was Objection 3. Further, “man” implies a suppositum of not, before the world was, “in His humanity.” human nature. But Christ was not always a suppositum of Reply to Objection 2. With this word “begin” we human nature. Therefore this Man began to be. cannot argue from the lower species to the higher. For On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 13:8): “Jesus it does not follow if “this began to be white,” that there- Christ yesterday and today: and the same for ever.” fore “it began to be colored.” And this because “to begin” I answer that, We must not say that “this Man”— implies being now and not heretofore: for it does not fol- pointing to Christ—“began to be,” unless we add some- low if “this was not white hitherto” that “therefore it was thing. And this for a twofold reason. First, for this propo- not colored hitherto.” Now, to be simply is higher than to sition is simply false, in the judgment of the Catholic be man. Hence this does not follow: “Christ began to be Faith, which affirms that in Christ there is one suppositum Man—therefore He began to be.” and one hypostasis, as also one Person. For according to Reply to Objection 3. This word “Man,” as it is taken this, when we say “this Man,” pointing to Christ, the eter- for Christ, although it signifies the human nature, which nal suppositum is necessarily meant, with Whose eternity began to be, nevertheless signifies the eternal suppositum a beginning in time is incompatible. Hence this is false: which did not begin to be. Hence, since it signifies the “This Man began to be.” Nor does it matter that to begin suppositum when placed in the subject, and refers to the to be refers to the human nature, which is signified by this nature when placed in the predicate, therefore this is false: word “man”; because the term placed in the subject is not “The Man Christ began to be”: but this is true: “Christ be- taken formally so as to signify the nature, but is taken ma- gan to be Man.” Whether this is true: “Christ as Man is a creature”? IIIa q. 16 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that this is false: “Christ v, text. 23. But this is false: “Christ as Man is per se and as Man is a creature,” or “began to be.” For nothing in simply a creature.” Hence this, too, is false; “Christ as Christ is created except the human nature. But this is Man is a creature.” false: “Christ as Man is the human nature.” Therefore On the contrary, Whatever is, is either Creator or this is also false; Christ as Man is a creature. creature. But this is false: “Christ as Man is Creator.” Objection 2. Further, the predicate is predicated of Therefore this is true: “Christ as Man is a creature.” the term placed in reduplication, rather than of the sub- I answer that, When we say “Christ as Man” this ject of the proposition; as when I say: “A body as colored word “man” may be added in the reduplication, either by is visible,” it follows that the colored is visible. But as reason of the suppositum or by reason of the nature. If it stated (Aa. 8,9) we must not absolutely grant that “the be added by reason of the suppositum, since the supposi- Man Christ is a creature”; nor consequently that “Christ tum of the human nature in Christ is eternal and uncreated, as Man is a creature.” this will be false: “Christ as Man is a creature.” But if it Objection 3. Further, whatever is predicated of a man be added by reason of the human nature, it is true, since as man is predicated of him “per se” and simply, for “per by reason of the human nature or in the human nature, it se” is the same as “inasmuch as itself,” as is said Metaph. belongs to Him to be a creature, as was said (a. 8). 2179 It must however be borne in mind that the term cov-ture” and that “man is a creature.” ered by the reduplication signifies the nature rather than Reply to Objection 2. Man as placed in the subject the suppositum, since it is added as a predicate, which is refers to the suppositum—and as placed in the reduplica- taken formally, for it is the same to say “Christ as Man” tion refers to the nature, as was stated above. And because and to say “Christ as He is a Man.” Hence this is to be the nature is created and the suppositum uncreated, there- granted rather than denied: “Christ as Man is a creature.” fore, although it is not granted that “this man is a crea- But if something further be added whereby [the term cov- ture,” yet it is granted that “Christ as Man is a creature.” ered by the reduplication] is attracted to the suppositum, Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to every man who this proposition is to be denied rather than granted, for is a suppositum of human nature alone to have his being instance were one to say: “Christ as ‘this’ Man is a crea- only in human nature. Hence of every such suppositum ture.” it follows that if it is a creature as man, it is a creature Reply to Objection 1. Although Christ is not the hu- simply. But Christ is a suppositum not merely of human man nature, He has human nature. Now the word “crea- nature, but also of the Divine Nature, in which He has an ture” is naturally predicated not only of abstract, but also uncreated being. Hence it does not follow that, if He is a of concrete things; since we say that “manhood is a crea- creature as Man, He is a creature simply. Whether this is true: “Christ as Man is God”? IIIa q. 16 a. 11 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ, as Man, is nature rather than the suppositum, as stated above (a. 10), God. For Christ is God by the grace of union. But Christ, hence this is to be denied rather than granted: “Christ as as Man, has the grace of union. Therefore Christ as Man Man is God.” is God. Reply to Objection 1. It is not with regard to the Objection 2. Further, to forgive sins is proper to God, same, that a thing moves towards, and that it is, some- according to Is. 43:25: “I am He that blot out thy in- thing; for to move belongs to a thing because of its matter iquities for My own sake.” But Christ as Man forgives or subject—and to be in act belongs to it because of its sin, according to Mat. 9:6: “But that you may know that form. So too it is not with regard to the same, that it be- the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins,” etc. longs to Christ to be ordained to be God by the grace of Therefore Christ as Man is God. union, and to be God. For the first belongs to Him in Objection 3. Further, Christ is not Man in common, His human nature, and the second, in His Divine Nature. but is this particular Man. Now Christ, as this Man, is Hence this is true: “Christ as Man has the grace of union”; God, since by “this Man” we signify the eternal supposi- yet not this: “Christ as Man is God.” tum which is God naturally. Therefore Christ as Man is Reply to Objection 2. The Son of Man has on earth God. the power of forgiving sins, not by virtue of the human na- On the contrary, Whatever belongs to Christ as Man ture, but by virtue of the Divine Nature, in which Divine belongs to every man. Now, if Christ as Man is God, it Nature resides the power of forgiving sins authoritatively; follows that every man is God—which is clearly false. whereas in the human nature it resides instrumentally and I answer that, This term “man” when placed in the ministerially. Hence Chrysostom expounding this passage reduplication may be taken in two ways. First as referring says∗: “He said pointedly ‘on earth to forgive sins,’ in or- to the nature; and in this way it is not true that Christ as der to show that by an indivisible union He united human Man is God, because the human nature is distinct from the nature to the power of the Godhead, since although He Divine by a difference of nature. Secondly it may be taken was made Man, yet He remained the Word of God.” as referring to the suppositum; and in this way, since the Reply to Objection 3. When we say “this man,” the suppositum of the human nature in Christ is the Person demonstrative pronoun “this” attracts “man” to the sup- of the Son of God, to Whom it essentially belongs to be positum; and hence “Christ as this Man, is God, is a truer God, it is true that Christ, as Man, is God. Nevertheless proposition than Christ as Man is God.” because the term placed in the reduplication signifies the ∗ Implicitly. Hom. xxx in Matth; cf. St. Thomas, Catena Aurea on Mk. 2:10 2180 Whether this is true: “Christ as Man is a hypostasis or person”? IIIa q. 16 a. 12 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ as Man is a hy- it may be taken that in Christ a proper personality, caused postasis or person. For what belongs to every man belongs by the principles of the human nature, is due to the hu- to Christ as Man, since He is like other men according to man nature; and in this way Christ as Man is not a person, Phil. 2:7: “Being made in the likeness of men.” But every since the human nature does not exist of itself apart from man is a person. Therefore Christ as Man is a person. the Divine Nature, and yet the notion of person requires Objection 2. Further, Christ as Man is a substance this. of rational nature. But He is not a universal substance: Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to every man to be therefore He is an individual substance. Now a person is a person, inasmuch as everything subsisting in human na- nothing else than an individual substance of rational na- ture is a person. Now this is proper to the Man Christ that ture; as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.). Therefore Christ the Person subsisting in His human nature is not caused by as Man is a person. the principles of the human nature, but is eternal. Hence Objection 3. Further, Christ as Man is a being of in one way He is a person, as Man; and in another way He human nature, and a suppositum and a hypostasis of the is not, as stated above. same nature. But every hypostasis and suppositum and Reply to Objection 2. The “individual substance,” being of human nature is a person. Therefore Christ as which is included in the definition of a person, implies a Man is a person. complete substance subsisting of itself and separate from On the contrary, Christ as Man is not an eternal per- all else; otherwise, a man’s hand might be called a per- son. Therefore if Christ as Man is a person it would follow son, since it is an individual substance; nevertheless, be- that in Christ there are two persons—one temporal and the cause it is an individual substance existing in something other eternal, which is erroneous, as was said above (q. 2, else, it cannot be called a person; nor, for the same reason, a. 6; q. 4, a. 2). can the human nature in Christ, although it may be called I answer that, As was said (Aa. 10,11), the term something individual and singular. “Man” placed in the reduplication may refer either to Reply to Objection 3. As a person signifies some- the suppositum or to the nature. Hence when it is said: thing complete and self-subsisting in rational nature, so a “Christ as Man is a person,” if it is taken as referring to hypostasis, suppositum, and being of nature in the genus the suppositum, it is clear that Christ as Man is a person, of substance, signify something that subsists of itself. since the suppositum of human nature is nothing else than Hence, as human nature is not of itself a person apart from the Person of the Son of God. But if it be taken as re- the Person of the Son of God, so likewise it is not of itself ferring to the nature, it may be understood in two ways. a hypostasis or suppositum or a being of nature. Hence First, we may so understand it as if it belonged to human in the sense in which we deny that “Christ as Man is a nature to be in a person, and in this way it is true, for person” we must deny all the other propositions. whatever subsists in human nature is a person. Secondly 2181 THIRD PART, QUESTION 17 Of Christ’s Unity of Being (In Two Articles) We must now consider what pertains to Christ’s unity in common. For, in their proper place, we must consider what pertains to unity and plurality in detail: thus we concluded (q. 9) that there is not only one knowledge in Christ, and it will be concluded hereafter (q. 35, a. 2) that there is not only one nativity in Christ. Hence we must consider Christ’s unity (1) of being; (2) of will; (3) of operation. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ is one or two? (2) Whether there is only one being in Christ? Whether Christ is one or two? IIIa q. 17 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ is not one, but “Whatever is, inasmuch as it is, is one.” But we confess two. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 7): “Because the that Christ is. Therefore Christ is one. form of God took the form of a servant, both are God by I answer that, Nature, considered in itself, as it is reason of God Who assumed, yet both are Man by reason used in the abstract, cannot truly be predicated of the sup- of the man assumed.” Now “both” may only be said when positum or person, except in God, in Whom “what it is” there are two. Therefore Christ is two. and “whereby it is” do not differ, as stated in the Ia, q. 29, Objection 2. Further, where there is one thing and a. 4, ad 1. But in Christ, since there are two natures, viz. another there are two. Now Christ is one thing and an- the Divine and the human, one of them, viz. the Divine, other; for Augustine says (Enchiridion xxxv): “Being in may be predicated of Him both in the abstract and in the the form of God. . . He took the form of a servant. . . being concrete, for we say that the Son of God, Who is signi- both in one; but He was one of these as Word, and the fied by the word Christ, is the Divine Nature and is God. other as man.” Therefore Christ is two. But the human nature cannot be predicated of Christ in Objection 3. Further, Christ is not only man; for, if the abstract, but only in the concrete, i.e. as it is signified He were a mere man, He would not be God. Therefore He by the suppositum. For we cannot truly say that “Christ is something else than man, and thus in Christ there is one is human nature,” because human nature is not naturally thing and another. Therefore Christ is two. predicated of its suppositum. But we say that Christ is Objection 4. Further, Christ is something that the Fa- a man, even as Christ is God. Now God signifies one ther is, and something that the Father is not. Therefore having the Godhead, and man signifies one having man- Christ is one thing and another. Therefore Christ is two. hood. Yet one having manhood is differently signified by Objection 5. Further, as in the mystery of the Trinity the word “man” and by the word “Jesus” or “Peter.” For there are three Persons in one Nature, so in the mystery of this word “man” implies one having manhood indistinctly, the Incarnation there are two natures in one Person. But even as the word “God” implies indistinctly one having on account of the unity of the Nature, notwithstanding the the Godhead; but the word “Peter” or “Jesus” implies one distinction of Person, the Father and Son are one, accord- having manhood distinctly, i.e. with its determinate indi- ing to Jn. 10:30: “I and the Father are one.” Therefore, vidual properties, as “Son of God” implies one having the notwithstanding the unity of Person, Christ is two on ac- Godhead under a determinate personal property. Now the count of the duality of nature. dual number is placed in Christ with regard to the natures. Objection 6. Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, Hence, if both the natures were predicated in the abstract text. 18) that “one” and “two” are predicated denomi- of Christ, it would follow that Christ is two. But because natively. Now Christ has a duality of nature. Therefore the two natures are not predicated of Christ, except as they Christ is two. are signified in the suppositum, it must be by reason of the Objection 7. Further, as accidental form makes a suppositum that “one” or “two” be predicated of Christ. thing otherwise [alterum] so does substantial form make Now some placed two supposita in Christ, and one another thing [aliud] as Porphyry says (Praedic.). Now in Person, which, in their opinion, would seem to be the sup- Christ there are two substantial natures, the human and the positum completed with its final completion. Hence, since Divine. Therefore Christ is one thing and another. There- they placed two supposita in Christ, they said that God is fore Christ is two. two, in the neuter. But because they asserted one Per- On the contrary, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.): son, they said that Christ is one, in the masculine, for the 2182 neuter gender signifies something unformed and imper-even as all relative things bearing a personal relation. But fect, whereas the masculine signifies something formed it does follow: “Therefore He has another nature.” and perfect. on the other hand, the Nestorians, who as- Reply to Objection 4. When it is said, “Christ is serted two Persons in Christ, said that Christ is two not something that the Father is”; “something” signifies the only in the neuter, but also in the masculine. But since we Divine Nature, which is predicated even in the abstract of maintain one person and one suppositum in Christ, as is the Father and Son. But when it is said: “Christ is some- clear from q. 2, Aa. 2,3, it follows that we say that Christ thing that is not the Father”; “something” signifies, not is one not merely in the masculine, but also in the neuter. the human nature as it is in the abstract, but as it is in the Reply to Objection 1. This saying of Augustine is not concrete; not, indeed, in a distinct, but in an indistinct sup- to be taken as if “both” referred to the predicate, so as to positum, i.e. inasmuch as it underlies the nature and not mean that Christ is both; but it refers to the subject. And the individuating properties. Hence it does not follow that thus “both” does not stand for two supposita, but for two Christ is one thing and another, or that He is two, since words signifying two natures in the concrete. For I can the suppositum of the human nature in Christ, which is say that “both, viz. God and Man, are God” on account the Person of the Son of God, does not reckon numeri- of God Who assumes; and “both, viz. God and Man,” are cally with the Divine Nature, which is predicated of the Man on account of the man assumed. Father and Son. Reply to Objection 2. When it is said that “Christ Reply to Objection 5. In the mystery of the Divine is one thing and another,” this saying is to be explained Trinity the Divine Nature is predicated, even in the ab- in this sense—“having this nature and another.” And it is stract of the three Persons; hence it may be said simply in this way that Augustine explains it (Contra Felic. xi), that the three Persons are one. But in the mystery of the where, after saying, “In the mediator of God and man, the Incarnation both natures are not predicated in the abstract Son of God is one thing, and the Son of Man another,” he of Christ; hence it cannot be said simply that Christ is two. adds: “I say another thing by reason of the difference of Reply to Objection 6. Two signifies what has dual- substance, and not another thing by reason of the unity of ity, not in another, but in the same thing of which “two” person.” Hence Gregory Nazianzen says (Ep. ad Chelid. is predicated. Now what is predicated is said of the sup- ci): “If we must speak briefly, that of which the Saviour positum, which is implied by the word “Christ.” Hence, is, is one thing and another; thus the invisible is not the although Christ has duality of nature, yet, because He has same as the visible; and what is without time is not the not duality of suppositum, it cannot be said that Christ is same as what is in time. Yet they are not one and another: two. far from it; for both these are one.” Reply to Objection 7. Otherwise implies diversity of Reply to Objection 3. This is false, “Christ is only accident. Hence diversity of accident suffices for anything man”; because it does not exclude another suppositum, to be called “otherwise” simply. But “another thing” im- but another nature, since terms placed in the predicate are plies diversity of substance. Now not merely the nature, taken formally. But if anything is added whereby it is but also the suppositum is said to be a substance, as is said drawn to the suppositum, it would be a true proposition— Metaph. v, text. 15. Hence diversity of nature does not for instance, “Christ is only that which is man.” Neverthe- suffice for anything to be called “another thing” simply, less, it would not follow that He is “any other thing than unless there is diversity of suppositum. But diversity of man,” because “another thing,” inasmuch as it refers to a nature makes “another thing” relatively, i.e. in nature, if diversity of substance, properly refers to the suppositum. there is no diversity of suppositum. Whether there is only one being in Christ? IIIa q. 17 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there is not three Persons, yet on account of the unity of nature there merely one being, but two. For Damascene says (De Fide is only one being. But in Christ there are two natures, Orth. iii, 13) that whatever follows the nature is doubled though there is one Person. Therefore in Christ there is in Christ. But being follows the nature, for being is from not only one being. the form. Hence in Christ there are two beings. Objection 4. Further, in Christ the soul gives some Objection 2. Further, the being of the Son of God is being to the body, since it is its form. But it does not the Divine Nature itself, and is eternal: whereas the be- give the Divine being, since this is uncreated. Therefore ing of the Man Christ is not the Divine Nature, but is a in Christ there is another being besides the Divine being; temporal being. Therefore there is not only one being in and thus in Christ there is not only one being. Christ. On the contrary, Everything is said to be a being, Objection 3. Further, in the Trinity, although there are inasmuch as it is one, for one and being are convertible. 2183 Therefore, if there were two beings in Christ, and not one would be said to be, not only with reference to what he had only, Christ would be two, and not one. previously, but also with reference to what accrued to him I answer that, Because in Christ there are two natures afterwards. And thus, since the human nature is united to and one hypostasis, it follows that things belonging to the the Son of God, hypostatically or personally as was said nature in Christ must be two; and that those belonging above (q. 2, Aa. 5,6), and not accidentally, it follows that to the hypostasis in Christ must be only one. Now being by the human nature there accrued to Him no new per- pertains both to the nature and to the hypostasis; to the sonal being, but only a new relation of the pre-existing hypostasis as to that which has being—and to the nature personal being to the human nature, in such a way that the as to that whereby it has being. For nature is taken after Person is said to subsist not merely in the Divine, but also the manner of a form, which is said to be a being because in the human nature. something is by it; as by whiteness a thing is white, and Reply to Objection 1. Being is consequent upon na- by manhood a thing is man. Now it must be borne in mind ture, not as upon that which has being, but as upon that that if there is a form or nature which does not pertain to whereby a thing is: whereas it is consequent upon per- the personal being of the subsisting hypostasis, this being son or hypostasis, as upon that which has being. Hence it is not said to belong to the person simply, but relatively; as has unity from the unity of hypostasis, rather than duality to be white is the being of Socrates, not as he is Socrates, from the duality of the nature. but inasmuch as he is white. And there is no reason why Reply to Objection 2. The eternal being of the Son this being should not be multiplied in one hypostasis or of God, which is the Divine Nature, becomes the being person; for the being whereby Socrates is white is distinct of man, inasmuch as the human nature is assumed by the from the being whereby he is a musician. But the being Son of God to unity of Person. which belongs to the very hypostasis or person in itself Reply to Objection 3. As was said in the Ia, q. 50, cannot possibly be multiplied in one hypostasis or person, a. 2, ad 3; Ia, q. 75, a. 5, ad 4, since the Divine Person since it is impossible that there should not be one being is the same as the Nature, there is no distinction in the for one thing. Divine Persons between the being of the Person and the If, therefore, the human nature accrued to the Son of being of the Nature, and, consequently, the three Persons God, not hypostatically or personally, but accidentally, as have only one being. But they would have a triple being some maintained, it would be necessary to assert two be- if the being of the Person were distinct in them from the ings in Christ—one, inasmuch as He is God—the other, being of the Nature. inasmuch as He is Man; even as in Socrates we place one Reply to Objection 4. In Christ the soul gives be- being inasmuch as he is white, and another inasmuch as he ing to the body, inasmuch as it makes it actually ani- is a man, since “being white” does not pertain to the per- mated, which is to give it the complement of its nature sonal being of Socrates. But being possessed of a head, and species. But if we consider the body perfected by being corporeal, being animated—all these pertain to the the soul, without the hypostasis having both—this whole, one person of Socrates, and hence there arises from these composed of soul and body, as signified by the word “hu- only the one being of Socrates. And if it so happened that manity,” does not signify “what is,” but “whereby it is.” after the person of Socrates was constituted there accrued Hence being belongs to the subsisting person, inasmuch to him hands or feet or eyes, as happened to him who as it has a relation to such a nature, and of this relation the was born blind, no new being would be thereby added to soul is the cause, inasmuch as it perfects human nature by Socrates, but only a relation to these, i.e. inasmuch as he informing the body. 2184 THIRD PART, QUESTION 18 Of Christ’s Unity of Will (In Six Articles) We must now consider unity as regards the will; and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the Divine will and the human are distinct in Christ? (2) Whether in Christ’s human nature the will of sensuality is distinct from the will of reason? (3) Whether as regards the reason there were several wills in Christ? (4) Whether there was free-will in Christ? (5) Whether Christ’s human will was always conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed? (6) Whether there was any contrariety of wills in Christ? Whether there are two wills in Christ? IIIa q. 18 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there are soul, or even in place of the intellect. Hence since “the not two wills, one Divine, the other human. For the will is will is in the reason,” as the Philosopher says (De Anima the first mover and first commander in whoever wills. But iii, 9), it followed that in Christ there was no human will; in Christ the first mover and commander was the Divine and thus there was only one will in Him. So, too, Eu- will, since in Christ everything human was moved by the tyches and all who held one composite nature in Christ Divine will. Hence it seems that in Christ there was only were forced to place one will in Him. Nestorius, too, who one will, viz. the Divine. maintained that the union of God and man was one of af- Objection 2. Further, an instrument is not moved by fection and will, held only one will in Christ. But later its own will but by the will of its mover. Now the hu- on, Macarius, Patriarch of Antioch, Cyrus of Alexandria, man nature of Christ was the instrument of His Godhead. and Sergius of Constantinople and some of their follow- Hence the human nature of Christ was not moved by its ers, held that there is one will in Christ, although they held own will, but by the Divine will. that in Christ there are two natures united in a hypostasis; Objection 3. Further, that alone is multiplied in Christ because they believed that Christ’s human nature never which belongs to the nature. But the will does not seem moved with its own motion, but only inasmuch as it was to pertain to nature: for natural things are of necessity; moved by the Godhead, as is plain from the synodical let- whereas what is voluntary is not of necessity. Therefore ter of Pope Agatho∗. there is but one will in Christ. And hence in the sixth Council held at Constantino- Objection 4. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ple† it was decreed that it must be said that there are two iii, 14) that “to will in this or that way belongs not to our wills in Christ, in the following passage: “In accordance nature but to our intellect,” i.e. our personal intellect. But with what the Prophets of old taught us concerning Christ, every will is this or that will, since there is nothing in a and as He taught us Himself, and the Symbol of the Holy genus which is not at the same time in some one of its Fathers has handed down to us, we confess two natural species. Therefore all will belongs to the person. But in wills in Him and two natural operations.” And this much Christ there was and is but one person. Therefore in Christ it was necessary to say. For it is manifest that the Son of there is only one will. God assumed a perfect human nature, as was shown above On the contrary, our Lord says (Lk. 22:42): “Father, (q. 5; q. 9, a. 1). Now the will pertains to the perfection if Thou wilt, remove this chalice from Me. But yet not My of human nature, being one of its natural powers, even as will but Thine be done.” And Ambrose, quoting this to the the intellect, as was stated in the Ia, Qq. 79,80. Hence Emperor Gratian (De Fide ii, 7) says: “As He assumed my we must say that the Son of God assumed a human will, will, He assumed my sorrow;” and on Lk. 22:42 he says: together with human nature. Now by the assumption of “His will, He refers to the Man—the Father’s, to the God- human nature the Son of God suffered no diminution of head. For the will of man is temporal, and the will of the what pertains to His Divine Nature, to which it belongs to Godhead eternal.” have a will, as was said in the Ia, q. 19, a. 1. Hence it must I answer that, Some placed only one will in Christ; be said that there are two wills in Christ, i.e. one human, but they seem to have had different motives for holding the other Divine. this. For Apollinaris did not hold an intellectual soul in Reply to Objection 1. Whatever was in the human Christ, but maintained that the Word was in place of the nature of Christ was moved at the bidding of the Divine ∗ Third Council of Constantinople, Act. 4 † Act. 18 2185 will; yet it does not follow that in Christ there was no 2,4; Ethic. viii, 11). And hence it was in this manner movement of the will proper to human nature, for the good that the human nature of Christ was the instrument of the wills of other saints are moved by God’s will, “Who wor- Godhead, and was moved by its own will. keth” in them “both to will and to accomplish,” as is writ- Reply to Objection 3. The power of the will is natu- ten Phil. 2:13. For although the will cannot be inwardly ral, and necessarily follows upon the nature; but the move- moved by any creature, yet it can be moved inwardly by ment or act of this power—which is also called will— God, as was said in the Ia, q. 105, a. 4. And thus, too, is sometimes natural and necessary, e.g. with respect to Christ by His human will followed the Divine will accord- beatitude; and sometimes springs from free-will and is ing to Ps. 39:9; “That I should do Thy will, O my God, neither necessary nor natural, as is plain from what has I have desired it.” Hence Augustine says (Contra Maxim. been stated in the Ia IIae, q. 10, Aa. 1,[2]∗. And yet even ii, 20): “Where the Son says to the Father, ‘Not what I reason itself, which is the principle of this movement, is will, but what Thou willest,’ what do you gain by adding natural. Hence besides the Divine will it is necessary your own words and saying ‘He shows that His will was to place in Christ a human will, not merely as a natu- truly subject to His Father,’ as if we denied that man’s will ral power, or a natural movement, but even as a rational ought to be subject to God’s will?” movement. Reply to Objection 2. It is proper to an instrument Reply to Objection 4. When we say “to will in a cer- to be moved by the principal agent, yet diversely, accord- tain way,” we signify a determinate mode of willing. Now ing to the property of its nature. For an inanimate instru- a determinate mode regards the thing of which it is the ment, as an axe or a saw, is moved by the craftsman with mode. Hence since the will pertains to the nature, “to will only a corporeal movement; but an instrument animated in a certain way” belongs to the nature, not indeed con- by a sensitive soul is moved by the sensitive appetite, as sidered absolutely, but as it is in the hypostasis. Hence a horse by its rider; and an instrument animated with a the human will of Christ had a determinate mode from the rational soul is moved by its will, as by the command of fact of being in a Divine hypostasis, i.e. it was always his lord the servant is moved to act, the servant being like moved in accordance with the bidding of the Divine will. an animate instrument, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, Whether in Christ there was a will of sensuality besides the will of reason? IIIa q. 18 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was the will of reason. no will of sensuality besides the will of reason. For the I answer that, As was said (q. 9, a. 1), the Son of God Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42) that “the will is assumed human nature together with everything pertain- in the reason, and in the sensitive appetite are the irasci- ing to the perfection of human nature. Now in human na- ble and concupiscible parts.” Now sensuality signifies the ture is included animal nature, as the genus in its species. sensitive appetite. Hence in Christ there was no will of Hence the Son of God must have assumed together with sensuality. the human nature whatever belongs to animal nature; one Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine (De of which things is the sensitive appetite, which is called Trin. xii, 12,13) the sensuality is signified by the serpent. the sensuality. Consequently it must be allowed that in But there was nothing serpent-like in Christ; for He had Christ there was a sensual appetite, or sensuality. But it the likeness of a venomous animal without the venom, as must be borne in mind that sensuality or the sensual ap- Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 32). Hence petite, inasmuch as it naturally obeys reason, is said to be in Christ there was no will of sensuality. “rational by participation,” as is clear from the Philoso- Objection 3. Further, will is consequent upon nature, pher (Ethic. i, 13). And because “the will is in the reason,” as was said (a. 1). But in Christ there was only one nature as stated above, it may equally be said that the sensuality besides the Divine. Hence in Christ there was only one is “a will by participation.” human will. Reply to Objection 1. This argument is based on the On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 7): will, essentially so called, which is only in the intellectual “Mine is the will which He calls His own; because as part; but the will by participation can be in the sensitive Man He assumed my sorrow.” From this we are given part, inasmuch as it obeys reason. to understand that sorrow pertains to the human will of Reply to Objection 2. The sensuality is signified by Christ. Now sorrow pertains to the sensuality, as was said the serpent—not as regards the nature of the sensuality, in the Ia IIae, q. 23, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 25, a. 1. Therefore, which Christ assumed, but as regards the corruption of seemingly, in Christ there is a will of sensuality besides the “fomes,” which was not in Christ. ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 82, a. 2 2186 Reply to Objection 3. “Where there is one thing on sensuality is called the will, only because it partakes of account of another, there seems to be only one” (Aristo- the rational will, there is said to be but one human will in tle, Topic. iii); thus a surface which is visible by color Christ, even as there is but one human nature. is one visible thing with the color. So, too, because the Whether in Christ there were two wills as regards the reason? IIIa q. 18 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there were in the Ia IIae, q. 8, Aa. 2,3, regards both the end and the two wills as regards the reason. For Damascene says (De means; and is affected differently towards both. For to- Fide Orth. ii, 22) that there is a double will in man, viz. wards the end it is borne simply and absolutely, as towards the natural will which is called thelesis, and the rational what is good in itself; but towards the means it is borne will which is called boulesis. Now Christ in His human under a certain relation, as the goodness of the means de- nature had whatever belongs to the perfection of human pends on something else. Hence the act of the will, inas- nature. Hence both the foregoing wills were in Christ. much as it is drawn to anything desired of itself, as health, Objection 2. Further, the appetitive power is diversi- which act is called by Damascene thelesis—i.e. simple fied in man by the difference of the apprehensive power, will, and by the masters “will as nature,” is different from and hence according to the difference of sense and intel- the act of the will as it is drawn to anything that is desired lect is the difference of sensitive and intellective appetite only in order to something else, as to take medicine; and in man. But in the same way as regards man’s apprehen- this act of the will Damascene calls boulesis—i.e. counsion, we hold the difference of reason and intellect; both seling will, and the masters, “will as reason.” But this of which were in Christ. Therefore there was a double diversity of acts does not diversify the power, since both will in Him, one intellectual and the other rational. acts regard the one common ratio of the object, which is Objection 3. Further, some∗ ascribe to Christ “a will goodness. Hence we must say that if we are speaking of of piety,” which can only be on the part of reason. There- the power of the will, in Christ there is but one human fore in Christ on the part of reason there are several wills. will, essentially so called and not by participation; but if On the contrary, In every order there is one first we are speaking of the will as an act, we thus distinguish mover. But the will is the first mover in the genus of hu- in Christ a will as nature, which is called thelesis, and a man acts. Therefore in one man there is only one will, will as reason, which is called boulesis. properly speaking, which is the will of reason. But Christ Reply to Objection 1. These two wills do not diver- is one man. Therefore in Christ there is only one human sify the power but only the act, as we have said. will. Reply to Objection 2. The intellect and the reason are I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 3), the will not distinct powers, as was said in the Ia, q. 79, a. 8. is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for the Reply to Objection 3. The “will of piety” would not act. Hence if the will is taken for the act, it is necessary seem to be distinct from the will considered as nature, to place two wills, i.e. two species of acts of the will in inasmuch as it shrinks from another’s evil, absolutely con- Christ on the part of the reason. For the will, as was said sidered. Whether there was free-will in Christ? IIIa q. 18 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was no we are certain of. But Christ was certain of everything. free-will. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) that Hence there was no counsel and consequently no free-will gnome, i.e. opinion, thinking or cogitation, and proaire-in Christ. sis, i.e. choice, “cannot possibly be attributed to our Lord, Objection 3. Further, free-will is indifferent. But if we wish to speak with propriety.” But in the things of Christ’s will was determined to good, since He could not faith especially we must speak with propriety. Therefore sin; as stated above (q. 15, Aa. 1 ,2). Hence there was no there was no choice in Christ and consequently no free- free-will in Christ. will, of which choice is the act. On the contrary, It is written (Is. 7:15): “He shall Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, eat butter and honey, that He may know to refuse the evil 2) that choice is “a desire of something after taking coun- and to choose the good,” which is an act of the free-will. sel.” Now counsel does not appear to be in Christ, be- Therefore there was free-will in Christ. cause we do not take counsel concerning such things as I answer that, As was said above (a. 3), there was ∗ Hugh of St. Victor, De Quat. Volunt. Christ. 2187 a twofold act of the will in Christ; one whereby He was choose, according to Eph. 1:4: “He chose us in Him be-drawn to anything willed in itself, which implies the na- fore the foundation of the world,” although in God there ture of an end; the other whereby His will was drawn is no doubt. Yet doubt is accidental to choice when it is in to anything willed on account of its being ordained to an ignorant nature. We may also say the same of whatever another—which pertains to the nature of means. Now, else is mentioned in the passage quoted. as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) choice differs from Reply to Objection 2. Choice presupposes counsel; will in this, that will of itself regards the end, while choice yet it follows counsel only as determined by judgment. regards the means. And thus simple will is the same as the For what we judge to be done, we choose, after the in- “will as nature”; but choice is the same as the “will as rea- quiry of counsel, as is stated (Ethic. iii, 2,3). Hence if son,” and is the proper act of free-will, as was said in the anything is judged necessary to be done, without any pre- Ia, q. 83, a. 3. Hence, since “will as reason” is placed in ceding doubt or inquiry, this suffices for choice. There- Christ, we must also place choice, and consequently free- fore it is plain that doubt or inquiry belong to choice not will, whose act is choice, as was said in the Ia, q. 83, a. 3; essentially, but only when it is in an ignorant nature. Ia IIae, q. 13, a. 1. Reply to Objection 3. The will of Christ, though de- Reply to Objection 1. Damascene excludes choice termined to good, is not determined to this or that good. from Christ, in so far as he considers that doubt is im- Hence it pertains to Christ, even as to the blessed, to plied in the word choice. Nevertheless doubt is not nec- choose with a free-will confirmed in good. essary to choice, since it belongs even to God Himself to Whether the human will of Christ was altogether conformed to the Divine will in the IIIa q. 18 a. 5 thing willed? Objection 1. It would seem that the human will in the will of sensuality, which is called will by participa- Christ did not will anything except what God willed. For it tion, and the rational will, whether considered after the is written (Ps. 39:9) in the person of Christ: “That I should manner of nature, or after the manner of reason. Now it do Thy will: O my God, I have desired it.” Now he who was said above (q. 13, a. 3, ad 1; q. 14, a. 1, ad 2) that desires to do another’s will, wills what the other wills. by a certain dispensation the Son of God before His Pas- Hence it seems that Christ’s human will willed nothing sion “allowed His flesh to do and suffer what belonged but what was willed by His Divine will. to it.” And in like manner He allowed all the powers of Objection 2. Further, Christ’s soul had most perfect His soul to do what belonged to them. Now it is clear charity, which, indeed, surpasses the comprehension of that the will of sensuality naturally shrinks from sensible all our knowledge, according to Eph. 3:19, “the charity pains and bodily hurt. In like manner, the will as nature of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge.” Now charity turns from what is against nature and what is evil in itself, makes men will what God wills; hence the Philosopher as death and the like; yet the will as reason may at time says (Ethic. ix, 4) that one mark of friendship is “to will choose these things in relation to an end, as in a mere man and choose the same.” Therefore the human will in Christ the sensuality and the will absolutely considered shrink willed nothing else than was willed by His Divine will. from burning, which, nevertheless, the will as reason may Objection 3. Further, Christ was a true comprehen- choose for the sake of health. Now it was the will of God sor. But the Saints who are comprehensors in heaven that Christ should undergo pain, suffering, and death, not will only what God wills, otherwise they would not be that these of themselves were willed by God, but for the happy, because they would not obtain whatever they will, sake of man’s salvation. Hence it is plain that in His will for “blessed is he who has what he wills, and wills noth- of sensuality and in His rational will considered as nature, ing amiss,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5). Hence Christ could will what God did not; but in His will as in His human will Christ wills nothing else than does the reason He always willed the same as God, which appears Divine will. from what He says (Mat. 26:39): “Not as I will, but as On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, Thou wilt.” For He willed in His reason that the Divine 20): “When Christ says ‘Not what I will, but what Thou will should be fulfilled although He said that He willed wilt’ He shows Himself to have willed something else something else by another will. than did His Father; and this could only have been by His Reply to Objection 1. By His rational will Christ human heart, since He did not transfigure our weakness willed the Divine will to be fulfilled; but not by His will of into His Divine but into His human will.” sensuality, the movement of which does not extend to the I answer that, As was said (Aa. 2,3), in Christ ac- will of God—nor by His will considered as nature which cording to His human nature there is a twofold will, viz. regards things absolutely considered and not in relation to 2188 the Divine will. Reply to Objection 3. Christ was at once comprehen- Reply to Objection 2. The conformity of the human sor and wayfarer, inasmuch as He was enjoying God in will to the Divine regards the will of reason: according to His mind and had a passible body. Hence things repug- which the wills even of friends agree, inasmuch as reason nant to His natural will and to His sensitive appetite could considers something willed in its relation to the will of a happen to Him in His passible flesh. friend. Whether there was contrariety of wills in Christ? IIIa q. 18 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that there was contrariety of one regards the doing of something with reference to of wills in Christ. For contrariety of wills regards con- some universal reason, and the will of another regards the trariety of objects, as contrariety of movements springs not doing the same with reference to some particular rea- from contrariety of termini, as is plain from the Philoso- son, there is not complete contrariety of will, e.g. when pher (Phys. v, text. 49, seq.). Now Christ in His different a judge wishes a brigand to be hanged for the good of wills wished contrary things. For in His Divine will He the commonwealth, and one of the latter’s kindred wishes wished for death, from which He shrank in His human him not to be hanged on account of a private love, there will, hence Athanasius says∗: “When Christ says ‘Father, is no contrariety of wills; unless, indeed, the desire of the if it be possible, let this chalice pass from Me; yet not My private good went so far as to wish to hinder the public will, but Thine be done,’ and again, ‘The spirit indeed is good for the private good—in that case the opposition of willing, but the flesh weak,’ He denotes two wills—the wills would regard the same. human, which through the weakness of the flesh shrank Secondly, for contrariety of wills it is necessary that it from the passion—and His Divine will eager for the pas- should be in the same will. For if a man wishes one thing sion.” Hence there was contrariety of wills in Christ. with his rational appetite, and wishes another thing with Objection 2. Further, it is written (Gal. 5:17) that his sensitive appetite, there is no contrariety, unless the “the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against sensitive appetite so far prevailed as to change or at least the flesh.” Now when the spirit desires one thing, and the keep back the rational appetite; for in this case something flesh another, there is contrariety of wills. But this was in of the contrary movement of the sensitive appetite would Christ; for by the will of charity which the Holy Spirit was reach the rational will. causing in His mind, He willed the passion, according to And hence it must be said that although the natural Is. 53:7: “He was offered because it was His own will,” and the sensitive will in Christ wished what the Divine yet in His flesh He shrank from the passion. Therefore will did not wish, yet there was no contrariety of wills in there was contrariety of wills in Him. Him. First, because neither the natural will nor the will Objection 3. Further, it is written (Lk. 22:43) that of sensuality rejected the reason for which the Divine will “being in an agony, He prayed the longer.” Now agony and the will of the human reason in Christ wished the pas- seems to imply a certain struggle† in a soul drawn to con- sion. For the absolute will of Christ wished the salva- trary things. Hence it seems that there was contrariety of tion of the human race, although it did not pertain to it to will in Christ. will this for the sake of something further; but the move- On the contrary, In the decisions of the Sixth Coun- ment of sensuality could nowise extend so far. Secondly, cil‡ it is said: “We confess two natural wills, not in op- because neither the Divine will nor the will of reason in position, as evil-minded heretics assert, but following His Christ was impeded or retarded by the natural will or the human will, and neither withstanding nor striving against, appetite of sensuality. So, too, on the other hand, neither but rather being subject to, His Divine and omnipotent the Divine will nor the will of reason in Christ shrank from will.” or retarded the movement of the natural human will and I answer that, Contrariety can exist only where there the movement of the sensuality in Christ. For it pleased is opposition in the same and as regards the same. For Christ, in His Divine will, and in His will of reason, that if the diversity exists as regards diverse things, and in di- His natural will and will of sensuality should be moved verse subjects, this would not suffice for the nature of con- according to the order of their nature. Hence it is clear trariety, nor even for the nature of contradiction, e.g. if that in Christ there was no opposition or contrariety of a man were well formed or healthy as regards his hand, wills. but not as regards his foot. Hence for there to be con- Reply to Objection 1. The fact of any will in Christ trariety of wills in anyone it is necessary, first, that the willing something else than did the Divine will, proceeded diversity of wills should regard the same. For if the will from the Divine will, by whose permission the human na- ∗ De Incarnat. et Cont. Arianos, written against Apollinarius † Greek, agonia ‡ Third Council of Constantinople, Act. 18 2189 ture in Christ was moved by its proper movements, as considering another, wishes the contrary. For this springs Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15,18,19). from the weakness of the reason, which is unable to judge Reply to Objection 2. In us the desires of the spirit which is the best simply. Now this did not occur in Christ, are impeded or retarded by the desires of the flesh: this since by His reason He judged it best that the Divine will did not occur in Christ. Hence in Christ there was no con- regarding the salvation of the human race should be ful- trariety of flesh and spirit, as in us. filled by His passion. Nevertheless, there was an agony in Reply to Objection 3. The agony in Christ was not Christ as regards the sensitive part, inasmuch as it implied in the rational soul, in as far as it implies a struggle in the a dread of coming trial, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. will arising from a diversity of motives, as when anyone, ii, 15; iii, 18,23). on his reason considering one, wishes one thing, and on its 2190 THIRD PART, QUESTION 19 Of the Unity of Christ’s Operation (In Four Articles) We must now consider the unity of Christ’s operation; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether in Christ there was one or several operations of the Godhead and Manhood? (2) Whether in Christ there were several operations of the human nature? (3) Whether Christ by His human operation merited anything for Himself? (4) Whether He merited anything for us by it? Whether in Christ there is only one operation of the Godhead and Manhood? IIIa q. 19 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there is I answer that, As was said above (q. 18, a. 1), the but one operation of the Godhead and the Manhood. For aforesaid heretics who placed one will in Christ placed Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): “The most loving opera- one operation in Christ. Now in order better to under- tion of God is made manifest to us by the supersubstantial stand their erroneous opinion, we must bear in mind that Word having taken flesh integrally and truly, and having wherever there are several mutually ordained agents, the operated and suffered whatsoever befits His human and inferior is moved by the superior, as in man the body is Divine operation.” But he here mentions only one human moved by the soul and the lower powers by the reason. and Divine operation, which is written in Greek thean- And thus the actions and movements of the inferior princi- drike, i.e. God-manlike. Hence it seems that there is but ple are things operated rather than operations. Now what one composite operation in Christ. pertains to the highest principle is properly the operation; Objection 2. Further, there is but one operation of the thus we say of man that to walk, which belongs to the feet, principal and instrumental agent. Now the human nature and to touch, which belongs to the hand, are things oper- in Christ was the instrument of the Divine, as was said ated by the man—one of which is operated by the soul above (q. 7, a. 1, ad 3; q. 8, a. 1, ad 1; q. 18, a. 1, ad 2). through the feet, the other through the hands. And be- Hence the operations of the Divine and human natures in cause it is the same soul that operates in both cases, there Christ are the same. is only one indifferent operation, on the part of the thing Objection 3. Further, since in Christ there are two operating, which is the first moving principle; but differ- natures in one hypostasis or person, whatever pertains to ence is found on the part of what is operated. Now, as in a the hypostasis or person is one and the same. But oper- mere man the body is moved by the soul, and the sensitive ation pertains to the hypostasis or person, for it is only a by the rational appetite, so in the Lord Jesus Christ the hu- subsisting suppositum that operates; hence, according to man nature is moved and ruled by the Divine. Hence they the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1), acts belong to singulars. said that there is one indifferent operation on the part of Hence in Christ there is only one operation of the God- the Godhead operating, but divers things operated, inas- head and the Manhood. much as the Godhead of Christ did one thing by Itself, Objection 4. Further, as being belongs to a subsisting as to uphold all things by the word of His power—and hypostasis, so also does operation. But on account of the another thing by His human nature, as to walk in body. unity of hypostasis there is only one operation of the God- Hence the Sixth Council∗ quotes the words of Severus the head and the (q. 17, a. 2). Hence, on account of the same heretic, who said: “What things were done and wrought unity, there is one operation in Christ. by the one Christ, differ greatly; for some are becoming Objection 5. Further, as being belongs to a sub- to God, and some are human, as to walk bodily on the operated there is one operation. But the same thing was earth is indeed human, but to give hale steps to sickly operated by the Godhead and the Manhood, as the heal- limbs, wholly unable to walk on the ground, is becom- ing of the lepers or the raising of the dead. Hence it seems ing to God. Yet one, i.e. the Incarnate Word, wrought that in Christ there is but one operation of the Godhead one and the other—neither was this from one nature, and and the Manhood. that from another; nor can we justly affirm that because On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 8): “How there are distinct things operated there are therefore two can the same operation spring from different powers? operating natures and forms.” Cannot the lesser operate as the greater? And can there But herein they were deceived, for what is moved by be one operation where there are different substances?” another has a twofold action—one which it has from its ∗ Third Council of Constantinople, Act. 10 2191 own form—the other, which it has inasmuch as it is moved (Ad Caium iv), “what is of man He works beyond man; by another; thus the operation of an axe of itself is to and this is shown by the Virgin conceiving supernaturally cleave; but inasmuch as it is moved by the craftsman, its and by the unstable waters bearing up the weight of bodily operation is to make benches. Hence the operation which feet.” Now it is clear that to be begotten belongs to human belongs to a thing by its form is proper to it, nor does it nature, and likewise to walk; yet both were in Christ su- belong to the mover, except in so far as he makes use of pernaturally. So, too, He wrought Divine things humanly, this kind of thing for his work: thus to heat is the proper as when He healed the leper with a touch. Hence in the operation of fire, but not of a smith, except in so far as he same epistle he adds: “He performed Divine works not as makes use of fire for heating iron. But the operation which God does, and human works not as man does, but, God belongs to the thing, as moved by another, is not distinct having been made man, by a new operation of God and from the operation of the mover; thus to make a bench man.” is not the work of the axe independently of the workman. Now, that he understood two operations in Christ, one Hence, wheresoever the mover and the moved have differ- of the Divine and the other of the human nature, is clear ent forms or operative faculties, there must the operation from what he says, Div. Nom. ii: “Whatever pertains of the mover and the proper operation of the moved be to His human operation the Father and the Holy Ghost distinct; although the moved shares in the operation of the no-wise share in, except, as one might say, by their most mover, and the mover makes use of the operation of the gracious and merciful will,” i.e. inasmuch as the Father moved, and, consequently, each acts in communion with and the Holy Ghost in their mercy wished Christ to do the other. and to suffer human things. And he adds: “He is truly the Therefore in Christ the human nature has its proper unchangeable God, and God’s Word by the sublime and form and power whereby it acts; and so has the Divine. unspeakable operation of God, which, being made man Hence the human nature has its proper operation distinct for us, He wrought.” Hence it is clear that the human op- from the Divine, and conversely. Nevertheless, the Divine eration, in which the Father and the Holy Ghost do not Nature makes use of the operation of the human nature, as share, except by Their merciful consent, is distinct from of the operation of its instrument; and in the same way the His operation, as the Word of God, wherein the Father and human nature shares in the operation of the Divine Nature, the Holy Ghost share. as an instrument shares in the operation of the principal Reply to Objection 2. The instrument is said to act agent. And this is what Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Flavian. through being moved by the principal agent; and yet, be- xxviii): “Both forms” (i.e. both the Divine and the hu- sides this, it can have its proper operation through its own man nature in Christ) “do what is proper to each in union form, as stated above of fire. And hence the action of the with the other, i.e. the Word operates what belongs to the instrument as instrument is not distinct from the action Word, and the flesh carries out what belongs to flesh.” of the principal agent; yet it may have another operation, But if there were only one operation of the Godhead inasmuch as it is a thing. Hence the operation of Christ’s and manhood in Christ, it would be necessary to say either human nature, as the instrument of the Godhead, is not that the human nature had not its proper form and power distinct from the operation of the Godhead; for the salva- (for this could not possibly be said of the Divine), whence tion wherewith the manhood of Christ saves us and that it would follow that in Christ there was only the Divine wherewith His Godhead saves us are not distinct; nev- operation; or it would be necessary to say that from the ertheless, the human nature in Christ, inasmuch as it is Divine and human power there was made up one power. a certain nature, has a proper operation distinct from the Now both of these are impossible. For by the first the hu- Divine, as stated above. man nature in Christ is supposed to be imperfect; and by Reply to Objection 3. To operate belongs to a sub- the second a confusion of the natures is supposed. Hence sisting hypostasis; in accordance, however, with the form it is with reason that the Sixth Council (Act. 18) con- and nature from which the operation receives its species. demned this opinion, and decreed as follows: “We con- Hence from the diversity of forms or natures spring the fess two natural, indivisible, unconvertible, unconfused, divers species of operations, but from the unity of hy- and inseparable operations in the same Lord Jesus Christ postasis springs the numerical unity as regards the oper- our true God”; i.e. the Divine operation and the human ation of the species: thus fire has two operations specif- operation. ically different, namely, to illuminate and to heat, from Reply to Objection 1. Dionysius places in Christ a the difference of light and heat, and yet the illumination theandric, i.e. a God-manlike or Divino-human, opera- of the fire that illuminates at one and the same time is nu- tion not by any confusion of the operations or powers of merically one. So, likewise, in Christ there are necessarily both natures, but inasmuch as His Divine operation em- two specifically different operations by reason of His two ploys the human, and His human operation shares in the natures; nevertheless, each of the operations at one and power of the Divine. Hence, as he says in a certain epistle the same time is numerically one, as one walking and one 2192 healing. erations is not incompatible with personal unity. Reply to Objection 4. Being and operation belong Reply to Objection 5. The proper work of the Divine to the person by reason of the nature; yet in a different operation is different from the proper work of the human manner. For being belongs to the very constitution of the operation. Thus to heal a leper is a proper work of the person, and in this respect it has the nature of a term; con- Divine operation, but to touch him is the proper work of sequently, unity of person requires unity of the complete the human operation. Now both these operations concur and personal being. But operation is an effect of the per- in one work, inasmuch as one nature acts in union with son by reason of a form or nature. Hence plurality of op- the other. Whether in Christ there are several human operations? IIIa q. 19 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there are when the inferior agent acts only as moved by the superior several human operations. For Christ as man communi- agent, then the operation of the superior and the inferior cates with plants by His nutritive soul, with the brutes by agent is one. His sensitive soul, and with the angels by His intellective And hence in every mere man the operations of the el- soul, even as other men do. Now the operations of a plant emental body and of the vegetative soul are distinct from as plant and of an animal as animal are different. There- the will’s operation, which is properly human; so likewise fore Christ as man has several operations. the operations of the sensitive soul inasmuch as it is not Objection 2. Further, powers and habits are distin- moved by reason; but inasmuch as it is moved by reason, guished by their acts. Now in Christ’s soul there were the operations of the sensitive and the rational part are the divers powers and habits; therefore also divers operations. same. Now there is but one operation of the rational part Objection 3. Further, instruments ought to be pro- if we consider the principle of the operation, which is the portioned to their operations. Now the human body has reason and the will; but the operations are many if we divers members of different form, and consequently fitted consider their relationship to various objects. And there to divers operations. Therefore in Christ there are divers were some who called this a diversity of things operated operations in the human nature. rather than of operations, judging the unity of the opera- On the contrary, As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. tion solely from the operative principle. And it is in this iii, 15), “operation is consequent upon the nature.” But in respect that we are now considering the unity and plurality Christ there is only one human nature. Therefore in Christ of operations in Christ. there is only one human operation. Hence in every mere man there is but one operation, I answer that, Since it is by his reason that man is which is properly called human; but besides this there what he is; that operation is called human simply, which are in a mere man certain other operations, which are not proceeds from the reason through the will, which is the strictly human, as was said above. But in the Man Jesus rational appetite. Now if there is any operation in man Christ there was no motion of the sensitive part which was which does not proceed from the reason and the will, it not ordered by reason. Even the natural and bodily oper- is not simply a human operation, but belongs to man by ations pertained in some respects to His will, inasmuch reason of some part of human nature—sometimes by rea- as it was His will “that His flesh should do and suffer son of the nature of elementary bodies, as to be borne what belonged to it,” as stated above (q. 18, a. 5). Much downwards—sometimes by reason of the force of the veg- more, therefore, is there one operation in Christ, than in etative soul, as to be nourished, and to grow—sometimes any other man whatsoever. by reason of the sensitive part, as to see and hear, to imag- Reply to Objection 1. The operations of the sensitive ine and remember, to desire and to be angry. Now be- and nutritive parts are not strictly human, as stated above; tween these operations there is a difference. For the oper- yet in Christ these operations were more human than in ations of the sensitive soul are to some extent obedient to others. reason, and consequently they are somewhat rational and Reply to Objection 2. Powers and habits are diversi- human inasmuch as they obey reason, as is clear from the fied by comparison with their objects. Hence in this way Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13). But the operations that spring the diversity of operations corresponds to the divers pow- from the vegetative soul, or from the nature of elemental ers and habits, as likewise to the divers objects. Now we bodies, are not subject to reason; consequently they are do not wish to exclude this diversity of operations from nowise rational; nor simply human, but only as regards a Christ’s humanity, nor that which springs from a diversity part of human nature. Now it was said (a. 1) that when of time, but only that which regards the first active princi- a subordinate agent acts by its own form, the operations ple, as was said above. of the inferior and of the superior agent are distinct; but (St. Thomas gives no reply to obj. 3; some codices 2193 add: Hence may be gathered the reply to the third objection.) Whether the human action of Christ could be meritorious to Him? IIIa q. 19 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the human action of Now since all perfection and greatness must be at- Christ could not be meritorious to Him. For before His tributed to Christ, consequently He must have by merit death Christ was a comprehensor even as He is now. But what others have by merit; unless it be of such a nature comprehensors do not merit: because the charity of the that its want would detract from Christ’s dignity and per- comprehensor belongs to the reward of beatitude, since fection more than would accrue to Him by merit. Hence fruition depends upon it. Hence it does not seem to be He merited neither grace nor knowledge nor the beatitude the principle of merit, since merit and reward are not the of His soul, nor the Godhead, because, since merit regards same. Therefore Christ before His passion did not merit, only what is not yet possessed, it would be necessary that even as He does not merit now. Christ should have been without these at some time; and Objection 2. Further, no one merits what is due to to be without them would have diminished Christ’s dig- him. But because Christ is the Son of God by nature, the nity more than His merit would have increased it. But the eternal inheritance is due to Him, which other men merit glory of the body, and the like, are less than the dignity by their works. And hence Christ Who, from the begin- of meriting, which pertains to the virtue of charity. Hence ning, was the Word of God, could not merit anything for we must say that Christ had, by merit, the glory of His Himself. body and whatever pertained to His outward excellence, Objection 3. Further, whoever has the principle does as His Ascension, veneration, and the rest. And thus it is not properly merit what flows from its possession. But clear that He could merit for Himself. Christ has the glory of the soul, whence, in the natural Reply to Objection 1. Fruition, which is an act of course, flowed the glory of the body, as Augustine says charity, pertains to the glory of the soul, which Christ did (Ep. ad Dios cxviii); though by a dispensation it was not merit. Hence if He merited by charity, it does not fol- brought about that in Christ the glory of the soul should low that the merit and the reward are the same. Nor did not overflow to the body. Hence Christ did not merit the He merit by charity inasmuch as it was the charity of a glory of the body. comprehensor, but inasmuch as it was that of a wayfarer. Objection 4. Further, the manifestation of Christ’s ex- For He was at once a wayfarer and a comprehensor, as cellence is a good, not of Christ Himself, but of those who was said above (q. 15, a. 10). And therefore, since He is know Him. Hence it is promised as a reward to such as no longer a wayfarer, He is not in the state of meriting. love Christ that He will be manifested to them, according Reply to Objection 2. Because by nature Christ is to Jn. 14:21: “He that loveth Me, shall be loved of My God and the Son of God, the Divine glory and the lordship Father, and I will love him and will manifest Myself to of all things are due to Him, as to the first and supreme him.” Therefore Christ did not merit the manifestation of Lord. Nevertheless a glory is due to Him as a beatified His greatness. man; and this He has partly without merit, and partly with On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil. 2:8,9): “Be- merit, as is clear from what has been said. coming obedient unto death. . . For which cause God also Reply to Objection 3. It is by Divine appointment hath exalted Him.” Therefore by obeying He merited His that there is an overflow of glory from the soul to the body, exaltation and thus He merited something for Himself. in keeping with human merit; so that as man merits by the I answer that, To have any good thing of oneself is act of the soul which he performs in the body, so he may more excellent than to have it from another, for “what is be rewarded by the glory of the soul overflowing to the of itself a cause is always more excellent than what is a body. And hence not only the glory of the soul, but also cause through another,” as is said Phys. viii, 5. Now a the glory of the body falls under merit, according to Rom. thing is said to have, of itself, that of which it is to some 8:11: “He. . . shall quicken also our [Vulg.: ‘your’] mortal extent the cause. But of whatever good we possess the bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth in us [Vulg.: first cause by authority is God; and in this way no crea- ‘you’].” And thus it could fall under Christ’s merit. ture has any good of itself, according to 1 Cor. 4:7: “What Reply to Objection 4. The manifestation of Christ’s hast thou that thou hast not received?” Nevertheless, in excellence is His good as regards the being which it has a secondary manner anyone may be a cause, to himself, in the knowledge of others; although in regard to the be- of having certain good things, inasmuch as he cooperates ing which they have in themselves it chiefly belongs to the with God in the matter, and thus whoever has anything by good of those who know Him. Yet even this is referred to his own merit has it, in a manner, of himself. Hence it is Christ inasmuch as they are His members. better to have a thing by merit than without merit. 2194 Whether Christ could merit for others? IIIa q. 19 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ could not merit was in Christ not merely as in an individual, but also as for others. For it is written (Ezech. 18:4): “The soul that in the Head of the whole Church, to Whom all are united, sinneth, the same shall die.” Hence, for a like reason, the as members to a head, who constitute one mystical per- soul that meriteth, the same shall be recompensed. There- son. And hence it is that Christ’s merit extends to others fore it is not possible that Christ merited for others. inasmuch as they are His members; even as in a man the Objection 2. Further, of the fulness of Christ’s grace action of the head reaches in a manner to all his members, we all receive, as is written Jn. 1:16. Now other men since it perceives not merely for itself alone, but for all the having Christ’s grace cannot merit for others. For it is members. written (Ezech. 14:20) that if “Noe and Daniel and Job be Reply to Objection 1. The sin of an individual harms in the city [Vulg.: ‘the midst thereof’]. . . they shall deliver himself alone; but the sin of Adam, who was appointed by neither son nor daughter; but they shall only deliver their God to be the principle of the whole nature, is transmit- own souls by their justice.” Hence Christ could not merit ted to others by carnal propagation. So, too, the merit of anything for us. Christ, Who has been appointed by God to be the head of Objection 3. Further, the “reward” that we merit is all men in regard to grace, extends to all His members. due “according to justice [Vulg.: ‘debt’] and not accord- Reply to Objection 2. Others receive of Christ’s ful- ing to grace,” as is clear from Rom. 4:4. Therefore if ness not indeed the fount of grace, but some particular Christ merited our salvation it follows that our salvation grace. And hence it need not be that men merit for others, is not by God’s grace but by justice, and that He acts un- as Christ did. justly with those whom He does not save, since Christ’s Reply to Objection 3. As the sin of Adam reaches merit extends to all. others only by carnal generation, so, too, the merit of On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:18): “As by Christ reaches others only by spiritual regeneration, which the offense of one, unto all men to condemnation; so also takes place in baptism; wherein we are incorporated with by the justice of one, unto all men to justification of life.” Christ, according to Gal. 3:27, “As many of you as have But Adam’s demerits reached to the condemnation of oth- been baptized in Christ, have put on Christ”; and it is by ers. Much more, therefore, does the merit of Christ reach grace that it is granted to man to be incorporated with others. Christ. And thus man’s salvation is from grace. I answer that, As stated above (q. 8, Aa. 1,5), grace 2195 THIRD PART, QUESTION 20 Of Christ’s Subjection to the Father (In Two Articles) We must now consider such things as belong to Christ in relation to the Father. Some of these things are predicated of Him because of His relation to the Father, e.g. that He was subject to Him, that He prayed to Him, that He ministered, to Him by priesthood. And some are predicated, or may be predicated, of Him because of the Father’s relation to Him, e.g. that the Father adopted Him and that He predestined Him. Hence we must consider (1) Christ’s subjection to the Father; (2) His prayer; (3) His priesthood; (4) Adoption— whether it is becoming to Him; (5) His predestination. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ is subject to the Father? (2) Whether He is subject to Himself? Whether we may say that Christ is subject to the Father? IIIa q. 20 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that we may not say that from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) while a created nature has Christ was subject to the Father. For everything subject a participation of the Divine goodness, being subject, so to to the Father is a creature, since, as is said in De Eccles. say, to the rays of this goodness. Secondly, human nature Dogm. iv, “in the Trinity there is no dependence or sub- is subject to God, as regards God’s power, inasmuch as jection.” But we cannot say simply that Christ is a crea- human nature, even as every creature, is subject to the op- ture, as was stated above (q. 16, a. 8). Therefore we cannot eration of the Divine ordinance. Thirdly, human nature is say simply that Christ is subject to God the Father. especially subject to God through its proper act, inasmuch Objection 2. Further, a thing is said to be subject to as by its own will it obeys His command. This triple sub- God when it is subservient to His dominion. But we can- jection to God Christ professes of Himself. The first (Mat. not attribute subservience to the human nature of Christ; 19:17): “Why askest thou Me concerning good? One is for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 21): “We must good, God.” And on this Jerome remarks: “He who had bear in mind that we may not call it” (i.e. Christ’s hu- called Him a good master, and had not confessed Him to man nature) “a servant; for the words ‘subservience’ and be God or the Son of God, learns that no man, however ‘domination’ are not names of the nature, but of relations, holy, is good in comparison with God.” And hereby He as the words ‘paternity’ and ‘filiation.’ ” Hence Christ in gave us to understand that He Himself, in His human na- His human nature is not subject to God the Father. ture, did not attain to the height of Divine goodness. And Objection 3. Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:28): because “in such things as are great, but not in bulk, to be “And when all things shall be subdued unto Him, then the great is the same as to be good,” as Augustine says (De Son also Himself shall be subject unto Him that put all Trin. vi, 8), for this reason the Father is said to be greater things under Him.” But, as is written (Heb. 2:8): “We see than Christ in His human nature. The second subjection not as yet all things subject to Him.” Hence He is not yet is attributed to Christ, inasmuch as all that befell Christ is subject to the Father, Who has subjected all things to Him. believed to have happened by Divine appointment; hence On the contrary, Our Lord says (Jn. 14:28), “The Fa- Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that Christ “is subject to ther is greater than I”; and Augustine says (De Trin. i, 7): the ordinance of God the Father.” And this is the sub- “It is not without reason that the Scripture mentions both, jection of subservience, whereby “every creature serves that the Son is equal to the Father and the Father greater God” (Judith 16:17), being subject to His ordinance, ac- than the Son, for the first is said on account of the form cording to Wis. 16:24: “The creature serving Thee the of God, and the second on account of the form of a ser- Creator.” And in this way the Son of God (Phil. 2:7) is vant, without any confusion.” Now the less is subject to said to have taken “the form of a servant.” The third sub- the greater. Therefore in the form of a servant Christ is jection He attributes to Himself, saying (Jn. 8:29): “I do subject to the Father. always the things that please Him.” And this is the sub- I answer that, Whoever has a nature is competent to jection to the Father, of obedience unto death. Hence it is have what is proper to that nature. Now human nature written (Phil. 2:8) that he became “obedient” to the Father from its beginning has a threefold subjection to God. The “unto death.” first regards the degree of goodness, inasmuch as the Di- Reply to Objection 1. As we are not to understand vine Nature is the very essence of goodness as is clear that Christ is a creature simply, but only in His human na- 2196 ture, whether this qualification be added or not, as stated serving in this or that nature. And in this way nothing above (q. 16, a. 8), so also we are to understand that Christ prevents Christ being subject or servant to the Father in is subject to the Father not simply but in His human na- human nature. ture, even if this qualification be not added; and yet it is Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Trin. better to add this qualification in order to avoid the error i, 8): “Christ will give the kingdom to God and the Fa- of Arius, who held the Son to be less than the Father. ther, when He has brought the faithful, over whom He now Reply to Objection 2. The relation of subservience reigns by faith, to the vision,” i.e. to see the essence com- and dominion is based upon action and passion, inasmuch mon to the Father and the Son: and then He will be totally as it belongs to a servant to be moved by the will of his subject to the Father not only in Himself, but also in His master. Now to act is not attributed to the nature as agent, members by the full participation of the Godhead. And but to the person, since “acts belong to supposita and to then all things will be fully subject to Him by the final ac- singulars,” according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1). complishment of His will concerning them; although even Nevertheless action is attributed to the nature as to that now all things are subject to Him as regards His power, whereby the person or hypostasis acts. Hence, although according to Mat. 28:18: “All power is given to Me in the nature is not properly said to rule or serve, yet every heaven and in earth.” hypostasis or person may be properly said to be ruling or Whether Christ is subject to Himself? IIIa q. 20 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ is not subject whoever is the servant of the Father is the servant of the to Himself. For Cyril says in a synodal letter which the Son; otherwise not everything that belongs to the Father Council of Ephesus (Part I, ch. xxvi) received: “Christ would belong to the Son. Therefore Christ is His own ser- is neither servant nor master of Himself. It is foolish, or vant and is subject to Himself. rather impious, to think or say this.” And Damascene says I answer that, As was said above (a. 1, ad 2), to be the same (De Fide Orth. iii, 21): “The one Being, Christ, master or servant is attributed to a person or hypostasis cannot be the servant or master of Himself.” Now Christ according to a nature. Hence when it is said that Christ is is said to be the servant of the Father inasmuch as He is the master or servant of Himself, or that the Word of God subject to Him. Hence Christ is not subject to Himself. is the Master of the Man Christ, this may be understood Objection 2. Further, servant has reference to mas- in two ways. First, so that this is understood to be said by ter. Now nothing has a relation to itself, hence Hilary says reason of another hypostasis or person, as if there was the (De Trin. vii) that nothing is like or equal to itself. Hence person of the Word of God ruling and the person of the Christ cannot be said to be the servant of Himself, and man serving; and this is the heresy of Nestorius. Hence consequently to be subject to Himself. in the condemnation of Nestorius it is said in the Council Objection 3. Further, “as the rational soul and flesh of Ephesus (Part III, ch. i, anath. 6): “If anyone say that are one man; so God and man are one Christ,” as Athana- the Word begotten of God the Father is the God or Lord of sius says (Symb. Fid.). Now man is not said to be subject Christ, and does not rather confess the same to be at once to himself or servant to himself or greater than himself be- God and man as the Word made flesh, according to the cause his body is subject to his soul. Therefore, Christ is Scriptures, let him be anathema.” And in this sense it is not said to be subject to Himself because His Manhood is denied by Cyril and Damascene (obj. 1); and in the same subject to His Godhead. sense must it be denied that Christ is less than Himself or On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 7): subject to Himself. Secondly, it may be understood of the “Truth shows in this way” (i.e. whereby the Father is diversity of natures in the one person or hypostasis. And greater than Christ in human nature) “that the Son is less thus we may say that in one of them, in which He agrees than Himself.” with the Father, He presides and rules together with the Further, as he argues (De Trin. i, 7), the form of a ser- Father; and in the other nature, in which He agrees with vant was so taken by the Son of God that the form of God us, He is subject and serves, and in this sense Augustine was not lost. But because of the form of God, which is says that “the Son is less than Himself.” common to the Father and the Son, the Father is greater Yet it must be borne in mind that since this name than the Son in human nature. Therefore the Son is greater “Christ” is the name of a Person, even as the name “Son,” than Himself in human nature. those things can be predicated essentially and absolutely Further, Christ in His human nature is the servant of of Christ which belong to Him by reason of the Person, God the Father, according to Jn. 20:17: “I ascend to My Which is eternal; and especially those relations which Father and to your Father to My God and your God.” Now seem more properly to pertain to the Person or the hy- 2197 postasis. But whatever pertains to Him in His human na-in different respects. ture is rather to be attributed to Him with a qualification; Reply to Objection 3. On account of the divers parts so that we say that Christ is simply greatest, Lord, Ruler, of man, one of which is superior and the other inferior, whereas to be subject or servant or less is to be attributed the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 11) that there is justice be- to Him with the qualification, in His human nature. tween a man and himself inasmuch as the irascible and Reply to Objection 1. Cyril and Damascene deny that concupiscible powers obey reason. Hence this way a man Christ is the head of Himself inasmuch as this implies a may be said to be subject and subservient to Himself as plurality of supposita, which is required in order that any- regards His different parts. one may be the master of another. To the other arguments, the reply is clear from what Reply to Objection 2. Simply speaking it is neces- has been said. For Augustine asserts that the Son is less sary that the master and the servant should be distinct; yet than, or subject to, Himself in His human nature, and not a certain notion of mastership and subservience may be by a diversity of supposita. preserved inasmuch as the same one is master of Himself 2198 THIRD PART, QUESTION 21 Of Christ’s Prayer (In Four Articles) We must now consider Christ’s prayer; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is becoming that Christ should pray? (2) Whether it pertains to Him in respect of His sensuality? (3) Whether it is becoming to Him to pray for Himself or only for others? (4) Whether every prayer of His was heard? Whether it is becoming of Christ to pray? IIIa q. 21 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem unbecoming that Christ to the Father, not as though He were incompetent, but for should pray. For, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, our instruction. First, that He might show Himself to be 24), “prayer is the asking for becoming things from God.” from the Father; hence He says (Jn. 11:42): “Because of But since Christ could do all things, it does not seem be- the people who stand about I have said it” (i.e. the words coming to Him to ask anything from anyone. Therefore it of the prayer) “that they may believe that Thou hast sent does not seem fitting that Christ should pray. Me.” Hence Hilary says (De Trin. x): “He did not need Objection 2. Further, we need not ask in prayer for prayer. It was for us He prayed, lest the Son should be what we know for certain will happen; thus, we do not unknown.” Secondly, to give us an example of prayer; pray that the sun may rise tomorrow. Nor is it fitting that hence Ambrose says (on Lk. 6:12): “Be not deceived, nor anyone should ask in prayer for what he knows will not think that the Son of God prays as a weakling, in order to happen. But Christ in all things knew what would happen. beseech what He cannot effect. For the Author of power, Therefore it was not fitting that He should ask anything in the Master of obedience persuades us to the precepts of prayer. virtue by His example.” Hence Augustine says (Tract. civ Objection 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. in Joan.): “Our Lord in the form of a servant could have iii, 24) that “prayer is the raising up of the mind to God.” prayed in silence, if need be, but He wished to show Him- Now Christ’s mind needed no uplifting to God, since His self a suppliant of the Father, in such sort as to bear in mind was always united to God, not only by the union of mind that He was our Teacher.” the hypostasis, but by the fruition of beatitude. Therefore Reply to Objection 2. Amongst the other things it was not fitting that Christ should pray. which He knew would happen, He knew that some would On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 6:12): “And it be brought about by His prayer; and for these He not un- came to pass in those days, that He went out into a moun- becomingly besought God. tain, and He passed the whole night in the prayer of God.” Reply to Objection 3. To rise is nothing more than to I answer that, As was said in the IIa IIae, q. 83, move towards what is above. Now movement is taken in Aa. 1,2, prayer is the unfolding of our will to God, that two ways, as is said De Anima iii, 7; first, strictly, accord- He may fulfill it. If, therefore, there had been but one ing as it implies the passing from potentiality to act, inas- will in Christ, viz. the Divine, it would nowise belong to much as it is the act of something imperfect, and thus to Him to pray, since the Divine will of itself is effective of rise pertains to what is potentially and not actually above. whatever He wishes by it, according to Ps. 134:6: “What- Now in this sense, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, soever the Lord pleased, He hath done.” But because the 24), “the human mind of Christ did not need to rise to Divine and the human wills are distinct in Christ, and the God, since it was ever united to God both by personal be- human will of itself is not efficacious enough to do what ing and by the blessed vision.” Secondly, movement sig- it wishes, except by Divine power, hence to pray belongs nifies the act of something perfect, i.e. something existing to Christ as man and as having a human will. in act, as to understand and to feel are called movements; Reply to Objection 1. Christ as God and not as man and in this sense the mind of Christ was always raised up was able to carry out all He wished, since as man He was to God, since He was always contemplating Him as exist- not omnipotent, as stated above (q. 13, a. 1 ). Neverthe- ing above Himself. less being both God and man, He wished to offer prayers 2199 Whether it pertains to Christ to pray according to His sensuality? IIIa q. 21 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that it pertains to Christ IIa IIae, q. 83, a. 1. to pray according to His sensuality. For it is written (Ps. Secondly, we may be said to pray according to the sen- 83:3) in the person of Christ: “My heart and My flesh have suality when our prayer lays before God what is in our ap- rejoiced in the Living God.” Now sensuality is called the petite of sensuality; and in this sense Christ prayed with appetite of the flesh. Hence Christ’s sensuality could as- His sensuality inasmuch as His prayer expressed the de- cend to the Living God by rejoicing; and with equal rea- sire of His sensuality, as if it were the advocate of the son by praying. sensuality—and this, that He might teach us three things. Objection 2. Further, prayer would seem to pertain First, to show that He had taken a true human nature, with to that which desires what is besought. Now Christ be- all its natural affections: secondly, to show that a man sought something that His sensuality desired when He may wish with his natural desire what God does not wish: said (Mat. 26:39): “Let this chalice pass from Me.” thirdly, to show that man should subject his own will to Therefore Christ’s sensuality prayed. the Divine will. Hence Augustine says in the Enchiridion Objection 3. Further, it is a greater thing to be united (Serm. 1 in Ps. 32): “Christ acting as a man, shows the to God in person than to mount to Him in prayer. But the proper will of a man when He says ‘Let this chalice pass sensuality was assumed by God to the unity of Person, from Me’; for this was the human will desiring something even as every other part of human nature. Much more, proper to itself and, so to say, private. But because He therefore, could it mount to God by prayer. wishes man to be righteous and to be directed to God, He On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:7) that the Son adds: ‘Nevertheless not as I will but as Thou wilt,’ as if of God in the nature that He assumed was “made in the to say, ‘See thyself in Me, for thou canst desire something likeness of men.” But the rest of men do not pray with proper to thee, even though God wishes something else.’ ” their sensuality. Therefore, neither did Christ pray accord- Reply to Objection 1. The flesh rejoices in the Liv- ing to His sensuality. ing God, not by the act of the flesh mounting to God, but I answer that, To pray according to sensuality may by the outpouring of the heart into the flesh, inasmuch as be understood in two ways. First as if prayer itself were the sensitive appetite follows the movement of the rational an act of the sensuality; and in this sense Christ did not appetite. pray with His sensuality, since His sensuality was of the Reply to Objection 2. Although the sensuality same nature and species in Christ as in us. Now in us wished what the reason besought, it did not belong to the the sensuality cannot pray for two reasons; first because sensuality to seek this by praying, but to the reason, as the movement of the sensuality cannot transcend sensible stated above. things, and, consequently, it cannot mount to God, which Reply to Objection 3. The union in person is accord- is required for prayer; secondly, because prayer implies a ing to the personal being, which pertains to every part of certain ordering inasmuch as we desire something to be the human nature; but the uplifting of prayer is by an act fulfilled by God; and this is the work of reason alone. which pertains only to the reason, as stated above. Hence Hence prayer is an act of the reason, as was said in the there is no parity. Whether it was fitting that Christ should pray for Himself? IIIa q. 21 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting Objection 3. Further, Cyprian says (De Orat. Dom.): that Christ should pray for Himself. For Hilary says (De “The Doctor of Peace and Master of Unity did not wish Trin. x): “Although His word of beseeching did not bene- prayers to be offered individually and privately, lest when fit Himself, yet He spoke for the profit of our faith.” Hence we prayed we should pray for ourselves alone.” Now it seems that Christ prayed not for Himself but for us. Christ did what He taught, according to Acts 1:1: “Jesus Objection 2. Further, no one prays save for what He began to do and to teach.” Therefore Christ never prayed wishes, because, as was said (a. 1), prayer is an unfolding for Himself alone. of our will to God that He may fulfil it. Now Christ wished On the contrary, our Lord Himself said while praying to suffer what He suffered. For Augustine says (Contra (Jn. 17:1): “Glorify Thy Son.” Faust. xxvi): “A man, though unwilling, is often angry; I answer that, Christ prayed for Himself in two ways. though unwilling, is sad; though unwilling, sleeps; though First, by expressing the desire of His sensuality, as stated unwilling, hungers and thirsts. But He” (i.e. Christ) “did above (a. 2); or also of His simple will, considered as a all these things, because He wished.” Therefore it was not nature; as when He prayed that the chalice of His Passion fitting that He should pray for Himself. might pass from Him (Mat. 26:39). Secondly, by express- 2200 ing the desire of His deliberate will, which is considered word of beseeching did not benefit Himself.” For if “the as reason; as when He prayed for the glory of His Res- Lord hears the desire of the poor,” as is said in the Ps. urrection (Jn. 17:1). And this is reasonable. For as we 9:38, much more the mere will of Christ has the force of have said above (a. 1, ad 1) Christ wished to pray to His a prayer with the Father: wherefore He said (Jn. 11:42): Father in order to give us an example of praying; and also “I know that Thou hearest Me always, but because of the to show that His Father is the author both of His eternal people who stand about have I said it, that they may be- procession in the Divine Nature, and of all the good that lieve that Thou hast sent Me.” He possesses in the human nature. Now just as in His hu- Reply to Objection 2. Christ wished indeed to suffer man nature He had already received certain gifts from His what He suffered, at that particular time: nevertheless He Father. so there were other gifts which He had not yet re- wished to obtain, after His passion, the glory of His body, ceived, but which He expected to receive. And therefore, which as yet He had not. This glory He expected to re- as He gave thanks to the Father for gifts already received ceive from His Father as the author thereof, and therefore in His human nature, by acknowledging Him as the author it was fitting that He should pray to Him for it. thereof, as we read (Mat. 26:27; Jn. 11:41): so also, in Reply to Objection 3. This very glory which Christ, recognition of His Father, He besought Him in prayer for while praying, besought for Himself, pertained to the sal- those gifts still due to Him in His human nature, such as vation of others according to Rom. 4:25: “He rose again the glory of His body, and the like. And in this He gave for our justification.” Consequently the prayer which He us an example, that we should give thanks for benefits re- offered for Himself was also in a manner offered for oth- ceived, and ask in prayer for those we have not as yet. ers. So also anyone that asks a boon of God that he may Reply to Objection 1. Hilary is speaking of vocal use it for the good of others, prays not only for himself, prayer, which was not necessary to Him for His own sake, but also for others. but only for ours. Whence he says pointedly that “His Whether Christ’s prayer was always heard? IIIa q. 21 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s prayer was or even of the simple will, which is considered as na- not always heard. For He besought that the chalice of ture is willed not absolutely but conditionally [secundum His passion might be taken from Him, as we read (Mat. quid]—that is, provided no obstacle be discovered by rea- 26:39): and yet it was not taken from Him. Therefore it son’s deliberation. Wherefore such a will should rather seems that not every prayer of His was heard. be called a “velleity” than an absolute will; because one Objection 2. Further, He prayed that the sin of those would will [vellet] if there were no obstacle. who crucified Him might be forgiven, as is related (Lk. But according to the will of reason, Christ willed noth- 23:34). Yet not all were pardoned this sin, since the Jews ing but what He knew God to will. Wherefore every ab- were punished on account thereof. Therefore it seems that solute will of Christ, even human, was fulfilled, because not every prayer of His was heard. it was in conformity with God; and consequently His ev- Objection 3. Further, our Lord prayed for them “who ery prayer was fulfilled. For in this respect also is it that would believe in Him through the word” of the apostles, other men’s prayers are fulfilled, in that their will is in that they “might all be one in Him,” and that they might conformity with God, according to Rom. 8:27: “And He attain to being with Him (Jn. 17:20,21,24). But not all at- that searcheth the hearts knoweth,” that is, approves of, tain to this. Therefore not every prayer of His was heard. “what the Spirit desireth,” that is, what the Spirit makes Objection 4. Further, it is said (Ps. 21:3) in the per- the saints to desire: “because He asketh for the saints ac- son of Christ: “I shall cry by day, and Thou wilt not hear.” cording to God,” that is, in conformity with the Divine Not every prayer of His, therefore, was heard. will. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 5:7): “With Reply to Objection 1. This prayer for the passing of a strong cry and tears offering up prayers. . . He was heard the chalice is variously explained by the Saints. For Hi- for His reverence.” lary (Super Matth. 31) says: “When He asks that this may I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), prayer is a cer- pass from Him, He does not pray that it may pass by Him, tain manifestation of the human will. Wherefore, then is but that others may share in that which passes on from the request of one who prays granted, when his will is Him to them; So that the sense is: As I am partaking of fulfilled. Now absolutely speaking the will of man is the the chalice of the passion, so may others drink of it, with will of reason; for we will absolutely that which we will unfailing hope, with unflinching anguish, without fear of in accordance with reason’s deliberation. Whereas what death.” we will in accordance with the movement of sensuality, Or according to Jerome (on Mat. 26:39): “He says 2201 pointedly, ‘This chalice,’ that is of the Jewish people, who But if we understand that He prayed that He might not cannot allege ignorance as an excuse for putting Me to drink the chalice of His passion and death; or that He death, since they have the Law and the Prophets, who might not drink it at the hands of the Jews; what He be- foretold concerning Me.” sought was not indeed fulfilled, because His reason which Or, according to Dionysius of Alexandria (De Martyr. formed the petition did not desire its fulfilment, but for ad Origen 7): “When He says ‘Remove this chalice from our instruction, it was His will to make known to us His Me,’ He does not mean, ‘Let it not come to Me’; for if it natural will, and the movement of His sensuality, which come not, it cannot be removed. But, as that which passes was His as man. is neither untouched nor yet permanent, so the Saviour Reply to Objection 2. Our Lord did not pray for all beseeches, that a slightly pressing trial may be repulsed.” those who crucified Him, as neither did He for all those Lastly, Ambrose, Origen and Chrysostom say that He who would believe in Him; but for those only who were prayed thus “as man,” being reluctant to die according to predestinated to obtain eternal life through Him. His natural will. Wherefore the reply to the third objection is also man- Thus, therefore, whether we understand, according to ifest. Hilary, that He thus prayed that other martyrs might be Reply to Objection 4. When He says: “I shall cry imitators of His Passion, or that He prayed that the fear of and Thou wilt not hear,” we must take this as referring to drinking His chalice might not trouble Him, or that death the desire of sensuality, which shunned death. But He is might not withhold Him, His prayer was entirely fulfilled. heard as to the desire of His reason, as stated above. 2202 THIRD PART, QUESTION 22 Of the Priesthood of Christ (In Six Articles) We have now to consider the Priesthood of Christ; and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is fitting that Christ should be a priest? (2) Of the victim offered by this priest; (3) Of the effect of this priesthood; (4) Whether the effect of His priesthood pertains to Himself, or only to others? (5) Of the eternal duration of His priesthood; (6) Whether He should be called “a priest according to the order of Melchisedech”? Whether it is fitting that Christ should be a priest? IIIa q. 22 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem unfitting that Christ sins.” Now this is most befitting to Christ. For through should be a priest. For a priest is less than an angel; Him are gifts bestowed on men, according to 2 Pet. 1:4: whence it is written (Zech. 3:1): “The Lord showed me “By Whom” (i.e. Christ) “He hath given us most great the high-priest standing before the angel of the Lord.” But and precious promises, that by these you may be made Christ is greater than the angels, according to Heb. 1:4: partakers of the Divine Nature.” Moreover, He reconciled “Being made so much better than the angels, as He hath the human race to God, according to Col. 1:19,20: “In inherited a more excellent name than they.” Therefore it Him” (i.e. Christ) “it hath well pleased (the Father) that is unfitting that Christ should be a priest. all fulness should dwell, and through Him to reconcile Objection 2. Further, things which were in the Old all things unto Himself.” Therefore it is most fitting that Testament were figures of Christ, according to Col. 2:17: Christ should be a priest. “Which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is Reply to Objection 1. Hierarchical power appertains Christ’s.” But Christ was not descended from the priests to the angels, inasmuch as they also are between God and of the Old Law, for the Apostle says (Heb. 7:14): “It is man, as Dionysius explains (Coel. Hier. ix), so that the evident that our Lord sprang out of Judah, in which tribe priest himself, as being between God and man, is called Moses spoke nothing concerning priests.” Therefore it is an angel, according to Malachi 2:7: “He is the angel of the not fitting that Christ should be a priest. Lord of hosts.” Now Christ was greater than the angels, Objection 3. Further, in the Old Law, which is a not only in His Godhead, but also in His humanity, as hav- figure of Christ, the lawgivers and the priests were dis- ing the fulness of grace and glory. Wherefore also He had tinct: wherefore the Lord said to Moses the lawgiver the hierarchical or priestly power in a higher degree than (Ex. 28:1): “Take unto thee Aaron, thy brother. . . that he the angels, so that even the angels were ministers of His [Vulg.: ‘they’] may minister to Me in the priest’s office.” priesthood, according to Mat. 4:11: “Angels came and But Christ is the giver of the New Law, according to Jer. ministered unto Him.” But, in regard to His passibility, 31:33: “I will give My law in their bowels.” Therefore it He “was made a little lower than the angels,” as the Apos- is unfitting that Christ should be a priest. tle says (Heb. 2:9): and thus He was conformed to those On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 4:14): “We have wayfarers who are ordained to the priesthood. [Vulg.: ‘Having’] therefore a great high-priest that hath Reply to Objection 2. As Damascene says (De Fide passed into the heavens, Jesus, the Son of God.” Orth. iii, 26): “What is like in every particular must be, I answer that, The office proper to a priest is to be a of course, identical, and not a copy.” Since, therefore, mediator between God and the people: to wit, inasmuch the priesthood of the Old Law was a figure of the priest- as He bestows Divine things on the people, wherefore hood of Christ, He did not wish to be born of the stock “sacerdos” [priest] means a giver of sacred things [sacra of the figurative priests, that it might be made clear that dans], according to Malachi 2:7: “They shall seek the law His priesthood is not quite the same as theirs, but differs at his,” i.e. the priest’s, “mouth”; and again, forasmuch as therefrom as truth from figure. he offers up the people’s prayers to God, and, in a man- Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 7, a. 7, ad ner, makes satisfaction to God for their sins; wherefore the 1), other men have certain graces distributed among them: Apostle says (Heb. 5:1): “Every high-priest taken from but Christ, as being the Head of all, has the perfection of among men is ordained for men in the things that apper- all graces. Wherefore, as to others, one is a lawgiver, an- tain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for other is a priest, another is a king; but all these concur in 2203 Christ, as the fount of all grace. Hence it is written (Is. the Lord is our King: He will” come and “save us.” 33:22): “The Lord is our Judge, the Lord is our law-giver, Whether Christ was Himself both priest and victim? IIIa q. 22 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ Himself was offerers, as is prescribed in the third chapter of Leviticus. not both priest and victim. For it is the duty of the priest to Thirdly, in order that the spirit of man be perfectly united slay the victim. But Christ did not kill Himself. Therefore to God: which will be most perfectly realized in glory. He was not both priest and victim. Hence, under the Old Law, the holocaust was offered, so Objection 2. Further, the priesthood of Christ has a called because the victim was wholly burnt, as we read in greater similarity to the Jewish priesthood, instituted by the first chapter of Leviticus. God, than to the priesthood of the Gentiles, by which the Now these effects were conferred on us by the human- demons were worshiped. Now in the old Law man was ity of Christ. For, in the first place, our sins were blotted never offered up in sacrifice: whereas this was very much out, according to Rom. 4:25: “Who was delivered up for to be reprehended in the sacrifices of the Gentiles, accord- our sins.” Secondly, through Him we received the grace of ing to Ps. 105:38: “They shed innocent blood; the blood salvation, according to Heb. 5:9: “He became to all that of their sons and of their daughters, which they sacrificed obey Him the cause of eternal salvation.” Thirdly, through to the idols of Chanaan.” Therefore in Christ’s priesthood Him we have acquired the perfection of glory, according the Man Christ should not have been the victim. to Heb. 10:19: “We have [Vulg.: ‘Having’] a confidence Objection 3. Further, every victim, through being of- in the entering into the Holies” (i.e. the heavenly glory) fered to God, is consecrated to God. But the humanity of “through His Blood.” Therefore Christ Himself, as man, Christ was from the beginning consecrated and united to was not only priest, but also a perfect victim, being at the God. Therefore it cannot be said fittingly that Christ as same time victim for sin, victim for a peace-offering, and man was a victim. a holocaust. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:2): Reply to Objection 1. Christ did not slay Himself, “Christ hath loved us, and hath delivered Himself for us, but of His own free-will He exposed Himself to death, ac- an oblation and a victim [Douay: ‘sacrifice’] to God for cording to Is. 53:7: “He was offered because it was His an odor of sweetness.” own will.” Thus He is said to have offered Himself. I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, Reply to Objection 2. The slaying of the Man Christ 5): “Every visible sacrifice is a sacrament, that is a sacred may be referred to a twofold will. First, to the will of sign, of the invisible sacrifice.” Now the invisible sacrifice those who slew Him: and in this respect He was not a vic- is that by which a man offers his spirit to God, according tim: for the slayers of Christ are not accounted as offering to Ps. 50:19: “A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit.” a sacrifice to God, but as guilty of a great crime: a simil- Wherefore, whatever is offered to God in order to raise itude of which was borne by the wicked sacrifices of the man’s spirit to Him, may be called a sacrifice. Gentiles, in which they offered up men to idols. Secondly, Now man is required to offer sacrifice for three rea- the slaying of Christ may be considered in reference to the sons. First, for the remission of sin, by which he is turned will of the Sufferer, Who freely offered Himself to suffer- away from God. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 5:1) that ing. In this respect He is a victim, and in this He differs it appertains to the priest “to offer gifts and sacrifices for from the sacrifices of the Gentiles. sins.” Secondly, that man may be preserved in a state of (The reply to the third objection is wanting in the grace, by ever adhering to God, wherein his peace and sal- original manuscripts, but it may be gathered from the vation consist. Wherefore under the old Law the sacrifice above.—Ed.)∗ of peace-offerings was offered up for the salvation of the ∗ Some editions, however, give the following reply: Reply to Objection 3: The fact that Christ’s manhood was holy from its beginning does not prevent that same manhood, when it was offered to God in the Passion, being sanctified in a new way—namely, as a victim actually offered then. For it acquired then the actual holiness of a victim, from the charity which it had from the beginning, and from the grace of union sanctifying it absolutely. 2204 Whether the effect of Christ’s priesthood is the expiation of sins? IIIa q. 22 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the effect of Christ’s blood.” Moreover, He satisfied for us fully, inasmuch as priesthood is not the expiation of sins. For it belongs to “He hath borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows” God alone to blot out sins, according to Is. 43:25: “I am (Is. 53:4). Wherefore it is clear that the priesthood of He that blot out thy iniquities for My own sake.” But Christ has full power to expiate sins. Christ is priest, not as God, but as man. Therefore the Reply to Objection 1. Although Christ was a priest, priesthood of Christ does not expiate sins. not as God, but as man, yet one and the same was both Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (Heb. 10:1-3) priest and God. Wherefore in the Council of Ephesus∗ we that the victims of the Old Testament could not “make” read: “If anyone say that the very Word of God did not be- (the comers thereunto) “perfect: for then they would come our High-Priest and Apostle, when He became flesh have ceased to be offered; because the worshipers once and a man like us, but altogether another one, the man cleansed should have no conscience of sin any longer; born of a woman, let him be anathema.” Hence in so far but in them there is made a commemoration of sins every as His human nature operated by virtue of the Divine, that year.” But in like manner under the priesthood of Christ sacrifice was most efficacious for the blotting out of sins. a commemoration of sins is made in the words: “Forgive For this reason Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 14): “So that, us our trespasses” (Mat. 6:12). Moreover, the Sacrifice is since four things are to be observed in every sacrifice—to offered continuously in the Church; wherefore again we whom it is offered, by whom it is offered, what is offered, say: “Give us this day our daily bread.” Therefore sins for whom it is offered; the same one true Mediator recon- are not expiated by the priesthood of Christ. ciling us to God by the sacrifice of peace, was one with Objection 3. Further, in the sin-offerings of the Old Him to Whom it was offered, united in Himself those for Law, a he-goat was mostly offered for the sin of a prince, whom He offered it, at the same time offered it Himself, a she-goat for the sin of some private individual, a calf and was Himself that which He offered.” for the sin of a priest, as we gather from Lev. 4:3,23,28. Reply to Objection 2. Sins are commemorated in the But Christ is compared to none of these, but to the lamb, New Law, not on account of the inefficacy of the priest- according to Jer. 11:19: “I was as a meek lamb, that is hood of Christ, as though sins were not sufficiently ex- carried to be a victim.” Therefore it seems that His priest- piated by Him: but in regard to those who either are not hood does not expiate sins. willing to be participators in His sacrifice, such as unbe- On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 9:14): “The lievers, for whose sins we pray that they be converted; or blood of Christ, Who by the Holy Ghost offered Himself who, after taking part in this sacrifice, fall away from it unspotted unto God, shall cleanse our conscience from by whatsoever kind of sin. The Sacrifice which is offered dead works, to serve the living God.” But dead works every day in the Church is not distinct from that which denote sins. Therefore the priesthood of Christ has the Christ Himself offered, but is a commemoration thereof. power to cleanse from sins. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. De. x, 20): “Christ I answer that, Two things are required for the perfect Himself both is the priest who offers it and the victim: the cleansing from sins, corresponding to the two things com- sacred token of which He wished to be the daily Sacrifice prised in sin—namely, the stain of sin and the debt of pun- of the Church.” ishment. The stain of sin is, indeed, blotted out by grace, Reply to Objection 3. As Origen says (Sup. Joan. by which the sinner’s heart is turned to God: whereas the i, 29), though various animals were offered up under the debt of punishment is entirely removed by the satisfaction Old Law, yet the daily sacrifice, which was offered up that man offers to God. Now the priesthood of Christ pro- morning and evening, was a lamb, as appears from Num. duces both these effects. For by its virtue grace is given 38:3,4. By which it was signified that the offering up of to us, by which our hearts are turned to God, according the true lamb, i.e. Christ, was the culminating sacrifice of to Rom. 3:24,25: “Being justified freely by His grace, all. Hence (Jn. 1:29) it is said: “Behold the Lamb of God, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, Whom God behold Him Who taketh away the sins [Vulg.: ‘sin’] of the hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His world.” ∗ Part III, ch. i, anath. 10 2205 Whether the effect of the priesthood of Christ pertained not only to others, but also IIIa q. 22 a. 4 to Himself? Objection 1. It would seem that the effect of the fountain-head of the entire priesthood: for the priest of the priesthood of Christ pertained not only to others, but also Old Law was a figure of Him; while the priest of the New to Himself. For it belongs to the priest’s office to pray Law works in His person, according to 2 Cor. 2:10: “For for the people, according to 2 Macc. 1:23: “The priests what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for made prayer while the sacrifice was consuming.” Now your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ.” There- Christ prayed not only for others, but also for Himself, as fore it is not fitting that Christ should receive the effect of we have said above (q. 21, a. 3), and as expressly stated His priesthood. (Heb. 5:7): “In the days of His flesh, with a strong cry and Reply to Objection 1. Although prayer is befitting tears He offered [Vulg.: ‘offering’] up prayers and suppli- to priests, it is not their proper office, for it is befitting cations to Him that was able to save Him from death.” to everyone to pray both for himself and for others, ac- Therefore the priesthood of Christ had an effect not only cording to James 5:16: “Pray for one another that you in others, but also in Himself. may be saved.” And so we may say that the prayer by Objection 2. Further, in His passion Christ offered which Christ prayed for Himself was not an action of His Himself as a sacrifice. But by His passion He merited, priesthood. But this answer seems to be precluded by not only for others, but also for Himself, as stated above the Apostle, who, after saying (Heb. 5:6), “Thou art a (q. 19, Aa. 3,4). Therefore the priesthood of Christ had an priest for ever according to the order of Melchisedech,” effect not only in others, but also in Himself. adds, “Who in the days of His flesh offering up payers,” Objection 3. Further, the priesthood of the Old Law etc., as quoted above (obj. 1 ): so that it seems that the was a figure of the priesthood of Christ. But the priest of prayer which Christ offered pertained to His priesthood. the Old Law offered sacrifice not only for others, but also We must therefore say that other priests partake in the ef- for himself: for it is written (Lev. 16:17) that “the high- fect of their priesthood, not as priests, but as sinners, as priest goeth into the sanctuary to pray for himself and his we shall state farther on (ad 3). But Christ had, simply house, and for the whole congregation of Israel.” There- speaking, no sin; though He had the “likeness of sin in the fore the priesthood of Christ also had an effect not merely flesh [Vulg.,: ‘sinful flesh’],” as is written Rom. 8:3. And, in others, but also in Himself. consequently, we must not say simply that He partook of On the contrary, We read in the acts of the Council of the effect of His priesthood but with this qualification—in Ephesus∗: “If anyone say that Christ offered sacrifice for regard to the passibility of the flesh. Wherefore he adds Himself, and not rather for us alone (for He Who knew pointedly, “that was able to save Him from death.” not sin needed no sacrifice), let him be anathema.” But Reply to Objection 2. Two things may be considered the priest’s office consists principally in offering sacrifice. in the offering of a sacrifice by any priest—namely, the Therefore the priesthood of Christ had no effect in Him- sacrifice itself which is offered, and the devotion of the self. offerer. Now the proper effect of priesthood is that which I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), a priest is set results from the sacrifice itself. But Christ obtained a re- between God and man. Now he needs someone between sult from His passion, not as by virtue of the sacrifice, himself and God, who of himself cannot approach to God; which is offered by way of satisfaction, but by the very and such a one is subject to the priesthood by sharing in devotion with which out of charity He humbly endured the effect thereof. But this cannot be said of Christ; for the the passion. Apostle says (Heb. 7:25): “Coming of Himself to God, al- Reply to Objection 3. A figure cannot equal the real- ways living to make intercession for us [Vulg.: ‘He is able ity, wherefore the figural priest of the Old Law could not to save for ever them that come to God by Him; always attain to such perfection as not to need a sacrifice of sat- living,’ etc.].” And therefore it is not fitting for Christ to isfaction. But Christ did not stand in need of this. Conse- be the recipient of the effect of His priesthood, but rather quently, there is no comparison between the two; and this to communicate it to others. For the influence of the first is what the Apostle says (Heb. 7:28): “The Law maketh agent in every genus is such that it receives nothing in men priests, who have infirmity; but the word of the oath, that genus: thus the sun gives but does not receive light; which was since the Law, the Son Who is perfected for fire gives but does not receive heat. Now Christ is the evermore.” ∗ Part III, ch. i, anath. 10 2206 Whether the priesthood of Christ endures for ever? IIIa q. 22 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the priesthood of “Christ is [Vulg.: ‘being come’] a high-priest of the good Christ does not endure for ever. For as stated above (a. 4, things to come”; for which reason the priesthood of Christ ad 1,3) those alone need the effect of the priesthood who is said to be eternal. Now this consummation of Christ’s have the weakness of sin, which can be expiated by the sacrifice was foreshadowed in this, that the high-priest of priest’s sacrifice. But this will not be for ever. For in the the Old Law, once a year, entered into the Holy of Holies Saints there will be no weakness, according to Is. 60:21: with the blood of a he-goat and a calf, as laid down, “Thy people shall be all just”: while no expiation will be Lev. 16:11, and yet he offered up the he-goat and calf possible for the weakness of sin, since “there is no re- not within the Holy of Holies, but without. In like man- demption in hell” (Office of the Dead, Resp. vii). There- ner Christ entered into the Holy of Holies—that is, into fore the priesthood of Christ endures not for ever. heaven—and prepared the way for us, that we might enter Objection 2. Further, the priesthood of Christ was by the virtue of His blood, which He shed for us on earth. made manifest most of all in His passion and death, when Reply to Objection 1. The Saints who will be in “by His own blood He entered into the Holies” (Heb. heaven will not need any further expiation by the priest- 9:12). But the passion and death of Christ will not endure hood of Christ, but having expiated, they will need con- for ever, as stated Rom. 6:9: “Christ rising again from summation through Christ Himself, on Whom their glory the dead, dieth now no more.” Therefore the priesthood depends, as is written (Apoc. 21:23): “The glory of God of Christ will not endure for ever. hath enlightened it”—that is, the city of the Saints—“and Objection 3. Further, Christ is a priest, not as God, the Lamb is the lamp thereof.” but as man. But at one time Christ was not man, namely Reply to Objection 2. Although Christ’s passion and during the three days He lay dead. Therefore the priest- death are not to be repeated, yet the virtue of that Victim hood of Christ endures not for ever. endures for ever, for, as it is written (Heb. 10:14), “by one On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 109:4): “Thou art oblation He hath perfected for ever them that are sancti- a priest for ever.” fied.” I answer that, In the priestly office, we may consider Wherefore the reply to the third objection is clear. two things: first, the offering of the sacrifice; secondly, As to the unity of this sacrifice, it was foreshadowed in the consummation of the sacrifice, consisting in this, that the Law in that, once a year, the high-priest of the Law en- those for whom the sacrifice is offered, obtain the end of tered into the Holies, with a solemn oblation of blood, as the sacrifice. Now the end of the sacrifice which Christ of- set down, Lev. 16:11. But the figure fell short of the real- fered consisted not in temporal but in eternal good, which ity in this, that the victim had not an everlasting virtue, for we obtain through His death, according to Heb. 9:11: which reason those sacrifices were renewed every year. Whether the priesthood of Christ was according to the order of Melchisedech? IIIa q. 22 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s priesthood of life”: which can be referred only to the Son of God. was not according to the order of Melchisedech. For Therefore Christ should not be called a priest according Christ is the fountain-head of the entire priesthood, as be- to the order of Melchisedech, as of some one else, but ac- ing the principal priest. Now that which is principal is not cording to His own order. . secondary in regard to others, but others are secondary On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 109:4): “Thou art in its regard. Therefore Christ should not be called a priest a priest for ever according to the order of Melchisedech.” according to the order of Melchisedech. I answer that, As stated above (a. 4, ad 3) the priest- Objection 2. Further, the priesthood of the Old Law hood of the Law was a figure of the priesthood of Christ, was more akin to Christ’s priesthood than was the priest- not as adequately representing the reality, but as falling far hood that existed before the Law. But the nearer the sacra- short thereof: both because the priesthood of the Law did ments were to Christ, the more clearly they signified Him; not wash away sins, and because it was not eternal, as the as is clear from what we have said in the IIa IIae, q. 2, a. 7. priesthood of Christ. Now the excellence of Christ’s over Therefore the priesthood of Christ should be denominated the Levitical priesthood was foreshadowed in the priest- after the priesthood of the Law, rather than after the order hood of Melchisedech, who received tithes from Abra- of Melchisedech, which was before the Law. ham, in whose loins the priesthood of the Law was tithed. Objection 3. Further, it is written (Heb. 7:2,3): “That Consequently the priesthood of Christ is said to be “ac- is ‘king of peace,’ without father, without mother, without cording to the order of Melchisedech,” on account of the genealogy; having neither beginning of days nor ending excellence of the true priesthood over the figural priest- 2207 hood of the Law. as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) ecclesiastical Reply to Objection 1. Christ is said to be according unity, which is established by our taking part in the sacri- to the order of Melchisedech not as though the latter were fice of Christ∗. Wherefore also in the New Law the true a more excellent priest, but because he foreshadowed the sacrifice of Christ is presented to the faithful under the excellence of Christ’s over the Levitical priesthood. form of bread and wine. Reply to Objection 2. Two things may be consid- Reply to Objection 3. Melchisedech is described as ered in Christ’s priesthood: namely, the offering made by “without father, without mother, without genealogy,” and Christ, and (our) partaking thereof. As to the actual offer- as “having neither beginning of days nor ending of life,” ing, the priesthood of Christ was more distinctly foreshad- not as though he had not these things, but because these owed by the priesthood of the Law, by reason of the shed- details in his regard are not supplied by Holy Scripture. ding of blood, than by the priesthood of Melchisedech in And this it is that, as the Apostle says in the same pas- which there was no blood-shedding. But if we consider sage, he is “likened unto the Son of God,” Who had no the participation of this sacrifice and the effect thereof, earthly father, no heavenly mother, and no genealogy, ac- wherein the excellence of Christ’s priesthood over the cording to Is. 53:8: “Who shall declare His generation?” priesthood of the Law principally consists, then the for- and Who in His Godhead has neither beginning nor end mer was more distinctly foreshadowed by the priesthood of days. of Melchisedech, who offered bread and wine, signifying, ∗ Cf. q. 79, a. 1 2208 THIRD PART, QUESTION 23 Of Adoption As Befitting to Christ (In Four Articles) We must now come to consider whether adoption befits Christ: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is fitting that God should adopt sons? (2) Whether this is fitting to God the Father alone? (3) Whether it is proper to man to be adopted to the sonship of God? (4) Whether Christ can be called the adopted Son? Whether it is fitting that God should adopt sons? IIIa q. 23 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not fitting that He is said to adopt them. Moreover Divine exceeds hu- God should adopt sons. For, as jurists say, no one adopts man adoption, forasmuch as God, by bestowing His grace, anyone but a stranger as his son. But no one is a stranger makes man whom He adopts worthy to receive the heav- in relation to God, Who is the Creator of all. Therefore it enly inheritance; whereas man does not make him worthy seems unfitting that God should adopt. whom he adopts; but rather in adopting him he chooses Objection 2. Further, adoption seems to have been in- one who is already worthy. troduced in default of natural sonship. But in God there is Reply to Objection 1. Considered in his nature man natural sonship, as set down in the Ia, q. 27, a. 2. There- is not a stranger in respect to God, as to the natural gifts fore it is unfitting that God should adopt. bestowed on him: but he is as to the gifts of grace and Objection 3. Further, the purpose of adopting any- glory; in regard to which he is adopted. one is that he may succeed, as heir, the person who adopts Reply to Objection 2. Man works in order to supply him. But it does not seem possible for anyone to succeed his wants: not so God, Who works in order to communi- God as heir, for He can never die. Therefore it is unfitting cate to others the abundance of His perfection. Wherefore, that God should adopt. as by the work of creation the Divine goodness is com- On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 1:5) that “He hath municated to all creatures in a certain likeness, so by the predestinated us unto the adoption of children of God.” work of adoption the likeness of natural sonship is com- But the predestination of God is not ineffectual. There- municated to men, according to Rom. 8:29: “Whom He fore God does adopt some as His sons. foreknew. . . to be made conformable to the image of His I answer that, A man adopts someone as his son Son.” forasmuch as out of goodness he admits him as heir to Reply to Objection 3. Spiritual goods can be pos- his estate. Now God is infinitely good: for which reason sessed by many at the same time; not so material goods. He admits His creatures to a participation of good things; Wherefore none can receive a material inheritance except especially rational creatures, who forasmuch as they are the successor of a deceased person: whereas all receive made to the image of God, are capable of Divine beati- the spiritual inheritance at the same time in its entirety tude. And this consists in the enjoyment of God, by which without detriment to the ever-living Father. also God Himself is happy and rich in Himself—that is, in Yet it might be said that God ceases to be, according the enjoyment of Himself. Now a man’s inheritance is that as He is in us by faith, so as to begin to be in us by vision, which makes him rich. Wherefore, inasmuch as God, of as a gloss says on Rom. 8:17: “If sons, heirs also.” His goodness, admits men to the inheritance of beatitude, Whether it is fitting that the whole Trinity should adopt? IIIa q. 23 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem unfitting that the whole might be the first-born among many brethren.” Now Trinity should adopt. For adoption is said of God in like- brethren are the sons of the same father; wherefore our ness to human custom. But among men those only adopt Lord says (Jn. 20:17): “I ascend to My Father and to your who can beget: and in God this can be applied only to the Father.” Therefore Christ’s Father alone has adopted sons. Father. Therefore in God the Father alone can adopt. Objection 3. Further, it is written (Gal. 4:4,5,6): Objection 2. Further, by adoption men become the “God sent His Son. . . that we might receive the adoption brethren of Christ, according to Rom. 8:29: “That He of sons. And because you are sons of God, God hath sent 2209 the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying: ‘Abba’ [Fa-doth, these the Son also doth in like manner.” Therefore it ther].” Therefore it belongs to Him to adopt, Who has the belongs to the whole Trinity to adopt men as sons of God. Son and the Holy Ghost. But this belongs to the Father Reply to Objection 1. All human individuals are not alone. Therefore it befits the Father alone to adopt. of one individual nature, so that there need be one oper- On the contrary, It belongs to Him to adopt us as ation and one effect of them all, as is the case in God. sons, Whom we can call Father; whence it is written Consequently in this respect no comparison is possible. (Rom. 8:15): “You have received the spirit of adoption Reply to Objection 2. By adoption we are made the of sons, whereby we cry: ‘Abba’ [Father].” But when we brethren of Christ, as having with Him the same Father: say to God, “Our Father,” we address the whole Trinity: as Who, nevertheless, is His Father in one way, and ours is the case with the other names which are said of God in in another. Whence pointedly our Lord says, separately, respect of creatures, as stated in the Ia, q. 33, a. 3, obj. 1; “My Father,” and “Your Father” (Jn. 20:17). For He is cf. Ia, q. 45, a. 6. Therefore to adopt is befitting to the Christ’s Father by natural generation; and this is proper to whole Trinity. Him: whereas He is our Father by a voluntary operation, I answer that, There is this difference between an which is common to Him and to the Son and Holy Ghost: adopted son of God and the natural Son of God, that the so that Christ is not the Son of the whole Trinity, as we latter is “begotten not made”; whereas the former is made, are. according to Jn. 1:12: “He gave them power to be made Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (a. 1, ad 2), the sons of God.” Yet sometimes the adopted son is said to adoptive sonship is a certain likeness of the eternal Son- be begotten, by reason of the spiritual regeneration which ship: just as all that takes place in time is a certain likeness is by grace, not by nature; wherefore it is written (James of what has been from eternity. Now man is likened to the 1:18): “Of His own will hath He begotten us by the word splendor of the Eternal Son by reason of the light of grace of truth.” Now although, in God, to beget belongs to the which is attributed to the Holy Ghost. Therefore adop- Person of the Father, yet to produce any effect in crea- tion, though common to the whole Trinity, is appropriated tures is common to the whole Trinity, by reason of the to the Father as its author; to the Son, as its exemplar; to oneness of their Nature: since, where there is one nature, the Holy Ghost, as imprinting on us the likeness of this there must needs be one power and one operation: whence exemplar. our Lord says (Jn. 5:19): “What things soever the Father Whether it is proper to the rational nature to be adopted? IIIa q. 23 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not proper to the ship of adoption is a certain likeness of natural sonship. rational nature to be adopted. For God is not said to be Now the Son of God proceeds naturally from the Father the Father of the rational creature, save by adoption. But as the Intellectual Word, in oneness of nature with the Fa- God is called the Father even of the irrational creature, ac- ther. To this Word, therefore, something may be likened cording to Job 38:28: “Who is father of the rain? Or who in three ways. First, on the part of the form but not on begot the drops of dew?” Therefore it is not proper to the the part of its intelligibility: thus the form of a house al- rational creature to be adopted. ready built is like the mental word of the builder in its Objection 2. Further, by reason of adoption some are specific form, but not in intelligibility, because the ma- called sons of God. But to be sons of God seems to be terial form of a house is not intelligible, as it was in the properly attributed by the Scriptures to the angels; accord- mind of the builder. In this way every creature is like the ing to Job 1:6: “On a certain day when the sons of God Eternal Word; since it was made through the Word. Sec- came to stand before the Lord.” Therefore it is not proper ondly, the creature is likened to the Word, not only as to to the rational creature to be adopted. its form, but also as to its intelligibility: thus the knowl- Objection 3. Further, whatever is proper to a nature, edge which is begotten in the disciple’s mind is likened to belongs to all that have that nature: just as risibility be- the word in the mind of the master. In this way the ratio- longs to all men. But to be adopted does not belong to nal creature, even in its nature, is likened to the Word of every rational nature. Therefore it is not proper to human God. Thirdly, a creature is likened to the Eternal Word, nature. as to the oneness of the Word with the Father, which is by On the contrary, Adopted sons are the “heirs of God,” reason of grace and charity: wherefore our Lord prays (Jn. as is stated Rom. 8:17. But such an inheritance belongs to 17:21,22): “That they may be one in Us. . . as We also are none but the rational nature. Therefore it is proper to the one.” And this likeness perfects the adoption: for to those rational nature to be adopted. who are thus like Him the eternal inheritance is due. It is I answer that, As stated above (a. 2, ad 3), the son- therefore clear that to be adopted belongs to the rational 2210 creature alone: not indeed to all, but only to those who Reply to Objection 2. Angels are called sons of God have charity; which is “poured forth in our hearts by the by adoptive sonship, not that it belongs to them first; but Holy Ghost” (Rom. 5:5); for which reason (Rom. 8:15) because they were the first to receive the adoption of sons. the Holy Ghost is called “the Spirit of adoption of sons.” Reply to Objection 3. Adoption is a property result- Reply to Objection 1. God is called the Father of ing not from nature, but from grace, of which the rational the irrational creature, not properly speaking, by reason nature is capable. Therefore it need not belong to every of adoption, but by reason of creation; according to the rational nature: but every rational creature must needs be first-mentioned participation of likeness. capable of adoption. Whether Christ as man is the adopted Son of God? IIIa q. 23 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ as man is the sonship: nor can a thing be said to participate in what it adopted Son of God. For Hilary says (De Trin. ii) speak- has essentially. Therefore Christ, Who is the natural Son ing of Christ: “The dignity of power is not forfeited when of God, can nowise be called an adopted Son. carnal humanity∗ is adopted.” Therefore Christ as man is But according to those who suppose two persons or the adopted Son of God. two hypostases or two supposita in Christ, no reason pre- Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Praedest. vents Christ being called the adopted Son of God. Sanct. xv) that “by the same grace that Man is Christ, Reply to Objection 1. As sonship does not properly as from the birth of faith every man is a Christian.” But belong to the nature, so neither does adoption. Conse- other men are Christians by the grace of adoption. There- quently, when it is said that “carnal humanity is adopted,” fore this Man is Christ by adoption: and consequently He the expression is metaphorical: and adoption is used to would seem to be an adopted son. signify the union of human nature to the Person of the Objection 3. Further, Christ, as man, is a servant. But Son. it is of greater dignity to be an adopted son than to be a ser- Reply to Objection 2. This comparison of Augustine vant. Therefore much more is Christ, as man, an adopted is to be referred to the principle because, to wit, just as Son. it is granted to any man without meriting it to be a Chris- On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Incarn. viii): tian, so did it happen that this man without meriting it was “We do not call an adopted son a natural son: the natu- Christ. But there is a difference on the part of the term: ral son is a true son.” But Christ is the true and natural because by the grace of union Christ is the natural Son; Son of God, according to 1 Jn. 5:20: “That we may. . . be whereas another man by habitual grace is an adopted son. in His true Son, Jesus Christ.” Therefore Christ, as Man, Yet habitual grace in Christ does not make one who was is not an adopted Son. not a son to be an adopted son, but is a certain effect of I answer that, Sonship belongs properly to the hy- Filiation in the soul of Christ, according to Jn. 1:14: “We postasis or person, not to the nature; whence in the Ia, saw His glory. . . as it were of the Only-begotten of the Fa- q. 32, a. 3 we have stated that Filiation is a personal prop- ther; full of grace and truth.” erty. Now in Christ there is no other than the uncreated Reply to Objection 3. To be a creature, as also to person or hypostasis, to Whom it belongs by nature to be be subservient or subject to God, regards not only the per- the Son. But it has been said above (a. 1, ad 2), that the son, but also the nature: but this cannot be said of sonship. sonship of adoption is a participated likeness of natural Wherefore the comparison does not hold. ∗ Some editions read ‘humilitas’—‘the humility or lowliness of the flesh’ 2211 THIRD PART, QUESTION 24 Of the Predestination of Christ (In Four Articles) We shall now consider the predestination of Christ. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ was predestinated? (2) Whether He was predestinated as man? (3) Whether His predestination is the exemplar of ours? (4) Whether it is the cause of our predestination? Whether it is befitting that Christ should be predestinated? IIIa q. 24 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem unfitting that Christ that predestination by which we are predestinated to be should be predestinated. For the term of anyone’s pre- adopted sons. And just as Christ in a singular manner destination seems to be the adoption of sons, according above all others is the natural Son of God, so in a singular to Eph. 1:5: “Who hath predestinated us unto the adop- manner is He predestinated. tion of children.” But it is not befitting to Christ to be an Reply to Objection 2. As a gloss∗ says on Rom. 1:4, adopted Son, as stated above (q. 23, a. 4). Therefore it is some understood that predestination to refer to the nature not fitting that Christ be predestinated. and not to the Person—that is to say, that on human nature Objection 2. Further, we may consider two things in was bestowed the grace of being united to the Son of God Christ: His human nature and His person. But it cannot be in unity of Person. said that Christ is predestinated by reason of His human But in that case the phrase of the Apostle would be nature; for this proposition is false—“The human nature improper, for two reasons. First, for a general reason: for is Son of God.” In like manner neither by reason of the we do not speak of a person’s nature, but of his person, as person; for this person is the Son of God, not by grace, being predestinated: because to be predestinated is to be but by nature: whereas predestination regards what is of directed towards salvation, which belongs to a suppositum grace, as stated in the Ia, q. 23, Aa. 2,5. Therefore Christ acting for the end of beatitude. Secondly, for a special rea- was not predestinated to be the Son of God. son. Because to be Son of God is not befitting to human Objection 3. Further, just as that which has been nature; for this proposition is false: “The human nature is made was not always, so also that which was predesti- the Son of God”: unless one were to force from it such nated; since predestination implies a certain antecedence. an exposition as: “Who was predestinated the Son of God But, because Christ was always God and the Son of God, in power”—that is, “It was predestinated that the Human it cannot be said that that Man was “made the Son of nature should be united to the Son of God in the Person.” God.” Therefore, for a like reason, we ought not to say Hence we must attribute predestination to the Person that Christ was “predestinated the Son of God.” of Christ: not, indeed, in Himself or as subsisting in On the contrary, The Apostle says, speaking of the Divine Nature, but as subsisting in the human nature. Christ (Rom. 1:4): “Who was predestinated the Son of Wherefore the Apostle, after saying, “Who was made to God in power.” Him of the seed of David according to the flesh,” added, I answer that, As is clear from what has been said in “Who was predestinated the Son of God in power”: so as the Ia, q. 23, Aa. 1,2, predestination, in its proper sense, to give us to understand that in respect of His being of the is a certain Divine preordination from eternity of those seed of David according to the flesh, He was predestinated things which are to be done in time by the grace of God. the Son of God in power. For although it is natural to that Now, that man is God, and that God is man, is something Person, considered in Himself, to be the Son of God in done in time by God through the grace of union. Nor can power, yet this is not natural to Him, considered in the hu- it be said that God has not from eternity pre-ordained to do man nature, in respect of which this befits Him according this in time: since it would follow that something would to the grace of union. come anew into the Divine Mind. And we must needs ad- Reply to Objection 3. Origen commenting on Rom. mit that the union itself of natures in the Person of Christ 1:4 says that the true reading of this passage of the Apos- falls under the eternal predestination of God. For this rea- tle is: “Who was destined to be the Son of God in power”; son do we say that Christ was predestinated. so that no antecedence is implied. And so there would Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle there speaks of be no difficulty. Others refer the antecedence implied in ∗ From St. Augustine, De Praed. Sanct. xv 2212 the participle “predestinated,” not to the fact of being the that He Who according to the flesh was to be the son of Son of God, but to the manifestation thereof, according David, should be nevertheless Son of God in power.” to the customary way of speaking in Holy Scripture, by Moreover, it must be observed that, although the par- which things are said to take place when they are made ticiple “predestinated,” just as this participle “made,” im- known; so that the sense would be—“Christ was predes- plies antecedence, yet there is a difference. For “to be tinated to be made known as the Son of God.” But this is made” belongs to the thing in itself: whereas “to be pre- an improper signification of predestination. For a person destinated” belongs to someone as being in the apprehen- is properly said to be predestinated by reason of his being sion of one who pre-ordains. Now that which is the sub- directed to the end of beatitude: but the beatitude of Christ ject of a form or nature in reality, can be apprehended ei- does not depend on our knowledge thereof. ther as under that form or absolutely. And since it cannot It is therefore better to say that the antecedence im- be said absolutely of the Person of Christ that He began to plied in the participle “predestinated” is to be referred to be the Son of God, yet this is becoming to Him as under- the Person not in Himself, but by reason of the human na- stood or apprehended to exist in human nature, because ture: since, although that Person was the Son of God from at one time it began to be true that one existing in human eternity, it was not always true that one subsisting in hu- nature was the Son of God; therefore this proposition— man nature was the Son of God. Hence Augustine says “Christ was predestinated the Son of God”—is truer than (De Praedest. Sanct. xv): “Jesus was predestinated, so this—“Christ was made the Son of God.” Whether this proposition is false: “Christ as man was predestinated to be the Son of IIIa q. 24 a. 2 God”? Objection 1. It would seem that this proposition is the Word; and by grace bestowed an it was it united in false: “Christ as man was predestinated to be the Son of Person to the Son of God. Consequently, by reason of God.” For at some time a man is that which he was pre- human nature alone can predestination be attributed to destinated to be: since God’s predestination does not fail. Christ. Wherefore Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. If, therefore, Christ as man was predestinated the Son of xv): “This human nature of ours was predestinated to be God, it seems to follow that as man He is the Son of God. raised to so great, so lofty, so exalted a position, that it But the latter is false. Therefore the former is false. would be impossible to raise it higher.” Now that is said to Objection 2. Further, what is befitting to Christ as belong to anyone as man which belongs to him by reason man is befitting to any man; since He belongs to the same of human nature. Consequently, we must say that “Christ, species as other men. If, therefore, Christ, as man, was as Man, was predestinated the Son of God.” predestinated the Son of God, it will follow that this is be- Reply to Objection 1. When we say, “Christ, as Man, fitting to any other man. But the latter is false. Therefore was predestinated the Son of God,” this qualification, “as the former is false. Man,” can be referred in two ways to the action signified Objection 3. Further, that is predestinated from eter- by the participle. First, as regards what comes under pre- nity which is to take place at some time. But this proposi- destination materially, and thus it is false. For the sense tion, “The Son of God was made man,” is truer than this, would be that it was predestinated that Christ, as Man, “Man was made the Son of God.” Therefore this proposi- should be the Son of God. And in this sense the objection tion, “Christ, as the Son of God, was predestinated to be takes it. man,” is truer than this, “Christ as Man was predestinated Secondly, it may be referred to the very nature of the to be the Son of God.” action itself: that is, forasmuch as predestination implies On the contrary, Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. xv) antecedence and gratuitous effect. And thus predestina- says: “Forasmuch as God the Son was made Man, we say tion belongs to Christ by reason of His human nature, as that the Lord of Glory was predestinated.” stated above. And in this sense He is said to be predesti- I answer that, Two things may be considered in pre- nated as Man. destination. One on the part of eternal predestination it- Reply to Objection 2. Something may be befitting self: and in this respect it implies a certain antecedence to a man by reason of human nature, in two ways. First, in regard to that which comes under predestination. Sec- so that human nature be the cause thereof: thus risibility ondly, predestination may be considered as regards its is befitting to Socrates by reason of human nature, being temporal effect, which is some gratuitous gift of God. caused by its principles. In this manner predestination is Therefore from both points of view we must say that pre- not befitting either to Christ or to any other man, by rea- destination is ascribed to Christ by reason of His human son of human nature. This is the sense of the objection. nature alone: for human nature was not always united to Secondly, a thing may be befitting to someone by reason 2213 of human nature, because human nature is susceptible of Who assumed human nature.” Consequently, since this it. And in this sense we say that Christ was predestinated assumption comes under predestination by reason of its by reason of human nature; because predestination refers being gratuitous, we can say both that the Son of God was to the exaltation of human nature in Him, as stated above. predestinated to be man, and that the Son of Man was pre- Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (Praedest. destinated to be the Son of God. But because grace was Sanct. xv): “The Word of God assumed Man to Him- not bestowed on the Son of God that He might be man, but self in such a singular and ineffable manner that at the rather on human nature, that it might be united to the Son same time He may be truly and correctly called the Son of God; it is more proper to say that “Christ, as Man, was of Man, because He assumed Men to Himself; and the predestinated to be the Son of God,” than that, “Christ, as Son of God, because it was the Only-begotten of God Son of God, was predestinated to be Man.” Whether Christ’s predestination is the exemplar of ours? IIIa q. 24 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s predestina- two ways. First, on the part of the act of predestination: tion is not the exemplar of ours. For the exemplar ex- and thus Christ’s predestination cannot be said to be the ists before the exemplate. But nothing exists before the exemplar of ours: for in the same way and by the same eternal. Since, therefore, our predestination is eternal, it eternal act God predestinated us and Christ. seems that Christ’s predestination is not the exemplar of Secondly, predestination may be considered on the ours. part of that to which anyone is predestinated, and this is Objection 2. Further, the exemplar leads us to knowl- the term and effect of predestination. In this sense Christ’s edge of the exemplate. But there was no need for God predestination is the exemplar of ours, and this in two to be led from something else to knowledge of our pre- ways. First, in respect of the good to which we are pre- destination; since it is written (Rom. 8:29): “Whom He destinated: for He was predestinated to be the natural Son foreknew, He also predestinated.” Therefore Christ’s pre- of God, whereas we are predestinated to the adoption of destination is not the exemplar of ours. sons, which is a participated likeness of natural sonship. Objection 3. Further, the exemplar is conformed to Whence it is written (Rom. 8:29): “Whom He foreknew, the exemplate. But Christ’s predestination seems to be of He also predestinated to be made conformable to the im- a different nature from ours: because we are predestinated age of His Son.” Secondly, in respect of the manner of to the sonship of adoption, whereas Christ was predesti- obtaining this good—that is, by grace. This is most mani- nated “Son of God in power,” as is written (Rom. 1:4). fest in Christ; because human nature in Him, without any Therefore His predestination is not the exemplar of ours. antecedent merits, was united to the Son of God: and of On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. the fulness of His grace we all have received, as it is writ- xv): “The Saviour Himself, the Mediator of God and men, ten (Jn. 1:16). the Man Christ Jesus is the most splendid light of predes- Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers the tination and grace.” Now He is called the light of predesti- aforesaid act of the predestinator. nation and grace, inasmuch as our predestination is made The same is to be said of the second objection. manifest by His predestination and grace; and this seems Reply to Objection 3. The exemplate need not be to pertain to the nature of an exemplar. Therefore Christ’s conformed to the exemplar in all respects: it is sufficient predestination is the exemplar of ours. that it imitate it in some. I answer that, Predestination may be considered in Whether Christ’s predestination is the cause of ours? IIIa q. 24 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s predestina- to the counsel of His will.” Therefore Christ’s predestina- tion is not the cause of ours. For that which is eternal tion is not the cause of ours. has no cause. But our predestination is eternal. Therefore Objection 3. Further, if the cause be taken away, the Christ’s predestination is not the cause of ours. effect is also taken away. But if we take away Christ’s Objection 2. Further, that which depends on the sim- predestination, ours is not taken away; since even if the ple will of God has no other cause but God’s will. Now, Son of God were not incarnate, our salvation might yet our predestination depends on the simple will of God, for have been achieved in a different manner, as Augustine it is written (Eph. 1:11): “Being predestinated according says (De Trin. xiii, 10). Therefore Christ’s predestination to the purpose of Him, Who worketh all things according is. not the cause of ours. 2214 On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 1:5): ”(Who) hath predestination covers not only that which is to be accom-predestinated us unto the adoption of children through Je- plished in time, but also the mode and order in which it is sus Christ.” to be accomplished in time. I answer that, if we consider predestination on the Replies obj. 1 and 2: These arguments consider pre- part of the very act of predestinating, then Christ’s pre- destination on the part of the act of predestinating. destination is not the cause of ours; because by one and Reply to Objection 3. If Christ were not to have the same act God predestinated both Christ and us. But been incarnate, God would have decreed men’s salvation if we consider predestination on the part of its term, thus by other means. But since He decreed the Incarnation of Christ’s predestination is the cause of ours: for God, by Christ, He decreed at the same time that He should be the predestinating from eternity, so decreed our salvation, that cause of our salvation. it should be achieved through Jesus Christ. For eternal 2215 THIRD PART, QUESTION 25 Of the Adoration of Christ (In Six Articles) We have now to consider things pertaining to Christ in reference to us; and first, the adoration of Christ, by which we adore Him; secondly, we must consider how He is our Mediator with God. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ’s Godhead and humanity are to be adored with one and the same adoration? (2) Whether His flesh is to be adored with the adoration of “latria”? (3) Whether the adoration of “latria” is to be given to the image of Christ? (4) Whether “latria” is to be given to the Cross of Christ? (5) Whether to His Mother? (6) Concerning the adoration of the relics of Saints. Whether Christ’s humanity and Godhead are to be adored with the same adoration? IIIa q. 25 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s humanity hand or foot, it is not by reason of these members being and Godhead are not to be adored with the same adora- honored of themselves: but by reason of the whole be- tion. For Christ’s Godhead is to be adored, as being com- ing honored in them. In this way a man may be honored mon to Father and Son; wherefore it is written (Jn. 5:23): even in something external; for instance in his vesture, his “That all may honor the Son, as they honor the Father.” image, or his messenger. But Christ’s humanity is not common to Him and the Fa- The cause of honor is that by reason of which the per- ther. Therefore Christ’s humanity and Godhead are not to son honored has a certain excellence. for honor is rev- be adored with the same adoration. erence given to something on account of its excellence, Objection 2. Further, honor is properly “the reward of as stated in the IIa IIae, q. 103, a. 1. If therefore in one virtue,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). But virtue man there are several causes of honor, for instance, rank, merits its reward by action. Since, therefore, in Christ knowledge, and virtue, the honor given to him will be one the action of the Divine Nature is distinct from that of the in respect of the person honored, but several in respect of human nature, as stated above (q. 19, a. 1), it seems that the causes of honor: for it is the man that is honored, both Christ’s humanity is to be adored with a different adora- on account of knowledge and by reason of his virtue. tion from that which is given to His Godhead. Since, therefore, in Christ there is but one Person of Objection 3. Further, if the soul of Christ were not the Divine and human natures, and one hypostasis, and united to the Word, it would have been worthy of ven- one suppositum, He is given one adoration and one honor eration on account of the excellence of its wisdom and on the part of the Person adored: but on the part of the grace. But by being united to the Word it lost nothing cause for which He is honored, we can say that there are of its worthiness. Therefore His human nature should re- several adorations, for instance that He receives one honor ceive a certain veneration proper thereto, besides the ven- on account of His uncreated knowledge, and another on eration which is given to His Godhead. account of His created knowledge. On the contrary, We read in the chapters of the Fifth But if it be said that there are several persons or hy- Council∗: “If anyone say that Christ is adored in two na- postases in Christ, it would follow that there would be, tures, so as to introduce two distinct adorations, and does absolutely speaking, several adorations. And this is what not adore God the Word made flesh with the one and the is condemned in the Councils. For it is written in the same adoration as His flesh, as the Church has handed chapters of Cyril†: “If anyone dare to say that the man down from the beginning; let such a one be anathema.” assumed should be adored besides the Divine Word, as I answer that, We may consider two things in a per- though these were distinct persons; and does not rather son to whom honor is given: the person himself, and the honor the Emmanuel with one single adoration, inasmuch cause of his being honored. Now properly speaking honor as the Word was made flesh; let him be anathema.” is given to a subsistent thing in its entirety: for we do not Reply to Objection 1. In the Trinity there are three speak of honoring a man’s hand, but the man himself. And Who are honored, but only one cause of honor. In the if at any time it happen that we speak of honoring a man’s mystery of the Incarnation it is the reverse: and therefore ∗ Second Council of Constantinople, coll. viii, can. 9 † Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 26 2216 only one honor is given to the Trinity and only one to in that Man. Wherefore honor would be due to it princi-Christ, but in a different way. pally, since man is that which is principal in him∗. But Reply to Objection 2. Operation is not the object but since Christ’s soul is united to a Person of greater dignity, the motive of honor. And therefore there being two opera- to that Person is honor principally due to Whom Christ’s tions in Christ proves, not two adorations, but two causes soul is united. Nor is the dignity of Christ’s soul hereby of adoration. diminished, but rather increased, as stated above (q. 2, Reply to Objection 3. If the soul of Christ were not a. 2, ad 2). united to the Word of God, it would be the principal thing Whether Christ’s humanity should be adored with the adoration of “latria”? IIIa q. 25 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s soul should First, so that the humanity is the thing adored: and thus to not be adored with the adoration of “latria.” For on the adore the flesh of Christ is nothing else than to adore the words of Ps. 98:5, “Adore His foot-stool for it is holy,” incarnate Word of God: just as to adore a King’s robe is a gloss says: “The flesh assumed by the Word of God is nothing else than to adore a robed King. And in this sense rightly adored by us: for no one partakes spiritually of His the adoration of Christ’s humanity is the adoration of “la- flesh unless he first adore it; but not indeed with the ado- tria.” Secondly, the adoration of Christ’s humanity may ration called ‘latria,’ which is due to the Creator alone.” be taken as given by reason of its being perfected with Now the flesh is part of the humanity. Therefore Christ’s every gift of grace. And so in this sense the adoration humanity is not to be adored with the adoration of “latria.” of Christ’s humanity is the adoration not of “latria” but Objection 2. Further, the worship of “latria” is not to of “dulia.” So that one and the same Person of Christ is be given to any creature: since for this reason were the adored with “latria” on account of His Divinity, and with Gentiles reproved, that they “worshiped and served the “dulia” on account of His perfect humanity. creature,” as it is written (Rom. 1:25). But Christ’s hu- Nor is this unfitting. For the honor of “latria” is due to manity is a creature. Therefore it should not be adored God the Father Himself on account of His Godhead; and with the adoration of “latria.” the honor of “dulia” on account of the dominion by which Objection 3. Further, the adoration of “latria” is due He rules over creatures. Wherefore on Ps. 7:1, “O Lord to God in recognition of His supreme dominion, accord- my God, in Thee have I hoped,” a gloss says: “Lord of all ing to Dt. 6:13: “Thou shalt adore [Vulg.: ‘fear’; cf. Mat. by power, to Whom ‘dulia’ is due: God of all by creation, 4:10] the Lord thy God, and shalt serve Him only.” But to Whom ‘latria’ is due.” Christ as man is less than the Father. Therefore His hu- Reply to Objection 1. That gloss is not to be under- manity is not to be adored with the adoration of “latria.” stood as though the flesh of Christ were adored separately On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, from its Godhead: for this could happen only, if there 3): “On account of the incarnation of the Divine Word, were one hypostasis of God, and another of man. But we adore the flesh of Christ not for its own sake, but be- since, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 3): “If by cause the Word of God is united thereto in person.” And a subtle distinction you divide what is seen from what is on Ps. 98:5, “Adore His foot-stool,” a gloss says: “He who understood, it cannot be adored because it is a creature”— adores the body of Christ, regards not the earth, but rather that is, with adoration of “latria.” And then thus un- Him whose foot-stool it is, in Whose honor he adores the derstood as distinct from the Word of God, it should be foot-stool.” But the incarnate Word is adored with the adored with the adoration of “dulia”; not any kind of “du- adoration of “latria.” Therefore also His body or His hu- lia,” such as is given to other creatures, but with a certain manity. higher adoration, which is called “hyperdulia.” I answer that, As stated above (a. 1) adoration is due Hence appear the answers to the second and third ob- to the subsisting hypostasis: yet the reason for honoring jections. Because the adoration of “latria” is not given to may be something non-subsistent, on account of which Christ’s humanity in respect of itself; but in respect of the the person, in whom it is, is honored. And so the adora- Godhead to which it is united, by reason of which Christ tion of Christ’s humanity may be understood in two ways. is not less than the Father. ∗ Cf. Ethic. ix, 8 2217 Whether the image of Christ should be adored with the adoration of “latria”? IIIa q. 25 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s image should Reply to Objection 1. This commandment does not not be adored with the adoration of “latria.” For it is writ- forbid the making of any graven thing or likeness, but the ten (Ex. 20:4): “Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven making thereof for the purpose of adoration, wherefore thing, nor the likeness of anything.” But no adoration it is added: “Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them.” should be given against the commandment of God. There- And because, as stated above, the movement towards the fore Christ’s image should not be adored with the adora- image is the same as the movement towards the thing, tion of “latria.” adoration thereof is forbidden in the same way as ado- Objection 2. Further, we should have nothing in com- ration of the thing whose image it is. Wherefore in the mon with the works of the Gentiles, as the Apostle says passage quoted we are to understand the prohibition to (Eph. 5:11). But the Gentiles are reproached principally adore those images which the Gentiles made for the pur- for that “they changed the glory of the incorruptible God pose of venerating their own gods, i.e. the demons, and so into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man,” as is it is premised: “Thou shalt not have strange gods before written (Rom. 1:23). Therefore Christ’s image is not to Me.” But no corporeal image could be raised to the true be adored with the adoration of “latria.” God Himself, since He is incorporeal; because, as Dam- Objection 3. Further, to Christ the adoration of “la- ascene observes (De Fide Orth. iv, 16): “It is the highest tria” is due by reason of His Godhead, not of His human- absurdity and impiety to fashion a figure of what is Di- ity. But the adoration of “latria” is not due to the image vine.” But because in the New Testament God was made of His Godhead, which is imprinted on the rational soul. man, He can be adored in His corporeal image. Much less, therefore, is it due to the material image which Reply to Objection 2. The Apostle forbids us to have represents the humanity of Christ Himself. anything in common with the “unfruitful works” of the Objection 4. Further, it seems that nothing should be Gentiles, but not with their useful works. Now the ado- done in the Divine worship that is not instituted by God; ration of images must be numbered among the unfruitful wherefore the Apostle (1 Cor. 11:23) when about to lay works in two respects. First, because some of the Gentiles down the doctrine of the sacrifice of the Church, says: “I used to adore the images themselves, as things, believing have received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto that there was something Divine therein, on account of you.” But Scripture does not lay down anything concern- the answers which the demons used to give in them, and ing the adoration of images. Therefore Christ’s image is on account of other such like wonderful effects. Secondly not to be adored with the adoration of “latria.” on account of the things of which they were images; for On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 16) they set up images to certain creatures, to whom in these quotes Basil as saying: “The honor given to an image images they gave the veneration of “latria.” Whereas we reaches to the prototype,” i.e. the exemplar. But the ex- give the adoration of “latria” to the image of Christ, Who emplar itself—namely, Christ—is to be adored with the is true God, not for the sake of the image, but for the sake adoration of “latria”; therefore also His image. of the thing whose image it is, as stated above. I answer that, As the Philosopher says (De Memor. Reply to Objection 3. Reverence is due to the ratio- et Remin. i), there is a twofold movement of the mind nal creature for its own sake. Consequently, if the ado- towards an image: one indeed towards the image itself as ration of “latria” were shown to the rational creature in a certain thing; another, towards the image in so far as it which this image is, there might be an occasion of error— is the image of something else. And between these move- namely, lest the movement of adoration might stop short ments there is this difference; that the former, by which at the man, as a thing, and not be carried on to God, Whose one is moved towards an image as a certain thing, is dif- image he is. This cannot happen in the case of a graven or ferent from the movement towards the thing: whereas the painted image in insensible material. latter movement, which is towards the image as an image, Reply to Objection 4. The Apostles, led by the in- is one and the same as that which is towards the thing. ward instinct of the Holy Ghost, handed down to the Thus therefore we must say that no reverence is shown to churches certain instructions which they did not put in Christ’s image, as a thing—for instance, carved or painted writing, but which have been ordained, in accordance with wood: because reverence is not due save to a rational crea- the observance of the Church as practiced by the faithful ture. It follow therefore that reverence should be shown to as time went on. Wherefore the Apostle says (2 Thess. it, in so far only as it is an image. Consequently the same 2:14): “Stand fast; and hold the traditions which you have reverence should be shown to Christ’s image as to Christ learned, whether by word”—that is by word of mouth— Himself. Since, therefore, Christ is adored with the adora- “or by our epistle”—that is by word put into writing. tion of “latria,” it follows that His image should be adored Among these traditions is the worship of Christ’s image. with the adoration of “latria.” Wherefore it is said that Blessed Luke painted the image 2218 of Christ, which is in Rome. Whether Christ’s cross should be worshipped with the adoration of “latria”? IIIa q. 25 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s cross should from its contact with the limbs of Christ, and from its be- not be worshiped with the adoration of “latria.” For no ing saturated with His blood. Wherefore in each way it dutiful son honors that which dishonors his father, as the is worshiped with the same adoration as Christ, viz. the scourge with which he was scourged, or the gibbet on adoration of “latria.” And for this reason also we speak to which he was hanged; rather does he abhor it. Now Christ the cross and pray to it, as to the Crucified Himself. But underwent the most shameful death on the cross; accord- if we speak of the effigy of Christ’s cross in any other ma- ing to Wis. 2:20: “Let us condemn Him to a most shame- terial whatever—for instance, in stone or wood, silver or ful death.” Therefore we should not venerate the cross but gold—thus we venerate the cross merely as Christ’s im- rather we should abhor it. age, which we worship with the adoration of “latria,” as Objection 2. Further, Christ’s humanity is worshiped stated above (a. 3). with the adoration of “latria,” inasmuch as it is united to Reply to Objection 1. If in Christ’s cross we con- the Son of God in Person. But this cannot be said of the sider the point of view and intention of those who did not cross. Therefore Christ’s cross should not be worshiped believe in Him, it will appear as His shame: but if we with the adoration of “latria.” consider its effect, which is our salvation, it will appear as Objection 3. Further, as Christ’s cross was the instru- endowed with Divine power, by which it triumphed over ment of His passion and death, so were also many other the enemy, according to Col. 2:14,15: “He hath taken the things, for instance, the nails, the crown, the lance; yet same out of the way, fastening it to the cross, and despoil- to these we do not show the worship of “latria.” It seems, ing the principalities and powers, He hath exposed them therefore, that Christ’s cross should not be worshiped with confidently, in open show, triumphing over them in Him- the adoration of “latria.” self.” Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 1:18): “The On the contrary, We show the worship of “latria” to Word of the cross to them indeed that perish is foolish- that in which we place our hope of salvation. But we place ness; but to them that are saved—that is, to us—it is the our hope in Christ’s cross, for the Church sings: power of God.” “Dear Cross, best hope o’er all beside, Reply to Objection 2. Although Christ’s cross was That cheers the solemn passion-tide: not united to the Word of God in Person, yet it was united Give to the just increase of grace, to Him in some other way, viz. by representation and con- Give to each contrite sinner peace.” tact. And for this sole reason reverence is shown to it. ∗ Reply to Objection 3. By reason of the contact of Therefore Christ’s cross should be worshiped with the Christ’s limbs we worship not only the cross, but all that adoration of “latria.” belongs to Christ. Wherefore Damascene says (De Fide I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), honor or rever- Orth. iv, 11): “The precious wood, as having been sanc- ence is due to a rational creature only; while to an insensi- tified by the contact of His holy body and blood, should ble creature, no honor or reverence is due save by reason be meetly worshiped; as also His nails, His lance, and His of a rational nature. And this in two ways. First, inasmuch sacred dwelling-places, such as the manger, the cave and as it represents a rational nature: secondly, inasmuch as it so forth.” Yet these very things do not represent Christ’s is united to it in any way whatsoever. In the first way men image as the cross does, which is called “the Sign of the are wont to venerate the king’s image; in the second way, Son of Man” that “will appear in heaven,” as it is writ- his robe. And both are venerated by men with the same ten (Mat. 24:30). Wherefore the angel said to the women veneration as they show to the king. (Mk. 16:6): “You seek Jesus of Nazareth, Who was cru- If, therefore, we speak of the cross itself on which cified”: he said not “pierced,” but “crucified.” For this Christ was crucified, it is to be venerated by us in both reason we worship the image of Christ’s cross in any ma- ways—namely, in one way in so far as it represents to us terial, but not the image of the nails or of any such thing. the figure of Christ extended thereon; in the other way, ∗ Hymn Vexilla Regis: translation of Father Aylward, O.P. 2219 Whether the Mother of God should be worshipped with the adoration of “latria”? IIIa q. 25 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the Mother of God tional creature is capable of being venerated for its own is to be worshiped with the adoration of “latria.” For it sake. Consequently the worship of “latria” is not due to seems that the same honor is due to the king’s mother any mere rational creature for its own sake. Since, there- as to the king: whence it is written (3 Kings 2:19) that fore, the Blessed Virgin is a mere rational creature, the “a throne was set for the king’s mother, and she sat on worship of “latria” is not due to her, but only that of “du- His right hand.” Moreover, Augustine∗ says: “It is right lia”: but in a higher degree than to other creatures, inas- that the throne of God, the resting-place of the Lord of much as she is the Mother of God. For this reason we say Heaven, the abode of Christ, should be there where He is that not any kind of “dulia” is due to her, but “hyperdulia.” Himself.” But Christ is worshiped with the adoration of Reply to Objection 1. The honor due to the king’s “latria.” Therefore His Mother also should be. mother is not equal to the honor which is due to the king: Objection 2. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. but is somewhat like it, by reason of a certain excellence iv, 16): “The honor of the Mother reflects on the Son.” on her part. This is what is meant by the authorities But the Son is worshiped with the adoration of “latria.” quoted. Therefore the Mother also. Reply to Objection 2. The honor given to the Mother Objection 3. Further, Christ’s Mother is more akin to reflects on her Son, because the Mother is to be honored Him than the cross. But the cross is worshiped with the for her Son’s sake. But not in the same way as honor given adoration of “latria.” Therefore also His Mother is to be to an image reflects on its exemplar: because the image it- worshiped with the same adoration. self, considered as a thing, is not to be venerated in any On the contrary, The Mother of God is a mere crea- way at all. ture. Therefore the worship of “latria” is not due to her. Reply to Objection 3. The cross, considered in itself, I answer that, Since “latria” is due to God alone, it is not an object of veneration, as stated above (Aa. 4,5). is not due to a creature so far as we venerate a creature But the Blessed Virgin is in herself an object of venera- for its own sake. For though insensible creatures are not tion. Hence there is no comparison. capable of being venerated for their own sake, yet the ra- Whether any kind of worship is due to the relics of the saints? IIIa q. 25 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the relics of the saints one’s parents is greater, in no way are the bodies them-are not to be worshiped at all. For we should avoid doing selves to be despised, which are much more intimately what may be the occasion of error. But to worship the and closely united to us than any garment; for they belong relics of the dead seems to savor of the error of the Gen- to man’s very nature.” It is clear from this that he who tiles, who gave honor to dead men. Therefore the relics of has a certain affection for anyone, venerates whatever of the saints are not to be honored. his is left after his death, not only his body and the parts Objection 2. Further, it seems absurd to venerate what thereof, but even external things, such as his clothes, and is insensible. But the relics of the saints are insensible. such like. Now it is manifest that we should show honor Therefore it is absurd to venerate them. to the saints of God, as being members of Christ, the chil- Objection 3. Further, a dead body is not of the same dren and friends of God, and our intercessors. Wherefore species as a living body: consequently it does not seem in memory of them we ought to honor any relics of theirs to be identical with it. Therefore, after a saint’s death, it in a fitting manner: principally their bodies, which were seems that his body should not be worshiped. temples, and organs of the Holy Ghost dwelling and oper- On the contrary, It is written (De Eccles. Dogm. ating in them, and are destined to be likened to the body xl): “We believe that the bodies of the saints, above all of Christ by the glory of the Resurrection. Hence God the relics of the blessed martyrs, as being the members Himself fittingly honors such relics by working miracles of Christ, should be worshiped in all sincerity”: and fur- at their presence. ther on: “If anyone holds a contrary opinion, he is not Reply to Objection 1. This was the argument of Vigi- accounted a Christian, but a follower of Eunomius and lantius, whose words are quoted by Jerome in the book he Vigilantius.” wrote against him (ch. ii) as follows: “We see something I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 13): like a pagan rite introduced under pretext of religion; they “If a father’s coat or ring, or anything else of that kind, worship with kisses I know not what tiny heap of dust is so much more cherished by his children, as love for in a mean vase surrounded with precious linen.” To him ∗ Sermon on the Assumption, work of an anonymous author 2220 Jerome replies (Ep. ad Ripar. cix): “We do not adore, I Reply to Objection 2. We worship that insensible will not say the relics of the martyrs, but either the sun body, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the soul, or the moon or even the angels”—that is to say, with the which was once united thereto, and now enjoys God; and worship of “latria.” “But we honor the martyrs’ relics, so for God’s sake, whose ministers the saints were. that thereby we give honor to Him Whose martyrs† they Reply to Objection 3. The dead body of a saint is are: we honor the servants, that the honor shown to them not identical with that which the saint had during life, on may reflect on their Master.” Consequently, by honoring account of the difference of form, viz. the soul: but it the martyrs’ relics we do not fall into the error of the Gen- is the same by identity of matter, which is destined to be tiles, who gave the worship of “latria” to dead men. reunited to its form. † The original meaning of the word ‘martyr,’ i.e. the Greek martys is ‘a witness’ 2221 THIRD PART, QUESTION 26 Of Christ As Called the Mediator of God and Man (In Two Articles) We have now to consider how Christ is called the Mediator of God and man, and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is proper to Christ to be the Mediator of God and man? (2) Whether this belongs to Him by reason of His human nature? Whether it is proper to Christ to be the Mediator of God and man? IIIa q. 26 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not proper to positively or ministerially. Christ to be the Mediator of God and man. For a priest and Reply to Objection 1. The prophets and priests of the a prophet seem to be mediators between God and man, ac- Old Law were called mediators between God and man, cording to Dt. 5:5: “I was the mediator and stood between dispositively and ministerially: inasmuch as they foretold God [Vulg.: ‘the Lord’] and you at that time.” But it is and foreshadowed the true and perfect Mediator of God not proper to Christ to be a priest and a prophet. Neither, and men. As to the priests of the New Law, they may therefore, is it proper to Him to be Mediator. be called mediators of God and men, inasmuch as they Objection 2. Further, that which is fitting to angels, are the ministers of the true Mediator by administering, in both good and bad, cannot be said to be proper to Christ. His stead, the saving sacraments to men. But to be between God and man is fitting to the good an- Reply to Objection 2. The good angels, as Augustine gels, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). It is also fit- says (De Civ. Dei ix, 13), cannot rightly be called medi- ting to the bad angels—that is, the demons: for they have ators between God and men. “For since, in common with something in common with God—namely, “immortality”; God, they have both beatitude and immortality, and none and something they have in common with men—namely, of these things in common with unhappy and mortal man, “passibility of soul” and consequently unhappiness; as ap- how much rather are they not aloof from men and akin to pears from what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 13,15). God, than established between them?” Dionysius, how- Therefore it is not proper to Christ to be a Mediator of ever, says that they do occupy a middle place, because, in God and man. the order of nature, they are established below God and Objection 3. Further, it belongs to the office of Medi- above man. Moreover, they fulfill the office of mediator, ator to beseech one of those, between whom he mediates, not indeed principally and for the other. But the Holy Ghost, as it is written (Rom. perfectively, but ministerially and dispositively: 8:26), “asketh” God “for us with unspeakable groanings.” whence (Mat. 4:11) it is said that “angels came and min- Therefore the Holy Ghost is a Mediator between God and istered unto Him”—namely, Christ. As to the demons, it man. Therefore this is not proper to Christ. is true that they have immortality in common with God, On the contrary, It is written (1 Tim. 2:5): “There and unhappiness in common with men. “Hence for this is. . . one Mediator of God and man, the man Christ Jesus.” purpose does the immortal and unhappy demon intervene, I answer that, Properly speaking, the office of a me- in order that he may hinder men from passing to a happy diator is to join together and unite those between whom immortality,” and may allure them to an unhappy immor- he mediates: for extremes are united in the mean [medio]. tality. Whence he is like “an evil mediator, who separates Now to unite men to God perfectively belongs to Christ, friends”∗. through Whom men are reconciled to God, according to But Christ had beatitude in common with God, mor- 2 Cor. 5:19: “God was in Christ reconciling the world to tality in common with men. Hence “for this purpose did Himself.” And, consequently, Christ alone is the perfect He intervene, that having fulfilled the span of His mortal- Mediator of God and men, inasmuch as, by His death, He ity, He might from dead men make immortal—which He reconciled the human race to God. Hence the Apostle, showed in Himself by rising again; and that He might con- after saying, “Mediator of God and man, the man Christ fer beatitude on those who were deprived of it—for which Jesus,” added: “Who gave Himself a redemption for all.” reason He never forsook us.” Wherefore He is “the good However, nothing hinders certain others from being Mediator, Who reconciles enemies” (De Civ. Dei xv). called mediators, in some respect, between God and man, Reply to Objection 3. Since the Holy Ghost is in ev- forasmuch as they cooperate in uniting men to God, dis- erything equal to God, He cannot be said to be between, ∗ Augustine, De Civ. Dei xv 2222 or a Mediator of, God and men: but Christ alone, Who, ‘Now a mediator is not of one, but God is one’],” the gloss though equal to the Father in His Godhead, yet is less than says: “Not the Father nor the Holy Ghost.” The Holy the Father in His human nature, as stated above (q. 20, Ghost, however, is said “to ask for us,” because He makes a. 1). Hence on Gal. 3:20, “Christ is a Mediator [Vulg.: us ask. Whether Christ, is the Mediator of God and men? IIIa q. 26 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ is not, as man, Reply to Objection 1. If we take the Divine Nature the Mediator of God and men. For Augustine says (Con- from Christ, we consequently take from Him the singu- tra Felic. x): “One is the Person of Christ: lest there be not lar fulness of grace, which belongs to Him as the Only- one Christ, not one substance; lest, the office of Mediator begotten of the Father, as it is written (Jn. 1:14). From being denied, He be called the Son either of God alone, or which fulness it resulted that He was established over all merely the Son of a man.” But He is the Son of God and men, and approached nearer to God. man, not as man, but as at the same time God and man. Reply to Objection 2. Christ, as God, is in all things Therefore neither should we say that, as man alone, He is equal to the Father. But even in the human nature He is Mediator of God and man. above all men. Therefore, as man, He can be Mediator, Objection 2. Further, just as Christ, as God, has a but not as God. common nature with the Father and the Holy Ghost; so, as Reply to Objection 3. Although it belongs to Christ man, He has a common nature with men. But for the rea- as God to take away sin authoritatively, yet it belongs to son that, as God, He has the same nature as the Father and Him, as man, to satisfy for the sin of the human race. And the Holy Ghost, He cannot be called Mediator, as God: for in this sense He is called the Mediator of God and men. on 1 Tim. 2:5, “Mediator of God and man,” a gloss says: ST. THOMAS AND THE IMMACULATE CONCEP- “As the Word, He is not a Mediator, because He is equal to TION (EDITORIAL NOTE) God, and God ‘with God,’ and at the same time one God.” The privilege of the Virgin-Mother of God and the Therefore neither, as man, can He be called Mediator, on supreme prerogative of her Son may be seen from the fol- account of His having the same nature as men. lowing diagram: Objection 3. Further, Christ is called Mediator, inas- THE LAW AND THE COURSE OF ORIGINAL SIN much as He reconciled us to God: and this He did by UNDER THE LAW. . . . . all descendants from Adam. . . . taking away sin, which separated us from God. But to . spring from Adam materially and seminally. . . . . the take away sin belongs to Christ, not as man, but as God. body lies (not under the guilty, but) under the effects of Therefore Christ is our Mediator, not as man, but as God. original sin. . . . . the stricken body dispositively causes On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 15): the soul to contract the guilt of original sin. . . . . all con- “Not because He is the Word, is Christ Mediator, since He tract both debt and stain. . . . . all need a Redeemer to de- Who is supremely immortal and supremely happy is far stroy the stain contracted PARTIALLY EXEMPT FROM from us unhappy mortals; but He is Mediator, as man.” THE LAW; PRIVILEGE OF IMMACULATE CONCEP- I answer that, We may consider two things in a me- TION. . . . . the Blessed Virgin. . . . . springs from Adam diator: first, that he is a mean; secondly, that he unites materially and seminally. . . . . the body lies (not under others. Now it is of the nature of a mean to be distant the guilt, but) under the effects of original sin. . . . . the from each extreme: while it unites by communicating to stricken body would have dispositively caused the soul to one that which belongs to the other. Now neither of these contract the guilt of original sin. . . . . the soul at the mo- can be applied to Christ as God, but only as man. For, ment of union with the body was prevented by the infu- as God, He does not differ from the Father and the Holy sion of grace from contracting sin. . . . . Mary contracted Ghost in nature and power of dominion: nor have the Fa- the debt, but not the stain. . . . . Mary needed a Redeemer ther and the Holy Ghost anything that the Son has not, so to prevent her from contracting the stain WHOLLY EX- that He be able to communicate to others something be- EMPT FROM THE LAW; MIRACULOUS CONCEP- longing to the Father or the Holy Ghost, as though it were TION. . . . . Our Blessed Lord. . . . . springs from Adam belonging to others than Himself. But both can be applied materially, not seminally (q. 31, a. 1). . . . . His body lay to Him as man. Because, as man, He is distant both from under neither guilt nor effects of original sin. . . . . the God, by nature, and from man by dignity of both grace body being entirely free, could not transmit the stain to and glory. Again, it belongs to Him, as man, to unite men His soul. . . . . no preventive grace needed. . . . . Jesus to God, by communicating to men both precepts and gifts, Christ contracted neither debt nor stain. . . . . Jesus Christ and by offering satisfaction and prayers to God for men. is not redeemed, but the Redeemer And therefore He is most truly called Mediator, as man. It will thus be seen how accurately St. Thomas speaks 2223 of the “flesh” or body of our Blessed Lady. For it should was that he did not perceive the fallacy of the argument, be remembered that, according to St. Thomas, the hu- since it might be neither before nor after, but in the very man body is animated in succession by (1) a vegetative, instant of, animation. (2) a sensitive, and (3) a rational soul. Hence his asser- The question is answered thus: St. Thomas as a Doc- tion that “the flesh of the Blessed Virgin was conceived in tor of the Church and in matters which were not then “de original sin” (q. 14, a. 3, ad 1) means that the body of the fide,” is a witness to the expression of the faith of his time. Blessed Virgin, being descended from Adam both mate- Hence his line of argument coincides with, because it fol- rially and seminally, contracted the bodily defects which lows, that of St. Bernard, Peter Lombard, Alexander of are conveyed by seminal generation, and are the results of Hales, Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure. It was not likely the privation of original justice (q. 69, a. 4, ad 3). Before that St. Thomas would differ from the great masters of animation, therefore the body of the Blessed Virgin would his time, who failed to understand that the grace of re- not be infected with the guilt of original sin, because pri- demption might at the same time be one of preservation vation of grace can only be in that which is the subject and prevention. Nor is it likely that St. Thomas had any of grace, viz. the rational soul. Nevertheless, before an- reliable information about the movement∗ in progress at imation the body of the Blessed Virgin, being seminally that time towards a belief in the Immaculate Conception. descended from Adam, was such that it would have been . No doubt he knew something of it, but the names of its the means of transmitting the taint of original sin to the promoters would have weighed little with him as against rational soul at the very first instant of animation, unless those of Bernard, Albert, Peter, Alexander, and Bonaven- the grace of the Redeemer intervened and sanctified her ture. And it must not be forgotten that among those who soul “in that self-same instant,” thus redeeming her and upheld the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, not a preventing her from contracting the guilt of original sin. few ascribed the privilege as being absolute and not one of Why, then, does St. Thomas say that because the preservation and Redemption. Hence it is that St. Thomas Blessed Virgin was not sanctified before animation, there- insists on two things: (1) that the Mother of God was re- fore she could be sanctified only after animation? deemed, and (2) that the grace of her sanctification was a Such a conclusion would hold if it were a question of grace of preservation. And, be it remarked in conclusion, the order of Nature: “a thing must be before it is such these two points, so much insisted on by St. Thomas, are [prius est esse quam esse tale]”; and therefore the soul at the very basis of the Catholic doctrine of the Immacu- must be, before it is sanctified. But if St. Thomas held for late Conception. a posteriority of time, no matter how short, we ask how it ∗ Principally in England, where, owing to the influence of St. Anselm (1109), the doctrine was maintained by Eadmer (1137). Nicolas of St. Albans (1175), Osbert of Clare (1170), Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln (1253), William of Ware (1300), who was the master of Duns Scotus (1308) 2224 THIRD PART, QUESTION 27 Of the Sanctification of the Blessed Virgin (In Six Articles) After the foregoing treatise of the union of God and man and the consequences thereof, it remains for us to consider what things the Incarnate Son of God did or suffered in the human nature united to Him. This consideration will be fourfold. For we shall consider: (1) Those things that relate to His coming into the world; (2) Those things that relate to the course of His life in this world; (3) His departure from this world; (4) Those things that concern His exaltation after this life. The first of these offers four points of consideration: (1) The Conception of Christ; (2) His Birth; (3) His Circumcision; (4) His Baptism. Concerning His Conception there are some points to be considered: (1) As to the Mother who conceived Him; (2) as to the mode of His Conception; (3) as to the perfection of the offspring conceived. On the part of the Mother four points offer themselves to our consideration: (1) Her sanctification. (2) her virginity; (3) her espousals; (4) her annunciation, or preparation for conception. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the Blessed Virgin, Mother of God, was sanctified before her birth from the womb? (2) Whether she was sanctified before animation? (3) Whether in virtue of this sanctification the fomes of sin was entirely taken away from her? (4) Whether the result of this sanctification was that she never sinned? (5) Whether in virtue of this sanctification she received the fulness of grace? (6) Whether it was proper to her to be thus sanctified? Whether the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before her birth from the womb? IIIa q. 27 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the Blessed Virgin Objection 4. Further, original sin is contracted was not sanctified before her birth from the womb. For through the origin, just as actual sin is contracted through the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46): “That was not first which an act. But as long as one is in the act of sinning, one can- is spiritual but that which is natural; afterwards that which not be cleansed from actual sin. Therefore neither could is spiritual.” But by sanctifying grace man is born spiritu- the Blessed Virgin be cleansed from original sin as long as ally into a son of God according to Jn. 1:13: ”(who) are she was in the act of origin, by existence in her mother’s born of God.” But birth from the womb is a natural birth. womb. Therefore the Blessed Virgin was not sanctified before her On the contrary, The Church celebrates the feast of birth from the womb. our Lady’s Nativity. Now the Church does not celebrate Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Ep. ad Dar- feasts except of those who are holy. Therefore even in dan.): “The sanctification, by which we become temples her birth the Blessed Virgin was holy. Therefore she was of God, is only of those who are born again.” But no one sanctified in the womb. is born again, who was not born previously. Therefore the I answer that, Nothing is handed down in the canoni- Blessed Virgin was not sanctified before her birth from the cal Scriptures concerning the sanctification of the Blessed womb. Mary as to her being sanctified in the womb; indeed, they Objection 3. Further, whoever is sanctified by grace is do not even mention her birth. But as Augustine, in his cleansed from sin, both original and actual. If, therefore, tractate on the Assumption of the Virgin, argues with rea- the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before her birth from the son, since her body was assumed into heaven, and yet womb, it follows that she was then cleansed from original Scripture does not relate this; so it may be reasonably ar- sin. Now nothing but original sin could hinder her from gued that she was sanctified in the womb. For it is rea- entering the heavenly kingdom. If therefore she had died sonable to believe that she, who brought forth “the Only- then, it seems that she would have entered the gates of Begotten of the Father full of grace and truth,” received heaven. But this was not possible before the Passion of greater privileges of grace than all others: hence we read Christ, according to the Apostle (Heb. 10:19): “We have (Lk. 1:28) that the angel addressed her in the words: “Hail [Vulg.: ‘having’] therefore a confidence in the entering full of grace!” into the Holies by His blood.” It seems therefore that the Moreover, it is to be observed that it was granted, by Blessed Virgin was not sanctified before her birth from the way of privilege, to others, to be sanctified in the womb; womb. for instance, to Jeremias, to whom it was said (Jer. 1:5): 2225 “Before thou camest forth out of the womb, I sanctified Reply to Objection 3. The Blessed Virgin was sanc-thee”; and again, to John the Baptist, of whom it is writ- tified in the womb from original sin, as to the personal ten (Lk. 1:15): “He shall be filled with the Holy Ghost stain; but she was not freed from the guilt to which the even from his mother’s womb.” It is therefore with reason whole nature is subject, so as to enter into Paradise other- that we believe the Blessed Virgin to have been sanctified wise than through the Sacrifice of Christ; the same also is before her birth from the womb. to be said of the Holy Fathers who lived before Christ. Reply to Objection 1. Even in the Blessed Virgin, Reply to Objection 4. Original sin is transmitted first was that which is natural, and afterwards that which through the origin, inasmuch as through the origin the is spiritual: for she was first conceived in the flesh, and human nature is transmitted, and original sin, properly afterwards sanctified in the spirit. speaking, affects the nature. And this takes place when Reply to Objection 2. Augustine speaks according the off-spring conceived is animated. Wherefore nothing to the common law, by reason of which no one is regen- hinders the offspring conceived from being sanctified after erated by the sacraments, save those who are previously animation: for after this it remains in the mother’s womb born. But God did not so limit His power to the law of the not for the purpose of receiving human nature, but for a sacraments, but that He can bestow His grace, by special certain perfecting of that which it has already received. privilege, on some before they are born from the womb. Whether the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before animation? IIIa q. 27 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the Blessed Virgin most High hath sanctified His own tabernacle,” seems to was sanctified before animation. Because, as we have signify the sanctification of the Mother of God, who is stated (a. 1), more grace was bestowed on the Virgin called “God’s Tabernacle,” according to Ps. 18:6: “He Mother of God than on any saint. Now it seems to have hath set His tabernacle in the sun.” But of the tabernacle been granted to some, to be sanctified before animation. it is written (Ex. 40:31,32): “After all things were per- For it is written (Jer. 1:5): “Before I formed thee in the fected, the cloud covered the tabernacle of the testimony, bowels of thy mother, I knew thee”: and the soul is not and the glory of the Lord filled it.” Therefore also the infused before the formation of the body. Likewise Am- Blessed Virgin was not sanctified until after all in her was brose says of John the Baptist (Comment. in Luc. i, 15): perfected, viz. her body and soul. “As yet the spirit of life was not in him and already he pos- I answer that, The sanctification of the Blessed Virgin sessed the Spirit of grace.” Much more therefore could the cannot be understood as having taken place before anima- Blessed Virgin be sanctified before animation. tion, for two reasons. First, because the sanctification of Objection 2. Further, as Anselm says (De Concep. which we are speaking, is nothing but the cleansing from Virg. xviii), “it was fitting that this Virgin should shine original sin: for sanctification is a “perfect cleansing,” as with such a purity that under God none greater can be Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii). Now sin cannot be taken imagined”: wherefore it is written (Canticles 4:7): “Thou away except by grace, the subject of which is the ratio- art all fair, O my love, and there is not a spot in thee.” But nal creature alone. Therefore before the infusion of the the purity of the Blessed Virgin would have been greater, rational soul, the Blessed Virgin was not sanctified. if she had never been stained by the contagion of original Secondly, because, since the rational creature alone sin. Therefore it was granted to her to be sanctified before can be the subject of sin; before the infusion of the ratio- her flesh was animated. nal soul, the offspring conceived is not liable to sin. And Objection 3. Further, as it has been stated above, no thus, in whatever manner the Blessed Virgin would have feast is celebrated except of some saint. But some keep been sanctified before animation, she could never have in- the feast of the Conception of the Blessed Virgin. There- curred the stain of original sin: and thus she would not fore it seems that in her very Conception she was holy; have needed redemption and salvation which is by Christ, and hence that she was sanctified before animation. of whom it is written (Mat. 1:21): “He shall save His peo- Objection 4. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 11:16): ple from their sins.” But this is unfitting, through implying “If the root be holy, so are the branches.” Now the root of that Christ is not the “Saviour of all men,” as He is called the children is their parents. Therefore the Blessed Virgin (1 Tim. 4:10). It remains, therefore, that the Blessed Vir- could be sanctified even in her parents, before animation. gin was sanctified after animation. On the contrary, The things of the Old Testament Reply to Objection 1. The Lord says that He “knew” were figures of the New, according to 1 Cor. 10:11: “All Jeremias before he was formed in the womb, by knowl- things happened to them in figure.” Now the sanctification edge, that is to say, of predestination: but He says that of the tabernacle, of which it is written (Ps. 45:5): “The He “sanctified” him, not before formation, but before he 2226 “came forth out of the womb,” etc. day,” that is of the Blessed Virgin, who in her birth was As to what Ambrose says, viz. that in John the Baptist immune from original sin. there was not the spirit of life when there was already the Reply to Objection 3. Although the Church of Rome Spirit of grace, by spirit of life we are not to understand does not celebrate the Conception of the Blessed Virgin, the life-giving soul, but the air which we breathe out [res- yet it tolerates the custom of certain churches that do keep piratus]. Or it may be said that in him as yet there was that feast, wherefore this is not to be entirely reprobated. not the spirit of life, that is the soul, as to its manifest and Nevertheless the celebration of this feast does not give us complete operations. to understand that she was holy in her conception. But Reply to Objection 2. If the soul of the Blessed Vir- since it is not known when she was sanctified, the feast of gin had never incurred the stain of original sin, this would her Sanctification, rather than the feast of her Conception, be derogatory to the dignity of Christ, by reason of His is kept on the day of her conception. being the universal Saviour of all. Consequently after Reply to Objection 4. Sanctification is twofold. one Christ, who, as the universal Saviour of all, needed not to is that of the whole nature: inasmuch as the whole human be saved, the purity of the Blessed Virgin holds the high- nature is freed from all corruption of sin and punishment. est place. For Christ did not contract original sin in any This will take place at the resurrection. The other is per- way whatever, but was holy in His very Conception, ac- sonal sanctification. This is not transmitted to the children cording to Lk. 1:35: “The Holy which shall be born of begotten of the flesh: because it does not regard the flesh thee, shall be called the Son of God.” But the Blessed but the mind. Consequently, though the parents of the Virgin did indeed contract original sin, but was cleansed Blessed Virgin were cleansed from original sin, neverthe- therefrom before her birth from the womb. This is what less she contracted original sin, since she was conceived is signified (Job 3:9) where it is written of the night of by way of fleshly concupiscence and the intercourse of original sin: “Let it expect light,” i.e. Christ, “and not man and woman: for Augustine says (De Nup. et Con- see it”—(because “no defiled thing cometh into her,” as is cup. i): “All flesh born of carnal intercourse is sinful.” written Wis. 7:25), “nor the rising of the dawning of the Whether the Blessed Virgin was cleansed from the infection of the fomes? IIIa q. 27 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the Blessed Virgin ions. For some have held that the fomes was entirely taken was not cleansed from the infection of the fomes. For just away in that sanctification whereby the Blessed Virgin as the fomes, consisting in the rebellion of the lower pow- was sanctified in the womb. Others say that it remained ers against the reason, is a punishment of original sin; so as far as it causes a difficulty in doing good, but was taken also are death and other corporeal penalties. Therefore the away as far as it causes a proneness to evil. Others again, fomes was not entirely removed from her. that it was taken away as to the personal corruption, by Objection 2. Further, it is written (2 Cor. 12:9): which it makes us quick to do evil and slow to do good: “Power is made perfect in infirmity,” which refers to the but that it remained as to the corruption of nature, inas- weakness of the fomes, by reason of which he (the Apos- much as it is the cause of transmitting original sin to the tle) felt the “sting of the flesh.” But it was not fitting that offspring. Lastly, others say that, in her first sanctification, anything should be taken away from the Blessed Virgin, the fomes remained essentially, but was fettered; and that, pertaining to the perfection of virtue. Therefore it was un- when she conceived the Son of God, it was entirely taken fitting that the fomes should be entirely taken away from away. In order to understand the question at issue, it must her. be observed that the fomes is nothing but a certain inordi- Objection 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. nate, but habitual, concupiscence of the sensitive appetite. iii) that “the Holy Ghost came upon” the Blessed Virgin, for actual concupiscence is a sinful motion. Now sen- “purifying her,” before she conceived the Son of God. sual concupiscence is said to be inordinate, in so far as it But this can only be understood of purification from the rebels against reason; and this it does by inclining to evil, fomes: for she committed no sin, as Augustine says (De or hindering from good. Consequently it is essential to the Nat. et Grat. xxvi). Therefore by the sanctification in the fomes to incline to evil, or hinder from good. Wherefore womb she was not absolutely cleansed from the fomes. to say that the fomes was in the Blessed Virgin without an On the contrary, It is written (Canticles 4:7): “Thou inclination to evil, is to combine two contradictory state- art all fair, O my love, and there is not a spot in thee!” ments. But the fomes implies a blemish, at any rate in the flesh. In like manner it seems to imply a contradiction to say Therefore the fomes was not in the Blessed Virgin. that the fomes remained as to the corruption of nature, but I answer that, on this point there are various opin- not as to the personal corruption. For, according to Au- 2227 gustine (De Nup. et Concup. i.), it is lust that transmits istence in her mother’s womb, for this was the singular original sin to the offspring. Now lust implies inordinate privilege of Christ: but by reason of the abundant grace concupiscence, not entirely subject to reason: and there- bestowed on her in her sanctification, and still more per- fore, if the fomes were entirely taken away as to personal fectly by Divine Providence preserving her sensitive soul, corruption, it could not remain as to the corruption of na- in a singular manner, from any inordinate movement. Af- ture. terwards, however, at the conception of Christ’s flesh, in It remains, therefore, for us to say, either that the which for the first time immunity from sin was to be con- fomes was entirely taken away from her by her first sanc- spicuous, it is to be believed that entire freedom from the tification or that it was fettered. Now that the fomes was fomes redounded from the Child to the Mother. This in- entirely taken away, might be understood in this way, that, deed is signified (Ezech. 43:2): “Behold the glory of the by the abundance of grace bestowed on the Blessed Vir- God of Israel came in by the way of the east,” i.e. by the gin, such a disposition of the soul’s powers was granted Blessed Virgin, “and the earth,” i.e. her flesh, “shone with to her, that the lower powers were never moved without His,” i.e. Christ’s, “majesty.” the command of her reason: just as we have stated to have Reply to Objection 1. Death and such like penalties been the case with Christ (q. 15, a. 2), who certainly did do not of themselves incline us to sin. Wherefore though not have the fomes of sin; as also was the case with Adam, Christ assumed them, He did not assume the fomes. Con- before he sinned, by reason of original justice: so that, sequently in order that the Blessed Virgin might be con- in this respect, the grace of sanctification in the Virgin formed to her Son, from “whose fulness” her grace was had the force of original justice. And although this ap- derived, the fomes was at first fettered and afterwards pears to be part of the dignity of the Virgin Mother, yet it taken away: while she was not freed from death and other is somewhat derogatory to the dignity of Christ, without such penalties. whose power no one had been freed from the first sentence Reply to Objection 2. The “infirmity” of the flesh, of condemnation. And though, through faith in Christ, that pertains to the fomes, is indeed to holy men an oc- some were freed from that condemnation, according to casional cause of perfect virtue: but not the “sine qua the spirit, before Christ’s Incarnation, yet it does not seem non” of perfection: and it is quite enough to ascribe to fitting that any one should be freed from that condemna- the Blessed Virgin perfect virtue and abundant grace: nor tion, according to the flesh, except after His Incarnation, is there any need to attribute to her every occasional cause for it was then that immunity from condemnation was first of perfection. to appear. Consequently, just as before the immortality of Reply to Objection 3. The Holy Ghost effected a the flesh of Christ rising again, none obtained immortal- twofold purification in the Blessed Virgin. The first was, ity of the flesh, so it seems unfitting to say that before as it were, preparatory to Christ’s conception: which did Christ appeared in sinless flesh, His Virgin Mother’s or not cleanse her from the stain of sin or fomes, but rather anyone else’s flesh should be without the fomes, which is gave her mind a unity of purpose and disengaged it from a called “the law of the flesh” or “of the members” (Rom. multiplicity of things (Cf. Dionysius, Div. Nom. iv), since 7:23,25). even the angels are said to be purified, in whom there is no Therefore it seems better to say that by the sanctifica- stain, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi). The second pu- tion in the womb, the Virgin was not freed from the fomes rification effected in her by the Holy Ghost was by means in its essence, but that it remained fettered: not indeed by of the conception of Christ which was the operation of the an act of her reason, as in holy men, since she had not Holy Ghost. And in respect of this, it may be said that He the use of reason from the very first moment of her ex- purified her entirely from the fomes. Whether by being sanctified in the womb the Blessed Virgin was preserved from all IIIa q. 27 a. 4 actual sin? Objection 1. It would seem that by being sanctified in Objection 2. Further, Augustine (Qq. Nov. et Vet. the womb the Blessed Virgin was not preserved from all Test. lxxiii on Lk. 2:35: “Thy own soul a sword shall actual sin. For, as we have already stated (a. 3), after her pierce”) says that the Blessed Virgin “was troubled with first sanctification the fomes remained in the Virgin. Now wondering doubt at the death of our Lord.” But doubt in the motion of the fomes, even if it precede the act of the matters of faith is a sin. Therefore the Blessed Virgin was reason, is a venial sin, albeit extremely slight, as Augus- not preserved from all actual sin. tine says in his work De Trinitate∗. Therefore there was Objection 3. Further, Chrysostom (Hom. xlv in some venial sin in the Blessed Virgin. Matth.) expounding the text: “Behold thy mother and thy ∗ Cf. Sent. ii, D, 24 2228 brethren stand without, seeking thee,” says: “It is clear subject to sins.” that they did this from mere vain glory.” Again, on Jn. We must therefore confess simply that the Blessed Vir- 2:3: “They have no wine,” the same Chrysostom says that gin committed no actual sin, neither mortal nor venial; so “she wished to do them a favor, and raise herself in their that what is written (Cant 4:7) is fulfilled: “Thou art all esteem, by means of her Son: and perchance she suc- fair, O my love, and there is not a spot in thee,” etc. cumbed to human frailty, just as did His brethren when Reply to Objection 1. After her sanctification the they said: ‘Manifest Thyself to the world.’ ” And a little fomes remained in the Blessed Virgin, but fettered; lest further on he says: “For as yet she did not believe in Him she should be surprised by some sudden inordinate act, as she ought.” Now it is quite clear that all this was sinful. antecedent to the act of reason. And although the grace Therefore the Blessed Virgin was not preserved from all of her sanctification contributed to this effect, yet it did sin. not suffice; for otherwise the result of her sanctification On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. would have been to render impossible in her any sensual xxxvi): “In the matter of sin, it is my wish to exclude ab- movement not preceded by an act of reason, and thus she solutely all questions concerning the holy Virgin Mary, on would. not have had the fomes, which is contrary to what account of the honor due to Christ. For since she con- we have said above (a. 3). We must therefore say that the ceived and brought forth Him who most certainly was above mentioned fettering (of the fomes) was perfected by guilty of no sin, we know that an abundance of grace was divine providence not permitting any inordinate motion to given her that she might be in every way the conqueror of result from the fomes. sin.” Reply to Objection 2. Origen (Hom. xvii in Luc.) I answer that, God so prepares and endows those, and certain other doctors expound these words of Simeon whom He chooses for some particular office, that they as referring to the sorrow which she suffered at the time are rendered capable of fulfilling it, according to 2 Cor. of our Lord’s Passion. Ambrose (in Luc. 2:35) says that 3:6: ”(Who) hath made us fit ministers of the New Tes- the sword signifies “Mary’s prudence which took note of tament.” Now the Blessed Virgin was chosen by God to the heavenly mystery. For the word of God is living and be His Mother. Therefore there can be no doubt that God, effectual, and more piercing than any two-edged sword” by His grace, made her worthy of that office, according (Heb. 4:12). to the words spoken to her by the angel (Lk. 1:30,31): Others again take the sword to signify doubt. But this “Thou hast found grace with God: behold thou shalt con- is to be understood of the doubt, not of unbelief, but of ceive,” etc. But she would not have been worthy to be wonder and discussion. Thus Basil says (Ep. ad Optim.) the Mother of God, if she had ever sinned. First, because that “the Blessed Virgin while standing by the cross, and the honor of the parents reflects on the child, according observing every detail, after the message of Gabriel, and to Prov. 17:6: “The glory of children are their fathers”: the ineffable knowledge of the Divine Conception, after and consequently, on the other hand, the Mother’s shame that wondrous manifestation of miracles, was troubled in would have reflected on her Son. Secondly, because of the mind”: that is to say, on the one side seeing Him suffer singular affinity between her and Christ, who took flesh such humiliation, and on the other considering His mar- from her: and it is written ( 2 Cor. 6:15): “What concord velous works. hath Christ with Belial?” Thirdly, because of the singu- Reply to Objection 3. In those words Chrysostom lar manner in which the Son of God, who is the “Divine goes too far. They may, however, be explained as meaning Wisdom” (1 Cor. 1:24) dwelt in her, not only in her soul that our Lord corrected in her, not the inordinate motion but in her womb. And it is written (Wis. 1:4): “Wisdom of vain glory in regard to herself, but that which might be will not enter into a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body in the thoughts of others. Whether, by her sanctification in the womb, the Blessed Virgin received the fulness of IIIa q. 27 a. 5 grace? Objection 1. It would seem that, by her sanctification grace at the time of her sanctification. in the womb, the Blessed Virgin did not receive the ful- Objection 2. Further, nothing remains to be added to ness or perfection of grace. For this seems to be Christ’s that which is full and perfect: for “the perfect is that which privilege, according to Jn. 1:14: “We saw Him [Vulg.: lacks nothing,” as is said Phys. iii. But the Blessed Virgin ‘His glory’] as the Only-Begotten [Vulg.: ‘as it were of received additional grace afterwards when she conceived the Only-Begotten’] full of grace and truth.” But what is Christ; for to her was it said (Lk. 1:35): “The Holy Ghost proper to Christ ought not to be ascribed to some one else. shall come upon thee: and again, when she was assumed Therefore the Blessed Virgin did not receive the fulness of into glory.” Therefore it seems that she did not receive the 2229 fulness of grace at the time of her first sanctification. qualities in the most perfect degree, having mounted to its Objection 3. Further, “God does nothing useless,” as own place. is said De Coelo et Mundo i. But it would have been use- In like manner there was a threefold perfection of less for her to have certain graces, for she would never grace in the Blessed Virgin. The first was a kind of dispo- have put them to use: since we do not read that she taught sition, by which she was made worthy to be the mother of which is the act of wisdom; or that she worked miracles, Christ: and this was the perfection of her sanctification. which is the act of one of the gratuitous graces. Therefore The second perfection of grace in the Blessed Virgin was she had not the fulness of grace. through the presence of the Son of God Incarnate in her On the contrary, The angel said to her: “Hail, full of womb. The third perfection of the end is that which she grace” (Lk. 1:28); which words Jerome expounds as fol- has in glory. lows, in a sermon on the Assumption (cf. Ep. ad Paul. et That the second perfection excels the first, and the Eustoch.): “Full indeed of grace: for to others it is given third the second, appears (1) from the point of view of in portions; whereas on Mary the fulness of grace was deliverance from evil. For at first in her sanctification she showered all at once.” was delivered from original sin: afterwards, in the con- I answer that, In every genus, the nearer a thing is to ception of the Son of God, she was entirely cleansed from the principle, the greater the part which it has in the effect the fomes: lastly, in her glorification she was also deliv- of that principle, whence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) ered from all affliction whatever. It appears (2) from the that angels, being nearer to God, have a greater share than point of view of ordering to good. For at first in her sanc- men, in the effects of the Divine goodness. Now Christ is tification she received grace inclining her to good: in the the principle of grace, authoritatively as to His Godhead, conception of the Son of God she received consummate instrumentally as to His humanity: whence (Jn. 1:17) it grace confirming her in good; and in her glorification her is written: “Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.” But grace was further consummated so as to perfect her in the the Blessed Virgin Mary was nearest to Christ in His hu- enjoyment of all good. manity: because He received His human nature from her. Reply to Objection 3. There is no doubt that the Therefore it was due to her to receive a greater fulness of Blessed Virgin received in a high degree both the gift of grace than others. wisdom and the grace of miracles and even of prophecy, Reply to Objection 1. God gives to each one accord- just as Christ had them. But she did not so receive them, ing to the purpose for which He has chosen him. And as to put them and such like graces to every use, as did since Christ as man was predestinated and chosen to be Christ: but accordingly as it befitted her condition of life. “predestinated the Son of God in power. . . of sanctifica- For she had the use of wisdom in contemplation, accord- tion” (Rom. 1:4), it was proper to Him to have such a ing to Lk. 2:19: “But Mary kept all these words, ponder- fulness of grace that it overflowed from Him into all, ac- ing them in her heart.” But she had not the use of wisdom cording to Jn. 1:16: “Of His fulness we have all received.” as to teaching: since this befitted not the female sex, ac- Whereas the Blessed Virgin Mary received such a fulness cording to 1 Tim. 2:12: “But I suffer not a woman to of grace that she was nearest of all to the Author of grace; teach.” The use of miracles did not become her while she so that she received within her Him Who is full of all lived: because at that time the Teaching of Christ was to grace; and by bringing Him forth, she, in a manner, dis- be confirmed by miracles, and therefore it was befitting pensed grace to all. that Christ alone, and His disciples who were the bearers Reply to Objection 2. In natural things at first there of His doctrine, should work miracles. Hence of John the is perfection of disposition, for instance when matter is Baptist it is written (Jn. 10:41) that he “did no sign”; that perfectly disposed for the form. Secondly, there is the is, in order that all might fix their attention on Christ. As perfection of the form; and this is the more excellent, for to the use of prophecy, it is clear that she had it, from the the heat that proceeds from the form of fire is more perfect canticle spoken by her: “My soul doth magnify the Lord” than that which disposed to the form of fire. Thirdly, there (Lk. 1:46, etc.). is the perfection of the end: for instance when fire has its Whether after Christ, it was proper to the Blessed Virgin to be sanctified in the womb? IIIa q. 27 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that it was proper for the she alone was sanctified in the womb. Blessed Virgin, after Christ, to be sanctified in the womb. Objection 2. Further, some men seem to have been For it has been said (a. 4) that the Blessed Virgin was sanc- more closely connected with Christ than Jeremias and tified in the womb, in order that she might be worthy to be John the Baptist, who are said to have been sanctified the mother of God. But this is proper to her. Therefore in the womb. For Christ is specially called the Son of 2230 David and of Abraham, by reason of the promise specially although, while in the womb, they had not the use of rea-made to them concerning Christ. Isaias also prophesied of son (which is the point discussed by Augustine); just as Christ in the most express terms. And the apostles were in neither do children enjoy the use of free will as soon as converse with Christ Himself. And yet these are not men- they are sanctified by baptism. tioned as having been sanctified in the womb. Therefore Nor are we to believe that any others, not mentioned it was not befitting that either Jeremias or John the Baptist by Scripture, were sanctified in the womb. For such priv- should be sanctified in the womb. ileges of grace, which are bestowed on some, outside the Objection 3. Further, Job says of himself (Job 31:18): common law, are ordered for the salvation of others, ac- “From my infancy mercy grew up with me; and it came cording to 1 Cor. 12:7: “The manifestation of the Spirit out with me from [my mother’s] womb.” Nevertheless is given to every man unto profit,” which would not re- we do not for this reason say that he was sanctified sult from the sanctification of anyone unless it were made in the womb. Neither therefore are we bound to say known to the Church. that Jeremias and John the Baptist were sanctified in the And although it is not possible to assign a reason for womb. God’s judgments, for instance, why He bestows such a On the contrary, It is written of Jeremias (Jer. 1:5): grace on one and not on another, yet there seems to be a “Before thou camest forth out of the womb I sanctified certain fittingness in both of these being sanctified in the thee.” And of John the Baptist it is written (Lk. 1:15): womb, by their foreshadowing the sanctification which “He shall be filled with the Holy Ghost, even from his was to be effected through Christ. First, as to His Passion, mother’s womb.” according to Heb. 13:12: “Jesus, that He might sanctify I answer that, Augustine (Ep. ad Dardan.) seems the people by His own blood, suffered without the gate”: to speak dubiously of their (Jeremias’ and John the Bap- which Passion Jeremias foretold openly by words and by tist’s) sanctification in the womb. For the leaping of John symbols, and most clearly foreshadowed by his own suf- in the womb “might,” as he says, “signify the great truth,” ferings. Secondly, as to His Baptism (1 Cor. 6:11): “But viz. that the woman was the mother of God, “which was you are washed, but you are sanctified”; to which Baptism to be made known to his elders, though as yet unknown John prepared men by his baptism. to the infant. Hence in the Gospel it is written, not that Reply to Objection 1. The blessed Virgin, who was the infant in her womb believed, but that it ‘leaped’: and chosen by God to be His Mother, received a fuller grace our eyes are witness that not only infants leap but also cat- of sanctification than John the Baptist and Jeremias, who tle. But this was unwonted because it was in the womb. were chosen to foreshadow in a special way the sanctifica- And therefore, just as other miracles are wont to be done, tion effected by Christ. A sign of this is that it was granted this was done divinely, in the infant; not humanly by the to the Blessed Virgin thence-forward never to sin either infant. Perhaps also in this child the use of reason and mortally or venially: whereas to the others who were thus will was so far accelerated that while yet in his mother’s sanctified it was granted thenceforward not to sin mor- womb he was able to acknowledge, believe, and consent, tally, through the protection of God’s grace. whereas in other children we have to wait for these things Reply to Objection 2. In other respects these saints till they grow older: this again I count as a miraculous might be more closely united to Christ than Jeremias and result of the divine power.” John the Baptist. But the latter were most closely united But since it is expressly said (of John) in the Gospel to Him by clearly foreshadowing His sanctification, as ex- that “he shall be filled with the Holy Ghost, even from his plained above. mother’s womb”; and of Jeremias, “Before thou camest Reply to Objection 3. The mercy of which Job speaks forth out of the womb, I sanctified thee”; it seems that we is not the infused virtue; but a certain natural inclination must needs assert that they were sanctified in the womb, to the act of that virtue. 2231 THIRD PART, QUESTION 28 Of the Virginity of the Mother of God (In Four Articles) We now have to consider the virginity of the Mother of God; concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether she was a virgin in conceiving? (2) Whether she was a virgin in His Birth? (3) Whether she remained a virgin after His Birth? (4) Whether she took a vow of virginity? Whether the Mother of God was a virgin in conceiving Christ? IIIa q. 28 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the Mother of God I answer that, We must confess simply that the was not a virgin in conceiving Christ. For no child having Mother of Christ was a virgin in conceiving for to deny father and mother is conceived by a virgin mother. But this belongs to the heresy of the Ebionites and Cerinthus, Christ is said to have had not only a mother, but also a fa- who held Christ to be a mere man, and maintained that He ther, according to Lk. 2:33: “His father and mother were was born of both sexes. wondering at those things which were spoken concerning It is fitting for four reasons that Christ should be born Him”: and further on (Lk. 2:48) in the same chapter she of a virgin. First, in order to maintain the dignity or the says: “Behold I and Thy father [Vulg.: ‘Thy father and I’] Father Who sent Him. For since Christ is the true and have sought Thee sorrowing.” Therefore Christ was not natural Son of God, it was not fitting that He should have conceived of a virgin mother. another father than God: lest the dignity belonging to God Objection 2. Further (Mat. 1) it is proved that Christ be transferred to another. was the Son of Abraham and David, through Joseph being Secondly, this was befitting to a property of the Son descended from David. But this proof would have availed Himself, Who is sent. For He is the Word of God: and nothing if Joseph were not the father of Christ. Therefore the word is conceived without any interior corruption: in- it seems that Christ’s Mother conceived Him of the seed deed, interior corruption is incompatible with perfect con- of Joseph; and consequently that she was not a virgin in ception of the word. Since therefore flesh was so assumed conceiving Him. by the Word of God, as to be the flesh of the Word of God, Objection 3. Further, it is written (Gal. 4:4): “God it was fitting that it also should be conceived without cor- sent His Son, made of a woman.” But according to the ruption of the mother. customary mode of speaking, the term “woman” applies Thirdly, this was befitting to the dignity of Christ’s hu- to one who is known of a man. Therefore Christ was not manity in which there could be no sin, since by it the sin conceived by a virgin mother. of the world was taken away, according to Jn. 1:29: “Be- Objection 4. Further, things of the same species have hold the Lamb of God” (i.e. the Lamb without stain) “who the same mode of generation: since generation is speci- taketh away the sin of the world.” Now it was not possi- fied by its terminus just as are other motions. But Christ ble in a nature already corrupt, for flesh to be born from belonged to the same species as other men, according to sexual intercourse without incurring the infection of orig- Phil. 2:7: “Being made in the likeness of men, and in habit inal sin. Whence Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. found as a man.” Since therefore other men are begotten i): “In that union,” viz. the marriage of Mary and Joseph, of the mingling of male and female, it seems that Christ “the nuptial intercourse alone was lacking: because in sin- was begotten in the same manner; and that consequently ful flesh this could not be without fleshly concupiscence He was not conceived of a virgin mother. which arises from sin, and without which He wished to be Objection 5. Further, every natural form has its deter- conceived, Who was to be without sin.” minate matter, outside which it cannot be. But the matter Fourthly, on account of the very end of the Incarna- of human form appears to be the semen of male and fe- tion of Christ, which was that men might be born again as male. If therefore Christ’s body was not conceived of the sons of God, “not of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of semen of male and female, it would not have been truly a man, but of God” (Jn. 1:13), i.e. of the power of God, of human body; which cannot be asserted. It seems therefore which fact the very conception of Christ was to appear as that He was not conceived of a virgin mother. an exemplar. Whence Augustine says (De Sanct. Virg.): On the contrary, It is written (Is. 7:14): “Behold a “It behooved that our Head, by a notable miracle, should virgin shall conceive.” be born, after the flesh, of a virgin, that He might thereby 2232 signify that His members would be born, after the Spirit, plies the term signifying woman to those of the female sex of a virgin Church.” who are virgins.” Reply to Objection 1. As Bede says on Lk. 1:33: Reply to Objection 4. This argument is true of those Joseph is called the father of the Saviour, not that he re- things which come into existence by the way of nature: ally was His father, as the Photinians pretended: but that since nature, just as it is fixed to one particular effect, so it he was considered by men to be so, for the safeguarding is determinate to one mode of producing that effect. But of Mary’s good name. Wherefore Luke adds (Lk. 3:23): as the supernatural power of God extends to the infinite: “Being, as it was supposed, the son of Joseph.” just as it is not determinate to one effect, so neither is Or, according to Augustine (De Cons. Evang. ii), it determinate to one mode of producing any effect what- Joseph is called the father of Christ just as “he is called ever. Consequently, just as it was possible for the first man the husband of Mary, without fleshly mingling, by the to be produced, by the Divine power, “from the slime of mere bond of marriage: being thereby united to Him much the earth,” so too was it possible for Christ’s body to be more closely than if he were adopted from another fam- made, by Divine power, from a virgin without the seed of ily. Consequently that Christ was not begotten of Joseph the male. by fleshly union is no reason why Joseph should not be Reply to Objection 5. According to the Philosopher called His father; since he would be the father even of an (De Gener. Animal. i, ii, iv), in conception the seed of the adopted son not born of his wife.” male is not by way of matter, but by way of agent: and Reply to Objection 2. As Jerome says on Mat. the female alone supplies the matter. Wherefore though 1:18: “Though Joseph was not the father of our Lord the seed of the male was lacking in Christ’s conception, it and Saviour, the order of His genealogy is traced down does not follow that due matter was lacking. to Joseph”—first, because “the Scriptures are not wont to But if the seed of the male were the matter of the fe- trace the female line in genealogies”: secondly, “Mary tus in animal conception, it is nevertheless manifest that and Joseph were of the same tribe”; wherefore by law he it is not a matter remaining under one form, but subject was bound to take her as being of his kin. Likewise, as to transformation. And though the natural power cannot Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i), “it was befitting transmute other than determinate matter to a determinate to trace the genealogy down to Joseph, lest in that mar- form; nevertheless the Divine power, which is infinite, riage any slight should be offered to the male sex, which can transmute all matter to any form whatsoever. Con- is indeed the stronger: for truth suffered nothing thereby, sequently, just as it transmuted the slime of the earth into since both Joseph and Mary were of the family of David.” Adam’s body, so could it transmute the matter supplied by Reply to Objection 3. As the gloss says on this pas- His Mother into Christ’s body, even though it were not the sage, the word “ ‘mulier,’ is here used instead of ‘femina,’ sufficient matter for a natural conception. according to the custom of the Hebrew tongue: which ap- Whether Christ’s Mother was a virgin in His birth? IIIa q. 28 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s Mother was urrection where the disciples were gathered, the doors be- not a virgin in His Birth. For Ambrose says on Lk. 2:23: ing shut, our Lord “showed that His body was the same “He who sanctified a strange womb, for the birth of a in nature but differed in glory”: so that it seems that to prophet, He it is who opened His Mother’s womb, that go through a closed passage pertains to a glorified body. He might go forth unspotted.” But opening of the womb But Christ’s body was not glorified in its conception, but excludes virginity. Therefore Christ’s Mother was not a was passible, having “the likeness of sinful flesh,” as the virgin in His Birth. Apostle says (Rom. 8:3). Therefore He did not come forth Objection 2. Further, nothing should have taken place through the closed womb of the Virgin. in the mystery of Christ, which would make His body to On the contrary, In a sermon of the Council of Eph- seem unreal. Now it seems to pertain not to a true but to esus (P. III, Cap. ix) it is said: “After giving birth, nature an unreal body, to be able to go through a closed passage; knows not a virgin: but grace enhances her fruitfulness, since two bodies cannot be in one place at the same time. and effects her motherhood, while in no way does it injure It was therefore unfitting that Christ’s body should come her virginity.” Therefore Christ’s Mother was a virgin also forth from His Mother’s closed womb: and consequently in giving birth to Him. that she should remain a virgin in giving birth to Him. I answer that, Without any doubt whatever we must Objection 3. Further, as Gregory says in the Homily assert that the Mother of Christ was a virgin even in His for the octave of Easter∗, that by entering after His Res- Birth: for the prophet says not only: “Behold a virgin ∗ xxvi in Evang. 2233 shall conceive,” but adds: “and shall bear a son.” This sure of virginal purity; but the mere coming forth of the indeed was befitting for three reasons. First, because this infant from the maternal womb. was in keeping with a property of Him whose Birth is in Reply to Objection 2. Christ wished so to show the question, for He is the Word of God. For the word is not reality of His body, as to manifest His Godhead at the only conceived in the mind without corruption, but also same time. For this reason He mingled wondrous with proceeds from the mind without corruption. Wherefore in lowly things. Wherefore, to show that His body was real, order to show that body to be the body of the very Word He was born of a woman. But in order to manifest His of God, it was fitting that it should be born of a virgin in- Godhead, He was born of a virgin, for “such a Birth befits corrupt. Whence in the sermon of the Council of Ephesus a God,” as Ambrose says in the Christmas hymn. (quoted above) we read: “Whosoever brings forth mere Reply to Objection 3. Some have held that Christ, in flesh, ceases to be a virgin. But since she gave birth to His Birth, assumed the gift of “subtlety,” when He came the Word made flesh, God safeguarded her virginity so as forth from the closed womb of a virgin; and that He as- to manifest His Word, by which Word He thus manifested sumed the gift of “agility” when with dry feet He walked Himself: for neither does our word, when brought forth, on the sea. But this is not consistent with what has been corrupt the mind; nor does God, the substantial Word, decided above (q. 14). For these gifts of a glorified body deigning to be born, destroy virginity.” result from an overflow of the soul’s glory on to the body, Secondly, this is fitting as regards the effect of Christ’s as we shall explain further on, in treating of glorified bod- Incarnation: since He came for this purpose, that He ies ( Suppl., q. 82): and it has been said above (q. 13, a. 3, might take away our corruption. Wherefore it is unfitting ad 1; q. 16, a. 1, ad 2) that before His Passion Christ “al- that in His Birth He should corrupt His Mother’s virginity. lowed His flesh to do and to suffer what was proper to it” Thus Augustine says in a sermon on the Nativity of Our (Damascene, De Fide Orth. iii): nor was there such an Lord: “It was not right that He who came to heal corrup- overflow of glory from His soul on to His body. tion, should by His advent violate integrity.” We must therefore say that all these things took place Thirdly, it was fitting that He Who commanded us to miraculously by Divine power. Whence Augustine says honor our father and mother should not in His Birth lessen (Sup. Joan. Tract. 121): “To the substance of a body in the honor due to His Mother. which was the Godhead closed doors were no obstacle. Reply to Objection 1. Ambrose says this in expound- For truly He had power to enter in by doors not open, ing the evangelist’s quotation from the Law: “Every male in Whose Birth His Mother’s virginity remained invio- opening the womb shall be called holy to the Lord.” This, late.” And Dionysius says in an epistle (Ad Caium iv) says Bede, “is said in regard to the wonted manner of that “Christ excelled man in doing that which is proper to birth; not that we are to believe that our Lord in coming man: this is shown in His supernatural conception, of a forth violated the abode of her sacred womb, which His virgin, and in the unstable waters bearing the weight of entrance therein had hallowed.” Wherefore the opening earthly feet.” here spoken of does not imply the unlocking of the enclo- Whether Christ’s Mother remained a virgin after His birth? IIIa q. 28 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s Mother did and Joseph: and that, consequently she did not remain a not remain a virgin after His Birth. For it is written (Mat. virgin after (Christ’s) Birth. 1:18): “Before Joseph and Mary came together, she was Objection 3. Further, again in the same passage a lit- found with child of the Holy Ghost.” Now the Evangelist tle further on (Mat. 1:24,25) we read: “And” (Joseph) would not have said this—“before they came together”— “took unto him his wife; and he knew her not till she unless he were certain of their subsequent coming to- brought forth her first-born Son.” Now this conjunction gether; for no one says of one who does not eventually “till” is wont to designate a fixed time, on the completion dine “before he dines” (cf. Jerome, Contra Helvid.). It of which that takes place which previously had not taken seems, therefore, that the Blessed Virgin subsequently had place. And the verb “knew” refers here to knowledge by intercourse with Joseph; and consequently that she did not intercourse (cf. Jerome, Contra Helvid.); just as (Gn. 4:1) remain a virgin after (Christ’s) Birth. it is said that “Adam knew his wife.” Therefore it seems Objection 2. Further, in the same passage (Mat. 1:20) that after (Christ’s) Birth, the Blessed Virgin was known are related the words of the angel to Joseph: “Fear not by Joseph; and, consequently, that she did not remain a to take unto thee Mary thy wife.” But marriage is con- virgin after the Birth (of Christ). summated by carnal intercourse. Therefore it seems that Objection 4. Further, “first-born” can only be said of this must have at some time taken place between Mary one who has brothers afterwards: wherefore (Rom. 8:29): 2234 “Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made she, of her own accord, by carnal intercourse to forfeit that conformable to the image of His Son; that He might be virginity which had been miraculously preserved in her. the first-born among many brethren.” But the evangelist Fourthly, it would be tantamount to an imputation of calls Christ the first-born by His Mother. Therefore she extreme presumption in Joseph, to assume that he at- had other children after Christ. And therefore it seems that tempted to violate her whom by the angel’s revelation he Christ’s Mother did not remain a virgin after His Birth. knew to have conceived by the Holy Ghost. Objection 5. Further, it is written (Jn. 2:12): “After We must therefore simply assert that the Mother of this He went down to Capharnaum, He”—that is, Christ— God, as she was a virgin in conceiving Him and a virgin “and His Mother and His brethren.” But brethren are those in giving Him birth, did she remain a virgin ever after- who are begotten of the same parent. Therefore it seems wards. that the Blessed Virgin had other sons after Christ. Reply to Objection 1. As Jerome says (Contra Objection 6. Further, it is written (Mat. 27:55,56): Helvid. i): “Although this particle ‘before’ often indicates “There were there”—that is, by the cross of Christ— a subsequent event, yet we must observe that it not in- “many women afar off, who had followed Jesus from frequently points merely to some thing previously in the Galilee, ministering unto Him; among whom was Mary mind: nor is there need that what was in the mind take Magdalen, and Mary the mother of James and Joseph, and place eventually, since something may occur to prevent the mother of the sons of Zebedee.” Now this Mary who its happening. Thus if a man say: ‘Before I dined in the is called “the mother of James and Joseph” seems to have port, I set sail,’ we do not understand him to have dined in been also the Mother of Christ; for it is written (Jn. 19:25) port after he set sail: but that his mind was set on dining that “there stood by the cross of Jesus, Mary His Mother.” in port.” In like manner the evangelist says: “Before they Therefore it seems that Christ’s Mother did not remain a came together” Mary “was found with child, of the Holy virgin after His Birth. Ghost,” not that they came together afterwards: but that, On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 44:2): “This when it seemed that they would come together, this was gate shall be shut, it shall not be opened, and no man shall forestalled through her conceiving by the Holy Ghost, the pass through it; because the Lord the God of Israel hath result being that afterwards they did not come together. entered in by it.” Expounding these words, Augustine Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Nup. et says in a sermon (De Annunt. Dom. iii): “What means Concup. i): “The Mother of God is called (Joseph’s) wife this closed gate in the House of the Lord, except that Mary from the first promise of her espousals, whom he had not is to be ever inviolate? What does it mean that ‘no man known nor ever was to know by carnal intercourse.” For, shall pass through it,’ save that Joseph shall not know her? as Ambrose says on Lk. 1:27: “The fact of her marriage And what is this—‘The Lord alone enters in and goeth is declared, not to insinuate the loss of virginity, but to out by it’—except that the Holy Ghost shall impregnate witness to the reality of the union.” her, and that the Lord of angels shall be born of her? And Reply to Objection 3. Some have said that this is what means this—‘it shall be shut for evermore’—but that not to be understood of carnal knowledge, but of acquain- Mary is a virgin before His Birth, a virgin in His Birth, and tance. Thus Chrysostom says† that “Joseph did not know a virgin after His Birth?” her, until she gave birth, being unaware of her dignity: but I answer that, Without any hesitation we must abhor after she had given birth, then did he know her. Because the error of Helvidius, who dared to assert that Christ’s by reason of her child she surpassed the whole world in Mother, after His Birth, was carnally known by Joseph, beauty and dignity: since she alone in the narrow abode and bore other children. For, in the first place, this is of her womb received Him Whom the world cannot con- derogatory to Christ’s perfection: for as He is in His tain.” Godhead the Only-Begotten of the Father, being thus His Others again refer this to knowledge by sight. For Son in every respect perfect, so it was becoming that He as, while Moses was speaking with God, his face was should be the Only-begotten son of His Mother, as being so bright “that the children of Israel could not steadfastly her perfect offspring. behold it”; so Mary, while being “overshadowed” by the Secondly, this error is an insult to the Holy Ghost, brightness of the “power of the Most High,” could not be whose “shrine” was the virginal womb∗, wherein He had gazed on by Joseph, until she gave birth. But afterwards formed the flesh of Christ: wherefore it was unbecoming she is acknowledged by Joseph, by looking on her face, that it should be desecrated by intercourse with man. not by lustful contact. Thirdly, this is derogatory to the dignity and holiness Jerome, however, grants that this is to be understood of of God’s Mother: for thus she would seem to be most un- knowledge by intercourse; but he observes that “before” grateful, were she not content with such a Son; and were or “until” has a twofold sense in Scripture. For some- ∗ “Sacrarium Spiritus Sancti” (Office of B. M. V., Ant. ad Benedictus, T. P.) † Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. 1: among the spurious works ascribed to Chrysostom 2235 times it indicates a fixed time, as Gal. 3:19: The law “was Reply to Objection 5. Some, as Jerome says on Mat. set because of transgressions, until the seed should come, 12:49,50, “suppose that the brethren of the Lord were to whom He made the promise.” On the other hand, it Joseph’s sons by another wife. But we understand the sometimes indicates an indefinite time, as in Ps. 122:2: brethren of the Lord to be not sons of Joseph, but cousins “Our eyes are unto the Lord our God, until He have mercy of the Saviour, the sons of Mary, His Mother’s sister.” on us”; from which it is not to be gathered that our eyes For “Scripture speaks of brethren in four senses; namely, are turned from God as soon as His mercy has been ob- those who are united by being of the same parents, of tained. In this sense those things are indicated “of which the same nation, of the same family, by common affec- we might doubt if they had not been written down: while tion.” Wherefore the brethren of the Lord are so called, others are left out to be supplied by our understanding. not by birth, as being born of the same mother; but by re- Thus the evangelist says that the Mother of God was not lationship, as being blood-relations of His. But Joseph, as known by her husband until she gave birth, that we may Jerome says (Contra Helvid. ix), is rather to be believed to be given to understand that still less did he know her af- have remained a virgin, “since he is not said to have had terwards” (Adversus Helvid. v). another wife,” and “a holy man does not live otherwise Reply to Objection 4. The Scriptures are wont to des- than chastely.” ignate as the first-born, not only a child who is followed Reply to Objection 6. Mary who is called “the by others, but also the one that is born first. “Otherwise, if mother of James and Joseph” is not to be taken for the a child were not first-born unless followed by others, the Mother of our Lord, who is not wont to be named in the first-fruits would not be due as long as there was no fur- Gospels save under this designation of her dignity—“the ther produce”∗: which is clearly false, since according to Mother of Jesus.” This Mary is to be taken for the wife the law the first-fruits had to be redeemed within a month of Alphaeus, whose son was James the less, known as the (Num. 18:16). “brother of the Lord” (Gal. 1:19). Whether the Mother of God took a vow of virginity? IIIa q. 28 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the Mother of God a. 6, works of perfection are more praiseworthy when per- did not take a vow of virginity. For it is written (Dt. 7:14): formed in fulfilment of a vow. Now it is clear that for “No one shall be barren among you of either sex.” But reasons already given (Aa. 1,2,3) virginity had a special sterility is a consequence of virginity. Therefore the keep- place in the Mother of God. It was therefore fitting that ing of virginity was contrary to the commandment of the her virginity should be consecrated to God by vow. Nev- Old Law. But before Christ was born the old law was still ertheless because, while the Law was in force both men in force. Therefore at that time the Blessed Virgin could and women were bound to attend to the duty of begetting, not lawfully take a vow of virginity. since the worship of God was spread according to carnal Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:25): origin, until Christ was born of that people; the Mother “Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord; of God is not believed to have taken an absolute vow of but I give counsel.” But the perfection of the counsels virginity, before being espoused to Joseph, although she was to take its beginning from Christ, who is the “end of desired to do so, yet yielding her own will to God’s judg- the Law,” as the Apostle says (Rom. 10:4). It was not ment. Afterwards, however, having taken a husband, ac- therefore becoming that the Virgin should take a vow of cording as the custom of the time required, together with virginity. him she took a vow of virginity. Objection 3. Further, the gloss of Jerome says on 1 Reply to Objection 1. Because it seemed to be for- Tim. 5:12, that “for those who are vowed to virginity, it bidden by the law not to take the necessary steps for leav- is reprehensible not only to marry, but also to desire to be ing a posterity on earth, therefore the Mother of God did married.” But the Mother of Christ committed no sin for not vow virginity absolutely, but under the condition that which she could be reprehended, as stated above (q. 27, it were pleasing to God. When, however, she knew that it a. 4). Since therefore she was “espoused,” as related by was acceptable to God, she made the vow absolute, before Lk. 1:27 it seems that she did not take a vow of virginity. the angel’s Annunciation. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Sanct. Virg. iv): Reply to Objection 2. Just as the fulness of grace “Mary answered the announcing angel: ‘How shall this be was in Christ perfectly, yet some beginning of the ful- done, because I know not man?’ She would not have said ness preceded in His Mother; so also the observance of this unless she had already vowed her virginity to God.” the counsels, which is an effect of God’s grace, began its I answer that, As we have stated in the IIa IIae, q. 88, perfection in Christ, but was begun after a fashion in His ∗ Jerome, Adversus Helvid. x 2236 Virgin Mother. to Joseph. After her espousals, however, by their com- Reply to Objection 3. These words of the Apostle are mon consent she took a vow of virginity together with her to be understood of those who vow chastity absolutely. spouse. Christ’s Mother did not do this until she was espoused 2237 THIRD PART, QUESTION 29 Of the Espousals of the Mother of God (In Two Articles) We now consider the espousals of God’s Mother: concerning which two points arise for inquiry: (1) Whether Christ should have been born of an espoused virgin? (2) Whether there was true marriage between our Lord’s Mother and Joseph? Whether Christ should have been born of an espoused virgin? IIIa q. 29 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ should not I answer that, It was fitting that Christ should be born have been born of an espoused virgin. For espousals of an espoused virgin; first, for His own sake; secondly, are ordered to carnal intercourse. But our Lord’s Mother for His Mother’s sake; thirdly, for our sake. For the sake never wished to have carnal intercourse with her husband; of Christ Himself, for four reasons. First, lest He should because this would be derogatory to the virginity of her be rejected by unbelievers as illegitimate: wherefore Am- mind. Therefore she should not have been espoused. brose says on Lk. 1:26,27: “How could we blame Herod Objection 2. Further, that Christ was born of a vir- or the Jews if they seem to persecute one who was born of gin was miraculous, whence Augustine says (Ep. ad Vo- adultery?” lus. cxxxvii): “This same power of God brought forth Secondly, in order that in the customary way His ge- the infant’s limbs out of the virginal womb of His invio- nealogy might be traced through the male line. Thus Am- late Mother, by which in the vigor of manhood He passed brose says on Lk. 3:23: “He Who came into the world, through the closed doors. If we are told why this hap- according to the custom of the world had to be enrolled pened, it will cease to be wonderful; if another instance Now for this purpose, it is the men that are required, be- be alleged, it will no longer be unique.” But miracles that cause they represent the family in the senate and other are wrought in confirmation of the Faith should be mani- courts. The custom of the Scriptures, too, shows that the fest. Since, therefore, by her Espousals this miracle would ancestry of the men is always traced out.” be less evident, it seems that it was unfitting that Christ Thirdly, for the safety of the new-born Child: lest the should be born of an espoused virgin. devil should plot serious hurt against Him. Hence Ignatius Objection 3. Further, the martyr Ignatius, as Jerome says that she was espoused “that the manner of His Birth says on Mat. 1:18, gives as a reason of the espousals of might be hidden from the devil.” the Mother of God, “that the manner of His Birth might Fourthly, that He might be fostered by Joseph: who is be hidden from the devil, who would think Him to be be- therefore called His “father,” as bread-winner. gotten not of a virgin but of a wife.” But this seems to be It was also fitting for the sake of the Virgin. First, no reason at all. First, because by his natural cunning he because thus she was rendered exempt from punishment; knows whatever takes place in bodies. Secondly, because that is, “lest she should be stoned by the Jews as an adul- later on the demons, through many evident signs, knew teress,” as Jerome says. Christ after a fashion: whence it is written (Mk. 1:23,24): Secondly, that thus she might be safeguarded from ill “A man with an unclean spirit. . . cried out, saying: What fame. Whence Ambrose says on Lk. 1:26,27: “She was have we to do with Thee, Jesus of Nazareth? Art Thou espoused lest she be wounded by the ill-fame of violated come to destroy us? I know. . . Thou art the Holy one of virginity, in whom the pregnant womb would betoken cor- God.” Therefore it does not seem fitting that the Mother ruption.” of God should have been espoused. Thirdly, that, as Jerome says, Joseph might administer Objection 4. Further, Jerome gives as another reason, to her wants. “lest the Mother of God should be stoned by the Jews as This was fitting, again, for our sake. First, because an adulteress.” But this reason seems to have no weight, Joseph is thus a witness to Christ’s being born of a vir- for if she were not espoused, she could not be condemned gin. Wherefore Ambrose says: “Her husband is the more for adultery. Therefore it does not seem reasonable that trustworthy witness of her purity, in that he would deplore Christ should be born of an espoused virgin. the dishonor, and avenge the disgrace, were it not that he On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 1:18): “When acknowledged the mystery.” as His Mother Mary was espoused to Joseph”: and (Lk. Secondly, because thereby the very words of the Vir- 1:26,27): “The angel Gabriel was sent. . . to a virgin es- gin are rendered more credible by which she asserted her poused to a man whose name was Joseph.” virginity. Thus Ambrose says: “Belief in Mary’s words 2238 is strengthened, the motive for a lie is removed. If she Thus it may be that by his natural power the devil could had not been espoused when pregnant, she would seem to know that the Mother of God knew not man, but was a have wished to hide her sin by a lie: being espoused, she virgin; yet was prevented by God from knowing the man- had no motive for lying, since a woman’s pregnancy is the ner of the Divine Birth. That afterwards the devil after a reward of marriage and gives grace to the nuptial bond.” fashion knew that He was the Son of God, makes no diffi- These two reasons add strength to our faith. culty: because then the time had already come for Christ Thirdly, that all excuse be removed from those virgins to make known His power against the devil, and to suf- who, through want of caution, fall into dishonor. Hence fer persecution aroused by him. But during His infancy Ambrose says: “It was not becoming that virgins should it behooved the malice of the devil to be withheld, lest expose themselves to evil report, and cover themselves he should persecute Him too severely: for Christ did not with the excuse that the Mother of the Lord had also been wish to suffer such things then, nor to make His power oppressed by ill-fame.” known, but to show Himself to be in all things like other Fourthly, because by this the universal Church is typ- infants. Hence Pope Leo (Serm. in Epiph. iv) says that ified, which is a virgin and yet is espoused to one Man, “the Magi found the Child Jesus small in body, dependent Christ, as Augustine says (De Sanct. Virg. xii). on others, unable to speak, and in no way differing from A fifth reason may be added: since the Mother of the the generality of human infants.” Ambrose, however, ex- Lord being both espoused and a virgin, both virginity and pounding Lk. 1:26, seems to understand this of the devil’s wedlock are honored in her person, in contradiction to members. For, after giving the above reason—namely, those heretics who disparaged one or the other. that the prince of the world might be deceived—he con- Reply to Objection 1. We must believe that the tinues thus: “Yet still more did He deceive the princes of Blessed Virgin, Mother of God, desired, from an intimate the world, since the evil disposition of the demons easily inspiration of the Holy Ghost, to be espoused, being con- discovers even hidden things: but those who spend their fident that by the help of God she would never come to lives in worldly vanities can have no acquaintance of Di- have carnal intercourse: yet she left this to God’s discre- vine things.” tion. Wherefore she suffered nothing in detriment to her Reply to Objection 4. The sentence of adulteresses virginity. according to the Law was that they should be stoned, not Reply to Objection 2. As Ambrose says on Lk. 1:26: only if they were already espoused or married, but also “Our Lord preferred that men should doubt of His origin if their maidenhood were still under the protection of the rather than of His Mother’s purity. For he knew the del- paternal roof, until the day when they enter the married icacy of virgin modesty, and how easily the fair name of state. Thus it is written (Dt. 22:20,21): “If. . . virginity be chastity is disparaged: nor did He choose that our faith not found in the damsel. . . the men of the city shall stone in His Birth should be strengthened in detriment to His her to death, and she shall die; because she hath done a Mother.” We must observe, however, that some miracles wicked thing in Israel, to play the whore in her father’s wrought by God are the direct object of faith; such are house.” the miracles of the virginal Birth, the Resurrection of our It may also be said, according to some writers, that Lord, and the Sacrament of the Altar. Wherefore our Lord the Blessed Virgin was of the family or kindred of Aaron, wished these to be more hidden, that belief in them might so that she was related to Elizabeth, as we are told (Lk. have greater merit. Whereas other miracles are for the 1:36). Now a virgin of the priestly tribe was condemned strengthening of faith: and these it behooves to be mani- to death for whoredom; for we read (Lev. 21:9): “If the fest. daughter of a priest be taken in whoredom, and dishonor Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Trin. the name of her father, she shall be burnt with fire.” iii), the devil can do many things by his natural power Lastly, some understand the passage of Jerome to refer which he is hindered by the Divine power from doing. to the throwing of stones by ill-fame. Whether there was a true marriage between Mary and Joseph? IIIa q. 29 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that there was no true Joseph the husband of Mary,” Jerome says: “When thou marriage between Mary and Joseph. For Jerome says readest ‘husband’ suspect not a marriage; but remember against Helvidius that Joseph “was Mary’s guardian rather that Scripture is wont to speak of those who are betrothed than her husband.” But if this was a true marriage, Joseph as husband and wife.” But a true marriage is not effected was truly her husband. Therefore there was no true mar- by the betrothal, but by the wedding. Therefore, there was riage between Mary and Joseph. no true marriage between the Blessed Virgin and Joseph. Objection 2. Further, on Mat. 1:16: “Jacob begot Objection 3. Further, it is written (Mat. 1:19): 2239 “Joseph, her husband, being a just man, and not willing by which children are begotten; thus this marriage was not to take her away∗, i.e. to take her to his home in order to consummated. Wherefore Ambrose says on Lk. 1:26,27: cohabit with her, was minded to put her away privately, “Be not surprised that Scripture calls Mary a wife. The i.e. to postpone the wedding,” as Remigius† expounds. fact of her marriage is declared, not to insinuate the loss Therefore, it seems that, as the wedding was not yet sol- of virginity, but to witness to the reality of the union.” emnized, there was no true marriage: especially since, af- Nevertheless, this marriage had the second perfection, as ter the marriage contract, no one can lawfully put his wife to upbringing of the child. Thus Augustine says (De Nup. away. et Concup. i): “All the nuptial blessings are fulfilled in On the contrary, Augustine says (De Consensu the marriage of Christ’s parents, offspring, faith and sacra- Evang. ii): “It cannot be allowed that the evangelist ment. The offspring we know to have been the Lord Jesus; thought that Joseph ought to sever his union with Mary” faith, for there was no adultery: sacrament, since there (since he said that Joseph was Mary’s husband) “on the was no divorce. Carnal intercourse alone there was none.” ground that in giving birth to Christ, she had not conceived Reply to Objection 1. Jerome uses the term “hus- of him, but remained a virgin. For by this example the band” in reference to marriage consummated. faithful are taught that if after marriage they remain con- Reply to Objection 2. By marriage Jerome means the tinent by mutual consent, their union is still and is rightly nuptial intercourse. called marriage, even without intercourse of the sexes.” Reply to Objection 3. As Chrysostom says (Hom. I answer that, Marriage or wedlock is said to be true i super Matth.∗) the Blessed Virgin was so espoused by reason of its attaining its perfection. Now perfection to Joseph that she dwelt in his home: “for just as she of anything is twofold; first, and second. The first per- who conceives in her husband’s house is understood to fection of a thing consists in its very form, from which it have conceived of him, so she who conceives elsewhere receives its species; while the second perfection of a thing is suspect.” Consequently sufficient precaution would not consists in its operation, by which in some way a thing have been taken to safeguard the fair fame of the Blessed attains its end. Now the form of matrimony consists in a Virgin, if she had not the entry of her husband’s house. certain inseparable union of souls, by which husband and Wherefore the words, “not willing to take her away” are wife are pledged by a bond of mutual affection that cannot better rendered as meaning, “not willing publicly to ex- be sundered. And the end of matrimony is the begetting pose her,” than understood of taking her to his house. and upbringing of children: the first of which is attained Hence the evangelist adds that “he was minded to put by conjugal intercourse; the second by the other duties her away privately.” But although she had the entry of of husband and wife, by which they help one another in Joseph’s house by reason of her first promise of espousals, rearing their offspring. yet the time had not yet come for the solemnizing of the Thus we may say, as to the first perfection, that the wedding; for which reason they had not yet consummated marriage of the Virgin Mother of God and Joseph was ab- the marriage. Therefore, as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv solutely true: because both consented to the nuptial bond, in Matth.): “The evangelist does not say, ‘before she was but not expressly to the bond of the flesh, save on the con- taken to the house of her husband,’ because she was al- dition that it was pleasing to God. For this reason the ready in the house. For it was the custom among the an- angel calls Mary the wife of Joseph, saying to him (Mat. cients for espoused maidens to enter frequently the houses 1:20): “Fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife”: on of them to whom they were betrothed.” Therefore the an- which words Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i): gel also said to Joseph: “Fear not to take unto thee Mary “She is called his wife from the first promise of her es- thy wife”; that is: “Fear not to solemnize your marriage pousals, whom he had not known nor ever was to know with her.” Others, however, say that she was not yet ad- by carnal intercourse.” mitted to his house, but only betrothed to him. But the But as to the second perfection which is attained by first is more in keeping with the Gospel narrative. the marriage act, if this be referred to carnal intercourse, ∗ Douay: ‘publicly to expose her’ † Cf. Catena Aurea in Matth. ∗ Opus Imperfectum among the supposititious works ascribed to St. Chrysostom 2240 THIRD PART, QUESTION 30 Of the Annunciation of the Blessed Virgin (In Four Articles) We now have to consider the Blessed Virgin’s Annunciation, concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether it was befitting that announcement should be made to her of that which was to be begotten of her? (2) By whom should this announcement be made? (3) In what manner should this announcement be made? (4) Of the order observed in the Annunciation. Whether it was necessary to announce to the Blessed Virgin that which was to be done IIIa q. 30 a. 1 in her? Objection 1. It would seem that it was unnecessary Christ. First, in order to maintain a becoming order in the to announce to the Blessed Virgin that which was to be union of the Son of God with the Virgin—namely, that she done in her. For there seems to have been no need of the should be informed in mind concerning Him, before con- Annunciation except for the purpose of receiving the Vir- ceiving Him in the flesh. Thus Augustine says (De Sancta gin’s consent. But her consent seems to have been unnec- Virgin. iii): “Mary is more blessed in receiving the faith essary: because the Virginal Conception was foretold by a of Christ, than in conceiving the flesh of Christ”; and fur- prophecy of “predestination,” which is “fulfilled without ther on he adds: “Her nearness as a Mother would have our consent,” as a gloss says on Mat. 1:22. There was no been of no profit to Mary, had she not borne Christ in her need, therefore, for this Annunciation. heart after a more blessed manner than in her flesh.” Objection 2. Further, the Blessed Virgin believed in Secondly, that she might be a more certain witness of the Incarnation, for to disbelieve therein excludes man this mystery, being instructed therein by God. from the way of salvation; because, as the Apostle says Thirdly, that she might offer to God the free gift of her (Rom. 3:22): “The justice of God (is) by faith of Jesus obedience: which she proved herself right ready to do, Christ.” But one needs no further instruction concerning saying: “Behold the handmaid of the Lord.” what one believes without doubt. Therefore the Blessed Fourthly, in order to show that there is a certain spiri- Virgin had no need for the Incarnation of her Son to be tual wedlock between the Son of God and human nature. announced to her. Wherefore in the Annunciation the Virgin’s consent was Objection 3. Further, just as the Blessed Virgin con- besought in lieu of that of the entire human nature. ceived Christ in her body, so every pious soul conceives Reply to Objection 1. The prophecy of predestination Him spiritually. Thus the Apostle says (Gal. 4:19): “My is fulfilled without the causality of our will; not without its little children, of whom I am in labor again, until Christ be consent. formed in you.” But to those who conceive Him spiritu- Reply to Objection 2. The Blessed Virgin did in- ally no announcement is made of this conception. There- deed believe explicitly in the future Incarnation; but, be- fore neither should it have been announced to the Blessed ing humble, she did not think such high things of herself. Virgin that she was to conceive the Son of God in her Consequently she required instruction in this matter. womb. Reply to Objection 3. The spiritual conception of On the contrary, It is related (Lk. 1:31) that the an- Christ through faith is preceded by the preaching of the gel said to her: “Behold, thou shalt conceive in thy womb, faith, for as much as “faith is by hearing” (Rom. 10:17). and shalt bring forth a son.” Yet man does not know for certain thereby that he has I answer that, It was reasonable that it should be an- grace; but he does know that the faith, which he has re- nounced to the Blessed Virgin that she was to conceive ceived, is true. 2241 Whether the annunciation should have been made by an angel to the Blessed Virgin? IIIa q. 30 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the Annunciation parted to us through them. Thus, then, the most god-like should not have been made by an angel to our Blessed Gabriel made known to Zachary that a prophet son would Lady. For revelations to the highest angels are made im- be born to him; and, to Mary, how the Divine mystery of mediately by God, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). the ineffable conception of God would be realized in her.” But the Mother of God is exalted above all the angels. Secondly, this was becoming to the restoration of hu- Therefore it seems that the mystery of the Incarnation man nature which was to be effected by Christ. Wherefore should have been announced to her by God immediately, Bede says in a homily (in Annunt.): “It was an apt begin- and not by an angel. ning of man’s restoration that an angel should be sent by Objection 2. Further, if in this matter it behooved the God to the Virgin who was to be hallowed by the Divine common order to be observed, by which Divine things Birth: since the first cause of man’s ruin was through the are announced to men by angels; in like manner Divine serpent being sent by the devil to cajole the woman by the things are announced to a woman by a man: wherefore spirit of pride.” the Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:34,35): “Let women keep si- Thirdly, because this was becoming to the virginity of lence in the churches. . . but if they would learn anything, the Mother of God. Wherefore Jerome says in a sermon let them ask their husbands at home.” Therefore it seems on the Assumption†: “It is well that an angel be sent to the that the mystery of the Incarnation should have been an- Virgin; because virginity is ever akin to the angelic nature. nounced to the Blessed Virgin by some man: especially Surely to live in the flesh and not according to the flesh is seeing that Joseph, her husband, was instructed thereupon not an earthly but a heavenly life.” by an angel, as is related (Mat. 1:20,21) Reply to Objection 1. The Mother of God was above Objection 3. Further, none can becomingly announce the angels as regards the dignity to which she was chosen what he knows not. But the highest angels did not fully by God. But as regards the present state of life, she was know the mystery of the Incarnation: wherefore Diony- beneath the angels. For even Christ Himself, by reason of sius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the question, “Who is this His passible life, “was made a little lower than the angels,” that cometh from Edom?” (Is. 63:1) is to be understood as according to Heb. 2:9. But because Christ was both way- made by them. Therefore it seems that the announcement farer and comprehensor, He did not need to be instructed of the Incarnation could not be made becomingly by any by angels, as regards knowledge of Divine things. The angel. Mother of God, however, was not yet in the state of com- Objection 4. Further, greater things should be an- prehension: and therefore she had to be instructed by an- nounced by messengers of greater dignity. But the mys- gels concerning the Divine Conception. tery of the Incarnation is the greatest of all things an- Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says in a ser- nounced by angels to men. It seems, therefore, if it mon on the Assumption (De Assump. B.V.M.‡) a true behooved to be announced by an angel at all, that this estimation of the Blessed Virgin excludes her from cer- should have been done by an angel of the highest order. tain general rules. For “neither did she ‘multiply her con- But Gabriel is not of the highest order, but of the or- ceptions’ nor was she ‘under man’s, i.e. her husband’s,’ der of archangels, which is the last but one: wherefore power (Gn. 3:16), who in her spotless womb conceived the Church sings: “We know that the archangel Gabriel Christ of the Holy Ghost.” Therefore it was fitting that brought thee a message from God”∗. Therefore this an- she should be informed of the mystery of the Incarnation nouncement was not becomingly made by the archangel by means not of a man, but of an angel. For this reason it Gabriel. was made known to her before Joseph: since the message On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 1:26): “The angel was brought to her before she conceived, but to Joseph Gabriel was sent by God,” etc. after she had conceived. I answer that, It was fitting for the mystery of the In- Reply to Objection 3. As may be gathered from carnation to be announced to the Mother of God by an the passage quoted from Dionysius, the angels were ac- angel, for three reasons. First, that in this also might be quainted with the mystery of the Incarnation: and yet they maintained the order established by God, by which Divine put this question, being desirous that Christ should give things are brought to men by means of the angels. Where- them more perfect knowledge of the details of this mys- fore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that “the angels were tery, which are incomprehensible to any created intellect. the first to be taught the Divine mystery of the loving kind- Thus Maximus§ says that “there can be no question that ness of Jesus: afterwards the grace of knowledge was im- the angels knew that the Incarnation was to take place. But ∗ Feast of Purification B.V.M. ix Resp. Brev. O.P. † Ascribed to St. Jerome but not his work ‡ Work of another author: among the works of St. Augustine § Maximus of Constantinople 2242 it was not given to them to trace the manner of our Lord’s archangel. Thus the Church calls him an archangel, and conception, nor how it was that He remained whole in the Gregory himself in a homily (De Centum Ovibus 34) says Father, whole throughout the universe, and was whole in that “those are called archangels who announce sublime the narrow abode of the Virgin.” things.” It is therefore sufficiently credible that he was Reply to Objection 4. Some say that Gabriel was of the highest of the archangels. And, as Gregory says (De the highest order; because Gregory says (Hom. de Cen- Centum Ovibus 34), this name agrees with his office: for tum Ovibus∗): “It was right that one of the highest an- “Gabriel means ‘Power of God.’ This message therefore gels should come, since his message was most sublime.” was fittingly brought by the ‘Power of God,’ because the But this does nat imply that he was of the highest or- Lord of hosts and mighty in battle was coming to over- der of all, but in regard to the angels: since he was an come the powers of the air.” Whether the angel of annunciation should have appeared to the Virgin in a bodily IIIa q. 30 a. 3 vision? Objection 1. It would seem that the angel of the An- order to make this known, an invisible creature should as- nunciation should not have appeared to the Virgin in a sume a form in which to appear visibly: forasmuch as all bodily vision. For “intellectual vision is more excellent the apparitions of the Old Testament are ordered to that than bodily vision,” as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii), apparition in which the Son of God appeared in the flesh. and especially more becoming to an angel: since by intel- Secondly, it was fitting as regards the dignity of the lectual vision an angel is seen in his substance; whereas Mother of God, who was to receive the Son of God not in a bodily vision he is seen in the bodily shape which only in her mind, but in her bodily womb. Therefore it he assumes. Now since it behooved a sublime messenger behooved not only her mind, but also her bodily senses to to come to announce the Divine Conception, so, seem- be refreshed by the angelic vision. ingly, he should have appeared in the most excellent kind Thirdly, it is in keeping with the certainty of that which of vision. Therefore it seems that the angel of the Annun- was announced. For we apprehend with greater certainty ciation appeared to the Virgin in an intellectual vision. that which is before our eyes, than what is in our imagi- Objection 2. Further, imaginary vision also seems to nation. Thus Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth.) that excel bodily vision: just as the imagination is a higher the angel “came to the Virgin not in her sleep, but visibly. power than the senses. But “the angel. . . appeared to For since she was receiving from the angel a message ex- Joseph in his sleep” (Mat. 1:20), which was clearly an ceeding great, before such an event she needed a vision of imaginary vision. Therefore it seems that he should have great solemnity.” appeared to the Blessed Virgin also in an imaginary vi- Reply to Objection 1. Intellectual vision excels sion. merely imaginary and merely bodily vision. But Augus- Objection 3. Further, the bodily vision of a spiritual tine himself says (De Annunt. iii) that prophecy is more substance stupefies the beholder; thus we sing of the Vir- excellent if accompanied by intellectual and imaginary vi- gin herself: “And the Virgin seeing the light was filled sion, than if accompanied by only one of them. Now the with fear”†. But it was better that her mind should be Blessed Virgin perceived not only the bodily vision, but preserved from being thus troubled. Therefore it was not also the intellectual illumination. Wherefore this was a fitting that this announcement should be made in a bodily more excellent vision. Yet it would have been more ex- vision. cellent if she had perceived the angel himself in his sub- On the contrary, Augustine in a sermon (De Annunt. stance by her intellectual vision. But it was incompatible iii) pictures the Blessed Virgin as speaking thus: “To me with her state of wayfarer that she should see an angel in came the archangel Gabriel with glowing countenance, his essence. gleaming robe, and wondrous step.” But these cannot per- Reply to Objection 2. The imagination is indeed a tain to other than bodily vision. Therefore the angel of the higher power than the exterior sense: but because the Annunciation appeared in a bodily vision to the Blessed senses are the principle of human knowledge, the great- Virgin. est certainty is in them, for the principles of knowledge I answer that, The angel of the Annunciation ap- must needs always be most certain. Consequently Joseph, peared in a bodily vision to the Blessed Virgin. And this to whom the angel appeared in his sleep, did not have so indeed was fitting, first in regard to that which was an- excellent a vision as the Blessed Virgin. nounced. For the angel came to announce the Incarnation Reply to Objection 3. As Ambrose says on Lk. 1:11: of the invisible God. Wherefore it was becoming that, in “We are disturbed, and lose our presence of mind, when ∗ 34 in Evang. † Feast of Annunciation, B.V.M. ii Resp. Brev. O.P. 2243 we are confronted by the presence of a superior power.” they were disturbed, he said: “Fear not.” For this reason, And this happens not only in bodily, but also in imaginary as we read in the life of Anthony, “it is difficult to discern vision. Wherefore it is written (Gn. 15:12) that “when good from evil spirits. For if joy succeed fear, we should the sun was setting, a deep sleep fell upon Abram, and a know that the help is from the Lord: because security of great and darksome horror seized upon him.” But by be- soul is a sign of present majesty. But if the fear with which ing thus disturbed man is not harmed to such an extent that we are stricken persevere, it is an enemy that we see.” therefore he ought to forego the vision of an angel. First Moreover it was becoming to virginal modesty that the because from the very fact that man is raised above him- Virgin should be troubled. Because, as Ambrose says on self, in which matter his dignity is concerned, his inferior Lk. 1:20: “It is the part of a virgin to be timid, to fear the powers are weakened; and from this results the aforesaid advances of men, and to shrink from men’s addresses.” disturbance: thus, also, when the natural heat is drawn But others says that as the Blessed Virgin was accus- within a body, the exterior parts tremble. Secondly, be- tomed to angelic visions, she was not troubled at seeing cause, as Origen says (Hom. iv in Luc.): “The angel who this angel, but with wonder at hearing what the angel said appeared, knowing hers was a human nature, first sought to her, for she did not think so highly of herself. Where- to remedy the disturbance of mind to which a man is sub- fore the evangelist does not say that she was troubled at ject.” Wherefore both to Zachary and to Mary, as soon as seeing the angel, but “at his saying.” Whether the Annunciation took place in becoming order? IIIa q. 30 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the Annunciation did dressed to anyone else, she, who had knowledge of the not take place in becoming order. For the dignity of the Law, would never have been astonished at the seeming Mother of God results from the child she conceived. But strangeness of the salutation.” In which salutation he be- the cause should be made known before the effect. There- gan by asserting her worthiness of the conception, by say- fore the angel should have announced to the Virgin the ing, “Full of grace”; then he announced the conception conception of her child before acknowledging her dignity in the words, “The Lord is with thee”; and then foretold in greeting her. the honor which would result to her therefrom, by saying, Objection 2. Further, proof should be omitted in “Blessed art thou among women.” things which admit of no doubt; and premised where Secondly, he purposed to instruct her about the mys- doubt is possible. But the angel seems first to have an- tery of the Incarnation, which was to be fulfilled in her. nounced what the virgin might doubt, and which, because This he did by foretelling the conception and birth, saying: of her doubt, would make her ask: “How shall this be “Behold, thou shalt conceive in thy womb,” etc.; and by done?” and afterwards to have given the proof, alleg- declaring the dignity of the child conceived, saying: “He ing both the instance of Elizabeth and the omnipotence of shall be great”; and further, by making known the mode God. Therefore the Annunciation was made by the angel of conception, when he said: “The Holy Ghost shall come in unbecoming order. upon thee.” Objection 3. Further, the greater cannot be adequately Thirdly, he purposed to lead her mind to consent. This proved by the less. But it was a greater wonder for a virgin he did by the instance of Elizabeth, and by the argument than for an old woman to be with child. Therefore the an- from Divine omnipotence. gel’s proof was insufficient to demonstrate the conception Reply to Objection 1. To a humble mind nothing is of a virgin from that of an old woman. more astonishing than to hear its own excellence. Now, On the contrary, it is written (Rom. 13:1): “Those wonder is most effective in drawing the mind’s attention. that are of God, are well ordered [Vulg.: ‘Those that are, Therefore the angel, desirous of drawing the Virgin’s at- are ordained of God’].” Now the angel was “sent by God” tention to the hearing of so great a mystery, began by to announce unto the Virgin, as is related Lk. 1:26. There- praising her. fore the Annunciation was made by the angel in the most Reply to Objection 2. Ambrose says explicitly on perfect order. Lk. 1:34, that the Blessed Virgin did not doubt the angel’s I answer that, The Annunciation was made by the an- words. For he says: “Mary’s answer is more temperate gel in a becoming manner. For the angel had a threefold than the words of the priest. She says: How shall this be? purpose in regard to the Virgin. First, to draw her atten- He replies: Whereby shall I know this? He denies that he tion to the consideration of a matter of such moment. This believes, since he denies that he knows this. She does not he did by greeting her by a new and unwonted salutation. doubt fulfilment when she asks how it shall be done.” Wherefore Origen says, commenting on Luke (Hom. vi), Augustine, however, seems to assert that she doubted. that if “she had known that similar words had been ad- For he says (De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. li): “To Mary, 2244 in doubt about the conception, the angel declares the pos-children, that the virginal birth might be credible.” sibility thereof.” But such a doubt is one of wonder rather The conception of the sterile Elizabeth is therefore ad- than of unbelief. And so the angel adduces a proof, not as duced, not as a sufficient argument, but as a kind of figu- a cure for unbelief, but in order to remove her astonish- rative example.: consequently in support of this instance, ment. the convincing argument is added taken from the Divine Reply to Objection 3. As Ambrose says (Hexae- omnipotence. meron v): “For this reason had many barren women borne 2245 THIRD PART, QUESTION 31 Of the Matter From Which the Saviour’s Body Was Conceived (In Eight Articles) We have now to consider the Saviour’s conception. First, as to the matter from which His body was conceived; secondly, as to the author of His conception; thirdly, as to the manner and order of His conception. Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the flesh of Christ was derived from Adam? (2) Whether it was derived from David? (3) Of the genealogy of Christ which is given in the Gospels; (4) Whether it was fitting for Christ to be born of a woman? (5) Whether His body was formed from the purest blood of the Virgin? (6) Whether the flesh of Christ was in the patriarchs as to something signate? (7) Whether the flesh of Christ in the patriarchs was subject to sin? (8) Whether Christ paid tithes in the loins of Abraham? Whether the flesh of Christ was derived from Adam? IIIa q. 31 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s flesh was not origin whereby it was descended from Adam. Therefore derived from Adam. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:47): it was becoming that He should assume flesh of matter de- “The first man was of the earth, earthly: the second man, rived from Adam, that the nature itself might be healed by from heaven, heavenly.” Now, the first man is Adam: and the assumption. the second man is Christ. Therefore Christ is not derived Reply to Objection 1. The second man, i.e. Christ, from Adam, but has an origin distinct from him. is said to be of heaven, not indeed as to the matter from Objection 2. Further, the conception of Christ should which His body was formed, but either as to the virtue have been most miraculous. But it is a greater miracle to whereby it was formed; or even as to His very Godhead. form man’s body from the slime of the earth, than from But as to matter, Christ’s body was earthly, as Adam’s human matter derived from Adam. It seems therefore un- body was. fitting that Christ should take flesh from Adam. Therefore Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 29, a. 1, ad the body of Christ should not have been formed from the 2) the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation is miraculous, not mass of the human race derived from Adam, but of some as ordained to strengthen faith, but as an article of faith. other matter. And therefore in the mystery of the Incarnation we do not Objection 3. Further, by “one man sin entered into seek that which is most miraculous, as in those miracles this world,” i.e. by Adam, because in him all nations that are wrought for the confirmation of faith’ but what sinned originally, as is clear from Rom. 5:12. But if is most becoming to Divine wisdom, and most expedient Christ’s body was derived from Adam, He would have to the salvation of man, since this is what we seek in all been in Adam originally when he sinned: therefore he matters of faith. would have contracted original sin; which is unbecom- It may also be said that in the mystery of the Incarna- ing in His purity. Therefore the body of Christ was not tion the miracle is not only in reference to the matter of formed of matter derived from Adam. the conception, but rather in respect of the manner of the On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 2:16): conception and birth; inasmuch as a virgin conceived and “Nowhere doth He”—that is, the Son of God—“take hold gave birth to God. of the angels: but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold.” Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 15, a. 1, But the seed of Abraham was derived from Adam. There- ad 2), Christ’s body was in Adam in respect of a bod- fore Christ’s body was formed of matter derived from ily substance—that is to say, that the corporeal matter of Adam. Christ’s body was derived from Adam: but it was not there I answer that, Christ assumed human nature in order by reason of seminal virtue, because it was not conceived to cleanse it of corruption. But human nature did not need from the seed of man. Thus it did not contract original sin, to be cleansed save in as far as it was soiled in its tainted as others who are descended from Adam by man’s seed. 2246 Whether Christ took flesh of the seed of David? IIIa q. 31 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ did not take Gentiles. flesh of the seed of David. For Matthew, in tracing the Reply to Objection 1. Faustus the Manichean ar- genealogy of Christ, brings it down to Joseph. But Joseph gued thus, in the desire to prove that Christ is not the was not Christ’s father, as shown above (q. 28, a. 1, ad Son of David, because He was not conceived of Joseph, 1,2). Therefore it seems that Christ was not descended in whom Matthew’s genealogy terminates. Augustine an- from David. swered this argument thus (Contra Faust. xxii): “Since the Objection 2. Further, Aaron was of the tribe of Levi, same evangelist affirms that Joseph was Mary’s husband as related Ex. 6. Now Mary the Mother of Christ is called and that Christ’s mother was a virgin, and that Christ was the cousin of Elizabeth, who was a daughter of Aaron, as of the seed of Abraham, what must we believe, but that is clear from Lk. 1:5,36. Therefore, since David was of Mary was not a stranger to the family of David: and that the tribe of Juda, as is shown Mat. 1, it seems that Christ it is not without reason that she was called the wife of was not descended from David. Joseph, by reason of the close alliance of their hearts, al- Objection 3. Further, it is written of Jechonias (Jer. though not mingled in the flesh; and that the genealogy is 22:30): “Write this man barren. . . for there shall not be a traced down to Joseph rather than to her by reason of the man of his seed that shall sit upon the throne of David.” dignity of the husband? So therefore we believe that Mary Whereas of Christ it is written (Is. 9:7): “He shall sit upon was also of the family of David: because we believe the the throne of David.” Therefore Christ was not of the seed Scriptures, which assert both that Christ was of the seed of Jechonias: nor, consequently, of the family of David, of David according to the flesh, and that Mary was His since Matthew traces the genealogy from David through Mother, not by sexual intercourse but retaining her vir- Jechonias. ginity.” For as Jerome says on Mat. 1:18: “Joseph and On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 1:3): “Who was Mary were of the same tribe: wherefore he was bound by made to him of the seed of David according to the flesh.” law to marry her as she was his kinswoman. Hence it was I answer that, Christ is said to have been the son es- that they were enrolled together at Bethlehem, as being pecially of two of the patriarchs, Abraham and David, as descended from the same stock.” is clear from Mat. 1:1. There are many reasons for this. Reply to Objection 2. Gregory of Nazianzum an- First to these especially was the promise made concerning swers this objection by saying that it happened by God’s Christ. For it was said to Abraham (Gn. 22:18): “In thy will, that the royal family was united to the priestly race, seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed”: which so that Christ, who is both king and priest, should be born words the Apostle expounds of Christ (Gal. 3:16): “To of both according to the flesh. Wherefore Aaron, who Abraham were the promises made and to his seed. He was the first priest according to the Law, married a wife saith not, ‘And to his seeds’ as of many; but as of one, of the tribe of Juda, Elizabeth, daughter of Aminadab. It ‘And to thy seed,’ which is Christ.” And to David it was is therefore possible that Elizabeth’s father married a wife said (Ps. 131:11): “Of the fruit of thy womb I will set of the family of David, through whom the Blessed Virgin upon thy throne.” Wherefore the Jewish people, receiving Mary, who was of the family of David, would be a cousin Him with kingly honor, said (Mat. 21:9): “Hosanna to the of Elizabeth. or conversely, and with greater likelihood, Son of David.” that the Blessed Mary’s father, who was of the family of A second reason is because Christ was to be king, David, married a wife of the family of Aaron. prophet, and priest. Now Abraham was a priest; which Again, it may be said with Augustine (Contra Faust. is clear from the Lord saying unto him (Gn. 15:9): “Take xxii) that if Joachim, Mary’s father, was of the family thee [Vulg.: ‘Me’] a cow of three years old,” etc. He was of Aaron (as the heretic Faustus pretended to prove from also a prophet, according to Gn. 20:7: “He is a prophet; certain apocryphal writings), then we must believe that and he shall pray for thee.” Lastly David was both king Joachim’s mother, or else his wife, was of the family of and prophet. David, so long as we say that Mary was in some way de- A third reason is because circumcision had its begin- scended from David. ning in Abraham: while in David God’s election was most Reply to Objection 3. As Ambrose says on Lk. 3:25, clearly made manifest, according to 1 Kings 13:14: “The this prophetical passage does not deny that a posterity will Lord hath sought Him a man according to His own heart.” be born of the seed of Jechonias. And so Christ is of his And consequently Christ is called in a most special way seed. Neither is the fact that Christ reigned contrary to the Son of both, in order to show that He came for the sal- prophecy, for He did not reign with worldly honor; since vation both of the circumcised and of the elect among the He declared: “My kingdom is not of this world.” 2247 Whether Christ’s genealogy is suitably traced by the evangelists? IIIa q. 31 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s genealogy raised by Julian the Apostate; for some, as Gregory is not suitably traced by the Evangelists. For it is written of Nazianzum, say that the people mentioned by the (Is. 53:8): “Who shall declare His generation?” Therefore two evangelists are the same, but under different names, Christ’s genealogy should not have been set down. as though they each had two. But this will not Objection 2. Further, one man cannot possibly have stand: because Matthew mentions one of David’s sons— two fathers. But Matthew says that “Jacob begot Joseph, namely, Solomon; whereas Luke mentions another— the husband of Mary”: whereas Luke says that Joseph was namely, Nathan, who according to the history of the kings the son of Heli. Therefore they contradict one another. (2 Kings 5:14) were clearly brothers. Objection 3. Further, there seem to be divergencies Wherefore others said that Matthew gave the true ge- between them on several points. For Matthew, at the com- nealogy of Christ: while Luke gave the supposititious ge- mencement of his book, beginning from Abraham and nealogy; hence he began: “Being (as it was supposed) coming down to Joseph, enumerates forty-two genera- the son of Joseph.” For among the Jews there were some tions. Whereas Luke sets down Christ’s genealogy after who believed that, on account of the crimes of the kings His Baptism, and beginning from Christ traces the series of Juda, Christ would be born of the family of David, not of generations back to God, counting in all seventy-seven through the kings, but through some other line of private generations, the first and last included. It seems therefore individuals. that their accounts of Christ’s genealogy do not agree. Others again have supposed that Matthew gave the Objection 4. Further, we read (4 Kings 8:24) that forefathers according to the flesh: whereas Luke gave Joram begot Ochozias, who was succeeded by his son these according to the spirit, that is, righteous men, who Joas: who was succeeded by his son Amasius: after whom are called (Christ’s) forefathers by likeness of virtue. reigned his son Azarias, called Ozias; who was succeeded But an answer is given in the Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test.∗ by his son Joathan. But Matthew says that Joram begot to the effect that we are not to understand that Joseph is Ozias. Therefore it seems that his account of Christ’s ge- said by Luke to be the son of Heli: but that at the time of nealogy is unsuitable, since he omits three kings in the Christ, Heli and Joseph were differently descended from middle thereof. David. Hence Christ is said to have been supposed to be Objection 5. Further, all those who are mentioned in the son of Joseph, and also to have been the son of Heli Christ’s genealogy had both a father and a mother, and as though (the Evangelist) were to say that Christ, from many of them had brothers also. Now in Christ’s ge- the fact that He was the son of Joseph, could be called nealogy Matthew mentions only three mothers—namely, the son of Heli and of all those who were descended from Thamar, Ruth, and the wife of Urias. He also mentions the David; as the Apostle says (Rom. 9:5): “Of whom” (viz. brothers of Judas and Jechonias, and also Phares and Zara. the Jews) “is Christ according to the flesh.” But Luke mentions none of these. Therefore the evange- Augustine again gives three solutions (De Qq. Evang. lists seem to have described the genealogy of Christ in an ii), saying: “There are three motives by one or other of unsuitable manner. which the evangelist was guided. For either one evange- On the contrary, The authority of Scripture suffices. list mentions Joseph’s father of whom he was begotten; I answer that, As is written (2 Tim. 3:16), “All Holy whilst the other gives either his maternal grandfather or Scripture is inspired of God [Vulg.: ‘All scripture inspired some other of his later forefathers; or one was Joseph’s of God is profitable’], etc. Now what is done by God is natural father: the other is father by adoption. Or, ac- done in perfect order, according to Rom. 13:1: “Those cording to the Jewish custom, one of those having died that are of God are ordained [Vulg.: ‘Those that are, are without children, a near relation of his married his wife, ordained of God’]. Therefore Christ’s genealogy is set the son born of the latter union being reckoned as the son down by the evangelists in a suitable order. of the former”: which is a kind of legal adoption, as Au- Reply to Objection 1. As Jerome says on Mat. 1, Isa- gustine himself says (De Consensu Evang. ii, Cf. Retract. ias speaks of the generation of Christ’s Godhead. Whereas ii). Matthew relates the generation of Christ in His humanity; This last motive is the truest: Jerome also gives it com- not indeed by explaining the manner of the Incarnation, menting on Mat. 1:16; and Eusebius of Caesarea in his which is also unspeakable; but by enumerating Christ’s Church history (I, vii), says that it is given by Africanus forefathers from whom He was descended according to the historian. For these writers says that Mathan and the flesh. Melchi, at different times, each begot a son of one and Reply to Objection 2. Various answers have been the same wife, named Estha. For Mathan, who traced made by certain writers to this objection which was his descent through Solomon, had married her first, and ∗ Part i, qu. lvi; part 2, qu. vi 2248 died, leaving one son, whose name was Jacob: and after cause he was adopted by him, since he says that Adam his death, as the law did not forbid his widow to remarry, was the son of God, inasmuch as he was created by God.” Melchi, who traced his descent through Mathan, being of Again, the number forty pertains to the time of our the same tribe though not of the same family as Mathan, present life: because of the four parts of the world in married his widow, who bore him a son, called Heli; so which we pass this mortal life under the rule of Christ. that Jacob and Heli were uterine brothers born to different And forty is the product of four multiplied by ten: while fathers. Now one of these, Jacob, on his brother Heli dy- ten is the sum of the numbers from one to four. The num- ing without issue, married the latter’s widow, according to ber ten may also refer to the decalogue; and the number the prescription of the law, of whom he had a son, Joseph, four to the present life; or again to the four Gospels, ac- who by nature was his own son, but by law was accounted cording to which Christ reigns in us. And thus “Matthew, the son of Heli. Wherefore Matthew says “Jacob begot putting forward the royal personality of Christ, enumer- Joseph”: whereas Luke, who was giving the legal geneal- ates forty persons not counting Him” (cf. Augustine, De ogy, speaks of no one as begetting. Consensu Evang. ii). But this is to be taken on the sup- And although Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv) says that position that it be the same Jechonias at the end of the the Blessed Virgin Mary was connected with Joseph in as second, and at the commencement of the third series of far as Heli was accounted as his father, for he says that fourteen, as Augustine understands it. According to him she was descended from Melchi: yet must we also be- this was done in order to signify “that under Jechonias lieve that she was in some way descended from Solomon there was a certain defection to strange nations during the through those patriarchs enumerated by Matthew, who is Babylonian captivity; which also foreshadowed the fact said to have set down Christ’s genealogy according to the that Christ would pass from the Jews to the Gentiles.” flesh; and all the more since Ambrose states that Christ On the other hand, Jerome (on Mat. 1:12-15) says was of the seed of Jechonias. that there were two Joachims—that is, Jechonias, father Reply to Objection 3. According to Augustine (De and son: both of whom are mentioned in Christ’s geneal- Consensu Evang. ii) “Matthew purposed to delineate the ogy, so as to make clear the distinction of the generations, royal personality of Christ; Luke the priestly personality: which the evangelist divides into three series of fourteen; so that in Matthew’s genealogy is signified the assump- which amounts in all to forty-two persons. Which number tion of our sins by our Lord Jesus Christ”: inasmuch as may also be applied to the Holy Church: for it is the prod- by his carnal origin “He assumed ‘the likeness of sinful uct of six, which signifies the labor of the present life, and flesh.’ But in Luke’s genealogy the washing away of our seven, which signifies the rest of the life to come: for six sins is signified,” which is effected by Christ’s sacrifice. times seven are forty-two. The number fourteen, which is “For which reason Matthew traces the generations down- the sum of ten and four, can also be given the same sig- wards, Luke upwards.” For the same reason too “Matthew nification as that given to the number forty, which is the descends from David through Solomon, in whose mother product of the same numbers by multiplication. David sinned; whereas Luke ascends to David through But the number used by Luke in Christ’s genealogy Nathan, through whose namesake, the prophet, God expi- signifies the generality of sins. “For the number ten is ated his sin.” And hence it is also that, because “Matthew shown in the ten precepts of the Law to be the number wished to signify that Christ had condescended to our of righteousness. Now, to sin is to go beyond the restric- mortal nature, he set down the genealogy of Christ at tion of the Law. And eleven is the number beyond ten.” the very outset of his Gospel, beginning with Abraham And seven signifies universality: because “universal time and descending to Joseph and the birth of Christ Him- is involved in seven days.” Now seven times eleven are self. Luke, on the contrary, sets forth Christ’s genealogy seventy-seven: so that this number signifies the generality not at the outset, but after Christ’s Baptism, and not in of sins which are taken away by Christ. the descending but in the ascending order: as though giv- Reply to Objection 4. As Jerome says on Mat. ing prominence to the office of the priest in expiating our 1:8,11: “Because Joram allied himself with the family of sins, to which John bore witness, saying: ‘Behold Him the most wicked Jezabel, therefore his memory is omit- who taketh away the sin of the world.’ And in the ascend- ted down to the third generation, lest it should be inserted ing order, he passes Abraham and continues up to God, to among the holy predecessors of the Nativity.” Hence as whom we are reconciled by cleansing and expiating. With Chrysostom∗ says: “Just as great was the blessing con- reason too he follows the origin of adoption; because by ferred on Jehu, who wrought vengeance on the house of adoption we become children of God: whereas by carnal Achab and Jezabel, so also great was the curse on the generation the Son of God became the Son of Man. More- house of Joram, through the wicked daughter of Achab over he shows sufficiently that he does not say that Joseph and Jezabel, so that until the fourth generation his poster- was the son of Heli as though begotten by him, but be- ity is cut off from the number of kings, according to Ex. ∗ Cf. Opus Imperf. in Matth. Hom. i, falsely ascribed to Chrysostom 2249 20:5: I shall visit [Vulg.: ‘Visiting’] the iniquity of the nated through her husband; both on account of his sin, fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth gener- for he was cognizant of the adultery and murder; and fur- ations.” ther in order that, by mentioning the husband by name, It must also be observed that there were other kings David’s sin might be recalled. And because Luke pur- who sinned and are mentioned in Christ’s genealogy: but poses to delineate Christ as the expiator of our sins, he their impiety was not continuous. For, as it is stated in the makes no mention of these women. But he does mention book De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. lxxxv: “Solomon Juda’s brethren, in order to show that they belong to God’s through his father’s merits is included in the series of people: whereas Ismael, the brother of Isaac, and Esau, kings; and Roboam. . . through the merits of Asa,” who Jacob’s brother, were cut off from God’s people, and for was son of his (Roboam’s) son, Abiam. “But the impi- this reason are not mentioned in Christ’s genealogy. An- ety of those three∗ was continuous.” other motive was to show the emptiness of pride of birth: Reply to Objection 5. As Jerome says on Mat. 1:3: for many of Juda’s brethren were born of hand-maidens, “None of the holy women are mentioned in the Saviour’s and yet all were patriarchs and heads of tribes. Phares and genealogy, but only those whom Scripture censures, so Zara are mentioned together, because, as Ambrose says that He who came for the sake of sinners, by being born on Lk. 3:23, “they are the type of the twofold life of man: of sinners, might blot out all sin.” Thus Thamar is men- one, according to the Law,” signified by Zara; “the other tioned, who is censured for her sin with her father-in-law; by Faith,” of which Phares is the type. The brethren of Je- Rahab who was a whore; Ruth who was a foreigner; and chonias are included, because they all reigned at various Bethsabee, the wife of Urias, who was an adulteress. The times: which was not the case with other kings: or, again, last, however, is not mentioned by name, but is desig- because they were alike in wickedness and misfortune. Whether the matter of Christ’s body should have been taken from a woman? IIIa q. 31 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the matter of Christ’s 11): “It was suitable that man’s liberation should be made body should not have been taken from a woman. For the manifest in both sexes. Consequently, since it behooved a male sex is more noble than the female. But it was most man, being of the nobler sex, to assume, it was becoming suitable that Christ should assume that which is perfect in that the liberation of the female sex should be manifested human nature. Therefore it seems that He should not have in that man being born of a woman.” taken flesh from a woman but rather from man: just as Secondly, because thus the truth of the Incarnation is Eve was formed from the rib of a man. made evident. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Incarn. vi): Objection 2. Further, whoever is conceived of a “Thou shalt find in Christ many things both natural, and woman is shut up in her womb. But it ill becomes God, supernatural. In accordance with nature He was within Who fills heaven and earth, as is written Jer. 23:24, to the womb,” viz. of a woman’s body: “but it was above na- be shut up within the narrow limits of the womb. There- ture that a virgin should conceive and give birth: that thou fore it seems that He should not have been conceived of a mightest believe that He was God, who was renewing na- woman. ture; and that He was man who, according to nature, was Objection 3. Further, those who are conceived of a being born of a man.” And Augustine says (Ep. ad Volus. woman contract a certain uncleanness: as it is written (Job cxxxvii): “If Almighty God had created a man formed 25:4): “Can man be justified compared with God? Or he otherwise than in a mother’s womb, and had suddenly pro- that is born of a woman appear clean?” But it was unbe- duced him to sight. . . would He not have strengthened an coming that any uncleanness should be in Christ: for He is erroneous opinion, and made it impossible for us to be- the Wisdom of God, of whom it is written (Wis. 7:25) that lieve that He had become a true man? And whilst He is “no defiled thing cometh into her.” Therefore it does not doing all things wondrously, would He have taken away seem right that He should have taken flesh from a woman. that which He accomplished in mercy? But now, He, the On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 4:4): “God sent mediator between God and man, has so shown Himself, His Son, made of a woman.” that, uniting both natures in the unity of one Person, He I answer that, Although the Son of God could have has given a dignity to ordinary by extraordinary things, taken flesh from whatever matter He willed, it was nev- and tempered the extraordinary by the ordinary.” ertheless most becoming that He should take flesh from a Thirdly, because in this fashion the begetting of man woman. First because in this way the entire human nature is accomplished in every variety of manner. For the first was ennobled. Hence Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. man was made from the “slime of the earth,” without the ∗ i.e. Ochozias, Joas, and Amasias, of whom St. Augustine asks in this question lxxxv, why they were omitted by St. Matthew 2250 concurrence of man or woman: Eve was made of man but of which can be entire everywhere, because they must of not of woman: and other men are made from both man necessity be diffused through their innumerable parts in and woman. So that this fourth manner remained as it various places. . . Far otherwise is the nature of the soul were proper to Christ, that He should be made of a woman from that of the body: how much more the nature of God, without the concurrence of a man. the Creator of soul and body!. . . He is able to be entire ev- Reply to Objection 1. The male sex is more noble erywhere, and to be contained in no place. He is able to than the female, and for this reason He took human na- come without moving from the place where He was; and ture in the male sex. But lest the female sex should be de- to go without leaving the spot whence He came.” spised, it was fitting that He should take flesh of a woman. Reply to Objection 3. There is no uncleanness in the Hence Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xi): “Men, de- conception of man from a woman, as far as this is the work spise not yourselves: the Son of God became a man: de- of God: wherefore it is written (Acts 10:15): “That which spise not yourselves, women; the Son of God was born of God hath cleansed do not thou call common,” i.e. unclean. a woman.” There is, however, a certain uncleanness therein, resulting Reply to Objection 2. Augustine thus (Contra Faust. from sin, as far as lustful desire accompanies conception xxiii) replies to Faustus, who urged this objection; “By by sexual union. But this was not the case with Christ, no means,” says he, “does the Catholic Faith, which be- as shown above (q. 28, a. 1). But if there were any un- lieves that Christ the Son of God was born of a virgin, cleanness therein, the Word of God would not have been according to the flesh, suppose that the same Son of God sullied thereby, for He is utterly unchangeable. Where- was so shut up in His Mother’s womb, as to cease to be fore Augustine says (Contra Quinque Haereses v): “God elsewhere, as though He no longer continued to govern saith, the Creator of man: What is it that troubles thee in heaven and earth, and as though He had withdrawn Him- My Birth? I was not conceived by lustful desire. I made self from the Father. But you, Manicheans, being of a Myself a mother of whom to be born. If the sun’s rays can mind that admits of nought but material images, are ut- dry up the filth in the drain, and yet not be defiled: much terly unable to grasp these things.” For, as he again says more can the Splendor of eternal light cleanse whatever It (Ep. ad Volus. cxxxvii), “it belongs to the sense of man shines upon, but Itself cannot be sullied.” to form conceptions only through tangible bodies, none Whether the flesh of Christ was conceived of the Virgin’s purest blood? IIIa q. 31 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the flesh of Christ with the laws of nature, but that He was born of a vir- was not conceived of the Virgin’s purest blood: For it is gin was above the laws of nature. Now, such is the law said in the collect (Feast of the Annunciation) that God of nature that in the generation of an animal the female “willed that His Word should take flesh from a Virgin.” supplies the matter, while the male is the active principle But flesh differs from blood. Therefore Christ’s body was of generation; as the Philosopher proves (De Gener. An- not taken from the Virgin’s blood. imal. i). But a woman who conceives of a man is not a Objection 2. Further, as the woman was miraculously virgin. And consequently it belongs to the supernatural formed from the man, so Christ’s body was formed mirac- mode of Christ’s generation, that the active principle of ulously from the Virgin. But the woman is not said to generation was the supernatural power of God: but it be- have been formed from the man’s blood, but rather from longs to the natural mode of His generation, that the mat- his flesh and bones, according to Gn. 2:23: “This now is ter from which His body was conceived is similar to the bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh.” It seems there- matter which other women supply for the conception of fore that neither should Christ’s body have been formed their offspring. Now, this matter, according to the Philoso- from the Virgin’s blood, but from her flesh and bones. pher (De Gener. Animal.), is the woman’s blood, not any Objection 3. Further, Christ’s body was of the same of her blood, but brought to a more perfect stage of se- species as other men’s bodies. But other men’s bodies are cretion by the mother’s generative power, so as to be apt not formed from the purest blood but from the semen and for conception. And therefore of such matter was Christ’s the menstrual blood. Therefore it seems that neither was body conceived. Christ’s body conceived of the purest blood of the Virgin. Reply to Objection 1. Since the Blessed Virgin was On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) of the same nature as other women, it follows that she had that “the Son of God, from the Virgin’s purest blood, flesh and bones of the same nature as theirs. Now, flesh formed Himself flesh, animated with a rational soul.” and bones in other women are actual parts of the body, I answer that, As stated above (a. 4), in Christ’s con- the integrity of which results therefrom: and consequently ception His being born of a woman was in accordance they cannot be taken from the body without its being cor- 2251 rupted or diminished. But as Christ came to heal what was the necessary matter of conception; as the Philosopher corrupt, it was not fitting that He should bring corruption says (De Gener. Animal. i): wherefore there was none or diminution to the integrity of His Mother. Therefore such in Christ’s conception: all the more since, though it was becoming that Christ’s body should be formed not it is imperfect in the seminal order, a certain concupis- from the flesh or bones of the Virgin, but from her blood, cence accompanies its emission, as also that of the male which as yet is not actually a part, but is potentially the semen: whereas in that virginal conception there could whole, as stated in De Gener. Animal. i. Hence He is be no concupiscence. Wherefore Damascene says (De said to have taken flesh from the Virgin, not that the mat- Fide Orth. iii) that Christ’s body was not conceived “sem- ter from which His body was formed was actual flesh, but inally.” But the menstrual blood, the flow of which is blood, which is flesh potentially. subject to monthly periods, has a certain natural impu- Reply to Objection 2. As stated in the Ia, q. 92, a. 3, rity of corruption: like other superfluities, which nature ad 2, Adam, through being established as a kind of princi- does not heed, and therefore expels. Of such menstrual ple of human nature, had in his body a certain proportion blood infected with corruption and repudiated by nature, of flesh and bone, which belonged to him, not as an inte- the conception is not formed; but from a certain secre- gral part of his personality, but in regard to his state as a tion of the pure blood which by a process of elimination principle of human nature. And from this was the woman is prepared for conception, being, as it were, more pure formed, without detriment to the man. But in the Virgin’s and more perfect than the rest of the blood. Nevertheless, body there was nothing of this sort, from which Christ’s it is tainted with the impurity of lust in the conception of body could be formed without detriment to His Mother’s other men: inasmuch as by sexual intercourse this blood body. is drawn to a place apt for conception. This, however, did Reply to Objection 3. Woman’s semen is not apt not take place in Christ’s conception: because this blood for generation, but is something imperfect in the semi- was brought together in the Virgin’s womb and fashioned nal order, which, on account of the imperfection of the into a child by the operation of the Holy Ghost. Therefore female power, it has not been possible to bring to com- is Christ’s body said to be “formed of the most chaste and plete seminal perfection. Consequently this semen is not purest blood of the Virgin.” Whether Christ’s body was in Adam and the other patriarchs, as to something sig-IIIa q. 31 a. 6 nate? Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s body was in matter, but only according to origin, as stated in the Ia, Adam and the patriarchs as to something signate. For Au- q. 119 , a. 1, a. 2, ad 4. Therefore neither was Christ in gustine says (Gen. ad lit. x) that the flesh of Christ was in Adam and Abraham according to something signate; and, Adam and Abraham “by way of a bodily substance.” But for the same reason, neither was He in the other patriarchs. bodily substance is something signate. Therefore Christ’s I answer that, As stated above (a. 5, ad 1), the mat- flesh was in Adam, Abraham, and the other patriarchs, ac- ter of Christ’s body was not the flesh and bones of the cording to something signate. Blessed Virgin, nor anything that was actually a part of her Objection 2. Further, it is said (Rom. 1:3) that Christ body, but her blood which was her flesh potentially. Now, “was made. . . of the seed of David according to the flesh.” whatever was in the Blessed Virgin, as received from her But the seed of David was something signate in him. parents, was actually a part of her body. Consequently Therefore Christ was in David, according to something that which the Blessed Virgin received from her parents signate, and for the same reason in the other patriarchs. was not the matter of Christ’s body. Therefore we must Objection 3. Further, the human race is Christ’s kin- say that Christ’s body was not in Adam and the other pa- dred, inasmuch as He took flesh therefrom. But if that triarchs according to something signate, in the sense that flesh were not something signate in Adam, the human some part of Adam’s or of anyone else’s body could be race, which is descended from Adam, would seem to have singled out and designated as the very matter from which no kindred with Christ: but rather with those other things Christ’s body was to be formed: but it was there according from which the matter of His flesh was taken. Therefore to origin, just as was the flesh of other men. For Christ’s it seems that Christ’s flesh was in Adam and the other pa- body is related to Adam and the other patriarchs through triarchs according to something signate. the medium of His Mother’s body. Consequently Christ’s On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x) that body was in the patriarchs, in no other way than was His in whatever way Christ was in Adam and Abraham, other Mother’s body, which was not in the patriarchs according men were there also; but not conversely. But other men to signate matter: as neither were the bodies of other men, were not in Adam and Abraham by way of some signate as stated in the Ia, q. 119, a. 1, a. 2, ad 4. 2252 Reply to Objection 1. The expression “Christ was through her being conceived from the seed of a man. For in Adam according to bodily substance,” does not mean this reason, through the medium of the Blessed Virgin, that Christ’s body was a bodily substance in Adam: but Christ is said to be of the seed of David, according to the that the bodily substance of Christ’s body, i.e. the mat- flesh, by way of origin. ter which He took from the Virgin, was in Adam as in Reply to Objection 3. Christ and the human race are its active principle, but not as in its material principle: in kindred, through the likeness of species. Now, specific other words, by the generative power of Adam and his likeness results not from remote but from proximate mat- descendants down to the Blessed Virgin, this matter was ter, and from the active principle which begets its like in prepared for Christ’s conception. But this matter was not species. Thus, then, the kinship of Christ and the human fashioned into Christ’s body by the seminal power de- race is sufficiently preserved by His body being formed rived from Adam. Therefore Christ is said to have been from the Virgin’s blood, derived in its origin from Adam in Adam by way of origin, according to bodily substance: and the other patriarchs. Nor is this kinship affected by but not according to seminal virtue. the matter whence this blood is taken, as neither is it in Reply to Objection 2. Although Christ’s body was the generation of other men, as stated in the Ia, q. 119, not in Adam and the other patriarchs, according to semi- a. 2, ad 3. nal virtue, yet the Blessed Virgin’s body was thus in them, Whether Christ’s flesh in the patriarchs was infected by sin? IIIa q. 31 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s flesh was not sinned in Adam, since after some fashion He was in him. infected by sin in the patriarchs. For it is written (Wis. But this is false; because Christ was not in Adam in such a 7:25) that “no defiled thing cometh into” Divine Wisdom. way that Adam’s sin belonged to Christ: forasmuch as He But Christ is the Wisdom of God according to 1 Cor. 1:24. is not descended from him according to the law of concu- Therefore Christ’s flesh was never defiled by sin. piscence, or according to seminal virtue; as stated above Objection 2. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. (a. 1, ad 3, a. 6, ad 1; q. 15, a. 1, ad 2). iii) that Christ “assumed the first-fruits of our nature.” But Secondly, error may occur by attributing the condition in the primitive state human flesh was not infected by sin. of Christ or of His flesh to that which was actually in the Therefore Christ’s flesh was not infected either in Adam patriarchs: by saying, for instance, that, because Christ’s or in the other patriarchs. flesh, as existing in Christ, was not subject to sin, there- Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. fore in Adam also and in the patriarchs there was some x) that “human nature ever had, together with the wound, part of his body that was not subject to sin, and from the balm with which to heal it.” But that which is infected which afterwards Christ’s body was formed; as some in- cannot heal a wound; rather does it need to be healed it- deed held. For this is quite impossible. First, because self. Therefore in human nature there was ever something Christ’s flesh was not in Adam and in the other patriarchs, preserved from infection, from which afterwards Christ’s according to something signate, distinguishable from the body was formed. rest of his flesh, as pure from impure; as already stated On the contrary, Christ’s body is not related to Adam (a. 6 ). Secondly, because since human flesh is infected and the other patriarchs, save through the medium of the by sin, through being conceived in lust, just as the entire Blessed Virgin’s body, of whom He took flesh. But the flesh of a man is conceived through lust, so also is it en- body of the Blessed Virgin was wholly conceived in orig- tirely defiled by sin. Consequently we must say that the inal sin, as stated above (q. 14, a. 3, ad 1), and thus, as far entire flesh of the patriarchs was subjected to sin, nor was as it was in the patriarchs, it was subject to sin. Therefore there anything in them that was free from sin, and from the flesh of Christ, as far as it was in the patriarchs, was which afterwards Christ’s body could be formed. subject to sin. Reply to Objection 1. Christ did not assume the flesh I answer that, When we say that Christ or His flesh of the human race subject to sin, but cleansed from all in- was in Adam and the other patriarchs, we compare Him, fection of sin. Thus it is that “no defiled thing cometh into or His flesh, to Adam and the other patriarchs. Now, it the Wisdom of God.” is manifest that the condition of the patriarchs differed Reply to Objection 2. Christ is said to have assumed from that of Christ: for the patriarchs were subject to the first-fruits of our nature, as to the likeness of condi- sin, whereas Christ was absolutely free from sin. Conse- tion; forasmuch as He assumed flesh not infected by sin, quently a twofold error may occur on this point. First, by like unto the flesh of man before sin. But this is not to be attributing to Christ, or to His flesh, that condition which understood to imply a continuation of that primitive pu- was in the patriarchs; by saying, for instance, that Christ rity, as though the flesh of innocent man was preserved in 2253 its freedom from sin until the formation of Christ’s body. sin. But the balm to heal the wound was not there actually, Reply to Objection 3. Before Christ, there was actu- but only by a certain virtue of origin, forasmuch as from ally in human nature a wound, i.e. the infection of original those patriarchs the flesh of Christ was to be propagated. Whether Christ paid tithes in Abraham’s loins? IIIa q. 31 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ “paid tithes” imperfection and to the perfection of another. Now, to sin in Abraham’s loins. For the Apostle says (Heb. 7:6-9) is due the imperfection of the human race, which needs to that Levi, the great-grandson of Abraham, “paid tithes be perfected by Him who cleanses from sin. But to heal in Abraham,” because, when the latter paid tithes to from sin belongs to Christ alone, for He is the “Lamb that Melchisedech, “he was yet in his loins.” In like manner taketh away the sin of the world” (Jn. 1:29), whose figure Christ was in Abraham’s loins when the latter paid tithes. was Melchisedech, as the Apostle proves (Heb. 7). There- Therefore Christ Himself also paid tithes in Abraham. fore by giving tithes to Melchisedech, Abraham foreshad- Objection 2. Further, Christ is of the seed of Abra- owed that he, as being conceived in sin, and all who were ham according to the flesh which He received from His to be his descendants in contracting original sin, needed Mother. But His Mother paid tithes in Abraham. There- that healing which is through Christ. And Isaac, Jacob, fore for a like reason did Christ. and Levi, and all the others were in Abraham in such a Objection 3. Further, “in Abraham tithe was levied way so as to be descended from him, not only as to bodily on that which needed healing,” as Augustine says (Gen. substance, but also as to seminal virtue, by which origi- ad lit. x). But all flesh subject to sin needed healing. nal sin is transmitted. Consequently, they all paid tithes Since therefore Christ’s flesh was the subject of sin, as in Abraham, i.e. foreshadowed as needing to be healed stated above (a. 7), it seems that Christ’s flesh paid tithes by Christ. And Christ alone was in Abraham in such a in Abraham. manner as to descend from him, not by seminal virtue, Objection 4. Further, this does not seem to be but according to bodily substance. Therefore He was not at all derogatory to Christ’s dignity. For the fact that in Abraham so as to need to be healed, but rather “as the the father of a bishop pays tithes to a priest does not balm with which the wound was to be healed.” Therefore hinder his son, the bishop, from being of higher rank He did not pay tithes in Abraham’s loins. than an ordinary priest. Consequently, although we may Thus the answer to the first objection is made mani- say that Christ paid tithes when Abraham paid them to fest. Melchisedech, it does not follow that Christ was not Reply to Objection 2. Because the Blessed Virgin greater than Melchisedech. was conceived in original sin, she was in Abraham as On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x) that needing to be healed. Therefore she paid tithes in him, “Christ did not pay tithes there,” i.e. in Abraham, “for His as descending from him according to seminal virtue. But flesh derived from him, not the heat of the wound, but the this is not true of Christ’s body, as stated above. matter of the antidote.” Reply to Objection 3. Christ’s flesh is said to have I answer that, It behooves us to say that the sense been subject to sin, according as it was in the patriarchs, of the passage quoted from the Apostle is that Christ did by reason of the condition in which it was in His forefa- not pay tithes in Abraham. For the Apostle proves that thers, who paid the tithes: but not by reason of its condi- the priesthood according to the order of Melchisedech is tion as actually in Christ, who did not pay the tithes. greater than the Levitical priesthood, from the fact that Reply to Objection 4. The levitical priesthood was Abraham paid tithes to Melchisedech, while Levi, from handed down through carnal origin: wherefore it was not whom the legal priesthood was derived, was yet in his less in Abraham than in Levi. Consequently, since Abra- loins. Now, if Christ had also paid tithes in Abraham, ham paid tithes to Melchisedech as to one greater than he, His priesthood would not have been according to the or- it follows that the priesthood of Melchisedech, inasmuch der of Melchisedech, but of a lower order. Consequently as he was a figure of Christ, was greater than that of Levi. we must say that Christ did not pay tithes in Abraham’s But the priesthood of Christ does not result from carnal loins, as Levi did. origin, but from spiritual grace. Therefore it is possible For since he who pays a tithe keeps nine parts to him- that a father pay tithes to a priest, as the less to the greater, self, and surrenders the tenth to another, inasmuch as the and yet his son, if he be a bishop, is greater than that priest, number ten is the sign of perfection, as being, in a sort, the not through carnal origin, but through the spiritual grace terminus of all numbers which mount from one to ten, it which he has received from Christ. follows that he who pays a tithe bears witness to his own 2254 THIRD PART, QUESTION 32 Of the Active Principle in Christ’s Conception (In Four Articles) We shall now consider the active principle in Christ’s conception: concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the Holy Ghost was the active principle of Christ’s conception? (2) Whether it can be said that Christ was conceived of the Holy Ghost? (3) Whether it can be said that the Holy Ghost is Christ’s father according to the flesh? (4) Whether the Blessed Virgin cooperated actively in Christ’s conception? Whether the accomplishment of Christ’s conception should be attributed to the Holy IIIa q. 32 a. 1 Ghost? Objection 1. It would seem that the accomplishment tion, on the part of the nature assumed. Because we are of Christ’s conception should not be attributed to the Holy thus given to understand that human nature was assumed Ghost, because. as Augustine says (De Trin. i), “The by the Son of God into the unity of Person, not by reason works of the Trinity are indivisible, just as the Essence of its merits, but through grace alone; which is attributed of the Trinity is indivisible.” But the accomplishment of to the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 12:4: “There Christ’s conception was the work of God. Therefore it are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit.” Wherefore seems that it should not be attributed to the Holy Ghost Augustine says (Enchiridion xl): “The manner in which any more than to the Father or the Son. Christ was born of the Holy Ghost. . . suggests to us the Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (Gal. 4:4): grace of God, whereby man, without any merits going be- “When the fulness of time was come, God sent His Son, fore, in the very beginning of his nature when he began to made of a woman”; which words Augustine expounds by exist was joined to God the Word, into so great unity of saying (De Trin. iv): “Sent, in so far as made of a woman.” Person, that He Himself should be the Son of God.” But the sending of the Son is especially attributed to the Thirdly, because this is befitting the term of the In- Father, as stated in the Ia, q. 43, a. 8. Therefore His carnation. For the term of the Incarnation was that that conception also, by reason of which He was “made of a man, who was being conceived, should be the Holy one woman,” should be attributed principally to the Father. and the Son of God. Now, both of these are attributed to Objection 3. Further, it is written (Prov. 9:1): “Wis- the Holy Ghost. For by Him men are made to be sons of dom hath built herself a house.” Now, Christ is Himself God, according to Gal. 4:6: “Because you are sons, God the Wisdom of God; according to 1 Cor. 1:24: “Christ the hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your [Vulg.: ‘our’] Power of God and the Wisdom of God.” And the house hearts, crying: Abba, Father.” Again, He is the “Spirit of this Wisdom is Christ’s body, which is also called His of sanctification,” according to Rom. 1:4. Therefore, just temple, according to Jn. 2:21: “But He spoke of the tem- as other men are sanctified spiritually by the Holy Ghost; ple of His body.” Therefore it seems that the accomplish- so as to be the adopted sons of God, so was Christ con- ment of Christ’s conception should be attributed princi- ceived in sanctity by the Holy Ghost, so as to be the natu- pally to the Son, and not, therefore, to the Holy Ghost. ral Son of God. Hence, according to a gloss on Rom. 1:4, On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 1:35): “The Holy the words, “Who was predestinated the Son of God, in Ghost shall come upon Thee.” power,” are explained by what immediately follows: “Ac- I answer that, The whole Trinity effected the concep- cording to the Spirit of sanctification, i.e. through being tion of Christ’s body: nevertheless, this is attributed to the conceived of the Holy Ghost.” And the Angel of the An- Holy Ghost, for three reasons. First, because this is be- nunciation himself, after saying, “The Holy Ghost shall fitting to the cause of the Incarnation, considered on the come upon thee,” draws the conclusion: “Therefore also part of God. For the Holy Ghost is the love of Father and the Holy which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son, as stated in the Ia, q. 37, a. 1. Now, that the Son of Son of God.” God took to Himself flesh from the Virgin’s womb was Reply to Objection 1. The work of the conception is due to the exceeding love of God: wherefore it is said indeed common to the whole Trinity; yet in some way it (Jn. 3:16): “God so loved the world as to give His only- is attributed to each of the Persons. For to the Father is at- begotten Son.” tributed authority in regard to the Person of the Son, who Secondly, this is befitting to the cause of the Incarna- by this conception took to Himself (human nature). The 2255 taking itself (of human nature) is attributed to the Son: but The “Most High” is the Father, whose Power is the Son. the formation of the body taken by the Son is attributed Reply to Objection 2. The mission refers to the Per- to the Holy Ghost. For the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of son assuming, who is sent by the Father; but the concep- the Son, according to Gal. 4:6: “God sent the Spirit of tion refers to the body assumed, which is formed by the His Son.” For just as the power of the soul which is in operation of the Holy Ghost. And therefore, though mis- the semen, through the spirit enclosed therein, fashions sion and conception are in the same subject; since they the body in the generation of other men, so the Power differ in our consideration of them, mission is attributed of God, which is the Son Himself, according to 1 Cor. to the Father, but the accomplishment of the conception 1:24: “Christ, the Power of God,” through the Holy Ghost to the Holy Ghost; whereas the assumption of flesh is at- formed the body which He assumed. This is also shown tributed to the Son. by the words of the angel: “The Holy Ghost shall come Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (QQ. Vet. upon thee,” as it were, in order to prepare and fashion et Nov. Test., qu. 52): “This may be understood in two the matter of Christ’s body; “and the Power of the Most ways. For, first, Christ’s house is the Church, which He High,” i.e. Christ, “shall overshadow thee—that is to say, built with His blood. Secondly, His body may be called the incorporeal Light of the Godhead shall in thee take His house, just as it is called His temple. . . and what is the corporeal substance of human nature: for a shadow is done by the Holy Ghost is done by the Son of God, be- formed by light and body,” as Gregory says (Moral. xviii). cause Theirs is one Nature and one Will.” t IIIa q. 32 a. 2 he Holy Ghost?]Whether it should be said that Christ was conceived of [de] the Holy Ghost? Objection 1. It would seem that we should not say I answer that, Conception is not attributed to Christ’s that Christ was conceived of [de] the Holy Ghost. Because body alone, but also to Christ Himself by reason of His on Rom. 11:36: “For of Him [ex ipso] and by Him, and in body. Now, in the Holy Ghost we may observe a twofold Him, are all things,” the gloss of Augustine says: “Notice habitude to Christ. For to the Son of God Himself, who that he does not say, ‘of Him’ [de ipso], but ‘of Him’ [ex is said to have been conceived, He has a habitude of con- ipso]. For of Him [ex ipso], are heaven and earth, since substantiality: while to His body He has the habitude of He made them: but not of Him [de ipso], since they are efficient cause. And this preposition of [de] signifies both not made of His substance.” But the Holy Ghost did not habitudes: thus we say that a certain man is “of [de] his form Christ’s body of [de] His own substance. Therefore father.” And therefore we can fittingly say that Christ was we should not say that Christ was conceived of [de] the conceived of the Holy Ghost in such a way that the effi- Holy Ghost. ciency of the Holy Ghost be referred to the body assumed, Objection 2. Further, the active principle of [de] and the consubstantiality to the Person assuming. which something is conceived is as the seed in genera- Reply to Objection 1. Christ’s body, through not be- tion. But the Holy Ghost did not take the place of seed ing consubstantial with the Holy Ghost, cannot properly in Christ’s conception. For Jerome says (Expos. Cathol. be said to be conceived “of” [de] the Holy Ghost, but Fidei)∗: “We do not say, as some wicked wretches hold, rather “from [ex] the Holy Ghost,” as Ambrose says (De that the Holy Ghost took the place of seed: but we say that Spir. Sanct. ii.): “What is from someone is either from Christ’s body was wrought,” i.e. formed, “by the power his substance or from his power: from his substance, as and might of the Creator.” Therefore we should not say the Son who is from the Father; from his power, as all that Christ’s body was conceived of [de] the Holy Ghost. things are from God, just as Mary conceived from the Objection 3. Further, no one thing is made of two, ex- Holy Ghost.” cept they be in some way mingled. But Christ’s body was Reply to Objection 2. It seems that on this point formed of [de] the Virgin Mary. If therefore we say that there is a difference of opinion between Jerome and cer- Christ was conceived of [de] the Holy Ghost, it seems that tain other Doctors, who assert that the Holy Ghost took a mingling took place of the Holy Ghost with the matter the place of seed in this conception. For Chrysostom says supplied by the Virgin: and this is clearly false. Therefore (Hom. i in Matth.†): “When God’s Only-Begotten was we should not say that Christ was conceived of [de] the about to enter into the Virgin, the Holy Ghost preceded Holy Ghost. Him; that by the previous entrance of the Holy Ghost, On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 1:18): “Before Christ might be born unto sanctification according to His they came together, she was found with child, of [de] the body, the Godhead entering instead of the seed.” And Holy Ghost.” Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): “God’s wisdom and ∗ Written by Pelagius † Opus Imperf., among the supposititious writings 2256 power overshadowed her, like unto a Divine seed.” a corporeal substance which is transformed in conception. But these expressions are easily explained. Because Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (Enchirid- Chrysostom and Damascene compare the Holy Ghost, or ion xl), Christ is said to be conceived or born of the Holy also the Son, who is the Power of the Most High, to seed, Ghost in one sense; of the Virgin Mary in another—of by reason of the active power therein; while Jerome denies the Virgin Mary materially; of the Holy Ghost efficiently. that the Holy Ghost took the place of seed, considered as Therefore there was no mingling here. Whether the Holy Ghost should be called Christ’s father in respect of His humanity? IIIa q. 32 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the Holy Ghost the hair like the man nor is the man born like the seed, but should be called Christ’s father in respect of His humanity. like the man who begot him. And if the likeness be per- Because, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Ani- fect, the sonship is perfect, whether in God or in man. But mal. i): “The Father is the active principle in generation, if the likeness be imperfect, the sonship is imperfect. Thus the Mother supplies the matter.” But the Blessed Virgin is in man there is a certain imperfect likeness to God, both called Christ’s Mother, by reason of the matter which she as regards his being created to God’s image and as regards supplied in His conception. Therefore it seems that the His being created unto the likeness of grace. Therefore in Holy Ghost can be called His father, through being the both ways man can be called His son, both because he is active principle in His conception. created to His image and because he is likened to Him by Objection 2. Further, as the minds of other holy men grace. Now, it must be observed that what is said in its are fashioned by the Holy Ghost, so also was Christ’s perfect sense of a thing should not be said thereof in its body fashioned by the Holy Ghost. But other holy men, imperfect sense: thus, because Socrates is said to be nat- on account of the aforesaid fashioning, are called the chil- urally a man, in the proper sense of “man,” never is he dren of the whole Trinity, and consequently of the Holy called man in the sense in which the portrait of a man is Ghost. Therefore it seems that Christ should be called the called a man, although, perhaps, he may resemble another Son of the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as His body was fash- man. Now, Christ is the Son of God in the perfect sense ioned by the Holy Ghost. of sonship. Wherefore, although in His human nature He Objection 3. Further, God is called our Father by rea- was created and justified, He ought not to be called the son of His having made us, according to Dt. 32:6: “Is not Son of God, either in respect of His being created or of He thy Father, that hath possessed thee, and made thee and His being justified, but only in respect of His eternal gen- created thee?” But the Holy Ghost made Christ’s body, as eration, by reason of which He is the Son of the Father stated above (Aa. 1,2). Therefore the Holy Ghost should alone. Therefore nowise should Christ be called the Son be called Christ’s Father in respect of the body fashioned of the Holy Ghost, nor even of the whole Trinity. by Him. Reply to Objection 1. Christ was conceived of the On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xl): Virgin Mary, who supplied the matter of His conception “Christ was born of the Holy Ghost not as a Son, and of unto likeness of species. For this reason He is called her the Virgin Mary as a Son.” Son. But as man He was conceived of the Holy Ghost as I answer that, The words “fatherhood,” “mother- the active principle of His conception, but not unto like- hood,” and “sonship,” result from generation; yet not from ness of species, as a man is born of his father. Therefore any generation, but from that of living things, especially Christ is not called the Son of the Holy Ghost. animals. For we do not say that fire generated is the son of Reply to Objection 2. Men who are fashioned spir- the fire generating it, except, perhaps, metaphorically; we itually by the Holy Ghost cannot be called sons of God speak thus only of animals in whom generation is more in the perfect sense of sonship. And therefore they are perfect. Nevertheless, the word “son” is not applied to ev- called sons of God in respect of imperfect sonship, which erything generated in animals, but only to that which is is by reason of the likeness of grace, which flows from the generated into likeness of the generator. Wherefore, as whole Trinity. Augustine says (Enchiridion xxxix), we do not say that a But with Christ it is different, as stated above. hair which is generated in a man is his son; nor do we say The same reply avails for the Third Objection. that a man who is born is the son of the seed; for neither is 2257 Whether the Blessed Virgin cooperated actively in the conception of Christ’s body? IIIa q. 32 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the Blessed Virgin ity, they say that the Holy Ghost supernaturally bestowed cooperated actively in the conception of Christ’s body. on her an active power in the conception of Christ’s body, For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that “the Holy which power other mothers have by reason of the semen Ghost came upon the Virgin, purifying her, and bestowing resolved. But this cannot stand, because, since “each thing on her the power to receive and to bring forth the Word of is on account of its operation” (De Coel. ii), nature would God.” But she had from nature the passive power of gen- not, for the purpose of the act of generation, distinguish eration, like any other woman. Therefore He bestowed on the male and female sexes, unless the action of the male her an active power of generation. And thus she cooper- were distinct from that of the female. Now, in generation ated actively in Christ’s conception. there are two distinct operations—that of the agent and Objection 2. Further, all the powers of the vegeta- that of the patient. Wherefore it follows that the entire ac- tive soul are active, as the Commentator says (De Anima tive operation is on the part of the male, and the passive ii). But the generative power, in both man and woman, on the part of the female. For this reason in plants, where belongs to the vegetative soul. Therefore, both in man both forces are mingled, there is no distinction of male and woman, it cooperates actively in the conception of and female. the child. Since, therefore, the Blessed Virgin was not Christ’s Objection 3. Further, in the conception of a child the Father, but His Mother, it follows that it was not given to woman supplies the matter from which the child’s body her to exercise an active power in His conception: whether is naturally formed. But nature is an intrinsic principle of to cooperate actively so as to be His Father, or not to co- movement. Therefore it seems that in the very matter sup- operate at all, as some say. whence it would follow that plied by the Blessed Virgin there was an active principle. this active power was bestowed on her to no purpose. We On the contrary, The active principle in generation is must therefore say that in Christ’s conception itself she called the “seminal virtue.” But, as Augustine says (Gen. did not cooperate actively, but merely supplied the matter ad lit. x), Christ’s body “was taken from the Virgin, only thereof. Nevertheless, before the conception she coop- as to corporeal matter, by the Divine power of concep- erated actively in the preparation of the matter so that it tion and formation, but not by any human seminal virtue.” should be apt for the conception. Therefore the Blessed Virgin did not cooperate actively Reply to Objection 1. This conception had three in, the conception of Christ’s body. privileges—namely, that it was without original sin; that it I answer that, Some say that the Blessed Virgin coop- was not that of a man only, but of God and man; and that erated actively in Christ’s conception, both by natural and it was a virginal conception. And all three were effected by a supernatural power. By natural power, because they by the Holy Ghost. Therefore Damascene says, as to the hold that in all natural matter there is an active principle. first, that the Holy Ghost “came upon the Virgin, purifying otherwise they believe that there would be no such thing her”—that is, preserving her from conceiving with origi- as natural transformation. But in this they are deceived. nal sin. As to the second, he says: “And bestowing on her Because a transformation is said to be natural by reason the power to receive,” i.e. to conceive, “the Word of God.” not only of an active but also of a passive intrinsic prin- As to the third, he says: “And to give birth” to Him, i.e. ciple: for the Philosopher says expressly (Phys. viii) that that she might, while remaining a virgin, bring Him forth, in heavy and light things there is a passive, and not an ac- not actively, but passively, just as other mothers achieve tive, principle of natural movement. Nor is it possible for this through the action of the male seed. matter to be active in its own formation, since it is not in Reply to Objection 2. The generative power of the act. Nor, again, is it possible for anything to put itself in female is imperfect compared to that of the male. And, motion except it be divided into two parts, one being the therefore, just as in the arts the inferior art gives a dispo- mover, the other being moved: which happens in animate sition to the matter to which the higher art gives the form, things only, as is proved Phys. viii. as is stated Phys. ii, so also the generative power of the By a supernatural power, because they say that the female prepares the matter, which is then fashioned by the mother requires not only to supply the matter, which is active power of the male. the menstrual blood, but also the semen, which, being Reply to Objection 3. In order for a transformation mingled with that of the male, has an active power in to be natural, there is no need for an active principle in generation. And since in the Blessed Virgin there was matter, but only for a passive principle, as stated above. no resolution of semen, by reason of her inviolate virgin- 2258 THIRD PART, QUESTION 33 Of the Mode and Order of Christ’s Conception (In Four Articles) We have now to consider the mode and order of Christ’s conception, concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ’s body was formed in the first instant of its conception? (2) Whether it was animated in the first instant of its conception? (3) Whether it was assumed by the Word in the first instant of its conception? (4) Whether this conception was natural or miraculous? Whether Christ’s body was formed in the first instant of its conception? IIIa q. 33 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s body was On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xviii): “As not formed in the first instant of its conception. For it is soon as the angel announced it, as soon as the Spirit came written (Jn. 2:20): “Six-and-forty years was this Tem- down, the Word was in the womb, within the womb the ple in building”; on which words Augustine comments as Word was made flesh.” follows (De Trin. iv): “This number applies manifestly I answer that, In the conception of Christ’s body three to the perfection of our Lord’s body.” He says, further points may be considered: first, the local movement of (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 56): “It is not without reason that the the blood to the place of generation; secondly, the forma- Temple, which was a type of His body, is said to have tion of the body from that matter; thirdly, the development been forty-six years in building: so that as many years whereby it was brought to perfection of quantity. of these, as it took to build the Temple, in so many days was our the second is the conception itself; the first is a preamble; Lord’s body perfected.” Therefore Christ’s body was not the third, a result of the conception. perfectly formed in the first instant of its conception. Now, the first could not be instantaneous: since this Objection 2. Further, there was need of local move- would be contrary to the very nature of the local move- ment for the formation of Christ’s body in order that the ment of any body whatever, the parts of which come into purest blood of the Virgin’s body might be brought where a place successively. The third also requires a succession generation might aptly take place. Now, no body can of time: both because there is no increase without local be moved locally in an instant: since the time taken in movement, and because increase is effected by the power movement is divided according to the division of the thing of the soul already informing the body, the operation of moved, as is proved Phys. vi. Therefore Christ’s body was which power is subject to time. not formed in an instant. But the body’s very formation, in which conception Objection 3. Further, Christ’s body was formed of principally consists, was instantaneous, for two reasons. the purest blood of the Virgin, as stated above (q. 31, First, because of the infinite power of the agent, viz. the a. 5). But that matter could not be in the same instant both Holy Ghost, by whom Christ’s body was formed, as stated blood and flesh, because thus matter would have been at above (q. 32, a. 1). For the greater the power of an agent, the same time the subject of two forms. Therefore the last the more quickly can it dispose matter; and, consequently, instant in which it was blood was distinct from the first in- an agent of infinite power can dispose matter instanta- stant in which it was flesh. But between any two instants neously to its due form. Secondly, on the part of the Per- there is an interval of time. Therefore Christ’s body was son of the Son, whose body was being formed. For it not formed in an instant, but during a space of time. was unbecoming that He should take to Himself a body Objection 4. Further, as the augmentative power re- as yet unformed. While, if the conception had been go- quires a fixed time for its act, so also does the genera- ing on for any time before the perfect formation of the tive power: for both are natural powers belonging to the body, the whole conception could not be attributed to the vegetative soul. But Christ’s body took a fixed time to Son of God, since it is not attributed to Him except by grow, like the bodies of other men: for it is written (Lk. reason of the assumption of that body. Therefore in the 2:52) that He “advanced in wisdom and age.” Therefore it first instant in which the various parts of the matter were seems for the same reason that the formation of His body, united together in the place of generation, Christ’s body since that, too, belongs to the generative power, was not was both perfectly formed and assumed. And thus is the instantaneous, but took a fixed time, like the bodies of Son of God said to have been conceived; nor could it be other men. said otherwise. 2259 Reply to Objection 1. Neither quotation from Au-Reply to Objection 4. Increase is caused by the aug- gustine refers to formation alone of Christ’s body, but to mentative power of that which is the subject of increase: its formation, together with a fixed development up to the but the formation of the body is caused by the generative time of His birth. Wherefore in the aforesaid number are power, not of that which is generated, but of the father foreshadowed the number of months during which Christ generating from seed, in which the formative power de- was in the Virgin’s womb. rived from the father’s soul has its operation. But Christ’s Reply to Objection 2. This local movement is not body was not formed by the seed of man, as stated above comprised within the conception itself, but is a preamble (q. 31, a. 5, ad 3), but by the operation of the Holy thereto. Ghost. Therefore the formation thereof should be such Reply to Objection 3. It is not possible to fix the last as to be worthy of the Holy Ghost. But the development instant in which that matter was blood: but it is possible of Christ’s body was the effect of the augmentative power to fix the last period of time which continued without any in Christ’s soul: and since this was of the same species as interval up to the first instant in which Christ’s body was ours, it behooved His body to develop in the same way as formed. And this instant was the terminus of the time oc- the bodies of other men, so as to prove the reality of His cupied by the local movement of the matter towards the human nature. place of generation. Whether Christ’s body was animated in the first instant of its conception? IIIa q. 33 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s body was not the very Son of God, as we confess in the Creed, when animated in the first instant of its conception. For Pope we say, “who was conceived by the Holy Ghost,” we must Leo says (Ep. ad Julian.): “Christ’s flesh was not of an- needs say that the body itself, in being conceived, was as- other nature than ours: nor was the beginning of His ani- sumed by the Word of God. Now it has been shown above mation different from that of other men.” But the soul is (q. 6, Aa. 1 ,2) that the Word of God assumed the body by not infused into other men at the first instant of their con- means of the soul, and the soul by means of the spirit, i.e. ception. Therefore neither should Christ’s soul have been the intellect. Wherefore in the first instant of its concep- infused into His body in the first instant of its conception. tion Christ’s body must needs have been animated by the Objection 2. Further, the soul, like any natural form, rational soul. requires determinate quantity in its matter. But in the first Reply to Objection 1. The beginning of the infusion instant of its conception Christ’s body was not of the same of the soul may be considered in two ways. First, in regard quantity as the bodies of other men when they are ani- to the disposition of the body. And thus, the beginning of mated: otherwise, if afterwards its development had been the infusion of the soul into Christ’s body was the same continuous, either its birth would have occurred sooner, or as in other men’s bodies: for just as the soul is infused at the time of birth He would have been a bigger child than into another man’s body as soon as it is formed, so was it others. The former alternative is contrary to what Augus- with Christ. Secondly, this beginning may be considered tine says (De Trin. iv), where he proves that Christ was merely in regard to time. And thus, because Christ’s body in the Virgin’s womb for the space of nine months: while was perfectly formed in a shorter space of time, so after a the latter is contrary to what Pope Leo says (Serm. iv shorter space of time was it animated. in Epiph.): “They found the child Jesus nowise differing Reply to Objection 2. The soul requires due quantity from the generality of infants.” Therefore Christ’s body in the matter into which it is infused: but this quantity al- was not animated in the first instant of its conception. lows of a certain latitude because it is not fixed to a certain Objection 3. Further, whenever there is “before” and amount. Now the quantity that a body has when the soul is “after” there must be several instants. But according to first infused into it is in proportion to the perfect quantity the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal. ii) in the generation to which it will attain by development: that is to say, men of a man there must needs be “before” and “after”: for he of greater stature have greater bodies at the time of first is first of all a living thing, and afterwards, an animal, and animation. But Christ at the perfect age was of becoming after that, a man. Therefore the animation of Christ could and middle stature: in proportion to which was the quan- not be effected in the first instant of His conception. tity of His body at the time when other men’s bodies are On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): animated; though it was less than theirs at the first instant “At the very instant that there was flesh, it was the flesh of His conception. Nevertheless that quantity was not too of the Word of God, it was flesh animated with a rational small to safeguard the nature of an animated body; since and intellectual soul.” it would have sufficed for the animation of a small man’s I answer that, For the conception to be attributed to body. 2260 Reply to Objection 3. What the Philosopher says is receives a perfect soul. But Christ’s body, on account of true in the generation of other men, because the body is the infinite power of the agent, was perfectly disposed in- successively formed and disposed for the soul: whence, stantaneously. Wherefore, at once and in the first instant first, as being imperfectly disposed, it receives an imper- it received a perfect form, that is, the rational soul. fect soul; and afterwards, when it is perfectly disposed, it Whether Christ’s flesh was first of all conceived and afterwards assumed? IIIa q. 33 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s flesh was hypostasis other than that of the Word of God. And this is first of all conceived, and afterwards assumed. Because against the very nature of the Incarnation, which we hold what is not cannot be assumed. But Christ’s flesh began to consist in this, that the Word of God was united to hu- to exist when it was conceived. Therefore it seems that it man nature and to all its parts in the unity of hypostasis: was assumed by the Word of God after it was conceived. nor was it becoming that the Word of God should, by as- Objection 2. Further, Christ’s flesh was assumed by suming human nature, destroy a pre-existing hypostasis the Word of God, by means of the rational soul. But it of human nature or of any part thereof. It is consequently received the rational soul at the term of the conception. contrary to faith to assert that Christ’s flesh was first of all Therefore it was assumed at the term of the conception. conceived and afterwards assumed by the Word of God. But at the term of the conception it was already conceived. Reply to Objection 1. If Christ’s flesh had been Therefore it was first of all conceived and afterwards as- formed or conceived, not instantaneously, but succes- sumed. sively, one of two things would follow: either that what Objection 3. Further, in everything generated, that was assumed was not yet flesh, or that the flesh was con- which is imperfect precedes in time that which is perfect: ceived before it was assumed. But since we hold that the which is made clear by the Philosopher (Metaph. ix). But conception was effected instantaneously, it follows that in Christ’s body is something generated. Therefore it did that flesh the beginning and the completion of its concep- not attain to its ultimate perfection, which consisted in the tion were in the same instant. So that, as Augustine† says: union with the Word of God, at the first instant of its con- “We say that the very Word of God was conceived in tak- ception; but, first of all, the flesh was conceived and after- ing flesh, and that His very flesh was conceived by the wards assumed. Word taking flesh.” On the contrary, Augustine says (De Fide ad Petrum From the above the reply to the Second Objection is xviii∗): “Hold steadfastly, and doubt not for a moment clear. For in the same moment that this flesh began to be that Christ’s flesh was not conceived in the Virgin’s conceived, its conception and animation were completed. womb, before being assumed by the Word.” Reply to Objection 3. The mystery of the Incarna- I answer that, As stated above, we may say properly tion is not to be looked upon as an ascent, as it were, of a that “God was made man,” but not that “man was made man already existing and mounting up to the dignity of the God”: because God took to Himself that which belongs Union: as the heretic Photinus maintained. Rather is it to to man—and that which belongs to man did not pre-exist, be considered as a descent, by reason of the perfect Word as subsisting in itself, before being assumed by the Word. of God taking unto Himself the imperfection of our na- But if Christ’s flesh had been conceived before being as- ture; according to Jn. 6:38: “I came down from heaven.” sumed by the Word, it would have had at some time an Whether Christ’s conception was natural? IIIa q. 33 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s conception His conception was not miraculous, but natural. was natural. For Christ is called the Son of Man by reason Objection 3. Further, for a transformation to be nat- of His conception in the flesh. But He is a true and natural ural, it is enough that the passive principle be natural, as Son of Man: as also is He the true and natural Son of God. stated above (q. 32, a. 4). But in Christ’s conception the Therefore His conception was natural. passive principle on the part of His Mother was natural, as Objection 2. Further, no creature can be the cause of we have shown (q. 32, a. 4). Therefore Christ’s concep- a miraculous effect. But Christ’s conception is attributed tion was natural. to the Blessed Virgin, who is a mere creature: for we say On the contrary, Dionysius says (Ep. ad Caium that the Virgin conceived Christ. Therefore it seems that Monach.): “Christ does in a superhuman way those things ∗ Written by Fulgentius † Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum xviii 2261 that pertain to man: this is shown in the miraculous vir-Reply to Objection 1. Christ is said to be a natural ginal conception.” Son of Man, by reason of His having a true human na- I answer that, As Ambrose says (De Incarn. vi): “In ture, through which He is a Son of Man, although He had this mystery thou shalt find many things that are natural, it miraculously; thus, too, the blind man to whom sight and many that are supernatural.” For if we consider in this has been restored sees naturally by sight miraculously re- conception anything connected with the matter thereof, ceived. which was supplied by the mother, it was in all such things Reply to Objection 2. The conception is attributed to natural. But if we consider it on the part of the active the Blessed Virgin, not as the active principle thereof, but power, thus it was entirely miraculous. And since judg- because she supplied the matter, and because the concep- ment of a thing should be pronounced in respect of its tion took place in her womb. form rather than of its matter: and likewise in respect of Reply to Objection 3. A natural passive principle suf- its activity rather than of its passiveness: therefore is it that fices for a transformation to be natural, when it is moved Christ’s conception should be described simply as mirac- by its proper active principle in a natural and wonted way. ulous and supernatural, although in a certain respect it was But this is not so in the case in point. Therefore this con- natural. ception cannot be called simply natural. 2262 THIRD PART, QUESTION 34 Of the Perfection of the Child Conceived (In Four Articles) We must now consider the perfection of the child conceived: and concerning this there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ was sanctified by grace in the first instant of His conception? (2) Whether in that same instant He had the use of free-will? (3) Whether in that same instant He could merit? (4) Whether in that same instant He was a perfect comprehensor? Whether Christ was sanctified in the first instant of His conception? IIIa q. 34 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ was not sanc- attain to the spiritual state. But the mystery of the Incarna- tified in the first instant of His conception. For it is writ- tion is considered as a condescension of the fulness of the ten (1 Cor. 15:46): “That was not first which is spiritual, Godhead into human nature rather than as the promotion but that which is natural: afterwards that which is spiri- of human nature, already existing, as it were, to the God- tual.” But sanctification by grace is something spiritual. head. Therefore in the man Christ there was perfection of Therefore Christ received the grace of sanctification, not spiritual life from the very beginning. at the very beginning of His conception, but after a space Reply to Objection 2. To be sanctified is to be made of time. holy. Now something is made not only from its contrary, Objection 2. Further, sanctification seems to be a but also from that which is opposite to it, either by nega- cleansing from sin: according to 1 Cor. 6:1: “And such tion or by privation: thus white is made either from black some of you were,” namely, sinners, “but you are washed, or from not-white. We indeed from being sinners are but you are sanctified.” But sin was never in Christ. made holy: so that our sanctification is a cleansing from Therefore it was not becoming that He should be sanc- sin. Whereas Christ, as man, was made holy, because He tified by grace. was not always thus sanctified by grace: yet He was not Objection 3. Further, as by the Word of God “all made holy from being a sinner, because He never sinned; things were made,” so from the Word incarnate all men but He was made holy from not-holy as man, not indeed who are made holy receive holiness, according to Heb. by privation, as though He were at some time a man and 2:11: “Both he that sanctifieth and they who are sancti- not holy; but by negation—that is, when He was not man fied are all of one.” But “the Word of God, by whom all He had not human sanctity. Therefore at the same time things were made, was not Himself made”; as Augustine He was made man and a holy man. For this reason the says (De Trin. i). Therefore Christ, by whom all are made angel said (Lk. 1:35): “The Holy which shall be born of holy, was not Himself made holy. thee.” Which words Gregory expounds as follows (Moral. On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 1:35): “The Holy xviii): “In order to show the distinction between His ho- which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of liness and ours, it is declared that He shall be born holy. God”; and (Jn. 10:36): “Whom the Father hath sanctified For we, though we are made holy, yet are not born holy, and sent into the world.” because by the mere condition of a corruptible nature we I answer that, As stated above (q. 7, Aa. 9,10,12), the are tied. . . But He alone is truly born holy who. . . was not abundance of grace sanctifying Christ’s soul flows from conceived by the combining of carnal union.” the very union of the Word, according to Jn. 1:14: “We Reply to Objection 3. The Father creates things saw His glory. . . as it were of the Only-Begotten of the through the Son, and the whole Trinity sanctifies men Father, full of grace and truth.” For it has been shown through the Man Christ, but not in the same way. For the above (q. 33, Aa. 2,3) that in the first instant of concep- Word of God has the same power and operation as God tion, Christ’s body was both animated and assumed by the Father: hence the Father does not work through the the Word of God. Consequently, in the first instant of His Son as an instrument, which is both mover and moved. conception, Christ had the fulness of grace sanctifying His Whereas the humanity of Christ is as the instrument of body and His soul. the Godhead, as stated above (q. 7, a. 1, ad 3; q. 8, a. 1, Reply to Objection 1. The order set down by the ad 1). Therefore Christ’s humanity is both sanctified and Apostle in this passage refers to those who by advancing sanctifier. 2263 Whether Christ as man had the use of free-will in the first instant of His conception? IIIa q. 34 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ as man had not den and instantaneous, much more, indeed, than corporeal the use of free-will in the first instant of His conception. vision; inasmuch as to understand, to will, and to feel, are For a thing is, before it acts or operates. Now the use of not movements that may be described as “acts of an im- free-will is an operation. Since, therefore, Christ’s soul perfect being,” which attains perfection successively, but began to exist in the first instant of His conception, as was are “the acts of an already perfect being,” as is said, De made clear above (q. 33, a. 2), it seems impossible that He Anima iii, text. 28. We must therefore say that Christ had should have the use of free-will in the first instant of His the use of free-will in the first instant of His conception. conception. Reply to Objection 1. Existence precedes action by Objection 2. Further, the use of free-will consists in nature, but not in time; but at the same time the agent has choice. But choice presupposes the deliberation of coun- perfect existence, and begins to act unless it is hindered. sel: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that choice is “the Thus fire, as soon as it is generated, begins to give heat desire of what has been previously the object of deliber- and light. The action of heating, however, is not termi- ation.” Therefore it seems impossible that Christ should nated in an instant, but continues for a time; whereas the have had the use of free-will in the first instant of His con- action of giving light is perfected in an instant. And such ception. an operation is the use of free-will, as stated above. Objection 3. Further, the free-will is “a faculty of the Reply to Objection 2. As soon as counsel or deliber-will and reason,” as stated in the Ia, q. 83, a. 2, obj. 2: ation is ended, there may be choice. But those who need consequently the use of free-will is an act of the will and the deliberation of counsel, as soon as this comes to an end the reason or intellect. But the act of the intellect pre- are certain of what ought to be chosen: and consequently supposes an act of the senses; and this cannot exist with- they choose at once. From this it is clear that the delibera- out proper disposition of the organs—a condition which tion of counsel does not of necessity precede choice save would seem impossible in the first instant of Christ’s con- for the purpose of inquiring into what is uncertain. But ception. Therefore it seems that Christ could not have the Christ, in the first instant of His conception, had the ful- use of free-will at the first instant of His conception. ness of sanctifying grace, and in like manner the fulness On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the of known truth; according to Jn. 1:14: “Full of grace and Trinity (Gregory: Regist. ix, Ep. 61): “As soon as the truth.” Wherefore, as being possessed of certainty about Word entered the womb, while retaining the reality of His all things, He could choose at once in an instant. Nature, He was made flesh, and a perfect man.” But a per- Reply to Objection 3. Christ’s intellect, in regard to fect man has the use of free-will. Therefore Christ had the His infused knowledge, could understand without turning use of free-will in the first instant of His conception. to phantasms, as stated above (q. 11, a. 2). Consequently I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), spiritual perfec- His intellect and will could act without any action of the tion was becoming to the human nature which Christ took, senses. which perfection He attained not by making progress, but Nevertheless it was possible for Him, in the first in- by receiving it from the very first. Now ultimate perfec- stant of His conception, to have an operation of the senses: tion does not consist in power or habit, but in operation; especially as to the sense of touch, which the infant can wherefore it is said (De Anima ii, text. 5) that operation exercise in the womb even before it has received the ratio- is a “second act.” We must, therefore, say that in the first nal soul, as is said, De Gener. Animal. ii, 3,4. Wherefore, instant of His conception Christ had that operation of the since Christ had the rational soul in the first instant of His soul which can be had in an instant. And such is the oper- conception, through His body being already fashioned and ation of the will and intellect, in which the use of free-will endowed with sensible organs, much more was it possible consists. For the operation of the intellect and will is sud- for Him to exercise the sense of touch in that same instant. Whether Christ could merit in the first instant of His conception? IIIa q. 34 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ could not merit Objection 2. Further, that which man has in the first in the first instant of His conception. For the free-will instant of his conception seems to be natural to him: for it bears the same relation to merit as to demerit. But the is in this that his natural generation is terminated. But we devil could not sin in the first instant of his creation, as do not merit by what is natural to us, as is clear from what was shown in the Ia, q. 63, a. 5. Therefore neither could has been said in the Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 5; Ia IIae, q. 114, Christ’s soul merit in the first instant of its creation—that a. 2. Therefore it seems that the use of free-will, which is, in the first instant of Christ’s conception. Christ as man had in the first instant of His conception, 2264 was not meritorious. the first instant of His conception. Objection 3. Further, that which a man has once mer- Reply to Objection 1. Free-will does not bear the ited he makes, in a way, his own: consequently it seems same relation to good as to evil: for to good it is related of that he cannot merit the same thing again: for no one mer- itself, and naturally; whereas to evil it is related as to a deits what is already his. If, therefore, Christ merited in the fect, and beside nature. Now, as the Philosopher says (De first instant of His conception, it follows that afterwards Coelo ii, text. 18): “That which is beside nature is sub- He merited nothing. But this is evidently untrue. There- sequent to that which is according to nature; because that fore Christ did not merit in the first instant of His concep- which is beside nature is an exception to nature.” There- tion. fore the free-will of a creature can be moved to good mer- On the contrary, Augustine∗ says: “Increase of merit itoriously in the first instant of its creation, but not to evil was absolutely impossible to the soul of Christ.” But in-sinfully; provided, however, its nature be unimpaired. crease of merit would have been possible had He not mer- Reply to Objection 2. That which man has at the first ited in the first instant of His conception. Therefore Christ moment of his creation, in the ordinary course of nature, merited in the first instant of His conception. is natural to him. but nothing hinders a creature from re- I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), Christ was sanc- ceiving from God a gift of grace at the very beginning of tified by grace in the first instant of His conception. Now, its creation. In this way did Christ’s soul in the first instant sanctification is twofold: that of adults who are sancti-of its creation receive grace by which it could merit. And fied in consideration of their own act; and that of infants for this reason is that grace, by way of a certain likeness, who are sanctified in consideration of, not their own act said to be natural to this Man, as explained by Augustine of faith, but that of their parents or of the Church. The (Enchiridion xl). former sanctification is more perfect than the latter: just Reply to Objection 3. Nothing prevents the same as act is more perfect than habit; and “that which is by it- thing belonging to someone from several causes. And self, than that which is by another”†. Since, therefore, the thus it is that Christ was able by subsequent actions and sanctification of Christ was most perfect, because He was sufferings to merit the glory of immortality, which He also so sanctified that He might sanctify others; consequently merited in the first instant of His conception: not, indeed, He was sanctified by reason of His own movement of the so that it became thereby more due to Him than before, but free-will towards God. Which movement, indeed, of the so that it was due to Him from more causes than before. free-will is meritorious. Consequently, Christ did merit in Whether Christ was a perfect comprehensor in the first instant of His conception? IIIa q. 34 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ was not a per- he whom Thou hast chosen, end taken to Thee”; which fect comprehensor in the first instant of His conception. words, according to the gloss, refer to Christ’s human na- For merit precedes reward, as fault precedes punishment. ture, which “was taken by the Word of God unto the unity But Christ merited in the first instant of His conception, as of Person.” But human nature was taken by the Word of stated above (a. 3). Since, therefore, the state of compre- God in the first instant of His conception. Therefore, in hension is the principal reward, it seems that Christ was the first instant of His conception, Christ, as man, was in not a comprehensor in the first instant of His conception. the state of beatitude; which is to be a comprehensor. Objection 2. Further, our Lord said (Lk. 24:26): I answer that, As appears from what was said above “Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and so (a. 3), it was unbecoming that in His conception Christ to enter into His glory?” But glory belongs to the state of should receive merely habitual grace without the act. comprehension. Therefore Christ was not in the state of Now, He received grace “not by measure” (Jn. 3:34), comprehension in the first instant of His conception, when as stated above (q. 7, a. 11). But the grace of the “way- as yet He had not suffered. farer,” being short of that of the “comprehensor,” is in less Objection 3. Further, what befits neither man nor an- measure than that of the comprehensor. Wherefore it is gel seems proper to God; and therefore is not becoming to manifest that in the first instant of His conception Christ Christ as man. But to be always in the state of beatitude received not only as much grace as comprehensors have, befits neither man nor angel: for if they had been cre- but also greater than that which they all have. And be- ated in beatitude, they would not have sinned afterwards. cause that grace was not without its act, it follows that Therefore Christ, as man, was not in the state of beatitude He was a comprehensor in act, seeing God in His Essence in the first instant of His conception. more clearly than other creatures. On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 64:5): “Blessed is Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 19, a. 3), ∗ Paterius, Expos. Vet. et Nov. Test. super Ex. 40 † Aristotle, Phys. viii 2265 Christ did not merit the glory of the soul, in respect of Reply to Objection 3. Since Christ was both God and which He is said to have been a comprehensor, but the man, He had, even in His humanity, something more than glory of the body, to which He came through His Passion. other creatures—namely, that He was in the state of beat- Wherefore the reply to the Second Objection is clear. itude from the very beginning. 2266 THIRD PART, QUESTION 35 Of Christ’s Nativity (In Eight Articles) After considering Christ’s conception, we must treat of His nativity. First, as to the nativity itself; secondly, as to His manifestation after birth. Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether nativity regards the nature or the person? (2) Whether another, besides His eternal, birth should be attributed to Christ? (3) Whether the Blessed Virgin is His Mother in respect of His temporal birth? (4) Whether she ought to be called the Mother of God? (5) Whether Christ is the Son of God the Father and of the Virgin Mother in respect of two filiations? (6) Of the mode of the Nativity; (7) Of its place; (8) Of the time of the Nativity. Whether nativity regards the nature rather than the person? IIIa q. 35 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that nativity regards the and whereas person or hypostasis designates something nature rather than the person. For Augustine∗ says (De as subsisting, nature designates form, whereby something Fide ad Petrum): “The eternal Divine Nature could not be subsists. Consequently, nativity is attributed to the person conceived and born of human nature, except in a true hu- or hypostasis as to the proper subject of being born, but man nature.” Consequently it becomes the Divine Nature not to the nature. to be conceived and born by reason of the human nature. But to the nature nativity is attributed as to its termi- Much more, therefore, does it regard human nature itself. nus. For the terminus of generation and of every nativity Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher is the form. Now, nature designates something as a form: (Metaph. v), “nature” is so denominated from “nativity.” wherefore nativity is said to be “the road to nature,” as the But things are denominated from one another by reason Philosopher states (Phys. ii): for the purpose of nature is of some likeness. Therefore it seems that nativity regards terminated in the form or nature of the species. the nature rather than the person. Reply to Objection 1. On account of the identity of Objection 3. Further, properly speaking, that is born nature and hypostasis in God, nature fs sometimes put in- which begins to exist by nativity. But Christ’s Person did stead of person or hypostasis. And in this sense Augustine not begin to exist by His nativity, whereas His human na- says that the Divine Nature was conceived and born, inas- ture did. Therefore it seems that the nativity properly re- much as the Person of the Son was conceived and born in gards the nature, and not the person. the human nature. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): Reply to Objection 2. No movement or change is de- “Nativity regards the hypostasis, not the nature.” nominated from the subject moved, but from the terminus I answer that, Nativity can be attributed to someone of the movement, whence the subject has its species. For in two ways: first, as to its subject; secondly, as to its this reason nativity is not denominated from the person terminus. To him that is born it is attributed as to its sub- born, but from nature, which is the terminus of nativity. ject: and this, properly speaking, is the hypostasis, not Reply to Objection 3. Nature, properly speaking, the nature. For since to be born is to be generated; as a does not begin to exist: rather is it the person that begins thing is generated in order for it to be, so is a thing born to exist in some nature. Because, as stated above, nature in order for it to be. Now, to be, properly speaking, be- designates that by which something is; whereas person longs to that which subsists; since a form that does not designates something as having subsistent being. subsist is said to be only inasmuch as by it something is: ∗ Fulgentius 2267 Whether a temporal nativity should be attributed to Christ? IIIa q. 35 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that temporal nativity is that they may be begotten. Without doubt, when this soul not to be attributed to Christ. For “to be born is a certain reaches the womb, being intent on fashioning the passible movement of a thing that did not exist before it was born, matter to its own purpose, it unites itself to the personality which movement procures for it the benefit of existence”∗. thereof, though manifestly it is not of the same substance; But Christ was from all eternity. Therefore He could not and thus of the active soul and passive matter, one man is be born in time. made out of two substances. And so we confess that the Objection 2. Further, what is perfect in itself needs soul is born from out the womb; but not as though, be- not to be born. But the Person of the Son of God was per- fore birth, it was nothing at all in itself. Thus, then, but fect from eternity. Therefore He needs not to be born in in a way much more sublime, the Son of God was born time. Therefore it seems that He had no temporal birth. as man, just as the soul is held to be born together with Objection 3. Further, properly speaking, nativity re- the body: not as though they both made one substance, gards the person. But in Christ there is only one person. but that from both, one person results. Yet we do not say Therefore in Christ there is but one nativity. that the Son of God began thus to exist: lest it be thought Objection 4. Further, what is born by two nativities is that His Divinity is temporal. Nor do we acknowledge the born twice. But this proposition is false; “Christ was born flesh of the Son of God to have been from eternity: lest it twice”: because the nativity whereby He was born of the be thought that He took, not a true human body, but some Father suffers no interruption; since it is eternal. Whereas resemblance thereof.” interruption is required to warrant the use of the adverb Reply to Objection 2. This was an argument of “twice”: for a man is said to run twice whose running is Nestorius, and it is thus solved by Cyril in an epistle†: interrupted. Therefore it seems that we should not admit “We do not say that the Son of God had need, for His own a double nativity in Christ. sake, of a second nativity, after that which is from the Fa- On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): ther: for it is foolish and a mark of ignorance to say that “We confess two nativities in Christ: one of the Father— He who is from all eternity, and co-eternal with the Father, eternal; and one which occurred in these latter times for needs to begin again to exist. But because for us and for our sake.” our salvation, uniting the human nature to His Person, He I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), nature is com- became the child of a woman, for this reason do we say pared to nativity, as the terminus to movement or change. that He was born in the flesh.” Now, movement is diversified according to the diversity Reply to Objection 3. Nativity regards the person as of its termini, as the Philosopher shows (Phys. v). But, in its subject, the nature as its terminus. Now, it is possible Christ there is a twofold nature: one which He received of for several transformations to be in the same subject: yet the Father from eternity, the other which He received from must they be diversified in respect of their termini. But we His Mother in time. Therefore we must needs attribute to do not say this as though the eternal nativity were a trans- Christ a twofold nativity: one by which He was born of formation or a movement, but because it is designated by the Father from all eternity; one by which He was born of way of a transformation or movement. His Mother in time. Reply to Objection 4. Christ can be said to have been Reply to Objection 1. This was the argument of a born twice in respect of His two nativities. For just as he certain heretic, Felician, and is solved thus by Augustine is said to run twice who runs at two different times, so can (Contra Felic. xii). “Let us suppose,” says he, “as many He be said to be born twice who is born once from eternity maintain, that in the world there is a universal soul, which, and once in time: because eternity and time differ much by its ineffable movement, so gives life to all seed, that it more than two different times, although each signifies a is not compounded with things begotten, but bestows life measure of duration. Whether the Blessed Virgin can be called Christ’s Mother in respect of His temporal IIIa q. 35 a. 3 nativity? Objection 1. It would seem that the Blessed Virgin but merely supplied the matter. But this does not seem cannot be called Christ’s Mother in respect of His tempo- sufficient to make her His Mother: otherwise wood might ral nativity. For, as stated above (q. 32, a. 4), the Blessed be called the mother of the bed or bench. Therefore it Virgin Mary did not cooperate actively in begetting Christ, seems that the Blessed Virgin cannot be called the Mother ∗ Cf. Augustine, De Unit. Trin. xii † Cf. Acta Concil. Ephes., p. 1, cap. viii 2268 of Christ. Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 32, a. 3), Objection 2. Further, Christ was born miraculously of not every generation implies fatherhood or motherhood the Blessed Virgin. But a miraculous begetting does not and sonship, but only the generation of living things. Con- suffice for motherhood or sonship: for we do not speak sequently when inanimate things are made from some of Eve as being the daughter of Adam. Therefore neither matter, the relationship of motherhood and sonship does should Christ be called the Son of the Blessed Virgin. not follow from this, but only in the generation of living Objection 3. Further, motherhood seems to imply things, which is properly called nativity. partial separation of the semen. But, as Damascene says Reply to Objection 2. As Damascene says (De Fide (De Fide Orth. iii), “Christ’s body was formed, not by a Orth. iii): “The temporal nativity by which Christ was seminal process, but by the operation of the Holy Ghost.” born for our salvation is, in a way, natural, since a Man Therefore it seems that the Blessed Virgin should not be was born of a woman, and after the due lapse of time called the Mother of Christ. from His conception: but it is also supernatural, because On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 1:18): “The gen- He was begotten, not of seed, but of the Holy Ghost and eration of Christ was in this wise. When His Mother Mary the Blessed Virgin, above the law of conception.” Thus, was espoused to Joseph,” etc. then, on the part of the mother, this nativity was natural, I answer that, The Blessed Virgin Mary is in truth and but on the part of the operation of the Holy Ghost it was by nature the Mother of Christ. For, as we have said above supernatural. Therefore the Blessed Virgin is the true and (q. 5, a. 2; q. 31, a. 5), Christ’s body was not brought down natural Mother of Christ. from heaven, as the heretic Valentine maintained, but was Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 31, a. 5, ad taken from the Virgin Mother, and formed from her purest 3; q. 32, a. 4), the resolution of the woman’s semen is not blood. And this is all that is required for motherhood, as necessary for conception; neither, therefore, is it required has been made clear above (q. 31, a. 5; q. 32, a. 4). There- for motherhood. fore the Blessed Virgin is truly Christ’s Mother. Whether the Blessed Virgin should be called the Mother of God? IIIa q. 35 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the Blessed Virgin Incarnation took place in the hypostasis, as above stated should not be called the Mother of God. For in the Divine (q. 2, a. 3), it is manifest that this word “God” can stand mysteries we should not make any assertion that is not for the hypostasis, having a human and a Divine nature. taken from Holy Scripture. But we read nowhere in Holy Therefore whatever belongs to the Divine and to the hu- Scripture that she is the mother or parent of God, but that man nature can be attributed to that Person: both when she is the “mother of Christ” or of “the Child,” as may be a word is employed to stand for it, signifying the Divine seen from Mat. 1:18. Therefore we should not say that Nature, and when a word is used signifying the human the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God. nature. Now, conception and birth are attributed to the Objection 2. Further, Christ is called God in respect person and hypostasis in respect of that nature in which it of His Divine Nature. But the Divine Nature did not first is conceived and born. Since, therefore, the human nature originate from the Virgin. Therefore the Blessed Virgin was taken by the Divine Person in the very beginning of should not be called the Mother of God. the conception, as stated above (q. 33, a. 3), it follows that Objection 3. Further, the word “God” is predicated it can be truly said that God was conceived and born of the in common of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. If, therefore, Virgin. Now from this is a woman called a man’s mother, the Blessed Virgin is Mother of God it seems to follow that she conceived him and gave birth to him. Therefore that she was the Mother of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the Blessed Virgin is truly called the Mother of God. For which cannot be allowed. Therefore the Blessed Virgin the only way in which it could be denied that the Blessed should not be called Mother of God. Virgin is the Mother of God would be either if the hu- On the contrary, In the chapters of Cyril, approved manity were first subject to conception and birth, before in the Council of Ephesus (P. 1, Cap. xxvi), we read: “If this man were the Son of God, as Photinus said; or if the anyone confess not that the Emmanuel is truly God, and humanity were not assumed unto unity of the Person or that for this reason the Holy Virgin is the Mother of God, hypostasis of the Word of God, as Nestorius maintained. since she begot of her flesh the Word of God made flesh, But both of these are erroneous. Therefore it is heretical let him be anathema.” to deny that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God. I answer that, As stated above (q. 16, a. 1), every Reply to Objection 1. This was an argument of word that signifies a nature in the concrete can stand for Nestorius, and it is solved by saying that, although we any hypostasis of that nature. Now, since the union of the do not find it said expressly in Scripture that the Blessed 2269 Virgin is the Mother of God, yet we do find it expressly of the soul, he says too much. Something like this may said in Scripture that “Jesus Christ is true God,” as may be be perceived in the generation of Christ. For the Word seen 1 Jn. 5:20, and that the Blessed Virgin is the “Mother of God was born of the substance of God the Father: but of Jesus Christ,” which is clearly expressed Mat. 1:18. because He took flesh, we must of necessity confess that Therefore, from the words of Scripture it follows of ne- in the flesh He was born of a woman.” Consequently we cessity that she is the Mother of God. must say that the Blessed Virgin is called the Mother of Again, it is written (Rom. 9:5) that Christ is of the God, not as though she were the Mother of the Godhead, Jews “according to the flesh, who is over all things, God but because she is the mother, according to His human na- blessed for ever.” But He is not of the Jews except through ture, of the Person who has both the divine and the human the Blessed Virgin. Therefore He who is “above all things, nature. God blessed for ever,” is truly born of the Blessed Virgin Reply to Objection 3. Although the name “God” is as of His Mother. common to the three Persons, yet sometimes it stands for Reply to Objection 2. This was an argument of the Person of the Father alone, sometimes only for the Nestorius. But Cyril, in a letter against Nestorius∗, an- Person of the Son or of the Holy Ghost, as stated above swers it thus: “Just as when a man’s soul is born with (q. 16, a. 1; Ia, q. 39, a. 4). So that when we say, “The its body, they are considered as one being: and if anyone Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God,” this word “God” wish to say that the mother of the flesh is not the mother stands only for the incarnate Person of the Son. Whether there are two filiations in Christ? IIIa q. 35 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that there are two filia- property, as appears from what was said in the Ia, q. 32, tions in Christ. For nativity is the cause of filiation. But in a. 3; Ia, q. 40, a. 2. Therefore there is but one filiation in Christ there are two nativities. Therefore in Christ there Christ. are also two filiations. I answer that, opinions differ on this question. For Objection 2. Further, filiation, which is said of a man some, considering only the cause of filiation, which is na- as being the son of someone, his father or his mother, de- tivity, put two filiations in Christ, just as there are two na- pends, in a way, on him: because the very being of a rela- tivities. On the contrary, others, considering only the sub- tion consists “in being referred to another”; wherefore if ject of filiation, which is the person or hypostasis, put only one of two relatives be destroyed, the other is destroyed one filiation in Christ, just as there is but one hypostasis also. But the eternal filiation by which Christ is the Son or person. Because the unity or plurality of a relation is of God the Father depends not on His Mother, because considered in respect, not of its terms, but of its cause or nothing eternal depends on what is temporal. Therefore of its subject. For if it were considered in respect of its Christ is not His Mother’s Son by temporal filiation. Ei- terms, every man would of necessity have in himself two ther, therefore, He is not her Son at all, which is in con- filiations—one in reference to his father, and another in tradiction to what has been said above (Aa. 3,4), or He reference to his mother. But if we consider the question must needs be her Son by some other temporal filiation. aright, we shall see that every man bears but one relation Therefore in Christ there are two filiations. to both his father and his mother, on account of the unity Objection 3. Further, one of two relatives enters the of the cause thereof. For man is born by one birth of both definition of the other; hence it is clear that of two rel- father and mother: whence he bears but one relation to atives, one is specified from the other. But one and the both. The same is said of one master who teaches many same cannot be in diverse species. Therefore it seems disciples the same doctrine, and of one lord who governs impossible that one and the same relation be referred to many subjects by the same power. But if there be various extremes which are altogether diverse. But Christ is said causes specifically diverse, it seems that in consequence to be the Son of the Eternal Father and a temporal mother, the relations differ in species: wherefore nothing hinders who are terms altogether diverse. Therefore it seems that several such relations being in the same subject. Thus if a Christ cannot, by the same relation, be called the Son of man teach grammar to some and logic to others, his teach- the Father and of His Mother Therefore in Christ there are ing is of a different kind in one case and in the other; and two filiations. therefore one and the same man may have different rela- On the contrary, As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. tions as the master of different disciples, or of the same iii), things pertaining to the nature are multiple in Christ; disciples in regard to diverse doctrines. Sometimes, how- but not those things that pertain to the Person. But filia- ever, it happens that a man bears a relation to several in tion belongs especially to the Person, since it is a personal respect of various causes, but of the same species: thus a ∗ Cf. Acta Conc. Ephes., p. 1, cap. ii 2270 father may have several sons by several acts of generation. Reply to Objection 1. Temporal nativity would cause Wherefore the a real temporal filiation in Christ if there were in Him a paternity cannot differ specifically, since the acts of subject capable of such filiation. But this cannot be; since generation are specifically the same. And because several the eternal suppositum cannot be receptive of a temporal forms of the same species cannot at the same time be in relation, as stated above. Nor can it be said that it is recep- the same subject, it is impossible for several paternities to tive of temporal filiation by reason of the human nature, be in a man who is the father of several sons by natural just as it is receptive of the temporal nativity; because hu- generation. But it would not be so were he the father of man nature would need in some way to be the subject of one son by natural generation and of another by adoption. filiation, just as in a way it is the subject of nativity; for Now, it is manifest that Christ was not born by one and since an Ethiopian is said to be white by reason of his the same nativity, of the Father from eternity, and of His teeth, it must be that his teeth are the subject of whiteness. Mother in time: indeed, these two nativities differ specifi- But human nature can nowise be the subject of filiation, cally. Wherefore, as to this, we must say that there are var- because this relation regards directly the person. ious filiations, one temporal and the other eternal. Since, Reply to Objection 2. Eternal filiation does not de- however, the subject of filiation is neither the nature nor pend on a temporal mother, but together with this eternal part of the nature, but the person or hypostasis alone; and filiation we understand a certain temporal relation depen- since in Christ there is no other hypostasis or person than dent on the mother, in respect of which relation Christ is the eternal, there can be no other filiation in Christ but called the Son of His Mother. that which is in the eternal hypostasis. Now, every rela- Reply to Objection 3. One and being are mutually tion which is predicated of God from time does not put consequent, as is said Metaph. iv. Therefore, just as it something real in the eternal God, but only something ac- happens that in one of the extremes of a relation there is cording to our way of thinking, as we have said in the Ia, something real, whereas in the other there is not some- q. 13, a. 7. Therefore the filiation by which Christ is re- thing real, but merely a certain aspect, as the Philosopher ferred to His Mother cannot be a real relation, but only a observes of knowledge and the thing known; so also it relation of reason. happens that on the part of one extreme there is one rela- Consequently each opinion is true to a certain extent. tion, whereas on the part of the other there are many. Thus For if we consider the adequate causes of filiation, we in man on the part of his parents there is a twofold rela- must needs say that there are two filiations in respect of tion, the one of paternity, the other of motherhood, which the twofold nativity. But if we consider the subject of are specifically diverse, inasmuch as the father is the prin- filiation, which can only be the eternal suppositum, then ciple of generation in one way, and the mother in another no other than the eternal filiation in Christ is a real rela- (whereas if many be the principle of one action and in the tion. Nevertheless, He has the relation of Son in regard to same way—for instance, if many. together draw a ship His Mother, because it is implied in the relation of moth- along—there would be one and the same relation in all of erhood to Christ. Thus God is called Lord by a relation them); but on the part of the child there is but one filiation which is implied in the real relation by which the crea- in reality, though there be two in aspect, corresponding to ture is subject to God. And although lordship is not a real the two relations in the parents, as considered by the in- relation in God, yet is He really Lord through the real sub- tellect. And thus in one way there is only one real filiation jection of the creature to Him. In the same way Christ is in Christ, which is in respect of the Eternal Father: yet really the Son of the Virgin Mother through the real rela- there is another temporal relation in regard to His tempo- tion of her motherhood to Christ. ral mother. Whether Christ was born without His Mother suffering? IIIa q. 35 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ was not born Objection 2. Further, the end is proportionate to the without His Mother suffering. For just as man’s death was beginning. But Christ ended His life in pain, according to a result of the sin of our first parents, according to Gn. Is. 53:4: “Surely. . . He hath carried our sorrows.” There- 2:17: “In what day soever ye shall eat, ye shall [Vulg.: fore it seems that His nativity was not without the pains ‘thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt] die”; so were the pains of of childbirth. childbirth, according to Gn. 3:16: “In sorrow shalt thou Objection 3. Further, in the book on the birth of bring forth children.” But Christ was willing to undergo our Saviour∗ it is related that midwives were present at death. Therefore for the same reason it seems that His Christ’s birth; and they would be wanted by reason of birth should have been with pain. the mother’s suffering pain. Therefore it seems that the ∗ Protevangelium Jacobi xix, xx 2271 Blessed Virgin suffered pain in giving birth to her Child. bring Him forth without pain, without violation of her On the contrary, Augustine says (Serm. de Nativ.†), virginal integrity, without detriment to the purity of her addressing himself to the Virgin-Mother: “In conceiving maidenhood.” Christ, indeed, suffered death, but through thou wast all pure, in giving birth thou wast without pain.” His own spontaneous desire, in order to atone for us, not I answer that, The pains of childbirth are caused by as a necessary result of that sentence, for He was not a the infant opening the passage from the womb. Now it has debtor unto death. been said above (q. 28, a. 2, Replies to objections), that Reply to Objection 2. As “by His death” Christ “de- Christ came forth from the closed womb of His Mother, stroyed our death”†, so by His pains He freed us from our and, consequently, without opening the passage. Con- pains; and so He wished to die a painful death. But the sequently there was no pain in that birth, as neither was mother’s pains in childbirth did not concern Christ, who there any corruption; on the contrary, there was much joy came to atone for our sins. And therefore there was no therein for that God-Man “was born into the world,” ac- need for His Mother to suffer in giving birth. cording to Is. 35:1,2: “Like the lily, it shall bud forth and Reply to Objection 3. We are told (Lk. 2:7) that the blossom, and shall rejoice with joy and praise.” Blessed Virgin herself “wrapped up in swaddling clothes” Reply to Objection 1. The pains of childbirth in the the Child whom she had brought forth, “and laid Him in a woman follow from the mingling of the sexes. Wherefore manger.” Consequently the narrative of this book, which (Gn. 3:16) after the words, “in sorrow shalt thou bring is apocryphal, is untrue. Wherefore Jerome says (Adv. forth children,” the following are added: “and thou shalt Helvid. iv): “No midwife was there, no officious women be under thy husband’s power.” But, as Augustine says interfered. She was both mother and midwife. ‘With (Serm. de Assumpt. B. Virg.,∗), from this sentence we swaddling clothes,’ says he, ‘she wrapped up the child, must exclude the Virgin-Mother of God; who, “because and laid Him in a manger.’ ” These words prove the false- she conceived Christ without the defilement of sin, and ness of the apocryphal ravings. without the stain of sexual mingling, therefore did she Whether Christ should have been born in Bethlehem? IIIa q. 35 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ should not hem for two reasons. First, because “He was made. . . of have been born in Bethlehem. For it is written (Is. 2:3): the seed of David according to the flesh,” as it is written “The law shall come forth from Sion, and the Word of (Rom. 1:3); to whom also was a special promise made the Lord from Jerusalem.” But Christ is truly the Word concerning Christ; according to 2 Kings 23:1: “The man of God. Therefore He should have come into the world at to whom it was appointed concerning the Christ of the Jerusalem. God of Jacob. . . said.” Therefore He willed to be born Objection 2. Further, it is said (Mat. 2:23) that it at Bethlehem, where David was born, in order that by is written of Christ that “He shall be called a Nazarene”; the very birthplace the promise made to David might be which is taken from Is. 11:1: “A flower shall rise up out shown to be fulfilled. The Evangelist points this out by of his root”; for “Nazareth” is interpreted “a flower.” But saying: “Because He was of the house and of the fam- a man is named especially from the place of his birth. ily of David.” Secondly, because, as Gregory says (Hom. Therefore it seems that He should have been born in viii in Evang.): “Bethlehem is interpreted ‘the house of Nazareth, where also He was conceived and brought up. bread.’ It is Christ Himself who said, ‘I am the living Objection 3. Further, for this was our Lord born into Bread which came down from heaven.’ ” the world, that He might make known the true faith. ac- Reply to Objection 1. As David was born in Beth- cording to Jn. 18:37: “For this was I born, and for this lehem, so also did he choose Jerusalem to set up his came I into the world; that I should give testimony to the throne there, and to build there the Temple of God, so truth.” But this would have been easier if He had been that Jerusalem was at the same time a royal and a priestly born in the city of Rome, which at that time ruled the city. Now, Christ’s priesthood and kingdom were “con- world; whence Paul, writing to the Romans (1:8) says: summated” principally in His Passion. Therefore it was “Your faith is spoken of in the whole world.” Therefore it becoming that He should choose Bethlehem for His Birth- seems that He should not have been born in Bethlehem. place and Jerusalem for the scene of His Passion. On the contrary, It is written (Mic. 5:2): “And thou, At the same time, too, He put to silence the vain boast- Bethlehem, Ephrata. . . out of thee shall He come forth ing of men who take pride in being born in great cities, unto Me, that is to be the ruler in Israel.” where also they desire especially to receive honor. Christ, I answer that, Christ willed to be born in Bethle- on the contrary, willed to be born in a mean city, and to † Supposititious ∗ Supposititious † Preface of the Mass in Paschal-time 2272 suffer reproach in a great city. Emperor, His benefits would have been attributed to the Reply to Objection 2. Christ wished “to flower” by latter’s power. But that we might acknowledge the work His holy life, not in His carnal birth. Therefore He wished of God in the transformation of the whole earth, He chose to be fostered and brought up at Nazareth. But He wished a poor mother and a birthplace poorer still.” to be born at Bethlehem away from home; because, as “But the weak things of the world hath God chosen, Gregory says (Hom. viii in Evang.), through the human that He may confound the strong” (1 Cor. 1:27). And nature which He had taken, He was born, as it were, in a therefore, in order the more to show His power, He set foreign place—foreign not to His power, but to His Na- up the head of His Church in Rome itself, which was the ture. And, again, as Bede says on Lk. 2:7: “In order that head of the world, in sign of His complete victory, in or- He who found no room at the inn might prepare many der that from that city the faith might spread throughout mansions for us in His Father’s house.” the world; according to Is. 26:5,6: “The high city He shall Reply to Objection 3. According to a sermon in the lay low. . . the feet of the poor,” i.e. of Christ, “shall tread Council of Ephesus∗: “If He had chosen the great city of it down; the steps of the needy,” i.e. of the apostles Peter Rome, the change in the world would be ascribed to the and Paul. influence of her citizens. If He had been the son of the Whether Christ was born at a fitting time? IIIa q. 35 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ was not born at therefore, as He took our mortal nature in order to re- a fitting time. Because Christ came in order to restore lib- store us to life, so, as Bede says (Super Luc. ii, 4,5), “He erty to His own. But He was born at a time of subjection— deigned to take flesh at such a time that, shortly after His namely, when the whole world, as it were, tributary to birth, He would be enrolled in Caesar’s census, and thus Augustus, was being enrolled, at his command as Luke submit Himself to bondage for the sake of our liberty.” relates (2:1). Therefore it seems that Christ was not born Moreover, at that time, when the whole world lived at a fitting time. under one ruler, peace abounded on the earth. Therefore Objection 2. Further, the promises concerning the it was a fitting time for the birth of Christ, for “He is our coming of Christ were not made to the Gentiles; accord- peace, who hath made both one,” as it is written (Eph. ing to Rom. 9:4: “To whom belong. . . the promises.” But 2:14). Wherefore Jerome says on Is. 2:4: “If we search Christ was born during the reign of a foreigner, as appears the page of ancient history, we shall find that throughout from Mat. 2:1: “When Jesus was born in the days of King the whole world there was discord until the twenty-eighth Herod.” Therefore it seems that He was not born at a fit- year of Augustus Caesar: but when our Lord was born, all ting time. war ceased”; according to Is. 2:4: “Nation shall not lift up Objection 3. Further, the time of Christ’s presence on sword against nation.” earth is compared to the day, because He is the “Light of Again, it was fitting that Christ should be born while the world”; wherefore He says Himself (Jn. 9:4): “I must the world was governed by one ruler, because “He came work the works of Him that sent Me, whilst it is day.” But to gather His own [Vulg.: ‘the children of God’] together in summer the days are longer than in winter. Therefore, in one” (Jn. 11:52), that there might be “one fold and one since He was born in the depth of winter, eight days be- shepherd” (Jn. 10:16). fore the Kalends of January, it seems that He was not born Reply to Objection 2. Christ wished to be born dur- at a fitting time. ing the reign of a foreigner, that the prophecy of Jacob On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 4:4): “When the might be fulfilled (Gn. 49:10): “The sceptre shall not fulness of the time was come, God sent His Son, made of be taken away from Juda, nor a ruler from his thigh, till a woman, made under the law.” He come that is to be sent.” Because, as Chrysostom I answer that, There is this difference between Christ says (Hom. ii in Matth.†), as long as the Jewish “people and other men, that, whereas they are born subject to the was governed by Jewish kings, however wicked, prophets restrictions of time, Christ, as Lord and Maker of all time, were sent for their healing. But now that the Law of God chose a time in which to be born, just as He chose a is under the power of a wicked king, Christ is born; be- mother and a birthplace. And since “what is of God is cause a grave and hopeless disease demanded a more skil- well ordered” and becomingly arranged, it follows that ful physician.” Christ was born at a most fitting time. Reply to Objection 3. As says the author of the book Reply to Objection 1. Christ came in order to bring De Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test., “Christ wished to be born, us back from a state of bondage to a state of liberty. And when the light of day begins to increase in length,” so as ∗ P. iii, cap. ix † Opus Imperf., falsely ascribed to Chrysostom 2273 to show that He came in order that man might come nearer In like manner He chose to be born in the rough win-to the Divine Light, according to Lk. 1:79: “To enlighten ter season, that He might begin from then to suffer in body them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death.” for us. 2274 THIRD PART, QUESTION 36 Of the Manifestation of the Newly Born Christ (In Eight Articles) We must now consider the manifestation of the newly born Christ: concerning which there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ’s birth should have been made known to all? (2) Whether it should have been made known to some? (3) To whom should it have been made known? (4) Whether He should have made Himself known, or should He rather have been manifested by others? (5) By what other means should it have been made known? (6) Of the order of these manifestations; (7) Of the star by means of which His birth was made known; (8) of the adoration of the Magi, who were informed of Christ’s nativity by means of the star. Whether Christ’s birth should have been made known to all? IIIa q. 36 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s birth should had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of have been made known to all. Because fulfilment should glory.” correspond to promise. Now, the promise of Christ’s com- Secondly, because this would have lessened the merit ing is thus expressed (Ps. 49:3): “God shall come mani- of faith, which He came to offer men as the way to righ- festly. But He came by His birth in the flesh.” Therefore teousness. according to Rom. 3:22: “The justice of God it seems that His birth should have been made known to by faith of Jesus Christ.” For if, when Christ was born, the whole world. His birth had been made known to all by evident signs, Objection 2. Further, it is written (1 Tim. 1:15): the very nature of faith would have been destroyed, since “Christ came into this world to save sinners.” But this it is “the evidence of things that appear not,” as stated, is not effected save in as far as the grace of Christ is made Heb. 11:1. known to them; according to Titus 2:11,12: “The grace of Thirdly, because thus the reality of His human nature God our Saviour hath appeared to all men, instructing us, would have come into doubt. Whence Augustine says that denying ungodliness and worldly desires, we should (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvii): “If He had not passed live soberly, and justly, and godly in this world.” There- through the different stages of age from babyhood to fore it seems that Christ’s birth should have been made youth, had neither eaten nor slept, would He not have known to all. strengthened an erroneous opinion, and made it impos- Objection 3. Further, God is most especially inclined sible for us to believe that He had become true man? And to mercy; according to Ps. 144:9: “His tender mercies are while He is doing all things wondrously, would He have over all His works.” But in His second coming, when He taken away that which He accomplished in mercy?” will “judge justices” (Ps. 70:3), He will come before the Reply to Objection 1. According to the gloss, the eyes of all; according to Mat. 24:27: “As lightning cometh words quoted must be understood of Christ’s coming as out of the east, and appeareth even into the west, so shall judge. also the coming of the Son of Man be.” Much more, there- Reply to Objection 2. All men were to be instructed fore, should His first coming, when He was born into the unto salvation, concerning the grace of God our Saviour, world according to the flesh, have been made known to not at the very time of His birth, but afterwards, in due all. time, after He had “wrought salvation in the midst of the On the contrary, It is written (Is. 45:15): “Thou art earth” (Ps. 73:12). Wherefore after His Passion and Res- a hidden God, the Holy [Vulg.: ‘the God] of Israel, the urrection, He said to His disciples (Mat. 28:19): “Go- Saviour.” And, again (Is. 43:3): “His look was, as it were, ing. . . teach ye all nations.” hidden and despised.” Reply to Objection 3. For judgment to be passed, the I answer that, It was unfitting that Christ’s birth authority of the judge needs to be known: and for this rea- should be made known to all men without distinction. son it behooves that the coming of Christ unto judgment First, because this would have been a hindrance to the should be manifest. But His first coming was unto the sal- redemption of man, which was accomplished by means vation of all, which is by faith that is of things not seen. of the Cross; for, as it is written (1 Cor. 2:8): “If they And therefore it was fitting that His first coming should 2275 be hidden. Whether Christ’s birth should have been made known to some? IIIa q. 36 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s birth should instructed concerning Christ’s birth before He was born, not have been made known to anyone. For, as stated because it devolved on them to show reverence to the child above (a. 1, ad 3), it befitted the salvation of mankind that conceived in the womb, and to serve Him even before He Christ’s first coming should be hidden. But Christ came was born. But their testimony, being of a domestic char- to save all; according to 1 Tim. 4:10: “Who is the Saviour acter, would have aroused suspicion in regard to Christ’s of all men, especially of the faithful.” Therefore Christ’s greatness: and so it behooved it to be made known to oth- birth should not have been made known to anyone. ers, whose testimony could not be suspect. Objection 2. Further, before Christ was born, His Reply to Objection 3. The very disturbance that arose future birth was made known to the Blessed Virgin and when it was known that Christ was born was becoming Joseph. Therefore it was not necessary that it should be to His birth. First, because thus the heavenly dignity of made known to others after His birth. Christ is made manifest. Wherefore Gregory says (Hom. Objection 3. Further, no wise man makes known that x in Evang.): “After the birth of the King of heaven, from which arise disturbance and harm to others. But, the earthly king is troubled: doubtless because earthly when Christ’s birth was made known, disturbance arose: grandeur is covered with confusion when the heavenly for it is written (Mat. 2:3) that “King Herod, hearing” majesty is revealed.” of Christ’s birth, “was troubled, and all Jerusalem with Secondly, thereby the judicial power of Christ was him.” Moreover, this brought harm to others; because it foreshadowed. Thus Augustine says in a sermon (30 de was the occasion of Herod’s killing “all the male children Temp.) on the Epiphany: “What will He be like in the that were in Bethlehem. . . from two years old and under.” judgment-seat; since from His cradle He struck terror into Therefore it seems unfitting for Christ’s birth to have been the heart of a proud king?” made known to anyone. Thirdly, because thus the overthrow of the devil’s On the contrary, Christ’s birth would have been prof- kingdom was foreshadowed. For, as Pope Leo says in itable to none if it had been hidden from all. But it be- a sermon on the Epiphany (Serm. v∗): “Herod was not hooved Christ’s birth to be profitable: else He were born so much troubled in himself as the devil in Herod. For in vain. Therefore it seems that Christ’s birth should have Herod thought Him to be a man, but the devil thought Him been made known to some. to be God. Each feared a successor to his kingdom: the I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1) “what devil, a heavenly successor; Herod, an earthly successor.” is of God is well ordered.” Now it belongs to the order But their fear was needless: since Christ had not come to of Divine wisdom that God’s gifts and the secrets of His set up an earthly kingdom, as Pope Leo says, addressing wisdom are not bestowed on all equally, but to some im- himself to Herod: “Thy palace cannot hold Christ: nor mediately, through whom they are made known to others. is the Lord of the world content with the paltry power Wherefore, with regard to the mystery of the Resurrection of thy scepter.” That the Jews were troubled, who, on it is written (Acts 10:40,41): “God. . . gave” Christ rising the contrary, should have rejoiced, was either because, as again “to be made manifest, not to all the people, but to Chrysostom says, “wicked men could not rejoice at the witnesses pre-ordained by God.” Consequently, that His coming of the Holy one,” or because they wished to court birth might be consistent with this, it should have been favor with Herod, whom they feared; for “the populace made known, not to all, but to some, through whom it is inclined to favor too much those whose cruelty it en- could be made known to others. dures.” Reply to Objection 1. As it would have been preju- And that the children were slain by Herod was not dicial to the salvation of mankind if God’s birth had been harmful to them, but profitable. For Augustine says in made known to all men, so also would it have been if none a sermon on the Epiphany (66 de Diversis): “It cannot had been informed of it. Because in either case faith is de- be questioned that Christ, who came to set man free, re- stroyed, whether a thing be perfectly manifest, or whether warded those who were slain for Him; since, while hang- it be entirely unknown, so that no one can hear it from ing on the cross, He prayed for those who were putting another; for “faith cometh by hearing” (Rom. 10:17). Him to death.” Reply to Objection 2. Mary and Joseph needed to be ∗ Opus Imperfectum in Matth., Hom. ii, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom 2276 Whether those to whom Christ’s birth was made known were suitably chosen? IIIa q. 36 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that those to whom was also another point of contrast: for the Magi were wise Christ’s birth was made known were not suitably chosen. and powerful; the shepherds simple and lowly. He was For our Lord (Mat. 10:5) commanded His disciples, “Go also made known to the righteous as Simeon and Anna; ye not into the way of the Gentiles,” so that He might be and to sinners, as the Magi. He was made known both made known to the Jews before the Gentiles. Therefore to men, and to women—namely, to Anna—so as to show it seems that much less should Christ’s birth have been at no condition of men to be excluded from Christ’s redemp- once revealed to the Gentiles who “came from the east,” tion. as stated Mat. 2:1. Reply to Objection 1. That manifestation of Christ’s Objection 2. Further, the revelation of Divine truth birth was a kind of foretaste of the full manifestation should be made especially to the friends of God, accord- which was to come. And as in the later manifestation the ing to Job 37 [Vulg.: Job 36:33]: “He sheweth His friend first announcement of the grace of Christ was made by concerning it.” But the Magi seem to be God’s foes; for Him and His Apostles to the Jews and afterwards to the it is written (Lev. 19:31): “Go not aside after wizards Gentiles, so the first to come to Christ were the shepherds, [magi], neither ask anything of soothsayers.” Therefore who were the first-fruits of the Jews, as being near to Him; Christ’s birth should not have been made known to the and afterwards came the Magi from afar, who were “the Magi. first-fruits of the Gentiles,” as Augustine says (Serm. 30 Objection 3. Further, Christ came in order to set free de Temp. cc.). the whole world from the power of the devil; whence it is Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says in a sermon written (Malachi 1:11): “From the rising of the sun even on the Epiphany (Serm. 30 de Temp.): “As unskilfulness to the going down, My name is great among the Gentiles.” predominates in the rustic manners of the shepherd, so Therefore He should have been made known, not only to ungodliness abounds in the profane rites of the Magi. Yet those who dwelt in the east, but also to some from all parts did this Corner-Stone draw both to Itself; inasmuch as He of the world. came ‘to choose the foolish things that He might confound Objection 4. Further, all the sacraments of the Old the wise,’ and ‘not to call the just, but sinners,’ ” so that Law were figures of Christ. But the sacraments of the “the proud might not boast, nor the weak despair.” Nev- Old Law were dispensed through the ministry of the legal ertheless, there are those who say that these Magi were priesthood. Therefore it seems that Christ’s birth should not wizards, but wise astronomers, who are called Magi have been made known rather to the priests in the Temple among the Persians or Chaldees. than to the shepherds in the fields. Reply to Objection 3. As Chrysostom says†: “The Objection 5. Further, Christ was born of a Virgin- Magi came from the east, because the first beginning of Mother, and was as yet a little child. It was therefore more faith came from the land where the day is born; since faith suitable that He should be made known to youths and vir- is the light of the soul.” Or, “because all who come to gins than to old and married people or to widows, such as Christ come from Him and through Him”: whence it is Simeon and Anna. written (Zech. 6:12): “Behold a Man, the Orient is His On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 13:18): “I know name.” Now, they are said to come from the east literally, whom I have chosen.” But what is done by God’s wisdom either because, as some say, they came from the farthest is done becomingly. Therefore those to whom Christ’s parts of the east, or because they came from the neigh- birth was made known were suitably chosen. boring parts of Judea that lie to the east of the region in- I answer that, Salvation, which was to be accom- habited by the Jews. Yet it is to be believed that certain plished by Christ, concerns all sorts and conditions of signs of Christ’s birth appeared also in other parts of the men: because, as it is written (Col. 3:11), in Christ world: thus, at Rome the river flowed with oil‡; and in “there is neither male nor female,∗ neither Gentile nor Spain three suns were seen, which gradually merged into Jew. . . bond nor free,” and so forth. And in order that this one§. might be foreshadowed in Christ’s birth, He was made Reply to Objection 4. As Chrysostom observes known to men of all conditions. Because, as Augustine (Theophylact., Enarr. in Luc. ii, 8), the angel who an- says in a sermon on the Epiphany (32 de Temp.), “the nounced Christ’s birth did not go to Jerusalem, nor did he shepherds were Israelites, the Magi were Gentiles. The seek the Scribes and Pharisees, for they were corrupted, former were nigh to Him, the latter far from Him. Both and full of ill-will. But the shepherds were single-minded, hastened to Him together as to the cornerstone.” There and were like the patriarchs and Moses in their mode of ∗ These words are in reality from Gal. 3:28 † Hom. ii in Matth. in the Opus Imperf., among the supposititious works of Chrysostom ‡ Eu- sebius, Chronic. II, Olymp. 185 § Cf. Eusebius, Chronic. II, Olymp. 184 2277 life. 2:25): “It was right that our Lord’s birth should be attested Moreover, these shepherds were types of the Doctors not only by the shepherds, but also by people advanced in of the Church, to whom are revealed the mysteries of age and virtue”: whose testimony is rendered the more Christ that were hidden from the Jews. credible by reason of their righteousness. Reply to Objection 5. As Ambrose says (on Lk. Whether Christ Himself should have made His birth know? IIIa q. 36 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ should have of God’s creatures, He showed the power of the Godhead Himself made His birth known. For “a direct cause is al- in Himself. Therefore Christ made His birth known, not ways of greater power than an indirect cause,” as is stated by Himself, but by means of certain other creatures. Phys. viii. But Christ made His birth known through Reply to Objection 1. By the way of generation and others—for instance, to the shepherds through the angels, movement we must of necessity come to the imperfect and to the Magi through the star. Much more, therefore, before the perfect. And therefore Christ was made known should He Himself have made His birth known. first through other creatures, and afterwards He Himself Objection 2. Further, it is written (Ecclus. 20:32): manifested Himself perfectly. “Wisdom that is hid and treasure that is not seen; what Reply to Objection 2. Although hidden wisdom is profit is there in them both?” But Christ had, to perfec- useless, yet there is no need for a wise man to make him- tion, the treasure of wisdom and grace from the beginning self known at all times, but at a suitable time; for it is writ-of His conception. Therefore, unless He had made the ten (Ecclus. 20:6): “There is one that holdeth his peace fulness of these gifts known by words and deeds, wisdom because he knoweth not what to say: and there is another and grace would have been given Him to no purpose. But that holdeth his peace, knowing the proper time.” Hence this is unreasonable: because “God and nature do nothing the wisdom given to Christ was not useless, because at a without a purpose” (De Coelo i). suitable time He manifested Himself. And the very fact Objection 3. Further, we read in the book De Infantia that He was hidden at a suitable time is a sign of wisdom. Salvatoris that in His infancy Christ worked many mir- Reply to Objection 3. The book De Infantia Salva- acles. It seems therefore that He did Himself make His toris is apocryphal. Moreover, Chrysostom (Hom. xxi birth known. super Joan.) says that Christ worked no miracles be- On the contrary, Pope Leo says (Serm. xxxiv) that fore changing the water into wine, according to Jn. 2:11: the Magi found the “infant Jesus in no way different from “ ‘This beginning of miracles did Jesus.’ For if He had the generality of human infants.” But other infants do not worked miracles at an early age, there would have been make themselves known. Therefore it was not fitting that no need for anyone else to manifest Him to the Israelites; Christ should Himself make His birth known. whereas John the Baptist says (Jn. 1:31): ‘That He may I answer that, Christ’s birth was ordered unto man’s be made manifest in Israel; therefore am I come baptiz- salvation, which is by faith. But saving faith confesses ing with water.’ Moreover, it was fitting that He should Christ’s Godhead and humanity. It behooved, therefore, not begin to work miracles at an early age. For people Christ’s birth to be made known in such a way that the would have thought the Incarnation to be unreal, and, out proof of His Godhead should not be prejudicial to faith in of sheer spite, would have crucified Him before the proper His human nature. But this took place while Christ pre- time.” sented a likeness of human weakness, and yet, by means Whether Christ’s birth should have been manifested by means of the angels and the IIIa q. 36 a. 5 star? Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s birth should angel of the Lord shall encamp round about them that not have been manifested by means of the angels. For fear Him, and shall deliver them.” But Christ’s birth was angels are spiritual substances, according to Ps. 103:4: not announced to the righteous, viz. Simeon and Anna, “Who maketh His [Vulg.: ‘makest Thy’] angels, spirits.” through the angels. Therefore neither should it have been But Christ’s birth was in the flesh, and not in His spiritual announced to the shepherds by means of the angels. substance. Therefore it should not have been manifested Objection 3. Further, it seems that neither ought it to by means of angels. have been announced to the Magi by means of the star. Objection 2. Further, the righteous are more akin to For this seems to favor the error of those who think that the angels than to any other, according to Ps. 33:8: “The man’s birth is influenced by the stars. But occasions of 2278 sin should be taken away from man. Therefore it was not speak He was manifested by speechless elements.” Again, fitting that Christ’s birth should be announced by a star. there is yet another reason. For, as Augustine† says in a Objection 4. Further, a sign should be certain, in or- sermon on the Epiphany: “To Abraham was promised an der that something be made known thereby. But a star innumerable progeny, begotten, not of carnal propagation, does not seem to be a certain sign of Christ’s birth. There- but of the fruitfulness of faith. For this reason it is com- fore Christ’s birth was not suitably announced by a star. pared to the multitude of stars; that a heavenly progeny On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 32:4): “The works might be hoped for.” Wherefore the Gentiles, “who are of God are perfect.” But this manifestation is the work of thus designated by the stars, are by the rising of a new star God. Therefore it was accomplished by means of suitable stimulated” to seek Christ, through whom they are made signs. the seed of Abraham. I answer that, As knowledge is imparted through Reply to Objection 1. That which of itself is hid- a syllogism from something which we know better, so den needs to be manifested, but not that which in itself knowledge given by signs must be conveyed through is manifest. Now, the flesh of Him who was born was things which are familiar to those to whom the knowl- manifest, whereas the Godhead was hidden. And there- edge is imparted. Now, it is clear that the righteous have, fore it was fitting that this birth should be made known through the spirit of prophecy, a certain familiarity with by angels, who are the ministers of God. Wherefore also the interior instinct of the Holy Ghost, and are wont to a certain “brightness” (Lk. 2:9) accompanied the angelic be taught thereby, without the guidance of sensible signs. apparition, to indicate that He who was just born was the Whereas others, occupied with material things, are led “Brightness of” the Father’s “glory.” through the domain of the senses to that of the intellect. Reply to Objection 2. The righteous did not need the The Jews, however, were accustomed to receive Divine visible apparition of the angel; on account of their perfec- answers through the angels; through whom they also re- tion the interior instinct of the Holy Ghost was enough for ceived the Law, according to Acts 7:53: “You [Vulg.: them. ‘who’]. . . have received the Law by the disposition of an- Reply to Objection 3. The star which manifested gels.” And the Gentiles, especially astrologers, were wont Christ’s birth removed all occasion of error. For, as Au- to observe the course of the stars. And therefore Christ’s gustine says (Contra Faust. ii): “No astrologer has ever birth was made known to the righteous, viz. Simeon and so far connected the stars with man’s fate at the time of Anna, by the interior instinct of the Holy Ghost, according his birth as to assert that one of the stars, at the birth of to Lk. 2:26: “He had received an answer from the Holy any man, left its orbit and made its way to him who was Ghost that he should not see death before he had seen the just born”: as happened in the case of the star which made Christ of the Lord.” But to the shepherds and Magi, as be- known the birth of Christ. Consequently this does not cor- ing occupied with material things, Christ’s birth was made roborate the error of those who “think there is a connec- known by means of visible apparitions. And since this tion between man’s birth and the course of the stars, for birth was not only earthly, but also, in a way, heavenly, to they do not hold that the course of the stars can be changed both (shepherds and Magi) it is revealed through heavenly at a man’s birth.” signs: for, as Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany In the same sense Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in (cciv): “The angels inhabit, and the stars adorn, the heav- Matth.): “It is not an astronomer’s business to know from ens: by both, therefore, do the ‘heavens show forth the the stars those who are born, but to tell the future from the glory of God.’ ” Moreover, it was not without reason that hour of a man’s birth: whereas the Magi did not know the Christ’s birth was made known, by means of angels, to time of the birth, so as to conclude therefrom some knowl- the shepherds, who, being Jews, were accustomed to fre- edge of the future; rather was it the other way about.” quent apparitions of the angels: whereas it was revealed Reply to Objection 4. Chrysostom relates (Hom. ii by means of a star to the Magi, who were wont to consider in Matth.) that, according to some apocryphal books, a the heavenly bodies. Because, as Chrysostom says (Hom. certain tribe in the far east near the ocean was in the pos- vi in Matth.): “Our Lord deigned to call them through session of a document written by Seth, referring to this things to which they were accustomed.” There is also an- star and to the presents to be offered: which tribe watched other reason. For, as Gregory says (Hom. x in Evang.): attentively for the rising of this star, twelve men being “To the Jews, as rational beings, it was fitting that a ratio- appointed to take observations, who at stated times re- nal animal∗,” viz. an angel, “should preach. Whereas the paired to the summit of a mountain with faithful assiduity: Gentiles, who were unable to come to the knowledge of whence they subsequently perceived the star containing God through the reason, were led to God, not by words, the figure of a small child, and above it the form of a cross. but by signs. And as our Lord, when He was able to speak, Or we may say, as may be read in the book De Qq. was announced by heralds who spoke, so before He could Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. lxiii, that “these Magi followed the ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 51, a. 1, ad 2 † Pope Leo 2279 tradition of Balaam,” who said, “ ‘A star shall rise out of a sign of the birth of Christ: and he thinks it probable Jacob.’ Wherefore observing this star to be a stranger to that these were “good angels; since in adoring Christ they the system of this world, they gathered that it was the one were seeking for salvation.” foretold by Balaam to indicate the King of the Jews.” Or with Pope Leo, in a sermon on the Epiphany Or again, it may be said with Augustine, in a ser- (xxxiv), that “besides the outward form which aroused the mon on the Epiphany (ccclxxiv), that “the Magi had re- attention of their corporeal eyes, a more brilliant ray en- ceived a revelation through the angels” that the star was lightened their minds with the light of faith.” Whether Christ’s birth was made known in a becoming order? IIIa q. 36 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s birth was according to the law of the Lord”—that is to say, after made known in an unbecoming order. For Christ’s birth they had offered up the Child Jesus in the Temple—“they should have been made known to them first who were returned into Galilee, to their city”—namely, “Nazareth.” nearest to Christ, and who longed for Him most; accord- In the third place, it was made known in the Temple to the ing to Wis. 6:14: “She preventeth them that covet her, so righteous on the fortieth day after His birth, as related by that she first showeth herself unto them.” But the righ- Luke (2:22). teous were nearest to Christ by faith, and longed most for The reason of this order is that the shepherds repre- His coming; whence it is written (Lk. 2:25) of Simeon sent the apostles and other believers of the Jews, to whom that “he was just and devout, waiting for the consolation the faith of Christ was made known first; among whom of Israel.” Therefore Christ’s birth should have been made there were “not many mighty, not many noble,” as we known to Simeon before the shepherds and Magi. read 1 Cor. 1:26. Secondly, the faith of Christ came to Objection 2. Further, the Magi were the “first-fruits the “fulness of the Gentiles”; and this is foreshadowed in of the Gentiles,” who were to believe in Christ. But first the Magi. Thirdly it came to the fulness of the Jews, which the “fulness of the Gentiles. . . come in” unto faith, and af- is foreshadowed in the righteous. Wherefore also Christ terwards “all Israel” shall “be saved,” as is written (Rom. was manifested to them in the Jewish Temple. 11:25). Therefore Christ’s birth should have been made Reply to Objection 1. As the Apostle says (Rom. known to the Magi before the shepherds. 9:30,31): “Israel, by following after the law of justice, is Objection 3. Further, it is written (Mat. 2:16) that not come unto the law of justice”: but the Gentiles, “who “Herod killed all the male children that were in Bethle- followed not after justice,” forestalled the generality of the hem, and in all the borders thereof, from two years old Jews in the justice which is of faith. As a figure of this, and under, according to the time which he had diligently Simeon, “who was waiting for the consolation of Israel,” inquired from the wise men”: so that it seems that the was the last to know Christ born: and he was preceded by Magi were two years in coming to Christ after His birth. the Magi and the shepherds, who did not await the coming It was therefore unbecoming that Christ should be made of Christ with such longing. known to the Gentiles so long after His birth. Reply to Objection 2. Although the “fulness of the On the contrary, It is written (Dan. 2:21): “He Gentiles came in” unto faith before the fulness of the changes time and ages.” Consequently the time of the Jews, yet the first-fruits of the Jews preceded the first- manifestation of Christ’s birth seems to have been ar- fruits of the Gentiles in faith. For this reason the birth of ranged in a suitable order. Christ was made known to the shepherds before the Magi. I answer that, Christ’s birth was first made known to Reply to Objection 3. There are two opinions about the shepherds on the very day that He was born. For, as it the apparition of the star seen by the Magi. For Chrysos- is written (Lk. 2:8,15,16): “There were in the same coun- tom (Hom. ii in Matth.∗), and Augustine in a sermon on try shepherds watching, and keeping the night-watches the Epiphany (cxxxi, cxxxii), say that the star was seen over their flock. . . And it came to pass, after the angels by the Magi during the two years that preceded the birth departed from them into heaven they [Vulg.: ‘the shep- of Christ: and then, having first considered the matter and herds’] said one to another: Let us go over to Bethle- prepared themselves for the journey, they came from the hem. . . and they came with haste.” Second in order were farthest east to Christ, arriving on the thirteenth day after the Magi, who came to Christ on the thirteenth day after His birth. Wherefore Herod, immediately after the de- His birth, on which day is kept the feast of the Epiphany. parture of the Magi, “perceiving that He was deluded by For if they had come after a year, or even two years, they them,” commanded the male children to be killed “from would not have found Him in Bethlehem, since it is writ- two years old and under,” being doubtful lest Christ were ten (Lk. 2:39) that “after they had performed all things already born when the star appeared, according as he had ∗ Opus Imperf. in Matth., falsely ascribed to Chrysostom 2280 heard from the Magi. cause he is said to have gone to Rome in the meanwhile But others say that the star first appeared when Christ on account of an accusation brought against him, or be- was born, and that the Magi set off as soon as they saw cause he was troubled at some imminent peril, and for the the star, and accomplished a journey of very great length time being desisted from his anxiety to slay the child, or in thirteen days, owing partly to the Divine assistance, and because he may have thought that the Magi, “being de- partly to the fleetness of the dromedaries. And I say this ceived by the illusory appearance of the star, and not find- on the supposition that they came from the far east. But ing the child, as they had expected to, were ashamed to others, again, say that they came from a neighboring coun- return to him”: as Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. try, whence also was Balaam, to whose teaching they were ii). And the reason why he killed not only those who were heirs; and they are said to have come from the east, be- two years old, but also the younger children, would be, cause their country was to the east of the country of the as Augustine says in a sermon on the Innocents, because Jews. In this case Herod killed the babes, not as soon as he feared lest a child whom the stars obey, might make the Magi departed, but two years after: and that either be- himself appear older or younger. Whether the star which appeared to the Magi belonged to the heavenly system? IIIa q. 36 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the star which ap- moon. Thirdly, because it was visible at one time and hid- peared to the Magi belonged to the heavenly system. den at another. For when they entered Jerusalem it hid For Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cxxii): itself: then, when they had left Herod, it showed itself “While God yet clings to the breast, and suffers Himself to again. Fourthly, because its movement was not continu- be wrapped in humble swaddling clothes, suddenly a new ous, but when the Magi had to continue their journey the star shines forth in the heavens.” Therefore the star which star moved on; when they had to stop the star stood still; appeared to the Magi belonged to the heavenly system. as happened to the pillar of a cloud in the desert. Fifthly, Objection 2. Further, Augustine says in a sermon on because it indicated the virginal Birth, not by remaining the Epiphany (cci): “Christ was made known to the shep- aloft, but by coming down below. For it is written (Mat. herds by angels, to the Magi by a star. A heavenly tongue 2:9) that “the star which they had seen in the east went speaks to both, because the tongue of the prophets spoke before them, until it came and stood over where the child no longer.” But the angels who appeared to the shepherds was.” Whence it is evident that the words of the Magi, were really angels from heaven. Therefore also the star “We have seen His star in the east,” are to be taken as which appeared to the Magi was really a star from the meaning, not that when they were in the east the star ap- heavens. peared over the country of Judea, but that when they saw Objection 3. Further, stars which are not in the heav- the star it was in the east, and that it preceded them into ens but in the air are called comets, which do not appear at Judea (although this is considered doubtful by some). But the birth of kings, but rather are signs of their approaching it could not have indicated the house distinctly, unless it death. But this star was a sign of the King’s birth: where- were near the earth. And, as he [Chrysostom] observes, fore the Magi said (Mat. 2:2): “Where is He that is born this does not seem fitting to a star, but “of some power King of the Jews? For we have seen His star in the east.” endowed with reason.” Consequently “it seems that this Therefore it seems that it was a star from the heavens. was some invisible force made visible under the form of a On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. ii): star.” “It was not one of those stars which since the beginning Wherefore some say that, as the Holy Ghost, after our of the creation observe the course appointed to them by Lord’s Baptism, came down on Him under the form of a the Creator; but this star was a stranger to the heavens, dove, so did He appear to the Magi under the form of a and made its appearance at the strange sight of a virgin in star. While others say that the angel who, under a human childbirth.” form, appeared to the shepherds, under the form of a star, I answer that, As Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in appeared to the Magi. But it seems more probable that Matth.), it is clear, for many reasons, that the star which it was a newly created star, not in the heavens, but in the appeared to the Magi did not belong to the heavenly sys- air near the earth, and that its movement varied accord- tem. First, because no other star approaches from the ing to God’s will. Wherefore Pope Leo says in a sermon same quarter as this star, whose course was from north to on the Epiphany (xxxi): “A star of unusual brightness ap- south, these being the relative positions of Persia, whence peared to the three Magi in the east, which, through be- the Magi came, and Judea. Secondly, from the time [at ing more brilliant and more beautiful than the other stars, which it was seen]. For it appeared not only at night, drew men’s gaze and attention: so that they understood at but also at midday: and no star can do this, not even the once that such an unwonted event could not be devoid of 2281 purpose.” Reply to Objection 3. As the star did not follow the Reply to Objection 1. In Holy Scripture the air is course of the heavenly stars, so neither did it follow the sometimes called the heavens—for instance, “The birds course of the comets, which neither appear during the day- of the heavens [Douay: ‘air’] and the fishes of the sea.” time nor vary their customary course. Nevertheless in its Reply to Objection 2. The angels of heaven, by rea- signification it has something in common with the comets. son of their very office, come down to us, being “sent to Because the heavenly kingdom of Christ “shall break in minister.” But the stars of heaven do not change their po- pieces, and shall consume all the kingdoms” of the earth, sition. Wherefore there is no comparison. “and itself shall stand for ever” (Dan. 2:44). Whether it was becoming that the Magi should come to adore Christ and pay homage IIIa q. 36 a. 8 to Him? Objection 1. It would seem that it was unbecom- the Jews were wont to have. But they had learnt that such ing that the Magi should come to adore Christ and pay a King was born that by adoring Him they might be sure homage to Him. For reverence is due to a king from his of obtaining from Him the salvation which is of God.” subjects. But the Magi did not belong to the kingdom Reply to Objection 2. By proclaiming [Christ King] of the Jews. Therefore, since they knew by seeing the star the Magi foreshadowed the constancy of the Gentiles in that He that was born was the “King of the Jews,” it seems confessing Christ even until death. Whence Chrysostom unbecoming that they should come to adore Him. says (Hom. ii in Matth.) that, while they thought of the Objection 2. Further, it seems absurd during the reign King who was to come, the Magi feared not the king who of one king to proclaim a stranger. But in Judea Herod was actually present. They had not yet seen Christ, and was reigning. Therefore it was foolish of the Magi to pro- they were already prepared to die for Him. claim the birth of a king. Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says in a sermon Objection 3. Further, a heavenly sign is more certain on the Epiphany (cc.): “The star which led the Magi to than a human sign. But the Magi had come to Judea from the place where the Divine Infant was with His Virgin- the east, under the guidance of a heavenly sign. Therefore Mother could bring them to the town of Bethlehem, in it was foolish of them to seek human guidance besides which Christ was born. Yet it hid itself until the Jews that of the star, saying: “Where is He that is born King of also bore testimony of the city in which Christ was to be the Jews?” born: so that, being encouraged by a twofold witness,” Objection 4. Further, the offering of gifts and the as Pope Leo says (Serm. xxxiv), “they might seek with homage of adoration are not due save to kings already more ardent faith Him, whom both the brightness of the reigning. But the Magi did not find Christ resplendent star and the authority of prophecy revealed.” Thus they with kingly grandeur. Therefore it was unbecoming for “proclaim” that Christ is born, and “inquire where; they them to offer Him gifts and homage. believe and ask, as it were, betokening those who walk On the contrary, It is written (Is. 60:3): ”[The Gen- by faith and desire to see,” as Augustine says in a sermon tiles] shall walk in the light, and kings in the brightness of on the Epiphany (cxcix). But the Jews, by indicating to thy rising.” But those who walk in the Divine light do not them the place of Christ’s birth, “are like the carpenters err. Therefore the Magi were right in offering homage to who built the Ark of Noe, who provided others with the Christ. means of escape, and themselves perished in the flood. I answer that, As stated above (a. 3, ad 1), the Magi Those who asked, heard and went their way: the teach- are the “first-fruits of the Gentiles” that believed in Christ; ers spoke and stayed where they were; like the milestones because their faith was a presage of the faith and devotion that point out the way but walk not” (Augustine, Serm. of the nations who were to come to Christ from afar. And cclxxiii). It was also by God’s will that, when they no therefore, as the devotion and faith of the nations is with- longer saw the star, the Magi, by human instinct, went to out any error through the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, so Jerusalem, to seek in the royal city the new-born King, also we must believe that the Magi, inspired by the Holy in order that Christ’s birth might be publicly proclaimed Ghost, did wisely in paying homage to Christ. first in Jerusalem, according to Is. 2:3: “The Law shall Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says in a sermon come forth from Sion, and the Word of the Lord from on the Epiphany (cc.): “Though many kings of the Jews Jerusalem”; and also “in order that by the zeal of the Magi had been born and died, none of them did the Magi seek who came from afar, the indolence of the Jews who lived to adore. And so they who came from a distant foreign near at hand, might be proved worthy of condemnation” land to a kingdom that was entirely strange to them, had (Remig., Hom. in Matth. ii, 1). no idea of showing such great homage to such a king as Reply to Objection 4. As Chrysostom says (Hom. 2282 ii in Matth.∗): “If the Magi had come in search of an rifice; and myrrh, which is used in embalming the bodies earthly King, they would have been disconcerted at find- of the dead, is offered as to Him who is to die for the sal- ing that they had taken the trouble to come such a long vation of all” (Gregory, Hom. x in Evang.). And hereby, way for nothing. Consequently they would have neither as Gregory says (Hom. x in Evang.), we are taught to of- adored nor offered gifts. But since they sought a heav- fer gold, “which signifies wisdom, to the new-born King, enly King, though they found in Him no signs of royal by the luster of our wisdom in His sight.” We offer God pre-eminence, yet, content with the testimony of the star incense, “which signifies fervor in prayer, if our constant alone, they adored: for they saw a man, and they acknowl- prayers mount up to God with an odor of sweetness”; and edged a God.” Moreover, they offer gifts in keeping with we offer myrrh, “which signifies mortification of the flesh, Christ’s greatness: “gold, as to the great King; they offer if we mortify the ill-deeds of the flesh by refraining from up incense as to God, because it is used in the Divine Sac- them.” ∗ From the supposititious Opus Imperfectum 2283 THIRD PART, QUESTION 37 Of Christ’s Circumcision, and of the Other Legal Observances Accomplished in Regard to the Child Christ (In Four Articles) We must now consider Christ’s circumcision. And since the circumcision is a kind of profession of observing the Law, according to Gal. 5:3: “I testify. . . to every man circumcising himself that he is a debtor to do the whole Law,” we shall have at the same time to inquire about the other legal observances accomplished in regard to the Child Christ. Therefore there are four points of inquiry: (1) His circumcision; (2) The imposition of His name; (3) His presentation; (4) His Mother’s purification. Whether Christ should have been circumcised? IIIa q. 37 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ should not us to be obedient”†. Wherefore He was circumcised on have been circumcised. For on the advent of the real- the eighth day according to the prescription of the Law ity, the figure ceases. But circumcision was prescribed to (Lev. 12:3). Sixthly, “that He who had come in the like- Abraham as a sign of the covenant concerning his poster- ness of sinful flesh might not reject the remedy whereby ity, as may be seen from Gn. 17. Now this covenant was sinful flesh was wont to be healed.” Seventhly, that by tak- fulfilled in Christ’s birth. Therefore circumcision should ing on Himself the burden of the Law, He might set others have ceased at once. free therefrom, according to Gal. 4:4,5: “God sent His Objection 2. Further, “every action of Christ is a les- Son. . . made under the Law, that He might redeem them son to us”∗; wherefore it is written (Jn. 3:15): “I have who were under the Law.” given you an example, that as I have done to you, so you Reply to Objection 1. Circumcision by the removal do also.” But we ought not to be circumcised; according to of the piece of skin in the member of generation, signi- Gal. 5:2: “If you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you fied “the passing away of the old generation”‡: from the nothing.” Therefore it seems that neither should Christ decrepitude of which we are freed by Christ’s Passion. have been circumcised. Consequently this figure was not completely fulfilled in Objection 3. Further, circumcision was prescribed as Christ’s birth, but in His Passion, until which time the a remedy of original sin. But Christ did not contract orig- circumcision retained its virtue and status. Therefore it inal sin, as stated above (q. 14, a. 3; q. 15, a. 1). Therefore behooved Christ to be circumcised as a son of Abraham Christ should not have been circumcised. before His Passion. On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 2:21): “After eight Reply to Objection 2. Christ submitted to circumci- days were accomplished, that the child should be circum- sion while it was yet of obligation. And thus His action cised.” in this should be imitated by us, in fulfilling those things I answer that, For several reasons Christ ought to which are of obligation in our own time. Because “there have been circumcised. First, in order to prove the reality is a time and opportunity for every business” (Eccl 8:6). of His human nature, in contradiction to the Manicheans, Moreover, according to Origen (Hom. xiv in Luc.), who said that He had an imaginary body: and in contra- “as we died when He died, and rose again when Christ diction to Apollinarius, who said that Christ’s body was rose from the dead, so were we circumcised spiritually consubstantial with His Godhead; and in contradiction to through Christ: wherefore we need no carnal circumci- Valentine, who said that Christ brought His body from sion.” And this is what the Apostle says (Col. 2:11): “In heaven. Secondly, in order to show His approval of cir- whom,” [i.e. Christ] “you are circumcised with circum- cumcision, which God had instituted of old. Thirdly, in cision not made by hand in despoiling of the body of the order to prove that He was descended from Abraham, who flesh, but in the circumcision of” our Lord Jesus “Christ.” had received the commandment of circumcision as a sign Reply to Objection 3. As Christ voluntarily took of his faith in Him. Fourthly, in order to take away from upon Himself our death, which is the effect of sin, the Jews an excuse for not receiving Him, if He were un- whereas He had no sin Himself, in order to deliver us from circumcised. Fifthly, “in order by His example to exhort death, and to make us to die spiritually unto sin, so also ∗ Innoc. III, Serm. xxii de Temp. † Bede, Hom. x in Evang. ‡ Athanasius, De Sabb. et Circumcis. 2284 He took upon Himself circumcision, which was a rem-and to accomplish a spiritual circumcision in us—in order, edy against original sin, whereas He contracted no orig- that is to say, that, by taking upon Himself the shadow, He inal sin, in order to deliver us from the yoke of the Law, might accomplish the reality. Whether His name was suitably given to Christ? IIIa q. 37 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that an unsuitable name made me to forget all my labors” (Gn. 41:51). Or, again, was given to Christ. For the Gospel reality should corre- from some quality of the person who receives the name; spond to the prophetic foretelling. But the prophets fore- thus it is written (Gn. 25:25) that “he that came forth first told another name for Christ: for it is written (Is. 7:14): was red and hairy like a skin; and his name was called “Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son, and His Esau,” which is interpreted “red.” name shall be called Emmanuel”; and (Is. 8:3): “Call His But names given to men by God always signify some name, Hasten to take away the spoils; Make haste to take gratuitous gift bestowed on them by Him; thus it was said away the prey”; and (Is. 9:6): “His name shall be called to Abraham (Gn. 17:5): “Thou shalt be called Abraham; Wonderful, Counselor God the Mighty, the Father of the because I have made thee a father of many nations”: and world to come, the Prince of Peace”; and (Zech. 6:12): it was said to Peter (Mat. 16:18): “Thou art Peter, and “Behold a Man, the Orient is His name.” Thus it was un- upon this rock I will build My Church.” Since, therefore, suitable that His name should be called Jesus. this prerogative of grace was bestowed on the Man Christ Objection 2. Further, it is written (Is. 62:2): “Thou that through Him all men might be saved, therefore He shalt be called by a new name, which the mouth of the was becomingly named Jesus, i.e. Saviour: the angel hav- Lord hath named [Vulg.: ‘shall name’].” But the name ing foretold this name not only to His Mother, but also to Jesus is not a new name, but was given to several in the Joseph, who was to be his foster-father. Old Testament: as may be seen in the genealogy of Christ Reply to Objection 1. All these names in some way (Lk. 3:29), “Therefore it seems that it was unfitting for mean the same as Jesus, which means “salvation.” For the His name to be called Jesus.” name “Emmanuel, which being interpreted is ‘God with Objection 3. Further, the name Jesus signifies “salva- us,’ ” designates the cause of salvation, which is the union tion”; as is clear from Mat. 1:21: “She shall bring forth a of the Divine and human natures in the Person of the Son son, and thou shalt call His name Jesus. For He shall save of God, the result of which union was that “God is with His people from their sins.” But salvation through Christ us.” was accomplished not only in the circumcision, but also When it was said, “Call his name, Hasten to take in uncircumcision, as is declared by the Apostle (Rom. away,” etc., these words indicate from what He saved us, 4:11,12). Therefore this name was not suitably given to viz. from the devil, whose spoils He took away, according Christ at His circumcision. to Col. 2:15: “Despoiling the principalities and powers, On the contrary is the authority of Scripture, in which He hath exposed them confidently.” it is written (Lk. 2:21): “After eight days were accom- When it was said, “His name shall be called Wonder- plished, that the child should be circumcised, His name ful,” etc., the way and term of our salvation are pointed was called Jesus.” out: inasmuch as “by the wonderful counsel and might of I answer that, A name should answer to the nature of the Godhead we are brought to the inheritance of the life a thing. This is clear in the names of genera and species, to come,” in which the children of God will enjoy “perfect as stated Metaph. iv: “Since a name is but an expres- peace” under “God their Prince.” sion of the definition” which designates a thing’s proper When it was said, “Behold a Man, the Orient is His nature. name,” reference is made to the same, as in the first, viz. Now, the names of individual men are always taken to the mystery of the Incarnation, by reason of which “to from some property of the men to whom they are given. the righteous a light is risen up in darkness” (Ps. 111:4). Either in regard to time; thus men are named after the Reply to Objection 2. The name Jesus could be Saints on whose feasts they are born: or in respect of some suitable for some other reason to those who lived before blood relation; thus a son is named after his father or some Christ—for instance, because they were saviours in a par- other relation; and thus the kinsfolk of John the Baptist ticular and temporal sense. But in the sense of spiritual wished to call him “by his father’s name Zachary,” not by and universal salvation, this name is proper to Christ, and the name John, because “there” was “none of” his “kin- thus it is called a “new” name. dred that” was “called by this name,” as related Lk. 1:59- Reply to Objection 3. As is related Gn. 17, Abra- 61. Or, again, from some occurrence; thus Joseph “called ham received from God and at the same time both his the name of” the “first-born Manasses, saying: God hath name and the commandment of circumcision. For this 2285 reason it was customary among the Jews to name children “Why does Solomon call himself an only son in the sight on the very day of circumcision, as though before being of his mother, when Scripture testifies that he had an elder circumcised they had not as yet perfect existence: just as brother of the same mother, unless it be that the latter died now also children receive their names in Baptism. Where- unnamed soon after birth?” Therefore it was that Christ fore on Prov. 4:3, “I was my father’s son, tender, and as received His name at the time of His circumcision. an only son in the sight of my mother,” the gloss says: Whether Christ was becomingly presented in the temple? IIIa q. 37 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ was unbecom- order to deliver the Israelites, He “slew every first-born in ingly presented in the Temple. For it is written (Ex. 13:2): the land of Egypt, both men and cattle” (Ex. 12:12,13,29), “Sanctify unto Me every first-born that openeth the womb the first-born of Israel being saved; which law is set down among the children of Israel.” But Christ came forth from Ex. 13. Here also was Christ foreshadowed, who is “the the closed womb of the Virgin; and thus He did not open First-born amongst many brethren” (Rom. 8:29). His Mother’s womb. Therefore Christ was not bound by Therefore, since Christ was born of a woman and was this law to be presented in the Temple. her first-born, and since He wished to be “made under the Objection 2. Further, that which is always in one’s Law,” the Evangelist Luke shows that both these precepts presence cannot be presented to one. But Christ’s human- were fulfilled in His regard. First, as to that which con- ity was always in God’s presence in the highest degree, as cerns the first-born, when he says (Lk. 2:22,23): “They being always united to Him in unity of person. Therefore carried Him to Jerusalem to present Him to the Lord: as there was no need for Him to be presented to the Lord. it is written in the law of the Lord, ‘Every male opening Objection 3. Further, Christ is the principal victim, to the womb shall be called holy to the Lord.’ ” Secondly, whom all the victims of the old Law are referred, as the as to the general precept which concerned all, when he figure to the reality. But a victim should not be offered says (Lk. 2:24): “And to offer a sacrifice according as it up for a victim. Therefore it was not fitting that another is written in the law of the Lord, a pair of turtle doves or victim should be offered up for Christ. two young pigeons.” Objection 4. Further, among the legal victims the Reply to Objection 1. As Gregory of Nyssa says (De principal was the lamb, which was a “continual sacrifice” Occursu Dom.): “It seems that this precept of the Law [Vulg.: ‘holocaust’], as is stated Num. 28:6: for which was fulfilled in God incarnate alone in a special manner reason Christ is also called “the Lamb—Behold the Lamb exclusively proper to Him. For He alone, whose con- of God” (Jn. 1: 29). It was therefore more fitting that ception was ineffable, and whose birth was incomprehen- a lamb should be offered for Christ than “a pair of turtle sible, opened the virginal womb which had been closed doves or two young pigeons.” to sexual union, in such a way that after birth the seal On the contrary is the authority of Scripture which re- of chastity remained inviolate.” Consequently the words lates this as having taken place (Lk. 2:22). “opening the womb” imply that nothing hitherto had en- I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), Christ wished tered or gone forth therefrom. Again, for a special reason to be “made under the Law, that He might redeem them is it written “ ‘a male,’ because He contracted nothing of who were under the Law” (Gal. 4:4,5), and that the “jus- the woman’s sin”: and in a singular way “is He called tification of the Law might be” spiritually “fulfilled” in ‘holy,’ because He felt no contagion of earthly corruption, His members. Now, the Law contained a twofold precept whose birth was wondrously immaculate” (Ambrose, on touching the children born. one was a general precept Lk. 2:23). which affected all—namely, that “when the days of the Reply to Objection 2. As the Son of God “became mother’s purification were expired,” a sacrifice was to be man, and was circumcised in the flesh, not for His own offered either “for a son or for a daughter,” as laid down sake, but that He might make us to be God’s through Lev. 12:6. And this sacrifice was for the expiation of the grace, and that we might be circumcised in the spirit; so, sin in which the child was conceived and born; and also again, for our sake He was presented to the Lord, that we for a certain consecration of the child, because it was then may learn to offer ourselves to God”∗. And this was done presented in the Temple for the first time. Wherefore one after His circumcision, in order to show that “no one who offering was made as a holocaust and another for sin. is not circumcised from vice is worthy of Divine regard”†. The other was a special precept in the law concern- Reply to Objection 3. For this very reason He wished ing the first-born of “both man and beast”: for the Lord the legal victims to be offered for Him who was the true claimed for Himself all the first-born in Israel, because, in Victim, in order that the figure might be united to and ∗ Athanasius, on Lk. 2:23 † Bede, on Lk. 2:23 2286 confirmed by the reality, against those who denied that in dove, being a loquacious bird, represents the preaching the Gospel Christ preached the God of the Law. “For we and confession of faith; and because it is a chaste animal, must not think,” says Origen (Hom. xiv in Luc.) “that the it signifies chastity; and being a solitary animal, it signi- good God subjected His Son to the enemy’s law, which fies contemplation. The pigeon is a gentle and simple ani- He Himself had not given.” mal, and therefore signifies gentleness and simplicity. It is Reply to Objection 4. The law of Lev. 12:6,8 “com- also a gregarious animal; wherefore it signifies the active manded those who could, to offer, for a son or a daughter, life. Consequently this sacrifice signified the perfection of a lamb and also a turtle dove or a pigeon: but those who Christ and His members. Again, “both these animals, by were unable to offer a lamb were commanded to offer two the plaintiveness of their song, represented the mourning turtle doves or two young pigeons”∗. “And so the Lord, of the saints in this life: but the turtle dove, being solitary, who, ‘being rich, became poor for our [Vulg.: ‘your’] signifies the tears of prayer; whereas the pigeon, being sakes, that through His poverty we [you] might be rich,” gregarious, signifies the public prayers of the Church”‡. as is written 2 Cor. 8:9, “wished the poor man’s victim to Lastly, two of each of these animals are offered, to show be offered for Him” just as in His birth He was “wrapped that holiness should be not only in the soul, but also in the in swaddling clothes and laid in a manger”†. Neverthe- body. less, these birds have a figurative sense. For the turtle Whether it was fitting that the Mother of God should go to the temple to be purified? IIIa q. 37 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that it was unfitting for wished, nevertheless, to submit to circumcision and the the Mother of God to go to the Temple to be purified. other burdens of the Law, in order to give an example of For purification presupposes uncleanness. But there was humility and obedience; and in order to show His approval no uncleanness in the Blessed Virgin, as stated above of the Law; and, again, in order to take away from the (Qq. 27,28). Therefore she should not have gone to the Jews an excuse for calumniating Him: for the same rea- Temple to be purified. sons He wished His Mother also to fulfil the prescriptions Objection 2. Further, it is written (Lev. 12:2-4): “If of the Law, to which, nevertheless, she was not subject. a woman, having received seed, shall bear a man-child, Reply to Objection 1. Although the Blessed Virgin she shall be unclean seven days”; and consequently she had no uncleanness, yet she wished to fulfil the obser- is forbidden “to enter into the sanctuary until the days vance of purification, not because she needed it, but on of her purification be fulfilled.” But the Blessed Virgin account of the precept of the Law. Thus the Evangelist brought forth a male child without receiving the seed of says pointedly that the days of her purification “according man. Therefore she had no need to come to the Temple to to the Law” were accomplished; for she needed no purifi- be purified. cation in herself. Objection 3. Further, purification from uncleanness is Reply to Objection 2. Moses seems to have cho- accomplished by grace alone. But the sacraments of the sen his words in order to exclude uncleanness from the Old Law did not confer grace; rather, indeed, did she have Mother of God, who was with child “without receiving the very Author of grace with her. Therefore it was not seed.” It is therefore clear that she was not bound to fulfil fitting that the Blessed Virgin should come to the Temple that precept, but fulfilled the observance of purification of to be purified. her own accord, as stated above. On the contrary is the authority of Scripture, where it Reply to Objection 3. The sacraments of the Law did is stated (Lk. 2:22) that “the days of” Mary’s “purification not cleanse from the uncleanness of sin which is accom- were accomplished according to the law of Moses.” plished by grace, but they foreshadowed this purification: I answer that, As the fulness of grace flowed from for they cleansed by a kind of carnal purification, from Christ on to His Mother, so it was becoming that the the uncleanness of a certain irregularity, as stated in the mother should be like her Son in humility: for “God Ia IIae, q. 102, a. 5; Ia IIae, q. 103, a. 2. But the Blessed giveth grace to the humble,” as is written James 4:6. And Virgin contracted neither uncleanness, and consequently therefore, just as Christ, though not subject to the Law, did not need to be purified. ∗ Bede, Hom. xv in Purif. † Bede on Lk. 1 ‡ Bede, Hom. xv in Purif. 2287 THIRD PART, QUESTION 38 Of the Baptism of John (In Six Articles) We now proceed to consider the baptism wherewith Christ was baptized. And since Christ was baptized with the baptism of John, we shall consider (1) the baptism of John in general; (2) the baptizing of Christ. In regard to the former there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether it was fitting that John should baptize? (2) Whether that baptism was from God? (3) Whether it conferred grace? (4) Whether others besides Christ should have received that baptism? (5) Whether that baptism should have ceased when Christ was baptized? (6) Whether those who received John’s baptism had afterwards to receive Christ’s baptism? Whether it was fitting that John should baptize? IIIa q. 38 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting that easily than if he had gone in search of each individual, as John should baptize. For every sacramental rite belongs to Chrysostom observes, commenting on St. John (Hom. x some law. But John did not introduce a new law. There- in Matth.). fore it was not fitting that he should introduce the new rite Thirdly, that by his baptism he might accustom men of baptism. to the baptism of Christ; wherefore Gregory says in a Objection 2. Further, John “was sent by God. . . for a homily (Hom. vii in Evang.) that therefore did John bap- witness” (Jn. 1:6,7) as a prophet; according to Lk. 1:76: tize, “that, being consistent with his office of precursor, “Thou, child, shalt be called the prophet of the Highest.” as he had preceded our Lord in birth, so he might also by But the prophets who lived before Christ did not intro- baptizing precede Him who was about to baptize.” duce any new rite, but persuaded men to observe the rites Fourthly, that by persuading men to do penance, he of the Law. as is clearly stated Malachi 4:4: “Remember might prepare men to receive worthily the baptism of the law of Moses My servant.” Therefore neither should Christ. Wherefore Bede∗ says that “the baptism of John John have introduced a new rite of baptism. was as profitable before the baptism of Christ, as instruc- Objection 3. Further, when there is too much of any- tion in the faith profits the catechumens not yet baptized. thing, nothing should be added to it. But the Jews ob- For just as he preached penance, and foretold the baptism served a superfluity of baptisms; for it is written (Mk. of Christ, and drew men to the knowledge of the Truth 7:3,4) that “the Pharisees and all the Jews eat not with- that hath appeared to the world, so do the ministers of out often washing their hands. . . and when they come from the Church, after instructing men, chide them for their the market, unless they be washed, they eat not; and many sins, and lastly promise them forgiveness in the baptism other things there are that have been delivered to them to of Christ.” observe, the washings of cups and of pots, and of brazen Reply to Objection 1. The baptism of John was not vessels, and of beds.” Therefore it was unfitting that John a sacrament properly so called [per se], but a kind of should baptize. sacramental, preparatory to the baptism of Christ. Con- On the contrary is the authority of Scripture (Mat. sequently, in a way, it belonged to the law of Christ, but 3:5,6), which, after stating the holiness of John, adds not to the law of Moses. many went out to him, “and were baptized in the Jordan.” Reply to Objection 2. John was not only a prophet, I answer that, It was fitting for John to baptize, for but “more than a prophet,” as stated Mat. 11:9: for he four reasons: first, it was necessary for Christ to be bap- was the term of the Law and the beginning of the Gospel. tized by John, in order that He might sanctify baptism; as Therefore it was in his province to lead men, both by word Augustine observes, super Joan. (Tract. xiii in Joan.). and deed, to the law of Christ rather than to the observance Secondly, that Christ might be manifested. Whence of the Old Law. John himself says (Jn. 1:31): “That He,” i.e. Christ, “may Reply to Objection 3. Those baptisms of the Phar- be made manifest in Israel, therefore am I come baptizing isees were vain, being ordered merely unto carnal clean- with water.” For he announced Christ to the crowds that liness. But the baptism of John was ordered unto spiri- gathered around him; which was thus done much more tual cleanliness, since it led men to do penance, as stated ∗ Cf. Scot. Erig. in Joan. iii, 24 2288 above. Whether the baptism of John was from God? IIIa q. 38 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the baptism of John except in as far as God works in man. was not from God. For nothing sacramental that is from Reply to Objection 1. By the baptism of the New Law God is named after a mere man: thus the baptism of the men are baptized inwardly by the Holy Ghost, and this is New Law is not named after Peter or Paul, but after Christ. accomplished by God alone. But by the baptism of John But that baptism is named after John, according to Mat. the body alone was cleansed by the water. Wherefore it 21:25: “The baptism of John. . . was it from heaven or is written (Mat. 3:11): “I baptize you in water; but. . . He from men?” Therefore the baptism of John was not from shall baptize you in the Holy Ghost.” For this reason the God. baptism of John was named after him, because it effected Objection 2. Further, every doctrine that proceeds nothing that he did not accomplish. But the baptism of the from God anew is confirmed by some signs: thus the Lord New Law is not named after the minister thereof, because (Ex. 4) gave Moses the power of working signs; and it is he does not accomplish its principal effect, which is the written (Heb. 2:3,4) that our faith “having begun to be de- inward cleansing. clared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that Reply to Objection 2. The whole teaching and work heard Him, God also bearing them witness by signs and of John was ordered unto Christ, who, by many miracles wonders.” But it is written of John the Baptist (Jn. 10:41) confirmed both His own teaching and that of John. But if that “John did no sign.” Therefore it seems that the bap- John had worked signs, men would have paid equal atten- tism wherewith he baptized was not from God. tion to John and to Christ. Wherefore, in order that men Objection 3. Further, those sacraments which are in- might pay greater attention to Christ, it was not given to stituted by God are contained in certain precepts of Holy John to work a sign. Yet when the Jews asked him why Scripture. But there is no precept of Holy Writ command- he baptized, he confirmed his office by the authority of ing the baptism of John. Therefore it seems that it was not Scripture, saying: “I am the voice of one crying in the from God. wilderness,” etc. as related, Jn. 1:23 (cf. Is. 40:3). More- On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:33): “He who over, the very austerity of his life was a commendation of sent me to baptize with water said to me: ‘He upon whom his office, because, as Chrysostom says, commenting on thou shalt see the Spirit,’ ” etc. Matthew (Hom. x in Matth.), “it was wonderful to witness I answer that, Two things may be considered in the such endurance in a human body.” baptism of John—namely, the rite of baptism and the ef- Reply to Objection 3. The baptism of John was in- fect of baptism. The rite of baptism was not from men, tended by God to last only for a short time, for the reasons but from God, who by an interior revelation of the Holy given above (a. 1). Therefore it was not the subject of a Ghost sent John to baptize. But the effect of that baptism general commandment set down in Sacred Writ, but of was from man, because it effected nothing that man could a certain interior revelation of the Holy Ghost, as stated not accomplish. Wherefore it was not from God alone, above. Whether grace was given in the baptism of John? IIIa q. 38 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that grace was given in inal sin was remitted through circumcision: because, as the baptism of John. For it is written (Mk. 1:4): “John Bede says (Hom. x in Circumcis.), “under the Law, cir- was in the desert baptizing and preaching the baptism of cumcision brought the same saving aid to heal the wound penance unto remission of sins.” But penance and remis- of original sin as baptism is wont to bring now that grace sion of sins are the effect of grace. Therefore the baptism is revealed.” Much more, therefore, did the baptism of of John conferred grace. John effect the remission of sins, which cannot be accom- Objection 2. Further, those who were about to be bap- plished without grace. tized by John “confessed their sins,” as related Mat. 3:6 On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 3:11): “I in- and Mk. 1:5. But the confession of sins is ordered to their deed baptize you in water unto penance.” Which words remission, which is effected by grace. Therefore grace Gregory thus expounds in a certain homily (Hom. vii in was conferred in the baptism of John. Evang.): “John baptized, not in the Spirit, but in water: Objection 3. Further, the baptism of John was more because he could not forgive sins.” But grace is given by akin than circumcision to the baptism of Christ. But orig- the Holy Ghost, and by means thereof sins are taken away. 2289 Therefore the baptism of John did not confer grace. Or it may be said that he preached the “baptism of I answer that, As stated above (a. 2, ad 2), the whole penance,” i.e. which induced men to do penance, which teaching and work of John was in preparation for Christ: penance leads men on to “the remission of sins.” just as it is the duty of the servant and of the under- Or again, it may be said with Jerome∗ that “by the bap- craftsman to prepare the matter for the form which is ac- tism of Christ grace is given, by which sins are remitted complished by the head-craftsman. Now grace was to be gratis; and that what is accomplished by the bridegroom conferred on men through Christ, according to Jn. 1:17: is begun by the bridesman,” i.e. by John. Consequently “Grace and truth came through Jesus Christ.” Therefore it is said that “he baptized and preached the baptism of the baptism of John did not confer grace, but only pre- penance unto remission of sins,” not as though he accom- pared the way for grace; and this in three ways: first, by plished this himself, but because he began it by preparing John’s teaching, which led men to faith in Christ; sec- the way for it. ondly, by accustoming men to the rite of Christ’s baptism; Reply to Objection 2. That confession of sins was thirdly, by penance, preparing men to receive the effect of not made unto the remission of sins, to be realized imme- Christ’s baptism. diately through the baptism of John, but to be obtained Reply to Objection 1. In these words, as Bede says through subsequent penance and through the baptism of (on Mk. 1:4), a twofold baptism of penance may be un- Christ, for which that penance was a preparation. derstood. one is that which John conferred by baptizing, Reply to Objection 3. Circumcision was instituted which is called “a baptism of penance,” etc., by reason of as a remedy for original sin. Whereas the baptism of its inducing men to do penance, and of its being a kind John was not instituted for this purpose, but was merely of protestation by which men avowed their purpose of do- in preparation for the baptism of Christ, as stated above; ing penance. The other is the baptism of Christ, by which whereas the sacraments attain their effect through the sins are remitted, and which John could not give, but only force of their institution. preach, saying: “He will baptize you in the Holy Ghost.” Whether Christ alone should have been baptized with the baptism of John? IIIa q. 38 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ alone should On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 3:21): “It came to have been baptized with the baptism of John. For, as pass, when all the people were baptized, that Jesus also stated above (a. 1), “the reason why John baptized was being baptized and praying, heaven was opened.” that Christ might receive baptism,” as Augustine says (Su- I answer that, For two reasons it behooved others be- per Joan., Tract. xiii). But what is proper to Christ should sides Christ to be baptized with the baptism of John. First, not be applicable to others. Therefore no others should as Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. iv, v), “if Christ have received that baptism. alone had been baptized with the baptism of John, some Objection 2. Further, whoever is baptized either re- would have said that John’s baptism, with which Christ ceives something from the baptism or confers something was baptized, was more excellent than that of Christ, with on the baptism. But no one could receive anything from which others are baptized.” the baptism of John, because thereby grace was not con- Secondly, because, as above stated, it behooved oth- ferred, as stated above (a. 3). On the other hand, no one ers to be prepared by John’s baptism for the baptism of could confer anything on baptism save Christ, who “sanc- Christ. tified the waters by the touch of His most pure flesh”†. Reply to Objection 1. The baptism of John was insti- Therefore it seems that Christ alone should have been bap- tuted not only that Christ might be baptized, but also for tized with the baptism of John. other reasons, as stated above (a. 1). And yet, even if it Objection 3. Further, if others were baptized with that were instituted merely in order that Christ might be bap- baptism, this was only in order that they might be pre- tized therewith, it was still necessary for others to receive pared for the baptism of Christ: and thus it would seem this baptism, in order to avoid the objection mentioned fitting that the baptism of John should be conferred on all, above. old and young, Gentile and Jew, just as the baptism of Reply to Objection 2. Others who approached to be Christ. But we do not read that either children or Gentiles baptized by John could not, indeed, confer anything on his were baptized by the latter; for it is written (Mk. 1:5) that baptism: yet neither did they receive anything therefrom, “there went out to him. . . all they of Jerusalem, and were save only the sign of penance. baptized by him.” Therefore it seems that Christ alone Reply to Objection 3. This was the baptism of should have been baptized by John. “penance,” for which children were not suited; wherefore ∗ Another author on Mk. 1 (inter op. Hier.) † Mag. Sent. iv, 3 2290 they were not baptized therewith. But to bring the nations Gospel to the Gentiles before His Passion and Resurrec-into the way of salvation was reserved to Christ alone, tion. Much less fitting, therefore, was it for the Gentiles who is the “expectation of the nations,” as we read Gn. to be baptized by John. 49:10. Indeed, Christ forbade the apostles to preach the Whether John’s baptism should have ceased after Christ was baptized? IIIa q. 38 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that John’s baptism cause, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xxix in Joan.), “if should have ceased after Christ was baptized. For it is John had ceased to baptize” when Christ had been bap- written (Jn. 1:31): “That He may be made manifest in Is- tized, “men would think that he was moved by jealousy or rael, therefore am I come baptizing in water.” But when anger.” Secondly, if he had ceased to baptize when Christ Christ had been baptized, He was made sufficiently man- baptized, “he would have given His disciples a motive for ifest, both by the testimony of John and by the dove com- yet greater envy.” Thirdly, because, by continuing to bap- ing down upon Him, and again by the voice of the Father tize, “he sent his hearers to Christ” (Hom. xxix in Joan.). bearing witness to Him. Therefore it seems that John’s Fourthly, because, as Bede∗ says, “there still remained a baptism should not have endured thereafter. shadow of the Old Law: nor should the forerunner with- Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Super Joan., draw until the truth be made manifest.” Tract. iv): “Christ was baptized, and John’s baptism Reply to Objection 1. When Christ was baptized, He ceased to avail.” Therefore it seems that, after Christ’s was not as yet fully manifested: consequently there was baptism, John should not have continued to baptize. still need for John to continue baptizing. Objection 3. Further, John’s baptism prepared the Reply to Objection 2. The baptism of John ceased way for Christ’s. But Christ’s baptism began as soon after Christ had been baptized, not immediately, but when as He had been baptized; because “by the touch of His the former was cast into prison. Thus Chrysostom says most pure flesh He endowed the waters with a regenerat- (Hom. xxix in Joan.): “I consider that John’s death was ing virtue,” as Bede asserts (Mag. Sent. iv, 3). Therefore allowed to take place, and that Christ’s preaching began in it seems that John’s baptism ceased when Christ had been a great measure after John had died, so that the undivided baptized. allegiance of the multitude was transferred to Christ, and On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 3:22,23): “Je- there was no further motive for the divergence of opinions sus. . . came into the land of Judea. . . and baptized: and concerning both of them.” John also was baptizing.” But Christ did not baptize be- Reply to Objection 3. John’s baptism prepared the fore being baptized. Therefore it seems that John contin- way not only for Christ to be baptized, but also for oth- ued to baptize after Christ had been baptized. ers to approach to Christ’s baptism: and this did not take I answer that, It was not fitting for the baptism of place as soon as Christ was baptized. John to cease when Christ had been baptized. First, be- Whether those who had been baptized with John’s baptism had to be baptized with IIIa q. 38 a. 6 the baptism of Christ? Objection 1. It would seem that those who had been Objection 2. Further, the apostles were baptized with baptized with John’s baptism had not to be baptized with John’s baptism, since some of them were his disciples, the baptism of Christ. For John was not less than the apos- as is clear from Jn. 1:37. But the apostles do not seem tles, since of him is it written (Mat. 11:11): “There hath to have been baptized with the baptism of Christ: for it not risen among them that are born of women a greater is written (Jn. 4:2) that “Jesus did not baptize, but His than John the Baptist.” But those who were baptized by disciples.” Therefore it seems that those who had been the apostles were not baptized again, but only received baptized with John’s baptism had not to be baptized with the imposition of hands; for it is written (Acts 8:16,17) the baptism of Christ. that some were “only baptized” by Philip “in the name Objection 3. Further, he who is baptized is less than of the Lord Jesus”: then the apostles—namely, Peter and he who baptizes. But we are not told that John himself John—“laid their hands upon them, and they received the was baptized with the baptism of Christ. Therefore much Holy Ghost.” Therefore it seems that those who had been less did those who had been baptized by John need to re- baptized by John had not to be baptized with the baptism ceive the baptism of Christ. of Christ. Objection 4. Further, it is written (Acts 19:1-5) that ∗ Scot. Erig. Comment. in Joan. 2291 “Paul. . . found certain disciples; and he said to them: belongs of necessity to Christ’s baptism that it be given Have you received the Holy Ghost since ye believed? But not only in water, but also in the Holy Ghost, accord- they said to him: We have not so much as heard whether ing to Jn. 3:5: “Unless a man be born of water and the there be a Holy Ghost. And he said: In what then were Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.” you baptized? Who said: In John’s baptism.” Wherefore Wherefore in the case of those who had been baptized “they were” again “baptized in the name of our [Vulg.: with John’s baptism in water only, not merely had the ‘the’] Lord Jesus Christ.” Hence it seems that they needed omission to be supplied by giving them the Holy Ghost to be baptized again, because they did not know of the by the imposition of hands, but they had to be baptized Holy Ghost: as Jerome says on Joel 2:28 and in an epis- wholly anew “in water and the Holy Ghost.” tle (lxix De Viro unius uxoris), and likewise Ambrose (De Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (Super Spiritu Sancto). But some were baptized with John’s bap- Joan., Tract. v): “After John, baptism was administered, tism who had full knowledge of the Trinity. Therefore and the reason why was because he gave not Christ’s bap- these had no need to be baptized again with Christ’s bap- tism, but his own. . . That which Peter gave. . . and if any tism. were given by Judas, that was Christ’s. And therefore if Objection 5. Further, on Rom. 10:8, “This is the Judas baptized anyone, yet were they not rebaptized. . . For word of faith, which we preach,” the gloss of Augustine the baptism corresponds with him by whose authority it is says: “Whence this virtue in the water, that it touches the given, not with him by whose ministry it is given.” For body and cleanses the heart, save by the efficacy of the the same reason those who were baptized by the deacon word, not because it is uttered, but because it is believed?” Philip, who gave the baptism of Christ, were not baptized Whence it is clear that the virtue of baptism depends on again, but received the imposition of hands by the apos- faith. But the form of John’s baptism signified the faith in tles, just as those who are baptized by priests are con- which we are baptized; for Paul says (Acts 19:4): “John firmed by bishops. baptized the people with the baptism of penance, saying: Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says to Seleu- That they should believe in Him who was to come after cianus (Ep. cclxv), “we deem that Christ’s disciples were him—that is to say, in Jesus.” Therefore it seems that baptized either with John’s baptism, as some maintain, or those who had been baptized with John’s baptism had no with Christ’s baptism, which is more probable. For He need to be baptized again with the baptism of Christ. would not fail to administer baptism so as to have baptized On the contrary, Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. servants through whom He baptized others, since He did v): “Those who were baptized with John’s baptism not fail in His humble service to wash their feet.” needed to be baptized with the baptism of our Lord.” Reply to Objection 3. As Chrysostom says (Hom. iv I answer that, According to the opinion of the Master in Matth.∗): “Since, when John said, ‘I ought to be bap- (Sent. iv, D, 2), “those who had been baptized by John tized by Thee,’ Christ answered, ‘Suffer it to be so now’: without knowing of the existence of the Holy Ghost, and it follows that afterwards Christ did baptize John.” More- who based their hopes on his baptism, were afterwards over, he asserts that “this is distinctly set down in some baptized with the baptism of Christ: but those who did of the apocryphal books.” At any rate, it is certain, as not base their hope on John’s baptism, and who believed Jerome says on Mat. 3:13, that, “as Christ was baptized in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, were not baptized af- in water by John, so had John to be baptized in the Spirit terwards, but received the Holy Ghost by the imposition by Christ.” of hands made over them by the apostles.” Reply to Objection 4. The reason why these persons And this, indeed, is true as to the first part, and is con- were baptized after being baptized by John was not only firmed by many authorities. But as to the second part, the because they knew not of the Holy Ghost, but also because assertion is altogether unreasonable. First, because John’s they had not received the baptism of Christ. baptism neither conferred grace nor imprinted a character, Reply to Objection 5. As Augustine says (Contra but was merely “in water,” as he says himself (Mat. 3:11). Faust. xix), our sacraments are signs of present grace, Wherefore the faith or hope which the person baptized had whereas the sacraments of the Old Law were signs of fu- in Christ could not supply this defect. Secondly, because, ture grace. Wherefore the very fact that John baptized in when in a sacrament, that is omitted which belongs of ne- the name of one who was to come, shows that he did not cessity to the sacrament, not only must the omission be give the baptism of Christ, which is a sacrament of the supplied, but the whole must be entirely renewed. Now, it New Law. ∗ From the supposititious Opus Imperfectum 2292 THIRD PART, QUESTION 39 Of the Baptizing of Christ (In Eight Articles) We have now to consider the baptizing of Christ, concerning which there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ should have been baptized? (2) Whether He should have been baptized with the baptism of John? (3) Of the time when He was baptized; (4) Of the place; (5) Of the heavens being opened unto Him; (6) Of the apparition of the Holy Ghost under the form of a dove; (7) Whether that dove was a real animal? (8) Of the voice of the Father witnessing unto Him. Whether it was fitting that Christ should be baptized? IIIa q. 39 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting for tom says (Hom. iv in Matth.), “although Christ was not a Christ to be baptized. For to be baptized is to be washed. sinner, yet did He take a sinful nature and ‘the likeness of But it was not fitting for Christ to be washed, since there sinful flesh.’ Wherefore, though He needed not baptism was no uncleanness in Him. Therefore it seems unfitting for His own sake, yet carnal nature in others had need for Christ to be baptized. thereof.” And, as Gregory Nazianzen says (Orat. xxxix) Objection 2. Further, Christ was circumcised in order “Christ was baptized that He might plunge the old Adam to fulfil the law. But baptism was not prescribed by the entirely in the water.” Thirdly, He wished to be baptized, law. Therefore He should not have been baptized. as Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cxxxvi), Objection 3. Further, the first mover in every genus “because He wished to do what He had commanded all is unmoved in regard to that movement; thus the heaven, to do.” And this is what He means by saying: “So it be- which is the first cause of alteration, is unalterable. But cometh us to fulfil all justice” (Mat. 3:15). For, as Am- Christ is the first principle of baptism, according to Jn. brose says (on Lk. 3:21), “this is justice, to do first thyself 1:33: “He upon whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending that which thou wishest another to do, and so encourage and remaining upon Him, He it is that baptizeth.” There- others by thy example.” fore it was unfitting for Christ to be baptized. Reply to Objection 1. Christ was baptized, not that On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 3:13) that “Je- He might be cleansed, but that He might cleanse, as stated sus cometh from Galilee to the Jordan, unto John, to be above. baptized by him.” Reply to Objection 2. It was fitting that Christ should I answer that, It was fitting for Christ to be baptized. not only fulfil what was prescribed by the Old Law, but First, because, as Ambrose says on Lk. 3:21: “Our Lord also begin what appertained to the New Law. Therefore was baptized because He wished, not to be cleansed, but He wished not only to be circumcised, but also to be bap- to cleanse the waters, that, being purified by the flesh of tized. Christ that knew no sin, they might have the virtue of bap- Reply to Objection 3. Christ is the first principle of tism”; and, as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth.), “that baptism’s spiritual effect. Unto this He was not baptized, He might bequeath the sanctified waters to those who but only in water. were to be baptized afterwards.” Secondly, as Chrysos- Whether it was fitting for Christ to be baptized with John’s baptism? IIIa q. 39 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that it was unfitting for Objection 2. Further, John’s baptism, as Chrysostom Christ to be baptized with John’s baptism. For John’s says (Hom. de Bapt. Christi), “was a mean between the baptism was the “baptism of penance.” But penance is baptism of the Jews and that of Christ.” But “the mean unbecoming to Christ, since He had no sin. Therefore it savors of the nature of the extremes” (Aristotle, De Partib. seems that He should not have been baptized with John’s Animal.). Since, therefore, Christ was not baptized with baptism. the Jewish baptism, nor yet with His own, on the same 2293 grounds He should not have been baptized with the bap-Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 1), Christ tism of John. wished to be baptized in order by His example to lead us Objection 3. Further, whatever is best in human to baptism. And so, in order that He might lead us thereto things should be ascribed to Christ. But John’s baptism more efficaciously, He wished to be baptized with a bap- does not hold the first place among baptisms. Therefore it tism which He clearly needed not, that men who needed it was not fitting for Christ to be baptized with John’s bap- might approach unto it. Wherefore Ambrose says on Lk. tism. 3:21: “Let none decline the laver of grace, since Christ On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 3:13) that “Jesus did not refuse the laver of penance.” cometh to the Jordan, unto John, to be baptized by him.” Reply to Objection 2. The Jewish baptism prescribed I answer that, As Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. by the law was merely figurative, whereas John’s baptism, xiii): “After being baptized, the Lord baptized, not with in a measure, was real, inasmuch as it induced men to that baptism wherewith He was baptized.” Wherefore, refrain from sin; but Christ’s baptism is efficacious unto since He Himself baptized with His own baptism, it fol- the remission of sin and the conferring of grace. Now lows that He was not baptized with His own, but with Christ needed neither the remission of sin, which was not John’s baptism. And this was befitting: first, because in Him, nor the bestowal of grace, with which He was John’s baptism was peculiar in this, that he baptized, not filled. Moreover, since He is “the Truth,” it was not fit- in the Spirit, but only “in water”; while Christ did not need ting that He should receive that which was no more than spiritual baptism, since He was filled with the grace of the a figure. Consequently it was more fitting that He should Holy Ghost from the beginning of His conception, as we receive the intermediate baptism than one of the extremes. have made clear above (q. 34, a. 1). And this is the rea- Reply to Objection 3. Baptism is a spiritual remedy. son given by Chrysostom (Hom. de Bapt. Christi). Sec- Now, the more perfect a thing is, the less remedy does it ondly, as Bede says on Mk. 1:9, He was baptized with the need. Consequently, from the very fact that Christ is most baptism of John, that, “by being thus baptized, He might perfect, it follows that it was fitting that He should not re- show His approval of John’s baptism.” Thirdly, as Gre- ceive the most perfect baptism: just as one who is healthy gory Nazianzen says (Orat. xxxix), “by going to John to does not need a strong medicine. be baptized by him, He sanctified baptism.” Whether Christ was baptized at a fitting time? IIIa q. 39 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ was baptized been baptized by John either before all the others, or after at an unfitting time. For Christ was baptized in order that them. He might lead others to baptism by His example. But it On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 3:21): “It came to is commendable that the faithful of Christ should be bap- pass, when all the people were baptized, that Jesus also tized, not merely before their thirtieth year, but even in being baptized, and praying;” and further on (Lk. 3:23): infancy. Therefore it seems that Christ should not have “And Jesus Himself was beginning about the age of thirty been baptized at the age of thirty. years.” Objection 2. Further, we do not read that Christ I answer that, Christ was fittingly baptized in His taught or worked miracles before being baptized. But it thirtieth year. First, because Christ was baptized as though would have been more profitable to the world if He had for the reason that He was about forthwith to begin to taught for a longer time, beginning at the age of twenty, or teach and preach: for which purpose perfect age is re- even before. Therefore it seems that Christ, who came for quired, such as is the age of thirty. Thus we read (Gn. man’s profit, should have been baptized before His thirti- 41:46) that “Joseph was thirty” years old when he under- eth year. took the government of Egypt. In like manner we read (2 Objection 3. Further, the sign of wisdom infused by Kings 5:4) that “David was thirty years old when he be- God should have been especially manifest in Christ. But gan to reign.” Again, Ezechiel began to prophesy in “his in the case of Daniel this was manifested at the time of his thirtieth year,” as we read Ezech. 1:1. boyhood; according to Dan. 13:45: “The Lord raised up Secondly, because, as Chrysostom says (Hom. x in the holy spirit of a young boy, whose name was Daniel.” Matth.), “the law was about to pass away after Christ’s Much more, therefore, should Christ have been baptized baptism: wherefore Christ came to be baptized at this age or have taught in His boyhood. which admits of all sins; in order that by His observing Objection 4. Further, John’s baptism was ordered to the law, no one might say that because He Himself could that of Christ as to its end. But “the end is first in in- not fulfil it, He did away with it.” tention and last in execution.” Therefore He should have Thirdly, because by Christ’s being baptized at the per- 2294 fect age, we are given to understand that baptism brings anyone should presume to govern or teach others before forth perfect men, according to Eph. 4:13: “Until we all attaining to perfect age. meet into the unity of faith, and of the knowledge of the Reply to Objection 3. Christ was set before men as an Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the example to all. Wherefore it behooved that to be shown age of the fulness of Christ.” Hence the very property of forth in Him, which is becoming to all according to the the number seems to point to this. For thirty is product of common law—namely, that He should teach after reach- three and ten: and by the number three is implied faith in ing the perfect age. But, as Gregory Nazianzen says (Orat. the Trinity, while ten signifies the fulfilment of the com- xxxix), that which seldom occurs is not the law of the mandments of the Law: in which two things the perfection Church; as “neither does one swallow make the spring.” of Christian life consists. For by special dispensation, in accordance with the ruling Reply to Objection 1. As Gregory Nazianzen says of Divine wisdom, it has been granted to some, contrary (Orat. xl), Christ was baptized, not “as though He needed to the common law, to exercise the functions of governing to be cleansed, or as though some peril threatened Him or teaching. such as Solomon, Daniel, and Jeremias. if He delayed to be baptized. But no small danger besets Reply to Objection 4. It was not fitting that Christ any other man who departs from this life without being should be baptized by John either before or after all oth- clothed with the garment of incorruptibility”—namely, ers. Because, as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth.∗), grace. And though it be a good thing to remain clean after for this was Christ baptized, “that He might confirm the baptism, “yet is it still better,” as he says, “to be slightly preaching and the baptism of John, and that John might sullied now and then than to be altogether deprived of bear witness to Him.” Now, men would not have had faith grace.” in John’s testimony except after many had been baptized Reply to Objection 2. The profit which accrues to by him. Consequently it was not fitting that John should men from Christ is chiefly through faith and humility: to baptize Him before baptizing anyone else. In like man- both of which He conduced by beginning to teach not in ner, neither was it fitting that he should baptize Him last. His boyhood or youth, but at the perfect age. To faith, For as he (Chrysostom) says in the same passage: “As the because in this manner His human nature is shown to be light of the sun does not wait for the setting of the morning real, by its making bodily progress with the advance of star, but comes forth while the latter is still above the hori- time; and lest this progress should be deemed imaginary, zon, and by its brilliance dims its shining: so Christ did He did not wish to show His wisdom and power before not wait till John had run his course, but appeared while His body had reached the perfect age: to humility, lest he was yet teaching and baptizing.” Whether Christ should have been baptized in the Jordan? IIIa q. 39 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ should not I answer that, It was through the river Jordan that the have been baptized in the Jordan. For the reality should children of Israel entered into the land of promise. Now, correspond to the figure. But baptism was prefigured in this is the prerogative of Christ’s baptism over all other the crossing of the Red Sea, where the Egyptians were baptisms: that it is the entrance to the kingdom of God, drowned, just as our sins are blotted out in baptism. which is signified by the land of promise; wherefore it is Therefore it seems that Christ should rather have been said (Jn. 3:5): “Unless a man be born again of water and baptized in the sea than in the river Jordan. the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.” Objection 2. Further, “Jordan” is interpreted a “going To this also is to be referred the dividing of the water of the down.” But by baptism a man goes up rather than down: Jordan by Elias, who was to be snatched up into heaven in wherefore it is written (Mat. 3:16) that “Jesus being bap- a fiery chariot, as it is related 4 Kings 2: because, to wit, tized, forthwith came up [Douay: ‘out’] from the water.” the approach to heaven is laid open by the fire of the Holy Therefore it seems unfitting that Christ should be baptized Ghost, to those who pass through the waters of baptism. in the Jordan. Therefore it was fitting that Christ should be baptized in Objection 3. Further, while the children of Israel were the Jordan. crossing, the waters of the Jordan “were turned back,” as it Reply to Objection 1. The crossing of the Red Sea is related Jos. 4, and as it is written Ps. 113:3,5. But those foreshadowed baptism in this—that baptism washes away who are baptized go forward, not back. Therefore it was sin: whereas the crossing of the Jordan foreshadows it in not fitting that Christ should be baptized in the Jordan. this—that it opens the gate to the heavenly kingdom: and On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 1:9) that “Jesus this is the principal effect of baptism, and accomplished was baptized by John in the Jordan.” through Christ alone. And therefore it was fitting that ∗ From the supposititious Opus Imperfectum 2295 Christ should be baptized in the Jordan rather than in the Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says in a sermon sea. for the Epiphany (x): “As of yore the waters of the Jor- Reply to Objection 2. In baptism we “go up” by ad- dan were held back, so now, when Christ was baptized, vancing in grace: for which we need to “go down” by the torrent of sin was held back.” Or else this may signify humility, according to James 4:6: “He giveth grace to the that against the downward flow of the waters the river of humble.” And to this “going down” must the name of the blessings flowed upwards. Jordan be referred. Whether the heavens should have been opened unto Christ at His baptism? IIIa q. 39 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the heavens should we gaze on heavenly things, which surpass the senses and not have been opened unto Christ at His baptism. For the human reason. And in order to signify this, the heavens heavens should be opened unto one who needs to enter were opened when Christ was baptized. heaven, by reason of his being out of heaven. But Christ Thirdly, because the entrance to the heavenly kingdom was always in heaven, according to Jn. 3:13: “The Son was opened to us by the baptism of Christ in a special of Man who is in heaven.” Therefore it seems that the manner, which entrance had been closed to the first man heavens should not have been opened unto Him. through sin. Hence, when Christ was baptized, the heav- Objection 2. Further, the opening of the heavens is ens were opened, to show that the way to heaven is open understood either in a corporal or in a spiritual sense. But to the baptized. it cannot be understood in a corporal sense: because the Now after baptism man needs to pray continually, in heavenly bodies are impassible and indissoluble, accord- order to enter heaven: for though sins are remitted through ing to Job 37:18: “Thou perhaps hast made the heavens baptism, there still remain the fomes of sin assailing us with Him, which are most strong, as if they were of molten from within, and the world and the devils assailing us brass.” In like manner neither can it be understood in a from without. And therefore it is said pointedly (Lk. spiritual sense, because the heavens were not previously 3:21) that “Jesus being baptized and praying, heaven was closed to the eyes of the Son of God. Therefore it seems opened”: because, to wit, the faithful after baptism stand unbecoming to say that when Christ was baptized “the in need of prayer. Or else, that we may be led to un- heavens were opened.” derstand that the very fact that through baptism heaven Objection 3. Further, heaven was opened to the faith- is opened to believers is in virtue of the prayer of Christ. ful through Christ’s Passion, according to Heb. 10:19: Hence it is said pointedly (Mat. 3:16) that “heaven was “We have [Vulg.: ‘Having’] a confidence in the entering opened to Him”—that is, “to all for His sake.” Thus, for into the holies by the blood of Christ.” Wherefore not example, the Emperor might say to one asking a favor for even those who were baptized with Christ’s baptism, and another: “Behold, I grant this favor, not to him, but to died before His Passion, could enter heaven. Therefore thee”—that is, “to him for thy sake,” as Chrysostom says the heavens should have been opened when Christ was (Hom. iv in Matth.∗). suffering rather than when He was baptized. Reply to Objection 1. According to Chrysostom On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 3:21): “Jesus being (Hom. iv in Matth.; from the supposititious Opus Imper- baptized and praying, heaven was opened.” fectum), as Christ was baptized for man’s sake, though I answer that, As stated above (a. 1; q. 38, a. 1), He needed no baptism for His own sake, so the heavens Christ wished to be baptized in order to consecrate the were opened unto Him as man, whereas in respect of His baptism wherewith we were to be baptized. And there- Divine Nature He was ever in heaven. fore it behooved those things to be shown forth which be- Reply to Objection 2. As Jerome says on Mat. long to the efficacy of our baptism: concerning which effi- 3:16,17, the heavens were opened to Christ when He was cacy three points are to be considered. First, the principal baptized, not by an unfolding of the elements, but by a power from which it is derived; and this, indeed, is a heav- spiritual vision: thus does Ezechiel relate the opening of enly power. For which reason, when Christ was baptized, the heavens at the beginning of his book. And Chrysostom heaven was opened, to show that in future the heavenly proves this (Hom. iv in Matth.; from the supposititious power would sanctify baptism. Opus Imperfectum) by saying that “if the creature”— Secondly, the faith of the Church and of the person namely, heaven—“had been sundered he would not have baptized conduces to the efficacy of baptism: wherefore said, ‘were opened to Him,’ since what is opened in a cor- those who are baptized make a profession of faith, and poreal sense is open to all.” Hence it is said expressly baptism is called the “sacrament of faith.” Now by faith (Mk. 1:10) that Jesus “forthwith coming up out of the wa- ∗ From the supposititious Opus Imperfectum 2296 ter, saw the heavens opened”; as though the opening of the ter heaven. And this is effected by baptism, according to heavens were to be considered as seen by Christ. Some, Rom. 6:3: “All we who are baptized in Christ Jesus are indeed, refer this to the corporeal vision, and say that such baptized in His death.” Wherefore mention is made of the a brilliant light shone round about Christ when He was opening of the heavens at His baptism rather than at His baptized, that the heavens seemed to be opened. It can Passion. also be referred to the imaginary vision, in which manner Or, as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth.; from Ezechiel saw the heavens opened: since such a vision was the supposititious Opus Imperfectum): “When Christ was formed in Christ’s imagination by the Divine power and baptized, the heavens were merely opened: but after He by His rational will, so as to signify that the entrance to had vanquished the tyrant by the cross; since gates were heaven is opened to men through baptism. Lastly, it can be no longer needed for a heaven which thenceforth would referred to intellectual vision: forasmuch as Christ, when be never closed, the angels said, not ‘open the gates,’ but He had sanctified baptism, saw that heaven was opened to ‘Take them away.’ ” Thus Chrysostom gives us to under- men: nevertheless He had seen before that this would be stand that the obstacles which had hitherto hindered the accomplished. souls of the departed from entering into heaven were en- Reply to Objection 3. Christ’s Passion is the common tirely removed by the Passion: but at Christ’s baptism they cause of the opening of heaven to men. But it behooves were opened, as though the way had been shown by which this cause to be applied to each one, in order that he en- men were to enter into heaven. Whether it is fitting to say that when Christ was baptized the Holy Ghost came down IIIa q. 39 a. 6 on Him in the form of a dove? Objection 1. It would seem that it is not fitting to say “is connected with the mystery accomplished in all who that when Christ was baptized the Holy Ghost came down were to be baptized afterwards.” Now, all those who on Him in the form of a dove. For the Holy Ghost dwells are baptized with the baptism of Christ receive the Holy in man by grace. But the fulness of grace was in the Man- Ghost, unless they approach unworthily; according to Christ from the beginning of His conception, because He Mat. 3:11: “He shall baptize you in the Holy Ghost.” was the “Only-begotten of the Father,” as is clear from Therefore it was fitting that when our Lord was baptized what has been said above (q. 7, a. 12; q. 34, a. 1). There- the Holy Ghost should descend upon Him. fore the Holy Ghost should not have been sent to Him at Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Trin. His baptism. xv): “It is most absurd to say that Christ received the Holy Objection 2. Further, Christ is said to have “de- Ghost, when He was already thirty years old: for when He scended” into the world in the mystery of the Incarnation, came to be baptized, since He was without sin, therefore when “He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant” was He not without the Holy Ghost. For if it is written (Phil. 2:7). But the Holy Ghost did not become incarnate. of John that ‘he shall be filled with the Holy Ghost from Therefore it is unbecoming to say that the Holy Ghost “de- his mother’s womb,’ what must we say of the Man-Christ, scended upon Him.” whose conception in the flesh was not carnal, but spiri- Objection 3. Further, that which is accomplished in tual? Therefore now,” i.e. at His baptism, “He deigned our baptism should have been shown in Christ’s baptism, to foreshadow His body,” i.e. the Church, “in which those as in an exemplar. But in our baptism no visible mission who are baptized receive the Holy Ghost in a special man- of the Holy Ghost takes place. Therefore neither should ner.” a visible mission of the Holy Ghost have taken place in Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Trin. Christ’s baptism. ii), the Holy Ghost is said to have descended on Christ in Objection 4. Further, the Holy Ghost is poured forth a bodily shape, as a dove, not because the very substance on others through Christ, according to Jn. 1:16: “Of His of the Holy Ghost was seen, for He is invisible: nor as fulness we all have received.” But the Holy Ghost came though that visible creature were assumed into the unity down on the apostles in the form, not of a dove, but of fire. of the Divine Person; since it is not said that the Holy Therefore neither should He have come down on Christ in Ghost was the dove, as it is said that the Son of God is the form of a dove, but in the form of fire. man by reason of the union. Nor, again, was the Holy On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 3:22): “The Holy Ghost seen under the form of a dove, after the manner in Ghost descended in a bodily shape as a dove upon Him.” which John saw the slain Lamb in the Apocalypse (5:6): I answer that, What took place with respect to Christ “For the latter vision took place in the spirit through spir- in His baptism, as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth.∗), itual images of bodies; whereas no one ever doubted that ∗ From the supposititious Opus Imperfectum 2297 this dove was seen by the eyes of the body.” Nor, again, not rend sound doctrines, as heretics do. Again, the dove did the Holy Ghost appear under the form of a dove in has no gall. This refers to the gift of piety, by reason of the sense in which it is said (1 Cor. 10:4): “ ‘Now, the which the saints are free from unreasonable anger. Again, rock was Christ’: for the latter had already a created exis- the dove builds its nest in the cleft of a rock. This refers to tence, and through the manner of its action was called by the gift of fortitude, wherewith the saints build their nest, the name of Christ, whom it signified: whereas this dove i.e. take refuge and hope, in the death wounds of Christ, came suddenly into existence, to fulfil the purpose of its who is the Rock of strength. Lastly, the dove has a plain- signification, and afterwards ceased to exist, like the flame tive song. This refers to the gift of fear, wherewith the which appeared in the bush to Moses.” saints delight in bewailing sins. Hence the Holy Ghost is said to have descended upon Thirdly, the Holy Ghost appeared under the form of Christ, not by reason of His being united to the dove: but a dove on account of the proper effect of baptism, which either because the dove itself signified the Holy Ghost, is the remission of sins and reconciliation with God: for inasmuch as it “descended” when it came upon Him; or, the dove is a gentle creature. Wherefore, as Chrysostom again, by reason of the spiritual grace, which is poured says, (Hom. xii in Matth.), “at the Deluge this creature out by God, so as to descend, as it were, on the creature, appeared bearing an olive branch, and publishing the tid- according to James 1:17: “Every best gift and every per- ings of the universal peace of the whole world: and now fect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of again the dove appears at the baptism, pointing to our De- lights.” liverer.” Reply to Objection 3. As Chrysostom says (Hom. xii Fourthly, the Holy Ghost appeared over our Lord at in Matth.): “At the beginning of all spiritual transactions His baptism in the form of a dove, in order to designate sensible visions appear, for the sake of them who cannot the common effect of baptism—namely, the building up conceive at all an incorporeal nature. . . so that, though af- of the unity of the Church. Hence it is written (Eph. terwards no such thing occur, they may shape their faith 5:25-27): “Christ delivered Himself up. . . that He might according to that which has occurred once for all.” And present. . . to Himself a glorious Church, not having spot therefore the Holy Ghost descended visibly, under a bod- or wrinkle, or any such thing. . . cleansing it by the laver of ily shape, on Christ at His baptism, in order that we may water in the word of life.” Therefore it was fitting that the believe Him to descend invisibly on all those who are bap- Holy Ghost should appear at the baptism under the form tized. of a dove, which is a creature both loving and gregarious. Reply to Objection 4. The Holy Ghost appeared over Wherefore also it is said of the Church (Cant 6:8): “One Christ at His baptism, under the form of a dove, for four is my dove.” reasons. First, on account of the disposition required in But on the apostles the Holy Ghost descended under the one baptized—namely, that he approach in good faith: the form of fire, for two reasons. First, to show with what since! as it is written (Wis. 1:5): “The holy spirit of dis- fervor their hearts were to be moved, so as to preach Christ cipline will flee from the deceitful.” For the dove is an everywhere, though surrounded by opposition. And there- animal of a simple character, void of cunning and deceit: fore He appeared as a fiery tongue. Hence Augustine says whence it is said (Mat. 10:16): “Be ye simple as doves.” (Super Joan., Tract. vi): Our Lord “manifests” the Holy Secondly, in order to designate the seven gifts of the Ghost “visibly in two ways”—namely, “by the dove corn- Holy Ghost, which are signified by the properties of the ing upon the Lord when He was baptized; by fire, coming dove. For the dove dwells beside the running stream, in upon the disciples when they were met together. . . In the order that, on perceiving the hawk, it may plunge in and former case simplicity is shown, in the latter fervor. . . We escape. This refers to the gift of wisdom, whereby the learn, then, from the dove, that those who are sanctified saints dwell beside the running waters of Holy Scripture, by the Spirit should be without guile: and from the fire, in order to escape the assaults of the devil. Again, the that their simplicity should not be left to wax cold. Nor dove prefers the more choice seeds. This refers to the gift let it disturb anyone that the tongues were cloven. . . in the of knowledge, whereby the saints make choice of sound dove recognize unity.” doctrines, with which they nourish themselves. Further, Secondly, because, as Chrysostom says (Gregory, the dove feeds the brood of other birds. This refers to the Hom. xxx in Ev.): “Since sins had to be forgiven,” which gift of counsel, with which the saints, by teaching and ex- is effected in baptism, “meekness was required”; this is ample, feed men who have been the brood, i.e. imitators, shown by the dove: “but when we have obtained grace we of the devil. Again, the dove tears not with its beak. This must look forward to be judged”; and this is signified by refers to the gift of understanding, wherewith the saints do the fire. 2298 Whether the dove in which the Holy Ghost appeared was real? IIIa q. 39 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the dove in which the Holy Ghost is called the Spirit of Truth, as appears from Holy Ghost appeared was not real. For that seems to be Jn. 16:13, therefore He too made a real dove in which to a mere apparition which appears in its semblance. But it appear, though He did not assume it into unity of person. is stated (Lk. 3:22) that the “Holy Ghost descended in a Wherefore, after the words quoted above, Augustine adds: bodily shape as a dove upon Him.” Therefore it was not a “Just as it behooved the Son of God not to deceive men, real dove, but a semblance of a dove. so it behooved the Holy Ghost not to deceive. But it was Objection 2. Further, just as “Nature does nothing easy for Almighty God, who created all creatures out of useless, so neither does God” (De Coelo i). Now since nothing, to frame the body of a real dove without the help this dove came merely “in order to signify something and of other doves, just as it was easy for Him to form a true pass away,” as Augustine says (De Trin. ii), a real dove body in Mary’s womb without the seed of a man: since would have been useless: because the semblance of a dove the corporeal creature obeys its Lord’s command and will, was sufficient for that purpose. Therefore it was not a real both in the mother’s womb in forming a man, and in the dove. world itself in forming a dove.” Objection 3. Further, the properties of a thing lead Reply to Objection 1. The Holy Ghost is said to have us to a knowledge of that thing. If, therefore, this were descended in the shape or semblance of a dove, not in the a real dove, its properties would have signified the nature sense that the dove was not real, but in order to show that of the real animal, and not the effect of the Holy Ghost. He did not appear in the form of His substance. Therefore it seems that it was not a real dove. Reply to Objection 2. It was not superfluous to form On the contrary, Augustine says (De Agone Christ. a real dove, in which the Holy Ghost might appear, be- xxii): “Nor do we say this as though we asserted that our cause by the very reality of the dove the reality of the Holy Lord Jesus Christ alone had a real body, and that the Holy Ghost and of His effects is signified. Ghost appeared to men’s eyes in a fallacious manner: but Reply to Objection 3. The properties of the dove lead we say that both those bodies were real.” us to understand the dove’s nature and the effects of the I answer that, As stated above (q. 5, a. 1), it was un- Holy Ghost in the same way. Because from the very fact becoming that the Son of God, who is the Truth of the Fa- that the dove has such properties, it results that it signifies ther, should make use of anything unreal; wherefore He the Holy Ghost. took, not an imaginary, but a real body. And since the Whether it was becoming, when Christ was baptized that the Father’s voice should be IIIa q. 39 a. 8 heard, bearing witness to the Son? Objection 1. It would seem that it was unbecoming is accomplished in our baptism should be manifested in when Christ was baptized for the Father’s voice to be Christ’s baptism, which was the exemplar of ours. Now heard bearing witness to the Son. For the Son and the the baptism which the faithful receive is hallowed by the Holy Ghost, according as they have appeared visibly, are invocation and the power of the Trinity; according to Mat. said to have been visibly sent. But it does not become the 28:19: “Go ye and teach all nations, baptizing them in Father to be sent, as Augustine makes it clear (De Trin. the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy ii). Neither, therefore, (does it become Him) to appear. Ghost.” Wherefore, as Jerome says on Mat. 3:16,17: “The Objection 2. Further, the voice gives expression to mystery of the Trinity is shown forth in Christ’s baptism. the word conceived in the heart. But the Father is not the our Lord Himself is baptized in His human nature; the Word. Therefore He is unfittingly manifested by a voice. Holy Ghost descended in the shape of a dove: the Father’s Objection 3. Further, the Man-Christ did not begin voice is heard bearing witness to the Son.” Therefore it to be Son of God at His baptism, as some heretics have was becoming that in that baptism the Father should be stated: but He was the Son of God from the beginning of manifested by a voice. His conception. Therefore the Father’s voice should have Reply to Objection 1. The visible mission adds some- proclaimed Christ’s Godhead at His nativity rather than at thing to the apparition, to wit, the authority of the sender. His baptism. Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost who are from an- On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 3:17): “Behold other, are said not only to appear, but also to be sent vis- a voice from heaven, saying: This is My beloved Son in ibly. But the Father, who is not from another, can appear whom I am well pleased.” indeed, but cannot be sent visibly. I answer that, As stated above (a. 5), that which Reply to Objection 2. The Father is manifested by the 2299 voice, only as producing the voice or speaking by it. And Reply to Objection 3. It was becoming that Christ’s since it is proper to the Father to produce the Word—that Godhead should not be proclaimed to all in His nativity, is, to utter or to speak—therefore was it most becoming but rather that It should be hidden while He was subject that the Father should be manifested by a voice, because to the defects of infancy. But when He attained to the per- the voice designates the word. Wherefore the very voice fect age, when the time came for Him to teach, to work to which the Father gave utterance bore witness to the miracles, and to draw men to Himself then did it behoove Sonship of the Word. And just as the form of the dove, in His Godhead to be attested from on high by the Father’s which the Holy Ghost was made manifest, is not the Na- testimony, so that His teaching might become the more ture of the Holy Ghost, nor is the form of man in which credible. Hence He says (Jn. 5:37): “The Father Him- the Son Himself was manifested, the very Nature of the self who sent Me, hath given testimony of Me.” And spe- Son of God, so neither does the voice belong to the Na- cially at the time of baptism, by which men are born again ture of the Word or of the Father who spoke. Hence (Jn. into adopted sons of God; since God’s sons by adoption 5:37) our Lord says: “Neither have you heard His,” i.e. are made to be like unto His natural Son, according to the Father’s, “voice at any time, nor seen His shape.” By Rom. 8:29: “Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated which words, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xl in Joan.), “He to be made conformable to the image of His Son.” Hence gradually leads them to the knowledge of the philosophi- Hilary says (Super Matth. ii) that when Jesus was bap- cal truth, and shows them that God has neither voice nor tized, the Holy Ghost descended on Him, and the Father’s shape, but is above all such forms and utterances.” And voice was heard saying: “ ‘This is My beloved Son,’ that just as the whole Trinity made both the dove and the hu- we might know, from what was accomplished in Christ, man nature assumed by Christ, so also they formed the that after being washed in the waters of baptism the Holy voice: yet the Father alone as speaking is manifested by Ghost comes down upon us from on high, and that the Fa- the voice, just as the Son alone assumed human nature, ther’s voice declares us to have become the adopted sons and the Holy Ghost alone is manifested in the dove, as of God.” Augustine∗ makes evident. ∗ Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum 2300 THIRD PART, QUESTION 40 Of Christ’s Manner of Life (In Four Articles) Having considered those things which relate to Christ’s entrance into the world, or to His beginning, it remains for us to consider those that relate to the process of His life. And we must consider (1) His manner of life; (2) His temptation; (3) His doctrine; (4) His miracles. Concerning the first there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ should have led a solitary life, or have associated with men? (2) Whether He should have led an austere life as regards food, drink, and clothing? Or should He have conformed Himself to others in these respects? (3) Whether He should have adopted a lowly state of life, or one of wealth and honor? (4) Whether He should have lived in conformity with the Law? Whether Christ should have associated with men, or led a solitary life? IIIa q. 40 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ should not came I into the world, that I should give testimony to the have associated with men, but should have led a solitary truth.” Hence it was fitting not that He should hide Him- life. For it behooved Christ to show by His manner of life self by leading a solitary life, but that He should appear not only that He was man, but also that He was God. But openly and preach in public. Wherefore (Lk. 4:42,43) He it is not becoming that God should associate with men, for says to those who wished to stay Him: “To other cities it is written (Dan. 2:11): “Except the gods, whose conver- also I must preach the kingdom of God: for therefore am sation is not with men”; and the Philosopher says (Polit. I sent.” i) that he who lives alone is “either a beast”—that is, if he Secondly, He came in order to free men from sin; ac- do this from being wild—“or a god,” if his motive be the cording to 1 Tim. 1:15: “Christ Jesus came into this world contemplation of truth. Therefore it seems that it was not to save sinners.” And hence, as Chrysostom says, “al- becoming for Christ to associate with men. though Christ might, while staying in the same place, have Objection 2. Further, while He lived in mortal flesh, it drawn all men to Himself, to hear His preaching, yet He behooved Christ to lead a most perfect life. But the most did not do so; thus giving us the example to go about and perfect is the contemplative life, as we have stated in the seek those who perish, like the shepherd in his search of IIa IIae, q. 182, Aa. 1,2. Now, solitude is most suitable the lost sheep, and the physician in his attendance on the to the contemplative life; according to Osee 2:14: “I will sick.” lead her into the wilderness, and I will speak to her heart.” Thirdly, He came that by Him “we might have access Therefore it seems that Christ should have led a solitary to God,” as it is written (Rom. 5:2). And thus it was fitting life. that He should give men confidence in approaching Him Objection 3. Further, Christ’s manner of life should by associating familiarly with them. Wherefore it is writ- have been uniform: because it should always have given ten (Mat. 9:10): “It came to pass as He was sitting. . . in evidence of that which is best. But at times Christ avoided the house, behold, many publicans and sinners came, and the crowd and sought lonely places: hence Remigius∗, sat down with Jesus and His disciples.” On which Jerome commenting on Matthew, says: “We read that our Lord comments as follows: “They had seen the publican who had three places of refuge: the ship, the mountain, the had been converted from a sinful to a better life: and con- desert; to one or other of which He betook Himself when- sequently they did not despair of their own salvation.” ever he was harassed by the crowd.” Therefore He ought Reply to Objection 1. Christ wished to make His always to have led a solitary life. Godhead known through His human nature. And there- On the contrary, It is written (Baruch 3:38): “After- fore, since it is proper to man to do so, He associated with wards He was seen upon earth and conversed with men.” men, at the same time manifesting His Godhead to all, by I answer that, Christ’s manner of life had to be in preaching and working miracles, and by leading among keeping with the end of His Incarnation, by reason of men a blameless and righteous life. which He came into the world. Now He came into the Reply to Objection 2. As stated in the IIa IIae, q. 182, world, first, that He might publish the truth. thus He says a. 1; IIa IIae, q. 188, a. 6, the contemplative life is, abso- Himself (Jn. 18:37): “For this was I born, and for this lutely speaking, more perfect than the active life, because ∗ Cf. Catena Aurea, Matth. 5:1 2301 the latter is taken up with bodily actions: yet that form had not so much as time to eat.” But sometimes it was of active life in which a man, by preaching and teaching, for the sake of prayer; thus it is written (Lk. 6:12): “It delivers to others the fruits of his contemplation, is more came to pass in those days, that He went out into a moun- perfect than the life that stops at contemplation, because tain to pray; and He passed the whole night in the prayer such a life is built on an abundance of contemplation, and of God.” On this Ambrose remarks that “by His exam- consequently such was the life chosen by Christ. ple He instructs us in the precepts of virtue.” And some- Reply to Objection 3. Christ’s action is our instruc- times He did so in order to teach us to avoid the favor of tion. And therefore, in order to teach preachers that they men. Wherefore Chrysostom, commenting on Mat. 5:1, ought not to be for ever before the public, our Lord with- Jesus, “seeing the multitude, went up into a mountain,” drew Himself sometimes from the crowd. We are told of says: “By sitting not in the city and in the market-place, three reasons for His doing this. First, for the rest of the but on a mountain and in a place of solitude, He taught us body: hence (Mk. 6:31) it is stated that our Lord said to to do nothing for show, and to withdraw from the crowd, His disciples: “Come apart into a desert place, and rest a especially when we have to discourse of needful things.” little. For there were many coming and going: and they Whether it was becoming that Christ should lead an austere life in this world? IIIa q. 40 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that it was becoming that lead a solitary life, but should associate with men. Now Christ should lead an austere life in this world. For Christ it is most fitting that he who associates with others should preached the perfection of life much more than John did. conform to their manner of living; according to the words But John led an austere life in order that he might persuade of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:22): “I became all things to all men by his example to embrace a perfect life; for it is men.” And therefore it was most fitting that Christ should written (Mat. 3:4) that “the same John had his garment of conform to others in the matter of eating and drinking. camel’s hair and a leathern girdle about his loins: and his Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xvi) that “John is meat was locusts and wild honey”; on which Chrysostom described as ‘neither eating nor drinking,’ because he did comments as follows (Hom. x): “It was a marvelous and not take the same food as the Jews. Therefore, unless our strange thing to behold such austerity in a human frame: Lord had taken it, it would not be said of Him, in contrast, which thing also particularly attracted the Jews.” There- ‘eating and drinking.’ ” fore it seems that an austere life was much more becoming Reply to Objection 1. In His manner of living our to Christ. Lord gave an example of perfection as to all those things Objection 2. Further, abstinence is ordained to con- which of themselves relate to salvation. Now abstinence tinency; for it is written (Osee 4:10): “They shall eat and in eating and drinking does not of itself relate to salvation, shall not be filled; they have committed fornication, and according to Rom. 14:17: “The kingdom of God is not have not ceased.” But Christ both observed continency meat and drink.” And Augustine (De Qq. Evang. ii, qu. in Himself and proposed it to be observed by others when 11) explains Mat. 11:19, “Wisdom is justified by her chil- He said (Mat. 19:12): “There are eunuchs who have made dren,” saying that this is because the holy apostles “under- themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven: he that stood that the kingdom of God does not consist in eating can take it let him take it.” Therefore it seems that Christ and drinking, but in suffering indigence with equanimity,” should have observed an austere life both in Himself and for they are neither uplifted by affluence, nor distressed by in His disciples. want. Again (De Doctr. Christ. iii), he says that in all such Objection 3. Further, it seems absurd for a man to be- things “it is not making use of them, but the wantonness gin a stricter form of life and to return to an easier life: for of the user, that is sinful.” Now both these lives are lawful one might quote to his discredit that which is written, Lk. and praiseworthy—namely, that a man withdraw from the 14:30: “This man began to build, and was not able to fin- society of other men and observe abstinence; and that he ish.” Now Christ began a very strict life after His baptism, associate with other men and live like them. And there- remaining in the desert and fasting for “forty days and fore our Lord wished to give men an example of either forty nights.” Therefore it seems unbecoming that, after kind of life. leading such a strict life, He should return to the common As to John, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxxvii manner of living. super Matth.), “he exhibited no more than his life and On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 11:19): “The Son righteous conduct. . . but Christ had the testimony also of of Man came eating and drinking.” miracles. Leaving, therefore, John to be illustrious by his I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), it was in keep- fasting, He Himself came the opposite way, both coming ing with the end of the Incarnation that Christ should not unto publicans’ tables and eating and drinking.” 2302 Reply to Objection 2. Just as by abstinence other men Augustine (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 81): “To know the Creator acquire the power of self-restraint, so also Christ, in Him- and the creature is the entire teaching of wisdom. The self and in those that are His, subdued the flesh by the Creator is the Trinity, the Father, the Son, and the Holy power of His Godhead. Wherefore, as we read Mat. 9:14, Ghost. Now the creature is partly invisible, as the soul, the Pharisees and the disciples of John fasted, but not the to which the number three may be ascribed, for we are disciples of Christ. On which Bede comments, saying that commanded to love God in three ways, ‘with our whole “John drank neither wine nor strong drink: because absti- heart, our whole soul, and our whole mind’; and partly nence is meritorious where the nature is weak. But why visible, as the body, to which the number four is applica- should our Lord, whose right by nature it is to forgive ble on account of its being subject to heat, moisture, cold, sins, avoid those whom He could make holier than such and dryness. Hence if we multiply ten, which may be re- as abstain?” ferred to the entire moral code, by four, which number Reply to Objection 3. As Chrysostom says (Hom. may be applied to the body, because it is the body that ex- xiii super Matth.), “that thou mightest learn how great a ecutes the law, the product is the number forty: in which,” good is fasting, and how it is a shield against the devil, consequently, “the time during which we sigh and grieve and that after baptism thou shouldst give thyself up, not is shown forth.” And yet there was no inconsistency in to luxury, but to fasting—for this cause did He fast, not Christ’s returning to the common manner of living, after as needing it Himself, but as teaching us. . . And for this fasting and (retiring into the) desert. For it is becoming did He proceed no further than Moses and Elias, lest His to that kind of life, which we hold Christ to have em- assumption of our flesh might seem incredible.” The mys- braced, wherein a man delivers to others the fruits of his tical meaning, as Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Evang.), is contemplation, that he devote himself first of all to con- that by Christ’s example the number “forty” is observed in templation, and that he afterwards come down to the pub- His fast, because the power of the “decalogue is fulfilled licity of active life by associating with other men. Hence throughout the four books of the Holy Gospel: since ten Bede says on Mk. 2:18: “Christ fasted, that thou mightest multiplied by four amounts to forty.” Or, because “we live not disobey the commandment; He ate with sinners, that in this mortal body composed of the four elements, and thou mightest discern His sanctity and acknowledge His by its lusts we transgress the commandments of the Lord, power.” which are expressed in the decalogue.” Or, according to Whether Christ should have led a life of poverty in this world? IIIa q. 40 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ should not were to say as Jerome observes: “Why desirest thou to have led a life of poverty in this world. Because Christ follow Me for the sake of riches and worldly gain, since should have embraced the most eligible form of life. But I am so poor that I have not even the smallest dwelling- the most eligible form of life is that which is a mean be- place, and I am sheltered by a roof that is not Mine?” And tween riches and poverty; for it is written (Prov. 30:8): on Mat. 17:26: “That we may not scandalize them, go to “Give me neither beggary nor riches; give me only the the sea,” Jerome says: “This incident, taken literally, af- necessaries of life.” Therefore Christ should have led a fords edification to those who hear it when they are told life, not of poverty, but of moderation. that our Lord was so poor that He had not the wherewithal Objection 2. Further, external wealth is ordained to to pay the tax for Himself and His apostles.” bodily use as to food and raiment. But Christ conformed I answer that, It was fitting for Christ to lead a life His manner of life to those among whom He lived, in the of poverty in this world. First, because this was in keep- matter of food and raiment. Therefore it seems that He ing with the duty of preaching, for which purpose He says should have observed the ordinary manner of life as to that He came (Mk. 1:38): “Let us go into the neighbor- riches and poverty, and have avoided extreme poverty. ing towns and cities, that I may preach there also: for to Objection 3. Further, Christ specially invited men to this purpose am I come.” Now in order that the preach- imitate His example of humility, according to Mat. 11:29: ers of God’s word may be able to give all their time to “Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart.” preaching, they must be wholly free from care of worldly But humility is most commendable in the rich; thus it is matters: which is impossible for those who are possessed written (1 Tim. 6:11): “Charge the rich of this world not of wealth. Wherefore the Lord Himself, when sending the to be high-minded.” Therefore it seems that Christ should apostles to preach, said to them (Mat. 10:9): “Do not pos- not have chosen a life of poverty. sess gold nor silver.” And the apostles (Acts 6:2) say: “It On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 8:20): “The Son is not reasonable that we should leave the word of God of Man hath not where to lay His head”: as though He and serve tables.” 2303 Secondly, because just as He took upon Himself the forasmuch as Christ was incapable of sin, He had not the death of the body in order to bestow spiritual life on us, so same motive as Solomon for avoiding these things. Yet did He bear bodily poverty, in order to enrich us spiritu- neither is every kind of beggary an occasion of theft and ally, according to 2 Cor. 8:9: “You know the grace of our perjury, as Solomon seems to add (Prov. 30:8); but only Lord Jesus Christ: that. . . He became poor for our [Vulg.: that which is involuntary, in order to avoid which, a man ‘your’] sakes that through His poverty we [Vulg.: ‘you’] is guilty of theft and perjury. But voluntary poverty is not might be rich.” open to this danger: and such was the poverty chosen by Thirdly, lest if He were rich His preaching might be as- Christ. cribed to cupidity. Wherefore Jerome says on Mat. 10:9, Reply to Objection 2. A man may feed and clothe that if the disciples had been possessed of wealth, “they himself in conformity with others, not only by possessing had seemed to preach for gain, not for the salvation of riches, but also by receiving the necessaries of life from mankind.” And the same reason applies to Christ. those who are rich. This is what happened in regard to Fourthly, that the more lowly He seemed by reason of Christ: for it is written (Lk. 8:2,3) that certain women His poverty, the greater might the power of His Godhead followed Christ and “ministered unto Him of their sub- be shown to be. Hence in a sermon of the Council of Eph- stance.” For, as Jerome says on Mat. 27:55, “It was a esus (P. iii, c. ix) we read: “He chose all that was poor Jewish custom, nor was it thought wrong for women, fol- and despicable, all that was of small account and hidden lowing the ancient tradition of their nation, out of their from the majority, that we might recognize His Godhead private means to provide their instructors with food and to have transformed the terrestrial sphere. For this reason clothing. But as this might give scandal to the heathens, did He choose a poor maid for His Mother, a poorer birth- Paul says that he gave it up”: thus it was possible for them place; for this reason did He live in want. Learn this from to be fed out of a common fund, but not to possess wealth, the manger.” without their duty of preaching being hindered by anxiety. Reply to Objection 1. Those who wish to live virtu- Reply to Objection 3. Humility is not much to be ously need to avoid abundance of riches and beggary, in praised in one who is poor of necessity. But in one who, as far as these are occasions of sin: since abundance of like Christ, is poor willingly, poverty itself is a sign of riches is an occasion for being proud; and beggary is an very great humility. occasion of thieving and lying, or even of perjury. But Whether Christ conformed His conduct to the Law? IIIa q. 40 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ did not con- On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:17): “Do not form His conduct to the Law. For the Law forbade any think that I am come to destroy the Law or the Prophets.” work whatsoever to be done on the Sabbath, since God Commenting on these words, Chrysostom says: “He ful- “rested on the seventh day from all His work which He filled the Law. . . in one way, by transgressing none of the had done.” But He healed a man on the Sabbath, and precepts of the Law; secondly, by justifying us through commanded him to take up his bed. Therefore it seems faith, which the Law, in the letter, was unable to do.” that He did not conform His conduct to the Law. I answer that, Christ conformed His conduct in all Objection 2. Further, what Christ taught, that He also things to the precepts of the Law. In token of this He did, according to Acts 1:1: “Jesus began to do and to wished even to be circumcised; for the circumcision is teach.” But He taught (Mat. 15:11) that “not” all “that a kind of protestation of a man’s purpose of keeping the which goeth into the mouth defileth a man”: and this is Law, according to Gal. 5:3: “I testify to every man cir- contrary to the precept of the Law, which declared that a cumcising himself, that he is a debtor to do the whole man was made unclean by eating and touching certain an- Law.” imals, as stated Lev. 11. Therefore it seems that He did And Christ, indeed, wished to conform His conduct to not conform His conduct to the Law. the Law, first, to show His approval of the Old Law. Sec- Objection 3. Further, he who consents to anything is ondly, that by obeying the Law He might perfect it and of the same mind as he who does it, according to Rom. bring it to an end in His own self, so as to show that it 1:32: “Not only they that do them, but they also that con- was ordained to Him. Thirdly, to deprive the Jews of an sent to them that do them.” But Christ, by excusing His excuse for slandering Him. Fourthly, in order to deliver disciples, consented to their breaking the Law by plucking men from subjection to the Law, according to Gal. 4:4,5: the ears of corn on the Sabbath; as is related Mat. 12:1-8. “God sent His Son. . . made under the Law that He might Therefore it seems that Christ did not conform His con- redeem them who were under the Law.” duct to the Law. Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord excuses Himself 2304 from any transgression of the Law in this matter, for three a man receives circumcision on the Sabbath-day. Now reasons. First, the precept of the hallowing of the Sabbath when Christ commanded the paralytic to carry his bed on forbids not Divine work, but human work: for though God the Sabbath-day, this pertained to the worship of God, i.e. ceased on the seventh day from the creation of new crea- to the praise of God’s power. And thus it is clear that He tures, yet He ever works by keeping and governing His did not break the Sabbath: although the Jews threw this creatures. Now that Christ wrought miracles was a Divine false accusation in His face, saying (Jn. 9:16): “This man work: hence He says (Jn. 5:17): “My Father worketh until is not of God, who keepeth not the Sabbath.” now; and I work.” Reply to Objection 2. By those words Christ wished Secondly, He excuses Himself on the ground that this to show that man is made unclean as to his soul, by the precept does not forbid works which are needful for bod- use of any sort of foods considered not in their nature, ily health. Wherefore He says (Lk. 13:15): “Doth not but only in some signification. And that certain foods are every one of you on the Sabbath-day loose his ox or his in the Law called “unclean” is due to some signification; ass from the manger, and lead them to water?” And far- whence Augustine says (Contra Faust. vi): “If a question ther on (Lk. 14:5): “Which of you shall have an ass or an be raised about swine and lambs, both are clean by na- ox fall into a pit, and will not immediately draw him out ture, since ‘all God’s creatures are good’; but by a certain on the Sabbath-day?” Now it is manifest that the mirac- signification lambs are clean and swine unclean.” ulous works done by Christ related to health of body and Reply to Objection 3. The disciples also, when, be- soul. ing hungry, they plucked the ears of corn on the Sabbath, Thirdly, because this precept does not forbid works are to be excused from transgressing the Law, since they pertaining to the worship of God. Wherefore He says were pressed by hunger: just as David did not transgress (Mat. 12:5): “Have ye not read in the Law that on the the Law when, through being compelled by hunger, he ate Sabbath-days the priests in the Temple break the Sabbath, the loaves which it was not lawful for him to eat. and are without blame?” And (Jn. 7:23) it is written that 2305 THIRD PART, QUESTION 41 Of Christ’s Temptation (In Four Articles) We have now to consider Christ’s temptation, concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether it was becoming that Christ should be tempted? (2) Of the place; (3) Of the time; (4) Of the mode and order of the temptation. Whether it was becoming that Christ should be tempted? IIIa q. 41 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it was not becoming tor in overcoming temptations, not only by helping us, but for Christ to be tempted. For to tempt is to make an ex- also by giving us an example.” periment, which is not done save in regard to something Fourthly, in order to fill us with confidence in His unknown. But the power of Christ was known even to the mercy. Hence it is written (Heb. 4:15): “We have not a demons; for it is written (Lk. 4:41) that “He suffered them high-priest, who cannot have compassion on our infirmi- not to speak, for they knew that He was Christ.” Therefore ties, but one tempted in all things like as we are, without it seems that it was unbecoming for Christ to be tempted. sin.” Objection 2. Further, Christ was come in order to de- Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Civ. stroy the works of the devil, according to 1 Jn. 3:8: “For Dei ix): “Christ was known to the demons only so far this purpose the Son of God appeared, that He might de- as He willed; not as the Author of eternal life, but as stroy the works of the devil.” But it is not for the same the cause of certain temporal effects,” from which they to destroy the works of a certain one and to suffer them. formed a certain conjecture that Christ was the Son of Therefore it seems unbecoming that Christ should suffer God. But since they also observed in Him certain signs of Himself to be tempted by the devil. human frailty, they did not know for certain that He was Objection 3. Further, temptation is from a threefold the Son of God: wherefore (the devil) wished to tempt source—the flesh, the world, and the devil. But Christ was Him. This is implied by the words of Mat. 4:2,3, saying not tempted either by the flesh or by the world. Therefore that, after “He was hungry, the tempter” came “to Him,” neither should He have been tempted by the devil. because, as Hilary says (Super Matth., cap. iii), “Had not On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 4:1): “Jesus was Christ’s weakness in hungering betrayed His human na- led by the Spirit into the desert to be tempted by the devil.” ture, the devil would not have dared to tempt Him.” More- I answer that, Christ wished to be tempted; first that over, this appears from the very manner of the temptation, He might strengthen us against temptations. Hence Gre- when he said: “If Thou be the Son of God.” Which words gory says in a homily (xvi in Evang.): “It was not unwor- Ambrose explains as follows (In Luc. iv): “What means thy of our Redeemer to wish to be tempted, who came this way of addressing Him, save that, though he knew also to be slain; in order that by His temptations He might that the Son of God was to come, yet he did not think that conquer our temptations, just as by His death He over- He had come in the weakness of the flesh?” came our death.” Reply to Objection 2. Christ came to destroy the Secondly, that we might be warned, so that none, how- works of the devil, not by powerful deeds, but rather by ever holy, may think himself safe or free from temptation. suffering from him and his members, so as to conquer the Wherefore also He wished to be tempted after His bap- devil by righteousness, not by power; thus Augustine says tism, because, as Hilary says (Super Matth., cap. iii.): (De Trin. xiii) that “the devil was to be overcome, not by “The temptations of the devil assail those principally who the power of God, but by righteousness.” And therefore are sanctified, for he desires, above all, to overcome the in regard to Christ’s temptation we must consider what He holy. Hence also it is written (Ecclus. 2): Son, when thou did of His own will and what He suffered from the devil. comest to the service of God, stand in justice and in fear, For that He allowed Himself to be tempted was due to and prepare thy soul for temptation.” His own will. Wherefore it is written (Mat. 4:1): “Jesus Thirdly, in order to give us an example: to teach us, to was led by the Spirit into the desert, to be tempted by the wit, how to overcome the temptations of the devil. Hence devil”; and Gregory (Hom. xvi in Evang.) says this is to Augustine says (De Trin. iv) that Christ “allowed Himself be understood of the Holy Ghost, to wit, that “thither did to be tempted” by the devil, “that He might be our Media- His Spirit lead Him, where the wicked spirit would find 2306 Him and tempt Him.” But He suffered from the devil in Reply to Objection 3. As the Apostle says (Heb. being “taken up” on to “the pinnacle of the Temple” and 4:15), Christ wished to be “tempted in all things, without again “into a very high mountain.” Nor is it strange, as sin.” Now temptation which comes from an enemy can Gregory observes, “that He allowed Himself to be taken be without sin: because it comes about by merely out- by him on to a mountain, who allowed Himself to be cru- ward suggestion. But temptation which comes from the cified by His members.” And we understand Him to have flesh cannot be without sin, because such a temptation is been taken up by the devil, not, as it were, by force, but caused by pleasure and concupiscence; and, as Augustine because, as Origen says (Hom. xxi super Luc.), “He fol- says (De Civ. Dei xix), “it is not without sin that ‘the flesh lowed Him in the course of His temptation like a wrestler desireth against the spirit.’ ” And hence Christ wished to advancing of his own accord.” be tempted by an enemy, but not by the flesh. Whether Christ should have been tempted in the desert? IIIa q. 41 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ should not He adds other reasons, saying that “Christ in doing this have been tempted in the desert. Because Christ wished set forth the mystery of Adam’s delivery from exile,” who to be tempted in order to give us an example, as stated had been expelled from paradise into the desert, and “set above (a. 1). But an example should be set openly before an example to us, by showing that the devil envies those those who are to follow it. Therefore He should not have who strive for better things.” been tempted in the desert. Reply to Objection 1. Christ is set as an example to Objection 2. Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xii in all through faith, according to Heb. 12:2: “Looking on Matth.): “Then most especially does the devil assail by Jesus, the author and finisher of faith.” Now faith, as it tempting us, when he sees us alone. Thus did he tempt the is written (Rom. 10:17), “cometh by hearing,” but not by woman in the beginning when he found her apart from her seeing: nay, it is even said (Jn. 20:29): “Blessed are they husband.” Hence it seems that, by going into the desert to that have not seen and have believed.” And therefore, in be tempted, He exposed Himself to temptation. Since, order that Christ’s temptation might be an example to us, therefore, His temptation is an example to us, it seems it behooved that men should not see it, and it was enough that others too should take such steps as will lead them that they should hear it related. into temptation. And yet this seems a dangerous thing Reply to Objection 2. The occasions of temptation to do, since rather should we avoid the occasion of being are twofold. one is on the part of man—for instance, when tempted. a man causes himself to be near to sin by not avoiding the Objection 3. Further, Mat. 4:5, Christ’s second temp- occasion of sinning. And such occasions of temptation tation is set down, in which “the devil took” Christ up should be avoided, as it is written of Lot (Gn. 19:17): “into the Holy City, and set Him upon the pinnacle of the “Neither stay thou in all the country about” Sodom. Temple”: which is certainly not in the desert. Therefore Another occasion of temptation is on the part of the He was not tempted in the desert only. devil, who always “envies those who strive for better On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 1:13) that Jesus things,” as Ambrose says (In Luc. iv, 1). And such occa- “was in the desert forty days and forty nights, and was sions of temptation are not to be avoided. Hence Chrysos- tempted by Satan.” tom says (Hom. v in Matth.∗): “Not only Christ was led I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 2), Christ into the desert by the Spirit, but all God’s children that of His own free-will exposed Himself to be tempted by have the Holy Ghost. For it is not enough for them to sit the devil, just as by His own free-will He submitted to idle; the Holy Ghost urges them to endeavor to do some- be killed by His members; else the devil would not have thing great: which is for them to be in the desert from dared to approach Him. Now the devil prefers to assail a the devil’s standpoint, for no unrighteousness, in which man who is alone, for, as it is written (Eccles. 4:12), “if a the devil delights, is there. Again, every good work, com- man prevail against one, two shall withstand him.” And so pared to the flesh and the world, is the desert; because it it was that Christ went out into the desert, as to a field of is not according to the will of the flesh and of the world.” battle, to be tempted there by the devil. Hence Ambrose Now, there is no danger in giving the devil such an occa- says on Lk. 4:1, that “Christ was led into the desert for the sion of temptation; since the help of the Holy Ghost, who purpose of provoking the devil. For had he,” i.e. the devil, is the Author of the perfect deed, is more powerful† than “not fought, He,” i.e. Christ, “would not have conquered.” the assault of the envious devil. . ∗ From the supposititious Opus Imperfectum † All the codices read ‘majus.’ One of the earliest printed editions has ‘magis,’ which has much to commend it, since St. Thomas is commenting the text quoted from St. Chrysostom. The translation would run thus: ‘since rather is it (the temptation) a help from the Holy Ghost, who,’ etc. 2307 Reply to Objection 3. Some say that all the temp-self, i.e. Jerusalem, is called “a desert,” because it was tations took place in the desert. Of these some say that deserted by God. But there is no need for this explana- Christ was led into the Holy City, not really, but in an tion. For Mark says that He was tempted in the desert by imaginary vision; while others say that the Holy City it- the devil, but not that He was tempted in the desert only. Whether Christ’s temptation should have taken place after His fast? IIIa q. 41 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s temptation overcome by want of food, but because He abandoned His should not have taken place after His fast. For it has been manhood to its nature. For the devil was to be conquered, said above (q. 40, a. 2) that an austere mode of life was not by God, but by the flesh.” Wherefore Chrysostom too not becoming to Christ. But it savors of extreme austerity says: “He proceeded no farther than Moses and Elias, lest that He should have eaten nothing for forty days and forty His assumption of our flesh might seem incredible.” nights, for Gregory (Hom. xvi inn Evang.) explains the Reply to Objection 1. It was becoming for Christ fact that “He fasted forty days and forty nights,” saying not to adopt an extreme form of austere life in order that “during that time He partook of no food whatever.” to show Himself outwardly in conformity with those to It seems, therefore, that He should not thus have fasted whom He preached. Now, no one should take up the of- before His temptation. fice of preacher unless he be already cleansed and perfect Objection 2. Further, it is written (Mk. 1:13) that in virtue, according to what is said of Christ, that “Je- “He was in the desert forty days and forty nights; and was sus began to do and to teach” (Acts 1:1). Consequently, tempted by Satan.” Now, He fasted forty days and forty immediately after His baptism Christ adopted an austere nights. Therefore it seems that He was tempted by the form of life, in order to teach us the need of taming the devil, not after, but during, His fast. flesh before passing on to the office of preaching, accord- Objection 3. Further, we read that Christ fasted but ing to the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:27): “I chastise my body, and once. But He was tempted by the devil, not only once, bring it into subjection, lest perhaps when I have preached for it is written (Lk. 4:13) “that all the temptation be- to others, I myself should become a castaway.” ing ended, the devil departed from Him for a time.” As, Reply to Objection 2. These words of Mark may be therefore, He did not fast before the second temptation, so understood as meaning that “He was in the desert forty neither should He have fasted before the first. days and forty nights,” and that He fasted during that time: On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 4:2,3): “When and the words, “and He was tempted by Satan,” may be He had fasted forty days and forty nights, afterwards He taken as referring, not to the time during which He fasted, was hungry”: and then “the tempter came to Him.” but to the time that followed: since Matthew says that “af- I answer that, It was becoming that Christ should ter He had fasted forty days and forty nights, afterwards wish to fast before His temptation. First, in order to He was hungry,” thus affording the devil a pretext for ap- give us an example. For since we are all in urgent need proaching Him. And so the words that follow, and the of strengthening ourselves against temptation, as stated angels ministered to Him, are to be taken in sequence, above (a. 1), by fasting before being tempted, He teaches which is clear from the words of Matthew (4:11): “Then us the need of fasting in order to equip ourselves against the devil left Him,” i.e. after the temptation, “and behold temptation. Hence the Apostle (2 Cor. 6:5,7) reckons angels came and ministered to Him.” And as to the words “fastings” together with the “armor of justice.” inserted by Mark, “and He was with the beasts,” according Secondly, in order to show that the devil assails with to Chrysostom (Hom. xiii in Matth.), they are set down in temptations even those who fast, as likewise those who order to describe the desert as being impassable to man are given to other good works. And so Christ’s temptation and full of beasts. took place after His fast, as also after His baptism. Hence On the other hand, according to Bede’s exposition of since rather Chrysostom says (Hom. xiii super Matth.): Mk. 1:12,13, our Lord was tempted forty days and forty “To instruct thee how great a good is fasting, and how it nights. But this is not to be understood of the visible temp- is a most powerful shield against the devil; and that after tations which are related by Matthew and Luke, and oc- baptism thou shouldst give thyself up, not to luxury, but curred after the fast, but of certain other assaults which to fasting; for this cause Christ fasted, not as needing it perhaps Christ suffered from the devil during that time of Himself, but as teaching us.” His fast. Thirdly, because after the fast, hunger followed, which Reply to Objection 3. As Ambrose says on Lk. 4:13, made the devil dare to approach Him, as already stated the devil departed from Christ “for a time, because, later (a. 1, ad 1). Now, when “our Lord was hungry,” says on, he returned, not to tempt Him, but to assail Him Hilary (Super Matth. iii), “it was not because He was openly”—namely, at the time of His Passion. Neverthe- 2308 less, He seemed in this later assault to tempt Christ to de-he had tempted Him to gluttonous pleasure and idolatrous jection and hatred of His neighbor; just as in the desert contempt of God. Whether the mode and order of the temptation were becoming? IIIa q. 41 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the mode and order things towards which each one has an inclination. Con- of the temptation were unbecoming. For the devil tempts sequently the devil does not straight away tempt the spir- in order to induce us to sin. But if Christ had assuaged itual man to grave sins, but he begins with lighter sins, His bodily hunger by changing the stones into bread, He so as gradually to lead him to those of greater magnitude. would not have sinned; just as neither did He sin when Wherefore Gregory (Moral. xxxi), expounding Job 39:25, He multiplied the loaves, which was no less a miracle, in “He smelleth the battle afar off, the encouraging of the order to succor the hungry crowd. Therefore it seems that captains and the shouting of the army,” says: “The cap- this was nowise a temptation. tains are fittingly described as encouraging, and the army Objection 2. Further, a counselor is inconsistent if as shouting. Because vices begin by insinuating them- he persuades the contrary to what he intends. But when selves into the mind under some specious pretext: then the devil set Christ on a pinnacle of the Temple, he pur- they come on the mind in such numbers as to drag it into posed to tempt Him to pride or vainglory. Therefore it all sorts of folly, deafening it with their bestial clamor.” was inconsistent to urge Him to cast Himself thence: for Thus, too, did the devil set about the temptation of the this would be contrary to pride or vainglory, which always first man. For at first he enticed his mind to consent to seeks to rise. the eating of the forbidden fruit, saying (Gn. 3:1): “Why Objection 3. Further, one temptation should lead hath God commanded you that you should not eat of ev- to one sin. But in the temptation on the mountain he ery tree of paradise?” Secondly [he tempted him] to vain- counseled two sins—namely, covetousness and idolatry. glory by saying: “Your eyes shall be opened.” Thirdly, Therefore the mode of the temptation was unfitting. he led the temptation to the extreme height of pride, say- Objection 4. Further, temptations are ordained to sin. ing: “You shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.” This But there are seven deadly sins, as we have stated in the same order did he observe in tempting Christ. For at first Ia IIae, q. 84, a. 4. But the tempter only deals with three, he tempted Him to that which men desire, however spir- viz. gluttony, vainglory, and covetousness. Therefore the itual they may be—namely, the support of the corporeal temptation seems to have been incomplete. nature by food. Secondly, he advanced to that matter in Objection 5. Further, after overcoming all the which spiritual men are sometimes found wanting, inas- vices, man is still tempted to pride or vainglory: since much as they do certain things for show, which pertains pride “worms itself in stealthily, and destroys even good to vainglory. Thirdly, he led the temptation on to that in works,” as Augustine says (Ep. ccxi). Therefore Matthew which no spiritual men, but only carnal men, have a part— unfittingly gives the last place to the temptation to cov- namely, to desire worldly riches and fame, to the extent of etousness on the mountain, and the second place to the holding God in contempt. And so in the first two temp- temptation to vainglory in the Temple, especially since tations he said: “If Thou be the Son of God”; but not in Luke puts them in the reverse order. the third, which is inapplicable to spiritual men, who are Objection 6. Further, Jerome says on Mat. 4:4 that sons of God by adoption, whereas it does apply to the two “Christ purposed to overcome the devil by humility, not preceding temptations. by might.” Therefore He should not have repulsed him And Christ resisted these temptations by quoting the with a haughty rebuke, saying: “Begone, Satan.” authority of the Law, not by enforcing His power, “so as Objection 7. Further, the gospel narrative seems to be to give more honor to His human nature and a greater pun- false. For it seems impossible that Christ could have been ishment to His adversary, since the foe of the human race set on a pinnacle of the Temple without being seen by oth- was vanquished, not as by God, but as by man”; as Pope ers. Nor is there to be found a mountain so high that all the Leo says (Serm. 1, De Quadrag. 3). world can be seen from it, so that all the kingdoms of the Reply to Objection 1. To make use of what is need- earth could be shown to Christ from its summit. It seems, ful for self-support is not the sin of gluttony; but if a man therefore, that Christ’s temptation is unfittingly described. do anything inordinate out of the desire for such support, On the contrary is the authority of Scripture. it can pertain to the sin of gluttony. Now it is inordinate I answer that, The temptation which comes from the for a man who has human assistance at his command to enemy takes the form of a suggestion, as Gregory says seek to obtain food miraculously for mere bodily support. (Hom. xvi in Evang.). Now a suggestion cannot be made Hence the Lord miraculously provided the children of Is- to everybody in the same way; it must arise from those rael with manna in the desert, where there was no means 2309 of obtaining food otherwise. And in like fashion Christ ing ended, the devil departed from Him,’ unless the matter miraculously provided the crowds with food in the desert, of all sins were included in the three temptations already when there was no other means of getting food. But in or- related. For the causes of temptations are the causes of der to assuage His hunger, He could have done otherwise desires”—namely, “lust of the flesh, hope of glory, eager- than work a miracle, as did John the Baptist, according to ness for power.” Matthew (3:4); or He could have hastened to the neigh- Reply to Objection 5. As Augustine says (De Con- boring country. Consequently the devil esteemed that if sensu Evang. ii): “It is not certain which happened first; Christ was a mere man, He would fall into sin by attempt- whether the kingdoms of the earth were first shown to ing to assuage His hunger by a miracle. Him, and afterwards He was set on the pinnacle of the Reply to Objection 2. It often happens that a man Temple; or the latter first, and the former afterwards. seeks to derive glory from external humiliation, whereby However, it matters not, provided it be made clear that all he is exalted by reason of spiritual good. Hence Augus- these things did take place.” It may be that the Evangelists tine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12): “It must be set these things in different orders, because sometimes cu- noted that it is possible to boast not only of the beauty and pidity arises from vainglory, sometimes the reverse hap- splendor of material things, but even of filthy squalor.” pens. And this is signified by the devil urging Christ to seek Reply to Objection 6. When Christ had suffered the spiritual glory by casting His body down. wrong of being tempted by the devil saying, “If Thou be Reply to Objection 3. It is a sin to desire worldly the Son of God cast Thyself down,” He was not troubled, riches and honors in an inordinate fashion. And the prin- nor did He upbraid the devil. But when the devil usurped cipal sign of this is when a man does something wrong to himself the honor due to God, saying, “All these things in order to acquire such things. And so the devil was not will I give Thee, if, falling down, Thou wilt adore me,” satisfied with instigating to a desire for riches and hon- He was exasperated, and repulsed him, saying, “Begone, ors, but he went so far as to tempt Christ, for the sake of Satan”: that we might learn from His example to bear gaining possession of these things, to fall down and adore bravely insults leveled at ourselves, but not to allow our- him, which is a very great crime, and against God. Nor selves so much as to listen to those which are aimed at does he say merely, “if Thou wilt adore me,” but he adds, God. “if, falling down”; because, as Ambrose says on Lk. 4:5: Reply to Objection 7. As Chrysostom says (Hom. v “Ambition harbors yet another danger within itself: for, in Matth.): “The devil set Him” (on a pinnacle of the Tem- while seeking to rule, it will serve; it will bow in submis- ple) “that He might be seen by all, whereas, unawares to sion that it may be crowned with honor; and the higher it the devil, He acted in such sort that He was seen by none.” aims, the lower it abases itself.” In regard to the words, “ ‘He showed Him all the king- In like manner [the devil] in the preceding temptations doms of the world, and the glory of them,’ we are not to tried to lead [Christ] from the desire of one sin to the com- understand that He saw the very kingdoms, with the cities mission of another; thus from the desire of food he tried and inhabitants, their gold and silver: but that the devil to lead Him to the vanity of the needless working of a mir- pointed out the quarters in which each kingdom or city acle; and from the desire of glory to tempt God by casting lay, and set forth to Him in words their glory and estate.” Himself headlong. Or, again, as Origen says (Hom. xxx in Luc.), “he showed Reply to Objection 4. As Ambrose says on Lk. 4:13, Him how, by means of the various vices, he was the lord Scripture would not have said that “ ‘all the temptation be- of the world.” 2310 THIRD PART, QUESTION 42 Of Christ’s Doctrine (In Four Articles) We have now to consider Christ’s doctrine, about which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ should have preached to the Jews only, or to the Gentiles also? (2) Whether in preaching He should have avoided the opposition of the Jews? (3) Whether He should have preached in an open or in a hidden manner? (4) Whether He should have preached by word only, or also by writing? Concerning the time when He began to teach, we have spoken above when treating of His baptism (q. 29, a. 3). Whether Christ should have preached not only to the Jews, but also to the Gentiles? IIIa q. 42 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ should have Christ. . . was minister of the circumcision,” i.e. the apos- preached not only to the Jews, but also to the Gentiles. tle and preacher of the Jews, “for the truth of God, to con- For it is written (Is. 49:6): “It is a small thing that thou firm the promises made unto the fathers.” shouldst be My servant to raise up the tribes of Israel Secondly, in order to show that His coming was of [Vulg.: ‘Jacob’] and to convert the dregs of Jacob [Vulg.: God; because, as is written Rom. 13:1: “Those things ‘Israel’]: behold, I have given thee to be the light of the which are of God are well ordered [Vulg.: ‘those that Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation even to the far- are, are ordained of God’]”∗. Now the right order de- thest part of the earth.” But Christ gave light and salva- manded that the doctrine of Christ should be made known tion through His doctrine. Therefore it seems that it was first to the Jews, who, by believing in and worshiping one “a small thing” that He preached to Jews alone, and not to God, were nearer to God, and that it should be transmitted the Gentiles. through them to the Gentiles: just as in the heavenly hier- Objection 2. Further, as it is written (Mat. 7:29): archy the Divine enlightenment comes to the lower angels “He was teaching them as one having power.” Now the through the higher. Hence on Mat. 15:24, “I was not sent power of doctrine is made more manifest in the instruc- but to the sheep that are lost in the house of Israel,” Jerome tion of those who, like the Gentiles, have received no says: “He does not mean by this that He was not sent to tidings whatever; hence the Apostle says (Rom. 15:20): the Gentiles, but that He was sent to the Jews first.” And “I have so preached the [Vulg.: ‘this’] gospel, not where so we read (Is. 66:19): “I will send of them that shall be Christ was named, lest I should build upon another man’s saved,” i.e. of the Jews, “to the Gentiles. . . and they shall foundation.” Therefore much rather should Christ have declare My glory unto the Gentiles.” preached to the Gentiles than to the Jews. Thirdly, in order to deprive the Jews of ground for Objection 3. Further, it is more useful to instruct quibbling. Hence on Mat. 10:5, “Go ye not into the way many than one. But Christ instructed some individual of the Gentiles.” Jerome says: “It behooved Christ’s com- Gentiles, such as the Samaritan woman (Jn. 4) and the ing to be announced to the Jews first, lest they should have Chananaean woman (Mat. 15). Much more reason, there- a valid excuse, and say that they had rejected our Lord be- fore, was there for Christ to preach to the Gentiles in gen- cause He had sent His apostles to the Gentiles and Samar- eral. itans.” On the contrary, our Lord said (Mat. 15:24): “I was Fourthly, because it was through the triumph of the not sent but to the sheep that are lost of the house of Is- cross that Christ merited power and lordship over the Gen- rael.” And (Rom. 10:15) it is written: “How shall they tiles. Hence it is written (Apoc. 2:26,28): “He that shall preach unless they be sent?” Therefore Christ should not overcome. . . I will give him power over the nations. . . as I have preached to the Gentiles. also have received of My Father”; and that because He be- I answer that, It was fitting that Christ’s preaching, came “obedient unto the death of the cross, God hath ex- whether through Himself or through His apostles, should alted Him. . . that in the name of Jesus every knee should be directed at first to the Jews alone. First, in order bow. . . ” and that “every tongue should confess Him” to show that by His coming the promises were fulfilled (Phil. 2:8-11). Consequently He did not wish His doc- which had been made to the Jews of old, and not to the trine to be preached to the Gentiles before His Passion: it Gentiles. Thus the Apostle says (Rom. 15:8): “I say that was after His Passion that He said to His disciples (Mat. ∗ See Scriptural Index on this passage 2311 28:19): “Going, teach ye all nations.” For this reason it tiles to Christ, although these had heard nothing of Him. was that when, shortly before His Passion, certain Gen- Now the power of Christ’s teaching is to be consid- tiles wished to see Jesus, He said: “Unless the grain of ered in the miracles by which He confirmed His doc- wheat falling into the ground dieth, itself remaineth alone: trine, in the efficacy of His persuasion, and in the au- but if it die it bringeth forth much fruit” (Jn. 12:20-25); thority of His words, for He spoke as being Himself and as Augustine says, commenting on this passage: “He above the Law when He said: “But I say to you” (Mat. called Himself the grain of wheat that must be mortified 5:22,28,32,34,39,44); and, again, in the force of His righ- by the unbelief of the Jews, multiplied by the faith of the teousness shown in His sinless manner of life. nations.” Reply to Objection 3. Just as it was unfitting that Reply to Objection 1. Christ was given to be the light Christ should at the outset make His doctrine known to and salvation of the Gentiles through His disciples, whom the Gentiles equally with the Jews, in order that He might He sent to preach to them. appear as being sent to the Jews, as to the first-born peo- Reply to Objection 2. It is a sign, not of lesser, but of ple; so neither was it fitting for Him to neglect the Gentiles greater power to do something by means of others rather altogether, lest they should be deprived of the hope of sal- than by oneself. And thus the Divine power of Christ was vation. For this reason certain individual Gentiles were specially shown in this, that He bestowed on the teaching admitted, on account of the excellence of their faith and of His disciples such a power that they converted the Gen- devotedness. Whether Christ should have preached to the Jews without offending them? IIIa q. 42 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ should have the Scribes and Pharisees and the princes of the Jews preached to the Jews without offending them. For, as Au- were by their malice a considerable hindrance to the sal- gustine says (De Agone Christ. xi): “In the Man Jesus vation of the people, both because they opposed them- Christ, a model of life is given us by the Son of God.” But selves to Christ’s doctrine, which was the only way to sal- we should avoid offending not only the faithful, but even vation, and because their evil ways corrupted the morals unbelievers, according to 1 Cor. 10:32: “Be without of- of the people. For which reason our Lord, undeterred by fense to the Jews, and to the Gentiles, and to the Church their taking offense, publicly taught the truth which they of God.” Therefore it seems that, in His teaching, Christ hated, and condemned their vices. Hence we read (Mat. should also have avoided giving offense to the Jews. 15:12,14) that when the disciples of our Lord said: “Dost Objection 2. Further, no wise man should do any- Thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard this word, thing that will hinder the result of his labor. Now through were scandalized?” He answered: “Let them alone: they the disturbance which His teaching occasioned among the are blind and leaders of the blind; and if the blind lead the Jews, it was deprived of its results; for it is written (Lk. blind, both fall into the pit.” 11:53,54) that when our Lord reproved the Pharisees and Reply to Objection 1. A man ought so to avoid giv- Scribes, they “began vehemently to urge Him, end to op- ing offense, as neither by wrong deed or word to be the press His mouth about many things; lying in wait for Him, occasion of anyone’s downfall. “But if scandal arise from and seeking to catch something from His mouth, that they truth, the scandal should be borne rather than the truth be might accuse Him.” It seems therefore unfitting that He set aside,” as Gregory says (Hom. vii in Ezech.). should have given them offense by His teaching. Reply to Objection 2. By publicly reproving the Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:1): Scribes and Pharisees, Christ promoted rather than hin- “An ancient man rebuke not; but entreat him as a father.” dered the effect of His teaching. Because when the peo- But the priests and princes of the Jews were the elders of ple came to know the vices of those men, they were less that people. Therefore it seems that they should not have inclined to be prejudiced against Christ by hearing what been rebuked with severity. was said of Him by the Scribes and Pharisees, who were On the contrary, It was foretold (Is. 8:14) that Christ ever withstanding His doctrine. would be “for a stone of stumbling and for a rock of of- Reply to Objection 3. This saying of the Apostle is fense to the two houses of Israel.” to be understood of those elders whose years are reck- I answer that, The salvation of the multitude is to oned not only in age and authority, but also in probity; be preferred to the peace of any individuals whatsoever. according to Num. 11:16: “Gather unto Me seventy men Consequently, when certain ones, by their perverseness, of the ancients of Israel, whom thou knowest to be an- hinder the salvation of the multitude, the preacher and cients. . . of the people.” But if by sinning openly they turn the teacher should not fear to offend those men, in order the authority of their years into an instrument of wicked- that he may insure the salvation of the multitude. Now ness, they should be rebuked openly and severely, as also 2312 Daniel says (Dan. 13:52): “O thou that art grown old in evil days,” etc. Whether Christ should have taught all things openly? IIIa q. 42 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ should not through them to be made known to many?” have taught all things openly. For we read that He taught Thirdly, doctrine is hidden, as to the manner in which many things to His disciples apart: as is seen clearly in the it is propounded. And thus Christ spoke certain things in sermon at the Supper. Wherefore He said: “That which secret to the crowds, by employing parables in teaching you heard in the ear in the chambers shall be preached them spiritual mysteries which they were either unable or on the housetops”∗. Therefore He did not teach all things unworthy to grasp: and yet it was better for them to be in- openly. structed in the knowledge of spiritual things, albeit hidden Objection 2. Further, the depths of wisdom should not under the garb of parables, than to be deprived of it alto- be expounded save to the perfect, according to 1 Cor. 2:6: gether. Nevertheless our Lord expounded the open and “We speak wisdom among the perfect.” Now Christ’s doc- unveiled truth of these parables to His disciples, so that trine contained the most profound wisdom. Therefore it they might hand it down to others worthy of it; according should not have been made known to the imperfect crowd. to 2 Tim. 2:2: “The things which thou hast heard of me by Objection 3. Further, it comes to the same, to hide many witnesses, the same command to faithful men, who the truth, whether by saying nothing or by making use of shall be fit to teach others.” This is foreshadowed, Num. a language that is difficult to understand. Now Christ, by 4, where the sons of Aaron are commanded to wrap up the speaking to the multitudes a language they would not un- sacred vessels that were to be carried by the Levites. derstand, hid from them the truth that He preached; since Reply to Objection 1. As Hilary says, commenting “without parables He did not speak to them” (Mat. 13:34). on the passage quoted, “we do not read that our Lord was In the same way, therefore, He could have hidden it from wont to preach at night, and expound His doctrine in the them by saying nothing at all. dark: but He says this because His speech is darkness to On the contrary, He says Himself (Jn. 18:20): “In the carnal-minded, and His words are night to the unbe- secret I have spoken nothing.” liever. His meaning, therefore, is that whatever He said I answer that, Anyone’s doctrine may be hidden in we also should say in the midst of unbelievers, by openly three ways. First, on the part of the intention of the believing and professing it.” teacher, who does not wish to make his doctrine known Or, according to Jerome, He speaks comparatively— to many, but rather to hide it. And this may happen in two that is to say, because He was instructing them in Judea, ways—sometimes through envy on the part of the teacher, which was a small place compared with the whole world, who desires to excel in his knowledge, wherefore he is un- where Christ’s doctrine was to be published by the preach- willing to communicate it to others. But this was not the ing of the apostles. case with Christ, in whose person the following words are Reply to Objection 2. By His doctrine our Lord did spoken (Wis. 7:13): “Which I have learned without guile, not make known all the depths of His wisdom, neither to and communicate without envy, and her riches I hide not.” the multitudes, nor, indeed, to His disciples, to whom He But sometimes this happens through the vileness of the said (Jn. 16:12): “I have yet many things to say to you, things taught; thus Augustine says on Jn. 16:12: “There but you cannot bear them now.” Yet whatever things out are some things so bad that no sort of human modesty can of His wisdom He judged it right to make known to oth- bear them.” Wherefore of heretical doctrine it is written ers, He expounded, not in secret, but openly; although He (Prov. 9:17): “Stolen waters are sweeter.” Now, Christ’s was not understood by all. Hence Augustine says on Jn. doctrine is “not of error nor of uncleanness” (1 Thess. 18:20: “We must understand this, ‘I have spoken openly 2:3). Wherefore our Lord says (Mk. 4:21): “Doth a can- to the world,’ as though our Lord had said, ‘Many have dle,” i.e. true and pure doctrine, “come in to be put under heard Me’. . . and, again, it was not ‘openly,’ because they a bushel?” did not understand.” Secondly, doctrine is hidden because it is put before Reply to Objection 3. As stated above, our Lord few. And thus, again, did Christ teach nothing in se- spoke to the multitudes in parables, because they were cret: for He propounded His entire doctrine either to neither able nor worthy to receive the naked truth, which the whole crowd or to His disciples gathered together. He revealed to His disciples. Hence Augustine says on Jn. 18:20: “How can it be And when it is said that “without parables He did not said that He speaks in secret when He speaks before so speak to them,” according to Chrysostom (Hom. xlvii in many men?. . . especially if what He says to few He wishes Matth.), we are to understand this of that particular ser- ∗ St. Thomas, probably quoting from memory, combines Mat. 10:27 with Lk. 12:3 2313 mon, since on other occasions He said many things to the nothing literally, but that He scarcely ever spoke without multitude without parables. Or, as Augustine says (De introducing a parable, although He also spoke some things Qq. Evang., qu. xvii), this means, “not that He spoke in the literal sense.” Whether Christ should have committed His doctrine to writing? IIIa q. 42 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ should have in the hearts of the hearers. committed His doctrine to writing. For the purpose of Secondly, on account of the excellence of Christ’s doc- writing is to hand down doctrine to posterity. Now trine, which cannot be expressed in writing; according to Christ’s doctrine was destined to endure for ever, accord- Jn. 21:25: “There are also many other things which Jesus ing to Lk. 21:33: “Heaven and earth shall pass away, but did: which, if they were written everyone, the world itself, My words shall not pass away.” Therefore it seems that I think, would not be able to contain the books that should Christ should have committed His doctrine to writing. be written.” Which Augustine explains by saying: “We Objection 2. Further, the Old Law was a foreshad- are not to believe that in respect of space the world could owing of Christ, according to Heb. 10:1: “The Law has not contain them. . . but that by the capacity of the read- [Vulg.: ‘having’] a shadow of the good things to come.” ers they could not be comprehended.” And if Christ had Now the Old Law was put into writing by God, accord- committed His doctrine to writing, men would have had ing to Ex. 24:12: “I will give thee” two “tables of stone no deeper thought of His doctrine than that which appears and the law, and the commandments which I have writ- on the surface of the writing. ten.” Therefore it seems that Christ also should have put Thirdly, that His doctrine might reach all in an or- His doctrine into writing. derly manner: Himself teaching His disciples immedi- Objection 3. Further, to Christ, who came to en- ately, and they subsequently teaching others, by preach- lighten them that sit in darkness (Lk. 1:79), it belonged ing and writing: whereas if He Himself had written, His to remove occasions of error, and to open out the road to doctrine would have reached all immediately. faith. Now He would have done this by putting His teach- Hence it is said of Wisdom (Prov. 9:3) that “she hath ing into writing: for Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. sent her maids to invite to the tower.” It is to be observed, i) that “some there are who wonder why our Lord wrote however, that, as Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. nothing, so that we have to believe what others have writ- i), some of the Gentiles thought that Christ wrote cer- ten about Him. Especially do those pagans ask this ques- tain books treating of the magic art whereby He worked tion who dare not blame or blaspheme Christ, and who miracles: which art is condemned by the Christian learn- ascribe to Him most excellent, but merely human, wis- ing. “And yet they who claim to have read those books dom. These say that the disciples made out the Master to of Christ do none of those things which they marvel at be more than He really was when they said that He was the His doing according to those same books. Moreover, it is Son of God and the Word of God, by whom all things were by a Divine judgment that they err so far as to assert that made.” And farther on he adds: “It seems as though they these books were, as it were, entitled as letters to Peter and were prepared to believe whatever He might have written Paul, for that they found them in several places depicted in of Himself, but not what others at their discretion pub- company with Christ. No wonder that the inventors were lished about Him.” Therefore it seems that Christ should deceived by the painters: for as long as Christ lived in the have Himself committed His doctrine to writing. mortal flesh with His disciples, Paul was no disciple of On the contrary, No books written by Him were to His.” be found in the canon of Scripture. Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says in the same I answer that, It was fitting that Christ should not book: “Christ is the head of all His disciples who are commit His doctrine to writing. First, on account of His members of His body. Consequently, when they put into dignity: for the more excellent the teacher, the more ex- writing what He showed forth and said to them, by no cellent should be his manner of teaching. Consequently it means must we say that He wrote nothing: since His was fitting that Christ, as the most excellent of teachers, members put forth that which they knew under His dic- should adopt that manner of teaching whereby His doc- tation. For at His command they, being His hands, as it trine is imprinted on the hearts of His hearers; wherefore were, wrote whatever He wished us to read concerning it is written (Mat. 7:29) that “He was teaching them as His deeds and words.” one having power.” And so it was that among the Gen- Reply to Objection 2. Since the old Law was given tiles, Pythagoras and Socrates, who were teachers of great under the form of sensible signs, therefore also was it fit- excellence, were unwilling to write anything. For writings tingly written with sensible signs. But Christ’s doctrine, are ordained, as to an end, unto the imprinting of doctrine which is “the law of the spirit of life” (Rom. 8:2), had to 2314 be “written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living believe what the apostles wrote of Christ would have re-God; not in tables of stone, but in the fleshly tables of the fused to believe the writings of Christ, whom they deemed heart,” as the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:3). to work miracles by the magic art. Reply to Objection 3. Those who were unwilling to 2315 THIRD PART, QUESTION 43 Of the Miracles Worked by Christ, in General (In Four Articles) We must now consider the miracles worked by Christ: (1) In general; (2) Specifically, of each kind of miracle; (3) In particular, of His transfiguration. Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ should have worked miracles? (2) Whether He worked them by Divine power? (3) When did He begin to work miracles? (4) Whether His miracles are a sufficient proof of His Godhead? Whether Christ should have worked miracles? IIIa q. 43 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ should not a man by the grace of the Holy Ghost: so that when a man have worked miracles. For Christ’s deeds should have does the works of God we may believe that God dwells in been consistent with His words. But He Himself said him by His grace. Wherefore it is written (Gal. 3:5): “He (Mat. 16:4): “A wicked and adulterous generation seeketh who giveth to you the Spirit, and worketh miracles among after a sign; and a sign shall not be given it, but the sign of you.” Jonas the prophet.” Therefore He should not have worked Now both these things were to be made known to men miracles. concerning Christ—namely, that God dwelt in Him by Objection 2. Further, just as Christ, at His second grace, not of adoption, but of union: and that His super- coming, is to come “with” great power and majesty, as natural doctrine was from God. And therefore it was most is written Mat. 24:30, so at His first coming He came in fitting that He should work miracles. Wherefore He Him- infirmity, according to Is. 53:3: “A man of sorrows and self says (Jn. 10:38): “Though you will not believe Me, acquainted with infirmity.” But the working of miracles believe the works”; and (Jn. 5:36): “The works which belongs to power rather than to infirmity. Therefore it was the Father hath given Me to perfect. . . themselves. . . give not fitting that He should work miracles in His first com- testimony to Me.” ing. Reply to Objection 1. These words, “a sign shall not Objection 3. Further, Christ came that He might save be given it, but the sign of Jonas,” mean, as Chrysostom men by faith; according to Heb. 12:2: “Looking on Jesus, says (Hom. xliii in Matth.), that “they did not receive a the author and finisher of faith.” But miracles lessen the sign such as they sought, viz. from heaven”: but not that merit of faith; hence our Lord says (Jn. 4:48): “Unless He gave them no sign at all. Or that “He worked signs not you see signs and wonders you believe not.” Therefore it for the sake of those whom He knew to be hardened, but seems that Christ should not have worked miracles. to amend others.” Therefore those signs were given, not On the contrary, It was said in the person of His ad- to them, but to others. versaries (Jn. 11:47): “What do we; for this man doth Reply to Objection 2. Although Christ came “in the many miracles?” infirmity” of the flesh, which is manifested in the pas- I answer that, God enables man to work miracles for sions, yet He came “in the power of God”∗, and this had two reasons. First and principally, in confirmation of the to be made manifest by miracles. doctrine that a man teaches. For since those things which Reply to Objection 3. Miracles lessen the merit of are of faith surpass human reason, they cannot be proved faith in so far as those are shown to be hard of heart who by human arguments, but need to be proved by the argu- are unwilling to believe what is proved from the Scrip- ment of Divine power: so that when a man does works tures unless (they are convinced) by miracles. Yet it is that God alone can do, we may believe that what he says better for them to be converted to the faith even by mira- is from God: just as when a man is the bearer of letters cles than that they should remain altogether in their unbe- sealed with the king’s ring, it is to be believed that what lief. For it is written (1 Cor. 14:22) that signs are given they contain expresses the king’s will. “to unbelievers,” viz. that they may be converted to the Secondly, in order to make known God’s presence in faith. ∗ Cf. 2 Cor. 13:4 2316 Whether Christ worked miracles by Divine power? IIIa q. 43 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ did not work on: “And He wondered because of their unbelief.” In like miracles by Divine power. For the Divine power is om- manner it is said (Gn. 18:17): “Can I hide from Abraham nipotent. But it seems that Christ was not omnipotent in what I am about to do?” and Gn. 19:22: “I cannot do working miracles; for it is written (Mk. 6:5) that “He anything till thou go in thither.” could not do any miracles there,” i.e. in His own coun- Reply to Objection 2. As Chrysostom says on Mat. try. Therefore it seems that He did not work miracles by 14:19, “He took the five loaves and the two fishes, and, Divine power. looking up to heaven, He blessed and brake: It was to be Objection 2. Further, God does not pray. But Christ believed of Him, both that He is of the Father and that He sometimes prayed when working miracles; as may be seen is equal to Him. . . Therefore that He might prove both, He in the raising of Lazarus (Jn. 11:41,42), and in the multi- works miracles now with authority, now with prayer. . . in plication of the loaves, as related Mat. 14:19. Therefore it the lesser things, indeed, He looks up to heaven”—for seems that He did not work miracles by Divine power. instance, in multiplying the loaves—“but in the greater, Objection 3. Further, what is done by Divine power which belong to God alone, He acts with authority; for cannot be done by the power of any creature. But the example, when He forgave sins and raised the dead.” things which Christ did could be done also by the power When it is said that in raising Lazarus He lifted up His of a creature: wherefore the Pharisees said (Lk. 11:15) eyes (Jn. 11:41), this was not because He needed to pray, that He cast out devils “by Beelzebub the prince of dev- but because He wished to teach us how to pray. Wherefore ils.” Therefore it seems that Christ did not work miracles He said: “Because of the people who stand about have I by Divine power. said it: that they may believe that Thou hast sent Me.” On the contrary, our Lord said (Jn. 14:10): “The Fa- Reply to Objection 3. Christ cast out demons other- ther who abideth in Me, He doth the works.” wise than they are cast out by the power of demons. For I answer that, as stated in the Ia, q. 110, a. 4, true mir-demons are cast out from bodies by the power of higher acles cannot be wrought save by Divine power: because demons in such a way that they retain their power over God alone can change the order of nature; and this is what the soul: since the devil does not work against his own is meant by a miracle. Wherefore Pope Leo says (Ep. ad kingdom. On the other hand, Christ cast out demons, not Flav. xxviii) that, while there are two natures in Christ, only from the body, but still more from the soul. For this there is “one,” viz. the Divine, which shines forth in mir- reason our Lord rebuked the blasphemy of the Jews, who acles; and “another,” viz. the human, “which submits to said that He cast out demons by the power of the demons: insults”; yet “each communicates its actions to the other”: first, by saying that Satan is not divided against himself; in as far as the human nature is the instrument of the Di- secondly, by quoting the instance of others who cast out vine action, and the human action receives power from the demons by the Spirit of God; thirdly, because He could Divine Nature, as stated above (q. 19, a. 1). not have cast out a demon unless He had overcome Him Reply to Objection 1. When it is said that “He could by Divine power; fourthly, because there was nothing in not do any miracles there,” it is not to be understood that common between His works and their effects and those of He could not do them absolutely, but that it was not fitting Satan; since Satan’s purpose was to “scatter” those whom for Him to do them: for it was unfitting for Him to work Christ “gathered” together∗. miracles among unbelievers. Wherefore it is said farther Whether Christ began to work miracles when He changed water into wine at the IIIa q. 43 a. 3 marriage feast? Objection 1. It would seem that Christ did not begin vine power. Now He was possessed of Divine power from to work miracles when He changed water into wine at the the first moment of His conception; for from that instant marriage feast. For we read in the book De Infantia Salva- He was both God and man. Therefore it seems that He toris that Christ worked many miracles in His childhood. worked miracles from the very first. But the miracle of changing water into wine at the mar- Objection 3. Further, Christ began to gather His dis- riage feast took place in the thirtieth or thirty-first year of ciples after His baptism and temptation, as related Mat. His age. Therefore it seems that it was not then that He 4:18 and Jn. 1:35. But the disciples gathered around Him, began to work miracles. principally on account of His miracles: thus it is written Objection 2. Further, Christ worked miracles by Di- (Lk. 5:4) that He called Peter when “he was astonished ∗ Cf. Mat. 12:24-30; Mk. 3:22; Lk. 11:15-32 2317 at” the miracle which He had worked in “the draught of worked miracles from His early years, John would by no fishes.” Therefore it seems that He worked other miracles means have been unacquainted with Him, nor would the before that of the marriage feast. rest of the people have stood in need of a teacher to point On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 2:11): “This begin- Him out to them.” ning of miracles did Jesus in Cana of Galilee.” Reply to Objection 2. What the Divine power I answer that, Christ worked miracles in order to con- achieved in Christ was in proportion to the needs of the firm His doctrine, and in order to show forth His Divine salvation of mankind, the achievement of which was the power. Therefore, as to the first, it was unbecoming for purpose of His taking flesh. Consequently He so worked Him to work miracles before He began to teach. And miracles by the Divine power as not to prejudice our belief it was unfitting that He should begin to teach until He in the reality of His flesh. reached the perfect age, as we stated above, in speaking Reply to Objection 3. The disciples were to be com- of His baptism (q. 39, a. 3 ). But as to the second, it was mended precisely because they followed Christ “without right that He should so manifest His Godhead by work- having seen Him work any miracles,” as Gregory says ing miracles that men should believe in the reality of His in a homily (Hom. v in Evang.). And, as Chrysostom manhood. And, consequently, as Chrysostom says (Hom. says (Hom. xxiii in Joan.), “the need for working mir- xxi in Joan.), “it was fitting that He should not begin to acles arose then, especially when the disciples were al- work wonders from His early years: for men would have ready gathered around and attached to Him, and attentive deemed the Incarnation to be imaginary and would have to what was going on around them. Hence it is added: crucified Him before the proper time.” ‘And His disciples believed in Him,’ ” not because they Reply to Objection 1. As Chrysostom says (Hom. then believed in Him for the first time, but because then xvii in Joan.), in regard to the saying of John the Bap- “they believed with greater discernment and perfection.” tist, “ ‘That He may be made manifest in Israel, therefore Or they are called “disciples” because “they were to be am I come baptizing with water,’ it is clear that the won- disciples later on,” as Augustine observes (De Consensu ders which some pretend to have been worked by Christ Evang. ii). in His childhood are untrue and fictitious. For had Christ Whether the miracles which Christ worked were a sufficient proof of His Godhead? IIIa q. 43 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the miracles which not be done save by Divine power. For this reason the Christ worked were not a sufficient proof of His Godhead. blind man, after his sight had been restored, said (Jn. For it is proper to Christ to be both God and man. But the 9:32,33): “From the beginning of the world it has not miracles which Christ worked have been done by others been heard, that any man hath opened the eyes of one also. Therefore they were not a sufficient proof of His born blind. Unless this man were of God, he could not Godhead. do anything.” Objection 2. Further, no power surpasses that of the Secondly, as to the way in which He worked Godhead. But some have worked greater miracles than miracles—namely, because He worked miracles as though Christ, for it is written (Jn. 14:12): “He that believeth of His own power, and not by praying, as others do. in Me, the works that I do, he also shall do, and greater Wherefore it is written (Lk. 6:19) that “virtue went out than these shall he do.” Therefore it seems that the mir- from Him and healed all.” Whereby it is proved, as Cyril acles which Christ worked are not sufficient proof of His says (Comment. in Lucam) that “He did not receive power Godhead. from another, but, being God by nature, He showed His Objection 3. Further, the particular is not a sufficient own power over the sick. And this is how He worked proof of the universal. But any one of Christ’s miracles countless miracles.” Hence on Mat. 8:16: “He cast out was one particular work. Therefore none of them was a spirits with His word, and all that were sick He healed,” sufficient proof of His Godhead, by reason of which He Chrysostom says: “Mark how great a multitude of persons had universal power over all things. healed, the Evangelists pass quickly over, not mentioning On the contrary, our Lord said (Jn. 5:36): one by one. . . but in one word traversing an unspeakable “The works which the Father hath given Me to per- sea of miracles.” And thus it was shown that His power fect. . . themselves. . . give testimony of Me.” was co-equal with that of God the Father, according to I answer that, The miracles which Christ worked Jn. 5:19: “What things soever” the Father “doth, these the were a sufficient proof of His Godhead in three respects. Son doth also in like manner”; and, again (Jn. 5:21): “As First, as to the very nature of the works, which surpassed the Father raiseth up the dead and giveth life, so the Son the entire capability of created power, and therefore could also giveth life to whom He will.” 2318 Thirdly, from the very fact that He taught that He was sage of John as follows (Tract. lxxi): “What are these God; for unless this were true it would not be confirmed ‘greater works’ which believers in Him would do? That, by miracles worked by Divine power. Hence it was said as they passed by, their very shadow healed the sick? For (Mk. 1:27): “What is this new doctrine? For with power it is greater that a shadow should heal than the hem of a He commandeth the unclean spirits, and they obey Him.” garment. . . When, however, He said these words, it was Reply to Objection 1. This was the argument of the the deeds and works of His words that He spoke of: for Gentiles. Wherefore Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusian. when He said. . . ‘The Father who abideth in Me, He doth cxxxvii): “No suitable wonders; say they, show forth the works,’ what works did He mean, then, but the words the presence of so great majesty, for the ghostly cleans- He was speaking?. . . and the fruits of those same words ing” whereby He cast out demons, “the cure of the sick, was the faith of those (who believed): but when the dis- the raising of the dead to life, if other miracles be taken ciples preached the Gospel, not some few like those, but into account, are small things before God.” To this Au- the very nations believed. . . (Tract. lxxii). Did not that gustine answers thus: “We own that the prophets did as rich man go away from His presence sorrowful?. . . and yet much. . . But even Moses himself and the other prophets afterwards, what one individual, having heard from Him, made Christ the Lord the object of their prophecy, and did not, that many did when He spake by the mouth of His gave Him great glory. . . He, therefore, chose to do simi- disciples. . . Behold, He did greater works when spoken lar things to avoid the inconsistency of failing to do what of by men believing than when speaking to men hearing. He had done through others. Yet still He was bound to But there is yet this difficulty: that He did these ‘greater do something which no other had done: to be born of a works’ by the apostles: whereas He saith as meaning not virgin, to rise from the dead, and to ascend into heaven. If only them:. . . ‘He that believeth in Me’. . . Listen!. . . ‘He anyone deem this a slight thing for God to do, I know not that believeth in Me, the works that I do, he also shall do’: what more he can expect. Having become man, ought He first, ‘I do,’ then ‘he also shall do,’ because I do that he to have made another world, that we might believe Him to may do. What works—but that from ungodly he should be Him by whom the world was made? But in this world be made righteous?. . . Which thing Christ worketh in him, neither a greater world could be made nor one equal to truly, but not without him. Yes, I may affirm this to be al- it: and if He had made a lesser world in comparison with together greater than to create”∗ “heaven and earth. . . for this, that too would have been deemed a small thing.” ‘heaven and earth shall pass away’; but the salvation and As to the miracles worked by others, Christ did greater justification of the predestinate shall remain. . . But also in still. Hence on Jn. 15:24: “If I had not done in [Douay: the heavens. . . the angels are the works of Christ: and does ‘among’] them the works that no other men hath done,” that man do greater works than these, who co-operates etc., Augustine says: “None of the works of Christ seem with Christ in the work of his justification?. . . let him, who to be greater than the raising of the dead: which thing we can, judge whether it be greater to create a righteous being know the ancient prophets also did. . . Yet Christ did some than to justify an ungodly one. Certainly if both are works works ‘which no other man hath done.’ But we are told in of equal power, the latter is a work of greater mercy.” answer that others did works which He did not, and which “But there is no need for us to understand all the works none other did. . . But to heal with so great a power so of Christ, where He saith ‘Greater than these shall he do.’ many defects and ailments and grievances of mortal men, For by ‘these’ He meant, perhaps, those which He was do- this we read concerning none soever of the men of old. ing at that hour: now at that time He was speaking words To say nothing of those, each of whom by His bidding, of faith:. . . and certainly it is less to preach words of righ-as they came in His way, He made whole. . . Mark saith teousness, which thing He did without us, than to justify (6:56): ‘Whithersoever He entered, into towns or into vil- the ungodly, which thing He so doth in us that we also do lages or into cities, they laid the sick in the streets, and it ourselves.” besought Him that they might touch but the hem of His Reply to Objection 3. When some particular work is garment: and as many as touched Him were made whole.’ proper to some agent, then that particular work is a suffi- These things none other did in them; for when He saith ‘In cient proof of the whole power of that agent: thus, since them,’ it is not to be understood to mean ‘Among them,’ the act of reasoning is proper to man, the mere fact that or ‘In their presence,’ but wholly ‘In them,’ because He someone reasons about any particular proposition proves healed them. . . Therefore whatever works He did in them him to be a man. In like manner, since it is proper to God are works that none ever did; since if ever any other man to work miracles by His own power, any single miracle did any one of them, by His doing he did it; whereas these worked by Christ by His own power is a sufficient proof works He did, not by their doing, but by Himself.” that He is God. Reply to Objection 2. Augustine explains this pas- ∗ The words ‘to create’ are not in the text of St. Augustine 2319 THIRD PART, QUESTION 44 Of (Christ’s) Miracles Considered Specifically (In Four Articles) We have now to consider each kind of miracle: (1) The miracles which He worked in spiritual substances; (2) The miracles which He worked in heavenly bodies; (3) The miracles which He worked in man; (4) The miracles which He worked in irrational creatures. Whether those miracles were fitting which Christ worked in spiritual substances? IIIa q. 44 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that those miracles were where it is written: “I will take away. . . the unclean spirit unfitting which Christ worked in spiritual substances. For out of the earth.” among spiritual substances the holy angels are above the I answer that, The miracles worked by Christ were ar- demons; for, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii): “The guments for the faith which He taught. Now, by the power treacherous and sinful rational spirit of life is ruled by the of His Godhead He was to rescue those who would be- rational, pious, and just spirit of life.” But we read of no lieve in Him, from the power of the demons; according miracles worked by Christ in the good angels. Therefore to Jn. 12:31: “Now shall the prince of this world be cast neither should He have worked miracles in the demons. out.” Consequently it was fitting that, among other mira- Objection 2. Further, Christ’s miracles were ordained cles, He should also deliver those who were obsessed by to make known His Godhead. But Christ’s Godhead was demons. not to be made known to the demons: since this would Reply to Objection 1. Just as men were to be deliv- have hindered the mystery of His Passion, according to ered by Christ from the power of the demons, so by Him 1 Cor. 2:8: “If they had known it, they would never have were they to be brought to the companionship of the an- crucified the Lord of glory.” Therefore He should not have gels, according to Col. 1:20: “Making peace through the worked miracles in the demons. blood of His cross, both as to the things on earth and the Objection 3. Further, Christ’s miracles were ordained things that are in heaven.” Therefore it was not fitting to to the glory of God: hence it is written (Mat. 9:8) that “the show forth to men other miracles as regards the angels, multitudes seeing” that the man sick of the palsy had been except by angels appearing to men: as happened in His healed by Christ, “feared, and glorified God that gave such Nativity, His Resurrection, and His Ascension. power to men.” But the demons have no part in glorifying Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Civ. God; since “praise is not seemly in the mouth of a sinner” Dei ix): “Christ was known to the demons just as much as (Ecclus. 15:9). For which reason also “He suffered them He willed; and He willed just as far as there was need. But not to speak” (Mk. 1:34; Lk. 4:41) those things which He was known to them, not as to the holy angels, by that reflected glory on Him. Therefore it seems that it was un- which is eternal life, but by certain temporal effects of His fitting for Him to work miracles in the demons. power.” First, when they saw that Christ was hungry after Objection 4. Further, Christ’s miracles are ordained fasting they deemed Him not to be the Son of God. Hence, to the salvation of mankind. But sometimes the casting on Lk. 4:3, “If Thou be the Son of God,” etc., Ambrose out of demons from men was detrimental to man, in some says: “What means this way of addressing Him? save cases to the body: thus it is related (Mk. 9:24,25) that a that, though He knew that the Son of God was to come, demon at Christ’s command, “crying out and greatly tear- yet he did not think that He had come in the weakness of ing” the man, “went out of him; and he became as dead, the flesh?” But afterwards, when he saw Him work mira- so that many said: He is dead”; sometimes also to things: cles, he had a sort of conjectural suspicion that He was the as when He sent the demons, at their own request, into Son of God. Hence on Mk. 1:24, “I know who Thou art, the swine, which they cast headlong into the sea; where- the Holy one of God,” Chrysostom∗ says that “he had no fore the inhabitants of those parts “besought Him that He certain or firm knowledge of God’s coming.” Yet he knew would depart from their coasts” (Mat. 8:31-34). There- that He was “the Christ promised in the Law,” wherefore fore it seems unfitting that He should have worked such it is said (Lk. 4:41) that “they knew that He was Christ.” like miracles. But it was rather from suspicion than from certainty that On the contrary, this was foretold (Zech. 13:2), they confessed Him to be the Son of God. Hence Bede ∗ Victor of Antioch. Cf. Catena Aurea 2320 says on Lk. 4:41: “The demons confess the Son of God, aroused thereby”‡. Hence “even the apostles are com-and, as stated farther on, ‘they knew that He was Christ.’ manded to be silent about Him, lest, if His Divine majesty For when the devil saw Him weakened by His fast, He were proclaimed, the gift of His Passion should be de- knew Him to be a real man: but when He failed to over- ferred.” come Him by temptation, He doubted lest He should be Reply to Objection 4. Christ came specially to teach the Son of God. And now from the power of His miracles and to work miracles for the good of man, and principally He either knew, or rather suspected that He was the Son as to the salvation of his soul. Consequently, He allowed of God. His reason therefore for persuading the Jews to the demons, that He cast out, to do man some harm, ei- crucify Him was not that he deemed Him not to be Christ ther in his body or in his goods, for the salvation of man’s or the Son of God, but because he did not foresee that he soul—namely, for man’s instruction. Hence Chrysostom would be the loser by His death. For the Apostle says of says on Mat. 8:32 that Christ let the demons depart into this mystery” (1 Cor. 2:7,8), “which is hidden from the the swine, “not as yielding to the demons, but first, to beginning, that ‘none of the princes of this world knew it,’ show . . . how harmful are the demons who attack men; for if they had known it they would never have crucified secondly, that all might learn that the demons would not the Lord of glory.” dare to hurt even the swine, except He allow them; thirdly, Reply to Objection 3. The miracles which Christ that they would have treated those men more grievously worked in expelling demons were for the benefit, not of than they treated the swine, unless they had been protected the demons, but of men, that they might glorify Him. by God’s providence.” Wherefore He forbade them to speak in His praise. First, And for the same motives He allowed the man, who to give us an example. For, as Athanasius says, “He re- was being delivered from the demons, to suffer grievously strained his speech, although he was confessing the truth; for the moment; yet did He release him at once from that to teach us not to care about such things, although it may distress. By this, moreover, we are taught, as Bede says seem that what is said is true. For it is wrong to seek to on Mk. 9:25, that “often, when after falling into sin we learn from the devil when we have the Divine Scripture”: strive to return to God, we experience further and more Besides, it is dangerous, since the demons frequently mix grievous attacks from the old enemy. This he does, either falsehood with truth. Or, as Chrysostom∗ says: “It was that he may inspire us with a distaste for virtue, or that not meet for them to usurp the prerogative of the apostolic he may avenge the shame of having been cast out.” For office. Nor was it fitting that the mystery of Christ should the man who was healed “became as dead,” says Jerome, be proclaimed by a corrupt tongue” because “praise is not “because to those who are healed it is said, ‘You are dead; seemly in the mouth of a sinner”†. Thirdly, because, as and your life is hid with Christ in God’ ” (Col. 3:3) Bede says, “He did not wish the envy of the Jews to be Whether it was fitting that Christ should work miracles in the heavenly bodies? IIIa q. 44 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that it was unfitting that the movements of the heavenly bodies. Christ should work miracles in the heavenly bodies. For, Objection 3. Further, it was more fitting that Christ as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), “it beseems Divine should work miracles in life and when teaching, than in providence not to destroy, but to preserve, nature.” Now, death: both because, as it is written (2 Cor. 13:4), “He was the heavenly bodies are by nature incorruptible and un- crucified through weakness, yet He liveth by the power changeable, as is proved De Coelo i. Therefore it was of God,” by which He worked miracles; and because His unfitting that Christ should cause any change in the order miracles were in confirmation of His doctrine. But there of the heavenly bodies. is no record of Christ having worked any miracles in the Objection 2. Further, the course of time is marked heavenly bodies during His lifetime: nay, more; when the out by the movement of the heavenly bodies, according to Pharisees asked Him to give “a sign from heaven,” He re- Gn. 1:14: “Let there be lights made in the firmament of fused, as Matthew relates (12,16). Therefore it seems that heaven. . . and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and neither in His death should He have worked any miracles for days and years.” Consequently if the movement of in the heavenly bodies. the heavenly bodies be changed, the distinction and order On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 23:44,45): “There of the seasons is changed. But there is no report of this was darkness over all the earth until the ninth hour; and having been perceived by astronomers, “who gaze at the the sun was darkened.” stars and observe the months,” as it is written (Is. 47:13). I answer that, As stated above (q. 43, a. 4) it be- Therefore it seems that Christ did not work any change in hooved Christ’s miracles to be a sufficient proof of His ∗ Cyril of Alexandria, Comment. in Luc. † Cf. Theophylact, Enarr. in Luc. ‡ Bede, Expos. in Luc. iv, 41 2321 Godhead. Now this is not so sufficiently proved by which shows that they sought him among the nations in changes wrought in the lower bodies, which changes can the neighborhood of Judea.” be brought about by other causes, as it is by changes On this point, however, credence is to be given rather wrought in the course of the heavenly bodies, which have to Dionysius, who is an eyewitness as to this having oc- been established by God alone in an unchangeable order. curred by the moon eclipsing the sun. For he says (Ep. This is what Dionysius says in his epistle to Polycarp: ad Polycarp): “Without any doubt we saw the moon en- “We must recognize that no alteration can take place in the croach on the sun,” he being in Egypt at the time, as he order end movement of the heavens that is not caused by says in the same letter. And in this he points out four mir- Him who made all and changes all by His word.” There- acles. The first is that the natural eclipse of the sun by fore it was fitting that Christ should work miracles even in interposition of the moon never takes place except when the heavenly bodies. the sun and moon are in conjunction. But then the sun and Reply to Objection 1. Just as it is natural to the lower moon were in opposition, it being the fifteenth day, since bodies to be moved by the heavenly bodies, which are it was the Jewish Passover. Wherefore he says: “For it higher in the order of nature, so is it natural to any crea- was not the time of conjunction.”—The second miracle is ture whatsoever to be changed by God, according to His that whereas at the sixth hour the moon was seen, together will. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi; quoted with the sun, in the middle of the heavens, in the evening by the gloss on Rom. 11:24: “Contrary to nature thou it was seen to be in its place, i.e. in the east, opposite the wert grafted,” etc.): “God, the Creator and Author of all sun. Wherefore he says: “Again we saw it,” i.e. the moon, natures, does nothing contrary to nature: for whatsoever “return supernaturally into opposition with the sun,” so as He does in each thing, that is its nature.” Consequently to be diametrically opposite, having withdrawn from the the nature of a heavenly body is not destroyed when God sun “at the ninth hour,” when the darkness ceased, “until changes its course: but it would be if the change were due evening.” From this it is clear that the wonted course of to any other cause. the seasons was not disturbed, because the Divine power Reply to Objection 2. The order of the seasons was caused the moon both to approach the sun supernaturally not disturbed by the miracle worked by Christ. For, ac- at an unwonted season, and to withdraw from the sun and cording to some, this gloom or darkening of the sun, return to its proper place according to the season. The which occurred at the time of Christ’s passion, was caused third miracle was that the eclipse of the sun naturally al- by the sun withdrawing its rays, without any change in the ways begins in that part of the sun which is to the west and movement of the heavenly bodies, which measures the du- spreads towards the east: and this is because the moon’s ration of the seasons. Hence Jerome says on Mat. 27:45: proper movement from west to east is more rapid than “It seems as though the ‘greater light’ withdrew its rays, that of the sun, and consequently the moon, coming up lest it should look on its Lord hanging on the Cross, or be- from the west, overtakes the sun and passes it on its east- stow its radiancy on the impious blasphemers.” And this ward course. But in this case the moon had already passed withdrawal of the rays is not to be understood as though the sun, and was distant from it by the length of half the it were in the sun’s power to send forth or withdraw its heavenly circle, being opposite to it: consequently it had rays: for it sheds its light, not from choice, but by nature, to return eastwards towards the sun, so as to come into as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But the sun is said to apparent contact with it from the east, and continue in withdraw its rays in so far as the Divine power caused the a westerly direction. This is what he refers to when he sun’s rays not to reach the earth. On the other hand, Ori- says: “Moreover, we saw the eclipse begin to the east and gen says this was caused by clouds coming between (the spread towards the western edge of the sun,” for it was earth and the sun). Hence on Mat. 27:45 he says: “We a total eclipse, “and afterwards pass away.” The fourth must therefore suppose that many large and very dense miracle consisted in this, that in a natural eclipse that part clouds were massed together over Jerusalem and the land of the sun which is first eclipsed is the first to reappear of Judea; so that it was exceedingly dark from the sixth (because the moon, coming in front of the sun, by its nat- to the ninth hour. Hence I am of opinion that, just as the ural movement passes on to the east, so as to come away other signs which occurred at the time of the Passion”— first from the western portion of the sun, which was the namely, “the rending of the veil, the quaking of the earth,” first part to be eclipsed), whereas in this case the moon, etc.—“took place in Jerusalem only, so this also:. . . or if while returning miraculously from the east to the west, anyone prefer, it may be extended to the whole of Judea,” did not pass the sun so as to be to the west of it: but hav- since it is said that “ ‘there was darkness over the whole ing reached the western edge of the sun returned towards earth,’ which expression refers to the land of Judea, as the east: so that the last portion of the sun to be eclipsed may be gathered from 3 Kings 18:10, where Abdias says was the first to reappear. Consequently the eclipse began to Elias: ‘As the Lord thy God liveth, there is no nation towards the east, whereas the sun began to reappear to- or kingdom whither my lord hath not sent to seek thee’: wards the west. And to this he refers by saying: “Again 2322 we observed that the occultation and emersion did not be-darkness to some disturbance of the atmosphere. But in gin from the same point,” i.e. on the same side of the sun, Egypt, where clouds are few on account of the tranquillity “but on opposite sides.” of the air, Dionysius and his companions were consider- Chrysostom adds a fifth miracle (Hom. lxxxviii in ably astonished so as to make the aforesaid observations Matth.), saying that “the darkness in this case lasted for about this darkness. three hours, whereas an eclipse of the sun lasts but a short Reply to Objection 3. Then, above all, was there need time, for it is soon over, as those know who have seen for miraculous proof of Christ’s Godhead, when the weak- one.” Hence we are given to understand that the moon ness of human nature was most apparent in Him. Hence was stationary below the sun, except we prefer to say that it was that at His birth a new star appeared in the heavens. the duration of the darkness was measured from the first Wherefore Maximus says (Serm. de Nativ. viii): “If thou moment of occultation of the sun to the moment when the disdain the manger, raise thine eyes a little and gaze on the sun had completely emerged from the eclipse. new star in the heavens, proclaiming to the world the birth But, as Origen says (on Mat. 27:45), “against this the of our Lord.” But in His Passion yet greater weakness ap- children of this world object: How is it such a phenome- peared in His manhood. Therefore there was need for yet nal occurrence is not related by any writer, whether Greek greater miracles in the greater lights of the world. And, or barbarian?” And he says that someone of the name as Chrysostom says (Hom. lxxxviii in Matth.): “This is of Phlegon “relates in his chronicles that this took place the sign which He promised to them who sought for one during the reign of Tiberius Caesar, but he does not say saying: ‘An evil and adulterous generation seeketh a sign; that it occurred at the full moon.” It may be, therefore, and a sign shall not be given it, but the sign of Jonas the that because it was not the time for an eclipse, the var- prophet,’ referring to His Cross. . . and Resurrection. . . For ious astronomers living then throughout the world were it was much more wonderful that this should happen when not on the look-out for one, and that they ascribed this He was crucified than when He was walking on earth.” Whether Christ worked miracles fittingly on men? IIIa q. 44 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ worked mir- blind.” It was unseemly, therefore, for Him to forgive the acles unfittingly on men. For in man the soul is of more sins of those who sought the healing of the body, as He import than the body. Now Christ worked many miracles is related to have done in the case of the man sick of the on bodies, but we do not read of His working any mira- palsy (Mat. 9:2): the more that the healing of the body, cles on souls: for neither did He convert any unbelievers being of less account than the forgiveness of sins, does to the faith mightily, but by persuading and convincing not seem a sufficient argument for the power of forgiving them with outward miracles, nor is it related of Him that sins. He made wise men out of fools. Therefore it seems that Objection 4. Further, Christ’s miracles were worked He worked miracles on men in an unfitting manner. in order to confirm His doctrine, and witness to His God- Objection 2. Further, as stated above (q. 43, a. 2), head, as stated above (q. 43, a. 4). Now no man should Christ worked miracles by Divine power: to which it is hinder the purpose of his own work. Therefore it seems proper to work suddenly, perfectly, and without any assis- unfitting that Christ commanded those who had been tance. Now Christ did not always heal men suddenly as to healed miraculously to tell no one, as appears from Mat. their bodies: for it is written (Mk. 8:22-25) that, “taking 9:30 and Mk. 8:26: the more so, since He commanded the blind man by the hand, He led him out of the town; others to proclaim the miracles worked on them; thus it and, spitting upon his eyes, laying His hands on him, He is related (Mk. 5:19) that, after delivering a man from the asked him if he saw anything. And, looking up, he said: I demons, He said to him: “Go into thy house to thy friends, see men as it were trees walking. After that again He laid and tell them, how great things the Lord hath done for His hands upon his eyes, and he began to see, and was thee.” restored, so that he saw all things clearly.” It is clear from On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 7:37): “He hath this that He did not heal him suddenly, but at first imper- done all things well: He hath made both the deaf to hear fectly, and by means of His spittle. Therefore it seems that and the dumb to speak.” He worked miracles on men unfittingly. I answer that, The means should be proportionate to Objection 3. Further, there is no need to remove at the the end. Now Christ came into the world and taught in same time things which do not follow from one another. order to save man, according to Jn. 3:17: “For God sent Now bodily ailments are not always the result of sin, as not His Son into the world to judge the world, but that the appears from our Lord’s words (Jn. 9:3): “Neither hath world may be saved by Him.” Therefore it was fitting that this man sinned, nor his parents, that he should be born Christ, by miraculously healing men in particular, should 2323 prove Himself to be the universal and spiritual Saviour of word. . . without any weapon, smite them through, drive all. them back, lay them prostrate: for God lay hidden in that Reply to Objection 1. The means are distinct from flesh.” Moreover, to this must be referred what Luke says the end. Now the end for which Christ’s miracles were (4:30) —namely, that Jesus, “passing through the midst worked was the health of the rational part, which is healed of them, went His way,” on which Chrysostom observes by the light of wisdom, and the gift of righteousness: the (Hom. xlviii in Joan.): “That He stood in the midst of former of which presupposes the latter, since, as it is writ- those who were lying in wait for Him, and was not seized ten (Wis. 1:4): “Wisdom will not enter into a malicious by them, shows the power of His Godhead”; and, again, soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins.” Now it was that which is written Jn. 8:59, “Jesus hid Himself and unfitting that man should be made righteous unless he went out of the Temple,” on which Theophylact says: “He willed: for this would be both against the nature of righ- did not hide Himself in a corner of the Temple, as if afraid, teousness, which implies rectitude of the will, and con- or take shelter behind a wall or pillar; but by His heavenly trary to the very nature of man, which requires to be led to power making Himself invisible to those who were threat- good by the free-will, not by force. Christ, therefore, jus- ening Him, He passed through the midst of them.” tified man inwardly by the Divine power, but not against From all these instances it is clear that Christ, when He man’s will. Nor did this pertain to His miracles, but to the willed, changed the minds of men by His Divine power, end of His miracles. In like manner by the Divine power not only by the bestowal of righteousness and the infusion He infused wisdom into the simple minds of His disci- of wisdom, which pertains to the end of miracles, but also ples: hence He said to them (Lk. 21:15): “I will give you by outwardly drawing men to Himself, or by terrifying or a mouth and wisdom” which “all your adversaries will stupefying them, which pertains to the miraculous itself. not be able to resist and gainsay.” And this, in so far Reply to Objection 2. Christ came to save the world, as the enlightenment was inward, is not to be reckoned not only by Divine power, but also through the mystery of as a miracle, but only as regards the outward action— His Incarnation. Consequently in healing the sick He fre- namely, in so far as men saw that those who had been quently not only made use of His Divine power, healing unlettered and simple spoke with such wisdom and con- by way of command, but also by applying something per- stancy. Wherefore it is written (Acts 4:13) that the Jews, taining to His human nature. Hence on Lk. 4:40, “He, lay- “seeing the constancy of Peter and of John, understanding ing His hands on every one of them, healed them,” Cyril that they were illiterate and ignorant men. . . wondered.”— says: “Although, as God, He might, by one word, have And though such like spiritual effects are different from driven out all diseases, yet He touched them, showing that visible miracles, yet do they testify to Christ’s doctrine His own flesh was endowed with a healing virtue.” And and power, according to Heb. 2:4: “God also bearing on Mk. 8:23, “Spitting upon his eyes, laying His hands them witness by signs and wonders and divers miracles, on him,” etc., Chrysostom∗ says: “He spat and laid His and distributions of the Holy Ghost.” hands upon the blind man, wishing to show that His Di- Nevertheless Christ did work some miracles on the vine word, accompanied by His operation, works won- soul of man, principally by changing its lower powers. ders: for the hand signifies operation; the spittle signifies Hence Jerome, commenting on Mat. 9:9, “He rose up the word which proceeds from the mouth.” Again, on Jn. and followed Him,” says: “Such was the splendor and 9:6, “He made clay of the spittle, and spread the clay upon majesty of His hidden Godhead, which shone forth even the eyes of the blind man,” Augustine says: “Of His spit- in His human countenance, that those who gazed on it tle He made clay—because ‘the Word was made flesh.’ ” were drawn to Him at first sight.” And on Mat. 21:12, Or, again, as Chrysostom says, to signify that it was He ”(Jesus) cast out all them that sold and bought,” the same who made man of “the slime of the earth.” Jerome says: “Of all the signs worked by our Lord, this It is furthermore to be observed concerning Christ’s seems to me the most wondrous—that one man, at that miracles that generally what He did was most perfect. time despised, could, with the blows of one scourge, cast Hence on Jn. 2:10, “Every man at first setteth forth good out such a multitude. For a fiery and heavenly light flashed wine,” Chrysostom says: “Christ’s miracles are such as from His eyes, and the majesty of His Godhead shone to far surpass the works of nature in splendor and useful- in His countenance.” And Origen says on Jn. 2:15 that ness.” Likewise in an instant He conferred perfect health “this was a greater miracle than when He changed water on the sick. Hence on Mat. 8:15, “She arose and minis- into wine, for there He shows His power over inanimate tered to them,” Jerome says: “Health restored by our Lord matter, whereas here He tames the minds of thousands returns wholly and instantly.” of men.” Again, on Jn. 18:6, “They went backward and There was, however, special reason for the contrary fell to the ground,” Augustine says: “Though that crowd happening in the case of the man born blind, and this was was fierce in hate and terrible with arms, yet did that one his want of faith, as Chrysostom† says. Or as Bede ob- ∗ Victor of Antioch † Victor of Antioch 2324 serves on Mk. 8:23: “Whom He might have healed wholly are frequently due to sin: for which reason, perhaps, first and instantly by a single word, He heals little by little, to are his sins forgiven, that the cause of the ailment being show the extent of human blindness, which hardly, and removed, health may return.” Wherefore, also (Jn. 4:14), that only by degrees, can come back to the light: and to it is said: “Sin no more, lest some worse thing happen to point out that each step forward in the way of perfection thee.” Whence, says Chrysostom, “we learn that his sick- is due to the help of His grace.” ness was the result of sin.” Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 43, a. 2), Nevertheless, as Chrysostom says on Mat. 9:5: “By Christ worked miracles by Divine power. Now “the works how much a soul is of more account than a body, by so of God are perfect” (Dt. 32:4). But nothing is perfect ex- much is the forgiving of sins a greater work than healing cept it attain its end. Now the end of the outward heal- the body; but because the one is unseen He does the lesser ing worked by Christ is the healing of the soul. Conse- and more manifest thing in order to prove the greater and quently it was not fitting that Christ should heal a man’s more unseen.” body without healing his soul. Wherefore on Jn. 7:23, Reply to Objection 4. On Mat. 9:30, “See that no “I have healed the whole man on a Sabbath day,” Augus- man know this,” Chrysostom says: “If in another place tine says: “Because he was cured, so as to be whole in we find Him saying, ‘Go and declare the glory of God’ body; he believed, so as to be whole in soul.” To the man (cf. Mk. 5:19; Lk. 8:39), that is not contrary to this. For sick of the palsy it is said specially, “Thy sins are forgiven He instructs us to forbid them that would praise us on our thee,” because, as Jerome observes on Mat. 9:5,6: “We own account: but if the glory be referred to God, then we are hereby given to understand that ailments of the body must not forbid, but command, that it be done.” Whether Christ worked miracles fittingly on irrational creatures? IIIa q. 44 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ worked mira- dereth all things sweetly.” cles unfittingly on irrational creatures. For brute animals I answer that, As stated above, Christ’s miracles were are more noble than plants. But Christ worked a miracle ordained to the end that He should be recognized as hav- on plants as when the fig-tree withered away at His com- ing Divine power, unto the salvation of mankind. Now it mand (Mat. 21:19). Therefore Christ should have worked belongs to the Divine power that every creature be subject miracles also on brute animals. thereto. Consequently it behooved Him to work miracles Objection 2. Further, punishment is not justly in- on every kind of creature, not only on man, but also on flicted save for fault. But it was not the fault of the fig- irrational creatures. tree that Christ found no fruit on it, when fruit was not in Reply to Objection 1. Brute animals are akin gener- season (Mk. 11:13). Therefore it seems unfitting that He ically to man, wherefore they were created on the same withered it up. day as man. And since He had worked many miracles on Objection 3. Further, air and water are between the bodies of men, there was no need for Him to work mir- heaven and earth. But Christ worked some miracles in the acles on the bodies of brute animals. and so much the less heavens, as stated above (a. 2), and likewise in the earth, that, as to their sensible and corporeal nature, the same when it quaked at the time of His Passion (Mat. 27:51). reason applies to both men and animals, especially terres- Therefore it seems that He should also have worked mir- trial. But fish, from living in water, are more alien from acles in the air and water, such as to divide the sea, as did human nature; wherefore they were made on another day. Moses (Ex. 14:21); or a river, as did Josue (Josh. 3:16) On them Christ worked a miracle in the plentiful draught and Elias (4 Kings 2:8); and to cause thunder to be heard of fishes, related Lk. 5 and Jn. 21; and, again, in the fish in the air, as occurred on Mount Sinai when the Law was caught by Peter, who found a stater in it (Mat. 17:26). As given (Ex. 19:16), and like to what Elias did (3 Kings to the swine who were cast headlong into the sea, this was 18:45). not the effect of a Divine miracle, but of the action of the Objection 4. Further, miraculous works pertain to the demons, God permitting. work of Divine providence in governing the world. But Reply to Objection 2. As Chrysostom says on Mat. this work presupposes creation. It seems, therefore, un- 21:19: “When our Lord does any such like thing” on fitting that in His miracles Christ made use of creation: plants or brute animals, “ask not how it was just to wither when, to wit, He multiplied the loaves. Therefore His mir- up the fig-tree, since it was not the fruit season; to ask acles in regard to irrational creatures seem to have been such a question is foolish in the extreme,” because such unfitting. things cannot commit a fault or be punished: “but look at On the contrary, Christ is “the wisdom of God” (1 the miracle, and wonder at the worker.” Nor does the Cre- Cor. 1:24), of whom it is said (Wis. 8:1) that “she or- ator “inflict” any hurt on the owner, if He choose to make 2325 use of His own creature for the salvation of others; rather, tle says (Heb. 12:18): “You are not come to a fire that as Hilary says on Mat. 21:19, “we should see in this a may be touched and approached [Vulg.: ‘a mountain that proof of God’s goodness, for when He wished to afford an might be touched, and a burning fire’], and a whirlwind, example of salvation as being procured by Him, He exer- and darkness, and storm.” cised His mighty power on the human body: but when He At the time of His Passion, however, the “veil was wished to picture to them His severity towards those who rent,” to signify the unfolding of the mysteries of the Law; wilfully disobey Him, He foreshadows their doom by His “the graves were opened,” to signify that His death gave sentence on the tree.” This is the more noteworthy in a life to the dead; “the earth quaked and the rocks were fig-tree which, as Chrysostom observes (on Mat. 21:19), rent,” to signify that man’s stony heart would be softened, “being full of moisture, makes the miracle all the more and the whole world changed for the better by the virtue remarkable.” of His Passion. Reply to Objection 3. Christ also worked miracles Reply to Objection 4. The multiplication of the befitting to Himself in the air and water: when, to wit, loaves was not effected by way of creation, but by an addi- as related Mat. 8:26, “He commanded the winds, and the tion of extraneous matter transformed into loaves; hence sea, and there came a great calm.” But it was not be- Augustine says on Jn. 6:1-14: “Whence He multiplieth fitting that He who came to restore all things to a state a few grains into harvests, thence in His hands He mul- of peace and calm should cause either a disturbance in tiplied the five loaves”: and it is clearly by a process of the atmosphere or a division of waters. Hence the Apos- transformation that grains are multiplied into harvests. 2326 THIRD PART, QUESTION 45 Of Christ’s Transfiguration (In Four Articles) We now consider Christ’s transfiguration; and here there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether it was fitting that Christ should be transfigured? (2) Whether the clarity of the transfiguration was the clarity of glory? (3) Of the witnesses of the transfiguration; (4) Of the testimony of the Father’s voice. Whether it was fitting that Christ should be transfigured? IIIa q. 45 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting that should show His disciples the glory of His clarity (which Christ should be transfigured. For it is not fitting for a is to be transfigured), to which He will configure those true body to be changed into various shapes [figuras], but who are His; according to Phil. 3:21: ”(Who) will reform only for an imaginary body. Now Christ’s body was not the body of our lowness configured [Douay: ‘made like’] imaginary, but real, as stated above (q. 5, a. 1). Therefore to the body of His glory.” Hence Bede says on Mk. 8:39: it seems that it should not have been transfigured. “By His loving foresight He allowed them to taste for a Objection 2. Further, figure is in the fourth species of short time the contemplation of eternal joy, so that they quality, whereas clarity is in the third, since it is a sensible might bear persecution bravely.” quality. Therefore Christ’s assuming clarity should not be Reply to Objection 1. As Jerome says on Mat. 17:2: called a transfiguration. “Let no one suppose that Christ,” through being said to Objection 3. Further, a glorified body has four gifts, be transfigured, “laid aside His natural shape and counte- as we shall state farther on ( Suppl., q. 82), viz. impas- nance, or substituted an imaginary or aerial body for His sibility, agility, subtlety, and clarity. Therefore His trans- real body. The Evangelist describes the manner of His figuration should not have consisted in an assumption of transfiguration when he says: ‘His face did shine as the clarity rather than of the other gifts. sun, and His garments became white as snow.’ Brightness On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 17:2) that Jesus of face and whiteness of garments argue not a change of “was transfigured” in the presence of three of His disci- substance, but a putting on of glory.” ples. Reply to Objection 2. Figure is seen in the outline of I answer that, Our Lord, after foretelling His Passion a body, for it is “that which is enclosed by one or more to His disciples, had exhorted them to follow the path of boundaries”∗. Therefore whatever has to do with the out- His sufferings (Mat. 16:21,24). Now in order that anyone line of a body seems to pertain to the figure. Now the go straight along a road, he must have some knowledge of clarity, just as the color, of a non-transparent body is seen the end: thus an archer will not shoot the arrow straight on its surface, and consequently the assumption of clarity unless he first see the target. Hence Thomas said (Jn. is called transfiguration. 14:5): “Lord, we know not whither Thou goest; and how Reply to Objection 3. Of those four gifts, clarity can we know the way?” Above all is this necessary when alone is a quality of the very person in himself; whereas hard and rough is the road, heavy the going, but delight- the other three are not perceptible, save in some action or ful the end. Now by His Passion Christ achieved glory, movement, or in some passion. Christ, then, did show in not only of His soul, not only of His soul, which He had Himself certain indications of those three gifts—of agility, from the first moment of His conception, but also of His for instance, when He walked on the waves of the sea; of body; according to Luke (24:26): “Christ ought [Vulg.: subtlety, when He came forth from the closed womb of ‘ought not Christ’] to have suffered these things, and so the Virgin; of impassibility, when He escaped unhurt from to enter into His glory (?).” To which glory He brings the hands of the Jews who wished to hurl Him down or to those who follow the footsteps of His Passion, according stone Him. And yet He is not said, on account of this, to Acts 14:21: “Through many tribulations we must enter to be transfigured, but only on account of clarity, which into the kingdom of God.” Therefore it was fitting that He pertains to the aspect of His Person. ∗ Euclid, bk i, def. xiv 2327 Whether this clarity was the clarity of glory? IIIa q. 45 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that this clarity was not passion, as when the air is lit up by the sun. Consequently the clarity of glory. For a gloss of Bede on Mat. 17:2, “He the refulgence, which appeared in Christ’s body then, was was transfigured before them,” says: “In His mortal body miraculous: just as was the fact of His walking on the He shows forth, not the state of immortality, but clarity waves of the sea. Hence Dionysius says (Ep. ad Cai. iv): like to that of future immortality.” But the clarity of glory “Christ excelled man in doing that which is proper to man: is the clarity of immortality. Therefore the clarity which this is shown in His supernatural conception of a virgin Christ showed to His disciples was not the clarity of glory. and in the unstable waters bearing the weight of material Objection 2. Further, on Lk. 9:27 ”(That) shall not and earthly feet.” taste death unless [Vulg.: ‘till’] they see the kingdom of Wherefore we must not say, as Hugh of St. Victor∗ God,” Bede’s gloss says: “That is, the glorification of the said, that Christ assumed the gift of clarity in the transfig- body in an imaginary vision of future beatitude.” But the uration, of agility in walking on the sea, and of subtlety image of a thing is not the thing itself. Therefore this was in coming forth from the Virgin’s closed womb: because not the clarity of beatitude. the gifts are immanent qualities of a glorified body. On Objection 3. Further, the clarity of glory is only in the contrary, whatever pertained to the gifts, that He had a human body. But this clarity of the transfiguration was miraculously. The same is to be said, as to the soul, of seen not only in Christ’s body, but also in His garments, the vision in which Paul saw God in a rapture, as we have and in “the bright cloud” which “overshaded” the disci- stated in the IIa IIae, q. 175, a. 3, ad 2. ples. Therefore it seems that this was not the clarity of Reply to Objection 1. The words quoted prove, not glory. that the clarity of Christ was not that of glory, but that it On the contrary, Jerome says on the words “He was was not the clarity of a glorified body, since Christ’s body transfigured before them” (Mat. 17:2): “He appeared to was not as yet immortal. And just as it was by dispensa- the Apostles such as He will appear on the day of judg- tion that in Christ the glory of the soul should not over- ment.” And on Mat. 16:28, “Till they see the Son of Man flow into the body so was it possible that by dispensation coming in His kingdom,” Chrysostom says: “Wishing to it might overflow as to the gift of clarity and not as to that show with what kind of glory He is afterwards to come, of impassibility. so far as it was possible for them to learn it, He showed Reply to Objection 2. This clarity is said to have been it to them in their present life, that they might not grieve imaginary, not as though it were not really the clarity of even over the death of their Lord.” glory, but because it was a kind of image representing that I answer that, The clarity which Christ assumed perfection of glory, in virtue of which the body will be in His transfiguration was the clarity of glory as to its glorious. essence, but not as to its mode of being. For the clarity Reply to Objection 3. Just as the clarity which was of the glorified body is derived from that of the soul, as in Christ’s body was a representation of His body’s fu- Augustine says (Ep. ad Diosc. cxviii). And in like man- ture clarity, so the clarity which was in His garments sig- ner the clarity of Christ’s body in His transfiguration was nified the future clarity of the saints, which will be sur- derived from His God. head, as Damascene says (Orat. de passed by that of Christ, just as the brightness of the Transfig.) and from the glory of His soul. That the glory snow is surpassed by that of the sun. Hence Gregory says of His soul did not overflow into His body from the first (Moral. xxxii) that Christ’s garments became resplendent, moment of Christ’s conception was due to a certain Divine “because in the height of heavenly clarity all the saints dispensation, that, as stated above (q. 14, a. 1, ad 2), He will cling to Him in the refulgence of righteousness. For might fulfil the mysteries of our redemption in a passible His garments signify the righteous, because He will unite body. This did not, however, deprive Christ of His power them to Himself,” according to Is. 49:18: “Thou shalt be of outpouring the glory of His soul into His body. And clothed with all these as with an ornament.” this He did, as to clarity, in His transfiguration, but other- The bright cloud signifies the glory of the Holy Ghost wise than in a glorified body. For the clarity of the soul or the “power of the Father,” as Origen says (Tract. iii in overflows into a glorified body, by way of a permanent Matth.), by which in the glory to come the saints will be quality affecting the body. Hence bodily refulgence is not covered. Or, again, it may be said fittingly that it signifies miraculous in a glorified body. But in Christ’s transfigu- the clarity of the world redeemed, which clarity will cover ration clarity overflowed from His Godhead and from His the saints as a tent. Hence when Peter proposed to make soul into His body, not as an immanent quality affecting tents, “a bright cloud overshaded” the disciples. His very body, but rather after the manner of a transient ∗ Innocent III, De Myst. Miss. iv 2328 Whether the witnesses of the transfiguration were fittingly chosen? IIIa q. 45 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the witnesses of the refused to give one; whereas here in order to increase the transfiguration were unfittingly chosen. For everyone is apostles’ faith, He gives a sign from heaven, Elias coming a better witness of things that he knows. But at the time down thence, whither he had ascended, and Moses aris- of Christ’s transfiguration no one but the angels had as ing from the nether world.” This is not to be understood yet any knowledge from experience of the glory to come. as though the soul of Moses was reunited to his body, but Therefore the witnesses of the transfiguration should have that his soul appeared through some assumed body, just been angels rather than men. as the angels do. But Elias appeared in his own body, not Objection 2. Further, truth, not fiction, is becoming in that he was brought down from the empyrean heaven, but a witness of the truth. Now, Moses and Elias were there, from some place on high whither he was taken up in the not really, but only in appearance; for a gloss on Lk. 9:30, fiery chariot. “They were Moses and Elias,” says: “It must be observed Reply to Objection 3. As Chrysostom says on Mat. that Moses and Elias were there neither in body nor in 17:3: “Moses and Elias are brought forward for many rea- soul”; but that those bodies were formed “of some avail- sons.” And, first of all, “because the multitude said He able matter. It is also credible that this was the result of was Elias or Jeremias or one of the prophets, He brings the angelic ministries, through the angels impersonating the leaders of the prophets with Him; that hereby at least them.” Therefore it seems that they were unsuitable wit- they might see the difference between the servants and nesses. their Lord.” Another reason was ”. . . that Moses gave the Objection 3. Further, it is said (Acts 10:43) that “all Law. . . while Elias. . . was jealous for the glory of God.” the prophets give testimony” to Christ. Therefore not only Therefore by appearing together with Christ, they show Moses and Elias, but also all the prophets, should have how falsely the Jews “accused Him of transgressing the been present as witnesses. Law, and of blasphemously appropriating to Himself the Objection 4. Further, Christ’s glory is promised as glory of God.” A third reason was “to show that He has a reward to all the faithful (2 Cor. 3:18; Phil. 3:21), in power of death and life, and that He is the judge of the whom He wished by His transfiguration to enkindle a de- dead and the living; by bringing with Him Moses who had sire of that glory. Therefore He should have taken not died, and Elias who still lived.” A fourth reason was be- only Peter, James, and John, but all His disciples, to be cause, as Luke says (9:31), “they spoke” with Him “of His witnesses of His transfiguration. decease that He should accomplish in Jerusalem,” i.e. of On the contrary is the authority of the Gospel. His Passion and death. Therefore, “in order to strengthen I answer that, Christ wished to be transfigured in or- the hearts of His disciples with a view to this,” He sets der to show men His glory, and to arouse men to a desire before them those who had exposed themselves to death of it, as stated above (a. 1). Now men are brought to the for God’s sake: since Moses braved death in opposing glory of eternal beatitude by Christ—not only those who Pharaoh, and Elias in opposing Achab. A fifth reason was lived after Him, but also those who preceded Him; there- that “He wished His disciples to imitate the meekness of fore, when He was approaching His Passion, both “the Moses and the zeal of Elias.” Hilary adds a sixth reason— multitude that followed” and that “which went before, namely, in order to signify that He had been foretold by cried saying: ‘Hosanna,’ ” as related Mat. 21:9, beseech- the Law, which Moses gave them, and by the prophets, of ing Him, as it were, to save them. Consequently it was whom Elias was the principal. fitting that witnesses should be present from among those Reply to Objection 4. Lofty mysteries should not be who preceded Him—namely, Moses and Elias—and from immediately explained to everyone, but should be handed those who followed after Him—namely, Peter, James, and down through superiors to others in their proper turn. John—that “in the mouth of two or three witnesses” this Consequently, as Chrysostom says (on Mat. 17:3), “He word might stand. took these three as being superior to the rest.” For “Peter Reply to Objection 1. By His transfiguration Christ excelled in the love” he bore to Christ and in the power manifested to His disciples the glory of His body, which bestowed on him; John in the privilege of Christ’s love belongs to men only. It was therefore fitting that He for him on account of his virginity, and, again, on account should choose men and not angels as witnesses. of his being privileged to be an Evangelist; James on ac- Reply to Objection 2. This gloss is said to be taken count of the privilege of martyrdom. Nevertheless He did from a book entitled On the Marvels of Holy Scripture. not wish them to tell others what they had seen before It is not an authentic work, but is wrongly ascribed to His Resurrection; “lest,” as Jerome says on Mat. 17:19, St. Augustine; consequently we need not stand by it. “such a wonderful thing should seem incredible to them; For Jerome says on Mat. 17:3: “Observe that when the and lest, after hearing of so great glory, they should be Scribes and Pharisees asked for a sign from heaven, He scandalized at the Cross” that followed; or, again, “lest 2329 [the Cross] should be entirely hindered by the people”∗; things when they should be filled with the Holy Ghost”†. and “in order that they might then be witnesses of spiritual Whether the testimony of the Father’s voice, saying, “This is My beloved Son,” was IIIa q. 45 a. 4 fittingly added? Objection 1. It would seem that the testimony of the Father: because He alone with the Son and Holy Ghost is Father’s voice, saying, “This is My beloved Son,” was perfectly conscious of that perfect generation. not fittingly added; for, as it is written (Job 33:14), “God Reply to Objection 1. The words quoted are to be un- speaketh once, and repeateth not the selfsame thing the derstood of God’s eternal speaking, by which God the Fa- second time.” But the Father’s voice had testified to this ther uttered the only-begotten and co-eternal Word. Nev- at the time of (Christ’s) baptism. Therefore it was not fit- ertheless, it can be said that God uttered the same thing ting that He should bear witness to it a second time. twice in a bodily voice, yet not for the same purpose, but Objection 2. Further, at the baptism the Holy Ghost in order to show the divers modes in which men can be appeared under the form of a dove at the same time as the partakers of the likeness of the eternal Sonship. Father’s voice was heard. But this did not happen at the Reply to Objection 2. Just as in the Baptism, where transfiguration. Therefore it seems that the testimony of the mystery of the first regeneration was proclaimed, the the Father was made in an unfitting manner. operation of the whole Trinity was made manifest, be- Objection 3. Further, Christ began to teach after His cause the Son Incarnate was there, the Holy Ghost ap- baptism. Nevertheless, the Father’s voice did not then peared under the form of a dove, and the Father made command men to hear him. Therefore neither should it Himself known in the voice; so also in the transfigura- have so commanded at the transfiguration. tion, which is the mystery of the second regeneration, the Objection 4. Further, things should not be said to whole Trinity appears—the Father in the voice, the Son in those who cannot bear them, according to Jn. 16:12: the man, the Holy Ghost in the bright cloud; for just as in “I have yet many things to say to you, but you cannot baptism He confers innocence, signified by the simplicity bear them now.” But the disciples could not bear the Fa- of the dove, so in the resurrection will He give His elect ther’s voice; for it is written (Mat. 17:6) that “the dis- the clarity of glory and refreshment from all sorts of evil, ciples hearing, fell upon their face, and were very much which are signified by the bright cloud. afraid.” Therefore the Father’s voice should not have been Reply to Objection 3. Christ came to give grace ac- addressed to them. tually, and to promise glory by His words. Therefore it On the contrary is the authority of the Gospel. was fitting at the time of His transfiguration, and not at I answer that, The adoption of the sons of God is the time of His baptism, that men should be commanded through a certain conformity of image to the natural Son to hear Him. of God. Now this takes place in two ways: first, by the Reply to Objection 4. It was fitting that the disciples grace of the wayfarer, which is imperfect conformity; sec- should be afraid and fall down on hearing the voice of the ondly, by glory, which is perfect conformity, according to Father, to show that the glory which was then being re- 1 Jn. 3:2: “We are now the sons of God, and it hath not vealed surpasses in excellence the sense and faculty of all yet appeared what we shall be: we know that, when He mortal beings; according to Ex. 33:20: “Man shall not shall appear, we shall be like to Him, because we shall see see Me and live.” This is what Jerome says on Mat. 17:6: Him as He is.” Since, therefore, it is in baptism that we “Such is human frailty that it cannot bear to gaze on such acquire grace, while the clarity of the glory to come was great glory.” But men are healed of this frailty by Christ foreshadowed in the transfiguration, therefore both in His when He brings them into glory. And this is signified by baptism and in His transfiguration the natural sonship of what He says to them: “Arise, and fear not.” Christ was fittingly made known by the testimony of the ∗ Bede, Hom. xviii; cf. Catena Aurea † Hilary, in Matth. xvii 2330 THIRD PART, QUESTION 46 The Passion of Christ (In Twelve Articles) In proper sequence we have now to consider all that relates to Christ’s leaving the world. In the first place, His Passion; secondly, His death; thirdly, His burial; and, fourthly, His descent into hell. With regard to the Passion, there arises a threefold consideration: (1) The Passion itself; (2) the efficient cause of the Passion; (3) the fruits of the Passion. Under the first heading there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether it was necessary for Christ to suffer for men’s deliverance? (2) Whether there was any other possible means of delivering men? (3) Whether this was the more suitable means? (4) Whether it was fitting for Christ to suffer on the cross? (5) The extent of His sufferings; (6) Whether the pain which He endured was the greatest? (7) Whether His entire soul suffered? (8) Whether His Passion hindered the joy of fruition? (9) The time of the Passion; (10) The place; (11) Whether it was fitting for Him to be crucified with robbers? (12) Whether Christ’s Passion is to be attributed to the Godhead? Whether it was necessary for Christ to suffer for the deliverance of the human race? IIIa q. 46 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it was not necessary On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 3:14): “As Moses for Christ to suffer for the deliverance of the human race. lifted up the serpent in the desert, so must the Son of man For the human race could not be delivered except by God, be lifted up, that whosoever believeth in Him may not per- according to Is. 45:21: “Am not I the Lord, and there is no ish, but may have life everlasting.” God else besides Me? A just God and a Saviour, there is I answer that, As the Philosopher teaches (Metaph. none besides Me.” But no necessity can compel God, for v), there are several acceptations of the word “necessary.” this would be repugnant to His omnipotence. Therefore it In one way it means anything which of its nature cannot was not necessary for Christ to suffer. be otherwise; and in this way it is evident that it was not Objection 2. Further, what is necessary is opposed to necessary either on the part of God or on the part of man what is voluntary. But Christ suffered of His own will; for for Christ to suffer. In another sense a thing may be neces- it is written (Is. 53:7): “He was offered because it was sary from some cause quite apart from itself; and should His own will.” Therefore it was not necessary for Him to this be either an efficient or a moving cause then it brings suffer. about the necessity of compulsion; as, for instance, when Objection 3. Further, as is written (Ps. 24:10): “All a man cannot get away owing to the violence of some- the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth.” But it does one else holding him. But if the external factor which not seem necessary that He should suffer on the part of induces necessity be an end, then it will be said to be nec- the Divine mercy, which, as it bestows gifts freely, so it essary from presupposing such end—namely, when some appears to condone debts without satisfaction: nor, again, particular end cannot exist at all, or not conveniently, ex- on the part of Divine justice, according to which man had cept such end be presupposed. It was not necessary, then, deserved everlasting condemnation. Therefore it does not for Christ to suffer from necessity of compulsion, either seem necessary that Christ should have suffered for man’s on God’s part, who ruled that Christ should suffer, or on deliverance. Christ’s own part, who suffered voluntarily. Yet it was Objection 4. Further, the angelic nature is more ex- necessary from necessity of the end proposed; and this can cellent than the human, as appears from Dionysius (Div. be accepted in three ways. First of all, on our part, who Nom. iv). But Christ did not suffer to repair the angelic have been delivered by His Passion, according to John nature which had sinned. Therefore, apparently, neither (3:14): “The Son of man must be lifted up, that whoso- was it necessary for Him to suffer for the salvation of the ever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life human race. everlasting.” Secondly, on Christ’s part, who merited the 2331 glory of being exalted, through the lowliness of His Pas-Reply to Objection 3. That man should be delivered sion: and to this must be referred Lk. 24:26: “Ought not by Christ’s Passion was in keeping with both His mercy Christ to have suffered these things, and so to enter into and His justice. With His justice, because by His Pas- His glory?” Thirdly, on God’s part, whose determination sion Christ made satisfaction for the sin of the human regarding the Passion of Christ, foretold in the Scriptures race; and so man was set free by Christ’s justice: and and prefigured in the observances of the Old Testament, with His mercy, for since man of himself could not satisfy had to be fulfilled. And this is what St. Luke says (22:22): for the sin of all human nature, as was said above (q. 1, “The Son of man indeed goeth, according to that which is a. 2), God gave him His Son to satisfy for him, accord- determined”; and (Lk. 24:44,46): “These are the words ing to Rom. 3:24,25: “Being justified freely by His grace, which I spoke to you while I was yet with you, that all through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God things must needs be fulfilled which are written in the law hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His of Moses, and in the prophets, and in the psalms concern- blood.” And this came of more copious mercy than if He ing Me: for it is thus written, and thus it behooved Christ had forgiven sins without satisfaction. Hence it is said to suffer, and to rise again from the dead.” (Eph. 2:4): “God, who is rich in mercy, for His exceeding Reply to Objection 1. This argument is based on the charity wherewith He loved us, even when we were dead necessity of compulsion on God’s part. in sins, hath quickened us together in Christ.” Reply to Objection 2. This argument rests on the ne- Reply to Objection 4. The sin of the angels was ir- cessity of compulsion on the part of the man Christ. reparable; not so the sin of the first man ( Ia, q. 64, a. 2). Whether there was any other possible way of human deliverance besides the Passion IIIa q. 46 a. 2 of Christ? Objection 1. It would seem that there was no other the man Jesus Christ, who is mediator between God and possible way of human deliverance besides Christ’s Pas- man, is both good and befitting the Divine dignity; but let sion. For our Lord says (Jn. 12:24): “Amen, amen I say us also show that other possible means were not lacking to you, unless the grain of wheat falling into the ground on God’s part, to whose power all things are equally sub- dieth, itself remaineth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth ordinate.” much fruit.” Upon this St. Augustine (Tract. li) observes I answer that, A thing may be said to be possible that “Christ called Himself the seed.” Consequently, un- or impossible in two ways: first of all, simply and abso- less He suffered death, He would not otherwise have pro- lutely; or secondly, from supposition. Therefore, speak- duced the fruit of our redemption. ing simply and absolutely, it was possible for God to de- Objection 2. Further, our Lord addresses the Father liver mankind otherwise than by the Passion of Christ, be- (Mat. 26:42): “My Father, if this chalice may not pass cause “no word shall be impossible with God” (Lk. 1:37). away but I must drink it, Thy will be done.” But He spoke Yet it was impossible if some supposition be made. For there of the chalice of the Passion. Therefore Christ’s Pas- since it is impossible for God’s foreknowledge to be de- sion could not pass away; hence Hilary says (Comm. 31 ceived and His will or ordinance to be frustrated, then, in Matth.): “Therefore the chalice cannot pass except He supposing God’s foreknowledge and ordinance regarding drink of it, because we cannot be restored except through Christ’s Passion, it was not possible at the same time for His Passion.” Christ not to suffer, and for mankind to be delivered oth- Objection 3. Further, God’s justice required that erwise than by Christ’s Passion. And the same holds good Christ should satisfy by the Passion in order that man of all things foreknown and preordained by God, as was might be delivered from sin. But Christ cannot let His laid down in the Ia, q. 14, a. 13. justice pass; for it is written (2 Tim. 2:13): “If we believe Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord is speaking there not, He continueth faithful, He cannot deny Himself.” But presupposing God’s foreknowledge and predetermination, He would deny Himself were He to deny His justice, since according to which it was resolved that the fruit of man’s He is justice itself. It seems impossible, then, for man to salvation should not follow unless Christ suffered. be delivered otherwise than by Christ’s Passion. Reply to Objection 2. In the same way we must un- Objection 4. Further, there can be no falsehood un- derstand what is here objected to in the second instance: derlying faith. But the Fathers of old believed that Christ “If this chalice may not pass away but I must drink of it”— would suffer. Consequently, it seems that it had to be that that is to say, because Thou hast so ordained it—hence He Christ should suffer. adds: “Thy will be done.” On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): “We Reply to Objection 3. Even this justice depends on assert that the way whereby God deigned to deliver us by the Divine will, requiring satisfaction for sin from the hu- 2332 man race. But if He had willed to free man from sin with-without satisfaction, acts mercifully and not unjustly. And out any satisfaction, He would not have acted against jus- so David exclaimed when he sought mercy: “To Thee tice. For a judge, while preserving justice, cannot par- only have I sinned” (Ps. 50:6), as if to say: “Thou canst don fault without penalty, if he must visit fault commit- pardon me without injustice.” ted against another—for instance, against another man, Reply to Objection 4. Human faith, and even the Di- or against the State, or any Prince in higher authority. vine Scriptures upon which faith is based, are both based But God has no one higher than Himself, for He is the on the Divine foreknowledge and ordinance. And the sovereign and common good of the whole universe. Con- same reason holds good of that necessity which comes sequently, if He forgive sin, which has the formality of of supposition, and of the necessity which arises of the fault in that it is committed against Himself, He wrongs no Divine foreknowledge and will. one: just as anyone else, overlooking a personal trespass, Whether there was any more suitable way of delivering the human race than by IIIa q. 46 a. 3 Christ’s Passion? Objection 1. It would seem that there was some other ity towards us; for when as yet we were sinners. . . Christ more suitable way of delivering the human race besides died for us.” Secondly, because thereby He set us an ex- Christ’s Passion. For nature in its operation imitates the ample of obedience, humility, constancy, justice, and the Divine work, since it is moved and regulated by God. But other virtues displayed in the Passion, which are requi- nature never employs two agents where one will suffice. site for man’s salvation. Hence it is written (1 Pet. 2:21): Therefore, since God could have liberated mankind solely “Christ also suffered for us, leaving you an example that by His Divine will, it does not seem fitting that Christ’s you should follow in His steps.” Thirdly, because Christ Passion should have been added for the deliverance of the by His Passion not only delivered man from sin, but also human race. merited justifying grace for him and the glory of bliss, as Objection 2. Further, natural actions are more suit- shall be shown later (q. 48, a. 1; q. 49, Aa. 1, 5). Fourthly, ably performed than deeds of violence, because violence because by this man is all the more bound to refrain from is “a severance or lapse from what is according to nature,” sin, according to 1 Cor. 6:20: “You are bought with a as is said in De Coelo ii. But Christ’s Passion brought great price: glorify and bear God in your body.” Fifthly, about His death by violence. Therefore it would have been because it redounded to man’s greater dignity, that as man more appropriate had Christ died a natural death rather was overcome and deceived by the devil, so also it should than suffer for man’s deliverance. be a man that should overthrow the devil; and as man de- Objection 3. Further, it seems most fitting that what- served death, so a man by dying should vanquish death. soever keeps something unjustly and by violence, should Hence it is written (1 Cor. 15:57): “Thanks be to God who be deprived of it by some superior power; hence Isaias hath given us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.” says (52:3): “You were sold gratis, and you shall be re- It was accordingly more fitting that we should be deliv- deemed without money.” But the devil possessed no right ered by Christ’s Passion than simply by God’s good-will. over man, whom he had deceived by guile, and whom he Reply to Objection 1. Even nature uses several means held subject in servitude by a sort of violence. Therefore to one intent, in order to do something more fittingly: as it seems most suitable that Christ should have despoiled two eyes for seeing; and the same can be observed in other the devil solely by His power and without the Passion. matters. On the contrary, St. Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): Reply to Objection 2. As Chrysostom∗ says: “Christ “There was no other more suitable way of healing our mis- had come in order to destroy death, not His own, (for since ery” than by the Passion of Christ. He is life itself, death could not be His), but men’s death. I answer that, Among means to an end that one is the Hence it was not by reason of His being bound to die that more suitable whereby the various concurring means em- He laid His body aside, but because the death He endured ployed are themselves helpful to such end. But in this that was inflicted on Him by men. But even if His body had man was delivered by Christ’s Passion, many other things sickened and dissolved in the sight of all men, it was not besides deliverance from sin concurred for man’s salva- befitting Him who healed the infirmities of others to have tion. In the first place, man knows thereby how much God his own body afflicted with the same. And even had He loves him, and is thereby stirred to love Him in return, and laid His body aside without any sickness, and had then ap- herein lies the perfection of human salvation; hence the peared, men would not have believed Him when He spoke Apostle says (Rom. 5:8): “God commendeth His char- of His resurrection. For how could Christ’s victory over ∗ Athanasius, Orat. De Incarn. Verb. 2333 death appear, unless He endured it in the sight of all men, faction on his behalf in the Passion. This was also a fit-and so proved that death was vanquished by the incorrup- ting means of overthrowing the pride of the devil, “who tion of His body?” is a deserter from justice, and covetous of sway”; in that Reply to Objection 3. Although the devil assailed Christ “should vanquish him and deliver man, not merely man unjustly, nevertheless, on account of sin, man was by the power of His Godhead, but likewise by the justice justly left by God under the devil’s bondage. And there- and lowliness of the Passion,” as Augustine says (De Trin. fore it was fitting that through justice man should be de- xiii). livered from the devil’s bondage by Christ making satis- Whether Christ ought to have suffered on the cross? IIIa q. 46 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ ought not to according to Ps. 68:5: “Then did I pay that which I took have suffered on the cross. For the truth ought to conform not away.” Hence Augustine says in a sermon on the Pas- to the figure. But in all the sacrifices of the Old Testament sion∗: “Adam despised the command, plucking the apple which prefigured Christ the beasts were slain with a sword from the tree: but all that Adam lost, Christ found upon and afterwards consumed by fire. Therefore it seems that the cross.” Christ ought not to have suffered on a cross, but rather by The third reason is because, as Chrysostom says in a the sword or by fire. sermon on the Passion (De Cruce et Latrone i, ii): “He Objection 2. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. suffered upon a high rood and not under a roof, in order iii) that Christ ought not to assume “dishonoring afflic- that the nature of the air might be purified: and the earth tions.” But death on a cross was most dishonoring and felt a like benefit, for it was cleansed by the flowing of the ignominious; hence it is written (Wis. 2:20): “Let us con- blood from His side.” And on Jn. 3:14: “The Son of man demn Him to a most shameful death.” Therefore it seems must be lifted up,” Theophylact says: “When you hear that Christ ought not to have undergone the death of the that He was lifted up, understand His hanging on high, cross. that He might sanctify the air who had sanctified the earth Objection 3. Further, it was said of Christ (Mat. by walking upon it.” 21:9): “Blessed is He that cometh in the name of the The fourth reason is, because, by dying on it, He pre- Lord.” But death upon the cross was a death of male- pares for us an ascent into heaven, as Chrysostom† says. diction, as we read Dt. 21:23: “He is accursed of God that Hence it is that He says (Jn. 12:32): “If I be lifted up from hangeth on a tree.” Therefore it does not seem fitting for the earth, I will draw all things to Myself.” Christ to be crucified. The fifth reason is because it is befitting the universal On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:8): “He became salvation of the entire world. Hence Gregory of Nyssa obedient unto death, even the death of the cross.” observes (In Christ. Resurr., Orat. i) that “the shape I answer that, It was most fitting that Christ should of the cross extending out into four extremes from their suffer the death of the cross. central point of contact denotes the power and the prov- First of all, as an example of virtue. For Augustine idence diffused everywhere of Him who hung upon it.” thus writes (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 25): “God’s Wisdom be- Chrysostom‡ also says that upon the cross “He dies with came man to give us an example in righteousness of liv- outstretched hands in order to draw with one hand the peo- ing. But it is part of righteous living not to stand in fear ple of old, and with the other those who spring from the of things which ought not to be feared. Now there are Gentiles.” some men who, although they do not fear death in itself, The sixth reason is because of the various virtues de- are yet troubled over the manner of their death. In order, noted by this class of death. Hence Augustine in his book then, that no kind of death should trouble an upright man, on the grace of the Old and New Testament (Ep. cxl) says: the cross of this Man had to be set before him, because, “Not without purpose did He choose this class of death, among all kinds of death, none was more execrable, more that He might be a teacher of that breadth, and height, fear-inspiring, than this.” and length, and depth,” of which the Apostle speaks (Eph. Secondly, because this kind of death was especially 3:18): “For breadth is in the beam, which is fixed trans- suitable in order to atone for the sin of our first parent, versely above; this appertains to good works, since the which was the plucking of the apple from the forbidden hands are stretched out upon it. Length is the tree’s extent tree against God’s command. And so, to atone for that from the beam to the ground; and there it is planted—that sin, it was fitting that Christ should suffer by being fas- is, it stands and abides—which is the note of longanimity. tened to a tree, as if restoring what Adam had purloined; Height is in that portion of the tree which remains over ∗ Cf. Serm. ci De Tempore † Athanasius, vide A, III, ad 2 ‡ Athanasius, vide A. III, ad 2 2334 from the transverse beam upwards to the top, and this is at says (De Fide Orth. iii). But. in particular, as Chrysos-the head of the Crucified, because He is the supreme de- tom∗ says: “His head is not cut off, as was done to John; sire of souls of good hope. But that part of the tree which nor was He sawn in twain, like Isaias, in order that His is hidden from view to hold it fixed, and from which the entire and indivisible body might obey death, and that entire rood springs, denotes the depth of gratuitous grace.” there might be no excuse for them who want to divide And, as Augustine says (Tract. cxix in Joan.): “The tree the Church.” While, instead of material fire, there was the upon which were fixed the members of Him dying was spiritual fire of charity in Christ’s holocaust. even the chair of the Master teaching.” Reply to Objection 2. Christ refused to undergo The seventh reason is because this kind of death re- dishonorable sufferings which are allied with defects of sponds to very many figures. For, as Augustine says in knowledge, or of grace, or even of virtue, but not those a sermon on the Passion (Serm. ci De Tempore), an ark injuries inflicted from without—nay, more, as is written of wood preserved the human race from the waters of the Heb. 12:2: “He endured the cross, despising the shame.” Deluge; at the exodus of God’s people from Egypt, Moses Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (Contra with a rod divided the sea, overthrew Pharaoh and saved Faust. xiv), sin is accursed, and, consequently, so is death, the people of God. the same Moses dipped his rod into and mortality, which comes of sin. “But Christ’s flesh was the water, changing it from bitter to sweet; at the touch of mortal, ‘having the resemblance of the flesh of sin’ ”; and a wooden rod a salutary spring gushed forth from a spiri- hence Moses calls it “accursed,” just as the Apostle calls tual rock; likewise, in order to overcome Amalec, Moses it “sin,” saying (2 Cor. 5:21): “Him that knew no sin, for stretched forth his arms with rod in hand; lastly, God’s us He hath made sin”—namely, because of the penalty law is entrusted to the wooden Ark of the Covenant; all of of sin. “Nor is there greater ignominy on that account, be- which are like steps by which we mount to the wood of cause he said: ‘He is accursed of God.’ ” For, “unless God the cross. had hated sin, He would never have sent His Son to take Reply to Objection 1. The altar of holocausts, upon upon Himself our death, and to destroy it. Acknowledge, which the sacrifices of animals were immolated, was con- then, that it was for us He took the curse upon Himself, structed of timbers, as is set forth Ex. 27:, and in this whom you confess to have died for us.” Hence it is writ- respect the truth answers to the figure; but “it is not nec- ten (Gal. 3:13): “Christ hath redeemed us from the curse essary for it to be likened in every respect, otherwise it of the law, being made a curse for us.” would not be a likeness,” but the reality, as Damascene Whether Christ endured all suffering? IIIa q. 46 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ did endure diers therefore came: and they broke the legs of the first, all sufferings, because Hilary (De Trin. x) says: “God’s and of the other who was crucified with Him; but after only-begotten Son testifies that He endured every kind of they were come to Jesus, when they saw that He was al- human sufferings in order to accomplish the sacrament of ready dead, they did not break His legs.” Consequently, His death, when with bowed head He gave up the ghost.” He did not endure every human suffering. It seems, therefore, that He did endure all human suffer- I answer that, Human sufferings may be considered ings. under two aspects. First of all, specifically, and in this Objection 2. Further, it is written (Is. 52:13): “Behold way it was not necessary for Christ to endure them all, My servant shall understand, He shall be exalted and ex- since many are mutually exclusive, as burning and drown- tolled, and shall be exceeding high; as many as have been ing; for we are dealing now with sufferings inflicted from astonished at Him [Vulg.: ‘thee’], so shall His visage be without, since it was not beseeming for Him to endure inglorious among men, and His form among the sons of those arising from within, such as bodily ailments, as al- men.” But Christ was exalted in that He had all grace and ready stated (q. 14, a. 4). But, speaking generically, He all knowledge, at which many were astonished in admira- did endure every human suffering. This admits of a three- tion thereof. Therefore it seems that He was “inglorious,” fold acceptance. First of all, on the part of men: for He by enduring every human suffering. endured something from Gentiles and from Jews; from Objection 3. Further, Christ’s Passion was ordained men and from women, as is clear from the women ser- for man’s deliverance from sin, as stated above (a. 3). But vants who accused Peter. He suffered from the rulers, Christ came to deliver men from every kind of sin. There- from their servants and from the mob, according to Ps. fore He ought to have endured every kind of suffering. 2:1,2: “Why have the Gentiles raged, and the people de- On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 19:32): “The sol- vised vain things? The kings of the earth stood up, and ∗ Athanasius, vide A, III, ad 2 2335 the princes met together, against the Lord and against His drink; in smell, by being fastened to the gibbet in a place Christ.” He suffered from friends and acquaintances, as is reeking with the stench of corpses, “which is called Cal- manifest from Judas betraying and Peter denying Him. vary”; in hearing, by being tormented with the cries of Secondly, the same is evident on the part of the suf- blasphemers and scorners; in sight, by beholding the tears ferings which a man can endure. For Christ suffered from of His Mother and of the disciple whom He loved. friends abandoning Him; in His reputation, from the blas- Reply to Objection 1. Hilary’s words are to be un- phemies hurled at Him; in His honor and glory, from the derstood as to all classes of sufferings, but not as to their mockeries and the insults heaped upon Him; in things, for kinds. He was despoiled of His garments; in His soul, from sad- Reply to Objection 2. The likeness is sustained, not ness, weariness, and fear; in His body, from wounds and as to the number of the sufferings and graces, but as to scourgings. their greatness; for, as He was uplifted above others in Thirdly, it may be considered with regard to His bod- gifts of graces, so was He lowered beneath others by the ily members. In His head He suffered from the crown of ignominy of His sufferings. piercing thorns; in His hands and feet, from the fastening Reply to Objection 3. The very least one of Christ’s of the nails; on His face from the blows and spittle; and sufferings was sufficient of itself to redeem the human from the lashes over His entire body. Moreover, He suf- race from all sins; but as to fittingness, it sufficed that He fered in all His bodily senses: in touch, by being scourged should endure all classes of sufferings, as stated above. and nailed; in taste, by being given vinegar and gall to Whether the pain of Christ’s Passion was greater than all other pains? IIIa q. 46 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the pain of Christ’s Objection 5. Further, the victim’s innocence lessens Passion was not greater than all other pains. For the suf- the sting of his sufferings. But Christ died innocent, ac- ferer’s pain is increased by the sharpness and the duration cording to Jer. 9:19: “I was as a meek lamb, that is carried of the suffering. But some of the martyrs endured sharper to be a victim.” Therefore it seems that the pain of Christ’s and more prolonged pains than Christ, as is seen in St. Passion was not the greatest. Lawrence, who was roasted upon a gridiron; and in St. Objection 6. Further, there was nothing superfluous Vincent, whose flesh was torn with iron pincers. There- in Christ’s conduct. But the slightest pain would have fore it seems that the pain of the suffering Christ was not sufficed to secure man’s salvation, because from His Di- the greatest. vine Person it would have had infinite virtue. Therefore it Objection 2. Further, strength of soul mitigates pain, would have been superfluous to choose the greatest of all so much so that the Stoics held there was no sadness in pains. the soul of a wise man; and Aristotle (Ethic. ii) holds that On the contrary, It is written (Lam. 1:12) on behalf moral virtue fixes the mean in the passions. But Christ of Christ’s Person: “O all ye that pass by the way attend, had most perfect strength of soul. Therefore it seems that and see if there be any sorrow like unto My sorrow.” the greatest pain did not exist in Christ. I answer that, As we have stated, when treating of the Objection 3. Further, the more sensitive the sufferer defects assumed by Christ (q. 15, Aa. 5,6), there was true is, the more acute will the pain be. But the soul is more and sensible pain in the suffering Christ, which is caused sensitive than the body, since the body feels in virtue of by something hurtful to the body: also, there was internal the soul; also, Adam in the state of innocence seems to pain, which is caused from the apprehension of something have had a body more sensitive than Christ had, who as- hurtful, and this is termed “sadness.” And in Christ each sumed a human body with its natural defects. Conse- of these was the greatest in this present life. This arose quently, it seems that the pain of a sufferer in purgatory, from four causes. First of all, from the sources of His or in hell, or even Adam’s pain, if he suffered at all, was pain. For the cause of the sensitive pain was the wound- greater than Christ’s in the Passion. ing of His body; and this wounding had its bitterness, Objection 4. Further, the greater the good lost, the both from the extent of the suffering already mentioned greater the pain. But by sinning the sinner loses a greater (a. 5 ) and from the kind of suffering, since the death of good than Christ did when suffering; since the life of the crucified is most bitter, because they are pierced in grace is greater than the life of nature: also, Christ, who nervous and highly sensitive parts—to wit, the hands and lost His life, but was to rise again after three days, seems feet; moreover, the weight of the suspended body inten- to have lost less than those who lose their lives and abide sifies the agony. and besides this there is the duration of in death. Therefore it seems that Christ’s pain was not the the suffering because they do not die at once like those greatest of all. slain by the sword. The cause of the interior pain was, 2336 first of all, all the sins of the human race, for which He as Augustine proves (De Civ. Dei xiv)—namely, when it made satisfaction by suffering; hence He ascribes them, flows from holy love, as, for instance, when a man is sad- so to speak, to Himself, saying (Ps. 21:2): “The words of dened over his own or others’ sins. Furthermore, it is em- my sins.” Secondly, especially the fall of the Jews and of ployed as a useful means of satisfying for sins, according the others who sinned in His death chiefly of the apostles, to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 7:10): “The sorrow who were scandalized at His Passion. Thirdly, the loss that is according to God worketh penance, steadfast unto of His bodily life, which is naturally horrible to human salvation.” And so to atone for the sins of all men, Christ nature. accepted sadness, the greatest in absolute quantity, yet not The magnitude of His suffering may be considered, exceeding the rule of reason. But moral virtue does not secondly, from the susceptibility of the sufferer as to lessen outward sensitive pain, because such pain is not both soul and body. For His body was endowed with a subject to reason, but follows the nature of the body; yet most perfect constitution, since it was fashioned miracu- it lessens it indirectly by redundance of the higher powers lously by the operation of the Holy Ghost; just as some into the lower. But this did not happen in Christ’s case, as other things made by miracles are better than others, as stated above (cf. q. 14, a. 1, ad 2; q. 45, a. 2). Chrysostom says (Hom. xxii in Joan.) respecting the wine Reply to Objection 3. The pain of a suffering, sep- into which Christ changed the water at the wedding-feast. arated soul belongs to the state of future condemnation, And, consequently, Christ’s sense of touch, the sensitive- which exceeds every evil of this life, just as the glory of ness of which is the reason for our feeling pain, was most the saints surpasses every good of the present life. Ac- acute. His soul likewise, from its interior powers, appre- cordingly, when we say that Christ’s pain was the great- hended most vehemently all the causes of sadness. est, we make no comparison between His and the pain Thirdly, the magnitude of Christ’s suffering can be es- of a separated soul. But Adam’s body could not suffer, timated from the singleness of His pain and sadness. In except he sinned. so that he would become mortal, and other sufferers the interior sadness is mitigated, and even passible. And, though actually suffering, it would have the exterior suffering, from some consideration of reason, felt less pain than Christ’s body, for the reasons already by some derivation or redundance from the higher powers stated. From all this it is clear that even if by impassibil- into the lower; but it was not so with the suffering Christ, ity Adam had suffered in the state of innocence, his pain because “He permitted each one of His powers to exercise would have been less than Christ’s. its proper function,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. Reply to Objection 4. Christ grieved not only over iii). the loss of His own bodily life, but also over the sins of Fourthly, the magnitude of the pain of Christ’s suffer- all others. And this grief in Christ surpassed all grief of ing can be reckoned by this, that the pain and sorrow were every contrite heart, both because it flowed from a greater accepted voluntarily, to the end of men’s deliverance from wisdom and charity, by which the pang of contrition is in- sin; and consequently He embraced the amount of pain tensified, and because He grieved at the one time for all proportionate to the magnitude of the fruit which resulted sins, according to Is. 53:4: “Surely He hath carried our therefrom. sorrows.” But such was the dignity of Christ’s life in the From all these causes weighed together, it follows that body, especially on account of the Godhead united with Christ’s pain was the very greatest. it, that its loss, even for one hour, would be a matter of Reply to Objection 1. This argument follows from greater grief than the loss of another man’s life for how- only one of the considerations adduced—namely, from soever long a time. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. the bodily injury, which is the cause of sensitive pain; but iii) that the man of virtue loves his life all the more in pro- the torment of the suffering Christ is much more intensi- portion as he knows it to be better; and yet he exposes it fied from other causes, as above stated. for virtue’s sake. And in like fashion Christ laid down His Reply to Objection 2. Moral virtue lessens interior most beloved life for the good of charity, according to Jer. sadness in one way, and outward sensitive pain in quite 12:7: “I have given My dear soul into the hands of her another; for it lessens interior sadness directly by fixing enemies.” the mean, as being its proper matter, within limits. But, as Reply to Objection 5. The sufferer’s innocence does was laid down in the Ia IIae, q. 64, a. 2, moral virtue fixes lessen numerically the pain of the suffering, since, when the mean in the passions, not according to mathematical a guilty man suffers, he grieves not merely on account of quantity, but according to quantity of proportion, so that the penalty, but also because of the crime. whereas the the passion shall not go beyond the rule of reason. And innocent man grieves only for the penalty: yet this pain since the Stoics held all sadness to be unprofitable, they is more intensified by reason of his innocence, in so far accordingly believed it to be altogether discordant with as he deems the hurt inflicted to be the more undeserved. reason, and consequently to be shunned altogether by a Hence it is that even others are more deserving of blame wise man. But in very truth some sadness is praiseworthy, if they do not compassionate him. according to Is. 57:1: 2337 “The just perisheth, and no man layeth it to heart.” what great virtue His suffering would have from union Reply to Objection 6. Christ willed to deliver the hu- with the Godhead, but also how much, according to His man race from sins not merely by His power, but also ac- human nature, His pain would avail for so great a satis- cording to justice. And therefore He did not simply weigh faction. Whether Christ suffered in His whole soul? IIIa q. 46 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ did not suffer way a faculty suffers by a passion in the subject on which in His whole soul. For the soul suffers indirectly when the it is based; as sight suffers when the sense of touch in the body suffers, inasmuch as it is the “act of the body.” But eye is affected, upon which the sense of sight rests, as, the soul is not, as to its every part, the “act of the body”; for instance, when the eye is pricked, or is disaffected by because the intellect is the act of no body, as is said De heat. Anima iii. Therefore it seems that Christ did not suffer in So, then, we say that if the soul be considered with re- His whole soul. spect to its essence, it is evident that Christ’s whole soul Objection 2. Further, every power of the soul is pas- suffered. For the soul’s whole essence is allied with the sive in regard to its proper object. But the higher part of body, so that it is entire in the whole body and in its every reason has for its object the eternal types, “to the con- part. Consequently, when the body suffered and was dis- sideration and consultation of which it directs itself,” as posed to separate from the soul, the entire soul suffered. Augustine says (De Trin. xii). But Christ could suffer no But if we consider the whole soul according to its facul- hurt from the eternal types, since they are nowise opposed ties, speaking thus of the proper passions of the faculties, to Him. Therefore it seems that He did not suffer in His He suffered indeed as to all His lower powers; because whole soul. in all the soul’s lower powers, whose operations are but Objection 3. Further, a sensitive passion is said to be temporal, there was something to be found which was a complete when it comes into contact with the reason. But source of woe to Christ, as is evident from what was said there was none such in Christ, but only “pro-passions”; as above (a. 6). But Christ’s higher reason did not suffer Jerome remarks on Mat. 26:37. Hence Dionysius says in thereby on the part of its object, which is God, who was a letter to John the Evangelist that “He endured only men- the cause, not of grief, but rather of delight and joy, to tally the sufferings inflicted upon Him.” Consequently it the soul of Christ. Nevertheless, all the powers of Christ’s does not seem that Christ suffered in His whole soul. soul did suffer according as any faculty is said to be af- Objection 4. Further, suffering causes pain: but there fected as regards its subject, because all the faculties of is no pain in the speculative intellect, because, as the Christ’s soul were rooted in its essence, to which suffer- Philosopher says (Topic. i), “there is no sadness in op- ing extended when the body, whose act it is, suffered. position to the pleasure which comes of consideration.” Reply to Objection 1. Although the intellect as a fac- Therefore it seems that Christ did not suffer in His whole ulty is not the act of the body, still the soul’s essence is the soul. act of the body, and in it the intellective faculty is rooted, On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 87:4) on behalf as was shown in the Ia, q. 77, Aa. 6,8. of Christ: “My soul is filled with evils”: upon which the Reply to Objection 2. This argument proceeds from gloss adds: “Not with vices, but with woes, whereby the passion on the part of the proper object, according to soul suffers with the flesh; or with evils, viz. of a per- which Christ’s higher reason did not suffer. ishing people, by compassionating them.” But His soul Reply to Objection 3. Grief is then said to be a true would not have been filled with these evils except He had passion, by which the soul is troubled, when the passion suffered in His whole soul. Therefore Christ suffered in in the sensitive part causes reason to deflect from the rec- His entire soul. titude of its act, so that it then follows the passion, and has I answer that, A whole is so termed with respect to no longer free-will with regard to it. In this way passion its parts. But the parts of a soul are its faculties. So, then, of the sensitive part did not extend to reason in Christ, but the whole soul is said to suffer in so far as it is afflicted merely subjectively, as was stated above. as to its essence, or as to all its faculties. But it must be Reply to Objection 4. The speculative intellect can borne in mind that a faculty of the soul can suffer in two have no pain or sadness on the part of its object, which ways: first of all, by its own passion; and this comes of its is truth considered absolutely, and which is its perfection: being afflicted by its proper object; thus, sight may suf- nevertheless, both grief and its cause can reach it in the fer from superabundance of the visible object. In another way mentioned above. 2338 Whether Christ’s entire soul enjoyed blessed fruition during the Passion? IIIa q. 46 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s entire soul by reason of the essence, is attributed to the higher part of did not enjoy blessed fruition during the Passion. For it the soul, so, on the other hand, by reason of the superior is not possible to be sad and glad at the one time, since part of the soul, fruition is attributed to the essence. But if sadness and gladness are contraries. But Christ’s whole we take the whole soul as comprising all its faculties, thus soul suffered grief during the Passion, as was stated above His entire soul did not enjoy fruition: not directly, indeed, (a. 7). Therefore His whole soul could not enjoy fruition. because fruition is not the act of any one part of the soul; Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii) nor by any overflow of glory, because, since Christ was that, if sadness be vehement, it not only checks the con- still upon earth, there was no overflowing of glory from trary delight, but every delight; and conversely. But the the higher part into the lower, nor from the soul into the grief of Christ’s Passion was the greatest, as shown above body. But since, on the contrary, the soul’s higher part (a. 6); and likewise the enjoyment of fruition is also the was not hindered in its proper acts by the lower, it follows greatest, as was laid down in the first volume of the Ia IIae, that the higher part of His soul enjoyed fruition perfectly q. 34, a. 3. Consequently, it was not possible for Christ’s while Christ was suffering. whole soul to be suffering and rejoicing at the one time. Reply to Objection 1. The joy of fruition is not op- Objection 3. Further, beatific “fruition” comes of the posed directly to the grief of the Passion, because they knowledge and love of Divine things, as Augustine says have not the same object. Now nothing prevents con- (Doctr. Christ. i). But all the soul’s powers do not ex- traries from being in the same subject, but not according tend to the knowledge and love of God. Therefore Christ’s to the same. And so the joy of fruition can appertain to whole soul did not enjoy fruition. the higher part of reason by its proper act; but grief of On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): the Passion according to the subject. Grief of the Passion Christ’s Godhead “permitted His flesh to do and to suffer belongs to the essence of the soul by reason of the body, what was proper to it.” In like fashion, since it belonged to whose form the soul is; whereas the joy of fruition (be- Christ’s soul, inasmuch as it was blessed, to enjoy fruition, longs to the soul) by reason of the faculty in which it is His Passion did not impede fruition. subjected. I answer that, As stated above (a. 7), the whole soul Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher’s contention can be understood both according to its essence and ac- is true because of the overflow which takes place naturally cording to all its faculties. If it be understood according of one faculty of the soul into another; but it was not so to its essence, then His whole soul did enjoy fruition, inas- with Christ, as was said above. much as it is the subject of the higher part of the soul, to Reply to Objection 3. Such argument holds good of which it belongs, to enjoy the Godhead: so that as passion, the totality of the soul with regard to its faculties. Whether Christ suffered at a suitable time? IIIa q. 46 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ did not suf- 15:25: “It was the third hour, and they crucified Him.” fer at a suitable time. For Christ’s Passion was prefigured Objection 3. Further, as the sun is at its highest point by the sacrifice of the Paschal lamb: hence the Apostle in each day at the sixth hour, so also it reaches its high- says (1 Cor. 5:7): “Christ our Pasch is sacrificed.” But est point in every year at the summer solstice. Therefore the paschal lamb was slain “on the fourteenth day at even- Christ ought to have suffered about the time of the sum- tide,” as is stated in Ex. 12:6. Therefore it seems that mer solstice rather than about the vernal equinox. Christ ought to have suffered then; which is manifestly Objection 4. Further, the world was enlightened by false: for He was then celebrating the Pasch with His Christ’s presence in it, according to Jn. 9:5: “As long as I disciples, according to Mark’s account (14:12): “On the am in the world I am the light of the world.” Consequently first day of the unleavened bread, when they sacrificed the it was fitting for man’s salvation that Christ should have Pasch”; whereas it was on the following day that He suf- lived longer in the world, so that He should have suffered, fered. not in young, but in old, age. Objection 2. Further, Christ’s Passion is called His On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 13:1): “Jesus, uplifting, according to Jn. 3:14: “So must the Son of man knowing that His hour was come for Him to pass out of be lifted up.” And Christ is Himself called the Sun of this world to the Father”; and (Jn. 2:4): “My hour is not Justice, as we read Mal. 4:2. Therefore it seems that He yet come.” Upon which texts Augustine observes: “When ought to have suffered at the sixth hour, when the sun is He had done as much as He deemed sufficient, then came at its highest point, and yet the contrary appears from Mk. His hour, not of necessity, but of will, not of condition, but 2339 of power.” Therefore Christ died at an opportune time. of His own immolation—that is, of His Passion.” I answer that, As was observed above (a. 1), Christ’s But the words (Jn. 13:1) “Before the festival day of Passion was subject to His will. But His will was ruled the Pasch” are to be understood to refer to the fourteenth by the Divine wisdom which “ordereth all things” conve- day of the moon, which then fell upon the Thursday: for niently and “sweetly” (Wis. 8:1). Consequently it must the fifteenth day of the moon was the most solemn day be said that Christ’s Passion was enacted at an opportune of the Pasch with the Jews: and so the same day which time. Hence it is written in De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test., John calls “before the festival day of the Pasch,” on ac- qu. lv: “The Saviour did everything in its proper place count of the natural distinction of days, Matthew calls the and season.” first day of the unleavened bread, because, according to Reply to Objection 1. Some hold that Christ did die the rite of the Jewish festivity, the solemnity began from on the fourteenth day of the moon, when the Jews sacri- the evening of the preceding day. When it is said, then, ficed the Pasch: hence it is stated (Jn. 18:28) that the Jews that they were going to eat the Pasch on the fifteenth day “went not into Pilate’s hall” on the day of the Passion, of the month, it is to be understood that the Pasch there is “that they might not be defiled, but that they might eat the not called the Paschal lamb, which was sacrificed on the Pasch.” Upon this Chrysostom observes (Hom. lxxxii in fourteenth day, but the Paschal food—that is, the unleav- Joan.): “The Jews celebrated the Pasch then; but He cel- ened bread—which had to be eaten by the clean. Hence ebrated the Pasch on the previous day, reserving His own Chrysostom in the same passage gives another explana- slaying until the Friday, when the old Pasch was kept.” tion, that the Pasch can be taken as meaning the whole And this appears to tally with the statement (Jn. 13:1-5) feast of the Jews, which lasted seven days. that “before the festival day of the Pasch. . . when supper Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Con- was done”. . . Christ washed “the feet of the disciples.” sensu Evang. iii): “ ‘It was about the sixth hour’ when the But Matthew’s account (26:17) seems opposed to this; Lord was delivered up by Pilate to be crucified,” as John that “on the first day of the Azymes the disciples came to relates. For it “was not quite the sixth hour, but about Jesus, saying: Where wilt Thou that we prepare for Thee the sixth—that is, it was after the fifth, and when part to eat the Pasch?” From which, as Jerome says, “since the of the sixth had been entered upon until the sixth hour fourteenth day of the first month is called the day of the was ended—that the darkness began, when Christ hung Azymes, when the lamb was slain, and when it was full upon the cross. It is understood to have been the third moon,” it is quite clear that Christ kept the supper on the hour when the Jews clamored for the Lord to be crucified: fourteenth and died on the fifteenth. And this comes out and it is most clearly shown that they crucified Him when more clearly from Mk. 14:12: “On the first day of the un- they clamored out. Therefore, lest anyone might divert leavened bread, when they sacrificed the Pasch,” etc.; and the thought of so great a crime from the Jews to the sol- from Lk. 22:7: “The day of the unleavened bread came, diers, he says: ‘It was the third hour, and they crucified on which it was necessary that the Pasch should be killed.” Him,’ that they before all may be found to have cruci- Consequently, then, others say that Christ ate the fied Him, who at the third hour clamored for His crucifix- Pasch with His disciples on the proper day—that is, on ion. Although there are not wanting some persons who the fourteenth day of the moon—“showing thereby that wish the Parasceve to be understood as the third hour, up to the last day He was not opposed to the law,” as which John recalls, saying: ‘It was the Parasceve, about Chrysostom says (Hom. lxxxi in Matth.): but that the the sixth hour.’ For ‘Parasceve’ is interpreted ‘prepara- Jews, being busied in compassing Christ’s death against tion.’ But the true Pasch, which was celebrated in the the law, put off celebrating the Pasch until the following Lord’s Passion, began to be prepared from the ninth hour day. And on this account it is said of them that on the day of the night—namely, when the chief priests said: ‘He is of Christ’s Passion they were unwilling to enter Pilate’s deserving of death.’ ” According to John, then, “the sixth hall, “that they might not be defiled, but that they might hour of the Parasceve” lasts from that hour of the night eat the Pasch.” down to Christ’s crucifixion; while, according to Mark, it But even this solution does not tally with Mark, who is the third hour of the day. says: “On the first day of the unleavened bread, when Still, there are some who contend that this discrepancy they sacrificed the Pasch.” Consequently Christ and the is due to the error of a Greek transcriber: since the charac- Jews celebrated the ancient Pasch at the one time. And ters employed by them to represent 3 and 6 are somewhat as Bede says on Lk. 22:7,8: “Although Christ who is our alike. Pasch was slain on the following day—that is, on the fif- Reply to Objection 3. According to the author of De teenth day of the moon—nevertheless, on the night when Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. lv, “our Lord willed to redeem the Lamb was sacrificed, delivering to the disciples to be and reform the world by His Passion, at the time of year at celebrated, the mysteries of His body and blood, and be- which He had created it—that is, at the equinox. It is then ing held and bound by the Jews, He hallowed the opening that day grows upon night; because by our Saviour’s Pas- 2340 sion we are brought from darkness to light.” And since the more His love by giving up His life for us when He the perfect enlightening will come about at Christ’s sec- was in His most perfect state of life. Secondly, because ond coming, therefore the season of His second coming is it was not becoming for Him to show any decay of na- compared (Mat. 24:32,33) to the summer in these words: ture nor to be subject to disease, as stated above (q. 14, “When the branch thereof is now tender, and the leaves a. 4). Thirdly, that by dying and rising at an early age come forth, you know that summer is nigh: so you also, Christ might exhibit beforehand in His own person the fu- when you shall see all these things, know ye that it is nigh ture condition of those who rise again. Hence it is written even at the doors.” And then also shall be Christ’s greatest (Eph. 4:13): “Until we all meet into the unity of faith, and exaltation. of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, Reply to Objection 4. Christ willed to suffer while unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ.” yet young, for three reasons. First of all, to commend Whether Christ suffered in a suitable place? IIIa q. 46 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ did not suffer Secondly, because the virtue of His Passion was to be in a suitable place. For Christ suffered according to His spread over the whole world, He wished to suffer in the human nature, which was conceived in Nazareth and born center of the habitable world—that is, in Jerusalem. Ac- in Bethlehem. Consequently it seems that He ought not to cordingly it is written (Ps. 73:12): “But God is our King have suffered in Jerusalem, but in Nazareth or Bethlehem. before ages: He hath wrought salvation in the midst of the Objection 2. Further, the reality ought to correspond earth”—that is, in Jerusalem, which is called “the navel of with the figure. But Christ’s Passion was prefigured by the earth”∗. the sacrifices of the Old Law, and these were offered up in Thirdly, because it was specially in keeping with His the Temple. Therefore it seems that Christ ought to have humility: that, as He chose the most shameful manner of suffered in the Temple, and not outside the city gate. death, so likewise it was part of His humility that He did Objection 3. Further, the medicine should corre- not refuse to suffer in so celebrated a place. Hence Pope spond with the disease. But Christ’s Passion was the Leo says (Serm. I in Epiph.): “He who had taken upon medicine against Adam’s sin: and Adam was not buried Himself the form of a servant chose Bethlehem for His in Jerusalem, but in Hebron; for it is written (Josh. 14:15): nativity and Jerusalem for His Passion.” “The name of Hebron before was called Cariath-Arbe: Fourthly, He willed to suffer in Jerusalem, where the Adam the greatest in the land of [Vulg.: ‘among’] the chief priests dwelt, to show that the wickedness of His Enacims was laid there.” slayers arose from the chiefs of the Jewish people. Hence On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 13:33): “It cannot it is written (Acts 4:27): “There assembled together in be that a prophet perish out of Jerusalem.” Therefore it this city against Thy holy child Jesus whom Thou hast was fitting that He should die in Jerusalem. anointed, Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and I answer that, According to the author of De Qq. Vet. the people of Israel.” et Nov. Test., qu. lv, “the Saviour did everything in its Reply to Objection 2. For three reasons Christ suf- proper place and season,” because, as all things are in His fered outside the gate, and not in the Temple nor in the hands, so are all places: and consequently, since Christ city. First of all, that the truth might correspond with the suffered at a suitable time, so did He in a suitable place. figure. For the calf and the goat which were offered in Reply to Objection 1. Christ died most appropriately most solemn sacrifice for expiation on behalf of the entire in Jerusalem. First of all, because Jerusalem was God’s multitude were burnt outside the camp, as commanded in chosen place for the offering of sacrifices to Himself: and Lev. 16:27. Hence it is written (Heb. 13:27): “For the these figurative sacrifices foreshadowed Christ’s Passion, bodies of those beasts, whose blood is brought into the which is a true sacrifice, according to Eph. 5:2: “He hath holies by the high-priest for sin, are burned without the delivered Himself for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to camp. Wherefore Jesus also, that He might sanctify the God for an odor of sweetness.” Hence Bede says in a people by His own blood, suffered without the gate.” Homily (xxiii): “When the Passion drew nigh, our Lord Secondly, to set us the example of shunning worldly willed to draw nigh to the place of the Passion”—that is to conversation. Accordingly the passage continues: “Let us say, to Jerusalem—whither He came five days before the go forth therefore to Him without the camp, bearing His Pasch; just as, according to the legal precept, the Paschal reproach.” lamb was led to the place of immolation five days before Thirdly, as Chrysostom says in a sermon on the Pas- the Pasch, which is the tenth day of the moon. sion (Hom. i De Cruce et Latrone): “The Lord was not ∗ Cf. Jerome’s comment on Ezech. 5:5 2341 willing to suffer under a roof, nor in the Jewish Temple, still, not the true one. For the spots where the condemned lest the Jews might take away the saving sacrifice, and lest are beheaded are outside the city and beyond the gates, you might think He was offered for that people only. Con- deriving thence the name of Calvary—that is, of the be- sequently, it was beyond the city and outside the walls, headed. Jesus, accordingly, was crucified there, that the that you may learn it was a universal sacrifice, an oblation standards of martyrdom might be uplifted over what was for the whole world, a cleansing for all.” formerly the place of the condemned. But Adam was Reply to Objection 3. According to Jerome, in his buried close by Hebron and Arbe, as we read in the book commentary on Mat. 27:33, “someone explained ‘the of Jesus Ben Nave.” But Jesus was to be crucified in place of Calvary’ as being the place where Adam was the common spot of the condemned rather than beside buried; and that it was so called because the skull of the Adam’s sepulchre, to make it manifest that Christ’s cross first man was buried there. A pleasing interpretation in- was the remedy, not only for Adam’s personal sin, but also deed, and one suited to catch the ear of the people, but, for the sin of the entire world. Whether it was fitting for Christ to be crucified with thieves? IIIa q. 46 a. 11 Objection 1. It would seem unfitting for Christ to thieves, because, as Jerome says on Mat. 27:33: “As have been crucified with thieves, because it is written (2 Christ became accursed of the cross for us, so for our sal- Cor. 6:14): “What participation hath justice with injus- vation He was crucified as a guilty one among the guilty.” tice?” But for our sakes Christ “of God is made unto us Secondly, as Pope Leo observes (Serm. iv de Passione): justice” (1 Cor. 1:30); whereas iniquity applies to thieves. “Two thieves were crucified, one on His right hand and Therefore it was not fitting for Christ to be crucified with one on His left, to set forth by the very appearance of the thieves. gibbet that separation of all men which shall be made in Objection 2. Further, on Mat. 26:35, “Though I His hour of judgment.” And Augustine on Jn. 7:36: “The should die with Thee, I will not deny Thee,” Origen very cross, if thou mark it well, was a judgment-seat: for (Tract. xxxv in Matth.) observes: “It was not men’s lot the judge being set in the midst, the one who believed was to die with Jesus, since He died for all.” Again, on Lk. delivered, the other who mocked Him was condemned. 22:33, “I am ready to go with Thee, both into prison and Already He has signified what He shall do to the quick death,” Ambrose says: “Our Lord’s Passion has followers, and the dead; some He will set on His right, others on His but not equals.” It seems, then, much less fitting for Christ left hand.” Thirdly, according to Hilary (Comm. xxxiii to suffer with thieves. in Matth.): “Two thieves are set, one upon His right and Objection 3. Further, it is written (Mat. 27:44) that one upon His left, to show that all mankind is called to the “the thieves who were crucified with Him reproached sacrament of His Passion. But because of the cleavage be- Him.” But in Lk. 22:42 it is stated that one of them who tween believers and unbelievers, the multitude is divided were crucified with Christ cried out to Him: “Lord, re- into right and left, those on the right being saved by the member me when Thou shalt come into Thy kingdom.” justification of faith.” Fourthly, because, as Bede says on It seems, then, that besides the blasphemous thieves there Mk. 15:27: “The thieves crucified with our Lord denote was another man who did not blaspheme Him: and so the those who, believing in and confessing Christ, either en- Evangelist’s account does not seem to be accurate when it dure the conflict of martyrdom or keep the institutes of says that Christ was crucified with thieves. stricter observance. But those who do the like for the sake On the contrary, It was foretold by Isaias (53:12): of everlasting glory are denoted by the faith of the thief on “And He was reputed with the wicked.” the right; while others who do so for the sake of human I answer that, Christ was crucified between thieves applause copy the mind and behavior of the one on the from one intention on the part of the Jews, and from quite left.” another on the part of God’s ordaining. As to the inten- Reply to Objection 1. Just as Christ was not obliged tion of the Jews, Chrysostom remarks (Hom. lxxxvii in to die, but willingly submitted to death so as to vanquish Matth.) that they crucified the two thieves, one on either death by His power: so neither deserved He to be classed side, “that He might be made to share their guilt. But with thieves; but willed to be reputed with the ungodly it did not happen so; because mention is never made of that He might destroy ungodliness by His power. Accord- them; whereas His cross is honored everywhere. Kings ingly, Chrysostom says (Hom. lxxxiv in Joan.) that “to lay aside their crowns to take up the cross: on their purple convert the thief upon the cross, and lead him into par- robes, on their diadems, on their weapons, on the conse- adise, was no less a wonder than to shake the rocks.” crated table, everywhere the cross shines forth.” Reply to Objection 2. It was not fitting that anyone As to God’s ordinance, Christ was crucified with else should die with Christ from the same cause as Christ: 2342 hence Origen continues thus in the same passage: “All the plural for the singular” when he said “the thieves re-had been under sin, and all required that another should proached Him.” Or it may be said, with Jerome, that “at die for them, not they for others.” first both blasphemed Him, but afterwards one believed in Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Con- Him on witnessing the wonders.” sensu Evang. iii): We can understand Matthew “as putting Whether Christ’s Passion is to be attributed to His Godhead? IIIa q. 46 a. 12 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s Passion is to reason of the human nature. Hence, in a Synodal Epistle be attributed to His Godhead; for it is written (1 Cor. 2:8): of Cyril∗ we read: “If any man does not confess that the “If they had known it, they would never have crucified the Word of God suffered in the flesh and was crucified in the Lord of glory.” But Christ is the Lord of glory in respect flesh, let him be anathema.” Therefore Christ’s Passion of His Godhead. Therefore Christ’s Passion is attributed belongs to the “suppositum” of the Divine Nature by rea- to Him in respect of His Godhead. son of the passible nature assumed, but not on account of Objection 2. Further, the principle of men’s salva- the impassible Divine Nature. tion is the Godhead Itself, according to Ps. 36:39: “But Reply to Objection 1. The Lord of glory is said to be the salvation of the just is from the Lord.” Consequently, crucified, not as the Lord of glory, but as a man capable of if Christ’s Passion did not appertain to His Godhead, it suffering. would seem that it could not produce fruit in us. Reply to Objection 2. As is said in a sermon of the Objection 3. Further, the Jews were punished for Council of Ephesus†, “Christ’s death being, as it were, slaying Christ as for murdering God Himself; as is proved God’s death”—namely, by union in Person—“destroyed by the gravity of the punishment. Now this would not death”; since He who suffered “was both God and man. be so if the Passion were not attributed to the Godhead. For God’s Nature was not wounded, nor did It undergo Therefore Christ’s Passion should be so attributed. any change by those sufferings.” On the contrary, Athanasius says (Ep. ad Epict.): Reply to Objection 3. As the passage quoted goes “The Word is impassible whose Nature is Divine.” But on to say: “The Jews did not crucify one who was simply what is impassible cannot suffer. Consequently, Christ’s a man; they inflicted their presumptions upon God. For Passion did not concern His Godhead. suppose a prince to speak by word of mouth, and that his I answer that, As stated above (q. 2, Aa. 1,2,3,6), the words are committed to writing on a parchment and sent union of the human nature with the Divine was effected in out to the cities, and that some rebel tears up the docu- the Person, in the hypostasis, in the suppositum, yet ob- ment, he will be led forth to endure the death sentence, serving the distinction of natures; so that it is the same not for merely tearing up a document, but as destroying Person and hypostasis of the Divine and human natures, the imperial message. Let not the Jew, then, stand in se- while each nature retains that which is proper to it. And curity, as crucifying a mere man; since what he saw was therefore, as stated above (q. 16, a. 4), the Passion is to as the parchment, but what was hidden under it was the be attributed to the suppositum of the Divine Nature, not imperial Word, the Son by nature, not the mere utterance because of the Divine Nature, which is impassible, but by of a tongue.” ∗ Act. Conc. Ephes., P. i, cap. 26 † P. iii, cap. 10 2343 THIRD PART, QUESTION 47 Of the Efficient Cause of Christ’s Passion (In Six Articles) We have now to consider the efficient cause of Christ’s Passion, concerning which there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ was slain by others, or by Himself? (2) From what motive did He deliver Himself up to the Passion? (3) Whether the Father delivered Him up to suffer? (4) Whether it was fitting that He should suffer at the hands of the Gentiles, or rather of the Jews? (5) Whether His slayers knew who He was? (6) Of the sin of them who slew Christ. Whether Christ was slain by another or by Himself? IIIa q. 47 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ was not slain His spirit had the power of preserving His fleshly nature by another, but by Himself. For He says Himself (Jn. from the infliction of any injury; and Christ’s soul had this 10:18): “No men taketh My life from Me, but I lay it down power, because it was united in unity of person with the of Myself.” But he is said to kill another who takes away Divine Word, as Augustine says (De Trin. iv). Therefore, his life. Consequently, Christ was not slain by others, but since Christ’s soul did not repel the injury inflicted on His by Himself. body, but willed His corporeal nature to succumb to such Objection 2. Further, those slain by others sink grad- injury, He is said to have laid down His life, or to have ually from exhausted nature, and this is strikingly appar- died voluntarily. ent in the crucified: for, as Augustine says (De Trin. iv): Reply to Objection 1. When we hear the words, “No “Those who were crucified were tormented with a linger- man taketh away My life from Me,” we must understand ing death.” But this did not happen in Christ’s case, since “against My will”: for that is properly said to be “taken “crying out, with a loud voice, He yielded up the ghost” away” which one takes from someone who is unwilling (Mat. 27:50). Therefore Christ was not slain by others, and unable to resist. but by Himself. Reply to Objection 2. In order for Christ to show that Objection 3. Further, those slain by others suffer a vi- the Passion inflicted by violence did not take away His olent death, and hence die unwillingly, because violent is life, He preserved the strength of His bodily nature, so opposed to voluntary. But Augustine says (De Trin. iv): that at the last moment He was able to cry out with a loud “Christ’s spirit did not quit the flesh unwillingly, but be- voice: and hence His death should be computed among cause He willed it, when He willed it, and as He willed His other miracles. Accordingly it is written (Mk. 15:39): it.” Consequently Christ was not slain by others, but by “And the centurion who stood over against Him, seeing Himself. that crying out in this manner, He had given up the ghost, On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 18:33): “After they said: Indeed, this man was the Son of God.” It was also have scourged Him, they will put him to death.” a subject of wonder in Christ’s death that He died sooner I answer that, A thing may cause an effect in two than the others who were tormented with the same suf- ways: in the first instance by acting directly so as to pro- fering. Hence John says (19:32) that “they broke the legs duce the effect; and in this manner Christ’s persecutors of the first, and of the other that was crucified with Him,” slew Him because they inflicted on Him what was a suf- that they might die more speedily; “but after they were ficient cause of death, and with the intention of slaying come to Jesus, when they saw that He was already dead, Him, and the effect followed, since death resulted from they did not break His legs.” Mark also states (15:44) that that cause. In another way someone causes an effect “Pilate wondered that He should be already dead.” For as indirectly—that is, by not preventing it when he can do of His own will His bodily nature kept its vigor to the end, so; just as one person is said to drench another by not so likewise, when He willed, He suddenly succumbed to closing the window through which the shower is enter- the injury inflicted. ing: and in this way Christ was the cause of His own Reply to Objection 3. Christ at the same time suf- Passion and death. For He could have prevented His Pas- fered violence in order to die, and died, nevertheless, sion and death. Firstly, by holding His enemies in check, voluntarily; because violence was inflicted on His body, so that they would not have been eager to slay Him, or which, however, prevailed over His body only so far as would have been powerless to do so. Secondly, because He willed it. 2344 Whether Christ died out of obedience? IIIa q. 47 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ did not die out told, but He showed the proceeding to be a voluntary one, of obedience. For obedience is referred to a command. and destroyed suspicion of opposition” to the Father. Yet But we do not read that Christ was commanded to suffer. because the Old Law was ended by Christ’s death, accord- Therefore He did not suffer out of obedience. ing to His dying words, “It is consummated” (Jn. 19:30), Objection 2. Further, a man is said to do from obedi- it may be understood that by His suffering He fulfilled ence what he does from necessity of precept. But Christ all the precepts of the Old Law. He fulfilled those of the did not suffer necessarily, but voluntarily. Therefore He moral order which are founded on the precepts of charity, did not suffer out of obedience. inasmuch as He suffered both out of love of the Father, Objection 3. Further, charity is a more excellent according to Jn. 14:31: “That the world may know that virtue than obedience. But we read that Christ suffered I love the Father, and as the Father hath given Me com- out of charity, according to Eph. 5:2: “Walk in love, as mandment, so do I: arise, let us go hence”—namely, to Christ also has loved us, and delivered Himself up for us.” the place of His Passion: and out of love of His neigh- Therefore Christ’s Passion ought to be ascribed rather to bor, according to Gal. 2:20: “He loved me, and deliv- charity than to obedience. ered Himself up for me.” Christ likewise by His Passion On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:8): “He became fulfilled the ceremonial precepts of the Law, which are obedient” to the Father “unto death.” chiefly ordained for sacrifices and oblations, in so far as I answer that, It was befitting that Christ should suf- all the ancient sacrifices were figures of that true sacrifice fer out of obedience. First of all, because it was in keeping which the dying Christ offered for us. Hence it is written with human justification, that “as by the disobedience of (Col. 2:16,17): “Let no man judge you in meat or drink, one man, many were made sinners: so also by the obedi- or in respect of a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the ence of one, many shall be made just,” as is written Rom. sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to come, but the 5:19. Secondly, it was suitable for reconciling man with body is Christ’s,” for the reason that Christ is compared God: hence it is written (Rom. 5:10): “We are recon- to them as a body is to a shadow. Christ also by His Pas- ciled to God by the death of His Son,” in so far as Christ’s sion fulfilled the judicial precepts of the Law, which are death was a most acceptable sacrifice to God, according chiefly ordained for making compensation to them who to Eph. 5:2: “He delivered Himself for us an oblation and have suffered wrong, since, as is written Ps. 68:5: He a sacrifice to God for an odor of sweetness.” Now obe- “paid that which” He “took not away,” suffering Himself dience is preferred to all sacrifices. according to 1 Kings to be fastened to a tree on account of the apple which man 15:22: “Obedience is better than sacrifices.” Therefore it had plucked from the tree against God’s command. was fitting that the sacrifice of Christ’s Passion and death Reply to Objection 2. Although obedience implies should proceed from obedience. Thirdly, it was in keeping necessity with regard to the thing commanded, neverthe- with His victory whereby He triumphed over death and its less it implies free-will with regard to the fulfilling of the author; because a soldier cannot conquer unless he obey precept. And, indeed, such was Christ’s obedience, for, al- his captain. And so the Man-Christ secured the victory though His Passion and death, considered in themselves, through being obedient to God, according to Prov. 21:28: were repugnant to the natural will, yet Christ resolved to “An obedient man shall speak of victory.” fulfill God’s will with respect to the same, according to Reply to Objection 1. Christ received a command Ps. 39:9: “That I should do Thy will: O my God, I have from the Father to suffer. For it is written (Jn. 10:18): desired it.” Hence He said (Mat. 26:42): “If this chalice “I have power to lay down My life, and I have power to may not pass away, but I must drink it, Thy will be done.” take it up again: (and) this commandment have I received Reply to Objection 3. For the same reason Christ suf- of My Father”—namely, of laying down His life and of fered out of charity and out of obedience; because He ful- resuming it again. “From which,” as Chrysostom says filled even the precepts of charity out of obedience only; (Hom. lix in Joan.), it is not to be understood “that at and was obedient, out of love, to the Father’s command. first He awaited the command, and that He had need to be Whether God the Father delivered up Christ to the Passion? IIIa q. 47 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that God the Father did without any iniquity.” Therefore He did not hand over the not deliver up Christ to the Passion. For it is a wicked innocent Christ to His Passion and death. and cruel act to hand over an innocent man to torment and Objection 2. Further, it is not likely that a man be death. But, as it is written (Dt. 32:4): “God is faithful, and given over to death by himself and by another also. But 2345 Christ gave Himself up for us, as it is written (Is. 53:12): forsaken Me?” because, to wit, He left Him to the power “He hath delivered His soul unto death.” Consequently it of His persecutors, as Augustine says (Ep. cxl). does not appear that God the Father delivered Him up. Reply to Objection 1. It is indeed a wicked and cruel Objection 3. Further, Judas is held to be guilty be- act to hand over an innocent man to torment and to death cause he betrayed Christ to the Jews, according to Jn. against his will. Yet God the Father did not so deliver 6:71: “One of you is a devil,” alluding to Judas, who was up Christ, but inspired Him with the will to suffer for us. to betray Him. The Jews are likewise reviled for deliv- God’s “severity” (cf. Rom. 11:22) is thereby shown, for ering Him up to Pilate; as we read in Jn. 18:35: “Thy He would not remit sin without penalty: and the Apostle own nation, and the chief priests have delivered Thee up indicates this when (Rom. 8:32) he says: “God spared to me.” Moreover, as is related in Jn. 19:16: Pilate “deliv- not even His own Son.” Likewise His “goodness” (Rom. ered Him to them to be crucified”; and according to 2 Cor. 11:22) shines forth, since by no penalty endured could 6:14: there is no “participation of justice with injustice.” man pay Him enough satisfaction: and the Apostle de- It seems, therefore, that God the Father did not deliver up notes this when he says: “He delivered Him up for us Christ to His Passion. all”: and, again (Rom. 3:25): “Whom”—that is to say, On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 8:32): “God hath Christ—God “hath proposed to be a propitiation through not spared His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all.” faith in His blood.” I answer that, As observed above (a. 2), Christ suf- Reply to Objection 2. Christ as God delivered Him- fered voluntarily out of obedience to the Father. Hence self up to death by the same will and action as that by in three respects God the Father did deliver up Christ to which the Father delivered Him up; but as man He gave the Passion. In the first way, because by His eternal will Himself up by a will inspired of the Father. Consequently He preordained Christ’s Passion for the deliverance of the there is no contrariety in the Father delivering Him up and human race, according to the words of Isaias (53:6): “The in Christ delivering Himself up. Lord hath laid on Him the iniquities of us all”; and again Reply to Objection 3. The same act, for good or (Is. 53:10): “The Lord was pleased to bruise Him in infir- evil, is judged differently, accordingly as it proceeds mity.” Secondly, inasmuch as, by the infusion of charity, from a different source. The Father delivered up Christ, He inspired Him with the will to suffer for us; hence we and Christ surrendered Himself, from charity, and conse- read in the same passage: “He was offered because it was quently we give praise to both: but Judas betrayed Christ His own will” (Is. 53:7). Thirdly, by not shielding Him from greed, the Jews from envy, and Pilate from worldly from the Passion, but abandoning Him to His persecutors: fear, for he stood in fear of Caesar; and these accordingly thus we read (Mat. 27:46) that Christ, while hanging upon are held guilty. the cross, cried out: “My God, My God, why hast Thou Whether it was fitting for Christ to suffer at the hands of the Gentiles? IIIa q. 47 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem unfitting that Christ cause He made Himself the Son of God.” It seems fitting, should suffer at the hands of the Gentiles. For since men therefore, that Christ should suffer, at the hands not of the were to be freed from sin by Christ’s death, it would seem Gentiles, but of the Jews, and that what they said was un- fitting that very few should sin in His death. But the true: “It is not lawful for us to put any man to death,” since Jews sinned in His death, on whose behalf it is said (Mat. many sins are punishable with death according to the Law, 21:38): “This is the heir; come, let us kill him.” It seems as is evident from Lev. 20. fitting, therefore, that the Gentiles should not be impli- On the contrary, our Lord Himself says (Mat. 20:19): cated in the sin of Christ’s slaying. “They shall deliver Him to the Gentiles to be mocked, and Objection 2. Further, the truth should respond to the scourged, and crucified.” figure. Now it was not the Gentiles but the Jews who of- I answer that, The effect of Christ’s Passion was fore- fered the figurative sacrifices of the Old Law. Therefore shown by the very manner of His death. For Christ’s Pas- neither ought Christ’s Passion, which was a true sacrifice, sion wrought its effect of salvation first of all among the to be fulfilled at the hands of the Gentiles. Jews, very many of whom were baptized in His death, as Objection 3. Further, as related Jn. 5:18, “the Jews is evident from Acts 2:41 and Acts 4:4. Afterwards, by the sought to kill” Christ because “He did not only break the preaching of Jews, Christ’s Passion passed on to the Gen- sabbath, but also said God was His Father, making Him- tiles. Consequently it was fitting that Christ should begin self equal to God.” But these things seemed to be only His sufferings at the hands of the Jews, and, after they had against the Law of the Jews: hence they themselves said delivered Him up, finish His Passion at the hands of the (Jn. 19:7): “According to the Law He ought to die be- Gentiles. 2346 Reply to Objection 1. In order to demonstrate the ful-any man to death,’ because they understood that it was not ness of His love, on account of which He suffered, Christ lawful for them to put any man to death” owing to the sa- upon the cross prayed for His persecutors. Therefore, that credness of the feast-day, which they had already begun the fruits of His petition might accrue to Jews and Gen- to celebrate. or, as Chrysostom observes (Hom. lxxxiii tiles, Christ willed to suffer from both. in Joan.), because they wanted Him to be slain, not as a Reply to Objection 2. Christ’s Passion was the offer- transgressor of the Law, but as a public enemy, since He ing of a sacrifice, inasmuch as He endured death of His had made Himself out to be a king, of which it was not own free-will out of charity: but in so far as He suffered their place to judge. Or, again, because it was not lawful from His persecutors it was not a sacrifice, but a most for them to crucify Him (as they wanted to), but to stone grievous sin. Him, as they did to Stephen. Better still is it to say that Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (Tract. cxiv the power of putting to death was taken from them by the in Joan.): “The Jews said that ‘it is not lawful for us to put Romans, whose subjects they were. Whether Christ’s persecutors knew who He was? IIIa q. 47 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s persecutors saw all the signs in Him which the prophets said would did know who He was. For it is written (Mat. 21:38) that come to pass: but they did not know the mystery of His the husbandmen seeing the son said within themselves: Godhead.” Consequently the Apostle says: “If they had “This is the heir; come, let us kill him.” On this Jerome re- known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of marks: “Our Lord proves most manifestly by these words glory.” It must, however, be understood that their igno- that the rulers of the Jews crucified the Son of God, not rance did not excuse them from crime, because it was, as from ignorance, but out of envy: for they understood that it were, affected ignorance. For they saw manifest signs it was He to whom the Father says by the Prophet: ‘Ask of His Godhead; yet they perverted them out of hatred of Me, and I will give Thee the Gentiles for Thy inher- and envy of Christ; neither would they believe His words, itance.’ ” It seems, therefore, that they knew Him to be whereby He avowed that He was the Son of God. Hence Christ or the Son of God. He Himself says of them (Jn. 15:22): “If I had not come, Objection 2. Further, our Lord says (Jn. 15:24): “But and spoken to them, they would not have sin; but now they now they have both seen and hated both Me and My Fa- have no excuse for their sin.” And afterwards He adds (Jn. ther.” Now what is seen is known manifestly. Therefore 15:24): “If I had not done among them the works that no the Jews, knowing Christ, inflicted the Passion on Him out other man hath done, they would not have sin.” And so of hatred. the expression employed by Job (21:14) can be accepted Objection 3. Further, it is said in a sermon delivered on their behalf: ”(Who) said to God: depart from us, we in the Council of Ephesus (P. iii, cap. x): “Just as he who desire not the knowledge of Thy ways.” tears up the imperial message is doomed to die, as de- But those of lesser degree—namely, the common spising the prince’s word; so the Jew, who crucified Him folk—who had not grasped the mysteries of the Scrip- whom he had seen, will pay the penalty for daring to lay tures, did not fully comprehend that He was the Christ his hands on God the Word Himself.” Now this would or the Son of God. For although some of them believed not be so had they not known Him to be the Son of God, in Him, yet the multitude did not; and if they doubted because their ignorance would have excused them. There- sometimes whether He was the Christ, on account of the fore it seems that the Jews in crucifying Christ knew Him manifold signs and force of His teaching, as is stated Jn. to be the Son of God. 7:31,41, nevertheless they were deceived afterwards by On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 2:8): “If they their rulers, so that they did not believe Him to be the had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord Son of God or the Christ. Hence Peter said to them: “I of glory.” And (Acts 3:17), Peter, addressing the Jews, know that you did it through ignorance, as did also your says: “I know that you did it through ignorance, as did rulers”—namely, because they were seduced by the rulers. also your rulers.” Likewise the Lord hanging upon the Reply to Objection 1. Those words are spoken by the cross said: “Father, forgive them, for they know not what husbandmen of the vineyard; and these signify the rulers they do” (Lk. 23:34). of the people, who knew Him to be the heir, inasmuch as I answer that, Among the Jews some were elders, they knew Him to be the Christ promised in the Law, but and others of lesser degree. Now according to the au- the words of Ps. 2:8 seem to militate against this answer: thor of De Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test., qu. lxvi, the elders, “Ask of Me, and I will give Thee the Gentiles for Thy who were called “rulers, knew,” as did also the devils, inheritance”; which are addressed to Him of whom it is “that He was the Christ promised in the Law: for they said: “Thou art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee.” 2347 If, then, they knew Him to be the one to whom the words that He was the Son of God. were addressed: “Ask of Me, and I will give Thee the Gen- Reply to Objection 2. The words quoted are pre- tiles for Thy inheritance,” it follows that they knew Him ceded by the following: “If I had not done among them to be the Son of God. Chrysostom, too, says upon the the works that no other man hath done, they would not same passage that “they knew Him to be the Son of God.” have sin”; and then follow the words: “But now they have Bede likewise, commenting on the words, “For they know both seen and hated both Me and My Father.” Now all this not what they do” (Lk. 23:34), says: “It is to be observed shows that while they beheld Christ’s marvelous works, it that He does not pray for them who, understanding Him was owing to their hatred that they did not know Him to to be the Son of God, preferred to crucify Him rather than be the Son of God. acknowledge Him.” But to this it may be replied that they Reply to Objection 3. Affected ignorance does not knew Him to be the Son of God, not from His Nature, but excuse from guilt, but seems, rather, to aggravate it: for from the excellence of His singular grace. it shows that a man is so strongly attached to sin that he Yet we may hold that they are said to have known also wishes to incur ignorance lest he avoid sinning. The Jews that He was verily the Son of God, in that they had evi- therefore sinned, as crucifiers not only of the Man-Christ, dent signs thereof: yet out of hatred and envy, they refused but also as of God. credence to these signs, by which they might have known Whether the sin of those who crucified Christ was most grievous? IIIa q. 47 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the sin of Christ’s mon order sinned most grievously as to the kind of their crucifiers was not the most grievous. Because the sin sin: yet in one respect their crime was lessened by rea- which has some excuse cannot be most grievous. But son of their ignorance. Hence Bede, commenting on Lk. our Lord Himself excused the sin of His crucifiers when 23:34, “Father, forgive them, for they know not what they He said: “Father, forgive them: for they know not what do,” says: “He prays for them who know not what they they do” (Lk. 23:34). Therefore theirs was not the most are doing, as having the zeal of God, but not according to grievous sin. knowledge.” But the sin of the Gentiles, by whose hands Objection 2. Further, our Lord said to Pilate (Jn. He was crucified, was much more excusable, since they 19:11): “He that hath delivered Me to thee hath the greater had no knowledge of the Law. sin.” But it was Pilate who caused Christ to be crucified by Reply to Objection 1. As stated above, the excuse his minions. Therefore the sin of Judas the traitor seems made by our Lord is not to be referred to the rulers among to be greater than that of those who crucified Him. the Jews, but to the common people. Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher Reply to Objection 2. Judas did not deliver up Christ (Ethic. v): “No one suffers injustice willingly”; and in to Pilate, but to the chief priests who gave Him up to Pi- the same place he adds: “Where no one suffers injustice, late, according to Jn. 18:35: “Thy own nation and the nobody works injustice.” Consequently nobody wreaks chief priests have delivered Thee up to me.” But the sin of injustice upon a willing subject. But Christ suffered will- all these was greater than that of Pilate, who slew Christ ingly, as was shown above (Aa. 1,2). Therefore those who from fear of Caesar; and even greater than the sin of the crucified Christ did Him no injustice; and hence their sin soldiers who crucified Him at the governor’s bidding, not was not the most grievous. out of cupidity like Judas, nor from envy and hate like the On the contrary, Chrysostom, commenting on the chief priests. words, “Fill ye up, then, the measure of your fathers” Reply to Objection 3. Christ, indeed willed His Pas- (Mat. 23:32), says: “In very truth they exceeded the mea- sion just as the Father willed it; yet He did not will the sure of their fathers; for these latter slew men, but they unjust action of the Jews. Consequently Christ’s slayers crucified God.” are not excused of their injustice. Nevertheless, whoever I answer that, As stated above (a. 5), the rulers of slays a man not only does a wrong to the one slain, but the Jews knew that He was the Christ: and if there was likewise to God and to the State; just as he who kills him- any ignorance in them, it was affected ignorance, which self, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v). Hence it was could not excuse them. Therefore their sin was the most that David condemned to death the man who “did not fear grievous, both on account of the kind of sin, as well as to lay hands upon the Lord’s anointed,” even though he from the malice of their will. The Jews also of the com- (Saul) had requested it, as related 2 Kings 1:5-14. 2348 THIRD PART, QUESTION 48 Of the Efficiency of Christ’s Passion (In Six Articles) We now have to consider Christ’s Passion as to its effect; first of all, as to the manner in which it was brought about; and, secondly, as to the effect in itself. Under the first heading there are six points for inquiry: (1) Whether Christ’s Passion brought about our salvation by way of merit? (2) Whether it was by way of atonement? (3) Whether it was by way of sacrifice? (4) Whether it was by way of redemption? (5) Whether it is proper to Christ to be the Redeemer? (6) Whether (the Passion) secured man’s salvation efficiently? Whether Christ’s Passion brought about our salvation by way of merit? IIIa q. 48 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s Passion did so that it might overflow into His members; and therefore not bring about our salvation by way of merit. For the Christ’s works are referred to Himself and to His mem- sources of our sufferings are not within us. But no one bers in the same way as the works of any other man in a merits or is praised except for that whose principle lies state of grace are referred to himself. But it is evident that within him. Therefore Christ’s Passion wrought nothing whosoever suffers for justice’s sake, provided that he be by way of merit. in a state of grace, merits his salvation thereby, according Objection 2. Further, from the beginning of His con- to Mat. 5:10: “Blessed are they that suffer persecution for ception Christ merited for Himself and for us, as stated justice’s sake.” Consequently Christ by His Passion mer- above (q. 9, a. 4; q. 34, a. 3). But it is superfluous to merit ited salvation, not only for Himself, but likewise for all over again what has been merited before. Therefore by His members. His Passion Christ did not merit our salvation. Reply to Objection 1. Suffering, as such, is caused by Objection 3. Further, the source of merit is charity. an outward principle: but inasmuch as one bears it will- But Christ’s charity was not made greater by the Passion ingly, it has an inward principle. than it was before. Therefore He did not merit our salva- Reply to Objection 2. From the beginning of His con- tion by suffering more than He had already. ception Christ merited our eternal salvation; but on our On the contrary, on the words of Phil. 2:9, “There- side there were some obstacles, whereby we were hin- fore God exalted Him,” etc., Augustine says (Tract. civ dered from securing the effect of His preceding merits: in Joan.): “The lowliness” of the Passion “merited glory; consequently, in order to remove such hindrances, “it was glory was the reward of lowliness.” But He was glorified, necessary for Christ to suffer,” as stated above (q. 46, a. 3). not merely in Himself, but likewise in His faithful ones, Reply to Objection 3. Christ’s Passion has a special as He says Himself (Jn. 17:10). Therefore it appears that effect, which His preceding merits did not possess, not on He merited the salvation of the faithful. account of greater charity, but because of the nature of the I answer that, As stated above (q. 7, Aa. 1,9; q. 8, work, which was suitable for such an effect, as is clear Aa. 1,5), grace was bestowed upon Christ, not only as an from the arguments brought forward above all the fitting- individual, but inasmuch as He is the Head of the Church, ness of Christ’s Passion (q. 46, AA, 3,4). Whether Christ’s Passion brought about our salvation by way of atonement? IIIa q. 48 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s Passion did Objection 2. Further, no atonement is made to another not bring about our salvation by way of atonement. For it by committing a graver offense. But in Christ’s Passion seems that to make the atonement devolves on him who the gravest of all offenses was perpetrated, because those commits the sin; as is clear in the other parts of penance, who slew Him sinned most grievously, as stated above because he who has done the wrong must grieve over it (q. 47, a. 6). Consequently it seems that atonement could and confess it. But Christ never sinned, according to 1 Pet. not be made to God by Christ’s Passion. 2:22: “Who did no sin.” Therefore He made no atonement Objection 3. Further, atonement implies equality with by His personal suffering. the trespass, since it is an act of justice. But Christ’s Pas- 2349 sion does not appear equal to all the sins of the human dant atonement for the sins of the human race; according race, because Christ did not suffer in His Godhead, but to 1 Jn. 2:2: “He is the propitiation for our sins: and not in His flesh, according to 1 Pet. 4:1: “Christ therefore for ours only, but also for those of the whole world.” having suffered in the flesh.” Now the soul, which is the Reply to Objection 1. The head and members are as subject of sin, is of greater account than the flesh. There- one mystic person; and therefore Christ’s satisfaction be- fore Christ did not atone for our sins by His Passion. longs to all the faithful as being His members. Also, in so On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 68:5) in Christ’s far as any two men are one in charity, the one can atone person: “Then did I pay that which I took not away.” But for the other as shall be shown later ( Suppl., q. 13, a. 2). he has not paid who has not fully atoned. Therefore it ap- But the same reason does not hold good of confession and pears that Christ by His suffering has fully atoned for our contrition, because atonement consists in an outward ac- sins. tion, for which helps may be used, among which friends I answer that, He properly atones for an offense who are to be computed. offers something which the offended one loves equally, or Reply to Objection 2. Christ’s love was greater than even more than he detested the offense. But by suffering His slayers’ malice: and therefore the value of His Passion out of love and obedience, Christ gave more to God than in atoning surpassed the murderous guilt of those who cru- was required to compensate for the offense of the whole cified Him: so much so that Christ’s suffering was suf- human race. First of all, because of the exceeding charity ficient and superabundant atonement for His murderer’s from which He suffered; secondly, on account of the dig- crime. nity of His life which He laid down in atonement, for it Reply to Objection 3. The dignity of Christ’s flesh was the life of one who was God and man; thirdly, on ac- is not to be estimated solely from the nature of flesh, but count of the extent of the Passion, and the greatness of the also from the Person assuming it—namely, inasmuch as grief endured, as stated above (q. 46, a. 6). And therefore it was God’s flesh, the result of which was that it was of Christ’s Passion was not only a sufficient but a superabun- infinite worth. Whether Christ’s Passion operated by way of sacrifice? IIIa q. 48 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s Passion did referred to that consummation of happiness wherein we not operate by way of sacrifice. For the truth should corre- can be truly blessed.” But, as is added in the same place, spond with the figure. But human flesh was never offered “Christ offered Himself up for us in the Passion”: and this up in the sacrifices of the Old Law, which were figures voluntary enduring of the Passion was most acceptable to of Christ: nay, such sacrifices were reputed as impious, God, as coming from charity. Therefore it is manifest that according to Ps. 105:38: “And they shed innocent blood: Christ’s Passion was a true sacrifice. Moreover, as Au- the blood of their sons and of their daughters, which they gustine says farther on in the same book, “the primitive sacrificed to the idols of Chanaan.” It seems therefore that sacrifices of the holy Fathers were many and various signs Christ’s Passion cannot be called a sacrifice. of this true sacrifice, one being prefigured by many, in the Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x) same way as a single concept of thought is expressed in that “a visible sacrifice is a sacrament—that is, a sacred many words, in order to commend it without tediousness”: sign—of an invisible sacrifice.” Now Christ’s Passion is and, as Augustine observe, (De Trin. iv), “since there are not a sign, but rather the thing signified by other signs. four things to be noted in every sacrifice—to wit, to whom Therefore it seems that Christ’s Passion is not a sacrifice. it is offered, by whom it is offered, what is offered, and Objection 3. Further, whoever offers sacrifice per- for whom it is offered—that the same one true Mediator forms some sacred rite, as the very word “sacrifice” reconciling us with God through the peace-sacrifice might shows. But those men who slew Christ did not perform continue to be one with Him to whom He offered it, might any sacred act, but rather wrought a great wrong. There- be one with them for whom He offered it, and might Him- fore Christ’s Passion was rather a malefice than a sacrifice. self be the offerer and what He offered.” On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:2): “He Reply to Objection 1. Although the truth answers to delivered Himself up for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to the figure in some respects, yet it does not in all, since the God for an odor of sweetness.” truth must go beyond the figure. Therefore the figure of I answer that, A sacrifice properly so called is some- this sacrifice, in which Christ’s flesh is offered, was flesh thing done for that honor which is properly due to God, in right fittingly, not the flesh of men, but of animals, as de- order to appease Him: and hence it is that Augustine says noting Christ’s. And this is a most perfect sacrifice. First (De Civ. Dei x): “A true sacrifice is every good work done of all, since being flesh of human nature, it is fittingly of- in order that we may cling to God in holy fellowship, yet fered for men, and is partaken of by them under the Sacra- 2350 ment. Secondly, because being passible and mortal, it was Reply to Objection 2. Augustine is speaking there of fit for immolation. Thirdly, because, being sinless, it had visible figurative sacrifices: and even Christ’s Passion, al- virtue to cleanse from sins. Fourthly, because, being the though denoted by other figurative sacrifices, is yet a sign offerer’s own flesh, it was acceptable to God on account of something to be observed by us, according to 1 Pet. of His charity in offering up His own flesh. Hence it is 4:1: “Christ therefore, having suffered in the flesh, be you that Augustine says (De Trin. iv): “What else could be also armed with the same thought: for he that hath suf- so fittingly partaken of by men, or offered up for men, as fered in the flesh hath ceased from sins: that now he may human flesh? What else could be so appropriate for this live the rest of his time in the flesh, not after the desires of immolation as mortal flesh? What else is there so clean for men, but according to the will of God.” cleansing mortals as the flesh born in the womb without Reply to Objection 3. Christ’s Passion was indeed a fleshly concupiscence, and coming from a virginal womb? malefice on His slayers’ part; but on His own it was the What could be so favorably offered and accepted as the sacrifice of one suffering out of charity. Hence it is Christ flesh of our sacrifice, which was made the body of our who is said to have offered this sacrifice, and not the exe- Priest?” cutioners. Whether Christ’s Passion brought about our salvation by way of redemption? IIIa q. 48 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s Passion did to the devil’s bondage. Secondly, as to the debt of pun- not effect our salvation by way of redemption. For no one ishment, to the payment of which man was held fast by purchases or redeems what never ceased to belong to him. God’s justice: and this, too, is a kind of bondage, since But men never ceased to belong to God according to Ps. it savors of bondage for a man to suffer what he does not 23:1: “The earth is the Lord’s and the fulness thereof: the wish, just as it is the free man’s condition to apply himself world and all they that dwell therein.” Therefore it seems to what he wills. that Christ did not redeem us by His Passion. Since, then, Christ’s Passion was a sufficient and a Objection 2. Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. superabundant atonement for the sin and the debt of the xiii): “The devil had to be overthrown by Christ’s justice.” human race, it was as a price at the cost of which we But justice requires that the man who has treacherously were freed from both obligations. For the atonement by seized another’s property shall be deprived of it, because which one satisfies for self or another is called the price, deceit and cunning should not benefit anyone, as even by which he ransoms himself or someone else from sin human laws declare. Consequently, since the devil by and its penalty, according to Dan. 4:24: “Redeem thou treachery deceived and subjugated to himself man, who thy sins with alms.” Now Christ made satisfaction, not by is God’s creature, it seems that man ought not to be res- giving money or anything of the sort, but by bestowing cued from his power by way of redemption. what was of greatest price—Himself—for us. And there- Objection 3. Further, whoever buys or redeems an fore Christ’s Passion is called our redemption. object pays the price to the holder. But it was not to the Reply to Objection 1. Man is said to belong to God in devil, who held us in bondage, that Christ paid His blood two ways. First of all, in so far as he comes under God’s as the price of our redemption. Therefore Christ did not power: in which way he never ceased to belong to God; redeem us by His Passion. according to Dan. 4:22: “The Most High ruleth over the On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 1:18): “You kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will.” were not redeemed with corruptible things as gold or sil- Secondly, by being united to Him in charity, according to ver from your vain conversation of the tradition of your Rom. 8:9: “If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is fathers: but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb none of His.” In the first way, then, man never ceased to unspotted and undefiled.” And (Gal. 3:13): “Christ hath belong to God, but in the second way he did cease because redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse of sin. And therefore in so far as he was delivered from for us.” Now He is said to be a curse for us inasmuch as sin by the satisfaction of Christ’s Passion, he is said to be He suffered upon the tree, as stated above (q. 46, a. 4). redeemed by the Passion of Christ. Therefore He did redeem us by His Passion. Reply to Objection 2. Man by sinning became the I answer that, Man was held captive on account of sin bondsman both of God and of the devil. Through guilt in two ways: first of all, by the bondage of sin, because he had offended God, and put himself under the devil by (Jn. 8:34): “Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of consenting to him; consequently he did not become God’s sin”; and (2 Pet. 2:19): “By whom a man is overcome, of servant on account of his guilt, but rather, by withdraw- the same also he is the slave.” Since, then, the devil had ing from God’s service, he, by God’s just permission, fell overcome man by inducing him to sin, man was subject under the devil’s servitude on account of the offense per- 2351 petrated. But as to the penalty, man was chiefly bound to the sin and ordaining it as to the penalty. And therefore to God as his sovereign judge, and to the devil as his tor- justice required man’s redemption with regard to God, but turer, according to Mat. 5:25: “Lest perhaps the adver- not with regard to the devil. sary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee Reply to Objection 3. Because, with regard to God, to the officer”—that is, “to the relentless avenging angel,” redemption was necessary for man’s deliverance, but not as Chrysostom says (Hom. xi). Consequently, although, with regard to the devil, the price had to be paid not to the after deceiving man, the devil, so far as in him lay, held devil, but to God. And therefore Christ is said to have paid him unjustly in bondage as to both sin and penalty, still it the price of our redemption—His own precious blood— was just that man should suffer it. God so permitting it as not to the devil, but to God. Whether it is proper to Christ to be the Redeemer? IIIa q. 48 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not proper to For if in redeeming something a man pays a price which Christ to be the Redeemer, because it is written (Ps. 30:6): is not his own, but another’s, he is not said to be the chief “Thou hast redeemed me, O Lord, the God of Truth.” But redeemer, but rather the other is, whose price it is. Now to be the Lord God of Truth belongs to the entire Trinity. Christ’s blood or His bodily life, which “is in the blood,” Therefore it is not proper to Christ. is the price of our redemption (Lev. 17:11,14), and that Objection 2. Further, he is said to redeem who pays life He paid. Hence both of these belong immediately to the price of redemption. But God the Father gave His Son Christ as man; but to the Trinity as to the first and remote in redemption for our sins, as is written (Ps. 110:9): “The cause, to whom Christ’s life belonged as to its first author, Lord hath sent redemption to His people,” upon which the and from whom Christ received the inspiration of suffer- gloss adds, “that is, Christ, who gives redemption to cap- ing for us. Consequently it is proper to Christ as man to be tives.” Therefore not only Christ, but the Father also, re- the Redeemer immediately; although the redemption may deemed us. be ascribed to the whole Trinity as its first cause. Objection 3. Further, not only Christ’s Passion, but Reply to Objection 1. A gloss explains the text also that of other saints conduced to our salvation, accord- thus: “Thou, O Lord God of Truth, hast redeemed me in ing to Col. 1:24: “I now rejoice in my sufferings for you, Christ, crying out, ‘Lord, into Thy hands I commend my and fill up those things that are wanting of the sufferings spirit.’ ” And so redemption belongs immediately to the of Christ, in my flesh for His body, which is the Church.” Man-Christ, but principally to God. Therefore the title of Redeemer belongs not only to Christ, Reply to Objection 2. The Man-Christ paid the price but also to the other saints. of our redemption immediately, but at the command of the On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 3:13): “Christ re- Father as the original author. deemed us from the curse of the Law, being made a curse Reply to Objection 3. The sufferings of the saints are for us.” But only Christ was made a curse for us. There- beneficial to the Church, as by way, not of redemption, fore only Christ ought to be called our Redeemer. but of example and exhortation, according to 2 Cor. 1:6: I answer that, For someone to redeem, two things are “Whether we be in tribulation, it is for your exhortation required—namely, the act of paying and the price paid. and salvation.” Whether Christ’s Passion brought about our salvation efficiently? IIIa q. 48 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s Passion did saving power,” as Chrysostom∗ says. But Christ’s Pas- not bring about our salvation efficiently. For the efficient sion could not touch all mankind. Therefore it could not cause of our salvation is the greatness of the Divine power, efficiently bring about the salvation of all men. according to Is. 59:1: “Behold the hand of the Lord is not Objection 3. Further, it does not seem to be consistent shortened that it cannot save.” But “Christ was crucified for the same agent to operate by way of merit and by way through weakness,” as it is written (2 Cor. 13:4). There- of efficiency, since he who merits awaits the result from fore, Christ’s Passion did not bring about our salvation someone else. But it was by way of merit that Christ’s efficiently. Passion accomplished our salvation. Therefore it was not Objection 2. Further, no corporeal agency acts effi- by way of efficiency. ciently except by contact: hence even Christ cleansed the On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 1:18) that “the leper by touching him “in order to show that His flesh had word of the cross to them that are saved. . . is the power ∗ Theophylact, Enarr. in Luc. 2352 of God.” But God’s power brings about our salvation efall human power. ficiently. Therefore Christ’s Passion on the cross accom- Reply to Objection 2. Christ’s Passion, although cor- plished our salvation efficiently. poreal, has yet a spiritual effect from the Godhead united: I answer that, There is a twofold efficient agency— and therefore it secures its efficacy by spiritual contact— namely, the principal and the instrumental. Now the prin- namely, by faith and the sacraments of faith, as the Apos- cipal efficient cause of man’s salvation is God. But since tle says (Rom. 3:25): “Whom God hath proposed to be a Christ’s humanity is the “instrument of the Godhead,” as propitiation, through faith in His blood.” stated above (q. 43, a. 2), therefore all Christ’s actions and Reply to Objection 3. Christ’s Passion, according as sufferings operate instrumentally in virtue of His Godhead it is compared with His Godhead, operates in an efficient for the salvation of men. Consequently, then, Christ’s Pas- manner: but in so far as it is compared with the will of sion accomplishes man’s salvation efficiently. Christ’s soul it acts in a meritorious manner: considered Reply to Objection 1. Christ’s Passion in relation to as being within Christ’s very flesh, it acts by way of satis- His flesh is consistent with the infirmity which He took faction, inasmuch as we are liberated by it from the debt upon Himself, but in relation to the Godhead it draws of punishment; while inasmuch as we are freed from the infinite might from It, according to 1 Cor. 1:25: “The servitude of guilt, it acts by way of redemption: but in so weakness of God is stronger than men”; because Christ’s far as we are reconciled with God it acts by way of sacri- weakness, inasmuch as He is God, has a might exceeding fice, as shall be shown farther on (q. 49). 2353 THIRD PART, QUESTION 49 Of the Effects of Christ’s Passion (In Six Articles) We have now to consider what are the effects of Christ’s Passion, concerning which there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether we were freed from sin by Christ’s Passion? (2) Whether we were thereby delivered from the power of the devil? (3) Whether we were freed thereby from our debt of punishment? (4) Whether we were thereby reconciled with God? (5) Whether heaven’s gate was opened to us thereby? (6) Whether Christ derived exaltation from it? Whether we were delivered from sin through Christ’s Passion? IIIa q. 49 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that we were not delivered since He is our head, then, by the Passion which He en- from sin through Christ’s Passion. For to deliver from sin dured from love and obedience, He delivered us as His belongs to God alone, according to Is. 43:25: “I am He members from our sins, as by the price of His Passion: in who blot out your iniquities for My own sake.” But Christ the same way as if a man by the good industry of his hands did not suffer as God, but as man. Therefore Christ’s Pas- were to redeem himself from a sin committed with his sion did not free us from sin. feet. For, just as the natural body is one though made up Objection 2. Further, what is corporeal does not act of diverse members, so the whole Church, Christ’s mys- upon what is spiritual. But Christ’s Passion is corporeal, tic body, is reckoned as one person with its head, which is whereas sin exists in the soul, which is a spiritual creature. Christ. Thirdly, by way of efficiency, inasmuch as Christ’s Therefore Christ’s Passion could not cleanse us from sin. flesh, wherein He endured the Passion, is the instrument Objection 3. Further, one cannot be purged from a of the Godhead, so that His sufferings and actions operate sin not yet committed, but which shall be committed here- with Divine power for expelling sin. after. Since, then, many sins have been committed since Reply to Objection 1. Although Christ did not suf- Christ’s death, and are being committed daily, it seems fer as God, nevertheless His flesh is the instrument of the that we were not delivered from sin by Christ’s death. Godhead; and hence it is that His Passion has a kind of Objection 4. Further, given an efficient cause, nothing Divine Power of casting out sin, as was said above. else is required for producing the effect. But other things Reply to Objection 2. Although Christ’s Passion is besides are required for the forgiveness of sins, such as corporeal, still it derives a kind of spiritual energy from baptism and penance. Consequently it seems that Christ’s the Godhead, to which the flesh is united as an instrument: Passion is not the sufficient cause of the forgiveness of and according to this power Christ’s Passion is the cause sins. of the forgiveness of sins. Objection 5. Further, it is written (Prov. 10:12): Reply to Objection 3. Christ by His Passion delivered “Charity covereth all sins”; and (Prov. 15:27): “By mercy us from our sins causally—that is, by setting up the cause and faith, sins are purged away.” But there are many other of our deliverance, from which cause all sins whatsoever, things of which we have faith, and which excite charity. past, present, or to come, could be forgiven: just as if a Therefore Christ’s Passion is not the proper cause of the doctor were to prepare a medicine by which all sicknesses forgiveness of sins. can be cured even in future. On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 1:5): “He loved Reply to Objection 4. As stated above, since Christ’s us, and washed us from our sins in His own blood.” Passion preceded, as a kind of universal cause of the for- I answer that, Christ’s Passion is the proper cause of giveness of sins, it needs to be applied to each individual the forgiveness of sins in three ways. First of all, by way for the cleansing of personal sins. Now this is done by of exciting our charity, because, as the Apostle says (Rom. baptism and penance and the other sacraments, which de- 5:8): “God commendeth His charity towards us: because rive their power from Christ’s Passion, as shall be shown when as yet we were sinners, according to the time, Christ later (q. 62, a. 5). died for us.” But it is by charity that we procure pardon of Reply to Objection 5. Christ’s Passion is applied to our sins, according to Lk. 7:47: “Many sins are forgiven us even through faith, that we may share in its fruits, ac- her because she hath loved much.” Secondly, Christ’s Pas- cording to Rom. 3:25: “Whom God hath proposed to be sion causes forgiveness of sins by way of redemption. For a propitiation, through faith in His blood.” But the faith 2354 through which we are cleansed from sin is not “lifeless to us, not only as to our minds, but also as to our hearts. faith,” which can exist even with sin, but “faith living” And even in this way sins are forgiven through the power through charity; that thus Christ’s Passion may be applied of the Passion of Christ. Whether we were delivered from the devil’s power through Christ’s Passion? IIIa q. 49 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that we were not deliv- wicked will hindered man from securing his salvation. ered from the power of the devil through Christ’s Passion. As to the first point, by Christ’s Passion man was de- For he has no power over others, who can do nothing to livered from the devil’s power, in so far as the Passion them without the sanction of another. But without the Di- is the cause of the forgiveness of sins, as stated above vine permission the devil could never do hurt to any man, (a. 1). As to the second, it must be said that Christ’s Pas- as is evident in the instance of Job (1,2), where, by power sion freed us from the devil’s power, inasmuch as it rec- received from God, the devil first injured him in his pos- onciled us with God, as shall be shown later (a. 4). But as sessions, and afterwards in his body. In like manner it is to the third, Christ’s Passion delivered us from the devil, stated (Mat. 8:31,32) that the devils could not enter into inasmuch as in Christ’s Passion he exceeded the limit of the swine except with Christ’s leave. Therefore the devil power assigned him by God, by conspiring to bring about never had power over men: and hence we are not deliv- Christ’s death, Who, being sinless, did not deserve to die. ered from his power through Christ’s Passion. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, cap. xiv): “The Objection 2. Further, the devil exercises his power devil was vanquished by Christ’s justice: because, while over men by tempting them and molesting their bodies. discovering in Him nothing deserving of death, neverthe- But even after the Passion he continues to do the same less he slew Him. And it is certainly just that the debtors to men. Therefore we are not delivered from his power whom he held captive should be set at liberty since they through Christ’s Passion. believed in Him whom the devil slew, though He was no Objection 3. Further, the might of Christ’s Passion debtor.” endures for ever, as, according to Heb. 10:14: “By one Reply to Objection 1. The devil is said to have had oblation He hath perfected for ever them that are sancti- such power over men not as though he were able to injure fied.” But deliverance rom the devil’s power is not found them without God’s sanction, but because he was justly everywhere, since there are still idolaters in many regions permitted to injure men whom by tempting he had induced of the world; nor will it endure for ever, because in the to give consent. time of Antichrist he will be especially active in using his Reply to Objection 2. God so permitting it, the devil power to the hurt of men; because it is said of him (2 can still tempt men’s souls and harass their bodies: yet Thess. 2:9): “Whose coming is according to the working there is a remedy provided for man through Christ’s Pas- of Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders, and sion, whereby he can safeguard himself against the en- in all seduction of iniquity.” Consequently it seems that emy’s assaults, so as not to be dragged down into the Christ’s Passion is not the cause of the human race being destruction of everlasting death. And all who resisted delivered from the power of the devil. the devil previous to the Passion were enabled to do so On the contrary, our Lord said (Jn. 12:31), when His through faith in the Passion, although it was not yet ac- Passion was drawing nigh: “Now shall the prince of this complished. Yet in one respect no one was able to escape world be cast out; and I, if I be lifted up from the earth, the devil’s hands, i.e. so as not to descend into hell. But will draw all things to Myself.” Now He was lifted up after Christ’s Passion, men can defend themselves from from the earth by His Passion on the cross. Therefore by this by its power. His Passion the devil was deprived of his power over man. Reply to Objection 3. God permits the devil to de- I answer that, There are three things to be consid- ceive men by certain persons, and in times and places, ered regarding the power which the devil exercised over according to the hidden motive of His judgments; still, men previous to Christ’s Passion. The first is on man’s there is always a remedy provided through Christ’s Pas- own part, who by his sin deserved to be delivered over sion, for defending themselves against the wicked snares to the devil’s power, and was overcome by his tempting. of the demons, even in Antichrist’s time. But if any man Another point is on God’s part, whom man had offended neglect to make use of this remedy, it detracts nothing by sinning, and who with justice left man under the devil’s from the efficacy of Christ’s Passion. power. The third is on the devil’s part, who out of his most 2355 Whether men were freed from the punishment of sin through Christ’s Passion? IIIa q. 49 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that men were not freed in order to secure the effects of Christ’s Passion, we must from the punishment of sin by Christ’s Passion. For the be likened unto Him. Now we are likened unto Him sacra- chief punishment of sin is eternal damnation. But those mentally in Baptism, according to Rom. 6:4: “For we are damned in hell for their sins were not set free by Christ’s buried together with Him by baptism into death.” Hence Passion, because “in hell there is no redemption”∗. It no punishment of satisfaction is imposed upon men at seems, therefore, that Christ’s Passion did not deliver men their baptism, since they are fully delivered by Christ’s from the punishment of sin. satisfaction. But because, as it is written (1 Pet. 3:18), Objection 2. Further, no punishment should be im- “Christ died” but “once for our sins,” therefore a man can- posed upon them who are delivered from the debt of pun- not a second time be likened unto Christ’s death by the ishment. But a satisfactory punishment is imposed upon sacrament of Baptism. Hence it is necessary that those penitents. Consequently, men were not freed from the who sin after Baptism be likened unto Christ suffering by debt of punishment by Christ’s Passion. some form of punishment or suffering which they endure Objection 3. Further, death is a punishment of sin, in their own person; yet, by the co-operation of Christ’s according to Rom. 6:23: “The wages of sin is death.” But satisfaction, much lighter penalty suffices than one that is men still die after Christ’s Passion. Therefore it seems that proportionate to the sin. we have not been delivered from the debt of punishment. Reply to Objection 3. Christ’s satisfaction works its On the contrary, It is written (Is. 53:4): “Surely He effect in us inasmuch as we are incorporated with Him, as hath borne our iniquities and carried our sorrows.” the members with their head, as stated above (a. 1). Now I answer that, Through Christ’s Passion we have been the members must be conformed to their head. Conse- delivered from the debt of punishment in two ways. First quently, as Christ first had grace in His soul with bodily of all, directly—namely, inasmuch as Christ’s Passion was passibility, and through the Passion attained to the glory sufficient and superabundant satisfaction for the sins of of immortality, so we likewise, who are His members, are the whole human race: but when sufficient satisfaction has freed by His Passion from all debt of punishment, yet so been paid, then the debt of punishment is abolished. In an- that we first receive in our souls “the spirit of adoption of other way—indirectly, that is to say—in so far as Christ’s sons,” whereby our names are written down for the inher- Passion is the cause of the forgiveness of sin, upon which itance of immortal glory, while we yet have a passible and the debt of punishment rests. mortal body: but afterwards, “being made conformable” Reply to Objection 1. Christ’s Passion works its ef- to the sufferings and death of Christ, we are brought into fect in them to whom it is applied, through faith and char- immortal glory, according to the saying of the Apostle ity and the sacraments of faith. And, consequently, the (Rom. 8:17): “And if sons, heirs also: heirs indeed of lost in hell cannot avail themselves of its effects, since God, and joint heirs with Christ; yet so if we suffer with they are not united to Christ in the aforesaid manner. Him, that we may be also glorified with Him.” Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (a. 1, ad 4,5), Whether we were reconciled to God through Christ’s Passion? IIIa q. 49 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that we were not recon- Objection 3. Further, Christ’s Passion was completed ciled to God through Christ’s Passion. For there is no need by men slaying Him; and thereby they offended God of reconciliation between friends. But God always loved grievously. Therefore Christ’s Passion is rather the cause us, according to Wis. 11:25: “Thou lovest all the things of wrath than of reconciliation to God. that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:10): “We made.” Therefore Christ’s Passion did not reconcile us to are reconciled to God by the death of His Son.” God. I answer that, Christ’s Passion is in two ways the Objection 2. Further, the same thing cannot be cause cause of our reconciliation to God. In the first way, inas- and effect: hence grace, which is the cause of meriting, much as it takes away sin by which men became God’s does not come under merit. But God’s love is the cause of enemies, according to Wis. 14:9: “To God the wicked Christ’s Passion, according to Jn. 3:16: “God so loved and his wickedness are hateful alike”; and Ps. 5:7: “Thou the world, as to give His only-begotten Son.” It does hatest all the workers of iniquity.” In another way, inas- not appear, then, that we were reconciled to God through much as it is a most acceptable sacrifice to God. Now Christ’s Passion, so that He began to love us anew. it is the proper effect of sacrifice to appease God: just as ∗ Office of the Dead, Resp. vii 2356 man likewise overlooks an offense committed against him Reply to Objection 2. Christ is not said to have recon account of some pleasing act of homage shown him. onciled us with God, as if God had begun anew to love Hence it is written (1 Kings 26:19): “If the Lord stir thee us, since it is written (Jer. 31:3): “I have loved thee with up against me, let Him accept of sacrifice.” And in like an everlasting love”; but because the source of hatred was fashion Christ’s voluntary suffering was such a good act taken away by Christ’s Passion, both through sin being that, because of its being found in human nature, God was washed away and through compensation being made in appeased for every offense of the human race with regard the shape of a more pleasing offering. to those who are made one with the crucified Christ in the Reply to Objection 3. As Christ’s slayers were men, aforesaid manner (a. 1, ad 4). so also was the Christ slain. Now the charity of the suffer- Reply to Objection 1. God loves all men as to their ing Christ surpassed the wickedness of His slayers. Ac- nature, which He Himself made; yet He hates them with cordingly Christ’s Passion prevailed more in reconciling respect to the crimes they commit against Him, according God to the whole human race than in provoking Him to to Ecclus. 12:3: “The Highest hateth sinners.” wrath. Whether Christ opened the gate of heaven to us by His Passion? IIIa q. 49 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ did not open men from entering into the kingdom of heaven. The first the gate of heaven to us by His Passion. For it is writ- is common to the whole race, for it is our first parents’ sin, ten (Prov. 11:18): “To him that soweth justice, there is a and by that sin heaven’s entrance is closed to man. Hence faithful reward.” But the reward of justice is the entering we read in Gn. 3:24 that after our first parents’ sin God into the kingdom of heaven. It seems, therefore, that the “placed. . . cherubim and a flaming sword, turning every holy Fathers who wrought works of justice, obtained by way, to keep the way of the tree of life.” The other is the faith the entering into the heavenly kingdom even without personal sin of each one of us, committed by our personal Christ’s Passion. Consequently Christ’s Passion is not the act. cause of the opening of the gate of the kingdom of heaven. Now by Christ’s Passion we have been delivered not Objection 2. Further, Elias was caught up to heaven only from the common sin of the whole human race, both previous to Christ’s Passion (4 Kings 2). But the effect as to its guilt and as to the debt of punishment, for which never precedes the cause. Therefore it seems that the He paid the penalty on our behalf; but, furthermore, from opening of heaven’s gate is not the result of Christ’s Pas- the personal sins of individuals, who share in His Passion sion. by faith and charity and the sacraments of faith. Conse- Objection 3. Further, as it is written (Mat. 3:16), quently, then the gate of heaven’s kingdom is thrown open when Christ was baptized the heavens were opened to to us through Christ’s Passion. This is precisely what the Him. But His baptism preceded the Passion. Conse- Apostle says (Heb. 9:11,12): “Christ being come a high- quently the opening of heaven is not the result of Christ’s priest of the good things to come. . . by His own blood Passion. entered once into the Holies, having obtained eternal re- Objection 4. Further, it is written (Mic. 2:13): “For demption.” And this is foreshadowed (Num. 35:25,28), He shall go up that shall open the way before them.” But where it is said that the slayer∗ “shall abide there”—that to open the way to heaven seems to be nothing else than is to say, in the city of refuge—“until the death of the to throw open its gate. Therefore it seems that the gate of high-priest, that is anointed with the holy oil: but after he heaven was opened to us, not by Christ’s Passion, but by is dead, then shall he return home.” His Ascension. Reply to Objection 1. The holy Fathers, by doing On the contrary, is the saying of the Apostle (Heb. works of justice, merited to enter into the heavenly king- 10:19): “We have [Vulg.: ‘having a’] confidence in the en- dom, through faith in Christ’s Passion, according to Heb. tering into the Holies”—that is, of the heavenly places— 11:33: The saints “by faith conquered kingdoms, wrought “through the blood of Christ.” justice,” and each of them was thereby cleansed from sin, I answer that, The shutting of the gate is the obsta- so far as the cleansing of the individual is concerned. Nev- cle which hinders men from entering in. But it is on ac- ertheless the faith and righteousness of no one of them count of sin that men were prevented from entering into sufficed for removing the barrier arising from the guilt of the heavenly kingdom, since, according to Is. 35:8: “It the whole human race: but this was removed at the cost of shall be called the holy way, and the unclean shall not Christ’s blood. Consequently, before Christ’s Passion no pass over it.” Now there is a twofold sin which prevents one could enter the kingdom of heaven by obtaining ever- ∗ The Septuagint has ‘slayer’, the Vulgate, ‘innocent’—i.e. the man who has slain ‘without hatred and enmity’. 2357 lasting beatitude, which consists in the full enjoyment of Christ’s sake, to whom heaven was ever open, but in order God. to signify that heaven is opened to the baptized, through Reply to Objection 2. Elias was taken up into the Christ’s baptism, which has its efficacy from His Passion. atmospheric heaven, but not in to the empyrean heaven, Reply to Objection 4. Christ by His Passion merited which is the abode of the saints: and likewise Enoch was for us the opening of the kingdom of heaven, and removed translated into the earthly paradise, where he is believed the obstacle; but by His ascension He, as it were, brought to live with Elias until the coming of Antichrist. us to the possession of the heavenly kingdom. And con- Reply to Objection 3. As was stated above (q. 39, sequently it is said that by ascending He “opened the way a. 5), the heavens were opened at Christ’s baptism, not for before them.” Whether by His Passion Christ merited to be exalted? IIIa q. 49 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that Christ did not merit to be His dignity in four respects. In the first place as to His exalted on account of His Passion. For eminence of rank Passion and death, to which He was not bound; secondly, belongs to God alone, just as knowledge of truth, accord- as to the place, since His body was laid in a sepulchre ing to Ps. 112:4: “The Lord is high above all nations, and and His soul in hell; thirdly, as to the shame and mock- His glory above the heavens.” But Christ as man had the eries He endured; fourthly, as to His being delivered up knowledge of all truth, not on account of any preceding to man’s power, as He Himself said to Pilate (Jn. 19:11): merit, but from the very union of God and man, accord- “Thou shouldst not have any power against Me, unless it ing to Jn. 1:14: “We saw His glory. . . as it were of the were given thee from above.” And, consequently, He mer- only-Begotten of the Father, full of grace and of truth.” ited a four-fold exaltation from His Passion. First of all, Therefore neither had He exaltation from the merit of the as to His glorious Resurrection: hence it is written (Ps. Passion but from the union alone. 138:1): “Thou hast known my sitting down”—that is, the Objection 2. Further, Christ merited for Himself from lowliness of My Passion—“and My rising up.” Secondly, the first instant of His conception, as stated above (q. 34, as to His ascension into heaven: hence it is written (Eph. a. 3). But His love was no greater during the Passion than 4:9): “Now that He ascended, what is it, but because He before. Therefore, since charity is the principle of merit, also descended first into the lower parts of the earth? He it seems that He did not merit exaltation from the Passion that descended is the same also that ascended above all the more than before. heavens.” Thirdly, as to the sitting on the right hand of the Objection 3. Further, the glory of the body comes Father and the showing forth of His Godhead, according from the glory of the soul, as Augustine says (Ep. ad to Is. 52:13: “He shall be exalted and extolled, and shall Dioscor.). But by His Passion Christ did not merit ex- be exceeding high: as many have been astonished at him, altation as to the glory of His soul, because His soul was so shall His visage be inglorious among men.” Moreover beatified from the first instant of His conception. There- (Phil. 2:8) it is written: “He humbled Himself, becoming fore neither did He merit exaltation, as to the glory of His obedient unto death, even to the death of the cross: for body, from the Passion. which cause also God hath exalted Him, and hath given On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:8): “He became Him a name which is above all names”—that is to say, so obedient unto death, even the death of the cross; for which that He shall be hailed as God by all; and all shall pay cause God also exalted Him.” Him homage as God. And this is expressed in what fol- I answer that, Merit implies a certain equality of jus- lows: “That in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, tice: hence the Apostle says (Rom. 4:4): “Now to him of those that are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth.” that worketh, the reward is reckoned according to debt.” Fourthly, as to His judiciary power: for it is written (Job But when anyone by reason of his unjust will ascribes to 36:17): “Thy cause hath been judged as that of the wicked himself something beyond his due, it is only just that he be cause and judgment Thou shalt recover.” deprived of something else which is his due; thus, “when Reply to Objection 1. The source of meriting comes a man steals a sheep he shall pay back four” (Ex. 22:1). of the soul, while the body is the instrument of the meri- And he is said to deserve it, inasmuch as his unjust will is torious work. And consequently the perfection of Christ’s chastised thereby. So likewise when any man through his soul, which was the source of meriting, ought not to be just will has stripped himself of what he ought to have, acquired in Him by merit, like the perfection of the body, he deserves that something further be granted to him as which was the subject of suffering, and was thereby the the reward of his just will. And hence it is written (Lk. instrument of His merit. 14:11): “He that humbleth himself shall be exalted.” Reply to Objection 2. Christ by His previous mer- Now in His Passion Christ humbled Himself beneath its did merit exaltation on behalf of His soul, whose will 2358 was animated with charity and the other virtues; but in the soul did not shine out in His body, in order that He might Passion He merited His exaltation by way of recompense procure His bodily glory with greater honor, when He had even on behalf of His body: since it is only just that the merited it by His Passion. But it was not beseeming for body, which from charity was subjected to the Passion, the glory of His soul to be postponed, since the soul was should receive recompense in glory. united immediately with the Word; hence it was beseem- Reply to Objection 3. It was owing to a special dis- ing that its glory should be filled by the Word Himself. pensation in Christ that before the Passion the glory of His But the body was united with the Word through the soul. 2359 THIRD PART, QUESTION 50 Of the Death of Christ (In Six Articles) We have now to consider the death of Christ; concerning which there are six subjects of inquiry: (1) Whether it was fitting that Christ should die? (2) Whether His death severed the union of Godhead and flesh? (3) Whether His Godhead was separated from His soul? (4) Whether Christ was a man during the three days of His death? (5) Whether His was the same body, living and dead? (6) Whether His death conduced in any way to our salvation? Whether it was fitting that Christ should die? IIIa q. 50 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting it is written (Heb. 2:14,15) that He communicated “to that Christ should die. For a first principle in any order flesh and blood, that through death He might destroy him is not affected by anything contrary to such order: thus who had the empire of death and might deliver them who, fire, which is the principle of heat, can never become cold. through the fear of death, were all their lifetime subject But the Son of God is the fountain-head and principle of to servitude.” Fourthly, that by dying in the body to the all life, according to Ps. 35:10: “With Thee is the foun- likeness of sin—that is, to its penalty—He might set us tain of life.” Therefore it does not seem fitting for Christ the example of dying to sin spiritually. Hence it is writ- to die. ten (Rom. 6:10): “For in that He died to sin, He died Objection 2. Further, death is a greater defect than once, but in that He liveth, He liveth unto God: so do you sickness, because it is through sickness that one comes to also reckon that you are dead to sin, but alive unto God.” die. But it was not beseeming for Christ to languish from Fifthly, that by rising from the dead, and manifesting His sickness, as Chrysostom∗ says. Consequently, neither was power whereby He overthrew death, He might instill into it becoming for Christ to die. us the hope of rising from the dead. Hence the Apostle Objection 3. Further, our Lord said (Jn. 10:10): “I says (1 Cor. 15:12): “If Christ be preached that He rose am come that they may have life, and may have it more again from the dead, how do some among you say, that abundantly.” But one opposite does not lead to another. there is no resurrection from the dead?” Therefore it seems that neither was it fitting for Christ to Reply to Objection 1. Christ is the fountain of life, die. as God, and not as man: but He died as man, and not as On the contrary, It is written, (Jn. 11:50): “It is God. Hence Augustine† says against Felician: “Far be it expedient that one man should die for the people. . . that from us to suppose that Christ so felt death that He lost the whole nation perish not”: which words were spoken His life inasmuch as He is life in Himself; for, were it so, prophetically by Caiphas, as the Evangelist testifies. the fountain of life would have run dry. Accordingly, He I answer that, It was fitting for Christ to die. First of experienced death by sharing in our human feeling, which all to satisfy for the whole human race, which was sen- of His own accord He had taken upon Himself, but He did tenced to die on account of sin, according to Gn. 2:17: not lose the power of His Nature, through which He gives “In what day soever ye shall [Vulg.: ‘thou shalt’] eat of it life to all things.” ye shall [Vulg.: ‘thou shalt’] die the death.” Now it is a Reply to Objection 2. Christ did not suffer death fitting way of satisfying for another to submit oneself to which comes of sickness, lest He should seem to die of the penalty deserved by that other. And so Christ resolved necessity from exhausted nature: but He endured death to die, that by dying He might atone for us, according to 1 inflicted from without, to which He willingly surrendered Pet. 3:18: “Christ also died once for our sins.” Secondly, Himself, that His death might be shown to be a voluntary in order to show the reality of the flesh assumed. For, as one. Eusebius says (Orat. de Laud. Constant. xv), “if, after Reply to Objection 3. One opposite does not of itself dwelling among men Christ were suddenly to disappear lead to the other, yet it does so indirectly at times: thus from men’s sight, as though shunning death, then by all cold sometimes is the indirect cause of heat: and in this men He would be likened to a phantom.” Thirdly, that way Christ by His death brought us back to life, when by by dying He might deliver us from fearing death: hence His death He destroyed our death; just as he who bears ∗ Athanasius, Orat. de Incarn. Verbi † Vigilius Tapsensis 2360 another’s punishment takes such punishment away. Whether the Godhead was separated from the flesh when Christ died? IIIa q. 50 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the Godhead was sep- of adoption is referred to a certain affective union. And arated from the flesh when Christ died. For as Matthew re- yet we see that the grace of adoption is never lost with- lates (27:46), when our Lord was hanging upon the cross out fault. Since, then there was no sin in Christ, it was He cried out: “My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken impossible for the union of the Godhead with the flesh to Me?” which words Ambrose, commenting on Lk. 23:46, be dissolved. Consequently, as before death Christ’s flesh explains as follows: “The man cried out when about to was united personally and hypostatically with the Word of expire by being severed from the Godhead; for since the God, it remained so after His death, so that the hypostasis Godhead is immune from death, assuredly death could not of the Word of God was not different from that of Christ’s be there, except life departed, for the Godhead is life.” flesh after death, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii). And so it seems that when Christ died, the Godhead was Reply to Objection 1. Such forsaking is not to be re- separated from His flesh. ferred to the dissolving of the personal union, but to this, Objection 2. Further, extremes are severed when the that God the Father gave Him up to the Passion: hence mean is removed. But the soul was the mean through there “to forsake” means simply not to protect from per- which the Godhead was united with the flesh, as stated secutors. or else He says there that He is forsaken, with above (q. 6, a. 1). Therefore since the soul was severed reference to the prayer He had made: “Father, if it be pos- from the flesh by death, it seems that, in consequence, His sible, let this chalice pass away from Me,” as Augustine Godhead was also separated from it. explains it (De Gratia Novi Test.). Objection 3. Further, God’s life-giving power is Reply to Objection 2. The Word of God is said to greater than that of the soul. But the body could not die be united with the flesh through the medium of the soul, unless the soul quitted it. Therefore, much less could it inasmuch as it is through the soul that the flesh belongs die unless the Godhead departed. to human nature, which the Son of God intended to as- On the contrary, As stated above (q. 16, Aa. 4,5), sume; but not as though the soul were the medium linking the attributes of human nature are predicated of the Son them together. But it is due to the soul that the flesh is of God only by reason of the union. But what belongs to human even after the soul has been separated from it— the body of Christ after death is predicated of the Son of namely, inasmuch as by God’s ordinance there remains in God—namely, being buried: as is evident from the Creed, the dead flesh a certain relation to the resurrection. And in which it is said that the Son of God “was conceived and therefore the union of the Godhead with the flesh is not born of a Virgin, suffered, died, and was buried.” There- taken away. fore Christ’s Godhead was not separated from the flesh Reply to Objection 3. The soul formally possesses when He died. the life-giving energy, and therefore, while it is present, I answer that, What is bestowed through God’s grace and united formally, the body must necessarily be a living is never withdrawn except through fault. Hence it is writ- one, whereas the Godhead has not the life-giving energy ten (Rom. 11:29): “The gifts and the calling of God formally, but effectively; because It cannot be the form of are without repentance.” But the grace of union whereby the body: and therefore it is not necessary for the flesh to the Godhead was united to the flesh in Christ’s Person, be living while the union of the Godhead with the flesh is greater than the grace of adoption whereby others are remains, since God does not act of necessity, but of His sanctified: also it is more enduring of itself, because this own will. grace is ordained for personal union, whereas the grace Whether in Christ’s death there was a severance between His Godhead and His soul? IIIa q. 50 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that there was a severance ject to the power of the body, but rather conversely: and in death between Christ’s Godhead and His soul, because so it appears that it belongs to Christ, as the Word of God, our Lord said (Jn. 10:18): “No man taketh away My soul to lay down His soul: but this is to separate it from Him- from Me: but I lay it down of Myself, and I have power self. Consequently, by death His soul was severed from to lay it down, and I have power to take it up again.” But the Godhead. it does not appear that the body can set the soul aside, by separating the soul from itself, because the soul is not sub- 2361 Objection 2. Further, Athanasius∗ says that he “is ac-Reply to Objection 1. Augustine (Tract. xlvii in cursed who does not confess that the entire man, whom Joan.), in commenting on the text of John, asks, since the Son of God took to Himself, after being assumed once Christ is Word and soul and body, “whether He putteth more or delivered by Him, rose again from the dead on down His soul, for that He is the Word? Or, for that He the third day.” But the entire man could not be assumed is a soul?” Or, again, “for that He is flesh?” And he says again, unless the entire man was at one time separated that, “should we say that the Word of God laid down His from the Word of God: and the entire man is made of soul soul”. . . it would follow that “there was a time when that and body. Therefore there was a separation made at one soul was severed from the Word”—which is untrue. “For time of the Godhead from both the body and the soul. death severed the body and soul . . . but that the soul was Objection 3. Further, the Son of God is truly styled severed from the Word I do not affirm. . . But should we a man because of the union with the entire man. If then, say that the soul laid itself down,” it follows “that it is when the union of the soul with the body was dissolved severed from itself: which is most absurd.” It remains, by death, the Word of God continued united with the soul, therefore, that “the flesh itself layeth down its soul and it would follow that the Son of God could be truly called taketh it again, not by its own power, but by the power of a soul. But this is false, because since the soul is the form the Word dwelling in the flesh”: because, as stated above of the body, it would result in the Word of God being the (a. 2), the Godhead of the Word was not severed from the form of the body; which is impossible. Therefore, in death flesh in death. the soul of Christ was separated from the Word of God. Reply to Objection 2. In those words Athanasius Objection 4. Further, the separated soul and body are never meant to say that the whole man was reassumed— not one hypostasis, but two. Therefore, if the Word of God that is, as to all his parts—as if the Word of God had laid remained united with Christ’s soul and body, then, when aside the parts of human nature by His death; but that the they were severed by Christ’s death, it seems to follow that totality of the assumed nature was restored once more in the Word of God was two hypostases during such time as the resurrection by the resumed union of soul and body. Christ was dead; which cannot be admitted. Therefore af- Reply to Objection 2. Through being united to hu- ter Christ’s death His soul did not continue to be united man nature, the Word of God is not on that account called with the Word. human nature: but He is called a man—that is, one having On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): human nature. Now the soul and the body are essential “Although Christ died as man, and His holy soul was sep- parts of human nature. Hence it does not follow that the arated from His spotless body, nevertheless His Godhead Word is a soul or a body through being united with both, remained unseparated from both—from the soul, I mean, but that He is one possessing a soul or a body. and from the body.” Reply to Objection 4. As Damascene says (De Fide I answer that, The soul is united with the Word of Orth. iii): “In Christ’s death the soul was separated from God more immediately and more primarily than the body the flesh: not one hypostasis divided into two: because is, because it is through the soul that the body is united both soul and body in the same respect had their existence with the Word of God, as stated above (q. 6, a. 1). Since, from the beginning in the hypostasis of the Word; and in then, the Word of God was not separated from the body death, though severed from one another, each one contin- at Christ’s death, much less was He separated from the ued to have the one same hypostasis of the Word. Where- soul. Accordingly, since what regards the body severed fore the one hypostasis of the Word was the hypostasis from the soul is affirmed of the Son of God—namely, that of the Word, of the soul, and of the body. For neither soul “it was buried”—so is it said of Him in the Creed that nor body ever had an hypostasis of its own, besides the hy- “He descended into hell,” because His soul when sepa- postasis of the Word: for there was always one hypostasis rated from the body did go down into hell. of the Word, and never two.” Whether Christ was a man during the three days of His death? IIIa q. 50 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ was a man dur- of death. ing the three days of His death, because Augustine says Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix) (De Trin. iii): “Such was the assuming [of nature] as to that “each man is his intellect”; consequently, when we make God to be man, and man to be God.” But this assum- address the soul of Peter after his death we say: “Saint ing [of nature] did not cease at Christ’s death. Therefore Peter, pray for us.” But the Son of God after death was it seems that He did not cease to be a man in consequence not separated from His intellectual soul. Therefore, dur- ∗ Vigilius Tapsensis, De Trin. vi; Bardenhewer assigns it to St. Athanasius: 45, iii. The full title is De Trinitate et Spiritu Sancto 2362 ing those three days the Son of God was a man. indeed erroneous, yet without intent of error in faith: as Objection 3. Further, every priest is a man. But dur- Hugh of Saint Victor, who (De Sacram. ii) contended that ing those three days of death Christ was a priest: other- Christ, during the three days that followed His death, was wise what is said in Ps. 109:4 would not be true: “Thou a man, because he held that the soul is a man: but this is art a priest for ever.” Therefore Christ was a man during false, as was shown in the Ia, q. 75, a. 4. Likewise the those three days. Master of the Sentences (iii, D, 22) held Christ to be a On the contrary, When the higher [species] is re- man during the three days of His death for quite another moved, so is the lower. But the living or animated being is reason. For he believed the union of soul and flesh not to a higher species than animal and man, because an animal be essential to a man, and that for anything to be a man is a sensible animated substance. Now during those three it suffices if it have a soul and body, whether united or days of death Christ’s body was not living or animated. separated: and that this is likewise false is clear both from Therefore He was not a man. what has been said in the Ia, q. 75, a. 4, and from what has I answer that, It is an article of faith that Christ was been said above regarding the mode of union (q. 2 , a. 5). truly dead: hence it is an error against faith to assert any- Reply to Objection 1. The Word of God assumed thing whereby the truth of Christ’s death is destroyed. Ac- a united soul and body: and the result of this assumption cordingly it is said in the Synodal epistle of Cyril∗: “If was that God is man, and man is God. But this assumption any man does not acknowledge that the Word of God suf- did not cease by the separation of the Word from the soul fered in the flesh, and was crucified in the flesh and tasted or from the flesh; yet the union of soul and flesh ceased. death in the flesh, let him be anathema.” Now it belongs Reply to Objection 2. Man is said to be his own in- to the truth of the death of man or animal that by death tellect, not because the intellect is the entire man, but be- the subject ceases to be man or animal; because the death cause the intellect is the chief part of man, in which man’s of the man or animal results from the separation of the whole disposition lies virtually; just as the ruler of the soul, which is the formal complement of the man or an- city may be called the whole city, since its entire disposal imal. Consequently, to say that Christ was a man during is vested in him. the three days of His death simply and without qualifica- Reply to Objection 3. That a man is competent to tion, is erroneous. Yet it can be said that He was “a dead be a priest is by reason of the soul, which is the subject man” during those three days. of the character of order: hence a man does not lose his However, some writers have contended that Christ was priestly order by death, and much less does Christ, who is a man during those three days, uttering words which are the fount of the entire priesthood. Whether Christ’s was identically the same body living and dead? IIIa q. 50 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s was not iden- death is a substantial corruption. tically the same body living and dead. For Christ truly On the contrary, Athanasius says (Epist. ad Epict.): died just as other men do. But the body of everyone else is “In that body which was circumcised and carried, which not simply identically the same, dead and living, because ate, and toiled, and was nailed on the tree, there was the there is an essential difference between them. Therefore impassible and incorporeal Word of God: the same was neither is the body of Christ identically the same, dead laid in the tomb.” But Christ’s living body was circum- and living. cised and nailed on the tree; and Christ’s dead body was Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher laid in the tomb. Therefore it was the same body living (Metaph. v, text. 12), things specifically diverse are also and dead. numerically diverse. But Christ’s body, living and dead, I answer that, The expression “simply” can be taken was specifically diverse: because the eye or flesh of the in two senses. In the first instance by taking “simply” dead is only called so equivocally, as is evident from the to be the same as “absolutely”; thus “that is said simply Philosopher (De Anima ii, text. 9; Metaph. vii). There- which is said without addition,” as the Philosopher put it fore Christ’s body was not simply identically the same, (Topic. ii): and in this way the dead and living body of living and dead. Christ was simply identically the same: since a thing is Objection 3. Further, death is a kind of corruption. said to be “simply” identically the same from the iden- But what is corrupted by substantial corruption after be- tity of the subject. But Christ’s body living and dead was ing corrupted, exists no longer, since corruption is change identical in its suppositum because alive and dead it had from being to non-being. Therefore, Christ’s body, after none other besides the Word of God, as was stated above it was dead, did not remain identically the same, because (a. 2). And it is in this sense that Athanasius is speaking ∗ Act. Conc. Ephes. P. I, cap. xxvi 2363 in the passage quoted. else does not continue united to an abiding hypostasis, as In another way “simply” is the same as “altogether” Christ’s dead body did; consequently the dead body of or “totally”: in which sense the body of Christ, dead and everyone else is not the same “simply,” but only in some alive, was not “simply” the same identically, because it respect: because it is the same as to its matter, but not the was not “totally” the same, since life is of the essence of same as to its form. But Christ’s body remains the same a living body; for it is an essential and not an acciden- simply, on account of the identity of the suppositum, as tal predicate: hence it follows that a body which ceases stated above. to be living does not remain totally the same. Moreover, Reply to Objection 2. Since a thing is said to be the if it were to be said that Christ’s dead body did con- same identically according to suppositum, but the same tinue “totally” the same, it would follow that it was not specifically according to form: wherever the suppositum corrupted—I mean, by the corruption of death: which is subsists in only one nature, it follows of necessity that the heresy of the Gaianites, as Isidore says (Etym. viii), when the unity of species is taken away the unity of iden- and is to be found in the Decretals (xxiv, qu. iii). And tity is also taken away. But the hypostasis of the Word of Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that “the term ‘cor- God subsists in two natures; and consequently, although ruption’ denotes two things: in one way it is the separation in others the body does not remain the same according of the soul from the body and other things of the sort; in to the species of human nature, still it continues identi- another way, the complete dissolving into elements. Con- cally the same in Christ according to the suppositum of sequently it is impious to say with Julian and Gaian that the Word of God. the Lord’s body was incorruptible after the first manner of Reply to Objection 3. Corruption and death do not corruption before the resurrection: because Christ’s body belong to Christ by reason of the suppositum, from which would not be consubstantial with us, nor truly dead, nor suppositum follows the unity of identity; but by reason of would we have been saved in very truth. But in the second the human nature, according to which is found the differ- way Christ’s body was incorrupt.” ence of death and of life in Christ’s body. Reply to Objection 1. The dead body of everyone Whether Christ’s death conduced in any way to our salvation? IIIa q. 50 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s death did not separation of soul and body has already taken place: and conduce in any way to our salvation. For death is a sort of it is in this sense that we are now speaking of Christ’s privation, since it is the privation of life. But privation has death. In this way Christ’s death cannot be the cause of not any power of activity, because it is nothing positive. our salvation by way of merit, but only by way of causal- Therefore it could not work anything for our salvation. ity, that is to say, inasmuch as the Godhead was not sepa- Objection 2. Further, Christ’s Passion wrought our rated from Christ’s flesh by death; and therefore, whatever salvation by way of merit. But Christ’s death could not befell Christ’s flesh, even when the soul was departed, was operate in this way, because in death the body is sepa- conducive to salvation in virtue of the Godhead united. rated from the soul, which is the principle of meriting. But the effect of any cause is properly estimated accord- Consequently, Christ’s death did not accomplish anything ing to its resemblance to the cause. Consequently, since towards our salvation. death is a kind of privation of one’s own life, the effect Objection 3. Further, what is corporeal is not the of Christ’s death is considered in relation to the removal cause of what is spiritual. But Christ’s death was corpo- of the obstacles to our salvation: and these are the death real. Therefore it could not be the cause of our salvation, of the soul and of the body. Hence Christ’s death is said which is something spiritual. to have destroyed in us both the death of the soul, caused On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv): “The by sin, according to Rom. 4:25: “He was delivered up one death of our Saviour,” namely, that of the body, “saved [namely unto death] for our sins”: and the death of the us from our two deaths,” that is, of the soul and the body. body, consisting in the separation of the soul, according I answer that, We may speak of Christ’s death in two to 1 Cor. 15:54: “Death is swallowed up in victory.” ways, “in becoming” and “in fact.” Death is said to be “in Reply to Objection 1. Christ’s death wrought our sal- becoming” when anyone from natural or enforced suffer- vation from the power of the Godhead united, and not con- ing is tending towards death: and in this way it is the same sisted merely as His death. thing to speak of Christ’s death as of His Passion: so that Reply to Objection 2. Though Christ’s death, consid- in this sense Christ’s death is the cause of our salvation, ered “in fact” did not effect our salvation by way of merit, according to what has been already said of the Passion yet it did so by way of causality, as stated above. (q. 48). But death is considered in fact, inasmuch as the Reply to Objection 3. Christ’s death was indeed cor- 2364 poreal; but the body was the instrument of the Godhead united to Him, working by Its power, although dead. 2365 THIRD PART, QUESTION 51 Of Christ’s Burial (In Four Articles) We have now to consider Christ’s burial, concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether it was fitting for Christ to be buried? (2) Concerning the manner of His burial; (3) Whether His body was decomposed in the tomb? (4) Concerning the length of time He lay in the tomb. Whether it was fitting for Christ to be buried? IIIa q. 51 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem unfitting for Christ to that are in their graves shall hear the voice of the Son of have been buried, because it is said of Him (Ps. 87:6): God. . . and they that hear shall live.” Thirdly, as an exam- “He is [Vulg.: ‘I am’] become as a man without help, free ple to them who dying spiritually to their sins are hidden among the dead.” But the bodies of the dead are enclosed away “from the disturbance of men” (Ps. 30:21). Hence in a tomb; which seems contrary to liberty. Therefore it it is said (Col. 3:3): “You are dead, and your life is hid does not seem fitting for Christ to have been buried. with Christ in God.” Wherefore the baptized likewise who Objection 2. Further, nothing should be done to through Christ’s death die to sins, are as it were buried Christ except it was helpful to our salvation. But Christ’s with Christ by immersion, according to Rom. 6:4: “We burial seems in no way to be conducive to our salvation. are buried together with Christ by baptism into death.” Therefore, it was not fitting for Him to be buried. Reply to Objection 1. Though buried, Christ proved Objection 3. Further, it seems out of place for God Himself “free among the dead”: since, although impris- who is above the high heavens to be laid in the earth. But oned in the tomb, He could not be hindered from going what befalls the dead body of Christ is attributed to God forth by rising again. by reason of the union. Therefore it appears to be unbe- Reply to Objection 2. As Christ’s death wrought our coming for Christ to be buried. salvation, so likewise did His burial. Hence Jerome says On the contrary, our Lord said (Mat. 26:10) of the (Super Marc. xiv): “By Christ’s burial we rise again”; and woman who anointed Him: “She has wrought a good on Is. 53:9: “He shall give the ungodly for His burial,” a work upon Me,” and then He added (Mat. 26:12)—“for gloss says: “He shall give to God and the Father the Gen- she, in pouring this ointment upon My body, hath done it tiles who were without godliness, because He purchased for My burial.” them by His death and burial.” I answer that, It was fitting for Christ to be buried. Reply to Objection 3. As is said in a discourse made First of all, to establish the truth of His death; for no one is at the Council of Ephesus∗, “Nothing that saves man is laid in the grave unless there be certainty of death. Hence derogatory to God; showing Him to be not passible, but we read (Mk. 15:44,45), that Pilate by diligent inquiry as- merciful”: and in another discourse of the same Council†: sured himself of Christ’s death before granting leave for “God does not repute anything as an injury which is an His burial. Secondly, because by Christ’s rising from the occasion of men’s salvation. Thus thou shalt not deem grave, to them who are in the grave, hope is given of ris- God’s Nature to be so vile, as though It may sometimes ing again through Him, according to Jn. 5:25,28: “All be subjected to injuries.” Whether Christ was buried in a becoming manner? IIIa q. 51 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ was buried in Arimathea, who was “a noble counselor,” to use Mark’s an unbecoming manner. For His burial should be in keep- expression (Mk. 15:43), and by Nicodemus, who was “a ing with His death. But Christ underwent a most shameful ruler of the Jews,” as John states (Jn. 3:1). death, according to Wis. 2:20: “Let us condemn Him to Objection 2. Further, nothing should be done to a most shameful death.” It seems therefore unbecoming Christ which might set an example of wastefulness. But for honorable burial to be accorded to Christ, inasmuch as it seems to savor of waste that in order to bury Christ He was buried by men of position—namely, by Joseph of Nicodemus came “bringing a mixture of myrrh and aloes ∗ P. iii, cap. 9 † P. iii, cap. 10 2366 about a hundred pounds weight,” as recorded by John or prophetic person is a sign of something great.” For (19:39), especially since a woman came beforehand to myrrh and aloes by their bitterness denote penance, by anoint His body for the burial, as Mark relates (Mk. which man keeps Christ within himself without the cor- 14:28). Consequently, this was not done becomingly with ruption of sin; while the odor of the ointments expresses regard to Christ. good report. Objection 3. Further, it is not becoming for anything Reply to Objection 3. Myrrh and aloes were used done to be inconsistent with itself. But Christ’s burial on on Christ’s body in order that it might be preserved from the one hand was simple, because “Joseph wrapped His corruption, and this seemed to imply a certain need (in body in a clean linen cloth,” as is related by Matthew the body): hence the example is set us that we may law- (27:59), “but not with gold or gems, or silk,” as Jerome fully use precious things medicinally, from the need of observes: yet on the other hand there appears to have been preserving our body. But the wrapping up of the body some display, inasmuch as they buried Him with fragrant was merely a question of becoming propriety. And we spices (Jn. 19:40). Consequently, the manner of Christ’s ought to content ourselves with simplicity in such things. burial does not seem to have been seemly. Yet, as Jerome observes, by this act was denoted that “he Objection 4. Further, “What things soever were writ- swathes Jesus in clean linen, who receives Him with a ten,” especially of Christ, “were written for our learning,” pure soul.” Hence, as Bede says on Mark 15:46: “The according to Rom. 15:4. But some of the things written Church’s custom has prevailed for the sacrifice of the al- in the Gospels touching Christ’s burial in no wise seem tar to be offered not upon silk, nor upon dyed cloth, but to pertain to our instruction—as that He was buried “in a on linen of the earth; as the Lord’s body was buried in a garden. . . “in a tomb which was not His own, which was clean winding-sheet.” “new,” and “hewed out in a rock.” Therefore the manner Reply to Objection 4. Christ was buried “in a gar- of Christ’s burial was not becoming. den” to express that by His death and burial we are deliv- On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:10): “And His ered from the death which we incur through Adam’s sin sepulchre shall be glorious.” committed in the garden of paradise. But for this “was our I answer that, The manner of Christ’s burial is shown Lord buried in the grave of a stranger,” as Augustine says to be seemly in three respects. First, to confirm faith in in a sermon (ccxlviii), “because He died for the salvation His death and resurrection. Secondly, to commend the of others; and a sepulchre is the abode of death.” Also devotion of those who gave Him burial. Hence Augustine the extent of the poverty endured for us can be thereby says (De Civ. Dei i): “The Gospel mentions as praise- estimated: since He who while living had no home, af- worthy the deed of those who received His body from the ter death was laid to rest in another’s tomb, and being cross, and with due care and reverence wrapped it up and naked was clothed by Joseph. But He is laid in a “new” buried it.” Thirdly, as to the mystery whereby those are sepulchre, as Jerome observes on Mat. 27:60, “lest af- molded who “are buried together with Christ into death” ter the resurrection it might be pretended that someone (Rom. 6:4). else had risen, while the other corpses remained. The new Reply to Objection 1. With regard to Christ’s death, sepulchre can also denote Mary’s virginal womb.” And His patience and constancy in enduring death are com- furthermore it may be understood that all of us are re- mended, and all the more that His death was the more de- newed by Christ’s burial; death and corruption being de- spicable: but in His honorable burial we can see the power stroyed. Moreover, He was buried in a monument “hewn of the dying Man, who, even in death, frustrated the intent out of a rock,” as Jerome says on Mat. 27:64, “lest, if it of His murderers, and was buried with honor: and thereby had been constructed of many stones, they might say that is foreshadowed the devotion of the faithful who in the He was stolen away by digging away the foundations of time to come were to serve the dead Christ. the tomb.” Hence the “great stone” which was set shows Reply to Objection 2. On that expression of the Evan- that “the tomb could not be opened except by the help of gelist (Jn. 19:40) that they buried Him “as the manner of many hands. Again, if He had been buried in the earth, the Jews is to bury,” Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cxx): they might have said: They dug up the soil and stole Him “He admonishes us that in offices of this kind which are away,” as Augustine observes†. Hilary (Comment. in rendered to the dead, the custom of each nation should be Matth. cap. xxxiii) gives the mystical interpretation, say- observed.” Now it was the custom of this people to anoint ing that “by the teaching of the apostles, Christ is borne bodies with various spices in order the longer to preserve into the stony heart of the gentile; for it is hewn out by them from corruption∗. Accordingly it is said in De Doctr. the process of teaching, unpolished and new, untenanted Christ. iii that “in all such things, it is not the use thereof, and open to the entrance of the fear of God. And since but the luxury of the user that is at fault”; and, farther on: naught besides Him must enter into our hearts, a great “what in other persons is frequently criminal, in a divine stone is rolled against the door.” Furthermore, as Origen ∗ Cf. Catena Aurea in Joan. xix † Cf. Catena Aurea 2367 says (Tract. xxxv in Matth.): “It was not written by haz-rolled a great stone,’ because all things around the body ard: ‘Joseph wrapped Christ’s body in a clean winding- of Jesus are clean, and new, and exceeding great.” sheet, and placed it in a new monument,’ ” and that “ ‘he Whether Christ’s body was reduced to dust in the tomb? IIIa q. 51 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s body was did not wish His body to putrefy in any way or dissolve no reduced to dust in the tomb. For just as man dies in pun- matter how; but for the manifestation of His Divine power ishment of his first parent’s sin, so also does he return to He willed that His body should continue incorrupt. Hence dust, since it was said to the first man after his sin: “Dust Chrysostom says (Cont. Jud. et Gent. quod ‘Christus sit thou art, and into dust thou shalt return” (Gn. 3:19). But Deus’) that “with other men, especially with such as have Christ endured death in order to deliver us from death. wrought strenuously, their deeds shine forth in their life- Therefore His body ought to be made to return to dust, so time; but as soon as they die, their deeds go with them. as to free us from the same penalty. But it is quite the contrary with Christ: because previous Objection 2. Further, Christ’s body was of the same to the cross all is sadness and weakness, but as soon as He nature as ours. But directly after death our bodies begin to is crucified, everything comes to light, in order that you dissolve into dust, and are disposed towards putrefaction, may learn it was not an ordinary man that was crucified.” because when the natural heat departs, there supervenes Reply to Objection 1. Since Christ was not subject to heat from without which causes corruption. Therefore it sin, neither was He prone to die or to return to dust. Yet of seems that the same thing happened to Christ’s body. His own will He endured death for our salvation, for the Objection 3. Further, as stated above (a. 1), Christ reasons alleged above (q. 51, a. 1). But had His body pu- willed to be buried in order to furnish men with the trefied or dissolved, this fact would have been detrimental hope of rising likewise from the grave. Consequently, He to man’s salvation, for it would not have seemed credible sought likewise to return to dust so as to give to them who that the Divine power was in Him. Hence it is on His be- have returned to dust the hope of rising from the dust. half that it is written (Ps. 19:10): “What profit is there in On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 15:10): “Nor wilt my blood, whilst I go down to corruption?” as if He were Thou suffer Thy holy one to see corruption”: and Dama- to say: “If My body corrupt, the profit of the blood shed scene (De Fide Orth. iii) expounds this of the corruption will be lost.” which comes of dissolving into elements. Reply to Objection 2. Christ’s body was a subject of I answer that, It was not fitting for Christ’s body to corruption according to the condition of its passible na- putrefy, or in any way be reduced to dust, since the pu- ture, but not as to the deserving cause of putrefaction, trefaction of any body comes of that body’s infirmity of which is sin: but the Divine power preserved Christ’s nature, which can no longer hold the body together. But body from putrefying, just as it raised it up from death. as was said above (q. 50, a. 1, ad 2), Christ’s death ought Reply to Objection 3. Christ rose from the tomb by not to come from weakness of nature, lest it might not be Divine power, which is not narrowed within bounds. Con- believed to be voluntary: and therefore He willed to die, sequently, His rising from the grave was a sufficient ar- not from sickness, but from suffering inflicted on Him, to gument to prove that men are to be raised up by Divine which He gave Himself up willingly. And therefore, lest power, not only from their graves, but also from any dust His death might be ascribed to infirmity of nature, Christ whatever. Whether Christ was in the tomb only one day and two nights? IIIa q. 51 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ was not in night, even so Christ rose in the night, taking away the the tomb during only one day and two nights; because He gates of hell.” But after rising He was not in the tomb. said (Mat. 12:40): “As Jonas was in the whale’s belly Therefore He was not two whole nights in the grave. three days and three nights: so shall the Son of man be in Objection 3. Further, light prevailed over darkness by the heart of the earth three days and three nights.” But He Christ’s death. But night belongs to darkness, and day to was in the heart of the earth while He was in the grave. light. Therefore it was more fitting for Christ’s body to Therefore He was not in the tomb for only one day and be in the tomb for two days and a night, rather than con- two nights. versely. Objection 2. Gregory says in a Paschal Homily (Hom. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv): xxi): “As Samson carried off the gates of Gaza during the “There were thirty-six hours from the evening of His 2368 burial to the dawn of the resurrection, that is, a whole ary usage of speech of the Scriptures, whereby the whole night with a whole day, and a whole night.” is understood from the part”: so that we are able to take a I answer that, The very time during which Christ re- day and a night as one natural day. And so the first day is mained in the tomb shows forth the effect of His death. computed from its ending, during which Christ died and For it was said above (q. 50, a. 6) that by Christ’s death was buried on the Friday; while the second. day is an en- we were delivered from a twofold death, namely, from the tire day with twenty-four hours of night and day; while the death of the soul and of the body: and this is signified night following belongs to the third day. “For as the prim- by the two nights during which He remained in the tomb. itive days were computed from light to night on account But since His death did not come of sin, but was endured of man’s future fall, so these days are computed from the from charity, it has not the semblance of night, but of day: darkness to the daylight on account of man’s restoration” consequently it is denoted by the whole day during which (De Trin. iv). Christ was in the sepulchre. And so it was fitting for Christ Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Trin. to be in the sepulchre during one day and two nights. iv; cf. De Consens. Evang. iii), Christ rose with the dawn, Reply to Objection 1. Augustine says (De Consens. when light appears in part, and still some part of the dark- Evang. iii): “Some men, ignorant of Scriptural language, ness of the night remains. Hence it is said of the women wished to compute as night those three hours, from the that “when it was yet dark” they came “to the sepulchre” sixth to the ninth hour, during which the sun was dark- (Jn. 20:1). Therefore, in consequence of this darkness, ened, and as day those other three hours during which it Gregory says (Hom. xxi) that Christ rose in the middle was restored to the earth, that is, from the ninth hour until of the night, not that night is divided into two equal parts, its setting: for the coming night of the Sabbath follows, but during the night itself: for the expression “early” can and if this be reckoned with its day, there will be already be taken as partly night and partly day, from its fittingness two nights and two days. Now after the Sabbath there fol- with both. lows the night of the first day of the Sabbath, that is, of Reply to Objection 3. The light prevailed so far in the dawning Sunday, on which the Lord rose. Even so, Christ’s death (which is denoted by the one day) that it the reckoning of the three days and three nights will not dispelled the darkness of the two nights, that is, of our stand. It remains then to find the solution in the custom- twofold death, as stated above. 2369 THIRD PART, QUESTION 52 Of Christ’s Descent Into Hell (In Eight Articles) We have now to consider Christ’s descent into hell; concerning which there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether it was fitting for Christ to descend into hell? (2) Into which hell did He descend? (3) Whether He was entirely in hell? (4) Whether He made any stay there? (5) Whether He delivered the Holy Fathers from hell? (6) Whether He delivered the lost from hell? (7) Whether He delivered the children who died in original sin? (8) Whether He delivered men from Purgatory? Whether it was fitting for Christ to descend into hell? IIIa q. 52 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting for death of the body, but also descent into hell. Consequently Christ to descend into hell, because Augustine says (Ep. since it was fitting for Christ to die in order to deliver us ad Evod. cliv.): “Nor could I find anywhere in the Scrip- from death, so it was fitting for Him to descend into hell in tures hell mentioned as something good.” But Christ’s order to deliver us also from going down into hell. Hence soul did not descend into any evil place, for neither do the it is written (Osee 13:14): “O death, I will be thy death; souls of the just. Therefore it does not seem fitting for O hell, I will be thy bite.” Secondly, because it was fit- Christ’s soul to descend into hell. ting when the devil was overthrown by the Passion that Objection 2. Further, it cannot belong to Christ to Christ should deliver the captives detained in hell, accord- descend into hell according to His Divine Nature, which ing to Zech. 9:11: “Thou also by the blood of Thy Testa- is altogether immovable; but only according to His as- ment hast sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit.” And it sumed nature. But that which Christ did or suffered in is written (Col. 2:15): “Despoiling the principalities and His assumed nature is ordained for man’s salvation: and powers, He hath exposed them confidently.” Thirdly, that to secure this it does not seem necessary for Christ to de- as He showed forth His power on earth by living and dy- scend into hell, since He delivered us from both guilt and ing, so also He might manifest it in hell, by visiting it and penalty by His Passion which He endured in this world, enlightening it. Accordingly it is written (Ps. 23:7): “Lift as stated above (q. 49, Aa. 1,3). Consequently, it was not up your gates, O ye princes,” which the gloss thus inter- fitting that Christ should descend into hell. prets: “that is—Ye princes of hell, take away your power, Objection 3. Further, by Christ’s death His soul was whereby hitherto you held men fast in hell”; and so “at the separated from His body, and this was laid in the sepul- name of Jesus every knee should bow,” not only “of them chre, as stated above (q. 51). But it seems that He de- that are in heaven,” but likewise “of them that are in hell,” scended into hell, not according to His soul only, because as is said in Phil. 2:10. seemingly the soul, being incorporeal, cannot be a subject Reply to Objection 1. The name of hell stands for of local motion; for this belongs to bodies, as is proved in an evil of penalty, and not for an evil of guilt. Hence it Phys. vi, text. 32; while descent implies corporeal mo- was becoming that Christ should descend into hell, not tion. Therefore it was not fitting for Christ to descend into as liable to punishment Himself, but to deliver them who hell. were. On the contrary, It is said in the Creed: “He de- Reply to Objection 2. Christ’s Passion was a kind scended into hell”: and the Apostle says (Eph. 4:9): of universal cause of men’s salvation, both of the living “Now that He ascended, what is it, but because He also and of the dead. But a general cause is applied to par- descended first into the lower parts of the earth?” And a ticular effects by means of something special. Hence, as gloss adds: “that is—into hell.” the power of the Passion is applied to the living through I answer that It was fitting for Christ to descend into the sacraments which make us like unto Christ’s Passion, hell. First of all, because He came to bear our penalty so likewise it is applied to the dead through His descent in order to free us from penalty, according to Is. 53:4: into hell. On which account it is written (Zech. 9:11) that “Surely He hath borne our infirmities and carried our sor- “He sent forth prisoners out of the pit, in the blood of His rows.” But through sin man had incurred not only the testament,” that is, by the power of His Passion. 2370 Reply to Objection 3. Christ’s soul descended into ies are moved, but by that kind whereby the angels are hell not by the same kind of motion as that whereby bod- moved, as was said in the Ia, q. 53, a. 1. Whether Christ went down into the hell of the lost? IIIa q. 52 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ went down I answer that, A thing is said to be in a place in two into the hell of the lost, because it is said by the mouth ways. First of all, through its effect, and in this way Christ of Divine Wisdom (Ecclus. 24:45): “I will penetrate to descended into each of the hells, but in different manner. all the lower parts of the earth.” But the hell of the lost For going down into the hell of the lost He wrought this is computed among the lower parts of the earth according effect, that by descending thither He put them to shame to Ps. 62:10: “They shall go into the lower parts of the for their unbelief and wickedness: but to them who were earth.” Therefore Christ who is the Wisdom of God, went detained in Purgatory He gave hope of attaining to glory: down even into the hell of the lost. while upon the holy Fathers detained in hell solely on ac- Objection 2. Further, Peter says (Acts 2:24) that “God count of original sin, He shed the light of glory everlast- hath raised up Christ, having loosed the sorrows of hell, ing. as it was impossible that He should be holden by it.” But In another way a thing is said to be in a place through there are no sorrows in the hell of the Fathers, nor in the its essence: and in this way Christ’s soul descended only hell of the children, since they are not punished with sen- into that part of hell wherein the just were detained. so sible pain on account of any actual sin, but only with the that He visited them “in place,” according to His soul, pain of loss on account of original sin. Therefore Christ whom He visited “interiorly by grace,” according to His went down into the hell of the lost, or else into Purgatory, Godhead. Accordingly, while remaining in one part of where men are tormented with sensible pain on account hell, He wrought this effect in a measure in every part of of actual sins. hell, just as while suffering in one part of the earth He Objection 3. Further, it is written (1 Pet. 3:19) that delivered the whole world by His Passion. “Christ coming in spirit preached to those spirits that were Reply to Objection 1. Christ, who is the Wisdom in prison, which had some time been incredulous”: and of God, penetrated to all the lower parts of the earth, not this is understood of Christ’s descent into hell, as Athana- passing through them locally with His soul, but by spread- sius says (Ep. ad Epict.). For he says that “Christ’s body ing the effects of His power in a measure to them all: was laid in the sepulchre when He went to preach to those yet so that He enlightened only the just: because the text spirits who were in bondage, as Peter said.” But it is clear quoted continues: “And I will enlighten all that hope in the unbelievers were in the hell of the lost. Therefore the Lord.” Christ went down into the hell of the lost. Reply to Objection 2. Sorrow is twofold: one is the Objection 4. Further, Augustine says (Ep. ad Evod. suffering of pain which men endure for actual sin, accord- clxiv): “If the sacred Scriptures had said that Christ came ing to Ps. 17:6: “The sorrows of hell encompassed me.” into Abraham’s bosom, without naming hell or its woes, I Another sorrow comes of hoped-for glory being deferred, wonder whether any person would dare to assert that He according to Prov. 13:12: “Hope that is deferred afflicteth descended into hell. But since evident testimonies men- the soul”: and such was the sorrow which the holy Fathers tion hell and its sorrows, there is no reason for believing suffered in hell, and Augustine refers to it in a sermon on that Christ went there except to deliver men from the same the Passion, saying that “they besought Christ with tearful woes.” But the place of woes is the hell of the lost. There- entreaty.” Now by descending into hell Christ took away fore Christ descended into the hell of the lost. both sorrows, yet in different ways: for He did away with Objection 5. Further, as Augustine says in a sermon the sorrows of pains by preserving souls from them, just upon the Resurrection: Christ descending into hell “set as a physician is said to free a man from sickness by ward- free all the just who were held in the bonds of original ing it off by means of physic. Likewise He removed the sin.” But among them was Job, who says of himself (Job sorrows caused by glory deferred, by bestowing glory. 17:16): “All that I have shall go down into the deepest Reply to Objection 3. These words of Peter are re- pit.” Therefore Christ descended into the deepest pit. ferred by some to Christ’s descent into hell: and they On the contrary, Regarding the hell of the lost it is explain it in this sense: “Christ preached to them who written (Job 10:21): “Before I go, and return no more, to a formerly were unbelievers, and who were shut up in land that is dark and covered with the mist of death.” Now prison”—that is, in hell—“in spirit”—that is, by His soul. there is no “fellowship of light with darkness,” according Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): “As He evan- to 2 Cor. 6:14. Therefore Christ, who is “the light,” did gelized them who are upon the earth, so did He those not descend into the hell of the lost. who were in hell”; not in order to convert unbelievers 2371 unto belief, but to put them to shame for their unbelief, was being built.” since preaching cannot be understood otherwise than as Reply to Objection 4. The expression “Abraham’s the open manifesting of His Godhead. which was laid bosom” may be taken in two senses. First of all, as imply- bare before them in the lower regions by His descending ing that restfulness, existing there, from sensible pain; so in power into hell. that in this sense it cannot be called hell, nor are there any Augustine, however, furnishes a better exposition of sorrows there. In another way it can be taken as implying the text in his Epistle to Evodius quoted above, namely, the privation of longed-for glory: in this sense it has the that the preaching is not to be referred to Christ’s descent character of hell and sorrow. Consequently, that rest of into hell, but to the operation of His Godhead, to which the blessed is now called Abraham’s bosom, yet it is not He gave effect from the beginning of the world. Conse- styled hell, nor are sorrows said to be now in Abraham’s quently, the sense is, that “to those (spirits) that were in bosom. prison”—that is, living in the mortal body, which is, as Reply to Objection 5. As Gregory says (Moral. xiii): it were, the soul’s prison-house—“by the spirit” of His “Even the higher regions of hell he calls the deepest Godhead “He came and preached” by internal inspira- hell. . . For if relatively to the height of heaven this dark- tions, and from without by the admonitions spoken by the some air is infernal, then relatively to the height of this righteous: to those, I say, He preached “which had been same air the earth lying beneath can be considered as in- some time incredulous,” i.e. not believing in the preach- fernal and deep. And again in comparison with the height ing of Noe, “when they waited for the patience of God,” of the same earth, those parts of hell which are higher than whereby the chastisement of the Deluge was put off: ac- the other infernal mansions, may in this way be designated cordingly (Peter) adds: “In the days of Noe, when the Ark as the deepest hell.” Whether the whole Christ was in hell? IIIa q. 52 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the whole Christ was body united with Him, and likewise He was entirely in not in hell. For Christ’s body is one of His parts. But His hell, because the whole Person of Christ was there by rea- body was not in hell. Therefore, the whole Christ was not son of the soul united with Him, and the whole Christ was in hell. then everywhere by reason of the Divine Nature. Objection 2. Further, nothing can be termed whole Reply to Objection 1. The body which was then in when its parts are severed. But the soul and body, which the grave is not a part of the uncreated Person, but of the are the parts of human nature, were separated at His death, assumed nature. Consequently, the fact of Christ’s body as stated above (q. 50, Aa. 3,4), and it was after death not being in hell does not prevent the whole Christ from that He descended into hell. Therefore the whole (Christ) being there: but proves that not everything appertaining to could not be in hell. human nature was there. Objection 3. Further, the whole of a thing is said to Reply to Objection 2. The whole human nature is be in a place when no part of it is outside such place. made up of the united soul and body; not so the Divine But there were parts of Christ outside hell; for instance, Person. Consequently when death severed the union of His body was in the grave, and His Godhead everywhere. the soul with the body, the whole Christ remained, but Therefore the whole Christ was not in hell. His whole human nature did not remain. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Symbolo iii): Reply to Objection 3. Christ’s Person is whole in “The whole Son is with the Father, the whole Son in each single place, but not wholly, because it is not cir- heaven, on earth, in the Virgin’s womb, on the Cross, in cumscribed by any place: indeed, all places put together hell, in paradise, into which He brought the robber.” could not comprise His immensity; rather is it His im- I answer that, It is evident from what was said in the mensity that embraces all things. But it happens in those Ia, q. 31, a. 2, ad 4, the masculine gender is referred to things which are in a place corporeally and circumscrip- the hypostasis or person, while the neuter belongs to the tively, that if a whole be in some place, then no part of nature. Now in the death of Christ, although the soul it is outside that place. But this is not the case with God. was separated from the body, yet neither was separated Hence Augustine says (De Symbolo iii): “It is not accord- from the Person of the Son of God, as stated above (q. 50, ing to times or places that we say that the whole Christ is a. 2). Consequently, it must be affirmed that during the everywhere, as if He were at one time whole in one place, three days of Christ’s death the whole Christ was in the at another time whole in another: but as being whole al- tomb, because the whole Person was there through the ways and everywhere.” 2372 Whether Christ made any stay in hell? IIIa q. 52 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ did not make upon Himself, willed His body to be laid in the tomb, so any stay in hell. For Christ went down into hell to deliver likewise He willed His soul to descend into hell. But the men from thence. But He accomplished this deliverance body lay in the tomb for a day and two nights, so as to at once by His descent, for, according to Ecclus. 11:23: demonstrate the truth of His death. Consequently, it is to “It is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to make the poor be believed that His soul was in hell, in order that it might man rich.” Consequently He does not seem to have tarried be brought back out of hell simultaneously with His body in hell. from the tomb. Objection 2. Further, Augustine says in a sermon Reply to Objection 1. When Christ descended into on the Passion (clx) that “of a sudden at our Lord and hell He delivered the saints who were there, not by lead- Saviour’s bidding all ‘the bars of iron were burst’ ” (Cf. ing them out at once from the confines of hell, but by en- Is. 45:2). Hence on behalf of the angels accompanying lightening them with the light of glory in hell itself. Nev- Christ it is written (Ps. 23:7,9): “Lift up your gates, O ye ertheless it was fitting that His soul should abide in hell as princes.” Now Christ descended thither in order to break long as His body remained in the tomb. the bolts of hell. Therefore He did not make any stay in Reply to Objection 2. By the expression “bars of hell. hell” are understood the obstacles which kept the holy Fa- Objection 3. Further, it is related (Lk. 23:43) that our thers from quitting hell, through the guilt of our first par-Lord while hanging on the cross said to the thief: “This ent’s sin; and these bars Christ burst asunder by the power day thou shalt be with Me in paradise”: from which it of His Passion on descending into hell: nevertheless He is evident that Christ was in paradise on that very day. chose to remain in hell for some time, for the reason stated But He was not there with His body. for that was in the above. grave. Therefore He was there with the soul which had Reply to Objection 3. Our Lord’s expression is not to gone down into hell: and consequently it appears that He be understood of the earthly corporeal paradise, but of a made no stay in hell. spiritual one, in which all are said to be who enjoy the Di- On the contrary, Peter says (Acts 2:24): “Whom God vine glory. Accordingly, the thief descended locally into hath raised up, having loosed the sorrows of hell, as it hell with Christ, because it was said to him: “This day was impossible that He should be held by it.” Therefore it thou shalt be with Me in paradise”; still as to reward he seems that He remained in hell until the hour of the Res- was in paradise, because he enjoyed Christ’s Godhead just urrection. as the other saints did. I answer that, As Christ, in order to take our penalties Whether Christ descending into hell delivered the holy Fathers from thence? IIIa q. 52 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ descending not delivered on Christ’s descent into hell. into hell did not deliver the holy Fathers from thence. On the contrary, Augustine says in the sermon on the For Augustine (Epist. ad Evod. clxiv) says: “I have not Passion already quoted that when Christ descended into yet discovered what Christ descending into hell bestowed hell “He broke down the gate and ‘iron bars’ of hell, set- upon those righteous ones who were in Abraham’s bosom, ting at liberty all the righteous who were held fast through from whom I fail to see that He ever departed according original sin.” to the beatific presence of His Godhead.” But had He de- I answer that, As stated above (a. 4, ad 2), when livered them, He would have bestowed much upon them. Christ descended into hell He worked through the power Therefore it does not appear that Christ delivered the holy of His Passion. But through Christ’s Passion the human Fathers from hell. race was delivered not only from sin, but also from the Objection 2. Further, no one is detained in hell except debt of its penalty, as stated above (q. 49, Aa. 1,3). Now on account of sin. But during life the holy Fathers were men were held fast by the debt of punishment in two ways: justified from sin through faith in Christ. Consequently first of all for actual sin which each had committed per- they did not need to be delivered from hell on Christ’s sonally: secondly, for the sin of the whole human race, descent thither. which each one in his origin contracts from our first par- Objection 3. Further, if you remove the cause, you re- ent, as stated in Rom. 5 of which sin the penalty is the move the effect. But that Christ went down into hell was death of the body as well as exclusion from glory, as is due to sin which was taken away by the Passion, as stated evident from Gn. 2 and 3: because God cast out man above (q. 49, a. 1). Consequently, the holy Fathers were from paradise after sin, having beforehand threatened him 2373 with death should he sin. Consequently, when Christ de-Christ bestowed something upon them as to their attain- scended into hell, by the power of His Passion He deliv- ing glory: and in consequence He dispelled the suffering ered the saints from the penalty whereby they were ex- which they endured through their glory being delayed: cluded from the life of glory, so as to be unable to see God still they had great joy from the very hope thereof, ac- in His Essence, wherein man’s beatitude lies, as stated in cording to Jn. 8:56: “Abraham your father rejoiced that the Ia IIae, q. 3, a. 8. But the holy Fathers were detained he might see my day.” And therefore he adds: “I fail to in hell for the reason, that, owing to our first parent’s sin, see that He ever departed, according to the beatific pres- the approach to the life of glory was not opened. And so ence of His Godhead,” that is, inasmuch as even before when Christ descended into hell He delivered the holy Fa- Christ’s coming they were happy in hope, although not thers from thence. And this is what is written Zech. 9:11: yet fully happy in fact. “Thou also by the blood of Thy testament hast sent forth Reply to Objection 2. The holy Fathers while yet Thy prisoners out of the pit, wherein is no water.” And living were delivered from original as well as actual sin (Col. 2:15) it is written that “despoiling the principalities through faith in Christ; also from the penalty of actual and powers,” i.e. “of hell, by taking out Isaac and Jacob, sins, but not from the penalty of original sin, whereby and the other just souls,” “He led them,” i.e. “He brought they were excluded from glory, since the price of man’s them far from this kingdom of darkness into heaven,” as redemption was not yet paid: just as the faithful are now the gloss explains. delivered by baptism from the penalty of actual sins, and Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking there from the penalty of original sin as to exclusion from glory, against such as maintained that the righteous of old were yet still remain bound by the penalty of original sin as to subject to penal sufferings before Christ’s descent into the necessity of dying in the body because they are re- hell. Hence shortly before the passage quoted he says: newed in the spirit, but not yet in the flesh, according to “Some add that this benefit was also bestowed upon the Rom. 8:10: “The body indeed is dead, because of sin; but saints of old, that on the Lord’s coming into hell they were the spirit liveth, because of justification.” freed from their sufferings. But I fail to see how Abraham, Reply to Objection 3. Directly Christ died His soul into whose bosom the poor man was received, was ever in went down into hell, and bestowed the fruits of His Pas- such sufferings.” Consequently, when he afterwards adds sion on the saints detained there; although they did not go that “he had not yet discovered what Christ’s descent into out as long as Christ remained in hell, because His pres- hell had brought to the righteous of old,” this must be un- ence was part of the fulness of their glory. derstood as to their being freed from penal sufferings. Yet Whether Christ delivered any of the lost from hell? IIIa q. 52 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ did deliver ered some persons of every state. Therefore, in hell also, some of the lost from hell, because it is written (Is. 24:22): He delivered some from the state of the lost. “And they shall be gathered together as in the gathering of On the contrary, It is written (Osee 13:14): “O death, one bundle into the pit, end they shall be shut up there in I will be thy death; O hell, I will be thy bite”: upon which prison: and after many days they shall be visited.” But the gloss says: “By leading forth the elect, and leaving there he is speaking of the lost, who “had adored the host there the reprobate.” But only the reprobate are in the hell of heaven,” according to Jerome’s commentary. Conse- of the lost. Therefore, by Christ’s descent into hell none quently it seems that even the lost were visited at Christ’s were delivered from the hell of the lost. descent into hell; and this seems to imply their deliver- I answer that, As stated above (a. 5), when Christ de- ance. scended into hell He worked by the power of His Passion. Objection 2. Further, on Zech. 9:11: “Thou also by Consequently, His descent into hell brought the fruits of the blood of Thy testament hast sent forth Thy prisoners deliverance to them only who were united to His Passion out of the pit wherein is no water,” the gloss observes: through faith quickened by charity, whereby sins are taken “Thou hast delivered them who were held bound in pris- away. Now those detained in the hell of the lost either ons, where no mercy refreshed them, which that rich man had no faith in Christ’s Passion, as infidels; or if they prayed for.” But only the lost are shut up in merciless had faith, they had no conformity with the charity of the prisons. Therefore Christ did deliver some from the hell suffering Christ: hence they could not be cleansed from of the lost. their sins. And on this account Christ’s descent into hell Objection 3. Further, Christ’s power was not less in brought them no deliverance from the debt of punishment hell than in this world, because He worked in every place in hell. by the power of His Godhead. But in this world He deliv- Reply to Objection 1. When Christ descended into 2374 hell, all who were in any part of hell were visited in some the refreshing of full deliverance, because the holy Fa-respect: some to their consolation and deliverance, others, thers could not be delivered from this prison of hell before namely, the lost, to their shame and confusion. Accord- Christ’s coming. ingly the passage continues: “And the moon shall blush, Reply to Objection 3. It was not due to any lack of and the sun be put to shame,” etc. power on Christ’s part that some were not delivered from This can also be referred to the visitation which will every state in hell, as out of every state among men in this come upon them in the Day of Judgment, not for their de- world; but it was owing to the very different condition of liverance, but for their yet greater confusion, according to each state. For, so long as men live here below, they can Sophon. i, 12: “I will visit upon the men that are settled be converted to faith and charity, because in this life men on their lees.” are not confirmed either in good or in evil, as they are after Reply to Objection 2. When the gloss says “where quitting this life. no mercy refreshed them,” this is to be understood of Whether the children who died in original sin were delivered by Christ? IIIa q. 52 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the children who nal sin either by their parents’ faith or by any sacrament of died in original sin were delivered from hell by Christ’s faith. Consequently, Christ’s descent into hell did not de- descending thither. For, like the holy Fathers, the chil- liver the children from thence. And furthermore, the holy dren were kept in hell simply because of original sin. But Fathers were delivered from hell by being admitted to the the holy Fathers were delivered from hell, as stated above glory of the vision of God, to which no one can come ex- (a. 5). Therefore the children were similarly delivered cept through grace; according to Rom. 6:23: “The grace from hell by Christ. of God is life everlasting.” Therefore, since children dy- Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 5:15): ing in original sin had no grace, they were not delivered “If by the offense of one, many died; much more the grace from hell. of God and the gift, by the grace of one man, Jesus Christ, Reply to Objection 1. The holy Fathers, although hath abounded unto many.” But the children who die with still held bound by the debt of original sin, in so far as it none but original sin are detained in hell owing to their touches human nature, were nevertheless delivered from first parent’s sin. Therefore, much more were they deliv- all stain of sin by faith in Christ: consequently, they were ered from hell through the grace of Christ. capable of that deliverance which Christ brought by de- Objection 3. Further, as Baptism works in virtue of scending into hell. But the same cannot be said of the Christ’s Passion, so also does Christ’s descent into hell, children, as is evident from what was said above. as is clear from what has been said (a. 4, ad 2, Aa. 5,6). Reply to Objection 2. When the Apostle says that But through Baptism children are delivered from original the grace of God “hath abounded unto many,” the word sin and hell. Therefore, they were similarly delivered by “many”∗ is to be taken, not comparatively, as if more Christ’s descent into hell. were saved by Christ’s grace than lost by Adam’s sin: but On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 3:25): absolutely, as if he said that the grace of the one Christ “God hath proposed Christ to be a propitiation, through abounded unto many, just as Adam’s sin was contracted faith in His blood.” But the children who had died with by many. But as Adam’s sin was contracted by those only original sin were in no wise sharers of faith in Christ. only who descended seminally from him according to the Therefore, they did not receive the fruits of Christ’s pro- flesh, so Christ’s grace reached those only who became pitiation, so as to be delivered by Him from hell. His members by spiritual regeneration: which does not I answer that, As stated above (a. 6), Christ’s descent apply to children dying in original sin. into hell had its effect of deliverance on them only who Reply to Objection 3. Baptism is applied to men in through faith and charity were united to Christ’s Passion, this life, in which man’s state can be changed from sin in virtue whereof Christ’s descent into hell was one of de- into grace: but Christ’s descent into hell was vouchsafed liverance. But the children who had died in original sin to the souls after this life when they are no longer capable were in no way united to Christ’s Passion by faith and of the said change. And consequently by baptism children love: for, not having the use of free will, they could have are delivered from original sin and from hell, but not by no faith of their own; nor were they cleansed from origi- Christ’s descent into hell. ∗ The Vulgate reads ‘plures,’ i.e. ‘many more’ 2375 Whether Christ by His descent into hell delivered souls from purgatory? IIIa q. 52 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ by His descent tion He hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified.” into hell delivered souls from Purgatory—for Augustine And so it is evident that Christ’s Passion had no greater ef- says (Ep. ad Evod. clxiv): “Because evident testimonies ficacy then than it has now. Consequently, they who were speak of hell and its pains, there is no reason for believing such as those who are now in Purgatory, were not set free that the Saviour came thither except to rescue men from from Purgatory by Christ’s descent into hell. But if any those same pains: but I still wish to know whether it was were found such as are now set free from Purgatory by all whom He found there, or some whom He deemed wor- virtue of Christ’s Passion, then there was nothing to hin- thy of such a benefit. Yet I do not doubt that Christ went der them from being delivered from Purgatory by Christ’s into hell, and granted this favor to them who were suffer- descent into hell. ing from its pains.” But, as stated above (a. 6), He did not Reply to Objection 1. From this passage of Augus- confer the benefit of deliverance upon the lost: and there tine it cannot be concluded that all who were in Purgatory are no others in a state of penal suffering except those in were delivered from it, but that such a benefit was be- Purgatory. Consequently Christ delivered souls from Pur- stowed upon some persons, that is to say, upon such as gatory. were already cleansed sufficiently, or who in life, by their Objection 2. Further, the very presence of Christ’s faith and devotion towards Christ’s death, so merited, that soul had no less effect than His sacraments have. But when He descended, they were delivered from the tempo- souls are delivered from Purgatory by the sacraments, es- ral punishment of Purgatory. pecially by the sacrament of the Eucharist, as shall be Reply to Objection 2. Christ’s power operates in shown later ( Suppl., q. 71, a. 9). Therefore much more the sacraments by way of healing and expiation. Conse- were souls delivered from Purgatory by the presence of quently, the sacrament of the Eucharist delivers men from Christ descending into hell. Purgatory inasmuch as it is a satisfactory sacrifice for sin. Objection 3. Further, as Augustine says (De Poenit. But Christ’s descent into hell was not satisfactory; yet it ix), those whom Christ healed in this life He healed com- operated in virtue of the Passion, which was satisfactory, pletely. Also, our Lord says (Jn. 7:23): “I have healed the as stated above (q. 48, a. 2), but satisfactory in general, whole man on the sabbath-day.” But Christ delivered them since its virtue had to be applied to each individual by who were in Purgatory from the punishment of the pain of something specially personal (q. 49, a. 1, ad 4,5). Conse- loss, whereby they were excluded from glory. Therefore, quently, it does not follow of necessity that all were deliv- He also delivered them from the punishment of Purgatory. ered from Purgatory by Christ’s descent into hell. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xiii): “Since Reply to Objection 3. Those defects from which our Creator and Redeemer, penetrating the bars of hell, Christ altogether delivered men in this world were purely brought out from thence the souls of the elect, He does personal, and concerned the individual; whereas exclu- not permit us to go thither, from whence He has already sion from God’s glory was a general defect and common by descending set others free.” But He permits us to go to to all human nature. Consequently, there was nothing to Purgatory. Therefore, by descending into hell, He did not prevent those detained in Purgatory being delivered by deliver souls from Purgatory. Christ from their privation of glory, but not from the debt I answer that, As we have stated more than once (a. 4, of punishment in Purgatory which pertains to personal ad 2, Aa. 5,6,7), Christ’s descent into hell was one of de- defect. Just as on the other hand, the holy Fathers be- liverance in virtue of His Passion. Now Christ’s Passion fore Christ’s coming were delivered from their personal had a virtue which was neither temporal nor transitory, but defects, but not from the common defect, as was stated everlasting, according to Heb. 10:14: “For by one obla- above (a. 7, ad 1; q. 49, a. 5, ad 1). 2376 THIRD PART, QUESTION 53 Of Christ’s Resurrection (In Four Articles) We have now to consider those things that concern Christ’s Exaltation; and we shall deal with (1) His Resurrection; (2) His Ascension; (3) His sitting at the right hand of God the Father; (4) His Judiciary Power. Under the first heading there is a fourfold consideration: (1) Christ’s Resurrection in itself; (2) the quality of the Person rising; (3) the manifestation of the Resurrection; (4) its causality. Concerning the first there are four points of inquiry: (1) The necessity of His Resurrection; (2) The time of the Resurrection; (3) Its order; (4) Its cause. Whether it was necessary for Christ to rise again? IIIa q. 53 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it was not necessary be not risen again, then is our preaching vain, and our for Christ to rise again. For Damascene says (De Fide [Vulg.: ‘your’] faith is also vain”: and (Ps. 29:10): “What Orth. iv): “Resurrection is the rising again of an animate profit is there in my blood?” that is, in the shedding of being, which was disintegrated and fallen.” But Christ did My blood, “while I go down,” as by various degrees of not fall by sinning, nor was His body dissolved, as is man- evils, “into corruption?” As though He were to answer: ifest from what was stated above (q. 51, a. 3). Therefore, “None. ‘For if I do not at once rise again but My body be it does not properly belong to Him to rise again. corrupted, I shall preach to no one, I shall gain no one,’ ” Objection 2. Further, whoever rises again is promoted as the gloss expounds. to a higher state, since to rise is to be uplifted. But after Thirdly, for the raising of our hope, since through death Christ’s body continued to be united with the God- seeing Christ, who is our head, rise again, we hope that head, hence it could not be uplifted to any higher condi- we likewise shall rise again. Hence it is written (1 Cor. tion. Therefore, it was not due to it to rise again. 15:12): “Now if Christ be preached that He rose from the Objection 3. Further, all that befell Christ’s human- dead, how do some among you say, that there is no resur- ity was ordained for our salvation. But Christ’s Passion rection of the dead?” And (Job 19:25,27): “I know,” that sufficed for our salvation, since by it we were loosed from is with certainty of faith, “that my Redeemer,” i.e. Christ, guilt and punishment, as is clear from what was said above “liveth,” having risen from the dead; “and” therefore “in (q. 49, a. 1,3). Consequently, it was not necessary for the last day I shall rise out of the earth. . . this my hope is Christ to rise again from the dead. laid up in my bosom.” On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 24:46): “It be- Fourthly, to set in order the lives of the faithful: ac- hooved Christ to suffer and to rise again from the dead.” cording to Rom. 6:4: “As Christ is risen from the dead by I answer that, It behooved Christ to rise again, for five the glory of the Father, so we also may walk in newness reasons. First of all; for the commendation of Divine Jus- of life”: and further on; “Christ rising from the dead dieth tice, to which it belongs to exalt them who humble them- now no more; so do you also reckon that you are dead to selves for God’s sake, according to Lk. 1:52: “He hath sin, but alive to God.” put down the mighty from their seat, and hath exalted the Fifthly, in order to complete the work of our salvation: humble.” Consequently, because Christ humbled Himself because, just as for this reason did He endure evil things even to the death of the Cross, from love and obedience to in dying that He might deliver us from evil, so was He glo- God, it behooved Him to be uplifted by God to a glorious rified in rising again in order to advance us towards good resurrection; hence it is said in His Person (Ps. 138:2): things; according to Rom. 4:25: “He was delivered up for “Thou hast known,” i.e. approved, “my sitting down,” i.e. our sins, and rose again for our justification.” My humiliation and Passion, “and my rising up,” i.e. My Reply to Objection 1. Although Christ did not fall by glorification in the resurrection; as the gloss expounds. sin, yet He fell by death, because as sin is a fall from righ- Secondly, for our instruction in the faith, since our be- teousness, so death is a fall from life: hence the words of lief in Christ’s Godhead is confirmed by His rising again, Mic. 7:8 can be taken as though spoken by Christ: “Re- because, according to 2 Cor. 13:4, “although He was cru- joice not thou, my enemy, over me, because I am fallen: cified through weakness, yet He liveth by the power of I shall rise again.” Likewise, although Christ’s body was God.” And therefore it is written (1 Cor. 15:14): “If Christ not disintegrated by returning to dust, yet the separation 2377 of His soul and body was a kind of disintegration. a higher condition of nature, but not to a higher personal Reply to Objection 2. The Godhead was united with state. Christ’s flesh after death by personal union, but not by Reply to Objection 3. Christ’s Passion wrought our natural union; thus the soul is united with the body as its salvation, properly speaking, by removing evils; but the form, so as to constitute human nature. Consequently, by Resurrection did so as the beginning and exemplar of all the union of the body and soul, the body was uplifted to good things. Whether it was fitting for Christ to rise again on the third day? IIIa q. 53 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem unfitting that Christ Furthermore, by His rising on the third day, the perfec- should have risen again on the third day. For the mem- tion of the number “three” is commended, which is “the bers ought to be in conformity with their head. But we number of everything,” as having “beginning, middle, and who are His members do not rise from death on the third end,” as is said in De Coelo i. Again in the mystical sense day, since our rising is put off until the end of the world. we are taught that Christ by “His one death” (i.e. of the Therefore, it seems that Christ, who is our head, should body) which was light, by reason of His righteousness, not have risen on the third day, but that His Resurrection “destroyed our two deaths” (i.e. of soul and body), which ought to have been deferred until the end of the world. are as darkness on account of sin; consequently, He re- Objection 2. Further, Peter said (Acts 2:24) that “it mained in death for one day and two nights, as Augustine was impossible for Christ to be held fast by hell” and observes (De Trin. iv). death. Therefore it seems that Christ’s rising ought not to And thereby is also signified that a third epoch began have been deferred until the third day, but that He ought with the Resurrection: for the first was before the Law; the to have risen at once on the same day; especially since the second under the Law; and the third under grace. More- gloss quoted above (a. 1) says that “there is no profit in over the third state of the saints began with the Resurrec- the shedding of Christ’s blood, if He did not rise at once.” tion of Christ: for, the first was under figures of the Law; Objection 3. The day seems to start with the rising of the second under the truth of faith; while the third will be the sun, the presence of which causes the day. But Christ in the eternity of glory, which Christ inaugurated by rising rose before sunrise: for it is related (Jn. 20:1) that “Mary again. Magdalen cometh early, when it was yet dark, unto the Reply to Objection 1. The head and members are sepulchre”: but Christ was already risen, for it goes on to likened in nature, but not in power; because the power of say: “And she saw the stone taken away from the sepul- the head is more excellent than that of the members. Ac- chre.” Therefore Christ did not rise on the third day. cordingly, to show forth the excellence of Christ’s power, On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 20:19): “They it was fitting that He should rise on the third day, while shall deliver Him to the Gentiles to be mocked, and the resurrection of the rest is put off until the end of the scourged, and crucified, and the third day He shall rise world. again.” Reply to Objection 2. Detention implies a certain I answer that, As stated above (a. 1) Christ’s Resur- compulsion. But Christ was not held fast by any necessity rection was necessary for the instruction of our faith. But of death, but was “free among the dead”: and therefore our faith regards Christ’s Godhead and humanity, for it is He abode a while in death, not as one held fast, but of His not enough to believe the one without the other, as is evi- own will, just so long as He deemed necessary for the in- dent from what has been said (q. 36, a. 4; cf. IIa IIae, q. 2, struction of our faith. And a task is said to be done “at Aa. 7,8). Consequently, in order that our faith in the truth once” which is performed within a short space of time. of His Godhead might be confirmed it was necessary that Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 51, a. 4, He should rise speedily, and that His Resurrection should ad 1,2), Christ rose early when the day was beginning to not be deferred until the end of the world. But to confirm dawn, to denote that by His Resurrection He brought us to our faith regarding the truth of His humanity and death, the light of glory; just as He died when the day was draw- it was needful that there should be some interval between ing to its close, and nearing to darkness, in order to signify His death and rising. For if He had risen directly after that by His death He would destroy the darkness of sin and death, it might seem that His death was not genuine and its punishment. Nevertheless He is said to have risen on consequently neither would His Resurrection be true. But the third day, taking day as a natural day which contains to establish the truth of Christ’s death, it was enough for twenty-four hours. And as Augustine says (De Trin. iv): His rising to be deferred until the third day, for within that “The night until the dawn, when the Lord’s Resurrection time some signs of life always appear in one who appears was proclaimed, belongs to the third day. Because God, to be dead whereas he is alive. who made the light to shine forth from darkness, in order 2378 that by the grace of the New Testament and partaking of caused by the sun’s presence, because the sun had already Christ’s rising we might hear this—‘once ye were dark- begun to brighten the sky. Hence it is written (Mk. 16:2) ness, but now light in the Lord’—insinuates in a measure that “the women come to the sepulchre, the sun being now to us that day draws its origin from night: for, as the first risen”; which is not contrary to John’s statement “when it days are computed from light to darkness on account of was yet dark,” as Augustine says (De Cons. Evang. iii), man’s coming fall, so these days are reckoned from dark- “because, as the day advances the more the light rises, ness to light owing to man’s restoration.” And so it is the more are the remaining shadows dispelled.” But when evident that even if He had risen at midnight, He could be Mark says “ ‘the sun being now risen,’ it is not to be taken said to have risen on the third day, taking it as a natural as if the sun were already apparent over the horizon, but day. But now that He rose early, it can be affirmed that He as coming presently into those parts.” rose on the third day, even taking the artificial day which is Whether Christ was the first to rise from the dead? IIIa q. 53 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ was not the first to attain life utterly immortal, according to Rom. 6:9: first to rise from the dead, because we read in the Old Tes- “Christ rising from the dead dieth now no more.” But by tament of some persons raised to life by Elias and Eliseus, an imperfect resurrection, some others have risen before according to Heb. 11:35: “Women received their dead Christ, so as to be a kind of figure of His Resurrection. raised to life again”: also Christ before His Passion raised And thus the answer to the first objection is clear: be- three dead persons to life. Therefore Christ was not the cause both those raised from the dead in the old Testa- first to rise from the dead. ment, and those raised by Christ, so returned to life that Objection 2. Further, among the other miracles which they had to die again. happened during the Passion, it is narrated (Mat. 27:52) Reply to Objection 2. There are two opinions regard- that “the monuments were opened, and many bodies of the ing them who rose with Christ. Some hold that they rose saints who had slept rose again.” Therefore Christ was not to life so as to die no more, because it would be a greater the first to rise from the dead. torment for them to die a second time than not to rise at Objection 3. Further, as Christ by His own rising is all. According to this view, as Jerome observes on Mat. the cause of our resurrection, so by His grace He is the 27:52,53, we must understand that “they had not risen be- cause of our grace, according to Jn. 1:16: “Of His fulness fore our Lord rose.” Hence the Evangelist says that “com- we all have received.” But in point of time some others ing out of the tombs after His Resurrection, they came into had grace previous to Christ—for instance all the fathers the holy city, and appeared to many.” But Augustine (Ep. of the Old Testament. Therefore some others came to the ad Evod. clxiv) while giving this opinion, says: “I know resurrection of the body before Christ. that it appears some, that by the death of Christ the Lord On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:20): “Christ the same resurrection was bestowed upon the righteous as is risen from the dead, the first fruits of them that sleep— is promised to us in the end; and if they slept not again by because,” says the gloss, “He rose first in point of time laying aside their bodies, it remains to be seen how Christ and dignity.” can be understood to be ‘the first-born of the dead,’ if so I answer that, Resurrection is a restoring from death many preceded Him unto that resurrection. Now if reply to life. Now a man is snatched from death in two ways: be made that this is said by anticipation, so that the mon- first of all, from actual death, so that he begins in any way uments be understood to have been opened by the earth- to live anew after being actually dead: in another way, quake while Christ was still hanging on the cross, but that so that he is not only rescued from death, but from the the bodies of the just did not rise then but after He had necessity, nay more, from the possibility of dying again. risen, the difficulty still arises—how is it that Peter asserts Such is a true and perfect resurrection, because so long that it was predicted not of David but of Christ, that His as a man lives, subject to the necessity of dying, death body would not see corruption, since David’s tomb was in has dominion over him in a measure, according to Rom. their midst; and thus he did not convince them, if David’s 8:10: “The body indeed is dead because of sin.” Further- body was no longer there; for even if he had risen soon more, what has the possibility of existence, is said to exist after his death, and his flesh had not seen corruption, his in some respect, that is, in potentiality. Thus it is evident tomb might nevertheless remain. Now it seems hard that that the resurrection, whereby one is rescued from actual David from whose seed Christ is descended, was not in death only, is but an imperfect one. that rising of the just, if an eternal rising was conferred Consequently, speaking of perfect resurrection, Christ upon them. Also that saying in the Epistle to the Hebrews is the first of them who rise, because by rising He was the (11:40) regarding the ancient just would be hard to ex- 2379 plain, ‘that they should not be perfected without us,’ if much more cogent. they were already established in that incorruption of the Reply to Objection 3. As everything preceding resurrection which is promised at the end when we shall Christ’s coming was preparatory for Christ, so is grace a be made perfect”: so that Augustine would seem to think disposition for glory. Consequently, it behooved all things that they rose to die again. In this sense Jerome also in appertaining to glory, whether they regard the soul, as the commenting on Matthew (27:52,53) says: “As Lazarus perfect fruition of God, or whether they regard the body, rose, so also many of the bodies of the saints rose, that as the glorious resurrection, to be first in Christ as the au- they might bear witness to the risen Christ.” Neverthe- thor of glory: but that grace should be first in those that less in a sermon for the Assumption∗ he seems to leave were ordained unto Christ. the matter doubtful. But Augustine’s reasons seem to be Whether Christ was the cause of His own Resurrection? IIIa q. 53 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that Christ was not the cause from His soul, nor from His flesh. Consequently, both the of His own Resurrection. For whoever is raised up by soul and the flesh of the dead Christ can be considered in another is not the cause of his own rising. But Christ was two respects: first, in respect of His Godhead; secondly, raised up by another, according to Acts 2:24: “Whom God in respect of His created nature. Therefore, according to hath raised up, having loosed the sorrows of hell”: and the virtue of the Godhead united to it, the body took back Rom. 8:11: “He that raised up Jesus Christ from the dead, again the soul which it had laid aside, and the soul took shall quicken also your mortal bodies.” Therefore Christ back again the body which it had abandoned: and thus is not the cause of His own Resurrection. Christ rose by His own power. And this is precisely what Objection 2. Further, no one is said to merit, or ask is written (2 Cor. 13:4): “For although He was crucified from another, that of which he is himself the cause. But through” our “weakness, yet He liveth by the power of Christ by His Passion merited the Resurrection, as Au- God.” But if we consider the body and soul of the dead gustine says (Tract. civ in Joan.): “The lowliness of the Christ according to the power of created nature, they could Passion is the meritorious cause of the glory of the Res- not thus be reunited, but it was necessary for Christ to be urrection.” Moreover He asked the Father that He might raised up by God. be raised up again, according to Ps. 40:11: “But thou, O Reply to Objection 1. The Divine power is the same Lord, have mercy on me, and raise me up again.” There- thing as the operation of the Father and the Son; ac- fore He was not the cause of His rising again. cordingly these two things are mutually consequent, that Objection 3. Further, as Damascene proves (De Fide Christ was raised up by the Divine power of the Father, Orth. iv), it is not the soul that rises again, but the body, and by His own power. which is stricken by death. But the body could not unite Reply to Objection 2. Christ by praying besought and the soul with itself, since the soul is nobler. Therefore merited His Resurrection, as man and not as God. what rose in Christ could not be the cause of His Resur- Reply to Objection 3. According to its created nature rection. Christ’s body is not more powerful than His soul; yet ac- On the contrary, Our Lord says (Jn. 10:18): “No one cording to its Divine power it is more powerful. Again the taketh My soul from Me, but I lay it down, and I take it soul by reason of the Godhead united to it is more pow- up again.” But to rise is nothing else than to take the soul erful than the body in respect of its created nature. Con- up again. Consequently, it appears that Christ rose again sequently, it was by the Divine power that the body and of His own power. soul mutually resumed each other, but not by the power of I answer that, As stated above (q. 50, Aa. 2,3) in their created nature. consequence of death Christ’s Godhead was not separated ∗ Ep. ix ad Paul. et Eustoch.; among the supposititious works ascribed to St. Jerome 2380 THIRD PART, QUESTION 54 Of the Quality of Christ Rising Again (In Four Articles) We have now to consider the quality of the rising Christ, which presents four points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ had a true body after His Resurrection? (2) Whether He rose with His complete body? (3) Whether His was a glorified body? (4) Of the scars which showed in His body. Whether Christ had a true body after His Resurrection? IIIa q. 54 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ did not have were shut, thus existing with another body in the same a true body after His Resurrection. For a true body can- place. But whether a glorified body can have this from not be in the same place at the same time with another some hidden property, so as to be with another body at body. But after the Resurrection Christ’s body was with the same time in the same place, will be discussed later another at the same time in the same place: since He en- ( Suppl., q. 83, a. 4) when the common resurrection will tered among the disciples “the doors being shut,” as is re- be dealt with. For the present let it suffice to say that it lated in Jn. 20:26. Therefore it seems that Christ did not was not from any property within the body, but by virtue have a true body after His Resurrection. of the Godhead united to it, that this body, although a true Objection 2. Further, a true body does not vanish one, entered in among the disciples while the doors were from the beholder’s sight unless perchance it be corrupted. shut. Accordingly Augustine says in a sermon for Easter But Christ’s body “vanished out of the sight” of the disci- (ccxlvii) that some men argue in this fashion: “If it were ples as they gazed upon Him, as is related in Lk. 24:31. a body; if what rose from the sepulchre were what hung Therefore, it seems that Christ did not have a true body upon the tree, how could it enter through closed doors?” after His Resurrection. And he answers: “If you understand how, it is no mira- Objection 3. Further, every true body has its deter- cle: where reason fails, faith abounds.” And (Tract. cxxi minate shape. But Christ’s body appeared before the dis- super Joan.) he says: “Closed doors were no obstacle to ciples “in another shape,” as is evident from Mk. 15:12. the substance of a Body wherein was the Godhead; for Therefore it seems that Christ did not possess a true body truly He could enter in by doors not open, in whose Birth after His Resurrection. His Mother’s virginity remained inviolate.” And Gregory On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 24:37) that when says the same in a homily for the octave of Easter (xxvi in Christ appeared to His disciples “they being troubled and Evang.). frightened, supposed that they saw a spirit,” as if He had Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 53, a. 3), not a true but an imaginary body: but to remove their fears Christ rose to the immortal life of glory. But such is the He presently added: “Handle and see, for a spirit hath not disposition of a glorified body that it is spiritual, i.e. sub- flesh and bones, as you see Me to have.” Consequently, ject to the spirit, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:44). Now He had not an imaginary but a true body. in order for the body to be entirely subject to the spirit, it I answer that, As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): is necessary for the body’s every action to be subject to that is said to rise, which fell. But Christ’s body fell by the will of the spirit. Again, that an object be seen is due death; namely, inasmuch as the soul which was its formal to the action of the visible object upon the sight, as the perfection was separated from it. Hence, in order for it to Philosopher shows (De Anima ii). Consequently, who- be a true resurrection, it was necessary for the same body ever has a glorified body has it in his power to be seen of Christ to be once more united with the same soul. And when he so wishes, and not to be seen when he does not since the truth of the body’s nature is from its form it fol- wish it. Moreover Christ had this not only from the con- lows that Christ’s body after His Resurrection was a true dition of His glorified body, but also from the power of body, and of the same nature as it was before. But had His His Godhead, by which power it may happen that even been an imaginary body, then His Resurrection would not bodies not glorified are miraculously unseen: as was by have been true, but apparent. a miracle bestowed on the blessed Bartholomew, that “if Reply to Objection 1. Christ’s body after His Resur- he wished he could be seen, and not be seen if he did not rection, not by miracle but from its glorified condition, as some say, entered in among the disciples while the doors 2381 wish it”∗. Christ, then, is said to have vanished from the clarity in the Resurrection: accordingly the same writer eyes of the disciples, not as though He were corrupted or adds: “but the semblance is changed, when, ceasing to be dissolved into invisible elements; but because He ceased, mortal, it becomes immortal; so that it acquired the glory of His own will, to be seen by them, either while He was of countenance, without losing the substance of the coun- present or while He was departing by the gift of agility. tenance.” Yet He did not come to those disciples in glori- Reply to Objection 3. As Severianus∗ says in a ser- fied appearance; but, as it lay in His power for His body mon for Easter: “Let no one suppose that Christ changed to be seen or not, so it was within His power to present His features at the Resurrection.” This is to be understood to the eyes of the beholders His form either glorified or of the outline of His members; since there was nothing not glorified, or partly glorified and partly not, or in any out of keeping or deformed in the body of Christ which fashion whatsoever. Still it requires but a slight difference was conceived of the Holy Ghost, that had to be righted for anyone to seem to appear another shape. at the Resurrection. Nevertheless He received the glory of Whether Christ’s body rose glorified? † IIIa q. 54 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that Christ’s body did not rise to the Passion; and later He adds: “Father, glorify Thy glorified. For glorified bodies shine, according to Mat. name,” whereby He asks for the glory of the Resurrection. 13:43: “Then shall the just shine as the sun in the kingdom Thirdly, because as stated above (q. 34, a. 4), Christ’s soul of their Father.” But shining bodies are seen under the as- was glorified from the instant of His conception by per- pect of light, but not of color. Therefore, since Christ’s fect fruition of the Godhead. But, as stated above (q. 14, body was beheld under the aspect of color, as it had been a. 1, ad 2), it was owing to the Divine economy that the hitherto, it seems that it was not a glorified one. glory did not pass from His soul to His body, in order that Objection 2. Further, a glorified body is incorruptible. by the Passion He might accomplish the mystery of our But Christ’s body seems not to have been incorruptible; redemption. Consequently, when this mystery of Christ’s because it was palpable, as He Himself says in Lk. 24:39: Passion and death was finished, straightway the soul com- “Handle, and see.” Now Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. municated its glory to the risen body in the Resurrection; xxvi) that “what is handled must be corruptible, and that and so that body was made glorious. which is incorruptible cannot be handled.” Consequently, Reply to Objection 1. Whatever is received within Christ’s body was not glorified. a subject is received according to the subject’s capacity. Objection 3. Further, a glorified body is not animal, Therefore, since glory flows from the soul into the body, but spiritual, as is clear from 1 Cor. 15. But after the Res- it follows that, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor. cxviii), urrection Christ’s body seems to have been animal, since the brightness or splendor of a glorified body is after the He ate and drank with His disciples, as we read in the manner of natural color in the human body; just as var- closing chapters of Luke and John. Therefore, it seems iously colored glass derives its splendor from the sun’s that Christ’s body was not glorified. radiance, according to the mode of the color. But as it lies On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil. 3:21): “He within the power of a glorified man whether his body be will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body seen or not, as stated above (a. 1, ad 2), so is it in his power of His glory.” whether its splendor be seen or not. Accordingly it can be I answer that, Christ’s was a glorified body in His seen in its color without its brightness. And it was in this Resurrection, and this is evident from three reasons. First way that Christ’s body appeared to the disciples after the of all, because His Resurrection was the exemplar and the Resurrection. cause of ours, as is stated in 1 Cor. 15:43. But in the res- Reply to Objection 2. We say that a body can be urrection the saints will have glorified bodies, as is writ- handled not only because of its resistance, but also on ten in the same place: “It is sown in dishonor, it shall account of its density. But from rarity and density fol- rise in glory.” Hence, since the cause is mightier than low weight and lightness, heat and cold, and similar con- the effect, and the exemplar than the exemplate; much traries, which are the principles of corruption in elemen- more glorious, then, was the body of Christ in His Res- tary bodies. Consequently, a body that can be handled urrection. Secondly, because He merited the glory of His by human touch is naturally corruptible. But if there be Resurrection by the lowliness of His Passion. Hence He a body that resists touch, and yet is not disposed accord- said (Jn. 12:27): “Now is My soul troubled,” which refers ing to the qualities mentioned, which are the proper ob- ∗ Apocryphal Historia Apost. viii, 2 ∗ Peter Chrysologus: Serm. lxxxii † Some editions give this article as the third, following the order of the introduction to the question. But this is evident from the first sentence of the body of a. 3 (a. 2 in the aforesaid editions), that the order of the Leonine edition is correct. 2382 jects of human touch, such as a heavenly body, then such of incorruption.” And therefore Gregory says (Hom. in body cannot be said to be handled. But Christ’s body af- Evang. xxvi): “Christ’s body is shown to be of the same ter the Resurrection was truly made up of elements, and nature, but of different glory, after the Resurrection.” had tangible qualities such as the nature of a human body Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Civ. requires, and therefore it could naturally be handled; and Dei xiii): “After the Resurrection, our Saviour in spiri- if it had nothing beyond the nature of a human body, it tual but true flesh partook of meat with the disciples, not would likewise be corruptible. But it had something else from need of food, but because it lay in His power.” For which made it incorruptible, and this was not the nature as Bede says on Lk. 24:41: “The thirsty earth sucks in of a heavenly body, as some maintain, and into which we the water, and the sun’s burning ray absorbs it; the former shall make fuller inquiry later ( Suppl., q. 82, a. 1), but it from need, the latter by its power.” Hence after the Res- was glory flowing from a beatified soul: because, as Au- urrection He ate, “not as needing food, but in order thus gustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor. cxviii): “God made the soul to show the nature of His risen body.” Nor does it follow of such powerful nature, that from its fullest beatitude the that His was an animal body that stands in need of food. fulness of health overflows into the body, that is, the vigor Whether Christ’s body rose again entire? IIIa q. 54 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s body did not bones, nor the other natural parts of a human body, be- rise entire. For flesh and blood belong to the integrity of longs to the error of Eutyches, Bishop of Constantinople, the body: whereas Christ seems not to have had both, for who maintained that “our body in that glory of the res- it is written (1 Cor. 15:50): “Flesh and blood can not pos- urrection will be impalpable, and more subtle than wind sess the kingdom of God.” But Christ rose in the glory of and air: and that our Lord, after the hearts of the disci- the kingdom of God. Therefore it seems that He did not ples who handled Him were confirmed, brought back to have flesh and blood. subtlety whatever could be handled in Him”∗. Now Gre- Objection 2. Further, blood is one of the four hu- gory condemns this in the same book, because Christ’s mors. Consequently, if Christ had blood, with equal rea- body was not changed after the Resurrection, according son He also had the other humors, from which corruption to Rom. 6:9: “Christ rising from the dead, dieth now no is caused in animal bodies. It would follow, then, that more.” Accordingly, the very man who had said these Christ’s body was corruptible, which is unseemly. There- things, himself retracted them at his death. For, if it be fore Christ did not have flesh and blood. unbecoming for Christ to take a body of another nature in Objection 3. Further, the body of Christ which rose, His conception, a heavenly one for instance, as Valentine ascended to heaven. But some of His blood is kept as asserted, it is much more unbecoming for Him at His Res- relics in various churches. Therefore Christ’s body did urrection to resume a body of another nature, because in not rise with the integrity of all its parts. His Resurrection He resumed unto an everlasting life, the On the contrary, our Lord said (Lk. 24:39) while body which in His conception He had assumed to a mortal addressing His disciples after the Resurrection: “A spirit life. hath not flesh and bones as you see Me to have.” Reply to Objection 1. Flesh and blood are not to be I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), Christ’s body taken there for the nature of flesh and blood, but, either for in the Resurrection was “of the same nature, but differed the guilt of flesh and blood, as Gregory says†, or else for in glory.” Accordingly, whatever goes with the nature of the corruption of flesh and blood: because, as Augustine a human body, was entirely in the body of Christ when says (Ad Consent., De Resur. Carn.), “there will be nei- He rose again. Now it is clear that flesh, bones, blood, ther corruption there, nor mortality of flesh and blood.” and other such things, are of the very nature of the human Therefore flesh according to its substance possesses the body. Consequently, all these things were in Christ’s body kingdom of God, according to Lk. 24:39: “A spirit hath when He rose again; and this also integrally, without any not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have.” But flesh, if diminution; otherwise it would not have been a complete understood as to its corruption, will not possess it; hence it resurrection, if whatever was lost by death had not been is straightway added in the words of the Apostle: “Neither restored. Hence our Lord assured His faithful ones by shall corruption possess incorruption.” saying (Mat. 10:30): “The very hairs of your head are all Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says in the same numbered”: and (Lk. 21:18): “A hair of your head shall book: “Perchance by reason of the blood some keener not perish.” critic will press us and say; If the blood was” in the body But to say that Christ’s body had neither flesh, nor of Christ when He rose, “why not the rheum?” that is, ∗ St. Gregory, Moral. in Job 14:56 † St. Gregory, Moral. in Job 14:56 2383 the phlegm; “why not also the yellow gall?” that is, the the power to eat, without need of food.” gall proper; “and why not the black gall?” that is, the bile, Reply to Objection 3. All the blood which flowed “with which four humors the body is tempered, as medi- from Christ’s body, belonging as it does to the integrity cal science bears witness. But whatever anyone may add, of human nature, rose again with His body: and the same let him take heed not to add corruption, lest he corrupt the reason holds good for all the particles which belong to health and purity of his own faith; because Divine power the truth and integrity of human nature. But the blood is equal to taking away such qualities as it wills from the preserved as relics in some churches did not flow from visible and tractable body, while allowing others to re- Christ’s side, but is said to have flowed from some mal- main, so that there be no defilement,” i.e. of corruption, treated image of Christ. “though the features be there; motion without weariness, Whether Christ’s body ought to have risen with its scars? IIIa q. 54 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s body ought name: because it will not be a deformity, but a dignity in not to have risen with its scars. For it is written (1 Cor. them; and a certain kind of beauty will shine in them, in 15:52): “The dead shall rise incorrupt.” But scars and the body, though not of the body.” Secondly, to confirm wounds imply corruption and defect. Therefore it was not the hearts of the disciples as to “the faith in His Resur- fitting for Christ, the author of the resurrection, to rise rection” (Bede, on Lk. 24:40). Thirdly, “that when He again with scars. pleads for us with the Father, He may always show the Objection 2. Further, Christ’s body rose entire, as manner of death He endured for us” (Bede, on Lk. 24:40). stated above (a. 3). But open scars are opposed to bod- Fourthly, “that He may convince those redeemed in His ily integrity, since they interfere with the continuity of blood, how mercifully they have been helped, as He ex- the tissue. It does not therefore seem fitting for the open poses before them the traces of the same death” (Bede, wounds to remain in Christ’s body; although the traces on Lk. 24:40). Lastly, “that in the Judgment-day He may of the wounds might remain, which would satisfy the be- upbraid them with their just condemnation” (Bede, on Lk. holder; thus it was that Thomas believed, to whom it was 24:40). Hence, as Augustine says (De Symb. ii): “Christ said: “Because thou hast seen Me, Thomas, thou hast be- knew why He kept the scars in His body. For, as He lieved” (Jn. 20:29). showed them to Thomas who would not believe except Objection 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. he handled and saw them, so will He show His wounds iv) that “some things are truly said of Christ after the Res- to His enemies, so that He who is the Truth may convict urrection, which He did not have from nature but from them, saying: ‘Behold the man whom you crucified; see special dispensation, such as the scars, in order to make the wounds you inflicted; recognize the side you pierced, it sure that it was the body which had suffered that rose since it was opened by you and for you, yet you would not again.” Now when the cause ceases, the effect ceases. enter.’ ” Therefore it seems that when the disciples were assured Reply to Objection 1. The scars that remained in of the Resurrection, He bore the scars no longer. But it ill Christ’s body belong neither to corruption nor defect, but became the unchangeableness of His glory that He should to the greater increase of glory, inasmuch as they are the assume anything which was not to remain in Him for ever. trophies of His power; and a special comeliness will ap- Consequently, it seems that He ought not at His Resurrec- pear in the places scarred by the wounds. tion to have resumed a body with scars. Reply to Objection 2. Although those openings of the On the contrary, Our Lord said to Thomas (Jn. wounds break the continuity of the tissue, still the greater 20:27): “Put in thy finger hither, and see My hands; and beauty of glory compensates for all this, so that the body bring hither thy hand, and put it into My side, and be not is not less entire, but more perfected. Thomas, however, faithless but believing.” not only saw, but handled the wounds, because as Pope I answer that, It was fitting for Christ’s soul at His Leo∗ says: “It sufficed for his personal faith for him to Resurrection to resume the body with its scars. In the first have seen what he saw; but it was on our behalf that he place, for Christ’s own glory. For Bede says on Lk. 24:40 touched what he beheld.” that He kept His scars not from inability to heal them, Reply to Objection 3. Christ willed the scars of His “but to wear them as an everlasting trophy of His vic- wounds to remain on His body, not only to confirm the tory.” Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii): “Perhaps faith of His disciples, but for other reasons also. From in that kingdom we shall see on the bodies of the Mar- these it seems that those scars will always remain on His tyrs the traces of the wounds which they bore for Christ’s body; because, as Augustine says (Ad Consent., De Res- ∗ Cf. Append. Opp. August., Serm. clxii 2384 urr. Carn.): “I believe our Lord’s body to be in heaven, turned to death; and what fool would dare to say this, save such as it was when He ascended into heaven.” And Gre- he that denies the true resurrection of the flesh?” Accord- gory (Moral. xiv) says that “if aught could be changed ingly, it is evident that the scars which Christ showed on in Christ’s body after His Resurrection, contrary to Paul’s His body after His Resurrection, have never since been truthful teaching, then the Lord after His Resurrection re- removed from His body. 2385 THIRD PART, QUESTION 55 Of the Manifestation of the Resurrection (In Six Articles) We have now to consider the manifestation of the Resurrection: concerning which there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ’s Resurrection ought to have been manifested to all men or only to some special individuals? (2) Whether it was fitting that they should see Him rise? (3) Whether He ought to have lived with the disciples after the Resurrection? (4) Whether it was fitting for Him to appeal to the disciples “in another shape”? (5) Whether He ought to have demonstrated the Resurrection by proofs? (6) Of the cogency of those proofs. Whether Christ’s Resurrection ought to have been manifested to all? IIIa q. 55 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s Resurrec- as concern future glory are beyond the common ken of tion ought to have been manifested to all. For just as a mankind, according to Is. 64:4: “The eye hath not seen, public penalty is due for public sin, according to 1 Tim. O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for 5:20: “Them that sin reprove before all,” so is a public re- them that wait for Thee.” Consequently, such things are ward due for public merit. But, as Augustine says (Tract. not known by man except through Divine revelation, as civ in Joan.), “the glory of the Resurrection is the reward the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:10): “God hath revealed them of the humility of the Passion.” Therefore, since Christ’s to us by His spirit.” Since, then, Christ rose by a glori- Passion was manifested to all while He suffered in public, ous Resurrection, consequently His Resurrection was not it seems that the glory of the Resurrection ought to have manifested to everyone, but to some, by whose testimony been manifested to all. it could be brought to the knowledge of others. Objection 2. Further, as Christ’s Passion is ordained Reply to Objection 1. Christ’s Passion was consum- for our salvation, so also is His Resurrection, according mated in a body that still had a passible nature, which is to Rom. 4:25: “He rose again for our justification.” But known to all by general laws: consequently His Passion what belongs to the public weal ought to be manifested could be directly manifested to all. But the Resurrection to all. Therefore Christ’s Resurrection ought to have been was accomplished “through the glory of the Father,” as manifested to all, and not to some specially. the Apostle says (Rom. 6:4). Therefore it was manifested Objection 3. Further, they to whom it was manifested directly to some, but not to all. were witnesses of the Resurrection: hence it is said (Acts But that a public penance is imposed upon public sin- 3:15): “Whom God hath raised from the dead, of which ners, is to be understood of the punishment of this present we are witnesses.” Now they bore witness by preaching life. And in like manner public merits should be rewarded in public: and this is unbecoming in women, according to in public, in order that others may be stirred to emulation. 1 Cor. 14:34: “Let women keep silence in the churches”: But the punishments and rewards of the future life are not and 1 Tim. 2:12: “I suffer not a woman to teach.” There- publicly manifested to all, but to those specially who are fore, it does not seem becoming for Christ’s Resurrection preordained thereto by God. to be manifested first of all to the women and afterwards Reply to Objection 2. Just as Christ’s Resurrection is to mankind in general. for the common salvation of all, so it came to the knowl- On the contrary, It is written (Acts 10:40): “Him God edge of all; yet not so that it was directly manifested to raised up the third day, and gave Him to be made mani- all, but only to some, through whose testimony it could be fest, not to all the people, but to witnesses preordained by brought to the knowledge of all. God.” Reply to Objection 3. A woman is not to be allowed I answer that, Some things come to our knowledge to teach publicly in church; but she may be permitted to by nature’s common law, others by special favor of grace, give familiar instruction to some privately. And therefore as things divinely revealed. Now, as Dionysius says (Coel. as Ambrose says on Lk. 24:22, “a woman is sent to them Hier. iv), the divinely established law of such things is that who are of her household,” but not to the people to bear they be revealed immediately by God to higher persons, witness to the Resurrection. But Christ appeared to the through whom they are imparted to others, as is evident woman first, for this reason, that as a woman was the first in the ordering of the heavenly spirits. But such things to bring the source of death to man, so she might be the 2386 first to announce the dawn of Christ’s glorious Resurrec-sex shall suffer no hurt; but if women burn with greater tion. Hence Cyril says on Jn. 20:17: “Woman who for- charity, they shall also attain greater glory from the Di- merly was the minister of death, is the first to see and vine vision: because the women whose love for our Lord proclaim the adorable mystery of the Resurrection: thus was more persistent—so much so that “when even the womankind has procured absolution from ignominy, and disciples withdrew” from the sepulchre “they did not de- removal of the curse.” Hereby, moreover, it is shown, part”∗—were the first to see Him rising in glory. so far as the state of glory is concerned, that the female Whether it was fitting that the disciples should see Him rise again? IIIa q. 55 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem fitting that the disciples tion, according to Rom. 6:10: “For in that He liveth, He should have seen Him rise again, because it was their of- liveth unto God.” And therefore it was fitting for Christ’s fice to bear witness to the Resurrection, according to Acts Resurrection not to be witnessed by men directly, but to be 4:33: “With great power did the apostles give testimony proclaimed to them by angels. Accordingly, Hilary (Com- to the Resurrection of Jesus Christ our Lord.” But the ment. Matth. cap. ult.) says: “An angel is therefore the surest witness of all is an eye-witness. Therefore it would first herald of the Resurrection, that it might be declared have been fitting for them to see the very Resurrection of out of obedience to the Father’s will.” Christ. Reply to Objection 1. The apostles were able to tes- Objection 2. Further, in order to have the certainty of tify to the Resurrection even by sight, because from the faith the disciples saw Christ ascend into heaven, accord- testimony of their own eyes they saw Christ alive, whom ing to Acts 1:9: “While they looked on, He was raised they had known to be dead. But just as man comes from up.” But it was also necessary for them to have faith in the hearing of faith to the beatific vision, so did men come the Resurrection. Therefore it seems that Christ ought to to the sight of the risen Christ through the message already have risen in sight of the disciples. received from angels. Objection 3. Further, the raising of Lazarus was a Reply to Objection 2. Christ’s Ascension as to its sign of Christ’s coming Resurrection. But the Lord raised term wherefrom, was not above men’s common knowl- up Lazarus in sight of the disciples. Consequently, it edge, but only as to its term whereunto. Consequently, seems that Christ ought to have risen in sight of the disci- the disciples were able to behold Christ’s Ascension as to ples. the term wherefrom, that is, according as He was uplifted On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 16:9): The Lord from the earth; but they did not behold Him as to the term “rising early the first day of the week, appeared first to whereunto, because they did not see how He was received Mary Magdalen.” Now Mary Magdalen did not see Him into heaven. But Christ’s Resurrection transcended com- rise; but, while searching for Him in the sepulchre, she mon knowledge as to the term wherefrom, according as heard from the angel: “He is risen, He is not here.” There- His soul returned from hell and His body from the closed fore no one saw Him rise again. sepulchre; and likewise as to the term whereunto, accord- I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): ing as He attained to the life of glory. Consequently, the “Those things that are of God, are well ordered [Vulg.: Resurrection ought not to be accomplished so as to be ‘Those that are, are ordained of God].” Now the divinely seen by man. established order is this, that things above men’s ken are Reply to Objection 3. Lazarus was raised so that he revealed to them by angels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. returned to the same life as before, which life is not be- iv). But Christ on rising did not return to the familiar man- yond man’s common ken. Consequently, there is no par- ner of life, but to a kind of immortal and God-like condi- ity. Whether Christ ought to have lived constantly with His disciples after the Resurrec-IIIa q. 55 a. 3 tion? Objection 1. It would seem that Christ ought to have have been more assured and consoled had He constantly lived constantly with His Disciples, because He appeared shown them His presence. Therefore it seems that He to them after His Resurrection in order to confirm their ought to have lived constantly with them. faith in the Resurrection, and to bring them comfort in Objection 2. Further, Christ rising from the dead did their disturbed state, according to Jn. 20:20: “The disci- not at once ascend to heaven, but after forty days, as is ples were glad when they saw the Lord.” But they would narrated in Acts 1:3. But meanwhile He could have been ∗ Gregory, Hom. xxv in Evang. 2387 in no more suitable place than where the disciples were tinually with the disciples was not because He deemed it met together. Therefore it seems that He ought to have more expedient for Him to be elsewhere: but because He lived with them continually. judged it to be more suitable for the apostles’ instruction Objection 3. Further, as Augustine says (De Consens. that He should not abide continually with them, for the Evang. iii), we read how Christ appeared five times on reason given above. But it is quite unknown in what places the very day of His Resurrection: first “to the women at He was bodily present in the meantime, since Scripture the sepulchre; secondly to the same on the way from the is silent, and His dominion is in every place (Cf. Ps. sepulchre; thirdly to Peter; fourthly to the two disciples 102:22). going to the town; fifthly to several of them in Jerusalem Reply to Objection 3. He appeared oftener on the when Thomas was not present.” Therefore it also seems first day, because the disciples were to be admonished by that He ought to have appeared several times on the other many proofs to accept the faith in His Resurrection from days before the Ascension. the very out set: but after they had once accepted it, they Objection 4. Further, our Lord had said to them be- had no further need of being instructed by so many appari- fore the Passion (Mat. 26:32): “But after I shall be risen tions. Accordingly one reads in the Gospel that after the again, I will go before you into Galilee”; moreover an an- first day He appeared again only five times. For, as Au- gel and our Lord Himself repeated the same to the women gustine says (De Consens. Evang. iii), after the first five after the Resurrection: nevertheless He was seen by them apparitions “He came again a sixth time when Thomas in Jerusalem on the very day of the Resurrection, as stated saw Him; a seventh time was by the sea of Tiberias at above (obj. 3); also on the eighth day, as we read in Jn. the capture of the fishes; the eighth was on the moun- 20:26. It seems, therefore, that He did not live with the tain of Galilee, according to Matthew; the ninth occasion disciples in a fitting way after the Resurrection. is expressed by Mark, ‘at length when they were at ta- On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 20:26) that “after ble,’ because no more were they going to eat with Him eight days” Christ appeared to the disciples. Therefore He upon earth; the tenth was on the very day, when no longer did not live constantly with them. upon the earth, but uplifted into the cloud, He was ascend- I answer that, Concerning the Resurrection two ing into heaven. But, as John admits, not all things were things had to be manifested to the disciples, namely, the written down. And He visited them frequently before He truth of the Resurrection, and the glory of Him who rose. went up to heaven,” in order to comfort them. Hence it is Now in order to manifest the truth of the Resurrection, it written (1 Cor. 15:6,7) that “He was seen by more than sufficed for Him to appear several times before them, to five hundred brethren at once. . . after that He was seen by speak familiarly to them, to eat and drink, and let them James”; of which apparitions no mention is made in the touch Him. But in order to manifest the glory of the risen Gospels. Christ, He was not desirous of living with them constantly Reply to Objection 4. Chrysostom in explaining Mat. as He had done before, lest it might seem that He rose 26:32—“after I shall be risen again, I will go before you unto the same life as before. Hence (Lk. 24:44) He said into Galilee,” says (Hom. lxxxiii in Matth.), “He goes to them: “These are the words which I spoke to you, while not to some far off region in order to appear to them, but I was yet with you.” For He was there with them by His among His own people, and in those very places” in which bodily presence, but hitherto He had been with them not for the most part they had lived with Him; “in order that merely by His bodily presence, but also in mortal sem- they might thereby believe that He who was crucified was blance. Hence Bede in explaining those words of Luke, the same as He who rose again.” And on this account “He “while I was with you,” says: “that is, while I was still in said that He would go into Galilee, that they might be de- mortal flesh, in which you are yet: for He had then risen in livered from fear of the Jews.” the same flesh, but was not in the same state of mortality Consequently, as Ambrose says (Expos. in Luc.), as they.” “The Lord had sent word to the disciples that they were Reply to Objection 1. Christ’s frequent appearing to see Him in Galilee; yet He showed Himself first to served to assure the disciples of the truth of the Resur- them when they were assembled together in the room out rection; but continual intercourse might have led them of fear. (Nor is there any breaking of a promise here, into the error of believing that He had risen to the same but rather a hastened fulfilling out of kindness)”∗: “after- life as was His before. Yet by His constant presence He wards, however, when their minds were comforted, they promised them comfort in another life, according to Jn. went into Galilee. Nor is there any reason to prevent us 16:22: “I will see you again, and your heart shall rejoice; from supposing that there were few in the room, and many and your joy no man shall take from you.” more on the mountain.” For, as Eusebius† says, “Two Reply to Objection 2. That Christ did not stay con- Evangelists, Luke and John, write that He appeared in ∗ Cf. Catena Aurea in Luc. xxiv, 36 † Of Caesarea; Cf. Migne, P. G., xxii, 1003 2388 Jerusalem to the eleven only; but the other two said that an them into Galilee,’ must be taken prophetically. For if we angel and our Saviour commanded not merely the eleven, take Galilee as meaning ‘a passing,’ we must understand but all the disciples and brethren, to go into Galilee. Paul that they were going to pass from the people of Israel to makes mention of them when he says (1 Cor. 15:6): ‘Then the Gentiles, who would not believe in the preaching of He appeared to more then five hundred brethren at once.’ ” the apostles unless He prepared the way for them in men’s The truer solution, however, is this, that while they were in hearts: and this is signified by the words ‘He shall go be- hiding in Jerusalem He appeared to them at first in order to fore you into Galilee.’ But if by Galilee we understand comfort them; but in Galilee it was not secretly, nor once ‘revelation,’ we are to understand this as applying to Him or twice, that He made Himself known to them with great not in the form of a servant, but in that form wherein He power, “showing Himself to them alive after His Passion, is equal to the Father, and which He has promised to them by many proofs,” as Luke says (Acts 1:3). Or as Augus- that love Him. Although He has gone before us in this tine writes (De Consens. Evang. iii): “What was said sense, He has not abandoned us.” by the angel and by our Lord—that He would ‘go before Whether Christ should have appeared to the disciples “in another shape”? IIIa q. 55 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ ought not to posed perceive them with a certain confusion of doubt or have appeared to the disciples “in another shape.” For error: “for, the sensual men perceiveth not those things a thing cannot appear in very truth other than it is. But that are of the Spirit of God,” as is said in 1 Cor. 2:14. there was only one shape in Christ. Therefore if He ap- Consequently, after His Resurrection Christ appeared in peared under another, it was not a true but a false appari- His own shape to some who were well disposed to belief, tion. Now this is not at all fitting, because as Augustine while He appeared in another shape to them who seemed says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 14): “If He deceives He is not the to be already growing tepid in their faith: hence these said Truth; yet Christ is the Truth.” Consequently, it seems (Lk. 24:21): “We hoped that it was He that should have that Christ ought not to have appeared to the disciples “in redeemed Israel.” Hence Gregory says (Hom. xxiii in another shape.” Evang.), that “He showed Himself to them in body such Objection 2. Further, nothing can appear in another as He was in their minds: for, because He was as yet a shape than the one it has, except the beholder’s eyes be stranger to faith in their hearts, He made pretense of go- captivated by some illusions. But since such illusions are ing on farther,” that is, as if He were a stranger. brought about by magical arts, they are unbecoming in Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Qq. Christ, according to what is written (2 Cor. 6:15): “What Evang. ii), “not everything of which we make pretense concord hath Christ with Belial?” Therefore it seems that is a falsehood; but when what we pretend has no meaning Christ ought not to have appeared in another shape. then is it a falsehood. But when our pretense has some sig- Objection 3. Further, just as our faith receives its nification, it is not a lie, but a figure of the truth; otherwise surety from Scripture, so were the disciples assured of everything said figuratively by wise and holy men, or even their faith in the Resurrection by Christ appearing to them. by our Lord Himself, would be set down as a falsehood, But, as Augustine says in an Epistle to Jerome (xxviii), because it is not customary to take such expressions in the if but one untruth be admitted into the Sacred Scripture, literal sense. And deeds, like words, are feigned without the whole authority of the Scriptures is weakened. Con- falsehood, in order to denote something else.” And so it sequently, if Christ appeared to the disciples, in but one happened here. as has been said. apparition, otherwise than He was, then whatever they Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Con- saw in Christ after the Resurrection will be of less im- sens. Evang. iii): “Our Lord could change His flesh so port, which is not fitting. Therefore He ought not to have that His shape really was other than they were accustomed appeared in another shape. to behold; for, before His Passion He was transfigured on On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 16:12): “After that the mountain, so that His face shone like the sun. But He appeared in another shape to two of them walking, as it did not happen thus now.” For not without reason do they were going into the country.” we “understand this hindrance in their eyes to have been I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,2), Christ’s Res- of Satan’s doing, lest Jesus might be recognized.” Hence urrection was to be manifested to men in the same way Luke says (24:16) that “their eyes were held, that they as Divine things are revealed. But Divine things are re- should not know Him.” vealed to men in various ways, according as they are vari- Reply to Objection 3. Such an argument would ously disposed. For, those who have minds well disposed, prove, if they had not been brought back from the sight of perceive Divine things rightly, whereas those not so dis- a strange shape to that of Christ’s true countenance. For, 2389 as Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. iii): “The per-nized.” Hence he goes on to say that “ ‘their eyes were mission was granted by Christ,” namely, that their eyes opened, and they knew Him’; not that they were hitherto should be held fast in the aforesaid way, “until the Sacra- walking with their eyes shut; but there was something in ment of the bread; that when they had shared in the unity them whereby they were not permitted to recognize what of His body, the enemy’s hindrance may be understood they saw. This could be caused by the darkness or by some to have been taken away, so that Christ might be recog- kind of humor.” Whether Christ should have demonstrated the truth of His Resurrection by proofs? IIIa q. 55 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ should which are written in the Law, and in the prophets, and in not have demonstrated the truth of His Resurrection by the Psalms, concerning Me”: as is set forth Lk. 24:44. proofs. For Ambrose says (De Fide, ad Gratian. i): “Let But if the term “proof” be taken in the second sense, there be no proofs where faith is required.” But faith is then Christ is said to have demonstrated His Resurrection required regarding the Resurrection. Therefore proofs are by proofs, inasmuch as by most evident signs He showed out of place there. that He was truly risen. Hence where our version has “by Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Hom. xxvi): many proofs,” the Greek text, instead of proof has tek- “Faith has no merit where human reason supplies the test.” merion, i.e. “an evident sign affording positive proof”‡. But it was no part of Christ’s office to void the merit of Now Christ showed these signs of the Resurrection to His faith. Consequently, it was not for Him to confirm the disciples, for two reasons. First, because their hearts were Resurrection by proofs. not disposed so as to accept readily the faith in the Resur- Objection 3. Further, Christ came into the world in rection. Hence He says Himself (Lk. 24:25): “O foolish order that men might attain beatitude through Him, ac- and slow of heart to believe”: and (Mk. 16:14): “He up- cording to Jn. 10:10: “I am come that they may have life, braided them with their incredulity and hardness of heart.” and may have it more abundantly.” But supplying proofs Secondly, that their testimony might be rendered more ef- seems to be a hindrance in the way of man’s beatitude; ficacious through the signs shown them, according to 1 Jn. because our Lord Himself said (Jn. 20:29): “Blessed are 1:1,3: “That which we have seen, and have heard, and our they that have not seen, and have believed.” Consequently, hands have handled. . . we declare.” it seems that Christ ought not to manifest His Resurrection Reply to Objection 1. Ambrose is speaking there of by any proofs. proofs drawn from human reason, which are useless for On the contrary, It is related in Acts 1:3, that Christ demonstrating things of faith, as was shown above. appeared to His disciples “for forty days by many proofs, Reply to Objection 2. The merit of faith arises from speaking of the Kingdom of God.” this, that at God’s bidding man believes what he does not I answer that, The word “proof” is susceptible of a see. Accordingly, only that reason debars merit of faith twofold meaning: sometimes it is employed to designate which enables one to see by knowledge what is proposed any sort “of reason in confirmation of what is a matter for belief: and this is demonstrative argument. But Christ of doubt”∗: and sometimes it means a sensible sign em- did not make use of any such argument for demonstrating ployed to manifest the truth; thus also Aristotle occasion- His Resurrection. ally uses the term in his works†. Taking “proof” in the Reply to Objection 3. As stated already (ad 2), the first sense, Christ did not demonstrate His Resurrection merit of beatitude, which comes of faith, is not entirely to the disciples by proofs, because such argumentative excluded except a man refuse to believe only such things proof would have to be grounded on some principles: and as he can see. But for a man to believe from visible signs if these were not known to the disciples, nothing would the things he does not see, does not entirely deprive him thereby be demonstrated to them, because nothing can be of faith nor of the merit of faith: just as Thomas, to whom known from the unknown. And if such principles were it was said (Jn. 20:29): “ ‘Because thou hast seen Me, known to them, they would not go beyond human reason, Thomas, thou hast believed,’ saw one thing and believed and consequently would not be efficacious for establish- another”§: the wounds were what he saw, God was the ing faith in the Resurrection, which is beyond human rea- object of His belief. But his is the more perfect faith son, since principles must be assumed which are of the who does not require such helps for belief. Hence, to same order, according to 1 Poster. But it was from the put to shame the faith of some men, our Lord said (Jn. authority of the Sacred Scriptures that He proved to them 4:48): “Unless you see signs and wonders, you believe the truth of His Resurrection, which authority is the basis not.” From this one can learn how they who are so ready of faith, when He said: “All things must needs be fulfilled to believe God, even without beholding signs, are blessed ∗ Tully, Topic. ii † Cf. Prior. Anal. ii; Rhetor. i ‡ Cf. Prior. Anal. ii § Gregory, Hom. xxvi 2390 in comparison with them who do not believe except they see the like. Whether the proofs which Christ made use of manifested sufficiently the truth of His IIIa q. 55 a. 6 Resurrection? Objection 1. It would seem that the proofs which sequently, the arguments for the Resurrection do not seem Christ made use of did not sufficiently manifest the truth to agree. of His Resurrection. For after the Resurrection Christ On the contrary, Christ, who is the Wisdom of God, showed nothing to His disciples which angels appearing “ordereth all things sweetly” and in a fitting manner, ac- to men did not or could not show; because angels have cording to Wis. 8:1. frequently shown themselves to men under human aspect, I answer that, Christ manifested His Resurrection in have spoken and lived with them, and eaten with them, two ways: namely, by testimony; and by proof or sign: just as if they were truly men, as is evident from Gene- and each manifestation was sufficient in its own class. For sis 18, of the angels whom Abraham entertained. and in in order to manifest His Resurrection He made use of a the Book of Tobias, of the angel who “conducted” him double testimony, neither of which can be rebutted. The “and brought” him back. Nevertheless, angels have not first of these was the angels’ testimony, who announced true bodies naturally united to them; which is required the Resurrection to the women, as is seen in all the Evan- for a resurrection. Consequently, the signs which Christ gelists: the other was the testimony of the Scriptures, showed His disciples were not sufficient for manifesting which He set before them to show the truth of the Res- His Resurrection. urrection, as is narrated in the last chapter of Luke. Objection 2. Further, Christ rose again gloriously, Again, the proofs were sufficient for showing that the that is, having a human nature with glory. But some of the Resurrection was both true and glorious. That it was a things which Christ showed to His disciples seem contrary true Resurrection He shows first on the part of the body; to human nature, as for instance, that “He vanished out of and this He shows in three respects; first of all, that it was their sight,” and entered in among them “when the doors a true and solid body, and not phantastic or rarefied, like were shut”: and some other things seem contrary to glory, the air. And He establishes this by offering His body to be as for instance, that He ate and drank, and bore the scars handled; hence He says in the last chapter of Luke (39): of His wounds. Consequently, it seems that those proofs “Handle and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as were neither sufficient nor fitting for establishing faith in you see Me to have.” Secondly, He shows that it was a the Resurrection. human body, by presenting His true features for them to Objection 3. Further, after the Resurrection Christ’s behold. Thirdly, He shows that it was identically the same body was such that it ought not to be touched by mor- body which He had before, by showing them the scars of tal man; hence He said to Magdalen (Jn. 20:17): “Do the wounds; hence, as we read in the last chapter of Luke not touch Me; for I am not yet ascended to My Father.” (39) he said to them: “See My hands and feet, that it is I Consequently, it was not fitting for manifesting the truth Myself.” of His Resurrection, that He should permit Himself to be Secondly, He showed them the truth of His Resurrec- handled by His disciples. tion on the part of His soul reunited with His body: and Objection 4. Further, clarity seems to be the princi- He showed this by the works of the threefold life. First pal of the qualities of a glorified body: yet He gave no of all, in the operations of the nutritive life, by eating and sign thereof in His Resurrection. Therefore it seems that drinking with His disciples, as we read in the last chapter those proofs were insufficient for showing the quality of of Luke. Secondly, in the works of the sensitive life, by Christ’s Resurrection. replying to His disciples’ questions, and by greeting them Objection 5. ∗ when they were in His presence, showing thereby that He Further, the angels introduced as witnesses for the both saw and heard; thirdly, in the works of the intellec- Resurrection seem insufficient from the want of agree- tive life by their conversing with Him, and discoursing on ment on the part of the Evangelists. Because in Matthew’s the Scriptures. And, in order that nothing might be want- account the angel is described as sitting upon the stone ing to make the manifestation complete, He also showed rolled back, while Mark states that he was seen after the that He had the Divine Nature, by working the miracle of women had entered the tomb; and again, whereas these the draught of fishes, and further by ascending into heaven mention one angel, John says that there were two sit- while they were beholding Him: because, according to Jn. ting, and Luke says that there were two standing. Con- 3:13: “No man hath ascended into heaven, but He that de- ∗ This objection is wanting in the older codices, and in the text of the Leonine edition, which, however, gives it in a note as taken from one of the more recent codices of the Vatican. 2391 scended from heaven, the Son of Man who is in heaven.” the Father. For to that man’s innermost perceptions He is, He also showed His disciples the glory of His Resur- in some sort, ascended unto the Father, who has become rection by entering in among them when the doors were so far proficient in Him, as to recognize in Him the equal closed: as Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.): “Our with the Father. . . whereas she as yet believed in Him but Lord allowed them to handle His flesh which He had carnally, since she wept for Him as for a man.” But when brought through closed doors, to show that His body was one reads elsewhere of Mary having touched Him, when of the same nature but of different glory.” It likewise was with the other women, she “ ‘came up and took hold of part of the property of glory that “He vanished suddenly His feet,’ that matters little,” as Severianus says∗, “for, the from their eyes,” as related in the last chapter of Luke; be-first act relates to figure, the other to sex; the former is of cause thereby it was shown that it lay in His power to be Divine grace, the latter of human nature.” Or as Chrysos- seen or not seen; and this belongs to a glorified body, as tom says (Hom. lxxxvi in Joan.): “This woman wanted to stated above (q. 54, a. 1, ad 2, a. 2, ad 1). converse with Christ just as before the Passion, and out of Reply to Objection 1. Each separate argument would joy was thinking of nothing great, although Christ’s flesh not suffice of itself for showing perfectly Christ’s Resur- had become much nobler by rising again.” And therefore rection, yet all taken collectively establish it completely, He said: “I have not yet ascended to My Father”; as if to especially owing to the testimonies of the Scriptures, the say: “Do not suppose I am leading an earthly life; for if sayings of the angels, and even Christ’s own assertion sup- you see Me upon earth, it is because I have not yet as- ported by miracles. As to the angels who appeared, they cended to My Father, but I am going to ascend shortly.” did not say they were men, as Christ asserted that He was Hence He goes on to say: “I ascend to My Father, and to truly a man. Moreover, the manner of eating was differ- your Father.” ent in Christ and the angels: for since the bodies assumed Reply to Objection 4. As Augustine says ad Orosium by the angels were neither living nor animated, there was (Dial. lxv, Qq.): “Our Lord rose in clarified flesh; yet He no true eating, although the food was really masticated did not wish to appear before the disciples in that condi- and passed into the interior of the assumed body: hence tion of clarity, because their eyes could not gaze upon that the angels said to Tobias (12:18,19): “When I was with brilliancy. For if before He died for us and rose again the you. . . I seemed indeed to eat and drink with you; but I disciples could not look upon Him when He was transfig- use an invisible meat.” But since Christ’s body was truly ured upon the mountain, how much less were they able to animated, His eating was genuine. For, as Augustine ob- gaze upon Him when our Lord’s flesh was glorified.” It serves (De Civ. Dei xiii), “it is not the power but the need must also be borne in mind that after His Resurrection our of eating that shall be taken away from the bodies of them Lord wished especially to show that He was the same as who rise again.” Hence Bede says on Lk. 24:41: “Christ had died; which the manifestation of His brightness would ate because He could, not because He needed.” have hindered considerably: because change of features Reply to Objection 2. As was observed above, some shows more than anything else the difference in the per- proofs were employed by Christ to prove the truth of His son seen: and this is because sight specially judges of the human nature, and others to show forth His glory in rising common sensibles, among which is one and many, or the again. But the condition of human nature, as considered same and different. But before the Passion, lest His dis- in itself, namely, as to its present state, is opposite to the ciples might despise its weakness, Christ meant to show condition of glory, as is said in 1 Cor. 15:43: “It is sown in them the glory of His majesty; and this the brightness weakness, it shall rise in power.” Consequently, the proofs of the body specially indicates. Consequently, before the brought forward for showing the condition of glory, seem Passion He showed the disciples His glory by brightness, to be in opposition to nature, not absolutely, but accord- but after the Resurrection by other tokens. ing to the present state, and conversely. Hence Gregory Reply to Objection 5. As Augustine says (De Con- says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.): “The Lord manifested two sens. Evang. iii): “We can understand one angel to have wonders, which are mutually contrary according to human been seen by the women, according to both Matthew and reason, when after the Resurrection He showed His body Mark, if we take them as having entered the sepulchre, as incorruptible and at the same time palpable.” that is, into some sort of walled enclosure, and that there Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (Tract. cxxi they saw an angel sitting upon the stone which was rolled super Joan.), “these words of our Lord, ‘Do not touch Me, back from the monument, as Matthew says; and that this is for I am not yet ascended to My Father,’ ” show “that in Mark’s expression—‘sitting on the right side’; afterwards that woman there is a figure of the Church of the Gentiles, when they scanned the spot where the Lord’s body had which did not believe in Christ until He was ascended to lain, they beheld two angels, who were at first seated, as the Father. Or Jesus would have men to believe in Him, John says, and who afterwards rose so as to be seen stand- i.e. to touch Him spiritually, as being Himself one with ing, as Luke relates.” ∗ Chrysologus, Serm. lxxvi 2392 THIRD PART, QUESTION 56 Of the Causality of Christ’s Resurrection (In Two Articles) We have now to consider the causality of Christ’s Resurrection, concerning which there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of our resurrection? (2) Whether it is the cause of our justification? Whether Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of our bodies? IIIa q. 56 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s Resurrection says: “Who is the efficient cause of our resurrection.” is not the cause of the resurrection of our bodies, because, I answer that, As stated in 2 Metaphysics, text 4: given a sufficient cause, the effect must follow of neces- “Whatever is first in any order, is the cause of all that come sity. If, then, Christ’s Resurrection be the sufficient cause after it.” But Christ’s Resurrection was the first in the or- of the resurrection of our bodies, then all the dead should der of our resurrection, as is evident from what was said have risen again as soon as He rose. above (q. 53, a. 3). Hence Christ’s Resurrection must be Objection 2. Further, Divine justice is the cause of the the cause of ours: and this is what the Apostle says (1 Cor. resurrection of the dead, so that the body may be rewarded 15:20,21): “Christ is risen from the dead, the first-fruits of or punished together with the soul, since they shared in them that sleep; for by a man came death, and by a man merit or sin, as Dionysius says (Eccles. Hier. vii) and the resurrection of the dead.” Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv). But God’s justice must And this is reasonable. Because the principle of hu- necessarily be accomplished, even if Christ had not risen. man life-giving is the Word of God, of whom it is said Therefore the dead would rise again even though Christ (Ps. 35:10): “With Thee is the fountain of life”: hence did not. Consequently Christ’s Resurrection is not the He Himself says (Jn. 5:21): “As the Father raiseth up cause of the resurrection of our bodies. the dead, and giveth life; so the Son also giveth life to Objection 3. Further, if Christ’s Resurrection be the whom He will.” Now the divinely established natural or- cause of the resurrection of our bodies, it would be either der is that every cause operates first upon what is near- the exemplar, or the efficient, or the meritorious cause. est to it, and through it upon others which are more re- Now it is not the exemplar cause; because it is God who mote; just as fire first heats the nearest air, and through will bring about the resurrection of our bodies, according it it heats bodies that are further off: and God Himself to Jn. 5:21: “The Father raiseth up the dead”: and God first enlightens those substances which are closer to Him, has no need to look at any exemplar cause outside Him- and through them others that are more remote, as Diony- self. In like manner it is not the efficient cause; because sius says (Coel. Hier. xiii). Consequently, the Word of an efficient cause acts only through contact, whether spiri- God first bestows immortal life upon that body which is tual or corporeal. Now it is evident that Christ’s Resurrec- naturally united with Himself, and through it works the tion has no corporeal contact with the dead who shall rise resurrection in all other bodies. again, owing to distance of time and place; and similarly Reply to Objection 1. As was stated above, Christ’s it has no spiritual contact, which is through faith and char- Resurrection is the cause of ours through the power of the ity, because even unbelievers and sinners shall rise again. united Word, who operates according to His will. And Nor again is it the meritorious cause, because when Christ consequently, it is not necessary for the effect to follow at rose He was no longer a wayfarer, and consequently not once, but according as the Word of God disposes, namely, in a state of merit. Therefore, Christ’s Resurrection does that first of all we be conformed to the suffering and dy- not appear to be in any way the cause of ours. ing Christ in this suffering and mortal life; and afterwards Objection 4. Further, since death is the privation of may come to share in the likeness of His Resurrection. life, then to destroy death seems to be nothing else than to Reply to Objection 2. God’s justice is the first cause bring life back again; and this is resurrection. But “by dy- of our resurrection, whereas Christ’s Resurrection is the ing, Christ destroyed our death”∗. Consequently, Christ’s secondary, and as it were the instrumental cause. But al- death, not His Resurrection, is the cause of our resurrec- though the power of the principal cause is not restricted to tion. one instrument determinately, nevertheless since it works On the contrary, on 1 Cor. 15:12: “Now if Christ through this instrument, such instrument causes the effect. be preached, that He rose again from the dead,” the gloss So, then, the Divine justice in itself is not tied down to ∗ Preface of Mass in Paschal Time 2393 Christ’s Resurrection as a means of bringing about our its personal union with the Word, is first in point of time, resurrection: because God could deliver us in some other so also is it first in dignity and perfection; as the gloss says way than through Christ’s Passion and Resurrection, as on 1 Cor. 15:20,23. But whatever is most perfect is always already stated (q. 46, a. 2). But having once decreed to the exemplar, which the less perfect copies according to deliver us in this way, it is evident that Christ’s Resurrec- its mode; consequently Christ’s Resurrection is the exem- tion is the cause of ours. plar of ours. And this is necessary, not on the part of Him Reply to Objection 3. Properly speaking, Christ’s who rose again, who needs no exemplar, but on the part of Resurrection is not the meritorious cause, but the efficient them who are raised up, who must be likened to that Res- and exemplar cause of our resurrection. It is the efficient urrection, according to Phil. 3:21: “He will reform the cause, inasmuch as Christ’s humanity, according to which body of our lowness, made like to the body of His glory.” He rose again, is as it were the instrument of His Godhead, Now although the efficiency of Christ’s Resurrection ex- and works by Its power, as stated above (q. 13, Aa. 2,3). tends to the resurrection of the good and wicked alike, still And therefore, just as all other things which Christ did its exemplarity extends properly only to the just, who are and endured in His humanity are profitable to our salva- made conformable with His Sonship, according to Rom. tion through the power of the Godhead, as already stated 8:29. (q. 48, a. 6), so also is Christ’s Resurrection the efficient Reply to Objection 4. Considered on the part of their cause of ours, through the Divine power whose office it is efficiency, which is dependent on the Divine power, both to quicken the dead; and this power by its presence is in Christ’s death and His Resurrection are the cause both of touch with all places and times; and such virtual contact the destruction of death and of the renewal of life: but con- suffices for its efficiency. And since, as was stated above sidered as exemplar causes, Christ’s death—by which He (ad 2), the primary cause of human resurrection is the Di- withdrew from mortal life—is the cause of the destruction vine justice, from which Christ has “the power of passing of our death; while His Resurrection, whereby He inaugu- judgment, because He is the Son of Man” (Jn. 5:27); the rated immortal life, is the cause of the repairing of our life. efficient power of His Resurrection extends to the good But Christ’s Passion is furthermore a meritorious cause, as and wicked alike, who are subject to His judgment. stated above (q. 48, a. 1). But just as the Resurrection of Christ’s body, through Whether Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of souls? IIIa q. 56 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s Resurrection Passion even more than His Resurrection is the cause of is not the cause of the resurrection of souls, because Au- the resurrection of souls. gustine says (Tract. xxiii super Joan.) that “bodies rise by On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 4:25): “He His human dispensation, but souls rise by the Substance rose again for our justification,” which is nothing else than of God.” But Christ’s Resurrection does not belong to the resurrection of souls: and on Ps. 29:6: “In the evening God’s Substance, but to the dispensation of His humanity. weeping shall have place,” the gloss says, “Christ’s Res- Therefore, although Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of urrection is the cause of ours, both of the soul at present, bodies rising, nevertheless it does not seem to be the cause and of the body in the future.” of the resurrection of souls. I answer that, As stated above, Christ’s Resurrection Objection 2. Further, a body does not act upon a works in virtue of the Godhead; now this virtue extends spirit. But the Resurrection belongs to His body, which not only to the resurrection of bodies, but also to that of death laid low. Therefore His Resurrection is not the cause souls: for it comes of God that the soul lives by grace, and of the resurrection of souls. that the body lives by the soul. Consequently, Christ’s Objection 3. Further, since Christ’s Resurrection is Resurrection has instrumentally an effective power not the cause why bodies rise again, the bodies of all men only with regard to the resurrection of bodies, but also shall rise again, according to 1 Cor. 15:51: “We shall all with respect to the resurrection of souls. In like fashion indeed rise again.” But the souls of all will not rise again, it is an exemplar cause with regard to the resurrection of because according to Mat. 25:46: “some shall go into ev- souls, because even in our souls we must be conformed erlasting punishment.” Therefore Christ’s Resurrection is with the rising Christ: as the Apostle says (Rom. 6:4-11) not the cause of the resurrection of souls. “Christ is risen from the dead by the glory of the Father, so Objection 4. Further, the resurrection of souls comes we also may walk in newness of life”: and as He, “rising of the forgiveness of sins. But this was effected by again from the dead, dieth now no more, so let us reckon Christ’s Passion, according to Apoc. 1:5: “He washed us that we (Vulg.: ‘you’)” are dead to sin, that we may “live from our sins in His own blood.” Consequently, Christ’s together with Him.” 2394 Reply to Objection 1. Augustine says that the resur-and therefore He raises up all as to their bodies, but not as rection of souls is wrought by God’s Substance, as to par- to their souls. ticipation, because souls become good and just by sharing Reply to Objection 4. Two things concur in the jus- in the Divine goodness, but not by sharing in anything tification of souls, namely, forgiveness of sin and new- created. Accordingly, after saying that souls rise by the ness of life through grace. Consequently, as to efficacy, Divine Substance, he adds: the soul is beatified by a par- which comes of the Divine power, the Passion as well as ticipation with God, and not by a participation with a holy the Resurrection of Christ is the cause of justification as soul. But our bodies are made glorious by sharing in the to both the above. But as to exemplarity, properly speak- glory of Christ’s body. ing Christ’s Passion and death are the cause of the for- Reply to Objection 2. The efficacy of Christ’s Res- giveness of guilt, by which forgiveness we die unto sin: urrection reaches souls not from any special virtue of His whereas Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of newness of risen body, but from the virtue of the Godhead personally life, which comes through grace or justice: consequently, united with it. the Apostle says (Rom. 4:25) that “He was delivered up,” Reply to Objection 3. The resurrection of souls per- i.e. to death, “for our sins,” i.e. to take them away, “and tains to merit, which is the effect of justification; but the rose again for our justification.” But Christ’s Passion was resurrection of bodies is ordained for punishment or re- also a meritorious cause, as stated above (a. 1, ad 4; q. 48, ward, which are the effects of Him who judges. Now it a. 1). belongs to Christ, not to justify all men, but to judge them: 2395 THIRD PART, QUESTION 57 Of the Ascension of Christ (In Six Articles) We have now to consider Christ’s Ascension: concerning which there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether it belonged for Christ to ascend into heaven? (2) According to which nature did it become Him to ascend? (3) Whether He ascended by His own power? (4) Whether He ascended above all the corporeal heavens? (5) Whether He ascended above all spiritual creatures? (6) Of the effect of the Ascension. Whether it was fitting for Christ to ascend into heaven? IIIa q. 57 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting for Reply to Objection 1. That which is best and pos- Christ to ascend into heaven. For the Philosopher says (De sesses its good without movement is God Himself, be- Coelo ii) that “things which are in a state of perfection cause He is utterly unchangeable, according to Malachi possess their good without movement.” But Christ was 3:6: “I am the Lord, and I change not.” But every creature in a state of perfection, since He is the Sovereign Good is changeable in some respect, as is evident from Augus- in respect of His Divine Nature, and sovereignly glorified tine (Gen. ad lit. viii). And since the nature assumed by in respect of His human nature. Consequently, He has the Son of God remained a creature, as is clear from what His good without movement. But ascension is movement. was said above (q. 2, a. 7; q. 16, Aa. 8,10; q. 20, a. 1 ), it Therefore it was not fitting for Christ to ascend. is not unbecoming if some movement be attributed to it. Objection 2. Further, whatever is moved, is moved on Reply to Objection 2. By ascending into heaven account of something better. But it was no better thing for Christ acquired no addition to His essential glory either Christ to be in heaven than upon earth, because He gained in body or in soul: nevertheless He did acquire something nothing either in soul or in body by being in heaven. as to the fittingness of place, which pertains to the well- Therefore it seems that Christ should not have ascended being of glory: not that His body acquired anything from into heaven. a heavenly body by way of perfection or preservation; but Objection 3. Further, the Son of God took human merely out of a certain fittingness. Now this in a measure flesh for our salvation. But it would have been more ben- belonged to His glory; and He had a certain kind of joy eficial for men if He had tarried always with us upon earth; from such fittingness, not indeed that He then began to thus He said to His disciples (Lk. 17:22): “The days will derive joy from it when He ascended into heaven, but that come when you shall desire to see one day of the Son of He rejoiced thereat in a new way, as at a thing completed. man; and you shall not see it.” Therefore it seems unfitting Hence, on Ps. 15:11: “At Thy right hand are delights even for Christ to have ascended into heaven. unto the end,” the gloss says: “I shall delight in sitting Objection 4. Further, as Gregory says (Moral. xiv), nigh to Thee, when I shall be taken away from the sight Christ’s body was in no way changed after the Resurrec- of men.” tion. But He did not ascend into heaven immediately after Reply to Objection 3. Although Christ’s bodily pres- rising again, for He said after the Resurrection (Jn. 20:17): ence was withdrawn from the faithful by the Ascension, “I am not yet ascended to My Father.” Therefore it seems still the presence of His Godhead is ever with the faithful, that neither should He have ascended after forty days. as He Himself says (Mat. 28:20): “Behold, I am with you On the contrary, Are the words of our Lord (Jn. all days, even to the consummation of the world.” For, “by 20:17): “I ascend to My Father and to your Father.” ascending into heaven He did not abandon those whom He I answer that, The place ought to be in keeping adopted,” as Pope Leo says (De Resurrec., Serm. ii). But with what is contained therein. Now by His Resurrection Christ’s Ascension into heaven, whereby He withdrew His Christ entered upon an immortal and incorruptible life. bodily presence from us, was more profitable for us than But whereas our dwelling-place is one of generation and His bodily presence would have been. corruption, the heavenly place is one of incorruption. And First of all, in order to increase our faith, which is of consequently it was not fitting that Christ should remain things unseen. Hence our Lord said (Jn. 26) that the Holy upon earth after the Resurrection; but it was fitting that He Ghost shall come and “convince the world. . . of justice,” should ascend to heaven. that is, of the justice “of those that believe,” as Augustine 2396 says (Tract. xcv super Joan.): “For even to put the faithful since the Holy Ghost is love drawing us up to heavenly beside the unbeliever is to put the unbeliever to shame”; things, therefore our Lord said to His disciples (Jn. 16:7): wherefore he goes on to say (10): “ ‘Because I go to the “It is expedient to you that I go; for if I go not, the Para- Father; and you shall see Me no longer’ ”—“For ‘blessed clete will not come to you; but if I go, I will send Him to are they that see not, yet believe.’ Hence it is of our jus- you.” On which words Augustine says (Tract. xciv super tice that the world is reproved: because ‘you will believe Joan.): “Ye cannot receive the Spirit, so long as ye persist in Me whom you shall not see.’ ” in knowing Christ according to the flesh. But when Christ Secondly, to uplift our hope: hence He says (Jn. 14:3): withdrew in body, not only “If I shall go, and prepare a place for you, I will come the Holy Ghost, but both Father and Son were present again, and will take you to Myself; that where I am, you with them spiritually.” also may be.” For by placing in heaven the human na- Reply to Objection 4. Although a heavenly place be- ture which He assumed, Christ gave us the hope of going fitted Christ when He rose to immortal life, nevertheless thither; since “wheresoever the body shall be, there shall He delayed the Ascension in order to confirm the truth of the eagles also be gathered together,” as is written in Mat. His Resurrection. Hence it is written (Acts 1:3), that “He 24:28. Hence it is written likewise (Mic. 2:13): “He shall showed Himself alive after His Passion, by many proofs, go up that shall open the way before them.” for forty days appearing to them”: upon which the gloss Thirdly, in order to direct the fervor of our charity to says that “because He was dead for forty hours, during heavenly things. Hence the Apostle says (Col. 3:1,2): forty days He established the fact of His being alive again. “Seek the things that are above, where Christ is sitting at Or the forty days may be understood as a figure of this the right hand of God. Mind the things that are above, world, wherein Christ dwells in His Church: inasmuch as not the things that are upon the earth”: for as is said (Mat. man is made out of the four elements, and is cautioned not 6:21): “Where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also.” And to transgress the Decalogue.” Whether Christ’s Ascension into heaven belonged to Him according to His Divine IIIa q. 57 a. 2 Nature? Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s Ascension and the cause of his ascension. When taken to express into heaven belonged to Him according to His Divine Na- the condition of the one ascending, the Ascension in no ture. For, it is written (Ps. 46:6): “God is ascended with wise belongs to Christ according to the condition of His jubilee”: and (Dt. 33:26): “He that is mounted upon the Divine Nature; both because there is nothing higher than heaven is thy helper.” But these words were spoken of the Divine Nature to which He can ascend; and because God even before Christ’s Incarnation. Therefore it be- ascension is local motion, a thing not in keeping with the longs to Christ to ascend into heaven as God. Divine Nature, which is immovable and outside all place. Objection 2. Further, it belongs to the same person Yet the Ascension is in keeping with Christ according to to ascend into heaven as to descend from heaven, accord- His human nature, which is limited by place, and can be ing to Jn. 3:13: “No man hath ascended into heaven, but the subject of motion. In this sense, then, we can say that He that descended from heaven”: and Eph. 4:10: “He Christ ascended into heaven as man, but not as God. that descended is the same also that ascended.” But Christ But if the phrase “according to” denote the cause of came down from heaven not as man, but as God: because the Ascension, since Christ ascended into heaven in virtue previously His Nature in heaven was not human, but Di- of His Godhead, and not in virtue of His human nature, vine. Therefore it seems that Christ ascended into heaven then it must be said that Christ ascended into heaven not as God. as man, but as God. Hence Augustine says in a sermon Objection 3. Further, by His Ascension Christ as- on the Ascension: “It was our doing that the Son of man cended to the Father. But it was not as man that He rose hung upon the cross; but it was His own doing that He to equality with the Father; for in this respect He says: ascended.” “He is greater than I,” as is said in Jn. 14:28. Therefore it Reply to Objection 1. These utterances were spoken seems that Christ ascended as God. prophetically of God who was one day to become incar- On the contrary, on Eph. 4:10: “That He ascended, nate. Still it can be said that although to ascend does not what is it, but because He also descended,” a gloss says: belong to the Divine Nature properly, yet it can metaphor- “It is clear that He descended and ascended according to ically; as, for instance, it is said “to ascend in the heart of His humanity.” man” (cf. Ps. 83:6), when his heart submits and humbles I answer that, The expression “according to” can de- itself before God: and in the same way God is said to as- note two things; the condition of the one who ascends, cend metaphorically with regard to every creature, since 2397 He subjects it to Himself. He is said to have descended from heaven, not that He de- Reply to Objection 2. He who ascended is the same serted heaven, but because He assumed human nature in as He who descended. For Augustine says (De Symb. iv): unity of person. “Who is it that descends? The God-Man. Who is it that as- And there is another descent whereby He descended cends? The self-same God-Man.” Nevertheless a twofold “into the lower regions of the earth,” as is written Eph. descent is attributed to Christ; one, whereby He is said 4:9; and this is local descent: hence this belongs to Christ to have descended from heaven, which is attributed to the according to the condition of human nature. God-Man according as He is God: for He is not to be un- Reply to Objection 3. Christ is said to ascend to the derstood as having descended by any local movement, but Father, inasmuch as He ascends to sit on the right hand as having “emptied Himself,” since “when He was in the of the Father; and this is befitting Christ in a measure ac- form of God He took the form of a servant.” For just as cording to His Divine Nature, and in a measure according He is said to be emptied, not by losing His fulness, but to His human nature, as will be said later (q. 58, a. 3) because He took our littleness upon Himself, so likewise Whether Christ ascended by His own power? IIIa q. 57 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ did not ascend such power as this. The other is the power of glory, which by His own power, because it is written (Mk. 16:19) that is in Christ’s human nature; and it was according to this “the Lord Jesus, after He had spoken to them, was taken that He ascended to heaven. up to heaven”; and (Acts 1:9) that, “while they looked Now there are some who endeavor to assign the cause on, He was raised up, and a cloud received Him out of of this power to the nature of the fifth essence. This, as their sight.” But what is taken up, and lifted up, appears they say, is light, which they make out to be of the compo- to be moved by another. Consequently, it was not by His sition of the human body, and by which they contend that own power, but by another’s that Christ was taken up into contrary elements are reconciled; so that in the state of heaven. this mortality, elemental nature is predominant in human Objection 2. Further, Christ’s was an earthly body, bodies: so that, according to the nature of this predom- like to ours. But it is contrary to the nature of an earthly inating element the human body is borne downwards by body to be borne upwards. Moreover, what is moved con- its own power: but in the condition of glory the heavenly trary to its nature is nowise moved by its own power. nature will predominate, by whose tendency and power Therefore Christ did not ascend to heaven by His own Christ’s body and the bodies of the saints are lifted up to power. heaven. But we have already treated of this opinion in the Objection 3. Further, Christ’s own power is Divine. Ia, q. 76, a. 7, and shall deal with it more fully in treating But this motion does not seem to have been Divine, be- of the general resurrection ( Suppl., q. 84, a. 1). cause, whereas the Divine power is infinite, such motion Setting this opinion aside, others assign as the cause would be instantaneous; consequently, He would not have of this power the glorified soul itself, from whose over- been uplifted to heaven “while” the disciples “looked on,” flow the body will be glorified, as Augustine writes to as is stated in Acts 1:9. Therefore, it seems that Christ did Dioscorus (Ep. cxviii). For the glorified body will be so not ascend to heaven by His own power. submissive to the glorified soul, that, as Augustine says On the contrary, It is written (Is. 63:1): “This beau- (De Civ. Dei xxii), “wheresoever the spirit listeth, thither tiful one in his robe, walking in the greatness of his the body will be on the instant; nor will the spirit desire strength.” Also Gregory says in a Homily on the Ascen- anything unbecoming to the soul or the body.” Now it is sion (xxix): “It is to be noted that we read of Elias having befitting the glorified and immortal body for it to be in ascended in a chariot, that it might be shown that one who a heavenly place, as stated above (a. 1). Consequently, was mere man needed another’s help. But we do not read Christ’s body ascended into heaven by the power of His of our Saviour being lifted up either in a chariot or by an- soul willing it. But as the body is made glorious by par- gels, because He who had made all things was taken up ticipation with the soul, even so, as Augustine says (Tract. above all things by His own power.” xxiii in Joan.), “the soul is beatified by participating in I answer that, There is a twofold nature in Christ, to God.” Consequently, the Divine power is the first source wit, the Divine and the human. Hence His own power of the ascent into heaven. Therefore Christ ascended into can be accepted according to both. Likewise a twofold heaven by His own power, first of all by His Divine power, power can be accepted regarding His human nature: one and secondly by the power of His glorified soul moving is natural, flowing from the principles of nature; and it His body at will. is quite evident that Christ did not ascend into heaven by Reply to Objection 1. As Christ is said to have risen 2398 by His own power, though He was raised to life by the natural or forced in a glorified body, whose entire nature power of the Father, since the Father’s power is the same is utterly under the control of the spirit. as the Son’s; so also Christ ascended into heaven by His Reply to Objection 3. Although the Divine power be own power, and yet was raised up and taken up to heaven infinite, and operate infinitely, so far as the worker is con- by the Father. cerned, still the effect thereof is received in things accord- Reply to Objection 2. This argument proves that ing to their capacity, and as God disposes. Now a body Christ did not ascend into heaven by His own power, i.e. is incapable of being moved locally in an instant, because that which is natural to human nature: yet He did ascend it must be commensurate with space, according to the di- by His own power, i.e. His Divine power, as well as by vision of which time is reckoned, as is proved in Physics His own power, i.e. the power of His beatified soul. And vi. Consequently, it is not necessary for a body moved by although to mount upwards is contrary to the nature of a God to be moved instantaneously, but with such speed as human body in its present condition, in which the body is God disposes. not entirely dominated by the soul, still it will not be un- Whether Christ ascended above all the heavens? IIIa q. 57 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ did not ascend glory the body derives a greater share in the Divine good- above all the heavens, for it is written (Ps. 10:5): “The ness than any other natural body does through its natural Lord is in His holy temple, the Lord’s throne is in heaven.” form; while among other glorious bodies it is manifest But what is in heaven is not above heaven. Therefore that Christ’s body shines with greater glory. Hence it was Christ did not ascend above all the heavens. most fitting for it to be set above all bodies. Thus it is Objection 2. ∗ that on Eph. 4:8: “Ascending on high,” the gloss says: “in Further, there is no place above the heavens, as is place and dignity.” proved in De Coelo i. But every body must occupy a Reply to Objection 1. God’s seat is said to be in place. Therefore Christ’s body did not ascend above all heaven, not as though heaven contained Him, but rather the heavens. because it is contained by Him. Hence it is not neces- Objection 3. Further, two bodies cannot occupy the sary for any part of heaven to be higher, but for Him to same place. Since, then, there is no passing from place be above all the heavens; according to Ps. 8:2: “For Thy to place except through the middle space, it seems that magnificence is elevated above the heavens, O God!” Christ could not have ascended above all the heavens un- Reply to Objection 2.† less heaven were divided; which is impossible. A place implies the notion of containing; hence the Objection 4. Further, it is narrated (Acts 1:9) that “a first container has the formality of first place, and such cloud received Him out of their sight.” But clouds cannot is the first heaven. Therefore bodies need in themselves be uplifted beyond heaven. Consequently, Christ did not to be in a place, in so far as they are contained by a heav- ascend above all the heavens. enly body. But glorified bodies, Christ’s especially, do not Objection 5. Further, we believe that Christ will dwell stand in need of being so contained, because they draw for ever in the place whither He has ascended. But what nothing from the heavenly bodies, but from God through is against nature cannot last for ever, because what is ac- the soul. So there is nothing to prevent Christ’s body from cording to nature is more prevalent and of more frequent being beyond the containing radius of the heavenly bod- occurrence. Therefore, since it is contrary to nature for ies, and not in a containing place. Nor is there need for an earthly body to be above heaven, it seems that Christ’s a vacuum to exist outside heaven, since there is no place body did not ascend above heaven. there, nor is there any potentiality susceptive of a body, On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:10): “He as- but the potentiality of reaching thither lies in Christ. So cended above all the heavens that He might fill all things.” when Aristotle proves (De Coelo ii) that there is no body I answer that, The more fully anything corporeal beyond heaven, this must be understood of bodies which shares in the Divine goodness, the higher its place in the are in a state of pure nature, as is seen from the proofs. corporeal order, which is order of place. Hence we see Reply to Objection 3. Although it is not of the na- that the more formal bodies are naturally the higher, as ture of a body for it to be in the same place with another is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. iv; De Coelo ii), body, yet God can bring it about miraculously that a body since it is by its form that every body partakes of the be with another in the same place, as Christ did when He Divine Essence, as is shown in Physics i. But through went forth from the Virgin’s sealed womb, also when He ∗ This objection with its solution is omitted in the Leonine edition as not being in the original manuscript. † Omitted in Leonine edition; see obj. 2 2399 entered among the disciples through closed doors, as Gre-in a cloud over the Tabernacle (Ex. 40:32; Num. 9:15). gory says (Hom. xxvi). Therefore Christ’s body can be Reply to Objection 5. A glorified body has the power in the same place with another body, not through some to be in heaven or above heaven. not from its natural prin- inherent property in the body, but through the assistance ciples, but from the beatified soul, from which it derives and operation of the Divine power. its glory: and just as the upward motion of a glorified body Reply to Objection 4. That cloud afforded no support is not violent, so neither is its rest violent: consequently, as a vehicle to the ascending Christ: but it appeared as a there is nothing to prevent it from being everlasting. sign of the Godhead, just as God’s glory appeared to Israel Whether Christ’s body ascended above every spiritual creature? IIIa q. 57 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s body did heavenly place which is the highest of places is becom- not ascend above every spiritual creature. For no fitting ingly due to spiritual substances, since they are highest in comparison can be made between things which have no the order of substances. But although Christ’s body is be- common ratio. But place is not predicated in the same ra- neath spiritual substances, if we weigh the conditions of tio of bodies and of spiritual creatures, as is evident from its corporeal nature, nevertheless it surpasses all spiritual what was said in the Ia, q. 8, a. 2, ad 1,2; Ia, q. 52, a. 1. substances in dignity, when we call to mind its dignity Therefore it seems that Christ’s body cannot be said to of union whereby it is united personally with God. Con- have ascended above every spiritual creature. sequently, owing to this very fittingness, a higher place Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. is due to it above every spiritual creature. Hence Gre- lv) that a spirit always takes precedence over a body. But gory says in a Homily on the Ascension (xxix in Evang.) the higher place is due to the higher things. Therefore it that “He who had made all things, was by His own power does not seem that Christ ascended above every spiritual raised up above all things.” creature. Reply to Objection 1. Although a place is differently Objection 3. Further, in every place a body exists, attributed to corporeal and spiritual substances, still in ei- since there is no such thing as a vacuum in nature. There- ther case this remains in common, that the higher place is fore if no body obtains a higher place than a spirit in assigned to the worthier. the order of natural bodies, then there will be no place Reply to Objection 2. This argument holds good of above every spiritual creature. Consequently, Christ’s Christ’s body according to the conditions of its corporeal body could not ascend above every spiritual creature. nature, but not according to its formality of union. On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 1:21): “God set Reply to Objection 3. This comparison may be con- Him above all principality, and Power, and every name sidered either on the part of the places; and thus there is that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which no place so high as to exceed the dignity of a spiritual is to come.” substance: in this sense the objection runs. Or it may be I answer that, The more exalted place is due to the considered on the part of the dignity of the things to which nobler subject, whether it be a place according to bod- a place is attributed: and in this way it is due to the body ily contact, as regards bodies, or whether it be by way of Christ to be above spiritual creatures. of spiritual contact, as regards spiritual substances; thus a Whether Christ’s Ascension is the cause of our salvation? IIIa q. 57 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s Ascension is ten (Heb. 10:19): “We have [Vulg.: ‘Having’] confidence not the cause of our salvation. For, Christ was the cause in the entering into the holies by” His “blood.” Therefore of our salvation in so far as He merited it. But He mer- it seems that Christ’s Ascension was not the cause of our ited nothing for us by His Ascension, because His Ascen- salvation. sion belongs to the reward of His exaltation: and the same Objection 3. Further, the salvation which Christ be- thing is not both merit and reward, just as neither are a stows is an everlasting one, according to Is. 51:6: “My road and its terminus the same. Therefore it seems that salvation shall be for ever.” But Christ did not ascend into Christ’s Ascension is not the cause of our salvation. heaven to remain there eternally; for it is written (Acts Objection 2. Further, if Christ’s Ascension be the 1:11): “He shall so come as you have seen Him going, cause of our salvation, it seems that this is principally due into heaven.” Besides, we read of Him showing Himself to the fact that His Ascension is the cause of ours. But to many holy people on earth after He went up to heaven. this was bestowed upon us by His Passion, for it is writ- to Paul, for instance (Acts 9). Consequently, it seems that 2400 Christ’s Ascension is not the cause of our salvation. cession for us,” as is said in Heb. 7:25. Because the very On the contrary, He Himself said (Jn. 16:7): “It is showing of Himself in the human nature which He took expedient to you that I go”; i.e. that I should leave you with Him to heaven is a pleading for us. so that for the and ascend into heaven. very reason that God so exalted human nature in Christ, I answer that, Christ’s Ascension is the cause of our He may take pity on them for whom the Son of God took salvation in two ways: first of all, on our part; secondly, human nature. Thirdly, that being established in His heav- on His. enly seat as God and Lord, He might send down gifts upon On our part, in so far as by the Ascension our souls men, according to Eph. 4:10: “He ascended above all the are uplifted to Him; because, as stated above (a. 1, ad 3), heavens, that He might fill all things,” that is, “with His His Ascension fosters, first, faith; secondly, hope; thirdly, gifts,” according to the gloss. charity. Fourthly, our reverence for Him is thereby in- Reply to Objection 1. Christ’s Ascension is the cause creased, since we no longer deem Him an earthly man, but of our salvation by way not of merit, but of efficiency, as the God of heaven; thus the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:16): was stated above regarding His Resurrection (q. 56, a. 1, “If we have known Christ according to the flesh—‘that is, ad 3,4). as mortal, whereby we reputed Him as a mere man,’ ” as Reply to Objection 2. Christ’s Passion is the cause the gloss interprets the words—“but now we know Him of our ascending to heaven, properly speaking, by remov- so no longer.” ing the hindrance which is sin, and also by way of merit: On His part, in regard to those things which, in as- whereas Christ’s Ascension is the direct cause of our as- cending, He did for our salvation. First, He prepared the cension, as by beginning it in Him who is our Head, with way for our ascent into heaven, according to His own say- whom the members must be united. ing (Jn. 14:2): “I go to prepare a place for you,” and the Reply to Objection 3. Christ by once ascending into words of Micheas (2:13), “He shall go up that shall open heaven acquired for Himself and for us in perpetuity the the way before them.” For since He is our Head the mem- right and worthiness of a heavenly dwelling-place; which bers must follow whither the Head has gone: hence He worthiness suffers in no way, if, from some special dis- said (Jn. 14:3): “That where I am, you also may be.” In pensation, He sometimes comes down in body to earth; sign whereof He took to heaven the souls of the saints de- either in order to show Himself to the whole world, as livered from hell, according to Ps. 67:19 (Cf. Eph. 4:8): at the judgment; or else to show Himself particularly to “Ascending on high, He led captivity captive,” because He some individual, e.g. in Paul’s case, as we read in Acts took with Him to heaven those who had been held captives 9. And lest any man may think that Christ was not bod- by the devil—to heaven, as to a place strange to human na- ily present when this occurred, the contrary is shown from ture. captives in deed of a happy taking, since they were what the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 14:8, to confirm faith in acquired by His victory. the Resurrection: “Last of all He was seen also by me, Secondly, because as the high-priest under the Old as by one born out of due time”: which vision would not Testament entered the holy place to stand before God for confirm the truth of the Resurrection except he had beheld the people, so also Christ entered heaven “to make inter- Christ’s very body. 2401 THIRD PART, QUESTION 58 Of Christ’s Sitting at the Right Hand of the Father (In Four Articles) WE have now to consider Christ’s sitting at the right hand of the Father, concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ is seated at the right hand of the Father? (2) Whether this belongs to Him according to the Divine Nature? (3) Whether it belongs to Him according to His human nature? (4) Whether it is something proper to Christ? Whether it is fitting that Christ should sit at the right hand of God the Father? IIIa q. 58 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem unfitting that Christ years’: Believe, then, that Christ dwells so at the right should sit at the right hand of God the Father. For right hand of the Father: for He is happy, and the Father’s right and left are differences of bodily position. But nothing hand is the name for His bliss.” Secondly, Christ is said to corporeal can be applied to God, since “God is a spirit,” sit at the right hand of the Father inasmuch as He reigns as we read in Jn. 4:24. Therefore it seems that Christ does together with the Father, and has judiciary power from not sit at the right hand of the Father. Him; just as he who sits at the king’s right hand helps him Objection 2. Further, if anyone sits at another’s right in ruling and judging. Hence Augustine says (De Symb. hand, then the latter is seated on his left. Consequently, if ii): “By the expression ‘right hand,’ understand the power Christ sits at the right hand of the Father, it follows that the which this Man, chosen of God, received, that He might Father is seated on the left of the Son; which is unseemly. come to judge, who before had come to be judged.” Objection 3. Further, sitting and standing savor of op- Reply to Objection 1. As Damascene says (De Fide position. But Stephen (Acts 7:55) said: “Behold, I see the Orth. iv): “We do not speak of the Father’s right hand as heavens opened, and the Son of man standing on the right of a place, for how can a place be designated by His right hand of God.” Therefore it seems that Christ does not sit hand, who Himself is beyond all place? Right and left at the right hand of the Father. belong to things definable by limit. But we style, as the On the contrary, It is written in the last chapter of Father’s right hand, the glory and honor of the Godhead.” Mark (16:19): “The Lord Jesus, after He had spoken to Reply to Objection 2. The argument holds good if them, was taken up to heaven, and sitteth on the right hand sitting at the right hand be taken corporeally. Hence Au- of God.” gustine says (De Symb. i): “If we accept it in a carnal I answer that, The word “sitting” may have a twofold sense that Christ sits at the Father’s right hand, then the meaning; namely, “abiding” as in Lk. 24:49: “Sit [Douay: Father will be on the left. But there”—that is, in eternal ‘Stay’] you in the city”: and royal or judiciary “power,” as bliss, “it is all right hand, since no misery is there.” in Prov. 20:8: “The king, that sitteth on the throne of judg- Reply to Objection 3. As Gregory says in a Homily ment, scattereth away all evil with his look.” Now in either on the Ascension (Hom. xxix in Evang.), “it is the judge’s sense it belongs to Christ to sit at the Father’s right hand. place to sit, while to stand is the place of the combatant or First of all inasmuch as He abides eternally unchangeable helper. Consequently, Stephen in his toil of combat saw in the Father’s bliss, which is termed His right hand, ac- Him standing whom He had as his helper. But Mark de- cording to Ps. 15:11: “At Thy right hand are delights even scribes Him as seated after the Ascension, because after to the end.” Hence Augustine says (De Symb. i): “ ‘Sitteth the glory of His Ascension He will at the end be seen as at the right hand of the Father’: To sit means to dwell, just judge.” as we say of any man: ‘He sat in that country for three Whether it belongs to Christ as God to sit at the right hand of the Father? IIIa q. 58 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that it does not belong to one and to sit on his right hand. Therefore, as God, Christ Christ as God to sit at the right hand of the Father. For, does not sit at the right hand of the Father. as God, Christ is the Father’s right hand. But it does not Objection 2. Further, in the last chapter of Mark appear to be the same thing to be the right hand of any- (16:19) it is said that “the Lord Jesus was taken up into 2402 heaven, and sitteth on the right hand of God.” But it was as God sits at the right hand of the Father; yet so that this not as God that Christ was taken up to heaven. Therefore preposition “at,” which is a transitive one, implies merely neither does He, as God, sit at the right hand of God. personal distinction and order of origin, but not degree of Objection 3. Further, Christ as God is the equal of the nature or dignity, for there is no such thing in the Divine Father and of the Holy Ghost. Consequently, if Christ sits Persons, as was shown in the Ia, q. 42, Aa. 3,4. as God at the right hand of the Father, with equal reason Reply to Objection 1. The Son of God is called the the Holy Ghost sits at the right hand of the Father and of Father’s “right hand” by appropriation, just as He is called the Son, and the Father Himself on the right hand of the the “Power” of the Father (1 Cor. 1:24). But “right hand Son; which no one is found to say. of the Father,” in its three meanings given above, is some- On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): thing common to the three Persons. that “what we style as the Father’s right hand, is the glory Reply to Objection 2. Christ as man is exalted to and honor of the Godhead, wherein the Son of God ex- Divine honor; and this is signified in the aforesaid sit- isted before ages as God and as consubstantial with the ting; nevertheless such honor belongs to Him as God, not Father.” through any assumption, but through His origin from eter- I answer that, As may be gathered from what has nity. been said (a. 1) three things can be understood under the Reply to Objection 3. In no way can it be said that expression “right hand.” First of all, as Damascene takes the Father is seated at the right hand of the Son or of the it, “the glory of the Godhead”: secondly, according to Au- Holy Ghost; because the Son and the Holy Ghost derive gustine “the beatitude of the Father”: thirdly, according their origin from the Father, and not conversely. The Holy to the same authority, “judiciary power.” Now as we ob- Ghost, however, can be said properly to sit at the right served (a. 1) “sitting denotes” either abiding, or royal or hand of the Father or of the Son, in the aforesaid sense, judiciary dignity. Hence, to sit on the right hand of the although by a kind of appropriation it is attributed to the Father is nothing else than to share in the glory of the Son, to whom equality is appropriated; thus Augustine Godhead with the Father, and to possess beatitude and ju- says (De Doctr. Christ. i) that “in the Father there is unity, diciary power, and that unchangeably and royally. But this in the Son equality, in the Holy Ghost the connection of belongs to the Son as God. Hence it is manifest that Christ unity with equality.” Whether it belongs to Christ as man to sit at the right hand of the Father? IIIa q. 58 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that it does not belong On the contrary, Augustine says (De Symb. ii): “By to Christ as man to sit at the right hand of the Father, be- the expression ‘right hand’ understand the power which cause, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): “What we this Man, chosen of God, received, that He might come as call the Father’s right hand is the glory and honor of the judge, who before had come to be judged.” Godhead.” But the glory and honor of the Godhead do I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), by the expres- not belong to Christ as man. Consequently, it seems that sion “right hand” is understood either the glory of His Christ as man does not sit at the right hand of the Father. Godhead, or His eternal beatitude, or His judicial and Objection 2. Further, to sit on the ruler’s right hand royal power. Now this preposition “at” signifies a kind seems to exclude subjection, because one so sitting seems of approach to the right hand; thus denoting something in in a measure to be reigning with him. But Christ as man common, and yet with a distinction, as already observed is “subject unto” the Father, as is said in 1 Cor. 15:28. (De Symb. ii). And this can be in three ways: first of Therefore it seems that Christ as man does not sit at the all, by something common in nature, and a distinction in Father’s right hand. person; and thus Christ as the Son of God, sits at the right Objection 3. Further, on Rom. 8:34: “Who is at the hand of the Father, because He has the same Nature as the right hand of God,” the gloss adds: “that is, equal to the Father: hence these things belong to the Son essentially, Father in that honor, whereby God is the Father: or, on just as to the Father; and this is to be in equality with the the right hand of the Father, that is, in the mightier gifts of Father. Secondly, according to the grace of union, which, God.” And on Heb. 1:3: “sitteth on the right hand of the on the contrary, implies distinction of nature, and unity majesty on high,” the gloss adds, “that is, in equality with of person. According to this, Christ as man is the Son of the Father over all things, both in place and dignity.” But God, and consequently sits at the Father’s right hand; yet equality with God does not belong to Christ as man; for in so that the expression “as” does not denote condition of this respect Christ Himself says (Jn. 14:28): “The Father nature, but unity of suppositum, as explained above (q. 16, is greater than I.” Consequently, it appears unseemly for Aa. 10,11). Thirdly, the said approach can be understood Christ as man to sit on the Father’s right hand. according to habitual grace, which is more fully in Christ 2403 than in all other creatures, so much so that human nature the passage quoted: “In which,” that is, in the glory of the in Christ is more blessed than all other creatures, and pos- Godhead, “the Son of God existing before ages, as God sesses over all other creatures royal and judiciary power. and consubstantial with the Father, sits in His conglorified So, then, if “as” denote condition of nature, then flesh; for, under one adoration the one hypostasis, together Christ, as God, sits “at the Father’s right hand,” that is, with His flesh, is adored by every creature.” “in equality with the Father”; but as man, He sits “at the Reply to Objection 2. Christ as man is subject to the right hand of the Father,” that is, “in the Father’s mightier Father, if “as” denote the condition of nature: in which gifts beyond all other creatures,” that is to say, “in greater respect it does not belong to Him as man to sit at the Fa- beatitude,” and “exercising judiciary power.” But if “as” ther’s right hand, by reason of their mutual equality. But denote unity of person, thus again as man, He sits at the it does thus belong to Him to sit at the right hand of the Father’s right hand “as to equality of honor,” inasmuch as Father, according as is thereby denoted the excellence of with the same honor we venerate the Son of God with His beatitude and His judiciary power over every creature. assumed nature, as was said above (q. 25, a. 1). Reply to Objection 3. It does not belong to Christ’s Reply to Objection 1. Christ’s humanity according to human nature to be in equality with the Father, but only to the conditions of His nature has not the glory or honor of the Person who assumed it; but it does belong even to the the Godhead, which it has nevertheless by reason of the assumed human nature to share in God’s mightier gifts, in Person with whom it is united. Hence Damascene adds in so far as it implies exaltation above other creatures. Whether it is proper to Christ to sit at the right hand of the Father? IIIa q. 58 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not proper to hand. Christ to sit at the right hand of the Father, because the I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), Christ is said to Apostle says (Eph. 2:4,6): “God. . . hath raised us up sit at the Father’s right hand inasmuch as He is on equal- together, and hath made us sit together in the heavenly ity with the Father in respect of His Divine Nature, while places through Christ Jesus.” But to be raised up is not in respect of His humanity, He excels all creatures in the proper to Christ. Therefore for like reason neither is it possession of Divine gifts. But each of these belongs ex- proper to Him to sit “on the right hand” of God “on high” clusively to Christ. Consequently, it belongs to no one (Heb. 1:3). else, angel or man, but to Christ alone, to sit at the right Objection 2. Further, as Augustine says (De Symb. i): hand of the Father. “For Christ to sit at the right hand of the Father, is to dwell Reply to Objection 1. Since Christ is our Head, then in His beatitude.” But many more share in this. Therefore what was bestowed on Christ is bestowed on us through it does not appear to be proper to Christ to sit at the right Him. And on this account, since He is already raised up, hand of the Father. the Apostle says that God has, so to speak, “raised us up Objection 3. Further, Christ Himself says (Apoc. together with Him,” still we ourselves are not raised up 3:21): “To him that shall overcome, I will give to sit with yet, but are to be raised up, according to Rom. 8:11: “He Me in My throne: as I also have overcome, and am set who raised up Jesus from the dead, shall quicken also your down with My Father in His throne.” But it is by sitting mortal bodies”: and after the same manner of speech the on His Father’s throne that Christ is seated at His right Apostle adds that “He has made us to sit together with hand. Therefore others who overcome likewise, sit at the Him, in the heavenly places”; namely, for the very reason Father’s right hand. that Christ our Head sits there. Objection 4. Further, the Lord says (Mat. 20:23): “To Reply to Objection 2. Since the right hand is the Di- sit on My right or left hand, is not Mine to give to you, but vine beatitude, then “to sit on the right hand” does not to them for whom it is prepared by My Father.” But no mean simply to be in beatitude, but to possess beatitude purpose would be served by saying this, unless it was pre- with a kind of dominative power, as a property and part pared for some. Consequently, to sit at the right hand is of one’s nature. This belongs to Christ alone, and to no not proper to Christ. other creature. Yet it can be said that every saint in bliss On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 1:13): “To which is placed on God’s right hand; hence it is written (Mat. of the angels said He at any time: Sit thou on My right 25:33): “He shall set the sheep on His right hand.” hand, i.e. ‘in My mightier gifts,’ ” or “ ‘as my equal in the Reply to Objection 3. By the “throne” is meant the Godhead’ ”?∗ as if to answer: “To none.” But angels are judiciary power which Christ has from the Father: and higher than other creatures. Therefore, much less does it in this sense He is said “to sit in the Father’s throne.” But belong to anyone save Christ to sit at the Father’s right other saints have it from Christ; and in this respect they are ∗ The comment is from the gloss of Peter Lombard 2404 said “to sit on Christ’s throne”; according to Mat. 19:28: hand?’ ” Our Lord therefore “replied not as though some “You also shall sit upon twelve seats, judging the twelve were going to sit there one day, but condescending to the tribes of Israel.” supplication of the questioners; since more than others Reply to Objection 4. As Chrysostom says (Hom. they sought this one thing alone, to stand nigh to Him.” lxv in Matth.), “that place,” to wit, sitting at the right hand, Still it can be said that the sons of Zebedee sought for “is closed not only to all men, but likewise to angels: for, higher excellence in sharing His judiciary power; hence Paul declares it to be the prerogative of Christ, saying: ‘To they did not ask to sit on the Father’s right hand or left, which of the angels said He at any time: Sit on My right but on Christ’s. 2405 THIRD PART, QUESTION 59 Of Christ’s Judiciary Power (In Six Articles) We have now to consider Christ’s judiciary power. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether judiciary power is to be attributed to Christ? (2) Whether it belongs to Him as man? (3) Whether He acquired it by merits? (4) Whether His judiciary power is universal with regard to all men? (5) Whether besides the judgment that takes place now in time, we are to expect Him in the future general judgment? (6) Whether His judiciary power extends likewise to the angels? It will be more suitable to consider the execution of the Last Judgment when we treat of things pertaining to the end of the world∗. For the present it will be enough to touch on those points that concern Christ’s dignity. Whether judiciary power is to be specially attributed to Christ? IIIa q. 59 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that judiciary power is is based, according to Ecclus. 10:1: “A wise judge shall not to be specially attributed to Christ. For judgment of judge his people.” The first two are conditions for judg- others seems to belong to their lord; hence it is written ing; but on the third the very rule of judgment is based, (Rom. 14:4): “Who art thou that judgest another man’s because the standard of judgment is the law of wisdom or servant?” But, it belongs to the entire Trinity to be Lord truth, according to which the judgment is passed. over creatures. Therefore judiciary power ought not to be Now because the Son is Wisdom begotten, and Truth attributed specially to Christ. proceeding from the Father, and His perfect Image, con- Objection 2. Further, it is written (Dan. 7:9): “The sequently, judiciary power is properly attributed to the Ancient of days sat”; and further on (Dan. 7:10), “the Son of God. Accordingly Augustine says (De Vera Relig. judgment sat, and the books were opened.” But the An- xxxi): “This is that unchangeable Truth, which is rightly cient of days is understood to be the Father, because as styled the law of all arts, and the art of the Almighty Hilary says (De Trin. ii): “Eternity is in the Father.” Con- Craftsman. But even as we and all rational souls judge sequently, judiciary power ought rather to be attributed to aright of the things beneath us, so does He who alone is the Father than to Christ. Truth itself pass judgment on us, when we cling to Him. Objection 3. Further, it seems to belong to the same But the Father judges Him not, for He is the Truth no less person to judge as it does to convince. But it belongs to than Himself. Consequently, whatever the Father judges, the Holy Ghost to convince: for our Lord says (Jn. 16:8): He judges through It.” Further on he concludes by say- “And when He is come,” i.e. the Holy Ghost, “He will ing: “Therefore the Father judges no man, but has given convince the world of sin, and of justice, and of judg- all judgment to the Son.” ment.” Therefore judiciary power ought to be attributed Reply to Objection 1. This argument proves that ju- to the Holy Ghost rather than to Christ. diciary power is common to the entire Trinity, which is On the contrary, It is said of Christ (Acts 10:42): “It quite true: still by special appropriation such power is at- is He who was appointed by God, to be judge of the living tributed to the Son, as stated above. end of the dead.” Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Trin. I answer that, Three things are required for passing vi), eternity is attributed to the Father, because He is the judgment: first, the power of coercing subjects; hence it is Principle, which is implied in the idea of eternity. And in written (Ecclus. 7:6): “Seek not to be made a judge unless the same place Augustine says that the Son is the art of thou have strength enough to extirpate iniquities.” The the Father. So, then, judiciary authority is attributed to the second thing required is upright zeal, so as to pass judg- Father, inasmuch as He is the Principle of the Son, but the ment not out of hatred or malice, but from love of justice, very rule of judgment is attributed to the Son who is the according to Prov. 3:12: “For whom the Lord loveth, He art and wisdom of the Father, so that as the Father does all chasteneth: and as a father in the son He pleaseth Him- things through the Son, inasmuch as the Son is His art, so self.” Thirdly, wisdom is needed, upon which judgment He judges all things through the Son, inasmuch as the Son ∗ See Suppl., Qq. 88, seqq. 2406 is His wisdom and truth. And this is implied by Daniel, in Joan.): “Christ said that the Holy Ghost shall convince when he says in the first passage that “the Ancient of days the world of sin, as if to say ‘He shall pour out charity sat,” and when he subsequently adds that the Son of Man upon your hearts.’ For thus, when fear is driven away, you “came even to the Ancient of days, who gave Him power, shall have freedom for convincing.” Consequently, then, and glory, and a kingdom”: and thereby we are given to judgment is attributed to the Holy Ghost, not as regards understand that the authority for judging lies with the Fa- the rule of judgment, but as regards man’s desire to judge ther, from whom the Son received the power to judge. others aright. Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (Tract. xcv Whether judiciary power belongs to Christ as man? IIIa q. 59 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that judiciary power does But it must be observed that although the primary au- not belong to Christ as man. For Augustine says (De Vera thority of judging rests with God, nevertheless the power Relig. xxxi) that judgment is attributed to the Son inas- to judge is committed to men with regard to those sub- much as He is the law of the first truth. But this is Christ’s ject to their jurisdiction. Hence it is written (Dt. 1:16): attribute as God. Consequently, judiciary power does not “Judge that which is just”; and further on (Dt. 1:17): “Be- belong to Christ as man but as God. cause it is the judgment of God,” that is to say, it is by His Objection 2. Further, it belongs to judiciary power to authority that you judge. Now it was said before (q. 8, reward the good, just as to punish the wicked. But eternal Aa. 1,4) that Christ even in His human nature is Head of beatitude, which is the reward of good works, is bestowed the entire Church, and that God has “put all things un- by God alone: thus Augustine says (Tract. xxiii super der His feet.” Consequently, it belongs to Him, even ac- Joan.) that “the soul is made blessed by participation of cording to His human nature, to exercise judiciary power. God, and not by participation of a holy soul.” Therefore on this account. it seems that the authority of Scripture it seems that judiciary power does not belong to Christ as quoted above must be interpreted thus: “He gave Him man, but as God. power to do judgment, because He is the Son of Man”; Objection 3. Further, it belongs to Christ’s judiciary not on account of the condition of His nature, for thus all power to judge secrets of hearts, according to 1 Cor. 4:5: men would have this kind of power, as Chrysostom ob- “Judge not before the time; until the Lord come, who both jects (Hom. xxxix in Joan.); but because this belongs to will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will the grace of the Head, which Christ received in His human make manifest the counsels of the hearts.” But this be- nature. longs exclusively to the Divine power, according to Jer. Now judiciary power belongs to Christ in this way ac- 17:9,10: “The heart of man is perverse and unsearchable, cording to His human nature on three accounts. First, be- who can know it? I am the Lord who search the heart, cause of His likeness and kinship with men; for, as God and prove the reins: who give to every one according to works through intermediary causes, as being closer to the his way.” Therefore judiciary power does not belong to effects, so He judges men through the Man Christ, that His Christ as man but as God. judgment may be sweeter to men. Hence (Heb. 4:15) the On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 5:27): “He hath given Apostle says: “For we have not a high-priest, who cannot Him power to do judgment, because He is the Son of have compassion on our infirmities; but one tempted in man.” all things like as we are, without sin. Let us go therefore I answer that, Chrysostom (Hom. xxxix in Joan.) with confidence to the throne of His grace.” Secondly, seems to think that judiciary power belongs to Christ not because at the last judgment, as Augustine says (Tract. as man, but only as God. Accordingly he thus explains xix in Joan.), “there will be a resurrection of dead bodies, the passage just quoted from John: “ ‘He gave Him power which God will raise up through the Son of Man”; just as to do judgment, because He is the Son of man: wonder by “the same Christ He raises souls,” inasmuch as “He is not at this.’ For He received judiciary power, not because the Son of God.” Thirdly, because, as Augustine observes He is man; but because He is the Son of the ineffable God, (De Verb. Dom., Serm. cxxvii): “It was but right that therefore is He judge. But since the expressions used were those who were to be judged should see their judge. But greater than those appertaining to man, He said in expla- those to be judged were the good and the bad. It follows nation: ‘Wonder not at this, because He is the Son of man, that the form of a servant should be shown in the judgment for He is likewise the Son of God.’ ” And he proves this by to both good and wicked, while the form of God should the effect of the Resurrection: wherefore He adds: “Be- be kept for the good alone.” cause the hour cometh when the dead in their graves shall Reply to Objection 1. Judgment belongs to truth as hear the voice of the Son of God.” its standard, while it belongs to the man imbued with 2407 truth, according as he is as it were one with truth, as a kind their salvation, according to Heb. 2:10: “Who had brought of law and “living justice”∗. Hence Augustine quotes (De many children into glory, to perfect the author of their sal- Verb. Dom., Serm. cxxvii) the saying of 1 Cor. 2:15: vation by His Passion.” “The spiritual man judgeth all things.” But beyond all Reply to Objection 3. To know and judge the se- creatures Christ’s soul was more closely united with truth, crets of hearts, of itself belongs to God alone; but from and more full of truth; according to Jn. 1:14: “We saw the overflow of the Godhead into Christ’s soul it belongs Him. . . full of grace and truth.” And according to this it to Him also to know and to judge the secrets of hearts, belongs principally to the soul of Christ to judge all things. as we stated above (q. 10, a. 2), when dealing with the Reply to Objection 2. It belongs to God alone to be- knowledge of Christ. Hence it is written (Rom. 2:16): “In stow beatitude upon souls by a participation with Him- the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus self; but it is Christ’s prerogative to bring them to such Christ.” beatitude, inasmuch as He is their Head and the author of Whether Christ acquired His judiciary power by His merits? IIIa q. 59 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ did not ac- cxxvii): “The Judge shall sit, who stood before a judge; quire His judiciary power by His merits. For judiciary He shall condemn the truly wicked, who Himself was power flows from the royal dignity: according to Prov. falsely reputed wicked.” 20:8: “The king that sitteth on the throne of judgment, I answer that, There is nothing to hinder one and scattereth away all evil with his look.” But it was without the same thing from being due to some one from vari- merits that Christ acquired royal power, for it is His due ous causes: as the glory of the body in rising was due to as God’s Only-begotten Son: thus it is written (Lk. 1:32): Christ not only as befitting His Godhead and His soul’s “The Lord God shall give unto Him the throne of David glory, but likewise “from the merit of the lowliness of His His father, and He shall reign in the house of Jacob for Passion”∗. And in the same way it must be said that ju- ever.” Therefore Christ did not obtain judiciary power by diciary power belongs to the Man Christ on account of His merits. both His Divine personality, and the dignity of His head- Objection 2. Further, as stated above (a. 2), judiciary ship, and the fulness of His habitual grace: and yet He power is Christ’s due inasmuch as He is our Head. But obtained it from merit, so that, in accordance with the Di- the grace of headship does not belong to Christ by rea- vine justice, He should be judge who fought for God’s jus- son of merit, but follows the personal union of the Di- tice, and conquered, and was unjustly condemned. Hence vine and human natures: according to Jn. 1:14,16: “We He Himself says (Apoc. 3:21): “I have overcome and saw His glory. . . as of the Only-Begotten of the Father, am set down in My Father’s throne [Vulg.: ‘with My Fa- full of grace and truth. . . and of His fulness we all have ther in His throne’].” Now judiciary power is understood received”: and this pertains to the notion of headship. by “throne,” according to Ps. 9:5: “Thou hast sat on the Consequently, it seems that Christ did not have judiciary throne, who judgest justice.” power from merits. Reply to Objection 1. This argument holds good of Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15): judiciary power according as it is due to Christ by reason “The spiritual man judgeth all things.” But a man be- of the union with the Word of God. comes spiritual through grace, which is not from merits; Reply to Objection 2. This argument is based on the otherwise it is “no more grace,” as is said in Rom. 11:6. ground of His grace as Head. Therefore it seems that judiciary power belongs neither to Reply to Objection 3. This argument holds good in Christ nor to others from any merits, but from grace alone. regard to habitual grace, which perfects Christ’s soul. But On the contrary, It is written (Job 36:17): “Thy cause although judiciary power be Christ’s due in these ways, it hath been judged as that of the wicked, cause and judg- is not hindered from being His due from merit. ment thou shalt recover.” And Augustine says (Serm. ∗ Aristotle, Ethic. v ∗ Cf. Augustine, Tract. civ in Joan. 2408 Whether judiciary power belongs to Christ with respect to all human affairs? IIIa q. 59 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that judiciary power con- (Rom. 14:10): “We shall all stand before the judgment cerning all human affairs does not belong to Christ. For seat of Christ”: and (Dan. 7:14) it is written that “He gave as we read in Lk. 12:13,14, when one of the crowd said Him power, and glory, and a kingdom; and all peoples, to Christ: “Speak to my brother that he divide the inheri- tribes, and tongues shall serve Him.” tance with me; He said to him: Man, who hath appointed Thirdly, the same thing is evident from comparison of Me judge, or divider over you?” Consequently, He does human affairs with the end of human salvation. For, to not exercise judgment over all human affairs. whomsoever the substance is entrusted, the accessory is Objection 2. Further, no one exercises judgment ex- likewise committed. Now all human affairs are ordered cept over his own subjects. But, according to Heb. 2:8, for the end of beatitude, which is everlasting salvation, to “we see not as yet all things subject to” Christ. There- which men are admitted, or from which they are excluded fore it seems that Christ has not judgment over all human by Christ’s judgment, as is evident from Mat. 25:31,40. affairs. Consequently, it is manifest that all human affairs are in- Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei cluded in Christ’s judiciary power. xx) that it is part of Divine judgment for the good to be Reply to Objection 1. As was said above (a. 3, obj. 1), afflicted sometimes in this world, and sometimes to pros- judiciary power goes with royal dignity. Now Christ, al- per, and in like manner the wicked. But the same was though established king by God, did not wish while living the case also before the Incarnation. Consequently, not all on earth to govern temporarily an earthly kingdom; con- God’s judgments regarding human affairs are included in sequently He said (Jn. 18:36): “My kingdom is not of Christ’s judiciary power. this world.” In like fashion He did not wish to exercise On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 5:22): “The Father judiciary power over temporal concerns, since He came hath given all judgment to the Son.” to raise men to Divine things. Hence Ambrose observes I answer that, If we speak of Christ according to His on this passage in Luke: “It is well that He who came Divine Nature, it is evident that every judgment of the Fa- down with a Divine purpose should hold Himself aloof ther belongs to the Son; for, as the Father does all things from temporal concerns; nor does He deign to be a judge through His Word, so He judges all things through His of quarrels and an arbiter of property, since He is judge of Word. the quick and the dead, and the arbitrator of merits.” But if we speak of Christ in His human nature, thus Reply to Objection 2. All things are subject to Christ again is it evident that all things are subject to His judg- in respect of that power, which He received from the Fa- ment. This is made clear if we consider first of all the rela- ther, over all things, according to Mat. 28:18: “All power tionship subsisting between Christ’s soul and the Word of is given to Me in heaven and in earth.” But as to the ex- God; for, if “the spiritual man judgeth all things,” as is said ercise of this power, all things are not yet subject to Him: in 1 Cor. 2:15, inasmuch as his soul clings to the Word of this will come to pass in the future, when He shall fulfil God, how much more Christ’s soul, which is filled with His will regarding all things, by saving some and punish- the truth of the Word of God, passes judgment upon all ing others. things. Reply to Objection 3. Judgments of this kind were Secondly, the same appears from the merit of His exercised by Christ before His Incarnation, inasmuch as death; because, according to Rom. 14:9: “To this end He is the Word of God: and the soul united with Him Christ died and rose again; that He might be Lord both of personally became a partaker of this power by the Incar- the dead and of the living.” And therefore He has judg- nation. ment over all men; and on this account the Apostle adds Whether after the Judgment that takes place in the present time, there remains yet IIIa q. 59 a. 5 another General Judgment? Objection 1. It would seem that after the Judgment adise”: and (Lk. 16:22) it is said that “the rich man died that takes place in the present time, there does not re- and was buried in hell.” Therefore it is useless to look main another General Judgment. For a judgment serves forward to a final Judgment. no purpose after the final allotment of rewards and pun- Objection 2. Further, according to another (the Sep- ishments. But rewards and punishments are allotted in tuagint) version of Nahum 1:9, “God shall not judge the this present time: for our Lord said to the thief on the same thing a second time.” But in the present time God cross (Lk. 23:43): “This day thou shalt be with Me in par- judges both temporal and spiritual matters. Therefore, it 2409 does not seem that another final judgment is to be ex-temporal concerns, for example, some of which quickly pected. lapse, while others endure longer. Objection 3. Further, reward and punishment corre- Now all these things are submitted to the verdict of the spond with merit and demerit. But merit and demerit bear Divine Judgment; and consequently, a perfect and public relation to the body only in so far as it is the instrument Judgment cannot be made of all these things during the of the soul. Therefore reward or punishment is not due to course of this present time. Wherefore, there must be a the body save as the soul’s instrument. Therefore no other final Judgment at the last day, in which everything con- Judgment is called for at the end (of the world) to requite cerning every man in every respect shall be perfectly and man with reward or punishment in the body, besides that publicly judged. Judgment in which souls are now punished or rewarded. Reply to Objection 1. Some men have held the opin- On the contrary, It is said in Jn. 12:48: “The word ion that the souls of the saints shall not be rewarded in that I have spoken, the same shall judge you [Vulg.: heaven, nor the souls of the lost punished in hell, until the ‘him’] in the last day.” Therefore there will be a Judg- Judgment-day. That this is false appears from the testi- ment at the last day besides that which takes place in the mony of the Apostle (2 Cor. 5:8), where he says: “We are present time. confident and have a good will to be absent rather from I answer that, Judgment cannot be passed perfectly the body, and to be present with the Lord”: that is, not to upon any changeable subject before its consummation: “walk by faith” but “by sight,” as appears from the con- just as judgment cannot be given perfectly regarding the text. But this is to see God in His Essence, wherein con- quality of any action before its completion in itself and in sists “eternal life,” as is clear from Jn. 17:3. Hence it is its results: because many actions appear to be profitable, manifest that the souls separated from bodies are in eter- which in their effects prove to be hurtful. And in the same nal life. way perfect judgment cannot be passed upon any man be- Consequently, it must be maintained that after death fore the close of his life, since he can be changed in many man enters into an unchangeable state as to all that con- respects from good to evil, or conversely, or from good cerns the soul: and therefore there is no need for post- to better, or from evil to worse. Hence the Apostle says poning judgment as to the reward of the soul. But since (Heb. 9:27): “It is appointed unto men once to die, and there are some other things pertaining to a man which go after this the Judgment.” on through the whole course of time, and which are not But it must be observed that although man’s tempo- foreign to the Divine judgment, all these things must be ral life in itself ends with death, still it continues depen- brought to judgment at the end of time. For although in dent in a measure on what comes after it in the future. In regard to such things a man neither merits nor demerits, one way, as it still lives on in men’s memories, in which still in a measure they accompany his reward or punish- sometimes, contrary to the truth, good or evil reputations ment. Consequently all these things must be weighed in linger on. In another way in a man’s children, who are so the final judgment. to speak something of their parent, according to Ecclus. Reply to Objection 2. “God shall not judge twice the 30:4: “His father is dead, and he is as if he were not dead, same thing,” i.e. in the same respect; but it is not unseemly for he hath left one behind him that is like himself.” And for God to judge twice according to different respects. yet many good men have wicked sons, and conversely. Reply to Objection 3. Although the reward or punish- Thirdly, as to the result of his actions: just as from the ment of the body depends upon the reward or punishment deceit of Arius and other false leaders unbelief continues of the soul, nevertheless, since the soul is changeable only to flourish down to the close of the world; and even un- accidentally, on account of the body, once it is separated til then faith will continue to derive its progress from the from the body it enters into an unchangeable condition, preaching of the apostles. In a fourth way, as to the body, and receives its judgment. But the body remains subject which is sometimes buried with honor and sometimes left to change down to the close of time: and therefore it must unburied, and finally falls to dust utterly. In a fifth way, receive its reward or punishment then, in the last Judg- as to the things upon which a man’s heart is set, such as ment. Whether Christ’s judiciary power extends to the angels? IIIa q. 59 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s judiciary of being judged again. Therefore Christ’s judiciary power power does not extend to the angels, because the good does not extend to the angels. and wicked angels alike were judged in the beginning of Objection 2. Further, the same person cannot be both the world, when some fell through sin while others were judge and judged. But the angels will come to judge with confirmed in bliss. But those already judged have no need Christ, according to Mat. 25:31: “When the Son of Man 2410 shall come in His majesty, and all the angels with Him.” done through them; which dispensing is likewise done by Therefore it seems that the angels will not be judged by the Man Christ, to whom the angels ministered, as related Christ. (Mat. 4:11), and from whom the devils besought that they Objection 3. Further, the angels are higher than other might be sent into the swine, according to Mat. 8:31. Sec- creatures. If Christ, then, be judge not only of men but ondly, as to other accidental rewards of the good angels, likewise of angels, then for the same reason He will be such as the joy which they have at the salvation of men, judge of all creatures; which seems to be false, since this according to Lk. 15:10: “There shall be joy before the belongs to God’s providence: hence it is written (Job angels of God upon one sinner doing penance”: and fur- 34:13): “What other hath He appointed over the earth? thermore as to the accidental punishments of the devils or whom hath He set over the world which He made?” wherewith they are either tormented here, or are shut up Therefore Christ is not the judge of the angels. in hell; and this also belongs to the Man Christ: hence On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:3): it is written (Mk. 1:24) that the devil cried out: “What “Know you not that we shall judge angels?” But the saints have we to do with thee, Jesus of Nazareth? art Thou judge only by Christ’s authority. Therefore, much more come to destroy us?” Thirdly, as to the essential reward does Christ possess judiciary power over the angels. of the good angels, which is everlasting bliss; and as to I answer that, The angels are subjects of Christ’s ju- the essential punishment of the wicked angels, which is diciary power, not only with regard to His Divine Nature, everlasting damnation. But this was done by Christ from as He is the Word of God, but also with regard to His hu- the beginning of the world, inasmuch as He is the Word man nature. And this is evident from three considerations. of God. First of all, from the closeness of His assumed nature to Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers judg- God; because, according to Heb. 2:16: “For nowhere doth ment as to the essential reward and chief punishment. He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Vera taketh hold.” Consequently, Christ’s soul is more filled Relig. xxxi): “Although the spiritual man judgeth all with the truth of the Word of God than any angel: for things, still he is judged by Truth Itself.” Consequently, al- which reason He also enlightens the angels, as Dionysius though the angels judge, as being spiritual creatures, still says (Coel. Hier. vii), and so He has power to judge them. they are judged by Christ, inasmuch as He is the Truth. Secondly, because by the lowliness of His Passion, human Reply to Objection 3. Christ judges not only the an- nature in Christ merited to be exalted above the angels; so gels, but also the administration of all creatures. For if, as that, as is said in Phil. 2:10: “In the name of Jesus ev- Augustine says (De Trin. iii) the lower things are ruled by ery knee should bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth, God through the higher, in a certain order, it must be said and under the earth.” And therefore Christ has judiciary that all things are ruled by Christ’s soul, which is above power even over the good and wicked angels: in token every creature. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 2:5): “For whereof it is said in the Apocalypse (7:11) that “all the God hath not subjected unto angels the world to come”— angels stood round about the throne.” Thirdly, on account subject namely to Christ—“of whom we speak” [Douay: of what they do for men, of whom Christ is the Head in ‘whereof we speak’]∗. Nor does it follow that God set an- a special manner. Hence it is written (Heb. 1:14): “They other over the earth; since one and the same Person is God are [Vulg.: ‘Are they not’] all ministering spirits, sent to and Man, our Lord Jesus Christ. minister for them, who shall receive the inheritance of sal- Let what has been said of the Mystery of His Incarna- vation (?).” But they are submitted to Christ’s judgment, tion suffice for the present. first, as regards the dispensing of those things which are ∗ The words “subject namely to Christ” are from a gloss 2411 THIRD PART, QUESTION 60 What Is a Sacrament? (In Eight Articles) After considering those things that concern the mystery of the incarnate Word, we must consider the sacraments of the Church which derive their efficacy from the Word incarnate Himself. First we shall consider the sacraments in general; secondly, we shall consider specially each sacrament. Concerning the first our consideration will be fivefold: (1) What is a sacrament? (2) Of the necessity of the sacraments; (3) of the effects of the sacraments; (4) Of their cause; (5) Of their number. Under the first heading there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether a sacrament is a kind of sign? (2) Whether every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament? (3) Whether a sacrament is a sign of one thing only, or of several? (4) Whether a sacrament is a sign that is something sensible? (5) Whether some determinate sensible thing is required for a sacrament? (6) Whether signification expressed by words is necessary for a sacrament? (7) Whether determinate words are required? (8) Whether anything may be added to or subtracted from these words? Whether a sacrament is a kind of sign? IIIa q. 60 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that a sacrament is not a kind of but medicine also is said to be healthy through producing sign. For sacrament appears to be derived from “sacring” health; diet through preserving it; and urine, through be- [sacrando]; just as medicament, from “medicando” [heal- ing a sign of health. Consequently, a thing may be called ing]. But this seems to be of the nature of a cause rather a “sacrament,” either from having a certain hidden sanc- than of a sign. Therefore a sacrament is a kind of cause tity, and in this sense a sacrament is a “sacred secret”; or rather than a kind of sign. from having some relationship to this sanctity, which re- Objection 2. Further, sacrament seems to signify lationship may be that of a cause, or of a sign or of any something hidden, according to Tob. 12:7: “It is good other relation. But now we are speaking of sacraments in to hide the secret [sacramentum] of a king”; and Eph. a special sense, as implying the habitude of sign: and in 3:9: “What is the dispensation of the mystery [sacramenti] this way a sacrament is a kind of sign. which hath been hidden from eternity in God.” But that Reply to Objection 1. Because medicine is an effi- which is hidden, seems foreign to the nature of a sign; for cient cause of health, consequently whatever things are “a sign is that which conveys something else to the mind, denominated from medicine are to be referred to some besides the species which it impresses on the senses,” as first active cause: so that a medicament implies a certain Augustine explains (De Doctr. Christ. ii). Therefore it causality. But sanctity from which a sacrament is denom- seems that a sacrament is not a kind of sign. inated, is not there taken as an efficient cause, but rather Objection 3. Further, an oath is sometimes called a as a formal or a final cause. Therefore it does not follow sacrament: for it is written in the Decretals (Caus. xxii, that a sacrament need always imply causality. qu. 5): “Children who have not attained the use of reason Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers sacra- must not be obliged to swear: and whoever has foresworn ment in the sense of a “sacred secret.” Now not only God’s himself once, must no more be a witness, nor be allowed but also the king’s, secret, is said to be sacred and to be to take a sacrament,” i.e. an oath. But an oath is not a kind a sacrament: because according to the ancients, whatever of sign, therefore it seems that a sacrament is not a kind it was unlawful to lay violent hands on was said to be of sign. holy or sacrosanct, such as the city walls, and persons of On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x): high rank. Consequently those secrets, whether Divine or “The visible sacrifice is the sacrament, i.e. the sacred sign, human, which it is unlawful to violate by making them of the invisible sacrifice.” known to anybody whatever, are called “sacred secrets or I answer that, All things that are ordained to one, sacraments.” even in different ways, can be denominated from it: thus, Reply to Objection 3. Even an oath has a certain rela- from health which is in an animal, not only is the ani- tion to sacred things, in so far as it consists in calling a samal said to be healthy through being the subject of health: cred thing to witness. And in this sense it is called a sacra- 2412 ment: not in the sense in which we speak of sacraments cally but analogically, i.e. by reason of a different relation now; the word “sacrament” being thus used not equivo- to the one thing, viz. something sacred. Whether every sign of a holy thing is a sacrament? IIIa q. 60 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that not every sign of a sacred I answer that, Signs are given to men, to whom it is thing is a sacrament. For all sensible creatures are signs proper to discover the unknown by means of the known. of sacred things; according to Rom. 1:20: “The invisible Consequently a sacrament properly so called is that which things of God are clearly seen being understood by the is the sign of some sacred thing pertaining to man; so that things that are made.” And yet all sensible things cannot properly speaking a sacrament, as considered by us now, be called sacraments. Therefore not every sign of a sacred is defined as being the “sign of a holy thing so far as it thing is a sacrament. makes men holy.” Objection 2. Further, whatever was done under the Reply to Objection 1. Sensible creatures signify Old Law was a figure of Christ Who is the “Holy of something holy, viz. Divine wisdom and goodness inas- Holies” (Dan. 9:24), according to 1 Cor. 10:11: “All much as these are holy in themselves; but not inasmuch (these) things happened to them in figure”; and Col. 2:17: as we are made holy by them. Therefore they cannot be “Which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is called sacraments as we understand sacraments now. Christ’s.” And yet not all that was done by the Fathers Reply to Objection 2. Some things pertaining to the of the Old Testament, not even all the ceremonies of the Old Testament signified the holiness of Christ considered Law, were sacraments, but only in certain special cases, as holy in Himself. Others signified His holiness consid- as stated in the Ia IIae, q. 101, a. 4. Therefore it seems ered as the cause of our holiness; thus the sacrifice of the that not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament. Paschal Lamb signified Christ’s Sacrifice whereby we are Objection 3. Further, even in the New Testament made holy: and such like are properly styled sacraments many things are done in sign of some sacred thing; yet of the Old Law. they are not called sacraments; such as sprinkling with Reply to Objection 3. Names are given to things con- holy water, the consecration of an altar, and such like. sidered in reference to their end and state of completeness. Therefore not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament. Now a disposition is not an end, whereas perfection is. On the contrary, A definition is convertible with the Consequently things that signify disposition to holiness thing defined. Now some define a sacrament as being “the are not called sacraments, and with regard to these the ob- sign of a sacred thing”; moreover, this is clear from the jection is verified: only those are called sacraments which passage quoted above (a. 1) from Augustine. Therefore it signify the perfection of holiness in man. seems that every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament. Whether a sacrament is a sign of one thing only? IIIa q. 60 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that a sacrament is a sign of sanctification. Now the end of sanctification is eternal life, one thing only. For that which signifies many things is an according to Rom. 6:22: “You have your fruit unto sancti- ambiguous sign, and consequently occasions deception: fication, and the end life everlasting.” Therefore it seems this is clearly seen in equivocal words. But all deception that the sacraments signify one thing only, viz. eternal should be removed from the Christian religion, according life. to Col. 2:8: “Beware lest any man cheat you by philoso- On the contrary, In the Sacrament of the Altar, two phy and vain deceit.” Therefore it seems that a sacrament things are signified, viz. Christ’s true body, and Christ’s is not a sign of several things. mystical body; as Augustine says (Liber Sent. Prosper.). Objection 2. Further, as stated above (a. 2), a sacra- I answer that, As stated above (a. 2) a sacrament ment signifies a holy thing in so far as it makes man holy. properly speaking is that which is ordained to signify our But there is only one cause of man’s holiness, viz. the sanctification. In which three things may be considered; blood of Christ; according to Heb. 13:12: “Jesus, that viz. the very cause of our sanctification, which is Christ’s He might sanctify the people by His own blood, suffered passion; the form of our sanctification, which is grace without the gate.” Therefore it seems that a sacrament and the virtues; and the ultimate end of our sanctifica- does not signify several things. tion, which is eternal life. And all these are signified by Objection 3. Further, it has been said above (a. 2, the sacraments. Consequently a sacrament is a sign that is ad 3) that a sacrament signifies properly the very end of both a reminder of the past, i.e. the passion of Christ; and 2413 an indication of that which is effected in us by Christ’s ture. In this way a sacrament signifies the three things passion, i.e. grace; and a prognostic, that is, a foretelling aforesaid, inasmuch as by being in a certain order they of future glory. are one thing. Reply to Objection 1. Then is a sign ambiguous Reply to Objection 2. Since a sacrament signifies that and the occasion of deception, when it signifies many which sanctifies, it must needs signify the effect, which is things not ordained to one another. But when it signi- implied in the sanctifying cause as such. fies many things inasmuch as, through being mutually or- Reply to Objection 3. It is enough for a sacrament dained, they form one thing, then the sign is not ambigu- that it signify that perfection which consists in the form, ous but certain: thus this word “man” signifies the soul nor is it necessary that it should signify only that perfec- and body inasmuch as together they form the human na- tion which is the end. Whether a sacrament is always something sensible? IIIa q. 60 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that a sacrament is not always cred things which are signified by the sacraments, are the something sensible. Because, according to the Philoso- spiritual and intelligible goods by means of which man is pher (Prior. Anal. ii), every effect is a sign of its cause. sanctified, it follows that the sacramental signs consist in But just as there are some sensible effects, so are there sensible things: just as in the Divine Scriptures spiritual some intelligible effects; thus science is the effect of a things are set before us under the guise of things sensible. demonstration. Therefore not every sign is sensible. Now And hence it is that sensible things are required for the all that is required for a sacrament is something that is a sacraments; as Dionysius also proves in his book on the sign of some sacred thing, inasmuch as thereby man is heavenly hierarchy (Coel. Hier. i). sanctified, as stated above (a. 2). Therefore something Reply to Objection 1. The name and definition of sensible is not required for a sacrament. a thing is taken principally from that which belongs to a Objection 2. Further, sacraments belong to the king- thing primarily and essentially: and not from that which dom of God and the Divine worship. But sensible things belongs to it through something else. Now a sensible ef- do not seem to belong to the Divine worship: for we are fect being the primary and direct object of man’s knowl- told (Jn. 4:24) that “God is a spirit; and they that adore edge (since all our knowledge springs from the senses) by Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth”; and (Rom. its very nature leads to the knowledge of something else: 14:17) that “the kingdom of God is not meat and drink.” whereas intelligible effects are not such as to be able to Therefore sensible things are not required for the sacra- lead us to the knowledge of something else, except in so ments. far as they are manifested by some other thing, i.e. by Objection 3. Further. Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. certain sensibles. It is for this reason that the name sign is ii) that “sensible things are goods of least account, since given primarily and principally to things which are offered without them man can live aright.” But the sacraments are to the senses; hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. necessary for man’s salvation, as we shall show farther on ii) that a sign “is that which conveys something else to (q. 61, a. 1): so that man cannot live aright without them. the mind, besides the species which it impresses on the Therefore sensible things are not required for the sacra- senses.” But intelligible effects do not partake of the na- ments. ture of a sign except in so far as they are pointed out by On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. lxxx super certain signs. And in this way, too, certain things which Joan.): “The word is added to the element and this be- are not sensible are termed sacraments as it were, in so far comes a sacrament”; and he is speaking there of water as they are signified by certain sensible things, of which which is a sensible element. Therefore sensible things are we shall treat further on (q. 63, a. 1, ad 2; a. 3, ad 2; q. 73, required for the sacraments. a. 6; q. 74, a. 1, ad 3). I answer that, Divine wisdom provides for each thing Reply to Objection 2. Sensible things considered in according to its mode; hence it is written (Wis. 8:1) that their own nature do not belong to the worship or kingdom “she. . . ordereth all things sweetly”: wherefore also we of God: but considered only as signs of spiritual things in are told (Mat. 25:15) that she “gave to everyone accord- which the kingdom of God consists. ing to his proper ability.” Now it is part of man’s nature Reply to Objection 3. Augustine speaks there of sen- to acquire knowledge of the intelligible from the sensible. sible things, considered in their nature; but not as em- But a sign is that by means of which one attains to the ployed to signify spiritual things, which are the highest knowledge of something else. Consequently, since the sa- goods. 2414 Whether determinate things are required for a sacrament? IIIa q. 60 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that determinate things are not tification, but this should be determined by Divine insti- required for a sacrament. For sensible things are required tution. Therefore in the sacraments of the New Law, by in sacraments for the purpose of signification, as stated which man is sanctified according to 1 Cor. 6:11, “You above (a. 4). But nothing hinders the same thing being are washed, you are sanctified,” we must use those things signified by divers sensible things: thus in Holy Scripture which are determined by Divine institution. God is signified metaphorically, sometimes by a stone (2 Reply to Objection 1. Though the same thing can be Kings 22:2; Zech. 3:9; 1 Cor. 10:4; Apoc. 4:3); some- signified by divers signs, yet to determine which sign must times by a lion (Is. 31:4; Apoc. 5:5); sometimes by the be used belongs to the signifier. Now it is God Who signi- sun (Is. 60:19,20; Mal. 4:2), or by something similar. fies spiritual things to us by means of the sensible things Therefore it seems that divers things can be suitable to in the sacraments, and of similitudes in the Scriptures. the same sacrament. Therefore determinate things are not And consequently, just as the Holy Ghost decides by what required for the sacraments. similitudes spiritual things are to be signified in certain Objection 2. Further, the health of the soul is more passages of Scripture, so also must it be determined by necessary than that of the body. But in bodily medicines, Divine institution what things are to be employed for the which are ordained to the health of the body, one thing purpose of signification in this or that sacrament. can be substituted for another which happens to be want- Reply to Objection 2. Sensible things are endowed ing. Therefore much more in the sacraments, which are with natural powers conducive to the health of the body: spiritual remedies ordained to the health of the soul, can and therefore if two of them have the same virtue, it mat- one thing be substituted for another when this happens to ters not which we use. Yet they are ordained unto sanctifi- be lacking. cation not through any power that they possess naturally, Objection 3. Further, it is not fitting that the salva- but only in virtue of the Divine institution. And therefore tion of men be restricted by the Divine Law: still less it was necessary that God should determine the sensible by the Law of Christ, Who came to save all. But in the things to be employed in the sacraments. state of the Law of nature determinate things were not re- Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (Contra quired in the sacraments, but were put to that use through Faust. xix), diverse sacraments suit different times; just a vow, as appears from Gn. 28, where Jacob vowed that he as different times are signified by different parts of the would offer to God tithes and peace-offerings. Therefore verb, viz. present, past, and future. Consequently, just it seems that man should not have been restricted, espe- as under the state of the Law of nature man was moved cially under the New Law, to the use of any determinate by inward instinct and without any outward law, to wor- thing in the sacraments. ship God, so also the sensible things to be employed in On the contrary, our Lord said (Jn. 3:5): “Unless a the worship of God were determined by inward instinct. man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot But later on it became necessary for a law to be given (to enter into the kingdom of God.” man) from without: both because the Law of nature had I answer that, In the use of the sacraments two things become obscured by man’s sins; and in order to signify may be considered, namely, the worship of God, and the more expressly the grace of Christ, by which the human sanctification of man: the former of which pertains to man race is sanctified. And hence the need for those things as referred to God, and the latter pertains to God in refer- to be determinate, of which men have to make use in the ence to man. Now it is not for anyone to determine that sacraments. Nor is the way of salvation narrowed thereby: which is in the power of another, but only that which is because the things which need to be used in the sacra- in his own power. Since, therefore, the sanctification of ments, are either in everyone’s possession or can be had man is in the power of God Who sanctifies, it is not for with little trouble. man to decide what things should be used for his sanc- Whether words are required for the signification of the sacraments? IIIa q. 60 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that words are not required for fore words are not required besides the sensible things in the signification of the sacraments. For Augustine says the sacraments . (Contra Faust. xix): “What else is a corporeal sacrament Objection 2. Further, a sacrament is some one thing, but a kind of visible word?” Wherefore to add words to but it does not seem possible to make one thing of those the sensible things in the sacraments seems to be the same that belong to different genera. Since, therefore, sensi- as to add words to words. But this is superfluous. There- ble things and words are of different genera, for sensible 2415 things are the product of nature, but words, of reason; it tinctness by means of words. And therefore in order to in-seems that in the sacraments, words are not required be- sure the perfection of sacramental signification it was nec- sides sensible things. essary to determine the signification of the sensible things Objection 3. Further, the sacraments of the New Law by means of certain words. For water may signify both succeed those of the Old Law: since “the former were in- a cleansing by reason of its humidity, and refreshment by stituted when the latter were abolished,” as Augustine says reason of its being cool: but when we say, “I baptize thee,” (Contra Faust. xix). But no form of words was required it is clear that we use water in baptism in order to signify in the sacraments of the Old Law. Therefore neither is it a spiritual cleansing. required in those of the New Law. Reply to Objection 1. The sensible elements of the On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:25,26): sacraments are called words by way of a certain like- “Christ loved the Church, and delivered Himself up for it; ness, in so far as they partake of a certain significative that He might sanctify it, cleansing it by the laver of water power, which resides principally in the very words, as in the word of life.” And Augustine says (Tract. xxx in stated above. Consequently it is not a superfluous repeti- Joan.): “The word is added to the element, and this be- tion to add words to the visible element in the sacraments; comes a sacrament.” because one determines the other, as stated above. I answer that, The sacraments, as stated above Reply to Objection 2. Although words and other sen- (Aa. 2,3), are employed as signs for man’s sanctification. sible things are not in the same genus, considered in their Consequently they can be considered in three ways: and natures, yet have they something in common as to the in each way it is fitting for words to be added to the sen- thing signified by them: which is more perfectly done sible signs. For in the first place they can be considered in words than in other things. Wherefore in the sacra- in regard to the cause of sanctification, which is the Word ments, words and things, like form and matter, combine incarnate: to Whom the sacraments have a certain confor- in the formation of one thing, in so far as the significa- mity, in that the word is joined to the sensible sign, just tion of things is completed by means of words, as above as in the mystery of the Incarnation the Word of God is stated. And under words are comprised also sensible ac- united to sensible flesh. tions, such as cleansing and anointing and such like: be- Secondly, sacraments may be considered on the part of cause they have a like signification with the things. man who is sanctified, and who is composed of soul and Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (Contra body: to whom the sacramental remedy is adjusted, since Faust. xix), the sacraments of things present should be it touches the body through the sensible element, and the different from sacraments of things to come. Now the soul through faith in the words. Hence Augustine says sacraments of the Old Law foretold the coming of Christ. (Tract. lxxx in Joan.) on Jn. 15:3, “Now you are clean Consequently they did not signify Christ so clearly as the by reason of the word,” etc.: “Whence hath water this so sacraments of the New Law, which flow from Christ Him- great virtue, to touch the body and wash the heart, but by self, and have a certain likeness to Him, as stated above. the word doing it, not because it is spoken, but because it Nevertheless in the Old Law, certain words were used is believed?” in things pertaining to the worship of God, both by the Thirdly, a sacrament may be considered on the part of priests, who were the ministers of those sacraments, ac- the sacramental signification. Now Augustine says (De cording to Num. 6:23,24: “Thus shall you bless the chil- Doctr. Christ. ii) that “words are the principal signs used dren of Israel, and you shall say to them: The Lord bless by men”; because words can be formed in various ways thee,” etc.; and by those who made use of those sacra- for the purpose of signifying various mental concepts, so ments, according to Dt. 26:3: “I profess this day before that we are able to express our thoughts with greater dis- the Lord thy God,” etc. Whether determinate words are required in the sacraments? IIIa q. 60 a. 7 Objection 1. It seems that determinate words are not words mean the same. Therefore determinate words are required in the sacraments. For as the Philosopher says not required in the sacraments. (Peri Herm. i), “words are not the same for all.” But salva- Objection 3. Further, corruption of anything changes tion, which is sought through the sacraments, is the same its species. But some corrupt the pronunciation of words, for all. Therefore determinate words are not required in and yet it is not credible that the sacramental effect is the sacraments. hindered thereby; else unlettered men and stammerers, in Objection 2. Further, words are required in the sacra- conferring sacraments, would frequently do so invalidly. ments forasmuch as they are the principal means of signi- Therefore it seems that determinate words are not required fication, as stated above (a. 6). But it happens that various in the sacraments. 2416 On the contrary, our Lord used determinate words by which the sacramental effect is signified: thus water in consecrating the sacrament of the Eucharist, when He is most commonly used by men for bodily cleansing, by said (Mat. 26:26): “This is My Body.” Likewise He com- which the spiritual cleansing is signified: and therefore manded His disciples to baptize under a form of determi- water is employed as the matter of baptism. nate words, saying (Mat. 28:19): “Go ye and teach all Reply to Objection 3. If he who corrupts the pronun- nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of ciation of the sacramental words—does so on purpose, he the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.” does not seem to intend to do what the Church intends: I answer that, As stated above (a. 6, ad 2), in the and thus the sacrament seems to be defective. But if he do sacraments the words are as the form, and sensible things this through error or a slip of the tongue, and if he so far are as the matter. Now in all things composed of matter mispronounce the words as to deprive them of sense, the and form, the determining principle is on the part of the sacrament seems to be defective. This would be the case form, which is as it were the end and terminus of the mat- especially if the mispronunciation be in the beginning of a ter. Consequently for the being of a thing the need of a de- word, for instance, if one were to say “in nomine matris” terminate form is prior to the need of determinate matter: instead of “in nomine Patris.” If, however, the sense of the for determinate matter is needed that it may be adapted to words be not entirely lost by this mispronunciation, the the determinate form. Since, therefore, in the sacraments sacrament is complete. This would be the case principally determinate sensible things are required, which are as the if the end of a word be mispronounced; for instance, if sacramental matter, much more is there need in them of a one were to say “patrias et filias.” For although the words determinate form of words. thus mispronounced have no appointed meaning, yet we Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (Tract. lxxx allow them an accommodated meaning corresponding to super Joan.), the word operates in the sacraments “not be- the usual forms of speech. And so, although the sensible cause it is spoken,” i.e. not by the outward sound of the sound is changed, yet the sense remains the same. voice, “but because it is believed” in accordance with the What has been said about the various mispronuncia- sense of the words which is held by faith. And this sense tions of words, either at the beginning or at the end, holds is indeed the same for all, though the same words as to forasmuch as with us a change at the beginning of a word their sound be not used by all. Consequently no matter changes the meaning, whereas a change at the end gener- in what language this sense is expressed, the sacrament is ally speaking does not effect such a change: whereas with complete. the Greeks the sense is changed also in the beginning of Reply to Objection 2. Although it happens in every words in the conjugation of verbs. language that various words signify the same thing, yet Nevertheless the principle point to observe is the ex- one of those words is that which those who speak that tent of the corruption entailed by mispronunciation: for in language use principally and more commonly to signify either case it may be so little that it does not alter the sense that particular thing: and this is the word which should of the words; or so great that it destroys it. But it is easier be used for the sacramental signification. So also among for the one to happen on the part of the beginning of the sensible things, that one is used for the sacramental signi- words, and the other at the end. fication which is most commonly employed for the action Whether it is lawful to add anything to the words in which the sacramental form IIIa q. 60 a. 8 consists? Objection 1. It seems that it is not lawful to add any- forms. thing to the words in which the sacramental form consists. Objection 2. Further, in the sacraments words are by For these sacramental words are not of less importance way of form, as stated above (a. 6, ad 2; a. 7). But any than are the words of Holy Scripture. But it is not lawful addition or subtraction in forms changes the species, as to add anything to, or to take anything from, the words also in numbers (Metaph. viii). Therefore it seems that of Holy Scripture: for it is written (Dt. 4:2): “You shall if anything be added to or subtracted from a sacramental not add to the word that I speak to you, neither shall you form, it will not be the same sacrament. take away from it”; and (Apoc. 22:18,19): “I testify to Objection 3. Further, just as the sacramental form everyone that heareth the words of the prophecy of this demands a certain number of words, so does it require book: if any man shall add to these things, God shall add that these words should be pronounced in a certain order to him the plagues written in this book. And if any man and without interruption. If therefore, the sacrament is shall take away. . . God shall take away his part out of the not rendered invalid by addition or subtraction of words, book of life.” Therefore it seems that neither is it lawful to in like manner it seems that neither is it, if the words be add anything to, or to take anything from, the sacramental pronounced in a different order or with interruptions. 2417 On the contrary, Certain words are inserted by some of the Father Almighty, and of the only Begotten Son, and in the sacramental forms, which are not inserted by oth- of the Holy Ghost, the Paraclete,” the baptism would be ers: thus the Latins baptize under this form: “I baptize valid; and in like manner if one were to say, “I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost”; whereas the Greeks use the following form: Holy Ghost”; and may the Blessed Virgin succour thee, “The servant of God, N. . . is baptized in the name of the the baptism would be valid. Father,” etc. Yet both confer the sacrament validly. There- Perhaps, however, if one were to say, “I baptize thee fore it is lawful to add something to, or to take something in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the from, the sacramental forms. Holy Ghost, and of the Blessed Virgin Mary,” the baptism I answer that, With regard to all the variations that would be void; because it is written (1 Cor. 1:13): “Was may occur in the sacramental forms, two points seem to Paul crucified for you or were you baptized in the name of call for our attention. one is on the part of the person Paul?” But this is true if the intention be to baptize in the who says the words, and whose intention is essential to name of the Blessed Virgin as in the name of the Trinity, the sacrament, as will be explained further on (q. 64, a. 8 by which baptism is consecrated: for such a sense would ). Wherefore if he intends by such addition or suppression be contrary to faith, and would therefore render the sacra- to perform a rite other from that which is recognized by ment invalid: whereas if the addition, “and in the name the Church, it seems that the sacrament is invalid: because of the Blessed Virgin” be understood, not as if the name he seems not to intend to do what the Church does. of the Blessed Virgin effected anything in baptism, but as The other point to be considered is the meaning of intimating that her intercession may help the person bap- the words. For since in the sacraments, the words pro- tized to preserve the baptismal grace, then the sacrament duce an effect according to the sense which they con- is not rendered void. vey, as stated above (a. 7, ad 1), we must see whether Reply to Objection 1. It is not lawful to add anything the change of words destroys the essential sense of the to the words of Holy Scripture as regards the sense; but words: because then the sacrament is clearly rendered in- many words are added by Doctors by way of explanation valid. Now it is clear, if any substantial part of the sacra- of the Holy Scriptures. Nevertheless, it is not lawful to mental form be suppressed, that the essential sense of the add even words to Holy Scripture as though such words words is destroyed; and consequently the sacrament is in- were a part thereof, for this would amount to forgery. It valid. Wherefore Didymus says (De Spir. Sanct. ii): “If would amount to the same if anyone were to pretend that anyone attempt to baptize in such a way as to omit one something is essential to a sacramental form, which is not of the aforesaid names,” i.e. of the Father, Son, and Holy so. Ghost, “his baptism will be invalid.” But if that which is Reply to Objection 2. Words belong to a sacramental omitted be not a substantial part of the form, such an omis- form by reason of the sense signified by them. Conse- sion does not destroy the essential sense of the words, nor quently any addition or suppression of words which does consequently the validity of the sacrament. Thus in the not add to or take from the essential sense, does not de- form of the Eucharist—“For this is My Body,” the omis- stroy the essence of the sacrament. sion of the word “for” does not destroy the essential sense Reply to Objection 3. If the words are interrupted of the words, nor consequently cause the sacrament to be to such an extent that the intention of the speaker is in- invalid; although perhaps he who makes the omission may terrupted, the sacramental sense is destroyed, and conse- sin from negligence or contempt. quently, the validity of the sacrament. But this is not the Again, it is possible to add something that destroys case if the interruption of the speaker is so slight, that his the essential sense of the words: for instance, if one were intention and the sense of the words is not interrupted. to say: “I baptize thee in the name of the Father Who The same is to be said of a change in the order of the is greater, and of the Son Who is less,” with which form words. Because if this destroys the sense of the words, the Arians baptized: and consequently such an addition the sacrament is invalidated: as happens when a negation makes the sacrament invalid. But if the addition be such is made to precede or follow a word. But if the order as not to destroy the essential sense, the sacrament is not is so changed that the sense of the words does not vary, rendered invalid. Nor does it matter whether this addition the sacrament is not invalidated, according to the Philoso- be made at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end: For pher’s dictum: “Nouns and verbs mean the same though instance, if one were to say, “I baptize thee in the name they be transposed” (Peri Herm. x). 2418 THIRD PART, QUESTION 61 Of the Necessity of the Sacraments (In Four Articles) We must now consider the necessity of the sacraments; concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether sacraments are necessary for man’s salvation? (2) Whether they were necessary in the state that preceded sin? (3) Whether they were necessary in the state after sin and before Christ? (4) Whether they were necessary after Christ’s coming? Whether sacraments are necessary for man’s salvation? IIIa q. 61 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that sacraments are not nec- so as to reach the part affected by disease. Consequently essary for man’s salvation. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. it was fitting that God should provide man with a spiritual 4:8): “Bodily exercise is profitable to little.” But the use medicine by means of certain corporeal signs; for if man of sacraments pertains to bodily exercise; because sacra- were offered spiritual things without a veil, his mind be- ments are perfected in the signification of sensible things ing taken up with the material world would be unable to and words, as stated above (q. 60, a. 6). Therefore sacra- apply itself to them. ments are not necessary for the salvation of man. The third reason is taken from the fact that man is Objection 2. Further, the Apostle was told (2 Cor. prone to direct his activity chiefly towards material things. 12:9): “My grace is sufficient for thee.” But it would not Lest, therefore, it should be too hard for man to be drawn suffice if sacraments were necessary for salvation. There- away entirely from bodily actions, bodily exercise was fore sacraments are not necessary for man’s salvation. offered to him in the sacraments, by which he might be Objection 3. Further, given a sufficient cause, nothing trained to avoid superstitious practices, consisting in the more seems to be required for the effect. But Christ’s Pas- worship of demons, and all manner of harmful action, sion is the sufficient cause of our salvation; for the Apostle consisting in sinful deeds. says (Rom. 5:10): “If, when we were enemies, we were It follows, therefore, that through the institution of reconciled to God by the death of His Son: much more, the sacraments man, consistently with his nature, is in- being reconciled, shall we be saved by His life.” There- structed through sensible things; he is humbled, through fore sacraments are not necessary for man’s salvation. confessing that he is subject to corporeal things, seeing On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix): that he receives assistance through them: and he is even “It is impossible to keep men together in one religious de- preserved from bodily hurt, by the healthy exercise of the nomination, whether true or false, except they be united sacraments. by means of visible signs or sacraments.” But it is neces- Reply to Objection 1. Bodily exercise, as such, is not sary for salvation that men be united together in the name very profitable: but exercise taken in the use of the sacra- of the one true religion. Therefore sacraments are neces- ments is not merely bodily, but to a certain extent spiritual, sary for man’s salvation. viz. in its signification and in its causality. I answer that, Sacraments are necessary unto man’s Reply to Objection 2. God’s grace is a sufficient salvation for three reasons. The first is taken from the con- cause of man’s salvation. But God gives grace to man dition of human nature which is such that it has to be led in a way which is suitable to him. Hence it is that man by things corporeal and sensible to things spiritual and in- needs the sacraments that he may obtain grace. telligible. Now it belongs to Divine providence to provide Reply to Objection 3. Christ’s Passion is a sufficient for each one according as its condition requires. Divine cause of man’s salvation. But it does not follow that the wisdom, therefore, fittingly provides man with means of sacraments are not also necessary for that purpose: be- salvation, in the shape of corporeal and sensible signs that cause they obtain their effect through the power of Christ’s are called sacraments. Passion; and Christ’s Passion is, so to say, applied to man The second reason is taken from the state of man who through the sacraments according to the Apostle (Rom. in sinning subjected himself by his affections to corporeal 6:3): “All we who are baptized in Christ Jesus, are bap- things. Now the healing remedy should be given to a man tized in His death.” 2419 Whether before sin sacraments were necessary to man? IIIa q. 61 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that before sin sacraments were of that state, in which the higher (parts of man) ruled the necessary to man. For, as stated above (a. 1, ad 2) man lower, and nowise depended on them: for just as the mind needs sacraments that he may obtain grace. But man was subject to God, so were the lower powers of the soul needed grace even in the state of innocence, as we stated subject to the mind, and the body to the soul. And it would in the Ia, q. 95, a. 4 (cf. Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 2; Ia IIae, be contrary to this order if the soul were perfected either q. 114, a. 2). Therefore sacraments were necessary in that in knowledge or in grace, by anything corporeal; which state also. happens in the sacraments. Therefore in the state of in- Objection 2. Further, sacraments are suitable to man nocence man needed no sacraments, whether as remedies by reason of the conditions of human nature, as stated against sin or as means of perfecting the soul. above (a. 1). But man’s nature is the same before and Reply to Objection 1. In the state of innocence man after sin. Therefore it seems that before sin, man needed needed grace: not so that he needed to obtain grace by the sacraments. means of sensible signs, but in a spiritual and invisible Objection 3. Further, matrimony is a sacrament, ac- manner. cording to Eph. 5:32: “This is a great sacrament; but I Reply to Objection 2. Man’s nature is the same be- speak in Christ and in the Church.” But matrimony was fore and after sin, but the state of his nature is not the instituted before sin, as may be seen in Gn. 2. Therefore same. Because after sin, the soul, even in its higher part, sacraments were necessary to man before sin. needs to receive something from corporeal things in order On the contrary, None but the sick need remedies, that it may be perfected: whereas man had no need of this according to Mat. 9:12: “They that are in health need not in that state. a physician.” Now the sacraments are spiritual remedies Reply to Objection 3. Matrimony was instituted in for the healing of wounds inflicted by sin. Therefore they the state of innocence, not as a sacrament, but as a func- were not necessary before sin. tion of nature. Consequently, however, it foreshadowed I answer that, Sacraments were not necessary in the something in relation to Christ and the Church: just as state of innocence. This can be proved from the rectitude everything else foreshadowed Christ. Whether there should have been sacraments after sin, before Christ? IIIa q. 61 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that there should have been no unsuitably instituted before Christ. sacraments after sin, before Christ. For it has been stated On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix) that the Passion of Christ is applied to men through the that “the first sacraments which the Law commanded to be sacraments: so that Christ’s Passion is compared to the solemnized and observed were announcements of Christ’s sacraments as cause to effect. But effect does not precede future coming.” But it was necessary for man’s salvation cause. Therefore there should have been no sacraments that Christ’s coming should be announced beforehand. before Christ’s coming. Therefore it was necessary that some sacraments should Objection 2. Further, sacraments should be suitable to be instituted before Christ. the state of the human race, as Augustine declares (Con- I answer that, Sacraments are necessary for man’s tra Faust. xix). But the state of the human race underwent salvation, in so far as they are sensible signs of invisible no change after sin until it was repaired by Christ. Nei- things whereby man is made holy. Now after sin no man ther, therefore, should the sacraments have been changed, can be made holy save through Christ, “Whom God hath so that besides the sacraments of the natural law, others proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood, should be instituted in the law of Moses. to the showing of His justice. . . that He Himself may be Objection 3. Further, the nearer a thing approaches to just, and the justifier of him who is of the faith of Jesus that which is perfect, the more like it should it be. Now Christ” (Rom. 3:25,26). Therefore before Christ’s com- the perfection of human salvation was accomplished by ing there was need for some visible signs whereby man Christ; to Whom the sacraments of the Old Law were might testify to his faith in the future coming of a Saviour. nearer than those that preceded the Law. Therefore they And these signs are called sacraments. It is therefore clear should have borne a greater likeness to the sacraments of that some sacraments were necessary before Christ’s com- Christ. And yet the contrary is the case, since it was fore- ing. told that the priesthood of Christ would be “according to Reply to Objection 1. Christ’s Passion is the final the order of Melchisedech, and not. . . according to the or- cause of the old sacraments: for they were instituted in der of Aaron” (Heb. 7:11). Therefore sacraments were order to foreshadow it. Now the final cause precedes not 2420 in time, but in the intention of the agent. Consequently, tive of man’s faith in the future coming of Christ: which there is no reason against the existence of sacraments be- sacraments are compared to those that preceded the Law, fore Christ’s Passion. as something determinate to that which is indeterminate: Reply to Objection 2. The state of the human race inasmuch as before the Law it was not laid down precisely after sin and before Christ can be considered from two of what sacraments men were to make use: whereas this points of view. First, from that of faith: and thus it was al- was prescribed by the Law; and this was necessary both ways one and the same: since men were made righteous, on account of the overclouding of the natural law, and for through faith in the future coming of Christ. Secondly, the clearer signification of faith. according as sin was more or less intense, and knowl- Reply to Objection 3. The sacrament of edge concerning Christ more or less explicit. For as time Melchisedech which preceded the Law is more like the went on sin gained a greater hold on man, so much so that Sacrament of the New Law in its matter: in so far as “he it clouded man’s reason, the consequence being that the offered bread and wine” (Gn. 14:18), just as bread and precepts of the natural law were insufficient to make man wine are offered in the sacrifice of the New Testament. live aright, and it became necessary to have a written code Nevertheless the sacraments of the Mosaic Law are more of fixed laws, and together with these certain sacraments like the thing signified by the sacrament, i.e. the Passion of faith. For it was necessary, as time went on, that the of Christ: as clearly appears in the Paschal Lamb and knowledge of faith should be more and more unfolded, such like. The reason of this was lest, if the sacraments since, as Gregory says (Hom. vi in Ezech.): “With the retained the same appearance, it might seem to be the advance of time there was an advance in the knowledge continuation of one and the same sacrament, where there of Divine things.” Consequently in the old Law there was no interruption of time. was also a need for certain fixed sacraments significa- Whether there was need for any sacraments after Christ came? IIIa q. 61 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that there was no need for any sacraments are signs in protestation of the faith whereby sacraments after Christ came. For the figure should cease man is justified; and signs should vary according as they with the advent of the truth. But “grace and truth came by signify the future, the past, or the present; for as Augus- Jesus Christ” (Jn. 1:17). Since, therefore, the sacraments tine says (Contra Faust. xix), “the same thing is variously are signs or figures of the truth, it seems that there was no pronounced as to be done and as having been done: for need for any sacraments after Christ’s Passion. instance the word ‘passurus’ [going to suffer] differs from Objection 2. Further, the sacraments consist in certain ‘passus’ [having suffered].” Therefore the sacraments of elements, as stated above (q. 60, a. 4). But the Apostle the New Law, that signify Christ in relation to the past, says (Gal. 4:3,4) that “when we were children we were must needs differ from those of the Old Law, that fore- serving under the elements of the world”: but that now shadowed the future. “when the fulness of time” has “come,” we are no longer Reply to Objection 1. As Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. children. Therefore it seems that we should not serve God v), the state of the New Law. is between the state of the under the elements of this world, by making use of corpo- Old Law, whose figures are fulfilled in the New, and the real sacraments. state of glory, in which all truth will be openly and per- Objection 3. Further, according to James 1:17 with fectly revealed. Wherefore then there will be no sacra- God “there is no change, nor shadow of alteration.” But it ments. But now, so long as we know “through a glass in seems to argue some change in the Divine will that God a dark manner,” (1 Cor. 13:12) we need sensible signs in should give man certain sacraments for his sanctification order to reach spiritual things: and this is the province of now during the time of grace, and other sacraments before the sacraments. Christ’s coming. Therefore it seems that other sacraments Reply to Objection 2. The Apostle calls the sacra- should not have been instituted after Christ. ments of the Old Law “weak and needy elements” (Gal. On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix) 4:9) because they neither contained nor caused grace. that the sacraments of the Old Law “were abolished be- Hence the Apostle says that those who used these sacra- cause they were fulfilled; and others were instituted, fewer ments served God “under the elements of this world”: for in number, but more efficacious, more profitable, and of the very reason that these sacraments were nothing else easier accomplishment.” than the elements of this world. But our sacraments both I answer that, As the ancient Fathers were saved contain and cause grace: consequently the comparison through faith in Christ’s future coming, so are we saved does not hold. through faith in Christ’s past birth and Passion. Now the Reply to Objection 3. Just as the head of the house 2421 is not proved to have a changeable mind, through issuing instituted sacraments of one kind after Christ’s coming, various commands to his household at various seasons, or- and of another kind at the time of the Law. because the dering things differently in winter and summer; so it does latter were suitable as foreshadowing grace; the former as not follow that there is any change in God, because He signifying the presence of grace, 2422 THIRD PART, QUESTION 62 Of the Sacraments’ Principal Effect, Which Is Grace (In Six Articles) We have now to consider the effect of the sacraments. First of their principal effect, which is grace; secondly, of their secondary effect, which is a character. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the sacraments of the New Law are the cause of grace? (2) Whether sacramental grace confers anything in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts? (3) Whether the sacraments contain grace? (4) Whether there is any power in them for the causing of grace? (5) Whether the sacraments derive this power from Christ’s Passion? (6) Whether the sacraments of the Old Law caused grace? Whether the sacraments are the cause of grace? IIIa q. 62 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that the sacraments are not the vested by means of a book, an abbot by means of a crozier, cause of grace. For it seems that the same thing is not a bishop by means of a ring, so by the various sacraments both sign and cause: since the nature of sign appears to be various kinds of grace are conferred.” But if we exam- more in keeping with an effect. But a sacrament is a sign ine the question properly, we shall see that according to of grace. Therefore it is not its cause. the above mode the sacraments are mere signs. For the Objection 2. Further, nothing corporeal can act on a leaden coin is nothing but a sign of the king’s command spiritual thing: since “the agent is more excellent than the that this man should receive money. In like manner the patient,” as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii). But the book is a sign of the conferring of a canonry. Hence, ac- subject of grace is the human mind, which is something cording to this opinion the sacraments of the New Law spiritual. Therefore the sacraments cannot cause grace. would be mere signs of grace; whereas we have it on the Objection 3. Further, what is proper to God should authority of many saints that the sacraments of the New not be ascribed to a creature. But it is proper to God to Law not only signify, but also cause grace. cause grace, according to Ps. 83:12: “The Lord will give We must therefore say otherwise, that an efficient grace and glory.” Since, therefore, the sacraments con- cause is twofold, principal and instrumental. The prin- sist in certain words and created things, it seems that they cipal cause works by the power of its form, to which form cannot cause grace. the effect is likened; just as fire by its own heat makes On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in something hot. In this way none but God can cause grace: Joan.) that the baptismal water “touches the body and since grace is nothing else than a participated likeness cleanses the heart.” But the heart is not cleansed save of the Divine Nature, according to 2 Pet. 1:4: “He hath through grace. Therefore it causes grace: and for like rea- given us most great and precious promises; that we may son so do the other sacraments of the Church. be [Vulg.: ‘you may be made’] partakers of the Divine Na- I answer that, We must needs say that in some way ture.” But the instrumental cause works not by the power the sacraments of the New Law cause grace. For it is ev- of its form, but only by the motion whereby it is moved ident that through the sacraments of the New Law man is by the principal agent: so that the effect is not likened to incorporated with Christ: thus the Apostle says of Bap- the instrument but to the principal agent: for instance, the tism (Gal. 3:27): “As many of you as have been baptized couch is not like the axe, but like the art which is in the in Christ have put on Christ.” And man is made a member craftsman’s mind. And it is thus that the sacraments of the of Christ through grace alone. New Law cause grace: for they are instituted by God to be Some, however, say that they are the cause of grace employed for the purpose of conferring grace. Hence Au- not by their own operation, but in so far as God causes gustine says (Contra Faust. xix): “All these things,” viz. grace in the soul when the sacraments are employed. And pertaining to the sacraments, “are done and pass away, but they give as an example a man who on presenting a leaden the power,” viz. of God, “which works by them, remains coin, receives, by the king’s command, a hundred pounds: ever.” Now that is, properly speaking, an instrument by not as though the leaden coin, by any operation of its own, which someone works: wherefore it is written (Titus 3:5): caused him to be given that sum of money; this being the “He saved us by the laver of regeneration.” effect of the mere will of the king. Hence Bernard says Reply to Objection 1. The principal cause cannot in a sermon on the Lord’s Supper: “Just as a canon is in- properly be called a sign of its effect, even though the 2423 latter be hidden and the cause itself sensible and manifest. in so far as it is the instrument of an art. But it does not But an instrumental cause, if manifest, can be called a sign accomplish the instrumental action save by exercising its of a hidden effect, for this reason, that it is not merely proper action: for it is by cutting that it makes a couch. a cause but also in a measure an effect in so far as it is In like manner the corporeal sacraments by their oper- moved by the principal agent. And in this sense the sacra- ation, which they exercise on the body that they touch, ments of the New Law are both cause and signs. Hence, accomplish through the Divine institution an instrumen- too, is it that, to use the common expression, “they ef- tal operation on the soul; for example, the water of bap- fect what they signify.” From this it is clear that they per- tism, in respect of its proper power, cleanses the body, fectly fulfil the conditions of a sacrament; being ordained and thereby, inasmuch as it is the instrument of the Divine to something sacred, not only as a sign, but also as a cause. power, cleanses the soul: since from soul and body one Reply to Objection 2. An instrument has a twofold thing is made. And thus it is that Augustine says (Gen. ad action; one is instrumental, in respect of which it works lit. xii) that it “touches the body and cleanses the heart.” not by its own power but by the power of the principal Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers that agent: the other is its proper action, which belongs to it in which causes grace as principal agent; for this belongs to respect of its proper form: thus it belongs to an axe to cut God alone, as stated above. asunder by reason of its sharpness, but to make a couch, Whether sacramental grace confers anything in addition to the grace of the virtues IIIa q. 62 a. 2 and gifts? Objection 1. It seems that sacramental grace confers whereby the powers are perfected in reference to their nothing in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts. actions. Now the sacraments are ordained unto certain For the grace of the virtues and gifts perfects the soul suf- special effects which are necessary in the Christian life: ficiently, both in its essence and in its powers; as is clear thus Baptism is ordained unto a certain spiritual regener- from what was said in the Ia IIae, q. 110, Aa. 3,4. But ation, by which man dies to vice and becomes a member grace is ordained to the perfecting of the soul. Therefore of Christ: which effect is something special in addition to sacramental grace cannot confer anything in addition to the actions of the soul’s powers: and the same holds true the grace of the virtues and gifts. of the other sacraments. Consequently just as the virtues Objection 2. Further, the soul’s defects are caused and gifts confer, in addition to grace commonly so called, by sin. But all sins are sufficiently removed by the grace a certain special perfection ordained to the powers’ proper of the virtues and gifts: because there is no sin that is actions, so does sacramental grace confer, over and above not contrary to some virtue. Since, therefore, sacramen- grace commonly so called, and in addition to the virtues tal grace is ordained to the removal of the soul’s defects, and gifts, a certain Divine assistance in obtaining the end it cannot confer anything in addition to the grace of the of the sacrament. It is thus that sacramental grace confers virtues and gifts. something in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts. Objection 3. Further, every addition or subtraction of Reply to Objection 1. The grace of the virtues and form varies the species (Metaph. viii). If, therefore, sacra- gifts perfects the essence and powers of the soul suffi- mental grace confers anything in addition to the grace of ciently as regards ordinary conduct: but as regards cer- the virtues and gifts, it follows that it is called grace equiv-tain special effects which are necessary in a Christian life, ocally: and so we are none the wiser when it is said that sacramental grace is needed. the sacraments cause grace. Reply to Objection 2. Vices and sins are sufficiently On the contrary, If sacramental grace confers noth- removed by virtues and gifts, as to present and future time. ing in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts, it is in so far as they prevent man from sinning. But in regard useless to confer the sacraments on those who have the to past sins, the acts of which are transitory whereas their virtues and gifts. But there is nothing useless in God’s guilt remains, man is provided with a special remedy in works. Therefore it seems that sacramental grace confers the sacraments. something in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts. Reply to Objection 3. Sacramental grace is compared I answer that, As stated in the Ia IIae, q. 110, Aa. 3,4, to grace commonly so called, as species to genus. Where-grace, considered in itself, perfects the essence of the soul, fore just as it is not equivocal to use the term “animal” in in so far as it is a certain participated likeness of the Di- its generic sense, and as applied to a man, so neither is vine Nature. And just as the soul’s powers flow from its it equivocal to speak of grace commonly so called and of essence, so from grace there flow certain perfections into sacramental grace. the powers of the soul, which are called virtues and gifts, 2424 Whether the sacraments of the New Law contain grace? IIIa q. 62 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that the sacraments of the New grace. Secondly, as in its cause; for, as stated above (a. 1) Law do not contain grace. For it seems that what is con- a sacrament of the New Law is an instrumental cause of tained is in the container. But grace is not in the sacra- grace. Wherefore grace is in a sacrament of the New Law, ments; neither as in a subject, because the subject of grace not as to its specific likeness, as an effect in its univocal is not a body but a spirit; nor as in a vessel, for according cause; nor as to some proper and permanent form propor- to Phys. iv, “a vessel is a movable place,” and an accident tioned to such an effect, as effects in non-univocal causes, cannot be in a place. Therefore it seems that the sacra- for instance, as things generated are in the sun; but as to a ments of the New Law do not contain grace. certain instrumental power transient and incomplete in its Objection 2. Further, sacraments are instituted as natural being, as will be explained later on (a. 4). means whereby men may obtain grace. But since grace Reply to Objection 1. Grace is said to be in a sacra- is an accident it cannot pass from one subject to another. ment not as in its subject; nor as in a vessel considered as Therefore it would be of no account if grace were in the a place, but understood as the instrument of some work sacraments. to be done, according to Ezech. 9:1: “Everyone hath a Objection 3. Further, a spiritual thing is not contained destroying vessel [Douay: ‘weapon’] in his hand.” by a corporeal, even if it be therein; for the soul is not con- Reply to Objection 2. Although an accident does not tained by the body; rather does it contain the body. Since, pass from one subject to another, nevertheless in a fash- therefore, grace is something spiritual, it seems that it can- ion it does pass from its cause into its subject through the not be contained in a corporeal sacrament. instrument; not so that it be in each of these in the same On the contrary, Hugh of S. Victor says (De Sacram. way, but in each according to its respective nature. i) that “a sacrament, through its being sanctified, contains Reply to Objection 3. If a spiritual thing exist per- an invisible grace.” fectly in something, it contains it and is not contained by I answer that, A thing is said to be in another in vari- it. But, in a sacrament, grace has a passing and incomplete ous ways; in two of which grace is said to be in the sacra- mode of being: and consequently it is not unfitting to say ments. First, as in its sign; for a sacrament is a sign of that the sacraments contain grace. Whether there be in the sacraments a power of causing grace? IIIa q. 62 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that there is not in the sacra- as soon as the sacrament is complete. Therefore it seems ments a power of causing grace. For the power of causing that in the sacraments there is no power for causing grace. grace is a spiritual power. But a spiritual power cannot Objection 4. Further, the same thing cannot be in be in a body; neither as proper to it, because power flows several. But several things concur in the completion of a from a thing’s essence and consequently cannot transcend sacrament, namely, words and things: while in one sacra- it; nor as derived from something else, because that which ment there can be but one power. Therefore it seems that is received into anything follows the mode of the recip- there is no power of causing grace in the sacraments. ient. Therefore in the sacraments there is no power of On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in causing grace. Joan.): “Whence hath water so great power, that it touches Objection 2. Further, whatever exists is reducible to the body and cleanses the heart?” And Bede says that some kind of being and some degree of good. But there “Our Lord conferred a power of regeneration on the wa- is no assignable kind of being to which such a power can ters by the contact of His most pure body.” belong; as anyone may see by running. through them all. I answer that, Those who hold that the sacraments Nor is it reducible to some degree of good; for neither do not cause grace save by a certain coincidence, deny the is it one of the goods of least account, since sacraments sacraments any power that is itself productive of the sacra- are necessary for salvation: nor is it an intermediate good, mental effect, and hold that the Divine power assists the such as are the powers of the soul, which are natural pow- sacraments and produces their effect. But if we hold that ers; nor is it one of the greater goods, for it is neither a sacrament is an instrumental cause of grace, we must grace nor a virtue of the mind. Therefore it seems that in needs allow that there is in the sacraments a certain in- the sacraments there is no power of causing grace. strumental power of bringing about the sacramental ef- Objection 3. Further, if there be such a power in the fects. Now such power is proportionate to the instrument: sacraments, its presence there must be due to nothing less and consequently it stands in comparison to the complete than a creative act of God. But it seems unbecoming that and perfect power of anything, as the instrument to the so excellent a being created by God should cease to exist principal agent. For an instrument, as stated above (a. 1), 2425 does not work save as moved by the principal agent, which speaking, is not in any genus, but is reducible to a genus works of itself. And therefore the power of the principal and species of perfect act. agent exists in nature completely and perfectly: whereas Reply to Objection 3. Just as an instrumental power the instrumental power has a being that passes from one accrues to an instrument through its being moved by thing into another, and is incomplete; just as motion is an the principal agent, so does a sacrament receive spiritual imperfect act passing from agent to patient. power from Christ’s blessing and from the action of the Reply to Objection 1. A spiritual power cannot be minister in applying it to a sacramental use. Hence Au- in a corporeal subject, after the manner of a permanent gustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (St. Maximus and complete power, as the argument proves. But there of Turin, Serm. xii): “Nor should you marvel, if we say is nothing to hinder an instrumental spiritual power from that water, a corporeal substance, achieves the cleansing being in a body; in so far as a body can be moved by a of the soul. It does indeed, and penetrates every secret particular spiritual substance so as to produce a particular hiding-place of the conscience. For subtle and clear as it spiritual effect; thus in the very voice which is perceived is, the blessing of Christ makes it yet more subtle, so that by the senses there is a certain spiritual power, inasmuch it permeates into the very principles of life and searches as it proceeds from a mental concept, of arousing the mind the inner-most recesses of the heart.” of the hearer. It is in this way that a spiritual power is Reply to Objection 4. Just as the one same power in the sacraments, inasmuch as they are ordained by God of the principal agent is instrumentally in all the instru- unto the production of a spiritual effect. ments that are ordained unto the production of an effect, Reply to Objection 2. Just as motion, through be- forasmuch as they are one as being so ordained: so also ing an imperfect act, is not properly in a genus, but is the one same sacramental power is in both words and reducible to a genus of perfect act, for instance, alteration things, forasmuch as words and things combine to form to the genus of quality: so, instrumental power, properly one sacrament. Whether the sacraments of the New Law derive their power from Christ’s Passion? IIIa q. 62 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that the sacraments of the New sequently, it seems that the sacraments derive their power Law do not derive their power from Christ’s Passion. For from Christ’s Passion. the power of the sacraments is in the causing of grace I answer that, As stated above (a. 1) a sacrament in which is the principle of spiritual life in the soul. But causing grace works after the manner of an instrument. as Augustine says (Tract. xix in Joan.): “The Word, as He Now an instrument is twofold. the one, separate, as a was in the beginning with God, quickens souls; as He was stick, for instance; the other, united, as a hand. More- made flesh, quickens bodies.” Since, therefore, Christ’s over, the separate instrument is moved by means of the Passion pertains to the Word as made flesh, it seems that united instrument, as a stick by the hand. Now the princi- it cannot cause the power of the sacraments. pal efficient cause of grace is God Himself, in comparison Objection 2. Further, the power of the sacraments with Whom Christ’s humanity is as a united instrument, seems to depend on faith. for as Augustine says (Tract. whereas the sacrament is as a separate instrument. Con- lxxx in Joan.), the Divine Word perfects the sacrament sequently, the saving power must needs be derived by the “not because it is spoken, but because it is believed.” But sacraments from Christ’s Godhead through His humanity. our faith regards not only Christ’s Passion, but also the Now sacramental grace seems to be ordained princi- other mysteries of His humanity, and in a yet higher mea- pally to two things: namely, to take away the defects con- sure, His Godhead. Therefore it seems that the power of sequent on past sins, in so far as they are transitory in the sacraments is not due specially to Christ’s Passion. act, but endure in guilt; and, further, to perfect the soul in Objection 3. Further, the sacraments are ordained things pertaining to Divine Worship in regard to the Chris- unto man’s justification, according to 1 Cor. 6:11: “You tian Religion. But it is manifest from what has been stated are washed. . . you are justified.” Now justification is as- above (q. 48, Aa. 1,2,6; q. 49, Aa. 1,3) that Christ deliv- cribed to the Resurrection, according to Rom. 4:25: ered us from our sins principally through His Passion, not ”(Who) rose again for our justification.” Therefore it only by way of efficiency and merit, but also by way of seems that the sacraments derive their power from Christ’s satisfaction. Likewise by His Passion He inaugurated the Resurrection rather than from His Passion. Rites of the Christian Religion by offering “Himself—an On the contrary, on Rom. 5:14: “After the simili- oblation and a sacrifice to God” (Eph. 5:2). Wherefore it tude of the transgression of Adam,” etc., the gloss says: is manifest that the sacraments of the Church derive their “From the side of Christ asleep on the Cross flowed the power specially from Christ’s Passion, the virtue of which sacraments which brought salvation to the Church.” Con- is in a manner united to us by our receiving the sacra- 2426 ments. It was in sign of this that from the side of Christ united to us. Now the power of blotting out sin belongs in hanging on the Cross there flowed water and blood, the a special way to His Passion. And therefore men are deliv- former of which belongs to Baptism, the latter to the Eu- ered from sin especially by faith in His Passion, according charist, which are the principal sacraments. to Rom. 3:25: “Whom God hath proposed to be a propi- Reply to Objection 1. The Word, forasmuch as He tiation through faith in His Blood.” Therefore the power was in the beginning with God, quickens souls as princi- of the sacraments which is ordained unto the remission of pal agent; but His flesh, and the mysteries accomplished sins is derived principally from faith in Christ’s Passion. therein, are as instrumental causes in the process of giv- Reply to Objection 3. Justification is ascribed to the ing life to the soul: while in giving life to the body they Resurrection by reason of the term “whither,” which is act not only as instrumental causes, but also to a certain newness of life through grace. But it is ascribed to the extent as exemplars, as we stated above (q. 56, a. 1, ad 3). Passion by reason of the term “whence,” i.e. in regard to Reply to Objection 2. Christ dwells in us “by faith” the forgiveness of sin. (Eph. 3:17). Consequently, by faith Christ’s power is Whether the sacraments of the Old Law caused grace? IIIa q. 62 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that the sacraments of the Old as it was stated above (a. 5 ), the power of Christ’s Passion Law caused grace. For, as stated above (a. 5, ad 2) the is united to us by faith and the sacraments, but in different sacraments of the New Law derive their efficacy from ways; because the link that comes from faith is produced faith in Christ’s Passion. But there was faith in Christ’s by an act of the soul; whereas the link that comes from the Passion under the Old Law, as well as under the New, sacraments, is produced by making use of exterior things. since we have “the same spirit of faith” (2 Cor. 4:13). Now nothing hinders that which is subsequent in point of Therefore just as the sacraments of the New Law confer time, from causing movement, even before it exists in re- grace, so did the sacraments of the Old Law. ality, in so far as it pre-exists in an act of the soul: thus Objection 2. Further, there is no sanctification save the end, which is subsequent in point of time, moves the by grace. But men were sanctified by the sacraments of agent in so far as it is apprehended and desired by him. On the Old Law: for it is written (Lev. 8:31): “And when the other hand, what does not yet actually exist, does not he,” i.e. Moses, “had sanctified them,” i.e. Aaron and his cause movement if we consider the use of exterior things. sons, “in their vestments,” etc. Therefore it seems that the Consequently, the efficient cause cannot in point of time sacraments of the Old Law conferred grace. come into existence after causing movement, as does the Objection 3. Further, Bede says in a homily on the final cause. It is therefore clear that the sacraments of the Circumcision: “Under the Law circumcision provided the New Law do reasonably derive the power of justification same health-giving balm against the wound of original from Christ’s Passion, which is the cause of man’s righ- sin, as baptism in the time of revealed grace.” But Bap- teousness; whereas the sacraments of the Old Law did not. tism confers grace now. Therefore circumcision conferred Nevertheless the Fathers of old were justified by faith grace; and in like manner, the other sacraments of the in Christ’s Passion, just as we are. And the sacraments of Law; for just as Baptism is the door of the sacraments of the old Law were a kind of protestation of that faith, inas- the New Law, so was circumcision the door of the sacra- much as they signified Christ’s Passion and its effects. It ments of the Old Law: hence the Apostle says (Gal. 5:3): is therefore manifest that the sacraments of the Old Law “I testify to every man circumcising himself, that he is a were not endowed with any power by which they con- debtor to the whole law.” duced to the bestowal of justifying grace: and they merely On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 4:9): “Turn you signified faith by which men were justified. again to the weak and needy elements?” i.e. “to the Law,” Reply to Objection 1. The Fathers of old had faith in says the gloss, “which is called weak, because it does not the future Passion of Christ, which, inasmuch as it was ap- justify perfectly.” But grace justifies perfectly. Therefore prehended by the mind, was able to justify them. But we the sacraments of the old Law did not confer grace. have faith in the past Passion of Christ, which is able to I answer that, It cannot be said that the sacraments justify, also by the real use of sacramental things as stated of the Old Law conferred sanctifying grace of themselves, above. i.e. by their own power: since thus Christ’s Passion would Reply to Objection 2. That sanctification was but a not have been necessary, according to Gal. 2:21: “If jus- figure: for they were said to be sanctified forasmuch as tice be by the Law, then Christ died in vain.” they gave themselves up to the Divine worship according But neither can it be said that they derived the power to the rite of the Old Law, which was wholly ordained to of conferring sanctifying grace from Christ’s Passion. For the foreshadowing of Christ’s Passion. 2427 Reply to Objection 3. There have been many opin-Hence others say that Circumcision conferred grace ions about Circumcision. For, according to some, Cir- also as regards a certain positive effect, i.e. by making cumcision conferred no grace, but only remitted sin. But man worthy of eternal life, but not so as to repress con- this is impossible; because man is not justified from sin cupiscence which makes man prone to sin. And so at one save by grace, according to Rom. 3:24: “Being justified time it seemed to me. But if the matter be considered care- freely by His grace.” fully, this too appears to be untrue; because the very least Wherefore others said that by Circumcision grace is grace is sufficient to resist any degree of concupiscence, conferred, as to the privative effects of sin, but not as to its and to merit eternal life. positive effects. But this also appears to be false, because And therefore it seems better to say that Circumcision by Circumcision, children received the faculty of obtain- was a sign of justifying faith: wherefore the Apostle says ing glory, which is the ultimate positive effect of grace. (Rom. 4:11) that Abraham “received the sign of Circum- Moreover, as regards the order of the formal cause, posi- cision, a seal of the justice of faith.” Consequently grace tive effects are naturally prior to privative effects, though was conferred in Circumcision in so far as it was a sign of according to the order of the material cause, the reverse Christ’s future Passion, as will be made clear further on is the case: for a form does not exclude privation save by (q. 70, a. 4). informing the subject. 2428 THIRD PART, QUESTION 63 Of the Other Effect of the Sacraments, Which Is a Character (In Six Articles) We have now to consider the other effect of the sacraments, which is a character: and concerning this there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether by the sacraments a character is produced in the soul? (2) What is this character? (3) Of whom is this character? (4) What is its subject? (5) Is it indelible? (6) Whether every sacrament imprints a character? Whether a sacrament imprints a character on the soul? IIIa q. 63 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that a sacrament does not im- sign thereof; thus in olden times soldiers who enlisted in print a character on the soul. For the word “charac- the ranks used to be marked with certain characters on the ter” seems to signify some kind of distinctive sign. But body, through being deputed to a bodily service. Since, Christ’s members are distinguished from others by eter- therefore, by the sacraments men are deputed to a spiri- nal predestination, which does not imply anything in the tual service pertaining to the worship of God, it follows predestined, but only in God predestinating, as we have that by their means the faithful receive a certain spiritual stated in the Ia, q. 23, a. 2. For it is written (2 Tim. character. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Parmen. ii): 2:19): “The sure foundation of God standeth firm, hav- “If a deserter from the battle, through dread of the mark of ing this seal: The Lord knoweth who are His.” Therefore enlistment on his body, throws himself on the emperor’s the sacraments do not imprint a character on the soul. clemency, and having besought and received mercy, re- Objection 2. Further, a character is a distinctive sign. turn to the fight; is that character renewed, when the man Now a sign, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) “is has been set free and reprimanded? is it not rather ac- that which conveys something else to the mind, besides knowledged and approved? Are the Christian sacraments, the species which it impresses on the senses.” But nothing by any chance, of a nature less lasting than this bodily in the soul can impress a species on the senses. Therefore mark?” it seems that no character is imprinted on the soul by the Reply to Objection 1. The faithful of Christ are des- sacraments. tined to the reward of the glory that is to come, by the seal Objection 3. Further, just as the believer is distin- of Divine Predestination. But they are deputed to acts be- guished from the unbeliever by the sacraments of the New coming the Church that is now, by a certain spiritual seal Law, so was it under the Old Law. But the sacraments of that is set on them, and is called a character. the Old Law did not imprint a character; whence they are Reply to Objection 2. The character imprinted on called “justices of the flesh” (Heb. 9:10) by the Apostle. the soul is a kind of sign in so far as it is imprinted by Therefore neither seemingly do the sacraments of the New a sensible sacrament: since we know that a certain one Law. has received the baptismal character, through his being On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 1:21,22): cleansed by the sensible water. Nevertheless from a kind “He. . . that hath anointed us is God; Who also hath sealed of likeness, anything that assimilates one thing to another, us, and given the pledge of the spirit in our hearts.” But or discriminates one thing from another, even though it a character means nothing else than a kind of sealing. be not sensible, can be called a character or a seal; thus Therefore it seems that by the sacraments God imprints the Apostle calls Christ “the figure” or charakter “of the His character on us. substance of the Father” (Heb. 1:3). I answer that, As is clear from what has been already Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 62, a. 6) the stated (q. 62, a. 5) the sacraments of the New Law are sacraments of the Old Law had not in themselves any spir- ordained for a twofold purpose; namely, for a remedy itual power of producing a spiritual effect. Consequently against sins; and for the perfecting of the soul in things in those sacraments there was no need of a spiritual char- pertaining to the Divine worship according to the rite of acter, and bodily circumcision sufficed, which the Apostle the Christian life. Now whenever anyone is deputed to calls “a seal” (Rom. 4:11). some definite purpose he is wont to receive some outward 2429 Whether a character is a spiritual power? IIIa q. 63 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that a character is not a spiri- ing Divine gifts, or in bestowing them on others. And for tual power. For “character” seems to be the same thing as both these purposes some power is needed; for to bestow “figure”; hence (Heb. 1:3), where we read “figure of His something on others, active power is necessary; and in or- substance, “for “figure” the Greek has charakter. Now der to receive, we need a passive power. Consequently, a “figure” is in the fourth species of quality, and thus dif- character signifies a certain spiritual power ordained unto fers from power which is in the second species. Therefore things pertaining to the Divine worship. character is not a spiritual power. But it must be observed that this spiritual power is in- Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. ii): strumental: as we have stated above (q. 62, a. 4) of the “The Divine Beatitude admits him that seeks happiness to virtue which is in the sacraments. For to have a sacramen- a share in Itself, and grants this share to him by conferring tal character belongs to God’s ministers: and a minister on him Its light as a kind of seal.” Consequently, it seems is a kind of instrument, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i). that a character is a kind of light. Now light belongs rather Consequently, just as the virtue which is in the sacraments to the third species of quality. Therefore a character is not is not of itself in a genus, but is reducible to a genus, for a power, since this seems to belong to the second species. the reason that it is of a transitory and incomplete nature: Objection 3. Further, character is defined by some so also a character is not properly in a genus or species, thus: “A character is a holy sign of the communion of but is reducible to the second species of quality. faith and of the holy ordination conferred by a hierarch.” Reply to Objection 1. Configuration is a certain Now a sign is in the genus of “relation,” not of “power.” boundary of quantity. Wherefore, properly speaking, it Therefore a character is not a spiritual power. is only in corporeal things; and of spiritual things is said Objection 4. Further, a power is in the nature of a metaphorically. Now that which decides the genus or cause and principle (Metaph. v). But a “sign” which is set species of a thing must needs be predicated of it properly. down in the definition of a character is rather in the nature Consequently, a character cannot be in the fourth species of an effect. Therefore a character is not a spiritual power. of quality, although some have held this to be the case. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii): Reply to Objection 2. The third species of quality “There are three things in the soul, power, habit, and pas- contains only sensible passions or sensible qualities. Now sion.” Now a character is not a passion: since a passion a character is not a sensible light. Consequently, it is not passes quickly, whereas a character is indelible, as will be in the third species of quality as some have maintained. made clear further on (a. 5). In like manner it is not a Reply to Objection 3. The relation signified by the habit: because no habit is indifferent to acting well or ill: word “sign” must needs have some foundation. Now the whereas a character is indifferent to either, since some use relation signified by this sign which is a character, cannot it well, some ill. Now this cannot occur with a habit: be- be founded immediately on the essence of the soul: be- cause no one abuses a habit of virtue, or uses well an evil cause then it would belong to every soul naturally. Con- habit. It remains, therefore, that a character is a power. sequently, there must be something in the soul on which I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the sacraments such a relation is founded. And it is in this that a character of the New Law produce a character, in so far as by them essentially consists. Therefore it need not be in the genus we are deputed to the worship of God according to the “relation” as some have held. rite of the Christian religion. Wherefore Dionysius (Eccl. Reply to Objection 4. A character is in the nature of Hier. ii), after saying that God “by a kind of sign grants a sign in comparison to the sensible sacrament by which a share of Himself to those that approach Him,” adds it is imprinted. But considered in itself, it is in the nature “by making them Godlike and communicators of Divine of a principle, in the way already explained. gifts.” Now the worship of God consists either in receiv- Whether the sacramental character is the character of Christ? IIIa q. 63 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that the sacramental character sign. And it is a sign of the grace that is conferred by the is not the character of Christ. For it is written (Eph. 4:30): sacrament. Now grace is poured forth into the soul by the “Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God, whereby you are whole Trinity; wherefore it is written (Ps. 83:12): “The sealed.” But a character consists essentially in some. thing Lord will give grace and glory.” Therefore it seems that that seals. Therefore the sacramental character should be the sacramental character should not be attributed spe- attributed to the Holy Ghost rather than to Christ. cially to Christ. Objection 2. Further, a character has the nature of a Objection 3. Further, a man is marked with a char- 2430 acter that he may be distinguishable from others. But the ters, which are nothing else than certain participations of saints are distinguishable from others by charity, which, Christ’s Priesthood, flowing from Christ Himself. as Augustine says (De Trin. xv), “alone separates the Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle speaks there of children of the Kingdom from the children of perdition”: that sealing by which a man is assigned to future glory, wherefore also the children of perdition are said to have and which is effected by grace. Now grace is attributed “the character of the beast” (Apoc. 13:16,17). But charity to the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as it is through love that is not attributed to Christ, but rather to the Holy Ghost ac- God gives us something gratis, which is the very nature cording to Rom. 5:5: “The charity of God is poured forth of grace: while the Holy Ghost is love. Wherefore it is in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us”; or written (1 Cor. 12:4): “There are diversities of graces, but even to the Father, according to 2 Cor. 13:13: “The grace the same Spirit.” of our Lord Jesus Christ and the charity of God.” There- Reply to Objection 2. The sacramental character is a fore it seems that the sacramental character should not be thing as regards the exterior sacrament, and a sacrament attributed to Christ. in regard to the ultimate effect. Consequently, something On the contrary, Some define character thus: “A can be attributed to a character in two ways. First, if the character is a distinctive mark printed in a man’s rational character be considered as a sacrament: and thus it is a soul by the eternal Character, whereby the created trinity sign of the invisible grace which is conferred in the sacra- is sealed with the likeness of the creating and re-creating ment. Secondly, if it be considered as a character. And Trinity, and distinguishing him from those who are not so thus it is a sign conferring on a man a likeness to some enlikened, according to the state of faith.” But the eter- principal person in whom is vested the authority over that nal Character is Christ Himself, according to Heb. 1:3: to which he is assigned: thus soldiers who are assigned “Who being the brightness of His glory and the figure,” or to military service, are marked with their leader’s sign, by character, “of His substance.” It seems, therefore, that the which they are, in a fashion, likened to him. And in this character should properly be attributed to Christ. way those who are deputed to the Christian worship, of I answer that, As has been made clear above (a. 1), a which Christ is the author, receive a character by which character is properly a kind of seal, whereby something is they are likened to Christ. Consequently, properly speak- marked, as being ordained to some particular end: thus a ing, this is Christ’s character. coin is marked for use in exchange of goods, and soldiers Reply to Objection 3. A character distinguishes one are marked with a character as being deputed to military from another, in relation to some particular end, to which service. Now the faithful are deputed to a twofold end. he, who receives the character is ordained: as has been First and principally to the enjoyment of glory. And for stated concerning the military character (a. 1) by which this purpose they are marked with the seal of grace ac- a soldier of the king is distinguished from the enemy’s cording to Ezech. 9:4: “Mark Thou upon the foreheads soldier in relation to the battle. In like manner the char- of the men that sigh and mourn”; and Apoc. 7:3: “Hurt acter of the faithful is that by which the faithful of Christ not the earth, nor the sea, nor the trees, till we sign the are distinguished from the servants of the devil, either in servants of our God in their foreheads.” relation to eternal life, or in relation to the worship of Secondly, each of the faithful is deputed to receive, or the Church that now is. Of these the former is the re- to bestow on others, things pertaining to the worship of sult of charity and grace, as the objection runs; while the God. And this, properly speaking, is the purpose of the latter results from the sacramental character. Wherefore sacramental character. Now the whole rite of the Chris- the “character of the beast” may be understood by oppo- tian religion is derived from Christ’s priesthood. Conse- sition, to mean either the obstinate malice for which some quently, it is clear that the sacramental character is spe- are assigned to eternal punishment, or the profession of an cially the character of Christ, to Whose character the unlawful form of worship. faithful are likened by reason of the sacramental charac- Whether the character be subjected in the powers of the soul? IIIa q. 63 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that the character is not sub- seem to be the subject of anything save habit and disposi- jected in the powers of the soul. For a character is said tion. But a character, as stated above (a. 2), is neither habit to be a disposition to grace. But grace is subjected in the nor disposition, but rather a power: the subject of which essence of the soul as we have stated in the Ia IIae, q. 110, is nothing else than the essence of the soul. Therefore it a. 4. Therefore it seems that the character is in the essence seems that the character is not subjected in a power of the of the soul and not in the powers. soul, but rather in its essence. Objection 2. Further, a power of the soul does not Objection 3. Further, the powers of the soul are di- 2431 vided into those of knowledge and those of appetite. But such cannot be accomplished suitably without the help of it cannot be said that a character is only in a cognitive grace, since, according to Jn. 4:24, “they that adore” God power, nor, again, only in an appetitive power: since it “must adore Him in spirit and in truth,” consequently, the is neither ordained to knowledge only, nor to desire only. Divine bounty bestows grace on those who receive the Likewise, neither can it be said to be in both, because the character, so that they may accomplish worthily the ser- same accident cannot be in several subjects. Therefore it vice to which they are deputed. Therefore the subject seems that a character is not subjected in a power of the should be ascribed to a character in respect of those ac- soul, but rather in the essence. tions that pertain to the Divine worship, rather than in re- On the contrary, A character, according to its defini- spect of grace. tion given above (a. 3), is imprinted in the rational soul Reply to Objection 2. The subject of the natural “by way of an image.” But the image of the Trinity in the power, which flows from the principles of the essence. soul is seen in the powers. Therefore a character is in the Now a character is not a power of this kind. but a spir- powers of the soul. itual power coming from without. Wherefore, just as the I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), a character is a essence of the soul, from which man has his natural life, kind of seal by which the soul is marked, so that it may is perfected by grace from which the soul derives spiritual receive, or bestow on others, things pertaining to Divine life; so the natural power of the soul is perfected by a spir- worship. Now the Divine worship consists in certain ac- itual power, which is a character. For habit and disposition tions: and the powers of the soul are properly ordained belong to a power of the soul, since they are ordained to to actions, just as the essence is ordained to existence. actions of which the powers are the principles. And in Therefore a character is subjected not in the essence of like manner whatever is ordained to action, should be at- the soul, but in its power. tributed to a power. Reply to Objection 1. The subject is ascribed to Reply to Objection 3. As stated above, a character an. accident in respect of that to which the accident dis- is ordained unto things pertaining to the Divine worship; poses it proximately, but not in respect of that to which which is a protestation of faith expressed by exterior signs. it disposes it remotely or indirectly. Now a character Consequently, a character needs to be in the soul’s cogni- disposes the soul directly and proximately to the fulfill- tive power, where also is faith. ing of things pertaining to Divine worship: and because Whether a character can be blotted out from the soul? IIIa q. 63 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that a character can be blotted military service is not repeated, but is “recognized and ap- out from the soul. Because the more perfect an accident proved” in the man who obtains the emperor’s forgiveness is, the more firmly does it adhere to its subject. But grace after offending him. Therefore neither can the sacramen- is more perfect than a character; because a character is or- tal character be blotted out. dained unto grace as to a further end. Now grace is lost I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), in a sacramental through sin. Much more, therefore, is a character so lost. character Christ’s faithful have a share in His Priesthood; Objection 2. Further, by a character a man is deputed in the sense that as Christ has the full power of a spiritual to the Divine worship, as stated above (Aa. 3,4). But some priesthood, so His faithful are likened to Him by sharing a pass from the worship of God to a contrary worship by certain spiritual power with regard to the sacraments and apostasy from the faith. It seems, therefore, that such lose to things pertaining to the Divine worship. For this reason the sacramental character. it is unbecoming that Christ should have a character: but Objection 3. Further, when the end ceases, the means His Priesthood is compared to a character, as that which to the end should cease also: thus after the resurrection is complete and perfect is compared to some participation there will be no marriage, because begetting will cease, of itself. Now Christ’s Priesthood is eternal, according to which is the purpose of marriage. Now the exterior wor- Ps. 109:4: “Thou art a priest for ever, according to the or- ship to which a character is ordained, will not endure in der of Melchisedech.” Consequently, every sanctification heaven, where there will be no shadows, but all will be wrought by His Priesthood, is perpetual, enduring as long truth without a veil. Therefore the sacramental character as the thing sanctified endures. This is clear even in inan- does not last in the soul for ever: and consequently it can imate things; for the consecration of a church or an altar be blotted out. lasts for ever unless they be destroyed. Since, therefore, On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Parmen. ii): the subject of a character is the soul as to its intellective “The Christian sacraments are not less lasting than the part, where faith resides, as stated above (a. 4, ad 3); it is bodily mark” of military service. But the character of clear that, the intellect being perpetual and incorruptible, 2432 a character cannot be blotted out from the soul. tism, for when they repent and return to the fold they do Reply to Objection 1. Both grace and character are in not receive it again; whence we conclude that it cannot be the soul, but in different ways. For grace is in the soul, as a lost.” The reason of this is that a character is an instru-form having complete existence therein: whereas a char- mental power, as stated above (ad 1), and the nature of an acter is in the soul, as an instrumental power, as stated instrument as such is to be moved by another, but not to above (a. 2). Now a complete form is in its subject ac- move itself; this belongs to the will. Consequently, how- cording to the condition of the subject. And since the soul ever much the will be moved in the contrary direction, the as long as it is a wayfarer is changeable in respect of the character is not removed, by reason of the immobility of free-will, it results that grace is in the soul in a change- the principal mover. able manner. But an instrumental power follows rather Reply to Objection 3. Although external worship the condition of the principal agent: and consequently a does not last after this life, yet its end remains. Conse- character exists in the soul in an indelible manner, not quently, after this life the character remains, both in the from any perfection of its own, but from the perfection of good as adding to their glory, and in the wicked as increas- Christ’s Priesthood, from which the character flows like ing their shame: just as the character of the military ser- an instrumental power. vice remains in the soldiers after the victory, as the boast Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (Contra of the conquerors, and the disgrace of the conquered. Parmen. ii), “even apostates are not deprived of their bap- Whether a character is imprinted by each sacrament of the New Law? IIIa q. 63 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that a character is imprinted by him to his former state. all the sacraments of the New Law: because each sacra- Now a sacrament may belong to the Divine worship in ment of the New Law makes man a participator in Christ’s three ways: first in regard to the thing done; secondly, in Priesthood. But the sacramental character is nothing but regard to the agent; thirdly, in regard to the recipient. In a participation in Christ’s Priesthood, as already stated regard to the thing done, the Eucharist belongs to the Di- (Aa. 3,5). Therefore it seems that a character is imprinted vine worship, for the Divine worship consists principally by each sacrament of the New Law. therein, so far as it is the sacrifice of the Church. And by Objection 2. Further, a character may be compared this same sacrament a character is not imprinted on man; to the soul in which it is, as a consecration to that which because it does not ordain man to any further sacramental is consecrated. But by each sacrament of the New Law action or benefit received, since rather is it “the end and man becomes the recipient of sanctifying grace, as stated consummation of all the sacraments,” as Dionysius says above (q. 62, a. 1). Therefore it seems that a character is (Eccl. Hier. iii). But it contains within itself Christ, in imprinted by each sacrament of the New Law. Whom there is not the character, but the very plenitude of Objection 3. Further, a character is both a reality and the Priesthood. a sacrament. But in each sacrament of the New Law, there But it is the sacrament of order that pertains to the is something which is only a reality, and something which sacramental agents: for it is by this sacrament that men are is only a sacrament, and something which is both reality deputed to confer sacraments on others: while the sacra- and sacrament. Therefore a character is imprinted by each ment of Baptism pertains to the recipients, since it confers sacrament of the New Law. on man the power to receive the other sacraments of the On the contrary, Those sacraments in which a char- Church; whence it is called the “door of the sacraments.” acter is imprinted, are not reiterated, because a character In a way Confirmation also is ordained for the same pur- is indelible, as stated above (a. 5): whereas some sacra- pose, as we shall explain in its proper place (q. 65, a. 3). ments are reiterated, for instance, penance and matrimony. Consequently, these three sacraments imprint a character, Therefore not all the sacraments imprint a character. namely, Baptism, Confirmation, and order. I answer that, As stated above (q. 62, Aa. 1,5), the Reply to Objection 1. Every sacrament makes man sacraments of the New Law are ordained for a twofold of the a participator in Christ’s Priesthood, from the fact purpose, namely, as a remedy for sin, and for the Divine that it confers on him some effect thereof. But every worship. Now all the sacraments, from the fact that they sacrament does not depute a man to do or receive some- confer grace, have this in common, that they afford a rem- thing pertaining to the worship of the priesthood of Christ: edy against sin: whereas not all the sacraments are di- while it is just this that is required for a sacrament to im- rectly ordained to the Divine worship. Thus it is clear that print a character. penance, whereby man is delivered from sin, does not af- Reply to Objection 2. Man is sanctified by each of ford man any advance in the Divine worship, but restores the sacraments, since sanctity means immunity from sin, 2433 which is the effect of grace. But in a special way some Reply to Objection 3. Although a character is a real-sacraments, which imprint a character, bestow on man a ity and a sacrament, it does not follow that whatever is a certain consecration, thus deputing him to the Divine wor- reality and a sacrament, is also a character. With regard to ship: just as inanimate things are said to be consecrated the other sacraments we shall explain further on what is forasmuch as they are deputed to Divine worship. the reality and what is the sacrament. 2434 THIRD PART, QUESTION 64 Of the Causes of the Sacraments (In Ten Articles) In the next place we have to consider the causes of the sacraments, both as to authorship and as to ministration. Concerning which there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether God alone works inwardly in the sacraments? (2) Whether the institution of the sacraments is from God alone? (3) Of the power which Christ exercised over the sacraments; (4) Whether He could transmit that power to others? (5) Whether the wicked can have the power of administering the sacraments? (6) Whether the wicked sin in administering the sacraments? (7) Whether the angels can be ministers of the sacraments? (8) Whether the minister’s intention is necessary in the sacraments? (9) Whether right faith is required therein; so that it be impossible for an unbeliever to confer a sacrament? (10) Whether a right intention is required therein? Whether God alone, or the minister also, works inwardly unto the sacramental effect? IIIa q. 64 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that not God alone, but also the ondly, because grace which is an interior sacramental ef- minister, works inwardly unto the sacramental effect. For fect is from God alone, as we have established in the Ia the inward sacramental effect is to cleanse man from sin IIae, q. 112, a. 1; while the character which is the inte- and enlighten him by grace. But it belongs to the minis- rior effect of certain sacraments, is an instrumental power ters of the Church “to cleanse, enlighten and perfect,” as which flows from the principal agent, which is God. In Dionysius explains (Coel. Hier. v). Therefore it seems the second way, however, the interior sacramental effect that the sacramental effect is the work not only of God, can be the work of man, in so far as he works as a minis- but also of the ministers of the Church. ter. For a minister is of the nature of an instrument, since Objection 2. Further, certain prayers are offered up the action of both is applied to something extrinsic, while in conferring the sacraments. But the prayers of the righ- the interior effect is produced through the power of the teous are more acceptable to God than those of any other, principal agent, which is God. according to Jn. 9:31: “If a man be a server of God, and Reply to Objection 1. Cleansing in so far as it is at- doth His will, him He heareth.” Therefore it stems that tributed to the ministers of the Church is not a washing a man obtains a greater sacramental effect if he receive it from sin: deacons are said to “cleanse,” inasmuch as they from a good minister. Consequently, the interior effect is remove the unclean from the body of the faithful, or pre- partly the work of the minister and not of God alone. pare them by their pious admonitions for the reception Objection 3. Further, man is of greater account than of the sacraments. In like manner also priests are said an inanimate thing. But an inanimate thing contributes to “enlighten” God’s people, not indeed by giving them something to the interior effect: since “water touches the grace, but by conferring on them the sacraments of grace; body and cleanses the soul,” as Augustine says (Tract. as Dionysius explains (Coel. Hier. v). lxxx in Joan.). Therefore the interior sacramental effect Reply to Objection 2. The prayers which are said in is partly the work of man and not of God alone. giving the sacraments, are offered to God, not on the part On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 8:33): “God that of the individual, but on the part of the whole Church, justifieth.” Since, then, the inward effect of all the sacra- whose prayers are acceptable to God, according to Mat. ments is justification, it seems that God alone works the 18:19: “If two of you shall consent upon earth, concern- interior sacramental effect. ing anything whatsoever they shall ask, it shall be done I answer that, There are two ways of producing an to them by My Father.” Nor is there any reason why the effect; first, as a principal agent; secondly, as an instru- devotion of a just man should not contribute to this effect. ment. In the former way the interior sacramental effect But that which is the sacramental effect is not impetrated is the work of God alone: first, because God alone can by the prayer of the Church or of the minister, but through enter the soul wherein the sacramental effect takes place; the merit of Christ’s Passion, the power of which operates and no agent can operate immediately where it is not: sec- in the sacraments, as stated above (q. 62, a. 5). Wherefore 2435 the sacramental effect is made no better by a better minis-Reply to Objection 3. Inanimate things do not pro- ter. And yet something in addition may be impetrated for duce the sacramental effect, except instrumentally, as the receiver of the sacrament through the devotion of the stated above. In like manner neither do men produce minister: but this is not the work of the minister, but the the sacramental effect, except ministerially, as also stated work of God Who hears the minister’s prayer. above. Whether the sacraments are instituted by God alone? IIIa q. 64 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that the sacraments are not in- a sacrament is twofold; viz. he who institutes the sacra- stituted by God alone. For those things which God has ments, and he who makes use of the sacrament instituted, instituted are delivered to us in Holy Scripture. But in by applying it for the production of the effect. Now the the sacraments certain things are done which are nowhere power of a sacrament cannot be from him who makes mentioned in Holy Scripture; for instance, the chrism with use of the sacrament: because he works but as a minister. which men are confirmed, the oil with which priests are Consequently, it follows that the power of the sacrament anointed, and many others, both words and actions, which is from the institutor of the sacrament. Since, therefore, we employ in the sacraments. Therefore the sacraments the power of the sacrament is from God alone, it follows were not instituted by God alone. that God alone can institute the sacraments. Objection 2. Further, a sacrament is a kind of sign. Reply to Objection 1. Human institutions observed in Now sensible things have their own natural signification. the sacraments are not essential to the sacrament; but be- Nor can it be said that God takes pleasure in certain signi- long to the solemnity which is added to the sacraments in fications and not in others; because He approves of all that order to arouse devotion and reverence in the recipients. He made. Moreover, it seems to be peculiar to the demons But those things that are essential to the sacrament, are to be enticed to something by means of signs; for Augus- instituted by Christ Himself, Who is God and man. And tine says (De Civ. Dei xxi): “The demons are enticed. . . by though they are not all handed down by the Scriptures, yet means of creatures, which were created not by them but the Church holds them from the intimate tradition of the by God, by various means of attraction according to their apostles, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. various natures, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as 11:34): “The rest I will set in order when I come.” a spirit is drawn by a sign.” It seems, therefore, that there Reply to Objection 2. From their very nature sensible is no need for the sacraments to be instituted by God. things have a certain aptitude for the signifying of spiritual Objection 3. Further, the apostles were God’s effects: but this aptitude is fixed by the Divine institution vicegerents on earth: hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. to some special signification. This is what Hugh of St. 2:10): “For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned Victor means by saying (De Sacram. i) that “a sacrament anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person owes its signification to its institution.” Yet God chooses of Christ,” i.e. as though Christ Himself had pardoned. certain things rather than others for sacramental significa- Therefore it seems that the apostles and their successors tion, not as though His choice were restricted to them, but can institute new sacraments. in order that their signification be more suitable to them. On the contrary, The institutor of anything is he who Reply to Objection 3. The apostles and their succes- gives it strength and power: as in the case of those who sors are God’s vicars in governing the Church which is institute laws. But the power of a sacrament is from God built on faith and the sacraments of faith. Wherefore, just alone, as we have shown above (a. 1; q. 62, a. 1). There- as they may not institute another Church, so neither may fore God alone can institute a sacrament. they deliver another faith, nor institute other sacraments: I answer that, As appears from what has been said on the contrary, the Church is said to be built up with the above (a. 1; q. 62, a. 1), the sacraments are instrumen- sacraments “which flowed from the side of Christ while tal causes of spiritual effects. Now an instrument has its hanging on the Cross.” power from the principal agent. But an agent in respect of Whether Christ as man had the power of producing the inward sacramental effect? IIIa q. 64 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that Christ as man had the see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He power of producing the interior sacramental effect. For it is that baptizeth with the Holy Ghost.” But to baptize John the Baptist said (Jn. 1:33): “He, Who sent me to with the Holy Ghost is to confer inwardly the grace of the baptize in water, said to me: He upon Whom thou shalt Holy Ghost. And the Holy Ghost descended upon Christ 2436 as man, not as God: for thus He Himself gives the Holy way. For, as God, He works in the sacraments by author-Ghost. Therefore it seems that Christ, as man, had the ity: but, as man, His operation conduces to the inward power of producing the inward sacramental effect. sacramental effects meritoriously and efficiently, but in- Objection 2. Further, our Lord said (Mat. 9:6): “That strumentally. For it has been stated (q. 48, Aa. 1,6; q. 49, you may know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to a. 1) that Christ’s Passion which belongs to Him in respect forgive sins.” But forgiveness of sins is an inward sacra- of His human nature, is the cause of justification, both mental effect. Therefore it seems that Christ as man pro- meritoriously and efficiently, not as the principal cause duces the inward sacramental effect. thereof, or by His own authority, but as an instrument, in Objection 3. Further, the institution of the sacraments so far as His humanity is the instrument of His Godhead, belongs to him who acts as principal agent in producing as stated above (q. 13, Aa. 2,3; q. 19, a. 1). the inward sacramental effect. Now it is clear that Christ Nevertheless, since it is an instrument united to the instituted the sacraments. Therefore it is He that produces Godhead in unity of Person, it has a certain headship and the inward sacramental effect. efficiency in regard to extrinsic instruments, which are the Objection 4. Further, no one can confer the sacra- ministers of the Church and the sacraments themselves, mental effect without conferring the sacrament, except he as has been explained above (a. 1). Consequently, just as produce the sacramental effect by his own power. But Christ, as God, has power of “authority” over the sacra- Christ conferred the sacramental effect without conferring ments, so, as man, He has the power of ministry in chief, the sacrament; as in the case of Magdalen to whom He or power of “excellence.” And this consists in four things. said: “Thy sins are forgiven Thee” (Lk. 7:48). Therefore First in this, that the merit and power of His Passion op- it seems that Christ, as man, produces the inward sacra- erates in the sacraments, as stated above (q. 62, a. 5). mental effect. And because the power of the Passion is communicated Objection 5. Further, the principal agent in causing to us by faith, according to Rom. 3:25: “Whom God the inward effect is that in virtue of which the sacrament hath proposed to be a propitiation through faith in His operates. But the sacraments derive their power from blood,” which faith we proclaim by calling on the name Christ’s Passion and through the invocation of His Name; of Christ: therefore, secondly, Christ’s power of excel- according to 1 Cor. 1:13: “Was Paul then crucified for lence over the sacraments consists in this, that they are you? or were you baptized in the name of Paul?” There- sanctified by the invocation of His name. And because fore Christ, as man, produces the inward sacramental ef- the sacraments derive their power from their institution, fect. hence, thirdly, the excellence of Christ’s power consists On the contrary, Augustine (Isidore, Etym. vi) says: in this, that He, Who gave them their power, could insti- “The Divine power in the sacraments works inwardly in tute the sacraments. And since cause does not depend on producing their salutary effect.” Now the Divine power is effect, but rather conversely, it belongs to the excellence Christ’s as God, not as man. Therefore Christ produces of Christ’s power, that He could bestow the sacramental the inward sacramental effect, not as man but as God. effect without conferring the exterior sacrament. Thus it I answer that, Christ produces the inward sacramen- is clear how to solve the objections; for the arguments on tal effect, both as God and as man, but not in the same either side are true to a certain extent, as explained above. Whether Christ could communicate to ministers the power which He had in the sacra-IIIa q. 64 a. 4 ments? Objection 1. It seems that Christ could not commu- therefore, could He give them the power of making the nicate to ministers the power which He had in the sacra- ungodly to be righteous. Since, therefore, the justification ments. For as Augustine argues against Maximin, “if He of the ungodly is effected by the power that Christ has in could, but would not, He was jealous of His power.” But the sacraments, it seems that He could not communicate jealousy was far from Christ Who had the fulness of char- that power to ministers. ity. Since, therefore, Christ did not communicate His Objection 3. Further, it belongs to Christ as Head of power to ministers, it seems that He could not. the Church that grace should flow from Him to others, Objection 2. Further, on Jn. 14:12: “Greater than according to Jn. 1:16: “Of His fulness we all have re- these shall he do,” Augustine says (Tract. lxxii): “I affirm ceived.” But this could not be communicated to others; this to be altogether greater,” namely, for a man from be- since then the Church would be deformed, having many ing ungodly to be made righteous, “than to create heaven heads. Therefore it seems that Christ could not communi- and earth.” But Christ could not communicate to His dis- cate His power to ministers. ciples the power of creating heaven and earth: neither, On the contrary, on Jn. 1:31: “I knew Him not,” Au- 2437 gustine says (Tract. v) that “he did not know that our Lord hand can to a stick. having the authority of baptizing. . . would keep it to Him- Reply to Objection 1. It was not through jealousy self.” But John would not have been in ignorance of this, that Christ refrained from communicating to ministers His if such a power were incommunicable. Therefore Christ power of excellence, but for the good of the faithful; lest could communicate His power to ministers. they should put their trust in men, and lest there should be I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), Christ had a various kinds of sacraments, giving rise to division in the twofold power in the sacraments. one was the power Church; as may be seen in those who said: “I am of Paul, of “authority,” which belongs to Him as God: and this I am of Apollo, and I of Cephas” (1 Cor. 1:12). power He could not communicate to any creature; just as Reply to Objection 2. This objection is true of the neither could He communicate the Divine Essence. The power of authority, which belongs to Christ as God. At the other was the power of “excellence,” which belongs to same time the power of excellence can be called author- Him as man. This power He could communicate to minis- ity in comparison to other ministers. Whence on 1 Cor. ters; namely, by giving them such a fulness of grace—that 1:13: “Is Christ divided?” the gloss says that “He could their merits would conduce to the sacramental effect— give power of authority in baptizing, to those to whom He that by the invocation of their names, the sacraments gave the power of administering it.” would be sanctified—and that they themselves might in- Reply to Objection 3. It was in order to avoid the stitute sacraments, and by their mere will confer the sacra- incongruity of many heads in the Church, that Christ was mental effect without observing the sacramental rite. For unwilling to communicate to ministers His power of ex- a united instrument, the more powerful it is, is all the more cellence. If, however, He had done so, He would have able to lend its power to the separated instrument; as the been Head in chief; the others in subjection to Him. Whether the sacraments can be conferred by evil ministers? IIIa q. 64 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that the sacraments cannot be the ministry would certainly pass to both good and evil conferred by evil ministers. For the sacraments of the men. . . What is a bad minister to thee, where the Lord is New Law are ordained for the purpose of cleansing from good?” sin and for the bestowal of grace. Now evil men, being I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the ministers themselves unclean, cannot cleanse others from sin, ac- of the Church work instrumentally in the sacraments, be- cording to Ecclus. 34:4: “Who [Vulg.: ‘What’] can be cause, in a way, a minister is of the nature of an instru- made clean by the unclean?” Moreover, since they have ment. But, as stated above (q. 62, Aa. 1,4), an instru- not grace, it seems that they cannot give grace, for “no ment acts not by reason of its own form, but by the power one gives what he has not.” It seems, therefore, that the of the one who moves it. Consequently, whatever form sacraments cannot be conferred by wicked men. or power an instrument has in addition to that which it Objection 2. Further, all the power of the sacraments has as an instrument, is accidental to it: for instance, is derived from Christ, as stated above (a. 3; q. 62, a. 5). that a physician’s body, which is the instrument of his But evil men are cut off from Christ: because they have soul, wherein is his medical art, be healthy or sickly; or not charity, by which the members are united to their that a pipe, through which water passes, be of silver or Head, according to 1 Jn. 4:16: “He that abideth in charity, lead. Therefore the ministers of the Church can confer the abideth in God, and God in him.” Therefore it seems that sacraments, though they be wicked. the sacraments cannot be conferred by evil men. Reply to Objection 1. The ministers of the Church Objection 3. Further, if anything is wanting that is do not by their own power cleanse from sin those who ap- required for the sacraments, the sacrament is invalid; for proach the sacraments, nor do they confer grace on them: instance, if the required matter or form be wanting. But it is Christ Who does this by His own power while He the minister required for a sacrament is one who is without employs them as instruments. Consequently, those who the stain of sin, according to Lev. 21:17,18: “Whosoever approach the sacraments receive an effect whereby they of thy seed throughout their families, hath a blemish, he are enlikened not to the ministers but to Christ. shall not offer bread to his God, neither shall he approach Reply to Objection 2. Christ’s members are united to to minister to Him.” Therefore it seems that if the minister their Head by charity, so that they may receive life from be wicked, the sacrament has no effect. Him; for as it is written (1 Jn. 3:14): “He that loveth not On the contrary, Augustine says on Jn. 1:33: “He abideth in death.” Now it is possible for a man to work upon Whom thou shalt see the Spirit,” etc. (Tract. v in with a lifeless instrument, and separated from him as to Joan.), that “John did not know that our Lord, having the bodily union, provided it be united to him by some sort of authority of baptizing, would keep it to Himself, but that motion: for a workman works in one way with his hand, 2438 in another with his axe. Consequently, it is thus that Christ this be wanting, the sacrament is invalid; for instance, if works in the sacraments, both by wicked men as lifeless the due form or matter be wanting. Secondly, a thing is re- instruments, and by good men as living instruments. quired for a sacrament, by reason of a certain fitness. And Reply to Objection 3. A thing is required in a sacra- in this way good ministers are required for a sacrament. ment in two ways. First, as being essential to it: and if Whether wicked men sin in administering the sacraments? IIIa q. 64 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that wicked men do not sin in plains (Ethic. ii). Now it has been said (a. 5, ad 3) that it administering the sacraments. For just as men serve God is fitting for the ministers of sacraments to be righteous; in the sacraments, so do they serve Him in works of char- because ministers should be like unto their Lord, accord- ity; whence it is written (Heb. 13:16): “Do not forget to ing to Lev. 19:2: “Be ye holy, because I. . . am holy”; and do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God’s favor Ecclus. 10:2: “As the judge of the people is himself, so is obtained.” But the wicked do not sin in serving God also are his ministers.” Consequently, there can be no by works of charity: indeed, they should be persuaded to doubt that the wicked sin by exercising the ministry of do so, according to Dan. 4:24: “Let my counsel be ac- God and the Church, by conferring the sacraments. And ceptable” to the king; “Redeem thou thy sins with alms.” since this sin pertains to irreverence towards God and the Therefore it seems that wicked men do not sin in admin- contamination of holy things, as far as the man who sins istering the sacraments. is concerned, although holy things in themselves cannot Objection 2. Further, whoever co-operates with an- be contaminated; it follows that such a sin is mortal in its other in his sin, is also guilty of sin, according to Rom. genus. 1:32: “He is [Vulg.: ‘They are’] worthy of death; not only Reply to Objection 1. Works of charity are not made he that commits the sin, but also he who consents to them holy by some process of consecration, but they belong to that do them.” But if wicked ministers sin in administering the holiness of righteousness, as being in a way parts of sacraments, those who receive sacraments from them, co- righteousness. Consequently, when a man shows himself operate in their sin. Therefore they would sin also; which as a minister of God, by doing works of charity, if he be seems unreasonable. righteous, he will be made yet holier; but if he be a sinner, Objection 3. Further, it seems that no one should act he is thereby disposed to holiness. On the other hand, the when in doubt, for thus man would be driven to despair, sacraments are holy in themselves owing to their mysti- as being unable to avoid sin. But if the wicked were to cal consecration. Wherefore the holiness of righteousness sin in administering sacraments, they would be in a state is required in the minister, that he may be suitable for his of perplexity: since sometimes they would sin also if they ministry: for which reason he acts unbecomingly and sins, did not administer sacraments; for instance, when by rea- if while in a state of sin he attempts to fulfil that ministry. son of their office it is their bounden duty to do so; for it Reply to Objection 2. He who approaches a sacra- is written (1 Cor. 9:16): “For a necessity lieth upon me: ment, receives it from a minister of the Church, not be- Woe is unto me if I preach not the gospel.” Sometimes cause he is such and such a man, but because he is a min- also on account of some danger; for instance, if a child in ister of the Church. Consequently, as long as the latter is danger of death be brought to a sinner for baptism. There- tolerated in the ministry, he that receives a sacrament from fore it seems that the wicked do not sin in administering him, does not communicate in his sin, but communicates the sacraments. with the Church from. whom he has his ministry. But On the contrary, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. i) that if the Church, by degrading, excommunicating, or sus- “it is wrong for the wicked even to touch the symbols,” pending him, does not tolerate him in the ministry, he that i.e. the sacramental signs. And he says in the epistle to receives a sacrament from him sins, because he commu- Demophilus: “It seems presumptuous for such a man,” nicates in his sin. i.e. a sinner, “to lay hands on priestly things; he is neither Reply to Objection 3. A man who is in mortal sin afraid nor ashamed, all unworthy that he is, to take part is not perplexed simply, if by reason of his office it be in Divine things, with the thought that God does not see his bounden duty to minister sacraments; because he can what he sees in himself: he thinks, by false pretenses, to repent of his sin and so minister lawfully. But there is cheat Him Whom he calls his Father; he dares to utter, in nothing unreasonable in his being perplexed, if we sup- the person of Christ, words polluted by his infamy, I will pose that he wishes to remain in sin. not call them prayers, over the Divine symbols.” However, in a case of necessity when even a lay per- I answer that, A sinful action consists in this, that a son might baptize, he would not sin in baptizing. For it man “fails to act as he ought to,” as the Philosopher ex- is clear that then he does not exercise the ministry of the 2439 Church, but comes to the aid of one who is in need of his not so necessary as baptism, as we shall show further on services. It is not so with the other sacraments, which are (q. 65, Aa. 3,4; q. 62, a. 3). Whether angels can administer sacraments? IIIa q. 64 a. 7 Objection 1. It seems that angels can administer than the angels” (Heb. 2:9). Consequently, it belongs to sacraments. Because a higher minister can do whatever men, but not to angels, to dispense the sacraments and to the lower can; thus a priest can do whatever a deacon can: take part in their administration. but not conversely. But angels are higher ministers in the But it must be observed that as God did not bind His hierarchical order than any men whatsoever, as Dionysius power to the sacraments, so as to be unable to bestow says (Coel. Hier. ix). Therefore, since men can be min- the sacramental effect without conferring the sacrament; isters of sacraments, it seems that much more can angels so neither did He bind His power to the ministers of the be. Church so as to be unable to give angels power to adminis- Objection 2. Further, in heaven holy men are likened ter the sacraments. And since good angels are messengers to the angels (Mat. 22:30). But some holy men, when of truth; if any sacramental rite were performed by good in heaven, can be ministers of the sacraments; since the angels, it should be considered valid, because it ought to sacramental character is indelible, as stated above (q. 63, be evident that this is being done by the will of God: for a. 5). Therefore it seems that angels too can be ministers instance, certain churches are said to have been conse- of sacraments. crated by the ministry of the angels∗. But if demons, who Objection 3. Further, as stated above (q. 8, a. 7), the are “lying spirits,” were to perform a sacramental rite, it devil is head of the wicked, and the wicked are his mem- should be pronounced as invalid. bers. But sacraments can be administered by the wicked. Reply to Objection 1. What men do in a less perfect Therefore it seems that they can be administered even by manner, i.e. by sensible sacraments, which are propor- demons. tionate to their nature, angels also do, as ministers of a On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 5:1): “Every high higher degree, in a more perfect manner, i.e. invisibly— priest taken from among men, is ordained for men in the by cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting. things that appertain to God.” But angels whether good Reply to Objection 2. The saints in heaven resemble or bad are not taken from among men. Therefore they are the angels as to their share of glory, but not as to the con- not ordained ministers in the things that appertain to God, ditions of their nature: and consequently not in regard to i.e. in the sacraments. the sacraments. I answer that, As stated above (a. 3; q. 62, a. 5), the Reply to Objection 3. Wicked men do not owe their whole power of the sacraments flows from Christ’s Pas- power of conferring sacraments to their being members of sion, which belongs to Him as man. And Him in their the devil. Consequently, it does not follow that “a fortiori” very nature men, not angels, resemble; indeed, in respect the devil, their head, can do so. of His Passion, He is described as being “a little lower Whether the minister’s intention is required for the validity of a sacrament? IIIa q. 64 a. 8 Objection 1. It seems that the minister’s intention is ments are necessary for salvation, as we shall state further not required for the validity of a sacrament. For the min- on (q. 65, a. 4). ister of a sacrament works instrumentally. But the perfec- Objection 3. Further, a man’s intention cannot bear tion of an action does not depend on the intention of the on that to which he does not attend. But sometimes min- instrument, but on that of the principal agent. Therefore isters of sacraments do not attend to what they say or do, the minister’s intention is not necessary for the perfecting through thinking of something else. Therefore in this re- of a sacrament. spect the sacrament would be invalid through want of in- Objection 2. Further, one man’s intention cannot be tention. known to another. Therefore if the minister’s intention On the contrary, What is unintentional happens by were required for the validity of a sacrament, he who chance. But this cannot be said of the sacramental opera- approaches a sacrament could not know whether he has tion. Therefore the sacraments require the intention of the received the sacrament. Consequently he could have no minister. certainty in regard to salvation; the more that some sacra- I answer that, When a thing is indifferent to many ∗ See Acta S.S., September 29 2440 uses, it must needs be determined to one, if that one has by their faith and devotion. to be effected. Now those things which are done in the This might be true enough of the ultimate effect, i.e. sacraments, can be done with various intent; for instance, justification from sins; but as to that effect which is both washing with water, which is done in baptism, may be or- real and sacramental, viz. the character, it does not ap- dained to bodily cleanliness, to the health of the body, to pear possible for it to be made good by the devotion of amusement, and many other similar things. Consequently, the recipient, since a character is never imprinted save by it needs to be determined to one purpose, i.e. the sacra- a sacrament. mental effect, by the intention of him who washes. And Consequently, others with better reason hold that the this intention is expressed by the words which are pro- minister of a sacrament acts in the person of the whole nounced in the sacraments; for instance the words, “I bap- Church, whose minister he is; while in the words uttered tize thee in the name of the Father,” etc. by him, the intention of the Church is expressed; and that Reply to Objection 1. An inanimate instrument has this suffices for the validity of the sacrament, except the no intention regarding the effect; but instead of the inten- contrary be expressed on the part either of the minister or tion there is the motion whereby it is moved by the princi- of the recipient of the sacrament. pal agent. But an animate instrument, such as a minister, Reply to Objection 3. Although he who thinks of is not only moved, but in a sense moves itself, in so far something else, has no actual intention, yet he has habitual as by his will he moves his bodily members to act. Con- intention, which suffices for the validity of the sacrament; sequently, his intention is required, whereby he subjects for instance if, when a priest goes to baptize someone, he himself to the principal agent; that is, it is necessary that intends to do to him what the Church does. Wherefore he intend to do that which Christ and the Church do. if subsequently during the exercise of the act his mind Reply to Objection 2. On this point there are two be distracted by other matters, the sacrament is valid in opinions. For some hold that the mental intention of the virtue of his original intention. Nevertheless, the minister minister is necessary; in the absence of which the sacra- of a sacrament should take great care to have actual in- ment is invalid: and that this defect in the case of children tention. But this is not entirely in man’s power, because who have not the intention of approaching the sacrament, when a man wishes to be very intent on something, he be- is made good by Christ, Who baptizes inwardly: whereas gins unintentionally to think of other things, according to in adults, who have that intention, this defect is made good Ps. 39:18: “My heart hath forsaken me.” Whether faith is required of necessity in the minister of a sacrament? IIIa q. 64 a. 9 Objection 1. It seems that faith is required of neces- nication: for it is written in the second canonical epistle sity in the minister of a sacrament. For, as stated above of John (10): “If any man come to you, and bring not (a. 8), the intention of the minister is necessary for the va- this doctrine, receive him not into the house, nor say to lidity of a sacrament. But “faith directs in intention” as him; God speed you”: and (Titus 3:10): “A man that is a Augustine says against Julian (In Psalm xxxi, cf. Contra heretic, after the first and second admonition avoid.” But it Julian iv). Therefore, if the minister is without the true seems that an excommunicate cannot confer a sacrament faith, the sacrament is invalid. of the Church: since he is separated from the Church, Objection 2. Further, if a minister of the Church has to whose ministry the dispensation of the sacraments be- not the true faith, it seems that he is a heretic. But heretics, longs. Therefore a sacrament requires of necessity that seemingly, cannot confer sacraments. For Cyprian says in the minister should have the true faith. an epistle against heretics (lxxiii): “Everything whatso- On the contrary, Augustine says against the Donatist ever heretics do, is carnal, void and counterfeit, so that Petilian: “Remember that the evil lives of wicked men are nothing that they do should receive our approval.” And not prejudicial to God’s sacraments, by rendering them Pope Leo says in his epistle to Leo Augustus (clvi): “It either invalid or less holy.” is a matter of notoriety that the light of all the heavenly I answer that, As stated above (a. 5), since the min- sacraments is extinguished in the see of Alexandria, by an ister works instrumentally in the sacraments, he acts not act of dire and senseless cruelty. The sacrifice is no longer by his own but by Christ’s power. Now just as charity be- offered, the chrism is no longer consecrated, all the mys- longs to a man’s own power so also does faith. Wherefore, teries of religion have fled at the touch of the parricide just as the validity of a sacrament does not require that the hands of ungodly men.” Therefore a sacrament requires minister should have charity, and even sinners can confer of necessity that the minister should have the true faith. sacraments, as stated above (a. 5); so neither is it neces- Objection 3. Further, those who have not the true sary that he should have faith, and even an unbeliever can faith seem to be separated from the Church by excommu- confer a true sacrament, provided that the other essentials 2441 be there. ceiving the effect of the sacrament. Wherefore Augustine Reply to Objection 1. It may happen that a man’s (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Pet.) says: “Be well assured and faith is defective in regard to something else, and not in have no doubt whatever that those who are baptized out- regard to the reality of the sacrament which he confers: side the Church, unless they come back to the Church, will for instance, he may believe that it is unlawful to swear reap disaster from their Baptism.” In this sense Pope Leo in any case whatever, and yet he may believe that baptism says that “the light of the sacraments was extinguished in is an efficient cause of salvation. And thus such unbelief the Church of Alexandria”; viz. in regard to the reality of does not hinder the intention of conferring the sacrament. the sacrament, not as to the sacrament itself. But if his faith be defective in regard to the very sacrament Cyprian, however, thought that heretics do not confer that he confers, although he believe that no inward effect even the sacrament: but in this respect we do not follow is caused by the thing done outwardly, yet he does know his opinion. Hence Augustine says (De unico Baptismo that the Catholic Church intends to confer a sacrament xiii): “Though the martyr Cyprian refused to recognize by that which is outwardly done. Wherefore, his unbe- Baptism conferred by heretics or schismatics, yet so great lief notwithstanding, he can intend to do what the Church are his merits, culminating in the crown of martyrdom, does, albeit he esteem it to be nothing. And such an in- that the light of his charity dispels the darkness of his tention suffices for a sacrament: because as stated above fault, and if anything needed pruning, the sickle of his (a. 8, ad 2) the minister of a sacrament acts in the person passion cut it off.” of the Church by whose faith any defect in the minister’s Reply to Objection 3. The power of administering the faith is made good. sacraments belongs to the spiritual character which is in- Reply to Objection 2. Some heretics in conferring delible, as explained above (q. 63, a. 3 ). Consequently, if sacraments do not observe the form prescribed by the a man be suspended by the Church, or excommunicated or Church: and these confer neither the sacrament nor the degraded, he does not lose the power of conferring sacra- reality of the sacrament. But some do observe the form ments, but the permission to use this power. Wherefore he prescribed by the Church: and these confer indeed the does indeed confer the sacrament, but he sins in so doing. sacrament but not the reality. I say this in the supposition He also sins that receives a sacrament from such a man: that they are outwardly cut off from the Church; because so that he does not receive the reality of the sacrament, from the very fact that anyone receives the sacraments unless ignorance excuses him. from them, he sins; and consequently is hindered from re- Whether the validity of a sacrament requires a good intention in the minister? IIIa q. 64 a. 10 Objection 1. It seems that the validity of a sacrament wickedness of the minister. But the wickedness of the requires a good intention in the minister. For the minis- minister does not annul the sacrament: neither, therefore, ter’s intention should be in conformity with the Church’s does his perverse intention. intention, as explained above (a. 8, ad 1). But the inten- I answer that, The minister’s intention may be per- tion of the Church is always good. Therefore the validity verted in two ways. First in regard to the sacrament: for of a sacrament requires of necessity a good intention in instance, when a man does not intend to confer a sacra- the minister. ment, but to make a mockery of it. Such a perverse inten- Objection 2. Further, a perverse intention seems tion takes away the truth of the sacrament, especially if it worse than a playful one. But a playful intention destroys be manifested outwardly. a sacrament: for instance, if someone were to baptize any- Secondly, the minister’s intention may be perverted as body not seriously but in fun. Much more, therefore, does to something that follows the sacrament: for instance, a a perverse intention destroy a sacrament: for instance, if priest may intend to baptize a woman so as to be able somebody were to baptize a man in order to kill him af- to abuse her; or to consecrate the Body of Christ, so as terwards. to use it for sorcery. And because that which comes first Objection 3. Further, a perverse intention vitiates the does not depend on that which follows, consequently such whole work, according to Lk. 11:34: “If thy eye be evil, a perverse intention does not annul the sacrament; but the thy” whole “body will be darksome.” But the sacraments minister himself sins grievously in having such an inten- of Christ cannot be contaminated by evil men; as Augus- tion. tine says against Petilian (Cont. Litt. Petil ii). Therefore Reply to Objection 1. The Church has a good in- it seems that, if the minister’s intention is perverse, the tention both as to the validity of the sacrament and as to sacrament is invalid. the use thereof: but it is the former intention that perfects On the contrary, A perverse intention belongs to the the sacrament, while the latter conduces to the meritori- 2442 ous effect. Consequently, the minister who conforms his the action of the one who has such an intention, not the intention to the Church as to the former rectitude, but not action of another. Consequently, the perverse intention of as to the latter, perfects the sacrament indeed, but gains no the minister perverts the sacrament in so far as it is his merit for himself. action: not in so far as it is the action of Christ, Whose Reply to Objection 2. The intention of mimicry or minister he is. It is just as if the servant [minister] of some fun excludes the first kind of right intention, necessary man were to carry alms to the poor with a wicked inten- for the validity of a sacrament. Consequently, there is no tion, whereas his master had commanded him with a good comparison. intention to do so. Reply to Objection 3. A perverse intention perverts 2443 THIRD PART, QUESTION 65 Of the Number of the Sacraments (In Four Articles) We have now to consider the number of the sacraments: and concerning this there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are seven sacraments? (2) The order of the sacraments among themselves; (3) Their mutual comparison; (4) Whether all the sacraments are necessary for salvation? Whether there should be seven sacraments? IIIa q. 65 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that there ought not to be seven inal, mortal and venial. Now Baptism is intended as a sacraments. For the sacraments derive their efficacy from remedy against original sin, and Penance against mortal the Divine power, and the power of Christ’s Passion. But sin. Therefore besides the seven sacraments, there should the Divine power is one, and Christ’s Passion is one; since be another against venial sin. “by one oblation He hath perfected for ever them that are I answer that, As stated above (q. 62, a. 5; q. 63, sanctified” (Heb. 10:14). Therefore there should be but a. 1), the sacraments of the Church were instituted for a one sacrament. twofold purpose: namely, in order to perfect man in things Objection 2. Further, a sacrament is intended as a pertaining to the worship of God according to the religion remedy for the defect caused by sin. Now this is twofold, of Christian life, and to be a remedy against the defects punishment and guilt. Therefore two sacraments would caused by sin. And in either way it is becoming that there be enough. should be seven sacraments. Objection 3. Further, sacraments belong to the ac- For spiritual life has a certain conformity with the life tions of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, as Dionysius explains of the body: just as other corporeal things have a certain (Eccl. Hier. v). But, as he says, there are three actions likeness to things spiritual. Now a man attains perfection of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, namely, “to cleanse, to en- in the corporeal life in two ways: first, in regard to his lighten, to perfect.” Therefore there should be no more own person; secondly, in regard to the whole community than three sacraments. of the society in which he lives, for man is by nature a so- Objection 4. Further, Augustine says (Contra Faust. cial animal. With regard to himself man is perfected in the xix) that the “sacraments” of the New Law are “less nu- life of the body, in two ways; first, directly [per se], i.e. by merous” than those of the Old Law. But in the Old Law acquiring some vital perfection; secondly, indirectly [per there was no sacrament corresponding to Confirmation accidens], i.e. by the removal of hindrances to life, such as and Extreme Unction. Therefore these should not be ailments, or the like. Now the life of the body is perfected counted among the sacraments of the New Law. “directly,” in three ways. First, by generation whereby a Objection 5. Further, lust is not more grievous than man begins to be and to live: and corresponding to this other sins, as we have made clear in the Ia IIae, q. 74, in the spiritual life there is Baptism, which is a spiritual a. 5; IIa IIae, q. 154, a. 3. But there is no sacrament insti- regeneration, according to Titus 3:5: “By the laver of re- tuted as a remedy for other sins. Therefore neither should generation,” etc. Secondly, by growth whereby a man is matrimony be instituted as a remedy for lust. brought to perfect size and strength: and corresponding to Objection 6. On the other hand, It seems that there this in the spiritual life there is Confirmation, in which the should be more than seven sacraments. For sacraments Holy Ghost is given to strengthen us. Wherefore the disci- are a kind of sacred sign. But in the Church there are ples who were already baptized were bidden thus: “Stay many sanctifications by sensible signs, such as Holy Wa- you in the city till you be endued with power from on ter the Consecration of Altars, and such like. Therefore high” (Lk. 24:49). Thirdly, by nourishment, whereby life there are more than seven sacraments. and strength are preserved to man; and corresponding to Objection 7. Further, Hugh of St. Victor (De Sacram. this in the spiritual life there is the Eucharist. Wherefore i) says that the sacraments of the Old Law were oblations, it is said (Jn. 6:54): “Except you eat of the flesh of the tithes and sacrifices. But the Sacrifice of the Church is one Son of Man, and drink His blood, you shall not have life sacrament, called the Eucharist. Therefore oblations also in you.” and tithes should be called sacraments. And this would be enough for man if he had an impas- Objection 8. Further, there are three kinds of sin, orig-sible life, both corporally and spiritually; but since man is 2444 liable at times to both corporal and spiritual infirmity, i.e. men’s various states and habitudes. And in this respect sin, hence man needs a cure from his infirmity; which cure it was necessary to have a number of sacraments, as ex- is twofold. one is the healing, that restores health: and plained above. corresponding to this in the spiritual life there is Penance, Reply to Objection 3. In hierarchical actions we must according to Ps. 40:5: “Heal my soul, for I have sinned consider the agents, the recipients and the actions. The against Thee.” The other is the restoration of former vigor agents are the ministers of the Church; and to these the by means of suitable diet and exercise: and corresponding sacrament of order belongs. The recipients are those who to this in the spiritual life there is Extreme Unction, which approach the sacraments: and these are brought into being removes the remainder of sin, and prepares man for final by Matrimony. The actions are “cleansing,” “enlighten- glory. Wherefore it is written (James 5:15): “And if he be ing,” and “perfecting.” Mere cleansing, however, cannot in sins they shall be forgiven him.” be a sacrament of the New Law, which confers grace: yet In regard to the whole community, man is perfected in it belongs to certain sacramentals, i.e. catechism and exor- two ways. First, by receiving power to rule the commu- cism. But cleansing coupled with enlightening, according nity and to exercise public acts: and corresponding to this to Dionysius, belongs to Baptism; and, for him who falls in the spiritual life there is the sacrament of order, accord- back into sin, they belong secondarily to Penance and Ex- ing to the saying of Heb. 7:27, that priests offer sacrifices treme Unction. And perfecting, as regards power, which not for themselves only, but also for the people. Secondly is, as it were, a formal perfection, belongs to Confirma- in regard to natural propagation. This is accomplished by tion: while, as regards the attainment of the end, it belongs Matrimony both in the corporal and in the spiritual life: to the Eucharist. since it is not only a sacrament but also a function of na- Reply to Objection 4. In the sacrament of Confirma- ture. tion we receive the fulness of the Holy Ghost in order to be We may likewise gather the number of the sacra- strengthened; while in Extreme Unction man is prepared ments from their being instituted as a remedy against for the immediate attainment of glory; and neither of these the defect caused by sin. For Baptism is intended as two purposes was becoming to the Old Testament. Conse- a remedy against the absence of spiritual life; Confir- quently, nothing in the old Law could correspond to these mation, against the infirmity of soul found in those of sacraments. Nevertheless, the sacraments of the old Law recent birth; the Eucharist, against the soul’s proneness were more numerous, on account of the various kinds of to sin; Penance, against actual sin committed after bap- sacrifices and ceremonies. tism; Extreme Unction, against the remainders of sins— Reply to Objection 5. There was need for a special of those sins, namely, which are not sufficiently removed sacrament to be applied as a remedy against venereal con- by Penance, whether through negligence or through igno- cupiscence: first because by this concupiscence, not only rance; order, against divisions in the community; Matri- the person but also the nature is defiled: secondly, by rea- mony, as a remedy against concupiscence in the individ- son of its vehemence whereby it clouds the reason. ual, and against the decrease in numbers that results from Reply to Objection 6. Holy Water and other conse- death. crated things are not called sacraments, because they do Some, again, gather the number of sacraments from not produce the sacramental effect, which is the receiv- a certain adaptation to the virtues and to the defects and ing of grace. They are, however, a kind of disposition to penal effects resulting from sin. They say that Baptism the sacraments: either by removing obstacles. thus holy corresponds to Faith, and is ordained as a remedy against water is ordained against the snares of the demons, and original sin; Extreme Unction, to Hope, being ordained against venial sins: or by making things suitable for the against venial sin; the Eucharist, to Charity, being or- conferring of a sacrament; thus the altar and vessels are dained against the penal effect which is malice. order, to consecrated through reverence for the Eucharist. Prudence, being ordained against ignorance; Penance to Reply to Objection 7. Oblations and tithes, both the Justice, being ordained against mortal sin; Matrimony, to Law of nature and in the Law of Moses, ere ordained not Temperance, being ordained against concupiscence; Con- only for the sustenance of the ministers and the poor, but firmation, to Fortitude, being ordained against infirmity. also figuratively; and consequently they were sacraments. Reply to Objection 1. The same principal agent uses But now they remain no longer as figures, and therefore various instruments unto various effects, in accordance they are not sacraments. with the thing to be done. In the same way the Divine Reply to Objection 8. The infusion of grace is not power and the Passion of Christ work in us through the necessary for the blotting out of venial sin. Wherefore, various sacraments as through various instruments. since grace is infused in each of the sacraments of the Reply to Objection 2. Guilt and punishment are di- New Law, none of them was instituted directly against ve- versified both according to species, inasmuch as there are nial sin. This is taken away by certain sacramentals, for various species of guilt and punishment, and according to instance, Holy Water and such like. Some, however, hold 2445 that Extreme Unction is ordained against venial sin. But a. 1). of this we shall speak in its proper place ( Suppl., q. 30, Whether the order of the sacraments, as given above, is becoming? IIIa q. 65 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that the order of the sacra- the spiritual life, and afterwards, those which are ordained ments as given above is unbecoming. For according to the thereto indirectly, viz. by removing some supervening ac- Apostle (1 Cor. 15:46), “that was. . . first. . . which is natu-cidental cause of harm; such are Penance and Extreme ral, afterwards that which is spiritual.” But man is begot- Unction: while, of these, Extreme Unction is naturally ten through Matrimony by a first and natural generation; placed last, for it preserves the healing which was begun while in Baptism he is regenerated as by a second and by Penance. spiritual generation. Therefore Matrimony should pre- Of the remaining three, it is clear that Baptism which cede Baptism. is a spiritual regeneration, comes first; then Confirmation, Objection 2. Further, through the sacrament of order which is ordained to the formal perfection of power; and man receives the power of agent in sacramental actions. after these the Eucharist which is ordained to final perfec- But the agent precedes his action. Therefore order should tion. precede Baptism and the other sacraments. Reply to Objection 1. Matrimony as ordained to nat- Objection 3. Further, the Eucharist is a spiritual food; ural life is a function of nature. But in so far as it has while Confirmation is compared to growth. But food something spiritual it is a sacrament. And because it has causes, and consequently precedes, growth. Therefore the the least amount of spirituality it is placed last. Eucharist precedes Confirmation. Reply to Objection 2. For a thing to be an agent it Objection 4. Further, Penance prepares man for the must first of all be perfect in itself. Wherefore those sacra- Eucharist. But a disposition precedes perfection. There- ments by which a man is perfected in himself, are placed fore Penance should precede the Eucharist. before the sacrament of order, in which a man is made a Objection 5. Further, that which is nearer the last end perfecter of others. comes after other things. But, of all the sacraments, Ex- Reply to Objection 3. Nourishment both precedes treme Unction is nearest to the last end which is Happi- growth, as its cause; and follows it, as maintaining the ness. Therefore it should be placed last among the sacra- perfection of size and power in man. Consequently, the ments. Eucharist can be placed before Confirmation, as Diony- On the contrary, The order of the sacraments, as sius places it (Eccl. Hier. iii, iv), and can be placed after given above, is commonly adopted by all. it, as the Master does (iv, 2,8). I answer that, The reason of the order among the Reply to Objection 4. This argument would hold if sacraments appears from what has been said above (a. 1). Penance were required of necessity as a preparation to the For just as unity precedes multitude, so those sacraments Eucharist. But this is not true: for if anyone be without which are intended for the perfection of the individual, mortal sin, he does not need Penance in order to receive naturally precede those which are intended for the per- the Eucharist. Thus it is clear that Penance is an acciden- fection of the multitude; and consequently the last place tal preparation to the Eucharist, that is to say, sin being among the sacraments is given to order and Matrimony, supposed. Wherefore it is written in the last chapter of which are intended for the perfection of the multitude: the second Book of Paralipomenon (cf. 2 Paral 33:18): while Matrimony is placed after order, because it has less “Thou, O Lord of the righteous, didst not impose penance participation in the nature of the spiritual life, to which on righteous men.”∗ the sacraments are ordained. Moreover, among things or- Reply to Objection 5. Extreme Unction, for this very dained to the perfection of the individual, those naturally reason, is given the last place among those sacraments come first which are ordained directly to the perfection of which are ordained to the perfection of the individual. ∗ The words quoted are from the apocryphal Prayer of Manasses, which, before the Council of Trent, was to be found inserted in some Latin copies of the Bible. 2446 Whether the Eucharist is the greatest of the sacraments? IIIa q. 65 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that the Eucharist is not the sacrament; in so far as it signifies the union of Christ principal of the sacraments. For the common good is of with the Church, of which union the Eucharist is a fig- more account than the good of the individual (1 Ethic. ii). ure: hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:32): “This is a great But Matrimony is ordained to the common good of the hu- sacrament: but I speak in Christ and in the Church.” man race by means of generation: whereas the sacrament Thirdly, this is made clear by considering the rites of of the Eucharist is ordained to the private good of the re- the sacraments. For nearly all the sacraments terminate cipient. Therefore it is not the greatest of the sacraments. in the Eucharist, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii): thus Objection 2. Further, those sacraments, seemingly, those who have been ordained receive Holy Communion, are greater, which are conferred by a greater minister. But as also do those who have been baptized, if they be adults. the sacraments of Confirmation and order are conferred The remaining sacraments may be compared to one by a bishop only, who is a greater minister than a mere another in several ways. For on the ground of neces- minister such as a priest, by whom the sacraments of the sity, Baptism is the greatest of the sacraments; while from Eucharist is conferred. Therefore those sacraments are the point of view of perfection, order comes first; while greater. Confirmation holds a middle place. The sacraments of Objection 3. Further, those sacraments are greater Penance and Extreme Unction are on a degree inferior to that have the greater power. But some of the sacraments those mentioned above; because, as stated above (a. 2), imprint a character, viz. Baptism, Confirmation and order; they are ordained to the Christian life, not directly, but ac- whereas the Eucharist does not. Therefore those sacra- cidentally, as it were, that is to say, as remedies against ments are greater. supervening defects. And among these, Extreme Unction Objection 4. Further, that seems to be greater, on is compared to Penance, as Confirmation to Baptism; in which others depend without its depending on them. But such a way, that Penance is more necessary, whereas Ex- the Eucharist depends on Baptism: since no one can re- treme Unction is more perfect. ceive the Eucharist except he has been baptized. There- Reply to Objection 1. Matrimony is ordained to the fore Baptism is greater than the Eucharist. common good as regards the body. But the common spir- On the contrary, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii) that itual good of the whole Church is contained substantially “No one receives hierarchical perfection save by the most in the sacrament itself of the Eucharist. God-like Eucharist.” Therefore this sacrament is greater Reply to Objection 2. By order and Confirmation the than all the others and perfects them. faithful of Christ are deputed to certain special duties; and I answer that, Absolutely speaking, the sacrament of this can be done by the prince alone. Consequently the the Eucharist is the greatest of all the sacraments: and conferring of these sacraments belongs exclusively to a this may be shown in three ways. First of all because it bishop, who is, as it were, a prince in the Church. But a contains Christ Himself substantially: whereas the other man is not deputed to any duty by the sacrament of the sacraments contain a certain instrumental power which is Eucharist, rather is this sacrament the end of all duties, as a share of Christ’s power, as we have shown above (q. 62, stated above. a. 4, ad 3, a. 5 ). Now that which is essentially such is Reply to Objection 3. The sacramental character, as always of more account than that which is such by partic- stated above (q. 63, a. 3), is a kind of participation in ipation. Christ’s priesthood. Wherefore the sacrament that unites Secondly, this is made clear by considering the rela- man to Christ Himself, is greater than a sacrament that tion of the sacraments to one another. For all the other imprints Christ’s character. sacraments seem to be ordained to this one as to their end. Reply to Objection 4. This argument proceeds on For it is manifest that the sacrament of order is ordained the ground of necessity. For thus Baptism, being of the to the consecration of the Eucharist: and the sacrament of greatest necessity, is the greatest of the sacraments, just as Baptism to the reception of the Eucharist: while a man order and Confirmation have a certain excellence consid- is perfected by Confirmation, so as not to fear to abstain ered in their administration; and Matrimony by reason of from this sacrament. By Penance and Extreme Unction its signification. For there is no reason why a thing should man is prepared to receive the Body of Christ worthily. not be greater from a certain point of view which is not And Matrimony at least in its signification, touches this greater absolutely speaking. 2447 Whether all the sacraments are necessary for salvation? IIIa q. 65 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that all the sacraments are nec- the end cannot be attained so becomingly: thus a horse is essary for salvation. For what is not necessary seems necessary for a journey. But this is not simple necessity to be superfluous. But no sacrament is superfluous, be- of end. cause “God does nothing without a purpose” (De Coelo et In the first way, three sacraments are necessary for sal- Mundo i). Therefore all the sacraments are necessary for vation. Two of them are necessary to the individual; Bap- salvation. tism, simply and absolutely; Penance, in the case of mor- Objection 2. Further, just as it is said of Baptism (Jn. tal sin committed after Baptism; while the sacrament of 3:5): “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy order is necessary to the Church, since “where there is no Ghost, he cannot enter in to the kingdom of God,” so of governor the people shall fall” (Prov. 11:14). the Eucharist is it said (Jn. 6:54): “Except you eat of the But in the second way the other sacraments are nec- flesh of the Son of Man, and drink of His blood, you shall essary. For in a sense Confirmation perfects Baptism; not have life in you.” Therefore, just as Baptism is a nec- Extreme Unction perfects Penance; while Matrimony, by essary sacrament, so is the Eucharist. multiplying them, preserves the numbers in the Church. Objection 3. Further, a man can be saved without Reply to Objection 1. For a thing not to be superflu- the sacrament of Baptism, provided that some unavoid- ous it is enough if it be necessary either in the first or the able obstacle, and not his contempt for religion, debar him second way. It is thus that the sacraments are necessary, from the sacrament, as we shall state further on (q. 68, as stated above. a. 2). But contempt of religion in any sacrament is a Reply to Objection 2. These words of our Lord are to hindrance to salvation. Therefore, in like manner, all the be understood of spiritual, and not of merely sacramental, sacraments are necessary for salvation. eating, as Augustine explains (Tract. xxvi super Joan.). On the contrary, Children are saved by Baptism Reply to Objection 3. Although contempt of any of alone without the other sacraments. the sacraments is a hindrance to salvation, yet it does not I answer that, Necessity of end, of which we speak amount to contempt of the sacrament, if anyone does not now, is twofold. First, a thing may be necessary so that trouble to receive a sacrament that is not necessary for without it the end cannot be attained; thus food is neces- salvation. Else those who do not receive orders, and those sary for human life. And this is simple necessity of end. who do not contract Matrimony, would be guilty of con- Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary, if, without it, tempt of those sacraments. 2448 THIRD PART, QUESTION 66 Of the Sacrament of Baptism (In Twelve Articles) We have now to consider each sacrament specially: (1) Baptism; (2) Confirmation; (3) the Eucharist; (4) Penance; (5) Extreme Unction; (6) Order; (7) Matrimony. Concerning the first, our consideration will be twofold: (1) of Baptism itself; (2) of things preparatory to Baptism. Concerning the first, four points arise for our consideration: (1) Things pertaining to the sacrament of Baptism; (2) The minister of this sacrament; (3) The recipients of this sacrament; (4) The effect of this sacrament. Concerning the first there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) What is Baptism? Is it a washing? (2) Of the institution of this sacrament; (3) Whether water be the proper matter of this sacrament? (4) Whether plain water be required? (5) Whether this be a suitable form of this sacrament: “I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost”? (6) Whether one could baptize with this form: “I baptize thee in the name of Christ?” (7) Whether immersion is necessary for Baptism? (8) Whether trine immersion is necessary? (9) Whether Baptism can be reiterated? (10) Of the Baptismal rite; (11) Of the various kinds of Baptism; (12) Of the comparison between various Baptisms. Whether Baptism is the mere washing? IIIa q. 66 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that Baptism is not the mere washing. Hence some have thought that the water itself washing. For the washing of the body is something tran- is the sacrament: which seems to be the meaning of the sitory: but Baptism is something permanent. Therefore passage quoted from Hugh of St. Victor. For in the gen- Baptism is not the mere washing; but rather is it “the re- eral definition of a sacrament he says that it is “a material generation, the seal, the safeguarding, the enlightenment,” element”: and in defining Baptism he says it is “water.” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv). But this is not true. For since the sacraments of the Objection 2. Further, Hugh of St. Victor says (De New Law effect a certain sanctification, there the sacra- Sacram. ii) that “Baptism is water sanctified by God’s ment is completed where the sanctification is completed. word for the blotting out of sins.” But the washing itself Now, the sanctification is not completed in water; but a is not water, but a certain use of water. certain sanctifying instrumental virtue, not permanent but Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Tract. lxxx su- transient, passes from the water, in which it is, into man per Joan.): “The word is added to the element, and this who is the subject of true sanctification. Consequently becomes a sacrament.” Now, the element is the water. the sacrament is not completed in the very water, but in Therefore Baptism is the water and not the washing. applying the water to man, i.e. in the washing. Hence On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 34:30): “He the Master (iv, 3) says that “Baptism is the outward wash- that washeth himself [baptizatur] after touching the dead, ing of the body done together with the prescribed form of if he touch him again, what does his washing avail?” It words.” seems, therefore, that Baptism is the washing or bathing. The Baptismal character is both reality and sacrament: I answer that, In the sacrament of Baptism, three because it is something real signified by the outward things may be considered: namely, that which is “sacra- washing; and a sacramental sign of the inward justifica- ment only”; that which is “reality and sacrament”; and tion: and this last is the reality only, in this sacrament— that which is “reality only.” That which is sacrament only, namely, the reality signified and not signifying. is something visible and outward; the sign, namely, of the Reply to Objection 1. That which is both sacrament inward effect: for such is the very nature of a sacrament. and reality—i.e. the character—and that which is reality And this outward something that can be perceived by the only—i.e. the inward justification—remain: the charac- sense is both the water itself and its use, which is the ter remains and is indelible, as stated above (q. 63, a. 5); 2449 the justification remains, but can be lost. Consequently reception of those most holy words and sacraments”; and Damascene defined Baptism, not as to that which is done again by its relation to heavenly glory, which is the univer- outwardly, and is the sacrament only; but as to that which sal end of all the sacraments, when he adds, “preparing the is inward. Hence he sets down two things as pertaining to way for us, whereby we mount to the repose of the heav- the character—namely, “seal” and “safeguarding”; inas- enly kingdom”; and again as to the beginning of spiritual much as the character which is called a seal, so far as it- life, when he adds, “the conferring of our most sacred and self is concerned, safeguards the soul in good. He also Godlike regeneration.” sets down two things as pertaining to the ultimate reality Reply to Objection 2. As already stated, the opinion of the sacrament—namely, “regeneration” which refers to of Hugh of St. Victor on this question is not to be fol- the fact that man by being baptized begins the new life lowed. Nevertheless the saying that “Baptism is water” of righteousness; and “enlightenment,” which refers es- may be verified in so far as water is the material principle pecially to faith, by which man receives spiritual life, ac- of Baptism: and thus there would be “causal predication.” cording to Habac 2 (Heb. 10:38; cf. Habac 2:4): “But Reply to Objection 3. When the words are added, (My) just man liveth by faith”; and Baptism is a sort of the element becomes a sacrament, not in the element it- protestation of faith; whence it is called the “Sacrament self, but in man, to whom the element is applied, by being of Faith.” Likewise Dionysius defined Baptism by its re- used in washing him. Indeed, this is signified by those lation to the other sacraments, saying (Eccl. Hier. ii) that very words which are added to the element, when we say: it is “the principle that forms the habits of the soul for the “I baptize thee,” etc. Whether Baptism was instituted after Christ’s Passion? IIIa q. 66 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that Baptism was instituted af- baptized. Consequently Baptism was truly instituted then, ter Christ’s Passion. For the cause precedes the effect. if we consider it as a sacrament. But the obligation of re- Now Christ’s Passion operates in the sacraments of the ceiving this sacrament was proclaimed to mankind after New Law. Therefore Christ’s Passion precedes the insti- the Passion and Resurrection. First, because Christ’s Pas- tution of the sacraments of the New Law: especially the sion put an end to the figurative sacraments, which were sacrament of Baptism since the Apostle says (Rom. 6:3): supplanted by Baptism and the other sacraments of the “All we, who are baptized in Christ Jesus, are baptized in New Law. Secondly, because by Baptism man is “made His death,” etc. conformable” to Christ’s Passion and Resurrection, in so Objection 2. Further, the sacraments of the New Law far as he dies to sin and begins to live anew unto righ- derive their efficacy from the mandate of Christ. But teousness. Consequently it behooved Christ to suffer and Christ gave the disciples the mandate of Baptism after His to rise again, before proclaiming to man his obligation of Passion and Resurrection, when He said: “Going, teach conforming himself to Christ’s Death and Resurrection. ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father,” Reply to Objection 1. Even before Christ’s Passion, etc. (Mat. 28:19). Therefore it seems that Baptism was Baptism, inasmuch as it foreshadowed it, derived its effi- instituted after Christ’s Passion. cacy therefrom; but not in the same way as the sacraments Objection 3. Further, Baptism is a necessary sacra- of the Old Law. For these were mere figures: whereas ment, as stated above (q. 65 , a. 4): wherefore, seemingly, Baptism derived the power of justifying from Christ Him- it must have been binding on man as soon as it was in- self, to Whose power the Passion itself owed its saving stituted. But before Christ’s Passion men were not bound virtue. to be baptized: for Circumcision was still in force, which Reply to Objection 2. It was not meet that men was supplanted by Baptism. Therefore it seems that Bap- should be restricted to a number of figures by Christ, Who tism was not instituted before Christ’s Passion. came to fulfil and replace the figure by His reality. There- On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on the fore before His Passion He did not make Baptism oblig- Epiphany (Append. Serm., clxxxv): “As soon as Christ atory as soon as it was instituted; but wished men to be- was plunged into the waters, the waters washed away the come accustomed to its use; especially in regard to the sins of all.” But this was before Christ’s Passion. There- Jews, to whom all things were figurative, as Augustine fore Baptism was instituted before Christ’s Passion. says (Contra Faust. iv). But after His Passion and Res- I answer that, As stated above (q. 62, a. 1), sacra- urrection He made Baptism obligatory, not only on the ments derive from their institution the power of confer- Jews, but also on the Gentiles, when He gave the com- ring grace. Wherefore it seems that a sacrament is then mandment: “Going, teach ye all nations.” instituted, when it receives the power of producing its ef- Reply to Objection 3. Sacraments are not obligatory fect. Now Baptism received this power when Christ was except when we are commanded to receive them. And 2450 this was not before the Passion, as stated above. For our into the kingdom of God, seem to refer to the future rather Lord’s words to Nicodemus (Jn. 3:5), “Unless a man be than to the present.” born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter Whether water is the proper matter of Baptism? IIIa q. 66 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that water is not the proper phers held that water is the first principle of all things. matter of Baptism. For Baptism, according to Dionysius Secondly, in regard to the effects of Baptism, to which (Eccl. Hier. v) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv), has the properties of water correspond. For by reason of its a power of enlightening. But enlightenment is a special moistness it cleanses; and hence it fittingly signifies and characteristic of fire. Therefore Baptism should be con- causes the cleansing from sins. By reason of its coolness it ferred with fire rather than with water: and all the more tempers superfluous heat: wherefore it fittingly mitigates since John the Baptist said when foretelling Christ’s Bap- the concupiscence of the fomes. By reason of its trans- tism (Mat. 3:11): “He shall baptize you in the Holy Ghost parency, it is susceptive of light; hence its adaptability to and fire.” Baptism as the “sacrament of Faith.” Objection 2. Further, the washing away of sins is sig- Thirdly, because it is suitable for the signification of nified in Baptism. But many other things besides water the mysteries of Christ, by which we are justified. For, as are employed in washing, such as wine, oil, and such like. Chrysostom says (Hom. xxv in Joan.) on Jn. 3:5, “Unless Therefore Baptism can be conferred with these also; and a man be born again,” etc., “When we dip our heads un- consequently water is not the proper matter of Baptism. der the water as in a kind of tomb our old man is buried, Objection 3. Further, the sacraments of the Church and being submerged is hidden below, and thence he rises flowed from the side of Christ hanging on the cross, as again renewed.” stated above (q. 62, a. 5). But not only water flowed there- Fourthly, because by being so universal and abundant, from, but also blood. Therefore it seems that Baptism can it is a matter suitable to our need of this sacrament: for it also be conferred with blood. And this seems to be more can easily be obtained everywhere. in keeping with the effect of Baptism, because it is written Reply to Objection 1. Fire enlightens actively. But (Apoc. 1:5): ”(Who) washed us from our sins in His own he who is baptized does not become an enlightener, but is blood.” enlightened by faith, which “cometh by hearing” (Rom. Objection 4. Further, as Augustine (cf. Master of 10:17). Consequently water is more suitable, than fire, for the Sentences, iv, 3) and Bede (Exposit. in Luc. iii, 21) Baptism. say, Christ, by “the touch of His most pure flesh, endowed But when we find it said: “He shall baptize you in the the waters with a regenerating and cleansing virtue.” But Holy Ghost and fire,” we may understand fire, as Jerome all waters are not connected with the waters of the Jor- says (In Matth. ii), to mean the Holy Ghost, Who ap- dan which Christ touched with His flesh. Consequently it peared above the disciples under the form of fiery tongues seems that Baptism cannot be conferred with any water; (Acts 2:3). Or we may understand it to mean tribulation, and therefore water, as such, is not the proper matter of as Chrysostom says (Hom. iii in Matth.): because tribu- Baptism. lation washes away sin, and tempers concupiscence. Or Objection 5. Further, if water, as such, were the again, as Hilary says (Super Matth. ii) that “when we proper matter of Baptism, there would be no need to do have been baptized in the Holy Ghost,” we still have to be anything to the water before using it for Baptism. But in “perfected by the fire of the judgment.” solemn Baptism the water which is used for baptizing, is Reply to Objection 2. Wine and oil are not so com- exorcized and blessed. Therefore it seems that water, as monly used for washing, as water. Neither do they wash such, is not the proper matter of Baptism. so efficiently: for whatever is washed with them, contracts On the contrary, our Lord said (Jn. 3:5): “Unless a a certain smell therefrom; which is not the case if water be man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot used. Moreover, they are not so universal or so abundant enter into the kingdom of God.” as water. I answer that, By Divine institution water is the Reply to Objection 3. Water flowed from Christ’s proper matter of Baptism; and with reason. First, by rea- side to wash us; blood, to redeem us. Wherefore blood son of the very nature of Baptism, which is a regeneration belongs to the sacrament of the Eucharist, while wa- unto spiritual life. And this answers to the nature of wa- ter belongs to the sacrament of Baptism. Yet this latter ter in a special degree; wherefore seeds, from which all sacrament derives its cleansing virtue from the power of living things, viz. plants and animals are generated, are Christ’s blood. moist and akin to water. For this reason certain philoso- Reply to Objection 4. Christ’s power flowed into all 2451 waters, by reason of, not connection of place, but likeness Reply to Objection 5. The blessing of the water is of species, as Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany not essential to Baptism, but belongs to a certain solem- (Append. Serm. cxxxv): “The blessing that flowed from nity, whereby the devotion of the faithful is aroused, and the Saviour’s Baptism, like a mystic river, swelled the the cunning of the devil hindered from impeding the bap- course of every stream, and filled the channels of every tismal effect. spring.” Whether plain water is necessary for Baptism? IIIa q. 66 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that plain water is not necessary combustible; in which manner animals are produced from for Baptism. For the water which we have is not plain wa- certain things by way of putrefaction. ter; as appears especially in sea-water, in which there is Whatever artificial change, then, takes place in the wa- a considerable proportion of the earthly element, as the ter, whether by mixture or by alteration, the water’s nature Philosopher shows (Meteor. ii). Yet this water may be is not changed. Consequently such water can be used for used for Baptism. Therefore plain and pure water is not Baptism: unless perhaps such a small quantity of water be necessary for Baptism. mixed artificially with a body that the compound is some- Objection 2. Further, in the solemn celebration of thing other than water; thus mud is earth rather than water, Baptism, chrism is poured into the water. But this seems and diluted wine is wine rather than water. to take away the purity and plainness of the water. There- But if the change be natural, sometimes it destroys the fore pure and plain water is not necessary for Baptism. nature of the water; and this is when by a natural process Objection 3. Further, the water that flowed from the water enters into the substance of a mixed body: thus wa- side of Christ hanging on the cross was a figure of Bap- ter changed into the juice of the grape is wine, wherefore tism, as stated above (a. 3, ad 3). But that water, seem- it has not the nature of water. Sometimes, however, there ingly, was not pure, because the elements do not exist may be a natural change of the water, without destruction actually in a mixed body, such as Christ’s. Therefore it of species: and this, both by alteration, as we may see seems that pure or plain water is not necessary for Bap- in the case of water heated by the sun; and by mixture, tism. as when the water of a river has become muddy by being Objection 4. Further, lye does not seem to be pure wa- mixed with particles of earth. ter, for it has the properties of heating and drying, which We must therefore say that any water may be used for are contrary to those of water. Nevertheless it seems that Baptism, no matter how much it may be changed, as long lye can be used for Baptism; for the water of the Baths can as the species of water is not destroyed; but if the species be so used, which has filtered through a sulphurous vein, of water be destroyed, it cannot be used for Baptism. just as lye percolates through ashes. Therefore it seems Reply to Objection 1. The change in sea-water and that plain water is not necessary for Baptism. in other waters which we have to hand, is not so great as Objection 5. Further, rose-water is distilled from to destroy the species of water. And therefore such waters roses, just as chemical waters are distilled from certain may be used for Baptism. bodies. But seemingly, such like waters may be used in Reply to Objection 2. Chrism does not destroy the Baptism; just as rain-water, which is distilled from va- nature of the water by being mixed with it: just as neither pors. Since, therefore, such waters are not pure and plain is water changed wherein meat and the like are boiled: water, it seems that pure and plain water is not necessary except the substance boiled be so dissolved that the liquor for Baptism. be of a nature foreign to water; in this we may be guided On the contrary, The proper matter of Baptism is wa- by the specific gravity [spissitudine]. If, however, from ter, as stated above (a. 3). But plain water alone has the the liquor thus thickened plain water be strained, it can nature of water. Therefore pure plain water is necessary be used for Baptism: just as water strained from mud, al- for Baptism. though mud cannot be used for baptizing. I answer that, Water may cease to be pure or plain Reply to Objection 3. The water which flowed from water in two ways: first, by being mixed with another the side of Christ hanging on the cross, was not the phleg- body; secondly, by alteration. And each of these may hap- matic humor, as some have supposed. For a liquid of pen in a twofold manner; artificially and naturally. Now this kind cannot be used for Baptism, as neither can the art fails in the operation of nature: because nature gives blood of an animal, or wine, or any liquid extracted from the substantial form, which art cannot give; for whatever plants. It was pure water gushing forth miraculously like form is given by art is accidental; except perchance when the blood from a dead body, to prove the reality of our art applies a proper agent to its proper matter, as fire to a Lord’s body, and confute the error of the Manichees: wa- 2452 ter, which is one of the four elements, showing Christ’s neither can wine. Nor does the comparison hold with rain-body to be composed of the four elements; blood, proving water, which for the most part is formed by the condens- that it was composed of the four humors. ing of vapors, themselves formed from water, and con- Reply to Objection 4. Baptism may be conferred with tains a minimum of the liquid matter from mixed bod- lye and the waters of Sulphur Baths: because such like ies; which liquid matter by the force of nature, which is waters are not incorporated, artificially or naturally, with stronger than art, is transformed in this process of conden- certain mixed bodies, and suffer only a certain alteration sation into real water, a result which cannot be produced by passing through certain bodies. artificially. Consequently rain-water retains no properties Reply to Objection 5. Rose-water is a liquid distilled of any mixed body; which cannot be said of rose-water or from roses: consequently it cannot be used for Baptism. chemical waters. For the same reason chemical waters cannot be used, as Whether this be a suitable form of Baptism: “I baptize thee in the name of the Father, IIIa q. 66 a. 5 and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost”? Objection 1. It seems that this is not a suitable form vine Persons, as stated in the Ia, q. 32, a. 3. Therefore we of Baptism: “I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and should not say, “in the name,” but “in the names of the of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.” For action should be Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.” ascribed to the principal agent rather than to the minister. Objection 7. Further, the Person of the Father is des- Now the minister of a sacrament acts as an instrument, ignated not only by the name Father, but also by that as stated above (q. 64, a. 1); while the principal agent in of “Unbegotten and Begetter”; and the Son by those of Baptism is Christ, according to Jn. 1:33, “He upon Whom “Word,” “Image,” and “Begotten”; and the Holy Ghost by thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon those of “Gift,” “Love,” and the “Proceeding One.” There- Him, He it is that baptizeth.” It is therefore unbecoming fore it seems that Baptism is valid if conferred in these for the minister to say, “I baptize thee”: the more so that names. “Ego” [I] is understood in the word “baptizo” [I baptize], On the contrary, our Lord said (Mat. 28:19): “Go- so that it seems redundant. ing. . . teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of Objection 2. Further, there is no need for a man who the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.” does an action, to make mention of the action done; thus I answer that, Baptism receives its consecration from he who teaches, need not say, “I teach you.” Now our its form, according to Eph. 5:26: “Cleansing it by the Lord gave at the same time the precepts both of baptiz- laver of water in the word of life.” And Augustine says ing and of teaching, when He said (Mat. 28:19): “Going, (De Unico Baptismo iv) that “Baptism is consecrated by teach ye all nations,” etc. Therefore there is no need in the the words of the Gospel.” Consequently the cause of Bap- form of Baptism to mention the action of baptizing. tism needs to be expressed in the baptismal form. Now Objection 3. Further, the person baptized sometimes this cause is twofold; the principal cause from which it does not understand the words; for instance, if he be deaf, derives its virtue, and this is the Blessed Trinity; and the or a child. But it is useless to address such a one; accord- instrumental cause, viz. the minister who confers the ing to Ecclus. 32:6: “Where there is no hearing, pour not sacrament outwardly. Wherefore both causes should be out words.” Therefore it is unfitting to address the person expressed in the form of Baptism. Now the minister is baptized with these words: “I baptize thee.” designated by the words, “I baptize thee”; and the prin- Objection 4. Further, it may happen that several cipal cause in the words, “in the name of the Father, and are baptized by several at the same time; thus the apos- of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.” Therefore this is the tles on one day baptized three thousand, and on another, suitable form of Baptism: “I baptize thee in the name of five thousand (Acts 2,4). Therefore the form of Baptism the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.” should not be limited to the singular number in the words, Reply to Objection 1. Action is attributed to an in- “I baptize thee”: but one should be able to say, “We bap- strument as to the immediate agent; but to the principal tize you.” agent inasmuch as the instrument acts in virtue thereof. Objection 5. Further, Baptism derives its power from Consequently it is fitting that in the baptismal form the Christ’s Passion. But Baptism is sanctified by the form. minister should be mentioned as performing the act of Therefore it seems that Christ’s Passion should be men- baptizing, in the words, “I baptize thee”; indeed, our Lord tioned in the form of Baptism. attributed to the ministers the act of baptizing, when He Objection 6. Further, a name signifies a thing’s prop- said: “Baptizing them,” etc. But the principal cause is in- erty. But there are three Personal Properties of the Di- dicated as conferring the sacrament by His own power, in 2453 the words, “in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and the same time: because an action is multiplied according of the Holy Ghost”: for Christ does not baptize without to the number of the agents, if it be done perfectly by each. the Father and the Holy Ghost. So that if two were to combine, of whom one were mute, The Greeks, however, do not attribute the act of bap- and unable to utter the words, and the other were without tizing to the minister, in order to avoid the error of those hands, and unable to perform the action, they could not who in the past ascribed the baptismal power to the bap- both baptize at the same time, one saying the words and tizers, saying (1 Cor. 1:12): “I am of Paul. . . and I of the other performing the action. Cephas.” Wherefore they use the form: “May the servant On the other hand, in a case of necessity, several could of Christ, N. . . , be baptized, in the name of the Father,” be baptized at the same time; for no single one of them etc. And since the action performed by the minister is ex- would receive more than one baptism. But it would be pressed with the invocation of the Trinity, the sacrament necessary, in that case, to say: “I baptize ye.” Nor would is validly conferred. As to the addition of “Ego” in our this be a change of form, because “ye” is the same as “thee form, it is not essential; but it is added in order to lay and thee.” Whereas “we” does not mean “I and I,” but “I greater stress on the intention. and thou”; so that this would be a change of form. Reply to Objection 2. Since a man may be washed Likewise it would be a change of form to say, “I bap- with water for several reasons, the purpose for which it is tize myself”: consequently no one can baptize himself. done must be expressed by the words of the form. And For this reason did Christ choose to be baptized by John this is not done by saying: “In the name of the Father, and (Extra, De Baptismo et ejus effectu, cap. Debitum). of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost”; because we are bound Reply to Objection 5. Although Christ’s Passion is to do all things in that Name (Col. 3:17). Wherefore un- the principal cause as compared to the minister, yet it is less the act of baptizing be expressed, either as we do, or an instrumental cause as compared to the Blessed Trin- as the Greeks do, the sacrament is not valid; according to ity. For this reason the Trinity is mentioned rather than the decretal of Alexander III: “If anyone dip a child thrice Christ’s Passion. in the water in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and Reply to Objection 6. Although there are three per- of the Holy Ghost, Amen, without saying, I baptize thee sonal names of the three Persons, there is but one essen- in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy tial name. Now the Divine power which works in Bap- Ghost, Amen, the child is not baptized.” tism, pertains to the Essence; and therefore we say, “in Reply to Objection 3. The words which are uttered the name,” and not, “in the names.” in the sacramental forms, are said not merely for the pur- Reply to Objection 7. Just as water is used in Bap- pose of signification, but also for the purpose of effi- tism, because it is more commonly employed in washing, ciency, inasmuch as they derive efficacy from that Word, so for the purpose of designating the three Persons, in the by Whom “all things were made.” Consequently they are form of Baptism, those names are chosen, which are gen- becomingly addressed not only to men, but also to insensi- erally used, in a particular language, to signify the Per- ble creatures; for instance, when we say: “I exorcize thee, sons. Nor is the sacrament valid if conferred in any other creature salt” (Roman Ritual). names. Reply to Objection 4. Several cannot baptize one at Whether Baptism can be conferred in the name of Christ? IIIa q. 66 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that Baptism can be conferred have been baptized in the name of the Trinity, or only in in the name of Christ. For just as there is “one Faith,” so the name of Christ, as we read in the Acts of the Apostles is there “one Baptism” (Eph. 4:5). But it is related (Acts (it is all the same, as Blessed Ambrose saith), must not 8:12) that “in the name of Jesus Christ they were baptized, be rebaptized.” But they would be baptized again if they both men and women.” Therefore now also can Baptism had not been validly baptized with that form. Therefore be conferred in the name of Christ. Baptism can be celebrated in the name of Christ by using Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. this form: “I baptize thee in the name of Christ.” i): “If you mention Christ, you designate both the Father On the contrary, Pope Pelagius II wrote to the Bishop by Whom He was anointed, and the Son Himself, Who Gaudentius: “If any people living in your Worship’s was anointed, and the Holy Ghost with Whom He was neighborhood, avow that they have been baptized in the anointed.” But Baptism can be conferred in the name of name of the Lord only, without any hesitation baptize the Trinity: therefore also in the name of Christ. them again in the name of the Blessed Trinity, when they Objection 3. Further, Pope Nicholas I, answering come in quest of the Catholic Faith.” Didymus, too, says questions put to him by the Bulgars, said: “Those who (De Spir. Sanct.): “If indeed there be such a one with a 2454 mind so foreign to faith as to baptize while omitting one reason at Christ’s Baptism, wherein was the source of the of the aforesaid names,” viz. of the three Persons, “he sanctification of our Baptism, the Trinity was present in baptizes invalidly.” sensible signs: viz. the Father in the voice, the Son in the I answer that, As stated above (q. 64, a. 3), the sacra- human nature, the Holy Ghost in the dove. ments derive their efficacy from Christ’s institution. Con- Reply to Objection 1. It was by a special revela- sequently, if any of those things be omitted which Christ tion from Christ that in the primitive Church the apostles instituted in regard to a sacrament, it is invalid; save by baptized in the name of Christ; in order that the name of special dispensation of Him Who did not bind His power Christ, which was hateful to Jews and Gentiles, might be- to the sacraments. Now Christ commanded the sacrament come an object of veneration, in that the Holy Ghost was of Baptism to be given with the invocation of the Trinity. given in Baptism at the invocation of that Name. And consequently whatever is lacking to the full invoca- Reply to Objection 2. Ambrose here gives this reason tion of the Trinity, destroys the integrity of Baptism. why exception could, without inconsistency, be allowed in Nor does it matter that in the name of one Person an- the primitive Church; namely, because the whole Trinity other is implied, as the name of the Son is implied in that is implied in the name of Christ, and therefore the form of the Father, or that he who mentions the name of only prescribed by Christ in the Gospel was observed in its in- one Person may believe aright in the Three; because just tegrity, at least implicitly. as a sacrament requires sensible matter, so does it require Reply to Objection 3. Pope Nicolas confirms his a sensible form. Hence, for the validity of the sacrament words by quoting the two authorities given in the preced- it is not enough to imply or to believe in the Trinity, un- ing objections: wherefore the answer to this is clear from less the Trinity be expressed in sensible words. For this the two solutions given above. Whether immersion in water is necessary for Baptism? IIIa q. 66 a. 7 Objection 1. It seems that immersion in water is nec- be done with water not only by immersion, but also by essary for Baptism. Because it is written (Eph. 4:5): “One sprinkling or pouring. And, therefore, although it is safer faith, one baptism.” But in many parts of the world the to baptize by immersion, because this is the more ordi- ordinary way of baptizing is by immersion. Therefore it nary fashion, yet Baptism can be conferred by sprinkling seems that there can be no Baptism without immersion. or also by pouring, according to Ezech. 36:25: “I will Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 6:3,4): pour upon you clean water,” as also the Blessed Lawrence “All we who are baptized in Christ Jesus, are baptized is related to have baptized. And this especially in cases of in His death: for we are buried together with Him, by urgency: either because there is a great number to be bap- Baptism into death.” But this is done by immersion: for tized, as was clearly the case in Acts 2 and 4, where we Chrysostom says on Jn. 3:5: “Unless a man be born again read that on one day three thousand believed, and on an- of water and the Holy Ghost,” etc.: “When we dip our other five thousand: or through there being but a small heads under the water as in a kind of tomb, our old man is supply of water, or through feebleness of the minister, buried, and being submerged, is hidden below, and thence who cannot hold up the candidate for Baptism; or through he rises again renewed.” Therefore it seems that immer- feebleness of the candidate, whose life might be endan- sion is essential to Baptism. gered by immersion. We must therefore conclude that im- Objection 3. Further, if Baptism is valid without total mersion is not necessary for Baptism. immersion of the body, it would follow that it would be Reply to Objection 1. What is accidental to a thing equally sufficient to pour water over any part of the body. does not diversify its essence. Now bodily washing with But this seems unreasonable; since original sin, to remedy water is essential to Baptism: wherefore Baptism is called which is the principal purpose of Baptism, is not in only a “laver,” according to Eph. 5:26: “Cleansing it by the one part of the body. Therefore it seems that immersion laver of water in the word of life.” But that the washing is necessary for Baptism, and that mere sprinkling is not be done this or that way, is accidental to Baptism. And enough. consequently such diversity does not destroy the oneness On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 10:22): “Let us of Baptism. draw near with a true heart in fulness of faith, having our Reply to Objection 2. Christ’s burial is more clearly hearts sprinkled from an evil conscience, and our bodies represented by immersion: wherefore this manner of bap- washed with clean water.” tizing is more frequently in use and more commendable. I answer that, In the sacrament of Baptism water is Yet in the other ways of baptizing it is represented after a put to the use of a washing of the body, whereby to sig- fashion, albeit not so clearly; for no matter how the wash- nify the inward washing away of sins. Now washing may ing is done, the body of a man, or some part thereof, is put 2455 under water, just as Christ’s body was put under the earth. by Baptism the transmission of original sin to the off- Reply to Objection 3. The principal part of the body, spring by the act of procreation is not deleted, but the especially in relation to the exterior members, is the head, soul is freed from the stain and debt of sin which it has wherein all the senses, both interior and exterior, flourish. contracted. Consequently that part of the body should be And therefore, if the whole body cannot be covered with washed in preference, in which the works of the soul are water, because of the scarcity of water, or because of some made manifest. other reason, it is necessary to pour water over the head, Nevertheless in the Old Law the remedy against origi- in which the principle of animal life is made manifest. nal sin was affixed to the member of procreation; because And although original sin is transmitted through the He through Whom original sin was to be removed, was members that serve for procreation, yet those members yet to be born of the seed of Abraham, whose faith was are not to be sprinkled in preference to the head, because signified by circumcision according to Rom. 4:11. Whether trine immersion is essential to Baptism? IIIa q. 66 a. 8 Objection 1. It seems that trine immersion is essen- above quoted explains, both single and trine immersion tial to Baptism. For Augustine says in a sermon on the are lawful considered in themselves; since one immersion Symbol, addressed to the Neophytes: “Rightly were you signifies the oneness of Christ’s death and of the Godhead; dipped three times, since you were baptized in the name while trine immersion signifies the three days of Christ’s of the Trinity. Rightly were you dipped three times, be- burial, and also the Trinity of Persons. cause you were baptized in the name of Jesus Christ, Who But for various reasons, according as the Church has on the third day rose again from the dead. For that thrice ordained, one mode has been in practice, at one time, the repeated immersion reproduces the burial of the Lord by other at another time. For since from the very earliest days which you were buried with Christ in Baptism.” Now of the Church some have had false notions concerning the both seem to be essential to Baptism, namely, that in Bap- Trinity, holding that Christ is a mere man, and that He is tism the Trinity of Persons should be signified, and that not called the “Son of God” or “God” except by reason we should be conformed to Christ’s burial. Therefore it of His merit, which was chiefly in His death; for this rea- seems that trine immersion is essential to Baptism. son they did not baptize in the name of the Trinity, but in Objection 2. Further, the sacraments derive their ef- memory of Christ’s death, and with one immersion. And ficacy from Christ’s mandate. But trine immersion was this was condemned in the early Church. Wherefore in the commanded by Christ: for Pope Pelagius II wrote to Apostolic Canons (xlix) we read: “If any priest or bishop Bishop Gaudentius: “The Gospel precept given by our confer baptism not with the trine immersion in the one Lord God Himself, our Saviour Jesus Christ, admonishes administration, but with one immersion, which baptism is us to confer the sacrament of Baptism to each one in said to be conferred by some in the death of the Lord, let the name of the Trinity and also with trine immersion.” him be deposed”: for our Lord did not say, “Baptize ye in Therefore, just as it is essential to Baptism to call on the My death,” but “In the name of the Father and of the Son, name of the Trinity, so is it essential to baptize by trine and of the Holy Ghost.” immersion. Later on, however, there arose the error of certain Objection 3. Further, if trine immersion be not essen- schismatics and heretics who rebaptized: as Augustine tial to Baptism, it follows that the sacrament of Baptism (Super. Joan., cf. De Haeres. lxix) relates of the Do- is conferred at the first immersion; so that if a second or natists. Wherefore, in detestation of their error, only one third immersion be added, it seems that Baptism is con- immersion was ordered to be made, by the (fourth) coun- ferred a second or third time. which is absurd. Therefore cil of Toledo, in the acts of which we read: “In order to one immersion does not suffice for the sacrament of Bap- avoid the scandal of schism or the practice of heretical tism, and trine immersion is essential thereto. teaching let us hold to the single baptismal immersion.” On the contrary, Gregory wrote to the Bishop Lean- But now that this motive has ceased, trine immersion der: “It cannot be in any way reprehensible to baptize an is universally observed in Baptism: and consequently any- infant with either a trine or a single immersion: since the one baptizing otherwise would sin gravely, through not Trinity can be represented in the three immersions, and following the ritual of the Church. It would, however, be the unity of the Godhead in one immersion.” valid Baptism. I answer that As stated above (a. 7, ad 1), washing with Reply to Objection 1. The Trinity acts as principal water is of itself required for Baptism, being essential to agent in Baptism. Now the likeness of the agent enters the sacrament: whereas the mode of washing is accidental into the effect, in regard to the form and not in regard to to the sacrament. Consequently, as Gregory in the words the matter. Wherefore the Trinity is signified in Baptism 2456 by the words of the form. Nor is it essential for the Trinity ferred “in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of to be signified by the manner in which the matter is used; the Holy Ghost.” Nor can we argue from the form to the although this is done to make the signification clearer. use of the matter, as stated above (ad 1). In like manner Christ’s death is sufficiently repre- Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 64, a. 8), sented in the one immersion. And the three days of His the intention is essential to Baptism. Consequently, one burial were not necessary for our salvation, because even Baptism results from the intention of the Church’s minis- if He had been buried or dead for one day, this would have ter, who intends to confer one Baptism by a trine immer- been enough to consummate our redemption: yet those sion. Wherefore Jerome says on Eph. 4:5,6: “Though the three days were ordained unto the manifestation of the re- Baptism,” i.e. the immersion, “be thrice repeated, on ac- ality of His death, as stated above (q. 53, a. 2). It is there- count of the mystery of the Trinity, yet it is reputed as one fore clear that neither on the part of the Trinity, nor on the Baptism.” part of Christ’s Passion, is the trine immersion essential to If, however, the intention were to confer one Bap- the sacrament. tism at each immersion together with the repetition of the Reply to Objection 2. Pope Pelagius understood the words of the form, it would be a sin, in itself, because it trine immersion to be ordained by Christ in its equivalent; would be a repetition of Baptism. in the sense that Christ commanded Baptism to be con- Whether Baptism may be reiterated? IIIa q. 66 a. 9 Objection 1. It seems that Baptism may be reiterated. be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, He cannot see For Baptism was instituted, seemingly, in order to wash [Vulg.: ‘enter into’] the kingdom of God.” Now one man away sins. But sins are reiterated. Therefore much more can be begotten but once. Wherefore Baptism cannot be should Baptism be reiterated: because Christ’s mercy sur- reiterated, just as neither can carnal generation. Hence passes man’s guilt. Augustine says on Jn. 3:4: “ ‘Can he enter a second time Objection 2. Further, John the Baptist received spe- into his mother’s womb and be born again’: So thou,” says cial commendation from Christ, Who said of him (Mat. he, “must understand the birth of the Spirit, as Nicodemus 11:11): “There hath not risen among them that are born of understood the birth of the flesh. . . . As there is no return women, a greater than John the Baptist.” But those whom to the womb, so neither is there to Baptism.” John had baptized were baptized again, according to Acts Secondly, because “we are baptized in Christ’s death,” 19:1-7, where it is stated that Paul rebaptized those who by which we die unto sin and rise again unto “newness had received the Baptism of John. Much more, therefore, of life” (cf. Rom. 6:3,4). Now “Christ died” but “once” should those be rebaptized, who have been baptized by (Rom. 6:10). Wherefore neither should Baptism be reit- heretics or sinners. erated. For this reason (Heb. 6:6) is it said against some Objection 3. Further, it was decreed in the Council of who wished to be baptized again: “Crucifying again to Nicaea (Can. xix) that if “any of the Paulianists or Cat- themselves the Son of God”; on which the gloss observes: aphrygians should be converted to the Catholic Church, “Christ’s one death hallowed the one Baptism.” they were to be baptized”: and this seemingly should be Thirdly, because Baptism imprints a character, which said in regard to other heretics. Therefore those whom the is indelible, and is conferred with a certain consecration. heretics have baptized, should be baptized again. Wherefore, just as other consecrations are not reiterated Objection 4. Further, Baptism is necessary for salva- in the Church, so neither is Baptism. This is the view ex- tion. But sometimes there is a doubt about the baptism of pressed by Augustine, who says (Contra Epist. Parmen. those who really have been baptized. Therefore it seems ii) that “the military character is not renewed”: and that that they should be baptized again. “the sacrament of Christ is not less enduring than this bod- Objection 5. Further, the Eucharist is a more perfect ily mark, since we see that not even apostates are deprived sacrament than Baptism, as stated above (q. 65, a. 3). But of Baptism, since when they repent and return they are not the sacrament of the Eucharist is reiterated. Much more baptized anew.” reason, therefore, is there for Baptism to be reiterated. Fourthly, because Baptism is conferred principally as On the contrary, It is written, (Eph. 4:5): “One faith, a remedy against original sin. Wherefore, just as original one Baptism.” sin is not renewed, so neither is Baptism reiterated, for as I answer that, Baptism cannot be reiterated. it is written (Rom. 5:18), “as by the offense of one, unto First, because Baptism is a spiritual regeneration; inas- all men to condemnation, so also by the justice of one, much as a man dies to the old life, and begins to lead the unto all men to justification of life.” new life. Whence it is written (Jn. 3:5): “Unless a man Reply to Objection 1. Baptism derives its efficacy 2457 from Christ’s Passion, as stated above (a. 2, ad 1). Wherein that state of error was no Baptism at all, not being con- fore, just as subsequent sins do not cancel the virtue of ferred in the name of the Trinity.” On the other hand, as Christ’s Passion, so neither do they cancel Baptism, so as set down in De Eccles. Dogm. xxii: “Those heretics who to call for its repetition. on the other hand the sin which have been baptized in the confession of the name of the hindered the effect of Baptism is blotted out on being sub- Trinity are to be received as already baptized when they mitted to Penance. come to the Catholic Faith.” Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says on Jn. 1:33: Reply to Objection 4. According to the Decretal of “ ‘And I knew Him not’: Behold; after John had baptized, Alexander III: “Those about whose Baptism there is a Baptism was administered; after a murderer has baptized, doubt are to be baptized with these words prefixed to the it is not administered: because John gave his own Bap- form: ‘If thou art baptized, I do not rebaptize thee; but if tism; the murderer, Christ’s; for that sacrament is so sa- thou art not baptized, I baptize thee,’ etc.: for that does cred, that not even a murderer’s administration contami- not appear to be repeated, which is not known to have nates it.” been done.” Reply to Objection 3. The Paulianists and Cataphry- Reply to Objection 5. Both sacraments, viz. Baptism gians used not to baptize in the name of the Trinity. and the Eucharist, are a representation of our Lord’s death Wherefore Gregory, writing to the Bishop Quiricus, says: and Passion, but not in the same way. For Baptism is a “Those heretics who are not baptized in the name of the commemoration of Christ’s death in so far as man dies Trinity, such as the Bonosians and Cataphrygians” (who with Christ, that he may be born again into a new life. But were of the same mind as the Paulianists), “since the for- the Eucharist is a commemoration of Christ’s death, in so mer believe not that Christ is God” (holding Him to be a far as the suffering Christ Himself is offered to us as the mere man), “while the latter,” i.e. the Cataphrygians, “are Paschal banquet, according to 1 Cor. 5:7,8: “Christ our so perverse as to deem a mere man,” viz. Montanus, “to pasch is sacrificed; therefore let us feast.” And forasmuch be the Holy Ghost: all these are baptized when they come as man is born once, whereas he eats many times, so is to holy Church, for the baptism which they received while Baptism given once, but the Eucharist frequently. Whether the Church observes a suitable rite in baptizing? IIIa q. 66 a. 10 Objection 1. It seems that the Church observes an un- tismal rite. suitable rite in baptizing. For as Chrysostom (Chromatius, On the contrary, The Church is ruled by the Holy in Matth. 3:15) says: “The waters of Baptism would never Ghost, Who does nothing inordinate. avail to purge the sins of them that believe, had they not I answer that, In the sacrament of Baptism something been hallowed by the touch of our Lord’s body.” Now this is done which is essential to the sacrament, and something took place at Christ’s Baptism, which is commemorated which belongs to a certain solemnity of the sacrament. Es- in the Feast of the Epiphany. Therefore solemn Baptism sential indeed, to the sacrament are both the form which should be celebrated at the Feast of the Epiphany rather designates the principal cause of the sacrament; and the than on the eves of Easter and Whitsunday. minister who is the instrumental cause; and the use of Objection 2. Further, it seems that several matters the matter, namely, washing with water, which designates should not be used in the same sacrament. But water is the principal sacramental effect. But all the other things used for washing in Baptism. Therefore it is unfitting that which the Church observes in the baptismal rite, belong the person baptized should be anointed thrice with holy rather to a certain solemnity of the sacrament. oil first on the breast, and then between the shoulders, and And these, indeed, are used in conjunction with the a third time with chrism on the top of the head. sacrament for three reasons. First, in order to arouse the Objection 3. Further, “in Christ Jesus. . . there is nei-devotion of the faithful, and their reverence for the sacra- ther male nor female” (Gal. 3:23). . . “neither Barbarian ment. For if there were nothing done but a mere wash- nor Scythian” (Col. 3:11), nor, in like manner, any other ing with water, without any solemnity, some might easily such like distinctions. Much less, therefore can a differ- think it to be an ordinary washing. ence of clothing have any efficacy in the Faith of Christ. Secondly, for the instruction of the faithful. Because It is consequently unfitting to bestow a white garment on simple and unlettered folk need to be taught by some sen- those who have been baptized. sible signs, for instance, pictures and the like. And in this Objection 4. Further, Baptism can be celebrated with- way by means of the sacramental ceremonies they are ei- out such like ceremonies. Therefore it seems that those ther instructed, or urged to seek the signification of such mentioned above are superfluous; and consequently that like sensible signs. And consequently, since, besides the they are unsuitably inserted by the Church in the bap- principal sacramental effect, other things should be known 2458 about Baptism, it was fitting that these also should be repis anointed on the breast, in order to receive the gift of resented by some outward signs. the Holy Ghost, to cast off error and ignorance, and to Thirdly, because the power of the devil is restrained, acknowledge the true faith, since ‘the just man liveth by by prayers, blessings, and the like, from hindering the faith’; while he is anointed between the shoulders, that he sacramental effect. may be clothed with the grace of the Holy Ghost, lay aside Reply to Objection 1. Christ was baptized on the indifference and sloth, and become active in good works; Epiphany with the Baptism of John, as stated above (q. 39, so that the sacrament of faith may purify the thoughts of a. 2), with which baptism, indeed, the faithful are not bap- his heart, and strengthen his shoulders for the burden of la- tized, rather are they baptized with Christ’s Baptism. This bor.” But after Baptism, as Rabanus says (De Sacram. iii), has its efficacy from the Passion of Christ, according to “he is forthwith anointed on the head by the priest with Rom. 6:3: “We who are baptized in Christ Jesus, are bap- Holy Chrism, who proceeds at once to offer up a prayer tized in His death”; and in the Holy Ghost, according to that the neophyte may have a share in Christ’s kingdom, Jn. 3:5: “Unless a man be born again of water and the and be called a Christian after Christ.” Or, as Ambrose Holy Ghost.” Therefore it is that solemn Baptism is held says (De Sacram. iii), his head is anointed, because “the in the Church, both on Easter Eve, when we commemo- senses of a wise man are in his head” (Eccl 2:14): to wit, rate our Lord’s burial and resurrection; for which reason that he may “be ready to satisfy everyone that asketh” him our Lord gave His disciples the commandment concerning to give “a reason of his faith” (cf. 1 Pet. 3:15; Innocent Baptism as related by Matthew (28:19): and on Whitsun- III, Decretal on Holy Unction). eve, when the celebration of the Feast of the Holy Ghost Reply to Objection 3. This white garment is given, begins; for which reason the apostles are said to have bap- not as though it were unlawful for the neophyte to use oth- tized three thousand on the very day of Pentecost when ers: but as a sign of the glorious resurrection, unto which they had received the Holy Ghost. men are born again by Baptism; and in order to designate Reply to Objection 2. The use of water in Baptism is the purity of life, to which he will be bound after being part of the substance of the sacrament; but the use of oil or baptized, according to Rom. 6:4: “That we may walk in chrism is part of the solemnity. For the candidate is first newness of life.” of all anointed with Holy oil on the breast and between Reply to Objection 4. Although those things that be- the shoulders, as “one who wrestles for God,” to use Am- long to the solemnity of a sacrament are not essential to brose’s expression (De Sacram. i): thus are prize-fighters it, yet are they not superfluous, since they pertain to the wont to besmear themselves with oil. Or, as Innocent III sacrament’s wellbeing, as stated above. says in a decretal on the Holy Unction: “The candidate Whether three kinds of Baptism are fittingly described—viz. Baptism of Water, of IIIa q. 66 a. 11 Blood, and of the Spirit? Objection 1. It seems that the three kinds of Baptism Ghost, as first cause. Now although the effect depends are not fittingly described as Baptism of Water, of Blood, on the first cause, the cause far surpasses the effect, nor and of the Spirit, i.e. of the Holy Ghost. Because the does it depend on it. Consequently, a man may, with- Apostle says (Eph. 4:5): “One Faith, one Baptism.” Now out Baptism of Water, receive the sacramental effect from there is but one Faith. Therefore there should not be three Christ’s Passion, in so far as he is conformed to Christ Baptisms. by suffering for Him. Hence it is written (Apoc. 7:14): Objection 2. Further, Baptism is a sacrament, as we “These are they who are come out of great tribulation, have made clear above (q. 65, a. 1). Now none but Bap- and have washed their robes and have made them white tism of Water is a sacrament. Therefore we should not in the blood of the Lamb.” In like manner a man receives reckon two other Baptisms. the effect of Baptism by the power of the Holy Ghost, not Objection 3. Further, Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv) only without Baptism of Water, but also without Baptism distinguishes several other kinds of Baptism. Therefore of Blood: forasmuch as his heart is moved by the Holy we should admit more than three Baptisms. Ghost to believe in and love God and to repent of his sins: On the contrary, on Heb. 6:2, “Of the doctrine of wherefore this is also called Baptism of Repentance. Of Baptisms,” the gloss says: “He uses the plural, because this it is written (Is. 4:4): “If the Lord shall wash away there is Baptism of Water, of Repentance, and of Blood.” the filth of the daughters of Zion, and shall wash away the I answer that, As stated above (q. 62, a. 5), Baptism blood of Jerusalem out of the midst thereof, by the spirit of of Water has its efficacy from Christ’s Passion, to which judgment, and by the spirit of burning.” Thus, therefore, a man is conformed by Baptism, and also from the Holy each of these other Baptisms is called Baptism, forasmuch 2459 as it takes the place of Baptism. Wherefore Augustine a sacrament is a kind of sign. The other two, however, says (De Unico Baptismo Parvulorum iv): “The Blessed are like the Baptism of Water, not, indeed, in the nature Cyprian argues with considerable reason from the thief to of sign, but in the baptismal effect. Consequently they are whom, though not baptized, it was said: ‘Today shalt thou not sacraments. be with Me in Paradise’ that suffering can take the place Reply to Objection 3. Damascene enumerates certain of Baptism. Having weighed this in my mind again and figurative Baptisms. For instance, “the Deluge” was a fig- again, I perceive that not only can suffering for the name ure of our Baptism, in respect of the salvation of the faith- of Christ supply for what was lacking in Baptism, but even ful in the Church; since then “a few. . . souls were saved in faith and conversion of heart, if perchance on account of the ark [Vulg.: ‘by water’],” according to 1 Pet. 3:20. He the stress of the times the celebration of the mystery of also mentions “the crossing of the Red Sea”: which was Baptism is not practicable.” a figure of our Baptism, in respect of our delivery from Reply to Objection 1. The other two Baptisms are the bondage of sin; hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:2) included in the Baptism of Water, which derives its effi- that “all. . . were baptized in the cloud and in the sea.” And cacy, both from Christ’s Passion and from the Holy Ghost. again he mentions “the various washings which were cus- Consequently for this reason the unity of Baptism is not tomary under the Old Law,” which were figures of our destroyed. Baptism, as to the cleansing from sins: also “the Baptism Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (q. 60, a. 1), of John,” which prepared the way for our Baptism. Whether the Baptism of Blood is the most excellent of these? IIIa q. 66 a. 12 Objection 1. It seems that the Baptism of Blood is I answer that, As stated above (a. 11), the shedding not the most excellent of these three. For the Baptism of of blood for Christ’s sake, and the inward operation of Water impresses a character; which the Baptism of Blood the Holy Ghost, are called baptisms, in so far as they pro- cannot do. Therefore the Baptism of Blood is not more duce the effect of the Baptism of Water. Now the Bap- excellent than the Baptism of Water. tism of Water derives its efficacy from Christ’s Passion Objection 2. Further, the Baptism of Blood is of no and from the Holy Ghost, as already stated (a. 11). These avail without the Baptism of the Spirit, which is by char- two causes act in each of these three Baptisms; most ex- ity; for it is written (1 Cor. 13:3): “If I should deliver cellently, however, in the Baptism of Blood. For Christ’s my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth Passion acts in the Baptism of Water by way of a figura- me nothing.” But the Baptism of the Spirit avails without tive representation; in the Baptism of the Spirit or of Re- the Baptism of Blood; for not only the martyrs are saved. pentance, by way of desire. but in the Baptism of Blood, Therefore the Baptism of Blood is not the most excellent. by way of imitating the (Divine) act. In like manner, too, Objection 3. Further, just as the Baptism of Water the power of the Holy Ghost acts in the Baptism of Water derives its efficacy from Christ’s Passion, to which, as through a certain hidden power. in the Baptism of Repen- stated above (a. 11), the Baptism of Blood corresponds, so tance by moving the heart; but in the Baptism of Blood by Christ’s Passion derives its efficacy from the Holy Ghost, the highest degree of fervor of dilection and love, accord- according to Heb. 9:14: “The Blood of Christ, Who by ing to Jn. 15:13: “Greater love than this no man hath that the Holy Ghost offered Himself unspotted unto God, shall a man lay down his life for his friends.” cleanse our conscience from dead works,” etc. Therefore Reply to Objection 1. A character is both reality and the Baptism of the Spirit is more excellent than the Bap- a sacrament. And we do not say that the Baptism of Blood tism of Blood. Therefore the Baptism of Blood is not the is more excellent, considering the nature of a sacrament; most excellent. but considering the sacramental effect. On the contrary, Augustine (Ad Fortunatum) speak- Reply to Objection 2. The shedding of blood is not in ing of the comparison between Baptisms says: “The the nature of a Baptism if it be without charity. Hence it newly baptized confesses his faith in the presence of the is clear that the Baptism of Blood includes the Baptism of priest: the martyr in the presence of the persecutor. The the Spirit, but not conversely. And from this it is proved former is sprinkled with water, after he has confessed; the to be more perfect. latter with his blood. The former receives the Holy Ghost Reply to Objection 3. The Baptism owes its pre- by the imposition of the bishop’s hands; the latter is made eminence not only to Christ’s Passion, but also to the Holy the temple of the Holy Ghost.” Ghost, as stated above. 2460 THIRD PART, QUESTION 67 Of the Ministers by Whom the Sacrament of Baptism Is Conferred (In Eight Articles) We have now to consider the ministers by whom the sacrament of Baptism is conferred. And concerning this there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether it belongs to a deacon to baptize? (2) Whether this belongs to a priest, or to a bishop only? (3) Whether a layman can confer the sacrament of Baptism? (4) Whether a woman can do this? (5) Whether an unbaptized person can baptize? (6) Whether several can at the same time baptize one and the same person? (7) Whether it is essential that someone should raise the person baptized from the sacred font? (8) Whether he who raises someone from the sacred font is bound to instruct him? Whether it is part of a deacon’s duty to baptize? IIIa q. 67 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that it is part of a deacon’s duty ment, but to minister to others, his elders, in the sacramen-to baptize. Because the duties of preaching and of baptiz- tal dispensations. And so it does not belong to a deacon ing were enjoined by our Lord at the same time, according to confer the sacrament of Baptism officially as it were; to Mat. 28:19: “Going. . . teach ye all nations, baptizing but to assist and serve his elders in the bestowal of this them,” etc. But it is part of a deacon’s duty to preach the and other sacraments. Hence Isidore says (Epist. ad Lud- gospel. Therefore it seems that it is also part of a deacon’s ifred.): “It is a deacon’s duty to assist and serve the priests, duty to baptize. in all the rites of Christ’s sacraments, viz. those of Bap- Objection 2. Further, according to Dionysius (Eccl. tism, of the Chrism, of the Paten and Chalice.” Hier. v) to “cleanse” is part of the deacon’s duty. But Reply to Objection 1. It is the deacon’s duty to read cleansing from sins is effected specially by Baptism, ac- the Gospel in church, and to preach it as one catechizing; cording to Eph. 5:26: “Cleansing it by the laver of water hence Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v) that a deacon’s of- in the word of life.” Therefore it seems that it belongs to fice involves power over the unclean among whom he in- a deacon to baptize. cludes the catechumens. But to teach, i.e. to expound the Objection 3. Further, it is told of Blessed Laurence, Gospel, is the proper office of a bishop, whose action is who was a deacon, that he baptized many. Therefore it “to perfect,” as Dionysius teaches (Eccl. Hier. v); and “to seems that it belongs to deacons to baptize. perfect” is the same as “to teach.” Consequently, it does On the contrary, Pope Gelasius I says (the passage is not follow that the office of baptizing belongs to deacons. to be found in the Decrees, dist. 93): “We order the dea- Reply to Objection 2. As Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. cons to keep within their own province”; and further on: ii), Baptism has a power not only of “cleansing” but also “Without bishop or priest they must not dare to baptize, of “enlightening.” Consequently, it is outside the province except in cases of extreme urgency, when the aforesaid of the deacon whose duty it is to cleanse only: viz. either are a long way off.” by driving away the unclean, or by preparing them for the I answer that, Just as the properties and duties of the reception of a sacrament. heavenly orders are gathered from their names, as Diony- Reply to Objection 3. Because Baptism is a neces- sius says (Coel. Hier. vi), so can we gather, from the sary sacrament, deacons are allowed to baptize in cases of names of the ecclesiastical orders, what belongs to each urgency when their elders are not at hand; as appears from order. Now “deacons” are so called from being “minis- the authority of Gelasius quoted above. And it was thus ters”; because, to wit, it is not in the deacon’s province that Blessed Laurence, being but a deacon, baptized. to be the chief and official celebrant in conferring a sacra- 2461 Whether to baptize is part of the priestly office, or proper to that of bishops? IIIa q. 67 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that to baptize is not part of apostles, whose place is taken by the bishops, both du- the priestly office, but proper to that of bishops. Because, ties, namely, of teaching and of baptizing, but in differ- as stated above (a. 1, obj. 1), the duties of teaching and ent ways. Because Christ committed to them the duty baptizing are enjoined in the same precept (Mat. 28:19). of teaching, that they might exercise it themselves as be- But to teach, which is “to perfect,” belongs to the office of ing the most important duty of all: wherefore the apos- bishop, as Dionysius declares (Eccl. Hier. v, vi). There- tles themselves said (Acts 6:2): “It is not reason that fore to baptize also belongs to the episcopal office. we should leave the word of God and serve tables.” On Objection 2. Further, by Baptism a man is admitted the other hand, He entrusted the apostles with the office to the body of the Christian people: and to do this seems of baptizing, to be exercised vicariously; wherefore the consistent with no other than the princely office. Now the Apostle says (1 Cor. 1:17): “Christ sent me not to baptize, bishops hold the position of princes in the Church, as the but to preach the Gospel.” And the reason for this was that gloss observes on Lk. 10:1: indeed, they even take the the merit and wisdom of the minister have no bearing on place of the apostles, of whom it is written (Ps. 44:17): the baptismal effect, as they have in teaching, as may be “Thou shalt make them princes over all the earth.” There- seen from what we have stated above (q. 64, a. 1, ad 2; fore it seems that to baptize belongs exclusively to the of- Aa. 5,9). A proof of this is found also in the fact that our fice of bishops. Lord Himself did not baptize, but His disciples, as John Objection 3. Further, Isidore says (Epist. ad Lud- relates (4:2). Nor does it follow from this that bishops ifred.) that “it belongs to the bishop to consecrate cannot baptize; since what a lower power can do, that can churches, to anoint altars, to consecrate [conficere] the also a higher power. Wherefore also the Apostle says (1 chrism; he it is that confers the ecclesiastical orders, and Cor. 1:14,16) that he had baptized some. blesses the consecrated virgins.” But the sacrament of Reply to Objection 2. In every commonwealth mi- Baptism is greater than all these. Therefore much more nor affairs are entrusted to lower officials, while greater reason is there why to baptize should belong exclusively affairs are restricted to higher officials; according to Ex. to the episcopal office. 18:22: “When any great matter soever shall fall out, let On the contrary, Isidore says (De Officiis. ii): “It is them refer it to thee, and let them judge the lesser matters certain that Baptism was entrusted to priests alone.” only.” Consequently it belongs to the lower officials of the I answer that, Priests are consecrated for the purpose state to decide matters concerning the lower orders; while of celebrating the sacrament of Christ’s Body, as stated to the highest it belongs to set in order those matters that above (q. 65, a. 3). Now that is the sacrament of ecclesias- regard the higher orders of the state. Now by Baptism a tical unity, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 10:17): “We, man attains only to the lowest rank among the Christian being many, are one bread, one body, all that partake of people: and consequently it belongs to the lesser officials one bread and one chalice.” Moreover, by Baptism a man of the Church becomes a participator in ecclesiastical unity, wherefore to baptize, namely, the priests, who hold the place of also he receives the right to approach our Lord’s Table. the seventy-two disciples of Christ, as the gloss says in the Consequently, just as it belongs to a priest to consecrate passage quoted from Luke 10. the Eucharist, which is the principal purpose of the priest- Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 65, a. 3), hood, so it is the proper office of a priest to baptize: since the sacrament of Baptism holds the first place in the order it seems to belong to one and the same, to produce the of necessity; but in the order of perfection there are other whole and to dispose the part in the whole. greater sacraments which are reserved to bishops. Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord enjoined on the Whether a layman can baptize? IIIa q. 67 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that a layman cannot baptize. such as to catechize, to exorcize, and to bless the bap- Because, as stated above (a. 2), to baptize belongs prop- tismal water. But these things cannot be done by laymen, erly to the priestly order. But those things which belong but only by priests. Therefore it seems that much less can to an order cannot be entrusted to one that is not ordained. laymen baptize. Therefore it seems that a layman, who has no orders, can- Objection 3. Further, just as Baptism is a necessary not baptize. sacrament, so is Penance. But a layman cannot absolve in Objection 2. Further, it is a greater thing to baptize, the tribunal of Penance. Neither, therefore, can he baptize. than to perform the other sacramental rites of Baptism, On the contrary, Pope Gelasius I and Isidore say that 2462 “it is often permissible for Christian laymen to baptize, in solemnity; but this is not essential to the sacrament. Con-cases of urgent necessity.” sequently, if a layman were to baptize even outside a case I answer that, It is due to the mercy of Him “Who of urgency; he would sin, yet he would confer the sacra- will have all men to be saved” (1 Tim. 2:4) that in those ment; nor would the person thus baptized have to be bap- things which are necessary for salvation, man can eas- tized again. ily find the remedy. Now the most necessary among all Reply to Objection 2. These sacramental rites of the sacraments is Baptism, which is man’s regeneration Baptism belong to the solemnity of, and are not essential unto spiritual life: since for children there is no substitute, to, Baptism. And therefore they neither should nor can be while adults cannot otherwise than by Baptism receive a done by a layman, but only by a priest, whose office it is full remission both of guilt and of its punishment. Conse- to baptize solemnly. quently, lest man should have to go without so necessary Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 65, a remedy, it was ordained, both that the matter of Baptism Aa. 3,4), Penance is not so necessary as Baptism; since should be something common that is easily obtainable by contrition can supply the defect of the priestly absolu- all, i.e. water; and that the minister of Baptism should be tion which does not free from the whole punishment, nor anyone, even not in orders, lest from lack of being bap- again is it given to children. Therefore the comparison tized, man should suffer loss of his salvation. with Baptism does not stand, because its effect cannot be Reply to Objection 1. To baptize belongs to the supplied by anything else. priestly order by reason of a certain appropriateness and Whether a woman can baptize? IIIa q. 67 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that a woman cannot baptize. just as a layman can baptize, as Christ’s minister, so can a For we read in the acts of the Council of Carthage (iv): woman. “However learned and holy a woman may be, she must But since “the head of the woman is the man,” and not presume to teach men in the church, or to baptize.” “the head of. . . man, is Christ” (1 Cor. 11:3), a woman But in no case is a woman allowed to teach in church, ac- should not baptize if a man be available for the purpose; cording to 1 Cor. 14:35: “It is a shame for a woman to just as neither should a layman in the presence of a cleric, speak in the church.” Therefore it seems that neither is a nor a cleric in the presence of a priest. The last, however, woman in any circumstances permitted to baptize. can baptize in the presence of a bishop, because it is part Objection 2. Further, to baptize belongs to those hav- of the priestly office. ing authority. wherefore baptism should be conferred by Reply to Objection 1. Just as a woman is not suffered priests having charge of souls. But women are not qual- to teach in public, but is allowed to instruct and admonish ified for this; according to 1 Tim. 2:12: “I suffer not a privately; so she is not permitted to baptize publicly and woman to teach, nor to use authority over man, but to be solemnly, and yet she can baptize in a case of urgency. subject to him [Vulg.: ‘but to be in silence’].” Therefore a Reply to Objection 2. When Baptism is celebrated woman cannot baptize. solemnly and with due form, it should be conferred by a Objection 3. Further, in the spiritual regeneration wa- priest having charge of souls, or by one representing him. ter seems to hold the place of the mother’s womb, as Au- But this is not required in cases of urgency, when a woman gustine says on Jn. 3:4, “Can” a man “enter a second time may baptize. into his mother’s womb, and be born again?” While he Reply to Objection 3. In carnal generation male and who baptizes seems to hold rather the position of father. female co-operate according to the power of their proper But this is unfitting for a woman. Therefore a woman can- nature; wherefore the female cannot be the active, but only not baptize. the passive, principle of generation. But in spiritual gen- On the contrary, Pope Urban II says (Decreta xxx): eration they do not act, either of them, by their proper “In reply to the questions asked by your beatitude, we con- power, but only instrumentally by the power of Christ. sider that the following answer should be given: that the Consequently, on the same grounds either man or woman baptism is valid when, in cases of necessity, a woman bap- can baptize in a case of urgency. tizes a child in the name of the Trinity.” If, however, a woman were to baptize without any ur- I answer that, Christ is the chief Baptizer, according gency for so doing. there would be no need of rebaptism: to Jn. 1:33: “He upon Whom thou shalt see the Spirit as we have said in regard to laymen (a. 3, ad 1). But the descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that bap- baptizer herself would sin, as also those who took part tizeth.” For it is written in Col. 3 (cf. Gal. 3:28), that with her therein, either by receiving Baptism from her, or in Christ there is neither male nor female. Consequently, by bringing someone to her to be baptized. 2463 Whether one that is not baptized can confer the sacrament of Baptism? IIIa q. 67 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that one that is not baptized II∗ writes to Bishop Boniface: “Those whom you assert to cannot confer the sacrament of Baptism. For “none gives have been baptized by pagans,” namely, with a form not what he has not.” But a non-baptized person has not the recognized by the Church, “we command you to rebaptize sacrament of Baptism. Therefore he cannot give it. in the name of the Trinity.” And the reason of this is that, Objection 2. Further, a man confers the sacrament of just as on the part of the matter, as far as the essentials Baptism inasmuch as he is a minister of the Church. But of the sacrament are concerned, any water will suffice, so, one that is not baptized, belongs nowise to the Church, on the part of the minister, any man is competent. Con- i.e. neither really nor sacramentally. Therefore he cannot sequently, an unbaptized person can baptize in a case of confer the sacrament of Baptism. urgency. So that two unbaptized persons may baptize one Objection 3. Further, it is more to confer a sacrament another, one baptizing the other and being afterwards bap- than to receive it. But one that is not baptized, cannot re- tized by him: and each would receive not only the sacra- ceive the other sacraments. Much less, therefore, can he ment but also the reality of the sacrament. But if this were confer any sacrament. done outside a case of urgency, each would sin grievously, On the contrary, Isidore says: “The Roman Pontiff both the baptizer and the baptized, and thus the baptismal does not consider it to be the man who baptizes, but that effect would be frustrated, although the sacrament itself the Holy Ghost confers the grace of Baptism, though he would not be invalidated. that baptizes be a pagan.” But he who is baptized, is not Reply to Objection 1. The man who baptizes offers called a pagan. Therefore he who is not baptized can con- but his outward ministration; whereas Christ it is Who fer the sacrament of Baptism. baptizes inwardly, Who can use all men to whatever pur- I answer that, Augustine left this question without pose He wills. Consequently, the unbaptized can bap- deciding it. For he says (Contra Ep. Parmen. ii): “This is tize: because, as Pope Nicolas I says, “the Baptism is not indeed another question, whether even those can baptize theirs,” i.e. the baptizers’, “but His,” i.e. Christ’s. who were never Christians; nor should anything be rashly Reply to Objection 2. He who is not baptized, though asserted hereupon, without the authority of a sacred coun- he belongs not to the Church either in reality or sacra- cil such as suffices for so great a matter.” But afterwards mentally, can nevertheless belong to her in intention and it was decided by the Church that the unbaptized, whether by similarity of action, namely, in so far as he intends Jews or pagans, can confer the sacrament of Baptism, pro- to do what the Church does, and in baptizing observes vided they baptize in the form of the Church. Where- the Church’s form, and thus acts as the minister of Christ, fore Pope Nicolas I replies to the questions propounded Who did not confine His power to those that are baptized, by the Bulgars: “You say that many in your country have as neither did He to the sacraments. been baptized by someone, whether Christian or pagan Reply to Objection 3. The other sacraments are not you know not. If these were baptized in the name of the so necessary as Baptism. And therefore it is allowable Trinity, they must not be rebaptized.” But if the form of that an unbaptized person should baptize rather than that the Church be not observed, the sacrament of Baptism is he should receive other sacraments. not conferred. And thus is to be explained what Gregory Whether several can baptize at the same time? IIIa q. 67 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that several can baptize at the greatest necessity. Now in certain cases it seems neces- same time. For unity is contained in multitude, but not sary for several to baptize one at the same time; for in- “vice versa.” Wherefore it seems that many can do what- stance, suppose a child to be in danger of death, and two ever one can but not “vice versa”: thus many draw a ship persons present, one of whom is dumb, and the other with- which one could draw. But one man can baptize. There- out hands or arms; for then the mutilated person would fore several, too, can baptize one at the same time. have to pronounce the words, and the dumb person would Objection 2. Further, it is more difficult for one agent have to perform the act of baptizing. Therefore it seems to act on many things, than for many to act at the same that several can baptize one at the same time. time on one. But one man can baptize several at the same On the contrary, Where there is one agent there is time. Much more, therefore, can many baptize one at the one action. If, therefore, several were to baptize one, it same time. seems to follow that there would be several baptisms: and Objection 3. Further, Baptism is a sacrament of the this is contrary to Eph. 4:5: “one Faith, one Baptism.” ∗ Gregory III 2464 I answer that, The Sacrament of Baptism derives its be punished as a rebaptizer. If, however, they were to pro-power principally from its form, which the Apostle calls nounce the words absolutely at the same time, and dipped “the word of life” (Eph. 5:26). Consequently, if several or sprinkled the man together, they should be punished for were to baptize one at the same time, we must consider baptizing in an improper manner, but not for rebaptizing: what form they would use. For were they to say: “We because each would intend to baptize an unbaptized per- baptize thee in the name of the Father and of the Son and son, and each, so far as he is concerned, would baptize. of the Holy Ghost,” some maintain that the sacrament of Nor would they confer several sacraments: but the one Baptism would not be conferred, because the form of the Christ baptizing inwardly would confer one sacrament by Church would not be observed, i.e. “I baptize thee in the means of both together. name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.” Reply to Objection 1. This argument avails in those But this reasoning is disproved by the form observed in agents that act by their own power. But men do not bap- the Greek Church. For they might say: “The servant of tize by their own, but by Christ’s power, Who, since He is God, N. . . , is baptized in the name of the Father and of the one, perfects His work by means of one minister. Son and of the Holy Ghost,” under which form the Greeks Reply to Objection 2. In a case of necessity one could receive the sacrament of Baptism: and yet this form dif- baptize several at the same time under this form: “I bap- fers far more from the form that we use, than does this: tize ye”: for instance, if they were threatened by a falling “We baptize thee.” house, or by the sword or something of the kind, so as not The point to be observed, however, is this, that by this to allow of the delay involved by baptizing them singly. form, “We baptize thee,” the intention expressed is that Nor would this cause a change in the Church’s form, since several concur in conferring one Baptism: and this seems the plural is nothing but the singular doubled: especially contrary to the notion of a minister; for a man does not as we find the plural expressed in Mat. 28:19: “Baptizing baptize save as a minister of Christ, and as standing in them,” etc. Nor is there parity between the baptizer and His place; wherefore just as there is one Christ, so should the baptized; since Christ, the baptizer in chief, is one: there be one minister to represent Christ. Hence the Apos- while many are made one in Christ by Baptism. tle says pointedly (Eph. 4:5): “one Lord, one Faith, one Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 66, a. 1), Baptism.” Consequently, an intention which is in opposi- the integrity of Baptism consists in the form of words and tion to this seems to annul the sacrament of Baptism. the use of the matter. Consequently, neither he who only On the other hand, if each were to say: “I baptize pronounces the words, baptizes, nor he who dips. Where thee in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the fore if one pronounces the words and the other dips, no Holy Ghost,” each would signify his intention as though form of words can be fitting. For neither could he say: he were conferring Baptism independently of the other. “I baptize thee”: since he dips not, and therefore baptizes This might occur in the case where both were striving not. Nor could they say: “We baptize thee”: since neither to baptize someone; and then it is clear that whichever baptizes. For if of two men, one write one part of a book, pronounced the words first would confer the sacrament of and the other write the other, it would not be a proper form Baptism; while the other, however great his right to bap- of speech to say: “We wrote this book,” but the figure of tize, if he presume to utter the words, would be liable to synecdoche in which the whole is put for the part. Whether in Baptism it is necessary for someone to raise the baptized from the sacred IIIa q. 67 a. 7 font? Objection 1. It seems that in Baptism it is not nec- in Baptism he that baptizes takes the place of the father, essary for someone to raise the baptized from the sacred while the very water of Baptism takes the place of the font. For our Baptism is consecrated by Christ’s Baptism mother, as Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany and is conformed thereto. But Christ when baptized was (cxxxv); it seems that there is no further need for some- not raised by anyone from the font, but according to Mat. one to raise the baptized from the sacred font. 3:16, “Jesus being baptized, forthwith came out of the Objection 3. Further, nothing ridiculous should be water.” Therefore it seems that neither when others are observed in the sacraments of the Church. But it seems baptized should anyone raise the baptized from the sacred ridiculous that after being baptized, adults who can stand font. up of themselves and leave the sacred font, should be held Objection 2. Further, Baptism is a spiritual regenera- up by another. Therefore there seems no need for anyone, tion, as stated above (a. 3). But in carnal generation noth- especially in the Baptism of adults, to raise the baptized ing else is required but the active principle, i.e. the father, from the sacred font. and the passive principle, i.e. the mother. Since, then, On the contrary, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. ii) that 2465 “the priests taking the baptized hand him over to his spon-of the child should hand it over to some instructor versed sor and guide.” in holy things, who would thenceforth take charge of the I answer that, The spiritual regeneration, which takes child, and be to it a spiritual father and a guide in the road place in Baptism, is in a certain manner likened to carnal of salvation.” generation: wherefore it is written (1 Pet. 2:2): “As new- Reply to Objection 1. Christ was baptized not that He born babes, endowed with reason desire milk [Vulg.: ‘de- might be regenerated, but that He might regenerate others: sire reasonable milk’] without guile.” Now, in carnal gen- wherefore after His Baptism He needed no tutor like other eration the new-born child needs nourishment and guid- children. ance: wherefore, in spiritual generation also, someone is Reply to Objection 2. In carnal generation nothing is needed to undertake the office of nurse and tutor by form- essential besides a father and a mother: yet to ease the lat- ing and instructing one who is yet a novice in the Faith, ter in her travail, there is need for a midwife; and for the concerning things pertaining to Christian faith and mode child to be suitably brought up there is need for a nurse of life, which the clergy have not the leisure to do through and a tutor: while their place is taken in Baptism by him being busy with watching over the people generally: be- who raises the child from the sacred font. Consequently cause little children and novices need more than ordinary this is not essential to the sacrament, and in a case of ne- care. Consequently someone is needed to receive the bap- cessity one alone can baptize with water. tized from the sacred font as though for the purpose of Reply to Objection 3. It is not on account of bodily instructing and guiding them. It is to this that Dionysius weakness that the baptized is raised from the sacred font refers (Eccl. Hier. xi) saying: “It occurred to our heav- by the godparent, but on account of spiritual weakness, as enly guides,” i.e. the Apostles, “and they decided, that stated above. infants should be taken charge of thus: that the parents Whether he who raises anyone from the sacred font is bound to instruct him? IIIa q. 67 a. 8 Objection 1. It seems that he who raises anyone from been stated above (a. 7) that godparents take upon them- the sacred font is not bound to instruct him. For none but selves the duties of a tutor. Consequently they are bound those who are themselves instructed can give instruction. to watch over their godchildren when there is need for But even the uneducated and ill-instructed are allowed to them to do so: for instance when and where children are raise people from the sacred font. Therefore he who raises brought up among unbelievers. But if they are brought up a baptized person from the font is not bound to instruct among Catholic Christians, the godparents may well be him. excused from this responsibility, since it may be presumed Objection 2. Further, a son is instructed by his fa- that the children will be carefully instructed by their par- ther better than by a stranger: for, as the Philosopher says ents. If, however, they perceive in any way that the con- (Ethic. viii), a son receives from his father, “being, food, trary is the case, they would be bound, as far as they are and education.” If, therefore, godparents are bound to in- able, to see to the spiritual welfare of their godchildren. struct their godchildren, it would be fitting for the carnal Reply to Objection 1. Where the danger is imminent, father, rather than another, to be the godparent of his own the godparent, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vii), should child. And yet this seems to be forbidden, as may be seen be someone “versed in holy things.” But where the danger in the Decretals (xxx, qu. 1, Cap. Pervenit and Dictum is not imminent, by reason of the children being brought est). up among Catholics, anyone is admitted to this position, Objection 3. Further, it is better for several to instruct because the things pertaining to the Christian rule of life than for one only. If, therefore, godparents are bound to and faith are known openly by all. Nevertheless an un- instruct their godchildren, it would be better to have sev- baptized person cannot be a godparent, as was decreed in eral godparents than only one. Yet this is forbidden in a the Council of Mainz, although an unbaptized person: be- decree of Pope Leo, who says: “A child should not have cause the person baptizing is essential to the sacrament, more than one godparent, be this a man or a woman.” wherefore as the godparent is not, as stated above (a. 7, ad On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon for 2). Easter (clxviii): “In the first place I admonish you, both Reply to Objection 2. Just as spiritual generation is men and women, who have raised children in Baptism, distinct from carnal generation, so is spiritual education that ye stand before God as sureties for those whom you distinct from that of the body; according to Heb. 12:9: have been seen to raise from the sacred font.” “Moreover we have had fathers of our flesh for instruc- I answer that, Every man is bound to fulfil those tors, and we reverenced them: shall we not much more duties which he has undertaken to perform. Now it has obey the Father of Spirits, and live?” Therefore the spiri- 2466 tual father should be distinct from the carnal father, unless confusion if there were more than one head instructor. necessity demanded otherwise. Wherefore there should be one principal sponsor in Bap- Reply to Objection 3. Education would be full of tism: but others can be allowed as assistants. 2467 THIRD PART, QUESTION 68 Of Those Who Receive Baptism (In Twelve Articles) We have now to consider those who receive Baptism; concerning which there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether all are bound to receive Baptism? (2) Whether a man can be saved without Baptism? (3) Whether Baptism should be deferred? (4) Whether sinners should be baptized? (5) Whether works of satisfaction should be enjoined on sinners that have been baptized? (6) Whether Confession of sins is necessary? (7) Whether an intention is required on the part of the one baptized? (8) Whether faith is necessary? (9) Whether infants should be baptized? (10) Whether the children of Jews should be baptized against the will of their parents? (11) Whether anyone should be baptized in the mother’s womb? (12) Whether madmen and imbeciles should be baptized? Whether all are bound to receive Baptism? IIIa q. 68 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that not all are bound to re- Reply to Objection 1. At no time, not even before ceive Baptism. For Christ did not narrow man’s road to the coming of Christ, could men be saved unless they be- salvation. But before Christ’s coming men could be saved came members of Christ: because, as it is written (Acts without Baptism: therefore also after Christ’s coming. 4:12), “there is no other name under heaven given to men, Objection 2. Further, Baptism seems to have been whereby we must be saved.” But before Christ’s com- instituted principally as a remedy for original sin. Now, ing, men were incorporated in Christ by faith in His fu- since a man who is baptized is without original sin, it ture coming: of which faith circumcision was the “seal,” seems that he cannot transmit it to his children. There- as the Apostle calls it (Rom. 4:11): whereas before cir- fore it seems that the children of those who have been cumcision was instituted, men were incorporated in Christ baptized, should not themselves be baptized. by “faith alone,” as Gregory says (Moral. iv), together Objection 3. Further, Baptism is given in order that a with the offering of sacrifices, by means of which the Fa- man may, through grace, be cleansed from sin. But those thers of old made profession of their faith. Again, since who are sanctified in the womb, obtain this without Bap- Christ’s coming, men are incorporated in Christ by faith; tism. Therefore they are not bound to receive Baptism. according to Eph. 3:17: “That Christ may dwell by faith On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 3:5): “Unless a in your hearts.” But faith in a thing already present is man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he can- manifested by a sign different from that by which it was not enter into the kingdom of God.” Again it is stated in manifested when that thing was yet in the future: just as De Eccl. Dogm. xli, that “we believe the way of salvation we use other parts of the verb, to signify the present, the to be open to those only who are baptized.” past, and the future. Consequently although the sacrament I answer that, Men are bound to that without which itself of Baptism was not always necessary for salvation, they cannot obtain salvation. Now it is manifest that no yet faith, of which Baptism is the sacrament, was always one can obtain salvation but through Christ; wherefore necessary. the Apostle says (Rom. 5:18): “As by the offense of one Reply to Objection 2. As we have stated in the Ia unto all men unto condemnation; so also by the justice of IIae, q. 81, a. 3, ad 2, those who are baptized are renewed one, unto all men unto justification of life.” But for this in spirit by Baptism, while their body remains subject to end is Baptism conferred on a man, that being regener- the oldness of sin, according to Rom. 8:10: “The body, in- ated thereby, he may be incorporated in Christ, by becom- deed, is dead because of sin, but the spirit liveth because ing His member: wherefore it is written (Gal. 3:27): “As of justification.” Wherefore Augustine (Contra Julian. vi) many of you as have been baptized in Christ, have put on proves that “not everything that is in man is baptized.” Christ.” Consequently it is manifest that all are bound to Now it is manifest that in carnal generation man does not be baptized: and that without Baptism there is no salva- beget in respect of his soul, but in respect of his body. tion for men. Consequently the children of those who are baptized are 2468 born with original sin; wherefore they need to be baptized. ter, by which they are conformed to Christ. Consequently, Reply to Objection 3. Those who are sanctified in if any were to be sanctified in the womb now, they would the womb, receive indeed grace which cleanses them from need to be baptized, in order to be conformed to Christ’s original sin, but they do not therefore receive the charac- other members by receiving the character. Whether a man can be saved without Baptism? IIIa q. 68 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that no man can be saved with- neither sacramentally nor mentally are they incorporated out Baptism. For our Lord said (Jn. 3:5): “Unless a man in Christ, through Whom alone can salvation be obtained. be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot en- Secondly, the sacrament of Baptism may be wanting ter the kingdom of God.” But those alone are saved who to anyone in reality but not in desire: for instance, when enter God’s kingdom. Therefore none can be saved with- a man wishes to be baptized, but by some ill-chance he is out Baptism, by which a man is born again of water and forestalled by death before receiving Baptism. And such a the Holy Ghost. man can obtain salvation without being actually baptized, Objection 2. Further, in the book De Eccl. Dogm. on account of his desire for Baptism, which desire is the xli, it is written: “We believe that no catechumen, though outcome of “faith that worketh by charity,” whereby God, he die in his good works, will have eternal life, except Whose power is not tied to visible sacraments, sanctifies he suffer martyrdom, which contains all the sacramental man inwardly. Hence Ambrose says of Valentinian, who virtue of Baptism.” But if it were possible for anyone to died while yet a catechumen: “I lost him whom I was to be saved without Baptism, this would be the case specially regenerate: but he did not lose the grace he prayed for.” with catechumens who are credited with good works, for Reply to Objection 1. As it is written (1 Kings 16:7), they seem to have the “faith that worketh by charity” (Gal. “man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord behold- 5:6). Therefore it seems that none can be saved without eth the heart.” Now a man who desires to be “born again Baptism. of water and the Holy Ghost” by Baptism, is regenerated Objection 3. Further, as stated above (a. 1; q. 65, a. 4), in heart though not in body. thus the Apostle says (Rom. the sacrament of Baptism is necessary for salvation. Now 2:29) that “the circumcision is that of the heart, in the that is necessary “without which something cannot be” spirit, not in the letter; whose praise is not of men but (Metaph. v). Therefore it seems that none can obtain sal- of God.” vation without Baptism. Reply to Objection 2. No man obtains eternal life On the contrary, Augustine says (Super Levit. unless he be free from all guilt and debt of punishment. lxxxiv) that “some have received the invisible sanctifica- Now this plenary absolution is given when a man receives tion without visible sacraments, and to their profit; but Baptism, or suffers martyrdom: for which reason is it though it is possible to have the visible sanctification, con- stated that martyrdom “contains all the sacramental virtue sisting in a visible sacrament, without the invisible sancti- of Baptism,” i.e. as to the full deliverance from guilt and fication, it will be to no profit.” Since, therefore, the sacra-punishment. Suppose, therefore, a catechumen to have the ment of Baptism pertains to the visible sanctification, it desire for Baptism (else he could not be said to die in his seems that a man can obtain salvation without the sacra- good works, which cannot be without “faith that worketh ment of Baptism, by means of the invisible sanctification. by charity”), such a one, were he to die, would not forth- I answer that, The sacrament or Baptism may be with come to eternal life, but would suffer punishment for wanting to someone in two ways. First, both in reality his past sins, “but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by and in desire; as is the case with those who neither are fire” as is stated 1 Cor. 3:15. baptized, nor wished to be baptized: which clearly indi- Reply to Objection 3. The sacrament of Baptism is cates contempt of the sacrament, in regard to those who said to be necessary for salvation in so far as man cannot have the use of the free-will. Consequently those to whom be saved without, at least, Baptism of desire; “which, with Baptism is wanting thus, cannot obtain salvation: since God, counts for the deed” (Augustine, Enarr. in Ps. 57). Whether Baptism should be deferred? IIIa q. 68 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that Baptism should be de- your Beatitude not to add any other days to this custom.” ferred. For Pope Leo says (Epist. xvi): “Two seasons,” i.e. Therefore it seems that Baptism should be conferred not Easter and Whitsuntide, “are fixed by the Roman Pontiff at once, but delayed until the aforesaid seasons. for the celebration of Baptism. Wherefore we admonish Objection 2. Further, we read in the decrees of the 2469 Council of Agde (Can. xxxiv): “If Jews whose bad faith in those things that pertain to the Christian mode of life. often “returns to the vomit,” wish to submit to the Law of Thirdly, a certain reverence for the sacrament demands a the Catholic Church, let them for eight months enter the delay whereby men are admitted to Baptism at the prin- porch of the church with the catechumens; and if they are cipal festivities, viz. of Easter and Pentecost, the result found to come in good faith then at last they may deserve being that they receive the sacrament with greater devo- the grace of Baptism.” Therefore men should not be bap- tion. tized at once, and Baptism should be deferred for a certain There are, however, two reasons for forgoing this de- fixed time. lay. First, when those who are to be baptized appear to Objection 3. Further, as we read in Is. 27:9, “this be perfectly instructed in the faith and ready for Baptism; is all the fruit, that the sin. . . should be taken away.” Now thus, Philip baptized the Eunuch at once (Acts 8); and Pe- sin seems to be taken away, or at any rate lessened, if Bap- ter, Cornelius and those who were with him (Acts 10). tism be deferred. First, because those who sin after Bap- Secondly, by reason of sickness or some kind of danger tism, sin more grievously, according to Heb. 10:29: “How of death. Wherefore Pope Leo says (Epist. xvi): “Those much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punish- who are threatened by death, sickness, siege, persecution, ments, who hath. . . esteemed the blood of the testament,” or shipwreck, should be baptized at any time.” Yet if a i.e. Baptism, “unclean, by which he was sanctified?” Sec- man is forestalled by death, so as to have no time to re- ondly, because Baptism takes away past, but not future, ceive the sacrament, while he awaits the season appointed sins: wherefore the more it is deferred, the more sins it by the Church, he is saved, yet “so as by fire,” as stated takes away. Therefore it seems that Baptism should be above (a. 2, ad 2). Nevertheless he sins if he defer being deferred for a long time. baptized beyond the time appointed by the Church, except On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 5:8): “Delay this be for an unavoidable cause and with the permission not to be converted to the Lord, and defer it not from day of the authorities of the Church. But even this sin, with his to day.” But the perfect conversion to God is of those who other sins, can be washed away by his subsequent contri- are regenerated in Christ by Baptism. Therefore Baptism tion, which takes the place of Baptism, as stated above should not be deferred from day to day. (q. 66, a. 11). I answer that, In this matter we must make a distinc- Reply to Objection 1. This decree of Pope Leo, con- tion and see whether those who are to be baptized are chil- cerning the celebration of Baptism at two seasons, is to dren or adults. For if they be children, Baptism should not be understood “with the exception of the danger of death” be deferred. First, because in them we do not look for bet- (which is always to be feared in children) as stated above. ter instruction or fuller conversion. Secondly, because of Reply to Objection 2. This decree concerning the the danger of death, for no other remedy is available for Jews was for a safeguard to the Church, lest they corrupt them besides the sacrament of Baptism. the faith of simple people, if they be not fully converted. On the other hand, adults have a remedy in the mere Nevertheless, as the same passage reads further on, “if desire for Baptism, as stated above (a. 2). And there- within the appointed time they are threatened with danger fore Baptism should not be conferred on adults as soon of sickness, they should be baptized.” as they are converted, but it should be deferred until some Reply to Objection 3. Baptism, by the grace which fixed time. First, as a safeguard to the Church, lest she it bestows, removes not only past sins, but hinders the be deceived through baptizing those who come to her un- commission of future sins. Now this is the point to be der false pretenses, according to 1 Jn. 4:1: “Believe not considered—that men may not sin: it is a secondary con- every spirit, but try the spirits, if they be of God.” And sideration that their sins be less grievous, or that their sins those who approach Baptism are put to this test, when be washed away, according to 1 Jn. 2:1,2: “My little chil- their faith and morals are subjected to proof for a space of dren, these things I write to you, that you may not sin. But time. Secondly, this is needful as being useful for those if any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus who are baptized; for they require a certain space of time Christ the just; and He is the propitiation for our sins.” in order to be fully instructed in the faith, and to be drilled Whether sinners should be baptized? IIIa q. 68 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that sinners should be baptized. tain of Baptism. Therefore it seems that the sacrament of For it is written (Zech. 13:1): “In that day there shall be Baptism should be offered even to sinners. a fountain open to the House of David, and to the inhabi- Objection 2. Further, our Lord said (Mat. 9:12): tants of Jerusalem: for the washing of the sinner and of the “They that are in health need not a physician, but they unclean woman”: and this is to be understood of the foun- that are ill.” But they that are ill are sinners. Therefore 2470 since Baptism is the remedy of Christ the physician of our to sin can, at the same time, be cleansed from sin, which souls, it seems that this sacrament should be offered to is the purpose of Baptism; for this would be to combine sinners. two contradictory things. Thirdly, because there should Objection 3. Further, no assistance should be with- be no falsehood in the sacramental signs. Now a sign is drawn from sinners. But sinners who have been baptized false if it does not correspond with the thing signified. But derive spiritual assistance from the very character of Bap- the very fact that a man presents himself to be cleansed tism, since it is a disposition to grace. Therefore it seems by Baptism, signifies that he prepares himself for the in- that the sacrament of Baptism should be offered to sin- ward cleansing: while this cannot be the case with one ners. who purposes to remain in sin. Therefore it is manifest On the contrary, Augustine says (Serm. clxix): “He that on such a man the sacrament of Baptism is not to be Who created thee without thee, will not justify thee with- conferred. out thee.” But since a sinner’s will is ill-disposed, he does Reply to Objection 1. The words quoted are to be un- not co-operate with God. Therefore it is useless to employ derstood of those sinners whose will is set on renouncing Baptism as a means of justification. sin. I answer that, A man may be said to be a sinner in two Reply to Objection 2. The physician of souls, i.e. ways. First, on account of the stain and the debt of pun- Christ, works in two ways. First, inwardly, by Himself: ishment incurred in the past: and on sinners in this sense and thus He prepares man’s will so that it wills good the sacrament of Baptism should be conferred, since it is and hates evil. Secondly, He works through ministers, instituted specially for this purpose, that by it the unclean- by the outward application of the sacraments: and in this ness of sin may be washed away, according to Eph. 5:26: way His work consists in perfecting what was begun out- “Cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life.” wardly. Therefore the sacrament of Baptism is not to Secondly, a man may be called a sinner because he be conferred save on those in whom there appears some wills to sin and purposes to remain in sin: and on sin- sign of their interior conversion: just as neither is bodily ners in this sense the sacrament of Baptism should not be medicine given to a sick man, unless he show some sign conferred. First, indeed, because by Baptism men are in- of life. corporated in Christ, according to Gal. 3:27: “As many of Reply to Objection 3. Baptism is the sacrament of you as have been baptized in Christ, have put on Christ.” faith. Now dead faith does not suffice for salvation; nor is Now so long as a man wills to sin, he cannot be united to it the foundation, but living faith alone, “that worketh by Christ, according to 2 Cor. 6:14: “What participation hath charity” (Gal. 5:6), as Augustine says (De Fide et oper.). justice with injustice?” Wherefore Augustine says in his Neither, therefore, can the sacrament of Baptism give sal- book on Penance (Serm. cccli) that “no man who has the vation to a man whose will is set on sinning, and hence use of free-will can begin the new life, except he repent of expels the form of faith. Moreover, the impression of his former life.” Secondly, because there should be noth- the baptismal character cannot dispose a man for grace ing useless in the works of Christ and of the Church. Now as long as he retains the will to sin; for “God compels no that is useless which does not reach the end to which it is man to be virtuous,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ordained; and, on the other hand, no one having the will ii). Whether works of satisfaction should be enjoined on sinners that have been baptized? IIIa q. 68 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that works of satisfaction is most necessary in the case of those who have been bap- should be enjoined on sinners that have been baptized. tized recently. Therefore it seems that works of satisfac- For God’s justice seems to demand that a man should be tion should be enjoined on sinners. punished for every sin of his, according to Eccles. 12:14: Objection 3. Further, man owes satisfaction to God “All things that are done, God will bring into judgment.” not less than to his neighbor. But if those who were re- But works of satisfaction are enjoined on sinners in pun- cently baptized have injured their neighbor, they should ishment of past sins. Therefore it seems that works of be told to make reparation to God by works of penance. satisfaction should be enjoined on sinners that have been On the contrary, Ambrose commenting on Rom. baptized. 11:29: “The gifts and the calling of God are without re- Objection 2. Further, by means of works of satisfac- pentance,” says: “The grace of God requires neither sighs tion sinners recently converted are drilled into righteous- nor groans in Baptism, nor indeed any work at all, but ness, and are made to avoid the occasions of sin: “for faith alone; and remits all, gratis.” satisfaction consists in extirpating the causes of vice, and I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 6:3,4), “all closing the doors to sin” (De Eccl. Dogm. iv). But this we who are baptized in Christ Jesus, are baptized in His 2471 death: for we are buried together with Him, by Baptism and carried our sorrows.” unto death”; which is to say that by Baptism man is in- Reply to Objection 2. Those who have been lately corporated in the very death of Christ. Now it is manifest baptized should be drilled into righteousness, not by pe- from what has been said above (q. 48, Aa. 2,4; q. 49, a. 3) nal, but by “easy works, so as to advance to perfection by that Christ’s death satisfied sufficiently for sins, “not for taking exercise, as infants by taking milk,” as a gloss says ours only, but also for those of the whole world,” accord- on Ps. 130:2: “As a child that is weaned is towards his ing to 1 Jn. 2:2. Consequently no kind of satisfaction mother.” For this reason did our Lord excuse His disci- should be enjoined on one who is being baptized, for any ples from fasting when they were recently converted, as sins whatever: and this would be to dishonor the Passion we read in Mat. 9:14,15: and the same is written 1 Pet. and death of Christ, as being insufficient for the plenary 2:2: “As new-born babes desire. . . milk. . . that thereby you satisfaction for the sins of those who were to be baptized. may grow unto salvation.” Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says in his book Reply to Objection 3. To restore what has been ill on Infant Baptism (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i), “the taken from one’s neighbor, and to make satisfaction for effect of Baptism is to make those, who are baptized, to wrong done to him, is to cease from sin: for the very fact be incorporated in Christ as His members.” Wherefore the of retaining what belongs to another and of not being rec- very pains of Christ were satisfactory for the sins of those onciled to one’s neighbor, is a sin. Wherefore those who who were to be baptized; just as the pain of one member are baptized should be enjoined to make satisfaction to can be satisfactory for the sin of another member. Hence it their neighbor, as also to desist from sin. But they are not is written (Is. 53:4): “Surely He hath borne our infirmities to be enjoined to suffer any punishment for past sins. Whether sinners who are going to be baptized are bound to confess their sins? IIIa q. 68 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that sinners who are going to be other is the outward confession of sins, which is made to baptized are bound to confess their sins. For it is written a priest; and such confession is not required before Bap- (Mat. 3:6) that many “were baptized” by John “in the Jor- tism. First, because this confession, since it is directed dan confessing their sins.” But Christ’s Baptism is more to the person of the minister, belongs to the sacrament perfect than John’s. Therefore it seems that there is yet of Penance, which is not required before Baptism, which greater reason why they who are about to receive Christ’s is the door of all the sacraments. Secondly, because the Baptism should confess their sins. reason why a man makes outward confession to a priest, Objection 2. Further, it is written (Prov. 28:13): “He is that the priest may absolve him from his sins, and bind that hideth his sins, shall not prosper; but he that shall him to works of satisfaction, which should not be enjoined confess and forsake them, shall obtain mercy.” Now for on the baptized, as stated above (a. 5). Moreover those this is a man baptized, that he may obtain mercy for his who are being baptized do not need to be released from sins. Therefore those who are going to be baptized should their sins by the keys of the Church, since all are forgiven confess their sins. them in Baptism. Thirdly, because the very act of con- Objection 3. Further, Penance is required before Bap- fession made to a man is penal, by reason of the shame it tism, according to Acts 2:38: “Do penance and be bap- inflicts on the one confessing: whereas no exterior pun- tized every one of you.” But confession is a part of ishment is enjoined on a man who is being baptized. Penance. Therefore it seems that confession of sins should Therefore no special confession of sins is required of take place before Baptism. those who are being baptized; but that general confession On the contrary, Confession of sins should be sor- suffices which they make when in accordance with the rowful: thus Augustine says (De Vera et Falsa Poenit. Church’s ritual they “renounce Satan and all his works.” xiv): “All these circumstances should be taken into ac- And in this sense a gloss explains Mat. 3:6, saying that in count and deplored.” Now, as Ambrose says on Rom. John’s Baptism “those who are going to be baptized learn 11:29, “the grace of God requires neither sighs nor groans that they should confess their sins and promise to amend in Baptism.” Therefore confession of sins should not be their life.” required of those who are going to be baptized. If, however, any persons about to be baptized, wish, I answer that, Confession of sins is twofold. One is out of devotion, to confess their sins, their confession made inwardly to God: and such confession of sins is re- should be heard; not for the purpose of enjoining them quired before Baptism: in other words, man should call to do satisfaction, but in order to instruct them in the spir- his sins to mind and sorrow for them; since “he cannot itual life as a remedy against their vicious habits. begin the new life, except he repent of his former life,” as Reply to Objection 1. Sins were not forgiven in Augustine says in his book on Penance (Serm. cccli). The John’s Baptism, which, however, was the Baptism of 2472 Penance. Consequently it was fitting that those who went make inward confession to God, and also an outward gen-to receive that Baptism, should confess their sins, so that eral confession, for them to “prosper and obtain mercy”: they should receive a penance in proportion to their sins. and they need no special outward confession, as stated But Christ’s Baptism is without outward penance, as Am- above. brose says (on Rom. 11:29); and therefore there is no Reply to Objection 3. Confession is a part of sacra- comparison. mental Penance, which is not required before Baptism, as Reply to Objection 2. It is enough that the baptized stated above: but the inward virtue of Penance is required. Whether the intention of receiving the sacrament of Baptism is required on the part IIIa q. 68 a. 7 of the one baptized? Objection 1. It seems that the intention of receiving tion of receiving the sacrament. the sacrament of Baptism is not required on the part of the I answer that, By Baptism a man dies to the old life one baptized. For the one baptized is, as it were, “patient” of sin, and begins a certain newness of life, according to in the sacrament. But an intention is required not on the Rom. 6:4: “We are buried together with” Christ “by Bap- part of the patient but on the part of the agent. Therefore tism into death; that, as Christ is risen from the dead. . . so it seems that the intention of receiving Baptism is not re-we also may walk in newness of life.” Consequently, just quired on the part of the one baptized. as, according to Augustine (Serm. cccli), he who has the Objection 2. Further, if what is necessary for Bap- use of free-will, must, in order to die to the old life, “will tism be omitted, the Baptism must be repeated; for in- to repent of his former life”; so must he, of his own will, stance, if the invocation of the Trinity be omitted, as stated intend to lead a new life, the beginning of which is pre- above (q. 66, a. 9, ad 3). But it does not seem that a man cisely the receiving of the sacrament. Therefore on the should be rebaptized through not having had the intention part of the one baptized, it is necessary for him to have of receiving Baptism: else, since his intention cannot be the will or intention of receiving the sacrament. proved, anyone might ask to be baptized again on account Reply to Objection 1. When a man is justified by of his lack of intention. Therefore it seems that no inten- Baptism, his passiveness is not violent but voluntary: tion is required on the part of the one baptized, in order wherefore it is necessary for him to intend to receive that that he receive the sacrament. which is given him. Objection 3. Further, Baptism is given as a remedy Reply to Objection 2. If an adult lack the intention for original sin. But original sin is contracted without the of receiving the sacrament, he must be rebaptized. But if intention of the person born. Therefore, seemingly, Bap- there be doubt about this, the form to be used should be: tism requires no intention on the part of the person bap- “If thou art not baptized, I baptize thee.” tized. Reply to Objection 3. Baptism is a remedy not only On the contrary, According to the Church’s ritual, against original, but also against actual sins, which are those who are to be baptized ask of the Church that they caused by our will and intention. may receive Baptism: and thus they express their inten- Whether faith is required on the part of the one baptized? IIIa q. 68 a. 8 Objection 1. It seems that faith is required on the part sacrament is required for Baptism. But this cannot be of the one baptized. For the sacrament of Baptism was in- without right faith, since Baptism is the sacrament of right stituted by Christ. But Christ, in giving the form of Bap- faith: for thereby men “are incorporated in Christ,” as tism, makes faith to precede Baptism (Mk. 16:16): “He Augustine says in his book on Infant Baptism (De Pecc. that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved.” Therefore Merit. et Remiss. i); and this cannot be without right faith, it seems that without faith there can be no sacrament of according to Eph. 3:17: “That Christ may dwell by faith Baptism. in your hearts.” Therefore it seems that a man who has not Objection 2. Further, nothing useless is done in the right faith cannot receive the sacrament of Baptism. sacraments of the Church. But according to the Church’s Objection 4. Further, unbelief is a most grievous sin, ritual, the man who comes to be baptized is asked con- as we have shown in the IIa IIae, q. 10, a. 3. But those cerning his faith: “Dost thou believe in God the Father who remain in sin should not be baptized: therefore nei- Almighty?” Therefore it seems that faith is required for ther should those who remain in unbelief. Baptism. On the contrary, Gregory writing to the bishop Quir- Objection 3. Further, the intention of receiving the icus says: “We have learned from the ancient tradition 2473 of the Fathers that when heretics, baptized in the name tizing men is that they may be cleansed from sin, accord-of the Trinity, come back to Holy Church, they are to ing to Is. 27:9: “This is all the fruit, that the sin. . . should be welcomed to her bosom, either with the anointing of be taken away.” And therefore, as far as she is concerned, chrism, or the imposition of hands, or the mere profession she does not intend to give Baptism save to those who of faith.” But such would not be the case if faith were have right faith, without which there is no remission of necessary for a man to receive Baptism. sins. And for this reason she asks those who come to be I answer that, As appears from what has been said baptized whether they believe. If, on the contrary, anyone, above (q. 63, a. 6; q. 66, a. 9) Baptism produces a twofold without right faith, receive Baptism outside the Church, effect in the soul, viz. the character and grace. Therefore he does not receive it unto salvation. Hence Augustine in two ways may a thing be necessary for Baptism. First, says (De Baptism. contr. Donat. iv): “From the Church as something without which grace, which is the ultimate being compared to Paradise we learn that men can receive effect of the sacrament, cannot be had. And thus right her Baptism even outside her fold, but that elsewhere none faith is necessary for Baptism, because, as it appears from can receive or keep the salvation of the blessed.” Rom. 3:22, the justice of God is by faith of Jesus Christ. Reply to Objection 3. Even he who has not right faith Secondly, something is required of necessity for Bap- on other points, can have right faith about the sacrament tism, because without it the baptismal character cannot be of Baptism: and so he is not hindered from having the in- imprinted And thus right faith is not necessary in the one tention of receiving that sacrament. Yet even if he think baptized any more than in the one who baptizes: provided not aright concerning this sacrament, it is enough, for the the other conditions are fulfilled which are essential to the receiving of the sacrament, that he should have a general sacrament. For the sacrament is not perfected by the righ- intention of receiving Baptism, according as Christ insti- teousness of the minister or of the recipient of Baptism, tuted, and as the Church bestows it. but by the power of God. Reply to Objection 4. Just as the sacrament of Bap- Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord is speaking there of tism is not to be conferred on a man who is unwilling to Baptism as bringing us to salvation by giving us sanctify- give up his other sins, so neither should it be given to one ing grace: which of course cannot be without right faith: who is unwilling to renounce his unbelief. Yet each re- wherefore He says pointedly: “He that believeth and is ceives the sacrament if it be conferred on him, though not baptized, shall be saved.” unto salvation. Reply to Objection 2. The Church’s intention in Bap- Whether children should be baptized? IIIa q. 68 a. 9 Objection 1. It seems that children should not be On the contrary, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii): baptized. For the intention to receive the sacrament is “Our heavenly guides,” i.e. the Apostles, “approved of required in one who is being baptized, as stated above infants being admitted to Baptism.” (a. 7). But children cannot have such an intention, since I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 5:17), “if they have not the use of free-will. Therefore it seems that by one man’s offense death reigned through one,” namely they cannot receive the sacrament of Baptism. Adam, “much more they who receive abundance of grace, Objection 2. Further, Baptism is the sacrament of and of the gift, and of justice, shall reign in life through faith, as stated above (q. 39, a. 5; q. 66, a. 1, ad 1). But one, Jesus Christ.” Now children contract original sin children have not faith, which demands an act of the will from the sin of Adam; which is made clear by the fact on the part of the believer, as Augustine says (Super Joan. that they are under the ban of death, which “passed upon xxvi). Nor can it be said that their salvation is implied in all” on account of the sin of the first man, as the Apostle the faith of their parents; since the latter are sometimes says in the same passage (Rom. 5:12). Much more, there- unbelievers, and their unbelief would conduce rather to fore, can children receive grace through Christ, so as to the damnation of their children. Therefore it seems that reign in eternal life. But our Lord Himself said (Jn. 3:5): children cannot be baptized. “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, Objection 3. Further, it is written (1 Pet. 3:21) that he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.” Consequently “Baptism saveth” men; “not the putting away of the filth it became necessary to baptize children, that, as in birth of the flesh, but the examination of a good conscience to- they incurred damnation through Adam so in a second wards God.” But children have no conscience, either good birth they might obtain salvation through Christ. More- or bad, since they have not the use of reason: nor can they over it was fitting that children should receive Baptism, in be fittingly examined, since they understand not. There- order that being reared from childhood in things pertain- fore children should not be baptized. ing to the Christian mode of life, they may the more easily 2474 persevere therein; according to Prov. 22:5: “A young man ing to the same Boniface (Ep. xcviii), “little children are according to his way, even when he is old, he will not de- offered that they may receive grace in their souls, not so part from it.” This reason is also given by Dionysius (Eccl. much from the hands of those that carry them (yet from Hier. iii). these too, if they be good and faithful) as from the whole Reply to Objection 1. The spiritual regeneration ef- company of the saints and the faithful. For they are rightly fected by Baptism is somewhat like carnal birth, in this considered to be offered by those who are pleased at their respect, that as the child while in the mother’s womb being offered, and by whose charity they are united in receives nourishment not independently, but through the communion with the Holy Ghost.” And the unbelief of nourishment of its mother, so also children before the use their own parents, even if after Baptism these strive to in- of reason, being as it were in the womb of their mother fect them with the worship of demons, hurts not the chil- the Church, receive salvation not by their own act, but by dren. For as Augustine says (Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. i) the act of the Church. Hence Augustine says (De Pecc. “when once the child has been begotten by the will of Merit. et Remiss. i): “The Church, our mother, offers others, he cannot subsequently be held by the bonds of her maternal mouth for her children, that they may im- another’s sin so long as he consent not with his will, ac- bibe the sacred mysteries: for they cannot as yet with their cording to” Ezech. 18:4: “ ‘As the soul of the Father, so own hearts believe unto justice, nor with their own mouths also the soul of the son is mine; the soul that sinneth, confess unto salvation. . . And if they are rightly said to be- the same shall die.’ Yet he contracted from Adam that lieve, because in a certain fashion they make profession of which was loosed by the grace of this sacrament, because faith by the words of their sponsors, why should they not as yet he was not endowed with a separate existence.” But also be said to repent, since by the words of those same the faith of one, indeed of the whole Church, profits the sponsors they evidence their renunciation of the devil and child through the operation of the Holy Ghost, Who unites this world?” For the same reason they can be said to in- the Church together, and communicates the goods of one tend, not by their own act of intention, since at times they member to another. struggle and cry; but by the act of those who bring them Reply to Objection 3. Just as a child, when he is be- to be baptized. ing baptized, believes not by himself but by others, so is Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says, writing to he examined not by himself but through others, and these Boniface (Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. i), “in the Church of in answer confess the Church’s faith in the child’s stead, our Saviour little children believe through others, just as who is aggregated to this faith by the sacrament of faith. they contracted from others those sins which are remitted And the child acquires a good conscience in himself, not in Baptism.” Nor is it a hindrance to their salvation if their indeed as to the act, but as to the habit, by sanctifying parents be unbelievers, because, as Augustine says, writ- grace. Whether children of Jews or other unbelievers be baptized against the will of their IIIa q. 68 a. 10 parents? Objection 1. It seems that children of Jews or other from whom he has his body. Therefore it is not unjust if unbelievers should be baptized against the will of their the children of unbelievers are taken away from their car- parents. For it is a matter of greater urgency to rescue a nal parents, and consecrated to God by Baptism. man from the danger of eternal death than from the dan- On the contrary, It is written in the Decretals (Dist. ger of temporal death. But one ought to rescue a child xlv), quoting the council of Toledo: “In regard to the that is threatened by the danger of temporal death, even if Jews the holy synod commands that henceforward none its parents through malice try to prevent its being rescued. of them be forced to believe: for such are not to be saved Therefore much more reason is there for rescuing the chil- against their will, but willingly, that their righteousness dren of unbelievers from the danger of eternal death, even may be without flaw.” against their parents’ will. I answer that, The children of unbelievers either have Objection 2. The children of slaves are themselves the use of reason or they have not. If they have, then they slaves, and in the power of their masters. But Jews and all already begin to control their own actions, in things that other unbelievers are the slaves of kings and rulers. There- are of Divine or natural law. And therefore of their own fore without any injustice rulers can have the children of accord, and against the will of their parents, they can re- Jews baptized, as well as those of other slaves who are ceive Baptism, just as they can contract marriage. Conse- unbelievers. quently such can lawfully be advised and persuaded to be Objection 3. Further, every man belongs more to baptized. God, from Whom he has his soul, than to his carnal father, If, however, they have not yet the use of free-will, ac- 2475 cording to the natural law they are under the care of their who has tried him, none should use force in order to res-parents as long as they cannot look after themselves. For cue him from death. Consequently, neither should anyone which reason we say that even the children of the ancients infringe the order of the natural law, in virtue of which a “were saved through the faith of their parents.” Where- child is under the care of its father, in order to rescue it fore it would be contrary to natural justice if such children from the danger of eternal death. were baptized against their parents’ will; just as it would Reply to Objection 2. Jews are slaves of rulers by be if one having the use of reason were baptized against civil slavery, which does not exclude the order of the nat- his will. Moreover under the circumstances it would be ural and Divine law. dangerous to baptize the children of unbelievers; for they Reply to Objection 3. Man is ordained unto God would be liable to lapse into unbelief, by reason of their through his reason, by which he can know God. Where- natural affection for their parents. Therefore it is not the fore a child, before it has the use of reason, is ordained to custom of the Church to baptize the children of unbeliev- God, by a natural order, through the reason of its parents, ers against their parents’ will. under whose care it naturally lies, and it is according to Reply to Objection 1. It is not right to rescue a man their ordering that things pertaining to God are to be done from death of the body against the order of civil law: for in respect of the child. instance, if a man be condemned to death by the judge Whether a child can be baptized while yet in its mother’s womb? IIIa q. 68 a. 11 Objection 1. It seems that a child can be baptized of the body of the person baptized be in some way washed while yet in its mother’s womb. For the gift of Christ is with water, since Baptism is a kind of washing, as stated more efficacious unto salvation than Adam’s sin unto con- above (q. 66, a. 1). But an infant’s body, before being born demnation, as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:15). But a child from the womb, can nowise be washed with water; unless while yet in its mother’s womb is under sentence of con- perchance it be said that the baptismal water, with which demnation on account of Adam’s sin. For much more rea- the mother’s body is washed, reaches the child while yet son, therefore, can it be saved through the gift of Christ, in its mother’s womb. But this is impossible: both because which is bestowed by means of Baptism. Therefore a the child’s soul, to the sanctification of which Baptism is child can be baptized while yet in its mother’s womb. ordained, is distinct from the soul of the mother; and be- Objection 2. Further, a child, while yet in its mother’s cause the body of the animated infant is already formed, womb, seems to be part of its mother. Now, when the and consequently distinct from the body of the mother. mother is baptized, whatever is in her and part of her, is Therefore the Baptism which the mother receives does not baptized. Therefore it seems that when the mother is bap- overflow on to the child which is in her womb. Hence Au- tized, the child in her womb is baptized. gustine says (Cont. Julian. vi): “If what is conceived Objection 3. Further, eternal death is a greater evil within a mother belonged to her body, so as to be consid- than death of the body. But of two evils the less should ered a part thereof, we should not baptize an infant whose be chosen. If, therefore, the child in the mother’s womb mother, through danger of death, was baptized while she cannot be baptized, it would be better for the mother to bore it in her womb. Since, then, it,” i.e. the infant, “is be opened, and the child to be taken out by force and baptized, it certainly did not belong to the mother’s body baptized, than that the child should be eternally damned while it was in the womb.” It follows, therefore, that a through dying without Baptism. child can nowise be baptized while in its mother’s womb. Objection 4. Further, it happens at times that some Reply to Objection 1. Children while in the mother’s part of the child comes forth first, as we read in Gn. 38:27: womb have not yet come forth into the world to live “In the very delivery of the infants, one put forth a hand, among other men. Consequently they cannot be subject whereon the midwife tied a scarlet thread, saying: This to the action of man, so as to receive the sacrament, at the shall come forth the first. But he drawing back his hand, hands of man, unto salvation. They can, however, be sub- the other came forth.” Now sometimes in such cases there ject to the action of God, in Whose sight they live, so as, is danger of death. Therefore it seems that that part should by a kind of privilege, to receive the grace of sanctifica- be baptized, while the child is yet in its mother’s womb. tion; as was the case with those who were sanctified in the On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Dardan.): womb. “No one can be born a second time unless he be born first.” Reply to Objection 2. An internal member of the But Baptism is a spiritual regeneration. Therefore no one mother is something of hers by continuity and material should be baptized before he is born from the womb. union of the part with the whole: whereas a child while I answer that, It is essential to Baptism that some part in its mother’s womb is something of hers through being 2476 joined with, and yet distinct from her. Wherefore there is baptized, in cases of danger: nor should it be baptized no comparison. again, if perfect birth should ensue. And seemingly the Reply to Objection 3. We should “not do evil that same should be done in cases of danger no matter what there may come good” (Rom. 3:8). Therefore it is wrong part of the body appear first. But as none of the exterior to kill a mother that her child may be baptized. If, how- parts of the body belong to its integrity in the same degree ever, the mother die while the child lives yet in her womb, as the head, some hold that since the matter is doubtful, she should be opened that the child may be baptized. whenever any other part of the body has been baptized, Reply to Objection 4. Unless death be imminent, the child, when perfect birth has taken place, should be we should wait until the child has entirely come forth baptized with the form: “If thou art not baptized, I baptize from the womb before baptizing it. If, however, the head, thee,” etc. wherein the senses are rooted, appear first, it should be Whether madmen and imbeciles should be baptized? IIIa q. 68 a. 12 Objection 1. It seems that madmen and imbeciles Again, there are some who, though mad or imbecile should not be baptized. For in order to receive Baptism, from birth, have, nevertheless, lucid intervals, in which the person baptized must have the intention, as stated they can make right use of reason. Wherefore, if then above (a. 7). But since madmen and imbeciles lack the they express a desire for Baptism, they can be baptized use of reason, they can have but a disorderly intention. though they be actually in a state of madness. And in this Therefore they should not be baptized. case the sacrament should be bestowed on them if there be Objection 2. Further, man excels irrational animals fear of danger otherwise it is better to wait until the time in that he has reason. But madmen and imbeciles lack the when they are sane, so that they may receive the sacra- use of reason, indeed in some cases we do not expect them ment more devoutly. But if during the interval of lucidity ever to have it, as we do in the case of children. It seems, they manifest no desire to receive Baptism, they should therefore, that just as irrational animals are not baptized, not be baptized while in a state of insanity. so neither should madmen and imbeciles in those cases be Lastly there are others who, though not altogether baptized. sane, yet can use their reason so far as to think about Objection 3. Further, the use of reason is suspended their salvation, and understand the power of the sacra- in madmen and imbeciles more than it is in one who ment. And these are to be treated the same as those who sleeps. But it is not customary to baptize people while are sane, and who are baptized if they be willing, but not they sleep. Therefore it should not be given to madmen against their will. and imbeciles. Reply to Objection 1. Imbeciles who never had, and On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. iv) of his have not now, the use of reason, are baptized, according to friend that “he was baptized when his recovery was de- the Church’s intention, just as according to the Church’s spaired of”: and yet Baptism was efficacious with him. ritual, they believe and repent; as we have stated above of Therefore Baptism should sometimes be given to those children (a. 9, ad OBJ). But those who have had the use of who lack the use of reason. reason at some time, or have now, are baptized according I answer that, In the matter of madmen and imbe- to their own intention, which they have now, or had when ciles a distinction is to be made. For some are so from they were sane. birth, and have no lucid intervals, and show no signs of Reply to Objection 2. Madmen and imbeciles lack the use of reason. And with regard to these it seems that the use of reason accidentally, i.e. through some imped- we should come to the same decision as with regard to iment in a bodily organ; but not like irrational animals children who are baptized in the Faith of the Church, as through want of a rational soul. Consequently the com- stated above (a. 9, ad 2). parison does not hold. But there are others who have fallen from a state of Reply to Objection 3. A person should not be bap- sanity into a state of insanity. And with regard to these tized while asleep, except he be threatened with the dan- we must be guided by their wishes as expressed by them ger of death. In which case he should be baptized, if pre- when sane: so that, if then they manifested a desire to re- viously he has manifested a desire to receive Baptism, as ceive Baptism, it should be given to them when in a state we have stated in reference to imbeciles: thus Augustine of madness or imbecility, even though then they refuse. relates of his friend that “he was baptized while uncon- If, on the other hand, while sane they showed no desire to scious,” because he was in danger of death (Confess. iv). receive Baptism, they must not be baptized. 2477 THIRD PART, QUESTION 69 Of the Effects of Baptism (In Ten Articles) We must now consider the effects of Baptism, concerning which there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether all sins are taken away by Baptism? (2) Whether man is freed from all punishment by Baptism? (3) Whether Baptism takes away the penalties of sin that belong to this life? (4) Whether grace and virtues are bestowed on man by Baptism? (5) Of the effects of virtue which are conferred by Baptism? (6) Whether even children receive grace and virtues in Baptism? (7) Whether Baptism opens the gates of the heavenly kingdom to those who are baptized? (8) Whether Baptism produces an equal effect in all who are baptized? (9) Whether insincerity hinders the effect of Baptism? (10) Whether Baptism takes effect when the insincerity ceases? Whether all sins are taken away by Baptism? IIIa q. 69 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that not all sins are taken to the primitive oldness. Consequently every sin is taken away by Baptism. For Baptism is a spiritual regeneration, away by Baptism. which corresponds to carnal generation. But by carnal Reply to Objection 1. As the Apostle says (Rom. generation man contracts none but original sin. Therefore 5:15,16), the sin of Adam was not so far-reaching as the none but original sin is taken away by Baptism. gift of Christ, which is bestowed in Baptism: “for judg- Objection 2. Further, Penance is a sufficient cause ment was by one unto condemnation; but grace is of many of the remission of actual sins. But penance is required offenses, unto justification.” Wherefore Augustine says in in adults before Baptism, according to Acts 2:38: “Do his book on Infant Baptism (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i), penance and be baptized every one of you.” Therefore that “in carnal generation, original sin alone is contracted; Baptism has nothing to do with the remission of actual but when we are born again of the Spirit, not only original sins. sin but also wilful sin is forgiven.” Objection 3. Further, various diseases demand vari- Reply to Objection 2. No sin can be forgiven save ous remedies: because as Jerome says on Mk. 9:27,28: by the power of Christ’s Passion: hence the Apostle says “What is a cure for the heel is no cure for the eye.” But (Heb. 9:22) that “without shedding of blood there is no re- original sin, which is taken away by Baptism, is generi- mission.” Consequently no movement of the human will cally distinct from actual sin. Therefore not all sins are suffices for the remission of sin, unless there be faith in taken away by Baptism. Christ’s Passion, and the purpose of participating in it, ei- On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 36:25): “I will ther by receiving Baptism, or by submitting to the keys pour upon you clean water, and you shall be cleansed from of the Church. Therefore when an adult approaches Bap- all your filthiness.” tism, he does indeed receive the forgiveness of all his sins I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 6:3), “all through his purpose of being baptized, but more perfectly we, who are baptized in Christ Jesus, are baptized in His through the actual reception of Baptism. death.” And further on he concludes (Rom. 6:11): “So Reply to Objection 3. This argument is true of special do you also reckon that you are dead to sin, but alive unto remedies. But Baptism operates by the power of Christ’s God in Christ Jesus our Lord.” Hence it is clear that by Passion, which is the universal remedy for all sins; and so Baptism man dies unto the oldness of sin, and begins to by Baptism all sins are loosed. live unto the newness of grace. But every sin belongs 2478 Whether man is freed by Baptism from all debt of punishment due to sin? IIIa q. 69 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that man is not freed by Bap- Aa. 1,4,5) by Baptism a man is incorporated in the Pas- tism from all debt of punishment due to sin. For the sion and death of Christ, according to Rom. 6:8: “If we Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): “Those things that are of God be dead with Christ, we believe that we shall live also to- are well ordered [Vulg.: ‘Those that are, are ordained of gether with Christ.” Hence it is clear that the Passion of God’].” But guilt is not set in order save by punishment, Christ is communicated to every baptized person, so that as Augustine says (Ep. cxl). Therefore Baptism does not he is healed just as if he himself had suffered and died. take away the debt of punishment due to sins already com- Now Christ’s Passion, as stated above (q. 68, a. 5), is a mitted. sufficient satisfaction for all the sins of all men. Conse- Objection 2. Further, the effect of a sacrament has quently he who is baptized, is freed from the debt of all a certain likeness to the sacrament itself; since the sacra- punishment due to him for his sins, just as if he himself ments of the New Law “effect what they signify,” as stated had offered sufficient satisfaction for all his sins. above (q. 62, a. 1, ad 1). But the washing of Baptism has Reply to Objection 1. Since the pains of Christ’s Pas- indeed a certain likeness with the cleansing from the stain sion are communicated to the person baptized, inasmuch of sin, but none, seemingly, with the remission of the debt as he is made a member of Christ, just as if he himself had of punishment. Therefore the debt of punishment is not borne those pains, his sins are set in order by the pains of taken away by Baptism. Christ’s Passion. Objection 3. Further, when the debt of punishment Reply to Objection 2. Water not only cleanses but has been remitted, a man no longer deserves to be pun- also refreshes. And thus by refreshing it signifies the re- ished, and so it would be unjust to punish him. If, there- mission of the debt of punishment, just as by cleansing it fore, the debt of punishment be remitted by Baptism, it signifies the washing away of guilt. would be unjust, after Baptism, to hang a thief who had Reply to Objection 3. In punishments inflicted by a committed murder before. Consequently the severity of human tribunal, we have to consider not only what pun- human legislation would be relaxed on account of Bap- ishment a man deserves in respect of God, but also to what tism; which is undesirable. Therefore Baptism does not extent he is indebted to men who are hurt and scandalized remit the debt of punishment. by another’s sin. Consequently, although a murderer is On the contrary, Ambrose, commenting on Rom. freed by Baptism from his debt of punishment in respect 11:29, “The gifts and the calling of God ate without re- of God, he remains, nevertheless, in debt to men; and it is pentance,” says: “The grace of God in Baptism remits all, right that they should be edified at his punishment, since gratis.” they were scandalized at his sin. But the sovereign may I answer that, As stated above (q. 49, a. 3, ad 2; q. 68, remit the penalty to such like out of kindness. Whether Baptism should take away the penalties of sin that belong to this life? IIIa q. 69 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that Baptism should take away like penalties should not remain. the penalties of sin that belong to this life. For as the On the contrary, on Rom. 6:6, “that the body of sin Apostle says (Rom. 5:15), the gift of Christ is farther- may be destroyed,” a gloss says: “The effect of Baptism reaching than the sin of Adam. But through Adam’s sin, is that the old man is crucified, and the body of sin de- as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:12), “death entered into this stroyed, not as though the living flesh of man were deliv- world,” and, consequently, all the other penalties of the ered by the destruction of that concupiscence with which present life. Much more, therefore, should man be freed it has been bespattered from its birth; but that it may not from the penalties of the present life, by the gift of Christ hurt him, when dead, though it was in him when he was which is received in Baptism. born.” Therefore for the same reason neither are the other Objection 2. Further, Baptism takes away the guilt of penalties taken away by Baptism. both original and actual sin. Now it takes away the guilt I answer that, Baptism has the power to take away of actual sin in such a way as to free man from all debt the penalties of the present life yet it does not take them of punishment resulting therefrom. Therefore it also frees away during the present life, but by its power they will man from the penalties of the present life, which are a be taken away from the just in the resurrection when “this punishment of original sin. mortal hath put on immortality” (1 Cor. 15:54). And this Objection 3. Further, if the cause be removed, the is reasonable. First, because, by Baptism, man is incorpo- effect is removed. But the cause of these penalties is orig- rated in Christ, and is made His member, as stated above inal sin, which is taken away by Baptism. Therefore such (a. 3; q. 68, a. 5). Consequently it is fitting that what takes 2479 place in the Head should take place also in the member Reply to Objection 1. As a gloss says on Rom. 6:6, incorporated. Now, from the very beginning of His con- “that we may serve sin no longer—Like a man who, hav- ception Christ was “full of grace and truth,” yet He had a ing captured a redoubtable enemy, slays him not forth- passible body, which through His Passion and death was with, but suffers him to live for a little time in shame and raised up to a life of glory. Wherefore a Christian receives suffering; so did Christ first of all fetter our punishment, grace in Baptism, as to his soul; but he retains a passible but at a future time He will destroy it.” body, so that he may suffer for Christ therein: yet at length Reply to Objection 2. As the gloss says on the same he will be raised up to a life of impassibility. Hence the passage (cf. ad 1), “the punishment of sin is twofold, the Apostle says (Rom. 8:11): “He that raised up Jesus Christ punishment of hell, and temporal punishment. Christ en- from the dead, shall quicken also our [Vulg.: ‘your’] mor- tirely abolished the punishment of hell, so that those who tal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth in us [Vulg.: are baptized and truly repent, should not be subject to it. ‘you’]”: and further on in the same chapter (Rom. 8:17): He did not, however, altogether abolish temporal punish- “Heirs indeed of God, and joint heirs with Christ: yet so, ment yet awhile; for hunger, thirst, and death still remain. if we suffer with Him, that we may be also glorified with But He overthrew its kingdom and power” in the sense Him.” that man should no longer be in fear of them: “and at Secondly, this is suitable for our spiritual training: length He will altogether exterminate it at the last day.” namely, in order that, by fighting against concupiscence Reply to Objection 3. As we stated in the Ia IIae, and other defects to which he is subject, man may receive q. 81, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 82, a. 1, ad 2 original sin spread in the crown of victory. Wherefore on Rom. 6:6, “that the this way, that at first the person infected the nature, and body of sin may be destroyed,” a gloss says: “If a man af- afterwards the nature infected the person. Whereas Christ ter Baptism live in the flesh, he has concupiscence to fight in reverse order at first repairs what regards the person, against, and to conquer by God’s help.” In sign of which and afterwards will simultaneously repair what pertains to it is written (Judges 3:1,2): “These are the nations which the nature in all men. Consequently by Baptism He takes the Lord left, that by them He might instruct Israel. . . that away from man forthwith the guilt of original sin and the afterwards their children might learn to fight with their punishment of being deprived of the heavenly vision. But enemies, and to be trained up to war.” the penalties of the present life, such as death, hunger, Thirdly, this was suitable, lest men might seek to be thirst, and the like, pertain to the nature, from the prin- baptized for the sake of impassibility in the present life, ciples of which they arise, inasmuch as it is deprived of and not for the sake of the glory of life eternal. Wherefore original justice. Therefore these defects will not be taken the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:19): “If in this life only we away until the ultimate restoration of nature through the have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable.” glorious resurrection. Whether grace and virtues are bestowed on man by Baptism? IIIa q. 69 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that grace and virtues are not difficulty in doing good, in which the act of virtue con- bestowed on man by Baptism. Because, as stated above sists. Therefore man does not acquire grace and virtue in (q. 62, a. 1, ad 1), the sacraments of the New Law “effect Baptism. what they signify.” But the baptismal cleansing signifies On the contrary, The Apostle says (Titus 3:5,6): “He the cleansing of the soul from guilt, and not the fashioning saved us by the laver of regeneration,” i.e. by Baptism, of the soul with grace and virtues. Therefore it seems that “and renovation of the Holy Ghost, Whom He hath poured grace and virtues are not bestowed on man by Baptism. forth upon us abundantly,” i.e. “unto the remission of sins Objection 2. Further, one does not need to receive and the fulness of virtues,” as a gloss expounds. Therefore what one has already acquired. But some approach Bap- the grace of the Holy Ghost and the fulness of virtues are tism who have already grace and virtues: thus we read given in Baptism. (Acts 10:1,2): “There was a certain man in Cesarea, I answer that, As Augustine says in the book on In- named Cornelius, a centurion of that which is called the fant Baptism (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i) “the effect of Italian band, a religious man and fearing God”; who, nev- Baptism is that the baptized are incorporated in Christ as ertheless, was afterwards baptized by Peter. Therefore His members.” Now the fulness of grace and virtues flows grace and virtues are not bestowed by Baptism. from Christ the Head to all His members, according to Jn. Objection 3. Further, virtue is a habit: which is de- 1:16: “Of His fulness we all have received.” Hence it is fined as a “quality not easily removed, by which one may clear that man receives grace and virtues in Baptism. act easily and pleasurably.” But after Baptism man retains Reply to Objection 1. As the baptismal water by its proneness to evil which removes virtue; and experiences cleansing signifies the washing away of guilt, and by its 2480 refreshment the remission of punishment, so by its natural fulness of grace and virtues. Hence in Ps. 22:2, “He hath clearness it signifies the splendor of grace and virtues. brought me up on the water of refreshment,” a gloss says: Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (a. 1, ad 2; “He has brought us up by an increase of virtue and good q. 68, a. 2) man receives the forgiveness of sins before deeds in Baptism.” Baptism in so far as he has Baptism of desire, explicitly or Reply to Objection 3. Difficulty in doing good and implicitly; and yet when he actually receives Baptism, he proneness to evil are in the baptized, not through their receives a fuller remission, as to the remission of the entire lacking the habits of the virtues, but through concupis- punishment. So also before Baptism Cornelius and others cence which is not taken away in Baptism. But just as like him receive grace and virtues through their faith in concupiscence is diminished by Baptism, so as not to en- Christ and their desire for Baptism, implicit or explicit: slave us, so also are both the aforesaid defects diminished, but afterwards when baptized, they receive a yet greater so that man be not overcome by them. Whether certain acts of the virtues are fittingly set down as effects of Baptism, to IIIa q. 69 a. 5 wit—incorporation in Christ, enlightenment, and fruitfulness? Objection 1. It seems that certain acts of the virtues which they derive sense and movement. And therefore are unfittingly set down as effects of Baptism, to wit— it follows of necessity that by Baptism man is incorpo- “incorporation in Christ, enlightenment, and fruitfulness.” rated in Christ, as one of His members. Again, just as For Baptism is not given to an adult, except he believe; ac- the members derive sense and movement from the mate- cording to Mk. 16:16: “He that believeth and is baptized, rial head, so from their spiritual Head, i.e. Christ, do His shall be saved.” But it is by faith that man is incorporated members derive spiritual sense consisting in the knowl- in Christ, according to Eph. 3:17: “That Christ may dwell edge Of truth, and spiritual movement which results from by faith in your hearts.” Therefore no one is baptized ex- the instinct of grace. Hence it is written (Jn. 1:14,16): cept he be already incorporated in Christ. Therefore in- “We have seen Him. . . full of grace and truth; and of His corporation with Christ is not the effect of Baptism. fulness we all have received.” And it follows from this that Objection 2. Further, enlightenment is caused by the baptized are enlightened by Christ as to the knowledge teaching, according to Eph. 3:8,9: “To me the least of all of truth, and made fruitful by Him with the fruitfulness of the saints, is given this grace. . . to enlighten all men,” etc. good works by the infusion of grace. But teaching by the catechism precedes Baptism. There- Reply to Objection 1. Adults who already believe in fore it is not the effect of Baptism. Christ are incorporated in Him mentally. But afterwards, Objection 3. Further, fruitfulness pertains to active when they are baptized, they are incorporated in Him, cor- generation. But a man is regenerated spiritually by Bap- porally, as it were, i.e. by the visible sacrament; without tism. Therefore fruitfulness is not an effect of Baptism. the desire of which they could not have been incorporated On the contrary, Augustine says in the book on Infant in Him even mentally. Baptism (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i) that “the effect of Reply to Objection 2. The teacher enlightens out- Baptism is that the baptized are incorporated in Christ.” wardly and ministerially by catechizing: but God enlight- And Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. ii) ascribes enlightenment to ens the baptized inwardly, by preparing their hearts for the Baptism. And on Ps. 22:2, “He hath brought me up on the reception of the doctrines of truth, according to Jn. 6:45: water of refreshment,” a gloss says that “the sinner’s soul, “It is written in the prophets. . . They shall all be taught of sterilized by drought, is made fruitful by Baptism.” God.” I answer that, By Baptism man is born again unto the Reply to Objection 3. The fruitfulness which i as- spiritual life, which is proper to the faithful of Christ, as cribed as an effect of Baptism is that by which man brings the Apostle says (Gal. 2:20): “And that I live now in the forth good works; not that by which he begets others in flesh; I live in the faith of the Son of God.” Now life is Christ, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:15): “In Christ Jesus only in those members that are united to the head, from by the Gospel I have begotten you.” Whether children receive grace and virtue in Baptism? IIIa q. 69 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that children do not receive liever”: and in like manner charity depends on the will of grace and virtues in Baptism. For grace and virtues are the lover. Now children have not the use of the will, and not possessed without faith and charity. But faith, as Au- consequently they have neither faith nor charity. There- gustine says (Ep. xcviii), “depends on the will of the be- fore children do not receive grace and virtues in Baptism. 2481 Objection 2. Further, on Jn. 14:12, “Greater than that they had no virtues at all after Baptism. But this in-these shall he do,” Augustine says that in order for the un- ability of children to act is not due to the absence of habits, godly to be made righteous “Christ worketh in him, but but to an impediment on the part of the body: thus also not without him.” But a child, through not having the use when a man is asleep, though he may have the habits of of free-will, does not co-operate with Christ unto its justi- virtue, yet is he hindered from virtuous acts through being fication: indeed at times it does its best to resist. Therefore asleep. it is not justified by grace and virtues. Reply to Objection 1. Faith and charity depend on Objection 3. Further, it is written (Rom. 4:5): “To man’s will, yet so that the habits of these and other virtues him that worketh not, yet believing in Him that justifieth require the power of the will which is in children; whereas the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice according to the acts of virtue require an act of the will, which is not in purpose of the grace of God.” But a child believeth not children. In this sense Augustine says in the book on In- “in Him that justifieth the ungodly.” Therefore a child re- fant Baptism (Ep. xcviii): “The little child is made a be- ceives neither sanctifying grace nor virtues. liever, not as yet by that faith which depends on the will Objection 4. Further, what is done with a carnal in- of the believer, but by the sacrament of faith itself,” which tention does not seem to have a spiritual effect. But some- causes the habit of faith. times children are taken to Baptism with a carnal inten- Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says in his book tion, to wit, that their bodies may be healed. Therefore on Charity (Ep. Joan. ad Parth. iii), “no man is born of they do not receive the spiritual effect consisting in grace water and the Holy Ghost unwillingly which is to be un- and virtue. derstood not of little children but of adults.” In like man- On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion lii): ner we are to understand as applying to adults, that man “When little children are baptized, they die to that sin “without himself is not justified by Christ.” Moreover, if which they contracted in birth: so that to them also may little children who are about to be baptized resist as much be applied the words: ‘We are buried together with Him as they can, “this is not imputed to them, since so little by Baptism unto death’ ”: (and he continues thus) “ ‘that do they know what they do, that they seem not to do it at as Christ is risen from the dead by the glory of the Father, all”: as Augustine says in a book on the Presence of God, so we also may walk in newness of life.’ ” Now newness addressed to Dardanus (Ep. clxxxvii). of life is through grace and virtues. Therefore children Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (Serm. receive grace and virtues in Baptism. clxxvi): “Mother Church lends other feet to the little chil- I answer that, Some of the early writers held that chil- dren that they may come; another heart that they may be- dren do not receive grace and virtues in Baptism, but that lieve; another tongue that they may confess.” So that chil- they receive the imprint of the character of Christ, by the dren believe, not by their own act, but by the faith of the power of which they receive grace and virtue when they Church, which is applied to them: by the power of which arrive at the perfect age. But this is evidently false, for faith, grace and virtues are bestowed on them. two reasons. First, because children, like adults, are made Reply to Objection 4. The carnal intention of those members of Christ in Baptism; hence they must, of neces- who take children to be baptized does not hurt the lat- sity, receive an influx of grace and virtues from the Head. ter, as neither does one’s sin hurt another, unless he con- Secondly, because, if this were true, children that die after sent. Hence Augustine says in his letter to Boniface (Ep. Baptism, would not come to eternal life; since according xcviii): “Be not disturbed because some bring children to to Rom. 6:23, “the grace of God is life everlasting.” And be baptized, not in the hope that they may be born again to consequently Baptism would not have profited them unto eternal life by the spiritual grace, but because they think salvation. it to be a remedy whereby they may preserve or recover Now the source of their error was that they did not rec- health. For they are not deprived of regeneration, through ognize the distinction between habit and act. And so, see- not being brought for this intention.” ing children to be incapable of acts of virtue, they thought Whether the effect of Baptism is to open the gates of the heavenly kingdom? IIIa q. 69 a. 7 Objection 1. It seems that it is not the effect of Bap- Therefore it is not the effect of Baptism, to open the gates tism, to open the gates of the heavenly kingdom. For of the heavenly kingdom. what is already opened needs no opening. But the gates Objection 2. Further, Baptism has had its effects of the heavenly kingdom were opened by Christ’s Pas- ever since it was instituted. But some were baptized sion: hence it is written (Apoc. 4:1): “After these things I with Christ’s Baptism, before His Passion, according to looked and behold (a great) door was opened in heaven.” Jn. 3:22,26: and if they had died then, the gates of the 2482 heavenly kingdom would not have been opened to them, all guilt and also all debt of punishment are taken away by since none entered therein before Christ, according to Baptism. It follows, therefore, that the effect of Baptism Mic. 2:13: “He went up [Vulg.: ‘shall go up’] that shall is to open the gates of the heavenly kingdom. open the way before them.” Therefore it is not the effect Reply to Objection 1. Baptism opens the gates of the of Baptism, to open the gates of the heavenly kingdom. heavenly kingdom to the baptized in so far as it incorpo- Objection 3. Further, the baptized are still subject to rates them in the Passion of Christ, by applying its power death and the other penalties of the present life, as stated to man. above (a. 3). But entrance to the heavenly kingdom is Reply to Objection 2. When Christ’s Passion was opened to none that are subject to punishment: as is clear not as yet consummated actually but only in the faith of in regard to those who are in purgatory. Therefore it is not believers, Baptism proportionately caused the gates to be the effect of Baptism, to open the gates of the heavenly opened, not in fact but in hope. For the baptized who died kingdom. then looked forward, with a sure hope, to enter the heav- On the contrary, on Lk. 3:21, “Heaven was opened,” enly kingdom. the gloss of Bede says: “We see here the power of Bap- Reply to Objection 3. The baptized are subject to tism; from which when a man comes forth, the gates of death and the penalties of the present life, not by reason of the heavenly kingdom are opened unto him.” a personal debt of punishment but by reason of the state of I answer that, To open the gates of the heavenly king- their nature. And therefore this is no bar to their entrance dom is to remove the obstacle that prevents one from en- to the heavenly kingdom, when death severs the soul from tering therein. Now this obstacle is guilt and the debt of the body; since they have paid, as it were, the debt of na- punishment. But it has been shown above (Aa. 1 ,2) that ture. Whether Baptism has an equal effect in all? IIIa q. 69 a. 8 Objection 1. It seems that Baptism has not an equal because they are baptized not in their own faith, but in that effect in all. For the effect of Baptism is to remove guilt. of the Church, they all receive an equal effect in Baptism. But in some it takes away more sins than in others; for Whereas adults, who approach Baptism in their own faith, in children it takes away only original sins, whereas in are not equally disposed to Baptism; for some approach adults it takes away actual sins, in some many, in others thereto with greater, some with less, devotion. And there- few. Therefore Baptism has not an equal effect in all. fore some receive a greater, some a smaller share of the Objection 2. Further, grace and virtues are bestowed grace of newness; just as from the same fire, he receives on man by Baptism. But some, after Baptism, seem to more heat who approaches nearest to it, although the fire, have more grace and more perfect virtue than others who as far as it is concerned, sends forth its heat equally to all. have been baptized. Therefore Baptism has not an equal But the accidental effect of Baptism, is that to which effect in all. Baptism is not ordained, but which the Divine power pro- Objection 3. Further, nature is perfected by grace, as duces miraculously in Baptism: thus on Rom. 6:6, “that matter by form. But a form is received into matter accord- we may serve sin no longer,” a gloss says: “this is not ing to its capacity. Therefore, since some of the baptized, bestowed in Baptism, save by an ineffable miracle of the even children, have greater capacity for natural gifts than Creator, so that the law of sin, which is in our members, others have, it seems that some receive greater grace than be absolutely destroyed.” And such like effects are not others. equally received by all the baptized, even if they approach Objection 4. Further, in Baptism some receive not with equal devotion: but they are bestowed according to only spiritual, but also bodily health; thus Constantine the ordering of Divine providence. was cleansed in Baptism from leprosy. But all the infirm Reply to Objection 1. The least baptismal grace suf- do not receive bodily health in Baptism. Therefore it has fices to blot out all sins. Wherefore that in some more sins not an equal effect in all. are loosed than in others is not due to the greater efficacy On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:5): “One Faith, of Baptism, but to the condition of the recipient: for in one Baptism.” But a uniform cause has a uniform effect. each one it looses whatever it finds. Therefore Baptism has an equal effect in all. Reply to Objection 2. That greater or lesser grace I answer that, The effect of Baptism is twofold, the appears in the baptized, may occur in two ways. First, be- essential effect, and the accidental. The essential ef- cause one receives greater grace in Baptism than another, fect of Baptism is that for which Baptism was instituted, on account of his greater devotion, as stated above. Sec- namely, the begetting of men unto spiritual life. There- ondly, because, though they receive equal grace, they do fore, since all children are equally disposed to Baptism, not make an equal use of it, but one applies himself more 2483 to advance therein, while another by his negligence baffles therefore gratuitous gifts are bestowed on the angels ac-grace. cording to their diverse capacity for natural gifts, but not Reply to Objection 3. The various degrees of capac- on men. ity in men arise, not from a variety in the mind which is Reply to Objection 4. Bodily health is not the essen- renewed by Baptism (since all men, being of one species, tial effect of Baptism, but a miraculous work of Divine are of one form), but from the diversity of bodies. But it providence. is otherwise with the angels, who differ in species. And Whether insincerity hinders the effect of Baptism? IIIa q. 69 a. 9 Objection 1. It seems that insincerity does not hinder itself; thirdly, through observing a rite which differs from the effect of Baptism. For the Apostle says (Gal. 3:27): that prescribed by the Church in conferring the sacrament; “As many of you as have been baptized in Christ Jesus, fourthly, through approaching the sacrament without de- have put on Christ.” But all that receive the Baptism of votion. Wherefore it is manifest that insincerity hinders Christ, are baptized in Christ. Therefore they all put on the effect of Baptism. Christ: and this is to receive the effect of Baptism. Conse- Reply to Objection 1. “To be baptized in Christ,” may quently insincerity does not hinder the effect of Baptism. be taken in two ways. First, “in Christ,” i.e. “in confor- Objection 2. Further, the Divine power which can mity with Christ.” And thus whoever is baptized in Christ change man’s will to that which is better, works in Bap- so as to be conformed to Him by Faith and Charity, puts tism. But the effect of the efficient cause cannot be hin- on Christ by grace. Secondly, a man is said to be baptized dered by that which can be removed by that cause. There- in Christ, in so far as he receives Christ’s sacrament. And fore insincerity cannot hinder the effect of Baptism. thus all put on Christ, through being configured to Him by Objection 3. Further, the effect of Baptism is grace, to the character, but not through being conformed to Him by which sin is in opposition. But many other sins are more grace. grievous than insincerity, which are not said to hinder the Reply to Objection 2. When God changes man’s will effect of Baptism. Therefore neither does insincerity. from evil to good, man does not approach with insincerity. On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 1:5): “The Holy But God does not always do this. Nor is this the purpose Spirit of discipline will flee from the deceitful.” But the of the sacrament, that an insincere man be made sincere; effect of Baptism is from the Holy Ghost. Therefore in- but that he who comes in sincerity, be justified. sincerity hinders the effect of Baptism. Reply to Objection 3. A man is said to be insincere I answer that, As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. who makes a show of willing what he wills not. Now ii), “God does not compel man to be righteous.” Con- whoever approaches Baptism, by that very fact makes a sequently in order that a man be justified by Baptism, his show of having right faith in Christ, of veneration for this will must needs embrace both Baptism and the baptismal sacrament, and of wishing to conform to the Church, and effect. Now, a man is said to be insincere by reason of to renounce sin. Consequently, to whatever sin a man his will being in contradiction with either Baptism or its wishes to cleave, if he approach Baptism, he approaches effect. For, according to Augustine (De Bapt. cont. Do- insincerely, which is the same as to approach without de- nat. vii), a man is said to be insincere, in four ways: first, votion. But this must be understood of mortal sin, which because he does not believe, whereas Baptism is the sacra- is in opposition to grace: but not of venial sin. Conse- ment of Faith; secondly, through scorning the sacrament quently, here insincerity includes, in a way, every sin. Whether Baptism produces its effect when the insincerity ceases? IIIa q. 69 a. 10 Objection 1. It seems that Baptism does not produce of insincerity cannot be taken away by Baptism which has its effect, when the insincerity ceases. For a dead work, been hindered by insincerity. And thus Baptism will not which is void of charity, can never come to life. But he receive its full effect, which is the remission of all sins. who approaches Baptism insincerely, receives the sacra- Objection 3. Further, it may happen that a man ment without charity. Therefore it can never come to life approach Baptism insincerely, and afterwards commit a so as to bestow grace. number of sins. And yet these sins will not be taken away Objection 2. Further, insincerity seems to be stronger by Baptism; because Baptism washes away past, not fu- than Baptism, because it hinders its effect. But the ture, sins. Such a Baptism, therefore, will never have its stronger is not removed by the weaker. Therefore the sin effect, which is the remission of all sins. 2484 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bapt. cont. Do-in the man, who being insincere, is baptized without char- nat. i): “Then does Baptism begin to have its salutary ity. effect, when truthful confession takes the place of that in- Reply to Objection 2. Insincerity is not removed by sincerity which hindered sins from being washed away, so Baptism but by Penance: and when it is removed, Bap- long as the heart persisted in malice and sacrilege.” tism takes away all guilt, and all debt of punishment due I answer that, As stated above (q. 66, a. 9), Baptism to sins, whether committed before Baptism, or even co- is a spiritual regeneration. Now when a thing is gener- existent with Baptism. Hence Augustine says (De Bapt. ated, it receives together with the form, the form’s effect, cont. Donat. i): “Yesterday is blotted out, and whatever unless there be an obstacle; and when this is removed, the remains over and above, even the very last hour and mo- form of the thing generated produces its effect: thus at the ment preceding Baptism, the very moment of Baptism. same time as a weighty body is generated, it has a down- But from that moment forward he is bound by his obli- ward movement, unless something prevent this; and when gations.” And so both Baptism and Penance concur in the obstacle is removed, it begins forthwith to move down- producing the effect of Baptism, but Baptism as the di- wards. In like manner when a man is baptized, he receives rect efficient cause, Penance as the indirect cause, i.e. as the character, which is like a form; and he receives in con- removing the obstacle. sequence its proper effect, which is grace whereby all his Reply to Objection 3. The effect of Baptism is to sins are remitted. But this effect is sometimes hindered by take away not future, but present and past sins. And con- insincerity. Wherefore, when this obstacle is removed by sequently, when the insincerity passes away, subsequent Penance, Baptism forthwith produces its effect. sins are indeed remitted, but by Penance, not by Baptism. Reply to Objection 1. The sacrament of Baptism is Wherefore they are not remitted, like the sins which pre- the work of God, not of man. Consequently, it is not dead ceded Baptism, as to the whole debt of punishment. 2485 THIRD PART, QUESTION 70 Of Circumcision (In Four Articles) We have now to consider things that are preparatory to Baptism: and (1) that which preceded Baptism, viz. Circumcision, (2) those which accompany Baptism, viz. Catechism and Exorcism. Concerning the first there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether circumcision was a preparation for, and a figure of, Baptism? (2) Its institution; (3) Its rite; (4) Its effect. Whether circumcision was a preparation for, and a figure of Baptism? IIIa q. 70 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that circumcision was not a “Having the same spirit of faith. . . we. . . believe.” But cir-preparation for, and a figure of Baptism. For every figure cumcision was a protestation of faith; wherefore by cir- has some likeness to that which it foreshadows. But cir- cumcision also men of old were aggregated to the body of cumcision has no likeness to Baptism. Therefore it seems the faithful. Consequently, it is manifest that circumcision that it was not a preparation for, and a figure of Baptism. was a preparation for Baptism and a figure thereof, foras- Objection 2. Further, the Apostle, speaking of the Fa- much as “all things happened” to the Fathers of old “in thers of old, says (1 Cor. 10:2), that “all were baptized in figure” (1 Cor. 10:11); just as their faith regarded things the cloud, and in the sea”: but not that they were baptized to come. in circumcision. Therefore the protecting pillar of a cloud, Reply to Objection 1. Circumcision was like Baptism and the crossing of the Red Sea, rather than circumcision, as to the spiritual effect of the latter. For just as circumci- were a preparation for, and a figure of Baptism. sion removed a carnal pellicule, so Baptism despoils man Objection 3. Further, it was stated above (q. 38, of carnal behavior. Aa. 1,3) that the baptism of John was a preparation for Reply to Objection 2. The protecting pillar of cloud Christ’s. Consequently, if circumcision was a preparation and the crossing of the Red Sea were indeed figures of our for, and a figure of Christ’s Baptism, it seems that John’s Baptism, whereby we are born again of water, signified by baptism was superfluous: which is unseemly. Therefore the Red Sea; and of the Holy Ghost, signified by the pil- circumcision was not a preparation for, and a figure of lar of cloud: yet man did not make, by means of these, a Baptism. profession of faith, as by circumcision; so that these two On the contrary, The Apostle says (Col. 2:11,12): things were figures but not sacraments. But circumcision “You are circumcised with circumcision, not made by was a sacrament, and a preparation for Baptism; although hand in despoiling the body of the flesh, but in the cir- less clearly figurative of Baptism, as to externals, than the cumcision of Christ, buried with Him in Baptism.” aforesaid. And for this reason the Apostle mentions them I answer that, Baptism is called the Sacrament of rather than circumcision. Faith; in so far, to wit, as in Baptism man makes a profes- Reply to Objection 3. John’s baptism was a prepara- sion of faith, and by Baptism is aggregated to the congre- tion for Christ’s as to the act done: but circumcision, as gation of the faithful. Now our faith is the same as that of to the profession of faith, which is required in Baptism, as the Fathers of old, according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:13): stated above. Whether circumcision was instituted in a fitting manner? IIIa q. 70 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that circumcision was instituted tuted forthwith after the first man’s sin, and not at the time in an unfitting manner. For as stated above (a. 1) a profes- of Abraham. sion of faith was made in circumcision. But none could Objection 2. Further, in circumcision man made pro- ever be delivered from the first man’s sin, except by faith fession of keeping the Old Law, just as in Baptism he in Christ’s Passion, according to Rom. 3:25: “Whom God makes profession of keeping the New Law; wherefore the hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His Apostle says (Gal. 5:3): “I testify. . . to every man circum- blood.” Therefore circumcision should have been insti- cising himself, that he is a debtor to do the whole Law.” 2486 But the observance of the Law was not promulgated at the profession, according as he thought best. But about the time of Abraham, but rather at the time of Moses. There- time of Abraham faith was on the wane, many being given fore it was unfitting for circumcision to be instituted at the over to idolatry. Moreover, by the growth of carnal concu- time of Abraham piscence natural reason was clouded even in regard to sins Objection 3. Further, circumcision was a figure of, against nature. And therefore it was fitting that then, and and a preparation for, Baptism. But Baptism is offered not before, circumcision should be instituted, as a profes- to all nations, according to Mat. 28:19: “Going. . . teach sion of faith and a remedy against carnal concupiscence. ye all nations, baptizing them.” Therefore circumcision Reply to Objection 2. The observance of the Law was should have been instituted as binding, not the Jews only, not to be promulgated until the people were already gath- but also all nations. ered together: because the law is ordained to the public Objection 4. Further, carnal circumcision should cor- good, as we have stated in the Ia IIae, q. 90, a. 2. Now it respond to spiritual circumcision, as the shadow to the re- behooved the body of the faithful to be gathered together ality. But spiritual circumcision which is of Christ, re- by a sensible sign, which is necessary in order that men be gards indifferently both sexes, since “in Christ Jesus there united together in any religion, as Augustine says (Contra is neither male nor female,” as is written Col. 3∗. There- Faust. xix). Consequently, it was necessary for circumci- fore the institution of circumcision which concerns only sion to be instituted before the giving of the Law. Those males, was unfitting. Fathers, however, who lived before the Law, taught their On the contrary, We read (Gn. 17) that circumcision families concerning Divine things by way of paternal ad- was instituted by God, Whose “works are perfect” (Dt. monition. Hence the Lord said of Abraham (Gn. 18:19): 32:4). “I know that he will command his children, and his house- I answer that, As stated above (a. 1) circumcision was hold after him to keep the way of the Lord.” a preparation for Baptism, inasmuch as it was a profession Reply to Objection 3. Baptism contains in itself the of faith in Christ, which we also profess in Baptism. Now perfection of salvation, to which God calls all men, ac- among the Fathers of old, Abraham was the first to receive cording to 1 Tim. 2:4: “Who will have all men to be the promise of the future birth of Christ, when it was said saved.” Wherefore Baptism is offered to all nations. On to him: “In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be the other hand circumcision did not contain the perfection blessed” (Gn. 22:18). Moreover, he was the first to cut of salvation, but signified it as to be achieved by Christ, himself off from the society of unbelievers, in accordance Who was to be born of the Jewish nation. For this reason with the commandment of the Lord, Who said to him (Gn. circumcision was given to that nation alone. 13:1): “Go forth out of thy country and from thy kindred.” Reply to Objection 4. The institution of circumcision Therefore circumcision was fittingly instituted in the per- is as a sign of Abraham’s faith, who believed that himself son of Abraham. would be the father of Christ Who was promised to him: Reply to Objection 1. Immediately after the sin of and for this reason it was suitable that it should be for our first parent, on account of the knowledge possessed males only. Again, original sin, against which circumci- by Adam, who was fully instructed about Divine things, sion was specially ordained, is contracted from the father, both faith and natural reason flourished in man to such an not from the mother, as was stated in the Ia IIae, q. 81, a. 5. extent, that there was no need for any signs of faith and But Baptism contains the power of Christ, Who is the uni- salvation to be prescribed to him, but each one was wont versal cause of salvation for all, and is “The Remission of to make protestation of his faith, by outward signs of his all sins” (Post-Communion, Tuesday in Whitweek). Whether the rite of circumcision was fitting? IIIa q. 70 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that the rite of circumcision more commonly than a stone knife. Therefore circumci- was unfitting. For circumcision, as stated above (Aa. 1,2), sion should not have been performed with a stone knife. was a profession of faith. But faith is in the apprehen- Objection 3. Further, just as Baptism was instituted as sive power, whose operations appear mostly in the head. a remedy against original sin, so also was circumcision, as Therefore the sign of circumcision should have been con- Bede says (Hom. in Circum.). But now Baptism is not put ferred on the head rather than on the virile member. off until the eighth day, lest children should be in danger Objection 2. Further, in the sacraments we make use of loss on account of original sin, if they should die before of such things as are in more frequent use; for instance, being baptized. On the other hand, sometimes Baptism is water, which is used for washing, and bread, which we put off until after the eighth day. Therefore the eighth day use for nourishment. But, in cutting, we use an iron knife should not have been fixed for circumcision, but this day ∗ Gal. 3:28 2487 should have been anticipated, just as sometimes it was de-Reply to Objection 3. The eighth day was fixed for ferred. circumcision: first, because of the mystery; since, Christ, On the contrary, The aforesaid rite of circumcision is by taking away from the elect, not only guilt but also all fixed by a gloss on Rom. 4:11: “And he received the sign penalties, will perfect the spiritual circumcision, in the of circumcision.” eighth age (which is the age of those that rise again), as I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), circumcision it were, on the eighth day. Secondly, on account of the was established, as a sign of faith, by God “of” Whose tenderness of the infant before the eighth day. Where- “wisdom there is no number” (Ps. 146:5). Now to deter- fore even in regard to other animals it is prescribed (Lev. mine suitable signs is a work of wisdom. Consequently, it 22:27): “When a bullock, or a sheep, or a goat, is brought must be allowed that the rite of circumcision was fitting. forth, they shall be seven days under the udder of their Reply to Objection 1. It was fitting for circumcision dam: but the eighth day and thenceforth, they may be of- to be performed on the virile member. First, because it fered to the Lord.” was a sign of that faith whereby Abraham believed that Moreover, the eighth day was necessary for the fulfil- Christ would be born of his seed. Secondly, because it ment of the precept; so that, to wit, those who delayed was to be a remedy against original sin, which is con- beyond the eighth day, sinned, even though it were the tracted through the act of generation. Thirdly, because sabbath, according to Jn. 7:23: ”(If) a man receives cir- it was ordained as a remedy for carnal concupiscence, cumcision on the sabbath-day, that the Law of Moses may which thrives principally in those members, by reason of not be broken.” But it was not necessary for the validity the abundance of venereal pleasure. of the sacrament: because if anyone delayed beyond the Reply to Objection 2. A stone knife was not essen- eighth day, they could be circumcised afterwards. tial to circumcision. Wherefore we do not find that an Some also say that in imminent danger of death, it was instrument of this description is required by any divine allowable to anticipate the eighth day. But this cannot be precept; nor did the Jews, as a rule, make use of such a proved either from the authority of Scripture or from the knife for circumcision; indeed, neither do they now. Nev- custom of the Jews. Wherefore it is better to say with ertheless, certain well-known circumcisions are related as Hugh of St. Victor (De Sacram. i) that the eighth day was having been performed with a stone knife, thus (Ex. 4:25) never anticipated for any motive, however urgent. Hence we read that “Sephora took a very sharp stone and circum- on Prov. 4:3: “I was. . . an only son in the sight of my cised the foreskin of her son,” and (Joshua 5:2): “Make mother,” a gloss says, that Bersabee’s other baby boy did thee knives of stone, and circumcise the second time the not count because through dying before the eighth day it children of Israel.” Which signified that spiritual circum- received no name; and consequently neither was it cir- cision would be done by Christ, of Whom it is written (1 cumcised. Cor. 10:4): “Now the rock was Christ.” Whether circumcision bestowed sanctifying grace? IIIa q. 70 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that circumcision did not be- “the people that were born in the desert, during the forty stow sanctifying grace. For the Apostle says (Gal. 2:21): years. . . were uncircumcised.” If, therefore, original sin “If justice be by the Law, then Christ died in vain,” i.e. was taken away by circumcision, it seems that all who without cause. But circumcision was an obligation im- died in the desert, both little children and adults, were posed by the Law, according to Gal. 5:3: “I testify. . . to lost. And the same argument avails in regard to those who every man circumcising himself, that ne is a debtor to do died before the eighth day, which was that of circumci- the whole law.” Therefore, if justice be by circumcision, sion, which day could nol be anticipated, as stated above “Christ died in vain,” i.e. without cause. But this cannot (a. 3, ad 3). be allowed. Therefore circumcision did not confer grace Objection 4. Further, nothing but sin closes the en- whereby the sinner is made righteous. trance to the heavenly kingdom. But before the Passion Objection 2. Further, before the institution of circum- the entrance to the heavenly kingdom was closed to the cision faith alone sufficed for justification; hence Gregory circumcised. Therefore men were not justified from sin says (Moral. iv): “Faith alone did of old in behalf of in- by circumcision. fants that for which the water of Baptism avails with us.” Objection 5. Further, original sin is not remitted with- But faith has lost nothing of its strength through the com- out actual sin being remitted also: because “it is wicked mandment of circumcision. Therefore faith alone justified to hope for half forgiveness from God,” as Augustine says little ones, and not circumcision. (De Vera et Falsa Poenit. ix). But we read nowhere of cir- Objection 3. Further, we read (Joshua 5:5,6) that cumcision as remitting actual sin. Therefore neither did it 2488 remit original sin. “received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the justice On the contrary, Augustine says, writing to Valerius of the faith”: because, to wit, justice was of faith sig- in answer to Julian (De Nup. et Concup. ii): “From the nified: not of circumcision signifying. And since Bap- time that circumcision was instituted among God’s peo- tism operates instrumentally by the power of Christ’s Pas- ple, as ‘a seal of the justice of the faith,’ it availed little sion, whereas circumcision does not, therefore Baptism children unto sanctification by cleansing them from the imprints a character that incorporates man in Christ, and original and bygone sin; just as Baptism also from the bestows grace more copiously than does circumcision; time of its institution began to avail unto the renewal of since greater is the effect of a thing already present, than man.” of the hope thereof. I answer that, All are agreed in saying that original Reply to Objection 1. This argument would prove if sin was remitted in circumcision. But some said that no justice were of circumcision otherwise than through faith grace was conferred, and that the only effect was to remit in Christ’s Passion. sin. The Master holds this opinion (Sent. iv, D, 1), and in Reply to Objection 2. Just as before the institution of a gloss on Rom. 4:11. But this is impossible, since guilt circumcision, faith in Christ to come justified both chil- is not remitted except by grace, according to Rom. 3:2: dren and adults, so, too, after its institution. But before, “Being justified freely by His grace,” etc. there was no need of a sign expressive of this faith; be- Wherefore others said that grace was bestowed by cir- cause as yet believers had not begun to be united together cumcision, as to that effect which is the remission of guilt, apart from unbelievers for the worship of one God. It is but not as to its positive effects; lest they should be com- probable, however, that parents who were believers of- pelled to say that the grace bestowed in circumcision suf- fered up some prayers to God for their children, especially ficed for the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law, and that, if these were in any danger. Or bestowed some blessing consequently, the coming of Christ was unnecessary. But on them, as a “seal of faith”; just as the adults offered neither can this opinion stand. First, because by circum- prayers and sacrifices for themselves. cision children. received the power of obtaining glory at Reply to Objection 3. There was an excuse for the the allotted time, which is the last positive effect of grace. people in the desert failing to fulfil the precept of circum- Secondly, because, in the order of the formal cause, pos- cision, both because they knew not when the camp was itive effects naturally precede those that denote privation, removed, and because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. although it is the reverse in the order of the material cause: iv) they needed no distinctive sign while they dwelt apart since a form does not remove a privation save by inform- from other nations. Nevertheless, as Augustine says (QQ. ing the subject. in Josue vi), those were guilty of disobedience who failed Consequently, others said that grace was conferred in to obey through contempt. circumcision, also as a particular positive effect consist- It seems, however, that none of the uncircumcised died ing in being made worthy of eternal life; but not as to all in the desert, for it is written (Ps. 104:37): “There was not its effects, for it did not suffice for the repression of the among their tribes one that was feeble”: and that those concupiscence of the fomes, nor again for the fulfilment alone died in the desert, who had been circumcised in of the precepts of the Law. And this was my opinion at Egypt. If, however, some of the uncircumcised did die one time (Sent. iv, D, 1; q. 2, a. 4). But if one consider there, the same applies to them as to those who died be- the matter carefully, it is clear that this is not true. Because fore the institution of circumcision. And this applies also the least grace can resist any degree of concupiscence, and to those children who, at the time of the Law, died before avoid every mortal sin, that is committed in transgressing the eighth day. the precepts of the Law; for the smallest degree of char- Reply to Objection 4. Original sin was taken away in ity loves God more than cupidity loves “thousands of gold circumcision, in regard to the person; but on the part of the and silver” (Ps. 118:72). entire nature, there remained the obstacle to the entrance We must say, therefore, that grace was bestowed in of the kingdom of heaven, which obstacle was removed circumcision as to all the effects of grace, but not as in by Christ’s Passion. Consequently, before Christ’s Pas- Baptism. Because in Baptism grace is bestowed by the sion not even Baptism gave entrance to the kingdom. But very power of Baptism itself, which power Baptism has as were circumcision to avail after Christ’s Passion, it would the instrument of Christ’s Passion already consummated. give entrance to the kingdom. Whereas circumcision bestowed grace, inasmuch as it was Reply to Objection 5. When adults were circumcised, a sign of faith in Christ’s future Passion: so that the man they received remission not only of original, but also of who was circumcised, professed to embrace that faith; actual sin: yet not so as to be delivered from all debt of whether, being an adult, he made profession for himself, punishment, as in Baptism, in which grace is conferred or, being a child, someone else made profession for him. more copiously. Hence, too, the Apostle says (Rom. 4:11), that Abraham 2489 THIRD PART, QUESTION 71 Of the Preparations That Accompany Baptism (In Four Articles) We have now to consider the preparations that accompany Baptism: concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether catechism should precede Baptism? (2) Whether exorcism should precede Baptism? (3) Whether what is done in catechizing and exorcizing, effects anything, or is a mere sign? (4) Whether those who are to be baptized should be catechized or exorcized by priests? Whether catechism should precede Baptism? IIIa q. 71 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that catechism should not pre- And therefore it is fitting that catechism should precede cede Baptism. For by Baptism men are regenerated unto Baptism. Hence when our Lord bade His disciples to bap- the spiritual life. But man begins to live before being tize, He made teaching to precede Baptism, saying: “Go taught. Therefore man should not be catechized, i.e. ye. . . and teach all nations, baptizing them,” etc. taught, before being baptized. Reply to Objection 1. The life of grace unto which Objection 2. Further, Baptism is given not only to a man is regenerated, presupposes the life of the rational adults, but also to children, who are not capable of being nature, in which man is capable of receiving instruction. taught, since they have not the use of reason. Therefore it Reply to Objection 2. Just as Mother Church, as is absurd to catechize them. stated above (q. 69, a. 6, ad 3), lends children another’s Objection 3. Further, a man, when catechized, con- feet that they may come, and another’s heart that they may fesses his faith. Now a child cannot confess its faith by believe, so, too, she lends them another’s ears, that they itself, nor can anyone else in its stead; both because no may hear, and another’s mind, that through others they one can bind another to do anything; and because one can- may be taught. And therefore, as they are to be baptized, not know whether the child, having come to the right age, on the same grounds they are to be instructed. will give its assent to faith. Therefore catechism should Reply to Objection 3. He who answers in the child’s not precede Baptism. stead: “I do believe,” does not foretell that the child will On the contrary, Rabanus says (De Instit. Cleric. i): believe when it comes to the right age, else he would say: “Before Baptism man should be prepared by catechism, “He will believe”; but in the child’s stead he professes the in order that the catechumen may receive the rudiments Church’s faith which is communicated to that child, the of faith.” sacrament of which faith is bestowed on it, and to which I answer that, As stated above (q. 70, a. 1), Bap- faith he is bound by another. For there is nothing unfitting tism is the Sacrament of Faith: since it is a profession in a person being bound by another in things necessary of the Christian faith. Now in order that a man receive the for salvation. In like manner the sponsor, in answering for faith, he must be instructed therein, according to Rom. the child, promises to use his endeavors that the child may 10:14: “How shall they believe Him, of Whom they have believe. This, however, would not be sufficient in the case not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher?” of adults having the use of reason. Whether exorcism should precede Baptism? IIIa q. 71 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that exorcism should not pre- Objection 3. Further, Holy water was introduced in cede Baptism. For exorcism is ordained against energu- order to ward off the power of the demons. Therefore ex- mens or those who are possessed. But not all are such orcism was not needed as a further remedy. like. Therefore exorcism should not precede Baptism. On the contrary, Pope Celestine says (Epist. ad Epis- Objection 2. Further, so long as man is a subject of cop. Galliae): “Whether children or young people ap- sin, the devil has power over him, according to Jn. 8:34: proach the sacrament of regeneration, they should not “Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin.” But sin come to the fount of life before the unclean spirit has been is taken away by Baptism. Therefore men should not be expelled from them by the exorcisms and breathings of the exorcized before Baptism. clerics.” 2490 I answer that, Whoever purposes to do a work wisely, the devil. And though not all that approach Baptism are first removes the obstacles to his work; hence it is written troubled by him in their bodies, yet all who are not bap- (Jer. 4:3): “Break up anew your fallow ground and sow tized are subject to the power of the demons, at least on not upon thorns.” Now the devil is the enemy of man’s account of the guilt of original sin. salvation, which man acquires by Baptism; and he has a Reply to Objection 2. The power of the devil in so far certain power over man from the very fact that the latter is as he hinders man from obtaining glory, is expelled from subject to original, or even actual, sin. Consequently it is man by the baptismal ablution; but in so far as he hinders fitting that before Baptism the demons should be cast out man from receiving the sacrament, his power is cast out by exorcisms, lest they impede man’s salvation. Which by the exorcisms. expulsion is signified by the (priest) breathing (upon the Reply to Objection 3. Holy water is used against the person to be baptized); while the blessing, with the im- assaults of demons from without. But exorcisms are di- position of hands, bars the way against the return of him rected against those assaults of the demons which are from who was cast out. Then the salt which is put in the mouth, within. hence those who are exorcized are called energu- and the anointing of the nose and ears with spittle, signify mens, as it were “laboring inwardly.” the receiving of doctrine, as to the ears; consent thereto Or we may say that just as Penance is given as a fur- as to the nose; and confession thereof, as to the mouth. ther remedy against sin, because Baptism is not repeated; And the anointing with oil signifies man’s ability to fight so Holy Water is given as a further remedy against the as- against the demons. saults of demons, because the baptismal exorcisms are not Reply to Objection 1. The energumens are so-called given a second time. from “laboring inwardly” under the outward operation of Whether what is done in the exorcism effects anything, or is a mere sign? IIIa q. 71 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that what is done in the exor- to expel from them the devil’s hostile power, which de- cism does not effect anything, but is a mere sign. For if ceived man.” But the Church does nothing in vain. There- a child die after the exorcisms, before being baptized, it fore the effect of these breathings is that the power of the is not saved. But the effects of what is done in the sacra- devils is expelled. ments are ordained to the salvation of man; hence it is I answer that, Some say that the things done in the written (Mk. 16:16): “He that believeth and is baptized exorcism have no effect, but are mere signs. But this is shall be saved.” Therefore what is done in the exorcism clearly false; since in exorcizing, the Church uses words effects nothing, but is a mere sign. of command to cast out the devil’s power, for instance, Objection 2. Further, nothing is required for a sacra- when she says: “Therefore, accursed devil, go out from ment of the New Law, but that it should be a sign and a him,” etc. cause, as stated above (q. 62, a. 1). If, therefore, the things Therefore we must say that they have some effect, done in the exorcism effect anything, it seems that each of but, other than that of Baptism. For Baptism gives man them is a sacrament. grace unto the full remission of sins. But those things that Objection 3. Further, just as the exorcism is ordained are done in the exorcism remove the twofold impediment to Baptism, so if anything be effected in the exorcism, it against the reception of saving grace. Of these, one is the is ordained to the effect of Baptism. But disposition must outward impediment, so far as the demons strive to hin- needs precede the perfect form: because form is not re- der man’s salvation. And this impediment is removed by ceived save into matter already disposed. It would follow, the breathings, whereby the demon’s power is cast out, as therefore, that none could obtain the effect of Baptism un- appears from the passage quoted from Augustine, i.e. as less he were previously exorcized; which is clearly false. to the devil not placing obstacles against the reception of Therefore what is done in the exorcisms has no effect. the sacrament. Nevertheless, the demon’s power over man Objection 4. Further, just as some things are done in remains as to the stain of sin, and the debt of punishment, the exorcism before Baptism, so are some things done af- until sin be washed away by Baptism. And in this sense ter Baptism; for instance, the priest anoints the baptized Cyprian says (Epist. lxxvi): “Know that the devil’s evil on the top of the head. But what is done after Baptism power remains until the pouring of the saving water: but seems to have no effect; for, if it had, the effect of Baptism in Baptism he loses it all.” would be imperfect. Therefore neither have those things The other impediment is within, forasmuch as, from an effect, which are done in exorcism before Baptism. having contracted original sin, man’s sense is closed to the On the contrary, Augustine says (De Symbolo I): perception of the mysteries of salvation. Hence Rabanus “Little children are breathed upon and exorcized, in order says (De Instit. Cleric. i) that “by means of the typifying 2491 spittle and the touch of the priest, the Divine wisdom and sacraments but sacramentals. power brings salvation to the catechumen, that his nostrils Reply to Objection 3. The disposition that suffices being opened he may perceive the odor of the knowledge for receiving the baptismal grace is the faith and inten- of God, that his ears be opened to hear the commandments tion, either of the one baptized, if it be an adult, or of the of God, that his senses be opened in his inmost heart to re- Church, if it be a child. But these things that are done spond.” in the exorcism, are directed to the removal of the im- Reply to Objection 1. What is done in the exorcism pediments. And therefore one may receive the effect of does not take away the sin for which man is punished after Baptism without them. death; but only the impediments against his receiving the Yet they are not to be omitted save in a case of neces- remission of sin through the sacrament. Wherefore exor- sity. And then, if the danger pass, they should be supplied, cism avails a man nothing after death if he has not been that uniformity in Baptism may be observed. Nor are they baptized. supplied to no purpose after Baptism: because, just as the Praepositivus, however, says that children who die af- effect of Baptism may be hindered before it is received, ter being exorcized but before being baptized are sub- so can it be hindered after it has been received. jected to lesser darkness. But this does not seem to be Reply to Objection 4. Of those things that are done true: because that darkness consists in privation of the vi- after Baptism in respect of the person baptized, something sion of God, which cannot be greater or lesser. is done which is not a mere sign, but produces an effect, Reply to Objection 2. It is essential to a sacrament for instance, the anointing on the top of the head, the ef- to produce its principal effect, which is grace that remits fect of which is the preservation of baptismal grace. And sin, or supplies some defect in man. But those things that there is something which has no effect, but is a mere sign, are done in the exorcism do not effect this; they merely for instance, the baptized are given a white garment to remove these impediments. Consequently, they are not signify the newness of life. Whether it belongs to a priest to catechize and exorcize the person to be baptized? IIIa q. 71 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that it does not belong to a (Hom. xxix super Ezech.): “When priests place their priest to catechize and exorcize the person to be baptized. hands on believers for the grace of exorcism, what else For it belongs to the office of ministers to operate on the do they but cast out the devils?” unclean, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v). But catechu- I answer that, The minister compared to the priest, mens who are instructed by catechism, and “energumens” is as a secondary and instrumental agent to the principal who are cleansed by exorcism, are counted among the un- agent: as is implied in the very word “minister.” Now the clean, as Dionysius says in the same place. Therefore to secondary agent does nothing without the principal agent catechize and to exorcize do not belong to the office of the in operating. And the more mighty the operation, so much priests, but rather to that of the ministers. the mightier instruments does the principal agent require. Objection 2. Further, catechumens are instructed in But the operation of the priest in conferring the sacrament the Faith by the Holy Scripture which is read in the church itself is mightier than in those things that are preparatory by ministers: for just as the Old Testament is recited by to the sacrament. And so the highest ministers who are the Readers, so the New Testament is read by the Dea- called deacons co-operate with the priest in bestowing the cons and Subdeacons. And thus it belongs to the minis- sacraments themselves: for Isidore says (Epist. ad Lud- ters to catechize. In like manner it belongs, seemingly, ifred.) that “it belongs to the deacons to assist the priests to the ministers to exorcize. For Isidore says (Epist. ad in all things that are done in Christ’s sacraments, in Bap- Ludifred.): “The exorcist should know the exorcisms by tism, to wit, in the Chrism, in the Paten and Chalice”; heart, and impose his hands on the energumens and cate- while the inferior ministers assist the priest in those things chumens during the exorcism.” Therefore it belongs not which are preparatory to the sacraments: the readers, for to the priestly office to catechize and exorcize. instance, in catechizing; the exorcists in exorcizing. Objection 3. Further, “to catechize” is the same as Reply to Objection 1. The minister’s operation in re- “to teach,” and this is the same as “to perfect.” Now this gard to the unclean is ministerial and, as it were, instru- belongs to the office of a bishop, as Dionysius says (Eccl. mental, but the priest’s is principal. Hier. v). Therefore it does not belong to the priestly of- Reply to Objection 2. To readers and exorcists be- fice. longs the duty of catechizing and exorcizing, not, indeed, On the contrary, Pope Nicolas I says: “The catechiz- principally, but as ministers of the priest in these things. ing of those who are to be baptized can be undertaken by Reply to Objection 3. Instruction is manifold. one the priests attached to each church.” And Gregory says leads to the embracing of the Faith; and is ascribed by 2492 Dionysius to bishops (Eccl. Hier. ii) and can be under-priests. A third is instruction in the mode of Christian life: taken by any preacher, or even by any believer. Another and this belongs to the sponsors. A fourth is the instruc- is that by which a man is taught the rudiments of faith, tion in the profound mysteries of faith, and on the perfec- and how to comport himself in receiving the sacraments: tion of Christian life: this belongs to bishops “ex officio,” this belongs secondarily to the ministers, primarily to the in virtue of their office. 2493 THIRD PART, QUESTION 72 Of the Sacrament of Confirmation (In Twelve Articles) We have now to consider the Sacrament of Confirmation. Concerning this there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether Confirmation is a sacrament? (2) Its matter; (3) Whether it is essential to the sacrament that the chrism should have been previously consecrated by a bishop? (4) Its form; (5) Whether it imprints a character? (6) Whether the character of Confirmation presupposes the character of Baptism? (7) Whether it bestows grace? (8) Who is competent to receive this sacrament? (9) In what part of the body? (10) Whether someone is required to stand for the person to be confirmed? (11) Whether this sacrament is given by bishops only? (12) Of its rite. Whether confirmation is a sacrament? IIIa q. 72 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that Confirmation is not a sacra- and material things bear a likeness to things spiritual and ment. For sacraments derive their efficacy from the Di- intelligible, from what occurs in the life of the body, we vine institution, as stated above (q. 64 , a. 2). But we can perceive that which is special to the spiritual life. Now read nowhere of Confirmation being instituted by Christ. it is evident that in the life of the body a certain special Therefore it is not a sacrament. perfection consists in man’s attaining to the perfect age, Objection 2. Further, the sacraments of the New Law and being able to perform the perfect actions of a man: were foreshadowed in the Old Law; thus the Apostle says hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:11): “When I became (1 Cor. 10:2-4), that “all in Moses were baptized, in a man, I put away the things of a child.” And thence it the cloud and in the sea; and did all eat the same spir- is that besides the movement of generation whereby man itual food, and all drank the same spiritual drink.” But receives life of the body, there is the movement of growth, Confirmation was not foreshadowed in the old Testament. whereby man is brought to the perfect age. So therefore Therefore it is not a sacrament. does man receive spiritual life in Baptism, which is a spir- Objection 3. Further, the sacraments are ordained itual regeneration: while in Confirmation man arrives at unto man’s salvation. But man can be saved without Con- the perfect age, as it were, of the spiritual life. Hence Pope firmation: since children that are baptized, who die before Melchiades says: “The Holy Ghost, Who comes down on being confirmed, are saved. Therefore Confirmation is not the waters of Baptism bearing salvation in His flight, be- a sacrament. stows at the font, the fulness of innocence; but in Confir- Objection 4. Further, by all the sacraments of the mation He confers an increase of grace. In Baptism we are Church, man is conformed to Christ, Who is the Author of born again unto life; after Baptism we are strengthened.” the sacraments. But man cannot be conformed to Christ And therefore it is evident that Confirmation is a special by Confirmation, since we read nowhere of Christ being sacrament. confirmed. Reply to Objection 1. Concerning the institution of On the contrary, Pope Melchiades wrote to the bish- this sacrament there are three opinions. Some (Alexan- ops of Spain: “Concerning the point on which you sought der of Hales, Summa Theol. P. IV, Q. IX; St. Bonaven- to be informed, i.e. whether the imposition of the bishop’s ture, Sent. iv, D, 7) have maintained that this sacrament hand were a greater sacrament than Baptism, know that was instituted neither by Christ, nor by the apostles; but each is a great sacrament.” later in the course of time by one of the councils. Others I answer that, The sacraments of the New Law are or- (Pierre de Tarentaise, Sent. iv, D, 7) held that it was insti- dained unto special effects of grace: and therefore where tuted by the apostles. But this cannot be admitted; since there is a special effect of grace, there we find a special the institution of a new sacrament belongs to the power of sacrament ordained for the purpose. But since sensible excellence, which belongs to Christ alone. 2494 And therefore we must say that Christ instituted this some as conducing to the perfection of salvation; and thus sacrament not by bestowing, but by promising it, accord- it is that Confirmation is necessary for salvation: although ing to Jn. 16:7: “If I go not, the Paraclete will not come salvation is possible without it, provided it be not omitted to you, but if I go, I will send Him to you.” And this was out of contempt. because in this sacrament the fulness of the Holy Ghost is Reply to Objection 4. Those who receive Confir- bestowed, which was not to be given before Christ’s Res- mation, which is the sacrament of the fulness of grace, urrection and Ascension; according to Jn. 7:39: “As yet are conformed to Christ, inasmuch as from the very first the Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet glori- instant of His conception He was “full of grace and fied.” truth” (Jn. 1:14). This fulness was made known at His Reply to Objection 2. Confirmation is the sacrament Baptism, when “the Holy Ghost descended in a bodily of the fulness of grace: wherefore there could be noth- shape. . . upon Him” (Lk. 3:22). Hence (Lk. 4:1) it is writ- ing corresponding to it in the Old Law, since “the Law ten that “Jesus being full of the Holy Ghost, returned from brought nothing to perfection” (Heb. 7:19). the Jordan.” Nor was it fitting to Christ’s dignity, that He, Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 65, a. 4), Who is the Author of the sacraments, should receive the all the sacraments are in some way necessary for salva- fulness of grace from a sacrament. tion: but some, so that there is no salvation without them; Whether chrism is a fitting matter for this sacrament? IIIa q. 72 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that chrism is not a fitting mat- the fulness of the Holy Ghost is given for the spiritual ter for this sacrament. For this sacrament, as stated above strength which belongs to the perfect age. Now when (a. 1, ad 1), was instituted by Christ when He promised man comes to perfect age he begins at once to have in- His disciples the Holy Ghost. But He sent them the Holy tercourse with others; whereas until then he lives an indi- Ghost without their being anointed with chrism. More- vidual life, as it were, confined to himself. Now the grace over, the apostles themselves bestowed this sacrament of the Holy Ghost is signified by oil; hence Christ is said without chrism, by the mere imposition of hands: for it to be “anointed with the oil of gladness” (Ps. 44:8), by is written (Acts 8:17) that the apostles “laid their hands reason of His being gifted with the fulness of the Holy upon” those who were baptized, “and they received the Ghost. Consequently oil is a suitable matter of this sacra- Holy Ghost.” Therefore chrism is not the matter of this ment. And balm is mixed with the oil, by reason of its fra- sacrament: since the matter is essential to the sacrament. grant odor, which spreads about: hence the Apostle says Objection 2. Further, Confirmation perfects, in a way, (2 Cor. 2:15): “We are the good odor of Christ,” etc. And the sacrament of Baptism, as stated above (q. 65, Aa. 3,4): though many other things be fragrant, yet preference is and so it ought to be conformed to it as perfection to the given to balm, because it has a special odor of its own, thing perfected. But the matter, in Baptism, is a simple and because it confers incorruptibility: hence it is written element, viz. water. Therefore chrism, which is made of (Ecclus. 24:21): “My odor is as the purest balm.” oil and balm, is not a fitting matter for this sacrament. Reply to Objection 1. Christ, by the power which Objection 3. Further, oil is used as the matter of this He exercises in the sacraments, bestowed on the apostles sacrament for the purpose of anointing. But any oil will the reality of this sacrament, i.e. the fulness of the Holy do for anointing: for instance, oil made from nuts, and Ghost, without the sacrament itself, because they had re- from anything else. Therefore not only olive oil should be ceived “the first fruits of the Spirit” (Rom. 8:23). Nev- used for this sacrament. ertheless, something of keeping with the matter of this Objection 4. Further, it has been stated above (q. 66, sacrament was displayed to the apostles in a sensible man- a. 3) that water is used as the matter of Baptism, because ner when they received the Holy Ghost. For that the Holy it is easily procured everywhere. But olive oil is not to be Ghost came down upon them in a sensible manner under procured everywhere; and much less is balm. Therefore the form of fire, refers to the same signification as oil: ex- chrism, which is made of these, is not a fitting matter for cept in so far as fire has an active power, while oil has a this sacrament. passive power, as being the matter and incentive of fire. On the contrary, Gregory says (Registr. iv): “Let no And this was quite fitting: for it was through the apostles priest dare to sign the baptized infants on the brow with that the grace of the Holy Ghost was to flow forth to oth- the sacred chrism.” Therefore chrism is the matter of this ers. Again, the Holy Ghost came down on the apostles in sacrament. the shape of a tongue. Which refers to the same significa- I answer that, Chrism is the fitting matter of this tion as balm: except in so far as the tongue communicates sacrament. For, as stated above (a. 1), in this sacrament with others by speech, but balm, by its odor. because, to 2495 wit, the apostles were filled with the Holy Ghost, as teach-are manifold, according to Wis. 7:22, “In her is the” Holy ers of the Faith; but the rest of the believers, as doing that “Spirit. . . one, manifold”; and 1 Cor. 12:4, “There are di- which gives edification to the faithful. versities of graces, but the same Spirit.” Consequently a In like manner, too, when the apostles imposed their compound matter is appropriate to this sacrament. hands, and when they preached, the fulness of the Holy Reply to Objection 3. These properties of oil, by Ghost came down under visible signs on the faithful, just reason of which it symbolizes the Holy Ghost, are to be as, at the beginning, He came down on the apostles: hence found in olive oil rather than in any other oil. In fact, the Peter said (Acts 11:15): “When I had begun to speak, the olive-tree itself, through being an evergreen, signifies the Holy Ghost fell upon them, as upon us also in the begin- refreshing and merciful operation of the Holy Ghost. ning.” Consequently there was no need for sacramental Moreover, this oil is called oil properly, and is very sensible matter, where God sent sensible signs miracu- much in use, wherever it is to be had. And whatever other lously. liquid is so called, derives its name from its likeness to However, the apostles commonly made use of chrism this oil: nor are the latter commonly used, unless it be to in bestowing the sacrament, when such like visible signs supply the want of olive oil. Therefore it is that this oil were lacking. For Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iv): “There alone is used for this and certain other sacraments. is a certain perfecting operation which our guides,” i.e. Reply to Objection 4. Baptism is the sacrament of the apostles, “call the sacrifice of Chrism.” absolute necessity; and so its matter should be at hand Reply to Objection 2. Baptism is bestowed that spiri- everywhere. But it is enough that the matter of this sacra- tual life may be received simply; wherefore simple matter ment, which is not of such great necessity, be easily sent is fitting to it. But this sacrament is given that we may to all parts of the world. receive the fulness of the Holy Ghost, Whose operations Whether it is essential to this sacrament that the chrism which is its matter be previ-IIIa q. 72 a. 3 ously consecrated by a bishop? Objection 1. It seems that it is not essential to this this sacrament that its matter be previously consecrated sacrament, that the chrism, which is its matter, be previ- by a bishop. ously consecrated by a bishop. For Baptism which be- I answer that, The entire sanctification of the sacra- stows full remission of sins is not less efficacious than ments is derived from Christ, as stated above (q. 64, a. 3). this sacrament. But, though the baptismal water receives But it must be observed that Christ did use certain sacra- a kind of blessing before being used for Baptism; yet this ments having a corporeal matter, viz. Baptism, and also is not essential to the sacrament: since in a case of ne- the Eucharist. And consequently, from Christ’s very act cessity it can be dispensed with. Therefore neither is it in using them, the matter of these sacraments received a essential to this sacrament that the chrism should be pre- certain aptitude to the perfection of the sacrament. Hence viously consecrated by a bishop. Chrysostom (Chromatius, In Matth. 3:15) says that “the Objection 2. Further, the same should not be con- waters of Baptism could never wash away the sins of secrated twice. But the sacramental matter is sanctified, believers, had they not been sanctified by contact with in the very conferring of the sacrament, by the form of our Lord’s body.” And again, our Lord Himself “taking words wherein the sacrament is bestowed; hence Augus- bread. . . blessed. . . and in like manner the chalice” (Mat. tine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.): “The word is added to the 26:26,27; Lk. 22:19, 20). For this reason there is no element, and this becomes a sacrament.” Therefore the need for the matter of these sacraments to be blessed pre- chrism should not be consecrated before this sacrament is viously, since Christ’s blessing is enough. And if any given. blessing be used, it belongs to the solemnity of the sacra- Objection 3. Further, every consecration employed in ment, not to its essence. But Christ did not make use of the sacraments is ordained to the bestowal of grace. But visible anointings, so as not to slight the invisible unc- the sensible matter composed of oil and balm is not recep- tion whereby He was “anointed above” His “fellows” (Ps. tive of grace. Therefore it should not be consecrated. 44:8). And hence both chrism, and the holy oil, and the On the contrary, Pope Innocent I says (Ep. ad De- oil of the sick are blessed before being put to sacramental cent.): “Priests, when baptizing, may anoint the baptized use. This suffices for the reply to the First Objection. with chrism, previously consecrated by a bishop: but they Reply to Objection 2. Each consecration of the must not sign the brow with the same oil; this belongs to chrism has not the same object. For just as an instrument the bishop alone, when he gives the Paraclete.” Now this derives instrumental power in two ways, viz. when it re- is done in this sacrament. Therefore it is necessary for ceives the form of an instrument, and when it is moved by 2496 the principal agent; so too the sacramental matter needs of grace, not so as to be the subject of grace, but only a twofold sanctification, by one of which it becomes fit as the instrument of grace, as explained above (q. 62, matter for the sacrament, while by the other it is applied a. 3). And this sacramental matter is consecrated, either to the production of the effect. by Christ, or by a bishop, who, in the Church, imperson- Reply to Objection 3. Corporeal matter is receptive ates Christ. Whether the proper form of this sacrament is: “I sign thee with the sign of the cross,” IIIa q. 72 a. 4 etc.? Objection 1. It seems that the proper form of this given to the combatant, as in a bodily combat: thus are sacrament is not: “I sign thee with the sign of the cross, I soldiers marked with the sign of their leaders. And to this confirm thee with the chrism of salvation, in the name of refer the words, “I sign thee with the sign of the cross,” in the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. Amen.” which sign, to wit, our King triumphed (cf. Col. 2:15). For the use of the sacraments is derived from Christ and Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 2, ad 1), the apostles. But neither did Christ institute this form, nor sometimes the effect of this sacrament, i.e. the fulness do we read of the apostles making use of it. Therefore it of the Holy Ghost, was given through the ministry of is not the proper form of this sacrament. the apostles, under certain visible signs, wrought mirac- Objection 2. Further, just as the sacrament is the same ulously by God, Who can bestow the sacramental effect, everywhere, so should the form be the same: because ev- independently of the sacrament. In these cases there was erything has unity, just as it has being, from its form. But no need for either the matter or the form of this sacrament. this form is not used by all: for some say: “I confirm thee On the other hand, sometimes they bestowed this sacra- with the chrism of sanctification.” Therefore the above is ment as ministers of the sacraments. And then, they used not the proper form of this sacrament. both matter and form according to Christ’s command. For Objection 3. Further, this sacrament should be con- the apostles, in conferring the sacraments, observed many formed to Baptism, as the perfect to the thing perfected, things which are not handed down in those Scriptures that as stated above (a. 2, obj. 2). But in the form of Baptism are in general use. Hence Dionysius says at the end of no mention is made of signing the character; nor again his treatise on the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy (chap. vii): of the cross of Christ, though in Baptism man dies with “It is not allowed to explain in writing the prayers which Christ, as the Apostle says (Rom. 6:3-8); nor of the ef- are used in the sacraments, and to publish their mystical fect which is salvation, though Baptism is necessary for meaning, or the power which, coming from God, gives salvation. Again, in the baptismal form, only one action them their efficacy; we learn these things by holy tradi- is included; and the person of the baptizer is expressed tion without any display,”∗ i.e. secretly. Hence the Apos- in the words: “I baptize thee, whereas the contrary is to tle, speaking of the celebration of the Eucharist, writes (1 be observed in the above form.” Therefore this is not the Cor. 11:34): “The rest I will set in order, when I come.” proper form of this sacrament. Reply to Objection 2. Holiness is the cause of sal- On the contrary, Is the authority of the Church, who vation. Therefore it comes to the same whether we say always uses this form. “chrism of salvation” or “of sanctification.” I answer that, The above form is appropriate to this Reply to Objection 3. Baptism is the regeneration sacrament. For just as the form of a natural thing gives unto the spiritual life, whereby man lives in himself. And it its species, so a sacramental form should contain what- therefore in the baptismal form that action alone is ex- ever belongs to the species of the sacrament. Now as is pressed which refers to the man to be sanctified. But evident from what has been already said (Aa. 1,2), in this this sacrament is ordained not only to the sanctification sacrament the Holy Ghost is given for strength in the spir- of man in himself, but also to strengthen him in his out- itual combat. Wherefore in this sacrament three things ward combat. Consequently not only is mention made of are necessary; and they are contained in the above form. interior sanctification, in the words, “I confirm thee with The first of these is the cause conferring fulness of spiri- the chrism of salvation”: but furthermore man is signed tual strength which cause is the Blessed Trinity: and this outwardly, as it were with the standard of the cross, unto is expressed in the words, “In the name of the Father,” the outward spiritual combat; and this is signified by the etc. The second is the spiritual strength itself bestowed words, “I sign thee with the sign of the cross.” on man unto salvation by the sacrament of visible matter; But in the very word “baptize,” which signifies “to and this is referred to in the words, “I confirm thee with cleanse,” we can understand both the matter, which is the chrism of salvation.” The third is the sign which is the cleansing water, and the effect, which is salvation. ∗ The passage quoted in the text of the Summa differs slightly from the above, which is translated directly from the works of Dionysius. 2497 Whereas these are not understood by the word “confirm”; however, included in order to express the intention. But and consequently they had to be expressed. this does not seem so necessary in Confirmation, which Again, it has been said above (q. 66, a. 5, ad 1) that is conferred only by a minister of excellence, as we shall the pronoun “I” is not necessary to the Baptismal form, state later on (a. 11). because it is included in the first person of the verb. It is, Whether the sacrament of Confirmation imprints a character? IIIa q. 72 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that the sacrament of Confirma- of sacred actions other than those in respect of which he tion does not imprint a character. For a character means receives power in Baptism. For in Baptism he receives a distinctive sign. But a man is not distinguished from power to do those things which pertain to his own salva- unbelievers by the sacrament of Confirmation, for this is tion, forasmuch as he lives to himself: whereas in Confir- the effect of Baptism; nor from the rest of the faithful, be- mation he receives power to do those things which pertain cause this sacrament is ordained to the spiritual combat, to the spiritual combat with the enemies of the Faith. This which is enjoined to all the faithful. Therefore a character is evident from the example of the apostles, who, before is not imprinted in this sacrament. they received the fulness of the Holy Ghost, were in the Objection 2. Further, it was stated above (q. 63, a. 2) “upper room. . . persevering. . . in prayer” (Acts 1:13,14); that a character is a spiritual power. Now a power must be whereas afterwards they went out and feared not to con- either active or passive. But the active power in the sacra- fess their faith in public, even in the face of the enemies ments is conferred by the sacrament of order: while the of the Christian Faith. And therefore it is evident that a passive or receptive power is conferred by the sacrament character is imprinted in the sacrament of Confirmation. of Baptism. Therefore no character is imprinted by the Reply to Objection 1. All have to wage the spiritual sacrament of Confirmation. combat with our invisible enemies. But to fight against Objection 3. Further, in circumcision, which is a visible foes, viz. against the persecutors of the Faith, by character of the body, no spiritual character is imprinted. confessing Christ’s name, belongs to the confirmed, who But in this sacrament a character is imprinted on the body, have already come spiritually to the age of virility, ac- when the sign of the cross is signed with chrism on man’s cording to 1 Jn. 2:14: “I write unto you, young men, be- brow. Therefore a spiritual character is not imprinted by cause you are strong, and the word of God abideth in you, this sacrament. and you have overcome the wicked one.” And therefore On the contrary, A character is imprinted in every the character of Confirmation is a distinctive sign, not be- sacrament that is not repeated. But this sacrament is not tween unbelievers and believers, but between those who repeated: for Gregory II says (Ep. iv ad Bonifac.): “As to are grown up spiritually and those of whom it is written: the man who was confirmed a second time by a bishop, “As new-born babes” (1 Pet. 2:2). such a repetition must be forbidden.” Therefore a charac- Reply to Objection 2. All the sacraments are protes- ter is imprinted in Confirmation. tations of faith. Therefore just as he who is baptized re- I answer that, As stated above (q. 63, a. 2), a charac- ceives the power of testifying to his faith by receiving ter is a spiritual power ordained to certain sacred actions. the other sacraments; so he who is confirmed receives the Now it has been said above (a. 1; q. 65, a. 1) that, just power of publicly confessing his faith by words, as it were as Baptism is a spiritual regeneration unto Christian life, “ex officio.” so also is Confirmation a certain spiritual growth bring- Reply to Objection 3. The sacraments of the Old Law ing man to perfect spiritual age. But it is evident, from are called “justice of the flesh” (Heb. 9:10) because, to a comparison with the life of the body, that the action wit, they wrought nothing inwardly. Consequently in cir- which is proper to man immediately after birth, is dif- cumcision a character was imprinted in the body only, but ferent from the action which is proper to him when he not in the soul. But in Confirmation, since it is a sacra- has come to perfect age. And therefore by the sacrament ment of the New Law, a spiritual character is imprinted at of Confirmation man is given a spiritual power in respect the same time, together with the bodily character. 2498 Whether the character of Confirmation presupposes of necessity, the baptismal char-IIIa q. 72 a. 6 acter? Objection 1. It seems that the character of Confir- mation is to Baptism as growth to birth, as is evident from mation does not presuppose, of necessity, the baptismal what has been said above (a. 1; q. 65, a. 1). Now it is clear character. For the sacrament of Confirmation is ordained that no one can be brought to perfect age unless he be first to the public confession of the Faith of Christ. But many, born: and in like manner, unless a man be first baptized, even before Baptism, have publicly confessed the Faith he cannot receive the sacrament of Confirmation. of Christ by shedding their blood for the Faith. There- Reply to Objection 1. The Divine power is not con- fore the character of Confirmation does not presuppose fined to the sacraments. Hence man can receive spiritual the baptismal character. strength to confess the Faith of Christ publicly, without Objection 2. Further, it is not related of the apostles receiving the sacrament of Confirmation: just as he can that they were baptized; especially, since it is written (Jn. also receive remission of sins without Baptism. Yet, just 4:2) that Christ “Himself did not baptize, but His disci- as none receive the effect of Baptism without the desire ples.” Yet afterwards they were confirmed by the coming of Baptism; so none receive the effect of Confirmation, of the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in like manner, others can without the desire of Confirmation. And man can have be confirmed before being baptized. this even before receiving Baptism. Objection 3. Further, it is written (Acts 10:44-48) that Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (Ep. cclxv), “while Peter was yet speaking. . . the Holy Ghost fell on all from our Lord’s words, “ ‘He that is washed, needeth not them that heard the word. . . and [Vulg.: ‘for’] they heard but to wash his feet’ (Jn. 13:10), we gather that Peter them speaking with tongues”: and afterwards “he com- and Christ’s other disciples had been baptized, either with manded them to be baptized.” Therefore others with equal John’s Baptism, as some think; or with Christ’s, which is reason can be confirmed before being baptized. more credible. For He did not refuse to administer Bap- On the contrary, Rabanus says (De Instit. Cleric. i): tism, so as to have servants by whom to baptize others.” “Lastly the Paraclete is given to the baptized by the impo- Reply to Objection 3. Those who heard the preach- sition of the high priest’s hands, in order that the baptized ing of Peter received the effect of Confirmation miracu- may be strengthened by the Holy Ghost so as to publish lously: but not the sacrament of Confirmation. Now it his faith.” has been stated (ad 1) that the effect of Confirmation can I answer that, The character of Confirmation, of ne- be bestowed on man before Baptism, whereas the sacra- cessity supposes the baptismal character: so that, in effect, ment cannot. For just as the effect of Confirmation, which if one who is not baptized were to be confirmed, he would is spiritual strength, presupposes the effect of Baptism, receive nothing, but would have to be confirmed again af- which is justification, so the sacrament of Confirmation ter receiving Baptism. The reason of this is that, Confir- presupposes the sacrament of Baptism. Whether sanctifying grace is bestowed in this sacrament? IIIa q. 72 a. 7 Objection 1. It seems that sanctifying grace is not On the contrary, Pope Melchiades says (Ep. ad bestowed in this sacrament. For sanctifying grace is or- Episc. Hispan.): “The Holy Ghost bestows at the font dained against sin. But this sacrament, as stated above the fulness of innocence; but in Confirmation He confers (a. 6) is given only to the baptized, who are cleansed from an increase of grace.” sin. Therefore sanctifying grace is not bestowed in this I answer that, In this sacrament, as stated above sacrament. (Aa. 1,4), the Holy Ghost is given to the baptized for Objection 2. Further, sinners especially need sanc- strength: just as He was given to the apostles on the day tifying grace, by which alone can they be justified. If, of Pentecost, as we read in Acts 2; and just as He was therefore, sanctifying grace is bestowed in this sacrament, given to the baptized by the imposition of the apostles’ it seems that it should be given to those who are in sin. hands, as related in Acts 8:17. Now it has been proved in And yet this is not true. the Ia, q. 43, a. 3 that the Holy Ghost is not sent or given Objection 3. Further, there can only be one species of except with sanctifying grace. Consequently it is evident sanctifying grace, since it is ordained to one effect. But that sanctifying grace is bestowed in this sacrament. two forms of the same species cannot be in the same sub- Reply to Objection 1. Sanctifying grace does indeed ject. Since, therefore, man receives sanctifying grace in take away sin; but it has other effects also, because it suf- Baptism, it seems that sanctifying grace is not bestowed fices to carry man through every step as far as eternal life. in Confirmation, which is given to none but the baptized. Hence to Paul was it said (2 Cor. 12:9): “My grace is suf- 2499 ficient for thee”: and he says of himself (1 Cor. 15:10): sacrament perfects the effects of Penance, as of Baptism: “By the grace of God I am what I am.” Therefore sancti- because by the grace which he has received in this sacra- fying grace is given not only for the remission of sin, but ment, the penitent will obtain fuller remission of his sin. also for growth and stability in righteousness. And thus is And if any adult approach, being in a state of sin of which it bestowed in this sacrament. he is not conscious or for which he is not perfectly con- Reply to Objection 2. Further, as appears from its trite, he will receive the remission of his sins through the very name, this sacrament is given in order “to confirm” grace bestowed in this sacrament. what it finds already there. And consequently it should Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 62, a. 2), not be given to those who are not in a state of grace. For the sacramental grace adds to the sanctifying grace taken this reason, just as it is not given to the unbaptized, so in its wide sense, something that produces a special ef- neither should it be given to the adult sinners, except they fect, and to which the sacrament is ordained. If, then, be restored by Penance. Wherefore was it decreed in the we consider, in its wide sense, the grace bestowed in this Council of Orleans (Can. iii) that “men should come to sacrament, it does not differ from that bestowed in Bap- Confirmation fasting; and should be admonished to con- tism, but increases what was already there. On the other fess their sins first, so that being cleansed they may be hand, if we consider it as to that which is added over and able to receive the gift of the Holy Ghost.” And then this above, then one differs in species from the other. Whether this sacrament should be given to all? IIIa q. 72 a. 8 Objection 1. It seems that this sacrament should not should come to perfect age: yet this is sometimes hin- be given to all. For this sacrament is given in order to dered by reason of the corruptibility of the body, which is confer a certain excellence, as stated above (a. 11, ad 2). forestalled by death. But much more is it God’s intention But all are not suited for that which belongs to excellence. to bring all things to perfection, since nature shares in this Therefore this sacrament should not be given to all. intention inasmuch as it reflects Him: hence it is written Objection 2. Further, by this sacrament man advances (Dt. 32:4): “The works of God are perfect.” Now the soul, spiritually to perfect age. But perfect age is inconsistent to which spiritual birth and perfect spiritual age belong, is with childhood. Therefore at least it should not be given immortal; and just as it can in old age attain to spiritual to children. birth, so can it attain to perfect (spiritual) age in youth or Objection 3. Further, as Pope Melchiades says (Ep. childhood; because the various ages of the body do not ad Episc. Hispan.) “after Baptism we are strengthened for affect the soul. Therefore this sacrament should be given the combat.” But women are incompetent to combat, by to all. reason of the frailty of their sex. Therefore neither should Reply to Objection 1. This sacrament is given in women receive this sacrament. order to confer a certain excellence, not indeed, like the Objection 4. Further, Pope Melchiades says (Ep. ad sacrament of order, of one man over another, but of man Episc. Hispan.): “Although the benefit of Regeneration in regard to himself: thus the same man, when arrived at suffices for those who are on the point of death, yet the maturity, excels himself as he was when a boy. graces of Confirmation are necessary for those who are Reply to Objection 2. As stated above, the age of to conquer. Confirmation arms and strengthens those to the body does not affect the soul. Consequently even in whom the struggles and combats of this world are re- childhood man can attain to the perfection of spiritual served. And he who comes to die, having kept unsul- age, of which it is written (Wis. 4:8): “Venerable old lied the innocence he acquired in Baptism, is confirmed age is not that of long time, nor counted by the number by death; for after death he can sin no more.” Therefore of years.” And hence it is that many children, by rea- this sacrament should not be given to those who are on the son of the strength of the Holy Ghost which they had re- point of death: and so it should not be given to all. ceived, fought bravely for Christ even to the shedding of On the contrary, It is written (Acts 2:2) that the Holy their blood. Ghost in coming, “filled the whole house,” whereby the Reply to Objection 3. As Chrysostom says (Hom. i Church is signified; and afterwards it is added that “they De Machab.), “in earthly contests fitness of age, physique were all filled with the Holy Ghost.” But this sacrament and rank are required; and consequently slaves, women, is given that we may receive that fulness. Therefore it old men, and boys are debarred from taking part therein. should be given to all who belong to the Church. But in the heavenly combats, the Stadium is open equally I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), man is spiri- to all, to every age, and to either sex.” Again, he says tually advanced by this sacrament to perfect age. Now (Hom. de Militia Spirit.): “In God’s eyes even women the intention of nature is that everyone born corporally, fight, for many a woman has waged the spiritual war- 2500 fare with the courage of a man. For some have rivaled the fulness of Christ.” And hence Hugh of St. Victor says men in the courage with which they have suffered martyr- (De Sacram. ii), “It would be altogether hazardous, if any- dom; and some indeed have shown themselves stronger one happened to go forth from this life without being con- than men.” Therefore this sacrament should be given to firmed”: not that such a one would be lost, except perhaps women. through contempt; but that this would be detrimental to Reply to Objection 4. As we have already observed, his perfection. And therefore even children dying after the soul, to which spiritual age belongs, is immortal. Confirmation obtain greater glory, just as here below they Wherefore this sacrament should be given to those on the receive more grace. The passage quoted is to be taken in point of death, that they may be seen to be perfect at the the sense that, with regard to the dangers of the present resurrection, according to Eph. 4:13: “Until we all meet combat, those who are on the point of death do not need into the unity of faith. . . unto the measure of the age of this sacrament. Whether this sacrament should be given to man on the forehead? IIIa q. 72 a. 9 Objection 1. It seems that this sacrament should not selves in public, whereas before they remained hidden in be given to man on the forehead. For this sacrament per- the upper room. fects Baptism, as stated above (q. 65, Aa. 3,4). But the Secondly, because man is hindered from freely con- sacrament of Baptism is given to man over his whole fessing Christ’s name, by two things—by fear and by body. Therefore this sacrament should not be given on shame. Now both these things betray themselves prin- the forehead only. cipally on the forehead on account of the proximity of the Objection 2. Further, this sacrament is given for spir- imagination, and because the (vital) spirits mount directly itual strength, as stated above (Aa. 1,2,4). But spiritual from the heart to the forehead: hence “those who are strength is situated principally in the heart. Therefore this ashamed, blush, and those who are afraid, pale” (Ethic. sacrament should be given over the heart rather than on iv). And therefore man is signed with chrism, that neither the forehead. fear nor shame may hinder him from confessing the name Objection 3. Further, this sacrament is given to man of Christ. that he may freely confess the faith of Christ. But “with Reply to Objection 1. By baptism we are regenerated the mouth, confession is made unto salvation,” according unto spiritual life, which belongs to the whole man. But to Rom. 10:10. Therefore this sacrament should be given in Confirmation we are strengthened for the combat; the about the mouth rather than on the forehead. sign of which should be borne on the forehead, as in a On the contrary, Rabanus says (De Instit. Cleric. i): conspicuous place. “The baptized is signed by the priest with chrism on the Reply to Objection 2. The principle of fortitude is in top of the head, but by the bishop on the forehead.” the heart, but its sign appears on the forehead: wherefore I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,4), in this sacra- it is written (Ezech. 3:8): “Behold I have made. . . thy fore- ment man receives the Holy Ghost for strength in the spir- head harder than their foreheads.” Hence the sacrament of itual combat, that he may bravely confess the Faith of the Eucharist, whereby man is confirmed in himself, be- Christ even in face of the enemies of that Faith. Where- longs to the heart, according to Ps. 103:15: “That bread fore he is fittingly signed with the sign of the cross on may strengthen man’s heart.” But the sacrament of Con- the forehead, with chrism, for two reasons. First, because firmation is required as a sign of fortitude against others; he is signed with the sign of the cross, as a soldier with and for this reason it is given on the forehead. the sign of his leader, which should be evident and mani- Reply to Objection 3. This sacrament is given that fest. Now, the forehead, which is hardly ever covered, is we may confess freely: but not that we may confess sim- the most conspicuous part of the human body. Wherefore ply, for this is also the effect of Baptism. And therefore the confirmed is anointed with chrism on the forehead, it should not be given on the mouth, but on the forehead, that he may show publicly that he is a Christian: thus too where appear the signs of those passions which hinder free the apostles after receiving the Holy Ghost showed them- confession. 2501 Whether he who is confirmed needs one to stand∗ for him? IIIa q. 72 a. 10 Objection 1. It seems that he who is confirmed needs Heb. 12:9: “We have had fathers of our flesh, for instruc- no one to stand for him. For this sacrament is given not tors, and we obeyed [Vulg.: ‘reverenced’]” them; so they only to children but also to adults. But adults can stand who are chosen for the fight need instructors by whom for themselves. Therefore it is absurd that someone else they are informed of things concerning the conduct of the should stand for them. battle, and hence in earthly wars, generals and captains Objection 2. Further, he that belongs already to the are appointed to the command of the others. For this rea- Church, has free access to the prince of the Church, i.e. son he also who receives this sacrament, has someone to the bishop. But this sacrament, as stated above (a. 6), is stand for him, who, as it were, has to instruct him con- given only to one that is baptized, who is already a mem- cerning the fight. ber of the Church. Therefore it seems that he should not Likewise, since this sacrament bestows on man the be brought by another to the bishop in order to receive this perfection of spiritual age, as stated above (Aa. 2,5), there- sacrament. fore he who approaches this sacrament is upheld by an- Objection 3. Further, this sacrament is given for other, as being spiritually a weakling and a child. spiritual strength, which has more vigor in men than in Reply to Objection 1. Although he who is confirmed, women, according to Prov. 31:10: “Who shall find a be adult in body, nevertheless he is not yet spiritually valiant woman?” Therefore at least a woman should not adult. stand for a man in confirmation. Reply to Objection 2. Though he who is baptized On the contrary, Are the following words of Pope is made a member of the Church, nevertheless he is not Innocent, which are to be found in the Decretals (XXX, yet enrolled as a Christian soldier. And therefore he is q. 4): “If anyone raise the children of another’s marriage brought to the bishop, as to the commander of the army, from the sacred font, or stand for them in Confirmation,” by one who is already enrolled as a Christian soldier. For etc. Therefore, just as someone is required as sponsor of one who is not yet confirmed should not stand for another one who is baptized, so is someone required to stand for in Confirmation. him who is to be confirmed . Reply to Objection 3. According to Col. 3 *(Gal. I answer that, As stated above (Aa. 1,4,9), this sacra- 3:28), “in Christ Jesus there is neither male nor female.” ment is given to man for strength in the spiritual combat. Consequently it matters not whether a man or a woman Now, just as one newly born requires someone to teach stand for one who is to be confirmed. him things pertaining to ordinary conduct, according to Whether only a bishop can confer this sacrament? IIIa q. 72 a. 11 Objection 1. It seems that not only a bishop can con- essential to this sacrament that it be conferred by a bishop. fer this sacrament. For Gregory (Regist. iv), writing to Objection 3. Further, the top of the head, where ac- Bishop Januarius, says: “We hear that some were scan- cording to medical men the reason is situated (i.e. the dalized because we forbade priests to anoint with chrism “particular reason,” which is called the “cogitative fac- those who have been baptized. Yet in doing this we fol- ulty”), is more noble than the forehead, which is the site lowed the ancient custom of our Church: but if this trou- of the imagination. But a simple priest can anoint the ble some so very much we permit priests, where no bishop baptized with chrism on the top of the head. Therefore is to be had, to anoint the baptized on the forehead with much more can he anoint them with chrism on the fore- chrism.” But that which is essential to the sacraments head, which belongs to this sacrament. should not be changed for the purpose of avoiding scan- On the contrary, Pope Eusebius (Ep. iii ad Ep. Tusc.) dal. Therefore it seems that it is not essential to this sacra- says: “The sacrament of the imposition of the hand should ment that it be conferred by a bishop. be held in great veneration, and can be given by none but Objection 2. Further, the sacrament of Baptism seems the high priests. Nor is it related or known to have been to be more efficacious than the sacrament of Confirma- conf erred in apostolic times by others than the apostles tion: since it bestows full remission of sins, both as to themselves; nor can it ever be either licitly or validly per- guilt and as to punishment, whereas this sacrament does formed by others than those who stand in their place. And not. But a simple priest, in virtue of his office, can give if anyone presume to do otherwise, it must be considered the sacrament of Baptism: and in a case of necessity any- null and void; nor will such a thing ever be counted among one, even without orders, can baptize. Therefore it is not the sacraments of the Church.” Therefore it is essential to ∗ Literally, “to hold him” 2502 this sacrament, which is called “the sacrament of the im-Reply to Objection 1. The Pope has the plenitude of position of the hand,” that it be given by a bishop. power in the Church, in virtue of which he can commit to I answer that, In every work the final completion is certain lower orders things that belong to the higher or- reserved to the supreme act or power; thus the preparation ders: thus he allows priests to confer minor orders, which of the matter belongs to the lower craftsmen, the higher belong to the episcopal power. And in virtue of this ful- gives the form, but the highest of all is he to whom per- ness of power the Pope, Blessed Gregory, allowed simple tains the use, which is the end of things made by art; thus priests to confer this sacrament, so long as the scandal was also the letter which is written by the clerk, is signed by ended. his employer. Now the faithful of Christ are a Divine Reply to Objection 2. The sacrament of Baptism is work, according to 1 Cor. 3:9: “You are God’s building”; more efficacious than this sacrament as to the removal of and they are also “an epistle,” as it were, “written with the evil, since it is a spiritual birth, that consists in change Spirit of God,” according to 2 Cor. 3:2,3. And this sacra- from non-being to being. But this sacrament is more effi- ment of Confirmation is, as it were, the final completion cacious for progress in good; since it is a spiritual growth of the sacrament of Baptism; in the sense that by Baptism from imperfect being to perfect being. And hence this man is built up into a spiritual dwelling, and is written sacrament is committed to a more worthy minister. like a spiritual letter; whereas by the sacrament of Con- Reply to Objection 3. As Rabanus says (De Instit. firmation, like a house already built, he is consecrated as Cleric. i), “the baptized is signed by the priest with chrism a temple of the Holy Ghost, and as a letter already writ- on the top of the head, but by the bishop on the forehead; ten, is signed with the sign of the cross. Therefore the that the former unction may symbolize the descent of the conferring of this sacrament is reserved to bishops, who Holy Ghost on hint, in order to consecrate a dwelling to possess supreme power in the Church: just as in the prim- God: and that the second also may teach us that the seven- itive Church, the fulness of the Holy Ghost was given by fold grace of the same Holy Ghost descends on man with the apostles, in whose place the bishops stand (Acts 8). all fulness of sanctity, knowledge and virtue.” Hence this Hence Pope Urban I says: “All the faithful should. after unction is reserved to bishops, not on account of its being Baptism, receive the Holy Ghost by the imposition of the applied to a more worthy part of the body, but by reason bishop’s hand, that they may become perfect Christians.” of its having a more powerful effect. Whether the rite of this sacrament is appropriate? IIIa q. 72 a. 12 Objection 1. It seems that the rite of this sacrament 18:20) saying: “Where there are two or three gathered to- is not appropriate. For the sacrament of Baptism is of gether in My name, there am I in the midst of them.” And greater necessity than this, as stated above (a. 2, ad 4; therefore we must hold firmly that the Church’s ordina- q. 65, Aa. 3,4). But certain seasons are fixed for Baptism, tions are directed by the wisdom of Christ. And for this viz. Easter and Pentecost. Therefore some fixed time of reason we must look upon it as certain that the rite ob- the year should be chosen for this sacrament. served by the Church, in this and the other sacraments, is Objection 2. Further, just as this sacrament requires appropriate. devotion both in the giver and in the receiver, so also does Reply to Objection 1. As Pope Melchiades says (Ep. the sacrament of Baptism. But in the sacrament of Bap- ad Epis. Hispan.), “these two sacraments,” viz. Baptism tism it is not necessary that it should be received or given and Confirmation, “are so closely connected that they can fasting. Therefore it seems unfitting for the Council of nowise be separated save by death intervening, nor can Orleans to declare that “those who come to Confirmation one be duly celebrated without the other.” Consequently should be fasting”; and the Council of Meaux, “that bish- the same seasons are fixed for the solemn celebration of ops should not give the Holy Ghost with imposition of the Baptism and of this sacrament. But since this sacrament is hand except they be fasting.” given only by bishops, who are not always present where Objection 3. Further, chrism is a sign of the fulness priests are baptizing, it was necessary, as regards the com- of the Holy Ghost, as stated above (a. 2). But the ful- mon use, to defer the sacrament of Confirmation to other ness of the Holy Ghost was given to Christ’s faithful on seasons also. the day of Pentecost, as related in Acts 2:1. Therefore the Reply to Objection 2. The sick and those in danger chrism should be mixed and blessed on the day of Pente- of death are exempt from this prohibition, as we read in cost rather than on Maundy Thursday. the decree of the Council of Meaux. And therefore, on On the contrary, Is the use of the Church, who is account of the multitude of the faithful, and on account of governed by the Holy Ghost. imminent dangers, it is allowed for this sacrament, which I answer that, Our Lord promised His faithful (Mat. can be given by none but a bishop, to be given or received 2503 even by those who are not fasting: since one bishop, es-chrism has to be used, is celebrated on Easter Eve, it was pecially in a large diocese, would not suffice to confirm rightly decreed, that chrism should be consecrated by the all, if he were confined to certain times. But where it can bishop two days beforehand, that it may be sent to the be done conveniently, it is more becoming that both giver various parts of the diocese. Moreover, this day is suffi- and receiver should be fasting. ciently appropriate to the blessing of sacramental matter, Reply to Objection 3. According to the acts of the since thereon was the Eucharist instituted, to which, in Council of Pope Martin, “it was lawful at all times to pre- a certain way, all the other sacraments are ordained, as pare the chrism.” But since solemn Baptism, for which stated above (q. 65, a. 3). 2504 THIRD PART, QUESTION 73 Of the Sacrament of the Eucharist (In Six Articles) We have now to consider the sacrament of the Eucharist; and first of all we treat of the sacrament itself; secondly, of its matter; thirdly, of its form; fourthly, of its effects; fifthly, of the recipients of this sacrament; sixthly, of the minister; seventhly, of the rite. Under the first heading there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the Eucharist is a sacrament? (2) Whether it is one or several sacraments? (3) Whether it is necessary for salvation? (4) Its names; (5) Its institution; (6) Its figures. Whether the Eucharist is a sacrament? IIIa q. 73 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that the Eucharist is not a sacra- eration is required for corporeal life, since thereby man ment. For two sacraments ought not to be ordained for receives life; and growth, whereby man is brought to ma- the same end, because every sacrament is efficacious in turity: so likewise food is required for the preservation of producing its effect. Therefore, since both Confirmation life. Consequently, just as for the spiritual life there had and the Eucharist are ordained for perfection, as Diony- to be Baptism, which is spiritual generation; and Confir- sius says (Eccl. Hier. iv), it seems that the Eucharist is not mation, which is spiritual growth: so there needed to be a sacrament, since Confirmation is one, as stated above the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is spiritual food. (q. 65, a. 1; q. 72, a. 1). Reply to Objection 1. Perfection is twofold. The first Objection 2. Further, in every sacrament of the New lies within man himself; and he attains it by growth: such Law, that which comes visibly under our senses causes perfection belongs to Confirmation. The other is the per- the invisible effect of the sacrament, just as cleansing with fection which comes to man from the addition of food, or water causes the baptismal character and spiritual cleans- clothing, or something of the kind; and such is the perfec- ing, as stated above (q. 63, a. 6; q. 66, Aa. 1,3,7). But tion befitting the Eucharist, which is the spiritual refresh- the species of bread and wine, which are the objects of ment. our senses in this sacrament, neither produce Christ’s true Reply to Objection 2. The water of Baptism does not body, which is both reality and sacrament, nor His mysti- cause any spiritual effect by reason of the water, but by cal body, which is the reality only in the Eucharist. There- reason of the power of the Holy Ghost, which power is fore, it seems that the Eucharist is not a sacrament of the in the water. Hence on Jn. 5:4, “An angel of the Lord New Law. at certain times,” etc., Chrysostom observes: “The water Objection 3. Further, sacraments of the New Law, as does not act simply as such upon the baptized, but when having matter, are perfected by the use of the matter, as it receives the grace of the Holy Ghost, then it looses all Baptism is by ablution, and Confirmation by signing with sins.” But the true body of Christ. bears the same rela- chrism. If, then, the Eucharist be a sacrament, it would tion to the species of the bread and wine, as the power of be perfected by the use of the matter, and not by its con- the Holy Ghost does to the water of Baptism: hence the secration. But this is manifestly false, because the words species of the bread and wine produce no effect except spoken in the consecration of the matter are the form of from the virtue of Christ’s true body. this sacrament, as will be shown later on (q. 78, a. 1). Reply to Objection 3. A sacrament is so termed be- Therefore the Eucharist is not a sacrament. cause it contains something sacred. Now a thing can be On the contrary, It is said in the Collect∗: “May this styled sacred from two causes; either absolutely, or in re- Thy Sacrament not make us deserving of punishment.” lation to something else. The difference between the Eu- I answer that, The Church’s sacraments are ordained charist and other sacraments having sensible matter is that for helping man in the spiritual life. But the spiritual life whereas the Eucharist contains something which is sacred is analogous to the corporeal, since corporeal things bear absolutely, namely, Christ’s own body; the baptismal wa- a resemblance to spiritual. Now it is clear that just as gen- ter contains something which is sacred in relation to some- ∗ Postcommunion “pro vivis et defunctis” 2505 thing else, namely, the sanctifying power: and the same both reality and sacrament is in the matter itself. but what holds good of chrism and such like. Consequently, the is reality only, namely, the grace bestowed, is in the recip- sacrament of the Eucharist is completed in the very con- ient; whereas in Baptism both are in the recipient, namely, secration of the matter, whereas the other sacraments are the character, which is both reality and sacrament, and the completed in the application of the matter for the sanc- grace of pardon of sins, which is reality only. And the tifying of the individual. And from this follows another same holds good of the other sacraments. difference. For, in the sacrament of the Eucharist, what is Whether the Eucharist is one sacrament or several? IIIa q. 73 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that the Eucharist is not one it is complete through the presence of all that is needed sacrament but several, because it is said in the Collect∗: for its end; as a man is complete by having all the mem- “May the sacraments which we have received purify us, bers required for the operation of his soul, and a house by O Lord”: and this is said on account of our receiving the having all the parts needful for dwelling therein. And so Eucharist. Consequently the Eucharist is not one sacra- this sacrament is said to be one. Because it is ordained ment but several. for spiritual refreshment, which is conformed to corpo- Objection 2. Further, it is impossible for genera to real refreshment. Now there are two things required for be multiplied without the species being multiplied: thus corporeal refreshment, namely, food, which is dry suste- it is impossible for one man to be many animals. But, as nance, and drink, which is wet sustenance. Consequently, stated above (q. 60, a. 1), sign is the genus of sacrament. two things concur for the integrity of this sacrament, to Since, then, there are more signs than one, to wit, bread wit, spiritual food and spiritual drink, according to John: and wine, it seems to follow that here must be more sacra- “My flesh is meat indeed, and My blood is drink indeed.” ments than one. Therefore, this sacrament is materially many, but formally Objection 3. Further, this sacrament is perfected in and perfectively one. the consecration of the matter, as stated above (a. 1, ad 3). Reply to Objection 1. The same Collect at first em- But in this sacrament there is a double consecration of the ploys the plural: “May the sacraments which we have matter. Therefore, it is a twofold sacrament. received purify us”; and afterwards the singular number: On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:17): “May this sacrament of Thine not make us worthy of pun- “For we, being many, are one bread, one body, all that ishment”: so as to show that this sacrament is in a measure partake of one bread”: from which it is clear that the several, yet simply one. Eucharist is the sacrament of the Church’s unity. But a Reply to Objection 2. The bread and wine are ma- sacrament bears the likeness of the reality whereof it is terially several signs, yet formally and perfectively one, the sacrament. Therefore the Eucharist is one sacrament. inasmuch as one refreshment is prepared therefrom. I answer that, As stated in Metaph. v, a thing is said Reply to Objection 3. From the double consecration to be one, not only from being indivisible, or continu- of the matter no more can be gathered than that the sacra- ous, but also when it is complete; thus we speak of one ment is several materially, as stated above. house, and one man. A thing is one in perfection, when Whether the Eucharist is necessary for salvation? IIIa q. 73 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that this sacrament is necessary also is the Eucharist. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:26): for salvation. For our Lord said (Jn. 6:54): “Except you “For as often as you shall eat this bread, and drink the eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink His blood, you chalice, you shall show the death of the Lord, until He shall not have life in you.” But Christ’s flesh is eaten and come.” Consequently, as Baptism is necessary for salva- His blood drunk in this sacrament. Therefore, without this tion, so also is this sacrament. sacrament man cannot have the health of spiritual life. On the contrary, Augustine writes (Ad Bonifac. con- Objection 2. Further, this sacrament is a kind of spir- tra Pelag. I): “Nor are you to suppose that children cannot itual food. But bodily food is requisite for bodily health. possess life, who are deprived of the body and blood of Therefore, also is this sacrament, for spiritual health. Christ.” Objection 3. Further, as Baptism is the sacrament of I answer that, Two things have to be considered in our Lord’s Passion, without which there is no salvation, so this sacrament, namely, the sacrament itself, and what is ∗ Postcommunion “pro vivis et defunctis” 2506 contained in it. Now it was stated above (a. 1, obj. 2) that Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says, explaining the reality of the sacrament is the unity of the mystical Jn. 6:54, “This food and this drink,” namely, of His flesh body, without which there can be no salvation; for there and blood: “He would have us understand the fellowship is no entering into salvation outside the Church, just as of His body and members, which is the Church in His in the time of the deluge there was none outside the Ark, predestinated, and called, and justified, and glorified, His which denotes the Church, according to 1 Pet. 3:20,21. holy and believing ones.” Hence, as he says in his Epis- And it has been said above (q. 68, a. 2), that before re- tle to Boniface (Pseudo-Beda, in 1 Cor. 10:17): “No one ceiving a sacrament, the reality of the sacrament can be should entertain the slightest doubt, that then every one of had through the very desire of receiving the sacrament. the faithful becomes a partaker of the body and blood of Accordingly, before actual reception of this sacrament, a Christ, when in Baptism he is made a member of Christ’s man can obtain salvation through the desire of receiving body; nor is he deprived of his share in that body and chal- it, just as he can before Baptism through the desire of Bap- ice even though he depart from this world in the unity of tism, as stated above (q. 68, a. 2). Yet there is a difference Christ’s body, before he eats that bread and drinks of that in two respects. First of all, because Baptism is the begin- chalice.” ning of the spiritual life, and the door of the sacraments; Reply to Objection 2. The difference between cor- whereas the Eucharist is, as it were, the consummation of poreal and spiritual food lies in this, that the former is the spiritual life, and the end of all the sacraments, as was changed into the substance of the person nourished, and observed above (q. 63, a. 6): for by the hallowings of all consequently it cannot avail for supporting life except it the sacraments preparation is made for receiving or con- be partaken of; but spiritual food changes man into itself, secrating the Eucharist. Consequently, the reception of according to that saying of Augustine (Confess. vii), that Baptism is necessary for starting the spiritual life, while he heard the voice of Christ as it were saying to him: “Nor the receiving of the Eucharist is requisite for its consum- shalt thou change Me into thyself, as food of thy flesh, but mation; by partaking not indeed actually, but in desire, as thou shalt be changed into Me.” But one can be changed an end is possessed in desire and intention. Another dif- into Christ, and be incorporated in Him by mental desire, ference is because by Baptism a man is ordained to the even without receiving this sacrament. And consequently Eucharist, and therefore from the fact of children being the comparison does not hold. baptized, they are destined by the Church to the Eucharist; Reply to Objection 3. Baptism is the sacrament of and just as they believe through the Church’s faith, so they Christ’s death and Passion, according as a man is born desire the Eucharist through the Church’s intention, and, anew in Christ in virtue of His Passion; but the Eucharist as a result, receive its reality. But they are not disposed is the sacrament of Christ’s Passion according as a man is for Baptism by any previous sacrament, and consequently made perfect in union with Christ Who suffered. Hence, before receiving Baptism, in no way have they Baptism as Baptism is called the sacrament of Faith, which is the in desire; but adults alone have: consequently, they can- foundation of the spiritual life, so the Eucharist is termed not have the reality of the sacrament without receiving the the sacrament of Charity, which is “the bond of perfec- sacrament itself. Therefore this sacrament is not neces- tion” (Col. 3:14). sary for salvation in the same way as Baptism is. Whether this sacrament is suitably called by various names? IIIa q. 73 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that this sacrament is not suit- thing sacred is done in all the sacraments, which belongs ably called by various names. For names should corre- to the notion of “Sacrifice”; and the faithful intercommu- spond with things. But this sacrament is one, as stated nicate through all the sacraments, which this Greek word above (a. 2). Therefore, it ought not to be called by vari- Synaxis and the Latin “Communio” express. Therefore, ous names. these names are not suitably adapted to this sacrament. Objection 2. Further, a species is not properly denom- Objection 3. Further, a host∗ seems to be the same as inated by what is common to the whole genus. But the Eu- a sacrifice. Therefore, as it is not properly called a sacri- charist is a sacrament of the New Law; and it is common fice, so neither is it properly termed a “Host.” to all the sacraments for grace to be conferred by them, On the contrary, is the use of these expressions by which the name “Eucharist” denotes, for it is the same the faithful. thing as “good grace.” Furthermore, all the sacraments I answer that, This sacrament has a threefold signifi- bring us help on our journey through this present life, cance. one with regard to the past, inasmuch as it is com- which is the notion conveyed by “Viaticum.” Again some- memorative of our Lord’s Passion, which was a true sac- ∗ From Latin “hostia,” a victim 2507 rifice, as stated above (q. 48, a. 3), and in this respect it is is life everlasting” (Rom. 6:23); or because it really con-called a “Sacrifice.” tains Christ, Who is “full of grace.” With regard to the present it has another meaning, In Greek, moreover, it is called Metalepsis, i.e. “As- namely, that of Ecclesiastical unity, in which men are ag- sumption,” because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. gregated through this Sacrament; and in this respect it is iv), “we thereby assume the Godhead of the Son.” called “Communion” or Synaxis. For Damascene says Reply to Objection 1. There is nothing to hinder the (De Fide Orth. iv) that “it is called Communion because same thing from being called by several names, according we communicate with Christ through it, both because we to its various properties or effects. partake of His flesh and Godhead, and because we com- Reply to Objection 2. What is common to all the municate with and are united to one another through it.” sacraments is attributed antonomastically to this one on With regard to the future it has a third meaning, inas- account of its excellence. much as this sacrament foreshadows the Divine fruition, Reply to Objection 3. This sacrament is called which shall come to pass in heaven; and according to this a “Sacrifice” inasmuch as it represents the Passion of it is called “Viaticum,” because it supplies the way of win- Christ; but it is termed a “Host” inasmuch as it contains ning thither. And in this respect it is also called the “Eu- Christ, Who is “a host (Douay: ‘sacrifice’). . . of sweet- charist,” that is, “good grace,” because “the grace of God ness” (Eph. 5:2). Whether the institution of this sacrament was appropriate? IIIa q. 73 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that the institution of this sacrawas going to leave His disciples in His proper species, ment was not appropriate, because as the Philosopher says He left Himself with them under the sacramental species; (De Gener. ii): “We are nourished by the things from as the Emperor’s image is set up to be reverenced in his whence we spring.” But by Baptism, which is spiritual absence. Hence Eusebius says: “Since He was going to regeneration, we receive our spiritual being, as Dionysius withdraw His assumed body from their eyes, and bear it says (Eccl. Hier. ii). Therefore we are also nourished by away to the stars, it was needful that on the day of the Baptism. Consequently there was no need to institute this supper He should consecrate the sacrament of His body sacrament as spiritual nourishment. and blood for our sakes, in order that what was once of- Objection 2. Further, men are united with Christ fered up for our ransom should be fittingly worshiped in a through this sacrament as the members with the head. But mystery.” Christ is the Head of all men, even of those who have Secondly, because without faith in the Passion there existed from the beginning of the world, as stated above could never be any salvation, according to Rom. 3:25: (q. 8, Aa. 3,6). Therefore the institution of this sacrament “Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through should not have been postponed till the Lord’s supper. faith in His blood.” It was necessary accordingly that there Objection 3. Further, this sacrament is called the should be at all times among men something to show forth memorial of our Lord’s Passion, according to Mat. 26 our Lord’s Passion; the chief sacrament of which in the (Lk. 22:19): “Do this for a commemoration of Me.” But old Law was the Paschal Lamb. Hence the Apostle says (1 a commemoration is of things past. Therefore, this sacra- Cor. 5:7): “Christ our Pasch is sacrificed.” But its succes- ment should not have been instituted before Christ’s Pas- sor under the New Testament is the sacrament of the Eu- sion. charist, which is a remembrance of the Passion now past, Objection 4. Further, a man is prepared by Baptism just as the other was figurative of the Passion to come. for the Eucharist, which ought to be given only to the And so it was fitting that when the hour of the Passion baptized. But Baptism was instituted by Christ after His was come, Christ should institute a new Sacrament after Passion and Resurrection, as is evident from Mat. 28:19. celebrating the old, as Pope Leo I says (Serm. lviii). Therefore, this sacrament was not suitably instituted be- Thirdly, because last words, chiefly such as are spoken fore Christ’s Passion. by departing friends, are committed most deeply to mem- On the contrary, This sacrament was instituted by ory; since then especially affection for friends is more Christ, of Whom it is said (Mk. 7:37) that “He did all enkindled, and the things which affect us most are im- things well.” pressed the deepest in the soul. Consequently, since, as I answer that, This sacrament was appropriately insti- Pope Alexander I says, “among sacrifices there can be tuted at the supper, when Christ conversed with His disci- none greater than the body and blood of Christ, nor any ples for the last time. First of all, because of what is con- more powerful oblation”; our Lord instituted this sacra- tained in the sacrament: for Christ is Himself contained in ment at His last parting with His disciples, in order that the Eucharist sacramentally. Consequently, when Christ it might be held in the greater veneration. And this is 2508 what Augustine says (Respons. ad Januar. i): “In order Incarnation; but then there was room for only such sacra-to commend more earnestly the death of this mystery, our ments as were prefigurative of the Lord’s Passion. Saviour willed this last act to be fixed in the hearts and Reply to Objection 3. This sacrament was instituted memories of the disciples whom He was about to quit for during the supper, so as in the future to be a memorial of the Passion.” our Lord’s Passion as accomplished. Hence He said ex- Reply to Objection 1. We are nourished from the pressively: “As often as ye shall do these things”∗, speak- same things of which we are made, but they do not come ing of the future. to us in the same way; for those out of which we are made Reply to Objection 4. The institution responds to the come to us through generation, while the same, as nour- order of intention. But the sacrament of the Eucharist, ishing us, come to us through being eaten. Hence, as we although after Baptism in the receiving, is yet previous are new-born in Christ through Baptism, so through the to it in intention; and therefore it behooved to be insti- Eucharist we eat Christ. tuted first. or else it can be said that Baptism was already Reply to Objection 2. The Eucharist is the perfect instituted in Christ’s Baptism; hence some were already sacrament of our Lord’s Passion, as containing Christ cru- baptized with Christ’s Baptism, as we read in Jn. 3:22. cified; consequently it could not be instituted before the Whether the Paschal Lamb was the chief figure of this sacrament? IIIa q. 73 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that the Paschal Lamb was is the bread and wine; that which is both reality and sacra- not the chief figure of this sacrament, because (Ps. ment, to wit, Christ’s true body; and lastly that which is 109:4) Christ is called “a priest according to the order reality only, namely, the effect of this sacrament. Con- of Melchisedech,” since Melchisedech bore the figure of sequently, in relation to what is sacrament only, the chief Christ’s sacrifice, in offering bread and wine. But the ex- figure of this sacrament was the oblation of Melchisedech, pression of likeness causes one thing to be named from who offered up bread and wine. In relation to Christ cru- another. Therefore, it seems that Melchisedech’s offering cified, Who is contained in this sacrament, its figures were was the “principal” figure of this sacrament. all the sacrifices of the Old Testament, especially the sac- Objection 2. Further, the passage of the Red Sea was rifice of expiation, which was the most solemn of all. a figure of Baptism, according to 1 Cor. 10:2: “All. . . were While with regard to its effect, the chief figure was the baptized in the cloud and in the sea.” But the immola- Manna, “having in it the sweetness of every taste” (Wis. tion of the Paschal Lamb was previous to the passage of 16:20), just as the grace of this sacrament refreshes the the Red Sea, and the Manna came after it, just as the Eu- soul in all respects. charist follows Baptism. Therefore the Manna is a more The Paschal Lamb foreshadowed this sacrament in expressive figure of this sacrament than the Paschal Lamb. these three ways. First of all, because it was eaten with Objection 3. Further, the principal power of this unleavened loaves, according to Ex. 12:8: “They shall eat sacrament is that it brings us into the kingdom of heaven, flesh. . . and unleavened bread.” As to the second because being a kind of “viaticum.” But this was chiefly prefig- it was immolated by the entire multitude of the children ured in the sacrament of expiation when the “high-priest of Israel on the fourteenth day of the moon; and this was a entered once a year into the Holy of Holies with blood,” as figure of the Passion of Christ, Who is called the Lamb on the Apostle proves in Heb. 9. Consequently, it seems that account of His innocence. As to the effect, because by the that sacrifice was a more significant figure of this sacra- blood of the Paschal Lamb the children of Israel were pre- ment than was the Paschal Lamb. served from the destroying Angel, and brought from the On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:7,8): Egyptian captivity; and in this respect the Paschal Lamb “Christ our Pasch is sacrificed; therefore let us is the chief figure of this sacrament, because it represents feast. . . with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth.” it in every respect. I answer that, We can consider three things in this From this the answer to the Objections is manifest. sacrament: namely, that which is sacrament only, and this ∗ Cf. Canon of the Mass 2509 THIRD PART, QUESTION 74 Of the Matter of This Sacrament (In Eight Articles) We have now to consider the matter of this sacrament: and first of all as to its species; secondly, the change of the bread and wine into the body of Christ; thirdly, the manner in which Christ’s body exists in this sacrament; fourthly, the accidents of bread and wine which continue in this sacrament. Under the first heading there are eight points for inquiry: (1) Whether bread and wine are the matter of this sacrament? (2) Whether a determinate quantity of the same is required for the matter of this sacrament? (3) Whether the matter of this sacrament is wheaten bread? (4) Whether it is unleavened or fermented bread? (5) Whether the matter of this sacrament is wine from the grape? (6) Whether water should be mixed with it? (7) Whether water is of necessity for this sacrament? (8) Of the quantity of the water added. Whether the matter of this sacrament is bread and wine? IIIa q. 74 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that the matter of this sacra- of bread and wine, as is evident from Mat. 26. Con- ment is not bread and wine. Because this sacrament ought sequently, bread and wine are the proper matter of this to represent Christ’s Passion more fully than did the sacra- sacrament. And the reasonableness of this is seen first, in ments of the Old Law. But the flesh of animals, which was the use of this sacrament, which is eating: for, as water is the matter of the sacraments under the Old Law, shows used in the sacrament of Baptism for the purpose of spir- forth Christ’s Passion more fully than bread and wine. itual cleansing, since bodily cleansing is commonly done Therefore the matter of this sacrament ought rather to be with water; so bread and wine, wherewith men are com- the flesh of animals than bread and wine. monly fed, are employed in this sacrament for the use of Objection 2. Further, this sacrament is to be cele- spiritual eating. brated in every place. But in many lands bread is not to Secondly, in relation to Christ’s Passion, in which the be found, and in many places wine is not to be found. blood was separated from the body. And therefore in this Therefore bread and wine are not a suitable matter for this sacrament, which is the memorial of our Lord’s Passion, sacrament. the bread is received apart as the sacrament of the body, Objection 3. Further, this sacrament is for both hale and the wine as the sacrament of the blood. and weak. But to some weak persons wine is hurtful. Thirdly, as to the effect, considered in each of the par- Therefore it seems that wine ought not to be the matter takers. For, as Ambrose (Mag. Sent. iv, D, xi) says on 1 of this sacrament. Cor. 11:20, this sacrament “avails for the defense of soul On the contrary, Pope Alexander I says (Ep. ad and body”; and therefore “Christ’s body is offered” un- omnes orth. i): “In oblations of the sacraments only bread der the species of bread “for the health of the body, and and wine mixed with water are to be offered.” the blood” under the species of wine “for the health of the I answer that, Some have fallen into various errors soul,” according to Lev. 17:14: “The life of the animal about the matter of this sacrament. Some, known as the [Vulg.: ‘of all flesh’] is in the blood.” Artotyrytae, as Augustine says (De Haeres. xxviii), “of- Fourthly, as to the effect with regard to the whole fer bread and cheese in this sacrament, contending that Church, which is made up of many believers, just “as oblations were celebrated by men in the first ages, from bread is composed of many grains, and wine flows from fruits of the earth and sheep.” Others, called Cataphrygae many grapes,” as the gloss observes on 1 Cor. 10:17: “We and Pepuziani, “are reputed to have made their Eucharis- being many are. . . one body,” etc. tic bread with infants’ blood drawn from tiny punctures Reply to Objection 1. Although the flesh of slaugh- over the entire body, and mixed with flour.” Others, styled tered animals represents the Passion more forcibly, never- Aquarii, under guise of sobriety, offer nothing but water theless it is less suitable for the common use of this sacra- in this sacrament. ment, and for denoting the unity of the Church. Now all these and similar errors are excluded by the Reply to Objection 2. Although wheat and wine are fact that Christ instituted this sacrament under the species not produced in every country, yet they can easily be con- 2510 veyed to every land, that is, as much as is needful for the Reply to Objection 3. Wine taken in small quantity use of this sacrament: at the same time one is not to be cannot do the sick much harm: yet if there be fear of harm, consecrated when the other is lacking, because it would it is not necessary for all who take Christ’s body to partake not be a complete sacrament. also of His blood, as will be stated later (q. 80, a. 12). Whether a determinate quantity of bread and wine is required for the matter of this IIIa q. 74 a. 2 sacrament? Objection 1. It seems that a determinate quantity of to an end, just as the matter of a saw is iron, so as to bread and wine is required for the matter of this sacra- adapt it for cutting. But the end of this sacrament is the ment. Because the effects of grace are no less set in order use of the faithful. Consequently, the quantity of the mat- than those of nature. But, “there is a limit set by nature ter of this sacrament must be determined by comparison upon all existing things, and a reckoning of size and de- with the use of the faithful. But this cannot be determined velopment” (De Anima ii). Consequently, in this sacra- by comparison with the use of the faithful who are actu- ment, which is called “Eucharist,” that is, “a good grace,” ally present; otherwise the parish priest having few parish- a determinate quantity of the bread and wine is required. ioners could not consecrate many hosts. It remains, then, Objection 2. Further, Christ gave no power to the for the matter of this sacrament to be determined in ref- ministers of the Church regarding matters which involve erence to the number of the faithful absolutely. But the derision of the faith and of His sacraments, according to number of the faithful is not a determinate one. Hence it 2 Cor. 10:8: “Of our power which the Lord hath given cannot be said that the quantity of the matter of this sacra- us unto edification, and not for your destruction.” But it ment is restricted. would lead to mockery of this sacrament if the priest were Reply to Objection 1. The matter of every natural to wish to consecrate all the bread which is sold in the object has its determinate quantity by comparison with market and all the wine in the cellar. Therefore he cannot its determinate form. But the number of the faithful, for do this. whose use this sacrament is ordained, is not a determinate Objection 3. Further, if anyone be baptized in the sea, one. Consequently there is no comparison. the entire sea-water is not sanctified by the form of bap- Reply to Objection 2. The power of the Church’s tism, but only the water wherewith the body of the bap- ministers is ordained for two purposes: first for the proper tized is cleansed. Therefore, neither in this sacrament can effect, and secondly for the end of the effect. But the sec- a superfluous quantity of bread be consecrated. ond does not take away the first. Hence, if the priest in- On the contrary, Much is opposed to little, and great tends to consecrate the body of Christ for an evil purpose, to small. But there is no quantity, however small, of the for instance, to make mockery of it, or to administer poi- bread and wine which cannot be consecrated. Therefore, son through it, he commits sin by his evil intention, nev- neither is there any quantity, however great, which cannot ertheless, on account of the power committed to him, he be consecrated. accomplishes the sacrament. I answer that, Some have maintained that the priest Reply to Objection 3. The sacrament of Baptism is could not consecrate an immense quantity of bread and perfected in the use of the matter: and therefore no more wine, for instance, all the bread in the market or all the of the water is hallowed than what is used. But this sacra- wine in a cask. But this does not appear to be true, be- ment is wrought in the consecration of the matter. Conse- cause in all things containing matter, the reason for the quently there is no parallel. determination of the matter is drawn from its disposition Whether wheaten bread is required for the matter of this sacrament? IIIa q. 74 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that wheaten bread is not requi- sign of species. But some cereals resemble wheat, such site for the matter of this sacrament, because this sacra- as spelt and maize, from which in some localities bread ment is a reminder of our Lord’s Passion. But barley is made for the use of this sacrament. Therefore wheaten bread seems to be more in keeping with the Passion than bread is not the proper matter of this sacrament. wheaten bread, as being more bitter, and because Christ Objection 3. Further, mixing dissolves species. But used it to feed the multitudes upon the mountain, as nar- wheaten flour is hardly to be found unmixed with some rated in Jn. 6. Therefore wheaten bread is not the proper other species of grain, except in the instance of specially matter of this sacrament. selected grain. Therefore it does not seem that wheaten Objection 2. Further, in natural things the shape is a bread is the proper matter for this sacrament. 2511 Objection 4. Further, what is corrupted appears to be cereals which can be grown from the seed of the wheat of another species. But some make the sacrament from (as wild wheat from wheat seed grown in bad ground), bread which is corrupted, and which no longer seems to the bread made from such grain can be the matter of this be wheaten bread. Therefore, it seems that such bread is sacrament: and this does not obtain either in barley, or in not the proper matter of this sacrament. spelt, or even in maize, which is of all grains the one most On the contrary, Christ is contained in this sacra- resembling the wheat grain. But the resemblance as to ment, and He compares Himself to a grain of wheat, say- shape in such seems to denote closeness of species rather ing (Jn. 12:24): “Unless the grain of wheat falling into the than identity; just as the resemblance in shape between ground die, itself remaineth alone.” Therefore bread from the dog and the wolf goes to show that they are allied but corn, i.e. wheaten bread, is the matter of this sacrament. not of the same species. Hence from such grains, which I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), for the use of the cannot in any way be generated from wheat grain, bread sacraments such matter is adopted as is commonly made cannot be made such as to be the proper matter of this use of among men. Now among other breads wheaten sacrament. bread is more commonly used by men; since other breads Reply to Objection 3. A moderate mixing does not seem to be employed when this fails. And consequently alter the species, because that little is as it were absorbed Christ is believed to have instituted this sacrament un- by the greater. Consequently, then, if a small quantity der this species of bread. Moreover this bread strength- of another grain be mixed with a much greater quantity ens man, and so it denotes more suitably the effect of this of wheat, bread may be made therefrom so as to be the sacrament. Consequently, the proper matter for this sacra- proper matter of this sacrament; but if the mixing be no- ment is wheaten bread. table, for instance, half and half; or nearly so, then such Reply to Objection 1. Barley bread serves to denote mixing alters the species; consequently, bread made there- the hardness of the Old Law; both on account of the hard- from will not be the proper matter of this sacrament. ness of the bread, and because, as Augustine says (q. 83): Reply to Objection 4. Sometimes there is such cor- “The flour within the barley, wrapped up as it is within a ruption of the bread that the species of bread is lost, as most tenacious fibre, denotes either the Law itself, which when the continuity of its parts is destroyed, and the taste, was given in such manner as to be vested in bodily sacra- color, and other accidents are changed; hence the body ments; or else it denotes the people themselves, who were of Christ may not be made from such matter. But some- not yet despoiled of carnal desires, which clung to their times there is not such corruption as to alter the species, hearts like fibre.” But this sacrament belongs to Christ’s but merely disposition towards corruption, which a slight “sweet yoke,” and to the truth already manifested, and to change in the savor betrays, and from such bread the body a spiritual people. Consequently barley bread would not of Christ may be made: but he who does so, sins from be a suitable matter for this sacrament. irreverence towards the sacrament. And because starch Reply to Objection 2. A begetter begets a thing like comes of corrupted wheat, it does not seem as if the body to itself in species. yet there is some unlikeness as to of Christ could be made of the bread made therefrom, al- the accidents, owing either to the matter, or to weakness though some hold the contrary. within the generative power. And therefore, if there be any Whether this sacrament ought to be made of unleavened bread? IIIa q. 74 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that this sacrament ought not to Ex. 12. Therefore we ought not to use unfermented bread be made of unleavened bread. because in this sacrament in this sacrament of grace. we ought to imitate Christ’s institution. But Christ appears Objection 3. Further, as stated above (q. 65, a. 1; to have instituted this sacrament in fermented bread, be- q. 73, a. 3), the Eucharist is the sacrament of charity just cause, as we have read in Ex. 12, the Jews, according to as Baptism is the sacrament of faith. But the fervor of the Law, began to use unleavened bread on the day of the charity is signified by fermented bread, as is declared by Passover which is celebrated on the fourteenth day of the the gloss on Mat. 13:33: “The kingdom of heaven is like moon; and Christ instituted this sacrament at the supper unto leaven,” etc. Therefore this sacrament ought to be which He celebrated “before the festival day of the Pasch” made of leavened bread. (Jn. 13:1,4). Therefore we ought likewise to celebrate this Objection 4. Further, leavened or unleavened are sacrament with fermented bread. mere accidents of bread, which do not vary the species. Objection 2. Further, legal observances ought not to But in the matter for the sacrament of Baptism no dif- be continued in the time of grace. But the use of unleav- ference is observed regarding the variation of the acci- ened bread was a ceremony of the Law, as is clear from dents, as to whether it be salt or fresh, warm or cold water. 2512 Therefore neither ought any distinction to be observed, as our Pasch is sacrificed: therefore let us feast. . . with the to whether the bread be unleavened or leavened. unleavened bread of sincerity and truth.” On the contrary, According to the Decretals (Extra, However, this custom of the Greeks is not unreason- De Celebr. Miss.), a priest is punished “for presuming to able both on account of its signification, to which Gregory celebrate, using fermented bread and a wooden cup.” refers, and in detestation of the heresy of the Nazarenes, I answer that, Two things may be considered touch- who mixed up legal observances with the Gospel. ing the matter of this sacrament namely, what is neces- Reply to Objection 1. As we read in Ex. 12, the sary, and what is suitable. It is necessary that the bread paschal solemnity began on the evening of the fourteenth be wheaten, without which the sacrament is not valid, as day of the moon. So, then, after immolating the Paschal stated above (a. 3). It is not, however, necessary for the Lamb, Christ instituted this sacrament: hence this day sacrament that the bread be unleavened or leavened, since is said by John to precede the day of the Pasch, while it can be celebrated in either. the other three Evangelists call it “the first day of the But it is suitable that every priest observe the rite of Azymes,” when fermented bread was not found in the his Church in the celebration of the sacrament. Now in houses of the Jews, as stated above. Fuller mention was this matter there are various customs of the Churches: made of this in the treatise on our Lord’s Passion (q. 46, for, Gregory says: “The Roman Church offers unleav- a. 9, ad 1). ened bread, because our Lord took flesh without union Reply to Objection 2. Those who celebrate the sacra- of sexes: but the Greek Churches offer leavened bread, ment with unleavened bread do not intend to follow the because the Word of the Father was clothed with flesh; as ceremonial of the Law, but to conform to Christ’s institu- leaven is mixed with the flour.” Hence, as a priest sins tion; so they are not Judaizing; otherwise those celebrat- by celebrating with fermented bread in the Latin Church, ing in fermented bread would be Judaizing, because the so a Greek priest celebrating with unfermented bread in Jews offered up fermented bread for the first-fruits. a church of the Greeks would also sin, as perverting the Reply to Objection 3. Leaven denotes charity on ac- rite of his Church. Nevertheless the custom of celebrating count of one single effect, because it makes the bread with unleavened bread is more reasonable. First, on ac- more savory and larger; but it also signifies corruption count of Christ’s institution: for He instituted this sacra- from its very nature. ment “on the first day of the Azymes” (Mat. 26:17; Mk. Reply to Objection 4. Since whatever is fermented 14:12; Lk. 22:7), on which day there ought to be nothing partakes of corruption, this sacrament may not be made fermented in the houses of the Jews, as is stated in Ex. from corrupt bread, as stated above (a. 3, ad 4); conse- 12:15,19. Secondly, because bread is properly the sacra- quently, there is a wider difference between unleavened ment of Christ’s body, which was conceived without cor- and leavened bread than between warm and cold bap- ruption, rather than of His Godhead, as will be seen later tismal water: because there might be such corruption of (q. 76, a. 1, ad 1). Thirdly, because this is more in keep- fermented bread that it could not be validly used for the ing with the sincerity of the faithful, which is required in sacrament. the use of this sacrament, according to 1 Cor. 5:7: “Christ Whether wine of the grape is the proper matter of this sacrament? IIIa q. 74 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that wine of the grape is not be made from such, according to what we read in the Sixth the proper matter of this sacrament. Because, as water is Council (Trull., Can. 28): “We have learned that in some the matter of Baptism, so is wine the matter of this sacra- churches the priests add grapes to the sacrifice of the obla- ment. But Baptism can be conferred with any kind of wa- tion; and so they dispense both together to the people. ter. Therefore this sacrament can be celebrated in any kind Consequently we give order that no priest shall do this of wine, such as of pomegranates, or of mulberries; since in future.” And Pope Julius I rebukes some priests “who vines do not grow in some countries. offer wine pressed from the grape in the sacrament of the Objection 2. Further, vinegar is a kind of wine drawn Lord’s chalice.” Consequently, it seems that wine from from the grape, as Isidore says (Etym. xx). But this the grape is not the proper matter of this sacrament. sacrament cannot be celebrated with vinegar. Therefore, On the contrary, As our Lord compared Himself to it seems that wine from the grape is not the proper matter the grain of wheat, so also He compared Himself to the of this sacrament. vine, saying (Jn. 15:1): “I am the true vine.” But only Objection 3. Further, just as the clarified wine is bread from wheat is the matter of this sacrament, as stated drawn from grapes, so also are the juice of unripe grapes above (a. 3). Therefore, only wine from the grape is the and must. But it does not appear that this sacrament may proper matter of this sacrament. 2513 I answer that, This sacrament can only be performed as is said in Metaph. viii. And consequently, just as this with wine from the grape. First of all on account of sacrament may not be made from bread which is utterly Christ’s institution, since He instituted this sacrament in corrupt, so neither can it be made from vinegar. It can, wine from the grape, as is evident from His own words, in however, be made from wine which is turning sour, just instituting this sacrament (Mat. 26:29): “I will not drink as from bread turning corrupt, although he who does so from henceforth of this fruit of the vine.” Secondly, be- sins, as stated above (a. 3). cause, as stated above (a. 3), that is adopted as the matter Reply to Objection 3. The juice of unripe grapes is of the sacraments which is properly and universally con- at the stage of incomplete generation, and therefore it has sidered as such. Now that is properly called wine, which not yet the species of wine: on which account it may not is drawn from the grape, whereas other liquors are called be used for this sacrament. Must, however, has already the wine from resemblance to the wine of the grape. Thirdly, species of wine, for its sweetness∗ indicates fermentation because the wine from the grape is more in keeping with which is “the result of its natural heat” (Meteor. iv); con- the effect of this sacrament, which is spiritual; because it sequently this sacrament can be made from must. Never- is written (Ps. 103:15): “That wine may cheer the heart of theless entire grapes ought not to be mixed with this sacra- man.” ment, because then there would be something else besides Reply to Objection 1. Such liquors are called wine, wine. It is furthermore forbidden to offer must in the chal- not properly but only from their resemblance thereto. But ice, as soon as it has been squeezed from the grape, since genuine wine can be conveyed to such countries wherein this is unbecoming owing to the impurity of the must. But the grape-vine does not flourish, in a quantity sufficient in case of necessity it may be done: for it is said by the for this sacrament. same Pope Julius, in the passage quoted in the argument: Reply to Objection 2. Wine becomes vinegar by cor- “If necessary, let the grape be pressed into the chalice.” ruption; hence there is no returning from vinegar to wine, Whether water should be mixed with the wine? IIIa q. 74 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that water ought not to be mixed ice neither wine only nor water only ought to be offered, with the wine, since Christ’s sacrifice was foreshadowed but both mixed because we read that both flowed from by that of Melchisedech, who (Gn. 14:18) is related to His side in the Passion.” Thirdly, because this is adapted have offered up bread and wine only. Consequently it for signifying the effect of this sacrament, since as Pope seems that water should not be added in this sacrament. Julius says (Concil. Bracarens iii, Can. 1): “We see that Objection 2. Further, the various sacraments have the people are signified by the water, but Christ’s blood their respective matters. But water is the matter of Bap- by the wine. Therefore when water is mixed with the tism. Therefore it should not be employed as the matter wine in the chalice, the people is made one with Christ.” of this sacrament. Fourthly, because this is appropriate to the fourth effect of Objection 3. Further, bread and wine are the matter of this sacrament, which is the entering into everlasting life: this sacrament. But nothing is added to the bread. There- hence Ambrose says (De Sacram. v): “The water flows fore neither should anything be added to the wine. into the chalice, and springs forth unto everlasting life.” On the contrary, Pope Alexander I writes (Ep. 1 ad Reply to Objection 1. As Ambrose says (De Sacram. omnes orth.): “In the sacramental oblations which in mass v), just as Christ’s sacrifice is denoted by the offering are offered to the Lord, only bread and wine mixed with of Melchisedech, so likewise it is signified by the water water are to be offered in sacrifice.” which flowed from the rock in the desert, according to 1 I answer that, Water ought to be mingled with the Cor. 10:4: “But they drank of the spiritual rock which wine which is offered in this sacrament. First of all on ac- came after them.” count of its institution: for it is believed with probability Reply to Objection 2. In Baptism water is used for that our Lord instituted this sacrament in wine tempered the purpose of ablution: but in this sacrament it is used with water according to the custom of that country: hence by way of refreshment, according to Ps. 22:3: “He hath it is written (Prov. 9:5): “Drink the wine which I have brought me up on the water of refreshment.” mixed for you.” Secondly, because it harmonizes with the Reply to Objection 3. Bread is made of water and representation of our Lord’s Passion: hence Pope Alexan- flour; and therefore, since water is mixed with the wine, der I says (Ep. 1 ad omnes orth.): “In the Lord’s chal- neither is without water. ∗ “Aut dulcis musti Vulcano decoquit humorem”; Virgil, Georg. i, 295 2514 Whether the mixing with water is essential to this sacrament? IIIa q. 74 a. 7 Objection 1. It seems that the mixing with water is matter: while the usage of the faithful is not essential to essential to this sacrament. Because Cyprian says to Ce- the sacrament, but only a consequence thereof. Conse- cilius (Ep. lxiii): “Thus the Lord’s chalice is not water quently, then, the adding of water is not essential to the only and wine only, but both must be mixed together: in sacrament. the same way as neither the Lord’s body be of flour only, Reply to Objection 1. Cyprian’s expression is to be except both,” i.e. the flour and the water “be united as taken in the same sense in which we say that a thing can- one.” But the admixture of water with the flour is neces- not be, which cannot be suitably. And so the comparison sary for this sacrament. Consequently, for the like reason, refers to what ought to be done, not to what is essential to so is the mixing of water with the wine. be done; since water is of the essence of bread, but not of Objection 2. Further, at our Lord’s Passion, of which the essence of wine. this is the memorial, water as well as blood flowed from Reply to Objection 2. The shedding of the blood be- His side. But wine, which is the sacrament of the blood, is longed directly to Christ’s Passion: for it is natural for necessary for this sacrament. For the same reason, there- blood to flow from a wounded human body. But the flow- fore, so is water. ing of the water was not necessary for the Passion; but Objection 3. Further, if water were not essential to merely to show its effect, which is to wash away sins, and this sacrament, it would not matter in the least what kind to refresh us from the heat of concupiscence. And there- of water was used; and so water distilled from roses, or fore the water is not offered apart from the wine in this any other kind might be employed; which is contrary to sacrament, as the wine is offered apart from the bread; the usage of the Church. Consequently water is essential but the water is offered mixed with the wine to show that to this sacrament. the wine belongs of itself to this sacrament, as of its very On the contrary, Cyprian says (Ep. lxiii): “If any of essence; but the water as something added to the wine. our predecessors, out of ignorance or simplicity, has not Reply to Objection 3. Since the mixing of water with kept this usage,” i.e. of mixing water with the wine, “one the wine is not necessary for the sacrament, it does not may pardon his simplicity”; which would not be the case matter, as to the essence of the sacrament, what kind of if water were essential to the sacrament, as the wine or the water is added to the wine, whether natural water, or ar- bread. Therefore the mingling of water with the wine is tificial, as rose-water, although, as to the propriety of the not essential to the sacrament. sacrament, he would sin who mixes any other than natural I answer that, Judgment concerning a sign is to be and true water, because true water flowed from the side drawn from the thing signified. Now the adding of water of Christ hanging on the cross, and not phlegm, as some to the wine is for the purpose of signifying the sharing of have said, in order to show that Christ’s body was truly this sacrament by the faithful, in this respect that by the composed of the four elements; as by the flowing blood, mixing of the water with the wine is signified the union it was shown to be composed of the four humors, as Pope of the people with Christ, as stated (a. 6). Moreover, the Innocent III says in a certain Decree. But because the flowing of water from the side of Christ hanging on the mixing of water with flour is essential to this sacrament, cross refers to the same, because by the water is denoted as making the composition of bread, if rose-water, or any the cleansing from sins, which was the effect of Christ’s other liquor besides true water, be mixed with the flour, Passion. Now it was observed above (q. 73, a. 1, ad 3), the sacrament would not be valid, because it would not be that this sacrament is completed in the consecration of the true bread. Whether water should be added in great quantity? IIIa q. 74 a. 8 Objection 1. It seems that water ought to be added sacrament as to add none. But it is not lawful to add none. in great quantity, because as blood flowed sensibly from Therefore, neither is it lawful to add a little. Christ’s side, so did water: hence it is written (Jn. 19:35): Objection 3. Further, if it sufficed to add a little, then “He that saw it, hath given testimony.” But water could as a consequence it would suffice to throw one drop of wa- not be sensibly present in this sacrament except it were ter into an entire cask. But this seems ridiculous. There- used in great quantity. Consequently it seems that water fore it does not suffice for a small quantity to be added. ought to be added in great quantity. On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (Extra, Objection 2. Further, a little water mixed with much De Celeb. Miss.): “The pernicious abuse has prevailed in wine is corrupted. But what is corrupted no longer exists. your country of adding water in greater quantity than the Therefore, it is the same thing to add a little water in this wine, in the sacrifice, where according to the reasonable 2515 custom of the entire Church more wine than water ought wine into blood. Now, this could not be done unless so to be employed.” little water was used that it would be changed into wine. I answer that, There is a threefold opinion regarding Consequently, it is always safer to add little water, espe- the water added to the wine, as Pope Innocent III says in cially if the wine be weak, because the sacrament could a certain Decretal. For some say that the water remains not be celebrated if there were such addition of water as by itself when the wine is changed into blood: but such to destroy the species of the wine. Hence Pope Julius I an opinion cannot stand, because in the sacrament of the reprehends some who “keep throughout the year a linen altar after the consecration there is nothing else save the cloth steeped in must, and at the time of sacrifice wash a body and the blood of Christ. Because, as Ambrose says part of it with water, and so make the offering.” in De Officiis (De Mysteriis ix): “Before the blessing it is Reply to Objection 1. For the signification of this another species that is named, after the blessing the Body sacrament it suffices for the water to be appreciable by is signified; otherwise it would not be adored with adora- sense when it is mixed with the wine: but it is not neces- tion of latria.” And therefore others have said that as the sary for it to be sensible after the mingling. wine is changed into blood, so the water is changed into Reply to Objection 2. If no water were added, the the water which flowed from Christ’s side. But this can- signification would be utterly excluded: but when the wa- not be maintained reasonably, because according to this ter is changed into wine, it is signified that the people is the water would be consecrated apart from the wine, as incorporated with Christ. the wine is from the bread. Reply to Objection 3. If water were added to a cask, And therefore as he (Innocent III, Decretals, Extra, De it would not suffice for the signification of this sacrament, Celeb. Miss.) says, the more probable opinion is that but the water must be added to the wine at the actual cel- which holds that the water is changed into wine, and the ebration of the sacrament. 2516 THIRD PART, QUESTION 75 Of the Change of Bread and Wine Into the Body and Blood of Christ (In Eight Articles) We have to consider the change of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ; under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the substance of bread and wine remain in this sacrament after the consecration?* (2) Whether it is annihilated? (3) Whether it is changed into the body and blood of Christ? (4) Whether the accidents remain after the change? (5) Whether the substantial form remains there? (6) Whether this change is instantaneous? (7) Whether it is more miraculous than any other change? (8) By what words it may be suitably expressed? ∗ Whether the body of Christ be in this sacrament in very truth, or merely as in a figure IIIa q. 75 a. 1 or sign? Objection 1. It seems that the body of Christ is not Objection 4. Further, the Church’s sacraments are or- in this sacrament in very truth, but only as in a figure, or dained for the profit of the faithful. But according to Gre- sign. For it is written (Jn. 6:54) that when our Lord had gory in a certain Homily (xxviii in Evang.), the ruler is uttered these words: “Except you eat the flesh of the Son rebuked “for demanding Christ’s bodily presence.” More- of Man, and drink His blood,” etc., “Many of His disciples over the apostles were prevented from receiving the Holy on hearing it said: ‘this is a hard saying’ ”: to whom He re- Ghost because they were attached to His bodily presence, joined: “It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth as Augustine says on Jn. 16:7: “Except I go, the Paraclete nothing”: as if He were to say, according to Augustine’s will not come to you” (Tract. xciv in Joan.). Therefore exposition on Ps. 4†: “Give a spiritual meaning to what I Christ is not in the sacrament of the altar according to His have said. You are not to eat this body which you see, nor bodily presence. to drink the blood which they who crucify Me are to spill. On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. viii): “There It is a mystery that I put before you: in its spiritual sense is no room for doubt regarding the truth of Christ’s body it will quicken you; but the flesh profiteth nothing.” and blood; for now by our Lord’s own declaring and by Objection 2. Further, our Lord said (Mat. 28:20): our faith His flesh is truly food, and His blood is truly “Behold I am with you all days even to the consummation drink.” And Ambrose says (De Sacram. vi): “As the Lord of the world.” Now in explaining this, Augustine makes Jesus Christ is God’s true Son so is it Christ’s true flesh this observation (Tract. xxx in Joan.): “The Lord is on which we take, and His true blood which we drink.” high until the world be ended; nevertheless the truth of I answer that, The presence of Christ’s true body and the Lord is here with us; for the body, in which He rose blood in this sacrament cannot be detected by sense, nor again, must be in one place; but His truth is spread abroad understanding, but by faith alone, which rests upon Divine everywhere.” Therefore, the body of Christ is not in this authority. Hence, on Lk. 22:19: “This is My body which sacrament in very truth, but only as in a sign. shall be delivered up for you,” Cyril says: “Doubt not Objection 3. Further, no body can be in several places whether this be true; but take rather the Saviour’s words at the one time. For this does not even belong to an an- with faith; for since He is the Truth, He lieth not.” gel; since for the same reason it could be everywhere. But Now this is suitable, first for the perfection of the New Christ’s is a true body, and it is in heaven. Consequently, Law. For, the sacrifices of the Old Law contained only it seems that it is not in very truth in the sacrament of the in figure that true sacrifice of Christ’s Passion, according altar, but only as in a sign. to Heb. 10:1: “For the law having a shadow of the good ∗ The titles of the Articles here given were taken by St. Thomas from his Commentary on the Sentences (Sent. iv, D, 90). However, in writing the Articles he introduced a new point of inquiry, that of the First Article; and substituted another division of the matter under discussion, as may be seen by referring to the titles of the various Articles. Most editions have ignored St. Thomas’s original division, and give the one to which he subsequently adhered. † On Ps. 98:9 2517 things to come, not the very image of the things.” And not to exclude the truth of Christ’s body, but that it was therefore it was necessary that the sacrifice of the New not to be eaten in this species in which it was seen by Law instituted by Christ should have something more, them. And by the words: “It is a mystery that I put before namely, that it should contain Christ Himself crucified, you; in its spiritual sense it will quicken you,” he intends not merely in signification or figure, but also in very truth. not that the body of Christ is in this sacrament merely ac- And therefore this sacrament which contains Christ Him- cording to mystical signification, but “spiritually,” that is, self, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii), is perfective of invisibly, and by the power of the spirit. Hence (Tract. all the other sacraments, in which Christ’s virtue is partic- xxvii), expounding Jn. 6:64: “the flesh profiteth nothing,” ipated. he says: “Yea, but as they understood it, for they under- Secondly, this belongs to Christ’s love, out of which stood that the flesh was to be eaten as it is divided piece- for our salvation He assumed a true body of our nature. meal in a dead body, or as sold in the shambles, not as it And because it is the special feature of friendship to live is quickened by the spirit. . . Let the spirit draw nigh to the together with friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix), flesh. . . then the flesh profiteth very much: for if the flesh He promises us His bodily presence as a reward, saying profiteth nothing, the Word had not been made flesh, that (Mat. 24:28): “Where the body is, there shall the eagles It might dwell among us.” be gathered together.” Yet meanwhile in our pilgrimage Reply to Objection 2. That saying of Augustine and He does not deprive us of His bodily presence; but unites all others like it are to be understood of Christ’s body as us with Himself in this sacrament through the truth of His it is beheld in its proper species; according as our Lord body and blood. Hence (Jn. 6:57) he says: “He that eateth Himself says (Mat. 26:11): “But Me you have not al- My flesh, and drinketh My blood, abideth in Me, and I in ways.” Nevertheless He is invisibly under the species of him.” Hence this sacrament is the sign of supreme charity, this sacrament, wherever this sacrament is performed. and the uplifter of our hope, from such familiar union of Reply to Objection 3. Christ’s body is not in this Christ with us. sacrament in the same way as a body is in a place, which Thirdly, it belongs to the perfection of faith, which by its dimensions is commensurate with the place; but in a concerns His humanity just as it does His Godhead, ac- special manner which is proper to this sacrament. Hence cording to Jn. 14:1: “You believe in God, believe also in we say that Christ’s body is upon many altars, not as in Me.” And since faith is of things unseen, as Christ shows different places, but “sacramentally”: and thereby we do us His Godhead invisibly, so also in this sacrament He not understand that Christ is there only as in a sign, al- shows us His flesh in an invisible manner. though a sacrament is a kind of sign; but that Christ’s body Some men accordingly, not paying heed to these is here after a fashion proper to this sacrament, as stated things, have contended that Christ’s body and blood are above. not in this sacrament except as in a sign, a thing to be re- Reply to Objection 4. This argument holds good of jected as heretical, since it is contrary to Christ’s words. Christ’s bodily presence, as He is present after the manner Hence Berengarius, who had been the first deviser of this of a body, that is, as it is in its visible appearance, but not heresy, was afterwards forced to withdraw his error, and as it is spiritually, that is, invisibly, after the manner and to acknowledge the truth of the faith. by the virtue of the spirit. Hence Augustine (Tract. xxvii Reply to Objection 1. From this authority the afore- in Joan.) says: “If thou hast understood” Christ’s words said heretics have taken occasion to err from evilly under- spiritually concerning His flesh, “they are spirit and life to standing Augustine’s words. For when Augustine says: thee; if thou hast understood them carnally, they are also “You are not to eat this body which you see,” he means spirit and life, but not to thee.” Whether in this sacrament the substance of the bread and wine remains after the IIIa q. 75 a. 2 consecration? Objection 1. It seems that the substance of the bread sacrament, with the body and the blood of Christ. and wine does remain in this sacrament after the consecra- Objection 2. Further, there ought to be conformity tion: because Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): “Since between the sacraments. But in the other sacraments the it is customary for men to eat bread and drink wine, God substance of the matter remains, like the substance of wa- has wedded his Godhead to them, and made them His ter in Baptism, and the substance of chrism in Confirma- body and blood”: and further on: “The bread of commu- tion. Therefore the substance of the bread and wine re- nication is not simple bread, but is united to the Godhead.” mains also in this sacrament. But wedding together belongs to things actually existing. Objection 3. Further, bread and wine are made use of Therefore the bread and wine are at the same time, in this in this sacrament, inasmuch as they denote ecclesiastical 2518 unity, as “one bread is made from many grains and wine except by change of the substance of bread into itself. But from many grapes,” as Augustine says in his book on the what is changed into another thing, no longer remains af- Creed (Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But this belongs to the sub- ter such change. Hence the conclusion is that, saving the stance of bread and wine. Therefore, the substance of the truth of this sacrament, the substance of the bread cannot bread and wine remains in this sacrament. remain after the consecration. On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv): “Al- Secondly, because this position is contrary to the form though the figure of the bread and wine be seen, still, after of this sacrament, in which it is said: “This is My body,” the Consecration, they are to be believed to be nothing which would not be true if the substance of the bread were else than the body end blood of Christ.” to remain there; for the substance of bread never is the I answer that, Some have held that the substance of body of Christ. Rather should one say in that case: “Here the bread and wine remains in this sacrament after the is My body.” consecration. But this opinion cannot stand: first of all, Thirdly, because it would be opposed to the venera- because by such an opinion the truth of this sacrament is tion of this sacrament, if any substance were there, which destroyed, to which it belongs that Christ’s true body ex- could not be adored with adoration of latria. ists in this sacrament; which indeed was not there before Fourthly, because it is contrary to the rite of the the consecration. Now a thing cannot be in any place, Church, according to which it is not lawful to take the where it was not previously, except by change of place, or body of Christ after bodily food, while it is nevertheless by the conversion of another thing into itself; just as fire lawful to take one consecrated host after another. Hence begins anew to be in some house, either because it is car- this opinion is to be avoided as heretical. ried thither, or because it is generated there. Now it is evi- Reply to Objection 1. God “wedded His Godhead,” dent that Christ’s body does not begin to be present in this i.e. His Divine power, to the bread and wine, not that sacrament by local motion. First of all, because it would these may remain in this sacrament, but in order that He follow that it would cease to be in heaven: for what is may make from them His body and blood. moved locally does not come anew to some place unless it Reply to Objection 2. Christ is not really present in quit the former one. Secondly, because every body moved the other sacraments, as in this; and therefore the sub- locally passes through all intermediary spaces, which can- stance of the matter remains in the other sacraments, but not be said here. Thirdly, because it is not possible for one not in this. movement of the same body moved locally to be termi- Reply to Objection 3. The species which remain in nated in different places at the one time, whereas the body this sacrament, as shall be said later (a. 5), suffice for its of Christ under this sacrament begins at the one time to signification; because the nature of the substance is known be in several places. And consequently it remains that by its accidents. Christ’s body cannot begin to be anew in this sacrament Whether the substance of the bread or wine is annihilated after the consecration of IIIa q. 75 a. 3 this sacrament, or dissolved into their original matter? Objection 1. It seems that the substance of the bread Officiis (De Myster. ix): “Before the blessing it is called is annihilated after the consecration of this sacrament, or another species, after the blessing the body of Christ is dissolved into its original matter. For whatever is cor- signified.” Therefore, when the consecration takes place, poreal must be somewhere. But the substance of bread, the substance of the bread or wine no longer remains, un- which is something corporeal, does not remain, in this less perchance dissolved into its (original) matter. sacrament, as stated above (a. 2); nor can we assign any Objection 3. Further, one of two contradictories must place where it may be. Consequently it is nothing after be true. But this proposition is false: “After the conse- the consecration. Therefore, it is either annihilated, or dis- cration the substance of the bread or wine is something.” solved into its original matter. Consequently, this is true: “The substance of the bread or Objection 2. Further, what is the term “wherefrom” wine is nothing.” in every change exists no longer, except in the potentiality On the contrary, Augustine says (q. 83): “God is not of matter; e.g. when air is changed into fire, the form of the cause of tending to nothing.” But this sacrament is the air remains only in the potentiality of matter; and in wrought by Divine power. Therefore, in this sacrament like fashion when what is white becomes black. But in the substance of the bread or wine is not annihilated. this sacrament the substance of the bread or of the wine I answer that, Because the substance of the bread and is the term “wherefrom,” while the body or the blood of wine does not remain in this sacrament, some, deeming Christ is the term “whereunto”: for Ambrose says in De that it is impossible for the substance of the bread and 2519 wine to be changed into Christ’s flesh and blood, have consideration, wherefore they formulated their proposi-maintained that by the consecration, the substance of the tion with an alternative viz. that (the substance) may be bread and wine is either dissolved into the original matter, annihilated. But even this cannot stand, because no way or that it is annihilated. can be assigned whereby Christ’s true body can begin to Now the original matter into which mixed bodies can be in this sacrament, except by the change of the substance be dissolved is the four elements. For dissolution cannot of bread into it, which change is excluded the moment we be made into primary matter, so that a subject can exist admit either annihilation of the substance of the bread, or without a form, since matter cannot exist without a form. dissolution into the original matter. Likewise no cause can But since after the consecration nothing remains under be assigned for such dissolution or annihilation, since the the sacramental species except the body and the blood of effect of the sacrament is signified by the form: “This is Christ, it will be necessary to say that the elements into My body.” Hence it is clear that the aforesaid opinion is which the substance of the bread and wine is dissolved, false. depart from thence by local motion, which would be per- Reply to Objection 1. The substance of the bread ceived by the senses. In like manner also the substance or wine, after the consecration, remains neither under the of the bread or wine remains until the last instant of the sacramental species, nor elsewhere; yet it does not follow consecration; but in the last instant of the consecration that it is annihilated; for it is changed into the body of there is already present there the substance of the body Christ; just as if the air, from which fire is generated, be or blood of Christ, just as the form is already present in not there or elsewhere, it does not follow that it is annihi- the last instant of generation. Hence no instant can be as- lated. signed in which the original matter can be there. For it Reply to Objection 2. The form, which is the term cannot be said that the substance of the bread or wine is “wherefrom,” is not changed into another form; but one dissolved gradually into the original matter, or that it suc- form succeeds another in the subject; and therefore the cessively quits the species, for if this began to be done in first form remains only in the potentiality of matter. But the last instant of its consecration, then at the one time here the substance of the bread is changed into the body under part of the host there would be the body of Christ of Christ, as stated above. Hence the conclusion does not together with the substance of bread, which is contrary to follow. what has been said above (a. 2). But if this begin to come Reply to Objection 3. Although after the consecra- to pass before the consecration, there will then be a time tion this proposition is false: “The substance of the breed in which under one part of the host there will be neither is something,” still that into which the substance of the the substance of bread nor the body of Christ, which is not bread is changed, is something, and consequently the sub- fitting. They seem indeed to have taken this into careful stance of the bread is not annihilated. Whether bread can be converted into the body of Christ? IIIa q. 75 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that bread cannot be converted Christ’s body must necessarily begin to be in the matter of into the body of Christ. For conversion is a kind of the bread, which is false. Consequently, the bread is not change. But in every change there must be some sub- changed into the substance of Christ’s body. ject, which from being previously in potentiality is now Objection 3. Further, when two things are diverse, in act. because as is said in Phys. iii: “motion is the act one never becomes the other, as whiteness never becomes of a thing existing in potentiality.” But no subject can be blackness, as is stated in Phys. i. But since two contrary assigned for the substance of the bread and of the body of forms are of themselves diverse, as being the principles Christ, because it is of the very nature of substance for it of formal difference, so two signate matters are of them- “not to be in a subject,” as it is said in Praedic. iii. There- selves diverse, as being the principles of material distinc- fore it is not possible for the whole substance of the bread tion. Consequently, it is not possible for this matter of to be converted into the body of Christ. bread to become this matter whereby Christ’s body is in- Objection 2. Further, the form of the thing into which dividuated, and so it is not possible for this substance of another is converted, begins anew to inhere in the matter bread to be changed into the substance of Christ’s body. of the thing converted into it: as when air is changed into On the contrary, Eusebius Emesenus says: “To thee fire not already existing, the form of fire begins anew to be it ought neither to be a novelty nor an impossibility that in the matter of the air; and in like manner when food is earthly and mortal things be changed into the substance of converted into non-pre-existing man, the form of the man Christ.” begins to be anew in the matter of the food. Therefore, I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), since Christ’s if bread be changed into the body of Christ, the form of true body is in this sacrament, and since it does not begin 2520 to be there by local motion, nor is it contained therein as forms succeed each other in the same subject; but also the in a place, as is evident from what was stated above (a. 1, change of all being, so that, to wit, the whole substance of ad 2), it must be said then that it begins to be there by one thing be changed into the whole substance of another. conversion of the substance of bread into itself. And this is done by Divine power in this sacrament; for Yet this change is not like natural changes, but is en- the whole substance of the bread is changed into the whole tirely supernatural, and effected by God’s power alone. substance of Christ’s body, and the whole substance of the Hence Ambrose says [(De Sacram. iv): “See how Christ’s wine into the whole substance of Christ’s blood. Hence word changes nature’s laws, as He wills: a man is not this is not a formal, but a substantial conversion; nor is it wont to be born save of man and woman: see therefore a kind of natural movement: but, with a name of its own, that against the established law and order a man is born of it can be called “transubstantiation.” a Virgin”: and]∗ (De Myster. iv): “It is clear that a Virgin Reply to Objection 1. This objection holds good in begot beyond the order of nature: and what we make is the respect of formal change, because it belongs to a form body from the Virgin. Why, then, do you look for nature’s to be in matter or in a subject; but it does not hold good order in Christ’s body, since the Lord Jesus was Himself in respect of the change of the entire substance. Hence, brought forth of a Virgin beyond nature?” Chrysostom since this substantial change implies a certain order of likewise (Hom. xlvii), commenting on Jn. 6:64: “The substances, one of which is changed into the other, it is words which I have spoken to you,” namely, of this sacra- in both substances as in a subject, just as order and num- ment, “are spirit and life,” says: i.e. “spiritual, having ber. nothing carnal, nor natural consequence; but they are rent Reply to Objection 2. This argument also is true of from all such necessity which exists upon earth, and from formal conversion or change, because, as stated above (ad the laws here established.” 1), a form must be in some matter or subject. But this is For it is evident that every agent acts according as it is not so in a change of the entire substance; for in this case in act. But every created agent is limited in its act, as be- no subject is possible. ing of a determinate genus and species: and consequently Reply to Objection 3. Form cannot be changed into the action of every created agent bears upon some deter- form, nor matter into matter by the power of any finite minate act. Now the determination of every thing in actual agent. Such a change, however, can be made by the power existence comes from its form. Consequently, no natural of an infinite agent, which has control over all being, be- or created agent can act except by changing the form in cause the nature of being is common to both forms and to something; and on this account every change made ac- both matters; and whatever there is of being in the one, cording to nature’s laws is a formal change. But God is the author of being can change into whatever there is of infinite act, as stated in the Ia, q. 7, a. 1; q. 26, a. 2; hence being in the other, withdrawing that whereby it was dis-His action extends to the whole nature of being. Therefore tinguished from the other. He can work not only formal conversion, so that diverse Whether the accidents of the bread and wine remain in this sacrament after the IIIa q. 75 a. 5 change? Objection 1. It seems that the accidents of the bread was said in the beginning of this work ( Ia, q. 1, a. 6, ad 2; and wine do not remain in this sacrament. For when that a. 8). But our reason has its origin in the senses. There- which comes first is removed, that which follows is also fore our faith ought not to be contrary to the senses, as it is taken away. But substance is naturally before accident, as when sense judges that to be bread which faith believes to is proved in Metaph. vii. Since, then, after consecration, be the substance of Christ’s body. Therefore it is not be- the substance of the bread does not remain in this sacra- fitting this sacrament for the accidents of bread to remain ment, it seems that its accidents cannot remain. subject to the senses, and for the substance of bread not to Objection 2. Further, there ought not to be any decep- remain. tion in a sacrament of truth. But we judge of substance Objection 4. Further, what remains after the change by accidents. It seems, then, that human judgment is de- has taken place seems to be the subject of change. If there- ceived, if, while the accidents remain, the substance of the fore the accidents of the bread remain after the change has bread does not. Consequently this is unbecoming to this been effected, it seems that the accidents are the subject sacrament. of the change. But this is impossible; for “an accident Objection 3. Further, although our faith is not subject cannot have an accident” (Metaph. iii). Therefore the ac- to reason, still it is not contrary to reason, but above it, as cidents of the bread and wine ought not to remain in this ∗ The passage in the brackets is not in the Leonine edition 2521 sacrament. Reply to Objection 1. As is said in the book De Cau- On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the sis, an effect depends more on the first cause than on the Sentences of Prosper (Lanfranc, De Corp. et Sang. Dom. second. And therefore by God’s power, which is the first xiii): “Under the species which we behold, of bread and cause of all things, it is possible for that which follows to wine, we honor invisible things, i.e. flesh and blood.” remain, while that which is first is taken away. I answer that, It is evident to sense that all the acci- Reply to Objection 2. There is no deception in this dents of the bread and wine remain after the consecration. sacrament; for the accidents which are discerned by the And this is reasonably done by Divine providence. First of senses are truly present. But the intellect, whose proper all, because it is not customary, but horrible, for men to eat object is substance as is said in De Anima iii, is preserved human flesh, and to drink blood. And therefore Christ’s by faith from deception. flesh and blood are set before us to be partaken of under And this serves as answer to the third argument; be- the species of those things which are the more commonly cause faith is not contrary to the senses, but concerns used by men, namely, bread and wine. Secondly, lest this things to which sense does not reach. sacrament might be derided by unbelievers, if we were to Reply to Objection 4. This change has not properly eat our Lord under His own species. Thirdly, that while a subject, as was stated above (a. 4, ad 1); nevertheless we receive our Lord’s body and blood invisibly, this may the accidents which remain have some resemblance of a redound to the merit of faith. subject. Whether the substantial form of the bread remains in this sacrament after the conse-IIIa q. 75 a. 6 cration? Objection 1. It seems that the substantial form of the body.” bread remains in this sacrament after the consecration. Secondly, because if the substantial form of the bread For it has been said (a. 5) that the accidents remain af- were to remain, it would remain either in matter, or sepa- ter the consecration. But since bread is an artificial thing, rated from matter. The first cannot be, for if it were to re- its form is an accident. Therefore it remains after the con- main in the matter of the bread, then the whole substance secration. of the bread would remain, which is against what was said Objection 2. Further, the form of Christ’s body is His above (a. 2). Nor could it remain in any other matter, be- soul: for it is said in De Anima ii, that the soul “is the cause the proper form exists only in its proper matter. But act of a physical body which has life in potentiality”. But if it were to remain separate from matter, it would then be it cannot be said that the substantial form of the bread is an actually intelligible form, and also an intelligence; for changed into the soul. Therefore it appears that it remains all forms separated from matter are such. after the consecration. Thirdly, it would be unbefitting this sacrament: be- Objection 3. Further, the proper operation of a cause the accidents of the bread remain in this sacrament, things follows its substantial form. But what remains in in order that the body of Christ may be seen under them, this sacrament, nourishes, and performs every operation and not under its proper species, as stated above (a. 5). which bread would do were it present. Therefore the sub- And therefore it must be said that the substantial form stantial form of the bread remains in this sacrament after of the bread does not remain. the consecration. Reply to Objection 1. There is nothing to prevent art On the contrary, The substantial form of bread is from making a thing whose form is not an accident, but of the substance of bread. But the substance of the a substantial form; as frogs and serpents can be produced bread is changed into the body of Christ, as stated above by art: for art produces such forms not by its own power, (Aa. 2,3,4). Therefore the substantial form of the bread but by the power of natural energies. And in this way it does not remain. produces the substantial forms of bread, by the power of I answer that, Some have contended that after the fire baking the matter made up of flour and water. consecration not only do the accidents of the bread re- Reply to Objection 2. The soul is the form of the main, but also its substantial form. But this cannot be. body, giving it the whole order of perfect being, i.e. being, First of all, because if the substantial form of the bread corporeal being, and animated being, and so on. There- were to remain, nothing of the bread would be changed fore the form of the bread is changed into the form of into the body of Christ, excepting the matter; and so it Christ’s body, according as the latter gives corporeal be- would follow that it would be changed, not into the whole ing, but not according as it bestows animated being. body of Christ, but into its matter, which is repugnant to Reply to Objection 3. Some of the operations of the form of the sacrament, wherein it is said: “This is My bread follow it by reason of the accidents, such as to affect 2522 the senses, and such operations are found in the species of its species, for instance, that it “strengthens man’s heart” the bread after the consecration on account of the acci- (Ps. 103:15); and such operations are found in this sacra- dents which remain. But some other operations follow ment, not on account of the form or matter remaining, but the bread either by reason of the matter, such as that it because they are bestowed miraculously upon the acci- is changed into something else, or else by reason of the dents themselves, as will be said later (q. 77, a. 3, ad 2,3; substantial form, such as an operation consequent upon Aa. 5,6). Whether this change is wrought instantaneously? IIIa q. 75 a. 7 Objection 1. It seems that this change is not wrought is the term of this conversion, does not receive more or instantaneously, but successively. For in this change there less. Secondly, because in this conversion there is no sub- is first the substance of bread, and afterwards the sub- ject to be disposed successively. Thirdly, because it is ef- stance of Christ’s body. Neither, then, is in the same in- fected by God’s infinite power. stant, but in two instants. But there is a mid-time between Reply to Objection 1. Some∗ do not grant simply that every two instants. Therefore this change must take place there is a mid-time between every two instants. For they according to the succession of time, which is between the say that this is true of two instants referring to the same last instant in which the bread is there, and the first instant movement, but not if they refer to different things. Hence in which the body of Christ is present. between the instant that marks the close of rest, and an- Objection 2. Further, in every change something is other which marks the beginning of movement, there is “in becoming” and something is “in being.” But these no mid-time. But in this they are mistaken, because the two things do not exist at the one time for, what is “in be- unity of time and of instant, or even their plurality, is not coming,” is not yet, whereas what is “in being,” already taken according to movements of any sort, but according is. Consequently, there is a before and an after in such to the first movement of the heavens, which is the measure change: and so necessarily the change cannot be instanta- of all movement and rest. neous, but successive. Accordingly others grant this of the time which mea- Objection 3. Further, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv) sures movement depending on the movement of the heav- that this sacrament “is made by the words of Christ.” But ens. But there are some movements which are not depen- Christ’s words are pronounced successively. Therefore dent on the movement of the heavens, nor measured by it, the change takes place successively. as was said in the Ia, q. 53, a. 3 concerning the movements On the contrary, This change is effected by a power of the angels. Hence between two instants responding to which is infinite, to which it belongs to operate in an in- those movements there is no mid-time. But this is not to stant. the point, because although the change in question has no I answer that, A change may be instantaneous from a relation of itself to the movement of the heavens, still it threefold reason. First on the part of the form, which is the follows the pronouncing of the words, which (pronounc- terminus of the change. For, if it be a form that receives ing) must necessarily be measured by the movement of more and less, it is acquired by its subject successively, the heavens. And therefore there must of necessity be a such as health; and therefore because a substantial form mid-time between every two signate instants in connec- does not receive more and less, it follows that its intro- tion with that change. duction into matter is instantaneous. Some say therefore that the instant in which the bread Secondly on the part of the subject, which sometimes was last, and the instant in which the body of Christ is is prepared successively for receiving the form; thus wa- first, are indeed two in comparison with the things mea- ter is heated successively. When, however, the subject it- sured, but are one comparatively to the time measuring; self is in the ultimate disposition for receiving the form, it as when two lines touch, there are two points on the part receives it suddenly, as a transparent body is illuminated of the two lines, but one point on the part of the place suddenly. Thirdly on the part of the agent, which pos- containing them. But here there is no likeness, because sesses infinite power: wherefore it can instantly dispose instant and time is not the intrinsic measure of particular the matter for the form. Thus it is written (Mk. 7:34) movements, as a line and point are of a body, but only the that when Christ had said, “ ‘Ephpheta,’ which is ‘Be thou extrinsic measure, as place is to bodies. opened,’ immediately his ears were opened, and the string Hence others say that it is the same instant in fact, of his tongue was loosed.” but another according to reason. But according to this For these three reasons this conversion is instanta- it would follow that things really opposite would exist to- neous. First, because the substance of Christ’s body which gether; for diversity of reason does not change a thing ob- ∗ Cf. Albert the Great, Sent. iv, D, 11; St. Bonaventure, Sent., iv, D, 11 2523 jectively. changes, as is evident from the Philosopher (Phys. viii). And therefore it must be said that this change, as stated Reply to Objection 2. In instantaneous changes a above, is wrought by Christ’s words which are spoken by thing is “in becoming,” and is “in being” simultaneously; the priest, so that the last instant of pronouncing the words just as becoming illuminated and to be actually illumi- is the first instant in which Christ’s body is in the sacra- nated are simultaneous: for in such, a thing is said to be ment; and that the substance of the bread is there during “in being” according as it now is; but to be “in becoming,” the whole preceding time. Of this time no instant is to be according as it was not before. taken as proximately preceding the last one, because time Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (ad 1), this is not made up of successive instants, as is proved in Phys. change comes about in the last instant of the pronouncing vi. And therefore a first instant can be assigned in which of the words. for then the meaning of the words is fin- Christ’s body is present; but a last instant cannot be as- ished, which meaning is efficacious in the forms of the signed in which the substance of bread is there, but a last sacraments. And therefore it does not follow that this time can be assigned. And the same holds good in natural change is successive. Whether this proposition is false: “The body of Christ is made out of bread”? IIIa q. 75 a. 8 Objection 1. It seems that this proposition is false: with natural transmutation, and in some respect differs “The body of Christ is made out of bread.” For everything from both. For the order of the terms is common to these out of which another is made, is that which is made the three; that is, that after one thing there is another (for, in other; but not conversely: for we say that a black thing is creation there is being after non-being; in this sacrament, made out of a white thing, and that a white thing is made Christ’s body after the substance of bread; in natural trans- black: and although we may say that a man becomes black mutation white after black, or fire after air); and that the still we do not say that a black thing is made out of a man, aforesaid terms are not coexistent. as is shown in Phys. i. If it be true, then, that Christ’s Now the conversion, of which we are speaking, has body is made out of bread, it will be true to say that bread this in common with creation, that in neither of them is is made the body of Christ. But this seems to be false, be- there any common subject belonging to either of the ex- cause the bread is not the subject of the making, but rather tremes; the contrary of which appears in every natural its term. Therefore, it is not said truly that Christ’s body transmutation. is made out of bread. Again, this conversion has something in common with Objection 2. Further, the term of “becoming” is natural transmutation in two respects, although not in the something that is, or something that is “made.” But same fashion. First of all because in both, one of the ex- this proposition is never true: “The bread is the body of tremes passes into the other, as bread into Christ’s body, Christ”; or “The bread is made the body of Christ”; or and air into fire; whereas non-being is not converted into again, “The bread will be the body of Christ.” Therefore being. But this comes to pass differently on the one side it seems that not even this is true: “The body of Christ is and on the other; for in this sacrament the whole substance made out of bread.” of the bread passes into the whole body of Christ; whereas Objection 3. Further, everything out of which another in natural transmutation the matter of the one receives the is made is converted into that which is made from it. But form of the other, the previous form being laid aside. Sec- this proposition seems to be false: “The bread is converted ondly, they have this in common, that on both sides some- into the body of Christ,” because such conversion seems thing remains the same; whereas this does not happen in to be more miraculous than the creation of the world, in creation: yet differently; for the same matter or subject re- which it is not said that non-being is converted into being. mains in natural transmutation; whereas in this sacrament Therefore it seems that this proposition likewise is false: the same accidents remain. “The body of Christ is made out of bread.” From these observations we can gather the various Objection 4. Further, that out of which something ways of speaking in such matters. For, because in no one is made, can be that thing. But this proposition is false: of the aforesaid three things are the extremes coexistent, “Bread can be the body of Christ.” Therefore this is like- therefore in none of them can one extreme be predicated wise false: “The body of Christ is made out of bread.” of the other by the substantive verb of the present tense: On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv): for we do not say, “Non-being is being” or, “Bread is the “When the consecration takes place, the body of Christ body of Christ,” or, “Air is fire,” or, “White is black.” Yet is made out of the bread.” because of the relationship of the extremes in all of them I answer that, This conversion of bread into the body we can use the preposition “ex” [out of], which denotes of Christ has something in common with creation, and order; for we can truly and properly say that “being is 2524 made out of non-being,” and “out of bread, the body of “bread is the body of Christ,” or, “bread will be the body Christ,” and “out of air, fire,” and “out of white, black.” of Christ,” or “the body of Christ is made of bread”; pro- But because in creation one of the extremes does not pass vided that by the word “bread” is not understood the sub- into the other, we cannot use the word “conversion” in stance of bread, but in general “that which is contained creation, so as to say that “non-being is converted into be- under the species of bread,” under which species there is ing”: we can, however, use the word in this sacrament, first contained the substance of bread, and afterwards the just as in natural transmutation. But since in this sacra- body of Christ. ment the whole substance is converted into the whole sub- Reply to Objection 1. That out of which something stance, on that account this conversion is properly termed else is made, sometimes implies together with the subject, transubstantiation. one of the extremes of the transmutation, as when it is said Again, since there is no subject of this conversion, “a black thing is made out of a white one”; but sometimes the things which are true in natural conversion by reason it implies only the opposite or the extreme, as when it is of the subject, are not to be granted in this conversion. said—“out of morning comes the day.” And so it is not And in the first place indeed it is evident that potentiality granted that the latter becomes the former, that is, “that to the opposite follows a subject, by reason whereof we morning becomes the day.” So likewise in the matter in say that “a white thing can be black,” or that “air can be hand, although it may be said properly that “the body of fire”; although the latter is not so proper as the former: Christ is made out of bread,” yet it is not said properly that for the subject of whiteness, in which there is potentiality “bread becomes the body of Christ,” except by similitude, to blackness, is the whole substance of the white thing; as was said above. since whiteness is not a part thereof; whereas the subject Reply to Objection 2. That out of which another is of the form of air is part thereof: hence when it is said, made, will sometimes be that other because of the subject “Air can be fire,” it is verified by synecdoche by reason which is implied. And therefore, since there is no subject of the part. But in this conversion, and similarly in cre- of this change, the comparison does not hold. ation, because there is no subject, it is not said that one Reply to Objection 3. In this change there are many extreme can be the other, as that “non-being can be be- more difficulties than in creation, in which there is but this ing,” or that “bread can be the body of Christ”: and for the one difficulty, that something is made out of nothing; yet same reason it cannot be properly said that “being is made this belongs to the proper mode of production of the first of [de] non-being,” or that “the body of Christ is made of cause, which presupposes nothing else. But in this con- bread,” because this preposition “of” [de] denotes a con- version not only is it difficult for this whole to be changed substantial cause, which consubstantiality of the extremes into that whole, so that nothing of the former may remain in natural transmutations is considered according to some- (which does not belong to the common mode of produc- thing common in the subject. And for the same reason it tion of a cause), but furthermore it has this difficulty that is not granted that “bread will be the body of Christ,” or the accidents remain while the substance is destroyed, and that it “may become the body of Christ,” just as it is not many other difficulties of which we shall treat hereafter granted in creation that “non-being will be being,” or that (q. 77). Nevertheless the word “conversion” is admitted “non-being may become being,” because this manner of in this sacrament, but not in creation, as stated above. speaking is verified in natural transmutations by reason of Reply to Objection 4. As was observed above, poten- the subject: for instance, when we say that “a white thing tiality belongs to the subject, whereas there is no subject becomes black,” or “a white thing will be black.” in this conversion. And therefore it is not granted that Nevertheless, since in this sacrament, after the change, bread can be the body of Christ: for this conversion does something remains the same, namely, the accidents of not come about by the passive potentiality of the creature, the bread, as stated above (a. 5), some of these expres- but solely by the active power of the Creator. sions may be admitted by way of similitude, namely, that 2525 THIRD PART, QUESTION 76 Of the Way in Which Christ Is in This Sacrament (In Eight Articles) We have now to consider the manner in which Christ exists in this sacrament; and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the whole Christ is under this sacrament? (2) Whether the entire Christ is under each species of the sacrament? (3) Whether the entire Christ is under every part of the species? (4) Whether all the dimensions of Christ’s body are in this sacrament? (5) Whether the body of Christ is in this sacrament locally? (6) Whether after the consecration, the body of Christ is moved when the host or chalice is moved? (7) Whether Christ’s body, as it is in this sacrament, can be seen by the eye? (8) Whether the true body of Christ remains in this sacrament when He is seen under the appearance of a child or of flesh? Whether the whole Christ is contained under this sacrament? IIIa q. 76 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that the whole Christ is not con- tive in this as in the other sacraments; for instance, by tained under this sacrament, because Christ begins to be in the words: “This is My body,” or, “This is My blood.” this sacrament by conversion of the bread and wine. But But from natural concomitance there is also in this sacra- it is evident that the bread and wine cannot be changed ei- ment that which is really united with that thing wherein ther into the Godhead or into the soul of Christ. Since the aforesaid conversion is terminated. For if any two therefore Christ exists in three substances, namely, the things be really united, then wherever the one is really, Godhead, soul and body, as shown above (q. 2, a. 5; q. 5, there must the other also be: since things really united to- Aa. 1,3), it seems that the entire Christ is not under this gether are only distinguished by an operation of the mind. sacrament. Reply to Objection 1. Because the change of the Objection 2. Further, Christ is in this sacrament, bread and wine is not terminated at the Godhead or the forasmuch as it is ordained to the refection of the faithful, soul of Christ, it follows as a consequence that the God- which consists in food and drink, as stated above (q. 74, head or the soul of Christ is in this sacrament not by a. 1). But our Lord said (Jn. 6:56): “My flesh is meat the power of the sacrament, but from real concomitance. indeed, and My blood is drink indeed.” Therefore, only For since the Godhead never set aside the assumed body, the flesh and blood of Christ are contained in this sacra- wherever the body of Christ is, there, of necessity, must ment. But there are many other parts of Christ’s body, for the Godhead be; and therefore it is necessary for the God- instance, the nerves, bones, and such like. Therefore the head to be in this sacrament concomitantly with His body. entire Christ is not contained under this sacrament. Hence we read in the profession of faith at Ephesus (P. Objection 3. Further, a body of greater quantity can- I., chap. xxvi): “We are made partakers of the body and not be contained under the measure of a lesser. But the blood of Christ, not as taking common flesh, nor as of a measure of the bread and wine is much smaller than the holy man united to the Word in dignity, but the truly life- measure of Christ’s body. Therefore it is impossible that giving flesh of the Word Himself.” the entire Christ be contained under this sacrament. On the other hand, His soul was truly separated from On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Officiis): “Christ His body, as stated above (q. 50, a. 5). And therefore had is in this sacrament.” this sacrament been celebrated during those three days I answer that, It is absolutely necessary to confess when He was dead, the soul of Christ would not have been according to Catholic faith that the entire Christ is in this there, neither by the power of the sacrament, nor from real sacrament. Yet we must know that there is something of concomitance. But since “Christ rising from the dead di- Christ in this sacrament in a twofold manner: first, as it eth now no more” (Rom. 6:9), His soul is always really were, by the power of the sacrament; secondly, from nat- united with His body. And therefore in this sacrament the ural concomitance. By the power of the sacrament, there body indeed of Christ is present by the power of the sacra- is under the species of this sacrament that into which the ment, but His soul from real concomitance. pre-existing substance of the bread and wine is changed, Reply to Objection 2. By the power of the sacrament as expressed by the words of the form, which are effec- there is contained under it, as to the species of the bread, 2526 not only the flesh, but the entire body of Christ, that is, the dimensions of the body of Christ, but substance into sub-bones the nerves, and the like. And this is apparent from stance. And so the substance of Christ’s body or blood is the form of this sacrament, wherein it is not said: “This is under this sacrament by the power of the sacrament, but My flesh,” but “This is My body.” Accordingly, when our not the dimensions of Christ’s body or blood. Hence it is Lord said (Jn. 6:56): “My flesh is meat indeed,” there the clear that the body of Christ is in this sacrament “by way word flesh is put for the entire body, because according to of substance,” and not by way of quantity. But the proper human custom it seems to be more adapted for eating, as totality of substance is contained indifferently in a small men commonly are fed on the flesh of animals, but not on or large quantity; as the whole nature of air in a great or the bones or the like. small amount of air, and the whole nature of a man in a big Reply to Objection 3. As has been already stated or small individual. Wherefore, after the consecration, the (q. 75, a. 5), after the consecration of the bread into the whole substance of Christ’s body and blood is contained body of Christ, or of the wine into His blood, the acci- in this sacrament, just as the whole substance of the bread dents of both remain. From which it is evident that the and wine was contained there before the consecration. dimensions of the bread or wine are not changed into the Whether the whole Christ is contained under each species of this sacrament? IIIa q. 76 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that the whole Christ is not bread by the power of the sacrament, while the blood is contained under both species of this sacrament. For this there from real concomitance, as stated above (a. 1, ad 1) sacrament is ordained for the salvation of the faithful, not in regard to the soul and Godhead of Christ; and under by virtue of the species, but by virtue of what is contained the species of wine the blood is present by the power of under the species, because the species were there even the sacrament, and His body by real concomitance, as is before the consecration, from which comes the power of also His soul and Godhead: because now Christ’s blood is this sacrament. If nothing, then, be contained under one not separated from His body, as it was at the time of His species, but what is contained under the other, and if the Passion and death. Hence if this sacrament had been cele- whole Christ be contained under both, it seems that one of brated then, the body of Christ would have been under the them is superfluous in this sacrament. species of the bread, but without the blood; and, under the Objection 2. Further, it was stated above (a. 1, ad species of the wine, the blood would have been present 1) that all the other parts of the body, such as the bones, without the body, as it was then, in fact. nerves, and the like, are comprised under the name of Reply to Objection 1. Although the whole Christ is flesh. But the blood is one of the parts of the human under each species, yet it is so not without purpose. For body, as Aristotle proves (De Anima Histor. i). If, then, in the first place this serves to represent Christ’s Passion, Christ’s blood be contained under the species of bread, in which the blood was separated from the body; hence just as the other parts of the body are contained there, the in the form for the consecration of the blood mention is blood ought not to be consecrated apart, just as no other made of its shedding. Secondly, it is in keeping with the part of the body is consecrated separately. use of this sacrament, that Christ’s body be shown apart to Objection 3. Further, what is once “in being” cannot the faithful as food, and the blood as drink. Thirdly, it is in be again “in becoming.” But Christ’s body has already keeping with its effect, in which sense it was stated above begun to be in this sacrament by the consecration of the (q. 74, a. 1) that “the body is offered for the salvation of bread. Therefore, it cannot begin again to be there by the the body, and the blood for the salvation of the soul.” consecration of the wine; and so Christ’s body will not be Reply to Objection 2. In Christ’s Passion, of which contained under the species of the wine, and accordingly this is the memorial, the other parts of the body were not neither the entire Christ. Therefore the whole Christ is not separated from one another, as the blood was, but the body contained under each species. remained entire, according to Ex. 12:46: “You shall not On the contrary, The gloss on 1 Cor. 11:25, com- break a bone thereof.” And therefore in this sacrament the menting on the word “Chalice,” says that “under each blood is consecrated apart from the body, but no other part species,” namely, of the bread and wine, “the same is re- is consecrated separately from the rest. ceived”; and thus it seems that Christ is entire under each Reply to Objection 3. As stated above, the body of species. Christ is not under the species of wine by the power of the I answer that, After what we have said above (a. 1), sacrament, but by real concomitance: and therefore by the it must be held most certainly that the whole Christ is un- consecration of the wine the body of Christ is not there of der each sacramental species yet not alike in each. For itself, but concomitantly. the body of Christ is indeed present under the species of 2527 Whether Christ is entire under every part of the species of the bread and wine? IIIa q. 76 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that Christ is not entire under part of air, and the entire nature of bread under every part every part of the species of bread and wine. Because those of bread; and this indifferently, whether the dimensions species can be divided infinitely. If therefore Christ be en- be actually divided (as when the air is divided or the bread tirely under every part of the said species, it would follow cut), or whether they be actually undivided, but potentially that He is in this sacrament an infinite number of times: divisible. And therefore it is manifest that the entire Christ which is unreasonable; because the infinite is repugnant is under every part of the species of the bread, even while not only to nature, but likewise to grace. the host remains entire, and not merely when it is bro- Objection 2. Further, since Christ’s is an organic ken, as some say, giving the example of an image which body, it has parts determinately distant. for a determinate appears in a mirror, which appears as one in the unbro- distance of the individual parts from each other is of the ken mirror, whereas when the mirror is broken, there is an very nature of an organic body, as that of eye from eye, image in each part of the broken mirror: for the compari- and eye from ear. But this could not be so, if Christ were son is not perfect, because the multiplying of such images entire under every part of the species; for every part would results in the broken mirror on account of the various re- have to be under every other part, and so where one part flections in the various parts of the mirror; but here there would be, there another part would be. It cannot be then is only one consecration, whereby Christ’s body is in this that the entire Christ is under every part of the host or of sacrament. the wine contained in the chalice. Reply to Objection 1. Number follows division, and Objection 3. Further, Christ’s body always retains the therefore so long as quantity remains actually undivided, true nature of a body, nor is it ever changed into a spirit. neither is the substance of any thing several times under Now it is the nature of a body for it to be “quantity hav- its proper dimensions, nor is Christ’s body several times ing position” (Predic. iv). But it belongs to the nature of under the dimensions of the bread; and consequently not this quantity that the various parts exist in various parts of an infinite number of times, but just as many times as it is place. Therefore, apparently it is impossible for the entire divided into parts. Christ to be under every part of the species. Reply to Objection 2. The determinate distance of On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon (Gre- parts in an organic body is based upon its dimensive quan- gory, Sacramentarium): “Each receives Christ the Lord, tity; but the nature of substance precedes even dimensive Who is entire under every morsel, nor is He less in each quantity. And since the conversion of the substance of the portion, but bestows Himself entire under each.” bread is terminated at the substance of the body of Christ, I answer that, As was observed above (a. 1, ad 3), be- and since according to the manner of substance the body cause the substance of Christ’s body is in this sacrament of Christ is properly and directly in this sacrament; such by the power of the sacrament, while dimensive quan- distance of parts is indeed in Christ’s true body, which, tity is there by reason of real concomitance, consequently however, is not compared to this sacrament according to Christ’s body is in this sacrament substantively, that is, in such distance, but according to the manner of its sub- the way in which substance is under dimensions, but not stance, as stated above (a. 1, ad 3). after the manner of dimensions, which means, not in the Reply to Objection 3. This argument is based on the way in which the dimensive quantity of a body is under nature of a body, arising from dimensive quantity. But it the dimensive quantity of place. was said above (ad 2) that Christ’s body is compared with Now it is evident that the whole nature of a substance this sacrament not by reason of dimensive quantity, but by is under every part of the dimensions under which it is reason of its substance, as already stated. contained; just as the entire nature of air is under every Whether the whole dimensive quantity of Christ’s body is in this sacrament? IIIa q. 76 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that the whole dimensive quan- sive quantities to be together, even though one be separate tity of Christ’s body is not in this sacrament. For it was from its subject, and the other in a natural body, as is clear said (a. 3) that Christ’s entire body is contained under ev- from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii). But the dimensive ery part of the consecrated host. But no dimensive quan- quantity of the bread remains in this sacrament, as is evi- tity is contained entirely in any whole, and in its every dent to our senses. Consequently, the dimensive quantity part. Therefore it is impossible for the entire dimensive of Christ’s body is not there. quantity of Christ’s body to be there. Objection 3. Further, if two unequal dimensive quan- Objection 2. Further, it is impossible for two dimen- tities be set side by side, the greater will overlap the lesser. 2528 But the dimensive quantity of Christ’s body is consider-not really deprived of its dimensive quantity and its other ably larger than the dimensive quantity of the consecrated accidents, hence it comes that by reason of real concomi- host according to every dimension. Therefore, if the di- tance the whole dimensive quantity of Christ’s body and mensive quantity of Christ’s body be in this sacrament all its other accidents are in this sacrament. together with the dimensive quantity of the host, the di- Reply to Objection 1. The manner of being of ev- mensive quantity of Christ’s body is extended beyond the ery thing is determined by what belongs to it of itself, quantity of the host, which nevertheless is not without the and not according to what is coupled accidentally with substance of Christ’s body. Therefore, the substance of it: thus an object is present to the sight, according as it is Christ’s body will be in this sacrament even outside the white, and not according as it is sweet, although the same species of the bread, which is unreasonable, since the sub- object may be both white and sweet; hence sweetness is stance of Christ’s body is in this sacrament, only by the in the sight after the manner of whiteness, and not after consecration of the bread, as stated above (a. 2). Conse- that of sweetness. Since, then, the substance of Christ’s quently, it is impossible for the whole dimensive quantity body is present on the altar by the power of this sacra- of Christ’s body to be in this sacrament. ment, while its dimensive quantity is there concomitantly On the contrary, The existence of the dimensive and as it were accidentally, therefore the dimensive quan- quantity of any body cannot be separated from the ex- tity of Christ’s body is in this sacrament, not according to istence of its substance. But in this sacrament the en- its proper manner (namely, that the whole is in the whole, tire substance of Christ’s body is present, as stated above and the individual parts in individual parts), but after the (Aa. 1,3). Therefore the entire dimensive quantity of manner of substance, whose nature is for the whole to be Christ’s body is in this sacrament. in the whole, and the whole in every part. I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), any part of Reply to Objection 2. Two dimensive quantities can- Christ is in this sacrament in two ways: in one way, by not naturally be in the same subject at the same time, so the power of the sacrament; in another, from real con- that each be there according to the proper manner of di- comitance. By the power of the sacrament the dimensive mensive quantity. But in this sacrament the dimensive quantity of Christ’s body is not in this sacrament; for, by quantity of the bread is there after its proper manner, that the power of the sacrament that is present in this sacra- is, according to commensuration: not so the dimensive ment, whereat the conversion is terminated. But the con- quantity of Christ’s body, for that is there after the man- version which takes place in this sacrament is terminated ner of substance, as stated above (ad 1). directly at the substance of Christ’s body, and not at its di- Reply to Objection 3. The dimensive quantity of mensions; which is evident from the fact that the dimen- Christ’s body is in this sacrament not by way of commen- sive quantity of the bread remains after the consecration, suration, which is proper to quantity, and to which it be- while only the substance of the bread passes away. longs for the greater to be extended beyond the lesser; but Nevertheless, since the substance of Christ’s body is in the way mentioned above (ad 1,2). Whether Christ’s body is in this sacrament as in a place? IIIa q. 76 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that Christ’s body is in this Objection 3. Further, as stated above (a. 4), the body sacrament as in a place. Because, to be in a place defini- of Christ is in this sacrament with its dimensive quantity, tively or circumscriptively belongs to being in a place. and with all its accidents. But to be in a place is an ac- But Christ’s body seems to be definitively in this sacra- cident of a body; hence “where” is numbered among the ment, because it is so present where the species of the nine kinds of accidents. Therefore Christ’s body is in this bread and wine are, that it is nowhere else upon the altar: sacrament locally. likewise it seems to be there circumscriptively, because it On the contrary, The place and the object placed is so contained under the species of the consecrated host, must be equal, as is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. iv). that it neither exceeds it nor is exceeded by it. Therefore But the place, where this sacrament is, is much less than Christ’s body is in this sacrament as in a place. the body of Christ. Therefore Christ’s body is not in this Objection 2. Further, the place of the bread and wine sacrament as in a place. is not empty, because nature abhors a vacuum; nor is the I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 3; a. 3), substance of the bread there, as stated above (q. 75, a. 2); Christ’s body is in this sacrament not after the proper but only the body of Christ is there. Consequently the manner of dimensive quantity, but rather after the man- body of Christ fills that place. But whatever fills a place ner of substance. But every body occupying a place is in is there locally. Therefore the body of Christ is in this the place according to the manner of dimensive quantity, sacrament locally. namely, inasmuch as it is commensurate with the place 2529 according to its dimensive quantity. Hence it remains that whereas it is in heaven under its own species, and on many Christ’s body is not in this sacrament as in a place, but other altars under the sacramental species. Likewise it is after the manner of substance, that is to say, in that way evident that it is not in this sacrament circumscriptively, in which substance is contained by dimensions; because because it is not there according to the commensuration the substance of Christ’s body succeeds the substance of of its own quantity, as stated above. But that it is not out- bread in this sacrament: hence as the substance of bread side the superficies of the sacrament, nor on any other part was not locally under its dimensions, but after the man- of the altar, is due not to its being there definitively or cirner of substance, so neither is the substance of Christ’s cumscriptively, but to its being there by consecration and body. Nevertheless the substance of Christ’s body is not conversion of the bread and wine, as stated above (a. 1; the subject of those dimensions, as was the substance of q. 15, a. 2, sqq.). the bread: and therefore the substance of the bread was Reply to Objection 2. The place in which Christ’s there locally by reason of its dimensions, because it was body is, is not empty; nor yet is it properly filled with the compared with that place through the medium of its own substance of Christ’s body, which is not there locally, as dimensions; but the substance of Christ’s body is com- stated above; but it is filled with the sacramental species, pared with that place through the medium of foreign di- which have to fill the place either because of the nature of mensions, so that, on the contrary, the proper dimensions dimensions, or at least miraculously, as they also subsist of Christ’s body are compared with that place through the miraculously after the fashion of substance. medium of substance; which is contrary to the notion of a Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (a. 4), the ac- located body. cidents of Christ’s body are in this sacrament by real con- Hence in no way is Christ’s body locally in this sacra- comitance. And therefore those accidents of Christ’s body ment. which are intrinsic to it are in this sacrament. But to be in Reply to Objection 1. Christ’s body is not in this a place is an accident when compared with the extrinsic sacrament definitively, because then it would be only on container. And therefore it is not necessary for Christ to the particular altar where this sacrament is performed: be in this sacrament as in a place. Whether Christ’s body is in this sacrament movably? IIIa q. 76 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that Christ’s body is movably heaven. Therefore it is not movably in this sacrament. in this sacrament, because the Philosopher says (Topic. I answer that, When any thing is one, as to subject, ii) that “when we are moved, the things within us are and manifold in being, there is nothing to hinder it from moved”: and this is true even of the soul’s spiritual sub- being moved in one respect, and yet to remain at rest in stance. “But Christ is in this sacrament,” as shown above another just as it is one thing for a body to be white, and (q. 74, a. 1 ). Therefore He is moved when it is moved. another thing, to be large; hence it can be moved as to Objection 2. Further, the truth ought to correspond its whiteness, and yet continue unmoved as to its magni- with the figure. But, according to the commandment tude. But in Christ, being in Himself and being under the (Ex. 12:10), concerning the Paschal Lamb, a figure of sacrament are not the same thing, because when we say this sacrament, “there remained nothing until the morn- that He is under this sacrament, we express a kind of rela- ing.” Neither, therefore, if this sacrament be reserved un- tionship to this sacrament. According to this being, then, til morning, will Christ’s body be there; and so it is not Christ is not moved locally of Himself, but only acciden- immovably in this sacrament. tally, because Christ is not in this sacrament as in a place, Objection 3. Further, if Christ’s body were to remain as stated above (a. 5). But what is not in a place, is not under this sacrament even until the morrow, for the same moved of itself locally, but only according to the motion reason it will remain there during all coming time; for it of the subject in which it is. cannot be said that it ceases to be there when the species In the same way neither is it moved of itself according pass, because the existence of Christ’s body is not de- to the being which it has in this sacrament, by any other pendent on those species. Yet Christ does not remain in change whatever, as for instance, that it ceases to be un- this sacrament for all coming time. It seems, then, that der this sacrament: because whatever possesses unfailing straightway on the morrow, or after a short time, He ceases existence of itself, cannot be the principle of failing; but to be under this sacrament. And so it seems that Christ is when something else fails, then it ceases to be in it; just as in this sacrament movably. God, Whose existence is unfailing and immortal, ceases On the contrary, it is impossible for the same thing to be in some corruptible creature because such corrupt- to be in motion and at rest, else contradictories would be ible creature ceases to exist. And in this way, since Christ verified of the same subject. But Christ’s body is at rest in has unfailing and incorruptible being, He ceases to be un- 2530 der this sacrament, not because He ceases to be, nor yet served until the morrow. It is against these that Cyril by local movement of His own, as is clear from what has says (Ep. lxxxiii): “Some are so foolish as to say that been said, but only by the fact that the sacramental species the mystical blessing departs from the sacrament, if any cease to exist. of its fragments remain until the next day: for Christ’s Hence it is clear that Christ, strictly speaking is im- consecrated body is not changed, and the power of the movably in this sacrament. blessing, and the life-giving grace is perpetually in it.” Reply to Objection 1. This argument deals with ac- Thus are all other consecrations irremovable so long as cidental movement, whereby things within us are moved the consecrated things endure; on which account they are together with us. But with things which can of themselves not repeated. And although the truth corresponds with the be in a place, like bodies, it is otherwise than with things figure, still the figure cannot equal it. which cannot of themselves be in a place, such as forms Reply to Objection 3. The body of Christ remains and spiritual substances. And to this mode can be reduced in this sacrament not only until the morrow, but also in what we say of Christ, being moved accidentally, accord- the future, so long as the sacramental species remain: and ing to the existence which He has in this sacrament, in when they cease, Christ’s body ceases to be under them, which He is not present as in a place. not because it depends on them, but because the relation- Reply to Objection 2. It was this argument which ship of Christ’s body to those species is taken away, in seems to have convinced those who held that Christ’s the same way as God ceases to be the Lord of a creature body does not remain under this sacrament if it be re- which ceases to exist. Whether the body of Christ, as it is in this sacrament, can be seen by any eye, at least IIIa q. 76 a. 7 by a glorified one? Objection 1. It seems that the body of Christ, as it in the medium, through its accidents. Now the accidents is in this sacrament, can be seen by the eye, at least by a of Christ’s body are in this sacrament by means of the glorified one. For our eyes are hindered from beholding substance; so that the accidents of Christ’s body have no Christ’s body in this sacrament, on account of the sacra- immediate relationship either to this sacrament or to adja- mental species veiling it. But the glorified eye cannot cent bodies; consequently they do not act on the medium be hindered by anything from seeing bodies as they are. so as to be seen by any corporeal eye. Secondly, because, Therefore, the glorified eye can see Christ’s body as it is as stated above (a. 1, ad 3; a. 3), Christ’s body is substan- in this sacrament. tially present in this sacrament. But substance, as such, is Objection 2. Further, the glorified bodies of the saints not visible to the bodily eye, nor does it come under any will be “made like to the body” of Christ’s “glory,” ac- one of the senses, nor under the imagination, but solely cording to Phil. 3:21. But Christ’s eye beholds Himself as under the intellect, whose object is “what a thing is” (De He is in this sacrament. Therefore, for the same reason, Anima iii). And therefore, properly speaking, Christ’s every other glorified eye can see Him. body, according to the mode of being which it has in this Objection 3. Further, in the resurrection the saints sacrament, is perceptible neither by the sense nor by the will be equal to the angels, according to Lk. 20:36. But imagination, but only by the intellect, which is called the the angels see the body of Christ as it is in this sacrament, spiritual eye. for even the devils are found to pay reverence thereto, and Moreover it is perceived differently by different intel- to fear it. Therefore, for like reason, the glorified eye can lects. For since the way in which Christ is in this sacra- see Christ as He is in this sacrament. ment is entirely supernatural, it is visible in itself to a su- On the contrary, As long as a thing remains the same, pernatural, i.e. the Divine, intellect, and consequently to a it cannot at the same time be seen by the same eye under beatified intellect, of angel or of man, which, through the diverse species. But the glorified eye sees Christ always, participated glory of the Divine intellect, sees all super- as He is in His own species, according to Is. 33:17: ”(His natural things in the vision of the Divine Essence. But it eyes) shall see the king in his beauty.” It seems, then, that can be seen by a wayfarer through faith alone, like other it does not see Christ, as He is under the species of this supernatural things. And not even the angelic intellect of sacrament. its own natural power is capable of beholding it; conse- I answer that, The eye is of two kinds, namely, the quently the devils cannot by their intellect perceive Christ bodily eye properly so-called, and the intellectual eye, so- in this sacrament, except through faith, to which they do called by similitude. But Christ’s body as it is in this not pay willing assent; yet they are convinced of it from sacrament cannot be seen by any bodily eye. First of all, the evidence of signs, according to James 2:19: “The dev- because a body which is visible brings about an alteration ils believe, and tremble.” 2531 Reply to Objection 1. Our bodily eye, on account of the way in which it exists under the sacrament, because the sacramental species, is hindered from beholding the that belongs to the intellect. But it is not the same with body of Christ underlying them, not merely as by way of any other glorified eye, because Christ’s eye is under this veil (just as we are hindered from seeing what is covered sacrament, in which no other glorified eye is conformed with any corporeal veil), but also because Christ’s body to it. bears a relation to the medium surrounding this sacra- Reply to Objection 3. No angel, good or bad, can see ment, not through its own accidents, but through the sacra- anything with a bodily eye, but only with the mental eye. mental species. Hence there is no parallel reason, as is evident from what Reply to Objection 2. Christ’s own bodily eye sees was said above. Himself existing under the sacrament, yet it cannot see Whether Christ’s body is truly there when flesh or a child appears miraculously in IIIa q. 76 a. 8 this sacrament? Objection 1. It seems that Christ’s body is not wards under the appearance of bread. Nor is there any de- truly there when flesh or a child appears miraculously ception there, as occurs in the feats of magicians, because in this sacrament. Because His body ceases to be un- such species is divinely formed in the eye in order to rep- der this sacrament when the sacramental species cease to resent some truth, namely, for the purpose of showing that be present, as stated above (a. 6). But when flesh or a Christ’s body is truly under this sacrament; just as Christ child appears, the sacramental species cease to be present. without deception appeared to the disciples who were go- Therefore Christ’s body is not truly there. ing to Emmaus. For Augustine says (De Qq. Evang. ii) Objection 2. Further, wherever Christ’s body is, it is that “when our pretense is referred to some significance, there either under its own species, or under those of the it is not a lie, but a figure of the truth.” And since in this sacrament. But when such apparitions occur, it is evident way no change is made in the sacrament, it is manifest that Christ is not present under His own species, because that, when such apparition occurs, Christ does not cease the entire Christ is contained in this sacrament, and He to be under this sacrament. remains entire under the form in which He ascended to But it sometimes happens that such apparition comes heaven: yet what appears miraculously in this sacrament about not merely by a change wrought in the beholders, is sometimes seen as a small particle of flesh, or at times as but by an appearance which really exists outwardly. And a small child. Now it is evident that He is not there under this indeed is seen to happen when it is beheld by every- the sacramental species, which is that of bread or wine. one under such an appearance, and it remains so not for an Consequently, it seems that Christ’s body is not there in hour, but for a considerable time; and, in this case some any way. think that it is the proper species of Christ’s body. Nor Objection 3. Further, Christ’s body begins to be in does it matter that sometimes Christ’s entire body is not this sacrament by consecration and conversion, as was seen there, but part of His flesh, or else that it is not seen said above (q. 75, Aa. 2,3,4). But the flesh and blood in youthful guise. but in the semblance of a child, because which appear by miracle are not consecrated, nor are they it lies within the power of a glorified body for it to be seen converted into Christ’s true body and blood. Therefore the by a non-glorified eye either entirely or in part, and under body or the blood of Christ is not under those species. its own semblance or in strange guise, as will be said later On the contrary, When such apparition takes place, ( Suppl., q. 85, Aa. 2,3). the same reverence is shown to it as was shown at first, But this seems unlikely. First of all, because Christ’s which would not be done if Christ were not truly there, body under its proper species can be seen only in one to Whom we show reverence of “latria.” Therefore, when place, wherein it is definitively contained. Hence since such apparition occurs, Christ is under the sacrament. it is seen in its proper species, and is adored in heaven, I answer that, Such apparition comes about in two it is not seen under its proper species in this sacrament. ways, when occasionally in this sacrament flesh, or blood, Secondly, because a glorified body, which appears at will, or a child, is seen. Sometimes it happens on the part of the disappears when it wills after the apparition; thus it is re- beholders, whose eyes are so affected as if they outwardly lated (Lk. 24:31) that our Lord “vanished out of sight” of saw flesh, or blood, or a child, while no change takes place the disciples. But that which appears under the likeness of in the sacrament. And this seems to happen when to one flesh in this sacrament, continues for a long time; indeed, person it is seen under the species of flesh or of a child, one reads of its being sometimes enclosed, and, by order while to others it is seen as before under the species of of many bishops, preserved in a pyx, which it would be bread; or when to the same individual it appears for an wicked to think of Christ under His proper semblance. hour under the appearance of flesh or a child, and after- Consequently, it remains to be said, that, while the di- 2532 mensions remain the same as before, there is a miracu-place, the sacramental species sometimes continue entire lous change wrought in the other accidents, such as shape, in themselves; and sometimes only as to that which is color, and the rest, so that flesh, or blood, or a child, is principal, as was said above. seen. And, as was said already, this is not deception, be- Reply to Objection 2. As stated above, during such cause it is done “to represent the truth,” namely, to show apparitions Christ’s proper semblance is not seen, but a by this miraculous apparition that Christ’s body and blood species miraculously formed either in the eyes of the be- are truly in this sacrament. And thus it is clear that as the holders, or in the sacramental dimensions themselves, as dimensions remain, which are the foundation of the other was said above. accidents, as we shall see later on (q. 77, a. 2), the body Reply to Objection 3. The dimensions of the con- of Christ truly remains in this sacrament. secrated bread and wine continue, while a miraculous Reply to Objection 1. When such apparition takes change is wrought in the other accidents, as stated above. 2533 THIRD PART, QUESTION 77 Of the Accidents Which Remain in This Sacrament (In Eight Articles) We must now consider the accidents which remain in this sacrament; under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the accidents which remain are without a subject? (2) Whether dimensive quantity is the subject of the other accidents? (3) Whether such accidents can affect an extrinsic body? (4) Whether they can be corrupted? (5) Whether anything can be generated from them? (6) Whether they can nourish? (7) Of the breaking of the consecrated bread? (8) Whether anything can be mixed with the consecrated wine? Whether the accidents remain in this sacrament without a subject? IIIa q. 77 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that the accidents do not remain On the contrary, Gregory says in an Easter Homily in this sacrament without a subject, because there ought (Lanfranc, De Corp. et Sang. Dom. xx) that “the sacra- not to be anything disorderly or deceitful in this sacra- mental species are the names of those things which were ment of truth. But for accidents to be without a subject is there before, namely, of the bread and wine.” Therefore contrary to the order which God established in nature; and since the substance of the bread and the wine does not re- furthermore it seems to savor of deceit, since accidents are main, it seems that these species remain without a subject. naturally the signs of the nature of the subject. Therefore I answer that, The species of the bread and wine, the accidents are not without a subject in this sacrament. which are perceived by our senses to remain in this sacra- Objection 2. Further, not even by miracle can the def- ment after consecration, are not subjected in the substance inition of a thing be severed from it, or the definition of of the bread and wine, for that does not remain, as stated another thing be applied to it; for instance, that, while above (q. 75, a. 2); nor in the substantial form, for that man remains a man, he can be an irrational animal. For does not remain (q. 75, a. 6), and if it did remain, “it it would follow that contradictories can exist at the one could not be a subject,” as Boethius declares (De Trin. time: for the “definition of a thing is what its name ex- i). Furthermore it is manifest that these accidents are not presses,” as is said in Metaph. iv. But it belongs to the subjected in the substance of Christ’s body and blood, definition of an accident for it to be in a subject, while the because the substance of the human body cannot in any definition of substance is that it must subsist of itself, and way be affected by such accidents; nor is it possible for not in another. Therefore it cannot come to pass, even by Christ’s glorious and impassible body to be altered so as miracle, that the accidents exist without a subject in this to receive these qualities. sacrament. Now there are some who say that they are in the sur- Objection 3. Further, an accident is individuated by rounding atmosphere as in a subject. But even this cannot its subject. If therefore the accidents remain in this sacra- be: in the first place, because atmosphere is not susceptive ment without a subject, they will not be individual, but of such accidents. Secondly, because these accidents are general, which is clearly false, because thus they would not where the atmosphere is, nay more, the atmosphere is not be sensible, but merely intelligible. displaced by the motion of these species. Thirdly, because Objection 4. Further, the accidents after the consecra- accidents do not pass from subject to subject, so that the tion of this sacrament do not obtain any composition. But same identical accident which was first in one subject be before the consecration they were not composed either of afterwards in another; because an accident is individuated matter and form, nor of existence [quo est] and essence by the subject; hence it cannot come to pass for an ac- [quod est]. Therefore, even after consecration they are cident remaining identically the same to be at one time not composite in either of these ways. But this is un- in one subject, and at another time in another. Fourthly, reasonable, for thus they would be simpler than angels, since the atmosphere is not deprived of its own accidents, whereas at the same time these accidents are perceptible it would have at the one time its own accidents and others to the senses. Therefore, in this sacrament the accidents foreign to it. Nor can it be maintained that this is done do not remain without a subject. miraculously in virtue of the consecration, because the 2534 words of consecration do not signify this, and they effect stance or accident. Consequently, the definition of sub-only what they signify. stance is not—“a being of itself without a subject,” nor is Therefore it follows that the accidents continue in this the definition of accident—“a being in a subject”; but it sacrament without a subject. This can be done by Divine belongs to the quiddity or essence of substance “to have power: for since an effect depends more upon the first existence not in a subject”; while it belongs to the quiddity cause than on the second, God Who is the first cause both or essence of accident “to have existence in a subject.” But of substance and accident, can by His unlimited power in this sacrament it is not in virtue of their essence that ac- preserve an accident in existence when the substance is cidents are not in a subject, but through the Divine power withdrawn whereby it was preserved in existence as by its sustaining them; and consequently they do not cease to proper cause, just as without natural causes He can pro- be accidents, because neither is the definition of accident duce other effects of natural causes, even as He formed a withdrawn from them, nor does the definition of substance human body in the Virgin’s womb, “without the seed of apply to them. man” (Hymn for Christmas, First Vespers). Reply to Objection 3. These accidents acquired indi- Reply to Objection 1. There is nothing to hinder the vidual being in the substance of the bread and wine; and common law of nature from ordaining a thing, the con- when this substance is changed into the body and blood of trary of which is nevertheless ordained by a special privi- Christ, they remain in that individuated being which they lege of grace, as is evident in the raising of the dead, and possessed before, hence they are individual and sensible. in the restoring of sight to the blind: even thus in human Reply to Objection 4. These accidents had no be- affairs, to some individuals some things are granted by ing of their own nor other accidents, so long as the sub- special privilege which are outside the common law. And stance of the bread and wine remained; but their subjects so, even though it be according to the common law of na- had “such” being through them, just as snow is “white” ture for an accident to be in a subject, still for a special through whiteness. But after the consecration the ac- reason, according to the order of grace, the accidents ex- cidents which remain have being; hence they are com- ist in this sacrament without a subject, on account of the pounded of existence and essence, as was said of the an- reasons given above (q. 75 , a. 5). gels, in the Ia, q. 50, a. 2, ad 3; and besides they have Reply to Objection 2. Since being is not a genus, composition of quantitative parts. then being cannot be of itself the essence of either sub- Whether in this sacrament the dimensive quantity of the bread or wine is the subject IIIa q. 77 a. 2 of the other accidents? Objection 1. It seems that in this sacrament the di- quantity can be the subject of the accidents which remain mensive quantity of the bread or wine is not the subject in this sacrament. of the other accidents. For accident is not the subject of Objection 4. Further, quantity abstract from matter accident; because no form can be a subject, since to be a seems to be mathematical quantity, which is not the sub- subject is a property of matter. But dimensive quantity is ject of sensible qualities. Since, then, the remaining ac- an accident. Therefore dimensive quantity cannot be the cidents in this sacrament are sensible, it seems that in subject of the other accidents. this sacrament they cannot be subjected in the dimensive Objection 2. Further, just as quantity is individuated quantity of the bread and wine that remains after conse- by substance, so also are the other accidents. If, then, the cration. dimensive quantity of the bread or wine remains individ- On the contrary, Qualities are divisible only acciden- uated according to the being it had before, in which it is tally, that is, by reason of the subject. But the qualities preserved, for like reason the other accidents remain in- remaining in this sacrament are divided by the division dividuated according to the existence which they had be- of dimensive quantity, as is evident through our senses. fore in the substance. Therefore they are not in dimensive Therefore, dimensive quantity is the subject of the acci- quantity as in a subject, since every accident is individu- dents which remain in this sacrament. ated by its own subject. I answer that, It is necessary to say that the other acci-Objection 3. Further, among the other accidents that dents which remain in this sacrament are subjected in the remain, of the bread and wine, the senses perceive also dimensive quantity of the bread and wine that remains: rarity and density, which cannot be in dimensive quan- first of all, because something having quantity and color tity existing outside matter; because a thing is rare which and affected by other accidents is perceived by the senses; has little matter under great dimensions. while a thing is nor is sense deceived in such. Secondly, because the first dense which has much matter under small dimensions, as disposition of matter is dimensive quantity, hence Plato is said in Phys. iv. It does not seem, then, that dimensive also assigned “great” and “small” as the first differences 2535 of matter (Aristotle, Metaph. iv). And because the first of individuation, so that we can imagine several lines of subject is matter, the consequence is that all other acci- the same species, differing in position, which is included dents are related to their subject through the medium of in the notion of this quantity; for it belongs to dimension dimensive quantity; just as the first subject of color is said for it to be “quantity having position” (Aristotle, Categor. to be the surface, on which account some have maintained iv), and therefore dimensive quantity can be the subject of that dimensions are the substances of bodies, as is said in the other accidents, rather than the other way about. Metaph. iii. And since, when the subject is withdrawn, Reply to Objection 1. One accident cannot of itself the accidents remain according to the being which they be the subject of another, because it does not exist of it- had before, it follows that all accidents remain founded self. But inasmuch as an accident is received in another upon dimensive quantity. thing, one is said to be the subject of the other, inasmuch Thirdly, because, since the subject is the principle of as one is received in a subject through another, as the sur- individuation of the accidents, it is necessary for what is face is said to be the subject of color. Hence when God admitted as the subject of some accidents to be somehow makes an accident to exist of itself, it can also be of itself the principle of individuation: for it is of the very notion of the subject of another. an individual that it cannot be in several; and this happens Reply to Objection 2. The other accidents, even as in two ways. First, because it is not natural to it to be in they were in the substance of the bread, were individuated any one; and in this way immaterial separated forms, sub- by means of dimensive quantity, as stated above. And sisting of themselves, are also individuals of themselves. therefore dimensive quantity is the subject of the other Secondly, because a form, be it substantial or acciden- accidents remaining in this sacrament, rather than con- tal, is naturally in someone indeed, not in several, as this versely. whiteness, which is in this body. As to the first, matter Reply to Objection 3. Rarity and density are par- is the principle of individuation of all inherent forms, be- ticular qualities accompanying bodies, by reason of their cause, since these forms, considered in themselves, are having much or little matter under dimensions; just as all naturally in something as in a subject, from the very fact other accidents likewise follow from the principles of sub- that one of them is received in matter, which is not in an- stance. And consequently, as the accidents are preserved other, it follows that neither can the form itself thus exist- by Divine power when the substance is withdrawn, so, ing be in another. As to the second, it must be maintained when matter is withdrawn, the qualities which go with that the principle of individuation is dimensive quantity. matter, such as rarity and density, are preserved by Divine For that something is naturally in another one solely, is power. due to the fact that that other is undivided in itself, and Reply to Objection 4. Mathematical quantity ab- distinct from all others. But it is on account of quantity stracts not from intelligible matter, but from sensible mat- that substance can be divided, as is said in Phys. i. And ter, as is said in Metaph. vii. But matter is termed sensi- therefore dimensive quantity itself is a particular principle ble because it underlies sensible qualities. And therefore of individuation in forms of this kind, namely, inasmuch it is manifest that the dimensive quantity, which remains as forms numerically distinct are in different parts of the in this sacrament without a subject, is not mathematical matter. Hence also dimensive quantity has of itself a kind quantity. Whether the species remaining in this sacrament can change external objects? IIIa q. 77 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that the species which remain Therefore, since the substantial form of the bread and in this sacrament cannot affect external objects. For it is wine does not remain in this sacrament, as was shown proved in Phys. vii, that forms which are in matter are above (q. 75, a. 6), it seems that the accidental forms produced by forms that are in matter, but not from forms which remain cannot act so as to change external matter. which are without matter, because like makes like. But the Objection 3. Further, nothing acts outside its species, sacramental species are species without matter, since they because an effect cannot surpass its cause. But all the remain without a subject, as is evident from what was said sacramental species are accidents. Therefore they cannot above (a. 1). Therefore they cannot affect other matter by change external matter, at least as to a substantial form. producing any form in it. On the contrary, If they could not change external Objection 2. Further, when the action of the princi- bodies, they could not be felt; for a thing is felt from the pal agent ceases, then the action of the instrument must senses being changed by a sensible thing, as is said in De cease, as when the carpenter rests, the hammer is moved Anima ii. no longer. But all accidental forms act instrumentally I answer that, Because everything acts in so far as it is in virtue of the substantial form as the principal agent. an actual being, the consequence is that everything stands 2536 in the same relation to action as it does to being. There-same way as the being of accident depends upon the be- fore, because, according to what was said above (a. 1), it is ing of substance; and therefore, as it is an effect of Di- an effect of the Divine power that the sacramental species vine power that the sacramental species exist without sub- continue in the being which they had when the substance stance, so is it an effect of Divine power that they can act of the bread and wine was present, it follows that they without a substantial form, because every action of a sub- continue in their action. Consequently they retain every stantial or accidental form depends upon God as the first action which they had while the substance of the bread agent. and wine remained, now that the substance of the bread Reply to Objection 3. The change which terminates and wine has passed into the body and blood of Christ. in a substantial form is not effected by a substantial form Hence there is no doubt but that they can change external directly, but by means of the active and passive qualities, bodies. which act in virtue of the substantial form. But by Divine Reply to Objection 1. The sacramental species, al- power this instrumental energy is retained in the sacra- though they are forms existing without matter, still retain mental species, just as it was before: and consequently the same being which they had before in matter, and there- their action can be directed to a substantial form instru- fore as to their being they are like forms which are in mat- mentally, just in the same way as anything can act outside ter. its species, not as by its own power, but by the power of Reply to Objection 2. The action of an accidental the chief agent. form depends upon the action of a substantial form in the Whether the sacramental species can be corrupted? IIIa q. 77 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that the sacramental species rupted in two ways: in one way, of themselves; in another cannot be corrupted, because corruption comes of the sep- way, accidentally. They could be corrupted of themselves, aration of the form from the matter. But the matter of the as by alteration of the qualities, and increase or decrease bread does not remain in this sacrament, as is clear from of the quantity, not in the way in which increase or de- what was said above (q. 75, a. 2). Therefore these species crease is found only in animated bodies, such as the sub- cannot be corrupted. stances of the bread and wine are not, but by addition or Objection 2. Further, no form is corrupted except ac- division; for, as is said in Metaph. iii, one dimension is cidentally, that is, when its subject is corrupted; hence dissolved by division, and two dimensions result; while self-subsisting forms are incorruptible, as is seen in spir- on the contrary, by addition, two dimensions become one. itual substances. But the sacramental species are forms And in this way such accidents can be corrupted man- without a subject. Therefore they cannot be corrupted. ifestly after consecration, because the dimensive quan- Objection 3. Further, if they be corrupted, it will ei- tity which remains can receive division and addition; and ther be naturally or miraculously. But they cannot be cor- since it is the subject of sensible qualities, as stated above rupted naturally, because no subject of corruption can be (a. 1), it can likewise be the subject of their alteration, for assigned as remaining after the corruption has taken place. instance, if the color or the savor of the bread or wine be Neither can they be corrupted miraculously, because the altered. miracles which occur in this sacrament take place in virtue An accident can be corrupted in another way, through of the consecration, whereby the sacramental species are the corruption of its subject, and in this way also they can preserved: and the same thing is not the cause of preser- be corrupted after consecration; for although the subject vation and of corruption. Therefore, in no way can the does not remain, still the being which they had in the sub- sacramental species be corrupted. ject does remain, which being is proper, and suited to the On the contrary, We perceive by our senses that the subject. And therefore such being can be corrupted by a consecrated hosts become putrefied and corrupted. contrary agent, as the substance of the bread or wine was I answer that, Corruption is “movement from being subject to corruption, and, moreover, was not corrupted into non-being” (Aristotle, Phys. v). Now it has been except by a preceding alteration regarding the accidents. stated (a. 3) that the sacramental species retain the same Nevertheless, a distinction must be made between being as they had before when the substance of the bread each of the aforesaid corruptions; because, when the body was present. Consequently, as the being of those acci- and the blood of Christ succeed in this sacrament to the dents could be corrupted while the substance of the bread substance of the bread and wine, if there be such change and wine was present, so likewise they can be corrupted on the part of the accidents as would not have sufficed now that the substance has passed away. for the corruption of the bread and wine, then the body But such accidents could have been previously cor- and blood of Christ do not cease to be under this sacra- 2537 ment on account of such change, whether the change be corruption to take away the being of a thing, in so far as on the part of the quality, as for instance, when the color the being of some form is in matter, it results that by cor- or the savor of the bread or wine is slightly modified; or ruption the form is separated from the matter. But if such on the part of the quantity, as when the bread or the wine being were not in matter, yet like such being as is in mat- is divided into such parts as to keep in them the nature ter, it could be taken away by corruption, even where there of bread or of wine. But if the change be so great that is no matter; as takes place in this sacrament, as is evident the substance of the bread or wine would have been cor- from what was said above. rupted, then Christ’s body and blood do not remain under Reply to Objection 2. Although the sacramental this sacrament; and this either on the part of the qualities, species are forms not in matter, yet they have the being as when the color, savor, and other qualities of the bread which they had in matter. and wine are so altered as to be incompatible with the na- Reply to Objection 3. This corruption of species is ture of bread or of wine; or else on the part of the quantity, not miraculous, but natural; nevertheless, it presupposes as, for instance, if the bread be reduced to fine particles, the miracle which is wrought in the consecration, namely, or the wine divided into such tiny drops that the species of that those sacramental species retain without a subject, the bread or wine no longer remain. same being as they had in a subject; just as a blind man, Reply to Objection 1. Since it belongs essentially to to whom sight is given miraculously, sees naturally. Whether anything can be generated from the sacramental species? IIIa q. 77 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that nothing can be generated generated from them. For it is quite evident that nothing from the sacramental species: because, whatever is gen- is generated out of the body and blood of Christ which are erated, is generated out of some matter: for nothing is truly there, because these are incorruptible. But if the sub- generated out of nothing, although by creation something stance, or even the matter, of the bread and wine were to is made out of nothing. But there is no matter underlying remain in this sacrament, then, as some have maintained, the sacramental species except that of Christ’s body, and it would be easy to account for this sensible object which that body is incorruptible. Therefore it seems that nothing succeeds to them. But that supposition is false, as was can be generated from the sacramental species. stated above (q. 75, Aa. 2,4,8). Objection 2. Further, things which are not of the Hence it is that others have said that the things gen- same genus cannot spring from one another: thus a line erated have not sprung from the sacramental species, but is not made of whiteness. But accident and substance dif- from the surrounding atmosphere. But this can be shown fer generically. Therefore, since the sacramental species in many ways to be impossible. In the first place, be- are accidents, it seems that no substance can be generated cause when a thing is generated from another, the latter at from them. first appears changed and corrupted; whereas no alteration Objection 3. Further, if any corporeal substance be or corruption appeared previously in the adjacent atmo- generated from them, such substance will not be without sphere; hence the worms or ashes are not generated there- accident. Therefore, if any corporeal substance be gen- from. Secondly, because the nature of the atmosphere is erated from the sacramental species, then substance and not such as to permit of such things being generated by accident would be generated from accident, namely, two such alterations. Thirdly, because it is possible for many things from one, which is impossible. Consequently, it consecrated hosts to be burned or putrefied; nor would it is impossible for any corporeal substance to be generated be possible for an earthen body, large enough to be gener- out of the sacramental species. ated from the atmosphere, unless a great and, in fact, ex- On the contrary, The senses are witness that some- ceedingly sensible condensation of the atmosphere took thing is generated out of the sacramental species, either place. Fourthly, because the same thing can happen to ashes, if they be burned, worms if they putrefy, or dust if the solid bodies surrounding them, such as iron or stone, they be crushed. which remain entire after the generation of the aforesaid I answer that, Since “the corruption of one thing is things. Hence this opinion cannot stand, because it is op- the generation of another” (De Gener. i), something must posed to what is manifest to our senses. be generated necessarily from the sacramental species if And therefore others have said that the substance of they be corrupted, as stated above (a. 4); for they are not the bread and wine returns during the corruption of the corrupted in such a way that they disappear altogether, as species, and so from the returning substance of the bread if reduced to nothing; on the contrary, something sensible and wine, ashes or worms or something of the kind are manifestly succeeds to them. generated. But this explanation seems an impossible one. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how anything can be First of all, because if the substance of the bread and 2538 wine be converted into the body and blood of Christ, as rectly described as created anew, than as returning. And was shown above (q. 75, Aa. 2,4), the substance of the in this sense the aforesaid position might be held. bread and wine cannot return, except the body and blood However, since it does not seem reasonable to say that of Christ be again changed back into the substance of anything takes place miraculously in this sacrament, ex- bread and wine, which is impossible: thus if air be turned cept in virtue of the consecration itself, which does not into fire, the air cannot return without the fire being again imply either creation or return of matter, it seems better changed into air. But if the substance of bread or wine to say that in the actual consecration it is miraculously be- be annihilated, it cannot return again, because what lapses stowed on the dimensive quantity of the bread and wine to into nothing does not return numerically the same. Un- be the subject of subsequent forms. Now this is proper to less perchance it be said that the said substance returns, matter; and therefore as a consequence everything which because God creates anew another new substance to re- goes with matter is bestowed on dimensive quantity; and place the first. Secondly, this seems to be impossible, be- therefore everything which could be generated from the cause no time can be assigned when the substance of the matter of bread or wine, if it were present, can be gener- bread returns. For, from what was said above (a. 4; q. 76, ated from the aforesaid dimensive quantity of the bread or a. 6, ad 3), it is evident that while the species of the bread wine, not, indeed, by a new miracle, but by virtue of the and wine remain, there remain also the body and blood miracle which has already taken place. of Christ, which are not present together with the sub- Reply to Objection 1. Although no matter is there stance of the bread and wine in this sacrament, according out of which a thing may be generated, nevertheless di- to what was stated above (q. 75, a. 2). Hence the substance mensive quantity supplies the place of matter, as stated of the bread and wine cannot return while the sacramen- above. tal species remain; nor, again, when these species pass Reply to Objection 2. Those sacramental species are away; because then the substance of the bread and wine indeed accidents, yet they have the act and power of sub- would be without their proper accidents, which is impos- stance, as stated above (a. 3). sible. Unless perchance it be said that in the last instant Reply to Objection 3. The dimensive quantity of the of the corruption of the species there returns (not, indeed, bread and wine retains its own nature, and receives mirac- the substance of bread and wine, because it is in that very ulously the power and property of substance; and there- instant that they have the being of the substance generated fore it can pass to both, that is, into substance and dimen- from the species, but) the matter of the bread and wine; sion. which, matter, properly speaking, would be more cor- Whether the sacramental species can nourish? IIIa q. 77 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that the sacramental species alludes to those who after the celebration of the sacred cannot nourish, because, as Ambrose says (De Sacram. mystery, and after the consecration of the bread and wine, v), “it is not this bread that enters into our body, but the claimed their oblations, and not sharing them with others, bread of everlasting life, which supports the substance of took the whole, so as even to become intoxicated thereby.” our soul.” But whatever nourishes enters into the body. But this could not happen if the sacramental species did Therefore this bread does not nourish: and the same rea- not nourish. Therefore the sacramental species do nour- son holds good of the wine. ish. Objection 2. Further, as is said in De Gener. ii, “We I answer that, This question presents no difficulty, are nourished by the very things of which we are made.” now that we have solved the preceding question. Because, But the sacramental species are accidents, whereas man as stated in De Anima ii, food nourishes by being con- is not made of accidents, because accident is not a part of verted into the substance of the individual nourished. Now substance. Therefore it seems that the sacramental species it has been stated (a. 5) that the sacramental species can cannot nourish. be converted into a substance generated from them. And Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (De An- they can be converted into the human body for the same ima ii) that “food nourishes according as it is a substance, reason as they can into ashes or worms. Consequently, it but it gives increase by reason of its quantity.” But the is evident that they nourish. sacramental species are not a substance. Consequently But the senses witness to the untruth of what some they cannot nourish. maintain; viz. that the species do not nourish as though On the contrary, The Apostle speaking of this sacra- they were changed into the human body, but merely re- ment says (1 Cor. 11:21): “One, indeed, is hungry, and fresh and hearten by acting upon the senses (as a man another is drunk”: upon which the gloss observes that “he is heartened by the odor of meat, and intoxicated by the 2539 fumes of wine). Because such refreshment does not suf-stance, as Gregory says in an Easter Homily (Lanfranc, fice long for a man, whose body needs repair owing to De Corp. et Sang. Dom. xx). Secondly, Christ’s very constant waste: and yet a man could be supported for body can be called bread, since it is the mystical bread long if he were to take hosts and consecrated wine in great “coming down from heaven.” Consequently, Ambrose quantity. uses the word “bread” in this second meaning, when he In like manner the statement advanced by others can- says that “this bread does not pass into the body,” because, not stand, who hold that the sacramental species nourish to wit, Christ’s body is not changed into man’s body, but owing to the remaining substantial form of the bread and nourishes his soul. But he is not speaking of bread taken wine: both because the form does not remain, as stated in the first acceptation. above (q. 75, a. 6): and because to nourish is the act not Reply to Objection 2. Although the sacramental of a form but rather of matter, which takes the form of the species are not those things out of which the human body one nourished, while the form of the nourishment passes is made, yet they are changed into those things stated away: hence it is said in De Anima ii that nourishment is above. at first unlike, but at the end is like. Reply to Objection 3. Although the sacramental Reply to Objection 1. After the consecration bread species are not a substance, still they have the virtue of can be said to be in this sacrament in two ways. First, as a substance, as stated above. to the species, which retain the name of the previous sub- Whether the sacramental species are broken in this sacrament? IIIa q. 77 a. 7 Objection 1. It seems that the sacramental species holders. But this contention cannot stand, because in this are not broken in this sacrament, because the Philosopher sacrament of truth the sense is not deceived with regard to says in Meteor. iv that bodies are breakable owing to a its proper object of judgment, and one of these objects is certain disposition of the pores; a thing which cannot be breaking, whereby from one thing arise many: and these attributed to the sacramental species. Therefore the sacra- are common sensibles, as is stated in De Anima ii. mental species cannot be broken. Others accordingly have said that there was indeed a Objection 2. Further, breaking is followed by sound. genuine breaking, but without any subject. But this again But the sacramental species emit no sound: because the contradicts our senses; because a quantitative body is seen Philosopher says (De Anima ii), that what emits sound in this sacrament, which formerly was one, and is now di- is a hard body, having a smooth surface. Therefore the vided into many, and this must be the subject of the break- sacramental species are not broken. ing. Objection 3. Further, breaking and mastication are But it cannot be said that Christ’s true body is broken. seemingly of the same object. But it is Christ’s true body First of all, because it is incorruptible and impassible: sec- that is eaten, according to Jn. 6:57: “He that eateth My ondly, because it is entire under every part, as was shown flesh, and drinketh My blood.” Therefore it is Christ’s above (q. 76, a. 3), which is contrary to the nature of a body that is broken and masticated: and hence it is said thing broken. in the confession of Berengarius: “I agree with the Holy It remains, then, that the breaking is in the dimensive Catholic Church, and with heart and lips I profess, that quantity of the bread, as in a subject, just as the other ac- the bread and wine which are placed on the altar, are cidents. And as the sacramental species are the sacrament the true body and blood of Christ after consecration, and of Christ’s true body, so is the breaking of these species are truly handled and broken by the priest’s hands, bro- the sacrament of our Lord’s Passion, which was in Christ’s ken and crushed by the teeth of believers.” Consequently, true body. the breaking ought not to be ascribed to the sacramental Reply to Objection 1. As rarity and density remain species. under the sacramental species, as stated above (a. 2, ad On the contrary, Breaking arises from the division of 3), so likewise porousness remains, and in consequence that which has quantity. But nothing having quantity ex- breakableness. cept the sacramental species is broken here, because nei- Reply to Objection 2. Hardness results from den- ther Christ’s body is broken, as being incorruptible, nor is sity; therefore, as density remains under the sacramental the substance of the bread, because it no longer remains. species, hardness remains there too, and the capability of Therefore the sacramental species are broken. sound as a consequence. I answer that, Many opinions prevailed of old on this Reply to Objection 3. What is eaten under its own matter. Some held that in this sacrament there was no species, is also broken and masticated under its own breaking at all in reality, but merely in the eyes of the be- species; but Christ’s body is eaten not under its proper, 2540 but under the sacramental species. Hence in explaining is not broken, except according to its sacramental species. Jn. 6:64, “The flesh profiteth nothing,” Augustine (Tract. And the confession made by Berengarius is to be under- xxvii in Joan.) says that this is to be taken as referring to stood in this sense, that the breaking and the crushing with those who understood carnally: “for they understood the the teeth is to be referred to the sacramental species, under flesh, thus, as it is divided piecemeal, in a dead body, or as which the body of Christ truly is. sold in the shambles.” Consequently, Christ’s very body Whether any liquid can be mingled with the consecrated wine? IIIa q. 77 a. 8 Objection 1. It seems that no liquid can be mingled were it there present. But it is evident that if the substance with the consecrated wine, because everything mingled of wine were there present, then some other liquid could with another partakes of its quality. But no liquid can be mingled with it. share in the quality of the sacramental species, because Nevertheless there would be a different effect of such those accidents are without a subject, as stated above mixing both according to the form and according to the (a. 1). Therefore it seems that no liquid can be mingled quantity of the liquid. For if sufficient liquid were mixed with the sacramental species of the wine. so as to spread itself all through the wine, then the whole Objection 2. Further, if any kind of liquid be mixed would be a mixed substance. Now what is made up of with those species, then some one thing must be the result. things mixed is neither of them, but each passes into a But no one thing can result from the liquid, which is a sub- third resulting from both: hence it would result that the stance, and the sacramental species, which are accidents; former wine would remain no longer. But if the liquid nor from the liquid and Christ’s blood, which owing to added were of another species, for instance, if water were its incorruptibility suffers neither increase nor decrease. mixed, the species of the wine would be dissolved, and Therefore no liquid can be mixed with the consecrated there would be a liquid of another species. But if liquid wine. of the same species were added, of instance, wine with Objection 3. Further, if any liquid be mixed with the wine, the same species would remain, but the wine would consecrated wine, then that also would appear to be con- not be the same numerically, as the diversity of the acci- secrated; just as water added to holy-water becomes holy. dents shows: for instance, if one wine were white and the But the consecrated wine is truly Christ’s blood. There- other red. fore the liquid added would likewise be Christ’s blood But if the liquid added were of such minute quantity otherwise than by consecration, which is unbecoming. that it could not permeate the whole, the entire wine would Therefore no liquid can be mingled with the consecrated not be mixed, but only part of it, which would not remain wine. the same numerically owing to the blending of extrane- Objection 4. Further, if one of two things be entirely ous matter: still it would remain the same specifically, not corrupted, there is no mixture (De Gener. i). But if we mix only if a little liquid of the same species were mixed with any liquid, it seems that the entire species of the sacramen- it, but even if it were of another species, since a drop of tal wine is corrupted, so that the blood of Christ ceases to water blended with much wine passes into the species of be beneath it; both because great and little are difference wine (De Gener. i). of quantity, and alter it, as white and black cause a dif- Now it is evident that the body and blood of Christ ference of color; and because the liquid mixed, as having abide in this sacrament so long as the species remain nu- no obstacle, seems to permeate the whole, and so Christ’s merically the same, as stated above (a. 4; q. 76, a. 6, ad 3); blood ceases to be there, since it is not there with any other because it is this bread and this wine which is consecrated. substance. Consequently, no liquid can be mixed with the Hence, if the liquid of any kind whatsoever added be so consecrated wine. much in quantity as to permeate the whole of the conse- On the contrary, It is evident to our senses that an- crated wine, and be mixed with it throughout, the result other liquid can be mixed with the wine after it is conse- would be something numerically distinct, and the blood crated, just as before. of Christ will remain there no longer. But if the quantity I answer that, The truth of this question is evident of the liquid added be so slight as not to permeate through- from what has been said already. For it was said above out, but to reach only a part of the species, Christ’s blood (a. 3; a. 5, ad 2) that the species remaining in this sacra- will cease to be under that part of the consecrated wine, ment, as they acquire the manner of being of substance in yet will remain under the rest. virtue of the consecration, so likewise do they obtain the Reply to Objection 1. Pope Innocent III in a Decretal mode of acting and of being acted upon, so that they can writes thus: “The very accidents appear to affect the wine do or receive whatever their substance could do or receive, that is added, because, if water is added, it takes the savor 2541 of the wine. The result is, then, that the accidents change be put in the chalice, it is not changed into the blood, nor the subject, just as subject changes accidents; for nature is it mingled with the blood, but, mixed with the acci- yields to miracle, and power works beyond custom.” But dents of the previous wine, it is diffused throughout the this must not be understood as if the same identical acci- body which underlies them, yet without wetting what sur- dent, which was in the wine previous to consecration, is rounds it.” Now this is to be understood when there is not afterwards in the wine that is added; but such change is sufficient mixing of extraneous liquid to cause the blood the result of action; because the remaining accidents of of Christ to cease to be under the whole; because a thing the wine retain the action of substance, as stated above, is said to be “diffused throughout,” not because it touches and so they act upon the liquid added, by changing it. the body of Christ according to its proper dimensions, but Reply to Objection 2. The liquid added to the con- according to the sacramental dimensions, under which it secrated wine is in no way mixed with the substance of is contained. Now it is not the same with holy water, be- Christ’s blood. Nevertheless it is mixed with the sacra- cause the blessing works no change in the substance of the mental species, yet so that after such mixing the afore- water, as the consecration of the wine does. said species are corrupted entirely or in part, after the way Reply to Objection 4. Some have held that however mentioned above (a. 5), whereby something can be gener- slight be the mixing of extraneous liquid, the substance ated from those species. And if they be entirely corrupted, of Christ’s blood ceases to be under the whole, and for there remains no further question, because the whole will the reason given above (obj. 4); which, however, is not a be uniform. But if they be corrupted in part, there will cogent one; because “more” or “less” diversify dimensive be one dimension according to the continuity of quantity, quantity, not as to its essence, but as to the determination but not one according to the mode of being, because one of its measure. In like manner the liquid added can be part thereof will be without a subject while the other is so small as on that account to be hindered from permeat- in a subject; as in a body that is made up of two metals, ing the whole, and not simply by the dimensions; which, there will be one body quantitatively, but not one as to the although they are present without a subject, still they are species of the matter. opposed to another liquid, just as substance would be if it Reply to Objection 3. As Pope Innocent says in the were present, according to what was said at the beginning aforesaid Decretal, “if after the consecration other wine of the article. 2542 THIRD PART, QUESTION 78 Of the Form of This Sacrament (In Six Articles) We must now consider the form of this sacrament; concerning which there are six points of inquiry: (1) What is the form of this sacrament? (2) Whether the form for the consecration of the bread is appropriate? (3) Whether the form for the consecration of the blood is appropriate? (4) Of the power of each form? (5) Of the truth of the expression? (6) Of the comparison of the one form with the other? Whether this is the form of this sacrament: “This is My body,” and “This is the chalice IIIa q. 78 a. 1 of My blood”? Objection 1. It seems that this is not the form of this pressions of the Lord Jesus. Because, by all the other sacrament: “This is My body,” and, “This is the chalice words spoken, praise is rendered to God, prayer is put of My blood.” Because those words seem to belong to the up for the people, for kings, and others; but when the form of this sacrament, wherewith Christ consecrated His time comes for perfecting the sacrament, the priest uses body and blood. But Christ first blessed the bread which no longer his own words, but the words of Christ. There- He took, and said afterwards: “Take ye and eat; this is My fore, it is Christ’s words that perfect this sacrament.” body” (Mat. 26:26). Therefore the whole of this seems to I answer that, This sacrament differs from the other belong to the form of this sacrament: and the same reason sacraments in two respects. First of all, in this, that this holds good of the words which go with the consecration sacrament is accomplished by the consecration of the mat- of the blood. ter, while the rest are perfected in the use of the conse- Objection 2. Further, Eusebius Emissenus (Pseudo- crated matter. Secondly, because in the other sacraments Hieron: Ep. xxix; Pseudo-Isid.: Hom. iv) says: “The in- the consecration of the matter consists only in a blessing, visible Priest changes visible creatures into His own body, from which the matter consecrated derives instrumentally saying: ‘Take ye and eat; this is My body.’ ” Therefore, a spiritual power, which through the priest who is an an- the whole of this seems to belong to the form of this sacra- imated instrument, can pass on to inanimate instruments. ment: and the same hold good of the works appertaining But in this sacrament the consecration of the matter con- to the blood. sists in the miraculous change of the substance, which can Objection 3. Further, in the form of Baptism both the only be done by God; hence the minister in performing minister and his act are expressed, when it is said, “I bap- this sacrament has no other act save the pronouncing of tize thee.” But in the words set forth above there is no the words. And because the form should suit the thing, mention made either of the minister or of his act. There- therefore the form of this sacrament differs from the forms fore the form of the sacrament is not a suitable one. of the other sacraments in two respects. First, because the Objection 4. Further, the form of the sacrament suf- form of the other sacraments implies the use of the matter, fices for its perfection; hence the sacrament of Baptism as for instance, baptizing, or signing; but the form of this can be performed sometimes by pronouncing the words sacrament implies merely the consecration of the matter, of the form only, omitting all the others. Therefore, if the which consists in transubstantiation, as when it is said, aforesaid words be the form of this sacrament, it would “This is My body,” or, “This is the chalice of My blood.” seem as if this sacrament could be performed sometimes Secondly, because the forms of the other sacraments are by uttering those words alone, while leaving out all the pronounced in the person of the minister, whether by way others which are said in the mass; yet this seems to be of exercising an act, as when it is said, “I baptize thee,” or false, because, were the other words to be passed over, “I confirm thee,” etc.; or by way of command, as when it the said words would be taken as spoken in the person of is said in the sacrament of order, “Take the power,” etc.; or the priest saying them, whereas the bread and wine are by way of entreaty, as when in the sacrament of Extreme not changed into his body and blood. Consequently, the Unction it is said, “By this anointing and our interces- aforesaid words are not the form of this sacrament. sion,” etc. But the form of this sacrament is pronounced On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv): as if Christ were speaking in person, so that it is given to “The consecration is accomplished by the words and ex- be understood that the minister does nothing in perfecting 2543 this sacrament, except to pronounce the words of Christ. with respect to the last word spoken, as if Christ had just Reply to Objection 1. There are many opinions on then pronounced those words, when He gave it to His dis- this matter. Some have said that Christ, Who had power ciples; but the sequence can be understood with regard to of excellence in the sacraments, performed this sacrament all that had gone before; so that the sense is: “While He without using any form of words, and that afterwards He was blessing, and breaking, and giving it to His disciples, pronounced the words under which others were to con- He spoke the words, ‘Take ye,’ ” etc. secrate thereafter. And the words of Pope Innocent III Reply to Objection 2. In these words, “Take ye and seem to convey the same sense (De Sacr. Alt. Myst. iv), eat,” the use of the consecrated, matter is indicated, which where he says: “In good sooth it can be said that Christ is not of the necessity of this sacrament, as stated above accomplished this sacrament by His Divine power, and (q. 74, a. 7). And therefore not even these words belong subsequently expressed the form under which those who to the substance of the form. Nevertheless, because the came after were to consecrate.” But in opposition to this use of the consecrated matter belongs to a certain perfec- view are the words of the Gospel in which it is said that tion of the sacrament, in the same way as operation is not Christ “blessed,” and this blessing was effected by cer- the first but the second perfection of a thing, consequently, tain words. Accordingly those words of Innocent are to the whole perfection of this sacrament is expressed by all be considered as expressing an opinion, rather than deter- those words: and it was in this way that Eusebius un- mining the point. derstood that the sacrament was accomplished by those Others, again, have said that the blessing was effected words, as to its first and second perfection. by other words not known to us. But this statement can- Reply to Objection 3. In the sacrament of Baptism not stand, because the blessing of the consecration is now the minister exercises an act regarding the use of the mat- performed by reciting the things which were then accom- ter, which is of the essence of the sacrament: such is not plished; hence, if the consecration was not performed then the case in this sacrament; hence there is no parallel. by these words, neither would it be now. Reply to Objection 4. Some have contended that Accordingly, others have maintained that this bless- this sacrament cannot be accomplished by uttering the ing was effected by the same words as are used now; but aforesaid words, while leaving out the rest, especially the that Christ spoke them twice, at first secretly, in order to words in the Canon of the Mass. But that this is false consecrate, and afterwards openly, to instruct others. But can be seen both from Ambrose’s words quoted above, as even this will not hold good, because the priest in conse- well as from the fact that the Canon of the Mass is not the crating uses these words, not as spoken in secret, but as same in all places or times, but various portions have been openly pronounced. Accordingly, since these words have introduced by various people. no power except from Christ pronouncing them, it seems Accordingly it must be held that if the priest were that Christ also consecrated by pronouncing them openly. to pronounce only the aforesaid words with the intention And therefore others said that the Evangelists did not of consecrating this sacrament, this sacrament would be always follow the precise order in their narrative as that in valid because the intention would cause these words to be which things actually happened, as is seen from Augus- understood as spoken in the person of Christ, even though tine (De Consens. Evang. ii). Hence it is to be understood the words were pronounced without those that precede. that the order of what took place can be expressed thus: The priest, however, would sin gravely in consecrating the “Taking the bread He blessed it, saying: This is My body, sacrament thus, as he would not be observing the rite of and then He broke it, and gave it to His disciples.” But the the Church. Nor does the comparison with Baptism prove same sense can be had even without changing the words anything; for it is a sacrament of necessity: whereas the of the Gospel; because the participle “saying” implies se- lack of this sacrament can be supplied by the spiritual par- quence of the words uttered with what goes before. And taking thereof, as Augustine says (cf. q. 73, a. 3, ad 1). it is not necessary for the sequence to be understood only Whether this is the proper form for the consecration of the bread: “This is My body”? IIIa q. 78 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that this is not the proper form say: “This becomes My body.” of this sacrament: “This is My body.” For the effect of a Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv), sacrament ought to be expressed in its form. But the ef- “Christ’s words consecrate this sacrament. What word of fect of the consecration of the bread is the change of the Christ? This word, whereby all things are made. The substance of the bread into the body of Christ, and this Lord commanded, and the heavens and earth were made. is better expressed by the word “becomes” than by “is.” ” Therefore, it would be a more proper form of this sacra- Therefore, in the form of the consecration we ought to ment if the imperative mood were employed, so as to say: 2544 “Be this My body.” the intention is referred. Objection 3. Further, that which is changed is implied And since the conversion is expressed in this form as in the subject of this phrase, just as the term of the change in “being,” it is necessary for the extremes of the conver- is implied in the predicate. But just as that into which the sion to be signified as they exist in the fact of conversion. change is made is something determinate, for the change But then the term “whereunto” has the proper nature of is into nothing else but the body of Christ, so also that its own substance; whereas the term “whence” does not which is converted is determinate, since only bread is con- remain in its own substance, but only as to the accidents verted into the body of Christ. Therefore, as a noun is in- whereby it comes under the senses, and can be determined serted on the part of the predicate, so also should a noun in relation to the senses. Hence the term “whence” of be inserted in the subject, so that it be said: “This bread is the conversion is conveniently expressed by the demon- My body.” strative pronoun, relative to the sensible accidents which Objection 4. Further, just as the term of the change continue; but the term “whereunto” is expressed by the is determinate in nature, because it is a body, so also is noun signifying the nature of the thing which terminates it determinate in person. Consequently, in order to deter- the conversion, and this is Christ’s entire body, and not mine the person, it ought to be said: “This is the body of merely His flesh; as was said above (q. 76, a. 1, ad 2). Christ.” Hence this form is most appropriate: “This is My body.” Objection 5. Further, nothing ought to be inserted in Reply to Objection 1. The ultimate effect of this con- the form except what is substantial to it. Consequently, version is not a “becoming” but a “being,” as stated above, the conjunction “for” is improperly added in some books, and consequently prominence should be given to this in since it does not belong to the substance of the form. the form. On the contrary, our Lord used this form in conse- Reply to Objection 2. God’s word operated in the crating, as is evident from Mat. 26:26. creation of things, and it is the same which operates in this I answer that, This is the proper form for the con- consecration, yet each in different fashion: because here secration of the bread. For it was said (a. 1) that this it operates effectively and sacramentally, that is, in virtue consecration consists in changing the substance of bread of its signification. And consequently the last effect of the into the body of Christ. Now the form of a sacrament consecration must needs be signified in this sentence by a ought to denote what is done in the sacrament. Conse- substantive verb of the indicative mood and present time. quently the form for the consecration of the bread ought But in the creation of things it worked merely effectively, to signify the actual conversion of the bread into the body and such efficiency is due to the command of His wisdom; of Christ. And herein are three things to be considered: and therefore in the creation of things the Lord’s word is namely, the actual conversion, the term “whence,” and the expressed by a verb in the imperative mood, as in Gn. 1:3: term “whereunto.” “Let there be light, and light was made.” Now the conversion can be considered in two ways: Reply to Objection 3. The term “whence” does not first, in “becoming,” secondly, in “being.” But the conver- retain the nature of its substance in the “being” of the con- sion ought not to be signified in this form as in “becom- version, as the term “whereunto” does. Therefore there is ing,” but as in “being.” First, because such conversion is no parallel. not successive, as was said above (q. 75, a. 7), but instan- Reply to Objection 4. The pronoun “My,” which im- taneous; and in such changes the “becoming” is nothing plicitly points to the chief person, i.e. the person of the else than the “being.” Secondly, because the sacramen- speaker, sufficiently indicates Christ’s person, in Whose tal forms bear the same relation to the signification of the person these words are uttered, as stated above (a. 1). sacramental effect as artificial forms to the representation Reply to Objection 5. The conjunction “for” is set in of the effect of art. Now an artificial form is the likeness this form according to the custom of the Roman Church, of the ultimate effect, on which the artist’s intention is who derived it from Peter the Apostle; and this on account fixed ;. just as the art-form in the builder’s mind is princi- of the sequence with the words preceding: and therefore pally the form of the house constructed, and secondarily it is not part of the form, just as the words preceding the of the constructing. Accordingly, in this form also the form are not. conversion ought to be expressed as in “being,” to which 2545 Whether this is the proper form for the consecration of the wine: “This is the chalice IIIa q. 78 a. 3 of My blood,” etc.? Objection 1. It seems that this is not the proper form death of the Lord.” Consequently, mention ought to be for the consecration of the wine. “This is the chalice of made of Christ’s Passion and its fruit rather in the form My blood, of the New and Eternal Testament, the Mys- of the consecration of the blood, than in the form of the tery of Faith, which shall be shed for you and for many consecration of the body, especially since our Lord said: unto the forgiveness of sins.” For as the bread is changed “This is My body, which shall be delivered up for you” by the power of consecration into Christ’s body, so is the (Lk. 22:19). wine changed into Christ’s blood, as is clear from what Objection 8. Further, as was already observed (q. 48, was said above (q. 76, Aa. 1,2,3). But in the form of the a. 2; q. 49, a. 3), Christ’s Passion sufficed for all; while consecration of the bread, the body of Christ is expressly as to its efficacy it was profitable for many. Therefore it mentioned, without any addition. Therefore in this form ought to be said: “Which shall be shed for all,” or else the blood of Christ is improperly expressed in the oblique “for many,” without adding, “for you.” case, and the chalice in the nominative, when it is said: Objection 9. Further, the words whereby this sacra- “This is the chalice of My blood.” ment is consecrated draw their efficacy from Christ’s in- Objection 2. Further, the words spoken in the conse- stitution. But no Evangelist narrates that Christ spoke all cration of the bread are not more efficacious than those these words. Therefore this is not an appropriate form for spoken in the consecration of the wine, since both are the consecration of the wine. Christ’s words. But directly the words are spoken—“This On the contrary, The Church, instructed by the apos- is My body,” there is perfect consecration of the bread. tles, uses this form. Therefore, directly these other words are uttered—“This I answer that, There is a twofold opinion regarding is the chalice of My blood,” there is perfect consecration this form. Some have maintained that the words “This is of the blood; and so the words which follow do not appeal the chalice of My blood” alone belong to the substance to be of the substance of the form, especially since they of this form, but not those words which follow. Now this refer to the properties of this sacrament. seems incorrect, because the words which follow them are Objection 3. Further, the New Testament seems to determinations of the predicate, that is, of Christ’s blood. be an internal inspiration, as is evident from the Apos- consequently they belong to the integrity of the expres- tle quoting the words of Jeremias (31:31): “I will perfect sion. unto the house of Israel a New Testament. . . I will give My And on this account others say more accurately that laws into their mind” (Heb. 8:8). But a sacrament is an all the words which follow are of the substance of the outward visible act. Therefore, in the form of the sacra- form down to the words, “As often as ye shall do this,” ment the words “of the New Testament” are improperly which belong to the use of this sacrament, and conse- added. quently do not belong to the substance of the form. Hence Objection 4. Further, a thing is said to be new which it is that the priest pronounces all these words, under the is near the beginning of its existence. But what is eternal same rite and manner, namely, holding the chalice in his has no beginning of its existence. Therefore it is incorrect hands. Moreover, in Lk. 22:20, the words that follow are to say “of the New and Eternal,” because it seems to savor interposed with the preceding words: “This is the chalice, of a contradiction. the new testament in My blood.” Objection 5. Further, occasions of error ought to be Consequently it must be said that all the aforesaid withheld from men, according to Is. 57:14: “Take away words belong to the substance of the form; but that by the stumbling blocks out of the way of My people.” But the first words, “This is the chalice of My blood,” the some have fallen into error in thinking that Christ’s body change of the wine into blood is denoted, as explained and blood are only mystically present in this sacrament. above (a. 2) in the form for the consecration of the bread; Therefore it is out of place to add “the mystery of faith.” but by the words which come after is shown the power Objection 6. Further, it was said above (q. 73, a. 3, of the blood shed in the Passion, which power works in ad 3), that as Baptism is the sacrament of faith, so is this sacrament, and is ordained for three purposes. First the Eucharist the sacrament of charity. Consequently, in and principally for securing our eternal heritage, accord- this form the word “charity” ought rather to be used than ing to Heb. 10:19: “Having confidence in the entering into “faith.” the holies by the blood of Christ”; and in order to denote Objection 7. Further, the whole of this sacrament, this, we say, “of the New and Eternal Testament.” Sec- both as to body and blood, is a memorial of our Lord’s ondly, for justifying by grace, which is by faith accord- Passion, according to 1 Cor. 11:26: “As often as you shall ing to Rom. 3:25,26: “Whom God hath proposed to be a eat this bread and drink the chalice, you shall show the propitiation, through faith in His blood. . . that He Himself 2546 may be just, and the justifier of him who is of the faith of of the New Testament, that by means of His death. . . they Jesus Christ”: and on this account we add, “The Mystery that are called may receive the promise of eternal inheri- of Faith.” Thirdly, for removing sins which are the im- tance.” Consequently, we say here, “The blood of the New pediments to both of these things, according to Heb. 9:14: Testament,” because it is shown now not in figure but in “The blood of Christ. . . shall cleanse our conscience from truth; and therefore we add, “which shall be shed for you.” dead works,” that is, from sins; and on this account, we But the internal inspiration has its origin in the power of say, “which shall be shed for you and for many unto the this blood, according as we are justified by Christ’s Pas- forgiveness of sins.” sion. Reply to Objection 1. The expression “This is the Reply to Objection 4. This Testament is a “new one” chalice of My blood” is a figure of speech, which can be by reason of its showing forth: yet it is called “eternal” understood in two ways. First, as a figure of metonymy; both on account of God’s eternal pre-ordination, as well because the container is put for the contained, so that the as on account of the eternal heritage which is prepared meaning is: “This is My blood contained in the chalice”; by this testament. Moreover, Christ’s Person is eternal, in of which mention is now made, because Christ’s blood is Whose blood this testament is appointed. consecrated in this sacrament, inasmuch as it is the drink Reply to Objection 5. The word “mystery” is in- of the faithful, which is not implied under the notion of serted, not in order to exclude reality, but to show that the blood; consequently this had to be denoted by the vessel reality is hidden, because Christ’s blood is in this sacra- adapted for such usage. ment in a hidden manner, and His Passion was dimly fore- Secondly, it can be taken by way of metaphor, so that shadowed in the Old Testament. Christ’s Passion is understood by the chalice by way of Reply to Objection 6. It is called the “Sacrament of comparison, because, like a cup, it inebriates, according Faith,” as being an object of faith: because by faith alone to Lam. 3:15: “He hath filled me with bitterness, he hath do we hold the presence of Christ’s blood in this sacra- inebriated me with wormwood”: hence our Lord Himself ment. Moreover Christ’s Passion justifies by faith. Bap- spoke of His Passion as a chalice, when He said (Mat. tism is called the “Sacrament of Faith” because it is a pro- 26:39): “Let this chalice pass away from Me”: so that fession of faith. This is called the “Sacrament of Charity,” the meaning is: “This is the chalice of My Passion.” This as being figurative and effective thereof. is denoted by the blood being consecrated apart from the Reply to Objection 7. As stated above (ad 2), the body; because it was by the Passion that the blood was blood consecrated apart represents Christ’s blood more separated from the body. expressively; and therefore mention is made of Christ’s Reply to Objection 2. As was said above (ad 1; q. 76, Passion and its fruits, in the consecration of the blood a. 2, ad 1), the blood consecrated apart expressly repre- rather than in that of the body. sents Christ’s Passion, and therefore mention is made of Reply to Objection 8. The blood of Christ’s Passion the fruits of the Passion in the consecration of the blood has its efficacy not merely in the elect among the Jews, to rather than in that of the body, since the body is the sub- whom the blood of the Old Testament was exhibited, but ject of the Passion. This is also pointed out in our Lord’s also in the Gentiles; nor only in priests who consecrate saying, “which shall be delivered up for you,” as if to say, this sacrament, and in those others who partake of it; but “which shall undergo the Passion for you.” likewise in those for whom it is offered. And therefore Reply to Objection 3. A testament is the disposal He says expressly, “for you,” the Jews, “and for many,” of a heritage. But God disposed of a heavenly heritage namely the Gentiles; or, “for you” who eat of it, and “for to men, to be bestowed through the virtue of the blood many,” for whom it is offered. of Jesus Christ; because, according to Heb. 9:16: “Where Reply to Objection 9. The Evangelists did not in- there is a testament the death of the testator must of neces- tend to hand down the forms of the sacraments, which in sity come in.” Now Christ’s blood was exhibited to men the primitive Church had to be kept concealed, as Diony- in two ways. First of all in figure, and this belongs to the sius observes at the close of his book on the ecclesiastical Old Testament; consequently the Apostle concludes (Heb. hierarchy; their object was to write the story of Christ. 9:16): “Whereupon neither was the first indeed dedicated Nevertheless nearly all these words can be culled from without blood,” which is evident from this, that as related various passages of the Scriptures. Because the words, in Ex. 24:7,8, “when every” commandment of the law “This is the chalice,” are found in Lk. 22:20, and 1 Cor. “had been read” by Moses, “he sprinkled all the people” 11:25, while Matthew says in chapter 26:28: “This is My saying: “This is the blood of the testament which the Lord blood of the New Testament, which shall be shed for many hath enjoined unto you.” unto the remission of sins.” The words added, namely, Secondly, it was shown in very truth; and this belongs “eternal” and “mystery of faith,” were handed down to to the New Testament. This is what the Apostle premises the Church by the apostles, who received them from our when he says (Rom. 9:15): “Therefore He is the Mediator Lord, according to 1 Cor. 11:23: “I have received of the 2547 Lord that which also I delivered unto you.” Whether in the aforesaid words of the forms there be any created power which causes IIIa q. 78 a. 4 the consecration? Objection 1. It seems that in the aforesaid words of Law. Hence, since this sacrament is of greater worth than the forms there is no created power which causes the con- the others, as stated above (q. 65, a. 3), the result is that secration. Because Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): there is in the words of the form of this sacrament a cre- “The change of the bread into Christ’s body is caused ated power which causes the change to be wrought in solely by the power of the Holy Ghost.” But the power it: instrumental, however, as in the other sacraments, as of the Holy Ghost is uncreated. Therefore this sacrament stated above (q. 62, Aa. 3,4). For since these words are is not caused by any created power of those words. uttered in the person of Christ, it is from His command Objection 2. Further, miraculous works are wrought that they receive their instrumental power from Him, just not by any created power, but solely by Divine power, as as His other deeds and sayings derive their salutary power was stated in the Ia, q. 110, a. 4. But the change of the instrumentally, as was observed above (q. 48, a. 6; q. 56, bread and wine into Christ’s body and blood is a work a. 1, ad 3). not less miraculous than the creation of things, or than the Reply to Objection 1. When the bread is said to be formation of Christ’s body in the womb of a virgin: which changed into Christ’s body solely by the power of the things could not be done by any created power. Therefore, Holy Ghost, the instrumental power which lies in the form neither is this sacrament consecrated by any created power of this sacrament is not excluded: just as when we say that of the aforesaid words. the smith alone makes a knife we do not deny the power Objection 3. Further, the aforesaid words are not sim- of the hammer. ple, but composed of many; nor are they uttered simul- Reply to Objection 2. No creature can work miracles taneously, but successively. But, as stated above (q. 75, as the chief agent. yet it can do so instrumentally, just as a. 7), this change is wrought instantaneously. hence it the touch of Christ’s hand healed the leper. And in this must be done by a simple power. Therefore it is not ef- fashion Christ’s words change the bread into His body. fected by the power of those words. But in Christ’s conception, whereby His body was fash- On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv): “If ioned, it was impossible for anything derived from His there be such might in the word of the Lord Jesus that body to have the instrumental power of forming that very things non-existent came into being, how much more ef- body. Likewise in creation there was no term wherein the ficacious is it to make things existing to continue, and to instrumental action of a creature could be received. Con- be changed into something else? And so, what was bread sequently there is no comparison. before consecration is now the body of Christ after con- Reply to Objection 3. The aforesaid words, which secration, because Christ’s word changes a creature into work the consecration, operate sacramentally. Conse- something different.” quently, the converting power latent under the forms of I answer that, Some have maintained that neither in these sacraments follows the meaning, which is termi- the above words is there any created power for causing nated in the uttering of the last word. And therefore the the transubstantiation, nor in the other forms of the sacra- aforesaid words have this power in the last instant of their ments, or even in the sacraments themselves, for produc- being uttered, taken in conjunction with those uttered be- ing the sacramental effects. This, as was shown above fore. And this power is simple by reason of the thing sig- (q. 62, a. 1 ), is both contrary to the teachings of the saints, nified, although there be composition in the words uttered and detracts from the dignity of the sacraments of the New outwardly. Whether the aforesaid expressions are true? IIIa q. 78 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that the aforesaid expressions sion, “This is My body,” is false. are not true. Because when we say: “This is My body,” Objection 2. Further, the pronoun “this” appeals to the word “this” designates a substance. But according to the senses. But the sensible species in this sacrament are what was said above (Aa. 1,4, ad 3; q. 75, Aa. 2,7), when neither Christ’s body nor even its accidents. Therefore the pronoun “this” is spoken, the substance of the bread this expression, “This is My body,” cannot be true. is still there, because the transubstantiation takes place in Objection 3. Further, as was observed above (a. 4, ad the last instant of pronouncing the words. But it is false to 3), these words, by their signification, effect the change of say: “Bread is Christ’s body.” Consequently this expres- the bread into the body of Christ. But an effective cause 2548 is understood as preceding its effect. Therefore the mean-meaning of the sentence would be: “My body is My ing of these words is understood as preceding the change body,” which the above phrase does not effect, because of the bread into the body of Christ. But previous to the this was so even before the utterance of the words: hence change this expression, “This is My body,” is false. There- neither does the aforesaid sentence mean this. fore the expression is to be judged as false simply; and the Consequently, then, it remains to be said, as stated same reason holds good of the other phrase: “This is the above (a. 4), that this sentence possesses the power of ef- chalice of My blood,” etc. fecting the conversion of the bread into the body of Christ. On the contrary, These words are pronounced in the And therefore it is compared to other sentences, which person of Christ, Who says of Himself (Jn. 14:6): “I am have power only of signifying and not of producing, as the truth.” the concept of the practical intellect, which is productive I answer that, There have been many opinions on this of the thing, is compared to the concept of our speculative point. Some have said that in this expression, “This is intellect which is drawn from things. because “words are My body,” the word “this” implies demonstration as con- signs of concepts,” as the Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ceived, and not as exercised, because the whole phrase is i). And therefore as the concept of the practical intellect taken materially, since it is uttered by a way of narration: does not presuppose the thing understood, but makes it, so for the priest relates that Christ said: “This is My body.” the truth of this expression does not presuppose the thing But such a view cannot hold good, because then signified, but makes it; for such is the relation of God’s these words would not be applied to the corporeal mat- word to the things made by the Word. Now this change ter present, and consequently the sacrament would not be takes place not successively, but in an instant, as stated valid: for Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.): “The above (q. 77, a. 7). Consequently one must understand word is added to the element, and this becomes a sacra- the aforesaid expression with reference to the last instant ment.” Moreover this solution ignores entirely the diffi- of the words being spoken, yet not so that the subject may culty which this question presents: for there is still the be understood to have stood for that which is the term of objection in regard to the first uttering of these words the conversion; viz. that the body of Christ is the body of by Christ; since it is evident that then they were em- Christ; nor again that the subject be understood to stand ployed, not materially, but significatively. And therefore for that which it was before the conversion, namely, the it must be said that even when spoken by the priest they bread. but for that which is commonly related to both, i.e. are taken significatively, and not merely materially. Nor that which is contained in general under those species. For does it matter that the priest pronounces them by way of these words do not make the body of Christ to be the body recital, as though they were spoken by Christ, because ow- of Christ, nor do they make the bread to be the body of ing to Christ’s infinite power, just as through contact with Christ; but what was contained under those species, and His flesh the regenerative power entered not only into the was formerly bread, they make to be the body of Christ. waters which came into contact with Christ, but into all And therefore expressly our Lord did not say: “This bread waters throughout the whole world and during all future is My body,” which would be the meaning of the second ages, so likewise from Christ’s uttering these words they opinion; nor “This My body is My body,” which would derived their consecrating power, by whatever priest they be the meaning of the third opinion: but in general: “This be uttered, as if Christ present were saying them. is My body,” assigning no noun on the part of the subject, And therefore others have said that in this phrase the but only a pronoun, which signifies substance in common, word “this” appeals, not to the senses, but to the intel- without quality, that is, without a determinate form. lect; so that the meaning is, “This is My body”—i.e. “The Reply to Objection 1. The term “this” points to a sub- thing signified by ‘this’ is My body.” But neither can this stance, yet without determining its proper nature, as stated stand, because, since in the sacraments the effect is that above. which is signified, from such a form it would not result Reply to Objection 2. The pronoun “this” does not that Christ’s body was in very truth in this sacrament, but indicate the accidents, but the substance underlying the merely as in a sign, which is heretical, as stated above accidents, which at first was bread, and is afterwards the (q. 85, a. 1). body of Christ, which body, although not informed by Consequently, others have said that the word “this” ap- those accidents, is yet contained under them. peals to the senses; not at the precise instant of its being Reply to Objection 3. The meaning of this expres- uttered, but merely at the last instant thereof; as when a sion is, in the order of nature, understood before the thing man says, “Now I am silent,” this adverb “now” points to signified, just as a cause is naturally prior to the effect; but the instant immediately following the speech: because the not in order of time, because this cause has its effect with sense is: “Directly these words are spoken I am silent.” it at the same time, and this suffices for the truth of the But neither can this hold good, because in that case the expression. 2549 Whether the form of the consecration of the bread accomplishes its effect before the IIIa q. 78 a. 6 form of the consecration of the wine be completed? Objection 1. It seems that the form of the consecra- ad 3), for the truth of this phrase, “This is My body,” tion of the bread does not accomplish its effect until the wherein the verb is in the present tense, it is required for form for the consecration of the wine be completed. For, the thing signified to be present simultaneously in time as Christ’s body begins to be in this sacrament by the con- with the signification of the expression used; otherwise, secration of the bread, so does His blood come to be there if the thing signified had to be awaited for afterwards, a by the consecration of the wine. If, then, the words for verb of the future tense would be employed, and not one consecrating the bread were to produce their effect be- of the present tense, so that we should not say, “This is fore the consecration of the wine, it would follow that My body,” but “This will be My body.” But the signifi- Christ’s body would be present in this sacrament without cation of this speech is complete directly those words are the blood, which is improper. spoken. And therefore the thing signified must be present Objection 2. Further, one sacrament has one comple- instantaneously, and such is the effect of this sacrament; tion: hence although there be three immersions in Bap- otherwise it would not be a true speech. Moreover, this tism, yet the first immersion does not produce its effect opinion is against the rite of the Church, which forthwith until the third be completed. But all this sacrament is one, adores the body of Christ after the words are uttered. as stated above (q. 73, a. 2). Therefore the words whereby Hence it must be said that the first form does not await the bread is consecrated do not bring about their effect the second in its action, but has its effect on the instant. without the sacramental words whereby the wine is con- Reply to Objection 1. It is on this account that they secrated. who maintained the above opinion seem to have erred. Objection 3. Further, there are several words in the Hence it must be understood that directly the consecra- form for consecrating the bread, the first of which do not tion of the bread is complete, the body of Christ is indeed secure their effect until the last be uttered, as stated above present by the power of the sacrament, and the blood by (a. 4, ad 3). Therefore, for the same reason, neither do the real concomitance; but afterwards by the consecration of words for the consecration of Christ’s body produce their the wine, conversely, the blood of Christ is there by the effect, until the words for consecrating Christ’s blood are power of the sacrament, and the body by real concomi- spoken. tance, so that the entire Christ is under either species, as On the contrary, Directly the words are uttered for stated above (q. 76, a. 2). consecrating the bread, the consecrated host is shown to Reply to Objection 2. This sacrament is one in per- the people to be adored, which would not be done if fection, as stated above (q. 73 , a. 2), namely, inasmuch Christ’s body were not there, for that would be an act of as it is made up of two things, that is, of food and drink, idolatry. Therefore the consecrating words of the bread each of which of itself has its own perfection; but the three produce their effect before. the words are spoken for con- immersions of Baptism are ordained to one simple effect, secrating the wine. and therefore there is no resemblance. I answer that, Some of the earlier doctors said that Reply to Objection 3. The various words in the these two forms, namely, for consecrating the bread and form for consecrating the bread constitute the truth of one the wine, await each other’s action, so that the first does speech, but the words of the different forms do not, and not produce its effect until the second be uttered. consequently there is no parallel. But this cannot stand, because, as stated above (a. 5, 2550 THIRD PART, QUESTION 79 Of the Effects of This Sacrament (In Eight Articles) We must now consider the effects of this sacrament, and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether this sacrament bestows grace? (2) Whether the attaining of glory is an effect of this sacrament? (3) Whether the forgiveness of mortal sin is an effect of this sacrament? (4) Whether venial sin is forgiven by this sacrament? (5) Whether the entire punishment due for sin is forgiven by this sacrament? (6) Whether this sacrament preserves man from future sins? (7) Whether this sacrament benefits others besides the recipients? (8) Of the obstacles to the effect of this sacrament. Whether grace is bestowed through this sacrament? IIIa q. 79 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that grace is not bestowed Word by uniting Himself with His own flesh, made it to be through this sacrament. For this sacrament is spiritual productive of life. For it was becoming that He should be nourishment. But nourishment is only given to the liv- united somehow with bodies through His sacred flesh and ing. Therefore since the spiritual life is the effect of grace, precious blood, which we receive in a life-giving blessing this sacrament belongs only to one in the state of grace. in the bread and wine.” Therefore grace is not bestowed through this sacrament Secondly, it is considered on the part of what is rep- for it to be had in the first instance. In like manner neither resented by this sacrament, which is Christ’s Passion, as is it given so as grace may be increased, because spiri- stated above (q. 74, a. 1; q. 76 , a. 2, ad 1). And therefore tual growth belongs to the sacrament of Confirmation, as this sacrament works in man the effect which Christ’s Pas- stated above (q. 72, a. 1). Consequently, grace is not be- sion wrought in the world. Hence, Chrysostom says on stowed through this sacrament. the words, “Immediately there came out blood and water” Objection 2. Further, this sacrament is given as a spir- (Jn. 19:34): “Since the sacred mysteries derive their ori- itual refreshment. But spiritual refreshment seems to be- gin from thence, when you draw nigh to the awe-inspiring long to the use of grace rather than to its bestowal. There- chalice, so approach as if you were going to drink from fore it seems that grace is not given through this sacra- Christ’s own side.” Hence our Lord Himself says (Mat. ment. 26:28): “This is My blood. . . which shall be shed for many Objection 3. Further, as was said above (q. 74, a. 1), unto the remission of sins.” “Christ’s body is offered up in this sacrament for the sal- Thirdly, the effect of this sacrament is considered from vation of the body, and His blood for that of the soul.” the way in which this sacrament is given; for it is given Now it is not the body which is the subject of grace, but by way of food and drink. And therefore this sacrament the soul, as was shown in the Ia IIae, q. 110, a. 4. There- does for the spiritual life all that material food does for the fore grace is not bestowed through this sacrament, at least bodily life, namely, by sustaining, giving increase, restor- so far as the body is concerned. ing, and giving delight. Accordingly, Ambrose says (De On the contrary, Our Lord says (Jn. 6:52): “The Sacram. v): “This is the bread of everlasting life, which bread which I will give, is My flesh for the life of the supports the substance of our soul.” And Chrysostom says world.” But the spiritual life is the effect of grace. There- (Hom. xlvi in Joan.): “When we desire it, He lets us feel fore grace is bestowed through this sacrament. Him, and eat Him, and embrace Him.” And hence our I answer that, The effect of this sacrament ought to Lord says (Jn. 6:56): “My flesh is meat indeed, and My be considered, first of all and principally, from what is blood is drink indeed.” contained in this sacrament, which is Christ; Who, just Fourthly, the effect of this sacrament is considered as by coming into the world, He visibly bestowed the life from the species under which it is given. Hence Augustine of grace upon the world, according to Jn. 1:17: “Grace says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.): “Our Lord betokened His body and truth came by Jesus Christ,” so also, by coming sacra- and blood in things which out of many units are made mentally into man causes the life of grace, according to into some one whole: for out of many grains is one thing Jn. 6:58: “He that eateth Me, the same also shall live by made,” viz. bread; “and many grapes flow into one thing,” Me.” Hence Cyril says on Lk. 22:19: “God’s life-giving viz. wine. And therefore he observes elsewhere (Tract. 2551 xxvi in Joan.): “O sacrament of piety, O sign of unity, O bread of communion is not simple bread but bread united bond of charity!” with the Godhead.” But as Gregory observes in a Homily And since Christ and His Passion are the cause of for Pentecost, “God’s love is never idle; for, wherever it grace. and since spiritual refreshment, and charity can- is it does great works.” And consequently through this not be without grace, it is clear from all that has been set sacrament, as far as its power is concerned, not only is the forth that this sacrament bestows grace. habit of grace and of virtue bestowed, but it is furthermore Reply to Objection 1. This sacrament has of itself aroused to act, according to 2 Cor. 5:14: “The charity of the power of bestowing grace; nor does anyone possess Christ presseth us.” Hence it is that the soul is spiritually grace before receiving this sacrament except from some nourished through the power of this sacrament, by being desire thereof; from his own desire, as in the case of the spiritually gladdened, and as it were inebriated with the adult. or from the Church’s desire in the case of children, sweetness of the Divine goodness, according to Cant 5:1: as stated above (q. 73, a. 3). Hence it is due to the ef- “Eat, O friends, and drink, and be inebriated, my dearly ficacy of its power, that even from desire thereof a man beloved.” procures grace whereby he is enabled to lead the spiritual Reply to Objection 3. Because the sacraments op- life. It remains, then, that when the sacrament itself is erate according to the similitude by which they signify, really received, grace is increased, and the spiritual life therefore by way of assimilation it is said that in this sacra- perfected: yet in different fashion from the sacrament of ment “the body is offered for the salvation of the body, Confirmation, in which grace is increased and perfected and the blood for the salvation of the soul,” although each for resisting the outward assaults of Christ’s enemies. But works for the salvation of both, since the entire Christ is by this sacrament grace receives increase, and the spiritual under each, as stated above (q. 76, a. 2). And although the life is perfected, so that man may stand perfect in himself body is not the immediate subject of grace, still the effect by union with God. of grace flows into the body while in the present life we Reply to Objection 2. This sacrament confers grace present “our [Vulg.: ‘your’] members” as “instruments of spiritually together with the virtue of charity. Hence Dam- justice unto God” (Rom. 6:13), and in the life to come ascene (De Fide Orth. iv) compares this sacrament to the our body will share in the incorruption and the glory of burning coal which Isaias saw (Is. 6:6): “For a live ember the soul. is not simply wood, but wood united to fire; so also the Whether the attaining of glory is an effect of this sacrament? IIIa q. 79 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that the attaining of glory is not tained in it, as also His Passion represented by it; and that an effect of this sacrament. For an effect is proportioned through which it works its effect, namely, the use of the to its cause. But this sacrament belongs to “wayfarers” sacrament, and its species. [viatoribus], and hence it is termed “Viaticum.” Since, Now as to both of these it belongs to this sacrament then, wayfarers are not yet capable of glory, it seems that to cause the attaining of eternal life. Because it was by this sacrament does not cause the attaining of glory. His Passion that Christ opened to us the approach to eter- Objection 2. Further, given sufficient cause, the ef- nal life, according to Heb. 9:15: “He is the Mediator of fect follows. But many take this sacrament who will never the New Testament; that by means of His death. . . they come to glory, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xxi). that are called may receive the promise of eternal inher- Consequently, this sacrament is not the cause of attaining itance.” Accordingly in the form of this sacrament it is unto glory. said: “This is the chalice of My blood, of the New and Objection 3. Further, the greater is not brought about Eternal Testament.” by the lesser, for nothing acts outside its species. But it is In like manner the refreshment of spiritual food and the lesser thing to receive Christ under a strange species, the unity denoted by the species of the bread and wine which happens in this sacrament, than to enjoy Him in are to be had in the present life, although imperfectly. but His own species, which belongs to glory. Therefore this perfectly in the state of glory. Hence Augustine says on sacrament does not cause the attaining of glory. the words, “My flesh is meat indeed” (Jn. 6:56): “Seeing On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 6:52): “If any man that in meat and drink, men aim at this, that they hunger eat of this bread, he shall live for ever.” But eternal life not nor thirst, this verily nought doth afford save only this is the life of glory. Therefore the attaining of glory is an meat and drink which maketh them who partake thereof effect of this sacrament. to be immortal and incorruptible, in the fellowship of the I answer that, In this sacrament we may consider both saints, where shall be peace, and unity, full and perfect.” that from which it derives its effect, namely, Christ con- Reply to Objection 1. As Christ’s Passion, in virtue 2552 whereof this sacrament is accomplished, is indeed the suf-tine (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), expounding the same passage, ficient cause of glory, yet not so that we are thereby forth- observes: “The sacrament is one thing, the power of the with admitted to glory, but we must first “suffer with Him sacrament another. Many receive it from the altar. . . and in order that we may also be glorified” afterwards “with by receiving”. . . die. . . Eat, then, spiritually the heavenly Him” (Rom. 8:17), so this sacrament does not at once “bread, bring innocence to the altar.” It is no wonder, then, admit us to glory, but bestows on us the power of com- if those who do not keep innocence, do not secure the ef- ing unto glory. And therefore it is called “Viaticum,” a fect of this sacrament. figure whereof we read in 3 Kings 19:8: “Elias ate and Reply to Objection 3. That Christ is received un- drank, and walked in the strength of that food forty days der another species belongs to the nature of a sacrament, and forty nights unto the mount of God, Horeb.” which acts instrumentally. But there is nothing to prevent Reply to Objection 2. Just as Christ’s Passion has an instrumental cause from producing a more mighty ef- not its effect in them who are not disposed towards it as fect, as is evident from what was said above (q. 77, a. 3, they should be, so also they do not come to glory through ad 3). this sacrament who receive it unworthily. Hence Augus- Whether the forgiveness of mortal sin is an effect of this sacrament? IIIa q. 79 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that the forgiveness of mortal within him an obstacle to receiving the effect of this sacra- sin is an effect of this sacrament. For it is said in one of the ment; since he is not a proper recipient of this sacrament, Collects (Postcommunion, Pro vivis et defunctis): “May both because he is not alive spiritually, and so he ought this sacrament be a cleansing from crimes.” But mortal not to eat the spiritual nourishment, since nourishment is sins are called crimes. Therefore mortal sins are blotted confined to the living; and because he cannot be united out by this sacrament. with Christ, which is the effect of this sacrament, as long Objection 2. Further, this sacrament, like Baptism, as he retains an attachment towards mortal sin. Conse- works by the power of Christ’s Passion. But mortal sins quently, as is said in the book De Eccles. Dogm.: “If the are forgiven by Baptism, as stated above (q. 69, a. 1). soul leans towards sin, it is burdened rather than purified Therefore they are forgiven likewise by this sacrament, from partaking of the Eucharist.” Hence, in him who is especially since in the form of this sacrament it is said: conscious of mortal sin, this sacrament does not cause the “Which shall be shed for many unto the forgiveness of forgiveness of sin. sins.” Nevertheless this sacrament can effect the forgiveness Objection 3. Further, grace is bestowed through this of sin in two ways. First of all, by being received, not actu- sacrament, as stated above (a. 1). But by grace a man is ally, but in desire; as when a man is first justified from sin. justified from mortal sins, according to Rom. 3:24: “Be- Secondly, when received by one in mortal sin of which ing justified freely by His grace.” Therefore mortal sins he is not conscious, and for which he has no attachment; are forgiven by this sacrament. since possibly he was not sufficiently contrite at first, but On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 11:29): “He by approaching this sacrament devoutly and reverently he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh obtains the grace of charity, which will perfect his contri- judgment to himself”: and a gloss of the same passage tion and bring forgiveness of sin. makes the following commentary: “He eats and drinks Reply to Objection 1. We ask that this sacrament may unworthily who is in the state of sin, or who handles (the be the “cleansing of crimes,” or of those sins of which we sacrament) irreverently; and such a one eats and drinks are unconscious, according to Ps. 18:13: “Lord, cleanse judgment, i.e. damnation, unto himself.” Therefore, he me from my hidden sins”; or that our contrition may be that is in mortal sin, by taking the sacrament heaps sin perfected for the forgiveness of our sins; or that strength upon sin, rather than obtains forgiveness of his sin. be bestowed on us to avoid sin. I answer that, The power of this sacrament can be Reply to Objection 2. Baptism is spiritual generation, considered in two ways. First of all, in itself: and thus which is a transition from spiritual non-being into spiritual this sacrament has from Christ’s Passion the power of for- being, and is given by way of ablution. Consequently, in giving all sins, since the Passion is the fount and cause of both respects he who is conscious of mortal sin does not the forgiveness of sins. improperly approach Baptism. But in this sacrament man Secondly, it can be considered in comparison with the receives Christ within himself by way of spiritual nour- recipient of the sacrament, in so far as there is, or is not, ishment, which is unbecoming to one that lies dead in his found in him an obstacle to receiving the fruit of this sins. Therefore the comparison does not hold good. sacrament. Now whoever is conscious of mortal sin, has Reply to Objection 3. Grace is the sufficient cause of 2553 the forgiveness of mortal sin; yet it does not forgive sin given so in this sacrament. Hence the argument does not except when it is first bestowed on the sinner. But it is not prove. Whether venial sins are forgiven through this sacrament? IIIa q. 79 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that venial sins are not forgiven ment is received under the form of nourishing food. Now by this sacrament, because this is the “sacrament of char- nourishment from food is requisite for the body to make ity,” as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But venial good the daily waste caused by the action of natural heat. sins are not contrary to charity, as was shown in the Ia But something is also lost daily of our spirituality from the IIae, q. 88, Aa. 1,2; IIa IIae, q. 24, a. 10. Therefore, since heat of concupiscence through venial sins, which lessen contrary is taken away by its contrary, it seems that venial the fervor of charity, as was shown in the IIa IIae, q. 24, sins are not forgiven by this sacrament. a. 10. And therefore it belongs to this sacrament to forgive Objection 2. Further, if venial sins be forgiven by this venial sins. Hence Ambrose says (De Sacram. v) that this sacrament, then all of them are forgiven for the same rea- daily bread is taken “as a remedy against daily infirmity.” son as one is. But it does not appear that all are forgiven, The reality of this sacrament is charity, not only as to because thus one might frequently be without any venial its habit, but also as to its act, which is kindled in this sin, against what is said in 1 Jn. 1:8: “If we say that we sacrament; and by this means venial sins are forgiven. have no sin, we deceive ourselves.” Therefore no venial Consequently, it is manifest that venial sins are forgiven sin is forgiven by this sacrament. by the power of this sacrament. Objection 3. Further, contraries mutually exclude Reply to Objection 1. Venial sins, although not op- each other. But venial sins do not forbid the receiving posed to the habit of charity, are nevertheless opposed to of this sacrament: because Augustine says on the words, the fervor of its act, which act is kindled by this sacra- “If any man eat of it he shall [Vulg.: ‘may’] not die for ment; by reason of which act venial sins are blotted out. ever” (Jn. 6:50): “Bring innocence to the altar: your sins, Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted is not to be though they be daily. . . let them not be deadly.” Therefore understood as if a man could not at some time be without neither are venial sins taken away by this sacrament. all guilt of venial sin: but that the just do not pass through On the contrary, Innocent III says (De S. Alt. Myst. this life without committing venial sins. iv) that this sacrament “blots out venial sins, and wards Reply to Objection 3. The power of charity, to which off mortal sins.” this sacrament belongs, is greater than that of venial sins: I answer that, Two things may be considered in this because charity by its act takes away venial sins, which sacrament, to wit, the sacrament itself, and the reality of nevertheless cannot entirely hinder the act of charity. And the sacrament: and it appears from both that this sacra- the same holds good of this sacrament. ment has the power of forgiving venial sins. For this sacra- Whether the entire punishment due to sin is forgiven through this sacrament? IIIa q. 79 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that the entire punishment due Objection 3. Further, it is certain that some part of to sin is forgiven through this sacrament. For through the debt of punishment is forgiven by this sacrament; for this sacrament man receives the effect of Christ’s Passion which reason it is sometimes enjoined upon a man, by way within himself as stated above (Aa. 1,2), just as he does of satisfaction, to have masses said for himself. But if one through Baptism. But through Baptism man receives for- part of the punishment is forgiven, for the same reason is giveness of all punishment, through the virtue of Christ’s the other forgiven: owing to Christ’s infinite power con- Passion, which satisfied sufficiently for all sins, as was ex- tained in this sacrament. Consequently, it seems that the plained above (q. 69, a. 2 ). Therefore it seems the whole whole punishment can be taken away by this sacrament. debt of punishment is forgiven through this sacrament. On the contrary, In that case no other punishment Objection 2. Further, Pope Alexander I says (Ep. ad would have to be enjoined; just as none is imposed upon omnes orth.): “No sacrifice can be greater than the body the newly baptized. and the blood of Christ.” But man satisfied for his sins by I answer that, This sacrament is both a sacrifice and the sacrifices of the old Law: for it is written (Lev. 4,5): a sacrament. it has the nature of a sacrifice inasmuch as “If a man shall sin, let him offer” (so and so) “for his sin, it is offered up; and it has the nature of a sacrament inas- and it shall be forgiven him.” Therefore this sacrament much as it is received. And therefore it has the effect of a avails much more for the forgiveness of all punishment. sacrament in the recipient, and the effect of a sacrifice in 2554 the offerer, or in them for whom it is offered. Therefore, although this offering suffices of its own quan- If, then, it be considered as a sacrament, it produces its tity to satisfy for all punishment, yet it becomes satisfac- effect in two ways: first of all directly through the power tory for them for whom it is offered, or even for the of- of the sacrament; secondly as by a kind of concomitance, ferers, according to the measure of their devotion, and not as was said above regarding what is contained in the sacra- for the whole punishment. ment (q. 76, Aa. 1,2). Through the power of the sacrament Reply to Objection 1. The sacrament of Baptism it produces directly that effect for which it was instituted. is directly ordained for the remission of punishment and Now it was instituted not for satisfaction, but for nour- guilt: not so the Eucharist, because Baptism is given ishing spiritually through union between Christ and His to man as dying with Christ, whereas the Eucharist is members, as nourishment is united with the person nour- given as by way of nourishing and perfecting him through ished. But because this union is the effect of charity, from Christ. Consequently there is no parallel. the fervor of which man obtains forgiveness, not only of Reply to Objection 2. Those other sacrifices and guilt but also of punishment, hence it is that as a conse- oblations did not effect the forgiveness of the whole pun- quence, and by concomitance with the chief effect, man ishment, neither as to the quantity of the thing offered, obtains forgiveness of the punishment, not indeed of the as this sacrament does, nor as to personal devotion; from entire punishment, but according to the measure of his de- which it comes to pass that even here the whole punish- votion and fervor. ment is not taken away. But in so far as it is a sacrifice, it has a satisfactory Reply to Objection 3. If part of the punishment and power. Yet in satisfaction, the affection of the offerer is not the whole be taken away by this sacrament, it is due to weighed rather than the quantity of the offering. Hence a defect not on the part of Christ’s power, but on the part our Lord says (Mk. 12:43: cf. Lk. 21:4) of the widow of man’s devotion. who offered “two mites” that she “cast in more than all.” Whether man is preserved by this sacrament from future sins? IIIa q. 79 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that man is not preserved by man’s nature is strengthened inwardly against inner de- this sacrament from future sins. For there are many that cay, and so by means of food and medicine he is preserved receive this sacrament worthily, who afterwards fall into from death. Secondly, by being guarded against outward sin. Now this would not happen if this sacrament were to assaults; and thus he is protected by means of arms by preserve them from future sins. Consequently, it is not an which he defends his body. effect of this sacrament to preserve from future sins. Now this sacrament preserves man from sin in both Objection 2. Further, the Eucharist is the sacrament of of these ways. For, first of all, by uniting man with charity, as stated above (a. 4). But charity does not seem Christ through grace, it strengthens his spiritual life, to preserve from future sins, because it can be lost through as spiritual food and spiritual medicine, according to sin after one has possessed it, as was stated in the IIa IIae, Ps. 103:5: ”(That) bread strengthens [Vulg.: ‘may q. 24, a. 11. Therefore it seems that this sacrament does strengthen’] man’s heart.” Augustine likewise says (Tract. not preserve man from sin. xxvi in Joan.): “Approach without fear; it is bread, not Objection 3. Further, the origin of sin within us is poison.” Secondly, inasmuch as it is a sign of Christ’s “the law of sin, which is in our members,” as declared by Passion, whereby the devils are conquered, it repels all the Apostle (Rom. 7:23). But the lessening of the fomes, the assaults of demons. Hence Chrysostom says (Hom. which is the law of sin, is set down as an effect not of this xlvi in Joan.): “Like lions breathing forth fire, thus do we sacrament, but rather of Baptism. Therefore preservation depart from that table, being made terrible to the devil.” from sin is not an effect of this sacrament. Reply to Objection 1. The effect of this sacrament On the contrary, our Lord said (Jn. 6:50): “This is is received according to man’s condition: such is the case the bread which cometh down from heaven; that if any with every active cause in that its effect is received in mat- man eat of it, he may not die”: which manifestly is not to ter according to the condition of the matter. But such is be understood of the death of the body. Therefore it is to the condition of man on earth that his free-will can be bent be understood that this sacrament preserves from spiritual to good or evil. Hence, although this sacrament of itself death, which is through sin. has the power of preserving from sin, yet it does not take I answer that, Sin is the spiritual death of the soul. away from man the possibility of sinning. Hence man is preserved from future sin in the same way Reply to Objection 2. Even charity of itself keeps as the body is preserved from future death of the body: man from sin, according to Rom. 13:10: “The love of our and this happens in two ways. First of all, in so far as neighbor worketh no evil”: but it is due to the mutability 2555 of free-will that a man sins after possessing charity, just cause, as Augustine says (q. 83), “the increase of charity is as after receiving this sacrament. the lessening of concupiscence.” But it directly strength- Reply to Objection 3. Although this sacrament is not ens man’s heart in good; whereby he is also preserved ordained directly to lessen the fomes, yet it does lessen from sin. it as a consequence, inasmuch as it increases charity, be- Whether this sacrament benefit others besides the recipients? IIIa q. 79 a. 7 Objection 1. It seems that this sacrament benefits only But to others who do not receive it, it is beneficial by the recipients. For this sacrament is of the same genus as way of sacrifice, inasmuch as it is offered for their salva- the other sacraments, being one of those into which that tion. Hence it is said in the Canon of the Mass: “Be mind- genus is divided. But the other sacraments only benefit ful, O Lord, of Thy servants, men and women. . . for whom the recipients; thus the baptized person alone receives ef- we offer, or who offer up to Thee, this sacrifice of praise fect of Baptism. Therefore, neither does this sacrament for themselves and for all their own, for the redemption benefit others than the recipients. of their souls, for the hope of their safety and salvation.” Objection 2. Further, the effects of this sacrament are And our Lord expressed both ways, saying (Mat. 26:28, the attainment of grace and glory, and the forgiveness of with Lk. 22:20): “Which for you,” i.e. who receive it, sin, at least of venial sin. If therefore this sacrament were “and for many,” i.e. others, “shall be shed unto remission to produce its effects in others besides the recipients, a of sins.” man might happen to acquire grace and glory and forgive- Reply to Objection 1. This sacrament has this in ad- ness of sin without doing or receiving anything himself, dition to the others, that it is a sacrifice: and therefore the through another receiving or offering this sacrament. comparison fails. Objection 3. Further, when the cause is multiplied, Reply to Objection 2. As Christ’s Passion benefits the effect is likewise multiplied. If therefore this sacra- all, for the forgiveness of sin and the attaining of grace ment benefit others besides the recipients, it would fol- and glory, whereas it produces no effect except in those low that it benefits a man more if he receive this sacra- who are united with Christ’s Passion through faith and ment through many hosts being consecrated in one mass, charity, so likewise this sacrifice, which is the memorial whereas this is not the Church’s custom: for instance, that of our Lord’s Passion, has no effect except in those who many receive communion for the salvation of one individ- are united with this sacrament through faith and charity. ual. Consequently, it does not seem that this sacrament Hence Augustine says to Renatus (De Anima et ejus orig- benefits anyone but the recipient. ine i): “Who may offer Christ’s body except for them who On the contrary, Prayer is made for many others dur- are Christ’s members?” Hence in the Canon of the Mass ing the celebration of this sacrament; which would serve no prayer is made for them who are outside the pale of the no purpose were the sacrament not beneficial to others. Church. But it benefits them who are members, more or Therefore, this sacrament is beneficial not merely to them less, according to the measure of their devotion. who receive it. Reply to Objection 3. Receiving is of the very nature I answer that, As stated above (a. 3), this sacrament of the sacrament, but offering belongs to the nature of sac- is not only a sacrament, but also a sacrifice. For, it has the rifice: consequently, when one or even several receive the nature of a sacrifice inasmuch as in this sacrament Christ’s body of Christ, no help accrues to others. In like fash- Passion is represented, whereby Christ “offered Himself ion even when the priest consecrates several hosts in one a Victim to God” (Eph. 5:2), and it has the nature of a mass, the effect of this sacrament is not increased, since sacrament inasmuch as invisible grace is bestowed in this there is only one sacrifice; because there is no more power sacrament under a visible species. So, then, this sacra- in several hosts than in one, since there is only one Christ ment benefits recipients by way both of sacrament and of present under all the hosts and under one. Hence, neither sacrifice, because it is offered for all who partake of it. will any one receive greater effect from the sacrament by For it is said in the Canon of the Mass: “May as many taking many consecrated hosts in one mass. But the obla- of us as, by participation at this Altar, shall receive the tion of the sacrifice is multiplied in several masses, and most sacred body and blood of Thy Son, be filled with all therefore the effect of the sacrifice and of the sacrament is heavenly benediction and grace.” multiplied. 2556 Whether the effect of this sacrament is hindered by venial sin? IIIa q. 79 a. 8 Objection 1. It seems that the effect of this sacrament q. 24, a. 10. Therefore venial sins hinder the effect of this is not hindered by venial sin. For Augustine (Tract. xxvi sacrament. in Joan.), commenting on Jn. 6:52, “If any man eat of I answer that, Venial sins can be taken in two ways: this bread,” etc., says: “Eat the heavenly bread spiritu- first of all as past, secondly as in the act of being commit- ally; bring innocence to the altar; your sins, though they ted. Venial sins taken in the first way do not in any way be daily, let them not be deadly.” From this it is evident hinder the effect of this sacrament. For it can come to pass that venial sins, which are called daily sins, do not pre- that after many venial sins a man may approach devoutly vent spiritual eating. But they who eat spiritually, receive to this sacrament and fully secure its effect. Considered the effect of this sacrament. Therefore, venial sins do not in the second way venial sins do not utterly hinder the ef- hinder the effect of this sacrament. fect of this sacrament, but merely in part. For, it has been Objection 2. Further, this sacrament is not less pow- stated above (a. 1), that the effect of this sacrament is not erful than Baptism. But, as stated above (q. 69, Aa. 9,10), only the obtaining of habitual grace or charity, but also a only pretense checks the effect of Baptism, and venial sins certain actual refreshment of spiritual sweetness: which do not belong to pretense; because according to Wis. 1:5: is indeed hindered if anyone approach to this sacrament “the Holy Spirit of discipline will flee from the deceitful,” with mind distracted through venial sins; but the increase yet He is not put to flight by venial sins. Therefore neither of habitual grace or of charity is not taken away. do venial sins hinder the effect of this sacrament. Reply to Objection 1. He that approaches this sacra- Objection 3. Further, nothing which is removed by ment with actual venial sin, eats spiritually indeed, in the action of any cause, can hinder the effect of such habit but not in act: and therefore he shares in the habitual cause. But venial sins are taken away by this sacrament. effect of the sacrament, but not in its actual effect. Therefore, they do not hinder its effect. Reply to Objection 2. Baptism is not ordained, as this On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): sacrament is, for the fervor of charity as its actual effect. “The fire of that desire which is within us, being kindled Because Baptism is spiritual regeneration, through which by the burning coal,” i.e. this sacrament, “will consume the first perfection is acquired, which is a habit or form; our sins, and enlighten our hearts, so that we shall be in- but this sacrament is spiritual eating, which has actual de- flamed and made godlike.” But the fire of our desire or light. love is hindered by venial sins, which hinder the fervor of Reply to Objection 3. This argument deals with past charity, as was shown in the Ia IIae, q. 81, a. 4; IIa IIae, venial sins, which are taken away by this sacrament. 2557 THIRD PART, QUESTION 80 Of the Use or Receiving of This Sacrament in General (In Twelve Articles) We have now to consider the use or receiving of this sacrament, first of all in general; secondly, how Christ used this sacrament. Under the first heading there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are two ways of eating this sacrament, namely, sacramentally and spiritually? (2) Whether it belongs to man alone to eat this sacrament spiritually? (3) Whether it belongs to the just man only to eat it sacramentally? (4) Whether the sinner sins in eating it sacramentally? (5) Of the degree of this sin; (6) Whether this sacrament should be refused to the sinner that approaches it? (7) Whether nocturnal pollution prevents man from receiving this sacrament? (8) Whether it is to be received only when one is fasting? (9) Whether it is to be given to them who lack the use of reason? (10) Whether it is to be received daily? (11) Whether it is lawful to refrain from it altogether? (12) Whether it is lawful to receive the body without the blood? Whether there are two ways to be distinguished of eating Christ’s body? IIIa q. 80 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that two ways ought not to be other spiritual.” distinguished of eating Christ’s body, namely, sacramen- I answer that, There are two things to be considered tally and spiritually. For, as Baptism is spiritual regener- in the receiving of this sacrament, namely, the sacrament ation, according to Jn. 3:5: “Unless a man be born again itself, and its fruits, and we have already spoken of both of water and the Holy Ghost,” etc., so also this sacrament (Qq. 73,79). The perfect way, then, of receiving this sacra- is spiritual food: hence our Lord, speaking of this sacra- ment is when one takes it so as to partake of its effect. ment, says (Jn. 6:64): “The words that I have spoken to Now, as was stated above (q. 79, Aa. 3,8), it sometimes you are spirit and life.” But there are no two distinct ways happens that a man is hindered from receiving the effect of receiving Baptism, namely, sacramentally and spiritu- of this sacrament; and such receiving of this sacrament ally. Therefore neither ought this distinction to be made is an imperfect one. Therefore, as the perfect is divided regarding this sacrament. against the imperfect, so sacramental eating, whereby the Objection 2. Further, when two things are so related sacrament only is received without its effect, is divided that one is on account of the other, they should not be put against spiritual eating, by which one receives the effect in contra-distinction to one another, because the one de- of this sacrament, whereby a man is spiritually united with rives its species from the other. But sacramental eating is Christ through faith and charity. ordained for spiritual eating as its end. Therefore sacra- Reply to Objection 1. The same distinction is made mental eating ought not to be divided in contrast with spir- regarding Baptism and the other sacraments: for, some itual eating. receive the sacrament only, while others receive the sacra- Objection 3. Further, things which cannot exist with- ment and the reality of the sacrament. However, there is a out one another ought not to be divided in contrast with difference, because, since the other sacraments are accom- each other. But it seems that no one can eat spiritually plished in the use of the matter, the receiving of the sacra- without eating sacramentally; otherwise the fathers of old ment is the actual perfection of the sacrament; whereas would have eaten this sacrament spiritually. Moreover, this sacrament is accomplished in the consecration of the sacramental eating would be to no purpose, if the spiritual matter: and consequently both uses follow the sacrament. eating could be had without it. Therefore it is not right On the other hand, in Baptism and in the other sacraments to distinguish a twofold eating, namely, sacramental and that imprint a character, they who receive the sacrament spiritual. receive some spiritual effect, that is, the character. which On the contrary, The gloss says on 1 Cor. 11:29: “He is not the case in this sacrament. And therefore, in this that eateth and drinketh unworthily,” etc.: “We hold that sacrament, rather than in Baptism, the sacramental use is there are two ways of eating, the one sacramental, and the distinguished from the spiritual use. 2558 Reply to Objection 2. That sacramental eating which ment spiritually ere they receive it sacramentally. Now is also a spiritual eating is not divided in contrast with this happens in two ways. First of all, from desire of re- spiritual eating, but is included under it; but that sacra- ceiving the sacrament itself, and thus are said to be bap- mental eating which does not secure the effect, is divided tized, and to eat spiritually, and not sacramentally, they in contrast with spiritual eating; just as the imperfect, who desire to receive these sacraments since they have which does not attain the perfection of its species, is di- been instituted. Secondly, by a figure: thus the Apostle vided in contrast with the perfect. says (1 Cor. 10:2), that the fathers of old were “baptized in Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 73, a. 3), the cloud and in the sea,” and that “they did eat. . . spiritual the effect of the sacrament can be secured by every man food, and. . . drank. . . spiritual drink.” Nevertheless sacra- if he receive it in desire, though not in reality. Conse- mental eating is not without avail, because the actual re- quently, just as some are baptized with the Baptism of de- ceiving of the sacrament produces more fully the effect of sire, through their desire of baptism, before being baptized the sacrament than does the desire thereof, as stated above in the Baptism of water; so likewise some eat this sacra- of Baptism (q. 69 , a. 4, ad 2). Whether it belongs to man alone to eat this sacrament spiritually? IIIa q. 80 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that it does not belong to man is the bread we hope for in heaven), and not by faith, as alone to eat this sacrament spiritually, but likewise to an- we are united with Him here. gels. Because on Ps. 77:25: “Man ate the bread of an- In another way one may eat Christ spiritually, as He gels,” the gloss says: “that is, the body of Christ, Who i’s is under the sacramental species, inasmuch as a man be- truly the food of angels.” But it would not be so unless the lieves in Christ, while desiring to receive this sacrament; angels were to eat Christ spiritually. Therefore the angels and this is not merely to eat Christ spiritually, but like- eat Christ spiritually. wise to eat this sacrament; which does not fall to the lot Objection 2. Further, Augustine (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) of the angels. And therefore although the angels feed on says: By “this meat and drink, He would have us to un- Christ spiritually, yet it does not belong to them to eat this derstand the fellowship of His body and members, which sacrament spiritually. is the Church in His predestinated ones.” But not only Reply to Objection 1. The receiving of Christ under men, but also the holy angels belong to that fellowship. this sacrament is ordained to the enjoyment of heaven, as Therefore the holy angels eat of it spiritually. to its end, in the same way as the angels enjoy it; and since Objection 3. Further, Augustine in his book De Verbis the means are gauged by the end, hence it is that such eat- Domini (Serm. cxlii) says: “Christ is to be eaten spiritu- ing of Christ whereby we receive Him under this sacra- ally, as He Himself declares: ‘He that eateth My flesh and ment, is, as it were, derived from that eating whereby the drinketh My blood, abideth in Me, and I in him.’ ” But angels enjoy Christ in heaven. Consequently, man is said this belongs not only to men, but also to the holy angels, to eat the “bread of angels,” because it belongs to the an- in whom Christ dwells by charity, and they in Him. Con- gels to do so firstly and principally, since they enjoy Him sequently, it seems that to eat Christ spiritually is not for in his proper species; and secondly it belongs to men, who men only, but also for the angels. receive Christ under this sacrament. On the contrary, Augustine (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) Reply to Objection 2. Both men and angels belong says: “Eat the bread” of the altar “spiritually; take inno- to the fellowship of His mystical body; men by faith, and cence to the altar.” But angels do not approach the altar as angels by manifest vision. But the sacraments are propor- for the purpose of taking something therefrom. Therefore tioned to faith, through which the truth is seen “through the angels do not eat spiritually. a glass” and “in a dark manner.” And therefore, properly I answer that, Christ Himself is contained in this speaking, it does not belong to angels, but to men, to eat sacrament, not under His proper species, but under the this sacrament spiritually. sacramental species. Consequently there are two ways of Reply to Objection 3. Christ dwells in men through eating spiritually. First, as Christ Himself exists under faith, according to their present state, but He is in the His proper species, and in this way the angels eat Christ blessed angels by manifest vision. Consequently the com- spiritually inasmuch as they are united with Him in the parison does not hold, as stated above (ad 2). enjoyment of perfect charity, and in clear vision (and this 2559 Whether the just man alone may eat Christ sacramentally? IIIa q. 80 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that none but the just man may a sinner does not at once cease to be, but it continues until eat Christ sacramentally. For Augustine says in his book digested by natural heat: hence Christ’s body remains just De Remedio Penitentiae (cf. Tract. in Joan. xxv, n. 12; as long under the sacramental species when taken by sin- xxvi, n. 1): “Why make ready tooth and belly? Believe, ners. Hence it must be said that the sinner, and not merely and thou hast eaten. . . For to believe in Him, this it is, to the just, can eat Christ’s body. eat the living bread.” But the sinner does not believe in Reply to Objection 1. Such words and similar expres- Him; because he has not living faith, to which it belongs sions are to be understood of spiritual eating, which does to believe “in God,” as stated above in the IIa IIae, q. 2, not belong to sinners. Consequently, it is from such ex- a. 2; IIa IIae, q. 4, a. 5. Therefore the sinner cannot eat pressions being misunderstood that the above error seems this sacrament, which is the living bread. to have arisen, through ignorance of the distinction be- Objection 2. Further, this sacrament is specially tween corporeal and spiritual eating. called “the sacrament of charity,” as stated above (q. 78, Reply to Objection 2. Should even an unbeliever re- a. 3, ad 6). But as unbelievers lack faith, so all sinners ceive the sacramental species, he would receive Christ’s lack charity. Now unbelievers do not seem to be capable body under the sacrament: hence he would eat Christ of eating this sacrament, since in the sacramental form it is sacramentally, if the word “sacramentally” qualify the called the “Mystery of Faith.” Therefore, for like reason, verb on the part of the thing eaten. But if it qualify the the sinner cannot eat Christ’s body sacramentally. verb on the part of the one eating, then, properly speak- Objection 3. Further, the sinner is more abominable ing, he does not eat sacramentally, because he uses what before God than the irrational creature: for it is said of the he takes, not as a sacrament, but as simple food. Unless sinner (Ps. 48:21): “Man when he was in honor did not perchance the unbeliever were to intend to receive what understand; he hath been compared to senseless beasts, the Church bestows; without having proper faith regard- and made like to them.” But an irrational animal, such as ing the other articles, or regarding this sacrament. a mouse or a dog, cannot receive this sacrament, just as Reply to Objection 3. Even though a mouse or a dog it cannot receive the sacrament of Baptism. Therefore it were to eat the consecrated host, the substance of Christ’s seems that for the like reason neither may sinners eat this body would not cease to be under the species, so long sacrament. as those species remain, and that is, so long as the sub- On the contrary, Augustine (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), stance of bread would have remained; just as if it were to commenting on the words, “that if any man eat of it he be cast into the mire. Nor does this turn to any indignity may not die,” says: “Many receive from the altar, and regarding Christ’s body, since He willed to be crucified by receiving die: whence the Apostle saith, ‘eateth and by sinners without detracting from His dignity; especially drinketh judgment to himself.’ ” But only sinners die by since the mouse or dog does not touch Christ’s body in receiving. Therefore sinners eat the body of Christ sacra- its proper species, but only as to its sacramental species. mentally, and not the just only. Some, however, have said that Christ’s body would cease I answer that, In the past, some have erred upon this to be there, directly it were touched by a mouse or a dog; point, saying that Christ’s body is not received sacramen- but this again detracts from the truth of the sacrament, as tally by sinners; but that directly the body is touched by stated above. None the less it must not be said that the irra- the lips of sinners, it ceases to be under the sacramental tional animal eats the body of Christ sacramentally; since species. it is incapable of using it as a sacrament. Hence it eats But this is erroneous; because it detracts from the truth Christ’s body “accidentally,” and not sacramentally, just of this sacrament, to which truth it belongs that so long as as if anyone not knowing a host to be consecrated were the species last, Christ’s body does not cease to be un- to consume it. And since no genus is divided by an acci- der them, as stated above (q. 76, a. 6, ad 3; q. 77, a. 8). dental difference, therefore this manner of eating Christ’s But the species last so long as the substance of the bread body is not set down as a third way besides sacramental would remain, if it were there, as was stated above (q. 77, and spiritual eating. a. 4). Now it is clear that the substance of bread taken by 2560 Whether the sinner sins in receiving Christ’s body sacramentally? IIIa q. 80 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that the sinner does not sin in one with Christ, and incorporated in His members; and receiving Christ’s body sacramentally, because Christ has this is done by living faith, which no one has who is in no greater dignity under the sacramental species than un- mortal sin. And therefore it is manifest that whoever re- der His own. But sinners did not sin when they touched ceives this sacrament while in mortal sin, is guilty of lying Christ’s body under its proper species; nay, rather they to this sacrament, and consequently of sacrilege, because obtained forgiveness of their sins, as we read in Lk. 7 he profanes the sacrament: and therefore he sins mortally. of the woman who was a sinner; while it is written (Mat. Reply to Objection 1. When Christ appeared under 14:36) that “as many as touched the hem of His garment His proper species, He did not give Himself to be touched were healed.” Therefore, they do not sin, but rather obtain by men as a sign of spiritual union with Himself, as He salvation, by receiving the body of Christ. gives Himself to be received in this sacrament. And there- Objection 2. Further, this sacrament, like the others, fore sinners in touching Him under His proper species did is a spiritual medicine. But medicine is given to the sick not incur the sin of lying to Godlike things, as sinners do for their recovery, according to Mat. 9:12: “They that are in receiving this sacrament. in health need not a physician.” Now they that are spiri- Furthermore, Christ still bore the likeness of the body tually sick or infirm are sinners. Therefore this sacrament of sin; consequently He fittingly allowed Himself to be can be received by them without sin. touched by sinners. But as soon as the body of sin was Objection 3. Further, this sacrament is one of our taken away by the glory of the Resurrection, he forbade greatest gifts, since it contains Christ. But according to the woman to touch Him, for her faith in Him was de- Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii), the greatest gifts are those fective, according to Jn. 20:17: “Do not touch Me, for I “which no one can abuse.” Now no one sins except by am not yet ascended to My Father,” i.e. “in your heart,” abusing something. Therefore no sinner sins by receiving as Augustine explains (Tract. cxxi in Joan.). And there- this sacrament. fore sinners, who lack living faith regarding Christ are not Objection 4. Further, as this sacrament is perceived allowed to touch this sacrament. by taste and touch, so also is it by sight. Consequently, if Reply to Objection 2. Every medicine does not suit the sinner sins by receiving the sacrament, it seems that every stage of sickness; because the tonic given to those he would sin by beholding it, which is manifestly untrue, who are recovering from fever would be hurtful to them since the Church exposes this sacrament to be seen and if given while yet in their feverish condition. So likewise adored by all. Therefore the sinner does not sin by eating Baptism and Penance are as purgative medicines, given this sacrament. to take away the fever of sin; whereas this sacrament is a Objection 5. Further, it happens sometimes that the medicine given to strengthen, and it ought not to be given sinner is unconscious of his sin. Yet such a one does except to them who are quit of sin. not seem to sin by receiving the body of Christ, for ac- Reply to Objection 3. By the greatest gifts Augustine cording to this all who receive it would sin, as exposing understands the soul’s virtues, “which no one uses to evil themselves to danger, since the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:4): purpose,” as though they were principles of evil. Nev- “I am not conscious to myself of anything, yet I am not ertheless sometimes a man makes a bad use of them, as hereby justified.” Therefore, the sinner, if he receive this objects of an evil use, as is seen in those who are proud sacrament, does not appear to be guilty of sin. of their virtues. So likewise this sacrament, so far as the On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:29): sacrament is concerned, is not the principle of an evil “He that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drin- use, but the object thereof. Hence Augustine says (Tract. keth judgment to himself.” Now the gloss says on this pas- lxii in Joan.): “Many receive Christ’s body unworthily; sage: “He eats and drinks unworthily who is in sin, or who whence we are taught what need there is to beware of re- handles it irreverently.” Therefore, if anyone, while in ceiving a good thing evilly. . . For behold, of a good thing, mortal sin, receives this sacrament, he purchases damna- received evilly, evil is wrought”: just as on the other hand, tion, by sinning mortally. in the Apostle’s case, “good was wrought through evil I answer that, In this sacrament, as in the others, that well received,” namely, by bearing patiently the sting of which is a sacrament is a sign of the reality of the sacra- Satan. ment. Now there is a twofold reality of this sacrament, Reply to Objection 4. Christ’s body is not received as stated above (q. 73, a. 6): one which is signified and by being seen, but only its sacrament, because sight does contained, namely, Christ Himself; while the other is sig- not penetrate to the substance of Christ’s body, but only to nified but not contained, namely, Christ’s mystical body, the sacramental species, as stated above (q. 76, a. 7). But which is the fellowship of the saints. Therefore, whoever he who eats, receives not only the sacramental species, receives this sacrament, expresses thereby that he is made but likewise Christ Himself Who is under them. Conse- 2561 quently, no one is forbidden to behold Christ’s body, when Christ’s body commits sin, although unconscious thereof, once he has received Christ’s sacrament, namely, Bap- because the very ignorance is a sin on his part. tism: whereas the non-baptized are not to be allowed even Secondly, it may happen without fault on his part, as, to see this sacrament, as is clear from Dionysius (Eccl. for instance, when he has sorrowed over his sin, but is not Hier. vii). But only those are to be allowed to share in the sufficiently contrite: and in such a case he does not sin in eating who are united with Christ not merely sacramen- receiving the body of Christ, because a man cannot know tally, but likewise really. for certain whether he is truly contrite. It suffices, how- Reply to Objection 5. The fact of a man being un- ever, if he find in himself the marks of contrition, for in- conscious of his sin can come about in two ways. First stance, if he “grieve over past sins,” and “propose to avoid of all through his own fault, either because through igno- them in the future”∗. But if he be ignorant that what he rance of the law (which ignorance does not excuse him), did was a sinful act, through ignorance of the fact, which he thinks something not to be sinful which is a sin, as for excuses, for instance, if a man approach a woman whom example if one guilty of fornication were to deem simple he believed to be his wife whereas she was not, he is not fornication not to be a mortal sin; or because he neglects to be called a sinner on that account; in the same way if to examine his conscience, which is opposed to what the he has utterly forgotten his sin, general contrition suffices Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:28): “Let a man prove himself, for blotting it out, as will be said hereafter ( Suppl., q. 2, and so let him eat of that bread, and drink of the chal- a. 3, ad 2); hence he is no longer to be called a sinner. ice.” And in this way nevertheless the sinner who receives Whether to approach this sacrament with consciousness of sin is the gravest of all IIIa q. 80 a. 5 sins? Objection 1. It seems that to approach this sacrament understood of the sin of unbelief, “in which all sins are with consciousness of sin is the gravest of all sins; be- comprised,” and so the greatest of all sins appears to be, cause the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:27): “Whosoever shall not this, but rather the sin of unbelief. eat this bread, or drink the chalice of the Lord unworthily, I answer that, As stated in the Ia IIae, q. 73, Aa. 3,6; shall be guilty of the body and of the blood of the Lord”: IIa IIae, q. 73, a. 3, one sin can be said to be graver than upon which the gloss observes: “He shall be punished as another in two ways: first of all essentially, secondly ac- though he slew Christ.” But the sin of them who slew cidentally. Essentially, in regard to its species, which is Christ seems to have been most grave. Therefore this sin, taken from its object: and so a sin is greater according as whereby a man approaches Christ’s table with conscious- that against which it is committed is greater. And since ness of sin, appears to be the gravest. Christ’s Godhead is greater than His humanity, and His Objection 2. Further, Jerome says in an Epistle (xlix): humanity greater than the sacraments of His humanity, “What hast thou to do with women, thou that speakest fa- hence it is that those are the gravest sins which are com- miliarly with God at the altar?”†. Say, priest, say, cleric, mitted against the Godhead, such as unbelief and blas- how dost thou kiss the Son of God with the same lips phemy. The second degree of gravity is held by those wherewith thou hast kissed the daughter of a harlot? “Ju- sins which are committed against His humanity: hence it das, thou betrayest the Son of Man with a kiss!” And thus is written (Mat. 12:32): “Whosoever shall speak a word it appears that the fornicator approaching Christ’s table against the Son of Man, it shall be forgiven him; but he sins as Judas did, whose sin was most grave. But there are that shall speak against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be for- many other sins which are graver than fornication, espe- given him, neither in this world nor in the world to come.” cially the sin of unbelief. Therefore the sin of every sinner In the third place come sins committed against the sacra- approaching Christ’s table is the gravest of all. ments, which belong to Christ’s humanity; and after these Objection 3. Further, spiritual uncleanness is more are the other sins committed against mere creatures. abominable to God than corporeal. But if anyone was to Accidentally, one sin can be graver than another on the cast Christ’s body into mud or a cess-pool, his sin would sinner’s part. for example, the sin which is the result of be reputed a most grave one. Therefore, he sins more ignorance or of weakness is lighter than one arising from deeply by receiving it with sin, which is spiritual unclean- contempt, or from sure knowledge; and the same reason ness, upon his soul. holds good of other circumstances. And according to this, On the contrary, Augustine says on the words, “If I the above sin can be graver in some, as happens in them had not come, and had not spoken to them, they would who from actual contempt and with consciousness of sin be without sin” (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.), that this is to be approach this sacrament: but in others it is less grave; for ∗ Cf. Rule of Augustine † The remaining part of the quotation is not from St. Jerome 2562 instance, in those who from fear of their sin being discov-Church, simply speaking, makes him to be utterly unfit for ered, approach this sacrament with consciousness of sin. receiving this sacrament; because it is the sacrament of the So, then, it is evident that this sin is specifically graver Church’s unity, as stated above (q. 61, a. 2). Hence the un- than many others, yet it is not the greatest of all. believer who receives this sacrament sins more grievously Reply to Objection 1. The sin of the unworthy re- than the believer who is in sin; and shows greater con- cipient is compared to the sin of them who slew Christ, tempt towards Christ Who is in the sacrament, especially by way of similitude, because each is committed against if he does not believe Christ to be truly in this sacrament; Christ’s body; but not according to the degree of the because, so far as lies in him, he lessens the holiness of crime. Because the sin of Christ’s slayers was much the sacrament, and the power of Christ acting in it, and graver, first of all, because their sin was against Christ’s this is to despise the sacrament in itself. But the believer body in its own species, while this sin is against it under who receives the sacrament with consciousness of sin, by sacramental species; secondly, because their sin came of receiving it unworthily despises the sacrament, not in it- the intent of injuring Christ, while this does not. self, but in its use. Hence the Apostle (1 Cor. 11:29) in Reply to Objection 2. The sin of the fornicator re- assigning the cause of this sin, says, “not discerning the ceiving Christ’s body is likened to Judas kissing Christ, body of the Lord,” that is, not distinguishing it from other as to the resemblance of the sin, because each outrages food: and this is what he does who disbelieves Christ’s Christ with the sign of friendship. but not as to the extent presence in this sacrament. of the sin, as was observed above (ad 1). And this resem- Reply to Objection 3. The man who would throw blance in crime applies no less to other sinners than to for- this sacrament into the mire would be guilty of more nicators: because by other mortal sins, sinners act against heinous sin than another approaching the sacrament fully the charity of Christ, of which this sacrament is the sign, conscious of mortal sin. First of all, because he would and all the more according as their sins are graver. But in intend to outrage the sacrament, whereas the sinner re- a measure the sin of fornication makes one more unfit for ceiving Christ’s body unworthily has no such intent; sec- receiving this sacrament, because thereby especially the ondly, because the sinner is capable of grace; hence he spirit becomes enslaved by the flesh, which is a hindrance is more capable of receiving this sacrament than any ir- to the fervor of love required for this sacrament. rational creature. Hence he would make a most revolting However, the hindrance to charity itself weighs more use of this sacrament who would throw it to dogs to eat, than the hindrance to its fervor. Hence the sin of unbelief, or fling it in the mire to be trodden upon. which fundamentally severs a man from the unity of the Whether the priest ought to deny the body of Christ to the sinner seeking it? IIIa q. 80 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that the priest should deny the wherefore we command that when the brethren have to body of Christ to the sinner seeking it. For Christ’s pre- exonerate themselves of such acts, that the abbot shall cel- cept is not to be set aside for the sake of avoiding scandal ebrate Mass, or someone else deputed by him, in the pres- or on account of infamy to anyone. But (Mat. 7:6) our ence of the community; and so, when the Mass is over, Lord gave this command: “Give not that which is holy to all shall communicate under these words: ‘May the body dogs.” Now it is especially casting holy things to dogs to of Christ prove thee today.’ ” And further on: “If any evil give this sacrament to sinners. Therefore, neither on ac- deed be imputed to a bishop or priest, for each charge he count of avoiding scandal or infamy should this sacrament must say Mass and communicate, and show that he is in- be administered to the sinner who asks for it. nocent of each act imputed.” But secret sinners must not Objection 2. Further, one must choose the lesser of be disclosed, for, once the blush of shame is set aside, they two evils. But it seems to be the lesser evil if the sin- will indulge the more in sin, as Augustine says (De Ver- ner incur infamy; or if an unconsecrated host be given to bis. Dom.; cf. Serm. lxxxii). Consequently, Christ’s body him; than for him to sin mortally by receiving the body is not to be given to occult sinners, even if they ask for it. of Christ. Consequently, it seems that the course to be On the contrary, on Ps. 21:30: “All the fat ones of adopted is either that the sinner seeking the body of Christ the earth have eaten and have adored,” Augustine says: be exposed to infamy, or that an unconsecrated host be “Let not the dispenser hinder the fat ones of the earth,” given to him. i.e. sinners, “from eating at the table of the Lord.” Objection 3. Further, the body of Christ is sometimes I answer that, A distinction must be made among sin- given to those suspected of crime in order to put them to ners: some are secret; others are notorious, either from proof. Because we read in the Decretals: “It often hap- evidence of the fact, as public usurers, or public rob- pens that thefts are perpetrated in monasteries of monks; bers, or from being denounced as evil men by some ec- 2563 clesiastical or civil tribunal. Therefore Holy Communion istering the body of Christ it is worse to commit mortal sin ought not to be given to open sinners when they ask for by unjustly defaming the hidden sinner than that the sinner it. Hence Cyprian writes to someone (Ep. lxi): “You were should sin mortally; because no one ought to commit mor- so kind as to consider that I ought to be consulted regard- tal sin in order to keep another out of mortal sin. Hence ing actors, end that magician who continues to practice Augustine says (Quaest. super Gen. 42): “It is a most his disgraceful arts among you; as to whether I thought dangerous exchange, for us to do evil lest another perpe- that Holy Communion ought to be given to such with the trate a greater evil.” But the secret sinner ought rather to other Christians. I think that it is beseeming neither the prefer infamy than approach the Lord’s table unworthily. Divine majesty, nor Christian discipline, for the Church’s Yet by no means should an unconsecrated host be modesty and honor to be defiled by such shameful and given in place of a consecrated one; because the priest infamous contagion.” by so doing, so far as he is concerned, makes others, ei- But if they be not open sinners, but occult, the Holy ther the bystanders or the communicant, commit idolatry Communion should not be denied them if they ask for it. by believing that it is a consecrated host; because, as Au- For since every Christian, from the fact that he is baptized, gustine says on Ps. 98:5: “Let no one eat Christ’s flesh, is admitted to the Lord’s table, he may not be robbed of except he first adore it.” Hence in the Decretals (Extra, his right, except from some open cause. Hence on 1 Cor. De Celeb. Miss., Ch. De Homine) it is said: “Although he 5:11, “If he who is called a brother among you,” etc., Au- who reputes himself unworthy of the Sacrament, through gustine’s gloss remarks: “We cannot inhibit any person consciousness of his sin, sins gravely, if he receive; still from Communion, except he has openly confessed, or has he seems to offend more deeply who deceitfully has pre- been named and convicted by some ecclesiastical or lay sumed to simulate it.” tribunal.” Nevertheless a priest who has knowledge of Reply to Objection 3. Those decrees were abolished the crime can privately warn the secret sinner, or warn by contrary enactments of Roman Pontiffs: because Pope all openly in public, from approaching the Lord’s table, Stephen V writes as follows: “The Sacred Canons do not until they have repented of their sins and have been rec- allow of a confession being extorted from any person by onciled to the Church; because after repentance and rec- trial made by burning iron or boiling water; it belongs onciliation, Communion must not be refused even to pub- to our government to judge of public crimes committed, lic sinners, especially in the hour of death. Hence in the and that by means of confession made spontaneously, or (3rd) Council of Carthage (Can. xxxv) we read: “Recon- by proof of witnesses: but private and unknown crimes ciliation is not to be denied to stage-players or actors, or are to be left to Him Who alone knows the hearts of the others of the sort, or to apostates, after their conversion to sons of men.” And the same is found in the Decretals God.” (Extra, De Purgationibus, Ch. Ex tuarum). Because in Reply to Objection 1. Holy things are forbidden to be all such practices there seems to be a tempting of God; given to dogs, that is, to notorious sinners: whereas hid- hence such things cannot be done without sin. And it den deeds may not be published, but are to be left to the would seem graver still if anyone were to incur judgment Divine judgment. of death through this sacrament, which was instituted as Reply to Objection 2. Although it is worse for the a means of salvation. Consequently, the body of Christ secret sinner to sin mortally in taking the body of Christ, should never be given to anyone suspected of crime, as by rather than be defamed, nevertheless for the priest admin- way of examination. Whether the seminal loss that occurs during sleep hinders anyone from receiving this IIIa q. 80 a. 7 sacrament? Objection 1. It seems that seminal loss does not hin- tions do not prevent one from receiving this sacrament. der anyone from receiving the body of Christ: because no Objection 2. Further, Gregory says in a Letter to Au- one is prevented from receiving the body of Christ except gustine, Bishop of the English (Regist. xi): “Those who on account of sin. But seminal loss happens without sin: pay the debt of marriage not from lust, but from desire for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii) that “the same image to have children, should be left to their own judgment, as that comes into the mind of a speaker may present itself to to whether they should enter the church and receive the the mind of the sleeper, so that the latter be unable to dis- mystery of our Lord’s body, after such intercourse: be- tinguish the image from the reality, and is moved carnally cause they ought not to be forbidden from receiving it, and with the result that usually follows such motions; and since they have passed through the fire unscorched.” there is as little sin in this as there is in speaking and thereFrom this it is evident that seminal loss even of one fore thinking about such things.” Consequently these mo- awake, if it be without sin, is no hindrance to receiving 2564 the body of Christ. Consequently, much less is it in the not necessarily prevent the receiving of this sacrament, so case of one asleep. as to make a man guilty of the body and blood of the Lord: Objection 3. Further, these movements of the flesh but should it be with mortal sin, it prevents it of necessity. seem to bring with them only bodily uncleanness. But For such illusions on the part of demons sometimes there are other bodily defilements which according to the come from one’s not striving to receive fervently; and this Law forbade entrance into the holy places, yet which un- can be either a mortal or a venial sin. At other times it is der the New Law do not prevent receiving this sacrament: due to malice alone on the part of the demons who wish as, for instance, in the case of a woman after child-birth, to keep men from receiving this sacrament. So we read in or in her periods, or suffering from issue of blood, as Gre- the Conferences of the Fathers (Cassian, Collat. xxii) that gory writes to Augustine, Bishop of the English (Regist. when a certain one always suffered thus on those feast- xi). Therefore it seems that neither do these movements days on which he had to receive Communion, his superi- of the flesh hinder a man from receiving this sacrament. ors, discovering that there was no fault on his part, ruled Objection 4. Further, venial sin is no hindrance to that he was not to refrain from communicating on that ac- receiving the sacrament, nor is mortal sin after repen- count, and the demoniacal illusion ceased. tance. But even supposing that seminal loss arises from In like fashion previous evil thoughts can sometimes some foregoing sin, whether of intemperance, or of bad be without any sin whatever, as when one has to think thoughts, for the most part such sin is venial; and if occa- of such things on account of lecturing or debating; and sionally it be mortal, a man may repent of it by morning if it be done without concupiscence and delectation, the and confess it. Consequently, it seems that he ought not thoughts will not be unclean but honest; and yet defile- to be prevented from receiving this sacrament. ment can come of such thoughts, as is clear from the au- Objection 5. Further, a sin against the Fifth Com- thority of Augustine (obj. 1). At other times such thoughts mandment is greater than a sin against the Sixth. But if come of concupiscence and delectation, and should there a man dream that he has broken the Fifth or Seventh or be consent, it will be a mortal sin: otherwise it will be a any other Commandment, he is not on that account de- venial sin. barred from receiving this sacrament. Therefore it seems In the same way too the corporeal cause can be with- that much less should he be debarred through defilement out sin, as when it arises from bodily debility, and hence resulting from a dream against the Sixth Commandment. some individuals suffer seminal loss without sin even in On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 15:16): “The man their wakeful hours; or it can come from the abundance from whom the seed of copulation goeth out. . . shall be of nature: for, just as blood can flow without sin, so also unclean until evening.” But for the unclean there is no can the semen which is superfluity of the blood, accord- approaching to the sacraments. Therefore, it seems that ing to the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal. i). But oc- owing to such defilement of the flesh a man is debarred casionally it is with sin, as when it is due to excess of from taking this which is the greatest of the sacraments. food or drink. And this also can be either venial or mor- I answer that, There are two things to be weighed tal sin; although more frequently the sin is mortal in the regarding the aforesaid movements: one on account of case of evil thoughts on account of the proneness to con- which they necessarily prevent a man from receiving this sent, rather than in the case of consumption of food and sacrament; the other, on account of which they do so, not drink. Hence Gregory, writing to Augustine, Bishop of the of necessity, but from a sense of propriety. English (Regist. xi), says that one ought to refrain from Mortal sin alone necessarily prevents anyone from Communion when this arises from evil thoughts, but not partaking of this sacrament: and although these move- when it arises from excess of food or drink, especially if ments during sleep, considered in themselves, cannot be necessity call for Communion. So, then, one must judge a mortal sin, nevertheless, owing to their cause, they have from its cause whether such bodily defilement of neces- mortal sin connected with them; which cause, therefore, sity hinders the receiving of this sacrament. must be investigated. Sometimes they are due to an ex- At the same time a sense of decency forbids Commu- ternal spiritual cause, viz. the deception of the demons, nion on two accounts. The first of these is always verified, who can stir up phantasms, as was stated in the Ia, q. 111, viz. the bodily defilement, with which, out of reverence a. 3, through the apparition of which, these movements for the sacrament, it is unbecoming to approach the al- occasionally follow. Sometimes they are due to an inter- tar (and hence those who wish to touch any sacred object, nal spiritual cause, such as previous thoughts. At other wash their hands): except perchance such uncleanness be times they arise from some internal corporeal cause, as perpetual or of long standing, such as leprosy or issue of from abundance or weakness of nature, or even from sur- blood, or anything else of the kind. The other reason is feit of meat or drink. Now every one of these three causes the mental distraction which follows after the aforesaid can be without sin at all, or else with venial sin, or with movements, especially when they take place with unclean mortal sin. If it be without sin, or with venial sin, it does imaginings. Now this obstacle, which arises from a sense 2565 of decency, can be set aside owing to any necessity, as “But if,” as Gregory says (Regist. xi), “it be not desire of Gregory says (Regist. xi): “As when perchance either a begetting offspring, but lust that prevails,” then such a one festival day calls for it, or necessity compels one to exer- should be forbidden to approach this sacrament. cise the ministry because there is no other priest at hand.” Reply to Objection 3. As Gregory says in his Letter Reply to Objection 1. A person is hindered neces- quoted above to Augustine, Bishop of the English, in the sarily, only by mortal sin, from receiving this sacrament: Old Testament some persons were termed polluted figura- but from a sense of decency one may be hindered through tively, which the people of the New Law understand spir- other causes, as stated above. itually. Hence such bodily uncleannesses, if perpetual or Reply to Objection 2. Conjugal intercourse, if it be of long standing, do not hinder the receiving of this saving without sin, (for instance, if it be done for the sake of sacrament, as they prevented approaching those figurative begetting offspring, or of paying the marriage debt), does sacraments; but if they pass speedily, like the uncleanness not prevent the receiving of this sacrament for any other of the aforesaid movements, then from a sense of fitting- reason than do those movements in question which hap- ness they hinder the receiving of this sacrament during the pen without sin, as stated above; namely, on account of day on which it happens. Hence it is written (Dt. 23:10): the defilement to the body and distraction to the mind. “If there be among you any man, that is defiled in a dream On this account Jerome expresses himself in the follow- by night, he shall go forth out of the camp; and he shall ing terms in his commentary on Matthew (Epist. xxviii, not return before he be washed with water in the evening.” among St. Jerome’s works): “If the loaves of Proposition Reply to Objection 4. Although the stain of guilt be might not be eaten by them who had known their wives taken away by contrition and confession nevertheless the carnally, how much less may this bread which has come bodily defilement is not taken away, nor the mental dis- down from heaven be defiled and touched by them who traction which follows therefrom. shortly before have been in conjugal embraces? It is not Reply to Objection 5. To dream of homicide brings that we condemn marriages, but that at the time when we no bodily uncleanness, nor such distraction of mind as for- are going to eat the flesh of the Lamb, we ought not to in- nication, on account of its intense delectation; still if the dulge in carnal acts.” But since this is to be understood in dream of homicide comes of a cause sinful in itself, espe- the sense of decency, and not of necessity, Gregory says cially if it be mortal sin, then owing to its cause it hinders that such a person “is to be left to his own judgment.” the receiving of this sacrament. Whether food or drink taken beforehand hinders the receiving of this sacrament? IIIa q. 80 a. 8 Objection 1. It seems that food or drink taken before- quently, one is not prevented by the above things from hand does not hinder the receiving of this sacrament. For receiving this sacrament. this sacrament was instituted by our Lord at the supper. Objection 5. Further, some eat and drink late at night, But when the supper was ended our Lord gave the sacra- and possibly after passing a sleepless night receive the sa- ment to His disciples, as is evident from Lk. 22:20, and cred mysteries in the morning when the food it not di- from 1 Cor. 11:25. Therefore it seems that we ought to gested. But it would savor more of moderation if a man take this sacrament after receiving other food. were to eat a little in the morning and afterwards receive Objection 2. Further, it is written (1 Cor. 11:33): this sacrament about the ninth hour, since also there is “When you come together to eat,” namely, the Lord’s occasionally a longer interval of time. Consequently, it body, “wait for one another; if any man be hungry, let seems that such taking of food beforehand does not keep him eat at home”: and thus it seems that after eating at one from this sacrament. home a man may eat Christ’s body in the Church. Objection 6. Further, there is no less reverence due to Objection 3. Further, we read in the (3rd) Council of this sacrament after receiving it, than before. But one may Carthage (Can. xxix): “Let the sacraments of the altar be take food and drink after receiving the sacrament. There- celebrated only by men who are fasting, with the excep- fore one may do so before receiving it. tion of the anniversary day on which the Lord’s Supper On the contrary, Augustine says (Resp. ad Januar., is celebrated.” Therefore, at least on that day, one may Ep. liv): “It has pleased the Holy Ghost that, out of honor receive the body of Christ after partaking of other food. for this great sacrament, the Lord’s body should enter the Objection 4. Further, the taking of water or medicine, mouth of a Christian before other foods.” or of any other food or drink in very slight quantity, or I answer that, A thing may prevent the receiving of of the remains of food continuing in the mouth, neither this sacrament in two ways: first of all in itself, like mortal breaks the Church’s fast, nor takes away the sobriety re-sin, which is repugnant to what is signified by this sacra- quired for reverently receiving this sacrament. Conse- ment, as stated above (a. 4): secondly, on account of the 2566 Church’s prohibition; and thus a man is prevented from or with other things, provided it be taken by way of food taking this sacrament after receiving food or drink, for or drink. But the remains of food left in the mouth, if three reasons. First, as Augustine says (Resp. ad Jan- swallowed accidentally, do not hinder receiving this sacra- uar., Ep. liv), “out of respect for this sacrament,” so that ment, because they are swallowed not by way of food but it may enter into a mouth not yet contaminated by any by way of saliva. The same holds good of the unavoid- food or drink. Secondly, because of its signification. i.e. able remains of the water or wine wherewith the mouth is to give us to understand that Christ, Who is the reality rinsed, provided they be not swallowed in great quantity, of this sacrament, and His charity, ought to be first of all but mixed with saliva. established in our hearts, according to Mat. 6:33: “Seek Secondly, there is the fast of the Church, instituted for first the kingdom of God.” Thirdly, on account of the dan- afflicting the body: and this fast is not hindered by the ger of vomiting and intemperance, which sometimes arise things mentioned (in the objection), because they do not from over-indulging in food, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. give much nourishment, but are taken rather as an alter- 11:21): “One, indeed, is hungry, and another is drunk.” ative. Nevertheless the sick are exempted from this general Reply to Objection 5. That this sacrament ought to rule, for they should be given Communion at once, even enter into the mouth of a Christian before any other food after food, should there be any doubt as to their danger, must not be understood absolutely of all time, otherwise lest they die without Communion, because necessity has he who had once eaten or drunk could never afterwards no law. Hence it is said in the Canon de Consecratione: take this sacrament: but it must be understood of the same “Let the priest at once take Communion to the sick person, day; and although the beginning of the day varies accord- lest he die without Communion.” ing to different systems of reckoning (for some begin their Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says in the same day at noon, some at sunset, others at midnight, and others book, “the fact that our Lord gave this sacrament after tak- at sunrise), the Roman Church begins it at midnight. Con- ing food is no reason why the brethren should assemble sequently, if any person takes anything by way of food or after dinner or supper in order to partake of it, or receive drink after midnight, he may not receive this sacrament it at meal-time, as did those whom the Apostle reproves on that day; but he can do so if the food was taken before and corrects. For our Saviour, in order the more strongly midnight. Nor does it matter, so far as the precept is con- to commend the depth of this mystery, wished to fix it cerned, whether he has slept after taking food or drink, closely in the hearts and memories of the disciples. and or whether he has digested it; but it does matter as to the on that account He gave no command for it to be received mental disturbance which one suffers from want of sleep in that order, leaving this to the apostles, to whom He was or from indigestion, for, if the mind be much disturbed, about to entrust the government of the churches.” one becomes unfit for receiving this sacrament. Reply to Objection 2. The text quoted is thus para- Reply to Objection 6. The greatest devotion is called phrased by the gloss: “If any man be hungry and loath to for at the moment of receiving this sacrament, because it await the rest, let him partake of his food at home, that is, is then that the effect of the sacrament is bestowed, and let him fill himself with earthly bread, without partaking such devotion is hindered more by what goes before it of the Eucharist afterwards.” than by what comes after it. And therefore it was ordained Reply to Objection 3. The wording of this decree is that men should fast before receiving the sacrament rather in accordance with the former custom observed by some than after. Nevertheless there ought to be some interval of receiving the body of Christ on that day after breaking between receiving this sacrament and taking other food. their fast, so as to represent the Lord’s supper. But this is Consequently, both the Postcommunion prayer of thanks- now abrogated, because as Augustine says (Resp. ad Jan- giving is said in the Mass, and the communicants say their uar., Ep. liv), it is customary throughout the whole world own private prayers. for Christ’s body to be received before breaking the fast. However, according to the ancient Canons, the follow- Reply to Objection 4. As stated in the IIa IIae, q. 147, ing ordination was made by Pope Clement I, (Ep. ii), “If a. 6, ad 2, there are two kinds of fast. First, there is the the Lord’s portion be eaten in the morning, the ministers natural fast, which implies privation of everything taken who have taken it shall fast until the sixth hour, and if before-hand by way of food or drink: and such fast is they take it at the third or fourth hour, they shall fast until required for this sacrament for the reasons given above. evening.” For in olden times, the priest celebrated Mass And therefore it is never lawful to take this sacrament af- less frequently, and with greater preparation: but now, be- ter taking water, or other food or drink, or even medicine, cause the sacred mysteries have to be celebrated oftener, no matter how small the quantity be. Nor does it matter the same could not be easily observed, and so it has been whether it nourishes or not, whether it be taken by itself abrogated by contrary custom. 2567 Whether those who have not the use of reason ought to receive this sacrament? IIIa q. 80 a. 9 Objection 1. It seems that those who have not the use found in the Decretals (xxvi, 6): “If a sick man ask to re- of reason ought not to receive this sacrament. For it is re- ceive the sacrament of Penance; and if, when the priest quired that man should approach this sacrament with de- who has been sent for comes to him, he be so weak as votion and previous self-examination, according to 1 Cor. to be unable to speak, or becomes delirious, let them, who 11:28: “Let a man prove himself, and so let him eat of heard him ask, bear witness, and let him receive the sacra- that bread, and drink of the chalice.” But this is not pos- ment of Penance. then if it be thought that he is going to sible for those who are devoid of reason. Therefore this die shortly, let him be reconciled by imposition of hands, sacrament should not be given to them. and let the Eucharist be placed in his mouth.” Objection 2. Further, among those who have not the Reply to Objection 1. Those lacking the use of reason use of reason are the possessed, who are called energu- can have devotion towards the sacrament; actual devotion mens. But such persons are kept from even beholding in some cases, and past in others. this sacrament, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii). Reply to Objection 2. Dionysius is speaking there of Therefore this sacrament ought not to be given to those energumens who are not yet baptized, in whom the devil’s who have not the use of reason. power is not yet extinct, since it thrives in them through Objection 3. Further, among those that lack the use the presence of original sin. But as to baptized persons of reason are children, the most innocent of all. But this who are vexed in body by unclean spirits, the same reason sacrament is not given to children. Therefore much less holds good of them as of others who are demented. Hence should it be given to others deprived of the use of reason. Cassian says (Collat. vii): “We do not remember the most On the contrary, We read in the First Council of Or- Holy Communion to have ever been denied by our elders ange, (Canon 13); and the same is to be found in the Dec- to them who are vexed by unclean spirits.” retals (xxvi, 6): “All things that pertain to piety are to be Reply to Objection 3. The same reason holds good given to the insane”: and consequently, since this is the of newly born children as of the insane who never have “sacrament of piety,” it must be given to them. had the use of reason: consequently, the sacred mysteries I answer that, Men are said to be devoid of reason in are not to be given to them. Although certain Greeks do two ways. First, when they are feeble-minded, as a man the contrary, because Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. ii) that who sees dimly is said not to see: and since such persons Holy Communion is to be given to them who are baptized; can conceive some devotion towards this sacrament, it is not understanding that Dionysius is speaking there of the not to be denied them. Baptism of adults. Nor do they suffer any loss of life from In another way men are said not to possess fully the the fact of our Lord saying (Jn. 6:54), “Except you eat use of reason. Either, then, they never had the use of rea- the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink His blood, you son, and have remained so from birth; and in that case this shall not have life in you”; because, as Augustine writes sacrament is not to be given to them, because in no way to Boniface (Pseudo-Beda, Comment. in 1 Cor. 10:17), has there been any preceding devotion towards the sacra- “then every one of the faithful becomes a partaker,” i.e. ment: or else, they were not always devoid of reason, and spiritually, “of the body and blood of the Lord, when he is then, if when they formerly had their wits they showed de- made a member of Christ’s body in Baptism.” But when votion towards this sacrament, it ought to be given to them children once begin to have some use of reason so as to be in the hour of death; unless danger be feared of vomiting able to conceive some devotion for the sacrament, then it or spitting it out. Hence we read in the acts of the Fourth can be given to them. Council of Carthage (Canon 76). and the same is to be Whether it is lawful to receive this sacrament daily? IIIa q. 80 a. 10 Objection 1. It does not appear to be lawful to receive ure of this sacrament, as was said above (q. 73, a. 9) was this sacrament daily, because, as Baptism shows forth our eaten only once in the year; while the Church once a year Lord’s Passion, so also does this sacrament. Now one commemorates Christ’s Passion, of which this sacrament may not be baptized several times, but only once, because is the memorial. It seems, then, that it is lawful to receive “Christ died once” only “for our sins,” according to 1 Pet. this sacrament not daily, but only once in the year. 3:18. Therefore, it seems unlawful to receive this sacra- Objection 3. Further, the greatest reverence is due to ment daily. this sacrament as containing Christ. But it is a token of Objection 2. Further, the reality ought to answer to reverence to refrain from receiving this sacrament; hence the figure. But the Paschal Lamb, which was the chief fig- the Centurion is praised for saying (Mat. 8:8), “Lord, I am 2568 not worthy that Thou shouldst enter under my roof”; also virtue, he may commendably receive this sacrament every Peter, for saying (Lk. 5:8), “Depart from me, for I am a day. sinful man, O Lord.” Therefore, it is not praiseworthy for And since Baptism is above all a spiritual regenera- a man to receive this sacrament daily. tion, therefore, as a man is born naturally but once, so Objection 4. Further, if it were a praiseworthy cus- ought he by Baptism to be reborn spiritually but once, as tom to receive this sacrament frequently, then the oftener Augustine says (Tract. xi in Joan.), commenting on Jn. it were taken the more praise-worthy it would be. But 3:4, “How can a man be born again, when he is grown there would be greater frequency if one were to receive it old?” But this sacrament is spiritual food; hence, just as several. times daily; and yet this is not the custom of the bodily food is taken every day, so is it a good thing to re- Church. Consequently, it does not seem praiseworthy to ceive this sacrament every day. Hence it is that our Lord receive it daily. (Lk. 11:3), teaches us to pray, “Give us this day our daily Objection 5. Further, the Church by her statutes in- bread”: in explaining which words Augustine observes tends to promote the welfare of the faithful. But the (De Verb. Dom., Serm. xxviii): “If you receive it,” i.e. Church’s statute only requires Communion once a year; this sacrament, every day, “every day is today for thee, hence it is enacted (Extra, De Poenit. et Remiss. xii): “Let and Christ rises again every day in thee, for when Christ every person of either sex devoutly receive the sacrament riseth it is today.” of the Eucharist at least at Easter; unless by the advice of Reply to Objection 2. The Paschal Lamb was the his parish priest, and for some reasonable cause, he con- figure of this sacrament chiefly as to Christ’s Passion rep- siders he ought to refrain from receiving for a time.” Con- resented therein; and therefore it was partaken of once a sequently, it is not praiseworthy to receive this sacrament year only, since Christ died but once. And on this ac- daily. count the Church celebrates once a year the remembrance On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., of Christ’s Passion. But in this sacrament the memorial of Serm. xxviii): “This is our daily bread; take it daily, that His Passion is given by way of food which is partaken of it may profit thee daily.” daily; and therefore in this respect it is represented by the I answer that, There are two things to be considered manna which was given daily to the people in the desert. regarding the use of this sacrament. The first is on the part Reply to Objection 3. Reverence for this sacrament of the sacrament itself, the virtue of which gives health to consists in fear associated with love; consequently rever- men; and consequently it is profitable to receive it daily ential fear of God is called filial fear, as was said in the Ia so as to receive its fruits daily. Hence Ambrose says (De IIae, q. 67, a. 4, ad 2; IIa IIae, q. 19, Aa. 9,11,12; because Sacram. iv): “If, whenever Christ’s blood is shed, it is the desire of receiving arises from love, while the humil- shed for the forgiveness of sins, I who sin often, should ity of reverence springs from fear. Consequently, each receive it often: I need a frequent remedy.” The second of these belongs to the reverence due to this sacrament; thing to be considered is on the part of the recipient, who both as to receiving it daily, and as to refraining from it is required to approach this sacrament with great rever- sometimes. Hence Augustine says (Ep. liv): “If one says ence and devotion. Consequently, if anyone finds that he that the Eucharist should not be received daily, while an- has these dispositions every day, he will do well to receive other maintains the contrary, let each one do as according it daily. Hence, Augustine after saying, “Receive daily, to his devotion he thinketh right; for Zaccheus and the that it may profit thee daily,” adds: “So live, as to deserve Centurion did not contradict one another while the one re- to receive it daily.” But because many persons are lacking ceived the Lord with joy, whereas the other said: ‘Lord I in this devotion, on account of the many drawbacks both am not worthy that Thou shouldst enter under my roof’; spiritual and corporal from which they suffer, it is not ex- since both honored our Saviour, though not in the same pedient for all to approach this sacrament every day; but way.” But love and hope, whereunto the Scriptures con- they should do so as often as they find themselves properly stantly urge us, are preferable to fear. Hence, too, when disposed. Hence it is said in De Eccles. Dogmat. liii: “I Peter had said, “Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O neither praise nor blame daily reception of the Eucharist.” Lord,” Jesus answered: “Fear not.” Reply to Objection 1. In the sacrament of Baptism Reply to Objection 4. Because our Lord said (Lk. a man is conformed to Christ’s death, by receiving His 11:3), “Give us this day our daily bread,” we are not on character within him. And therefore, as Christ died but that account to communicate several times daily, for, by once, so a man ought to be baptized but once. But a man one daily communion the unity of Christ’s Passion is set does not receive Christ’s character in this sacrament; He forth. receives Christ Himself, Whose virtue endures for ever. Reply to Objection 5. Various statutes have emanated Hence it is written (Heb. 10:14): “By one oblation He according to the various ages of the Church. In the primi- hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified.” Conse- tive Church, when the devotion of the Christian faith was quently, since man has daily need of Christ’s health-giving more flourishing, it was enacted that the faithful should 2569 communicate daily: hence Pope Anaclete says (Ep. i): Council of Chalon, Canon xlvii) declares that Commu- “When the consecration is finished, let all communicate nion should be received “on Holy Thursday,” as is set forth who do not wish to cut themselves off from the Church; in the Decretals (De Consecratione, dist. 2). Later on, for so the apostles have ordained, and the holy Roman when “iniquity abounded and charity grew cold” (Mat. Church holds.” Later on, when the fervor of faith relaxed, 24:12), Pope Innocent III commanded that the faithful Pope Fabian (Third Council of Tours, Canon 1) gave per- should communicate “at least once a year,” namely, “at mission “that all should communicate, if not more fre- Easter.” However, in De Eccles. Dogmat. xxiii, the faith- quently, at least three times in the year, namely, at Easter, ful are counseled “to communicate on all Sundays.” Pentecost, and Christmas.” Pope Soter likewise (Second Whether it is lawful to abstain altogether from communion? IIIa q. 80 a. 11 Objection 1. It seems to be lawful to abstain al- tual eating comprises the desire or yearning for receiving together from Communion. Because the Centurion is this sacrament, as was said above (a. 1, ad 3, a. 2). There- praised for saying (Mat. 8:8): “Lord, I am not worthy fore, a man cannot be saved without desiring to receive that Thou shouldst enter under my roof”; and he who this sacrament. deems that he ought to refrain entirely from Communion Now a desire would be vain except it were fulfilled can be compared to the Centurion, as stated above (a. 10, when opportunity presented itself. Consequently, it is ev- ad 3). Therefore, since we do not read of Christ enter- ident that a man is bound to receive this sacrament, not ing his house, it seems to be lawful for any individual to only by virtue of the Church’s precept, but also by virtue abstain from Communion his whole life long. of the Lord’s command (Lk. 22:19): “Do this in memory Objection 2. Further, it is lawful for anyone to refrain of Me.” But by the precept of the Church there are fixed from what is not of necessity for salvation. But this sacra- times for fulfilling Christ’s command. ment is not of necessity for salvation, as was stated above Reply to Objection 1. As Gregory says: “He is truly (q. 73, a. 3). Therefore it is permissible to abstain from humble, who is not obstinate in rejecting what is com- Communion altogether. manded for his good.” Consequently, humility is not Objection 3. Further, sinners are not bound to go to praiseworthy if anyone abstains altogether from Commu- Communion: hence Pope Fabian (Third Council of Tours, nion against the precept of Christ and the Church. Again Canon 1) after saying, “Let all communicate thrice each the Centurion was not commanded to receive Christ into year,” adds: “Except those who are hindered by grievous his house. crimes.” Consequently, if those who are not in the state of Reply to Objection 2. This sacrament is said not to be sin are bound to go to Communion, it seems that sinners as necessary as Baptism, with regard to children, who can are better off than good people, which is unfitting. There- be saved without the Eucharist, but not without the sacra- fore, it seems lawful even for the godly to refrain from ment of Baptism: both, however, are of necessity with Communion. regard to adults. On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 6:54): “Except Reply to Objection 3. Sinners suffer great loss in be- ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink His blood, ing kept back from receiving this sacrament, so that they you shall not have life in you.” are not better off on that account; and although while con- I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), there are two tinuing in their sins they are not on that account excused ways of receiving this sacrament namely, spiritually and from transgressing the precept, nevertheless, as Pope In- sacramentally. Now it is clear that all are bound to eat nocent III says, penitents, “who refrain on the advice of it at least spiritually, because this is to be incorporated in their priest,” are excused. Christ, as was said above (q. 73, a. 3, ad 1). Now spiri- Whether it is lawful to receive the body of Christ without the blood? IIIa q. 80 a. 12 Objection 1. It seems unlawful to receive the body the sacrament altogether.” Therefore it is not lawful to of Christ without the blood. For Pope Gelasius says (cf. receive the body of Christ without His blood. De Consecr. ii): “We have learned that some persons af- Objection 2. Further, the eating of the body and the ter taking only a portion of the sacred body, abstain from drinking of the blood are required for the perfection of this the chalice of the sacred blood. I know not for what su- sacrament, as stated above (q. 73, a. 2; q. 76, a. 2, ad 1). perstitious motive they do this: therefore let them either Consequently, if the body be taken without the blood, it receive the entire sacrament, or let them be withheld from will be an imperfect sacrament, which seems to savor of 2570 sacrilege; hence Pope Gelasius adds (cf. De Consecr. ii), it might easily be spilt. And because the multitude of the “because the dividing of one and the same mystery cannot Christian people increased, in which there are old, young, happen without a great sacrilege.” and children, some of whom have not enough discretion Objection 3. Further, this sacrament is celebrated in to observe due caution in using this sacrament, on that memory of our Lord’s Passion, as stated above (q. 73, account it is a prudent custom in some churches for the Aa. 4,5; q. 74, a. 1), and is received for the health of soul. blood not to be offered to the reception of the people, but But the Passion is expressed in the blood rather than in the to be received by the priest alone. body; moreover, as stated above (q. 74, a. 1), the blood is Reply to Objection 1. Pope Gelasius is speaking offered for the health of the soul. Consequently, one ought of priests, who, as they consecrate the entire sacrament, to refrain from receiving the body rather than the blood. ought to communicate in the entire sacrament. For, as we Therefore, such as approach this sacrament ought not to read in the (Twelfth) Council of Toledo, “What kind of a take Christ’s body without His blood. sacrifice is that, wherein not even the sacrificer is known On the contrary, It is the custom of many churches to have a share?” for the body of Christ to be given to the communicant Reply to Objection 2. The perfection of this sacra- without His blood. ment does not lie in the use of the faithful, but in the I answer that, Two points should be observed regard- consecration of the matter. And hence there is nothing ing the use of this sacrament, one on the part of the sacra- derogatory to the perfection of this sacrament; if the peo- ment, the other on the part of the recipients; on the part of ple receive the body without the blood, provided that the the sacrament it is proper for both the body and the blood priest who consecrates receive both. to be received, since the perfection of the sacrament lies Reply to Objection 3. Our Lord’s Passion is repre- in both, and consequently, since it is the priest’s duty both sented in the very consecration of this sacrament, in which to consecrate and finish the sacrament, he ought on no ac- the body ought not to be consecrated without the blood. count to receive Christ’s body without the blood. But the body can be received by the people without the But on the part of the recipient the greatest reverence blood: nor is this detrimental to the sacrament. Because and caution are called for, lest anything happen which is the priest both offers and consumes the blood on behalf of unworthy of so great a mystery. Now this could especially all; and Christ is fully contained under either species, as happen in receiving the blood, for, if incautiously handled, was shown above (q. 76, a. 2). 2571 THIRD PART, QUESTION 81 Of the Use Which Christ Made of This Sacrament at Its Institution (In Four Articles) We have now to consider the use which Christ made of this sacrament at its institution; under which heading there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ received His own body and blood? (2) Whether He gave it to Judas? (3) What kind of body did He receive or give, namely, was it passible or impassible? (4) What would have been the condition of Christ’s body under this sacrament, if it had been reserved or consecrated during the three days He lay dead? Whether Christ received His own body and blood? IIIa q. 81 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that Christ did not receive His Reply to Objection 1. We read in the Gospels how own body and blood, because nothing ought to be asserted Christ “took the bread. . . and the chalice”; but it is not to of either Christ’s doings or sayings, which is not handed be understood that He took them merely into His hands, down by the authority of Sacred Scripture. But it is not as some say. but that He took them in the same way as narrated in the gospels that He ate His own body or drank He gave them to others to take. Hence when He said to His own blood. Therefore we must not assert this as a fact. the disciples, “Take ye and eat,” and again, “Take ye and Objection 2. Further, nothing can be within itself ex- drink,” it is to be understood that He Himself, in taking cept perchance by reason of its parts, for instance. as one it, both ate and drank. Hence some have composed this part is in another, as is stated in Phys. iv. But what is rhyme: eaten and drunk is in the eater and drinker. Therefore, “The King at supper sits, since the entire Christ is under each species of the sacra- The twelve as guests He greets, ment, it seems impossible for Him to have received this Clasping Himself in His hands, sacrament. The food Himself now eats.” Objection 3. Further, the receiving of this sacrament Reply to Objection 2. As was said above (q. 76, a. 5), is twofold, namely, spiritual and sacramental. But the Christ as contained under this sacrament stands in relation spiritual was unsuitable for Christ, as He derived no ben- to place, not according to His own dimensions, but ac- efit from the sacrament. and in consequence so was the cording to the dimensions of the sacramental species; so sacramental, since it is imperfect without the spiritual, as that Christ is Himself in every place where those species was observed above (q. 80, a. 1). Consequently, in no way are. And because the species were able to be both in the did Christ partake of this sacrament. hands and the mouth of Christ, the entire Christ could be On the contrary, Jerome says (Ad Hedib., Ep. xxx), in both His hands and mouth. Now this could not come “The Lord Jesus Christ, Himself the guest and banquet, is to pass were His relation to place to be according to His both the partaker and what is eaten.” proper dimensions. I answer that, Some have said that Christ during the Reply to Objection 3. As was stated above (q. 79, supper gave His body and blood to His disciples, but did a. 1, ad 2), the effect of this sacrament is not merely an not partake of it Himself. But this seems improbable. Be- increase of habitual grace, but furthermore a certain ac- cause Christ Himself was the first to fulfill what He re- tual delectation of spiritual sweetness. But although grace quired others to observe: hence He willed first to be bap- was not increased in Christ through His receiving this tized when imposing Baptism upon others: as we read in sacrament, yet He had a certain spiritual delectation from Acts 1:1: “Jesus began to do and to teach.” Hence He first the new institution of this sacrament. Hence He Himself of all took His own body and blood, and afterwards gave said (Lk. 22:15): “With desire I have desired to eat this it to be taken by the disciples. And hence the gloss upon Pasch with you,” which words Eusebius explains of the Ruth 3:7, “When he had eaten and drunk, says: Christ ate new mystery of the New Testament, which He gave to and drank at the supper, when He gave to the disciples the disciples. And therefore He ate it both spiritually and the sacrament of His body and blood. Hence, ‘because sacramentally, inasmuch as He received His own body un- the children partook∗ of His flesh and blood, He also hath der the sacrament which sacrament of His own body He been partaker in the same.’ ” both understood and prepared; yet differently from others ∗ Vulg.: ‘are partakers’ (Heb. 2:14) 2572 who partake of it both sacramentally and spiritually, for the sacramental signs for perceiving its truth. these receive an increase of grace, and they have need of Whether Christ gave His body to Judas? IIIa q. 81 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that Christ did not give His held that Christ did not give His body and blood to Judas. body to Judas. Because, as we read (Mat. 26:29), our And this would have been quite proper, if the malice of Lord, after giving His body and blood to the disciples, said Judas be considered. But since Christ was to serve us as to them: “I will not drink from henceforth of this fruit of a pattern of justice, it was not in keeping with His teach- the vine, until that day when I shall drink it with you new ing authority to sever Judas, a hidden sinner, from Com- in the kingdom of My Father.” From this it appears that munion with the others without an accuser and evident those to whom He had given His body and blood were to proof. lest the Church’s prelates might have an example drink of it again with Him. But Judas did not drink of it af- for doing the like, and lest Judas himself being exasper- terwards with Him. Therefore he did not receive Christ’s ated might take occasion of sinning. Therefore, it remains body and blood with the other disciples. to be said that Judas received our Lord’s body and blood Objection 2. Further, what the Lord commanded, He with the other disciples, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. Himself fulfilled, as is said in Acts 1:1: “Jesus began to iii), and Augustine (Tract. lxii in Joan.). do and to teach.” But He gave the command (Mat. 7:6): Reply to Objection 1. This is Hilary’s argument, to “Give not that which is holy to dogs.” Therefore, knowing show that Judas did not receive Christ’s body. But it is not Judas to be a sinner, seemingly He did not give him His cogent; because Christ is speaking to the disciples, from body and blood. whose company Judas separated himself: and it was not Objection 3. Further, it is distinctly related (Jn. Christ that excluded him. Therefore Christ for His part 13:26) that Christ gave dipped bread to Judas. Conse- drinks the wine even with Judas in the kingdom of God; quently, if He gave His body to him, it appears that He but Judas himself repudiated this banquet. gave it him in the morsel, especially since we read (Jn. Reply to Objection 2. The wickedness of Judas was 13:26) that “after the morsel, Satan entered into him.” known to Christ as God; but it was unknown to Him, after And on this passage Augustine says (Tract. lxii in Joan.): the manner in which men know it. Consequently, Christ “From this we learn how we should beware of receiving a did not repel Judas from Communion; so as to furnish an good thing in an evil way. . . For if he be ‘chastised’ who example that such secret sinners are not to be repelled by does ‘not discern,’ i.e. distinguish, the body of the Lord other priests. from other meats, how must he be ‘condemned’ who, Reply to Objection 3. Without any doubt Judas did feigning himself a friend, comes to His table a foe?” But not receive Christ’s body in the dipped bread; he received (Judas) did not receive our Lord’s body with the dipped mere bread. Yet as Augustine observes (Tract. lxii in morsel; thus Augustine commenting on Jn. 13:26, “When Joan.), “perchance the feigning of Judas is denoted by He had dipped the bread, He gave it to Judas, the son of the dipping of the bread; just as some things are dipped Simon the Iscariot [Vulg.: ‘to Judas Iscariot, the son of to be dyed. If, however, the dipping signifies here any- Simon],” says (Tract. lxii in Joan.): “Judas did not receive thing good” (for instance, the sweetness of the Divine Christ’s body then, as some think who read carelessly.” goodness, since bread is rendered more savory by being Therefore it seems that Judas did not receive the body of dipped), “then, not undeservedly, did condemnation fol- Christ. low his ingratitude for that same good.” And owing to that On the contrary, Chrysostom says (Hom. lxxxii in ingratitude, “what is good became evil to him, as happens Matth.): “Judas was not converted while partaking of the to them who receive Christ’s body unworthily.” sacred mysteries: hence on both sides his crime becomes And as Augustine says (Tract. lxii in Joan.), “it must the more heinous, both because imbued with such a pur- be understood that our Lord had already distributed the pose he approached the mysteries, and because he became sacrament of His body and blood to all His disciples, none the better for approaching, neither from fear, nor among whom was Judas also, as Luke narrates: and after from the benefit received, nor from the honor conferred that, we came to this, where, according to the relation of on him.” John, our Lord, by dipping and handing the morsel, does I answer that, Hilary, in commenting on Mat. 26:17, most openly declare His betrayer.” 2573 Whether Christ received and gave to the disciples His impassible body? IIIa q. 81 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that Christ both received and ties, concerning which we have already stated what should gave to the disciples His impassible body. Because on be held (q. 28, a. 2, ad 3; q. 45, a. 2), nevertheless the Mat. 17:2, “He was transfigured before them,” the gloss above opinion regarding impassibility is inadmissible. For says: “He gave to the disciples at the supper that body it is manifest that the same body of Christ which was then which He had through nature, but neither mortal nor pas- seen by the disciples in its own species, was received by sible.” And again, on Lev. 2:5, “if thy oblation be from them under the sacramental species. But as seen in its own the frying-pan,” the gloss says: “The Cross mightier than species it was not impassible; nay more, it was ready for all things made Christ’s flesh fit for being eaten, which be- the Passion. Therefore, neither was Christ’s body impas- fore the Passion did not seem so suited.” But Christ gave sible when given under the sacramental species. His body as suited for eating. Therefore He gave it just as Yet there was present in the sacrament, in an impas- it was after the Passion, that is, impassible and immortal. sible manner, that which was passible of itself; just as Objection 2. Further, every passible body suffers by that was there invisibly which of itself was visible. For contact and by being eaten. Consequently, if Christ’s body as sight requires that the body seen be in contact with the was passible, it would have suffered both from contact and adjacent medium of sight, so does passion require con- from being eaten by the disciples. tact of the suffering body with the active agents. But Objection 3. Further, the sacramental words now spo- Christ’s body, according as it is under the sacrament, as ken by the priest in the person of Christ are not more pow- stated above (a. 1, ad 2; q. 76, a. 5), is not compared with erful than when uttered by Christ Himself. But now by its surroundings through the intermediary of its own di- virtue of the sacramental words it is Christ’s impassible mensions, whereby bodies touch each other, but through and immortal body which is consecrated upon the altar. the dimensions of the bread and wine; consequently, it is Therefore, much more so was it then. those species which are acted upon and are seen, but not On the contrary, As Innocent III says (De Sacr. Alt. Christ’s own body. Myst. iv), “He bestowed on the disciples His body such Reply to Objection 1. Christ is said not to have given as it was.” But then He had a passible and a mortal body. His mortal and passible body at the supper, because He Therefore, He gave a passible and mortal body to the dis- did not give it in mortal and passible fashion. But the ciples. Cross made His flesh adapted for eating, inasmuch as this I answer that, Hugh of Saint Victor (Innocent III, De sacrament represents Christ’s Passion. Sacr. Alt. Myst. iv), maintained, that before the Pas- Reply to Objection 2. This argument would hold, if sion, Christ assumed at various times the four proper- Christ’s body, as it was passible, were also present in a ties of a glorified body —namely, subtlety in His birth, passible manner in this sacrament. when He came forth from the closed womb of the Virgin; Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 76, a. 4), agility, when He walked dryshod upon the sea; clarity, in the accidents of Christ’s body are in this sacrament by the Transfiguration; and impassibility at the Last Supper, real concomitance, but not by the power of the sacrament, when He gave His body to the disciples to be eaten. And whereby the substance of Christ’s body comes to be there. according to this He gave His body in an impassible and And therefore the power of the sacramental words extends immortal condition to His disciples. to this, that the body, i.e. Christ’s, is under this sacrament, But whatever may be the case touching the other quali-whatever accidents really exist in it. Whether, if this sacrament had been reserved in a pyx, or consecrated at the moment IIIa q. 81 a. 4 of Christ’s death by one of the apostles, Christ Himself would have died there? Objection 1. It seems that if this sacrament had been not die in this sacrament. reserved in a pyx at the moment of Christ’s death, or had Objection 3. Further, death ensues from the separa- then been consecrated by one of the apostles, that Christ tion of the soul from the body. But both the body and the would not have died there. For Christ’s death happened soul of Christ are contained in this sacrament. Therefore through His Passion. But even then He was in this sacra- Christ could not die in this sacrament. ment in an impassible manner. Therefore, He could not On the contrary, The same Christ Who was upon the die in this sacrament. cross would have been in this sacrament. But He died Objection 2. Further, on the death of Christ, His upon the cross. Therefore, if this sacrament had been re- blood was separated from the body. But His flesh and served, He would have died therein. blood are together in this sacrament. Therefore He could I answer that, Christ’s body is substantially the same 2574 in this sacrament, as in its proper species, but not after in virtue of the consecration, the body of Christ is under the same fashion; because in its proper species it comes in the species of bread, while His blood is under the species contact with surrounding bodies by its own dimensions: of wine. But now that His blood is not really separated but it does not do so as it is in this sacrament, as stated from His body; by real concomitance, both His blood is above (a. 3). And therefore, all that belongs to Christ, as present with the body under the species of the bread, and He is in Himself, can be attributed to Him both in His His body together with the blood under the species of the proper species, and as He exists in the sacrament; such as wine. But at the time when Christ suffered, when His to live, to die, to grieve, to be animate or inanimate, and blood was really separated from His body, if this sacra- the like; while all that belongs to Him in relation to out- ment had been consecrated, then the body only would ward bodies, can be attributed to Him as He exists in His have been present under the species of the bread, and the proper species, but not as He is in this sacrament; such blood only under the species of the wine. as to be mocked, to be spat upon, to be crucified, to be Reply to Objection 3. As was observed above (q. 76, scourged, and the rest. Hence some have composed this a. 1, ad 1), Christ’s soul is in this sacrament by real con- verse: comitance; because it is not without the body: but it is not “Our Lord can grieve beneath the sacramental veils there in virtue of the consecration. And therefore, if this But cannot feel the piercing of the thorns and nails.” sacrament had been consecrated then, or reserved, when Reply to Objection 1. As was stated above, suffering His soul was really separated from His body, Christ’s soul belongs to a body that suffers in respect of some extrinsic would not have been under this sacrament, not from any body. And therefore Christ, as in this sacrament, cannot defect in the form of the words, but owing to the different suffer; yet He can die. dispositions of the thing contained. Reply to Objection 2. As was said above (q. 76, a. 2), 2575 THIRD PART, QUESTION 82 Of the Minister of This Sacrament (In Ten Articles) We now proceed to consider the minister of this sacrament: under which head there are ten points for our inquiry: (1) Whether it belongs to a priest alone to consecrate this sacrament? (2) Whether several priests can at the same time consecrate the same host? (3) Whether it belongs to the priest alone to dispense this sacrament? (4) Whether it is lawful for the priest consecrating to refrain from communicating? (5) Whether a priest in sin can perform this sacrament? (6) Whether the Mass of a wicked priest is of less value than that of a good one? (7) Whether those who are heretics, schismatics, or excommunicated, can perform this sacrament? (8) Whether degraded priests can do so? (9) Whether communicants receiving at their hands are guilty of sinning? (10) Whether a priest may lawfully refrain altogether from celebrating? ∗ Whether the consecration of this sacrament belongs to a priest alone? IIIa q. 82 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that the consecration of this secrate this sacrament of the Lord’s body and blood upon sacrament does not belong exclusively to a priest. Be- God’s altar.” cause it was said above (q. 78, a. 4) that this sacrament is I answer that, As stated above (q. 78, Aa. 1,4), such consecrated in virtue of the words, which are the form of is the dignity of this sacrament that it is performed only this sacrament. But those words are not changed, whether as in the person of Christ. Now whoever performs any act spoken by a priest or by anyone else. Therefore, it seems in another’s stead, must do so by the power bestowed by that not only a priest, but anyone else, can consecrate this such a one. But as the power of receiving this sacrament is sacrament. conceded by Christ to the baptized person, so likewise the Objection 2. Further, the priest performs this sacra- power of consecrating this sacrament on Christ’s behalf is ment in the person of Christ. But a devout layman is bestowed upon the priest at his ordination: for thereby he united with Christ through charity. Therefore, it seems is put upon a level with them to whom the Lord said (Lk. that even a layman can perform this sacrament. Hence 22:19): “Do this for a commemoration of Me.” Therefore, Chrysostom (Opus imperfectum in Matth., Hom. xliii) it must be said that it belongs to priests to accomplish this says that “every holy man is a priest.” sacrament. Objection 3. Further, as Baptism is ordained for the Reply to Objection 1. The sacramental power is in salvation of mankind, so also is this sacrament, as is clear several things, and not merely in one: thus the power of from what was said above (q. 74, a. 1 ; q. 79, a. 2). But Baptism lies both in the words and in the water. Accord- a layman can also baptize, as was stated above (q. 67 , ingly the consecrating power is not merely in the words, a. 3). Consequently, the consecration of this sacrament is but likewise in the power delivered to the priest in his con- not proper to a priest. secration and ordination, when the bishop says to him: Objection 4. Further, this sacrament is completed in “Receive the power of offering up the Sacrifice in the the consecration of the matter. But the consecration of Church for the living as well as for the dead.” For instru- other matters such as the chrism, the holy oil, and blessed mental power lies in several instruments through which oil, belongs exclusively to a bishop; yet their consecration the chief agent acts. does not equal the dignity of the consecration of the Eu- Reply to Objection 2. A devout layman is united with charist, in which the entire Christ is contained. Therefore Christ by spiritual union through faith and charity, but not it belongs, not to a priest, but only to a bishop, to perform by sacramental power: consequently he has a spiritual this sacrament. priesthood for offering spiritual sacrifices, of which it is On the contrary, Isidore says in an Epistle to Lud- said (Ps. 1:19): “A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit”; ifred (Decretals, dist. 25): “It belongs to a priest to con- and (Rom. 12:1): “Present your bodies a living sacrifice.” ∗ This is the order observed by St. Thomas in writing the Articles; but in writing this prologue, he placed Article 10 immediately after Article 4 (Cf. Leonine edition). 2576 Hence, too, it is written (1 Pet. 2:5): “A holy priesthood, belong to the mystical body are not reserved to the bishop, to offer up spiritual sacrifices.” such as the consecration of this sacrament. But it belongs Reply to Objection 3. The receiving of this sacrament to the bishop to deliver, not only to the people, but like- is not of such necessity as the receiving of Baptism, as is wise to priests, such things as serve them in the fulfillment evident from what was said above (q. 65, Aa. 3,4; q. 80, of their respective duties. And because the blessing of the a. 11, ad 2). And therefore, although a layman can baptize chrism, and of the holy oil, and of the oil of the sick, and in case of necessity, he cannot perform this sacrament. other consecrated things, such as altars, churches, vest- Reply to Objection 4. The bishop receives power ments, and sacred vessels, makes such things fit for use in to act on Christ’s behalf upon His mystical body, that is, performing the sacraments which upon the Church; but the priest receives no such power in belong to the priestly duty, therefore such consecra- his consecration, although he may have it by commission tions are reserved to the bishop as the head of the whole from the bishop. Consequently all such things as do not ecclesiastical order. Whether several priests can consecrate one and the same host? IIIa q. 82 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that several priests cannot con- And therefore, according to the custom of some Churches, secrate one and the same host. For it was said above as the apostles supped when Christ supped, so the newly (q. 67, a. 6), that several cannot at the same time baptize ordained co-celebrate with the ordaining bishop. Nor is one individual. But the power of a priest consecrating is the consecration, on that account, repeated over the same not less than that of a man baptizing. Therefore, several host, because as Innocent III says (De Sacr. Alt. Myst. priests cannot consecrate one host at the same time. iv), the intention of all should be directed to the same in- Objection 2. Further, what can be done by one, is su- stant of the consecration. perfluously done by several. But there ought to be nothing Reply to Objection 1. We do not read of Christ bap- superfluous in the sacraments. Since, then, one is suffi- tizing with the apostles when He committed to them the cient for consecrating, it seems that several cannot conse- duty of baptizing; consequently there is no parallel. crate one host. Reply to Objection 2. If each individual priest were Objection 3. Further, as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi acting in his own power, then other celebrants would be in Joan.), this is “the sacrament of unity.” But multitude superfluous, since one would be sufficient. But whereas seems to be opposed to unity. Therefore it seems incon- the priest does not consecrate except as in Christ’s stead; sistent with the sacrament for several priests to consecrate and since many are “one in Christ” (Gal. 3:28); conse- the same host. quently it does not matter whether this sacrament be con- On the contrary, It is the custom of some Churches secrated by one or by many, except that the rite of the for priests newly ordained to co-celebrate with the bishop Church must be observed. ordaining them. Reply to Objection 3. The Eucharist is the sacrament I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), when a priest of ecclesiastical unity, which is brought about by many is ordained he is placed on a level with those who re- being “one in Christ.” ceived consecrating power from our Lord at the Supper. Whether dispensing of this sacrament belongs to a priest alone? IIIa q. 82 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that the dispensing of this the consecration of the matter, and not in the use, to which sacrament does not belong to a priest alone. For Christ’s the dispensing belongs. Therefore it seems that it does not blood belongs to this sacrament no less than His body. belong to a priest to dispense the Lord’s body. But Christ’s blood is dispensed by deacons: hence the Objection 3. Further, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii, blessed Lawrence said to the blessed Sixtus (Office of St. iv) that this sacrament, like chrism, has the power of per- Lawrence, Resp. at Matins): “Try whether you have cho- fecting. But it belongs, not to priests, but to bishops, to sen a fit minister, to whom you have entrusted the dispens- sign with the chrism. Therefore likewise, to dispense this ing of the Lord’s blood.” Therefore, with equal reason sacrament belongs to the bishop and not to the priest. the dispensing of Christ’s body does not belong to priests On the contrary, It is written (De Consecr., dist. 12): only. “It has come to our knowledge that some priests deliver Objection 2. Further, priests are the appointed minis- the Lord’s body to a layman or to a woman to carry it to ters of the sacraments. But this sacrament is completed in the sick: The synod therefore forbids such presumption 2577 to continue; and let the priest himself communicate the so that he may dispense the blood; but not the body, ex-sick.” cept in case of necessity, at the bidding of a bishop or of I answer that, The dispensing of Christ’s body be- a priest. First of all, because Christ’s blood is contained longs to the priest for three reasons. First, because, as in a vessel, hence there is no need for it to be touched was said above (a. 1), he consecrates as in the person of by the dispenser, as Christ’s body is touched. Secondly, Christ. But as Christ consecrated His body at the supper, because the blood denotes the redemption derived by the so also He gave it to others to be partaken of by them. Ac- people from Christ; hence it is that water is mixed with cordingly, as the consecration of Christ’s body belongs to the blood, which water denotes the people. And because the priest, so likewise does the dispensing belong to him. deacons are between priest and people, the dispensing of Secondly, because the priest is the appointed intermediary the blood is in the competency of deacons, rather than the between God and the people; hence as it belongs to him to dispensing of the body. offer the people’s gifts to God, so it belongs to him to de- Reply to Objection 2. For the reason given above, it liver consecrated gifts to the people. Thirdly, because out belongs to the same person to dispense and to consecrate of reverence towards this sacrament, nothing touches it, this sacrament. but what is consecrated; hence the corporal and the chal- Reply to Objection 3. As the deacon, in a measure, ice are consecrated, and likewise the priest’s hands, for shares in the priest’s “power of enlightening” (Eccl. Hier. touching this sacrament. Hence it is not lawful for anyone v), inasmuch as he dispenses the blood. so the priest else to touch it except from necessity, for instance, if it shares in the “perfective dispensing” (Eccl. Hier. v) of the were to fall upon the ground, or else in some other case of bishop, inasmuch as he dispenses this sacrament whereby urgency. man is perfected in himself by union with Christ. But Reply to Objection 1. The deacon, as being nigh to other perfections whereby a man is perfected in relation the priestly order, has a certain share in the latter’s duties, to others, are reserved to the bishop. Whether the priest who consecrates is bound to receive this sacrament? IIIa q. 82 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that the priest who consecrates I answer that, As stated above (q. 79, Aa. 5,7), the is not bound to receive this sacrament. Because, in the Eucharist is not only a sacrament, but also a sacrifice. other consecrations, he who consecrates the matter does Now whoever offers sacrifice must be a sharer in the sac- not use it, just as the bishop consecrating the chrism is not rifice, because the outward sacrifice he offers is a sign of anointed therewith. But this sacrament consists in the con- the inner sacrifice whereby he offers himself to God, as secration of the matter. Therefore, the priest performing Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x). Hence by partaking of this sacrament need not use the same, but may lawfully the sacrifice he shows that the inner one is likewise his. refrain from receiving it. In the same way also, by dispensing the sacrifice to the Objection 2. Further, in the other sacraments the min- people he shows that he is the dispenser of Divine gifts, ister does not give the sacrament to himself: for no one of which he ought himself to be the first to partake, as can baptize himself, as stated above (q. 66, a. 5, ad 4). But Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii). Consequently, he ought as Baptism is dispensed in due order, so also is this sacra- to receive before dispensing it to the people. Accordingly ment. Therefore the priest who consecrates this sacrament we read in the chapter mentioned above (Twelfth Council ought not to receive it at his own hands. of Toledo, Can. v): “What kind of sacrifice is that wherein Objection 3. Further, it sometimes happens that not even the sacrificer is known to have a share?” But it Christ’s body appears upon the altar under the guise of is by partaking of the sacrifice that he has a share in it, as flesh, and the blood under the guise of blood; which are the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:18): “Are not they that eat of unsuited for food and drink: hence, as was said above the sacrifices, partakers of the altar?” Therefore it is nec- (q. 75, a. 5), it is on that account that they are given under essary for the priest, as often as he consecrates, to receive another species, lest they beget revulsion in the communi- this sacrament in its integrity. cants. Therefore the priest who consecrates is not always Reply to Objection 1. The consecration of chrism or bound to receive this sacrament. of anything else is not a sacrifice, as the consecration of On the contrary, We read in the acts of the (Twelfth) the Eucharist is: consequently there is no parallel. Council of Toledo (Can. v), and again (De Consecr., dist. Reply to Objection 2. The sacrament of Baptism is 2): “It must be strictly observed that as often as the priest accomplished in the use of the matter, and consequently sacrifices the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ no one can baptize himself, because the same person can- upon the altar, he must himself be a partaker of Christ’s not be active and passive in a sacrament. Hence neither in body and blood.” this sacrament does the priest consecrate himself, but he 2578 consecrates the bread and wine, in which consecration the “It is lawful to eat of this sacrifice which is wonderfully sacrament is completed. But the use thereof follows the performed in memory of Christ: but it is not lawful for sacrament, and therefore there is no parallel. anyone to eat of that one which Christ offered on the al- Reply to Objection 3. If Christ’s body appears mirac- tar of the cross.” Nor does the priest transgress on that ulously upon the altar under the guise of flesh, or the blood account, because miraculous events are not subject to hu- under the guise of blood, it is not to be received. For man laws. Nevertheless the priest would be well advised Jerome says upon Leviticus (cf. De Consecr., dist. 2): to consecrate again and receive the Lord’s body and blood. Whether a wicked priest can consecrate the Eucharist? IIIa q. 82 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that a wicked priest cannot and wicked ministers or servants. Hence (Mat. 24:45) our consecrate the Eucharist. For Jerome, commenting on Lord says: “Who, thinkest thou, is a faithful and wise ser- Sophon. iii, 4, says: “The priests who perform the Eu- vant?” and afterwards He adds: “But if that evil servant charist, and who distribute our Lord’s blood to the people, shall say in his heart,” etc. And the Apostle (1 Cor. 4:1) act wickedly against Christ’s law, in deeming that the Eu- says: “Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of charist is consecrated by a prayer rather than by a good Christ”; and afterwards he adds: “I am not conscious to life; and that only the solemn prayer is requisite, and not myself of anything; yet am I not hereby justified.” He was the priest’s merits: of whom it is said: ‘Let not the priest, therefore certain that he was Christ’s minister; yet he was in whatever defilement he may be, approach to offer obla- not certain that he was a just man. Consequently, a man tions to the Lord’ ” (Lev. 21:21, Septuagint). But the sin- can be Christ’s minister even though he be not one of the ful priest, being defiled, has neither the life nor the merits just. And this belongs to Christ’s excellence, Whom, as befitting this sacrament. Therefore a sinful priest cannot the true God, things both good and evil serve, since they consecrate the Eucharist. are ordained by His providence for His glory. Hence it Objection 2. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. is evident that priests, even though they be not godly, but iv) that “the bread and wine are changed supernaturally sinners, can consecrate the Eucharist. into the body and blood of our Lord, by the coming of the Reply to Objection 1. In those words Jerome is con- Holy Ghost.” But Pope Gelasius I says (Ep. ad Elphid., demning the error of priests who believed they could con- cf. Decret. i, q. 1): “How shall the Holy Spirit, when in- secrate the Eucharist worthily, from the mere fact of being voked, come for the consecration of the Divine Mystery, priests, even though they were sinners; and Jerome con- if the priest invoking him be proved full of guilty deeds?” demns this from the fact that persons defiled are forbidden Consequently, the Eucharist cannot be consecrated by a to approach the altar; but this does not prevent the sacri- wicked priest. fice, which they offer, from being a true sacrifice, if they Objection 3. Further, this sacrament is consecrated do approach. by the priest’s blessing. But a sinful priest’s blessing is Reply to Objection 2. Previous to the words quoted, not efficacious for consecrating this sacrament, since it Pope Gelasius expresses himself as follows: “That most is written (Malachi 2:2): “I will curse your blessings.” holy rite, which contains the Catholic discipline, claims Again, Dionysius says in his Epistle (viii) to the monk for itself such reverence that no one may dare to ap- Demophilus: “He who is not enlightened has completely proach it except with clean conscience.” From this it is fallen away from the priestly order; and I wonder that such evident that his meaning is that the priest who is a sin- a man dare to employ his hands in priestly actions, and in ner ought not to approach this sacrament. Hence when the person of Christ to utter, over the Divine symbols, his he resumes, “How shall the Holy Spirit come when sum- unclean infamies, for I will not call them prayers.” moned,” it must be understood that He comes, not through On the contrary, Augustine (Paschasius) says (De the priest’s merits, but through the power of Christ, Whose Corp. Dom. xii): “Within the Catholic Church, in the words the priest utters. mystery of the Lord’s body and blood, nothing greater is Reply to Objection 3. As the same action can be evil, done by a good priest, nothing less by an evil priest, be- inasmuch as it is done with a bad intention of the servant; cause it is not by the merits of the consecrator that the and good from the good intention of the master; so the sacrament is accomplished, but by the Creator’s word, and blessing of a sinful priest, inasmuch as he acts unworthily by the power of the Holy Spirit.” is deserving of a curse, and is reputed an infamy and a I answer that, As was said above (Aa. 1,3), the priest blasphemy, and not a prayer; whereas, inasmuch as it is consecrates this sacrament not by his own power, but as pronounced in the person of Christ, it is holy and effica- the minister of Christ, in Whose person he consecrates this cious. Hence it is said with significance: “I will curse sacrament. But from the fact of being wicked he does not your blessings.” cease to be Christ’s minister; because our Lord has good 2579 Whether the mass of a sinful priest is of less worth than the mass of a good priest? IIIa q. 82 a. 6 Objection 1. It seems that the mass of a sinful priest is is concerned, the mass of a wicked priest is not of less not of less worth than that of a good priest. For Pope Gre- value than that of a good priest, because the same sacri- gory says in the Register: “Alas, into what a great snare fice is offered by both. they fall who believe that the Divine and hidden mysteries Again, the prayer put up in the mass can be consid- can be sanctified more by some than by others; since it is ered in two respects: first of all, in so far as it has its the one and the same Holy Ghost Who hallows those mys- efficacy from the devotion of the priest interceding, and teries in a hidden and invisible manner.” But these hidden in this respect there is no doubt but that the mass of the mysteries are celebrated in the mass. Therefore the mass better priest is the more fruitful. In another respect, inas- of a sinful priest is not of less value than the mass of a much as the prayer is said by the priest in the mass in the good priest. place of the entire Church, of which the priest is the min- Objection 2. Further, as Baptism is conferred by a ister; and this ministry remains even in sinful men, as was minister through the power of Christ Who baptizes, so said above (a. 5) in regard to Christ’s ministry. Hence, in likewise this sacrament is consecrated in the person of this respect the prayer even of the sinful priest is fruitful, Christ. But Baptism is no better when conferred by a bet- not only that which he utters in the mass, but likewise all ter priest, as was said above (q. 64, a. 1, ad 2). Therefore those he recites in the ecclesiastical offices, wherein he neither is a mass the better, which is celebrated by a better takes the place of the Church. on the other hand, his pri- priest. vate prayers are not fruitful, according to Prov. 28:9: “He Objection 3. Further, as the merits of priests differ in that turneth away his ears from hearing the law, his prayer the point of being good and better, so they likewise dif- shall be an abomination.” fer in the point of being good and bad. Consequently, if Reply to Objection 1. Gregory is speaking there of the mass of a better priest be itself better, it follows that the holiness of the Divine sacrament. the mass of a bad priest must be bad. Now this is unrea- Reply to Objection 2. In the sacrament of Baptism sonable, because the malice of the ministers cannot affect solemn prayers are not made for all the faithful, as in the Christ’s mysteries, as Augustine says in his work on Bap- mass; therefore there is no parallel in this respect. There tism (Contra Donat. xii). Therefore neither is the mass of is, however, a resemblance as to the effect of the sacra- a better priest the better. ment. On the contrary, It is stated in Decretal i, q. 1: “The Reply to Objection 3. By reason of the power of the worthier the priest, the sooner is he heard in the needs for Holy Ghost, Who communicates to each one the bless- which he prays.” ings of Christ’s members on account of their being united I answer that, There are two things to be considered in charity, the private blessing in the mass of a good priest in the mass. namely, the sacrament itself, which is the is fruitful to others. But the private evil of one man can- chief thing; and the prayers which are offered up in the not hurt another, except the latter, in some way, consent, mass for the quick and the dead. So far as the mass itself as Augustine says (Contra Parmen. ii). Whether heretics, schismatics, and excommunicated persons can consecrate? IIIa q. 82 a. 7 Objection 1. It seems that heretics, schismatics, and we allow them to confer nothing save Baptism.” But none excommunicated persons are not able to consecrate the can consecrate the Eucharist, unless he have the dignity Eucharist. For Augustine says (Liber sentent. Prosperi of the priesthood. Therefore heretics and the like cannot xv) that “there is no such thing as a true sacrifice outside consecrate the Eucharist. the Catholic Church”: and Pope Leo I says (Ep. lxxx; Objection 3. Further, it does not seem feasible for one cf. Decretal i, q. 1): Elsewhere ”(i.e. than in the Church outside the Church to act on behalf of the Church. But which is Christ’s body) there is neither valid priesthood when the priest consecrates the Eucharist, he does so in nor true sacrifice.” But heretics, schismatics, and excom- the person of the entire Church, as is evident from the fact municated persons are severed from the Church. There- of his putting up all prayers in the person of the Church. fore they are unable to offer a true sacrifice. Therefore, it seems that those who are outside the Church, Objection 2. Further (Decretal, caus. i, q. 1), Inno- such as those who are heretics, schismatics, and excom- cent I is quoted as saying: “Because we receive the laity municate, are not able to consecrate the Eucharist. of the Arians and other pestilential persons, if they seem On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Parmen. ii): to repent, it does not follow that their clergy have the dig- “Just as Baptism remains in them,” i.e. in heretics, schis- nity of the priesthood or of any other ministerial office, for matics, and those who are excommunicate, “so do their 2580 orders remain intact.” Now, by the power of his ordina-which on being consecrated by them contains Christ’s true tion, a priest can consecrate the Eucharist. Therefore, it body and blood; but they act wrongly, and sin by doing seems that heretics, schismatics, and those who are ex- so; and in consequence they do not receive the fruit of the communicate, can consecrate the Eucharist, since their or- sacrifice, which is a spiritual sacrifice. ders remain entire. Reply to Objection 1. Such and similar authorities I answer that, Some have contended that heretics, are to be understood in this sense, that the sacrifice is schismatics, and the excommunicate, who are outside offered wrongly outside the Church. Hence outside the the pale of the Church, cannot perform this sacrament. Church there can be no spiritual sacrifice that is a true But herein they are deceived, because, as Augustine says sacrifice with the truth of its fruit, although it be a true (Contra Parmen. ii), “it is one thing to lack something sacrifice with the truth of the sacrament; thus it was stated utterly, and another to have it improperly”; and in like above (q. 80, a. 3), that the sinner receives Christ’s body fashion, “it is one thing not to bestow, and quite another sacramentally, but not spiritually. to bestow, but not rightly.” Accordingly, such as, being Reply to Objection 2. Baptism alone is allowed to be within the Church, received the power of consecrating the conferred by heretics, and schismatics, because they can Eucharist through being ordained to the priesthood, have lawfully baptize in case of necessity; but in no case can such power rightly indeed; but they use it improperly if they lawfully consecrate the Eucharist, or confer the other afterwards they be separated from the Church by heresy, sacraments. schism, or excommunication. But such as are ordained Reply to Objection 3. The priest, in reciting the while separated from the Church, have neither the power prayers of the mass, speaks instead of the Church, in rightly, nor do they use it rightly. But that in both cases whose unity he remains; but in consecrating the sacra- they have the power, is clear from what Augustine says ment he speaks as in the person of Christ, Whose place he (Contra Parmen. ii), that when they return to the unity of holds by the power of his orders. Consequently, if a priest the Church, they are not re-ordained, but are received in severed from the unity of the Church celebrates mass, not their orders. And since the consecration of the Eucharist having lost the power of order, he consecrates Christ’s true is an act which follows the power of order, such persons body and blood; but because he is severed from the unity as are separated from the Church by heresy, schism, or of the Church, his prayers have no efficacy. excommunication, can indeed consecrate the Eucharist, Whether a degraded priest can consecrate this sacrament? IIIa q. 82 a. 8 Objection 1. It seems that a degraded priest cannot degraded man be restored, he has not to be ordained over consecrate this sacrament. For no one can perform this again. Consequently, he has not lost the power of conse- sacrament except he have the power of consecrating. But crating, and so the degraded priest can perform this sacra- the priest “who has been degraded has no power of con- ment. secrating, although he has the power of baptizing” (App. I answer that, The power of consecrating the Eu- Gratiani). Therefore it seems that a degraded priest cannot charist belongs to the character of the priestly order. But consecrate the Eucharist. every character is indelible, because it is given with a kind Objection 2. Further, he who gives can take away. of consecration, as was said above (q. 63 , a. 5), just as the But the bishop in ordaining gives to the priest the power consecrations of all other things are perpetual, and cannot of consecrating. Therefore he can take it away by degrad- be lost or repeated. Hence it is clear that the power of con- ing him. secrating is not lost by degradation. For, again, Augustine Objection 3. Further, the priest, by degradation, loses says (Contra Parmen. ii): “Both are sacraments,” namely either the power of consecrating, or the use of such power. Baptism and order, “and both are given to a man with a But he does not lose merely the use, for thus the degraded kind of consecration; the former, when he is baptized; the one would lose no more than one excommunicated, who latter when he is ordained; and therefore it is not lawful also lacks the use. Therefore it seems that he loses the for Catholics to repeat either of them.” And thus it is evi- power to consecrate, and in consequence that he cannot dent that the degraded priest can perform this sacrament. perform this sacrament. Reply to Objection 1. That Canon is speaking, not On the contrary, Augustine (Contra Parmen. ii) as by way of assertion, but by way of inquiry, as can be proves that “apostates” from the faith “are not deprived gleaned from the context. of their Baptism,” from the fact that “it is not restored Reply to Objection 2. The bishop gives the priestly to them when they return repentant; and therefore it is power of order, not as though coming from himself, but deemed that it cannot be lost.” But in like fashion, if the instrumentally, as God’s minister, and its effect cannot be 2581 taken away by man, according to Mat. 19:6: “What God nal. And therefore the ministry of the priestly power is hath joined together, let no man put asunder.” And there- not taken away from the excommunicate, as it were, per- fore the bishop cannot take this power away, just as neither petually, but only for a time, that they may mend; but the can he who baptizes take away the baptismal character. exercise is withdrawn from the degraded, as though con- Reply to Objection 3. Excommunication is medici- demned perpetually. Whether it is permissible to receive communion from heretical, excommunicate, or IIIa q. 82 a. 9 sinful priests, and to hear mass said by them? Objection 1. It seems that one may lawfully receive forbidden, by the Church’s sentence, to perform the Eu- Communion from heretical, excommunicate, or even sin- charistic rite. And therefore whoever hears their mass or ful priests, and to hear mass said by them. Because, as receives the sacraments from them, commits sin. But not Augustine says (Contra Petilian. iii), “we should not avoid all who are sinners are debarred by the Church’s sentence God’s sacraments, whether they be given by a good man from using this power: and so, although suspended by the or by a wicked one.” But priests, even if they be sinful, or Divine sentence, yet they are not suspended in regard to heretics, or excommunicate, perform a valid sacrament. others by any ecclesiastical sentence: consequently, until Therefore it seems that one ought not to refrain from re- the Church’s sentence is pronounced, it is lawful to re- ceiving Communion at their hands, or from hearing their ceive Communion at their hands, and to hear their mass. mass. Hence on 1 Cor. 5:11, “with such a one not so much Objection 2. Further, Christ’s true body is figurative as to eat,” Augustine’s gloss runs thus: “In saying this of His mystical body, as was said above (q. 67, a. 2). But he was unwilling for a man to be judged by his fellow Christ’s true body is consecrated by the priests mentioned man on arbitrary suspicion, or even by usurped extraordi- above. Therefore it seems that whoever belongs to His nary judgment, but rather by God’s law, according to the mystical body can communicate in their sacrifices. Church’s ordering, whether he confess of his own accord, Objection 3. Further, there are many sins graver than or whether he be accused and convicted.” fornication. But it is not forbidden to hear the masses of Reply to Objection 1. By refusing to hear the masses priests who sin otherwise. Therefore, it ought not to be of such priests, or to receive Communion from them, we forbidden to hear the masses of priests guilty of this sin. are not shunning God’s sacraments; on the contrary, by so On the contrary, The Canon says (Dist. 32): “Let doing we are giving them honor (hence a host consecrated no one hear the mass of a priest whom he knows with- by such priests is to be adored, and if it be reserved, it can out doubt to have a concubine.” Moreover, Gregory says be consumed by a lawful priest): but what we shun is the (Dial. iii) that “the faithless father sent an Arian bishop to sin of the unworthy ministers. his son, for him to receive sacrilegiously the consecrated Reply to Objection 2. The unity of the mystical body Communion at his hands. But, when the Arian bishop ar- is the fruit of the true body received. But those who re- rived, God’s devoted servant rebuked him, as was right for ceive or minister unworthily, are deprived of the fruit, as him to do.” was said above (a. 7; q. 80, a. 4). And therefore, those I answer that, As was said above (Aa. 5,7), hereti- who belong to the unity of the Faith are not to receive the cal, schismatical, excommunicate, or even sinful priests, sacrament from their dispensing. although they have the power to consecrate the Eucharist, Reply to Objection 3. Although fornication is not yet they do not make a proper use of it; on the contrary, graver than other sins, yet men are more prone to it, ow- they sin by using it. But whoever communicates with an- ing to fleshly concupiscence. Consequently, this sin is other who is in sin, becomes a sharer in his sin. Hence specially inhibited to priests by the Church, lest anyone we read in John’s Second Canonical Epistle (11) that “He hear the mass of one living in concubinage. However, this that saith unto him, God speed you, communicateth with is to be understood of one who is notorious, either from his wicked works.” Consequently, it is not lawful to re- being convicted and sentenced, or from having acknowl- ceive Communion from them, or to assist at their mass. edged his guilt in legal form, or from it being impossible Still there is a difference among the above, because to conceal his guilt by any subterfuge. heretics, schismatics, and excommunicates, have been 2582 Whether it is lawful for a priest to refrain entirely from consecrating the Eucharist? IIIa q. 82 a. 10 Objection 1. It seems to be lawful for a priest to re- portunity of offering sacrifice is considered not merely in frain entirely from consecrating the Eucharist. Because, relation to the faithful of Christ to whom the sacraments as it is the priest’s office to consecrate the Eucharist, so it must be administered, but chiefly with regard to God to is likewise to baptize and administer the other sacraments. Whom the sacrifice of this sacrament is offered by conse- But the priest is not bound to act as a minister of the other crating. Hence, it is not lawful for the priest, even though sacraments, unless he has undertaken the care of souls. he has not the care of souls, to refrain altogether from cel- Therefore, it seems that likewise he is not bound to conse- ebrating; and he seems to be bound to celebrate at least on crate the Eucharist except he be charged with the care of the chief festivals, and especially on those days on which souls. the faithful usually communicate. And hence it is that (2 Objection 2. Further, no one is bound to do what is Macc. 4:14) it is said against some priests that they “were unlawful for him to do; otherwise he would be in two not now occupied about the offices of the altar. . . despising minds. But it is not lawful for the priest who is in a state the temple and neglecting the sacrifices.” of sin, or excommunicate, to consecrate the Eucharist, as Reply to Objection 1. The other sacraments are ac- was said above (a. 7). Therefore it seems that such men complished in being used by the faithful, and therefore he are not bound to celebrate, and so neither are the others; alone is bound to administer them who has undertaken the otherwise they would be gainers by their fault. care of souls. But this sacrament is performed in the con- Objection 3. Further, the priestly dignity is not lost secration of the Eucharist, whereby a sacrifice is offered by subsequent weakness: because Pope Gelasius I says to God, to which the priest is bound from the order he has (cf. Decretal, Dist. 55): “As the canonical precepts do received. not permit them who are feeble in body to approach the Reply to Objection 2. The sinful priest, if deprived by priesthood, so if anyone be disabled when once in that the Church’s sentence from exercising his order, simply or state, he cannot lose that he received at the time he was for a time, is rendered incapable of offering sacrifice; con- well.” But it sometimes happens that those who are al- sequently, the obligation lapses. But if not deprived of the ready ordained as priests incur defects whereby they are power of celebrating, the obligation is not removed; nor is hindered from celebrating, such as leprosy or epilepsy, or he in two minds, because he can repent of his sin and then the like. Consequently, it does not appear that priests are celebrate. bound to celebrate. Reply to Objection 3. Weakness or sickness con- On the contrary, Ambrose says in one of his Orations tracted by a priest after his ordination does not deprive (xxxiii): “It is a grave matter if we do not approach Thy him of his orders; but hinders him from exercising them, altar with clean heart and pure hands; but it is graver still as to the consecration of the Eucharist: sometimes by if while shunning sins we also fail to offer our sacrifice.” making it impossible to exercise them, as, for example, I answer that, Some have said that a priest may law- if he lose his sight, or his fingers, or the use of speech; fully refrain altogether from consecrating, except he be and sometimes on account of danger, as in the case of bound to do so, and to give the sacraments to the people, one suffering from epilepsy, or indeed any disease of the by reason of his being entrusted with the care of souls. mind; and sometimes, on account of loathsomeness, as is But this is said quite unreasonably, because everyone evident in the case of a leper, who ought not to celebrate is bound to use the grace entrusted to him, when oppor- in public: he can, however, say mass privately, unless the tunity serves, according to 2 Cor. 6:1: “We exhort you leprosy has gone so far that it has rendered him incapable that you receive not the grace of God in vain.” But the op- owing to the wasting away of his limbs. 2583 THIRD PART, QUESTION 83 Of the Rite of This Sacrament (In Six Articles) We have now to consider the Rite of this sacrament, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ is sacrificed in the celebration of this mystery? (2) Of the time of celebrating; (3) Of the place and other matters relating to the equipment for this celebration; (4) Of the words uttered in celebrating this mystery; (5) Of the actions performed in celebrating this mystery. (6) Of the defects which occur in the celebration of this sacrament. Whether Christ is sacrificed in this sacrament? IIIa q. 83 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that Christ is not sacrificed in we do? Do we not offer it up every day in memory of His the celebration of this sacrament. For it is written (Heb. death?” Secondly it is called a sacrifice, in respect of the 10:14) that “Christ by one oblation hath perfected for ever effect of His Passion: because, to wit, by this sacrament, them that are sanctified.” But that oblation was His obla- we are made partakers of the fruit of our Lord’s Passion. tion. Therefore Christ is not sacrificed in the celebration Hence in one of the Sunday Secrets (Ninth Sunday after of this sacrament. Pentecost) we say: “Whenever the commemoration of this Objection 2. Further, Christ’s sacrifice was made sacrifice is celebrated, the work of our redemption is en- upon the cross, whereon “He delivered Himself for us, acted.” Consequently, according to the first reason, it is an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odor of sweet- true to say that Christ was sacrificed, even in the figures ness,” as is said in Eph. 5:2. But Christ is not crucified in of the Old Testament: hence it is stated in the Apocalypse the celebration of this mystery. Therefore, neither is He (13:8): “Whose names are not written in the Book of Life sacrificed. of the Lamb, which was slain from the beginning of the Objection 3. Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. iv), world.” But according to the second reason, it is proper to in Christ’s sacrifice the priest and the victim are one and this sacrament for Christ to be sacrificed in its celebration. the same. But in the celebration of this sacrament the Reply to Objection 1. As Ambrose says (comment- priest and the victim are not the same. Therefore, the cel- ing on Heb. 10:1), “there is but one victim,” namely that ebration of this sacrament is not a sacrifice of Christ. which Christ offered, and which we offer, “and not many On the contrary, Augustine says in the Liber Sentent. victims, because Christ was offered but once: and this lat- Prosp. (cf. Ep. xcviii): “Christ was sacrificed once in ter sacrifice is the pattern of the former. For, just as what Himself, and yet He is sacrificed daily in the Sacrament.” is offered everywhere is one body, and not many bodies, I answer that, The celebration of this sacrament is so also is it but one sacrifice.” called a sacrifice for two reasons. First, because, as Au- Reply to Objection 2. As the celebration of this gustine says (Ad Simplician. ii), “the images of things sacrament is an image representing Christ’s Passion, so are called by the names of the things whereof they are the the altar is representative of the cross itself, upon which images; as when we look upon a picture or a fresco, we Christ was sacrificed in His proper species. say, ‘This is Cicero and that is Sallust.’ ” But, as was said Reply to Objection 3. For the same reason (cf. Reply above (q. 79, a. 1), the celebration of this sacrament is obj. 2) the priest also bears Christ’s image, in Whose per- an image representing Christ’s Passion, which is His true son and by Whose power he pronounces the words of con- sacrifice. Accordingly the celebration of this sacrament is secration, as is evident from what was said above (q. 82, called Christ’s sacrifice. Hence it is that Ambrose, in com- Aa. 1,3). And so, in a measure, the priest and victim are menting on Heb. 10:1, says: “In Christ was offered up a one and the same. sacrifice capable of giving eternal salvation; what then do 2584 Whether the time for celebrating this mystery has been properly determined? IIIa q. 83 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that the time for celebrating this solemnly celebrated by the Church in that part of the day. mystery has not been properly determined. For as was ob- Reply to Objection 1. Christ’s Passion is recalled served above (a. 1), this sacrament is representative of our in this sacrament, inasmuch as its effect flows out to the Lord’s Passion. But the commemoration of our Lord’s faithful; but at Passion-tide Christ’s Passion is recalled Passion takes place in the Church once in the year: be- inasmuch as it was wrought in Him Who is our Head. This cause Augustine says (Enarr. ii in Ps. 21): “Is not Christ took place but once; whereas the faithful receive daily the slain as often as the Pasch is celebrated? Nevertheless, fruits of His Passion: consequently, the former is com- the anniversary remembrance represents what took place memorated but once in the year, whereas the latter takes in by-gone days; and so it does not cause us to be stirred place every day, both that we may partake of its fruit and as if we saw our Lord hanging upon the cross.” Therefore in order that we may have a perpetual memorial. this sacrament ought to be celebrated but once a year. Reply to Objection 2. The figure ceases on the advent Objection 2. Further, Christ’s Passion is commemo- of the reality. But this sacrament is a figure and a represen- rated in the Church on the Friday before Easter, and not tation of our Lord’s Passion, as stated above. And there- on Christmas Day. Consequently, since this sacrament is fore on the day on which our Lord’s Passion is recalled as commemorative of our Lord’s Passion, it seems unsuit- it was really accomplished, this sacrament is not conse- able for this sacrament to be celebrated thrice on Christ- crated. Nevertheless, lest the Church be deprived on that mas Day, and to be entirely omitted on Good Friday. day of the fruit of the Passion offered to us by this sacra- Objection 3. Further, in the celebration of this sacra- ment, the body of Christ consecrated the day before is ment the Church ought to imitate Christ’s institution. But reserved to be consumed on that day; but the blood is not it was in the evening that Christ consecrated this sacra- reserved, on account of danger, and because the blood is ment. Therefore it seems that this sacrament ought to be more specially the image of our Lord’s Passion, as stated celebrated at that time of day. above (q. 78, a. 3, ad 2). Nor is it true, as some affirm, Objection 4. Further, as is set down in the Decretals that the wine is changed into blood when the particle of (De Consecr., dist. i), Pope Leo I wrote to Dioscorus, Christ’s body is dropped into it. Because this cannot be Bishop of Alexandria, that “it is permissible to celebrate done otherwise than by consecration under the due form mass in the first part of the day.” But the day begins at of words. midnight, as was said above (q. 80, a. 8, ad 5). Therefore On Christmas Day, however, several masses are said it seems that after midnight it is lawful to celebrate. on account of Christ’s threefold nativity. Of these the first Objection 5. Further, in one of the Sunday Secrets is His eternal birth, which is hidden in our regard. and (Ninth Sunday after Pentecost) we say: “Grant us, Lord, therefore one mass is sung in the night, in the “Introit” of we beseech Thee, to frequent these mysteries.” But there which we say: “The Lord said unto Me: Thou art My Son, will be greater frequency if the priest celebrates several this day have I begotten Thee.” The second is His nativity times a day. Therefore it seems that the priest ought not in time, and the spiritual birth, whereby Christ rises “as to be hindered from celebrating several times daily. the day-star in our [Vulg.: ‘your’] hearts” (2 Pet. 1:19), On the contrary is the custom which the Church ob- and on this account the mass is sung at dawn, and in the serves according to the statutes of the Canons. “Introit” we say: “The light will shine on us today.” The I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), in the celebra- third is Christ’s temporal and bodily birth, according as tion of this mystery, we must take into consideration the He went forth from the virginal womb, becoming visible representation of our Lord’s Passion, and the participa- to us through being clothed with flesh: and on that account tion of its fruits; and the time suitable for the celebration the third mass is sung in broad daylight, in the “Introit” of of this mystery ought to be determined by each of these which we say: “A child is born to us.” Nevertheless, on considerations. Now since, owing to our daily defects, we the other hand, it can be said that His eternal generation, stand in daily need of the fruits of our Lord’s Passion, this of itself, is in the full light, and on this account in the sacrament is offered regularly every day in the Church. gospel of the third mass mention is made of His eternal Hence our Lord teaches us to pray (Lk. 11:3): “Give us birth. But regarding His birth in the body, He was literally this day our daily bread”: in explanation of which words born during the night, as a sign that He came to the dark- Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxviii): “If it be a daily nesses of our infirmity; hence also in the midnight mass bread, why do you take it once a year, as the Greeks have we say the gospel of Christ’s nativity in the flesh. the custom in the east? Receive it daily that it may benefit Likewise on other days upon which many of God’s you every day.” benefits have to be recalled or besought, several masses But since our Lord’s Passion was celebrated from are celebrated on one day, as for instance, one for the the third to the ninth hour, therefore this sacrament is feast, and another for a fast or for the dead. 2585 Reply to Objection 3. As already observed (q. 73, to be taken from midnight; nor from sunrise, that is, when a. 5), Christ wished to give this sacrament last of all, in the substance of the sun appears above the earth; but when order that it might make a deeper impression on the hearts the dawn begins to show: because then the sun is said to of the disciples; and therefore it was after supper, at the be risen when the brightness of his beams appears. Ac- close of day, that He consecrated this sacrament and gave cordingly it is written (Mk. 16:1) that “the women came it to His disciples. But we celebrate at the hour when our to the tomb, the sun being now risen”; though, as John Lord suffered, i.e. either, as on feast-days, at the hour of relates (Jn. 20:1), “while it was yet dark they came to Terce, when He was crucified by the tongues of the Jews the tomb.” It is in this way that Augustine explains this (Mk. 15:25), and when the Holy Ghost descended upon difference (De Consens. Evang. iii). the disciples (Acts 2:15); or, as when no feast is kept, at Exception is made on the night of Christmas eve, when the hour of Sext, when He was crucified at the hands of mass is celebrated, because our Lord was born in the night the soldiers (Jn. 19:14), or, as on fasting days, at None, (De Consecr., dist. 1). And in like manner it is cel- when crying out with a loud voice He gave up the ghost ebrated on Holy Saturday towards the beginning of the (Mat. 27:46,50). night, since our Lord rose in the night, that is, “when it Nevertheless the mass can be postponed, especially was yet dark, before the sun’s rising was manifest.” when Holy orders have to be conferred, and still more on Reply to Objection 5. As is set down in the de- Holy Saturday; both on account of the length of the of- cree (De Consecr., dist. 1), in virtue of a decree of fice, and also because orders belong to the Sunday, as is Pope Alexander II, “it is enough for a priest to celebrate set forth in the Decretals (dist. 75). one mass each day, because Christ suffered once and re- Masses, however, can be celebrated “in the first part of deemed the whole world; and very happy is he who can the day,” owing to any necessity; as is stated De Consecr., worthily celebrate one mass. But there are some who say dist. 1. one mass for the dead, and another of the day, if need be. Reply to Objection 4. As a rule mass ought to be said But I do not deem that those escape condemnation who in the day and not in the night, because Christ is present presume to celebrate several masses daily, either for the in this sacrament, Who says (Jn. 9:4,5): “I must work the sake of money, or to gain flattery from the laity.” And works of Him that sent Me, whilst it is day: because the Pope Innocent III says (Extra, De Celebr. Miss., chap. night cometh when no man can work; as long as I am in Consuluisti) that “except on the day of our Lord’s birth, the world, I am the light of the world.” Yet this should be unless necessity urges, it suffices for a priest to celebrate done in such a manner that the beginning of the day is not only one mass each day.” Whether this sacrament ought to be celebrated in a house and with sacred vessels? IIIa q. 83 a. 3 Objection 1. It seems that this sacrament ought not to Holy Ghost. But it seems useless to consecrate a church, be celebrated in a house and with sacred vessels. For this or an altar, or such like inanimate things, since they are not sacrament is a representation of our Lord’s Passion. But capable of receiving grace or spiritual virtue. Therefore it Christ did not suffer in a house, but outside the city gate, is unbecoming for such consecrations to be performed in according to Heb. 1:12: “Jesus, that He might sanctify the Church. the people by His own blood, suffered without the gate.” Objection 4. Further, only Divine works ought to be Therefore, it seems that this sacrament ought not to be recalled with solemnity, according to Ps. 91:5: “I shall celebrated in a house, but rather in the open air. rejoice in the works of Thy hands.” Now the consecration Objection 2. Further, in the celebration of this sacra- of a church or altar, is the work of a man; as is also the ment the Church ought to imitate the custom of Christ and consecration of the chalice, and of the ministers, and of the apostles. But the house wherein Christ first wrought other such things. But these latter consecrations are not this sacrament was not consecrated, but merely an ordi- commemorated in the Church. Therefore neither ought nary supper-room prepared by the master of the house, as the consecration of a church or of an altar to be commem- related in Lk. 22:11,12. Moreover, we read (Acts 2:46) orated with solemnity. that “the apostles were continuing daily with one accord Objection 5. Further, the truth ought to correspond in the temple; and, breaking bread from house to house, with the figure. But in the Old Testament, which was a they took their meat with gladness.” Consequently, there figure of the New, the altar was not made of hewn stones: is no need for houses, in which this sacrament is cele- for, it is written (Ex. 20:24): “You shall make an altar of brated, to be consecrated. earth unto Me. . . and if thou make an altar of stone unto Objection 3. Further, nothing that is to no purpose Me, thou shalt not build it of hewn stones.” Again, the ought to be done in the Church, which is governed by the altar is commanded to be made of “setim-wood,” covered 2586 “with brass” (Ex. 27:1,2), or “with gold” (Ex. 25). Con-try, that so the whole world might serve as a house for sequently, it seems unfitting for the Church to make ex- Christ’s Passion. Nevertheless, as is said in De Consecr., clusive use of altars made of stone. dist. 1, “if a church be not to hand, we permit travelers Objection 6. Further, the chalice with the paten rep- to celebrate mass in the open air, or in a tent, if there be resents Christ’s tomb, which was “hewn in a rock,” as is a consecrated altar-table to hand, and the other requisites narrated in the Gospels. Consequently, the chalice ought belonging to the sacred function.” to be of stone, and not of gold or of silver or tin. Reply to Objection 2. The house in which this sacra- Objection 7. Further, just as gold is the most precious ment is celebrated denotes the Church, and is termed a among the materials of the altar vessels, so are cloths of church; and so it is fittingly consecrated, both to represent silk the most precious among other cloths. Consequently, the holiness which the Church acquired from the Passion, since the chalice is of gold, the altar cloths ought to be as well as to denote the holiness required of them who made of silk and not of linen. have to receive this sacrament. By the altar Christ Him- Objection 8. Further, the dispensing and ordering of self is signified, of Whom the Apostle says (Heb. 13:15): the sacraments belong to the Church’s ministers, just as “Through Him we offer a sacrifice of praise to God.” the ordering of temporal affairs is subject to the ruling of Hence the consecration of the altar signifies Christ’s holi- secular princes; hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:1): “Let ness, of which it was said (Lk. 1:35): “The Holy one born a man so esteem us as the ministers of Christ end the dis- of thee shall be called the Son of God.” Hence we read pensers of the mysteries of God.” But if anything be done in De Consecr., dist. 1: “It has seemed pleasing for the against the ordinances of princes it is deemed void. There- altars to be consecrated not merely with the anointing of fore, if the various items mentioned above are suitably chrism, but likewise with the priestly blessing.” commanded by the Church’s prelates, it seems that the And therefore, as a rule, it is not lawful to celebrate body of Christ could not be consecrated unless they be ob- this sacrament except in a consecrated house. Hence it is served; and so it appears to follow that Christ’s words are enacted (De Consecr., dist. 1): “Let no priest presume to not sufficient of themselves for consecrating this sacra- say mass except in places consecrated by the bishop.” And ment: which is contrary to the fact. Consequently, it does furthermore because pagans and other unbelievers are not not seem fitting for such ordinances to be made touching members of the Church, therefore we read (De Consecr., the celebration of this sacrament. dist. 1): “It is not lawful to bless a church in which the On the contrary, The Church’s ordinances are bodies of unbelievers are buried, but if it seem suitable for Christ’s own ordinances; since He said (Mat. 18:20): consecration, then, after removing the corpses and tear- “Wherever two or three are gathered together in My name, ing down the walls or beams, let it be rebuilt. If, how- there am I in the midst of them.” ever, it has been already consecrated, and the faithful lie I answer that, There are two things to be considered in it, it is lawful to celebrate mass therein.” Nevertheless regarding the equipment of this sacrament: one of these in a case of necessity this sacrament can be performed in belongs to the representation of the events connected with houses which have not been consecrated, or which have our Lord’s Passion; while the other is connected with the been profaned; but with the bishop’s consent. Hence we reverence due to the sacrament, in which Christ is con- read in the same distinction: “We deem that masses are tained verily, and not in figure only. not to be celebrated everywhere, but in places consecrated Hence we consecrate those things which we make use by the bishop, or where he gives permission.” But not of in this sacrament; both that we may show our reverence without a portable altar consecrated by the bishop: hence for the sacrament, and in order to represent the holiness in the same distinction we read: “We permit that, if the which is the effect of the Passion of Christ, according to churches be devastated or burned, masses may be cele- Heb. 13:12: “Jesus, that He might sanctify the people by brated in chapels, with a consecrated altar.” For because His own blood,” etc. Christ’s holiness is the fount of all the Church’s holiness, Reply to Objection 1. This sacrament ought as a rule therefore in necessity a consecrated altar suffices for per- to be celebrated in a house, whereby the Church is signi- forming this sacrament. And on this account a church fied, according to 1 Tim. 3:15: “That thou mayest know is never consecrated without consecrating the altar. Yet how thou oughtest to behave thyself in the house of God, sometimes an altar is consecrated apart from the church, which is the Church of the living God.” Because “out- with the relics of the saints, “whose lives are hidden with side the Church there is no place for the true sacrifice,” as Christ in God” (Col. 3:3). Accordingly under the same Augustine says (Liber Sentent. Prosp. xv). And because distinction we read: “It is our pleasure that altars, in which the Church was not to be confined within the territories of no relics of saints are found enclosed, be thrown down, if the Jewish people, but was to be established throughout possible, by the bishops presiding over such places.” the whole world, therefore Christ’s Passion was not cele- Reply to Objection 3. The church, altar, and other brated within the city of the Jews, but in the open coun- like inanimate things are consecrated, not because they are 2587 capable of receiving grace, but because they acquire spe-consecration of a church or of an altar is more fittingly cial spiritual virtue from the consecration, whereby they commemorated. And on this account the solemnity of are rendered fit for the Divine worship, so that man derives a church dedication is observed for eight days, in or- devotion therefrom, making him more fitted for Divine der to signify the happy resurrection of Christ and of the functions, unless this be hindered by want of reverence. Church’s members. Nor is the consecration of a church Hence it is written (2 Macc. 3:38): “There is undoubtedly or altar man’s doing only, since it has a spiritual virtue. in that place a certain power of God; for He that hath His Hence in the same distinction (De Consecr.) it is said: dwelling in the heavens is the visitor, and the protector of “The solemnities of the dedication of churches are to be that place.” solemnly celebrated each year: and that dedications are to Hence it is that such places are cleansed and exor- be kept up for eight days, you will find in the third book cised before being consecrated, that the enemy’s power of Kings” (8:66). may be driven forth. And for the same reason churches Reply to Objection 5. As we read in De Consecr., defiled by shedding of blood or seed are reconciled: be- dist. 1, “altars, if not of stone, are not to be consecrated cause some machination of the enemy is apparent on ac- with the anointing of chrism.” And this is in keeping with count of the sin committed there. And for this reason we the signification of this sacrament; both because the altar read in the same distinction: “Wherever you find churches signifies Christ, for in 1 Cor. 10:3, it is written, “But the of the Arians, consecrate them as Catholic churches with- rock was Christ”: and because Christ’s body was laid in a out delay by means of devout prayers and rites.” Hence, stone sepulchre. This is also in keeping with the use of the too, it is that some say with probability, that by entering a sacrament. Because stone is solid, and may be found ev- consecrated church one obtains forgiveness of venial sins, erywhere. which was not necessary in the old Law, when just as one does by the sprinkling of holy water; alleging the altar was made in one place. As to the commandment the words of Ps. 84:2,3: “Lord, Thou hast blessed Thy to make the altar of earth, or of unhewn stones, this was land. . . Thou hast forgiven the iniquity of Thy people.” given in order to remove idolatry. And therefore, in consequence of the virtue acquired by a Reply to Objection 6. As is laid down in the same church’s consecration, the consecration is never repeated. distinction, “formerly the priests did not use golden but Accordingly we find in the same distinction the follow- wooden chalices; but Pope Zephyrinus ordered the mass ing words quoted from the Council of Nicaea: “Churches to be said with glass patens; and subsequently Pope Ur- which have once been consecrated, must not be conse- ban had everything made of silver.” Afterwards it was crated again, except they be devastated by fire, or defiled decided that “the Lord’s chalice with the paten should be by shedding of blood or of anyone’s seed; because, just made entirely of gold, or of silver or at least of tin. But it as a child once baptized in the name of the Father, and of is not to be made of brass, or copper, because the action of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, ought not to be baptized the wine thereon produces verdigris, and provokes vomit- again, so neither ought a place, once dedicated to God, ing. But no one is to presume to sing mass with a chalice to be consecrated again, except owing to the causes men- of wood or of glass,” because as the wood is porous, the tioned above; provided that the consecrators held faith in consecrated blood would remain in it; while glass is brit- the Holy Trinity”: in fact, those outside the Church can- tle and there might arise danger of breakage; and the same not consecrate. But, as we read in the same distinction: applies to stone. Consequently, out of reverence for the “Churches or altars of doubtful consecration are to be con- sacrament, it was enacted that the chalice should be made secrated anew.” of the aforesaid materials. And since they acquire special spiritual virtue from Reply to Objection 7. Where it could be done with- their consecration, we find it laid down in the same dis- out danger, the Church gave order for that thing to be used tinction that “the beams of a dedicated church ought not which more expressively represents Christ’s Passion. But to be used for any other purpose, except it be for some there was not so much danger regarding the body which other church, or else they are to be burned, or put to the is placed on the corporal, as there is with the blood con- use of brethren in some monastery: but on no account are tained in the chalice. And consequently, although the they to be discarded for works of the laity.” We read there, chalice is not made of stone, yet the corporal is made of too, that “the altar covering, chair, candlesticks, and veil, linen, since Christ’s body was wrapped therein. Hence we are to be burned when warn out; and their ashes are to be read in an Epistle of Pope Silvester, quoted in the same placed in the baptistery, or in the walls, or else cast into distinction: “By a unanimous decree we command that the trenches beneath the flag-stones, so as not to be defiled no one shall presume to celebrate the sacrifice of the al- by the feet of those that enter.” tar upon a cloth of silk, or dyed material, but upon linen Reply to Objection 4. Since the consecration of the consecrated by the bishop; as Christ’s body was buried in altar signifies Christ’s holiness, and the consecration of a clean linen winding-sheet.” Moreover, linen material is a house the holiness of the entire Church, therefore the becoming, owing to its cleanness, to denote purity of con- 2588 science, and, owing to the manifold labor with which it is cration over the proper matter with the intention of con-prepared, to denote Christ’s Passion. secrating, then, without every one of the things men- Reply to Objection 8. The dispensing of the sacra- tioned above—namely, without house, and altar, conse- ments belongs to the Church’s ministers; but their conse- crated chalice and corporal, and the other things insti- cration is from God Himself. Consequently, the Church’s tuted by the Church—he consecrates Christ’s body in very ministers can make no ordinances regarding the form of truth; yet he is guilty of grave sin, in not following the rite the consecration, and the manner of celebrating. And of the Church. therefore, if the priest pronounces the words of conse- Whether the words spoken in this sacrament are properly framed? IIIa q. 83 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that the words spoken in this is much more excellent than the sacrifice of the fathers sacrament are not properly framed. For, as Ambrose of old. Therefore, it is unfitting for the priest to pray that says (De Sacram. iv), this sacrament is consecrated with this sacrifice may be as acceptable as the sacrifice of Abel, Christ’s own words. Therefore no other words besides Abraham, and Melchisedech. Christ’s should be spoken in this sacrament. Objection 9. Further, just as Christ’s body does not Objection 2. Further, Christ’s words and deeds are begin to be in this sacrament by change of place, as stated made known to us through the Gospel. But in conse- above (q. 75, a. 2), so likewise neither does it cease to be crating this sacrament words are used which are not set there. Consequently, it is improper for the priest to ask: down in the Gospels: for we do not read in the Gospel, “Bid these things be borne by the hands of thy holy angel of Christ lifting up His eyes to heaven while consecrat- unto Thine altar on high.” ing this sacrament: and similarly it is said in the Gospel: On the contrary, We find it stated in De Consecr., “Take ye and eat” [comedite] without the addition of the dist. 1, that “James, the brother of the Lord according to word “all,” whereas in celebrating this sacrament we say: the flesh, and Basil, bishop of Caesarea, edited the rite of “Lifting up His eyes to heaven,” and again, “Take ye and celebrating the mass”: and from their authority it is man- eat [manducate] of this.” Therefore such words as these ifest that whatever words are employed in this matter, are are out of place when spoken in the celebration of this chosen becomingly. sacrament. I answer that, Since the whole mystery of our sal- Objection 3. Further, all the other sacraments are or- vation is comprised in this sacrament, therefore is it per- dained for the salvation of all the faithful. But in the cele- formed with greater solemnity than the other sacraments. bration of the other sacraments there is no common prayer And since it is written (Eccles. 4:17): “Keep thy foot put up for the salvation of all the faithful and of the de- when thou goest into the house of God”; and (Ecclus. parted. Consequently it is unbecoming in this sacrament. 18:23): “Before prayer prepare thy soul,” therefore the Objection 4. Further, Baptism especially is called the celebration of this mystery is preceded by a certain prepa- sacrament of faith. Consequently, the truths which belong ration in order that we may perform worthily that which to instruction in the faith ought rather to be given regard- follows after. The first part of this preparation is Di- ing Baptism than regarding this sacrament, such as the vine praise, and consists in the “Introit”: according to Ps. doctrine of the apostles and of the Gospels. 49:23: “The sacrifice of praise shall glorify me; and there Objection 5. Further, devotion on the part of the faith- is the way by which I will show him the salvation of God”: ful is required in every sacrament. Consequently, the de- and this is taken for the most part from the Psalms, or, at votion of the faithful ought not to be stirred up in this least, is sung with a Psalm, because, as Dionysius says sacrament more than in the others by Divine praises and (Eccl. Hier. iii): “The Psalms comprise by way of praise by admonitions, such as, “Lift up your hearts.” whatever is contained in Sacred Scripture.” Objection 6. Further, the minister of this sacrament is The second part contains a reference to our present the priest, as stated above (q. 82, a. 1). Consequently, all misery, by reason of which we pray for mercy, saying: the words spoken in this sacrament ought to be uttered by “Lord, have mercy on us,” thrice for the Person of the Fa- the priest, and not some by the ministers, and some by the ther, and “Christ, have mercy on us,” thrice for the Person choir. of the Son, and “Lord, have mercy on us,” thrice for the Objection 7. Further, the Divine power works this Person of the Holy Ghost; against the threefold misery sacrament unfailingly. Therefore it is to no purpose that of ignorance, sin, and punishment; or else to express the the priest asks for the perfecting of this sacrament, saying: “circuminsession” of all the Divine Persons. “Which oblation do thou, O God, in all,” etc. The third part commemorates the heavenly glory, to Objection 8. Further, the sacrifice of the New Law the possession of which, after this life of misery, we are 2589 tending, in the words, “Glory be to God on high,” which or for whom the mass is offered.” Secondly, he commem-are sung on festival days, on which the heavenly glory is orates the saints, invoking their patronage for those men- commemorated, but are omitted in those sorrowful offices tioned above, when he says: “Communicating with, and which commemorate our unhappy state. honoring the memory,” etc. Thirdly, he concludes the peti- The fourth part contains the prayer which the priest tion when he says: “Wherefore that this oblation,” etc., in makes for the people, that they may be made worthy of order that the oblation may be salutary to them for whom such great mysteries. it is offered. There precedes, in the second place, the instruction of Then he comes to the consecration itself. Here he asks the faithful, because this sacrament is “a mystery of faith,” first of all for the effect of the consecration, when he says: as stated above (q. 78, a. 3, ad 5). Now this instruction is “Which oblation do Thou, O God,” etc. Secondly, he per- given “dispositively,” when the Lectors and Sub-deacons forms the consecration using our Saviour’s words, when read aloud in the church the teachings of the prophets and he says: “Who the day before,” etc. Thirdly, he makes apostles: after this “lesson,” the choir sing the “Gradual,” excuse for his presumption in obeying Christ’s command, which signifies progress in life; then the “Alleluia” is in- saying: “Wherefore, calling to mind,” etc. Fourthly, he toned, and this denotes spiritual joy; or in mournful offices asks that the sacrifice accomplished may find favor with the “Tract”, expressive of spiritual sighing; for all these God, when he says: “Look down upon them with a propi- things ought to result from the aforesaid teaching. But tious,” etc. Fifthly, he begs for the effect of this sacrifice the people are instructed “perfectly” by Christ’s teaching and sacrament, first for the partakers, saying: “We humbly contained in the Gospel, which is read by the higher min- beseech Thee”; then for the dead, who can no longer re- isters, that is, by the Deacons. And because we believe ceive it, saying: “Be mindful also, O Lord,” etc.; thirdly, Christ as the Divine truth, according to Jn. 8:46, “If I for the priests themselves who offer, saying: “And to us tell you the truth, why do you not believe Me?” after the sinners,” etc. Gospel has been read, the “Creed” is sung in which the Then follows the act of receiving the sacrament. First people show that they assent by faith to Christ’s doctrine. of all, the people are prepared for Communion; first, by And it is sung on those festivals of which mention is made the common prayer of the congregation, which is the therein, as on the festivals of Christ, of the Blessed Virgin, Lord’s Prayer, in which we ask for our daily bread to be and of the apostles, who laid the foundations of this faith, given us; and also by private prayer, which the priest puts and on other such days. up specially for the people, when he says: “Deliver us, we So then, after the people have been prepared and in- beseech Thee, O Lord,” etc. Secondly, the people are pre- structed, the next step is to proceed to the celebration of pared by the “Pax” which is given with the words, “Lamb the mystery, which is both offered as a sacrifice, and con- of God,” etc., because this is the sacrament of unity and secrated and received as a sacrament: since first we have peace, as stated above (q. 73, a. 4; q. 79, a. 1). But in the oblation; then the consecration of the matter offered; masses for the dead, in which the sacrifice is offered not and thirdly, its reception. for present peace, but for the repose of the dead, the “Pax” In regard to the oblation, two things are done, namely, is omitted. the people’s praise in singing the “offertory,” express- Then follows the reception of the sacrament, the priest ing the joy of the offerers, and the priest’s prayer asking receiving first, and afterwards giving it to others, because, for the people’s oblation to be made acceptable to God. as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii), he who gives Divine Hence David said (1 Para 29:17): “In the simplicity of my things to others, ought first to partake thereof himself. heart, I have. . . offered all these things: and I have seen Finally, the whole celebration of mass ends with the with great joy Thy people which are here present, offer thanksgiving, the people rejoicing for having received the Thee their offerings”: and then he makes the following mystery (and this is the meaning of the singing after the prayer: “O Lord God. . . keep. . . this will.” Communion); and the priest returning thanks by prayer, as Then, regarding the consecration, performed by super- Christ, at the close of the supper with His disciples, “said natural power, the people are first of all excited to devotion a hymn” (Mat. 26:30). in the “Preface,” hence they are admonished “to lift up Reply to Objection 1. The consecration is accom- their hearts to the Lord,” and therefore when the “Preface” plished by Christ’s words only; but the other words must is ended the people devoutly praise Christ’s Godhead, say- be added to dispose the people for receiving it, as stated ing with the angels: “Holy, Holy, Holy”; and His human- above. ity, saying with the children: “Blessed is he that cometh.” Reply to Objection 2. As is stated in the last chap- In the next place the priest makes a “commemoration,” ter of John (verse 25), our Lord said and did many things first of those for whom this sacrifice is offered, namely, which are not written down by the Evangelists; and among for the whole Church, and “for those set in high places” them is the uplifting of His eyes to heaven at the supper; (1 Tim. 2:2), and, in a special manner, of them “who offer, nevertheless the Roman Church had it by tradition from 2590 the apostles. For it seems reasonable that He Who lifted sis Deo.” Other words are uttered by the ministers, such up His eyes to the Father in raising Lazarus to life, as re- as the doctrine of the Old and New Testament, as a sign lated in Jn. 11:41, and in the prayer which He made for that this doctrine was announced to the peoples through the disciples (Jn. 17:1), had more reason to do so in insti- ministers sent by God. And there are other words which tuting this sacrament, as being of greater import. the priest alone recites, namely, such as belong to his per- The use of the word “manducate” instead of sonal office, “that he may offer up gifts and prayers for “comedite” makes no difference in the meaning, nor does the people” (Heb. 5:1). Some of these, however, he says the expression signify, especially since those words are no aloud, namely, such as are common to priest and people part of the form, as stated above (q. 78, a. 1, ad 2,4). alike, such as the “common prayers”; other words, how- The additional word “all” is understood in the ever, belong to the priest alone, such as the oblation and Gospels, although not expressed, because He had said (Jn. the consecration; consequently, the prayers that are said in 6:54): “Except you eat the flesh of the Son of Man. . . you connection with these have to be said by the priest in se- shall not have life in you.” cret. Nevertheless, in both he calls the people to attention Reply to Objection 3. The Eucharist is the sacra- by saying: “The Lord be with you,” and he waits for them ment of the unity of the whole Church: and therefore in to assent by saying “Amen.” And therefore before the se- this sacrament, more than in the others, mention ought to cret prayers he says aloud, “The Lord be with you,” and be made of all that belongs to the salvation of the entire he concludes, “For ever and ever.” Or the priest secretly Church. pronounces some of the words as a token that regarding Reply to Objection 4. There is a twofold instruction Christ’s Passion the disciples acknowledged Him only in in the Faith: the first is for those receiving it for the first secret. time, that is to say, for catechumens, and such instruc- Reply to Objection 7. The efficacy of the sacramen- tion is given in connection with Baptism. The other is tal words can be hindered by the priest’s intention. Nor is the instruction of the faithful who take part in this sacra- there anything unbecoming in our asking of God for what ment; and such instruction is given in connection with this we know He will do, just as Christ (Jn. 17:1,5) asked for sacrament. Nevertheless catechumens and unbelievers are His glorification. not excluded therefrom. Hence in De Consecr., dist. 1, But the priest does not seem to pray there for the con- it is laid down: “Let the bishop hinder no one from en- secration to be fulfilled, but that it may be fruitful in our tering the church, and hearing the word of God, be they regard, hence he says expressively: “That it may become Gentiles, heretics, or Jews, until the mass of the Catechu- ‘to us’ the body and the blood.” Again, the words preced- mens begins,” in which the instruction regarding the Faith ing these have that meaning, when he says: “Vouchsafe to is contained. make this oblation blessed,” i.e. according to Augustine Reply to Objection 5. Greater devotion is required in (Paschasius, De Corp. et Sang. Dom. xii), “that we may this sacrament than in the others, for the reason that the receive a blessing,” namely, through grace; “ ‘enrolled,’ entire Christ is contained therein. Moreover, this sacra- i.e. that we may be enrolled in heaven; ‘ratified,’ i.e. ment requires a more general devotion, i.e. on the part that we may be incorporated in Christ; ‘reasonable,’ i.e. of the whole people, since for them it is offered; and not that we may be stripped of our animal sense; ‘acceptable,’ merely on the part of the recipients, as in the other sacra- i.e. that we who in ourselves are displeasing, may, by its ments. Hence Cyprian observes (De Orat. Domin. 31), means, be made acceptable to His only Son.” “The priest, in saying the Preface, disposes the souls of Reply to Objection 8. Although this sacrament is of the brethren by saying, ‘Lift up your hearts,’ and when itself preferable to all ancient sacrifices, yet the sacrifices the people answer—‘We have lifted them up to the Lord,’ of the men of old were most acceptable to God on account let them remember that they are to think of nothing else of their devotion. Consequently the priest asks that this but God.” sacrifice may be accepted by God through the devotion of Reply to Objection 6. As was said above (ad 3), those the offerers, just as the former sacrifices were accepted by things are mentioned in this sacrament which belong to Him. the entire Church; and consequently some things which Reply to Objection 9. The priest does not pray that refer to the people are sung by the choir, and same of the sacramental species may be borne up to heaven; nor these words are all sung by the choir, as though inspir- that Christ’s true body may be borne thither, for it does ing the entire people with them; and there are other words not cease to be there; but he offers this prayer for Christ’s which the priest begins and the people take up, the priest mystical body, which is signified in this sacrament, that then acting as in the person of God; to show that the things the angel standing by at the Divine mysteries may present they denote have come to the people through Divine rev- to God the prayers of both priest and people, according to elation, such as faith and heavenly glory; and therefore Apoc. 8:4: “And the smoke of the incense of the prayers the priest intones the “Creed” and the “Gloria in excel- of the saints ascended up before God, from the hand of 2591 the angel.” But God’s “altar on high” means either the And from this the mass derives its name [missa]; Church triumphant, unto which we pray to be translated, because the priest sends [mittit] his prayers up to God or else God Himself, in Whom we ask to share; because it through the angel, as the people do through the priest. is said of this altar (Ex. 20:26): “Thou shalt not go up by or else because Christ is the victim sent [missa] to us: steps unto My altar, i.e. thou shalt make no steps towards accordingly the deacon on festival days “dismisses” the the Trinity.” Or else by the angel we are to understand people at the end of the mass, by saying: “Ite, missa est,” Christ Himself, Who is the “Angel of great counsel” (Is. that is, the victim has been sent [missa est] to God through 9:6: Septuagint), Who unites His mystical body with God the angel, so that it may be accepted by God. the Father and the Church triumphant. Whether the actions performed in celebrating this sacrament are becoming? IIIa q. 83 a. 5 Objection 1. It seems that the actions performed in proper for the priest to divide the host. celebrating this mystery are not becoming. For, as is evi- Objection 8. Further, the ceremonies performed in dent from its form, this sacrament belongs to the New Tes- this sacrament represent Christ’s Passion. But during the tament. But under the New Testament the ceremonies of Passion Christ’s body was divided in the places of the five the old are not to be observed, such as that the priests and wounds. Therefore Christ’s body ought to be broken into ministers were purified with water when they drew nigh to five parts rather than into three. offer up the sacrifice: for we read (Ex. 30:19,20): “Aaron Objection 9. Further, Christ’s entire body is conse- and his sons shall wash their hands and feet. . . when they crated in this sacrament apart from the blood. Conse- are going into the tabernacle of the testimony. . . and when quently, it is not proper for a particle of the body to be they are to come to the altar.” Therefore it is not fitting that mixed with the blood. the priest should wash his hands when celebrating mass. Objection 10. Further, just as, in this sacrament, Objection 2. Further, (Ex. 30:7), the Lord com- Christ’s body is set before us as food, so is His blood, manded Aaron to “burn sweet-smelling incense” upon the as drink. But in receiving Christ’s body no other bodily altar which was “before the propitiatory”: and the same food is added in the celebration of the mass. Therefore, it action was part of the ceremonies of the Old Law. There- is out of place for the priest, after taking Christ’s blood, to fore it is not fitting for the priest to use incense during receive other wine which is not consecrated. mass. Objection 11. Further, the truth ought to be con- Objection 3. Further, the ceremonies performed in the formable with the figure. But regarding the Paschal Lamb, sacraments of the Church ought not to be repeated. Con- which was a figure of this sacrament, it was commanded sequently it is not proper for the priest to repeat the sign that nothing of it should “remain until the morning.” It is of the cross many times over this sacrament. improper therefore for consecrated hosts to be reserved, Objection 4. Further, the Apostle says (Heb. 7:7): and not consumed at once. “And without all contradiction, that which is less, is Objection 12. Further, the priest addresses in the plu- blessed by the better.” But Christ, Who is in this sacra- ral number those who are hearing mass, when he says, ment after the consecration, is much greater than the “The Lord be with you”: and, “Let us return thanks.” But priest. Therefore quite unseemingly the priest, after the it is out of keeping to address one individual in the plu- consecration, blesses this sacrament, by signing it with ral number, especially an inferior. Consequently it seems the cross. unfitting for a priest to say mass with only a single server Objection 5. Further, nothing which appears ridicu- present. Therefore in the celebration of this sacrament it lous ought to be done in one of the Church’s sacraments. seems that some of the things done are out of place. But it seems ridiculous to perform gestures, e.g. for the On the contrary, The custom of the Church stands priest to stretch out his arms at times, to join his hands, to for these things: and the Church cannot err, since she is join together his fingers, and to bow down. Consequently, taught by the Holy Ghost. such things ought not to be done in this sacrament. I answer that, As was said above (q. 60, a. 6), there Objection 6. Further, it seems ridiculous for the priest is a twofold manner of signification in the sacraments, to turn round frequently towards the people, and often to by words, and by actions, in order that the signification greet the people. Consequently, such things ought not to may thus be more perfect. Now, in the celebration of this be done in the celebration of this sacrament. sacrament words are used to signify things pertaining to Objection 7. Further, the Apostle (1 Cor. 13) deems Christ’s Passion, which is represented in this sacrament; it improper for Christ to be divided. But Christ is in or again, pertaining to Christ’s mystical body, which is this sacrament after the consecration. Therefore it is not signified therein; and again, things pertaining to the use 2592 of this sacrament, which use ought to be devout and rever-sign of the cross at the words, “These gifts, these presents, ent. Consequently, in the celebration of this mystery some these holy unspotted sacrifices.” things are done in order to represent Christ’s Passion, or Secondly, there was the selling of Christ. Now he was the disposing of His mystical body, and some others are sold to the Priests, to the Scribes, and to the Pharisees: and done which pertain to the devotion and reverence due to to signify this the threefold sign of the cross is repeated, at this sacrament. the words, “blessed, enrolled, ratified.” Or again, to sig- Reply to Objection 1. The washing of the hands is nify the price for which He was sold, viz. thirty pence. done in the celebration of mass out of reverence for this And a double cross is added at the words—“that it may sacrament; and this for two reasons: first, because we are become to us the Body and the Blood,” etc., to signify the not wont to handle precious objects except the hands be person of Judas the seller, and of Christ Who was sold. washed; hence it seems indecent for anyone to approach Thirdly, there was the foreshadowing of the Passion so great a sacrament with hands that are, even literally, un- at the last supper. To denote this, in the third place, two clean. Secondly, on account of its signification, because, crosses are made, one in consecrating the body, the other as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii), the washing of the in consecrating the blood; each time while saying, “He extremities of the limbs denotes cleansing from even the blessed.” smallest sins, according to Jn. 13:10: “He that is washed Fourthly, there was Christ’s Passion itself. And so in needeth not but to wash his feet.” And such cleansing order to represent His five wounds, in the fourth place, is required of him who approaches this sacrament; and there is a fivefold signing of the cross at the words, “a this is denoted by the confession which is made before pure Victim, a holy Victim, a spotless Victim, the holy the “Introit” of the mass. Moreover, this was signified by bread of eternal life, and the cup of everlasting salvation.” the washing of the priests under the Old Law, as Diony- Fifthly, the outstretching of Christ’s body, and the sius says (Eccl. Hier. iii). However, the Church observes shedding of the blood, and the fruits of the Passion, are this ceremony, not because it was prescribed under the signified by the triple signing of the cross at the words, “as Old Law, but because it is becoming in itself, and there- many as shall receive the body and blood, may be filled fore instituted by the Church. Hence it is not observed in with every blessing,” etc. the same way as it was then: because the washing of the Sixthly, Christ’s threefold prayer upon the cross is rep- feet is omitted, and the washing of the hands is observed; resented; one for His persecutors when He said, “Father, for this can be done more readily, and suffices far denot- forgive them”; the second for deliverance from death, ing perfect cleansing. For, since the hand is the “organ when He cried, “My God, My God, why hast Thou for- of organs” (De Anima iii), all works are attributed to the saken Me?” the third referring to His entrance into glory, hands: hence it is said in Ps. 25:6: “I will wash my hands when He said, “Father, into Thy hands I commend My among the innocent.” spirit”; and in order to denote these there is a triple sign- Reply to Objection 2. We use incense, not as com- ing with the cross made at the words, “Thou dost sanctify, manded by a ceremonial precept of the Law, but as pre- quicken, bless.” scribed by the Church; accordingly we do not use it in Seventhly, the three hours during which He hung upon the same fashion as it was ordered under the Old Law. the cross, that is, from the sixth to the ninth hour, are rep- It has reference to two things: first, to the reverence due resented; in signification of which we make once more a to this sacrament, i.e. in order by its good odor, to re- triple sign of the cross at the words, “Through Him, and move any disagreeable smell that may be about the place; with Him, and in Him.” secondly, it serves to show the effect of grace, wherewith Eighthly, the separation of His soul from the body is Christ was filled as with a good odor, according to Gn. signified by the two subsequent crosses made over the 27:27: “Behold, the odor of my son is like the odor of a chalice. ripe field”; and from Christ it spreads to the faithful by the Ninthly, the resurrection on the third day is repre- work of His ministers, according to 2 Cor. 2:14: “He man- sented by the three crosses made at the words—“May the ifesteth the odor of his knowledge by us in every place”; peace of the Lord be ever with you.” and therefore when the altar which represents Christ, has In short, we may say that the consecration of this been incensed on every side, then all are incensed in their sacrament, and the acceptance of this sacrifice, and its proper order. fruits, proceed from the virtue of the cross of Christ, and Reply to Objection 3. The priest, in celebrating the therefore wherever mention is made of these, the priest mass, makes use of the sign of the cross to signify Christ’s makes use of the sign of the cross. Passion which was ended upon the cross. Now, Christ’s Reply to Objection 4. After the consecration, the Passion was accomplished in certain stages. First of all priest makes the sign of the cross, not for the purpose of there was Christ’s betrayal, which was the work of God, blessing and consecrating, but only for calling to mind the of Judas, and of the Jews; and this is signified by the triple virtue of the cross, and the manner of Christ’s suffering, 2593 as is evident from what has been said (ad 3). is no longer observed, on account of the danger; neverthe- Reply to Objection 5. The actions performed by the less, the same meaning of the parts continues, which some priest in mass are not ridiculous gestures, since they are persons have expressed in verse, thus: done so as to represent something else. The priest in “The host being rent— extending his arms signifies the outstretching of Christ’s What is dipped, means the blest; arms upon the cross. He also lifts up his hands as he prays, What is dry, means the living; to point out that his prayer is directed to God for the peo- What is kept, those at rest.” ple, according to Lam. 3:41: “Let us lift up our hearts with Others, however, say that the part put into the chalice our hands to the Lord in the heavens”: and Ex. 17:11: denotes those still living in this world. while the part kept “And when Moses lifted up his hands Israel overcame.” outside the chalice denotes those fully blessed both in soul That at times he joins his hands, and bows down, praying and body; while the part consumed means the others. earnestly and humbly, denotes the humility and obedience Reply to Objection 9. Two things can be signified of Christ, out of which He suffered. He closes his fingers, by the chalice: first, the Passion itself, which is repre- i.e. the thumb and first finger, after the consecration, be- sented in this sacrament, and according to this, by the part cause, with them, he had touched the consecrated body of put into the chalice are denoted those who are still shar- Christ; so that if any particle cling to the fingers, it may ers of Christ’s sufferings; secondly, the enjoyment of the not be scattered: and this belongs to the reverence for this Blessed can be signified, which is likewise foreshadowed sacrament. in this sacrament; and therefore those whose bodies are Reply to Objection 6. Five times does the priest turn already in full beatitude, are denoted by the part put into round towards the people, to denote that our Lord mani- the chalice. And it is to be observed that the part put into fested Himself five times on the day of His Resurrection, the chalice ought not to be given to the people to supple- as stated above in the treatise on Christ’s Resurrection ment the communion, because Christ gave dipped bread (q. 55, a. 3, obj. 3). But the priest greets the people seven only to Judas the betrayer. times, namely, five times, by turning round to the people, Reply to Objection 10. Wine, by reason of its hu- and twice without turning round, namely, when he says, midity, is capable of washing, consequently it is received “The Lord be with you” before the “Preface,” and again in order to rinse the mouth after receiving this sacrament, when he says, “May the peace of the Lord be ever with lest any particles remain: and this belongs to reverence you”: and this is to denote the sevenfold grace of the Holy for the sacrament. Hence (Extra, De Celebratione mis- Ghost. But a bishop, when he celebrates on festival days, sae, chap. Ex parte), it is said: “The priest should al- in his first greeting says, “Peace be to you,” which was ways cleanse his mouth with wine after receiving the en- our Lord’s greeting after Resurrection, Whose person the tire sacrament of Eucharist: except when he has to cele- bishop chiefly represents. brate another mass on the same day, lest from taking the Reply to Objection 7. The breaking of the host de- ablution-wine he be prevented from celebrating again”; notes three things: first, the rending of Christ’s body, and it is for the same reason that wine is poured over the which took place in the Passion; secondly, the distinc- fingers with which he had touched the body of Christ. tion of His mystical body according to its various states; Reply to Objection 11. The truth ought to be con- and thirdly, the distribution of the graces which flow from formable with the figure, in some respect: namely, be- Christ’s Passion, as Dionysius observes (Eccl. Hier. iii). cause a part of the host consecrated, of which the priest Hence this breaking does not imply severance in Christ. and ministers or even the people communicate, ought not Reply to Objection 8. As Pope Sergius says, and it is to be reserved until the day following. Hence, as is laid to be found in the Decretals (De Consecr., dist. ii), “the down (De Consecr., dist. ii), Pope Clement I ordered that Lord’s body is threefold; the part offered and put into the “as many hosts are to be offered on the altar as shall suffice chalice signifies Christ’s risen body,” namely, Christ Him- for the people; should any be left over, they are not to be self, and the Blessed Virgin, and the other saints, if there reserved until the morrow, but let the clergy carefully con- be any, who are already in glory with their bodies. “The sume them with fear and trembling.” Nevertheless, since part consumed denotes those still walking upon earth,” be- this sacrament is to be received daily, whereas the Paschal cause while living upon earth they are united together by Lamb was not, it is therefore necessary for other hosts to this sacrament; and are bruised by the passions, just as the be reserved for the sick. Hence we read in the same dis- bread eaten is bruised by the teeth. “The part reserved on tinction: “Let the priest always have the Eucharist ready, the altar till the close of the mass, is His body hidden in so that, when anyone fall sick, he may take Communion the sepulchre, because the bodies of the saints will be in to him at once, lest he die without it.” their graves until the end of the world”: though their souls Reply to Objection 12. Several persons ought to be are either in purgatory, or in heaven. However, this rite present at the solemn celebration of the mass. Hence Pope of reserving one part on the altar till the close of the mass Soter says (De Consecr., dist. 1): “It has also been or- 2594 dained, that no priest is to presume to celebrate solemn solemnity that we find it decreed (De Consecr. dist. 1) mass, unless two others be present answering him, while that a bishop is to solemnize mass with several assistants. he himself makes the third; because when he says in the Nevertheless, in private masses it suffices to have one plural, ‘The Lord be with you,’ and again in the Secrets, server, who takes the place of the whole Catholic peo- ‘Pray ye for me,’ it is most becoming that they should ple, on whose behalf he makes answer in the plural to the answer his greeting.” Hence it is for the sake of greater priest. Whether the defects occurring during the celebration of this sacrament can be suffi-IIIa q. 83 a. 6 ciently met by observing the Church’s statutes? Objection 1. It seems that the defects occurring dur- hands into the chalice, either before or after the break- ing the celebration of this sacrament cannot be sufficiently ing. In this case then the priest will not be able to comply met by observing the statutes of the Church. For it some- with the Church’s rite, either as to the breaking, or else as times happens that before or after the consecration the to this, that only a third part is put into the chalice. priest dies or goes mad, or is hindered by some other in- Objection 7. Further, sometimes, too, it happens, firmity from receiving the sacrament and completing the owing to the priest’s want of care, that Christ’s blood is mass. Consequently it seems impossible to observe the spilled, or that he vomits the sacrament received, or that Church’s statute, whereby the priest consecrating must the consecrated hosts are kept so long that they become communicate of his own sacrifice. corrupt, or that they are nibbled by mice, or lost in any Objection 2. Further, it sometimes happens that, be- manner whatsoever; in which cases it does not seem possi- fore the consecration, the priest remembers that he has ble for due reverence to be shown towards this sacrament, eaten or drunk something, or that he is in mortal sin, or as the Church’s ordinances require. It does not seem then under excommunication, which he did not remember pre- that such defects or dangers can be met by keeping to the viously. Therefore, in such a dilemma a man must nec- Church’s statutes. essarily commit mortal sin by acting against the Church’s On the contrary, Just as God does not command an statute, whether he receives or not. impossibility, so neither does the Church. Objection 3. Further, it sometimes happens that a fly I answer that, Dangers or defects happening to this or a spider, or some other poisonous creature falls into sacrament can be met in two ways: first, by preventing the chalice after the consecration. Or even that the priest any such mishaps from occurring: secondly, by dealing comes to know that poison has been put in by some evilly with them in such a way, that what may have happened disposed person in order to kill him. Now in this instance, amiss is put right, either by employing a remedy, or at if he takes it, he appears to sin by killing himself, or by least by repentance on his part who has acted negligently tempting God: also in like manner if he does not take it, he regarding this sacrament. sins by acting against the Church’s statute. Consequently, Reply to Objection 1. If the priest be stricken by he seems to be perplexed, and under necessity of sinning, death or grave sickness before the consecration of our which is not becoming. Lord’s body and blood, there is no need for it to be com- Objection 4. Further, it sometimes happens from the pleted by another. But if this happens after the consecra- server’s want of heed that water is not added to the chalice, tion is begun, for instance, when the body has been con- or even the wine overlooked, and that the priest discovers secrated and before the consecration of the blood, or even this. Therefore he seems to be perplexed likewise in this after both have been consecrated, then the celebration of case, whether he receives the body without the blood, thus the mass ought to be finished by someone else. Hence, as making the sacrifice to be incomplete, or whether he re- is laid down (Decretal vii, q. 1), we read the following ceives neither the body nor the blood. decree of the (Seventh) Council of Toledo: “We consider Objection 5. Further, it sometimes happens that the it to be fitting that when the sacred mysteries are conse- priest cannot remember having said the words of conse- crated by priests during the time of mass, if any sickness cration, or other words which are uttered in the celebration supervenes, in consequence of which they cannot finish of this sacrament. In this case he seems to sin, whether the mystery begun, let it be free for the bishop or another he repeats the words over the same matter, which words priest to finish the consecration of the office thus begun. possibly he has said before, or whether he uses bread and For nothing else is suitable for completing the mysteries wine which are not consecrated, as if they were conse- commenced, unless the consecration be completed either crated. by the priest who began it, or by the one who follows Objection 6. Further, it sometimes comes to pass ow- him: because they cannot be completed except they be ing to the cold that the host will slip from the priest’s performed in perfect order. For since we are all one in 2595 Christ, the change of persons makes no difference, since responsible for the neglect ought to be punished. And on unity of faith insures the happy issue of the mystery. Yet no account should water be mixed with the consecrated let not the course we propose for cases of natural debility, wine, because corruption of the sacrament would ensue in be presumptuously abused: and let no minister or priest part, as was said above (q. 77, a. 8). But if after the words presume ever to leave the Divine offices unfinished, un- of consecration the priest perceive that no wine has been less he be absolutely prevented from continuing. If any- put in the chalice, and if he detect it before receiving the one shall have rashly presumed to do so, he will incur body, then rejecting the water, he ought to pour in wine sentence of excommunication.” with water, and begin over again the consecrating words Reply to Objection 2. Where difficulty arises, the of the blood. But if he notice it after receiving the body, he less dangerous course should always be followed. But ought to procure another host which must be consecrated the greatest danger regarding this sacrament lies in what- together with the blood; and I say so for this reason, be- ever may prevent its completion, because this is a heinous cause if he were to say only the words of consecration of sacrilege; while that danger is of less account which re- the blood, the proper order of consecrating would not be gards the condition of the receiver. Consequently, if after observed; and, as is laid down by the Council of Toledo, the consecration has been begun the priest remembers that quoted above (ad 1), sacrifices cannot be perfect, except he has eaten or drunk anything, he ought nevertheless to they be performed in perfect order. But if he were to be- complete the sacrifice and receive the sacrament. Like- gin from the consecration of the blood, and were to repeat wise, if he recalls a sin committed, he ought to make an all the words which follow, it would not suffice, unless act of contrition, with the firm purpose of confessing and there was a consecrated host present, since in those words making satisfaction for it: and thus he will not receive the there are things to be said and done not only regarding sacrament unworthily, but with profit. The same applies if the blood, but also regarding the body; and at the close he calls to mind that he is under some excommunication; he ought once more to receive the consecrated host and for he ought to make the resolution of humbly seeking blood, even if he had already taken the water which was absolution; and so he will receive absolution from the in- in the chalice, because the precept of the completing this visible High Priest Jesus Christ for his act of completing sacrament is of greater weight than the precept of receiv- the Divine mysteries. ing the sacrament while fasting, as stated above (q. 80, But if he calls to mind any of the above facts previous a. 8). to the consecration, I should deem it safer for him to inter- Reply to Objection 5. Although the priest may not rupt the mass begun, especially if he has broken his fast, recollect having said some of the words he ought to say, or is under excommunication, unless grave scandal were he ought not to be disturbed mentally on that account; for to be feared. a man who utters many words cannot recall to mind all Reply to Objection 3. If a fly or a spider falls into the that he has said; unless perchance in uttering them he ad-chalice before consecration, or if it be discovered that the verts to something connected with the consecration; for wine is poisoned, it ought to be poured out, and after pu- so it is impressed on the memory. Hence, if a man pays rifying the chalice, fresh wine should be served for conse- attention to what he is saying, but without adverting to the cration. But if anything of the sort happen after the conse- fact that he is saying these particular words, he remembers cration, the insect should be caught carefully and washed soon after that he has said them; for, a thing is presented thoroughly, then burned, and the “ablution,” together with to the memory under the formality of the past (De Mem. the ashes, thrown into the sacrarium. If it be discovered et Remin. i). that the wine has been poisoned, the priest should neither But if it seem to the priest that he has probably omitted receive it nor administer it to others on any account, lest some of the words that are not necessary for the sacra- the life-giving chalice become one of death, but it ought ment, I think that he ought not to repeat them on that to be kept in a suitable vessel with the relics: and in order account, changing the order of the sacrifice, but that he that the sacrament may not remain incomplete, he ought ought to proceed: but if he is certain that he has left out to put other wine into the chalice, resume the mass from any of those that are necessary for the sacrament, namely, the consecration of the blood, and complete the sacrifice. the form of the consecration, since the form of the conse- Reply to Objection 4. If before the consecration of cration is necessary for the sacrament, just as the matter the blood, and after the consecration of the body the priest is, it seems that the same thing ought to be done as was detect that either the wine or the water is absent, then he stated above (ad 4) with regard to defect in the matter, ought at once to add them and consecrate. But if after the namely, that he should begin again with the form of the words of consecration he discover that the water is absent, consecration, and repeat the other things in order, lest the he ought notwithstanding to proceed straight on, because order of the sacrifice be altered. the addition of the water is not necessary for the sacra- Reply to Objection 6. The breaking of the conse- ment, as stated above (q. 74, a. 7): nevertheless the person crated host, and the putting of only one part into the chal- 2596 ice, regards the mystical body, just as the mixing with quotation from the Penitential of Bede the Priest: “If, ow-water signifies the people, and therefore the omission of ing to drunkenness or gluttony, anyone vomits up the Eu- either of them causes no such imperfection in the sacri- charist, let him do forty days’ penance, if he be a layman; fice, as calls for repetition regarding the celebration of this but let clerics or monks, deacons and priests, do seventy sacrament. days’ penance; and let a bishop do ninety days’. But if Reply to Objection 7. According to the decree, De they vomit from sickness, let them do penance for seven Consecr., dist. ii, quoting a decree of Pope Pius I, “If from days.” And in the same distinction, we read a decree of the neglect any of the blood falls upon a board which is fixed (Fourth) Council of Arles: “They who do not keep proper to the ground, let it be taken up with the tongue, and let the custody over the sacrament, if a mouse or other animal board be scraped. But if it be not a board, let the ground consume it, must do forty days’ penance: he who loses it be scraped, and the scrapings burned, and the ashes buried in a church, or if a part fall and be not found, shall do thirty inside the altar and let the priest do penance for forty days. days’ penance.” And the priest seems to deserve the same But if a drop fall from the chalice on to the altar, let the penance, who from neglect allows the hosts to putrefy. minister suck up the drop, and do penance during three And on those days the one doing penance ought to fast, days; if it falls upon the altar cloth and penetrates to the and abstain from Communion. However, after weighing second altar cloth, let him do four days’ penance; if it pen- the circumstances of the fact and of the person, the said etrates to the third, let him do nine days’ penance; if to the penances may be lessened or increased. But it must be fourth, let him do twenty days’ penance; and let the altar observed that wherever the species are found to be entire, linens which the drop touched be washed three times by they must be preserved reverently, or consumed; because the priest, holding the chalice below, then let the water Christ’s body is there so long as the species last, as stated be taken and put away nigh to the altar.” It might even above (q. 77, Aa. 4,5). But if it can be done conveniently, be drunk by the minister, unless it might be rejected from the things in which they are found are to be burned, and nausea. Some persons go further, and cut out that part of the ashes put in the sacrarium, as was said of the scrapings the linen, which they burn, putting the ashes in the altar of the altar-table, here above. or down the sacrarium. And the Decretal continues with a 2597 THIRD PART, QUESTION 84 Of the Sacrament of Penance (In Ten Articles) We must now consider the Sacrament of Penance. We shall consider (1) Penance itself; (2) Its effect; (3) Its Parts; (4) The recipients of this sacrament; (5) The power of the ministers, which pertains to the keys; (6) The solemnization of this sacrament. The first of these considerations will be two fold: (1) Penance as a sacrament; (2) Penance as a virtue. Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether Penance is a sacrament? (2) Of its proper matter; (3) Of its form; (4) Whether imposition of hands is necessary for this sacrament? (5) Whether this sacrament is necessary for salvation? (6) Of its relation to the other sacraments; (7) Of its institution; (8) Of its duration; (9) Of its continuance; (10) Whether it can be repeated? Whether Penance is a sacrament? IIIa q. 84 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that Penance is not a I answer that, As Gregory says†, “a sacrament con- sacrament. For Gregory∗ says: “The sacraments are Bap- sists in a solemn act, whereby something is so done that tism, Chrism, and the Body and Blood of Christ; which we understand it to signify the holiness which it confers.” are called sacraments because under the veil of corpo- Now it is evident that in Penance something is done so that real things the Divine power works out salvation in a something holy is signified both on the part of the penitent hidden manner.” But this does not happen in Penance, sinner, and on the part of the priest absolving, because the because therein corporeal things are not employed that, penitent sinner, by deed and word, shows his heart to have under them, the power of God may work our salvation. renounced sin, and in like manner the priest, by his deed Therefore Penance is not a sacrament. and word with regard to the penitent, signifies the work Objection 2. Further, the sacraments of the Church of God Who forgives his sins. Therefore it is evident that are shown forth by the ministers of Christ, according to 1 Penance, as practiced in the Church, is a sacrament. Cor. 4:1: “Let a man so account of us as of the ministers Reply to Objection 1. By corporeal things taken in of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God.” a wide sense we may understand also external sensible But Penance is not conferred by the ministers of Christ, actions, which are to this sacrament what water is to Bap- but is inspired inwardly into man by God, according to tism, or chrism to Confirmation. But it is to be observed Jer. 31:19: “After Thou didst convert me, I did penance.” that in those sacraments, whereby an exceptional grace Therefore it seems that Penance is not a sacrament. surpassing altogether the proportion of a human act, is Objection 3. Further, in the sacraments of which conferred, some corporeal matter is employed externally, we have already spoken above, there is something that is e.g. in Baptism, which confers full remission of all sins, sacrament only, something that is both reality and sacra- both as to guilt and as to punishment, and in Confirma- ment, and something that is reality only, as is clear from tion, wherein the fulness of the Holy Ghost is bestowed, what has been stated (q. 66, a. 1). But this does not apply and in Extreme Unction, which confers perfect spiritual to Penance. Therefore Penance is not a sacrament. health derived from the virtue of Christ as from an extrin- On the contrary, As Baptism is conferred that we sic principle. Wherefore, such human acts as are in these may be cleansed from sin, so also is Penance: where- sacraments, are not the essential matter of the sacrament, fore Peter said to Simon Magus (Acts 8:22): “Do but are dispositions thereto. On the other hand, in those penance. . . from this thy wickedness.” But Baptism is a sacraments whose effect corresponds to that of some hu- sacrament as stated above (q. 66, a. 1). Therefore for the man act, the sensible human act itself takes the place of same reason Penance is also a sacrament. matter, as in the case of Penance and Matrimony, even as ∗ Cf. Isidore, Etym. vi, ch. 19 † Isidore, Etym. vi, ch. 19 2598 in bodily medicines, some are applied externally, such as plied by the minister, but by God working inwardly; while plasters and drugs, while others are acts of the person who the minister furnishes the complement of the sacrament, seeks to be cured, such as certain exercises. when he absolves the penitent. Reply to Objection 2. In those sacraments which Reply to Objection 3. In Penance also, there is some- have a corporeal matter, this matter needs to be applied thing which is sacrament only, viz. the acts performed by a minister of the Church, who stands in the place of outwardly both by the repentant sinner, and by the priest Christ, which denotes that the excellence of the power in giving absolution; that which is reality and sacrament is which operates in the sacraments is from Christ. But in the sinner’s inward repentance; while that which is reality, the sacrament of Penance, as stated above (ad 1), human and not sacrament, is the forgiveness of sin. The first of actions take the place of matter, and these actions proceed these taken altogether is the cause of the second; and the from internal inspiration, wherefore the matter is not ap- first and second together are the cause of the third. Whether sins are the proper matter of this sacrament? IIIa q. 84 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that sins are not the proper ment consists in the acts of the penitent, the matter of matter of this sacrament. Because, in the other sacra- which acts are the sins over which he grieves, which he ments, the matter is hallowed by the utterance of certain confesses, and for which he satisfies. Hence it follows words, and being thus hallowed produces the sacramental that sins are the remote matter of Penance, as a matter, effect. Now sins cannot be hallowed, for they are opposed not for approval, but for detestation, and destruction. to the effect of the sacrament, viz. grace which blots out Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers the sin. Therefore sins are not the proper matter of this sacra- proximate matter of a sacrament. ment. Reply to Objection 2. The old life that was subject to Objection 2. Further, Augustine says in his book De death is the object of Penance, not as regards the punish- Poenitentia [Cf. Serm. cccli]: “No one can begin a new ment, but as regards the guilt connected with it. life, unless he repent of the old.” Now not only sins but Reply to Objection 3. Penance regards every kind also the penalties of the present life belong to the old life. of sin in a way, but not each in the same way. Because Therefore sins are not the proper matter of Penance. Penance regards actual mortal sin properly and chiefly; Objection 3. Further, sin is either original, mortal or properly, since, properly speaking, we are said to repent venial. Now the sacrament of Penance is not ordained of what we have done of our own will; chiefly, since this against original sin, for this is taken away by Baptism, sacrament was instituted chiefly for the blotting out of [nor against mortal sin, for this is taken away by the sin- mortal sin. Penance regards venial sins, properly speaking ner’s confession]∗, nor against venial sin, which is taken indeed, in so far as they are committed of our own will, but away by the beating of the breast and the sprinkling of this was not the chief purpose of its institution. But as to holy water and the like. Therefore sins are not the proper original sin, Penance regards it neither chiefly, since Bap- matter of Penance. . tism, and not Penance, is ordained against original sin, nor On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:21): properly, because original sin is not done of our own will, ”(Who) have not done penance for the uncleanness and except in so far as Adam’s will is looked upon as ours, fornication and lasciviousness, that they have committed.” in which sense the Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): “In whom I answer that, Matter is twofold, viz. proximate and all have sinned.” Nevertheless, Penance may be said to remote: thus the proximate matter of a statue is a metal, regard original sin, if we take it in a wide sense for any while the remote matter is water. Now it has been stated detestation of something past: in which sense Augustine (a. 1, ad 1, ad 2), that the proximate matter of this sacra- uses the term in his book De Poenitentia (Serm. cccli). Whether the form of this sacrament is: “I absolve thee”? IIIa q. 84 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the form of this sacra- Prime and Compline and on Maundy Thursday), absolu- ment is not: “I absolve thee.” Because the forms of the tion is given not in the indicative form by saying: “I ab- sacraments are received from Christ’s institution and the solve thee,” but In the deprecatory form, by saying: “May Church’s custom. But we do not read that Christ insti- Almighty God have mercy on you,” or: “May Almighty tuted this form. Nor is it in common use; in fact in certain God grant you absolution and forgiveness.” Therefore the absolutions which are given publicly in church (e.g. at form of this sacrament is not: “I absolve thee.” ∗ The words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine edition 2599 Objection 2. Further, Pope Leo says (Ep. cviii) that these sacraments are perfected in the use of their matter: God’s forgiveness cannot be obtained without the priestly while in the sacrament of the Eucharist, which consists in supplications: and he is speaking there of God’s forgive- the very consecration of the matter, the reality of the con- ness granted to the penitent. Therefore the form of this secration is expressed in the words: “This is My Body.” sacrament should be deprecatory. Now this sacrament, namely the sacrament of Objection 3. Further, to absolve from sin is the same Penance, consists not in the consecration of a matter, nor as to remit sin. But God alone remits sin, for He alone in the use of a hallowed matter, but rather in the removal cleanses man inwardly from sin, as Augustine says (Con- of a certain matter, viz. sin, in so far as sins are said to be tra Donatist. v, 21). Therefore it seems that God alone the matter of Penance, as explained above (a. 2). This re- absolves from sin. Therefore the priest should say not: “I moval is expressed by the priest saying: “I absolve thee”: absolve thee,” as neither does he say: “I remit thy sins.” because sins are fetters, according to Prov. 5:22. “His Objection 4. Further, just as our Lord gave His disci- own iniquities catch the wicked, and he is fast bound with ples the power to absolve from sins, so also did He give the ropes of his own sins.” Wherefore it is evident that them the power “to heal infirmities,” “to cast out devils,” this is the most fitting form of this sacrament: “I absolve and “to cure diseases” (Mat. 10:1; Lk. 9:1). Now the thee.” apostles, in healing the sick, did not use the words: “I heal Reply to Objection 1. This form is taken from thee,” but: “The Lord Jesus Christ heal [Vulg.: ‘heals’] Christ’s very words which He addressed to Peter (Mat. thee,” as Peter said to the palsied man (Acts 9:34). There- 16:19): “Whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth,” etc., and fore since priests have the power which Christ gave His such is the form employed by the Church in sacramental apostles, it seems that they should not use the form: “I absolution. But such absolutions as are given in public absolve thee,” but: “May Christ absolve thee.” are not sacramental, but are prayers for the remission of Objection 5. Further, some explain this form by stat- venial sins. Wherefore in giving sacramental absolution it ing that when they say: “I absolve thee,” they mean “I de- would not suffice to say: “May Almighty God have mercy clare you to be absolved.” But neither can this be done by on thee,” or: “May God grant thee absolution and forgive- a priest unless it be revealed to him by God, wherefore, as ness,” because by such words the priest does not signify we read in Mat. 16:19 before it was said to Peter: “What- the giving of absolution, but prays that it may be given. soever thou shalt bind upon earth,” etc., it was said to him Nevertheless the above prayer is said before the sacramen- (Mat. 16:17): “Blessed art thou Simon Bar-Jona: because tal absolution is given, lest the sacramental effect be hin- flesh and blood have not revealed it to thee, but My Father dered on the part of the penitent, whose acts are as matter Who is in heaven.” Therefore it seems presumptuous for in this sacrament, but not in Baptism or Confirmation. a priest, who has received no revelation on the matter, to Reply to Objection 2. The words of Leo are to be un- say: “I absolve thee,” even if this be explained to mean: derstood of the prayer that precedes the absolution, and do “I declare thee absolved.” not exclude the fact that the priest pronounces absolution. On the contrary, As our Lord said to His disciples Reply to Objection 3. God alone absolves from sin (Mat. 28:19): “Going. . . teach ye all nations, baptizing and forgives sins authoritatively; yet priests do both min- them,” etc., so did He say to Peter (Mat. 16:19): “What- isterially, because the words of the priest in this sacrament soever thou shalt loose on earth,” etc. Now the priest, work as instruments of the Divine power, as in the other relying on the authority of those words of Christ, says: “I sacraments: because it is the Divine power that works baptize thee.” Therefore on the same authority he should inwardly in all the sacramental signs, be they things or say in this sacrament: “I absolve thee.” words, as shown above (q. 62, a. 4; q. 64, Aa. 1,2). Where- I answer that, The perfection of a thing is ascribed to fore our Lord expressed both: for He said to Peter (Mat. its form. Now it has been stated above (a. 1, ad 2) that 16:19): “Whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth,” etc., and this sacrament is perfected by that which is done by the to His disciples (Jn. 20:23): “Whose sins you shall for- priest. Wherefore the part taken by the penitent, whether give, they are forgiven them.” Yet the priest says: “I it consist of words or deeds, must needs be the matter of absolve thee,” rather than: “I forgive thee thy sins,” be- this sacrament, while the part taken by the priest, takes the cause it is more in keeping with the words of our Lord, place of the form. by expressing the power of the keys whereby priests ab- Now since the sacraments of the New Law accomplish solve. Nevertheless, since the priest absolves ministe- what they signify, as stated above (q. 62, a. 1, ad 1), it be- rially, something is suitably added in reference to the hooves the sacramental form to signify the sacramental ef- supreme authority of God, by the priest saying: “I absolve fect in a manner that is in keeping with the matter. Hence thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the the form of Baptism is: “I baptize thee,” and the form of Holy Ghost,” or by the power of Christ’s Passion, or by Confirmation is: “I sign thee with the sign of the cross, the authority of God. However, as this is not defined by and I confirm thee with the chrism of salvation,” because the words of Christ, as it is for Baptism, this addition is 2600 left to the discretion of the priest. effectively, so also when he says: “I absolve thee,” he de- Reply to Objection 4. Power was given to the apos- clares the man to be absolved not only significatively but tles, not that they themselves might heal the sick, but that also effectively. And yet he does not speak as of some- the sick might be healed at the prayer of the apostles: thing uncertain, because just as the other sacraments of whereas power was given to them to work instrumentally the New Law have, of themselves, a sure effect through or ministerially in the sacraments; wherefore they could the power of Christ’s Passion, which effect, nevertheless, express their own agency in the sacramental forms rather may be impeded on the part of the recipient, so is it with than in the healing of infirmities. Nevertheless in the lat- this sacrament. Hence Augustine says (De Adult. Conjug. ter case they did not always use the deprecatory form, but ii): “There is nothing disgraceful or onerous in the recon- sometimes employed the indicative or imperative: thus we ciliation of husband and wife, when adultery committed read (Acts 3:6) that Peter said to the lame man: “What I has been washed away, since there is no doubt that remis- have, I give thee: In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, sion of sins is granted through the keys of the kingdom of arise and walk.” heaven.” Consequently there is no need for a special rev- Reply to Objection 5. It is true in a sense that the elation to be made to the priest, but the general revelation words, “I absolve thee” mean “I declare thee absolved,” of faith suffices, through which sins are forgiven. Hence but this explanation is incomplete. Because the sacra- the revelation of faith is said to have been made to Peter. ments of the New Law not only signify, but effect what It would be a more complete explanation to say that they signify. Wherefore, just as the priest in baptizing the words, “I absolve thee” mean: “I grant thee the sacra- anyone, declares by deed and word that the person is ment of absolution.” washed inwardly, and this not only significatively but also Whether the imposition of the priest’s hands is necessary for this sacrament? IIIa q. 84 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the imposition of the imposition of hands is required for this sacrament. priest’s hands is necessary for this sacrament. For it is I answer that, In the sacraments of the Church the im- written (Mk. 16:18): “They shall lay hands upon the sick, position of hands is made, to signify some abundant effect and they shall recover.” Now sinners are sick spiritually, of grace, through those on whom the hands are laid being, and obtain recovery through this sacrament. Therefore an as it were, united to the ministers in whom grace should imposition of hands should be made in this sacrament. be plentiful. Wherefore an imposition of hands is made in Objection 2. Further, in this sacrament man regains the sacrament of Confirmation, wherein the fulness of the the Holy Ghost Whom he had lost, wherefore it is said in Holy Ghost is conferred; and in the sacrament of order, the person of the penitent (Ps. 1:14): “Restore unto me wherein is bestowed a certain excellence of power over the joy of Thy salvation, and strengthen me with a perfect the Divine mysteries; hence it is written (2 Tim. 1:6): spirit.” Now the Holy Ghost is given by the imposition of “Stir up the grace of God which is in thee, by the imposi- hands; for we read (Acts 8:17) that the apostles “laid their tion of my hands.” hands upon them, and they received the Holy Ghost”; and Now the sacrament of Penance is ordained, not that (Mat. 19:13) that “little children were presented” to our man may receive some abundance of grace, but that his Lord, “that He should impose hands upon them.” There- sins may be taken away; and therefore no imposition of fore an imposition of hands should be made in this sacra- hands is required for this sacrament, as neither is there for ment. Baptism, wherein nevertheless a fuller remission of sins is Objection 3. Further, the priest’s words are not more bestowed. efficacious in this than in the other sacraments. But in Reply to Objection 1. That imposition of hands is not the other sacraments the words of the minister do not suf- sacramental, but is intended for the working of miracles, fice, unless he perform some action: thus, in Baptism, namely, that by the contact of a sanctified man’s hand, the priest while saying: “I baptize thee,” has to perform a even bodily infirmity might be removed; even as we read bodily washing. Therefore, also while saying: “I absolve of our Lord (Mk. 6:5) that He cured the sick, “laying His thee,” the priest should perform some action in regard to hands upon them,” and (Mat. 8:3) that He cleansed a leper the penitent, by laying hands on him. by touching him. On the contrary, When our Lord said to Peter (Mat. Reply to Objection 2. It is not every reception of the 16:19): “Whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth,” etc., He Holy Ghost that requires an imposition of hands, since made no mention of an imposition of hands; nor did He even in Baptism man receives the Holy Ghost, without when He said to all the apostles (Jn. 20:13): “Whose sins any imposition of hands: it is at the reception of the ful- you shall forgive, they are forgiven them.” Therefore no ness of the Holy Ghost which belongs to Confirmation 2601 that an imposition of hands is required. pronouncing the words over the matter, so the mere words Reply to Objection 3. In those sacraments which which the priest while absolving pronounces over the pen- are perfected in the use of the matter, the minister has to itent perfect the sacrament of absolution. If, indeed, any perform some bodily action on the recipient of the sacra- bodily act were necessary on the part of the priest, the sign ment, e.g. in Baptism, Confirmation, and Extreme Unc- of the cross, which is employed in the Eucharist, would tion; whereas this sacrament does not consist in the use not be less becoming than the imposition of hands, in to- of matter employed outwardly, the matter being supplied ken that sins are forgiven through the blood of Christ cru- by the part taken by the penitent: wherefore, just as in cified; and yet this is not essential to this sacrament as the Eucharist the priest perfects the sacrament by merely neither is it to the Eucharist. Whether this sacrament is necessary for salvation? IIIa q. 84 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that this sacrament is not Penance, wherein the power of Christ’s Passion operates necessary for salvation. Because on Ps. 125:5, “They that through the priest’s absolution and the acts of the peni- sow in tears,” etc., the gloss says: “Be not sorrowful, if tent, who co-operates with grace unto the destruction of thou hast a good will, of which peace is the meed.” But his sin. For as Augustine says (Tract. lxxii in Joan.†), “He sorrow is essential to Penance, according to 2 Cor. 7:10: Who created thee without thee, will not justify thee with- “The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance out thee.” Therefore it is evident that after sin the sacra- steadfast unto salvation.” Therefore a good will without ment of Penance is necessary for salvation, even as bodily Penance suffices for salvation. medicine after man has contracted a dangerous disease. Objection 2. Further, it is written (Prov. 10:12): Reply to Objection 1. This gloss should apparently “Charity covereth all sins,” and further on (Prov. 15:27): be understood as referring to the man who has a good will “By mercy and faith sins are purged away.” But this sacra- unimpaired by sin, for such a man has no cause for sor- ment is for nothing else but the purging of sins. Therefore row: but as soon as the good will is forfeited through sin, if one has charity, faith, and mercy, one can obtain salva- it cannot be restored without that sorrow whereby a man tion, without the sacrament of Penance. sorrows for his past sin, and which belongs to Penance. Objection 3. Further, the sacraments of the Church Reply to Objection 2. As soon as a man falls into take their origin from the institution of Christ. But ac- sin, charity, faith, and mercy do not deliver him from cording to Jn. 8 Christ absolved the adulterous woman sin, without Penance. Because charity demands that a without Penance. Therefore it seems that Penance is not man should grieve for the offense committed against his necessary for salvation. friend, and that he should be anxious to make satisfaction On the contrary, our Lord said (Lk. 13:3): “Unless to his friend; faith requires that he should seek to be jus- you shall do penance, you shall all likewise perish.” tified from his sins through the power of Christ’s Passion I answer that, A thing is necessary for salvation in which operates in the sacraments of the Church; and well- two ways: first, absolutely; secondly, on a supposition. A ordered pity necessitates that man should succor himself thing is absolutely necessary for salvation, if no one can by repenting of the pitiful condition into which sin has obtain salvation without it, as, for example, the grace of brought him, according to Prov. 14:34: “Sin maketh na- Christ, and the sacrament of Baptism, whereby a man is tions miserable”; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 30:24): born again in Christ. The sacrament of Penance is neces- “Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God.” sary on a supposition, for it is necessary, not for all, but for Reply to Objection 3. It was due to His power of those who are in sin. For it is written (2 Paral 37∗), “Thou, “excellence,” which He alone had, as stated above (q. 64, Lord, God of the righteous, hast not appointed repentance a. 3), that Christ bestowed on the adulterous woman the to the righteous, to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, nor to those effect of the sacrament of Penance, viz. the forgiveness who sinned not against Thee.” But “sin, when it is com- of sins, without the sacrament of Penance, although not pleted, begetteth death” (James 1:15). Consequently it is without internal repentance, which He operated in her by necessary for the sinner’s salvation that sin be taken away grace. from him; which cannot be done without the sacrament of ∗ The prayer of Manasses, among the Apocrypha † Implicitly in the passage referred to, but explicitly Serm. xv de verb Apost. 2602 Whether Penance is a second plank after shipwreck? IIIa q. 84 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that Penance is not a sec- gard to the state of integrity which is bestowed and safe- ond plank after shipwreck. Because on Is. 3:9, “They guarded by the aforesaid sacraments, so that it is called have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom,” a gloss says: metaphorically “a second plank after shipwreck.” For just “The second plank after shipwreck is to hide one’s sins.” as the first help for those who cross the sea is to be safe- Now Penance does not hide sins, but reveals them. There- guarded in a whole ship, while the second help when the fore Penance is not a second plank. ship is wrecked, is to cling to a plank; so too the first Objection 2. Further, in a building the foundation help in this life’s ocean is that man safeguard his integrity, takes the first, not the second place. Now in the spiritual while the second help is, if he lose his integrity through edifice, Penance is the foundation, according to Heb. 6:1: sin, that he regain it by means of Penance. “Not laying again the foundation of Penance from dead Reply to Objection 1. To hide one’s sins may happen works”; wherefore it precedes even Baptism, according in two ways: first, in the very act of sinning. Now it is to Acts 2:38: “Do penance, and be baptized every one of worse to sin in public than in private, both because a pub- you.” Therefore Penance should not be called a second lic sinner seems to sin more from contempt, and because plank. by sinning he gives scandal to others. Consequently in Objection 3. Further, all the sacraments are planks, sin it is a kind of remedy to sin secretly, and it is in this i.e. helps against sin. Now Penance holds, not the second sense that the gloss says that “to hide one’s sins is a sec- but the fourth, place among the sacraments, as is clear ond plank after shipwreck”; not that it takes away sin, as from what has been said above (q. 65, Aa. 1,2). Therefore Penance does, but because it makes the sin less grievous. Penance should not be called a second plank after ship- Secondly, one hides one’s sin previously committed, by wreck. neglecting to confess it: this is opposed to Penance, and On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. cxxx) that to hide one’s sins thus is not a second plank, but is the re- “Penance is a second plank after shipwreck.” verse, since it is written (Prov. 28:13): “He that hideth his I answer that, That which is of itself precedes natu- sins shall not prosper.” rally that which is accidental, as substance precedes acci- Reply to Objection 2. Penance cannot be called the dent. Now some sacraments are, of themselves, ordained foundation of the spiritual edifice simply, i.e. in the first to man’s salvation, e.g. Baptism, which is the spiritual building thereof; but it is the foundation in the second birth, Confirmation which is the spiritual growth, the Eu- building which is accomplished by destroying sin, be- charist which is the spiritual food; whereas Penance is or- cause man, on his return to God, needs Penance first. dained to man’s salvation accidentally as it were, and on However, the Apostle is speaking there of the foundation something being supposed, viz. sin: for unless man were of spiritual doctrine. Moreover, the penance which pre- to sin actually, he would not stand in need of Penance and cedes Baptism is not the sacrament of Penance. yet he would need Baptism, Confirmation, and the Eu- Reply to Objection 3. The three sacraments which charist; even as in the life of the body, man would need no precede Penance refer to the ship in its integrity, i.e. to medical treatment, unless he were ill, and yet life, birth, man’s state of integrity, with regard to which Penance is growth, and food are, of themselves, necessary to man. called a second plank. Consequently Penance holds the second place with re- Whether this sacrament was suitably instituted in the New Law? IIIa q. 84 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that this sacrament was should not have been instituted in the New Law. unsuitably instituted in the New Law. Because those Objection 3. Further, Penance comes after Baptism, things which belong to the natural law need not to be in- since it is a second plank, as stated above (a. 6). Now stituted. Now it belongs to the natural law that one should it seems that our Lord instituted Penance before Baptism, repent of the evil one has done: for it is impossible to love because we read that at the beginning of His preaching He good without grieving for its contrary. Therefore Penance said (Mat. 4:17): “Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven was unsuitably instituted in the New Law. is at hand.” Therefore this sacrament was not suitably in- Objection 2. Further, that which existed in the Old stituted in the New Law. Law had not to be instituted in the New. Now there was Objection 4. Further, the sacraments of the New Law Penance in the old Law wherefore the Lord complains were instituted by Christ, by Whose power they work, as (Jer. 8:6) saying: “There is none that doth penance for stated above (q. 62, a. 5; q. 64, a. 1). But Christ does not his sin, saying: What have I done?” Therefore Penance seem to have instituted this sacrament, since He made no 2603 use of it, as of the other sacraments which He instituted. ural law were determined in various ways in the old and Therefore this sacrament was unsuitably instituted in the in the New Law, in keeping with the imperfection of the New Law. old, and the perfection of the New. Wherefore Penance On the contrary, our Lord said (Lk. 24:46,47): “It was fixed in a certain way in the Old Law—with regard to behooved Christ to suffer, and to rise again from the dead sorrow, that it should be in the heart rather than in exter- the third day: and that penance and remission of sins nal signs, according to Joel 2:13: “Rend your hearts and should be preached in His name unto all nations.” not your garments”; and with regard to seeking a remedy I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 1, ad 2), in for sorrow, that they should in some way confess their this sacrament the acts of the penitent are as matter, while sins, at least in general, to God’s ministers. Wherefore the the part taken by the priest, who works as Christ’s min- Lord said (Lev. 5:17,18): “If anyone sin through igno- ister, is the formal and completive element of the sacra- rance. . . he shall offer of the flocks a ram without blemish ment. Now in the other sacraments the matter pre-exists, to the priest, according to the measure and estimation of being provided by nature, as water, or by art, as bread: the sin, and the priest shall pray for him, because he did but that such and such a matter be employed for a sacra- it ignorantly, and it shall be forgiven him”; since by the ment requires to be decided by the institution; while the very fact of making an offering for his sin, a man, in a sacrament derives its form and power entirely from the in- fashion, confessed his sin to the priest. And accordingly stitution of Christ, from Whose Passion the power of the it is written (Prov. 28:13): “He that hideth his sins, shall sacraments proceeds. not prosper: but he that shall confess, and forsake them, Accordingly the matter of this sacrament pre-exists, shall obtain mercy.” Not yet, however, was the power of being provided by nature; since it is by a natural princi- the keys instituted, which is derived from Christ’s Pas- ple of reason that man is moved to repent of the evil he sion, and consequently it was not yet ordained that a man has done: yet it is due to Divine institution that man does should grieve for his sin, with the purpose of submitting penance in this or that way. Wherefore at the outset of His himself by confession and satisfaction to the keys of the preaching, our Lord admonished men, not only to repent, Church, in the hope of receiving forgiveness through the but also to “do penance,” thus pointing to the particular power of Christ’s Passion. manner of actions required for this sacrament. As to the Reply to Objection 3. If we note carefully what our part to be taken by the ministers, this was fixed by our Lord said about the necessity of Baptism (Jn. 3:3, seqq.), Lord when He said to Peter (Mat. 16:19): “To thee will I we shall see that this was said before His words about give the keys of the kingdom of heaven,” etc.; but it was the necessity of Penance (Mat. 4:17); because He spoke after His resurrection that He made known the efficacy of to Nicodemus about Baptism before the imprisonment of this sacrament and the source of its power, when He said John, of whom it is related afterwards (Jn. 3:23, 24) that (Lk. 24:47) that “penance and remission of sins should be he baptized, whereas His words about Penance were said preached in His name unto all nations,” after speaking of after John was cast into prison. His Passion and resurrection. Because it is from the power If, however, He had admonished men to do penance of the name of Jesus Christ suffering and rising again that before admonishing them to be baptized, this would be this sacrament is efficacious unto the remission of sins. because also before Baptism some kind of penance is re- It is therefore evident that this sacrament was suitably quired, according to the words of Peter (Acts 2:38): “Do instituted in the New Law. penance, and be baptized, every one of you.” Reply to Objection 1. It is a natural law that one Reply to Objection 4. Christ did not use the Baptism should repent of the evil one has done, by grieving for which He instituted, but was baptized with the baptism of having done it, and by seeking a remedy for one’s grief in John, as stated above (q. 39, Aa. 1,2). Nor did He use some way or other, and also that one should show some it actively by administering it Himself, because He “did signs of grief, even as the Ninevites did, as we read in Jn. not baptize” as a rule, “but His disciples” did, as related 3. And yet even in their case there was also something of in Jn. 4:2, although it is to be believed that He baptized faith which they had received through Jonas’ preaching, His disciples, as Augustine asserts (Ep. cclxv, ad Seleuc.). inasmuch as they did these things in the hope that they But with regard to His institution of this sacrament it was would receive pardon from God, according as we read (Jn. nowise fitting that He should use it, neither by repenting 3:9): “Who can tell if God will turn and forgive, and will Himself, in Whom there was no sin, nor by administering turn away from His fierce anger, and we shall not perish?” the sacrament to others, since, in order to show His mercy But just as other matters which are of the natural law were and power, He was wont to confer the effect of this sacra- fixed in detail by the institution of the Divine law, as we ment without the sacrament itself, as stated above (a. 5, ad have stated in the Ia IIae, q. 91, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 95, a. 2; Ia 3). On the other hand, He both received and gave to others IIae, q. 99, so was it with Penance. the sacrament of the Eucharist, both in order to commend Reply to Objection 2. Things which are of the nat- the excellence of that sacrament, and because that sacra- 2604 ment is a memorial of His Passion, in which Christ is both priest and victim. Whether Penance should last till the end of life? IIIa q. 84 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that Penance should not is susceptible to sorrow, as man is in this life; but after last till the end of life. Because Penance is ordained for this life the saints are not susceptible to sorrow, wherefore the blotting out of sin. Now the penitent receives forgive- they will be displeased at, without sorrowing for, their past ness of his sins at once, according to Ezech. 18:21: “If sins, according to Is. 65:16. “The former distresses are the wicked do penance for all his sins which he hath com- forgotten.” mitted. . . he shall live and shall not die.” Therefore there External penance is that whereby a man shows ex- is no need for Penance to be further prolonged. ternal signs of sorrow, confesses his sins verbally to the Objection 2. Further, Penance belongs to the state of priest who absolves him, and makes satisfaction for his beginners. But man ought to advance from that state to sins according to the judgment of the priest. Such penance the state of the proficient, and, from this, on to the state need not last until the end of life, but only for a fixed time of the perfect. Therefore man need not do Penance till the according to the measure of the sin. end of his life. Reply to Objection 1. True penance not only removes Objection 3. Further, man is bound to observe the past sins, but also preserves man from future sins. Conse- laws of the Church in this as in the other sacraments. But quently, although a man receives forgiveness of past sins the duration of repentance is fixed by the canons, so that, in the first instant of his true penance, nevertheless he to wit, for such and such a sin one is bound to do penance must persevere in his penance, lest he fall again into sin. for so many years. Therefore it seems that Penance should Reply to Objection 2. To do penance both internal not be prolonged till the end of life. and external belongs to the state of beginners, of those, On the contrary, Augustine says in his book, De to wit, who are making a fresh start from the state of sin. Poenitentia∗: “What remains for us to do, save to sor- But there is room for internal penance even in the profi- row ever in this life? For when sorrow ceases, repentance cient and the perfect, according to Ps. 83:7: “In his heart fails; and if repentance fails, what becomes of pardon?” he hath disposed to ascend by steps, in the vale of tears.” I answer that, Penance is twofold, internal and ex- Wherefore Paul says (1 Cor. 15:9): “I. . . am not worthy ternal. Internal penance is that whereby one grieves for a to be called an apostle because I persecuted the Church of sin one has committed, and this penance should last until God.” the end of life. Because man should always be displeased Reply to Objection 3. These durations of time are at having sinned, for if he were to be pleased thereat, he fixed for penitents as regards the exercise of external would for this very reason fall into sin and lose the fruit penance. of pardon. Now displeasure causes sorrow in one who Whether Penance can be continuous? IIIa q. 84 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that penance cannot be “Comfort him,” viz. the penitent, “lest perhaps such an continuous. For it is written (Jer. 31:16): “Let thy voice one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow.” But com- cease from weeping, and thy eyes from tears.” But this fort dispels grief, which is essential to penance. Therefore would be impossible if penance were continuous, for it penance need not be continuous. consists in weeping and tears. Therefore penance cannot On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on be continuous. Penance†: “In doing penance grief should be continual.” Objection 2. Further, man ought to rejoice at every I answer that, One is said to repent in two ways, actu- good work, according to Ps. 99:1: “Serve ye the Lord with ally and habitually. It is impossible for a man continually gladness.” Now to do penance is a good work. There- to repent actually. for the acts, whether internal or exter- fore man should rejoice at it. But man cannot rejoice nal, of a penitent must needs be interrupted by sleep and and grieve at the same time, as the Philosopher declares other things which the body needs. Secondly, a man is (Ethic. ix, 4). Therefore a penitent cannot grieve con- said to repent habitually. and thus he should repent contin- tinually for his past sins, which is essential to penance. ually, both by never doing anything contrary to penance, Therefore penance cannot be continuous. so as to destroy the habitual disposition of the penitent, Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 2:7): and by being resolved that his past sins should always be ∗ De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown † De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown 2605 displeasing to him. ing. If, on the other hand, joy and sorrow, understood thus, Reply to Objection 1. Weeping and tears belong to be not of the same object in the same respect, but either the act of external penance, and this act needs neither to be of different objects, or of the same object in different re- continuous, nor to last until the end of life, as stated above spects, in that case joy and sorrow are not contrary to one (a. 8): wherefore it is significantly added: “For there is a another, so that nothing hinders a man from being joyful reward for thy work.” Now the reward of the penitent’s and sorrowful at the same time—for instance, if we see a work is the full remission of sin both as to guilt and as good man suffer, we both rejoice at his goodness and at to punishment; and after receiving this reward there is no the same time grieve for his suffering. In this way a man need for man to proceed to acts of external penance. This, may be displeased at having sinned, and be pleased at his however, does not prevent penance being continual, as ex- displeasure together with his hope for pardon, so that his plained above. very sorrow is a matter of joy. Hence Augustine says†: Reply to Objection 2. Of sorrow and joy we may “The penitent should ever grieve and rejoice at his grief.” speak in two ways: first, as being passions of the sensi- If, however, sorrow were altogether incompatible with tive appetite; and thus they can no. wise be together, since joy, this would prevent the continuance, not of habitual they are altogether contrary to one another, either on the penance, but only of actual penance. part of the object (as when they have the same object), or Reply to Objection 3. According to the Philosopher at least on the part of the movement, for joy is with ex- (Ethic. ii, 3,6,7,9) it belongs to virtue to establish the pansion∗ of the heart, whereas sorrow is with contraction; mean in the passions. Now the sorrow which, in the sen- and it is in this sense that the Philosopher speaks in Ethic. sitive appetite of the penitent, arises from the displeasure ix. Secondly, we may speak of joy and sorrow as being of his will, is a passion; wherefore it should be moderated simple acts of the will, to which something is pleasing according to virtue, and if it be excessive it is sinful, be- or displeasing. Accordingly, they cannot be contrary to cause it leads to despair, as the Apostle teaches (2 Cor. one another, except on the part of the object, as when they 2:7), saying: “Lest such an one be swallowed up with concern the same object in the same respect, in which way overmuch sorrow.” Accordingly comfort, of which the joy and sorrow cannot be simultaneous, because the same Apostle speaks, moderates sorrow but does not destroy it thing in the same respect cannot be pleasing and displeas- altogether. Whether the sacrament of Penance may be repeated? IIIa q. 84 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that the sacrament of Objection 4. Further, Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Penance should not be repeated. For the Apostle says Evang.): “Penance consists in deploring past sins, and (Heb. 6:4, seqq.): “It is impossible for those, who were in not committing again those we have deplored”: and once illuminated, have tasted also the heavenly gift, and Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii): “He is a mocker and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost. . . and are fallen no penitent who still does what he has repented of.” If, away, to be renewed again to penance.” Now whosoever therefore, a man is truly penitent, he will not sin again. have done penance, have been illuminated, and have re- Therefore Penance cannot be repeated. ceived the gift of the Holy Ghost. Therefore whosoever Objection 5. Further, just as Baptism derives its sin after doing penance, cannot do penance again. efficacy from the Passion of Christ, so does Penance. Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Poenit. ii): Now Baptism is not repeated, on account of the unity “Some are to be found who think they ought often to do of Christ’s Passion and death. Therefore in like manner penance, who take liberties with Christ: for if they were Penance is not repeated. truly penitent, they would not think of doing penance over Objection 6. Further, Ambrose says on Ps. 118:58, again, since there is but one Penance even as there is but “I entreated Thy face,” etc., that “facility of obtaining par- one Baptism.” Now Baptism is not repeated. Neither, don is an incentive to sin.” If, therefore, God frequently therefore, is Penance to be repeated. grants pardon through Penance, it seems that He affords Objection 3. Further, the miracles whereby our Lord man an incentive to sin, and thus He seems to take plea- healed bodily diseases, signify the healing of spiritual dis- sure in sin, which is contrary to His goodness. Therefore eases, whereby men are delivered from sins. Now we do Penance cannot be repeated. not read that our Lord restored the sight to any blind man On the contrary, Man is induced to be merciful by twice, or that He cleansed any leper twice, or twice raised the example of Divine mercy, according to Lk. 6:36: any dead man to life. Therefore it seems that He does not “Be ye. . . merciful, as your Father also is merciful.” Now twice grant pardon to any sinner. our Lord commanded His disciples to be merciful by fre- ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 33, a. 1 † De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown 2606 quently pardoning their brethren who had sinned against selves repeatedly from their uncleannesses. In order to them; wherefore, as related in Mat. 18:21, when Peter disprove this the Apostle wrote to the Hebrews that “it asked: “How often shall my brother off end against me, is impossible for those who were once illuminated,” viz. and I forgive him? till seven times?” Jesus answered: through Baptism, “to be renewed again to penance,” viz. “I say not to thee, till seven times, but till seventy times through Baptism, which is “the laver of regeneration, and seven times.” Therefore also God over and over again, renovation of the Holy Ghost,” as stated in Titus 3:5: and through Penance, grants pardon to sinners, especially as he declares the reason to be that by Baptism man dies with He teaches us to pray (Mat. 6:12): “Forgive us our tres- Christ, wherefore he adds (Heb. 6:6): “Crucifying again passes, as we forgive them that trespass against us.” to themselves the Son of God.” I answer that, As regards Penance, some have erred, Reply to Objection 2. Ambrose is speaking of solemn saying that a man cannot obtain pardon of his sins through Penance, which is not repeated in the Church, as we shall Penance a second time. Some of these, viz. the Nova- state further on ( Suppl., q. 28, a. 2). tians, went so far as to say that he who sins after the first Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says‡, “Our Penance which is done in Baptism, cannot be restored Lord gave sight to many blind men at various times, and again through Penance. There were also other heretics strength to many infirm, thereby showing, in these dif- who, as Augustine relates in De Poenitentia∗, said that, ferent men, that the same sins are repeatedly forgiven, at after Baptism, Penance is useful, not many times, but only one time healing a man from leprosy and afterwards from once. blindness. For this reason He healed so many stricken These errors seem to have arisen from a twofold with fever, so many feeble in body, so many lame, blind, source: first from not knowing the nature of true Penance. and withered, that the sinner might not despair; for this For since true Penance requires charity, without which reason He is not described as healing anyone but once, sins are not taken away, they thought that charity once that every one might fear to link himself with sin; for this possessed could not be lost, and that, consequently, reason He declares Himself to be the physician welcomed Penance, if true, could never be removed by sin, so that not of the hale, but of the unhealthy. What sort of a physi- it should be necessary to repeat it. But this was refuted cian is he who knows not how to heal a recurring disease? in the IIa IIae, q. 24, a. 11, where it was shown that on For if a man ail a hundred times it is for the physician account of free-will charity, once possessed, can be lost, to heal him a hundred times: and if he failed where others and that, consequently, after true Penance, a man can sin succeed, he would be a poor physician in comparison with mortally. Secondly, they erred in their estimation of the them.” gravity of sin. For they deemed a sin committed by a man Reply to Objection 4. Penance is to deplore past after he had received pardon, to be so grave that it could sins, and, “while deploring them,” not to commit again, not be forgiven. In this they erred not only with regard either by act or by intention, those which we have to de- to sin which, even after a sin has been forgiven, can be plore. Because a man is a mocker and not a penitent, who, either more or less grievous than the first, which was for- “while doing penance,” does what he repents having done, given, but much more did they err against the infinity of or intends to do again what he did before, or even commits Divine mercy, which surpasses any number and magni- actually the same or another kind of sin. But if a man sin tude of sins, according to Ps. 50:1,2: “Have mercy on me, afterwards either by act or intention, this does not destroy O God, according to Thy great mercy: and according to the fact that his former penance was real, because the re- the multitude of Thy tender mercies, blot out my iniquity.” ality of a former act is never destroyed by a subsequent Wherefore the words of Cain were reprehensible, when he contrary act: for even as he truly ran who afterwards sits, said (Gn. 4:13): “My iniquity is greater than that I may so he truly repented who subsequently sins. deserve pardon.” And so God’s mercy, through Penance, Reply to Objection 5. Baptism derives its power from grants pardon to sinners without any end, wherefore it is Christ’s Passion, as a spiritual regeneration, with a spiri- written (2 Paral 37†): “Thy merciful promise is unmeasur- tual death, of a previous life. Now “it is appointed unto able and unsearchable. . . (and Thou repentest) for the evil man once to die” (Heb. 9:27), and to be born once, where- brought upon man.” It is therefore evident that Penance fore man should be baptized but once. On the other hand, can be repeated many times. Penance derives its power from Christ’s Passion, as a spir- Reply to Objection 1. Some of the Jews thought itual medicine, which can be repeated frequently. that a man could be washed several times in the laver of Reply to Objection 6. According to Augustine (De Baptism, because among them the Law prescribed certain vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is un- washing-places where they were wont to cleanse them- known), “it is evident that sins displease God exceedingly, ∗ De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown † Prayer of Manasses, among the Apocrypha. St. Thomas is evidently quoting from memory, and omits the words in brackets. ‡ De vera et falsa Poenitentia the authorship of which is unknown 2607 for He is always ready to destroy them, lest what He cre-despair. ated should perish, and what He loved be lost,” viz. by 2608 THIRD PART, QUESTION 85 Of Penance As a Virtue (In Six Articles) We must now consider penance as a virtue, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether penance is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a special virtue? (3) To what species of virtue does it belong? (4) Of its subject; (5) Of its cause; (6) Of its relation to the other virtues. Whether Penance is a virtue? IIIa q. 85 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that penance is not a Now it belongs to right reason than one should grieve for virtue. For penance is a sacrament numbered among the a proper object of grief as one ought to grieve, and for an other sacraments, as was shown above (q. 84, a. 1; q. 65, end for which one ought to grieve. And this is observed in a. 1). Now no other sacrament is a virtue. Therefore nei- the penance of which we are speaking now; since the pen- ther is penance a virtue. itent assumes a moderated grief for his past sins, with the Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher intention of removing them. Hence it is evident that the (Ethic. iv, 9), “shame is not a virtue,” both because it is a penance of which we are speaking now, is either a virtue passion accompanied by a bodily alteration, and because or the act of a virtue. it is not the disposition of a perfect thing, since it is about Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 84, a. 1, ad an evil act, so that it has no place in a virtuous man. Now, 1; Aa. 2,3), in the sacrament of Penance, human acts take in like manner, penance is a passion accompanied by a the place of matter, which is not the case in Baptism and bodily alteration, viz. tears, according to Gregory, who Confirmation. Wherefore, since virtue is a principle of says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.) that “penance consists in an act, penance is either a virtue or accompanies a virtue, deploring past sins”: moreover it is about evil deeds, viz. rather than Baptism or Confirmation. sins, which have no place in a virtuous man. Therefore Reply to Objection 2. Penance, considered as a pas- penance is not a virtue. sion, is not a virtue, as stated above, and it is thus that it Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher is accompanied by a bodily alteration. On the other hand, (Ethic. iv, 3), “no virtuous man is foolish.” But it seems it is a virtue, according as it includes a right choice on foolish to deplore what has been done in the past, since it the part of the will; which, however, applies to penance cannot be otherwise, and yet this is what we understand rather than to shame. Because shame regards the evil by penance. Therefore penance is not a virtue. deed as present, whereas penance regards the evil deed On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about as past. Now it is contrary to the perfection of virtue that acts of virtue, because “a lawgiver intends to make the cit- one should have an evil deed actually present, of which izens virtuous” (Ethic. ii, 1). But there is a precept about one ought to be ashamed; whereas it is not contrary to the penance in the Divine law, according to Mat. 4:17: “Do perfection of virtue that we should have previously com- penance,” etc. Therefore penance is a virtue. mitted evil deeds, of which it behooves us to repent, since I answer that, As stated above (obj. 2; q. 84, a. 10, ad a man from being wicked becomes virtuous. 4), to repent is to deplore something one has done. Now Reply to Objection 3. It would indeed be foolish to it has been stated above (q. 84 , a. 9) that sorrow or sad- grieve for what has already been done, with the intention ness is twofold. First, it denotes a passion of the sensitive of trying to make it not done. But the penitent does not in- appetite, and in this sense penance is not a virtue, but a tend this: for his sorrow is displeasure or disapproval with passion. Secondly, it denotes an act of the will, and in this regard to the past deed, with the intention of removing its way it implies choice, and if this be right, it must, of ne- result, viz. the anger of God and the debt of punishment: cessity, be an act of virtue. For it is stated in Ethic. ii, 6 and this is not foolish. that virtue is a habit of choosing according to right reason. 2609 Whether Penance is a special virtue? IIIa q. 85 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that penance is not a spe- God, which does not apply to any other virtue. We must cial virtue. For it seems that to rejoice at the good one has therefore conclude that penance is a special virtue. done, and to grieve for the evil one has done are acts of Reply to Objection 1. An act springs from charity in the same nature. But joy for the good one has done is not two ways: first as being elicited by charity, and a like vir- a special virtue, but is a praiseworthy emotion proceeding tuous act requires no other virtue than charity, e.g. to love from charity, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,8,9): the good, to rejoice therein, and to grieve for what is op- wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:6) that charity “re- posed to it. Secondly, an act springs from charity, being, joiceth not at iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth.” There- so to speak, commanded by charity; and thus, since char- fore, in like manner, neither is penance, which is sorrow ity commands all the virtues, inasmuch as it directs them for past sins, a special virtue, but an emotion resulting to its own end, an act springing from charity may belong from charity. even to another special virtue. Accordingly, if in the act of Objection 2. Further, every special virtue has its spe- the penitent we consider the mere displeasure in the past cial matter, because habits are distinguished by their acts, sin, it belongs to charity immediately, in the same way as and acts by their objects. But penance has no special mat- joy for past good acts; but the intention to aim at the de- ter, because its matter is past sins in any matter whatever. struction of past sin requires a special virtue subordinate Therefore penance is not a special virtue. to charity. Objection 3. Further, nothing is removed except by Reply to Objection 2. In point of fact, penance has its contrary. But penance removes all sins. Therefore it indeed a general matter, inasmuch as it regards all sins; is contrary to all sins, and consequently is not a special but it does so under a special aspect, inasmuch as they can virtue. be remedied by an act of man in co-operating with God On the contrary, The Law has a special precept about for his justification. penance, as stated above (q. 84, Aa. 5,7). Reply to Objection 3. Every special virtue removes I answer that, As stated in the Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 1, ad formally the habit of the opposite vice, just as whiteness 1, a. 2, habits are specifically distinguished according to removes blackness from the same subject: but penance the species of their acts, so that whenever an act has a spe- removes every sin effectively, inasmuch as it works for cial reason for being praiseworthy, there must needs be a the destruction of sins, according as they are pardonable special habit. Now it is evident that there is a special rea- through the grace of God if man co-operate therewith. son for praising the act of penance, because it aims at the Wherefore it does not follow that it is a general virtue. destruction of past sin, considered as an offense against Whether the virtue of penance is a species of justice? IIIa q. 85 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the virtue of penance Objection 4. Further, a gloss on Lk. 6:21, “Blessed is not a species of justice. For justice is not a theological are ye that weep now,” says: “It is prudence that teaches but a moral virtue, as was shown in the IIa IIae, q. 62, a. 3. us the unhappiness of earthly things and the happiness But penance seems to be a theological virtue, since God of heavenly things.” But weeping is an act of penance. is its object, for it makes satisfaction to God, to Whom, Therefore penance is a species of prudence rather than of moreover, it reconciles the sinner. Therefore it seems that justice. penance is not a species of justice. On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia∗: Objection 2. Further, since justice is a moral virtue “Penance is the vengeance of the sorrowful, ever punish- it observes the mean. Now penance does not observe the ing in them what they are sorry for having done.” But to mean, but rather goes to the extreme, according to Jer. take vengeance is an act of justice, wherefore Tully says 6:26: “Make thee mourning as for an only son, a bitter (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that one kind of justice is called vin- lamentation.” Therefore penance is not a species of jus- dictive. Therefore it seems that penance is a species of tice. justice. Objection 3. Further, there are two species of justice, I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 2) penance is a as stated in Ethic. v, 4, viz. “distributive” and “commu-special virtue not merely because it sorrows for evil done tative.” But penance does not seem to be contained under (since charity would suffice for that), but also because the either of them. Therefore it seems that penance is not a penitent grieves for the sin he has committed, inasmuch as species of justice. it is an offense against God, and purposes to amend. Now ∗ De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown 2610 amendment for an offense committed against anyone is Reply to Objection 2. The mean of justice is the not made by merely ceasing to offend, but it is necessary equality that is established between those between whom to make some kind of compensation, which obtains in of- justice is, as stated in Ethic. v. But in certain cases perfect fenses committed against another, just as retribution does, equality cannot be established, on account of the excel- only that compensation is on the part of the offender, as lence of one, as between father and son, God and man, as when he makes satisfaction, whereas retribution is on the the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14), wherefore in such part of the person offended against. Each of these belongs cases, he that falls short of the other must do whatever he to the matter of justice, because each is a kind of commu- can. Yet this will not be sufficient simply, but only accord- tation. Wherefore it is evident that penance, as a virtue, is ing to the acceptance of the higher one; and this is what is a part of justice. meant by ascribing excess to penance. It must be observed, however, that according to the Reply to Objection 3. As there is a kind of commu- Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) a thing is said to be just in two tation in favors, when, to wit, a man gives thanks for a ways, simply and relatively. A thing is just simply when it favor received, so also is there commutation in the mat- is between equals, since justice is a kind of equality, and ter of offenses, when, on account of an offense committed he calls this the politic or civil just, because all citizens are against another, a man is either punished against his will, equal, in the point of being immediately under the ruler, which pertains to vindictive justice, or makes amends of retaining their freedom. But a thing is just relatively when his own accord, which belongs to penance, which regards it is between parties of whom one is subject to the other, the person of the sinner, just as vindictive justice regards as a servant under his master, a son under his father, a wife the person of the judge. Therefore it is evident that both under her husband. It is this kind of just that we consider are comprised under commutative justice. in penance. Wherefore the penitent has recourse to God Reply to Objection 4. Although penance is directly with a purpose of amendment, as a servant to his master, a species of justice, yet, in a fashion, it comprises things according to Ps. 122:2: “Behold, as the eyes of servants pertaining to all the virtues; for inasmuch as there is a jus- are on the hands of their masters. . . so are our eyes unto tice of man towards God, it must have a share in matter the Lord our God, until He have mercy on us”; and as a pertaining to the theological virtues, the object of which son to his father, according to Lk. 15:21: “Father, I have is God. Consequently penance comprises faith in Christ’s sinned against heaven and before thee”; and as a wife to Passion, whereby we are cleansed of our sins, hope for her husband, according to Jer. 3:1: “Thou hast prostituted pardon, and hatred of vice, which pertains to charity. Inas- thyself to many lovers; nevertheless return to Me, saith much as it is a moral virtue, it has a share of prudence, the Lord.” which directs all the moral virtues: but from the very Reply to Objection 1. As stated in Ethic. v, 1, justice nature of justice, it has not only something belonging to is a virtue towards another person, and the matter of jus- justice, but also something belonging to temperance and tice is not so much the person to whom justice is due as fortitude, inasmuch as those things which cause pleasure, the thing which is the subject of distribution or commuta- and which pertain to temperance, and those which cause tion. Hence the matter of penance is not God, but human terror, which fortitude moderates, are objects of commu- acts, whereby God is offended or appeased; whereas God tative justice. Accordingly it belongs to justice both to is as one to whom justice is due. Wherefore it is evident abstain from pleasure, which belongs to temperance, and that penance is not a theological virtue, because God is to bear with hardships, which belongs to fortitude. not its matter or object. Whether the will is properly the subject of penance? IIIa q. 85 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the subject of the memory, according to the Philosopher (De Memoria penance is not properly the will. For penance is a species i). Now penance regards the past, as stated above (a. 1, ad of sorrow. But sorrow is in the concupiscible part, even as 2, ad 3). Therefore penance is subjected in the memory. joy is. Therefore penance is in the concupiscible faculty. Objection 4. Further, nothing acts where it is not. Objection 2. Further, penance is a kind of vengeance, Now penance removes sin from all the powers of the soul. as Augustine states in De Poenitentia∗. But vengeance Therefore penance is in every power of the soul, and not seems to regard the irascible faculty, since anger is the de- only in the will. sire for vengeance. Therefore it seems that penance is in On the contrary, Penance is a kind of sacrifice, ac- the irascible part. cording to Ps. 50:19: “A sacrifice to God is an afflicted Objection 3. Further, the past is the proper object of spirit.” But to offer a sacrifice is an act of the will, accord- ∗ De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown 2611 ing to Ps. 53:8: “I will freely sacrifice to Thee.” Therefore Reply to Objection 2. To desire vengeance on an-penance is in the will. other, through passion, belongs to the irascible appetite, I answer that, We can speak of penance in two ways: but to desire or take vengeance on oneself or on another, first, in so far as it is a passion, and thus, since it is a kind through reason, belongs to the will. of sorrow, it is in the concupiscible part as its subject; sec- Reply to Objection 3. The memory is a power that ondly, in so far as it is a virtue, and thus, as stated above apprehends the past. But penance belongs not to the ap- (a. 3), it is a species of justice. Now justice, as stated in prehensive but to the appetitive power, which presupposes the Ia IIae, q. 56, a. 6, is subjected in the rational appetite an act of the apprehension. Wherefore penance is not in which is the will. Therefore it is evident that penance, the memory, but presupposes it. in so far as it is a virtue, is subjected in the will, and its Reply to Objection 4. The will, as stated above ( Ia, proper act is the purpose of amending what was commit- q. 82, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 9, a. 1 ), moves all the other powers ted against God. of the soul; so that it is not unreasonable for penance to Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers be subjected in the will, and to produce an effect in each penance as a passion. power of the soul. Whether penance originates from fear? IIIa q. 85 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that penance does not God in turning the heart, according to Lam. 5:21: “Con- originate from fear. For penance originates in displeasure vert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted”; the at sin. But this belongs to charity, as stated above (a. 3). second, an act of faith; the third, a movement of servile Therefore penance originates from love rather than fear. fear, whereby a man is withdrawn from sin through fear Objection 2. Further, men are induced to do penance, of punishment; the fourth, a movement of hope, whereby through the expectation of the heavenly kingdom, accord- a man makes a purpose of amendment, in the hope of ob- ing to Mat. 3:2 and Mat. 4:17: “Do penance, for the king- taining pardon; the fifth, a movement of charity, whereby dom of heaven is at hand.” Now the kingdom of heaven is sin is displeasing to man for its own sake and no longer for the object of hope. Therefore penance results from hope the sake of the punishment; the sixth, a movement of fil- rather than from fear. ial fear whereby a man, of his own accord, offers to make Objection 3. Further, fear is an internal act of man. amends to God through fear of Him. But penance does not seem to arise in us through any work Accordingly it is evident that the act of penance re- of man, but through the operation of God, according to sults from servile fear as from the first movement of the Jer. 31:19: “After Thou didst convert me I did penance.” appetite in this direction and from filial fear as from its Therefore penance does not result from fear. immediate and proper principle. On the contrary, It is written (Is. 26:17): “As a Reply to Objection 1. Sin begins to displease a man, woman with child, when she draweth near the time of especially a sinner, on account of the punishments which her delivery, is in pain, and crieth out in her pangs, so servile fear regards, before it displeases him on account ere we become,” by penance, to wit; and according to an- of its being an offense against God, or on account of its other∗ version the text continues: “Through fear of Thee, wickedness, which pertains to charity. O Lord, we have conceived, and been as it were in labor, Reply to Objection 2. When the kingdom of heaven and have brought forth the spirit of salvation,” i.e. of salu- is said to be at hand, we are to understand that the king is tary penance, as is clear from what precedes. Therefore on his way, not only to reward but also to punish. Where- penance results from fear. fore John the Baptist said (Mat. 3:7): “Ye brood of vipers, I answer that, We may speak of penance in two ways: who hath showed you to flee from the wrath to come?” first, as to the habit, and then it is infused by God im- Reply to Objection 3. Even the movement of fear mediately without our operating as principal agents, but proceeds from God’s act in turning the heart; wherefore it not without our co-operating dispositively by certain acts. is written (Dt. 5:29): “Who shall give them to have such Secondly, we may speak of penance, with regard to the a mind, to fear Me?” And so the fact that penance results acts whereby in penance we co-operate with God operat- from fear does not hinder its resulting from the act of God ing, the first principle† of which acts is the operation of in turning the heart. ∗ The Septuagint † Cf. Ia IIae, q. 113 2612 Whether penance is the first of the virtues? IIIa q. 85 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that penance is the first of act of the virtue of penance is directed against sin, through the virtues. Because, on Mat. 3:2, “Do penance,” etc., a love of God; where the first-mentioned act is the reason gloss says: “The first virtue is to destroy the old man, and and cause of the second. hate sin by means of penance.” Consequently penance is not simply the first of the Objection 2. Further, withdrawal from one extreme virtues, either in the order of time, or in the order of seems to precede approach to the other. Now all the other nature, because, in the order of nature, the theological virtues seem to regard approach to a term, because they virtues precede it simply. Nevertheless, in a certain re- all direct man to do good; whereas penance seems to di- spect, it is the first of the other virtues in the order of time, rect him to withdraw from evil. Therefore it seems that as regards its act, because this act is the first in the justifi-penance precedes all the other virtues. cation of the ungodly; whereas in the order of nature, the Objection 3. Further, before penance, there is sin in other virtues seem to precede, as that which is natural pre- the soul. Now no virtue is compatible with sin in the soul. cedes that which is accidental; because the other virtues Therefore no virtue precedes penance, which is itself the seem to be necessary for man’s good, by reason of their first of all and opens the door to the others by expelling very nature, whereas penance is only necessary if some- sin. thing, viz. sin, be presupposed, as stated above (q. 55, On the contrary, Penance results from faith, hope, a. 2), when we spoke of the relation of the sacrament of and charity, as already stated (Aa. 2,5). Therefore penance penance to the other sacraments aforesaid. is not the first of the virtues. Reply to Objection 1. This gloss is to be taken as I answer that, In speaking of the virtues, we do not meaning that the act of penance is the first in point of time, consider the order of time with regard to the habits, be- in comparison with the acts of the other virtues. cause, since the virtues are connected with one another, as Reply to Objection 2. In successive movements with- stated in the Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 1, they all begin at the same drawal from one extreme precedes approach to the other, time to be in the soul; but one is said to precede the other in point of time; and also in the order of nature, if we con- in the order of nature, which order depends on the order of sider the subject, i.e. the order of the material cause; but their acts, in so far as the act of one virtue presupposes the if we consider the order of the efficient and final causes, act of another. Accordingly, then, one must say that, even approach to the end is first, for it is this that the efficient in the order of time, certain praiseworthy acts can precede cause intends first of all: and it is this order which we the act and the habit of penance, e.g. acts of dead faith and consider chiefly in the acts of the soul, as stated in Phys. hope, and an act of servile fear; while the act and habit of ii. charity are, in point of time, simultaneous with the act and Reply to Objection 3. Penance opens the door to the habit of penance, and with the habits of the other virtues. other virtues, because it expels sin by the virtues of faith, For, as was stated in the Ia IIae, q. 113, Aa. 7,8, in the hope and charity, which precede it in the order of nature; justification of the ungodly, the movement of the free-will yet it so opens the door to them that they enter at the same towards God, which is an act of faith quickened by char- time as it: because, in the justification of the ungodly, at ity, and the movement of the free-will towards sin, which the same time as the free-will is moved towards God and is the act of penance, are simultaneous. Yet of these two against sin, the sin is pardoned and grace infused, and with acts, the former naturally precedes the latter, because the grace all the virtues, as stated in the Ia IIae, q. 65, Aa. 3,5. 2613 THIRD PART, QUESTION 86 Of the Effect of Penance, As Regards the Pardon of Mortal Sin (In Six Articles) We must now consider the effect of Penance; and (1) as regards the pardon of mortal sins; (2) as regards the pardon of venial sins; (3) as regards the return of sins which have been pardoned; (4) as regards the recovery of the virtues. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether all mortal sins are taken away by Penance? (2) Whether they can be taken away without Penance? (3) Whether one can be taken away without the other? (4) Whether Penance takes away the guilt while the debt remains? (5) Whether any remnants of sin remain? (6) Whether the removal of sin is the effect of Penance as a virtue, or as a sacrament? Whether all sins are taken away by Penance? IIIa q. 86 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that not all sins are taken anguish of spirit.” Consequently such Penance brings no away by Penance. For the Apostle says (Heb. 12:17) hope of pardon, but only despair. Nevertheless no sin of that Esau “found no place of repentance, although with a wayfarer can be such as that, because his will is flexible tears he had sought it,” which a gloss explains as meaning to good and evil. Wherefore to say that in this life there is that “he found no place of pardon and blessing through any sin of which one cannot repent, is erroneous, first, be- Penance”: and it is related (2 Macc. 9:13) of Antiochus, cause this would destroy free-will, secondly, because this that “this wicked man prayed to the Lord, of Whom he would be derogatory to the power of grace, whereby the was not to obtain mercy.” Therefore it does not seem that heart of any sinner whatsoever can be moved to repent, all sins are taken away by Penance. according to Prov. 21:1: “The heart of the king is in the Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Serm. hand of the Lord: whithersoever He will He shall turn it.” Dom. in Monte i) that “so great is the stain of that sin It is also erroneous to say that any sin cannot be par- (namely, when a man, after coming to the knowledge of doned through true Penance. First, because this is con- God through the grace of Christ, resists fraternal char- trary to Divine mercy, of which it is written (Joel 2:13) ity, and by the brands of envy combats grace itself) that that God is “gracious and merciful, patient, and rich in he is unable to humble himself in prayer, although he is mercy, and ready to repent of the evil”; for, in a manner, forced by his wicked conscience to acknowledge and con- God would be overcome by man, if man wished a sin to fess his sin.” Therefore not every sin can be taken away be blotted out, which God were unwilling to blot out. Sec- by Penance. ondly, because this would be derogatory to the power of Objection 3. Further, our Lord said (Mat. 12:32): Christ’s Passion, through which Penance produces its ef- “He that shall speak against the Holy Ghost, it shall not fect, as do the other sacraments, since it is written (1 Jn. be forgiven him, neither in this world nor in the world to 2:2): “He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours come.” Therefore not every sin can be pardoned through only, but also for those of the whole world.” Penance. Therefore we must say simply that, in this life, every On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:22): “I will sin can be blotted out by true Penance. not remember” any more “all his iniquities that he hath Reply to Objection 1. Esau did not truly repent. This done.” is evident from his saying (Gn. 27:41): “The days will I answer that, The fact that a sin cannot be taken away come of the mourning of my father, and I will kill my by Penance may happen in two ways: first, because of brother Jacob.” Likewise neither did Antiochus repent the impossibility of repenting of sin; secondly, because of truly; since he grieved for his past sin, not because he Penance being unable to blot out a sin. In the first way had offended God thereby, but on account of the sickness the sins of the demons and of men who are lost, cannot be which he suffered in his body. blotted out by Penance, because their will is confirmed in Reply to Objection 2. These words of Augustine evil, so that sin cannot displease them as to its guilt, but should be understood thus: “So great is the stain of that only as to the punishment which they suffer, by reason of sin, that man is unable to humble himself in prayer,” i.e. which they have a kind of repentance, which yet is fruit- it is not easy for him to do so; in which sense we say that less, according to Wis. 5:3: “Repenting, and groaning for a man cannot be healed, when it is difficult to heal him. 2614 Yet this is possible by the power of God’s grace, which of sins. or, if by the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, sometimes turns men even “into the depths of the sea” we understand sin committed through certain malice, this (Ps. 67:23). means either that the blasphemy itself against the Holy Reply to Objection 3. The word or blasphemy spoken Ghost is unpardonable, i.e. not easily pardonable, or that against the Holy Ghost is final impenitence, as Augustine such a sin does not contain in itself any motive for pardon, states (De Verb. Dom. xi), which is altogether unpardon- or that for such a sin a man is punished both in this and in able, because after this life is ended, there is no pardon the next world, as we explained in the IIa IIae, q. 14, a. 3. Whether sin can be pardoned without Penance? IIIa q. 86 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that sin can be pardoned God pardon a man for an offense, without his will being without Penance. For the power of God is no less with changed. Now the offense of mortal sin is due to man’s regard to adults than with regard to children. But He par- will being turned away from God, through being turned to dons the sins of children without Penance. Therefore He some mutable good. Consequently, for the pardon of this also pardons adults without penance. offense against God, it is necessary for man’s will to be so Objection 2. Further, God did not bind His power to changed as to turn to God and to renounce having turned the sacraments. But Penance is a sacrament. Therefore by to something else in the aforesaid manner, together with a God’s power sin can be pardoned without Penance. purpose of amendment; all of which belongs to the nature Objection 3. Further, God’s mercy is greater than of penance as a virtue. Therefore it is impossible for a sin man’s. Now man sometimes forgives another for offend- to be pardoned anyone without penance as a virtue. ing him, without his repenting: wherefore our Lord com- But the sacrament of Penance, as stated above (q. 88, manded us (Mat. 5:44): “Love your enemies, do good a. 3), is perfected by the priestly office of binding and to them that hate you.” Much more, therefore, does God loosing, without which God can forgive sins, even as pardon men for offending him, without their repenting. Christ pardoned the adulterous woman, as related in Jn. On the contrary, The Lord said (Jer. 18:8): “If that 8, and the woman that was a sinner, as related in Luke nation. . . shall repent of their evil” which they have done, vii, whose sins, however, He did not forgive without the “I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do virtue of penance: for as Gregory states (Hom. xxxiii in them,” so that, on the other hand, if man “do not penance,” Evang.), “He drew inwardly by grace,” i.e. by penance, it seems that God will not pardon him his sin. “her whom He received outwardly by His mercy.” I answer that, It is impossible for a mortal actual sin Reply to Objection 1. In children there is none but to be pardoned without penance, if we speak of penance original sin, which consists, not in an actual disorder of as a virtue. For, as sin is an offense against God, He par- the will, but in a habitual disorder of nature, as explained dons sin in the same way as he pardons an offense com- in the Ia IIae, q. 82, a. 1, and so in them the forgiveness of mitted against Him. Now an offense is directly opposed to sin is accompanied by a habitual change resulting from the grace, since one man is said to be offended with another, infusion of grace and virtues, but not by an actual change. because he excludes him from his grace. Now, as stated in On the other hand, in the case of an adult, in whom there the Ia IIae, q. 110, a. 1, the difference between the grace are actual sins, which consist in an actual disorder of the of God and the grace of man, is that the latter does not will, there is no remission of sins, even in Baptism, with- cause, but presupposes true or apparent goodness in him out an actual change of the will, which is the effect of who is graced, whereas the grace of God causes goodness Penance. in the man who is graced, because the good-will of God, Reply to Objection 2. This argument takes Penance which is denoted by the word “grace,” is the cause of all as a sacrament. created good. Hence it is possible for a man to pardon Reply to Objection 3. God’s mercy is more powerful an offense, for which he is offended with someone, with- than man’s, in that it moves man’s will to repent, which out any change in the latter’s will; but it is impossible that man’s mercy cannot do. Whether by Penance one sin can be pardoned without another? IIIa q. 86 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that by Penance one sin piece whereupon I rained not, withered.” These words are can be pardoned without another. For it is written (Amos expounded by Gregory, who says (Hom. x super Ezech.): 4:7): “I caused it to rain upon one city, and caused it not to “When a man who hates his neighbor, breaks himself of rain upon another city; one piece was rained upon: and the other vices, rain falls on one part of the city, leaving the 2615 other part withered, for there are some men who, when is common to all mortal sins: and where the same reason they prune some vices, become much more rooted in oth- applies, the result will be the same. Consequently a man ers.” Therefore one sin can be forgiven by Penance, with- cannot be truly penitent, if he repent of one sin and not out another. of another. For if one particular sin were displeasing to Objection 2. Further, Ambrose in commenting on him, because it is against the love of God above all things Ps. 118, “Blessed are the undefiled in the way,” after (which motive is necessary for true repentance), it follows expounding verse 136 (“My eyes have sent forth springs that he would repent of all. Whence it follows that it is of water”), says that “the first consolation is that God is impossible for one sin to be pardoned through Penance, mindful to have mercy; and the second, that He punishes, without another. Thirdly, because this would be contrary for although faith be wanting, punishment makes satisfac- to the perfection of God’s mercy, since His works are per- tion and raises us up.” Therefore a man can be raised up fect, as stated in Dt. 32:4; wherefore whomsoever He par- from one sin, while the sin of unbelief remains. dons, He pardons altogether. Hence Augustine says†, that Objection 3. Further, when several things are not nec- “it is irreverent and heretical to expect half a pardon from essarily together, one can be removed without the other. Him Who is just and justice itself.” Now it was stated in the Ia IIae, q. 73, a. 1 that sins Reply to Objection 1. These words of Gregory do are not connected together, so that one sin can be with- not refer to the forgiveness of the guilt, but to the ces- out another. Therefore also one sin can be taken away by sation from act, because sometimes a man who has been Penance without another being taken away. wont to commit several kinds of sin, renounces one and Objection 4. Further, sins are the debts, for which we not the other; which is indeed due to God’s assistance, but pray for pardon when we say in the Lord’s Prayer: “For- does not reach to the pardon of the sin. give us our trespasses,” etc. Now man sometimes forgives Reply to Objection 2. In this saying of Ambrose one debt without forgiving another. Therefore God also, “faith” cannot denote the faith whereby we believe in by Penance, forgives one sin without another. Christ, because, as Augustine says on Jn. 15:22, “If I had Objection 5. Further, man’s sins are forgiven him not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin” through the love of God, according to Jer. 31:3: “I have (viz. unbelief): “for this is the sin which contains all oth- loved thee with an everlasting love, therefore have I drawn ers”: but it stands for consciousness, because sometimes thee, taking pity on thee.” Now there is nothing to hinder a man receives pardon for a sin of which he is not con- God from loving a man in one respect, while being of- scious, through the punishment which he bears patiently. fended with him in another, even as He loves the sinner as Reply to Objection 3. Although sins are not con- regards his nature, while hating him for his sin. Therefore nected in so far as they turn towards a mutable good, yet it seems possible for God, by Penance, to pardon one sin they are connected in so far as they turn away from the without another. immutable Good, which applies to all mortal sins in com- On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia∗: mon. and it is thus that they have the character of an of- “There are many who repent having sinned, but not com- fense which needs to be removed by Penance. pletely; for they except certain things which give them Reply to Objection 4. Debt as regards external things, pleasure, forgetting that our Lord delivered from the devil e.g. money, is not opposed to friendship through which the man who was both dumb and deaf, whereby He shows the debt is pardoned. hence one debt can be condoned us that we are never healed unless it be from all sins.” without another. On the other hand, the debt of sin is I answer that, It is impossible for Penance to take one opposed to friendship, and so one sin or offense is not sin away without another. First because sin is taken away pardoned without another; for it would seem absurd for by grace removing the offense against God. Wherefore anyone to ask even a man to forgive him one offense and it was stated in the Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 7; Ia IIae, q. 113, not another. a. 2 that without grace no sin can be forgiven. Now every Reply to Objection 5. The love whereby God loves mortal sin is opposed to grace and excludes it. Therefore man’s nature, does not ordain man to the good of glory it is impossible for one sin to be pardoned without another. from which man is excluded by any mortal sin. but the Secondly, because, as shown above (a. 2) mortal sin can- love of grace, whereby mortal sin is forgiven, ordains man not be forgiven without true Penance, to which it belongs to eternal life, according to Rom. 6:23: “The grace of God to renounce sin, by reason of its being against God, which (is) life everlasting.” Hence there is no comparison. ∗ De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown † De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown 2616 Whether the debt of punishment remains after the guilt has been forgiven through IIIa q. 86 a. 4 Penance? Objection 1. It would seem that no debt of punish- ral punishment. Consequently when guilt is pardoned ment remains after the guilt has been forgiven through through grace, the soul ceases to be turned away from Penance. For when the cause is removed, the effect is God, through being united to God by grace: so that at the removed. But the guilt is the cause of the debt of pun- same time, the debt of punishment is taken away, albeit a ishment: since a man deserves to be punished because he debt of some temporal punishment may yet remain. has been guilty of a sin. Therefore when the sin has been Reply to Objection 1. Mortal sin both turns away forgiven, no debt of punishment can remain. from God and turns to a created good. But, as stated in Objection 2. Further, according to the Apostle (Rom. the Ia IIae, q. 71, a. 6, the turning away from God is as 5) the gift of Christ is more effective than the sin of Adam. its form while the turning to created good is as its matter. Now, by sinning, man incurs at the same time guilt and the Now if the formal element of anything be removed, the debt of punishment. Much more therefore, by the gift of species is taken away: thus, if you take away rational, you grace, is the guilt forgiven and at the same time the debt take away the human species. Consequently mortal sin is of punishment remitted. said to be pardoned from the very fact that, by means of Objection 3. Further, the forgiveness of sins is ef- grace, the aversion of the mind from God is taken away fected in Penance through the power of Christ’s Passion, together with the debt of eternal punishment: and yet the according to Rom. 3:25: “Whom God hath proposed to be material element remains, viz. the inordinate turning to a a propitiation, through faith in His Blood. . . for the remis- created good, for which a debt of temporal punishment is sion of former sins.” Now Christ’s Passion made satisfac- due. tion sufficient for all sins, as stated above (Qq. 48,49,79, Reply to Objection 2. As stated in the Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 5). Therefore after the guilt has been pardoned, no debt Aa. 7,8; Ia IIae, q. 111, a. 2, it belongs to grace to operate of punishment remains. in man by justifying him from sin, and to co-operate with On the contrary, It is related (2 Kings 12:13) that man that his work may be rightly done. Consequently when David penitent had said to Nathan: “I have sinned the forgiveness of guilt and of the debt of eternal punish- against the Lord,” Nathan said to him: “The Lord also ment belongs to operating grace, while the remission of hath taken away thy sin, thou shalt not die. Neverthe- the debt of temporal punishment belongs to co-operating less. . . the child that is born to thee shall surely die,” which grace, in so far as man, by bearing punishment patiently was to punish him for the sin he had committed, as stated with the help of Divine grace, is released also from the in the same place. Therefore a debt of some punishment debt of temporal punishment. Consequently just as the ef- remains after the guilt has been forgiven. fect of operating grace precedes the effect of co-operating I answer that, As stated in the Ia IIae, q. 87, a. 4, grace, so too, the remission of guilt and of eternal punish- in mortal sin there are two things, namely, a turning from ment precedes the complete release from temporal pun- the immutable Good, and an inordinate turning to mutable ishment, since both are from grace, but the former, from good. Accordingly, in so far as mortal sin turns away from grace alone, the latter, from grace and free-will. the immutable Good, it induces a debt of eternal punish- Reply to Objection 3. Christ’s Passion is of itself suf- ment, so that whosoever sins against the eternal Good ficient to remove all debt of punishment, not only eternal, should be punished eternally. Again, in so far as mortal but also temporal; and man is released from the debt of sin turns inordinately to a mutable good, it gives rise to a punishment according to the measure of his share in the debt of some punishment, because the disorder of guilt is power of Christ’s Passion. Now in Baptism man shares not brought back to the order of justice, except by punish- the Power of Christ’s Passion fully, since by water and the ment: since it is just that he who has been too indulgent Spirit of Christ, he dies with Him to sin, and is born again to his will, should suffer something against his will, for in Him to a new life, so that, in Baptism, man receives the thus will equality be restored. Hence it is written (Apoc. remission of all debt of punishment. In Penance, on the 18:7): “As much as she hath glorified herself, and lived in other hand, man shares in the power of Christ’s Passion delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her.” according to the measure of his own acts, which are the Since, however, the turning to mutable good is finite, matter of Penance, as water is of Baptism, as stated above sin does not, in this respect, induce a debt of eternal pun- (q. 84, Aa. 1,3). Wherefore the entire debt of punishment ishment. Wherefore, if man turns inordinately to a mu- is not remitted at once after the first act of Penance, by table good, without turning from God, as happens in ve- which act the guilt is remitted, but only when all the acts nial sins, he incurs a debt, not of eternal but of tempo- of Penance have been completed. 2617 Whether the remnants of sin are removed when a mortal sin is forgiven? IIIa q. 86 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that all the remnants of sin away by grace, that which is on the part of the inordinate are removed when a mortal sin is forgiven. For Augustine turning to a mutable good can remain, since this may hap- says in De Poenitentia∗: “Our Lord never healed anyone pen to be without the other, as stated above (a. 4). Con- without delivering him wholly; for He wholly healed the sequently, there is no reason why, after the guilt has been man on the Sabbath, since He delivered his body from all forgiven, the dispositions caused by preceding acts should disease, and his soul from all taint.” Now the remnants not remain, which are called the remnants of sin. Yet they of sin belong to the disease of sin. Therefore it does not remain weakened and diminished, so as not to domineer seem possible for any remnants of sin to remain when the over man, and they are after the manner of dispositions guilt has been pardoned. rather than of habits, like the “fomes” which remains af- Objection 2. Further, according to Dionysius (Div. ter Baptism. Nom. iv), “good is more efficacious than evil, since evil Reply to Objection 1. God heals the whole man per- does not act save in virtue of some good.” Now, by sin- fectly; but sometimes suddenly, as Peter’s mother-in-law ning, man incurs the taint of sin all at once. Much more, was restored at once to perfect health, so that “rising she therefore, by repenting, is he delivered also from all rem- ministered to them” (Lk. 4:39), and sometimes by de- nants of sin. grees, as we said above (q. 44, a. 3, ad 2) about the blind Objection 3. Further, God’s work is more efficacious man who was restored to sight (Mat. 8). And so too, He than man’s. Now by the exercise of good human works sometimes turns the heart of man with such power, that it the remnants of contrary sins are removed. Much more, receives at once perfect spiritual health, not only the guilt therefore, are they taken away by the remission of guilt, being pardoned, but all remnants of sin being removed as which is a work of God. was the case with Magdalen (Lk. 7); whereas at other On the contrary, We read (Mk. 8) that the blind man times He sometimes first pardons the guilt by operating whom our Lord enlightened, was restored first of all to im- grace, and afterwards, by co-operating grace, removes the perfect sight, wherefore he said (Mk. 8:24): “I see men, remnants of sin by degrees. as it were trees, walking”; and afterwards he was restored Reply to Objection 2. Sin too, sometimes induces at perfectly, “so that he saw all things clearly.” Now the en- once a weak disposition, such as is the result of one act, lightenment of the blind man signifies the delivery of the and sometimes a stronger disposition, the result of many sinner. Therefore after the first remission of sin, whereby acts. the sinner is restored to spiritual sight, there still remain Reply to Objection 3. One human act does not re- in him some remnants of his past sin. move all the remnants of sin, because, as stated in the I answer that, Mortal sin, in so far as it turns inor- Predicaments (Categor. viii) “a vicious man by doing dinately to a mutable good, produces in the soul a cer- good works will make but little progress so as to be any tain disposition, or even a habit, if the acts be repeated better, but if he continue in good practice, he will end in frequently. Now it has been said above (a. 4) that the being good as to acquired virtue.” But God’s grace does guilt of mortal sin is pardoned through grace removing this much more effectively, whether by one or by several the aversion of the mind from God. Nevertheless when acts. that which is on the part of the aversion has been taken Whether the forgiveness of guilt is an effect of Penance? IIIa q. 86 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the forgiveness of Objection 3. Further, there is no forgiveness of sin guilt is not an effect of penance as a virtue. For penance except through the power of Christ’s Passion, according is said to be a virtue, in so far as it is a principle of a to Heb. 9:22: “Without shedding of blood there is no human action. But human action does nothing towards remission.” Now Penance, as a sacrament, produces its the remission of guilt, since this is an effect of operating effect through the power of Christ’s Passion, even as the grace. Therefore the forgiveness of guilt is not an effect other sacraments do, as was shown above (q. 62, Aa. 4,5). of penance as a virtue. Therefore the forgiveness of sin is the effect of Penance, Objection 2. Further, certain other virtues are more not as a virtue, but as a sacrament. excellent than penance. But the forgiveness of sin is not On the contrary, Properly speaking, the cause of a said to be the effect of any other virtue. Neither, therefore, thing is that without which it cannot be, since every de- is it the effect of penance as a virtue. fect depends on its cause. Now forgiveness of sin can ∗ De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown 2618 come from God without the sacrament of Penance, but a movement of the free-will towards God, which is an act not without the virtue of penance, as stated above (q. 84, of faith quickened by charity, and a movement of the free- a. 5, ad 3; q. 85, a. 2); so that, even before the sacraments will against sin, which is the act of penance. Yet these of the New Law were instituted, God pardoned the sins human acts are there as the effects of operating grace, and of the penitent. Therefore the forgiveness of sin is chiefly are produced at the same time as the forgiveness of sin. the effect of penance as a virtue. Consequently the forgiveness of sin does not take place I answer that, Penance is a virtue in so far as it is without an act of the virtue of penance, although it is the a principle of certain human acts. Now the human acts, effect of operating grace. which are performed by the sinner, are the material ele- Reply to Objection 2. In the justification of the un- ment in the sacrament of Penance. Moreover every sacra- godly there is not only an act of penance, but also an act of ment produces its effect, in virtue not only of its form, but faith, as stated above (ad 1: Ia IIae, q. 113, a. 4). Where- also of its matter. because both these together make the fore the forgiveness of sin is accounted the effect not only one sacrament, as stated above (q. 60, a. 6, ad 2, a. 7). of the virtue of penance, but also, and that chiefly, of faith Hence in Baptism forgiveness of sin is effected, in virtue and charity. not only of the form (but also of the matter, viz. water, Reply to Objection 3. The act of the virtue of penance albeit chiefly in virtue of the form)∗ from which the wa- is subordinate to Christ’s Passion both by faith, and by its ter receives its power—and, similarly, the forgiveness of relation to the keys of the Church; and so, in both ways, sin is the effect of Penance, chiefly by the power of the it causes the forgiveness of sin, by the power of Christ’s keys, which is vested in the ministers, who furnish the Passion. formal part of the sacrament, as stated above (q. 84, a. 3), To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we re- and secondarily by the instrumentality of those acts of the ply that the act of the virtue of penance is necessary for penitent which pertain to the virtue of penance, but only the forgiveness of sin, through being an inseparable effect in so far as such acts are, in some way, subordinate to the of grace, whereby chiefly is sin pardoned, and which pro- keys of the Church. Accordingly it is evident that the for- duces its effect in all the sacraments. Consequently it only giveness of sin is the effect of penance as a virtue, but still follows that grace is a higher cause of the forgiveness of more of Penance as a sacrament. sin than the sacrament of Penance. Moreover, it must be Reply to Objection 1. The effect of operating grace observed that, under the Old Law and the law of nature, is the justification of the ungodly (as stated in the Ia IIae, there was a sacrament of Penance after a fashion, as stated q. 113), wherein there is, as was there stated (Aa. 1,2,3), above (q. 84, a. 7, ad 2). not only infusion of grace and forgiveness of sin, but also ∗ The words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine edition 2619 THIRD PART, QUESTION 87 Of the Remission of Venial Sin (In Four Articles) We must now consider the forgiveness of venial sins, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether venial sin can be forgiven without Penance? (2) Whether it can be forgiven without the infusion of grace? (3) Whether venial sins are forgiven by the sprinkling of holy water, a bishop’s blessing, the beating of the breast, the Lord’s Prayer, and the like? (4) Whether a venial sin can be taken away without a mortal sin? Whether venial sin can be forgiven without Penance? IIIa q. 87 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that venial sin can be for- remains. given without penance. For, as stated above (q. 84, a. 10, Yet a more perfect penance is requisite for the forgive- ad 4), it is essential to true penance that man should not ness of mortal sin, namely that man should detest actually only sorrow for his past sins, but also that he should pur- the mortal sin which he committed, so far as lies in his pose to avoid them for the future. Now venial sins are power, that is to say, he should endeavor to remember each forgiven without any such purpose, for it is certain that single mortal sin, in order to detest each one. But this is, man cannot lead the present life without committing ve- not required for the forgiveness of venial sins; although nial sins. Therefore venial sins can be forgiven without it does not suffice to have habitual displeasure, which is penance. included in the habit of charity or of penance as a virtue, Objection 2. Further, there is no penance without ac- since then venial sin would be incompatible with charity, tual displeasure at one’s sins. But venial sins can be taken which is evidently untrue. Consequently it is necessary away without any actual displeasure at them, as would be to have a certain virtual displeasure, so that, for instance, the case if a man were to be killed in his sleep, for Christ’s a man’s affections so tend to God and Divine things, that sake, since he would go to heaven at once, which would whatever might happen to him to hamper that tendency not happen if his venial sins remained. Therefore venial would be displeasing to him, and would grieve him, were sins can be forgiven without penance. he to commit it, even though he were not to think of it ac- Objection 3. Further, venial sins are contrary to the tually: and this is not sufficient for the remission of mortal fervor of charity, as stated in the IIa IIae, q. 24, a. 10. sin, except as regards those sins which he fails to remem- Now one contrary is removed by another. Therefore for- ber after a careful examination. giveness of venial sins is caused by the fervor of charity, Reply to Objection 1. When man is in a state of which may be without actual displeasure at venial sin. grace, he can avoid all mortal sins, and each single one; On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia∗, and he can avoid each single venial sin, but not all, as that “there is a penance which is done for venial sins in was explained in the Ia IIae, q. 74, a. 8, ad 2; Ia IIae, the Church every day” which would be useless if venial q. 109, a. 8. Consequently penance for mortal sins re- sins could be forgiven without Penance. quires man to purpose abstaining from mortal sins, all and I answer that, Forgiveness of sin, as stated above each; whereas penance for venial sins requires man to pur- (q. 86, a. 2), is effected by man being united to God from pose abstaining from each, but not from all, because the Whom sin separates him in some way. Now this separa- weakness of this life does not allow of this. Nevertheless tion is made complete by mortal sin, and incomplete by he needs to have the purpose of taking steps to commit venial sin: because, by mortal sin, the mind through act- fewer venial sins, else he would be in danger of falling ing against charity is altogether turned away from God; back, if he gave up the desire of going forward, or of re- whereas by venial sin man’s affections are clogged, so that moving the obstacles to spiritual progress, such as venial they are slow in tending towards God. Consequently both sins are. kinds of sin are taken away by penance, because by both Reply to Objection 2. Death for Christ’s sake, as of them man’s will is disordered through turning inordi- stated above (q. 66, a. 11), obtains the power of Baptism, nately to a created good; for just as mortal sin cannot be wherefore it washes away all sin, both venial and mortal, forgiven so long as the will is attached to sin, so neither unless it find the will attached to sin. can venial sin, because while the cause remains, the effect Reply to Objection 3. The fervor of charity implies ∗ De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown 2620 virtual displeasure at venial sins, as stated above (q. 79, a. 4). Whether infusion of grace is necessary for the remission of venial sins? IIIa q. 87 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that infusion of grace is will (in whom alone can there be venial sins), there can necessary for the remission of venial sins. Because an ef- be no infusion of grace without an actual movement of fect is not produced without its proper cause. Now the the free-will towards God and against sin, consequently proper cause of the remission of sins is grace; for man’s whenever grace is infused anew, venial sins are forgiven. sins are not forgiven through his own merits; wherefore Reply to Objection 1. Even the forgiveness of venial it is written (Eph. 2:4,5): “God, Who is rich in mercy, sins is an effect of grace, in virtue of the act which grace for His exceeding charity, wherewith He loved us, even produces anew, but not through any habit infused anew when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together in into the soul. Christ, by Whose grace you are saved.” Therefore venial Reply to Objection 2. Venial sin is never forgiven sins are not forgiven without infusion of grace. without some act, explicit or implicit, of the virtue of Objection 2. Further, venial sins are not forgiven penance, as stated above (a. 1): it can, however, be for- without Penance. Now grace is infused, in Penance as given without the sacrament of Penance, which is for- in the other sacraments of the New Law. Therefore venial mally perfected by the priestly absolution, as stated above sins are not forgiven without infusion of grace. (q. 87, a. 2). Hence it does not follow that infusion of Objection 3. Further, venial sin produces a stain on grace is required for the forgiveness of venial sin, for the soul. Now a stain is not removed save by grace which although this infusion takes place in every sacrament, it is the spiritual beauty of the soul. Therefore it seems that does not occur in every act of virtue. venial sins are not forgiven without infusion of grace. Reply to Objection 3. Just as there are two kinds of On the contrary, The advent of venial sin neither de- bodily stain, one consisting in the privation of something stroys nor diminishes grace, as stated in the IIa IIae, q. 24, required for beauty, e.g. the right color or the due propor- a. 10. Therefore, in like manner, an infusion of grace is tion of members, and another by the introduction of some not necessary in order to remove venial sin. hindrance to beauty, e.g. mud or dust; so too, a stain is I answer that, Each thing is removed by its contrary. put on the soul, in one way, by the privation of the beauty But venial sin is not contrary to habitual grace or charity, of grace through mortal sin, in another, by the inordinate but hampers its act, through man being too much attached inclination of the affections to some temporal thing, and to a created good, albeit not in opposition to God, as stated this is the result of venial sin. Consequently, an infusion in the Ia IIae, q. 88, a. 1; IIa IIae, q. 24, a. 10. Therefore, of grace is necessary for the removal of mortal sin, but in in order that venial sin be removed, it is not necessary order to remove venial sin, it is necessary to have a move- that habitual grace be infused, but a movement of grace or ment proceeding from grace, removing the inordinate at- charity suffices for its forgiveness. tachment to the temporal thing. Nevertheless, since in those who have the use of free- Whether venial sins are removed by the sprinkling of holy water and the like? IIIa q. 87 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that venial sins are not Objection 3. Further, venial sins occasion a debt of removed by the sprinkling of holy water, a bishop’s bless- some punishment, albeit temporal; for it is written (1 Cor. ing, and the like. For venial sins are not forgiven without 3:12,15) of him that builds up “wood, hay, stubble” that Penance, as stated above (a. 1). But Penance suffices by “he shall be saved, yet so as by fire.” Now the above things itself for the remission of venial sins. Therefore the above whereby venial sins are said to be taken away, contain ei- have nothing to do with the remission of venial sins. ther no punishment at all, or very little. Therefore they do Objection 2. Further, each of the above bears the not suffice for the full remission of venial sins. same relation to one venial sin as to all. If therefore, by On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia∗ means of one of them, some venial sin is remitted, it fol- that “for our slight sins we strike our breasts, and say: For- lows that in like manner all are remitted, so that by beat- give us our trespasses,” and so it seems that striking one’s ing his breast once, or by being sprinkled once with holy breast, and the Lord’s Prayer cause the remission of venial water, a man would be delivered from all his venial sins, sins: and the same seems to apply to the other things. which seems unreasonable. I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), no infusion of ∗ Hom. 30 inter 1; Ep. cclxv 2621 fresh grace is required for the forgiveness of a venial sin, mission of venial sins, in so far as they incline the soul but it is enough to have an act proceeding from grace, in to the movement of penance, viz., the implicit or explicit detestation of that venial sin, either explicit or at least im- detestation of one’s sins. plicit, as when one is moved fervently to God. Hence, for Reply to Objection 2. All these things, so far as they three reasons, certain things cause the remission of ve- are concerned, conduce to the remission of all venial sins: nial sins: first, because they imply the infusion of grace, but the remission may be hindered as regards certain ve- since the infusion of grace removes venial sins, as stated nial sins, to which the mind is still actually attached, even above (a. 2); and so, by the Eucharist, Extreme Unction, as insincerity sometimes impedes the effect of Baptism. and by all the sacraments of the New Law without excep- Reply to Objection 3. By the above things, venial tion, wherein grace is conferred, venial sins are remitted. sins are indeed taken away as regards the guilt, both be- Secondly, because they imply a movement of detestation cause those things are a kind of satisfaction, and through for sin, and in this way the general confession†, the beat- the virtue of charity whose movement is aroused by such ing of one’s breast, and the Lord’s Prayer conduce to the things. remission of venial sins, for we ask in the Lord’s Prayer: Yet it does not always happen that, by means of each “Forgive us our trespasses.” Thirdly, because they include one, the whole guilt of punishment is taken away, because, a movement of reverence for God and Divine things; and in that case, whoever was entirely free from mortal sin, in this way a bishop’s blessing, the sprinkling of holy wa- would go straight to heaven if sprinkled with holy water: ter, any sacramental anointing, a prayer said in a dedicated but the debt of punishment is remitted by means of the church, and anything else of the kind, conduce to the re- above, according to the movement of fervor towards God, mission of venial sins. which fervor is aroused by such things, sometimes more, Reply to Objection 1. All these things cause the re- sometimes less. Whether venial sin can be taken away without mortal sin? IIIa q. 87 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that venial sin can be tal sin. taken away without mortal sin. For, on Jn. 8:7: “He that I answer that, As stated above (q. 87, a. 3), there is is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her,” no remission of any sin whatever except by the power of a gloss says that “all those men were in a state of mortal grace, because, as the Apostle declares (Rom. 4:8), it is sin: for venial offenses were forgiven them through the le- owing to God’s grace that He does not impute sin to a gal ceremonies.” Therefore venial sin can be taken away man, which a gloss on that passage expounds as referring without mortal sin. to venial sin. Now he that is in a state of mortal sin is with- Objection 2. Further, no infusion of grace is required out the grace of God. Therefore no venial sin is forgiven for the remission of venial sin. but it is required for the him. forgiveness of mortal sin. Therefore venial sin can be Reply to Objection 1. Venial offenses, in the passage taken away without mortal sin. quoted, denote the irregularities or uncleannesses which Objection 3. Further, a venial sin differs from a mor- men contracted in accordance with the Law. tal sin more than from another venial sin. But one venial Reply to Objection 2. Although no new infusion of sin can be pardoned without another, as stated above (a. 3, habitual grace is requisite for the remission of venial sin, ad 2; q. 87, a. 3). Therefore a venial sin can be taken away yet it is necessary to exercise some act of grace, which without a mortal sin. cannot be in one who is a subject of mortal sin. On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:26): “Amen I Reply to Objection 3. Venial sin does not preclude say to thee, thou shalt not go out from thence,” viz., from every act of grace whereby all venial sins can be removed; the prison, into which a man is cast for mortal sin, “till whereas mortal sin excludes altogether the habit of grace, thou repay the last farthing,” by which venial sin is de- without which no sin, either mortal or venial, is remitted. noted. Therefore a venial sin is not forgiven without mor- Hence the comparison fails. † i.e. the recital of the Confiteor or of an act of contrition 2622 THIRD PART, QUESTION 88 Of the Return of Sins Which Have Been Taken Away by Penance (In Four Articles) We must now consider the return of sins which have been taken away by Penance: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether sins which have been taken away by Penance return simply through a subsequent sin? (2) Whether more specially as regards certain sins they return, in a way, on account of ingratitude? (3) Whether the debt of punishment remains the same for sins thus returned? (4) Whether this ingratitude, on account of which sins return, is a special sin? Whether sins once forgiven return through a subsequent sin? IIIa q. 88 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that sins once forgiven Therefore the sins which have been taken away do not re- return through a subsequent sin. For Augustine says (De turn through a subsequent sin, as though God repented His Bapt. contra Donat. i, 12): “Our Lord teaches most ex- gift of forgiveness. plicitly in the Gospel that sins which have been forgiven Moreover, Augustine says (Lib. Resp. Prosperi i∗): return, when fraternal charity ceases, in the example of “When he that turns away from Christ, comes to the end the servant from whom his master exacted the payment of of this life a stranger to grace, whither does he go, except the debt already forgiven, because he had refused to for- to perdition? Yet he does not fall back into that which had give the debt of his fellow-servant.” Now fraternal charity been forgiven, nor will he be condemned for original sin.” is destroyed through each mortal sin. Therefore sins al- I answer that, As stated above (q. 86, a. 4), mortal sin ready taken away through Penance, return through each contains two things, aversion from God and adherence to subsequent mortal sin. a created good. Now, in mortal sin, whatever attaches to Objection 2. Further, on Lk. 11:24, “I will return into the aversion, is, considered in itself, common to all mor- my house, whence I came out,” Bede says: “This verse tal sins, since man turns away from God by every mor- should make us tremble, we should not endeavor to ex- tal sin, so that, in consequence, the stain resulting from plain it away lest through carelessness we give place to the privation of grace, and the debt of everlasting punish- the sin which we thought to have been taken away, and ment are common to all mortal sins. This is what is meant become its slave once more.” Now this would not be so by what is written (James 2:10): “Whosoever. . . shall of- unless it returned. Therefore a sin returns after once being fend in one point, is become guilty of all.” On the other taken away by Penance. hand, as regards their adherence they are different from, Objection 3. Further, the Lord said (Ezech. 18:24): and sometimes contrary to one another. Hence it is evi- “If the just man turn himself away from his justice, and dent, that on the part of the adherence, a subsequent mor- do iniquity. . . all his justices which he hath done, shall not tal sin does not cause the return of mortal sins previously be remembered.” Now among the other “justices” which dispelled, else it would follow that by a sin of wasteful- he had done, is also his previous penance, since it was said ness a man would be brought back to the habit or dispo- above (q. 85, a. 3) that penance is a part of justice. There- sition of avarice previously dispelled, so that one contrary fore when one who has done penance, sins, his previous would be the cause of another, which is impossible. But penance, whereby he received forgiveness of his sins, is if in mortal sins we consider that which attaches to the not imputed to him. Therefore his sins return. aversion absolutely, then a subsequent mortal sin [causes Objection 4. Further, past sins are covered by grace, the return of that which was comprised in the mortal sins as the Apostle declares (Rom. 4:7) where he quotes Ps. before they were pardoned, in so far as the subsequent 31:1: “Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and mortal sin]† deprives man of grace, and makes him de- whose sins are covered.” But a subsequent mortal sin serving of everlasting punishment, just as he was before. takes away grace. Therefore the sins committed previ- Nevertheless, since the aversion of mortal sin is [in a way, ously, become uncovered: and so, seemingly, they return. caused by the adherence, those things which attach to the On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 11:29): aversion are*] diversified somewhat in relation to various “The gifts and the calling of God are without repentance.” adherences, as it were to various causes, so that there will Now the penitent’s sins are taken away by a gift of God. be a different aversion, a different stain, a different debt ∗ Cf. Prosper, Responsiones ad Capitula Gallorum ii † The words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine edition. 2623 of punishment, according to the different acts of mortal sin to be forgiven than for the sinner to be endured. sin from which they arise; hence the question is moved Accordingly the sin which follows repentance brings whether the stain and the debt of eternal punishment, as back, in a sense, the debt of punishment due to the sins caused by acts of sins previously pardoned, return through previously forgiven, not as caused by those sins already a subsequent mortal sin. forgiven but as caused by this last sin being committed, Accordingly some have maintained that they return on account of its being aggravated in view of those pre- simply even in this way. But this is impossible, because vious sins. This means that those sins return, not simply, what God has done cannot be undone by the work of man. but in a restricted sense, viz., in so far as they are virtually Now the pardon of the previous sins was a work of Divine contained in the subsequent sin. mercy, so that it cannot be undone by man’s subsequent Reply to Objection 1. This saying of Augustine sin, according to Rom. 3:3: “Shall their unbelief make seems to refer to the return of sins as to the debt of eternal the faith of God without effect?” punishment considered in itself, namely, that he who sins Wherefore others who maintained the possibility of after doing penance incurs a debt of eternal punishment, sins returning, said that God pardons the sins of a peni- just as before, but not altogether for the same “reason.” tent who will afterwards sin again, not according to His Wherefore Augustine, after saying (Lib. Resp. Prosperi foreknowledge, but only according to His present justice: i∗) that “he does not fall back into that which was for- since He foresees that He will punish such a man eternally given, nor will he be condemned for original sin,” adds: for his sins, and yet, by His grace, He makes him righ- “Nevertheless, for these last sins he will be condemned to teous for the present. But this cannot stand: because if a the same death, which he deserved to suffer for the for- cause be placed absolutely, its effect is placed absolutely; mer,” because he incurs the punishment of eternal death so that if the remission of sins were effected by grace and which he deserved for his previous sins. the sacraments of grace, not absolutely but under some Reply to Objection 2. By these words Bede means condition dependent on some future event, it would fol- that the guilt already forgiven enslaves man, not by the low that grace and the sacraments of grace are not the suf- return of his former debt of punishment, but by the repe- ficient causes of the remission of sins, which is erroneous, tition of his act. as being derogatory to God’s grace. Reply to Objection 3. The effect of a subsequent sin Consequently it is in no way possible for the stain of is that the former “justices” are not remembered, in so past sins and the debt of punishment incurred thereby, to far as they were deserving of eternal life, but not in so return, as caused by those acts. Yet it may happen that a far as they were a hindrance to sin. Consequently if a man subsequent sinful act virtually contains the debt of punish- sins mortally after making restitution, he does not become ment due to the previous sin, in so far as when a man sins guilty as though he had not paid back what he owed; and a second time, for this very reason he seems to sin more much less is penance previously done forgotten as to the grievously than before, as stated in Rom. 2:5: “According pardon of the guilt, since this is the work of God rather to thy hardness and impenitent heart, thou treasurest up than of man. to thyself wrath against the day of wrath,” from the mere Reply to Objection 4. Grace removes the stain and fact, namely, that God’s goodness, which waits for us to the debt of eternal punishment simply; but it covers the repent, is despised. And so much the more is God’s good- past sinful acts, lest, on their account, God deprive man ness despised, if the first sin is committed a second time of grace, and judge him deserving of eternal punishment; after having been forgiven, as it is a greater favor for the and what grace has once done, endures for ever. Whether sins that have been forgiven, return through ingratitude which is shown IIIa q. 88 a. 2 especially in four kinds of sin? Objection 1. It would seem that sins do not return after one has received the grace of pardon, the greater the through ingratitude, which is shown especially in four ingratitude. But there are sins more grievous than these, kinds of sin, viz., hatred of one’s neighbor, apostasy from such as blasphemy against God, and the sin against the faith, contempt of confession and regret for past repen- Holy Ghost. Therefore it seems that sins already pardoned tance, and which have been expressed in the following do not return through ingratitude as manifested in these verse: sins, any more than as shown in other sins. “Fratres odit, apostata fit, spernitque, fateri, Objection 2. Further, Rabanus says: “God delivered Poenituisse piget, pristina culpa redit.” the wicked servant to the torturers, until he should pay For the more grievous the sin committed against God the whole debt, because a man will be deemed punishable ∗ Cf. Prosper, Responsiones ad Capitula Gallorum ii 2624 not only for the sins he commits after Baptism, but also be taken in regard to the penitent who receives this favor, for original sin which was taken away when he was bap- we find on his part a twofold movement of the free-will. tized.” Now venial sins are reckoned among our debts, The first is the movement of the free-will towards God, since we pray in their regard: “Forgive us our trespasses and is an act of faith quickened by charity; and against [debita].” Therefore they too return through ingratitude; this a man acts by apostatizing from the faith. The sec- and, in like manner seemingly, sins already pardoned re- ond is a movement of the free-will against sin, and is the turn through venial sins, and not only through those sins act of penance. This act consists first, as we have stated mentioned above. above (q. 85, Aa. 2,5) in man’s detestation of his past sins; Objection 3. Further, ingratitude is all the greater, acand against this a man acts when he regrets having done cording as one sins after receiving a greater favor. Now in- penance. Secondly, the act of penance consists in the peni- nocence whereby one avoids sin is a Divine favor, for Au- tent purposing to subject himself to the keys of the Church gustine says (Confess. ii): “Whatever sins I have avoided by confession, according to Ps. 31:5: “I said: I will con- committing, I owe it to Thy grace.” Now innocence is a fess against myself my injustice to the Lord: and Thou greater gift, than even the forgiveness of all sins. There- hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin”: and against this fore the first sin committed after innocence is no less an a man acts when he scorns to confess as he had purposed ingratitude to God, than a sin committed after repentance, to do. so that seemingly ingratitude in respect of the aforesaid Accordingly it is said that the ingratitude of sinners is sins is not the chief cause of sins returning. a special cause of the return of sins previously forgiven. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xviii∗): “It Reply to Objection 1. This is not said of these sins is evident from the words of the Gospel that if we do not as though they were more grievous than others, but be- forgive from our hearts the offenses committed against us, cause they are more directly opposed to the favor of the we become once more accountable for what we rejoiced forgiveness of sin. in as forgiven through Penance”: so that ingratitude im- Reply to Objection 2. Even venial sins and origi- plied in the hatred of one’s brother is a special cause of nal sin return in the way explained above, just as mortal the return of sins already forgiven: and the same seems to sins do, in so far as the favor conferred by God in for- apply to the others. giving those sins is despised. A man does not, however, I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), sins pardoned incur ingratitude by committing a venial sin, because by through Penance are said to return, in so far as their debt sinning venially man does not act against God, but apart of punishment, by reason of ingratitude, is virtually con- from Him, wherefore venial sins nowise cause the return tained in the subsequent sin. Now one may be guilty of of sins already forgiven. ingratitude in two ways: first by doing something against Reply to Objection 3. A favor can be weighed in the favor received, and, in this way, man is ungrateful to two ways. First by the quantity of the favor itself, and God in every mortal sin whereby he offends God Who in this way innocence is a greater favor from God than forgave his sins, so that by every subsequent mortal sin, penance, which is called the second plank after shipwreck the sins previously pardoned return, on account of the in- (cf. q. 84, a. 6). Secondly, a favor may be weighed with gratitude. Secondly, one is guilty of ingratitude, by do- regard to the recipient, who is less worthy, wherefore a ing something not only against the favor itself, but also greater favor is bestowed on him, so that he is the more against the form of the favor received. If this form be ungrateful if he scorns it. In this way the favor of the considered on the part of the benefactor, it is the remis- pardon of sins is greater when bestowed on one who is sion of something due to him; wherefore he who does not altogether unworthy, so that the ingratitude which follows forgive his brother when he asks pardon, and persists in is all the greater. his hatred, acts against this form. If, however, this form Whether the debt of punishment that arises through ingratitude in respect of a subse-IIIa q. 88 a. 3 quent sin is as great as that of the sins previously pardoned? Objection 1. It would seem that the debt of punish- itude whereby this favor is scorned. But the greatness of ment arising through ingratitude in respect of a subse- the consequent debt of punishment is in accord with the quent sin is as great as that of the sins previously par- greatness of the ingratitude. Therefore the debt of pun- doned. Because the greatness of the favor of the pardon ishment arising through ingratitude in respect of a subse- of sins is according to the greatness of the sin pardoned, quent sin is as great as the debt of punishment due for all and so too, in consequence, is the greatness of the ingrat- the previous sins. ∗ Cf. Dial. iv 2625 Objection 2. Further, it is a greater sin to offend God ity which it incurs through the ingratitude connected with than to offend man. But a slave who is freed by his mas- it. For it is not necessary that the measure of ingratitude ter returns to the same state of slavery from which he was should be exactly equal to the measure of the favor re- freed, or even to a worse state. Much more therefore he ceived, which latter is measured according to the great- that sins against God after being freed from sin, returns ness of the sins previously pardoned. Because it may hap- to the debt of as great a punishment as he had incurred pen that in respect of the same favor, one man is very un- before. grateful, either on account of the intensity of his scorn Objection 3. Further, it is written (Mat. 18:34) that for the favor received, or on account of the gravity of the “his lord being angry, delivered him” (whose sins returned offense committed against the benefactor, while another to him on account of his ingratitude) “to the torturers, un- man is slightly ungrateful, either because his scorn is less til he paid all the debt.” But this would not be so unless the intense, or because his offense against the benefactor is debt of punishment incurred through ingratitude were as less grave. But the measure of ingratitude is proportion- great as that incurred through all previous sins. Therefore ately equal to the measure of the favor received: for sup- an equal debt of punishment returns through ingratitude. posing an equal contempt of the favor, or an equal offense On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 25:2): “Accord- against the benefactor, the ingratitude will be so much the ing to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the greater, as the favor received is greater. stripes be,” whence it is evident that a great debt of pun- Hence it is evident that the debt of punishment in- ishment does not arise from a slight sin. But sometimes a curred by a subsequent sin need not always be equal to subsequent mortal sin is much less grievous than any one that of previous sins; but it must be in proportion thereto, of those previously pardoned. Therefore the debt of pun- so that the more numerous or the greater the sins previ- ishment incurred through subsequent sins is not equal to ously pardoned, the greater must be the debt of punish- that of sins previously forgiven. ment incurred by any subsequent mortal sin whatever. I answer that, Some have maintained that the debt of Reply to Objection 1. The favor of the pardon of sins punishment incurred through ingratitude in respect of a takes its absolute quantity from the quantity of the sins subsequent sin is equal to that of the sins previously par- previously pardoned: but the sin of ingratitude does not doned, in addition to the debt proper to this subsequent take its absolute quantity from the measure of the favor sin. But there is no need for this, because, as stated above bestowed, but from the measure of the contempt or of the (a. 1), the debt of punishment incurred by previous sins offense, as stated above: and so the objection does not does not return on account of a subsequent sin, as result- prove. ing from the acts of the subsequent sin. Wherefore the Reply to Objection 2. A slave who has been given amount of the debt that returns must be according to the his freedom is not brought back to his previous state of gravity of the subsequent sin. slavery for any kind of ingratitude, but only when this is It is possible, however, for the gravity of the subse- grave. quent sin to equal the gravity of all previous sins. But it Reply to Objection 3. He whose forgiven sins return need not always be so, whether we speak of the gravity to him on account of subsequent ingratitude, incurs the which a sin has from its species (since the subsequent sin debt for all, in so far as the measure of his previous sins may be one of simple fornication, while the previous sins is contained proportionally in his subsequent ingratitude, were adulteries, murders, or sacrileges); or of the grav- but not absolutely, as stated above. Whether the ingratitude whereby a subsequent sin causes the return of previous sins, IIIa q. 88 a. 4 is a special sin? Objection 1. It would seem that the ingratitude, Objection 3. Further, a special effect proceeds from whereby a subsequent sin causes the return of sins pre- a special cause. Now ingratitude has a special effect, viz. viously forgiven, is a special sin. For the giving of thanks the return, after a fashion, of sins already forgiven. There- belongs to counterpassion which is a necessary condition fore ingratitude is a special sin. of justice, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. v, 5). But On the contrary, That which is a sequel to every sin justice is a special virtue. Therefore this ingratitude is a is not a special sin. Now by any mortal sin whatever, a special sin. man becomes ungrateful to God, as evidenced from what Objection 2. Further, Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) has been said (a. 1). Therefore ingratitude is not a special that thanksgiving is a special virtue. But ingratitude is op- sin. posed to thanksgiving. Therefore ingratitude is a special I answer that, The ingratitude of the sinner is some- sin. times a special sin; and sometimes it is not, but a circum- 2626 stance arising from all mortal sins in common committed God, his ingratitude will not be a special sin, but will be against God. For a sin takes its species according to the drawn to the species of the other sin, as a circumstance sinner’s intention, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. thereof. And, as Augustine observes (De Nat. et Grat. v, 2) that “he who commits adultery in order to steal is a xxix), not every sin implies contempt of God in His com- thief rather than an adulterer.” mandments. Therefore it is evident that the sinner’s in- If, therefore, a sinner commits a sin in contempt of gratitude is sometimes a special sin, sometimes not. God and of the favor received from Him, that sin is drawn This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the to the species of ingratitude, and in this way a sinner’s first (three) objections prove that ingratitude is in itself a ingratitude is a special sin. If, however, a man, while in- special sin; while the last objection proves that ingrati- tending to commit a sin, e.g. murder or adultery, is not tude, as included in every sin, is not a special sin. withheld from it on account of its implying contempt of 2627 THIRD PART, QUESTION 89 Of the Recovery of Virtue by Means of Penance (In Six Articles) We must now consider the recovery of virtues by means of Penance, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether virtues are restored through Penance? (2) Whether they are restored in equal measure? (3) Whether equal dignity is restored to the penitent? (4) Whether works of virtue are deadened by subsequent sin? (5) Whether works deadened by sin revive through Penance? (6) Whether dead works, i.e. works that are done without charity, are quickened by Penance? Whether the virtues are restored through Penance? IIIa q. 89 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the virtues are not re- it follows that grace is infused into man through Penance. stored through penance. Because lost virtue cannot be re- Now all the gratuitous virtues flow from grace, even as all stored by penance, unless penance be the cause of virtue. the powers result from the essence of the soul; as stated in But, since penance is itself a virtue, it cannot be the cause the Ia IIae, q. 110, a. 4, ad 1. Therefore all the virtues are of all the virtues, and all the more, since some virtues nat- restored through Penance. urally precede penance, viz., faith, hope, and charity, as Reply to Objection 1. Penance restores the virtues in stated above (q. 85, a. 6). Therefore the virtues are not the same way as it causes grace, as stated above (q. 86, restored through penance. a. 1). Now it is a cause of grace, in so far as it is a sacra- Objection 2. Further, Penance consists in certain acts ment, because, in so far as it is a virtue, it is rather an effect of the penitent. But the gratuitous virtues are not caused of grace. Consequently it does not follow that penance, as through any act of ours: for Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. a virtue, needs to be the cause of all the other virtues, but ii, 18: In Ps. 118) that “God forms the virtues in us with- that the habit of penance together with the habits of the out us.” Therefore it seems that the virtues are not restored other virtues is caused through the sacrament of Penance. through Penance. Reply to Objection 2. In the sacrament of Penance Objection 3. Further, he that has virtue performs human acts stand as matter, while the formal power of this works of virtue with ease and pleasure: wherefore the sacrament is derived from the power of the keys. Con- Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) that “a man is not just if sequently the power of the keys causes grace and virtue he does not rejoice in just deeds.” Now many penitents effectively indeed, but instrumentally; and the first act of find difficulty in performing deeds of virtue. Therefore the penitent, viz., contrition, stands as ultimate disposi- the virtues are not restored through Penance. tion to the reception of grace, while the subsequent acts On the contrary, We read (Lk. 15:22) that the fa- of Penance proceed from the grace and virtues which are ther commanded his penitent son to be clothed in “the already there. first robe,” which, according to Ambrose (Expos. in Luc. Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (q. 86, a. 5), vii), is the “mantle of wisdom,” from which all the virtues sometimes after the first act of Penance, which is con- flow together, according to Wis. 8:7: “She teacheth tem- trition, certain remnants of sin remain, viz. dispositions perance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which caused by previous acts, the result being that the peni- are such things as men can have nothing more profitable tent finds difficulty in doing deeds of virtue. Neverthe- in life.” Therefore all the virtues are restored through less, so far as the inclination itself of charity and of the Penance. other virtues is concerned, the penitent performs works of I answer that, Sins are pardoned through Penance, as virtue with pleasure and ease. even as a virtuous man may stated above (q. 86 , a. 1). But there can be no remission accidentally find it hard to do an act of virtue, on account of sins except through the infusion of grace. Wherefore of sleepiness or some indisposition of the body. 2628 Whether, after Penance, man rises again to equal virtue? IIIa q. 89 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that, after Penance, man Reply to Objection 1. The very fact of falling away rises again to equal virtue. For the Apostle says (Rom. from the love of God by sin, does not work unto the good 8:28): “To them that love God all things work together of all those who love God, which is evident in the case of unto good,” whereupon a gloss of Augustine says that those who fall and never rise again, or who rise and fall “this is so true that, if any such man goes astray and wan- yet again; but only to the good of “such as according to ders from the path, God makes even this conduce to his His purpose are called to be saints,” viz. the predestined, good.” But this would not be true if he rose again to lesser who, however often they may fall, yet rise again finally. virtue. Therefore it seems that a penitent never rises again Consequently good comes of their falling, not that they to lesser virtue. always rise again to greater grace, but that they rise to Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says∗ that “Penance more abiding grace, not indeed on the part of grace itself, is a very good thing, for it restores every defect to a state because the greater the grace, the more abiding it is, but of perfection.” But this would not be true unless virtues on the part of man, who, the more careful and humble he were recovered in equal measure. Therefore equal virtue is, abides the more steadfastly in grace. Hence the same is always recovered through Penance. gloss adds that “their fall conduces to their good, because Objection 3. Further, on Gn. 1:5: “There was evening they rise more humble and more enlightened.” and morning, one day,” a gloss says: “The evening light Reply to Objection 2. Penance, considered in itself, is that from which we fall the morning light is that to has the power to bring all defects back to perfection, and which we rise again.” Now the morning light is greater even to advance man to a higher state; but this is some- than the evening light. Therefore a man rises to greater times hindered on the part of man, whose movement to- grace or charity than that which he had before; which is wards God and in detestation of sin is too remiss, just as in confirmed by the Apostle’s words (Rom. 5:20): “Where Baptism adults receive a greater or a lesser grace, accord- sin abounded, grace did more abound.” ing to the various ways in which they prepare themselves. On the contrary, Charity whether proficient or per- Reply to Objection 3. This comparison of the two fect is greater than incipient charity. But sometimes a man graces to the evening and morning light is made on ac- falls from proficient charity, and rises again to incipient count of a likeness of order, since the darkness of night charity. Therefore man always rises again to less virtue. follows after the evening light, and the light of day after I answer that, As stated above (q. 86, a. 6, ad 3; q. 89, the light of morning, but not on account of a likeness of a. 1, ad 2), the movement of the free-will, in the justifica- greater or lesser quantity. Again, this saying of the Apos- tion of the ungodly, is the ultimate disposition to grace; tle refers to the grace of Christ, which abounds more than so that in the same instant there is infusion of grace to- any number of man’s sins. Nor is it true of all, that the gether with the aforesaid movement of the free-will, as more their sins abound, the more abundant grace they re- stated in the Ia IIae, q. 113, Aa. 5,7, which movement ceive, if we measure habitual grace by the quantity. Grace includes an act of penance, as stated above (q. 86, a. 2). is, however, more abundant, as regards the very notion of But it is evident that forms which admit of being more or grace, because to him who sins more a more “gratuitous” less, become intense or remiss, according to the different favor is vouchsafed by his pardon; although sometimes dispositions of the subject, as stated in the Ia IIae, q. 52, those whose sins abound, abound also in sorrow, so that Aa. 1,2; Ia IIae, q. 66, a. 1. Hence it is that, in Penance, they receive a more abundant habit of grace and virtue, as according to the degree of intensity or remissness in the was the case with Magdalen. movement of the free-will, the penitent receives greater To the argument advanced in the contrary sense it must or lesser grace. Now the intensity of the penitent’s move- be replied that in one and the same man proficient grace is ment may be proportionate sometimes to a greater grace greater than incipient grace, but this is not necessarily the than that from which man fell by sinning, sometimes to case in different men, for one begins with a greater grace an equal grace, sometimes to a lesser. Wherefore the peni- than another has in the state of proficiency: thus Gregory tent sometimes arises to a greater grace than that which he says (Dial. ii, 1): “Let all, both now and hereafter, ac- had before, sometimes to an equal, sometimes to a lesser knowledge how perfectly the boy Benedict turned to the grace: and the same applies to the virtues, which flow life of grace from the very beginning.” from grace. ∗ Cf. Hypognosticon iii, an anonymous work falsely ascribed to St. Augustine 2629 Whether, by Penance, man is restored to his former dignity? IIIa q. 89 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that man is not restored by in Evang.), “those who acknowledge themselves to have Penance to his former dignity: because a gloss on Amos strayed away from God, make up for their past losses, by 5:2, “The virgin of Israel is cast down,” observes: “It is subsequent gains: so that there is more joy in heaven on not said that she cannot rise up, but that the virgin of Israel their account, even as in battle, the commanding officer shall not rise; because the sheep that has once strayed, al- thinks more of the soldier who, after running away, re- though the shepherd bring it back on his shoulder, has not turns and bravely attacks the foe, than of one who has the same glory as if it had never strayed.” Therefore man never turned his back, but has done nothing brave.” does not, through Penance, recover his former dignity. By sin man loses his ecclesiastical dignity, because Objection 2. Further, Jerome says: “Whoever fail to thereby he becomes unworthy of those things which ap- preserve the dignity of the sacred order, must be content pertain to the exercise of the ecclesiastical dignity. This with saving their souls; for it is a difficult thing to return he is debarred from recovering: first, because he fails to to their former degree.” Again, Pope Innocent I says (Ep. repent; wherefore Isidore wrote to the bishop Masso, and vi ad Agapit.) that “the canons framed at the council of as we read in the Distinction quoted above (obj. 3): “The Nicaea exclude penitents from even the lowest orders of canons order those to be restored to their former degree, clerics.” Therefore man does not, through Penance, re- who by repentance have made satisfaction for their sins, or cover his former dignity. have made worthy confession of them. On the other hand, Objection 3. Further, before sinning a man can ad- those who do not mend their corrupt and wicked ways are vance to a higher sacred order. But this is not permitted to neither allowed to exercise their order, nor received to the a penitent after his sin, for it is written (Ezech. 44:10,13): grace of communion.” “The Levites that went away. . . from Me. . . shall never Secondly, because he does penance negligently, [Vulg.: ‘not’] come near to Me, to do the office of priest”: wherefore it is written in the same Distinction (obj. 3): and as laid down in the Decretals (Dist. 1, ch. 52), and “We can be sure that those who show no signs of humble taken from the council of Lerida: “If those who serve at compunction, or of earnest prayer, who avoid fasting or the Holy Altar fall suddenly into some deplorable weak- study, would exercise their former duties with great negli- ness of the flesh, and by God’s mercy do proper penance, gence if they were restored to them.” let them return to their duties, yet so as not to receive fur- Thirdly, if he has committed a sin to which an irreg- ther promotion.” Therefore Penance does not restore man ularity is attached; wherefore it is said in the same Dis- to his former dignity. tinction (obj. 3), quoting the council of Pope Martin∗: “If On the contrary, As we read in the same Distinction, a man marry a widow or the relict of another, he must Gregory writing to Secundinus (Regist. vii) says: “We not be admitted to the ranks of the clergy: and if he has consider that when a man has made proper satisfaction, succeeded in creeping in, he must be turned out. In like he may return to his honorable position”: and moreover manner, if anyone after Baptism be guilty of homicide, we read in the acts of the council of Agde: “Contuma- whether by deed, or by command, or by counsel, or in cious clerics, so far as their position allows, should be self-defense.” But this is in consequence not of sin, but of corrected by their bishops. so that when Penance has re- irregularity. formed them, they may recover their degree and dignity.” Fourthly, on account of scandal, wherefore it is said I answer that, By sin, man loses a twofold dignity, in the same Distinction (obj. 3): “Those who have been one in respect of God, the other in respect of the Church. publicly convicted or caught in the act of perjury, robbery, In respect of God he again loses a twofold dignity. one fornication, and of such like crimes, according to the pre- is his principal dignity, whereby he was counted among scription of the sacred canons must be deprived of the ex- the children of God, and this he recovers by Penance, ercise of their respective orders, because it is a scandal which is signified (Lk. 15) in the prodigal son, for when to God’s people that such persons should be placed over he repented, his father commanded that the first garment them. But those who commit such sins occultly and con- should be restored to him, together with a ring and shoes. fess them secretly to a priest, may be retained in the exer- The other is his secondary dignity, viz. innocence, of cise of their respective orders, with the assurance of God’s which, as we read in the same chapter, the elder son merciful forgiveness, provided they be careful to expiate boasted saying (Lk. 15:29): “Behold, for so many years their sins by fasts and alms, vigils and holy deeds.” The do I serve thee, and I have never transgressed thy com- same is expressed (Extra, De Qual. Ordinand.): “If the mandments”: and this dignity the penitent cannot recover. aforesaid crimes are not proved by a judicial process, or Nevertheless he recovers something greater sometimes; in some other way made notorious, those who are guilty of because as Gregory says (Hom. de centum Ovibus, 34 them must not be hindered, after they have done penance, ∗ Martin, bishop of Braga 2630 from exercising the orders they have received, or from renity; and Blessed Peter by shedding most bitter tears did ceiving further orders, except in cases of homicide.” indeed repent him of having denied his Lord, and yet he Reply to Objection 1. The same is to be said of the re- remained an apostle. Nevertheless we must not deem the covery of virginity as of the recovery of innocence which care of later teachers excessive, who without endangering belongs to man’s secondary dignity in the sight of God. a man’s salvation, exacted more from his humility, having, Reply to Objection 2. In these words Jerome does in my opinion, found by experience, that some assumed a not say that it is impossible, but that it is difficult, for man pretended repentance through hankering after honors and to recover his former dignity after having sinned, because power.” this is allowed to none but those who repent perfectly, as Reply to Objection 3. This statute is to be under- stated above. To those canonical statutes, which seem to stood as applying to those who do public penance, for forbid this, Augustine replies in his letter to Boniface (Ep. these cannot be promoted to a higher order. For Peter, clxxxv): “If the law of the Church forbids anyone, af- after his denial, was made shepherd of Christ’s sheep, as ter doing penance for a crime, to become a cleric, or to appears from Jn. 21:21, where Chrysostom comments return to his clerical duties, or to retain them the inten- as follows: “After his denial and repentance Peter gives tion was not to deprive him of the hope of pardon, but to proof of greater confidence in Christ: for whereas, at the preserve the rigor of discipline; else we should have to supper, he durst not ask Him, but deputed John to ask deny the keys given to the Church, of which it was said: in his stead, afterwards he was placed at the head of his ‘Whatsoever you shall loose on earth shall be loosed in brethren, and not only did not depute another to ask for heaven.’ ” And further on he adds: “For holy David did him, what concerned him, but henceforth asks the Master penance for his deadly crimes, and yet he retained his dig- instead of John.” Whether virtuous deeds done in charity can be deadened? IIIa q. 89 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that virtuous deeds done a thing is said to be deadened when it is hindered from in charity cannot be deadened. For that which is not can- producing its proper effect or operation. not be changed. But to be deadened is to be changed from Now the effect of virtuous works, which are done in life to death. Since therefore virtuous deeds, after being charity, is to bring man to eternal life; and this is hin- done, are no more, it seems that they cannot afterwards be dered by a subsequent mortal sin, inasmuch as it takes deadened. away grace. Wherefore deeds done in charity are said to Objection 2. Further, by virtuous deeds done in char- be deadened by a subsequent mortal sin. ity, man merits eternal life. But to take away the reward Reply to Objection 1. Just as sinful deeds pass as to from one who has merited it is an injustice, which cannot the act but remain as to guilt, so deeds done in charity, be ascribed to God. Therefore it is not possible for virtu- after passing, as to the act, remain as to merit, in so far as ous deeds done in charity to be deadened by a subsequent they are acceptable to God. It is in this respect that they sin. are deadened, inasmuch as man is hindered from receiv- Objection 3. Further, the strong is not corrupted by ing his reward. the weak. Now works of charity are stronger than any Reply to Objection 2. There is no injustice in with- sins, because, as it is written (Prov. 10:12), “charity cov- drawing the reward from him who has deserved it, if he ereth all sins.” Therefore it seems that deeds done in char- has made himself unworthy by his subsequent fault, since ity cannot be deadened by a subsequent mortal sin. at times a man justly forfeits through his own fault, even On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:24): “If the that which he has already received. just man turn himself away from his justice. . . all his jus- Reply to Objection 3. It is not on account of the tices which he hath done shall not be remembered.” strength of sinful deeds that deeds, previously done in I answer that, A living thing, by dying, ceases to have charity, are deadened, but on account of the freedom of vital operations: for which reason, by a kind of metaphor, the will which can be turned away from good to evil. Whether deeds deadened by sin, are revived by Penance? IIIa q. 89 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that deeds deadened by sins remitted by Penance do not return, as stated above sin are not revived by Penance. Because just as past sins (q. 88, Aa. 1,2). Therefore it seems that neither are dead are remitted by subsequent Penance, so are deeds previ- deeds revived by charity. ously done in charity, deadened by subsequent sin. But Objection 2. Further, deeds are said to be deadened 2631 by comparison with animals who die, as stated above vening sin whereby he is become unworthy of eternal life. (a. 4). But a dead animal cannot be revived. Therefore But this impediment is removed by Penance, inasmuch as neither can dead works be revived by Penance. sins are taken away thereby. Hence it follows that deeds Objection 3. Further, deeds done in charity are de- previously deadened, recover, through Penance, their effi- serving of glory according to the quantity of grace or char- cacy in bringing him, who did them, to eternal life, and, in ity. But sometimes man arises through Penance to lesser other words, they are revived. It is therefore evident that grace or charity. Therefore he does not receive glory ac- deadened works are revived by Penance. cording to the merit of his previous works; so that it seems Reply to Objection 1. The very works themselves of that deeds deadened by sin are not revived. sin are removed by Penance, so that, by God’s mercy, no On the contrary, on Joel 2:25, “I will restore to you further stain or debt of punishment is incurred on their ac- the years, which the locust. . . hath eaten,” a gloss says: “I count: on the other hand, works done in charity are not will not suffer to perish the fruit which you lost when your removed by God, since they abide in His acceptance, but soul was disturbed.” But this fruit is the merit of good they are hindered on the part of the man who does them; works which was lost through sin. Therefore meritorious wherefore if this hindrance, on the part of the man who deeds done before are revived by Penance. does those works, be removed, God on His side fulfills I answer that, Some have said that meritorious works what those works deserved. deadened by subsequent sin are not revived by the ensuing Reply to Objection 2. Deeds done in charity are not Penance, because they deemed such works to have passed in themselves deadened, as explained above, but only with away, so that they could not be revived. But that is no regard to a supervening impediment on the part of the man reason why they should not be revived: because they are who does them. On the other hand, an animal dies in it- conducive to eternal life (wherein their life consists) not self, through being deprived of the principle of life: so only as actually existing, but also after they cease to exist that the comparison fails. actually, and as abiding in the Divine acceptance. Now, Reply to Objection 3. He who, through Penance, they abide thus, so far as they are concerned, even after arises to lesser charity, will receive the essential reward they have been deadened by sin, because those works, ac- according to the degree of charity in which he is found. cording as they were done, will ever be acceptable to God Yet he will have greater joy for the works he had done and give joy to the saints, according to Apoc. 3:11: “Hold in his former charity, than for those which he did in his fast that which thou hast, that no man take thy crown.” subsequent charity: and this joy belongs to the accidental That they fail in their efficacy to bring the man, who did reward. them, to eternal life, is due to the impediment of the super- Whether the effect of subsequent Penance is to quicken even dead works? IIIa q. 89 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the effect of sub- by Penance. Therefore it seems that through Penance, sequent Penance is to quicken even dead works, those, God rewards the former deeds done in the state of sin, namely, that were not done in charity. For it seems more which implies that they are quickened. difficult to bring to life that which has been deadened, On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3): “If since this is never done naturally, than to quicken that I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I which never had life, since certain living things are en- should deliver my body to be burned, and have not char- gendered naturally from things without life. Now dead- ity, it profiteth me nothing.” But this would not be true, ened works are revived by Penance, as stated above (a. 5). if, at least by subsequent Penance, they were quickened. Much more, therefore, are dead works revived. Therefore Penance does not quicken works which before Objection 2. Further, if the cause be removed, the were dead. effect is removed. But the cause of the lack of life in I answer that, A work is said to be dead in two ways: works generically good done without charity, was the lack first, effectively, because, to wit, it is a cause of death, of charity and grace. which lack is removed by Penance. in which sense sinful works are said to be dead, accord- Therefore dead works are quickened by charity. ing to Heb. 9:14: “The blood of Christ. . . shall cleanse Objection 3. Further, Jerome in commenting on Agg. our conscience from dead works.” These dead works are i, 6: “You have sowed much,” says: “If at any time you not quickened but removed by Penance, according to Heb. find a sinner, among his many evil deeds, doing that which 6:1: “Not laying again the foundation of Penance from is right, God is not so unjust as to forget the few good dead works.” Secondly, works are said to be dead priva- deeds on account of his many evil deeds.” Now this seems tively, because, to wit, they lack spiritual life, which is to be the case chiefly when past evil “deeds” are removed founded on charity, whereby the soul is united to God, the 2632 result being that it is quickened as the body by the soul: in proceed from such a principle. Hence the argument does which sense too, faith, if it lack charity, is said to be dead, not prove. according to James 2:20: “Faith without works is dead.” Reply to Objection 3. God remembers the good In this way also, all works that are generically good, are deeds a man does when in a state of sin, not by reward- said to be dead, if they be done without charity, inasmuch ing them in eternal life, which is due only to living works, as they fail to proceed from the principle of life; even as i.e. those done from charity, but by a temporal reward: we might call the sound of a harp, a dead voice. Accord- thus Gregory declares (Hom. de Divite et Lazaro, 41 in ingly, the difference of life and death in works is in rela- Evang.) that “unless that rich man had done some good tion to the principle from which they proceed. But works deed, and had received his reward in this world, Abraham cannot proceed a second time from a principle, because would certainly not have said to him: ‘Thou didst receive they are transitory, and the same identical deed cannot be good things in thy lifetime.’ ” Or again, this may mean resumed. Therefore it is impossible for dead works to be that he will be judged less severely: wherefore Augustine quickened by Penance. says (De Patientia xxvi): “We cannot say that it would be Reply to Objection 1. In the physical order things better for the schismatic that by denying Christ he should whether dead or deadened lack the principle of life. But suffer none of those things which he suffered by confess- works are said to be deadened, not in relation to the princi- ing Him; but we must believe that he will be judged with ple whence they proceeded, but in relation to an extrinsic less severity, than if by denying Christ, he had suffered impediment; while they are said to be dead in relation to none of those things. Thus the words of the Apostle, ‘If a principle. Consequently there is no comparison. I should deliver my body to be burned and have not char- Reply to Objection 2. Works generically good done ity, it profiteth me nothing,’ refer to the obtaining of the without charity are said to be dead on account of the lack kingdom of heaven, and do not exclude the possibility of of grace and charity, as principles. Now the subsequent being sentenced with less severity at the last judgment.” Penance does not supply that want, so as to make them 2633 THIRD PART, QUESTION 90 Of the Parts of Penance, in General (In Four Articles) We must now consider the parts of Penance: (1) in general. (2) each one in particular. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether Penance has any parts? (2) Of the number of its parts; (3) What kind of parts are they? (4) Of its division into subjective parts. Whether Penance should be assigned any parts? IIIa q. 90 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that parts should not be Now it has been stated above (q. 84, Aa. 2,3), that, in assigned to Penance. For it is the Divine power that works the sacrament of Penance, human actions stand as matter: our salvation most secretly in the sacraments. Now the Di- and so, since several actions are requisite for the perfec- vine power is one and simple. Therefore Penance, being tion of Penance, viz., contrition, confession, and satisfac- a sacrament, should have no parts assigned to it. tion, as we shall show further on (a. 2), it follows that the Objection 2. Further, Penance is both a virtue and a sacrament of Penance has parts. sacrament. Now no parts are assigned to it as a virtue, Reply to Objection 1. Every sacrament is something since virtue is a habit, which is a simple quality of the simple by reason of the Divine power, which operates mind. In like manner, it seems that parts should not be therein: but the Divine power is so great that it can op- assigned to Penance as a sacrament, because no parts are erate both through one and through many, and by reason assigned to Baptism and the other sacraments. Therefore of these many, parts may be assigned to a particular sacra- no parts at all should be assigned to Penance. ment. Objection 3. Further, the matter of Penance is sin, as Reply to Objection 2. Parts are not assigned to stated above (q. 84, a. 2). But no parts are assigned to sin. penance as a virtue: because the human acts of which Neither, therefore, should parts be assigned to Penance. there are several in penance, are related to the habit of On the contrary, The parts of a thing are those out virtue, not as its parts, but as its effects. It follows, there-of which the whole is composed. Now the perfection of fore, that parts are assigned to Penance as a sacrament, to Penance is composed of several things, viz. contrition, which the human acts are related as matter: whereas in confession, and satisfaction. Therefore Penance has parts. the other sacraments the matter does not consist of human I answer that, The parts of a thing are those into acts, but of some one external thing, either simple, as wa- which the whole is divided materially, for the parts of a ter or oil, or compound, as chrism, and so parts are not thing are to the whole, what matter is to the form; where- assigned to the other sacraments. fore the parts are reckoned as a kind of material cause, and Reply to Objection 3. Sins are the remote matter of the whole as a kind of formal cause (Phys. ii). Accord- Penance, inasmuch, to wit, as they are the matter or object ingly wherever, on the part of matter, we find a kind of of the human acts, which are the proper matter of Penance plurality, there we shall find a reason for assigning parts. as a sacrament. Whether contrition, confession, and satisfaction are fittingly assigned as parts of IIIa q. 90 a. 2 Penance? Objection 1. It would seem that contrition, confes- sacrament of Penance. sion, and satisfaction are not fittingly assigned as parts of Objection 2. Further, grace is conferred in the sacra- Penance. For contrition is in the heart, and so belongs to ments of the New Law, as stated above (q. 62, Aa. 1,3). interior penance; while confession consists of words, and But no grace is conferred in satisfaction. Therefore satis- satisfaction in deeds; so that the two latter belong to inte- faction is not part of a sacrament. rior penance. Now interior penance is not a sacrament, but Objection 3. Further, the fruit of a thing is not the only exterior penance which is perceptible by the senses. same as its part. But satisfaction is a fruit of penance, Therefore these three parts are not fittingly assigned to the according to Lk. 3:8: “Bring forth. . . fruits worthy of 2634 penance.” Therefore it is not a part of Penance. we seek not only the restoration of the equality of justice, Objection 4. Further, Penance is ordained against sin. as in vindictive justice, but also and still more the rec- But sin can be completed merely in the thought by con- onciliation of friendship, which is accomplished by the sent, as stated in the Ia IIae, q. 72, a. 7: therefore Penance offender making atonement according to the will of the can also. Therefore confession in word and satisfaction in person offended. Accordingly the first requisite on the deed should not be reckoned as parts of Penance. part of the penitent is the will to atone, and this is done On the contrary, It seems that yet more parts should by contrition; the second is that he submit to the judgment be assigned to Penance. For not only is the body assigned of the priest standing in God’s place, and this is done in as a part of man, as being the matter, but also the soul, confession; and the third is that he atone according to the which is his form. But the aforesaid three, being the acts decision of God’s minister, and this is done in satisfac- of the penitent, stand as matter, while the priestly abso- tion: and so contrition, confession, and satisfaction are lution stands as form. Therefore the priestly absolution assigned as parts of Penance. should be assigned as a fourth part of Penance. Reply to Objection 1. Contrition, as to its essence, is I answer that, A part is twofold, essential and quan- in the heart, and belongs to interior penance; yet, virtually, titative. The essential parts are naturally the form and the it belongs to exterior penance, inasmuch as it implies the matter, and logically the genus and the difference. In this purpose of confessing and making satisfaction. way, each sacrament is divided into matter and form as Reply to Objection 2. Satisfaction confers grace, in its essential parts. Hence it has been said above (q. 60, so far as it is in man’s purpose, and it increases grace, Aa. 5,6) that sacraments consist of things and words. But according as it is accomplished, just as Baptism does in since quantity is on the part of matter, quantitative parts adults, as stated above (q. 68, a. 2; q. 69, a. 8). are parts of matter: and, in this way, as stated above (a. 1), Reply to Objection 3. Satisfaction is a part of parts are assigned specially to the sacrament of Penance, Penance as a sacrament, and a fruit of penance as a virtue. as regards the acts of the penitent, which are the matter of Reply to Objection 4. More things are required this sacrament. for good, “which proceeds from a cause that is entire,” Now it has been said above (q. 85, a. 3, ad 3) that than for evil, “which results from each single defect,” as an offense is atoned otherwise in Penance than in vindic- Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). And thus, although sin tive justice. Because, in vindictive justice the atonement is is completed in the consent of the heart, yet the perfection made according to the judge’s decision, and not according of Penance requires contrition of the heart, together with to the discretion of the offender or of the person offended; confession in word and satisfaction in deed. whereas, in Penance, the offense is atoned according to The Reply to the Fifth Objection is clear from what the will of the sinner, and the judgment of God against has been said. Whom the sin was committed, because in the latter case Whether these three are integral parts of Penance? IIIa q. 90 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that these three are not integral parts of Penance. integral parts of Penance. For, as stated above (q. 84, I answer that, Some have said that these three are a. 3), Penance is ordained against sin. But sins of thought, subjective parts of Penance. But this is impossible, be- word, and deed are the subjective and not integral parts of cause the entire power of the whole is present in each sin, because sin is predicated of each one of them. There- subjective part at the same time and equally, just as the fore in Penance also, contrition in thought, confession in entire power of an animal, as such, is assured to each ani- word, and satisfaction in deed are not integral parts. mal species, all of which species divide the animal genus Objection 2. Further, no integral part includes within at the same time and equally: which does not apply to the itself another that is condivided with it. But contrition in- point in question. Wherefore others have said that these cludes both confession and satisfaction in the purpose of are potential parts: yet neither can this be true, since the amendment. Therefore they are not integral parts. whole is present, as to the entire essence, in each poten- Objection 3. Further, a whole is composed of its in- tial part, just as the entire essence of the soul is present tegral parts, taken at the same time and equally, just as a in each of its powers: which does not apply to the case line is made up of its parts. But such is not the case here. in point. Therefore it follows that these three are integral Therefore these are not integral parts of Penance. parts of Penance, the nature of which is that the whole On the contrary, Integral parts are those by which the is not present in each of the parts, either as to its entire perfection of the whole is integrated. But the perfection of power, or as to its entire essence, but that it is present to Penance is integrated by these three. Therefore they are all of them together at the same time. 2635 Reply to Objection 1. Sin forasmuch as it is an evil, Penance. can be completed in one single point, as stated above (a. 2, Reply to Objection 3. All integral parts have a cer- ad 4); and so the sin which is completed in thought alone, tain relation of order to one another: but some are only is a special kind of sin. Another species is the sin that is related as to position, whether in sequence as the parts of completed in thought and word: and yet a third species is an army, or by contact, as the parts of a heap, or by being the sin that is completed in thought, word, and deed; and fitted together, as the parts of a house, or by continuation, the quasi-integral parts of this last sin, are that which is in as the parts of a line; while some are related, in addition, thought, that which is in word, and that which is in deed. as to power, as the parts of an animal, the first of which Wherefore these three are the integral parts of Penance, is the heart, the others in a certain order being dependent which is completed in them. on one another: and thirdly some are related in the order Reply to Objection 2. One integral part can include of time: as the parts of time and movement. Accordingly the whole, though not as to its essence: because the the parts of Penance are related to one another in the order foundation, in a way, contains virtually the whole build- of power and time, since they are actions, but not in the ing. In this way contrition includes virtually the whole of order of position, since they do not occupy a place. Whether Penance is fittingly divided into penance before Baptism, penance for mortal IIIa q. 90 a. 4 sins, and penance for venial sins? Objection 1. It would seem that penance is unfittingly the better, which is the end, so to speak, of penance. And divided into penance before Baptism, penance for mortal, since moral matters take their species from the end, as and penance for venial sins. For Penance is the second stated in the Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 3; Ia IIae, 18, Aa. 4,6, it is plank after shipwreck, as stated above (q. 84, a. 6 ), while reasonable to distinguish various species of penance, ac- Baptism is the first. Therefore that which precedes Bap- cording to the various changes intended by the penitent. tism should not be called a species of penance. Accordingly there is a threefold change intended by Objection 2. Further, that which can destroy the the penitent. The first is by regeneration unto a new life, greater, can destroy the lesser. Now mortal sin is greater and this belongs to that penance which precedes Baptism. than venial; and penance which regards mortal sins re- The second is by reforming one’s past life after it has been gards also venial sins. Therefore they should not be con- already destroyed, and this belongs to penance for mortal sidered as different species of penance. sins committed after Baptism. The third is by changing Objection 3. Further, just as after Baptism man com- to a more perfect operation of life, and this belongs to mits venial and mortal sins, so does he before Baptism. If penance for venial sins, which are remitted through a fer- therefore penance for venial sins is distinct from penance vent act of charity, as stated above (q. 87, Aa. 2,3). for mortal sins after Baptism, in like manner they should Reply to Objection 1. The penance which precedes be distinguished before Baptism. Therefore penance is Baptism is not a sacrament, but an act of virtue disposing not fittingly divided into these species. one to that sacrament. On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia∗ Reply to Objection 2. The penance which washes that these three are species of Penance. away mortal sins, washes away venial sins also, but the I answer that, This is a division of penance as a converse does not hold. Wherefore these two species of virtue. Now it must be observed that every virtue acts penance are related to one another as perfect and imper- in accordance with the time being, as also in keeping with fect. other due circumstances, wherefore the virtue of penance Reply to Objection 3. Before Baptism there are no has its act at this time, according to the requirements of venial sins without mortal sins. And since a venial sin the New Law. cannot be remitted without mortal sin, as stated above Now it belongs to penance to detest one’s past sins, (q. 87, a. 4), before Baptism, penance for mortal sins is and to purpose, at the same time, to change one’s life for not distinct from penance for venial sins. ∗ Cf. Hom. 30 inter 1 2636 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART Editor’s Note: After writing these few questions of the treatise on Penance, St. Thomas was called to the heavenly reward which he had merited by writing so well of his Divine Master. The remainder of the Summa Theologica, known as the Supplement, was compiled probably by Fra Rainaldo da Piperno, companion and friend of the Angelic Doctor, and was gathered from St. Thomas’s commentary on the Fourth Book of the Sentences of Peter Lombard. This commentary was written in the years 1235-1253, while St. Thomas was under thirty years of age. Everywhere it reveals the influence of him whom St. Thomas always called the Master. But that influence was not to be always supreme. That the mind of the Angelic Doctor moved forward to positions which directly contradicted the Master may be seen by any student of the Summa Theologica. The compiler of the Supplement was evidently well acquainted with the commentary on the Sentences, which had been in circulation for some twenty years or more, but it is probable that he was badly acquainted with the Summa Theologica. This will be realized and must be borne in mind when we read the Supplement, notably IIIa, q. 62, a. 1; also q. 43, a. 3, ad 2 of the Supplement. SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 1 Of the Parts of Penance, in Particular, and First of Contrition (In Three Articles) We must now consider each single part of Penance, and (1) Contrition; (2) Confession; (3) Satisfaction. The consideration about Contrition will be fourfold: (1) What is it? (2) What should it be about? (3) How great should it be? (4) Of its duration; (5) Of its effect. Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether Contrition is suitably defined? (2) Whether it is an act of virtue? (3) Whether attrition can become contrition? Whether contrition is an assumed sorrow for sins, together with the purpose of con-Suppl. q. 1 a. 1 fessing them and of making satisfaction for them? Objection 1. It would seem that contrition is not “an that persists in his own judgment, is called metaphorically assumed sorrow for sins, together with the purpose of rigid and hard: wherefore anyone is said to be broken confessing them and of making satisfaction for them,” as when he is torn from his own judgment. But, in material some define it. For, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei things, whence these expressions are transferred to spir- xiv, 6), “sorrow is for those things that happen against our itual things, there is a difference between breaking and will.” But this does not apply to sin. Therefore contrition crushing or contrition, as stated in Meteor. iv, in that is not sorrow for sins. we speak of breaking when a thing is sundered into large Objection 2. Further, contrition is given us by God. parts, but of crushing or contrition when that which was in But what is given is not assumed. Therefore contrition is itself solid is reduced to minute particles. And since, for not an assumed sorrow. the remission of sin, it is necessary that man should put Objection 3. Further, satisfaction and confession are aside entirely his attachment to sin, which implies a cer- necessary for the remission of the punishment which was tain state of continuity and solidity in his mind, therefore not remitted by contrition. But sometimes the whole pun- it is that the act through which sin is cast aside is called ishment is remitted in contrition. Therefore it is not al- contrition metaphorically. ways necessary for the contrite person to have the purpose In this contrition several things are to be observed, viz. of confessing and of making satisfaction. the very substance of the act, the way of acting, its origin On the contrary, stands the definition. and its effect: in respect of which we find that contrition I answer that, As stated in Ecclus. 10:15, “pride has been defined in various ways. For, as regards the sub- is the beginning of all sin,” because thereby man clings stance of the act, we have the definition given above: and to his own judgment, and strays from the Divine com- since the act of contrition is both an act of virtue, and mandments. Consequently that which destroys sin must a part of the sacrament of Penance, its nature as an act needs make man give up his own judgment. Now he of virtue is explained in this definition by mentioning its 2637 genus, viz. “sorrow,” its object by the words “for sins,” ered from the words of Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 11) as and the act of choice which is necessary for an act of follows: “Contrition is humility of the soul, crushing sin virtue, by the word “assumed”: while, as a part of the between hope and fear.” Here the derivation is indicated sacrament, it is made manifest by pointing out its relation by saying that contrition is “humility of the soul”; the ef- to the other parts, in the words “together with the purpose fect, by the words, “crushing sin”; and the origin, by the of confessing and of making satisfaction.” words, “between hope and fear.” Indeed, it includes not There is another definition which defines contrition, only the principal cause, which is fear, but also its joint only as an act of virtue; but at the same time including cause, which is hope, without which, fear might lead to the difference which confines it to a special virtue, viz. despair. penance, for it is thus expressed: “Contrition is volun- Reply to Objection 1. Although sins, when commit- tary sorrow for sin whereby man punishes in himself that ted, were voluntary, yet when we are contrite for them, which he grieves to have done,” because the addition of they are no longer voluntary, so that they occur against our the word “punishes” defines the definition to a special will; not indeed in respect of the will that we had when we virtue. Another definition is given by Isidore (De Sum. consented to them, but in respect of that which we have Bono ii, 12) as follows: “Contrition is a tearful sorrow now, so as to wish they had never been. and humility of mind, arising from remembrance of sin Reply to Objection 2. Contrition is from God alone and fear of the Judgment.” Here we have an allusion to as to the form that quickens it, but as to the substance of the derivation of the word, when it is said that it is “hu- the act, it is from the free-will and from God, Who oper- mility of the mind,” because just as pride makes the mind ates in all works both of nature and of will. rigid, so is a man humbled, when contrition leads him to Reply to Objection 3. Although the entire punish- give up his mind. Also the external manner is indicated ment may be remitted by contrition, yet confession and by the word “tearful,” and the origin of contrition, by the satisfaction are still necessary, both because man cannot words, “arising from remembrance of sin,” etc. Another be sure that his contrition was sufficient to take away all, definition is taken from the words of Augustine∗, and in- and because confession and satisfaction are a matter of dicates the effect of contrition. It runs thus: “Contrition precept: wherefore he becomes a transgressor, who con- is the sorrow which takes away sin.” Yet another is gath- fesses not and makes not satisfaction. Whether contrition is an act of virtue? Suppl. q. 1 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that contrition is not an which it belongs to detest and destroy past sins, the act, to act of virtue. For passions are not acts of virtue, since wit, of penance, as is evident from what was said above “they bring us neither praise nor blame” (Ethic. ii, 5). But (Sent. iv, D, 14, q. 1, a. 1; IIIa, q. 85, Aa. 2,3). sorrow is a passion. As therefore contrition is sorrow, it Reply to Objection 1. Contrition includes a twofold seems that it is not an act of virtue. sorrow for sin. One is in the sensitive part, and is a pas- Objection 2. Further, as contrition is so called from sion. This does not belong essentially to contrition as an its being a crushing, so is attrition. Now all agree in say- act of virtue, but is rather its effect. For just as the virtue ing that attrition is not an act of virtue. Neither, therefore, of penance inflicts outward punishment on the body, in or-is contrition an act of virtue. der to compensate for the offense done to God through the On the contrary, Nothing but an act of virtue is meri- instrumentality of the bodily members, so does it inflict torious. But contrition is a meritorious act. Therefore it is on the concupiscible part of the soul a punishment, viz. an act of virtue. the aforesaid sorrow, because the concupiscible also co- I answer that, Contrition as to the literal signification operated in the sinful deeds. Nevertheless this sorrow may of the word, does not denote an act of virtue, but a cor- belong to contrition taken as part of the sacrament, since poreal passion. But the question in point does not refer the nature of a sacrament is such that it consists not only to contrition in this sense, but to that which the word is of internal but also of external acts and sensible things. employed to signify by way of metaphor. For just as the The other sorrow is in the will, and is nothing else save inflation of one’s own will unto wrong-doing implies, in displeasure for some evil, for the emotions of the will are itself, a generic evil, so the utter undoing and crushing named after the passions, as stated above (Sent. iii, D, 26, of that same will implies something generically good, for q. 1, a. 5; Ia IIae, q. 22, a. 3, ad 3). Accordingly, contrition this is to detest one’s own will whereby sin was commit-is essentially a kind of sorrow, and is an act of the virtue ted. Wherefore contrition, which signifies this, implies of penance. rectitude of the will; and so it is the act of that virtue to Reply to Objection 2. Attrition denotes approach to ∗ Implicitly on Ps. 46 2638 perfect contrition, wherefore in corporeal matters, things minutely. Wherefore, in spiritual matters, attrition signi-are said to be attrite, when they are worn away to a certain fies a certain but not a perfect displeasure for sins com- extent, but not altogether crushed to pieces; while they are mitted, whereas contrition denotes perfect displeasure. said to be contrite, when all the parts are crushed [tritae] Whether attrition can become contrition? Suppl. q. 1 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that attrition can become but an act only: and those habits of infused virtue which contrition. For contrition differs from attrition, as living regard the will cannot be lifeless, since they result from from dead. Now dead faith becomes living. Therefore charity, as stated above (Sent. iii, D, 27, q. 2, a. 4; Ia IIae, attrition can become contrition. q. 65, a. 4). Wherefore until grace be infused, there is Objection 2. Further, matter receives perfection when no habit by which afterwards the act of contrition may be privation is removed. Now sorrow is to grace, as matter to elicited; so that attrition can nowise become attrition: and form, because grace quickens sorrow. Therefore the sor- this is the other opinion. row that was previously lifeless, while guilt remained, re- Reply to Objection 1. There is no comparison be- ceives perfection through being quickened by grace: and tween faith and contrition, as stated above. so the same conclusion follows as above. Reply to Objection 2. When the privation is removed On the contrary, Things which are caused by prin- from matter, the matter is quickened if it remains when ciples altogether diverse cannot be changed, one into the the perfection comes. But the sorrow which was lifeless, other. Now the principle of attrition is servile fear, while does not remain when charity comes, wherefore it cannot filial fear is the cause of contrition. Therefore attrition be quickened. cannot become contrition. It may also be replied that matter does not take its ori- I answer that, There are two opinions on this ques- gin from the form essentially, as an act takes its origin tion: for some say that attrition may become contrition, from the habit which quickens it. Wherefore nothing hin- even as lifeless faith becomes living faith. But, seem- ders matter being quickened anew by some form, whereby ingly, this is impossible; since, although the habit of life- it was not quickened previously: whereas this cannot be less faith becomes living, yet never does an act of lifeless said of an act, even as it is impossible for the identically faith become an act of living faith, because the lifeless same thing to arise from a cause wherefrom it did not arise act passes away and remains no more, as soon as charity before, since a thing is brought into being but once. comes. Now attrition and contrition do not denote a habit, 2639 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 2 Of the Object of Contrition (In Six Articles) We must now consider the object of contrition. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether a man should be contrite on account of his punishment? (2) Whether, on account of original sin? (3) Whether, for every actual sin he has committed? (4) Whether, for actual sins he will commit? (5) Whether, for the sins of others? (6) Whether, for each single mortal sin? Whether man should be contrite on account of the punishment, and not only on ac-Suppl. q. 2 a. 1 count of his sin? Objection 1. It would seem that man should be con- this wholeness and hardness is found in the evil of fault, trite on account of the punishment, and not only on ac- since the will, which is the cause thereof in the evil-doer, count of his sin. For Augustine says in De Poenitentia∗: sticks to its own ground§, and refuses to yield to the pre- “No man desires life everlasting unless he repent of this cept of the law, wherefore displeasure at a suchlike evil mortal life.” But the morality of this life is a punishment. is called metaphorically “contrition.” . But this metaphor Therefore the penitent should be contrite on account of his cannot be applied to evil of punishment, because punish- punishments also. ment simply denotes a lessening, so that it is possible to Objection 2. Further, the Master says (Sent. iv, D, have sorrow for punishment but not contrition. 16, cap. i), quoting Augustine (De vera et falsa Poeniten- Reply to Objection 1. According to St. Augustine, tia†), that the penitent should be sorry for having deprived penance should be on account of this mortal life, not by himself of virtue. But privation of virtue is a punishment. reason of its mortality (unless penance be taken broadly Therefore contrition is sorrow for punishments also. for every kind of sorrow); but by reason of sins, to which On the contrary, No one holds to that for which he we are prone on account of the weakness of this life. is sorry. But a penitent, by the very signification of the Reply to Objection 2. Sorrow for the loss of virtue word, is one who holds to his punishment‡. Therefore he through sin is not essentially the same as contrition, but is is not sorry on account of his punishment, so that con- its principle. For just as we are moved to desire a thing trition which is penitential sorrow is not on account of on account of the good we expect to derive from it, so are punishment. we moved to be sorry for something on account of the evil I answer that, As stated above (q. 1, a. 1), contrition accruing to us therefrom. implies the crushing of something hard and whole. Now Whether contrition should be on account of original sin? Suppl. q. 2 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that contrition should be Therefore man should be displeased at original sin; and on account of original sin. For we ought to be contrite on so he ought to have contrition for it. account of actual sin; not by reason of the act, considered On the contrary, The medicine should be proportion- as a kind of being, but by reason of its deformity, since the ate to the disease. Now we contracted original sin without act, regarded in its substance, is a good, and is from God. willing to do so. Therefore it is not necessary that we Now original sin has a deformity, even as actual sin has. should be cleansed from it by an act of the will, such as Therefore we should be contrite on its account also. contrition is. Objection 2. Further, by original sin man has been I answer that, Contrition is sorrow, as stated above turned away from God, since in punishment thereof he (q. 1, Aa. 1,2), respecting and, so to speak, crushing the was to be deprived of seeing God. But every man should hardness of the will. Consequently it can regard those sins be displeased at having been turned away from God. only which result in us through the hardness of our will. ∗ Cf. Hom. 50 inter 1 † Work of an unknown author ‡ “Poenitens,” i.e. “poenam tenens” § There is a play on the words here—‘integer’ (whole) and ‘in suis terminis’ (to its own ground) 2640 And as original sin was not brought upon us by our own does not include the notion of guilt, and sometimes de-will, but contracted from the origin of our infected nature, notes a punishment. But contrition ought to be on account it follows that, properly speaking, we cannot have contri- of sin, as implying deformity resulting from an act of the tion on its account, but only displeasure or sorrow. will; and this does not apply to original sin, so that contri- Reply to Objection 1. Contrition is for sin, not by tion does not apply to it. reason of the mere substance of the act, because it does The same Reply avails for the Second Objection, be- not derive the character of evil therefrom; nor again, by cause contrition is due to aversion of the will. reason of its deformity alone, because deformity, of itself, Whether we should have contrition for every actual sin? Suppl. q. 2 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that we have no need to powers, which the will uses for its own end, but also on have contrition for every actual sin we have committed. the will’s own proper act: for the will wills to will some- For contraries are healed by their contraries. Now some thing. Accordingly the will’s choice falls on that pain or sins are committed through sorrow, e.g. sloth and envy. sadness which is to be found in the sin of envy and the Therefore their remedy should not be sorrow, such as con- like, whether such pain be in the senses or in the will it- trition is, but joy. self. Consequently the sorrow of contrition is opposed to Objection 2. Further, contrition is an act of the will, those sins. which cannot refer to that which is not known. But there Reply to Objection 2. One may forget a thing in two are sins of which we have no knowledge, such as those ways, either so that it escapes the memory altogether, and we have forgotten. Therefore we cannot have contrition then one cannot search for it; or so that it escapes from the for them. memory in part, and in part remains, as when I remember Objection 3. Further, by voluntary contrition those having heard something in general, but know not what it sins are blotted out which we committed voluntarily. But was in particular, and then I search my memory in order to ignorance takes away voluntariness, as the Philosopher discover it. Accordingly a sin also may be forgotten in two declares (Ethic. iii, 1). Therefore contrition need not ways, either so as to remain in a general, but not in a par- cover things which have occurred through ignorance. ticular remembrance, and then a man is bound to bethink Objection 4. Further, we need not be contrite for a sin himself in order to discover the sin, because he is bound to which is not removed by contrition. Now some sins are have contrition for each individual mortal sin. And if he is not removed by contrition, e.g. venial sins, that remain unable to discover it, after applying himself with due care, after the grace of contrition. Therefore there is no need to it is enough that he be contrite for it, according as it stands have contrition for all one’s past sins. in his knowledge, and indeed he should grieve not only for On the contrary, Penance is a remedy for all ac- the sin, but also for having forgotten it, because this is ow- tual sins. But penance cannot regard some sins, without ing to his neglect. If, however, the sin has escaped from contrition regarding them also, for it is the first part of his memory altogether, then he is excused from his duty Penance. Therefore contrition should be for all one’s past through being unable to fulfill it, and it is enough that he sins. be contrite in general for everything wherein he has of- Further, no sin is forgiven a man unless he be justified. fended God. But when this inability is removed, as when But justification requires contrition, as stated above (q. 1, the sin is recalled to his memory, then he is bound to have a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 113). Therefore it is necessary to have contrition for that sin in particular, even as a poor man, contrition for all one’s sins. who cannot pay a debt, is excused, and yet is bound to, as I answer that, Every actual sin is caused by our will soon as he can. not yielding to God’s law, either by transgressing it, or by Reply to Objection 3. If ignorance were to remove al- omitting it, or by acting beside it: and since a hard thing together the will to do evil, it will excuse, and there would is one that is disposed not to give way easily, hence it is be no sin: and sometimes it does not remove the will alto- that a certain hardness of the will is to be found in every gether, and then it does not altogether excuse, but only to actual sin. Wherefore, if a sin is to be remedied, it needs a certain extent: wherefore a man is bound to be contrite to be taken away by contrition which crushes it. for a sin committed through ignorance. Reply to Objection 1. As clearly shown above (a. 2, Reply to Objection 4. A venial sin can remain after ad 1), contrition is opposed to sin, in so far as it proceeds contrition for a mortal sin, but not after contrition for the from the choice of the will that had failed to obey the com- venial sin: wherefore contrition should also cover venial mand of God’s law, and not as regards the material part of sins even as penance does, as stated above (Sent. iv, D, sin: and it is on this that the choice of the will falls. Now 16, q. 2, a. 2, qu. 2; Suppl., q. 87, a. 1). the will’s choice falls not only on the acts of the other 2641 Whether a man is bound to have contrition for his future sins? Suppl. q. 2 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that a man is bound to movement of prudence: and therefore, since penance is have contrition for his future sins also. For contrition is a moral virtue, as it is a part of justice, in addition to its an act of the free-will: and the free-will extends to the fu- own act, it acquires the movement of prudence. Now its ture rather than to the past, since choice, which is an act proper movement is towards its proper object, which is of the free-will, is about future contingents, as stated in a sin committed. Wherefore its proper and principal act, Ethic. iii. Therefore contrition is about future sins rather viz. contrition, essentially regards past sins alone; but, than about past sins. inasmuch as it acquires something of the act of prudence, Objection 2. Further, sin is aggravated by the result it regards future sins indirectly, although it is not essen- that ensues from it: wherefore Jerome says∗ that the pun- tially moved towards those future sins. For this reason, he ishment of Arius is not yet ended, for it is yet possible for that is contrite, is sorry for his past sins, and is cautious some to be ruined through his heresy, by reason of whose of future sins. Yet we do not speak of contrition for future ruin his punishment would be increased: and the same sins, but of caution, which is a part of prudence conjoined applies to a man who is judged guilty of murder, if he to penance. has committed a murderous assault, even before his vic- Reply to Objection 1. The free-will is said to regard tim dies. Now the sinner ought to be contrite during that future contingents, in so far as it is concerned with acts, intervening time. Therefore the degree of his contrition but not with the object of acts: because, of his own free- ought to be proportionate not only to his past act, but also will, a man can think about past and necessary things, and to its eventual result: and consequently contrition regards yet the very act of thinking, in so far as it is subject to the the future. free-will, is a future contingent. Hence the act the contri- On the contrary, Contrition is a part of penance. But tion also is a future contingent, in so far as it is subject to penance always regards the past: and therefore contrition the free-will; and yet its object can be something past. does also, and consequently is not for a future sin. Reply to Objection 2. The consequent result which I answer that, In every series of things moving and aggravates a sin was already present in the act as in its moved ordained to one another, we find that the infe- cause; wherefore when the sin was committed, its de- rior mover has its proper movement, and besides this, it gree of gravity was already complete, and no further guilt follows, in some respect, the movement of the superior accrued to it when the result took place. Nevertheless mover: this is seen in the movement of the planets, which, some accidental punishment accrues to it, in the respect in addition to their proper movements, follow the move- of which the damned will have the more motives of regret ment of the first heaven. Now, in all the moral virtues, for the more evils that have resulted from their sins. It is the first mover is prudence, which is called the chario- in this sense that Jerome† speaks. Hence there is not need teer of the virtues. Consequently each moral virtue, in for contrition to be for other than past sins. addition to its proper movement, has something of the Whether a man ought to have contrition for another’s sin? Suppl. q. 2 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that a man ought to have penance. But no one repents save for what he has done contrition for another’s sin. For one should not ask for- himself. Therefore no one is contrite for others’ sins. giveness for a sin unless one is contrite for it. Now for- I answer that, The same thing is crushed [conteritur] giveness is asked for another’s sin in Ps. 18:13: “From which hitherto was hard and whole. Hence contrition for those of others spare thy servant.” Therefore a man ought sin must needs be in the same subject in which the hard- to be contrite for another’s sins. ness of sin was hitherto: so that there is no contrition for Objection 2. Further, man is bound, ought of char- the sins of others. ity, to love his neighbor as himself. Now, through love Reply to Objection 1. The prophet prays to be spared of himself, he both grieves for his ills, and desires good from the sins of others, in so far as, through fellowship things. Therefore, since we are bound to desire the goods with sinners, a man contracts a stain by consenting to their of grace for our neighbor, as for ourselves, it seems that sins: thus it is written (Ps. 17:27): “With the perverse thou we ought to grieve for his sins, even as for our own. But wilt be perverted.” contrition is nothing else than sorrow for sins. Therefore Reply to Objection 2. We ought to grieve for the sins man should be contrite for the sins of others. of others, but not to have contrition for them, because not On the contrary, Contrition is an act of the virtue of all sorrow for past sins is contrition, as is evident for what ∗ St. Basil asserts this implicitly in De Vera Virgin. † Basil 2642 has been said already. Whether it is necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin? Suppl. q. 2 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not necessary to to be contrite for each sin that he calls to mind; but as have contrition for each mortal sin. For the movement of regards its term, it suffices for him to have one general contrition in justification is instantaneous: whereas a man contrition for all, because then the movement of his con- cannot think of every mortal sin in an instant. Therefore trition acts in virtue of all his preceding dispositions. it is not necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin. This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. Objection 2. Further, contrition should be for sins, Reply to Objection 2. Although all mortal sins agree inasmuch as they turn us away from God, because we in turning man away from God, yet they differ in the cause need not be contrite for turning to creatures without turn- and mode of aversion, and in the degree of separation ing away from God. Now all mortal sins agree in turning from God; and this regards the different ways in which us away from God. Therefore one contrition for all is suf- they turn us to creatures. ficient. Reply to Objection 3. Baptism acts in virtue of Objection 3. Further, mortal sins have more in com- Christ’s merit, Who had infinite power for the blotting out mon with one another, than actual and original sin. Now of all sins; and so for all sins one Baptism suffices. But in one Baptism blots out all sins both actual and original. contrition, in addition to the merit of Christ, an act of ours Therefore one general contrition blots out all mortal sins. is requisite, which must, therefore, correspond to each sin, On the contrary, For diverse diseases there are di- since it has not infinite power for contrition. verse remedies, since “what heals the eye will not heal the It may also be replied that Baptism is a spiritual gener- foot,” as Jerome says (Super Marc. ix, 28). But contrition ation; whereas Penance, as regards contrition and its other is the special remedy for one mortal sin. Therefore one parts, is a kind of spiritual healing by way of some al- general contrition for all mortal sins does not suffice. teration. Now it is evident in the generation of a body, Further, contrition is expressed by confession. But it accompanied by corruption of another body, that all the is necessary to confess each mortal sin. Therefore it is accidents contrary to the thing generated, and which were necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin. the accidents of the thing corrupted, are removed by the I answer that, Contrition may be considered in two one generation: whereas in alteration, only that accident is ways, as to its origin, and as to its term. By origin of con- removed which was contrary to the accident which is the trition I mean the process of thought, when a man thinks term of the alteration. In like manner, one Baptism blots of his sin and is sorry for it, albeit not with the sorrow of out all sins together and introduces a new life; whereas contrition, yet with that of attrition. The term of contrition Penance does not blot out each sin, unless it be directed to is when that sorrow is already quickened by grace. Ac- each. For this reason it is necessary to be contrite for, and cordingly, as regards the origin of contrition, a man needs to confess each sin. 2643 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 3 Of the Degree of Contrition (In Three Articles) We must now consider the degree of contrition: under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether contrition is the greatest possible sorrow in the world? (2) Whether the sorrow of contrition can be too great? (3) Whether sorrow for one sin ought to be greater than for another? Whether contrition is the greatest possible sorrow in the world? Suppl. q. 3 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that contrition is not the pleasing. The other sorrow is in the sensitive part, and greatest possible sorrow in the world. For sorrow is the is caused by the former sorrow either from natural neces- sensation of hurt. But some hurts are more keenly felt sity, in so far as the lower powers follow the movements than the hurt of sin, e.g. the hurt of a wound. Therefore of the higher, or from choice, in so far as a penitent ex- contrition is not the greatest sorrow. cites in himself this sorrow for his sins. In neither of these Objection 2. Further, we judge of a cause accord- ways is such sorrow, of necessity, the greatest, because ing to its effect. Now the effect of sorrow is tears. Since the lower powers are more deeply moved by their own therefore sometimes a contrite person does not shed out- objects than through redundance from the higher powers. ward tears for his sins, whereas he weeps for the death of Wherefore the nearer the operation of the higher powers a friend, or for a blow, or the like, it seems that contrition approaches to the objects of the lower powers, the more is not the greatest sorrow. do the latter follow the movement of the former. Conse- Objection 3. Further, the more a thing is mingled with quently there is greater pain in the sensitive part, on ac- its contrary, the less its intensity. But the sorrow of con- count of a sensible hurt, than that which redounds into the trition has a considerable admixture of joy, because the sensitive part from the reason; and likewise, that which contrite man rejoices in his delivery, in the hope of par- redounds from the reason when it deliberates on corpo- don, and in many like things. Therefore his sorrow is very real things, is greater than that which redounds from the slight. reason in considering spiritual things. Therefore the sor- Objection 4. Further, the sorrow of contrition is a kind row which results in the sensitive part from the reason’s of displeasure. But there are many things more displeas- displeasure at sin, is not greater than the other sorrows of ing to the contrite than their past sins; for they would not which that same part is the subject: and likewise, neither prefer to suffer the pains of hell rather than to sin. nor is the sorrow which is assumed voluntarily greater than to have suffered, nor yet to suffer all manner of temporal other sorrows—both because the lower appetite does not punishment; else few would be found contrite. Therefore obey the higher appetite infallibly, as though in the lower the sorrow of contrition is not the greatest. appetite there should arise a passion of such intensity and On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Civ. of such a kind as the higher appetite might ordain—and Dei xiv, 7, 9), “all sorrow is based on love.” Now the love because the passions are employed by the reason, in acts of charity, on which the sorrow of contrition is based, is of virtue, according to a certain measure, which the sor- the greatest love. Therefore the sorrow of contrition is the row that is without virtue sometimes does not observe, but greatest sorrow. exceeds. Further, sorrow is for evil. Therefore the greater the Reply to Objection 1. Just as sensible sorrow is on evil, the greater the sorrow. But the fault is a greater evil account of the sensation of hurt, so interior sorrow is on than its punishment. Therefore contrition which is sorrow account of the thought of something hurtful. Therefore, for fault, surpasses all other sorrow. although the hurt of sin is not perceived by the external I answer that, As stated above (q. 1, a. 2, ad 1), there sense, yet it is perceived to be the most grievous hurt by is a twofold sorrow in contrition: one is in the will, and the interior sense or reason. is the very essence of contrition, being nothing else than Reply to Objection 2. Affections of the body are the displeasure at past sin, and this sorrow, in contrition, sur- immediate result of the sensitive passions and, through passes all other sorrows. For the more pleasing a thing is, them, of the emotions of the higher appetite. Hence it is the more displeasing is its contrary. Now the last end is that bodily tears flow more quickly from sensible sorrow, above all things pleasing: wherefore sin, which turns us or even from a thing that hurts the senses, than from the away from the last end, should be, above all things, dis- spiritual sorrow of contrition. 2644 Reply to Objection 3. The joy which a penitent has more than he shudders at the past evil: wherefore also, for his sorrow does not lessen his displeasure (for it is not no passion of the soul corresponds directly to the past, contrary to it), but increases it, according as every opera- as sorrow corresponds to present evil, and fear to future tion is increased by the delight which it causes, as stated evil. Consequently, of two past evils, the mind shrinks the in Ethic. x, 5. Thus he who delights in learning a science, more from that one which still produces a greater effect at learns the better, and, in like manner, he who rejoices in the present time, or which, it fears, will produce a greater his displeasure, is the more intensely displeased. But it effect in the future, although in the past it was the lesser may well happen that this joy tempers the sorrow that re- evil. And, since the effect of the past sin is sometimes not sults from the reason in the sensitive part. so keenly felt as the effect of the past punishment, both Reply to Objection 4. The degree of displeasure at because sin is more perfectly remedied than punishment, a thing should be proportionate to the degree of its mal- and because bodily defect is more manifest than spiritual ice. Now the malice of mortal sin is measured from Him defect, therefore even a man, who is well disposed, some- against Whom it is committed, inasmuch as it is offen- times feels a greater abhorrence of his past punishment sive to Him; and from him who sins, inasmuch as it is than of his past sin, although he would be ready to suffer hurtful to him. And, since man should love God more the same punishment over again rather than commit the than himself, therefore he should hate sin, as an offense same sin. against God, more than as being hurtful to himself. Now We must also observe, in comparing sin with punish- it is hurtful to him chiefly because it separates him from ment, that some punishments are inseparable from offense God; and in this respect the separation from God which is of God, e.g. separation from God; and some also are a punishment, should be more displeasing than the sin it- everlasting, e.g. the punishment of hell. Therefore the self, as causing this hurt (since what is hated on account of punishment to which is connected offense of God is to something else, is less hated), but less than the sin, as an be shunned in the same way as sin; whereas that which offense against God. Again, among all the punishments is everlasting is simply to be shunned more than sin. If, of malice a certain order is observed according to the de- however, we separate from these punishments the notion gree of the hurt. Consequently, since this is the greatest of offense, and consider only the notion of punishment, hurt, inasmuch as it consists in privation of the greatest they have the character of malice, less than sin has as an good, the greatest of all punishments will be separation offense against God: and for this reason should cause less from God. displeasure. Again, with regard to this displeasure, it is necessary We must, however, take note that, although the con- to observe that there is also an accidental degree of mal- trite should be thus disposed, yet he should not be ques- ice, in respect of the present and the past; since what is tioned about his feelings, because man cannot easily mea- past, is no more, whence it has less of the character of sure them. Sometimes that which displeases least seems malice or goodness. Hence it is that a man shrinks from to displease most, through being more closely connected suffering an evil at the present, or at some future time, with some sensible hurt, which is more known to us. Whether the sorrow of contrition can be too great? Suppl. q. 3 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the sorrow of con- Objection 3. On the contrary, Every moral virtue is trition cannot be too great. For no sorrow can be more destroyed by excess and deficiency. But contrition is an immoderate than that which destroys its own subject. But act of a moral virtue, viz. penance, since it is a part of the sorrow of contrition, if it be so great as to cause death justice. Therefore sorrow for sins can be too great. or corruption of the body, is praiseworthy. For Anselm I answer that, Contrition, as regards the sorrow in says (Orat. lii): “Would that such were the exuberance of the reason, i.e. the displeasure, whereby the sin is dis- my inmost soul, as to dry up the marrow of my body”; and pleasing through being an offense against God, cannot Augustine∗ confesses that “he deserves to blind his eyes be too great; even as neither can the love of charity be with tears.” Therefore the sorrow of contrition cannot be too great, for when this is increased the aforesaid displea- too great. sure is increased also. But, as regards the sensible sorrow, Objection 2. Further, the sorrow of contrition results contrition may be too great, even as outward affliction of from the love of charity. But the love of charity cannot be the body may be too great. In all these things the rule too great. Neither, therefore, can the sorrow of contrition should be the safeguarding of the subject, and of that gen- be too great. eral well-being which suffices for the fulfillment of one’s ∗ De Contritione Cordis, work of an unknown author † Vulg.: ‘Present your bodies. . . a reasonable sacrifice’ 2645 duties; hence it is written (Rom. 12:1): “Let your sacrifice eyes on account of his sins, because every sinner deserves be reasonable†.” not only eternal, but also temporal death, yet he did not Reply to Objection 1. Anselm desired the marrow of wish his eyes to be blinded. his body to be dried up by the exuberance of his devo- Reply to Objection 2. This objection considers the tion, not as regards the natural humor, but as to his bodily sorrow which is in the reason: while the Third considers desires and concupiscences. And, although Augustine ac- the sorrow of the sensitive part. knowledged that he deserved to lose the use of his bodily Whether sorrow for one sin should be greater than for another? Suppl. q. 3 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow for one sin of the higher appetite, the degree of sorrow depends on need not be greater than for another. For Jerome (Ep. the disposition of the lower faculty to the reception of im- cviii) commends Paula for that “she deplored her slightest pressions from the higher faculty, and not on the greatness sins as much as great ones.” Therefore one need not be of the sin. more sorry for one sin than for another. Secondly, contrition may be taken in so far as it is di- Objection 2. Further, the movement of contrition is rected to all one’s sins together, as in the act of justifica- instantaneous. Now one instantaneous movement cannot tion. Such contrition arises either from the consideration be at the same time more intense and more remiss. There- of each single sin, and thus although it is but one act, yet fore contrition for one sin need not be greater than for the distinction of the sins remains virtually therein; or, at another. least, it includes the purpose of thinking of each sin; and Objection 3. Further, contrition is for sin chiefly as in this way too it is habitually more for one than for an- turning us away from God. But all mortal sins agree in other. turning us away from God, since they all deprive us of Reply to Objection 1. Paula is commended, not for grace whereby the soul is united to God. Therefore we deploring all her sins equally, but because she grieved for should have equal contrition for all mortal sins. her slight sins as much as though they were grave sins, in On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 25:2): “Accord- comparison with other persons who grieve for their sins: ing to the measure of the sin, shall the measure also of but for graver sins she would have grieved much more. the stripes be.” Now, in contrition, the stripes are mea- Reply to Objection 2. In that instantaneous move- sured according to the sins, because to contrition is united ment of contrition, although it is not possible to find an the purpose of making satisfaction. Therefore contrition actually distinct intensity in respect of each individual sin, should be for one sin more than for another. yet it is found in the way explained above; and also in an- Further, man should be contrite for that which he other way, in so far as, in this general contrition, each ought to have avoided. But he ought to avoid one sin more individual sin is related to that particular motive of sor- than another, if that sin is more grievous, and it be neces- row which occurs to the contrite person, viz. the offense sary to do one or the other. Therefore, in like manner, he against God. For he who loves a whole, loves its parts po- ought to be more sorry for one, viz. the more grievous, tentially although not actually, and accordingly he loves than for the other. some parts more and some less, in proportion to their re- I answer that, We may speak of contrition in two lation to the whole; thus he who loves a community, virtu- ways: first, in so far as it corresponds to each single sin, ally loves each one more or less according to their respec- and thus, as regards the sorrow in the higher appetite, a tive relations to the common good. In like manner he who man ought to be more sorry for a more grievous sin, be- is sorry for having offended God, implicitly grieves for cause there is more reason for sorrow, viz. the offense his different sins in different ways, according as by them against God, in such a sin than in another, since the more he offended God more or less. inordinate the act is, the more it offends God. In like man- Reply to Objection 3. Although each mortal sin turns ner, since the greater sin deserves a greater punishment, us away from God and deprives us of His grace, yet some the sorrow also of the sensitive part, in so far as it is volun-remove us further away than others, inasmuch as through tarily undergone for sin, as the punishment thereof, ought their inordinateness they become more out of harmony to be greater where the sin is greater. But in so far as the with the order of the Divine goodness, than others do. emotions of the lower appetite result from the impression 2646 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 4 Of the Time for Contrition (In Three Articles) We must now consider the time for contrition: under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the whole of this life is the time for contrition? (2) Whether it is expedient to grieve continually for our sins? (3) Whether souls grieve for their sins even after this life? Whether the whole of this life is the time for contrition? Suppl. q. 4 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the time for contri- the time for contrition is the whole of the present state of tion is not the whole of this life. For as we should be sorry life. For as long as one is a wayfarer, one detests the ob- for a sin committed, so should we be ashamed of it. But stacles which retard or hinder one from reaching the end shame for sin does not last all one’s life, for Ambrose says of the way. Wherefore, since past sin retards the course of (De Poenit. ii) that “he whose sin is forgiven has nothing our life towards God (because the time which was given to to be ashamed of.” Therefore it seems that neither should us for the course cannot be recovered), it follows that the contrition last all one’s life, since it is sorrow for sin. state of contrition remains during the whole of this life- Objection 2. Further, it is written (1 Jn. 4:18) that time, as regards the detestation of sin. The same is to be “perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain.” said of the sensible sorrow, which is assumed by the will But sorrow also has pain. Therefore the sorrow of contri- as a punishment: for since man, by sinning, deserved ev- tion cannot remain in the state of perfect charity. erlasting punishment, and sinned against the eternal God, Objection 3. Further, there cannot be any sorrow for the everlasting punishment being commuted into a tempo- the past (since it is, properly speaking, about a present ral one, sorrow ought to remain during the whole of man’s evil) except in so far as something of the past sin remains eternity, i.e. during the whole of the state of this life. For in the present time. Now, in this life, sometimes one at- this reason Hugh of St. Victor says‡ that “when God ab- tains to a state in which nothing remains of a past sin, solves a man from eternal guilt and punishment, He binds neither disposition, nor guilt, nor any debt of punishment. him with a chain of eternal detestation of sin.” Therefore there is no need to grieve any more for that sin. Reply to Objection 1. Shame regards sin only as a Objection 4. Further, it is written (Rom. 8:28) that “to disgraceful act; wherefore after sin has been taken away them that love God all things work together unto good,” as to its guilt, there is no further motive for shame; but even sins as a gloss declares∗. Therefore there is no need there does remain a motive of sorrow, which is for the for them to grieve for sin after it has been forgiven. guilt, not only as being something disgraceful, but also as Objection 5. Further, contrition is a part of Penance, having a hurt connected with it. condivided with satisfaction. But there is no need for con- Reply to Objection 2. Servile fear which charity casts tinual satisfaction. Therefore contrition for sin need not be out, is opposed to charity by reason of its servility, be- continual. cause it regards the punishment. But the sorrow of con- On the contrary, Augustine in De Poenitentia† says trition results from charity, as stated above (q. 3, a. 2): that “when sorrow ceases, penance fails, and when wherefore the comparison fails. penance fails, no pardon remains.” Therefore, since it Reply to Objection 3. Although, by penance, the sin- behooves one not to lose the forgiveness which has been ner returns to his former state of grace and immunity from granted, it seems that one ought always to grieve for one’s the debt of punishment, yet he never returns to his former sins. dignity of innocence, and so something always remains Further, it is written (Ecclus. 5:5): “Be not without from his past sin. fear about sin forgiven.” Therefore man should always Reply to Objection 4. Just as a man ought not to grieve, that his sins may be forgiven him. do evil that good may come of it, so he ought not to re- I answer that, As stated above (q. 3, a. 1), there is a joice in evil, for the reason that good may perchance come twofold sorrow in contrition: one is in the reason, and is from it through the agency of Divine grace or providence, detestation of the sin committed; the other is in the sensi- because his sins did not cause but hindered those goods; tive part, and results from the former: and as regards both, rather was it Divine providence that was their cause, and ∗ Augustine, De Correp. et Grat. † De vera et falsa Poenitentia, work of an unknown author ‡ Richard of St. Victor, De Pot. Lig. et Solv. 3,5,13 2647 in this man should rejoice, whereas he should grieve for whence it derives its finiteness. On the other hand, the his sins. sorrow of contrition corresponds to sin on the part of the Reply to Objection 5. Satisfaction depends on the aversion, whence it derives a certain infinity; wherefore punishment appointed, which should be enjoined for sins; contrition ought to continue always; nor is it unreasonable hence it can come to an end, so that there be no further if that which precedes remains, when that which follows need of satisfaction. But that punishment is proportion- is taken away. ate to sin chiefly on the part of its adherence to a creature Whether it is expedient to grieve for sin continually? Suppl. q. 4 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not expedient to 5:5, “Blessed are they that mourn.” Therefore it is expe- grieve for sin continually. For it is sometimes expedient dient for sorrow to be as continual as possible. to rejoice, as is evident from Phil. 4:4, where the gloss on I answer that, We find this condition in the acts of the the words, “Rejoice in the Lord always,” says that “it is virtues, that in them excess and defect are not possible, as necessary to rejoice.” Now it is not possible to rejoice and is proved in Ethic. ii, 6,7. Wherefore, since contrition, so grieve at the same time. Therefore it is not expedient to far as it is a kind of displeasure seated in the rational ap- grieve for sin continually. petite, is an act of the virtue of penance, there can never be Objection 2. Further, that which, in itself, is an evil excess in it, either as to its intensity, or as to its duration, and a thing to be avoided should not be taken upon one-except in so far as the act of one virtue hinders the act of self, except in so far as it is necessary as a remedy against another which is more urgent for the time being. Conse- something, as in the case of burning or cutting a wound. quently the more continually a man can perform acts of Now sorrow is in itself an evil; wherefore it is written (Ec- this displeasure, the better it is, provided he exercises the clus. 30:24): “Drive away sadness far from thee,” and the acts of other virtues when and how he ought to. On the reason is given (Ecclus. 30:25): “For sadness hath killed other hand, passions can have excess and defect, both in many, and there is no profit in it.” Moreover the Philoso- intensity and in duration. Wherefore, as the passion of pher says the same (Ethic. vii, 13,14; x, 5). Therefore one sorrow, which the will takes upon itself, ought to be mod- should not grieve for sin any longer than suffices for the erately intense, so ought it to be of moderate duration, lest, sin to be blotted out. Now sin is already blotted out after if it should last too long, man fall into despair, cowardice, the first sorrow of contrition. Therefore it is not expedient and such like vices. to grieve any longer. Reply to Objection 1. The sorrow of contrition is a Objection 3. Further, Bernard says (Serm. xi in hindrance to worldly joy, but not to the joy which is about Cant.): “Sorrow is a good thing, if it is not continual; for God, and which has sorrow itself for object. honey should be mingled with wormwood.” Therefore it Reply to Objection 2. The words of Ecclesiasticus seems that it is inexpedient to grieve continually. refer to worldly joy: and the Philosopher is referring to On the contrary, Augustine∗ says: “The penitent sorrow as a passion, of which we should make moderate should always grieve, and rejoice in his grief.” use, according as the end, for which it is assumed, de- Further, it is expedient always to continue, as far as it mands. is possible, those acts in which beatitude consists. Now Reply to Objection 3. Bernard is speaking of sorrow such is sorrow for sin, as is shown by the words of Mat. as a passion. Whether our souls are contrite for sins even after this life? Suppl. q. 4 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that our souls are contrite Much more, therefore, do they grieve for the sins they for sins even after this life. For the love of charity causes committed. displeasure at sin. Now, after this life, charity remains in Objection 3. Further, the pain of purgatory satisfies some, both as to its act and as to its habit, since “charity for sin. But satisfaction derives its efficacy from the power never falleth away.” Therefore the displeasure at the sin of contrition. Therefore contrition remains after this life. committed, which is the essence of contrition, remains. On the contrary, contrition is a part of the sacrament Objection 2. Further, we should grieve more for sin of Penance. But the sacraments do not endure after this than for punishment. But the souls in purgatory grieve life. Neither, therefore, does contrition. for their sensible punishment and for the delay of glory. Further, contrition can be so great as to blot out both ∗ De vera et falsa Poenitentia, work of an unknown author 2648 guilt and punishment. If therefore the souls in purgatory ened by grace; yet it is not meritorious, for they are not in could have contrition, it would be possible for their debt the state of meriting. In this life, however, all these three of punishment to be remitted through the power of their can be found. contrition, so that they would be delivered from their sen- Reply to Objection 1. Charity does not cause this sor- sible pain, which is false. row, save in those who are capable of it; but the fulness of I answer that, Three things are to be observed in con- joy in the Blessed excludes all capability of sorrow from trition: first, its genus, viz. sorrow; secondly, its form, for them: wherefore, though they have charity, they have no it is an act of virtue quickened by charity; thirdly, its ef- contrition. ficacy, for it is a meritorious and sacramental act, and, to Reply to Objection 2. The souls in purgatory grieve a certain extent, satisfactory. Accordingly, after this life, for their sins; but their sorrow is not contrition, because it those souls which dwell in the heavenly country, cannot lacks the efficacy of contrition. have contrition, because they are void of sorrow by rea- Reply to Objection 3. The pain which the souls suffer son of the fulness of their joy: those which are in hell, in purgatory, cannot, properly speaking, be called satis- have no contrition, for although they have sorrow, they faction, because satisfaction demands a meritorious work; lack the grace which quickens sorrow; while those which yet, in a broad sense, the payment of the punishment due are in purgatory have a sorrow for their sins, that is quick- may be called satisfaction. 2649 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 5 Of the Effect of Contrition (In Three Articles) We must now consider the effect of contrition: under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the remission of sin is the effect of contrition? (2) Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely? (3) Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins? Whether the forgiveness of sin is the effect of contrition? Suppl. q. 5 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the forgiveness of sin it operates primarily as an instrument for the forgiveness is not the effect of contrition. For God alone forgives sins. of sin, as is evident with regard to the other sacraments But we are somewhat the cause of contrition, since it is (cf. Sent. iv, D, 1, q. 1, a. 4: IIIa, q. 62, a. 1); while, as an an act of our own. Therefore contrition is not the cause of act of virtue, it is the quasi-material cause of sin’s forgive- forgiveness. ness. For a disposition is, as it were, a necessary condition Objection 2. Further, contrition is an act of virtue. for justification, and a disposition is reduced to a material Now virtue follows the forgiveness of sin: because virtue cause, if it be taken to denote that which disposes mat- and sin are not together in the soul. Therefore contrition ter to receive something. It is otherwise in the case of an is not the cause of the forgiveness of sin. agent’s disposition to act, because this is reduced to the Objection 3. Further, nothing but sin is an obstacle to genus of efficient cause. receiving the Eucharist. But the contrite should not go to Reply to Objection 1. God alone is the principal effi- Communion before going to confession. Therefore they cient cause of the forgiveness of sin: but the dispositive have not yet received the forgiveness of their sins. cause can be from us also, and likewise the sacramen- On the contrary, a gloss on Ps. 50:19, “A sacrifice to tal cause, since the sacramental forms are words uttered God is an afflicted spirit,” says: “A hearty contrition is the by us, having an instrumental power of conferring grace sacrifice by which sins are loosed.” whereby sins are forgiven. Further, virtue and vice are engendered and corrupted Reply to Objection 2. The forgiveness of sin pre- by the same causes, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2. Now sin is cedes virtue and the infusion of grace, in one way, and, in committed through the heart’s inordinate love. Therefore another, follows: and in so far as it follows, the act elicited it is destroyed by sorrow caused by the heart’s ordinate by the virtue can be a cause of the forgiveness of sin. love; and consequently contrition blots out sin. Reply to Objection 3. The dispensation of the Eu- I answer that, Contrition can be considered in two charist belongs to the ministers of the Church: wherefore ways, either as part of a sacrament, or as an act of virtue, a man should not go to Communion until his sin has been and in either case it is the cause of the forgiveness of sin, forgiven through the ministers of the Church, although his but not in the same way. Because, as part of a sacrament, sin may be forgiven him before God. Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely? Suppl. q. 5 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that contrition cannot take mented” (Wis. 11:17), it seems that the punishment for away the debt of punishment entirely. For satisfaction and suchlike sins can never be remitted by contrition. confession are ordained for man’s deliverance from the Objection 3. Further, the sorrow of contrition is finite. debt of punishment. Now no man is so perfectly contrite Now an infinite punishment is due for some, viz. mortal, as not to be bound to confession and satisfaction. There- sins. Therefore contrition can never be so great as to remit fore contrition is never so great as to blot out the entire the whole punishment. debt of punishment. On the contrary, The affections of the heart are more Objection 2. Further, in Penance the punishment acceptable to God than external acts. Now man is ab- should in some way compensate for the sin. Now some solved from both punishment and guilt by means of ex- sins are accomplished by members of the body. There- ternal actions; and therefore he is also by means of the fore, since it is for the due compensation for sin that “by heart’s affections, such as contrition is. what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tor- Further, we have an example of this in the thief, to 2650 whom it was said (Lk. 23:43): “This day shalt thou be Reply to Objection 1. A man cannot be sure that his with Me in paradise,” on account of his one act of repen- contrition suffices for the remission of both punishment tance. and guilt: wherefore he is bound to confess and to make As to whether the whole debt of punishment is always satisfaction, especially since his contrition would not be taken away by contrition, this question has already been true contrition, unless he had the purpose of confessing considered above (Sent. iv, D, 14, q. 2, Aa. 1,2; IIIa, q. 86, united thereto: which purpose must also be carried into a. 4), where the same question was raised with regard to effect, on account of the precept given concerning confes- Penance. sion. I answer that, The intensity of contrition may be re- Reply to Objection 2. Just as inward joy redounds garded in two ways. First, on the part of charity, which into the outward parts of the body, so does interior sor- causes the displeasure, and in this way it may happen that row show itself in the exterior members: wherefore it is the act of charity is so intense that the contrition resulting written (Prov. 17:22): “A sorrowful spirit drieth up the therefrom merits not only the removal of guilt, but also bones.” the remission of all punishment. Secondly, on the part of Reply to Objection 3. Although the sorrow of con- the sensible sorrow, which the will excites in contrition: trition is finite in its intensity, even as the punishment due and since this sorrow is also a kind of punishment, it may for mortal sin is finite; yet it derives infinite power from be so intense as to suffice for the remission of both guilt charity, whereby it is quickened, and so it avails for the and punishment. remission of both guilt and punishment. Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins? Suppl. q. 5 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that slight contrition does slack as not to suffice for real charity. The other sorrow is not suffice to blot out great sins. For contrition is the rem- in the senses, and the slightness of this is no hindrance to edy for sin. Now a bodily remedy, that heals a lesser bod- real contrition, because it does not, of itself, belong essen- ily infirmity, does not suffice to heal a greater. Therefore tially to contrition, but is connected with it accidentally: the least contrition does not suffice to blot out very great nor again is it under our control. Accordingly we must sins. say that sorrow, however slight it be, provided it suffice Objection 2. Further, it was stated above (q. 3, a. 3) for true contrition, blots out all sin. that for greater sins one ought to have greater contrition. Reply to Objection 1. Spiritual remedies derive in- Now contrition does not blot out sin, unless it fulfills the finite efficacy from the infinite power which operates in requisite conditions. Therefore the least contrition does them: wherefore the remedy which suffices for healing a not blot out all sins. slight sin, suffices also to heal a great sin. This is seen On the contrary, Every sanctifying grace blots out in Baptism which looses great and small: and the same every mortal sin, because it is incompatible therewith. applies to contrition provided it fulfill the necessary con- Now every contrition is quickened by sanctifying grace. ditions. Therefore, however slight it be, it blots out all sins. Reply to Objection 2. It follows of necessity that a I answer that, As we have often said (q. 1, a. 2, ad 1; man grieves more for a greater sin than for a lesser, ac- q. 3, a. 1; q. 4 , a. 1), contrition includes a twofold sorrow. cording as it is more repugnant to the love which causes One is in the reason, and is displeasure at the sin commit- his sorrow. But if one has the same degree of sorrow for a ted. This can be so slight as not to suffice for real contri- greater sin, as another has for a lesser, this would suffice tion, e.g. if a sin were less displeasing to a man, than sep- for the remission of the sin. aration from his last end ought to be; just as love can be so 2651 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 6 Of Confession, As Regards Its Necessity (In Six Articles) We must now consider confession, about which there are six points for our consideration: (1) The necessity of confession; (2) Its nature; (3) Its minister; (4) Its quality; (5) Its effect; (6) The seal of confession. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether confession is necessary for salvation? (2) Whether confession is according to the natural law? (3) Whether all are bound to confession? (4) Whether it is lawful to confess a sin of which one is not guilty? (5) Whether one is bound to confess at once? (6) Whether one can be dispensed from confessing to another man? Whether confession is necessary for salvation? Suppl. q. 6 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that confession is not nec- derive their efficacy from it. Wherefore for the remis- essary for salvation. For the sacrament of Penance is or- sion of both actual and original sin, a sacrament of the dained for the sake of the remission of sin. But sin is suf- Church is necessary, received either actually, or at least ficiently remitted by the infusion of grace. Therefore con- in desire, when a man fails to receive the sacrament ac- fession is not necessary in order to do penance for one’s tually, through an unavoidable obstacle, and not through sins. contempt. Consequently those sacraments which are or- Objection 2. Further, we read of some being forgiven dained as remedies for sin which is incompatible with sal- their sins without confession, e.g. Peter, Magdalen and vation, are necessary for salvation: and so just as Bap- Paul. But the grace that remits sins is not less efficacious tism, whereby original sin is blotted out, is necessary for now than it was then. Therefore neither is it necessary for salvation, so also is the sacrament of Penance. And just salvation now that man should confess. as a man through asking to be baptized, submits to the Objection 3. Further, a sin which is contracted from ministers of the Church, to whom the dispensation of that another, should receive its remedy from another. There- sacrament belongs, even so, by confessing his sin, a man fore actual sin, which a man has committed through his submits to a minister of the Church, that, through the own act, must take its remedy from the man himself. Now sacrament of Penance dispensed by him, he may receive Penance is ordained against such sins. Therefore confes- the pardon of his sins: nor can the minister apply a fit- sion is not necessary for salvation. ting remedy, unless he be acquainted with the sin, which Objection 4. Further, confession is necessary for a ju- knowledge he acquires through the penitent’s confession. dicial sentence, in order that punishment may be inflicted Wherefore confession is necessary for the salvation of a in proportion to the offense. Now a man is able to in- man who has fallen into a mortal actual sin. flict on himself a greater punishment than even that which Reply to Objection 1. The infusion of grace suffices might be inflicted on him by another. Therefore it seems for the remission of sin; but after the sin has been forgiven, that confession is not necessary for salvation. the sinner still owes a debt of temporal punishment. More- On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. i): “If over, the sacraments of grace are ordained in order that you want the physician to be of assistance to you, you man may receive the infusion of grace, and before he re- must make your disease known to him.” But it is nec- ceives them, either actually or in his intention, he does not essary for salvation that man should take medicine for receive grace. This is evident in the case of Baptism, and his sins. Therefore it is necessary for salvation that man applies to Penance likewise. Again, the penitent expiates should make his disease known by means of confession. his temporal punishment by undergoing the shame of con- Further, in a civil court the judge is distinct from the fession, by the power of the keys to which he submits, and accused. Therefore the sinner who is the accused ought by the enjoined satisfaction which the priest moderates ac- not to be his own judge, but should be judged by another cording to the kind of sins made known to him in confes- and consequently ought to confess to him. sion. Nevertheless the fact that confession is necessary for I answer that, Christ’s Passion, without whose power, salvation is not due to its conducing to the satisfaction for neither original nor actual sin is remitted, produces its ef- sins, because this punishment to which one remains bound fect in us through the reception of the sacraments which after the remission of sin, is temporal, wherefore the way 2652 of salvation remains open, without such punishment be-though he was sufficient to sin by himself, because sin is ing expiated in this life: but it is due to its conducing to finite on the part of the thing to which it turns, in which the remission of sin, as explained above. respect the sinner returns to self; while, on the part of the Reply to Objection 2. Although we do not read that aversion, sin derives infinity, in which respect the remis- they confessed, it may be that they did; for many things sion of sin must needs begin from someone else, because were done which were not recorded in writing. Moreover “that which is last in order of generation is first in the or- Christ has the power of excellence in the sacraments; so der of intention” (Ethic. iii). Consequently actual sin also that He could bestow the reality of the sacrament without must needs take its remedy from another. using the things which belong to the sacrament. Reply to Objection 4. Satisfaction would not suf- Reply to Objection 3. The sin that is contracted from fice for the expiation of sin’s punishment, by reason of another, viz. original sin, can be remedied by an entirely the severity of the punishment which is enjoined in satis- extrinsic cause, as in the case of infants: whereas actual faction, but it does suffice as being a part of the sacrament sin, which a man commits of himself, cannot be expiated, having the sacramental power; wherefore it ought to be without some operation on the part of the sinner. Never- imposed by the dispensers of the sacraments, and conse- theless man is not sufficient to expiate his sin by himself, quently confession is necessary. Whether confession is according to the natural law? Suppl. q. 6 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that confession is accord- Himself; and these are wrought either through the agency ing to the natural law. For Adam and Cain were bound to of nature, or in the working of miracles, or in the revela- none but the precepts of the natural law, and yet they are tion of mysteries, or in the institution of the sacraments. reproached for not confessing their sin. Therefore confes- Hence confession, which is of sacramental necessity, is sion of sin is according to the natural law. according to Divine, but not according to natural law. Objection 2. Further, those precepts which are com- Reply to Objection 1. Adam is reproached for not mon to the Old and New Law are according to the natural confessing his sin before God: because the confession law. But confession was prescribed in the Old Law, as which is made to God by the acknowledgment of one’s may be gathered from Is. 43:26: “Tell, if thou hast any- sin, is according to the natural law. whereas here we are thing to justify thyself.” Therefore it is according to the speaking of confession made to a man. We may also re- natural law. ply that in such a case confession of one’s sin is according Objection 3. Further, Job was subject only to the nat- to the natural law, namely when one is called upon by ural law. But he confessed his sins, as appears from his the judge to confess in a court of law, for then the sinner words (Job 31:33) “If, as a man, I have hid my sin.” There- should not lie by excusing or denying his sin, as Adam and fore confession is according to the natural law. Cain are blamed for doing. But confession made voluntar- On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v.) that the nat- ily to a man in order to receive from God the forgiveness ural law is the same in all. But confession is not in all in of one’s sins, is not according to the natural law. the same way. Therefore it is not according to the natural Reply to Objection 2. The precepts of the natural law law. Further, confession is made to one who has the keys. avail in the same way in the law of Moses and in the New But the keys of the Church are not an institution of the Law. But although there was a kind of confession in the natural law; neither, therefore, is confession. law of Moses, yet it was not after the same manner as I answer that, The sacraments are professions of in the New Law, nor as in the law of nature; for in the faith, wherefore they ought to be proportionate to faith. law of nature it was sufficient to acknowledge one’s sin Now faith surpasses the knowledge of natural reason, inwardly before God; while in the law of Moses it was whose dictate is therefore surpassed by the sacraments. necessary for a man to declare his sin by some external And since “the natural law is not begotten of opinion, but sign, as by making a sin-offering, whereby the fact of his a product of a certain innate power,” as Tully states (De having sinned became known to another man; but it was Inv. Rhet. ii), consequently the sacraments are not part not necessary for him to make known what particular sin of the natural law, but of the Divine law which is above he had committed, or what were its circumstances, as in nature. This latter, however, is sometimes called natural, the New Law. in so far as whatever a thing derives from its Creator is Reply to Objection 3. Job is speaking of the man who natural to it, although, properly speaking, those things are hides his sin by denying it or excusing himself when he is said to be natural which are caused by the principles of na- accused thereof, as we may gather from a gloss∗ on the ture. But such things are above nature as God reserves to passage. ∗ Cf. Gregory, Moral. xxii, 9 2653 Whether all are bound to confession? Suppl. q. 6 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that not all are bound to charist may be approached with greater reverence; and confession, for Jerome says on Is. 3:9 (“They have pro- lastly, that parish priests may know their flock, lest a wolf claimed abroad”), “their sin,” etc.: “Penance is the second may hide therein. plank after shipwreck.” But some have not suffered ship- Reply to Objection 1. Although it is possible for a wreck after Baptism. Therefore Penance is not befitting man, in this mortal life, to avoid shipwreck, i.e. mortal them, and consequently neither is confession which is a sin, after Baptism, yet he cannot avoid venial sins, which part of Penance. dispose him to shipwreck, and against which also Penance Objection 2. Further, it is to the judge that confession is ordained; wherefore there is still room for Penance, and should be made in any court. But some have no judge over consequently for confession, even in those who do not them. Therefore they are not bound to confession. commit mortal sins. Objection 3. Further, some have none but venial sins. Reply to Objection 2. All must acknowledge Christ Now a man is not bound to confess such sins. Therefore as their judge, to Whom they must confess in the person not everyone is bound to confession. of His vicar; and although the latter may be the inferior if On the contrary, Confession is condivided with satis- the penitent be a prelate, yet he is the superior, in so far as faction and contrition. Now all are bound to contrition and the penitent is a sinner, while the confessor is the minister satisfaction. Therefore all are bound to confession also. of Christ. Further, this appears from the Decretals (De Poenit. et Reply to Objection 3. A man is bound to confess his Remiss. xii), where it is stated that “all of either sex are venial sins, not in virtue of the sacrament, but by the insti- bound to confess their sins as soon as they shall come to tution of the Church, and that, when he has no other sins to the age of discretion.” confess. We may also, with others, answer that the Decre- I answer that, We are bound to confession on two tal quoted above does not bind others than those who have counts: first, by the Divine law, from the very fact that mortal sins to confess. This is evident from the fact that confession is a remedy, and in this way not all are bound it orders all sins to be confessed, which cannot apply to to confession, but those only who fall into mortal sin af- venial sins, because no one can confess all his venial sins. ter Baptism; secondly, by a precept of positive law, and in Accordingly, a man who has no mortal sins to confess, this way all are bound by the precept of the Church laid is not bound to confess his venial sins, but it suffices for down in the general council (Lateran iv, Can. 21) under the fulfillment of the commandment of the Church that he Innocent III, both in order that everyone may acknowl- present himself before the priest, and declare himself to edge himself to be a sinner, because “all have sinned and be unconscious of any mortal sin: and this will count for need the grace of God” (Rom. 3:23); and that the Eu- his confession. Whether it is lawful for a man to confess a sin which he has not committed? Suppl. q. 6 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that it is lawful for a confession. But a man can do satisfaction for a sin which man to confess a sin which he has not committed. For, he has not committed. Therefore he can also confess a sin as Gregory says (Regist. xii), “it is the mark of a good which he has not done. conscience to acknowledge a fault where there is none.” On the contrary, Whosoever says he has done what Therefore it is the mark of a good conscience to accuse he did not, tells an untruth. But no one ought to tell an un- oneself of those sins which one has not committed. truth in confession, since every untruth is a sin. Therefore Objection 2. Further, by humility a man deems him- no one should confess a sin which he has not committed. self worse than another, who is known to be a sinner, and Further, in the public court of justice, no one should in this he is to be praised. But it is lawful for a man to be accused of a crime which cannot be proved by means confess himself to be what he thinks he is. Therefore it is of proper witnesses. Now the witness, in the tribunal of lawful to confess having committed a more grievous sin Penance, is the conscience. Therefore a man ought not to than one has. accuse himself of a sin which is not on his conscience. Objection 3. Further, sometimes one doubts about a I answer that, The penitent should, by his confession, sin, whether it be mortal or venial, in which case, seem- make his state known to his confessor. Now he who tells ingly, one ought to confess it as mortal. Therefore a per- the priest something other than what he has on his con- son must sometimes confess a sin which he has not com- science, whether it be good or evil, does not make his state mitted. known to the priest, but hides it; wherefore his confession Objection 4. Further, satisfaction originates from is unavailing: and in order for it to be effective his words 2654 must agree with his thoughts, so that his words accuse him grievously. only of what is on his conscience. Reply to Objection 3. When a man doubts whether Reply to Objection 1. To acknowledge a fault where a certain sin be mortal, he is bound to confess it, so long there is none, may be understood in two ways: first, as as he remains in doubt, because he sins mortally by com- referring to the substance of the act, and then it is untrue; mitting or omitting anything, while doubting of its being for it is a mark, not of a good, but of an erroneous con- a mortal sin, and thus leaving the matter to chance; and, science, to acknowledge having done what one has not moreover, he courts danger, if he neglect to confess that done. Secondly, as referring to the circumstances of the which he doubts may be a mortal sin. He should not, how- act, and thus the saying of Gregory is true, because a just ever, affirm that it was a mortal sin, but speak doubtfully, man fears lest, in any act which is good in itself, there leaving the verdict to the priest, whose business it is to should be any defect on his part. thus it is written (Job discern between what is leprosy and what is not. 9:28): “I feared all my works.” Wherefore it is also the Reply to Objection 4. A man does not commit a mark of a good conscience that a man should accuse him- falsehood by making satisfaction for a sin which he did self in words of this fear which he holds in his thoughts. not commit, as when anyone confesses a sin which he From this may be gathered the Reply to the Second thinks he has not committed. And if he mentions a sin Objection, since a just man, who is truly humble, deems that he has not committed, believing that he has, he does himself worse not as though he had committed an act not lie; wherefore he does not sin, provided his confession generically worse, but because he fears lest in those things thereof tally with his conscience. which he seems to do well, he may by pride sin more Whether one is bound to confess at once? Suppl. q. 6 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that one is bound to con- is bound to have contrition, viz. when he calls his sins to fess at once. For Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. ii): mind, and chiefly when he is in danger of death, or when “The contempt of confession is inexcusable, unless there he is so circumstanced that unless his sin be forgiven, he be an urgent reason for delay.” But everyone is bound to must fall into another sin: for instance, if a priest be bound avoid contempt. Therefore everyone is bound to confess to say Mass, and a confessor is at hand, he is bound to as soon as possible. confess or, if there be no confessor, he is bound at least to Objection 2. Further, everyone is bound to do more to contrition and to have the purpose of confessing. avoid spiritual disease than to avoid bodily disease. Now But to actual confession a man is bound in two ways. if a man who is sick in body were to delay sending for the First, accidentally, viz. when he is bound to do some- physician, it would be detrimental to his health. Therefore thing which he cannot do without committing a mortal it seems that it must needs be detrimental to a man’s health sin, unless he go to confession first: for then he is bound if he omits to confess immediately to a priest if there be to confess; for instance, if he has to receive the Eucharist, one at hand. to which no one can approach, after committing a mor- Objection 3. Further, that which is due always, is due tal sin, without confessing first, if a priest be at hand, and at once. But man owes confession to God always. There- there be no urgent necessity. Hence it is that the Church fore he is bound to confess at once. obliges all to confess once a year; because she commands On the contrary, A fixed time both for confession and all to receive Holy Communion once a year, viz. at Easter, for receiving the Eucharist is determined by the Decretals wherefore all must go to confession before that time. (Cap. Omnis utriusque sexus: De Poenit. et Remiss.). Secondly, a man is bound absolutely to go to confes- Now a man does not sin by failing to receive the Eucharist sion; and here the same reason applies to delay of confes- before the fixed time. Therefore he does not sin if he does sion as to delay of Baptism, because both are necessary not confess before that time. sacraments. Now a man is not bound to receive Baptism Further, it is a mortal sin to omit doing what a com- as soon as he makes up his mind to be baptized; and so mandment bids us to do. If therefore a man is bound to he would not sin mortally, if he were not baptized at once: confess at once, and omits to do so, with a priest at hand, nor is there any fixed time beyond which, if he defer Bap- he would commit a mortal sin; and in like manner at any tism, he would incur a mortal sin. Nevertheless the delay other time, and so on, so that he would fall into many of Baptism may amount to a mortal sin, or it may not, mortal sins for the delay in confessing one, which seems and this depends on the cause of the delay, since, as the unreasonable. Philosopher says (Phys. viii, text. 15), the will does not I answer that, As the purpose of confessing is united defer doing what it wills to do, except for a reasonable to contrition, a man is bound to have this purpose when he cause. Wherefore if the cause of the delay of Baptism has 2655 a mortal sin connected with it, e.g. if a man put off being because the time involves urgency. Consequently, if he baptized through contempt, or some like motive, the de- does not confess at the very first opportunity, it does not lay will be a mortal sin, but otherwise not: and the same follow that he commits a mortal sin, even though he does seems to apply to confession which is not more necessary not await a better opportunity. unless it becomes urgent than Baptism. Moreover, since man is bound to fulfill for him to confess through being in danger of death. Nor in this life those things that are necessary for salvation, is it on account of the Church’s indulgence that he is not therefore, if he be in danger of death, he is bound, even bound to confess at once, but on account of the nature of absolutely, then and there to make his confession or to an affirmative precept, so that before the commandment receive Baptism. For this reason too, James proclaimed was made, there was still less obligation. at the same time the commandment about making con- Others again say that secular persons are not bound fession and that about receiving Extreme Unction (James to confess before Lent, which is the time of penance for 5:14,16). Therefore the opinion seems probable of those them; but that religious are bound to confess at once, be- who say that a man is not bound to confess at once, though cause, for them, all time is a time for penance. But this is it is dangerous to delay. not to the point; for religious have no obligations besides Others, however, say that a contrite man is bound to those of other men, with the exception of such as they are confess at once, as soon as he has a reasonable and proper bound to by vow. opportunity. Nor does it matter that the Decretal fixes the Reply to Objection 1. Hugh is speaking of those who time limit to an annual confession, because the Church die without this sacrament. does not favor delay, but forbids the neglect involved in a Reply to Objection 2. It is not necessary for bodily further delay. Wherefore by this Decretal the man who de- health that the physician be sent for at once, except when lays is excused, not from sin in the tribunal of conscience; there is necessity for being healed: and the same applies but from punishment in the tribunal of the Church; so that to spiritual disease. such a person would not be deprived of proper burial if he Reply to Objection 3. The retaining of another’s were to die before that time. But this seems too severe, be- property against the owner’s will is contrary to a negative cause affirmative precepts bind, not at once, but at a fixed precept, which binds always and for always, and therefore time; and this, not because it is most convenient to fulfill one is always bound to make immediate restitution. It is them then (for in that case if a man were not to give alms not the same with the fulfillment of an affirmative precept, of his superfluous goods, whenever he met with a man in which binds always, but not for always, wherefore one is need, he would commit a mortal sin, which is false), but not bound to fulfill it at once. Whether one can be dispensed from confession? Suppl. q. 6 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that one can be dispensed supposed to the work of nature. And since the Church is from confessing his sins to a man. For precepts of posi- founded on faith and the sacraments, the ministers of the tive law are subject to dispensation by the prelates of the Church have no power to publish new articles of faith, or Church. Now such is confession, as appears from what to do away with those which are already published, or to was said above (a. 3). Therefore one may be dispensed institute new sacraments, or to abolish those that are insti- from confession. tuted, for this belongs to the power of excellence, which Objection 2. Further, a man can grant a dispensation belongs to Christ alone, Who is the foundation of the in that which was instituted by a man. But we read of con- Church. Consequently, the Pope can neither dispense a fession being instituted, not by God, but by a man (James man so that he may be saved without Baptism, nor that he 5:16): “Confess your sins, one to another.” Now the Pope be saved without confession, in so far as it is obligatory in has the power of dispensation in things instituted by the virtue of the sacrament. He can, however, dispense from apostles, as appears in the matter of bigamists. Therefore confession, in so far as it is obligatory in virtue of the he can also dispense a man from confessing. commandment of the Church; so that a man may delay On the contrary, Penance, whereof confession is a confession longer than the limit prescribed by the Church. part, is a necessary sacrament, even as Baptism is. Since Reply to Objection 1. The precepts of the Divine law therefore no one can be dispensed from Baptism, neither do not bind less than those of the natural law: wherefore, can one be dispensed from confession. just as no dispensation is possible from the natural law, so I answer that, The ministers of the Church are ap- neither can there be from positive Divine law. pointed in the Church which is founded by God. Where- Reply to Objection 2. The precept about confession fore they need to be appointed by the Church before ex- was not instituted by a man first of all, though it was ercising their ministry, just as the work of creation is pre- promulgated by James: it was instituted by God, and al- 2656 though we do not read it explicitly, yet it was somewhat priests, and though they were not priests of the New Tes-foreshadowed in the fact that those who were being pre- tament, yet the priesthood of the New Testament was fore- pared by John’s Baptism for the grace of Christ, confessed shadowed in them. their sins to him, and that the Lord sent the lepers to the 2657 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 7 Of the Nature of Confession (In Three Articles) We must now consider the nature of confession, under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether Augustine fittingly defines confession? (2) Whether confession is an act of virtue? (3) Whether confession is an act of the virtue of penance? Whether Augustine fittingly defines confession? Suppl. q. 7 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that Augustine defines viz. release from part of the punishment, and the obliga- confession unfittingly, when he says (Super Ps. 21) that tion to pay the other part. Accordingly the first definition, confession “lays bare the hidden disease by the hope of given by Augustine, indicates the substance of the act, by pardon.” For the disease against which confession is or- saying that “it lays bare”—the matter of confession, by dained, is sin. Now sin is sometimes manifest. Therefore saying that it is a “hidden disease”—its cause, which is it should not be said that confession is the remedy for a “the hope of pardon”; while the other definitions include “hidden” disease. one or other of the five things aforesaid, as may be seen Objection 2. Further, the beginning of penance is fear. by anyone who considers the matter. But confession is a part of Penance. Therefore fear rather Reply to Objection 1. Although the priest, as a man, than “hope” should be set down as the cause of confes- may sometimes have knowledge of the penitent’s sin, yet sion. he does not know it as a vicar of Christ (even as a judge Objection 3. Further, that which is placed under a sometimes knows a thing, as a man, of which he is igno- seal, is not laid bare, but closed up. But the sin which is rant, as a judge), and in this respect it is made known to confessed is placed under the seal of confession. There- him by confession. or we may reply that although the ex- fore sin is not laid bare in confession, but closed up. ternal act may be in the open, yet the internal act, which Objection 4. Further, other definitions are to be found is the cause of the external act, is hidden; so that it needs differing from the above. For Gregory says (Hom. xl in to be revealed by confession. Evang.) that confession is “the uncovering of sins, and the Reply to Objection 2. Confession presupposes char- opening of the wound.” Others say that “confession is a ity, which gives us life, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, legal declaration of our sins in the presence of a priest.” 17). Now it is in contrition that charity is given; while Others define it thus: “Confession is the sinner’s sacra- servile fear, which is void of hope, is previous to charity: mental self-accusation through shame for what he has yet he that has charity is moved more by hope than by done, which through the keys of the Church makes satis- fear. Hence hope rather than fear is set down as the cause faction for his sins, and binds him to perform the penance of confession. imposed on him.” Therefore it seems that the definition in Reply to Objection 3. In every confession sin is laid question is insufficient, since it does not include all that bare to the priest, and closed to others by the seal of con- these include. fession. I answer that, Several things offer themselves to our Reply to Objection 4. It is not necessary that every notice in the act of confession: first, the very substance definition should include everything connected with the or genus of the act, which is a kind of manifestation; sec- thing defined: and for this reason we find some definitions ondly, the matter manifested, viz. sin; thirdly, the per- or descriptions that indicate one cause, and some that in- son to whom the manifestation is made, viz. the priest; dicate another. fourthly, its cause, viz. hope of pardon; fifthly, its effect, Whether confession is an act of virtue? Suppl. q. 7 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that confession is not an belong to the natural law. Therefore it is not an act of act of virtue. For every act of virtue belongs to the natu- virtue. ral law, since “we are naturally capable of virtue,” as the Objection 2. Further, an act of virtue is more befit- Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1). But confession does not ting one who is innocent than one who has sinned. But 2658 the confession of a sin, which is the confession of which and is an act of virtue: yet it can be done badly, if it be we are speaking now, cannot be befitting an innocent man. devoid of other due circumstances. Therefore it is not an act of virtue. Reply to Objection 1. Natural reason, in a general Objection 3. Further, the grace which is in the sacra- way, inclines a man to make confession in the proper way, ments differs somewhat from the grace which is in the to confess as he ought, what he ought, and when he ought, virtues and gifts. But confession is part of a sacrament. and in this way confession belongs to the natural law. Therefore it is not an act of virtue. But it belongs to the Divine law to determine the circum- On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about stances, when, how, what, and to whom, with regard to the acts of virtue. But confession comes under a precept. confession of which we are speaking now. Accordingly it Therefore it is an act of virtue. is evident that the natural law inclines a man to confes- Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. sion, by means of the Divine law, which determines the But confession is meritorious, for “it opens the gate of circumstances, as is the case with all matters belonging to heaven,” as the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 17). Therefore it the positive law. seems that it is an act of virtue. Reply to Objection 2. Although an innocent man may I answer that, As stated above ( Ia IIae, q. 18, Aa. 6,7; have the habit of the virtue whose object is a sin already IIa IIae, q. 80; IIa IIae, q. 85 , a. 3; IIa IIae, q. 109, committed, he has not the act, so long as he remains in- a. 3), for an act to belong to a virtue it suffices that it nocent. Wherefore the confession of sins, of which con- be of such a nature as to imply some condition belong- fession we are speaking now, is not befitting an innocent ing to virtue. Now, although confession does not include man, though it is an act of virtue. everything that is required for virtue, yet its very name Reply to Objection 3. Though the grace of the sacra- implies the manifestation of that which a man has on his ments differs from the grace of the virtues, they are not conscience: for thus his lips and heart agree. For if a man contrary but disparate; hence there is nothing to prevent professes with his lips what he does not hold in his heart, it that which is an act of virtue, in so far as it proceeds from is not a confession but a fiction. Now to express in words the free-will quickened by grace, from being a sacrament, what one has in one’s thoughts is a condition of virtue; or part of a sacrament, in so far as it is ordained as a rem- and, consequently, confession is a good thing generically, edy for sin. Whether confession is an act of the virtue of penance? Suppl. q. 7 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that confession is not an not of penance. act of the virtue of penance. For an act belongs to the On the contrary, Penance is ordained for the de- virtue which is its cause. Now the cause of confession is struction of sin. Now confession is ordained to this also. the hope of pardon, as appears from the definition given Therefore it is an act of penance. above (a. 1). Therefore it seems that it is an act of hope I answer that, It must be observed with regard to and not of penance. virtues, that when a special reason of goodness or diffi- Objection 2. Further, shame is a part of temperance. culty is added over and above the object of a virtue, there But confession arises from shame, as appears in the defi- is need of a special virtue: thus the expenditure of large nition given above (a. 1, obj. 4). Therefore it is an act of sums is the object of magnificence, although the ordinary temperance and not of penance. kind of average expenditure and gifts belongs to liberal- Objection 3. Further, the act of penance leans on Di- ity, as appears from Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1. The same applies to vine mercy. But confession leans rather on Divine wis- the confession of truth, which, although it belongs to the dom, by reason of the truth which is required in it. There- virtue of truth absolutely, yet, on account of the additional fore it is not an act of penance. reason of goodness, begins to belong to another kind of Objection 4. Further, we are moved to penance by virtue. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that a the article of the Creed which is about the Judgment, on confession made in a court of justice belongs to the virtue account of fear, which is the origin of penance. But we of justice rather than to truth. In like manner the confes- are moved to confession by the article which is about life sion of God’s favors in praise of God, belongs not to truth, everlasting, because it arises from hope of pardon. There- but to religion: and so too the confession of sins, in order fore it is not an act of penance. to receive pardon for them, is not the elicited act of the Objection 5. Further, it belongs to the virtue of truth virtue of truth, as some say, but of the virtue of penance. that a man shows himself to be what he is. But this is what It may, however, be the commanded act of many virtues, a man does when he goes to confession. Therefore con- in so far as the act of confession can be directed to the end fession is an act of that virtue which is called truth, and of many virtues. 2659 Reply to Objection 1. Hope is the cause of confes-tation of the truth—and satisfaction to power, on account sion, not as eliciting but as commanding. of the labor it entails. And since contrition is the first part Reply to Objection 2. In that definition shame is not of Penance, and renders the other parts efficacious, for this mentioned as the cause of confession, since it is more of reason the same is to be said of Penance as a whole, as of a nature to hinder the act of confession, but rather as the contrition. joint cause of delivery from punishment (because shame Reply to Objection 4. Since confession results from is in itself a punishment), since also the keys of the Church hope rather than from fear, as stated above (a. 1, ad 2), it is are the joint cause with confession, to the same effect. based on the article about eternal life which hope looks to, Reply to Objection 3. By a certain adaptation the rather than on the article about the Judgment, which fear parts of Penance can be ascribed to three Personal At- considers; although penance, in its aspect of contrition, is tributes, so that contrition may correspond to mercy the opposite. or goodness, by reason of its being sorrow for evil— The Reply to the Fifth Objection is to be gathered from confession to wisdom, by reason of its being a manifes- what has been said. 2660 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 8 Of the Minister of Confession (In Seven Articles) We must now consider the minister of confession, under which head there are seven points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is necessary to confess to a priest? (2) Whether it is ever lawful to confess to another than a priest? (3) Whether outside a case of necessity one who is not a priest can hear the confession of venial sins? (4) Whether it is necessary for a man to confess to his own priest? (5) Whether it is lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest, in virtue of a privilege or of the command of a superior? (6) Whether a penitent, in danger of death can be absolved by any priest? (7) Whether the temporal punishment should be enjoined in proportion to the sin? Whether it is necessary to confess to a priest? Suppl. q. 8 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not necessary to secrate the Eucharist. Therefore, since grace is given in confess to a priest. For we are not bound to confession, the sacrament of Penance, none but a priest is the minister except in virtue of its Divine institution. Now its Divine of the sacrament: and consequently sacramental confes- institution is made known to us (James 5:16): “Confess sion which should be made to a minister of the Church, your sins, one to another,” where there is no mention of a should be made to none but a priest. priest. Therefore it is not necessary to confess to a priest. Reply to Objection 1. James speaks on the presuppo- Objection 2. Further, Penance is a necessary sacra- sition of the Divine institutions: and since confession had ment, as is also Baptism. But any man is the minister of already been prescribed by God to be made to a priest, in Baptism, on account of its necessity. Therefore any man is that He empowered them, in the person of the apostles, the minister of Penance. Now confession should be made to forgive sins, as related in Jn. 20:23, we must take the to the minister of Penance. Therefore it suffices to confess words of James as conveying an admonishment to confess to anyone. to priests. Objection 3. Further, confession is necessary in or- Reply to Objection 2. Baptism is a sacrament of der that the measure of satisfaction should be imposed on greater necessity than Penance, as regards confession and the penitent. Now, sometimes another than a priest might absolution, because sometimes Baptism cannot be omit- be more discreet than many priests are in imposing the ted without loss of eternal salvation, as in the case of chil- measure of satisfaction on the penitent. Therefore it is not dren who have not come to the use of reason: whereas this necessary to confess to a priest. cannot be said of confession and absolution, which regard Objection 4. Further, confession was instituted in the none but adults, in whom contrition, together with the pur- Church in order that the rectors might know their sheep pose of confessing and the desire of absolution, suffices to by sight. But sometimes a rector or prelate is not a priest. deliver them from everlasting death. Consequently there Therefore confession should not always be made to a is no parity between Baptism and confession. priest. Reply to Objection 3. In satisfaction we must con- On the contrary, The absolution of the penitent, for sider not only the quantity of the punishment but also the sake of which he makes his confession, is imparted by its power, inasmuch as it is part of a sacrament. In this none but priests to whom the keys are intrusted. Therefore way it requires a dispenser of the sacraments, though the confession should be made to a priest. quantity of the punishment may be fixed by another than Further, confession is foreshadowed in the raising of a priest. the dead Lazarus to life. Now our Lord commanded none Reply to Objection 4. It may be necessary for two but the disciples to loose Lazarus (Jn. 11:44). Therefore reasons to know the sheep by sight. First, in order to confession should be made to a priest. register them as members of Christ’s flock, and to know I answer that, The grace which is given in the sacra- the sheep by sight thus belongs to the pastoral charge and ments, descends from the Head to the members. Where- care, which is sometimes the duty of those who are not fore he alone who exercises a ministry over Christ’s true priests. Secondly, that they may be provided with suitable body is a minister of the sacraments, wherein grace is remedies for their health; and to know the sheep by sight given; and this belongs to a priest alone, who can con- thus belongs to the man, i.e. the priest, whose business 2661 it is to provide remedies conducive to health, such as the this knowledge of the sheep that confession is ordained. sacrament of the Eucharist, and other like things. It is to Whether it is ever lawful to confess to another than a priest? Suppl. q. 8 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that it is never lawful to cur when possible. But when there is reason for urgency, confess to another than a priest. For confession is a sacra- the penitent should fulfill his own part, by being contrite mental accusation, as appears from the definition given and confessing to whom he can; and although this per- above (q. 7, a. 1). But the dispensing of a sacrament be- son cannot perfect the sacrament, so as to fulfill the part longs to none but the minister of a sacrament. Since then of the priest by giving absolution, yet this defect is sup- the proper minister of Penance is a priest, it seems that plied by the High Priest. Nevertheless confession made to confession should be made to no one else. a layman, through lack∗ of a priest, is quasi-sacramental, Objection 2. Further, in every court of justice con- although it is not a perfect sacrament, on account of the fession is ordained to the sentence. Now in a disputed absence of the part which belongs to the priest. case the sentence is void if pronounced by another than Reply to Objection 2. Although a layman is not the the proper judge; so that confession should be made to judge of the person who confesses to him, yet, on account none but a judge. But, in the court of conscience, the of the urgency, he does take the place of a judge over him, judge is none but a priest, who has the power of binding absolutely speaking, in so far as the penitent submits to and loosing. Therefore confession should be made to no him, through lack of a priest. one else. Reply to Objection 3. By means of the sacraments Objection 3. Further, in the case of Baptism, since man must needs be reconciled not only to God, but also to anyone can baptize, if a layman has baptized, even with- the Church. Now he cannot be reconciled to the Church, out necessity, the Baptism should not be repeated by a unless the hallowing of the Church reach him. In Baptism priest. But if anyone confess to a layman in a case of ne- the hallowing of the Church reaches a man through the el- cessity, he is bound to repeat his confession to a priest, ement itself applied externally, which is sanctified by “the when the cause for urgency has passed. Therefore confes- word of life” (Eph. 5:26), by whomsoever it is conferred: sion should not be made to a layman in a case of necessity. and so when once a man has been baptized, no matter by On the contrary, is the authority of the text (Sent. iv, whom, he must not be baptized again. On the other hand, D, 17). in Penance the hallowing of the Church reaches man by I answer that, Just as Baptism is a necessary sacra- the minister alone, because in that sacrament there is no ment, so is Penance. And Baptism, through being a nec- bodily element applied externally, through the hallowing essary sacrament has a twofold minister: one whose duty of which grace may be conferred. Consequently although it is to baptize, in virtue of his office, viz. the priest, and the man who, in a case of necessity, has confessed to a another, to whom the conferring of Baptism is commit- layman, has received forgiveness from God, for the reason ted, in a case of necessity. In like manner the minister that he fulfilled, so far as he could, the purpose which he of Penance, to whom, in virtue of his office, confession conceived in accordance with God’s command, he is not should be made, is a priest; but in a case of necessity even yet reconciled to the Church, so as to be admitted to the a layman may take the place of a priest, and hear a per- sacraments, unless he first be absolved by a priest, even son’s confession. as he who has received the Baptism of desire, is not ad- Reply to Objection 1. In the sacrament of Penance mitted to the Eucharist. Wherefore he must confess again there is not only something on the part of the minister, to a priest, as soon as there is one at hand, and the more viz. the absolution and imposition of satisfaction, but also so since, as stated above (ad 1), the sacrament of Penance something on the part of the recipient, which is also es- was not perfected, and so it needs yet to be perfected, in sential to the sacrament, viz. contrition and confession. order that by receiving the sacrament, the penitent may Now satisfaction originates from the minister in so far as receive a more plentiful effect, and that he may fulfill the he enjoins it, and from the penitent who fulfills it; and, for commandment about receiving the sacrament of Penance. the fulness of the sacrament, both these things should con- ∗ Here and in the Reply to obj. 2 the Leonine edition reads “through desire for a priest”. 2662 Whether, outside a case of necessity, anyone who is not a priest may hear the confes-Suppl. q. 8 a. 3 sion of venial sins? Objection 1. It would seem that, outside a case of fore he does not need to receive any further grace for the necessity, no one but a priest may hear the confession of forgiveness of such a sin, nor does he need to be recon- venial sins. For the dispensation of a sacrament is com- ciled to the Church. Consequently a man does not need mitted to a layman by reason of necessity. But the con- to confess his venial sins to a priest. And since confes- fession of venial sins is not necessary. Therefore it is not sion made to a layman is a sacramental, although it is not committed to a layman. a perfect sacrament, and since it proceeds from charity, Objection 2. Further, Extreme Unction is ordained it has a natural aptitude to remit sins, just as the beating against venial sin, just as Penance is. But the former of one’s breast, or the sprinkling of holy water (cf. IIIa, may not be given by a layman, as appears from James q. 87, a. 3). 5:14. Therefore neither can the confession of venial sins This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection, be- be made to a layman. cause there is no need to receive a sacrament for the for- On the contrary, is the authority of Bede (on James giveness of venial sins. and a sacramental, such as holy 5:16, “Confess. . . one to another”) quoted in the text water or the like, suffices for the purpose. (Sent. iv, D, 17). Reply to Objection 2. Extreme Unction is not given I answer that, By venial sin man is separated neither directly as a remedy for venial sin, nor is any other sacra- from God nor from the sacraments of the Church: where- ment. Whether it is necessary for one to confess to one’s own priest? Suppl. q. 8 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that it is nol necessary fession, which was instituted for the sake of charity, would to confess to one’s own priest. For Gregory∗ says: “By militate against charity, if a man were bound to confess to our apostolic authority and in discharge of our solicitude any particular priest: e.g. if the sinner know that his own we have decreed that priests, who as monks imitate the priest is a heretic, or a man of evil influence, or weak and ex. ample of the apostles, may preach, baptize, give com- prone to the very sin that he wishes to confess to him, or munion, pray for sinners, impose penances, and absolve reasonably suspected of breaking the seal of confession, from sins.” Now monks are not the proper priests of any- or if the penitent has to confess a sin committed against one, since they have not the care of souls. Since, therefore his confessor. Therefore it seems that one need not always confession is made for the sake of absolution it suffices confess to one’s own priest. for it to be made to any priest. Objection 6. Further, men should not be straitened Objection 2. Further, the minister of this sacrament is in matters necessary for salvation, lest they be hindered a priest, as also of the Eucharist. But any priest can per- in the way of salvation. But it seems a great inconve- form the Eucharist. Therefore any priest can administer nience to be bound of necessity to confess to one particu- the sacrament of Penance. Therefore there is no need to lar man, and many might be hindered from going to con- confess to one’s own priest. fession, through either fear, shame, or something else of Objection 3. Further, when we are bound to one thing the kind. Therefore, since confession is necessary for sal- in particular it is not left to our choice. But the choice of vation, men should not be straitened, as apparently they a discreet priest is left to us as appears from the authority would be, by having to confess to their own priest. of Augustine quoted in the text (Sent. ix, D, 17): for he On the contrary, stands a decree of Pope Innocent says in De vera et falsa Poenitentia†: “He who wishes to III in the Fourth Lateran Council (Can. 21), who ap- confess his sins, in order to find grace, must seek a priest pointed “all of either sex to confess once a year to their who knows how to loose and to bind.” Therefore it seems own priest.” unnecessary to confess to one’s own priest. Further, as a bishop is to his diocese, so is a priest to Objection 4. Further, there are some, such as prelates, his parish. Now it is unlawful, according to canon law who seem to have no priest of their own, since they have (Can. Nullus primas ix, q. 2; Can. Si quis episcoporum no superior: yet they are bound to confession. Therefore xvi, q. 5), for a bishop to exercise the episcopal office in a man is not always bound to confess to his own priest. another diocese. Therefore it is not lawful for one priest Objection 5. Further, “That which is instituted for to hear the confession of another’s parishioner. the sake of charity, does not militate against charity,” as I answer that, The other sacraments do not consist in Bernard observes (De Praecept. et Dispens. ii). Now con- an action of the recipient, but only in his receiving some- ∗ Cf. Can. Ex auctoritate xvi, q. 1 † Work of an unknown author 2663 thing, as is evident with regard to Baptism and so forth. is not left to us in such a way that we can do just as we though the action of the recipient is required as removing like; but it is left to the permission of a higher authority, if an obstacle, i.e. insincerity, in order that he may receive perchance one’s own priest happens to be less suitable for the benefit of the sacrament, if he has come to the use of applying a salutary remedy to our sins. his free-will. On the other hand, the action of the man Reply to Objection 4. Since it is the duty of prelates who approaches the sacrament of Penance is essential to to dispense the sacraments, which the clean alone should the sacrament, since contrition, confession, and satisfac- handle, they are allowed by law (De Poenit. et Remiss., tion, which are acts of the penitent, are parts of Penance. Cap. Ne pro dilatione) to choose a priest for their confes- Now our actions, since they have their origin in us, cannot sor; who in this respect is the prelate’s superior; even as be dispensed by others, except through their command. one physician is cured by another, not as a physician but Hence whoever is appointed a dispenser of this sacrament, as a patient. must be such as to be able to command something to be Reply to Objection 5. In those cases wherein the pen- done. Now a man is not competent to command another itent has reason to fear some harm to himself or to the unless he have jurisdiction over him. Consequently it is priest by reason of his confessing to him, he should have essential to this sacrament, not only for the minister to recourse to the higher authority, or ask permission of the be in orders, as in the case of the other sacraments, but priest himself to confess to another; and if he fails to ob- also for him to have jurisdiction: wherefore he that has tain permission, the case is to be decided as for a man who no jurisdiction cannot administer this sacrament any more has no priest at hand; so that he should rather choose a lay- than one who is not a priest. Therefore confession should man and confess to him. Nor does he disobey the law of be made not only to a priest, but to one’s own priest; for the Church by so doing, because the precepts of positive since a priest does not absolve a man except by binding law do not extend beyond the intention of the lawgiver, him to do something, he alone can absolve, who, by his which is the end of the precept, and in this case, is charity, command, can bind the penitent to do something. according to the Apostle (1 Tim. 1:5). Nor is any slur cast Reply to Objection 1. Gregory is speaking of those on the priest, for he deserves to forfeit his privilege, for monks who have jurisdiction, through having charge of a abusing the power intrusted to him. parish; about whom some had maintained that from the Reply to Objection 6. The necessity of confessing very fact that they were monks, they could not absolve or to one’s own priest does not straiten the way of salvation, impose penance, which is false. but determines it sufficiently. A priest, however, would Reply to Objection 2. The sacrament of the Eu- sin if he were not easy in giving permission to confess charist does not require the power of command over a to another, because many are so weak that they would man, whereas this sacrament does, as stated above: and so rather die without confession than confess to such a priest. the argument proves nothing. Nevertheless it is not law- Wherefore those priests who are too anxious to probe the ful to receive the Eucharist from another than one’s own consciences of their subjects by means of confession, lay a priest, although it is a real sacrament that one receives snare of damnation for many, and consequently for them- from another. selves. Reply to Objection 3. The choice of a discreet priest Whether it is lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest, in virtue of Suppl. q. 8 a. 5 a privilege or a command given by a superior? Objection 1. It would seem that it is not lawful for subjects. Therefore this cannot be prescribed by any hu- anyone to confess to another than his own priest, even man privilege or command. in virtue of a privilege or command given by a superior. Objection 3. Further, he that hears another’s confes- For no privilege should be given that wrongs a third party. sion is the latter’s own judge, else he could not bind or Now it would be prejudicial to the subject’s own priest, if loose him. Now one man cannot have several priests or he were to confess to another. Therefore this cannot be al- judges of his own, for then he would be bound to obey lowed by a superior’s privilege, permission, or command. several men, which would be impossible, if their com- Objection 2. Further, that which hinders the obser- mands were contrary or incompatible. Therefore one may vance of a Divine command cannot be the subject of a not confess to another than one’s own priest, even with the command or privilege given by man. Now it is a Divine superior’s permission. command to the rectors of churches to “know the counte- Objection 4. Further, it is derogatory to a sacrament, nance of their own cattle” (Prov. 27:23); and this is hin- or at least useless, to repeat a sacrament over the same dered if another than the rector hear the confession of his matter. But he who has confessed to another priest, is 2664 bound to confess again to his own priest, if the latter re-certainty than by believing his subject, because this is nec- quires him to do so, because he is not absolved from his essary that he may help his subject’s conscience. Conse- obedience, whereby he is bound to him in this respect. quently in the tribunal of confession, the penitent is be- Therefore it cannot be lawful for anyone to confess to an- lieved whether he speak for himself or against himself, other than his own priest. but not in the court of external judgment: wherefore it suf- On the contrary, He that can perform the actions of fices for this knowledge that he believe the penitent when an order can depute the exercise thereof to anyone who he says that he has confessed to one who could absolve has the same order. Now a superior, such as a bishop, him. It is therefore clear that this knowledge of the flock can hear the confession of anyone belonging to a priest’s is not hindered by a privilege granted to another to hear parish, for sometimes he reserves certain cases to himself, confessions. since he is the chief rector. Therefore he can also depute Reply to Objection 3. It would be inconvenient, if another priest to hear that man. two men were placed equally over the same people, but Further, a superior can do whatever his subject can do. there is no inconvenience if over the same people two are But the priest himself can give his parishioner permission placed one of whom is over the other. In this way the to confess to another. Much more, therefore, can his su- parish priest, the bishop, and the Pope are placed imme- perior do this. diately over the same people, and each of them can com- Further, the power which a priest has among his peo- mit matters of jurisdiction to some other. Now a higher ple, comes to him from the bishop. Now it is through superior delegates a man in two ways: first, so that the that power that he can hear confessions. Therefore, in like latter takes the superior’s place, as when the Pope or a manner, another can do so, to whom the bishop gives the bishop appoints his penitentiaries; and then the man thus same power. delegated is higher than the inferior prelate, as the Pope’s I answer that, A priest may be hindered in two ways penitentiary is higher than a bishop, and the bishop’s pen- from hearing a man’s confession: first, through lack of itentiary than a parish priest, and the penitent is bound to jurisdiction; secondly, through being prevented from ex- obey the former rather than the latter. Secondly, so that ercising his order, as those who are excommunicate, de- the delegate is appointed the coadjutor of this other priest; graded, and so forth. Now whoever has jurisdiction, can and since a co-adjutor is subordinate to the person he is depute to another whatever comes under his jurisdiction; appointed to help, he holds a lower rank, and the penitent so that if a priest is hindered from hearing a man’s confes- is not so bound to obey him as his own priest. sion through want of jurisdiction, anyone who has imme- Reply to Objection 4. No man is bound to confess diate jurisdiction over that man, priest, bishop, or Pope, sins that he has no longer. Consequently, if a man has can depute that priest to hear his confession and absolve confessed to the bishop’s penitentiary, or to someone else him. If, on the other hand, the priest cannot hear the con- having faculties from the bishop, his sins are forgiven both fession, on account of an impediment to the exercise of before the Church and before God, so that he is not bound his order, anyone who has the power to remove that im- to confess them to his own priest, however much the lat- pediment can permit him to hear confessions. ter may insist: but on account of the Ecclesiastical precept Reply to Objection 1. No wrong is done to a person (De Poenit. et Remiss., Cap. Omnis utriusque) which pre- unless what is taken away from him was granted for his scribes confession to be made once a year to one’s own own benefit. Now the power of jurisdiction is not granted priest, he is under the same obligation as one who has a man for his own benefit, but for the good of the people committed none but venial sins. For such a one, accord- and for the glory of God. Wherefore if the higher prelates ing to some, is bound to confess none but venial sins, or he deem it expedient for the furthering of the people’s salva- must declare that he is free from mortal sin, and the priest, tion and God’s glory, to commit matters of jurisdiction to in the tribunal of conscience, ought, and is bound, to be- others, no wrong is done to the inferior prelates, except lieve him. If, however, he were bound to confess again, to those who “seek the things that are their own; not the his first confession would not be useless, because the more things that are Jesus Christ’s” (Phil. 2:21), and who rule priests one confesses to, the more is the punishment remit- their flock, not by feeding it, but by feeding on it. ted, both by reason of the shame in confessing, which is Reply to Objection 2. The rector of a church should reckoned as a satisfactory punishment, and by reason of “know the countenance of his own cattle” in two ways. the power of the keys: so that one might confess so often First, by an assiduous attention to their external conduct, as to be delivered from all punishment. Nor is repetition so as to watch over the flock committed to his care: and derogatory to a sacrament, except in those wherein there in acquiring this knowledge he should not believe his sub- is some kind of sanctification, either by the impressing of ject, but, as far as possible, inquire into the truth of facts. a character, or by the consecration of the matter, neither of Secondly, by the manifestation of confession; and with which applies to Penance. Hence it would be well for him regard to this knowledge, he cannot arrive at any greater who hears confessions by the bishop’s authority, to advise 2665 the penitent to confess to his own priest, yet he must absolve him, even if he declines to do so. Whether a penitent, at the point of death, can be absolved by any priest? Suppl. q. 8 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that a penitent, at the receive as much benefit from the absolution of this other point of death, cannot be absolved by any priest. For ab- priest as if he had been absolved by his own. Moreover solution requires jurisdiction, as stated above (a. 5). Now a man can then be absolved by any priest not only from a priest does not acquire jurisdiction over a man who re- his sins, but also from excommunication, by whomsoever pents at the point of death. Therefore he cannot absolve pronounced, because such absolution is also a matter of him. that jurisdiction which by the ordination of the Church is Objection 2. Further, he that receives the sacrament con. fined within certain limits. of Baptism, when in danger of death, from another than Reply to Objection 1. One person may act on the ju- his own priest, does not need to be baptized again by the risdiction of another according to the latter’s will, since latter. If, therefore, any priest can absolve, from any sin, a matters of jurisdiction can be deputed. Since, therefore, man who is in danger of death, the penitent, if he survive the Church recognizes absolution granted by any priest at the danger, need not go to his own priest; which is false, the hour of death, from this very fact a priest has the use since otherwise the priest would not “know the counte- of jurisdiction though he lack the power of jurisdiction. nance of his cattle.” Reply to Objection 2. He needs to go to his own Objection 3. Further, when there is danger of death, priest, not that he may be absolved again from the sins, Baptism can be conferred not only by a strange priest, but from which he was absolved when in danger of death, but also by one who is not a priest. But one who is not a priest that his own priest may know that he is absolved. In like can never absolve in the tribunal of Penance. Therefore manner, he who has been absolved from excommunica- neither can a priest absolve a man who is not his subject, tion needs to go to the judge, who in other circumstances when he is in danger of death. could have absolved him, not in order to seek absolution, On the contrary, Spiritual necessity is greater than but in order to offer satisfaction. bodily necessity. But it is lawful in a case of extreme ne- Reply to Objection 3. Baptism derives its efficacy cessity, for a man to make use of another’s property, even from the sanctification of the matter itself, so that a man against the owner’s will, in order to supply a bodily need. receives the sacrament whosoever baptizes him: whereas Therefore in danger of death, a man may be absolved by the sacramental power of Penance consists in a sanctifica- another than his own priest, in order to supply his spiritual tion pronounced by the minister, so that if a man confess need. to a layman, although he fulfills his own part of the sacra- Further, the authorities quoted in the text prove the mental confession, he does not receive sacramental abso- same (Sent. iv, D, 20, Cap. Non Habet). lution. Wherefore his confession avails him somewhat, as I answer that, If we consider the power of the keys, to the lessening of his punishment, owing to the merit de- every priest has power over all men equally and over all rived from his confession and to his repentance. but he sins: and it is due to the fact that by the ordination of the does not receive that diminution of his punishment which Church, he has a limited jurisdiction or none at all, that he results from the power of the keys; and consequently he cannot absolve all men from all sins. But since “necessity must confess again to a priest; and one who has confessed knows no law”∗ in cases of necessity the ordination of the thus, is more punished hereafter than if he had confessed Church does not hinder him from being able to absolve, to a priest. since he has the keys sacramentally: and the penitent will Whether the temporal punishment is imposed according to the degree of the fault? Suppl. q. 8 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the temporal pun- pleasure, there is less fault, since “carnal sins, which af- ishment, the debt of which remains after Penance, is not ford more pleasure than spiritual sins, are less guilty,” ac- imposed according to the degree of fault. For it is imposed cording to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 2). Therefore the pun- according to the degree of pleasure derived from the sin, ishment is not imposed according to the degree of fault. as appears from Apoc. 18:7: “As much as she hath glori- Objection 2. Further, in the New Law one is bound fied herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and to punishment for mortal sins, in the same way as in the sorrow give ye her.” Yet sometimes where there is greater Old Law. Now in the Old Law the punishment for sin was ∗ Cap. Consilium, De observ. jejun.; De reg. jur. (v, Decretal) 2666 due to last seven days, in other words, they had to remain ous to others, than another’s sin, or because the people unclean seven days for one mortal sin. Since therefore, are more prone to that particular sin, so that it is neces- in the New Testament, a punishment of seven years is im- sary by the punishment of the one man to deter others. posed for one mortal sin, it seems that the quantity of the Consequently, in the tribunal of Penance, the punishment punishment does not answer to the degree of fault. has to be imposed with due regard to both these things: Objection 3. Further, the sin of murder in a layman is and so a greater punishment is not always imposed for a more grievous than that of fornication in a priest, because greater sin. on the other hand, the punishment of Purga- the circumstance which is taken from the species of a sin, tory is only for the payment of the debt, because there is is more aggravating than that which is taken from the per- no longer any possibility of sinning, so that this punish- son of the sinner. Now a punishment of seven years’ dura- ment is meted only according to the measure of sin, with tion is appointed for a layman guilty of murder, while for due consideration however for the degree of contrition, fornication a priest is punished for ten years, according to and for confession and absolution, since all these lessen Can. Presbyter, Dist. lxxxii. Therefore punishment is not the punishment somewhat: wherefore the priest in enjoin- imposed according to the degree of fault. ing satisfaction should bear them in mind. Objection 4. Further, a sin committed against the very Reply to Objection 1. In the words quoted two things body of Christ is most grievous, because the greater the are mentioned with regard to the sin, viz. “glorifica- person sinned against, the more grievous the sin. Now for tion” and “delicacies” or “delectation”; the first of which spilling the blood of Christ in the sacrament of the altar a regards the uplifting of the sinner, whereby he resists punishment of forty days or a little more is enjoined, while God; while the second regards the pleasure of sin: and a punishment of seven years is prescribed for fornication, though sometimes there is less pleasure in a greater sin, according to the Canons (Can. Presbyter, Dist. lxxxii). yet there is greater uplifting; wherefore the argument does Therefore the quantity of the punishment does not answer not prove. to the degree of fault. Reply to Objection 2. This punishment of seven days On the contrary, It is written (Is. 27:8): “In measure did not expiate the punishment due for the sin, so that against measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge even if the sinner died after that time, he would be pun- it.” Therefore the quantity of punishment adjudicated for ished in Purgatory: but it was in expiation of the irreg- sin answers the degree of fault. ularity incurred, from which all the legal sacrifices expi- Further, man is reduced to the equality of justice by ated. Nevertheless, other things being equal, a man sins the punishment inflicted on him. But this would not be so more grievously under the New Law than under the Old, if the quantity of the fault and of the punishment did not on account of the more plentiful sanctification received in mutually correspond. Therefore one answers to the other. Baptism, and on account of the more powerful blessings I answer that, After the forgiveness of sin, a punish- bestowed by God on the human race. This is evident from ment is required for two reasons, viz. to pay the debt, Heb. 29: “How much more, do you think, he deserveth and to afford a remedy. Hence the punishment may be worse punishments,” etc. And yet it is not universally true imposed in consideration of two things. First, in consider- that a seven years’ penance is exacted for every mortal ation of the debt, and in this way the quantity of the pun- sin: but it is a kind of general rule applicable to the ma- ishment corresponds radically to the quantity of the fault, jority of cases, which must, nevertheless, be disregarded, before anything of the latter is forgiven: yet the more there with due consideration for the various circumstances of is remitted by the first of those things which are of a nature sins and penitents. to remit punishment, the less there remains to be remitted Reply to Objection 3. A bishop or priest sins with or paid by the other, because the more contrition remits greater danger to others or to himself; wherefore the of the punishment, the less there remains to be remitted canons are more anxious to withdraw him from sin, by in- by confession. Secondly, in consideration of the remedy, flicting a greater punishment, in as much as it is intended either as regards the one who sinned, or as regards others: as a remedy; although sometimes so great a punishment is and thus sometimes a greater punishment is enjoined for not strictly due. Hence he is punished less in Purgatory. a lesser sin; either because one man’s sin is more diffi- Reply to Objection 4. This punishment refers to the cult to resist than another’s (thus a heavier punishment is case when this happens against the priest’s will: for if he imposed on a young man for fornication, than on an old spilled it willingly he would deserve a much heavier pun- man, though the former’s sin be less grievous), or because ishment. one man’s sin; for instance, a priest’s, is more danger- 2667 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 9 Of the Quality of Confession (In Four Articles) We must now consider the quality of confession: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether confession can be lacking in form? (2) Whether confession ought to be entire? (3) Whether one can confess through another, or by writing? (4) Whether the sixteen conditions, which are assigned by the masters, are necessary for confession? Whether confession can be lacking in form? Suppl. q. 9 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that confession cannot be the property of being meritorious, and thus is of no avail lacking in form. For it is written (Ecclus. 17:26): “Praise without charity, which is the principle of merit. But in so [confession] perisheth from the dead as nothing.” But a far as it is part of a sacrament, it subordinates the peni- man without charity is dead, because charity is the life of tent to the priest who has the keys of the Church, and who the soul. Therefore there can be no confession without by means of the confession knows the conscience of the charity. person confessing. In this way it is possible for confes- Objection 2. Further, confession is condivided with sion to be in one who is not contrite, for he can make his contrition and satisfaction. But contrition and satisfaction sins known to the priest, and subject himself to the keys are impossible without charity. Therefore confession is of the Church: and though he does not receive the fruit of also impossible without charity. absolution then, yet he will begin to receive it, when he Objection 3. Further, it is necessary in confession that is sincerely contrite, as happens in the other sacraments: the word should agree with the thought for the very name wherefore he is not bound to repeat his confession, but to of confession requires this. Now if a man confess while confess his lack of sincerity. remaining attached to sin, his word is not in accord with Reply to Objection 1. These words must be under- his thought, since in his heart he holds to sin, while he stood as referring to the receiving of the fruit of confes- condemns it with his lips. Therefore such a man does not sion, which none can receive who is not in the state of confess. charity. On the contrary, Every man is bound to confess his Reply to Objection 2. Contrition and satisfaction are mortal sins. Now if a man in mortal sin has confessed offered to God: but confession is made to man: hence it is once, he is not bound to confess the same sins again, be- essential to contrition and satisfaction, but not to confes- cause, as no man knows himself to have charity, no man sion, that man should be united to God by charity. would know of him that he had confessed. Therefore it Reply to Objection 3. He who declares the sins which is not necessary that confession should be quickened by he has, speaks the truth; and thus his thought agrees with charity. his lips or words, as to the substance of confession, though I answer that, Confession is an act of virtue, and is it is discordant with the purpose of confession. part of a sacrament. In so far as it is an act of virtue, it has Whether confession should be entire? Suppl. q. 9 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not necessary for punishment for different sins can be imposed by different confession to be entire, namely, for a man to confess all priests. Therefore it is not necessary to confess all one’s his sins to one priest. For shame conduces to the diminu- sins to one priest. tion of punishment. Now the greater the number of priests Objection 3. Further, it may happen that a man after to whom a man confesses, the greater his shame. There- going to confession and performing his penance, remem- fore confession is more fruitful if it be divided among sev- bers a mortal sin, which escaped his memory while con- eral priests. fessing, and that his own priest to whom he confessed first Objection 2. Further, confession is necessary in is no longer available, so that he can only confess that sin Penance in order that punishment may be enjoined for sin to another priest, and thus he will confess different sins to according to the judgment of the priest. Now a sufficient different priests. 2668 Objection 4. Further, the sole reason for confessing corruption. one’s sins to a priest is in order to receive absolution. Now Reply to Objection 2. The punishment imposed by sometimes, the priest who hears a confession can absolve different priests would not be sufficient, because each from some of the sins, but not from all. Therefore in such would only consider one sin by itself, and not the grav- a case at all events the confession need not be entire. ity which it derives from being in conjunction with an- On the contrary, Hypocrisy is an obstacle to Penance. other. Moreover sometimes the punishment which would But it savors of hypocrisy to divide one’s confession, as be given for one sin would foster another. Again the priest Augustine says∗. Therefore confession should be entire. in hearing a confession takes the place of God, so that con- Further, confession is a part of Penance. But Penance fession should be made to him just as contrition is made should be entire. Therefore confession also should be en- to God: wherefore as there would be no contrition unless tire. one were contrite for all the sins which one calls to mind, I answer that, In prescribing medicine for the body, so is there no confession unless one confess all the sins the physician should know not only the disease for which that one remembers committing. he is prescribing, but also the general constitution of the Reply to Objection 3. Some say that when a man sick person, since one disease is aggravated by the addi- remembers a sin which he had previously forgotten, he tion of another, and a medicine which would be adapted ought to confess again the sins which he had confessed to one disease, would be harmful to another. The same before, especially if he cannot go to the same priest to is to be said in regard to sins, for one is aggravated when whom his previous confession was made, in order that the another is added to it; and a remedy which would be suit- total quantity of his sins may be made known to one priest. able for one sin, might prove an incentive to another, since But this does not seem necessary, because sin takes its sometimes a man is guilty of contrary sins, as Gregory quantity both from itself and from the conjunction of an- says (Pastoral. iii, 3). Hence it is necessary for confession other; and as to the sins which he confessed he had already that man confess all the sins that he calls to mind, and if manifested their quantity which they have of themselves, he fails to do this, it is not a confession, but a pretense of while as to the sin which he had forgotten, in order that confession. the priest may know the quantity which it has under both Reply to Objection 1. Although a man’s shame is the above heads, it is enough that the penitent declare it multiplied when he makes a divided confession to differ- explicitly, and confess the others in general, saying that ent confessors, yet all his different shames together are he had confessed many sins in his previous confession, not so great as that with which he confesses all his sins but had forgotten this particular one. together: because one sin considered by itself does not Reply to Objection 4. Although the priest may be un- prove the evil disposition of the sinner, as when it is con- able to absolve the penitent from all his sins, yet the latter sidered in conjunction with several others, for a man may is bound to confess all to him, that he may know the to- fall into one sin through ignorance or weakness, but a tal quantity of his guilt, and refer him to the superior with number of sins proves the malice of the sinner, or his great regard to the sins from which he cannot absolve him. Whether one may confess through another, or by writing? Suppl. q. 9 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that one may confess from what has been said (q. 8, a. 5 ). Now sometimes through another, or by writing. For confession is neces- a man’s own priest is absent, so that the penitent cannot sary in order that the penitent’s conscience may be made speak to him with his own voice. But he could make his known to the priest. But a man can make his conscience conscience known to him by writing. Therefore it seems known to the priest, through another or by writing. There- that he ought to manifest his conscience to him by writing fore it is enough to confess through another or by writing. to him. Objection 2. Further, some are not understood by On the contrary, Man is bound to confess his sins their own priests on account of a difference of language, even as he is bound to confess his faith. But confession of and consequently cannot confess save through others. faith should be made “with the mouth,” as appears from Therefore it is not essential to the sacrament that one Rom. 10:10: therefore confession of sins should also. should confess by oneself, so that if anyone confesses Further, who sinned by himself should, by himself, do through another in any way whatever, it suffices for his penance. But confession is part of penance. Therefore the salvation. penitent should confess his own sins. Objection 3. Further, it is essential to the sacrament I answer that, Confession is not only an act of virtue, that a man should confess to his own priest, as appears but also part of a sacrament. Now, though, in so far as it ∗ De vera et falsa Poenitentia, work of an unknown author 2669 is an act of virtue it matters not how it is done, even if it declared by a determinate act. be easier to do it in one way than in another, yet, in so far Reply to Objection 2. It is enough for one who is ig- as it is part of a sacrament, it has a determinate act, just as norant of a language, to confess by writing, or by signs, the other sacraments have a determinate matter. And as in or by an interpreter, because a man is not bound to do Baptism, in order to signify the inward washing, we em- more than he can: although a man is not able or obliged ploy that element which is chiefly used in washing, so in to receive Baptism, except with water, which is from an the sacramental act which is intended for manifestation entirely external source and is applied to us by another: we generally make use of that act which is most com- whereas the act of confession is from within and is per- monly employed for the purpose of manifestation, viz. formed by ourselves, so that when we cannot confess in our own words; for other ways have been introduced as one way, we must confess as we can. supplementary to this. Reply to Objection 3. In the absence of one’s own Reply to Objection 1. Just as in Baptism it is not priest, confession may be made even to a layman, so that enough to wash with anything, but it is necessary to wash there is no necessity to confess in writing, because the act with a determinate element, so neither does it suffice, in of confession is more essential than the person to whom Penance, to manifest one’s sins anyhow, but they must be confession is made. Whether the sixteen conditions usually assigned are necessary for confession? Suppl. q. 9 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the conditions as- ii, 4. The first is knowledge, in respect of which con- signed by masters, and contained in the following lines, fession is said to be “discreet,” inasmuch as prudence is are not requisite for confession: required in every act of virtue: and this discretion consists Simple, humble, pure, faithful, in giving greater weight to greater sins. The second condi- Frequent, undisguised, discreet, voluntary, tion is choice, because acts of virtue should be voluntary, shamefaced, and in this respect confession is said to be “voluntary.” Entire, secret, tearful, not delayed, The third condition is that the act be done for a particular Courageously accusing, ready to obey. purpose, viz. the due end, and in this respect confession For fidelity, simplicity, and courage are virtues by is said to be “pure,” i.e. with a right intention. The fourth themselves, and therefore should not be reckoned as con- condition is that one should act immovably, and in this ditions of confession. respect it is said that confession should be “courageous,” Objection 2. Further, a thing is “pure” when it is not viz. that the truth should not be forsaken through shame. mixed with anything else: and “simplicity,” in like man- Now confession is an act of the virtue of penance. ner, removes composition and admixture. Therefore one First of all it takes its origin in the horror which one con- or the other is superfluous. ceives for the shamefulness of sin, and in this respect con- Objection 3. Further, no one is bound to confess more fession should be “full of shame,” so as not to be a boast- than once a sin which he has committed but once. There- ful account of one’s sins, by reason of some worldly van- fore if a man does not commit a sin again, his penance ity accompanying it. Then it goes on to deplore the sin need not be “frequent.” committed, and in this respect it is said to be “tearful.” Objection 4. Further, confession is directed to satis- Thirdly, it culminates in self-abjection, and in this respect faction. But satisfaction is sometimes public. Therefore it should be “humble,” so that one confesses one’s misery confession should not always be “secret.” and weakness. Objection 5. Further, that which is not in our power By reason of its very nature, viz. confession, this act is not required of us. But it is not in our power to shed is one of manifestation: which manifestation can be hin- “tears.” Therefore it is not required of those who confess. dered by four things: first, by falsehood, and in this re- On the contrary, We have the authority of the masters spect confession is said to be “faithful,” i.e. true. Sec- who assigned the above. ondly, by the use of vague words, and against this con- I answer that, Some of the above conditions are es- fession is said to be “open,” so as not to be wrapped up in sential to confession, and some are requisite for its well- vague words; thirdly, by “multiplicity” of words, in which being. Now those things which are essential to confes- respect it is said to be “simple” indicating that the penitent sion belong to it either as to an act of virtue, or as to part should relate only such matters as affect the gravity of the of a sacrament. If in the first way, it is either by reason sin; fourthly none of those things should be suppressed of virtue in general, or by reason of the special virtue of which should be made known, and in this respect confes- which it is the act, or by reason of the act itself. Now there sion should be “entire.” are four conditions of virtue in general, as stated in Ethic. In so far as confession is part of a sacrament it is sub- 2670 ject to the judgment of the priest who is the minister of perversity of intention, from which man is cleansed: but the sacrament. Wherefore it should be an “accusation” on the condition “simple” excludes the introduction of un- the part of the penitent, should manifest his “readiness to necessary matter. obey” the priest, should be “secret” as regards the nature Reply to Objection 3. This is not necessary for con- of the court wherein the hidden affairs of conscience are fession, but is a condition of its well-being. tried. Reply to Objection 4. Confession should be made The well-being of confession requires that it should be not publicly but privately, lest others be scandalized, and “frequent”; and “not delayed,” i.e. that the sinner should led to do evil through hearing the sins confessed. On the confess at once. other hand, the penance enjoined in satisfaction does not Reply to Objection 1. There is nothing unreason- give rise to scandal, since like works of satisfaction are able in one virtue being a condition of the act of another done sometimes for slight sins, and sometimes for none at virtue, through this act being commanded by that virtue; all. or through the mean which belongs to one virtue princi- Reply to Objection 5. We must understand this to pally, belonging to other virtues by participation. refer to tears of the heart. Reply to Objection 2. The condition “pure” excludes 2671 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 10 Of the Effect of Confession (In Five Articles) We must now consider the effect of confession: under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether confession delivers one from the death of sin? (2) Whether confession delivers one in any way from punishment? (3) Whether confession opens Paradise to us? (4) Whether confession gives hope of salvation? (5) Whether a general confession blots out mortal sins that one has forgotten? Whether confession delivers one from the death of sin? Suppl. q. 10 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that confession does not already sanctified. And unless a man offers an obstacle, deliver one from the death of sin. For confession fol- he receives, through the very fact of being baptized, grace lows contrition. But contrition sufficiently blots out guilt. whereby his sins are remitted, if they are not already re- Therefore confession does not deliver one from the death mitted. The same is to be said of confession, to which of sin. absolution is added because it delivered the penitent from Objection 2. Further, just as mortal sin is a fault, so guilt through being previously in his desire. Afterwards is venial. Now confession renders venial that which was at the time of actual confession and absolution he receives mortal before, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). There- an increase of grace, and forgiveness of sins would also be fore confession does not blot out guilt, but one guilt is granted to him, if his previous sorrow for sin was not suf- changed into another. ficient for contrition, and if at the time he offered no ob- On the contrary, Confession is part of the sacrament stacle to grace. Consequently just as it is said of Baptism of Penance. But Penance deliver from guilt. Therefore that it delivers from death, so can it be said of confession. confession does also. Reply to Objection 1. Contrition has the desire of I answer that, Penance, as a sacrament, is perfected confession attached to it, and therefore it delivers peni- chiefly in confession, because by the latter a man submits tents from death in the same way as the desire of Baptism to the ministers of the Church, who are the dispensers of delivers those who are going to be baptized. the sacraments: for contrition has the desire of confes- Reply to Objection 2. In the text venial does not des- sion united thereto, and satisfaction is enjoined according ignate guilt, but punishment that is easily expiated. and to the judgment of the priest who hears the confession. so it does not follow that one guilt is changed into another And since in the sacrament of Penance, as in Baptism, but that it is wholly done away. For “venial” is taken in that grace is infused whereby sins are forgiven, therefore three senses∗: first, for what is venial generically, e.g. an confession in virtue of the absolution granted remits guilt, idle word: secondly, for what is venial in its cause, i.e. even as Baptism does. Now Baptism delivers one from the having within itself a motive of pardon, e.g. sins due to death of sin, not only by being received actually, but also weakness: thirdly, for what is venial in the result, in which by being received in desire, as is evident with regard to sense it is understood here, because the result of confes- those who approach the sacrament of Baptism after being sion is that man’s past guilt is pardoned. Whether confession delivers from punishment in some way? Suppl. q. 10 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that confession nowise trite has the intention to confess. wherefore his intention delivers from punishment. For sin deserves no punish- avails him as though he had already confessed, and so the ment but what is either eternal or temporal. Now eternal confession which he makes afterwards remits no part of punishment is remitted by contrition, and temporal pun- the punishment. ishment by satisfaction. Therefore nothing of the punish- On the contrary, Confession is a penal work. But all ment is remitted by confession. penal works expiate the punishment due to sin. Therefore Objection 2. Further, “the will is taken for the deed”†, confession does also. as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). Now he that is con- I answer that, Confession together with absolution ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 88, a. 2 † Cf. Can. Magna Pietas, De Poenit., Dist. i 2672 has the power to deliver from punishment, for two rea-one who confesses, for this act has the punishment of sons. First, from the power of absolution itself: and thus shame attached to it, so that the oftener one confesses the the very desire of absolution delivers a man from eter- same sins, the more is the punishment diminished. nal punishment, as also from the guilt. Now this punish- This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. ment is one of condemnation and total banishment: and Reply to Objection 2. The will is not taken for the when a man is delivered therefrom he still remains bound deed, if this is done by another, as in the case of Baptism: to a temporal punishment, in so far as punishment is a for the will to receive Baptism is not worth as much as cleansing and perfecting remedy; and so this punishment the reception of Baptism. But a man’s will is taken for remains to be suffered in Purgatory by those who also the deed, when the latter is something done by him, en- have been delivered from the punishment of hell. Which tirely. Again, this is true of the essential reward, but not temporal punishment is beyond the powers of the peni- of the removal of punishment and the like, which come tent dwelling in this world, but is so far diminished by under the head of accidental and secondary reward. Con- the power of the keys, that it is within the ability of the sequently one who has confessed and received absolution penitent, and he is able, by making satisfaction, to cleanse will be less punished in Purgatory than one who has gone himself in this life. Secondly, confession diminishes the no further than contrition. punishment in virtue of the very nature of the act of the Whether confession opens paradise? Suppl. q. 10 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that confession does not sion removes these obstacles, as shown above (Aa. 1,2), it open Paradise. For different sacraments have different ef- is said to open Paradise. fects. But it is the effect of Baptism to open Paradise. Reply to Objection 1. Although Baptism and Therefore it is not the effect of confession. Penance are different sacraments, they act in virtue of Objection 2. Further, it is impossible to enter by a Christ’s one Passion, whereby a way was opened unto Par- closed door before it be opened. But a dying man can en- adise. ter heaven before making his confession. Therefore con- Reply to Objection 2. If the dying man was in mortal fession does not open Paradise. sin Paradise was closed to him before he conceived the de- On the contrary, Confession makes a man submit to sire to confess his sin, although afterwards it was opened the keys of the Church. But Paradise is opened by those by contrition implying a desire for confession, even be- keys. Therefore it is opened by confession. fore he actually confessed. Nevertheless the obstacle of I answer that, Guilt and the debt of punishment pre- the debt of punishment was not entirely removed before vent a man from entering into Paradise: and since confes- confession and satisfaction. Whether confession gives hope of salvation? Suppl. q. 10 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that hope of salvation ness of our sins except through Christ: and since by con- should not be reckoned an effect of confession. For hope fession a man submits to the keys of the Church which arises from all meritorious acts. Therefore, seemingly, it derive their power from Christ’s Passion, therefore do we is not the proper effect of confession. say that confession gives hope of salvation. Objection 2. Further, we arrive at hope through tribu- Reply to Objection 1. It is not our actions, but the lation, as appears from Rom. 5:3,4. Now man suffers grace of our Redeemer, that is the principal cause of the tribulation chiefly in satisfaction. Therefore, satisfaction hope of salvation: and since confession relies upon the rather than confession gives hope of salvation. grace of our Redeemer, it gives hope of salvation, not only On the contrary, ” Confession makes a man more as a meritorious act, but also as part of a sacrament. humble and more wary,” as the Master states in the text Reply to Objection 2. Tribulation gives hope of sal- (Sent. iv, D, 17). But the result of this is that man con- vation, by making us exercise our own virtue, and by pay- ceives a hope of salvation. Therefore it is the effect of ing off the debt of punishment: while confession does so confession to give hope of salvation. also in the way mentioned above. I answer that, We can have no hope for the forgive- 2673 Whether a general confession suffices to blot out forgotten mortal sins? Suppl. q. 10 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that a general confession which it includes, and by the power of the keys to which does not suffice to blot out forgotten mortal sins. For there a man submits by confessing. Now it happens sometimes is no necessity to confess again a sin which has been blot- that by previous contrition a sin has been blotted out as ted out by confession. If, therefore, forgotten sins were to the guilt, either in a general way (if it was not remem- forgiven by a general confession, there would be no need bered at the time) or in particular (and yet is forgotten be- to confess them when they are called to mind. fore confession): and then general sacramental confession Objection 2. Further, whoever is not conscious of works for the remission of the punishment in virtue of the sin, either is not guilty of sin, or has forgotten his sin. keys, to which man submits by confessing, provided he If, therefore, mortal sins are forgiven by a general con- offers no obstacle so far as he is concerned: but so far as fession, whoever is not conscious of a mortal sin, can be the shame of confessing a sin diminishes its punishment, certain that he is free from mortal sin, whenever he makes the punishment for the sin for which a man does not ex- a general confession: which is contrary to what the Apos- press his shame, through failing to confess it to the priest, tle says (1 Cor. 4:4), “I am not conscious to myself of is not diminished. anything, yet am I not hereby justified.” Reply to Objection 1. In sacramental confession, not Objection 3. Further, no man profits by neglect. Now only is absolution required, but also the judgment of the a man cannot forget a mortal sin without neglect, before priest who imposes satisfaction is awaited. Wherefore al- it is forgiven him. Therefore he does not profit by his for- though the latter has given absolution, nevertheless the getfulness so that the sin is forgiven him without special penitent is bound to confess in order to supply what was mention thereof in confession. wanting to the sacramental confession. Objection 4. Further, that which the penitent knows Reply to Objection 2. As stated above, confession nothing about is further from his knowledge than that does not produce its effect, unless contrition be presup- which he has forgotten. Now a general confession posed; concerning which no man can know whether it be does not blot out sins committed through ignorance, else true contrition, even as neither can one know for certain heretics, who are not aware that certain things they have if he has grace. Consequently a man cannot know for cer- done are sinful, and certain simple people, would be ab- tain whether a forgotten sin has been forgiven him in a solved by a general confession, which is false. Therefore general confession, although he may think so on account a general confession does not take away forgotten sins. of certain conjectural signs. On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 33:6): “Come ye to Reply to Objection 3. He does not profit by his ne- Him and be enlightened, and your faces shall not be con- glect, since he does not receive such full pardon, as he founded.” Now he who confesses all the sins of which he would otherwise have received, nor is his merit so great. is conscious, approaches to God as much as he can: nor Moreover he is bound to confess the sin when he calls it can more be required for him. Therefore he will not be to mind. confounded by being repelled, but will be forgiven. Reply to Objection 4. Ignorance of the law does not Further, he that confesses is pardoned unless he be in- excuse, because it is a sin by itself: but ignorance of fact sincere. But he who confesses all the sins that he calls to does excuse. Therefore if a man omits to confess a sin, be- mind, is not insincere through forgetting some, because cause he does not know it to be a sin, through ignorance he suffers from ignorance of fact, which excuses from sin. of the Divine law, he is not excused from insincerity. on Therefore he receives forgiveness, and then the sins which the other hand, he would be excused, if he did not know it he has forgotten, are loosened, since it is wicked to hope to be a sin, through being unaware of some particular cir- for half a pardon. cumstance, for instance, if he had knowledge of another’s I answer that, Confession produces its effect, on the wife, thinking her his own. Now forgetfulness of an act of presupposition that there is contrition which blots out sin comes under the head of ignorance of fact, wherefore guilt: so that confession is directly ordained to the remis- it excuses from the sin of insincerity in confession, which sion of punishment, which it causes in virtue of the shame is an obstacle to the fruit of absolution and confession. 2674 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 11 Of the Seal of Confession (In Five Articles) We must now inquire about the seal of confession, about which there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether in every case a man is bound to hide what he knows under the seal of confession? (2) Whether the seal of confession extends to other matters than those which have reference to confession? (3) Whether the priest alone is bound by the seal of confession? (4) Whether, by permission of the penitent, the priest can make known to another, a sin of his which he knew under the seal of confession? (5) Whether he is bound to hide even what he knows through other sources besides? Whether in every case the priest is bound to hide the sins which he knows under the Suppl. q. 11 a. 1 seal of confession? Objection 1. It would seem that the priest is not bound is unworthy of ecclesiastical preferment. Now everyone in every case to hide the sins which he knows under the is bound to prevent the promotion of the unworthy, if it is seal of confession. For, as Bernard says (De Proecep. et his business. Since then by raising an objection he seems Dispens. ii), “that which is instituted for the sake of char- to raise a suspicion of sin, and so to reveal the confes- ity does not militate against charity.” Now the secret of sion somewhat, it seems that it is necessary sometimes to confession would militate against charity in certain cases: divulge a confession. for instance, if a man knew through confession that a cer- On the contrary, The Decretal says (De Poenit. et tain man was a heretic, whom he cannot persuade to desist Remiss., Cap. Omnis utriusque): “Let the priest beware from misleading the people; or, in like manner, if a man lest he betray the sinner, by word, or sign, or in any other knew, through confession, that certain people who wish to way whatever.” marry are related to one another. Therefore such ought to Further, the priest should conform himself to God, reveal what they know through confession. Whose minister he is. But God does not reveal the sins Objection 2. Further, that which is obligatory solely which are made known to Him in confession, but hides on account of a precept of the Church need not be ob- them. Neither, therefore, should the priest reveal them. served, if the commandment be changed to the contrary. I answer that, Those things which are done outwardly Now the secret of confession was introduced solely by in the sacraments are the signs of what takes place in- a precept of the Church. If therefore the Church were wardly: wherefore confession, whereby a man subjects to prescribe that anyone who knows anything about such himself to a priest, is a sign of the inward submission, and such a sin must make it known, a man that had such whereby one submits to God. Now God hides the sins knowledge through confession would be bound to speak. of those who submit to Him by Penance; wherefore this Objection 3. Further, a man is bound to safeguard also should be signified in the sacrament of Penance, and his conscience rather than the good name of another, be- consequently the sacrament demands that the confession cause there is order in charity. Now it happens sometimes should remain hidden, and he who divulges a confession that a man by hiding a sin injures his own conscience— sins by violating the sacrament. Besides this there are for instance, if he be called upon to give witness of a sin other advantages in this secrecy, because thereby men are of which he has knowledge through confession, and is more attracted to confession, and confess their sins with forced to swear to tell the truth—or when an abbot knows greater simplicity. through confession the sin of a prior who is subject to him, Reply to Objection 1. Some say that the priest is not which sin would be an occasion of ruin to the latter, if he bound by the seal of confession to hide other sins than suffers him to retain his priorship, wherefore he is bound those in respect of which the penitent promises amend- to deprive him of the dignity of his pastoral charge, and ment; otherwise he may reveal them to one who can be yet in depriving him he seem to divulge the secret of con- a help and not a hindrance. But this opinion seems erro- fession. Therefore it seems that in certain cases it is lawful neous, since it is contrary to the truth of the sacrament; to reveal a confession. for just as, though the person baptized be insincere, yet Objection 4. Further, it is possible for a priest through his Baptism is a sacrament, and there is no change in hearing a man’s confession to be conscious that the latter the essentials of the sacrament on that account, so con- 2675 fession does not cease to be sacramental although he that as man. And even if he were expressly interrogated about confesses, does not purpose amendment. Therefore, this a confession, he ought to say nothing, nor would he incur notwithstanding, it must be held secret; nor does the seal the excommunication, for he is not subject to his superior, of confession militate against charity on that account, be- save as a man, and he knows this not as a man, but as God cause charity does not require a man to find a remedy for knows it. a sin which he knows not: and that which is known in Reply to Objection 3. A man is not called upon to confession, is, as it were, unknown, since a man knows witness except as a man, wherefore without wronging it, not as man, but as God knows it. Nevertheless in the his conscience he can swear that he knows not, what he cases quoted one should apply some kind of remedy, so knows only as God knows it. In like manner a superior far as this can be done without divulging the confession, can, without wronging his conscience, leave a sin unpun- e.g. by admonishing the penitent, and by watching over ished which he knows only as God knows it, or he may the others lest they be corrupted by heresy. He can also forbear to apply a remedy, since he is not bound to ap- tell the prelate to watch over his flock with great care, yet ply a remedy, except according as it comes to his knowl- so as by neither word nor sign to betray the penitent. edge. Wherefore with regard to matters which come to his Reply to Objection 2. The precept concerning the knowledge in the tribunal of Penance, he should apply the secret of confession follows from the sacrament itself. remedy, as far as he can, in the same court: thus as to the Wherefore just as the obligation of making a sacramen- case in point, the abbot should advise the prior to resign tal confession is of Divine law, so that no human dis- his office, and if the latter refuse, he can absolve him from pensation or command can absolve one therefrom, even the priorship on some other occasion, yet so as to avoid all so, no man can be forced or permitted by another man suspicion of divulging the confession. to divulge the secret of confession. Consequently if he Reply to Objection 4. A man is rendered unworthy be commanded under pain of excommunication to be in- of ecclesiastical preferment, by many other causes besides curred “ipso facto,” to say whether he knows anything sin, for instance, by lack of knowledge, age, or the like: so about such and such a sin, he ought not to say it, because that by raising an objection one does not raise a suspicion he should assume that the intention of the person in com- of crime or divulge the secret of confession. manding him thus, was that he should say what he knew Whether the seal of confession extends to other matters than those which have refer-Suppl. q. 11 a. 2 ence to confession? Objection 1. It would seem that the seal of confes- reference to sacramental confession. sion extends to other matters besides those which have I answer that, The seal of confession does not ex- reference to confession. For sins alone have reference to tend directly to other matters than those which have ref- confession. Now sometimes besides sins other matters are erence to sacramental confession, yet indirectly matters told which have no reference to confession. Therefore, also which are not connected with sacramental confession since such things are told to the priest, as to God, it seems are affected by the seal of confession, those, for instance, that the seal of confession extends to them also. which might lead to the discovery of a sinner or of his sin. Objection 2. Further, sometimes one person tells an- Nevertheless these matters also must be most carefully other a secret, which the latter receives under the seal of hidden, both on account of scandal, and to avoid leading confession. Therefore the seal of confession extends to others into sin through their becoming familiar with it. matters having no relation to confession. This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. On the contrary, The seal of confession is connected Reply to Objection 2. A confidence ought not eas- with sacramental confession. But those things which are ily to be accepted in this way: but if it be done the secret connected with a sacrament, do not extend outside the must be kept in the way promised, as though one had the bounds of the sacrament. Therefore the seal of confession secret through confession, though not through the seal of does not extend to matters other than those which have confession. Whether the priest alone is bound by the seal of confession? Suppl. q. 11 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that not only the priest is preter is bound to keep the confession secret. Therefore bound by the seal of confession. For sometimes a priest one who is not a priest knows something under the seal of hears a confession through an interpreter, if there be an confession. urgent reason for so doing. But it seems that the inter- Objection 2. Further, it is possible sometimes in cases 2676 of urgency for a layman to hear a confession. But he is what he hears in confession, is because he knows them, bound to secrecy with regard to those sins, since they are not as man but as God knows them. But the priest alone told to him as to God. Therefore not only the priest is is God’s minister. Therefore he alone is bound to secrecy. bound by the seal of confession. I answer that, The seal of confession affects the priest Objection 3. Further, it may happen that a man preas minister of this sacrament: which seal is nothing else tends to be a priest, so that by this deceit he may know than the obligation of keeping the confession secret, even what is on another’s conscience: and it would seem that as the key is the power of absolving. Yet, as one who is he also sins if he divulges the confession. Therefore not not a priest, in a particular case has a kind of share in the only the priest is bound by the seal of confession. act of the keys, when he hears a confession in a case of On the contrary, A priest alone is the minister of this urgency, so also does he have a certain share in the act of sacrament. But the seal of confession is connected with the seal of confession, and is bound to secrecy, though, this sacrament. Therefore the priest alone is bound by the properly speaking, he is not bound by the seal of confes- seal of confession. sion. Further, the reason why a man is bound to keep secret This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. Whether by the penitent’s permission, a priest may reveal to another a sin which he Suppl. q. 11 a. 4 knows under the seal of confession? Objection 1. It would seem that a priest may not, by own authority reveal his sin to another. Therefore he can the penitent’s permission, reveal to another a sin which do it through the priest. he knows under the seal of confession. For an inferior I answer that There are two reasons for which the may not do what his superior may not. Now the Pope priest is bound to keep a sin secret: first and chiefly, be- cannot give permission for anyone to divulge a sin which cause this very secrecy is essential to the sacrament, in he knows through confession. Neither therefore can the so far as the priest knows that sin, as it is known to God, penitent give him such a permission. Whose place he holds in confession: secondly, in order Objection 2. Further, that which is instituted for the to avoid scandal. Now the penitent can make the priest common good of the Church cannot be changed at the will know, as a man, what he knew before only as God knows of an individual. Now the secrecy of confession was insti- it, and he does this when he allows him to divulge it: so tuted for the good of the whole Church, in order that men that if the priest does reveal it, he does not break the seal might have greater confidence in approaching the confes- of confession. Nevertheless he should beware of giving sional. Therefore the penitent cannot allow the priest to scandal by revealing the sin, lest he be deemed to have divulge his confession. broken the seal. Objection 3. Further, if the priest could grant such a Reply to Objection 1. The Pope cannot permit a permission, this would seem to palliate the wickedness of priest to divulge a sin, because he cannot make him to bad priests, for they might pretend to have received the know it as a man, whereas he that has confessed it, can. permission and so they might sin with impunity, which Reply to Objection 2. When that is told which was would be unbecoming. Therefore it seems that the peni- known through another source, that which is instituted for tent cannot grant this permission. the common good is not done away with, because the seal Objection 4. Further, the one to whom this sin is di- of confession is not broken. vulged does not know that sin under the seal of confes- Reply to Objection 3. This does not bestow impunity sion, so that he may publish a sin which is already blotted on wicked priests, because they are in danger of having to out, which is unbecoming. Therefore this permission can- prove that they had the penitent’s permission to reveal the not be granted. sin, if they should be accused of the contrary. On the contrary, If the sinner consent, a superior may Reply to Objection 4. He that is informed of a sin refer him by letter to an inferior priest. Therefore with the through the priest with the penitent’s consent, shares in an consent of the penitent, the priest may reveal a sin of his act of the priest’s, so that the same applies to him as to to another. an interpreter, unless perchance the penitent wish him to Further, whosoever can do a thing of his own author- know it unconditionally and freely. ity, can do it through another. But the penitent can by his 2677 Whether a man may reveal that which he knows through confession and through some Suppl. q. 11 a. 5 other source besides? Objection 1. It would seem that a man may not re- ing what he knew afterwards and in another way. Now veal what he knows through confession and through some both these opinions, by exaggerating the seal of confes- other source besides. For the seal of confession is not sion, are prejudicial to the truth and to the safeguarding broken unless one reveals a sin known through confes- of justice. For a man might be more inclined to sin, if he sion. If therefore a man divulges a sin which he knows had no fear of being accused by his confessor supposing through confession, no matter how he knows it otherwise, that he repeated the sin in his presence: and furthermore he seems to break the seal. it would be most prejudicial to justice if a man could not Objection 2. Further, whoever hears someone’s con- bear witness to a deed which he has seen committed again fession, is under obligation to him not to divulge his sins. after being confessed to him. Nor does it matter that, as Now if one were to promise someone to keep something some say, he ought to declare that he cannot keep it secret, secret, he would be bound to do so, even if he knew it for he cannot make such a declaration until the sin has al- through some other source. Therefore a man is bound ready been confessed to him, and then every priest could, to keep secret what he knows through the confession, no if he wished, divulge a sin, by making such a declaration, matter how he knows it otherwise. if this made him free to divulge it. Consequently there Objection 3. Further, the stronger of two things draws is a third and truer opinion, viz. that what a man knows the other to itself. Now the knowledge whereby a man through another source either before or after confession, knows a sin as God knows it, is stronger and more excel- he is not bound to keep secret, in so far as he knows it lent than the knowledge whereby he knows a sin as man. as a man, for he can say: “I know so end so since I saw Therefore it draws the latter to itself: and consequently a it.” But he is bound to keep it secret in so far as he knows man cannot reveal that sin, because this is demanded by it as God knows it, for he cannot say: “I heard so and so his knowing it as God knows it. in confession.” Nevertheless, on account of the scandal he Objection 4. Further, the secrecy of confession was should refrain from speaking of it unless there is an urgent instituted in order to avoid scandal, and to prevent men reason. being shy of going to confession. But if a man might say Reply to Objection 1. If a man says that he has seen what he had heard in confession, though he knew it other- what he has heard in the confessional, he does not reveal wise, scandal would result all the same. Therefore he can what he heard in confession, save indirectly: even as one nowise say what he has heard. who knows something through hearing and seeing it, does On the contrary, No one can put another under a new not, properly speaking, divulge what he saw, if he says he obligation, unless he be his superior, who can bind him by heard it, but only indirectly, because he says he has heard a precept. Now he who knew of a sin by witnessing it was what he incidentally saw. Wherefore he does not break not bound to keep it secret. Therefore he that confesses the seal of confession. to him, not being his superior, cannot put him under an Reply to Objection 2. The confessor is not forbidden obligation of secrecy by confessing to him. to reveal a sin simply, but to reveal it as heard in confes- Further, the justice of the Church would be hindered sion: for in no case is he allowed to say that he has heard if a man, in order to escape a sentence of excommunica- it in the confessional. tion, incurred on account of some sin, of which he has Reply to Objection 3. This is true of things that are been convicted, were to confess to the person who has to in opposition to one another: whereas to know a sin as sentence him. Now the execution of justice falls under a God knows it, and to know it as man knows it, are not in precept. Therefore a man is not bound to keep a sin secret, opposition; so that the argument proves nothing. which he has heard in confession, but knows from some Reply to Objection 4. It would not be right to avoid other source. scandal so as to desert justice: for the truth should not I answer that, There are three opinions about this be gainsayed for fear of scandal. Wherefore when justice question. For some say that a man can by no means tell and truth are in the balance, a man should not be deterred another what he has heard in confession, even if he knew by the fear of giving scandal, from divulging what he has it from some other source either before or after the con- heard in confession, provided he knows it from some other fession: while others assert that the confession debars him source: although he ought to avoid giving scandal, as far from speaking of what he knew already, but not from say- as he is able. 2678 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 12 Of Satisfaction, As to Its Nature (In Three Articles) We must now consider satisfaction; about which four things have to be considered: (1) Its nature; (2) Its possibility; (3) Its quality; (4) The means whereby man offers satisfaction to God. Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether satisfaction is a virtue or an act of virtue? (2) Whether it is an act of justice? (3) Whether the definition of satisfaction contained in the text is suitable? Whether satisfaction is a virtue or an act of virtue? Suppl. q. 12 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that satisfaction is neither is said to be satisfied by reason of an equal proportion to a virtue nor an act of virtue. For every act of virtue is something), it is evident that satisfaction also is formally meritorious; whereas, seemingly, satisfaction is not, since an act of virtue. merit is gratuitous, while satisfaction answers to a debt. Reply to Objection 1. Although to make satisfaction Therefore satisfaction is not an act of virtue. is due in itself, yet, in so far as the deed is done voluntar- Objection 2. Further, every act of virtue is voluntary. ily by the one who offers satisfaction, it becomes some- But sometimes a man has to make satisfaction for some- thing gratuitous on the part of the agent, so that he makes thing against his will, as when anyone is punished by the a virtue of necessity. For debt diminishes merit through judge for an offense against another. Therefore satisfac- being necessary and consequently against the will, so that tion is not an act of virtue. if the will consent to the necessity, the element of merit is Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher not forfeited. (Ethic. viii, 13): “Choice holds the chief place in moral Reply to Objection 2. An act of virtue demands vol- virtue.” But satisfaction is not an act of choice but regards untariness not in the patient but in the agent, for it is his chiefly external works. Therefore it is not an act of virtue. act. Consequently since he on whom the judge wreaks On the contrary, Satisfaction belongs to penance. vengeance is the patient and not the agent as regards sat- Now penance is a virtue. Therefore satisfaction is also isfaction, it follows that satisfaction should be voluntary an act of virtue. not in him but in the judge as agent. Further, none but an act of virtue has the effect of blot- Reply to Objection 3. The chief element of virtue ting out sin, for one contrary is destroyed by the other. can be understood in two ways. First, as being the chief Now satisfaction destroys sin altogether. Therefore it is element of virtue as virtue, and thus the chief element of an act of virtue. virtue denotes whatever belongs to the nature of virtue or I answer that, An act is said to be the act of a virtue is most akin thereto; thus choice and other internal acts in two ways. First, materially; and thus any act which im- hold the chief place in virtue. Secondly, the chief ele- plies no malice, or defect of a due circumstance, may be ment of virtue may be taken as denoting that which holds called an act of virtue, because virtue can make use of any the first place in such and such a virtue; and then the first such act for its end, e.g. to walk, to speak, and so forth. place belongs to that which gives its determination. Now Secondly, an act is said to belong to a virtue formally, be- the interior act, in certain virtues, is determined by some cause its very name implies the form and nature of virtue; external act, since choice, which is common to all virtues, thus to suffer courageously is an act of courage. Now the becomes proper to such and such a virtue through being formal element in every moral virtue is the observance of directed to such and such an act. Thus it is that external a mean. wherefore every act that implies the observance acts hold the chief place in certain virtues; and this is the of a mean is formally an act of virtue. And since equality case with satisfaction. is the mean implied in the name of satisfaction (for a thing 2679 Whether satisfaction is an act of justice? Suppl. q. 12 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that satisfaction is not an may do an injustice to another, either by taking something act of justice. Because the purpose of satisfaction is that away, or by a hurtful action. And since to give is to use one may be reconciled to the person offended. But recon- an external thing, the act of justice, in so far as it estab- ciliation, being an act of love, belongs to charity. There- lishes equality between external things, signifies, properly fore satisfaction is an act of charity and not of justice. speaking, a giving back: but to make satisfaction clearly Objection 2. Further, the causes of sin in us are the points to equality between actions, although sometimes passions of the soul, which incline us to evil. But jus- one is put for the other. Now equalization concerns only tice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2,3), is not such things as are unequal, wherefore satisfaction presup- about passions, but about operations. Since therefore sat- poses inequality among actions, which inequality consti- isfaction aims at removing the causes of sin, as stated in tutes an offense; so that satisfaction regards a previous the text (Sent. iv, D, 15), it seems that it is not an act of offense. But no part of justice regards a previous offense, justice. except vindictive justice, which establishes equality indif- Objection 3. Further, to be careful about the future is ferently, whether the patient be the same subject as the not an act of justice but of prudence of which caution is a agent, as when anyone punishes himself, or whether they part. But it belongs to satisfaction, “to give no opening to be distinct, as when a judge punishes another man, since the suggestions of sin”∗. Therefore satisfaction is not an vindictive justice deals with both cases. The same applies act of justice. to penance, which implies equality in the agent only, since On the contrary, No virtue but justice considers the it is the penitent who holds to the penance [poenam tenet], notion of that which is due. But satisfaction gives due so that penance is in a way a species of vindictive justice. honor to God, as Anselm states (Cur Deus Homo i). This proves that satisfaction, which implies equality in the Therefore satisfaction is an act of justice. agent with respect to a previous offense, is a work of jus- Further, no virtue save justice establishes equality be- tice, as to that part which is called penance. tween external things. But this is done by satisfaction Reply to Objection 1. Satisfaction, as appears from which establishes equality between amendment and the what has been said, is compensation for injury inflicted. previous offense. Therefore satisfaction is an act of jus- Wherefore as the injury inflicted entailed of itself an in- tice. equality of justice, and consequently an inequality op- I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. posed to friendship, so satisfaction brings back directly v, 3,4), the mean of justice is considered with regard to an equality of justice, and consequently equality of friend- equation between thing and thing according to a certain ship. And since an act is elicited by the habit to whose proportion. Wherefore, since the very name of satisfac- end it is immediately directed, but is commanded by that tion implies an equation of the kind, because the adverb habit to whose end it is directed ultimately, hence satis- “satis” [enough] denotes an equality of proportion, it is faction is elicited by justice but is commanded by charity. evident that satisfaction is formally an act of justice. Now Reply to Objection 2. Although justice is chiefly the act of justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, about operations, yet it is consequently about passions, 2,4), is either an act done by one man to another, as when in so far as they are the causes of operations. Where- a man pays another what he owes him, or an act done by fore as justice curbs anger, lest it inflict an unjust injury one man between two others, as when a judge does jus- on another, and concupiscence from invading another’s tice between two men. When it is an act of justice of one marriage right, so satisfaction removes the causes of other man to another, the equality is set up in the agent, while sins. when it is something done between two others, the equal- Reply to Objection 3. Each moral virtue shares in ity is set up in the subject that has suffered an injustice. the act of prudence, because this virtue completes in it And since satisfaction expresses equality in the agent, it the conditions essential to virtue, since each moral virtue denotes, properly speaking, an act of justice of one man takes its mean according to the ruling of prudence, as is to another. Now a man may do justice to another either evident from the definition of virtue given in Ethic. ii, 6. in actions and passions or in external things; even as one ∗ Cf. Suppl./q. 12/a. 3/obj. 1 2680 Whether the definition of satisfaction given in the text is suitable? Suppl. q. 12 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the definition of sat- they be taken away the sickness cannot follow. But it is isfaction given in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15) and quoted not thus in spiritual diseases, for the free-will cannot be from Augustine∗ is unsuitable—viz. that “satisfaction is forced, so that even in the presence of their causes, they to uproot the causes of sins, and to give no opening to can, though with difficulty, be avoided, while they can be the suggestions thereof.” For the cause of actual sin is incurred even when their causes are removed. Hence he the fomes.† But we cannot remove the “fomes” in this puts two things in the definition of satisfaction, viz. re- life. Therefore satisfaction does not consist in removing moval of the causes, as to the first, and the free-will’s re- the causes of sins. fusal to sin. Objection 2. Further, the cause of sin is stronger than Reply to Objection 1. By “causes” we must un- sin itself. But man by himself cannot remove sin. Much derstand the proximate causes of actual sin, which are less therefore can he remove the cause of sin; and so the twofold: viz. the lust of sin through the habit or act of same conclusion follows. a sin that has been given up, and those things which are Objection 3. Further, since satisfaction is a part of called the remnants of past sin; and external occasions of Penance, it regards the past and not the future. Now “to sin, such as place, bad company and so forth. Such causes give no opening to the suggestions of sin” regards the fu- are removed by satisfaction in this life, albeit the “fomes,” ture. Therefore it should not be put in the definition of which is the remote cause of actual sin, is not entirely re- satisfaction. moved by satisfaction in this life though it is weakened. Objection 4. Further, satisfaction regards a past of- Reply to Objection 2. Since the cause of evil or of fense. Yet no mention is made of this. Therefore the defi- privation (according as it has a cause) is nothing else than nition of satisfaction is unsuitable. a defective good, and since it is easier to destroy good Objection 5. Further, Anselm gives another definition than to set it up, it follows that it is easier to uproot the (Cur Deus homo i): “Satisfaction consists in giving God causes of privation and of evil than to remove the evil it- due honor,” wherein no reference is made to the things self, which can only be removed by setting up good, as mentioned by Augustine‡ in this definition. Therefore one may be seen in the case of blindness and its causes. Yet or the other is unsuitable. the aforesaid are not sufficient causes of sin, for sin does Objection 6. Further, an innocent man can give due not, of necessity, ensue therefrom, but they are occasions honor to God: whereas satisfaction is not compatible with of sin. Nor again can satisfaction be made without God’s innocence. Therefore Anselm’s definition is faulty. help, since it is not possible without charity, as we shall I answer that, Justice aims not only at removing in- state further on (q. 14, a. 2). equality already existing, by punishing the past fault, but Reply to Objection 3. Although Penance was primar- also at safeguarding equality for the future, because ac- ily instituted and intended with a view to the past, yet, as a cording to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3) “punishments are consequence, it regards the future, in so far as it is a safe- medicinal.” Wherefore satisfaction which is the act of jus- guarding remedy; and the same applies to satisfaction. tice inflicting punishment, is a medicine healing past sins Reply to Objection 4. Augustine§ defined satisfac- and preserving from future sins: so that when one man tion, as made to God, from Whom, in reality, nothing makes satisfaction to another, he offers compensation for can be taken, though the sinner, for his own part, takes the past, and takes heed for the future. Accordingly sat- something away. Consequently in such like satisfaction, isfaction may be defined in two ways, first with regard amendment for future time is of greater weight than com- to past sin, which it heals by making compensation, and pensation for the past. Hence Augustine defines satisfac- thus it is defined as “compensation for an inflicted injury tion from this point of view. And yet it is possible to gauge according to the equality of justice.” The definition of the compensation for the past from the heed taken for the Anselm amounts to the same, for he says that “satisfaction future, for the latter regards the same object as the former, consists in giving God due honor”; where duty is consid- but in the opposite way: since when looking at the past we ered in respect of the sin committed. Secondly, satisfac- detest the causes of sins on account of the sins themselves, tion may be defined, considered as preserving us from fu- which are the starting-point of the movement of detesta- ture sins; and as Augustine (Cf. obj. 1) defines it. Now tion: whereas when taking heed of the future, we begin preservation from bodily sickness is assured by remov- from the causes, that by their removal we may avoid sins ing the causes from which the sickness may ensue, for if the more easily. ∗ Gennadius Massiliensis, De Eccl. Dogm. liv † “Fomes” signifies literally “fuel,” and metaphorically, “incentive.” As used by the theologian, it denotes the quasi-material element and effect of original sin, and sometimes goes under the name of “concupiscence,” Cf. Ia IIae, q. 82, a. 3. ‡ Gennadius, obj. 1 § Gennadius Massiliensis, De Eccl. Dogm. liv 2681 Reply to Objection 5. There is no reason why the Reply to Objection 6. By debt is meant the debt we same thing should not be described in different ways ac- owe to God by reason of the sins we have committed, be- cording to the various things found in it: and such is the cause Penance regards a debt, as stated above (a. 2). case here, as explained above. 2682 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 13 Of the Possibility of Satisfaction (In Two Articles) We must now consider the possibility of satisfaction, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether man can make satisfaction to God? (2) Whether one man can make satisfaction for another? Whether man can make satisfaction to God? Suppl. q. 13 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that man cannot make balances the fault, since “justice is the same as counter- satisfaction to God. For satisfaction should balance the passion,” as the Pythagoreans said‡. Now punishment offense, as shown above (q. 12, Aa. 2,3). But an offense may equal the pleasure contained in a sin committed. against God is infinite, since it is measured by the person Therefore satisfaction can be made to God. against whom it is committed, for it is a greater offense I answer that, Man becomes God’s debtor in two to strike a prince than anyone else. Therefore, as no ac- ways; first, by reason of favors received, secondly, by rea- tion of man can be infinite, it seems that he cannot make son of sin committed: and just as thanksgiving or worship satisfaction to God. or the like regard the debt for favors received, so satis- Objection 2. Further, a slave cannot make compensa- faction regards the debt for sin committed. Now in giv- tion for a debt, since all that he has is his master’s. But ing honor to one’s parents or to the gods, as indeed the we are the slaves of God, and whatever good we have, we Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14), it is impossible to re- owe to Him. Therefore, as satisfaction is compensation pay them measure for measure, but it suffices that man for a past offense, it seems that we cannot offer it to God. repay as much as he can, for friendship does not demand Objection 3. Further, if all that a man has suffices measure for measure, but what is possible. Yet even this is not to pay one debt, he cannot pay another debt. Now all equal somewhat, viz. according to proportion, for as the that man is, all that he can do, and all that he has, does debt due to God is, in comparison with God, so is what not suffice to pay what he owes for the blessing of cre- man can do, in comparison with himself, so that in an- ation, wherefore it is written (Is. 40:16) that “the wood of other way the form of justice is preserved. It is the same Libanus shall not be enough for a burnt offering∗.” There- as regards satisfaction. Consequently man cannot make fore by no means can he make satisfaction for the debt satisfaction to God if “satis” [enough] denotes quantita- resulting from the offense committed. tive equality; but he can, if it denote proportionate equal- Objection 4. Further, man is bound to spend all his ity, as explained above, and as this suffices for justice, so time in the service of God. Now time once lost cannot be does it suffice for satisfaction. recovered, wherefore, as Seneca observes (Lib. i, Ep. i, Reply to Objection 1. Just as the offense derived a ad Lucilium) loss of time is a very grievous matter. There- certain infinity from the infinity of the Divine majesty, so fore man cannot make compensation to God, and the same does satisfaction derive a certain infinity from the infin- conclusion follows as before. ity of Divine mercy, in so far as it is quickened by grace, Objection 5. Further, mortal actual sin is more whereby whatever man is able to repay becomes accept- grievous than original sin. But none could satisfy for orig- able. Others, however, say that the offense is infinite as inal sin unless he were both God and man. Neither, there- regards the aversion, and in this respect it is pardoned gra- fore, can he satisfy for actual sin. tuitously, but that it is finite as turning to a mutable good, On the contrary, Jerome† says: “Whoever maintains in which respect it is possible to make satisfaction for it. that God has commanded anything impossible to man, let But this is not to the point, since satisfaction does not an- him be anathema.” But satisfaction is commanded (Lk. swer to sin, except as this is an offense against God, which 3:8): “Bring forth. . . fruits worthy of penance.” Therefore is a matter, not of turning to a creature but of turning away it is possible to make satisfaction to God. from God. Others again say that even as regards the aver- Further, God is more merciful than any man. But it sion it is possible to make satisfaction for sin in virtue is possible to make satisfaction to a man. Therefore it is of Christ’s merit, which was, in a way, infinite. And this possible to make satisfaction to God. comes to the same as what we said before, since grace is Further, there is due satisfaction when the punishment given to believers through faith in the Mediator. If, how- ∗ Vulg.: ‘Libanus shall not be enough to burn, nor the beasts thereof for a burnt offering’ † Pelagius, Expos. Fidei ad Damasum ‡ Aristotle, Ethic. v, 5; Cf. IIa IIae, q. 61, a. 4 2683 ever, He were to give grace otherwise, satisfaction would put forth his whole power into any one single thing, since suffice in the way explained above. he has to be heedful about many things. And so his con- Reply to Objection 2. Man, who was made to God’s duct is subject to a certain measure, viz. the fulfillment of image, has a certain share of liberty, in so far as he is mas- God’s commandments, over and above which he can offer ter of his actions through his free-will; so that, through something by way of satisfaction. acting by his free-will, he can make satisfaction to God, Reply to Objection 4. Though man cannot recover for though it belongs to God, in so far as it was bestowed the time that is past, he can in the time that follows make on him by God, yet it was freely bestowed on him, that he compensation for what he should have done in the past, might be his own master, which cannot be said of a slave. since the commandment did not exact from him the ful- Reply to Objection 3. This argument proves that it fillment of his whole power, as stated above (ad 3). is impossible to make equivalent satisfaction to God, but Reply to Objection 5. Though original sin has less not that it is impossible to make sufficient satisfaction to of the nature of sin than actual sin has, yet it is a more Him. For though man owes God all that he is able to give grievous evil, because it is an infection of human nature Him, yet it is not necessary for his salvation that he should itself, so that, unlike actual sin, it could not be expiated by actually do the whole of what he is able to do, for it is im-the satisfaction of a mere man. possible for him, according to his present state of life, to Whether one man can fulfill satisfactory punishment for another? Suppl. q. 13 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that one man cannot ful- for the flesh of one man is not tamed by another’s fast; fill satisfactory punishment for another. Because merit is nor does one man acquire the habit of well-doing, through requisite for satisfaction. Now one man cannot merit or the actions of another, except accidentally, in so far as a demerit for another, since it is written (Ps. 61:12): “Thou man, by his good actions, may merit an increase of grace wilt render to every man according to his works.” There- for another, since grace is the most efficacious remedy for fore one man cannot make satisfaction for another. the avoidance of sin. But this is by way of merit rather Objection 2. Further, satisfaction is condivided with than of satisfaction. on the other hand, as regards the pay- contrition and confession. But one man cannot be contrite ment of the debt, one man can satisfy for another, pro- or confess for another. Neither therefore can one make vided he be in a state of charity, so that his works may satisfaction for another. avail for satisfaction. Nor is it necessary that he who satis- Objection 3. Further, by praying for another one mer- fies for another should undergo a greater punishment than its also for oneself. If therefore a man can make satisfac- the principal would have to undergo (as some maintain, tion for another, he satisfies for himself by satisfying for who argue that a man profits more by his own punish- another, so that if a man satisfy for another he need not ment than by another’s), because punishment derives its make satisfaction for his own sins. power of satisfaction chiefly from charity whereby man Objection 4. Further, if one can satisfy for another, as bears it. And since greater charity is evidenced by a man soon as he takes the debt of punishment on himself, this satisfying for another than for himself, less punishment is other is freed from his debt. Therefore the latter will go required of him who satisfies for another, than of the prin- straight to heaven, if he die after the whole of his debt of cipal: wherefore we read in the Lives of the Fathers (v, 5) punishment has been taken up by another; else, if he be of one who for love of his brother did penance for a sin punished all the same, a double punishment will be paid which his brother had not committed, and that on account for the same sin, viz. by him who has begun to make sat- of his charity his brother was released from a sin which he isfaction, and by him who is punished in Purgatory. had committed. Nor is it necessary that the one for whom On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 6:2): “Bear ye satisfaction is made should be unable to make satisfaction one another’s burdens.” Therefore it seems that one can himself, for even if he were able, he would be released bear the burden of punishment laid upon another. from his debt when the other satisfied in his stead. But Further, charity avails more before God than before this is necessary in so far as the satisfactory punishment man. Now before man, one can pay another’s debt for is medicinal: so that a man is not to be allowed to do love of him. Much more, therefore, can this be done be- penance for another, unless there be evidence of some de- fore the judgment seat of God. fect in the penitent, either bodily, so that he is unable to I answer that, Satisfactory punishment has a twofold bear it, or spiritual, so that he is not ready to undergo it. purpose, viz. to pay the debt, and to serve as a remedy for Reply to Objection 1. The essential reward is be- the avoidance of sin. Accordingly, as a remedy against stowed on a man according to his disposition, because the future sin, the satisfaction of one does not profit another, fulness of the sight of God will be according to the ca- 2684 pacity of those who see Him. Wherefore just as one man sequently there is no comparison between satisfaction and is not disposed thereto by another’s act, so one man does contrition and confession. not merit the essential reward for another, unless his merit Reply to Objection 3. In the payment of the debt we has infinite efficacy, as the merit of Christ, whereby chil- consider the measure of the punishment, whereas in merit dren come to eternal life through Baptism. On the other we regard the root which is charity: wherefore he that, hand, the temporal punishment due to sin after the guilt through charity, merits for another, at least congruously, has been forgiven is not measured according to the dis- merits more for himself; yet he that satisfies for another position of the man to whom it is due, since sometimes does not also satisfy for himself, because the measure the better man owes a greater debt of punishment. Conse- of the punishment does not suffice for the sins of both, quently one man can merit for another as regards release although by satisfying for another he merits something from punishment, and one man’s act becomes another’s, greater than the release from punishment, viz. eternal life. by means of charity whereby we are “all one in Christ” Reply to Objection 4. If this man bound himself to (Gal. 3:28). undergo a certain punishment, he would not be released Reply to Objection 2. Contrition is ordained against from the debt before paying it: wherefore he himself will the guilt which affects a man’s disposition to goodness suffer the punishment, as long as the other makes satisfac- or malice, so that one man is not freed from guilt by an- tion for him: and if he do not this, then both are debtors in other’s contrition. In like manner by confession a man respect of fulfilling this punishment, one for the sin com- submits to the sacraments of the Church: nor can one man mitted, the other for his omission, so that it does not fol- receive a sacrament instead of another, since in a sacra- low that one sin is twice punished. ment grace is given to the recipient, not to another. Con- 2685 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 14 Of the Quality of Satisfaction (In Five Articles) We must now consider the quality of satisfaction, under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another? (2) Whether if a man fall into sin after being contrite for all his sins, he can, now that he has lost charity, satisfy for his other sins which were pardoned him through his contrition? (3) Whether a man’s previous satisfaction begins to avail when he recovers charity? (4) Whether works done without charity merit any good? (5) Whether such works avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell? Whether a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another? Suppl. q. 14 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that a man can satisfy for tion, the mode of satisfaction must needs be consistent one sin without satisfying for another. Because when sev- with the removal of the offense. Now removal of offense eral things are not connected together one can be taken is renewal of friendship: wherefore if there be anything away without another. Now sins are not connected to- to hinder the renewal of friendship there can be no satis- gether, else whoever had one would have them all. There- faction. Since, therefore, every sin is a hindrance to the fore one sin can be expiated by satisfaction, without an- friendship of charity, which is the friendship of man for other. God, it is impossible for man to make satisfaction for one Objection 2. Further, God is more merciful than man. sin while holding to another: even as neither would a man But man accepts the payment of one debt without the pay- make satisfaction to another for a blow, if while throwing ment of another. Therefore God accepts satisfaction for himself at his feet he were to give him another. one sin without the other. Reply to Objection 1. As sins are not connected to- Objection 3. Further, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, gether in some single one, a man can incur one without 15), “satisfaction is to uproot the causes of sin, and give incurring another; whereas all sins are remitted by reason no opening to the suggestions thereof.” Now this can be of one same thing, so that the remissions of various sins done with regard to one sin and not another, as when a are connected together. Consequently satisfaction cannot mall curbs his lust and perseveres in covetousness. There- be made for one and not for another. fore we can make satisfaction for one sin without satisfy- Reply to Objection 2. When a man is under obliga- ing for another. tion to another by reason of a debt, the only inequality be- On the contrary, The fast of those who fasted “for de- tween them is that which is opposed to justice, so that for bates and strifes” (Is. 58:4,5) was not acceptable to God, restitution nothing further is required than that the equal- though fasting be a work of satisfaction. Now satisfaction ity of justice should be reinstated, and this can be done in cannot be made save by works that are acceptable to God. respect of one debt without another. But when the obli- Therefore he that has a sin on his conscience cannot make gation is based on an offense, there is inequality not only satisfaction to God. of justice but also of friendship, so that for the offense to Further, satisfaction is a remedy for the healing of past be removed by satisfaction, not only must the equality of sins, and for preserving from future sins, as stated above justice be restored by the payment of a punishment equal (q. 12, a. 3). But without grace it is impossible to avoid to the offense, but also the equality of friendship must be sins. Therefore, since each sin excludes grace, it is not reinstated, which is impossible so long as an obstacle to possible to make satisfaction for one sin and not for an- friendship remains. other. Reply to Objection 3. By its weight, one sin drags us I answer that, Some have held that it is possible to down to another, as Gregory says (Moral. xxv): so that make satisfaction for one sin and not for another, as the when a man holds to one sin, he does not sufficiently cut Master states (Sent. iv, D, 15). But this cannot be. For himself off from the causes of further sin. since the previous offense has to be removed by satisfac- 2686 Whether, when deprived of charity, a man can make satisfaction for sins for which he Suppl. q. 14 a. 2 was previously contrite? Objection 1. It would seem that if a man fall into sin, and then makes satisfaction, such satisfaction will be sin after being contrite for all his sins, he can, now that valid, so that if he die in that sin, he will not be punished he has lost charity, satisfy for his other sins which were in hell for the other sins. already pardoned him through his contrition. For Daniel But this cannot be, because satisfaction requires the said to Nabuchodonosor (Dan. 4:24): “Redeem thou thy reinstatement of friendship and the restoration of the sins with alms.” Yet he was still a sinner, as is shown by equality of justice, the contrary of which destroys friend- his subsequent punishment. Therefore a man can make ship, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 1,3). Now in sat- satisfaction while in a state of sin. isfaction made to God, the equality is based, not on equiv- Objection 2. Further, “Man knoweth not whether he alence but rather on God’s acceptation: so that, although be worthy of love or hatred” (Eccles. 9:1). If therefore the offense be already removed by previous contrition, the one cannot make satisfaction unless one be in a state of works of satisfaction must be acceptable to God, and for charity, it would be impossible to know whether one had this they are dependent on charity. Consequently works made satisfaction, which would be unseemly. done without charity are not satisfactory. Objection 3. Further, a man’s entire action takes its Reply to Objection 1. Daniel’s advice meant that he form from the intention which he had at the beginning. should give up sin and repent, and so make satisfaction by But a penitent is in a state of charity when he begins to giving alms. repent. Therefore his whole subsequent satisfaction will Reply to Objection 2. Even as man knows not for derive its efficacy from the charity which quickens his in- certain whether he had charity when making satisfaction, tention. or whether he has it now, so too he knows not for certain Objection 4. Further, satisfaction consists in a certain whether he made full satisfaction: wherefore it is written equalization of guilt to punishment. But these things can (Ecclus. 5:5): “Be not without fear about sin forgiven.” be equalized even in one who is devoid of charity. There- And yet man need not, on account of that fear, repeat the fore, etc. satisfaction made, if he is not conscious of a mortal sin. On the contrary, “Charity covereth all sins” (Prov. For although he may not have expiated his punishment by 10:12). But satisfaction has the power of blotting out sins. that satisfaction, he does not incur the guilt of omission Therefore it is powerless without charity. through neglecting to make satisfaction; even as he who Further, the chief work of satisfaction is almsdeeds. receives the Eucharist without being conscious of a mor- But alms given by one who is devoid of charity avail noth- tal sin of which he is guilty, does not incur the guilt of ing, as is clearly stated 1 Cor. 13:3, “If I should distribute receiving unworthily. all my goods to feed the poor. . . and have not charity, it Reply to Objection 3. His intention was interrupted profiteth me nothing.” Therefore there can be no satisfac- by his subsequent sin, so that it gives no virtue to the tion with mortal sin. works done after that sin. I answer that, Some have said that if, when all a Reply to Objection 4. Sufficient equalization is im- man’s sins have been pardoned through contrition, and possible both as to the Divine acceptation and as to equiv- before he has made satisfaction for them, he falls into alence: so that the argument proves nothing. Whether previous satisfaction begins to avail after man is restored to charity? Suppl. q. 14 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that when a man has re- taken away. covered charity his previous satisfaction begins to avail, Objection 3. Further, if a man is given as a penance because a gloss on Lev. 25:25, “If thy brother being for the sins he has committed, to fast for several days, and impoverished,” etc., says that “the fruit of a man’s good then, after falling again into sin, he completes his penance, works should be counted from the time when he sinned.” he is not told, when he goes to confession a second time, But they would not be counted, unless they derived some to fast once again. But he would be told to do so, if he did efficacy from his subsequent charity. Therefore they begin not fulfill his duty of satisfaction by them. Therefore his to avail after he recovers charity. previous works become valid unto satisfaction, through Objection 2. Further, as the efficacy of satisfaction is his subsequent repentance. hindered by sin, so the efficacy of Baptism is hindered by On the contrary, Works done without charity were insincerity. Now Baptism begins to avail when insincerity not satisfactory, through being dead works. But they are ceases. Therefore satisfaction begins to avail when sin is not quickened by penance. Therefore they do not begin to 2687 be satisfactory. man does while in sin, the more he disposes himself to Further, charity does not quicken a work, unless in the grace of contrition, so that it is probable that he owes some way that work proceeds therefrom. But works can- a smaller debt of punishment. For this reason the priest not be acceptable to God, and therefore cannot be satisfac- should use discretion in taking them into account, so as tory, unless they be quickened by charity. Since then the to give him a lighter penance, according as he finds him works done without charity, in no way proceeded from better disposed. charity, nor ever can proceed therefrom, they can by no Reply to Objection 2. Baptism imprints a character means count towards satisfaction. on the soul, whereas satisfaction does not. Hence on the I answer that, Some have said that works done while advent of charity, which removes both insincerity and sin, in a state of charity, which are called living works, are it causes Baptism to have its effect, whereas it does not meritorious in respect of eternal life, and satisfactory in do this for satisfaction. Moreover Baptism confers justi- respect of paying off the debt of punishment; and that by fication in virtue of the deed [ex opere operato] which is subsequent charity, works done without charity are quick- not man’s deed but God’s, wherefore it does not become a ened so as to be satisfactory, but not so as to be meritori- lifeless deed as satisfaction does, which is a deed of man. ous of eternal life. But this is impossible, because works Reply to Objection 3. Sometimes satisfaction is such done in charity produce both these effects for the same as to leave an effect in the person who makes satisfac- reason, viz. because they are pleasing to God: wherefore tion, even after the act of satisfaction has been done; thus just as charity by its advent cannot make works done with- fasting leaves the body weak, and almsdeeds result in a out charity to be pleasing in one respect, so neither can it diminution of a person’s substance, and so on. In such make them pleasing in the other respect. cases there is no need to repeat the works of satisfaction Reply to Objection 1. This means that the fruits are if they have been done while in a state of sin, because reckoned, not from the time when he was first in sin, but through penance they are acceptable to God in the re- from the time when he ceased to sin, when, to wit, he sult they leave behind. But when a work of satisfaction was last in sin; unless he was contrite as soon as he had leaves behind no effect in the person that does satisfac- sinned, and did many good actions before he confessed. tion, it needs to be repeated, as in the case of prayer and Or we may say that the greater the contrition the more so forth. Interior works, since they pass away altogether, it alleviates the punishment, and the more good actions a are nowise quickened, and must be repeated. Whether works done without charity merit any, at least temporal, good? Suppl. q. 14 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that works done without Further, he that is nothing, can merit nothing. But a charity merit some, at least a temporal, good. For as pun- sinner, through not having charity, is nothing in respect of ishment is to the evil act, so is reward to a good act. Now spiritual being, according to 1 Cor. 13:2. Therefore he no evil deed is unpunished by God the just judge. There- can merit nothing. fore no good deed is unrewarded, and so every good deed I answer that, Properly speaking a merit is an action merits some good. on account of which it is just that the agent should be Objection 2. Further, reward is not given except for given something. Now justice is twofold: first, there is merit. Now some reward is given for works done without justice properly so called, which regards something due charity, wherefore it is written (Mat. 6:2,5,16) of those on the part of the recipient. Secondly, there is metaphor- who do good actions for the sake of human glory, that ical justice, so to speak, which regards something due on “they have received their reward.” Therefore those works the part of the giver, for it may be right for the giver to merit some good. give something to which the receiver has no claim. In Objection 3. Further, if there be two men both in sin, this sense the “fitness of the Divine goodness” is justice; one of whom does many deeds that are good in themselves thus Anselm says (Proslog. x) that “God is just when He and in their circumstances, while the other does none, they spares the sinner, because this is befitting.” And in this are not equally near to the reception of good things from way merit is also twofold. The first is an act in respect of Gods else the latter need not be advised to do any good which the agent himself has a claim to receive something, deeds. Now he that is nearer to God receives more of His and this is called merit of “condignity.” The second is an good things. Therefore the former, on account of his good act the result of which is that there is a duty of giving in works, merits some good from God. the giver by reason of fittingness, wherefore it is called On the contrary, Augustine says that “the sinner is merit of “congruity.” Now since in all gratuitous givings, not worthy of the bread he eats.” Therefore he cannot the primary reason of the giving is love, it is impossible merit anything from God. for anyone, properly speaking, to lay claim to a gift, if he 2688 lack friendship. Wherefore, as all things, whether tempo-received from him a father can never become his son’s ral or eternal, are bestowed on us by the bounty of God, no debtor: and much less can man make God his debtor on one can acquire a claim to any of them, save through char- account of equivalence of work. Consequently no work of ity towards God: so that works done without charity are ours can merit a reward by reason of its measure of good- not condignly meritorious of any good from God either ness, but it can by reason of charity, which makes friends eternal or temporal. But since it is befitting the goodness hold their possessions in common. Therefore, no matter of God, that wherever He finds a disposition He should how good a work may be, if it be done without charity, it grant the perfection, a man is said to merit congruously does not give man a claim to receive anything from God. some good by means of good works done without charity. On the other hand, an evil deed deserves an equivalent Accordingly suchlike works avail for a threefold good, ac- punishment according to the measure of its malice, be- quisition of temporal goods, disposition to grace, habitu- cause no evil has been done to us on the part of God, like ation to good works. Since, however, this is not merit the good which He has done. Therefore, although an evil properly so called, we should grant that such works are deed deserves condign punishment, nevertheless a good not meritorious of any good, rather than that they are. deed without charity does not merit condign reward. Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher states Reply obj. 2 and 3: These arguments consider merit (Ethic. viii, 14), since no matter what a son may do, he of congruity; while the other arguments consider merit of can never give back to his father the equal of what he has condignity. Whether the aforesaid works avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell? Suppl. q. 14 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the aforesaid works be absolved from guilt, (for an effect is not diminished or do not avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell. For the taken away unless its cause be diminished or taken away), measure of punishment in hell will answer to the measure the pain of hell cannot be mitigated by works done with- of guilt. But works done without charity do not diminish out charity, since they are unable to remove or diminish the measure of guilt. Neither, therefore, do they lessen the guilt. Secondly, so that the demerit of punishment is hin- pains of hell. dered; and thus the aforesaid works diminish the pain of Objection 2. Further, the pain of hell, though infi- hell—first because he who does such works escapes being nite in duration, is nevertheless finite in intensity. Now guilty of omitting them—secondly, because such works anything finite is done away with by finite subtraction. If dispose one somewhat to good, so that a man sins from therefore works done without charity canceled any of the less contempt, and indeed is drawn away from many sins punishment due for sins, those works might be so numer- thereby. ous, that the pain of hell would be done away with alto- These works do, however merit a diminution or post- gether: which is false. ponement of temporal punishment, as in the case of Achab Objection 3. Further, the suffrages of the Church are (3 Kings 21:27, seqq.), as also the acquisition of temporal more efficacious than works done without charity. But, goods. according to Augustine (Enchiridion cx), “the suffrages of Some, however, say that they mitigate the pains of the Church do not profit the damned in hell.” Much less hell, not by subtracting any of their substance, but by therefore are those pains mitigated by works done without strengthening the subject, so that he is more able to bear charity. them. But this is impossible, because there is no strength- On the contrary, Augustine also says (Enchiridion ening without a diminution of passibility. Now passibility cx): “Whomsoever they profit, either receive a full par- is according to the measure of guilt, wherefore if guilt is don, or at least find damnation itself more tolerable.” not removed, neither can the subject be strengthened. Further, it is a greater thing to do a good deed than to Some again say that the punishment is mitigated as to omit an evil deed. But the omission of an evil deed al- the remorse of conscience, though not as to the pain of ways avoids a punishment, even in one who lacks charity. fire. But neither will this stand, because as the pain of Much more, therefore, do good deeds void punishment. fire is equal to the guilt, so also is the pain of the remorse I answer that, Mitigation of the pains of hell can be of conscience: so that what applies to one applies to the understood in two ways: first, as though one were deliv- other. ered from the punishment which he already deserved, and This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. thus, since no one is delivered from punishment unless he 2689 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 15 Of the Means of Making Satisfaction (In Three Articles) We must now consider the means of making satisfaction, under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works? (2) Whether the scourges whereby God punishes man in this life, are satisfactory? (3) Whether the works of satisfaction are suitably reckoned, by saying that there are three, viz. almsdeeds, fasting, and prayer? Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works? Suppl. q. 15 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that satisfaction need not the person from whom something has been taken. And, be made by means of penal works. For satisfaction should although nothing can be taken away from God, so far as make compensation for the offense committed against He is concerned, yet the sinner, for his part, deprives Him God. Now, seemingly, no compensation is given to God of something by sinning as stated above (q. 12, Aa. 3,4). by penal works, for God does not delight in our suffer- Consequently, in order that compensation be made, some- ings, as appears from Tob. 3:22. Therefore satisfaction thing by way of satisfaction that may conduce to the glory need not be made by means of penal works. of God must be taken away from the sinner. Now a good Objection 2. Further, the greater the charity from work, as such, does not deprive the agent of anything, but which a work proceeds, the less penal is that work, for perfects him: so that the deprivation cannot be effected by “charity hath no pain∗” according to 1 Jn. 4:18. If there- a good work unless it be penal. Therefore, in order that a fore works of satisfaction need to be penal, the more they work be satisfactory it needs to be good that it may con- proceed from charity, the less satisfactory will they be: duce to God’s honor, and it must be penal, so that some- which is false. thing may be taken away from the sinner thereby. Objection 3. Further, “Satisfaction,” as Anselm states Again punishment preserves from future sin, because (Cur Deus homo i) “consists in giving due honor to God.” a man does not easily fall back into sin when he has had But this can be done by other means than penal works. experience of the punishment. Wherefore, according to Therefore satisfaction needs not to be made by means of the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3) punishments are medicinal. penal works. Reply to Objection 1. Though God does not delight On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xx): in our punishments as such, yet He does, in so far as they “It is just that the sinner, by his repentance, should in- are just, and thus they can be satisfactory. flict on himself so much the greater suffering, as he has Reply to Objection 2. Just as, in satisfaction, we have brought greater harm on himself by his sin.” to note the penality of the work, so, in merit, we must ob- Further, the wound caused by sin should be perfectly serve its difficulty. Now if the difficulty of the work itself healed by satisfaction. Now punishment is the remedy for be diminished, other things being equal, the merit is also sins, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3). Therefore sat- diminished; but if the difficulty be diminished on the part isfaction should be made by means of penal works. of the promptitude of the will, this does not diminish the I answer that, As stated above (q. 12, a. 3), satisfac- merit, but increases it; and, in like manner, diminution of tion regards both the past offense, for which compensation the penality of a work, on account of the will being made is made by its means, and also future sin wherefrom we more prompt by charity, does not lessen the efficacy of are preserved thereby: and in both respects satisfaction satisfaction, but increases it. needs to be made by means of penal works. For compen- Reply to Objection 3. That which is due for sin is sation for an offense implies equality, which must needs compensation for the offense, and this cannot be done be between the offender and the person whom he offends. without punishment of the sinner. It is of this debt that Now equalization in human justice consists in taking away Anselm speaks. from one that which he has too much of, and giving it to ∗ Vulg.: ‘Perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain’ 2690 Whether the scourges of the present life are satisfactory? Suppl. q. 15 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the scourges whereby quire a satisfactory character. Now they become the act we are punished by God in this life, cannot be satisfactory. of the sufferer in so far as he accepts them for the cleans- For nothing but what is meritorious can be satisfactory, as ing of his sins, by taking advantage of them patiently. If, is clear from what has been said (q. 14, a. 2). But we do however, he refuse to submit to them patiently, then they not merit except by what is in our own power. Since there- do not become his personal act in any way, and are not of fore the scourges with which God punishes us are not in a satisfactory, but merely of a vindictive character. our power, it seems that they cannot be satisfactory. Reply to Objection 1. Although these scourges are Objection 2. Further, only the good make satisfac- not altogether in our power, yet in some respect they are, tion. But these scourges are inflicted on the wicked also, in so far as we use them patiently. In this way man makes and are deserved by them most of all. Therefore they can- a virtue of necessity, so that such things can become both not be satisfactory. meritorious and satisfactory. Objection 3. Further, satisfaction regards past sins. Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine observes (De But these scourges are sometimes inflicted on those who Civ. Dei i, 8), even as “the same fire makes gold glisten have no sins, as in the case of Job. Therefore it seems that and straw reek,” so by the same scourges are the good they are not satisfactory. cleansed and the wicked worsened on account of their On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:3,4): “Tribula- impatience. Hence, though the scourges are common to tion worketh patience, and patience trial, i.e. deliverance both, satisfaction is only on the side of the good. from sin,” as a gloss explains it. Reply to Objection 3. These scourges always regard Further, Ambrose says (Super Ps. 118): “Although past guilt, not always the guilt of the person, but some- faith,” i.e. the consciousness of sin, “be lacking, the pun- times the guilt of nature. For had there not been guilt ishment satisfies.” Therefore the scourges of this life are in human nature, there would have been no punishment. satisfactory. But since guilt preceded in nature, punishment is inflicted I answer that, Compensation for a past offense can by God on a person without the person’s fault, that his be enforced either by the offender or by another. When it virtue may be meritorious, and that he may avoid future is enforced by another, such compensation is of a vindic- sin. Moreover, these two things are necessary in satisfac- tive rather than of a satisfactory nature, whereas when it is tion. For the work needs to be meritorious, that honor may made by the offender, it is also satisfactory. Consequently, be given to God, and it must be a safeguard of virtue, that if the scourges, which are inflicted by God on account of we may be preserved from future sins. sin, become in some way the act of the sufferer they ac- Whether the works of satisfaction are suitably enumerated? Suppl. q. 15 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the works of satis- fore the other two are in excess. faction are unsuitably enumerated by saying that there are Objection 4. On the other hand, it seems that there three, viz. almsdeeds, fasting, and prayer. For a work should be more. For contrary heals contrary. But there of satisfaction should be penal. But prayer is not penal, are many more than three kinds of sin. Therefore more since it is a remedy against penal sorrow, and is a source works of satisfaction should be enumerated. of pleasure, wherefore it is written (James 5:13): “Is any Objection 5. Further, pilgrimages and scourgings are of you sad? Let him pray. Is he cheerful in mind? Let him also enjoined as works of satisfaction, and are not in- sing.” Therefore prayer should not be reckoned among the cluded among the above. Therefore they are not suffi- works of satisfaction. ciently enumerated. Objection 2. Further, every sin is either carnal or spir-I answer that, Satisfaction should be of such a na- itual. Now, as Jerome says on Mk. 9:28, “This kind” of ture as to involve something taken away from us for the demons “can go out by nothing, but by prayer and fasting: honor of God. Now we have but three kinds of goods, Diseases of the body are healed by fasting, diseases of the bodily, spiritual, and goods of fortune, or external goods. mind, by prayer.” Therefore no other work of satisfaction By alms-deeds we deprive ourselves of some goods of for- is necessary. tune, and by fasting we retrench goods of the body. As to Objection 3. Further, satisfaction is necessary in or- goods of the soul, there is no need to deprive ourselves of der for us to be cleansed from our sins. But almsgiving any of them, either in whole or in part, since thereby we cleanses from all sins, according to Lk. 11:41: “Give become acceptable to God, but we should submit them alms, and behold all things are clean unto you.” There- entirely to God, which is done by prayer. 2691 This number is shown to be suitable in so far as sat-lust. and, another which is completed in things relating to isfaction uproots the causes of sin, for these are reckoned the flesh, though it be completed in the delectation of the to be three (1 Jn. 2:16), viz. “concupiscence of the flesh,” soul rather than of the flesh, as covetousness. Hence such “concupiscence of the eyes,” and “pride of life.” Fasting is like sins are between spiritual and carnal sins, so that they directed against concupiscence of the “flesh,” alms-deeds need a satisfaction proper to them, viz. almsdeeds. against concupiscence of the “eyes,” and “prayer” against Reply to Objection 3. Although each of these three, “pride of life,” as Augustine says (Enarr. in Ps. 42). by a kind of likeness, is appropriated to some particular This number is also shown to be suitable in so far as kind of sin because it is reasonable that, whereby a man satisfaction does not open a way to the suggestions of sin, sins, in that he should be punished, and that satisfaction because every sin is committed either against God, and should cut out the very root of the sin committed, yet each this is prevented by “prayer,” or against our neighbor, and of them can satisfy for any kind of sin. Hence if a man is this is remedied by “alms-deeds,” or against ourselves, unable to perform one of the above, another is imposed and this is forestalled by “fasting.” on him, chiefly almsdeeds, which can take the place of Reply to Objection 1. According to some, prayer the others, in so far as in those to whom a man gives alms is twofold. There is the prayer of contemplatives whose he purchases other works of satisfaction thereby. Conse- “conversation is in heaven”: and this, since it is altogether quently even if almsgiving washes all sins away, it does delightful, is not a work of satisfaction. The other is a not follow that other works are in excess. prayer which pours forth sighs for sin; this is penal and a Reply to Objection 4. Though there are many kinds part of satisfaction. of sins, all are reduced to those three roots or to those It may also be replied, and better, that every prayer has three kinds of sin, to which, as we have said, the aforesaid the character of satisfaction, for though it be sweet to the works of satisfaction correspond. soul it is painful to the body, since, as Gregory says (Su- Reply to Objection 5. Whatever relates to affliction per Ezech., Hom. xiv), “doubtless, when our soul’s love of the body is all referred to fasting, and whatever is spent is strengthened, our body’s strength is weakened”; hence for the benefit of one’s neighbor is a kind of alms, and we read (Gn. 32:25) that the sinew of Jacob’s thigh shrank whatever act of worship is given to God becomes a kind through his wrestling with the angel. of prayer, so that even one work can be satisfactory in Reply to Objection 2. Carnal sin is twofold; one several ways. which is completed in carnal delectation, as gluttony and 2692 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 16 Of Those Who Receive the Sacrament of Penance (In Three Articles) We must now consider the recipients of the sacrament of Penance: under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether penance can be in the innocent? (2) Whether it can be in the saints in glory? (3) Whether in the good or bad angels? Whether penance can be in the innocent? Suppl. q. 16 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that penance cannot be in moval of what follows, but not conversely, the removal of the innocent. For penance consists in bewailing one’s evil the habit ensues from the removal of the power to act, but deeds: whereas the innocent have done no evil. Therefore not from the removal of the act. And because removal of penance cannot be in them. the matter entails the removal of the act, since there can be Objection 2. Further, the very name of penance no act without the matter into which it passes, hence the [poenitentia] implies punishment [poena]. But the inno- habit of a virtue is possible in one for whom the matter cent do not deserve punishment. Therefore penance is not is not available, for the reason that it can be available, so in them. that the habit can proceed to its act—thus a poor man can Objection 3. Further, penance coincides with vindic- have the habit of magnificence, but not the act, because tive justice. But if all were innocent, there would be no he is not possessed of great wealth which is the matter of room for vindictive justice. Therefore there would be no magnificence, but he can be possessed thereof. penance, so that there is none in the innocent. Reply to Objection 1. Although the innocent have On the contrary, All the virtues are infused together. committed no sin, nevertheless they can, so that they are But penance is a virtue. Since, therefore, other virtues are competent to have the habit of penance. Yet this habit infused into the innocent at Baptism, penance is infused can never proceed to its act, except perhaps with regard with them. to their venial sins, because mortal sins destroy the habit. Further, a man is said to be curable though he has Nevertheless it is not without its purpose, because it is a never been sick in body: therefore in like manner, one perfection of the natural power. who has never been sick spiritually. Now even as there Reply to Objection 2. Although they deserve no pun- can be no actual cure from the wound of sin without an ishment actually, yet it is possible for something to be in act of penance, so is there no possibility of cure without them for which they would deserve to be punished. the habit of penance. Therefore one who has never had Reply to Objection 3. So long as the power to sin the disease of sin, has the habit of penance. remains, there would be room for vindictive justice as to I answer that, Habit comes between power and act: the habit, though not as to the act, if there were no actual and since the removal of what precedes entails the re- sins. Whether the saints in glory have penance? Suppl. q. 16 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the saints in glory duced to its act. But the saints in heaven will not repent have not penance. For, as Gregory says (Moral. iv), actually, because, if they did, there would be something “the blessed remember their sins, even as we, without in them against their wish. Therefore the habit of penance grief, remember our griefs after we have been healed.” will not be in them. But penance is grief of the heart. Therefore the saints in Objection 4. On the other hand, penance is a part heaven have not penance. of justice. But justice is “perpetual and immortal” (Wis. Objection 2. Further, the saints in heaven are con- 1:15), and will remain in heaven. Therefore penance will formed to Christ. But there was no penance in Christ, also. since there was no faith which is the principle of penance. Objection 5. Further, we read in the Lives of the Fa- Therefore there will be no penance in the saints in heaven. thers, that one of them said that even Abraham will repent Objection 3. Further, a habit is useless if it is not re-of not having done more good. But one ought to repent 2693 of evil done more than of good left undone, and which both actually and potentially: so that there is no compari-one was not bound to do, for such is the good in question. son between Him and others. Therefore repentance will be there of evil done. Reply to Objection 3. Repentance, properly speak- I answer that, The cardinal virtues will remain in ing, considered as that act of penance which is in this life, heaven, but only as regards the acts which they exercise will not be in heaven: and yet the habit will not be without in respect of their end. Wherefore, since the virtue of its use, for it will have another act. penance is a part of justice which is a cardinal virtue, who- Reply obj. 4,5: We grant the Fourth argument. But ever has the habit of penance in this life, will have it in the since the Fifth Objection proves that there will be the same life to come: but he will not have the same act as now, act of penance in heaven as now, we answer the latter by but another, viz. thanksgiving to God for His mercy in saying that in heaven one will be altogether conformed to pardoning his sins. the will of God. Wherefore, as God, by His antecedent Reply to Objection 1. This argument proves that they will, but not by His consequent will, wishes that all things do not have the same act as penance has now; and we should be good, and therefore that there should be no evil, grant this. so is it with the blessed. It is this will that this holy father Reply to Objection 2. Christ could not sin, where-improperly calls penance. fore the matter of this virtue was lacking in His respect Whether an angel can be the subject of penance? Suppl. q. 16 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that even a good or bad parison, the name of penance is given to that act of the angel can be a subject of penance. For fear is the begin- will, whereby a man detests what he has done, even as ning of penance. But fear is in the angels, according to love and other passions are spoken of as though they were James 2:19: “The devils. . . believe and tremble.” There- in the intellectual appetite. Secondly, penance is taken as fore there can be penance in them. a virtue, and in this way its act consists in the detestation Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, of evil done, together with the purpose of amendment and 4) that “evil men are full of repentance, and this is a great the intention of expiating the evil, or of placating God for punishment for them.” Now the devils are exceeding evil, the offense committed. Now detestation of evil befits a nor is there any punishment that they lack. Therefore they person according as he is naturally ordained to good. And can repent. since this order or inclination is not entirely destroyed in Objection 3. Further, a thing is more easily moved to any creature, it remains even in the damned, and conse- that which is according to its nature than to that which is quently the passion of repentance, or something like it, against its nature: thus water which has by violence been remains in them too, as stated in Wis. 5:3 ”(saying) within heated, of itself returns to its natural property. Now angels themselves, repenting,” etc. This repentance, as it is not can be moved to sin which is contrary to their common na- a habit, but a passion or act, can by no means be in the ture. Much more therefore can they return to that which is blessed angels, who have not committed any sins: but it is in accord with their nature. But this is done by penance. in the wicked angels, since the same applies to them as to Therefore they are susceptible to penance. the lost souls, for, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. Objection 4. Further, what applies to angels, applies ii, 4), “death is to men what sin is to an angel.” But no for- equally to separated souls, as Damascene says (De Fide giveness is possible for the sin of an angel. Now sin is the Orth. ii, 4). But there can be penance in separated souls, proper object of the virtue itself which we call penance, as some say, as in the souls of the blessed in heaven. in so far as it can be pardoned or expiated. Therefore, Therefore there can be penance in the angels. since the wicked angels cannot have the matter, they have On the contrary, By penance man obtains pardon for not the power to produce the act, so that neither can they the sin he has committed. But this is impossible in the have the habit. Hence the angels cannot be subjects of the angels. Therefore they are not subjects of penance. virtue of penance. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that Reply to Objection 1. A certain movement of man is subject to penance on account of the weakness of penance is engendered in them from fear, but not such his body. But the angels are not united to a body. There- as is a virtue. fore no penance can be in them. This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. I answer that, In us, penance is taken in two senses; Reply to Objection 3. Whatever is natural in them is first, as a passion, and thus it is nothing but pain or sorrow entirely good, and inclines to good: but their free-will is on account of a sin committed: and though, as a passion fixed on evil. And since the movement of virtue and vice it is only in the concupiscible part, yet, by way of com- follows the inclination, not of nature, but of the free-will, 2694 there is no need that there should be movements of virtue there has been or could have been a sin that could be parin them either actually or possibly, although they are in- doned, but not in the former: so that though they are like clined to good by nature. as to their present state, they differ as to their previous Reply to Objection 4. There is no parity between the states, which penance regards directly. holy angels and the beatified souls, because in the latter 2695 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 17 Of the Power of the Keys (In Three Articles) We must now consider the power of the ministers of this sacrament, which power depends on the keys. As to this matter, in the first place we shall treat of the keys, secondly, of excommunication, thirdly, of indulgences, since these two things are connected with the power of the keys. The first of these considerations will be fourfold: (1) the nature and meaning of the keys. (2) the use of the keys; (3) the ministers of the keys; (4) those on whom the use of the keys can be exercised. Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether there ought to be keys in the Church? (2) Whether the key is the power of binding and loosing, etc.? (3) Whether there are two keys or only one? Whether there should be keys in the Church? Suppl. q. 17 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no necessity efficacy of the Passion abides in the sacraments of the for keys in the Church. For there is no need for keys that Church. Wherefore a certain power for the removal of one may enter a house the door of which is open. But it the aforesaid obstacle is bestowed on the ministers of the is written (Apoc. 4:1): “I looked and behold a door was Church, who are the dispensers of the sacraments, not by opened in heaven,” which door is Christ, for He said of their own, but by a Divine power and by the Passion of Himself (Jn. 10:7): “I am the door.” Therefore the Church Christ. This power is called metaphorically the Church’s needs no keys for the entrance into heaven. key, and is the key of “ministry.” Objection 2. Further, a key is needed for opening and Reply to Objection 1. The door of heaven, considered shutting. But this belongs to Christ alone, “Who openeth in itself, is ever open, but it is said to be closed to some- and no man shutteth, shutteth and no man openeth” one, on account of some obstacle against entering therein, (Apoc. 3:7). Therefore the Church has no keys in the which is in himself. The obstacle which the entire human hands of her ministers. nature inherited from the sin of the first man was removed Objection 3. Further, hell is opened to whomever by Christ’s Passion; hence, after the Passion, John saw an heaven is closed, and vice versa. Therefore whoever has opened door in heaven. Yet that door still remains closed the keys of heaven, has the keys of hell. But the Church to this or that man, on account of the original sin which he is not said to have the keys of hell. Therefore neither has has contracted, or the actual sin which he has committed: she the keys of heaven. hence we need the sacraments and the keys of the Church. On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 16:19): “To thee Reply to Objection 2. This refers to His closing will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven.” Limbo, so that thenceforth no one should go there, and Further, every dispenser should have the keys of the to His opening of Paradise, the obstacle of nature being things that he dispenses. But the ministers of the Church removed by His Passion. are the dispensers of the divine mysteries, as appears from Reply to Objection 3. The key whereby hell is 1 Cor. 4:1. Therefore they ought to have the keys. opened and closed, is the power of bestowing grace, I answer that, In material things a key is an instru- whereby hell is opened to man, so that he is taken out ment for opening a door. Now the door of the kingdom from sin which is the door of hell, and closed, so that is closed to us through sin, both as to the stain and as by the help of grace man should no more fall into sin. to the debt of punishment. Wherefore the power of re- Now the power of bestowing grace belongs to God alone, moving this obstacle is called a key. Now this power is wherefore He kept this key to Himself. But the key of in the Divine Trinity by authority; hence some say that the kingdom is also the power to remit the debt of tem- God has the key of “authority.” But Christ Man had the poral punishment, which debt prevents man from entering power to remove the above obstacle, through the merit of the kingdom Consequently the key of the kingdom can be His Passion, which also is said to open the door; hence given to man rather than the key of hell, for they are not some say that He has the keys of “excellence.” And since the same, as is clear from what has been said. For a man “the sacraments of which the Church is built, flowed from may be set free from hell by the remission of the debt of the side of Christ while He lay asleep on the cross”∗, the eternal punishment, without being at once admitted to the ∗ Augustine, Enarr. in Ps. 138 2696 kingdom, on account of his yet owing a debt of temporal heaven is also the key of hell, since if one is opened to a punishment. man, the other, for that very reason, is closed to him, but It may also be replied, as some state, that the key of it takes its name from the better of the two. Whether the key is the power of binding and loosing, etc.? Suppl. q. 17 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the key is not the open and shut; the object of which act is referred to in the power of binding and loosing, whereby “the ecclesiastical words “from the kingdom,” and the mode, in the words, judge has to admit the worthy to the kingdom and exclude “worthy” and “unworthy,” because account is taken of the the unworthy” therefrom, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, worthiness or unworthiness of those on whom the act is 16). For the spiritual power conferred in a sacrament is exercised. the same as the character. But the key and the character Reply to Objection 1. The same power is directed to do not seem to be the same, since by the character man is two things, of which one is the cause of the other, as heat, referred to God, whereas by the key he is referred to his in fire, is directed to make a thing hot and to melt it. And subjects. Therefore the key is not a power. since every grace and remission in a mystical body comes Objection 2. Further, an ecclesiastical judge is only to it from its head, it seems that it is essentially the same one who has jurisdiction, which is not given at the same power whereby a priest can consecrate, and whereby he time as orders. But the keys are given in the conferring of can loose and bind, if he has jurisdiction, and that there orders. Therefore there should have been no mention of is only a logical difference, according as it is referred to the ecclesiastical judge in the definition of the keys. different effects, even as fire in one respect is said to have Objection 3. Further, when a man has something of the power of heating, and in another, the power of melting. himself, he needs not to be reduced to act by some active And because the character of the priestly order is nothing power. Now a man is admitted to the kingdom from the else than the power of exercising that act to which the very fact that he is worthy. Therefore it does not concern priestly order is chiefly ordained (if we maintain that it is the power of the keys to admit the worthy to the kingdom. the same as a spiritual power), therefore the character, the Objection 4. Further, sinners are unworthy of the power of consecrating, and the power of the keys are one kingdom. But the Church prays for sinners, that they may and the same essentially, but differ logically. go to heaven. Therefore she does not exclude the unwor- Reply to Objection 2. All spiritual power is conferred thy, but admits them, so far as she is concerned. by some kind of consecration. Therefore the key is given Objection 5. Further, in every ordered series of together with the order: yet the use of the key requires agents, the last end belongs to the principal and not to due matter, i.e. a people subject through jurisdiction, so the instrumental agent. But the principal agent in view of that until he has jurisdiction, the priest has the keys, but man’s salvation is God. Therefore admission to the king- he cannot exercise the act of the keys. And since the key dom, which is the last end, belongs to Him, and not to is defined from its act, its definition contains a reference those who have the keys, who are as instrumental or min- to jurisdiction. isterial agents. Reply to Objection 3. A person may be worthy to I answer that, According to the Philosopher (De An- have something in two ways, either so as to have a right to ima ii, text. 33), “powers are defined from their acts.” possess it, and thus whoever is worthy has heaven already Wherefore, since the key is a kind of power, it should be opened to him—or so that it is meet that he should receive defined from its act or use, and reference to the act should it, and thus the power of the keys admits those who are include its object from which it takes its species, and the worthy, but to whom heaven is not yet altogether opened. mode of acting whereby the power is shown to be well- Reply to Objection 4. Even as God hardens not by ordered. Now the act of the spiritual power is to open imparting malice, but by withholding grace, so a priest is heaven, not absolutely, since it is already open, as stated said to exclude, not as though he placed an obstacle to en- above (a. 1, ad 1), but for this or that man; and this cannot trance, but because he does not remove an obstacle which be done in an orderly manner without due consideration of is there, since he cannot remove it unless God has already the worthiness of the one to be admitted to heaven. Hence removed it.∗ Hence God is prayed that He may absolve, the aforesaid definition of the key gives the genus, viz. so that there may be room for the priest’s absolution. “power,” the subject of the power, viz. the “ecclesiastical Reply to Objection 5. The priest’s act does not bear judge,” and the act, viz. “of excluding or admitting,” cor- immediately on the kingdom, but on the sacraments, by responding to the two acts of a material key which are to means of which man wins to the kingdom. ∗ St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. Cf. IIIa, q. 62, a. 1; IIIa, q. 64, a. 1; IIIa, q. 86, a. 6. 2697 Whether there are two keys or only one? Suppl. q. 17 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that there are not two keys tion. but only one. For one lock requires but one key. Now the These two keys are distinct, not in the essence of au- lock for the removal of which the keys of the Church are thority, since both belong to the minister by virtue of his required, is sin. Therefore the Church does not require office, but in comparison with their respective acts, one of two keys for one sin. which presupposes the other. Objection 2. Further, the keys are given when orders Reply to Objection 1. One key is ordained immedi- are conferred. But knowledge is not always due to infu- ately to the opening of one lock, but it is not unfitting that sion, but sometimes is acquired, nor is it possessed by all one key should be ordained to the act of another. Thus it is those who are ordained, and is possessed by some who in the case in point. For it is the second key, which is the are not ordained. Therefore knowledge is not a key, so power of binding and loosing, that opens the lock of sin that there is but one key, viz. the power of judging. immediately, but the key of knowledge shows to whom Objection 3. Further, the power which the priest that lock should be opened. has over the mystic body of Christ flows from the power Reply to Objection 2. There are two opinions about which he has over Christ’s true body. Now the power of the key of knowledge. For some say that knowledge con- consecrating Christ’s true body is but one. Therefore the sidered as a habit, acquired or infused, is the key in this power which regards Christ’s mystic body is but one. But case, and that it is not the principal key, but is called a this is a key. Therefore, etc. key through being subordinate to another key: so that it Objection 4. On the other hand, It seems that there is not called a key when the other key is wanting, for in- are more than two keys. For just as knowledge and power stance, in an educated man who is not a priest. And al- are requisite for man to act, so is will. But the knowledge though priests lack this key at times, through being with- of discretion is reckoned as a key, and so is the power of out knowledge, acquired or infused, of loosing and bind- judging. Therefore the will to absolve should be counted ing, yet sometimes they make use of their natural endeav- as a key. ors, which they who hold this opinion call a little key, so Objection 5. Further, all three Divine Persons remit that although knowledge be not bestowed together with sins. Now the priest, through the keys, is the minister orders, yet with the conferring of orders the knowledge for the remission of sins. Therefore he should have three becomes a key which it was not before. This seems to keys, so that he may be conformed to the Trinity. have been the opinion of the Master (Sent. iv, D, 19). I answer that, Whenever an act requires fitness on the But this does not seem to agree with the words of the part of the recipient, two things are necessary in the one Gospel, whereby the keys are promised to Peter (Mat. who has to perform the act, viz. judgment of the fitness 16:19), so that not only one but two are given in orders. of the recipient, and accomplishment of the act. There- For which reason the other opinion holds that the key is fore in the act of justice whereby a man is given what he not knowledge considered as a habit, but the authority to deserves, there needs to be a judgment in order to discern exercise the act of knowledge, which authority is some- whether he deserves to receive. Again, an authority or times without knowledge, while the knowledge is some- power is necessary for both these things, for we cannot times present without the authority. This may be seen give save what we have in our power; nor can there be even in secular courts, for a secular judge may have the judgment, without the right to enforce it, since judgment authority to judge, without having the knowledge of the is determined to one particular thing, which determination law, while another man, on the contrary, has knowledge of it derives, in speculative matters, from the first principles the law without having the authority to judge. And since which cannot be gainsaid, and, in practical matters, from the act of judging to which a man is bound through the au- the power of command vested in the one who judges. And thority which is vested in him, and not through his habit of since the act of the key requires fitness in the person on knowledge, cannot be well performed without both of the whom it is exercised—because the ecclesiastical judge, above, the authority to judge, which is the key of knowl- by means of the key, “admits the worthy and excludes the edge, cannot be accepted without sin by one who lacks unworthy,” as may be seen from the definition given above knowledge; whereas knowledge void of authority can be (a. 2)—therefore the judge requires both judgment of dis- possessed without sin. cretion whereby he judges a man to be worthy, and also Reply to Objection 3. The power of consecrating is the very act of receiving (that man’s confession); and for directed to only one act of another kind, wherefore it is both these things a certain power or authority is neces- not numbered among the keys, nor is it multiplied as the sary. Accordingly we may distinguish two keys, the first power of the keys, which is directed to different acts, al- of which regards the judgment about the worthiness of the though as to the essence of power and authority it is but person to be absolved, while the other regards the absolu- one, as stated above. 2698 Reply to Objection 4. Everyone is free to will, so for the priest, who is the minister of the Trinity, to have that no one needs authority to will; wherefore will is not three keys: and all the more, since the will, which is ap- reckoned as a key. propriated to the Holy Ghost, requires no key, as stated Reply to Objection 5. All three Persons remit sins in above (ad 4). the same way as one Person, wherefore there is no need 2699 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 18 Of the Effect of the Keys (In Four Articles) We must now consider the effect of the keys under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt? (2) Whether a priest can remit sin as to the punishment? (3) Whether a priest can bind in virtue of the power of the keys? (4) Whether he can loose and bind according to his own judgment? Whether the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt? ∗ Suppl. q. 18 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the power of the keys and then the sacramental virtue is in both together. Some- extends to the remission of guilt. For it was said to the times, however, the essence of the sacrament requires only disciples (Jn. 20:23): “Whose sins you shall forgive, they sanctification of the matter, as in Baptism, which has are forgiven them.” Now this was not said in reference no fixed minister on whom it depends necessarily, and to the declaration only, as the Master states (Sent. iv, D, then the whole virtue of the sacrament is in the matter. 18), for in that case the priest of the New Testament would Again, sometimes the essence of the sacrament requires have no more power than the priest of the Old Testament. the consecration or sanctification of the minister without Therefore he exercises a power over the remission of the any sanctification of the matter, and then the entire sacra- guilt. mental virtue is in the minister, as in Penance. Hence the Objection 2. Further, in Penance grace is given for the power of the keys which is in the priest, stands in the same remission of sin. Now the priest is the dispenser of this relation to the effect of Penance, as the virtue in the bap- sacrament by virtue of the keys. Therefore, since grace is tismal water does to the effect of Baptism. Now Baptism opposed to sin, not on the part of the punishment, but on and the sacrament of Penance agree somewhat in their ef- the part of the guilt, it seems that the priest operates unto fect, since each is directly ordained against guilt, which the remission of sin by virtue of the keys. is not the case in the other sacraments: yet they differ in Objection 3. Further, the priest receives more power this, that the sacrament of Penance, since the acts of the by his consecration than the baptismal water by its sancti- recipient are as its matter, cannot be given save to adults, fication. Now the baptismal water receives the power “to who need to be disposed for the reception of the sacra- touch the body and cleanse the heart,” as Augustine says mental effect; whereas Baptism is given, sometimes to (Tract. lxxx in Joan.). Much more, therefore, does the adults, sometimes to children and others who lack the use priest, in his consecration, receive the power to cleanse of reason, so that by Baptism children receive grace and the heart from the stain of sin. remission of sin without any previous disposition, while On the contrary, The Master stated above (Sent. iv, adults do not, for they require to be disposed by the re- D, 18) that God has not bestowed on the minister the moval of insincerity. This disposition sometimes precedes power to co-operate with Him in the inward cleansing. their Baptism by priority of time, being sufficient for the Now if he remitted sins as to the guilt, he would co- reception of grace, before they are actually baptized, but operate with God in the inward cleansing. Therefore the not before they have come to the knowledge of the truth power of the keys does not extend to the remission of and have conceived the desire for Baptism. At other times guilt. this disposition does not precede the reception of Baptism Further, sin is not remitted save by the Holy Ghost. by a priority of time, but is simultaneous with it, and then But no man has the power to give the Holy Ghost, as the the grace of the remission of guilt is bestowed through the Master said above (Sent. i, D, 14). Neither therefore can reception of Baptism. On the other hand, grace is never he remit sins as to their guilt. given through the sacrament of Penance unless the recip- I answer that, According to Hugh (De Sacram. ii), ient be disposed either simultaneously or before. Hence “the sacraments, by virtue of their sanctification, contain the power of the keys operates unto the remission of guilt, an invisible grace.” Now this sanctification is sometimes either through being desired or through being actually ex- essential to the sacrament both as regards the matter and ercised, even as the waters of Baptism. But just as Bap- as regards the minister, as may be seen in Confirmation, tism acts, not as a principal agent but as an instrument, ∗ St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. Cf. IIIa, q. 62, a. 1; IIIa, q. 64, a. 1; IIIa, q. 86, a. 6 2700 and does not go so far as to cause the reception itself of therein in any way: and thus the sacraments of the Old grace, even instrumentally†, but merely disposes the re- Law signified the Divine operation, so that the priest of cipient to the grace whereby his guilt is remitted, so is it the Old Law did but declare and did not operate the for- with the power of the keys. Wherefore God alone directly giveness of sins. Secondly, by a declaration of present for- remits guilt, and Baptism acts through His power instru- giveness without co-operating in it at all: and thus some mentally, as an inanimate instrument, and the priest as an say that the sacraments of the New Law signify the be- animate instrument, such as a servant is, according to the stowal of grace, which God gives when the sacraments are Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11): and consequently the priest conferred, without the sacraments containing any power acts as a minister. Hence it is clear that the power of the productive of grace, according to which opinion, even the keys is ordained, in a manner, to the remission of guilt, not power of the keys would merely declare the Divine oper- as causing that remission, but as disposing thereto. Con- ation that has its effect in the remission of guilt when the sequently if a man, before receiving absolution, were not sacrament is conferred. Thirdly, by signifying the Divine perfectly disposed for the reception of grace, he would re- operation causing then and there the remission of guilt, ceive grace at the very time of sacramental confession and and by co-operating towards this effect dispositively and absolution, provided he offered no obstacle. For if the key instrumentally: and then, according to another and more were in no way ordained to the remission of guilt, but only common opinion, the sacraments of the New Law declare to the remission of punishment, as some hold, it would not the cleansing effected by God. In this way also the priest be necessary to have a desire of receiving the effect of the of the New Testament declares the recipient to be absolved keys in order to have one’s sins forgiven, just as it is not from guilt, because in speaking of the sacraments, what is necessary to have a desire of receiving the other sacra- ascribed to the power of the ministers must be consistent ments which are ordained, not to the remission of guilt, with the sacrament. Nor is it unreasonable that the keys but against punishment. But this enables us to see that it of the Church should dispose the penitent to the remission is not ordained unto the remission of guilt, because the of his guilt, from the fact that the guilt is already remitted, use of the keys, in order to be effective, always requires a even as neither is it unreasonable that Baptism, consid- disposition on the part of the recipient of the sacrament. ered in itself, causes a disposition in one who is already And the same would apply to Baptism, were it never given sanctified. save to adults. Reply to Objection 2. Neither the sacrament of Reply to Objection 1. As the Master says in the text Penance, nor the sacrament of Baptism, by its operation, (Sent. iv, D, 18), the power of forgiving sins was entrusted causes grace, or the remission of guilt, directly, but only to priests, not that they may forgive them, by their own dispositively†. Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is power, for this belongs to God, but that, as ministers, they evident. may declare∗ the operation of God Who forgives. Now The other arguments show that the power of the keys this happens in three ways. First, by a declaration, not does not effect the remission of guilt directly, and this is of present, but of future forgiveness, without co-operating to be granted. Whether a priest can remit sin as to the punishment? Suppl. q. 18 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that a priest cannot re- ishment for the graver sin be lessened in any way through mit sin as to the punishment. For sin deserves eternal and the priestly administrations, it would be possible for a sin temporal punishment. But after the priest’s absolution the to be so slight that the punishment which it deserves is no penitent is still obliged to undergo temporal punishment greater than that which has been remitted for the graver either in Purgatory or in this world. Therefore the priest sin. Therefore the priest would be able to remit the entire does not remit the punishment in any way. punishment due for the slight sin: which is false. Objection 2. Further, the priest cannot anticipate the Objection 4. Further, the whole of the temporal pun- judgment of God. But Divine justice appoints the pun- ishment due for a sin is of one kind. If, therefore, by a first ishment which penitents have to undergo. Therefore the absolution something is taken away from the punishment, priest cannot remit any part of it. it will be possible for something more to be taken away by Objection 3. Further, a man who has committed a a second absolution, so that the absolution can be so often slight sin, is not less susceptible to the power of the keys, repeated, that by virtue of the keys the whole punishment than one who has committed a graver sin. Now if the pun- will be taken away, since the second absolution is not less † See note at beginning of this article ∗ See note at the beginning of this article † St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. Cf. IIIa, q. 62, a. 1; IIIa, q. 64, a. 1; IIIa, q. 86, a. 6 2701 efficacious than the first: and consequently that sin will be fore receiving absolution. altogether unpunished, which is absurd. Reply to Objection 1. The priest does not remit the On the contrary, The key is the power of binding and entire temporal punishment, but part of it; wherefore the loosing. But the priest can enjoin a temporal punishment. penitent still remains obliged to undergo satisfactory pun- Therefore he can absolve from punishment. ishment. Further, the priest cannot remit sin either as to the Reply to Objection 2. Christ’s Passion was suffi- guilt∗, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 18), or as to the ciently satisfactory for the sins of the whole world, so that eternal punishment, for a like reason. If therefore he can- without prejudice to Divine justice something can be re- not remit sin as to the temporal punishment, he would be mitted from the punishment which a sinner deserves, in so unable to remit sin in any way, which is altogether con- far as the effect of Christ’s Passion reaches him through trary to the words of the Gospel. the sacraments of the Church. I answer that, Whatever may be said of the effect of Reply to Objection 3. Some satisfactory punish- Baptism conferred on one who has already received grace, ment must remain for each sin, so as to provide a remedy applies equally to the effect of the actual exercise of the against it. Wherefore though, by virtue of the absolution power of the keys on one who has already been contrite. some measure of the punishment due to a grave sin is re- For a man may obtain the grace of the remission of his sins mitted, it does not follow that the same measure of pun- as to their guilt, through faith and contrition, previous to ishment is remitted for each sin, because in that case some Baptism; but when, afterwards, he actually receives Bap- sin would remain without any punishment at all: but, by tism, his grace is increased, and he is entirely absolved virtue of the keys, the punishments due to various sins are from the debt of punishment, since he is then made a par- remitted in due proportion. taker of the Passion of Christ. In like manner when a man, Reply to Objection 4. Some say that at the first through contrition, has received the pardon of his sins as absolution, as much as possible is remitted by virtue of to their guilt, and consequently as to the debt of eternal the keys, and that, nevertheless, the second confession is punishment, (which is remitted together with the guilt) valid, on account of the instruction received, on account by virtue of the keys which derive their efficacy from the of the additional surety, on account of the prayers of the Passion of Christ, his grace is increased and the temporal priest or confessor, and lastly on account of the merit of punishment is remitted, the debt of which remained after the shame. the guilt had been forgiven. However, this temporal pun- But this does not seem to be true, for though there ishment is not entirely remitted, as in Baptism, but only might be a reason for repeating the confession, there partly, because the man who is regenerated in Baptism is would be no reason for repeating the absolution, espe- conformed to the Passion of Christ, by receiving into him- cially if the penitent has no cause to doubt about his pre- self entirely the efficacy of Christ’s Passion, which suf- vious absolution; for he might just as well doubt after the fices for the blotting out of all punishment, so that noth- second as after the first absolution: even as we see that the ing remains of the punishment due to his preceding actual sacrament of Extreme Unction is not repeated during the sins. For nothing should be imputed to a man unto punish- same sickness, for the reason that all that could be done ment, save what he has done himself, and in Baptism man through the sacrament, has been done once. Moreover, begins a new life, and by the baptismal water becomes a in the second confession, there would be no need for the new man, as that no debt for previous sin remains in him. confessor to have the keys, if the power of the keys had no on the other hand, in Penance, a man does not take on a effect therein. new life, since therein he is not born again, but healed. For these reasons others say that even in the second Consequently by virtue of the keys which produce their absolution something of the punishment is remitted by effect in the sacrament of Penance, the punishment is not virtue of the keys, because when absolution is given a sec- entirely remitted, but something is taken off the temporal ond time, grace is increased, and the greater the grace re- punishment, the debt of which could remain after the eter- ceived, the less there remains of the blemish of the previ- nal punishment had been remitted. Nor does this apply ous sin, and the less punishment is required to remove that only to the temporal punishment which the penitent owes blemish. Wherefore even when a man is first absolved, at the time of confession, as some hold, (for then confes- his punishment is more or less remitted by virtue of the sion and sacramental absolution would be mere burdens, keys, according as he disposes himself more or less to which cannot be said of the sacraments of the New Law), receive grace; and this disposition may be so great, that but also to the punishment due in Purgatory, so that one even by virtue of his contrition the whole punishment is who has been absolved and dies before making satisfac- remitted, as we have already stated (q. 5, a. 2). Conse- tion, is less punished in Purgatory, than if he had died be- quently it is not unreasonable, if by frequent confession ∗ St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. Cf. IIIa, q. 62, a. 1; IIIa, q. 64, a. 1; IIIa, q. 86, a. 6 2702 even the whole punishment be remitted, that a sin remain its punishment. altogether unpunished, since Christ made satisfaction for Whether the priest can bind through the power of the keys? Suppl. q. 18 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the priest cannot bind harden, when He withholds His grace; whereas His op- by virtue of the power of the keys. For the sacramental eration extends to punishment directly, in both respects, power is ordained as a remedy against sin. Now binding because He both spares and inflicts it. In like manner, is not a remedy for sin, but seemingly is rather conducive therefore, although the priest, in absolving, exercises an to an aggravation of the disease. Therefore, by the power operation ordained to the remission of guilt, in the way of the keys, which is a sacramental power, the priest can- mentioned above (a. 1), nevertheless, in binding, he exer- not bind. cises no operation on the guilt; (unless he be said to bind Objection 2. Further, just as to loose or to open is by not absolving the penitent and by declaring him to be to remove an obstacle, so to bind is to place an obstacle. bound), but he has the power both of binding and of loos- Now an obstacle to heaven is sin, which cannot be placed ing with regard to the punishment. For he looses from on us by an extrinsic cause, since no sin is committed ex- the punishment which he remits, while he binds as to the cept by the will. Therefore the priest cannot bind. punishment which remains. This he does in two ways— Objection 3. Further, the keys derive their efficacy first as regards the quantity of the punishment considered from Christ’s Passion. But binding is not an effect of the in general, and thus he does not bind save by not loosing, Passion. Therefore the priest cannot bind by the power of and declaring the penitent to be bound, secondly, as re- the keys. gards this or that particular punishment, and thus he binds On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 16:19): “What- to punishment by imposing it. soever thou shalt bind on earth, shall be bound also in Reply to Objection 1. The remainder of the pun- heaven.” ishment to which the priest binds the penitent, is the Further, rational powers are directed to opposites. But medicine which cleanses the latter from the blemish of the power of the keys is a rational power, since it has dis- sin. cretion connected with it. Therefore it is directed to oppo- Reply to Objection 2. Not only sin, but also pun- sites. Therefore if it can loose, it can bind. ishment is an obstacle to heaven: and how the latter is I answer that, The operation of the priest in using enjoined by the priest, has been said in the article. the keys, is conformed to God’s operation, Whose minis- Reply to Objection 3. Even the Passion of Christ ter he is. Now God’s operation extends both to guilt and binds us to some punishment whereby we are conformed to punishment; to the guilt indeed, so as to loose it di- to Him. rectly. but to bind it indirectly, in so far as He is said to Whether the priest can bind and loose according to his own judgment? Suppl. q. 18 a. 4 Objection 1. It seems that the priest can bind and struction. Now on some sinners He imposed no punish- loose according to his own judgment. For Jerome∗ says: ment, but only amendment of life, as in the case of the “The canons do not fix the length of time for doing adulterous woman (Jn. 8). Therefore it seems that the penance so precisely as to say how each sin is to be priest also, who is the vicar of Christ, can, according to amended, but leave the decision of this matter to the judg- his own judgment, remit the punishment, either wholly or ment of a discreet priest.” Therefore it seems that he can in part. bind and loose according to his own judgment. On the contrary, Gregory VII† says: “We declare it a Objection 2. Further, “The Lord commended the mock penance if it is not imposed according to the author- unjust steward, forasmuch as he had done wisely” (Lk. ity of the holy fathers in proportion to the sin.” Therefore 16:5), because he had allowed a liberal discount to his it seems that it does not altogether depend on the priest’s master’s debtors. But God is more inclined to mercy judgment. than any temporal lord. Therefore it seems that the more Further, the act of the keys requires discretion. Now if punishment the priest remits, the more he is to be com- the priest could remit and impose as much as he liked of mended. a penance, he would have no need of discretion, because Objection 3. Further, Christ’s every action is our in- there would be no room for indiscretion. Therefore it does ∗ Cf. Can. 86, Mensuram, De Poenit. Dist. i † Cf. Act. Concil. Rom. v, Can. 5 2703 not altogether depend on the priest’s judgment. but his medical science, so the satisfactory punishments I answer that, In using the keys, the priest acts as the appointed by the canons are not suitable to all, but have to instrument and minister of God. Now no instrument can be varied according to the judgment of the priest guided have an efficacious act, except in so far as it is moved by the Divine instinct. Therefore just as sometimes the by the principal agent. Wherefore, Dionysius says (Hier. physician prudently refrains from giving a medicine suffi- Eccl. cap. ult.) that “priests should use their hierarchi- ciently efficacious to heal the disease, lest a greater danger cal powers, according as they are moved by God.” A sign should arise on account of the weakness of nature so the of this is that before the power of the keys was conferred priest, moved by Divine instinct, some times refrains from on Peter (Mat. 16:19) mention is made of the revelation enjoining the entire punishment due to one sin, lest by the vouchsafed to him of the Godhead; and the gift of the severity of the punishment, the sick man come to despair Holy Ghost, whereby “the sons of God are led” (Rom. and turn away altogether from repentance. 8:14), is mentioned before power was given to the apostles Reply to Objection 1. This judgment should be to forgive sins. Consequently if anyone were to presume guided entirely by the Divine instinct. to use his power against that Divine motion, he would Reply to Objection 2. The steward is commended not realize the effect, as Dionysius states (Hier. Eccl., also for having done wisely. Therefore in the remission of cap. ult.), and, besides, he would be turned away from the due punishment, there is need for discretion. the Divine order, and consequently would be guilty of a Reply to Objection 3. Christ had the power of “ex- sin. Moreover, since satisfactory punishments are medici- cellence” in the sacraments, so that, by His own authority, nal, just as the medicines prescribed by the medical art are He could remit the punishment wholly or in part, just as not suitable to all, but have to be changed according to the He chose. Therefore there is no comparison between Him judgment of a medical man, who follows not his own will, and those who act merely as ministers. 2704 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 19 Of the Ministers of the Keys (In Six Articles) We must now consider the ministers and the use of the keys: under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the priest of the Law had the keys? (2) Whether Christ had the keys? (3) Whether priests alone have the keys? (4) Whether holy men who are not priests have the keys or their use? (5) Whether wicked priests have the effective use of the keys? (6) Whether those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or degraded, have the use of the keys? Whether the priest of the Law had the keys? Suppl. q. 19 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the priests of the Law stowed by Christ on the priests of the New Law. had the keys. For the possession of the keys results from But this seems to be contrary to the intent of the Apos- having orders. But they had orders since they were called tle in the Epistle to the Hebrews (Heb. 9:11-12). For there priests. Therefore the priests of the Law had the keys. the priesthood of Christ is given the preference over the Objection 2. Further, as the Master states (Sent. iv, priesthood of the Law, inasmuch as Christ came, “a high D, 18), there are two keys, knowledge of discretion, and priest of the good things to come,” and brought us “by His power of judgment. But the priests of the Law had author- own blood” into a tabernacle not made with hand, whither ity for both of these: therefore they had the keys. the priesthood of the Old Law brought men “by the blood Objection 3. Further, the priests of the Law had of goats and of oxen.” Hence it is clear that the power some power over the rest of the people, which power was of that priesthood did not reach to heavenly things but to not temporal, else the kingly power would not have dif- the shadow of heavenly things: and so, we must say with fered from the priestly power. Therefore it was a spiritual others that they had not the keys, but that the keys were power; and this is the key. Therefore they had the key. foreshadowed in them. On the contrary, The keys are ordained to the open- Reply to Objection 1. The keys of the kingdom go ing of the heavenly kingdom, which could not be opened with the priesthood whereby man is brought into the heav- before Christ’s Passion. Therefore the priest of the Law enly kingdom, but such was not the priesthood of Levi; had not the keys. Further, the sacraments of the old hence it had the keys, not of heaven, but of an earthly Law did not confer grace. Now the gate of the heavenly tabernacle. kingdom could not be opened except by means of grace. Reply to Objection 2. The priests of the Old Law had Therefore it could not be opened by means of those sacra- authority to discern and judge, but not to admit those they ments, so that the priests who administered them, had not judged into heaven, but only into the shadow of heavenly the keys of the heavenly kingdom. things. I answer that, Some have held that, under the Old Reply to Objection 3. They had no spiritual power, Law, the keys of the kingdom were in the hands of the since, by the sacraments of the Law, they cleansed men priests, because the right of imposing punishment for sin not from their sins but from irregularities, so that those was conferred on them, as related in Lev. 5, which right who were cleansed by them could enter into a tabernacle seems to belong to the keys; but that these keys were which was “made with hand.” incomplete then, whereas now they are complete as be- Whether Christ had the key? Suppl. q. 19 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ did not have lence” in the sacraments, so that He could produce the the key. For the key goes with the character of order. But sacramental effect without the sacramental rite. Now the Christ did not have a character. Therefore He had not the key is something sacramental. Therefore He needed no key. key, and it would have been useless to Him to have it. Objection 2. Further, Christ had power of “excel- On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 3:7): “These 2705 things saith. . . He that hath the key of David,” etc. the key, but in a higher way than His ministers, wherefore I answer that, The power to do a thing is both in the He is said to have the key of “excellence.” instrument and in the principal agent, but not in the same Reply to Objection 1. A character implies the notion way since it is more perfectly in the latter. Now the power of something derived from another, hence the power of of the keys which we have, like other sacramental powers, the keys which we receive from Christ results from the is instrumental: whereas it is in Christ as principal agent character whereby we are conformed to Christ, whereas in the matter of our salvation, by authority, if we consider in Christ it results not from a character, but from the prin- Him as God, by merit, if we consider Him as man∗. But cipal form. the very notion of a key expresses a power to open and Reply to Objection 2. The key, which Christ had was shut, whether this be done by the principal agent or by an not sacramental, but the origin of the sacramental key. instrument. Consequently we must admit that Christ had Whether priests alone have the keys? Suppl. q. 19 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that not only priests have heaven, not directly but through the medium of the Church the keys. For Isidore says (Etym. vii, 12) that the “door- Militant. By this key a man goes to heaven, since, by its keepers have to tell the good from the bad, so as to admit means, a man is shut out from or admitted to the fellow- the good and keep out the bad.” Now this is the definition ship of the Church Militant, by excommunication or ab- of the keys, as appears from what has been said (q. 17, solution. This is called the key of “jurisdiction” in the ex- a. 2). Therefore not only priests but even doorkeepers ternal court, wherefore even those who are not priests can have the keys. have this key, e.g. archdeacons, bishops elect, and others Objection 2. Further, the keys are conferred on priests who can excommunicate. But it is not properly called a when by being anointed they receive power from God. key of heaven, but a disposition thereto. But kings of Christian peoples also receive power from Reply to Objection 1. The doorkeepers have the key God and are consecrated by being anointed. Therefore for taking care of those things which are contained in a not only priests have the keys. material temple, and they have to judge whether a person Objection 3. Further, the priesthood is an order be- should be excluded from or admitted to that temple; which longing to an individual person. But sometimes a num- judgment they pronounce, not by their own authority, but ber of people together seem to have the key, because cer- in pursuance to the priest’s judgment, so that they appear tain Chapters can pass a sentence of excommunication, to be the administrators of the priestly power. which pertains to the power of the keys. Therefore not Reply to Objection 2. Kings have no power in spir- only priests have the key. itual matters, so that they do not receive the key of the Objection 4. Further, a woman is not capable of re- heavenly kingdom. Their power is confined to temporal ceiving the priesthood, since she is not competent to teach, matters, and this too can only come to them from God, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 14:34). But some women as appears from Rom. 13:1. Nor are they consecrated by (abbesses, for instance, who exercise a spiritual power the unction of a sacred order: their anointing is merely over their subjects), seem to have the keys. Therefore not a sign that the excellence of their power comes down to only priests have the keys. them from Christ, and that, under Christ, they reign over On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Poenit. i): “This the Christian people. right,” viz. of binding and loosing, “is granted to priests Reply to Objection 3. Just as in civil matters the alone.” whole power is sometimes vested in a judge, as in a king- Further, by receiving the power of the keys, a man is dom, whereas sometimes it is vested in many exercising set up between the people and God. But this belongs to various offices but acting together with equal rights (Ethic. the priest alone, who is “ordained. . . in the things that ap- viii, 10,11), so too, spiritual jurisdiction may be exercised pertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices both by one alone, e.g. a bishop, and by many together, for sins” (Heb. 5:1). Therefore only priests have the keys. e.g. by a Chapter, and thus they have the key of jurisdic- I answer that, There are two kinds of key. one reaches tion, but they have not all together the key of order. to heaven itself directly, by remitting sin and thus remov- Reply to Objection 4. According to the Apostle (1 ing the obstacles to the entrance into heaven; and this is Tim. 2:11; Titus 2:5), woman is in a state of subjection: called the key of “order.” Priests alone have this key, be- wherefore she can have no spiritual jurisdiction, since the cause they alone are ordained for the people in the things Philosopher also says (Ethic. viii) that it is a corruption which appertain to God directly. The other key reaches to of public life when the government comes into the hands ∗ For St. Thomas’ later teaching on this point, Cf. IIIa, q. 48, a. 6; Ia IIae, q. 112, a. 1, AD 1 2706 of a woman. Consequently a woman has neither the key correct other women who are under them, on account of of order nor the key of jurisdiction. Nevertheless a certain the danger that might threaten if men were to dwell under use of the keys is allowed to women, such as the right to the same roof. Whether holy men who are not priests have the keys? Suppl. q. 19 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that holy men, even those God, and by merit is Christ as man,∗ it follows that on ac- who are not priests, have the use of the keys. For loosing count of the very fulness of Divine goodness in Him, and and binding, which are the effects of the keys, derive their of the perfection of His grace, He is competent to exercise efficacy from the merit of Christ’s Passion. Now those are the act of the keys. . But another man is not competent most conformed to Christ’s Passion, who follow Christ, to exercise this act as principal agent, since neither can he suffering by patience and other virtues. Therefore it seems give another man grace whereby sins are remitted, nor can that even if they have not the priestly order, they can bind he merit sufficiently, so that he is nothing more than an in- and loose. strumental agent. Consequently the recipient of the effect Objection 2. Further, it is written (Heb. 7:7): “With- of the keys, is likened, not to the one who uses the keys, out all contradiction, that which is less is blessed by the but to Christ. Therefore, no matter how much grace a man greater [Vulg.: ‘better’].” Now “in spiritual matters,” ac- may have, he cannot produce the effect of the keys, unless cording to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 8), “to be better is to he be appointed to that purpose by receiving orders. be greater.” Therefore those who are better, i.e. who have Reply to Objection 1. Just as between instrument and more charity, can bless others by absolving them. Hence effect there is need or likeness, not of a similar form, but the same conclusion follows. of aptitude in the instrument for the effect, so is it as re- On the contrary, “Action belongs to that which has gards the instrument and the principal agent. The former the power,” as the Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigil. is the likeness between holy men and the suffering Christ, i). But the key which is a spiritual power belongs to priests nor does it bestow on them the use of the keys. alone. Therefore priests alone are competent to have the Reply to Objection 2. Although a mere man cannot use of the keys. merit grace for another man condignly, yet the merit of I answer that, There is this difference between a prin- one man can co-operate in the salvation of another. Hence cipal and an instrumental agent, that the latter does not there is a twofold blessing. One proceeds from a mere produce, in the effect, its own likeness, but the likeness of man, as meriting by his own act: this blessing can be con- the principal agent, whereas the principal agent produces ferred by any holy person in whom Christ dwells by His its own likeness. Consequently a thing becomes a princi- grace, in so far as he excels in goodness the person whom pal agent through having a form, which it can reproduce in he blesses. The other blessing is when a man blesses, as another, whereas an instrumental agent is not constituted applying a blessing instrumentally through the merit of thus, but through being applied by the principal agent in Christ, and this requires excellence of order and not of order to produce a certain effect. Since therefore in the virtue. act of the keys the principal agent by authority is Christ as Whether wicked priests have the use of the keys? Suppl. q. 19 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that wicked priests have Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Bapt. v, not the use of the keys. For in the passage where the use 21) that God “gives the sacrament of grace even through of the keys is bestowed on the apostles (Jn. 20:22,23), the wicked men, but grace itself only by Himself or through gift of the Holy Ghost is promised. But wicked men have His saints.” Hence He forgives sin by Himself, or by those not the Holy Ghost. Therefore they have not the use of the who are members of the Dove. But the remission of sins is keys. the use of the keys. Therefore sinners, who are not “mem- Objection 2. Further, no wise king entrusts his en- bers of the Dove,” have not the use of the keys. emy with the dispensation of his treasure. Now the use Objection 4. Further, the prayer of a wicked priest of the keys consists in dispensing the treasure of the King cannot effect reconciliation, for, as Gregory says (Pas- of heaven, Who is Wisdom itself. Therefore the wicked, tor. i, 11), “if an unacceptable person is sent to intercede, who are His enemies on account of sin, have not the use anger is provoked to yet greater severity.” But the use of of the keys. the keys implies a kind of intercession, as appears in the ∗ For St. Thomas’ later teaching on this point, cf. IIIa, q. 48, a. 6; Ia IIae, q. 112, a. 1, ad 1 2707 form of absolution. Therefore wicked priests cannot use the King of heaven cannot be cheated, because all tends to the keys effectively. His own glory, even the abuse of the keys by some, for He On the contrary, No man can know whether another can make good come out of evil, and produce many good man is in the state of grace. If, therefore, no one could effects through evil men. Hence the comparison fails. use the keys in giving absolution unless he were in a state Reply to Objection 3. Augustine speaks of the remis- of grace, no one would know that he had been absolved, sion of sins in so far as holy men co-operate therein, not which would be very unfitting. by virtue of the keys, but by merit of congruity. Hence He Further, the wickedness of the minister cannot void the says that God confers the sacraments even through evil liberality of his lord. But the priest is no more than a min- men, and among the other sacraments, absolution which ister. Therefore he cannot by his wickedness take away is the use of the keys should be reckoned: but that through from us the gift which God has given through him. “members of the Dove,” i.e. holy men, He grants forgive- I answer that, Just as participation of a form to be ness of sins, in so far as He remits sins on account of their induced into an effect does not make a thing to be an intercession. instrument, so neither does the loss of that form prevent We might also reply that by “members of the Dove” he that thing being used as an instrument. Consequently, means all who are not cut off from the Church, for those since man is merely an instrument in the use of the keys, who receive the sacraments from them, receive grace, however much he may through sin be deprived of grace, whereas those who receive the sacraments from those who whereby sins are forgiven, yet he is by no means deprived are cut off from the Church, do not receive grace, because of the use of the keys. they sin in so doing, except in the case of Baptism, which, Reply to Objection 1. The gift of the Holy Ghost is in cases of necessity, may be received even from one who requisite for the use of the keys, not as being indispens- is excommunicate. able for the purpose, but because it is unbecoming for the Reply to Objection 4. The prayer which the wicked user to use them without it, though he that submits to them priest proffers on his own account, is not efficacious: but receives their effect. that which he makes as a minister of the Church, is effi- Reply to Objection 2. An earthly king can be cheated cacious through the merit of Christ. Yet in both ways the and deceived in the matter of his treasure, and so he does priest’s prayer should profit those who are subject to him. not entrust his enemy with the dispensation thereof. But Whether those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or degraded Suppl. q. 19 a. 6 have the use of the keys? Objection 1. It would seem that those who are schis- Joan.) that the “charity of the Church forgives sins.” Now matics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or degraded it is the charity of the Church which unites its members. have the use of the keys. For just as the power of the keys Since therefore the above are disunited from the Church, results from orders, so does the power of consecration. it seems that they have not the use of the keys in remitting But the above cannot lose the use of the power of conse- sins. cration, since if they do consecrate it is valid, though they Further, no man is absolved from sin by sinning. Now sin in doing so. Therefore neither can they lose the use of it is a sin for anyone to seek absolution of his sins from the the keys. above, for he disobeys the Church in so doing. Therefore Objection 2. Further, any active spiritual power in he cannot be absolved by them: and so the same conclu- one who has the use of his free-will can be exercised by sion follows. him when he wills. Now the power of the keys remains I answer that, In all the above the power of the keys in the aforesaid, for, since it is only conferred with orders, remains as to its essence, but its use is hindered on account they would have to be reordained when they return to the of the lack of matter. For since the use of the keys requires Church. Therefore, since it is an active power, they can in the user authority over the person on whom they are exercise it when they will. used, as stated above (q. 17, a. 2, ad 2), the proper matter Objection 3. Further, spiritual grace is hindered by on whom one can exercise the use of the keys is a man guilt more than by punishment. Now excommunication, under one’s authority. And since it is by appointment of suspension and degradation are punishments. Therefore, the Church that one man has authority over another, so a since a man does not lose the use of the keys on account man may be deprived of his authority over another by his of guilt, it seems that he does not lose it on account of the ecclesiastical superiors. Consequently, since the Church aforesaid. deprives heretics, schismatics and the like, by withdraw- On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. cxxi in ing their subjects from them either altogether or in some 2708 respect, in so far as they are thus deprived, they cannot ity, yet he can baptize and consecrate, albeit to his own have the use of the keys. damnation. Reply to Objection 1. The matter of the sacrament of Reply to Objection 2. The assertion is true, provided the Eucharist, on which the priest exercises his power, is matter be not lacking as it is in the case in point. not a man but wheaten bread, and in Baptism, the matter Reply to Objection 3. Sin, of itself, does not remove is simply a man. Wherefore, just as, were a heretic to be matter, as certain punishments do: so that punishment is without wheaten bread, he could not consecrate, so nei- a hindrance not because it is contrary to the effect, but for ther can a prelate absolve if he be deprived of his author- the reason stated. 2709 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 20 Of Those On Whom the Power of the Keys Can Be Exercised (In Three Articles) We must now consider those on whom the power of the keys can be exercised. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether a priest can use the key, which he has, on any man? (2) Whether a priest can always absolve his subject? (3) Whether anyone can use the keys on his superior? Whether a priest can use the key which he has, on any man? Suppl. q. 20 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that a priest can use the inately, a place is given to the Principalities, who are ap- key which he has, on any man. For the power of the keys pointed to individual kingdoms, and to the Angels who are was bestowed on priests by Divine authority in the words: given charge over individual men, as we have explained “Receive ye the Holy Ghost; whose sins you shall forgive, above ( Ia, q. 113, Aa. 1,2). Consequently there should they are forgiven them” (Jn. 20:22,23). But this was said be a like order of authority in the Church Militant, so that without any restriction. Therefore he that has the key, can an indiscriminate authority over all should be vested in use it on any without restriction. one individual, and that there should be others under him, Objection 2. Further, a material key that opens one having distinct authority over various people. Now the use lock, opens all locks of the same pattern. Now every sin of the keys implies a certain power to exercise authority, of every man is the same kind of obstacle against entering whereby the one on whom the keys are used, becomes the into heaven. Therefore if a priest can, by means of the key proper matter of that act. Therefore he that has power over which he has, absolve one man, he can do the same for all all indiscriminately, can use the keys on all, whereas those others. who have received authority over distinct persons, cannot Objection 3. Further, the priesthood of the New Tes- use the keys on everyone, but only on those over whom tament is more perfect than that of the Old Testament. But they are appointed, except in cases of necessity, when the the priest of the Old Testament could use the power which sacraments should be refused to no one. he had of discerning between different kinds of leprosy, Reply to Objection 1. A twofold power is required with regard to all indiscriminately. Much more therefore in order to absolve from sins, namely, power of order and can the priest of the Gospel use his power with regard to power of jurisdiction. The former power is equally in all all. priests, but not the latter. And therefore, when our Lord On the contrary, It is written in the Appendix of Gra- (Jn. 20:23) gave all the apostles in general, the power of tian: “It is not lawful for every priest to loose or bind forgiving sins, this is to be understood of the power which another priest’s parishioner.” Therefore a priest cannot results from receiving orders, wherefore these words are absolve everybody. addressed to priests when they are ordained. But to Peter Further, judgment in spiritual matters should be bet- in particular He gave the power of forgiving sins (Mat. ter regulated than in temporal matters. But in temporal 16:19), that we may understand that he has the power matters a judge cannot judge everybody. Therefore, since of jurisdiction before the others. But the power of or- the use of the keys is a kind of judgment, it is not within ders, considered in itself, extends to all who can be ab- the competency of a priest to use his key with regard to solved: wherefore our Lord said indeterminately, “Whose everyone. sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them,” on the un- I answer that, That which has to do with singular derstanding that this power should be used in dependence matters is not equally in the power of all. Thus, even as on the power given to Peter, according to His appoint- besides the general principles of medicine, it is necessary ment. to have physicians, who adapt those general principles to Reply to Objection 2. A material key can open only individual patients or diseases, according to their various its own lock. nor can any active force act save on its own requirements, so in every kingdom, besides that one who matter. Now a man becomes the matter of the power of proclaims the universal precepts of law, there is need for order by jurisdiction: and consequently no one can use others to adapt those precepts to individual cases, accord- the key in respect of another over whom he has not juris- ing as each case demands. For this reason, in the heav- diction. enly hierarchy also, under the Powers who rule indiscrim- Reply to Objection 3. The people of Israel were one 2710 people, and had but one temple, so that there was no need the Church which comprises various peoples and nations. for a distinction in priestly jurisdiction, as there is now in Whether a priest can always absolve his subject? Suppl. q. 20 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that a priest cannot al- judgment of which he does not commit to his inferior; ways absolve his subject. For, as Augustine says (De vera otherwise any simple priest who has jurisdiction can ab- et false Poenitentia∗), “no man should exercise the priestly solve from any sin. Now there are five cases in which a office, unless he be free from those things which he con- simple priest must refer his penitent to his superior. The demns in others.” But a priest might happen to share in first is when a public penance has to be imposed, because a sin committed by his subject, e.g. by knowledge of a in that case the bishop is the proper minister of the sacra- woman who is his subject. Therefore it seems that he can- ment. The second is the case of those who are excommu- not always use the power of the keys on his subjects. nicated when the inferior priest cannot absolve a penitent Objection 2. Further, by the power of the keys a man through the latter being excommunicated by his superior. is healed of all his shortcomings. Now it happens some- The third case is when he finds that an irregularity has times that a sin has attached to it a defect of irregularity been contracted, for the dispensation of which he has to or a sentence of excommunication, from which a simple have recourse to his superior. The fourth is the case of priest cannot absolve. Therefore it seems that he cannot arson. The fifth is when it is the custom in a diocese for use the power of the keys on such as are shackled by these the more heinous crimes to be reserved to the bishop, in things in the above manner. order to inspire fear, because custom in these cases either Objection 3. Further, the judgment and power of our gives the power or takes it away. priesthood was foreshadowed by the judgment of the an- Reply to Objection 1. In this case the priest should cient priesthood. Now according to the Law, the lesser not hear the confession of his accomplice, with regard judges were not competent to decide all cases, and had re- to that particular sin, but must refer her to another: nor course to the higher judges, according to Ex. 24:14: “If should she confess to him but should ask permission to go any question shall arise” among you, “you shall refer it to another, or should have recourse to his superior if he to them.” It seems, therefore, that a priest cannot absolve refused, both on account of the danger, and for the sake of his subject from graver sins, but should refer him to his less shame. If, however, he were to absolve her it would superior. be valid‡: because when Augustine says that they should On the contrary, Whoever has charge of the princi- not be guilty of the same sin, he is speaking of what is pal has charge of the accessory. Now priests are charged congruous, not of what is essential to the sacrament. with the dispensation of the Eucharist to their subjects, Reply to Objection 2. Penance delivers man from all to which sacrament the absolution of sins is subordinate†. defects of guilt, but not from all defects of punishment, Therefore, as far as the power of the keys is concerned, a since even after doing penance for murder, a man remains priest can absolve his subject from any sins whatever. irregular. Hence a priest can absolve from a crime, but Further, grace, however small, removes all sin. But for the remission of the punishment he must refer the pen- a priest dispenses sacraments whereby grace is given. itent to the superior, except in the case of excommuni- Therefore, as far as the power of the keys is concerned, cation, absolution from which should precede absolution he can absolve from all sins. from sin, for as long as a man is excommunicated, he can- I answer that, The power of order, considered in it- not receive any sacrament of the Church. self, extends to the remission of all sins. But since, as Reply to Objection 3. This objection considers those stated above, the use of this power requires jurisdiction cases in which superiors reserve the power of jurisdiction which inferiors derive from their superiors, it follows that to themselves. the superior can reserve certain matters to himself, the Whether a man can use the keys with regard to his superior? Suppl. q. 20 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that a man cannot use the (q. 19, a. 6). Therefore a priest cannot use the keys in keys in respect of a superior. For every sacramental act respect of one who is not his subject. requires its proper matter. Now the proper matter for the Objection 2. Further, the Church Militant is an image use of the keys, is a person who is subject, as stated above of the Church Triumphant. Now in the heavenly Church ∗ Work of an unknown author † Cf. q. 17, a. 2, ad 1 ‡ Benedict XIV declared the absolution of an accomplice “in materia turpi” to be invalid. 2711 an inferior angel never cleanses, enlightens or perfects a and therefore on someone else, for no man can be subject higher angel. Therefore neither can an inferior priest exer- to himself. cise on a superior a hierarchical action such as absolution. Reply to Objection 1. Although the bishop whom a Objection 3. Further, the judgment of Penance should simple priest absolves is his superior absolutely speaking, be better regulated than the judgment of an external court. yet he is beneath him in so far as he submits himself as a Now in the external court an inferior cannot excommuni- sinner to him. cate or absolve his superior. Therefore, seemingly, neither Reply to Objection 2. In the angels there can be no can he do so in the penitential court. defect by reason of which the higher angel can submit to On the contrary, The higher prelate is also “com- the lower, such as there can happen to be among men; and passed with infirmity,” and may happen to sin. Now the so there is no comparison. power of the keys is the remedy for sin. Therefore, since Reply to Objection 3. External judgment is accord- he cannot use the key on himself, for he cannot be both ing to men, whereas the judgment of confession is accord- judge and accused at the same time, it seems that an infe- ing to God, in Whose sight a man is lessened by sinning, rior can use the power of the keys on him. which is not the case in human prelacy. Therefore just as Further, absolution which is given through the power in external judgment no man can pass sentence of excom- of the keys, is ordained to the reception of the Eucharist. munication on himself, so neither can he empower another But an inferior can give Communion to his superior, if the to excommunicate him. On the other hand, in the tribunal latter asks him to. Therefore he can use the power of the of conscience he can give another the power to absolve keys on him if he submit to him. him, though he cannot use that power himself. I answer that, The power of the keys, considered in It may also be replied that absolution in the tri- itself, is applicable to all, as stated above (a. 2): and that a bunal of the confessional belongs principally to the power priest is unable to use the keys on some particular person of the keys and consequently to the power of jurisdic- is due to his power being limited to certain individuals. tion, whereas excommunication regards jurisdiction ex- Therefore he who limited his power can extend it to whom clusively. And, as to the power of orders, all are equal, he wills, so that he can give him power over himself, al- but not as to jurisdiction. Wherefore there is no compari- though he cannot use the power of the keys on himself, son. because this power requires to be exercised on a subject, 2712 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 21 Of the Definition, Congruity and Cause of Excommunication (In Four Articles) We must now treat of excommunication: we shall consider: (1) the definition, congruity and cause of excommunication; (2) who has the power to excommunicate; (3) communication with excommunicated persons; (4) absolution from excommunication. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether excommunication is suitably defined? (2) Whether the Church should excommunicate anyone? (3) Whether anyone should be excommunicated for inflicting temporal harm? (4) Whether an excommunication unjustly pronounced has any effect? Whether excommunication is suitably defined as separation from the communion of Suppl. q. 21 a. 1 the Church, etc? Objection 1. It would seem that excommunication vation of communion with the faithful, but not of the par- is unsuitably defined by some thus: “Excommunication ticipation of the sacraments, for the reason already given, is separation from the communion of the Church, as to because, to wit, the faithful communicate together in the fruit and general suffrages.” For the suffrages of the sacraments. Now communion with the faithful is twofold. Church avail for those for whom they are offered. But One consists in spiritual things, such as their praying for the Church prays for those who are outside the Church, one another, and meeting together for the reception of sa- as, for instance, for heretics and pagans. Therefore she cred things; while another consists in certain legitimate prays also for the excommunicated, since they are outside bodily actions. These different manners of communion the Church, and so the suffrages of the Church avail for are signified in the verse which declares that those who them. are excommunicate are deprived of— Objection 2. Further, no one loses the suffrages of the “os, orare, vale, communio, mensa.” Church except by his own fault. Now excommunication “Os,” i.e. we must not give them tokens of goodwill; is not a fault, but a punishment. Therefore excommunica- “orare,” i.e. we must not pray with them; “vale,” we must tion does not deprive a man of the general suffrages of the not give them marks of respect; “communio,” i.e. we must Church. not communicate with them in the sacraments; “mensa,” Objection 3. Further, the fruit of the Church seems to i.e. we must not take meals with them. Accordingly the be the same as the Church’s suffrages, for it cannot mean above definition includes privation of the sacraments in the fruit of temporal goods, since excommunication does the words “as to the fruit,” and from partaking together not deprive a man of these. Therefore there is no reason with the faithful in spiritual things, in the words, “and the for mentioning both. general prayers of the Church.” Objection 4. Further, there is a kind of excommu- Another definition is given which expresses the priva- nication called minor∗, by which man is not deprived of tion of both kinds of acts, and is as follows: “Excommu- the suffrages of the Church. Therefore this definition is nication is the privation of all lawful communion with the unsuitable. faithful.” I answer that, When a man enters the Church by Bap- Reply to Objection 1. Prayers are said for unbeliev- tism, he is admitted to two things, viz. the body of the ers, but they do not receive the fruit of those prayers unless faithful and the participation of the sacraments: and this they be converted to the faith. In like manner prayers may latter presupposes the former, since the faithful are united be offered up for those who are excommunicated, but not together in the participation of the sacraments. Conse- among the prayers that are said for the members of the quently a person may be expelled from the Church in two Church. Yet they do not receive the fruit so long as they ways. First, by being deprived merely of the participa- remain under the excommunication, but prayers are said tion of the sacraments, and this is the minor excommu- for them that they may receive the spirit of repentance, so nication. Secondly, by being deprived of both, and this that they may be loosed from excommunication. is the major excommunication, of which the above is the Reply to Objection 2. One man’s prayers profit an- definition. Nor can there be a third, consisting in the pri- other in so far as they can reach to him. Now the ac- ∗ Minor excommunication is no longer recognized by Canon Law. 2713 tion of one man may reach to another in two ways. First, Church which are offered up for the whole Church, do not by virtue of charity which unites all the faithful, making profit those who are excommunicated. Nor can prayers them one in God, according to Ps. 118:63: “I am a par- be said for them among the members of the Church as taker with all them that fear Thee.” Now excommunica- speaking in the Church’s name, although a private indi- tion does not interrupt this union, since no man can be vidual may say a prayer with the intention of offering it justly excommunicated except for a mortal sin, whereby for their conversion. a man is already separated from charity, even without be- Reply to Objection 3. The spiritual fruit of the ing excommunicated. An unjust excommunication can- Church is derived not only from her prayers, but also from not deprive a man of charity, since this is one of the the sacraments received and from the faithful dwelling to- greatest of all goods, of which a man cannot be deprived gether. against his will. Secondly, through the intention of the Reply to Objection 4. The minor excommunication one who prays, which intention is directed to the person does not fulfill all the conditions of excommunication but he prays for, and this union is interrupted by excommu- only a part of them, hence the definition of excommuni- nication, because by passing sentence of excommunica- cation need not apply to it in every respect, but only in tion, the Church severs a man from the whole body of the some. faithful, for whom she prays. Hence those prayers of the Whether the Church should excommunicate anyone? Suppl. q. 21 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the Church ought For by severing a man from the communion of the faithful not to excommunicate anyone, because excommunication that he may blush with shame, she imitates the judgment is a kind of curse, and we are forbidden to curse (Rom. whereby God chastises man with stripes; and by depriv- 12:14). Therefore the Church should not excommunicate. ing him of prayers and other spiritual things, she imitates Objection 2. Further, the Church Militant should imi- the judgment of God in leaving man to himself, in order tate the Church Triumphant. Now we read in the epistle of that by humility he may learn to know himself and return Jude (verse 9) that “when Michael the Archangel disput- to God. ing with the devil contended about the body of Moses, he Reply to Objection 1. A curse may be pronounced in durst not bring against him the judgment of railing speech, two ways: first, so that the intention of the one who curses but said: The Lord command thee.” Therefore the Church is fixed on the evil which he invokes or pronounces, and Militant ought not to judge any man by cursing or excom- cursing in this sense is altogether forbidden. Secondly, so municating him. that the evil which a man invokes in cursing is intended Objection 3. Further, no man should be given into the for the good of the one who is cursed, and thus cursing hands of his enemies, unless there be no hope for him. is sometimes lawful and salutary: thus a physician makes Now by excommunication a man is given into the hands a sick man undergo pain, by cutting him, for instance, in of Satan, as is clear from 1 Cor. 5:5. Since then we should order to deliver him from his sickness. never give up hope about anyone in this life, the Church Reply to Objection 2. The devil cannot be brought to should not excommunicate anyone. repentance, wherefore the pain of excommunication can- On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. 5:5) ordered a not do him any good. man to be excommunicated. Reply to Objection 3. From the very fact that a man Further, it is written (Mat. 18:17) about the man who is deprived of the prayers of the Church, he incurs a triple refuses to hear the Church: “Let him be to thee as the hea- loss, corresponding to the three things which a man ac- then or publican.” But heathens are outside the Church. quires through the Church’s prayers. For they bring an Therefore they also who refuse to hear the Church, should increase of grace to those who have it, or merit grace be banished from the Church by excommunication. for those who have it not; and in this respect the Mas- I answer that, The judgment of the Church should be ter of the Sentences says (Sent. iv, D, 18): “The grace conformed to the judgment of God. Now God punishes of God is taken away by excommunication.” They also the sinner in many ways, in order to draw him to good, prove a safeguard of virtue; and in this respect he says either by chastising him with stripes, or by leaving him to that “protection is taken away,” not that the excommuni- himself so that being deprived of those helps whereby he cated person is withdrawn altogether from God’s provi- was kept out of evil, he may acknowledge his weakness, dence, but that he is excluded from that protection with and humbly return to God Whom he had abandoned in his which He watches over the children of the Church in a pride. In both these respects the Church by passing sen- more special way. Moreover, they are useful as a defense tence of excommunication imitates the judgment of God. against the enemy, and in this respect he says that “the 2714 devil receives greater power of assaulting the excommu-his body by the devil. Nor is it unreasonable that one, for nicated person, both spiritually and corporally.” Hence whom there is still hope, be given over to the enemy, for in the early Church, when men had to be enticed to the he is surrendered, not unto damnation, but unto correc- faith by means of outward signs (thus the gift of the Holy tion, since the Church has the power to rescue him from Ghost was shown openly by a visible sign), so too excom- the hands of the enemy, whenever he is willing. munication was evidenced by a person being troubled in Whether anyone should be excommunicated for inflicting temporal harm? Suppl. q. 21 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that no man should be his body or in his temporalities, one may sin mortally and excommunicated for inflicting a temporal harm. For the act against charity, the Church can excommunicate a man punishment should not exceed the fault. But the punish- for having inflicted temporal injury on anyone. Yet, as ex- ment of excommunication is the privation of a spiritual communication is the most severe punishment, and since good, which surpasses all temporal goods. Therefore no punishments are intended as remedies, according to the man should be excommunicated for temporal injuries. Philosopher (Ethic. ii), and again since a prudent physi- Objection 2. Further, we should render to no man evil cian begins with lighter and less risky remedies, therefore for evil, according to the precept of the Apostle (Rom. excommunication should not be inflicted, even for a mor- 12:17). But this would be rendering evil for evil, if a tal sin, unless the sinner be obstinate, either by not com- man were to be excommunicated for doing such an injury. ing up for judgment, or by going away before judgment Therefore this ought by no means to be done. is pronounced, or by failing to obey the decision of the On the contrary, Peter sentenced Ananias and court. For then, if, after due warning, he refuse to obey, Saphira to death for keeping back the price of their piece he is reckoned to be obstinate, and the judge, not being of land (Acts 5:1-10). Therefore it is lawful for the Church able to proceed otherwise against him, must excommuni- to excommunicate for temporal injuries. cate him. I answer that, By excommunication the ecclesiasti- Reply to Objection 1. A fault is not measured by cal judge excludes a man, in a sense, from the kingdom. the extent of the damage a man does, but by the will Wherefore, since he ought not to exclude from the king- with which he does it, acting against charity. Wherefore, dom others than the unworthy, as was made clear from though the punishment of excommunication exceeds the the definition of the keys (q. 17, a. 2), and since no one harm done, it does not exceed the measure of the sin. becomes unworthy, unless, through committing a mortal Reply to Objection 2. When a man is corrected by be- sin, he lose charity which is the way leading to the king- ing punished, evil is not rendered to him, but good: since dom, it follows that no man should be excommunicated punishments are remedies, as stated above. except for a mortal sin. And since by injuring a man in Whether an excommunication unjustly pronounced has any effect? Suppl. q. 21 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that an excommunication I answer that, An excommunication may be unjust which is pronounced unjustly has no effect at all. Because for two reasons. First, on the part of its author, as excommunication deprives a man of the protection and when anyone excommunicates through hatred or anger, grace of God, which cannot be forfeited unjustly. There- and then, nevertheless, the excommunication takes effect, fore excommunication has no effect if it be unjustly pro- though its author sins, because the one who is excommu- nounced. nicated suffers justly, even if the author act wrongly in Objection 2. Further, Jerome says (on Mat. 16:19: “I excommunicating him. Secondly, on the part of the ex- will give to thee the keys”): “It is a pharisaical severity communication, through there being no proper cause, or to reckon as really bound or loosed, that which is bound through the sentence being passed without the forms of or loosed unjustly.” But that severity was proud and er- law being observed. In this case, if the error, on the part roneous. Therefore an unjust excommunication has no of the sentence, be such as to render the sentence void, effect. this has no effect, for there is no excommunication; but On the contrary, According to Gregory (Hom. xxvi if the error does not annul the sentence, this takes ef- in Evang.), “the sentence of the pastor is to be feared fect, and the person excommunicated should humbly sub- whether it be just or unjust.” Now there would be no rea- mit (which will be credited to him as a merit), and either son to fear an unjust excommunication if it did not hurt. seek absolution from the person who has excommunicated Therefore, etc. him, or appeal to a higher judge. If, however, he were to 2715 contemn the sentence, he would “ipso facto” sin mortally. God’s grace unjustly, yet he can unjustly lose those things But sometimes it happens that there is sufficient cause which on our part dispose us to receive grace. for instance, on the part of the excommunicator, but not on the part a man may be deprived of the instruction which he ought of the excommunicated, as when a man is excommuni- to have. It is in this sense that excommunication is said cated for a crime which he has not committed, but which to deprive a man of God’s grace, as was explained above has been proved against him: in this case, if he submit (a. 2, ad 3). humbly, the merit of his humility will compensate him for Reply to Objection 2. Jerome is speaking of sin not the harm of excommunication. of its punishments, which can be inflicted unjustly by ec- Reply to Objection 1. Although a man cannot lose clesiastical superiors. 2716 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 22 Of Those Who Can Excommunicate or Be Excommunicated (In Six Articles) We must now consider those who can excommunicate or be excommunicated. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether every priest can excommunicate? (2) Whether one who is not a priest can excommunicate? (3) Whether one who is excommunicated or suspended, can excommunicate? (4) Whether anyone can excommunicate himself, or an equal, or a superior? (5) Whether a multitude can be excommunicated? (6) Whether one who is already excommunicated can be excommunicated again? Whether every priest can excommunicate? Suppl. q. 22 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that every priest can ex- ine and the like, in which the law allows them to excom- communicate. For excommunication is an act of the keys. municate. Others, however, have maintained that even But every priest has the keys. Therefore every priest can parish priests can excommunicate: but the former opin- excommunicate. ion is more reasonable. Objection 2. Further, it is a greater thing to loose and Reply to Objection 1. Excommunication is an act bind in the tribunal of penance than in the tribunal of judg- of the keys not directly, but with respect to the external ment. But every priest can loose and bind his subjects in judgment. The sentence of excommunication, however, the tribunal of Penance. Therefore every priest can ex- though it is promulgated by an external verdict, still, as it communicate his subjects. belongs somewhat to the entrance to the kingdom, in so On the contrary, Matters fraught with danger should far as the Church Militant is the way to the Church Tri- be left to the decision of superiors. Now the punishment umphant, this jurisdiction whereby a man is competent to of excommunication is fraught with many dangers, unless excommunicate, can be called a key. It is in this sense it be inflicted with moderation. Therefore it should not be that some distinguish between the key of orders, which all entrusted to every priest. priests have, and the key of jurisdiction in the tribunal of I answer that, In the tribunal of conscience the plea is judgment, which none have but the judges of the external between man and God, whereas in the outward tribunal it tribunal. Nevertheless God bestowed both on Peter (Mat. is between man and man. Wherefore the loosing or bind- 16:19), from whom they are derived by others, whichever ing of one man in relation to God alone, belongs to the of them they have. tribunal of Penance, whereas the binding or loosing of a Reply to Objection 2. Parish priests have jurisdiction man in relation to other men, belongs to the public tri- indeed over their subjects, in the tribunal of conscience, bunal of external judgment. And since excommunication but not in the judicial tribunal, for they cannot summons severs a man from the communion of the faithful, it be- them in contentious cases. Hence they cannot excom- longs to the external tribunal. Consequently those alone municate, but they can absolve them in the tribunal of can excommunicate who have jurisdiction in the judicial Penance. And though the tribunal of Penance is higher, tribunal. Hence, of their own authority, only bishops and yet more solemnity is requisite in the judicial tribunal, be- higher prelates, according to the more common opinion cause therein it is necessary to make satisfaction not only can excommunicate, whereas parish priests can do so only to God but also to man. by commission or in certain cases, as those of theft, rap- Whether those who are not priests can excommunicate? Suppl. q. 22 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that those who are not Objection 2. Further, more is required for excommu- priests cannot excommunicate. Because excommunica- nication than for absolution in the tribunal of Penance. tion is an act of the keys, as stated in Sent. iv, D, 18. But But one who is not a priest cannot absolve in the tribunal those who are not priests have not the keys. Therefore of Penance. Neither therefore can he excommunicate. they cannot excommunicate. On the contrary, Archdeacons, legates and bishops- 2717 elect excommunicate, and yet sometimes they are not priests, provided they have jurisdiction in a contentious priests. Therefore not only priests can excommunicate. court, can excommunicate. I answer that, Priests alone are competent to dis- Reply to Objection 1. Though they have not the key pense the sacraments wherein grace is given: wherefore of orders, they have the key of jurisdiction. they alone can loose and bind in the tribunal of Penance. Reply to Objection 2. These two are related to On the other hand excommunication regards grace, not di- one another as something exceeding and something ex- rectly but consequently, in so far as it deprives a man of ceeded∗, and consequently one of them may be within the the Church’s prayers, by which he is disposed for grace or competency of someone while the other is not. preserved therein. Consequently even those who are not Whether a man who is excommunicated or suspended can excommunicate another? Suppl. q. 22 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that one who is excom- faithful, he is deprived of the use of jurisdiction. And municated or suspended can excommunicate another. For as excommunication requires jurisdiction, an excommuni- such a one has lost neither orders nor jurisdiction, since cated person cannot excommunicate, and the same reason neither is he ordained anew when he is absolved, nor is applies to one who is suspended from jurisdiction. For if his jurisdiction renewed. But excommunication requires he be suspended from orders only, then he cannot exer- nothing more than orders or jurisdiction. Therefore even cise his order, but he can use his jurisdiction, while, on one who is excommunicated or suspended can excommu- the other hand, if he be suspended from jurisdiction and nicate. not from orders. he cannot use his jurisdiction, though he Objection 2. Further. it is a greater thing to conse- can exercise his order: and if he be suspended from both, crate the body of Christ than to excommunicate. But such he can exercise neither. persons can consecrate. Therefore they can excommuni- Reply to Objection 1. Although an excommunicated cate. or suspended person does not lose his jurisdiction, yet he On the contrary, one whose body is bound cannot does lose its use. bind another. But spiritual gyves are stronger than bod- Reply to Objection 2. The power of consecration re- ily fetters. Therefore one who is excommunicated cannot sults from the power of the character which is indelible, excommunicate another, since excommunication is a spir- wherefore, from the very fact that a man has the charac- itual chain. ter of order, he can always consecrate, though not always I answer that, Jurisdiction can only be used in rela- lawfully. It is different with the power of excommunica- tion to another man. Consequently, since every excom- tion which results from jurisdiction, for this can be taken municated person is severed from the communion of the away and bound. Whether a man can excommunicate himself, his equal, or his superior? Suppl. q. 22 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that a man can excom- to another. Therefore it seems that a man may also excom- municate himself, his equal, or his superior. For an angel municate his superior, or his equal. of God was greater than Paul, according to Mat. 11:11: On the contrary, Excommunication is an act of juris- “He that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater then diction. But no man has jurisdiction over himself (since he, a greater” than whom “hath not risen among men that one cannot be both judge and defendant in the same trial), are born of women.” Now Paul excommunicated an angel or over his superior, or over an equal. Therefore a man from heaven (Gal. 1:8). Therefore a man can excommu- cannot excommunicate his superior, or his equal, or him- nicate his superior. self. Objection 2. Further, sometimes a priest pronounces I answer that, Since, by jurisdiction, a man is placed a general excommunication for theft or the like. But it above those over whom he has jurisdiction, through being might happen that he, or his equal, or a superior has done their judge, it follows that no man has jurisdiction over such things. Therefore a man can excommunicate him- himself, his superior, or his equal, and that, consequently, self, his equal, or a superior. no one can excommunicate either himself, or his superior, Objection 3. Further, a man can absolve his superior or his equal. or his equal in the tribunal of Penance, as when a bishop Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle is speaking hypo- confesses to his subject, or one priest confesses venial sins thetically, i.e. supposing an angel were to sin, for in that ∗ Cf. a. 1, a[2]; q. 24, a. 1, ad 1 2718 case he would not be higher than the Apostle, but lower. tion is the affair of an external tribunal in which a man Nor is it absurd that, if the antecedent of a conditional sen- does not forfeit his superiority on account of sin. Hence tence be impossible, the consequence be impossible also. there is no comparison between the two tribunals. Never- Reply to Objection 2. In that case no one would be theless, even in the tribunal of confession, a man cannot excommunicated, since no man has power over his peer. absolve himself, or his superior, or his equal, unless the Reply to Objection 3. Loosing and binding in the tri- power to do so be committed to him. This does not apply bunal of confession affects our relation to God only, in to venial sins, because they can be remitted through any Whose sight a man from being above another sinks below sacraments which confer grace, hence remission of venial him through sin; while on the other hand excommunica- sins follows the power of orders. Whether a sentence of excommunication can be passed on a body of men? Suppl. q. 22 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that sentence of excom- whole multitude, as when many draw a boat, which none munication can be passed on a body of men. Because it of them could draw by himself, yet it is not probable that is possible for a number of people to be united together in a community would so wholly consent to evil that there wickedness. Now when a man is obstinate in his wicked- would be no dissentients. Now God, Who judges all the ness he should be excommunicated. Therefore a body of earth, does not condemn the just with the wicked (Gn. men can be excommunicated. 18:25). Therefore the Church, who should imitate the Objection 2. Further, the most grievous effect of an judgments of God, prudently decided that a community excommunication is privation of the sacraments of the should not be excommunicated, lest the wheat be uprooted Church. But sometimes a whole country is laid under an together with the tares and cockle. interdict. Therefore a body of people can be excommuni- The Reply to the First Objection is evident from what cated. has been said. On the contrary, A gloss of Augustine∗ on Mat. 12 Reply to Objection 2. Suspension is not so great a asserts that the sovereign and a body of people cannot be punishment as excommunication, since those who are sus- excommunicated. pended are not deprived of the prayers of the Church, as I answer that, No man should be excommunicated the excommunicated are. Wherefore a man can be sus- except for a mortal sin. Now sin consists in an act: and pended without having committed a sin himself, just as acts do not belong to communities, but, generally speak- a whole kingdom is laid under an interdict on account of ing, to individuals. Wherefore individual members of a the king’s crime. Hence there is no comparison between community can be excommunicated, but not the commu- excommunication and suspension. nity itself. And although sometimes an act belongs to a Whether a man can be excommunicated who is already under sentence of excommu-Suppl. q. 22 a. 6 nication? Objection 1. It would seem that a man who is al- tion can be repeated. ready under sentence of excommunication cannot be ex- I answer that, A man who is under sentence of one communicated any further. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. excommunication, can be excommunicated again, either 5:12): “What have I to do to judge them that are without?” by a repetition of the same excommunication, for his Now those who are excommunicated are already outside greater confusion, so that he may renounce sin, or for the Church. Therefore the Church cannot exercise any some other cause. And then there are as many princi- further judgment on them, so as to excommunicate them pal excommunications, as there are causes for his being again. excommunicated. Objection 2. Further, excommunication is privation Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle is speaking of of divine things and of the communion of the faithful. But heathens and of other unbelievers who have no (sacra- when a man has been deprived of a thing, he cannot be de- mental) character, whereby they are numbered among the prived of it again. Therefore one who is excommunicated people of God. But since the baptismal character whereby cannot be excommunicated again a man is numbered among God’s people, is indelible, one On the contrary, Excommunication is a punishment who is baptized always belongs to the Church in some and a healing medicine. Now punishments and medicines way, so that the Church is always competent to sit in judg- are repeated when necessary. Therefore excommunica- ment on him. ∗ Cf. Ep. ccl 2719 Reply to Objection 2. Although privation does not re-man who has been excommunicated several times is fur- ceive more or less in itself, yet it can, as regards its cause. ther from the Church’s prayers than one who has been ex- In this way an excommunication can be repeated, and a communicated only once. 2720 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 23 Of Communication with Excommunicated Persons (In Three Articles) We must now consider communication with those who are excommunicated. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is lawful to communicate in matters purely corporal with one who is excommunicated? (2) Whether one who communicates with an excommunicated person is excommunicated? (3) Whether it is always a mortal sin to communicate with an excommunicated person in matters not permitted by law? Whether it is lawful, in matters purely corporal, to communicate with an excommu-Suppl. q. 23 a. 1 nicated person? Objection 1. It would seem that it is lawful, in mat- business it is to be in attendance on the excommunicated ters purely corporal, to communicate with an excommuni- person, viz. his wife, child, slave, vassal or subordinate. cated person. For excommunication is an act of the keys. This, however, is to be understood of children who have But the power of the keys extends only to spiritual mat- not attained their majority, else they are forbidden to com- ters. Therefore excommunication does not prevent one municate with their father: and as to the others, the excep- from communicating with another in matters corporal. tion applies to them if they have entered his service before Objection 2. Further, “What is instituted for the sake his excommunication, but not if they did so afterwards. of charity, does not militate against charity” (Cf. q. 11, Some understand this exception to apply in the oppo- a. 1, obj. 1). But we are bound by the precept of charity site way, viz. that the master can communicate with his to succor our enemies, which is impossible without some subjects: while others hold the contrary. At any rate it sort of communication. Therefore it is lawful to commu- is lawful for them to communicate with others in matters nicate with an excommunicated person in corporal mat- wherein they are under an obligation to them, for just as ters. subjects are bound to serve their master, so is the mas- On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 5:11): “With ter bound to look after his subjects. Again certain cases such an one not so much as to eat.” are excepted; as when the fact of the excommunication I answer that, Excommunication is twofold: there is is unknown, or in the case of strangers or travelers in the minor excommunication, which deprives a man merely of country of those who are excommunicated, for they are a share in the sacraments, but not of the communion of allowed to buy from them, or to receive alms from them. the faithful. Wherefore it is lawful to communicate with a Likewise if anyone were to see an excommunicated per- person lying under an excommunication of this kind, but son in distress: for then he would be bound by the precept not to give him the sacraments. The other is major excom- of charity to assist him. These are all contained in the munication which deprives a man of the sacraments of the following line: “Utility, law, lowliness, ignorance of fact, Church and of the communion of the faithful. Where- necessity,” where “utility” refers to salutary words, “law” fore it is not lawful to communicate with one who lies to marriage, “lowliness” to subjection. The others need under such an excommunication. But, since the Church no explanation. resorts to excommunication to repair and not to destroy, Reply to Objection 1. Corporal matters are subordi- exception is made from this general law, in certain mat- nate to spiritual matters. Wherefore the power which ex- ters wherein communication is lawful, viz. in those which tends to spiritual things, can also extend to matters touch- concern salvation, for one is allowed to speak of such mat- ing the body: even as the art which considers the end com- ters with an excommunicated person; and one may even mands in matters ordained to the end. speak of other matters so as to put him at his ease and Reply to Objection 2. In a case where one is bound to make the words of salvation more acceptable. More- by the precept of charity to hold communication, the pro- over exception is made in favor of certain people whose hibition ceases, as is clear from what has been said. 2721 Whether a person incurs excommunication for communicating with one who is ex-Suppl. q. 23 a. 2 communicated? Objection 1. It would seem that a person does not tion in two ways. First, so that the excommunication in- incur excommunication for communicating with one who cludes both himself and whosoever communicates with is excommunicated. For a heathen or a Jew is more sep- him: and then, without any doubt, whoever communicates arated from the Church than a person who is excommu- with him, incurs a major excommunication. Secondly, so nicated. But one does not incur excommunication for that the excommunication is simply pronounced on him; communicating with a heathen or a Jew. Neither, there- and then a man may communicate with him either in his fore, does one for communicating with an excommuni- crime, by counsel, help or favor, in which case again he cated Christian. incurs the major excommunication, or he may communi- Objection 2. Further, if a man incurs excommunica- cate with him in other things by speaking to him, greeting tion for communicating with an excommunicated person, him, or eating with him, in which case he incurs the minor for the same reason a third would incur excommunication excommunication. for communicating with him, and thus one might go on in- Reply to Objection 1. The Church has no intention definitely, which would seem absurd. Therefore one does of correcting unbelievers as well as the faithful who are not incur excommunication for communicating with one under her care: hence she does not sever those, whom she who is excommunicated. excommunicates, from the fellowship of unbelievers, as On the contrary, An excommunicated person is ban- she does from the communion of the faithful over whom ished from communion. Therefore whoever communi- she exercises a certain power. cates with him leaves the communion of the Church: and Reply to Objection 2. It is lawful to hold communion hence he seems to be excommunicated. with one who has incurred a minor excommunication, so I answer that, A person may incur excommunica- that excommunication does not pass on to a third person. Whether it is always a mortal sin to communicate with an excommunicated person in Suppl. q. 23 a. 3 other cases than those in which it is allowed? Objection 1. It would seem that it is always a mortal a major excommunication for holding communion with sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person an excommunicated person. Therefore it is a mortal sin to in other cases than those in which it is allowed. Because hold communion with one who is excommunicated. a certain decretal (Cap. Sacris: De his quae vi, metuve, On the contrary, None can absolve a man from mor- etc.) declares that “not even through fear of death should tal sin unless he have jurisdiction over him. But any priest anyone hold communion with an excommunicated per- can absolve a man for holding communion with those who son, since one ought to die rather than commit a mortal are excommunicated. Therefore it is not a mortal sin. sin.” But this would be no reason unless it were always Further, the measure of the penalty should be accord- a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated ing to the measure of the sin, as stated in Dt. 25:3. Now person. Therefore, etc. the punishment appointed by common custom for holding Objection 2. Further, it is a mortal sin to act against communion with an excommunicated person is not that a commandment of the Church. But the Church forbids which is inflicted for mortal sin, but rather that which is anyone to hold communion with an excommunicated per- due for venial sin. Therefore it is not a mortal sin. son. Therefore it is a mortal sin to hold communion with I answer that, Some hold that it is always a mortal one who is excommunicated. sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person, Objection 3. Further, no man is debarred from receiv- by word or in any of the forbidden ways mentioned above ing the Eucharist on account of a venial sin. But a man (a. 2), except in those cases allowed by law (Cap. Quo- who holds communion with an excommunicated person, niam). But since it seems very hard that a man should outside those cases in which it is allowed, is debarred from be guilty of a mortal sin by uttering just a slight word to receiving the Eucharist, since he incurs a minor excom- an excommunicated person, and that by excommunicating munication. Therefore it is a mortal sin to hold commu- a person one would endanger the salvation of many, and nion with an excommunicated person, save in those cases lay a snare which might turn to one’s own hurt, it seems to in which it is allowed. others more probable that he is not always guilty of a mor- Objection 4. Further, no one should incur a major ex- tal sin, but only when he holds communion with him in a communication save for a mortal sin. Now according to criminal deed, or in an act of Divine worship, or through the law (Can. Praecipue, seqq., caus. xi) a man may incur contempt of the Church. 2722 Reply to Objection 1. This decretal is speaking of commits a mortal sin; but by holding communion in other holding communion in Divine worship. It may also be matters, one acts beside the commandment, and sins ve- replied that the same reason applies both to mortal and nially. venial sin, since just as one cannot do well by committing Reply to Objection 3. Sometimes a man is debarred a mortal sin, so neither can one by committing a venial from the Eucharist even without his own fault, as in the sin: so that just as it is a man’s duty to suffer death rather case of those who are suspended or under an interdict, be- than commit a mortal sin, so is it his duty to do so sooner cause these penalties are sometimes inflicted on one per- than commit a venial sin, inasmuch as it is his duty to son for the sin of another who is thus punished. avoid venial sin. Reply to Objection 4. Although it is a venial sin to Reply to Objection 2. The commandment of the hold communion with one who is excommunicated, yet to Church regards spiritual matters directly, and legitimate do so obstinately is a mortal sin: and for this reason one actions as a consequence: hence by holding communion may be excommunicated according to the law. in Divine worship one acts against the commandment, and 2723 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 24 Of Absolution From Excommunication (In Three Articles) We must now consider absolution from excommunication: under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether any priest can absolve his subject from excommunication? (2) Whether a man can be absolved from excommunication against his will? (3) Whether a man can be absolved from one excommunication without being absolved from another? Whether any priest can absolve his subject from excommunication? Suppl. q. 24 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that any priest can ab- There are however eight exceptions to the first case: solve his subject from excommunication. For the chains (1) In the hour of death, when a person can be absolved of sin are stronger than those of excommunication. But by any priest from any excommunication; (2) if the striker any priest can absolve his subject from sin. Therefore be the doorkeeper of a man in authority, and the blow be much more can he absolve him from excommunication. given neither through hatred nor of set purpose; (3) if the Objection 2. Further, if the cause is removed the ef- striker be a woman; (4) if the striker be a servant, whose fect is removed. But the cause of excommunication is a master is not at fault and would suffer from his absence; mortal sin. Therefore since any priest can absolve (his (5) if a religious strike a religious, unless he strike him subject) from that mortal sin, he is able likewise to ab- very grievously; (6) if the striker be a poor man; (7) if he solve him from the excommunication. be a minor, an old man, or an invalid; (8) if there be a On the contrary, It belongs to the same power to ex- deadly feud between them. communicate as to absolve from excommunication. But There are, besides, seven cases in which the person priests of inferior degree cannot excommunicate their sub- who strikes a cleric does not incur excommunication: (1) jects. Neither, therefore, can they absolve them. if he do it for the sake of discipline, as a teacher or a I answer that, Anyone can absolve from minor ex- superior; (2) if it be done for fun; (3) if the striker find communication who can absolve from the sin of partici- the cleric behaving with impropriety towards his wife his pation in the sin of another. But in the case of a major mother, his sister or his daughter; (4) if he return blow for excommunication, this is pronounced either by a judge, blow at once; (5) if the striker be not aware that he is strik- and then he who pronounced sentence or his superior can ing a cleric; (6) if the latter be guilty of apostasy after the absolve—or it is pronounced by law, and then the bishop triple admonition; (7) if the cleric exercise an act which is or even a priest can absolve except in the six cases which altogether contrary to the clerical life, e.g. if he become a the Pope, who is the maker of laws, reserves to himself: soldier, or if he be guilty of bigamy∗. the first is the case of a man who lays hands on a cleric or Reply to Objection 1. Although the chains of sin a religious; the second is of one who breaks into a church are in themselves greater than those of excommunication, and is denounced for so doing; the third is of the man yet in a certain respect the chains of excommunication who sets fire to a church and is denounced for the deed; are greater, inasmuch as they bind a man not only in the the fourth is of one who knowingly communicates in the sight of God, but also in the eye of the Church. Hence Divine worship with those whom the Pope has excommu- absolution from excommunication requires jurisdiction in nicated by name; the fifth is the case of one who tampers the external forum, whereas absolution from sin does not. with the letters of the Holy See; the sixth is the case of one Nor is there need of giving one’s word by oath, as in the who communicates in a crime of one who is excommuni- case of absolution from excommunication, because, as the cated. For he should not be absolved except by the person Apostle declares (Heb. 6:16), controversies between men who excommunicated him, even though he be not subject are decided by oath. to him, unless, by reason of the difficulty of appearing Reply to Objection 2. As an excommunicated person before him, he be absolved by the bishop or by his own has no share in the sacraments of the Church, a priest can- priest, after binding himself by oath to submit to the com- not absolve him from his guilt, unless he be first absolved mand of the judge who pronounced the excommunication from excommunication. on him. ∗ Namely, that which is known by canonists as “similar bigamy” 2724 Whether anyone can be absolved against his will? Suppl. q. 24 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that no man can be ab- all sin is voluntary, whereas the origin of punishment is solved against his will. For spiritual things are not con- sometimes without, since punishment does not need to be ferred on anyone against his will. Now absolution from voluntary, in fact the nature of punishment is rather to be excommunication is a spiritual favor. Therefore it cannot against the will. Wherefore, just as a man commits no sin be granted to a man against his will. except willingly, so no sin is forgiven him against his will. Objection 2. Further, the cause of excommunication On the other hand just as a person can be excommunicated is contumacy. But when, through contempt of the excom- against his will, so can he be absolved therefrom. munication, a man is unwilling to be absolved, he shows Reply to Objection 1. The assertion is true of those a high degree of contumacy. Therefore he cannot be ab- spiritual goods which depend on our will, such as the solved. virtues, which we cannot lose unwillingly; for knowledge, On the contrary, Excommunication can be pro- although a spiritual good, can be lost by a man against his nounced on a man against his will. Now things that hap- will through sickness. Hence the argument is not to the pen to a man against his will, can be removed from him point. against his will, as in the case of the goods of fortune. Reply to Objection 2. It is possible for excommu- Therefore excommunication can be removed from a man nication to be removed from a man even though he be against his will. contumacious, if it seem to be for the good of the man for I answer that, Evil of fault and evil of punishment whom the excommunication was intended as a medicine. differ in this, that the origin of fault is within us, since Whether a man can be absolved from one excommunication without being absolved Suppl. q. 24 a. 3 from all? Objection 1. It would seem that a man cannot be judge; and then, when he is absolved from one, he is un- absolved from one excommunication without being ab- derstood to be absolved from all, unless the contrary be solved from all. For an effect should be proportionate to expressed, or unless he ask to be absolved from excom- its cause. Now the cause of excommunication is a sin. munication on one count only, whereas he was excom- Since then a man cannot be absolved from one sin with- municated under several. On the other hand sometimes out being absolved from all, neither can this happen as a man lies under several sentences of excommunication regards excommunication. pronounced by several judges; and then, when absolved Objection 2. Further, absolution from excommunica- from one excommunication, he is not therefore absolved tion is pronounced in the Church. But a man who is under from the others, unless at his prayer they all confirm his the ban of one excommunication is outside the Church. absolution, or unless they all depute one to absolve him. Therefore so long as one remains, a man cannot be loosed Reply to Objection 1. All sins are connected to- from another. gether in aversion from God, which is incompatible with On the contrary, Excommunication is a punishment. the forgiveness of sin: wherefore one sin cannot be for- Now a man can be loosed from one punishment, while an- given without another. But excommunications have no other remains. Therefore a man can be loosed from one such connection. Nor again is absolution from excom- excommunication and yet remain under another. munication hindered by contrariety of the will, as stated I answer that, Excommunications are not connected above (a. 2). Hence the argument does not prove. together in any way, and so it is possible for a man to be Reply to Objection 2. Just as such a man was for absolved from one, and yet remain under another. several reasons outside the Church so is it possible for his It must be observed however that sometimes a man separation to be removed on one count and to remain on lies under several excommunications pronounced by one another. 2725 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 25 Of Indulgences (In Three Articles) We must now consider indulgence: (1) in itself; (2) those who grant indulgence; (3) those who receive it. Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether an indulgence remits any part of the punishment due for the satisfaction of sins? (2) Whether indulgences are as effective as they claim to be? (3) Whether an indulgence should be granted for temporal assistance? Whether an indulgence can remit any part of the punishment due for the satisfaction Suppl. q. 25 a. 1 of sins? Objection 1. It would seem that an indulgence cannot Further, the universal Church cannot err; since He remit any part of the punishment due for the satisfaction Who “was heard for His reverence” (Heb. 5:7) said to Pe- of sins. Because a gloss on 2 Tim. 2:13, “He cannot deny ter, on whose profession of faith the Church was founded Himself,” says: “He would do this if He did not keep His (Lk. 22:32): “I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail word.” Now He said (Dt. 25:2): “According to the mea- not.” Now the universal Church approves and grants in- sure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be.” dulgences. Therefore indulgences have some value. Therefore nothing can be remitted from the satisfactory I answer that, All admit that indulgences have some punishment which is appointed according to the measure value, for it would be blasphemy to say that the Church of sin. does anything in vain. But some say that they do not Objection 2. Further, an inferior cannot absolve from avail to free a man from the debt of punishment which he an obligation imposed by his superior. But when God ab- has deserved in Purgatory according to God’s judgment, solves us from sin He binds us to temporal punishment, and that they merely serve to free him from the obliga- as Hugh of St. Victor declares (Tract. vi Sum. Sent.∗). tion imposed on him by the priest as a punishment for his Therefore no man can absolve from that punishment, by sins, or from the canonical penalties he has incurred. But remitting any part of it. this opinion does not seem to be true. First, because it Objection 3. Further, the granting of the sacramen- is expressly opposed to the privilege granted to Peter, to tal effect without the sacraments belongs to the power of whom it was said (Mat. 16:19) that whatsoever he should excellence. Now none but Christ has the power of excel- loose on earth should be loosed also in heaven. Wherefore lence in the sacraments. Since then satisfaction is a part of whatever remission is granted in the court of the Church the sacrament of Penance, conducing to the remission of holds good in the court of God. Moreover the Church the punishment due, it seems that no mere man can remit by granting such indulgences would do more harm than the debt of punishment without satisfaction. good, since, by remitting the punishment she had enjoined Objection 4. Further, the power of the ministers of on a man, she would deliver him to be punished more the Church was given them, not “unto destruction,” but severely in Purgatory. “unto edification” (2 Cor. 10:8). But it would be con- Hence we must say on the contrary that indulgences ducive to destruction, if satisfaction, which was intended hold good both in the Church’s court and in the judg- for our good, inasmuch as it serves for a remedy, were ment of God, for the remission of the punishment done away with. Therefore the power of the ministers of which remains after contrition, absolution, and confes- the Church does not extend to this. sion, whether this punishment be enjoined or not. The On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. 2:10): “For, reason why they so avail is the oneness of the mystical what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for body in which many have performed works of satisfaction your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ,” and a exceeding the requirements of their debts; in which, too, gloss adds: i.e. “as though Christ Himself had pardoned.” many have patiently borne unjust tribulations whereby a But Christ could remit the punishment of a sin without multitude of punishments would have been paid, had they any satisfaction, as evidenced in the case of the adulter- been incurred. So great is the quantity of such merits that ous woman (Jn. 8). Therefore Paul could do so likewise. it exceeds the entire debt of punishment due to those who Therefore the Pope can too, since his power in the Church are living at this moment: and this is especially due to the is not less than Paul’s. merits of Christ: for though He acts through the sacra- ∗ Of doubtful authenticity 2726 ments, yet His efficacy is nowise restricted to them, but other’s guilt, as explained above. infinitely surpasses their efficacy. Reply to Objection 2. He who gains an indulgence is Now one man can satisfy for another, as we have ex- not, strictly speaking, absolved from the debt of punish- plained above (q. 13, a. 2). And the saints in whom this ment, but is given the means whereby he may pay it. super-abundance of satisfactions is found, did not perform Reply to Objection 3. The effect of sacramental ab- their good works for this or that particular person, who solution is the removal of a man’s guilt, an effect which needs the remission of his punishment (else he would have is not produced by indulgences. But he who grants indul- received this remission without any indulgence at all), gences pays the debt of punishment which a man owes, but they performed them for the whole Church in gen- out of the common stock of the Church’s goods, as ex- eral, even as the Apostle declares that he fills up “those plained above. things that are wanting of the sufferings of Christ. . . for Reply to Objection 4. Grace affords a better remedy His body, which is the Church” to whom he wrote (Col. for the avoidance of sin than does habituation to (good) 1:24). These merits, then, are the common property of the works. And since he who gains an indulgence is disposed whole Church. Now those things which are the common to grace through the love which he conceives for the cause property of a number are distributed to the various indi- for which the indulgence is granted, it follows that indul- viduals according to the judgment of him who rules them gences provide a remedy against sin. Consequently it is all. Hence, just as one man would obtain the remission not harmful to grant indulgences unless this be done with- of his punishment if another were to satisfy for him, so out discretion. Nevertheless those who gain indulgences would he too if another’s satisfactions be applied to him should be advised, not, on this account, to omit the peni- by one who has the power to do so. tential works imposed on them, so that they may derive a Reply to Objection 1. The remission which is granted remedy from these also, even though they may be quit of by means of indulgences does not destroy the proportion the debt of punishment; and all the more, seeing that they between punishment and sin, since someone has sponta- are often more in debt than they think. neously taken upon himself the punishment due for an- Whether indulgences are as effective as they claim to be? Suppl. q. 25 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that indulgences are not granted, so that for visiting a church a man obtains a seven as effective as they claim to be. For indulgences have no years’ remission. If, then, an indulgence avails as much effect save from the power of the keys. Now by the power as is claimed for it a man who lives near that church, or of the keys, he who has that power can only remit some the clergy attached thereto who go there every day, obtain fixed part of the punishment due for sin, after taking into as much indulgence as one who comes from a distance account the measure of the sin and of the penitent’s sor- (which would appear unjust); moreover, seemingly, they row. Since then indulgences depend on the mere will of would gain the indulgence several times a day, since they the grantor, it seems that they are not as effective as they go there repeatedly. claim to be. Objection 5. Further, to remit a man’s punishment be- Objection 2. Further, the debt of punishment keeps yond a just estimate seems to amount to the same as to re- man back from the attainment of glory, which he ought to mit it without reason; because in so far as he exceeds that desire above all things. Now, if indulgences are as effec- estimate, he limits the compensation. Now he who grants tive as they claim to be, a man by setting himself to gain an indulgence cannot without cause remit a man’s punish- indulgences might become immune from all debt of tem- ment either wholly or partly, even though the Pope were to poral punishment. Therefore it would seem that a man say to anyone: “I remit to all the punishment you owe for ought to put aside all other kinds of works, and devote your sins.” Therefore it seems that he cannot remit any- himself to gain indulgences. thing beyond the just estimate. Now indulgences are often Objection 3. Further, sometimes an indulgence published which exceed that just estimate. Therefore they whereby a man is remitted a third part of the punishment do not avail as much as is claimed for them. due for his sins is granted if he contribute towards the On the contrary, It is written (Job 13:7): “Hath God erection of a certain building. If, therefore, indulgences any need of your lie, that you should speak deceitfully for produce the effect which is claimed for them, he who Him?” Therefore the Church, in publishing indulgences, gives a penny, and then another, and then again another, does not lie; and so they avail as much as is claimed for would obtain a plenary absolution from all punishment them. due for his sins, which seems absurd. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:14): “If. . . our Objection 4. Further, sometimes an indulgence is preaching is vain, your faith is also vain.” Therefore who- 2727 ever utters a falsehood in preaching, so far as he is con-sion granted by the indulgence is not to be measured by cerned, makes faith void. and so sins mortally. If there- the cause for which a person is worthy of an indulgence. fore indulgences are not as effective as they claim to be, We must therefore say otherwise that the quantity of all who publish indulgences would commit a mortal sin: an effect is proportionate to the quantity of the cause. Now which is absurd. the cause of the remission of punishment effected by in- I answer that, on this point there are many opinions. dulgences is no other than the abundance of the Church’s For some maintain that indulgences have not the efficacy merits, and this abundance suffices for the remission of claimed for them, but that they simply avail each individ- all punishment. The effective cause of the remission is not ual in proportion to his faith and devotion. And conse- the devotion, or toil, or gift of the recipient; nor, again, is it quently those who maintain this, say that the Church pub-the cause for which the indulgence was granted. We can- lishes her indulgences in such a way as, by a kind of pious not, then, estimate the quantity of the remission by any of fraud, to induce men to do well, just as a mother entices the foregoing, but solely by the merits of the Church—and her child to walk by holding out an apple. But this seems a these are always superabundant. Consequently, accord- very dangerous assertion to make. For as Augustine states ing as these merits are applied to a person so does he ob- (Ep. ad Hieron. lxxviii), “if any error were discovered in tain remission. That they should be so applied demands, Holy Writ, the authority of Holy Writ would perish.” In firstly, authority to dispense this treasure. secondly, union like manner, if any error were to be found in the Church’s between the recipient and Him Who merited it—and this preaching, her doctrine would have no authority in settling is brought about by charity; thirdly, there is required a rea- questions of faith. son for so dispensing this treasury, so that the intention, Hence others have maintained that indulgences avail namely, of those who wrought these meritorious works is as much as is claimed for them, according to a just es- safeguarded, since they did them for the honor of God and timate, not of him who grants it—who perhaps puts too for the good of the Church in general. Hence whenever high a value on it—nor of the recipient—for he may prize the cause assigned tends to the good of the Church and too highly the gift he receives, but a just estimate accord- the honor of God, there is sufficient reason for granting an ing to the estimate of good men who consider the con- indulgence. dition of the person affected, and the utility and needs Hence, according to others, indulgences have pre- of the Church, for the Church’s needs are greater at one cisely the efficacy claimed for them, provided that he who time than at another. Yet, neither, seemingly, can this grants them have the authority, that the recipient have opinion stand. First, because in that case indulgences charity, and that, as regards the cause, there be piety which would no longer be a remission, but rather a mere com- includes the honor of God and the profit of our neighbor. mutation. Moreover the preaching of the Church would Nor in this view have we “too great a market of the Di- not be excused from untruth, since, at times, indulgences vine mercy”∗, as some maintain, nor again does it dero- are granted far in excess of the requirements of this just gate from Divine justice, for no punishment is remitted, estimate, taking into consideration all the aforesaid con- but the punishment of one is imputed to another. ditions, as, for example, when the Pope granted to any- Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 19, a. 3) one who visited a certain church, an indulgence of seven there are two keys, the key of orders and the key of ju- years, which indulgence was granted by Blessed Gregory risdiction. The key of orders is a sacramental: and as for the Roman Stations. the effects of the sacraments are fixed, not by men but by Hence others say that the quantity of remission ac- God, the priest cannot decide in the tribunal of confession corded in an indulgence is not to be measured by the de- how much shall be remitted by means of the key of or- votion of the recipient, as the first opinion suggested, nor ders from the punishment due; it is God Who appoints according to the quantity of what is given, as the second the amount to be remitted. On the other hand the key opinion held; but according to the cause for which the in- of jurisdiction is not something sacramental, and its ef- dulgence is granted, and according to which a person is fect depends on a man’s decision. The remission granted held deserving of obtaining such an indulgence. Thus ac- through indulgences is the effect of this key, since it does cording as a man approached near to that cause, so would not belong to the dispensation of the sacraments, but to he obtain remission in whole or in part. But neither will the distribution of the common property of the Church: this explain the custom of the Church, who assigns, now a hence it is that legates, even though they be not priests, greater, now a lesser indulgence, for the same cause: thus, can grant indulgences. Consequently the decision of how under the same circumstances, now a year’s indulgence, much punishment is to be remitted by an indulgence de- now one of only forty days, according to the graciousness pends on the will of the one who grants that indulgence. of the Pope, who grants the indulgence, is granted to those If, however, he remits punishment without sufficient rea- who visit a church. Wherefore the amount of the remis- son, so that men are enticed to substitute mere nothings, ∗ St. Bonaventure, Sent. iv, D, 20 2728 as it were, for works of penance, he sins by granting such thus the Pope at the time of general absolution grants an indulgences, although the indulgence is gained fully. indulgence of five years to those who come from across Reply to Objection 2. Although indulgences avail the seas, and one of three years to those who come from much for the remission of punishment, yet works of sat- across the mountains, to others an indulgence of one year. isfaction are more meritorious in respect of the essential Nor does a person gain the indulgence each time he visits reward, which infinitely transcends the remission of tem- the church during the term of indulgence, because some- poral punishment. times it is granted for a fixed time; thus when it is said, Reply to Objection 3. When an indulgence is granted “Whoever visits such and such a church until such and in a general way to anyone that helps towards the building such a day, shall gain so much indulgence,” we must un- of a church, we must understand this to mean a help pro- derstand that it can be gained only once. on the other hand portionate to the giver: and in so far as he approaches to if there be a continual indulgence in a certain church, as this, he will gain the indulgence more or less fully. Con- the indulgence of forty days to be gained in the church of sequently a poor man by giving one penny would gain the the Blessed Peter, then a person gains the indulgence as full indulgence, not so a rich man, whom it would not be- often as he visits the church. come to give so little to so holy and profitable a work; Just Reply to Objection 5. An indulgence requires a as a king would not be said to help a man if he gave him cause, not as a measure of the remission of punishment, an “obol.” but in order that the intention of those whose merits are Reply to Objection 4. A person who lives near the applied, may reach to this particular individual. Now one church, and the priest and clergy of the church, gain the person’s good is applied to another in two ways: first, by indulgence as much as those who come perhaps a distance charity; and in this way, even without indulgences, a per- of a thousand days’ journey: because the remission, as son shares in all the good deeds done, provided he have stated above, is proportionate, not to the toil, but to the charity: secondly, by the intention of the person who does merits which are applied. Yet he who toils most gains the good action; and in this way, provided there be a law- most merit. This, however, is to be understood of those ful cause, the intention of a person who has done some- cases in which an indulgence is given in an undetermi- thing for the profit of the Church, may reach to some in- nate manner. For sometimes a distinction is expressed: dividual through indulgences. Whether an indulgence ought to be granted for temporal help? Suppl. q. 25 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that an indulgence ought indulgence must not be granted for the sake of temporal not to be granted for temporal help. Because the remission matters as such, but in so far as they are subordinate to of sins is something spiritual. Now to exchange a spiritual spiritual things: such as the quelling of the Church’s ene- for a temporal thing is simony. Therefore this ought not mies, who disturb her peace; or such as the building of a to be done. church, of a bridge, and other forms of almsgiving. It is Objection 2. Further, spiritual assistance is more nec- therefore evident that there is no simony in these transac- essary than temporal. But indulgences do not appear to be tions, since a spiritual thing is exchanged, not for a tem- granted for spiritual assistance. Much less therefore ought poral but for a spiritual commodity. they to be granted for temporal help. Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear. On the contrary, stands the common custom of the Reply to Objection 2. Indulgences can be, and some- Church in granting indulgences for pilgrimages and alms- times are, granted even for purely spiritual matters. Thus giving. Pope Innocent IV granted an indulgence of ten days to all I answer that, Temporal things are subordinate to who prayed for the king of France; and in like manner spiritual matters, since we must make use of temporal sometimes the same indulgence is granted to those who things on account of spiritual things. Consequently an preach a crusade as to those who take part in it. 2729 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 26 Of Those Who Can Grant Indulgences (In Four Articles) We must now consider those who can grant indulgences: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether every parish priest can grant indulgences? (2) Whether a deacon or another, who is not a priest, can grant indulgences? (3) Whether a bishop can grant them? (4) Whether they can be granted by one who is in mortal sin? Whether every parish priest can grant indulgences? Suppl. q. 26 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that every parish priest sides over the Church can communicate what belongs to can grant indulgences. For an indulgence derives its ef- an individual congregation or to an individual man: and he ficacy from the superabundance of the Church’s merits. who presides over a congregation can communicate what Now there is no congregation without some superabun- belongs to an individual man, but not conversely. Yet nei- dance of merits. Therefore every priest, who has charge ther the first nor the second communication is called an of a congregation, can grant indulgences, and, in like man- indulgence, but only the third; and this for two reasons. ner, so can every prelate. First, because, although those communications loose man Objection 2. Further, every prelate stands for a mul- from the debt of punishment in the sight of God, yet he is titude, just as an individual stands for himself. But any not freed from the obligation of fulfilling the satisfaction individual can assign his own goods to another and thus enjoined, to which he is bound by a commandment of the offer satisfaction for a third person. Therefore a prelate Church; whereas the third communication frees man even can assign the property of the multitude subject to him, from this obligation. Secondly, because in one person or and so it seems that he can grant indulgences. even in one congregation there is not such an unfailing On the contrary, To excommunicate is less than to supply of merits as to be sufficient both for the one person grant indulgences. But a parish priest cannot do the for- or congregation and for all others; and consequently the mer. Therefore he cannot do the latter. individual is not freed from the entire debt of punishment I answer that, Indulgences are effective, in as much unless satisfaction is offered for him individually, to the as the works of satisfaction done by one person are ap- very amount that he owes. On the other hand, in the whole plied to another, not only by virtue of charity, but also by Church there is an unfailing supply of merits, chiefly on the intention of the person who did them being directed in account of the merit of Christ. Consequently he alone who some way to the person to whom they are applied. Now is at the head of the Church can grant indulgences. Since, a person’s intention may be directed to another in three however, the Church is the congregation of the faithful, ways, specifically, generically and individually. Individ- and since a congregation of men is of two kinds, the do- ually, as when one person offers satisfaction for another mestic, composed of members of the same family, and the particular person; and thus anyone can apply his works civil, composed of members of the same nationality, the to another. Specifically, as when a person prays for the Church is like to a civil congregation, for the people them- congregation to which he belongs, for the members of his selves are called the Church; while the various assemblies, household, or for his benefactors, and directs his works or parishes of one diocese are likened to a congregation in of satisfaction to the same intention: in this way the su- the various families and services. Hence a bishop alone perior of a congregation can apply those works to some is properly called a prelate of the Church, wherefore he other person, by applying the intention of those who be- alone, like a bridegroom, receives the ring of the Church. long to his congregation to some fixed individual. Gener- Consequently full power in the dispensation of the sacra- ically, as when a person directs his works for the good of ments, and jurisdiction in the public tribunal, belong to the Church in general; and thus he who presides over the him alone as the public person, but to others by delega- whole Church can communicate those works, by apply- tion from him. Those priests who have charge of the peo- ing his intention to this or that individual. And since a ple are not prelates strictly speaking, but assistants, hence, man is a member of a congregation, and a congregation is in consecrating priests the bishop says: “The more fragile a part of the Church, hence the intention of private good we are, the more we need these assistants”: and for this includes the intention of the good of the congregation, and reason they do not dispense all the sacraments. Hence of the good of the whole Church. Therefore he who pre- parish priests, or abbots or other like prelates cannot grant 2730 indulgences. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. Whether a deacon or another who is not a priest can grant an indulgence? Suppl. q. 26 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that a deacon, or one that since they derive their efficacy from the distribution of the is not a priest cannot grant an indulgence. Because re- Church’s treasury. mission of sins is an effect of the keys. Now none but I answer that, The power of granting indulgences fol- a priest has the keys. Therefore a priest alone can grant lows jurisdiction, as stated above (q. 25, a. 2). And since indulgences. deacons and others, who are not priests, can have jurisdic- Objection 2. Further, a fuller remission of punish- tion either delegated, as legates, or ordinary, as bishops- ment is granted by indulgences than by the tribunal of elect, it follows that even those who are not priests can Penance. But a priest alone has power in the latter, and, grant indulgences, although they cannot absolve in the tri- therefore, he alone has power in the former. bunal of Penance, since this follows the reception of or- On the contrary, The distribution of the Church’s ders. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, be- treasury is entrusted to the same person as the government cause the granting of indulgences belongs to the key of of the Church. Now this is entrusted sometimes to one jurisdiction and not to the key of orders. who is not a priest. Therefore he can grant indulgences, Whether a bishop can grant indulgences? Suppl. q. 26 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that even a bishop cannot I answer that, The Pope has the plenitude of pon- grant indulgences. Because the treasury of the Church is tifical power, being like a king in his kingdom: whereas the common property of the whole Church. Now the com- the bishops are appointed to a share in his solicitude, like mon property of the whole Church cannot be distributed judges over each city. Hence them alone the Pope, in his save by him who presides over the whole Church. There- letters, addresses as “brethren,” whereas he calls all oth- fore the Pope alone can grant indulgences. ers his “sons.” Therefore the plenitude of the power of Objection 2. Further, none can remit punishments granting indulgences resides in the Pope, because he can fixed by law, save the one who has the power to make the grant them, as he lists, provided the cause be a lawful one: law. Now punishments in satisfaction for sins are fixed while, in bishops, this power resides subject to the Pope’s by law. Therefore the Pope alone can remit these punish- ordination, so that they can grant them within fixed limits ments, since he is the maker of the law. and not beyond. On the contrary, stands the custom of the Church in This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. accordance with which bishops grant indulgences. Whether indulgences can be granted by one who is in mortal sin? Suppl. q. 26 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that indulgences cannot I answer that, The granting of indulgences belongs be granted by one who is in mortal sin. For a stream can to jurisdiction. But a man does not, through sin, lose ju- no longer flow if cut off from its source. Now the source risdiction. Consequently indulgences are equally valid, of grace which is the Holy Ghost is cut off from one who whether they be granted by one who is in mortal sin, or by is in mortal sin. Therefore such a one can convey nothing a most holy person; since he remits punishment, not by to others by granting indulgences. virtue of his own merits, but by virtue of the merits laid Objection 2. Further, it is a greater thing to grant an up in the Church’s treasury. indulgence than to receive one. But one who is in mor- Reply to Objection 1. The prelate who, while in a tal sin cannot receive an indulgence, as we shall show state of mortal sin, grants an indulgence, does not pour presently (q. 27, a. 1). Neither, therefore, can he grant forth anything of his own, and so it is not necessary that one. he should receive an inflow from the source, in order that On the contrary, Indulgences are granted in virtue of he may grant a valid indulgence. the power conferred on the prelates of the Church. Now Reply to Objection 2. Further, to grant an indulgence mortal sin takes away, not power but goodness. Therefore is more than to receive one, if we consider the power, but one who is in mortal sin can grant indulgences. it is less, if we consider the personal profit. 2731 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 27 Of Those Whom Indulgences Avail (In Four Articles) We must now consider those whom indulgences avail: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether indulgences avail those who are in mortal sin? (2) Whether they avail religious? (3) Whether they avail a person who does not fulfill the conditions for which the indulgence is given? (4) Whether they avail him who grants them? Whether an indulgence avails those who are in mortal sin? Suppl. q. 27 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that an indulgence avails unto the remission of guilt, cannot receive the remission those who are in mortal sin. For one person can merit of his punishment from the minister of the Church neither grace and many other good things for another, even by indulgences nor in the tribunal of Penance. though he be in mortal sin. Now indulgences derive their But this opinion seems to be untrue. Because, al- efficacy from the application of the saints’ merits to an though those merits which are applied by means of an in- individual. Therefore they are effective in one who is in dulgence, might possibly avail a person so that he could mortal sin. merit grace (by way of congruity and impetration), yet Objection 2. Further, the greater the need, the more it is not for this reason that they are applied, but for the room there is for pity. Now a man who is in mortal sin is remission of punishment. Hence they do not avail those in very great need. Therefore all the more should pity be who are in mortal sin, and consequently, true contrition extended to him by indulgence. and confession are demanded as conditions for gaining all On the contrary, A dead member receives no inflow indulgences. If however the merits were applied by such from the other members that are living. But one who is in a form as this: “I grant you a share in the merits of the mortal sin, is like a dead member. Therefore he receives whole Church—or of one congregation, or of one speci- no inflow, through indulgences, from the merits of living fied person,” then they might avail a person in mortal sin members. so that he could merit something, as the foregoing opinion I answer that, Some hold that indulgences avail those holds. even who are in mortal sin, for the acquiring of grace, but This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. not for the remission of their punishment, since none can Reply to Objection 2. Although he who is in mor- be freed from punishment who is not yet freed from guilt. tal sin is in greater need of help, yet he is less capable of For he who has not yet been reached by God’s operation receiving it. Whether indulgences avail religious? Suppl. q. 27 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that indulgences do not take away from religious the profit to be derived from in- avail religious. For there is no reason to bring supplies to dulgences. those who supply others out of their own abundance. Now I answer that, Indulgences avail both seculars and re- indulgences are derived from the abundance of works of ligious, provided they have charity and satisfy the con- satisfaction to be found in religious. Therefore it is unrea- ditions for gaining the indulgences: for religious can be sonable for them to profit by indulgences. helped by indulgences no less than persons living in the Objection 2. Further, nothing detrimental to religious world. life should be done in the Church. But, if indulgences Reply to Objection 1. Although religious are in the were to avail religious, this would be detrimental to reg- state of perfection, yet they cannot live without sin: and ular discipline, because religious would become lax on so if at times they are liable to punishment on account of account of indulgences, and would neglect the penances some sin, they can expiate this debt by means of indul- imposed in chapter. Therefore indulgences do not avail gences. For it is not unreasonable that one who is well religious. off absolutely speaking, should be in want at times and On the contrary, Good brings harm to no man. But in some respect, and thus need to be supplied with what the religious life is a good thing. Therefore it does not he lacks. Hence it is written (Gal. 6:2): “Bear ye one 2732 another’s burdens.” lesser good, they merit less. Nor again do indulgences re- Reply to Objection 2. There is no reason why in- mit the punishment enjoined in chapter, because the chap- dulgences should be detrimental to religious observance, ter is a judicial rather than a penitential tribunal. hence because, as to the reward of eternal life, religious merit even those who are not priests hold chapter. Absolution more by observing their rule than by gaining indulgences; from punishment enjoined or due for sin is given in the although, as to the remission of punishment, which is a tribunal of Penance. Whether an indulgence can ever be granted to one who does not fulfill the conditions Suppl. q. 27 a. 3 required? Objection 1. It would seem that an indulgence can condition that a person does or gives a certain thing, if he sometimes be granted to one who does not fulfill the re- fails in this, he does not gain the indulgence. quired conditions. Because when a person is unable to Reply to Objection 1. This is true of the essential re- perform a certain action his will is taken for the deed. ward, but not of certain accidental rewards, such as the Now sometimes an indulgence is to be gained by giving an remission of punishment and the like. alms, which a poor man is unable to do, though he would Reply to Objection 2. A person can by his intention do so willingly. Therefore he can gain the indulgence. apply his own action to whomever he lists, and so he can Objection 2. Further, one man can make satisfaction make satisfaction for whomever he chooses. On the other for another. Now an indulgence is directed to the remis- hand, an indulgence cannot be applied to someone, except sion of punishment, just as satisfaction is. Therefore one in accordance with the intention of the grantor. Hence, man can gain an indulgence for another; and so a man since he applies it to the doer or giver of a particular ac- can gain an indulgence without doing that for which the tion or thing, the doer cannot transfer this intention to an- indulgence is given. other. If, however, the indulgence were expressed thus: On the contrary, If the cause is removed, the effect is “Whosoever does this, or for whomsoever this is done, removed. If therefore a person fails to do that for which shall gain so much indulgence,” it would avail the person an indulgence is granted, and which is the cause of the for whom it is done. Nor would the person who does this indulgence, he does not gain the indulgence. action, give the indulgence to another, but he who grants I answer that, Failing the condition of a grant, no the indulgence in this form. grant ensues. Hence, as an indulgence is granted on the Whether an indulgence avails the person who grants it? Suppl. q. 27 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that an indulgence does prelate to whom is committed the care of the Church’s not avail him who grants it. For the granting of an indul- good and of the furthering of God’s honor, does not need gence belongs to jurisdiction. Now no one can exercise to entice himself thereto. Therefore he cannot grant an in- jurisdiction on himself. thus no one can excommunicate dulgence to himself alone; but he can avail himself of an himself. Therefore no one can participate in an indulgence indulgence that he grants for others, since it is based on a granted by himself. cause for granting it to them. Objection 2. Further, if this were possible, he who Reply to Objection 1. A man cannot exercise an act grants an indulgence might gain the remission of the pun- of jurisdiction on himself, but a prelate can avail himself ishment of all his sins for some small deed, so that he of those things which are granted to others by the au- would sin with impunity, which seems senseless. thority of his jurisdiction, both in temporal and in spiri- Objection 3. Further, to grant indulgences and to ex- tual matters: thus also a priest gives himself the Eucharist communicate belong to the same power. Now a man can- which he gives to others. And so a bishop too can apply to not excommunicate himself. Therefore he cannot share in himself the suffrages of the Church which he dispenses to the indulgence of which he is the grantor. others, the immediate effect of which suffrages, and not of On the contrary, He would be worse off than others his jurisdiction, is the remission of punishment by means if he could not make use of the Church’s treasury which of indulgences. he dispenses to others. The Reply to the Second Objection is clear from what I answer that, An indulgence should be given for had been said. some reason, in order for anyone to be enticed by the Reply to Objection 3. Excommunication is pro- indulgence to perform some action that conduces to the nounced by way of sentence, which no man can pro- good of the Church and to the honor of God. Now the nounce on himself, for the reason that in the tribunal of 2733 justice the same man cannot be both judge and accused. form of a sentence, but by way of dispensation, which a On the other hand an indulgence is not given under the man can apply to himself. 2734 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 28 Of the Solemn Rite of Penance (In Three Articles) We must now consider the solemn rite of Penance: under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether a penance can be published or solemnized? (2) Whether a solemn penance can be repeated? (3) Whether public penance should be imposed on women? Whether a penance should be published or solemnized? Suppl. q. 28 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that a penance should not confession by imposing such a penance, though people be published or solemnized. Because it is not lawful for a may suspect the penitent of having committed some great priest, even through fear, to divulge anyone’s sin, however sin. For a man is not certainly taken to be guilty, because notorious it may be. Now a sin is published by a solemn he is punished, since sometimes one does penance for an- penance. Therefore a penance should not be solemnized. other: thus we read in the Lives of the Fathers of a certain Objection 2. Further, the judgment should follow the man who, in order to incite his companion to do penance, nature of the tribunal. Now penance is a judgment pro- did penance together with him. And if the sin be public, nounced in a secret tribunal. Therefore it should not be the penitent, by fulfilling his penance, shows that he has published or solemnized. been to confession. Objection 3. Further, “Every deficiency is made good Reply to Objection 2. A solemn penance, as to its by penance” as Ambrose∗ states. Now solemnization has imposition, does not go beyond the limits of a secret tri- a contrary effect, since it involves the penitent in many de- bunal, since, just as the confession is made secretly, so ficiencies: for a layman cannot be promoted to the ranks the penance is imposed secretly. It is the execution of the of the clergy nor can a cleric be promoted to higher orders, penance, that goes beyond the limits of the secret tribunal: after doing solemn penance. Therefore Penance should and there is nothing objectionable in this. not be solemnized. Reply to Objection 3. Although Penance cancels all On the contrary, Penance is a sacrament. Now some deficiencies, by restoring man to his former state of grace, kind of solemnity is observed in every sacrament. There- yet it does not always restore him to his former dignity. fore there should be some solemnity in Penance. Hence women after doing penance for fornication are not Further, the medicine should suit the disease. Now a given the veil, because they do not recover the honor of sin is sometimes public, and by its example draws many virginity. In like manner, after doing public penance, a to sin. Therefore the penance which is its medicine should sinner does not recover his former dignity so as to be eli- also be public and solemn so as to give edification to gible for the clerical state and a bishop who would ordain many. such a one ought to be deprived of the power of ordaining, I answer that, Some penances should be public and unless perhaps the needs of the Church or custom require solemn for four reasons. First, so that a public sin may it. In that case such a one would be admitted to minor have a public remedy; secondly, because he who has com- orders by way of exception, but not to the sacred orders. mitted a very grave crime deserves the greatest confusion First, on account of the dignity of the latter; secondly, for even in this life; thirdly, in order that it may deter others; fear of relapse; thirdly, in order to avoid the scandal which fourthly, that he may be an example of repentance, lest the people might take through recollection of his former those should despair, who have committed grievous sins. sins; fourthly, because he would not have the face to cor- Reply to Objection 1. The priest does not divulge the rect others, by reason of the publicity of his own sin. Whether a solemn penance can be repeated? Suppl. q. 28 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that a solemn penance does not imprint a character, therefore it can be solem- can be repeated. For those sacraments which do not im- nized over again. print a character, can be solemnized a second time, such as Objection 2. Further, penance is solemnized on ac- the Eucharist, Extreme Unction and the like. But Penance count of the gravity and publicity of the sin. Now, after ∗ Cf. Hypognost. iii, among the spurious works ascribed to St. Augustine 2735 doing penance, a person may commit the same sins over continual repentance. Wherefore repetition is inconsis-again, or even more grievous sins. Therefore the solemn tent with solemnization. And if the sinner fall again, he is penance should be imposed again. not precluded from doing penance, but a solemn penance On the contrary, Solemn penance signifies the expul- should not be imposed on him again. sion of the first man from paradise. Now this was done but Reply to Objection 1. In those sacraments which are once. Therefore solemn penance should be imposed once solemnized again and again, repetition is not inconsistent only. with solemnity, as it is in the present case. Hence the com- I answer that, Solemn penance ought not to be re- parison fails. peated, for three reasons. First, lest frequency bring it into Reply to Objection 2. Although, if we consider his contempt. Secondly, on account of its signification; for crime, he ought to do the same penance again, yet the it signifies the expulsion of the first man from paradise, repeated solemnization is not becoming, for the reasons which happened only once; thirdly, because the solem- stated above. nization indicates, in a way, that one makes profession of Whether solemn penance should be imposed on women and clerics, and whether any Suppl. q. 28 a. 3 priest can impose it? Objection 1. It would seem that solemn penance the octave day of Easter, without however being admitted should not be imposed on women. Because, when this to Communion or to the kiss of peace. This shall be done penance is imposed on a man, he has to cut his hair off. every year as long as entrance into the church is forbidden But this becomes not a woman, according to 1 Cor. 11:15. them. The final reconciliation is reserved to the bishop, Therefore she should not do solemn penance. who alone can impose solemn penance”∗. Objection 2. It also seems that it ought to be imposed This penance can be imposed on men and women; on clerics. For it is enjoined on account of a grievous but not on clerics, for fear of scandal. Nor ought such crime. Now the same sin is more grievous in a cleric than a penance to be imposed except for a crime which has in a layman. Therefore it ought to be imposed on a cleric disturbed the whole of the city. more than on a layman. On the other hand public but not solemn penance is Objection 3. It also seems that it can be imposed by that which is done in the presence of the Church, but with- any priest. Because to absolve in the tribunal of Penance out the foregoing solemnity, such as a pilgrimage through- belongs to one who has the keys. Now an ordinary priest out the world with a staff. A penance of this kind can be has the keys. Therefore he can administer this penance. repeated, and can be imposed by a mere priest, even on a I answer that, Every solemn penance is public, but cleric. Sometimes however a solemn penance is taken to not vice versa. For solemn penance is done as follows: signify a public one: so that authorities speak of solemn “On the first day of Lent, these penitents clothed in sack- penance in different senses. cloth, with bare feet, their faces to the ground, and their Reply to Objection 1. The woman’s hair is a sign of hair shorn away, accompanied by their priests, present her subjection, a man’s is not. Hence it is not proper for a themselves to the bishop of the city at the door of the woman to put aside her hair when doing penance, as it is church. Having brought them into the church the bishop for a man. with all his clergy recites the seven penitential psalms, and Reply to Objection 2. Although in the same kind of then imposes his hand on them, sprinkles them with holy sin, a cleric offends more grievously than a layman, yet water, puts ashes on their heads, covers their shoulders a solemn penance is not imposed on him, lest his orders with a hairshirt, and sorrowfully announces to them that should be an object of contempt. Thus deference is given as Adam was expelled from paradise, so are they expelled not to the person but to his orders. from the church. He then orders the ministers to put them Reply to Objection 3. Grave sins need great care in out of the church, and the clergy follow reciting the re- their cure. Hence the imposition of a solemn penance, sponsory: ‘In the sweat of thy brow,’ etc. Every year on which is only applied for the most grievous sins, is re- the day of our Lord’s Supper they are brought back into served to the bishop. the church by their priests, and there shall they be until ∗ Cap. lxiv, dist. 50 2736 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 29 Of Extreme Unction, As Regards Its Essence and Institution (In Nine Articles) We must now consider the sacrament of Extreme Unction: in respect of which five points have to be considered: (1) Its essentials and institution; (2) Its effect; (3) Its minister; (4) on whom should it be conferred and in what parts; (5) Its repetition. Under the first head there are nine points of inquiry: (1) Whether Extreme Unction is a sacrament? (2) Whether it is one sacrament? (3) Whether this sacrament was instituted by Christ? (4) Whether olive oil is a suitable matter for this sacrament? (5) Whether the oil ought to be consecrated? (6) Whether the matter of this sacrament should be consecrated by a bishop? (7) Whether this sacrament has any form? (8) Whether the form of this sacrament should take the shape of a deprecatory phrase? (9) Whether this is a suitable form for this sacrament? Whether Extreme Unction is a sacrament? Suppl. q. 29 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that Extreme Unction is though it does not reach to that effect, is nevertheless di- not a sacrament. For just as oil is used on sick people, so rected towards that principal action. Now the effect in- is it on catechumens. But anointing of catechumens with tended in the administration of the sacraments is the heal- oil is not a sacrament. Therefore neither is the Extreme ing of the disease of sin: wherefore it is written (Is. 27:9): Unction of the sick with oil. “This is all the fruit, that the sin. . . should be taken away.” Objection 2. Further, the sacraments of the Old Law Since then Extreme Unction reaches to this effect, as is were figures of the sacraments of the New Law. But there clear from the words of James, and is not ordained to any was no figure of Extreme Unction in the Old Law. There- other sacrament as an accessory thereto, it is evident that fore it is not a sacrament of the New Law. Extreme Unction is not a sacramental but a sacrament. Objection 3. Further, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Reply to Objection 1. The oil with which catechu- Hier. iii, v) every sacrament aims at either cleansing, or mens are anointed does not convey the remission of sins enlightening, or perfecting. Now Extreme Unction does to them by its unction, for that belongs to Baptism. It not aim at either cleansing, or enlightening, for this is as- does, however, dispose them to receive Baptism, as stated cribed to Baptism alone, or perfecting, for according to above ( IIIa, q. 71, a. 3). Hence that unction is not a sacra- Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. ii), this belongs to Confirmation ment as Extreme Unction is. and the Eucharist. Therefore Extreme Unction is not a Reply to Objection 2. This sacrament prepares man sacrament. for glory immediately, since it is given to those who are On the contrary, The sacraments of the Church sup- departing from this life. And as, under the Old Law, it was ply man’s defects sufficiently with respect to every state not yet time to enter into glory, because “the Law brought of life. Now no other than Extreme Unction does this for nobody [Vulg.: ‘nothing’] to perfection” (Heb. 7:19), those who are departing from this life. Therefore it is a so this sacrament had not to be foreshadowed therein by sacrament. some corresponding sacrament, as by a figure of the same Further, the sacraments are neither more nor less than kind. Nevertheless it was somewhat foreshadowed re- spiritual remedies. Now Extreme Unction is a spiritual motely by all the healings related in the Old Testament. remedy, since it avails for the remission of sins, according Reply to Objection 3. Dionysius makes no mention to James 5:15. Therefore it is a sacrament. of Extreme Unction, as neither of Penance, nor of Matri- I answer that, Among the visible operations of the mony, because he had no intention to decide any question Church, some are sacraments, as Baptism, some are sacra- about the sacraments, save in so far as they serve to illus- mentals, as Exorcism. The difference between these is trate the orderly disposition of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, that a sacrament is an action of the Church that reaches as regards the ministers, their actions, and the recipients. to the principal effect intended in the administration of Nevertheless since Extreme Unction confers grace and re- the sacraments, whereas a sacramental is an action which, mission of sins, there is no doubt that it possesses an en- 2737 lightening and cleansing power, even as Baptism, though not so copious. Whether Extreme Unction is one sacrament? Suppl. q. 29 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Extreme Unction is consists in that action only, as may be seen in Confirma- not one sacrament. Because the oneness of a thing de- tion. When, however, the signification of the sacrament pends on its matter and form, since being and oneness are can be both in one and in several actions, then the sacra- derived from the same source. Now the form of this sacra- ment can be complete both in one and in several actions, ment is said several times during the one administration, even as Baptism in one immersion and in three, since and the matter is applied to the person anointed in respect washing which is signified in Baptism, can be completed of various parts of his body. Therefore it is not one sacra- by one immersion and by several. But when the perfect ment. signification cannot be expressed except by means of sev- Objection 2. Further, the unction itself is a sacrament, eral actions, then these several actions are essential for the for it would be absurd to say that the oil is a sacrament. perfection of the sacrament, as is exemplified in the Eu- But there are several unctions. Therefore there are several charist, for the refreshment of the body which signifies sacraments. that of the soul, can only be attained by means of meat Objection 3. Further, one sacrament should be per- and drink. It is the same in this sacrament, because the formed by one minister. But the case might occur that healing of the internal wounds cannot be perfectly signi- Extreme Unction could not be conferred by one minister: fied save by the application of the remedy to the various thus if the priest die after the first unction, another priest sources of the wounds. Hence several actions are essential would have to proceed with the others. Therefore Extreme to the perfection of this sacrament. Unction is not one sacrament. Reply to Objection 1. The unity of a complete whole On the contrary, As immersion is in relation to Bap- is not destroyed by reason of a diversity of matter or form tism, so is unction to this sacrament. But several immer- in the parts of that whole. Thus it is evident that there sions are but one sacrament of Baptism. Therefore the is neither the same matter nor the same form in the flesh several unctions in Extreme Unction are also one sacra- and in the bones of which one man is composed. In like ment. manner too, in the sacrament of the Eucharist, and in this Further, if it were not one sacrament, then after the sacrament, the diversity of matter and form does not de- first unction, it would not be essential for the perfection stroy the unity of the sacrament. of the sacrament that the second unction should be per- Reply to Objection 2. Although those actions are formed, since each sacrament has perfect being of itself. several simply, yet they are united together in one com- But that is not true. Therefore it is one sacrament. plete action, viz. the anointing of all the external senses, I answer that, Strictly speaking, a thing is one numer- whence arises the infernal malady. ically in three ways. First, as something indivisible, which Reply to Objection 3. Although, in the Eucharist, if is neither actually nor potentially several—as a point, and the priest die after the consecration of the bread, another unity. Secondly, as something continuous, which is ac- priest can go on with the consecration of the wine, be- tually one, but potentially several—as a line. Thirdly, as ginning where the other left off, or can begin over again something complete, that is composed of several parts— with fresh matter, in Extreme Unction he cannot begin as a house, which is, in a way, several things, even ac- over again, but should always go on, because to anoint the tually, although those several things go together towards same part a second time would produce as much effect making one. In this way each sacrament is said to be one as if one were to consecrate a host a second time, which thing, in as much as the many things which are contained ought by no means to be done. Nor does the plurality of in one sacrament, are united together for the purpose of ministers destroy the unity of this sacrament, because they signifying or causing one thing, because a sacrament is a only act as instruments, and the unity of a smith’s work is sign of the effect it produces. Hence when one action suf- not destroyed by his using several hammers. fices for a perfect signification, the unity of the sacrament 2738 Whether this sacrament was instituted by Christ? Suppl. q. 29 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that this sacrament was cogent, since, just as Christ, before His Passion, promised not instituted by Christ. For mention is made in the the mission of the Holy Ghost in His plenitude, so could Gospel of the institution of those sacraments which Christ He institute these sacraments. instituted, for instance the Eucharist and Baptism. But no Wherefore others hold that Christ Himself instituted mention is made of Extreme Unction. Therefore it was all the sacraments, but that He Himself published some, not instituted by Christ. which present greater difficulty to our belief, while he Objection 2. Further, the Master says explicitly (Sent. reserved some to be published by the apostles, such as iv, D, 23) that it was instituted by the apostles. Therefore Extreme Unction and Confirmation. This opinion seems Christ did not institute it Himself. so much the more probable, as the sacraments belong to Objection 3. Further, Christ showed forth the sacra- the foundation of the Law, wherefore their institution per- ments which He instituted, as in the case of the Eucharist tains to the lawgiver; besides, they derive their efficacy and Baptism. But He did not bestow this sacrament on from their institution, which efficacy is given them by God anyone. Therefore He did not institute it Himself. alone. On the contrary, The sacraments of the New Law are Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord did and said many more excellent than those of the Old Law. But all the things which are not related in the Gospel. For the evan- sacraments of the Old Law were instituted by God. There- gelists were intent on handing down chiefly those things fore much more do all the sacraments of the New Law owe that were necessary for salvation or concerned the build- their institution to Christ Himself. ing of the ecclesiastical edifice. Hence they related the Further, to make an institution and to remove it be- institution by Christ of Baptism, Penance, the Eucharist longs to the same authority. Now the Church, who enjoys and orders, rather than of Extreme Unction and Confir- the same authority in the successors of the apostles, as mation, which are not necessary for salvation, nor do they the apostles themselves possessed, cannot do away with concern the building or division of the Church. As a mat- the sacrament of Extreme Unction. Therefore the apostles ter of fact however an anointing done by the apostles is did not institute it, but Christ Himself. mentioned in the Gospel (Mk. 6:13) where it is said that I answer that, There are two opinions on this point. they “anointed the sick with oil.” For some hold that this sacrament and Confirmation were Reply to Objection 2. The Master says it was in- not instituted by Christ Himself, but were left by Him to stituted by the apostles because its institution was made be instituted by the apostles; for the reason that these two known to us by the teaching of the apostles. sacraments, on account of the plenitude of grace conferred Reply to Objection 3. Christ did not show forth any in them, could not be instituted before the mission of the sacrament except such as He received by way of example: Holy Ghost in perfect plenitude. Hence they are sacra- but He could not be a recipient of Penance and Extreme ments of the New Law in such a way as not to be fore- Unction, since there was no sin in Him: hence He did not shadowed in the Old Law. But this argument is not very show them forth. Whether olive oil is a suitable matter for this sacrament? Suppl. q. 29 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that olive oil is not a the dying, who are in the greatest danger, it seems that suitable matter for this sacrament. For this sacrament is olive oil is not a suitable matter. ordained immediately to the state of incorruption. Now On the contrary, oil is appointed (James 5:14) as the incorruption is signified by balsam which is contained in matter of this sacrament. Now, properly speaking, oil is chrism. Therefore chrism would be a more suitable matter none but olive oil. Therefore this is the matter of this for this sacrament. sacrament. Objection 2. Further, this sacrament is a spiritual Further, spiritual healing is signified by anointing with healing. Now spiritual healing is signified by the use of oil, as is evident from Is. 1:6 where we read: ”. . . swelling wine, as may be gathered from the parable of the wounded sores: they are not. . . dressed nor fomented with oil.” man (Lk. 10:34). Therefore wine also would be more suit- Therefore the suitable matter for this sacrament is oil. able a matter for this sacrament. I answer that, The spiritual healing, which is given Objection 3. Further, where there is the greater dan- at the end of life, ought to be complete, since there is no ger, the remedy should be a common one. But olive oil other to follow; it ought also to be gentle, lest hope, of is not a common remedy, since the olive is not found in which the dying stand in utmost need, be shattered rather every country. Therefore, since this sacrament is given to than fostered. Now oil has a softening effect, it penetrates 2739 to the very heart of a thing, and spreads over it. Hence, in indicative of a good name, which is no longer necessary, both the foregoing respects, it is a suitable matter for this for its own sake, to those who are dying; they need only a sacrament. And since oil is, above all, the name of the clear conscience which is signified by oil. liquid extract of olives, for other liquids are only called Reply to Objection 2. Wine heals by its roughness, oil from their likeness to it, it follows that olive oil is the oil by its softness, wherefore healing with wine pertains matter which should be employed in this sacrament. to Penance rather than to this sacrament. Reply to Objection 1. The incorruption of glory is Reply to Objection 3. Though olive oil is not pro- something not contained in this sacrament: and there is duced everywhere, yet it can easily be transported from no need for the matter to signify such a thing. Hence it one place to another. Moreover this sacrament is not so is not necessary for balsam to be included in the matter necessary that the dying cannot obtain salvation without of this sacrament, because on account of its fragrance it is it. Whether the oil ought to be consecrated? Suppl. q. 29 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the oil need not be ing, and that the matter of this sacrament is consecrated consecrated. Because there is a sanctification in the use oil. Three reasons may be assigned why consecrated mat- of this sacrament, through the form of words. Therefore ter is needed in this sacrament and in certain others. The another sanctification is superfluous if it be applied to the first is that all sacramental efficacy is derived from Christ: matter. wherefore those sacraments which He Himself used, de- Objection 2. Further, the efficacy and signification of rived their efficacy from His use of them, even as, by the the sacraments are in their very matter. But the significa- contact of His flesh, He bestowed the force of regenera- tion of the effect of this sacrament, is suitable to oil on tion on the waters. But He did not use this sacrament, nor account of its natural properties, and the efficacy thereof any bodily anointing, wherefore in all anointings a conse- is due to the Divine institution. Therefore its matter does crated matter is required. The second reason is that this not need to be sanctified. sacrament confers a plenitude of grace, so as to take away Objection 3. Further, Baptism is a more perfect sacra- not only sin but also the remnants of sin, and bodily sick- ment than Extreme Unction. But, so far as the essen- ness. The third reason is that its effect on the body, viz. tials of the sacrament are concerned, the baptismal matter bodily health, is not caused by a natural property of the needs no sanctification. Neither therefore does the matter matter. wherefore it has to derive this efficacy from being of Extreme Unction need to be sanctified. consecrated. On the contrary, In all other anointings the matter is Reply to Objection 1. The first consecration sancti- previously consecrated. Therefore since this sacrament is fies the matter in itself, but the second regards rather the an anointing, it requires consecrated matter. use of the matter considered as actually producing its ef- I answer that, Some hold that mere oil is the mat- fect. Hence neither is superfluous, because instruments ter of this sacrament, and that the sacrament itself is per- also receive their efficacy from the craftsman, both when fected in the consecration of the oil by the bishop. But they are made, and when they are used for action. this is clearly false since we proved when treating of the Reply to Objection 2. The efficacy which the sacra- Eucharist that that sacrament alone consists in the conse- ment derives from its institution, is applied to this partic- cration of the matter (q. 2, a. 1, ad 2). ular matter when it is consecrated. We must therefore say that this sacrament consists in The Reply to the Third Objection is gathered from the anointing itself, just as Baptism consists in the wash- what has been said. Whether the matter of this sacrament need be consecrated by a bishop? Suppl. q. 29 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the matter of this which applies the matter is more excellent than that which sacrament need not be consecrated by a bishop. Because prepares it, as stated in Phys. ii, text. 25. Now a bishop is the consecration of the Eucharistic elements surpasses above a priest. Therefore he does not prepare the matter of that of the matter in this sacrament. But a priest can con- a sacrament which is applied by a priest. But a priest dis- secrate the matter in the Eucharist. Therefore he can do penses this sacrament, as we shall state further on (q. 31). so in this sacrament also. Therefore the consecration of the matter does not belong Objection 2. Further, in material works the higher to a bishop. art never prepares the matter for the lower, because the art On the contrary, In other anointings also the matter 2740 is consecrated by a bishop. Therefore the same applies to hand: but the altar and such like things, even the priest this. himself, need to be consecrated, all of which can be done I answer that, The minister of a sacrament produces by none but a bishop: so that in this sacrament also, the the effect, not by his own power, as though he were the priest’s power is shown to be derived from the bishop’s, principal agent, but by the efficacy of the sacrament which as Dionysius observes (Eccl. Hier. iii). The reason why a he dispenses. This efficacy comes, in the first place, from priest can perform that consecration of matter which is a Christ, and from Him flows down to others in due order, sacrament by itself, and not that which, as a sacramental, viz. to the people through the medium of the ministers is directed to a sacrament consisting in something used by who dispense the sacraments, and to the lower ministers the faithful, is that in respect of Christ’s true body no or- through the medium of the higher ministers who sanctify der is above the priesthood, whereas, in respect of Christ’s the matter. Wherefore, in all the sacraments which require mystic body the episcopate is above the priesthood, as we a sanctified matter, the first consecration of the matter is shall state further on (q. 40, a. 4). performed by a bishop, and the application thereof some- Reply to Objection 2. The sacramental matter is not times by a priest, in order to show that the priest’s power is one that is made into something else by him that uses it, as derived from the bishop’s, according to Ps. 132:2: “Like occurs in the mechanical arts: it is one, in virtue of which the precious ointment on the head,” i.e. Christ, “that ran something is done, so that it partakes somewhat of the na- down upon the beard of Aaron” first, and then “to the skirt ture of an efficient cause, in so far as it is the instrument of his garment.” of a Divine operation. Hence the matter needs to acquire Reply to Objection 1. The sacrament of the Eucharist this virtue from a higher art or power, since among effi- consists in the consecration of the matter and not in its use. cient causes, the more prior the cause the more perfect it Consequently, strictly speaking, that which is the matter is, whereas in material causes, the more prior the matter, of the sacrament is not a consecrated thing. Hence no the more imperfect it is. consecration of the matter by a bishop is required before- Whether this sacrament has a form? Suppl. q. 29 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that this sacrament has I answer that, Some have held that no farm is essen- no form. Because, since the efficacy of the sacraments tial to this sacrament. This, however, seems derogatory to is derived from their institution, as also from their form, the effect of this sacrament, since every sacrament signi- the latter must needs be appointed by the institutor of the fies its effect. Now the matter is indifferent as regards its sacrament. But there is no account of the form of this effect, and consequently cannot be determined to any par- sacrament being instituted either by Christ or by the apos- ticular effect save by the form of words. Hence in all the tles. Therefore this sacrament has no form. sacraments of the New Law, since they effect what they Objection 2. Further, whatever is essential to a sacra- signify, there must needs be things and words. Moreover ment is observed everywhere in the same way. Now noth- James (5:14,15) seems to ascribe the whole force of this ing is so essential to a sacrament that has a form, as that sacrament to prayer, which is the form thereof, as we shall very form. Therefore, as in this sacrament there is no form state further on (ad 2: Aa. 8,9). Wherefore the foregoing commonly used by all, since various words are in use, it opinion seems presumptuous and erroneous; and for that seems that this sacrament has no form. reason we should hold with the common opinion that this, Objection 3. Further, in Baptism no form is needed like all the other sacraments, has a fixed form. except for the sanctification of the matter, because the Reply to Objection 1. Holy Writ is proposed to all water is “sanctified by the word of life so as to wash sin alike: and so, the form of Baptism, which can be con- away,” as Hugh states (De Sacram. ii). Now the matter of ferred by all, should be expressed in Holy Writ, as also the this sacrament is already consecrated. Therefore it needs form of the Eucharist, which in regard to that sacrament, no form of words. expresses faith which is necessary for salvation. Now the On the contrary, The Master says (Sent. iv, D, 1) that forms of the other sacraments are not contained in Holy every sacrament of the New Law consists in things and Writ, but were handed down to the Church by the apos- words. Now the words are the sacramental form. There- tles, who received them from our Lord, as the Apostle fore, since this is a sacrament of the New Law, it seems declares (1 Cor. 11:23): “For I have received of the Lord that it has a form. that which also I delivered to you,” etc. Further, this is confirmed by the rite of the Universal Reply to Objection 2. The words which are essential Church, who uses certain words in the bestowal of this to the form, viz. the prayer of deprecation, are said by all; sacrament. but other words which pertain to the well-being thereof, 2741 are not said by all. that it has a sanctifying force. In like manner when the Reply to Objection 3. The matter of Baptism has a matter of this sacrament has been sanctified in itself, it certain sanctification of its own from the very contact of requires sanctification in its use, so that it may sanctify our Saviour’s flesh; but the form of words sanctifies it so actually. Whether the form of this sacrament should be expressed by way of assertion or of Suppl. q. 29 a. 8 petition? Objection 1. It would seem that the form of this sacra- pressed by way of a petition, as appears from the words of ment should be expressed by way of assertion rather than James, and from the custom of the Roman Church, who of petition. Because all the sacraments of the New Law uses no other than words of supplication in conferring this have a sure effect. But sureness of effect is not expressed sacrament. Several reasons are assigned for this: first, be- in the sacramental forms except by way of assertion, as cause the recipient of this sacrament is deprived of his when we say: “This is My body” or “I baptize thee.” strength, so that he needs to be helped by prayers; sec- Therefore the form of this sacrament should be expressed ondly, because it is given to the dying, who are on the as an assertion. point of quitting the courts of the Church, and rest in the Objection 2. Further, the intention of the minister hands of God alone, for which reason they are committed should be expressed in the sacramental forms because it to Him by prayer; thirdly, because the effect of this sacra- is essential to the sacrament. But the intention of confer- ment is not such that it always results from the minister’s ring a sacrament is not expressed except by an assertion. prayer, even when all essentials have been duly observed, Therefore, etc. as is the case with the character in Baptism and Confirma- Objection 3. Further, in some churches the follow- tion, transubstantiation in the Eucharist, remission of sin ing words are said in the conferring of this sacrament: “I in Penance (given contrition) which remission is essen- anoint these eyes with consecrated oil in the name of the tial to the sacrament of Penance but not to this sacrament. Father,” etc., which is in keeping with the forms of the Consequently the form of this sacrament cannot be ex- other sacraments. Therefore it seems that such is the form pressed in the indicative mood, as in the sacraments just of this sacrament. mentioned. On the contrary, The form of a sacrament must needs Reply to Objection 1. This sacrament, like the others be one that is observed everywhere. Now the words em- mentioned, considered in itself, is sure of its effect. yet ployed according to the custom of all the churches are not this effect can be hindered through the insincerity of the those quoted above, but take the form of a petition viz.: recipient (though by his intention he submit to the sacra- “Through this holy unction, and His most tender mercy, ment), so that he receives no effect at all. Hence there is may the Lord pardon thee whatever sins thou hast com- no parity between this sacrament, and the others wherein mitted, by sight,” etc. Therefore the form of this sacra- some effect always ensues. ment is expressed as a petition. Reply to Objection 2. The intention is sufficiently Further, this seems to follow from the words of James, expressed by the act which is mentioned in the form, viz.: who ascribes the effect of this sacrament to prayer: “The “By this holy unction.” prayer of faith,” says he (5:15), “shall save the sick man.” Reply to Objection 3. These words in the indicative Since then a sacrament takes its efficacy from its form, it mood, which some are wont to say before the prayer, are seems that the form of this sacrament is expressed as a not the sacramental form, but are a preparation for the petition. form, in so far as they determine the intention of the min- I answer that, The form of this sacrament is ex- ister. Whether the foregoing prayer is a suitable form for this sacrament? Suppl. q. 29 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that the foregoing prayer fects of the other sacraments. But mention is made in the is not a suitable form for this sacrament. For in the forms forms of the other sacraments, not of the Divine mercy, of the other sacraments mention is made of the matter, for but rather of the Trinity and of the Passion. Therefore the instance in Confirmation, whereas this is not done in the same should be done here. aforesaid words. Therefore it is not a suitable form. Objection 3. Further, this sacrament is stated in the Objection 2. Further, just as the effect of this sacra- text (Sent. iv, D, 23) to have a twofold effect. But in ment is bestowed on us by the mercy of God, so are the ef- the foregoing words mention is made of only one effect, 2742 viz. the remission of sins, and not of the healing of the Reply to Objection 2. The object of mercy is misery: body to which end James directs the prayer of faith to be and because this sacrament is given when we are in a state made (James 5:15): “The prayer of faith shall save the of misery, i.e. of sickness, mention of mercy is made in sick man.” Therefore the above form is unsuitable. this rather than in other sacraments. I answer that, The prayer given above (a. 8) is a suit- Reply to Objection 3. The form should contain men- able form for this sacrament, for it includes the sacra- tion of the principal effect, and of that which always en- ment by the words: “By this holy unction,” and that which sues in virtue of the sacrament, unless there be something works in the sacrament, viz. “the mercy of God,” and the lacking on the part of the recipient. Now bodily health effect, viz. “remission of sins.” is not an effect of this kind, as we shall state further on Reply to Objection 1. The matter of this sacrament (q. 30, Aa. 1 ,2), though it does ensue at times, for which may be understood in the act of anointing, whereas the reason James ascribes this effect to the prayer which is the matter of Confirmation cannot be implied by the act ex- form of this sacrament. pressed in the form. Hence there is no parity. 2743 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 30 Of the Effect of This Sacrament (In Three Articles) We must now consider the effect of this sacrament: under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether Extreme Unction avails for the remission of sins? (2) Whether bodily health is an effect of this sacrament? (3) Whether this sacrament imprints a character? Whether Extreme Unction avails for the remission of sins? Suppl. q. 30 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that Extreme Unction one who is cured, so does a spiritual cure presuppose spir- does not avail for the remission of sins. For when a thing itual life. Hence this sacrament is not an antidote to those can be attained by one means, no other is needed. Now defects which deprive man of spiritual life, namely. orig- repentance is required in the recipient of Extreme Unc- inal and mortal sin, but is a remedy for such defects as tion for the remission of his sins. Therefore sins are not weaken man spiritually, so as to deprive him of perfect remitted by Extreme Unction. vigor for acts of the life of grace or of glory; which de- Objection 2. Further, there are no more than three fects consist in nothing else but a certain weakness and things in sin, the stain, the debt of punishment, and the unfitness, the result in us of actual or original sin. against remnants of sin. Now Extreme Unction does not remit which weakness man is strengthened by this sacrament. the stain without contrition, and this remits sin even with- Since, however, this strength is given by grace, which is out Unction; nor does it remit the punishment, for if the incompatible with sin, it follows that. in consequence, if recipient recover, he is still bound to fulfill the satisfac- it finds any sin, either mortal or venial, it removes it as far tion enjoined; nor does it take away the remnants of sin, as the guilt is concerned, provided there be no obstacle on since the dispositions remaining from preceding acts still the part of the recipient; just as we have stated to be the remain, as may easily be seen after recovery. Therefore case with regard to the Eucharist and Confirmation ( IIIa, remission of sins is by no means the effect of Extreme q. 73, a. 7; IIIa, q. 79, a. 3). Hence, too, James speaks Unction. of the remission of sin as being conditional, for he says: Objection 3. Further, remission of sins takes place, “If he be in sins, they shall be forgiven him,” viz. as to the not successively, but instantaneously. On the other hand, guilt. Because it does not always blot out sin, since it does Extreme Unction is not done all at once, since several not always find any: but it always remits in respect of the anointings are required. Therefore the remission of sins aforesaid weakness which some call the remnants of sin. is not its effect. Some, however, maintain that it is instituted chiefly as a On the contrary, It is written (James 5:15): “If he be remedy for venial sin which cannot be cured perfectly in in sins, they shall be forgiven him.” this lifetime: for which reason the sacrament of the dying Further, every sacrament of the New Law confers is ordained specially against venial sin. But this does not grace. Now grace effects the forgiveness of sins. There- seem to be true, since Penance also blots out venial sins fore since Extreme Unction is a sacrament of the New sufficiently during this life as to their guilt, and that we Law, its effect is the remission of sins. cannot avoid them after doing penance, does not cancel I answer that, Each sacrament was instituted for the the effect of the previous penance; moreover this is part purpose of one principal effect, though it may, in conse- of the weakness mentioned above. quence, produce other effects besides. And since a sacra- Consequently we must say that the principal effect of ment causes what it signifies, the principal effect of a this sacrament is the remission of sin, as to its remnants, sacrament must be gathered from its signification. Now and, consequently, even as to its guilt, if it find it. this sacrament is conferred by way of a kind of medica- Reply to Objection 1. Although the principal effect ment, even as Baptism is conferred by way of washing, of a sacrament can be obtained without actually receiv- and the purpose of a medicament is to expel sickness. ing that sacrament (either without any sacrament at all, Hence the chief object of the institution of this sacrament or indirectly by means of some other sacrament), yet it is to cure the sickness of sin. Therefore, just as Baptism never can be obtained without the purpose of receiving is a spiritual regeneration, and Penance, a spiritual resur- that sacrament. And so, since Penance was instituted rection, so Extreme Unction is a spiritual healing or cure. chiefly against actual sin, whichever other sacrament may Now just as a bodily cure presupposes bodily life in the blot out sin indirectly, it does not exclude the necessity of 2744 Penance. faction is diminished. As to the remnants of sin, they do Reply to Objection 2. Extreme Unction remits sin in not mean here those dispositions which result from acts, some way as to those three things. For, although the stain and are inchoate habits so to speak, but a certain spiri- of sin is not washed out without contrition, yet this sacra- tual debility in the mind, which debility being removed, ment, by the grace which it bestows, makes the movement though such like habits or dispositions remain, the mind of the free will towards sin to be one of contrition, just as is not so easily prone to sin. may occur in the Eucharist and Confirmation. Again it Reply to Objection 3. When many actions are or- diminishes the debt of temporal punishment; and this in- dained to one effect, the last is formal with respect to all directly, in as much as it takes away weakness, for a strong the others that precede, and acts by virtue of them: where- man bears the same punishment more easily than a weak fore by the last anointing is infused grace which gives the man. Hence it does not follow that the measure of satis- sacrament its effect. Whether bodily health is an effect of this sacrament? Suppl. q. 30 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that bodily health is not an I answer that, Just as Baptism causes a spiritual effect of this sacrament. For every sacrament is a spiritual cleansing from spiritual stains by means of a bodily wash- remedy. Now a spiritual remedy is ordained to spiritual ing, so this sacrament causes an inward healing by means health, just as a bodily remedy is ordained to health of of an outward sacramental healing: and even as the bap- the body. Therefore bodily health is not an effect of this tismal washing has the effect of a bodily washing, since it sacrament. effects even a bodily cleansing, so too, Extreme Unction Objection 2. Further, the sacraments always produce has the effect of a bodily remedy, namely a healing of the their effect in those who approach them in the proper dis- body. But there is a difference, for as much as the bodily positions. Now sometimes the recipient of this sacrament washing causes a bodily cleansing by a natural property does not receive bodily health, no matter how devoutly he of the bodily element, and consequently always causes it, receives it. Therefore bodily health is not its effect. whereas Extreme Unction causes a bodily healing, not by Objection 3. Further, the efficacy of this sacrament is a natural property of the matter, but by the Divine power notified to us in the fifth chapter of James. Now healing which works reasonably. And since reasonable working is ascribed there as the effect, not of the anointing, but of never produces a secondary effect, except in so far as it the prayer, for he says: “The prayer of faith shall save the is required for the principal effect, it follows that a bodily sick man.” Therefore bodily healing is not an effect of this healing does not always ensue from this sacrament, but sacrament. only when it is requisite for the spiritual healing: and then On the contrary, The operation of the Church is more it produces it always, provided there be no obstacle on the efficacious since Christ’s Passion than before. Now, be- part of the recipient. fore the Passion, those whom the apostles anointed with Reply to Objection 1. This objection proves that bod- oil were healed (Mk. 6:13). Therefore unction has its ef- ily health is not the principal effect of this sacrament: and fect now in healing bodies. this is true. Further, the sacraments produce their effect by sig- The Reply to the Second Objection is clear from what nifying it. Now Baptism signifies and effects a spir- has been said above (cf. q. 29, a. 8). itual washing, through the bodily washing in which it Reply to Objection 3. This prayer is the form of this consists outwardly. Therefore Extreme Unction signifies sacrament as stated above (q. 29, Aa. 8,9). Hence, so far and causes a spiritual healing through the bodily healing as its form is concerned, this sacrament derives from it its which it effects externally. efficacy in healing the body. Whether this sacrament imprints a character? Suppl. q. 30 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that this sacrament im- sacraments or order and Confirmation, as there is in this prints a character. For a character is a distinctive sign. sacrament. But a character is imprinted in those sacra- Now just as one who is baptized is distinguished from one ments. Therefore a character is imprinted in this one also. who is not so is one who is anointed, from one who is not. Objection 3. Further, every sacrament contains some- Therefore, just as Baptism imprints a character so does thing that is a reality only, something that is a sacrament Extreme Unction. only, and something that is both reality and sacrament. Objection 2. Further, there is an anointing in the Now nothing in this sacrament can be assigned as both re- 2745 ality and sacrament except a character. Therefore in this remedy, and man is not deputed thereby to do or receive sacrament also, a character is imprinted. anything holy. Therefore it does not imprint a character. On the contrary, No sacrament that imprints a char- Reply to Objection 1. A character marks a distinc- acter is repeated. But this sacrament is repeated as we tion of . states with regard to duties which have to be shall state further on (q. 33). Therefore it does not imprint performed in the Church, a distinction which a man does a character. not receive by being anointed. Further, a sacramental character causes a distinction Reply to Objection 2. The unction of orders and Con- among those who are in the present Church. But Extreme firmation, is the unction of consecration whereby a man is Unction is given to one who is departing from the present deputed to some sacred duty, whereas this unction is re- Church. Therefore it does not imprint a character. medial. Hence the comparison fails. I answer that, A character is not imprinted except in Reply to Objection 3. In this sacrament, that which is those sacraments whereby man is deputed to some sacred both reality and sacrament is not a character, but a certain duty. Now this sacrament is for no other purpose than a inward devotion which is a kind of spiritual anointing. 2746 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 31 Of the Minister of This Sacrament (In Three Articles) We must now consider the minister of this sacrament: under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether a layman can confer this sacrament? (2) Whether a deacon can? (3) Whether none but a bishop can confer it? Whether a layman can confer this sacrament? Suppl. q. 31 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that even a layman can incompetent to dispense any sacrament: and that they can confer this sacrament. For this sacrament derives its effi- baptize in cases of necessity, is due to the Divine dispen- cacy from prayer, as James declares (James 5:15). But a sation, in order that no one may be deprived of spiritual layman’s prayer is sometimes as acceptable to God as a regeneration. priest’s. Therefore he can confer this sacrament. Reply to Objection 1. This prayer is not said by the Objection 2. Further, we read of certain fathers in priest in his own person, for since sometimes he is in sin, Egypt that they sent the oil to the sick, and that these were he would not in that case be heard. But it is said in the healed. It is also related of the Blessed Genevieve that she person of the whole Church, in whose person he can pray anointed the sick with oil. Therefore this sacrament can as a public official, whereas a layman cannot, for he is a be conferred even by lay people. private individual. On the contrary, Remission of sins is given in this Reply to Objection 2. These unctions were not sacra- sacrament. But laymen have not the power to forgive sins. mental. It was due to the devotion of the recipients of Therefore, etc. the unction, and to the merits of those who anointed them I answer that, According to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. that they procured the effects of bodily health, through the v) there are some who exercise hierarchical actions, and “grace of healing” (1 Cor. 12:9) but not through sacra- some who are recipients only. Hence laymen are officially mental grace. Whether deacons can confer this sacrament? Suppl. q. 31 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that deacons can confer not to enlighten. Hence, since enlightenment is an effect this sacrament. For, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. of grace, no sacrament whereby grace is conferred can be v) “deacons have the power to cleanse.” Now this sacra- given by a deacon in virtue of his office: and so he cannot ment was instituted precisely to cleanse from sickness of confer this sacrament, since grace is bestowed therein. the mind and body. Therefore deacons also can confer it. Reply to Objection 1. This sacrament cleanses by Objection 2. Further, Baptism is a more excellent enlightening through the bestowal of grace: wherefore a sacrament than the one of which we are speaking. But deacon is not competent to confer it. deacons can baptize, as instanced by the Blessed Lau- Reply to Objection 2. This is not a necessary sacra- rence. Therefore they can confer this sacrament also. ment, as Baptism is. Hence its bestowal is not committed On the contrary, It is written (James 5:14): “Let him to all in cases of necessity, but only to those who are com- bring in the priests of the Church.” petent to do so in virtue of their office. Nor are deacons I answer that, A deacon has the power to cleanse but competent to baptize in virtue of their office. Whether none but a bishop can confer this sacrament? Suppl. q. 31 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that none but a bishop Objection 2. Further, he who cannot do what is less can confer this sacrament. For this sacrament consists in cannot do what is greater. Now the use of consecrated an anointing, just as Confirmation does. Now none but a matter surpasses the act of consecrating the matter, since bishop can confirm. Therefore only a bishop can confer the former is the end of the latter. Therefore since a priest this sacrament. cannot consecrate the matter, neither can he use the matter 2747 after it has been consecrated. Reply to Objection 1. Confirmation imprints a char- On the contrary, The minister of this sacrament has acter, whereby man is placed in a state of perfection, as to be brought in to the recipient, as is clear from James stated above ( IIIa, q. 63, Aa. 1, 2,6). But this does not 5:14. Now a bishop cannot go to all the sick people of his take place in this sacrament; hence there is no compari- diocese. Therefore the bishop is not the only one who can son. confer this sacrament. Reply to Objection 2. Although the use of conse- I answer that, According to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. crated matter is of more importance than the consecration v), the office of perfecting belongs to a bishop, just as of the matter, from the point of view of the final cause; it belongs to a priest to enlighten. Wherefore those sacra- nevertheless, from the point of view of efficient cause, the ments are reserved to a bishop’s dispensation, which place consecration of the matter is the more important, since the recipient in a state of perfection above others. But this the use of the matter is dependent thereon, as on its ac- is not the case with this sacrament, for it is given to all. tive cause: hence the consecration of the matter demands Consequently it can be given by ordinary priests. a higher power than the use of the matter does. 2748 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 32 On Whom Should This Sacrament Be Conferred and On What Part of the Body? (In Seven Articles) We must now consider on whom this sacrament should be conferred and on what part of the body: under which head there are seven points of inquiry: (1) Whether this sacrament should be conferred on those who are in good health? (2) Whether it should be conferred in any kind of sickness? (3) Whether it should be conferred on madmen and imbeciles? (4) Whether it should be given to children? (5) Whether, in this sacrament, the whole body should be anointed? (6) Whether certain parts are suitably assigned to be anointed? (7) Whether those who are deformed in the above parts ought to be anointed thereon? Whether this sacrament ought to be conferred on those who are in good health? Suppl. q. 32 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that this sacrament should as stated above (q. 30, Aa. 1,2), and is signified by way be conferred even on those who are in good health. For of a healing of the body. Hence this sacrament should the healing of the mind is a more important effect of this not be conferred on those who are not subjects for bodily sacrament than the healing of the body, as stated above healing, those namely, who are in good health. (q. 30, a. 2). Now even those who are healthy in body need Reply to Objection 1. Although spiritual health is to be healed in mind. Therefore this sacrament should be the principal effect of this sacrament, yet this same spiri- conferred on them also. tual healing needs to be signified by a healing of the body, Objection 2. Further, this is the sacrament of those although bodily health may not actually ensue. Conse- who are departing this life, just as Baptism is the sacra- quently spiritual health can be conferred by this sacrament ment of those who are entering this life. Now Baptism is on those alone who are competent to receive bodily heal- given to all who enter. Therefore this sacrament should be ing, viz. the sick; even as he alone can receive Baptism given to all who are departing. But sometimes those who who is capable of a bodily washing, and not a child yet in are near departure are in good health, for instance those its mother’s womb. who are to be beheaded. Therefore this sacrament should Reply to Objection 2. Even those who are entering be conferred on them. into life cannot receive Baptism unless they are capable On the contrary, It is written (James 5:14): “Is any of a bodily washing. And so those who are departing this man sick among you,” etc. Therefore none but the sick life cannot receive this sacrament, unless they be subjects are competent to receive this sacrament. for a bodily healing. I answer that, This sacrament is a spiritual healing, Whether this sacrament ought to be given in any kind of sickness? Suppl. q. 32 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that this sacrament should man to the extremity of his life, since some ailments pro- be given in any kind of sickness. For no kind of sickness is long life, according to the Philosopher (De Long. et Brev. determined in the fifth chapter of James where this sacra- Vitae i). Therefore this sacrament should not be given in ment is delivered to us. Therefore this sacrament should every case of sickness. be given in all kinds of sickness. I answer that, This sacrament is the last remedy that Objection 2. Further, the more excellent a remedy is, the Church can give, since it is an immediate preparation the more generally should it be available. Now this sacra- for glory. Therefore it ought to be given to those only, who ment is more excellent than bodily medicine. Since then are so sick as to be in a state of departure from this life, bodily medicine is given to all manner of sick persons, it through their sickness being of such a nature as to cause seems that this sacrament should be given in like manner death, the danger of which is to be feared. to all. Reply to Objection 1. Any sickness can cause death, On the contrary, This sacrament is called by all Ex- if it be aggravated. Hence if we consider the different treme Unction. Now it is not every sickness that brings kinds of disease, there is none in which this sacrament 2749 cannot be given; and for this reason the apostle does not whatever be the stage of their sickness. But the principal determine any particular one. But if we consider the de- effect of this sacrament is that immunity from disorder gree and the stage of the complaint, this sacrament should which is needed by those who are taking their departure not be given to every sick person. from this life and setting out for the life of glory. Hence Reply to Objection 2. The principal effect of bod- the comparison fails. ily medicine is bodily health, which all sick people lack, Whether this sacrament ought to be given to madmen and imbeciles? Suppl. q. 32 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that this sacrament should of a prayer. Hence it should not be given those who cannot be given to madmen and imbeciles. For these diseases are acknowledge it, and especially to madmen and imbeciles, full of danger and cause death quickly. Now when there who might dishonor the sacrament by their offensive con- is danger it is the time to apply the remedy. Therefore duct, unless they have lucid intervals, when they would this sacrament, which was intended as a remedy to human be capable of acknowledging the sacrament, for then the weakness, should be given to such people. sacrament should be given to children the same in that Objection 2. Further, Baptism is a greater sacrament state. than this. Now Baptism is conferred on mad people as Reply to Objection 1. Although such people are stated above ( IIIa, q. 68, a. 12). Therefore this sacrament sometimes in danger of death; yet the remedy cannot be also should be given to them. applied to them, on account of their lack of devotion. On the contrary, This sacrament should be given to Hence it should not be given to them. none but such as acknowledge it. Now this does not ap- Reply to Objection 2. Baptism does not require a ply to madmen and imbeciles. Therefore it should not be movement of the free-will, because it is given chiefly as a given to them. remedy for original sin, which, in us, is not taken away by I answer that, The devotion of the recipient, the per- a movement of the free-will. On the other hand this sacra- sonal merit of the minister, and the general merits of the ment requires a movement of the free-will; wherefore the whole Church, are of great account towards the reception comparison fails. Moreover Baptism is a necessary sacra- of the effect of this sacrament. This is evident from the ment, while Extreme Unction is not. fact that the form of this sacrament is pronounced by way Whether this sacrament should be given to children? Suppl. q. 32 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that this sacrament ought Therefore this sacrament should not be given to them. to be given to children. Because children suffer from the I answer that, This sacrament, like the Eucharist, re- same ailments sometimes as adults. Now the same dis- quires actual devotion in the recipient. Therefore, just as ease requires the same remedy. Therefore this sacrament the Eucharist ought not to be given to children, so neither should be given to children the same as to adults. ought this sacrament to be given to them. Objection 2. Further, this sacrament is given in order Reply to Objection 1. Children’s infirmities are not to remove the remnants of sin, whether original or actual, caused by actual sin, as in adults, and this sacrament is as stated above (q. 30, a. 1). Now the remnants of orig- given chiefly as a remedy for infirmities that result from inal sin are in children. Therefore this sacrament should sins, being the remnants of sin, as it were. be given to them. Reply to Objection 2. This sacrament is not given On the contrary, This sacrament should be given to as a remedy for the remnants of original sin, except in so none but those to whom the form applies. But the form of far as they gather strength, so to speak, from actual sins. this sacrament does not apply to children, since they have Hence from the very form it appears that it is given chiefly not sinned by sight and hearing; as expressed in the form. as a remedy for actual sins, which are not in children. Whether the whole body should be anointed in this sacrament? Suppl. q. 32 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the whole body order to heal the soul. Therefore the whole body ought to should be anointed in this sacrament. For, according to be anointed. Augustine (De Trin. vi, 6), “the whole soul is in every Objection 2. Further, the remedy should be applied part of the body.” Now this sacrament is given chiefly in to the part affected by the disease. But sometimes the 2750 disease is general, and affects the whole body, as a fever rooted. does. Therefore the whole body should be anointed. Reply to Objection 1. Although the whole soul is, as Objection 3. Further, in Baptism the whole body is to its essence, in each part of the body, it is not as to its dipped under the water. Therefore in this sacrament the powers which are the roots of sinful acts. Hence certain whole body should be anointed. fixed parts have to be anointed, those, namely, in which On the contrary, stands the rite observed throughout powers have their being. the Church, according to which in this sacrament the sick Reply to Objection 2. The remedy is not always ap- man is anointed, only in certain fixed parts of the body. plied to the part affected by the disease, but, with greater I answer that, This sacrament is shown to us under reason, to the part where the root of the disease is seated. the form of a healing. Now bodily healing has to be ef- Reply to Objection 3. Baptism is given under the fected, by applying the remedy, not to the whole body, form of washing: and a bodily washing cleanses only the but to those parts where the root of the disease is seated. part to which it is applied; for this reason Baptism is ap- Consequently the sacramental unction also ought to be ap- plied to the whole body. It is different with Extreme Unc- plied to those parts only in which the spiritual sickness is tion for the reason given above. Whether the parts to be anointed are suitably assigned? Suppl. q. 32 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that these parts are un- five senses are anointed. the eyes, to wit, on account of suitably assigned, namely, that the eyes, nose, ears, lips, the sight, the ears on account of hearing, the nostrils on hands, and feet should be anointed. For a wise physi- account of the smell, the mouth on account of the taste, cian heals the disease in its root. Now “from the heart the hands on account of the touch which is keenest in the come forth thoughts. . . that defile a man” (Mat. 15:19,20). finger tips, (in some places too the loins are anointed on Therefore the breast ought to be anointed. account of the appetite), and the feet are anointed on ac- Objection 2. Further, purity of mind is not less nec- count of the motive power of which they are the chief in- essary to those who are departing this life than to those strument. And since the cognitive power is the first prin- who are entering therein. Now those who are entering are ciple of human activity, the anointing of the five senses is anointed with chrism on the head by the priest, to signify observed by all, as being essential to the sacrament. But purity of mind. Therefore in this sacrament those who are some do not observe the other unctions—some also anoint departing should be anointed on the head. the feet but not the loins—because the appetitive and mo- Objection 3. Further, the remedy should be applied tive powers are secondary principles. where the disease is most virulent. Now spiritual sickness Reply to Objection 1. No thought arises in the heart is most virulent in the loins in men, and in the navel in without an act of the imagination which is a movement women, according to Job 40:11: “His strength is in his proceeding from sensation (De Anima ii). Hence the pri- loins, and his force in the navel of his belly,” as Gregory mary root of thought is not the heart, but the sensory or- expounds the passage (Moral. xxxii, 11). Therefore these gans, except in so far as the heart is a principle of the parts should be anointed. whole body, albeit a remote principle. Objection 4. Further, sins are committed with other Reply to Objection 2. Those who enter have to re- parts of the body, no less than with the feet. Therefore, as ceive purity of the mind, whereas those who are depart- the feet are anointed, so ought other members of the body ing have to cleanse the mind. Hence the latter need to to be anointed. be anointed in those parts in respect of which the mind’s I answer that, The principles of sinning are the same purity may be sullied. in us as the principles of action, for a sin is an act. Now Reply to Objection 3. Some are wont to anoint the there are in us three principles of action; the first is the loins, because they are the chief seat of the concupiscible directing principle, namely, the cognitive power; the sec- appetite: however, as stated above, the appetitive power is ond is the commanding principle, namely, the appetitive not the primary root. power; the third is the executive principle, namely, the Reply to Objection 4. The bodily organs which are motive power. the instruments of sin, are the feet, hands, and tongue, all Now all our knowledge has its origin in the senses. of which are anointed, and the organs of generation which And, since the remedy for sin should be applied where it would be unbecoming to anoint, on account of their un- sin originates in us first, for that reason the places of the cleanliness, and out of respect for the sacrament. 2751 Whether those who are deformed in those parts should be anointed? Suppl. q. 32 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that those who are de- ment to any other sacrament. Therefore it should not be formed should not be anointed in those parts. For just as an impediment to this one. Now each of the anointings is this sacrament demands a certain disposition on the part essential to the sacrament. Therefore all should be applied of the recipient, viz. that he should be sick, so it demands to those who are deformed. that he should be anointed in a certain part of the body. I answer that, Even those who are deformed should Now he that is not sick cannot be anointed. Therefore nei- be anointed, and that as near as possible to the part which ther can he be anointed who lacks the part to be anointed. ought to have been anointed. For though they have not the Objection 2. Further, a man born blind does not sin by members, nevertheless, they have, at least radically, the his sight. Yet in the anointing of the eyes mention is made powers of the soul, corresponding to those members, and of sins by sight. Therefore this anointing ought not to be they may commit inwardly the sins that pertain to those applied to one born blind, and in like manner as regards members, though they cannot outwardly. the other senses. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. On the contrary, Bodily deformity is not an impedi- 2752 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 33 Of the Repetition of This Sacrament (In Two Articles) We must now consider the repetition of this sacrament: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether this sacrament ought to be repeated? (2) Whether it ought to be repeated during the same sickness? Whether this sacrament ought to be repeated? Suppl. q. 33 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that this sacrament ought ever, can be repeated without disparaging that sacrament, not to be repeated. For the anointing of a man is of greater in order that the lost effect may be recovered. And since import than the anointing of a stone. But the anointing of health of body and soul, which is the effect of this sacra- an altar is not repeated, unless the altar be shattered. Nei- ment, can be lost after it has been effected, it follows that ther, therefore, should Extreme Unction, whereby a man this sacrament can, without disparagement thereto, be re- is anointed, be repeated. peated. Objection 2. Further, nothing comes after what is ex- Reply to Objection 1. The stone is anointed in order treme. But this unction is called extreme. Therefore it that the altar may be consecrated, and the stone remains should not be repeated. consecrated, as long as the altar remains, hence it cannot On the contrary, This sacrament is a spiritual healing be anointed again. But a man is not consecrated by be- applied under the form of a bodily cure. But a bodily cure ing anointed, since it does not imprint a character on him. is repeated. Therefore this sacrament also can be repeated. Hence there is no comparison. I answer that, No sacramental or sacrament, having Reply to Objection 2. What men think to be extreme an effect that lasts for ever, can be repeated, because this is not always extreme in reality. It is thus that this sacra- would imply that the sacrament had failed to produce that ment is called Extreme Unction, because it ought not to effect; and this would be derogatory to the sacrament. On be given save to those whose death men think to be nigh. the other hand a sacrament whose effect does not last for Whether this sacrament ought to be repeated during the same sickness? Suppl. q. 33 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that this sacrament ought diseases do not last long; so that if this sacrament is given not to be repeated during the same sickness. For one dis- at the time that the sick man is in a state of danger of ease demands one remedy. Now this sacrament is a spiri- death, he does not leave that state except the disease be tual remedy. Therefore it ought not to be repeated for one cured, and thus he needs not to be anointed again. But sickness. if he has a relapse, it will be a second sickness, and he Objection 2. Further, if a sick man could be anointed can be anointed again. on the other hand some diseases more than once during one disease, this might be done for are of long duration, as hectic fever, dropsy and the like, a whole day: which is absurd. and those who lie sick of them should not be anointed un- On the contrary, Sometimes a disease lasts long after til they seem to be in danger of death. And if the sick the sacrament has been received, so that the remnants of man escape that danger while the disease continues, and sin, against which chiefly this sacrament is given, would be brought again thereby to the same state of danger, he be contracted. Therefore it ought to be given again. can be anointed again, because it is, as it were, another I answer that, This sacrament regards not only the state of sickness, although strictly speaking, it is not an- sickness, but also the state of the sick man, because it other sickness. This suffices for the Replies to the Objec- ought not to be given except to those sick people who tions. seem, in man’s estimation, to be nigh to death. Now some 2753 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 34 Of the Sacrament of Order As to Its Essence and Its Parts (In Five Articles) In the next place we must consider the sacrament of Order: (1) Order in general; (2) the difference of Orders; (3) those who confer Orders; (4) the impediments to receiving Orders; (5) things connected with Orders. Concerning Order in general three points have to be considered: (1) Its essence, quiddity, and parts; (2) Its effect; (3) The recipients of Orders. Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether there should be Order in the Church? (2) Whether it is fittingly defined? (3) Whether it is a sacrament? (4) Whether its form is expressed properly? (5) Whether this sacrament has any matter? Whether there should be Order in the Church? Suppl. q. 34 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there should not be says (Eccl. Hier. v). Wherefore that this beauty might not Order in the Church. For Order requires subjection and be lacking to the Church, He established Order in her so preeminence. But subjection seemingly is incompatible that some should deliver the sacraments to others, being with the liberty whereunto we are called by Christ. There- thus made like to God in their own way, as co-operating fore there should not be Order in the Church. with God; even as in the natural body, some members act Objection 2. Further, he who has received an Order on others. becomes another’s superior. But in the Church everyone Reply to Objection 1. The subjection of slavery is should deem himself lower than another (Phil. 2:3): “Let incompatible with liberty; for slavery consists in lord- each esteem others better than themselves.” Therefore Or- ing over others and employing them for one’s own profit. der should not be in the Church. Such subjection is not required in Order, whereby those Objection 3. Further, we find order among the an- who preside have to seek the salvation of their subjects gels on account of their differing in natural and gratuitous and not their own profit. gifts. But all men are one in nature, and it is not known Reply to Objection 2. Each one should esteem him- who has the higher gifts of grace. Therefore Order should self lower in merit, not in office; and orders are a kind of not be in the Church. office. On the contrary, “Those things that are of God, are in Reply to Objection 3. Order among the angels does order∗.” Now the Church is of God, for He Himself built not arise from difference of nature, unless accidentally, in it with His blood. Therefore there ought to be Order in the so far as difference of grace results in them from differ- Church. ence of nature. But in them it results directly from their Further, the state of the Church is between the state of difference in grace; because their orders regard their par- nature and the state of glory. Now we find order in na- ticipation of divine things, and their communicating them ture, in that some things are above others, and likewise in in the state of glory, which is according to the measure of glory, as in the angels. Therefore there should be Order in grace, as being the end and effect, so to speak, of grace. the Church. on the other hand, the Orders of the Church militant re- I answer that, God wished to produce His works in gard the participation in the sacraments and the commu- likeness to Himself, as far as possible, in order that they nication thereof, which are the cause of grace and, in a might be perfect, and that He might be known through way, precede grace; and consequently our Orders do not them. Hence, that He might be portrayed in His works, require sanctifying grace, but only the power to dispense not only according to what He is in Himself, but also ac- the sacraments; for which reason order does not corre- cording as He acts on others, He laid this natural law on all spond to the difference of sanctifying grace, but to the things, that last things should be reduced and perfected by difference of power. middle things, and middle things by the first, as Dionysius ∗ Vulg: ‘Those (powers) that are, are ordained of God.’ 2754 Whether Order is properly defined? Suppl. q. 34 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that order is improperly inward character, but for the outward action, which is the defined by the Master (Sent. iv, D, 53), where it is said sign and cause of inward power; and this is also the sense “Order is a seal of the Church, whereby spiritual power is of character in the other definition. If, however, it be taken conferred on the person ordained.” For a part should not for the inward character, the definition would not be un- be described as the genus of the whole. Now the character suitable; because the division of a sacrament into those which is denoted by the seal in a subsequent definition is three things is not a division into integral parts, properly a part of order, since it is placed in contradistinction with speaking; since what is reality only is not essential to the that which is either reality only, or sacrament only, since sacrament, and that which is the sacrament is transitory; it is both reality and sacrament. Therefore seal should not while that which is sacrament and reality is said to remain. be mentioned as the genus of Order. Wherefore it follows that inward character itself is essen- Objection 2. Further, just as a character is imprinted tially and principally the sacrament of Order. in the sacrament of order, so is it in the sacrament of Bap- Reply to Objection 2. Although in Baptism there tism. Now character was not mentioned in the definition is conferred a spiritual power to receive the other sacra- of Baptism. Therefore neither should it be mentioned in ments, for which reason it imprints a character, neverthe- the definition of Order. less this is not its principal effect, but the inward cleans- Objection 3. Further, in Baptism there is also given ing; wherefore Baptism would be given even though the a certain spiritual power to approach the sacraments; and former motive did not exist. On the other hand, order de- again it is a seal, since it is a sacrament. Therefore this notes power principally. Wherefore the character which is definition is applicable to Baptism; and consequently it is a spiritual power is included in the definition of Order, but improperly applied to Order. not in that of Baptism. Objection 4. Further, Order is a kind of relation, and Reply to Objection 3. In Baptism there is given a relation is realized in both its terms. Now the terms of the certain spiritual potentiality to receive, and consequently relation of order are the superior and the inferior. There- a somewhat passive potentiality. But power properly de- fore inferiors have order as well as superiors. Yet there is notes active potentiality, together with some kind of pre- no power of preeminence in them, such as is mentioned eminence. Hence this definition is not applicable to Bap- here in the definition of Order, as appears from the sub- tism. sequent explanation (Sent. iv, D, 53), where promotion to Reply to Objection 4. The word “order” is used in power is mentioned. Therefore Order is improperly de- two ways. For sometimes it denotes the relation itself, and fined there. thus it is both in the inferior and in the superior, as the ob- I answer that, The Master’s definition of Order ap- jection states; but it is not thus that we use the word here. plies to Order as a sacrament of the Church. Hence he On the other hand, it denotes the degree which results in mentions two things, namely the outward sign, a “kind of the order taken in the first sense. And since the notion seal,” i.e. a kind of sign, and the inward effect, “whereby of order as relation is observed where we first meet with spiritual power,” etc. something higher than another, it follows that this degree Reply to Objection 1. Seal stands here, not for the of pre-eminence by spiritual power is called Order. Whether Order is a sacrament? Suppl. q. 34 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that Order is not a sacra- ment. Therefore neither is order of which we speak now. ment. For a sacrament, according to Hugh of St. Vic- On the contrary, It is mentioned by all among the tor (De Sacram. i) “is a material element.” Now Order seven sacraments of the Church. denotes nothing of the kind, but rather relation or power; Further, “the cause of a thing being such, is still more since Order is a part of power according to Isidore. There- so.” Now Order is the cause of man being the dispenser fore it is not a sacrament. of the other sacraments. Therefore Order has more reason Objection 2. Further, the sacraments do not concern for being a sacrament than the others. the Church triumphant. Yet Order is there, as in the an- I answer that, As stated above (q. 29, a. 1; IIIa, q. 60), gels. Therefore it is not a sacrament. a sacrament is nothing else than a sanctification conferred Objection 3. Further, just as spiritual authority, which on man with some outward sign. Wherefore, since by re-is Order, is given by means of consecration, so is secular ceiving orders a consecration is conferred on man by vis- authority, since kings also are anointed, as stated above ible signs, it is clear that Order is a sacrament. (q. 19, a. 3, ad 2). But the kingly power is not a sacra- Reply to Objection 1. Although Order does not by 2755 its name express a material element, it is not conferred fore Order is a sacrament among men, but not among an-without some material element. gels. Reply to Objection 2. Power must needs be propor- Reply to Objection 3. Not every blessing or conse- tionate to the purpose for which it is intended. Now the cration given to men is a sacrament, for both monks and communication of divine things, which is the purpose for abbots are blessed, and yet such blessings are not sacra- which spiritual power is given, is not effected among the ments, and in like manner neither is the anointing of a angels by means of sensible signs, as is the case among king; because by such blessings men are not ordained to men. Hence the spiritual power that is Order is not be- the dispensing of the divine sacraments, as by the blessing stowed on the angels by visible signs, as on men. Where- of Order. Hence the comparison fails. Whether the form of this sacrament is suitably expressed? Suppl. q. 34 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the form of this the sacraments are dispensed, as this sacrament is. Hence sacrament is unsuitably set forth in the text (Sent. iv, in this sacrament there is a kind of universal communi- D, 24). Because the sacraments take their efficacy from cation. Wherefore in the other sacraments something is their form. Now the efficacy of the sacraments is from expressed on the part of the divine power to which the ef- the divine power, which works our salvation in them in fect of the sacrament is likened, but not in this sacrament. a most hidden manner. Therefore the form of this sacra- Reply to Objection 2. [There is a special reason why ment should include a mention of the divine power by the this sacrament, rather than the others, is conferred by em- invocation of the Trinity, as in the other sacraments. ploying the imperative mood. For]∗ although the bishop Objection 2. Further, to command pertains to one who is the minister of this sacrament has no authority in who has authority. Now the dispenser of the sacrament respect of the conferring of this sacrament, nevertheless exercises no authority, but only ministry. Therefore he he has some power with regard to the power of Order, should not use the imperative mood by saying: “Do” or which power he confers, in so far as it is derived, from “Receive” this or that, or some similar expression. his. Objection 3. Further, mention should not be made in Reply to Objection 3. The use of power is the ef- the sacramental form, except of such things as are essen- fect of power in the genus of efficient cause, and from this tial to the sacrament. But the use of the power received is point of view it has no reason to be mentioned in the def- not essential to this sacrament, but is consequent upon it. inition of Order. But it is somewhat a cause in the genus Therefore it should not be mentioned in the form of this of final cause, and from this point of view it can be placed sacrament. in the definition of order. Objection 4. Further, all the sacraments direct us to Reply to Objection 4. There is here a difference be- an eternal reward. But the forms of the other sacraments tween this and the other sacraments. Because by this make no mention of a reward. Therefore neither should sacrament an office or the power to do something is con- any mention be made thereof in the form of this sacra- ferred; and so it is fitting that mention be made of the ment, as in the words: “Since thou wilt have a share, if reward to be obtained if it be administered faithfully. But faithfully,” etc. in the other sacraments no such office or power to act is I answer that, This sacrament consists chiefly in the conferred, and so no mention of reward is made in them. power conferred. Now power is conferred by power, as Accordingly the recipient is somewhat passive in relation like proceeds from like; and again power is made known to the other sacraments, because he receives them for the by its use, since powers are manifested by their acts. perfecting of his own state only, whereas in relation to Wherefore in the form of order the use of order is ex- this sacrament he holds himself somewhat actively, since pressed by the act which is commanded; and the confer- he receives it for the sake of exercising hierarchical duties ring of power is expressed by employing the imperative in the Church. Wherefore although the other sacraments, mood. from the very fact that they give grace, direct the recipient Reply to Objection 1. The other sacraments are not to salvation, properly speaking they do not direct him to a ordained chiefly to effects similar to the power whereby reward, in the same way as this sacrament does. ∗ The sentence in brackets is not in the Leonine edition. 2756 Whether this sacrament has any matter? Suppl. q. 34 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that this sacrament has since the effect proper to this sacrament, namely the char- no matter. Because in every sacrament that has a matter acter, is not received through any operation of the one who the power that works in the sacrament is in the matter. approaches the sacrament, as was the case in Penance, but But in the material objects which are used here, such as comes wholly from without, it is fitting that it should have keys, candlesticks, and so forth, there is not apparently a matter, yet otherwise than the other sacraments that have any power of sanctification. Therefore it has no matter. matter; because that which is bestowed in the other sacra- Objection 2. Further, in this sacrament the fulness of ments comes from God alone, and not from the minis- sevenfold grace is conferred, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, ter who dispenses the sacrament; whereas that which is D, 24), just as in Confirmation. But the matter of Confir- conferred in this sacrament, namely the spiritual power, mation requires to be consecrated beforehand. Since then comes also from him who gives the sacrament, as imper- the things which appear to be material in this sacrament fect from perfect power. Hence the efficacy of the other are not consecrated beforehand, it would seem that they sacraments resides chiefly in the matter which both sig- are not the matter of the sacrament. nifies and contains the divine power through the sancti- Objection 3. Further, in any sacrament that has mat- fication applied by the minister; whereas the efficacy of ter there needs to be contact of matter with the recipient of this sacrament resides chiefly with him who dispenses the the sacrament. Now, as some say, it is not essential to this sacrament. And the matter is employed to show the pow- sacrament that there be contact between the aforesaid ma- ers conferred in particular by one who has it completely, terial objects and the recipient of the sacrament, but only rather than to cause power; and this is clear from the fact that they be presented to him. Therefore the aforesaid ma- that the matter is in keeping with the use of power. This terial objects are not the matter of this sacrament. suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. On the contrary, Every sacrament consists of things Reply to Objection 2. It is necessary for the matter to and words. Now in any sacrament the thing is the mat- be consecrated in the other sacraments, on account of the ter. Therefore the things employed in this sacrament are power it contains; but it is not so in the case in point. its matter. Reply to Objection 3. If we admit this assertion, the Further, more is requisite to dispense the sacraments reason for it is clear from what we have said; for since than to receive them. Yet Baptism, wherein the power is the power of order is received from the minister and not given to receive the sacraments, needs a matter. Therefore from the matter, the presenting of the matter is more es- order also does, wherein the power is given to dispense sential to the sacrament than contact therewith. However, them. the words themselves of the form would seem to indicate I answer that, The matter employed outwardly in that contact with the matter is essential to the sacrament, the sacraments signifies that the power which works in for it is said: “Receive” this or that. the sacraments comes entirely from without. Wherefore, 2757 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 35 Of the Effect of This Sacrament (In Five Articles) We must next consider me effect of this sacrament. Under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether sanctifying grace is conferred in the sacrament of Order? (2) Whether a character is imprinted in connection with all the Orders? (3) Whether the character of Order presupposes of necessity the character of Baptism? (4) Whether it presupposes of necessity the character of Confirmation? (5) Whether the character of one Order presupposes of necessity the character of another Order? Whether sanctifying grace is conferred in the sacrament of Order? Suppl. q. 35 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that sanctifying grace is since animals are provided with members, by which their not conferred in the sacrament of Order. For it is com- soul’s powers are enabled to proceed to their respective monly agreed that the sacrament of Order is directed to actions unless there be some defect on the part of mat- counteract the defect of ignorance. Now not sanctifying ter. Now just as sanctifying grace is necessary in order grace but gratuitous grace is given to counteract igno- that man receive the sacraments worthily, so is it that he rance, for sanctifying grace has more to do with the will. may dispense them worthily. Wherefore as in Baptism, Therefore sanctifying grace is not given in the sacrament whereby a man is adapted to receive the other sacraments, of Order. sanctifying grace is given, so is it in the sacrament of Or- Objection 2. Further, Order implies distinction. Now der whereby man is ordained to the dispensation of the the members of the Church are distinguished, not by sanc- other sacraments. tifying but by gratuitous grace, of which it is said (1 Cor. Reply to Objection 1. Order is given as a remedy, not 12:4): “There are diversities of graces.” Therefore sancti- to one person but to the whole Church. Hence, although it fying grace is not given in order. is said to be given in order to counteract ignorance, it does Objection 3. Further, no cause presupposes its effect. not mean that by receiving Orders a man has his ignorance But grace is presupposed in one who receives orders, so driven out of him, but that the recipient of Orders is set in that he may be worthy to receive them. Therefore this authority to expel ignorance from among the people. same grace is not given in the conferring of Orders. Reply to Objection 2. Although the gifts of sanctify- On the contrary, The sacraments of the New Law ing grace are common to all the members of the Church, cause what they signify. Now Order by its sevenfold num- nevertheless a man cannot be the worthy recipient of those ber signifies the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, as stated gifts, in respect of which the members of the Church are in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Therefore the gifts of the distinguished from one another, unless he have charity, Holy Ghost, which are not apart from sanctifying grace, and this cannot be apart from sanctifying grace. are given in Orders. Reply to Objection 3. The worthy exercise of Orders Further, Order is a sacrament of the New Law. Now requires not any kind of goodness but excellent goodness, the definition of a sacrament of that kind includes the in order that as they who receive orders are set above the words, “that it may be a cause of grace.” Therefore it people in the degree of Order, so may they be above them causes grace in the recipient. by the merit of holiness. Hence they are required to have I answer that The works of God are perfect (Dt. 32:4); the grace that suffices to make them worthy members of and consequently whoever receives power from above re- Christ’s people, but when they receive Orders they are ceives also those things that render him competent to ex- given a yet greater gift of grace, whereby they are ren- ercise that power. This is also the case in natural things, dered apt for greater things. Whether in the sacrament of Order a character is imprinted in connection with all Suppl. q. 35 a. 2 the Orders? Objection 1. It would seem that in the sacrament of Now some Orders are directed only to certain bodily acts, Order a character is not imprinted in connection with all for instance those of the doorkeeper or of the acolyte. the Orders. For the character of Order is a spiritual power. Therefore a character is not imprinted in these Orders. 2758 Objection 2. Further, every character is indelible. he has a spiritual power which others have not. For this Therefore a character places a man in a state whence he reason others have said that a character is impressed in cannot withdraw. Now those who have certain Orders can the sacred, but not in the minor, Orders. But this again lawfully return to the laity. Therefore a character is not comes to nothing, since each Order sets a man above the imprinted in all the Orders. people in some degree of authority directed to the dispen- Objection 3. Further, by means of a character a man sation of the sacraments. Wherefore since a character is is appointed to give or to receive some sacred thing. Now a sign whereby one thing is distinguished from another, it a man is sufficiently adapted to the reception of the sacra- follows that a character is imprinted in each Order. And ments by the character of Baptism, and a man is not ap- this is confirmed by the fact that they remain for ever and pointed to dispense the sacraments except in the Order of are never repeated. This is the third and more common priesthood. Therefore a character is not imprinted in the opinion. other Orders. Reply to Objection 1. Each Order either has an act On the contrary, Every sacrament in which a char- connected with the sacrament itself, or adapts a man to acter is not imprinted can be repeated. But no Order can the dispensation of the sacraments; thus doorkeepers exer- be repeated. Therefore a character is imprinted in each cise the act of admitting men to witness the Divine sacra- Order. ments, and so forth; and consequently a spiritual power is Further, a character is a distinctive sign. Now there is required in each. something distinct in every Order. Therefore every Order Reply to Objection 2. For all that a man may return imprints a character. to the laity, the character always remains in him. This is I answer that, There have been three opinions on this evident from the fact that if he return to the clerical state, point. For some have said that a character is imprinted he does not receive again the order which he had already. only in the Order of priesthood; but this is not true, since The Reply to the Third Objection is the same as to the none but a deacon can exercise the act of the diaconate, First. and so it is clear that in the dispensation of the sacraments, Whether the character of Order presupposes the baptismal character? Suppl. q. 35 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the character of Or- a man the power to receive the other sacraments. Where- der does not presuppose the character of Baptism. For fore he that has not the baptismal character, can receive no the character of Order makes a man a dispenser of the other sacrament; and consequently the character of Order sacraments; while the character of Baptism makes him a presupposes the character of Baptism. recipient of them. Now active power does not necessarily Reply to Objection 1. In one who has active power of presuppose passive power, for it can be without it, as in himself, the active does not presuppose the passive power; God. Therefore the character of Order does not necessar- but in one who has active power from another, passive ily presuppose the character of Baptism. power, whereby he is enabled to receive the active power, Objection 2. Further, it may happen that a man is not is prerequisite to active power. baptized, and yet think with probability that he has been Reply to Objection 2. Such a man if he be ordained baptized. If therefore such a person present himself for to the priesthood is not a priest, and he can neither conse- Orders, he will not receive the character of Order, suppos- crate, nor absolve in the tribunal of Penance. Wherefore ing the character of Order to presuppose the character of according to the canons he must be baptized, and reor- Baptism; and consequently whatever he does by way of dained (Extra De Presbyt. non Bapt., cap. Si quis; cap. consecration or absolution will be invalid, and the Church Veniens). And even though he be raised to the episcopate, will be deceived therein, which is inadmissible. those whom he ordains receive not the Order. Yet it may On the contrary, Baptism is the door of the sacra- piously be believed that as regards the ultimate effects of ments. Therefore since Order is a sacrament, it presup- the sacraments, the High Priest will supply the defect, and poses Baptism. that He would not allow this to be so hidden as to endan- I answer that, No one can receive what he has not ger the Church. the power to receive. Now the character of Baptism gives 2759 Whether the character of Order necessarily presupposes the character of Confirma-Suppl. q. 35 a. 4 tion? Objection 1. It would seem that the character of Or- thing as congruous to the sacrament. For the validity of der necessarily presupposes the character of Confirma- the sacrament it is required that one who presents him- tion. For in things subordinate to one another, as the mid- self for Orders should be capable of receiving them, and dle presupposes the first, so does the last presuppose the this is competent to him through Baptism; wherefore the middle. Now the character of Confirmation presupposes baptismal character is prerequisite for the validity of the that of Baptism as being the first. Therefore the character sacrament, so that the sacrament of Order cannot be con- of Order presupposes that of Confirmation as being in the ferred without it. On the other hand, as congruous to middle. the sacrament a man is required to have every perfection Objection 2. Further, those who are appointed to con- whereby he becomes adapted to the exercise of Orders, firm should themselves be most firm. Now those who and one of these is that he be confirmed. Wherefore the receive the sacrament of Order are appointed to confirm character of Order presupposes the character of Confirma- others. Therefore they especially should have received the tion as congruous but not as necessary. sacrament of Confirmation. Reply to Objection 1. In this case the middle does On the contrary, The apostles received the power of not stand in the same relation to the last as the first to the order before the Ascension (Jn. 20:22), where it is said: middle, because the character of Baptism enables a man to “Receive the Holy Ghost.” But they were confirmed after receive the sacrament of Confirmation, whereas the char- the Ascension by the coming of the Holy Ghost. There- acter of Confirmation does not enable a man to receive the fore order does not presuppose Confirmation. sacrament of Order. Hence the comparison fails. I answer that, For the reception of Orders something Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers apt- is prerequisite for the validity of the sacrament, and some- ness by way of congruity. Whether the character of one Order necessarily presupposes the character of another Suppl. q. 35 a. 5 Order? Objection 1. It would seem that the character of one priests without having previously received the lower Or- Order necessarily presupposes the character of another ders and yet they could do all that the lower Orders could, Order. For there is more in common between one Order because the lower power is comprised in the higher, even and another, than between Order and another sacrament. as sense in understanding, and dukedom in kingdom. Af- But the character of Order presupposes the character of terwards, however, it was decided by the legislation of the another sacrament, namely Baptism. Much more there- Church that no one should present himself to the higher fore does the character of one Order presuppose the char- orders who had not previously humbled himself in the acter of another. lower offices. And hence it is that according to the Canons Objection 2. Further, the Orders are degrees of a kind. (cap. Tuae literae, De clerico per salt. prom.) those who Now no one can reach a further degree, unless he first are ordained without receiving a preceding Order are not mount the previous degree. Therefore no one can receive reordained, but receive what was lacking to them of the the character of a subsequent Order unless he has first re- preceding Order. ceived the preceding Order. Reply to Objection 1. Orders have more in common On the contrary, If anything necessary for a sacra- with one another as regards specific likeness, than order ment be omitted in that sacrament, the sacrament must be has with Baptism. But as regards proportion of power to repeated. But if one receive a subsequent Order, with- action, Baptism has more in common with Order, than out receiving a preceding Order, he is not reordained, but one Order with another, because Baptism confers on man he receives what was lacking, according to the canoni- the passive power to receive Orders, whereas a lower Or- cal statutes (cap. Tuae literae, De clerico per salt. prom.). der does not give him the passive power to receive higher Therefore the preceding Order is not necessary for the fol- Orders. lowing. Reply to Objection 2. Orders are not degrees com- I answer that, It is not necessary for the higher Orders bining in one action or in one movement, so that it be that one should have received the minor Orders, because necessary to reach the last through the first; but they are their respective powers are distinct, and one, considered like degrees consisting in things of different kinds, such in its essentials, does not require another in the same sub- as the degrees between man and angel, and it is not nec- ject. Hence even in the early Church some were ordained essary that one who is an angel be first of all a man. Such 2760 also are the degrees between the head and all members of should be previously a foot; and thus it is in the case in the body; nor is it necessary that that which is the head point. 2761 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 36 Of the Qualities Required of Those Who Receive This Sacrament (In Five Articles) We must next consider the qualities required of those who receive the sacrament of Order. Under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether goodness of life is required of those who receive this sacrament? (2) Whether the knowledge of the whole of Sacred Writ is required? (3) Whether the degree of Orders is obtained by mere merit of life? (4) Whether he who raises the unworthy to Orders sins? (5) Whether one who is in sin can without committing a sin exercise the Order he has received? Whether goodness of life is required of those who receive Orders? Suppl. q. 36 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that goodness of life is I answer that, As Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii), not required of those who receive Orders. For by Orders a “even as the more subtle and clear essences, being filled man is ordained to the dispensation of the sacraments. But by the outpouring of the solar radiance, like the sun en- the sacraments can be administered by good and wicked. lighten other bodies with their brilliant light, so in all Therefore goodness of life is not requisite. things pertaining to God a man must not dare to become a Objection 2. Further, the service of God in the sacra- leader of others, unless in all his habits he be most deiform ments is no greater than service offered to Him in the and godlike.” Wherefore, since in every order a man is ap- body. Now our Lord did not cast aside the sinful and no- pointed to lead others in Divine things, he who being con- torious woman from rendering Him a bodily service (Lk. scious of mortal sin presents himself for Orders is guilty 7). Therefore neither should the like be debarred from His of presumption and sins mortally. Consequently holiness service in the sacraments. of life is requisite for Orders, as a matter of precept, but Objection 3. Further, by every grace a remedy is not as essential to the sacrament; and if a wicked man be given against sin. Now those who are in sin should not be ordained, he receives the Order none the less, and yet with refused a remedy that may avail them. Since then grace sin withal. is given in the sacrament of order, it would seem that this Reply to Objection 1. Just as the sinner dispenses sacrament ought also to be conferred on sinners. sacraments validly, so does he receive validly the sacra- On the contrary, “Whosoever of the seed of Aaron ment of Orders, and as he dispenses unworthily, even so throughout their families hath a blemish, he shall not offer he receives unworthily. bread to his God neither shall he approach to minister to Reply to Objection 2. The service in point consisted him∗” (Lev. 21:17,18). Now “blemish signifies all kinds only in the exercise of bodily homage, which even sinners of vice” according to a gloss. Therefore he who is shack- can offer lawfully. It is different with the spiritual service led by any vice should not be admitted to the ministry of to which the ordained are appointed, because thereby they Orders. are made to stand between God and the people. Where- Further, Jerome commenting on the words of Titus fore they should shine with a good conscience before God, 2:15, “Let no man despise thee,” says that “not only and with a good name before men. should bishops, priests, and deacons take very great care Reply to Objection 3. Certain medicines require a to be examples of speech and conduct to those over whom robust constitution, else it is mortally dangerous to take they are placed, but also the lower grades, and without them; others can be given to the weakly. So too in spir- exception all who serve the household of God, since it is itual things certain sacraments are ordained as remedies most disastrous to the Church if the laity be better than for sin, and the like are to be given to sinners, as Baptism the clergy.” Therefore holiness of life is requisite in all and Penance, while others, which confer the perfection of the Orders. grace, require a man made strong by grace. ∗ Vulg.: ‘Say to Aaron: Whosoever of thy seed,‘etc. 2762 Whether knowledge of all Holy Writ is required? Suppl. q. 36 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that knowledge of all Reply to Objection 1. A priest exercises a twofold Holy Writ is required. For one from whose lips we seek action: the one, which is principal, over the true body of the law, should have knowledge of the law. Now the laity Christ; the other, which is secondary, over the mystical seek the law at the mouth of the priest (Malachi 2:7). body of Christ. The second act depends on the first, but Therefore he should have knowledge of the whole law. not conversely. Wherefore some are raised to the priest- Objection 2. Further, “being always ready to satisfy hood, to whom the first act alone is deputed, for instance everyone that asketh you a reason of that faith and hope in those religious who are not empowered with the care of you∗.” Now to give a reason for things pertaining to faith souls. The law is not sought at the mouth of these, they are and hope belongs to those who have perfect knowledge of required only for the celebration of the sacraments; and Holy Writ. Therefore the like knowledge should be pos- consequently it is enough for them to have such knowl- sessed by those who are placed in Orders, and to whom edge as enables them to observe rightly those things that the aforesaid words are addressed. regard the celebration of the sacrament. Others are raised Objection 3. Further, no one is competent to read to exercise the other act which is over the mystical body what he understands not, since to read without intel- of Christ, and it is at the mouth of these that the people ligence is “negligence,”† as Cato declares (Rudiment.). seek the law; wherefore they ought to possess knowledge Now it belongs to the reader (which is the lower Order) of the law, not indeed to know all the difficult points of to read the Old Testament, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, the law (for in these they should have recourse to their D, 24). Therefore he should understand the whole of the superiors), but to know what the people have to believe Old Testament; and much more those in the higher Orders. and fulfill in the law. To the higher priests, namely the On the contrary, Many are raised to the priesthood bishops, it belongs to know even those points of the law even who know nothing at all of these things, even in which may offer some difficulty, and to know them the many religious Orders. Therefore apparently this knowl- more perfectly according as they are in a higher position. edge is not required. Reply to Objection 2. The reason that we have to Further, we read in the Lives of the Fathers that some give for our faith and hope does not denote one that suf- who were monks were raised to the priesthood, being of a fices to prove matters of faith and hope, since they are most holy life. Therefore the aforesaid knowledge is not both of things invisible; it means that we should be able required in those to be ordained. to give general proofs of the probability of both, and for I answer that, For any human act to be rightly ordered this there is not much need of great knowledge. there must needs be the direction of reason. Wherefore in Reply to Objection 3. The reader has not to explain order that a man exercise the office of an Order, it is nec- Holy Writ to the people (for this belongs to the higher essary for him to have as much knowledge as suffices for orders), but merely to voice the words. Therefore he is his direction in the act of that Order. And consequently not required to have so much knowledge as to understand one who is to be raised to Orders is required to have that Holy Writ, but only to know how to pronounce it cor- knowledge, and to be instructed in Sacred Scripture, not rectly. And since such knowledge is obtained easily and the whole, but more or less, according as his office is of a from many persons, it may be supposed with probability greater or lesser extent—to wit, that those who are placed that the ordained will acquire that knowledge even if he over others, and receive the care of souls, know things per- have it not already, especially if it appear that he is on the taining to the doctrine of faith and morals, and that others road to acquire it. know whatever concerns the exercise of their Order. Whether a man obtains the degrees of Order by the merit of one’s life? Suppl. q. 36 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that a man obtains the de- Objection 2. Further, in natural things, men obtain a grees of order by the mere merit of his life. For, according higher degree from the very fact that they are near God, to Chrysostom‡, “not every priest is a saint, but every saint and have a greater share of His favors, as Dionysius says is a priest.” Now a man becomes a saint by the merit of (Eccl. Hier. iv). Now it is by merit of holiness and knowl- his life. Consequently he thereby also becomes a priest, edge that a man approaches nearer to God and receives and “a fortiori” has he the other Orders. more of His favors. Therefore by this alone he is raised to ∗ Vulg.: ‘Of that hope which is in you; St. Thomas apparently took his reading from Bede † “Legere et non intelligere est negligere.” The play on the words is more evident in Latin. ‡ Hom. xliii in the Opus Imperfectum, wrongly ascribed to St. John Chrysostom 2763 the degree of Orders. far as he assists others by the sacraments, may be called On the contrary, Holiness once possessed can be lost. a priest. But he is not speaking according to the actual But when once a man is ordained he never loses his order. meaning of the words; for this word “sacerdos” [priest] is Therefore order does not consist in the mere merit of ho- employed to signify one who gives sacred things by dis- liness. pensing the sacraments. I answer that, A cause should be proportionate to its Reply to Objection 2. Natural things acquire a degree effect. And consequently as in Christ, from Whom grace of superiority over others, from the fact that they are able comes down on all men, there must needs be fulness of to act on them by virtue of their form; wherefore from grace; so in the ministers of the Church, to whom it be- the very fact that they have a higher form, they obtain a longs, not to give grace, but to give the sacraments of higher degree. But the ministers of the Church are placed grace, the degree of order does not result from their hav- over others, not to confer anything on them by virtue of ing grace, but from their participating in a sacrament of their own holiness (for this belongs to God alone), but as grace. ministers, and as instruments, so to say, of the outpour- Reply to Objection 1. Chrysostom is speaking of the ing from the Head to the members. Hence the comparison priest in reference to the reason for which he is so called, fails as regards the dignity of Order, although it applies as the word “sacerdos” signifying dispenser of holy things to congruity. [sacra dans]: for in this sense every righteous man, in so Whether he who raises the unworthy to Orders commits a sin? Suppl. q. 36 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that he who raises the son all the spiritual things that he dispenses. Therefore he unworthy to orders commits no sin. For a bishop needs who promotes the unworthy sins mortally. assistants appointed to the lesser offices. But he would be I answer that, Our Lord describes the faithful ser- unable to find them in sufficient number, if he were to re- vant whom He has set “over His household to give them quire of them such qualifications as the saints enumerate. their measure of wheat.” Hence he is guilty of unfaithful- Therefore if he raise some who are not qualified, he would ness who gives any man Divine things above his measure: seem to be excusable. and whoso promotes the unworthy does this. Where- Objection 2. Further, the Church needs not only min- fore he commits a mortal crime, as being unfaithful to isters for the dispensation of things spiritual, but also his sovereign Lord, especially since this is detrimental to for the supervision of temporalities. But sometimes men the Church and to the Divine honor which is promoted without knowledge or holiness of life may be useful for by good ministers. For a man would be unfaithful to his the conduct of temporal affairs, either because of their earthly lord were he to place unworthy subjects in his of- worldly power, or on account of their natural industry. fices. Therefore seemingly the like can be promoted without sin. Reply to Objection 1. God never so abandons His Objection 3. Further, everyone is bound to avoid sin, Church that apt ministers are not to be found sufficient for as far as he can. If therefore a bishop sins in promoting the needs of the people, if the worthy be promoted and the unworthy, he is bound to take the utmost pains to know the unworthy set aside. And though it were impossible whether those who present themselves for Orders be wor- to find as many ministers as there are now, it were better thy, by making a careful inquiry about their morals and to have few good ministers than many bad ones, as the knowledge, and yet seemingly this is not done anywhere. blessed Clement declares in his second epistle to James On the contrary, It is worse to raise the wicked to the brother of the Lord. the sacred ministry, than not to correct those who are Reply to Objection 2. Temporal things are not to be raised already. But Heli sinned mortally by not correcting sought but for the sake of spiritual things. Wherefore all his sons for their wickedness; wherefore “he fell back- temporal advantage should count for nothing, and all gain wards. . . and died” (1 Kings 4:18). Therefore he who pro- be despised for the advancement of spiritual good. motes the unworthy does not escape sin. Reply to Objection 3. It is at least required that the Further, spiritual things must be set before temporal ordainer know that nothing contrary to holiness is in the things in the Church. Now a man would commit a mor- candidate for ordination. But besides this he is required tal sin were he knowingly to endanger the temporalities of to take the greatest care, in proportion to the Order or of- the Church. Much more therefore is it a mortal sin to en- fice to be enjoined, so as to be certain of the qualifications danger spiritual things. But whoever promotes the unwor- of those to be promoted, at least from the testification of thy endangers spiritual things, since according to Gregory others. This is the meaning of the Apostle when he says (Hom. xii in Evang.) “if a man’s life is contemptible, his (1 Tim. 5:22): “Impose not hands lightly on any man.” preaching is liable to be despised”; and for the same rea- 2764 Whether a man who is in sin can without sin exercise the Order he has received? ∗ Suppl. q. 36 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that one who is in sin can I answer that, The law prescribes (Dt. 16:20) that without sin exercise the order he has received. For since, “man should follow justly after that which is just.” Where- by virtue of his office, he is bound to exercise his order, he fore whoever fulfills unworthily the duties of his order fol- sins if he fails to do so. If therefore he sins by exercising lows unjustly after that which is just, and acts contrary to it, he cannot avoid sin: which is inadmissible. a precept of the law, and thereby sins mortally. Now any- Objection 2. Further, a dispensation is a relaxation of one who exercises a sacred office in mortal sin, without the law. Therefore although by rights it would be unlaw- doubt does so unworthily. Hence it is clear that he sins ful for him to exercise the order he has received, it would mortally. be lawful for him to do so by dispensation. Reply to Objection 1. He is not perplexed as though Objection 3. Further, whoever co-operates with an- he were in the necessity of sinning; for he can renounce other in a mortal sin, sins mortally. If therefore a sinner his sin, or resign his office whereby he was bound to the sins mortally by exercising his order, he who receives or exercise of his order. demands any Divine thing from him also sins mortally: Reply to Objection 2. The natural law allows of no and this seems absurd. dispensation; and it is of natural law that man handle holy Objection 4. Further, if he sins by exercising his or- things holily. Therefore no one can dispense from this. der, it follows that every act of his order that he performs Reply to Objection 3. So long as a minister of the is a mortal sin; and consequently since many acts con- Church who is in mortal sin is recognized by the Church, cur in the one exercise of his order, it would seem that he his subject must receive the sacraments from him, since commits many mortal sins: which seems very hard. this is the purpose for which he is bound to him. Never- On the contrary, Dionysius says (Ep. ad Demophil.): theless, outside the case of necessity, it would not be safe “It seems presumptuous for such a man, one to wit who to induce him to an execution of his Order, as long as he is is not enlightened, to lay hands on priestly things; he is conscious of being in mortal sin, which conscience, how- not afraid nor ashamed, all unworthy that he is to take ever, he can lay aside since a man is repaired in an instant part in Divine things, with the thought that God does not by Divine grace. see what he sees in himself; he thinks, by false pretense, Reply to Objection 4. When any man performs an ac- to cheat Him Whom he falsely calls his Father; he dares tion as a minister of the Church while in a state of mortal to utter in the person of Christ, words polluted by his in- sin, he sins mortally, and as often as he performs that ac- famy, I will not call them prayers, over the Divine sym- tion, since, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. i), “it is wrong bols.” Therefore a priest is a blasphemer and a cheat if he for the unclean even to touch the symbols,” i.e. the sacra- exercises his order unworthily, and thus he sins mortally: mental signs. Hence when they touch sacred things in the and in like manner any other person in orders. exercise of their office they sin mortally. It would be oth- Further, holiness of life is required in one who receives erwise if they were to touch some sacred thing or perform an order, that he may be qualified to exercise it. Now a some sacred duty in a case of necessity, when it would be man sins mortally if he present himself for orders in mor- allowable even to a layman, for instance if they were to tal sin. Much more therefore does he sin mortally when- baptize in a case of urgency, or gather up the Lord’s body ever he exercises his order. should it be cast to the ground. ∗ Cf. IIIa, q. 64, a. 6 2765 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 37 Of the Distinction of Orders, of Their Acts, and the Imprinting of the Character (In Five Articles) In the next place we must consider the distinction of the orders and their acts, and the imprinting of the character. Under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether Order should be divided into several kinds? (2) How many are there? (3) Whether they ought to be divided into those that are sacred and those that are not? (4) Whether the acts of the Orders are rightly assigned in the text? (5) When are the characters of the Orders imprinted? Whether we ought to distinguish several Orders? Suppl. q. 37 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to dis- New Testament not only the priests but also their minis- tinguish several Orders. For the greater a power is, the ters should be consecrated by the sacrament of Order; and less is it multiplied. Now this sacrament ranks above the consequently there ought to be several Orders. others in so far as it places its recipients in a degree above I answer that, Multiplicity of Orders was introduced other persons. Since then the other sacraments are not into the Church for three reasons. First to show forth the divided into several of which the whole is predicated, nei- wisdom of God, which is reflected in the orderly distinc- ther ought this sacrament to be divided into several Or- tion of things both natural and spiritual. This is signified ders. in the statement of 3 Kings 10:4,5 that “when the queen Objection 2. Further, if it be divided, the parts of the of Saba saw. . . the order of” Solomon’s “servants. . . she division are either integral or subjective. But they are not had no longer any spirit in her,” for she was breathless integral, for then the whole would not be predicated of from admiration of his wisdom. Secondly, in order to suc- them. Therefore it is a division into subjective parts. Now cor human weakness, because it would be impossible for subjective parts can have the remote genus predicated of one man, without his being heavily burdened, to fulfill all them in the plural in the same way as the proximate genus; things pertaining to the Divine mysteries; and so various thus man and ass are several animals, and are several an- orders are severally appointed to the various offices; and imated bodies. Therefore also priesthood and diaconate, this is shown by the Lord giving Moses seventy ancients as they are several Orders, even so are several sacraments, to assist him. Thirdly, that men may be given a broader since sacrament is the genus, so to speak, in respect of way for advancing (to perfection), seeing that the various Orders. duties are divided among many men, so that all become Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher the co-operators of God; than which nothing is more God- (Ethic. viii, 10) the form of authority in which one alone like, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii). governs is a better government of the common weal than Reply to Objection 1. The other sacraments are given aristocracy, where different persons occupy different of- that certain effects may be received; but this sacrament is fices. But the government of the Church should be the given chiefly that certain acts may be performed. Hence best of all. Therefore in the Church there should be no dis- it behooves the sacrament of Order to be differentiated tinction of Orders for different acts, but the whole power according to the diversity of acts, even as powers are dif- should reside in one person; and consequently there ought ferentiated by their acts. to be only one Order. Reply to Objection 2. The division of Order is not On the contrary, The Church is Christ’s mystical that of an integral whole into its parts, nor of a univer- body, like to our natural body, according to the Apostle sal whole, but of a potential whole, the nature of which (Rom. 12:5; 1 Cor. 12:12,27; Eph. 1:22,23; Col. 1:24). is that the notion of the whole is found to be complete in Now in the natural body there are various offices of the one part, but in the others by some participation thereof. members. Therefore in the Church also there should be Thus it is here: for the entire fulness of the sacrament is various Orders. in one Order, namely the priesthood, while in the other Further, the ministry of the New Testament is superior sacraments there is a participation of Order. And this is to that of the Old Testament (2 Cor. 3). Now in the Old signified by the Lord saying (Num. 11:17): “I will take of Testament not only the priests, but also their ministers, thy spirit and give to them, that they may bear with thee the Levites, were consecrated. Therefore likewise in the the burden of the people.” Therefore all the Orders are 2766 one sacrament. pation of the kingly power. It is the same in Order. In Reply to Objection 3. In a kingdom, although the the aristocratic form of government, on the contrary, the entire fulness of power resides in the king, this does not fulness of power resides in no one, but in all. exclude the ministers having a power which is a partici- Whether there are seven Orders? Suppl. q. 37 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that there are not seven graces are not given, as the Orders are, to one same man. Orders. For the Orders of the Church are directed to the For it is written (1 Cor. 12:4): “There are distributions hierarchical acts. But there are only three hierarchical [Douay: ‘diversities’] of graces.” Moreover the episco- acts, namely “to cleanse, to enlighten, and to perfect,” for pate∗ and the office of psalmist are included, which are which reason Dionysius distinguishes three Orders (Eccl. not Orders. Wherefore others account for the Orders by Hier. v). Therefore there are not seven. likening them to the heavenly hierarchy, where the Orders Objection 2. Further, all the sacraments derive their are distinguished in reference to cleansing, enlightening, efficacy and authenticity from their institution by Christ, and perfecting. Thus they say that the doorkeeper cleanses or at least by His apostles. But no mention except of outwardly, by separating even in the body the good from priests and deacons is made in the teaching of Christ and the wicked; that the acolyte cleanses inwardly, because His apostles. Therefore seemingly there are no other Or- by the light which he bears, he signifies that he dispels in- ders. ward darkness; and that the exorcist cleanses both ways, Objection 3. Further, by the sacrament of Order a for he casts out the devil who disturbs a man both ways. man is appointed to dispense the other sacraments. But But enlightening, which is effected by teaching, is done by there are only six other sacraments. Therefore there readers as regards prophetic doctrine; by subdeacons as to should be only six Orders. apostolic doctrine; and by deacons as to the gospel doc- Objection 4. On the other hand, It would seem that trine; while ordinary perfection, such as the perfection of there ought to be more. For the higher a power is, the less Penance, Baptism, and so forth is the work of the priest; is it subject to multiplication. Now the hierarchical power excellent perfection, such as the consecration of priests is in the angels in a higher way than in us, as Dionysius and virgins, is the work of the bishop; while the most ex- says (Eccl. Hier. i). Since then there are nine Orders in cellent perfection is the work of the Sovereign Pontiff in the angelic hierarchy, there should be as many, or more, whom resides the fulness of authority. But this again is of in the Church. no account; both because the orders of the heavenly hier- Objection 5. Further, the prophecy of the Psalms is archy are not distinguished by the aforesaid hierarchical the most noble of all the prophecies. Now there is one Or- actions, since each of them is applicable to every Order; der, namely of readers, for reading the other prophecies and because, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v), per- in the Church. Therefore there ought to be another Order fecting belongs to the bishops alone, enlightening to the for reading the Psalms, especially since (Decretals, Dist. priests, and cleansing to all the ministers. Wherefore oth- xxi, cap. Cleros) the “psalmist” is reckoned as the second ers suit the orders to the seven gifts, so that the priesthood Order after the doorkeeper. corresponds to the gift of wisdom, which feeds us with I answer that, Some show the sufficiency of the or- the bread of life and understanding, even as the priest re- ders from their correspondence with the gratuitous graces freshes us with the heavenly bread; fear to the doorkeeper, which are indicated 1 Cor. 12. For they say that the “word for he separates us from the wicked; and thus the interme- of wisdom” belongs to the bishop, because he is the or- diate Orders to the intermediate gifts. But this again is dainer of others, which pertains to wisdom; the “word of no account, since the sevenfold grace is given in each of knowledge” to the priest, for he ought to have the key one of the Orders. Consequently we must answer differ- of knowledge; “faith” to the deacon, for he preaches the ently by saying that the sacrament of Order is directed Gospel; the “working of miracles” to the subdeacon, who to the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is the sacrament sets himself to do deeds of perfection by the vow of con- of sacraments, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii). For tinency; “interpretation of speeches” to the acolyte, this just as temple, altar, vessels, and vestments need to be being signified by the light which he bears; the “grace of consecrated, so do the ministers who are ordained for the healing” to the exorcist; “diverse kinds of tongues” to the Eucharist; and this consecration is the sacrament of Or- psalmist; “prophecy” to the reader; and the “discerning of der. Hence the distinction of Orders is derived from their spirits” to the doorkeeper, for he excludes some and ad- relation to the Eucharist. For the power of Order is di- mits others. But this is of no account, for the gratuitous rected either to the consecration of the Eucharist itself, ∗ Cf. q. 40, a. 5 2767 or to some ministry in connection with this sacrament of to cleanse; this is the deacon who is called a minister: and the Eucharist. If in the former way, then it is the Order under this last all the lower Orders are comprised. But of priests; hence when they are ordained, they receive the Orders derive their sacramental nature from their re- the chalice with wine, and the paten with the bread, be- lation to the greatest of the sacraments, and consequently cause they are receiving the power to consecrate the body the number of Orders depends on this. and blood of Christ. The co-operation of the ministers Reply to Objection 2. In the early Church, on account is directed either to the sacrament itself, or to the recip- of the fewness of ministers, all the lower ministries were ients. If the former, this happens in three ways. For in entrusted to the deacons, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. the first place, there is the ministry whereby the minister iii), where he says: “Some of the ministers stand at the co-operates with the priest in the sacrament itself, by dis- closed door of the Church, others are otherwise occupied pensing, but not by consecrating, for this is done by the in the exercise of their own order; others place the sacred priest alone; and this belongs to the deacon. Hence in the bread and the chalice of benediction on the altar and offer text (Sent. iv, D, 24) it is said that it belongs to the deacon them to the priests.” Nevertheless all the power to do all to minister to the priests in whatever is done in Christ’s these things was included in the one power of the deacon, sacraments, wherefore he dispenses Christ’s blood. Sec- though implicitly. But afterwards the Divine worship de- ondly, there is the ministry directed to the disposal of the veloped, and the Church committed expressly to several sacramental matter in the sacred vessels of the sacrament. persons that which had hitherto been committed implic- and this belongs to subdeacons. Wherefore it is stated in itly in one Order. This is what the Master means, when the text (Sent. iv, D, 24) that they carry the vessels of our He says in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24) that the Church insti- Lord’s body and blood, and place the oblation on the altar; tuted other Orders. hence, when they are ordained, they receive the chalice, Reply to Objection 3. The orders are directed to the empty however, from the bishop’s hands. Thirdly, there is sacrament of the Eucharist chiefly, and to the other sacra- the ministry directed to the proffering of the sacramental ments consequently, for even the other sacraments flow matter, and this belongs to the acolyte. For he, as stated in from that which is contained in that sacrament. Hence it the text (Sent. iv, D, 24), prepares the cruet with wine and does not follow that the orders ought to be distinguished water; wherefore he receives an empty cruet. The ministry according to the sacraments. directed to the preparation of the recipients can be exer- Reply to Objection 4. The angels differ specifically∗: cised only over the unclean, since those who are clean are for this reason it is possible for them to have various already apt for receiving the sacraments. Now the unclean modes of receiving Divine things, and hence also they are are of three kinds, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. divided into various hierarchies. But in men there is only iii). For some are absolute unbelievers and unwilling to one hierarchy, because they have only one mode of receiv- believe; and these must be altogether debarred from be- ing Divine things, which results from the human species, holding Divine things and from the assembly of the faith- namely through the images of sensible objects. Conse- ful; this belongs to the doorkeepers. Some, however, are quently the distinction of orders in the angels cannot bear willing to believe, but are not as yet instructed, namely any relation to a sacrament as it is with us, but only a re- catechumens, and to the instruction of such persons the lation to the hierarchical actions which among them each Order of readers is directed, who are therefore entrusted Order exercises on the Orders below. In this respect our with the reading of the first rudiments of the doctrine of Orders correspond to theirs; since in our hierarchy there faith, namely the Old Testament. But some are believers are three Orders, distinguished according to the three hi- and instructed, yet lie under an impediment through the erarchical actions, even as in each angelic hierarchy. power of the devil, namely those who are possessed: and Reply to Objection 5. The office of psalmist is not an to this ministry the order of exorcists is directed. Thus the Order, but an office annexed to an Order. For the psalmist reason and number of the degrees of Orders is made clear. is also styled precentor because the psalms are recited Reply to Objection 1. Dionysius is speaking of the with chant. Now precentor is not the name of a special orders not as sacraments, but as directed to hierarchical Order, both because it belongs to the whole choir to sing, actions. Wherefore he distinguishes three Orders cor- and because he has no special relation to the sacrament of responding to those actions. The first of these Orders, the Eucharist. Since, however, it is a particular office, it is namely the bishop, has all three actions; the second, sometimes reckoned among the Orders, taking these in a namely the priest, has two; while the third has one, namely broad sense. ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 50, a. 4 2768 Whether the Order should be divided into those that are sacred and those that are Suppl. q. 37 a. 3 not? Objection 1. It would seem that the Orders ought not I answer that, An Order is said to be sacred in two to be divided into those that are sacred and those that are ways. First, in itself, and thus every order is sacred, not. For all the Orders are sacraments, and all the sacra- since it is a sacrament. Secondly, by reason of the mat- ments are sacred. Therefore all the Orders are sacred. ter about which it exercises an act, and thus an Order is Objection 2. Further, by the Orders of the Church called sacred, if it exercises an act about some consecrated a man is not appointed to any other than Divine offices. thing. In this sense there are only three sacred Orders, Now all these are sacred. Therefore all the Orders also namely the priesthood and diaconate, which exercise an are sacred. act about the consecrated body and blood of Christ, and On the contrary, The sacred Orders are an impedi- the subdiaconate, which exercises an act about the con- ment to the contracting of marriage and annul the mar- secrated vessels. Wherefore continency is enjoined them, riage that is already contracted. But the four lower or- that they who handle holy things may themselves be holy ders neither impede the contracting nor annul the contract. and clean. Therefore these are not sacred Orders. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. Whether the acts of the Orders are rightly assigned in the text? Suppl. q. 37 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the acts of the Or- poreal. Therefore the exorcist has not the spiritual act of ders are not rightly assigned in the text (Sent. iv, D, casting out devils, since he is of inferior rank. 24). Because a person is prepared by absolution to re- Objection 8. Further, things that have most in com- ceive Christ’s body. Now the preparation of the recipients mon should be placed beside one another. Now the read- of a sacrament belongs to the lower Orders. Therefore ab- ing of the Old Testament must needs have most in com- solution from sins is unfittingly reckoned among the acts mon with the reading of the New Testament, which lat- of a priest. ter belongs to the higher ministers. Therefore the reading Objection 2. Further, man is made like to God im- of the Old Testament should be reckoned the act, not of mediately in Baptism, by receiving the character which the reader, but rather of the acolyte; especially since the causes this likeness. But prayer and the offering of obla- bodily light which the acolytes carry signifies the light of tions are acts directed immediately to God. Therefore ev- spiritual doctrine. ery baptized person can perform these acts, and not priests Objection 9. Further, in every act of a special Or- alone. der, there should be some special power, which the per- Objection 3. Further, different Orders have different son ordained has to the exclusion of other persons. But in acts. But it belongs to the subdeacon to place the oblations opening and shutting doors the doorkeeper has no special on the altar, and to read the epistle; and subdeacons carry power that other men have not. Therefore this should not the cross before the Pope. Therefore these acts should not be reckoned their act. be assigned to the deacon. I answer that, Since the consecration conferred in the Objection 4. Further, the same truth is contained in sacrament of orders is directed to the sacrament of the Eu- the Old and in the New Testament. But it belongs to the charist, as stated above (a. 2), the principal act of each or- readers to read the Old Testament. Therefore it should be- der is that whereby it is most nearly directed to the sacra- long to them likewise, and not to deacons, to read the New ment of the Eucharist. In this respect, too, one order ranks Testament. above another, in so far as one act is more nearly directed Objection 5. Further, the apostles preached naught to that same sacrament. But because many things are di- else but the gospel of Christ (Rom. 1:15). But the teach- rected to the Eucharist, as being the most exalted of the ing of the apostles is entrusted to subdeacons to be read sacraments, it follows not unfittingly that one Order has by them. Therefore the Gospel teaching should be also. many acts besides its principal act, and all the more, as Objection 6. Further, according to Dionysius (Eccl. it ranks higher, since a power extends to the more things, Hier. v) that which belongs to a higher Order should not the higher it is. be applicable to a lower Order. But it is an act of subdea- Reply to Objection 1. The preparation of the recipi- cons to minister with the cruets. Therefore it should not ents of a sacrament is twofold. One is remote and is ef- be assigned to acolytes. fected by the ministers: another is proximate, whereby Objection 7. Further, spiritual actions should rank they are rendered apt at once for receiving the sacraments. above bodily actions. But the acolyte’s act is merely cor- This latter belongs to priests, since even in natural things 2769 matter receives from one and the same agent both the ul-the water over the hands of the priest; and the deacon, like timate disposition to the form, and the form itself. And the subdeacon, exercises an act over the chalice only, not since a person acquires the proximate disposition to the over its contents, whereas the priest exercises an act over Eucharist by being cleansed from sin, it follows that the the contents. Wherefore as the subdeacon at his ordina- priest is the proper minister of all those sacraments which tion receives an empty chalice, while the priest receives a are chiefly instituted for the cleansing of sins, namely full chalice, so the acolyte receives an empty cruet, but the Baptism, Penance, and Extreme Unction. subdeacon a full one. Thus there is a certain connection Reply to Objection 2. Acts are directed immediately among the Orders. to God in two ways; in one way on the part of one person Reply to Objection 7. The bodily acts of the acolyte only, for instance the prayers of individuals, vows, and so are more intimately connected with the act of Holy orders forth: such acts befit any baptized person. In another way than the act of the exorcist, although the latter is, in a fash-on the part of the whole Church, and thus the priest alone ion, spiritual. For the acolytes exercise a ministry over the exercises acts immediately directed to God; because to vessels in which the sacramental matter is contained, as impersonate the whole Church belongs to him alone who regards the wine, which needs a vessel to hold it on ac- consecrates the Eucharist, which is the sacrament of the count of its humidity. Hence of all the minor orders the universal Church. Order of acolytes is the highest. Reply to Objection 3. The offerings made by the Reply to Objection 8. The act of the acolyte is more people are offered through the priest. Hence a twofold closely connected with the principal acts of the higher ministry is necessary with regard to offerings. One on ministers, than the acts of the other minor Orders, as the part of the people: and this belongs to the subdea- is self-evident; and again as regards the secondary acts con who receives the offerings from the people and places whereby they prepare the people by doctrine. For the them on the altar or offers them to the deacon. the other is acolyte by bearing a light represents the doctrine of the on the part of the priest, and belongs to the deacon, who New Testament in a visible manner, while the reader by hands the offerings to the priest. This is the principal act his recital represents it differently, wherefore the acolyte of both Orders, and for this reason the deacon’s Order is is of higher rank. It is the same with the exorcist, for as the higher. But to read the epistle does not belong to a the act of the reader is compared with the secondary act deacon, except as the acts of lower Orders are ascribed to of the deacon and subdeacon, so is the act of the exorcist the higher; and in like manner to carry the cross. More- compared with the secondary act of the priest, namely to over, this depends on the customs of Churches, because in bind and to loose, by which man is wholly freed from the secondary acts it is not unfitting for customs to vary. slavery of the devil. This, too, shows the degrees of Or- Reply to Objection 4. Doctrine is a remote prepara- der to be most orderly. since only the three higher Orders tion for the reception of a sacrament; wherefore the an- co-operate with the priest in his principal act which is to nouncement of doctrine is entrusted to the ministers. But consecrate the body of Christ, while both the higher and the doctrine of the Old Testament is more remote than lower Orders co-operate with him in his secondary act, that of the New Testament, since it contains no instruc- which is to loose and bind. tion about this sacrament except in figures. Hence an- Reply to Objection 9. Some say that in receiving the nouncing of the New Testament is entrusted to the higher Order the doorkeeper is given a Divine power to debar ministers, and that of the Old Testament to the lower min- others from entering the Church, even as Christ had, when isters. Moreover the doctrine of the New Testament is He cast out the sellers from the Temple. But this belongs more perfect as delivered by our Lord Himself, than as to a gratuitous grace rather than to a sacramental grace. made known by His apostles. Wherefore the Gospel is Wherefore we should reply that he receives the power to committed to deacons and the Epistle to subdeacons. do this by virtue of his office, although others may do so, This suffices for the Reply to the Fifth Objection. but not officially. It is the case in all the acts of the mi- Reply to Objection 6. Acolytes exercise an act over nor Orders, that they can be lawfully exercised by others, the cruet alone, and not over the contents of the cruet; even though these have no office to that effect: just as whereas the subdeacon exercises an act over the contents Mass may be said in an unconsecrated building, although of the cruet, because he handles the water and wine to the the consecration of a church is directed to the purpose that end that they be put into the chalice,∗ and again he pours Mass be said there. ∗ The wording of St. Thomas is sufficiently vague to refer either to the Roman rite, where the priest pours the wine and water into the chalice, or to the Dominican rite, where this is done by the subdeacon. 2770 Whether the character is imprinted on a priest when the chalice is handed to him? Suppl. q. 37 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the character is not things, namely blessing, imposition of hands, and anoint- imprinted on the priest at the moment when the chalice is ing. By the blessing they are enlisted in the Divine ser- handed to him. For the consecration of a priest is done vice, wherefore the blessing is given to all. By the impo- by anointing as in Confirmation. Now in Confirmation sition of hands the fulness of grace is given, whereby they the character is imprinted at the moment of anointing; and are qualified for exalted duties, wherefore only deacons therefore in the priesthood also and not at the handing of and priests receive the imposition of hands, because they the chalice. are competent to dispense the sacraments, although the Objection 2. Further, our Lord gave His disciples the latter as principal dispensers, the former as ministers. But priestly power when He said (Jn. 20:22,23): “Receive by the anointing they are consecrated for the purpose of ye the Holy Ghost: whose sins you shall forgive,” etc. handling the sacrament, wherefore the anointing is done Now the Holy Ghost is given by the imposition of hands. to the priests alone who touch the body of Christ with Therefore the character of order is given at the moment of their own hands; even as a chalice is anointed because it the imposition of hands. holds the blood, and the paten because it holds the body. Objection 3. Further, as the ministers are consecrated, The conferring of power is effected by giving them even so are the ministers’ vestments. Now the blessing something pertaining to their proper act. And since the alone consecrates the vestments. Therefore the consecra- principal act of a priest is to consecrate the body and blood tion of the priest also is effected by the mere blessing of of Christ, the priestly character is imprinted at the very the bishop. giving of the chalice under the prescribed form of words. Objection 4. Further, as a chalice is handed to the Reply to Objection 1. In Confirmation there is not priest, even so is the priestly vestment. Therefore if a given the office of exercising an act on an exterior matter, character is imprinted at the giving of the chalice, so like- wherefore the character is not imprinted in that sacrament wise is there at the giving of the chasuble, and thus a priest at the handing of some particular thing, but at the mere would have two characters: but this is false. imposition of hands and anointing. But it is otherwise in Objection 5. Further, the deacon’s order is more the priestly Order, and consequently the comparison fails. closely allied to the priest’s Order than is the subdeacon’s. Reply to Objection 2. Our Lord gave His disciples But if a character is imprinted on the priest at the mo- the priestly power, as regards the principal act, before His ment of the handing of the chalice, the subdeacon would passion at the supper when He said: “Take ye and eat” be more closely allied to the priest than the deacon; be- (Mat. 26:26), wherefore He added: “Do this for a com- cause the subdeacon receives the character at the handing memoration of Me” (Lk. 22:19). After the resurrection, of the chalice and not the deacon. Therefore the priestly however, He gave them the priestly power, as to its sec- character is not imprinted at the handing of the chalice. ondary act, which is to bind and loose. Objection 6. Further, the Order of acolytes ap- Reply to Objection 3. Vestments require no other proaches nearer to the priestly act by exercising an act consecration except to be set aside for the Divine worship, over the cruet than by exercising an act over the torch. Yet wherefore the blessing suffices for their consecration. But the character is imprinted on the acolytes when they re- it is different with those who are ordained, as explained ceive the torch rather than when they receive the cruet, be- above. cause the name of acolyte signifies candle-bearer. There- Reply to Objection 4. The priestly vestment signifies, fore the character is not imprinted on the priest when he not the power given to the priest, but the aptitude required receives the chalice. of him for exercising the act of that power. Wherefore a On the contrary, The principal act of the priest’s Or- character is imprinted neither on the priest nor on anyone der is to consecrate Christ’s body. Now he receives the else at the giving of a vestment. power to this effect at the handing of the chalice. There- Reply to Objection 5. The deacon’s power is midway fore the character is imprinted on him then. between the subdeacon’s and the priest’s. For the priest I answer that, As stated above (a. 4, ad 1), to cause exercises a power directly on Christ’s body, the subdeacon the form and to give the matter its proximate prepara- on the vessels only, and the deacon on Christ’s body con- tion for the form belong to the same agent. Wherefore tained in a vessel. Hence it is not for him to touch Christ’s the bishop in conferring orders does two things; for he body, but to carry the body on the paten, and to dispense prepares the candidates for the reception of orders, and the blood with the chalice. Consequently his power, as delivers to them the power of order. He prepares them, to the principal act, could not be expressed, either by the both by instructing them in their respective offices and by giving of the vessel only, or by the giving of the matter; doing something to them, so that they may be adapted and his power is expressed as to the secondary act alone, to receive the power. This preparation consists of three by his receiving the book of the Gospels, and this power 2771 is understood to contain the other; wherefore the character the torch; although he takes his name from the secondary is impressed at the handing of the book. act, because it is better known and more proper to him. Reply to Objection 6. The act of the acolyte whereby Hence the acolyte receives the character when he is given he serves with the cruet ranks before his act of carrying the cruet, by virtue of the words uttered by the bishop. 2772 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 38 Of Those Who Confer This Sacrament (In Two Articles) We must now consider those who confer this sacrament. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether a bishop alone can confer this sacrament? (2) Whether a heretic or any other person cut off from the Church can confer this sacrament? Whether a bishop alone confers the sacrament of Order? Suppl. q. 38 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that not only a bishop more can he alone ordain. confers the sacrament of Order. For the imposition of I answer that, The episcopal power stands in the same hands has something to do with the consecration. Now relation to the power of the lower Orders, as political sci- not only the bishop but also the assisting priests lay hands ence, which seeks the common good, to the lower acts and on the priests who are being ordained. Therefore not only virtues which seek some special good, as appears from a bishop confers the sacrament of Order. what was said above (q. 37, a. 1). Now political science, Objection 2. Further, a man receives the power of as stated in Ethic. i, 2, lays down the law to lower sci- Order, when that which pertains to the act of his Order ences, namely what science each one ought to cultivate, is handed to him. Now the cruet with water, bowl∗ and and how far he should pursue it and in what way. Where- towel, are given to the subdeacon by the archdeacon; as fore it belongs to a bishop to assign others to places in also the candlestick with candle, and the empty cruet to all the Divine services. Hence he alone confirms, because the acolyte. Therefore not only the bishop confers the those who are confirmed receive the office, as it were, of sacrament of Order. confessing the faith; again he alone blesses virgins who Objection 3. Further, that which belongs to an Order are images of the Church, Christ’s spouse, the care of cannot be entrusted to one who has not the Order. Now which is entrusted chiefly to him; and he it is who con- the conferring of minor Orders is entrusted to certain per- secrates the candidates for ordination to the ministry of sons who are not bishops, for instance to Cardinal priests. Orders, and, by his consecration, appoints the vessels that Therefore the conferring of Orders does not belong to the they are to use; even as secular offices in various cities are episcopal Order. allotted by him who holds the highest power, for instance Objection 4. Further, whoever is entrusted with the by the king. principal is entrusted with the accessory also. Now the Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (q. 37, a. 5), sacrament of Order is directed to the Eucharist, as acces- at the imposition of hands there is given, not the character sory to principal. Since then a priest consecrates the Eu- of the priestly Order, but grace which makes a man fit to charist, he can also confer Orders. exercise his Order. And since those who are raised to the Objection 5. Further, there is a greater distinction priesthood need most copious grace, the priests together between a priest and a deacon than between bishop and with the bishop lay hands on them, but the bishop alone bishop. But a bishop can consecrate a bishop. Therefore lays hands on deacons. a priest can ordain a deacon. Reply to Objection 2. Since the archdeacon is as it On the contrary, Ministers are applied by their Or- were minister-in-chief, all things pertaining to the min- ders to the Divine worship in a more noble way than the istry are handed by him, for instance the candle with sacred vessels. But the consecration of the vessels belongs which the acolyte serves the deacon by carrying it before to a bishop only. Much more therefore does the consecra- him at the Gospel, and the cruet with which he serves the tion of ministers. subdeacon; and in like manner he gives the subdeacon the Further, the sacrament of Order ranks higher than the things with which the latter serves the higher Orders. And sacrament of Confirmation. Now a bishop alone confirms. yet the principal act of the subdeacon does not consist in Much more therefore does a bishop alone confer the sacra- these things, but in his co-operation as regards the mat- ment of Order. ter of the sacrament; wherefore he receives the character Further, virgins are not placed in a degree of spiritual through the chalice being handed to him by the bishop. On power by their consecration, as the ordained are. Yet a the other hand, the acolyte receives the character by virtue bishop alone can consecrate a virgin. Therefore much of the words of the bishop when the aforesaid things—the ∗ “Bacili.” The rubric has “aquamanili.” Some texts of the Summa have “mantili” (“maniple”), but the archdeacon does not give the maniple to the subdeacon. 2773 cruet rather than the candlestick—are handed to him by than that of a simple priest. the archdeacon. Hence it does not follow that the archdea- Reply to Objection 4. Although the Eucharist is in con ordains. itself the greatest of the sacraments, it does not place a Reply to Objection 3. The Pope, who has the fulness man in an office as does the sacrament of Order. Hence of episcopal power, can entrust one who is not a bishop the comparison fails. with things pertaining to the episcopal dignity, provided Reply to Objection 5. In order to bestow what one they bear no immediate relation to the true body of Christ. has on another, it is necessary not only to be near him but Hence by virtue of his commission a simple priest can also to have fulness of power. And since a priest has not confer the minor Orders and confirm; but not one who is fulness of power in the hierarchical offices, as a bishop not a priest. Nor can a priest confer the higher Orders has, it does not follow that he can raise others to the dia- which bear an immediate relation to Christ’s body, over conate, although the latter Order is near to his. the consecration of which the Pope’s power is no greater Whether heretics and those who are cut off from the Church can confer Orders? ∗ Suppl. q. 38 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that heretics and those does he lose the power to ordain. who are cut off from the Church cannot confer Orders. I answer that, on this question four opinions are men- For to confer Orders is a greater thing than to loose or tioned in the text (Sent. iv, D, 25). For some said that bind anyone. But a heretic cannot loose or bind. Neither heretics, so long as they are tolerated by the Church, re- therefore can he ordain. tain the power to ordain, but not after they have been cut Objection 2. Further, a priest that is separated from off from the Church; as neither do those who have been the Church can consecrate, because the character whence degraded and the like. This is the first opinion. Yet this he derives this power remains in him indelibly. But a is impossible, because, happen what may, no power that bishop receives no character when he is raised to the epis- is given with a consecration can be taken away so long as copate. Therefore he does not necessarily retain the epis- the thing itself remains, any more than the consecration it- copal power after his separation from the Church. self can be annulled, for even an altar or chrism once con- Objection 3. Further, in no community can one who secrated remains consecrated for ever. Wherefore, since is expelled therefrom dispose of the offices of the commu- the episcopal power is conferred by consecration, it must nity. Now Orders are offices of the Church. Therefore one needs endure for ever, however much a man may sin or be who is outside the Church cannot confer Orders. cut off from the Church. For this reason others said that Objection 4. Further, the sacraments derive their ef- those who are cut off from the Church after having epis- ficacy from Christ’s passion. Now a heretic is not united copal power in the Church, retain the power to ordain and to Christ’s passion; neither by his own faith, since he is raise others, but that those who are raised by them have an unbeliever, nor by the faith of the Church, since he is not this power. This is the fourth opinion. But this again is severed from the Church. Therefore he cannot confer the impossible, for if those who were ordained in the Church sacrament of Orders. retain the power they received, it is clear that by exercis- Objection 5. Further, a blessing is necessary in the ing their power they consecrate validly, and therefore they conferring of Orders. But a heretic cannot bless; in fact validly confer whatever power is given with that consecra- his blessing is turned into a curse, as appears from the au- tion, and thus those who receive ordination or promotion thorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 25). Therefore he from them have the same power as they. Wherefore oth- cannot ordain. ers said that even those who are cut off from the Church On the contrary, When a bishop who has fallen into can confer Orders and the other sacraments, provided they heresy is reconciled he is not reconsecrated. Therefore he observe the due form and intention, both as to the first ef- did not lose the power which he had of conferring Orders. fect, which is the conferring of the sacrament, and as to Further, the power to ordain is greater than the power the ultimate effect which is the conferring of grace. This of Orders. But the power of Orders is not forfeited on is the second opinion. But this again is inadmissible, since account of heresy and the like. Neither therefore is the by the very fact that a person communicates in the sacra- power to ordain. ments with a heretic who is cut off from the Church, he Further, as the one who baptizes exercises a merely sins, and thus approaches the sacrament insincerely and outward ministry, so does one who ordains, while God cannot obtain grace, except perhaps in Baptism in a case works inwardly. But one who is cut off from the Church of necessity. Hence others say that they confer the sacra- by no means loses the power to baptize. Neither therefore ments validly, but do not confer grace with them, not that ∗ Cf. IIIa, q. 64, Aa. 5,9 2774 the sacraments are lacking in efficacy, but on account of man is not thereby placed in direct relation to God, but to the sins of those who receive the sacraments from such Christ’s mystical body. Nevertheless it remains indelibly persons despite the prohibition of the Church. This is the even as the character, because it is given by consecration. third and the true opinion. Reply to Objection 3. Those who are ordained by Reply to Objection 1. The effect of absolution is heretics, although they receive an Order, do not receive nothing else but the forgiveness of sins which results from the exercise thereof, so as to minister lawfully in their Or- grace, and consequently a heretic cannot absolve, as nei- ders, for the very reason indicated in the Objection. ther can he confer grace in the sacraments. Moreover in Reply to Objection 4. They are united to the passion order to give absolution it is necessary to have jurisdic- of Christ by the faith of the Church, for although in them- tion, which one who is cut off from the Church has not. selves they are severed from it, they are united to it as Reply to Objection 2. When a man is raised to the regards the form of the Church which they observe. episcopate he receives a power which he retains for ever. Reply to Objection 5. This refers to the ultimate ef- This, however, cannot be called a character, because a fect of the sacraments, as the third opinion maintains. 2775 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 39 Of the Impediments to This Sacrament (In Six Articles) We must next consider the impediments to this sacrament. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the female sex is an impediment to receiving this sacrament? (2) Whether lack of the use of reason is? (3) Whether the state of slavery is? (4) Whether homicide is? (5) Whether illegitimate birth is? (6) Whether lack of members is? Whether the female sex is an impediment to receiving Orders? Suppl. q. 39 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the female sex is no quired for receiving Orders not only in the second, but impediment to receiving Orders. For the office of prophet also in the first way. Wherefore even though a woman is greater than the office of priest, since a prophet stands were made the object of all that is done in conferring Or- midway between God and priests, just as the priest does ders, she would not receive Orders, for since a sacrament between God and people. Now the office of prophet was is a sign, not only the thing, but the signification of the sometimes granted to women, as may be gathered from 4 thing, is required in all sacramental actions; thus it was Kings 22:14. Therefore the office of priest also may be stated above (q. 32, a. 2) that in Extreme Unction it is nec- competent to them. essary to have a sick man, in order to signify the need of Objection 2. Further, just as Order pertains to a kind healing. Accordingly, since it is not possible in the female of pre-eminence, so does a position of authority as well sex to signify eminence of degree, for a woman is in the as martyrdom and the religious state. Now authority is state of subjection, it follows that she cannot receive the entrusted to women in the New Testament, as in the case sacrament of Order. Some, however, have asserted that of abbesses, and in the Old Testament, as in the case of the male sex is necessary for the lawfulness and not for Debbora, who judged Israel (Judges 2). Moreover mar- the validity of the sacrament, because even in the Decre- tyrdom and the religious life are also befitting to them. tals (cap. Mulieres dist. 32; cap. Diaconissam, 27, qu. i) Therefore the Orders of the Church are also competent to mention is made of deaconesses and priestesses. But dea- them. coness there denotes a woman who shares in some act of Objection 3. Further, the power of orders is founded a deacon, namely who reads the homilies in the Church; in the soul. But sex is not in the soul. Therefore difference and priestess [presbytera] means a widow, for the word in sex makes no difference to the reception of Orders. “presbyter” means elder. On the contrary, It is said (1 Tim. 2:12): “I suffer not Reply to Objection 1. Prophecy is not a sacrament a woman to teach (in the Church),∗ nor to use authority but a gift of God. Wherefore there it is not the significa- over the man.” tion, but only the thing which is necessary. And since in Further, the crown is required previous to receiving matters pertaining to the soul woman does not differ from Orders, albeit not for the validity of the sacrament. But man as to the thing (for sometimes a woman is found to the crown or tonsure is not befitting to women according be better than many men as regards the soul), it follows to 1 Cor. 11. Neither therefore is the receiving of Orders. that she can receive the gift of prophecy and the like, but I answer that, Certain things are required in the re- not the sacrament of Orders. cipient of a sacrament as being requisite for the validity And thereby appears the Reply to the Second and of the sacrament, and if such things be lacking, one can Third Objections. However, as to abbesses, it is said that receive neither the sacrament nor the reality of the sacra- they have not ordinary authority, but delegated as it were, ment. Other things, however, are required, not for the on account of the danger of men and women living to- validity of the sacrament, but for its lawfulness, as be- gether. But Debbora exercised authority in temporal, not ing congruous to the sacrament; and without these one in priestly matters, even as now woman may have tempo- receives the sacrament, but not the reality of the sacra- ral power. ment. Accordingly we must say that the male sex is re- ∗ The words in parenthesis are from 1 Cor. 14:34, “Let women keep silence in the churches.” 2776 Whether boys and those who lack the use of reason can receive Orders? Suppl. q. 39 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that boys and those who the validity of the sacrament, but some spiritual power is lack the use of reason cannot receive Orders. For, as stated conferred from above; with this difference, however, that in the text (Sent. iv, D, 25), the sacred canons have ap- in the minor orders the age of discretion is required out pointed a certain fixed age in those who receive Orders. of respect for the dignity of the sacrament, but not for its But this would not be if boys could receive the sacrament lawfulness, nor for its validity. Hence some can without of Orders. Therefore, etc. sin be raised to the minor orders before the years of discre- Objection 2. Further, the sacrament of Orders ranks tion, if there be an urgent reason for it and hope of their above the sacrament of matrimony. Now children and proficiency. and they are validly ordained; for although those who lack the use of reason cannot contract matri- at the time they are not qualified for the offices entrusted mony. Neither therefore can they receive Orders. to them, they will become qualified by being habituated Objection 3. Further, act and power are in the same thereto. For the higher Orders, however, the use of reason subject, according to the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vigil. is required both out of respect for, and for the lawfulness i). Now the act of Orders requires the use of reason. of the sacrament, not only on account of the vow of con- Therefore the power of Orders does also. tinency annexed thereto, but also because the handling of On the contrary, one who is raised to Orders before the sacraments is entrusted to them∗. But for the episco- the age of discretion is sometimes allowed to exercise pate whereby a man receives power also over the mystical them without being reordained, as appears from Extra., body, the act of accepting the pastoral care of souls is re- De Cler. per salt. prom. But this would not be the case if quired; wherefore the use of reason is necessary for the he had not received Orders. Therefore a boy can receive validity of episcopal consecration. Some, however, main- Orders. tain that the use of reason is necessary for the validity of Further, boys can receive other sacraments in which a the sacrament in all the Orders. but this statement is not character is imprinted, namely Baptism and Confirmation. confirmed either by authority or by reason. Therefore in like manner they can receive Orders. Reply to Objection 1. As stated in the Article, not I answer that, Boyhood and other defects which re- all that is necessary for the lawfulness of a sacrament is move the use of reason occasion an impediment to act. required for its validity. Wherefore the like are unfit to receive all those sacraments Reply to Objection 2. The cause of matrimony is con- which require an act on the part of the recipient of the sent, which cannot be without the use of reason. Whereas sacrament, such as Penance, Matrimony, and so forth. But in the reception of Orders no act is required on the part since infused powers like natural powers precede acts— of the recipients since no act on their part is expressed in although acquired powers follow acts—and the removal their consecration. Hence there is no comparison. of that which comes after does not entail the removal of Reply to Objection 3. Act and power are in the same what comes first, it follows that children and those who subject; yet sometimes a power, such as the free-will, pre- lack the use of reason can receive all the sacraments in cedes its act; and thus it is in the case in point. which an act on the part of the recipient is not required for Whether the state of slavery is an impediment to receiving Orders? Suppl. q. 39 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the state of slavery is to become a slave than for a slave to be made a cleric. Yet not an impediment to receiving Orders. For corporal sub- a cleric may lawfully be sold as a slave; for a bishop of jection is not incompatible with spiritual authority. But in Nola, Paulinus, to wit, sold himself as a slave as related a slave there is corporal subjection. Therefore he is not by Gregory (Dial. iii). Much more therefore can a slave hindered from receiving the spiritual authority which is be made a cleric. given in orders. Objection 4. On the contrary, It would seem that it Objection 2. Further, that which is an occasion for hu- is an impediment to the validity of the sacrament. For a mility should not be an impediment to the reception of a woman, on account of her subjection, cannot receive the sacrament. Now such is slavery, for the Apostle counsels a sacrament of Orders. But greater still is the subjection in man, if possible, rather to remain in slavery (1 Cor. 7:21). a slave; since woman was not given to man as his hand- Therefore it should not hinder him from being raised to maid (for which reason she was not made from his feet). Orders. Therefore neither can a slave receive this sacrament. Objection 3. Further, it is more disgraceful for a cleric Objection 5. Further, a man, from the fact that he re- ∗ See Acts of the Council of Trent: De Reform., Sess. xxii, cap. 4,11,12 2777 ceives an Order, is bound to minister in that Order. But hindrance to the exercise of Orders. he cannot at the same time serve his carnal master and Reply to Objection 3. The blessed Paulinus did this exercise his spiritual ministry. Therefore it would seem out of the abundance of his charity, being led by the spirit that he cannot receive Orders, since the master must be of God; as was proved by the result of his action, since by indemnified. his becoming a slave, many of his flock were freed from I answer that, By receiving Orders a man pledges slavery. Hence we must not draw a conclusion from this himself to the Divine offices. And since no man can give particular instance, since “where the spirit of the Lord is, what is not his, a slave who has not the disposal of him- there is liberty” (2 Cor. 3:17). self, cannot be raised to Orders. If, however, he be raised, Reply to Objection 4. The sacramental signs signify he receives the Order, because freedom is not required for by reason of their natural likeness. Now a woman is a the validity of the sacrament, although it is requisite for subject by her nature, whereas a slave is not. Hence the its lawfulness, since it hinders not the power, but the act comparison fails. only. The same reason applies to all who are under an Reply to Objection 5. If he be ordained, his master obligation to others, such as those who are in debt and knowing and not dissenting, by this very fact he becomes like persons. a freedman. But if his master be in ignorance, the bishop Reply to Objection 1. The reception of spiritual and he who presented him are bound to pay the master power involves also an obligation to certain bodily ac- double the slave’s value, if they knew him to be a slave. tions, and consequently it is hindered by bodily subjec- Otherwise if the slave has possessions of his own, he is tion. bound to buy his freedom, else he would have to return to Reply to Objection 2. A man may take an occasion the bondage of his master, notwithstanding the impossi- for humility from many other things which do not prove a bility of his exercising his Order. Whether a man should be debarred from receiving Orders on account of homicide? Suppl. q. 39 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that a man ought not to Christ slain, to whom all the ministers of the aforesaid be debarred from receiving Orders on account of homi- sacrament ought to be conformed, it follows that it is un- cide. Because our Orders originated with the office of the lawful, although not invalid, for homicides to be raised to Levites, as stated in the previous Distinction (Sent. iv, D, Orders. 24). But the Levites consecrated their hands by shedding Reply to Objection 1. The Old Law inflicted the pun- the blood of their brethren (Ex. 32:29). Therefore neither ishment of blood, whereas the New Law does not. Hence should anyone in the New Testament be debarred from the comparison fails between the ministers of the Old Tes- receiving Orders on account of the shedding of blood. tament and those of the New, which is a sweet yoke and a Objection 2. Further, no one should be debarred from light burden (Mat. 11:30). a sacrament on account of an act of virtue. Now blood is Reply to Objection 2. Irregularity is incurred not only sometimes shed for justice’ sake, for instance by a judge; on account of sin, but chiefly on account of a person being and he who has the office would sin if he did not shed it. unfit to administer the sacrament of the Eucharist. Hence Therefore he is not hindered on that account from receiv- the judge and all who take part with him in a cause of ing Orders. blood, are irregular, because the shedding of blood is un- Objection 3. Further, punishment is not due save for becoming to the ministers of that sacrament. a fault. Now sometimes a person commits homicide with- Reply to Objection 3. No one does a thing without out fault, for instance by defending himself, or again by being the cause thereof, and in man this is something vol- mishap. Therefore he ought not to incur the punishment untary. Hence he who by mishap slays a man without of irregularity. knowing that it is a man, is not called a homicide, nor On the contrary, Against this there are many canoni- does he incur irregularity (unless he was occupying him- cal statutes∗, as also the custom of the Church. self in some unlawful manner, or failed to take sufficient I answer that, All the Orders bear a relation to the care, since in this case the slaying becomes somewhat vol- sacrament of the Eucharist, which is the sacrament of the untary). But this is not because he is not in fault, since ir- peace vouchsafed to us by the shedding of Christ’s blood. regularity is incurred even without fault. Wherefore even And since homicide is most opposed to peace, and those he who in a particular case slays a man in self-defense who slay are conformed to Christ’s slayers rather than to without committing a sin, is none the less irregular†. ∗ Cap. Miror; cap. Clericum; cap. De his Cler., dist. 1; cap. Continebatur, De homic. volunt. † St. Thomas is speaking according to the canon law of his time. This is no longer the case now. 2778 Whether those of illegitimate birth should be debarred from receiving Orders? Suppl. q. 39 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that those who are of ille- not for the validity but for the lawfulness of the sacrament, gitimate birth should not be debarred from receiving Or- namely that they should be of good repute, bedecked with ders. For the son should not bear the iniquity of the father a virtuous life, and not publicly penitent. And since a (Ezech. 18:20); and yet he would if this were an impedi- man’s good name is bedimmed by a sinful origin, there- ment to his receiving Orders. Therefore, etc. fore those also who are born of an unlawful union are de- Objection 2. Further, one’s own fault is a greater im- barred from receiving orders, unless they receive a dispen- pediment than the fault of another. Now unlawful inter- sation; and this is the more difficult to obtain, according course does not always debar a man from receiving Or- as their origin is more discreditable. ders. Therefore neither should he be debarred by the un- Reply to Objection 1. Irregularity is not a punish- lawful intercourse of his father. ment due for sin. Hence it is clear that those who are of On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 23:2): “A mamzer, illegitimate birth do not bear the iniquity of their father that is to say, one born of a prostitute, shall not enter into through being irregular. the Church of the Lord until the tenth generation.” Much Reply to Objection 2. What a man does by his own less therefore should he be ordained. act can be removed by repentance and by a contrary act; I answer that, Those who are ordained are placed in not so the things which are from nature. Hence the com- a position of dignity over others. Hence by a kind of pro- parison fails between sinful act and sinful origin. priety it is requisite that they should be without reproach, Whether lack of members should be an impediment? Suppl. q. 39 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that a man ought not to We shall speak of bigamy in the treatise on Matrimony be debarred from receiving Orders on account of a lack (q. 66). of members. For one who is afflicted should not receive I answer that, As appears from what we have said additional affliction. Therefore a man ought not to be de- above (Aa. 3,4,5), a man is disqualified from receiving prived of the degree of Orders on account of his suffering Orders, either on account of an impediment to the act, or a bodily defect. on account of an impediment affecting his personal come- Objection 2. Further, integrity of discretion is more liness. Hence he who suffers from a lack of members is necessary for the act of orders than integrity of body. debarred from receiving Orders, if the defect be such as to But some can be ordained before the years of discretion. cause a notable blemish, whereby a man’s comeliness is Therefore they can also be ordained though deficient in bedimmed (for instance if his nose be cut off) or the exer- body. cise of his Order imperilled; otherwise he is not debarred. On the contrary, The like were debarred from the This integrity, however, is necessary for the lawfulness ministry of the Old Law (Lev. 21:18, seqq.). Much more and not for the validity of the sacrament. therefore should they be debarred in the New Law. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. 2779 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 40 Of the Things Annexed to the Sacrament of Order (In Seven Articles) We must now consider the things that are annexed to the sacrament of Order. Under this head there are seven points of inquiry: (1) Whether those who are ordained ought to be shaven and tonsured in the form of a crown? (2) Whether the tonsure is an Order? (3) Whether by receiving the tonsure one renounces temporal goods? (4) Whether above the priestly Order there should be an episcopal power? (5) Whether the episcopate is an Order? (6) Whether in the Church there can be any power above the episcopate? (7) Whether the vestments of the ministers are fittingly instituted by the Church? Whether those who are ordained ought to wear the tonsure? Suppl. q. 40 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that those who are or- themselves to the Divine ministry to be shaven or tonsured dained ought not to wear the tonsure in the shape of a in the form of a crown by reason of the shape. Because crown. For the Lord threatened captivity and dispersion a crown is the sign of royalty; and of perfection, since to those who were shaven in this way: “Of the captiv- it is circular; and those who are appointed to the Divine ity of the bare head of the enemies” (Dt. 32:42), and: “I service acquire a royal dignity and ought to be perfect will scatter into every wind them that have their hair cut in virtue. It is also becoming to them as it involves the round” (Jer. 49:32). Now the ministers of Christ should hair being taken both from the higher part of the head by not be captives, but free. Therefore shaving and tonsure shaving, lest their mind be hindered by temporal occu- in the shape of a crown does not become them. pations from contemplating Divine things, and from the Objection 2. Further, the truth should correspond to lower part by clipping, lest their senses be entangled in the figure. Now the crown was prefigured in the Old temporal things. Law by the tonsure of the Nazarenes, as stated in the text Reply to Objection 1. The Lord threatens those who (Sent. iv, D, 24). Therefore since the Nazarenes were not did this for the worship of demons. ordained to the Divine ministry, it would seem that the Reply to Objection 2. The things that were done in ministers of the Church should not receive the tonsure or the Old Testament represent imperfectly the things of the shave the head in the form of a crown. The same would New Testament. Hence things pertaining to the ministers seem to follow from the fact that lay brothers, who are not of the New Testament were signified not only by the of- ministers of the Church, receive a tonsure in the religious fices of the Levites, but also by all those persons who pro- Orders. fessed some degree of perfection. Now the Nazarenes Objection 3. Further, the hair signifies superabun- professed a certain perfection by having their hair cut dance, because it grows from that which is superabundant. off, thus signifying their contempt of temporal things, al- But the ministers of the Church should cast off all super- though they did not have it cut in the shape of a crown, but abundance. Therefore they should shave the head com- cut it off completely, for as yet it was not the time of the pletely and not in the shape of a crown. royal and perfect priesthood. In like manner lay brothers On the contrary, According to Gregory, “to serve have their hair cut because they renounce temporalities. God is to reign” (Super Ps. 101:23). Now a crown is the but they do not shave the head, because they are not occu- sign of royalty. Therefore a crown is becoming to those pied in the Divine ministry, so as to have to contemplate who are devoted to the Divine ministry. Divine things with the mind. Further, according to 1 Cor. 11:15, hair is given us Reply to Objection 3. Not only the renunciation of “for a covering.” But the ministers of the altar should have temporalities, but also the royal dignity has to be signi- the mind uncovered. Therefore the tonsure is becoming to fied by the form of a crown; wherefore the hair should not them. be cut off entirely. Another reason is that this would be I answer that, It is becoming for those who apply unbecoming. 2780 Whether the tonsure is an Order? Suppl. q. 40 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the tonsure is an Or- ered from the people in order that they may give them- der. For in the acts of the Church the spiritual corresponds selves entirely to the Divine worship. Now in the Divine to the corporal. Now the tonsure is a corporal sign em- worship are certain actions that have to be exercised by ployed by the Church. Therefore seemingly there is some virtue of certain definite powers, and for this purpose the interior signification corresponding thereto; so that a per- spiritual power of order is given; while other actions are son receives a character when he receives the tonsure, and performed by the whole body of ministers in common, for consequently the latter is an Order. instance the recital of the Divine praises. For such things Objection 2. Further, just as Confirmation and the it is not necessary to have the power of Order, but only other Orders are given by a bishop alone, so is the ton- to be deputed to such an office; and this is done by the sure. Now a character is imprinted in Confirmation, and tonsure. Consequently it is not an Order but a preamble to the other Orders. Therefore one is imprinted likewise in Orders. receiving the tonsure. Therefore the same conclusion fol- Reply to Objection 1. The tonsure has some spiritual lows. thing inwardly corresponding to it, as signate corresponds Objection 3. Further, Order denotes a degree of dig- to sign; but this is not a spiritual power. Wherefore a char- nity. Now a cleric by the very fact of being a cleric is acter is not imprinted in the tonsure as in an Order. placed on a degree above the people. Therefore the ton- Reply to Objection 2. Although a man does not re- sure by which he is made a cleric is an Order. ceive a character in the tonsure, nevertheless he is ap- On the contrary, No Order is given except during the pointed to the Divine worship. Hence this appointment celebration of Mass. But the tonsure is given even outside should be made by the supreme minister, namely the the office of the Mass. Therefore it is not an Order. bishop, who moreover blesses the vestments and vessels Further, in the conferring of every Order mention is and whatsoever else is employed in the Divine worship. made of some power granted, but not in the conferring of Reply to Objection 3. A man through being a cleric the tonsure. Therefore it is not an Order. is in a higher state than a layman; but as regards power he I answer that, The ministers of the Church are sev- has not the higher degree that is required for Orders. Whether by receiving the tonsure a man renounces temporal goods? Suppl. q. 40 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that men renounce tem- renounce their patrimony or other temporalities; since the poral goods by receiving the tonsure, for when they are possession of earthly things is not contrary to the Divine tonsured they say: “The Lord is the portion of my inher- worship to which clerics are appointed, although exces- itance.” But as Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot.), “the Lord sive care for such things is; for as Gregory says (Moral. x, disdains to be made a portion together with these tempo- 30), “it is not wealth but the love of wealth that is sinful.” ral things.” Therefore he renounces temporalities. Reply to Objection 11. The Lord disdains to be a Objection 2. Further, the justice of the ministers of portion as being loved equally with other things, so that a the New Testament ought to abound more than that of the man place his end in God and the things of the world. He ministers of the Old Testament (Mat. 5:20). But the min- does not, however, disdain to be the portion of those who isters of the Old Testament, namely the Levites, did not so possess the things of the world as not to be withdrawn receive a portion of inheritance with their brethren (Dt. thereby from the Divine worship. 10; Dt. 18). Therefore neither should the ministers of the Reply to Objection 2. In the Old Testament the New Testament. Levites had a right to their paternal inheritance; and the Objection 3. Further, Hugh says (De Sacram. ii) that reason why they did not receive a portion with the other “after a man is made a cleric, he must from thenceforward tribes was because they were scattered throughout all the live on the pay of the Church.” But this would not be so tribes, which would have been impossible if, like the other were he to retain his patrimony. Therefore he would seem tribes, they had received one fixed portion of the soil. to renounce it by becoming a cleric. Reply to Objection 3. Clerics promoted to holy or- On the contrary, Jeremias was of the priestly order ders, if they be poor, must be provided for by the bishop (Jer. 1:1). Yet he retained possession of his inheritance who ordained them; otherwise he is not so bound. And (Jer. 32:8). Therefore clerics can retain their patrimony. they are bound to minister to the Church in the Order they Further, if this were not so there would seem to be no have received. The words of Hugh refer to those who have difference between religious and the secular clergy. no means of livelihood. I answer that, Clerics by receiving the tonsure, do not 2781 Whether above the priestly Order there ought to be an episcopal power? Suppl. q. 40 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that there ought not to be pends on the power that makes those ordinances. Now a an episcopal power above the priestly Order. For as stated priest cannot loose and bind, except we presuppose him in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24) “the priestly Order originated to have the jurisdiction of authority, whereby those whom from Aaron.” Now in the Old Law there was no one above he absolves are subject to him. But he can consecrate any Aaron. Therefore neither in the New Law ought there to matter determined by Christ, nor is anything else required be any power above that of the priests. for the validity of the sacrament; although, on account Objection 2. Further, powers rank according to acts. of a certain congruousness, the act of the bishop is pre- Now no sacred act can be greater than to consecrate the required in the consecration of the altar, vestments, and so body of Christ, whereunto the priestly power is directed. forth. Hence it is clear that it behooves the episcopal to be Therefore there should not be an episcopal above the above the priestly power, as regards the priest’s secondary priestly power. act, but not as regards his primary act. Objection 3. Further, the priest, in offering, repre- Reply to Objection 1. Aaron was both priest and pon- sents Christ in the Church, Who offered Himself for us to tiff, that is chief priest. Accordingly the priestly power the Father. Now no one is above Christ in the Church, originated from him, in so far as he was a priest offering since He is the Head of the Church. Therefore there sacrifices, which was lawful even to the lesser priests; but should not be an episcopal above the priestly power. it does not originate from him as pontiff, by which power On the contrary, A power is so much the higher ac- he was able to do certain things; for instance, to enter once cording as it extends to more things. Now the priestly a year the Holy of Holies, which it was unlawful for the power, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v), extends other priests to do. only to cleansing and enlightening, whereas the episcopal Reply to Objection 2. There is no higher power with power extends both to this and to perfecting. Therefore regard to this act, but with regard to another, as stated the episcopal should be above the priestly power. above. Further, the Divine ministries should be more orderly Reply to Objection 3. Just as the perfections of all than human ministries. Now the order of human min- natural things pre-exist in God as their exemplar, so was istries requires that in each office there should be one per- Christ the exemplar of all ecclesiastical offices. Where- son to preside, just as a general is placed over soldiers. fore each minister of the Church is, in some respect, a Therefore there should also be appointed over priests one copy of Christ, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). who is the chief priest, and this is the bishop. Therefore Yet he is the higher who represents Christ according to the episcopal should be above the priestly power. a greater perfection. Now a priest represents Christ in I answer that, A priest has two acts: one is the princi- that He fulfilled a certain ministry by Himself, whereas pal, namely to consecrate the body of Christ. the other is a bishop represents Him in that He instituted other minis- secondary, namely to prepare God’s people for the recep- ters and founded the Church. Hence it belongs to a bishop tion of this sacrament, as stated above (q. 37, Aa. 2,4). As to dedicate a thing to the Divine offices, as establishing regards the first act, the priest’s power does not depend on the Divine worship after the manner of Christ. For this a higher power save God’s; but as to the second, it depends reason also a bishop is especially called the bridegroom on a higher and that a human power. For every power of the Church even as Christ is. that cannot exercise its act without certain ordinances, de- Whether the episcopate is an Order? Suppl. q. 40 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the episcopate is an tual power other than of Order or jurisdiction. But things Order. First of all, because Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) as- pertaining to the episcopal power are not matters of juris- signs these three orders to the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the diction, else they might be committed to one who is not a bishop, the priest, and the minister. In the text also (Sent. bishop, which is false. Therefore they belong to the power iv, D, 24) it is stated that the episcopal Order is fourfold. of Order. Therefore the bishop has an Order which a sim- Objection 2. Further, Order is nothing else but a de- ple priest has not; and thus the episcopate is an Order. gree of power in the dispensing of spiritual things. Now On the contrary, One Order does not depend on a bishops can dispense certain sacraments which priests preceding order as regards the validity of the sacrament. cannot dispense, namely Confirmation and Order. There- But the episcopal power depends on the priestly power, fore the episcopate is an Order. since no one can receive the episcopal power unless he Objection 3. Further, in the Church there is no spiri- have previously the priestly power. Therefore the episco- 2782 pate is not an Order. quoted speak. Further, the greater Orders are not conferred except on Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear. Saturdays∗. But the episcopal power is bestowed on Sun- Reply to Objection 2. Order considered as a sacra- days†. Therefore it is not an Order. ment which imprints a character is specially directed to I answer that, Order may be understood in two ways. the sacrament of the Eucharist, in which Christ Himself In one way as a sacrament, and thus, as already stated is contained, because by a character we are made like (q. 37, Aa. 2,4), every Order is directed to the sacrament to Christ Himself‡. Hence although at his promotion of the Eucharist. Wherefore since the bishop has not a a bishop receives a spiritual power in respect of certain higher power than the priest, in this respect the episcopate sacraments, this power nevertheless has not the nature of is not an Order. In another way Order may be considered a character. For this reason the episcopate is not an Order, as an office in relation to certain sacred actions: and thus in the sense in which an Order is a sacrament. since in hierarchical actions a bishop has in relation to the Reply to Objection 3. The episcopal power is one not mystical body a higher power than the priest, the episco- only of jurisdiction but also of Order, as stated above, tak- pate is an Order. It is in this sense that the authorities ing Order in the sense in which it is generally understood. Whether in the Church there can be anyone above the bishops? Suppl. q. 40 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be any- place of Him Who set up that very throne, and Who gave one in the Church higher than the bishops. For all the the fulness of His own to no other, but to him alone, to bishops are the successors of the apostles. Now the power whom by divine right all bow the head, and the primates so given to one of the apostles, namely Peter (Mat. 16:19), of the world are obedient as to our Lord Jesus Christ Him- was given to all the apostles (Jn. 20:23). Therefore all self.” Therefore bishops are subject to someone even by bishops are equal, and one is not above another. divine right. Objection 2. Further, the rite of the Church ought to I answer that, Wherever there are several authorities be more conformed to the Jewish rite than to that of the directed to one purpose, there must needs be one univer- Gentiles. Now the distinction of the episcopal dignity and sal authority over the particular authorities, because in all the appointment of one over another, were introduced by virtues and acts the order is according to the order of their the Gentiles. as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24); and ends (Ethic. i, 1,2). Now the common good is more God- there was no such thing in the Old Law. Therefore neither like than the particular good. Wherefore above the gov- in the Church should one bishop be above another. erning power which aims at a particular good there must Objection 3. Further, a higher power cannot be con- be a universal governing power in respect of the common ferred by a lower, nor equal by equal, because “without all good, otherwise there would be no cohesion towards the contradiction that which is less is blessed by the greater one object. Hence since the whole Church is one body, it [Vulg.: ‘better’]”; hence a priest does not consecrate a behooves, if this oneness is to be preserved, that there be bishop or a priest, but a bishop consecrates a priest. But a a governing power in respect of the whole Church, above bishop can consecrate any bishop, since even the bishop of the episcopal power whereby each particular Church is Ostia consecrates the Pope. Therefore the episcopal dig- governed, and this is the power of the Pope. Consequently nity is equal in all matters, and consequently one bishop those who deny this power are called schismatics as caus- should not be subject to another, as stated in the text (Sent. ing a division in the unity of the Church. Again, between iv, D, 24). a simple bishop and the Pope there are other degrees of On the contrary, We read in the council of Con- rank corresponding to the degrees of union, in respect of stantinople: “In accordance with the Scriptures and the which one congregation or community includes another; statutes and definitions of the canons, we venerate the thus the community of a province includes the commu- most holy bishop of ancient Rome the first and greatest nity of a city, and the community of a kingdom includes of bishops, and after him the bishop of Constantinople.” the community of one province, and the community of the Therefore one bishop is above another. whole world includes the community of one kingdom. Further, the blessed Cyril, bishop of Alexandria, says: Reply to Objection 1. Although the power of binding “That we may remain members of our apostolic head, the and loosing was given to all the apostles in common, nev- throne of the Roman Pontiffs, of whom it is our duty to ertheless in order to indicate some order in this power, it seek what we are to believe and what we are to hold, ven- was given first of all to Peter alone, to show that this power erating him, beseeching him above others; for his it is to must come down from him to the others. For this reason reprove, to correct, to appoint, to loose, and to bind in He said to him in the singular: “Confirm thy brethren” ∗ The four Ember Saturdays † Dist. lxxv, can. Ordinationes ‡ Cf. IIIa, q. 63, a. 3 2783 (Lk. 22:32), and: “Feed My sheep” (Jn. 21:17), i.e. ac-Church to be like the rite of the Gentiles rather than that cording to Chrysostom: “Be thou the president and head of the Jews. of thy brethren in My stead, that they, putting thee in My Reply to Objection 3. The priestly power is surpassed place, may preach and confirm thee throughout the world by the episcopal power, as by a power of a different kind; whilst thou sittest on thy throne.” but the episcopal is surpassed by the papal power as by Reply to Objection 2. The Jewish rite was not spread a power of the same kind. Hence a bishop can perform abroad in various kingdoms and provinces, but was con- every hierarchical act that the Pope can; whereas a priest fined to one nation; hence there was no need to distinguish cannot perform every act that a bishop can in conferring various pontiffs under the one who had the chief power. the sacraments. Wherefore as regards matters pertaining But the rite of the Church, like that of the Gentiles, is to the episcopal Order, all bishops are equal, and for this spread abroad through various nations; and consequently reason any bishop can consecrate another bishop. in this respect it is necessary for the constitution of the Whether the vestments of the ministers are fittingly instituted in the Church? Suppl. q. 40 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the vestments of the have the pallium which other bishops have not. ministers are not fittingly instituted in the Church. For Objection 8. Further, the fulness of power resides in the ministers of the New Testament are more bound to the Roman Pontiff. But he has not a crozier. Therefore chastity than were the ministers of the Old Testament. other bishops should not have one. Now among the vestments of the Old Testament there I answer that, The vestments of the ministers denote were the breeches as a sign of chastity. Much more there- the qualifications required of them for handling Divine fore should they have a place among the vestments of the things. And since certain things are required of all, and Church’s ministers. some are required of the higher, that are not so exacted of Objection 2. Further, the priesthood of the New Tes- the lower ministers, therefore certain vestments are com- tament is more worthy than the priesthood of the Old. But mon to all the ministers, while some pertain to the higher the priests of the Old Testament had mitres, which are a ministers only. Accordingly it is becoming to all the min- sign of dignity. Therefore the priests of the New Testa- isters to wear the “amice” which covers the shoulders, ment should also have them. thereby signifying courage in the exercise of the Divine Objection 3. Further, the priest is nearer than the epis-offices to which they are deputed; and the “alb,” which copal Order to the Orders of ministers. Now the bishop signifies a pure life, and the “girdle,” which signifies re- uses the vestments of the ministers, namely the dalmatic, straint of the flesh. But the subdeacon wears in addition which is the deacon’s vestment, and the tunic, which is the the “maniple” on the left arm; this signifies the wiping subdeacon’s. Much more therefore should simple priests away of the least stains, since a maniple is a kind of hand- use them. kerchief for wiping the face; for they are the first to be ad- Objection 4. Further, in the Old Law the pontiff wore mitted to the handling of sacred things. They also have the the ephod∗, which signified the burden of the Gospel, as “narrow tunic,” signifying the doctrine of Christ; where- Bede observes (De Tabernac. iii). Now this is especially fore in the Old Law little bells hung therefrom, and sub- incumbent on our pontiffs. Therefore they ought to wear deacons are the first admitted to announce the doctrine of the ephod. the New Law. The deacon has in addition the “stole” over Objection 5. Further, “Doctrine and Truth” were in- the left shoulder, as a sign that he is deputed to a ministry scribed on the “rational” which the pontiffs of the Old Tes- in the sacraments themselves, and the “dalmatic” (which tament wore. Now truth was made known especially in is a full vestment, so called because it first came into use the New Law. Therefore it is becoming to the pontiffs of in Dalmatia), to signify that he is the first to be appointed the New Law. to dispense the sacraments: for he dispenses the blood, Objection 6. Further, the golden plate on which was and in dispensing one should be generous. written the most admirable name of God, was the most But in the case of the priest the “stole” hangs from admirable of the adornments of the Old Law. Therefore it both shoulders, to show that he has received full power should especially have been transferred to the New Law. to dispense the sacraments, and not as the minister of an- Objection 7. Further, the things which the ministers other man, for which reason the stole reaches right down. of the Church wear outwardly are signs of inward power. He also wears the “chasuble,” which signifies charity, be- Now the archbishop has no other kind of power than a cause he it is who consecrates the sacrament of charity, bishop, as stated above (a. 6). Therefore he should not namely the Eucharist. ∗ Superhumerale, i.e. over-the-shoulders 2784 Bishops have nine ornaments besides those which the sign of the chastity which they had then to observe, they priest has; these are the “stockings, sandals, succinctory, wore the breeches while offering sacrifices. But the min- tunic, dalmatic, mitre, gloves, ring, and crozier,” because isters of the New Testament are enjoined perpetual conti- there are nine things which they can, but priests can- nency; and so the comparison fails. not, do, namely ordain clerics, bless virgins, consecrate Reply to Objection 2. The mitre was not a sign of bishops, impose hands, dedicate churches, depose clerics, dignity, for it was a kind of hat, as Jerome says (Ep. ad celebrate synods, consecrate chrism, bless vestments and Fabiol.). But the diadem which was a sign of dignity was vessels. given to the pontiffs alone, as the mitre is now. We may also say that the “stockings” signify his up- Reply to Objection 3. The power of the ministers re- right walk; the “sandals” which cover the feet, his con- sides in the bishop as their source, but not in the priest, for tempt of earthly things; the “succinctory” which girds the he does not confer those Orders. Wherefore the bishop, stole with the alb, his love of probity; the “tunic,” per- rather than the priest, wears those vestments. severance, for Joseph is said (Gn. 37:23) to have had a Reply to Objection 4. Instead of the ephod, they wear long tunic—“talaric,” because it reached down to the an- the stole, which is intended for the same signification as kles [talos], which denote the end of life; the “dalmatic,” the ephod. generosity in works of mercy; the “gloves,” prudence in Reply to Objection 5. The pallium takes the place of action; the “mitre,” knowledge of both Testaments, for the “rational.” which reason it has two crests; the “crozier,” his pastoral Reply to Objection 6. Instead of that plate our pontiff care, whereby he has to gather together the wayward (this wears the cross, as Innocent III says (De Myst. Miss. i), is denoted by the curve at the head of the crozier), to up- just as the breeches are replaced by the sandals, the linen hold the weak (this is denoted by the stem of the crozier), garment by the alb, the belt by the girdle, the long or ta- and to spur on the laggards (this is denoted by the point at laric garment by the tunic, the ephod by the amice, the the foot of the crozier). Hence the line: “rational” by the pallium, the diadem by the mitre. “Gather, uphold, spur on Reply to Objection 7. Although he has not another The wayward, the weak, and the laggard.” kind of power he has the same power more fully. and so The “ring” signifies the sacraments of that faith in order to designate this perfection, he receives the pal- whereby the Church is espoused to Christ. For bishops lium which surrounds him on all sides. are espoused to the Church in the place of Christ. Fur- Reply to Objection 8. The Roman Pontiff does not thermore archbishops have the “pallium” in sign of their use a pastoral staff because Peter sent his to restore to privileged power, for it signifies the golden chain which life a certain disciple who afterwards became bishop of those who fought rightfully were wont to receive. Treves. Hence in the diocese of Treves the Pope carries Reply to Objection 1. The priests of the Old Law a crozier but not elsewhere; or else it is a sign of his not were enjoined continency only for the time of their atten- having a restricted power denoted by the curve of the staff. dance for the purpose of their ministry. Wherefore as a 2785 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 41 Of the Sacrament of Matrimony As Directed to an Office of Nature (In Four Articles) In the next place we must consider matrimony. We must treat of it (1) as directed to an office of nature; (2) as a sacrament; (3) as considered absolutely and in itself. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is of natural law? (2) Whether it is a matter of precept? (3) Whether its act is lawful? (4) Whether its act can be meritorious? Whether matrimony is of natural law? Suppl. q. 41 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that matrimony is not nat- inclines although it comes to pass through the intervention ural. Because “the natural law is what nature has taught of the free-will; thus acts of virtue and the virtues them- all animals”∗. But in other animals the sexes are united selves are called natural; and in this way matrimony is nat- without matrimony. Therefore matrimony is not of natu- ural, because natural reason inclines thereto in two ways. ral law. First, in relation to the principal end of matrimony, namely Objection 1. Further, that which is of natural law is the good of the offspring. For nature intends not only the found in all men with regard to their every state. But mat- begetting of offspring, but also its education and devel- rimony was not in every state of man, for as Tully says opment until it reach the perfect state of man as man, and (De Inv. Rhet.), “at the beginning men were savages and that is the state of virtue. Hence, according to the Philoso- then no man knew his own children, nor was he bound by pher (Ethic. viii, 11,12), we derive three things from our any marriage tie,” wherein matrimony consists. Therefore parents, namely “existence,” “nourishment,” and “educa- it is not natural. tion.” Now a child cannot be brought up and instructed Objection 3. Further, natural things are the same unless it have certain and definite parents, and this would among all. But matrimony is not in the same way among not be the case unless there were a tie between the man all, since its practice varies according to the various laws. and a definite woman and it is in this that matrimony con- Therefore it is not natural. sists. Secondly, in relation to the secondary end of matri- Objection 4. Further, those things without which the mony, which is the mutual services which married persons intention of nature can be maintained would seem not render one another in household matters. For just as nat- to be natural. But nature intends the preservation of the ural reason dictates that men should live together, since species by generation which is possible without matri- one is not self-sufficient in all things concerning life, for mony, as in the case of fornicators. Therefore matrimony which reason man is described as being naturally inclined is not natural. to political society, so too among those works that are nec- On the contrary, At the commencement of the Di- essary for human life some are becoming to men, others gests it is stated: “The union of male and female, which to women. Wherefore nature inculcates that society of we call matrimony, is of natural law.” man and woman which consists in matrimony. These two Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) says that reasons are given by the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12). “man is an animal more inclined by nature to connubial Reply to Objection 1. Man’s nature inclines to a thing than political society.” But “man is naturally a politi- in two ways. In one way, because that thing is becom- cal and gregarious animal,” as the same author asserts ing to the generic nature, and this is common to all an- (Polit. i, 2). Therefore he is naturally inclined to con- imals; in another way because it is becoming to the na- nubial union, and thus the conjugal union or matrimony is ture of the difference, whereby the human species in so natural. far as it is rational overflows the genus; such is an act I answer that, A thing is said to be natural in two of prudence or temperance. And just as the generic na- ways. First, as resulting of necessity from the principles ture, though one in all animals, yet is not in all in the of nature; thus upward movement is natural to fire. In this same way, so neither does it incline in the same way in way matrimony is not natural, nor are any of those things all, but in a way befitting each one. Accordingly man’s that come to pass at the intervention or motion of the free- nature inclines to matrimony on the part of the difference, will. Secondly, that is said to be natural to which nature as regards the second reason given above; wherefore the ∗ Digest. I, i, de justitia et jure, 1 2786 Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12; Polit. i) gives this reason it as referring to the proximate beginning of that nation in men over other animals; but as regards the first reason when it became a nation distinct from others; for that to it inclines on the part of the genus; wherefore he says that which natural reason inclines is not realized in all things, the begetting of offspring is common to all animals. Yet and this statement is not universally true, since Holy Writ nature does not incline thereto in the same way in all ani- states that there has been matrimony from the beginning mals; since there are animals whose offspring are able to of the human race. seek food immediately after birth, or are sufficiently fed Reply to Objection 3. According to the Philosopher by their mother; and in these there is no tie between male (Ethic. vii) “human nature is not unchangeable as the Di- and female; whereas in those whose offspring needs the vine nature is.” Hence things that are of natural law vary support of both parents, although for a short time, there according to the various states and conditions of men; al- is a certain tie, as may be seen in certain birds. In man, though those which naturally pertain to things Divine no- however, since the child needs the parents’ care for a long wise vary. time, there is a very great tie between male and female, to Reply to Objection 4. Nature intends not only being which tie even the generic nature inclines. in the offspring, but also perfect being, for which matri- Reply to Objection 2. The assertion of Tully may mony is necessary, as shown above. be true of some particular nation, provided we understand Whether matrimony still comes under a precept? Suppl. q. 41 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that matrimony still precept. comes under a precept. For a precept is binding so long I answer that, Nature inclines to a thing in two ways. as it is not recalled. But the primary institution of matri- In one way as to that which is necessary for the perfec- mony came under a precept, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, tion of the individual, and such an obligation is binding D, 26); nor do we read anywhere that this precept was on each one, since natural perfections are common to all. recalled, but rather that it was confirmed (Mat. 19:6): In another way it inclines to that which is necessary for “What. . . God hath joined together let no man put asun- the perfection of the community; and since there are many der.” Therefore matrimony still comes under a precept. things of this kind, one of which hinders another, such an Objection 2. Further, the precepts of natural law are inclination does not bind each man by way of precept; binding in respect of all time. Now matrimony is of natu- else each man would be bound to husbandry and building ral law, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore, etc. and to such offices as are necessary to the human com- Objection 3. Further, the good of the species is bet- munity; but the inclination of nature is satisfied by the ter than the good of the individual, “for the good of the accomplishment of those various offices by various indi- State is more Godlike than the good of one man” (Ethic. viduals. Accordingly, since the perfection of the human i, 2). Now the precept given to the first man concerning community requires that some should devote themselves the preservation of the good of the individual by the act of to the contemplative life to which marriage is a very great the nutritive power is still in force. Much more therefore obstacle, the natural inclination to marriage is not bind- does the precept concerning matrimony still hold, since it ing by way of precept even according to the philosophers. refers to the preservation of the species. Hence Theophrastus proves that it is not advisable for a Objection 4. Further, where the reason of an obli- wise man to marry, as Jerome relates (Contra Jovin. i). gation remains the same, the obligation must remain the Reply to Objection 1. This precept has not been re- same. Now the reason why men were bound to marry in called, and yet it is not binding on each individual, for the olden times was lest the human race should cease to mul- reason given above, except at that time when the paucity tiply. Since then the result would be the same, if each one of men required each one to betake himself to the beget- were free to abstain from marriage, it would seem that ting of children. matrimony comes under a precept. The Replies to objections 2 and 3 are clear from what On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:38): “He that has been said. giveth not his virgin in marriage doth better∗,” namely Reply to Objection 4. Human nature has a general than he that giveth her in marriage. Therefore the contract inclination to various offices and acts, as already stated. of marriage is not now a matter of precept. But since it is variously in various subjects, as individu- Further, no one deserves a reward for breaking a pre- alized in this or that one, it inclines one subject more to cept. Now a special reward, namely the aureole, is due one of those offices, and another subject more to another, to virgins†. Therefore matrimony does not come under a according to the difference of temperament of various in- ∗ Vulg.: ‘He that giveth his virgin in marriage doth well, and he that giveth her not doth better’ † Cf. q. 96, a. 5 2787 dividuals. And it is owing to this difference, as well as another. And so it is too that some choose the married life to Divine providence which governs all, that one person and some the contemplative. Wherefore no danger threat- chooses one office such as husbandry, and another person ens. Whether the marriage act is always sinful? Suppl. q. 41 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the marriage act is evil; wherefore, since the inclination to beget an offspring always sinful. For it is written (1 Cor. 7:29): “That whereby the specific nature is preserved is from nature, it they. . . who have wives, be as if they had none.” But is impossible to maintain that the act of begetting children those who are not married do not perform the marriage is altogether unlawful, so that it be impossible to find the act. Therefore even those who are married sin in that act. mean of virtue therein; unless we suppose, as some are Objection 2. Further, “Your iniquities have divided mad enough to assert, that corruptible things were created between you and your God.” Now the marriage act di- by an evil god, whence perhaps the opinion mentioned in vides man from God wherefore the people who were to the text is derived (Sent. iv, D, 26); wherefore this is a see God (Ex. 19:11) were commanded not to go near their most wicked heresy. wives (Ex. 19:20); and Jerome says (Ep. ad Ageruch.: Reply to Objection 1. By these words the Apostle did Contra Jovini, 18) that in the marriage act “the Holy Ghost not forbid the marriage act, as neither did he forbid the touches not the hearts of the prophets.” Therefore it is sin- possession of things when he said (1 Cor. 7:31): “They ful. that use this world” (let them be) “as if they used it not.” Objection 3. Further, that which is shameful in it- In each case he forbade enjoyment∗; which is clear from self can by no means be well done. Now the marriage act the way in which he expresses himself; for he did not say is always connected with concupiscence, which is always “let them not use it,” or “let them not have them,” but let shameful. Therefore it is always sinful. them be “as if they used it not” and “as if they had none.” Objection 4. Further, nothing is the object of excuse Reply to Objection 2. We are united to God by the save sin. Now the marriage act needs to be excused by the habit of grace and by the act of contemplation and love. marriage blessings, as the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 26). Therefore whatever severs the former of these unions is Therefore it is a sin. always a sin, but not always that which severs the latter, Objection 5. Further, things alike in species are since a lawful occupation about lower things distracts the judged alike. But marriage intercourse is of the same mind so that it is not fit for actual union with God; and species as the act of adultery, since its end is the same, this is especially the case in carnal intercourse wherein namely the human species. Therefore since the act of the mind is withheld by the intensity of pleasure. For this adultery is a sin, the marriage act is likewise. reason those who have to contemplate Divine things or Objection 6. Further, excess in the passions corrupts handle sacred things are enjoined not to have to do with virtue. Now there is always excess of pleasure in the mar- their wives for that particular time; and it is in this sense riage act, so much so that it absorbs the reason which that the Holy Ghost, as regards the actual revelation of is man’s principal good, wherefore the Philosopher says hidden things, did not touch the hearts of the prophets at (Ethic. vii, 11) that “in that act it is impossible to under- the time of the marriage act. stand anything.” Therefore the marriage act is always a Reply to Objection 3. The shamefulness of concu- sin. piscence that always accompanies the marriage act is a On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:28): “If a shamefulness not of guilt, but of punishment inflicted for virgin marry she hath not sinned,” and (1 Tim. 5:14): the first sin, inasmuch as the lower powers and the mem- “I will. . . that the younger should marry,” and “bear chil- bers do not obey reason. Hence the argument does not dren.” But there can be no bearing of children without prove. carnal union. Therefore the marriage act is not a sin; else Reply to Objection 4. Properly speaking, a thing is the Apostle would not have approved of it. said to be excused when it has some appearance of evil, Further, no sin is a matter of precept. But the marriage and yet is not evil, or not as evil as it seems, because some act is a matter of precept (1 Cor. 7:3): “Let the husband things excuse wholly, others in part. And since the mar- render the debt to his life.” Therefore it is not a sin. riage act, by reason of the corruption of concupiscence, I answer that, If we suppose the corporeal nature to has the appearance of an inordinate act, it is wholly ex- be created by the good God we cannot hold that those cused by the marriage blessing, so as not to be a sin. things which pertain to the preservation of the corpo- Reply to Objection 5. Although they are the same real nature and to which nature inclines, are altogether as to their natural species, they differ as to their moral ∗ “Fruitionem,” i.e. enjoyment of a thing sought as one’s last end 2788 species, which differs in respect of one circumstance, Reply to Objection 6. The excess of passions that namely intercourse with one’s wife and with another than corrupts virtue not only hinders the act of reason, but also one’s wife; just as to kill a man by assault or by justice dif- destroys the order of reason. The intensity of pleasure in ferentiates the moral species, although the natural species the marriage act does not do this, since, although for the is the same; and yet the one is lawful and the other unlaw- moment man is not being directed, he was previously di- ful. rected by his reason. Whether the marriage act is meritorious? Suppl. q. 41 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the marriage act is I answer that, Since no act proceeding from a deliber- not meritorious. For Chrysostom∗ says in his commen- ate will is indifferent, as stated in the Second Book (Sent. tary on Matthew: “Although marriage brings no punish- ii, D, 40, q. 1, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 9), the marriage act ment to those who use it, it affords them no meed.” Now is always either sinful or meritorious in one who is in a merit bears a relation to meed. Therefore the marriage act state of grace. For if the motive for the marriage act be a is not meritorious. virtue, whether of justice that they may render the debt, or Objection 2. Further, to refrain from what is merito- of religion, that they may beget children for the worship rious deserves not praise. Yet virginity whereby one re- of God, it is meritorious. But if the motive be lust, yet not frains from marriage is praiseworthy. Therefore the mar- excluding the marriage blessings, namely that he would riage act is not meritorious. by no means be willing to go to another woman, it is a Objection 3. Further, he who avails himself of an in- venial sin; while if he exclude the marriage blessings, so dulgence granted him, avails himself of a favor received. as to be disposed to act in like manner with any woman, it But a man does not merit by receiving a favor. Therefore is a mortal sin. And nature cannot move without being ei- the marriage act is not meritorious. ther directed by reason, and thus it will be an act of virtue, Objection 4. Further, merit like virtue, consists in dif-or not so directed, and then it will be an act of lust. ficulty. But the marriage act affords not difficulty but plea- Reply to Objection 1. The root of merit, as regards sure. Therefore it is not meritorious. the essential reward, is charity itself; but as regards an ac- Objection 5. Further, that which cannot be done with- cidental reward, the reason for merit consists in the diffi- out venial sin is never meritorious, for a man cannot both culty of an act; and thus the marriage act is not meritorious merit and demerit at the same time. Now there is always except in the first way. a venial sin in the marriage act, since even the first move- Reply to Objection 2. The difficulty required for ment in such like pleasures is a venial sin. Therefore the merit of the accidental reward is a difficulty of labor, but aforesaid act cannot be meritorious. the difficulty required for the essential reward is the dif- On the contrary, Every act whereby a precept is ful- ficulty of observing the mean, and this is the difficulty in filled is meritorious if it be done from charity. Now such the marriage act. is the marriage act, for it is said (1 Cor. 7:3): “Let the Reply to Objection 3. First movements in so far husband render the debt to his wife.” Therefore, etc. as they are venial sins are movements of the appetite to Further, every act of virtue is meritorious. Now the some inordinate object of pleasure. This is not the case in aforesaid act is an act of justice, for it is called the renderthe marriage act, and consequently the argument does not ing of a debt. Therefore it is meritorious. prove. ∗ Hom. i in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom 2789 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 42 Of Matrimony As a Sacrament (In Four Articles) We must next consider matrimony as a sacrament. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether matrimony is a sacrament? (2) Whether it ought to have been instituted before sin was committed? (3) Whether it confers grace? (4) Whether carnal intercourse belongs to the integrity of matrimony? Whether matrimony is a sacrament? Suppl. q. 42 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that matrimony is not a Wherefore since this is the case in matrimony, it is reck- sacrament. For every sacrament of the New Law has a oned among the sacraments. form that is essential to the sacrament. But the blessing Reply to Objection 1. The words whereby the mar- given by the priest at a wedding is not essential to matri- riage consent is expressed are the form of this sacrament, mony. Therefore it is not a sacrament. and not the priest’s blessing, which is a sacramental. Objection 2. Further, a sacrament according to Hugh Reply to Objection 2. The sacrament of Matrimony, (De Sacram. i) is “a material element.” But matrimony like that of Penance, is perfected by the act of the recipi- has not a material element for its matter. Therefore it is ent. Wherefore just as Penance has no other matter than not a sacrament. the sensible acts themselves, which take the place of the Objection 3. Further, the sacraments derive their ef- material element, so it is in Matrimony. ficacy from Christ’s Passion. But matrimony, since it has Reply to Objection 3. Although Matrimony is not pleasure annexed to it, does not conform man to Christ’s conformed to Christ’s Passion as regards pain, it is as re- Passion, which was painful. Therefore it is not a sacra- gards charity, whereby He suffered for the Church who ment. was to be united to Him as His spouse. Objection 4. Further, every sacrament of the New Reply to Objection 4. The union of Christ with the Law causes that which it signifies. Yet matrimony does Church is not the reality contained in this sacrament, but not cause the union of Christ with the Church, which is the reality signified and not contained—and no sacra- union it signifies. Therefore matrimony is not a sacra- ment causes a reality of that kind—but it has another both ment. contained and signified which it causes, as we shall state Objection 5. Further, in the other sacraments there is further on (ad 5). The Master, however (Sent. iv, D, 26), something which is reality and sacrament. But this is not asserts that it is a non-contained reality, because he was of to be found in matrimony, since it does not imprint a char- opinion that Matrimony has no reality contained therein. acter, else it would not be repeated. Therefore it is not a Reply to Objection 5. In this sacrament also those sacrament. three things† are to be found, for the acts externally appar- On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 5:32): “This is a ent are the sacrament only; the bond between husband and great sacrament.” Therefore, etc. wife resulting from those acts is reality and sacrament; Further, a sacrament is the sign of a sacred thing. But and the ultimate reality contained is the effect of this such is Matrimony. Therefore, etc. sacrament, while the non-contained reality is that which I answer that, A sacrament denotes a sanctifying the Master assigns (Sent. iv, D, 26). remedy against sin offered to man under sensible signs∗. Whether this sacrament ought to have been instituted before sin was committed? Suppl. q. 42 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that Matrimony ought not Objection 2. Further, sacraments are medicines to have been instituted before sin. Because that which is against the disease of sin. But a medicine is not made of natural law needs not to be instituted. Now such is Mat- ready except for an actual disease. Therefore it should not rimony, as stated above (q. 41, a. 1). Therefore it ought not have been instituted before sin. to have been instituted. Objection 3. Further, one institution suffices for one ∗ Cf. IIIa, q. 61, a. 1; IIIa, q. 65, a. 1 † Cf. IIIa, q. 66, a. 1 2790 thing. Now Matrimony was instituted also after sin, as mony, such as the friendship and mutual services which stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 26). Therefore it was not husband and wife render one another, its institution be- instituted before sin. longs to the civil law. Since, however, a sacrament is es- Objection 4. Further, the institution of a sacrament sentially a sign and a remedy, it follows that the nature must come from God. Now before sin, the words relat- of sacrament applies to matrimony as regards the inter- ing to Matrimony were not definitely said by God but by mediate institution; that it is fittingly intended to fulfill an Adam; the words which God uttered (Gn. 1:22), “Increase office of nature as regards the first institution; and. as re- and multiply,” were addressed also to the brute creation gards the last-mentioned institution, that it is directed to where there is no marriage. Therefore Matrimony was fulfill an office of society. not instituted before sin. Reply to Objection 1. Things which are of natural Objection 5. Further, Matrimony is a sacrament of the law in a general way, need to be instituted as regards their New Law. But the sacraments of the New Law took their determination which is subject to variation according to origin from Christ. Therefore it ought not to have been various states; just as it is of natural law that evil-doers instituted before sin. be punished, but that such and such a punishment be ap- On the contrary, It is said (Mat. 19:4): “Have ye not pointed for such and such a crime is determined by posi- read that He Who made man from the beginning ‘made tive law. them male and female’ ”? Reply to Objection 2. Matrimony is not only for a Further, Matrimony was instituted for the begetting of remedy against sin, but is chiefly for an office of nature; children. But the begetting of children was necessary to and thus it was instituted before sin, not as intended for a man before sin. Therefore it behooved Matrimony to be remedy. instituted before sin. Reply to Objection 3. There is no reason why matri- I answer that, Nature inclines to marriage with a cer- mony should not have had several institutions correspond- tain good in view, which good varies according to the dif- ing to the various things that had to be determined in con- ferent states of man, wherefore it was necessary for mat- nection with marriage. Hence these various institutions rimony to be variously instituted in the various states of are not of the same thing in the same respect. man in reference to that good. Consequently matrimony Reply to Objection 4. Before sin matrimony was in- as directed to the begetting of children, which was nec- stituted by God, when He fashioned a helpmate for man essary even when there was no sin, was instituted before out of his rib, and said to them: “Increase and multiply.” sin; according as it affords a remedy for the wound of sin, And although this was said also to the other animals, it it was instituted after sin at the time of the natural law; its was not to be fulfilled by them in the same way as by men. institution belongs to the Mosaic Law as regards personal As to Adam’s words, he uttered them inspired by God to disqualifications; and it was instituted in the New Law in understand that the institution of marriage was from God. so far as it represents the mystery of Christ’s union with Reply to Objection 5. As was clearly stated, matri- the Church, and in this respect it is a sacrament of the New mony was not instituted before Christ as a sacrament of Law. As regards other advantages resulting from matri- the New Law. Whether matrimony confers grace? Suppl. q. 42 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that matrimony does not Now the wound of concupiscence is to be found in all. confer grace. For, according to Hugh (De Sacram. i) “the Therefore if grace were given in matrimony against the sacraments, by virtue of their sanctification, confer an in- wound of concupiscence, all men ought to contract mar- visible grace.” But matrimony has no sanctification essen- riage, and it would be very stupid to refrain from matri- tial to it. Therefore grace is not conferred therein. mony. Objection 2. Further, every sacrament that confers Objection 4. Further, sickness does not seek a rem- grace confers it by virtue of its matter and form. Now edy where it finds aggravation. Now concupiscence is the acts which are the matter in this sacrament are not the aggravated by concupiscence, because, according to the cause of grace (for it would be the heresy of Pelagius to Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12), “the desire of concupis- assert that our acts cause grace); and the words expressive cence is insatiable, and is increased by congenial actions.” of consent are not the cause of grace, since no sanctifica- Therefore it would seem that grace is not conferred in tion results from them. Therefore grace is by no means matrimony, as a remedy for concupiscence. given in matrimony. On the contrary, Definition and thing defined should Objection 3. Further, the grace that is directed against be convertible. Now causality of grace is included in the the wound of sin is necessary to all who have that wound. definition of a sacrament. Since, then, matrimony is a 2791 sacrament, it is a cause of grace. out which he cannot becomingly do so; just as we have Further, Augustine says (De Bono Viduit. viii; Gen. said of the sacrament of orders (q. 35, a. 1). And thus ad lit. ix, 7) that “matrimony affords a remedy to the sick.” this grace which is given is the last thing contained in this But it is not a remedy except in so far as it has some ef- sacrament. ficacy. Therefore it has some efficacy for the repression Reply to Objection 1. Just as the baptismal water by of concupiscence. Now concupiscence is not repressed virtue of its contact with Christ’s body§ is able to “touch except by grace. Therefore grace is conferred therein. the body and cleanse the heart”¶, so is matrimony able to I answer that, There have been three opinions on this do so through Christ having represented it by His Passion, point. For some∗ said that matrimony is nowise the cause and not principally through any blessing of the priest. of grace, but only a sign thereof. But this cannot be main- Reply to Objection 2. Just as the water of Baptism tained, for in that case it would in no respect surpass the together with the form of words results immediately not sacraments of the Old Law. Wherefore there would be no in the infusion of grace, but in the imprinting of the char- reason for reckoning it among the sacraments of the New acter, so the outward acts and the words expressive of con- Law; since even in the Old Law by the very nature of the sent directly effect a certain tie which is the sacrament of act it was able to afford a remedy to concupiscence lest matrimony; and this tie by virtue of its Divine institution the latter run riot when held in too strict restraint. works dispositivelyk to the infusion of grace. Hence others† said that grace is conferred therein as Reply to Objection 3. This argument would hold if no regards the withdrawal from evil, because the act is ex- more efficacious remedy could be employed against the cused from sin, for it would be a sin apart from matri- disease of concupiscence; but a yet more powerful rem- mony. But this would be too little, since it had this also edy is found in spiritual works and mortification of the in the Old Law. And so they say that it makes man with- flesh by those who make no use of matrimony. draw from evil, by restraining the concupiscence lest it Reply to Objection 4. A remedy can be employed tend to something outside the marriage blessings, but that against concupiscence in two ways. First, on the part of this grace does not enable a man to do good works. But concupiscence by repressing it in its root, and thus matri- this cannot be maintained, since the same grace hinders mony affords a remedy by the grace given therein. Sec- sin and inclines to good, just as the same heat expels cold ondly, on the part of its act, and this in two ways: first, and gives heat. by depriving the act to which concupiscence inclines of Hence others‡ say that matrimony, inasmuch as it is its outward shamefulness, and this is done by the mar- contracted in the faith of Christ, is able to confer the grace riage blessings which justify carnal concupiscence; sec- which enables us to do those works which are required ondly, by hindering the shameful act, which is done by in matrimony. and this is more probable, since wher- the very nature of the act. because concupiscence, being ever God gives the faculty to do a thing, He gives also satisfied by the conjugal act, does not incline so much to the helps whereby man is enabled to make becoming use other wickedness. For this reason the Apostle says (1 Cor. of that faculty; thus it is clear that to all the soul’s pow- 7:9): “It is better to marry than to burn.” For though the ers there correspond bodily members by which they can works congenial to concupiscence are in themselves of a proceed to act. Therefore, since in matrimony man re- nature to increase concupiscence, yet in so far as they are ceives by Divine institution the faculty to use his wife for directed according to reason they repress concupiscence, the begetting of children, he also receives the grace with- because like acts result in like dispositions and habits. Whether carnal intercourse is an integral part of this sacrament? Suppl. q. 42 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that carnal intercourse is in the text (Sent. iv, D, 26). Therefore it is an integral part an integral part of marriage. For at the very institution of of the sacrament. marriage it was declared (Gn. 2:24): “They shall be two Objection 3. Further, this sacrament is directed to the in one flesh.” Now this is not brought about save by carnal preservation of the species. But the species cannot be pre- intercourse. Therefore it is an integral part of marriage. served without carnal intercourse. Therefore it is an inte- Objection 2. Further, that which belongs to the signi- gral part of the sacrament. fication of a sacrament is necessary for the sacrament, as Objection 4. Further, Matrimony is a sacrament inas- we have stated above (a. 2; q. 9, a. 1 ). Now carnal inter- much as it affords a remedy against concupiscence; ac- course belongs to the signification of matrimony, as stated cording to the Apostle’s saying (1 Cor. 7:9): “It is better ∗ Peter Lombard, Sent. iv, D, 2 † St. Albert Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 26 ‡ St. Bonaventure, Sent. iv, D, 26 § Cf. IIIa, q. 66, a. 3, ad 4 ¶ St. Augustine, Tract. lxxx in Joan. k Cf. q. 18, a. 1, where St. Thomas uses the same expression; and Editor’s notes at the beginning of the Supplement and on that Article 2792 to marry than to burn.” But it does not afford this remedy Reply to Objection 1. Adam expressed the integrity to those who have no carnal intercourse. Therefore the of marriage in regard to both perfections, because a thing same conclusion follows as before. is known by its operation. On the contrary, There was matrimony in Paradise, Reply to Objection 2. Signification of the thing con- and yet there was no carnal intercourse. Therefore carnal tained is necessary for the sacrament. Carnal intercourse intercourse is not an integral part of matrimony. belongs not to this signification, but to the thing not con- Further, a sacrament by its very name denotes a sanc- tained, as appears from what was said above (a. 1, ad 4,5). tification. But matrimony is holier without carnal inter- Reply to Objection 3. A thing does not reach its course, according to the text (Sent. D, 26). Therefore end except by its own act. Wherefore, from the fact that carnal intercourse is not necessary for the sacrament. the end of matrimony is not attained without carnal inter- I answer that, Integrity is twofold. One regards the course, it follows that it belongs to the second and not to primal perfection consisting in the very essence of a thing; the first integrity. the other regards the secondary perfection consisting in Reply to Objection 4. Before carnal intercourse mar- operation. Since then carnal intercourse is an operation riage is a remedy by virtue of the grace given therein, al- or use of marriage which gives the faculty for that inter- though not by virtue of the act, which belongs to the sec- course, it follows, that carnal intercourse belongs to the ond integrity. latter, and not to the former integrity of marriage∗. ∗ Cf. IIIa, q. 29, a. 2 2793 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 43 Of Matrimony with Regard to the Betrothal (In Three Articles) In the next place we must consider matrimony absolutely; and here we must treat (1) of the betrothal; (2) of the nature of matrimony; (3) of its efficient cause, namely the consent; (4) of its blessings; (5) of the impediments thereto; (6) of second marriages; (7) of certain things annexed to marriage. Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) What is the betrothal? (2) Who can contract a betrothal? (3) Whether a betrothal can be canceled? Whether a betrothal is a promise of future marriage? Suppl. q. 43 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that a betrothal is not firstly, a mere promise, by saying: “I will take thee for rightly defined “a promise of future marriage,” as ex- my wife,” and conversely; secondly, by giving betrothal pressed in the words of Pope Nicholas I (Resp. ad Con- pledges, such as money and the like; thirdly, by giving sul. Bulgar., iii). For as Isidore says (Etym. iv), “a man an engagement ring; fourthly, by the addition of an oath. is betrothed not by a mere promise, but by giving his If, however, this promise be made conditionally, we must troth [spondet] and providing sureties [sponsores]”. Now draw a distinction; for it is either an honorable condition, a person is said to be betrothed by reason of his betrothal. for instance if we say: “I will take thee, if thy parents Therefore it is wrongly described as a promise. consent,” and then the promise holds if the condition is Objection 2. Further, whoever promises a thing must fulfilled, and does not hold if the condition is not fulfilled; be compelled to fulfill his promise. But those who have or else the condition is dishonorable, and this in two ways: contracted a betrothal are not compelled by the Church to for either it is contrary to the marriage blessings, as if we fulfill the marriage. Therefore a betrothal is not a promise. were to say: “I will take thee if thou promise means of Objection 3. Further, sometimes a betrothal does not sterility,” and then no betrothal is contracted; or else it is consist of a mere promise, but an oath is added, as also not contrary to the marriage blessings, as were one to say: certain pledges. Therefore seemingly it should not be de- “I will take thee if thou consent to my thefts,” and then the fined as a mere promise. promise holds, but the condition should be removed. Objection 4. Further, marriage should be free and ab- Reply to Objection 1. The betrothal itself and giv- solute. But a betrothal is sometimes expressed under a ing of sureties are a ratification of the promise, wherefore condition even of money to be received. Therefore it is it is denominated from these as from that which is more not fittingly described as a promise of marriage. perfect. Objection 5. Further, promising about the future is Reply to Objection 2. By this promise one party is blamed in James 4:13, seqq. But there should be nothing bound to the other in respect of contracting marriage; and blameworthy about the sacraments. Therefore one ought he who fulfills not his promise sins mortally, unless a law- not to make a promise of future marriage. ful impediment arise; and the Church uses compulsion in Objection 6. Further, no man is called a spouse ex- the sense that she enjoins a penance for the sin. But he cept on account of his espousals. But a man is said to be is not compelled by sentence of the court, because com- a spouse on account of actual marriage, according to the pulsory marriages are wont to have evil results; unless the text (Sent. iv, D, 27). Therefore espousals are not always parties be bound by oath, for then he ought to be com- a promise of future marriage. pelled, in the opinion of some, although others think dif- I answer that, Consent to conjugal union if expressed ferently on account of the reason given above, especially in words of the future does not make a marriage, but a if there be fear of one taking the other’s life. promise of marriage; and this promise is called “a be- Reply to Objection 3. Such things are added only in trothal from plighting one’s troth,” as Isidore says (Etym. confirmation of the promise, and consequently they are iv). For before the use of writing-tablets, they used to not distinct from it. give pledges of marriage, by which they plighted their mu- Reply to Objection 4. The condition that is appended tual consent under the marriage code, and they provided does not destroy the liberty of marriage; for if it be unlaw- guarantors. This promise is made in two ways, namely ful, it should be renounced; and if it be lawful, it is either absolutely, or conditionally. Absolutely, in four ways: about things that are good simply, as were one to say, “I 2794 will take thee, if thy parents consent,” and such a condi-life; hence he teaches that we ought to add the condition. tion does not destroy the liberty of the betrothal, but gives “If the Lord will,” which, though it be not expressed in it an increase of rectitude. or else it is about things that words, ought nevertheless to be impressed on the heart. are useful, as were one to say: “I will marry thee if thou Reply to Objection 6. In marriage we may consider pay me a hundred pounds,” and then this condition is ap- both the marriage union and the marriage act; and on ac- pended, not as asking a price for the consent of marriage, count of his promise of the first as future a man is called but as referring to the promise of a dowry; so that the mar- a “spouse” from his having contracted his espousals by riage does not lose its liberty. Sometimes, however, the words expressive of the future; but from the promise of the condition appended is the payment of a sum of money by second a man is called a “spouse,” even when the marriage way of penalty, and then, since marriage should be free, has been contracted by words expressive of the present, such a condition does not hold, nor can such a penalty because by this very fact he promises [spondet] the mar- be exacted from a person who is unwilling to fulfill the riage act. However, properly speaking, espousals are so promise of marriage. called from the promise [sponsione] in the first sense, be- Reply to Objection 5. James does not intend to forbid cause espousals are a kind of sacramental annexed to mat- altogether the making of promises about the future, but the rimony, as exorcism to baptism. making of promises as though one were certain of one’s Whether seven years is fittingly assigned as the age for betrothal? Suppl. q. 43 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that seven years is not a betrothal with a girl who is not seven years old, since fittingly assigned as the age for betrothal. For a contract the lack of age in one is more than counterbalanced in the that can be formed by others does not require discretion other. in those whom it concerns. Now a betrothal can be ar- Objection 7. Further, those who at about the age of ranged by the parents without the knowledge of either of puberty, but before it, enter into the marriage contract by the persons betrothed. Therefore a betrothal can be ar- words expressive of the present are reputed to be mar- ranged before the age of seven years as well as after. ried. Therefore in like manner if they contract marriage Objection 2. Further, just as some use of reason is by words expressive of the future, before yet close on the necessary for the contract of betrothal, so is there for the age of puberty, they are to be reputed as betrothed. consent to mortal sin. Now, as Gregory says (Dial. iv), I answer that, The age of seven years is fixed rea- a boy of five years of age was carried off by the devil on sonably enough by law for the contracting of betrothals, account of the sin of blasphemy. Therefore a betrothal can for since a betrothal is a promise of the future, as already take place before the age of seven years. stated (a. 1), it follows that they are within the competency Objection 3. Further, a betrothal is directed to mar- of those who can make a promise in some way, and this is riage. But for marriage the same age is not assigned to only for those who can have some foresight of the future, boy and girl. and this requires the use of reason, of which three degrees Objection 4. Further, one can become betrothed as are to be observed, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. soon as future marriage can be agreeable to one. Now i, 4). The first is when a person neither understands by signs of this agreeableness are often apparent in boys be- himself nor is able to learn from another; the second stage fore the age of seven. Therefore they can become be- is when a man can learn from another but is incapable trothed before that age. by himself of consideration and understanding; the third Objection 5. Further, if persons become betrothed be- degree is when a man is both able to learn from another fore they are seven years old, and subsequently after the and to consider by himself. And since reason develops in age of seven and before the age of maturity renew their man by little and little, in proportion as the movement and promise in words expressive of the present, they are reck- fluctuation of the humors is calmed, man reaches the first oned to be betrothed. Now this is not by virtue of the sec- stage of reason before his seventh year; and consequently ond contract, since they intend to contract not betrothal during that period he is unfit for any contract, and there- but marriage. Therefore it is by the virtue of the first; and fore for betrothal. But he begins to reach the second stage thus espousals can be contracted before the age of seven. at the end of his first seven years, wherefore children at Objection 6. Further, when a thing is done by many that age are sent to school. But man begins to reach the persons in common, if one fails he is supplied by another, third stage at the end of his second seven years, as regards as in the case of those who row a boat. Now the contract things concerning his person, when his natural reason de- of betrothal is an action common to the contracting par- velops; but as regards things outside his person, at the end ties. Therefore if one be of mature age, he can contract of his third seven years. Hence before his first seven years 2795 a man is not fit to make any contract, but at the end of that of the use of reason, but also on the part of the body, in period he begins to be fit to make certain promises for the that it is necessary to be of an age adapted to procreation. future, especially about those things to which natural rea- And since a girl becomes apt for the act of procreation son inclines us more, though he is not fit to bind himself in her twelfth year, and a boy at the end of his second by a perpetual obligation, because as yet he has not a firm seven years, as the Philosopher says (De Hist. Anim. vii), will. Hence at that age betrothals can be contracted. But whereas the age is the same in both for attaining the use of at the end of the second seven years he can already bind reason which is the sole condition for betrothal, hence it is himself in matters concerning his person, either to religion that the one age is assigned for both as regards betrothal, or to wedlock. And after the third seven years he can bind but not as regards marriage. himself in other matters also; and according to the laws Reply to Objection 4. This agreeableness in regard to he is given the power of disposing of his property after his boys under the age of seven does not result from the per- twenty-second year. fect use of reason, since they are not as yet possessed of Reply to Objection 1. If the parties are betrothed by complete self-control; it results rather from the movement another person before they reach the age of puberty, ei- of nature than from any process of reason. Consequently, ther of them or both can demur; wherefore in that case this agreeableness does not suffice for contracting a be- the betrothal does not take effect, so that neither does any trothal. affinity result therefrom. Hence a betrothal made between Reply to Objection 5. In this case, although the sec- certain persons by some other takes effect, in so far as ond contract does not amount to marriage, nevertheless those between whom the betrothal is arranged do not de- the parties show that they ratify their former promise; mur when they reach the proper age, whence they are un- wherefore the first contract is confirmed by the second. derstood to consent to what others have done. Reply to Objection 6. Those who row a boat act by Reply to Objection 2. Some say that the boy of whom way of one cause, and consequently what is lacking in one Gregory tells this story was not lost, and that he did not can be supplied by another. But those who make a con- sin mortally; and that this vision was for the purpose of tract of betrothal act as distinct persons, since a betrothal making the father sorrowful, for he had sinned in the boy can only be between two parties; wherefore it is necessary through failing to correct him. But this is contrary to the for each to be qualified to contract, and thus the defect of express intention of Gregory, who says (Dial. iv) that “the one is an obstacle to their betrothal, nor can it be supplied boy’s father having neglected the soul of his little son, fos- by the other. tered no little sinner for the flames of hell.” Consequently Reply to Objection 7. It is true that in the matter it must be said that for a mortal sin it is sufficient to give of betrothal if the contracting parties are close upon the consent to something present, whereas in a betrothal the age of seven, the contract of betrothal is valid, since, ac- consent is to something future; and greater discretion of cording to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 56), “when little is reason is required for looking to the future than for con- lacking it seems as though nothing were lacking.” Some senting to one present act. Wherefore a man can sin mor- fix the margin at six months. but it is better to determine it tally before he can bind himself to a future obligation. according to the condition of the contracting parties, since Reply to Objection 3. Regarding the age for the mar- the use of reason comes sooner to some than to others. riage contract a disposition is required not only on the part Whether a betrothal can be dissolved? Suppl. q. 43 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that a betrothal cannot be be punished for being under a penalty. Now the man who dissolved if one of the parties enter religion. For if I have contracts an infirmity would be punished if he were to lose promised a thing to someone I cannot lawfully pledge it to his right to the woman betrothed to him. Therefore a be- someone else. Now he who betroths himself promises his trothal should not be dissolved on account of a bodily in- body to the woman. Therefore he cannot make a further firmity. offering of himself to God in religion. Objection 4. Again, neither seemingly should a be- Objection 2. Again, seemingly it should not be dis- trothal be dissolved on account of a supervening affinity, solved when one of the parties leaves for a distant country, for instance if the spouse were to commit fornication with because in doubtful matters one should always choose the a kinswoman of his betrothed; for in that case the affi- safer course. Now the safer course would be to wait for anced bride would be penalized for the sin of her affianced him. Therefore she is bound to wait for him. spouse, which is unreasonable. Objection 3. Again, neither seemingly is it dissolved Objection 5. Again, seemingly they cannot set one by sickness contracted after betrothal, for no man should another free; for it would be a proof of greatest fickleness 2796 if they contracted together and then set one another free; thus contracted have an evil result. Nor is one punished and such conduct ought not to be tolerated by the Church. for being under a penalty, although one incurs a loss from Therefore, etc. one’s penalty, and this is not unreasonable. Objection 6. Again, neither seemingly ought a be- Reply to Objection 4. If the affianced bridegroom has trothal to be dissolved on account of the fornication of carnal knowledge of a kinswoman of his spouse, or “vice one of the parties. For a betrothal does not yet give the versa,” the betrothal must be dissolved; and for proof it one power over the body of the other; wherefore it would is sufficient that the fact be the common talk, in order seem that they nowise sin against one another if mean- to avoid scandal; for causes whose effects mature in the while they commit fornication. Consequently a betrothal future are voided of their effects, not only by what ac- should not be dissolved on that account. tually is, but also by what happens subsequently. Hence Objection 7. Again, neither seemingly on account of just as affinity, had it existed at the time of the betrothal, his contracting with another woman by words expressive would have prevented that contract, so, if it supervene be- of the present. For a subsequent sale does not void a previ- fore marriage, which is an effect of the betrothal, the pre- ous sale. Therefore neither should a second contract void vious contract is voided of its effect. Nor does the other a previous one. party suffer in consequence, indeed he or she gains, be- Objection 8. Again, neither seemingly should it be ing set free from one who has become hateful to God by dissolved on account of deficient age; since what is not committing fornication. cannot be dissolved. Now a betrothal is null before the Reply to Objection 5. Some do not admit this case. requisite age. Therefore it cannot be dissolved. Yet they have against them the Decretal (cap. Praeterea, I answer that, In all the cases mentioned above the De spons. et matr.) which says expressly: “Just as those betrothal that has been contracted is dissolved, but in dif- who enter into a contract of fellowship by pledging their ferent ways. For in two of them—namely when a party faith to one another and afterwards give it back, so it may enters religion, and when either of the affianced spouses be patiently tolerated that those who are betrothed to one contracts with another party by words expressive of the another should set one another free.” Yet to this they say present—the betrothal is dissolved by law, whereas in the that the Church allows this lest worse happen rather than other cases it has to be dissolved according to the judg- because it is according to strict law. But this does not ment of the Church. seem to agree with the example quoted by the Decretal. Reply to Objection 1. The like promise is dissolved Accordingly we must reply that it is not always a proof by spiritual death, for that promise is purely spiritual, as of fickleness to rescind an agreement, since “our counsels we shall state further on (q. 61, a. 2). are uncertain” (Wis. 9:14). Reply to Objection 2. This doubt is solved by either Reply to Objection 6. Although when they become party not putting in an appearance at the time fixed for betrothed they have not yet given one another power over completing the marriage. Wherefore if it was no fault of one another’s body, yet if this∗ were to happen it would that party that the marriage was not completed, he or she make them suspicious of one another’s fidelity; and so can lawfully marry without any sin. But if he or she was one can ensure himself against the other by breaking off responsible for the non-completion of the marriage, this the engagement. responsibility involves the obligation of doing penance for Reply to Objection 7. This argument would hold if the broken promise—or oath if the promise was confirmed each contract were of the same kind; whereas the second by oath—and he or she can contract with another if they contract of marriage has greater force than the first, and wish it, subject to the judgment of the Church. consequently dissolves it. Reply to Objection 3. If either of the betrothed par- Reply to Objection 8. Although it was not a true be- ties incur an infirmity which notably weakens the subject trothal, there was a betrothal of a kind; and consequently, (as epilepsy or paralysis), or causes a deformity (as loss of lest approval should seem to be given when they come to the nose or eyes, and the like), or is contrary to the good the lawful age, they should seek a dissolution of the be- of the offspring (as leprosy, which is wont to be transmit- trothal by the judgment of the Church, for the sake of a ted to the children), the betrothal can be dissolved, lest the good example. betrothed be displeasing to one another, and the marriage ∗ Referring to the contention of the Objection 2797 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 44 Of the Definition of Matrimony (In Three Articles) We must now consider the nature of matrimony. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether matrimony is a kind of joining? (2) Whether it is fittingly named? (3) Whether it is fittingly defined? Whether matrimony is a kind of joining? Suppl. q. 44 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that matrimony is not a are directed to one begetting and upbringing of children, kind of joining. Because the bond whereby things are tied and again to one family life, it is clear that in matrimony together differs from their joining, as cause from effect. there is a joining in respect of which we speak of hus- Now matrimony is the bond whereby those who are joined band and wife; and this joining, through being directed to in matrimony are tied together. Therefore it is not a kind some one thing, is matrimony; while the joining together of joining. of bodies and minds is a result of matrimony. Objection 2. Further, every sacrament is a sensible Reply to Objection 1. Matrimony is the bond by sign. But no relation is a sensible accident. Therefore which they are tied formally, not effectively, and so it need since matrimony is a sacrament, it is not a kind of rela- not be distinct from the joining. tion, and consequently neither is it a kind of joining. Reply to Objection 2. Although relation is not itself Objection 3. Further, a joining is a relation of a sensible accident, its causes may be sensible. Nor is it equiparance as well as of equality. Now according to Avi- necessary in a sacrament for that which is both reality and cenna the relation of equality is not identically the same sacrament∗ to be sensible (for such is the relation of the in each extreme. Neither therefore is there an identically aforesaid joining to this sacrament), whereas the words same joining; and consequently if matrimony is a kind of expressive of consent, which are sacrament only and are joining, there is not only one matrimony between man and the cause of that same joining, are sensible. wife. Reply to Objection 3. A relation is founded on some- On the contrary, It is by relation that things are re- thing as its cause—for instance likeness is founded on lated to one another. Now by matrimony certain things quality—and on something as its subject—for instance in are related to one another; for the husband is the wife’s the things themselves that are like; and on either hand we husband, and the wife is the husband’s wife. Therefore may find unity and diversity of relation. Since then it is matrimony is a kind of relation, nor is it other than a join- not the same identical quality that conduces to likeness, ing. but the same specific quality in each of the like subjects, Further, the union of two things into one can result and since, moreover, the subjects of likeness are two in only from their being joined. Now such is the effect of number, and the same applies to equality, it follows that matrimony (Gn. 2:24): “They shall be two in one flesh.” both equality and likeness are in every way numerically Therefore matrimony is a kind of joining. distinct in either of the like or equal subjects. But the re- I answer that, A joining denotes a kind of uniting, lations of matrimony, on the one hand, have unity in both and so wherever things are united there must be a joining. extremes, namely on the part of the cause, since it is di- Now things directed to one purpose are said to be united rected to the one identical begetting; whereas on the part in their direction thereto, thus many men are united in fol- of the subject there is numerical diversity. The fact of this lowing one military calling or in pursuing one business, in relation having a diversity of subjects is signified by the relation to which they are called fellow-soldiers or busi- terms “husband” and “wife,” while its unity is denoted by ness partners. Hence, since by marriage certain persons its being called matrimony. ∗ Cf. IIIa, q. 66, a. 1 2798 Whether matrimony is fittingly named? Suppl. q. 44 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that matrimony is unfit- because it is a joining together for the purpose of provid- tingly named. Because a thing should be named after that ing the matter of one offspring as though it were derived which ranks higher. But the father ranks above the mother. from monos and “materia”; or into “matre” and “nato,” as Therefore the union of father and mother should rather be Isidore says (Etym. ix), because it makes a woman the named after the father. mother of a child. Objection 2. Further, a thing should be named from Reply to Objection 1. Although the father ranks that which is essential to it, since a “definition expresses above the mother, the mother has more to do with the off- the nature signified by a name” (Metaph. iv, 28). Now spring than the father has. or we may say that woman was nuptials are not essential to matrimony. Therefore matri- made chiefly in order to be man’s helpmate in relation to mony should not be called nuptials. the offspring, whereas the man was not made for this pur- Objection 3. Further, a species cannot take its proper pose. Wherefore the mother has a closer relation to the name from that which belongs to the genus. Now a join- nature of marriage than the father has. ing [conjunctio] is the genus of matrimony. Therefore it Reply to Objection 2. Sometimes essentials are should not be called a conjugal union. known by accidentals, wherefore some things can be On the contrary, stands the common use of speech. named even after their accidentals, since a name is given I answer that, Three things may be considered in mat- to a thing for the purpose that it may become known. rimony. First, its essence, which is a joining together, and Reply to Objection 3. Sometimes a species is named in reference to this it is called the “conjugal union”; sec- after something pertaining to the genus on account of ondly, its cause, which is the wedding, and in reference to an imperfection in the species, when namely it has the this it is called the “nuptial union” from “nubo”∗, because generic nature completely, yet adds nothing pertaining to at the wedding ceremony, whereby the marriage is com- dignity; thus the accidental property retains the name of pleted, the heads of those who are wedded are covered property, which is common to it and to the definition. with a veil†; thirdly, the effect, which is the offspring, Sometimes, however, it is on account of a perfection, and in reference to this it is called “matrimony,” as Au- when we find the generic nature completely in one species gustine says (Contra Faust. xix, 26), because “a woman’s and not in another; thus animal is named from soul [an- sole purpose in marrying should be motherhood.” Mat- ima], and this belongs to an animate body, which is the rimony may also be resolved into “matris munium”‡, i.e. genus of animal; yet animation is not found perfectly in a mother’s duty, since the duty of bringing up the chil- those animate beings that are not animals. It is thus with dren chiefly devolves on the women; or into “matrem mu- the case in point. for the joining of husband and wife by niens,” because it provides the mother with a protector matrimony is the greatest of all joinings, since it is a join- and support in the person of her husband; or into “matrem ing of soul and body, wherefore it is called a “conjugal” monens,” as admonishing her not to leave her husband union. and take up with another man; or into “materia unius,” Whether matrimony is fittingly defined in the text? Suppl. q. 44 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that matrimony is unfit- morals. Yet it often happens that married persons differ tingly defined in the text§ (Sent. iv, D, 27). For it is neces- very much in habit. Therefore the words “involving their sary to mention matrimony in defining a husband, since it living together [consuetudinem] in undivided partnership” is the husband who is joined to the woman in matrimony. should have no place in the definition of matrimony. Now “marital union” is put in the definition of matrimony. Objection 4. Further, we find other definitions given Therefore in these definitions there would seem to be a vi- of matrimony, for according to Hugh (Sum. Sent. vii, 6), cious circle. “matrimony is the lawful consent of two apt persons to be Objection 2. Further, matrimony makes the woman joined together.” Also, according to some, “matrimony is the man’s wife no less than it makes the man the woman’s the fellowship of a common life and a community regu- husband. Therefore it should not be described as a “mari- lated by Divine and human law”; and we ask how these tal union” rather than an uxorial union. definitions differ. Objection 3. Further, habit [consuetudo] pertains to I answer that, As stated above (a. 2), three things ∗ The original meaning of ‘nubo’ is ‘to veil’ † This is still done in some countries ‡ i.e. munus § The definition alluded to is as fol- lows: “Marriage is the marital union of man and woman involving living together in undivided partnership.” 2799 are to be considered in matrimony, namely its cause, its things that are posterior simply, but prior to us; thus in essence, and its effect; and accordingly we find three def- the definition of quality the Philosopher employs the word initions given of matrimony. For the definition of Hugh “such” [quale] when he says (Cap. De Qualitate) that indicates the cause, namely the consent, and this defini- “quality is that whereby we are said to be such.” Thus, tion is self-evident. The definition given in the text indi- too, in defining matrimony we say that it is a “marital cates the essence of matrimony, namely the “union,” and union,” by which we mean that matrimony is a union for adds determinate subjects by the words “between lawful the purpose of those things required by the marital office, persons.” It also points to the difference of the contracting all of which could not be expressed in one word. parties in reference to the species, by the word “marital,” Reply to Objection 2. As stated (a. 2), this difference for since matrimony is a joining together for the purpose indicates the end of the union. And since, according to of some one thing, this joining together is specified by the the Apostle (1 Cor. 11:9), the “man is not [Vulg.: ‘was purpose to which it is directed, and this is what pertains to not created’] for the woman, but the woman for the man,” the husband [maritum]. It also indicates the force of this it follows that this difference should be indicated in refer- joining—for it is indissoluble—by the words “involving,” ence to the man rather than the woman. etc. Reply to Objection 3. Just as the civic life denotes The remaining definition indicates the effect to which not the individual act of this or that one, but the things that matrimony is directed, namely the common life in fam-concern the common action of the citizens, so the conju- ily matters. And since every community is regulated by gal life is nothing else than a particular kind of compan- some law, the code according to which this community is ionship pertaining to that common action. wherefore as directed, namely Divine and human law, finds a place in regards this same life the partnership of married persons this definition. while other communities, such as those of is always indivisible, although it is divisible as regards the traders or soldiers, are established by human law alone. act belonging to each party. Reply to Objection 1. Sometimes the prior things The Reply to the Fourth Objection is clear from what from which a definition ought to be given are not known has been said above. to us, and consequently certain things are defined from 2800 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 45 Of the Marriage Consent Considered in Itself (In Five Articles) In the next place we have to consider the consent; and the first point to discuss is the consent considered in itself; the second is the consent confirmed by oath or by carnal intercourse; the third is compulsory consent and conditional consent; and the fourth is the object of the consent. Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether the consent is the efficient cause of matrimony? (2) Whether the consent needs to be expressed in words? (3) Whether consent given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage? (4) Whether consent given in words expressive of the present, without inward consent, makes a true marriage outwardly? (5) Whether consent given secretly in words expressive of the present makes a marriage? Whether consent is the efficient cause of matrimony? Suppl. q. 45 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that consent is not the ef- rimony there is a kind of spiritual joining together, in so ficient cause of matrimony. For the sacraments depend not far as matrimony is a sacrament, and a certain material on the human will but on the Divine institution, as shown joining together, in so far as it is directed to an office of above (Sent. iv, D, 2; IIIa, q. 64, a. 2). But consent be- nature and of civil life, it follows that the spiritual joining longs to the human will. Therefore it is no more the cause is the effect of the Divine power by means of the mate- of matrimony than of the other sacraments. rial joining. Therefore seeing that the joinings of material Objection 2. Further, nothing is its own cause. But contracts are effected by mutual consent, it follows that seemingly matrimony is nothing else than the consent, the joining together of marriage is effected in the same since it is the consent which signifies the union of Christ way. with the Church. Reply to Objection 1. The first cause of the sacra- Objection 3. Further, of one thing there should be one ments is the Divine power which works in them the wel- cause. Now there is one marriage between two persons, fare of the soul; but the second or instrumental causes are as stated above (q. 44, a. 1); whereas the consents of the material operations deriving their efficacy from the Divine two parties are distinct, for they are given by different per- institution, and thus consent is the cause in matrimony. sons and to different things, since on the one hand there is Reply to Objection 2. Matrimony is not the consent consent to take a husband, and on the other hand consent itself, but the union of persons directed to one purpose, as to take a wife. Therefore mutual consent is not the cause stated above (q. 44, a. 1), and this union is the effect of the of matrimony. consent. Moreover, the consent, properly speaking, signi- On the contrary, Chrysostom∗ says: “It is not coition fies not the union of Christ with the Church, but His will but consent that makes a marriage.” whereby His union with the Church was brought about. Further, one person does not receive power over that Reply to Objection 3. Just as marriage is one on the which is at the free disposal of another, without the latter’s part of the object to which the union is directed, whereas it consent. Now by marriage each of the married parties re- is more than one on the part of the persons united, so too ceives power over the other’s body (1 Cor. 7:4), whereas the consent is one on the part of the thing consented to, hitherto each had free power over his own body. There- namely the aforesaid union, whereas it is more than one fore consent makes a marriage. on the part of the persons consenting. Nor is the direct I answer that, In every sacrament there is a spiritual object of consent a husband but union with a husband on operation by means of a material operation which signi- the part of the wife, even as it is union with a wife on the fies it; thus in Baptism the inward spiritual cleansing is part of the husband. effected by a bodily cleansing. Wherefore, since in mat- ∗ Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom 2801 Whether the consent needs to be expressed in words? Suppl. q. 45 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that there is no need tually to one another. Therefore in matrimony also the for the consent to be expressed in words. For a man is consent must be expressed in words. brought under another’s power by a vow just as he is by I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), the marriage matrimony. Now a vow is binding in God’s sight, even union is effected in the same way as the bond in material though it be not expressed in words. Therefore consent contracts. And since material contracts are not feasible also makes a marriage binding even without being ex- unless the contracting parties express their will to one an- pressed in words. other in words, it follows that the consent which makes a Objection 2. Further, there can be marriage between marriage must also be expressed in words, so that the ex- persons who are unable to express their mutual consent pression of words is to marriage what the outward wash- in words, through being dumb or of different languages. ing is to Baptism. Therefore expression of the consent by words is not re- Reply to Objection 1. In a vow there is not a sacra- quired for matrimony. mental but only a spiritual bond, wherefore there is no Objection 3. Further, if that which is essential to a need for it to be done in the same way as material con- sacrament be omitted for any reason whatever, there is no tracts, in order that it be binding, as in the case of matri- sacrament. Now there is a case of marriage without the mony. expression of words if the maid is silent through bashful- Reply to Objection 2. Although the like cannot plight ness when her parents give her away to the bridegroom. themselves to one another in words, they can do so by Therefore the expression of words is not essential to mat- signs, and such signs count for words. rimony. Reply to Objection 3. According to Hugh of S. Victor On the contrary, Matrimony is a sacrament. Now a (Tract. vii, Sum. Sent.), persons who are being married sensible sign is required in every sacrament. Therefore should give their consent by accepting one another freely. it is also required in matrimony, and consequently there and this is judged to be the case if they show no dissent must needs be at least words by which the consent is made when they are being wedded. Wherefore in such a case perceptible to the senses. the words of the parents are taken as being the maid’s, for Further, in matrimony there is a contract between hus- the fact that she does not contradict them is a sign that band and wife. Now in every contract there must be ex- they are her words. pression of the words by which men bind themselves mu- Whether consent given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage? Suppl. q. 45 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that consent given in Sicut ex Litteris, De spons. et matr.). But this would not words expressive of the future makes a marriage. For as be the case if consent given in words of the future tense present is to present, so is future to future. But consent made a marriage, since from the very fact that his mar- given in words expressive of the present makes a marriage riage with the one is valid, he cannot, as long as she lives, in the present. Therefore consent given in words expres- marry another. Therefore consent given in words of the sive of the future makes a marriage in the future. future tense does not make a marriage. Objection 2. Further, in other civil contracts, just as Further, he who promises to do a certain thing does in matrimony, a certain obligation results from the words it not yet. Now he who consents in words of the future expressing consent. Now in other contracts it matters not tense, promises to marry a certain woman. Therefore he whether the obligation is effected by words of the present does not marry her yet. or of the future tense. Therefore neither does it make any I answer that, The sacramental causes produce their difference in matrimony. effect by signifying it; hence they effect what they sig- Objection 3. Further, by the religious vow man con- nify. Since therefore when a man expresses his consent tracts a spiritual marriage with God. Now the religious by words of the future tense, he does not signify that he is vow is expressed in words of the future tense, and is bind- marrying, but promises that he will marry, it follows that ing. Therefore carnal marriage also can be effected by a consent expressed in this manner does not make a mar- words of the future tense. riage, but a promise [sponsionem] of marriage, and this On the contrary, A man who consents in words of the promise is known as a betrothal [sponsalia]. future tense to take a particular woman as his wife, and af- Reply to Objection 1. When consent is expressed in ter, by words of the present tense, consents to take another, words of the present tense, not only are the words actually according to law must take the second for his wife (cap. present, but consent is directed to the present, so that they 2802 coincide in point of time; but when consent is given in he uses words indicative of the present. words of the future tense, although the words are actually Reply to Objection 3. In the vow of religious pro- present, the consent is directed to a future time, and hence fession it is not the spiritual marriage itself that is ex- they do not coincide in point of time. For this reason the pressed in words which refer to the future, but an act of comparison fails. the spiritual marriage, namely obedience or observance of Reply to Objection 2. Even in other contracts, a man the rule. If, however, a man vow spiritual marriage in the who uses words referring to the future, does not trans- future, it is not a spiritual marriage, for a man does not fer the power over his property to another person—for in- become a monk by taking such a vow, but promises to stance if he were to say “I will give thee”—but only when become one. Whether, in the absence of inward consent, a marriage is made by consent given in Suppl. q. 45 a. 4 words of the present? Objection 1. It would seem that even in the absence of I answer that, The outward cleansing stands in the inward consent a marriage is made by consent expressed same relation to baptism as the expression of words to this in words of the present. For “fraud and deceit should ben- sacrament, as stated above (a. 2). Wherefore just as were efit no man,” according to the law (cap. Ex Tenore, De a person to receive the outward cleansing, with the inten- Rescrip., cap. Si Vir, De cognat. spir.). Now he who gives tion, not of receiving the sacrament, but of acting in jest consent in words without consenting in heart commits a or deceit, he would not be baptized; so, too, expression of fraud. Therefore he should not benefit by it, through be- words without inward consent makes no marriage. ing released of the bond of marriage. Reply to Objection 1. There are two things here, Objection 2. Further, the mental consent of one per- namely the lack of consent—which benefits him in the son cannot be known to another, except in so far as it is tribunal of his conscience so that he is not bound by the expressed in words. If then the expression of the words marriage tie, albeit not in the tribunal of the Church where is not enough, and inward consent is required in both par- judgment is pronounced according to the evidence—and ties, neither of them will be able to know that he is truly the deceit in the words, which does not benefit him, nei- married to the other; and consequently whenever he uses ther in the tribunal of his conscience nor in the tribunal of marriage he will commit fornication. the Church, since in both he is punished for this. Objection 3. Further, if a man is proved to have con- Reply to Objection 2. If mental consent is lacking in sented to take a certain woman to wife in words of the one of the parties, on neither side is there marriage, since present tense, he is compelled under pain of excommu- marriage consists in a mutual joining together, as stated nication to take her as his wife, even though he should above (q. 44, a. 1). However one may believe that in all say that he was wanting in mental consent, notwithstand- probability there is no fraud unless there be evident signs ing that afterwards he may have contracted marriage with thereof; because we must presume good of everyone, un- another woman by words expressive of consent in the less there be proof of the contrary. Consequently the party present. But this would not be the case if mental consent in whom there is no fraud is excused from sin on account were requisite for marriage. Therefore it is not required. of ignorance. On the contrary, Innocent III says in a Decretal (cap. Reply to Objection 3. In such a case the Church Tua Nos, De Spons. et matr.) in reference to this case: compels him to hold to his first wife, because the Church “Other things cannot complete the marriage bond in the judges according to outward appearances; nor is she de- absence of consent.” ceived in justice or right, although she is deceived in the Further, intention is necessary in all the sacraments. facts of the case. Yet such a man ought to bear the excom- Now he who consents not in his heart has no intention of munication rather than return to his first wife; or else he contracting marriage; and therefore he does not contract a should go far away into another country. marriage. Whether consent given secretly in words of the present makes a marriage? Suppl. q. 45 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that consent given se- power. Therefore she cannot by marriage be transferred to cretly in words of the present does not make a marriage. a husband’s power without her father’s consent. Where- For a thing that is in one person’s power is not transferred fore if consent be given secretly, even though it should be to the power of another without the consent of the person expressed in words of the present, there will be no mar- in whose power it was. Now the maid is in her father’s riage. 2803 Objection 2. Further, in penance, just as in matri-Hence if these be omitted it is a true marriage, although mony, our act is as it were essential to the sacrament. But the contracting parties sin, unless they have a lawful mo- the sacrament of penance is not made complete except by tive for being excused.∗ means of the ministers of the Church, who are the dis- Reply to Objection 1. The maid is in her father’s pensers of the sacraments. Therefore neither can marriage power, not as a female slave without power over her own be perfected without the priest’s blessing. body, but as a daughter, for the purpose of education. Objection 3. Further, the Church does not forbid bap- Hence, in so far as she is free, she can give herself into tism to be given secretly, since one may baptize either pri- another’s power without her father’s consent, even as a vately or publicly. But the Church does forbid the cele- son or daughter, since they are free, may enter religion bration of clandestine marriages (cap. Cum inhibitio, De without their parent’s consent. clandest. despons.). Therefore they cannot be done se- Reply to Objection 2. In penance our act, although cretly. essential to the sacrament, does not suffice for producing Objection 4. Further, marriage cannot be contracted the proximate effect of the sacrament, namely forgiveness by those who are related in the second degree, because the of sins, and consequently it is necessary that the act of the Church has forbidden it. But the Church has also forbid- priest intervene in order that the sacrament be perfected. den clandestine marriages. Therefore they cannot be valid But in matrimony our acts are the sufficient cause for the marriages. production of the proximate effect, which is the marriage On the contrary, Given the cause the effect follows. bond, because whoever has the right to dispose of him- Now the sufficient cause of matrimony is consent ex- self can bind himself to another. Consequently the priest’s pressed in words of the present. Therefore whether this blessing is not required for matrimony as being essential be done in public or in private the result is a marriage. to the sacrament. Further, wherever there is the due matter and the due Reply to Objection 3. It is also forbidden to receive form of a sacrament there is the sacrament. Now in a se- baptism otherwise than from a priest, except in a case of cret marriage there is the due matter, since there are per- necessity. But matrimony is not a necessary sacrament: sons who are able lawfully to contract—and the due form, and consequently the comparison fails. However, clandes- since there are the words of the present expressive of con- tine marriages are forbidden on account of the evil results sent. Therefore there is a true marriage. to which they are liable, since it often happens that one of I answer that, Just as in the other sacraments certain the parties is guilty of fraud in such marriages; frequently, things are essential to the sacrament, and if they are omit- too, they have recourse to other nuptials when they repent ted there is no sacrament, while certain things belong to of having married in haste; and many other evils result the solemnization of the sacrament, and if these be omit- therefrom, besides which there is something disgraceful ted the sacrament is nevertheless validly performed, al- about them. though it is a sin to omit them; so, too, consent expressed Reply to Objection 4. Clandestine marriages are not in words of the present between persons lawfully qualified forbidden as though they were contrary to the essentials to contract makes a marriage, because these two condi- of marriage, in the same way as the marriages of unlaw- tions are essential to the sacrament; while all else belongs ful persons, who are undue matter for this sacrament; and to the solemnization of the sacrament, as being done in hence there is no comparison. order that the marriage may be more fittingly performed. ∗ Clandestine marriages have since been declared invalid by the Council of Trent (sess. xxiv). It must be borne in mind that throughout the treatise on marriage St. Thomas gives the Canon Law of his time. 2804 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 46 Of the Consent to Which an Oath or Carnal Intercourse Is Appended (In Two Articles) We must now consider the consent to which an oath or carnal intercourse is appended. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether an oath added to the consent that is expressed in words of the future tense makes a marriage? (2) Whether carnal intercourse supervening to such a consent makes a marriage? Whether an oath added to the consent that is expressed in words of the future tense Suppl. q. 46 a. 1 makes a marriage? Objection 1. It would seem that if an oath be added addition of an oath does not make words of the future to a consent that is expressed in words of the future tense tense signify anything else than consent to something fu- it makes a marriage. For no one can bind himself to act ture. Therefore it is not a marriage yet. against the Divine Law. But the fulfilling of an oath is of Further, after a marriage is complete, no further con- Divine law according to Mat. 5:33, “Thou shalt perform sent is required for the marriage. But after the oath there thy oaths to the Lord.” Consequently no subsequent obli- is yet another consent which makes the marriage, else it gation can relieve a man of the obligation to keep an oath would be useless to swear to a future marriage. Therefore previously taken. If, therefore, after consenting to marry a it does not make a marriage. woman by words expressive of the future and confirming I answer that, An oath is employed in confirmation that consent with an oath, a man binds himself to another of one’s words; wherefore it confirms that only which is woman by words expressive of the present, it would seem signified by the words, nor does it change their significa- that none the less he is bound to keep his former oath. tion. Consequently, since it belongs to words of the future But this would not be the case unless that oath made the tense, by their very signification, not to make a marriage, marriage complete. Therefore an oath affixed to a consent since what is promised in the future is not done yet, even expressed in words of the future tense makes a marriage. though an oath be added to the promise, the marriage is Objection 2. Further, Divine truth is stronger than not made yet, as the Master says in the text (Sent. iv, D, human truth. Now an oath confirms a thing with the Di- 28). vine truth. Since then words expressive of consent in the Reply to Objection 1. The fulfilling of a lawful present in which there is mere human truth complete a oath is of Divine law, but not the fulfilling of an unlaw- marriage, it would seem that much more is this the case ful oath. Wherefore if a subsequent obligation makes with words of the future confirmed by an oath. that oath unlawful, whereas it was lawful before, he who Objection 3. Further, according to the Apostle does not keep the oath he took previously does not dis- (Heb. 6:16), “An oath for confirmation is the end of obey the Divine law. And so it is in the case in point; all. . . controversy”; wherefore in a court of justice at any since he swears unlawfully who promises unlawfully; and rate one must stand by an oath rather than by a mere af- a promise about another’s property is unlawful. Conse- firmation. Therefore if a man consent to marry a woman quently the subsequent consent by words of the present, by a simple affirmation expressed in words of the present, whereby a man transfers the power over his body to an- after having consented to marry another in words of the other woman, makes the previous oath unlawful which future confirmed by oath, it would seem that in the judg- was lawful before. ment of the Church he should be compelled to take the Reply to Objection 2. The Divine truth is most effi- first and not the second as his wife. cacious in confirming that to which it is applied. Hence Objection 4. Further, the simple uttering of words re- the Reply to the Third Objection is clear. lating to the future makes a betrothal. But the addition of Reply to Objection 4. The oath has some effect, not an oath must have some effect. Therefore it makes some- by causing a new obligation, but confirming that which thing more than a betrothal. Now beyond a betrothal there is already made, and thus he who violates it sins more is nothing but marriage. Therefore it makes a marriage. grievously. On the contrary, What is future is not yet. Now the 2805 Whether carnal intercourse after consent expressed in words of the future makes a Suppl. q. 46 a. 2 marriage? Objection 1. It would seem that carnal intercourse sent is lacking, since words, even though expressive of after consent expressed in words of the future makes a the present, would not make a marriage in the absence of marriage. For consent by deed is greater than consent by mental consent, as stated above (q. 45, a. 4). Secondly, in word. But he who has carnal intercourse consents by deed reference to the judgment of the Church; and since in the to the promise he has previously made. Therefore it would external tribunal judgment is given in accordance with ex- seem that much more does this make a marriage than if he ternal evidence, and since nothing is more expressly sig- were to consent to mere words referring to the present. nificant of consent than carnal intercourse, it follows that Objection 2. Further, not only explicit but also in- in the judgment of the Church carnal intercourse follow- terpretive consent makes a marriage. Now there can be ing on betrothal is declared to make a marriage, unless no better interpretation of consent than carnal intercourse. there appear clear signs of deceit or fraud∗ (De sponsal. Therefore marriage is completed thereby. et matrim., cap. Is qui fidem). Objection 3. Further, all carnal union outside mar- Reply to Objection 1. In reality he who has carnal riage is a sin. But the woman, seemingly, does not sin by intercourse consents by deed to the act of sexual union, admitting her betrothed to carnal intercourse. Therefore it and does not merely for this reason consent to marriage makes a marriage. except according to the interpretation of the law. Objection 4. Further, “Sin is not forgiven unless resti- Reply to Objection 2. This interpretation does not al- tution be made,” as Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Mace- ter the truth of the matter, but changes the judgment which don.). Now a man cannot reinstate a woman whom he has is about external things. violated under the pretense of marriage unless he marry Reply to Objection 3. If the woman admit her be- her. Therefore it would seem that even if, after his carnal trothed, thinking that he wishes to consummate the mar- intercourse, he happen to contract with another by words riage, she is excused from the sin, unless there be clear of the present tense, he is bound to return to the first; and signs of fraud; for instance if they differ considerably in this would not be the case unless he were married to her. birth or fortune, or some other evident sign appear. Never- Therefore carnal intercourse after consent referring to the theless the affianced husband is guilty of fornication, and future makes a marriage. should be punished for this fraud he has committed. On the contrary, Pope Nicholas I says (Resp. ad Con- Reply to Objection 4. In a case of this kind the affi- sult. Bulg. iii; Cap. Tuas dudum, De clandest. despons.), anced husband, before his marriage with the other woman, “Without the consent to marriage, other things, including is bound to marry the one to whom he was betrothed, if coition, are of no effect.” she be his equal or superior in rank. But if he has married Further, that which follows a thing does not make it. another woman, he is no longer able to fulfill his obliga- But carnal intercourse follows the actual marriage, as ef- tion, wherefore it suffices if he provide for her marriage. fect follows cause. Therefore it cannot make a marriage. Nor is he bound even to do this, according to some, if her I answer that, We may speak of marriage in two affianced husband is of much higher rank than she, or if ways. First, in reference to the tribunal of conscience, there be some evident sign of fraud, because it may be and thus in very truth carnal intercourse cannot complete presumed that in all probability she was not deceived but a marriage the promise of which has previously been pretended to be. made in words expressive of the future, if inward con- ∗ According to the pre-Tridentine legislation 2806 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 47 Of Compulsory and Conditional Consent (In Six Articles) We must now consider compulsory and conditional consent. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether compulsory consent is possible? (2) Whether a constant man can be compelled by fear? (3) Whether compulsory consent invalidates marriage? (4) Whether compulsory consent makes a marriage as regards the party using compulsion? (5) Whether conditional consent makes a marriage? (6) Whether one can be compelled by one’s father to marry? Whether a compulsory consent is possible? Suppl. q. 47 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that no consent can be riage also it is possible for the consent to be compulsory. compulsory. For, as stated above (Sent. ii, D, 25∗) the I answer that, Compulsion or violence is twofold. free-will cannot be compelled. Now consent is an act of One is the cause of absolute necessity, and violence of the free-will. Therefore it cannot be compulsory. this kind the Philosopher calls (Ethic. iii, 1) “violent Objection 2. Further, violent is the same as compul- simply,” as when by bodily strength one forces a per- sory. Now, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), “a son to move; the other causes conditional necessity, and violent action is one the principle of which is without, the the Philosopher calls this a “mixed violence,” as when a patient concurring not at all.” But the principle of consent person throws his merchandise overboard in order to save is always within. Therefore no consent can be compul- himself. In the latter kind of violence, although the thing sory. done is not voluntary in itself, yet taking into considera- Objection 3. Further, every sin is perfected by con- tion the circumstances of place and time it is voluntary. sent. But that which perfects a sin cannot be compulsory, And since actions are about particulars, it follows that it is for, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18), “no one voluntary simply, and involuntary in a certain respect (Cf. sins in what he cannot avoid.” Since then violence is de- Ia IIae, q. 6, a. 6). Wherefore this latter violence or com- fined by jurists (i, ff. de eo quod vi metusve) as the “force pulsion is consistent with consent, but not the former. And of a stronger being that cannot be repulsed,” it would seem since this compulsion results from one’s fear of a threat- that consent cannot be compulsory or violent. ening danger, it follows that this violence coincides with Objection 4. Further, power is opposed to liberty. But fear which, in a manner, compels the will, whereas the compulsion is allied to power, as appears from a definition former violence has to do with bodily actions. Moreover, of Tully’s in which he says that “compulsion is the force since the law considers not merely internal actions, but of one who exercises his power to detain a thing outside rather external actions, consequently it takes violence to its proper bounds.” Therefore the free-will cannot be com- mean absolute compulsion, for which reason it draws a pelled, and consequently neither can consent which is an distinction between violence and fear. Here, however, it is act thereof. a question of internal consent which cannot be influenced On the contrary, That which cannot be, cannot be an by compulsion or violence as distinct from fear. There- impediment. But compulsory consent is an impediment to fore as to the question at issue compulsion and fear are matrimony, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 29). There- the same. Now, according to lawyers fear is “the agita- fore consent can be compelled. tion of the mind occasioned by danger imminent or fu- Further, in marriage there is a contract. Now the will ture” (Ethic. iii, 1). can be compelled in the matter of contracts; for which rea- This suffices for the Replies to the Objections; for the son the law adjudges that restitution should be made of the first set of arguments consider the first kind of compul- whole, for it does not ratify “that which was done under sion, and the second set of arguments consider the second. compulsion or fear” (Sent. iv, D[29]). Therefore in mar- ∗ Ia IIae, q. 6, a. 4 2807 Whether a constant man can be compelled by fear? Suppl. q. 47 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that “a constant man”∗ the constant man is compelled to bear with the lesser evil cannot be compelled by fear. Because the nature of a con- through fear of the greater evil, but he is not compelled to stant man is not to be agitated in the midst of dangers. bear with the greater evil in order to avoid the lesser. But Since then fear is “agitation of the mind occasioned by the inconstant man is compelled to bear with the greater imminent danger,” it would seem that he is not compelled evil through fear of a lesser evil, namely to commit sin by fear. through fear of bodily suffering; whereas on the contrary Objection 2. Further, “Of all fearsome things death is the obstinate man cannot be compelled even to permit or the limit,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6), as to do a lesser evil, in order to avoid a greater. Hence the though it were the most perfect of all things that inspire constant man is a mean between the inconstant and the fear. But the constant man is not compelled by death, obstinate. Secondly, they differ as to their estimate of the since the brave face even mortal dangers. Therefore no threatening evil, for a constant man is not compelled un- fear influences a constant man. less for grave and probable reasons, while the inconstant Objection 3. Further, of all dangers a good man fears man is compelled by trifling motives: “The wicked man most that which affects his good name. But the fear of seeth when no man pursueth” (Prov. 28:1). disgrace is not reckoned to influence a constant man, be- Reply to Objection 1. The constant man, like the cause, according to the law (vii, ff, de eo quod metus, brave man, is fearless, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. etc.), “fear of disgrace is not included under the ordinance, iii, 4), not that he is altogether without fear, but because ‘That which is done through fear’ ”†. Therefore neither he fears not what he ought not to fear, or where, or when does any other kind of fear influence a constant man. he ought not to fear. Objection 4. Further, in him who is compelled by Reply to Objection 2. Sin is the greatest of evils, and fear, fear leaves a sin, for it makes him promise what he is consequently a constant man can nowise be compelled to unwilling to fulfill, and thus it makes him lie. But a con- sin; indeed a man should die rather than suffer the like, stant man does not commit a sin, not even a very slight as again the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6,9). Yet cer- one, for fear. Therefore no fear influences a constant man. tain bodily injuries are less grievous than certain others; On the contrary, Abraham and Isaac were constant. and chief among them are those which relate to the per- Yet they were influenced by fear, since on account of fear son, such as death, blows, the stain resulting from rape, each said that his wife was his sister (Gn. 12:12; 26:7). and slavery. Wherefore the like compel a constant man Further, wherever there is mixed violence, it is fear to suffer other bodily injuries. They are contained in the that compels. But however constant a man may be he may verse: “Rape, status, blows, and death.” Nor does it mat- suffer violence of that kind, for if he be on the sea, he will ter whether they refer to his own person, or to the person throw his merchandise overboard if menaced with ship- of his wife or children, or the like. wreck. Therefore fear can influence a constant man. Reply to Objection 3. Although disgrace is a greater I answer that, By fear influencing a man we mean injury it is easy to remedy it. Hence fear of disgrace is not his being compelled by fear. A man is compelled by fear reckoned to influence a constant man according to law. when he does that which otherwise he would not wish to Reply to Objection 4. The constant man is not com- do, in order to avoid that which he fears. Now the constant pelled to lie, because at the time he wishes to give; yet differs from the inconstant man in two respects. First, afterwards he wishes to ask for restitution, or at least to in respect of the quality of the danger feared, because appeal to the judge, if he promised not to ask for restitu- the constant man follows right reason, whereby he knows tion. But he cannot promise not to appeal, for since this whether to omit this rather than that, and whether to do is contrary to the good of justice, he cannot be compelled this rather than that. Now the lesser evil or the greater thereto, namely to act against justice. good is always to be chosen in preference; and therefore Whether compulsory consent invalidates a marriage? Suppl. q. 47 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that compulsory consent pelled by fear to consent is bound by his marriage. does not invalidate a marriage. For just as consent is nec- Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher essary for matrimony, so is intention necessary for Bap- (Ethic. iii, 1), that which is done on account of mixed vi- tism. Now one who is compelled by fear to receive Bap- olence is more voluntary than involuntary. Now consent tism, receives the sacrament. Therefore one who is com- cannot be compelled except by mixed violence. There- ∗ Cap. Ad audientiam, De his quae vi. † Dig. iv, 2, Quod metus causa 2808 fore it is not entirely involuntary, and consequently the the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4), is a measure in all human marriage is valid. actions. Objection 3. Further, seemingly he who has con- However, some say that if there be consent although sented to marriage under compulsion ought to be coun- compulsory, the marriage is valid in conscience and in seled to stand to that marriage; because to promise and God’s sight, but not in the eyes of the Church, who pre- not to fulfill has an “appearance of evil,” and the Apostle sumes that there was no inward consent on account of wishes us to refrain from all such things (1 Thess 5:22). the fear. But this is of no account, because the Church But that would not be the case if compulsory consent in- should not presume a person to sin until it be proved; and validated a marriage altogether. Therefore, etc. he sinned if he said that he consented whereas he did not On the contrary, A Decretal says (cap. Cum locum, consent. Wherefore the Church presumes that he did con- De sponsal. et matrim.): “Since there is no room for con- sent, but judges this compulsory consent to be insufficient sent where fear or compulsion enters in, it follows that for a valid marriage. where a person’s consent is required, every pretext for Reply to Objection 1. The intention is not the effi- compulsion must be set aside.” Now mutual contract is cient cause of the sacrament in baptism, it is merely the necessary in marriage. Therefore, etc. cause that elicits the action of the agent; whereas the con- Further, Matrimony signifies the union of Christ with sent is the efficient cause in matrimony. Hence the com- the Church, which union is according to the liberty of parison fails. love. Therefore it cannot be the result of compulsory con- Reply to Objection 2. Not any kind of voluntariness sent. suffices for marriage: it must be completely voluntary, be- I answer that, The marriage bond is everlasting. cause it has to be perpetual; and consequently it is invali- Hence whatever is inconsistent with its perpetuity inval- dated by violence of a mixed nature. idates marriage. Now the fear which compels a constant Reply to Objection 3. He ought not always to be ad- man deprives the contract of its perpetuity, since its com- vised to stand to that marriage, but only when evil results plete rescission can be demanded. Wherefore this com- are feared from its dissolution. Nor does he sin if he does pulsion by fear which influences a constant man, invali- otherwise, because there is no appearance of evil in not dates marriage, but not the other compulsion. Now a con- fulfilling a promise that one has made unwillingly. stant man is reckoned a virtuous man who, according to Whether compulsory consent makes a marriage as regards the party who uses com-Suppl. q. 47 a. 4 pulsion? Objection 1. It would seem that compulsory consent arising in the other, it follows that whatever is an imped- makes a marriage, at least as regards the party who uses iment to matrimony in the one, is an impediment to mat- compulsion. For matrimony is a sign of a spiritual union. rimony in the other; since it is impossible for a man to be But spiritual union which is by charity may be with one the husband of one who is not his wife, or for a woman who has not charity. Therefore marriage is possible with to be a wife without a husband, just as it is impossible to one who wills it not. be a mother without having a child. Hence it is a common Objection 2. Further, if she who was compelled con- saying that “marriage is not lame.” sents afterwards, it will be a true marriage. But he who Reply to Objection 1. Although the act of the lover compelled her before is not bound by her consent. There- can be directed to one who loves not, there can be no fore he was married to her by virtue of the consent he gave union between them, unless love be mutual. Wherefore before. the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 2) that friendship which On the contrary, Matrimony is an equiparant rela- consists in a kind of union requires a return of love. tion. Now a relation of that kind is equally in both terms. Reply to Objection 2. Marriage does not result from Therefore if there is an impediment on the part of one, the consent of her who was compelled before, except in so there will be no marriage on the part of the other. far as the other party’s previous consent remains in force; I answer that, Since marriage is a kind of relation, wherefore if he were to withdraw his consent there would and a relation cannot arise in one of the terms without be no marriage. 2809 Whether conditional consent makes a marriage? Suppl. q. 47 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that not even a condi- contrary to marriage, whether it be moral or immoral, the tional consent makes a marriage, because a statement is marriage holds if the condition is verified, and is invalid not made simply if it is made subject to a condition. But if the condition is not verified. If, however, it be contrary in marriage the words expressive of consent must be ut- to the marriage blessings, the marriage is invalid, as we tered simply. Therefore a conditional consent makes no have also said in reference to betrothals (q. 43, a. 1). But marriage. if the condition refer to the future, it is either necessary, Objection 2. Further, marriage should be certain. But as that the sun will rise tomorrow—and then the marriage where a statement is made under a condition it is rendered is valid, because such future things are present in their doubtful. Therefore a like consent makes no marriage. causes—or else it is contingent, as the payment of a sum On the contrary, In other contracts an obligation is of money, or the consent of the parents, and then the judg- undertaken conditionally, and holds so long as the condi- ment about a consent of this kind is the same as about a tion holds. Therefore since marriage is a contract, it would consent expressed in words of the future tense; wherefore seem that it can be made by a conditional consent. it makes no marriage. I answer that, The condition made is either of the This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. present or of the future. If it is of the present and is not Whether one can be compelled by one’s father’s command to marry? Suppl. q. 47 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that one can be compelled in the same way as he is affected by that cause, so that if by one’s father’s command to marry. For it is written (Col. the cause be compelling as indicating either obligation or 3:20): “Children, obey your parents in all things.” There- fitness, his father’s command will compel him in the same fore they are bound to obey them in this also. measure: otherwise he may not compel him. Objection 2. Further, Isaac charged Jacob (Gn. 28:1) Reply to Objection 1. The words of the Apostle do not to take a wife from the daughters of Chanaan. But he not refer to those matters in which a man is his own mas- would not have charged him thus unless he had the right ter as the father is. Such is marriage by which the son also to command it. Therefore a son is bound to obey his father becomes a father. in this. Reply to Objection 2. There were other motives why Objection 3. Further, no one should promise, es- Jacob was bound to do what Isaac commanded him, both pecially with an oath, for one whom he cannot compel on account of the wickedness of those women, and be- to keep the promise. Now parents promise future mar- cause the seed of Chanaan was to be cast forth from the riages for their children, and even confirm their promise land which was promised to the seed of the patriarchs. by oath. Therefore they can compel their children to keep Hence Isaac could command this. that promise. Reply to Objection 3. They do not swear except with Objection 4. Further, our spiritual father, the Pope to the implied condition “if it please them”; and they are wit, can by his command compel a man to a spiritual mar- bound to induce them in good faith. riage, namely to accept a bishopric. Therefore a carnal Reply to Objection 4. Some say that the Pope cannot father can compel his son to marriage. command a man to accept a bishopric, because consent On the contrary, A son may lawfully enter religion should be free. But if this be granted there would be an though his father command him to marry. Therefore he is end of ecclesiastical order, for unless a man can be com- not bound to obey him in this. pelled to accept the government of a church, the Church Further, if he were bound to obey, a betrothal con- could not be preserved, since sometimes those who are tracted by the parents would hold good without their chil- qualified for the purpose are unwilling to accept unless dren’s consent. But this is against the law (cap. Ex litteris, they be compelled. Therefore we must reply that the two De despon. impub.). Therefore, etc. cases are not parallel; for there is no bodily service in a I answer that, Since in marriage there is a kind of spiritual marriage as there is in the bodily marriage; be- perpetual service, as it were, a father cannot by his com- cause the spiritual marriage is a kind of office for dispens- mand compel his son to marry, since the latter is of free ing the public weal: “Let a man so account of us as of the condition: but he may induce him for a reasonable cause; ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of and thus the son will be affected by his father’s command God” (1 Cor. 4:1). 2810 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 48 Of the Object of the Consent (In Two Articles) We must now consider the object of the consent. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether the consent that makes a marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse? (2) Whether consent to marry a person for an immoral motive makes a marriage? Whether the consent that makes a marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse? Suppl. q. 48 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the consent which sent that causes marriage a consent to carnal intercourse. makes a marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse. For Now, as stated above (q. 44, a. 1; q. 45, Aa. 1,2), mar- Jerome∗ says that “for those who have vowed virginity it riage is not essentially the carnal union itself, but a certain is wicked, not only to marry, but even to wish to marry.” joining together of husband and wife ordained to carnal But it would not be wicked unless it were contrary to vir- intercourse, and a further consequent union between hus- ginity, and marriage is not contrary to virginity except by band and wife, in so far as they each receive power over reason of carnal intercourse. Therefore the will’s consent the other in reference to carnal intercourse, which joining in marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse. together is called the nuptial bond. Hence it is evident Objection 2. Further, whatever there is in marriage that they said well who asserted that to consent to mar- between husband and wife is lawful between brother and riage is to consent to carnal intercourse implicitly and not sister except carnal intercourse. But there cannot lawfully explicitly. For carnal intercourse is not to be understood, be a consent to marriage between them. Therefore the except as an effect is implicitly contained in its cause, for marriage consent is a consent to carnal intercourse. the power to have carnal intercourse, which power is the Objection 3. Further, if the woman say to the man: object of the consent, is the cause of carnal intercourse, “I consent to take thee provided however that you know just as the power to use one’s own property is the cause of me not,” it is not a marriage consent, because it contains the use. something against the essence of that consent. Yet this Reply to Objection 1. The reason why consent to would not be the case unless the marriage consent were a marriage after taking the vow of virginity is sinful, is be- consent to carnal intercourse. Therefore, etc. cause that consent gives a power to do what is unlawful: Objection 4. Further, in everything the beginning cor- even so would a man sin if he gave another man the power responds to the consummation. Now marriage is consum- to receive that which he has in deposit, and not only by ac- mated by carnal intercourse. Therefore, since it begins by tually delivering it to him. With regard to the consent of the consent, it would seem that the consent is to carnal the Blessed Virgin, we have spoken about it above (Sent. intercourse. iv, D, 3; IIIa, q. 29, a. 2). On the contrary, No one that consents to carnal inter- Reply to Objection 2. Between brother and sister course is a virgin in mind and body. Yet Blessed John the there can be no power of one over the other in relation to evangelist after consenting to marriage was a virgin both carnal intercourse, even as neither can there be lawfully in mind and body. Therefore he did not consent to carnal carnal intercourse itself. Consequently the argument does intercourse. not prove. Further, the effect corresponds to its cause. Now con- Reply to Objection 3. Such an explicit condition is sent is the cause of marriage. Since then carnal inter- contrary not only to the act but also to the power of carnal course is not essential to marriage, seemingly neither is intercourse, and therefore it is contrary to marriage. the consent which causes marriage a consent to carnal in- Reply to Objection 4. Marriage begun corresponds tercourse. to marriage consummated, as habit or power corresponds I answer that, The consent that makes a marriage is a to the act which is operation. consent to marriage, because the proper effect of the will The arguments on the contrary side show that consent is the thing willed. Wherefore, according as carnal inter- is not given explicitly to carnal intercourse; and this is course stands in relation to marriage, so far is the con- true. ∗ The words quoted are found implicitly in St. Augustine (De Bono Viduit ix) 2811 Whether marriage can result from one person’s consent to take another for a base Suppl. q. 48 a. 2 motive? Objection 1. It would seem that marriage cannot re- not altered by what comes after, but conversely; marriage sult from one person’s consent to take another for a base does not become good or evil by reason of that cause, but motive. For there is but one reason for one thing. Now the contracting parties to whom this cause is the essential marriage is one sacrament. Therefore it cannot result from end. And since accidental causes are infinite in number, it the intention of any other end than that for which it was follows that there can be an infinite number of such causes instituted by God; namely the begetting of children. in matrimony, some of which are good and some bad. Objection 2. Further, the marriage union is from God, Reply to Objection 1. This is true of the essential and according to Mat. 19:6, “What. . . God hath joined to- principal cause; but that which has one essential and prin- gether let no man put asunder.” But a union that is made cipal end may have several secondary essential ends, and for immoral motives is not from God. Therefore it is not an infinite number of accidental ends. a marriage. Reply to Objection 2. The joining together can be Objection 3. Further, in the other sacraments, if the taken for the relation itself which is marriage, and that is intention of the Church be not observed, the sacrament is always from God, and is good, whatever be its cause; or invalid. Now the intention of the Church in the sacrament for the act of those who are being joined together, and of matrimony is not directed to a base purpose. Therefore, thus it is sometimes evil and is not from God simply. Nor if a marriage be contracted for a base purpose, it will not is it unreasonable that an effect be from God, the cause of be a valid marriage. which is evil, such as a child born of adultery; for it is not Objection 4. Further, according to Boethius (De Diff., from that cause as evil, but as having some good in so far Topic. ii) “a thing is good if its end be good.” But matri- as it is from God, although it is not from God simply. mony is always good. Therefore it is not matrimony if it Reply to Objection 3. The intention of the Church is done for an evil end. whereby she intends to confer a sacrament is essential to Objection 5. Further, matrimony signifies the union each sacrament, so that if it be not observed, all sacra- of Christ with the Church; and in this there can be nothing ments are null. But the intention of the Church whereby base. Neither therefore can marriage be contracted for a she intends an advantage resulting from the sacrament be- base motive. longs to the well-being and not to the essence of a sacra- On the contrary, He who baptizes another for the ment; wherefore, if it be not observed, the sacrament is sake of gain baptizes validly. Therefore if a man marries none the less valid. Yet he who omits this intention sins; a woman for the purpose of gain it is a valid marriage. for instance if in baptism one intend not the healing of the Further, the same conclusion is proved by the exam- mind which the Church intends. In like manner he who ples and authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 30). intends to marry, although he fail to direct it to the end I answer that, The final cause of marriage may be which the Church intends, nevertheless contracts a valid taken as twofold, namely essential and accidental. The marriage. essential cause of marriage is the end to which it is by its Reply to Objection 4. This evil which is intended is very nature ordained, and this is always good, namely the the end not of marriage, but of the contracting parties. begetting of children and the avoiding of fornication. But Reply to Objection 5. The union itself, and not the the accidental final cause thereof is that which the con- action of those who are united, is the sign of the union tracting parties intend as the result of marriage. And since of Christ with the Church: wherefore the conclusion does that which is intended as the result of marriage is conse- not follow. quent upon marriage, and since that which comes first is 2812 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 49 Of the Marriage Goods∗ (In Six Articles) In the next place we must consider the marriage goods. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether certain goods are necessary in order to excuse marriage? (2) Whether those assigned are sufficient? (3) Whether the sacrament is the principal among the goods? (4) Whether the marriage act is excused from sin by the aforesaid goods? (5) Whether it can ever be excused from sin without them? (6) Whether in their absence it is always a mortal sin? Whether certain blessings are necessary in order to excuse marriage? Suppl. q. 49 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that certain blessings are allowed in the state of infirmity “by indulgence” (1 Cor. not necessary in order to excuse marriage. For just as the 7:6). Therefore it needs to be excused by certain goods. preservation of the individual which is effected by the nu- Further, the intercourse of fornication and that of mar- tritive power is intended by nature, so too is the preser- riage are of the same species as regards the species of na- vation of the species which is effected by marriage; and ture. But the intercourse of fornication is wrong in itself. indeed so much the more as the good of the species is Therefore, in order that the marriage intercourse be not better and more exalted than the good of the individual. wrong, something must be added to it to make it right, But no goods are necessary to excuse the act of the nutri- and draw it to another moral species. tive power. Neither therefore are they necessary to excuse I answer that, No wise man should allow himself to marriage. lose a thing except for some compensation in the shape Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher of an equal or better good. Wherefore for a thing that (Ethic. viii, 12) the friendship between husband and wife has a loss attached to it to be eligible, it needs to have is natural, and includes the virtuous, the useful, and the some good connected with it, which by compensating for pleasant. But that which is virtuous in itself needs no ex- that loss makes that thing ordinate and right. Now there cuse. Therefore neither should any goods be assigned for is a loss of reason incidental to the union of man and the excuse of matrimony. woman, both because the reason is carried away entirely Objection 3. Further, matrimony was instituted as a on account of the vehemence of the pleasure, so that it remedy and as an office, as stated above (q. 42, a. 2). Now is unable to understand anything at the same time, as the it needs no excuse in so far as it is instituted as an office, Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11); and again because of the since then it would also have needed an excuse in par- tribulation of the flesh which such persons have to suffer adise, which is false, for there, as Augustine says, “mar- from solicitude for temporal things (1 Cor. 7:28). Conse- riage would have been without reproach and the marriage- quently the choice of this union cannot be made ordinate bed without stain” (Gen. ad lit. ix). In like manner nei- except by certain compensations whereby that same union ther does it need an excuse in so far as it is intended as a is righted. and these are the goods which excuse marriage remedy, any more than the other sacraments which were and make it right. instituted as remedies for sin. Therefore matrimony does Reply to Objection 1. In the act of eating there is not not need these excuses. such an intense pleasure overpowering the reason as in Objection 4. Further, the virtues are directed to what- the aforesaid action, both because the generative power, ever can be done aright. If then marriage can be righted whereby original sin is transmitted, is infected and cor- by certain goods, it needs nothing else to right it besides rupt, whereas the nutritive power, by which original sin is the virtues of the soul; and consequently there is no need not transmitted, is neither corrupt nor infected; and again to assign to matrimony any goods whereby it is righted, because each one feels in himself a defect of the individ- any more than to other things in which the virtues direct ual more than a defect of the species. Hence, in order to us. entice a man to take food which supplies a defect of the On the contrary, Wherever there is indulgence, there individual, it is enough that he feel this defect; but in order must needs be some reason for excuse. Now marriage is to entice him to the act whereby a defect of the species is ∗ “Bona Matrimonii,” Variously Rendered Marriage Goods, Marriage Blessings, and Advantages of Marriage. 2813 remedied, Divine providence attached pleasure to that act, aspect of something useful and right; nevertheless both which moves even irrational animals in which there is not aspects belong to it from the fact that it has these goods the stain of original sin. Hence the comparison fails. by which it fulfills the office and affords a remedy to con- Reply to Objection 2. These goods which justify cupiscence. marriage belong to the nature of marriage, which conse- Reply to Objection 4. An act of virtue may derive quently needs them, not as extrinsic causes of its rectitude, its rectitude both from the virtue as its elicitive principle, but as causing in it that rectitude which belongs to it by and from its circumstances as its formal principles; and nature. the goods of marriage are related to marriage as circum- Reply to Objection 3. From the very fact that mar- stances to an act of virtue which owes it to those circum- riage is intended as an office or as a remedy it has the stances that it can be an act of virtue. Whether the goods of marriage are sufficiently enumerated? Suppl. q. 49 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the goods of marriage reckoned a condition of matrimony. are insufficiently enumerated by the Master (Sent. iv, D, I answer that, Matrimony is instituted both as an of- 31), namely “faith, offspring, and sacrament.” For the ob- fice of nature and as a sacrament of the Church. As an of- ject of marriage among men is not only the begetting and fice of nature it is directed by two things, like every other feeding of children, but also the partnership of a common virtuous act. one of these is required on the part of the life, whereby each one contributes his share of work to agent and is the intention of the due end, and thus the the common stock, as stated in Ethic. viii, 12. Therefore “offspring” is accounted a good of matrimony; the other as the offspring is reckoned a good of matrimony, so also is required on the part of the act, which is good generi- should the communication of works. cally through being about a due matter; and thus we have Objection 2. Further, the union of Christ with the “faith,” whereby a man has intercourse with his wife and Church, signified by matrimony, is the effect of charity. with no other woman. Besides this it has a certain good- Therefore charity rather than faith should be reckoned ness as a sacrament, and this is signified by the very word among the goods of matrimony. “sacrament.” Objection 3. Further, in matrimony, just as it is re- Reply to Objection 1. Offspring signifies not only the quired that neither party have intercourse with another, so begetting of children, but also their education, to which as is it required that the one pay the marriage debt to the its end is directed the entire communion of works that ex- other. Now the former pertains to faith according to the ists between man and wife as united in marriage, since Master (Sent. iv, D, 31). Therefore justice should also be parents naturally “lay up” for their “children” (2 Cor. reckoned among the goods of marriage on account of the 12:14); so that the offspring like a principal end includes payment of the debt. another, as it were, secondary end. Objection 4. Further, in matrimony as signifying the Reply to Objection 2. Faith is not taken here as a union of Christ with the Church, just as indivisibility is theological virtue, but as part of justice, in so far as faith required, so also is unity, whereby one man has one wife. [fides] signifies the suiting of deed to word [fiant dicta] by But the sacrament which is reckoned among the three keeping one’s promises; for since marriage is a contract marriage goods pertains to indivisibility. Therefore there it contains a promise whereby this man is assigned to this should be something else pertaining to unity. woman. Objection 5. On the other hand, it would seem that Reply to Objection 3. Just as the marriage promise they are too many. For one virtue suffices to make one means that neither party is to have intercourse with a third act right. Now faith is one virtue. Therefore it was not party, so does it require that they should mutually pay the necessary to add two other goods to make marriage right. marriage debt. The latter is indeed the chief of the two, Objection 6. Further, the same cause does not make since it follows from the power which each receives over a thing both useful and virtuous, since the useful and the the other. Consequently both these things pertain to faith, virtuous are opposite divisions of the good. Now mar- although the Book of Sentences mentions that which is riage derives its character of useful from the offspring. the less manifest. Therefore the offspring should not be reckoned among the Reply to Objection 4. By sacrament we are to un- goods that make marriage virtuous. derstand not only indivisibility, but all those things that Objection 7. Further, nothing should be reckoned as result from marriage being a sign of Christ’s union with a property or condition of itself. Now these goods are the Church. We may also reply that the unity to which reckoned to be conditions of marriage. Therefore since the objection refers pertains to faith, just as indivisibility matrimony is a sacrament, the sacrament should not be belongs to the sacrament. 2814 Reply to Objection 5. Faith here does not denote a but its indissolubility, which is a sign of the same thing as virtue, but that condition of virtue which is a part of jus- matrimony is. tice and is called by the name of faith. We may also reply that although marriage is a sacra- Reply to Objection 6. Just as the right use of a use- ment, marriage as marriage is not the same as marriage ful good derives its rectitude not from the useful but from as a sacrament, since it was instituted not only as a sign the reason which causes the right use, so too direction to a of a sacred thing, but also as an office of nature. Hence useful good may cause the goodness of rectitude by virtue the sacramental aspect is a condition added to marriage of the reason causing the right direction; and in this way considered in itself, whence also it derives its rectitude. marriage, through being directed to the offspring, is use- Hence its sacramentality, if I may use the term, is reck- ful, and nevertheless righteous, inasmuch as it is directed oned among the goods which justify marriage; and ac- aright. cordingly this third good of marriage, the sacrament to Reply to Objection 7. As the Master says (Sent. iv, wit, denotes not only its indissolubility, but also whatever D, 31), sacrament here does not mean matrimony itself, pertains to its signification. Whether the sacrament is the chief of the marriage goods? Suppl. q. 49 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the “sacrament” is ments is more efficacious than human power. But “off- not the chief of the marriage goods. For the end is prin- spring” and “faith” pertain to matrimony as directed to an cipal in everything. Now the end of marriage is the off- office of human nature, whereas “sacrament” pertains to spring. Therefore the offspring is the chief marriage good. it as instituted by God. Therefore sacrament takes a more Objection 2. Further, in the specific nature the differ- important part in marriage than the other two. ence is more important than the genus, even as the form is I answer that, This or that may be more important more important than matter in the composition of a natu- to a thing in two ways, either because it is more essen- ral thing. Now “sacrament” refers to marriage on the part tial or because it is more excellent. If the reason is be- of its genus, while “offspring” and “faith” refer thereto on cause it is more excellent, then “sacrament” is in every the part of the difference whereby it is a special kind of way the most important of the three marriage goods, since sacrament. Therefore these other two are more important it belongs to marriage considered as a sacrament of grace; than sacrament in reference to marriage. while the other two belong to it as an office of nature; Objection 3. Further, just as we find marriage without and a perfection of grace is more excellent than a perfec- “offspring” and without “faith,” so do we find it without tion of nature. If, however, it is said to be more impor- indissolubility, as in the case where one of the parties en- tant because it is more essential, we must draw a distinc- ters religion before the marriage is consummated. There- tion; for “faith” and “offspring” can be considered in two fore neither from this point of view is “sacrament” the ways. First, in themselves, and thus they regard the use of most important marriage good. matrimony in begetting children and observing the mar- Objection 4. Further, an effect cannot be more im- riage compact; while inseparability, which is denoted by portant than its cause. Now consent, which is the cause “sacrament,” regards the very sacrament considered in it- of matrimony, is often changed. Therefore the marriage self, since from the very fact that by the marriage compact also can be dissolved and consequently inseparability is man and wife give to one another power the one over the not always a condition of marriage. other in perpetuity, it follows that they cannot be put asun- Objection 5. Further, the sacraments which produce der. Hence there is no matrimony without inseparabil- an everlasting effect imprint a character. But no character ity, whereas there is matrimony without “faith” and “off- is imprinted in matrimony. Therefore it is not conditioned spring,” because the existence of a thing does not depend by a lasting inseparability. Consequently just as there is on its use; and in this sense “sacrament” is more essen- marriage without “offspring” so is there marriage with- tial to matrimony than “faith” and “offspring.” Secondly, out “sacrament,” and thus the same conclusion follows as “faith” and “offspring” may be considered as in their prin- above. ciples, so that “offspring” denote the intention of having On the contrary, That which has a place in the defini- children, and “faith” the duty of remaining faithful, and tion of a thing is most essential thereto. Now inseparabil- there can be no matrimony without these also, since they ity, which pertains to sacrament, is placed in the definition are caused in matrimony by the marriage compact itself, of marriage (q. 44, a. 3), while offspring and faith are not. so that if anything contrary to these were expressed in the Therefore among the other goods sacrament is the most consent which makes a marriage, the marriage would be essential to matrimony. invalid. Taking “faith” and “offspring” in this sense, it is Further, the Divine power which works in the sacra- clear that “offspring” is the most essential thing in mar- 2815 riage, secondly “faith,” and thirdly “sacrament”; even as union, or by spiritual death after a merely spiritual union. to man it is more essential to be in nature than to be in Reply to Objection 4. Although the consent which grace, although it is more excellent to be in grace. makes a marriage is not everlasting materially, i.e. in re- Reply to Objection 1. The end as regards the inten- gard to the substance of the act, since that act ceases and a tion stands first in a thing, but as regards the attainment it contrary act may succeed it, nevertheless formally speak- stands last. It is the same with “offspring” among the mar- ing it is everlasting, because it is a consent to an ever last- riage goods; wherefore in a way it is the most important ing bond, else it would not make a marriage, for a consent and in another way it is not. to take a woman for a time makes no marriage. Hence it is Reply to Objection 2. Sacrament, even as holding the everlasting formally, inasmuch as an act takes its species third place among the marriage goods, belongs to matri- from its object; and thus it is that matrimony derives its mony by reason of its difference; for it is called “sacra- inseparability from the consent. ment” from its signification of that particular sacred thing Reply to Objection 5. In those sacraments wherein which matrimony signifies. a character is imprinted, power is given to perform spiri- Reply to Objection 3. According to Augustine (De tual actions; but in matrimony, to perform bodily actions. Bono Conjug. ix), marriage is a good of mortals, where- Wherefore matrimony by reason of the power which man fore in the resurrection “they shall neither marry nor be and wife receive over one another agrees with the sacra- married” (Mat. 22:30). Hence the marriage bond does ments in which a character is imprinted, and from this it not last after the life wherein it is contracted, and con- derives its inseparability, as the Master says (Sent. iv, D, sequently it is said to be inseparable, because it cannot be 31); yet it differs from them in so far as that power regards sundered in this life, but either by bodily death after carnal bodily acts; hence it does not confer a spiritual character. Whether the marriage act is excused by the aforesaid goods? Suppl. q. 49 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the marriage act can- like circumstances are sufficient to prevent an action from not be altogether excused from sin by the aforesaid goods. being evil. Therefore these goods can excuse marriage so For whoever allows himself to lose a greater good for that it is nowise a sin. the sake of a lesser good sins because he allows it inor- I answer that, An act is said to be excused in two dinately. Now the good of reason which is prejudiced ways. First, on the part of the agent, so that although it in the marriage act is greater than these three marriage be evil it is not imputed as sin to the agent, or at least not goods. Therefore the aforesaid goods do not suffice to as so grave a sin. thus ignorance is said to excuse a sin excuse marriage intercourse. wholly or partly. Secondly, an act is said to be excused on Objection 2. Further, if a moral good be added to a its part, so that, namely, it is not evil; and it is thus that the moral evil the sum total is evil and not good, since one aforesaid goods are said to excuse the marriage act. Now evil circumstance makes an action evil, whereas one good it is from the same cause that an act is not morally evil, circumstance does not make it good. Now the marriage and that it is good, since there is no such thing as an indif- act is evil in itself, else it would need no excuse. There- ferent act, as was stated in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, fore the addition of the marriage goods cannot make the 40; Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 9). Now a human act is said to be good act good. in two ways. In one way by goodness of virtue, and thus Objection 3. Further, wherever there is immoderate an act derives its goodness from those things which place passion there is moral vice. Now the marriage goods can- it in the mean. This is what “faith” and “offspring” do in not prevent the pleasure in that act from being immoder- the marriage act, as stated above (a. 2). In another way, ate. Therefore they cannot excuse it from being a sin. by goodness of the “sacrament,” in which way an act is Objection 4. Further, according to Damascene (De said to be not only good, but also holy, and the marriage Fide Orth. ii, 15), shame is only caused by a disgraceful act derives this goodness from the indissolubility of the deed. Now the marriage goods do not deprive that deed of union, in respect of which it signifies the union of Christ its shame. Therefore they cannot excuse it from sin. with the Church. Thus it is clear that the aforesaid goods On the contrary, The marriage act differs not from sufficiently excuse the marriage act. fornication except by the marriage goods. If therefore Reply to Objection 1. By the marriage act man does these were not sufficient to excuse it marriage would be not incur harm to his reason as to habit, but only as to always unlawful; and this is contrary to what was stated act. Nor is it unfitting that a certain act which is generi- above (q. 41, a. 3). cally better be sometimes interrupted for some less good Further, the marriage goods are related to its act as its act; for it is possible to do this without sin, as in the case due circumstances, as stated above (a. 1, ad 4). Now the of one who ceases from the act of contemplation in order 2816 meanwhile to devote himself to action. that it is reckoned to be immoderate. Now the pleasure Reply to Objection 2. This argument would avail if attaching to the marriage act, while it is most intense in the evil that is inseparable from carnal intercourse were point of quantity, does not go beyond the bounds previ- an evil of sin. But in this case it is an evil not of sin but ously appointed by reason before the commencement of of punishment alone, consisting in the rebellion of concu- the act, although reason is unable to regulate them during piscence against reason; and consequently the conclusion the pleasure itself. does not follow. Reply to Objection 4. The turpitude that always ac- Reply to Objection 3. The excess of passion that companies the marriage act and always causes shame is amounts to a sin does not refer to the passion’s quantita- the turpitude of punishment, not of sin, for man is natu- tive intensity, but to its proportion to reason; wherefore it rally ashamed of any defect. is only when a passion goes beyond the bounds of reason Whether the marriage act can be excused without the marriage goods? Suppl. q. 49 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the marriage act can fornication is always evil. Therefore the marriage act also be excused even without the marriage goods. For he who will always be evil unless it be excused by the aforesaid is moved by nature alone to the marriage act, apparently goods. does not intend any of the marriage goods, since the mar- I answer that, Just as the marriage goods, in so far as riage goods pertain to grace or virtue. Yet when a person they consist in a habit, make a marriage honest and holy, is moved to the aforesaid act by the natural appetite alone, so too, in so far as they are in the actual intention, they seemingly he commits no sin, for nothing natural is an make the marriage act honest, as regards those two mar- evil, since “evil is contrary to nature and order,” as Diony- riage goods which relate to the marriage act. Hence when sius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore the marriage act can married persons come together for the purpose of beget- be excused even without the marriage goods. ting children, or of paying the debt to one another (which Objection 2. Further, he who has intercourse with pertains to “faith”) they are wholly excused from sin. But his wife in order to avoid fornication, does not seemingly the third good does not relate to the use of marriage, but to intend any of the marriage goods. Yet he does not sin ap- its excuse, as stated above (a. 3); wherefore it makes mar- parently, because marriage was granted to human weak- riage itself honest, but not its act, as though its act were ness for the very purpose of avoiding fornication (1 Cor. wholly excused from sin, through being done on account 7:2,6). Therefore the marriage act can be excused even of some signification. Consequently there are only two without the marriage goods. ways in which married persons can come together with- Objection 3. Further, he who uses as he will that out any sin at all, namely in order to have offspring, and which is his own does not act against justice, and thus in order to pay the debt. otherwise it is always at least a seemingly does not sin. Now marriage makes the wife venial sin. the husband’s own, and “vice versa.” Therefore, if they Reply to Objection 1. The offspring considered as a use one another at will through the instigation of lust, it marriage good includes something besides the offspring would seem that it is no sin; and thus the same conclusion as a good intended by nature. For nature intends offspring follows. as safeguarding the good of the species, whereas the off- Objection 4. Further, that which is good generically spring as a good of the sacrament of marriage includes does not become evil unless it be done with an evil in- besides this the directing of the child to God. Wherefore tention. Now the marriage act whereby a husband knows the intention of nature which intends the offspring must his wife is generically good. Therefore it cannot be evil needs be referred either actually or habitually to the inten- unless it be done with an evil intention. Now it can be tion of having an offspring, as a good of the sacrament: done with a good intention, even without intending any otherwise the intention would go no further than a crea- marriage good, for instance by intending to keep or ac- ture; and this is always a sin. Consequently whenever quire bodily health. Therefore it seems that this act can be nature alone moves a person to the marriage act, he is not excused even without the marriage goods. wholly excused from sin, except in so far as the move- On the contrary, If the cause be removed the effect is ment of nature is further directed actually or habitually removed. Now the marriage goods are the cause of recti- to the offspring as a good of the sacrament. Nor does it tude in the marriage act. Therefore the marriage act can- follow that the instigation of nature is evil, but that it is not be excused without them. imperfect unless it be further directed to some marriage Further, the aforesaid act does not differ from the act good. of fornication except in the aforesaid goods. But the act of Reply to Objection 2. If a man intends by the mar- 2817 riage act to prevent fornication in his wife, it is no sin, use is good, but when one uses it as one ought according because this is a kind of payment of the debt that comes to all the circumstances. under the good of “faith.” But if he intends to avoid for- Reply to Objection 4. Although it is not evil in it- nication in himself, then there is a certain superfluity, and self to intend to keep oneself in good health, this intention accordingly there is a venial sin, nor was the sacrament becomes evil, if one intend health by means of something instituted for that purpose, except by indulgence, which that is not naturally ordained for that purpose; for instance regards venial sins. if one sought only bodily health by the sacrament of bap- Reply to Objection 3. One due circumstance does not tism, and the same applies to the marriage act in the ques- suffice to make a good act, and consequently it does not tion at issue. follow that, no matter how one use one’s own property, the Whether it is a mortal sin for a man to have knowledge of his wife, with the intention Suppl. q. 49 a. 6 not of a marriage good but merely of pleasure? Objection 1. It would seem that whenever a man has it is wholly void of venial sin; so that it would be a mor- knowledge of his wife, with the intention not of a mar- tal sin to seek pleasure in this act, a venial sin to take the riage good but merely of pleasure, he commits a mortal pleasure when offered, but that perfection requires one to sin. For according to Jerome (Comment. in Eph. 5:25), as detest it. But this is impossible, since according to the quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 31), “the pleasure taken in Philosopher (Ethic. x, 3,4) the same judgment applies to the embraces of a wanton is damnable in a husband.” Now pleasure as to action, because pleasure in a good action is nothing but mortal sin is said to be damnable. Therefore good, and in an evil action, evil; wherefore, as the mar- it is always a mortal sin to have knowledge of one’s wife riage act is not evil in itself, neither will it be always a for mere pleasure. mortal sin to seek pleasure therein. Consequently the right Objection 2. Further, consent to pleasure is a mortal answer to this question is that if pleasure be sought in such sin, as stated in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 24). Now a way as to exclude the honesty of marriage, so that, to whoever knows his wife for the sake of pleasure consents wit, it is not as a wife but as a woman that a man treats to the pleasure. Therefore he sins mortally. his wife, and that he is ready to use her in the same way Objection 3. Further, whoever fails to refer the use of if she were not his wife, it is a mortal sin; wherefore such a creature to God enjoys a creature, and this is a mortal a man is said to be too ardent a lover of his wife, because sin. But whoever uses his wife for mere pleasure does not his ardor carries him away from the goods of marriage. If, refer that use to God. Therefore he sins mortally. however, he seek pleasure within the bounds of marriage, Objection 4. Further, no one should be excommu- so that it would not be sought in another than his wife, it nicated except for a mortal sin. Now according to the is a venial sin. text (Sent. ii, D, 24) a man who knows his wife for mere Reply to Objection 1. A man seeks wanton pleasure pleasure is debarred from entering the Church, as though in his wife when he sees no more in her that he would in he were excommunicate. Therefore every such man sins a wanton. mortally. Reply to Objection 2. Consent to the pleasure of the On the contrary, As stated in the text (Sent. ii, D, intercourse that is a mortal sin is itself a mortal sin; but 24), according to Augustine (Contra Jul. ii, 10; De De- such is not the consent to the marriage act. cem Chord. xi; Serm. xli, de Sanct.), carnal intercourse Reply to Objection 3. Although he does not actually of this kind is one of the daily sins, for which we say the refer the pleasure to God, he does not place his will’s last “Our Father.” Now these are not mortal sins. Therefore, end therein; otherwise he would seek it anywhere indiffer- etc. ently. Hence it does not follow that he enjoys a creature; Further, it is no mortal sin to take food for mere plea- but he uses a creature actually for his own sake, and him- sure. Therefore in like manner it is not a mortal sin for a self habitually, though not actually, for God’s sake. man to use his wife merely to satisfy his desire. Reply to Objection 4. The reason for this statement is I answer that, Some say that whenever pleasure is not that man deserves to be excommunicated for this sin, the chief motive for the marriage act it is a mortal sin; that but because he renders himself unfit for spiritual things, when it is an indirect motive it is a venial sin; and that since in that act, he becomes flesh and nothing more. when it spurns the pleasure altogether and is displeasing, 2818 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 50 Of the Impediments of Marriage, in General (In One Article) In the next place we must consider the impediments of marriage: (1) In general; (2) In particular. Whether it is fitting that impediments should be assigned to marriage? Suppl. q. 50 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem unfitting for impediments there should be an infinite number of impediments to mar- to be assigned to marriage. For marriage is a sacrament riage. For marriage is a good. Now good may be lack- condivided with the others. But no impediments are as- ing in an infinite number of ways, as Dionysius says (Div. signed to the others. Neither therefore should they be as- Nom. iii). Therefore there is an infinite number of imped- signed to marriage. iments to marriage. Objection 2. Further, the less perfect a thing is the Objection 9. Further, the impediments to marriage fewer its obstacles. Now matrimony is the least perfect of arise from the conditions of individuals. But such like the sacraments. Therefore it should have either no imped- conditions are infinite in number. Therefore the impedi- iments or very few. ments to marriage are also infinite. Objection 3. Further, wherever there is disease, it is I answer that, In marriage, as in other sacraments, necessary to have a remedy for the disease. Now concu- there are certain things essential to marriage, and others piscence, a remedy for which is permitted in matrimony that belong to its solemnization. And since even without (1 Cor. 7:6), is in all. Therefore there should not be any the things that pertain to its solemnization it is still a true impediment making it altogether unlawful for a particular sacrament, as also in the case of the other sacraments, it person to marry. follows that the impediments to those things that pertain to Objection 4. Further, unlawful means against the law. the solemnization of this sacrament do not derogate from Now these impediments that are assigned to matrimony the validity of the marriage. These impediments are said are not against the natural law, because they are not found to hinder the contracting of marriage, but they do not dis- to be the same in each state of the human race, since solve the marriage once contracted; such are the veto of more degrees of kindred come under prohibition at one the Church, or the holy seasons. Hence the verse: time than at another. Nor, seemingly, can human law set “The veto of the Church and holy tide impediments against marriage, since marriage, like the Forbid the knot, but loose it not if tied.” other sacraments, is not of human but of Divine institu- On the other hand, those impediments which regard tion. Therefore impediments should not be assigned to the essentials of marriage make a marriage invalid, where- marriage, making it unlawful for a person to marry. fore they are said not only to hinder the contracting of Objection 5. Further, lawful and unlawful differ as marriage, but to dissolve it if contracted; and they are con- that which is against the law from that which is not, and tained in the following verse: between these there is no middle term, since they are op- “Error, station, vow, kinship, crime, posed according to affirmation and negation. Therefore Difference of worship, force, holy orders, there cannot be impediments to marriage, placing a per- Marriage bond, honesty, affinity, impotence, son in a middle position between those who are lawful All these forbid marriage, and annul it though and those who are unlawful subjects of marriage. contracted.” Objection 6. Further, union of man and woman is The reason for this number may be explained as fol- unlawful save in marriage. Now every unlawful union lows: Marriage may be hindered either on the part of the should be dissolved. Therefore if anything prevent a mar- contract or in regard to the contracting parties. If in the riage being contracted, it will “de facto” dissolve it after first way, since the marriage contract is made by voluntary it has been contracted; and thus impediments should not consent, and this is incompatible with either ignorance be assigned to marriage, which hinder it from being con- or violence, there will be two impediments to marriage, tracted, and dissolve it after it has been contracted. namely “force,” i.e. compulsion, and “error” in reference Objection 7. Further, no impediment can remove to ignorance. Wherefore the Master pronounced on these from a thing that which is part of its definition. Now indis- two impediments when treating of the cause of matrimony solubility is part of the definition of marriage. Therefore (Sent. iv, DD 29,30). Here, however, he is treating of the there cannot be any impediments which annul a marriage impediments as arising from the contracting parties, and already contracted. these may be differentiated as follows. A person may be Objection 8. On the other hand, it would seem that hindered from contracting marriage either simply, or with 2819 some particular person. If simply, so that he be unable to hindered in more ways, in so far as more conditions are re-contract marriage with any woman, this can only be be- quired for them. And if an imperfect thing requires more cause he is hindered from performing the marriage act. conditions, there will be more impediments to it; and thus This happens in two ways. First, because he cannot “de it is in matrimony. facto,” either through being altogether unable—and thus Reply to Objection 3. This argument would hold, we have the impediment of “impotence”—or through be- were there no other and more efficacious remedies for the ing unable to do so freely, and thus we have the impedi- disease of concupiscence; which is false. ment of the “condition of slavery.” Secondly, because he Reply to Objection 4. Persons are said to be unlaw- cannot do it lawfully, and this because he is bound to con- ful subjects for marriage through being contrary to the law tinence, which happens in two ways, either through his whereby marriage is established. Now marriage as fulfill- being bound on account of the office he has undertaken to ing an office of nature is established by the natural law; fulfill—and thus we have the impediment of “Order”—or as a sacrament, by the Divine law; as fulfilling an office on account of his having taken a vow—and thus “Vow” is of society, by the civil law. Consequently a person may an impediment. be rendered an unlawful subject of marriage by any of the If, however, a person is hindered from marrying, not aforesaid laws. Nor does the comparison with the other simply but in reference to a particular person, this is either sacraments hold, for they are sacraments only. And since because he is bound to another person, and thus he who the natural law is particularized in various ways according is married to one cannot marry another, which constitutes to the various states of mankind, and since positive law, the impediment of the “bond of marriage”—or through too, varies according to the various conditions of men, the lack of proportion to the other party, and this for three Master (Sent. iv, D, 34) asserts that at various times vari- reasons. First, on account of too great a distance separat- ous persons have been unlawful subjects of marriage. ing them, and thus we have “difference of worship”; sec- Reply to Objection 5. The law may forbid a thing ondly, on account of their being too closely related, and either altogether, or in part and in certain cases. Hence thus we have three impediments, namely “kinship,” then between that which is altogether according to the law and “affinity,” which denotes the close relationship between that which is altogether against the law (which are op- two persons, in reference to a third united to one of them posed by contrariety and not according to affirmation and by marriage, and the “justice of public honesty,” where we negation), that which is somewhat according to the law have a close relationship between two persons arising out and somewhat against the law is a middle term. For this of the betrothal of one of them to a third person; thirdly, reason certain persons hold a middle place between those on account of a previous undue union between him and who are simply lawful subjects and those who are simply the woman, and thus the “crime of adultery” previously unlawful. committed with her is an impediment. Reply to Objection 6. Those impediments which do Reply to Objection 1. There may be impediments to not annul a marriage already contracted sometimes hin- the other sacraments also in the omission either of that der a marriage from being contracted, by rendering it not which is essential, or of that which pertains to the sol- invalid but unlawful. And if it be contracted it is a true emnization of the sacrament, as stated above. However, marriage although the contracting parties sin; just as by impediments are assigned to matrimony rather than to the consecrating after breaking one’s fast one would sin by other sacraments for three reasons. First, because matri- disobeying the Church’s ordinance, and yet it would be a mony consists of two persons, and consequently can be valid sacrament because it is not essential to the sacrament impeded in more ways than the other sacraments which that the consecrator be fasting. refer to one person taken individually; secondly, because Reply to Objection 7. When we say that the afore- matrimony has its cause in us and in God, while some said impediments annul marriage already contracted, we of the other sacraments have their cause in God alone. do not mean that they dissolve a marriage contracted in Wherefore penance which in a manner has a cause in us, due form, but that they dissolve a marriage contracted “de is assigned certain impediments by the Master (Sent. iv, facto” and not “de jure.” Wherefore if an impediment su- D, 16), such as hypocrisy, the public games, and so forth; pervene after a marriage has been contracted in due form, thirdly, because other sacraments are objects of command it cannot dissolve the marriage. or counsel, as being more perfect goods, whereas mar- Reply to Objection 8. The impediments that hinder riage is a matter of indulgence, as being a less perfect a good accidentally are infinite in number, like all acci- good (1 Cor. 7:6). Wherefore, in order to afford an oppor- dental causes. But the causes which of their own nature tunity of proficiency towards a greater good, more imped- corrupt a certain good are directed to that effect, and de- iments are assigned to matrimony than to the other sacra- terminate, even as are the causes which produce that good; ments. for the causes by which a thing is destroyed and those by Reply to Objection 2. The more perfect things can be which it is made are either contrary to one another, or the 2820 same but taken in a contrary way. ber; as instanced in medicine and all operative arts, which Reply to Objection 9. The conditions of particu- consider the conditions of particular persons in whom acts lar persons taken individually are infinite in number, but are. taken in general, they may be reduced to a certain num- 2821 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 51 Of the Impediment of Error (In Two Articles) We must now consider the impediments to matrimony in particular, and in the first place the impediment of error. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether error of its very nature is an impediment to matrimony? (2) What kind of error? Whether it is right to reckon error as an impediment to marriage? Suppl. q. 51 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that error should not be nature hinders the effect likewise. Now consent is the reckoned in itself an impediment to marriage. For con- cause of matrimony, as stated above (q. 45, a. 1). Hence sent, which is the efficient cause of marriage, is hindered whatever voids the consent, voids marriage. Now consent in the same way as the voluntary. Now the voluntary, ac- is an act of the will, presupposing an act of the intellect; cording to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), may be hin- and if the first be lacking, the second must needs be lack- dered by ignorance. But ignorance is not the same as ing also. Hence, when error hinders knowledge, there fol- error, because ignorance excludes knowledge altogether, lows a defect in the consent also, and consequently in the whereas error does not, since “error is to approve the false marriage. Therefore it is possible according to the natural as though it were true,” according to Augustine (De Trin. law for error to void marriage. ix, 11). Therefore ignorance rather than error should have Reply to Objection 1. Speaking simply, ignorance been reckoned here as an impediment to marriage. differs from error, because ignorance does not of its very Objection 2. Further, that which of its very nature nature imply an act of knowledge, while error supposes can be an impediment to marriage is in opposition to the a wrong judgment of reason about something. However, good of marriage. But error is not a thing of this kind. as regards being an impediment to the voluntary, it dif- Therefore error is not by its very nature an impediment to fers not whether we call it ignorance or error, since no marriage. ignorance can be an impediment to the voluntary, unless Objection 3. Further, just as consent is required for it have error in conjunction with it, because the will’s marriage, so is intention required for baptism. Now if act presupposes an estimate or judgment about something one were to baptize John, thinking to baptize Peter, John which is the object of the will. Wherefore if there be igno- would be baptized none the less. Therefore error does not rance there must needs be error; and for this reason error annul matrimony. is set down as being the proximate cause. Objection 4. Further, there was true marriage be- Reply to Objection 2. Although error is not of itself tween Lia and Jacob, and yet, in this case, there was error. contrary to matrimony, it is contrary thereto as regards the Therefore error does not annul a marriage. cause of marriage. On the contrary, It is said in the Digests (Si per er- Reply to Objection 3. The character of baptism is rorem, ff. De jurisdic. omn. judic.): “What is more op- not caused directly by the intention of the baptizer, but by posed to consent than error?” Now consent is required for the material element applied outwardly; and the intention marriage. Therefore error is an impediment to matrimony. is effective only as directing the material element to its Further, consent denotes something voluntary. Now effect; whereas the marriage tie is caused by the consent error is an obstacle to the voluntary, since “the voluntary,” directly. Hence the comparison fails. according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), Damascene Reply to Objection 4. According to the Master (Sent. (De Fide Orth. ii, 24), and Gregory of Nyssa∗ (De Nat. iv, D, 30) the marriage between Lia and Jacob was ef- Hom. xxxii), “is that which has its principle in one who fected not by their coming together, which happened has knowledge of singulars which are the matter of ac- through an error, but by their consent, which followed tions.” But this does not apply to one who is in error. afterwards. Yet both are clearly to be excused from sin Therefore error is an impediment to matrimony. (Sent. iv, D, 30). I answer that, Whatever hinders a cause, of its very ∗ Nemesius 2822 Whether every error is an impediment to matrimony? Suppl. q. 51 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that every error is an im- her consent, but should hold on to his brother. Thus error pediment to matrimony, and not, as stated in the text (Sent. regarding the person is not an impediment to marriage. iv, D, 30), only error about the condition or the person. I answer that, Just as error, through causing involun- For that which applies to a thing as such applies to it in all tariness, is an excuse from sin, so on the same count is it its bearings. Now error is of its very nature an impediment an impediment to marriage. Now error does not excuse to matrimony, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore every error from sin unless it refer to a circumstance the presence or is an impediment to matrimony. absence of which makes an action lawful or unlawful. For Objection 2. Further, if error, as such, is an imped- if a man were to strike his father with an iron rod thinking iment to matrimony, the greater the error the greater the it to be of wood, he is not excused from sin wholly, al- impediment. Now the error concerning faith in a heretic though perhaps in part; but if a man were to strike his fa- who disbelieves in this sacrament is greater than an error ther, thinking to strike his son to correct him, he is wholly concerning the person. Therefore it should be a greater excused provided he take due care. Wherefore error, in impediment than error about the person. order to void marriage, must needs be about the essentials Objection 3. Further, error does not void marriage of marriage. Now marriage includes two things, namely except as removing voluntariness. Now ignorance about the two persons who are joined together, and the mutual any circumstance takes away voluntariness (Ethic. iii, 1). power over one another wherein marriage consists. The Therefore it is not only error about condition or person first of these is removed by error concerning the person, that is an impediment to matrimony. the second by error regarding the condition, since a slave Objection 4. Further, just as the condition of slavery cannot freely give power over his body to another, without is an accident affecting the person, so are bodily or mental his master’s consent. For this reason these two errors, and qualities. But error regarding the condition is an impedi- no others, are an impediment to matrimony. ment to matrimony. Therefore error concerning quality or Reply to Objection 1. It is not from its generic nature fortune is equally an impediment. that error is an impediment to marriage, but from the na- Objection 5. Further, just as slavery or freedom per- ture of the difference added thereto; namely from its being tains to the condition of person, so do high and low rank, error about one of the essentials to marriage. or dignity of position and the lack thereof. Now error Reply to Objection 2. An error of faith about mat- regarding the condition of slavery is an impediment to rimony is about things consequent upon matrimony, for matrimony. Therefore error about the other matters men- instance on the question of its being a sacrament, or of its tioned is also an impediment. being lawful. Wherefore such error as these is no imped- Objection 6. Further, just as the condition of slavery iment to marriage, as neither does an error about baptism is an impediment, so are difference of worship and impo- hinder a man from receiving the character, provided he in- tence, as we shall say further on (q. 52, a. 2; q. 58, a. 1; tend to receive what the Church gives, although he believe q. 59, a. 1). Therefore just as error regarding the condition it to be nothing. is an impediment, so also should error about those other Reply to Objection 3. It is not any ignorance of a matters be reckoned an impediment. circumstance that causes the involuntariness which is an Objection 7. On the other hand, it would seem that excuse from sin, as stated above; wherefore the argument not even error about the person is an impediment to mar- does not prove. riage. For marriage is a contract even as a sale is. Now Reply to Objection 4. Difference of fortune or of in buying and selling the sale is not voided if one coin quality does not make a difference in the essentials to be given instead of another of equal value. Therefore a matrimony, as the condition of slavery does. Hence the marriage is not voided if one woman be taken instead of argument does not prove. another. Reply to Objection 5. Error about a person’s rank, Objection 8. Further, it is possible for them to remain as such, does not void a marriage, for the same reason in this error for many years and to beget between them as neither does error about a personal quality. If, how- sons and daughters. But it would be a grave assertion to ever, the error about a person’s rank or position amounts maintain that they ought to be separated then. Therefore to an error about the person, it is an impediment to mat- their previous error did not void their marriage. rimony. Hence, if the woman consent directly to this par- Objection 9. Further, it might happen that the woman ticular person, her error about his rank does not void the is betrothed to the brother of the man whom she thinks marriage; but if she intend directly to consent to marry the that she is consenting to marry, and that she has had car- king’s son, whoever he may be, then, if another man than nal intercourse with him; in which case, seemingly, she the king’s son be brought to her, there is error about the cannot go back to the man to whom she thought to give person, and the marriage will be void. 2823 Reply to Objection 6. Error is an impediment to mat-it is in the case in point. rimony, although it be about other impediments to mar- Reply to Objection 8. No matter how long they have riage if it concern those things which render a person cohabited, unless she be willing to consent again, there is an unlawful subject of marriage. But (the Master) does no marriage. not mention error about such things, because they are Reply to Objection 9. If she did not consent previ- an impediment to marriage whether there be error about ously to marry his brother, she may hold to the one whom them or not; so that if a woman contract with a subdea- she took in error. Nor can she return to his brother, es- con, whether she know this or not, there is no marriage; pecially if there has been carnal intercourse between her whereas the condition of slavery is no impediment if the and the man she took to husband. If, however, she had slavery be known. Hence the comparison fails. previously consented to take the first one in words of the Reply to Objection 7. In contracts money is regarded present, she cannot have the second while the first lives. as the measure of other things (Ethic. v, 5), and not as But she may either leave the second or return to the first; being sought for its own sake. Hence if the coin paid is and ignorance of the fact excuses her from sin, just as she not what it is thought to be but another of equal value, this would be excused if after the consummation of the mar- does not void the contract. But if there be error about a riage a kinsman of her husband were to know her by fraud thing sought for its own sake, the contract is voided, for since she is not to be blamed for the other’s deceit. instance if one were to sell a donkey for a horse; and thus 2824 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 52 Of the Impediment of the Condition of Slavery (In Four Articles) We must now consider the impediment of the condition of slavery. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the condition of slavery is an impediment to matrimony? (2) Whether a slave can marry without his master’s consent? (3) Whether a man who is already married can make himself a slave without his wife’s consent? (4) Whether the children should follow the condition of their father or of their mother? Whether the condition of slavery is an impediment to matrimony? Suppl. q. 52 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the condition of slav- reckoned an impediment to marriage. Therefore neither ery is no impediment to matrimony. For nothing is an should slavery be so reckoned. impediment to marriage except what is in some way op- On the contrary, A Decretal says (De conjug. servo- posed to it. But slavery is in no way opposed to marriage, rum, cap. Ad nostram) that “error regarding the condition else there could be no marriage among slaves. Therefore hinders a marriage from being contracted and voids that slavery is no impediment to marriage. which is already contracted.” Objection 2. Further, that which is contrary to nature Further, marriage is one of the goods that are sought cannot be an impediment to that which is according to for their own sake, because it is qualified by honesty; nature. Now slavery is contrary to nature, for as Gregory whereas slavery is one of the things to be avoided for their says (Pastor. ii, 6), “it is contrary to nature for man to wish own sake. Therefore marriage and slavery are contrary to to lord it over another man”; and this is also evident from one another; and consequently slavery is an impediment the fact that it was said of man (Gn. 1:26) that he should to matrimony. “have dominion over the fishes of the sea,” but not that he I answer that, In the marriage contract one party is should have dominion over man. Therefore it cannot be bound to the other in the matter of paying the debt; where- an impediment to marriage, which is a natural thing. fore if one who thus binds himself is unable to pay the Objection 3. Further, if it is an impediment, this is debt, ignorance of this inability, on the side of the party to either of natural law or of positive law. But it is not of nat- whom he binds himself, voids the contract. Now just as ural law, since according to natural law all men are equal, impotence in respect of coition makes a person unable to as Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 6), while it is stated at the pay the debt, so that he is altogether disabled, so slavery beginning of the Digests (Manumissiones, ff. de just. et makes him unable to pay it freely. Therefore, just as igno- jure.) that slavery is not of natural law; and positive law rance or impotence in respect of coition is an impediment springs from the natural law, as Tully says (De Invent. ii). if not known but not if known, as we shall state further on Therefore, according to law, slavery is not an impediment (q. 58), so the condition of slavery is an impediment if not to any marriage. known, but not if it be known. Objection 4. Further, that which is an impediment to Reply to Objection 1. Slavery is contrary to marriage marriage is equally an impediment whether it be known as regards the act to which marriage binds one party in re- or not, as in the case of consanguinity. Now the slavery of lation to the other, because it prevents the free execution one party, if it be known to the other, is no impediment to of that act; and again as regards the good of the offspring their marriage. Therefore slavery, considered in itself, is who become subject to the same condition by reason of unable to void a marriage; and consequently it should not the parent’s slavery. Since, however, it is free to everyone be reckoned by itself as a distinct impediment to marriage. to suffer detriment in that which is his due, if one of the Objection 5. Further, just as one may be in error about parties knows the other to be a slave, the marriage is none slavery, so as to deem a person free who is a slave, so may the less valid. Likewise since in marriage there is an equal one be in error about freedom, so as to deem a person a obligation on either side to pay the debt, neither party slave whereas he is free. But freedom is not accounted can exact of the other a greater obligation than that un- an impediment to matrimony. Therefore neither should der which he lies; so that if a slave marry a bondswoman, slavery be so accounted. thinking her to be free, the marriage is not thereby ren- Objection 7. Further, leprosy is a greater burden to dered invalid. It is therefore evident that slavery is no the fellowship of marriage and is a greater obstacle to the impediment to marriage except when it is unknown to the good of the offspring than slavery is. Yet leprosy is not other party, even though the latter be in a condition of free- 2825 dom; and so nothing prevents marriage between slaves, or positive law that slavery if unknown is an impediment to even between a freeman and a bondswoman. matrimony, lest one who is not guilty be punished; for it Reply to Objection 2. Nothing prevents a thing be- is a punishment to the wife to have a slave for husband, ing against nature as to the first intention of nature, and and “vice versa.” yet not against nature as to its second intention. Thus, as Reply to Objection 4. Certain impediments render a stated in De Coelo, ii, all corruption, defect, and old age marriage unlawful; and since it is not our will that makes are contrary to nature, because nature intends being and a thing lawful or unlawful, but the law to which our will perfection, and yet they are not contrary to the second in- ought to be subject, it follows that the validity or invalid- tention of nature, because nature, through being unable to ity of a marriage is not affected either by ignorance (such preserve being in one thing, preserves it in another which as destroys voluntariness) of the impediment or by knowl- is engendered of the other’s corruption. And when na- edge thereof; and such an impediment is affinity or a vow, ture is unable to bring a thing to a greater perfection it and others of the same kind. other impediments, how- brings it to a lesser; thus when it cannot produce a male ever, render a marriage ineffectual as to the payment of it produces a female which is “a misbegotten male” (De the debt; and since it is within the competency of our will Gener. Animal. ii, 3). I say then in like manner that to remit a debt that is due to us, it follows that such imped- slavery is contrary to the first intention of nature. Yet it iments, if known, do not invalidate a marriage, but only is not contrary to the second, because natural reason has when ignorance of them destroys voluntariness. Such im- this inclination, and nature has this desire—that everyone pediments are slavery and impotence of coition. And, be- should be good; but from the fact that a person sins, nature cause they have of themselves the nature of an impedi- has an inclination that he should be punished for his sin, ment, they are reckoned as special impediments besides and thus slavery was brought in as a punishment of sin. error; whereas a change of person is not reckoned a spe- Nor is it unreasonable for a natural thing to be hindered cial impediment besides error, because the substitution of by that which is unnatural in this way; for thus is mar- another person has not the nature of an impediment ex- riage hindered by impotence of coition, which impotence cept by reason of the intention of one of the contracting is contrary to nature in the way mentioned. parties. Reply to Objection 3. The natural law requires pun- Reply to Objection 5. Freedom does not hinder the ishment to be inflicted for guilt, and that no one should marriage act, wherefore ignorance of freedom is no im- be punished who is not guilty; but the appointing of the pediment to matrimony. punishment according to the circumstances of person and Reply to Objection 6. Leprosy does not hinder mar- guilt belongs to positive law. Hence slavery which is a riage as to its first act, since lepers can pay the debt freely; definite punishment is of positive law, and arises out of although they lay a burden upon marriage as to its sec- natural law, as the determinate from that which is indeter- ondary effects; wherefore it is not an impediment to mar- minate. And it arises from the determination of the same riage as slavery is. Whether a slave can marry without his master’s consent? Suppl. q. 52 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that a slave cannot marry be. without his master’s consent. For no one can give a per- Objection 4. Further, a master may sell his slave into son that which is another’s without the latter’s consent. a foreign country, where the latter’s wife is unable to fol- Now a slave is his master’s chattel. Therefore he cannot low him, through either bodily weakness, or imminent give his wife power over his body by marrying without his danger to her faith; for instance if he be sold to unbe- master’s consent. lievers, or if her master be unwilling, supposing her to be Objection 2. Further, a slave is bound to obey his a bondswoman; and thus the marriage will be dissolved, master. But his master may command him not to consent which is unfitting. Therefore a slave cannot marry without to marry. Therefore he cannot marry without his consent. his master’s consent. Objection 3. Further, after marriage, a slave is bound Objection 5. Further, the burden under which a man even by a precept of the Divine law to pay the debt to binds himself to the Divine service is more advantageous his wife. But at the time that his wife asks for the debt than that whereby a man subjects himself to his wife. But his master may demand of him a service which he will be a slave cannot enter religion or receive orders without his unable to perform if he wish to occupy himself in carnal master’s consent. Much less therefore can he be married intercourse. Therefore if a slave can marry without his without his consent. master’s consent, the latter would be deprived of a service On the contrary, “In Christ Jesus. . . there is neither due to him without any fault of his; and this ought not to bond nor free” (Gal. 3:26,28). Therefore both freeman 2826 and bondsman enjoy the same liberty to marry in the faith Reply to Objection 3. If a slave has married with his of Christ Jesus. master’s consent, he should omit the service commanded Further, slavery is of positive law; whereas marriage by his master and pay the debt to his wife; because the is of natural and Divine law. Since then positive law is not master, by consenting to his slave’s marriage, implicitly prejudicial to the natural or the Divine law, it would seem consented to all that marriage requires. If, however, the that a slave can marry without his master’s consent. marriage was contracted without the master’s knowledge I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 3), the pos- or consent, he is not bound to pay the debt, but in pref- itive law arises out of the natural law, and consequently erence to obey his master, if the two things are incom- slavery, which is of positive law, cannot be prejudicious patible. Nevertheless in such matters there are many par- to those things that are of natural law. Now just as nature ticulars to be considered, as in all human acts, namely the seeks the preservation of the individual, so does it seek danger to which his wife’s chastity is exposed, and the ob- the preservation of the species by means of procreation; stacle which the payment of the debt places in the way of wherefore even as a slave is not so subject to his master the service commanded, and other like considerations, all as not to be at liberty to eat, sleep, and do such things as of which being duly weighed it will be possible to judge pertain to the needs of his body, and without which na- which of the two in preference the slave is bound to obey, ture cannot be preserved, so he is not subject to him to the his master or his wife. extent of being unable to marry freely, even without his Reply to Objection 4. In such a case it is said that the master’s knowledge or consent. master should be compelled not to sell the slave in such Reply to Objection 1. A slave is his master’s chattel a way as to increase the weight of the marriage burden, in matters superadded to nature, but in natural things all especially since he is able to obtain anywhere a just price are equal. Wherefore, in things pertaining to natural acts, for his slave. a slave can by marrying give another person power over Reply to Objection 5. By entering religion or receiv- his body without his master’s consent. ing orders a man is bound to the Divine service for all Reply to Objection 2. A slave is bound to obey his time; whereas a husband is bound to pay the debt to his master in those things which his master can command wife not always, but at a fitting time; hence the compar- lawfully; and just as his master cannot lawfully command ison fails. Moreover, he who enters religion or receives him not to eat or sleep, so neither can he lawfully com- orders binds himself to works that are superadded to nat- mand him to refrain from marrying. For it is the concern ural works, and in which his master has power over him, of the lawgiver how each one uses his own, and conse- but not in natural works to which a man binds himself by quently if the master command his slave not to marry, the marriage. Hence he cannot vow continence without his slave is not bound to obey his master. master’s consent. Whether slavery can supervene to marriage? Suppl. q. 52 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that slavery cannot su- generated. Now bondage of the husband, if unknown to pervene to marriage, by the husband selling himself to the wife, is an impediment to the act of marriage before it another as slave. Because what is done by fraud and to is performed. Therefore if it could supervene to marriage another’s detriment should not hold. But a husband who it would dissolve it; which is unreasonable. sells himself for a slave, does so sometimes to cheat mar- On the contrary, Everyone can give another that riage, and at least to the detriment of his wife. Therefore which is his own. Now the husband is his own master such a sale should not hold as to the effect of slavery. since he is free. Therefore he can surrender his right to Objection 2. Further, two favorable things outweigh another. one that is not favorable. Now marriage and freedom are Further, a slave can marry without his master’s con- favorable things and are contrary to slavery, which in law sent, as stated above (a. 2). Therefore a husband can in is not a favorable thing. Therefore such a slavery ought to like manner subject himself to a master, without his wife’s be entirely annulled in marriage. consent. Objection 3. Further, in marriage husband and wife I answer that, A husband is subject to his wife in are on a par with one another. Now the wife cannot sur- those things which pertain to the act of nature; in these render herself to be a slave without her husband’s consent. things they are equal, and the subjection of slavery does Therefore neither can the husband without his wife’s con- not extend thereto. Wherefore the husband, without his sent. wife’s knowledge, can surrender himself to be another’s Objection 4. Further, in natural things that which hin- slave. Nor does this result in a dissolution of the mar- ders a thing being generated destroys it after it has been riage, since no impediment supervening to marriage can 2827 dissolve it, as stated above (q. 50, a. 1, ad 7). considered to be on a par in the marriage act and in things Reply to Objection 1. The fraud can indeed hurt the relating to nature, to which the condition of slavery does person who has acted fraudulently, but it cannot be prej- not extend, nevertheless as regards the management of the udicial to another person: wherefore if the husband, to household, and other such additional matters the husband cheat his wife, surrender himself to be another’s slave, It is the head of the wife and should correct her, and not will be to his own prejudice, through his losing the in- “vice versa.” Hence the wife cannot surrender herself to estimable good of freedom; whereas this can nowise be be a slave without her husband’s consent. prejudicial to the wife, and he is bound to pay her the debt Reply to Objection 4. This argument considers cor- when she asks, and to do all that marriage requires of him ruptible things; and yet even in these there are many obsta- for he cannot be taken away from these obligations by his cles to generation that are not capable of destroying what master’s command. is already generated. But in things which have stability it Reply to Objection 2. In so far as slavery is opposed is possible to have an impediment which prevents a cer- to marriage, marriage is prejudicial to slavery, since the tain thing from beginning to be, yet does not cause it to slave is bound then to pay the debt to his wife, though his cease to be; as instanced by the rational soul. It is the master be unwilling. same with marriage, which is a lasting tie so long as this Reply to Objection 3. Although husband and wife are life lasts. Whether children should follow the condition of their father? Suppl. q. 52 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that children should fol- mother in freedom and bondage; whereas in matters per- low the condition of their father. Because dominion be- taining to dignity as proceeding from a thing’s form, they longs to those of higher rank. Now in generating the father follow the father, for instance in honors, franchise, inheri- ranks above the mother. Therefore, etc. tance and so forth. The canons are in agreement with this Objection 2. Further, the being of a thing depends (cap. Liberi, 32, qu. iv, in gloss.: cap. Inducens, De natis on the form more than on the matter. Now in generation ex libero ventre) as also the law of Moses (Ex. 21). the father gives the form, and the mother the matter (De In some countries, however, where the civil law does Gener. Animal. ii, 4). Therefore the child should follow not hold, the offspring follows the inferior condition, so the condition of the father rather than of the mother. that if the father be a slave the children will be slaves al- Objection 3. Further, a thing should follow that though the mother be free; but not if the father gave him- chiefly to which it is most like. Now the son is more like self up as a slave after his marriage and without his wife’s the father than the mother, even as the daughter is more consent; and the same applies if the case be reversed. And like the mother. Therefore at least the son should follow if both be of servile condition and belong to different mas- the father in preference, and the daughter the mother. ters, the children, if several, are divided among the latter, Objection 4. Further, in Holy Writ genealogies are or if one only, the one master will compensate the other in not traced through the women but through the men. value and will take the child thus born for his slave. How- Therefore the children follow the father rather than the ever it is incredible that this custom have as much reason mother. in its favor as the decision of the time-honored delibera- On the contrary, If a man sows on another’s land, tions of many wise men. Moreover in natural things it is the produce belongs to the owner of the land. Now the the rule that what is received is in the recipient accord- woman’s womb in relation to the seed of man is like the ing to the mode of the recipient and not according to the land in relation to the sower. Therefore, etc. mode of the giver; wherefore it is reasonable that the seed Further, we observe that in animals born from differ- received by the mother should be drawn to her condition. ent species the offspring follows the mother rather that Reply to Objection 1. Although the father is a more the father, wherefore mules born of a mare and an ass are noble principle than the mother, nevertheless the mother more like mares than those born of a she-ass and a horse. provides the substance of the body, and it is to this that the Therefore it should be the same with men. condition of slavery attaches. I answer that, According to civil law (XIX, ff. De Reply to Objection 2. As regards things pertaining statu hom. vii, cap. De rei vendit.) the offspring follows to the specific nature the son is like the father rather than the womb: and this is reasonable since the offspring de- the mother, but in material conditions should be like the rives its formal complement from the father, but the sub- mother rather than the father, since a thing has its specific stance of the body from the mother. Now slavery is a being from its form, but material conditions from matter. condition of the body, since a slave is to the master a kind Reply to Objection 3. The son is like the father in re- of instrument in working; wherefore children follow the spect of the form which is his, and also the father’s, com- 2828 plement. Hence the argument is not to the point. custom, children are named after their father rather than Reply to Objection 4. It is because the son derives from their mother. But in matters relating to slavery they honor from his father rather than from his mother that in follow the mother by preference. the genealogies of Scripture, and according to common 2829 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 53 Of the Impediment of Vows and Orders (In Four Articles) We must now consider the impediment of vows and orders. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether a simple vow is a diriment impediment to matrimony? (2) Whether a solemn vow is a diriment impediment? (3) Whether order is an impediment to matrimony? (4) Whether a man can receive a sacred order after being married? Whether marriage already contracted should be annulled by the obligation of a simple Suppl. q. 53 a. 1 vow? Objection 1. It would seem that a marriage already suluit, De his qui cler. vel vovent.) that a “simple vow contracted ought to be annulled by the obligation of a is an impediment to the contract of marriage, but does not simple vow. For the stronger tie takes precedence of the annul it after it is contracted.” weaker. Now a vow is a stronger tie than marriage, since I answer that, A thing ceases to be in one man’s the latter binds man to man, but the former binds man to power from the fact that it passes into the power of an- God. Therefore the obligation of a vow takes precedence other. Now the promise of a thing does not transfer it into of the marriage tie. the power of the person to whom it is promised, where- Objection 2. Further, God’s commandment is no less fore a thing does not cease to be in a person’s power for binding than the commandment of the Church. Now the the reason that he has promised it. Since then a simple commandment of the Church is so binding that a marriage vow contains merely a simple promise of one’s body to is void if contracted in despite thereof; as instanced in the the effect of keeping continence for God’s sake, a man still case of those who marry within the degrees of kindred for- retains power over his own body after a simple vow, and bidden by the Church. Therefore, since it is a Divine com- consequently can surrender it to another, namely his wife; mandment to keep a vow, it would seem that if a person and in this surrender consists the sacrament of matrimony, marry in despite of a vow his marriage should be annulled which is indissoluble. Therefore although a simple vow is for that reason. an impediment to the contracting of a marriage, since it is Objection 3. Further, in marriage a man may have a sin to marry after taking a simple vow of continence, yet carnal intercourse without sin. Yet he who has taken a since the contract is valid, the marriage cannot be annulled simple vow of chastity can never have carnal intercourse on that account. with his wife without sin. Therefore a simple vow an- Reply to Objection 1. A vow is a stronger tie than nuls marriage. The minor is proved as follows. It is clear matrimony, as regards that to which man is tied, and the that it is a mortal sin to marry after taking a simple vow obligation under which he lies. because by marriage a of continence, since according to Jerome∗ “for those who man is tied to his wife, with the obligation of paying the vow virginity it is damnable not only to marry, but even to debt, whereas by a vow a man is tied to God, with the wish to marry.” Now the marriage contract is not contrary obligation of remaining continent. But as to the manner to the vow of continence, except by reason of carnal inter- in which he is tied marriage is a stronger tie than a simple course: and therefore he sins mortally the first time he has vow, since by marriage a man surrenders himself actually intercourse with his wife, and for the same reason every to the power of his wife, but not by a simple vow as ex- other time, because a sin committed in the first instance plained above: and the possessor is always in the stronger cannot be an excuse for a subsequent sin. position. In this respect a simple vow binds in the same Objection 4. Further, husband and wife should be way as a betrothal; wherefore a betrothal must be annulled equal in marriage, especially as regards carnal intercourse. on account of a simple vow. But he who has taken a simple vow of continence can Reply to Objection 2. The contracting of a marriage never ask for the debt without a sin, for this is clearly between blood relations is annulled by the commandment against his vow of continence, since he is bound to con- forbidding such marriages, not precisely because it is a tinence by vow. Therefore neither can he pay the debt commandment of God or of the Church, but because it without sin. makes it impossible for the body of a kinswoman to be On the contrary, Pope Clement† says (cap. Con- transferred into the power of her kinsman: whereas the ∗ Cf. St. Augustine, De Bono Viduit, ix † Alexander III 2830 commandment forbidding marriage after a simple vow if his wife die he is bound to continence altogether. And has not this effect, as already stated. Hence the argument since the marriage tie does not bind him to ask for the is void for it assigns as a cause that which is not cause. debt, he cannot ask for it without sin, although he can pay Reply to Objection 3. If after taking a simple vow a the debt without sin on being asked, when once he has in- man contract marriage by words of the present, he can- curred this obligation through the carnal intercourse that not know his wife without mortal sin, because until the has already occurred. And this holds whether the wife ask marriage is consummated he is still in a position to fulfill expressly or interpretively, as when she is ashamed and the vow of continence. But after the marriage has been her husband feels that she desires him to pay the debt, for consummated, thenceforth through his fault it is unlawful then he may pay it without sin. This is especially the case for him not to pay the debt when his wife asks: where- if he fears to endanger her chastity: nor does it matter that fore this is not covered by his obligation to his vow, as they are equal in the marriage act, since everyone may re- explained above (ad 1). Nevertheless he should atone for nounce what is his own. Some say, however, that he may not keeping continence, by his tears of repentance. both ask and pay lest the marriage become too burden- Reply to Objection 4. After contracting marriage he some to the wife who has always to ask; but if this be is still bound to keep his vow of continence in those mat- looked into aright, it is the same as asking interpretively. ters wherein he is not rendered unable to do so. Hence Whether a solemn vow dissolves a marriage already contracted? Suppl. q. 53 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that not even a solemn over the indissolubility of marriage belongs to the truth vow dissolves a marriage already contracted. For accord- of life∗, which truth is not to be set aside on account of ing to a Decretal (cap. Rursus, De his qui cler. vel vovent.) scandal. Wherefore others say that it is on account of the “in God’s sight a simple vow is no less binding than a ordinance of the Church. But this again is insufficient, solemn one.” Now marriage stands or falls by virtue of since in that case the Church might decide the contrary, the Divine acceptance. Therefore since a simple vow does which is seemingly untrue. Wherefore we must say with not dissolve marriage, neither will a solemn vow dissolve others that a solemn vow of its very nature dissolves the it. marriage contract, inasmuch namely as thereby a man has Objection 2. Further, a solemn vow does not add the lost the power over his own body, through surrendering it same force to a simple vow as an oath does. Now a sim- to God for the purpose of perpetual continence. Where- ple vow, even though an oath be added thereto, does not fore he is unable to surrender it to the power of a wife by dissolve a marriage already contracted. Neither therefore contracting marriage. And since the marriage that follows does a solemn vow. such a vow is void, a vow of this kind is said to annul the Objection 3. Further, a solemn vow has nothing that a marriage contracted. simple vow cannot have. For a simple vow may give rise Reply to Objection 1. A simple vow is said to be no to scandal since it may be public, even as a solemn vow. less binding in God’s sight than a solemn vow, in matters Again the Church could and should ordain that a simple pertaining to God, for instance the separation from God vow dissolves a marriage already contracted, so that many by mortal sin, because he who breaks a simple vow com- sins may be avoided. Therefore for the same reason that mits a mortal sin just as one who breaks a solemn vow, a simple vow does not dissolve a marriage already con- although it is more grievous to break a solemn vow, so tracted, neither should a solemn vow dissolve it. that the comparison be understood as to the genus and not On the contrary, He who takes a solemn vow con- as to the definite degree of guilt. But as regards marriage, tracts a spiritual marriage with God, which is much more whereby one man is under an obligation to another, there excellent than a material marriage. Now a material mar- is no need for it to be of equal obligation even in gen- riage already contracted annuls a marriage contracted af- eral, since a solemn vow binds to certain things to which terwards. Therefore a solemn vow does also. a simple vow does not bind. Further, the same conclusion may be proved by many Reply to Objection 2. An oath is more binding than authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 28). a vow on the part of the cause of the obligation: but a I answer that, All agree that as a solemn vow is an solemn vow is more binding as to the manner in which it impediment to the contracting of marriage, so it invali- binds, in so far as it is an actual surrender of that which is dates the contract. Some assign scandal as the reason. But promised; while an oath does not do this actually. Hence this is futile, because even a simple vow sometimes leads the conclusion does not follow. to scandal since it is at times somewhat public. More- Reply to Objection 3. A solemn vow implies the ac- ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 16, a. 4, ad 3; Ia, q. 21, a. 2, ad 2; IIa IIae, q. 109, a. 3, ad 3 2831 tual surrender of one’s body, whereas a simple vow does suffice to prove the conclusion. not, as stated above (a. 1). Hence the argument does not Whether order is an impediment to matrimony? Suppl. q. 53 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that order is not an im- by virtue of order; whereas with the Latins it is an im- pediment to matrimony. For nothing is an impediment to pediment by virtue of order, and besides by virtue of the a thing except its contrary. But order is not contrary to vow of continence which is annexed to the sacred orders; matrimony. Therefore it is not an impediment thereto. for although this vow is not expressed in words, neverthe- Objection 2. Further, orders are the same with us as less a person is understood to have taken it by the very with the Eastern Church. But they are not an impediment fact of his being ordained. Hence among the Greeks and to matrimony in the Eastern Church. Therefore, etc. other Eastern peoples a sacred order is an impediment to Objection 3. Further, matrimony signifies the union the contracting of matrimony but it does not forbid the of Christ with the Church. Now this is most fittingly sig- use of marriage already contracted: for they can use mar- nified in those who are Christ’s ministers, those namely riage contracted previously, although they cannot be mar- who are ordained. Therefore order is not an impediment ried again. But in the Western Church it is an impediment to matrimony. both to marriage and to the use of marriage, unless per- Objection 4. Further, all the orders are directed to haps the husband should receive a sacred order without spiritual things. Now order cannot be an impediment to the knowledge or consent of his wife, because this cannot matrimony except by reason of its spirituality. Therefore be prejudicial to her. if order is an impediment to matrimony, every order will Of the distinction between sacred and non-sacred or- be an impediment, and this is untrue. ders now and in the early Church we have spoken above Objection 5. Further, every ordained person can have (q. 37, a. 3). ecclesiastical benefices, and can enjoy equally the priv- Reply to Objection 1. Although a sacred order is not ilege of clergy. If, therefore, orders are an impediment contrary to matrimony as a sacrament, it has a certain in- to marriage, because married persons cannot have an ec- compatibility with marriage in respect of the latter’s act clesiastical benefice, nor enjoy the privilege of clergy, as which is an obstacle to spiritual acts. jurists assert (cap. Joannes et seqq., De cler. conjug.), Reply to Objection 2. The objection is based on a then every order ought to be an impediment. Yet this is false statement: since order is everywhere an impediment false, as shown by the Decretal of Alexander III (De cler. to the contracting of marriage, although it has not every- conjug., cap. Si Quis): and consequently it would seem where a vow annexed to it. that no order is an impediment to marriage. Reply to Objection 3. Those who are in sacred or- On the contrary, the Decretal says (De cler. conjug., ders signify Christ by more sublime actions, as appears cap. Si Quis): “any person whom you shall find to have from what has been said in the treatise on orders (q. 37, taken a wife after receiving the subdiaconate or the higher Aa. 2,4), than those who are married. Consequently the orders, you shall compel to put his wife away.” But this conclusion does not follow. would not be so if the marriage were valid. Reply to Objection 4. Those who are in minor orders Further, no person who has vowed continence can con- are not forbidden to marry by virtue of their order; for tract marriage. Now some orders have a vow of con- although those orders are entrusted with certain spiritual- tinence connected with them, as appears from the text ities, they are not admitted to the immediate handling of (Sent. iv, D, 37). Therefore in that case order is an im- sacred things, as those are who are in sacred orders. But pediment to matrimony. according to the laws of the Western Church, the use of I answer that, By a certain fittingness the very nature marriage is an impediment to the exercise of a non-sacred of holy order requires that it should be an impediment to order, for the sake of maintaining a greater honesty in the marriage: because those who are in holy orders handle the offices of the Church. And since the holding of an eccle- sacred vessels and the sacraments: wherefore it is becom- siastical benefice binds a man to the exercise of his order, ing that they keep their bodies clean by continence∗. But and since for this very reason he enjoys the privilege of it is owing to the Church’s ordinance that it is actually clergy, it follows that in the Latin Church this privilege is an impediment to marriage. However it is not the same forfeit to a married cleric. with the Latins as with the Greeks; since with the Greeks This suffices for the Reply to the last Objection. it is an impediment to the contracting of marriage, solely ∗ Cf. Is. 52:11 2832 Whether a sacred order cannot supervene to matrimony? Suppl. q. 53 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that a sacred order cannot his order. If, however, his wife consent, or if she be dead, supervene to matrimony. For the stronger prejudices the he receives both the order and the exercise. weaker. Now a spiritual obligation is stronger than a bod- Reply to Objection 1. The bond of orders dissolves ily tie. Therefore if a married man be ordained, this will the bond of marriage as regards the payment of the debt, prejudice the wife, so that she will be unable to demand in respect of which it is incompatible with marriage, on the debt, since order is a spiritual, and marriage a bodily the part of the person ordained, since he cannot demand bond. Hence it would seem that a man cannot receive a the debt, nor is the wife bound to pay it. But it does not sacred order after consummating marriage. dissolve the bond in respect of the other party, since the Objection 2. Further, after consummating the mar- husband is bound to pay the debt to the wife if he cannot riage, one of the parties cannot vow continence without persuade her to observe continence. the other’s consent∗. Now a sacred order has a vow of Reply to Objection 2. If the husband receive sacred continence annexed to it. Therefore if the husband be or- orders with the knowledge and consent of his wife, she is dained without his wife’s consent, she will be bound to bound to vow perpetual continence, but she is not bound remain continent against her will, since she cannot marry to enter religion, if she has no fear of her chastity being another man during her husband’s lifetime. endangered through her husband having taken a solemn Objection 3. Further, a husband may not even for a vow: it would have been different, however, if he had time devote himself to prayer without his wife’s consent taken a simple vow. On the other hand, if he be ordained (1 Cor. 7:5). But in the Eastern Church those who are in without her consent, she is not bound in this way, because sacred orders are bound to continence for the time when the result is not prejudicial to her in any way. they exercise their office. Therefore neither may they be Reply to Objection 3. It would seem more probable, ordained without their wife’s consent, and much less may although some say the contrary, that even a Greek ought the Latins. not to receive sacred orders without his wife’s consent, Objection 4. Further, husband and wife are on a par since at least at the time of his ministry she would be de- with one another. Now a Greek priest cannot marry again prived of the payment of the debt, of which she cannot after his wife’s death. Therefore neither can his wife after be deprived according to law if the husband should have her husband’s death. But she cannot be deprived by her been ordained without her consent or knowledge. husband’s act of the right to marry after his death. There- Reply to Objection 4. As stated, among the Greeks fore her husband cannot receive orders after marriage. the wife, by the very fact of consenting to her husband’s Objection 5. Further, order is as much opposed to receiving a sacred order, binds herself never to marry an- marriage as marriage to order. Now a previous order is an other man, because the signification of marriage would impediment to a subsequent marriage. Therefore, etc. not be safeguarded, and this is especially required in the On the contrary, Religious are bound to continence marriage of a priest. If, however, he be ordained without like those who are in sacred orders. But a man may enter her consent, seemingly she would not be under that obli- religion after marriage, if his wife die, or if she consent. gation. Therefore he can also receive orders. Reply to Objection 5. Marriage has for its cause our Further, a man may become a man’s bondsman after consent: not so order, which has a sacramental cause ap- marriage. Therefore he can become a bondsman of God pointed by God. Hence matrimony may be impeded by by receiving orders. a previous order; so as not to be true marriage: whereas I answer that, Marriage is not an impediment to the order cannot be impeded by marriage, so as not to be true receiving of sacred orders, since if a married man receive order, because the power of the sacraments is unchange- sacred orders, even though his wife be unwilling, he re- able, whereas human acts can be impeded. ceives the character of order: but he lacks the exercise of ∗ Cf. q. 61, a. 1 2833 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 54 Of the Impediment of Consanguinity (In Four Articles) We must next consider the impediment of consanguinity. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether consanguinity is rightly defined by some? (2) Whether it is fittingly distinguished by degrees and lines? (3) Whether certain degrees are by natural law an impediment to marriage? (4) Whether the impediment degrees can be fixed by the ordinance of the Church? Whether consanguinity is rightly defined? Suppl. q. 54 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that consanguinity is un- who are connected by a common political life, of fellow- suitably defined by some as follows: “Consanguinity is soldiers who are connected by the common business of the tie contracted between persons descending from the soldiering, and in the same way those who are connected same common ancestor by carnal procreation.” For all by the fellowship of nature are said to be tied by blood men descend from the same common ancestor, namely [consanguinei]. Hence in the above definition “tie” is in- Adam, by carnal procreation. Therefore if the above def- cluded as being the genus of consanguinity; the “persons inition of consanguinity is right, all men would be related descending from the same common ancestor,” who are by consanguinity: which is false. thus tied together are the subject of this tie. while “car- Objection 2. Further, a tie is only between things in nal procreation” is mentioned as being its origin. accord with one another, since a tie unites. Now there is Reply to Objection 1. An active force is not received not greater accordance between persons descended from a into an instrument in the same degree of perfection as common ancestor than there is between other men, since it has in the principal agent. And since every moved they accord in species but differ in number, just as other mover is an instrument, it follows that the power of the men do. Therefore consanguinity is not a tie. first mover in a particular genus when drawn out through Objection 3. Further, carnal procreation, according to many mediate movers fails at length, and reaches some- the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. ii, 19), is effected from thing that is moved and not a mover. But the power of a the surplus food∗. Now this surplus has more in common begetter moves not only as to that which belongs to the with that which is eaten, since it agrees with it in sub- species, but also as to that which belongs to the individ- stance, than with him who eats. Since then no tie of con- ual, by reason of which the child is like the parent even sanguinity arises between the person born of semen and in accidentals and not only in the specific nature. And yet that which he eats, neither will there be any tie of kindred this individual power of the father is not so perfect in the between him and the person of whom he is born by carnal son as it was in the father, and still less so in the grandson, procreation. and thus it goes on failing: so that at length it ceases and Objection 4. Further, Laban said to Jacob (Gn. can go no further. Since then consanguinity results from 29:14): “Thou art my bone and my flesh,” on account this power being communicated to many through being of the relationship between them. Therefore such a kin- conveyed to them from one person by procreation, it de- ship should be called flesh-relationship rather than blood- stroys itself by little and little, as Isidore says (Etym. ix). relationship [consanguinitas]. Consequently in defining consanguinity we must not take Objection 5. Further, carnal procreation is common a remote common ancestor but the nearest, whose power to men and animals. But no tie of consanguinity is con- still remains in those who are descended from him. tracted among animals from carnal procreation. Therefore Reply to Objection 2. It is clear from what has been neither is there among men. said that blood relations agree not only in the specific na- I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ture but also in that power peculiar to the individual which iii, 11, 12) “all friendship is based on some kind of fel- is conveyed from one to many: the result being that some- lowship.” And since friendship is a knot or union, it fol- times the child is not only like his father, but also his lows that the fellowship which is the cause of friendship grandfather or his remote ancestors (De Gener. Anim. iv, is called “a tie.” Wherefore in respect of any kind of 3). a fellowship certain persons are denominated as though Reply to Objection 3. Likeness depends more on they were tied together: thus we speak of fellow-citizens form whereby a thing is actually, than on matter whereby ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 119, a. 2 2834 a thing is potentially: for instance, charcoal has more formed into the man’s seed or into the menstrual fluid is in common with fire than with the tree from which the potentially flesh and bone. wood was cut. In like manner food already transformed Reply to Objection 5. Some say that the reason why by the nutritive power into the substance of the person the tie of consanguinity is contracted among men through fed has more in common with the subject nourished than carnal procreation, and not among other animals, is be- with that from which the nourishment was taken. The ar- cause whatever belongs to the truth of human nature in gument however would hold according to the opinion of all men was in our first parent: which does not apply to those who asserted that the whole nature of a thing is from other animals. But according to this, matrimonial consan- its matter and that all forms are accidents: which is false. guinity would never come to an end. However the above Reply to Objection 4. It is the blood that is proxi- theory was disproved in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 30: mately changed into the semen, as proved in De Gener. Ia, q. 119, a. 1). Wherefore we must reply that the rea- Anim. i, 18. Hence the tie contracted by carnal pro- son for this is that animals are not united together in the creation is more fittingly called blood-relationship than union of friendship through the begetting of many from flesh-relationship. That sometimes one relation is called one proximate parent, as is the case with men, as stated the flesh of another, is because the blood which is trans- above. Whether consanguinity is fittingly distinguished by degrees and lines? Suppl. q. 54 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that consanguinity is un- of number. Yet the addition of one person to another does fittingly distinguished by degrees and lines. For a line of not always make a different degree of consanguinity, since consanguinity is described as “the ordered series of per- father and uncle are in the same degree of consanguinity, sons related by blood, and descending from a common for they are side by side. Therefore consanguinity is not ancestor in various degrees.” Now consanguinity is noth- rightly divided into degrees. ing else but a series of such persons. Therefore a line of Objection 7. Further, if two persons be akin to one an- consanguinity is the same as consanguinity. Now a thing other there is always the same measure of kinship between ought not to be distinguished by itself. Therefore consan- them, since the distance from one extreme to the other is guinity is not fittingly distinguished into lines. the same either way. Yet the degrees of consanguinity are Objection 2. Further, that by which a common thing not always the same on either side, since sometimes one is divided should not be placed in the definition of that relative is in the third and the other in the fourth degree. common thing. Now descent is placed in the above def- Therefore the measure of consanguinity cannot be suffi- inition of consanguinity. Therefore consanguinity cannot ciently known by its degrees. be divided into ascending, descending and collateral lines. I answer that, Consanguinity as stated (a. 1) is a Objection 3. Further, a line is defined as being be- certain propinquity based on the natural communication tween two points. But two points make but one degree. by the act of procreation whereby nature is propagated. Therefore one line has but one degree, and for this reason Wherefore according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) it would seem that consanguinity should not be divided this communication is threefold. one corresponds to the into lines and degrees. relationship between cause and effect, and this is the con- Objection 4. Further, a degree is defined as “the rela- sanguinity of father to son, wherefore he says that “par- tion between distant persons, whereby is known the dis- ents love their children as being a part of themselves.” tance between them.” Now since consanguinity is a kind Another corresponds to the relation of effect to cause, of propinquity, distance between persons is opposed to and this is the consanguinity of son to father, wherefore consanguinity rather than a part thereof. he says that “children love their parents as being them- Objection 5. Further, if consanguinity is distin- selves something which owes its existence to them.” The guished and known by its degrees, those who are in the third corresponds to the mutual relation between things same degree ought to be equally related. But this is false that come from the same cause, as brothers, “who are since a man’s great-uncle and great-nephew are in the born of the same parents,” as he again says (Ethic. viii, same degree, and yet they are not equally related accord- 12). And since the movement of a point makes a line, and ing to a Decretal (cap. Porro; cap. Parenteloe, 35, qu. since a father by procreation may be said to descend to v). Therefore consanguinity is not rightly divided into de- his son, hence it is that corresponding to these three re- grees. lationships there are three lines of consanguinity, namely Objection 6. Further, in ordinary things a different the “descending” line corresponding to the first relation- degree results from the addition of one thing to another, ship, the “ascending” line corresponding to the second, even as every additional unity makes a different species and the “collateral” line corresponding to the third. Since 2835 however the movement of propagation does not rest in one common stock, than he himself is to the common stock, term but continues beyond, the result is that one can point because this other person may be more distantly related to to the father’s father and to the son’s son, and so on, and the common stock than he is: and consanguinity must be according to the various steps we take we find various de- reckoned according to the more distant degree. grees in one line. And seeing that the degrees of a thing Reply to Objection 1. This objection is based on a are parts of that thing, there cannot be degrees of propin- false premise: for consanguinity is not the series but a quity where there is no propinquity. Consequently iden- mutual relationship existing between certain persons, the tity and too great a distance do away with degrees of con- series of whom forms a line of consanguinity. sanguinity; since no man is kin to himself any more than Reply to Objection 2. Descent taken in a general he is like himself: for which reason there is no degree sense attaches to every line of consanguinity, because car- of consanguinity where there is but one person, but only nal procreation whence the tie of consanguinity arises is when one person is compared to another. a kind of descent: but it is a particular kind of descent, Nevertheless there are different ways of counting the namely from the person whose consanguinity is in ques- degrees in various lines. For the degree of consanguinity tion, that makes the descending line. in the ascending and descending line is contracted from Reply to Objection 3. A line may be taken in two the fact that one of the parties whose consanguinity is in ways. Sometimes it is taken properly for the dimen- question, is descended from the other. Wherefore accord- sion itself that is the first species of continuous quantity: ing to the canonical as well as the legal reckoning, the per- and thus a straight line contains actually but two points son who occupies the first place, whether in the ascending which terminate it, but infinite points potentially, any one or in the descending line, is distant from a certain one, of which being actually designated, the line is divided, say Peter, in the first degree—for instance father and son; and becomes two lines. But sometimes a line designates while the one who occupies the second place in either di- things which are arranged in a line, and thus we have line rection is distant in the second degree, for instance grand- and figure in numbers, in so far as unity added to unity father, grandson and so on. But the consanguinity that involves number. Thus every unity added makes a degree exists between persons who are in collateral lines is con- in a particular line: and it is the same with the line of con- tracted not through one being descended from the other, sanguinity: wherefore one line contains several degrees. but through both being descended from one: wherefore Reply to Objection 4. Even as there cannot be like- the degrees of consanguinity in this line must be reckoned ness without a difference, so there is no propinquity with- in relation to the one principle whence it arises. Here, out distance. Hence not every distance is opposed to con- however, the canonical and legal reckonings differ: for sanguinity, but such as excludes the propinquity of blood- the legal reckoning takes into account the descent from the relationship. common stock on both sides, whereas the canonical reck- Reply to Objection 5. Even as whiteness is said to be oning takes into account only one, that namely on which greater in two ways, in one way through intensity of the the greater number of degrees are found. Hence according quality itself, in another way through the quantity of the to the legal reckoning brother and sister, or two brothers, surface, so consanguinity is said to be greater or lesser in are related in the second degree, because each is separated two ways. First, intensively by reason of the very nature from the common stock by one degree; and in like manner of consanguinity: secondly, extensively as it were, and the children of two brothers are distant from one another thus the degree of consanguinity is measured by the per- in the fourth degree. But according to the canonical reck- sons between whom there is the propagation of a common oning, two brothers are related in the first degree, since blood, and in this way the degrees of consanguinity are neither is distant more than one degree from the common distinguished. Wherefore it happens that of two persons stock: but the children of one brother are distant in the related to one person in the same degree of consanguinity, second degree from the other brother, because they are at one is more akin to him than the other, if we consider the that distance from the common stock. Hence, according quantity of consanguinity in the first way: thus a man’s to the canonical reckoning, by whatever degree a person is father and brother are related to him in the first degree distant from some higher degree, by so much and never by of consanguinity, because in neither case does any person less is he distant from each person descending from that come in between; and yet from the point of view of in- degree, because “the cause of a thing being so is yet more tensity a man’s father is more closely related to him than so.” Wherefore although the other descendants from the his brother, since his brother is related to him only be- common stock be related to some person on account of his cause he is of the same father. Hence the nearer a person being descended from the common stock, these descen- is to the common ancestor from whom the consanguinity dants of the other branch cannot be more nearly related to descends, the greater is his consanguinity although he be him than he is to the common stock. Sometimes, however, not in a nearer degree. In this way a man’s great-uncle a person is more distantly related to a descendant from the is more closely related to him than his great-nephew, al- 2836 though they are in the same degree. whereas the uncle cannot be nearer than the second de- Reply to Objection 6. Although a man’s father and gree, wherein the grandfather stands. uncle are in the same degree in respect of the root of Reply to Objection 7. Two persons are always related consanguinity, since both are separated by one degree in the same degree to one another, although they are not from the grandfather, nevertheless in respect of the per- always distant in the same number of degrees from the son whose consanguinity is in question, they are not in common ancestor, as explained above. the same degree, since the father is in the first degree, Whether consanguinity is an impediment to marriage by virtue of the natural law? Suppl. q. 54 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that consanguinity is not union of marriage. Therefore consanguinity is an impedi- by natural law an impediment to marriage. For no woman ment to marriage according to the natural law. can be more akin to a man than Eve was to Adam, since I answer that, In relation to marriage a thing is said to of her did he say (Gn. 2:23): “This now is bone of my be contrary to the natural law if it prevents marriage from bones and flesh of my flesh.” Yet Eve was joined in mar- reaching the end for which it was instituted. Now the es- riage to Adam. Therefore as regards the natural law no sential and primary end of marriage is the good of the consanguinity is an impediment to marriage. offspring. and this is hindered by a certain consanguin- Objection 2. Further, the natural law is the same for ity, namely that which is between father and daughter, or all. Now among the uncivilized nations no person is de- son and mother. It is not that the good of the offspring barred from marriage by reason of consanguinity. There- is utterly destroyed, since a daughter can have a child of fore, as regards the law of nature, consanguinity is no im- her father’s semen and with the father rear and teach that pediment to marriage. child in which things the good of the offspring consists, Objection 3. Further, the natural law is what “nature but that it is not effected in a becoming way. For it is out has taught all animals,” as stated at the beginning of the of order that a daughter be mated to her father in marriage Digests (i, ff. De just. et jure). Now brute animals copu- for the purpose of begetting and rearing children, since in late even with their mother. Therefore it is not of natural all things she ought to be subject to her father as proceed- law that certain persons are debarred from marriage on ing from him. Hence by natural law a father and mother account of consanguinity. are debarred from marrying their children; and the mother Objection 4. Further, nothing that is not contrary to still more than the father, since it is more derogatory to the one of the goods of matrimony is an impediment to mar- reverence due to parents if the son marry his mother than riage. But consanguinity is not contrary to any of the if the father marry his daughter; since the wife should be goods of marriage. Therefore it is not an impediment to a certain extent subject to her husband. The secondary thereto. essential end of marriage is the curbing of concupiscence; Objection 5. Further, things which are more akin and and this end would be forfeit if a man could marry any more similar to one another are better and more firmly blood-relation, since a wide scope would be afforded to united together. Now matrimony is a kind of union. Since concupiscence if those who have to live together in the then consanguinity is a kind of kinship, it does not hinder same house were not forbidden to be mated in the flesh. marriage but rather strengthens the union. Wherefore the Divine law debars from marriage not only On the contrary, According to the natural law what- father and mother, but also other kinsfolk who have to live ever is an obstacle to the good of the offspring is an im- in close intimacy with one another and ought to safeguard pediment to marriage. Now consanguinity hinders the one another’s modesty. The Divine law assigns this rea- good of the offspring, because in the words of Gregory son (Lev. 18:10): “Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness” (Regist., epis. xxxi) quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 40): of such and such a one, “because it is thy own nakedness.” “We have learnt by experience that the children of such a But the accidental end of marriage is the binding to- union cannot thrive.” Therefore according to the law of gether of mankind and the extension of friendship: for nature consanguinity is an impediment to matrimony. a husband regards his wife’s kindred as his own. Hence Further, that which belongs to human nature when it it would be prejudicial to this extension of friendship if was first created is of natural law. Now it belonged to hu- a man could take a woman of his kindred to wife since man nature from when it was first created that one should no new friendship would accrue to anyone from such a be debarred from marrying one’s father or mother: in marriage. Wherefore, according to human law and the or- proof of which it was said (Gn. 2:24): “Wherefore a man dinances of the Church, several degrees of consanguinity shall leave father and mother”: which cannot be under- are debarred from marriage. stood of cohabitation, and consequently must refer to the Accordingly it is clear from what has been said that 2837 consanguinity is by natural law an impediment to mar-a lasting solicitude for his children or reverence for par- riage in regard to certain persons, by Divine law in respect ents; but to other animals more or less, according as the of some, and by human law in respect of others. offspring is more or less necessary to its parents, or the Reply to Objection 1. Although Eve was formed parents to their offspring. Hence as the Philosopher at- from Adam she was not Adam’s daughter, because she tests (De Animal. ix, 47) concerning the camel and the was not formed from him after the manner in which it is horse, among certain animals the son abhors copulation natural for a man to beget his like in species, but by the with its mother as long as he retains knowledge of her and Divine operation, since from Adam’s rib a horse might a certain reverence for her. And since all honest customs have been formed in the same way as Eve was. Hence of animals are united together in man naturally, and more the natural connection between Eve and Adam was not so perfectly than in other animals, it follows that man natu- great as between daughter and father, nor was Adam the rally abhors carnal knowledge not only of his mother, but natural principle of Eve as a father is of his daughter. also of his daughter, which is, however, less against na- Reply to Objection 2. That certain barbarians are ture, as stated above. united carnally to their parents does not come from the Moreover consanguinity does not result from carnal natural law but from the passion of concupiscence which procreation in other animals as in man, as stated above has clouded the natural law in them. (a. 1, ad 5). Hence the comparison fails. Reply to Objection 3. Union of male and female is Reply to Objection 4. It has been shown how consan- said to be of natural law, because nature has taught this to guinity between married persons is contrary to the goods animals: yet she has taught this union to various animals of marriage. Hence the Objection proceeds from false in various ways according to their various conditions. But premises. carnal copulation with parents is derogatory to the rev- Reply to Objection 5. It is not unreasonable for one erence due to them. For just as nature has instilled into of two unions to be hindered by the other, even as where parents solicitude in providing for their offspring, so has there is identity there is not likeness. In like manner the it instilled into the offspring reverence towards their par- tie of consanguinity may hinder the union of marriage. ents: yet to no kind of animal save man has she instilled Whether the degrees of consanguinity that are an impediment to marriage could be Suppl. q. 54 a. 4 fixed by the Church? Objection 1. It would seem that the degrees of con- reasonable cause that it proceeds from the natural law. sanguinity that are an impediment to marriage could not But the causes that are assigned for the number of degrees be fixed by the Church so as to reach to the fourth de- seem altogether unreasonable, since they bear no relation gree. For it is written (Mat. 19:6): “What God hath joined to their effect; for instance, that consanguinity be an im- together let no man put asunder.” But God joined those pediment as far as the fourth degree on account of the four together who are married within the fourth degree of con- elements as far as the sixth degree on account of the six sanguinity, since their union is not forbidden by the Di- ages of the world, as far as the seventh degree on account vine law. Therefore they should not be put asunder by a of the seven days of which all time is comprised. There- human law. fore seemingly this prohibition is of no force. Objection 2. Further, matrimony is a sacrament as Objection 5. Further, where the cause is the same also is baptism. Now no ordinance of the Church could there should be the same effect. Now the causes for which prevent one who is baptized from receiving the baptismal consanguinity is an impediment to marriage are the good character, if he be capable of receiving it according to the of the offspring, the curbing of concupiscence, and the Divine law. Therefore neither can an ordinance of the extension of friendship, as stated above (a. 3), which are Church forbid marriage between those who are not for- equally necessary for all time. Therefore the degrees of bidden to marry by the Divine law. consanguinity should have equally impeded marriage at Objection 3. Further, positive law can neither void all times: yet this is not true since consanguinity is now nor extend those things which are natural. Now consan- an impediment to marriage as far as the fourth degree, guinity is a natural tie which is in itself of a nature to im- whereas formerly it was an impediment as far as the sev- pede marriage. Therefore the Church cannot by its ordi- enth. nance permit or forbid certain people to marry, any more Objection 6. Further, one and the same union cannot than she can make them to be kin or not kin. be a kind of sacrament and a kind of incest. But this would Objection 4. Further, an ordinance of positive law be the case if the Church had the power of fixing a differ- should have some reasonable cause, since it is for this ent number in the degrees which are an impediment to 2838 marriage. Thus if certain parties related in the fifth degree ship of God is no longer handed down and spread abroad were married when that degree was an impediment, their by a carnal birth but by a spiritual grace: wherefore it was union would be incestuous, and yet this same union would necessary that men should be yet more withdrawn from be a marriage afterwards when the Church withdrew her carnal things by devoting themselves to things spiritual, prohibition. And the reverse might happen if certain de- and that love should have a yet wider play. Hence in olden grees which were not an impediment were subsequently times marriage was forbidden even within the more re- to be forbidden by the Church. Therefore seemingly the mote degrees of consanguinity, in order that consanguin- power of the Church does not extend to this. ity and affinity might be the sources of a wider natural Objection 7. Further, human law should copy the friendship; and this was reasonably extended to the sev- Divine law. Now according to the Divine law which is enth degree, both because beyond this it was difficult to contained in the Old Law, the prohibition of degrees does have any recollection of the common stock, and because not apply equally in the ascending and descending lines: this was in keeping with the sevenfold grace of the Holy since in the Old Law a man was forbidden to marry his Ghost. Afterwards, however, towards these latter times father’s sister but not his brother’s daughter. Therefore the prohibition of the Church has been restricted to the neither should there remain now a prohibition in respect fourth degree, because it became useless and dangerous of nephews and uncles. to extend the prohibition to more remote degrees of con- On the contrary, Our Lord said to His disciples (Lk. sanguinity. Useless, because charity waxed cold in many 10:16): “He that heareth you heareth Me.” Therefore a hearts so that they had scarcely a greater bond of friend- commandment of the Church has the same force as a com- ship with their more remote kindred than with strangers: mandment of God. Now the Church sometimes has for- and it was dangerous because through the prevalence of bidden and sometimes allowed certain degrees which the concupiscence and neglect men took no account of so nu- Old Law did not forbid. Therefore those degrees are an merous a kindred, and thus the prohibition of the more re- impediment to marriage. mote degrees became for many a snare leading to damna- Further, even as of old the marriages of pagans were tion. Moreover there is a certain fittingness in the restric- controlled by the civil law, so now is marriage controlled tion of the above prohibition to the fourth degree. First by the laws of the Church. Now formerly the civil law de- because men are wont to live until the fourth generation, cided which degrees of consanguinity impede marriage, so that consanguinity cannot lapse into oblivion, where- and which do not. Therefore this can be done now by a fore God threatened (Ex. 20:5) to visit the parent’s sins commandment of the Church. on their children to the third and fourth generation. Sec- I answer that, The degrees within which consanguin- ondly, because in each generation the blood, the identity ity has been an impediment to marriage have varied ac- of which causes consanguinity, receives a further addition cording to various times. For at the beginning of the of new blood, and the more another blood is added the less human race father and mother alone were debarred from there is of the old. And because there are four elements, marrying their children, because then mankind were few each of which is the more easily mixed with another, ac- in number, and then it was necessary for the propagation cording as it is more rarefied it follows that at the first of the human race to be ensured with very great care, and admixture the identity of blood disappears as regards the consequently only such persons were to be debarred as first element which is most subtle; at the second admix- were unfitted for marriage even in respect of its principal ture, as regards the second element; at the third, as to the end which is the good of the offspring, as stated above third element; at the fourth, as to the fourth element. Thus (a. 3). Afterwards however, the human race having multi- after the fourth generation it is fitting for the carnal union plied, more persons were excluded by the law of Moses, to be repeated. for they already began to curb concupiscence. Wherefore Reply to Objection 1. Even as God does not join to- as Rabbi Moses says (Doc. Perp. iii, 49) all those persons gether those who are joined together against the Divine were debarred from marrying one another who are wont command, so does He not join together those who are to live together in one household, because if a lawful car- joined together against the commandment of the Church, nal intercourse were possible between them, this would which has the same binding force as a commandment of prove a very great incentive to lust. Yet the Old Law per- God. mitted other degrees of consanguinity, in fact to a certain Reply to Objection 2. Matrimony is not only a sacra- extent it commanded them; to wit that each man should ment but also fulfills an office; wherefore it is more sub- take a wife from his kindred, in order to avoid confusion ject to the control of the Church’s ministers than baptism of inheritances: because at that time the Divine worship which is a sacrament only: because just as human con- was handed down as the inheritance of the race. But af- tracts and offices are controlled by human laws, so are terwards more degrees were forbidden by the New Law spiritual contracts and offices controlled by the law of the which is the law of the spirit and of love, because the wor- Church. 2839 Reply to Objection 3. Although the tie of consan-a union would not become a marriage on account of the guinity is natural, it is not natural that consanguinity for- Church’s commandment by reason of the former contract, bid carnal intercourse, except as regards certain degrees, because they could separate if they wished. Nevertheless, as stated above (a. 3). Wherefore the Church’s command- they could contract anew, and this would be a new union. ment does not cause certain people to be kin or not kin, Reply to Objection 7. In prohibiting the degrees of because they remain equally kin at all times: but it makes consanguinity the Church considers chiefly the point of carnal intercourse to be lawful or unlawful at different view of affection. And since the reason for affection to- times for different degrees of consanguinity. wards one’s brother’s son is not less but even greater than Reply to Objection 4. The reasons assigned are the reasons for affection towards one’s father’s brother, given as indicating aptness and congruousness rather than inasmuch as the son is more akin to the father than the fa- causality and necessity. ther to the son (Ethic. viii, 12), therefore did the Church Reply to Objection 5. The reason for the impediment equally prohibit the degrees of consanguinity in uncles of consanguinity is not the same at different times: where- and nephews. On the other hand the Old Law in debar- fore that which it was useful to allow at one time, it was ring certain persons looked chiefly to the danger of con- beneficial to forbid at another. cupiscence arising from cohabitation; and debarred those Reply to Objection 6. A commandment does not af- persons who were in closer intimacy with one another on fect the past but the future. Wherefore if the fifth degree account of their living together. Now it is more usual for a which is now allowed were to be forbidden at any time, niece to live with her uncle than an aunt with her nephew: those in the fifth degree who are married would not have because a daughter is more identified with her father, be- to separate, because no impediment supervening to mar- ing part of him, whereas a sister is not in this way identi- riage can annul it; and consequently a union which was fied with her brother, for she is not part of him but is born a marriage from the first would not be made incestuous of the same parent. Hence there was not the same reason by a commandment of the Church. In like manner, if a for debarring a niece and an aunt. degree which is now forbidden were to be allowed, such 2840 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 55 Of the Impediment of Affinity (In Eleven Articles) We must consider next the impediment of affinity. Under this head there are eleven points of inquiry: (1) Whether affinity results from matrimony? (2) Whether it remains after the death of husband or wife? (3) Whether it is caused through unlawful intercourse? (4) Whether it arises from a betrothal? (5) Whether affinity is caused through affinity? (6) Whether affinity is an impediment to marriage? (7) Whether affinity in itself admits of degrees? (8) Whether its degrees extend as far as the degrees of consanguinity? (9) Whether marriages of persons related to one another by consanguinity or affinity should always be dissolved by divorce? (10) Whether the process for the dissolution of like marriages should always be by way of accusation? (11) Whether witnesses should be called in such a case? Whether a person contracts affinity through the marriage of a blood-relation? Suppl. q. 55 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that a person does not connected with another by carnal procreation is bound to contract affinity through the marriage of a blood-relation. him by a tie of natural friendship, so does one person be- For “the cause of a thing being so is yet more so.” Now the come connected with another through carnal intercourse. wife is not connected with her husband’s kindred except But there is a difference in this, that one who is connected by reason of the husband. Since then she does not contract with another through carnal procreation, as a son with his affinity with her husband, neither does she contract it with father, shares in the same common stock and blood, so her husband’s kindred. that a son is connected with his father’s kindred by the Objection 2. Further, if certain things be separate same kind of tie as the father was, the tie, namely of con- from one another and something be connected with one of sanguinity, albeit in a different degree on account of his them, it does not follow that it is connected with the other. being more distant from the stock: whereas one who is Now a person’s blood relations are separate from one an- connected with another through carnal intercourse does other. Therefore it does not follow, if a certain woman be not share in the same stock, but is as it were an extraneous married to a certain man, that she is therefore connected addition thereto: whence arises another kind of tie known with all his kindred. by the name of “affinity.” This is expressed in the verse: Objection 3. Further, relations result from certain Marriage makes a new kind of connection, things being united together. Now the kindred of the hus- While birth makes a new degree, band do not become united together by the fact of his tak- because, to wit, the person begotten is in the same kind ing a wife. Therefore they do not acquire any relationship of relationship, but in a different degree, whereas through of affinity. carnal intercourse he enters into a new kind of relation- On the contrary, Husband and wife are made one ship. flesh. Therefore if the husband is related in the flesh to all Reply to Objection 1. Although a cause is more po- his kindred, for the same reason his wife will be related to tent than its effect, it does not always follow that the same them all. name is applicable to the cause as to the effect, because Further, this is proved by the authorities quoted in the sometimes that which is in the effect, is found in the cause text (Sent. iv, D, 41). not in the same but in a higher way; wherefore it is not ap- I answer that, A certain natural friendship is founded plicable to both cause and effect under the same name or on natural fellowship. Now natural fellowship, according under the same aspect, as is the case with all equivocal ef- to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12), arises in two ways; fective causes. Thus, then, the union of husband and wife first, from carnal procreation; secondly, from connection is stronger than the union of the wife with her husband’s with orderly carnal procreation, wherefore he says (Ethic. kindred, and yet it ought not to be named affinity, but mat- viii, 12) that the friendship of a husband towards his wife rimony which is a kind of unity; even as a man is identical is natural. Consequently even as a person through being with himself, but not with his kinsman. 2841 Reply to Objection 2. Blood-relations are in a way in the other logically only. In another way when the re-separate, and in a way connected: and it happens in re- lation results from the movement of one extreme without spect of their connection that a person who is connected any concomitant movement, but not without a previous with one of them is in some way connected with all of movement of the other; thus there results equality between them. But on account of their separation and distance two men by the increase of one, without the other ei- from one another it happens that a person who is con- ther increasing or decreasing then, although previously he nected with one of them in one way is connected with reached his actual quantity by some movement or change, another in another way, either as to the kind of connection so that this relation is founded really in both extremes. It or as to the degree. is the same with consanguinity and affinity, because the Reply to Objection 3. Further, a relation results relation of brotherhood which results in a grown child on sometimes from a movement in each extreme, for instance the birth of a boy, is caused without any movement of the fatherhood and sonship, and a relation of this kind is really former’s at the time, but by virtue of that previous move- in both extremes. Sometimes it results from the move- ment of his wherein he was begotten; wherefore at the ment of one only, and this happens in two ways. In one time it happens that there results in him the aforesaid rela- way when a relation results from the movement of one tion through the movement of another. Likewise because extreme without any movement previous or concomitant this man descends through his own birth from the same of the other extreme; as in the Creator and the creature, stock as the husband, there results in him affinity with the the sensible and the sense, knowledge and the knowable latter’s wife, without any new change in him. object: and then the relation is in one extreme really and Whether affinity remains after the death of husband or wife? Suppl. q. 55 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that affinity does not of them are caused through something being adapted to remain after the death of husband or wife, between the movement, for instance the relations between the motive blood-relations of husband and wife or “vice versa.” Be- power and the movable, or between master and servant; cause if the cause cease the effect ceases. Now the cause and some of them result from something, having been of affinity was the marriage, which ceases after the hus- moved previously, such as the relation between father and band’s death, since then “the woman. . . is loosed from the son, for the relation between them is caused not by (the law of the husband” (Rom. 7:2). Therefore the aforesaid con) being begotten now, but by his having been begot- affinity ceases also. ten. Now aptitude for movement and for being moved is Objection 2. Further, consanguinity is the cause of transitory; whereas the fact of having been moved is ev- affinity. Now the consanguinity of the husband with his erlasting, since what has been never ceases having been. blood-relations ceases at his death. Therefore, the wife’s Consequently fatherhood and sonship are never dissolved affinity with them ceases also. through the removal of the cause, but only through the On the contrary, Affinity is caused by consanguinity. corruption of the subject, that is of one of the subjects. Now consanguinity binds persons together for all time as The same applies to affinity, for this is caused by certain long as they live. Therefore affinity does so also: and con- persons having been joined together not by their being ac- sequently affinity (between two persons) is not dissolved tually joined. Wherefore it is not done away, as long as through the dissolution of the marriage by the death of a the persons between whom affinity has been contracted third person. survive, although the person die through whom it was con- I answer that, A relation ceases in two ways: in one tracted. way through the corruption of its subject, in another way Reply to Objection 1. The marriage tie causes affin- by the removal of its cause; thus likeness ceases when one ity not only by reason of actual union, but also by reason of the like subjects dies, or when the quality that caused of the union having been effected in the past. the likeness is removed. Now there are certain relations Reply to Objection 2. Consanguinity is not the chief which have for their cause an action, or a passion or move- cause of affinity, but union with a blood-relation, not only ment (Metaph. v, 20): and some of these are caused because that union is now, but because it has been. Hence by movement, through something being moved actually; the argument does not prove. such is the relation between mover and moved: some 2842 Whether unlawful intercourse causes affinity? Suppl. q. 55 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that unlawful intercourse secondly on account of the community of works: the for- does not cause affinity. For affinity is an honorable thing. mer of which belongs to marriage by reason of carnal cop- Now honorable things do not result from that which is ulation, and the latter, in so far as marriage is a partnership dishonorable. Therefore affinity cannot be caused by a directed to a common life. Now the former is to be found dishonorable intercourse. in every carnal union where there is a mingling of seeds, Objection 2. Further, where there is consanguinity since such a union may be productive of offspring, but there cannot be affinity; since affinity is a relationship be- the latter may be wanting. Consequently since marriage tween persons that results from carnal intercourse and is caused affinity, in so far as it was a carnal mingling, it fol- altogether void of blood-relationship. Now if unlawful lows that also an unlawful intercourse causes affinity in so intercourse were a cause of affinity, it would sometimes far as it has something of natural copulation. happen that a man would contract affinity with his blood- Reply to Objection 1. In an unlawful intercourse relations and with himself: for instance when a man is there is something natural which is common to fornication guilty of incest with a blood-relation. Therefore affinity is and marriage, and in this respect it causes affinity. There not caused by unlawful intercourse. is also something which is inordinate whereby it differs Objection 3. Further, unlawful intercourse is accord- from marriage, and in this respect it does not cause affin- ing to nature or against nature. Now affinity is not caused ity. Hence affinity remains honorable, although its cause by unnatural unlawful intercourse as decided by law (can. is in a way dishonorable. Extraordinaria, xxxv, qu. 2,3). Therefore it is not caused Reply to Objection 2. There is no reason why diverse only by unlawful intercourse according to nature. relations should not be in the same subject by reason of On the contrary, He who is joined to a harlot is made different things. Consequently there can be affinity and one body (1 Cor. 6:16). Now this is the reason why mar- consanguinity between two persons, not only on account riage caused affinity. Therefore unlawful intercourse does of unlawful but also on account of lawful intercourse: for so for the same reason. instance if a blood-relation of mine on my father’s side Further, carnal intercourse is the cause of affinity, as marries a blood-relation of mine on my mother’s side. shown by the definition of affinity, which definition is Hence in the above definition the words “which is al- as follows: Affinity is the relationship of persons which together void of blood-relationship” apply to affinity as results from carnal intercourse and is altogether void of such. Nor does it follow that a man by having inter- blood-relationship. But there is carnal copulation even course with his blood-relation contracts affinity with him- in unlawful intercourse. Therefore unlawful intercourse self, since affinity, like consanguinity, requires diversity causes affinity. of subjects, as likeness does. I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. Reply to Objection 3. In unnatural copulation there viii, 12) the union of husband and wife is said to be natu- is no mingling of seeds that makes generation possible: ral chiefly on account of the procreation of offspring, and wherefore a like intercourse does not cause affinity. Whether affinity is caused by betrothal? Suppl. q. 55 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that affinity cannot be promise be made between persons to whom marriage is caused by betrothal. For affinity is a lasting tie: whereas rendered unlawful by a vow; or in any other way what- a betrothal is sometimes broken off. Therefore it cannot ever. Therefore betrothal cannot cause affinity. cause affinity. On the contrary, Pope Alexander (cap. Ad audien- Objection 2. Further if the hymen be penetrated dem, De spons. et matrim.) forbade a certain woman to without the deed being consummated, affinity is not con- marry a certain man, because she had been betrothed to tracted. Yet this is much more akin to carnal intercourse his brother. Now this would not be the case unless affinity than a betrothal. Therefore betrothal does not cause affin- were contracted by betrothal. Therefore, etc. ity. I answer that, Just as a betrothal has not the condi- Objection 3. Further, betrothal is nothing but a tions of a perfect marriage, but is a preparation for mar- promise of future marriage. Now sometimes there is a riage, so betrothal causes not affinity as marriage does, but promise of future marriage without affinity being con- something like affinity. This is called “the justice of pub- tracted, for instance if it take place before the age of seven lic honesty,” which is an impediment to marriage even as years; or if a man having a perpetual impediment of im- affinity and consanguinity are, and according to the same potence promise a woman future marriage; or if a like degrees, and is defined thus: “The justice of public hon- 2843 esty is a relationship arising out of betrothal, and derives words of the present and before its consummation, and its force from ecclesiastical institution by reason of its in like manner there results from betrothal, which is a honesty.” This indicates the reason of its name as well promise of conjugal fellowship, something akin to affin- as its cause, namely that this relationship was instituted ity, namely the justice of public honesty. by the Church on account of its honesty. Reply to Objection 3. All those impediments which Reply to Objection 1. Betrothal, by reason not of void a betrothal prevent affinity being contracted through itself but of the end to which it is directed, causes this a promise of marriage. Hence whether he who actually kind of affinity known as “the justice of public honesty”: promises marriage be lacking in age, or be under a solemn wherefore just as marriage is a lasting tie, so is the afore- vow of continence or any like impediment, no affinity nor said kind of affinity. anything akin to it results because the betrothal is void. If Reply to Objection 2. In carnal intercourse man however, a minor, laboring under insensibility or malefice, and woman become one flesh by the mingling of seeds. having a perpetual impediment, is betrothed before the Wherefore it is not every invasion or penetration of the age of puberty and after the age of seven years, with a hymen that causes affinity to be contracted, but only such woman who is of age, from such a contract there results as is followed by a mingling of seeds. But marriage causes the impediment called “justice of public honesty,” because affinity not only on account of carnal intercourse, but also at the time the impediment was not actual, since at that age by reason of the conjugal fellowship, in respect of which the boy who is insensible is equally impotent in respect of also marriage is according to nature. Consequently affin- the act in question. ity results from the marriage contract itself expressed in Whether affinity is a cause of affinity? Suppl. q. 55 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that affinity also is a cause than affinity. But the blood-relations of the wife do not of affinity. For Pope Julius I says (cap. Contradicimus 35, become blood-relations of the husband. Much less, there- qu. iii): “No man may marry his wife’s surviving blood- fore, does affinity to the wife cause affinity to her blood- relation”: and it is said in the next chapter (cap. Porro relations, and thus the same conclusion follows. duorum) that “the wives of two cousins are forbidden to I answer that, There are two ways in which one thing marry, one after the other, the same husband.” But this is proceeds from another: in one way a thing proceeds from only on account of affinity being contracted through union another in likeness of species, as a man is begotten of a with a person related by affinity. Therefore affinity is a man: in another way one thing proceeds from another, not cause of affinity. in likeness of species; and this process is always towards Objection 2. Further, carnal intercourse makes per- a lower species, as instanced in all equivocal agents. The sons akin even as carnal procreation, since the degrees of first kind of procession, however often it be repeated, the affinity and consanguinity are reckoned equally. But con- same species always remains: thus if one man be begot- sanguinity causes affinity. Therefore affinity does also. ten of another by an act of the generative power, of this Objection 3. Further, things that are the same with man also another man will be begotten, and so on. But one and the same are the same with one another. But the the second kind of procession, just as in the first instance wife contracts the same relations with all her husband’s it produces another species, so it makes another species kindred. Therefore all her husband’s kindred are made as often as it is repeated. Thus by movement from a point one with all who are related by affinity to the wife, and there proceeds a line and not a point, because a point by thus affinity is the cause of affinity. being moved makes a line; and from a line moved lineally, Objection 4. On the contrary, If affinity is caused by there proceeds not a line but a surface, and from a sur- affinity a man who has connection with two women can face a body, and in this way the procession can go no fur- marry neither of them, because then the one would be re- ther. Now in the procession of kinship we find two kinds lated to the other by affinity. But this is false. Therefore whereby this tie is caused: one is by carnal procreation, affinity does not cause affinity. and this always produces the same species of relationship; Objection 5. Further, if affinity arose out of affinity the other is by the marriage union, and this produces a a man by marrying another man’s widow would contract different kind of relationship from the beginning: thus it affinity with all her first husband’s kindred, since she is is clear that a married woman is related to her husband’s related to them by affinity. But this cannot be the case blood-relations not by blood but by affinity. Wherefore because he would become especially related by affinity to if this kind of process be repeated, the result will be not her deceased husband. Therefore, etc. affinity but another kind of relationship; and consequently Objection 6. Further, consanguinity is a stronger tie a married party contracts with the affines of the other party 2844 a relation not of affinity but of some other kind which is Since however the arguments in the contrary sense called affinity of the second kind. And again if a person would seem to show that no tie is caused by affinity, we through marriage contracts relationship with an affine of must reply to them lest the time-honored prohibition of the second kind, it will not be affinity of the second kind, the Church seem unreasonable. but of a third kind, as indicated in the verse quoted above Reply to Objection 4. As stated above, a woman does (a. 1). Formerly these two kinds were included in the pro- not contract affinity of the first kind with the man to whom hibition, under the head of the justice of public honesty she is united in the flesh, wherefore she does not contract rather than under the head of affinity, because they fall affinity of the second kind with a woman known by the short of true affinity, in the same way as the relationship same man; and consequently if a man marry one of these arising out of betrothal. Now however they have ceased women, the other does not contract affinity of the third to be included in the prohibition, which now refers only kind with him. And so the laws of bygone times did not to the first kind of affinity in which true affinity consists. forbid the same man to marry successively two women Reply to Objection 1. A husband contracts affinity known by one man. of the first kind with his wife’s male blood-relation, and Reply to Objection 5. As a man is not connected with affinity of the second kind with the latter’s wife: where- his wife by affinity of the first kind, so he does not con- fore if the latter man dies the former cannot marry his tract affinity of the second kind with the second husband widow on account of the second kind of affinity. Again of the same wife. Wherefore the argument does not prove. if a man A marry a widow B, C, a relation of her former Reply to Objection 6. One person is not connected husband being connected with B by the first kind of affin- with me through another, except they be connected to- ity, contracts affinity of the second kind with her husband gether. Hence through a woman who is affine to me, no A; and D, the wife of this relation C being connected, by person becomes connected with me, except such as is con- affinity of the second kind, with B, this man’s wife con- nected with her. Now this cannot be except through carnal tracts affinity of the third kind with her husband A. And procreation from her, or through connection with her by since the third kind of affinity was included in the prohibi- marriage: and according to the olden legislation, I con- tion on account of a certain honesty more than by reason tracted some kind of connection through her in both ways: of affinity, the canon (cap. Porro duorum 35, qu. iii) says: because her son even by another husband becomes affine “The justice of public honesty forbids the wives of two to me in the same kind and in a different degree of affinity, cousins to be married to the same man, the one after the as appears from the rule given above: and again her sec- other.” But this prohibition is done away with. ond husband becomes affine to me in the second kind of Reply to Objection 2. Although carnal intercourse is affinity. But her other blood-relations are not connected a cause of people being connected with one another, it is with him, but she is connected with them, either as with not the same kind of connection. father or mother, inasmuch as she descends from them, or, Reply to Objection 3. The wife contracts the same as with her brothers, as proceeding from the same princi- connection with her husband’s relatives as to the degree ple; wherefore the brother or father of my affine does not but not as to the kind of connection. become affine to me in any kind of affinity. Whether affinity is an impediment to marriage? Suppl. q. 55 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that affinity is not an im- I answer that, Affinity that precedes marriage hinders pediment to marriage. For nothing is an impediment to marriage being contracted and voids the contract, for the marriage except what is contrary thereto. But affinity is same reason as consanguinity. For just as there is a cer- not contrary to marriage since it is caused by it. Therefore tain need for blood-relations to live together, so is there it is not an impediment to marriage. for those who are connected by affinity: and just as there Objection 2. Further, by marriage the wife becomes is a tie of friendship between blood-relations, so is there a possession of the husband. Now the husband’s kindred between those who are affine to one another. If, however, inherit his possessions after his death. Therefore they can affinity supervene to matrimony, it cannot void the mar- succeed to his wife, although she is affine to them, as riage, as stated above (q. 50, a. 7). shown above (a. 5). Therefore affinity is not an imped- Reply to Objection 1. Affinity is not contrary to the iment to marriage. marriage which causes it, but to a marriage being con- On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 18:8): “Thou shalt tracted with an affine, in so far as the latter would hinder not uncover the nakedness of thy father’s wife.” Now she the extension of friendship and the curbing of concupis- is only affine. Therefore affinity is an impediment to mar- cence, which are sought in marriage. riage. Reply to Objection 2. The husband’s possessions do 2845 not become one with him as the wife is made one flesh ment to marriage or union with the husband according to with him. Wherefore just as consanguinity is an impedi- the flesh, so is one forbidden to marry the husband’s wife. Whether affinity in itself admits of degrees? Suppl. q. 55 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that affinity in itself ad- through consanguinity which is the latter’s cause. Where- mits of degrees. For any kind of propinquity can itself be fore since the degrees of relationship are distinguished in the subject of degrees. Now affinity is a kind of propin- reference to carnal procreation, the distinction of degrees quity. Therefore it has degrees in itself apart from the is directly and immediately referable to consanguinity, degrees of consanguinity by which it is caused. and to affinity through consanguinity. Hence the general Objection 2. Further, it is stated in the text (Sent. iv, rule in seeking the degrees of affinity is that in whatever D, 41) that the child of a second marriage could not take degree of consanguinity I am related to the husband, in a consort from within the degrees of affinity of the first that same degree of affinity I am related to the wife. husband. But this would not be the case unless the son of Reply to Objection 1. The degrees in propinquity of an affine were also affine. Therefore affinity like consan- relationship can only be taken in reference to ascent and guinity admits itself of degrees. descent of propagation, to which affinity is compared only On the contrary, Affinity is caused by consanguinity. through consanguinity. Wherefore affinity has no direct Therefore all the degrees of affinity are caused by the de- degrees, but derives them according to the degrees of con- grees of consanguinity: and so it has no degrees of itself. sanguinity. I answer that, A thing does not of itself admit of be- Reply to Objection 2. Formerly it used to be said that ing divided except in reference to something belonging to the son of my affine by a second marriage was affine to it by reason of its genus: thus animal is divided into ratio- me, not directly but accidentally as it were: wherefore he nal and irrational and not into white and black. Now car- was forbidden to marry on account of the justice of pub- nal procreation has a direct relation to consanguinity, be- lic honesty rather than affinity. And for this reason this cause the tie of consanguinity is immediately contracted prohibition is now revoked. through it; whereas it has no relation to affinity except Whether the degrees of affinity extend in the same way as the degrees of consanguin-Suppl. q. 55 a. 8 ity? Objection 1. It would seem that the degrees of affinity consanguinity. do not extend in the same way as the degrees of consan- I answer that, Since the degrees of affinity are reck- guinity. For the tie of affinity is less strong than the tie oned according to the degrees of consanguinity, the de- of consanguinity, since affinity arises from consanguinity grees of affinity must needs be the same in number as in diversity of species, as from an equivocal cause. Now those of consanguinity. Nevertheless, affinity being a the stronger the tie the longer it lasts. Therefore the tie lesser tie than consanguinity, both formerly and now, a of affinity does not last to the same number of degrees as dispensation is more easily granted in the more remote consanguinity. degrees of affinity than in the remote degrees of consan- Objection 2. Further, human law should imitate Di- guinity. vine law. Now according to the Divine law certain degrees Reply to Objection 1. The fact that the tie of affinity of consanguinity were forbidden, in which degrees affin- is less than the tie of consanguinity causes a difference in ity was not an impediment to marriage: as instanced in a the kind of relationship but not in the degrees. Hence this brother’s wife whom a man could marry although he could argument is not to the point. not marry her sister. Therefore now too the prohibition of Reply to Objection 2. A man could not take his de- affinity and consanguinity should not extend to the same ceased brother’s wife except, in the case when the lat- degrees. ter died without issue, in order to raise up seed to his On the contrary, A woman is connected with me by brother. This was requisite at a time when religious wor- affinity from the very fact that she is married to a blood- ship was propagated by means of the propagation of the relation of mine. Therefore in whatever degree her hus- flesh, which is not the case now. Hence it is clear that band is related to me by blood she is related to me in he did not marry her in his own person as it were, but as that same degree by affinity: and so the degrees of affinity supplying the place of his brother. should be reckoned in the same number as the degrees of 2846 Whether a marriage contracted by persons with the degrees of affinity or consanguin-Suppl. q. 55 a. 9 ity should always be annulled? Objection 1. It would seem that a marriage contracted held by God’s gift and authority, yet in so far as she is by persons within the degrees of affinity or consanguinity an assembly of men there results in her acts something of ought not always to be annulled by divorce. For “what human frailty which is not Divine. Therefore a union ef- God hath joined together let no man put asunder” (Mat. fected in the presence of the Church who is ignorant of an 19:6). Since then it is understood that what the Church impediment is not indissoluble by Divine authority, but is does God does, and since the Church sometimes through brought about contrary to Divine authority through man’s ignorance joins such persons together, it would seem that error, which being an error of fact excuses from sin, as if subsequently this came to knowledge they ought not to long as it remains. Hence when the impediment comes be separated. to the knowledge of the Church, she ought to sever the Objection 2. Further, the tie of marriage is less oner- aforesaid union. ous than the tie of ownership. Now after a long time a Reply to Objection 2. That which cannot be done man may acquire by prescription the ownership of a thing without sin is not ratified by any prescription, for as Inno- of which he was not the owner. Therefore by length of cent III says (Conc. Later. iv, can. 50: cap. Non debent, time a marriage becomes good in law, although it was not De consang. et affinit.), “length of time does not dimin- so before. ish sin but increases it”: nor can it in any way legitimize Objection 3. Further, of like things we judge alike. a marriage which could not take place between unlawful Now if a marriage ought to be annulled on account of persons. consanguinity, in the case when two brothers marry two Reply to Objection 3. In contentious suits be- sisters, if one be separated on account of consanguinity, tween two persons the verdict does not prejudice a third the other ought to be separated for the same reason. and party, wherefore although the one brother’s marriage with yet this is not seemly. Therefore a marriage ought not to the one sister is annulled on account of consanguinity, be annulled on account of affinity or consanguinity. the Church does not therefore annul the other marriage On the contrary, Consanguinity and affinity forbid against which no action is taken. Yet in the tribunal of the contracting of a marriage and void the contract. There- the conscience the other brother ought not on this account fore if affinity or consanguinity be proved, the parties always to be bound to put away his wife, because such ac- should be separated even though they have actually con- cusations frequently proceed from ill-will, and are proved tracted marriage. by false witnesses. Hence he is not bound to form his con- I answer that, Since all copulation apart from lawful science on what has been done about the other marriage: marriage is a mortal sin, which the Church uses all her but seemingly one ought to draw a distinction, because endeavors to prevent, it belongs to her to separate those either he has certain knowledge of the impediment of his between whom there cannot be valid marriage, especially marriage, or he has an opinion about it, or he has neither. those related by blood or by affinity, who cannot without In the first case, he can neither seek nor pay the debt, in incest be united in the flesh. the second, he must pay, but not ask, in the third he can Reply to Objection 1. Although the Church is up- both pay and ask. Whether it is necessary to proceed by way of accusation for the annulment of a mar-Suppl. q. 55 a. 10 riage contracted by persons related to each other by affinity or consanguinity? Objection 1. It would seem that one ought not to pro- 41). But in accusations even strangers are heard. There- ceed by way of accusation in order to sever a marriage fore in a suit for matrimonial separation the process is not contracted between persons related by affinity or consan- by way of accusation. guinity. Because accusation is preceded by inscription∗ Objection 3. Further, if a marriage ought to be de- whereby a man binds himself to suffer the punishment of nounced this should be done especially where it is least retaliation, if he fail to prove his accusation. . But this difficult to sever the tie. Now this is when only the be- is not required when a matrimonial separation is at issue. trothal has been contracted, and then it is not the marriage Therefore accusation has no place then. that is denounced. Therefore accusation should never take Objection 2. Further, in a matrimonial lawsuit only place at any other time. the relatives are heard, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, Objection 4. Further, a man is not prevented from ac- ∗ The accuser was bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation; Cf. IIa IIae, q. 33, a. 7 2847 cusing by the fact that he does not accuse at once. But this nearly related they be, are not debarred from accusing, happens in marriage, for if he was silent at first when the when the marriage is denounced on account of a perpetual marriage was being contracted, he cannot denounce the impediment, which prevents the contracting of the mar- marriage afterwards without laying himself open to suspi- riage and voids the contract. When, however, the accu- cion. Therefore, etc. sation is based on a denial of the contract having taken On the contrary, Whatever is unlawful can be de- place, the parents should be debarred from witnessing as nounced. But the marriage of relatives by affinity and being liable to suspicion, except those of the party that consanguinity is unlawful. Therefore it can be denounced. is inferior in rank and wealth, for they, one is inclined to I answer that, Accusation is instituted lest the guilty think, would be willing for the marriage to stand. be tolerated as though they were innocent. Now just as Reply to Objection 3. If the marriage is not yet con- it happens through ignorance of fact that a guilty man is tracted and there is only a betrothal, there can be no accu- reputed innocent, so it happens through ignorance of a cir- sation, for what is not, cannot be accused. But the imped- cumstance that a certain fact is deemed lawful whereas it iment can be denounced lest the marriage be contracted. is unlawful. Wherefore just as a man is sometimes ac- Reply to Objection 4. He who is silent at first is cused, so is a fact sometimes an object of accusation. It sometimes heard afterwards if he wish to denounce the is in this way that a marriage is denounced, when through marriage, and sometimes he is repulsed. This is made ignorance of an impediment it is deemed lawful, whereas clear by the Decretal (cap. Cum in tua, De his qui matrim. it is unlawful. accus. possunt.) which runs as follows: “If an accuser Reply to Objection 1. The punishment of retaliation present himself after the marriage has been contracted, takes place when a person is accused of a crime, because since he did not declare himself when according to cus- then action is taken that he may be punished. But when it tom, the banns were published in church, we may rightly is a deed that is accused, action is taken not for the pun- ask whether he should be allowed to voice his accusation. ishment of the doer, but in order to prevent what is un- In this matter we deem that a distinction should be made, lawful. Hence in a matrimonial suit the accuser does not so that if he who lodges information against persons al- bind himself to a punishment. Moreover, the accusation ready married was absent from the diocese at the time of may be made either in words or in writing, provided the the aforesaid publication, or if for some other reason this person who denounces the marriage denounced, and the could not come to his knowledge, for instance if through impediment for which it is denounced, be expressed. exceeding stress of weakness and fever he was not in pos- Reply to Objection 2. Strangers cannot know of the session of his faculties, or was of so tender years as to be consanguinity except from the relatives, since these know too young to understand such matters, or if he were hin- with greater probability. Hence when these are silent, a dered by some other lawful cause, his accusation should stranger is liable to be suspected of acting from ill-will be heard. otherwise without doubt he should be repulsed unless he wish the relatives to prove his assertion. Where- as open to suspicion, unless he swear that the information fore a stranger is debarred from accusing when there are lodged by him came to his knowledge subsequently and relatives who are silent, and by whom he cannot prove that he is not moved by ill-will to make his accusation.” his accusation. On the other hand the relatives, however Whether in a suit of this kind one should proceed by hearing witnesses in the same Suppl. q. 55 a. 11 way as in other suits? Objection 1. It would seem that in such a suit one are at stake. Now in these the same person cannot be both ought not to proceed by hearing witnesses, in the same accuser and witness. Neither therefore can this be in a way as in other suits where any witnesses may be called matrimonial suit; and so it would appear that it is not right provided they be unexceptionable. But here strangers are to proceed by hearing witnesses in a suit of this kind. not admitted, although they be unexceptionable. There- On the contrary, Witnesses are called in a suit in fore, etc. order to give the judge evidence concerning matters of Objection 2. Further, witnesses who are suspected of doubt. Now evidence should be afforded the judge in private hatred or love are debarred from giving evidence. this suit as in other suits, since he must not pronounce Now relatives are especially open to suspicion of love for a hasty judgment on what is not proven. Therefore here one party, and hatred for the other. Therefore their evi- as in other lawsuits witnesses should be called. dence should not be taken. I answer that, In this kind of lawsuit as in others, Objection 3. Further, marriage is a more favorable truth must be unveiled by witnesses: yet, as the lawyers suit than those others in which purely corporeal questions say, there are many things peculiar to this suit; namely 2848 that “the same person can be accuser and witness; that ev-nesses may be called after the publication of the names idence is not taken ‘on oath of calumny,’ since it is a quasi- of the witnesses.” All this is in order to prevent the sin spiritual lawsuit; that relatives are allowed as witnesses; that may occur in such a union (cap. Quoties aliqui; cap. that the juridical order is not perfectly observed, since if Super eo, De test. et attest.; cap. Literas, De juram. cal- the denunciation has been made, and the suit is uncon- umn.). tested, the defendant may be excommunicated if contu- This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. macious; that hearsay evidence is admitted; and that wit- 2849 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 56 Of the Impediment of Spiritual Relationship (In Five Articles) We must now consider the impediment of spiritual relationship: under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether spiritual relationship is an impediment to marriage? (2) From what cause is it contracted? (3) Between whom? (4) Whether it passes from husband to wife? (5) Whether it passes to the father’s carnal children? Whether spiritual relationship is an impediment to marriage? Suppl. q. 56 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that spiritual relationship contracted by carnal procreation is natural to man, inas- is not an impediment to marriage. For nothing is an im- much as he is a natural being, so the tie that is contracted pediment to marriage save what is contrary to a marriage from the reception of the sacraments is after a fashion nat- good. Now spiritual relationship is not contrary to a mar- ural to man, inasmuch as he is a member of the Church. riage good. Therefore it is not an impediment to marriage. Therefore as carnal relationship hinders marriage, even so Objection 2. Further, a perpetual impediment to mar- does spiritual relationship by command of the Church. We riage cannot stand together with marriage. But spiritual must however draw a distinction in reference to spiritual relationship sometimes stands together with marriage, as relationship, since either it precedes or follows marriage. stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42), as when a man in a case If it precedes, it hinders the contracting of marriage and of necessity baptizes his own child, for then he contracts voids the contract. If it follows, it does not dissolve the a spiritual relationship with his wife, and yet the marriage marriage bond: but we must draw a further distinction in is not dissolved. Therefore spiritual relationship is not an reference to the marriage act. For either the spiritual re- impediment to marriage. lationship is contracted in a case of necessity, as when a Objection 3. Further, union of the spirit does not pass father baptizes his child who is at the point of death— to the flesh. But marriage is a union of the flesh. There- and then it is not an obstacle to the marriage act on ei- fore since spiritual relationship is a union of the spirit, it ther side—or it is contracted without any necessity and cannot become an impediment to marriage. through ignorance, in which case if the person whose ac- Objection 4. Further, contraries have not the same ef- tion has occasioned the relationship acted with due cau- fects. Now spiritual relationship is apparently contrary to tion, it is the same with him as in the former case—or it is disparity of worship, since spiritual relationship is a kin- contracted purposely and without any necessity, and then ship resulting from the giving of a sacrament or the inten- the person whose action has occasioned the relationship, tion of so doing∗: whereas disparity of worship consists loses the right to ask for the debt; but is bound to pay if in the lack of a sacrament, as stated above (q. 50, a. 1). asked, because the fault of the one party should not be Since then disparity of worship is an impediment to mat- prejudicial to the other. rimony, it would seem that spiritual relationship has not Reply to Objection 1. Although spiritual relationship this effect. does not hinder any of the chief marriage goods, it hin- On the contrary, The holier the bond, the more is it ders one of the secondary goods, namely the extension to be safeguarded. Now a spiritual bond is holier than a of friendship, because spiritual relationship is by itself a bodily tie: and since the tie of bodily kinship is an im- sufficient reason for friendship: wherefore intimacy and pediment to marriage, it follows that spiritual relationship friendship with other persons need to be sought by means should also be an impediment. of marriage. Further, in marriage the union of souls ranks higher Reply to Objection 2. Marriage is a lasting bond, than union of bodies, for it precedes it. Therefore with wherefore no supervening impediment can sever it. Hence much more reason can a spiritual relationship hinder mar- it happens sometimes that marriage and an impediment to riage than bodily relationship does. marriage stand together, but not if the impediment pre- I answer that, Just as by carnal procreation man re- cedes. ceives natural being, so by the sacraments he receives the Reply to Objection 3. In marriage there is not only spiritual being of grace. Wherefore just as the tie that is a bodily but also a spiritual union: and consequently kin- ∗ See next Article, ad 3 2850 ship of spirit proves an impediment thereto, without spir-to equal. Thus disparity of worship and spiritual relation- itual kinship having to pass into a bodily relationship. ship are opposed to marriage, because in one the distance Reply to Objection 4. There is nothing unreasonable is greater, and in the other less, than required by marriage. in two things that are contrary to one another being con- Hence there is an impediment to marriage in either case. trary to the same thing, as great and small are contrary Whether spiritual relationship is contracted by baptism only? Suppl. q. 56 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that spiritual relationship means of seven things, beginning with the first taste of is contracted by Baptism only. For as bodily kinship is to blessed salt and ending with Confirmation given by the bodily birth, so is spiritual kinship to spiritual birth. Now bishop: and they say that spiritual relationship is con- Baptism alone is called spiritual birth. Therefore spiritual tracted by each of these seven things. But this does not kinship is contracted by Baptism only, even as only by seem reasonable, for carnal relationship is not contracted carnal birth is carnal kinship contracted. except by a perfect act of generation. Wherefore affinity Objection 2. Further, a character is imprinted in or- is not contracted except there be mingling of seeds, from der as in Confirmation. But spiritual relationship does not which it is possible for carnal generation to follow. Now result from receiving orders. Therefore it does not result spiritual generation is not perfected except by a sacra- from Confirmation but only from Baptism. ment: wherefore it does not seem fitting for spiritual rela- Objection 3. Further, sacraments are more excellent tionship to be contracted otherwise than through a sacra- than sacramentals. Now spiritual relationship does not re- ment. Hence others say that spiritual relationship is only sult from certain sacraments, for instance from Extreme contracted through three sacraments, namely catechism, Unction. Much less therefore does it result from catechiz- Baptism and Confirmation, but these do not apparently ing, as some maintain. know the meaning of what they say, since catechism is Objection 4. Further, many other sacramentals are at- not a sacrament but a sacramental. Wherefore others say tached to Baptism besides catechizing. Therefore spiritual that it is contracted through two sacraments only, namely relationship is not contracted from catechism any more Confirmation and Baptism, and this is the more common than from the others. opinion. Some however of these say that catechism is a Objection 5. Further, prayer is no less efficacious than weak impediment, since it hinders the contracting of mar-instruction of catechism for advancement in good. But riage but does not void the contract. spiritual relationship does not result from prayer. There- Reply to Objection 1. Carnal birth is twofold. The fore it does not result from catechism. first is in the womb, wherein that which is born is a weak- Objection 6. Further, the instruction given to the bap- ling and cannot come forth without danger: and to this tized by preaching to them avails no less than preaching birth regeneration by Baptism is likened; wherein a man to those who are not yet baptized. But no spiritual rela- is regenerated as though yet needing to be fostered in the tionship results from preaching. Neither therefore does it womb of the Church. The second is birth from out of result from catechism. the womb, when that which was born in the womb is so Objection 7. On the other hand, It is written (1 Cor. far strengthened that it can without danger face the outer 4:15): “In Christ Jesus by the gospel I have begotten you.” world which has a natural corruptive tendency. To this is Now spiritual birth causes spiritual relationship. There- likened Confirmation, whereby man being strengthened fore spiritual relationship results from the preaching of the goes forth abroad to confess the name of Christ. Hence gospel and instruction, and not only from Baptism. spiritual relationship is fittingly contracted through both Objection 8. Further, as original sin is taken away by these sacraments. Baptism, so is actual sin taken away by Penance. There- Reply to Objection 2. The effect of the sacrament of fore just as Baptism causes spiritual relationship, so also order is not regeneration but the bestowal of power, for does Penance. which reason it is not conferred on women, and conse- Objection 9. Further, “father” denotes relationship. quently no impediment to marriage can arise therefrom. Now a man is called another’s spiritual father in respect Hence this kind of relationship does not count. of Penance, teaching, pastoral care and many other like Reply to Objection 3. In catechism one makes a pro- things. Therefore spiritual relationship is contracted from fession of future Baptism, just as in betrothal one enters many other sources besides Baptism and Confirmation. an engagement of future marriage. Wherefore just as in I answer that, There are three opinions on this ques- betrothal a certain kind of propinquity is contracted, so is tion. Some say that as spiritual regeneration is bestowed there in catechism, whereby marriage is rendered at least by the sevenfold grace of the Holy Ghost, it is caused by unlawful, as some say; but not in the other sacraments. 2851 Reply to Objection 4. There is not made a profes-to spiritual relationship, so that if he have carnal inter- sion of faith in the other sacramentals of Baptism, as in course with her, he sins as grievously as if she were his catechism: wherefore the comparison fails. spiritual daughter. The reason of this is that the relations The same answer applies to the Fifth and Sixth Objec- between priest and penitent are most intimate, and conse- tions. quently in order to remove the occasion of sin this prohi- Reply to Objection 7. The Apostle had instructed bition∗ was made. them in the faith by a kind of catechism; and consequently Reply to Objection 9. A spiritual father is so called his instruction was directed to their spiritual birth. from his likeness to a carnal father. Now as the Philoso- Reply to Objection 8. Properly speaking a spiritual pher says (Ethic. viii, 2) a carnal father gives his child relationship is not contracted through the sacrament of three things, being nourishment and instruction: and con- Penance. Wherefore a priest’s son can marry a woman sequently a person’s spiritual father is so called from one whose confession the priest has heard, else in the whole of these three things. Nevertheless he has not, through be- parish he could not find a woman whom he could marry. ing his spiritual father, a spiritual relationship with him, Nor does it matter that by Penance actual sin is taken unless he is like a (carnal) father as to generation which is away, for this is not a kind of birth, but a kind of healing. the way to being. This solution may also be applied to the Nevertheless Penance occasions a kind of bond between foregoing Eighth Objection. the woman penitent and the priest, that has a resemblance Whether spiritual relationship is contracted between the person baptized and the per-Suppl. q. 56 a. 3 son who raises him from the sacred font? Objection 1. It would seem that spiritual relationship a person is born again a son of God as Father, and of is not contracted between the person baptized and the per- the Church as Mother. Now while he who confers the son who raises him from the sacred font. For in carnal sacrament stands in the place of God, whose instrument generation carnal relationship is contracted only on the and minister he is, he who raises a baptized person from part of the person of whose seed the child is born; and the sacred font, or holds the candidate for Confirmation, not on the part of the person who receives the child after stands in the place of the Church. Therefore spiritual re- birth. Therefore neither is spiritual relationship contracted lationship is contracted with both. between the receiver and the received at the sacred font. Reply to Objection 1. Not only the father, of whose Objection 2. Further, he who raises a person from the seed the child is born, is related carnally to the child, but sacred font is called anadochos by Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. also the mother who provides the matter, and in whose ii): and it is part of his office to instruct the child. But in-womb the child is begotten. So too the godparent who struction is not a sufficient cause of spiritual relationship, in place of the Church offers and raises the candidate for as stated above (a. 2). Therefore no relationship is con- Baptism and holds the candidate for Confirmation con- tracted between him and the person whom he raises from tracts spiritual relationship. the sacred font. Reply to Objection 2. He contracts spiritual rela- Objection 3. Further, it may happen that someone tionship not by reason of the instruction it is his duty to raises a person from the sacred font before he himself is give, but on account of the spiritual birth in which he co- baptized. Now spiritual relationship is not contracted in operates. such a case, since one who is not baptized is not capable Reply to Objection 3. A person who is not baptized of spirituality. Therefore raising a person from the sacred cannot raise anyone from the sacred font, since he is not font is not sufficient to contract a spiritual relationship. a member of the Church whom the godparent in Baptism On the contrary, There is the definition of spiritual represents: although he can baptize, because he is a crea- relationship quoted above (a. 1), as also the authorities ture of God Whom the baptizer represents. And yet he mentioned in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42). cannot contract a spiritual relationship, since he is void of I answer that, Just as in carnal generation a person spiritual life to which man is first born by receiving Bap- is born of a father and mother, so in spiritual generation tism. ∗ Can. Omnes quos, and seqq., Caus. xxx 2852 Whether spiritual relationship passes from husband to wife? Suppl. q. 56 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that spiritual relationship but not if the marriage be not yet consummated, since they does not pass from husband to wife. For spiritual and bod- are not as yet made one flesh: and this is by way of a kind ily union are disparate and differ generically. Therefore of affinity; wherefore it would seem on the same grounds carnal union which is between husband and wife cannot to pass to a woman of whom he has carnal knowledge, be the means of contracting a spiritual relationship. though she be not his wife. Hence the verse: “I may not Objection 2. Further, the godfather and godmother marry my own child’s godmother, nor the mother of my have more in common in the spiritual birth that is the godchild: but I may marry the godmother of my wife’s cause of spiritual relationship, than a husband, who child.” is godfather, has with his wife. Now godfather and Reply to Objection 1. From the fact that corporal and godmother do not hereby contract spiritual relationship. spiritual union differ generically we may conclude that the Therefore neither does a wife contract a spiritual relation- one is not the other, but not that the one cannot cause the ship through her husband being godfather to someone. other, since things of different genera sometimes cause Objection 3. Further, it may happen that the husband one another either directly or indirectly. is baptized, and his wife not, for instance when he is con- Reply to Objection 2. The godfather and godmother verted from unbelief without his wife being converted. of the same person are not united in that person’s spiri- Now spiritual relationship cannot be contracted by one tual birth save accidentally, since one of them would be who is not baptized. Therefore it does not always pass self-sufficient for the purpose. Hence it does not follow from husband to wife. from this that any spiritual relationship results between Objection 4. Further, husband and wife together can them whereby they are hindered from marrying one an- raise a person from the sacred font, since no law forbids it. other. Hence the verse: If therefore spiritual relationship passed from husband to “Of two co-parents one is always spiritual, the other wife, it would follow that each of them is twice godfather carnal: this rule is infallible.” or godmother of the same individual: which is absurd. On the other hand, marriage by itself makes husband On the contrary, Spiritual goods are more commu- and wife one flesh: wherefore the comparison fails. nicable than bodily goods. But the bodily consanguinity Reply to Objection 3. If the wife be not baptized, the of the husband passes to his wife by affinity. Much more spiritual relationship will not reach her, because she is not therefore does spiritual relationship. a fit subject, and not because spiritual relationship cannot I answer that, A may become co-parent with B in pass from husband to wife through marriage. two ways. First, by the act of another (B), who baptizes Reply to Objection 4. Since no spiritual relationship A’s child, or raises him in Baptism. In this way spiritual results between godfather and godmother, nothing pre- relationship does not pass from husband to wife, unless vents husband and wife from raising together someone perchance it be his wife’s child, for then she contracts spir- from the sacred font. Nor is it absurd that the wife be- itual relationship directly, even as her husband. Secondly, come twice godmother of the same person from different by his own act, for instance when he raises B’s child from causes, just as it is possible for her to be connected in car- the sacred font, and thus spiritual relationship passes to nal relationship both by affinity and consanguinity to the the wife if he has already had carnal knowledge of her, same person. Whether spiritual relationship passes to the godfather’s carnal children? Suppl. q. 56 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that spiritual relationship in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42). does not pass to the godfather’s carnal children. For no I answer that, A son is something of his father and degrees are assigned to spiritual relationship. Yet there not conversely (Ethic. viii, 12): wherefore spiritual rela- would be degrees if it passed from father to son, since tionship passes from father to his carnal son and not con- the person begotten involves a change of degree, as stated versely. Thus it is clear that there are three spiritual re- above (q. 55, a. 5). Therefore it does not pass to the god- lationships: one called spiritual fatherhood between god- father’s carnal sons. father and godchild; another called co-paternity between Objection 2. Further, father and son are related in the the godparent and carnal parent of the same person; and same degree as brother and brother. If therefore spiritual the third is called spiritual brotherhood, between godchild relationship passes from father to son, it will equally pass and the carnal children of the same parent. Each of these from brother to brother: and this is false. hinders the contracting of marriage and voids the contract. On the contrary, This is proved by authority quoted Reply to Objection 1. The addition of a person by 2853 carnal generation entails a degree with regard to a per-contracted. Consequently it does not follow that spiritual son connected by the same kind of relationship, but not relationship admits of degrees. with regard to one connected by another kind of relation- Reply to Objection 2. A man is not part of his brother ship. Thus a son is connected with his father’s wife in as a son is of his father. But a wife is part of her husband, the same degree as his father, but by another kind of re- since she is made one with him in body. Consequently lationship. Now spiritual relationship differs in kind from the relationship does not pass from brother to brother, carnal. Wherefore a godson is not related to his godfa- whether the brother be born before or after spiritual broth- ther’s carnal son in the same degree as the latter’s father is erhood. related to him, through whom the spiritual relationship is 2854 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 57 Of Legal Relationship, Which Is by Adoption (In Three Articles) We must now consider legal relationship which is by adoption. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) What is adoption? (2) Whether one contracts through it a tie that is an impediment to marriage? (3) Between which persons is this tie contracted. Whether adoption is rightly defined? Suppl. q. 57 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that adoption is not adopted, is adopted as a child; and consequently it is not rightly defined: “Adoption is the act by which a person right to say that one may be adopted as a grandchild. lawfully takes for his child or grandchild and so on one Objection 7. Further, adoption is a result of love, who does not belong to him.” For the child should be wherefore God is said to have adopted us as children subject to its father. Now, sometimes the person adopted through charity. Now we should have greater charity does not come under the power of the adopter. Therefore towards those who are connected with us than towards adoption is not always the taking of someone as a child. strangers. Therefore adoption should be not of a stranger Objection 2. Further, “Parents should lay up for their but of someone connected with us. children” (2 Cor. 12:14). But the adoptive father does I answer that, Art imitates nature and supplies the not always necessarily lay up for his adopted child, since defect of nature where nature is deficient. Hence just as sometimes the adopted does not inherit the goods of the a man begets by natural procreation, so by positive law adopter. Therefore adoption is not the taking of someone which is the art of what is good and just, one person as a child. can take to himself another as a child in likeness to one Objection 3. Further, adoption, whereby someone is that is his child by nature, in order to take the place of taken as a child, is likened to natural procreation whereby the children he has lost, this being the chief reason why a child is begotten naturally. Therefore whoever is com- adoption was introduced. And since taking implies a term petent to beget a child naturally is competent to adopt. “wherefrom,” for which reason the taker is not the thing But this is untrue, since neither one who is not his own taken, it follows that the person taken as a child must be master, nor one who is not twenty-five years of age, nor a stranger. Accordingly, just as natural procreation has a woman can adopt, and yet they can beget a child nat- a term “whereto,” namely the form which is the end of urally. Therefore, properly speaking, adoption is not the generation, and a term “wherefrom,” namely the contrary taking of someone as a child. form, so legal generation has a term “whereto,” namely a Objection 4. Further, to take as one’s child one who is child or grandchild, and a term “wherefrom,” namely, a not one’s own seems necessary in order to supply the lack stranger. Consequently the above definition includes the of children begotten naturally. Now one who is unable to genus of adoption, for it is described as a “lawful taking,” beget, through being a eunuch or impotent, suffers espe- and the term “wherefrom,” since it is said to be the taking cially from the absence of children of his own begetting. of “a stranger,” and the term “whereto,” because it says, Therefore he is especially competent to adopt someone as “as a child or grandchild .” his child. But he is not competent to adopt. Therefore Reply to Objection 1. The sonship of adoption is adoption is not the taking of someone as one’s child. an imitation of natural sonship. Wherefore there are two Objection 5. Further, in spiritual relationship, where species of adoption, one which imitates natural sonship someone is taken as a child without carnal procreation, it perfectly, and this is called “arrogatio,” whereby the per- is of no consequence whether an older person become the son adopted is placed under the power of the adopter; and father of a younger, or “vice versa,” since a youth can bap- one who is thus adopted inherits from his adopted father tize an old man and “vice versa.” Therefore, if by adoption if the latter die intestate, nor can his father legally deprive a person is taken as a child without being carnally begot-him of a fourth part of his inheritance. But no one can ten, it would make no difference whether an older person adopt in this way except one who is his own master, one adopted a younger, or a younger an older person; which is namely who has no father or, if he has, is of age. There not true. Therefore the same conclusion follows. can be no adoption of this kind without the authority of Objection 6. Further, there is no difference of de- the sovereign. The other kind of adoption imitates natu- gree between adopted and adopter. Therefore whoever is ral sonship imperfectly, and is called “simple adoption,” 2855 and by this the adopted does not come under the power of could have had them but have them not by reason of some the adopter: so that it is a disposition to perfect adoption, accidental impediment. rather than perfect adoption itself. In this way even one Reply to Objection 5. Spiritual relationship is con- who is not his own master can adopt, without the consent tracted through a sacrament whereby the faithful are born of the sovereign and with the authority of a magistrate: again in Christ, in Whom there is no difference between and one who is thus adopted does not inherit the estate of male and female, bondman and free, youth and old age the adopter, nor is the latter bound to bequeath to him any (Gal. 3:28; Col. 3:11). Wherefore anyone can indif- of his goods in his will, unless he will. ferently become another’s godfather. But adoption aims This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. at hereditary succession and a certain subjection of the Reply to Objection 3. Natural procreation is directed adopted to the adopter: and it is not fitting that older per- to the production of the species; wherefore anyone in sons should be subjected to younger in the care of the whom the specific nature is not hindered is competent household. Consequently a younger person cannot adopt to be able to beget naturally. But adoption is directed an older; but according to law the adopted person must to hereditary succession, wherefore those alone are com- be so much younger than the adopter, that he might have petent to adopt who have the power to dispose of their been the child of his natural begetting. estate. Consequently one who is not his own master, or Reply to Objection 6. One may lose one’s grandchil- who is less than twenty-five years of age, or a woman, dren and so forth even as one may lose one’s children. cannot adopt anyone, except by special permission of the Wherefore since adoption was introduced as a solace for sovereign. children lost, just as someone may be adopted in place of Reply to Objection 4. An inheritance cannot pass a child, so may someone be adopted in place of a grand- to posterity through one who has a perpetual impediment child and so on. from begetting: hence for this very reason it ought to pass Reply to Objection 7. A relative ought to succeed by to those who ought to succeed to him by right of relation- right of relationship; and therefore such a person is not ship; and consequently he cannot adopt, as neither can he competent to be chosen to succeed by adoption. And if beget. Moreover greater is sorrow for children lost than a relative, who is not competent to inherit the estate, be for children one has never had. Wherefore those who are adopted, he is adopted not as a relative, but as a stranger impeded from begetting need no solace for their lack of lacking the right of succeeding to the adopter’s goods. children as those who have had and have lost them, or Whether a tie that is an impediment to marriage is contracted through adoption? Suppl. q. 57 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that there is not con- another’s estate. tracted through adoption a tie that is an impediment to Objection 4. Further, the sacraments of the Church marriage. For spiritual care is more excellent than corpo- are not subject to human laws. Now marriage is a sacra- real care. But no tie of relationship is contracted through ment of the Church. Since then adoption was introduced one’s being subjected to another’s spiritual care: else all by human law, it would seem that a tie contracted from those who dwell in the parish would be related to the adoption cannot be an impediment to marriage. parish priest and would be unable to marry his son. Nei- On the contrary, Relationship is an impediment to ther therefore can this result from adoption which places marriage. Now a kind of relationship results from adop- the adopted under the care of the adopter. tion, namely legal relationship, as evidenced by its defini- Objection 2. Further, no tie of relationship results tion, for “legal relationship is a connection arising out of from persons conferring a benefit on another. But adop- adoption.” Therefore adoption results in a tie which is an tion is nothing but the conferring of a benefit. Therefore impediment to marriage. no tie of relationship results from adoption. Further, the same is proved by the authorities quoted Objection 3. Further, a natural father provides for in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42). his child chiefly in three things, as the Philosopher states I answer that, The Divine law especially forbids mar- (Ethic. viii, 11,12), namely by giving him being, nourish- riage between those persons who have to live together lest, ment and education; and hereditary succession is subse- as Rabbi Moses observes (Doc. Perp. iii, 49), if it were quent to these. Now no tie of relationship is contracted by lawful for them to have carnal intercourse, there should be one’s providing for a person’s nourishment and education, more room for concupiscence to the repression of which else a person would be related to his nourishers, tutors and marriage is directed. And since the adopted child dwells masters, which is false. Therefore neither is any relation- in the house of his adopted father like one that is begotten ship contracted through adoption by which one inherits naturally human laws forbid the contracting of marriage 2856 between the like, and this prohibition is approved by the pediment to marriage. Church. Hence it is that legal adoption is an impediment Reply to Objection 4. The prohibition of a human to marriage. This suffices for the Replies to the first three law would not suffice to make an impediment to marriage, Objections, because none of those things entails such a unless the authority of the Church intervenes by issuing cohabitation as might be an incentive to concupiscence. the same prohibition. Therefore they do not cause a relationship that is an im- Whether legal relationship is contracted only between the adopting father and the Suppl. q. 57 a. 3 adopted child? Objection 1. It would seem that a relationship of this tive father and the wife of the adopted son, or contrariwise kind is contracted only between the adopting father and between the adopted son and the wife of the adoptive fa- the adopted child. For it would seem that it ought above ther. Accordingly the first and third relationships are per- all to be contracted between the adopting father and the petual impediments to marriage: but the second is not, natural mother of the adopted, as happens in spiritual rela- but only so long as the adopted person remains under the tionship. Yet there is no legal relationship between them. power of the adoptive father, wherefore when the father Therefore it is not contracted between any other persons dies or when the child comes of age, they can be married. besides the adopter and adopted. Reply to Objection 1. By spiritual generation the son Objection 2. Further, the relationship that impedes is not withdrawn from the father’s power, as in the case of marriage is a perpetual impediment. But there is not a per- adoption, so that the godson remains the son of both at the petual impediment between the adopted son and the natu- same time, whereas the adopted son does not. Hence no rally begotten daughter of the adopted; because when the relationship is contracted between the adoptive father and adoption terminates at the death of the adopter, or when the natural mother or father, as was the case in spiritual the adopted comes of age, the latter can marry her. There- relationship. fore he was not related to her in such a way as to prevent Reply to Objection 2. Legal relationship is an imped- him from marrying her. iment to marriage on account of the parties dwelling to- Objection 3. Further, spiritual relationship passes to gether: hence when the need for dwelling together ceases, no person incapable of being a god-parent; wherefore it it is not unreasonable that the aforesaid tie cease, for in- does not pass to one who is not baptized. Now a woman stance when he ceases to be under the power of the same cannot adopt, as stated above (a. 1, ad 2). Therefore legal father. But the adoptive father and his wife always retain relationship does not pass from husband to wife. a certain authority over their adopted son and his wife, Objection 4. Further, spiritual relationship is stronger wherefore the tie between them remains. than legal. But spiritual relationship does not pass to a Reply to Objection 3. Even a woman can adopt by grandchild. Neither, therefore, does legal relationship. permission of the sovereign, wherefore legal relationship On the contrary, Legal relationship is more in agree- passes also to her. Moreover the reason why spiritual re- ment with carnal union or procreation than spiritual re- lationship does not pass to a non-baptized person is not lationship is. But spiritual relationship passes to another because such a person cannot be a god-parent but because person. Therefore legal relationship does so also. he is not a fit subject of spirituality. Further, the same is proved by the authorities quoted Reply to Objection 4. By spiritual relationship the in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42). son is not placed under the power and care of the godfa- I answer that, Legal relationship is of three kinds. ther, as in legal relationship: because it is necessary that The first is in the descending order as it were, and is con- whatever is in the son’s power pass under the power of the tracted between the adoptive father and the adopted child, adoptive father. Wherefore if a father be adopted the chil- the latter’s child grandchild and so on; the second is be- dren and grandchildren who are in the power of the person tween the adopted child and the naturally begotten child; adopted are adopted also. the third is like a kind of affinity, and is between the adop- 2857 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 58 Of the Impediments of Impotence, Spell, Frenzy or Madness, Incest and Defective Age (In Five Articles) We must now consider five impediments to marriage, namely the impediments of impotence, spell, frenzy or madness, incest, and defective age. Under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether impotence is an impediment to marriage? (2) Whether a spell is? (3) Whether frenzy or madness is? (4) Whether incest is? (5) Whether defective age is? Whether impotence is an impediment to marriage? Suppl. q. 58 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that impotence is not because it is for this purpose that he gives the other party an impediment to marriage. For carnal copulation is power over his body. Therefore a frigid person, being in- not essential to marriage, since marriage is more perfect capable of carnal copulation, cannot marry. when both parties observe continency by vow. But impo- I answer that, In marriage there is a contract whereby tence deprives marriage of nothing save carnal copulation. one is bound to pay the other the marital debt: wherefore Therefore it is not a diriment impediment to the marriage just as in other contracts, the bond is unfitting if a person contract. bind himself to what he cannot give or do, so the marriage Objection 2. Further, just as impotence prevents contract is unfitting, if it be made by one who cannot pay carnal copulation so does frigidity. But frigidity is not the marital debt. This impediment is called by the general reckoned an impediment to marriage. Therefore neither name of impotence as regards coition, and can arise either should impotence be reckoned as such. from an intrinsic and natural cause, or from an extrinsic Objection 3. Further, all old people are frigid. Yet old and accidental cause, for instance spell, of which we shall people can marry. Therefore, etc. speak later (a. 2). If it be due to a natural cause, this may Objection 4. Further, if the woman knows the man happen in two ways. For either it is temporary, and can to be frigid when she marries him, the marriage is valid. be remedied by medicine, or by the course of time, and Therefore frigidity, considered in itself, is not an impedi- then it does not void a marriage: or it is perpetual and ment to marriage. then it voids marriage, so that the party who labors under Objection 5. Further, calidity may prove a sufficient this impediment remains for ever without hope of mar- incentive to carnal copulation with one who is not a vir- riage, while the other may “marry to whom she will. . . in gin, but not with one who is, because it happens to be so the Lord” (1 Cor. 7:39). In order to ascertain whether the weak as to pass away quickly, and is therefore insufficient impediment be perpetual or not, the Church has appointed for the deflowering of a virgin. Or again it may move a a fixed time, namely three years, for putting the matter to man sufficiently in regard to a beautiful woman, but in- a practical proof: and if after three years, during which sufficiently in regard to an uncomely one. Therefore it both parties have honestly endeavored to fulfil their mari- would seem that frigidity, although it be an impediment tal intercourse, the marriage remain unconsummated, the in regard to one, is not an impediment absolutely. Church adjudges the marriage to be dissolved. And yet Objection 6. Further, generally speaking woman is the Church is sometimes mistaken in this, because three more frigid than man. But women are not debarred from years are sometimes insufficient to prove impotence to marriage. Neither therefore should men be debarred on be perpetual. Wherefore if the Church find that she has account of frigidity. been mistaken, seeing that the subject of the impediment On the contrary, It is stated (Extra, De Frigidis et has completed carnal copulation with another or with the Malefic., cap. Quod Sedem): “Just as a boy who is inca- same person, she reinstates the former marriage and dis- pable of marital intercourse is unfit to marry, so also those solves the subsequent one, although the latter has been who are impotent are deemed most unfit for the marriage contract.” Now persons affected with frigidity are the like. Therefore, etc. Further, no one can bind himself to the impossible. Now in marriage man binds himself to carnal copulation; 2858 contracted with her permission.∗ of it the contract is void. Consequently frigidity which Reply to Objection 1. Although the act of carnal cop- causes such an impotence that a man cannot “de facto” ulation is not essential to marriage, ability to fulfill the act pay the marriage debt, as also the condition of slavery, is essential, because marriage gives each of the married whereby a man cannot “de facto” give his service freely, parties power over the other’s body in relation to marital are impediments to marriage, when the one married party intercourse. does not know that the other is unable to pay the marriage Reply to Objection 2. Excessive calidity can scarcely debt. But an impediment whereby a person cannot pay the be a perpetual impediment. If, however, it were to prove marriage debt “de jure,” for instance consanguinity, voids an impediment to marital intercourse for three years it the marriage contract, whether the other party knows of it would be adjudged to be perpetual. Nevertheless, since or not. For this reason the Master holds (Sent. iv, D, 34) frigidity is a greater and more frequent impediment (for it that these two impediments, frigidity and slavery, make it not only hinders the mingling of seeds but also weakens not altogether unlawful for their subjects to marry. the members which co-operate in the union of bodies), it Reply to Objection 5. A man cannot have a perpet- is accounted an impediment rather than calidity, since all ual natural impediment in regard to one person and not in natural defects are reduced to frigidity. regard to another. But if he cannot fulfill the carnal act Reply to Objection 3. Although old people have not with a virgin, while he can with one who is not a virgin, sufficient calidity to procreate, they have sufficient to cop- the hymeneal membrane may be broken by a medical in- ulate. Wherefore they are allowed to marry, in so far as strument, and thus he may have connection with her. Nor marriage is intended as a remedy, although it does not be- would this be contrary to nature, for it would be done not fit them as fulfilling an office of nature. for pleasure but for a remedy. Dislike for a woman is Reply to Objection 4. In all contracts it is agreed on not a natural cause, but an accidental extrinsic cause: and all hands that anyone who is unable to satisfy an obliga- therefore we must form the same judgment in its regard as tion is unfit to make a contract which requires the fulfilling about spells, of which we shall speak further on (a. 2). of that obligation. Now this inability is of two kinds. First, Reply to Objection 6. The male is the agent in pro- because a person is unable to fulfill the obligation “de creation, and the female is the patient, wherefore greater jure,” and such inability renders the contract altogether calidity is required in the male than in the female for the void, whether the party with whom he contracts knows act of procreation. Hence the frigidity which renders the of this or not. Secondly, because he is unable to fulfill man impotent would not disable the woman. Yet there “de facto”; and then if the party with whom he contracts may be a natural impediment from another cause, namely knows of this and, notwithstanding, enters the contract, stricture, and then we must judge of stricture in the woman this shows that the latter seeks some other end from the in the same way as of frigidity in the man. contract, and the contract stands. But if he does not know Whether a spell can be an impediment to marriage? Suppl. q. 58 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that a spell cannot be an the Church which are employed for the repression of the impediment to marriage. For the spells in question are demon’s power. Therefore a spell cannot be an impedi- caused by the operation of demons. But the demons have ment to marriage. no more power to prevent the marriage act than other bod- Objection 4. Further, carnal copulation cannot be hin- ily actions; and these they cannot prevent, for thus they dered, unless there be an impediment to the generative would upset the whole world if they hindered eating and power which is its principle. But the generative power of walking and the like. Therefore they cannot hinder mar- one man is equally related to all women. Therefore a spell riage by spells. cannot be an impediment in respect of one woman without Objection 2. Further, God’s work is stronger than the being so also in respect of all. devil’s. But a spell is the work of the devil. Therefore it On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (XXXIII, cannot hinder marriage which is the work of God. qu. 1, cap. iv): “If by sorcerers or witches. . . ,” and further Objection 3. Further, no impediment, unless it be per-on, “if they be incurable, they must be separated.” petual, voids the marriage contract. But a spell cannot be Further, the demons’ power is greater than man’s: a perpetual impediment, for since the devil has no power “There is no power upon earth that can be compared with over others than sinners, the spell will be removed if the him who was made to fear no one” (Job 41:24). Now sin be cast out, or by another spell, or by the exorcisms of through the action of man, a person may be rendered in- ∗ “Nowadays it is seldom necessary to examine too closely into this matter, as all cases arising from it are treated as far as possible under the form of dispensations of non-consummated marriages.” Cf. Catholic Encyclopedia, article Canonical Impediments. 2859 capable of carnal copulation by some power or by castra-one woman and not to another, and consequently when the tion; and this is an impediment to marriage. Therefore Church adjudges the marriage to be dissolved, each party much more can this be done by the power of a demon. is permitted to seek another partner in marriage. I answer that, Some have asserted that witchcraft is Reply to Objection 1. The first corruption of sin nothing in the world but an imagining of men who as- whereby man became the slave of the devil was trans- cribed to spells those natural effects the causes of which mitted to us by the act of the generative power, and for are hidden. But this is contrary to the authority of holy this reason God allows the devil to exercise his power of men who state that the demons have power over men’s witchcraft in this act more than in others. Even so the bodies and imaginations, when God allows them: where- power of witchcraft is made manifest in serpents more fore by their means wizards can work certain signs. Now than in other animals according to Gn. 3, since the devil this opinion grows from the root of unbelief or incredulity, tempted the woman through a serpent. because they do not believe that demons exist save only Reply to Objection 2. God’s work may be hindered in the imagination of the common people, who ascribe by the devil’s work with God’s permission; not that the to the demon the terrors which a man conjures from his devil is stronger than God so as to destroy His works by thoughts, and because, owing to a vivid imagination, cer- violence. tain shapes such as he has in his thoughts become appar- Reply to Objection 3. Some spells are so perpetual ent to the senses, and then he believes that he sees the that they can have no human remedy, although God might demons. But such assertions are rejected by the true faith afford a remedy by coercing the demon, or the demon by whereby we believe that angels fell from heaven, and that desisting. For, as wizards themselves admit, it does not al- the demons exist, and that by reason of their subtle na- ways follow that what was done by one kind of witchcraft ture they are able to do many things which we cannot; can be destroyed by another kind, and even though it were and those who induce them to do such things are called possible to use witchcraft as a remedy, it would never- wizards. theless be reckoned to be perpetual, since nowise ought Wherefore others have maintained that witchcraft can one to invoke the demon’s help by witchcraft. Again, if set up an impediment to carnal copulation, but that no the devil has been given power over a person on account such impediment is perpetual: hence it does not void the of sin, it does not follow that his power ceases with the marriage contract, and they say that the laws asserting this sin, because the punishment sometimes continues after the have been revoked. But this is contrary to actual facts and fault has been removed. And again, the exorcisms of the to the new legislation which agrees with the old. Church do not always avail to repress the demons in all We must therefore draw a distinction: for the inability their molestations of the body, if God will it so, but they to copulate caused by witchcraft is either perpetual and always avail against those assaults of the demons against then it voids marriage, or it is not perpetual and then it which they are chiefly instituted. does not void marriage. And in order to put this to prac- Reply to Objection 4. Witchcraft sometimes causes tical proof the Church has fixed the space of three years an impediment in relation to all, sometimes in relation to in the same way as we have stated with regard to frigidity one only: because the devil is a voluntary cause not acting (a. 1). There is, however this difference between a spell from natural necessity. Moreover, the impediment result- and frigidity, that a person who is impotent through frigid- ing from witchcraft may result from an impression made ity is equally impotent in relation to one as to another, by the demon on a man’s imagination, whereby he is de- and consequently when the marriage is dissolved, he is prived of the concupiscence that moves him in regard to a not permitted to marry another woman. whereas through particular woman and not to another. witchcraft a man may be rendered impotent in relation to Whether madness is an impediment to marriage? Suppl. q. 58 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that madness is not an Objection 3. Further, marriage is not voided save by a impediment to marriage. For spiritual marriage which is perpetual impediment. But one cannot tell whether mad- contracted in Baptism is more excellent than carnal mar- ness is a perpetual impediment. Therefore it does not void riage. But mad persons can be baptized. Therefore they marriage. can also marry. Objection 4. Further, the impediments that hinder Objection 2. Further, frigidity is an impediment to marriage are sufficiently contained in the verses given marriage because it impedes carnal copulation, which is above (q. 50). But they contain no mention of madness. not impeded by madness. Therefore neither is marriage Therefore, etc. impeded thereby. On the contrary, Madness removes the use of reason 2860 more than error does. But error is an impediment to mar-essary for matrimony. Hence the comparison fails. We riage. Therefore madness is also. have, however, spoken of the Baptism of mad persons ( Further, mad persons are not fit for making contracts. IIIa, q. 68, a. 12). But marriage is a contract. Therefore, etc. Reply to Objection 2. Madness impedes marriage on I answer that, The madness is either previous or sub- the part of the latter’s cause which is the consent, although sequent to marriage. If subsequent, it nowise voids the not on the part of the act as frigidity does. Yet the Master marriage, but if it be previous, then the mad person either treats of it together with frigidity, because both are defects has lucid intervals, or not. If he has, then although it is not of nature (Sent. iv, D, 34). safe for him to marry during that interval, since he would Reply to Objection 3. A passing impediment which not know how to educate his children, yet if he marries, hinders the cause of marriage, namely the consent, voids the marriage is valid. But if he has no lucid intervals, or marriage altogether. But an impediment that hinders the marries outside a lucid interval, then, since there can be act must needs be perpetual in order to void the marriage. no consent without use of reason, the marriage will be in- Reply to Objection 4. This impediment is reducible valid. to error, since in either case there is lack of consent on the Reply to Objection 1. The use of reason is not nec- part of the reason. essary for Baptism as its cause, in which way it is nec- Whether marriage is annulled by the husband committing incest with his wife’s sister? Suppl. q. 58 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that marriage is not an- prived of marriage. nulled by the husband committing incest with his wife’s I answer that, If a man has connection with the sister sister. For the wife should not be punished for her hus- or other relative of his wife before contracting marriage, band’s sin. Yet she would be punished if the marriage even after his betrothal, the marriage should be broken off were annulled. Therefore, etc. on account of the resultant affinity. If, however, the con- Objection 2. Further, it is a greater sin to know one’s nection take place after the marriage has been contracted own relative, than to know the relative of one’s wife. But and consummated, the marriage must not be altogether the former sin is not an impediment to marriage. There- dissolved: but the husband loses his right to marital inter- fore neither is the second. course, nor can he demand it without sin. And yet he must Objection 3. Further, if this is inflicted as a punish- grant it if asked, because the wife should not be punished ment of the sin, it would seem, if the incestuous husband for her husband’s sin. But after the death of his wife he marry even after his wife’s death, that they ought to be ought to remain without any hope of marriage, unless he separated: which is not true. receive a dispensation on account of his frailty, through Objection 4. Further, this impediment is not men- fear of unlawful intercourse. If, however, he marry with- tioned among those enumerated above (q. 50). Therefore out a dispensation, he sins by contravening the law of the it does not void the marriage contract. Church, but his marriage is not for this reason to be an- On the contrary, By knowing his wife’s sister he con- nulled. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, tracts affinity, with his wife. But affinity voids the mar- for incest is accounted an impediment to marriage not so riage contract. Therefore the aforesaid incest does also. much for its being a sin as on account of the affinity which Further, by whatsoever a man sinneth, by the same it causes. For this reason it is not mentioned with the other also is he punished. Now such a man sins against mar- impediments, but is included in the impediment of affin- riage. Therefore he ought to be punished by being de- ity. Whether defective age is an impediment to marriage? Suppl. q. 58 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that deficient age is not an to marriage. impediment to marriage. For according to the laws chil- Objection 2. Further, just as the tie of religion is per-dren are under the care of a guardian until their twenty- petual so is the marriage tie. Now according to the new fifth year. Therefore it would seem that before that age legislation (cap. Non Solum, De regular. et transeunt.) their reason is not sufficiently mature to give consent, and no one can be professed before the fourteenth year of age. consequently that ought seemingly to be the age fixed for Therefore neither could a person marry if defective age marrying. Yet marriage can be contracted before that age. were an impediment. Therefore lack of the appointed age is not an impediment Objection 3. Further, just as consent is necessary for 2861 marriage on the part of the man, so is it on the part of tive law are consequent upon what happens in the major-the woman. Now a woman can marry before the age of ity of cases, if anyone reach the required perfection before fourteen. Therefore a man can also. the aforesaid age, so that nature and reason are sufficiently Objection 4. Further, inability to copulate, unless it developed to supply the lack of age, the marriage is not an- be perpetual and not known, is not an impediment to mar- nulled. Wherefore if the parties who marry before the age riage. But lack of age is neither perpetual nor unknown. of puberty have marital intercourse before the aforesaid Therefore it is not an impediment to marriage. age, their marriage is none the less perpetually indissolu- Objection 5. Further, it is not included under any ble. of the aforesaid impediments (q. 50), and consequently Reply to Objection 1. In matters to which nature in- would seem not to be an impediment to marriage. clines there is not required such a development of reason On the contrary, A Decretal (cap. Quod Sedem, De in order to deliberate, as in other matters: and therefore it frigid et malefic.) says that “a boy who is incapable of is possible after deliberation to consent to marriage before marriage intercourse is unfit to marry.” But in the major- one is able to manage one’s own affairs in other matters ity of cases he cannot pay the marriage debt before the age without a guardian. of fourteen (De Animal. vii). Therefore, etc. Reply to Objection 2. The same answer applies, since Further, “There is a fixed limit of size and growth for the religious vow is about matters outside the inclination all things in nature” according to the Philosopher (De An- of nature, and which offer greater difficulty than marriage. ima ii, 4): and consequently it would seem that, since mar- Reply to Objection 3. It is said that woman comes to riage is natural, it must have a fixed age by defect of which the age of puberty sooner than man does (De Animal. ix); it is impeded. hence there is no parallel between the two. I answer that, Since marriage is effected by way of Reply to Objection 4. In this case there is an imped- a contract, it comes under the ordinance of positive law iment not only as to inability to copulate, but also on ac- like other contracts. Consequently according to law (cap. count of the defect of the reason, which is not yet qualified Tua, De sponsal. impub.) it is determined that marriage to give rightly that consent which is to endure in perpetu- may not be contracted before the age of discretion when ity. each party is capable of sufficient deliberation about mar- Reply to Objection 5. The impediment arising from riage, and of mutual fulfilment of the marriage debt, and defective age, like that which arises from madness, is re- that marriages otherwise contracted are void. Now for the ducible to the impediment of error; because a man has not most part this age is the fourteenth year in males and the yet the full use of his free-will. twelfth year in women: but since the ordinances of posi- 2862 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 59 Of Disparity of Worship As an Impediment to Marriage (In Six Articles) We must now consider disparity of worship as an impediment to marriage. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether a believer can marry an unbeliever? (2) Whether there is marriage between unbelievers? (3) Whether a husband being converted to the faith can remain with his wife if she be unwilling to be converted? (4) Whether he may leave his unbelieving wife? (5) Whether after putting her away he may take another wife? (6) Whether a husband may put aside his wife on account of other sins as he may for unbelief? Whether a believer can marry an unbeliever? Suppl. q. 59 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that a believer can marry one who is in the light of faith cannot marry one who is in an unbeliever. For Joseph married an Egyptian woman, the darkness of unbelief. and Esther married Assuerus: and in both marriages there Further, it is written (Malachi 2:11): “Juda hath pro- was disparity of worship, since one was an unbeliever and faned the holiness of the Lord, which he loved, and hath the other a believer. Therefore disparity of worship previ- married the daughter of a strange god.” But such had not ous to marriage is not an impediment thereto. been the case if they could have married validly. There- Objection 2. Further, the Old Law teaches the same fore disparity of worship is an impediment to marriage. faith as the New. But according to the Old Law there I answer that, The chief good of marriage is the off- could be marriage between a believer and an unbeliever, spring to be brought up to the worship of God. Now since as evidenced by Dt. 21:10 seqq.: “If thou go out to the education is the work of father and mother in common, fight. . . and seest in the number of the captives a beautiful each of them intends to bring up the child to the worship woman and lovest her, and wilt have her to wife. . . thou of God according to their own faith. Consequently if they shalt go in unto her, and shalt sleep with her, and she shall be of different faith, the intention of the one will be con- be thy wife.” Therefore it is lawful also under the New trary to the intention of the other, and therefore there can- Law. not be a fitting marriage between them. For this reason Objection 3. Further, betrothal is directed to mar- disparity of faith previous to marriage is an impediment riage. Now there can be a betrothal between a believer to the marriage contract. and an unbeliever in the case where a condition is made Reply to Objection 1. In the Old Law it was allow- of the latter’s future conversion. Therefore under the same able to marry with certain unbelievers, and forbidden with condition there can be marriage between them. others. It was however especially forbidden with regard to Objection 4. Further, every impediment to marriage inhabitants of the land of Canaan, both because the Lord is in some way contrary to marriage. But unbelief is not had commanded them to be slain on account of their ob- contrary to marriage, since marriage fulfills an office of stinacy, and because it was fraught with a greater danger, nature whose dictate faith surpasses. Therefore disparity lest to wit they should pervert to idolatry those whom they of worship is not an impediment to marriage. married or their children, since the Israelites were more Objection 5. Further, there is sometime disparity of liable to adopt their rites and customs through dwelling worship even between two persons who are baptized, for among them. But it was permitted in regard to other unbe- instance when, after Baptism, a person falls into heresy. lievers, especially when there could be no fear of their be- Yet if such a person marry a believer, it is nevertheless a ing drawn into idolatry. And thus Joseph, Moses, and Es- valid marriage. Therefore disparity of worship is not an ther married unbelievers. But under the New Law which impediment to marriage. is spread throughout the whole world the prohibition ex- On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. 6:14): “What tends with equal reason to all unbelievers. Hence dispar- concord hath light with darkness?∗” Now there is the ity of worship previous to marriage is an impediment to greatest concord between husband and wife. Therefore its being contracted and voids the contract. ∗ Vulg.: ‘What fellowship hath light with darkness? And what concord hath Christ with Belial?’ 2863 Reply to Objection 2. This law either refers to other and therefore so far as the sacramental essentials are connations with whom they could lawfully marry, or to the cerned, it requires purity with regard to the sacrament of case when the captive woman was willing to be converted faith, namely Baptism, rather than with regard to interior to the faith and worship of God. faith. For which reason also this impediment is not called Reply to Objection 3. Present is related to present in disparity of faith, but disparity of worship which concerns the same way as future to future. Wherefore just as when outward service, as stated above (Sent. iii, D, 9, q. 1, marriage is contracted in the present, unity of worship is a. 1, qu. 1). Consequently if a believer marry a bap- required in both contracting parties, so in the case of a be- tized heretic, the marriage is valid, although he sins by trothal, which is a promise of future marriage, it suffices marrying her if he knows her to be a heretic: even so he to add the condition of future unity of worship. would sin were he to marry an excommunicate woman, Reply to Objection 4. It has been made clear that dis- and yet the marriage would not be void: whereas on the parity of worship is contrary to marriage in respect of its other hand if a catechumen having right faith but not hav- chief good, which is the good of the offspring. ing been baptized were to marry a baptized believer, the Reply to Objection 5. Matrimony is a sacrament: marriage would not be valid. Whether there can be marriage between unbelievers? Suppl. q. 59 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that there can be no mar- longs to an office of nature, which precedes the state of riage between unbelievers. For matrimony is a sacrament grace, the principle of which is faith. Therefore unbelief of the Church. Now Baptism is the door of the sacraments. does not prevent the existence of marriage between unbe- Therefore unbelievers, since they are not baptized, cannot lievers. marry any more than they can receive other sacraments. I answer that, Marriage was instituted chiefly for the Objection 2. Further, two evils are a greater impedi- good of the offspring, not only as to its begetting—since ment to good than one. But the unbelief of only one party this can be effected even without marriage—but also as is an impediment to marriage. Much more, therefore, is to its advancement to a perfect state, because everything the unbelief of both, and consequently there can be no intends naturally to bring its effect to perfection. Now marriage between unbelievers. a twofold perfection is to be considered in the offspring. Objection 3. Further, just as there is disparity of wor- one is the perfection of nature, not only as regards the ship between believer and unbeliever, so can there be be- body but also as regards the soul, by those means which tween two unbelievers, for instance if one be a heathen are of the natural law. The other is the perfection of grace: and the other a Jew. Now disparity of worship is an im- and the former perfection is material and imperfect in rela- pediment to marriage, as stated above (a. 1). Therefore tion to the latter. Consequently, since those things which there can be no valid marriage at least between unbeliev- are for the sake of the end are proportionate to the end, ers of different worship. the marriage that tends to the first perfection is imperfect Objection 4. Further, in marriage there is real and material in comparison with that which tends to the chastity. But according to Augustine (De Adult. Con- second perfection. And since the first perfection can be jug. i, 18) there is no real chastity between an unbeliever common to unbelievers and believers, while the second and his wife, and these words are quoted in the Decretals belongs only to believers, it follows that between unbe- (XXVIII, qu. i, can. Sic enim.). Neither therefore is there lievers there is marriage indeed, but not perfected by its a true marriage. ultimate perfection as there is between believers. Objection 5. Further, true marriage excuses carnal in- Reply to Objection 1. Marriage was instituted not tercourse from sin. But marriage contracted between un- only as a sacrament, but also as an office of nature. And believers cannot do this, since “the whole life of unbeliev- therefore, although marriage is not competent to unbeliev- ers is a sin,” as a gloss observes on Rom. 14:23, “All that ers, as a sacrament dependent on the dispensation of the is not of faith is sin.” Therefore there is no true marriage Church’s ministers, it is nevertheless competent to them between unbelievers. as fulfilling an office of nature. And yet even a marriage On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:12): “If any of this kind is a sacrament after the manner of a habit, al- brother hath a wife that believeth not, and she consent to though it is not actually since they do not marry actually dwell with him, let him not put her away.” But she is not in the faith of the Church. called his wife except by reason of marriage. Therefore Reply to Objection 2. Disparity of worship is an im- marriage between unbelievers is a true marriage. pediment to marriage, not by reason of unbelief, but on ac- Further, the removal of what comes after does not im- count of the difference of faith. For disparity of worship ply the removal of what comes first. Now marriage be- hinders not only the second perfection of the offspring, 2864 but also the first, since the parents endeavor to draw their Reply to Objection 4. The chastity and other virtues children in different directions, which is not the case when of unbelievers are said not to be real, because they cannot both are unbelievers. attain the end of real virtue, which is real happiness. Thus Reply to Objection 3. As already stated (ad 1) there we say it is not a real wine if it has not the effect of wine. is marriage between unbelievers, in so far as marriage ful- Reply to Objection 5. An unbeliever does not sin in fills an office of nature. Now those things that pertain having intercourse with his wife, if he pays her the mar- to the natural law are determinable by positive law: and riage debt, for the good of the offspring, or for the troth therefore if any law among unbelievers forbid the con- whereby he is bound to her: since this is an act of justice tracting of marriage with unbelievers of a different rite, and of temperance which observes the due circumstance the disparity of worship will be an impediment to their in- in pleasure of touch; even as neither does he sin in per- termarrying. They are not, however, forbidden by Divine forming acts of other civic virtues. Again, the reason why law, because before God, however much one may stray the whole life of unbelievers is said to be a sin is not that from the faith, this makes no difference to one’s being re- they sin in every act, but because they cannot be delivered moved from grace: nor is it forbidden by any law of the from the bondage of sin by that which they do. Church who has not to judge of those who are without. Whether the husband, being converted to the faith, may remain with his wife is she Suppl. q. 59 a. 3 be unwilling to be converted? Objection 1. It would seem that when a husband fore that at least in this case he cannot remain with this is converted to the faith he cannot remain with his wife second wife. who is an unbeliever and is unwilling to be converted, On the contrary, The Apostle counsels him to remain and whom he had married while he was yet an unbe- (1 Cor. 7:12). liever. For where the danger is the same one should take Further, no impediment that supervenes upon a true the same precautions. Now a believer is forbidden to marriage dissolves it. Now it was a true marriage when marry an unbeliever for fear of being turned away from they were both unbelievers. Therefore when one of them the faith. Since then if the believer remain with the unbe- is converted, the marriage is not annulled on that account; liever whom he had married previously, the danger is the and thus it would seem that they may lawfully remain to- same, in fact greater, for neophytes are more easily per- gether. verted than those who have been brought up in the faith, it I answer that, The faith of a married person does not would seem that a believer, after being converted, cannot dissolve but perfects the marriage. Wherefore, since there remain with an unbeliever. is true marriage between unbelievers, as stated above (a. 2, Objection 2. Further, “An unbeliever cannot remain ad 1), the marriage tie is not broken by the fact that one united to her who has been received into the Christian of them is converted to the faith, but sometimes while the faith” (Decretals, XXVIII, qu. 1, can. Judaei). There- marriage tie remains, the marriage is dissolved as to co- fore a believer is bound to put away a wife who does not habitation and marital intercourse, wherein unbelief and believe. adultery are on a par, since both are against the good of Objection 3. Further, a marriage contracted between the offspring. Consequently, the husband has the same believers is more perfect than one contracted between un- power to put away an unbelieving wife or to remain with believers. Now, if believers marry within the degrees for- her, as he has to put away an adulterous wife or to remain bidden by the Church, their marriage is void. Therefore with her. For an innocent husband is free to remain with the same applies to unbelievers, and thus a believing hus- an adulterous wife in the hope of her amendment, but not band cannot remain with an unbelieving wife, at any rate, if she be obstinate in her sin of adultery, lest he seem to if as an unbeliever he married her within the forbidden approve of her disgrace; although even if there be hope of degrees. her amendment he is free to put her away. In like manner Objection 4. Further, sometimes an unbeliever has the believer after his conversion may remain with the un- several wives recognized by his law. If, then, he can re- believer in the hope of her conversion, if he see that she is main with those whom he married while yet an unbeliever, not obstinate in her unbelief, and he does well in remain- it would seem that even after his conversion he can retain ing with her, though not bound to do so: and this is what several wives. the Apostle counsels (1 Cor. 7:12). Objection 5. Further, it may happen that after divorc- Reply to Objection 1. It is easier to prevent a thing ing his first wife he has married a second, and that he is being done than to undo what is rightly done. Hence there converted during this latter marriage. It would seem there- are many things that impede the contracting of marriage 2865 if they precede it, which nevertheless cannot dissolve it if by the ordinances of the Divine law. Hence unbelievers they follow it. Such is the case with affinity (q. 55, a. 6): who have married within the degrees forbidden by the Di- and it is the same with disparity of worship. vine law, whether both or one of them be converted to the Reply to Objection 2. In the early Church at the time faith, cannot continue in a like marriage. But if they have of the apostles, both Jews and Gentiles were everywhere married within the degrees forbidden by a commandment converted to the faith: and consequently the believing hus- of the Church, they can remain together if both be con- band could then have a reasonable hope for his wife’s con- verted, or if one be converted and there be hope of the version, even though she did not promise to be converted. other’s conversion. Afterwards, however, as time went on the Jews became Reply to Objection 4. To have several wives is con- more obstinate than the Gentiles, because the Gentiles still trary to the natural law by which even unbelievers are continued to come to the faith, for instance, at the time bound. Wherefore an unbeliever is not truly married save of the martyrs, and at the time of Constantine and there- to her whom he married first. Consequently if he be con- abouts. Wherefore it was not safe then for a believer to verted with all his wives, he may remain with the first, and cohabit with an unbelieving Jewish wife, nor was there must put the others away. If, however, the first refuse to be hope for her conversion as for that of a Gentile wife. Con- converted, and one of the others be converted, he has the sequently, then, the believer could, after his conversion, same right to marry her again as he would have to marry cohabit with his wife if she were a Gentile, but not if she another. We shall treat of this matter further on (a. 5). were a Jewess, unless she promised to be converted. This Reply to Objection 5. To divorce a wife is contrary to is the sense of that decree. Now, however, they are on the law of nature, wherefore it is not lawful for an unbe- a par, namely Gentiles and Jews, because both are obsti- liever to divorce his wife. Hence if he be converted after nate; and therefore unless the unbelieving wife be willing divorcing one and marrying another, the same judgment is to be converted, he is not allowed to cohabit with her, be to be pronounced in this case as in the case of a man who she Gentile or Jew. had several wives, because if he wish to be converted he Reply to Objection 3. Non-baptized unbelievers are is bound to take the first whom he had divorced and to put not bound by the laws of the Church, but they are bound the other away. Whether a believer can, after his conversion, put away his unbelieving wife if she be Suppl. q. 59 a. 4 willing to cohabit with him without insult to the Creator? Objection 1. It would seem that a believer, after his his unbelieving wife, the children of their union would conversion, cannot put away his unbelieving wife if she be remain with the mother, because “the offspring follows willing to cohabit with him without insult to the Creator. the womb,” and thus their salvation would be imperiled. For the husband is more bound to his wife than a slave Therefore he cannot lawfully put away his unbelieving to his master. But a converted slave is not freed from the wife. bond of slavery, as appears from 1 Cor. 7:21; 1 Tim. 6:1. Objection 5. Further, an adulterous husband can- Therefore neither can a believing husband put away his not put away an adulterous wife, even after he has done unbelieving wife. penance for his adultery. Therefore if an adulterous and Objection 2. Further, no one may act to another’s an unbelieving husband are to be judged alike, neither can prejudice without the latter’s consent. Now the unbeliev- the believer put aside the unbeliever, even after his con- ing wife had a right in the body of her unbelieving hus- version to the faith. band. If, then, her husband’s conversion to the faith could On the contrary, are the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. be prejudicial to the wife, so that he would be free to put 7:15,16). her away, the husband could not be converted to the faith Further, spiritual adultery is more grievous than car- without his wife’s consent, even as he cannot receive or- nal. But a man can put his wife away, as to cohabitation, ders or vow continence without her consent. on account of carnal adultery. Much more, therefore, can Objection 3. Further, if a man, whether slave or free, he do so on account of unbelief, which is spiritual adul- knowingly marry a bondwoman, he cannot put her away tery. on account of her different condition. Since, then, the hus- I answer that, Different things are competent and ex- band, when he married an unbeliever, knew that she was pedient to man according as his life is of one kind or of an unbeliever, it would seem that in like manner he cannot another. Wherefore he who dies to his former life is not put her away on account of her unbelief. bound to those things to which he was bound in his former Objection 4. Further, a father is in duty bound to work life. Hence it is that he who vowed certain things while for the salvation of his children. But if he were to leave living in the world is not bound to fulfill them when he 2866 dies to the world by adopting the religious life. Now he (Rom. 7:3). Wherefore if the husband leave her after he who is baptized is regenerated in Christ and dies to his has changed his life by dying to his former life, this is no- former life, since the generation of one thing is the cor- wise prejudicial to her. Now he who goes over to the reli- ruption of another, and consequently he is freed from the gious life dies but a spiritual death and not a bodily death. obligation whereby he was bound to pay his wife the mar- Wherefore if the marriage be consummated, the husband riage debt, and is not bound to cohabit with her when she cannot enter religion without his wife’s consent, whereas is unwilling to be converted, although in a certain case he he can before carnal connection when there is only a spir- is free to do so, as stated above (a. 3), just as a religious itual connection. On the other hand, he who is baptized is is free to fulfill the vows he took in the world, if they be even corporeally buried together with Christ unto death; not contrary to his religious profession, although he is not and therefore he is freed from paying the marriage debt bound to do so. even after the marriage has been consummated. Reply to Objection 1. Bondage is not inconsistent We may also reply that it is through her own fault in with the perfection of the Christian religion, which makes refusing to be converted that the wife suffers prejudice. a very special profession of humility. But the obligation Reply to Objection 3. Disparity of worship makes a to a wife, or the conjugal bond, is somewhat derogatory to person simply unfit for lawful marriage, whereas the con- the perfection of Christian life, the highest state of which dition of bondage does not, but only where it is unknown. is in the possession of the continent: hence the compar- Hence there is no comparison between an unbeliever and ison fails. Moreover one married party is not bound to a bondswoman. the other as the latter’s possession, as a slave to his mas- Reply to Objection 4. Either the child has reached ter, but by way of a kind of partnership, which is unfitting a perfect age, and then it is free to follow either the be- between unbeliever and believer as appears from 2 Cor. lieving father or the unbelieving mother, or else it is under 6:15; hence there is no comparison between a slave and a age, and then it should be given to the believer notwith- married person. standing that it needs the mother’s care for its education. Reply to Objection 2. The wife had a right in the Reply to Objection 5. By doing penance the adul- body of her husband only as long as he remained in the terer does not enter another life as an unbeliever by being life wherein he had married, since also when the husband baptized. Hence the comparison fails. dies the wife “is delivered from the law of her husband” Whether the believer who leaves his unbelieving wife can take another wife? Suppl. q. 59 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the believer who tinence without the consent of his unbelieving wife, since leaves his unbelieving wife cannot take another wife. For then the latter would be deprived of marriage if she were indissolubility is of the nature of marriage, since it is con- afterwards converted. Much less therefore is it lawful for trary to the natural law to divorce one’s wife. Now there him to take another wife. was true marriage between them as unbelievers. There- Objection 5. Further, the son who persists in unbelief fore their marriage can nowise be dissolved. But as long after his father’s conversion loses the right to inherit from as a man is bound by marriage to one woman he cannot his father: and yet if he be afterwards converted, the inher- marry another. Therefore a believer who leaves his unbe- itance is restored to him even though another should have lieving wife cannot take another wife. entered into possession thereof. Therefore it would seem Objection 2. Further, a crime subsequent to marriage that in like manner, if the unbelieving wife be converted, does not dissolve the marriage. Now, if the wife be will- her husband ought to be restored to her even though he ing to cohabit without insult to the Creator, the marriage should have married another wife: yet this would be im- tie is not dissolved, since the husband cannot marry an- possible if the second marriage were valid. Therefore he other. Therefore the sin of the wife who refuses to cohabit cannot take another wife. without insult to the Creator does not dissolve the mar- On the contrary, Matrimony is not ratified without riage so that her husband be free to take another wife. the sacrament of Baptism. Now what is not ratified can be Objection 3. Further, husband and wife are equal in annulled. Therefore marriage contracted in unbelief can the marriage tie. Since, then, it is unlawful for the un- be annulled, and consequently, the marriage tie being dis- believing wife to marry again while her husband lives, it solved, it is lawful for the husband to take another wife. would seem that neither can the believing husband do so. Further, a husband ought not to cohabit with an unbe- Objection 4. Further, the vow of continence is more lieving wife who refuses to cohabit without insult to the favorable than the marriage contract. Now seemingly it is Creator. If therefore it were unlawful for him to take an- not lawful for the believing husband to take a vow of con- other wife he would be forced to remain continent, which 2867 would seem unreasonable, since then he would be at a disis dissolved by the second marriage which the believing advantage through his conversion. husband would be unable to accomplish unless he were I answer that, When either husband or wife is con- freed from his obligation to his wife by her own fault. verted to the faith the other remaining in unbelief, a dis- Reply to Objection 3. After the believer has mar- tinction must be made. For if the unbeliever be willing ried, the marriage tie is dissolved on either side, because to cohabit without insult to the Creator—that is without the marriage is not imperfect as to the bond, although it is drawing the other to unbelief—the believer is free to part sometimes imperfect as to its effect. Hence it is in punish- from the other, but by parting is not permitted to marry ment of the unbelieving wife rather than by virtue of the again. But if the unbeliever refuse to cohabit without in- previous marriage that she is forbidden to marry again. If sult to the Creator, by making use of blasphemous words however she be afterwards converted, she may be allowed and refusing to hear Christ’s name, then if she strive to by dispensation to take another husband, should her hus- draw him to unbelief, the believing husband after parting band have taken another wife. from her may be united to another in marriage. Reply to Objection 4. The husband ought not to take Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 2), the a vow of continence nor enter into a second marriage, if marriage of unbelievers is imperfect, whereas the mar- after his conversion there be a reasonable hope of the con- riage of believers is perfect and consequently binds more version of his wife, because the wife’s conversion would firmly. Now the firmer tie always looses the weaker if it is be more difficult if she knew she was deprived of her hus- contrary to it, and therefore the subsequent marriage con- band. If however there be no hope of her conversion, he tracted in the faith of Christ dissolves the marriage pre- can take Holy orders or enter religion, having first be- viously contracted in unbelief. Therefore the marriage of sought his wife to be converted. And then if the wife be unbelievers is not altogether firm and ratified, but is rati- converted after her husband has received Holy orders, her fied afterwards by Christ’s faith. husband must not be restored to her, but she must take it as Reply to Objection 2. The sin of the wife who refuses a punishment of her tardy conversion that she is deprived to cohabit without insult to the Creator frees the husband of her husband. from the tie whereby he was bound to his wife so as to Reply to Objection 5. The bond of fatherhood is not be unable to marry again during her lifetime. It does not dissolved by disparity of worship, as the marriage bond is: however dissolve the marriage at once, since if she were wherefore there is no comparison between an inheritance converted from her blasphemy before he married again, and a wife. her husband would be restored to her. But the marriage Whether other sins dissolve marriage? Suppl. q. 59 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that other sins besides un- Objection 5. Further, the Master says this expressly belief dissolve marriage. For adultery is seemingly more (Sent. iv, D, 30). directly opposed to marriage than unbelief is. But unbe- On the contrary, It is said (Mat. 5:32): “Whosoever lief dissolves marriage in a certain case so that it is lawful shall put away his wife, excepting for the cause of forni- to marry again. Therefore adultery has the same effect. cation, maketh her to commit adultery.” Objection 2. Further, just as unbelief is spiritual for- Further, if this were true, divorces would be made all nication, so is any kind of sin. If, then unbelief dissolves day long, since it is rare to find a marriage wherein one of marriage because it is spiritual fornication, for the same the parties does not fall into sin. reason any kind of sin will dissolve marriage. I answer that, Bodily fornication and unbelief have Objection 3. Further, it is said (Mat. 5:30): “If thy a special contrariety to the goods of marriage, as stated right hand scandalize thee, pluck it off and cast it from above (a. 3). Hence they are specially effective in dis- thee,” and a gloss of Jerome says that “by the hand and solving marriages. Nevertheless it must be observed that the right eye we may understand our brother, wife, rela- marriage is dissolved in two ways. In one way as to the tives and children.” Now these become obstacles to us by marriage tie, and thus marriage cannot be dissolved af- any kind of sin. Therefore marriage can be dissolved on ter it is ratified, neither by unbelief nor by adultery. But account of any kind of sin. if it be not ratified, the tie is dissolved, if the one party Objection 4. Further, covetousness is idolatry accord- remain in unbelief, and the other being converted to the ing to Eph. 5:5. Now a wife may be put away on account faith has married again. On the other hand the aforesaid of idolatry. Therefore in like manner she can be put away tie is not dissolved by adultery, else the unbeliever would on account of covetousness, as also on account of other be free to give a bill of divorce to his adulterous wife, and sins graver than covetousness. having put her away, could take another wife, which is 2868 false. In another way marriage is dissolved as to the act, cations by a more remote signification. and thus it can be dissolved on account of either unbelief Reply to Objection 3. This applies to the case when or fornication. But marriage cannot be dissolved even as the wife proves a notable occasion of sin to her husband, to the act on account of other sins, unless perchance the so that he has reason to fear his being in danger: for then husband wish to cease from intercourse with his wife in the husband can withdraw from living with her, as stated order to punish her by depriving her of the comfort of his above (a. 5). presence. Reply to Objection 4. Covetousness is said to be idol- Reply to Objection 1. Although adultery is opposed atry on account of a certain likeness of bondage, because to marriage as fulfilling an office of nature, more directly both the covetous and the idolater serve the creature rather than unbelief, it is the other way about if we consider mar- than the Creator; but not on account of likeness of un- riage as a sacrament of the Church, from which source it belief, since unbelief corrupts the intellect whereas cov- derives perfect stability, inasmuch as it signifies the in- etousness corrupts the affections. dissoluble union of Christ with the Church. Wherefore Reply to Objection 5. The words of the Master re- the marriage that is not ratified can be dissolved as to the fer to betrothal, because a betrothal can be rescinded on marriage tie on account of unbelief rather than on account account of a subsequent crime. Or, if he is speaking of of adultery. marriage, they must be referred to the severing of mutual Reply to Objection 2. The primal union of the soul to companionship for a time, as stated above, or to the case God is by faith, and consequently the soul is thereby es- when the wife is unwilling to cohabit except on the con- poused to God as it were, according to Osee 2:20, “I will dition of sinning, for instance, if she were to say: “I will espouse thee to Me in faith.” Hence in Holy Writ idola- not remain your wife unless you amass wealth for me by try and unbelief are specially designated by the name of theft,” for then he ought to leave her rather than thieve. fornication: whereas other sins are called spiritual forni- 2869 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 60 Of Wife-Murder (In Two Articles) We must now consider wife-murder, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether in a certain case it is lawful to kill one’s wife? (2) Whether wife-murder is an impediment to marriage? Whether it is lawful for a man to kill his wife if she be discovered in the act of adultery? Suppl. q. 60 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem lawful for a man to kill his because, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 37), the Church wife if she be discovered in the act of adultery. For the Di- does not wield a material sword. Secondly, a husband can vine law commanded adulterous wives to be stoned. Now kill his wife himself without her being convicted in court, it is not a sin to fulfill the Divine law. Neither therefore is and thus to kill her outside of the act of adultery is not it a sin to kill one’s own wife if she be an adulteress. lawful, neither according to civil law nor according to the Objection 2. Further, that which the law can rightly law of conscience, whatever evidence he may have of her do, can be rightly done by one whom the law has commis- adultery. The civil law however considers it, as though it sioned to do it. But the law can rightly kill an adulterous were lawful, that he should kill her in the very act, not by wife or any other person deserving of death. Since then commanding him to do so, but by not inflicting on him the law has commissioned the husband to kill his wife if the punishment for murder, on account of the very great she be discovered in the act of adultery, it would seem that provocation which the husband receives by such a deed to he can rightly do so. kill his wife. But the Church is not bound in this matter Objection 3. Further, the husband has greater power by human laws, neither does she acquit him of the debt over his adulterous wife than over the man who commit- of eternal punishment, nor of such punishment as may be ted adultery with her. Now if the husband strike a cleric awarded him by an ecclesiastical tribunal for the reason whom he found with his wife he is not excommunicated. that he is quit of any punishment to be inflicted by a sec- Therefore it would seem lawful for him even to kill his ular court. Therefore in no case is it lawful for a husband own wife if she be discovered in adultery. to kill his wife on his own authority. Objection 4. Further, the husband is bound to cor- Reply to Objection 1. The law has committed the in- rect his wife. But correction is given by inflicting a just fliction of this punishment not to private individuals, but punishment. Since then the just punishment of adultery is to public persons, who are deputed to this by their office. death, because it is a capital sin, it would seem lawful for Now the husband is not his wife’s judge: wherefore he a husband to kill his adulterous wife. may not kill her, but may accuse her in the judge’s pres- On the contrary, It is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, ence. 37) that “the Church of God is never bound by the laws of Reply to Objection 2. The civil law has not commis- this world, for she has none but a spiritual sword.” There- sioned the husband to kill his wife by commanding him to fore it would seem that he who wishes to belong to the do so, for thus he would not sin, just as the judge’s deputy Church cannot rightly take advantage of the law which does not sin by killing the thief condemned to death: but permits a man to kill his wife. it has permitted this by not punishing it. For which reason Further, husband and wife are judged on a par. But it it has raised certain obstacles to prevent the husband from is not lawful for a wife to kill her husband if he be discov- killing his wife. ered in adultery. Neither therefore may a husband kill his Reply to Objection 3. This does not prove that it is wife. lawful simply, but that it is lawful as regards immunity I answer that, It happens in two ways that a husband from a particular kind of punishment, since excommuni- kills his wife. First, by a civil judgment; and thus there cation is also a kind of punishment. is no doubt that a husband, moved by zeal for justice and Reply to Objection 4. There are two kinds of com- not by vindictive anger or hatred can, without sin, bring munity: the household, such as a family; and the civil a criminal accusation of adultery upon his wife before a community, such as a city or kingdom. Accordingly, he secular court, and demand that she receive capital punish- who presides over the latter kind of community, a king for ment as appointed by the law; just as it is lawful to accuse instance, can punish an individual both by correcting and a person of murder or any other crime. Such an accusa- by exterminating him, for the betterment of the commu- tion however cannot be made in an ecclesiastical court, nity with whose care he is charged. But he who presides 2870 over a community of the first kind, can inflict only correc-of death. Wherefore the husband who exercises this kind tive punishment, which does not extend beyond the limits of control over his wife may not kill her, but he may ac- of amendment, and these are exceeded by the punishment cuse or chastise her in some other way. Whether wife-murder is an impediment to marriage? Suppl. q. 60 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that wife-murder is not an the Church so as to marry lawfully. Sometimes it also impediment to marriage. For adultery is more directly op- voids the contract, as when a man kills his wife in order posed to marriage than murder is. Now adultery is not to marry her with whom he has committed adultery, for an impediment to marriage. Neither therefore is wife- then the law declares him simply unfit to marry her, so murder. that if he actually marry her his marriage is void. He is Objection 2. Further, it is a more grievous sin to not however hereby rendered simply unfit by law in rela- kill one’s mother than one’s wife, for it is never lawful tion to other women: wherefore if he should have married to strike one’s mother, whereas it is sometimes lawful to another, although he sin by disobeying the Church’s or- strike one’s wife. But matricide is not an impediment to dinance, the marriage is nevertheless not voided for this marriage. Neither therefore is wife-murder. reason. Objection 3. Further, it is a greater sin for a man to Reply to Objection 1. Murder and adultery in certain kill another man’s wife on account of adultery than to kill cases forbid the contracting of marriage and void the con- his own wife, inasmuch as he has less motive and is less tract, as we say here in regard to wife-murder, and shall concerned with her correction. But he who kills another say further on (Sent. iv, q. 62, a. 2) in regard to adul- man’s wife is not hindered from marrying. Neither there- tery. We may also reply that wife-murder is contrary to fore is he who kills his own wife. the substance of wedlock, whereas adultery is contrary to Objection 4. Further, if the cause be removed, the ef- the good of fidelity due to marriage. Hence adultery is fect is removed. But the sin of murder can be removed not more opposed to marriage than wife-murder, and the by repentance. Therefore the consequent impediment to argument is based on a false premiss. marriage can be removed also: and consequently it would Reply to Objection 2. Simply speaking it is a more seem that after he has done penance he is not forbidden to grievous sin to kill one’s mother than one’s wife, as also marry. more opposed to nature, since a man reveres his mother On the contrary, A canon (caus. xxxiii, qu. ii, can. naturally. Consequently he is less inclined to matricide Interfectores) says: “The slayers of their own wives must and more prone to wife-murder; and it is to repress this be brought back to penance, and they are absolutely for- proneness that the Church has forbidden marriage to the bidden to marry.” Further, in whatsoever a man sins, in man who has murdered his wife. that same must he be punished. But he who kills his wife Reply to Objection 3. Such a man does not sin sins against marriage. Therefore he must be punished by against marriage as he does who kills his own wife; being deprived of marriage. wherefore the comparison fails. I answer that, By the Church’s decree wife-murder is Reply to Objection 4. It does not follow that because an impediment to marriage. Sometimes however it forbids guilt has been remitted therefore the entire punishment the contracting of marriage without voiding the contract, is remitted, as evidenced by irregularity. For repentance when to wit the husband kills his wife on account of adul- does not restore a man to his former dignity, although tery or even through hatred; nevertheless if there be fear it can restore him to his former state of grace, as stated lest he should prove incontinent, he may be dispensed by above (q. 38, a. 1, ad 3). 2871 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 61 Of the Impediment to Marriage, Arising From a Solemn Vow (In Three Articles) We must next consider the impediments which supervene to marriage. We shall consider (1) the impediment which affects an unconsummated marriage, namely a solemn vow: (2) the impediment which affects a consummated marriage, namely fornication. Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether either party after the marriage has been consummated can enter religion without the other’s consent? (2) Whether they can enter religion before the consummation of the marriage? (3) Whether the wife can take another husband if her former husband has entered religion before the consummation of the marriage? Whether one party after the marriage has been consummated can enter religion with-Suppl. q. 61 a. 1 out the other’s consent? Objection 1. It would seem that even after the mar- gious vow taken by one consort is prejudicial to the other, riage has been consummated one consort can enter reli- since the one has power over the other’s body. There- gion without the other’s consent. For the Divine law ought fore one of them cannot take a religious vow without the to be more favorable to spiritual things than human law. other’s consent. Now human law has allowed this. Therefore much more I answer that, No one can make an offering to God of should the Divine law permit it. what belongs to another. Wherefore since by a consum- Objection 2. Further, the lesser good does not hinder mated marriage the husband’s body already belongs to his the greater. But the married state is a lesser good than the wife, he cannot by a vow of continence offer it to God religious state, according to 1 Cor. 7:38. Therefore mar- without her consent. riage ought not to hinder a man from being able to enter Reply to Objection 1. Human law considers marriage religion. merely as fulfilling an office of nature: whereas the Divine Objection 3. Further, in every form of religious life law considers it as a sacrament, by reason of which it is there is a kind of spiritual marriage. Now it is lawful to altogether indissoluble. Hence the comparison fails. pass from a less strict religious order to one that is stricter. Reply to Objection 2. It is not unreasonable that a Therefore it is also allowable to pass from a less strict— greater good be hindered by a lesser which is contrary to namely a carnal—marriage to a stricter marriage, namely it, just as good is hindered by evil. that of the religious life, even without the wife’s consent. Reply to Objection 3. In every form of religious life On the contrary, Married persons are forbidden (1 marriage is contracted with one person, namely Christ; to Cor. 7:5) to abstain from the use of marriage even for a Whom, however, a person contracts more obligations in time without one another’s consent, in order to have time one religious order than in another. But in carnal mar- for prayer. riage and religious marriage the contract is not with the Further, no one can lawfully do that which is prejudi- same person: wherefore that comparison fails. cial to another without the latter’s consent. Now the reli- Whether before the marriage has been consummated one consort can enter religion Suppl. q. 61 a. 2 without the other’s consent? Objection 1. It would seem that even before the mar- Objection 2. Further, by virtue of the consent ex- riage has been consummated one consort cannot enter re- pressed in words of the present, the one consort has given ligion without the other’s consent. For the indissolubility power over his body to the other. Therefore the one can of marriage belongs to the sacrament of matrimony, inas- forthwith ask for the marriage debt, and the other is bound much, namely, as it signifies the union of Christ with the to pay: and so the one cannot enter religion without the Church. Now marriage is a true sacrament before its con- other’s consent. summation, and after consent has been expressed in words Objection 3. Further, it is said (Mat. 19:6): “What of the present. Therefore it cannot be dissolved by one of God hath joined together let no man put asunder.” But them entering religion. the union which precedes marital intercourse was made 2872 by God. Therefore it cannot be dissolved by the will of body of one consort is not absolutely delivered into the man. power of the other, but conditionally, provided neither On the contrary, According to Jerome∗ our Lord consort meanwhile seek the fruit of a better life. But by called John from his wedding. marital intercourse the aforesaid delivery is completed, I answer that, Before marital intercourse there is only because then each of them enters into bodily possession a spiritual bond between husband and wife, but afterwards of the power transferred to him. Wherefore also before there is a carnal bond between them. Wherefore, just as consummation they are not bound to pay the marriage after marital intercourse marriage is dissolved by carnal debt forthwith after contracting marriage by words of the death, so by entering religion the bond which exists be- present, but a space of two months is allowed them for fore the consummation of the marriage is dissolved, be- three reasons. First that they may deliberate meanwhile cause religious life is a kind of spiritual death, whereby a about entering religion; secondly, to prepare what is nec- man dies to the world and lives to God. essary for the solemnization of the wedding. thirdly, lest Reply to Objection 1. Before consummation mar- the husband think little of a gift he has not longed to pos- riage signifies the union of Christ with the soul by grace, sess (cap. Institutum, caus. xxvi, qu. ii). which is dissolved by a contrary spiritual disposition, Reply to Objection 3. The marriage union, before namely mortal sin. But after consummation it signifies consummation, is indeed perfect as to its primary being, the union of Christ with the Church, as regards the as- but is not finally perfect as to its second act which is oper- sumption of human nature into the unity of person, which ation. It is like bodily possession and consequently is not union is altogether indissoluble. altogether indissoluble. Reply to Objection 2. Before consummation the Whether the wife may take another husband if her husband has entered religion be-Suppl. q. 61 a. 3 fore the consummation of the marriage? Objection 1. It would seem that the wife may not take those things that belong to perfection. Therefore a wife is another husband, if her husband has entered religion be- not bound to continence on account of her husband enter- fore the consummation of the marriage. For that which ing religion, and consequently she can marry. is consistent with marriage does not dissolve the marriage I answer that, Just as bodily death of the husband tie. Now the marriage tie still remains between those who dissolves the marriage tie in such a way that the wife may equally take religious vows. Therefore by the fact that one marry whom she will, according to the statement of the enters religion, the other is not freed from the marriage Apostle (1 Cor. 7:39); so too after the husband’s spiritual tie. But as long as she remains tied to one by marriage, death by entering religion, she can marry whom she will. she cannot marry another. Therefore, etc. Reply to Objection 1. When both consorts take a Objection 2. Further, after entering religion and be- like vow of continence, neither renounces the marriage fore making his profession the husband can return to the tie, wherefore it still remains: but when only one takes world. If then the wife can marry again when her husband the vow, then for his own part he renounces the marriage enters religion, he also can marry again when he returns tie, wherefore the other is freed therefrom. to the world: which is absurd. Reply to Objection 2. A person is not accounted dead Objection 3. Further, by a new decree (cap. Non to the world by entering religion until he makes his pro- solum, de regular. et transeunt.) a profession, if made fession, and consequently his wife is bound to wait for before the expiry of a year, is accounted void. Therefore him until that time. if he return to his wife after making such a profession, she Reply to Objection 3. We must judge of a profession is bound to receive him. Therefore neither by her hus- thus made before the time fixed by law, as of a simple band’s entry into religion, nor by his taking a vow, does vow. Wherefore just as when the husband has taken a the wife receive the power to marry again. simple vow his wife is not bound to pay him the marriage On the contrary, No one can bind another to those debt, and yet has not the power to marry again, so is it in things which belong to perfection. Now continence is of this case. ∗ Prolog. in Joan. 2873 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 62 Of the Impediment That Supervenes to Marriage After Its Consummation, Namely Fornication (In Six Articles) We must now consider the impediment that supervenes upon marriage after its consummation, namely fornication, which is an impediment to a previous marriage as regards the act, although the marriage tie remains. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is lawful for a husband to put his wife away on account of fornication? (2) Whether he is bound to do so? (3) Whether he may put her away at his own judgment? (4) Whether in this matter husband and wife are of equal condition? (5) Whether, after being divorced, they must remain unmarried? (6) Whether they can be reconciled after being divorced? Whether it is lawful for a husband to put away his wife on account of fornication? Suppl. q. 62 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for a husband to the marriage-bed; the fifth is if she be overcome by force; put away his wife on account of fornication. For we must the sixth is if he has been reconciled to her by having car- not return evil for evil. But the husband, by putting away nal intercourse with her after she has committed adultery; his wife on account of fornication, seemingly returns evil the seventh is if both having been married in the state of for evil. Therefore this is not lawful. unbelief, the husband has given his wife a bill of divorce Objection 2. Further, the sin is greater if both com- and she has married again; for then if both be converted mit fornication, than if one only commits it. But if both the husband is bound to receive her back again. commit fornication, they cannot be divorced on that ac- Reply to Objection 1. A husband sins if through vin- count. Neither therefore can they be, if only one commits dictive anger he puts away his wife who has committed fornication. fornication, but he does not sin if he does so in order to Objection 3. Further, spiritual fornication and certain avoid losing his good name, lest he seem to share in her other sins are more grievous than carnal fornication. But guilt, or in order to correct his wife’s sin, or in order to separation from bed cannot be motived by those sins. Nei- avoid the uncertainty of her offspring. ther therefore can it be done on account of fornication. Reply to Objection 2. Divorce on account of for- Objection 4. Further, the unnatural vice is further re- nication is effected by the one accusing the other. And moved from the marriage goods than fornication is, the since no one can accuse who is guilty of the same crime, manner of which is natural. Therefore it ought to have a divorce cannot be pronounced when both have commit- been a cause of separation rather than fornication. ted fornication, although marriage is more sinned against On the contrary, are the words of Mat. 5:32. when both are guilty of fornication that when only one is. Further, one is not bound to keep faith with one who Reply to Objection 3. Fornication is directly opposed breaks his faith. But a spouse by fornication breaks the to the good of marriage, since by it the certainty of off- faith due to the other spouse. Therefore one can put the spring is destroyed, faith is broken, and marriage ceases to other away on account of fornication. have its signification when the body of one spouse is given I answer that, Our Lord permitted a man to put away to several others. Wherefore other sins, though perhaps his wife on account of fornication, in punishment of the they be more grievous than fornication, are not motives for unfaithful party and in favor of the faithful party, so that a divorce. Since, however, unbelief which is called spir- the latter is not bound to marital intercourse with the un- itual fornication, is also opposed to the good of marriage faithful one. There are however seven cases to be ex- consisting in the rearing of the offspring to the worship cepted in which it is not lawful to put away a wife who of God, it is also a motive for divorce, yet not in the same has committed fornication, when either the wife is not way as bodily fornication. Because one may take steps for to be blamed, or both parties are equally blameworthy. procuring a divorce on account of one act of carnal forni- The first is if the husband also has committed fornica- cation, not, however, on account of one act of unbelief, tion; the second is if he has prostituted his wife; the third but on account of inveterate unbelief which is a proof of is if the wife, believing her husband dead on account of obstinacy wherein unbelief is perfected. his long absence, has married again; the fourth is if an- Reply to Objection 4. Steps may be taken to procure other man has fraudulently impersonated her husband in a divorce on account also of the unnatural vice: but this 2874 is not mentioned in the same way, both because it is an the certainty of offspring. unmentionable passion, and because it does not so affect Whether the husband is bound by precept to put away his wife when she is guilty of Suppl. q. 62 a. 2 fornication? Objection 1. It would seem that the husband is bound punishment is not required when amendment has already by precept to put away his wife who is guilty of fornica- taken place. Wherefore, if the wife repent of her sin, her tion. For since the husband is the head of his wife, he husband is not bound to put her away: whereas if she re- is bound to correct his wife. Now separation from bed pent not, he is bound to do so, lest he seem to consent to is prescribed as a correction of the wife who is guilty of her sin, by not having recourse to her due correction. fornication. Therefore he is bound to separate from her. Reply to Objection 1. The wife can be corrected for Objection 2. Further, he who consents with one who her sin of fornication not only by this punishment but also sins mortally, is also guilty of mortal sin. Now the hus- by words and blows; wherefore if she be ready to be cor- band who retains a wife guilty of fornication would seem rected otherwise, her husband is not bound to have re- to consent with her, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 35). course to the aforesaid punishment in order to correct her. Therefore he sins unless he puts her away. Reply to Objection 2. The husband seems to consent Objection 3. Further, it is written (1 Cor. 6:16): “He with her when he retains her, notwithstanding that she per- who is joined to a harlot is made one body.” Now a man sists in her past sin: if, however, she has mended her ways, cannot at once be a member of a harlot and a member of he does not consent with her. Christ (1 Cor. 6:15). Therefore the husband who is joined Reply to Objection 3. She can no longer be called a to a wife guilty of fornication ceases to be a member of harlot since she has repented of her sin. Wherefore her Christ, and therefore sins mortally. husband, by being joined to her, does not become a mem- Objection 4. Further, just as relationship voids the ber of a harlot. We might also reply that he is joined to marriage tie, so does fornication dissolve the marriage- her not as a harlot but as his wife. bed. Now after the husband becomes cognizant of his Reply to Objection 4. There is no parallel, because consanguinity with his wife, he sins mortally if he has car- the effect of consanguinity is that there is no marriage tie nal intercourse with her. Therefore he also sins mortally between them, so that carnal intercourse between them if he does so after knowing her to be guilty of fornication. becomes unlawful. Whereas fornication does not remove Objection 5. On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 7:11, the said tie, so that the act remains, in itself, lawful, unless “Let not the husband put away his wife” says that “Our it become accidentally unlawful, in so far as the husband Lord permitted a wife to be put away on account of forni- seems to consent to his wife’s lewdness. cation.” Therefore it is not a matter of precept. Reply to Objection 5. This permission is to be un- Objection 6. Further, one can always pardon the sin derstood as an absence of prohibition: and thus it is not in that another has committed against oneself. Now the wife, contradistinction with a precept, for that which is a matter by committing fornication, sinned against her husband. of precept is also not forbidden. Therefore the husband may spare her by not putting her Reply to Objection 6. The wife sins not only against away. her husband, but also against herself and against God, I answer that, The putting away of a wife guilty of wherefore her husband cannot entirely remit the punish- fornication was prescribed in order that the wife might be ment, unless amendment has followed. corrected by means of that punishment. Now a corrective Whether the husband can on his own judgment put away his wife on account of for-Suppl. q. 62 a. 3 nication? Objection 1. It would seem that the husband can on Objection 2. Further, it is stated (Mat. 1:19) that his own judgment put away his wife on account of forni- Joseph. . . being a just man. . . “was minded to put” Mary cation. For when sentence has been pronounced by the “away privately.” Therefore it would seem that a husband judge, it is lawful to carry it out without any further judg- may privately pronounce a divorce without the judgment ment. But God, the just Judge, has pronounced this judg- of the Church. ment, that a husband may put his wife away on account of Objection 3. Further, if after becoming cognizant of fornication. Therefore no further judgment is required for his wife’s fornication a husband has marital intercourse this. with his wife, he forfeits the action which he had against 2875 the adulteress. Therefore the refusal of the marriage debt, vorce cannot be pronounced except at the judgment of the which pertains to a divorce, ought to precede the judgment Church. of the Church. Reply to Objection 1. The sentence is an application Objection 4. Further, that which cannot be proved of the general law to a particular fact. Wherefore God ought not to be submitted to the judgment of the Church. gave out the law according to which the sentence of the Now the crime of fornication cannot be proved, since court has to be pronounced. “the eye of the adulterer observeth darkness” (Job 24:15). Reply to Objection 2. Joseph was minded to put away Therefore the divorce in question ought not to be made on the Blessed Virgin not as suspected of fornication, but be- the judgment of the Church. cause in reverence for her sanctity, he feared to cohabit Objection 5. Further, accusation should be preceded with her. Moreover there is no parallel, because then the by inscription∗, whereby a person binds himself under the sentence at law was not only divorce but also stoning, but pain of retaliation, if he fails to bring proof. But this is not now when the case is brought to the Church for judg- impossible in this matter, because then, in every event the ment. The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what husband would obtain his end, whether he put his wife has been said. away, or his wife put him away. Therefore she ought not Reply to Objection 4. Sometimes when the husband to be summoned by accusation to receive the judgment of suspects his wife of adultery he watches her secretly that the Church. together with witnesses he may discover her in the sin of Objection 6. Further, a man is more bound to his fornication, and so proceed to accusation. Moreover, if wife than to a stranger. Now a man ought not to refer he has no evidence of the fact, there may be strong sus- to the Church the crime of another, even though he be picions of fornication, which suspicions being proved the a stranger, without previously admonishing him privately fornication seems to be proved: for instance if they be (Mat. 18:15). Much less therefore may the husband bring found together alone, at a time and place which are open his wife’s crime before the Church, unless he has previ- to suspicion, or “nudas cum nuda.” ously rebuked her in private. Reply to Objection 5. A husband may accuse his wife On the contrary, No one should avenge himself. But of adultery in two ways. First, he may seek a separation if a husband were by his own judgment to put away his from bed before a spiritual judge, and then there is no need wife on account of fornication, he would avenge himself. for an inscription to be made under the pain of retaliation, Therefore this should not be done. since thus the husband would gain his end, as the objec- Further, no man is prosecutor and judge in the same tion proves. Secondly, he may seek for the crime to be cause. But the husband is the prosecutor by suing his wife punished in a secular court, and then it is necessary for in- for the offense she has committed against him. Therefore scription to precede, whereby he binds himself under pain he cannot be the judge, and consequently he cannot put of retaliation if he fail to prove his case. her away on his own judgment. Reply to Objection 6. According to a Decretal (Ex- I answer that, A husband can put away his wife in two tra, De Simonia, cap. Licet), “there are three modes of ways. First as to bed only, and thus he may put her away procedure in criminal cases. First, by inquisition, which on his own judgment, as soon as he has evidence of her should be preceded by notoriety; secondly, by accusation, fornication: nor is he bound to pay her the marriage debt which should be preceded by inscription;† thirdly, by de- at her demand, unless he be compelled by the Church, and nunciation, which should be preceded by fraternal correc- by paying it thus he nowise prejudices his own case. Sec- tion.” Accordingly the saying of our Lord refers to the ondly, as to bed and board, and in this way she cannot case where the process is by way of denunciation, and not be put away except at the judgment of the Church; and if by accusation, because then the end in view is not only she has been put away otherwise, he must be compelled the correction of the guilty party, but also his punishment, to cohabit with her unless the husband can at once prove for the safeguarding of the common good, which would the wife’s fornication. Now this putting away is called a be destroyed if justice were lacking. divorce: and consequently it must be admitted that a di- Whether in a case of divorce husband and wife should be judged on a par with each Suppl. q. 62 a. 4 other? Objection 1. It would seem that, in a case of divorce, place of the divorce [repudium] recognized by the Old husband and wife ought not to be judged on a par with Law (Mat. 5:31,32). Now in the “repudium” husband each other. For divorce under the New Law takes the and wife were not judged on a par with each other, since ∗ Cf. IIa IIae, q. 33, a. 7 † Cf. IIa IIae, q. 33, a. 7 2876 the husband could put away his wife, but not “vice versa.” of the offspring the wife’s adultery is a greater sin against Therefore neither in divorce ought they to be judged on a marriage than the husband’s wherefore it is a greater rea- par with each other. son for divorce in the wife than in the husband: and thus Objection 2. Further, it is more opposed to the natural they are under an equal obligation, but not for equal rea- law that a wife have several husbands than that a husband sons. Nor is this unjust for on either hand there is suffi- have several wives: wherefore the latter has been some- cient reason for the punishment in question, just as there times lawful, but the former never. Therefore the wife sins is in two persons condemned to the punishment of death, more grievously in adultery than the husband, and conse- although one of them may have sinned more grievously quently they ought not to be judged on a par with each than the other. other. Reply to Objection 1. The only reason why divorce Objection 3. Further, where there is greater injury to was permitted, was to avoid murder. And since there was one’s neighbor, there is a greater sin. Now the adulterous more danger of this in men than in women, the husband wife does a greater injury to her husband, than does the was allowed to put away his wife by a bill of divorce, but adulterous husband to his wife, since a wife’s adultery in- not “vice versa.” volves uncertainty of the offspring, whereas the husband’s Reply obj. 2 and 3: These arguments are based on adultery does not. Therefore the wife’s sin is the greater, the fact that in comparison with the good of the offspring and so they ought not to be judged on a par with each there is more reason for divorce in an adulterous wife than other. in an adulterous husband. It does not follow, however, that Objection 4. Further, divorce is prescribed in order to they are not judged on a par with each other. punish the crime of adultery. Now it belongs to the hus- Reply to Objection 4. Although the husband is the band who is the head of the wife (1 Cor. 11:3) to correct head of the wife, he is her pilot as it were, and is no more his wife, rather than “vice versa.” Therefore they should her judge than she is his. Consequently in matters that not be judged on a par with each other for the purpose of have to be submitted to a judge, the husband has no more divorce, but the husband ought to have the preference. power over his wife, than she over him. Objection 5. On the contrary, It would seem in this Reply to Objection 5. In adultery there is the same matter the wife ought to have the preference. For the sinful character as in simple fornication, and something more frail the sinner the more is his sin deserving of par- more which aggravates it, namely the lesion to marriage. don. Now there is greater frailty in women than in men, Accordingly if we consider that which is common to adul- for which reason Chrysostom∗ says that “lust is a pas- tery and fornication, the sin of the husband and that of the sion proper to women,” and the Philosopher says (Ethic. wife are compared the one to the other as that which ex- vii, 7) that “properly speaking women are not said to be ceeds to that which is exceeded, for in women the humors continent on account of their being easily inclined to con- are more abundant, wherefore they are more inclined to cupiscence,” for neither can dumb animals be continent, be led by their concupiscences, whereas in man there is because they have nothing to stand in the way of their abundance of heat which excites concupiscence. Simply desires. Therefore women are rather to be spared in the speaking, however, other things being equal, a man sins punishment of divorce. more grievously in simple fornication than a woman, be- Objection 6. Further, the husband is placed as the cause he has more of the good of reason, which prevails head of the woman in order to correct her. Therefore his over all movements of bodily passions. But as regards the sin is greater than the woman’s and so he should be pun- lesion to marriage which adultery adds to fornication and ished the more. for which reason it is an occasion for divorce, the woman I answer that, In a case of divorce husband and wife sins more grievously than the man, as appears from what are judged on a par with each other, in the sense that the we have said above. And since it is more grievous than same things are lawful or unlawful to the one as to the simple fornication, it follows that, simply speaking, the other: but they are not judged on a par with each other adulterous wife sins more grievously than the adulterous in reference to those things, since the reason for divorce husband, other things being equal. is greater in one spouse than in the other, although there Reply to Objection 6. Although the control which is sufficient reason for divorce in both. For divorce is a the husband receives over his wife is an aggravating cir- punishment of adultery, in so far as it is opposed to the cumstance, nevertheless the sin is yet more aggravated by marriage goods. Now as regards the good of fidelity to this circumstance which draws the sin to another species, which husband and wife are equally bound towards each namely by the lesion to marriage, which lesion becomes other, the adultery of one is as great a sin against marriage a kind of injustice, through the fraudulent substitution of as the adultery of the other, and this is in either of them another’s child. a sufficient reason for divorce. But as regards the good ∗ Hom. xl in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom 2877 Whether a husband can marry again after having a divorce? Suppl. q. 62 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that a husband can marry band to contract a second marriage. again after having a divorce. For no one is bound to per- I answer that, Nothing supervenient to marriage can petual continence. Now in some cases the husband is dissolve it: wherefore adultery does not make a marriage bound to put away his wife forever on account of fornica- cease to be valid. For, according to Augustine (De Nup. tion, as stated above (a. 2). Therefore seemingly at least et Concup. i, 10), “as long as they live they are bound by in this case he can marry again. the marriage tie, which neither divorce nor union with an- Objection 2. Further, a sinner should not be given a other can destroy.” Therefore it is unlawful for one, while greater occasion of sin. But if she who is put away on the other lives, to marry again. account of the sin of fornication is not allowed to seek an- Reply to Objection 1. Although no one is absolutely other marriage, she is given a greater occasion of sin: for it bound to continence, he may be bound accidentally; for is improbable that one who was not continent during mar- instance, if his wife contract an incurable disease that is riage will be able to be continent afterwards. Therefore it incompatible with carnal intercourse. And it is the same would seem lawful for her to marry again. if she labor under a spiritual disease, namely fornication, Objection 3. Further, the wife is not bound to the so as to be incorrigible. husband save as regards the payment of the marriage debt Reply to Objection 2. The very shame of having been and cohabitation. But she is freed from both obligations divorced ought to keep her from sin: and if it cannot keep by divorce. Therefore “she is loosed from the law of her her from sin, it is a lesser evil that she alone sin than that husband”∗. Therefore she can marry again; and the same her husband take part in her sin. applies to her husband. Reply to Objection 3. Although after divorce the wife Objection 4. Further, it is said (Mat. 19:9): “Whoso- is not bound to her husband as regards paying him the ever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, marriage debt and cohabiting with him, the marriage tie, and shall marry another committeth adultery.” Therefore whereby she was bound to this, remains, and consequently seemingly he does not commit adultery if he marry again she cannot marry again during her husband’s lifetime. She after putting away his wife on account of fornication, and can, however, take a vow of continence, against her hus- consequently this will be a true marriage. band’s will, unless it seem that the Church has been de- On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:10,11): “Not ceived by false witnesses in pronouncing the divorce; for I, but the Lord, commandeth that the wife depart not from in that case, even if she has made her vow of profession her husband. and, if she depart, that she remain unmar- she ought to be restored to her husband, and would be ried.” bound to pay the marriage debt, but it would be unlawful Further, no one should gain advantage from sin. But for her to demand it. the adulteress would if she were allowed to contract an- Reply to Objection 4. The exception expressed in our other and more desired marriage; and an occasion of adul- Lord’s words refers to the putting away of the wife. Hence tery would be afforded those who wish to marry again. the objection is based on a false interpretation. Therefore it is unlawful both to the wife and to the hus- Whether husband and wife may be reconciled after being divorced? Suppl. q. 62 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that husband and wife ciliation allowable. may not be reconciled after being divorced. For the law Objection 3. Further, if reconciliation were allowable, contains the rule (Can. Quod bene semel, Caus. vi, qu. it would seem that the adulterous wife is bound to return iv): “That which has been once well decided must not be to her husband if her husband asks her. But she is not subsequently withdrawn.” Now it has been decided by the bound, since they are separated by the Church. Therefore, judgment of the Church that they ought to be separated. etc. Therefore they cannot subsequently be reconciled. Objection 4. Further, if it were lawful to be recon- Objection 2. Further, if it were allowable for them ciled to an adulterous wife, this would especially be the to be reconciled, the husband would seem bound to re- case when the husband is found to have committed adul- ceive his wife, especially after she has repented. But he tery after the divorce. But in this case the wife cannot is not bound, for the wife, in defending herself before the compel him to be reconciled, since the divorce has been judge, cannot allege her repentance against her husband’s justly pronounced. Therefore she may nowise be recon- accusation of fornication. Therefore in no way is recon- ciled. ∗ Rom. 7:2 2878 Objection 5. Further, if a husband whose adultery is induce the husband not to accuse or put away the wife unknown put away his wife, who is convicted of adultery who is guilty of fornication. He cannot, however, be com- by the sentence of the Church, the divorce would seem pelled to this course of action, nor can his wife oppose her to have been pronounced unjustly. And yet the husband repentance to his accusation, because although she is no is not bound to be reconciled to his wife, because she is longer guilty, neither in act nor in the stain of sin, there unable to prove his adultery in court. Much less, there- still remains something of the debt of punishment, and fore, is reconciliation allowable when the divorce has been though this has been taken away in the sight of God, there granted justly. still remains the debt of punishment to be inflicted by the On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:11): “And if judgment of man, because man sees not the heart as God she depart, that she remain unmarried, or be reconciled to does. her husband.” Reply to Objection 3. That which is done in a per- Further, it is allowable for the husband not to put her son’s favor does him no prejudice. Wherefore since the away after fornication. Therefore, for the same reason, he divorce has been granted in favor of the husband, it does can be reconciled to her after divorce. not deprive him of the right of asking for the marriage I answer that, If the wife has mended her ways by debt, or of asking his wife to return to him. Hence his repenting of her sin after the divorce, her husband may wife is bound to pay the debt, and to return to him, if he become reconciled to her; but if she remain incorrigible ask her, unless with his consent she has taken a vow of in her sin, he must not take her back, for the same reason continence. which forbade him to retain her while she refused to desist Reply to Objection 4. According to strict law, a hus- from sin. band who was previously innocent should not be com- Reply to Objection 1. The sentence of the Church pelled to receive an adulterous wife on account of his hav- in pronouncing the divorce did not bind them to separate, ing committed adultery after the divorce. But according to but allowed them to do so. Therefore reconciliation may equity, the judge is bound by virtue of his office first of all be effected or ensue without any withdrawal of the previ-to admonish him to beware of imperiling his own soul and ous sentence. of scandalizing others; although the wife may not herself Reply to Objection 2. The wife’s repentance should seek reconciliation. 2879 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 63 Of Second Marriages (In Two Articles) In the next place we must consider second marriage. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is lawful? (2) Whether it is a sacrament? Whether a second marriage is lawful? Suppl. q. 63 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that a second marriage is marriage tie ceases: and consequently when one dies the unlawful. Because we should judge of things according to other is not hindered from marrying a second time on ac- truth. Now Chrysostom∗ says that “to take a second hus- count of the previous marriage. Therefore not only second band is in truth fornication,” which is unlawful. Therefore marriages are lawful, but even third and so on. neither is a second marriage lawful. Reply to Objection 1. Chrysostom is speaking in ref- Objection 2. Further, whatever is not good is unlaw- erence to the cause which is wont at times to incite a per- ful. Now Ambrose† says that a second marriage is not son to a second marriage, namely concupiscence which good. Therefore it is unlawful. incites also to fornication. Objection 3. Further, no one should be debarred from Reply to Objection 2. A second marriage is stated being present at such things as are becoming and lawful. not to be good, not that it is unlawful, but because it lacks Yet priests are debarred from being present at second mar- the honor of the signification which is in a first marriage, riages, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42). Therefore where one husband has one wife, as in the case of Christ they are unlawful. and the Church. Objection 4. Further, no one incurs a penalty save Reply to Objection 3. Men who are consecrated to for sin. Now a person incurs the penalty of irregularity Divine things are debarred not only from unlawful things, on account of being married twice. Therefore a second but even from things which have any appearance of turpi- marriage is unlawful. tude; and consequently they are debarred from second On the contrary, We read of Abraham having con- marriages, which lack the decorum which was in a first tracted a second marriage (Gn. 25:1). marriage. Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:14): “I will. . . that Reply to Objection 4. Irregularity is not always in- the younger,” namely widows, “should marry, bear chil- curred on account of a sin, and may be incurred through a dren.” Therefore second marriages are lawful. defect in a sacrament‡. Hence the argument is not to the I answer that, The marriage tie lasts only until death point. (Rom. 7:2), wherefore at the death of either spouse the Whether a second marriage is a sacrament? Suppl. q. 63 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that a second marriage is of only one woman with only one man, as in the case of not a sacrament. For he who repeats a sacrament injures Christ and the Church. Therefore it is not a sacrament. the sacrament. But no sacrament should be done an in- Objection 4. Further, one sacrament is not an impedi- jury. Therefore if a second marriage were a sacrament, ment to receiving another. But a second marriage is an im- marriage ought nowise to be repeated. pediment to receiving orders. Therefore it is not a sacra- Objection 2. Further, in every sacrament some kind ment. of blessing is given. But no blessing is given in a second On the contrary, Marital intercourse is excused from marriage, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42). Therefore sin in a second marriage even as in a first marriage. Now no sacrament is conferred therein. marital intercourse is excused§ by the marriage goods Objection 3. Further, signification is essential to a which are fidelity, offspring, and sacrament. Therefore sacrament. But the signification of marriage is not pre- a second marriage is a sacrament. served in a second marriage, because there is not a union Further, irregularity is not contracted through a second ∗ Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom † On 1 Cor. 7:40 and De Viduis ‡ “Defectus sacra- menti,” i.e. defect of signification; Cf. a. 2, obj. 3 § Cf. q. 69, a. 1 2880 and non-sacramental union, such as fornication. Yet irreg-fective sacrament, because it has not its full signification, ularity is contracted through a second marriage. Therefore since there is not a union of only one woman with only it is a sacramental union. one man as in the marriage of Christ with the Church. And I answer that, Wherever we find the essentials of a on account of this defect the blessing is omitted in a sec- sacrament, there is a true sacrament. Wherefore, since in a ond marriage. This, however, refers to the case when it is second marriage we find all the essentials of the sacrament a second marriage on the part of both man and woman, or of marriage (namely the due matter—which results from on the part of the woman only. For if a virgin marry a man the parties having the conditions prescribed by law—and who has had another wife, the marriage is blessed never- the due form, which is the expression of the inward con- theless. Because the signification is preserved to a cer- sent by words of the present), it is clear that a second mar- tain extent even in relation to the former marriage, since riage is a sacrament even as a first. though Christ has but one Church for His spouse, there are Reply to Objection 1. This is true of a sacrament many persons espoused to Him in the one Church. But the which causes an everlasting effect: for then, if the sacra- soul cannot be espoused to another besides Christ, else it ment be repeated, it is implied that the first was not ef- commits fornication with the devil. Nor is there a spiritual fective, and thus an injury is done to the first, as is clear marriage. For this reason when a woman marries a second in all those sacraments which imprint a character. But time the marriage is not blessed on account of the defect those sacraments which have not an everlasting effect can in the sacrament. be repeated without injury to the sacrament, as in the case Reply to Objection 3. The perfect signification is of Penance. And, since the marriage tie ceases with death, found in a second marriage considered in itself, not how- no injury is done to the sacrament if a woman marry again ever if it be considered in relation to the previous mar- after her husband’s death. riage, and it is thus that it is a defective sacrament. Reply to Objection 2. Although the second marriage, Reply to Objection 4. A second marriage in so far as considered in itself, is a perfect sacrament, yet if we con- there is a defect in the sacrament, but not as a sacrament, sider it in relation to the first marriage, it is somewhat a de-is an impediment to the sacrament of Order. 2881 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 64 Of the Things Annexed to Marriage, and First of the Payment of the Marriage Debt (In Ten Articles) In the next place we must consider those things which are annexed to marriage: (1) the payment of the marriage debt; (2) plurality of wives; (3) bigamy; (4) the bill of divorce; (5) illegitimate children. Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether one spouse is bound to pay the marriage debt to the other? (2) Whether one is sometimes bound to pay without being asked? (3) Whether a wife may demand the debt during the menses? (4) Whether she is bound to pay it at that time? (5) Whether husband and wife are equal in this matter? (6) Whether the one without the other’s consent may take a vow that prohibits the payment of the debt? (7) Whether it is forbidden to ask for the debt at any particular time? (8) Whether it is a mortal sin to ask for it at a holy time? (9) Whether it is an obligation to pay it at the time of a festival? (10) Whether weddings should be forbidden at certain times? Whether husband and wife are mutually bound to the payment of the marriage debt? Suppl. q. 64 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that husband and wife are 7:4). But a slave is bound by an obligation of precept to not mutually bound, under the obligation of a precept, to pay his master the debt of his service according to Rom. the payment of the marriage debt. For no one is forbidden 13:7, “Render. . . to all men their dues, tribute to whom to receive the Eucharist on account of fulfilling a precept. tribute is due,” etc. Therefore husband and wife are mutu- Yet he who has had intercourse with his wife cannot par- ally bound to the payment of the marriage debt. take of the flesh of the Lamb according to Jerome∗ quoted Further, marriage is directed to the avoiding of forni- in the text (Sent. iv, D, 32). Therefore the payment of the cation (1 Cor. 7:2). But this could not be the effect of debt does not come under the obligation of a precept. marriage, if the one were not bound to pay the debt to Objection 2. Further, it is lawful to everyone to ab- the other when the latter is troubled with concupiscence. stain from what is hurtful to his person. But it is some- Therefore the payment of the debt is an obligation of pre- times harmful to a person to pay the debt when asked, cept. whether on account of sickness, or because they have al- I answer that, Marriage was instituted especially as ready paid it. Therefore it would seem allowable to refuse fulfilling an office of nature. Wherefore in its act the the one who asks. movement of nature must be observed according to which Objection 3. Further, it is a sin to render oneself unfit the nutritive power administers to the generative power to fulfill an obligation of precept. If, therefore, the pay- that alone which is in excess of what is required for the ment of the debt comes under the obligation of a precept, preservation of the individual: for the natural order re- it would seem sinful to render oneself unfit for paying the quires that a thing should be first perfected in itself, and debt, by fasting or otherwise weakening the body: but ap- that afterwards it should communicate of its perfection to parently this is untrue. others: and this is also the order of charity which perfects Objection 4. Further, according to the Philosopher nature. And therefore, since the wife has power over her (Ethic. viii, 12), marriage is directed to the begetting and husband only in relation to the generative power and not rearing of children, as well as to the community of life. in relation to things directed to the preservation of the in- Now leprosy is opposed to both these ends of marriage, dividual, the husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife, for since it is a contagious disease, the wife is not bound to in matters pertaining to the begetting of children, with due cohabit with a leprous husband; and besides this disease regard however to his own welfare. is often transmitted to the offspring. Therefore it would Reply to Objection 1. It is possible through fulfilling seem that a wife is not bound to pay the debt to a leprous a precept to render oneself unfit for the exercise of a sa- husband. cred duty: thus a judge becomes irregular by sentencing On the contrary, As the slave is in the power of his a man to death. In like manner he who pays the marriage master, so is one spouse in the power of the other (1 Cor. debt, in fulfillment of the precept, becomes unfit for the ∗ Serm. de Esu Agni viii 2882 exercise of divine offices, not because the act in question the debt and being unable to pay it, the wife has no right to is sinful, but on account of its carnal nature. And so, ac- ask again, and in doing so she behaves as a harlot rather cording to the Master (Sent. iv, D, 32), Jerome is speaking than as a wife. But if he be rendered incapable through only of the ministers of the Church, and not of others who some other cause, then if this be a lawful cause, he is not should be left to use their own discretion, because with- bound, and she cannot ask, but if it be an unlawful cause, out sin they may either abstain out of reverence or receive then he sins, and his wife’s sin, should she fall into for- Christ’s body out of devotion. nication on this account, is somewhat imputable to him. Reply to Objection 2. The wife has no power over her Hence he should endeavor to do his best that his wife may husband’s body, except as is consistent with the welfare of remain continent. his person, as stated above. Wherefore if she go beyond Reply to Objection 4. Leprosy voids a betrothal but this in her demands, it is not a request for the debt, but not a marriage. Wherefore a wife is bound to pay the debt an unjust exaction; and for this reason the husband is not even to a leprous husband. But she is not bound to co- bound to satisfy her. habit with him, because she is not so liable to infection Reply to Objection 3. If the husband be rendered in- from marital intercourse as from continual cohabitation. capable of paying the debt through a cause consequent And though the child begotten of them be diseased, it is upon marriage, for instance through having already paid better to be thus than not at all. Whether a husband is bound to pay the debt if his wife does not ask for it? Suppl. q. 64 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the husband is not sometimes the husband is bound to pay the debt to his bound to pay the marriage debt if his wife does not ask wife even though she ask it not of him. for it. For an affirmative precept is binding only at a cer- I answer that, The debt may be demanded in two tain time. But the time fixed for the payment of the debt ways. First, explicitly, as when they ask one another by can only be when it is asked for. Therefore he is not bound words; secondly, implicitly, when namely the husband to payment otherwise. knows by certain signs that the wife would wish him to Objection 2. Further, we ought to presume the bet- pay the debt, but is silent through shame. And so even ter things of everyone. Now even for married people it though she does not ask for the debt explicitly in words, is better to be continent than to make use of marriage. the husband is bound to pay it, whenever his wife shows Therefore unless she ask expressly for the debt, the hus- signs of wishing him to do so. band should presume that it pleases her to be continent, Reply to Objection 1. The appointed time is not only and so he is not bound to pay her the debt. when it is demanded but also when on account of certain Objection 3. Further, as the wife has power over her signs there is fear of danger (to avoid which is the purpose husband, so has a master over his slave. Now a slave is not of the payment of the debt) unless it be paid then. bound to serve his master save when the latter commands Reply to Objection 2. The husband may presume this him. Therefore neither is a husband bound to pay the debt of his wife when he perceives in her no signs of the con- to his wife except when she demands it. trary; but it would be foolish of him to admit this pre- Objection 4. Further, the husband can sometimes re- sumption if he does see such signs. quest his wife not to exact the debt when she asks for it. Reply to Objection 3. The master is not ashamed to Much more therefore may he not pay it when he is not demand of his slave the duty of his service, as a wife is asked. to ask the marriage debt of her husband. Yet if the master On the contrary, By the payment of the debt a rem- were not to demand it, either through ignorance or some edy is afforded against the wife’s concupiscence. Now a other cause, the slave would nevertheless be bound to ful- physician who has the care of a sick person is bound to fill his duty, if some danger were threatening. For this is remedy the disease without being asked. Therefore the what is meant by “not serving to the eye” (Eph. 6:6; Col. husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife although 3:22) which is the Apostle’s command to servants. she ask not for it. Further, a superior is bound to apply a Reply to Objection 4. A husband should not dissuade remedy for the sins of his subjects even though they rebel his wife from asking for the debt, except for a reasonable against it. But the payment of the debt on the husband’s cause; and even then he should not be too insistent, on part is directed against the sins of his wife. Therefore account of the besetting danger. 2883 Whether it is allowable for a menstruous wife to ask for the marriage debt? ∗ Suppl. q. 64 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem lawful for a menstruous nial precept, but with regard to the second it was a moral wife to ask for the marriage debt. For in the Law a man precept. For since marriage is chiefly directed to the good who had an issue of seed was unclean, even as a menstru- of the offspring, all use of marriage which is intended for ous woman. Yet a man who has an issue of seed may ask the good of the offspring is in order. Consequently this for the debt. Therefore a menstruous wife may also. precept is binding even in the New Law on account of the Objection 2. Further, leprosy is a worse complaint second reason, although not on account of the first. Now, than suffering from monthly periods, and would seem to the menstrual issue may be natural or unnatural. The nat- cause a greater corruption in the offspring. Yet a leper can ural issue is that to which women are subject at stated ask for the debt. Therefore, etc. periods when they are in good health; and it is unnatu- Objection 3. Further, if a menstruous wife is not al- ral when they suffer from an issue of blood through some lowed to ask for the debt, this can only be because it is disorder resulting from sickness. Accordingly if the men- feared this may be detrimental to the offspring. Yet if strual flow be unnatural it is not forbidden in the New Law the wife be unfruitful there is no such fear. Therefore, to approach to a menstruous woman both on account of seemingly, at least an unfruitful wife may ask for the debt her infirmity since a woman in that state cannot conceive, during her menses. and because an issue of this kind is lasting and continu- On the contrary, “Thou shalt not approach to a ous, so that the husband would have to abstain for always. woman having her flowers” (Lev. 18:19) where Augustine When however the woman is subject to a natural issue of observes: “Although he has already sufficiently forbidden the menstruum, she can conceive; moreover, the said is- this he repeats the prohibition here lest he seem to have sue lasts only a short time, wherefore it is forbidden to spoken figuratively.” approach to her. In like manner a woman is forbidden to Further, “All our justices” are become “as the rag ask for the debt during the period of that issue. of a menstruous woman” (Is. 64:6) where Jerome ob- Reply to Objection 1. The issue of seed in a man is serves: “Men ought then to keep away from their wives the result of infirmity, nor is the seed in this case apt for because thus is a deformed blind lame leprous offspring generation. Moreover a complaint of this kind is continual conceived: so that those parents who are not ashamed to or lasting like leprosy: wherefore the comparison falls. come together in sexual intercourse have their sin made This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. obvious to all”: and thus the same conclusion follows. Reply to Objection 3. As long as a woman is subject I answer that, It was forbidden in the Law to ap- to the menses it cannot be certain that she is sterile. For proach to a menstruous woman, for two reasons both on some are sterile in youth, and in course of time become account of her uncleanness, and on account of the harm fruitful, and “vice versa,” as the Philosopher observes (De that frequently resulted to the offspring from such inter- Gener. Anim. xvi). course. With regard to the first reason, it was a ceremo- Whether a menstruous woman should or may lawfully pay the marriage debt to her Suppl. q. 64 a. 4 husband if he ask for it? † Objection 1. It would seem that a menstruous wife in like manner neither should a wife give her body to her may not pay the marriage debt to her husband at his ask- husband during her menses, lest he be guilty of spiritual ing. For it is written (Lev. 20:18) that if any man approach murder. to a menstruous woman both shall be put to death. There- On the contrary, “The wife hath not power of her fore it would seem that both he who asks and she who own body, but the husband” (1 Cor. 7:4). Therefore at his grants are guilty of mortal sin. asking his wife must pay the debt even during her menses. Objection 2. Further, “Not only they that do them but Further, the menstruous wife should not be an occa- they also that consent to them are worthy of death” (Rom. sion of sin to her husband. But she would give her hus- 1:32). Now he who knowingly asks for the debt from a band an occasion of sin, if she paid him not the debt at menstruous woman sins mortally. Therefore she also sins his asking; since he might commit fornication. Therefore, mortally by consenting to pay the debt. etc. Objection 3. Further, a madman must not be given I answer that, In this regard some have asserted that back his sword lest he kill himself or another. Therefore a menstruous woman may not pay the debt even as she ∗ This and the Fourth Article are omitted in the Leonine edition. † This and the previous article are omitted in the Leonine edition. 2884 may not ask for it. For just as she would not be bound to lege sickness as a reason for not paying the debt, unless pay it if she had some personal ailment so as to make it there be fear of danger to her husband. If, however, the dangerous for herself, so is she not bound to pay for fear husband ultimately persists in his request, she must yield of danger to the offspring. But this opinion would seem to his demand. But it would not be safe for her to make to derogate from marriage, by which the husband is given known∗ her disaffection, lest this make her husband en- entire power of his wife’s body with regard to the marriage tertain a repulsion towards her, unless his prudence may act. Nor is there any parallel between bodily affliction of be taken for granted. the offspring and the danger to her own body: since, if the Reply to Objection 1. This refers to the case when wife be ailing, it is quite certain that she would be endan- both willingly consent, but not when the woman pays the gered by the carnal act, whereas this is by no means so debt by force as it were. certain with regard to the offspring which perhaps would Reply to Objection 2. Since there is no consent with- not be forthcoming. out the concurrence of the will, the woman is not deemed Wherefore others say that a menstruous woman is to consent in her husband’s sin unless she pay the debt never allowed to ask for the debt; and that if her husband willingly. For when she is unwilling she is passive rather ask, he does so either knowingly or in ignorance. If know- than consenting. ingly, she ought to dissuade him by her prayers and admo- Reply to Objection 3. A madman should be given nitions; yet not so insistently as possibly to afford him an back his sword if a greater danger were feared from its occasion of falling into other, and those sinful, practices, not being returned to him: and thus it is in the case in if he be deemed that way inclined. If however, he ask in point. ignorance, the wife may put forward some motive, or al- Whether husband and wife are equal in the marriage act? Suppl. q. 64 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that husband and wife are in length. But equality of proportion is that which is ob- not equal in the marriage act. For according to Augustine served between two proportions of the same kind as dou- (Gen. ad lit. xii) the agent is more noble than the patient. ble to double. Accordingly, speaking of the first equality, But in the marriage act the husband is as agent and the husband and wife are not equal in marriage; neither as re- wife as patient. Therefore they are not equal in that act. gards the marriage act, wherein the more noble part is due Objection 2. Further, the wife is not bound to pay her to the husband, nor as regards the household management, husband the debt without being asked; whereas he is so wherein the wife is ruled and the husband rules. But with bound, as stated above (Aa. 1,2). Therefore they are not reference to the second kind of equality, they are equal in equal in the marriage act. both matters, because just as in both the marriage act and Objection 3. Further, the woman was made on the in the management of the household the husband is bound man’s account in reference to marriage according to Gn. to the wife in all things pertaining to the husband, so is the 2:18, “Let us make him a help like unto himself.” But wife bound to the husband in all things pertaining to the that on account of which another thing is, is always the wife. It is in this sense that it is stated in the text (Sent. principal. Therefore, etc. iv, D, 32) that they are equal in paying and demanding the Objection 4. Further, marriage is chiefly directed to debt. the marriage act. But in marriage “the husband is the head Reply to Objection 1. Although it is more noble to be of the wife” (Eph. 5:23). Therefore they are not equal in active than passive, there is the same proportion between the aforesaid act. patient and passivity as between agent and activity; and On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:4): “The hus- accordingly there is equality of proportion between them. band. . . hath not power of his own body,” and the same is Reply to Objection 2. This is accidental. For the hus- said of the wife. Therefore they are equal in the marriage band having the more noble part in the marriage act, it is act. natural that he should be less ashamed than the wife to ask Further, Marriage is a relation of equiparence, since it for the debt. Hence it is that the wife is not bound to pay is a kind of union, as stated above (q. 44, Aa. 1,3). There- the debt to her husband without being asked, whereas the fore husband and wife are equal in the marriage act. husband is bound to pay it to the wife. I answer that, Equality is twofold, of quantity and Reply to Objection 3. This proves that they are not of proportion. Equality of quantity is that which is ob- equal absolutely, but not that they are not equal in propor- served between two quantities of the same measure, for tion. instance a thing two cubits long and another two cubits Reply to Objection 4. Although the head is the prin- ∗ “Indicare,” as in the commentary on the Sentences; the Leonine edition reads “judicare.” 2885 cipal member, yet just as the members are bound to the its own capacity bound to the members: and thus there is head in their own respective capacities, so is the head in equality of proportion between them. Whether husband and wife can take a vow contrary to the marriage debt without Suppl. q. 64 a. 6 their mutual consent? Objection 1. It would seem that husband and wife he is bound. Consequently, since husband and wife are may take a vow contrary to the marriage debt without their mutually bound as regards the payment of the debt which mutual consent. For husband and wife are equally bound is an obstacle to continence, the one cannot vow conti- to pay the debt, as stated above (a. 5). Now it is lawful nence without the other’s consent; and if he take the vow for the husband, even if his wife be unwilling, to take the he sins, and must not keep the vow, but must do penance cross in defense of the Holy Land: and consequently this for an ill-taken vow∗. is also lawful to the wife. Therefore, since this prevents Reply to Objection 1. It is sufficiently probable that the payment of the debt, either husband or wife may with- the wife ought to be willing to remain continent for a time, out the other’s consent take the aforesaid vow. in order to succor the need of the universal Church. Hence Objection 2. Further, in taking a vow one should not in favor of the business for which the cross is given to him, await the consent of another who cannot dissent without it is laid down that the husband may take the cross without sin. Now the husband or wife cannot, without sin, refuse his wife’s consent, even as he might go fighting without their consent to the other’s taking a vow of continence the consent of his landlord whose land he has leased. And whether absolutely or for a time; because to prevent a per- yet the wife is not entirely deprived of her right, since she son’s spiritual progress is a sin against the Holy Ghost. can follow him. Nor is there a parallel between wife and Therefore the one can take a vow of continence either ab- husband: because, since the husband has to rule the wife solutely or for a time, without the other’s consent. and not “vice versa,” the wife is bound to follow her hus- Objection 3. Further, in the marriage act, the debt has band rather than the husband the wife. Moreover there to be demanded just as it has to be paid. Now the one can, would be more danger to the wife’s chastity as a result of without the other’s consent, vow not to demand the debt, wandering from country to country, than to the husband’s, since in this he is within his own rights. Therefore he can and less profit to the Church. Wherefore the wife cannot equally take a vow not to pay the debt. take this vow without her husband’s consent. Objection 4. Further, no one can be bound by the Reply to Objection 2. The one spouse, by refusing to command of a superior to do what he cannot lawfully vow consent to the other’s vow of continence, does not sin, be- or do simply, since one must not obey in what is unlawful. cause the object of his dissent is to hinder not the other’s Now the superior authority might command the husband good, but the harm to himself. not to pay the debt to his wife for a time, by occupying Reply to Objection 3. There are two opinions on this him in some service. Therefore he might, of his own ac- point. For some say that one can without the other’s con- cord, do or vow that which would hinder him from paying sent vow not to demand the debt, not however not to pay the debt. it, because in the former case they are both within their On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:5): “Defraud own rights, but not in the second. Seeing, however, that not one another, except. . . by consent, for a time, that you if one were never to ask for the debt, marriage would be- may give yourselves to prayer.” come too burdensome to the other who would always have Further, no one can vow that which belongs to another. to undergo the shame of asking for the debt, others assert Now “the husband. . . hath not power of his own body, but with greater probability that neither vow can be lawfully the wife” (1 Cor. 7:4). Therefore, without her consent, taken by one spouse without the other’s consent. the husband cannot take a vow of continence whether ab- Reply to Objection 4. Just as the wife receives power solutely or for a time. over her husband’s body, without prejudice to the hus- I answer that, A vow is a voluntary act, as its very band’s duty to his own body, so also is it without preju- name implies: and consequently a vow can only be about dice to his duty to his master. Hence just as a wife cannot those goods which are subject to our will, and those in ask her husband for the debt to the detriment of his bodily which one person is bound to another do not come under health, so neither can she do this so as to hinder him in this head. Therefore in matters of this kind one person his duty to his master. And yet the master cannot for this cannot take a vow without the consent of the one to whom reason prevent her from paying the debt. ∗ Cf. q. 53, Aa. 1,4; q. 61, a. 1 2886 Whether it is forbidden to demand the debt on holy days? Suppl. q. 64 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that a person ought not holy time. to be forbidden to ask for the debt on holy days. For the I answer that, Although the marriage act is void of remedy should be applied when the disease gains strength. sin, nevertheless since it oppresses the reason on account Now concupiscence may possibly gain strength on a feast of the carnal pleasure, it renders man unfit for spiritual day. Therefore the remedy should be applied then by ask- things. Therefore, on those days when one ought espe- ing for the debt. cially to give one’s time to spiritual things, it is not lawful Objection 2. Further, the only reason why the debt to ask for the debt. should not be demanded on feast days is because they are Reply to Objection 1. At such a time other means devoted to prayer. Yet on those days certain hours are ap- may be employed for the repression of concupiscence; for pointed for prayer. Therefore one may ask for the debt at instance, prayer and many similar things, to which even some other time. those who observe perpetual continence have recourse. On the contrary, Just as certain places are holy be- Reply to Objection 2. Although one is not bound to cause they are devoted to holy things, so are certain times pray at all hours, one is bound throughout the day to keep holy for the same reason. But it is not lawful to demand oneself fit for prayer. the debt in a holy place. Therefore neither is it lawful at a Whether it is a mortal sin to ask for the debt at a holy time? Suppl. q. 64 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that it is a mortal sin to I answer that, To ask for the debt on a feast day is not ask for the debt at a holy time. For Gregory says (Dial. i) a circumstance drawing a sin into another species; where- that the devil took possession of a woman who had inter- fore it cannot aggravate infinitely. Consequently a wife or course with her husband at night and came in the morning husband does not sin mortally by asking for the debt on a to the procession. But this would not have happened had feast day. It is however a more grievous sin to ask for the she not sinned mortally. Therefore, etc. sake of mere pleasure, than through fear of the weakness Objection 2. Further, whoever disobeys a Divine of the flesh. command commits a mortal sin. Now the Lord com- Reply to Objection 1. This woman was punished manded (Ex. 19:15): “Come not near your wives,” when not because she paid the debt, but because afterwards she namely they were about to receive the Law. Much more rashly intruded into the divine service against her con- therefore do husbands sin mortally if they have inter- science. course with their wives at a time when they should be Reply to Objection 2. The authority quoted shows intent on the sacred observances of the New Law. not that it is a mortal sin but that it is unbecoming. For On the contrary, No circumstance aggravates in- under the Old Law which was given to a carnal people finitely. But undue time is a circumstance. Therefore it many things were required under an obligation of precept, does not aggravate a sin infinitely, so as to make mortal for the sake of bodily cleanness, which are not required in what was otherwise venial. the New Law which is the law of the spirit. Whether one spouse is bound to pay the debt to the other at a festal time? Suppl. q. 64 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that neither are they On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:5): “Defraud bound to pay the debt at a festal time. For those who com- not one another, except by consent, for a time,” etc. There- mit a sin as well as those who consent thereto are equally fore when one spouse asks the other must pay. punished (Rom. 1:32). But the one who pays the debt I answer that, Since the wife has power of her hus- consents with the one that asks, who sins. Therefore he band’s body, and “vice versa,” with regard to the act of sins also. procreation, the one is bound to pay the debt to the other, Objection 2. Further, it is an affirmative precept that at any season or hour, with due regard to the decorum re- binds us to pray, and therefore we are bound to do so at a quired in such matters, for this must not be done at once fixed time. Therefore one ought not to pay the debt at a openly. time when one is bound to pray, as neither ought one at a Reply to Objection 1. As far as he is concerned he time when one is bound to fulfill a special duty towards a does not consent, but grants unwillingly and with grief temporal master. that which is exacted of him; and consequently he does 2887 not sin. For it is ordained by God, on account of the weak-Reply to Objection 2. No hour is fixed for praying, ness of the flesh, that the debt must always be paid to the but that compensation can be made at some other hour; one who asks lest he be afforded an occasion of sin. wherefore the argument is not cogent. Whether weddings should be forbidden at certain times? ∗ Suppl. q. 64 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that weddings ought not proper place, IIIa, q. 30), from Septuagesima until the oc- to be forbidden at certain times. For marriage is a sacra- tave day of Easter, on account of the Easter Communion, ment: and the celebration of the others sacraments is not and from the three days before the Ascension until the oc- forbidden at those times. Therefore neither should the cel- tave day of Pentecost, on account of the preparation for ebration of marriage be forbidden then. Communion to be received at that time. Objection 2. Further, asking for the marriage debt is Reply to Objection 1. The celebration of marriage more unbecoming on feast days than the celebration of has a certain worldly and carnal rejoicing connected with marriage. Yet the debt may be asked for on those days. it, which does not apply to the other sacraments. Hence Therefore also marriages may be solemnized. the comparison fails. Objection 3. Further, marriages that are contracted in Reply to Objection 2. There is not such a distraction despite of the law of the Church ought to be dissolved. of minds caused by the payment of a request for the debt Yet marriages are not dissolved if they be contracted at as by the celebration of a marriage; and consequently the those times. Therefore it should not be forbidden by a comparison fails. commandment of the Church. Reply to Objection 3. Since time is not essential to On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 3:5): “A time a marriage contracted within the forbidden seasons, the to embrace, and a time to be far from embraces.” marriage is nevertheless a true sacrament. Nor is the mar- I answer that, When the newly married spouse is riage dissolved absolutely, but for a time, that they may given to her husband, the minds of husband and wife are do penance for having disobeyed the commandment of taken up with carnal preoccupations by reason of the very the Church. It is thus that we are to understand the state- newness of things, wherefore weddings are wont to be sig- ment of the Master (Sent. iv, D, 33), namely that should nalized by much unrestrained rejoicing. On this account a marriage have been contracted or a wedding celebrated it is forbidden to celebrate marriages at those times when at the aforesaid times, those who have done so “ought to men ought especially to arise to spiritual things. Those be separated.” Nor does he say this on his own authority, times are from Advent until the Epiphany because of the but in reference to some canonical ordinance, such as that Communion which, according to the ancient Canons, is of the Council of Lerida, which decision is quoted by the wont to be made at Christmas (as was observed in its Decretals. ∗ This article is omitted in the Leonine edition. 2888 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 65 Of Plurality of Wives (In Five Articles) We must now consider the plurality of wives. Under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is against the natural law to have several wives? (2) Whether this was ever lawful? (3) Whether it is against the natural law to have a concubine? (4) Whether it is a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine? (5) Whether it was ever lawful to have a concubine? Whether it is against the natural law to have several wives? Suppl. q. 65 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not against the that one man should have one wife, according to Gn. 2:24, natural law to have several wives. For custom does not “They shall be two in one flesh.” Therefore it is of natural prejudice the law of nature. But “it was not a sin” to have law. several wives “when this was the custom,” according to Objection 7. Further, it is contrary to the law of na- Augustine (De Bono Conjug. xv) as quoted in the text ture that man should bind himself to the impossible, and (Sent. iv, D, 33). Therefore it is not contrary to the natu- that what is given to one should be given to another. Now ral law to have several wives. when a man contracts with a wife, he gives her the power Objection 2. Further, whoever acts in opposition to of his body, so that he is bound to pay her the debt when the natural law, disobeys a commandment, for the law of she asks. Therefore it is against the law of nature that he nature has its commandments even as the written law has. should afterwards give the power of his body to another, Now Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xv; De Civ. Dei because it would be impossible for him to pay both were xv, 38) that “it was not contrary to a commandment” to both to ask at the same time. have several wives, “because by no law was it forbidden.” Objection 8. Further, “Do not to another what thou Therefore it is not against the natural law to have several wouldst not were done to thyself”∗ is a precept of the nat- wives. ural law. But a husband would by no means be willing for Objection 3. Further, marriage is chiefly directed to his wife to have another husband. Therefore he would be the begetting of offspring. But one man may get children acting against the law of nature, were he to have another of several women, by causing them to be pregnant. There- wife in addition. fore It is not against the natural law to have several wives. Objection 9. Further, whatever is against the natural Objection 4. Further, “Natural right is that which na- desire is contrary to the natural law. Now a husband’s jeal- ture has taught all animals,” as stated at the beginning of ousy of his wife and the wife’s jealousy of her husband are the Digests (1, i, ff. De just. et jure). Now nature has natural, for they are found in all. Therefore, since jealousy not taught all animals that one male should be united to is “love impatient of sharing the beloved,” it would seem but one female, since with many animals the one male is to be contrary to the natural law that several wives should united to several females. Therefore it is not against the share one husband. natural law to have several wives. I answer that, All natural things are imbued with cer- Objection 5. Further, according to the Philosopher tain principles whereby they are enabled not only to exer- (De Gener. Animal. i, 20), in the begetting of offspring cise their proper actions, but also to render those actions the male is to the female as agent to patient, and as the proportionate to their end, whether such actions belong to craftsman is to his material. But it is not against the or- a thing by virtue of its generic nature, or by virtue of its der of nature for one agent to act on several patients, or specific nature: thus it belongs to a magnet to be borne for one craftsman to work in several materials. Therefore downwards by virtue of its generic nature, and to attract neither is it contrary to the law of nature for one husband iron by virtue of its specific nature. Now just as in those to have many wives. things which act from natural necessity the principle of ac- Objection 6. On the contrary, That which was in- tion is the form itself, whence their proper actions proceed stilled into man at the formation of human nature would proportionately to their end, so in things which are en- seem especially to belong to the natural law. Now it was dowed with knowledge the principles of action are knowl- instilled into him at the very formation of human nature edge and appetite. Hence in the cognitive power there ∗ Cf. Tob. 4:16 2889 needs to be a natural concept, and in the appetitive power a the signification of Christ and the Church: and thus the natural inclination, whereby the action befitting the genus “sacrament” is said to be a marriage good. Wherefore the or species is rendered proportionate to the end. Now since first end corresponds to the marriage of man inasmuch as man, of all animals, knows the aspect of the end, and the he is an animal: the second, inasmuch as he is a man; the proportion of the action to the end, it follows that he is third, inasmuch as he is a believer. Accordingly plurality imbued with a natural concept, whereby he is directed to of wives neither wholly destroys nor in any way hinders act in a befitting manner, and this is called “the natural the first end of marriage, since one man is sufficient to get law” or “the natural right,” but in other animals “the natu- children of several wives, and to rear the children born of ral instinct.” For brutes are rather impelled by the force of them. But though it does not wholly destroy the second nature to do befitting actions, than guided to act on their end, it hinders it considerably for there cannot easily be own judgment. Therefore the natural law is nothing else peace in a family where several wives are joined to one than a concept naturally instilled into man, whereby he husband, since one husband cannot suffice to satisfy the is guided to act in a befitting manner in his proper ac- requisitions of several wives, and again because the shar- tions, whether they are competent to him by virtue of his ing of several in one occupation is a cause of strife: thus generic nature, as, for instance, to beget, to eat, and so on, “potters quarrel with one another”∗, and in like manner or belong to him by virtue of his specific nature, as, for the several wives of one husband. The third end, it re- instance, to reason and so forth. Now whatever renders moves altogether, because as Christ is one, so also is the an action improportionate to the end which nature intends Church one. It is therefore evident from what has been to obtain by a certain work is said to be contrary to the said that plurality of wives is in a way against the law of natural law. But an action may be improportionate either nature, and in a way not against it. to the principal or to the secondary end, and in either case Reply to Objection 1. Custom does not prejudice the this happens in two ways. First, on account of something law of nature as regards the first precepts of the latter, which wholly hinders the end; for instance a very great ex- which are like the general concepts of the mind in spec- cess or a very great deficiency in eating hinders both the ulative matters. But those which are drawn like conclu- health of the body, which is the principal end of food, and sions from these custom enforces, as Tully declares (De aptitude for conducting business, which is its secondary Inv. Rhet. ii), or weakens. Such is the precept of nature in end. Secondly, on account of something that renders the the matter of having one wife. attainment of the principal or secondary end difficult, or Reply to Objection 2. As Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. less satisfactory, for instance eating inordinately in respect ii), “fear of the law and religion have sanctioned those of undue time. Accordingly if an action be improportion- things that come from nature and are approved by cus- ate to the end, through altogether hindering the principal tom.” Wherefore it is evident that those dictates of the end directly, it is forbidden by the first precepts of the nat- natural law, which are derived from the first principles as ural law, which hold the same place in practical matters, it were of the natural law, have not the binding force of as the general concepts of the mind in speculative matters. an absolute commandment, except when they have been If, however, it be in any way improportionate to the sec- sanctioned by Divine or human law. This is what Augus- ondary end, or again to the principal end, as rendering its tine means by saying that “they did not disobey the com- attainment difficult or less satisfactory, it is forbidden, not mandments of the law, since it was not forbidden by any indeed by the first precepts of the natural law, but by the law.” second which are derived from the first even as conclu- The Reply to the Third Objection follows from what sions in speculative matters receive our assent by virtue has been said. of self-known principles: and thus the act in question is Reply to Objection 4. Natural right has several signi- said to be against the law of nature. fications. First a right is said to be natural by its principle, Now marriage has for its principal end the begetting because it is instilled by nature: and thus Tully defines it and rearing of children, and this end is competent to man (De Inv. Rhet. ii) when he says: “Natural right is not the according to his generic nature, wherefore it is common result of opinion but the product of an innate force.” And to other animals (Ethic. viii, 12), and thus it is that the since even in natural things certain movements are called “offspring” is assigned as a marriage good. But for its natural, not that they be from an intrinsic principle, but be- secondary end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12), cause they are from a higher moving principle—thus the it has, among men alone, the community of works that movements that are caused in the elements by the impress are a necessity of life, as stated above (q. 41, a. 1). And of heavenly bodies are said to be natural, as the Commen- in reference to this they owe one another “fidelity” which tator states (De Coelo et Mundo iii, 28), therefore those is one of the goods of marriage. Furthermore it has an- things that are of Divine right are said to be of natural other end, as regards marriage between believers, namely right, because they are caused by the impress and influ- ∗ Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 4 2890 ence of a higher principle, namely God. Isidore takes it in far as it is instituted as a remedy (which is its secondary this sense, when he says (Etym. v) that “the natural right end), marriage does require the debt to be paid at all times is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel.” on being asked for. Hence it is evident that by taking sev- Thirdly, right is said to be natural not only from its prin- eral wives a man does not bind himself to the impossible, ciple but also from its matter, because it is about natu- considering the principal end of marriage; and therefore ral things. And since nature is contradistinguished with plurality of wives is not against the first principles of the reason, whereby man is a man, it follows that if we take natural law. natural right in its strictest sense, those things which are Reply to Objection 8. This precept of the natural law, dictated by natural reason and pertain to man alone are not “Do not to another what thou wouldst not were done to said to be of natural right, but only those which are dic- thyself,” should be understood with the proviso that there tated by natural reason and are common to man and other be equal proportion. For if a superior is unwilling to be animals. Thus we have the aforesaid definition, namely: withstood by his subject, he is not therefore bound not to “Natural right is what nature has taught all animals.” Ac- withstand his subject. Hence it does not follow in virtue cordingly plurality of wives, though not contrary to nat- of this precept that as a husband is unwilling for his wife ural right taken in the third sense, is nevertheless against to have another husband, he must not have another wife: natural right taken in the second sense, because it is for- because for one man to have several wives is not contrary bidden by the Divine law. It is also against natural right to the first principles of the natural law, as stated above: taken in the first sense, as appears from what has been whereas for one wife to have several husbands is contrary said, for such is nature’s dictate to every animal according to the first principles of the natural law, since thereby the to the mode befitting its nature. Wherefore also certain good of the offspring which is the principal end of mar- animals, the rearing of whose offspring demands the care riage is, in one respect, entirely destroyed, and in another of both, namely the male and female, by natural instinct respect hindered. For the good of the offspring means cling to the union of one with one, for instance the turtle- not only begetting, but also rearing. Now the begetting dove, the dove, and so forth. of offspring, though not wholly voided (since a woman The Reply to the Fifth Objection is clear from what may be impregnated a second time after impregnation has has been said. already taken place, as stated in De Gener. Animal. vii. Since, however, the arguments adduced “on the con- 4), is nevertheless considerably hindered, because this can trary side” would seem to show that plurality of wives is scarcely happen without injury either to both fetus or to against the first principles of the natural law, we must re- one of them. But the rearing of the offspring is altogether ply to them. done away, because as a result of one woman having sev- Accordingly we reply to the Sixth Objection that hu- eral husbands there follows uncertainty of the offspring in man nature was founded without any defect, and conse- relation to its father, whose care is necessary for its edu- quently it is endowed not only with those things without cation. Wherefore the marriage of one wife with several which the principal end of marriage is impossible of at- husbands has not been sanctioned by any law or custom, tainment, but also with those without which the secondary whereas the converse has been. end of marriage could not be obtained without difficulty: Reply to Objection 9. The natural inclination in the and in this way it sufficed man when he was first formed appetitive power follows the natural concept in the cog- to have one wife, as stated above. nitive power. And since it is not so much opposed to the Reply to Objection 7. In marriage the husband gives natural concept for a man to have several wives as for a his wife power of his body, not in all respects, but only in wife to have several husbands, it follows that a wife’s love those things that are required by marriage. Now marriage is not so averse to another sharing the same husband with does not require the husband to pay the debt every time his her, as a husband’s love is to another sharing the same wife asks for it, if we consider the principal end for which wife with him. Consequently both in man and in other marriage was instituted, namely the good of the offspring, animals the male is more jealous of the female than “vice but only as far as is necessary for impregnation. But in so versa.” Whether it was ever lawful to have several wives? Suppl. q. 65 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that it can never have fore as it is unlawful now, it was unlawful at all times. been lawful to have several wives. For, according to the Objection 2. Further, if it was ever lawful, this could Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7), “The natural law has the same only be because it was lawful either in itself, or by dis- power at all times and places.” Now plurality of wives is pensation. If the former, it would also be lawful now; if forbidden by the natural law, as stated above (a. 1). There- the latter, this is impossible, for according to Augustine 2891 (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3), “as God is the founder of na-from whose authority he derives its binding force to per- ture, He does nothing contrary to the principles which He mit the non-observance of the law in those cases to which has planted in nature.” Since then God has planted in our the force of the law ought not to extend, and this permis- nature the principle that one man should be united to one sion is called a dispensation. Now the law prescribing the wife, it would seem that He has never dispensed man from one wife was framed not by man but by God, nor was it this. ever given by word or in writing, but was imprinted on the Objection 3. Further, if a thing be lawful by dispen- heart, like other things belonging in any way to the natu- sation, it is only lawful for those who receive the dispen- ral law. Consequently a dispensation in this matter could sation. Now we do not read in the Law of a general dis- be granted by God alone through an inward inspiration, pensation having been granted to all. Since then in the vouchsafed originally to the holy patriarchs, and by their Old Testament all who wished to do so, without any dis- example continued to others, at a time when it behooved tinction, took to themselves several wives, nor were re- the aforesaid precept not to be observed, in order to en- proached on that account, either by the law or by the sure the multiplication of the offspring to be brought up prophets, it would seem that it was not made lawful by in the worship of God. For the principal end is ever to be dispensation. borne in mind before the secondary end. Wherefore, since Objection 4. Further, where there is the same reason the good of the offspring is the principal end of marriage, for dispensation, the same dispensation should be given. it behooved to disregard for a time the impediment that Now we cannot assign any other reason for dispensation might arise to the secondary ends, when it was necessary than the multiplying of the offspring for the worship of for the offspring to be multiplied; because it was for the God, and this is necessary also now. Therefore this dis- removal of this impediment that the precept forbidding a pensation would be still in force, especially as we read plurality of wives was framed, as stated above (a. 1). nowhere of its having been recalled. Reply to Objection 1. The natural law, considered Objection 5. Further, in granting a dispensation the in itself, has the same force at all times and places; but greater good should not be overlooked for the sake of a accidentally on account of some impediment it may vary lesser good. Now fidelity and the sacrament, which it at certain times and places, as the Philosopher (Ethic. i, would seem impossible to safeguard in a marriage where 3,7) instances in the case of other natural things. For at one man is joined to several wives, are greater goods than all times and places the right hand is better than the left the multiplication of the offspring. Therefore this dispen- according to nature, but it may happen accidentally that sation ought not to have been granted with a view to this a person is ambidextrous, because our nature is variable; multiplication. and the same applies to the natural, just as the Philosopher On the contrary, It is stated (Gal. 3:19) that the states (Ethic. i, 3,7). Law “was set because of transgressors [Vulg.: ‘transgres- Reply to Objection 2. In a Decretal (De divortiis, sions’],” namely in order to prohibit them. Now the Old cap. Gaudemus) it is asserted that is was never lawful Law mentions plurality of wives without any prohibition to have several wives without having a dispensation re- thereof, as appears from Dt. 21:15, “If a man have two ceived through Divine inspiration. Nor is the dispensation wives,” etc. Therefore they were not transgressors through thus granted a contradiction to the principles which God having two wives; and so it was lawful. has implanted in nature, but an exception to them, because Further, this is confirmed by the example of the holy those principles are not intended to apply to all cases but patriarchs, who are stated to have had several wives, and to the majority, as stated. Even so it is not contrary to na- yet were most pleasing to God, for instance Jacob, David, ture when certain occurrences take place in natural things and several others. Therefore at one time it was lawful. miraculously, by way of exception to more frequent oc- I answer that, As stated above (a. 1, ad 7,8), plu- currences. rality of wives is said to be against the natural law, not Reply to Objection 3. Dispensation from a law as regards its first precepts, but as regards the secondary should follow the quality of the law. Wherefore, since precepts, which like conclusions are drawn from its first the law of nature is imprinted on the heart, it was not nec- precepts. Since, however, human acts must needs vary essary for a dispensation from things pertaining to the nat- according to the various conditions of persons, times, and ural law to be given under the form of a written law but other circumstances, the aforesaid conclusions do not pro- by internal inspiration. ceed from the first precepts of the natural law, so as to be Reply to Objection 4. When Christ came it was the binding in all cases, but only in the majority. for such is time of the fulness of the grace of Christ, whereby the the entire matter of Ethics according to the Philosopher worship of God was spread abroad among all nations by (Ethic. i, 3,7). Hence, when they cease to be binding, it is a spiritual propagation. Hence there is not the same rea- lawful to disregard them. But because it is not easy to de- son for a dispensation as before Christ’s coming, when the termine the above variations, it belongs exclusively to him worship of God was spread and safeguarded by a carnal 2892 propagation. two other goods for the sake of the good of the offspring. Reply to Objection 5. The offspring, considered as Nor are they entirely done away, since there remains faith one of the marriage goods, includes the keeping of faith towards several wives; and the sacrament remains after a with God, because the reason why it is reckoned a mar- fashion, for though it did not signify the union of Christ riage good is because it is awaited with a view to its being with the Church as one, nevertheless the plurality of wives brought up in the worship of God. Now the faith to be signified the distinction of degrees in the Church, which kept with God is of greater import than the faith to be kept distinction is not only in the Church militant but also in with a wife, which is reckoned a marriage good, and than the Church triumphant. Consequently their marriages sig- the signification which pertains to the sacrament, since nified somewhat the union of Christ not only with the the signification is subordinate to the knowledge of faith. Church militant, as some say, but also with the Church Hence it is not unfitting if something is taken from the triumphant where there are “many mansions”∗. Whether it is against the natural law to have a concubine? Suppl. q. 65 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that to have a concubine is than by marriage. Therefore it is against the natural law not against the natural law. For the ceremonies of the Law to have a concubine. are not of the natural law. But fornication is forbidden I answer that, As stated above (a. 1), an action is said (Acts 15:29) in conjunction with ceremonies of the law to be against the natural law, if it is not in keeping with which for the time were being imposed on those who were the due end intended by nature, whether through not being brought to the faith from among the heathens. Therefore directed thereto by the action of the agent, or through be- simple fornication which is intercourse with a concubine ing directed thereto by the action of the agent, or through is not against the natural law. being in itself improportionate to that end. Now the end Objection 2. Further, positive law is an outcome of which nature intends in sexual union is the begetting and the natural law, as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Now forni- rearing of the offspring. and that this good might be cation was not forbidden by positive law; indeed accord- sought after, it attached pleasure to the union; as Augus- ing to the ancient laws women used to be sentenced to be tine says (De Nup. et Concup. i, 8). Accordingly to make taken to brothels. Therefore it is not against the natural use of sexual intercourse on account of its inherent plea- law to have a concubine. sure, without reference to the end for which nature in- Objection 3. Further, the natural law does not forbid tended it, is to act against nature, as also is it if the inter-that which is given simply, to be given for a time or un- course be not such as may fittingly be directed to that end. der certain restrictions. Now one unmarried woman may And since, for the most part, things are denominated from give the power of her body for ever to an unmarried man, their end, as being that which is of most consequence to so that he may use her when he will. Therefore it is not them, just as the marriage union took its name from the against the law of nature, if she give him power of her good of the offspring†, which is the end chiefly sought af- body for a time. ter in marriage, so the name of concubine is expressive Objection 4. Further, whoever uses his own property of that union where sexual intercourse is sought after for as he will, injures no one. But a bondswoman is her mas- its own sake. Moreover even though sometimes a man ter’s property. Therefore if her master use her as he will, may seek to have offspring of such an intercourse, this he injures no one: and consequently it is not against the is not befitting to the good of the offspring, which sig- natural law to have a concubine. nifies not only the begetting of children from which they Objection 5. Further, everyone may give his own take their being, but also their rearing and instruction, by property to another. Now the wife has power of her hus- which means they receive nourishment and learning from band’s body (1 Cor. 7:4). Therefore if his wife be willing, their parents, in respect of which three things the parents the husband can have intercourse with another woman are bound to their children, according to the Philosopher without sin. (Ethic. viii, 11,12). Now since the rearing and teach- On the contrary, According to all laws the children ing of the children remain a duty of the parents during born of a concubine are children of shame. But this would a long period of time, the law of nature requires the fa- not be so unless the union of which they are born were ther and mother to dwell together for a long time, in order naturally shameful. that together they may be of assistance to their children. Further, as stated above (q. 41, a. 1), marriage is nat- Hence birds that unite together in rearing their young do ural. But this would not be so if without prejudice to the not sever their mutual fellowship from the time when they natural law a man could be united to a woman otherwise first come together until the young are fully fledged. Now ∗ Jn. 19:2 † Cf. q. 44, a. 2 2893 this obligation which binds the female and her mate to re-Reply to Objection 3. In certain cases no evil results main together constitutes matrimony. Consequently it is ensue if a person surrenders his right to a thing whether evident that it is contrary to the natural law for a man to absolutely or for a time, so that in neither case is the sur- have intercourse with a woman who is not married to him, render against the natural law. But that does not apply to which is the signification of a concubine. the case in point, wherefore the argument does not prove. Reply to Objection 1. Among the Gentiles the nat- Reply to Objection 4. Injury is opposed to justice. ural law was obscured in many points: and consequently Now the natural law forbids not only injustice, but also they did not think it wrong to have intercourse with a con- whatever is opposed to any of the virtues: for instance it is cubine, and in many cases practiced fornication as though contrary to the natural law to eat immoderately, although it were lawful, as also other things contrary to the cere- by doing so a man uses his own property without injury monial laws of the Jews, though not contrary to the law of to anyone. Moreover although a bondswoman is her mas- nature. Wherefore the apostles inserted the prohibition of ter’s property that she may serve him, she is not his that fornication among that of other ceremonial observances, she may be his concubine. And again it depends how a because in both cases there was a difference of opinion person makes use of his property. For such a man does an between Jews and Gentiles. injury to the offspring he begets, since such a union is not Reply to Objection 2. This law was the result of directed to its good, as stated above. the darkness just mentioned, into which the Gentiles had Reply to Objection 5. The wife has power of her hus- fallen, by not giving due honor to God as stated in Rom. band’s body, not simply and in all respects, but only in 1:21, and did not proceed from the instinct of the natu- relation to marriage, and consequently she cannot transfer ral law. Hence, when the Christian religion prevailed, this her husband’s body to another to the detriment of the good law was abolished. of marriage. Whether it is a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine? Suppl. q. 65 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not a mortal sin to keep thyself. . . from all fornication, and beside thy wife to have intercourse with a concubine. For a lie is a greater never endure to know crime.” Therefore, etc. sin than simple fornication: and a proof of this is that Juda, I answer that, As we have already stated (Sent. ii, D, who did not abhor to commit fornication with Thamar, re- 42, q. 1, a. 4), those sins are mortal in their genus which coiled from telling a lie, saying (Gn. 38:23): “Surely she violate the bond of friendship between man and God, and cannot charge us with a lie.” But a lie is not always a between man and man; for such sins are against the two mortal sin. Neither therefore is simple fornication. precepts of charity which is the life of the soul. Wherefore Objection 2. Further, a deadly sin should be punished since the intercourse of fornication destroys the due rela- with death. But the Old Law did not punish with death tions of the parent with the offspring that is nature’s aim intercourse with a concubine, save in a certain case (Dt. in sexual intercourse, there can be no doubt that simple 22:25). Therefore it is not a deadly sin. fornication by its very nature is a mortal sin even though Objection 3. Further, according to Gregory (Moral. there were no written law. xxxiii, 12), the sins of the flesh are less blameworthy than Reply to Objection 1. It often happens that a man spiritual sins. Now pride and covetousness, which are who does not avoid a mortal sin, avoids a venial sin to spiritual sins, are not always mortal sins. Therefore forni- which he has not so great an incentive. Thus, too, Juda cation, which is a sin of the flesh, is not always a mortal avoided a lie while he avoided not fornication. Neverthe- sin. less that would have been a pernicious lie, for it would Objection 4. Further, where the incentive is greater have involved an injury if he had not kept his promise. the sin is less grievous, because he sins more who is over- Reply to Objection 2. A sin is called deadly, not be- come by a lighter temptation. But concupiscence is the cause it is punished with temporal, but because it is pun- greatest incentive to lust. Therefore since lustful actions ished with eternal death. Hence also theft, which is a mor- are not always mortal sins, neither is simple fornication a tal sin, and many other sins are sometimes not punished mortal sin. with temporal death by the law. The same applies to for- On the contrary, Nothing but mortal sin excludes nication. from the kingdom of God. But fornicators are excluded Reply to Objection 3. Just as not every movement of from the kingdom of God (1 Cor. 6:9,10). Therefore sim- pride is a mortal sin, so neither is every movement of lust, ple fornication is a mortal sin. because the first movements of lust and the like are venial Further, mortal sins alone are called crimes. Now all sins, even sometimes marriage intercourse. Nevertheless fornication is a crime according to Tob. 4:13, “Take heed some acts of lust are mortal sins, while some movements 2894 of pride are venial: since the words quoted from Gregory on account of the greatness of its incentive, yet on account are to be understood as comparing vices in their genus and of the matter about which it is, it has a greater gravity than not in their particular acts. immoderate eating, because it is about those things which Reply to Objection 4. A circumstance is the more ef- tighten the bond of human fellowship, as stated above. fective in aggravating a sin according as it comes nearer to Hence the argument does not prove. the nature of sin. Hence although fornication is less grave Whether it was ever lawful to have a concubine? Suppl. q. 65 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that it has been some- mit of no dispensation. Hence wherever in the Old Testa- times lawful to have a concubine. For just as the natural ment we read of concubines being taken by such men as law requires a man to have but one wife, so does it forbid we ought to excuse from mortal sin, we must needs un- him to have a concubine. Yet at times it has been lawful derstand them to have been taken in marriage, and yet to to have several wives. Therefore it has also been lawful to have been called concubines, because they had something have a concubine. of the character of a wife and something of the character Objection 2. Further, a woman cannot be at the same of a concubine. In so far as marriage is directed to its prin- time a slave and a wife; wherefore according to the Law cipal end, which is the good of the offspring, the union of (Dt. 21:11, seqq.) a bondswoman gained her freedom wife and husband is indissoluble or at least of a lasting na- by the very fact of being taken in marriage. Now we ture, as shown above (a. 1), and in regard to this there is no read that certain men who were most beloved of God, for dispensation. But in regard to the secondary end, which instance Abraham and Jacob, had intercourse with their is the management of the household and community of bondswomen. Therefore these were not wives, and con- works, the wife is united to the husband as his mate: and sequently it was sometime lawful to have a concubine. this was lacking in those who were known as concubines. Objection 3. Further, a woman who is taken in mar- For in this respect a dispensation was possible, since it is riage cannot be cast out, and her son should have a share the secondary end of marriage. And from this point of in the inheritance. Yet Abraham sent Agar away, and her view they bore some resemblance to concubines, and for son was not his heir (Gn. 21:14). Therefore she was not this reason they were known as such. Abraham’s wife. Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 1, ad 7,8) On the contrary, Things opposed to the precepts of to have several wives is not against the first precepts of the decalogue were never lawful. Now to have a concu- the natural law, as it is to have a concubine; wherefore the bine is against a precept of the decalogue, namely, “Thou argument does not prove. shalt not commit adultery.” Therefore it was never lawful. Reply to Objection 2. The patriarchs of old by virtue Further, Ambrose says in his book on the patriarchs of the dispensation which allowed them several wives, ap- (De Abraham i, 4): “What is unlawful to a wife is unlaw- proached their bondswomen with the disposition of a hus- ful to a husband.” But it is never lawful for a wife to put band towards his wife. For these women were wives as aside her own husband and have intercourse with another to the principal and first end of marriage, but not as to the man. Therefore it was never lawful for a husband to have other union which regards the secondary end, to which a concubine. bondage is opposed since a woman cannot be at once mate I answer that, Rabbi Moses says (Doc. Perp. iii, 49) and slave. that before the time of the Law fornication was not a sin; Reply to Objection 3. As in the Mosaic law it was al- and he proved his assertion from the fact that Juda had lowable by dispensation to grant a bill of divorce in order intercourse with Thamar. But this argument is not con- to avoid wife-murder (as we shall state further on, q. 67, clusive. For there is no need to excuse Jacob’s sons from a. 6), so by the same dispensation Abraham was allowed mortal sin, since they were accused to their father of a to send Agar away, in order to signify the mystery which most wicked crime (Gn. 37:2), and consented kill Joseph the Apostle explains (Gal. 4:22, seqq.). Again, that this and to sell him. Wherefore we must say that since it is son did not inherit belongs to the mystery, as explained in against the natural law to have a concubine outside wed- the same place. Even so Esau, the son of a free woman, lock, as stated above (a. 3), it was never lawful either in did not inherit (Rom. 9:13, seqq.). In like manner on ac- itself or by dispensation. For as we have shown (Doc. count of the mystery it came about that the sons of Jacob Perp. iii, 49) intercourse with a woman outside wedlock born of bond and free women inherited, as Augustine says is an action improportionate to the good of the offspring (Tract. xi in Joan.) because “sons and heirs are born to which is the principal end of marriage: and consequently Christ both of good ministers denoted by the free woman it is against the first precepts of the natural law which ad- and of evil ministers denoted by the bondswoman.” 2895 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 66 Of Bigamy and of the Irregularity Contracted Thereby (In Five Articles) In the next place we must consider bigamy and the irregularity contracted thereby. Under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether irregularity attaches to the bigamy that consists in having two successive wives? (2) Whether irregularity is contracted by one who has two wives at once? (3) Whether irregularity is contracted by marrying one who is not a virgin? (4) Whether bigamy is removed by Baptism? (5) Whether a dispensation can be granted to a bigamous person? Whether irregularity attaches to bigamy? Suppl. q. 66 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that irregularity is not at- has several wives at once, one in law, the other in fact; tached to the bigamy that consists in having two wives the third, when he has several successively, one in law, successively. For multitude and unity are consequent the other in fact; the fourth, when a man marries a widow. upon being. Since then non-being does not cause plu- Accordingly irregularity attaches to all of these. rality, a man who has two wives successively, the one in There is another consequent reason assigned, since being, the other in non-being, does not thereby become those who receive the sacrament of order should be sig- the husband of more than one wife, so as to be debarred, nalized by the greatest spirituality, both because they ad- according to the Apostle (1 Tim. 3:2; Titus 1:6), from the minister spiritual things, namely the sacraments, and be- episcopate. cause they teach spiritual things, and should be occupied Objection 2. Further, a man who commits fornication in spiritual matters. Wherefore since concupiscence is with several women gives more evidence of incontinence most incompatible with spirituality, inasmuch as it makes than one who has several wives successively. Yet in the a man to be wholly carnal, they should give no sign of first case a man does not become irregular. Therefore nei- persistent concupiscence, which does indeed show itself ther in the second should he become irregular. in bigamous persons, seeing that they were unwilling to Objection 3. Further, if bigamy causes irregularity, be content with one wife. The first reason however is the this is either because of the sacrament, or because of the better. carnal intercourse. Now it is not on account of the for- Reply to Objection 1. The multitude of several wives mer, for if a man had contracted marriage by words of at the same time is a multitude simply, wherefore a mul- the present and, his wife dying before the consummation titude of this kind is wholly inconsistent with the signifi- of the marriage, he were to marry another, he would be- cation of the sacrament, so that the sacrament is voided come irregular, which is against the decree of Innocent III on that account. But the multitude of several successive (cap. Dubium, De bigamia). Nor again is it on account wives is a multitude relatively, wherefore it does not en- of the second, for then a man who had committed fornica- tirely destroy the signification of the sacrament, nor does tion with several women would become irregular: which it void the sacrament in its essence but in its perfection, is false. Therefore bigamy nowise causes irregularity. which is required of those who are the dispensers of sacra- I answer that, By the sacrament of order a man is ap- ments. pointed to the ministry of the sacraments; and he who has Reply to Objection 2. Although those who are guilty to administer the sacraments to others must suffer from no of fornication give proof of greater concupiscence, theirs defect in the sacraments. Now there is a defect in a sacra- is not a so persistent concupiscence, since by fornication ment when the entire signification of the sacrament is not one party is not bound to the other for ever; and conse- found therein. And the sacrament of marriage signifies the quently no defect attaches to the sacrament. union of Christ with the Church, which is the union of one Reply to Objection 3. As stated above, bigamy with one. Therefore the perfect signification of the sacra- causes irregularity, because it destroys the perfect signifi- ment requires the husband to have only one wife, and the cation of the sacrament: which signification is seated both wife to have but one husband; and consequently bigamy, in the union of minds, as expressed by the consent, and in which does away with this, causes irregularity. And there the union of bodies. Wherefore bigamy must affect both are four kinds of bigamy: the first is when a man has sev- of these at the same time in order to cause irregularity. eral lawful wives successively; the second is when a man Hence the decree of Innocent III disposes of the statement 2896 of the Master (Sent. iv, D, 27), namely that consent alone by words of the present is sufficient to cause irregularity. Whether irregularity results from bigamy, when one husband has two wives, one in Suppl. q. 66 a. 2 law, the other in fact? Objection 1. It would seem that irregularity does not ther in law or in fact, and yet he is not irregular, since he result from bigamy when one husband has two wives at has not divided his flesh among several women. Therefore the same time, one in law and one in fact. For when the irregularity is not contracted by reason of the aforesaid sacrament is void there can be no defect in the sacrament. kind of bigamy. Now when a man marries a woman in fact but not in law I answer that, Irregularity is contracted in the two there is no sacrament, since such a union does not signify second kinds of bigamy, for although in the one there is the union of Christ with the Church. Therefore since ir- no sacrament, there is a certain likeness to a sacrament. regularity does not result from bigamy except on account Wherefore these two kinds are secondary, and the first is of a defect in the sacrament, it would seem that no irregu- the principal kind in causing irregularity. larity attaches to bigamy of this kind. Reply to Objection 1. Although there is no sacra- Objection 2. Further, if a man has intercourse with a ment in this case there is a certain likeness to a sacrament, woman whom he has married in fact and not in law, he whereas there is no such likeness in fornication or adul- commits fornication if he has not a lawful wife, or adul- tery. Hence the comparison fails. tery if he has. But a man does not become irregular by This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. dividing his flesh among several women by fornication or Reply to Objection 3. In this case the man is not adultery. Therefore neither does he by the aforesaid kind reckoned a bigamist, because the first marriage lacked its of bigamy. perfect signification. Nevertheless if, by the judgment of Objection 3. Further, it may happen that a man, be- the Church, he be compelled to return to his first wife and fore knowing carnally the woman he has married in law, carnally to know her, he becomes irregular forthwith, be- marries another in fact and not in law, and knows her car- cause the irregularity is the result not of the sin but of nally, whether the former woman be living or dead. Now imperfect signification. this man has contracted marriage with several women ei- Whether irregularity is contracted by marrying one who is not a virgin? Suppl. q. 66 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that irregularity is not over, it might happen that, after knowing of this, he pays contracted by marrying one who is not a virgin. For a her the debt at her asking, before she is accused and con- man’s own defect is a greater impediment to him than the victed of adultery. Therefore it would seem that this kind defect of another. But if the man himself who marries is of bigamy does not cause irregularity. not a virgin he does not become irregular. Therefore much On the contrary, Gregory says (Regist. ii, ep. 37): less does he if his wife is not a virgin. “We command thee never to make unlawful ordinations, Objection 2. Further, it may happen that a man mar- nor to admit to holy orders a bigamist, or one who has ries a woman after corrupting her. Now, seemingly, such married a woman that is not a virgin, or one who is unlet- a man does not become irregular, since he has not divided tered, or one who is deformed in his limbs, or bound to do his flesh among several, nor has his wife done so, and yet penance or to perform some civil duty, or who is in any he marries a woman who is not a virgin. Therefore this state of subjection.” kind of bigamy does not cause irregularity. I answer that, In the union of Christ with the Church Objection 3. Further, no man can become irregular unity is found on either side. Consequently whether we except voluntarily. But sometimes a man marries involun- find division of the flesh on the part of the husband, or tarily one who is not a virgin, for instance when he thinks on the part of the wife, there is a defect of sacrament. her a virgin and afterwards, by knowing her carnally, finds There is, however, a difference, because on the part of that she is not. Therefore this kind does not always cause the husband it is required that he should not have married irregularity. another wife, but not that he should be a virgin, whereas Objection 4. Further, unlawful intercourse after mar- on the part of the wife it is also required that she be a riage is more guilty than before marriage. Now if a wife, virgin. The reason assigned by those versed in the Dec- after the marriage has been consummated, has intercourse retals is because the bridegroom signifies the Church mil- with another man, her husband does not become irregular, itant which is entrusted to the care of a bishop, and in otherwise he would be punished for his wife’s sin. More- which there are many corruptions, while the spouse signi- 2897 fies Christ Who was a virgin: wherefore virginity on the not in himself, but in the other party, wherefore it takes part of the spouse, but not on the part of the bridegroom, its species from its term, which, moreover, in regard to is required in order that a man be made a bishop. This that act, is the matter as it were of the sacrament. Conse- reason, however, is expressly contrary to the words of quently if a woman were able to receive orders, just as her the Apostle (Eph. 5:25): “Husbands, love your wives, as husband becomes irregular through marrying one who is Christ also loved the Church,” which show that the bride not a virgin, but not through his not being a virgin when signifies the Church, and the bridegroom Christ; and again he marries, so also would a woman become irregular if he says (Eph. 5:23): “Because the husband is the head of she were to marry a man who is not a virgin, but not if she the wife, as Christ is the head of the Church.” Wherefore were no longer a virgin when she married —unless she others say that Christ is signified by the bridegroom, and had been corrupted by reason of a previous marriage. that the bride signifies the Church triumphant in which This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. there is no stain. Also that the synagogue was first united Reply to Objection 2. In this case opinions differ. to Christ as a concubine; so that the sacrament loses noth- It is, however, more probable that he is not irregular, be- ing of its signification if the bridegroom previously had cause he has not divided his flesh among several women. a concubine. But this is most absurd, since just as the Reply to Objection 3. Irregularity is not the infliction faith of ancients and of moderns is one, so is the Church of a punishment, but the defect of a sacrament. Conse- one. Wherefore those who served God at the time of the quently it is not always necessary for bigamy to be vol- synagogue belonged to the unity of the Church in which untary in order to cause irregularity. Hence a man who we serve God. Moreover this is expressly contrary to Jer. marries a woman, thinking her to be a virgin, whereas she 3:14, Ezech. 16:8, Osee 2:16, where the espousals of the is not, becomes irregular by knowing her carnally. synagogue are mentioned explicitly: so that she was not Reply to Objection 4. If a woman commits forni- as a concubine but as a wife. Again, according to this, for- cation after being married, her husband does not become nication would be the sacred sign [sacramentum] of that irregular on that account, unless he again knows her car- union, which is absurd. Wherefore heathendom, before nally after she has been corrupted by adultery, since oth- being espoused to Christ in the faith of the Church, was erwise the corruption of the wife nowise affects the mar- corrupted by the devil through idolatry. Hence we must riage act of the husband. But though he be compelled by say otherwise that irregularity is caused by a defect in the law to pay her the debt, or if he do so at her request, be- sacrament itself. Now when corruption of the flesh occurs ing compelled by his own conscience, even before she is outside wedlock on account of a preceding marriage, it convicted of adultery, he becomes irregular, albeit opin- causes no defect in the sacrament on the part of the per- ions differ on this point. However, what we have said is son corrupted, but it causes a defect in the other person, more probable, since here it is not a question of sin, but of because the act of one who contracts marriage terminates signification only. Whether bigamy is removed by Baptism? Suppl. q. 66 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that bigamy is removed are more efficacious than the sacraments of the Old Law. by Baptism. For Jerome says in his commentary on the But the sacraments of the Old Law removed irregularities Epistle to Titus (1:6, “the husband of one wife”) that if according to the Master’s statement (Sent. iv,). Therefore a man has had several wives before receiving Baptism, or Baptism also, being the most efficacious of the sacraments one before and another after Baptism, he is not a bigamist. of the New Law, removes the irregularity consequent upon Therefore bigamy is removed by Baptism. bigamy. Objection 2. Further, he who does what is more, does On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. what is less. Now Baptism removes all sin, and sin is a xviii): “Those understand the question more correctly greater thing than irregularity. Therefore it removes irreg- who maintain that a man who has married a second wife, ularity. though he was a catechumen or even a pagan at the time, Objection 3. Further, Baptism takes away all punish- cannot be ordained, because it is a question of a sacra- ment resulting from an act. Now such is the irregularity ment, not of a sin.” of bigamy. Therefore, etc. Further, according to the same authority (De Bono Objection 4. Further, a bigamist is irregular because Conjug. xviii) “a woman who has been corrupted while he is deficient in the representation of Christ. Now by a catechumen or a pagan cannot after Baptism be conse- Baptism we are fully conformed to Christ. Therefore this crated among God’s virgins.” Therefore in like manner irregularity is removed. one who was a bigamist before Baptism cannot be or- Objection 5. Further, the sacraments of the New Law dained. 2898 I answer that, Baptism removes sin, but does not dis-punishments consequent upon actual sin, which are, or solve marriage. Wherefore since irregularity results from have yet to be, inflicted: for one does not recover virginity marriage, it cannot be removed by Baptism, as Augustine by Baptism, nor again undivision of the flesh. says (De Bono Conjug. xviii). Reply to Objection 4. Baptism conforms a man to Reply to Objection 1. In this case Jerome’s opinion is Christ as regards the virtue of the mind, but not as to the not followed: unless perhaps he wished to explain that he condition of the body, which is effected by virginity or means that a dispensation should be more easily granted. division of the flesh. Reply to Objection 2. It does not follow that what Reply to Objection 5. Those irregularities were con- does a greater thing, does a lesser, unless it be directed tracted through slight and temporary causes, and con- to the latter. This is not so in the case in point, because sequently they could be removed by those sacraments. Baptism is not directed to the removal of an irregularity. Moreover the latter were ordained for that purpose, Reply to Objection 3. This must be understood of whereas Baptism is not. Whether it is lawful for a bigamist to receive a dispensation? Suppl. q. 66 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for a bigamist I answer that, Irregularity attaches to bigamy not by to be granted a dispensation. For it is said (Extra, De natural, but by positive law; nor again is it one of the es- bigamis, cap. Nuper): “It is not lawful to grant a dis- sentials of order that a man be not a bigamist, which is pensation to clerics who, as far as they could do so, have evident from the fact that if a bigamist present himself taken to themselves a second wife.” for orders, he receives the character. Wherefore the Pope Objection 2. Further, it is not lawful to grant a dis- can dispense altogether from such an irregularity; but a pensation from the Divine law. Now whatever is in the bishop, only as regards the minor orders, though some say canonical writings belongs to the Divine law. Since then that in order to prevent religious wandering abroad he can in canonical Scripture the Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:2): “It dispense therefrom as regards the major orders in those behooveth. . . a bishop to be. . . the husband of one wife,” it who wish to serve God in religion. would seem that a dispensation cannot be granted in this Reply to Objection 1. This Decretal shows that there matter. is the same difficulty against granting a dispensation in Objection 3. Further, no one can receive a dispensa- those who have married several wives in fact, as if they tion in what is essential to a sacrament. But it is essential had married them in law; but it does not prove that the to the sacrament of order that the recipient be not irregular, Pope has no power to grant a dispensation in such cases. since the signification which is essential to a sacrament is Reply to Objection 2. This is true as regards things lacking in one who is irregular. Therefore he cannot be belonging to the natural law, and those which are essen- granted a dispensation in this. tial to the sacraments, and to faith. But in those which Objection 4. Further, what is reasonably done cannot owe their institution to the apostles, since the Church has be reasonably undone. If, therefore, a bigamist can law- the same power now as then of setting up and of putting fully receive a dispensation, it was unreasonable that he down, she can grant a dispensation through him who holds should be irregular: which is inadmissible. the primacy. On the contrary, Pope Lucius granted a dispensation Reply to Objection 3. Not every signification is es- to the bishop of Palermo who was a bigamist, as stated in sential to a sacrament, but that alone which belongs to the the gloss on can. Lector, dist. 34. sacramental effect,† and this is not removed by irregular- Further, Pope Martin∗ says: “If a Reader marry a ity. widow, let him remain a Reader, or if there be need for Reply to Objection 4. In particular cases there is no it, he may receive the Subdiaconate, but no higher order: ratio that applies to all equally, on account of their variety. and the same applies if he should be a bigamist.” There- Hence what is reasonably established for all, in considera- fore he may at least receive a dispensation as far as the tion of what happens in the majority of cases, can be with Subdiaconate. equal reason done away in a certain definite case. ∗ Martinus Bracarensis: cap. xliii † Leonine edition reads “officium,” some read “effectum”; the meaning is the same, and is best rendered as above. 2899 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 67 Of the Bill of Divorce (In Seven Articles) We must now consider the bill of divorce, under which head there are seven points of inquiry: (1) Whether the indissolubility of marriage is of natural law? (2) Whether by dispensation it may become lawful to put away a wife? (3) Whether it was lawful under the Mosaic law? (4) Whether a wife who has been divorced may take another husband? (5) Whether the husband can marry again the wife whom he has divorced? (6) Whether the cause of divorce was hatred of the wife? (7) Whether the reasons for divorce had to be written on the bill? Whether inseparableness of the wife is of natural law? Suppl. q. 67 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that inseparableness of that children should be their parents’ heirs (2 Cor. 12:14). the wife is not of natural law. For the natural law is the Therefore, since the offspring is the common good of hus- same for all. But no law save Christ’s has forbidden the band and wife, the dictate of the natural law requires the divorcing of a wife. Therefore inseparableness of a wife latter to live together for ever inseparably: and so the in- is not of natural law. dissolubility of marriage is of natural law. Objection 2. Further, the sacraments are not of the Reply to Objection 1. Christ’s law alone brought natural law. But the indissolubility of marriage is one of mankind “to perfection”∗ by bringing man back to the the marriage goods. Therefore it is not of the natural law. state of the newness of nature. Wherefore neither Mo- Objection 3. Further, the union of man and woman in saic nor human laws could remove all that was contrary to marriage is chiefly directed to the begetting, rearing, and the law of nature, for this was reserved exclusively to “the instruction of the offspring. But all things are complete law of the spirit of life”†. by a certain time. Therefore after that time it is lawful to Reply to Objection 2. Indissolubility belongs to mar- put away a wife without prejudice to the natural law. riage in so far as the latter is a sign of the perpetual union Objection 4. Further, the good of the offspring is the of Christ with the Church, and in so far as it fulfills an of- principal end of marriage. But the indissolubility of mar- fice of nature that is directed to the good of the offspring, riage is opposed to the good of the offspring, because, as stated above. But since divorce is more directly incom- according to philosophers, a certain man cannot beget off- patible with the signification of the sacrament than with spring of a certain woman, and yet he might beget of an- the good of the offspring, with which it is incompatible other, even though she may have had intercourse with an- consequently, as stated above (q. 65, a. 2, ad 5), the indis- other man. Therefore the indissolubility of marriage is solubility of marriage is implied in the good of the sacra- against rather than according to the natural law. ment rather than in the good of the offspring, although it On the contrary, Those things which were assigned may be connected with both. And in so far as it is con- to nature when it was well established in its beginning nected with the good of the offspring, it is of the natural belong especially to the law of nature. Now the indissolu- law, but not as connected with the good of the sacrament. bility of marriage is one of these things according to Mat. The Reply to the Third Objection may be gathered 19:4,6. Therefore it is of natural law. from what has been said. Further, it is of natural law that man should not oppose Reply to Objection 4. Marriage is chiefly directed to himself to God. Yet man would, in a way, oppose himself the common good in respect of its principal end, which is to God if he were to sunder “what God hath joined to- the good of the offspring; although in respect of its sec- gether.” Since then the indissolubility of marriage is gath- ondary end it is directed to the good of the contracting ered from this passage (Mat. 19:6) it would seem that it is party, in so far as it is by its very nature a remedy for of natural law. concupiscence. Hence marriage laws consider what is ex- I answer that, By the intention of nature marriage is pedient for all rather than what may be suitable for one. directed to the rearing of the offspring, not merely for a Therefore although the indissolubility of marriage hinder time, but throughout its whole life. Hence it is of natu- the good of the offspring with regard to some individual, it ral law that parents should lay up for their children, and is proportionate with the good of the offspring absolutely ∗ Cf. Heb. 7:19 † Cf. Rom. 8:2 2900 speaking: and for this reason the argument does not prove. Whether it may have been lawful by dispensation to put away a wife? Suppl. q. 67 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that it could not be lawful by mystery, as instanced in the dispensation vouchsafed to dispensation to put away a wife. For in marriage anything Abraham in the slaying of his innocent son. Such dis- that is opposed to the good of the offspring is against the pensations, however, are not granted to all generally, but first precepts of the natural law, which admit of no dispen- to certain individual persons, as also happens in regard to sation. Now such is the putting away of a wife, as stated miracles. Accordingly, if the indissolubility of marriage above (a. 1). Therefore, etc. is contained among the first precepts of the natural law, Objection 2. Further, a concubine differs from a wife it could only be a matter of dispensation in this second especially in the fact that she is not inseparably united. way; but, if it be one of the second precepts of the natural But by no dispensation could a man have a concubine. law, it could be a matter of dispensation even in the first Therefore by no dispensation could he put his wife away. way. Now it would seem to belong rather to the secondary Objection 3. Further, men are as fit to receive a dis- precepts of the natural law. For the indissolubility of mar- pensation now as of old. But now a man cannot receive a riage is not directed to the good of the offspring, which is dispensation to divorce his wife. Neither, therefore, could the principal end of marriage, except in so far as parents he in olden times. have to provide for their children for their whole life, by On the contrary, Abraham carnally knew Agar with due preparation of those things that are necessary in life. the disposition of a husband towards his wife, as stated Now this preparation does not pertain to the first intention above (q. 65, a. 5, ad 2,3). Now by Divine command he of nature, in respect of which all things are common. And sent her away, and yet sinned not. Therefore it could be therefore it would seem that to put away one’s wife is not lawful by dispensation for a man to put away his wife. contrary to the first intention of nature, and consequently I answer that, In the commandments, especially those that it is contrary not to the first but to the second precepts which in some way are of natural law, a dispensation is of the natural law. Therefore, seemingly, it can be a matter like a change in the natural course of things: and this of dispensation even in the first way. course is subject to a twofold change. First, by some natu- Reply to Objection 1. The good of the offspring, in ral cause whereby another natural cause is hindered from so far as it belongs to the first intention of nature, includes following its course: it is thus in all things that happen procreation, nourishment, and instruction, until the off- by chance less frequently in nature. In this way, how- spring comes to perfect age. But that provision be made ever, there is no variation in the course of those natural for the children by bequeathing to them the inheritance or things which happen always, but only in the course of other goods belongs seemingly to the second intention of those which happen frequently. Secondly, by a cause al- the natural law. together supernatural, as in the case of miracles: and in Reply to Objection 2. To have a concubine is con- this way there can be a variation in the course of nature, trary to the good of the offspring, in respect of nature’s not only in the course which is appointed for the major- first intention in that good, namely the rearing and instruc- ity of cases, but also in the course which is appointed for tion of the child, for which purpose it is necessary that all cases, as instanced by the sun standing still at the time the parents remain together permanently; which is not the of Josue, and by its turning back at the time of Ezechias, case with a concubine, since she is taken for a time. Hence and by the miraculous eclipse at the time of Christ’s Pas- the comparison fails. But in respect of nature’s second in- sion∗. In like manner the reason for a dispensation from a tention, even the having of a concubine may be a matter precept of the law of nature is sometimes found in the of dispensation as evidenced by Osee 1. lower causes, and in this way a dispensation may bear Reply to Objection 3. Although indissolubility be- upon the secondary precepts of the natural law, but not longs to the second intention of marriage as fulfilling an on the first precepts because these are always existent as office of nature, it belongs to its first intention as a sacra- it were, as stated above (q. 65, a. 1) in reference to the ment of the Church. Hence, from the moment it was made plurality of wives and so forth. But sometimes this reason a sacrament of the Church, as long as it remains such it is found in the higher causes, and then a dispensation may cannot be a matter of dispensation, except perhaps by the be given by God even from the first precepts of the natu- second kind of dispensation. ral law, for the sake of signifying or showing some Divine ∗ Jos. 10:14; 4 Kings 20:10; Is. 38:8; Mat. 27:15 2901 Whether it was lawful to divorce a wife under the Mosaic law? Suppl. q. 67 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that it was lawful to di- sake of preventing a greater evil, namely wife-murder to vorce a wife under the Mosaic law. For one way of giving which the Jews were prone on account of the corruption consent is to refrain from prohibiting when one can pro- of their irascible appetite. Even so they were allowed to hibit. It is also unlawful to consent to what is unlawful. lend money for usury to strangers, on account of corrup- Since then the Mosaic law did not forbid the putting away tion in their concupiscible appetite, lest they should exact of a wife and did no wrong by not forbidding it, for “the usury of their brethren; and again on account of the cor- law. . . is holy” (Rom. 7:12), it would seem that divorce ruption of suspicion in the reason they were allowed the was at one time lawful. sacrifice of jealousy, lest mere suspicion should corrupt Objection 2. Further, the prophets spoke inspired by their judgment. But because the Old Law, though it did the Holy Ghost, according to 2 Pet. 1:21. Now it is written not confer grace, was given that it might indicate sin, as (Malachi 2:16): “When thou shalt hate her, put her away.” the saints are agreed in saying, others are of opinion that Since then that which the Holy Ghost inspires is not un- if it had been a sin for a man to put away his wife, this lawful, it would seem that it was not always unlawful to ought to have been indicated to him, at least by the law divorce a wife. or the prophets: “Show My people their wicked doings” Objection 3. Further, Chrysostom∗ says that even (Is. 58:1): else they would seem to have been neglected, if as the apostles permitted second marriages, so Moses al- those things which are necessary for salvation and which lowed the bill of divorce. But second marriages are not they knew not were never made known to them: and this sinful. Therefore neither was it sinful under the Mosaic cannot be admitted, because the righteousness of the Law law to divorce a wife. observed at the time of the Law would merit eternal life. Objection 4. On the contrary, our Lord said (Mat. For this reason they say that although to put away one’s 19:8) that Moses granted the Jews the bill of divorce by wife is wrong in itself, it nevertheless became lawful by reason of the hardness of their heart. But their hardness of God’s permitting it, and they confirm this by the authority heart did not excuse them from sin. Neither therefore did of Chrysostom, who says‡ that “the Lawgiver by permit- the law about the bill of divorce. ting divorce removed the guilt from the sin.” Although Objection 5. Further, Chrysostom says† that “Moses, this opinion has some probability the former is more gen- by granting the bill of divorce, did not indicate the justice erally held: wherefore we must reply to the arguments on of God, but deprived their sin of its guilt, for while the both sides§. Jews acted as though they were keeping the law, their sin Reply to Objection 1. He who can forbid, sins not seemed to be no sin.” by omitting to forbid if he has no hope of correcting, but I answer that, on this point there are two opinions. fears by forbidding to furnish the occasion of a greater For some say that under the Law those who put away evil. Thus it happened to Moses: wherefore acting on Di- their wives, after giving them a bill of divorce, were not vine authority he did not forbid the bill of divorce. excused from sin, although they were excused from the Reply to Objection 2. The prophets, inspired by the punishment which they should have suffered according to Holy Ghost, said that a wife ought to be put away, not as the Law: and that for this reason Moses is stated to have though this were a command of the Holy Ghost, but as permitted the bill of divorce. Accordingly they reckon being permitted lest greater evils should be perpetrated. four kinds of permission: one by absence of precept, so Reply to Objection 3. This likeness of permission that when a greater good is not prescribed, a lesser good must not be applied to every detail, but only to the cause is said to be permitted: thus the Apostle by not prescrib- which was the same in both cases, since both permissions ing virginity, permitted marriage (1 Cor. 7). The second were granted in order to avoid some form of wickedness. is by absence of prohibition: thus venial sins are said to Reply to Objection 4. Although their hardness of be permitted because they are not forbidden. The third is heart excused them not from sin, the permission given on by absence of prevention, and thus all sins are said to be account of that hardness excused them. For certain things permitted by God, in so far as He does not prevent them are forbidden those who are healthy in body, which are whereas He can. The fourth is by omission of punishment, not forbidden the sick, and yet the sick sin not by availing and in this way the bill of divorce was permitted in the themselves of the permission granted to them. Law, not indeed for the sake of obtaining a greater good, Reply to Objection 5. A good may be omitted in two as was the dispensation to have several wives, but for the ways. First, in order to obtain a greater good, and then the ∗ Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom † Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom ‡ Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom § Cf. Ia IIae, q. 105, a. 4, ad 8; Ia IIae, q. 108, a. 3, ad 2; Contra Gentes iii, cap. 123 2902 omission of that good becomes virtuous by being directed wife-murder. Hence Chrysostom says that “he removed to a greater good; thus Jacob rightly omitted to have only the guilt from the sin.” For though divorce remained inor- one wife, on account of the good of the offspring. In an- dinate, for which reason it is called a sin, it did not incur other way a good is omitted in order to avoid a greater the debt of punishment, either temporal or eternal, in so evil, and then if this is done with the authority of one far as it was done by Divine permission: and thus its guilt who can grant a dispensation, the omission of that good was taken away from it. And therefore he says again¶ is not sinful, and yet it does not also become virtuous. In that “divorce was permitted, an evil indeed, yet lawful.” this way the indissolubility of marriage was suspended in Those who hold the first opinion understand by this only the law of Moses in order to avoid a greater evil, namely that divorce incurred the debt of temporal punishment. Whether it was lawful for a divorced wife to have another husband? Suppl. q. 67 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that it was lawful for a the divine dispensation: and as long as that indissolubility divorced wife to have another husband. For in divorce the remains the saying of the Apostle holds. husband did a greater wrong by divorcing his wife than the Accordingly to reply to the arguments on either side: wife by being divorced. But the husband could, without Reply to Objection 1. It was lawful for a husband sin, marry another wife. Therefore the wife could without to have several wives at one time by virtue of the divine sin, marry another husband. dispensation: wherefore having put one away he could Objection 2. Further, Augustine, speaking about marry another even though the former marriage were not bigamy, says (De Bono Conjug. xv, xviii) that “when it dissolved. But it was never lawful for a wife to have sev- was the manner it was no sin.” Now at the time of the Old eral husbands. Wherefore the comparison fails. Law it was the custom for a wife after divorce to marry Reply to Objection 2. In this saying of Augustine another husband: “When she is departed and marrieth an- manner [mos] does not signify custom but good manners; other husband,” etc. Therefore the wife sinned not by mar- in the same sense a person is said to have manners [morig- rying another husband. eratus] because he has good manners; and “moral” philos- Objection 3. Further, our Lord showed that the jus- ophy takes its name from the same source. tice of the New Testament is superabundant in compari- Reply to Objection 3. Our Lord shows the super- son with the justice of the Old Testament (Mat. 5). Now abundance of the New Law over the Old in respect of He said that it belongs to the superabundant justice of the the counsels, not only as regards those things which the New Testament that the divorced wife marry not another Old Law permitted, but also as regards those things which husband (Mat. 5:32). Therefore it was lawful in the Old were forbidden in the Old Law, and yet were thought by Law. many to be permitted on account of the precepts being Objection 4. On the contrary, are the words of Mat. incorrectly explained—for instance that of the hatred to- 5:32, “He that shall marry her that is put away committeth wards our enemies. and so is it in the matter of divorce. adultery.” Now adultery was never permitted in the Old Reply to Objection 4. The saying of our Lord refers Law. Therefore it was not lawful for the divorced wife to to the time of the New Law, when the aforesaid permis- have another husband. sion was recalled. In the same way we are to understand Objection 5. Further, it is written (Dt. 24:3) that a dithe statement of Chrysostom∗, who says that “a man who vorced woman who marries another husband “is defiled, divorces his wife according to the law is guilty of four and is become abominable before the Lord.” Therefore crimes: for in God’s sight he is a murderer,” in so far as he she sinned by marrying another husband. has the purpose of killing his wife unless he divorce her; I answer that, According to the first above mentioned “and because he divorces her without her having commit- opinion (a. 3), she sinned by marrying another husband ted fornication,” in which case alone the law of the Gospel after being divorced, because her first marriage still held allows a man to put away his wife; “and again, because he good. For “the woman. . . whilst her husband liveth, is makes her an adulteress, and the man whom she marries bound to the law of her husband” (Rom. 7:2): and she an adulterer.” could not have several husbands at one time. But accord- Reply to Objection 5. A gloss observes here: “She ing to the second opinion, just as it was lawful by virtue is defiled and abominable, namely in the judgment of him of the Divine dispensation for a husband to divorce his who first put her away as being defiled,” and consequently wife, so could the wife marry another husband, because it does not follow that she is defiled absolutely speak- the indissolubility of marriage was removed by reason of ing; or she is said to be defiled just as a person who had ¶ Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom ∗ Hom. xii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom 2903 touched a dead or leprous body was said to be unclean regularity. Wherefore a priest could not marry a widow or with the uncleanness, not of sin, but of a certain legal ir- a divorced woman. Whether a husband could lawfully take back the wife he had divorced? Suppl. q. 67 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that a husband could law- this was done in punishment of the woman who married fully take back the wife he had divorced. For it is lawful again, and that it was by this sin that she was defiled: but to undo what was ill done. But for the husband to divorce according to the others it was done that a husband might his wife was ill done. Therefore it was lawful for him to not be too ready to divorce his wife if he could nowise undo it, by taking back his wife. take her back afterwards. Objection 2. Further, it has always been lawful to be Reply to Objection 1. In order to prevent the evil indulgent to the sinner, because this is a moral precept, committed by a man in divorcing his wife, it was ordered which obtains in every law. Now the husband by taking that the husband could not take back his divorced wife, as back the wife he had divorced was indulgent to one who stated above: and for this reason it was ordered by God. had sinned. Therefore this also was lawful. Reply to Objection 2. It was always lawful to be in- Objection 3. Further, the reason given (Dt. 24:4) for dulgent to the sinner as regards the unkindly feelings of its being unlawful to take back a divorced wife was “be- the heart, but not as regards the punishment appointed by cause she is defiled.” But the divorced wife is not defiled God. except by marrying another husband. Therefore at least it Reply to Objection 3. There are two opinions on this was lawful to take back a divorced wife before she mar- point. For some say that it was lawful for a divorced wife ried again. to be reconciled to her husband, unless she were joined On the contrary, It is said (Dt. 24:4) that “the former in marriage to another husband. For then, on account of husband cannot take her again,” etc. the adultery to which she had voluntarily yielded, it was I answer that, In the law concerning the bill of di- assigned to her in punishment that she should not return vorce two things were permitted, namely for the husband to her former husband. Since, however, the law makes no to put away the wife, and for the divorced wife to take an- distinction in its prohibition, others say that from the mo- other husband; and two things were commanded, namely ment that she was put away she could not be taken back, that the bill of divorce should be written, and secondly even before marrying again, because the defilement must that the husband who divorced his wife could not take her be understood not in reference to sin, but as explained back. According to those who hold the first opinion (a. 3) above (a. 4, ad 3). Whether the reason for divorce was hatred for the wife? Suppl. q. 67 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the reason for divorce be condemned in a hundred sicles of silver, and he shall be was hatred for the wife. For it is written (Malachi 2:16): unable to put her away all the days of his life (Dt. 22:13- “When thou shalt hate her put her away.” Therefore, etc. 19). Therefore hatred is not a sufficient reason for divorce. Objection 2. Further, it is written (Dt. 24:1): I answer that, It is the general opinion of holy men “If. . . she find not favor in his eyes, for some uncleanness,” that the reason for permission being given to divorce a etc. Therefore the same conclusion follows as before. wife was the avoidance of wife-murder. Now the proxi- Objection 3. On the contrary, Barrenness and fornica- mate cause of murder is hatred: wherefore the proximate tion are more opposed to marriage than hatred. Therefore cause of divorce was hatred. But hatred proceeds, like they ought to have been reasons for divorce rather than love, from a cause. Wherefore we must assign to divorce hatred. certain remote causes which were a cause of hatred. For Objection 4. Further, hatred may be caused by the Augustine says in his gloss (De Serm. Dom. in Monte virtue of the person hated. Therefore, if hatred is a suf- i, 14): “In the Law there were many causes for divorc- ficient reason, a woman could be divorced on account of ing a wife: Christ admitted none but fornication: and He her virtue, which is absurd. commands other grievances to be borne for conjugal fi- Objection 5. Further, “If a man marry a wife and af- delity and chastity.” Such causes are imperfections either terwards hate her, and seek occasions to put her away”∗ of body, as sickness or some notable deformity, or in soul alleging that she was not a virgin when he married her, as fornication or the like which amounts to moral deprav- should he fail to prove this, he shall be beaten, and shall ity. Some, however, restrict these causes within narrower ∗ The rest of the passage is apparently quoted from memory. 2904 limits, saying with sufficient probability that it was not soul but also to the condition of the body. Accordingly lawful to divorce a wife except for some cause subsequent we grant the first two objections. to the marriage; and that not even then could it be done Reply to Objection 3. Barrenness and other like for any such cause, but only for such as could hinder the things are causes of hatred, and so they are remote causes good of the offspring, whether in body as barrenness, or of divorce. leprosy and the like, or in soul, for instance if she were a Reply to Objection 4. No one is hateful on account woman of wicked habits which her children through con- of virtue as such, because goodness is the cause of love. tinual contact with her would imitate. There is however Wherefore the argument does not hold. a gloss on Dt. 24:1, “If. . . she find not favor in his eyes,” Reply to Objection 5. The husband was punished in which would seem to restrict them yet more, namely to that case by being unable to put away his wife for ever, sin, by saying that there “uncleanness” denotes sin: but just as in the case when he had corrupted a maid (Dt. “sin” in the gloss refers not only to the morality of the 22:28-30). Whether the causes of divorce had to be written in the bill? Suppl. q. 67 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the causes of divorce proved to be unjust, and therefore could not be effected. had to be written in the bill: because the husband was ab- Therefore the causes for divorce were by no means partic- solved from the punishment of the law by the written bill ularized in the bill. of divorce. But this would seem altogether unjust, unless I answer that, The causes for divorce were not partic- sufficient causes were alleged for a divorce. Therefore it ularized in the bill, but were indicated in a general way, was necessary for them to be written in the bill. so as to prove the justice of the divorce. According to Objection 2. Further, seemingly this document was of Josephus (Antiq. iv, 6) this was in order that the woman, no use except to show the causes for divorce. Therefore, having the written bill of divorce, might take another hus- if they were not written down, the bill was delivered for band, else she would not have been believed. Wherefore no purpose. according to him it was written in this wise: “I promise Objection 3. Further, the Master says that it was so in never to have thee with me again.” But according to Au- the text (Sent. iv, D, 33). gustine (Contra Faust. xix, 26) the bill was put into writ- On the contrary, The causes for divorce were either ing in order to cause a delay, and that the husband might sufficient or not. If they were sufficient, the wife was de- be dissuaded by the counsel of the notaries to refrain from barred from a second marriage, though this was allowed his purpose of divorce. her by the Law. If they were insufficient, the divorce was This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. 2905 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 68 Of Illegitimate Children (In Three Articles) We must now consider children of illegitimate birth. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether those born out of true marriage are illegitimate? (2) Whether children should suffer any loss through being illegitimate? (3) Whether they can be legitimized? Whether children born out of true marriage are illegitimate? Suppl. q. 68 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that children born out of gitimate, as those who are born of fornication; some are true marriage are legitimate. For he that is born according legitimate and not natural, as adopted children; some are to law is called a legitimate son. Now everyone is born ac- neither legitimate nor natural; such are those born of adul- cording to law, at least the law of nature, which has more tery or incest, for these are born not only against the pos- force than any other. Therefore every child is to be called itive law, but against the express natural law. Hence we legitimate. must grant that some children are illegitimate. Objection 2. Further, it is the common saying that Reply to Objection 1. Although those who are born a legitimate child is one born of a legitimate marriage, of an unlawful intercourse are born according to the na- or of a marriage that is deemed legitimate in the eyes of ture common to man and all animals, they are born con- the Church. Now it happens sometimes that a marriage trary to the law of nature which is proper to man: since is deemed legitimate in the eyes of the Church, whereas fornication, adultery, and the like are contrary to the law there is some impediment affecting its validity; which im- of nature. Hence the like are not legitimate by any law. pediment may be known to the parties who marry in the Reply to Objection 2. Ignorance, unless it be af- presence of the Church: or they may marry in secret and fected, excuses unlawful intercourse from sin. Wherefore be ignorant of the impediment, in which case their mar- those who contract together in good faith in the presence riage would seem legitimate in the eyes of the Church, of the Church, although there be an impediment, of which for the very reason that it is not prevented by the Church. however they are ignorant, sin not, nor are their children Therefore children born out of true marriage are not ille- illegitimate. If, however, they know of the impediment, gitimate. although the Church upholds their marriage because she On the contrary, Illegitimate is that which is against knows not of the impediment, they are not excused from the law. Now those who are born out of wedlock are born sin, nor do their children avoid being illegitimate. Neither contrary to the law. Therefore they are illegitimate. are they excused if they know not of the impediment and I answer that, Children are of four conditions. Some marry secretly, because such ignorance would appear to are natural and legitimate, for instance those who are born be affected. of a true and lawful marriage; some are natural and ille- Whether children should suffer any loss through being illegitimate? Suppl. q. 68 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that children ought not On the contrary, It is stated (Gn. 25:5,6) that “Abra- to suffer any loss through being illegitimate. For a child ham gave all his possessions to Isaac, and that to the chil- should not be punished on account of his father’s sin, ac- dren of the concubines he gave gifts”: and yet the latter cording to the Lord’s saying (Ezech. 18:20). But it is not were not born of an unlawful intercourse. Much more, his own but his father’s fault that he is born of an unlaw- therefore, ought those born of an unlawful intercourse to ful union. Therefore he should not incur a loss on this incur loss by not inheriting their father’s property. account. I answer that, A person is said to incur a loss for some Objection 2. Further, human justice is copied from cause in two ways: First, because he is deprived of his Divine. Now God confers natural goods equally on le- due, and thus an illegitimate child incurs no loss. Sec- gitimate and illegitimate children. Therefore illegitimate ondly, because something is not due to him, which might should be equalled to legitimate children according to hu- have been due otherwise, and thus an illegitimate son in- man laws. curs a twofold loss. First because he is excluded from le- 2906 gitimate acts such as offices and dignities, which require son is punished by not succeeding to the throne through a certain respectability in those who perform them. Sec- not being the king’s son. In like manner it is no punish- ondly, he incurs a loss by not succeeding to his father’s ment to an illegitimate child that he has no right to that inheritance. Nevertheless natural sons can inherit a sixth which belongs to the legitimate children. only, whereas spurious children cannot inherit any por- Reply to Objection 2. Illegitimate intercourse is con- tion, although by natural law their parents are bound to trary to the law, not as an act of the generative power, but provide for their needs. Hence it is part of a bishop’s care as proceeding from a wicked will. Hence an illegitimate to compel both parents to provide for them. son incurs a loss, not in those things which come to him Reply to Objection 1. To incur a loss in this second by his natural origin, but in those things which are depen- way is not a punishment. Hence we do not say that a per- dent on the will for being done or possessed. Whether an illegitimate son can be legitimized? Suppl. q. 68 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that an illegitimate son an unlawful child (if it were not a case of adultery), and cannot be legitimized. For the legitimate child is as far by special indulgence and dispensation of the lord Pope. removed from the illegitimate as the illegitimate from the The other four ways are according to the laws: (1) If the legitimate. But a legitimate child is never made illegiti- father offer his natural son to the emperor’s court, for by mate. Neither, therefore, is an illegitimate child ever made this very fact the son is legitimate on account of the rep- legitimate. utation of the court; (2) if the father designate him in his Objection 2. Further, illegitimate intercourse begets will as his legitimate heir, and the son afterwards offer the an illegitimate child. But illegitimate intercourse never will to the emperor; (3) if there be no legitimate son and becomes legitimate. Neither, therefore, can an illegitimate the son himself offer himself to the emperor; (4) if the fa- son become legitimate. ther designate him as legitimate in a public document or On the contrary, What is done by the law can be un- in a document signed by three witnesses, without calling done by the law. Now the illegitimacy of children is an him natural. effect of positive law. Therefore an illegitimate child can Reply to Objection 1. A favor may be bestowed on a be legitimized by one who has legal authority. person without injustice, but a person cannot be damnified I answer that, An illegitimate child can be legit- except for a fault. Hence an illegitimate child can be legit- imized, not so that he be born of a legitimate intercourse, imized rather than “vice versa”; for although a legitimate because this intercourse is a thing of the past and can son is sometimes deprived of his inheritance on account never be legitimized from the moment that it was once of his fault, he is not said to be illegitimate, because he illegitimate. But the child is said to be legitimized, in so was legitimately begotten. far as the losses which an illegitimate child ought to incur Reply to Objection 2. Illegitimate intercourse has an are withdrawn by the authority of the law. inherent inseparable defect whereby it is opposed to the There are six ways of becoming legitimate: two ac- law: and consequently it cannot be legitimized. Nor is cording to the canons (Cap. Conquestus; Cap. Tanta), there any comparison with an illegitimate child who has namely when a man marries the woman of whom he has no such defect. 2907 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 69 Of Matters Concerning the Resurrection, and First of the Place Where Souls Are After Death (In Seven Articles) In sequence to the foregoing we must treat of matters concerning the state of resurrection: for after speaking of the sacraments whereby man is delivered from the death of sin, we must next speak of the resurrection whereby man is delivered from the death of punishment. The treatise on the resurrection offers a threefold consideration, namely the things that precede, those that accompany, and those that follow the resurrection. Consequently we must speak (1) of those things which partly, though not wholly, precede the resurrection; (2) of the resurrection itself and its circumstances; (3) of the things which follow it. Among the things which precede the resurrection we must consider (1) the places appointed for the reception of bodies after death; (2) the quality of separated souls, and the punishment inflicted on them by fire; (3) the suffrages whereby the souls of the departed are assisted by the living; (4) the prayers of the saints in heaven; (5) the signs preceding the general judgment; (6) the fire of the world’s final conflagration which will precede the appearance of the Judge. Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry: (1) Whether any places are appointed to receive souls after death? (2) Whether souls are conveyed thither immediately after death? (3) Whether they are able to leave those places? (4) Whether the limbo of hell is the same as Abraham’s bosom? (5) Whether limbo is the same as the hell of the damned? (6) Whether the limbo of the patriarchs is the same as the limbo of children? (7) Whether so many places should be distinguished? Whether places are appointed to receive souls after death? Suppl. q. 69 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that places are not ap- On the contrary, The empyrean heaven is a corporeal pointed to receive souls after death. For as Boethius says place, and yet as soon as it was made it was filled with (De Hebdom.): “Wise men are agreed that incorporeal the holy angels, as Bede∗ says. Since then angels even as things are not in a place,” and this agrees with the words separated souls are incorporeal, it would seem that some of Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32): “We can answer with- place should also be assigned to receive separated souls. out hesitation that the soul is not conveyed to corporeal Further, this appears from Gregory’s statement (Dial. places, except with a body, or that it is not conveyed lo- iv) that souls after death are conveyed to various corpo- cally.” Now the soul separated from the body is without a real places, as in the case of Paschasius whom Germanus, body, as Augustine also says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32). There- Bishop of Capua, found at the baths, and of the soul of fore it is absurd to assign any places for the reception of King Theodoric, which he asserts to have been conveyed souls. to hell. Therefore after death souls have certain places for Objection 2. Further, whatever has a definite place their reception. has more in common with that place than with any other. I answer that, Although spiritual substances do not Now separated souls, like certain other spiritual sub- depend on a body in respect of their being, nevertheless stances, are indifferent to all places; for it cannot be said the corporeal world is governed by God by means of the that they agree with certain bodies, and differ from others, spiritual world, as asserted by Augustine (De Trin. iii, since they are utterly removed from all corporeal condi- 4) and Gregory (Dial. iv, 6). Hence it is that there is a tions. Therefore places should not be assigned for their certain fittingness by way of congruity of spiritual sub- reception. stances to corporeal substances, in that the more noble Objection 3. Further, nothing is assigned to separated bodies are adapted to the more noble substances: where- souls after death, except what conduces to their punish- fore also the philosophers held that the order of separate ment or to their reward. But a corporeal place cannot substances is according to the order of movables. And conduce to their punishment or reward, since they receive though after death souls have no bodies assigned to them nothing from bodies. Therefore definite places should not whereof they be the forms or determinate motors, never- be assigned to receive them. theless certain corporeal places are appointed to them by ∗ Hexaem. i, ad Gn. 1:2 2908 way of congruity in reference to their degree of nobility something in common, and incorporeal things can have (wherein they are as though in a place, after the manner in nothing in common with corporeal things in this way. Sec- which incorporeal things can be in a place), according as ondly, by a kind of proportionateness, by reason of which they more or less approach to the first substance (to which the Scriptures apply the corporeal world to the spiritual the highest place it fittingly assigned), namely God, whose metaphorically. Thus the Scriptures speak of God as the throne the Scriptures proclaim heaven to be (Ps. 102:19, sun, because He is the principle of spiritual life, as the sun Is. 66:1). Wherefore we hold that those souls that have a is of corporeal life. In this way certain souls have more in perfect share of the Godhead are in heaven, and that those common with certain places: for instance, souls that are souls that are deprived of that share are assigned to a con- spiritually enlightened, with luminous bodies, and souls trary place. that are plunged in darkness by sin, with dark places. Reply to Objection 1. Incorporeal things are not in Reply to Objection 3. The separated soul receives place after a manner known and familiar to us, in which nothing directly from corporeal places in the same way way we say that bodies are properly in place; but they as bodies which are maintained by their respective places: are in place after a manner befitting spiritual substances, yet these same souls, through knowing themselves to be a manner that cannot be fully manifest to us. appointed to such places, gather joy or sorrow therefrom; Reply to Objection 2. Things have something in and thus their place conduces to their punishment or re- common with or a likeness to one another in two ways. ward. First, by sharing a same quality: thus hot things have Whether souls are conveyed to heaven or hell immediately after death? Suppl. q. 69 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that no souls are conveyed them, namely at the last judgment, according to Mat. 25. to heaven or hell immediately after death. For a gloss on Therefore no one will go up to heaven or down to hell Ps. 36:10, “Yet a little while and the wicked shall not be,” before the day of judgment. says that “the saints are delivered at the end of life; yet On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. 5:1): “If after this life they will not yet be where the saints will be our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, that when it is said to them: Come ye blessed of My Father.” we have. . . a house not made with hands, but reserved in Now those saints will be in heaven. Therefore after this heaven∗.” Therefore, after the body’s dissolution, the soul life the saints do not go immediately up to heaven. has an abode, which had been reserved for it in heaven. Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion Further, the Apostle says (Phil. 1:23): “I desire [Vulg.: cix) that “the time which lies between man’s death and ‘Having a desire’] to be dissolved and to be with Christ.” the final resurrection holds the souls in secret receptacles From these words Gregory argues as follows (Dial. iv, according as each one is worthy of rest or of suffering.” 25): “If there is no doubt that Christ is in heaven, it can- Now these secret abodes cannot denote heaven and hell, not be denied that Paul’s soul is in heaven likewise.” Now since also after the final resurrection the souls will be there it cannot be gainsaid that Christ is in heaven, since this together with their bodies: so that he would have no rea- is an article of faith. Therefore neither is it to be denied son to distinguish between the time before and the time that the souls of the saints are borne to heaven. That also after the resurrection. Therefore they will be neither in some souls go down to hell immediately after death is ev- hell nor in heaven until the day of judgment. ident from Lk. 16:22, “And the rich man died, and he was Objection 3. Further, the glory of the soul is greater buried in hell.” than that of bodies. Now the glory of the body is awarded I answer that, Even as in bodies there is gravity or to all at the same time, so that each one may have the levity whereby they are borne to their own place which is greater joy in the common rejoicing of all, as appears from the end of their movement, so in souls there is merit or a gloss on Heb. 11:40, “God providing some better thing demerit whereby they reach their reward or punishment, for us—that the common joy may make each one rejoice which are the ends of their deeds. Wherefore just as a the more.” Much more, therefore, ought the glory of souls body is conveyed at once to its place, by its gravity or lev- to be deferred until the end, so as to be awarded to all at ity, unless there be an obstacle, so too the soul, the bonds the same time. of the flesh being broken, whereby it was detained in the Objection 4. Further, punishment and reward, being state of the way, receives at once its reward or punish- pronounced by the sentence of the judge, should not pre- ment, unless there be an obstacle. Thus sometimes venial cede the judgment. Now hell fire and the joys of heaven sin, though needing first of all to be cleansed, is an obsta- will be awarded to all by the sentence of Christ judging cle to the receiving of the reward; the result being that the ∗ Vulg.: ‘eternal in heaven’; cf. 1 Pet. 1:4 2909 reward is delayed. And since a place is assigned to souls Reply to Objection 3. There is a kind of continuity in keeping with their reward or punishment, as soon as the among men as regards the body, because in respect thereof soul is set free from the body it is either plunged into hell is verified the saying of Acts 17:24,26, “God. . . hath made or soars to heaven, unless it be held back by some debt, of one all mankind”: whereas He has fashioned souls in- for which its flight must needs be delayed until the soul is dependently of one another. Consequently it is not so fit- first of all cleansed. This truth is attested by the manifest ting that all men should be glorified together in the soul as authority of the canonical Scriptures and the doctrine of that they should be glorified together in the body. More- the holy Fathers; wherefore the contrary must be judged over the glory of the body is not so essential as the glory heretical as stated in Dial. iv, 25, and in De Eccl. Dogm. of the soul; wherefore it would be more derogatory to the xlvi. saints if the glory of the soul were delayed, than that the Reply to Objection 1. The gloss explains itself: for glory of the body be deferred: nor could this detriment to it expounds the words, “They will not yet be where the their glory be compensated on account of the joy of each saints will be,” etc., by saying immediately afterwards: one being increased by the common joy. “That is to say, they will not have the double stole which Reply to Objection 4. Gregory proposes and solves the saints will have at the resurrection.” this very difficulty (Dial. iv, 25): “If then,” he says, “the Reply to Objection 2. Among the secret abodes of souls of the just are in heaven now, what will they receive which Augustine speaks, we must also reckon hell and in reward for their justice on the judgment day?” And he heaven, where some souls are detained before the resur- answers: “Surely it will be a gain to them at the judg- rection. The reason why a distinction is drawn between ment, that whereas now they enjoy only the happiness of the time before and the time after the resurrection is be- the soul, afterwards they will enjoy also that of the body, cause before the resurrection they are there without the so as to rejoice also in the flesh wherein they bore sor- body whereas afterwards they are with the body, and be- row and torments for the Lord.” The same is to be said in cause in certain places there are souls now which will not reference to the damned. be there after the resurrection. Whether the souls who are in heaven or hell are able to go from thence? Suppl. q. 69 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the souls in heaven graves when they will. Wouldst thou then lay down the or hell are unable to go from thence. For Augustine says law for God? Wouldst thou put the apostles in chains, im- (De Cura pro Mort. xiii): “If the souls of the dead took prison them until the day of judgment, and forbid them to any part in the affairs of the living, to say nothing of oth- be with their lord, them of whom it is written: They fol- ers, there is myself whom not for a single night would my low the Lamb whithersoever He goeth? And if the Lamb loving mother fail to visit since she followed me by land is everywhere, therefore we must believe that those also and sea in order to abide with me”: and from this he con- who are with Him are everywhere.” Therefore it is ab- cludes that the souls of the departed do not mingle in the surd to say that the souls of the departed do not leave their affairs of the living. But they would be able to do so if abode. they were to leave their abode. Therefore they do not go Further, Jerome argues as follows: “Since the devil forth from their abode. and the demons wander throughout the whole world, and Objection 2. Further, it is written (Ps. 26:4): “That are everywhere present with wondrous speed, why should I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my the martyrs, after shedding their blood be imprisoned and life,” and (Job 7:9): “He that shall go down to hell shall unable to go forth?” Hence we may infer that not only the not come up.” Therefore neither the good nor the wicked good sometimes leave their abode, but also the wicked, quit their abode. since their damnation does not exceed that of the demons Objection 3. Further, as stated above (a. 2), abodes who wander about everywhere. are awarded to souls after death as a reward or punish- Further, the same conclusion may be gathered from ment. Now after death neither the rewards of the saints Gregory (Dial. iv), where he relates many cases of the nor the punishments of the damned are increased. There- dead having appeared to the living. fore they do not quit their abodes. I answer that, There are two ways of understanding a On the contrary, Jerome writing against Vigilantius person to leave hell or heaven. First, that he goes from addresses him thus: “For thou sayest that the souls of the thence simply, so that heaven or hell be no longer his apostles and martyrs have taken up their abode either in place: and in this way no one who is finally consigned Abraham’s bosom or in the place of refreshment, or un- to hell or heaven can go from thence, as we shall state der the altar of God, and that they are unable to visit their further on (q. 71, a. 5, ad 5). Secondly, they may be un- 2910 derstood to go forth for a time: and here we must distin-the Divine disposition, or else they are so overwhelmed guish what befits them according to the order of nature, by their punishments that their grief for their unhappiness and what according to the order of Divine providence; surpasses their desire to appear to others. for as Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xvi): “Human Reply to Objection 2. The authorities quoted speak affairs have their limits other than have the wonders of in the sense that no one comes forth from heaven or hell the Divine power, nature’s works differ from those which simply, and do not imply that one may not come forth for are done miraculously.” Consequently, according to the a time. natural course, the separated souls consigned to their re- Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (a. 1, ad 3) the spective abodes are utterly cut off from communication soul’s place conduces to its punishment or reward in so with the living. For according to the course of nature far as the soul, through being consigned to that place, is men living in mortal bodies are not immediately united affected either by joy or by grief. Now this joy or grief at to separate substances, since their entire knowledge arises being consigned to such a place remains in the soul even from the senses: nor would it be fitting for them to leave when it is outside that place. Thus a bishop who is given their abode for any purpose other than to take part in the the honor of sitting on a throne in the church incurs no affairs of the living. Nevertheless, according to the dis- dishonor when he leaves the throne, for though he sits not position of Divine providence separated souls sometimes therein actually, the place remains assigned to him. come forth from their abode and appear to men, as Au- We must also reply to the arguments in the contrary gustine, in the book quoted above, relates of the martyr sense. Felix who appeared visibly to the people of Nola when Reply to Objection 4. Jerome is speaking of the apos- they were besieged by the barbarians. It is also credible tles and martyrs in reference to that which they gain from that this may occur sometimes to the damned, and that their power of glory, and not to that which befits them as for man’s instruction and intimidation they be permitted due to them by nature. And when he says that they are ev- to appear to the living; or again in order to seek our suf- erywhere, he does not mean that they are in several places frages, as to those who are detained in purgatory, as ev- or everywhere at once, but that they can be wherever they idenced by many instances related in the fourth book of will. the Dialogues. There is, however, this difference between Reply to Objection 5. There is no parity between the saints and the damned, that the saints can appear when demons and angels on the one hand and the souls of the they will to the living, but not the damned; for even as the saints and of the damned on the other. For the good or saints while living in the flesh are able by the gifts of gra- bad angels have allotted to them the office of presiding tuitous grace to heal and work wonders, which can only over men, to watch over them or to try them; but this can- be done miraculously by the Divine power, and cannot not be said of the souls of men. Nevertheless, according be done by those who lack this gift, so it is not unfitting to the power of glory, it is competent to the souls of the for the souls of the saints to be endowed with a power in saints that they can be where they will; and this is what virtue of their glory, so that they are able to appear won- Jerome means to say. drously to the living, when they will: while others are Reply to Objection 6. Although the souls of the saints unable to do so unless they be sometimes permitted. or of the damned are sometimes actually present where Reply to Objection 1. Augustine, as may be gathered they appear, we are not to believe that this is always so: from what he says afterwards, is speaking according to for sometimes these apparitions occur to persons whether the common course of nature, And yet it does not follow, asleep or awake by the activity of good or wicked angels although the dead be able to appear to the living as they in order to instruct or deceive the living. Thus sometimes will, that they appear as often as when living in the flesh: even the living appear to others and tell them many things because when they are separated from the flesh, they are in their sleep; and yet it is clear that they are not present, either wholly conformed to the divine will, so that they as Augustine proves from many instances (De Cura pro may do nothing but what they see to be agreeable with Mort. xi, xii). Whether the limbo of hell is the same as Abraham’s bosom? Suppl. q. 69 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the limbo of hell is be allowed to give an unfavorable signification to Abra- not the same as Abraham’s bosom. For according to Au- ham’s bosom and the place of rest whither the godly poor gustine (Gen. ad lit. xxxiii): “I have not yet found Scrip- man was carried by the angels.” Therefore Abraham’s bo- ture mentioning hell in a favorable sense.” Now Abra- som is not the same as the limbo of hell. ham’s bosom is taken in a favorable sense, as Augustine Objection 2. Further, those who are in hell see not goes on to say (Gen. ad lit. xxxiii): “Surely no one would God. Yet God is seen by those who are in Abraham’s bo- 2911 som, as may be gathered from Augustine (Confess. ix, had complete rest through enjoying the vision of God, 3) who, speaking of Nebridius, says: “Whatever that be, whereas before Christ’s coming they had rest through be- which is signified by thut bosom, there lives my Nebrid- ing exempt from punishment, but their desire was not set ius,” and further on: “Now lays he not his ear to my at rest by their attaining their end. Consequently the state mouth, but his spiritual mouth unto Thy fountain, and of the saints before Christ’s coming may be considered drinketh as much as he can receive wisdom in proportion both as regards the rest it afforded, and thus it is called to his thirst, endlessly happy.” Therefore Abraham’s bo- Abraham’s bosom, and as regards its lack of rest, and som is not the same as the limbo of hell. thus it is called the limbo of hell. Accordingly, before Objection 3. Further, the Church prays not that a man Christ’s coming the limbo of hell and Abraham’s bosom be taken to hell: and yet she prays that the angels may were one place accidentally and not essentially: and con- carry the departed soul to Abraham’s bosom. Therefore sequently, nothing prevents Abraham’s bosom from being it would seem that Abraham’s bosom is not the same as after Christ’s coming, and from being altogether distinct limbo. from limbo, since things that are one accidentally may be On the contrary, The place whither the beggar parted from one another. Lazarus was taken is called Abraham’s bosom. Now he Reply to Objection 1. The state of the holy Fathers as was taken to hell, for as a gloss∗ on Job 30:23, “Where a regards what was good in it was called Abraham’s bosom, house is appointed for every one that liveth,” says: “Hell but as regards its deficiencies it was called hell. Accord- was the house of all the living until the coming of Christ.” ingly, neither is Abraham’s bosom taken in an unfavorable Therefore Abraham’s bosom is the same as limbo. sense nor hell in a favorable sense, although in a way they Further, Jacob said to his sons (Gn. 44:38): “You will are one. bring down my grey hairs with sorrow to hell”: where- Reply to Objection 2. The place of rest of the holy fore Jacob knew that he would be taken to hell after his Fathers was called Abraham’s bosom before as well as af- death. Therefore Abraham likewise was taken to hell af- ter Christ’s coming, but in different ways. For since before ter his death; and consequently Abraham’s bosom would Christ’s coming the saints’ rest had a lack of rest attached seem to be a part of hell. to it, it was called both hell and Abraham’s bosom, where- I answer that, After death men’s souls cannot find rest fore God was not seen there. But since after the coming save by the merit of faith, because “he that cometh to God of Christ the saints’ rest is complete through their seeing must believe” (Heb. 11:6). Now the first example of faith God, this rest is called Abraham’s bosom, but not hell by was given to men in the person of Abraham, who was the any means. It is to this bosom of Abraham that the Church first to sever himself from the body of unbelievers, and prays for the faithful to be brought. to receive a special sign of faith: for which reason “the Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident: place of rest given to men after death is called Abraham’s and the same meaning applies to a gloss on Lk. 16:22, bosom,” as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii). But “It came to pass that the beggar died,” etc., which says: the souls of the saints have not at all times had the same “Abraham’s bosom is the rest of the blessed poor, whose rest after death; because, since Christ’s coming they have is the kingdom of heaven.” Whether limbo is the same as the hell of the damned? Suppl. q. 69 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the limbo of hell is that I have shall go down into the deepest hell [Douay: the same as the hell of the damned. For Christ is said to ‘pit’].” Now since Job was a holy and just man, he went have “bitten”† hell, but not to have swallowed it, because down to limbo. Therefore limbo is the same as the deepest He took some from thence but not all. Now He would not hell. be said to have “bitten” hell if those whom He set free On the contrary, In hell there is no redemption‡. But were not part of the multitude shut up in hell. Therefore the saints were redeemed from limbo. Therefore limbo is since those whom He set free were shut up in hell, the not the same as hell. same were shut up in limbo and in hell. Therefore limbo Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii): “I do not is either the same as hell, or is a part of hell. see how we can believe that the rest which Lazarus re- Objection 2. Further, in the Creed Christ is said to ceived was in hell.” Now the soul of Lazarus went down have descended into hell. But he did not descend save to into limbo. Therefore limbo is not the same as hell. the limbo of the Fathers. Therefore the limbo of the Fa- I answer that, The abodes of souls after death may thers is the same as hell. be distinguished in two ways; either as to their situation, Objection 3. Further, it is written (Job 17:16): “All or as to the quality of the places, inasmuch as souls are ∗ St. Gregory, Moral. xx † Allusion to Osee 13:14 ‡ Office of the Dead, Resp. vii 2912 punished or rewarded in certain places. Accordingly if condemned to punishment. we consider the limbo of the Fathers and hell in respect Reply to Objection 1. When Christ, by His descent, of the aforesaid quality of the places, there is no doubt delivered the Fathers from limbo, He is said to have “bit- that they are distinct, both because in hell there is sensible ten” hell and to have descended into hell, in so far as hell punishment, which was not in the limbo of the Fathers, and limbo are the same as to situation. and because in hell there is eternal punishment, whereas This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. the saints were detained but temporally in the limbo of the Reply to Objection 3. Job descended, not to the hell Fathers. On the other hand, if we consider them as to the of the damned, but to the limbo of the Fathers. The latter situation of the place, it is probable that hell and limbo is called the deepest place not in reference to the places are the same place, or that they are continuous as it were of punishment, but in comparison with other places, as in- yet so that some higher part of hell be called the limbo cluding all penal places under one head. Again we may of the Fathers. For those who are in hell receive diverse reply with Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii): who says of Jacob: punishments according to the diversity of their guilt, so “When Jacob said to his sons, ‘You will bring down my that those who are condemned are consigned to darker and grey hairs with sorrow to hell,’ he seems to have feared deeper parts of hell according as they have been guilty of most, lest he should be troubled with so great a sorrow as graver sins, and consequently the holy Fathers in whom to obtain, not the rest of good men, but the hell of sinners.” there was the least amount of sin were consigned to a The saying of Job may be expounded in the same way, as higher and less darksome part than all those who were being the utterance of one in fear, rather than an assertion. Whether the limbo of children is the same as the limbo of the Fathers? Suppl. q. 69 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the limbo of children moreover, shone forth the light of faith and grace. But as is the same as the limbo of the Fathers. For punishment regards their situation, there is reason to believe that the should correspond to sin. Now the Fathers were detained place of both is the same; except that the limbo of the Fa- in limbo for the same sin as children, namely for original thers is placed higher than the limbo of children, just as sin. Therefore the place of punishment should be the same we have stated in reference to limbo and hell (a. 5). for both. Reply to Objection 1. The Fathers did not stand in Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Enchir. xciii): the same relation to original sin as children. For in the “The punishment of children who die in none but original Fathers original sin was expiated in so far as it infected sin is most lenient.” But no punishment is more lenient the person, while there remained an obstacle on the part than that of the holy Fathers. Therefore the place of pun- of nature, on account of which their satisfaction was not ishment is the same for both. yet complete. On the other hand, in children there is an On the contrary, Even as temporal punishment in obstacle both on the part of the person and on the part of purgatory and eternal punishment in hell are due to actual nature: and for this reason different abodes are appointed sin, so temporal punishment in the limbo of the Fathers to the Fathers and to children. and eternal punishment in the limbo of the children were Reply to Objection 2. Augustine is speaking of pun- due to original sin. If, therefore, hell and purgatory be ishments due to some one by reason of his person. Of not the same it would seem that neither are the limbo of these the most lenient are due to those who are burdened children and the limbo of the Fathers the same. with none but original sin. But lighter still is the punish- I answer that, The limbo of the Fathers and the limbo ment due to those who are debarred from the reception of of children, without any doubt, differ as to the quality glory by no personal defect but only by a defect of nature, of punishment or reward. For children have no hope of so that this very delay of glory is called a kind of punish- the blessed life, as the Fathers in limbo had, in whom, ment. Whether so many abodes should be distinguished? Suppl. q. 69 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that we should not distin- Objection 2. Further, abodes are appointed to souls guish so many abodes. For after death, just as abodes are after death on account of merits or demerits. Now there due to souls on account of sin, so are they due on account is one place where they merit or demerit. Therefore only of merit. Now there is only one abode due on account of one abode should be assigned to them after death. merit, namely paradise. Therefore neither should there be Objection 3. Further, the places of punishment should more than one abode due on account of sin, namely hell. correspond to the sins. Now there are only three kinds of 2913 sin, namely original, venial, and mortal. Therefore there they are received now, so ought we to distinguish the one should only be three penal abodes. in which they are received now from the one where they Objection 4. On the other hand, it would seem that will be received after the resurrection. there should be many more than those assigned. For this I answer that, The abodes of souls are distinguished darksome air is the prison house of the demons (2 Pet. according to the souls’ various states. Now the soul united 2:17), and yet it is not reckoned among the five abodes to a mortal body is in the state of meriting, while the soul which are mentioned by certain authors. Therefore there separated from the body is in the state of receiving good are more than five abodes. or evil for its merits; so that after death it is either in the Objection 5. Further, the earthly paradise is distinct state of receiving its final reward, or in the state of being from the heavenly paradise. Now some were borne away hindered from receiving it. If it is in the state of receiving to the earthly paradise after this state of life, as is related its final retribution, this happens in two ways: either in of Enoch and Elias. Since then the earthly paradise is not the respect of good, and then it is paradise; or in respect counted among the five abodes, it would seem that there of evil, and thus as regards actual sin it is hell, and as re- are more than five. gards original sin it is the limbo of children. On the other Objection 6. Further, some penal place should corre- hand, if it be in the state where it is hindered from receiv- spond to each state of sinners. Now if we suppose a person ing its final reward, this is either on account of a defect to die in original sin who has committed only venial sins, of the person, and thus we have purgatory where souls are none of the assigned abodes will be befitting to him. For detained from receiving their reward at once on account it is clear that he would not be in heaven, since he would of the sins they have committed, or else it is on account be without grace, and for the same reason neither would of a defect of nature, and thus we have the limbo of the he be in the limbo of the Fathers; nor again, would he be Fathers, where the Fathers were detained from obtaining in the limbo of children, since there is no sensible pun- glory on account of the guilt of human nature which could ishment there, which is due to such a person by reason of not yet be expiated. venial sin: nor would he be in purgatory, where there is Reply to Objection 1. Good happens in one way, but none but temporal punishment, whereas everlasting pun- evil in many ways, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) ishment is due to him: nor would he be in the hell of the and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6): wherefore it is not un- damned, since he is not guilty of actual mortal sin. There- fitting if there be one place of blissful reward and several fore a sixth abode should be assigned. places of punishment. Objection 7. Further, rewards and punishments vary Reply to Objection 2. The state of meriting and de- in quantity according to the differences of sins and mer- meriting is one state, since the same person is able to merit its. Now the degrees of merit and sin are infinite. There- and demerit: wherefore it is fitting that one place should fore we should distinguish an infinite number of abodes, be assigned to all: whereas of those who receive according in which souls are punished or rewarded after death. to their merits there are various states, and consequently Objection 8. Further, souls are sometimes punished in the comparison fails. the places where they sinned, as Gregory states (Dial. iv, Reply to Objection 3. One may be punished in two 55). But they sinned in the place which we inhabit. There- ways for original sin, as stated above, either in reference fore this place should be reckoned among the abodes, to the person, or in reference to nature only. Consequently especially since some are punished for their sins in this there is a twofold limbo corresponding to that sin. world, as the Master said above (Sent. iv, D, 21). Reply to Objection 4. This darksome air is assigned Objection 9. Further, just as some die in a state of to the demons, not as the place where they receive retri- grace and have some venial sins for which they deserve bution for their merits, but as a place befitting their office, punishment, so some die in mortal sin and have some in so far as they are appointed to try us. Hence it is not good for which they would deserve a reward. Now to reckoned among the abodes of which we are treating now: those who die in grace with venial sins an abode is as- since hell fire is assigned to them in the first place (Mat. signed where they are punished ere they receive their re- 25). ward, which abode is purgatory. Therefore, on the other Reply to Objection 5. The earthly paradise belongs hand, there should be equally an abode for those who die to the state of the wayfarer rather than to the state of those in mortal sin together with some good works. who receive for their merits; and consequently it is not Objection 10. Further, just as the Fathers were de- reckoned among the abodes whereof we are treating now. layed from obtaining full glory of the soul before Christ’s Reply to Objection 6. This supposition is impossi- coming, so are they now detained from receiving the glory ble∗. If, however, it were possible, such a one would be of the body. Therefore as we distinguish an abode of the punished in hell eternally: for it is accidental to venial saints before the coming of Christ from the one where sin that it be punished temporally in purgatory, through its ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 89, a. 6 2914 having grace annexed to it: wherefore if it be annexed to be pure and without the admixture of good, just as the a mortal sin, which is without grace, it will be punished supreme good is without any admixture of evil. Conse- eternally in hell. And since this one who dies in origi- quently those who are to be conveyed to beatitude which nal sin has a venial sin without grace, it is not unfitting to is a supreme good must be cleansed of all evil. where- suppose that he be punished eternally. fore there must needs be a place where such persons are Reply to Objection 7. Diversity of degrees in pun- cleansed if they go hence without being perfectly clean. ishments or rewards does not diversify the state, and it is But those who will be thrust into hell will not be free from according to the diversity of state that we distinguish var- all good: and consequently the comparison fails, since ious abodes. Hence the argument does not prove. those who are in hell can receive the reward of their goods, Reply to Objection 8. Although separated souls are in so far as their past goods avail for the mitigation of their sometimes punished in the place where we dwell, it does punishment. not follow that this is their proper place of punishment: Reply to Objection 10. The essential reward consists but this is done for our instruction, that seeing their pun- in the glory of the soul, but the body’s glory, since it over- ishment we may be deterred from sin. That souls while flows from the soul, is entirely founded as it were on the yet in the flesh are punished here for their sins has noth- soul: and consequently lack of the soul’s glory causes a ing to do with the question, because a punishment of this difference of state, whereas lack of the body’s glory does kind does not place a man outside the state of meriting not. For this reason, too, the same place, namely the or demeriting: whereas we are treating now of the abodes empyrean, is assigned to the holy souls separated from to which souls are assigned after the state of merit or de- their bodies and united to glorious bodies: whereas the merit. same place was not assigned to the souls of the Fathers Reply to Objection 9. It is impossible for evil to both before and after the glorification of souls. 2915 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 70 Of the Quality of the Soul After Leaving the Body, and of the Punishment Inflicted On It by Material Fire (In Three Articles) We must next consider the general quality of the soul after leaving the body, and the punishment inflicted on it by material fire. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul? (2) Whether the acts of the aforesaid powers remain in the soul? (3) Whether the separated soul can suffer from a material fire? Whether the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul? ∗ Suppl. q. 70 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the sensitive powers Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1), as the soul is to the body remain in the sensitive soul. For Augustine says (De Spir. so are the soul’s powers to the parts of the body, for in- et Anim. xv): “The soul withdraws from the body tak- stance the sight to the eye. But if it were not identically ing all with itself, sense and imagination, reason, under- the same soul that returns to the body, it would not be standing and intelligence, the concupiscible and irascible identically the same man. Therefore for the same reason it powers.” Now sense, imagination, concupiscible and iras- would not be identically the same eye, if the visual power cible are sensitive powers. Therefore the sensitive powers were not identically the same; and in like manner no other remain in the separated soul. part would rise again in identity, and consequently neither Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Eccl. would the whole man be identically the same. Therefore Dogm. xvi): “We believe that man alone has a substan- it is impossible for the separated soul to lose its sensitive tial soul, which lives though separated from the body, and powers. clings keenly to its senses and wits.” Therefore the soul Objection 7. Further, if the sensitive powers were to retains its senses after being separated from the body. be corrupted when the body is corrupted, it would follow Objection 3. Further, the soul’s powers are either its that they are weakened when the body is weakened. Yet essential parts as some maintain, or at least are its natural this is not the case, for according to De Anima i, “if an properties. Now that which is in a thing essentially cannot old man were given the eye of a young man, he would, be separated from it, nor is a subject severed from its nat- without doubt, see as well as a young man.” Therefore ural properties. Therefore it is impossible for the soul to neither are the sensitive powers corrupted when the body lose any of its powers after being separated from the body. is corrupted. Objection 4. Further, a whole is not entire if one of On the contrary, Augustine says (De Eccl. Dogm. its parts be lacking. Now the soul’s powers are called its xix): “Of two substances alone does man consist, soul parts. Therefore, if the soul lose any of its powers after and body: the soul with its reason, and the body with death, it will not be entire after death: and this is unfit- its senses.” Therefore the sensitive powers belong to the ting. body: and consequently when the body is corrupted the Objection 5. Further, the soul’s powers co-operate in sensitive powers remain not in the soul. merit more even than the body, since the body is a mere Further, the Philosopher, speaking of the separation instrument of action, while the powers are principles of of the soul, expresses himself thus (Metaph. xi, 3): “If, action. Now the body must of necessity be rewarded to- however, anything remain at last, we must ask what this gether with the soul, since it co-operated in merit. Much is: because in certain subjects it is not impossible, for in- more, therefore, is it necessary that the powers of the soul stance if the soul be of such a disposition, not the whole be rewarded together with it. Therefore the separated soul soul but the intellect; for as regards the whole soul this is does not lose them. probably impossible.” Hence it seems that the whole soul Objection 6. Further, if the soul after separation from is not separated from the body, but only the intellective the body loses its sensitive power, that must needs come to powers of the soul, and consequently not the sensitive or naught. For it cannot be said that it is dissolved into some vegetative powers. matter, since it has no matter as a part of itself. Now that Further, the Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says which entirely comes to naught is not restored in identity; (De Anima ii, 2): “This alone is ever separated, as the ev- wherefore at the resurrection the soul will not have the erlasting from the corruptible: for it is hereby clear that same identical sensitive powers. Now according to the the remaining parts are not separable as some maintain.” ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 77, a. 8 2916 Therefore the sensitive powers do not remain in the sepa-other powers by means of which these mean powers flow rated soul. from the essence of the soul, and so on to infinity, and if I answer that, There are many opinions on this ques- we have to stop it is better to do so at the first step. tion. For some, holding the view that all the powers are Hence others say that the sensitive and other like pow- in the soul in the same way as color is in a body, hold ers do not remain in the separated soul except in a re- that the soul separated from the body takes all its pow- stricted sense, namely radically, in the same way as a re- ers away with it: because, if it lacked any one of them, it sult is in its principle: because there remains in the sepa- would follow that the soul is changed in its natural prop- rated soul the ability to produce these powers if it should erties, since these cannot change so long as their subject be reunited to the body; nor is it necessary for this ability remains. But the aforesaid view is false, for since a power to be anything in addition to the essence of the soul, as is so called because it enables us to do or suffer some- stated above. This opinion appears to be the more reason- thing, and since to do and to be able belong to the same able. subject, it follows that the subject of a power is the same Reply to Objection 1. This saying of Augustine is to as that which is agent or patient. Hence the Philosopher be understood as meaning that the soul takes away with it says (De Somn. et Vigil.) that “where we find power some of those powers actually, namely understanding and there we find action.” Now it is evident that certain op- intelligence, and some radically, as stated above∗. erations, whereof the soul’s powers are the principles, do Reply to Objection 2. The senses which the soul not belong to the soul properly speaking but to the soul takes away with it are not these external senses, but the as united to the body, because they are not performed ex- internal, those, namely, which pertain to the intellective cept through the medium of the body—such as to see, to part, for the intellect is sometimes called sense, as Basil hear, and so forth. Hence it follows that such like powers states in his commentary on the Proverbs, and again the belong to the united soul and body as their subject, but to Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 11). If, however, he means the ex- the soul as their quickening principle, just as the form is ternal senses we must reply as above to the first objection. the principle of the properties of a composite being. Some Reply to Objection 3. As stated above, the sensitive operations, however, are performed by the soul without a powers are related to the soul, not as natural passions to bodily organ—for instance to understand, to consider, to their subject, but as compared to their origin: wherefore will: wherefore, since these actions are proper to the soul, the conclusion does not follow. the powers that are the principles thereof belong to the Reply to Objection 4. The powers of the soul are not soul not only as their principle but also as their subject. called its integral but its potential parts. Now the nature of Therefore, since so long as the proper subject remains its such like wholes is that the entire energy of the whole is proper passions must also remain, and when it is corrupted found perfectly in one of the parts, but partially in the oth- they also must be corrupted, it follows that these powers ers; thus in the soul the soul’s energy is found perfectly in which use no bodily organ for their actions must needs the intellective part, but partially in the others. Wherefore, remain in the separated body, while those which use a as the powers of the intellective part remain in the sepa- bodily organ must needs be corrupted when the body is rated soul, the latter will remain entire and undiminished, corrupted: and such are all the powers belonging to the although the sensitive powers do not remain actually: as sensitive and the vegetative soul. On this account some neither is the king’s power decreased by the death of a draw a distinction in the sensitive powers of the soul: for mayor who shared his authority. they say that they are of two kinds—some being acts of Reply to Objection 5. The body co-operates in merit, organs and emanating from the soul into the body are cor- as an essential part of the man who merits. The sensitive rupted with the body; others, whence the former originate, powers, however, do not co-operate thus, since they are of are in the soul, because by them the soul sensitizes the the genus of accidents. Hence the comparison fails. body for seeing, hearing, and so on; and these primary Reply to Objection 6. The powers of the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul. But this statement soul are said to be acts of the organs, not as though they seems unreasonable: because the soul, by its essence and were the essential forms of those organs, except in ref- not through the medium of certain other powers, is the ori- erence to the soul whose powers they are. But they are gin of those powers which are the acts of organs, even as the acts of the organs, by perfecting them for their proper any form, from the very fact that by its essence it informs operations, as heat is the act of fire by perfecting it for its matter, is the origin of the properties which result nat- the purpose of heating. Wherefore, just as a fire would urally in the composite. For were it necessary to suppose remain identically the same, although another individual other powers in the soul, by means of which the powers heat were in it (even so the cold of water that has been that perfect the organs may flow from the essence of the heated returns not identically the same, although the wa- soul, for the same reason it would be necessary to suppose ter remains the same in identity), so the organs will be the ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 77, a. 8, ad 1 and infra a. 2, ad 1 2917 same identically, although the powers be not identically is clear from his saying that “old age is an affection not the same. of the soul, but of that in which the soul is,” namely the Reply to Objection 7. The Philosopher is speaking body. For in this way the powers of the soul are neither there of these powers as being rooted in the soul. This weakened nor corrupted on account of the body. Whether the acts of the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul? Suppl. q. 70 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the acts of the sensi- our faith we hold to be in separated souls, are in the iras- tive powers remain in the separated soul. For Augustine cible and concupiscible. Therefore separated souls will says (De Spiritu et Anima xv): “When the soul leaves the not be deprived of the acts of the sensitive powers. body it derives pleasure or sorrow through being affected On the contrary, That which is common to soul and with these” (namely the imagination, and the concupisci- body cannot remain in the separated soul. Now all the op- ble and irascible faculties) “according to its merits.” But erations of the sensitive powers are common to the soul the imagination, the concupiscible, and the irascible are and body: and this is evident from the fact that no sensi- sensitive powers. Therefore the separated soul will be af- tive power exercises an act except through a bodily organ. fected as regards the sensitive powers, and consequently Therefore the separated soul will be deprived of the acts will be in some act by reason of them. of the sensitive powers. Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii) Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), that that “the body feels not, but the soul through the body,” “when the body is corrupted, the soul neither remembers and further on: “The soul feels certain things, not through nor loves,” and the same applies to all the acts of the sen- the body but without the body.” Now that which befits the sitive powers. Therefore the separated soul does not exer- soul without the body can be in the soul separated from cise the act of any sensitive power. the body. Therefore the soul will then be able to feel ac- I answer that, Some distinguish two kinds of acts in tually. the sensitive powers: external acts which the soul exer- Objection 3. Further, to see images of bodies, as oc- cises through the body. and these do not remain in the curs in sleep, belongs to imaginary vision which is in the separated soul; and internal acts which the soul performs sensitive part. Now it happens that the separated soul sees by itself; and these will be in the separated soul. This images of bodies in the same way as when we sleep. Thus statement would seem to have originated from the opin- Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii): “For I see not why the ion of Plato, who held that the soul is united to the body, soul has an image of its own body when, the body lying as a perfect substance nowise dependant on the body, and senseless, yet not quite dead, it sees some things which merely as a mover is united to the thing moved. This is many have related after returning to life from this sus- an evident consequence of transmigration which he held. pended animation and yet has it not when it has left the And since according to him nothing is in motion except body through death having taken place.” For it is unin- what is moved, and lest he should go on indefinitely, he telligible that the soul should have an image of its body, said that the first mover moves itself, and he maintained except in so far as it sees that image: wherefore he said that the soul is the cause of its own movement. Accord- before of those who lie senseless that “they have a cer- ingly there would be a twofold movement of the soul, one tain image of their own body, by which they are able to be by which it moves itself, and another whereby the body is borne to corporeal places and by means of sensible images moved by the soul: so that this act “to see” is first of all in to take cognizance of such things as they see.” Therefore the soul itself as moving itself, and secondly in the bodily the separated soul can exercise the acts of the sensitive organ in so far as the soul moves the body. This opinion powers. is refuted by the Philosopher (De Anima i, 3) who proves Objection 4. Further, the memory is a power of the that the soul does not move itself, and that it is nowise sensitive part, as proved in De Memor. et Remin. i. Now moved in respect of such operations as seeing, feeling, separated souls will actually remember the things they did and the like, but that such operations are movements of in this world: wherefore it is said to the rich glutton (Lk. the composite only. We must therefore conclude that the 16:25): “Remember that thou didst receive good things in acts of the sensitive powers nowise remain in the sepa- thy lifetime.” Therefore the separated soul will exercise rated soul, except perhaps as in their remote origin. the act of a sensitive power. Reply to Objection 1. Some deny that this book is Objection 5. Further, according to the Philosopher Augustine’s: for it is ascribed to a Cistercian who com- (De Anima iii, 9) the irascible and concupiscible are in piled it from Augustine’s works and added things of his the sensitive part. But joy and sorrow, love and hatred, own. Hence we are not to take what is written there, fear and hope, and similar emotions which according to as having authority. If, however, its authority should be 2918 maintained, it must be said that the meaning is that the straction from matter and material conditions. Where-separated soul is affected with imagination and other like fore Augustine’s comparison holds in this respect that just powers, not as though such affection were the act of the as the images of corporeal things are in the soul of the aforesaid powers, but in the sense that the soul will be af- dreamer or of one who is carried out of his mind, imag- fected in the future life for good or ill, according to the inatively, so are they in the separated soul intellectively: things which it committed in the body through the imagi- but not that they are in the separated soul imaginatively. nation and other like powers: so that the imagination and Reply to Objection 4. As stated in the first book such like powers are not supposed to elicit that affection, (Sent. i, D, 3, qu. 4), memory has a twofold significa- but to have elicited in the body the merit of that affection. tion. Sometimes it means a power of the sensitive part, Reply to Objection 2. The soul is said to feel through in so far as its gaze extends over past time; and in this the body, not as though the act of feeling belonged to the way the act of the memory will not be in the separated soul by itself, but as belonging to the whole composite by soul. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4) reason of the soul, just as we say that heat heats. That that “when this,” the body to wit, “is corrupted, the soul which is added, namely that the soul feels some things remembers not.” In another way memory is used to des- without the body, such as fear and so forth, means that ignate that part of the imagination which pertains to the it feels such things without the outward movement of the intellective faculty, in so far namely as it abstracts from body that takes place in the acts of the proper senses: since all differences of time, since it regards not only the past fear and like passions do not occur without any bodily but also the present, and the future as Augustine says (De movement. Trin. xiv, 11). Taking memory in this sense the separated It may also be replied that Augustine is speaking ac- soul will remember∗. cording to the opinion of the Platonists who maintained Reply to Objection 5. Love, joy, sorrow, and the like, this as stated above. have a twofold signification. Sometimes they denote pas- Reply to Objection 3. Augustine speaks there as sions of the sensitive appetite, and thus they will not be in nearly throughout that book, as one inquiring and not de- the separated soul, because in this way they are not exer- ciding. For it is clear that there is no comparison between cised without a definite movement of the heart. In another the soul of a sleeper and the separated soul: since the soul way they denote acts of the will which is in the intellec- of the sleeper uses the organ of imagination wherein cor- tive part: and in this way they will be in the separated poreal images are impressed; which cannot be said of the soul, even as delight will be there without bodily move- separated soul. Or we may reply that images of things are ment, even as it is in God, namely in so far as it is a simple in the soul, both as to the sensitive and imaginative power movement of the will. In this sense the Philosopher says and as to the intellective power, with greater or lesser ab- (Ethic. vii, 14) that “God’s joy is one simple delight.” Whether the separated soul can suffer from a bodily fire? Suppl. q. 70 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the separated soul a bodily fire. cannot suffer from a bodily fire. For Augustine says (Gen. Objection 4. Further, whatsoever is patient receives ad lit. xii): “The things that affect the soul well or ill after something from the agent. Therefore if the soul suffer its separation from the body, are not corporeal but resem- from the bodily fire, it will receive something therefrom. ble corporeal things.” Therefore the separated soul is not Now whatsoever is received in a thing is received accord- punished with a bodily fire. ing to the mode of the recipient. Therefore that which is Objection 2. Further, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii) says received in the soul from the fire, is in it not materially that “the agent is always more excellent than the patient.” but spiritually. Now the forms of things existing spiritu- But it is impossible for any body to be more excellent than ally in the soul are its perfections. Therefore though it be the separated soul. Therefore it cannot suffer from a body. granted that the soul suffer from the bodily fire, this will Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher not conduce to its punishment, but rather to its perfection. (De Gener. i) and Boethius (De Duab. Natur.) only Objection 5. Further, if it be said that the soul is pun-those things that agree in matter are active and passive ished merely by seeing the fire, as Gregory would seem in relation to one another. But the soul and corporeal fire to say (Dial. iv, 29). On the contrary, if the soul sees do not agree in matter, since there is no matter common the fire of hell, it cannot see it save by intellectual vision, to spiritual and corporeal things: wherefore they cannot since it has not the organs by which sensitive or imagina- be changed into one another, as Boethius says (De Duab. tive vision is effected. But it would seem impossible for Natur.). Therefore the separated soul does not suffer from intellectual vision to be the cause of sorrow, since “there ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 77, a. 8; Ia, q. 89, a. 6 2919 is no sorrow contrary to the pleasure of considering,” ac-fer punishment from a corporeal fire, since our Lord said cording to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 13). Therefore the (Mat. 25:41) that this fire was prepared for the devil and soul is not punished by that vision. his angels, who are incorporeal even as the soul. But how Objection 6. Further, if it be said that the soul suffers it is that they can thus suffer is explained in many ways. from the corporeal fire, through being held thereby, even For some have said that the mere fact that the soul sees as now it is held by the body while living in the body; on the fire makes the soul suffer from the fire: wherefore Gre- the contrary, the soul while living in the body is held by gory (Dial. iv, 29) says: “The soul suffers from the fire by the body in so far as there results one thing from the soul merely seeing it.” But this does not seem sufficient, be- and the body, as from form and matter. But the soul will cause whatever is seen, from the fact that it is seen, is a not be the form of that corporeal fire. Therefore it cannot perfection of the seer. wherefore it cannot conduce to his be held by the fire in the manner aforesaid. punishment, as seen. Sometimes, however, it is of a penal Objection 7. Further, every bodily agent acts by con- or unpleasant nature accidentally, in so far, to wit, as it is tact. But a corporeal fire cannot be in contact with the apprehended as something hurtful, and consequently, be- soul, since contact is only between corporeal things whose sides the fact that the soul sees the fire, there must needs bounds come together. Therefore the soul suffers not from be some relation of the soul to the fire, according to which that fire. the fire is hurtful to the soul. Objection 8. Further, an organic agent does not act on Hence others have said that although a corporeal fire a remote object, except through acting on the intermedi- cannot burn the soul, the soul nevertheless apprehends it ate objects; wherefore it is able to act at a fixed distance in as hurtful to itself, and in consequence of this apprehen-proportion to its power. But souls, or at least the demons sion is seized with fear and sorrow, in fulfillment of Ps. to whom this equally applies, are sometimes outside the 13:5, “They have trembled for fear, where there was no place of hell, since sometimes they appear to men even fear.” Hence Gregory says (Dial. iv, 29) that “the soul in this world: and yet they are not then free from punish- burns through seeing itself aflame.” But this, again, seems ment, for just as the glory of the saints is never interrupted, insufficient, because in this case the soul would suffer so neither is the punishment of the damned. And yet we from the fire, not in reality but only in apprehension: for do not find that all the intermediate things suffer from the although a real passion of sorrow or pain may result from fire of hell: nor again is it credible that any corporeal thing a false imagination, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. of an elemental nature has such a power that its action can xii), it cannot be said in relation to that passion that one re-reach to such a distance. Therefore it does not seem that ally suffers from the thing, but from the image of the thing the pains suffered by the souls of the damned are inflicted that is present to one’s fancy. Moreover, this kind of suf- by a corporeal fire. fering would be more unlike real suffering than that which On the contrary, The possibility of suffering from a results from imaginary vision, since the latter is stated to corporeal fire is equally consistent with separated souls result from real images of things, which images the soul and with demons. Now demons suffer therefrom since carries about with it, whereas the former results from false they are punished by that fire into which the bodies of the fancies which the erring soul imagines: and furthermore, damned will be cast after the resurrection, and which must it is not probable that separated souls or demons, who are needs be as corporeal fire. This is evident from the words endowed with keen intelligence, would think it possible of our Lord (Mat. 25:41), “Depart from Me, you cursed, for a corporeal fire to hurt them, if they were nowise dis- into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil,” tressed thereby. etc. Therefore separated souls also can suffer from that Hence others say that it is necessary to admit that the fire. soul suffers even really from the corporeal fire: where- Further, punishment should correspond to sin. Now fore Gregory says (Dial. iv, 29): “We can gather from the in sinning the soul subjected itself to the body by sinful words of the Gospel, that the soul suffers from the fire not concupiscence. Therefore it is just that it should be pun- only by seeing it, but also by feeling it.” They explain the ished by being made subject to a bodily thing by suffering possibility of this as follows. They say that this corporeal therefrom. fire can be considered in two ways. First, as a corporeal Further, there is greater union between form and mat- thing, and thus it has not the power to act on the soul. ter than between agent and patient. Now the diversity Secondly, as the instrument of the vengeance of Divine of spiritual and corporeal nature does not hinder the soul justice. For the order of Divine justice demands that the from being the form of the body. Therefore neither is it an soul which by sinning subjected itself to corporeal things obstacle to its suffering from a body. should be subjected to them also in punishment. Now an I answer that, Given that the fire of hell is not so instrument acts not only in virtue of its own nature, but called metaphorically, nor an imaginary fire, but a real also in virtue of the principal agent: wherefore it is not corporeal fire, we must needs say that the soul will suf- unreasonable if that fire, seeing that it acts in virtue of a 2920 spiritual agent, should act on the spirit of a man or demon, this union conceives a loathing.” in the same way as we have explained the sanctification of Accordingly we must unite all the aforesaid modes to- the soul by the sacraments ( IIIa, q. 62, Aa. 1,4). gether, in order to understand perfectly how the soul suf- But, again, this does not seem to suffice, since every fers from a corporeal fire: so as to say that the fire of its instrument, in acting on that on which it is used instru- nature is able to have an incorporeal spirit united to it as mentally, has its own connatural action besides the action a thing placed is united to a place; that as the instrument whereby it acts in virtue of the principal agent: in fact it of Divine justice it is enabled to detain it enchained as it is by fulfilling the former that it effects the latter action, were, and in this respect this fire is really hurtful to the even as, in Baptism, it is by laving the body that water spirit, and thus the soul seeing the fire as something hurt- sanctifies the soul, and the saw by cutting wood produces ful to it is tormented by the fire. Hence Gregory (Dial. iv, the shape of a house. 29) mentions all these in order, as may be seen from the Hence we must allow the fire to exercise on the soul above quotations. an action connatural to the fire, in order that it may be the Reply to Objection 1. Augustine speaks there as instrument of Divine justice in the punishment of sin: and one inquiring: wherefore he expresses himself otherwise for this reason we must say that a body cannot naturally when deciding the point, as quoted above (De Civ. Dei act on a spirit, nor in any way be hurtful or distressful to xxi). Or we may reply that Augustine means to say it, except in so far as the latter is in some way united to that the things which are the proximate occasion of the a body: for thus we observe that “the corruptible body is soul’s pain or sorrow are spiritual, since it would not be a load upon the soul” (Wis. 9:15). Now a spirit is united distressed unless it apprehended the fire as hurtful to it: to a body in two ways. In one way as form to matter, so wherefore the fire as apprehended is the proximate cause that from their union there results one thing simply: and of its distress, whereas the corporeal fire which exists out- the spirit that is thus united to a body both quickens the side the soul is the remote cause of its distress. body and is somewhat burdened by the body: but it is not Reply to Objection 2. Although the soul is simply thus that the spirit of man or demon is united to the cor- more excellent than the fire, the fire is relatively more ex- poreal fire. In another way as the mover is united to the cellent than the soul, in so far, to wit, as it is the instrument things moved, or as a thing placed is united to place, even of Divine justice. as incorporeal things are in a place. In this way created Reply to Objection 3. The Philosopher and Boethius incorporeal spirits are confined to a place, being in one are speaking of the action whereby the patient is changed place in such a way as not to be in another. Now although into the nature of the agent. Such is not the action of the of its nature a corporeal thing is able to confine an incor- fire on the soul: and consequently the argument is not con- poreal spirit to a place, it is not able of its nature to detain clusive. an incorporeal spirit in the place to which it is confined, Reply to Objection 4. By acting on the soul the and so to tie it to that place that it be unable to seek an- fire bestows nothing on it but detains it, as stated above. other, since a spirit is not by nature in a place so as to be Hence the argument is not to the point. subject to place. But the corporeal fire is enabled as the in- Reply to Objection 5. In intellectual vision sorrow strument of the vengeance of Divine justice thus to detain is not caused by the fact that something is seen, since the a spirit; and thus it has a penal effect on it, by hindering thing seen as such can nowise be contrary to the intel- it from fulfilling its own will, that is by hindering it from lect. But in the sensible vision the thing seen, by its very acting where it will and as it will. action on the sight so as to be seen, there may be acci- This way is asserted by Gregory (Dial. iv, 29). For dentally something corruptive of the sight, in so far as it in explaining how the soul can suffer from that fire by destroys the harmony of the organ Nevertheless, intellec- feeling it, he expresses himself as follows: “Since Truth tual vision may cause sorrow, in so far as the thing seen declares the rich sinner to be condemned to fire, will any is apprehended as hurtful, not that it hurts through being wise man deny that the souls of the wicked are impris- seen, but in some other way no matter which. It is thus oned in flames?” Julian∗ says the same as quoted by the that the soul in seeing the fire is distressed. Master (Sent. iv, D, 44): “If the incorporeal spirit of a liv- Reply to Objection 6. The comparison does not hold ing man is held by the body, why shall it not be held after in every respect, but it does in some, as explained above. death by a corporeal fire?” and Augustine says (De Civ. Reply to Objection 7. Although there is no bod- Dei xxi, 10) that “just as, although the soul is spiritual and ily contact between the soul and body, there is a certain the body corporeal, man is so fashioned that the soul is spiritual contact between them (even as the mover of the united to the body as giving it life, and on account of this heaven, being spiritual, touches the heaven, when it moves union conceives a great love for its body, so it is chained it, with a spiritual contact) in the same way as a “painful to the fire, as receiving punishment therefrom, and from object is said to touch,” as stated in De Gener. i. This ∗ Bishop of Toledo, Prognostic ii, 17 2921 mode of contact is sufficient for action. ished, neither as to the essential, nor as to the accidental Reply to Objection 8. The souls of the damned are reward, if they happen to be outside the empyrean, in fact never outside hell, except by Divine permission, either this somewhat conduces to their glory, so the punishment for the instruction or for the trial of the elect. And wher- of the damned is nowise diminished, if by God’s permis- ever they are outside hell they nevertheless always see the sion they happen to be outside hell for a time. A gloss on fire thereof as prepared for their punishment. Wherefore, James 3:6, “inflameth the wheel of our nativity,” etc., is since this vision is the immediate cause of their distress, in agreement with this, for it is worded thus: “The devil, as stated above, wherever they are, they suffer from hell- wherever he is, whether in the air or under the earth, drags fire. Even so prisoners, though outside the prison, suffer with him the torments of his flames.” But the objection somewhat from the prison, seeing themselves condemned argues as though the corporeal fire tortured the spirit im- thereto. Hence just as the glory of the elect is not dimin- mediately in the same way as it torments bodies. 2922 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 71 Of the Suffrages for the Dead (In Fourteen Articles) We must now consider the suffrages for the dead. Under this head there are fourteen points of inquiry: (1) Whether suffrages performed by one person can profit others? (2) Whether the dead can be assisted by the works of the living? (3) Whether the suffrages of sinners profit the dead? (4) Whether suffrages for the dead profit those who perform them? (5) Whether suffrages profit those who are in hell? (6) Whether they profit those who are in purgatory? (7) Whether they avail the children in limbo? (8) Whether in any way they profit those who are heaven? (9) Whether the prayer of the Church, the Sacrament of the altar, and almsgiving profit the departed? (10) Whether indulgences granted by the Church profit them? (11) Whether the burial service profits the departed? (12) Whether suffrages for one dead person profit that person more than others? (13) Whether suffrages for many avail each one as much as if they were offered for each individual? (14) Whether general suffrages avail those for whom special suffrages are not offered, as much as special and general suffrages together avail those for whom they are offered? Whether the suffrages of one person can profit others? Suppl. q. 71 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the suffrages of one sisted by the merits of another. person cannot profit others. For it is written (Gal. 6:8): I answer that, our actions can avail for two purposes. “What things a man shall sow, those also shall he reap.” First, for acquiring a certain state; thus by a meritorious Now if one person reaped fruit from the suffrages of an- work a man obtains the state of bliss. Secondly, for some- other, he would reap from another’s sowing. Therefore a thing consequent upon a state; thus by some work a man person receives no fruit from the suffrages of others. merits an accidental reward, or a rebate of punishment. Objection 2. Further, it belongs to God’s justice, that And for both these purposes our actions may avail in two each one should receive according to his merits, where- ways: first, by way of merit; secondly, by way of prayer: fore the psalm (Ps. 61:13) says: “Thou wilt render to ev- the difference being that merit relies on justice, and prayer ery man according to his works.” Now it is impossible for on mercy; since he who prays obtains his petition from the God’s justice to fail. Therefore it is impossible for one mere liberality of the one he prays. Accordingly we must man to be assisted by the works of another. say that the work of one person nowise can avail another Objection 3. Further, a work is meritorious on the for acquiring a state by way of merit, so that, to wit, a same count as it is praiseworthy, namely inasmuch as it man be able to merit eternal life by the works which I is voluntary. Now one man is not praised for the work of do, because the share of glory is awarded according to the another. Therefore neither can the work of one man be measure of the recipient, and each one is disposed by his meritorious and fruitful for another. own and not by another’s actions—disposed, that is to say, Objection 4. Further, it belongs to Divine justice to by being worthy of reward. By way of prayer, however, repay good for good in the same way as evil for evil. But the work of one may profit another while he is a wayfarer, no man is punished for the evildoings of another; indeed, even for acquiring a state; for instance, one man may ob- according to Ezech. 18:4, “the soul that sinneth, the same tain the first grace for another∗: and since the impetration shall die.” Therefore neither does one person profit by of prayer depends on the liberality of God Whom we pray, another’s good. it may extend to whatever is ordinately subject to the Di- On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 118:63): “I am a vine power. On the other hand, as regards that which is partaker with all them that fear Thee,” etc. consequent upon or accessory to a state, the work of one Further, all the faithful united together by charity are may avail another, not only by way of prayer but even members of the one body of the Church. Now one mem- by way of merit: and this happens in two ways. First, ber is assisted by another. Therefore one man can be as- on account of their communion in the root of the work, ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 114, a. 6 2923 which root is charity in meritorious works. Wherefore all receives the fruit of the works done by a man who is one who are united together by charity acquire some benefit with him in charity, or of works done for him. This also from one another’s works, albeit according to the mea- happens according to human justice, so that the satisfac- sure of each one’s state, since even in heaven each one tion offered by one is accepted in lieu of another’s. will rejoice in the goods of others. Hence it is that the Reply to Objection 3. Praise is not given to a person communion of saints is laid down as an article of faith. save according to his relation to an act, wherefore praise Secondly, through the intention of the doer who does cer- is “in relation to something” (Ethic. i, 12). And since tain works specially for the purpose that they may profit no man is made or shown to be well- or ill-disposed to such persons: so that those works become somewhat the something by another’s deed, it follows that no man is works of those for whom they are done, as though they praised for another’s deeds save accidentally in so far as were bestowed on them by the doer. Wherefore they can he is somewhat the cause of those deeds, by giving coun- avail them either for the fulfillment of satisfaction or for sel, assistance, inducement, or by any other means. on the some similar purpose that does not change their state. other hand, a work is meritorious to a person, not only by Reply to Objection 1. This reaping is the receiv- reason of his disposition, but also in view of something ing of eternal life, as stated in Jn. 4:36, “And he that consequent upon his disposition or state, as evidenced by reapeth. . . gathereth fruit unto life everlasting.” Now a what has been said. share of eternal life is not given to a man save for his Reply to Objection 4. It is directly contrary to justice own works, for although we may impetrate for another to take away from a person that which is his due: but to that he obtain life, this never happens except by means of give a person what is not his due is not contrary to jus- his own works, when namely, at the prayers of one, an- tice, but surpasses the bounds of justice, for it is liberality. other is given the grace whereby he merits eternal life. Now a person cannot be hurt by the ills of another, unless Reply to Objection 2. The work that is done for an- he be deprived of something of his own. Consequently it other becomes his for whom it is done: and in like manner is not becoming that one should be punished for another’s the work done by a man who is one with me is somewhat sins, as it is that one should acquire some advantage from mine. Hence it is not contrary to Divine justice if a man deeds of another. Whether the dead can be assisted by the works of the living? Suppl. q. 71 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the dead cannot be as- that they may be loosed from sins.” But this would not sisted by the works of the living. First, because the Apos- be profitable unless it were a help to them. Therefore the tle says (2 Cor. 5:10): “We must all be manifested before suffrages of the living profit the dead. the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive Further, Augustine says (De Cure pro Mort. i): “Of the proper things of the body, according as he hath done.” no small weight is the authority of the Church whereby Therefore nothing can accrue to a man from the works of she clearly approves of the custom whereby a commen- others, which are done after his death and when he is no dation of the dead has a place in the prayers which the longer in the body. priests pour forth to the Lord God at His altar.” This cus- Objection 2. Further, this also seems to follow from tom was established by the apostles themselves according the words of Apoc. 14:13, “Blessed are the dead who die to the Damascene in a sermon on suffrages for the dead∗, in the Lord. . . for their works follow them.” where he expresses himself thus: “Realizing the nature of Objection 3. Further, it belongs only to one who is the Mysteries the disciples of the Saviour and His holy on the way to advance on account of some deed. Now apostles sanctioned a commemoration of those who had after death men are no longer wayfarers, because to them died in the faith, being made in the awe-inspiring and life- the words of Job 19:8, refer: “He hath hedged in my path giving Mysteries.” This is also confirmed by the authority round about, and I cannot pass.” Therefore the dead can- of Dionysius (Hier. Eccl.), where he mentions the rite not be assisted by a person’s suffrages. of the Early Church in praying for the dead, and, more- Objection 4. Further, no one is assisted by the deed of over, asserts that the suffrages of the living profit the dead. another, unless there be some community of life between Therefore we must believe this without any doubt. them. Now there is no community between the dead and I answer that, Charity, which is the bond uniting the the living, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 11). There- members of the Church, extends not only to the living, fore the suffrages of the living do not profit the dead. but also to the dead who die in charity. For charity which On the contrary are the words of 2 Macc. 12:46: “It is the life of the soul, even as the soul is the life of the is. . . a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead body, has no end: “Charity never falleth away” (1 Cor. ∗ De his qui in fide dormierunt, 3 2924 13:8). Moreover, the dead live in the memory of the liv-Reply to Objection 2. The words quoted refer ex- ing: wherefore the intention of the living can be directed pressly to the sequel of eternal retribution as is clear from to them. Hence the suffrages of the living profit the dead the opening words: “Blessed are the dead,” etc. Or we in two ways even as they profit the living, both on account may reply that deeds done on their behalf are somewhat of the bond of charity and on account of the intention be- their own, as stated above. ing directed to them. Nevertheless, we must not believe Reply to Objection 3. Although, strictly speaking, af- that the suffrages of the living profit them so as to change ter death souls are not in the state of the way, yet in a cer- their state from unhappiness to happiness or “vice versa”; tain respect they are still on the way, in so far as they are but they avail for the diminution of punishment or some- delayed awhile in their advance towards their final award. thing of the kind that involves no change in the state of the Wherefore, strictly speaking, their way is hedged in round dead. about, so that they can no more be changed by any works Reply to Objection 1. Man while living in the body in respect of the state of happiness or unhappiness. Yet merited that such things should avail him after death. their way is not so hedged around that they cannot be Wherefore if he is assisted thereby after this life, this is, helped by others in the matter of their being delayed from nevertheless, the result of the things he has done in the receiving their final award, because in this respect they are body. still wayfarers. Or we may reply, according to John Damascene, in the Reply to Objection 4. Although the communion of sermon quoted above, that these words refer to the retribu- civic deeds whereof the Philosopher speaks, is impossible tion which will be made at the final judgment, of eternal between the dead and the living, because the dead are out- glory or eternal unhappiness: for then each one will re- side civic life, the communication of the spiritual life is ceive only according as he himself has done in the body. possible between them, for that life is founded on charity Meanwhile, however, he can be assisted by the suffrages towards God, to Whom the spirits of the dead live. of the living. Whether suffrages performed by sinners profit the dead? Suppl. q. 71 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that suffrages performed Objection 6. Further, according to Augustine by sinners do not profit the dead. For, according to Jn. (Enchiridion cix), as quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45), 9:31, “God doth not hear sinners.” Now if their prayers the dead are assisted by suffrages according as while liv- were to profit those for whom they pray, they would be ing they merited to be assisted after death. Therefore the heard by God. Therefore the suffrages performed by them worth of suffrages is measured according to the disposi- do not profit the dead. tion of the person for whom they are performed. There- Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Pastoral i, 11) fore it would appear that it differs not whether they be that “when an offensive person is sent to intercede, the performed by good or by wicked persons. wrath of the angered party is provoked to harsher mea- I answer that, Two things may be considered in the sures.” Now every sinner is offensive to God. Therefore suffrages performed by the wicked. First, the deed done, God is not inclined to mercy by the suffrages of sinners, for instance the sacrifice of the altar. And since our sacra- and consequently their suffrages are of no avail. ments have their efficacy from themselves independently Objection 3. Further, a person’s deed would seem to of the deed of the doer, and are equally efficacious by be more fruitful to the doer than to another. But a sinner whomsoever they are performed, in this respect the suf- merits naught for himself by his deeds. Much less, there- frages of the wicked profit the departed. Secondly, we fore, can he merit for another. may consider the deed of the doer, and then we must draw Objection 4. Further, every meritorious work must be a distinction; because the deed of a sinner who offers suf- a living work, that is to say, informed by charity. Now frage may be considered—in one way in so far as it is works done by sinners are dead. Therefore the dead for his own deed, and thus it can nowise be meritorious ei- whom they are done cannot be assisted thereby. ther to himself or to another; in another way in so far as Objection 5. On the contrary, No man can know for it is another’s deed, and this happens in two ways. First, certain about another man whether the latter be in a state when the sinner, offering suffrages, represents the whole of sin or of grace. If, therefore, only those suffrages were Church; for instance a priest when he performs the burial profitable that are done by those who are in a state of service in church. And since one in whose name or in grace, a man could not know of whom to ask suffrages whose stead a thing is done is understood to do it himself for his dead, and consequently many would be deterred as Dionysius asserts (Coel. Hier. xiii), it follows that the from obtaining suffrages. suffrages of that priest, albeit a sinner, profit the departed. 2925 Secondly, when he acts as the instrument of another: for Reply to Objection 3. The reason why the sinner who the work of the instrument belongs more to the principal performs these suffrages gains nothing thereby is because agent. Wherefore, although he who acts as the instrument he is not capable of profiting by reason of his own indis- of another be not in a state of merit, his act may be meri- position. Nevertheless, as stated above, it may in some torious on account of the principal agent: for instance if a way profit another, who is disposed. servant being in sin do any work of mercy at the command Reply to Objection 4. Although the sinner’s deed is of his master who has charity. Hence, if a person dying not living in so far as it is his own, it may be living in so in charity command suffrages to be offered for him, or if far as it is another’s, as stated above. some other person having charity prescribe them, those Since, however, the arguments in the contrary sense suffrages avail for the departed, even though the persons would seem to show that it matters not whether one ob- by whom they are performed be in sin. Nevertheless they tain suffrages from good or from evil persons, we must would avail more if those persons were in charity, because reply to them also. then those works would be meritorious on two counts. Reply to Objection 5. Although one cannot know for Reply to Objection 1. The prayer offered by a sin- certain about another whether he be in the state of salva- ner is sometimes not his but another’s, and consequently tion, one may infer it with probability from what one sees in this respect is worthy to be heard by God. Neverthe- outwardly of a man: for a tree is known by its fruit (Mat. less, God sometimes hears sinners, when, to wit, they ask 7:16). for something acceptable to God. For God dispenses His Reply to Objection 6. In order that suffrage avail an- goods not only to the righteous but also to sinners (Mat. other, it is requisite that the one for whom it is performed 5:45), not indeed on account of their merits, but of His be capable of availing by it: and a man has become ca- loving kindness. Hence a gloss on Jn. 9:31, “God doth pable of this by his own works which he did in his life- not hear sinners,” says that “he speaks as one unanointed time. This is what Augustine means to say. Nevertheless, and as not seeing clearly.” those works must be such that they can profit him, and Reply to Objection 2. Although the sinner’s prayer is this depends not on the person for whom the suffrage is not acceptable in so far as he is offensive, it may be ac- performed, but rather on the one who offers the suffrages ceptable to God on account of another in whose stead or whether by performing them or by commanding them. at whose command he offers the prayer. Whether suffrages offered by the living for the dead profit those who offer them? Suppl. q. 71 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that suffrages offered by Further, the Damascene says in the sermon “On those the living for the dead do not profit those who offer them. who fell asleep in the faith: Just as when about to anoint For according to human justice a man is not absolved from a sick man with the ointment or other holy oil, first of all his own debt if he pay a debt for another man. Therefore a he, ” namely the anointer, “shares in the anointing and man is not absolved from his own debt for the reason that thus proceeds to anoint the patient, so whoever strives for by offering suffrages he has paid the debt of the one for his neighbor’s salvation first of all profits himself and af- whom he offered them. terwards his neighbor.” And thus the question at issue is Objection 2. Further, whatever a man does, he should answered. do it as best he can. Now it is better to assist two than I answer that, The work of suffrage that is done for one. Therefore if one who by suffrages has paid the debt another may be considered in two ways. First, as expiat- of a dead person is freed from his own debt, it would seem ing punishment by way of compensation which is a con- that one ought never to satisfy for oneself, but always for dition of satisfaction: and in this way the work of suffrage another. that is counted as belonging to the person for whom it is Objection 3. Further, if the satisfaction of one who done, while absolving him from the debt of punishment, satisfies for another profits him equally with the one for does not absolve the performer from his own debt of pun- whom he satisfies, it will likewise equally profit a third ishment, because in this compensation we have to con- person if he satisfy for him at the same time, and likewise sider the equality of justice: and this work of satisfaction a fourth and so on. Therefore he might satisfy for all by can be equal to the one debt without being equal to the one work of satisfaction; which is absurd. other, for the debts of two sinners require a greater satis- On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 34:13): “My prayer faction than the debt of one. Secondly, it may be consid- shall be turned into my bosom.” Therefore, in like man- ered as meriting eternal life, and this it has as proceeding ner, suffrages that are offered for others profit those who from its root, which is charity: and in this way it profits satisfy. not only the person for whom it is done, but also and still 2926 more the doer. first considered the work of suffrage as a work of satisfac- This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the tion, while the others consider it as meritorious. Whether suffrages profit those who are in hell? Suppl. q. 71 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that suffrages profit those sequently he says (Eccl. Hier. vii) that “he prays not that who are in hell. For it is written (2 Macc. 12:40): “They sinners be forgiven, because his prayer for them would not found under the coats of the slain some of the donaries be heard.” Therefore suffrages avail not those who are in of the idols. . . which the law forbiddeth to the Jews,” and hell. yet we read further on (2 Macc. 12:43) that Judas “sent Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 19): “There is twelve thousand drachms of silver to Jerusalem. . . to be the same reason for not praying then” (namely after the offered for the sins of the dead.” Now it is clear that they judgment day) “for men condemned to the everlasting fire, sinned mortally through acting against the Law, and con- as there is now for not praying for the devil and his angels sequently that they died in mortal sin, and were taken to who are sentenced to eternal punishment, and for this rea- hell. Therefore suffrages profit those who are in hell. son the saints pray not for dead unbelieving and wicked Objection 2. Further, the text (Sent. iv, D, 45) quotes men, because, forsooth, knowing them to be already con- the saying of Augustine (Enchiridion cx) that “those demned to eternal punishment, they shrink from pleading whom suffrages profit gain either entire forgiveness, or at for them by the merit of their prayers before they are sum- least an abatement of their damnation.” Now only those moned to the presence of the just Judge.” who are in hell are said to be damned. Therefore suffrages Further, the text (Sent. iv, D, 45) quotes the words of profit even those who are in hell. Augustine (De Verb. A post. Serm. xxxii): “If a man Objection 3. Further, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier.): depart this life without the faith that worketh by charity “If here the prayers of the righteous avail those who are and its sacraments, in vain do his friends have recourse alive, how much more do they, after death, profit those to such like acts of kindness.” Now all the damned come alone who are worthy of their holy prayers?” Hence we under that head. Therefore suffrages profit them not. may gather that suffrages are more profitable to the dead I answer that, There have been three opinions about than to the living. Now they profit the living even though the damned. For some have said that a twofold distinc- they be in mortal sin, for the Church prays daily for sin- tion must be made in this matter. First, as to time; for ners that they be converted to God. Therefore suffrages they said that after the judgment day no one in hell will avail also for the dead who are in mortal sin. be assisted by any suffrage, but that before the judgment Objection 4. Further, in the Lives of the Fathers (iii, day some are assisted by the suffrages of the Church. Sec- 172; vi, 3) we read, and the Damascene relates in his ser- ondly, they made a distinction among those who are de- mon∗ that Macarius discovered the skull of a dead man tained in hell. Some of these, they said, are very bad, on the road, and that after praying he asked whose head those namely who have died without faith and the sacra- it was, and the head replied that it had belonged to a pa- ments, and these, since they were not of the Church, nei- gan priest who was condemned to hell; and yet he con- ther “by grace nor, by name”‡ can the suffrages of the fessed that he and others were assisted by the prayers of Church avail; while others are not very bad, those namely Macarius. Therefore the suffrages of the Church profit who belonged to the Church as actual members, who had even those who are in hell. the faith, frequented the sacraments and performed works Objection 5. Further, the Damascene in the same ser- generically good, and for these the suffrages of the Church mon relates that Gregory, while praying for Trajan, heard ought to avail. Yet they were confronted with a difficulty a voice from heaven saying to him: “I have heard thy which troubled them, for it would seem to follow from this voice, and I pardon Trajan”: and of this fact the Dama- (since the punishment of hell is finite in intensity although scene adds in the same sermon, “the whole East and West infinite in duration) that a multiplicity of suffrages would are witnesses.” Yet it is clear that Trajan was in hell, since take away that punishment altogether, which is the error “he put many martyrs to a cruel death”†. Therefore the of Origen (Peri Archon. i; cf. Gregory, Moral. xxxiv): suffrages of the Church avail even for those who are in and consequently endeavored in various ways to avoid this hell. difficulty. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vii): Praepositivus§ said that suffrages for the damned can “The high priest prays not for the unclean, because by so be so multiplied that they are entirely freed from punish- doing he would act counter to the Divine order,” and con- ment, not absolutely as Origen maintained, but for a time, ∗ De his qui in fide dormierunt † De his qui fide dormierunt ‡ Cf. Oratio ad Vesperas, Fer. ii, post Dom. Pass. § Gilbert Prevostin, Chancellor of the See of Paris, A.D. 1205-9 2927 namely till the judgment day: for their souls will be re-ing. Secondly, because they have entirely come to the end united to their bodies, and will be cast back into the pun- of life, and have received the final award for their merits, ishments of hell without hope of pardon. But this opin- even as the saints who are in heaven. For the remain- ion seems incompatible with Divine providence, which ing punishment or glory of the body does not make them leaves nothing inordinate in the world. For guilt cannot be to be wayfarers, since glory essentially and radically re- restored to order save by punishment: wherefore it is im- sides in the soul. It is the same with the unhappiness of possible for punishment to cease, unless first of all guilt be the damned, wherefore their punishment cannot be dimin- expiated: so that, as guilt remains for ever in the damned, ished as neither can the glory of the saints be increased as their punishment will nowise be interrupted. to the essential reward. For this reason the followers of Gilbert de la Porree However, we may admit, in a certain measure, the devised another explanation. These said that the process manner in which, according to some, suffrages profit the in the diminution of punishments by suffrages is as the damned, if it be said that they profit neither by dimin- process in dividing a line, which though finite, is indef- ishing nor interrupting their punishment, nor again by di- initely divisible, and is never destroyed by division, if it minishing their sense of punishment, but by withdrawing be diminished not by equal but by proportionate quan- from the damned some matter of grief, which matter they tities, for instance if we begin by taking away a quarter might have if they knew themselves to be so outcast as to of the whole, and secondly, a quarter of that quarter, and be a care to no one; and this matter of grief is withdrawn then a quarter of this second quarter, and so on indefi- from them when suffrages are offered for them. Yet even nitely. In like manner, they say by the first suffrage a cer- this is impossible according to the general law, because as tain proportion of the punishment is taken away, and by Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii)—and this applies the second an equally proportionate part of the remainder. especially to the damned—“the spirits of the departed are But this explanation is in many ways defective. First, be- where they see nothing of what men do or of what hap- cause it seems that indefinite division which is applicable pens to them in this life,” and consequently they know not to continuous quantity cannot be transferred to spiritual when suffrages are offered for them, unless this relief be quantity: secondly, because there is no reason why the granted from above to some of the damned in spite of the second suffrage, if it be of equal worth, should diminish general law. This, however, is a matter of great uncer- the punishment less than the first: thirdly, because pun- tainty; wherefore it is safer to say simply that suffrages ishment cannot be diminished unless guilt be diminished, profit not the damned, nor does the Church intend to pray even as it cannot be done away unless the guilt be done for them, as appears from the authors quoted above. away: fourthly, because in the division of a line we come Reply to Objection 1. The donaries to the idols were at length to something which is not sensible, for a sensible not found on those dead so that they might be taken as a body is not indefinitely divisible: and thus it would follow sign that they were carried off in reverence to the idols: that after many suffrages the remaining punishment would but they took them as conquerors because they were due be so little as not to be felt, and thus would no longer be a to them by right of war. They sinned, however, venially by punishment. covetousness: and consequently they were not damned in Hence others found another explanation. For Antis- hell, and thus suffrages could profit them. or we may say, siodorensis∗ (Sent. iv, Tract. 14) said that suffrages profit according to some, that in the midst of fighting, seeing the damned not by diminishing or interrupting their pun- they were in danger, they repented of their sin, accord- ishment, but by fortifying the person punished: even as a ing to Ps. 77:34, “When He slew them, then they sought man who is carrying a heavy load might bathe his face in Him”: and this is a probable opinion. Wherefore the of- water, for thus he would be enabled to carry it better, and fering was made for them. yet his load would be none the lighter. But this again is Reply to Objection 2. In these words damnation is impossible, because according to Gregory (Moral. ix) a taken in a broad sense for any kind of punishment, so as to man suffers more or less from the eternal fire according include also the punishment of purgatory which is some- as his guilt deserves; and consequently some suffer more, times entirely expiated by suffrages, and sometimes not some less, from the same fire. wherefore since the guilt entirety, but diminished. of the damned remains unchanged, it cannot be that he Reply to Objection 3. Suffrage for a dead person is suffers less punishment. Moreover, the aforesaid opinion more acceptable than for a living person, as regards his is presumptuous, as being in opposition to the statements being in greater want, since he cannot help himself as a of holy men, and groundless as being based on no author- living person can. But a living person is better off in that ity. It is also unreasonable. First, because the damned he can be taken from the state of mortal sin to the state in hell are cut off from the bond of charity in virtue of of grace, which cannot be said of the dead. Hence there which the departed are in touch with the works of the liv- is not the same reason for praying for the dead as for the ∗ William of Auxerre, Archdeacon of Beauvais 2928 living. and damned. For we must needs say likewise of all such Reply to Objection 4. This assistance did not consist persons that they were consigned to hell, not finally, but as in a diminishment of their punishment, but in this alone was actually due to their own merits according to justice: (as stated in the same place) that when he prayed they and that according to higher causes, in view of which it were permitted to see one another, and in this they had was foreseen that they would be recalled to life, they were a certain joy, not real but imaginary, in the fulfillment of to be disposed of otherwise. their desire. Even so the demons are said to rejoice when Or we may say with some that Trajan’s soul was not they draw men into sin, although this nowise diminishes simply freed from the debt of eternal punishment, but that their punishment, as neither is the joy of the angels dimin- his punishment was suspended for a time, that is, until the ished by the fact that they take pity on our ills. judgment day. Nor does it follow that this is the general Reply to Objection 5. Concerning the incident of result of suffrages, because things happen differently in Trajan it may be supposed with probability that he was accordance with the general law from that which is per- recalled to life at the prayers of blessed Gregory, and thus mitted in particular cases and by privilege. Even so the obtained the grace whereby he received the pardon of his bounds of human affairs differ from those of the miracles sins and in consequence was freed from punishment. The of the Divine power as Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. same applies to all those who were miraculously raised xvi). from the dead, many of whom were evidently idolaters Whether suffrages profit those who are in purgatory? Suppl. q. 71 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that suffrages do not profit those who are not very good or not very bad.” Now such even those who are in purgatory. For purgatory is a part are those who are detained in purgatory. Therefore, etc. of hell. Now “there is no redemption in hell”∗, and it is Further, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vii) that the “god- written (Ps. 6:6), “Who shall confess to Thee in hell?” like priest in praying for the departed prays for those who Therefore suffrages do not profit those who are in purga- lived a holy life, and yet contracted certain stains through tory. human frailty.” Now such persons are detained in purga- Objection 2. Further, the punishment of purgatory is tory. Therefore, etc. finite. Therefore if some of the punishment is abated by I answer that, The punishment of purgatory is in- suffrages, it would be possible to have such a great num- tended to supplement the satisfaction which was not fully ber of suffrages, that the punishment would be entirely re- completed in the body. Consequently, since, as stated mitted, and consequently the sin entirely unpunished: and above (Aa. 1,2; q. 13, a. 2), the works of one person can this would seem incompatible with Divine justice. avail for another’s satisfaction, whether the latter be liv- Objection 3. Further, souls are in purgatory in or- ing or dead, the suffrages of the living, without any doubt, der that they may be purified there, and being pure may profit those who are in purgatory. come to the kingdom. Now nothing can be purified, un- Reply to Objection 1. The words quoted refer to less something be done to it. Therefore suffrages offered those who are in the hell of the damned, where there is by the living do not diminish the punishment of purgatory. no redemption for those who are finally consigned to that Objection 4. Further, if suffrages availed those who punishment. We may also reply with Damascene (Serm.: are in purgatory, those especially would seem to avail De his qui in fide dormierunt) that such statements are them which are offered at their behest. Yet these do not to be explained with reference to the lower causes, that always avail: for instance, if a person before dying were is according to the demands of the merits of those who to provide for so many suffrages to be offered for him that are consigned to those punishments. But according to the if they were offered they would suffice for the remission Divine mercy which transcends human merits, it happens of his entire punishment. Now supposing these suffrages otherwise through the prayers of the righteous, than is im- to be delayed until he is released from punishment, they plied by the expressions quoted in the aforesaid authori- will profit him nothing. For it cannot be said that they ties. Now “God changes His sentence but not his coun- profit him before they are discharged; and after they are sel,” as Gregory says (Moral. xx): wherefore the Dam- fulfilled, he no longer needs them, since he is already re- ascene (Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) quotes as leased. Therefore suffrages do not avail those who are in instances of this the Ninevites, Achab and Ezechias, in purgatory. whom it is apparent that the sentence pronounced against On the contrary, As quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, them by God was commuted by the Divine mercy†. 45), Augustine says (Enchiridion cx): “Suffrages profit Reply to Objection 2. It is not unreasonable that the ∗ Office of the Dead, Resp. vii † Cf. Ia, q. 19, a. 7, ad 2 2929 punishment of those who are in purgatory be entirely done tion of the agent may be considered in relation either to away by the multiplicity of suffrages. But it does not fol- the principal agent or to the executor. I say, then, that low that the sins remain unpunished, because the punish- the dying person, as soon as he provides for certain suf- ment of one undertaken in lieu of another is credited to frages to be offered for him, receives the full meed of that other. those suffrages, even before they are discharged, as re- Reply to Objection 3. The purifying of the soul by gards the efficacy of the suffrages that results from the the punishment of purgatory is nothing else than the expi- action as proceeding from the principal agent. But as re- ation of the guilt that hinders it from obtaining glory. And gards the efficacy of the suffrages arising from the action since, as stated above (q. 13, a. 2), the guilt of one person done or from the action as proceeding from the executor, can be expiated by the punishment which another under- he does not receive the fruit before the suffrages are dis- goes in his stead, it is not unreasonable that one person be charged. And if, before this, he happens to be released purified by another satisfying for him. from his punishment, he will in this respect be deprived Reply to Objection 4. Suffrages avail on two counts, of the fruit of the suffrages, and this will fall back upon namely the action of the agent∗ and the action done. By those by whose fault he was then defrauded. For it is not action done I mean not only the sacrament of the Church, unreasonable that a person be defrauded in temporal mat- but the effect incidental to that action—thus from the giv- ters by another’s fault—and the punishment of purgatory ing of alms there follow the relief of the poor and their is temporal—although as regards the eternal retribution prayer to God for the deceased. In like manner the ac- none can be defrauded save by his own fault. Whether suffrages avail the children who are in limbo? Suppl. q. 71 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that suffrages avail the in limbo save because they lack the state of grace. Hence, children who are in limbo. For they are not detained there since the state of the dead cannot be changed by the works except for another’s sin. Therefore it is most becoming of the living, especially as regards the merit of the essen- that they should be assisted by the suffrages of others. tial reward or punishment, the suffrages of the living can- Objection 2. Further, in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45) not profit the children in limbo. the words of Augustine (Enchiridion cx) are quoted: “The Reply to Objection 1. Although original sin is such suffrages of the Church obtain forgiveness for those who that one person can be assisted by another on its account, are not very bad.” Now children are not reckoned among nevertheless the souls of the children in limbo are in such those who are very bad, since their punishment is very a state that they cannot be assisted, because after this life light. Therefore the suffrages of the Church avail them. there is no time for obtaining grace. On the contrary, The text (Sent. iv, D, 45) quotes Au- Reply to Objection 2. Augustine is speaking of those gustine as saying (Serm. xxxii, De Verb Ap.) that “suf- who are not very bad, but have been baptized. This is clear frages avail not those who have departed hence without from what precedes: “Since these sacrifices, whether of the faith that works by love.” Now the children departed the altar or of any alms whatsoever are offered for those thus. Therefore suffrages avail them not. who have been baptized,” etc. I answer that, Unbaptized children are not detained Whether suffrages profit the saints in heaven? Suppl. q. 71 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that in some way suf- Church profit those who are in heaven. frages profit the saints in heaven; on account of the words Objection 3. Further, the saints rejoice in heaven not of the Collect in the Mass†: “Even as they” (i.e. the sacra- only in their own goods, but also in the goods of others: ments) “avail thy saints unto glory, so may they profit us hence it is written (Lk. 15:10): “There is [Vulg.: ‘shall unto healing.” Now foremost among all suffrages is the be’] joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing sacrifice of the altar. Therefore suffrages profit the saints penance.” Therefore the joy of the saints in heaven in- in heaven. creases on account of the good works of the living: and Objection 2. Further, the sacraments cause what they consequently our suffrages also profit them. signify. Now the third part of the host, that namely Objection 4. Further, the Damascene says (Serm.: De which is dropped into the chalice, signifies those who lead his qui in fide dormierunt) quoting the words of Chrysos- a happy life in heaven. Therefore the suffrages of the tom: “For if the heathens,” he says, “burn the dead to- ∗ “Ex opere operante” and “ex opere operato” † Postcommunion, Feast of St. Andrew, Apostle 2930 gether with what has belonged to them, how much more what thy signify, they do not produce this effect in respect shouldst thou, a believer, send forth a believer together of everything that they signify: else, since they signify with what has belonged to him, not that they also may be Christ, they would produce something in Christ (which is brought to ashes like him, but that thou mayest surround absurd). But they produce their effect on the recipient of him with greater glory by so doing; and if he be a sinner the sacrament in virtue of that which is signified by the who has died, that thou mayest loose him from his sins, sacrament. Thus it does not follow that the sacrifices of- and if he be righteous, that thou mayest add to his meed fered for the faithful departed profit the saints, but that by and reward!” And thus the same conclusion follows. the merits of the saints which we commemorate, or which On the contrary, As quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, are signified in the sacrament, they profit others for whom 15), Augustine says (De Verb Ap., Serm. xvii): “It is in- they are offered. sulting to pray for a martyr in church, since we ought to Reply to Objection 3. Although the saints in heaven commend ourselves to his prayers.” rejoice in all our goods, it does not follow, that if our joys Further, to be assisted belongs to one who is in need. be increased their joy is also increased formally, but only But the saints in heaven are without any need whatever. materially, because every passion is increased formally in Therefore they are not assisted by the suffrages of the respect of the formal aspect of its object. Now the formal Church. aspect of the saints’ joy, no matter what they rejoice in, is I answer that, Suffrage by its very nature implies the God Himself, in Whom they cannot rejoice more and less, giving of some assistance, which does not apply to one for otherwise their essential reward, consisting of their joy who suffers no default: since no one is competent to be in God, would vary. Hence from the fact that the goods assisted except he who is in need. Hence, as the saints in are multiplied, wherein they rejoice with God as the for- heaven are free from all need, being inebriated with the mal aspect of their joy, it does not follow that their joy plenty of God’s house (Ps. 35:10), they are not competent is intensified, but that they rejoice in more things. Con- to be assisted by suffrages. sequently it does not follow that they are assisted by our Reply to Objection 1. Such like expressions do works. not mean that the saints receive an increase of glory in Reply to Objection 4. The sense is not that an in- themselves through our observing their feasts, but that crease of meed or reward accrues to the saint from the we profit thereby in celebrating their glory with greater suffrages offered by a person, but that this accrues to the solemnity. Thus, through our knowing or praising God, offerer. Or we may reply that the blessed departed may and through His glory thus increasing some what in us, derive a reward from suffrages through having, while liv- there accrues something, not to God, but to us. ing, provided for suffrage to be offered for himself, and Reply to Objection 2. Although the sacraments cause this was meritorious for him. Whether the prayers of the Church, the sacrifice of the altar and alms profit the de-Suppl. q. 71 a. 9 parted? Objection 1. It would seem that the souls of the de- departed equally with or more than the Sacrament of the parted are not assisted only by the prayers of the Church, altar. the sacrifice of the altar and alms, or that they are not Objection 4. Further, this would seem to follow from assisted by them chiefly. For punishment should com- the words of 1 Cor. 15:29, “If the dead rise not again at all, pensate for punishment. Now fasting is more penal than why are they then baptized for them?” Therefore Baptism almsgiving or prayer. Therefore fasting profits more as avails as suffrage for the dead. suffrage than any of the above. Objection 5. Further, in different Masses there is the Objection 2. Further, Gregory reckons fasting to- same Sacrifice of the altar. If, therefore, sacrifice, and gether with these three, as stated in the Decretals (xiii, not the Mass, be reckoned among the suffrages, it would Q. ii, Cap. 22): “The souls of the departed are released in seem that the effect would be the same whatever Mass four ways, either by the offerings of priests, or the alms of be said for a deceased person, whether in honor of the their friends, or the prayers of the saints, or the fasting of Blessed Virgin or of the Holy Ghost, or any other. Yet this their kinsfolk.” Therefore the three mentioned above are seems contrary to the ordinance of the Church which has insufficiently reckoned by Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. appointed a special Mass for the dead. xviii). Objection 6. Further, the Damascene (Serm.: De his Objection 3. Further, Baptism is the greatest of the qui in fide dormierunt) teaches that candles and oil should sacraments, especially as regards its effect. Therefore be offered for the dead. Therefore not only the offering of Baptism and other sacraments ought to be offered for the the sacrifice of the altar, but also other offerings should be 2931 reckoned among suffrages for the dead. Reply to Objection 3. Baptism is a spiritual regen- I answer that, The suffrages of the living profit the eration, wherefore just as by generation being does not dead in so far as the latter are united to the living in char- accrue save to the object generated, so Baptism produces ity, and in so far as the intention of the living is directed to its effect only in the person baptized, as regards the deed the dead. Consequently those whose works are by nature done: and yet as regards the deed of the doer whether of best adapted to assist the dead, which pertain chiefly to the baptizer or of the baptized, it may profit others even as the communication of charity, or to the directing of one’s other meritorious works. On the other hand, the Eucharist intention to another person. Now the sacrament of the is the sign of ecclesiastical unity, wherefore by reason of Eucharist belongs chiefly to charity, since it is the sacra- the deed done its effect can pass to another, which is not ment of ecclesiastical unity, inasmuch as it contains Him the case with the other sacraments. in Whom the whole Church is united and incorporated, Reply to Objection 4. According to a gloss this pas- namely Christ: wherefore the Eucharist is as it were the sage may be expounded in two ways. First, thus: “If the origin and bond of charity. Again, chief among the effects dead rise not again, nor did Christ rise again, why are they of charity is the work of almsgiving: wherefore on the part baptized for them? i.e. for sins, since they are not par- of charity these two, namely the sacrifice of the Church doned if Christ rose not again, because in Baptism not and almsgiving are the chief suffrages for the dead. But on only Christ’s passion but also His resurrection operates, the part of the intention directed to the dead the chief suf- for the latter is in a sense the cause of our spiritual res- frage is prayer, because prayer by its very nature implies urrection.” Secondly, thus: There have been some mis- relation not only to the person who prays, even as other guided persons who were baptized for those who had de- works do, but more directly still to that which we pray parted this life without baptism, thinking that this would for. Hence these three are reckoned the principal means profit them: and according to this explanation the Apostle of succoring the dead, although we must allow that any is speaking, in the above words, merely according to the other goods whatsoever that are done out of charity for opinion of certain persons. the dead are profitable to them. Reply to Objection 5. In the office of the Mass there Reply to Objection 1. When one person satisfies for is not only a sacrifice but also prayers. Hence the suf- another, the point to consider, in order that the effect of frage of the Mass contains two of the things mentioned his satisfaction reach the other, is the thing whereby the by Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xviii), namely “prayer” satisfaction of one passes to another, rather than even the and “sacrifice.” As regards the sacrifice offered the Mass punishment undergone by way of satisfaction; although profits equally the departed, no matter in whose honor it the punishment expiates more the guilt of the one who be said: and this is the principal thing done in the Mass. satisfies, in so far as it is a kind of medicine. And con- But as regards the prayers, that Mass is most profitable in sequently the three aforesaid are more profitable to the which the prayers are appointed for this purpose. Never- departed than fasting. theless, this defect may be supplied by the greater devo- Reply to Objection 2. It is true that fasting can profit tion, either of the one who says Mass, or of the one who the departed by reason of charity, and on account of the in- orders the Mass to be said, or again, by the intercession of tention being directed to the departed. Nevertheless, fast- the saint whose suffrage is besought in the Mass. ing does not by its nature contain anything pertaining to Reply to Objection 6. This offering of candles or oil charity or to the directing of the intention, and these things may profit the departed in so far as they are a kind of alms: are extrinsic thereto as it were, and for this reason Au- for they are given for the worship of the Church or for the gustine did not reckon, while Gregory did reckon, fasting use of the faithful. among the suffrages for the dead. Whether the indulgences of the Church profit the dead? Suppl. q. 71 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that the indulgences is more efficacious than that of one person. Now personal granted by the Church profit even the dead. First, on ac- merit serves as a suffrage for the departed, for instance count of the custom of the Church, who orders the preach- in the case of almsgiving. Much more therefore does the ing of a crusade in order that some one may gain an in- merit of the Church whereon indulgences are founded. dulgence for himself and for two or three and sometimes Objection 3. Further, the indulgences of the Church even ten souls, both of the living and of the dead. But profit those who are members of the Church. Now those this would amount to a deception unless they profited the who are in purgatory are members of the Church, else the dead. Therefore indulgences profit the dead. suffrages of the Church would not profit them. Therefore Objection 2. Further, the merit of the whole Church it would seem that indulgences profit the departed. 2932 On the contrary, In order that indulgences may avail that which is the cause of the indulgence. This is some-a person, there must be a fitting cause for granting the in- times feasible and sometimes not, according to the differ- dulgence∗. Now there can be no such cause on the part ent forms of indulgence. For if the form of indulgence be of the dead, since they can do nothing that is of profit to such as this: “Whosoever does this or that shall gain so the Church, and it is for such a cause that indulgences are much indulgence,” he who does this cannot transfer the chiefly granted. Therefore, seemingly, indulgences profit fruit of the indulgence to another, because it is not in his not the dead. power to apply to a particular person the intention of the Further, indulgences are regulated according to the de- Church who dispenses the common suffrages whence in- cision of the party who grants them. If, therefore, indul- dulgences derive their value, as stated above (q. 27, a. 3, gences could avail the dead, it would be in the power of ad 2). If, however, the indulgence be granted in this form: the party granting them to release a deceased person en- “Whosoever does this or that, he, his father, or any other tirely from punishment: which is apparently absurd. person connected with him and detained in purgatory, will I answer that, An indulgence may profit a person in gain so much indulgence,” an indulgence of this kind will two ways: in one way, principally; in another, secon- avail not only a living but also a deceased person. For darily. It profits principally the person who avails him- there is no reason why the Church is able to transfer the self of an indulgence, who, namely, does that for which common merits, whereon indulgences are based, to the the indulgence is granted, for instance one who visits the living and not to the dead. Nor does it follow that a prelate shrine of some saint. Hence since the dead can do none of the Church can release souls from purgatory just as he of those things for which indulgences are granted, indul- lists, since for indulgences to avail there must be a fitting gences cannot avail them directly. However, they profit cause for granting them, as stated above (q. 26, a. 3). secondarily and indirectly the person for whom one does Whether the burial service profits the dead? Suppl. q. 71 a. 11 Objection 1. It would seem that the burial service ity. Therefore the burial service profits the dead. profits the dead. For Damascene (Serm.: De his qui in fide Objection 5. Further, God is more inclined to pity dormierunt) quotes Athanasius as saying: “Even though than to condemn. Now burial in a sacred place is hurt- he who has departed in godliness be taken up to heaven, ful to some if they be unworthy: wherefore Gregory says do not hesitate to call upon God and to burn oil and wax (Dial. iv): “If those who are burdened with grievous sins at his tomb; for such things are pleasing to God and re- are buried in the church this will lead to their more severe ceive a great reward from Him.” Now the like pertain to condemnation rather than to their release.” Much more, the burial service. Therefore the burial service profits the therefore, should we say that the burial service profits the dead. good. Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine (De On the contrary, Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. Cura pro mort. iii), “In olden times the funerals of just iii): “Whatever service is done the body is no aid to sal- men were cared for with dutiful piety, their obsequies vation, but an office of humanity.” celebrated, their graves provided, and themselves while Further, Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii; De living charged their children touching the burial or even Civ. Dei i): “The funereal equipment, the disposition of the translation of their bodies.” But they would not have the grace, the solemnity of the obsequies are a comfort to done this unless the tomb and things of this kind conferred the living rather than a help to the dead.” something on the dead. Therefore the like profit the dead Further, Our Lord said (Lk. 12:4): “Be not afraid of somewhat. them who kill the body, and after that have no more that Objection 3. Further, no one does a work of mercy they can do.” Now after death the bodies of the saints can on some one’s behalf unless it profit him. Now burying be hindered from being buried, as we read of having been the dead is reckoned among the works of mercy, therefore done to certain martyrs at Lyons in Gaul (Eusebius, Eccl. Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii): “Tobias, as at- Hist. v, 1). Therefore the dead take no harm if their bod- tested by the angel, is declared to have found favor with ies remain unburied: and consequently the burial service God by burying the dead.” Therefore such like burial ob- does not profit them. servances profit the dead. I answer that, We have recourse to burial for the sake Objection 4. Further, it is unbecoming to assert that of both the living and the dead. For the sake of the liv- the devotion of the faithful is fruitless. Now some, out of ing, lest their eyes be revolted by the disfigurement of the devotion, arrange for their burial in some religious local- corpse, and their bodies be infected by the stench, and this ∗ Cf. q. 25, a. 2 2933 as regards the body. But it profits the living also spiritu-Reply to Objection 2. The fathers of old arranged for ally inasmuch as our belief in the resurrection is confirmed the burial of their bodies, so as to show that “the bodies thereby. It profits the dead in so far as one bears the dead of the dead” are the object of Divine providence, not that in mind and prays for them through looking on their burial there is any feeling in a dead body, but in order to confirm place, wherefore a “monument” takes its name from re- the belief in the resurrection, as Augustine says (De Civ. membrance, for a monument is something that recalls the Dei i, 13). Hence, also, they wished to be buried in the mind [monens mentem], as Augustine observes (De Civ. land of promise, where they believed Christ’s birth and Dei i; De Cura pro Mort. iv). It was, however, a pagan death would take place, Whose resurrection is the cause error that burial was profitable to the dead by procuring of our rising again. rest for his soul: for they believed that the soul could not Reply to Objection 3. Since flesh is a part of man’s be at rest until the body was buried, which is altogether nature, man has a natural affection for his flesh, according ridiculous and absurd. to Eph. 5:29, “No man ever hated his own flesh.” Hence That, moreover, burial in a sacred place profits the in accordance with this natural affection a man has during dead, does not result from the action done, but rather from life a certain solicitude for what will become of his body the action itself of the doer: when, to wit, the dead person after death: and he would grieve if he had a presentiment himself, or another, arranges for his body to be buried in that something untoward would happen to his body. Con- a sacred place, and commends him to the patronage of sequently those who love a man, through being conformed some saint, by whose prayers we must believe that he is to the one they love in his affection for himself, treat his assisted, as well as to the suffrages of those who serve the body with loving care. For as Augustine says (De Civ. holy place, and pray more frequently and more specially Dei i, 13): “If a father’s garment and ring, and whatever for those who are buried in their midst. But such things such like is the more dear to those whom they leave be- as are done for the display of the obsequies are profitable hind the greater their affection is towards their parents, in to the living, as being a consolation to them; and yet they no wise are the bodies themselves to be spurned which can also profit the dead, not directly but indirectly, in so truly we wear in more familiar and close conjunction than far as men are aroused to pity thereby and consequently to anything else we put on.” pray, or in so far as the outlay on the burial brings either Reply to Objection 4. As Augustine says (De Cura assistance to the poor or adornment to the church: for it is pro Mort. iv), the devotion of the faithful is not fruitless in this sense that the burial of the dead is reckoned among when they arrange for their friends to be buried in holy the works of mercy. places, since by so doing they commend their dead to the Reply to Objection 1. By bringing oil and candles suffrages of the saints, as stated above. to the tombs of the dead we profit them indirectly, either Reply to Objection 5. The wicked man dead takes no as offering them to the Church and as giving them to the harm by being buried in a holy place, except in so far as poor, or as doing this in reverence of God. Hence, af- he rendered such a burial place unfitting for him by reason ter the words quoted we read: “For oil and candles are a of human glory. holocaust.” Whether suffrages offered for one deceased person profit the person for whom they Suppl. q. 71 a. 12 are offered more than others? Objection 1. It would seem that suffrages offered for than those for whom they are offered. Therefore they one deceased person are not more profitable to the one for profit more by those suffrages, else their merits would be whom they are offered, than to others. For spiritual light rendered unavailing. is more communicable than a material light. Now a mate- Objection 3. Further, the poor have not so many suf- rial light, for instance of a candle, though kindled for one frages given them as the rich. Therefore if the suffrages person only, avails equally all those who are gathered to- offered for certain people profit them alone, or profit them gether, though the candle be not lit for them. Therefore, more than others, the poor would be worse off: yet this is since suffrages are a kind of spiritual light, though they be contrary to our Lord’s saying (Lk. 6:20): “Blessed are ye offered for one person in particular, do not avail him any poor, for yours is the kingdom of God.” more than the others who are in purgatory. On the contrary, Human justice is copied from Di- Objection 2. Further, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, vine justice. But if a person pay another’s debt human D, 45), suffrages avail the dead “in so far as during this justice releases the latter alone. Therefore since he who life they merited that they might avail them afterwards”∗. offers suffrages for another pays the debt, in a sense, of Now some merited that suffrages might avail them more the person for whom he offers them, they profit this per- ∗ St. Augustine, Enchiridion cx 2934 son alone. ment; for after death there is no possibility of obtaining or Further, just as a man by offering suffrages satisfies increasing grace, whereas during life the works of others somewhat for a deceased person, so, too, sometimes a avail for this purpose by the virtue of charity. In the sec- person can satisfy for a living person. Now where one ond place suffrages derive their value from being applied satisfies for a living person the satisfaction counts only to another person by one’s intention. In this way the satis- for the person for whom it is offered. Therefore one also faction of one person counts for another, and there can be who offers suffrages profits him alone for whom he offers no doubt that thus they avail more the person for whom them. they are offered: in fact, they avail him alone in this way, I answer that, There have been two opinions on this because satisfaction, properly speaking, is directed to the question. Some, like Praepositivus, have said that suf- remission of punishment. Consequently, as regards the re- frages offered for one particular person do avail chiefly, mission of punishment, suffrages avail chiefly the person not the person for whom they are offered, but those who for whom they are offered, and accordingly there is more are most worthy. And they instanced a candle which is truth in the second opinion than in the first. lit for a rich man and profits those who are with him no Reply to Objection 1. Suffrages avail, after the man- less than the rich man himself, and perhaps even more, ner of a light, in so far as they reach the dead, who thereby if they have keener sight. They also gave the instance of receive a certain amount of consolation: and this is all the a lesson which profits the person to whom it is given no greater according as they are endowed with a greater char- more than others who listen with him, but perhaps prof- ity. But in so far as suffrages are a satisfaction applied to its these others more, if they be more intelligent. And if another by the intention of the offerer, they do not resem- it were pointed out to them that in this case the Church’s ble a light, but rather the payment of a debt: and it does ordinance in appointing certain special prayers for certain not follow, if one person’s debt be paid, that the debt of persons is futile, they said that the Church did this to ex- others is paid likewise. cite the devotion of the faithful, who are more inclined to Reply to Objection 2. Such a merit is conditional, for offer special than common suffrages, and pray more fer- in this way they merited that suffrages would profit them vently for their kinsfolk than for strangers. if offered for them, and this was merely to render them- Others, on the contrary, said that suffrages avail more selves fit recipients of those suffrages. It is therefore clear those for whom they are offered. Now both opinions have that they did not directly merit the assistance of those suf- a certain amount of truth: for the value of suffrages may frages, but made themselves fit by their preceding merits be gauged from two sources. For their value is derived to receive the fruit of suffrages. Hence it does not follow in the first place from the virtue of charity, which makes that their merit is rendered unavailing. all goods common, and in this respect they avail more the Reply to Objection 3. Nothing hinders the rich from person who is more full of charity, although they are not being in some respects better off than the poor, for in- offered specially for him. In this way the value of suf- stance as regards the expiation of their punishment. But frages regards more a certain inward consolation by rea- this is as nothing in comparison with the kingdom of son of which one who is in charity rejoices in the goods of heaven, where the poor are shown to be better off by the another after death in respect of the diminution of punish- authority quoted. Whether suffrages offered for several are of as much value to each one as if they had Suppl. q. 71 a. 13 been offered for each in particular? Objection 1. It would seem that suffrages offered for the dead person for whom the Mass is said were to lose several are of as much value to each one as if they had something thereby. Therefore the same conclusion fol- been offered for each in particular. For it is clear that if lows as above. one person receives a lesson he loses nothing if others re- Objection 3. Further, suffrages, especially of prayers, ceive the lesson with him. Therefore in like manner a per- rely on the Divine power. But with God, just as it makes son for whom a suffrage is offered loses nothing if some no difference whether He helps by means of many or by one else is reckoned together with him: and consequently means of a few, so it differs not whether He assists many if it be offered for several, it is of as much value to each or a few. Therefore if the one same prayer be said for one as if it were offered for each in particular. many, each one of them will receive as much assistance Objection 2. Further, it is to be observed that accord- as one person would if that same prayer were said for him ing to the common practice of the Church, when Mass is alone. said for one deceased person, other prayers are added for On the contrary, It is better to assist many than one. other deceased persons. Now this would not be done, if If therefore a suffrage offered for several is of as much 2935 value to each one as if it were offered for one alone, it dent that this question depends on the first; and, moreover, would seem that the Church ought not to have appointed it is made clear why special suffrages are appointed to be a Mass and prayer to be said for one person in particular, offered in the Church. but that Mass ought always to be said for all the faithful Reply to Objection 1. Suffrages considered as works departed: and this is evidently false. of satisfaction do not profit after the manner of an action Further, a suffrage has a finite efficiency. Therefore if as teaching does; for teaching, like any other action, pro- it be divided among many it avails less for each one than duces its effect according to the disposition of the recipi- if it were offered for one only. ent. But they profit after the manner of the payment of a I answer that, If the value of suffrages be considered debt, as stated above (a. 12, ad 1); and so the comparison according as it is derived from the virtue of charity unit- fails. ing the members of the Church together, suffrages offered Reply to Objection 2. Since suffrages offered for one for several persons avail each one as much as if they were person avail others in a certain way, as stated (a. 1), it offered for one alone, because charity is not diminished follows that when Mass is said for one person, it is not if its effect be divided among many, in fact rather is it in- unfitting for prayers to be said for others also. For these creased; and in like manner joy increases through being prayers are said, not that the satisfaction offered by one shared by many, as Augustine says (Confess. viii). Con- suffrage be applied to those others chiefly, but that the sequently many in purgatory rejoice in one good deed no prayer offered for them in particular may profit them also. less than one does. On the other hand, if we consider the Reply to Objection 3. Prayer may be considered both value of suffrages, inasmuch as they are a kind of satis- on the part of the one who prays, and on the part of the per- faction applied to the dead by the intention of the person son prayed: and its effect depends on both. Consequently offering them, then the suffrage for some person in par- though it is no more difficult to the Divine power to ab- ticular avails him more than that which is offered for him solve many than to absolve one, nevertheless the prayer of in common with many others; for in this case the effect of one who prays thus is not as satisfactory for many as for the suffrages is divided in virtue of Divine justice among one. those for whom the suffrages are offered. Hence it is evi- Whether general suffrages avail those for whom special suffrages are not offered, as Suppl. q. 71 a. 14 much as special suffrages avail those for whom they are offered in addition to general suffrages? Objection 1. It would seem that general suffrages suffrages offered for one person in particular avail indif- avail those for whom special suffrages are not offered, as ferently for all, then all suffrages are common; and con- much as special suffrages avail those for whom they are sequently one for whom the special suffrages are not of- offered in addition to general suffrages. For in the life to fered will be assisted as much as the one for whom they come each one will be rewarded according to his merits. are offered, if he be equally worthy. On the other hand, Now a person for whom no suffrages are offered merited if the suffrages offered for a person do not profit all in- to be assisted after death as much as one for whom spe- differently, but those chiefly for whom they are offered, cial suffrages are offered. Therefore the former will be then there is no doubt that general and special suffrages assisted by general suffrages as much as the latter by spe- together avail a person more than general suffrages alone. cial and general suffrages. Hence the Master, in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45), men- Objection 3. Further, the Eucharist is the chief of tions two opinions: one, when he says that a rich man the suffrages of the Church. Now the Eucharist, since it derives from general, together with special suffrages, an contains Christ whole, has infinite efficacy so to speak. equal profit to that which a poor man derives from special Therefore one offering of the Eucharist for all in general suffrages alone; for although the one receives assistance is of sufficient value to release all who are in purgatory: from more sources than the other, he does not receive a and consequently general suffrages alone afford as much greater assistance: the other opinion he mentions when he assistance as special and general suffrages together. says that a person for whom special suffrages are offered On the contrary, Two goods are more eligible than obtains a more speedy but not a more complete release, one. Therefore special suffrages, together with general because each will be finally released from all punishment. suffrages, are more profitable to the person for whom they Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 12, ad 2) are offered than general suffrages alone. the assistance derived from suffrages is not directly and I answer that, The reply to this question depends on simply an object of merit, but conditionally as it were: that which is given to the twelfth inquiry (a. 12): for if the hence the argument does not prove. 2936 Reply to Objection 2. Although the power of Christ whom they are offered (for instance if they need them not) Who is contained in the Sacrament of the Eucharist is in- we may well believe that by God’s mercy this is granted finite, yet there is a definite effect to which that sacrament to others for whom those suffrages are not offered, if they is directed. Hence it does not follow that the whole pun- need them: as affirmed by Damascene (Serm.: De his qui ishment of those who are in purgatory is expiated by one in fide dormierunt) who says: “Truly God, forasmuch as sacrifice of the altar: even so, by the one sacrifice which He is just will adapt ability to the disabled, and will ar- a man offers, he is not released from the whole satisfac- range for an exchange of deficiencies”: and this exchange tion due for his sins, wherefore sometimes several Masses is effected when what is lacking to one is supplied by an- are enjoined in satisfaction for one sin. Nevertheless, if other. any thing from special suffrages be left over for those for 2937 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 72 Of Prayers with Regard to the Saints in Heaven (In Three Articles) We must now consider prayer with regard to the saints in heaven. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the saints have knowledge of our prayers? (2) Whether we should beseech them to pray for us? (3) Whether the prayers they pour forth for us are always granted? Whether the saints have knowledge of our prayers? Suppl. q. 72 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the saints have no Objection 5. Further, God alone is the searcher of knowledge of our prayers. For a gloss on Is. 62:16, “Thou hearts. Now prayer is seated chiefly in the heart. There- art our father and Abraham hath not known us, and Israel fore it belongs to God alone to know our prayers. There- hath been ignorant of us,” says that “the dead saints know fore our prayers are unknown to the saints. not what the living, even their own children, are doing.” On the contrary, Gregory, commenting on Job 14:21, This is taken from Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), “Whether his children come to honor or dishonor, he shall where he quotes the aforesaid authority, and the follow- not understand,” says (Moral. xii): “This does not apply ing are his words: “If such great men as the patriarchs to the souls of the saints, for since they have an insight of knew not what was happening to the people begotten of Almighty God’s glory we must nowise believe that any- them, how can the dead occupy themselves in watching thing outside that glory is unknown to them.” Therefore and helping the affairs and actions of the living?” There- they are cognizant of our prayers. Further, Gregory says fore the saints cannot be cognizant of our prayers. (Dial. ii): “All creatures are little to the soul that sees Objection 2. Further, the following words are ad- God: because however little it sees of the Creator’s light, dressed to King Joas (4 Kings 22:20): “Therefore” (i.e. every created thing appears foreshortened to it.” Now ap- because thou hast wept before Me), “I will gather thee to parently the chief obstacle to the souls of the saints be- thy fathers. . . that thy eyes may not see all the evils which ing cognizant of our prayers and other happenings in our I will bring upon this place.” But Joas would have gained regard is that they are far removed from us. Since then no such advantage from his death if he were to know after distance does not prevent these things, as appears from death what was happening to his people. Therefore the the authority quoted, it would seem that the souls of the saints after death know not our actions, and thus they are saints are cognizant of our prayers and of what happens not cognizant of our prayers. here below. Objection 3. Further, the more perfect a man is in Further, unless they were aware of what happens in charity, the more he succors his neighbor when the latter our regard they would not pray for us, since they would is in danger. Now the saints, in this life, watch over their be ignorant of our needs. But this is the error of Vigilan- neighbor, especially their kinsfolk, when these are in dan- tius, as Jerome asserts in his letter against him. Therefore ger, and manifestly assist them. Since then, after death, the saints are cognizant of what happens in our regard. their charity is much greater, if they were cognizant of our I answer that, The Divine essence is a sufficient deeds, much more would they watch over their friends and medium for knowing all things, and this is evident from kindred and assist them in their needs: and yet, seemingly, the fact that God, by seeing His essence, sees all things. they do not. Therefore it would seem that our deeds and But it does not follow that whoever sees God’s essence prayers are not known to them. knows all things, but only those who comprehend the Objection 4. Further, even as the saints after death essence of God†: even as the knowledge of a principle see the Word, so do the angels of whom it is stated (Mat. does not involve the knowledge of all that follows from 18:10) that “their angels in heaven always see the face of that principle unless the whole virtue of the principle be My Father.” Yet the angels through seeing the Word do comprehended. Wherefore, since the souls of the saints not therefore know all things, since the lower angels are do not comprehend the Divine essence, it does not fol- cleansed from their lack of knowledge by the higher an- low that they know all that can be known by the Divine gels∗, as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore essence—for which reason the lower angels are taught although the saints see the Word, they do not see therein concerning certain matters by the higher angels, though our prayers and other things that happen in our regard. they all see the essence of God; but each of the blessed ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 106, a. 1 † Cf. Ia, q. 12, Aa. 7,8 2938 must needs see in the Divine essence as many other things enly joy, that sorrow finds no place in them. Wherefore as the perfection of his happiness requires. For the perfec- if after death they know the woes of their friends, their tion of a man’s happiness requires him to have whatever grief is forestalled by their removal from this world be- he will, and to will nothing amiss: and each one wills fore their woes occur. Perhaps, however, the non-glorified with a right will, to know what concerns himself. Hence souls would grieve somewhat, if they were aware of the since no rectitude is lacking to the saints, they wish to distress of their dear ones: and since the soul of Josias know what concerns themselves, and consequently it fol- was not glorified as soon as it went out from his body, it is lows that they know it in the Word. Now it pertains to their in this respect that Augustine uses this argument to show glory that they assist the needy for their salvation: for thus that the souls of the dead have no knowledge of the deeds they become God’s co-operators, “than which nothing is of the living. more Godlike,” as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. iii). Reply to Objection 3. The souls of the saints have Wherefore it is evident that the saints are cognizant of their will fully conformed to the Divine will even as re- such things as are required for this purpose; and so it is gards the things willed. and consequently, although they manifest that they know in the Word the vows, devotions, retain the love of charity towards their neighbor, they do and prayers of those who have recourse to their assistance. not succor him otherwise than they see to be in conformity Reply to Objection 1. The saying of Augustine is with the disposition of Divine justice. Nevertheless, it is to be understood as referring to the natural knowledge of to be believed that they help their neighbor very much by separated souls, which knowledge is devoid of obscurity interceding for him to God. in holy men. But he is not speaking of their knowledge in Reply to Objection 4. Although it does not follow the Word, for it is clear that when Isaias said this, Abra- that those who see the Word see all things in the Word, ham had no such knowledge, since no one had come to they see those things that pertain to the perfection of their the vision of God before Christ’s passion. happiness, as stated above. Reply to Objection 2. Although the saints, after this Reply to Objection 5. God alone of Himself knows life, know what happens here below, we must not believe the thoughts of the heart: yet others know them, in so far that they grieve through knowing the woes of those whom as these are revealed to them, either by their vision of the they loved in this world: for they are so filled with heav- Word or by any other means. Whether we ought to call upon the saints to pray for us? Suppl. q. 72 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to call our intercessors with God. upon the saints to pray for us. For no man asks anyone’s Objection 5. Further, it is unnecessary to do a thing friends to pray for him, except in so far as he believes if, without doing it, the purpose for which it is done would he will more easily find favor with them. But God is in- be achieved in the same way, or else not achieved at all. finitely more merciful than any saint, and consequently Now the saints would pray for us just the same, or would His will is more easily inclined to give us a gracious hear- not pray for us at all, whether we pray to them or not: for ing, than the will of a saint. Therefore it would seem un- if we be worthy of their prayers, they would pray for us necessary to make the saints mediators between us and even though we prayed not to them, while if we be un- God, that they may intercede for us. worthy they pray not for us even though we ask them to. Objection 2. Further, if we ought to beseech them to Therefore it seems altogether unnecessary to call on them pray for us, this is only because we know their prayer to be to pray for us. acceptable to God. Now among the saints the holier a man On the contrary, It is written (Job 5:1): “Call. . . if is, the more is his prayer acceptable to God. Therefore we there be any that will answer thee, and turn to some of the ought always to bespeak the greater saints to intercede for saints.” Now, as Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) on this pas- us with God, and never the lesser ones. sage, “we call upon God when we beseech Him in humble Objection 3. Further, Christ, even as man, is called prayer.” Therefore when we wish to pray God, we should the “Holy of Holies,” and, as man, it is competent to Him turn to the saints, that they may pray God for us. to pray. Yet we never call upon Christ to pray for us. Further, the saints who are in heaven are more accept- Therefore neither should we ask the other saints to do so. able to God than those who are on the way. Now we Objection 4. Further, whenever one person intercedes should make the saints, who are on the way, our inter- for another at the latter’s request, he presents his petition cessors with God, after the example of the Apostle, who to the one with whom he intercedes for him. Now it is said (Rom. 15:30): “I beseech you. . . brethren, through unnecessary to present anything to one to whom all things our Lord Jesus Christ, and by the charity of the Holy are present. Therefore it is unnecessary to make the saints Ghost, that you help me in your prayers for me to God.” 2939 Much more, therefore, should we ask the saints who are First, because sometimes one has greater devotion for a in heaven to help us by their prayers to God. lesser saint than for a greater, and the effect of prayer de- Further, an additional argument is provided by the pends very much on one’s devotion. Secondly, in order common custom of the Church which asks for the prayers to avoid tediousness, for continual attention to one thing of the saints in the Litany. makes a person weary; whereas by praying to different I answer that, According to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) saints, the fervor of our devotion is aroused anew as it the order established by God among things is that “the last were. Thirdly, because it is granted to some saints to ex- should be led to God by those that are midway between.” ercise their patronage in certain special cases, for instance Wherefore, since the saints who are in heaven are near- to Saint Anthony against the fire of hell. Fourthly, that due est to God, the order of the Divine law requires that we, honor be given by us to all. Fifthly, because the prayers of who while we remain in the body are pilgrims from the several sometimes obtain that which would not have been Lord, should be brought back to God by the saints who obtained by the prayers of one. are between us and Him: and this happens when the Di- Reply to Objection 3. Prayer is an act, and acts be- vine goodness pours forth its effect into us through them. long to particular persons [supposita]. Hence, were we And since our return to God should correspond to the out- to say: “Christ, pray for us,” except we added something, flow of His boons upon us, just as the Divine favors reach this would seem to refer to Christ’s person, and conse- us by means of the saints intercession, so should we, by quently to agree with the error either of Nestorius, who their means, be brought back to God, that we may receive distinguished in Christ the person of the son of man from His favors again. Hence it is that we make them our inter- the person of the Son of God, or of Arius, who asserted cessors with God, and our mediators as it were, when we that the person of the Son is less than the Father. Where- ask them to pray for us. fore to avoid these errors the Church says not: “Christ, Reply to Objection 1. It is not on account of any de- pray for us,” but “Christ, hear us,” or “have mercy on us.” fect in God’s power that He works by means of second Reply to Objection 4. As we shall state further on causes, but it is for the perfection of the order of the uni- (a. 3) the saints are said to present our prayers to God, verse, and the more manifold outpouring of His goodness not as though they notified things unknown to Him, but on things, through His bestowing on them not only the because they ask God to grant those prayers a gracious goodness which is proper to them, but also the faculty of hearing, or because they seek the Divine truth about them, causing goodness in others. Even so it is not through any namely what ought to be done according to His provi- defect in His mercy, that we need to bespeak His clemency dence. through the prayers of the saints, but to the end that the Reply to Objection 5. A person is rendered worthy of aforesaid order in things be observed. a saint’s prayers for him by the very fact that in his need Reply to Objection 2. Although the greater saints are he has recourse to him with pure devotion. Hence it is not more acceptable to God than the lesser, it is sometimes unnecessary to pray to the saints. profitable to pray to the lesser; and this for five reasons. Whether the prayers which the saints pour forth to God for us are always granted? Suppl. q. 72 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the prayers which the Objection 3. Further, the saints in heaven are stated saints pour forth to God for us are not always granted. For to be equal to the angels of God (Mat. 22:30). But the if they were always granted, the saints would be heard es- angels are not always heard in the prayers which they of- pecially in regard to matters concerning themselves. But fer up to God. This is evident from Dan. 10:12,13, where they are not heard in reference to these things; wherefore it is written: “I am come for thy words: but the prince of it is stated in the Apocalypse (6:11) that on the martyrs be- the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one-and-twenty seeching vengeance on them that dwell on earth, “it was days.” But the angel who spoke had not come to Daniel’s said to them that they should rest for a little while till the aid except by asking of God to be set free; and yet the ful- number of their brethren should be filled up∗.” Much less fillment of his prayer was hindered. Therefore neither are therefore, are they heard in reference to matters concern- other saints always heard by God when they pray for us. ing others. Objection 4. Further, whosoever obtains something Objection 2. Further, it is written (Jer. 15:1): “If by prayer merits it in a sense. But the saints in heaven are Moses and Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is not not in the state of meriting. Therefore they cannot obtain towards this people.” Therefore, the saints are not always anything for us from God by their prayers. heard when they pray God for us. Objection 5. Further, the saints, in all things, conform ∗ Vulg.: ‘till their fellow-servants and their brethren. . . should be filled up’ 2940 their will to the will of God. Therefore they will nothing be saved”∗. For this will is not always fulfilled; wherefore but what they know God to will. But no one prays save no wonder if that also which the saints will according to for what he wills. Therefore they pray not save for what this kind of will be not fulfilled sometimes. they know God to will. Now that which God wills would Reply to Objection 1. This prayer of the martyrs is be done even without their praying for it. Therefore their merely their desire to obtain the robe of the body and the prayers are not efficacious for obtaining anything. fellowship of those who will be saved, and their consent to Objection 6. Further, the prayers of the whole heav- God’s justice in punishing the wicked. Hence a gloss on enly court, if they could obtain anything, would be more Apoc. 6:11, “How long, O Lord,” says: “They desire an efficacious than all the petitions of the Church here be- increase of joy and the fellowship of the saints, and they low. Now if the suffrages of the Church here below for consent to God’s justice.” some one in purgatory were to be multiplied, he would Reply to Objection 2. The Lord speaks there of be wholly delivered from punishment. Since then the Moses and Samuel according to their state in this life. For saints in heaven pray for those who are in purgatory on we read that they withstood God’s anger by praying for the same account as for us, if they obtain anything for the people. And yet even if they had been living at the us, their prayers would deliver entirely from punishment time in question, they would have been unable to placate those who are in purgatory. But this is not true because, God towards the people by their prayers, on account of then the Church’s suffrages for the dead would be unnec- the wickedness of this same people: and it is thus that we essary. are to understand this passage. On the contrary, It is written (2 Macc. 15:14): “This Reply to Objection 3. This dispute among the good is he that prayeth much for the people, and for all the holy angels does not mean that they offered contradictory city, Jeremias the prophet of God”: and that his prayer prayers to God, but that they submitted contrary merits on was granted is clear from what follows (2 Macc. 15:15): various sides to the Divine inquiry, with a view of God’s “Jeremias stretched forth his right hand, and gave to Judas pronouncing sentence thereon. This, in fact, is what Gre- a sword of gold, saying: Take this holy sword, a gift from gory says (Moral. xvii) in explanation of the aforesaid God,” etc. words of Daniel: “The lofty spirits that are set over the Further, Jerome says (Ep. contra Vigilant.): “Thou nations never fight in behalf of those that act unjustly, but sayest in thy pamphlets, that while we live, we can pray they justly judge and try their deeds. And when the guilt for one another, but that when we are dead no one’s prayer or innocence of any particular nation is brought into the for another will be heard”: and afterwards he refutes this debate of the court above, the ruling spirit of that nation in the following words: “If the apostles and martyrs while is said to have won or lost in the conflict. Yet the supreme yet in the body can pray for others, while they are still will of their Maker is victorious over all, for since they solicitous for themselves, how much more can they do have it ever before their eyes, they will not what they are so when the crown, the victory, the triumph is already unable to obtain,” wherefore neither do they seek for it. theirs!” And consequently it is clear that their prayers are always Further, this is confirmed by the custom of the Church, heard. which often asks to be assisted by the prayers of the saints. Reply to Objection 4. Although the saints are not I answer that, The saints are said to pray for us in two in a state to merit for themselves, when once they are in ways. First, by “express” prayer, when by their prayers heaven, they are in a state to merit for others, or rather to they seek a hearing of the Divine clemency on our be- assist others by reason of their previous merit: for while half: secondly, by “interpretive” prayer, namely by their living they merited that their prayers should be heard after merits which, being known to God, avail not only them their death. unto glory, but also us as suffrages and prayers, even as Or we may reply that prayer is meritorious on one the shedding of Christ’s blood is said to ask pardon for count, and impetratory on another. For merit consists in us. In both ways the saints’ prayers considered in them- a certain equation of the act to the end for which it is selves avail to obtain what they ask, yet on our part they intended, and which is given to it as its reward; while may fail so that we obtain not the fruit of their prayers, the impetration of a prayer depends on the liberality of in so far as they are said to pray for us by reason of their the person supplicated. Hence prayer sometimes, through merits availing on our behalf. But in so far as they pray the liberality of the person supplicated, obtains that which for us by asking something for us in their prayers, their was not merited either by the suppliant, or by the person prayers are always granted, since they will only what God supplicated for: and so, although the saints are not in the wills, nor do they ask save for what they will to be done; state of meriting, it does not follow that they are not in the and what God wills is always fulfilled—unless we speak state of impetrating. of His “antecedent” will, whereby “He wishes all men to Reply to Objection 5. As appears from the authority ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1 2941 of Gregory quoted above (ad 3), the saints and angels will shall be fulfilled through their prayers. nothing but what they see to be in the Divine will: and so Reply to Objection 6. The suffrages of the Church for neither do they pray for aught else. Nor is their prayer the dead are as so many satisfactions of the living in lieu fruitless, since as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.†): of the dead: and accordingly they free the dead from the “The prayers of the saints profit the predestinate, because punishment which the latter have not paid. But the saints it is perhaps pre-ordained that they shall be saved through in heaven are not in the state of making satisfaction; and the prayers of those who intercede for them”: and conse- consequently the parallel fails between their prayers and quently God also wills that what the saints see Him to will the suffrages of the Church. † De Dono Persever. xxii 2942 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 73 Of the Signs That Will Precede the Judgment (In Three Articles) We must next consider the signs that will precede the judgment: and under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether any signs will precede the Lord’s coming to judgment? (2) Whether in very truth the sun and moon will be darkened? (3) Whether the powers of the heavens will be moved when the Lord shall come? Whether any signs will precede the Lord’s coming to judgment? Suppl. q. 73 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the Lord’s coming to great, will be divided into four parts dashing against one judgment will not be preceded by any signs. Because it is another; on the “eleventh” day all hills and mountains and written (1 Thess. 5:3): “When they shall say: Peace and buildings will be reduced to dust; on the “twelfth” day all security; then shall sudden destruction come upon them.” animals will come from forest and mountain to the fields, Now there would be no peace and security if men were roaring and tasting of nothing; on the “thirteenth” day all terrified by previous signs. Therefore signs will not pre- graves from east to west will open to allow the bodies cede that coming to rise again; on the “fourteenth” day all men will leave Objection 2. Further, signs are ordained for the man- their abode, neither understanding nor speaking, but rush- ifestation of something. But His coming is to be hidden; ing hither and thither like madmen; on the “fifteenth” day wherefore it is written (1 Thess. 5:2): “The day of the all will die and will rise again with those who died long Lord shall come as a thief in the night.” Therefore signs before. ought not to precede it. I answer that, When Christ shall come to judge He Objection 3. Further, the time of His first coming will appear in the form of glory, on account of the author- was foreknown by the prophets, which does not apply to ity becoming a judge. Now it pertains to the dignity of His second coming. Now no such signs preceded the first judicial power to have certain signs that induce people to coming of Christ. Therefore neither will they precede the reverence and subjection: and consequently many signs second. will precede the advent of Christ when He shall come to On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 21:25): “There judgment, in order that the hearts of men be brought to shall be signs in the sun, and in the moon, and in the stars,” subjection to the coming judge, and be prepared for the etc. judgment, being forewarned by those signs. But it is not Further, Jerome∗ mentions fifteen signs preceding the easy to know what these signs may be: for the signs of judgment. He says that on the “first” day all the seas will which we read in the gospels, as Augustine says, writ- rise fifteen cubits above the mountains; in the “second” ing to Hesychius about the end of the world (Ep. lxxx), day all the waters will be plunged into the depths, so that refer not only to Christ’s coming to judgment, but also scarcely will they be visible; on the “third” day they will to the time of the sack of Jerusalem, and to the coming be restored to their previous condition; on the “fourth” day of Christ in ceaselessly visiting His Church. So that, per- all the great fishes and other things that move in the wa- haps, if we consider them carefully, we shall find that none ters will gather together and, raising their heads above the of them refers to the coming advent, as he remarks: be- sea, roar at one another contentiously; on the “fifth” day, cause these signs that are mentioned in the gospels, such all the birds of the air will gather together in the fields, as wars, fears, and so forth, have been from the beginning wailing to one another, with neither bite nor sup; on the of the human race: unless perhaps we say that at that time “sixth” day rivers of fire will arise towards the firmament they will be more prevalent: although it is uncertain in rushing together from the west to the east; on the “sev- what degree this increase will foretell the imminence of enth” day all the stars, both planets and fixed stars, will the advent. The signs mentioned by Jerome are not as- throw out fiery tails like comets; on the “eighth” day there serted by him; he merely says that he found them written will be a great earthquake, and all animals will be laid in the annals of the Hebrews: and, indeed, they contain low; on the “ninth” day all the plants will be bedewed as very little likelihood. it were with blood; on the “tenth” day all stones, little and Reply to Objection 1. According to Augustine (Ad ∗ St. Peter Damian, Opuscul. xlix; he quotes St. Jerome, but the reference is not known. 2943 Hesych., Ep. lxxx) towards the end of the world there death of Antichrist and before the coming of Christ, see-will be a general persecution of the good by the wicked: ing that the world is not at once destroyed, as they thought so that at the same time some will fear, namely the good, hitherto. and some will be secure, namely the wicked. The words: Reply to Objection 2. The day of the Lord is said “When they shall say: Peace and security,” refer to the to come as a thief, because the exact time is not known, wicked, who will pay little heed to the signs of the coming since it will not be possible to know it from those signs: judgment: while the words of Lk. 21:26, “men withering although, as we have already said, all these most manifest away,” etc., should be referred to the good. sings which will precede the judgment immediately may We may also reply that all these signs that will hap- be comprised under the judgment day. pen about the time of the judgment are reckoned to oc- Reply to Objection 3. At His first advent Christ came cur within the time occupied by the judgment, so that the secretly, although the appointed time was known before- judgment day contains them all. Wherefore although men hand by the prophets. Hence there was no need for such be terrified by the signs appearing about the judgment signs to appear at His first coming, as will appear at His day, yet before those signs begin to appear the wicked second advent, when He will come openly, although the will think themselves to be in peace and security, after the appointed time is hidden. Whether towards the time of the judgment the sun and moon will be darkened in very Suppl. q. 73 a. 2 truth? Objection 1. It would seem that towards the time of credible that they will be darkened through being bereft the judgment the sun and moon will be darkened in very of their light, since when Christ comes and the saints rise truth. For, as Rabanus says, commenting on Mat. 24:29 again the whole world will be renewed, as we shall state “nothing hinders us from gathering that the sun moon, and further on (q. 74). If, however, we speak of them in re- stars will then be deprived of their light, as we know hap- spect of the time immediately preceding the judgment, it pened to the sun at the time of our Lord’s passion.” is possible that by the Divine power the sun, moon, and Objection 2. Further, the light of the heavenly bodies other luminaries of the heavens will be darkened, either at is directed to the generation of inferior bodies, because by various times or all together, in order to inspire men with its means and not only by their movement they act upon fear. this lower world as Averroes says (De Subst. Orbis.). But Reply to Objection 1. Rabanus is speaking of the generation will cease then. Therefore neither will light time preceding the judgment: wherefore he adds that remain in the heavenly bodies. when the judgment day is over the words of Isaias shall Objection 3. Further, according to some the inferior be fulfilled. bodies will be cleansed of the qualities by which they act. Reply to Objection 2. Light is in the heavenly bod- Now heavenly bodies act not only by movement, but also ies not only for the purpose of causing generation in these by light, as stated above (obj. 2). Therefore as the move- lower bodies, but also for their own perfection and beauty. ment of heaven will cease, so will the light of the heavenly Hence it does not follow that where generation ceases, the bodies. light of the heavenly bodies will cease, but rather that it On the contrary, According to astronomers the sun will increase. and moon cannot be eclipsed at the same time. But this Reply to Objection 3. It does not seem probable that darkening of the sun and moon is stated to be simultane- the elemental qualities will be removed from the elements, ous, when the Lord shall come to judgment. Therefore the although some have asserted this. If, however, they be re- darkening will not be in very truth due to a natural eclipse. moved, there would still be no parallel between them and Further, it is not seemly for the same to be the cause of light, since the elemental qualities are in opposition to one a thing’s failing and increasing. Now when our Lord shall another, so that their action is corruptive: whereas light is come the light of the luminaries will increase according a principle of action not by way of opposition, but by way to Is. 30:26, “The light of the moon shall be as the light of a principle regulating things in opposition to one an- of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold.” other and bringing them back to harmony. Nor is there a Therefore it is unfitting for the light of these bodies to parallel with the movement of heavenly bodies, for move- cease when our Lord comes. ment is the act of that which is imperfect, wherefore it I answer that, If we speak of the sun and moon in must needs cease when the imperfection ceases: whereas respect of the very moment of Christ’s coming, it is not this cannot be said of light. 2944 Whether the virtues of heaven will be moved when our Lord shall come? Suppl. q. 73 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the virtues of heaven in reference to virtue as the name of a particular order; and will not be moved when our Lord shall come. For the then that order is said to be moved more than the others virtues of heaven can de. note only the blessed angels. by reason of the effect, since according to Gregory (Hom. Now immobility is essential to blessedness. Therefore it in Evang. xxxiv) we ascribe to that order the working of will be impossible for them to be moved. miracles which especially will be worked about that time: Objection 2. Further, ignorance is the cause of won- or again, because that order—since, according to Diony- der (Metaph. i, 2). Now ignorance, like fear, is far from sius (Coel. Hier. xi), it belongs to the middle hierarchy— the angels, for as Gregory says (Dial. iv, 33; Moral. ii, is not limited in its power, wherefore its ministry must 3), “what do they not see, who see Him Who sees all.” needs regard universal causes. Consequently the proper Therefore it will be impossible for them to be moved with office of the virtues is seemingly to move the heavenly wonder, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 48). bodies which are the cause of what happens in nature here Objection 3. Further, all the angels will be present at below. And again the very name denotes this, since they the Divine judgment; wherefore it is stated (Apoc. 7:11): are called the “virtues of heaven.” Accordingly they will “All the angels stood round about the throne.” Now the be moved then, because they will no more produce their virtues denote one particular order of angels. Therefore it effect, by ceasing to move the heavenly bodies: even as should not be said of them rather than of others, that they the angels who are appointed to watch over men will no are moved. longer fulfill the office of guardians. On the contrary, It is written (Job 26:11): “The pil- Reply to Objection 1. This movement changes noth- lars of heaven tremble, and dread at His beck.” Now the ing pertaining to their state; but refers either to their ef- pillars of heaven can denote only the virtues of heaven. fects which may vary without any change on their part, or Therefore the virtues of heaven will be moved. to some new consideration of things which hitherto they Further, it is written (Mat. 24:29): “The stars shall fall were unable to see by means of their concreated species, from heaven, and the virtues [Douay: ‘powers’] of heaven which change of thought is not taken from them by their shall be moved.” state of blessedness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. I answer that, Virtue is twofold as applied to the an- viii, 20) that “God moves the spiritual creature through gels,∗ as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. xi). For sometimes time.” the name of “virtues” is appropriated to one order, which Reply to Objection 2. Wonder is wont to be about according to him, is the middle order of the middle hierar- things surpassing our knowledge or ability: and accord- chy, but according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv) is ingly the virtues of heaven will wonder at the Divine the highest order of the lowest hierarchy. In another sense power doing such things, in so far as they fail to do or it is employed to denote all the angels: and then they are comprehend them. In this sense the blessed Agnes said said to the question at issue it may be taken either way. For that the “sun and moon wonder at His beauty”: and this in the text (Sent. iv, D, 48) it is explained according to the does not imply ignorance in the angels, but removes the second acceptation, so as to denote all the angels: and then comprehension of God from them. they are said to be moved through wonder at the renewing The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what of the world, as stated in the text. It can also be explained has been said. ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 108, a. 5, ad 1 2945 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 74 Of the Fire of the Final Conflagration (In Nine Articles) We must now consider the fire of the final conflagration: and under this head there are nine points of inquiry: (1) Whether any cleansing of the world is to take place? (2) Whether it will be effected by fire? (3) Whether that fire is of the same species as elemental fire? (4) Whether that fire will cleanse also the higher heavens? (5) Whether that fire will consume the other elements? (6) Whether it will cleanse all the elements? (7) Whether that fire precedes or follows the judgment? (8) Whether men are to be consumed by that fire? (9) Whether the wicked will be involved therein? Whether the world is to be cleansed? Suppl. q. 74 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there is not to be any in order that man obtain the glory of the body, it behooves cleansing of the world. For only that which is unclean first of all those things to be removed which are opposed needs cleansing. Now God’s creatures are not unclean, to glory. There are two, namely the corruption and stain wherefore it is written (Acts 10:15): “That which God of sin—because according to 1 Cor. 15:50, “neither shall hath cleansed, do not thou call common,” i.e. unclean. corruption possess incorruption,” and all the unclean shall Therefore the creatures of the world shall not be cleansed. be without the city of glory (Apoc. 22:15)—and again, Objection 2. Further, according to Divine justice the elements require to be cleansed from the contrary dis- cleansing is directed to the removal of the uncleanness of positions, ere they be brought to the newness of glory, sin, as instanced in the cleansing after death. But there can proportionately to what we have said with regard to man. be no stain of sin in the elements of this world. Therefore, Now although, properly speaking, a corporeal thing can- seemingly, they need not to be cleansed. not be the subject of the stain of sin, nevertheless, on ac- Objection 3. Further, a thing is said to be cleansed count of sin corporeal things contract a certain unfitting- when any foreign matter that depreciates it is removed ness for being appointed to spiritual purposes; and for this therefrom: for the removal of that which ennobles a thing reason we find that places where crimes have been com- is not called a cleansing, but rather a diminishing. Now it mitted are reckoned unfit for the performance of sacred pertains to the perfection and nobility of the elements that actions therein, unless they be cleansed beforehand. Ac- something of a foreign nature is mingled with them, since cordingly that part of the world which is given to our use the form of a mixed body is more noble than the form of a contracts from men’s sins a certain unfitness for being glo- simple body. Therefore it would seem nowise fitting that rified, wherefore in this respect it needs to be cleansed. the elements of this world can possibly be cleansed. In like manner with regard to the intervening space, on On the contrary, All renewal is effected by some kind account of the contact of the elements, there are many of cleansing. But the elements will be renewed; hence it corruptions, generations and alterations of the elements, is written (Apoc. 21:1): “I saw a new heaven and a new which diminish their purity: wherefore the elements need earth: for the first heaven and the first earth was gone.” to be cleansed from these also, so that they be fit to receive Therefore the elements shall be cleansed. the newness of glory. Further, a gloss∗ on 1 Cor. 7:31, “The fashion of this Reply to Objection 1. When it is asserted that ev- earth passeth away,” says: “The beauty of this world will ery creature of God is clean we are to understand this as perish in the burning of worldly flames.” Therefore the meaning that its substance contains no alloy of evil, as the same conclusion follows. Manichees maintained, saying that evil and good are two I answer that, Since the world was, in a way, made substances in some places severed from one another, in for man’s sake, it follows that, when man shall be glori- others mingled together. But it does not exclude a crea- fied in the body, the other bodies of the world shall also ture from having an admixture of a foreign nature, which be changed to a better state, so that it is rendered a more in itself is also good, but is inconsistent with the perfection fitting place for him and more pleasant to look upon. Now of that creature. Nor does this prevent evil from being ac- ∗ St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei xx, 16 2946 cidental to a creature, although not mingled with it as part composition of contraries. Wherefore a simple body, al-of its substance. though it be corruptible in part is incorruptible as a whole, Reply to Objection 2. Although corporeal elements which cannot be said of a mixed body. And since incor- cannot be the subject of sin, nevertheless, from the sin that ruption belongs to the perfection of glory, it follows that is committed in them they contract a certain unfitness for the perfection of a simple is more in keeping with the per- receiving the perfection of glory. fection of glory, than the perfection of a mixed body, un- Reply to Objection 3. The form of a mixed body and less the mixed body has also in itself some principle of the form of an element may be considered in two ways: incorruption, as the human body has, the form of which either as regards the perfection of the species, and thus a is incorruptible. Nevertheless, although a mixed body is mixed body is more perfect—or as regards their contin- somewhat more noble than a simple body, a simple body ual endurance; and thus the simple body is more noble, that exists by itself has a more noble being than if it exist because it has not in itself the cause of corruption, unless in a mixed body, because in a mixed body simple bodies it be corrupted by something extrinsic: whereas a mixed are somewhat in potentiality, whereas, existing by them- body has in itself the cause of its corruption, namely the selves, they are in their ultimate perfection. Whether the cleansing of the world will be effected by fire? Suppl. q. 74 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that this cleansing will not in this threefold respect it will be most fitting for it to be be effected by fire. For since fire is a part of the world, it effected by fire. First, because since fire is the most no- needs to be cleansed like the other parts. Now, the same ble of the elements, its natural properties are more like the thing should not be both cleanser and cleansed. Therefore properties of glory, and this is especially clear in regard to it would seem that the cleansing will not be by fire. light. Secondly, because fire, on account of the efficacy of Objection 2. Further, just as fire has a cleansing virtue its active virtue, is not as susceptible as the other elements so has water. Since then all things are not capable of be- to the admixture of a foreign matter. Thirdly, because the ing cleansed by fire, and some need to be cleansed by sphere of fire is far removed from our abode; nor are we water—which distinction is moreover observed by the Old so familiar with the use of fire as with that of earth, water, Law—it would seem that fire will not at any rate cleanse and air, so that it is not so liable to depreciation. More- all things. over, it is most efficacious in cleansing and in separating Objection 3. Further, this cleansing would seem to by a process of rarefaction. consist in purifying the parts of the world by separating Reply to Objection 1. Fire is not employed by us in them from one another. Now the separation of the parts of its proper matter (since thus it is far removed from us), the world from one another at the world’s beginning was but only in a foreign matter: and in this respect it will be effected by God’s power alone, for the work of distinction possible for the world to be cleansed by fire as existing in was carried out by that power: wherefore Anaxagoras as- its pure state. But in so far as it has an admixture of some serted that the separation was effected by the act of the foreign matter it will be possible for it to be cleansed; and intellect which moves all things (cf. Aristotle, Phys. viii, thus it will be cleanser and cleansed under different as- 9). Therefore it would seem that at the end of the world pects. and this is not unreasonable. the cleansing will be done immediately by God and not Reply to Objection 2. The first cleansing of the world by fire. by the deluge regarded only the stain of sin. Now the sin On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 49:3): “A fire shall which was most prevalent then was the sin of concupis-burn before Him, and a mighty tempest shall be around cence, and consequently it was fitting that the cleansing Him”; and afterwards in reference to the judgment (Ps. should be by means of its contrary, namely water. But the 49:4): “He shall call heaven from above, and the earth to second cleansing regards both the stain of sin and the im- judge His people.” Therefore it would seem that the final purity of mixture, and in respect of both it is more fitting cleansing of the world will be by means of fire. for it to be effected by fire than by water. For the power Further, it is written (2 Pet. 3:12): “The heavens be- of water tends to unite rather than to separate; wherefore ing on fire will be dissolved, and the elements shall melt the natural impurity of the elements could not be removed with the burning heat.” Therefore this cleansing will be by water as by fire. Moreover, at the end of the world the effected by fire. prevalent sin will be that of tepidity, as though the world I answer that, As stated above (a. 1) this cleansing of were already growing old, because then, according to Mat. the world will remove from it the stain contracted from 24:12, “the charity of many shall grow cold,” and conse- sin, and the impurity resulting from mixture, and will be quently the cleansing will then be fittingly effected by fire. a disposition to the perfection of glory; and consequently Nor is there any thing that cannot in some way be cleansed 2947 by fire: some things, however, cannot be cleansed by fire from one another: and consequently this could only be without being destroyed themselves, such as cloths and done by Him Who is the author of nature. But by the fi- wooden vessels, and these the Law ordered to be cleansed nal cleansing things will be restored to the purity wherein with water; yet all these things will be finally destroyed they were created, wherefore created nature will be able by fire. to minister to its Creator to this effect; and for this reason Reply to Objection 3. By the work of distinction is a creature employed as a minister, that it is ennobled things received different forms whereby they are distinct thereby. Whether the fire whereby the world will be cleansed will be of the same species with Suppl. q. 74 a. 3 elemental fire? Objection 1. It would seem that the fire in question together of the rays of the heavenly bodies, just as we see is not of the same species as elemental fire. For nothing them focused together in a burning-glass; for at that time consumes itself. But that fire will consume the four ele- in lieu of glasses there will be concave clouds, on which ments according to a gloss on 2 Pet. 3:12. Therefore that the rays will strike But this again does not seem probable: fire will not be of the same species as elemental fire. for since the effects of heavenly bodies depend on cer- Objection 2. Further, as power is made known by op- tain fixed positions and aspects, if this fire resulted from eration, so is nature made known by power. Now that fire the virtue of the heavenly bodies, the time of this cleans- will have a different power from the fire which is an el- ing would be known to those who observe the movements ement: because it will cleanse the universe, whereas this of the stars and this is contrary to the authority of Scrip- fire cannot do that. Therefore it will not be of the same ture. Consequently others, following Augustine, say that species as this. “just as the deluge resulted from an outpouring of the wa- Objection 3. Further, in natural bodies those that are ters of the world, so the fashion of this world will per- of the same species have the same movement. But that ish by a burning of worldly flames” (De Civ. Dei. xx, fire will have a different movement from the fire that is 16). This burning is nothing else but the assembly of all an element, because it will move in all directions so as to those lower and higher causes that by their nature have a cleanse the whole. Therefore it is not of the same species. kindling virtue: and this assembly will take place not in On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, the ordinary course of things, but by the Divine power: 16), and his words are contained in a gloss on 1 Cor. 7:31, and from all these causes thus assembled the fire that will that “the fashion of this world will perish in the burning burn the surface of this world will result. If we consider of worldly flames.” Therefore that fire will be of the same aright these opinions, we shall find that they differ as to nature as the fire which is now in the world. the cause producing this fire and not as to its species. For Further, just as the future cleansing is to be by fire, so fire, whether produced by the sun or by some lower heat- was the past cleansing by water: and they are both com- ing cause, is of the same species as fire in its own sphere, pared to one another, 2 Pet. 3:5. Now in the first cleansing except in so far as the former has some admixture of for- the water was of the same species with elemental water. eign matter. And this will of necessity be the case then, Therefore in like manner the fire of the second cleansing since fire cannot cleanse a thing, unless this become its will be of the same species with elemental fire. matter in some way. Hence we must grant that the fire in I answer that, We meet with three opinions on this question is simply of the same species as ours. question. For some say that the element of fire which is Reply to Objection 1. The fire in question, although in its own sphere will come down to cleanse the world: of the same species as ours, is not identically the same. and they explain this descent by way of multiplication, Now we see that of two fires of the same species one de- because the fire will spread through finding combustible stroys the other, namely the greater destroys the lesser, by matter on all sides. And this will result all the more then consuming its matter. In like manner that fire will be able since the virtue of the fire will be raised over all the ele- to destroy our fire. ments. Against this, however, would seem to be not only Reply to Objection 2. Just as an operation that pro- the fact that this fire will come down, but also the state- ceeds from the virtue of a thing is an indication of that ment of the saints that it will rise up; thus (2 Pet. 3:10) it virtue, so is its virtue an indication of its essence or na- is declared that the fire of the judgment will rise as high as ture, if it proceed from the essential principles of the thing. the waters of the deluge; whence it would seem to follow But an operation that does not proceed from the virtue of that this fire is situated towards the middle of the place of the operator does not indicate its virtue. This appears in generation. Hence others say that this fire will be gener- instruments: for the action of an instrument shows forth ated towards the intervening space through the focusing the virtue of the mover rather than that of the instrument, 2948 since it shows forth the virtue of the agent in so far as the power therein arises, not from its essential principles but latter is the first principle of the action, whereas it does not from the divine power or operation: whether we say that show forth the virtue of the instrument, except in so far as this power is an absolute quality, such as heat in hot water, it is susceptive of the influence of the principal agent as or a kind of intention as we have ascribed to instrumental moving that instrument. In like manner a virtue that does virtue (Sent. iv, D, 1, qu. 1, a. 4)∗. The latter is more not proceed from the essential principles of a thing does probable since that fire will not act save as the instrument not indicate the nature of that thing except in the point of the Divine power. of susceptibility. Thus the virtue whereby hot water can Reply to Objection 3. Of its own nature fire tends heat is no indication of the nature of water except in the only upwards; but in so far as it pursues its matter, which point of its being receptive of heat. Consequently noth- it requires when it is outside its own sphere, it follows the ing prevents water that has this virtue from being of the site of combustible matter. Accordingly it is not unrea- same species as water that has it not. In like manner it is sonable for it to take a circular or a downward course, es- not unreasonable that this fire, which will have the power pecially in so far as it acts as the instrument of the Divine to cleanse the surface of the world, will be of the same power. species as the fire to which we are used, since the heating Whether that fire will cleanse also the higher heavens? Suppl. q. 74 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that that fire will cleanse contrary to the perfection of glory, and this perfection is also the higher heavens. For it is written (Ps. 101:26,27): the final consummation of the universe: and this disposi- “The heavens are the works of Thy hands: they shall per- tion is to be found in all bodies, but differently in differ- ish but Thou remainest.” Now the higher heavens also are ent bodies. For in some this indisposition regards some- the work of God’s hands. Therefore they also shall perish thing inherent to their substance: as in these lower bod- in the final burning of the world. ies which by being mixed together fall away from their Objection 2. Further, it is written (2 Pet. 3:12): “The own purity. In others this indisposition does not regard heavens being on fire shall be dissolved, and the elements something inherent to their substance; as in the heavenly shall melt with the burning heat of fire.” Now the heavens bodies, wherein nothing is to be found contrary to the fi- that are distinct from the elements are the higher heavens, nal perfection of the universe, except movement which is wherein the stars are fixed. Therefore it would seem that the way to perfection, and this not any kind of movement, they also will be cleansed by that fire. but only local movement, which changes nothing intrinsic Objection 3. Further, the purpose of that fire will be to a thing, such as its substance, quantity, or quality, but to remove from bodies their indisposition to the perfection only its place which is extrinsic to it. Consequently there of glory. Now in the higher heaven we find this indispo- is no need to take anything away from the substance of sition both as regards guilt, since the devil sinned there, the higher heavens, but only to set its movement at rest. and as regards natural deficiency, since a gloss on Rom. Now local movement is brought to rest not by the action 8:22, “We know that every creature groaneth and is in la- of a counter agent, but by the mover ceasing to move; and bor even until now,” says: “All the elements fulfill their therefore the heavenly bodies will not be cleansed, nei- duty with labor: even as it is not without labor that the ther by fire nor by the action of any creature, but in lieu of sun and moon travel their appointed course.” Therefore being cleansed they will be set at rest by God’s will alone. the higher heavens also will be cleansed by that fire. Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Civ. On the contrary, “The heavenly bodies are not recep- Dei xx, 18,24): “Those words of the psalm refer to the tive of impressions from without”∗. aerial heavens which will be cleansed by the fire of the fi- Further, a gloss on 2 Thess. 1:8, “In a flame of fire nal conflagration.” Or we may reply that if they refer also giving vengeance,” says: “There will be in the world a to the higher heavens, these are said to perish as regards fire that shall precede Him, and shall rise in the air to the their movement whereby now they are moved without ces- same height as did the waters of the deluge.” But the wa- sation. ters of the deluge did not rise to the height of the higher Reply to Objection 2. Peter explains himself to heavens but only 15 cubits higher than the mountain sum- which heavens he refers. For before the words quoted, mits (Gn. 7:20). Therefore the higher heavens will not be he had said (2 Pet. 3:5-7): “The heavens. . . first, and the cleansed by that fire. earth. . . through water. . . perished. . . which. . . now, by the I answer that, The cleansing of the world will be same word are kept in store, reserved unto fire unto the for the purpose of removing from bodies the disposition ∗ Cf. IIIa, q. 62, a. 4, ad 1 ∗ Cf. Sent. Philosop. ex Arist. collect. lit. c.—Among the works of Bede 2949 day of judgment.”† Therefore the heavens to be cleansed they are subject to time, and the lack of that final con-are those which before were cleansed by the waters of the summation which they will attain in the end. Nor did the deluge, namely the aerial heavens. empyrean heaven contract any stain from the sin of the Reply to Objection 3. This labor and service of the demons, because they were expelled from that heaven as creature, that Ambrose ascribes to the heavenly bodies, soon as they sinned. is nothing else than the successive movements whereby Whether that fire will consume the other elements? Suppl. q. 74 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the fire in question be called “heaven”; although air will retain the same sub- will consume the other elements. For a gloss of Bede on stantial form as it has now, since even now it is called 2 Pet. 3:12 says: “This exceeding great fire will engulf “heaven.” Wherefore (Apoc. 21:1) only heaven and earth the four elements whereof the world consists: yet it will are mentioned: “I saw,” says he, “a new heaven and a not so engulf all things that they will cease to be, but it new earth.” But this opinion is altogether absurd: for it will consume two of them entirely, and will restore two of is opposed both to philosophy—which holds it impossi- them to a better fashion.” Therefore it would seem that at ble for the lower bodies to be in potentiality to the form of least two of the elements are to be entirely destroyed by heaven, since they have neither a common matter, nor mu- that fire. tual contrariety—and to theology, since according to this Objection 2. Further, it is written (Apoc. 21:1): “The opinion the perfection of the universe with the integrity first heaven and the first earth have passed away and the of its parts will not be assured on account of two of the sea is no more.” Now the heaven here denotes the air, as elements being destroyed. Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xx, 18); and the sea denotes Consequently “heaven” is taken to denote the fifth the gathering together of the waters. Therefore it would body, while all the elements are designated by “earth,” as seem that these three elements will be wholly destroyed. expressed in Ps. 148:7,8, “Praise the Lord from the earth” Objection 3. Further, fire does not cleanse except in and afterwards, “fire, hail, snow, ice,” etc. so far as other things are made to be its matter. If, then, Hence others say that all the elements will remain as fire cleanses the other elements, they must needs become to their substance, but that their active and passive qual- its matter. Therefore they must pass into its nature, and ities will be taken from them: even as they say too, that consequently be voided of their own nature. in a mixed body the elements retain their substantial form Objection 4. Further, the form of fire is the most noble without having their proper qualities, since these are re-of the forms to which elemental matter can attain. Now duced to a mean, and a mean is neither of the extremes. all things will be brought to the most noble state by this And seemingly the following words of Augustine (De Civ. cleansing. Therefore the other elements will be wholly Dei xx, 16) would seem in agreement with this: “In this transformed into fire. conflagration of the world the qualities of the corruptible On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 7:31, “The fash- elements that were befitting our corruptible bodies will ion of this world passeth away,” says: “The beauty, not entirely perish by fire: and the substance itself will have the substance, passeth.” But the very substance of the el- those qualities that become an immortal body.” ements belongs to the perfection of the world. Therefore However, this does not seem probable, for since the the elements will not be consumed as to their substance. proper qualities of the elements are the effects of their Further, this final cleansing that will be effected by fire substantial form, it seems impossible, as long as the sub- will correspond to the first cleansing which was effected stantial forms remain, for the aforesaid qualities to be by water. Now the latter did not corrupt the substance of changed, except for a time by some violent action: thus the elements. Therefore neither will the former which will in hot water we see that by virtue of its species it returns be the work of fire. to the cold temperature which it had lost by the action I answer that, There are many opinions on this ques- of fire, provided the species of water remain. Moreover, tion. For some say that all the elements will remain as these same elemental qualities belong to the second per- to their matter, while all will be changed as regards their fection of the elements, as being their proper passions: nor imperfection; but that two of them will retain their respec- is it probable that in this final consummation the elements tive substantial form, namely air and earth, while two of will lose anything of their natural perfection. Wherefore them, namely fire and water, will not retain their substan- it would seem that the reply to this question should be that tial form but will be changed to the form of heaven. In the elements will remain as to their substance and proper this way three elements, namely air, fire, and water, will qualities, but that they will be cleansed both from the stain † The entire text differs somewhat from St. Thomas’s quotation; but the sense is the same. 2950 which they contracted from the sins of men, and from the Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Civ. impurity resulting in them through their mutual action and Dei xx, 16), when it is stated: “And the sea is no more,” by passion: because when once the movement of the first the sea we may understand the present world of which he movable body ceases, mutual action and passion will be had said previously (De Civ. Dei xx, 13): “The sea gave impossible in the lower elements: and this is what Augus- up the dead that were in it.” If, however, the sea be taken tine calls the “qualities of corruptible elements,” namely literally we must reply that by the sea two things are to be their unnatural dispositions by reason of which they come understood, namely the substance of the waters, and their near to corruption. disposition, as containing salt and as to the movement of Reply to Objection 1. That fire is said to engulf the the waves. The sea will remain, not as to this second, but four elements in so far as in some way it will cleanse them. as to the first. But when it is said further that “it will consume two en- Reply to Objection 3. This fire will not act save as the tirely,” this does not mean that two of the elements are instrument of God’s providence and power; wherefore it to be destroyed as to their substance, but that two will be will not act on the other elements so as to consume them more changed from the property which they have now. but only so as to cleanse them. Nor is it necessary for Some say that these two are fire and water which excel that which becomes the matter of fire, to be voided of its the others in their active qualities, namely heat and cold, proper species entirely, as instanced by incandescent iron, which are the chief principles of corruption in other bod- which by virtue of its species that remains returns to its ies; and since then there will be no action of fire and water proper and former state as soon as it is taken from the fur- which surpass the others in activity, they would seem es- nace. It will be the same with the elements after they are pecially to be changed from the virtue which they have cleansed by fire. now. Others, however, say that these two are air and wa- Reply to Objection 4. In the elemental parts we must ter, on account of the various movements of these two ele- consider not only what is befitting a part considered in it- ments, which movements they derive from the movement self, but also what is befitting it in its relation to the whole. of the heavenly bodies. And since these movements will I say, then, that although water would be more noble if cease (such as the ebb and flow of the sea, and the dis- it had the form of fire, as likewise would earth and air, turbances of winds and so forth), therefore these elements yet the universe would be more imperfect, if all elemental especially will be changed from the property which they matter were to assume the form of fire. have now. Whether all the elements will be cleansed by that fire? Suppl. q. 74 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that neither will all the Therefore it would seem that the elements will not all be elements be cleansed by that fire. Because that fire, as wholly cleansed. stated already (a. 3), will not rise higher than the waters On the contrary, The gloss quoted above (a. 5, obj. 1) of the deluge. But the waters of the deluge did not reach on 2 Pet. 3:12 declares that “this fire will engulf the four to the sphere of fire. Therefore neither will the element of elements.” fire be cleansed by the final cleansing. I answer that, Some∗ say that the fire in question will Objection 2. Further, a gloss on Apoc. 21:1, “I saw rise to the summit of the space containing the four ele- a new heaven,” etc., says: “There can be no doubt that ments: so that the elements would be entirely cleansed the transformation of the air and earth will be caused by both from the stain of sin by which also the higher parts fire; but it is doubtful about water, since it is believed to of the elements were infected (as instanced by the smoke have the power of cleansing itself.” Therefore at least it is of idolatry which stained the higher regions), and again uncertain that all the elements will be cleansed. from corruption, since the elements are corruptible in all Objection 3. Further, a place where there is an ever- their parts. But this opinion is opposed to the authority lasting stain is never cleansed. Now there will always be of Scripture, because it is written (2 Pet. 3:7) that those a stain in hell. Since, then, hell is situated among the ele- heavens are “kept in store unto fire,” which were cleansed ments, it would seem that the elements will not be wholly by water; and Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 18) that cleansed. “the same world which perished in the deluge is reserved Objection 4. Further, the earthly paradise is situated unto fire.” Now it is clear that the waters of the deluge on the earth. Yet it will not be cleansed by fire, since did not rise to the summit of the space occupied by the not even the waters of the deluge reached it, as Bede says elements, but only 15 cubits above the mountain tops; and (Hexaem. i, ad Gen. 2:8), as is stated in Sentent. ii, D, 7. moreover it is known that vapors or any smoke whatever ∗ St. Bonaventure, Sentent. iv, D, 47, a. 2, q. 3 2951 rising from the earth cannot pierce the entire sphere of as will be competent to the future state, as stated above fire so as to reach its summit; and so the stain of sin did (a. 5; a. 2, ad 2). not reach the aforesaid space. Nor can the elements be Reply to Objection 3. The purpose of this cleansing cleansed from corruptibility by the removal of something will be chiefly to remove all imperfection from the abode that might be consumed by fire: whereas it will be pos- of the saints; and consequently in this cleansing all that is sible for the impurities of the elements arising from their foul will be brought together to the place of the damned: mingling together to be consumed by fire. And these im- so hell will not be cleansed, and the dregs of the whole purities are chiefly round about the earth as far as the mid- earth will be brought thither, according to Ps. 74:9, “The dle of the air: wherefore the fire of the final conflagration dregs thereof are not emptied, all the sinners of the earth will cleanse up to that point, since the waters of the deluge shall drink.” rose to a height which can be approximately calculated Reply to Objection 4. Although the sin of the first from the height of the mountains which they surpassed in man was committed in the earthly paradise, this is not the a fixed measure. place of sinners, as neither is the empyrean heaven: since We therefore grant the First Objection. from both places man and devil were expelled forthwith Reply to Objection 2. The reason for doubt is ex- after their sin. Consequently that place needs no cleans- pressed in the gloss, because, to wit, water is believed to ing. have in itself the power of cleansing, yet not such a power Whether the fire of the final conflagration is to follow the judgment? Suppl. q. 74 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the fire of the final burning of the world will precede the resurrection, for the conflagration is to follow the judgment. For Augustine saints who will rise again will have spiritual and impas- (De Civ. Dei xx, 30) gives the following order of the sible bodies, so that it will be impossible for the fire to things to take place at the judgment, saying: “At this judg- cleanse them, and yet the text (Sent. iv, D, 47) quotes ment we have learned that the following things will occur. Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 18) as saying that “whatever Elias the Thesbite will appear, the Jews will believe, An- needs cleansing in any way shall be cleansed by that fire.” tichrist will persecute, Christ will judge, the dead shall Therefore that fire will precede the judgment. rise again, the good shall be separated from the wicked, I answer that, The fire in question will in reality, as the world shall be set on fire and shall be renewed.” There- regards its beginning, precede the judgment. This can fore the burning will follow the judgment. clearly be gathered from the fact that the resurrection of Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei the dead will precede the judgment, since according to xx, 16): “After the wicked have been judged, and cast 1 Thess. 4:13-16, those who have slept “shall be taken into everlasting fire, the figure of this world will perish in up. . . in the clouds. . . into the air. . . to meet Christ coming the furnace of worldly flames.” Therefore the same conto judgment.” Now the general resurrection and the glori- clusion follows. fication of the bodies of the saints will happen at the same Objection 3. Further, when the Lord comes to judg- time; for the saints in rising again will assume a glori- ment He will find some men living, as appears from the fied body, as evidenced by 1 Cor. 15:43, “It is sown in words of 1 Thess. 4:16, where the Apostle speaking in dishonor, it shall rise in glory”: and at the same time as their person says: “Then we who are alive, who remain the saints’ bodies shall be glorified, all creatures shall be unto the coming of the Lord∗.” But it would not be so, renewed, each in its own way, as appears from the state- if the burning of the world were to come first, since they ment (Rom. 8:21) that “the creature. . . itself shall be de- would be destroyed by the fire. Therefore this fire will livered from the servitude of corruption into the liberty of follow the judgment. the glory of the children of God.” Since then the burn- Objection 4. Further, it is said that our Lord will come ing of the world is a disposition to the aforesaid renewal, to judge the earth by fire, and consequently the final con- as stated above (Aa. 1,4); it can clearly be gathered that flagration would seem to be the execution of the sentence this burning, so far as it shall cleanse the world, will pre- of Divine judgment. Now execution follows judgment. cede the judgment, but as regards a certain action thereof, Therefore that fire will follow the judgment. whereby it will engulf the wicked, it will follow the judg- On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 96:3): “A fire shall ment. go before Him.” Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking not as Further, the resurrection will precede the judgment, one who decides the point, but as expressing an opinion. else every eye would not see Christ judging. Now the This is clear from his continuing thus: “That all these ∗ Vulg.: ‘who are left, shall be taken. . . to meet Christ’—the words “who remain,” etc., are from 1 Thess. 4:14 2952 things are to happen is a matter of faith, but how and in Reply to Objection 3. All men shall die and rise what order we shall learn more then by experience of the again: yet those are said to be found alive who will live in things themselves than now by seeking a definite conclu- the body until the time of the conflagration. sion by arguing about them. Methinks, however, they will Reply to Objection 4. That fire will not carry out the occur in the order I have given.” Hence it is clear that sentence of the judge except as regards the engulfing of he is speaking as offering his opinion. The same answer the wicked: in this respect it will follow the judgment. applies to the Second Objection. Whether that fire will have such an effect on men as is described? Suppl. q. 74 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that this fire will not have act differently on different people as regards the sense of such an effect on men as is described in the text (Sent. iv, pain. For the wicked will be tortured by the action of the D, 47). For a thing is said to be consumed when it is re- fire; whereas the good in whom there will be nothing to duced to naught. Now the bodies of the wicked will not be cleanse will feel no pain at all from the fire, as neither reduced to naught, but will be kept for eternity, that they did the children in the fiery furnace (Dan. 3); although may bear an eternal punishment. Therefore this fire will their bodies will not be kept whole, as were the bodies of not consume the wicked, as stated in the text. the children: and it will be possible by God’s power for Objection 2. Further, if it be said that it will consume their bodies to be destroyed without their suffering pain. the bodies of the wicked by reducing them to ashes; on the But the good, in whom matter for cleansing will be found, contrary, as the bodies of the wicked, so will those of the will suffer pain from that fire, more or less according to good be brought to ashes: for it is the privilege of Christ their different merits. alone that His flesh see not corruption. Therefore it will On the other hand, as regards the action which this fire consume also the good who will then be found. will have after the judgment, it will act on the damned Objection 3. Further, the stain of sin is more abundant alone, since the good will all have impassible bodies. in the elements, as combining together to the formation of Reply to Objection 1. Consumption there signifies the human body wherein is the corruption of the fomes∗ being brought, not to nothing, but to ashes. even in the good, than in the elements existing outside Reply to Objection 2. Although the bodies of the the human body. Now the elements existing outside the good will be reduced to ashes by the fire, they will not human body will be cleansed on account of the stain of suffer pain thereby, as neither did the children in the Baby- sin. Much therefore will the elements in the human body lonian furnace. In this respect a distinction is drawn be- whether of the good or of the wicked need to be cleansed, tween the good and the wicked. and consequently the bodies of both will need to be de- Reply to Objection 3. The elements that are in human stroyed. bodies, even in the bodies of the elect, will be cleansed by Objection 4. Further, as long as the state of the way fire. But this will be done, by God’s power, without their lasts the elements act in like manner on the good and the suffering pain. wicked. Now the state of the way will still endure in that Reply to Objection 4. This fire will act not only ac- conflagration, since after this state of the way death will cording to the natural power of the element, but also as not be natural, and yet it will be caused by that fire. There- the instrument of Divine justice. fore that fire will act equally on good and wicked; and Reply to Objection 5. There are three reasons why consequently it does not seem that any distinction is made those who will be found living will be able to be cleansed between them as to their being affected by that fire, as suddenly. One is because there will be few things in them stated in the text. to be cleansed, since they will be already cleansed by the Objection 5. Further, this fire will have done its work previous fears and persecutions. The second is because in a moment as it were. Yet there will be many among the they will suffer pain both while living and of their own living in whom there will be many things to be cleansed. will: and pain suffered in this life voluntarily cleanses Therefore that fire will not suffice for their cleansing. much more than pain inflicted after death, as in the case of I answer that, This fire of the final conflagration, in the martyrs, because “if anything needing to be cleansed so far as it will precede the judgment, will act as the in- be found in them, it is cut off by the sickle of suffering,” strument of Divine justice as well as by the natural virtue as Augustine says (De Unic. Bap. xiii), although the pain of fire. Accordingly, as regards its natural virtue, it will of martyrdom is of short duration in comparison with the act in like manner on the wicked and good who will be pain endured in purgatory. The third is because the heat alive, by reducing the bodies of both to ashes. But in so will gain in intensity what it loses in shortness of time. far as it acts as the instrument of Divine justice, it will ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 83, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 91, a. 6 2953 Whether that fire will engulf the wicked? Suppl. q. 74 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that that fire will not en- the renewal for the purpose of cleansing will be directed gulf the wicked. For a gloss on Malachi 3:3, “He shall to the renewal of man: and consequently the cleansing purify the sons of Levi,” says that “it is a fire consuming and renewal of the world must needs correspond with the the wicked and refining the good”; and a gloss on 1 Cor. cleansing and renewal of mankind. Now mankind will be 3:13, “Fire shall try every man’s work,” says: “We read cleansed in one way by the separation of the wicked from that there will be a twofold fire, one that will cleanse the the good: wherefore it is said (Lk. 3:17): “Whose fan is in elect and will precede the judgment, another that will tor- His hand, and He will purge His poor, and will gather the ture the wicked.” Now the latter is the fire of hell that shall wheat,” i.e. the elect, “into His barn, but the chaff,” i.e. the engulf the wicked, while the former is the fire of the final wicked, “He will burn with unquenchable fire.” Hence it conflagration. Therefore the fire of the final conflagration will be thus with the cleansing of the world, so that all that will not be that which will engulf the wicked. is ugly and vile will be cast with the wicked into hell, and Objection 2. Further, that fire will obey God in the all that is beautiful and noble will be taken up above for cleansing of the world: therefore it should receive its re- the glory of the elect: and so too will it be with the fire of ward like the other elements, especially since fire is the that conflagration, as Basil says in Ps. 28:7, “The voice of most noble of the elements. Therefore it would seem that the Lord divideth the flame of fire,” because whatever fire it ought not to be cast into hell for the punishment of the contains of burning heat and gross matter will go down damned. into hell for the punishment of the wicked, and whatever Objection 3. Further, the fire that will engulf the is subtle and lightsome will remain above for the glory of wicked will be the fire of hell: and this fire was prepared the elect. from the beginning of the world for the damned; hence it Reply to Objection 1. The fire that will cleanse the is written (Mat. 25:41): “Depart. . . you cursed. . . into ev- elect before the judgment will be the same as the fire that erlasting fire which was prepared for the devil,” etc., and will burn the world, although some say the contrary. For (Is. 30:33): “Tophet is prepared from yesterday, prepared it is fitting that man, being a part of the world, be cleansed by the king,” etc., where a gloss observes: “From yester- with the same fire as the world. They are, however, de- day, i.e. from the beginning—Tophet, i.e. the valley of scribed as two fires, that will cleanse the good, and torture hell.” But this fire of the final conflagration was not pre- the wicked, both in reference to their respective offices, pared from the beginning, but will result from the meeting and somewhat in reference to their substance: since the together of the fires of the world. Therefore that fire is not substance of the cleansing fire will not all be cast into hell, the fire of hell which will engulf the wicked. as stated above. On the contrary, are the words of Ps. 96:3, where it Reply to Objection 2. This fire will be rewarded be- is said of this fire that it “shall burn His enemies round cause whatever it contains of gross matter will be sepa- about.” rated from it, and cast into hell. Further, it is written (Dan. 7:10): “A swift stream of Reply to Objection 3. The punishment of the wicked, fire issued forth from before Him”; and a gloss adds, “to even as the glory of the elect, will be greater after the drag sinners into hell.” Now the passage quoted refers to judgment than before. Wherefore, just as charity will be that fire of which we are now speaking, as appears from added to the higher creature in order to increase the glory a gloss which observes on the same words: “In order to of the elect, so too whatever is vile in creatures will be punish the wicked and cleanse the good.” Therefore the thrust down into hell in order to add to the misery of the fire of the final conflagration will be plunged into hell to- damned. Consequently it is not unbecoming that another gether with the wicked fire be added to the fire of the damned that was prepared I answer that, The entire cleansing of the world and from the beginning of the world. 2954 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 75 Of the Resurrection (In Three Articles) In the next place we must consider things connected with and accompanying the resurrection. Of these the first to be considered will be the resurrection itself; the second will be the cause of the resurrection; the third its time and manner. the fourth its term “wherefrom”; the fifth the condition of those who rise again. Under the first head there will be three points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is to be a resurrection of the body? (2) Whether it is universally of all bodies? (3) Whether it is natural or miraculous? Whether there is to be a resurrection of the body? Suppl. q. 75 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there is not to be inflicted on man for his own transgression, as appears a resurrection of the body: for it is written (Job 14:12): from Gn. 2, even as spiritual death, which is the sepa- “Man, when he is fallen asleep, shall not rise again till the ration of the soul from God, is inflicted on man for mortal heavens be broken.” But the heavens shall never be bro- sin. Now man never returns to life from spiritual death ken, since the earth, to which seemingly this is still less after receiving the sentence of his damnation. Therefore applicable, “standeth for ever” (Eccles. 1:4). Therefore neither will there be any return from bodily death to bod- the man that is dead shall never rise again. ily life, and so there will be no resurrection. Objection 2. Further, Our Lord proves the resurrec- On the contrary, It is written (Job 19:25-26): “I know tion by quoting the words: “I am the God of Abraham, that my Redeemer liveth, and in the last day I shall rise out and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. He is not the of the earth, and I shall be clothed again with my skin,” God of the dead but of the living” (Mat. 22:32; Ex. 3:6). etc. Therefore there will be a resurrection of the body. But it is clear that when those words were uttered, Abra- Further, the gift of Christ is greater than the sin of ham, Isaac, and Jacob lived not in body, but only in the Adam, as appears from Rom. 5:15. Now death was soul. Therefore there will be no resurrection of bodies but brought in by sin, for if sin had not been, there had been only of souls. no death. Therefore by the gift of Christ man will be re- Objection 3. Further, the Apostle (1 Cor. 15) seem- stored from death to life. ingly proves the resurrection from the reward for labors Further, the members should be conformed to the endured by the saints in this life. For if they trusted in this head. Now our Head lives and will live eternally in body life alone, they would be the most unhappy of all men. and soul, since “Christ rising again from the dead dieth Now there can be sufficient reward for labor in the soul now no more” (Rom. 6:8). Therefore men who are His alone: since it is not necessary for the instrument to be members will live in body and soul; and consequently repaid together with the worker, and the body is the soul’s there must needs be a resurrection of the body. instrument. Wherefore even in purgatory, where souls will I answer that, According to the various opinions be punished for what they did in the body, the soul is pun- about man’s last end there have been various opinions ished without the body. Therefore there is no need to hold holding or denying the resurrection. For man’s last end a resurrection of the body, but it is enough to hold a resur- which all men desire naturally is happiness. Some have rection of souls, which consists in their being taken from held that man is able to attain this end in this life: where- the death of sin and unhappiness to the life of grace and fore they had no need to admit another life after this, glory. wherein man would be able to attain to his perfection: and Objection 4. Further, the last state of a thing is the so they denied the resurrection. most perfect, since thereby it attains its end. Now the most This opinion is confuted with sufficient probability by perfect state of the soul is to be separated from the body, the changeableness of fortune, the weakness of the hu- since in that state it is more conformed to God and the man body, the imperfection and instability of knowledge angels, and is more pure, as being separated from any ex- and virtue, all of which are hindrances to the perfection of traneous nature. Therefore separation from the body is its happiness, as Augustine argues at the end of De Civ. Dei final state, and consequently it returns not from this state (xxii, 22). to the body, as neither does a man end in becoming a boy. Hence others maintained that after this there is another Objection 5. Further, bodily death is the punishment life wherein, after death, man lives according to the soul 2955 only, and they held that such a life sufficed to satisfy the to make the God of Abraham the God of a living man. But natural desire to obtain happiness: wherefore Porphyrius there needs to be life in the whole composite, i.e. the soul said as Augustine states (De Civ. De. xxii, 26): “The soul, and body: and although this life were not actually when to be happy, must avoid all bodies”: and consequently these words were uttered, it was in each part as ordained these did not hold the resurrection. to the resurrection. Wherefore our Lord proves the resur- This opinion was based by various people on various rection with the greatest subtlety and efficacy. false foundations. For certain heretics asserted that all Reply to Objection 3. The soul is compared to the bodily things are from the evil principle, but that spiri- body, not only as a worker to the instrument with which tual things are from the good principle: and from this it he works, but also as form to matter: wherefore the work follows that the soul cannot reach the height of its perfec- belongs to the composite and not to the soul alone, as the tion unless it be separated from the body, since the latter Philosopher shows (De Anima i, 4). And since to the withdraws it from its principle, the participation of which worker is due the reward of the work, it behooves man makes it happy. Hence all those heretical sects that hold himself, who is composed of soul and body, to receive the corporeal things to have been created or fashioned by the reward of his work. Now as venial offenses are called sins devil deny the resurrection of the body. The falsehood of as being dispositions to sin, and not as having simply and this principle has been shown at the beginning of the Sec- perfectly the character of sin, so the punishment which is ond Book (Sent. ii, D, 4, qu. 1, a. 3;∗). awarded to them in purgatory is not a retribution simply, Others said that the entire nature of man is seated in but rather a cleansing, which is wrought separately in the the soul, so that the soul makes use of the body as an in- body, by death and by its being reduced to ashes, and in strument, or as a sailor uses his ship: wherefore accord- the soul by the fire of purgatory. ing to this opinion, it follows that if happiness is attained Reply to Objection 4. Other things being equal, the by the soul alone, man would not be balked in his natu- state of the soul in the body is more perfect than outside ral desire for happiness, and so there is no need to hold the body, because it is a part of the whole composite; and the resurrection. But the Philosopher sufficiently destroys every integral part is material in comparison to the whole: this foundation (De Anima ii, 2), where he shows that the and though it were conformed to God in one respect, it soul is united to the body as form to matter. Hence it is is not simply. Because, strictly speaking, a thing is more clear that if man cannot be happy in this life, we must of conformed to God when it has all that the condition of necessity hold the resurrection. its nature requires, since then most of all it imitates the Reply to Objection 1. The heavens will never be bro- Divine perfection. Hence the heart of an animal is more ken as to their substance, but as to the effect of their power conformed to an immovable God when it is in movement whereby their movement is the cause of generation and than when it is at rest, because the perfection of the heart corruption of lower things: for this reason the Apostle is in its movement, and its rest is its undoing. says (1 Cor. 7:31): “The fashion of this world passeth Reply to Objection 5. Bodily death was brought away.” about by Adam’s sin which was blotted out by Christ’s Reply to Objection 2. Abraham’s soul, properly death: hence its punishment lasts not for ever. But mortal speaking, is not Abraham himself, but a part of him (and sin which causes everlasting death through impenitence the same as regards the others). Hence life in Abraham’s will not be expiated hereafter. Hence that death will be soul does not suffice to make Abraham a living being, or everlasting. Whether the resurrection will be for all without exception? Suppl. q. 75 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the resurrection will argues (1 Cor. 15:12, seqq.) that if Christ rose again, not be for all without exception. For it is written (Ps. 1:5): we also shall rise again. Now those alone should be con- “The wicked shall not rise again in judgment.” Now men formed to Christ rising again who have borne His image, will not rise again except at the time of the general judg- and this belongs to the good alone. Therefore they alone ment. Therefore the wicked shall in no way rise again. shall rise again. Objection 2. Further, it is written (Dan. 12:2): “Many Objection 4. Further, punishment is not remitted un- of those that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake.” less the fault be condoned. Now bodily death is the pun- But these words imply a restriction. Therefore all will not ishment of original sin. Therefore, as original sin is not rise again. forgiven to all, all will not rise again. Objection 3. Further, by the resurrection men are Objection 5. Further, as we are born again by the conformed to Christ rising again; wherefore the Apostle grace of Christ, even so shall we rise again by His grace. ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 49, a. 3 2956 Now those who die in their mother’s womb can never be already judged∗. born again: therefore neither can they rise again, and con- Reply to Objection 2. Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, sequently all will not rise again. 23) explains “many” as meaning “all”: in fact, this way On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 5:28,25): “All that are of speaking is often met with in Holy Writ. Or else the in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God. . . and restriction may refer to the children consigned to limbo they that hear shall live.” Therefore the dead shall all rise who, although they shall rise again, are not properly said again. to awake, since they will have no sense either of pain or Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:51): “We shall all in- of glory, and waking is the unchaining of the senses. deed rise again,” etc. Reply to Objection 3. All, both good and wicked, Further, the resurrection is necessary in order that are conformed to Christ, while living in this life, as re- those who rise again may receive punishment or reward gards things pertaining to the nature of the species, but according to their merits. Now either punishment or re- not as regards matters pertaining to grace. Hence all will ward is due to all, either for their own merits, as to adults, be conformed to Him in the restoration of natural life, but or for others’ merits, as to children. Therefore all will rise not in the likeness of glory, except the good alone. again. Reply to Objection 4. Those who have died in origi- I answer that, Those things, the reason of which nal sin have, by dying, discharged the obligation of death comes from the nature of a species, must needs be found which is the punishment of original sin. Hence, notwith- likewise in all the members of that same species. Now standing original sin, they can rise again from death: for such is the resurrection: because the reason thereof, as the punishment of original sin is to die, rather than to be stated above (a. 1), is that the soul cannot have the final detained by death. perfection of the human species, so long as it is separated Reply to Objection 5. We are born again by the grace from the body. Hence no soul will remain for ever sepa- of Christ that is given to us, but we rise again by the grace rated from the body. Therefore it is necessary for all, as of Christ whereby it came about that He took our nature, well as for one, to rise again. since it is by this that we are conformed to Him in natu- Reply to Objection 1. As a gloss expounds these ral things. Hence those who die in their mother’s womb, words, they refer to the spiritual resurrection whereby the although they are not born again by receiving grace, will wicked shall not rise again in the particular judgment. or nevertheless rise again on account of the conformity of else they refer to the wicked who are altogether unbeliev- their nature with Him, which conformity they acquired by ers, who will not rise again to be judged, since they are attaining to the perfection of the human species. Whether the resurrection is natural? Suppl. q. 75 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the resurrection is abide not for long, because they are violent, so to speak. natural. For, as the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, But the life that is restored by the resurrection will last for 14), “that which is commonly observed in all, marks the ever. Therefore the resurrection will be natural. nature of the individuals contained under it.” Now resur- Objection 4. Further, that to which the entire expec- rection applies commonly to all. Therefore it is natural. tation of nature looks forward would seem to be natural. Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral. xiv, 55): Now such a thing is the resurrection and the glorification “Those who do not hold the resurrection on the princi- of the saints according to Rom. 8:19. Therefore the resur- ple of obedience ought certainly to hold it on the prin- rection will be natural. ciple of reason. For what does the world every day but Objection 5. Further, the resurrection is a kind of imitate, in its elements, our resurrection?” And he of- movement towards the everlasting union of soul and body. fers as examples the light which “as it were dies. . . and Now movement is natural if it terminate in a natural rest is withdrawn from our sight. . . and again rises anew, as it (Phys. v, 6): and the everlasting union of soul and body were, and is recalled—the shrubs which lose their green- will be natural, for since the soul is the body’s proper ery, and again by a kind of resurrection are renewed—and mover, it has a body proportionate to it: so that the body the seeds which rot and die and then sprout and rise again is likewise for ever capable of being quickened by it, even as it were”: which same example is adduced by the Apos- as the soul lives for ever. Therefore the resurrection will tle (1 Cor. 15:36). Now from the works of nature nothing be natural. can be known save what is natural. Therefore the resur- On the contrary, There is no natural return from pri- rection is natural. vation to habit. But death is privation of life. Therefore Objection 3. Further, things that are against nature the resurrection whereby one returns from death to life is ∗ Jn. 3:18 2957 not natural. principle in respect of its ultimate perfection, namely the Further, things of the one species have one fixed way form; or in respect of a disposition in virtue of which it of origin: wherefore animals begotten of putrefaction are demands the ultimate form, as in the generation of a man never of the same species as those begotten of seed, as the according to the teaching of faith, or in all other gener- Commentator says on Phys. viii. Now the natural way of ations according to the opinions of Plato and Avicenna. man’s origin is for him to be begotten of a like in species: But in nature there is no active principle of the resurrec- and such is not the case in the resurrection. Therefore it tion, neither as regards the union of the soul with the body, will not be natural. nor as regards the disposition which is the demand for that I answer that, A movement or an action stands re- union: since such a disposition cannot be produced by na- lated to nature in three ways. For there is a movement ture, except in a definite way by the process of generation or action whereof nature is neither the principle nor the from seed. Wherefore even granted a passive potentiality term: and such a movement is sometimes from a principle on the part of the body, or any kind of inclination to its above nature as in the case of a glorified body; and some- union with the soul, it is not such as to suffice for the con- times from any other principle whatever; for instance, the ditions of natural movement. Therefore the resurrection, violent upward movement of a stone which terminates in strictly speaking, is miraculous and not natural except in a violent rest. Again, there is a movement whereof nature a restricted sense, as we have explained. is both principle and term: for instance, the downward Reply to Objection 1. Damascene is speaking of movement of a stone. And there is another movement those things that are found in all individuals and are whereof nature is the term, but not the principle, the lat- caused by the principles of nature. For supposing by a ter being sometimes something above nature (as in giving divine operation all men to be made white, or to be gath- sight to a blind man, for sight is natural, but the principle ered together in one place, as happened at the time of the of the sight-giving is above nature), and sometimes some- deluge, it would not follow that whiteness or existence in thing else, as in the forcing of flowers or fruit by artificial some particular place is a natural property of man. process. It is impossible for nature to be the principle and Reply to Objection 2. From natural things one does not the term, because natural principles are appointed to not come by a demonstration of reason to know non- definite effects, beyond which they cannot extend. natural things, but by the induction of reason one may Accordingly the action or movement that is related to know something above nature, since the natural bears a nature in the first way can nowise be natural, but is either certain resemblance to the supernatural. Thus the union of miraculous if it come from a principle above nature, or vi- soul and body resembles the union of the soul with God olent if from any other principle. The action or movement by the glory of fruition, as the Master says (Sent. ii, D, that is related to nature in the second way is simply natu- 1): and in like manner the examples, quoted by the Apos- ral: but the action that is related to nature in the third way tle and Gregory, are confirmatory evidences of our faith in cannot be described as natural simply, but as natural in a the resurrection. restricted sense, in so far, to wit, as it leads to that which Reply to Objection 3. This argument regards an op- is according to nature: but it is called either miraculous eration which terminates in something that is not natural or artificial or violent. For, properly speaking, natural is but contrary to nature. Such is not the resurrection, and that which is according to nature, and a thing is according hence the argument is not to the point. to nature if it has that nature and whatever results from Reply to Objection 4. The entire operation of nature that nature (Phys. ii, 1). Consequently, speaking simply, is subordinate to the Divine operation, just as the working movement cannot be described as natural unless its prin- of a lower art is subordinate to the working of a higher ciple be natural. art. Hence just as all the work of a lower art has in view Now nature cannot be the principle of resurrection, al- an end unattainable save by the operation of the higher art though resurrection terminates in the life of nature. For that produces the form, or makes use of what has been nature is the principle of movement in the thing wherein made by art: so the last end which the whole expectation nature is—either the active principle, as in the movement of nature has in view is unattainable by the operation of of heavy and light bodies and in the natural alterations of nature, and for which reason the attaining thereto is not animals—or the passive principle, as in the generation of natural. simple bodies. The passive principle of natural generation Reply to Objection 5. Although there can be no nat- is the natural passive potentiality which always has an ac- ural movement terminating in a violent rest, there can be tive principle corresponding to it in nature, according to a non-natural movement terminating in a natural rest, as Metaphysics viii, 1: nor as to this does it matter whether explained above. the active principle in nature correspond to the passive 2958 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 76 Of the Cause of the Resurrection (In Three Articles) We must next consider the cause of our resurrection. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ’s resurrection is the cause of our resurrection? (2) Whether the sound of the trumpet is? (3) Whether the angels are? Whether the resurrection of Christ is the cause of our resurrection? Suppl. q. 76 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the resurrection of grace from above, and His grace is the cause of our grace, Christ is not the cause of our resurrection. For, given the because “of His fulness we all have received. . . grace for cause, the effect follows. Yet given the resurrection of grace” (Jn. 1:16), so in Christ has our resurrection begun, Christ the resurrection of the other dead did not follow at and His resurrection is the cause of ours. Thus Christ as once. Therefore His resurrection is not the cause of ours. God is, as it were, the equivocal cause of our resurrection, Objection 2. Further, an effect cannot be unless the but as God and man rising again, He is the proximate and, cause precede. But the resurrection of the dead would be so to say, the univocal cause of our resurrection. Now a even if Christ had not risen again: for God could have univocal efficient cause produces its effect in likeness to delivered man in some other way. Therefore Christ’s res- its own form, so that not only is it an efficient, but also urrection is not the cause of ours. an exemplar cause in relation to that effect. This happens Objection 3. Further, the same thing produces the one in two ways. For sometimes this very form, whereby the effect throughout the one same species. Now the resur- agent is likened to its effect, is the direct principle of the rection will be common to all men. Since then Christ’s action by which the effect is produced, as heat in the fire resurrection is not its own cause, it is not the cause of the that heats: and sometimes it is not the form in respect resurrection of others. of which this likeness is observed, that is primarily and Objection 4. Further, an effect retains some likeness directly the principle of that action, but the principles of to its cause. But the resurrection, at least of some, namely that form. For instance, if a white man beget a white man, the wicked, bears no likeness to the resurrection of Christ. the whiteness of the begetter is not the principle of active Therefore Christ’s resurrection will not be the cause of generation, and yet the whiteness of the begetter is said to theirs. be the cause of the whiteness of the begotten, because the On the contrary, “In every genus that which is first is principles of whiteness in the begetter are the generative the cause of those that come after it” (Metaph. ii, 1). Now principles causing whiteness in the begotten. In this way Christ, by reason of His bodily resurrection, is called “the the resurrection of Christ is the cause of our resurrection, first-fruits of them that sleep” (1 Cor. 15:20), and “the because the same thing that wrought the resurrection of first-begotten of the dead” (Apoc. 1:5). Therefore His Christ, which is the univocal efficient cause of our res- resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of others. urrection, is the active cause of our resurrection, namely Further, Christ’s resurrection has more in common the power of Christ’s Godhead which is common to Him with our bodily resurrection than with our spiritual res- and the Father. Hence it is written (Rom. 8:11): “He urrection which is by justification. But Christ’s resurrec- that raised up Jesus Christ from the dead shall quicken tion is the cause of our justification, as appears from Rom. also your mortal bodies.” And this very resurrection of 4:25, where it is said that He “rose again for our justifica- Christ by virtue of His indwelling Godhead is the quasi- tion.” Therefore Christ’s resurrection is the cause of our instrumental cause of our resurrection: since the Divine bodily resurrection. operations were wrought by means of Christ’s flesh, as I answer that, Christ by reason of His nature is called though it were a kind of organ; thus the Damascene in- the mediator of God and men: wherefore the Divine gifts stances as an example (De Fide Orth. iii, 15) the touch of are bestowed on men by means of Christ’s humanity. Now His body whereby He healed the leper (Mat. 8:3). just as we cannot be delivered from spiritual death save Reply to Objection 1. A sufficient cause produces by the gift of grace bestowed by God, so neither can at once its effect to which it is immediately directed, but we be delivered from bodily death except by resurrection not the effect to which it is directed by means of some- wrought by the Divine power. And therefore as Christ, thing else, no matter how sufficient it may be: thus heat, in respect of His human nature, received the firstfruits of however intense it be, does not cause heat at once in the 2959 first instant, but it begins at once to set up a movement resurrection is the cause of ours: and yet He could have towards heat, because heat is its effect by means of move- appointed another order, and then our resurrection would ment. Now Christ’s resurrection is said to be the cause have had another cause ordained by God. of ours, in that it works our resurrection, not immediately, Reply to Objection 3. This argument holds when all but by means of its principle, namely the Divine power the things of one species have the same order to the first which will work our resurrection in likeness to the res- cause of the effect to be produced in the whole of that urrection of Christ. Now God’s power works by means species. But it is not so in the case in point, because of His will which is nearest to the effect; hence it is not Christ’s humanity is nearer to His Godhead, Whose power necessary that our resurrection should follow straightway is the first cause of the resurrection, than is the humanity after He has wrought the resurrection of Christ, but that it of others. Hence Christ’s Godhead caused His resurrec- should happen at the time which God’s will has decreed. tion immediately, but it causes the resurrection of others Reply to Objection 2. God’s power is not tied to any by means of Christ-man rising again. particular second causes, but that He can produce their Reply to Objection 4. The resurrection of all men effects either immediately or by means of other causes: will bear some resemblance to Christ’s resurrection, as re- thus He might work the generation of lower bodies even gards that which pertains to the life of nature, in respect though there were no movement of the heaven: and yet of which all were conformed to Christ. Hence all will rise according to the order which He has established in things, again to immortal life; but in the saints who were con- the movement of the heaven is the cause of the generation formed to Christ by grace, there will be conformity as to of the lower bodies. In like manner according to the order things pertaining to glory. appointed to human things by Divine providence, Christ’s Whether the sound of the trumpet will be the cause of our resurrection? Suppl. q. 76 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the sound of the trum- way be united together, since mover and moved, maker pet will not be the cause of our resurrection. For the Dam- and made, are simultaneous (Phys. vii, 2). Now Christ ris- ascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): “Thou must believe that ing again is the univocal cause of our resurrection: where- the resurrection will take place by God’s will, power, and fore at the resurrection of bodies, it behooves Christ to nod.” Therefore since these are a sufficient cause of our work the resurrection at the giving of some common bod- resurrection, we ought not to assign the sound of the trum- ily sign. According to some this sign will be literally pet as a cause thereof. Christ’s voice commanding the resurrection, even as He Objection 2. Further, it is useless to make sounds to commanded the sea and the storm ceased (Mat. 8:26). one who cannot hear. But the dead will not have hearing. Others say that this sign will be nothing else than the man- Therefore it is unfitting to make a sound to arouse them. ifest appearance of the Son of God in the world, according Objection 3. Further, if any sound is the cause of the to the words of Mat. 24:27: “As lightning cometh out of resurrection, this will only be by a power given by God the east, and appeareth even into the west, so shall also the to the sound: wherefore a gloss on Ps. 67:34, “He will coming of the Son of man be.” These rely on the author- give to His voice the voice of power,” says: “to arouse our ity of Gregory∗ who says that “the sound of the trumpet is bodies.” Now from the moment that a power is given to nothing else but the Son appearing to the world as judge.” a thing, though it be given miraculously, the act that en- According to this, the visible presence of the Son of God sues is natural, as instanced in the man born blind who, is called His voice, because as soon as He appears all na- after being restored to sight, saw naturally. Therefore if a ture will obey His command in restoring human bodies: sound be the cause of resurrection, the resurrection would hence He is described as coming “with commandment” be natural: which is false. (1 Thess. 4:15). In this way His appearing, in so far as On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. 4:15): “The it has the force of a command, is called His voice: which Lord Himself will come down from heaven. . . with the voice, whatever it be, is sometimes called a cry†, as of a trumpet of God; and the dead who are in Christ shall rise.” crier summoning to judgment; sometimes the sound of a Further, it is written (Jn. 5:28) that they “who are in trumpet‡, either on account of its distinctness, as stated the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God. . . and in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43), or as being in keeping with (Jn. 5:25) they that hear shall live.” Now this voice is the use of the trumpet in the Old Testament: for by the called the trumpet, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). trumpet they were summoned to the council, stirred to the Therefore, etc. battle, and called to the feast; and those who rise again I answer that, Cause and effect must needs in some will be summoned to the council of judgment, to the bat- ∗ Moral. xxxi, as quoted by St. Albert the Great, Sentent. iv, D, 42, a. 4 † Mt 25:6 ‡ 1 Cor. 15:52; 1 Thess. 4:15 2960 tle in which “the world shall fight. . . against the unwise” Reply to Objection 2. As the forms of the Sacra- (Wis. 5:21), and to the feast of everlasting solemnity. ment have the power to sanctify, not through being heard, Reply to Objection 1. In those words the Damascene but through being spoken: so this sound, whatever it be, touches on three things respecting the material cause of will have an instrumental efficacy of resuscitation, not the resurrection: to wit, the Divine will which commands, through being perceived, but through being uttered. Even the power which executes, and the ease of execution, so a sound by the pulsation of the air arouses the sleeper, when he adds “bidding,” in resemblance to our own af- by loosing the organ of perception, and not because it is fairs: since it is very easy for us to do what is done at once known: since judgment about the sound that reaches the at our word. But the ease is much more evident, if before ears is subsequent to the awakening and is not its cause. we say a word, our servants execute our will at once at the Reply to Objection 3. This argument would avail, if first sign of our will, which sign is called a nod: and this the power given to that sound were a complete being in nod is a kind of cause of that execution, in so far as others nature: because then that which would proceed therefrom are led thereby to accomplish our will. And the Divine would have for principle a power already rendered natu- nod, at which the resurrection will take place, is nothing ral. But this power is not of that kind but such as we have but the sign given by God, which all nature will obey by ascribed above to the forms of the Sacraments (Sent. iv, concurring in the resurrection of the dead. This sign is the D, 1; Ia, q. 62, Aa. 1,4). same as the sound of the trumpet, as explained above. Whether the angels will do anything towards the resurrection? Suppl. q. 76 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels will do is something pertaining to the transmutation of the bod- nothing at all towards the resurrection. For raising the ies, to wit the gathering together of the mortal remains dead shows a greater power than does begetting men. and the disposal thereof for the restoration of the human Now when men are begotten, the soul is not infused into body; wherefore in this respect God will employ the min- the body by means of the angels. Therefore neither will istry of the angels in the resurrection. But the soul, even the resurrection, which is reunion of soul and body, be as it is immediately created by God, so will it be reunited wrought by the ministry of the angels. to the body immediately by God without any operation of Objection 2. Further, if this is to be ascribed to the inthe angels: and in like manner He Himself will glorify the strumentality of any angels at all, it would seem especially body without the ministry of the angels, just as He imme- referable to the virtues, to whom it belongs to work mira- diately glorifies man’s soul. This ministry of the angels is cles. Yet it is referred, not to them, but to the archangels, called their voice, according to one explanation given in according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). Therefore the resur- the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). rection will not be wrought by the ministry of the angels. Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident from On the contrary, It is stated (1 Thess. 4:15) that “the what has been said. Lord. . . shall come down from heaven. . . with the voice of Reply to Objection 2. This ministry will be exer- an archangel. . . and the dead shall rise again.” Therefore cised chiefly by one Archangel, namely Michael, who the resurrection of the dead will be accomplished by the is the prince of the Church as he was of the Synagogue angelic ministry. (Dan. 10:13,21). Yet he will act under the influence of I answer that, According to Augustine (De Trin. iii, the Virtues and the other higher orders: so that what he 4) “just as the grosser and inferior bodies are ruled in a shall do, the higher orders will, in a way, do also. In like certain order by the more subtle and more powerful bod- manner the lower angels will co-operate with him as to ies, so are all bodies ruled by God by the rational spirit the resurrection of each individual to whose guardianship of life”: and Gregory speaks in the same sense (Dial. iv, they were appointed: so that this voice can be ascribed 6). Consequently in all God’s bodily works, He employs either to one or to many angels. the ministry of the angels. Now in the resurrection there 2961 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 77 Of the Time and Manner of the Resurrection (In Four Articles) We must now consider the time and manner of the resurrection. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the time of the resurrection should be delayed until the end of the world? (2) Whether that time is hidden? (3) Whether the resurrection will occur at night-time? (4) Whether it will happen suddenly? Whether the time of our resurrection should be delayed till the end of the world? Suppl. q. 77 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the time of the resur- resurrection of all is not delayed until the end of the world, rection ought not to be delayed till the end of the world, so that all may rise together. that all may rise together. For there is more conformity be- On the contrary, It is written (Job 14:12): “Man tween head and members than between one member and when he is fallen asleep shall not rise again till the heav- another, as there is more between cause and effect than ens be broken, he shall not wake, nor rise out of his sleep,” between one effect and another. Now Christ, Who is our and it is a question of the sleep of death. Therefore the res- Head, did not delay His resurrection until the end of the urrection of men will be delayed until the end of the world world, so as to rise again together with all men. Therefore when the heavens shall be broken. there is no need for the resurrection of the early saints to Further, it is written (Heb. 11:39): “All these being ap- be deferred until the end of the world, so that they may proved by the testimony of faith received not the promise,” rise again together with the others. i.e. full beatitude of soul and body, since “God has pro- Objection 2. Further, the resurrection of the Head vided something better for us, lest they should be con- is the cause of the resurrection of the members. But the summated,” i.e. perfected, “without us—in order that,” as resurrection of certain members that desire nobility from a gloss observes, “through all rejoicing each one might re- their being closely connected with the Head was not de- joice the more.” But the resurrection will not precede the layed till the end of the world, but followed immediately glorification of bodies, because “He will reform the body after Christ’s resurrection, as is piously believed concern- of our lowness made like to the body of His glory” (Phil. ing the Blessed Virgin and John the Evangelist∗. There- 3:21), and the children of the resurrection will be “as the fore the resurrection of others will be so much nearer angels. . . in heaven” (Mat. 22:30). Therefore the resur- Christ’s resurrection, according as they have been more rection will be delayed till the end of the world, when all conformed to Him by grace and merit. shall rise together. Objection 3. Further, the state of the New Testament I answer that, As Augustine states (De Trin. iii, 4) is more perfect, and bears a closer resemblance to Christ, “Divine providence decreed that the grosser and lower than the state of the Old Testament. Yet some of the fa- bodies should be ruled in a certain order by the more thers of the Old Testament rose again when Christ rose, subtle and powerful bodies”: wherefore the entire mat- according to Mat. 27:52: “Many of the bodies of the ter of the lower bodies is subject to variation according saints, that had slept, arose.” Therefore it would seem to the movement of the heavenly bodies. Hence it would that the resurrection of the Old Testament saints should be contrary to the order established in things by Divine not be delayed till the end of the world, so that all may providence if the matter of lower bodies were brought to rise together. the state of incorruption, so long as there remains move- Objection 4. Further, there will be no numbering of ment in the higher bodies. And since, according to the years after the end of the world. Yet after the resurrection teaching of faith, the resurrection will bring men to im- of the dead, the years are still reckoned until the resur- mortal life conformably to Christ Who “rising again from rection of others, as appears from Apoc. 20:4,5. For it the dead dieth now no more” (Rom. 6:9), the resurrec- is stated there that “I saw. . . the souls of them that were tion of human bodies will be delayed until the end of the beheaded for the testimony of Jesus, and for the word of world when the heavenly movement will cease. For this God,” and further on: “And they lived and reigned with reason, too, certain philosophers, who held that the move- Christ a thousand years.” And “the rest of the dead lived ment of the heavens will never cease, maintained that hu- not till the thousand years were finished.” Therefore the man souls will return to mortal bodies such as we have ∗ Ep. de Assump. B.V., cap. ii, among St. Jerome’s works 2962 now—whether, as Empedocles, they stated that the soul might bear true witness to Christ’s true resurrection, it was would return to the same body at the end of the great year, fitting that they should truly rise again. Nor was their res- or that it would return to another body; thus Pythagoras urrection hastened for their sake, but for the sake of bear- asserted that “any soul will enter any body,” as stated in ing witness to Christ’s resurrection: and that by bearing De Anima i, 3. witness thereto they might lay the foundation of the faith Reply to Objection 1. Although the head is more of the New Testament: wherefore it was more fitting that conformed to the members by conformity of proportion it should be borne by the fathers of the Old Testament, (which is requisite in order that it have influence over the than by those who died after the foundation of the New. members) than one member is to another, yet the head has It must, however, be observed that, although the Gospel a certain causality over the members which the members mentions their resurrection before Christ’s, we must take have not; and in this the members differ from the head and this statement as made in anticipation, as is often the case agree with one another. Hence Christ’s resurrection is an with writers of history. For none rose again with a true exemplar of ours, and through our faith therein there arises resurrection before Christ, since He is the “first-fruits of in us the hope of our own resurrection. But the resurrec- them that sleep” (1 Cor. 15:20), although some were re- tion of one of Christ’s members is not the cause of the suscitated before Christ’s resurrection, as in the case of resurrection of other members, and consequently Christ’s Lazarus. resurrection had to precede the resurrection of others who Reply to Objection 4. On account of these words, have all to rise again at the consummation of the world. as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xx, 7), certain heretics Reply to Objection 2. Although among the members asserted that there will be a first resurrection of the dead some rank higher than others and are more conformed to that they may reign with Christ on earth for a thousand the Head, they do not attain to the character of headship years; whence they were called “chiliasts” or “millenari- so as to be the cause of others. Consequently greater con- ans.” Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 7) that these formity to Christ does not give them a right to rise again words are to be understood otherwise, namely of the spir- before others as though they were exemplar and the others itual resurrection, whereby men shall rise again from their exemplate, as we have said in reference to Christ’s res- sins to the gift of grace: while the second resurrection is of urrection: and if it has been granted to others that their bodies. The reign of Christ denotes the Church wherein resurrection should not be delayed until the general res- not only martyrs but also the other elect reign, the part urrection, this has been by special privilege of grace, and denoting the whole; or they reign with Christ in glory as not as due on account of conformity to Christ. regards all, special mention being made of the martyrs, be- Reply to Objection 3. Jerome, in a sermon on the As- cause they especially reign after death who fought for the sumption∗, seems to be doubtful of this resurrection of the truth, even unto death. The number of a thousand years saints with Christ, namely as to whether, having been wit- denotes not a fixed number, but the whole of the present nesses to the resurrection, they died again, so that theirs time wherein the saints now reign with Christ, because the was a resuscitation (as in the case of Lazarus who died number 1,000 designates universality more than the num- again) rather than a resurrection such as will be at the end ber 100, since 100 is the square of 10, whereas 1,000 is a of the world—or really rose again to immortal life, to live cube resulting from the multiplication of ten by its square, for ever in the body, and to ascend bodily into heaven with for 10 X 10 = 100, and 100 X 10 = 1,000. Again in Ps. Christ, as a gloss says on Mat. 27:52. The latter seems 104:8, “The word which He commanded to a thousand,” more probable, because, as Jerome says, in order that they i.e. all, “generations.” Whether the time of our resurrection is hidden? Suppl. q. 77 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that this time is not hid- pared by God, that there she might feed [Vulg.: ‘they den. Because when we know exactly the beginning of a should feed her’] a thousand two hundred sixty days.” thing, we can know its end exactly, since “all things are Again (Dan. 12:11), a certain fixed number of days is measured by a certain period” (De Generat. ii). Now the mentioned, which apparently signify years, according to beginning of the world is known exactly. Therefore its Ezech. 4:6: “A day for a year, yea a day for a year I have end can also be known exactly. But this will be the time appointed to thee.” Therefore the time of the end of the of the resurrection and judgment. Therefore that time is world and of the resurrection can be known exactly from not hidden. Holy Writ. Objection 2. Further, it is stated (Apoc. 12:6) that Objection 3. Further, the state of the New Testament “the woman who represents the Church had a place pre- was foreshadowed in the Old Testament. Now we know ∗ Ep. x ad Paul. et Eustoch., now recognized as spurious 2963 exactly the time wherein the state of the Old Testament ther hath put in His own power,” whereby, as Augustine endured. Therefore we can also know exactly the time says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 53): “He scatters the fingers of all wherein the state of the New Testament will endure. But calculators and bids them be still.” For what He refused the state of the New Testament will last to the end of the to tell the apostles, He will not reveal to others: where- world, wherefore it is said (Mat. 28:20): “Behold I am fore all those who have been misled to reckon the afore- with you. . . to the consummation of the world.” Therefore said time have so far proved to be untruthful; for some, as the time of the end of the world and of the resurrection Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 53), stated that from can be known exactly. our Lord’s Ascension to His last coming 400 years would On the contrary, That which is unknown to the an- elapse, others 500, others 1,000. The falseness of these gels will be much more unknown to men: because those calculators is evident, as will likewise be the falseness of things to which men attain by natural reason are much those who even now cease not to calculate. more clearly and certainly known to the angels by their Reply to Objection 1. When we know a thing’s be- natural knowledge. Moreover revelations are not made ginning and also its end it follows that its measure is to men save by means of the angels as Dionysius asserts known to us: wherefore if we know the beginning of a (Coel. Hier. iv). Now the angels have no exact knowledge thing the duration of which is measured by the move- of that time, as appears from Mat. 24:36: “Of that day ment of the heaven, we are able to know its end, since and hour no one knoweth, no not the angels of heaven.” the movement of heaven is known to us. But the measure Therefore that time is hidden from men. of the duration of the heavenly movement is God’s ordi- Further, the apostles were more cognizant of God’s nance alone, which is unknown to us. Wherefore however secrets than others who followed them, because they had much we may know its beginning, we are unable to know “the first-fruits of the spirit” (Rom. 8:23)—” before oth- its end. ers in point of time and more abundantly,” as a gloss ob- Reply to Objection 2. The thousand two hundred serves. And yet when they questioned our Lord about this sixty days mentioned in the Apocalypse (12:6) denote all very matter, He answered them (Acts 1:7): “It is not for the time during which the Church endures, and not any you to know the times or moments which the Father hath definite number of years. The reason whereof is because put in His own power.” Much more, therefore, is it hidden the preaching of Christ on which the Church is built lasted from others. three years and a half, which time contains almost an I answer that, As Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. equal number of days as the aforesaid number. Again the 58) “as to the last age of the human race, which begins number of days appointed by Daniel does not refer to a from our Lord’s coming and lasts until the end of the number of years to elapse before the end of the world or world, it is uncertain of how many generations it will con- until the preaching of Antichrist, but to the time of An- sist: even so old age, which is man’s last age, has no fixed tichrist’s preaching and the duration of his persecution. time according to the measure of the other ages, since Reply to Objection 3. Although the state of the New sometimes alone it lasts as long a time as all the others.” Testament in general is foreshadowed by the state of the The reason of this is because the exact length of future Old Testament it does not follow that individuals corre- time cannot be known except either by revelation or by spond to individuals: especially since all the figures of natural reason: and the time until the resurrection cannot the Old Testament were fulfilled in Christ. Hence Au- be reckoned by natural reason, because the resurrection gustine (De Civ. Dei xviii, 52) answers certain persons and the end of the heavenly movement will be simultane- who wished to liken the number of persecutions suffered ous as stated above (a. 1). And all things that are foreseen by the Church to the number of the plagues of Egypt, in by natural reason to happen at a fixed time are reckoned these words: “I do not think that the occurrences in Egypt by movement: and it is impossible from the movement of were in their signification prophetic of these persecutions, the heaven to reckon its end, for since it is circular, it is for although those who think so have shown nicety and inthis very reason able by its nature to endure for ever: and genuity in adapting them severally the one to the other, consequently the time between this and the resurrection not indeed by a prophetic spirit, but by the guess-work of cannot be reckoned by natural reason. Again it cannot be the human mind, which sometimes reaches the truth and known by revelation, so that all may be on the watch and sometimes not.” The same remarks would seem applica- ready to meet Christ: and for this reason when the apos- ble to the statements of Abbot Joachim, who by means tles asked Him about this, Christ answered (Acts 1:7): “It of such conjectures about the future foretold some things is not for you to know the times or moments which the Fa- that were true, and in others was deceived. 2964 Whether the resurrection will take place at night-time? Suppl. q. 77 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the resurrection will Therefore the resurrection will be at night-time. not be at night-time. For the resurrection will not be “till I answer that, The exact time and hour at which the the heavens be broken” (Job 14:12). Now when the heav- resurrection will be cannot be known for certain, as stated enly movement ceases, which is signified by its breaking, in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). Nevertheless some assert there will be no time, neither night nor day. Therefore the with sufficient probability that it will be towards the twi- resurrection will not be at night-time. light, the moon being in the east and the sun in the west; Objection 2. Further, the end of a thing ought to be because the sun and moon are believed to have been cre- most perfect. Now the end of time will be then: where- ated in these positions, and thus their revolutions will be fore it is said (Apoc. 10:6) that “time shall be no longer.” altogether completed by their return to the same point. Therefore time ought to be then in its most perfect dispo- Wherefore it is said that Christ arose at such an hour. sition and consequently it should be the daytime. Reply to Objection 1. When the resurrection occurs, Objection 3. Further, the time should be such as to be it will not be time but the end of time; because at the very adapted to what is done therein: wherefore (Jn. 13:30) the instant that the heavens will cease to move the dead will night is mentioned as being the time when Judas went out rise again. Nevertheless the stars will be in the same po- from the fellowship of the light. Now, all things that are sition as they occupy now at any fixed hour: and accord- hidden at the present time will then be made most mani- ingly it is said that the resurrection will be at this or that fest, because when the Lord shall come He “will bring to hour. light the hidden things of darkness, and will make mani- Reply to Objection 2. The most perfect disposition of fest the counsels of the hearts” (1 Cor. 4:5). Therefore it time is said to be midday, on account of the light given by ought to be during the day. the sun. But then the city of God will need neither sun nor On the contrary, Christ’s resurrection is the exemplar moon, because the glory of God will enlighten it (Apoc. of ours. Now Christ’s resurrection was at night, as Gre- 22:5). Wherefore in this respect it matters not whether the gory says in a homily for Easter (xxi in Evang.). Therefore resurrection be in the day or in the night. our resurrection will also be at night-time. Reply to Objection 3. That time should be adapted to Further, the coming of our Lord is compared to the manifestation as regards the things that will happen then, coming of a thief into the house (Lk. 12:39,40). But the and to secrecy as regards the fixing of the time. Hence thief comes to the house at night-time. Therefore our Lord either may happen fittingly, namely that the resurrection will also come in the night. Now, when He comes the be in the day or in the night. resurrection will take place, as stated above (q. 76, a. 2). Whether the resurrection will happen suddenly or by degrees? Suppl. q. 77 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the resurrection will Objection 4. Further, no local movement can be sud- not happen suddenly but by degrees. For the resurrection den as stated in De Sensu et Sensato vii. Now the res- of the dead is foretold (Ezech. 37:7,8) where it is writ- urrection requires local movement in the gathering of the ten: “The bones came together. . . and I saw and behold ashes. Therefore it will not happen suddenly. the sinews and the flesh came up upon them, and the skin On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:51,52): “We was stretched out over them, but there was no spirit in shall all indeed rise again. . . in a moment, in the twinkling them.” Therefore the restoration of the bodies will pre- of an eye.” Therefore the resurrection will be sudden. cede in time their reunion with the souls, and thus the res- Further, infinite power works suddenly. But the Dam- urrection will not be sudden. ascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): “Thou shalt believe in the Objection 2. Further, a thing does not happen sud- resurrection to be wrought by the power of God,” and it is denly if it require several actions following one another. evident that this is infinite. Therefore the resurrection will Now the resurrection requires several actions following be sudden. one another, namely the gathering of the ashes, the re- I answer that, At the resurrection something will be fashioning of the body, the infusion of the soul. Therefore done by the ministry of the angels, and something im- the resurrection will not be sudden. mediately by the power of God, as stated above (q. 76, Objection 3. Further, all sound is measured by time. a. 3). Accordingly that which is done by the ministry Now the sound of the trumpet will be the cause of the of the angels, will not be instantaneous, if by instant we resurrection, as stated above (q. 76, a. 2). Therefore the mean an indivisible point of time, but it will be instanta- resurrection will take time and will not happen suddenly. neous if by instant we mean an imperceptible time. But 2965 that which will be done immediately by God’s power will Reply to Objection 2. Although these actions follow happen suddenly, namely at the end of the time wherein one another in nature, they are all together in time: be- the work of the angels will be done, because the higher cause either they are together in the same instant, or one power brings the lower to perfection. is in the instant that terminates the other. Reply to Objection 1. Ezechiel spoke, like Moses Objection 3. The same would seem to apply to that to a rough people, and therefore, just as Moses divided sound as to the forms of the sacraments, namely that the the works of the six days into days, in order that the un- sound will produce its effect in its last instant. cultured people might be able to understand, although all Reply to Objection 4. The gathering of the ashes things were made together according to Augustine (Gen. which cannot be without local movement will be done ad lit. iv), so Ezechiel expressed the various things that by the ministry of the angels. Hence it will be in time will happen in the resurrection, although they will all hap- though imperceptible on account of the facility of opera- pen together in an instant. tion which is competent to the angels. 2966 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 78 Of the Term “Wherefrom” of the Resurrection (In Three Articles) We must now consider the term “wherefrom” of the resurrection; and under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether death is the term “wherefrom” of the resurrection in every case? (2) Whether ashes are, or dust? (3) Whether this dust has a natural inclination towards the soul? Whether death will be the term “wherefrom” of the resurrection in all cases? Suppl. q. 78 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that death will not be the to the seed. term “wherefrom” of the resurrection in all cases. Be- Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:22): “As in Adam all cause some shall not die but shall be clothed with immor- die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive.” Now all tality: for it is said in the creed that our Lord “will come shall be made alive in Christ. Therefore all shall die in to judge the living and the dead.” Now this cannot refer to Adam: and so all shall rise again from death. the time of judgment, because then all will be alive; there- I answer that, The saints differ in speaking on this fore this distinction must refer to the previous time, and question, as may be seen in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). consequently all will not die before the judgment. However, the safer and more common opinion is that all Objection 2. Further, a natural and common desire shall die and rise again from death: and this for three rea- cannot be empty and vain, but is fulfilled in some cases. sons. First, because it is more in accord with Divine jus- Now according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 5:4) it is a common tice, which condemned human nature for the sin of its first desire that “we would not be unclothed but clothed upon.” parent, that all who by the act of nature derive their ori- Therefore there will be some who will never be stripped gin from him should contract the stain of original sin, and of the body by death, but will be arrayed in the glory of consequently be the debtors of death. Secondly, because the resurrection. it is more in agreement with Divine Scripture which fore- Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion tells the resurrection of all; and resurrection is not pre- cxv) that the four last petitions of the Lord’s prayer re- dicted properly except of that “which has fallen and per- fer to the present life: and one of them is: “Forgive us our ished,” as the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv). Thirdly, debts [Douay: ‘trespasses’].” Therefore the Church prays because it is more in harmony with the order of nature that all debts may be forgiven her in this life. Now the where we find that what is corrupted and decayed is not Church’s prayer cannot be void and not granted: “If you renewed except by means of corruption: thus vinegar does ask the Father anything in My name, He will give it you” not become wine unless the vinegar be corrupted and pass (Jn. 16:23). Therefore at some time of this life the Church into the juice of the grape. Wherefore since human nature will receive the remission of all debts: and one of the debts has incurred the defect of the necessity of death, it cannot to which we are bound by the sin of our first parent is that return to immortality save by means of death. It is also we be born in original sin. Therefore at some time God in keeping with the order of nature for another reason, will grant to the Church that men be born without original because, as it is stated in Phys. viii, 1, “the movement sin. But death is the punishment of original sin. Therefore of heaven is as a kind of life to all existing in nature,” at the end of the world there will be some men who will just as the movement of the heart is a kind of life of the not die: and so the same conclusion follows. whole body: wherefore even as all the members become Objection 4. Further, the wise man should always dead on the heart ceasing to move, so when the heavenly choose the shortest way. Now the shortest way is for movement ceases nothing can remain living with that life the men who shall be found living to be transferred to which was sustained by the influence of that movement. the impassibility of the resurrection, than for them to die Now such is the life by which we live now: and therefore first, and afterwards rise again from death to immortality. it follows that those who shall live after the movement of Therefore God Who is supremely wise will choose this the heaven comes to a standstill must depart from this life. way for those who shall be found living. Reply to Objection 1. This distinction of the dead On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:36): “That and the living does not apply to the time itself of the judg- which thou sowest is not quickened except it die first,” and ment, nor to the whole preceding time, since all who are he is speaking of the resurrection of the body as compared to be judged were living at some time, and dead at some 2967 time: but it applies to that particular time which shall pre-one cannot be delivered from an evil or absolved from a cede the judgment immediately, when, to wit, the signs of debt unless one incur the debt or incur the evil: and con- the judgment shall begin to appear. sequently all could not reap in themselves the fruit of the Reply to Objection 2. The perfect desire of the saints Lord’s prayer, unless all were born debtors and subject to cannot be void; but nothing prevents their conditional de- evil. Hence the forgiveness of debts or delivery from evil sire being void. Such is the desire whereby we would not cannot be applied to one who is born without a debt or be “unclothed,” but “clothed upon,” namely if that be pos- free from evil, but only to one who is born with a debt sible: and this desire is called by some a “velleity.” and is afterwards delivered by the grace of Christ. Nor Reply to Objection 3. It is erroneous to say that does it follow, if it can be asserted without error that some any one except Christ is conceived without original sin, die not, that they are born without original sin, although because those who would be conceived without original death is a punishment of original sin; because God can of sin would not need the redemption which was wrought His mercy remit the punishment which one has incurred by Christ, and thus Christ would not be the Redeemer by a past fault, as He forgave the adulterous woman with- of all men∗. Nor can it be said that they needed not out punishment (Jn. 8): and in like manner He can deliver this redemption, because it was granted to them that they from death those who have contracted the debt of death by should be conceived without sin. For, this grace was being born in original sin. And thus it does not follow that vouchsafed—either to their parents, that the sin of nature if they die not, therefore they were born without original might be healed in them (because so long as that sin re- sin. mained they were unable to beget without communicat- Reply to Objection 4. The shortest way is not always ing original sin)—or to nature itself which was healed. the one to be chosen, but only when it is more or equally Now we must allow that every one needs the redemption adapted for attaining the end. It is not so here, as is clear of Christ personally, and not only by reason of nature, and from what we have said. Whether all will rise again from ashes? Suppl. q. 78 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that all will not rise again Further, there are many things in the human body that from ashes. For Christ’s resurrection is the exemplar of do not truly belong to human nature. But all these will be ours. Yet His resurrection was not from ashes, for His removed. Therefore all bodies must needs be reduced to flesh saw not corruption according to Ps. 15:10; Acts ashes. 2:27,31. Therefore neither will all rise again from ashes. I answer that, The same reasons by which we have Objection 2. Further, the human body is not always shown (a. 1) that all rise again from death prove also that burned. Yet a thing cannot be reduced to ashes unless it at the general resurrection all will rise again from ashes, be burned. Therefore not all will rise again from ashes. unless the contrary, such as the hastening of their resurrec- Objection 3. Further, the body of a dead man is not tion, be vouchsafed to certain persons by a special privi- reduced to ashes immediately after death. But some will lege of grace. For just as holy writ foretells the resurrec- rise again at once after death, according to the text (Sent. tion, so does it foretell the reformation of bodies (Phil. iv, D, 43), namely those who will be found living. There- 3:21). And thus it follows that even as all die that the bod- fore all will not rise again from ashes. ies of all may be able truly to rise again, so will the bodies Objection 4. Further, the term “wherefrom” corre- of all perish that they may be able to be reformed. For just sponds to the term “whereto.” Now the term “whereto” as death was inflicted by Divine justice as a punishment of the resurrection is not the same in the good as in the on man, so was the decay of the body, as appears from wicked: “We shall all indeed rise again, but we shall Gn. 3:19, “Earth thou art and into earth shalt thou go†.” not all be changed” (1 Cor. 15:51). Therefore the term Moreover the order of nature requires the dissolution “wherefrom” is not the same. And thus, if the wicked rise not only of the union of soul and body, but also of the min- again from ashes, the good will not rise again from ashes. gling of the elements: even as vinegar cannot be brought On the contrary, Haymo says (on Rom. 5:10, “For if back to the quality of wine unless it first be dissolved when we were enemies”): “All who are born in original into the prejacent matter: for the mingling of the ele- sin lie under the sentence: Earth thou art and into earth ments is both caused and preserved by the movement of shalt thou go.” Now all who shall rise again at the general the heaven, and when this ceases all mixed bodies will be resurrection were born in original sin, either at their birth dissolved into pure elements. within the womb or at least at their birth from the womb. Reply to Objection 1. Christ’s resurrection is the ex- Therefore all will rise again from ashes. emplar of ours as to the term “whereto,” but not as to the ∗ See Editor’s note which follows IIIa, q. 26 † Vulg.: ‘Dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return’ 2968 term “wherefrom.” Reply to Objection 3. The fire that will cleanse the Reply to Objection 2. By ashes we mean all the re- face of the earth will be able to reduce suddenly to ashes mains that are left after the dissolution of the body—for the bodies of those that will be found living, even as it will two reasons. First, because it was the common custom in dissolve other mixed bodies into their prejacent matter. olden times to burn the bodies of the dead, and to keep Reply to Objection 4. Movement does not take the ashes, whence it became customary to speak of the re- its species from its term “wherefrom” but from its term mains of a human body as ashes. Secondly, on account of “whereto.” Hence the resurrection of the saints which will the cause of dissolution, which is the flame of the fomes∗ be glorious must needs differ from the resurrection of the whereby the human body is radically infected. Hence, wicked which will not be glorious, in respect of the term in order to be cleansed of this infection the human body “whereto,” and not in respect of the term “wherefrom.” must needs be dissolved into its primary components: and And it often happens that the term “whereto” is not the when a thing is destroyed by fire it is said to be reduced same, whereas the term “wherefrom” is the same—for in- to ashes. wherefore the name of ashes is given to those stance, a thing may be moved from blackness to whiteness things into which the human body is dissolved. and to pallor. Whether the ashes from which the human body will be restored have any natural Suppl. q. 78 a. 3 inclination towards the soul which will be united to them? Objection 1. It would seem that the ashes from which making it a living and growing man.” the human body will be restored will have a natural incli- Further, to every natural inclination there corresponds nation towards the soul which will be united to them. For a natural agent: else nature would fail in necessaries. Now if they had no inclination towards the soul, they would the aforesaid ashes cannot be reunited to the same soul by stand in the same relation to that soul as other ashes. any natural agent. Therefore there is not in them any nat- Therefore it would make no difference whether the body ural inclination to the aforesaid reunion. that is to be united to that soul were restored from those I answer that, Opinion is threefold on this point. For ashes or from others: and this is false. some say that the human body is never dissolved into its Objection 2. Further, the body is more dependent on very elements; and so there always remains in the ashes a the soul than the soul on the body. Now the soul sepa- certain force besides the elements, which gives a natural rated from the body is still somewhat dependent on the inclination to the same soul. But this assertion is in con- body, wherefore its movement towards God is retarded on tradiction with the authority of Augustine quoted above, account of its desire for the body, as Augustine says (Gen. as well as with the senses and reason: since whatever is ad lit. xii). Much more, therefore, has the body when composed of contraries can be dissolved into its compo- separated from the soul, a natural inclination towards that nent parts. Wherefore others say that these parts of the soul. elements into which the human body is dissolved retain Objection 3. Further, it is written (Job 20:11): “His more light, through having been united to the soul, and bones shall be filled with the vices of his youth, and they for this reason have a shall sleep with him in the dust.” But vices are only in natural inclination to human souls. But this again is the soul. Therefore there will still remain in those ashes a nonsensical, since the parts of the elements are of the natural inclination towards the soul. same nature and have an equal share of light and darkness. On the contrary, The human body can be dissolved Hence we must say differently that in those ashes there into the very elements, or changed into the flesh of other is no natural inclination to resurrection, but only by the animals. But the elements are homogeneous, and so is the ordering of Divine providence, which decreed that those flesh of a lion or other animal. Since then in the other parts ashes should be reunited to the soul: it is on this account of the elements or animals there is no natural inclination to that those parts of the elements shall be reunited and not that soul, neither will there be an inclination towards the others. soul in those parts into which the human body has been Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear. changed. The first proposition is made evident on the au- Reply to Objection 2. The soul separated from the thority of Augustine (Enchiridion lxxxviii): “The human body remains in the same nature that it has when united to body, although changed into the substance of other bodies the body. It is not so with the body, and consequently the or even into the elements, although it has become the food comparison fails. and flesh of any animals whatsoever, even of man, will in Reply to Objection 3. These words of Job do not an instant return to that soul which erstwhile animated it, mean that the vices actually remain in the ashes of the ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 82, a. 3 2969 dead, but that they remain according to the ordering of sins committed. Divine justice, whereby those ashes are destined to the restoration of the body which will suffer eternally for the 2970 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 79 Of the Conditions of Those Who Rise Again, and First of Their Identity (In Three Articles) In the next place we must consider the conditions of those who rise again. Here we shall consider: (1) Those which concern the good and wicked in common; (2) those which concern the good only; (3) those which concern only the wicked. Three things concern the good and wicked in common, namely their identity, their integrity, and their quality: and we shall inquire (1) about their identity; (2) about their integrity; (3) about their quality. Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the body will rise again identically the same? (2) Whether it will be the self-same man? (3) Whether it is necessary that the same ashes should return to the same parts in which they were before? Whether in the resurrection the soul will be reunited to the same identical body? Suppl. q. 79 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the soul will not be there cannot be identity where there is distinction of ex- reunited to the same identical body at the resurrection, for istence: and existence, which is the act of a being, is dif- “thou sowest not the body that shall be, but bare grain” (1 ferentiated by being interrupted, as is any interrupted act. Cor. 15:37). Now the Apostle is there comparing death Now the form of a mixed body passes away into complete to sowing and resurrection to fructifying. Therefore the nonentity by death, since it is a bodily form, and so also same body that is laid aside in death is not resumed at the do the contrary qualities from which the mixture results. resurrection. Therefore the form of a mixed body does not return in Objection 2. Further, to every form some matter is identity. adapted according to its condition, and likewise to every On the contrary, It is written (Job 19:26): “In my agent some instrument. Now the body is compared to the flesh I shall see God my Saviour [Vulg.: ‘my God’],” soul as matter to form, and as instrument to agent. Since where he is speaking of the vision after the resurrection, then at the resurrection the soul will not be of the same as appears from the preceding words: “In the last day I condition as now (for it will be either entirely borne away shall rise out of the earth.” Therefore the selfsame body to the heavenly life to which it adhered while living in the will rise again. world, or will be cast down into the life of the brutes if it Further, the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, lived as a brute in this world) it would seem that it will not 27): “Resurrection is the second rising of that which has resume the same body, but either a heavenly or a brutish fallen.” But the body which we have now fell by death. body. Therefore it will rise again the same identically. Objection 3. Further, after death, as stated above I answer that, on this point the philosophers erred and (q. 78, a. 3), the human body is dissolved into the ele- certain modern heretics err. For some of the philosophers ments. Now these elemental parts into which the human allowed that souls separated from bodies are reunited to body has been dissolved do not agree with the human bodies, yet they erred in this in two ways. First, as to body dissolved into them, except in primary matter, even the mode of reunion, for some held the separated soul to as any other elemental parts agree with that same body. be naturally reunited to a body by the way of generation. But if the body were to be formed from those other ele- Secondly, as to the body to which it was reunited, for they mental parts, it would not be described as identically the held that this second union was not with the selfsame body same. Therefore neither will it be the self-same body if it that was laid aside in death, but with another, sometimes be restored from these parts. of the same, sometimes of a different species. Of a dif- Objection 4. Further, there cannot be numerical iden- ferent species when the soul while existing in the body tity where there is numerical distinction of essential parts. had led a life contrary to the ordering of reason: where- Now the form of the mixed body, which form is an es- fore it passed after death from the body of a man into the sential part of the human body, as being its form, cannot body of some other animal to whose manner of living it be resumed in numerical identity. Therefore the body will had conformed in this life, for instance into the body of a not be identically the same. The minor is proved thus: dog on account of lust, into the body of a lion on account That which passes away into complete nonentity cannot of robbery and violence, and so forth—and into a body of be resumed in identity. This is clear from the fact that the same species when the soul has led a good life in the 2971 body, and having after death experienced some happiness, of bodies corresponds proportionally to the difference of after some centuries began to wish to return to the body; souls. and thus it was reunited to a human body. Reply to Objection 3. That which is understood as This opinion arises from two false sources. The first though it were in matter before its form remains in mat- of these is that they said that the soul is not united to the ter after corruption, because when that which comes after- body essentially as form to matter, but only accidentally, wards is removed that which came before may yet remain. as mover to the thing moved,∗ or as a man to his clothes. Now, as the Commentator observes on the First Book of Hence it was possible for them to maintain that the soul Physics and in De Substantia Orbis, in the matter of things pre-existed before being infused into the body begotten subject to generation and corruption, we must presuppose of natural generation, as also that it is united to various undeterminate dimensions, by reason of which matter is bodies. The second is that they held intellect not to differ divisible, so as to be able to receive various forms in from sense except accidentally, so that man would be said its various parts. Wherefore after the separation of the to surpass other animals in intelligence, because the sen- substantial form from matter, these dimensions still re- sitive power is more acute in him on account of the excel- main the same: and consequently the matter existing un- lence of his bodily complexion; and hence it was possible der those dimensions, whatever form it receive, is more for them to assert that man’s soul passes into the soul of identified with that which was generated from it, than any a brute animal, especially when the human soul has been other part of matter existing under any form whatever. habituated to brutish actions. But these two sources are Thus the matter that will be brought back to restore the refuted by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1), and in con- human body will be the same as that body’s previous mat- sequence of these being refuted, it is clear that the above ter. opinion is false. Reply to Objection 4. Even as a simple quality is not In like manner the errors of certain heretics are re- the substantial form of an element, but its proper accident, futed. Some of them fell into the aforesaid opinions of and the disposition whereby its matter is rendered proper the philosophers: while others held that souls are reunited to such a form; so the form of a mixed body, which form to heavenly bodies, or again to bodies subtle as the wind, is a quality resulting from simple qualities reduced to a as Gregory relates of a certain Bishop of Constantinople, mean, is not the substantial form of the mixed body, but its in his exposition of Job 19:26, “In my flesh I shall see my proper accident, and the disposition whereby the matter is God,” etc. Moreover these same errors of heretics may be in need of the form. Now the human body has no substan- refuted by the fact that they are prejudicial to the truth of tial form besides this form of the mixed body, except the resurrection as witnessed to by Holy Writ. For we can- rational soul, for if it had any previous substantial form, not call it resurrection unless the soul return to the same this would give it substantial being, and would establish body, since resurrection is a second rising, and the same it in the genus of substance: so that the soul would be thing rises that falls: wherefore resurrection regards the united to a body already established in the genus of sub- body which after death falls rather than the soul which af- stance, and thus the soul would be compared to the body ter death lives. And consequently if it be not the same as artificial forms are to their matter, in respect of their bebody which the soul resumes, it will not be a resurrection, ing established in the genus of substance by their matter. but rather the assuming of a new body. Hence the union of the soul to the body would be acciden- Reply to Objection 1. A comparison does not apply tal, which is the error of the ancient philosophers refuted to every particular, but to some. For in the sowing of grain, by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 2†). It would also fol- the grain sown and the grain that is born thereof are nei- low that the human body and each of its parts would not ther identical, nor of the same condition, since it was first retain their former names in the same sense, which is con- sown without a husk, yet is born with one: and the body trary to the teaching of the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1). will rise again identically the same, but of a different con- Therefore since the rational soul remains, no substantial dition, since it was mortal and will rise in immortality. form of the human body falls away into complete nonen- Reply to Objection 2. The soul rising again and the tity. And the variation of accidental forms does not make soul living in this world differ, not in essence but in re- a difference of identity. Therefore the selfsame body will spect of glory and misery, which is an accidental differ- rise again, since the selfsame matter is resumed as stated ence. Hence it follows that the body in rising again dif- in a previous reply (ad 2). fers, not in identity, but in condition, so that a difference ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 76, a. 1 † Cf. Ia, q. 76, a. 1 2972 Whether it will be identically the same man that shall rise again? Suppl. q. 79 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that it will not be iden- which is contrary to faith. tically the same man that shall rise again. For according I answer that, The necessity of holding the resurrec- to the Philosopher (De Gener. ii): “Whatsoever things tion arises from this—that man may obtain the last end are changed in their corruptible substance are not repeated for which he was made; for this cannot be accomplished identically.” Now such is man’s substance in his present in this life, nor in the life of the separated soul, as stated state. Therefore after the change wrought by death the above (q. 75, Aa. 1,2): otherwise man would have been self-same man cannot be repeated . made in vain, if he were unable to obtain the end for Objection 2. Further, where there is a distinction of which he was made. And since it behooves the end to human nature there is not the same identical man: where- be obtained by the selfsame thing that was made for that fore Socrates and Plato are two men and not one man, end, lest it appear to be made without purpose, it is nec- since each has his own distinct human nature. Now the essary for the selfsame man to rise again; and this is ef- human nature of one who rises again is distinct from that fected by the selfsame soul being united to the selfsame which he has now. Therefore he is not the same identical body. For otherwise there would be no resurrection prop- man. The minor can be proved in two ways. First, be- erly speaking, if the same man were not reformed. Hence cause human nature which is the form of the whole is not to maintain that he who rises again is not the selfsame both form and substance as the soul is, but is a form only. man is heretical, since it is contrary to the truth of Scrip- Now such like forms pass away into complete nonentity, ture which proclaims the resurrection. and consequently they cannot be restored. Secondly, be- Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking of cause human nature results from union of parts. Now the repetition by movement or natural change. For he shows same identical union as that which was heretofore can- the difference between the recurrence that occurs in gen- not be resumed, because repetition is opposed to identity, eration and corruption and that which is observed in the since repetition implies number, whereas identity implies movement of the heavens. Because the selfsame heaven unity, and these are incompatible with one another. But by local movement returns to the beginning of its move- resurrection is a repeated union: therefore the union is not ment, since it has a moved incorruptible substance. On the same, and consequently there is not the same human the other hand, things subject to generation and corruption nature nor the same man. return by generation to specific but not numerical iden- Objection 3. Further, one same man is not several an- tity, because from man blood is engendered, from blood imals: wherefore if it is not the same animal it is not the seed, and so on until a man is begotten, not the selfsame same identical man. Now where sense is not the same, man, but the man specifically. In like manner from fire there is not the same animal, since animal is defined from comes air, from air water, from water earth, whence fire the primary sense, namely touch. But sense, as it does not is produced, not the selfsame fire, but the same in species. remain in the separated soul (as some maintain), cannot Hence it is clear that the argument, so far as the meaning be resumed in identity. Therefore the man who rises again of the Philosopher is concerned, is not to the point. will not be the same identical animal, and consequently he We may also reply that the form of other things sub- will not be the same man. ject to generation and corruption is not subsistent of itself, Objection 4. Further, the matter of a statue ranks so as to be able to remain after the corruption of the com- higher in the statue than the matter of a man does in man: posite, as it is with the rational soul. For the soul, even because artificial things belong to the genus of substance after separation from the body, retains the being which by reason of their matter, but natural things by reason of accrues to it when in the body, and the body is made to their form, as appears from the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 1), share that being by the resurrection, since the being of the and again from the Commentator (De Anima ii). But if body and the being of the soul in the body are not distinct a statue is remade from the same brass, it will not be the from one another, otherwise the union of soul and body same identically. Therefore much less will it be identi- would be accidental. Consequently there has been no in- cally the same man if he be reformed from the same ashes. terruption in the substantial being of man, as would make On the contrary, It is written (Job 19:27): “Whom it impossible for the self-same man to return on account I myself shall see. . . and not another,” and he is speaking of an interruption in his being, as is the case with other of the vision after the resurrection. Therefore the same things that are corrupted, the being of which is interrupted identical man will rise again. altogether, since their form remains not, and their matter Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 5) that “to rise remains under another being. again is naught else but to live again.” Now unless the Nevertheless neither does the self-same man recur by same identical man that died return to life, he would not natural generation, because the body of the man begotten be said to live again. Therefore he would not rise again, is not composed of the whole body of his begetter: hence 2973 his body is numerically distinct, and consequently his soul those forms that are composition or order (Phys. ii, 1), as and the whole man. are the forms of things produced by art, so that if there be Reply to Objection 2. There are two opinions about another distinct composition there is another distinct form humanity and about any form of a whole. For some say of a house. that the form of the whole and the form of the part are re- Reply to Objection 3. This argument affords a very ally one and the same: but that it is called the form of the good proof against those who held a distinction between part inasmuch as it perfects the matter, and the form of the the sensitive and rational souls in man: because in that whole inasmuch as the whole specific nature results there- case the sensitive soul in man would not be incorruptible, from. According to this opinion humanity is really noth- as neither is it in other animals; and consequently in the ing else than the rational soul: and so, since the selfsame resurrection there would not be the same sensitive soul, rational soul is resumed, there will be the same identical and consequently neither the same animal nor the same humanity, which will remain even after death, albeit not man. under the aspect of humanity, because the composite does But if we assert that in man the same soul is by its not derive the specific nature from a separated humanity. substance both rational and sensitive, we shall encounter The other opinion, which seems nearer the truth, is no difficulty in this question, because animal is defined Avicenna’s, according to whom the form of the whole is from sense, i.e. the sensitive soul as from its essential not the form of a part only, nor some other form besides form: whereas from sense, i.e. the sensitive power, we the form of the part, but is the whole resulting from the know its definition as from an accidental form “that con- composition of form and matter, embracing both within tributes more than another to our knowledge of the quid- itself. This form of the whole is called the essence or dity” (De Anima i, 1). Accordingly after death there re- quiddity. Since then at the resurrection there will be the mains the sensitive soul, even as the rational soul, accord- selfsame body, and the selfsame rational soul, there will ing to its substance: whereas the sensitive powers, accord- be, of necessity, the same humanity. ing to some, do not remain. And since these powers are The first argument proving that there will be a distinc- accidental properties, diversity on their part cannot pre- tion of humanity was based on the supposition that hu- vent the identity of the whole animal, not even of the ani- manity is some distinct form supervening form and mat- mal’s parts: nor are powers to be called perfections or acts ter; which is false. of organs unless as principles of action, as heat in fire. The second reason does not disprove the identity of Reply to Objection 4. A statue may be considered humanity, because union implies action or passion, and in two ways, either as a particular substance, or as some- though there be a different union, this cannot prevent the thing artificial. And since it is placed in the genus of sub- identity of humanity, because the action and passion from stance by reason of its matter, it follows that if we con- which humanity resulted are not of the essence of human- sider it as a particular substance, it is the selfsame statue ity, wherefore a distinction on their part does not involve that is remade from the same matter. On the other hand, a distinction of humanity: for it is clear that generation it is placed in the genus of artificial things inasmuch as it and resurrection are not the self-same movement. Yet the has an accidental form which, if the statue be destroyed, identity of the rising man with the begotten man is not passes away also. Consequently it does not return identi- hindered for this reason: and in like manner neither is the cally the same, nor can the statue be identically the same. identity of humanity prevented if we take union for the But man’s form, namely the soul, remains after the body relation itself: because this relation is not essential to but has perished: wherefore the comparison fails. concomitant with humanity, since humanity is not one of Whether the ashes of the human body must needs, by the resurrection, return to the Suppl. q. 79 a. 3 same parts of the body that were dissolved into them? Objection 1. It would seem necessary for the ashes of same parts of the soul. the human body to return, by the resurrection, to the same Objection 2. Further, difference of matter causes dif- parts that were dissolved into them. For, according to the ference of identity. But if the ashes return not to the same Philosopher, “as the whole soul is to the whole body, so is parts, each part will not be remade from the same mat- a part of the soul to a part of the body, as sight to the pupil” ter of which it consisted before. Therefore they will not (De Anima ii, 1). Now it is necessary that after the resur- be the same identically. Now if the parts are different the rection the body be resumed by the same soul. Therefore whole will also be different, since parts are to the whole it is also necessary for the same parts of the body to return as matter is to form (Phys. ii, 3). Therefore it will not be to the same limbs, in which they were perfected by the the self-same man; which is contrary to the truth of the 2974 resurrection. in the text (Sent. iv, D, 44), because a statue, after being Objection 3. Further, the resurrection is directed to remade, is identically the same, not as to its form, but as to the end that man may receive the meed of his works. its matter, in respect of which it is a particular substance, Now different parts of the body are employed in differ- and in this way a statue is homogeneous, although it is ent works, whether of merit or of demerit. Therefore at not according to its artificial form. But if it be said that the resurrection each part must needs return to its former the matter of one part returns to another part of another state that it may be rewarded in due measure. species, it follows of necessity that there is a change not On the contrary, Artificial things are more depen- only in the position of parts, but also in their identity: yet dent on their matter than natural things. Now in artificial so that the whole matter, or something belonging to the things, in order that the same artificial thing be remade, truth of human nature in one is transferred to another. but from the same matter, there is no need for the parts to be not if what was superfluous in one part is transferred to brought back to the same position. Neither therefore is it another. Now the identity of parts being taken away, the necessary in man. identity of the whole is removed, if we speak of essential Further, change of an accident does not cause a change parts, but not if we speak of accidental parts, such as hair of identity. Now the situation of parts is an accident. and nails, to which apparently Augustine refers (De Civ. Therefore its change in a man does not cause a change Dei xxii). It is thus clear how the transference of matter of identity. from one part of another destroys the identity, and how it I answer that, In this question it makes a difference does not. whether we ask what can be done without prejudice to But speaking of the congruity, it is more probable that identity, and what will be done for the sake of congruity. even the parts will retain their position at the resurrection, As regards the first it must be observed that in man we especially as regards the essential and organic parts, al- may speak of parts in two ways: first as of the various though perhaps not as regards the accidental parts, such parts of a homogeneous whole, for instance the various as nails and hair. parts of flesh, or the various parts of bone; secondly, as of Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers or- various parts of various species of a heterogeneous whole, ganic or heterogeneous parts, but no homogeneous or like for instance bone and flesh. Accordingly if it be said that parts. one part of matter will return to another part of the same Reply to Objection 2. A change in the position of species, this causes no change except in the position of the the parts of matter does not cause a change of identity, parts: and change of position of parts does not change the although difference of matter does. species in homogeneous wholes: and so if the matter of Reply to Objection 3. Operation, properly speaking, one part return to another part, this is nowise prejudicial is not ascribed to the part but to the whole, wherefore the to the identity of the whole. Thus is it in the example given reward is due, not to the part but to the whole. 2975 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 80 Of the Integrity of the Bodies in the Resurrection (In Five Articles) We must next consider the integrity of the bodies in the resurrection. Under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether all the members of the human body will rise again therein? (2) Whether the hair and nails will? (3) Whether the humors will? (4) Whether whatever the body contained belonging to the truth of human nature will rise again? (5) Whether whatever it contained materially will rise again? Whether all the members of the human body will rise again? Suppl. q. 80 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that not all the members appears in the parts of the body is all contained originally of the human body will rise again. For if the end be done and, in a way, implicitly in the soul. Thus just as the work away it is useless to repair the means. Now the end of of an art would not be perfect, if its product lacked any each member is its act. Since then nothing useless is done of the things contained in the art, so neither could man in the Divine works, and since the use of certain members be perfect, unless the whole that is contained enfolded in is not fitting to man after the resurrection, especially the the soul be outwardly unfolded in the body, nor would the use of the genital members, for then they “shall neither body correspond in full proportion to the soul. Since then marry, nor be married” (Mat. 22:30), it would seem that at the resurrection it behooves man’s body to correspond not all the members shall rise again. entirely to the soul, for it will not rise again except accord- Objection 2. Further, the entrails are members: and ing to the relation it bears to the rational soul, it follows yet they will not rise again. For they can neither rise full, that man also must rise again perfect, seeing that he is since thus they contain impurities, nor empty, since noth- thereby repaired in order that he may obtain his ultimate ing is empty in nature. Therefore the members shall not perfection. Consequently all the members that are now in all rise again. man’s body must needs be restored at the resurrection. Objection 3. Further, the body shall rise again that it Reply to Objection 1. The members may be consid- may be rewarded for the works which the soul did through ered in two ways in relation to the soul: either according it. Now the member of which a thief has been deprived to the relation of matter to form, or according to the re- for theft, and who has afterwards done penance and is lation of instrument to agent, since “the whole body is saved, cannot be rewarded at the resurrection, neither for compared to the whole soul in the same way as one part any good deed, since it has not co-operated in any, nor for is to another” (De Anima ii, 1). If then the members be evil deeds, since the punishment of the member would re- considered in the light of the first relationship, their end is dound to the punishment of man. Therefore the members not operation, but rather the perfect being of the species, will not all rise again. and this is also required after the resurrection: but if they On the contrary, The other members belong more to be considered in the light of the second relationship, then the truth of human nature than hair and nails. Yet these their end is operation. And yet it does not follow that will be restored to man at the resurrection according to when the operation fails the instrument is useless, because the text (Sent. iv, D, 4). Much more therefore does this an instrument serves not only to accomplish the operation apply to the other members. of the agent, but also to show its virtue. Hence it will be Further, “The works of God are perfect” (Dt. 32:4). necessary for the virtue of the soul’s powers to be shown But the resurrection will be the work of God. Therefore in their bodily instruments, even though they never pro- man will be remade perfect in all his members. ceed to action, so that the wisdom of God be thereby glo- I answer that, As stated in De Anima ii, 4, “the soul rified. stands in relation to the body not only as its form and end, Reply to Objection 2. The entrails will rise again in but also as efficient cause.” For the soul is compared to the body even as the other members: and they will be the body as art to the thing made by art, as the Philoso- filled not with vile superfluities but with goodly humors. pher says (De Anim. Gener. ii, 4), and whatever is shown Reply to Objection 3. The acts whereby we merit forth explicitly in the product of art is all contained im- are not the acts, properly speaking, of hand or foot but plicitly and originally in the art. In like manner whatever of the whole man; even as the work of art is ascribed not 2976 to the instrument but to the craftsman. Therefore though glory, yet man himself merits that the whole man may be the member which was cut off before a man’s repentance rewarded, who with his whole being serves God. did not co-operate with him in the state wherein he merits Whether the hair and nails will rise again in the human body? Suppl. q. 80 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the hair and nails tion of art: thus the art of warfare employs a sword for will not rise again in the human body. For just as hair and fighting, and a sheath for the safe-keeping of the sword. nails result from the surplus of food, so do urine, sweat And so among the parts of an animated body, some are and other superfluities or dregs. But these will not rise directed to the accomplishment of the souls’ operations, again with the body. Neither therefore will hair and nails. for instance the heart, liver, hand, foot; while others are Objection 2. Further, of all the superfluities that are directed to the safe-keeping of the other parts as leaves to produced from food, seed comes nearest to the truth of cover fruit; and thus hair and nails are in man for the pro- human nature, since though superfluous it is needed. Yet tection of other parts. Consequently, although they do not seed will not rise again in the human body. Much less belong to the primary perfection of the human body, they therefore will hair and nails. belong to the secondary perfection: and since man will Objection 3. Further, nothing is perfected by a ratio- rise again with all the perfections of his nature, it follows nal soul that is not perfected by a sensitive soul. But hair that hair and nails will rise again in him. and nails are not perfected by a sensitive soul, for “we do Reply to Objection 1. Those superfluities are voided not feel with them” (De Anima i, 5; iii, 13). Therefore by nature, as being useful for nothing. Hence they do not since the human body rises not again except because it is belong to the perfection of the human body. It is not so perfected by a rational soul, it would seem that the hair with the superfluities which nature reserves for the pro- and nails will not rise again. duction of hair and nails which she needs for the protec- On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 21:18): “A hair of tion of the members. your head shall not perish.” Reply to Objection 2. Seed is not required for the Further, hair and nails were given to man as an or- perfection of the individual, as hair and nails are, but only nament. Now the bodies of men, especially of the elect, for the protection of the species. ought to rise again with all their adornment. Therefore Reply to Objection 3. Hair and nails are nourished they ought to rise again with the hair. and grow, and so it is clear that they share in some opera- I answer that, The soul is to the animated body, as art tion, which would not be possible unless they were parts is to the work of art, and is to the parts of the body as art to in some way perfected by the soul. And since in man its instruments: wherefore an animated body is called an there is but one soul, namely the rational soul, it is clear organic body. Now art employs certain instruments for the that they are perfected by the rational soul, although not accomplishment of the work intended, and these instru- so far as to share in the operation of sense, as neither do ments belong to the primary intention of art: and it also bones, and yet it is certain that these will rise again and uses other instruments for the safe-keeping of the princi- that they belong to the integrity of the individual. pal instruments, and these belong to the secondary inten- Whether the humors will rise again in the body? Suppl. q. 80 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the humors will not ation because they are potentially flesh and bone. There- rise again in the body. For it is written (1 Cor. 15:50): fore they are not yet perfected by the rational soul. Now “Flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God.” the human body is not directed to the resurrection except Now blood is the chief humor. Therefore it will not rise in so far as it is perfected by the rational soul. Therefore again in the blessed, who will possess the kingdom of the humors will not rise again. God, and much less in others. On the contrary, Whatever enters into the constitu- Objection 2. Further, humors are intended to make tion of the human body will rise again with it. Now this up for the waste. Now after the resurrection there will applies to the humors, as appears from the statement of be no waste. Therefore the body will not rise again with Augustine (De Spir. et Anima xv) that “the body consists humors. of functional members; the functional members of homo- Objection 3. Further, that which is in process of gen- geneous parts; and the homogeneous parts of humors.” eration in the human body is not yet perfected by the ra- Therefore the humors will rise again in the body. tional soul. Now the humors are still in process of gener- Further, our resurrection will be conformed to the res- 2977 urrection of Christ. Now in Christ’s resurrection His tion and already beginning to undergo alteration, and thus blood rose again, else the wine would not now be changed it is called “cambium”: but in neither state will it rise into His blood in the Sacrament of the altar. Therefore the again. The third kind of humidity is that which has al- blood will rise again in us also, and in like manner the ready reached its ultimate perfection that nature intends other humors. in the body of the individual, and has already undergone I answer that, Whatever belongs to the integrity of transformation and become incorporate with the mem- human nature in those who take part in the resurrection bers. This is called “gluten,” and since it belongs to the will rise again, as stated above (Aa. 1,2). Hence whatever members it will rise again just as the members will. humidity of the body belongs to the integrity of human Reply to Objection 1. In these words of the Apostle nature must needs rise again in man. Now there is a three- flesh and blood do not denote the substance of flesh and fold humidity in man. There is one which occurs as reced- blood but deeds of flesh and blood, which are either deeds ing from the perfection of the individual—either because of sin or the operations of the animal life. Or we may say it is on the way to corruption, and is voided by nature, for with Augustine in his letter to Consentius (Ep. cxlvi) that instance urine, sweat, matter, and so forth—or because it “flesh and blood here signify the corruption which is now is directed by nature to the preservation of the species in predominant in flesh and blood”; wherefore the Apostle’s some individual, either by the act of the generative power, words continue: “Neither shall corruption possess incor- as seed, or by the act of the nutritive power, as milk. None ruption.” of these humidities will rise again, because they do not Reply to Objection 2. Just as the members that serve belong to the perfection of the person rising again. for generation will be after the resurrection for the in- The second kind of humidity is one that has not yet tegrity of human nature, and not for the operation accom- reached its ultimate perfection, which nature achieves in plished now by them, so will the humors be in the body the individual, yet it is directed thereto by nature: and not to make up for waste, but to restore the integrity of this is of two kinds. For there is one kind that has a def- human nature and to show forth its natural power. inite form and is contained among the parts of the body, Reply to Objection 3. Just as the elements are in the for instance the blood and the other humors which nature course of generation in relation to mixed bodies, because has directed to the members that are produced or nour- they are their matter, yet not so as to be always in tran- ished therefrom: and yet they have certain definite forms sition when in the mixed body, so too are the humors in like the other parts of the body, and consequently will rise relation to the members. And for this reason as the el- again with the other parts of the body: while another kind ements in the parts of the universe have definite forms, of humidity is in transition from form to form, namely by reason of which they, like mixed bodies, belong to the from the form of humor to the form of member. Hu- perfection of the universe, so too the humors belong to midities of this kind will not rise again, because after the the perfection of the human body, just as the other parts resurrection each part of the body will be established in do, although they do not reach its entire perfection, as the its form, so that one will not pass into another. Where- other parts do, and although the elements have not perfect fore this humidity that is actually in transition from one forms as mixed bodies have. But as all the parts of the form to another will not rise again. Now this humidity universe receive their perfection from God, not equally, may be considered in a twofold state—either as being at but each one according to its mode, so too the humors are the beginning of its transformation, and thus it is called in some way perfected by the rational soul, yet not in the “ros,” namely the humidity that is found in the cavities same measure as the more perfect parts. of the smaller veins—or as in the course of transforma- Whether whatever in the body belonged to the truth of human nature will rise again Suppl. q. 80 a. 4 in it? Objection 1. It would seem that what was in the body, rib will rise again not in Adam but in Eve, else Eve would belonging to the truth of human nature, will not all rise not rise again at all since she was made from that rib. again in it. For food is changed into the truth of human Therefore whatever belonged in man to the truth of hu- nature. Now sometimes the flesh of the ox or of other an- man nature will not all rise again in him. imals is taken as food. Therefore if whatever belonged Objection 3. Further, it is impossible for the same to the truth of human nature will rise again, the flesh of thing from different men to rise again. Yet it is possible the ox or of other animals will also rise again: which is for something in different men to belong to the truth of inadmissible. human nature, for instance if a man were to partake of Objection 2. Further, Adam’s rib belonged to the truth human flesh which would be changed into his substance. of human nature in him, as ours does in us. But Adam’s Therefore there will not rise again in man whatever be- 2978 longed in him to the truth of human nature. order therefore to see what it is that belongs to the truth Objection 4. Further, if it be said that not all the flesh of human nature, we must observe that there have been partaken of belongs to the truth of human nature and that three opinions on the question. For some have maintained consequently some of it may possibly rise again in the one that nothing begins anew to belong to the truth of human man and some in the other—on the contrary: That which nature and that whatever belongs to the truth of human na- is derived from one’s parents would especially seem to ture, all of it belonged to the truth of human nature when belong to the truth of human nature. But if one who par- this was created; and that this multiplies by itself, so that took of nothing but human flesh were to beget children it is possible for the seed whereof the child is begotten to that which his child derives from him must needs be of be detached therefrom by the begetter, and that again the the flesh of other men partaken of by his father, since the detached part multiplies in the child, so that he reaches seed is from the surplus of food, as the Philosopher proves perfect quantity by growth, and so on, and that thus was (De Gen. Animal. i). Therefore what belongs to the truth the whole human race multiplied. Wherefore according of human nature in that child belonged also to the truth of to this opinion, whatever is produced by nourishment. al- human nature in other men of whose flesh his father had though it seem to have the appearance of flesh and blood, partaken. does not belong to the truth of human nature. Objection 5. Further, if it be said that what was Others held that something new is added to the truth changed into seed was not that which belong to the truth of human nature by the natural transformation of the food of human nature in the flesh of the men eaten, but some- into the human body, if we consider the truth of human thing not belonging to the truth of human nature—on the nature in the species to the preservation of which the act contrary: Let us suppose that some one is fed entirely on of the generative power is directed: but that if we con- embryos in which seemingly there is nothing but what be- sider the truth of human nature in the individual, to the longs to the truth of human nature since whatever is in preservation and perfection of which the act of the nutri- them is derived from the parents. If then the surplus food tive power is directed, that which is added by food belongs be changed into seed, that which belonged to the truth of to the truth of the human nature of the individual, not pri- human nature in the embryos—and after these have re- marily but secondarily. For they assert that the truth of ceived a rational soul, the resurrection applies to them— human nature, first and foremost, consists in the radical must needs belong to the truth of human nature in the child humor, that namely which is begotten of the seed of which begotten of that seed. And thus, since the same cannot rise the human race was originally fashioned: and that what is again in two subjects, it will be impossible for whatever changed from food into true flesh and blood does not be- belonged to the truth of human nature in both to rise again long principally to the truth of human nature in this partic- in both of them. ular individual, but secondarily: and that nevertheless this On the contrary, Whatever belonged to the truth of can belong principally to the truth of human nature in an- human nature was perfected by the rational soul. Now it other individual who is begotten of the seed of the former. is through being perfected by the rational soul that the hu- For they assert that seed is the surplus from food, either man body is directed to the resurrection. Therefore what- mingled with something belonging principally to the truth ever belonged to the truth of human nature will rise again of human nature in the begetter, according to some, or in each one. without any such admixture, as others maintain. And thus Further, if anything belonging to the truth of human the nutrimental humor in one becomes the radical humor nature in a man be taken from his body, this will not be in another. the perfect body of a man. Now all imperfection of a man The third opinion is that something new begins to be- will be removed at the resurrection, especially in the elect, long principally to the truth of human nature even in this to whom it was promised (Lk. 21:18) that not a hair of individual, because distinction in the human body does their head should perish. Therefore whatever belonged to not require that any signate material part must needs re- the truth of human nature in a man will rise again in him. main throughout the whole lifetime; any signate part one I answer that, “Everything is related to truth in the may take is indifferent to this, whereas it remains always same way as to being” (Metaph. ii), because a thing is as regards what belongs to the species in it, albeit as re- true when it is as it appears to him who actually knows gards what is material therein it may ebb and flow. And it. For this reason Avicenna (Metaph. ii) says that “the thus the nutrimental humor is not distinct from the radical truth of anything is a property of the being immutably at- on the part of its principle (so that it be called radical when tached thereto.” Accordingly a thing is said to belong to begotten of the seed, and nutrimental when produced by the truth of human nature, because it belongs properly to the food), but rather on the part of the term, so that it be the being of human nature, and this is what shares the called radical when it reaches the term of generation by form of human nature, just as true gold is what has the the act of the generative, or even nutritive power, but nu- true form of gold whence gold derives its proper being. In trimental, when it has not yet reached this term, but is still 2979 on the way to give nourishment. ter be drawn into the species of wine, it does not share These three opinions have been more fully exposed the species of wine as perfectly as the first water added to and examined in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 30); where- the wine. Even so that which is secondly changed from fore there is no need for repetition here, except in so far food into flesh does not so perfectly attain to the species as the question at issue is concerned. It must accordingly of flesh as that which was changed first, and consequently be observed that this question requires different answers does not belong in the same degree to the truth of human according to these opinions. nature nor to the resurrection. Accordingly it is clear that For the first opinion on account of its explanation of this opinion maintains that the whole of what belongs to the process of multiplication is able to admit perfection of the truth of human nature principally will rise again, but the truth of human nature, both as regards the number of not the whole of what belongs to the truth of human nature individuals and as regards the due quantity of each indi- secondarily. vidual, without taking into account that which is produced The third opinion differs somewhat from the second from food; for this is not added except for the purpose of and in some respects agrees with it. It differs in that it resisting the destruction that might result from the action maintains that whatever is under the form of flesh and of natural heat, as lead is added to silver lest it be de- bone all belongs to the truth of human nature, because this stroyed in melting. Wherefore since at the resurrection opinion does not distinguish as remaining in man during it behooves human nature to be restored to its perfection, his whole lifetime any signate matter that belongs essen- nor does the natural heat tend to destroy the natural humor, tially and primarily to the truth of human nature, besides there will be no need for anything resulting from food to something ebbing and flowing, that belongs. to the truth rise again in man, but that alone will rise again which be- of human nature merely on account of the perfection of longed to the truth of the human nature of the individual, quantity, and not on account of the primary being of the and this reaches the aforesaid perfection in number and species, as the second opinion asserted. But it states that quantity by being detached and multiplied. all the parts that are not beside the intention of the nature The second opinion, since it maintains that what is generated belong to the truth of human nature, as regards produced from food is needed for the perfection of quan- what they have of the species, since thus they remain; but tity in the individual and for the multiplication that results not as regards what they have of matter, since thus they from generation, must needs admit that something of this are indifferent to ebb and flow: so that we are to under- product from food shall rise again: not all, however, but stand that the same thing happens in the parts of one man only so much as is required for the perfect restoration of as in the whole population of a city, for each individual human nature in all its individuals. Hence this opinion as- is cut off from the population by death, while others take serts that all that was in the substance of the seed will rise their place: wherefore the parts of the people flow back again in this man who was begotten of this seed; because and forth materially, but remain formally, since these oth- this belongs chiefly to the truth of human nature in him: ers occupy the very same offices and positions from which while of that which afterwards he derives from nourish- the former were withdrawn, so that the commonwealth is ment, only so much will rise again in him as is needed said to remain the selfsame. In like manner, while cer- for the perfection of his quantity; and not all, because this tain parts are on the ebb and others are being restored to does not belong to the perfection of human nature, except the same shape and position, all the parts flow back and in so far as nature requires it for the perfection of quan- forth as to their matter, but remain as to their species; and tity. Since however this nutrimental humor is subject to nevertheless the selfsame man remains. ebb and flow the restoration will be effected in this order, On the other hand, The third opinion agrees with the that what first belonged to the substance of a man’s body, second, because it holds that the parts which come sec- will all be restored, and of that which was added secondly, ondly do not reach the perfection of the species so per- thirdly, and so on, as much as is required to restore quan- fectly as those which come first: and consequently the tity. This is proved by two reasons. First, because that third opinion asserts that the same thing rises again in man which was added was intended to restore what was wasted as the second opinion maintains, but not for quite the same at first, and thus it does not belong principally to the truth reason. For it holds that the whole of what is produced of human nature to the same extent as that which came from the seed will rise again, not because it belongs to the first. Secondly, because the addition of extraneous humor truth of human nature otherwise than that which comes to the first radical humors results in the whole mixture not after, but because it shares the truth of human nature more sharing the truth of the specific nature as perfectly as the perfectly: which same order the second opinion applied first did: and the Philosopher instances as an example (De to those things that are produced afterwards from food, in Gener. i) the mixing of water with wine, which always which point also these two opinions agree. weakens the strength of the wine, so that in the end the Reply to Objection 1. A natural thing is what it is, wine becomes watery: so that although the second wa- not from its matter but from its form; wherefore, although 2980 that part of matter which at one time was under the form Reply to Objection 4. According to the first opinion of bovine flesh rises again in man under the form of hu- this argument is easily answered. For that opinion asserts man flesh, it does not follow that the flesh of an ox rises that the seed is not from the surplus food: so that the flesh again, but the flesh of a man: else one might conclude eaten is not changed into the seed whereof the child is be- that the clay from which Adam’s body was fashioned shall gotten. But according to the other two opinions we must rise again. The second opinion, however, grants this argu- reply that it is impossible for the whole of the flesh eaten ment. to be changed into seed, because it is after much separa- Reply to Objection 2. That rib did not belong to the tion that the seed is distilled from the food, since seed is perfection of the individual in Adam, but was directed to the ultimate surplus of food. That part of the eaten flesh the multiplication of the species. Hence it will rise again which is changed into seed belongs to the truth of human not in Adam but in Eve, just as the seed will rise again, nature in the one born of the seed more than in the one of not in the begetter, but in the begotten. whose flesh the seed was the product. Hence according to Reply to Objection 3. According to the first opinion the rule already laid down (ad 3), whatever was changed it is easy to reply to this argument, because the flesh that into the seed will rise again in the person born of the seed; is eaten never belonged to the truth of human nature in the while the remaining matter will rise again in him of whose eater, but it did belong to the truth of human nature in him flesh the seed was the product. whose flesh was eaten: and thus it will rise again in the lat- Reply to Objection 5. The embryo is not concerned ter but not in the former. according to the second and third with the resurrection before it is animated by a rational opinions, each one will rise again in that wherein he ap- soul, in which state much has been added to the seminal proached nearest to the perfect participation of the virtue substance from the substance of food, since the child is of the species, and if he approached equally in both, he nourished in the mother’s womb. Consequently on the will rise again in that wherein he was first, because in that supposition that a man partook of such food, and that he first was directed to the resurrection by union with the some one were begotten of the surplus thereof, that which rational soul of that man. Hence if there were any surplus was in the seminal substance will indeed rise again in the in the flesh eaten, not belonging to the truth of human na- one begotten of that seed; unless it contain something that ture in the first man, it will be possible for it to rise again would have belonged to the seminal substance in those in the second: otherwise what belonged to the resurrection from whose flesh being eaten the seed was produced, for in the first will rise again in him and not in the second; but this would rise again in the first but not in the second. The in the second its place is taken either by something of that remainder of the eaten flesh, not being changed into seed, which was the product from other food, or if he never par- will clearly rise again in the first the Divine power supply- took of any other food than human flesh, the substitution ing deficiencies in both. The first opinion is not troubled is made by Divine power so far as the perfection of quan- by this objection, since it does not hold the seed to be from tity requires, as it does in those who die before the perfect the surplus food: but there are many other reasons against age. Nor does this derogate from numerical identity, as it as may be seen in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 30; Ia, neither does the ebb and flow of parts. q. 119, a. 2). Whether whatever was materially in a man’s members will all rise again? Suppl. q. 80 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that whatever was ma- from the same cause as it derives its divisibility into parts. terially in a man’s members will all rise again. For the But division into parts belongs to a body in respect of mat- hair, seemingly, is less concerned in the resurrection than ter the disposition of which is quantity in respect of which the other members. Yet whatever was in the hair will all it is divided. Therefore totality is ascribed to the body in rise again, if not in the hair, at least in other parts of the respect of its parts of matter. If then all the parts of mat- body, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii) quoted in the ter rise not again, neither will the whole body rise again: text (Sent. iv, D, 44). Much more therefore whatever was which is inadmissible. materially in the other members will all rise again. On the contrary, The parts of matter are not perma- Objection 2. Further, just as the parts of the flesh are nent in the body but ebb and flow, as stated in De Gener. perfected as to species by the rational soul, so are the parts i. If, therefore, all the parts of matter, which remain not as to matter. But the human body is directed to the resur- but ebb and flow, rise again, either the body of one who rection through being perfected by a rational soul. There- rises again will be very dense, or it will be immoderate in fore not only the parts of species but also the parts of mat- quantity. ter will all rise again. Further, whatever belongs to the truth of human nature Objection 3. Further, the body derives its totality in one man can all be a part of matter in another man, if 2981 the latter were to partake of his flesh. Therefore if all the species, since it does not occupy another place or posi-parts of matter in one man were to rise again it follows tion in the body than that which was occupied by the part that in one man there will rise again that which belongs to that has passed away: although it may be reckoned an- the truth of human nature in another: which is absurd. other part if we consider the totality of matter. The same I answer that, What is in man materially, is not di- applies to the hair. Augustine, however, is speaking of rected to the resurrection, except in so far as it belongs to the cutting of hair that was a part causing growth of the the truth of human nature; because it is in this respect that body; wherefore it must needs rise again, not however as it bears a relation to the human souls. Now all that is in regards the quantity of hair, lest it should be immoderate, man materially belongs indeed to the truth of human na- but it will rise again in other parts as deemed expedient ture in so far as it has something of the species, but not all, by Divine providence. Or else he refers to the case when if we consider the totality of matter; because all the matter something will be lacking to the other parts, for then it that was in a man from the beginning of his life to the end will be possible for this to be supplied from the surplus of would surpass the quantity due to his species, as the third hair. opinion states, which opinion seems to me more probable Reply to Objection 2. According to the third opinion than the others. Wherefore the whole of what is in man parts of species are the same as parts of matter: for the will rise again, if we speak of the totality of the species Philosopher does not make this distinction (De Gener. i) which is dependent on quantity, shape, position and or- in order to distinguish different parts, but in order to show der of parts, but the whole will not rise again if we speak that the same parts may be considered both in respect of of the totality of matter. The second and first opinions, species, as to what belongs to the form and species in however, do not make this distinction, but distinguish be- them, and in respect of matter, as to that which is under tween parts both of which have the species and matter. the form and species. Now it is clear that the matter of But these two opinions agree in that they both state what the flesh has no relation to the rational soul except in so is produced from the seed will all rise again even if we far as it is under such a form, and consequently by reason speak of totality of matter: while they differ in this that thereof it is directed to the resurrection. But the first and the first opinion maintains that nothing will rise again of second opinions which draw a distinction between parts that which was engendered from food, whereas the second of species and parts of matter say that although the ratio- holds that something but not all, thereof will rise again, as nal soul perfects both parts, it does not perfect parts of stated above (a. 4). matter except by means of the parts of species, wherefore Reply to Objection 1. Just as all that is in the other they are not equally directed to the resurrection. parts of the body will rise again, if we speak of the totality Reply to Objection 3. In the matter of things subject of the species, but not if we speak of material totality, so is to generation and corruption it is necessary to presuppose it with the hair. In the other parts something accrues from indefinite dimensions before the reception of the substan- nourishment which causes growth, and this is reckoned tial form. Consequently division which is made accord- as another part, if we speak of totality of species, since ing to these dimensions belongs properly to matter. But it occupies another place and position in the body, and is complete and definite quantity comes to matter after the under other parts of dimension: and there accrues some- substantial form; wherefore division that is made in ref- thing which does not cause growth, but serves to make erence to definite quantity regards the species especially up for waste by nourishing. and this is not reckoned as when definite position of parts belongs to the essence of another part of the whole considered in relation to the the species, as in the human body. 2982 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 81 Of the Quality of Those Who Rise Again (In Four Articles) We must now consider the quality of those who rise again. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether all will rise again in the youthful age? (2) Whether they will be of equal stature? (3) Whether all will be of the same sex? (4) Whether they will rise again to the animal life? Whether all will rise again of the same age? Suppl. q. 81 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that all will not rise again without a defect, even so will He restore it without defect. of the same, namely the youthful age. Because God will Now human nature has a twofold defect. First, because it take nothing pertaining to man’s perfection from those has not yet attained to its ultimate perfection. Secondly, who rise again, especially from the blessed. Now age per- because it has already gone back from its ultimate perfec- tains to the perfection of man, since old age is the age that tion. The first defect is found in children, the second in demands reverence. Therefore the old will not rise again the aged: and consequently in each of these human nature of a youthful age. will be brought by the resurrection to the state of its ul- Objection 2. Further, age is reckoned according to the timate perfection which is in the youthful age, at which length of past time. Now it is impossible for past time not the movement of growth terminates, and from which the to have passed. Therefore it is impossible for those who movement of decrease begins. were of greater age to be brought back to a youthful age. Reply to Objection 1. Old age calls for reverence, not Objection 3. Further, that which belonged most to the on account of the state of the body which is at fault; but on truth of human nature in each individual will especially account of the soul’s wisdom which is taken for granted rise again in him. Now the sooner a thing was in man the on account of its being advanced in years. Wherefore in more would it seem to have belonged to the truth of hu- the elect there will remain the reverence due to old age on man nature, because in the end, through the strength of account of the fulness of Divine wisdom which will be in the species being weakened the human body is likened to them, but the defect of old age will not be in them. watery wine according to the Philosopher (De Gener. i). Reply to Objection 2. We speak of age not as regards Therefore if all are to rise again of the same age, it is more the number of years, but as regards the state which the fitting that they should rise again in the age of childhood. human body acquires from years. Hence Adam is said to On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:13): “Until we have been formed in the youthful age on account of the all meet. . . unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age particular condition of body which he had at the first day of the fulness of Christ.” of his formation. Thus the argument is not to the point. Now Christ rose again of youthful age, which begins Reply to Objection 3. The strength of the species is about the age of thirty years, as Augustine says (De Civ. said to be more perfect in a child than in a young man, as Dei xxii). Therefore others also will rise again of a youth- regards the ability to transform nourishment in a certain ful age. way, even as it is more perfect in the seed than in the ma- Further, man will rise again at the most perfect stage ture man. In youth, however, it is more perfect as regards of nature. Now human nature is at the most perfect stage the term of completion. Wherefore that which belonged in the age of youth. Therefore all will rise again of that principally to the truth of human nature will be brought to age. that perfection which it has in the age of youth, and not to I answer that, Man will rise again without any defect that perfection which it has in the age of a child, wherein of human nature, because as God founded human nature the humors have not yet reached their ultimate disposition. 2983 Whether all will rise again of the same stature? Suppl. q. 81 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that all will rise again of be restored not only in the self-same species but also in the same stature. For just as man is measured by dimen- the selfsame individual: and consequently we must ob- sive quantity, so is he by the quantity of time. Now the serve in the resurrection what is requisite not only to the quantity of time will be reduced to the same measure in specific but also to the individual nature. Now the spe- all, since all will rise again of the same age. Therefore the cific nature has a certain quantity which it neither exceeds dimensive quantity will also be reduced to the same mea- nor fails without error, and yet this quantity has certain sure in all, so that all will rise again of the same stature. degrees of latitude and is not to be attached to one fixed Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (De An- measure; and each individual in the human species aims ima ii, 4) that “all things in nature have a certain limit end at some degree of quantity befitting his individual nature measure of size and growth.” Now this limitation can only within the bounds of that latitude, and reaches it at the end arise by virtue of the form, with which the quantity as well of his growth, if there has been no error in the working as all the other accidents ought to agree. Therefore since of nature, resulting in the addition of something to or the all men have the same specific form, there should be the subtraction of something from the aforesaid quantity: the same measure of quantity in respect of matter in all, un- measure whereof is gauged according to the proportion of less an error should occur. But the error of nature will be heat as expanding, and of humidity as expansive, in point set right at the resurrection. Therefore all will rise again of which all are not of the same power. Therefore all will of the same stature. not rise again of the same quantity, but each one will rise Objection 3. Further, it will be impossible for man in again of that quantity which would have been his at the rising again to be of a quantity proportionate to the natu- end of his growth if nature had not erred or failed: and the ral power which first formed his body; for otherwise those Divine power will subtract or supply what was excessive who could not be brought to a greater quantity by the or lacking in man. power of nature will never rise again of a greater quan- Reply to Objection 1. It has already been explained tity, which is false. Therefore that quantity must needs be (a. 1, ad 2) that all are said to rise again of the same age, proportionate to the power which will restore the human not as though the same length of time were befitting to body by the resurrection, and to the matter from which it each one, but because the same state of perfection will be is restored. Now the selfsame, namely the Divine, power in all, which state is indifferent to a great or small quan- will restore all bodies; and all the ashes from which the tity. human bodies will be restored are equally disposed to re- Reply to Objection 2. The quantity of a particular in- ceive the action of that power. Therefore the resurrection dividual corresponds not only to the form of the species, of all men will bring them to the same quantity: and so but also to the nature or matter of the individual: where- the same conclusion follows. fore the conclusion does not follow. On the contrary, Natural quantity results from each Reply to Objection 3. The quantity of those who will individual’s nature. Now the nature of the individual will be raised from the dead is not proportionate to the restor- not be altered at the resurrection. Therefore neither will its ing power, because the latter does not belong to the power natural quantity. But all are not of the same natural quan- of the body—nor to the ashes, as to the state in which they tity. Therefore all will not rise again of the same stature. are before the resurrection—but to nature which the indi- Further, human nature will be restored by resurrection vidual had at first. Nevertheless if the formative power unto glory or unto punishment. But there will not be the on account of some defect was unable to effect the due same quantity of glory or punishment in all those who rise quantity that is befitting to the species, the Divine power again. Neither therefore will there be the same quantity of will supply the defect at the resurrection, as in dwarfs, stature. and in like manner in those who by immoderate size have I answer that, At the resurrection human nature will exceeded the due bounds of nature. Whether all will rise again of the male sex? Suppl. q. 81 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that all will rise again of Now woman is subject to man in the natural order. There- the male sex. For it is written (Eph. 4:13) that we shall fore women will rise again not in the female but in the all meet “unto a perfect man,” etc. Therefore there will be male sex. none but the male sex. Objection 3. Further, that which is produced inciden- Objection 2. Further, in the world to come all pre- tally and beside the intention of nature will not rise again, eminence will cease, as a gloss observes on 1 Cor. 15:24. since all error will be removed at the resurrection. Now 2984 the female sex is produced beside the intention of nature, ious stature, so will they rise again of different sex. And through a fault in the formative power of the seed, which though there be difference of sex there will be no shame in is unable to bring the matter of the fetus to the male form: seeing one another, since there will no lust to invite them wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima xvi, i.e. De to shameful deeds which are the cause of shame. Generat. Animal. ii) that “the female is a misbegotten Reply to Objection 1. When it is said: We shall all male.” Therefore the female sex will not rise again. meet “Christ unto a perfect man,” this refers not to the On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii): male sex but to the strength of soul which will be in all, “Those are wiser, seemingly, who doubt not that both both men and women. sexes will rise again.” Reply to Objection 2. Woman is subject to man on Further, at the resurrection God will restore man to account of the frailty of nature, as regards both vigor of what He made him at the creation. Now He made woman soul and strength of body. After the resurrection, how- from the man’s rib (Gn. 2:22). Therefore He will also ever, the difference in those points will be not on account restore the female sex at the resurrection. of the difference of sex, but by reason of the difference of I answer that, Just as, considering the nature of the merits. Hence the conclusion does not follow. individual, a different quantity is due to different men, so Reply to Objection 3. Although the begetting of a also, considering the nature of the individual, a different woman is beside the intention of a particular nature, it is sex is due to different men. Moreover, this same diversity in the intention of universal nature, which requires both is becoming to the perfection of the species, the different sexes for the perfection of the human species. Nor will degrees whereof are filled by this very difference of sex any defect result from sex as stated above (ad 2). and quantity. Wherefore just as men will rise again of var- Whether all will rise again to animal life so as to exercise the functions of nutrition Suppl. q. 81 a. 4 and generation? Objection 1. It would seem that they will rise again resurrection they shall neither marry nor be married.” to the animal life, or in other words that they will make Further, generation is directed to supply the defect re- use of the acts of the nutritive and generative powers. For sulting from death, and to the multiplication of the human our resurrection will be conformed to Christ’s. But Christ race: and eating is directed to make up for waste, and to is said to have ate after His resurrection (Jn. 21; Lk. 24). increase quantity. But in the state of the resurrection the Therefore, after the resurrection men will eat, and in like human race will already have the number of individuals manner beget. preordained by God, since generation will continue up to Objection 2. Further, the distinction of sexes is di- that point. In like manner each man will rise again in due rected to generation; and in like manner the instruments quantity; neither will death be any more, nor any waste af- which serve the nutritive power are directed to eating. fect the parts of man. Therefore the acts of the generative Now man will rise again with all these. Therefore he will and nutritive powers would be void of purpose. exercise the acts of the generative and nutritive powers. I answer that, The resurrection will not be necessary Objection 3. Further, the whole man will be beatified to man on account of his primary perfection, which con- both in soul and in body. Now beatitude or happiness, sists in the integrity of those things that belong to his na- according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7), consists in a ture, since man can attain to this in his present state of perfect operation. Therefore it must needs be that all the life by the action of natural causes; but the necessity of powers of the soul and all the members should have their the resurrection regards the attainment of his ultimate per- respective acts after the resurrection. And so the same fection, which consists in his reaching his ultimate end. conclusion follows as above. Consequently those natural operations which are directed Objection 4. Further, after the resurrection there will to cause or preserve the primary perfection of human na- be perfect joy in the blessed. Now such a joy includes all ture will not be in the resurrection: such are the actions pleasures, since “happiness” according to Boethius is “a of the animal life in man, the action of the elements on state rendered perfect by the accumulation of all goods” one another, and the movement of the heavens; wherefore (De Consol. iii), and the perfect is that which lacks noth- all these will cease at the resurrection. And since to eat, ing. Since then there is much pleasure in the act of the drink, sleep, beget, pertain to the animal life, being di- generative and nutritive powers it would seem that such rected to the primary perfection of nature, it follows that acts belonging to animal life will be in the blessed, and they will not be in the resurrection. much more in others, who will have less spiritual bodies. Reply to Objection 1. When Christ partook of that On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 22:30): “In the meal, His eating was an act, not of necessity as though 2985 human nature needed food after the resurrection, but of does not consist therein. But the human body will be power, so as to prove that He had resumed the true hu- glorified by an overflow from the reason whereby man is man nature which He had in that state wherein He ate and man, inasmuch as the body will be subject to reason. drank with His disciples. There will be no need of such Reply to Objection 4. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. proof at the general resurrection, since it will be evident vii, 12, x, 5), the pleasures of the body are medicinal, be- to all. Hence Christ is said to have ate by dispensation cause they are applied to man for the removal of weari- in the sense in which lawyers say that a “dispensation is ness; or again, they are unhealthy, in so far as man in- a relaxation of the general law”: because Christ made an dulges in those pleasures inordinately, as though they exception to that which is common to those who rise again were real pleasures: just as a man whose taste is viti- (namely not to partake of food) for the aforesaid motive. ated delights in things which are not delightful to the Hence the argument does not prove. healthy. Consequently it does not follow that such plea- Reply to Objection 2. The distinction of sexes and sures as these belong to the perfection of beatitude, as the the difference of members will be for the restoration of Jews and Turks maintain, and certain heretics known as the perfection of human nature both in the species and in the Chiliasts asserted; who, moreover, according to the the individual. Hence it does not follow that they are with- Philosopher’s teaching, would seem to have an unhealthy out purpose, although they lack their animal operations. appetite, since according to him none but spiritual plea- Reply to Objection 3. The aforesaid operations do sures are pleasures simply, and to be sought for their own not belong to man as man, as also the Philosopher states sake: wherefore these alone are requisite for beatitude. (Ethic. x, 7), wherefore the happiness of the human body 2986 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 82 Of the Impassibility of the Bodies of the Blessed After Their Resurrection (In Four Articles) We must now consider the conditions under which the blessed rise again, and (1) the impassibility of their bodies; (2) their subtlety; (3) their agility; (4) their clarity. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the bodies of the saints will be impassible after the resurrection? (2) Whether all will be equally impassible? (3) Whether this impassibility renders the glorious bodies? (4) Whether in them all the senses are in act? Whether the bodies of the saints will be impassible after the resurrection? Suppl. q. 82 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that the bodies of the saints will stance”∗. Now the bodies of the saints will be incorrupt-not be impassible after the resurrection. For everything ible after the resurrection, according to 1 Cor. 15:42, “It mortal is passible. But man, after the resurrection, will is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption.” There- be “a mortal rational animal,” for such is the definition of fore they will be impassible. man, which will never be dissociated from him. Therefore Further, the stronger is not passive to the weaker. But the body will be passible. no body will be stronger than the bodies of the saints, of Objection 2. Further, whatever is in potentiality to which it is written (1 Cor. 15:43): “It is sown in weakness, have the form of another thing is passible in relation to it shall rise in power.” Therefore they will be impassible. something else; for this is what is meant by being pas- I answer that, We speak of a thing being “passive” in sive to another thing (De Gener. i). Now the bodies of two ways†. First in a broad sense, and thus every reception the saints will be in potentiality to the form of another is called a passion, whether the thing received be fitting to thing after the resurrection; since matter, according as it the receiver and perfect it, or contrary to it and corrupt it. is under one form, does not lose its potentiality to another The glorious bodies are not said to be impassible by the form. But the bodies of the saints after the resurrection removal of this kind of passion, since nothing pertaining will have matter in common with the elements, because to perfection is to be removed from them. In another way they will be restored out of the same matter of which they we use the word “passive” properly, and thus the Dam- are now composed. Therefore they will be in potentiality ascene defines passion (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) as being to another form, and thus will be passible. “a movement contrary to nature.” Hence an immoderate Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher movement of the heart is called its passion, but a moder- (De Gener. i), contraries have a natural inclination to be ate movement is called its operation. The reason of this active and passive towards one another. Now the bodies is that whatever is patient is drawn to the bounds of the of the saints will be composed of contraries after the res- agent, since the agent assimilates the patient to itself, so urrection, even as now. Therefore they will be passible. that, therefore, the patient as such is drawn beyond its own Objection 4. Further, in the human body the blood bounds within which it was confined. Accordingly taking and humors will rise again, as stated above (q. 80, passion in its proper sense there will be no potentiality Aa. 3,4). Now, sickness and such like passions arise in to passion in the bodies of the saints after resurrection; the body through the antipathy of the humors. Therefore wherefore they are said to be impassible. the bodies of the saints will be passible after the resurrec- The reason however of this impassibility is assigned tion. differently by different persons. Some ascribe it to the Objection 5. Further, actual defect is more inconsis- condition of the elements, which will be different then tent with perfection than potential defect. But passibility from what it is now. For they say that the elements will denotes merely potential defect. Since then there will be remain, then, as to substance, yet that they will be de- certain actual defects in the bodies of the blessed, such as prived of their active and passive qualities. But this does the scars of the wounds in the martyrs, even as they were not seem to be true: because the active and passive quali- in Christ, it would seem that their perfections will not suf- ties belong to the perfection of the elements, so that if the fer, if we grant their bodies to be passible. elements were restored without them in the body of the On the contrary, Everything passible is corrupt- man that rises again, they would be less perfect than now. ible, because “increase of passion results in loss of sub- Moreover since these qualities are the proper accidents of ∗ Aristotle, Topic. vi, 1 † Cf. Ia IIae, q. 22, a. 1 2987 the elements, being caused by their form and matter, it least the diminution of the hold which the other contrary would seem most absurd for the cause to remain and the has on it. Now the human body and all that it contains will effect to be removed. Wherefore others say that the quali- be perfectly subject to the rational soul, even as the soul ties will remain, but deprived of their proper activities, the will be perfectly subject to God. Wherefore it will be im- Divine power so doing for the preservation of the human possible for the glorified body to be subject to any change body. This however would seem to be untenable, since contrary to the disposition whereby it is perfected by the the action and passion of the active and passive qualities is soul; and consequently those bodies will be impassible. necessary for the mixture (of the elements), and according Reply to Objection 1. According to Anselm (Cur as one or the other preponderates the mixed (bodies) differ Deus Homo ii, 11), “mortal is included in the philoso- in their respective complexions, and this must apply to the phers’ definition of man, because they did not believe that bodies of those who rise again, for they will contain flesh the whole man could be ever immortal, for they had no ex- and bones and like parts, all of which demand different perience of man otherwise than in this state of mortality.” complexions. Moreover, according to this, impassibility Or we may say that since, according to the Philosopher could not be one of their gifts, because it would not imply (Metaph. vi, 12), essential differences are unknown to a disposition in the impassible substance, but merely an us, we sometimes employ accidental differences in order external preventive to passion, namely the power of God, to signify essential differences from which the accidental which might produce the same effect in a human body differences result. Hence “mortal” is put in the definition even in this state of life. Consequently others say that in of man, not as though mortality were essential to man, but the body itself there will be something preventing the pas- because that which causes passibility and mortality in the sion of a glorified body, namely the nature of a fifth‡: or present state of life, namely composition of contraries, is heavenly body, which they maintain enters into the com- essential to man, but it will not cause it then, on account position of a human body, to the effect of blending the of the triumph of the soul over the body. elements together in harmony so as to be fitting matter for Reply to Objection 2. Potentiality is twofold, tied the rational soul; but that in this state of life, on account and free: and this is true not only of active but also of of the preponderance of the elemental nature, the human passive potentiality. For the form ties the potentiality of body is passible like other elements, whereas in the res- matter, by determining it to one thing, and it is thus that it urrection the nature of the fifth body will predominate, so overcomes it. And since in corruptible things form does that the human body will be made impassible in likeness not perfectly overcome matter, it cannot tie it completely to the heavenly body. But this cannot stand, because the so as to prevent it from sometimes receiving a disposi- fifth body does not enter materially into the composition tion contrary to the form through some passion. But in of a human body, as was proved above (Sent. ii, D, 12, Q. the saints after the resurrection, the soul will have com- 1, a. 1). Moreover it is absurd to say that a natural power, plete dominion over the body, and it will be altogether such as the power of a heavenly body, should endow the impossible for it to lose this dominion, because it will be human body with a property of glory, such as the impas- immutably subject to God, which was not the case in the sibility of a glorified body, since the Apostle ascribes to state of innocence. Consequently those bodies will re- Christ’s power the transformation of the human body, be- tain substantially the same potentiality as they have now cause “such as is the heavenly, such also are they that are to another form; yet that potentiality will remain tied by heavenly” (1 Cor. 15:48), and “He will reform the body of the triumph of the soul over the body, so that it will never our lowness, made like to the body of His glory, accord- be realized by actual passion. ing to the operation whereby also He is able to subdue all Reply to Objection 3. The elemental qualities are the things unto Himself” (Phil. 3:21). And again, a heavenly instruments of the soul, as stated in De Anima ii, text. 38, nature cannot exercise such power over the human body seqq., for the heat of fire in an animal’s body is directed as to take from it its elemental nature which is passible in the act of nutrition by the soul’s power. When, how- by reason of its essential constituents. Consequently we ever, the principal agent is perfect, and there is no defect must say otherwise that all passion results from the agent in the instrument, no action proceeds from the instrument, overcoming the patient, else it would not draw it to its own except in accordance with the disposition of the principal bounds. Now it is impossible for agent to overcome pa- agent. Consequently in the bodies of the saints after the tient except through the weakening of the hold which the resurrection, no action or passion will result from the el- form of the patient has over its matter, if we speak of the emental qualities that is contrary to the disposition of the passion which is against nature, for it is of passion in this soul which has the preservation of the body in view. sense that we are speaking now: for matter is not subject Reply to Objection 4. According to Augustine (Ep. to one of two contraries, except through the cessation or at ad Consent. cxlvi) “the Divine power is able to remove” ‡ The other four being the elements; this fifth element was known to the peripatetic philosophers as the quintessence, of which they held heavenly bodies to be formed 2988 whatever qualities He will “from this visible and tangible faith: so that this will increase their own and others’ joy body, other qualities remaining.” Hence even as in a cer- (Cf. IIIa, q. 54, a. 4, ad 3). Hence Augustine says (De tain respect “He deprived the flames of the Chaldees’ fur- Civ. Dei xxii, 19): “We feel an undescribable love for the nace of the power to burn, since the bodies of the children blessed martyrs so as to desire to see in that kingdom the were preserved without hurt, while in another respect that scars of the wounds in their bodies, which they bore for power remained, since those flames consumed the wood, Christ’s name. Perchance indeed we shall see them for so will He remove passibility from the humors while leav- this will not make them less comely but more glorious. ing their nature unchanged.” It has been explained in the A certain beauty will shine in them, a beauty though in Article how this is brought about. the body, yet not of the body but of virtue.” Neverthe- Reply to Objection 5. The scars of wounds will not less those martyrs who have been maimed and deprived be in the saints, nor were they in Christ, in so far as they of their limbs will not be without those limbs in the resur- imply a defect, but as signs of the most steadfast virtue rection of the dead, for to them it is said (Lk. 21:18): “A whereby the saints suffered for the sake of justice and hair of your head shall not perish.” Whether all will be equally impassible? Suppl. q. 82 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that all will be equally ways, either in itself, or in respect of its cause. If it be impassible. For a gloss on 1 Cor. 15:42, “It is sown in cor- considered in itself, since it denotes a mere negation or ruption,” says that “all have equal immunity from suffer- privation, it is not subject to be more or less, but will be ing.” Now the gift of impassibility consists in immunity equal in all the blessed. on the other hand, if we con- from suffering. Therefore all will be equally impassible. sider it in relation to its cause, thus it will be greater in Objection 2. Further, negations are not subject to be one person than in another. Now its cause is the dominion more or less. Now impassibility is a negation or privation of the soul over the body, and this dominion is caused by of passibility. Therefore it cannot be greater in one subject the soul’s unchangeable enjoyment of God. Consequently than in another. in one who enjoys God more perfectly, there is a greater Objection 3. Further, a thing is more white if it have cause of impassibility. less admixture of black. But there will be no admixture Reply to Objection 1. This gloss is speaking of im- of passibility in any of the saints’ bodies. Therefore they passibility in itself and not in relation to its cause. will all be equally impassible. Reply to Objection 2. Although negations and priva- On the contrary, Reward should be proportionate to tions considered in themselves are not increased nor di- merit. Now some of the saints were greater in merit than minished, yet they are subject to increase and diminution others. Therefore, since impassibility is a reward, it would in relation to their causes. Thus a place is said to be more seem to be greater in some than in others. darksome from having more and greater obstacles to light. Further, impassibility is condivided with the gift of Reply to Objection 3. Some things increase not only clarity. Now the latter will not be equal in all, accord- by receding from their contrary, but also by approach to ing to 1 Cor. 15:41. Therefore neither will impassibility a term: thus light increases. Consequently impassibility be equal in all. also is greater in one subject than in another, although I answer that, Impassibility may be considered in two there is no passibility remaining in any one. Whether impassibility excludes actual sensation from glorified bodies? Suppl. q. 82 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that impassibility ex- uisite for sensation. cludes actual sensation from glorified bodies. For accord- Objection 3. Further, whenever actual sensation is ing to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 11), “sensation is a due to a new perception, there is a new judgment. But in kind of passion.” But the glorified bodies will be impassi- that state there will be no new judgment, because “our ble. Therefore they will not have actual sensation. thoughts will not then be unchangeable,” as Augustine Objection 2. Further, natural alteration precedes spir- says (De Trin. xv, 16). Therefore there will be no actual itual∗ alteration, just as natural being precedes intentional sensation. being. Now glorified bodies, by reason of their impassi- Objection 4. Further, when the act of one of the soul’s bility, will not be subject to natural alteration. Therefore powers is intense, the acts of the other powers are remiss. they will not be subject to spiritual alteration which is req- Now the soul will be supremely intent on the act of the ∗ “Animalem,” as though it were derived from “animus”—the mind. Cf. Ia IIae, q. 50, a. 1,3m; Ia IIae, q. 52, a. 1,3m. 2989 contemplative power in contemplating God. Therefore the sensations, but that it seems to them that they have sen-soul will have no actual sensation whatever. sations. Consequently we must say with others that sen- On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 1:7): “Every eye sation in glorified bodies will result from the reception of shall see Him.” Therefore there will be actual sensation. things outside the soul. It must, however, be observed that Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima i, 2) the organs of sense are transmuted by things outside the “the animate is distinct from the inanimate by sensation soul in two ways. First by a natural transmutation, when and movement.” Now there will be actual movement since namely the organ is disposed by the same natural quality they “shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds” as the thing outside the soul which acts on that organ: for (Wis. 3:7). Therefore there will also be actual sensation. instance, when the hand is heated by touching a hot ob- I answer that, All are agreed that there is some sen- ject, or becomes fragrant through contact with a fragrant sation in the bodies of the blessed: else the bodily life of object. Secondly, by a spiritual transmutation, as when a the saints after the resurrection would be likened to sleep sensible quality is received in an instrument, according to rather than to vigilance. Now this is not befitting that per- a spiritual mode of being, when, namely, the species or the fection, because in sleep a sensible body is not in the ul- intention of a quality, and not the quality itself is received: timate act of life, for which reason sleep is described as thus the pupil receives the species of whiteness and yet half-life.∗ But there is a difference of opinion as to the does not itself become white. Accordingly the first recep- mode of sensation. tion does not cause sensation, properly speaking, because For some say that the glorified bodies will be impas- the senses are receptive of species in matter but without sible, and consequently “not susceptible to impressions matter. that is to say without the material “being” which from without”† and much less so than the heavenly bod- the species had outside the soul (De Anima ii, text. 121). ies, because they will have actual sensations, not by re- This reception transmutes the nature of the recipient, be- ceiving species from sensibles, but by emission of species. cause in this way the quality is received according to its But this is impossible, since in the resurrection the specific material “being.” Consequently this kind of reception will nature will remain the same in man and in all his parts. not be in the glorified bodies, but the second, which of it- Now the nature of sense is to be a passive power as the self causes actual sensation, without changing the nature Philosopher proves (De Anima ii, text. 51,54). Where- of the recipient. fore if the saints, in the resurrection, were to have sen- Reply to Objection 1. As already explained, by this sations by emitting and not by receiving species, sense passion that takes place in actual sensation and is no other in them would be not a passive but an active power, and than the aforesaid reception of species, the body is not thus it would not be the same specifically with sense as drawn away from natural quality, but is perfected by a it is now, but would be some other power bestowed on spiritual change. Wherefore the impassibility of glorified them; for just as matter never becomes form, so a passive bodies does not exclude this kind of passion. power never becomes active. Consequently others say that Reply to Objection 2. Every subject of passion re- the senses will be actualized by receiving species, not in- ceives the action of the agent according to its mode. Ac- deed from external sensibles, but by an outflow from the cordingly if there be a thing that is naturally adapted to be higher powers, so that as now the higher powers receive altered by an active principle, with a natural and a spiri- from the lower, so on the contrary the lower powers will tual alteration, the natural alteration precedes the spiritual then receive from the higher. But this mode of reception alteration, just as natural precedes intentional being. If does not result in real sensation, because every passive however a thing be naturally adapted to be altered only power, according to its specific nature, is determined to with a spiritual alteration it does not follow that it is al- some special active principle, since a power as such bears tered naturally. For instance the air is not receptive of relation to that with respect to which it is said to be the color, according to its natural being, but only according to power. Wherefore since the proper active principle in ex- its spiritual being, wherefore in this way alone is it altered: ternal sensation is a thing existing outside the soul and not whereas, on the contrary, inanimate bodies are altered by an intention thereof existing in the imagination or reason, sensible qualities only naturally and not spiritually. But in if the organ of sense be not moved by external things, but the glorified bodies there cannot be any natural alteration, by the imagination or other higher powers, there will be and consequently there will be only spiritual alteration. no true sensation. Hence we do not say that madmen or Reply to Objection 3. Just as there will be new re- other witless persons (in whom there is this kind of out- ception of species in the organs of sensation, so there will flow of species towards the organs of sense, on account be new judgment in the common sense: but there will be of the powerful influence of the imagination) have real no new judgment on the point in the intellect; such is the ∗ This is what Aristotle says: “The good and the bad are in sleep least distinguishable: hence men say that for half their lives there is no difference between the happy and the unhappy” (Ethic. i, 13) † Cf. q. 74, a. 4, On the contrary 2990 case with one who sees what he knew before. The saying their attention to perceiving sensibles, or to contemplating of Augustine, that “there our thoughts will not be change- or doing anything else will nowise hinder their contempla- able,” refers to the thoughts of the intellectual part: there- tion of God, nor conversely. Or we may say that the reason fore it is not to the point. why one power is hindered in its act when another power Reply to Objection 4. When one of two things is the is intensely engaged is because one power does not alone type of the other, the attention of the soul to the one does suffice for such an intense operation, unless it be assisted not hinder or lessen its attention to the other: thus a physi- by receiving from the principle of life the inflow that the cian while considering urine is not less but more able to other powers or members should receive. And since in the bear in mind the rules of his art concerning the colors of saints all the powers will be most perfect, one will be able urine. And since God is apprehended by the saints as the to operate intensely without thereby hindering the opera- type of all things that will be done or known by them, tion of another power even as it was with Christ. Whether in the blessed, after the resurrection, all the senses will be in act? Suppl. q. 82 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that all the senses are not not have actual sense of sight. The minor is proved thus. in act there. For touch is the first of all the senses (De An- Whenever a thing is seen at an angle, the angle must be ima ii, 2). But the glorified body will lack the actual sense proportionate to the distance of the object seen: because of touch, since the sense of touch becomes actual by the what is seen from a greater distance is less seen and at a alteration of an animal body by some external body pre- lesser angle, so that the angle may be so small that noth- ponderating in some one of the active or passive qualities ing is seen of the object. Therefore if the glorified eye which touch is capable of discerning: and such an alter- sees at an angle, it follows that it sees things within a cer- ation will then be impossible. Therefore all the senses will tain distance, and that consequently it does not see a thing not be in act there. from a greater distance than we see now: and this would Objection 2. Further, the sense of taste assists the seem very absurd. And thus it would seem that the sense action of the nutritive power. Now after the resurrection of sight will not be actual in glorified bodies. there will be no such action, as stated above (q. 81, a. 4). On the contrary, A power conjoined to its act is more Therefore taste would be useless there. perfect than one not so conjoined. Now human nature in Objection 3. Further, nothing will be corrupted af- the blessed will be in its greatest perfection. Therefore all ter the resurrection because the whole creature will be in- the senses will be actual there. vested with a certain virtue of incorruption. Now the sense Further, the sensitive powers are nearer to the soul than of smell cannot have its act without some corruption hav- the body is. But the body will be rewarded or punished on ing taken place, because smell is not perceived without account of the merits or demerits of the soul. Therefore all a volatile evaporation consisting in a certain dissolution. the senses in the blessed will also be rewarded and in the Therefore the sense of smell is not there in its act. wicked will be punished, with regard to pleasure and pain Objection 4. Further, “Hearing assists teaching” (De or sorrow which consist in the operation of the senses. Sensu et Sensato i). But the blessed, after the resurrec- I answer that, There are two opinions on this ques- tion, will require no teaching by means of sensible ob- tion. For some say that in the glorified bodies there will jects, since they will be filled with Divine wisdom by the be all the sensitive powers, but that only two senses will very vision of God. Therefore hearing will not be there. be in act, namely touch and sight; nor will this be owing Objection 5. Further. seeing results from the pupil to defective senses, but from lack of medium and object; receiving the species of the thing seen. But after the res- and that the senses will not be useless, because they will urrection this will be impossible in the blessed. Therefore conduce to the integrity of human nature and will show there will be no actual seeing there, and yet this is the forth the wisdom of their Creator. But this is seemingly most noble of the senses. The minor is proved thus: That untrue, because the medium in these senses is the same as which is actually lightsome is not receptive of a visible in the others. For in the sight the medium is the air, and species; and consequently a mirror placed under the sun’s this is also the medium in hearing and smelling (De An- rays does not reflect the image of a body opposite to it. ima ii, 7). Again, the taste, like the touch, has the medium Now the pupil like the whole body will be endowed with in contact, since taste is a kind of touch (De Anima ii, clarity. Therefore it will not receive the image of a colored 9). Smell also which is the object of the sense of smell body. will be there, since the Church sings that the bodies of the Objection 6. Further, according to the science of per- saints will be a most sweet smell. There will also be vocal spective, whatever is seen is seen at an angle. But this praise in heaven; hence a gloss says on Ps. 149:6, “The does not apply to the glorified bodies. Therefore they will high praises of God shall be in their mouth” that “hearts 2991 and tongues shall not cease to praise God.” The same is being nowise hampered by humidity: wherefore it will af-had on the authority of a gloss on 2 Esdra 12:27, “With fect the organ with a spiritual alteration, like the odor of singing and with cymbals.” Wherefore, according to oth- a volatile evaporation. Such will be the sense of smell in ers we may say that smelling and hearing will be in act the saints, because it will not be hindered by any humid- there, but taste will not be in act, in the sense of being af- ity: and it will take cognizance not only of the excellences fected by the taking of food or drink, as appears from what of odors, as happens with us now on account of the very we have said (q. 81, a. 4): unless perchance we say that great humidity of the brain, but also of the minutest dif- there will be taste in act through the tongue being affected ferences of odors. by some neighboring humor. Reply to Objection 4. In heaven there will be vo- Reply to Objection 1. The qualities perceived by the cal praise (though indeed some think otherwise), and in touch are those which constitute the animal body. Where- the blessed it will affect the organ of hearing by a merely fore the body of an animal has, through its tangible quali- spiritual alteration. Nor will it be for the sake of learning ties according to the present state of life, a natural aptitude whereby they may acquire knowledge, but for the sake of to be affected with a natural and spiritual alteration by the the perfection of the sense and for the sake pleasure. How object of touch. For this reason the touch is said to be the it is possible for the voice to give sound there, we have most material of the senses, since it has a greater measure already stated (Sent. ii, D, 2; q. 2, a. 2, ad 5). of material alteration connected with it. Yet material al- Reply to Objection 5. The intensity of light does not teration is only accidentally related to the act of sensation hinder the spiritual reception of the image of color, so long which is effected by a spiritual alteration. Consequently as the pupil retains its diaphanous nature; thus it is evi- the glorified bodies, which by reason of their impassibility dent that however much the air be filled with light, it can are immune from natural alteration, will be subject only to be the medium of sight, and the more it is illumined, the spiritual alteration by tangible qualities. Thus it was with more clearly are objects seen through it, unless there be the body of Adam, which could neither be burned by fire, a fault through defective sight. The fact that the image nor pierced by sword, although he had the sense of such of an object placed in opposition to a mirror directly op- things. posite the sun’s rays does not appear therein, is not due Reply to Objection 2. Taste, in so far as it is the per- to the reception being hindered, but to the hindering of ception of food, will not be in act; but perhaps it will be reflection: because for an image to appear in a mirror it possible in so far as it is cognizant of flavors in the way must needs be thrown back by an opaque body, for which mentioned above. reason lead is affixed to the glass in a mirror. The sun’s Reply to Objection 3. Some have considered smell to ray dispels this opacity so that no image can appear in the be merely a volatile evaporation. But this opinion cannot mirror. But the clarity of a glorified body does not destroy be true; which is evident from the fact that vultures hasten the diaphanous nature of the pupil, since glory does not to a corpse on perceiving the odor from a very great dis- destroy nature; and consequently the greatness of clarity tance, whereas it would be impossible for an evaporation in the pupil renders the sight keen rather than defective. to travel from the corpse to a place so remote, even though Reply to Objection 6. The more perfect the sense the the whole corpse were to be dissolved into vapor. This less does it require to be altered in order to perceive its is confirmed by the fact that sensible objects at an equal object. Now the smaller the angle at which the sight is distance exercise their influence in all directions: so that affected by the visible object, the less is the organ altered. smell affects the medium sometimes, and the instrument Hence it is that a stronger sight can see from a distance of sensation with a spiritual alteration, without any evap- more than a weaker sight; because the greater the distance oration reaching the organ. That some evaporation should the smaller the angle at which a thing is seen. And since be necessary is due to the fact that smell in bodies is mixed the sight of a glorified body will be most perfect it will be with humidity; wherefore it is necessary for dissolution to able to see by the very least alteration (of the organ); and take place in order for the smell to be perceived. But in consequently at a very much smaller angle than now, and the glorified bodies odor will be in its ultimate perfection, therefore from a much greater distance. 2992 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 83 Of the Subtlety of the Bodies of the Blessed (In Six Articles) We must now consider the subtlety of the bodies of the blessed. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether subtlety is a property of the glorified body? (2) Whether by reason of this subtlety it can be in the same place with another not glorified body? (3) Whether by a miracle two bodies can be in the same place? (4) Whether a glorified body can be in the same place with another glorified body? (5) Whether a glorified body necessarily requires a place equal to itself? (6) Whether a glorified body is palpable? Whether subtlety is a property of the glorified body? Suppl. q. 83 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that subtlety is not a prop- because penetration regards depth, wherefore length is not erty of the glorified body. For the properties of glory sur- an obstacle to penetration. Secondly, through paucity of pass the properties of nature, even as the clarity of glory matter, wherefore rarity is synonymous with subtlety: and surpasses the clarity of the sun, which is the greatest in na- since in rare bodies the form is more predominant over the ture. Accordingly if subtlety be a property of the glorified matter, the term “subtlety” has been transferred to those body, it would seem that the glorified body will be more bodies which are most perfectly subject to their form, and subtle than anything which is subtle in nature, and thus it are most fully perfected thereby: thus we speak of sub- will be “more subtle than the wind and the air,” which was tlety in the sun and moon and like bodies, just as gold and condemned by Gregory in the city of Constantinople, as similar things may be called subtle, when they are most he relates (Moral. xiv, 56). perfectly complete in their specific being and power. And Objection 2. Further, as heat and cold are simple since incorporeal things lack quantity and matter, the term qualities of bodies, i.e. of the elements, so is subtlety. But “subtlety” is applied to them, not only by reason of their heat and other qualities of the elements will not be inten- substance, but also on account of their power. For just sified in the glorified bodies any more than they are now, as a subtle thing is said to be penetrative, for the reason in fact, they will be more reduced to the mean. Neither, that it reaches to the inmost part of a thing, so is an intel- therefore, will subtlety be in them more than it is now. lect said to be subtle because it reaches to the insight of Objection 3. Further, subtlety is in bodies as a result the intrinsic principles and the hidden natural properties of scarcity of matter, wherefore bodies that have less mat- of a thing. In like manner a person is said to have subtle ter within equal dimensions are said to be more subtle; as sight, because he is able to perceive by sight things of the fire in comparison with air, and air as compared with wa- smallest size: and the same applies to the other senses. ter, and water as compared with earth. But there will be Accordingly people have differed by ascribing subtlety to as much matter in the glorified bodies as there is now, nor the glorified bodies in different ways. will their dimensions be greater. Therefore they will not For certain heretics, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei be more subtle then than now. xiii, 22), ascribed to them the subtlety whereby spiritual On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:44): “It is substances are said to be subtle: and they said that at the sown a corruptible body, it shall rise a spiritual,” i.e. a resurrection the body will be transformed into a spirit, and spirit-like, “body.” But the subtlety of a spirit surpasses that for this reason the Apostle describes as being “spir- all bodily subtlety. Therefore the glorified bodies will be itual” the bodies of those who rise again (1 Cor. 15:44). most subtle. But this cannot be maintained. First, because a body can- Further, the more subtle a body is the more exalted it not be changed into a spirit, since there is no community is. But the glorified bodies will be most exalted. There- of matter between them: and Boethius proves this (De fore they will be most subtle. Duab. Nat.). Secondly, because, if this were possible, I answer that, Subtlety takes its name from the power and one’s body were changed into a spirit, one would not to penetrate. Hence it is said in De Gener. ii that “a subtle rise again a man, for a man naturally consists of a soul and thing fills all the parts and the parts of parts.” Now that body. Thirdly, because if this were the Apostle’s meaning, a body has the power of penetrating may happen through just as he speaks of spiritual bodies, so would he speak of two causes. First, through smallness of quantity, espe- natural [animale] bodies, as being changed into souls [an- cially in respect of depth and breadth, but not of length, imam]: and this is clearly false. 2993 Hence certain heretics said that the body will remain at human bodies would not be of the same stature, unless the resurrection, but that it will be endowed with subtlety perhaps elemental matter in man were decreased, which is by means of rarefaction, so that human bodies in rising inconsistent with the integrity of those who rise again)— again will be like the air or the wind, as Gregory relates or unless elemental nature were endowed with the proper- (Moral. xiv, 56). But this again cannot be maintained, be- ties of the heavenly nature through the latter’s dominion cause our Lord had a palpable body after the Resurrection, over the body, and in that case a natural power would be as appears from the last chapter of Luke, and we must be- the cause of a property of glory, which seems absurd. lieve that His body was supremely subtle. Moreover the Hence others say that the aforesaid completeness by human body will rise again with flesh and bones, as did reason of which human bodies are said to be subtle will the body of our Lord, according to Lk. 24:39, “A spirit result from the dominion of the glorified soul (which is the hath not flesh and bones as you see Me to have,” and Job form of the body) over the body, by reason of which do- 19:26, “In my flesh I shall see God,” my Saviour: and the minion the glorified body is said to be “spiritual,” as being nature of flesh and bone is incompatible with the aforesaid wholly subject to the spirit. The first subjection whereby rarity. the body is subject to the soul is to the effect of its par- Consequently another kind of subtlety must be as- ticipating in its specific being, in so far as it is subject to signed to glorified bodies, by saying that they are subtle the soul as matter to form; and secondly it is subject to the on account of the most complete perfection of the body. soul in respect of the other operations of the soul, in so far But this completeness is explained by some in relation to as the soul is a principle of movement. Consequently the the fifth, or heavenly, essence, which will be then predom- first reason for spirituality in the body is subtlety, and, af- inant in them. This, however, is impossible, since first of ter that, agility and the other properties of a glorified body. all the fifth essence can nowise enter into the composi- Hence the Apostle, as the masters expound, in speaking tion of a body, as we have shown above (Sent. D, 12, of spirituality indicates subtlety: wherefore Gregory says qu. 1). Secondly, because granted that it entered into the (Moral. xiv, 56) that “the glorified body is said to be sub- composition of the human body, it would be impossible to tle as a result of a spiritual power.” account for its having a greater predominance over the ele- This suffices for the Replies to the Objections which mental nature then than now, unless—either the amount of refer to the subtlety of rarefaction. the heavenly nature in human bodies were increased (thus Whether by reason of this subtlety a glorified body is able to be in the same place with Suppl. q. 83 a. 2 another body not glorified? Objection 1. It would seem that by reason of this sub- same place together with another body, it will never be tlety a body is able to be in the same place with another able to ascend to the empyrean,∗ and this is erroneous. . body not glorified. For according to Phil. 3:21, “He will Objection 4. Further, a body which is unable to be reform the body of our lowness made like to the body of in the same place with another body can be hindered in His glory.” Now the body of Christ was able to be in the its movement or even surrounded by others standing in its same place with another body, as appears from the fact way. But this cannot happen to glorified bodies. There- that after His Resurrection He went in to His disciples, fore they will be able to be together in the same place with the doors being shut (Jn. 20:19,26). Therefore also the other bodies. glorified bodies by reason of their subtlety will be able to Objection 5. Further, as point is to point, so is line to be in the same place with other bodies not glorified. line, surface to surface, and body to body. Now two points Objection 2. Further, glorified bodies will be superior can be coincident, as in the case of two lines touching to all other bodies. Yet by reason of their superiority cer- one another, and two lines when two surfaces are in con- tain bodies, to wit the solar rays, are able now to occupy tact with one another, and two surfaces when two bodies the same place together with other bodies. Much more touch one another, because “contiguous things are those therefore is this befitting glorified bodies. whose boundaries coincide” (Phys. vi, 6). Therefore it is Objection 3. Further, a heavenly body cannot be not against the nature of a body to be in the same place severed, at least as regards the substance of the spheres: together with another body. Now whatever excellence is hence it is written (Job 37:18) that “the heavens. . . are competent to the nature of a body will all be bestowed on most strong, as if they were of molten brass.” If then the the glorified body. Therefore a glorified body, by reason subtlety of a glorified body will not enable it to be in the of its subtlety, will be able to be in the same place together ∗ The empyrean was the highest of the concentric spheres or heavens, and was identified by Christian writers with the abode of God. Cf. Ia, q. 56, a. 3 2994 with another body. same place with another body, since the removal of the On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin. i): “Differ- lesser does not involve the removal of the greater. ence of accidents makes distinction in number. For three Accordingly we must say that the obstacle to our men differ not in genus, nor in species, but in their ac- body’s being now in the same place with another body can cidents. If we were to remove absolutely every accident nowise be removed by the gift of subtlety. For nothing can from them, still each one has a different place; and it is prevent a body from occupying the same place together quite conceivable that they should all occupy the same with another body, except something in it that requires a place.” Therefore if we suppose two bodies to occupy the different place: since nothing is an obstacle to identity, same place, there will be but one body numerically. save that which is a cause of distinction. Now this distinc- I answer that, It cannot be maintained that a glorified tion of place is not required by any quality of the body, body, by reason of its subtlety, is able to be in the same because a body demands a place, not by reason of its qual- place with another body, unless the obstacle to its being ity: wherefore if we remove from a body the fact of its now in the same place with another body be removed by being hot or cold, heavy or light, it still retains the neces- that subtlety. Some say that in the present state this obsta- sity of the aforesaid distinction, as the Philosopher proves cle is its grossness by virtue of which it is able to occupy (Phys. iv), and as is self-evident. In like manner neither a place; and that this grossness is removed by the gift of can matter cause the necessity of the aforesaid distinction, subtlety. But there are two reasons why this cannot be because matter does not occupy a place except through its maintained. First, because the grossness which the gift of dimensive quantity. Again neither does form occupy a subtlety removes is a kind of defect, for instance an inor- place, unless it have a place through its matter. It remains dinateness of matter in not being perfectly subject to its therefore that the necessity for two bodies occupying each form. For all that pertains to the integrity of the body will a distinct place results from the nature of dimensive quan- rise again in the body, both as regards the matter and as tity, to which a place is essentially befitting. For this forms regards the form. And the fact that a body is able to fill part of its definition, since dimensive quantity is quantity a place belongs to it by reason of that which pertains to occupying a place. Hence it is that if we remove all else its integrity, and not on account of any defect of nature. in a thing from it, the necessity of this distinction is found For since fulness is opposed to vacancy, that alone does in its dimensive quantity alone. Thus take the example not fill a place, which being put in a place, nevertheless of a separate line, supposing there to be two such lines, leaves a place vacant. Now a vacuum is defined by the or two parts of one line, they must needs occupy distinct Philosopher (Phys. iv, 6,7) as being “a place not filled places, else one line added to another would not make by a sensible body.” And a body is said to be sensible something greater, and this is against common sense. The by reason of its matter, form, and natural accidents, all of same applies to surfaces and mathematical bodies. And which pertain to the integrity of nature. It is also plain since matter demands place, through being the subject of that the glorified body will be sensible even to touch, as dimension, the aforesaid necessity results in placed mat- evidenced by the body of our Lord (Lk. 24:39): nor will ter, so that just as it is impossible for there to be two lines, it lack matter, or form, or natural accidents, namely heat, or two parts of a line, unless they occupy distinct places, cold, and so forth. Hence it is evident that the glorified so is it impossible for there to be two matters, or two parts body, the gift of subtlety notwithstanding, will fill a place: of matter, without there be distinction of place. And since for it would seem madness to say that the place in which distinction of matter is the principle of the distinction be- there will be a glorified body will be empty. Secondly tween individuals, it follows that, as Boethius says (De their aforesaid argument does not avail, because to hin- Trin.), “we cannot possibly conceive two bodies occupy- der the co-existence of a body in the same place is more ing one place,” so that this distinction of individuals re- than to fill a place. For if we suppose dimensions sep- quires this difference of accidents. Now subtlety does not arate from matter, those dimensions do not fill a place. deprive the glorified body of its dimension; wherefore it Hence some who held the possibility of a vacuum, said nowise removes from it the aforesaid necessity of occu- that a vacuum is a place wherein such like dimensions ex- pying a distinct place from another body. Therefore the ist apart from a sensible body; and yet those dimensions subtlety of a glorified body will not enable it to be in the hinder another body from being together with them in the same place together with another body, but it will be pos- same place. This is made clear by the Philosopher (Phys. sible for it to be together with another body by the oper- iv, 1,8; Metaph. ii, 2), where he considers it impossible ation of the Divine power: even as the body of Peter had for a mathematical body, which is nothing but separate the power whereby the sick were healed at the passing dimensions, to be together with another natural sensible of Peter’s shadow (Acts 5:15) not through any inherent body. Consequently, granted that the subtlety of a glori- property, but by the power of God for the upbuilding of fied body hindered it from filling a place, nevertheless it the faith. Thus will the Divine power make it possible would not follow that for this reason it is able to be in the for a glorified body to be in the same place together with 2995 another body for the perfection of glory. will assist them in all things at will. Reply to Objection 1. That Christ’s body was able to Reply to Objection 4. From the fact that God will be together with another body in the same place was not come to the aid of the blessed at will in whatever they due to its subtlety, but resulted from the power of His God- desire, it follows that they cannot be surrounded or im- head after His resurrection, even as in His birth∗. Hence prisoned. Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.): “The same body Reply to Objection 5. As stated in Phys. iv, 5, “a went into His disciples the doors being shut, which to hu- point is not in a place”: hence if it be said to be in a place, man eyes came from the closed womb of the Virgin at His this is only accidental, because the body of which it is a birth.” Therefore there is no reason why this should be term is in a place. And just as the whole place corresponds befitting to glorified bodies on account of their subtlety. to the whole body, so the term of the place corresponds to Reply to Objection 2. Light is not a body as we have the term of the body. But it happens that two places have said above (Sent. ii, q. 13, a. 3; Ia, q. 67, a. 2): hence the one term, even as two lines terminate in one point. And objection proceeds on a false supposition. consequently though two bodies must needs be in distinct Reply to Objection 3. The glorified body will pass places, yet the same term of two places corresponds to the through the heavenly spheres without severing them, not two terms of the two bodies. It is in this sense that the by virtue of its subtlety, but by the Divine power, which bounds of contiguous bodies are said to coincide. Whether it is possible, by a miracle, for two bodies to be in the same place? Suppl. q. 83 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that not even by a mira- time. Now it is contrary to common principles, both to the cle is it possible for two bodies to be in the same place. conclusions of geometry and to the definition of a line, for For it is not possible that, by a miracle, two bodies be at two bodies to be in the same place. Therefore this cannot once two and one, since this would imply that contradic- be done by a miracle. The minor is proved as follows: It tions are true at the same time. But if we suppose two is a conclusion of geometry that two circles touch one an- bodies to be in the same place, it would follow that those other only at a point. Now if two circular bodies were in two bodies are one. Therefore this cannot be done by a the same place, the two circles described in them would miracle. The minor is proved thus. Suppose two bodies touch one another as a whole. Again it is contrary to the A and B to be in the same place. The dimensions of A definition of a line that there be more than one straight will either be the same as the dimensions of the place, or line between two points: yet this would be the case were they will differ from them. If they differ, then some of the two bodies in the same place, since between two given dimensions will be separate: which is impossible, since points in the various surfaces of the place, there would be the dimensions that are within the bounds of a place are two straight lines corresponding to the two bodies in that not in a subject unless they be in a placed body. If they place. be the same, then for the same reason the dimensions of Objection 3. Further, it would seem impossible that B will be the same as the dimensions of the place. “Now by a miracle a body which is enclosed within another things that are the same with one and the same thing are should not be in a place, for then it would have a com- the same with one another.” Therefore the dimensions of mon and not a proper place, and this is impossible. Yet A and B are the same. But two bodies cannot have iden- this would follow if two bodies were in the same place. tical dimensions just as they cannot have the same white- Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor ness. Therefore A and B are one body and yet they were is proved thus. Supposing two bodies to be in the same two. Therefore they are at the same time one and two. place, the one being greater than the other as to every di- Objection 2. Further, a thing cannot be done mirac- mension, the lesser body will be enclosed in the greater, ulously either against the common principles—for in- and the place occupied by the greater body will be its com- stance that the part be not less than the whole; since mon place; while it will have no proper place, because no what is contrary to common principles implies a di- given surface of the body will contain it, and this is essen- rect contradiction—or contrary to the conclusions of ge- tial to place. Therefore it will not have a proper place. ometry which are infallible deductions from common Objection 4. Further, place corresponds in proportion principles—for instance that the three angles of a trian- to the thing placed. Now it can never happen by a miracle gle should not be equal to two right angles. In like man- that the same body is at the same time in different places, ner nothing can be done to a line that is contrary to the except by some kind of transformation, as in the Sacra- definition of a line, because to sever the definition from ment of the Altar. Therefore it can nowise happen by a the defined is to make two contradictories true at the same miracle that two bodies be together in the same place. ∗ Cf. IIIa, q. 28, a. 2, ad 3 2996 On the contrary, The Blessed Virgin gave birth to her is commensurate with the distance between the bounds of Son by a miracle. Now in this hallowed birth it was nec- the thing placed, just as the former would be distant by essary for two bodies to be together in the same place, their own dimensions if they had them. Thus that the di- because the body of her child when coming forth did not mensions of two bodies be the dimensions of one place break through the enclosure of her virginal purity. There- is nothing else than that two bodies be in the same place, fore it is possible for two bodies to be miraculously to- which is the chief question at issue. gether in the same place. Reply to Objection 2. Granted that by a miracle two Further, this may again be proved from the fact that bodies be together in the same place, nothing follows ei- our Lord went in to His disciples, the doors being shut ther against common principles, or against the definition (Jn. 20:19, 26). of a line, or against any conclusions of geometry. For, I answer that, As shown above (a. 2) the reason why as stated above (a. 2), dimensive quantity differs from all two bodies must needs be in two places is that distinc- other accidents in that it has a special reason of individ- tion in matter requires distinction in place. Wherefore we uality and distinction, namely on account of the placing observe that when two bodies merge into one, each loses of the parts, besides the reason of individuality and dis- its distinct being, and one indistinct being accrues to the tinction which is common to it and all other accidents, two combined, as in the case of mixtures. Hence it is im- arising namely from the matter which is its subject. Thus possible for two bodies to remain two and yet be together then one line may be understood as being distinct from an- unless each retain its distinct being which it had hitherto, other, either because it is in another subject (in which case in so much as each of them was a being undivided in itself we are considering a material line), or because it is placed and distinct from others. Now this distinct being depends at a distance from another (in which case we are consid- on the essential principles of a thing as on its proximate ering a mathematical line, which is understood apart from causes, but on God as on the first cause. And since the matter). Accordingly if we remove matter, there can be first cause can preserve a thing in being, though the sec- no distinction between lines save in respect of a different ond causes be done away, as appears from the first propo- placing: and in like manner neither can there be a dis- sition of De Causis, therefore by God’s power and by that tinction of points, nor of superficies, nor of any dimen- alone it is possible for an accident to be without substance sions whatever. Consequently geometry cannot suppose as in the Sacrament of the Altar. Likewise by the power of one line to be added to another, as being distinct there- God, and by that alone, it is possible for a body to retain from unless it be distinct as to place. But supposing by a its distinct being from that of another body, although its Divine miracle a distinction of subject without a distinc- matter be not distinct as to place from the matter of the tion of place, we can understand a distinction of lines; and other body: and thus it is possible by a miracle for two these are not distant from one another in place, on account bodies to be together in the same place. of the distinction of subjects. Again we can understand a Reply to Objection 1. This argument is sophistical difference of points, and thus different lines described on because it is based on a false supposition, or begs the two bodies that are in the same place are drawn from dif- question. For it supposes the existence, between two op- ferent points to different points; for the point that we take posite superficies of a place, of a dimension proper to the is not a point fixed in the place, but in the placed body, be- place, with which dimension a dimension of the body put cause a line is not said to be drawn otherwise than from a in occupation of the place would have to be identified: point which is its term. In like manner the two circles de- because it would then follow that the dimensions of two scribed in two spherical bodies that occupy the same place bodies occupying a place would become one dimension, are two, not on account of the difference of place, else if each of them were identified with the dimension of the they could not touch one another as a whole, but on ac- place. But this supposition is false, because if it were true count of the distinction of subjects, and thus while wholly whenever a body acquires a new place, it would follow touching one another they still remain two. Even so a that a change takes place in the dimensions of the place or circle described by a placed spherical body touches, as a of thing placed: since it is impossible for two things to be- whole, the other circle described by the locating body. come one anew, except one of them be changed. Whereas Reply to Objection 3. God could make a body not to if, as is the case in truth, no other dimensions belong to be in a place; and yet supposing this, it would not follow a place than those of the thing occupying the place, it is that a certain body is not in a place, because the greater clear that the argument proves nothing, but begs the ques- body is the place of the lesser body, by reason of its su- tion, because according to this nothing else has been said, perficies which is described by contact with the terms of but that the dimensions of a thing placed are the same as the lesser body. the dimensions of the place; excepting that the dimensions Reply to Objection 4. It is impossible for one body to of the thing placed are contained within the bounds of the be miraculously in two places locally (for Christ’s body is place, and that the distance between the bounds of a place not locally on the altar), although it is possible by a mir- 2997 acle for two bodies to be in the same place. Because to (Metaph. v), whereas distinction from others is a result be in several places at once is incompatible with the indi- of the nature of unity. Wherefore that one same body be vidual, by reason of its having being undivided in itself, locally in several places at once implies a contradiction, for it would follow that it is divided as to place. on the even as for a man to lack reason, while for two bodies to other hand, to be in the same place with another body is be in the same place does not imply a contradiction, as incompatible with the individual as distinct from aught explained above. Hence the comparison fails. else. Now the nature of unity is perfected in indivision Whether one glorified body can be in the same place together with another glorified Suppl. q. 83 a. 4 body? Objection 1. It would seem that a glorified body can penetrated by the other. But to be penetrated is a mark be in the same place together with another glorified body. of imperfection which will be altogether absent from the Because where there is greater subtlety there is less re- glorified bodies. Therefore it will be impossible for two sistance. If then a glorified body is more subtle than a glorified bodies to be in the same place. non-glorified body, it will offer less resistance to a glori- I answer that, The property of a glorified body does fied body: and so if a glorified body can be in the same not make it able to be in the same place with another glo- place with a non-glorified body, much more can it with a rified body, nor again to be in the same place with a non- glorified body. glorified body. But it would be possible by the Divine Objection 2. Further, even as a glorified body will be power for two glorified bodies or two non-glorified bod- more subtle than a non-glorified body, so will one glori- ies to be in the same place, even as a glorified body with fied body be more subtle than another. Therefore if a glo- a non-glorified body. Nevertheless it is not befitting for a rified body can be in the same place with a non-glorified glorified body to be in the same place with another glo- body, a more subtle glorified body can be in the same rified body, both because a becoming order will be ob- place with a less subtle glorified body. served in them, which demands distinction, and because Objection 3. Further, the body of heaven is subtle, one glorified body will not be in the way of another. Con- and will then be glorified. Now the glorified body of a sequently two glorified bodies will never be in the same saint will be able to be in the same place with the body of place. heaven, since the saints will be able at will to travel to and Reply to Objection 1. This argument supposes that a from earth. Therefore two glorified bodies will be able to glorified body is able by reason of its subtlety to be in the occupy the same place. same place with another body: and this is not true. On the contrary, The glorified bodies will be spiri- The same answer applies to the Second Objection. tual, that is like spirits in a certain respect. Now two spir- Reply to Objection 3. The body of heaven and the its cannot be in the same place, although a body and a other bodies will be said equivocally to be glorified, in spirit can be in the same place, as stated above (Sent. i, D, so far as they will have a certain share in glory, and not 37, q. 3, a. 3; Ia, q. 52, a. 3). Therefore neither will two as though it were becoming for them to have the gifts of glorified bodies be able to be in the same place. glorified human bodies. Further, if two bodies occupy the same place, one is Whether by virtue of its subtlety a glorified body will no longer need to be in an equal Suppl. q. 83 a. 5 place? Objection 1. It would seem that by virtue of its sub- smallest place, since its various parts could be in the same tlety, a glorified body will no longer need to be in an equal part of the place: for it makes no difference whether two place. For the glorified bodies will be made like to the bodies or however many be in the same place. Now a glo- body of Christ according to Phil. 3:21. Now Christ’s body rified body will be in the same place with another body, as is not bound by this necessity of being in an equal place: is commonly admitted. Therefore it will be possible for it wherefore it is contained whole under the small or great to be in any place however small. dimensions of a consecrated host. Therefore the same will Objection 3. Further, even as a body is seen by rea- be true of the glorified bodies. son of its color, so is it measured by reason of its quantity. Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. Now the glorified body will be so subject to the spirit that iv, 6), that two bodies are not in the same place, because it will be able at will to be seen, and not seen, especially it would follow that the greatest body would occupy the by a non-glorified eye, as evidenced in the case of Christ. 2998 Therefore its quantity will be so subject to the spirit’s will body become smaller than itself may be understood by that it will be able to be in a little or great place, and to a variation of place; so, to wit, that the parts of a glori- have a little or great quantity at will. fied body insinuate themselves into one another, so that it On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. is reduced in quantity however small it may become. And 30) that “whatever is in a place occupies a place equal to some have held this to be the case, saying that by reason of itself.” Now the glorified body will be in a place. There- its subtlety a glorified body will be able to be in the same fore it will occupy a place equal to itself. place with a non-glorified body: and that in like manner Further, the dimensions of a place and of that which is its parts can be one within the other, so much so that a in that place are the same, as shown in Phys. iv, text. whole glorified body will be able to pass through the min- 30,76,77. Therefore if the place were larger than that utest opening in another body: and thus they explain how which is in the place the same thing would be greater and Christ’s body came out of the Virgin’s womb; and how smaller than itself, which is absurd. it went into His disciples, the doors being shut. But this I answer that, A body is not related to place save is impossible; both because the glorified body will not be through the medium of its proper dimensions, in respect able, by reason of its subtlety, to be in the same place with of which a located body is confined through contact with another body, and because, even if it were able to be in the the locating body. Hence it is not possible for a body to same place with another body, this would not be possible occupy a place smaller than its quantity, unless its proper if the other were a glorified body, as many say; and again quantity be made in some way less than itself: and this because this would be inconsistent with the right disposi- can only be understood in two ways. First, by a variation tion of the human body, which requires the parts to be in in quantity in respect of the same matter, so that in fact a certain fixed place and at a certain fixed distance from the matter which at first is subject to a greater quantity one another. Wherefore this will never happen, not even is afterwards subject to a lesser. Some have held this to by a miracle. Consequently we must say that the glorified be the case with the glorified bodies, saying that quantity body will always be in a place equal to itself. is subject to them at will, so that when they list, they are Reply to Objection 1. Christ’s body is not locally in able to have a great quantity, and when they list a small the Sacrament of the Altar, as stated above (Sent. iv, D, quantity. But this is impossible, because no movement 10, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5; IIIa, q. 77, a. 5). affecting that which is intrinsic to a thing is possible with- Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher’s argument is out passion to the detriment∗ of its substance. Hence in that for the same reason one part might permeate another. incorruptible, i.e. heavenly, bodies, there is only local But this permeation of the parts of a glorified body into movement, which is not according to something intrin- one another is impossible, as stated above. Therefore the sic. Thus it is clear that change of quantity in respect of objection does not prove. matter would be incompatible with the impassibility and Reply to Objection 3. A body is seen because it acts incorruptibility of a glorified body. Moreover, it would on the sight: but that it does or does not act on the sight follow that a glorified body would be sometimes rarer and causes no change in the body. Hence it is not unfitting, if sometimes denser, because since it cannot be deprived of it can be seen when it will, and not seen when it will†. On any of its matter, sometimes the same matter would be un- the other hand, being in a place is not an action proceed- der great dimensions and sometimes under small dimen- ing from a body by reason of its quantity, as being seen is sions, and thus it would be rarefied and densified, which by reason of its color. Consequently the comparison fails. is impossible. Secondly, that the quantity of a glorified Whether the glorified body, by reason of its subtlety, will be impalpable? Suppl. q. 83 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the glorified body, by Objection 3. Further, every palpable body is tangible. reason of its subtlety, is impalpable. For Gregory says Now every tangible body has tangible qualities in excess (Hom. xxv in Evang.): “What is palpable must needs of the qualities of the one touching it. Since then in the be corruptible.” But the glorified body is incorruptible. glorified bodies the tangible qualities are not in excess but Therefore it is impalpable. are reduced to a supreme degree of equality, it would seem Objection 2. Further, whatever is palpable resists one that they are impalpable. who handles it. But that which can be in the same place On the contrary, our Lord rose again with a glorified with another does not resist it. Since then a glorified body body; and yet His body was palpable, as appears from Lk. can be in the same place with another body, it will not be 24:39: “Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and palpable. bones.” Therefore the glorified bodies also will be palpa- ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 22, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 41, a. 1 † Cf. IIIa, q. 55, a. 4 2999 ble. resist any other passing body, so that the latter cannot be Further, this is the heresy of Eutychius, Bishop of in the same place together with it: although, according to Constantinople, as Gregory states (Moral. xxiv): for he its pleasure, it may happen by the Divine power that it oc- said that in the glory of the resurrection our bodies will be cupy the same place with another body, and thus offer no impalpable. resistance to a passing body. Wherefore according to its I answer that, Every palpable body is tangible, but nature the glorified body is palpable, but it is competent not conversely. For every body is tangible that has qual- for it to be impalpable to a non-glorified body by a super- ities whereby the sense of touch has a natural aptitude to natural power. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xxv in Evang.) be affected: wherefore air, fire, and the like are tangible that “our Lord offered His flesh to be handled, which He bodies: but a palpable body, in addition to this, resists the had brought in through the closed doors, so as to afford touch; wherefore the air which never resists that which a complete proof that after His resurrection His body was passes through it, and is most easily pierced, is tangible unchanged in nature though changed in glory.” indeed but not palpable. Accordingly it is clear that a Reply to Objection 1. The incorruptibility of a glori- body is said to be palpable for two reasons, namely on fied body does not result from the nature of its component account of its tangible qualities, and on account of its re- parts; and it is on account of that nature that whatever is sisting that which touches it, so as to hinder it from pierc- palpable is corruptible, as stated above. Hence the argu- ing it. And since the tangible qualities are hot and cold ment does not prove. and so forth, which are not found save in heavy and light Reply to Objection 2. Although in a way it is possible bodies, which through being contrary to one another are for a glorified body to be in the same place with another therefore corruptible, it follows that the heavenly bodies, body: nevertheless the glorified body has it in its power to which by their nature are incorruptible, are sensible to the resist at will any one touching it, and thus it is palpable. sight but not tangible, and therefore neither are they pal- Reply to Objection 3. In the glorified bodies the tan- pable. This is what Gregory means when he says (Hom. gible qualities are not reduced to the real mean that is xxv in Evang.) that “whatever is palpable must needs be measured according to equal distance from the extremes, corruptible.” Accordingly the glorified body has by its na- but to the proportionate mean, according as is most be- ture those qualities which have a natural aptitude to affect coming to the human complexion in each part. Where- the touch, and yet since the body is altogether subject to fore the touch of those bodies will be most delightful, be- the spirit, it is in its power thereby to affect or not to affect cause a power always delights in a becoming object, and the touch. In like manner it is competent by its nature to is grieved by excess. 3000 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 84 Of the Agility of the Bodies of the Blessed (In Three Articles) We must now consider the agility of the bodies of the blessed in the resurrection. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the glorified bodies will be agile? (2) Whether they will move? (3) Whether they will move instantaneously? Whether the glorified bodies will be agile? Suppl. q. 84 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the glorified bodies fection, whereby it will become adapted to that subjec- will not be agile. For that which is agile by itself needs tion: and this perfection is called “the gift of the glori- not to be carried in order to move. But the glorified bod- fied body.” Now the soul is united to body not only as its ies will, after the resurrection, be taken up by the angels form, but also as its mover; and in both ways the glorified (according to a gloss) in the clouds “to meet Christ, into body must needs be most perfectly subject to the glorified the air” (1 Thess. 4:16). Therefore the glorified bodies soul. Wherefore even as by the gift of subtlety the body will not be agile. is wholly subject to the soul as its form, whence it derives Objection 2. Further, no body that moves with labor its specific being, so by the gift of agility it is subject to and pain can be said to be agile. Yet the glorified bod- the soul as its mover, so that it is prompt and apt to obey ies will move thus, since the principle of their movement, the spirit in all the movements and actions of the soul. namely the soul, moves them counter to their nature, else Some, however, ascribe the cause of this agility to the they would always move in the same direction. Therefore fifth, i.e. the heavenly essence, which will then be pre- they are not agile. dominant in the glorified bodies. But of this we have fre- Objection 3. Further, of all the animal operations quently observed that it does not seem probable (q. 82, sense surpasses movement in nobility and priority. Yet no a. 1; q. 83, a. 1). Wherefore it is better to ascribe it to the property is ascribed to glorified bodies as perfecting them soul, whence glory flows to the body. in sensation. Therefore neither should agility be ascribed Reply to Objection 1. Glorified bodies are said to be to them as perfecting them in movement. borne by the angels and also on the clouds, not as though Objection 4. Further, nature gives different animals they needed them, but in order to signify the reverence instruments of different disposition according to their dif- which both angels and all creatures will show them. ferent powers: hence she does not give instruments of the Reply to Objection 2. The more the power of the same disposition to slow as to fleet animals. Now God’s moving soul dominates over the body, the less is the works are much more orderly than those of nature. Since labor of movement, even though it be counter to the then the glorified body’s members will have the same dis- body’s nature. Hence those in whom the motive power position, shape and quantity as they now have, it would is stronger, and those who through exercise have the body seem that it will have no agility other than it has now. more adapted to obey the moving spirit, labor less in be- On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:43): “It is ing moved. And since, after the resurrection, the soul will sown in weakness, it shall rise in power,” that is, accord- perfectly dominate the body, both on account of the per- ing to a gloss, “mobile and living.” But mobility can only fection of its own power, and on account of the glorified signify agility in movement. Therefore the glorified bod- body’s aptitude resulting from the outflow of glory which ies will be agile. it receives from the soul, there will be no labor in the Further, slowness of movement would seem especially saints’ movements, and thus it may be said that the bodies inconsistent with the nature of a spirit. But the glorified of the saints’ will be agile. bodies will be most spiritual according to 1 Cor. 15:44. Reply to Objection 3. By the gift of agility the glo- Therefore they will be agile. rified body will be rendered apt not only for local move- I answer that, The glorified body will be altogether ment but also for sensation, and for the execution of all subject to the glorified soul, so that not only will there the other operations of the soul. be nothing in it to resist the will of the spirit, for it was Reply to Objection 4. Even as nature gives to fleeter even so in the case of Adam’s body, but also from the animals instruments of a different disposition in shape and glorified soul there will flow into the body a certain per- quantity, so God will give to the bodies of the saints a dis- 3001 position other than that which they have now, not indeed is called agility. in shape and quantity, but in that property of glory which Whether the saints will never use their agility for the purpose of movement? Suppl. q. 84 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the saints will never rified bodies are moved sometimes, since even Christ’s use their agility for the purpose of movement. For, ac- body was moved in His ascension, and likewise the bod- cording to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 2), “movement is ies of the saints, which will arise from the earth, will as- the act of the imperfect.” But there will be no imperfec- cend to the empyrean‡. But even after they have climbed tion in glorified bodies. Neither therefore will there be the heavens, it is likely that they will sometimes move any movement. according as it pleases them; so that by actually putting Objection 2. Further, all movement is on account of into practice that which is in their power, they may show some need, because whatever is in motion is moved for forth the excellence of Divine wisdom, and that further- the sake of obtaining some end. But glorified bodies will more their vision may be refreshed by the beauty of the have no need, since as Augustine says (De Spiritu et An- variety of creatures, in which God’s wisdom will shine ima, lxiii∗), “all thou willest will be there, and nothing forth with great evidence: for sense can only perceive that that thou willest not.” Therefore they will not move. which is present, although glorified bodies can perceive Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher from a greater distance than non-glorified bodies. And (De Coelo et Mundo ii), “that which shares the Divine yet movement will nowise diminish their happiness which goodness without movement shares it more excellently consists in seeing God, for He will be everywhere present than that which shares it with movement.” Now the glo- to them; thus Gregory says of the angels (Hom. xxxiv in rified body shares the Divine goodness more excellently Evang.) that “wherever they are sent their course lies in than any other body. Since then certain bodies, like the God.” heavenly bodies, will remain altogether without move- Reply to Objection 1. Local movement changes noth- ment, it seems that much more will human bodies remain ing that is intrinsic to a thing, but only that which is with- so. out namely place. Hence that which is moved locally is Objection 4. Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. perfect as to those things which are within (Phys. viii, 7), xii) that the soul being established in God will in conse- although it has an imperfection as to place, because while quence establish its body. Now the soul will be so estab- it is in one place it is in potentiality with regard to another lished in God, that in no way will it move away from Him. place, since it cannot be in several places at the same time, Therefore in the body there will be no movement caused for this belongs to God alone. But this defect is not incon- by the soul. sistent with the perfection of glory, as neither is the defect Objection 5. Further, the more noble a body is, the whereby a creature is formed from nothing. Hence such more noble a place is due to it: wherefore Christ’s body like defects will remain in glorified bodies. which is the most exalted of all has the highest place of all, Reply to Objection 2. A person is said to need a thing according to Heb. 7:26, “Made higher than the heavens,” in two ways, namely absolutely and relatively. One needs where a gloss† says, “in place and dignity.” And again absolutely that without which one cannot retain one’s be- each glorified body will, in like manner, have a place be- ing or one’s perfection: and thus movement in glorified fitting it according to the measure of its dignity. Now a bodies will not be on account of a need, because their fitting place is one of the conditions pertaining to glory. happiness will suffice them for all such things. But we Since then after the resurrection the glory of the saints will need a thing relatively when without it some end we have never vary, neither by increase nor by decrease, because in view cannot be obtained by us, or not so well, or not they will then have reached the final term of all, it would in some particular way. It is thus that movement will be seem that their bodies will never leave the place assigned in the blessed on account of need, for they will be unable to them, and consequently will not be moved. to show forth their motive power practically, unless they On the contrary, It is written (Is. 40:31): “They shall be in motion, since nothing prevents a need of this kind run and not be weary, they shall walk and not faint”; and being in glorified bodies. (Wis. 3:7): ”(The just) shall run to and fro like sparks Reply to Objection 3. This argument would prove if among the reeds.” Therefore there will be some move- the glorified body were unable even without movement to ment in glorified bodies. share the Divine goodness much more perfectly than the I answer that, It is necessary to suppose that the glo- heavenly bodies, which is untrue. Hence glorified bodies ∗ Cf. q. 70, a. 2, ad 1 † Gloss on Heb. 1:3: “On the right hand of the majesty” ‡ The empyrean was the highest of the concentric spheres or heavens, and was identified by Christian writers with the abode of God. Cf. Ia, q. 56, a. 3 3002 will be moved, not in order to gain a perfect participa-thing, as stated above (ad 1). tion in the Divine goodness (since they have this through Reply to Objection 5. The fitting place assigned to glory), but in order to show the soul’s power. On the each glorified body according to the degree of its dignity other hand, the movement of the heavenly bodies could belongs to the accidental reward. Nor does it follow that not show their power, except the power they have in mov- this reward is diminished whenever the body is outside ing lower bodies to generation and corruption, which is its place; because that place pertains to reward, not as ac- not becoming to that state. Hence the argument does not tually containing the body located therein (since nothing prove. flows therefrom into the glorified body, but rather does it Reply to Objection 4. Local movement takes nothing receive splendor therefrom), but as being due to merits. away from the stability of the soul that is established in Wherefore, though out of that place, they will still con- God, since it does not affect that which is intrinsic to a tinue to rejoice in it. Whether the movement of the saints will be instantaneous? Suppl. q. 84 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that movement of the the glorified body will not be moved in time, since time saints will be instantaneous. For Augustine says (De Civ. will not be then according to Apoc. 10:6. Therefore this Dei xxii, 30) that “wherever the spirit listeth there will the movement will be instantaneous. body be.” Now the movement of the will, whereby the On the contrary, In local movement space. move- spirit wishes to be anywhere, is instantaneous. Therefore ment and time are equally divisible, as is demonstrated in the body’s movement will be instantaneous. Phys. vi, 4. Now the space traversed by a glorified body in Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher (Phys. iv, motion is divisible. Therefore both the movement and the 8) proves that there is no movement through a vacuum, time are divisible. But an instant is indivisible. Therefore because it would follow that something moves instanta- this movement will not be instantaneous. neously, since a vacuum offers no resistance whatever to Further, a thing cannot be at the same time wholly a thing that is in motion, whereas the plenum offers re- in one place and partly in another place, since it would sistance; and so there would be no proportion between follow that the remaining part is in two places at the the velocity of movement in a vacuum and that of move- same time, which is impossible. But whatever is in mo- ment in a plenum, since the ratio of movements in point tion is partly in a term “wherefrom” and partly in a term of velocity is as the ratio of the resistance offered by the “whereto,” as is proved in Phys. vi, 6: while whatever has medium. Now the velocities of any two movements that been in motion is wholly in the term whereto the move- take place in time must needs be proportional, since any ment is directed; and it is impossible at the same time for one space of time is proportional to any other. But in like it to be moved and to have been moved. Now that which manner no full place can resist a glorified body since this is moved instantaneously is being moved and has been can be in the same place with another body, no matter how moved at the same time. Therefore the local movement of this may occur; even as neither can a vacuum resist a body. a glorified body cannot be instantaneous. Therefore if it moves at all, it moves instantaneously. I answer that, Opinion is much divided on this point. Objection 3. Further, the power of a glorified soul For some say that a glorified body passes from one place surpasses the power of a non-glorified soul, out of all pro- to another without passing through the interval, just as portion so to speak. Now the non-glorified soul moves the the will passes from one place to another without pass- body in time. Therefore the glorified soul moves the body ing through the interval, and that consequently it is possi- instantaneously. ble for the movement of a glorified body like that of the Objection 4. Further, whatever is moved equally soon will to be instantaneous. But this will not hold: because to what is near and what is distant, is moved instanta- the glorified body will never attain to the dignity of the neously. Now such is the movement of a glorified body, spiritual nature, just as it will never cease to be a body. for however distant the space to which it is moved, the Moreover, when the will is said to move from one place time it takes to be moved is imperceptible: wherefore Au- to another, it is not essentially transferred from place to gustine says (QQ. De Resurrectione, Ep. cii, qu. 1) that place, because in neither place is it contained essentially, “the glorified body reaches equally soon to any distance, but it is directed to one place after being directed by the like the sun’s ray.” Therefore the glorified body is moved intention to another: and in this sense it is said to move instantaneously. from one place to another. Objection 5. Further, whatever is in motion is moved Hence others∗ say that it is a property of the nature either in time or in an instant. Now after the resurrection of a glorified body, since it is a body, to pass through the ∗ Alexander of Hales, Sum. Th. III, q. 23, mem. 3 3003 interval and consequently to be moved in time, but that to its reality and not according to our way of considering by the power of glory, which raises it to a certain infini- it. Wherefore an instant through being considered in a tude above the power of nature, it is possible for it not to different way is not rendered capable of measuring things pass through the interval, and consequently to be moved that are not simultaneous in time, just as a point through instantaneously. But this is impossible since it implies being considered in a different way does not make it possi- a contradiction: which is proved as follows. Suppose a ble for one point of place to contain things that are locally body which we will call Z to be in motion from A to B. distant from one another. It is clear that Z, as long as it is wholly in A is not in mo- Hence others with greater probability hold that a glo- tion; and in like manner when it is wholly in B, because rified body moves in time, but that this time is so short then the movement is past. Therefore if it is at any time as to be imperceptible; and that nevertheless one glorified in motion it must needs be neither wholly in A nor wholly body can pass through the same space in less time than an- in B. Therefore while it is in motion, it is either nowhere, other, because there is no limit to the divisibility of time, or partly in A, and partly in B, or wholly in some other no matter how short a space we may take. intervening place, say C, or partly in A and C and partly Reply to Objection 1. That which is little lacking is in C and B. But it is impossible for it to be nowhere, for as it were not lacking at all (Phys. ii, 5); wherefore we then there would be a dimensive quantity without a place, say: “I do so and so at once,” when it is to be done after a which is impossible. Nor again is it possible for it to be short time. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks when partly in A and partly in B without being in some way in he says that “wheresoever the will shall be, there shall the the intervening space. for since B is a place distant from body be forthwith.” Or we may say that in the blessed A, it would follow that in the intervening space the part of there will never be an inordinate will: so that they never Z which is in B is not continuous with the part which is will wish their body to be instantaneously where it can- in A. Therefore it follows that it is either wholly in C, or not be, and consequently whatever instant the will shall partly in C, and partly in some other place that intervenes choose, at that same instant the body will be in whatever between C and A, say D, and so forth. Therefore it follows place the will shall determine. that Z does not pass form A to B unless first of all it be in Reply to Objection 2. Some have demurred to this all the intervening places: unless we suppose that it passes proposition of the Philosopher’s, as the Commentator from A to B without ever being moved, which implies a thereon observes. They say that the ratio of one whole contradiction, because the very succession of places is lo- movement to another whole movement is not necessar- cal movement. The same applies to any change whatever ily as the ratio of one resisting medium to another resist- having two opposite terms, each of which is a positive en- ing medium, but that the ratio of the intervening medi- tity, but not to those changes which have only one positive ums gives us the ratio of retardations attending the move- term, the other being a pure privation, since between affir- ments on account of the resistance of the medium. For mation and negation or privation there is no fixed distance: every movement has a certain fixed speed, either fast or wherefore that which is in the negation may be nearer to slow, through the mover overcoming the movable, al- or more remote from affirmation, and conversely, by rea- though there be no resistance on the part of the medium; son of something that causes either of them or disposes as evidenced in heavenly bodies, which have nothing to thereto: so that while that which is moved is wholly under hinder their movement; and yet they do not move instan- a negation it is changed into affirmation, and “vice versa”; taneously, but in a fixed time proportionate to the power of wherefore in such things “to be changing precedes to be the mover in comparison with the movable. Consequently changed,” as is proved in Phys. vi, 5. Nor is there any it is clear that even if we suppose something to move in a comparison with the movement of an angel, because be- vacuum, it does not follow that it moves instantaneously, ing in a place is predicated equivocally of a body and an but that nothing is added to the time which that movement angel. Hence it is clear that it is altogether impossible for requires in the aforesaid proportion of the mover to the a body to pass from one place to another, unless it pass movable, because the movement is not retarded. through every interval. But this reply, as the Commentator observes, proceeds Wherefore others grant this, and yet they maintain that from an error in the imagination; for it is imagined that the the glorified body is moved instantaneously. But it follows retardation resulting from the resistance of the medium is from this that a glorified body is at the same instant in two a part of movement added to the natural movement, the or more places together, namely in the ultimate term, and quantity of which is in proportion to the mover in com- in all the intervening places, which is impossible. parison with the movable, as when one line is added to To this, however, they reply that, although it is the another: for the proportion of one total to the other is not same instant really, it is not the same logically, like a point the same as the proportion of the lines to which an addi-at which different lines terminate. But this is not enough, because an instant measures the instantaneous, according 3004 tion has been made.∗ And so there would not be the same ment in time. on the other hand, in those movements proportion between one whole sensible movement and an- where there is resistance on the part of the medium only, other, as between the retardations resulting from the resis- the measure of time is taken only according to the obsta- tance of the medium. This is an error of the imagination, cle on the part of the medium, so that if the medium be re- because each part of a movement has as much speed as moved there will be no longer an obstacle; and so either it the whole movement: whereas not every part of a line has will move instantaneously, or it will move in an equal time as much of the dimensive quantity as the whole line has. through a vacuum and through a plenum, because granted Hence any retardation or acceleration affecting the move- that it moves in time through a vacuum, that time will bear ment affects each of its parts, which is not the case with some proportion to the time in which it moves through a lines: and consequently the retardation that comes to a plenum. Now it is possible to imagine another body more movement is not another part of the movement, whereas subtle in the same proportion than the body which filled in the case of the lines that which is added is a part of the the space, and then if this body fill some other equal space total line. it will move in as little time through that plenum as it did Consequently, in order to understand the Philoso- previously through a vacuum, since by as much as the sub- pher’s argument, as the Commentator explains, we must tlety of the medium is increased by so much is the length take the whole as being one, that is we must take not of time decreased, and the more subtle the medium the only the resistance of the movable to the moving power, less it resists. But in those other movements where resis- but also the resistance of the medium through which the tance is offered by both the movable and the medium, the movement takes place, and again the resistance of any- quantity of time must be proportionate to the power of the thing else, so that we take the amount of retardation in mover as compared with the resistance of both movable the whole movement as being proportionate to the moving and medium together. Hence granted that the medium be power in comparison with the resisting movable, no mat- taken away altogether, or that it cease to hinder, it does ter in what way it resist, whether by itself or by reason of not follow that the movement is instantaneous, but that something extrinsic. For the movable must needs always the time is measured according only to the resistance of resist the mover somewhat, since mover and moved, agent the movable. Nor will there be any inconsistency if it and patient, as such, are opposed to one another. Now move in an equal time through a vacuum, and through a sometimes it is to be observed that the moved resists the space filled with the most subtle body imaginable, since mover by itself, either because it has a force inclining it to the greater the subtlety we ascribe to the medium the less a contrary movement, as appears in violent movements, or is it naturally inclined to retard the movement. Wherefore at least because it has a place contrary to the place which it is possible to imagine so great a subtlety, as will natu- is in the intention of the mover; and such like resistance rally retard the movement less than does the resistance of even heavenly bodies offer their movers. Sometimes the the movable, so that the resistance of the medium will add movable resists the power of the mover, by reason only no retardation to the movement. of something else and not by itself. This is seen in the It is therefore evident that although the medium of- natural movement of heavy and light things, because by fer no resistance to the glorified bodies, in so far as it is their very form they are inclined to such a movement: for possible for them to be in the same place with another the form is an impression of their generator, which is the body, nevertheless their movement will not be instanta- mover as regards heavy and light bodies. On the part of neous, because the movable body itself will resist the mo- matter we find no resistance, neither of a force inclining to tive power from the very fact that it has a determinate a contrary movement nor of a contrary place, since place place, as we have said in reference to the heavenly bodies. is not due to matter except in so far as the latter, being cir- Reply to Objection 3. Although the power of a glo- cumscribed by its dimensions, is perfected by its natural rified soul surpasses immeasurably the power of a non- form. Hence there can be no resistance save on the part glorified soul, it does not surpass it infinitely, because of the medium, and this resistance is connatural to their both powers are finite: hence it does not follow that it movement. Sometimes again the resistance results from causes instantaneous movement. And even if its power both, as may be seen in the movements of animals. were simply infinite, it would not follow that it causes Accordingly when in a movement there is no resis- an instantaneous movement, unless the resistance of the tance save on the part of the movable, as in the heavenly movable were overcome altogether. Now although the re- bodies, the time of the movement is measured according sistance of the movable to the mover, that results from to the proportion of the mover to the movable, and the opposition to such a movement by reason of its being in- Philosopher’s argument does not apply to these, since if clined to a contrary movement, can be altogether over- there be no medium at all their movement is still a move- come by a mover of infinite power, nevertheless the resis- ∗ The same applies to mathematical quantities: for instance the ratio 2 + 1 to 4 + 1 is not as 2 to 4. 3005 tance it offers through contrariety towards the place which it can nowise be moved instantaneously, however greater the mover intends by the movement cannot be overcome be the motive power. Now the glorified body will never altogether except by depriving it of its being in such and lose its corporeity, and therefore it will never be possible such a place or position. For just as white resists black by for it to be moved instantaneously. reason of whiteness, and all the more according as white- Reply to Objection 4. In the words of Augustine, the ness is the more distant from blackness, so a body resists speed is said to be equal because the excess of one over a certain place through having an opposite place and its the other is imperceptible, just as the time taken by the resistance is all the greater, according as the distance is whole movement is imperceptible. greater. Now it is impossible to take away from a body its Reply to Objection 5. Although after the resurrection being in some place or position, except one deprive it of the time which is the measure of the heaven’s movement its corporeity, by reason of which it requires a place or po- will be no more, there will nevertheless be time resulting sition: wherefore so long as it retains the nature of a body, from the before and after in any kind of movement. 3006 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 85 Of the Clarity of the Beatified Bodies (In Three Articles) We must now consider the clarity of the beatified bodies at the resurrection. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether there will be clarity in the glorified bodies? (2) Whether this clarity will be visible to the non-glorified eye? (3) Whether a glorified body will of necessity be seen by a non-glorified body? Whether clarity is becoming to the glorified body? Suppl. q. 85 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that clarity is unbecom- Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:43): “It is sown in ing to the glorified body. Because according to Avicenna dishonor, it shall rise in glory,” which refers to clarity, as (Natural. vi, 2), “every luminous body consists of trans- evidenced by the previous context where the glory of the parent parts.” But the parts of a glorified body will not rising bodies is compared to the clarity of the stars. There- be transparent, since in some of them, such as flesh and fore the bodies of the saints will be lightsome. bones, earth is predominant. Therefore glorified bodies I answer that, It is necessary to assert that after the are not lightsome. resurrection the bodies of the saints will be lightsome, Objection 2. Further, every lightsome body hides one on account of the authority of Scripture which makes this that is behind it; wherefore one luminary behind another promise. But the cause of this clarity is ascribed by some is eclipsed, and a flame of fire prevents one seeing what is to the fifth or heavenly essence, which will then predomi- behind it. But the glorified bodies will not hide that which nate in the human body. Since, however, this is absurd, as is within them, for as Gregory says on Job 28:17, “Gold we have often remarked (q. 84, a. 1), it is better to say that or crystal cannot equal it” (Moral. xviii, 48). “There,” that this clarity will result from the overflow of the soul’s glory is in the heavenly country, “the grossness of the members into the body. For whatever is received into anything is re- will not hide one’s mind from another’s eyes, and the very ceived not according to the mode of the source whence it harmony of the body will be evident to the bodily sight.” flows, but according to the mode of the recipient. Where- Therefore those bodies will not be lightsome. fore clarity which in the soul is spiritual is received into Objection 3. Further, light and color require a con- the body as corporeal. And consequently according to the trary disposition in their subject, since “light is the ex- greater clarity of the soul by reason of its greater merit, so treme point of visibility in an indeterminate body; color, too will the body differ in clarity, as the Apostle affirms in a determinate body” (De Sensu et Sensato iii). But glo- (1 Cor. 15:41). Thus in the glorified body the glory of the rified bodies will have color, for as Augustine says (De soul will be known, even as through a crystal is known the Civ. Dei xxii, 3), “the body’s beauty is harmony of parts color of a body contained in a crystal vessel, as Gregory with a certain charm of color”: and it will be impossible says on Job 28:17, “Gold or crystal cannot equal it.” for the glorified bodies to lack beauty. Therefore the glo- Reply to Objection 1. Avicenna is speaking of a body rified bodies will not be lightsome. that has clarity through the nature of its component parts. Objection 4. Further, if there be clarity in the glori- It is not thus but rather by merit of virtue that the glorified fied bodies, it will need to be equal in all the parts of the body will have clarity. body, just as all the parts will be equally impassible, subtle Reply to Objection 2. Gregory compares the glorified and agile. But this is not becoming, since one part has a body to gold on account of clarity, and to crystal on ac- greater disposition to clarity than another, for instance the count of its transparency. Wherefore seemingly we should eye than the hand, the spirits∗ than the bones, the humors say that they will be both transparent and lightsome; for than the flesh or nerves. Therefore it would seem unfitting that a lightsome body be not transparent is owing to the for those bodies to be lightsome. fact that the clarity of that body results from the density On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 13:43): “The just of the lightsome parts, and density is opposed to trans- shall shine as the sun in the kingdom of their Father,” and parency. Then, however, clarity will result from another (Wis. 3:7): “The just shall shine, and shall run to and fro cause, as stated above: and the density of the glorified like sparks among the reeds.” body will not deprive it of transparency, as neither does ∗ “Animalem,” as though it were derived from “animus”—the mind. Cf. Ia IIae, q. 50, a. 1,3m; Ia IIae, q. 52, a. 1 ,3m 3007 the density of a crystal deprive crystal. resulting from the soul’s glory. Thus we see bodies which Some, on the other hand, say that they are compared have color by their nature aglow with the resplendence of to crystal, not because they are transparent, but on account the sun, or from some other cause extrinsic or intrinsic. of this likeness, for as much as that which is enclosed in Reply to Objection 4. Even as the clarity of glory crystal is visible, so the glory of the soul enclosed in the will overflow from the soul into the body according to glorified body will not be hidden. But the first explana- the mode of the body, and is there otherwise than in the tion is better, because it safeguards better the dignity of soul, so again it will overflow into each part of the soul the glorified body, and is more consistent with the words according to the mode of that part. Hence it is not un- of Gregory. reasonable that the different parts should have clarity in Reply to Objection 3. The glory of the body will not different ways, according as they are differently disposed destroy nature but will perfect it. Wherefore the body will thereto by their nature. Nor is there any comparison with retain the color due to it by reason of the nature of its the other gifts of the body, for the various parts of the body component parts, but in addition to this it will have clarity are not differently disposed in their regard. Whether the clarity of the glorified body is visible to the non-glorified eye? Suppl. q. 85 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the clarity of the glo- I answer that, Some have asserted that the clarity of rified body is invisible to the non-glorified eye. For the the glorified body will not be visible to the non-glorified visible object should be proportionate to the sight. But a eye, except by a miracle. But this is impossible, unless non-glorified eye is not proportionate to see the clarity of this clarity were so named equivocally, because light by glory, since this differs generically from the clarity of na- its essence has a natural tendency to move the sight, and ture. Therefore the clarity of the glorified body will not sight by its essence has a natural tendency to perceive be seen by a non-glorified eye. light, even as the true is in relation to the intellect, and Objection 2. Further, the clarity of the glorified body the good to the appetite. Wherefore if there were a sight will be greater than the clarity of the sun is now, since altogether incapable of perceiving a light, either this sight the clarity of the sun also will then be greater than it is is so named equivocally, or else this light is. This cannot now, according to Is. 30:26, and the clarity of the glori- be said in the point at issue, because then nothing would fied body will be much greater still, for which reason the be made known to us when we are told that the glorified sun and the entire world will receive greater clarity. Now bodies will be lightsome: even so a person who says that a a non-glorified eye is unable to gaze on the very orb of the dog∗ is in the heavens conveys no knowledge to one who sun on account of the greatness of its clarity. Therefore knows no other dog than the animal. Hence we must say still less will it be able to gaze on the clarity of a glorified that the clarity of a glorified body is naturally visible to body. the non-glorified eye. Objection 3. Further, a visible object that is oppo- Reply to Objection 1. The clarity of glory will differ site the eyes of the seer must needs be seen, unless there generically from the clarity of nature, as to its cause, but be some lesion to the eye. But the clarity of a glorified not as to its species. Hence just as the clarity of nature is, body that is opposite to non-glorified eyes is not neces- by reason of its species, proportionate to the sight, so too sarily seen by them: which is evident in the case of the will the clarity of glory be. disciples who saw our Lord’s body after the resurrection, Reply to Objection 2. Just as a glorified body is not without witnessing its clarity. Therefore this clarity will passible to a passion of nature but only to a passion of the be invisible to a non-glorified eye. soul†, so in virtue of its property of glory it acts only by On the contrary, A gloss on Phil. 3:21, “Made like the action of the soul. Now intense clarity does not dis- to the body of His glory,” says: “It will be like the clar- turb the sight, in so far as it acts by the action of the soul, ity which He had in the Transfiguration.” Now this clarity for thus it rather gives delight, but it disturbs it in so far as was seen by the non-glorified eyes of the disciples. There-it acts by the action of nature by heating and destroying fore the clarity of the glorified body will be visible to non- the organ of sight, and by scattering the spirits‡ asunder. glorified eyes also. Hence, though the clarity of a glorified body surpasses the Further, the wicked will be tortured in the judgment clarity of the sun, it does not by its nature disturb the sight by seeing the glory of the just, according to Wis. 5:2. But but soothes it: wherefore this clarity is compared to the they would not fully see their glory unless they gazed on jasper-stone (Apoc. 21:11). their clarity. Therefore, etc. Reply to Objection 3. The clarity of the glorified ∗ The dog star † Cf. q. 82, a. 1 ‡ “Animalem,” as though it were derived from “animus”—the mind. Cf. Ia IIae, q. 50, a. 1 ,3m; Ia IIae, q. 52, a. 1,3m. 3008 body results from the merit of the will and therefore will the glorified body to show forth its clarity or to hide it: be subject to the will, so as to be seen or not seen accord- and this was the opinion of Praepositivus. ing to its command. Therefore it will be in the power of Whether a glorified body will be necessarily seen by a non-glorified body? Suppl. q. 85 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that a glorified body will thing through its acting or not acting on an external ob- be necessarily seen by a non-glorified body. For the glori- ject. Wherefore a glorified body may be seen or not seen fied bodies will be lightsome. Now a lightsome body re- without any property pertaining to its perfection being veals itself and other things. Therefore the glorified bod- changed. Consequently it will be in the power of a glo- ies will be seen of necessity. rified soul for its body to be seen or not seen, even as any Objection 2. Further, every body which hides other other action of the body will be in the soul’s power; else bodies that are behind it is necessarily perceived by the the glorified body would not be a perfectly obedient in- sight, from the very fact that the other things behind it are strument of its principal agent. hidden. Now the glorified body will hide other bodies that Reply to Objection 1. This clarity will be obedient are behind it from being seen, because it will be a colored to the glorified body so that this will be able to show it or body. Therefore it will be seen of necessity. hide it. Objection 3. Further, just as quantity is something Reply to Objection 2. A body’s color does not pre- in a body, so is the quality whereby a body is seen. Now vent its being transparent except in so far as it affects the quantity will not be subject to the will, so that the glorified sight, because the sight cannot be affected by two colors body be able to be of greater or smaller quantity. There- at the same time, so as to perceive them both perfectly. fore neither will the quality of visibility be subject to the But the color of the glorified body will be completely in will, so that a body be able not to be seen. the power of the soul, so that it can thereby act or not act On the contrary, our body will be glorified in being on the sight. Hence it will be in its power to hide or not to made like to the body of Christ after the resurrection. Now hide a body that is behind it. after the resurrection Christ’s body was not necessarily Reply to Objection 3. Quantity is inherent to the glo- seen; in fact it vanished from the sight of the disciples at rified body itself, nor would it be possible for the quantity Emmaus (Lk. 24:31). Therefore neither will the glorified to be altered at the soul’s bidding without the glorified body be necessarily seen. body suffering some alteration incompatible with its im- Further, there the body will be in complete obedience passibility. Hence there is no comparison between quan- to the will. Therefore as the soul lists the body will be tity and visibility, because even this quality whereby it is visible or invisible. visible cannot be removed at the soul’s bidding, but the ac- I answer that, A visible object is seen, inasmuch tion of that quality will be suspended, and thus the body as it acts on the sight. Now there is no change in a will be hidden at the soul’s command. 3009 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 86 Of the Conditions Under Which the Bodies of the Damned Will Rise Again (In Three Articles) We must next consider the conditions in which the bodies of the damned will rise again. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the bodies of the damned will rise again with their deformities? (2) Whether their bodies will be corruptible? (3) Whether they will be impassible? Whether the bodies of the damned will rise again with their deformities? Suppl. q. 86 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the bodies of the rise again whole. Another deformity arises from the un- damned will rise again with their deformities. For that due disposition of the parts, by reason of undue quantity, which was appointed as a punishment for sin should not quality, or place—which deformity is, moreover, incom- cease except the sin be forgiven. Now the lack of limbs patible with due proportion of parts to whole. Concerning that results from mutilation, as well as all other bodily de- these deformities and like defects such as fevers and simi- formities, are appointed as punishments for sin. Therefore lar ailments which sometimes result in deformity, Augus- these deformities will not be taken away from the damned, tine remained undecided and doubtful (Enchiridion xcii) seeing that they will not have received the forgiveness of as the Master remarks (Sent. iv, D, 44). Among modern their sins. masters, however, there are two opinions on this point. Objection 2. Further, just as the saints will rise again For some say that such like deformities and defects will to final happiness, so the wicked will rise again to final remain in the bodies of the damned, because they con- unhappiness. Now when the saints rise again nothing will sider that those who are damned are sentenced to utmost be taken from them that can pertain to their perfection, unhappiness wherefrom no affliction should be rebated. therefore nothing pertaining to the defect or unhappiness But this would seem unreasonable. For in the restoration of the wicked will be taken from them at the resurrection. of the rising body we look to its natural perfection rather But such are their deformities. Therefore, etc. than to its previous condition: wherefore those who die Objection 3. Further, just as deformity is a defect of under perfect age will rise again in the stature of youth, the passible body, so is slowness of movement. Now slow- as stated above (q. 81, a. 1). Consequently those who had ness of movement will not be taken from the bodies of the natural defects in the body, or deformities resulting there- damned at the resurrection, since their bodies will not be from, will be restored without those defects or deformities agile. Therefore for the same reason neither will their de- at the resurrection, unless the demerit of sin prevent; and formity be taken away. so if a person rise again with such defects and deformities, On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:52): “The this will be for his punishment. Now the mode of punish- dead shall rise again incorruptible”; where a gloss says: ment is according to the measure of guilt. And a sinner “The dead, i.e. sinners, or all the dead in general shall rise who is about to be damned may be burdened with less again incorruptible, i.e. without the loss of any limbs.” grievous sins and yet have deformities and defects which Therefore the wicked will rise again without their defor- one who is about to be damned has not, while burdened mities. with more grievous sins. Wherefore if he who had de- Further, there will be nothing in the damned to lessen formities in this life rise again with them, while the other the sense of pain. But sickness hinders the sense of pain who had them not in this life, and therefore, as is clear, by weakening the organ of sense, and in like manner the will rise again without them, though deserving of greater lack of a limb would prevent pain from affecting the whole punishment, the mode of the punishment would not cor- body. Therefore the damned will rise again without these respond to the amount of guilt; in fact it would seem that defects. a man is more punished on account of the pains which he I answer that, Deformity in the human body is of two suffered in this world; which is absurd. kinds. One arises from the lack of a limb: thus we say Hence others say with more reason, that He Who fash- that a mutilated person is deformed, because he lacks due ioned nature will wholly restore the body’s nature at the proportion of the parts to the whole. Deformities of this resurrection. Wherefore whatever defect or deformity was kind, without any doubt, will not be in the bodies of the in the body through corruption, or weakness of nature damned, since all bodies of both wicked and good will or of natural principles (for instance fever, purblindness, 3010 and so forth) will be entirely done away at the resurrec-Reply to Objection 2. There is no parity between the tion: whereas those defects in the human body which are good and the wicked, because a thing can be altogether the natural result of its natural principles, such as heavi- good, but not altogether evil. Hence the final happiness of ness, passibility, and the like, will be in the bodies of the the saints requires that they should be altogether exempt damned, while they will be removed from the bodies of from all evil; whereas the final unhappiness of the wicked the elect by the glory of the resurrection. will not exclude all good, because “if a thing be wholly Reply to Objection 1. Since in every tribunal pun- evil it destroys itself,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, ishment is inflicted according to the jurisdiction of the 5). Hence it is necessary for the good of their nature to un- tribunal, the punishments which in this temporal life are derlie the unhappiness of the damned, which good is the inflicted for some particular sin are themselves temporal, work of their perfect Creator, Who will restore that same and extend not beyond the term of this life. Hence al- nature to the perfection of its species. though the damned are not pardoned their sins, it does not Reply to Objection 3. Slowness of movement is one follow that there they will undergo the same punishments of those defects which are the natural result of the princi- as they have in this world: but the Divine justice demands ples of the human body; but deformity is not, and conse- that there they shall suffer more severe punishment for quently the comparison fails. eternity. Whether the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible? Suppl. q. 86 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the bodies of the which is corruptible on account of the nature of its princi- damned will be corruptible. For everything composed ples may be rendered incorruptible in two ways. First by of contraries must necessarily be corruptible. Now the the total removal of the principle which leads to corrup- bodies of the damned will be composed of the contraries tion, and in this way the bodies of the damned will be in- whereof they are composed even now, else they would not corruptible. For since the heaven is the first principle of al- be the same, neither specifically nor, in consequence, nu- teration in virtue of its local movement, and all other sec- merically. Therefore they will be corruptible. ondary agents act in virtue thereof and as though moved Objection 2. Further, if the bodies of the damned will thereby, it follows that at the cessation of the heavenly not be corruptible, this will be due either to nature, or to movement there is no longer any agent that can change the grace, or to glory. But it will not be by nature, since they body by altering it from its natural property. Wherefore will be of the same nature as now; nor will it be by grace or after the resurrection, and the cessation of the heavenly glory, since they will lack these things altogether. There- movement, there will be no quality capable of altering the fore they will be corruptible. human body from its natural quality. Now corruption, like Objection 3. Further, it would seem inconsistent to generation, is the term of alteration. Hence the bodies of withdraw the greatest of punishments from those who the damned will be incorruptible, and this will serve the are in the highest degree of unhappiness. Now death is purpose of Divine justice, since living for ever they will be the greatest of punishments, as the Philosopher declares punished for ever. This is in keeping with the demands of (Ethic. iii, 6). Therefore death should not be withdrawn Divine justice, as we shall state further on (a. 3), even as from the damned, since they are in the highest degree of now the corruptibility of bodies serves the purpose of Di- unhappiness. Therefore their bodies will be corruptible. vine providence, by which through the corruption of one On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 9:6): “In those thing another is generated. days men shall seek death, and shall not find it, and they Secondly, this happens through the principle of cor- shall desire to die, and death shall fly from them.” ruption being hindered, and in this way the body of Adam Further, the damned will be punished with an ever- was incorruptible, because the conflicting qualities that lasting punishment both in soul and body (Mat. 25:46): exist in man’s body were withheld by the grace of in- “These shall go into everlasting punishment.” But this nocence from conducing to the body’s dissolution: and would not be possible if their bodies were corruptible. much more will they be withheld in the glorified bodies, Therefore their bodies will be incorruptible. which will be wholly subject to the spirit. Thus after the I answer that, Since in every movement there must general resurrection the two aforesaid modes of incorrupt- needs be a principle of movement, movement or change ibility will be united together in the bodies of the blessed. may be withdrawn from a movable in two ways: first Reply to Objection 1. The contraries of which bodies through absence of a principle of movement, secondly are composed are conducive to corruption as secondary through an obstacle to the principle of movement. Now principles. For the first active principle thereof is the heav- corruption is a kind of change: and consequently a body enly movement: wherefore given the movement of the 3011 heaven, it is necessary for a body composed of contraries the increase of punishment. For as the Philosopher says to be corrupted unless some more powerful cause prevent (Ethic. ix, 9), “Life is pleasant to all, for all desire to it: whereas if the heavenly movement be withdrawn, the be. . . But we must not apply this to a wicked or corrupt contraries of which a body is composed do not suffice to life, nor one passed in sorrow.” Accordingly just as life is cause corruption, even in accordance with nature, as ex- simply pleasant, but not the life that is passed in sorrows, plained above. But the philosophers were ignorant of a so too death, which is the privation of life, is painful sim- cessation in the heavenly movement; and consequently ply, and the greatest of punishments, inasmuch as it de- they held that a body composed of contraries is without prives one of the primary good, namely being, with which fail corrupted in accordance with nature. other things are withdrawn. But in so far as it deprives Reply to Objection 2. This incorruptibility will result one of a wicked life, and of such as is passed in sorrow, from nature, not as though there were some principle of it is a remedy for pains, since it puts an end to them. and incorruption in the bodies of the damned, but on account consequently the withdrawal of death leads to the increase of the cessation of the active principle of corruption, as of punishments by making them everlasting. If however shown above. we say that death is penal by reason of the bodily pain Reply to Objection 3. Although death is simply the which the dying feel, without doubt the damned will con- greatest of punishments, yet nothing prevents death con- tinue to feel a far greater pain: wherefore they are said to ducing, in a certain respect, to a cessation of punishments; be in “everlasting death,” according to the Psalm (48:15): and consequently the removal of death may contribute to “Death shall feed upon them.” Whether the bodies of the damned will be impassible? Suppl. q. 86 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the bodies of the through excess of pain. Much more therefore if those bod- damned will be impassible. For, according to the Philoso- ies will be passible, the souls will be separate from the pher (Topic. vi), “increase of passion results in loss of bodies through excess of pain, and thus those bodies will substance.” Now “if a finite thing be continually less- be corrupted: which is false. Therefore those bodies will ened, it must needs at length be done away” (Phys. i, be impassible. 4). Therefore if the bodies of the damned will be passi- On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:52): “And ble, and will be ever suffering, they will at length be done we shall be changed”: and a gloss says: “We—the good away and corrupted: and this has been shown to be false alone—will be changed with the unchangeableness and (a. 2). Therefore they will be impassible. impassibility of glory.” Objection 2. Further, every agent likens the patient Further, even as the body co-operates with the soul in to itself. If then the bodies of the damned are passive to merit, so does it co-operate in sin. Now on account of the the fire the fire will liken them to itself. Now fire does former co-operation not only the soul but also the body not consume bodies except in so far as in likening them will be rewarded after the resurrection. Therefore in like to itself it disintegrates them. Therefore if the bodies of manner the bodies of the damned will be punished; which the damned will be passible they will at length be con- would not be the case were they impassible. Therefore sumed by the fire, and thus the same conclusion follows they will be passible. as before. I answer that, The principal cause of the bodies of Objection 3. Further, those animals, for instance the the damned not being consumed by fire will be the Di- salamander, which are said to remain living in fire without vine justice by which their bodies will be consigned to being destroyed, are not distressed by the fire: because an everlasting punishment. Now the Divine justice is served animal is not distressed by bodily pain, unless the body also by the natural disposition, whether on the part of the in some way is hurt thereby. If therefore the bodies of passive body or on the part of the active causes; for since the damned can, like the aforesaid animals, remain in the passiveness is a kind of receptiveness, there are two kinds fire without being corrupted, as Augustine asserts (De Civ. of passion, corresponding to two ways in which one thing Dei xxi, 2,4), it would seem that they will suffer no dis- is receptive of another. For a form may be received into tress there: which would not be the case unless their bod- a subject materially according to its natural being, just as ies were impassible. Therefore, etc. the air receives heat from fire materially; and correspond- Objection 4. Further, if the bodies of the damned ing to this manner of reception there is a kind of passion be passible, the pain resulting from their suffering, seem- which we call “passion of nature.” In another way one ingly, will surpass all present bodily pain, even as the joy thing is received into another spiritually by way of an “in- of the saints will surpass all present joy. Now in this life it tention,” just as the likeness of whiteness is received into sometimes happens that the soul is severed from the body the air and in the pupil: this reception is like that whereby 3012 the soul receives the likeness of things: wherefore cor-it is received, whereas it is spiritually in the pupil and in responding to this mode of reception is another mode of the transferring medium. And so it is in the case at issue, passion which we call “passion of the soul.” Since there- because the species which is in the fire materially is re- fore after the resurrection and the cessation of the heav- ceived spiritually into the bodies of the damned; thus it is enly movement it will be impossible for a body to be al- that the fire will assimilate the bodies of the damned to tered by its natural quality, as stated above (a. 2), it will itself, without consuming them withal. not be possible for any body to be passive with a passion Reply to Objection 3. According to the Philosopher of nature. Consequently as regards this mode of passion (De Prop. Element.), “no animal can live in fire.” Galen the bodies of the damned will be impassible even as they also (De simp. medic.) says “that there is no body which will be incorruptible. Yet after the heaven has ceased to at length is not consumed by fire”; although sometimes move, there will still remain the passion which is after the certain bodies may remain in fire without hurt, such as manner of the soul, since the air will both receive light ebony. The instance of the salamander is not altogether from the sun, and will convey the variety of colors to the apposite, since it cannot remain in the fire without being sight. Wherefore in respect of this mode of passion the at last consumed, as do the bodies of the damned in hell. bodies of the damned will be passible. But the glorified Nor does it follow that because the bodies of the damned bodies, albeit they receive something, and are in a man- suffer no corruption from the fire, they therefore are not ner patient to sensation, will nevertheless not be passive, tormented by the fire, because the sensible object has a since they will receive nothing to distress or hurt them, as natural aptitude to please or displease the senses, not only will the bodies of the damned, which for this reason are as regards its natural action of stimulating or injuring the said to be passible. organ, but also as regards its spiritual action: since when Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking of the sensible object is duly proportionate to the sense, it the passion whereby the patient is changed from its natu- pleases, whereas the contrary is the result when it is in ral disposition. But this kind of passion will not be in the excess or defect. Hence subdued colors and harmonious bodies of the damned, as stated above. sounds are pleasing, whereas discordant sounds displease Reply to Objection 2. The likeness of the agent is in the hearing. the patient in two ways. First, in the same way as in the Reply to Objection 4. Pain does not sever the soul agent, and thus it is in all univocal agents, for instance a from the body, in so far as it is confined to a power of the thing that is hot makes another thing hot, and fire gener- soul which feels the pain, but in so far as the passion of ates fire. Secondly, otherwise than in the agent, and thus the soul leads to the body being changed from its natural it is in all equivocal agents. In these it happens sometimes disposition. Thus it is that we see that through anger the that a form which is in the agent spiritually is received into body becomes heated, and through fear, chilled: whereas the patient materially: thus the form of the house built by after the resurrection it will be impossible for the body to the craftsman is materially in itself, but spiritually in the be changed from its natural disposition, as stated above mind of the craftsman. On the other hand, sometimes it is (a. 2). Consequently, however great the pain will be, it in the agent materially, but is received into the patient spir- will not sever the body from the soul. itually: thus whiteness is materially on the wall wherein 3013 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 87 Of the Knowledge Which, After Rising Again, Men Will Have at the Judgment Concerning Merits and Demerits (In Three Articles) In the next place we must treat of those things which follow the resurrection. The first of these to be considered will be the knowledge, which after rising again, men will have at the judgment, concerning merits and demerits; the second will be the general judgment itself, as also the time and place at which it will be; thirdly we shall consider who will judge and who will be judged; fourthly we shall treat of the form wherein the judge will come to judge; and fifthly we shall consider what will be after the judgment, the state of the world and of those who will have risen again. Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether at the judgment every man will know all his sins? (2) Whether every one will be able to read all that is on another’s conscience? (3) Whether one will be able at one glance to see all merits and demerits? Whether after the resurrection every one will know what sins he has committed? Suppl. q. 87 a. 1 Objection 1. It seems that after the resurrection every- will be to the good they once did as the blessed to the one will not be able to know all the sins he has committed. sins they once committed. Now seemingly the damned af- For whatever we know, either we receive it anew through ter rising again will have no knowledge of the good they the senses, or we draw it from the treasure house of the once did, since this would alleviate their pain consider- memory. Now after the resurrection men will be unable to ably. Neither therefore will the blessed have any knowl- perceive their sins by means of sense, because they will be edge of the sins they had committed. things of the past, while sense perceives only the present: On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx) and many sins will have escaped the sinner’s memory, and that “a kind of Divine energy will come to our aid, so that he will be unable to recall them from the treasure house we shall recall all of our sins to mind.” of his memory. Therefore after rising again one will not Further, as human judgment is to external evidence, so be cognizant of all the sins one has committed. is the Divine judgment to the witness of the conscience, Objection 2. Further, it is stated in the text (Sent. iv, according to 1 Kings 16:7, “Man seeth those things that D, 43), that “there are certain books of the conscience, appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart.” Now man can- wherein each one’s merits are inscribed.” Now one can- not pass a perfect judgment on a matter unless evidence not read a thing in a book, unless it be marked down in the be taken on all the points that need to be judged. There- book: and sin leaves its mark upon the conscience accord- fore, since the Divine judgment is most perfect, it is nec- ing to a gloss of Origen on Rom. 2:15, “Their conscience essary for the conscience to witness to everything that has bearing witness,” etc. which mark, seemingly, is nothing to be judged. But all works, both good and evil, will have else than the guilt or stain. Since then in many persons the to be judged (2 Cor. 5:10): “We must all be manifested guilt or stain of many sins is blotted out by grace, it would before the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may re- seem that one cannot read in one’s conscience all the sins ceive the proper things of the body, according as he hath one has committed: and thus the same conclusion follows done, whether it be good or evil.” Therefore each one’s as before. conscience must needs retain all the works he has done, Objection 3. Further, the greater the cause the greater whether good or evil. the effect. Now the cause which makes us grieve for the I answer that, According to Rom. 2:15,16, “In the sins which we recall to memory is charity. Since then day when God shall judge” each one’s conscience will charity is perfect in the saints after the resurrection, they bear witness to him and his thoughts will accuse and de- will grieve exceedingly for their sins, if they recall them to fend him. And since in every judicial hearing, the wit- memory: yet this is impossible, seeing that according to ness, the accuser, and the defendant need to be acquainted Apoc. 21:4, “Sorrow and mourning shall flee away from with the matter on which judgment has to be pronounced, them.”∗ Therefore they will not recall their own sins to and since at the general judgment all the works of men memory. will be submitted to judgment, it will behoove every man Objection 4. Further, at the resurrection the damned to be cognizant then of all his works. Wherefore each ∗ The quotation is from Is. 35:10. The text of the Apocalypse has: “Nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow shall be any more.” 3014 man’s conscience will be as a book containing his deeds In like manner those demerits which are not blotted out by on which judgment will be pronounced, even as in the repentance remain in the debt of punishment due to them, human court of law we make use of records. Of these while those which have been blotted out by repentance re- books it is written in the Apocalypse (20:12): “The books main in the remembrance of repentance, which they will were opened: and another book was opened, which is the recall together with their other merits. Hence in each man book of life; and the dead were judged by those things there will be something whereby he will be able to recol- which were written in the books [Vulg.: ‘book’], accord- lect his deeds. Nevertheless, as Augustine says (De Civ. ing to their works.” According to Augustine’s exposition Dei xx), the Divine energy will especially conduce to this. (De Civ. Dei xx) the books which are here said to be Reply to Objection 2. Each one’s conscience will opened “denote the saints of the New and Old Testaments bear certain marks of the deeds done by him; and it does in whom God’s commandments are exemplified.” Hence not follow that these marks are the guilt alone, as stated Richard of St. Victor (De judic. potest.) says: “Their above. hearts will be like the code of law.” But the book of life, Reply to Objection 3. Although charity is now the of which the text goes on to speak, signifies each one’s cause of sorrow for sin, yet the saints in heaven will be so conscience, which is said to be one single book, because full of joy, that they will have no room for sorrow; and so the one Divine power will cause all to recall their deeds, they will not grieve for their sins, but rather will they re- and this energy, in so far as it reminds a man of his deeds, joice in the Divine mercy, whereby their sins are forgiven is called the “book of life”†. Or else we may refer the them. Even so do the angels rejoice now in the Divine jus- first books to the conscience, and by the second book we tice whereby those whom they guard fall headlong into sin may understand the Judge’s sentence as expressed in His through being abandoned by grace. and whose salvation providence. none the less they eagerly watch over. Reply to Objection 1. Although many merits and de- Reply to Objection 4. The wicked will know all the merits will have escaped our memory, yet there will be good they have done, and this will not diminish their pain; none of them but will remain somewhat in its effect, be- indeed, it will increase it, because the greatest sorrow is cause those merits which are not deadened will remain in to have lost many goods: for which reason Boethius says the reward accorded to them, while those that are dead- (De Consol. ii) that “the greatest misfortune is to have ened remain in the guilt of ingratitude, which is increased been happy.” through the fact that a man sinned after receiving grace. Whether every one will be able to read all that is in another’s conscience? Suppl. q. 87 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that it will be impossible for be possible for every one to know all that is in another’s every one to read all that is in another’s conscience. For conscience. the knowledge of those who rise again will not be clearer Objection 3. Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xxxi than that of the angels, equality with whom is promised in Ep. ad Hebr.), as we have quoted before (Sent. iv, D, us after the resurrection (Mat. 22:30). Now angels cannot 17): “If thou remember thy sins now, and frequently con- read one another’s thoughts in matters dependent on the fess them before Cod and beg pardon for them, thou wilt free-will, wherefore they need to speak in order to notify very soon blot them out; but if thou forget them, thou wilt such things to one another∗. Therefore after rising again then remember them unwillingly, when they will be made we shall be unable to read what is contained in another’s public, and declared before all thy friends and foes, and conscience. in the presence of the holy angels.” Hence it follows that Objection 2. Further, whatever is known is known ei- this publication will be the punishment of man’s neglect ther in itself, or in its cause, or in its effect. Now the mer- in omitting to confess his sins. Therefore the sins which a its or demerits contained in a person’s conscience cannot man has confessed will not be made known to others. be known by another in themselves, because God alone Objection 4. Further, it is a relief to know that one has enters the heart and reads its secrets. Neither will it be had many associates in sin, so that one is less ashamed possible for them to be known in their cause, since all will thereof. If therefore every one were to know the sin of not see God Who alone can act on the will, whence mer- another, each sinner’s shame would be much diminished, its and demerits proceed. Nor again will it be possible to which is unlikely. Therefore every one will not know the know them from their effect, since there will be many de- sins of all. merits, which through being wholly blotted out by repen- On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 4:5, “will. . . bring tance will leave no effect remaining. Therefore it will not to light the hidden things of darkness,” says: “Deeds and † Cf. Ia, q. 24, a. 1, ad 1 ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 107 3015 thoughts both good and evil will then be revealed and eternal things being seen, all things in their consciences made known to all.” will be visible, especially as the Divine power will con- Further, the past sins of all the good will be equally duce to this so that the Judge’s sentence may appear just blotted out. Yet we know the sins of some saints, for in- to all. stance of Magdalen, Peter, and David. Therefore in like Reply to Objection 2. It will be possible for a man’s manner the sins of the other elect will be known, and merits or demerits to be made known by their effects as much more those of the damned. stated above (a. 1, ad 1), or by the power of God, although I answer that, At the last and general judgment it be- the power of the created intellect is not sufficient for this. hooves the Divine justice, which now is in many ways Reply to Objection 3. The manifestation of his sins hidden, to appear evidently to all. Now the sentence of to the confusion of the sinner is a result of his neglect in one who condemns or rewards cannot be just, unless it be omitting to confess them. But that the sins of the saints delivered according to merits and demerits. Therefore just be revealed cannot be to their confusion or shame, as nei- as it behooves both judge and jury to know the merits of a ther does it bring confusion to Mary Magdalen that her case, in order to deliver a just verdict, so is it necessary, in sins are publicly recalled in the Church, because shame is order that the sentence appear to be just, that all who know “fear of disgrace,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), the sentence should be acquainted with the merits. Hence, and this will be impossible in the blessed. But this man- since every one will know of his reward or condemnation, ifestation will bring them great glory on account of the so will every one else know of it, and consequently as penance they did, even as the confessor hails a man who each one will recall his own merits or demerits, so will he courageously confesses great crimes. Sins are said to be be cognizant of those of others. This is the more probable blotted out because God sees them not for the purpose of and more common opinion, although the Master (Sent. iv, punishing them. D, 43) says the contrary, namely that a man’s sins blot- Reply to Objection 4. The sinner’s confusion will ted out by repentance will not be made known to others at not be diminished, but on the contrary increased, through the judgment. But it would follow from this that neither his seeing the sins of others, for in seeing that others are would his repentance for these sins be perfectly known, blameworthy he will all the more acknowledge himself to which would detract considerably from the glory of the be blamed. For that confusion be diminished by a cause of saints and the praise due to God for having so mercifully this kind is owing to the fact that shame regards the esteem delivered them. of men, who esteem more lightly that which is customary. Reply to Objection 1. All the preceding merits or But then confusion will regard the esteem of God, which demerits will come to a certain amount in the glory or un- weighs every sin according to the truth, whether it be the happiness of each one rising again. Consequently through sin of one man or of many. Whether all merits and demerits, one’s own as well as those of others, will be seen by Suppl. q. 87 a. 3 anyone at a single glance? Objection 1. It would seem that not all merits and de- the same time. Therefore neither will the damned be able merits, one’s own as well as those of others, will be seen then to see all their deeds at the same time. by anyone at a single glance. For things considered singly On the contrary, A gloss on Job 8:22, “They. . . shall are not seen at one glance. Now the damned will consider be clothed with confusion,” says: “As soon as they shall their sins singly and will bewail them, wherefore they say see the Judge, all their evil deeds will stand before their (Wis. 5:8): “What hath pride profited us?” Therefore they eyes.” Now they will see the Judge suddenly. Therefore will not see them all at a glance. in like manner will they see the evil they have done, and Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii) for the same reason all others. that “we do not arrive at understanding several things at Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx) considers it un- the same time.” Now merits and demerits, both our own fitting that at the judgment a material book should be read and those of others, will not be visible save to the intellect. containing the deeds of each individual written therein, for Therefore it will be impossible for them all to be seen at the reason that it would be impossible to measure the size the same time. of such a book, or the time it would take to read. But in Objection 3. Further, the intellect of the damned after like manner it would be impossible to estimate the length the resurrection will not be clearer than the intellect of the of time one would require in order to consider all one’s blessed and of the angels is now, as to the natural knowl- merits and demerits and those of others, if one saw these edge whereby they know things by innate species. Now various things one after the other. Therefore we must ad- by such knowledge the angels do not see several things at mit that each one sees them all at the same time. 3016 I answer that, There are two opinions on this ques-single one at the same time. But neither does this seem tion. For some say that one will see all merits and de- consonant with the words of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx), merits, both one’s own and those of others, at the same who says that they will count them all with one glance of time in an instant. This is easily credible with regard to the mind; and what is known generically is not counted. the blessed, since they will see all things in the Word: and Hence we may choose a middle way, by holding that they consequently it is not unreasonable that they should see will consider each sin not instantaneously, but in a very several things at the same time. But with regard to the short time, the Divine power coming to their aid. This damned, a difficulty presents itself, since their intellect agrees with the saying of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx) that is not raised so that they can see God and all else in Him. “they will be discerned with wondrous rapidity.” Nor is Wherefore others say that the wicked will see all their sins this impossible, since in a space of time, however short, is and those of others generically at the same time: and this potentially an infinite number of instants. This suffices for suffices for the accusation or absolution necessary for the the replies to the objections on either side of the question. judgment; but that they will not see them all down to each 3017 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 88 Of the General Judgment, As to the Time and Place at Which It Will Be (In Four Articles) We must next consider the general judgment, as to the time and place at which it will be. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there will be a general judgment? (2) Whether as regards the debate it will be conducted by word of mouth? (3) Whether it will take place at an unknown time? (4) Whether it will take place in the valley of Josaphat? Whether there will be a general judgment? Suppl. q. 88 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there will not be a this it is written (Jn. 5:17): “My Father worketh until general judgment. For according to Nahum 1:9, follow- now; and I work.” Hence we distinguish in Him a twofold ing the Septuagint version, “God will not judge the same judgment, but in the reverse order. One corresponds to thing a second time.” But God judges now of mans’ every the work of governance which cannot be without judg- work, by assigning punishments and rewards to each one ment: and by this judgment each one is judged individu- after death, and also by rewarding and punishing certain ally according to his works, not only as adapted to him- ones in this life for their good or evil deeds. Therefore it self, but also as adapted to the government of the universe. would seem that there will be no other judgment. Hence one man’s reward is delayed for the good of others Objection 2. Further, in no judicial inquiry is the sen- (Heb. 11:13,39,40), and the punishment of one conduces tence carried cut before judgment is pronounced. But the to the profit of another. Consequently it is necessary that sentence of the Divine judgment on man regards the ac- there should be another, and that a general judgment cor- quisition of the kingdom or exclusion from the kingdom responding on the other hand with the first formation of (Mat. 25:34,41). Therefore since some obtain possession things in being, in order that, to wit, just as then all things of the kingdom now, and some are excluded from it for proceeded immediately from God, so at length the world ever, it would seem that there will be no other judgment. will receive its ultimate complement, by each one receiv- Objection 3. Further, the reason why certain things ing finally his own personal due. Hence at this judgment are submitted to judgment is that we may come to a de- the Divine justice will be made manifest in all things, cision about them. Now before the end of the world each whereas now it remains hidden, for as much as at times of the damned is awarded his damnation, and each of the some persons are dealt with for the profit of others, oth- blessed his beatitude. Therefore, etc. erwise than their manifest works would seem to require. On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 12:41): “The men For this same reason there will then be a general separa- of Nineve shall rise in judgment with this generation, and tion of the good from the wicked, because there will be shall condemn it.” Therefore there will be a judgment af- no further motive for the good to profit by the wicked, or ter the resurrection. the wicked by the good: for the sake of which profit the Further, it is written (Jn. 5:29): “They that have done good are meanwhile mingled with the wicked, so long as good things shall come forth unto the resurrection of life, this state of life is governed by Divine providence. but they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of judg- Reply to Objection 1. Each man is both an individual ment.” Therefore it would seem that after the resurrection person and a part of the whole human race: wherefore a there will be a judgment. twofold judgment is due to him. One, the particular judg- I answer that, Just as operation refers to the begin- ment, is that to which he will be subjected after death, ning wherefrom things receive their being, so judgment when he will receive according as he hath done in the belongs to the term, wherein they are brought to their end. body∗, not indeed entirely but only in part since he will Now we distinguish a twofold operation in God. One is receive not in the body but only in the soul. The other that whereby He first gave things their being, by fashion- judgment will be passed on him as a part of the human ing their nature and by establishing the distinctions which race: thus a man is said to be judged according to hu- contribute to the perfection thereof: from this work God man justice, even when judgment is pronounced on the is stated to have rested (Gn. 2:2). His other operation community of which he is a part. Hence at the general is that whereby He works in governing creatures; and of judgment of the whole human race by the general sepa- ∗ Cf. 2 Cor. 5:10 3018 ration of the good from the wicked, it follows that each and from the completion of the number of the saints. The one will be judged. And yet God will not judge “the same wicked also will receive an increase of torment from the thing a second time,” since He will not inflict two punish- added punishment of the body and from the completion of ments for one sin, and the punishment which before the the number of damned to be punished, because the more judgment was not inflicted completely will be completed numerous those with whom they will burn, the more will at the last judgment, after which the wicked will be tor- they themselves burn. mented at the same time in body and soul. Reply to Objection 3. The general judgment will re- Reply to Objection 2. The sentence proper to this gard more directly the generality of men than each indi- general judgment is the general separation of the good vidual to be judged, as stated above. Wherefore although from the wicked, which will not precede this judgment. before that judgment each one will be certain of his con- Yet even now, as regards the particular sentence on each demnation or reward, he will not be cognizant of the con- individual, the judgment does not at once take full effect demnation or reward of everyone else. Hence the neces- since even the good will receive an increase of reward af- sity of the general judgment. ter the judgment, both from the added glory of the body Whether the judgment will take place by word of mouth? Suppl. q. 88 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that this judgment, as re- fending one another in the day when God shall judge the gards the inquiry and sentence, will take place by word of secrets of men.” Therefore seemingly, this sentence and mouth. For according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx) “it is the entire judgment will take place mentally. uncertain how many days this judgment will last.” But it I answer that, It is not possible to come to any certain would not be uncertain if the things we are told will take conclusion about the truth of this question. It is, however, place at the judgment were to be accomplished only in the the more probable opinion that the whole of this judg- mind. Therefore this judgment will take place by word of ment, whether as regards the inquiry, or as regards the mouth and not only in the mind. accusation of the wicked and the approval of the good or Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxvi): again as regards the sentence on both, will take place men- “Those at least will hear the words of the Judge, who have tally. For if the deeds of each individual were to be related confessed their faith in Him by words.” Now this cannot by word of mouth, this would require an inconceivable be understood as referring to the inner word, because thus length of time. Thus Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx) that all will hear the Judge’s words, since all the deeds of other “if we suppose the book, from the pages of which all will men will be known to all both good and wicked. There- be judged according to Apoc. 20, to be a material book, fore it seems that this judgment will take place by word of who will be able to conceive its size and length? or the mouth. length of time required for the reading of a book that con- Objection 3. Further, Christ will judge according to tains the entire life of every individual?” Nor is less time His human form, so as to be visible in the body to all. requisite for telling by word of mouth the deeds of each Therefore in like manner it seems that He will speak with individual, than for reading them if they were written in the voice of the body, so as to be heard by all. a material book. Hence, probably we should understand On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx) that the details set forth in Mat. 25 will be fulfilled not by that the book of life which is mentioned Apoc. 20:12,15 word of mouth but mentally. “is a kind of Divine energy enabling each one to remem- Reply to Objection 1. The reason why Augustine ber all his good or evil works, and to discern them with says that “it is uncertain how many days this judgment the gaze of the mind, with wondrous rapidity, his knowl- will last” is precisely because it is not certain whether it edge accusing or defending his conscience, so that all and will take place mentally or by word of mouth. For if it each will be judged at the same moment.” But if each were to take place by word of mouth, a considerable time one’s merits were discussed by word of mouth, all and would be necessary. but if mentally, it is possible for it to each could not be judged at the same moment. Therefore be accomplished in an instant. it would seem that this judgment will not take place by Reply to Objection 2. Even if the judgment is accom- word of mouth. plished solely in the mind, the saying of Gregory stands, Further, the sentence should correspond proportion- since though all will be cognizant of their own and of ately to the evidence. Now the evidence both of accu- others’ deeds, as a result of the Divine energy which the sation and of defense will be mental, according to Rom. Gospel describes as speech (Mat. 25:84-46), nevertheless 2:15,16, “Their conscience bearing witness to them, and those who have had the faith which they received through their thoughts between themselves accusing or also de- God’s words will be judged from those very words, for it 3019 is written (Rom. 2:12): “Whosoever have sinned in the so that the Judge may be recognized in the body by all, Law shall be judged by the Law.” Hence in a special way and it is possible for this to take place suddenly. But something will be said to those who had been believers, speech which is measured by time would require an im- which will not be said to unbelievers. mense length of time, if the judgment took place by word Reply to Objection 3. Christ will appear in body, of mouth. Whether the time of the future judgment is unknown? Suppl. q. 88 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the time of the future I answer that, God is the cause of things by His judgment is not unknown. For just as the holy Fathers knowledge†. Now He communicates both these things looked forward to the first coming, so do we look for- to His creatures, since He both endows some with the ward to the second. But the holy Fathers knew the time of power of action on others whereof they are the cause, and the first coming, as proved by the number of weeks men- bestows on some the knowledge of things. But in both tioned in Daniel 9: wherefore the Jews are reproached cases He reserves something to Himself, for He operates for not knowing the time of Christ’s coming (Lk. 12:56): certain things wherein no creature co-operates with Him, “You hypocrites, you know how to discern the face of the and again He knows certain things which are unknown to heaven and of the earth, but how is it that you do not dis- any mere creature. Now this should apply to none more cern this time?” Therefore it would seem that the time than to those things which are subject to the Divine power of the second coming when God will come to judgment alone, and in which no creature co-operates with Him. should also be certified to us. Such is the end of the world when the day of judgment Objection 2. Further, we arrive by means of signs at will come. For the world will come to an end by no cre- the knowledge of the things signified. Now many signs ated cause, even as it derived its existence immediately of the coming judgment are declared to us in Scripture from God. Wherefore the knowledge of the end of the (Mat. 24, Mk. 13, Lk. 21). Therefore we can arrive at the world is fittingly reserved to God. Indeed our Lord seems knowledge of that time. to assign this very reason when He said (Acts 1:7): “It Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:11): is not for you to know the times or moments which the “It is on us∗ that the ends of the world are come,” and (1 Father hath put in His own power,” as though He were to Jn. 2:18): “Little children, it is the last hour,” etc. Since say, “which are reserved to His power alone.” then it is a long time since these things were said, it would Reply to Objection 1. At His first coming Christ seem that now at least we can know that the last judgment came secretly according to Is. 45:15, “Verily Thou art is nigh. a hidden God, the God of Israel, the Saviour.” Hence, that Objection 4. Further, there is no need for the time He might be recognized by believers, it was necessary for of the judgment to be hidden, except that each one may the time to be fixed beforehand with certainty. On the be careful to prepare himself for judgment, being in ig- other hand, at the second coming, He will come openly, norance of the appointed time. Yet the same care would according to Ps. 49:3, “God shall come manifestly.” Con- still be necessary even were the time known for certain, sequently there can be no error affecting the knowledge of because each one is uncertain about the time of his death, His coming. Hence the comparison fails. of which Augustine says (Ep. ad Hesych. cxcix) that “as Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says, in his let- each one’s last day finds him, so will the world’s last day ter to Hesychius concerning the day of judgment (Ep. cx- find him.” Therefore there is no necessity for the time of cix), “the signs mentioned in the Gospels do not all refer the judgment to be uncertain. to the second advent which will happen at the end of the On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 13:32): “Of that world, but some of them belong to the time of the sack of day or hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven, Jerusalem, which is now a thing of the past, while some, in nor the Son, but the Father.” The Son, however, is said not fact many of them, refer to the advent whereby He comes to know in so far as He does not impart the knowledge to daily to the Church, whom He visits spiritually when He us. dwells in us by faith and love.” Moreover, the details men- Further, it is written (1 Thess. 5:2): “The day of the tioned in the Gospels and Epistles in connection with the Lord shall so come as a thief in the night.” Therefore last advent are not sufficient to enable us to determine the seemingly, as the coming of a thief in the night is alto- time of the judgment, for the trials that are foretold as an- gether uncertain, the day of the last judgment is altogether nouncing the proximity of Christ’s coming occurred even uncertain. at the time of the Early Church, in a degree sometimes ∗ ‘These things. . . are written for our correction, upon whom the ends of the world are come’ † Cf. Ia, q. 14, a. 8 3020 more sometimes less marked; so that even the days of the time. For they are not intended to indicate a short length apostles were called the last days (Acts 2:17) when Pe- of time, but to signify the last state of the world, which is ter expounded the saying of Joel 2:28, “It shall come to the last age of all, and it is not stated definitely how long pass in the last days,” etc., as referring to that time. Yet it this will last. Thus neither is fixed duration appointed to was already a long time since then: and sometimes there old age, which is the last age of man, since sometimes it is were more and sometimes less afflictions in the Church. seen to last as long as or even longer than all the previous Consequently it is impossible to decide after how long a ages, as Augustine remarks (Qq. 83, qu. lviii). Hence also time it will take place, nor fix the month, year, century, the Apostle (2 Thess. 2:2) disclaims the false signification or thousand years as Augustine says in the same book which some had given to his words, by believing that the (Ep. ad Hesych. cxcix). And even if we are to believe day of the Lord was already at hand. that at the end these calamities will be more frequent, it Reply to Objection 4. Notwithstanding the uncer- is impossible to fix what amount of such calamities will tainty of death, the uncertainty of the judgment conduces immediately precede the judgment day or the coming of to watchfulness in two ways. First, as regards the thing ig- Antichrist, since even at the time of the Early Church per- nored, since its delay is equal to the length of man’s life, secutions were so bitter, and the corruptions of error were so that on either side uncertainty provokes him to greater so numerous, that some looked forward to the coming of care. Secondly, for the reason that a man is careful not Antichrist as being near or imminent; as related in Euse- only of his own person, but also of his family, or of his bius’ History of the Church (vi, 7) and in Jerome’s book city or kingdom, or of the whole Church, the length of De Viris Illustribus lii. whose duration is not dependent on the length of man’s Reply to Objection 3. The statement, “It is the last life. And yet it behooves each of these to be so ordered hour” and similar expressions that are to be found in that the day of the Lord find us not unprepared. Scripture do not enable us to know the exact length of Whether the judgment will take place in the valley of Josaphat? Suppl. q. 88 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the judgment will looks the valley of Josaphat. Therefore He will come to not take place in the valley of Josaphat or in the surround- judge in the neighborhood of that place. ing locality. For at least it will be necessary for those to I answer that, We cannot know with any great cer- be judged to stand on the ground, and those alone to be tainty the manner in which this judgment will take place, raised aloft whose business it will be to judge. But the nor how men will gather together to the place of judgment; whole land of promise would not be able to contain the but it may be gathered from Scripture that in all probabil- multitude of those who are to be judged. Therefore it is ity He will descend in the neighborhood of Mount Olivet, impossible for the judgment to take place in the neighbor- even as He ascended from there, so as to show that He hood of that valley. who descends is the same as He who ascended. Objection 2. Further, to Christ in His human form Reply to Objection 1. A great multitude can be en- judgment is given that He may judge justly, since He was closed in a small space. And all that is required is that in judged unjustly in the court of Pilate, and bore the sen- the neighborhood of that locality there be a space, how- tence of an unjust judgment on Golgotha. Therefore these ever great, to contain the multitude of those who are to places would be more suitably appointed for the judg- be judged, provided that Christ can be seen thence since ment. being raised in the air, and shining with exceeding glory, Objection 3. Further, clouds result from the exhala- He will be visible from a great distance. tion of vapors. But then there will be no evaporation or Reply to Objection 2. Although through being sen- exhalation. Therefore it will be impossible for the just to tenced unjustly Christ merited His judiciary power, He be “taken up. . . in the clouds to meet Christ, into the air”: will not judge with the appearance of infirmity wherein and consequently it will be necessary for both good and He was judged unjustly, but under the appearance of glory wicked to be on the earth, so that a much larger place than wherein He ascended to the Father. Hence the place of His this valley will be required. ascension is more suitable to the judgment than the place On the contrary, It is written (Joel 3:2): “I will gather where He was condemned. together all nations and will bring them down into the val- Reply to Objection 3. In the opinion of some the ley of Josaphat, and I will plead with them there.” name of clouds is here given to certain condensations of Further, it is written (Acts 1:11): ”(This Jesus). . . shall the light shining from the bodies of the saints, and not to so come as you have seen Him going into heaven.” Now evaporations from earth and water. Or we may say that He ascended into heaven from Mount Olivet which over- those clouds will be produced by Divine power in order 3021 to show the parallel between His coming to judge and His Again the cloud on account of its refreshing influence ascension; so that He Who ascended in a cloud may come indicates the mercy of the Judge. to judgment in a cloud. 3022 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 89 Of Those Who Will Judge and of Those Who Will Be Judged at the General Judgment (In Eight Articles) We must next consider who will judge and who will be judged at the general judgment. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether any men will judge together with Christ? (2) Whether the judicial power corresponds to voluntary poverty? (3) Whether the angels also will judge? (4) Whether the demons will carry out the Judge’s sentence on the damned? (5) Whether all men will come up for judgment? (6) Whether any of the good will be judged? (7) Whether any of the wicked will be judged? (8) Whether the angels also will be judged? Whether any men will judge together with Christ? Suppl. q. 89 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that no men will judge to doing it. Wherefore those who will consent with Christ with Christ. For it is written (Jn. 5:22,23): “The Fa- the Judge, by approving His sentence, will be said to ther. . . hath given all judgment to the Son, that all men judge. In this sense it will belong to all the elect to judge: may honor the Son.” Therefore, etc. wherefore it is written (Wis. 3:7,8): “The just. . . shall Objection 2. Further, whoever judges has authority judge nations.” Thirdly, a person is said to judge asses- over that which he judges. Now those things about which sorially and by similitude, because he is like the judge in the coming judgment will have to be, such as human mer- that his seat∗ is raised above the others: and thus asses- its and demerits, are subject to Divine authority alone. sors are said to judge. Some say that the perfect to whom Therefore no one is competent to judge of those things. judiciary power is promised (Mat. 19:28) will judge in Objection 3. Further, this judgment will take place this sense, namely that they will be raised to the dignity not vocally but mentally. Now the publication of merits of assessors, because they will appear above others at the and demerits in the hearts of all men (which is like an judgment, and go forth “to meet Christ, into the air.” But accusation or approval), or the repayment of punishment this apparently does not suffice for the fulfilment of our and reward (which is like the pronouncement of the sen- Lord’s promise (Mat. 19:28): “You shall sit. . . judging,” tence) will be the work of God alone. Therefore none but for He would seem to make “judging” something addi- Christ Who is God will judge. tional to “sitting.” Hence there is a fourth way of judg- On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 19:28): “You ing, which will be competent to perfect men as containing also shall sit on twelve seats judging the twelve tribes of the decrees of Divine justice according to which men will Israel.” Therefore, etc. be judged: thus a book containing the law might be said Further, “The Lord will enter into judgment with the to judge: wherefore it is written (Apoc. 20:12): ”(Judg- ancients of His people” (Is. 3:14). Therefore it would ment took her seat†) and the books were opened.” Richard seem that others also will judge together with Christ. of St. Victor expounds this judging in this way (De ju- I answer that, To judge has several significations. dic. potest.), wherefore he says: “Those who persevere First it is used causally as it were, when we say it of that in Divine contemplation, who read every day the book of which proves that some person ought to be judged. In this wisdom, transcribe, so to speak, in their hearts whatever sense the expression is used of certain people in compari- they grasp by their clear insight of the truth”; and fur- son, in so far as some are shown to be deserving of judg- ther on: “What else are the hearts of those who judge, ment through being compared with others: for instance divinely instructed in all truth, but a codex of the law?” (Mat. 12:41): “The men of Nineve shall rise in judgment Since, however, judging denotes an action exercised on with this generation, and shall condemn it.” To rise in another person, it follows that, properly speaking, he is judgment thus is common to the good and the wicked. said to judge who pronounces judgment on another. But Secondly, the expression “to judge” is used equivalently, this happens in two ways. First, by his own authority: so to say; for consent to an action is considered equivalent and this belongs to the one who has dominion and power ∗ An “assessor” is one who “sits by” the judge. † The words in brackets are not in the Vulgate. Apoc. 20:4 we find: “I saw seats, and they sat upon them and judgment was given to them.” 3023 over others, and to whose ruling those who are judged signifies that they open their hearts to the gaze of all those are subject, wherefore it belongs to him to pass judgment who are below them, and that they reveal their knowledge on them. In this sense to judge belongs to God alone. in whatever pertains to the judgment.” Secondly, to judge is to acquaint others of the sentence Reply to Objection 1. This objection considers the delivered by another’s authority, that is to announce the judgment of authority which belongs to Christ alone: and verdict already given. In this way perfect men will judge, the same answer applies to the Second Objection. because they will lead others to the knowledge of Divine Reply to Objection 3. There is no reason why some justice, that these may know what is due to them on ac- of the saints should not reveal certain things to others, ei- count of their merits: so that this very revelation of justice ther by way of enlightenment, as the higher angels en- is called judgment. Hence Richard of St. Victor says (De lighten the lower∗,: or by way of speech as the lower an- judic. potest.) that for “the judges to open the books of gels speak to the higher†. their decree in the presence of those who are to be judged Whether the judicial power corresponds to voluntary poverty? Suppl. q. 89 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the judicial power not the wicked, and He giveth judgment to the poor.” does not correspond to voluntary poverty. For it was Further, a gloss on Mat. 19:28, “You who have left all promised to none but the twelve apostles (Mat. 19:28): things’§” says: “Those who left all things and followed “You shall sit on twelve seats, judging,” etc. Since then God will be the judges; those who made right use of what those who are voluntarily poor are not all apostles, it they had lawfully will be judged,” and thus the same con- would seem that the judicial power is not competent to clusion follows as before. all. I answer that, The judicial power is due especially Objection 2. Further, to offer sacrifice to God of one’s to poverty on three counts. First, by reason of congruity, own body is more than to do so of outward things. Now since voluntary poverty belongs to those who despise all martyrs and also virgins offer sacrifice to God of their the things of the world and cleave to Christ alone. Conse- own body. whereas the voluntarily poor offer sacrifice quently there is nothing in them to turn away their judg- of outward things. Therefore the sublimity of the judicial ment from justice, so that they are rendered competent power is more in keeping with martyrs and virgins than to be judges as loving the truth of justice above all things. with those who are voluntarily poor. Secondly, by reason of merit, since exaltation corresponds Objection 3. Further, it is written (Jn. 5:45): “There by way of merit to humility. Now of all the things that is one that accuseth you, Moses in whom you trust— make man contemptible in this world humility is the chief: because you believe not his voice,” according to a gloss, and for this reason the excellence of judicial power is and (Jn. 12:48): “The word that I have spoken shall judge promised to the poor, so that he who humbles himself for him in the last day.” Therefore the fact that a man pro- Christ’s sake shall be exalted. Thirdly, because poverty pounds a law, or exhorts men by word to lead a good life, disposes a man to the aforesaid manner of judging. For gives him the right to judge those who scorn his utter- the reason why one of the saints will be said to judge as ances. But this belongs to doctors. Therefore it is more stated above¶, is that he will have the heart instructed in competent to doctors than to those who are poor voluntar- all Divine truth which he will be thus able to make known ily. to others. Now in the advancement to perfection, the first Objection 4. Further, Christ through being judged un- thing that occurs to be renounced is external wealth, be- justly merited as man to be judge of all in His human na- cause this is the last thing of all to be acquired. And ture‡, according to Jn. 5:27, “He hath given Him power to that which is last in the order of generation is the first in do judgment, because He is the Son of man.” Now those the order of destruction: wherefore among the beatitudes who suffer persecution for justice’ sake are judged un- whereby we advance to perfection, the first place is given justly. Therefore the judicial power is competent to them to poverty. Thus judicial power corresponds to poverty, in rather than to the voluntarily poor. so far as this is the disposition to the aforesaid perfection. Objection 5. Further, a superior is not judged by his Hence also it is that this same power is not promised to all inferior. Now many who will have made lawful use of who are voluntarily poor, but to those who leave all and riches will have greater merit than many of the voluntarily follow Christ in accordance with the perfection of life. poor. Therefore the voluntarily poor will not judge where Reply to Objection 1. According to Augustine (De those are to be judged. Civ. Dei xx), “we must not imagine that because He says On the contrary, It is written (Job 36:6): “He saveth that they will sit on twelve seats only twelve men will ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 106 † Cf. Ia, q. 107, a. 2 ‡ Cf. IIIa, q. 59, a. 6 § Vulg.: ‘You who have followed Me’ ¶ Cf. a. 1 3024 judge with Him. else since we read that Matthias was sense, because others will be judged in reference to the appointed apostle in the place of the traitor Judas, Paul words he has uttered or propounded. Hence the judicial who worked more than the rest will have nowhere to sit as power does not properly correspond to preaching or teach- judge.” Hence “the number twelve,” as he states (De Civ. ing. or we may reply that, as some say, three things are Dei xx), “signifies the whole multitude of those who will requisite for the judicial power; first, that one renounce judge, because the two parts of seven, namely three and temporal cares, lest the mind be hindered from the con- four, being multiplied together make twelve.” Moreover templation of wisdom; secondly that one possess Divine twelve is a perfect number, being the double of six, which justice by way of habit both as to knowledge and as to is a perfect number. observance; thirdly that one should have taught others Or, speaking literally, He spoke to the twelve apostles this same justice; and this teaching will be the perfection in whose person he made this promise to all who follow whereby a man merits to have judicial power. them. Reply to Objection 4. Christ humbled Himself in that Reply to Objection 2. Virginity and martyrdom do He was judged unjustly; for “He was offered because it not dispose man to retain the precepts of Divine justice was His own will” (Is. 53:7): and by His humility He in his heart in the same degree as poverty does: even merited His exaltation to judicial power, since all things so, on the other hand, outward riches choke the word of are made subject to Him (Phil. 2:8,9). Hence, judicial God by the cares which they entail (Lk. 8:14). Or we power is more due to them who humble themselves of may reply that poverty does not suffice alone to merit ju- their own will by renouncing temporal goods, on account dicial power, but is the fundamental part of that perfec- of which men are honored by worldlings, than to those tion to which the judicial power corresponds. Wherefore who are humbled by others. among those things regarding perfection which follow af- Reply to Objection 5. An inferior cannot judge a su- ter poverty we may reckon both virginity and martyrdom perior by his own authority, but he can do so by the au- and all the works of perfection: yet they do not rank as thority of a superior, as in the case of a judge-delegate. high as poverty, since the beginning of a thing is its chief Hence it is not unfitting that it be granted to the poor as part. an accidental reward to judge others, even those who have Reply to Objection 3. He who propounded the law higher merit in respect of the essential reward. or urged men to good will judge, in the causal (Cf. a. 1) Whether the angels will judge? Suppl. q. 89 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels will judge. of the Judge and, according to Mat. 13:41: “The Son of For it is written (Mat. 25:31): “When the Son of man shall man shall send His angels and they shall gather out of come in His majesty, and all the angels with Him.” Now His kingdom all scandals.” Therefore the angels will not He is speaking of His coming to judgment. Therefore it judge. would seem that also the angels will judge. I answer that, The judge’s assessors must be con- Objection 2. Further, the orders of the angels take formed to the judge. Now judgment is ascribed to the their names from the offices which they fulfill. Now one Son of man because He will appear to all, both good and of the angelic orders is that of the Thrones, which would wicked, in His human nature, although the whole Trinity seem to pertain to the judicial power, since a throne is the will judge by authority. Consequently it behooves also “judicial bench, a royal seat, a professor’s chair”∗. There- the Judge’s assessors to have the human nature, so as to fore some of the angels will judge. be visible to all, both good and wicked. Hence it is not fit- Objection 3. Further, equality with the angels is ting for the angels to judge, although in a certain sense we promised the saints after this life (Mat. 22:30). If then may say that the angels will judge, namely by approving men will have this power of judging, much more will the the sentence†. angels have it. Reply to Objection 1. As a gloss on this passage ob- On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 5:27): “He hath serves, the angels will come with Christ, not to judge, but given Him power to judgment, because He is the Son of “as witnesses of men’s deeds because it was under their man.” But the angels have not the human nature in com- guardianship that men did well or ill.” mon with Him. Neither therefore do they share with Him Reply to Objection 2. The name of Thrones is given in the judicial power. to angels in reference to the judgment which God is ever Further, the same person is not judge and judge’s min- pronouncing, by governing all things with supreme jus- ister. Now in this judgment the angels will act as ministers tice: of which judgment angels are in a way the executors ∗ Cf. St. Isidore, Etym. vii, 5 † Cf. a. 1 3025 and promulgators. On the other hand, the judgment of nothing hinders an accidental reward from being bestowed men by the man Christ will require human assessors. on men to the exclusion of the angels, as in the case of the Reply to Objection 3. Equality with angels is virgins’ and martyrs’ crowns: and the same may be said promised to men as regards the essential reward. But of the judicial power. Whether the demons will carry out the sentence of the Judge on the damned? Suppl. q. 89 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the demons will not Nor does this in any way diminish the punishment of the carry out the sentence of the Judge on the damned after demons, since even in torturing others they are themselves the day of judgment. For, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. tortured, because then the fellowship of the unhappy will 15:24): “He will then bring to naught∗ all principality, and not lessen but will increase unhappiness. power, and virtue.” Therefore all supremacy will cease Reply to Objection 1. The supremacy which, it is de- then. But the carrying out of the Judge’s sentence implies clared, will be brought to nought by Christ in the time to some kind of supremacy. Therefore after the judgment come must be taken in the sense of the supremacy which day the demons will not carry out the Judge’s sentence. is in keeping with the state of this world: wherein men Objection 2. Further, the demons sinned more are placed over men, angels over men, angels over angels, grievously than men. Therefore it is not just that men demons over demons, and demons over men; in every case should be tortured by demons. so as either to lead towards the end or to lead astray from Objection 3. Further, just as the demons suggest evil the end. But then when all things will have attained to that things to men, so good angels suggest good things. Now end there will be no supremacy to lead astray from the end it will not be the duty of the good angels to reward the or to lead to it, but only that which maintains in the end, good, but this will be done by God, immediately by Him- good or evil. self. Therefore neither will it be the duty of the demons to Reply to Objection 2. Although the demerit of the punish the wicked. demons does not require that they be placed over men, On the contrary, Sinners have subjected themselves since they made men subject to them unjustly, yet this is to the devil by sinning. Therefore it is just that they should required by the order of their nature in relation to human be subjected to him in their punishments, and punished by nature: since “natural goods remain in them unimpaired” him as it were. as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). I answer that, The Master in the text of Sentent. iv, D, Reply to Objection 3. The good angels are not the 47 mentions two opinions on this question, both of which cause of the principal reward in the elect, because all re- seem consistent with Divine justice, because it is just for ceive this immediately from God. Nevertheless the an- man to be subjected to the devil for having sinned, and gels are the cause of certain accidental rewards in men, in yet it is unjust for the demon to be over him. Accordingly so far as the higher angels enlighten those beneath them, the opinion which holds that after the judgment day the both angels and men, concerning certain hidden things of demons will not be placed over men to punish them, re- God, which do not belong to the essence of beatitude. In gards the order of Divine justice on the part of the demons like manner the damned will receive their principal pun- punishing; while the contrary opinion regards the order of ishment immediately from God, namely the everlasting Divine justice on the part of the men punished. banishment from the Divine vision: but there is no reason Which of these opinions is nearer the truth we cannot why the demons should not torture men with other sensi- know for certain. Yet I think it truer to say that just as, ble punishments. There is, however, this difference: that among the saved, order will be observed so that some will merit exalts, whereas sin debases. Wherefore since the be enlightened and perfected by others (because all the or- angelic nature is higher than the human, some on account ders of the heavenly hierarchies will continue for ever)†, of the excellence of their merit will be so far exalted as to so, too, will order be observed in punishments, men being be raised above the angels both in nature and rewards‡, so punished by demons, lest the Divine order, whereby the that some angels will be enlightened by some men. On the angels are placed between the human nature and the Di- other hand, no human sinners will, on account of a certain vine, be entirely set aside. Wherefore just as the Divine degree of virtue, attain to the eminence that attaches to the illuminations are conveyed to men by the good angels, so nature of the demons. too the demons execute the Divine justice on the wicked. ∗ Vulg.: ‘When He shall have brought to naught’, etc. † Cf. Ia, q. 108, Aa. 7,8 ‡ Cf. Ia, q. 108, a. 8 3026 Whether all men will be present at the judgment? Suppl. q. 89 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that men will not all be showed forth in His passion. Now in His passion He shed present at the judgment. For it is written (Mat. 19:28): His blood for all in point of sufficiency, although through “You. . . shall sit on twelve seats, judging the twelve tribes meeting with an obstacle in some, it had not its effect in of Israel.” But all men do not belong to those twelve all. Therefore it is fitting that all men should assemble at tribes. Therefore it would seem that men will not all be the judgment, to see His exaltation in His human nature, present at the judgment. in respect of which “He was appointed by God to be judge Objection 2. Further, the same apparently is to be of the living and of the dead.” gathered from Ps. 1:5, “The wicked shall not rise again in Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Civ. judgment.” Dei xx, 5), “it does not follow from the saying, ‘Judging Objection 3. Further, a man is brought to judgment the twelve tribes of Israel,’ that the tribe of Levi, which is that his merits may be discussed. But some there are who the thirteenth, is not to be judged, or that they will judge have acquired no merits, such as children who died be- that people alone, and not other nations.” The reason why fore reaching the perfect age. Therefore they need not be all other nations are denoted by the twelve tribes is be- present at the judgment. Now there are many such. There- cause they were called by Christ to take the place of the fore it would seem that not all will be present. twelve tribes. On the contrary, It is written (Acts 10:42) that Christ Reply to Objection 2. The words, “The wicked shall “was appointed by God to be judge of the living and of not rise in judgment,” if referred to all sinners, mean that the dead.” Now this division comprises all men, no mat- they will not arise to judge. But if the wicked denote un- ter how the living be distinct from the dead. Therefore all believers, the sense is that they will not arise to be judged, men will be present at the judgment. because they are “already judged” (Jn. 3:18). All, how- Further, it is written (Apoc. 1:7): “Behold He cometh ever, will rise again to assemble at the judgment and wit- with the clouds, and every eye shall see Him.” Now this ness the glory of the Judge. would not be so unless all were present at the judgment. Reply to Objection 3. Even children who have died Therefore, etc. before reaching the perfect age will be present at the judg- I answer that, The judicial power was bestowed on ment, not to be judged, but to see the Judge’s glory. Christ as man, in reward for the humility which He Whether the good will be judged at the judgment? Suppl. q. 89 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that none of the good will every one may receive the proper things of the body, ac- be judged at the judgment. For it is declared (Jn. 3:18) cording as he hath done, whether it be good or evil.” Now that “he that believeth in Him is not judged.” Now all the there is nothing else to be judged. Therefore all, even the good believed in Him. Therefore they will not be judged. good, will be judged. Objection 2. Further, those who are uncertain of their Further, the “general” includes all. Now this is called bliss are not blessed: whence Augustine proves (Gen. ad the general judgment. Therefore all will be judged. lit. xi) that the demons were never blessed. But the saints I answer that, The judgment comprises two things, are now blessed. Therefore they are certain of their bliss. namely the discussion of merits and the payment of re- Now what is certain is not submitted to judgment. There- wards. As regards the payment of rewards, all will be fore the good will not be judged. judged, even the good, since the Divine sentence will ap- Objection 3. Further, fear is incompatible with bliss. point to each one the reward corresponding to his merit. But the last judgment, which above all is described as ter- But there is no discussion of merits save where good and rible, cannot take place without inspiring fear into those evil merits are mingled together. Now those who build on who are to be judged. Hence Gregory observes on Job the foundation of faith, “gold, silver, and precious stones” 41:16 “When he shall raise him up, the angels shall fear,” (1 Cor. 3:12), by devoting themselves wholly to the Di- etc. (Moral. xxxiv): “Consider how the conscience of the vine service, and who have no notable admixture of evil wicked will then be troubled when even the just are dis- merit, are not subjected to a discussion of their merits. turbed about their life.” Therefore the blessed will not be Such are those who have entirely renounced the things of judged. the world and are solicitously thoughtful of the things that On the contrary, It would seem that all the good will are of God: wherefore they will be saved but will not be be judged, since it is written (2 Cor. 5:10): “We must judged. Others, however, build on the foundation of faith, all be manifested before the judgment seat of Christ, that 3027 wood, hay, stubble∗; they, in fact, love worldly things and discussed, not to remove the uncertainty of their beatitude are busy about earthly concerns, yet so as to prefer noth- from the hearts of those who are to be judged, but that it ing to Christ, but strive to redeem their sins with alms, and may be made manifest to us that their good merits out- these have an admixture of good with evil merits. Hence weigh their evil merits, and thus God’s justice be proved. they are subjected to a discussion of their merits, and con- Reply to Objection 3. Gregory is speaking of the just sequently in this account will be judged, and yet they will who will still be in mortal flesh, wherefore he had already be saved. said: “Those who will still be in the body, although al- Reply to Objection 1. Since punishment is the effect ready brave and perfect, yet through being still in the flesh of justice, while reward is the effect of mercy, it follows must needs be troubled with fear in the midst of such a that punishment is more especially ascribed antonomasti- whirlwind of terror.” Hence it is clear that this fear refers cally to judgment which is the act of justice; so that judg- to the time immediately before the judgment, most terri- ment is sometimes used to express condemnation. It is ble indeed to the wicked, but not to the good, who will thus that we are to understand the words quoted, as a gloss have no apprehension of evil. on the passage remarks. The arguments in the contrary sense consider judg- Reply to Objection 2. The merits of the elect will be ment as regards the payment of rewards. Whether the wicked will be judged? Suppl. q. 89 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that none of the wicked foundation of faith remains, have at least a praiseworthy will be judged. For even as damnation is certain in the act of faith, which though it is not meritorious without case of unbelievers, so is it in the case of those who die charity, yet is in itself directed to merit, and consequently in mortal sin. Now it is declared because of the certainty they will be subjected to the discussion of merits. Conse- of damnation (Jn. 3:18): “He that believeth not is already quently, believers who were at least counted as citizens of judged.” Therefore in like manner neither will other sin- the City of God will be judged as citizens, and sentence ners be judged. of death will not be passed on them without a discussion Objection 2. Further, the voice of the Judge is most of their merits; whereas unbelievers will be condemned as terrible to those who are condemned by His judgment. foes, who are wont among men to be exterminated with- Now according to the text of Sentent. iv, D, 47 and in out their merits being discussed. the words of Gregory (Moral. xxvi) “the Judge will not Reply to Objection 1. Although it is certain that those address Himself to unbelievers.” If therefore He were to who die in mortal sin will be damned, nevertheless since address Himself to the believers about to be condemned, they have an admixture of certain things connected with the unbelievers would reap a benefit from their unbelief, meriting well, it behooves, for the manifestation of Divine which is absurd. justice, that their merits be subjected to discussion, in or- On the contrary, It would seem that all the wicked are der to make it clear that they are justly banished from the to be judged, because all the wicked will be sentenced to city of the saints, of which they appeared outwardly to be punishment according to the degree of their guilt. But this citizens. cannot be done without a judicial pronouncement. There- Reply to Objection 2. Considered under this special fore all the wicked will be judged. aspect the words addressed to the believers about to be I answer that, The judgment as regards the sentencing condemned will not be terrible, because they will reveal to punishment for sin concerns all the wicked. whereas in them certain things pleasing to them, which it will be the judgment as regards the discussion of merits concerns impossible to find in unbelievers, since “without faith it is only believers. Because in unbelievers the foundation of impossible to please God” (Heb. 11:6). But the sentence faith is lacking, without which all subsequent works are of condemnation which will be passed on them all will be deprived of the perfection of a right intention, so that in terrible to all of them. them there is no admixture of good and evil works or The argument in the contrary sense considered the merits requiring discussion. But believers in whom the judgment of retribution. ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 89, a. 2 3028 Whether at the coming judgment the angels will be judged? Suppl. q. 89 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels will be concerns either the good or the wicked angels, since nei- judged at the coming judgment. For it is written (1 Cor. ther is any evil to be found in the good angels, nor is any 6:3): “Know you not that we shall judge angels?” But this good liable to judgment to be found in the wicked an- cannot refer to the state of the present time. Therefore it gels. But if we speak of the judgment of retribution, we should refer to the judgment to come. must distinguish a twofold retribution. One corresponds Objection 2. Further, it is written concerning Behe- to the angels’ personal merits and was made to both from moth or Leviathan, whereby the devil is signified (Job the beginning when some were raised to bliss, and others 40:28): “In the sight of all he shall be cast down”; and plunged into the depths of woe. The other corresponds to (Mk. 1:24)∗ the demon cried out to Christ: “Why art Thou the merits, good or evil, procured through the angels, and come to destroy us before the time?” for, according to a this retribution will be made in the judgment to come, be- gloss, “the demons seeing our Lord on earth thought they cause the good angels will have an increased joy in the were to be judged forthwith.” Therefore it would seem salvation of those whom they have prompted to deeds that a final judgment is in store for them. of merit, while the wicked will have an increase of tor- Objection 3. Further, it is written (2 Pet. 2:4): ment through the manifold downfall of those whom they “God spared not the angels that sinned, but delivered them have incited to evil deeds. Consequently the judgment drawn down by infernal ropes to the lower hell, unto tor- will not regard the angels directly, neither as judging nor ments, to be reserved unto judgment.” Therefore it seems as judged, but only men; but it will regard the angels in- that the angels will be judged. directly somewhat, in so far as they were concerned in On the contrary, It is written (Nahum 1:9) according men’s deeds. to the Septuagint version: “God will not judge the same Reply to Objection 1. This saying of the Apostle thing a second time.” But the wicked angels are already refers to the judgment of comparison, because certain men judged, wherefore it is written (Jn. 16:11): “The prince will be found to be placed higher than the angels. of this world is already judged.” Therefore the angels will Reply to Objection 2. The demons will then be cast not be judged in the time to come. down in the sight of all because they will be imprisoned Further, goodness and wickedness are more perfect in for ever in the dungeon of hell, so that they will no more the angels than in men who are wayfarers. Now some be free to go out, since this was permitted to them only in men, good and wicked, will not be judged as stated in the so far as they were directed by Divine providence to try text of Sentent. iv, D, 47. Therefore neither will good or the life of man. wicked angels be judged. The same answer applies to the Third Objection. I answer that, The judgment of discussion nowise ∗ The reference should be Mat. 8:29: ‘Art Thou come hither to torment us before the time?’ The text of Mark reads: ‘Art Thou come to destroy us?’ 3029 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 90 Of the Form of the Judge in Coming to the Judgment (In Three Articles) We must now consider the form of the Judge in coming to the judgment. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ will judge under the form or His humanity? (2) Whether He will appear under the form of His glorified humanity? (3) Whether His Godhead can be seen without joy? Whether Christ will judge under the form of His humanity? Suppl. q. 90 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that Christ will not judge human nature. Therefore He will judge under the human under the form of His humanity. For judgment requires nature. authority in the judge. Now Christ has authority over the Further, to Him it belongs to judge who made the law. quick and the dead as God, for thus is He the Lord and Now Christ gave us the law of the Gospel while appearing Creator of all. Therefore He will judge under the form of in the human nature. Therefore He will judge under that His Godhead. same nature. Objection 2. Further, invincible power is requisite I answer that, Judgment requires a certain authority in a judge; wherefore it is written (Eccles. 7:6): “Seek in the judge. Wherefore it is written (Rom. 14:4): “Who not to be made a judge, unless thou have strength enough art thou that judgest another man’s servant?” Hence it is to extirpate iniquities.” Now invincible power belongs to becoming that Christ should judge in respect of His hav- Christ as God. Therefore He will judge under the form of ing authority over men to whom chiefly the last judgment the Godhead. will be directed. Now He is our Lord, not only by reason Objection 3. Further, it is written (Jn. 5:22,23): “The of the Creation, since “the Lord He is God, He made us Father. . . hath given all judgment to the Son, that all men and not we ourselves” (Ps. 99:3), but also by reason of the may honor the Son as they honor the Father.” Now equal Redemption, which pertains to Him in respect of His hu- honor to that of the Father is not due to the Son in respect man nature. Wherefore “to this end Christ died and rose of His human nature. Therefore He will not judge under again, that He might be Lord both of the dead and of the His human form. living” (Rom. 14:9). But the goods of the Creation would Objection 4. Further, it is written (Dan. 7:9): “I be- not suffice us to obtain the reward of eternal life, without held till thrones were placed and the Ancient of days sat.” the addition of the boon of the Redemption, on account of Now the thrones signify judicial power, and God is called the obstacle accruing to created nature through the sin of the Ancient by reason of His eternity, according to Diony- our first parent. Hence, since the last judgment is directed sius (Div. Nom. x). Therefore it becomes the Son to judge to the admission of some to the kingdom, and the exclu- as being eternal; and consequently not as man. sion of others therefrom, it is becoming that Christ should Objection 5. Further, Augustine says (Tract. xix in preside at that judgment under the form of His human na- Joan.) that “the resurrection of the soul is the work of the ture, since it is by favor of that same nature’s Redemption Word the Son of God, and the resurrection of the body is that man is admitted to the kingdom. In this sense it is the work of the Word made the Son of man in the flesh.” stated (Acts 10:42) that “He. . . was appointed by God to Now that last judgment regards the soul rather than the be Judge of the living and of the dead.” And forasmuch body. Therefore it becomes Christ to judge as God rather as by redeeming mankind He restored not only man but than as man. all creatures without exception—inasmuch as all creatures On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 5:27): “He hath are bettered through man’s restoration, according to Col. given Him power to do judgment, because He is the Son 1:20, “Making peace through the blood of His cross, both of man.” as to things on earth, and the things that are in heaven”—it Further, it is written (Job 36:17): “Thy cause hath follows that through His Passion Christ merited lordship been judged as that of the wicked—by Pilate” accord- and judicial power not over man alone, but over all crea- ing to a gloss—therefore, “cause and judgment thou shalt tures, according to Mat. 28:18, “All power is given to Me, recover—that thou mayest judge justly,” according to the in heaven and in earth”∗. gloss. Now Christ was judged by Pilate with regard to His Reply to Objection 1. Christ, in respect of His Divine ∗ Cf. IIIa, q. 59 3030 nature, has authority of lordship over all creatures by right from the Father to the Son, not only from eternity in re-of creation; but in respect of His human nature He has au- spect of the Divine nature, but also in time in respect of thority of lordship merited through His Passion. The latter the human nature wherein He merited it. Hence in the is secondary so to speak and acquired, while the former is aforesaid vision it is further stated (Dan. 7:13,14): “Lo, natural and eternal. one like the Son of man came with the clouds of heaven, Reply to Objection 2. Although Christ as man has and He came even to the Ancient of days. . . And He gave not of Himself invincible power resulting from the natural Him power and glory, and a kingdom.” power of the human species, nevertheless there is also in Reply to Objection 5. Augustine is speaking by a His human nature an invincible power derived from His kind of appropriation, so as to trace the effects which Godhead, whereby all things are subjected under His feet Christ wrought in the human nature to causes somewhat (1 Cor. 15:25-28; Heb. 2:8,9). Hence He will judge in His similar to them. And since we are made to the image and human nature indeed, but by the power of His Godhead. likeness of God in respect of our soul, and are of the same Reply to Objection 3. Christ would not have sufficed species as the man Christ in respect of our body, he as- for the redemption of mankind, had He been a mere man. cribes to the Godhead the effects wrought by Christ in our Wherefore from the very fact that He was able as man to souls, and those which He wrought or will work in our redeem mankind, and thereby obtained judicial power, it bodies he ascribes to His flesh; although His flesh, as be- is evident that He is God, and consequently is to be hon- ing the instrument of His Godhead, has also its effect on ored equally with the Father, not as man but as God. our souls as Damascene asserts (De Fide Orth. iii, 15), ac- Reply to Objection 4. In that vision of Daniel the cording to the saying of Heb. 9:14, that His “blood” hath whole order of the judicial power is clearly expressed. cleansed “our conscience from dead works.” And thus This power is in God Himself as its first origin, and more that “the Word was made flesh” is the cause of the resur- especially in the Father Who is the fount of the entire God- rection of souls; wherefore also according to His human head; wherefore it is stated in the first place that the “An- nature He is becomingly the Judge not only of bodily but cient of days sat.” But the judicial power was transmitted also of spiritual goods∗. Whether at the judgment Christ will appear in His glorified humanity? Suppl. q. 90 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that at the judgment Now it is promised as a reward to the righteous that they Christ will not appear in His glorified humanity. For a shall see the glory of His humanity (Jn. 10:9): “He shall gloss† on Jn. 19:37, “They shall look on him whom go in, and go out, and shall find pastures, i.e. refreshment they pierced,” says: “Because He will come in the flesh in His Godhead and humanity,” according to the commen- wherein He was crucified.” Now He was crucified in the tary of Augustine‡ and Is. 33:17: “His eyes shall see the form of weakness. Therefore He will appear in the form King in his beauty.” Therefore He will not appear to all in of weakness and not in the form of glory. His glorified form. Objection 2. Further, it is stated (Mat. 24:30) that Objection 5. Further, Christ will judge in the form “the sign of the Son of man shall appear in heaven,” wherein He was judged: wherefore a gloss§ on Jn. 5:21, namely, “the sign of the cross,” as Chrysostom says (Hom. “So the Son also giveth life to whom He will,” says: “He lxxvii in Matth.), for “Christ when coming to the judg- will judge justly in the form wherein He was judged un- ment will show not only the scars of His wounds but even justly, that He may be visible to the wicked.” Now He was His most shameful death.” Therefore it seems that He will judged in the form of weakness. Therefore He will appear not appear in the form of glory. in the same form at the judgment. Objection 3. Further, Christ will appear at the judg- On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 21:27): “Then they ment under that form which can be gazed upon by all. shall see the Son of man coming in a cloud with great Now Christ will not be visible to all, good and wicked, power and majesty.” Now majesty and power pertain to under the form of His glorified humanity: because the eye glory. Therefore He will appear in the form of glory. that is not glorified is seemingly unproportionate to see Further, he who judges should be more conspicuous the clarity of a glorified body. Therefore He will not ap- than those who are judged. Now the elect who will be pear under a glorified form. judged by Christ will have a glorified body. Much more Objection 4. Further, that which is promised as a re- therefore will the Judge appear in a glorified form. ward to the righteous is not granted to the unrighteous. Further, as to be judged pertains to weakness, so to ∗ Cf. IIIa, q. 56, a. 2, ad 1 † St. Augustine, Tract. cxx in Joan. ‡ De Spiritu et Anima, work of an unknown author. St. Thomas, De Anima, ascribes it to Alcherus, a Cistercian monk; see above q. 70, a. 2, ad 1 § St. Augustine, Tract. xix, in Joan. 3031 judge pertains to authority and glory. Now at His first demned who scorned so great mercy, especially those who coming when Christ came to be judged, He appeared in persecuted Christ unjustly. The scars which will appear the form of weakness. Therefore at the second coming, in His body will not be due to weakness, but will indi- when He will come to judge, He will appear in the form cate the exceeding power whereby Christ overcame His of glory. enemies by His Passion and infirmity. He will also show I answer that, Christ is called the mediator of God forth His most shameful death, not by bringing it sensi- and men (1 Tim. 2:5) inasmuch as He satisfies for men bly before the eye, as though He suffered it there; but by and intercedes for them to the Father, and confers on men the things which will appear then, namely the signs of His things which belong to the Father, according to Jn. 17:22, past Passion, He will recall men to the thought of His past “The glory which Thou hast given Me, I have given to death. them.” Accordingly then both these things belong to Him Reply to Objection 3. A glorified body has it in its in that He communicates with both extremes: for in that power to show itself or not to show itself to an eye that He communicates with men, He takes their part with the is not glorified, as stated above (q. 85, a. 2, ad 3). Hence Father, and in that He communicates with the Father, He Christ will be visible to all in His glorified form. bestows the Father’s gifts on men. Since then at His first Reply to Objection 4. Even as our friend’s glory coming He came in order to make satisfaction for us to the gives us pleasure, so the glory and power of one we hate is Father, He came in the form of our weakness. But since at most displeasing to us. Hence as the sight of the glory of His second coming He will come in order to execute the Christ’s humanity will be a reward to the righteous, so will Father’s justice on men, He will have to show forth His it be a torment to Christ’s enemies: wherefore it is writ- glory which is in Him by reason of His communication ten (Is. 26:11): “Let the envious people see and be con- with the Father: and therefore He will appear in the form founded and let fire” (i.e. envy) “devour Thy enemies.” of glory. Reply to Objection 5. Form is taken there for human Reply to Objection 1. He will appear in the same nature wherein He was judged and likewise will judge; flesh, but not under the same form. but not for a quality of nature, namely of weakness, which Reply to Objection 2. The sign of the cross will ap- will not be the same in Him when judging as when judged pear at the judgment, to denote not a present but a past (Cf. ad 2). weakness: so as to show how justly those were con- Whether the Godhead can be seen by the wicked without joy? Suppl. q. 90 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the Godhead can be received into the seer. Therefore although the Godhead seen by the wicked without joy. For there can be no doubt is in itself supremely enjoyable, nevertheless when seen that the wicked will know with the greatest certainty that by those who are plunged in grief, it will give no joy but Christ is God. Therefore they will see His Godhead, and rather displeasure. yet they will not rejoice in seeing Christ. Therefore it will Objection 5. Further, as sense is to the sensible ob- be possible to see it without joy. ject, so is the intellect to the intelligible object. Now in Objection 2. Further, the perverse will of the wicked the senses, “to the unhealthy palate bread is painful, to the is not more adverse to Christ’s humanity than to His God- healthy palate sweet,” as Augustine says (Confess. vii), head. Now the fact that they will see the glory of His hu- and the same happens with the other senses. Therefore manity will conduce to their punishment, as stated above since the damned have the intellect indisposed, it would (a. 2, ad 4). Therefore if they were to see His Godhead, seem that the vision of the uncreated light will give them there would be much more reason for them to grieve rather pain rather than joy. than rejoice. On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 17:3): “This is Objection 3. Further, the course of the affections is eternal life: That they may know Thee, the. . . true God.” not a necessary sequel to that which is in the intellect: Wherefore it is clear that the essence of bliss consists in wherefore Augustine says (In Ps. 118: conc. 8): “The in- seeing God. Now joy is essential to bliss. Therefore the tellect precedes, the affections follow slowly or not at all.” Godhead cannot be seen without joy. Now vision regards the intellect, whereas joy regards the Further, the essence of the Godhead is the essence of affections. Therefore it will be possible to see the God- truth. Now it is delightful to every one to see the truth, head without joy. wherefore “all naturally desire to know,” as stated at the Objection 4. Further, whatever is received into “a beginning of the Metaphysics. Therefore it is impossible thing is received according to the mode of the receiver to see the Godhead without joy. and not of the received.” But whatever is seen is, in a way, Further, if a certain vision is not always delightful, it 3032 happens sometimes to be painful. But intellective vision is considered in itself, as neither can one hate goodness it-never painful since “the pleasure we take in objects of un- self. But God is said to be hated by certain persons in derstanding has no grief opposed to it,” according to the respect of some of the effects of the Godhead, in so far as Philosopher (Topic. ii). Since then the Godhead cannot He does or commands something contrary to their will∗. be seen save by the intellect, it seems that the Godhead Therefore the vision of the Godhead can be painful to no cannot be seen without joy. one. I answer that, In every object of appetite or of plea- Reply to Objection 3. The saying of Augustine ap- sure two things may be considered, namely the thing plies when the thing apprehended previously by the in- which is desired or which gives pleasure, and the aspect tellect is good by participation and not essentially, such of appetibility or pleasurableness in that thing. Now ac- as all creatures are; wherefore there may be something in cording to Boethius (De Hebdom.) that which is can have them by reason of which the affections are not moved. In something besides what it is, but ‘being’ itself has no ad- like manner God is known by wayfarers through His ef- mixture of aught else beside itself. Hence that which is fects, and their intellect does not attain to the very essence desirable or pleasant can have an admixture of something of His goodness. Hence it is not necessary that the affec- rendering it undesirable or unpleasant; but the very as- tions follow the intellect, as they would if the intellect saw pect of pleasurableness has not and cannot have anything God’s essence which is His goodness. mixed with it rendering it unpleasant or undesirable. Now Reply to Objection 4. Grief denotes not a disposition it is possible for things that are pleasurable, by partici- but a passion. Now every passion is removed if a stronger pation of goodness which is the aspect of appetibility or contrary cause supervene, and does not remove that cause. pleasurableness, not to give pleasure when they are ap- Accordingly the grief of the damned would be done away prehended, but it is impossible for that which is good by if they saw God in His essence. its essence not to give pleasure when it is apprehended. Reply to Objection 5. The indisposition of an organ Therefore since God is essentially His own goodness, it is removes the natural proportion of the organ to the object impossible for the Godhead to be seen without joy. that has a natural aptitude to please, wherefore the plea- Reply to Objection 1. The wicked will know most sure is hindered. But the indisposition which is in the clearly that Christ is God, not through seeing His God- damned does not remove the natural proportion whereby head, but on account of the most manifest signs of His they are directed to the Divine goodness, since its image Godhead. ever remains in them. Hence the comparison fails. Reply to Objection 2. No one can hate the Godhead ∗ Cf. IIa IIae, q. 34, a. 1 3033 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 91 Of the Quality of the World After the Judgment (In Five Articles) We must next discuss the quality which the world and those who rise again will have after the judgment. Here a threefold matter offers itself to our consideration: (1) The state and quality of the world; (2) The state of the blessed; (3) The state of the wicked. Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether there will be a renewal of the world? (2) Whether the movement of the heavenly bodies will cease? (3) Whether the heavenly bodies will be more brilliant? (4) Whether the elements will receive an additional clarity? (5) Whether the animals and plants will remain? Whether the world will be renewed? Suppl. q. 91 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the world will never On the contrary, It is written (Is. 65:17): “Behold I be renewed. For nothing will be but what was at some create new heavens and a new earth, and the former things time as to its species: “What is it that hath been? the same shall not be in remembrance”; and (Apoc. 21:1): “I saw a thing that shall be” (Eccles. 1:9). Now the world never new heaven and a new earth. For the first heaven and the had any disposition other than it has now as to essential first earth was gone.” parts, both genera and species. Therefore it will never be Further, the dwelling should befit the dweller. But the renewed. world was made to be man’s dwelling. Therefore it should Objection 2. Further, renewal is a kind of alteration. befit man. Now man will be renewed. Therefore the world But it is impossible for the universe to be altered; because will be likewise. whatever is altered argues some alterant that is not altered, Further, “Every beast loveth its like” (Ecclus. 13:19), which nevertheless is a subject of local movement: and it wherefore it is evident that likeness is the reason of love. is impossible to place such a thing outside the universe. Now man has some likeness to the universe, wherefore Therefore it is impossible for the world to be renewed. he is called “a little world.” Hence man loves the whole Objection 3. Further, it is stated (Gn. 2:2) that world naturally and consequently desires its good. There- “God. . . rested on the seventh day from all His work which fore, that man’s desire be satisfied the universe must needs He had done,” and holy men explain that “He rested from also be made better. forming new creatures.” Now when things were first es- I answer that, We believe all corporeal things to have tablished, the mode imposed upon them was the same as been made for man’s sake, wherefore all things are stated they have now in the natural order. Therefore they will to be subject to him∗. Now they serve man in two ways, never have any other. first, as sustenance to his bodily life, secondly, as help- Objection 4. Further, the disposition which things ing him to know God, inasmuch as man sees the invisible have now is natural to them. Therefore if they be altered things of God by the things that are made (Rom. 1:20). to another disposition, this disposition will be unnatural Accordingly glorified man will nowise need creatures to to them. Now whatever is unnatural and accidental can- render him the first of these services, since his body will not last for ever (De Coelo et Mundo i). Therefore this be altogether incorruptible, the Divine power effecting disposition acquired by being renewed will be taken away this through the soul which it will glorify immediately. from them; and thus there will be a cycle of changes in Again man will not need the second service as to intellec- the world as Empedocles and Origen (Peri Archon. ii, 3) tive knowledge, since by that knowledge he will see God maintained, and after this world there will be another, and immediately in His essence. The carnal eye, however, will after that again another. be unable to attain to this vision of the Essence; wherefore Objection 5. Further, newness of glory is given to that it may be fittingly comforted in the vision of God, the rational creature as a reward. Now where there is no it will see the Godhead in Its corporeal effects, wherein merit, there can be no reward. Since then insensible crea- manifest proofs of the Divine majesty will appear, espe- tures have merited nothing, it would seem that they will cially in Christ’s flesh, and secondarily in the bodies of the not be renewed. blessed, and afterwards in all other bodies. Hence those ∗ Ps. 8:5, seqq. 3034 bodies also will need to receive a greater inflow from the immovable principle, namely God. Divine goodness than now, not indeed so as to change Reply to Objection 3. God is stated to have ceased their species, but so as to add a certain perfection of glory: on the seventh day forming new creatures, for as much and such will be the renewal of the world. Wherefore at as nothing was made afterwards that was not previously the one same time, the world will be renewed, and man in some likeness∗ either generically, or specifically, or at will be glorified. least as in a seminal principle, or even as in an obedien- Reply to Objection 1. Solomon is speaking there of tial potentiality†. I say then that the future renewal of the the natural course: this is evident from his adding: “Noth- world preceded in the works of the six days by way of a ing under the sun is new.” For since the movement of remote likeness, namely in the glory and grace of the an- the sun follows a circle, those things which are subject gels. Moreover it preceded in the obediential potentiality to the sun’s power must needs have some kind of circu- which was then bestowed on the creature to the effect of lar movement. This consists in the fact that things which its receiving this same renewal by the Divine agency. were before return the same in species but different in the Reply to Objection 4. This disposition of newness individual (De Generat. i). But things belonging to the will be neither natural nor contrary to nature, but above state of glory are not “under the sun.” nature (just as grace and glory are above the nature of the Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers natu- soul): and it will proceed from an everlasting agent which ral alteration which proceeds from a natural agent, which will preserve it for ever. acts from natural necessity. For such an agent cannot pro- Reply to Objection 5. Although, properly speaking, duce different dispositions, unless it be itself disposed dif- insensible bodies will not have merited this glory, yet man ferently. But things done by God proceed from freedom of merited that this glory should be bestowed on the whole will, wherefore it is possible, without any change in God universe, in so far as this conduces to man’s increase of Who wills it, for the universe to have at one time one dis- glory. Thus a man merits to be clothed in more splen- position, and another at another time. Thus this renewal did robes, which splendor the robes nowise merited them- will not be reduced to a cause that is moved, but to an selves. Whether the movement of the heavenly bodies will cease? Suppl. q. 91 a. 2 Objection 1. It seems that when the world is thus Therefore their movement will remain for ever, else those renewed the movement of the heavenly bodies will not bodies would remain without a purpose. cease. For it is written (Gn. 8:22): “All the days of the Objection 4. Further, in this renewal of the world the earth. . . cold and heat, summer and winter, night and day whole world will be bettered. Therefore no body will be shall not cease.” Now night and day, summer and win- deprived of what pertains to its perfection. Now move- ter result from the movement of the sun. Therefore the ment belongs to the perfection of a heavenly body, be- movement of the sun will never cease. cause, as stated in De Coelo et Mundo ii, “those bodies Objection 2. Further, it is written (Jer. 31:35,36): participate of the Divine goodness by their movement.” “Thus saith the Lord Who giveth the sun for the light Therefore the movement of the heaven will not cease. of the day, the order of the moon and of the stars for Objection 5. Further, the sun successively gives light the light of the night: Who stirreth up the sea, and the to the various parts of the world, by reason of its circu- waves thereof roar. . . If these ordinances shall fail before lar movement. Therefore if the circular movement of the Me. . . then also the seed of Israel shall fail, so as not to be heaven ceases, it follows that in some part of the earth’s a nation before Me for ever.” Now the seed of Israel shall surface there will be perpetual darkness, which is unbe- never fail, but will remain for ever. Therefore the laws of coming to the aforesaid renewal. day and of the sea waves, which result from the heavenly Objection 6. Further, if the movement were to cease, movement, will remain for ever. Therefore the movement this could only be because movement causes some imper- of the heaven will never cease. fection in the heaven, for instance wear and tear, which is Objection 3. Further, the substance of the heavenly impossible, since this movement is natural, and the heav- bodies will remain for ever. Now it is useless to admit enly bodies are impassible, wherefore they are not worn the existence of a thing unless you admit the purpose for out by movement (De Coelo et Mundo ii). Therefore the which it was made: and the heavenly bodies were made movement of the heaven will never cease. in order “to divide the day and the night”; and to be Objection 7. Further, a potentiality is useless if it be “for signs, and for seasons, and for days and for years” not reduced to act. Now in whatever position the heav- (Gn. 1:14). But they cannot do this except by movement. enly body is placed it is in potentiality to another posi- ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 73, a. 1 † Cf. Ia, q. 115, a. 2, ad 4; IIIa, q. 11, a. 1 3035 tion. Therefore unless this potentiality be reduced to act, I answer that, There are three opinions touching this it would remain useless, and would always be imperfect. question. The first is of the philosophers who assert that But it cannot be reduced to act save by local movement. the movement of the heaven will last for ever. But this is Therefore it will always be in motion. not in keeping with our faith, which holds that the elect are Objection 8. Further, if a thing is indifferent in rela- in a certain number preordained by God, so that the beget- tion to more than one alternation, either both are ascribed ting of men will not last for ever, and for the same reason, to it, or neither. Now the sun is indifferent to being in neither will other things that are directed to the begetting the east or in the west, else its movement would not be of men, such as the movement of the heaven and the varia- uniform throughout, since it would move more rapidly to tions of the elements. Others say that the movement of the the place which is more natural to it. Therefore either nei- heaven will cease naturally. But this again is false, since ther position is ascribed to the sun, or both. But neither every body that is moved naturally has a place wherein it both nor neither can be ascribed to it, except successively rests naturally, whereto it is moved naturally, and whence by movement; for if it stand still, it must needs stand in it is not moved except by violence. Now no such place can some position. Therefore the solar body will always be in be assigned to the heavenly body, since it is not more nat- motion, and in like manner all other heavenly bodies. ural to the sun to move towards a point in the east than to Objection 9. Further, the movement of the heaven move away from it, wherefore either its movement would is the cause of time. Therefore if the movement of the not be altogether natural, or its movement would not nat- heaven fail, time must needs fail: and if this were to fail, urally terminate in rest. Hence we must agree with others it would fail in an instant. Now an instant is defined (Phys. who say that the movement of the heaven will cease at this viii) “the beginning of the future and the end of the past.” renewal of the world, not indeed by any natural cause, but Consequently there would be time after the last instant of as a result of the will of God. For the body in question, time, which is impossible. Therefore the movement of the like other bodies, was made to serve man in the two ways heavens will never cease. above mentioned (a. 1): and hereafter in the state of glory Objection 10. Further, glory does not remove nature. man will no longer need one of these services, that namely But the movement of the heaven is natural. Therefore it is in respect of which the heavenly bodies serve man for the not deprived thereof by glory. sustenance of his bodily life. Now in this way the heav- On the contrary, It is stated (Apoc. 10:6) that the an- enly bodies serve man by their movement, in so far as gel who appeared, “swore by him that liveth for ever and by the heavenly movement the human race is multiplied, ever. . . that time shall be no longer,” namely after the sev- plants and animals needful for man’s use generated, and enth angel shall have sounded the trumpet, at the sound of the temperature of the atmosphere rendered conducive to which “the dead shall rise again” (1 Cor. 15:52). Now if health. Therefore the movement of the heavenly body will time be not, there is no movement of the heaven. There- cease as soon as man is glorified. fore the movement of the heaven will cease. Reply to Objection 1. These words refer to the earth Further: “Thy sun shall go down no more, and thy in its present state, when it is able to be the principle of moon shall not decrease” (Is. 60:20). Now the setting the generation and corruption of plants. This is evident of the sun and the phases of the moon are caused by the from its being said there: “All the days of the earth, seed movement of the heavens. Therefore the heavenly move- time and harvest,” etc. And it is simply to be granted that ment will cease at length. as long as the earth is fit for seed time and harvest, the Further, it is shown in De Gener. ii that “the move- movement of the heaven will not cease. ment of the heaven is for the sake of continual generation We reply in like manner to obj. 2 that the Lord is in this lower world.” But generation will cease when the speaking there of the duration of the seed of Israel with number of the elect is complete. Therefore the movement regard to the present state. This is evident from the words: of the heaven will cease. “Then also the seed of Israel shall fail, so as not to be a Further, all movement is for some end (Metaph. ii). nation before Me for ever.” For after this state there will But all movement for an end ceases when the end is ob- be no succession of days: wherefore the laws also which tained. Therefore either the movement of the heaven will He had mentioned will cease after this state. never obtain its end, and thus it would be useless, or it will Reply to Objection 3. The end which is there as- cease at length. signed to the heavenly bodies is their proximate end, be- Further, rest is more noble than movement, because cause it is their proper act. But this act is directed further things are more likened to God, Who is supremely im- to another end, namely the service of man, which is shown movable, by being themselves unmoved. Now the move- by the words of Dt. 4:19: “Lest perhaps lifting up thy eyes ment of lower bodies terminates naturally in rest. There- to heaven, thou see the sun and the moon and all the stars fore since the heavenly bodies are far nobler, their move- of heaven, and being deceived by error thou adore and ment terminates naturally in rest. serve them, which the Lord thy God created for the ser- 3036 vice of all the nations, that are under heaven.” Therefore to every situation: but in respect of one situation it has a we should form our judgment of the heavenly bodies from more noble disposition in comparison with certain things the service of man, rather than from the end assigned to than in respect of another situation; thus in our regard the them in Genesis. Moreover the heavenly bodies, as stated sun has a more noble disposition at daytime than at night- above, will serve glorified man in another way; hence it time. Hence it is probable, since the entire renewal of does not follow that they will remain without a purpose. the world is directed to man, that the heaven will have in Reply to Objection 4. Movement does not belong this renewal the most noble situation possible in relation to the perfection of a heavenly body, except in so far as to our dwelling there. Or, according to some, the heaven thereby it is the cause of generation and corruption in will rest in that situation wherein it was made, else one this lower world: and in that respect also this movement of its revolutions would remain incomplete. But this ar- makes the heavenly body participate in the Divine good- gument seems improbable, for since a revolution of the ness by way of a certain likeness of causality. But move- heaven takes no less than 36,000 years to complete, it ment does not belong to the perfection of the substance would follow that the world must last that length of time, of the heaven, which substance will remain. Wherefore it which does not seem probable. Moreover according to does not follow that, when this movement ceases, the sub- this it would be possible to know when the world will stance of the heaven will lose something of its perfection. come to an end. For we may conclude with probability Reply to Objection 5. All the elemental bodies will from astronomers in what position the heavenly bodies have in themselves a certain clarity of glory. Hence were made, by taking into consideration the number of though part of the surface of the earth be not lit up by years that have elapsed since the beginning of the world: the sun, there will by no means be any darkness there. and in the same way it would be possible to know the ex- Reply to Objection 6. A gloss of Ambrose on Rom. act number of years it would take them to return to a like 8:22, “Every creature groaneth,” etc. says explicitly that position: whereas the time of the world’s end is stated to “all the elements labor to fulfill their offices: thus the sun be unknown. and moon fill the places appointed to them not without Reply to Objection 9. Time will at length cease, work: this is for our sake, wherefore they will rest when when the heavenly movement ceases. Yet that last “now” we are taken up to heaven.” This work, in my opinion, will not be the beginning of the future. For the definition does not signify that any stress or passion occurs to these quoted applies to the “now” only as continuous with the bodies from their movement, since this movement is nat- parts of time, not as terminating the whole of time. ural to them and nowise violent, as is proved in De Coelo Reply to Objection 10. The movement of the heaven et Mundo i. But work here denotes a defect in relation to is said to be natural, not as though it were part of nature the term to which a thing tends. Hence since this move- in the same way as we speak of natural principles; but be- ment is ordained by Divine providence to the completion cause it has its principle in the nature of a body, not indeed of the number of the elect, it follows that as long as the its active but its receptive principle. Its active principle is a latter is incomplete, this movement has not reached the spiritual substance, as the Commentator says on De Coelo term whereto it was ordained: hence it is said metaphor- et Mundo; and consequently it is not unreasonable for this ically to labor, as a man who has not what he intends to movement to be done away by the renewal of glory, since have. This defect will be removed from the heaven when the nature of the heavenly body will not alter through the the number of the elect is complete. Or it may refer to cessation of that movement. the desire of the future renewal which it awaits from the We grant the other objections which argue in the con- Divine disposal. trary sense, namely the first three, because they conclude Reply to Objection 7. In a heavenly body there is no in due manner. But since the remaining two seem to con- potentiality that can be perfected by place, or that is made clude that the movement of heaven will cease naturally, for this end which is to be in such and such a place. But we must reply to them. To the first, then, we reply that potentiality to situation in a place is related to a heavenly movement ceases when its purpose is attained, provided body, as the craftsman’s potentiality to construct various this is a sequel to, and does not accompany the movement. houses of one kind: for if he construct one of these he Now the purpose of the heavenly movement, according is not said to have the potentiality uselessly, and in like to philosophers, accompanies that movement, namely the manner in whatever situation a heavenly body be placed, imitation of the Divine goodness in the causality of that its potentiality to be in a place will not remain incomplete movement with respect to this lower world. Hence it does or without a purpose. not follow that this movement ceases naturally. Reply to Objection 8. Although a heavenly body, so To the second we reply that although immobility is far as regards its nature, is equally inclined to every sit- simply nobler than movement, yet movement in a subject uation that it can possibly occupy, nevertheless in com- which thereby can acquire a perfect participation of the parison with things outside it, it is not equally inclined Divine goodness is nobler than rest in a subject which is 3037 altogether unable to acquire that perfection by movement. ments of the higher bodies might be held to be perpetual, For this reason the earth which is the lowest of the ele- so far as their natural power is concerned, and never to ments is without movement: although God Who is exalted terminate in rest, although the movement of lower bodies above all things is without movement, by Whom the more terminates in rest. noble bodies are moved. Hence also it is that the move- Whether the brightness of the heavenly bodies will be increased at this renewal? Suppl. q. 91 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the brightness of the ison with the heavenly bodies, which by their huge bulk heavenly bodies will not be increased at this renewal. For surpass the size of man almost beyond comparison: in fact this renewal as regards the lower bodies will be caused by the size of the whole earth in comparison with the heaven the cleansing fire. But the cleansing fire will not reach the is as a point compared with a sphere, as astronomers say. heavenly bodies. Therefore the heavenly bodies will not Since then God is most wise it would seem that man is be renewed by receiving an increase of brightness. not the end of the creation of the heavens, and so it is un- Objection 2. Further, just as the heavenly bodies are seemly that the heaven should deteriorate when he sinned, the cause of generation in this lower world by their move- or that it should be bettered when he is glorified. ment, so are they by their light. But, when generation On the contrary, It is written (Is. 30:26): “The light ceases, movement will cease as stated above (a. 2). There- of the moon shall be as the light of the sun, and the light fore in like manner the light of the heavenly bodies will of the sun shall be sevenfold.” cease rather than increase. Further, the whole world will be renewed for the bet- Objection 3. Further, if the heavenly bodies will be ter. But the heaven is the more noble part of the corpo- renewed when man is renewed, it follows that when man real world. Therefore it will be altered for the better. But deteriorated they deteriorated likewise. But this does not this cannot be unless it shine out with greater brightness. seem probable, since these bodies are unalterable as to Therefore its brightness will be bettered and will increase. their substance. Therefore neither will they be renewed Further, “every creature that groaneth and travaileth in when man is renewed. pain, awaiteth the revelation of the glory of the children Objection 4. Further, if they deteriorated then it fol- of God”∗ (Rom. 8:21,22). Now such are the heavenly lows that their deterioration was on a par with the ame- bodies, as a gloss says on the same passage. Therefore lioration which, it is said, will accrue to them at man’s they await the glory of the saints. But they would not renewal. Now it is written (Is. 30:26) that “the light await it unless they were to gain something by it. There- of the moon shall be as the light of the sun.” Therefore fore their brightness will increase thereby, since it is their in the original state before sin the moon shone as much chief beauty. as the sun does now. Therefore whenever the moon was I answer that, The renewal of the world is directed to over the earth, it made it to be day as the sun does now: the end that, after this renewal has taken place, God may which is proved manifestly to be false from the statement become visible to man by signs so manifest as to be per- of Gn. 1:16 that the moon was made “to rule the night.” ceived as it were by his senses. Now creatures lead to the Therefore when man sinned the heavenly bodies were not knowledge of God chiefly by their comeliness and beauty, deprived of their light; and so their light will not be in- which show forth the wisdom of their Maker and Gover- creased, so it seems, when man is glorified. nor; wherefore it is written (Wis. 13:5): “By the greatness Objection 5. Further, the brightness of the heavenly of the beauty and of the creature, the Creator of them may bodies, like other creatures, is directed to the use of man. be seen, so as to be known thereby.” And the beauty of Now, after the resurrection, the brightness of the sun will the heavenly bodies consists chiefly in light; wherefore be of no use to man: for it is written (Is. 60:19): “Thou it is written (Ecclus. 43:10): “The glory of the stars is shalt no more have the sun for thy light by day, nei- the beauty of heaven, the Lord enlighteneth the world on ther shall the brightness of the moon enlighten thee,” and high.” Hence the heavenly bodies will be bettered, espe- (Apoc. 21:23): “The city hath no need of the sun, nor of cially as regards their brightness. But to what degree and the moon to shine in it.” Therefore their brightness will in what way this betterment will take place is known to not be increased. Him alone Who will bring it about. Objection 6. Further, it were not a wise craftsman Reply to Objection 1. The cleansing fire will not who would make very great instruments for the making of cause the form of the renewal, but will only dispose a small work. Now man is a very small thing in compar- thereto, by cleansing from the vileness of sin and the im- ∗ ‘The creature also itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption, into the liberty of the children of God. For we know that every creature groaneth and travaileth in pain,’ etc. 3038 purity resulting from the mingling of bodies, and this is over the earth would have made it to be day, but that man not to be found in the heavenly bodies. Hence although would have derived as much benefit from the light of the the heavenly bodies are not to be cleansed by fire, they moon then as now from the light of the sun. After the res- are nevertheless to be Divinely renewed. urrection, however, when the light of the moon will be in- Reply to Objection 2. Movement does not denote creased in very truth, there will be night nowhere on earth perfection in the thing moved, considered in itself, since but only in the center of the earth, where hell will be, be- movement is the act of that which is imperfect: although cause then, as stated, the moon will shine as brightly as the it may pertain to the perfection of a body in so far as sun does now; the sun seven times as much as now, and the latter is the cause of something. But light belongs to the bodies of the blessed seven times more than the sun, the perfection of a lightsome body, even considered in its although there be no authority or reason to prove this. substance: and consequently after the heavenly body has Reply to Objection 5. A thing may be useful to ceased to be the cause of generation, its brightness will man in two ways. First, by reason of necessity, and thus remain, while its movement will cease. no creature will be useful to man because he will have Reply to Objection 3. A gloss on Is. 30:26, “The light complete sufficiency from God. This is signified (Apoc. of the moon shall be as the light of the sun,” says: “All 21:23) by the words quoted, according to which that “city things made for man’s sake deteriorated at his fall, and hath no need of the sun,” nor “of the moon.” Secondly, on sun and moon diminished in light.” This diminishment account of a greater perfection, and thus man will make is understood by some to mean a real lessening of light. use of other creatures, yet not as needful to him in order Nor does it matter that the heavenly bodies are by nature to obtain his end, in which way he makes use of them now. unalterable, because this alteration was brought about by Reply to Objection 6. This is the argument of Rabbi the Divine power. Others, however, with greater probabil- Moses who endeavors to prove (Dux errantium iii) that ity, take this diminishment to mean, not a real lessening the world was by no means made for man’s use. Where- of light, but a lessening in reference to man’s use; be- fore he maintains that what we read in the Old Testament cause after sin man did not receive as much benefit from about the renewal of the world, as instanced by the quo- the light of the heavenly bodies as before. In the same tations from Isaias, is said metaphorically: and that even sense we read (Gn. 3:17,18): “Cursed is the earth in thy as the sun is said to be darkened in reference to a person work. . . Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee”; when he encounters a great sorrow so as not to know what although it would have brought forth thorns and thistles to do (which way of speaking is customary to Scripture), before sin, but not as a punishment to man. Nor does it so on the other hand the sun is said to shine brighter for follow that, supposing the light of the heavenly bodies not a person, and the whole world to be renewed, when he is to have been lessened essentially through man sinning, it brought from a state of sorrow to one of very great joy. will not really be increased at man’s glorification, because But this is not in harmony with the authority and com- man’s sin wrought no change upon the state of the uni- mentaries of holy men. Consequently we must answer verse, since both before and after sin man had an animal this argument by saying that although the heavenly bodies life, which needs the movement and generation of a cor- far surpass the human body, yet the rational soul surpasses poreal creature; whereas man’s glorification will bring a the heavenly bodies far more than these surpass the human change upon the state of all corporeal creatures, as stated body. Hence it is not unreasonable to say that the heav- above (q. 76, a. 7). Hence there is no comparison. enly bodies were made for man’s sake; not, however as Reply to Objection 4. This diminution, according to though this were the principal end, since the principal end the more probable opinion, refers not to the substance but of all things is God. to the effect. Hence it does not follow that the moon while Whether the elements will be renewed by an addition of brightness? Suppl. q. 91 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the elements will not them at this renewal. Now the rarity and density of the el- be renewed by receiving some kind of brightness. For ements would seem to be an obstacle to brightness, since just as light is a quality proper to a heavenly body, so are a bright body needs to be condensed, for which reason the hot and cold, wet and dry. qualities proper to the ele- rarity of the air seems incompatible with brightness, and ments. Therefore as the heaven is renewed by an increase in like manner the density of the earth which is an ob- of brightness, so ought the elements to be renewed by an stacle to transparency. Therefore it is impossible for the increase of active and passive qualities. elements to be renewed by the addition of brightness. Objection 2. Further, rarity, and density are qualities Objection 3. Further, it is agreed that the damned will of the elements, and the elements will not be deprived of be in the earth. Yet they will be in darkness not only in- 3039 ternal but also external. Therefore the earth will not be 22:30): and this will be accomplished by conferring the endowed with brightness in this renewal, nor for the same highest degree of perfection on that in which the human reason will the other elements. spirit agrees with the angelic. Wherefore, in like manner, Objection 4. Further, increase of brightness in the el- since the lower bodies do not agree with the heavenly bod- ements implies an increase of heat. If therefore at this ies except in the nature of light and transparency (De An- renewal the brightness of the elements be greater than it is ima ii), it follows that the lower bodies are to be perfected now, their heat will likewise be greater; and thus it would chiefly as regards brightness. Hence all the elements will seem that they will be changed from their natural quali- be clothed with a certain brightness, not equally, however, ties, which are in them according to a fixed measure: and but according to their mode: for it is said that the earth on this is absurd. its outward surface will be as transparent as glass, water Objection 5. Further, the good of the universe which as crystal, the air as heaven, fire as the lights of heaven. consists in the order and harmony of the parts is more Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (a. 1), the re- excellent than the good of any individual creature. But newal of the world is directed to the effect that man even if one creature be bettered, the good of the universe is by his senses may as it were see the Godhead by manifest done away, since there will no longer be the same har- signs. Now the most spiritual and subtle of our senses is mony. Therefore if the elemental bodies, which according the sight. Consequently all the lower bodies need to be to their natural degree in the universe should be devoid of bettered, chiefly as regards the visible qualities the prin- brightness, were to be endowed with brightness, the per- ciple of which is light. On the other hand, the elemen- fection of the universe would be diminished thereby rather tal qualities regard the touch, which is the most material than increased. of the senses, and the excess of their contrariety is more On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 21:1): “I saw displeasing than pleasant; whereas excess of light will be a new heaven and a new earth.” Now the heaven will be pleasant, since it has no contrariety, except on account of renewed by an increase of brightness. Therefore the earth a weakness in the organ, such as will not be then. and likewise the other elements will also. Reply to Objection 2. The air will be bright, not Further, the lower bodies, like the higher, are for man’s as casting forth rays, but as an enlightened transparency; use. Now the corporeal creature will be rewarded for its while the earth, although it is opaque through lack of light, services to man, as a gloss of Ambrose seems to say on yet by the Divine power its surface will be clothed with the Rom. 8:22, “Every creature groaneth,” and a gloss of glory of brightness, without prejudice to its density. Jerome on Is. 30:26, “And the light of the moon shall Reply to Objection 3. The earth will not be glorified be,” etc. Therefore the elements will be glorified as well with brightness in the infernal regions; but instead of this as the heavenly bodies. glory, that part of the earth will have the rational spirits of Further, man’s body is composed of the elements. men and demons who though weak by reason of sin are Therefore the elemental particles that are in man’s body nevertheless superior to any corporeal quality by the dig- will be glorified by the addition of brightness when man nity of their nature. or we may say that, though the whole is glorified. Now it is fitting that whole and part should earth be glorified, the wicked will nevertheless be in exte- have the same disposition. Therefore it is fitting that the rior darkness, since even the fire of hell, while shining for elements themselves should be endowed with brightness. them in one respect, will be unable to enlighten them in I answer that, Just as there is a certain order between another. the heavenly spirits and the earthly or human spirits, so Reply to Objection 4. This brightness will be in these is there an order between heavenly bodies and earthly bodies even as it is in the heavenly bodies, in which it bodies. Since then the corporeal creature was made for causes no heat, because these bodies will then be unalter- the sake of the spiritual and is ruled thereby, it follows able, as the heavenly bodies are now. that corporeal things are dealt with similarly to spiritual Reply to Objection 5. The order of the universe will things. Now in this final consummation of things the not be done away by the betterment of the elements, be- lower spirits will receive the properties of the higher spir- cause all the other parts will also be bettered, and so the its, because men will be as the angels in heaven (Mat. same harmony will remain. Whether the plants and animals will remain in this renewal? Suppl. q. 91 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the plants and ani- Now the elements are said to be adorned by the animals mals will remain in this renewal. For the elements should and plants∗. Therefore they will not be removed in this be deprived of nothing that belongs to their adornment. renewal. ∗ Cf. Gn. 1:11,12,20,21,24,25 3040 Objection 2. Further, just as the elements served man, to the renewal of man. Now by being renewed man will so also did animals, plants and mineral bodies. But on ac- pass from the state of corruption to incorruptibility and to count of this service the elements will be glorified. There- a state of everlasting rest, wherefore it is written (1 Cor. fore both animals and plants and mineral bodies will be 15:53): “This corruptible must put on incorruption, and glorified likewise. this mortal must put on immortality”; and consequently Objection 3. Further, the universe will remain imper- the world will be renewed in such a way as to throw off all fect if anything belonging to its perfection be removed. corruption and remain for ever at rest. Therefore it will be Now the species of animals, plants, and mineral bodies impossible for anything to be the subject of that renewal, belong to the perfection of the universe. Since then we unless it be a subject of incorruption. Now such are the must not say that the world will remain imperfect when it heavenly bodies, the elements, and man. For the heavenly is renewed, it seems that we should assert that the plants bodies are by their very nature incorruptible both as to and animals will remain. their whole and as to their part: the elements are corrupt- Objection 4. Further, animals and plants have a more ible as to their parts but incorruptible as a whole: while noble form than the elements. Now the world, at this final men are corruptible both in whole and in part, but this is renewal, will be changed for the better. Therefore animals on the part of their matter not on the part of their form, and plants should remain rather than the elements, since the rational soul to wit, which will remain incorrupt after they are nobler. the corruption of man. on the other hand, dumb animals, Objection 5. Further, it is unseemly to assert that the plants, and minerals, and all mixed bodies, are corruptible natural appetite will be frustrated. But by their natural both in their whole and in their parts, both on the part of appetite animals and plants desire to be for ever, if in- their matter which loses its form, and on the part of their deed not as regards the individual, at least as regards the form which does not remain actually; and thus they are species: and to this end their continual generation is di- in no way subjects of incorruption. Hence they will not rected (De Generat. ii). Therefore it is unseemly to say remain in this renewal, but those things alone which we that these species will at length cease to be. have mentioned above. On the contrary, If plants and animals are to remain, Reply to Objection 1. These bodies are said to adorn either all of them will, or some of them. If all of them, the elements, inasmuch as the general active and passive then dumb animals, which had previously died, will have forces which are in the elements are applied to specific to rise again just as men will rise again. But this cannot be actions: hence they adorn the elements in their active and asserted for since their form comes to nothing, they can- passive state. But this state will not remain in the ele- not resume the same identical form. On the other hand if ments: wherefore there is no need for animals or plants to not all but some of them remain, since there is no more remain. reason for one of them remaining for ever rather than an- Reply to Objection 2. Neither animals nor plants other, it would seem that none of them will. But whatever nor any other bodies merited anything by their services remains after the world has been renewed will remain for to man, since they lack free-will. However, certain bod- ever, generation and corruption being done away. There- ies are said to be rewarded in so far as man merited that fore plants and animals will altogether cease after the re- those things should be renewed which are adapted to be newal of the world. renewed. But plants and animals are not adapted to the Further, according to the Philosopher (De Generat. ii) renewal of incorruption, as stated above. Wherefore for the species of animals, plants and such like corruptible this very reason man did not merit that they should be re- things, are not perpetuated except by the continuance of newed, since no one can merit for another, or even for the heavenly movement. Now this will cease then. There- himself that which another or himself is incapable of re- fore it will be impossible for those species to be perpetu- ceiving. Hence, granted even that dumb animals merited ated. by serving man, it would not follow that they are to be Further, if the end cease, those things which are di- renewed. rected to the end should cease. Now animals and plants Reply to Objection 3. Just as several kinds of perfec- were made for the upkeep of human life; wherefore it is tion are ascribed to man (for there is the perfection of cre- written (Gn. 9:3): “Even as the green herbs have I de- ated nature and the perfection of glorified nature), so also livered all flesh to you∗.” Therefore when man’s animal there is a twofold perfection of the universe, one corre- life ceases, animals and plants should cease. But after this sponding to this state of changeableness, the other corre- renewal animal life will cease in man. Therefore neither sponding to the state of a future renewal. Now plants and plants nor animals ought to remain. animals belong to its perfection according to the present I answer that, Since the renewal of the world will state, and not according to the state of this renewal, since be for man’s sake it follows that it should be conformed they are not capable thereof. ∗ Vulg.: ‘have I delivered them all to you’ 3041 Reply to Objection 4. Although animals and plants as continue in being as long as the movement of the heaven to certain other respects are more noble than the elements, lasts: since there cannot be an appetite for an effect to the elements are more noble in relation to incorruption, as last longer than its cause. Wherefore if at the cessation of explained above†. movement in the first movable body, plants and animals Reply to Objection 5. The natural desire to be for cease as to their species, it does not follow that the natural ever that is in animals and plants must be understood in appetite is frustrated. reference to the movement of the heaven, so that they may † Cf. q. 74, a. 1, ad 3 3042 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 92 Of the Vision of the Divine Essence in Reference to the Blessed∗ (In Three Articles) In the next place we must consider matters concerning the blessed after the general judgment. We shall consider: (1) Their vision of the Divine essence, wherein their bliss consists chiefly; (2) Their bliss and their mansions; (3) Their relations with the damned; (4) Their gifts, which are contained in their bliss; (5) The crowns which perfect and adorn their happiness. Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the saints will see God in His essence? (2) Whether they will see Him with the eyes of the body? (3) Whether in seeing God they will see all that God sees? Whether the human intellect can attain to the vision of God in His essence? Suppl. q. 92 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the human intellect the perfection of the intellect, there must needs be propor- cannot attain to the vision of God in His essence. For tion between intelligible and intellect, as between the vis- it is written (Jn. 1:18): “No man hath seen God at any ible object and the sight. But there is no possible propor- time”; and Chrysostom in his commentary says (Hom. xiv tion between our intellect and the Divine essence, since in Joan.) that “not even the heavenly essences, namely an infinite distance separates them. Therefore our intel- the Cherubim and Seraphim, have ever been able to see lect will be unable to attain to the vision of the Divine Him as He is.” Now, only equality with the angels is essence. promised to men (Mat. 22:30): “They. . . shall be as the Objection 7. Further, God is more distant from our angels of God in heaven.” Therefore neither will the saints intellect than the created intelligible is from our senses. in heaven see God in His essence. But the senses can nowise attain to the sight of a spiritual Objection 2. Further, Dionysius argues thus (Div. creature. Therefore neither will our intellect be able to Nom. i): “Knowledge is only of existing things.” Now attain to the vision of the Divine essence. whatever exists is finite, since it is confined to a certain Objection 8. Further, whenever the intellect under- genus: and therefore God, since He is infinite, is above all stands something actually it needs to be informed with existing things. Therefore there is no knowledge of Him, the likeness of the object understood, which likeness is and He is above all knowledge. the principle of the intellectual operation terminating in Objection 3. Further, Dionysius (De Myst. Theol. i) that object, even as heat is the principle of heating. Ac- shows that the most perfect way in which our intellect can cordingly if our intellect understands God, this must be by be united to God is when it is united to Him as to some- means of some likeness informing the intellect itself. Now thing unknown. Now that which is seen in its essence is this cannot be the very essence of God, since form and not unknown. Therefore it is impossible for our intellect thing informed must needs have one being, while the Di- to see God in His essence. vine essence differs from our intellect in essence and be- Objection 4. Further, Dionysius says (Ep. ad Caium ing. Therefore the form whereby our intellect is informed Monach.) that “the darkness”—for thus he calls the abun- in understanding God must needs be a likeness impressed dance of light—“which screens God is impervious to all by God on our intellect. But this likeness, being some- illuminations, and hidden from all knowledge: and if any- thing created, cannot lead to the knowledge of God except one in seeing God understood what he saw, he saw not as an effect leads to the knowledge of its cause. Therefore God Himself, but one of those things that are His.” There- it is impossible for our intellect to see God except through fore no created intellect will be able to see God in His His effect. But to see God through His effect is not to see essence. Him in His essence. Therefore our intellect will be unable Objection 5. Further, according to Dionysius (Ep. ad to see God in His essence. Hieroth.) “God is invisible on account of His surpassing Objection 9. Further, the Divine essence is more dis- glory.” Now His glory surpasses the human intellect in tant from our intellect than any angel or intelligence. Now heaven even as on the way. Therefore since He is invisi- according to Avicenna (Metaph. iii), “the existence of an ble on the way, so will He be in heaven. intelligence in our intellect does not imply that its essence Objection 6. Further, since the intelligible object is is in our intellect,” because in that case our knowledge of ∗ Cf. Ia, Q. 12 3043 the intelligence would be a substance and not an accident, essence. Therefore God will be seen in His essence by the “but that its likeness is impressed on our intellect.” There- saints in heaven. fore neither is God in our intellect, to be understood by Further, it is written (1 Jn. 3:2): “When He shall ap- us, except in so far as an impression of Him is in our in- pear we shall be like to Him, because we shall see Him as tellect. But this impression cannot lead to the knowledge He is.” Therefore we shall see Him in His essence. of the Divine essence, for since it is infinitely distant from Further, a gloss on 1 Cor. 15:24, “When He shall have the Divine essence, it degenerates to another image much delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father,” says: more than if the image of a white thing were to degenerate “Where,” i.e. in heaven, “the essence of Father, Son, and to the image of a black thing. Therefore, just as a person Holy Ghost shall be seen: this is given to the clean of heart in whose sight the image of a white thing degenerates to alone and is the highest bliss.” Therefore the blessed will the image of a black thing, on account of an indisposition see God in His essence. in the organ, is not said to see a white thing, so neither Further, it is written (Jn. 14:21): “He that loveth Me will our intellect be able to see God in His essence, since shall be loved of My Father; and I will love him, and will it understands God only by means of this impression. manifest Myself to him.” Now that which is manifested Objection 10. Further, “In things devoid of matter is seen in its essence. Therefore God will be seen in His that which understands is the same as that which is under- essence by the saints in heaven. stood” (De Anima iii). Now God is supremely devoid of Further, Gregory commenting (Moral. xviii) on the matter. Since then our intellect, which is created, cannot words of Ex. 33:20, “Man shall not see Me and live,” attain to be an uncreated essence, it is impossible for our disapproves of the opinion of those who said that “in this intellect to see God in His essence. abode of bliss God can be seen in His glory but not in His Objection 11. Further, whatever is seen in its essence nature; for His glory differs not from His nature.” But His is known as to what it is. But our intellect cannot know nature is His essence. Therefore He will be seen in His of God what He is, but only what He is not as Dionysius essence. (Coel. Hier. ii) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. i) declare. Further, the desire of the saints cannot be altogether Therefore our intellect will be unable to see God in His frustrated. Now the common desire of the saints is to see essence. God in His essence, according to Ex. 33:13, “Show me Objection 12. Further, every infinite thing, as such, is Thy glory”; Ps. 79:20, “Show Thy face and we shall be unknown. But God is in every way infinite. Therefore He saved”; and Jn. 14:8, “Show us the Father and it is enough is altogether unknown. Therefore it will be impossible for for us.” Therefore the saints will see God in His essence. Him to be seen in His essence by a created intellect. I answer that, Even as we hold by faith that the last Objection 13. Further, Augustine says (De Videndo end of man’s life is to see God, so the philosophers main- Deo: Ep. cxlvii): “God is by nature invisible.” Now that tained that man’s ultimate happiness is to understand im- which is in God by nature cannot be otherwise. Therefore material substances according to their being. Hence in ref- it is impossible for Him to be seen in His essence. erence to this question we find that philosophers and the- Objection 14. Further, whatever is in one way and is ologians encounter the same difficulty and the same dif- seen in another way is not seen as it is. Now God is in ference of opinion. For some philosophers held that our one way and will be seen in another way by the saints in passive intellect can never come to understand separate heaven: for He according to His own mode, but will be substances. thus Alfarabius expresses himself at the end seen by the saints according to their mode. Therefore He of his Ethics, although he says the contrary in his book On will not be seen by the saints as He is, and thus will not the Intelligence, as the Commentator attests (De Anima be seen in His essence. iii). In like manner certain theologians held that the hu- Objection 15. Further, that which is seen through a man intellect can never attain to the vision of God in His medium is not seen in its essence. Now God will be seen essence. on either side they were moved by the distance in heaven through a medium which is the light of glory, which separates our intellect from the Divine essence and according to Ps. 35:10, “In Thy light we shall see light.” from separate substances. For since the intellect in act is Therefore He will not be seen in His essence. somewhat one with the intelligible object in act, it would Objection 16. Further, in heaven God will be seen seem difficult to understand how the created intellect is face to face, according to 1 Cor. 13:12. Now when we made to be an uncreated essence. Wherefore Chrysostom see a man face to face, we see him through his likeness. says (Hom. xiv in Joan.): “How can the creature see the Therefore in heaven God will be seen through His like- uncreated?” Those who hold the passive intellect to be ness, and consequently not in His essence. the subject of generation and corruption, as being a power On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 13:12): “We dependent on the body, encounter a still greater difficulty see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face not only as regards the vision of God but also as regards to face.” Now that which is seen face to face is seen in its the vision of any separate substances. But this opinion 3044 is altogether untenable. First, because it is in contradic-But this reasoning is seemingly inconclusive. First, tion to the authority of canonical scripture, as Augustine because the quiddity of the material substance, which the declares (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii). Secondly, be- intellect abstracts, is not of the same nature as the quid- cause, since understanding is an operation most proper to dity of the separate substances, and consequently from man, it follows that his happiness must be held to consist the fact that our intellect abstracts the quiddities of ma- in that operation when perfected in him. Now since the terial substances and knows them, it does not follow that perfection of an intelligent being as such is the intelligible it knows the quiddity of a separate substance, especially object, if in the most perfect operation of his intellect man of the Divine essence, which more than any other is of does not attain to the vision of the Divine essence, but to a different nature from any created quiddity. Secondly, something else, we shall be forced to conclude that some- because granted that it be of the same nature, neverthe- thing other than God is the object of man’s happiness: and less the knowledge of a composite thing would not lead since the ultimate perfection of a thing consists in its being to the knowledge of a separate substance, except in the united to its principle, it follows that something other than point of the most remote genus, namely substance: and God is the effective principle of man, which is absurd, ac- such a knowledge is imperfect unless it reach to the prop- cording to us, and also according to the philosophers who erties of a thing. For to know a man only as an animal maintain that our souls emanate from the separate sub- is to know him only in a restricted sense and potentially: stances, so that finally we may be able to understand these and much less is it to know only the nature of substance substances. Consequently, according to us, it must be as- in him. Hence to know God thus, or other separate sub- serted that our intellect will at length attain to the vision stances, is not to see the essence of God or the quiddity of the Divine essence, and according to the philosophers, of a separate substance, but to know Him in His effect that it will attain to the vision of separate substances. and in a mirror as it were. For this reason Avicenna in It remains, then, to examine how this may come about. his Metaphysics. propounds another way of understand- For some, like Alfarabius and Avempace, held that from ing separate substances, to wit that separate substances the very fact that our intellect understands any intelligi- are understood by us by means of intentions of their quid- ble objects whatever, it attains to the vision of a separate dities, such intentions being images of their substances, substance. To prove this they employ two arguments. The not indeed abstracted therefrom, since they are immate- first is that just as the specific nature is not diversified in rial, but impressed thereby on our souls. But this way also various individuals, except as united to various individu- seems inadequate to the Divine vision which we seek. For ating principles, so the idea understood is not diversified it is agreed that “whatever is received into any thing is in me and you, except in so far as it is united to vari- therein after the mode of the recipient”: and consequently ous imaginary forms: and consequently when the intellect the likeness of the Divine essence impressed on our intel- separates the idea understood from the imaginary forms, lect will be according to the mode of our intellect: and there remains a quiddity understood, which is one and the the mode of our intellect falls short of a perfect reception same in the various persons understanding it, and such is of the Divine likeness. Now the lack of perfect likeness the quiddity of a separate substance. Hence, when our in- may occur in as many ways, as unlikeness may occur. For tellect attains to the supreme abstraction of any intelligible in one way there is a deficient likeness, when the form is quiddity, it thereby understands the quiddity of the sepa- participated according to the same specific nature, but not rate substance that is similar to it. The second argument in the same measure of perfection: such is the defective is that our intellect has a natural aptitude to abstract the likeness in a subject that has little whiteness in compari- quiddity from all intelligible objects having a quiddity. If, son with one that has much. In another way the likeness then, the quiddity which it abstracts from some particular is yet more defective, when it does not attain to the same individual be a quiddity without a quiddity, the intellect specific nature but only to the same generic nature: such by understanding it understands the quiddity of the sep- is the likeness of an orange-colored or yellowish object in arate substance which has a like disposition, since sepa- comparison with a white one. In another way, still more rate substances are subsisting quiddities without quiddi- defective is the likeness when it does not attain to the same ties; for the quiddity of a simple thing is the simple thing generic nature, but only to a certain analogy or proportion: itself, as Avicenna says (Met. iii). On the other hand if such is the likeness of whiteness to man, in that each is a the quiddity abstracted from this particular sensible be a being: and in this way every likeness received into a crea- quiddity that has a quiddity, it follows that the intellect ture is defective in comparison with the Divine essence. has a natural aptitude to abstract this quiddity, and conse- Now in order that the sight know whiteness, it is neces- quently since we cannot go on indefinitely, we shall come sary for it to receive the likeness of whiteness according to some quiddity without a quiddity, and this is what we to its specific nature, although not according to the same understand by a separate quiddity∗. manner of being because the form has a manner of being ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 88, a. 2 3045 in the sense other from that which it has in the thing out-and matter, there results one thing simply, so from the side the soul: for if the form of yellowness were received form whereby the intellect understands, and the intellect into the eye, the eye would not be said to see whiteness. In itself, there results one thing intelligibly. Now in natural like manner in order that the intellect understand a quid- things a self-subsistent thing cannot be the form of any dity, it is necessary for it to receive its likeness according matter, if that thing has matter as one of its parts, since it to the same specific nature, although there may possibly is impossible for matter to be the form of a thing. But if not be the same manner of being on either side: for the this self-subsistent thing be a mere form, nothing hinders form which is in the intellect or sense is not the principle it from being the form of some matter and becoming that of knowledge according to its manner of being on both whereby the composite itself is∗ as instanced in the soul. sides, but according to its common ratio with the external Now in the intellect we must take the intellect itself in po- object. Hence it is clear that by no likeness received in tentiality as matter, and the intelligible species as form; so the created intellect can God be understood, so that His that the intellect actually understanding will be the com- essence be seen immediately. And for this reason those posite as it were resulting from both. Hence if there be a who held the Divine essence to be seen in this way alone, self-subsistent thing, that has nothing in itself besides that said that the essence itself will not be seen, but a certain which is intelligible, such a thing can by itself be the form brightness, as it were a radiance thereof. Consequently whereby the intellect understands. Now a thing is intelli- neither does this way suffice for the Divine vision that we gible in respect of its actuality and not of its potentiality seek. (Met. ix): in proof of which an intelligible form needs to Therefore we must take the other way, which also cer- be abstracted from matter and from all the properties of tain philosophers held, namely Alexander and Averroes matter. Therefore, since the Divine essence is pure act, it (De Anima iii.). For since in every knowledge some form will be possible for it to be the form whereby the intellect is required whereby the object is known or seen, this form understands: and this will be the beatific vision. Hence by which the intellect is perfected so as to see separate the Master says (Sent. ii, D, 1) that the union of the body substances is neither a quiddity abstracted by the intellect with the soul is an illustration of the blissful union of the from composite things, as the first opinion maintained, spirit with God. nor an impression left on our intellect by the separate sub- Reply to Objection 1. The words quoted can be ex- stance, as the second opinion affirmed; but the separate plained in three ways, according to Augustine (De Vi- substance itself united to our intellect as its form, so as dendo Deo: Ep. cxlvii). In one way as excluding cor- to be both that which is understood, and that whereby it poreal vision, whereby no one ever saw or will see God is understood. And whatever may be the case with other in His essence; secondly, as excluding intellectual vision separate substances, we must nevertheless allow this to be of God in His essence from those who dwell in this mor- our way of seeing God in His essence, because by what- tal flesh; thirdly, as excluding the vision of comprehen- ever other form our intellect were informed, it could not sion from a created intellect. It is thus that Chrysostom be led thereby to the Divine essence. This, however, must understands the saying wherefore he adds: “By seeing, not be understood as though the Divine essence were in the evangelist means a most clear perception, and such a reality the form of our intellect, or as though from its con- comprehension as the Father has of the Son.” This also is junction with our intellect there resulted one being simply, the meaning of the evangelist, since he adds: “The Only- as in natural things from the natural form and matter: but begotten Son Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath the meaning is that the proportion of the Divine essence declared Him”: his intention being to prove the Son to be to our intellect is as the proportion of form to matter. For God from His comprehending God. whenever two things, one of which is the perfection of the Reply to Objection 2. Just as God, by His infinite other, are received into the same recipient, the proportion essence, surpasses all existing things which have a deter- of one to the other, namely of the more perfect to the less minate being, so His knowledge, whereby He knows, is perfect, is as the proportion of form to matter: thus light above all knowledge. Wherefore as our knowledge is to and color are received into a transparent object, light be- our created essence, so is the Divine knowledge to His in- ing to color as form to matter. When therefore intellectual finite essence. Now two things contribute to knowledge, light is received into the soul, together with the indwelling to wit, the knower and the thing known. Again, the vi- Divine essence, though they are not received in the same sion whereby we shall see God in His essence is the same way, the Divine essence will be to the intellect as form to whereby God sees Himself, as regards that whereby He is matter: and that this suffices for the intellect to be able to seen, because as He sees Himself in His essence so shall see the Divine essence by the Divine essence itself may we also see Him. But as regards the knower there is the be shown as follows. difference that is between the Divine intellect and ours. As from the natural form (whereby a thing has being) Now in the order of knowledge the object known follows ∗ Literally,—and becoming the ‘whereby-it-is’ of the composite itself 3046 the form by which we know, since by the form of a stone We may also reply that proportion according to the we see a stone: whereas the efficacy of knowledge follows strict sense in which it is employed signifies a ratio of the power of the knower: thus he who has stronger sight quantity to quantity based on a certain fixed excess or sees more clearly. Consequently in that vision we shall equality; but is further transferred to denote any ratio of see the same thing that God sees, namely His essence, but any one thing to another; and in this sense we say that mat- not so effectively. ter should be proportionate to its form. In this sense noth- Reply to Objection 3. Dionysius is speaking there of ing hinders our intellect, although finite, being described the knowledge whereby wayfarers know God by a created as proportionate to the vision of the Divine essence; but form, whereby our intellect is informed so as to see God. not to the comprehension thereof, on account of its im- But as Augustine says (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii), mensity. “God evades every form of our intellect,” because what- Reply to Objection 7. Likeness and distance are ever form our intellect conceive, that form is out of pro- twofold. One is according to agreement in nature; and portion to the Divine essence. Hence He cannot be fath- thus God is more distant from the created intellect than omed by our intellect: but our most perfect knowledge the created intelligible is from the sense. The other is ac- of Him as wayfarers is to know that He is above all that cording to proportionateness; and thus it is the other way our intellect can conceive, and thus we are united to Him about, for sense is not proportionate to the knowledge as to something unknown. In heaven, however, we shall of the immaterial, as the intellect is proportionate to the see Him by a form which is His essence, and we shall be knowledge of any immaterial object whatsoever. It is this united to Him as to something known. likeness and not the former that is requisite for knowledge, Reply to Objection 4. God is light (Jn. 1:9). Now il- for it is clear that the intellect understanding a stone is not lumination is the impression of light on an illuminated ob-like it in its natural being; thus also the sight apprehends ject. And since the Divine essence is of a different mode red honey and red gall, though it does not apprehend sweet from any likeness thereof impressed on the intellect, he honey, for the redness of gall is more becoming to honey (Dionysius) says that the “Divine darkness is impervious as visible, than the sweetness of honey to honey. to all illumination,” because, to wit, the Divine essence, Reply to Objection 8. In the vision wherein God will which he calls “darkness” on account of its surpassing be seen in His essence, the Divine essence itself will be brightness, remains undemonstrated by the impression on the form, as it were, of the intellect, by which it will un- our intellect, and consequently is “hidden from all knowl- derstand: nor is it necessary for them to become one in edge.” Therefore if anyone in seeing God conceives some- being, but only to become one as regards the act of under- thing in his mind, this is not God but one of God’s effects. standing. Reply to Objection 5. Although the glory of God sur- Reply to Objection 9. We do not uphold the saying passes any form by which our intellect is informed now, of Avicenna as regards the point at issue, for in this other it does not surpass the Divine essence, which will be the philosophers also disagree with him. Unless perhaps we form of our intellect in heaven: and therefore although it might say that Avicenna refers to the knowledge of sepa- is invisible now, it will be visible then. rate substances, in so far as they are known by the habits Reply to Objection 6. Although there can be no pro- of speculative sciences and the likeness of other things. portion between finite and infinite, since the excess of the Hence he makes this statement in order to prove that in infinite over the finite is indeterminate, there can be pro- us knowledge is not a substance but an accident. Never- portionateness or a likeness to proportion between them: theless, although the Divine essence is more distant, as to for as a finite thing is equal to some finite thing, so is the property of its nature, from our intellect, than is the an infinite thing equal to an infinite thing. Now in order substance of an angel, it surpasses it in the point of in- that a thing be known totally, it is sometimes necessary telligibility, since it is pure act without any admixture of that there be proportion between knower and known, be- potentiality, which is not the case with other separate sub- cause the power of the knower needs to be adequate to the stances. Nor will that knowledge whereby we shall see knowableness of the thing known, and equality is a kind God in His essence be in the genus of accident as regards of proportion. Sometimes, however, the knowableness of that whereby He will be seen, but only as regards the act the thing surpasses the power of the knower, as when we of the one who understands Him, for this act will not be know God, or conversely when He knows creatures: and the very substance either of the person understanding or then there is no need for proportion between knower and of the thing understood. known, but only for proportionateness; so that, to wit, as Reply to Objection 10. A substance that is separate the knower is to the knowable object, so is the knowable from matter understands both itself and other things; and object to the fact of its being known: and this proportion- in both cases the authority quoted can be verified. For ateness suffices for the infinite to be known by the finite, since the very essence of a separate substance is of itself or conversely. intelligible and actual, through being separate from mat- 3047 ter, it is clear that when a separate substance understands will not have so great an efficacy in seeing, as the Divine itself, that which understands and that which is under- essence has to the effect of being seen. stood are absolutely identical, for it does not understand Reply to Objection 15. There is a threefold medium itself by an intention abstracted from itself, as we under- both in bodily and in intellectual vision. The first is the stand material objects. And this is apparently the mean- medium “under which” the object is seen, and this is ing of the Philosopher (De Anima iii.) as indicated by the something perfecting the sight so as to see in general, Commentator (De Anima iii). But when it understands without determining the sight to any particular object. other things, the object actually understood becomes one Such is bodily light in relation to bodily vision; and the with the intellect in act, in so far as the form of the ob- light of the active intellect in relation to the passive in- ject understood becomes the form of the intellect, for as tellect, in so far as this light is a medium. The second much as the intellect is in act; not that it becomes identi- is the light “by which” the object is seen, and this is the fied with the essence of the intellect, as Avicenna proves visible form whereby either sight is determined to a spe- (De Natural. vi.), because the essence of the intellect re- cial object, for instance by the form of a stone to know mains one under two forms whereby it understands two a stone. The third is the medium “in which” it is seen; things in succession, in the same way as primary matter and this is something by gazing on which the sight is led remains one under various forms. Hence also the Com- to something else: thus by looking in a mirror it is led to mentator (De Anima iii.) compares the passive intellect, see the things reflected in the mirror, and by looking at an in this respect, to primary matter. Thus it by no means image it is led to the thing represented by the image. In follows that our intellect in seeing God becomes the very this way, too, the intellect from knowing an effect is led essence of God, but that the latter is compared to it as its to the cause, or conversely. Accordingly in the heavenly perfection or form. vision there will be no third medium, so that, to wit, God Reply to Objection 11. These and all like authorities be known by the images of other things, as He is known must be understood to refer to the knowledge whereby we now, for which reason we are said to see now in a glass: know God on the way, for the reason given above. nor will there be the second medium, because the essence Reply to Objection 12. The infinite is unknown if we itself of God will be that whereby our intellect will see take it in the privative sense, as such, because it indicates God. But there will only be the first medium, which will removal of completion whence knowledge of a thing is upraise our intellect so that it will be possible for it to be derived. Wherefore the infinite amounts to the same as united to the uncreated substance in the aforesaid man- matter subject to privation, as stated in Phys. iii. But if ner. Yet this medium will not cause that knowledge to be we take the infinite in the negative sense, it indicates the mediate, because it does not come in between the knower absence of limiting matter, since even a form is somewhat and the thing known, but is that which gives the knower limited by its matter. Hence the infinite in this sense is the power to know∗. of itself most knowable; and it is in this way that God is Reply to Objection 16. Corporeal creatures are not infinite. said to be seen immediately, except when that which in Reply to Objection 13. Augustine is speaking of bod- them is capable of being brought into conjunction with ily vision, by which God will never be seen. This is evi- the sight is in conjunction therewith. Now they are not dent from what precedes: “For no man hath seen God at capable of being in conjunction with the sight of their any time, nor can any man see Him as these things which essence on account of their materiality: hence they are we call visible are seen: in this way He is by nature invis- seen immediately when their image is in conjunction with ible even as He is incorruptible.” As, however, He is by the sight. But God is able to be united to the intellect by nature supremely being, so He is in Himself supremely His essence: wherefore He would not be seen immedi- intelligible. But that He be for a time not understood by ately, unless His essence were united to the intellect: and us is owing to our defect: wherefore that He be seen by us this vision, which is effected immediately, is called “vi- after being unseen is owing to a change not in Him but in sion of face.” Moreover the likeness of the corporeal ob- us. ject is received into the sight according to the same ratio Reply to Objection 14. In heaven God will be seen as it is in the object, although not according to the same by the saints as He is, if this be referred to the mode of the mode of being. Wherefore this likeness leads to the ob- object seen, for the saints will see that God has the mode ject directly: whereas no likeness can lead our intellect in which He has. But if we refer the mode to the knower, this way to God, as shown above: and for this reason the He will not be seen as He is, because the created intellect comparison fails. ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 12, a. 5 3048 Whether after the resurrection the saints will see God with the eyes of the body? ∗ Suppl. q. 92 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that after the resurrection Further, Jerome, commenting on Is. 6:1, “I saw the the saints will see God with the eyes of the body. Because Lord sitting,” says: “The Godhead not only of the Father, the glorified eye has greater power than one that is not glo- but also of the Son and of the Holy Ghost is visible, not to rified. Now the blessed Job saw God with his eyes (Job carnal eyes, but only to the eyes of the mind, of which it 42:5): “With the hearing of the ear, I have heard Thee, but is said: Blessed are the pure in heart.” now my eye seeth Thee.” Much more therefore will the Further, Jerome says again (as quoted by Augustine, glorified eye be able to see God in His essence. Ep. cxlvii): “An incorporeal thing is invisible to a corpo- Objection 2. Further, it is written (Job 19:26): “In real eye.” But God is supremely incorporeal. Therefore, my flesh I shall see God my Saviour [Vulg.: ‘my God’].” etc. Therefore in heaven God will be seen with the eyes of the Further, Augustine says (De Videndo Deo, Ep. cxlvii): body. “No man hath seen God as He is at any time, neither in this Objection 3. Further. Augustine, speaking of the life, nor in the angelic life, in the same way as these visi- sight of the glorified eyes, expresses himself as follows ble things which are seen with the corporeal sight.” Now (De Civ. Dei xxii): “A greater power will be in those the angelic life is the life of the blessed, wherein they will eyes, not to see more keenly, as certain serpents or ea- live after the resurrection. Therefore, etc. gles are reported to see (for whatever acuteness of vision Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv.), “man is possessed by these animals they can see only corpo- is said to be made to God’s image inasmuch as he is able real things), but to see even incorporeal things.” Now any to see God.” But man is in God’s image as regards his power that is capable of knowing incorporeal things can mind, and not as regards his flesh. Therefore he will see be upraised to see God. Therefore the glorified eyes will God with his mind and not with his flesh. be able to see God. I answer that, A thing is perceptible to the senses of Objection 4. Further, the disparity of corporeal to in- the body in two ways, directly and indirectly. A thing corporeal things is the same as of incorporeal to corpo- is perceptible directly if it can act directly on the bodily real. Now the incorporeal eye can see corporeal things. senses. And a thing can act directly either on sense as such Therefore the corporeal eye can see the incorporeal: and or on a particular sense as such. That which acts directly consequently the same conclusion follows. in this second way on a sense is called a proper sensible, Objection 5. Further, Gregory, commenting on Job for instance color in relation to the sight, and sound in re- 4:16, “There stood one whose countenance I knew not,” lation to the hearing. But as sense as such makes use of a says (Moral. v): “Man who, had he been willing to obey bodily organ, nothing can be received therein except cor- the command, would have been spiritual in the flesh, be- poreally, since whatever is received into a thing is therein came, by sinning, carnal even in mind.” Now through be- after the mode of the recipient. Hence all sensibles act coming carnal in mind, “he thinks only of those things on the sense as such, according to their magnitude: and which he draws to his soul by the images of bodies” consequently magnitude and all its consequences, such as (Moral. v). Therefore when he will be spiritual in the flesh movement, rest, number, and the like, are called common (which is promised to the saints after the resurrection), he sensibles, and yet they are direct objects of sense. will be able even in the flesh to see spiritual things. There- An indirect object of sense is that which does not act fore the same conclusion follows. on the sense, neither as sense nor as a particular sense, Objection 6. Further, man can be beatified by God but is annexed to those things that act on sense directly: alone. Now he will be beatified not only in soul but also for instance Socrates; the son of Diares; a friend and the in body. Therefore God will be visible not only to his like which are the direct object of the intellect’s knowl- intellect but also to his flesh. edge in the universal, and in the particular are the object of Objection 7. Further, even as God is present to the the cogitative power in man, and of the estimative power intellect by His essence, so will He be to the senses, be- in other animals. The external sense is said to perceive cause He will be “all in all” (1 Cor. 15:28). Now He will things of this kind, although indirectly, when the appre- be seen by the intellect through the union of His essence hensive power (whose province it is to know directly this therewith. Therefore He will also be visible to the sense. thing known), from that which is sensed directly, appre- On the contrary, Ambrose, commenting on Lk. 1:2, hends them at once and without any doubt or discourse “There appeared to him an angel,” says: “God is not (thus we see that a person is alive from the fact that he sought with the eyes of the body, nor surveyed by the speaks): otherwise the sense is not said to perceive it even sight, nor clasped by the touch.” Therefore God will by indirectly. no means be visible to the bodily sense. I say then that God can nowise be seen with the eyes of ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 12, a. 3 3049 the body, or perceived by any of the senses, as that which from what he had said before: “Therefore they will have is seen directly, neither here, nor in heaven: for if that an altogether different power, if they shall see that incor- which belongs to sense as such be removed from sense, poreal nature”: and then he goes on to say: “Accordingly there will be no sense, and in like manner if that which be- a greater power,” etc., and afterwards he explains himself. longs to sight as sight be removed therefrom, there will be Reply to Objection 4. All knowledge results from no sight. Accordingly seeing that sense as sense perceives some kind of abstraction from matter. Wherefore the more magnitude, and sight as such a sense perceives color, it is a corporeal form is abstracted from matter, the more is it impossible for the sight to perceive that which is neither a principle of knowledge. Hence it is that a form exist- color nor magnitude, unless we call it a sense equivocally. ing in matter is in no way a principle of knowledge, while Since then sight and sense will be specifically the same a form existing in the senses is somewhat a principle of in the glorified body, as in a non-glorified body, it will be knowledge, in so far as it is abstracted from matter, and impossible for it to see the Divine essence as an object a form existing in the intellect is still better a principle of of direct vision; yet it will see it as an object of indirect knowledge. Therefore the spiritual eye, whence the obsta- vision, because on the one hand the bodily sight will see cle to knowledge is removed, can see a corporeal object: so great a glory of God in bodies, especially in the glori- but it does not follow that the corporeal eye, in which the fied bodies and most of all in the body of Christ, and, on cognitive power is deficient as participating in matter, be the other hand, the intellect will see God so clearly, that able to know perfectly incorporeal objects of knowledge. God will be perceived in things seen with the eye of the Reply to Objection 5. Although the mind that has body, even as life is perceived in speech. For although our become carnal cannot think but of things received from intellect will not then see God from seeing His creatures, the senses, it thinks of them immaterially. In like manner yet it will see God in His creatures seen corporeally. This whatever the sight apprehends it must always apprehend it manner of seeing God corporeally is indicated by Augus- corporeally: wherefore it cannot know things which can- tine (De Civ. Dei xxii), as is clear if we take note of his not be apprehended corporeally. words, for he says: “It is very credible that we shall so see Reply to Objection 6. Beatitude is the perfection of the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, man as man. And since man is man not through his body as to see most clearly God everywhere present, governing but through his soul, and the body is essential to man, in all corporeal things, not as we now see the invisible things so far as it is perfected by the soul: it follows that man’s of God as understood by those that are made, but as when beatitude does not consist chiefly otherwise than in an act we see men. . . we do not believe but see that they live.” of the soul, and passes from the soul on to the body by Reply to Objection 1. This saying of Job refers to the a kind of overflow, as explained above (q. 85, a. 1). Yet spiritual eye, of which the Apostle says (Eph. 1:18): “The our body will have a certain beatitude from seeing God in eyes of our [Vulg.: ‘your’] heart enlightened.” sensible creatures: and especially in Christ’s body. Reply to Objection 2. The passage quoted does not Reply to Objection 7. The intellect can perceive spir- mean that we are to see God with the eyes of the flesh, but itual things, whereas the eyes of the body cannot: where- that, in the flesh, we shall see God. fore the intellect will be able to know the Divine essence Reply to Objection 3. In these words Augustine united to it, but the eyes of the body will not. speaks as one inquiring and conditionally. This appears Whether the saints, seeing God, see all that God sees? ∗ Suppl. q. 92 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the saints, seeing God 7), that “when an intellect understands the greatest things, in His essence, see all that God sees in Himself. For as it is all the more able to understand the least things.” Now Isidore says (De Sum. Bon. 1.): “The angels know all God is the greatest of intelligible things. Therefore the things in the World of God, before they happen.” Now the power of the intellect is greatly increased by understand- saints will be equal to the angels of God (Mat. 22:30). ing Him. Therefore the intellect seeing Him understands Therefore the saints also in seeing God see all things. all things. Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Dial. iv.): “Since Objection 4. Further, the intellect is not hindered all see God there with equal clearness, what do they not from understanding a thing except by this surpassing it. know, who know Him Who knows all things?” and he Now no creature surpasses the intellect that understands refers to the blessed who see God in His essence. There- God, since, as Gregory says (Dial. ii.), “to the soul which fore those who see God in His essence know all things. sees its Creator all creatures are small.” Therefore those Objection 3. Further, it is stated in De Anima (iii, text. who see God in His essence know all things. ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 12, Aa. 7,8 3050 Objection 5. Further, every passive power that is not Therefore an angel while seeing the Divine essence may reduced to act is imperfect. Now the passive intellect of be ignorant of certain things. But the soul will not see God the human soul is a power that is passive as it were to the more perfectly than an angel. Therefore the souls seeing knowledge of all things, since “the passive intellect is in God will not necessarily see all things. which all are in potentiality” (De Anima iii, text. 18). If Further, Christ alone has the spirit not “by measure” then in that beatitude it were not to understand all things, (Jn. 3:34). Now it becomes Christ, as having the spirit it would remain imperfect, which is absurd. without measure, to know all things in the Word: where- Objection 6. Further, whoever sees a mirror sees the fore it is stated in the same place (Jn. 3:35) that “the things reflected in the mirror. Now all things are reflected Father. . . hath given all things into His hand.” Therefore in the Word of God as in a mirror, because He is the type none but Christ is competent to know all things in the and image of all. Therefore the saints who see the Word Word. in its essence see all created things. Further, the more perfectly a principle is known, the Objection 7. Further, according to Prov. 10:24, “to more of its effects are known thereby. Now some of those the just their desire shall be given.” Now the just desire to who see God in His essence will know God more perfectly know all things, since “all men desire naturally to know,” than others. Therefore some will know more things than and nature is not done away by glory. Therefore God will others, and consequently every one will not know all. grant them to know all things. I answer that, God by seeing his essence knows all Objection 8. Further, ignorance is one of the penal- things whatsoever that are, shall be, or have been: and ties of the present life∗. Now all penalty will be removed He is said to know these things by His “knowledge of from the saints by glory. Therefore all ignorance will be vision,” because He knows them as though they were removed: and consequently they will know all. present in likeness to corporeal vision. Moreover by see- Objection 9. Further, the beatitude of the saints is ing this essence He knows all that He can do, although He in their soul before being in their body. Now the bodies never did them, nor ever will: else He would not know of the saints will be reformed in glory to the likeness of His power perfectly; since a power cannot be known un- Christ’s body (Phil. 3:21). Therefore their souls will be less its objects be known: and this is called His “science” perfected in likeness to the soul of Christ. Now Christ’s or “knowledge of simple intelligence.” Now it is impos- soul sees all things in the Word. Therefore all the souls of sible for a created intellect, by seeing the Divine essence, the saints will also see all things in the Word. to know all that God can do, because the more perfectly a Objection 10. Further, the intellect, like the senses, principle is known, the more things are known in it; thus knows all the things with the image of which it is in- in one principle of demonstration one who is quick of in- formed. Now the Divine essence shows a thing forth more telligence sees more conclusions than one who is slow of clearly than any other image thereof. Therefore since in intelligence. Since then the extent of the Divine power is that blessed vision the Divine essence becomes the form measured according to what it can do, if an intellect were as it were of our intellect, it would seem that the saints to see in the Divine essence all that God can do, its per- seeing God see all. fection in understanding would equal in extent the Divine Objection 11. Further, the Commentator says (De power in producing its effects, and thus it would compre- Anima iii), that “if the active intellect were the form of the hend the Divine power, which is impossible for any cre- passive intellect, we should understand all things.” Now ated intellect to do. Yet there is a created intellect, namely the Divine essence represents all things more clearly than the soul of Christ†, which knows in the Word all that God the active intellect. Therefore the intellect that sees God knows by the knowledge of vision. But regarding others in His essence knows all things. who see the Divine essence there are two opinions. For Objection 12. Further, the lower angels are enlight- some say that all who see God in His essence see all that ened by the higher about the things they are ignorant of, God sees by His knowledge of vision. This, however, is for the reason that they know not all things. Now after contrary to the sayings of holy men, who hold that angels the day of judgment, one angel will not enlighten another; are ignorant of some things; and yet it is clear that accord- for then all superiority will cease, as a gloss observes on 1 ing to faith all the angels see God in His essence. Where- Cor. 15:24, “When He shall have brought to nought,” etc. fore others say that others than Christ, although they see Therefore the lower angels will then know all things, and God in His essence, do not see all that God sees because for the same reason all the other saints who will see God they do not comprehend the Divine essence. For it is not in His essence. necessary that he who knows a cause should know all its On the contrary, Dionysius says (Hier. Eccles. vi): effects, unless he comprehend the cause: and this is not “The higher angels cleanse the lower angels from igno- in the competency of a created intellect. Consequently of rance.” Now the lower angels see the Divine essence. those who see God in His essence, each one sees in His ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 3 † Cf. IIIa, q. 16, a. 2 3051 essence so much the more things according as he sees the with its ultimate perfection, it is not said to be imper-Divine essence the more clearly: and hence it is that one fect, even though it lack some of the preceding disposi- is able to instruct another concerning these things. Thus tions. Now all knowledge by which the created intellect the knowledge of the angels and of the souls of the saints is perfected is directed to the knowledge of God as its can go on increasing until the day of judgment, even as end. Wherefore he who sees God in His essence, even other things pertaining to the accidental reward. But af- though he know nothing else, would have a perfect in- terwards it will increase no more, because then will be the tellect: nor is his intellect more perfect through knowing final state of things, and in that state it is possible that all something else besides Him, except in so far as it sees will know everything that God knows by the knowledge Him more fully. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v.): of vision. “Unhappy is he who knoweth all these” (namely, crea- Reply to Objection 1. The saying of Isidore, that “the tures), “and knoweth not Thee: but happy whoso knoweth angels know in the Word all things before they happen,” Thee, though he know not these. And whoso knoweth cannot refer to those things which God knows only by the both Thee and them is not the happier for them but for knowledge of simple intelligence, because those things Thee only.” will never happen; but it must refer to those things which Reply to Objection 6. This mirror has a will: and God knows only by the knowledge of vision. Even of even as He will show Himself to whom He will, so will these he does not say that all the angels know them all, but He show in Himself whatsoever He will. Nor does the that perhaps some do; and that even those who know do comparison with a material mirror hold, for it is not in its not know all perfectly. For in one and the same thing there power to be seen or not to be seen. are many intelligible aspects to be considered, such as its We may also reply that in a material mirror both object various properties and relations to other things: and it is and mirror are seen under their proper image; although the possible that while one thing is known in common by two mirror be seen through an image received from the thing persons, one of them perceives more aspects, and that the itself, whereas the stone is seen through its proper image one learns these aspects from the other. Hence Dionysius reflected in some other thing, where the reason for seeing says (Div. Nom. iv) that “the lower angels learn from the the one is the reason for seeing the other. But in the uncre- higher angels the intelligible aspects of things.” Where- ated mirror a thing is seen through the form of the mirror, fore it does not follow that even the angels who know all just as an effect is seen through the image of its cause and creatures are able to see all that can be understood in them. conversely. Consequently it does not follow that whoever Reply to Objection 2. It follows from this saying of sees the eternal mirror sees all that is reflected in that mir- Gregory that this blessed vision suffices for the seeing of ror: since he who sees the cause does not of necessity see all things on the part of the Divine essence, which is the all its effects, unless he comprehend the cause. medium by which one sees, and whereby God sees all Reply to Objection 7. The desire of the saints to things. That all things, however, are not seen is owing know all things will be fulfilled by the mere fact of their to the deficiency of the created intellect which does not seeing God: just as their desire to possess all good things comprehend the Divine essence. will be fulfilled by their possessing God. For as God suf- Reply to Objection 3. The created intellect sees the fices the affections in that He has perfect goodness, and by Divine essence not according to the mode of that same possessing Him we possess all goods as it were, so does essence, but according to its own mode which is finite. the vision of Him suffice the intellect: “Lord, show us the Hence its efficacy in knowing would need to be infinitely Father and it is enough for us” (Jn. 14:8). increased by reason of that vision in order for it to know Reply to Objection 8. Ignorance properly so called all things. denotes a privation and thus it is a punishment: for in this Reply to Objection 4. Defective knowledge results way ignorance is nescience of things, the knowledge of not only from excess and deficiency of the knowable ob- which is a duty or a necessity. Now the saints in heaven ject in relation to the intellect, but also from the fact that will not be ignorant of any of these things. Sometimes, the aspect of knowableness is not united to the intellect: however, ignorance is taken in a broad sense of any kind thus sometimes the sight sees not a stone, through the im- of nescience: and thus the angels and saints in heaven will age of the stone not being united to it. And although the be ignorant of certain things. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Divine essence which is the type of all things is united to Nom. iv) that “the angels will be cleansed from their ig- the intellect of one who sees God, it is united thereto not norance.” In this sense ignorance is not a penalty but a as the type of all things, but as the type of some and of so defect. Nor is it necessary for all such defects to be done much the more according as one sees the Divine essence away by glory: for thus we might say that it was a defect more fully. in Pope Linus that he did not attain to the glory of Peter. Reply to Objection 5. When a passive power is per- Reply to Objection 9. Our body will be conformed to ceptible by several perfections in order, if it be perfected the body of Christ in glory, in likeness but not in equality, 3052 for it will be endowed with clarity even as Christ’s body, angels will be consummated once for all, all the blessed but not equally. In like manner our soul will have glory in will know all that God knows by the knowledge of vi- likeness to the soul of Christ, but not in equality thereto: sion, yet so that not all will see all in the Divine essence. thus it will have knowledge even as Christ’s soul, but not Christ’s soul, however, will see clearly all things therein, so great, so as to know all as Christ’s soul does. even as it sees them now; while others will see therein a Reply to Objection 10. Although the Divine essence greater or lesser number of things according to the de- is the type of all things knowable it will not be united gree of clearness wherewith they will know God: and to each created intellect according as it is the type of all. thus Christ’s soul will enlighten all other souls concerning Hence the objection proves nothing. those things which it sees in the Word better than others. Reply to Objection 11. The active intellect is a form Hence it is written (Apoc. 21:23): “The glory of God shall proportionate to the passive intellect; even as the passive enlighten the city of Jerusalem∗, and the Lamb is the lamp power of matter is proportionate to the power of the nat- thereof.” In like manner the higher souls will enlighten ural agent, so that whatsoever is in the passive power of the lower (not indeed with a new enlightening, so as to in- matter or the passive intellect is in the active power of the crease the knowledge of the lower), but with a kind of con- active intellect or of the natural agent. Consequently if tinued enlightenment; thus we might understand the sun to the active intellect become the form of the passive intel- enlighten the atmosphere while at a standstill. Wherefore lect, the latter must of necessity know all those things to it is written (Dan. 12:3): “They that instruct many to jus- which the power of the active intellect extends. But the tice” shall shine “as stars for all eternity.” The statement Divine essence is not a form proportionate to our intellect that the superiority of the orders will cease refers to their in this sense. Hence the comparison fails. present ordinate ministry in our regard, as is clear from Reply to Objection 12. Nothing hinders us from say- the same gloss. ing that after the judgment day, when the glory of men and ∗ Vulg.: ‘hath enlightened it’ 3053 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 93 Of the Happiness of the Saints and Their Mansions (In Three Articles) We must next consider the happiness of the saints and their mansions. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the happiness of the saints will increase after the judgment? (2) Whether the degrees of happiness should be called mansions? (3) Whether the various mansions differ according to various degrees of charity? Whether the happiness of the saints will be greater after the judgment than before? Suppl. q. 93 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the happiness of the ness of the saints will be greater after the resurrection of saints will not be greater after the judgment than before. the body than before. For the nearer a thing approaches to the Divine likeness, I answer that, It is manifest that the happiness of the the more perfectly does it participate happiness. Now the saints will increase in extent after the resurrection, be- soul is more like God when separated from the body than cause their happiness will then be not only in the soul when united to it. Therefore its happiness is greater before but also in the body. Moreover, the soul’s happiness also being reunited to the body than after. will increase in extent, seeing that the soul will rejoice not Objection 2. Further, power is more effective when it only in its own good, but also in that of the body. We may is united than when divided. Now the soul is more united also say that the soul’s happiness will increase in inten- when separated from the body than when it is joined to the sity†. For man’s body may be considered in two ways: body. Therefore it has then greater power for operation, first, as being dependent on the soul for its completion; and consequently has a more perfect share of happiness, secondly, as containing something that hampers the soul since this consists in action∗. in its operations, through the soul not perfectly complet- Objection 3. Further, beatitude consists in an act of ing the body. As regards the first way of considering the the speculative intellect. Now the intellect, in its act, body, its union with the soul adds a certain perfection to makes no use of a bodily organ; and consequently by be- the soul, since every part is imperfect, and is completed ing reunited to the body the soul does not become capable in its whole; wherefore the whole is to the part as form of more perfect understanding. Therefore the soul’s hap- to matter. Consequently the soul is more perfect in its piness is not greater after than before the judgment. natural being, when it is in the whole—namely, man who Objection 4. Further, nothing can be greater than the results from the union of soul and body—than when it infinite, and so the addition of the finite to the infinite does is a separate part. But as regards the second considera-not result in something greater than the infinite by itself. tion the union of the body hampers the perfection of the Now the beatified soul before its reunion with the body is soul, wherefore it is written (Wis. 9:15) that “the cor- rendered happy by rejoicing in the infinite good, namely ruptible body is a load upon the soul.” If, then, there be God; and after the resurrection of the body it will rejoice removed from the body all those things wherein it ham- in nothing else except perhaps the glory of the body, and pers the soul’s action, the soul will be simply more per- this is a finite good. Therefore their joy after the resump- fect while existing in such a body than when separated tion of the body will not be greater than before. therefrom. Now the more perfect a thing is in being, the On the contrary, A gloss on Apoc. 6:9, “I saw un- more perfectly is it able to operate: wherefore the opera- der the altar the souls of them that were slain,” says: “At tion of the soul united to such a body will be more perfect present the souls of the saints are under the altar, i.e. less than the operation of the separated soul. But the glorified exalted than they will be.” Therefore their happiness will body will be a body of this description, being altogether be greater after the resurrection than after their death. subject to the spirit. Therefore, since beatitude consists in Further, just as happiness is bestowed on the good as a an operation‡, the soul’s happiness after its reunion with reward, so is unhappiness awarded to the wicked. But the the body will be more perfect than before. For just as the unhappiness of the wicked after reunion with their bodies soul separated from a corruptible body is able to operate will be greater than before, since they will be punished not more perfectly than when united thereto, so after it has only in the soul but also in the body. Therefore the happi- been united to a glorified body, its operation will be more ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 3, a. 2 † Cf. Ia IIae, q. 4, a. 5 , ad 5, where St. Thomas retracts this statement ‡ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 3, a. 2, seqq. 3054 perfect than while it was separated. Now every imperfection of the body will somewhat conduce to the perfec- fect thing desires its perfection. Hence the separated soul tion of the intellectual operation in so far as through being naturally desires reunion with the body and on account of united to a glorified body, the soul will be more perfect in this desire which proceeds from the soul’s imperfection its its nature, and consequently more effective in its opera- operation whereby it is borne towards God is less intense. tion, and accordingly the good itself of the body will con- This agrees with the saying of Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, duce instrumentally, as it were, to the operation wherein 35) that “on account of the body’s desire it is held back happiness consists: thus the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. i, from tending with all its might to that sovereign good.” 8,10) that external goods conduce instrumentally to the Reply to Objection 1. The soul united to a glorified happiness of life. body is more like to God than when separated therefrom, Reply to Objection 4. Although finite added to infi- in so far as when united it has more perfect being. For the nite does not make a greater thing, it makes more things, more perfect a thing is the more it is like to God: even so since finite and infinite are two things, while infinite taken the heart, the perfection of whose life consists in move- by itself is one. Now the greater extent of joy regards not a ment, is more like to God while in movement than while greater thing but more things. Wherefore joy is increased at rest, although God is never moved. in extent, through referring to God and to the body’s glory, Reply to Objection 2. A power which by its own na- in comparison with the joy which referred to God. More- ture is capable of being in matter is more effective when over, the body’s glory will conduce to the intensity of the subjected in matter than when separated from matter, al- joy that refers to God, in so far as it will conduce to the though absolutely speaking a power separate from matter more perfect operation whereby the soul tends to God: is more effective. since the more perfect is a becoming operation, the greater Reply to Objection 3. Although in the act of under- the delight∗, as stated in Ethic. x, 8. standing the soul does not make use of the body, the per- Whether the degrees of beatitude should be called mansions? Suppl. q. 93 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the degrees of beati- ments according to the Philosopher (Phys., liber viii, 7). tude should not be called mansions. For beatitude implies Now the end of local movement is a place, and when a the notion of a reward: whereas mansion denotes nothing thing has arrived at that place it remains there at rest and pertaining to a reward. Therefore the various degrees of is maintained therein. Hence in every movement this very beatitude should not be called mansions. rest at the end of the movement is called an establishment Objection 2. Further, mansion seemingly denotes a [collocatio] or mansion. Wherefore since the term move- place. Now the place where the saint will be beatified ment is transferred to the actions of the appetite and will, is not corporeal but spiritual, namely God Who is one. the attainment of the end of an appetitive movement is Therefore there is but one mansion: and consequently the called a mansion or establishment: so that the unity of a various degrees of beatitude should not be called man- house corresponds to the unity of beatitude which unity is sions. on the part of the object, and the plurality of mansions cor- Objection 3. Further, as in heaven there will be men responds to the differences of beatitude on the part of the of various merits, so are there now in purgatory, and were blessed: even so we observe in natural things that there in the limbo of the fathers. But various mansions are not is one same place above to which all light objects tend, distinguished in purgatory and limbo. Therefore in like whereas each one reaches it more closely, according as it manner neither should they be distinguished in heaven. is lighter, so that they have various mansions correspond- On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 14:2): “In My Fa- ing to their various lightness. ther’s house there are many mansions”: and Augustine Reply to Objection 1. Mansion implies the notion of expounds this in reference to the different degrees of re- end and consequently of reward which is the end of merit. wards (Tract. lxvii in Joan.). Reply to Objection 2. Though there is one spiritual Further, in every well-ordered city there is a distinc- place, there are different degrees of approaching thereto: tion of mansions. Now the heavenly kingdom is compared and the various mansions correspond to these. to a city (Apoc. 21:2). Therefore we should distinguish Reply to Objection 3. Those who were in limbo or various mansions there according to the various degrees are now in purgatory have not yet attained to their end. of beatitude. Wherefore various mansions are not distinguished in pur- I answer that, Since local movement precedes all gatory or limbo, but only in heaven and hell, wherein is other movements, terms of movement, distance and the the end of the good and of the wicked. like are derived from local movement to all other move- ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 32, a. 1 3055 Whether the various mansions are distinguished according to the various degrees of Suppl. q. 93 a. 3 charity? Objection 1. It would seem that the various mansions by which they have obtained that beatitude. In the first are not distinguished according to the various degrees of way the mansions are distinguished according to the char- charity. For it is written (Mat. 25:15): “He gave to ev- ity of heaven, which the more perfect it will be in any one, ery one according to his proper virtue [Douay: ‘ability’].” the more will it render him capable of the Divine clarity, Now the proper ability of a thing is its natural power. on the increase of which will depend the increase in per- Therefore the gifts also of grace and glory are distributed fection of the Divine vision. In the second way the man- according to the different degrees of natural power. sions are distinguished according to the charity of the way. Objection 2. Further, it is written (Ps. 61:12): “Thou For our actions are meritorious, not by the very substance wilt render to every man according to his works.” Now of the action, but only by the habit of virtue with which that which is rendered is the measure of beatitude. There- they are informed. Now every virtue obtains its meritori- fore the degrees of beatitude are distinguished according ous efficacy from charity∗, which has the end itself for its to the diversity of works and not according to the diversity object†. Hence the diversity of merit is all traced to the of charity. diversity of charity, and thus the charity of the way will Objection 3. Further, reward is due to act and not distinguish the mansions by way of merit. to habit: hence “it is not the strongest who are crowned Reply to Objection 1. In this passage “virtue” de- but those who engage in the conflict” (Ethic. i, 8) and notes not the natural ability alone, but the natural abil- “he. . . shall not be [Vulg.: ‘is not’] crowned except he ity together with the endeavour to obtain grace‡. Con- strive lawfully.” Now beatitude is a reward. Therefore sequently virtue in this sense will be a kind of material the various degrees of beatitude will be according to the disposition to the measure of grace and glory that one will various degrees of works and not according to the various receive. But charity is the formal complement of merit in degrees of charity. relation to glory, and therefore the distinction of degrees On the contrary, The more one will be united to God in glory depends on the degrees of charity rather than on the happier will one be. Now the measure of charity is the the degrees of the aforesaid virtue. measure of one’s union with God. Therefore the diversity Reply to Objection 2. Works in themselves do not of beatitude will be according to the difference of charity. demand the payment of a reward, except as informed by Further, “if one thing simply follows from another charity: and therefore the various degrees of glory will be thing simply, the increase of the former follows from the according to the various degrees of charity. increase of the latter.” Now to have beatitude follows from Reply to Objection 3. Although the habit of charity having charity. Therefore to have greater beatitude fol- or of any virtue whatever is not a merit to which a re- lows from having greater charity. ward is due, it is none the less the principle and reason of I answer that, The distinctive principle of the man- merit in the act: and consequently according to its diver- sions or degrees of beatitude is twofold, namely proximate sity is the diversity of rewards. This does not prevent our and remote. The proximate principle is the difference of observing a certain degree of merit in the act considered disposition which will be in the blessed, whence will re- generically, not indeed in relation to the essential reward sult the difference of perfection in them in respect to the which is joy in God, but in relation to some accidental beatific operation: while the remote principle is the merit reward, which is joy in some created good. ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 114, a. 4 † Cf. IIa IIae, q. 24, a. 3, ad 1 ‡ Cf. IIa IIae, q. 23, a. 8 3056 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 94 Of the Relations of the Saints Towards the Damned (In Three Articles) We must next consider the relations of the saints towards the damned. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the saints see the sufferings of the damned? (2) Whether they pity them? (3) Whether they rejoice in their sufferings? Whether the blessed in heaven will see the sufferings of the damned? Suppl. q. 94 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the blessed in heaven erything is known the more for being compared with its will not see the sufferings of the damned. For the damned contrary, because when contraries are placed beside one are more cut off from the blessed than wayfarers. But the another they become more conspicuous. Wherefore in or- blessed do not see the deeds of wayfarers: wherefore a der that the happiness of the saints may be more delightful gloss on Is. 63:16, “Abraham hath not known us,” says: to them and that they may render more copious thanks to “The dead, even the saints, know not what the living, even God for it, they are allowed to see perfectly the sufferings their own children, are doing”∗. Much less therefore do of the damned. they see the sufferings of the damned. Reply to Objection 1. This gloss speaks of what the Objection 2. Further, perfection of vision depends on departed saints are able to do by nature: for it is not the perfection of the visible object: wherefore the Philoso- necessary that they should know by natural knowledge pher says (Ethic. x, 4) that “the most perfect operation of all that happens to the living. But the saints in heaven the sense of sight is when the sense is most disposed with know distinctly all that happens both to wayfarers and to reference to the most beautiful of the objects which fall the damned. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xii) that Job’s under the sight.” Therefore, on the other hand, any defor- words (14:21), “ ‘Whether his children come to honour or mity in the visible object redounds to the imperfection of dishonour, he shall not understand,’ do not apply to the the sight. But there will be no imperfection in the blessed. souls of the saints, because since they possess the glory of Therefore they will not see the sufferings of the damned God within them, we cannot believe that external things wherein there is extreme deformity. are unknown to them.”†. On the contrary, It is written (Is. 66:24): “They shall Reply to Objection 2. Although the beauty of the go out and see the carcasses of the men that have trans- thing seen conduces to the perfection of vision, there may gressed against Me”; and a gloss says: “The elect will be deformity of the thing seen without imperfection of go out by understanding or seeing manifestly, so that they vision: because the images of things whereby the soul may be urged the more to praise God.” knows contraries are not themselves contrary. Wherefore I answer that, Nothing should be denied the blessed also God Who has most perfect knowledge sees all things, that belongs to the perfection of their beatitude. Now ev- beautiful and deformed. Whether the blessed pity the unhappiness of the damned? Suppl. q. 94 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the blessed pity On the contrary, Whoever pities another shares the unhappiness of the damned. For pity proceeds from somewhat in his unhappiness. But the blessed cannot charity‡; and charity will be most perfect in the blessed. share in any unhappiness. Therefore they do not pity the Therefore they will most especially pity the sufferings of afflictions of the damned. the damned. I answer that, Mercy or compassion may be in a per- Objection 2. Further, the blessed will never be so far son in two ways: first by way of passion, secondly by from taking pity as God is. Yet in a sense God compas- way of choice. In the blessed there will be no passion in sionates our afflictions, wherefore He is said to be merci- the lower powers except as a result of the reason’s choice. ful. Hence compassion or mercy will not be in them, except by ∗ St. Augustine, De cura pro mortuis xiii, xv † Concerning this Re- ply, Cf. Ia, q. 89, a. 8 ‡ Cf. IIa IIae, q. 30 3057 the choice of reason. Now mercy or compassion comes of be possible to pity their sufferings according to right reathe reason’s choice when a person wishes another’s evil son. Therefore the blessed in glory will have no pity on to be dispelled: wherefore in those things which, in ac- the damned. cordance with reason, we do not wish to be dispelled, we Reply to Objection 1. Charity is the principle of pity have no such compassion. But so long as sinners are in when it is possible for us out of charity to wish the cessa- this world they are in such a state that without prejudice tion of a person’s unhappiness. But the saints cannot de- to the Divine justice they can be taken away from a state sire this for the damned, since it would be contrary to Di- of unhappiness and sin to a state of happiness. Conse- vine justice. Consequently the argument does not prove. quently it is possible to have compassion on them both Reply to Objection 2. God is said to be merciful, by the choice of the will—in which sense God, the an- in so far as He succors those whom it is befitting to be gels and the blessed are said to pity them by desiring their released from their afflictions in accordance with the or- salvation—and by passion, in which way they are pitied der of wisdom and justice: not as though He pitied the by the good men who are in the state of wayfarers. But in damned except perhaps in punishing them less than they the future state it will be impossible for them to be taken deserve. away from their unhappiness: and consequently it will not Whether the blessed rejoice in the punishment of the wicked? Suppl. q. 94 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the blessed do not saints will rejoice in the punishment of the wicked, by rejoice in the punishment of the wicked. For rejoicing in considering therein the order of Divine justice and their another’s evil pertains to hatred. But there will be no ha- own deliverance, which will fill them with joy. And thus tred in the blessed. Therefore they will not rejoice in the the Divine justice and their own deliverance will be the di- unhappiness of the damned. rect cause of the joy of the blessed: while the punishment Objection 2. Further, the blessed in heaven will be of the damned will cause it indirectly. in the highest degree conformed to God. Now God does Reply to Objection 1. To rejoice in another’s evil not rejoice in our afflictions. Therefore neither will the as such belongs to hatred, but not to rejoice in another’s blessed rejoice in the afflictions of the damned. evil by reason of something annexed to it. Thus a per- Objection 3. Further, that which is blameworthy in a son sometimes rejoices in his own evil as when we rejoice wayfarer has no place whatever in a comprehensor. Now in our own afflictions, as helping us to merit life: “My it is most reprehensible in a wayfarer to take pleasure in brethren, count it all joy when you shall fall into divers the pains of others, and most praiseworthy to grieve for temptations” (James 1:2). them. Therefore the blessed nowise rejoice in the punish- Reply to Objection 2. Although God rejoices not in ment of the damned. punishments as such, He rejoices in them as being ordered On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 57:11): “The just by His justice. shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge.” Reply to Objection 3. It is not praiseworthy in a way- Further, it is written (Is. 56:24): “They shall satiate∗ farer to rejoice in another’s afflictions as such: yet it is the sight of all flesh.” Now satiety denotes refreshment of praiseworthy if he rejoice in them as having something the mind. Therefore the blessed will rejoice in the punish- annexed. However it is not the same with a wayfarer as ment of the wicked. with a comprehensor, because in a wayfarer the passions I answer that, A thing may be a matter of rejoicing often forestall the judgment of reason, and yet sometimes in two ways. First directly, when one rejoices in a thing such passions are praiseworthy, as indicating the good dis- as such: and thus the saints will not rejoice in the pun- position of the mind, as in the case of shame pity and re- ishment of the wicked. Secondly, indirectly, by reason pentance for evil: whereas in a comprehensor there can be namely of something annexed to it: and in this way the no passion but such as follows the judgment of reason. ∗ Douay: ‘They shall be a loathsome sight to all flesh.’ 3058 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 95 Of the Gifts∗ of the Blessed (In Five Articles) We must now consider the gifts of the blessed; under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether any gifts should be assigned to the blessed? (2) Whether a gift differs from beatitude? (3) Whether it is fitting for Christ to have gifts? (4) Whether this is competent to the angels? (5) Whether three gifts of the soul are rightly assigned? Whether any gifts should be assigned as dowry to the blessed? Suppl. q. 95 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that no gifts should be ered with certain gifts. assigned as dowry to the blessed. For a dowry (Cod. v, Further, a dowry is appointed to carnal marriage for 12, De jure dot. 20: Dig. xxiii, 3, De jure dot.) is given to the ease of marriage. But the spiritual marriage is more the bridegroom for the upkeep of the burdens of marriage. blissful than the carnal marriage. Therefore a dowry But the saints resemble not the bridegroom but the bride, should be especially assigned thereto. as being members of the Church. Therefore they receive Further, the adornment of the bride is part of the no dowry. dowry. Now the saints are adorned when they are taken Objection 2. Further, the dowry is given not by the into glory, according to Is. 61:10, “He hath clothed me bridegroom’s father, but by the father of the bride (Cod. with the garments of salvation. . . as a bride adorned with v, 11, De dot. promiss., 1: Dig. xxiii, 2, De rit. nup.). her jewels.” Therefore the saints in heaven have a dowry. Now all the beatific gifts are bestowed on the blessed by I answer that, Without doubt the blessed when they the father of the bridegroom, i.e. Christ: “Every best gift are brought into glory are dowered by God with certain and every perfect gift is from above coming down from gifts for their adornment, and this adornment is called the Father of lights.” Therefore these gifts which are be- their dowry by the masters. Hence the dower of which we stowed on the blessed should not be called a dowry. speak now is defined thus: “The dowry is the everlasting Objection 3. Further, in carnal marriage a dowry is adornment of soul and body adequate to life, lasting for given that the burdens of marriage may be the more easily ever in eternal bliss.” This description is taken from a like- borne. But in spiritual marriage there are no burdens, es- ness to the material dowry whereby the bride is adorned pecially in the state of the Church triumphant. Therefore and the husband provided with an adequate support for his no dowry should be assigned to that state. wife and children, and yet the dowry remains inalienable Objection 4. Further, a dowry is not given save on from the bride, so that if the marriage union be severed the occasion of marriage. But a spiritual marriage is con- it reverts to her. As to the reason of the name there are tracted with Christ by faith in the state of the Church mil- various opinions. For some say that the name “dowry” is itant. Therefore if a dowry is befitting the blessed, for the taken not from a likeness to the corporeal marriage, but same reason it will be befitting the saints who are wayfar- according to the manner of speaking whereby any per- ers. But it is not befitting the latter: and therefore neither fection or adornment of any person whatever is called an is it befitting the blessed. endowment; thus a man who is proficient in knowledge Objection 5. Further, a dowry pertains to external is said to be endowed with knowledge, and in this sense goods, which are styled goods of fortune: whereas the re- ovid employed the word “endowment” (De Arte Amandi ward of the blessed will consist of internal goods. There- i, 538): “By whatever endowment thou canst please, strive fore they should not be called a dowry. to please.” But this does not seem quite fitting, for when- On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 5:32): “This is a ever a term is employed to signify a certain thing prin- great sacrament: but I speak in Christ and in the Church.” cipally, it is not usually transferred to another save by Hence it follows that the spiritual marriage is signified by reason of some likeness. Wherefore since by its primary the carnal marriage. But in a carnal marriage the dow- signification a dowry refers to carnal marriage, it follows ered bride is brought to the dwelling of the bridegroom. that in every other application of the term we must ob- Therefore since the saints are brought to Christ’s dwelling serve some kind of likeness to its principal signification. when they are beatified, it would seem that they are dow- Consequently others say that the likeness consists in the ∗ the Latin ‘Dos’ Signifies a Dowry. 3059 fact that in carnal marriage a dowry is properly a gift be-marriage, the very adornments bestowed on the spiritual stowed by the bridegroom on the bride for her adornment bride, namely the Church in her members, belong indeed when she is taken to the bridegroom’s dwelling: and that to the Bridegroom, in so far as they conduce to His glory this is shown by the words of Sichem to Jacob and his and honor, yet to the bride as adorned thereby. sons (Gn. 34:12): “Raise the dowry, and ask gifts,” and Reply to Objection 2. The Father of the Bridegroom, from Ex. 22:16: “If a man seduce a virgin. . . and lie with that is of Christ, is the Person of the Father alone: while her, he shall endow her, and have her to wife.” Hence the the Father of the bride is the whole Trinity, since that adornment bestowed by Christ on the saints, when they which is effected in creatures belongs to the whole Trinity. are brought into the abode of glory, is called a dowry. But Hence in spiritual marriage these endowments, properly this is clearly contrary to what jurists say, to whom it be- speaking, are given by the Father of the bride rather than longs to treat of these matters. For they say that a dowry, by the Father of the Bridegroom. Nevertheless, although properly speaking, is a donation on the part of the wife this endowment is made by all the Persons, it may be in made to those who are on the part of the husband, in view a manner appropriated to each Person. To the Person of of the marriage burden which the husband has to bear; the Father, as endowing, since He possesses authority; and while that which the bridegroom gives the bride is called fatherhood in relation to creatures is also appropriated to “a donation in view of marriage.” In this sense dowry is Him, so that He is Father of both Bridegroom and bride. taken (3 Kings 9:16) where it is stated that “Pharoa, the To the Son it is appropriated, inasmuch as it is made for king of Egypt, took Gezer. . . and gave it for a dowry to his His sake and through Him: and to the Holy Ghost, inas- daughter, Solomon’s wife.” Nor do the authorities quoted much as it is made in Him and according to Him, since prove anything to the contrary. For although it is custom- love is the reason of all giving∗. ary for a dowry to be given by the maiden’s parents, it Reply to Objection 3. That which is effected by the happens sometimes that the bridegroom or his father gives dowry belongs to the dowry by its nature, and that is the the dowry instead of the bride’s father; and this happens ease of marriage: while that which the dowry removes, in two ways: either by reason of his very great love for namely the marriage burden which is lightened thereby, the bride as in the case of Sichem’s father Hemor, who belongs to it accidentally: thus it belongs to grace by its on account of his son’s great love for the maiden wished nature to make a man righteous, but accidentally to make to give the dowry which he had a right to receive; or as a an ungodly man righteous. Accordingly, though there are punishment on the bridegroom, that he should out of his no burdens in the spiritual marriage, there is the greatest own possessions give a dowry to the virgin seduced by gladness; and that this gladness may be perfected the bride him, whereas he should have received it from the girl’s is dowered with gifts, so that by their means she may be father. In this sense Moses speaks in the passage quoted happily united with the bridegroom. above. Wherefore in the opinion of others we should hold Reply to Objection 4. The dowry is usually settled on that in carnal marriage a dowry, properly speaking, is that the bride not when she is espoused, but when she is taken which is given by those on the wife’s side to those on the to the bridegroom’s dwelling, so as to be in the presence husband’s side, for the bearing of the marriage burden, as of the bridegroom, since “while we are in the body we are stated above. Yet the difficulty remains how this significa- absent from the Lord” (2 Cor. 5:6). Hence the gifts be- tion can be adapted to the case in point, since the heavenly stowed on the saints in this life are not called a dowry, but adornments are given to the spiritual spouse by the Father those which are bestowed on them when they are received of the Bridegroom. This shall be made clear by replying into glory, where the Bridegroom delights them with His to the objections. presence. Reply to Objection 1. Although in carnal marriage Reply to Objection 5. In spiritual marriage inward the dowry is given to the bridegroom for his use, yet the comeliness is required, wherefore it is written (Ps. 44:14): ownership and control belong to the bride: which is ev- “All the glory of the king’s daughter is within,” etc. But in ident by the fact that if the marriage be dissolved, the carnal marriage outward comeliness is necessary. Hence dowry reverts to the bride according to law (Cap. 1,2,3, there is no need for a dowry of this kind to be appointed De donat. inter virum et uxorem). Thus also in spiritual in spiritual marriage as in carnal marriage. ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 38, a. 2 3060 Whether the dowry is the same as beatitude∗? Suppl. q. 95 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the dowry is the same in reality but differ in aspect: because dowry regards the as beatitude. For as appears from the definition of dowry spiritual marriage between Christ and the soul, whereas (a. 1), the dowry is “the everlasting adornment of body beatitude does not. But seemingly this will not stand, and soul in eternal happiness.” Now the happiness of the since beatitude consists in an operation, whereas a dowry soul is an adornment thereof. Therefore beatitude is a is not an operation, but a quality or disposition. Where- dowry. fore according to others it must be stated that beatitude Objection 2. Further, a dowry signifies something and dowry differ even in reality, beatitude being the per- whereby the union of bride and bridegroom is rendered fect operation itself by which the soul is united to God, delightful. Now such is beatitude in the spiritual marriage. while the dowries are habits or dispositions or any other Therefore beatitude is a dowry. qualities directed to this same perfect operation, so that Objection 3. Further, according to Augustine (In Ps. they are directed to beatitude instead of being in it as parts 92) vision is “the whole essence of beatitude.” Now vi- thereof. sion is accounted one of the dowries. Therefore beatitude Reply to Objection 1. Beatitude, properly speaking, is a dowry. is not an adornment of the soul, but something resulting Objection 4. Further, fruition gives happiness. Now from the soul’s adornment; since it is an operation, while fruition is a dowry. Therefore a dowry gives happiness its adornment is a certain comeliness of the blessed them- and thus beatitude is a dowry. selves. Objection 5. Further, according to Boethius (De Con- Reply to Objection 2. Beatitude is not directed to the sol. iii), “beatitude is a state made perfect by the aggre- union but is the union itself of the soul with Christ. This gate of all good things.” Now the state of the blessed is union is by an operation, whereas the dowries are gifts perfected by the dowries. Therefore the dowries are part disposing to this same union. of beatitude. Reply to Objection 3. Vision may be taken in two On the contrary, The dowries are given without mer- ways. First, actually, i.e. for the act itself of vision; and its: whereas beatitude is not given, but is awarded in re- thus vision is not a dowry, but beatitude itself. Secondly, turn for merits. Therefore beatitude is not a dowry. it may be taken habitually, i.e. for the habit whereby this Further, beatitude is one only, whereas the dowries are act is elicited, namely the clarity of glory, by which the several. Therefore beatitude is not a dowry. soul is enlightened from above to see God: and thus it is Further, beatitude is in man according to that which is a dowry and the principle of beatitude, but not beatitude principal in him (Ethic. x, 7): whereas a dowry is also itself. The same answer applies to obj. 4. appointed to the body. Therefore dowry and beatitude are Reply to Objection 5. Beatitude is the sum of all not the same. goods not as though they were essential parts of beati- I answer that, There are two opinions on this ques- tude, but as being in a way directed to beatitude, as stated tion. For some say that beatitude and dowry are the same above. Whether it is fitting that Christ should receive a dowry? Suppl. q. 95 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem fitting that Christ should fitting that Christ should have a dowry. receive a dowry. For the saints will be conformed to Christ Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. through glory, according to Phil. 3:21, “Who will reform Christ. iii) that Christ, according to the Rule‡ of Tyco- the body of our lowness made like to the body of His nius, on account of the unity of the mystic body that exists glory.” Therefore Christ also will have a dowry. between the head and its members, calls Himself also the Objection 2. Further, in the spiritual marriage a Bride and not only the Bridegroom, as may be gathered dowry is given in likeness to a carnal marriage. Now from Is. 61:10, “As a bridegroom decked with a crown, there is a spiritual marriage in Christ, which is peculiar to and as a bride adorned with her jewels.” Since then a Him, namely of the two natures in one Person, in regard dowry is due to the bride, it would seem that Christ ought to which the human nature in Him is said to have been to receive a dowry. espoused by the Word, as a gloss† has it on Ps. 18:6, “He Objection 4. Further, a dowry is due to all the mem- hath set His tabernacle in the sun,” etc., and Apoc. 21:3, bers of the Church, since the Church is the spouse. But “Behold the tabernacle of God with men.” Therefore it is Christ is a member of the Church according to 1 Cor. ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 12, a. 7, ad 1; Ia IIae, q. 4, a. 3 † St. Augustine, De Consensu Evang. i, 40 ‡ Liber regularum 3061 12:27, “You are the body of Christ, and members of mem-than perfectly united. Wherefore in the opinion of others ber, i.e. of Christ,” according to a gloss. Therefore the we should say that the notion of dowry is either altogether dowry is due to Christ. unbecoming to Christ, or not so properly as to the saints; Objection 5. Further, Christ has perfect vision, but that the things which we call dowries befit Him in the fruition, and joy. Now these are the dowries. Therefore, highest degree. etc. Reply to Objection 1. This conformity must be un- On the contrary, A distinction of persons is requisite derstood to refer to the thing which is a dowry and not to between the bridegroom and the bride. But in Christ there the notion of a dowry being in Christ: for it is not requisite is nothing personally distinct from the Son of God Who that the thing in which we are conformed to Christ should is the Bridegroom, as stated in Jn. 3:29, “He that hath the be in the same way in Christ and in us. bride is the bridegroom.” Therefore since the dowry is al- Reply to Objection 2. Human nature is not properly lotted to the bride or for the bride, it would seem unfitting said to be a bride in its union with the Word, since the for Christ to have a dowry. distinction of persons, which is requisite between bride- Further, the same person does not both give and re- groom and bride, is not observed therein. That human ceive a dowry. But it is Christ Who gives spiritual nature is sometimes described as being espoused in refer- dowries. Therefore it is not fitting that Christ should have ence to its union with the Word is because it has a certain a dowry. act of the bride, in that it is united to the Bridegroom in- I answer that, There are two opinions on this point. separably, and in this union is subject to the Word and For some say that there is a threefold union in Christ. One ruled by the Word, as the bride by the bridegroom. is the union of concord, whereby He is united to God in Reply to Objection 3. If Christ is sometimes spoken the bond of love; another is the union of condescension, of as the Bride, this is not because He is the Bride in very whereby the human nature is united to the Divine; the truth, but in so far as He personifies His spouse, namely third is the union whereby Christ is united to the Church. the Church, who is united to Him spiritually. Hence noth- They say, then, that as regards the first two unions it is ing hinders Him, in this way of speaking, from being said fitting for Christ to have the dowries as such, but as re- to have the dowries, not that He Himself is dowered, but gards the third, it is fitting for Him to have the dowries in the Church. the most excellent degree, considered as to that in which Reply to Objection 4. The term Church is taken they consist, but not considered as dowries; because in in two senses. For sometimes it denotes the body only, this union Christ is the bridegroom and the Church the which is united to Christ as its Head. In this way alone bride, and a dowry is given to the bride as regards prop- has the Church the character of spouse: and in this way erty and control, although it is given to the bridegroom Christ is not a member of the Church, but is the Head as to use. But this does not seem congruous. For in the from which all the members receive. In another sense the union of Christ with the Father by the concord of love, Church denotes the head and members united together; even if we consider Him as God, there is not said to be and thus Christ is said to be a member of the Church, a marriage, since it implies no subjection such as is re- inasmuch as He fulfills an office distinct from all others, quired in the bride towards the bridegroom. Nor again in by pouring forth life into the other members: although He the union of the human nature with the Divine, whether is not very properly called a member, since a member im- we consider the Personal union or that which regards the plies a certain restriction, whereas in Christ spiritual good conformity of will, can there be a dowry, properly speak- is not restricted but is absolutely entire∗, so that He is the ing, for three reasons. First, because in a marriage where a entire good of the Church, nor is He together with oth- dowry is given there should be likeness of nature between ers anything greater than He is by Himself. Speaking of bridegroom and bride, and this is lacking in the union the Church in this sense, the Church denotes not only the of the human nature with the Divine; secondly, because bride, but the bridegroom and bride, in so far as one thing there is required a distinction of persons, and the human results from their spiritual union. Consequently although nature is not personally distinct from the Word; thirdly, Christ be called a member of the Church in a certain sense, because a dowry is given when the bride is first taken to He can by no means be called a member of the bride; and the dwelling of the bridegroom and thus would seem to therefore the idea of a dowry is not becoming to Him. belong to the bride, who from being not united becomes Reply to Objection 5. There is here a fallacy of “ac- united; whereas the human nature, which was assumed cident”; for these things are not befitting to Christ if we into the unity of Person by the Word, never was otherwise consider them under the aspect of dowry. ∗ Cf. IIIa, q. 8, a. 1 3062 Whether the angels receive the dowries? Suppl. q. 95 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the angels receive the character of bride is not so properly becoming to the dowries. For a gloss on Canticle of Canticles 6:8, “One angels as to men. For there is required a conformity of na- is my dove,” says: “One is the Church among men and ture between bridegroom and bride, to wit that they should angels.” But the Church is the bride, wherefore it is fit- be of the same species. Now men are in conformity with ting for the members of the Church to have the dowries. Christ in this way, since He took human nature, and by so Therefore the angels have the dowries. doing became conformed to all men in the specific nature Objection 2. Further, a gloss on Lk. 12:36, “And you of man. on the other hand, He is not conformed to the yourselves like to men who wait for their lord, when he angels in unity of species, neither as to His Divine nor as shall return from the wedding,” says: “Our Lord went to to His human nature. Consequently the notion of dowry the wedding when after His resurrection the new Man es- is not so properly becoming to angels as to men. Since, poused to Himself the angelic host.” Therefore the angelic however, in metaphorical expressions, it is not necessary hosts are the spouse of Christ and consequently it is fitting to have a likeness in every respect, we must not argue that that they should have the dowries. one thing is not to be said of another metaphorically on Objection 3. Further, the spiritual marriage consists account of some lack of likeness; and consequently the ar- in a spiritual union. Now the spiritual union between the gument we have adduced does not prove that the dowries angels and God is no less than between beatified men and are simply unbecoming to the angels, but only that they God. Since, then, the dowries of which we treat now are are not so properly befitting to angels as to men, on ac- assigned by reason of a spiritual marriage, it would seem count of the aforesaid lack of likeness. that they are becoming to the angels. Reply to Objection 1. Although the angels are in- Objection 4. Further, a spiritual marriage demands a cluded in the unity of the Church, they are not members spiritual bridegroom and a spiritual bride. Now the an- of the Church according to conformity of nature, if we gels are by nature more conformed than men to Christ as consider the Church as bride: and thus it is not properly the supreme spirit. Therefore a spiritual marriage is more fitting for them to have the dowries. possible between the angels and Christ than between men Reply to Objection 2. Espousal is taken there in a and Christ. broad sense, for union without conformity of specific na- Objection 5. Further, a greater conformity is required ture: and in this sense nothing prevents our saying that the between the head and members than between bridegroom angels have the dowries taking these in a broad sense. and bride. Now the conformity between Christ and the Reply to Objection 3. In the spiritual marriage al- angels suffices for Christ to be called the Head of the an- though there is no other than a spiritual union, those gels. Therefore for the same reason it suffices for Him to whose union answers to the idea of a perfect marriage be called their bridegroom. should agree in specific nature. Hence espousal does not On the contrary, Origen at the beginning of the pro- properly befit the angels. logue to his commentary on the Canticles, distinguishes Reply to Objection 4. The conformity between the four persons, namely “the bridegroom with the bride, the angels and Christ as God is not such as suffices for the young maidens, and the companions of the bridegroom”: notion of a perfect marriage, since so far are they from and he says that “the angels are the companions of the agreeing in species that there is still an infinite distance bridegroom.” Since then the dowry is due only to the between them. bride, it would seem that the dowries are not becoming Reply to Objection 5. Not even is Christ properly to the angels. called the Head of the angels, if we consider the head as Further, Christ espoused the Church by His Incarna- requiring conformity of nature with the members. We tion and Passion: wherefore this is foreshadowed in the must observe, however, that although the head and the words (Ex. 4:25), “A bloody spouse thou art to me.” Now other members are parts of an individual of one species, by His Incarnation and Passion Christ was not otherwise if we consider each one by itself, it is not of the same united to the angels than before. Therefore the angels do species as another member, for a hand is another specific not belong to the Church, if we consider the Church as part from the head. Hence, speaking of the members in spouse. Therefore the dowries are not becoming to the themselves, the only conformity required among them is angels. one of proportion, so that one receive from another, and I answer that, Without any doubt, whatever pertains one serve another. Consequently the conformity between to the endowments of the soul is befitting to the angels as God and the angels suffices for the notion of head rather it is to men. But considered under the aspect of dowry than for that of bridegroom. they are not as becoming to the angels as to men, because 3063 Whether three dowries of the soul are suitably assigned? Suppl. q. 95 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem unfitting to assign to which is vision, and its perfection which is delight: since the soul three dowries, namely, “vision,” “love” and beatitude must needs be a perfect operation. Again, a vi- “fruition.” For the soul is united to God according to the sion is delightful in two ways: first, on the part of the mind wherein is the image of the Trinity in respect of the object, by reason of the thing seen being delightful; sec- memory, understanding, and will. Now love regards the ondly, on the part of the vision, by reason of the seeing will, and vision the understanding. Therefore there should itself being delightful, even as we delight in knowing evil be something corresponding to the memory, since fruition things, although the evil things themselves delight us not. regards not the memory but the will. And since this operation wherein ultimate beatitude con- Objection 2. Further, the beatific dowries are said to sists must needs be most perfect, this vision must needs correspond to the virtues of the way, which united us to be delightful in both ways. Now in order that this vision God: and these are faith, hope, and charity, whereby God be delightful on the part of the vision, it needs to be made Himself is the object. Now love corresponds to charity, connatural to the seer by means of a habit; while for it to and vision to faith. Therefore there should be something be delightful on the part of the visible object, two things corresponding to hope, since fruition corresponds rather are necessary, namely that the visible object be suitable, to charity. and that it be united to the seer. Accordingly for the vi- Objection 3. Further, we enjoy God by love and vi- sion to be delightful on its own part a habit is required sion only, since “we are said to enjoy those things which to elicit the vision, and thus we have one dowry, which we love for their own sake,” as Augustine says (De Doctr. all call vision. But on the part of the visible object two Christ. i, 4). Therefore fruition should not be reckoned a things are necessary. First, suitableness, which regards distinct dowry from love. the affections—and in this respect some reckon love as a Objection 4. Further, comprehension is required for dowry, others fruition (in so far as fruition regards the af- the perfection of beatitude: “So run that you may compre- fective part) since what we love most we deem most suit- hend” (1 Cor. 9:24). Therefore we should reckon a fourth able. Secondly, union is required on the part of the vis- dowry ible object, and thus some reckon comprehension, which Objection 5. Further, Anselm says (De Simil. xlviii) is nothing else than to have God present and to hold Him that the following pertain to the soul’s beatitude: “wis- within ourself∗; while others reckon fruition, not of hope, dom, friendship, concord, power, honor, security, joy”: which is ours while on the way, but of possession† which and consequently the aforesaid dowries are reckoned un- is in heaven. suitably. Thus the three dowries correspond to the three the- Objection 6. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ological virtues, namely vision to faith, comprehension xxii) that “in that beatitude God will be seen unendingly, (or fruition in one sense) to hope, and fruition (or delight loved without wearying, praised untiringly.” Therefore according to another reckoning to charity). For perfect praise should be added to the aforesaid dowries. fruition such as will be had in heaven includes delight and Objection 7. Further, Boethius reckons five things comprehension, for which reason some take it for the one, pertaining to beatitude (De Consol. iii) and these are: Suf- and some for the other. ficiency which wealth offers, joy which pleasure offers, Others, however, ascribe these three dowries to the celebrity which fame offers, security which power offers, three powers of the soul, namely vision to the rational, reverence which dignity offers. Consequently it seems delight to the concupiscible, and fruition to the irascible, that these should be reckoned as dowries rather than the seeing that this fruition is acquired by a victory. But this is aforesaid. not said properly, because the irascible and concupiscible I answer that, All agree in reckoning three dowries powers are not in the intellective but in the sensitive part, of the soul, in different ways however. For some say whereas the dowries of the soul are assigned to the mind. that the three dowries of the soul are vision, love, and Reply to Objection 1. Memory and understanding fruition. others reckon them to be vision, comprehension, have but one act: either because understanding is itself an and fruition; others, vision, delight, and comprehension. act of memory, or—if understanding denote a power— However, all these reckonings come to the same, and their because memory does not proceed to act save through number is assigned in the same way. For it has been said the medium of the understanding, since it belongs to the (a. 2) that a dowry is something inherent to the soul, and memory to retain knowledge. Consequently there is only directing it to the operation in which beatitude consists. one habit, namely knowledge, corresponding to memory Now two things are requisite in this operation: its essence and understanding: wherefore only one dowry, namely vi- ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 4, a. 3 † Literally “of the reality: non spei. . . sed rei” 3064 sion, corresponds to both. consent in actions, or one’s inferiors, to whom “power” Reply to Objection 2. Fruition corresponds to hope, refers, so far as inferior things are ordered by superior, and in so far as it includes comprehension which will take the “honor” as regards that which inferiors offer to their supe- place of hope: since we hope for that which we have not riors. Or again (they may accompany or follow beatitude) yet; wherefore hope chafes somewhat on account of the in relation to oneself: to this “security” refers as regards distance of the beloved: for which reason it will not re- the removal of evil, and “joy” as regards the attainment of main in heaven [Cf. IIa IIae, q. 18, a. 2] but will be suc- good. ceeded by comprehension. Reply to Objection 6. Praise, which Augustine men- Reply to Objection 3. Fruition as including compre- tions as the third of those things which will obtain in hension is distinct from vision and love, but otherwise heaven, is not a disposition to beatitude but rather a se- than love from vision. For love and vision denote different quel to beatitude: because from the very fact of the soul’s habits, the one belonging to the intellect, the other to the union with God, wherein beatitude consists, it follows that affective faculty. But comprehension, or fruition as denot- the soul breaks forth into praise. Hence praise has not the ing comprehension, does not signify a habit distinct from necessary conditions of a dowry. those two, but the removal of the obstacles which made Reply to Objection 7. The five things aforesaid men- it impossible for the mind to be united to God by actual tioned by Boethius are certain conditions of beatitude, but vision. This is brought about by the habit of glory freeing not dispositions to beatitude or to its act, because beat- the soul from all defects; for instance by making it capa- itude by reason of its perfection has of itself alone and ble of knowledge without phantasms, of complete control undividedly all that men seek in various things, as the over the body, and so forth, thus removing the obstacles Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7; x, 7,8). Accordingly which result in our being pilgrims from the Lord. Boethius shows that these five things obtain in perfect Reply obj. 4 is clear from what has been said. beatitude, because they are what men seek in temporal Reply to Objection 5. Properly speaking, the dowries happiness. For they pertain either, as “security,” to immu- are the immediate principles of the operation in which per- nity from evil, or to the attainment either of the suitable fect beatitude consists and whereby the soul is united to good, as “joy,” or of the perfect good, as “sufficiency,” or Christ. The things mentioned by Anselm do not answer to the manifestation of good, as “celebrity,” inasmuch as to this description; but they are such as in any way ac- the good of one is made known to others, or as “rever- company or follow beatitude, not only in relation to the ence,” as indicating that good or the knowledge thereof, Bridegroom, to Whom “wisdom” alone of the things men- for reverence is the showing of honor which bears witness tioned by him refers, but also in relation to others. They to virtue. Hence it is evident that these five should not be may be either one’s equals, to whom “friendship” refers as called dowries, but conditions of beatitude. regards the union of affections, and “concord” as regards 3065 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 96 Of the Aureoles (In Thirteen Articles) In the next place we must consider the aureoles. Under this head there are thirteen points of inquiry: (1) Whether the aureoles differ from the essential reward? (2) Whether they differ from the fruit? (3) Whether a fruit is due to the virtue of continence only? (4) Whether three fruits are fittingly assigned to the three parts of continence? (5) Whether an aureole is due to virgins? (6) Whether it is due to martyrs? (7) Whether it is due to doctors? (8) Whether it is due to Christ? (9) Whether to the angels? (10) Whether it is due to the human body? (11) Whether three aureoles are fittingly assigned? (12) Whether the virgin’s aureole is the greatest? (13) Whether one has the same aureole in a higher degree than another? Whether the aureole is the same as the essential reward which is called the aurea? Suppl. q. 96 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the aureole is not dis- Objection 5. Further, a higher reward is due to higher tinct from the essential reward which is called the “aurea.” merit. If, then, the “aurea” is due to works which are of For the essential reward is beatitude itself. Now according obligation, and the aureole to works of counsel, the au- to Boethius (De Consol. iii), beatitude is “a state rendered reole will be more perfect than the “aurea,” and conse- perfect by the aggregate of all goods.” Therefore the es- quently should not be expressed by a diminutive∗. There- sential reward includes every good possessed in heaven; fore it would seem that the aureole is not a distinct reward so that the aureole is included in the “aurea.” from the “aurea.” Objection 2. Further, “more” and “less” do not On the contrary, A gloss† on Ex. 25:24,25, “Thou change a species. But those who keep the counsels and shalt make. . . another little golden crown [coronam aureo- commandments receive a greater reward than those who lam],” says: “This crown denotes the new hymn which the keep the commandments only, nor seemingly does their virgins alone sing in the presence of the Lamb.” Where- reward differ, except in one reward being greater than an- fore apparently the aureole is a crown awarded, not to all, other. Since then the aureole denotes the reward due to but especially to some: whereas the aurea is awarded to works of perfection it would seem that it does not signify all the blessed. Therefore the aureole is distinct from the something distinct from the “aurea.” “aurea.” Objection 3. Further, reward corresponds to merit. Further, a crown is due to the fight which is followed Now charity is the root of all merit. Since then the “au- by victory: “He. . . is not crowned except he strive law- rea” corresponds to charity, it would seem that there will fully” (2 Tim. 2:5). Hence where there is a special kind be no reward in heaven other than the “aurea.” of conflict, there should be a special crown. Now in cer- Objection 4. Further, “All the blessed are taken into tain works there is a special kind of conflict. Therefore the angelic orders” as Gregory declares (Hom. xxxiv in they deserve a special kind of crown, which we call an Evang.). Now as regards the angels, “though some of aureole. them receive certain gifts in a higher degree, nothing is Further, the Church militant comes down from the possessed by any of them exclusively, for all gifts are in all Church triumphant: “I saw the Holy City,” etc. (Apoc. of them, though not equally, because some are endowed 21:2). Now in the Church militant special rewards are more highly than others with gifts which, however, they given to those who perform special deeds, for instance a all possess,” as Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.). crown to the conqueror, a prize to the runner. Therefore Therefore as regards the blessed, there will be no reward the same should obtain in the Church triumphant. other than that which is common to all. Therefore the au- I answer that, Man’s essential reward, which is his reole is not a distinct reward from the “aurea.” beatitude, consists in the perfect union of the soul with ∗ “Aureola,” i.e. a little “aurea” † Ven. Bede, De Tabernaculis i, 6 3066 God, inasmuch as it enjoys God perfectly as seen and the other in so far as it corresponds to higher merit as re-loved perfectly. Now this reward is called a “crown” gards the way of meriting. But this would seem contrary or “aurea” metaphorically, both with reference to merit to the meaning of the gloss quoted above. For if “aurea” which is gained by a kind of conflict—since “the life of and “aureole” were the same, the “aureole” would not be man upon earth is a warfare” (Job 7:1)—and with refer- described as added to the “aurea.” Moreover, since reward ence to the reward whereby in a way man is made a par- corresponds to merit, a more excellent reward must needs ticipator of the Godhead, and consequently endowed with correspond to this more excellent way of meriting: and regal power: “Thou hast made us to our God a kingdom,” it is this excellence that we call an “aureole.” Hence it etc. (Apoc. 5:10); for a crown is the proper sign of regal follows that an “aureole” differs from the “aurea.” power. Reply to Objection 1. Beatitude includes all the In like manner the accidental reward which is added goods necessary for man’s perfect life consisting in his to the essential has the character of a crown. For a crown perfect operation. Yet some things can be added, not as signifies some kind of perfection, on account of its circu- being necessary for that perfect operation as though it lar shape, so that for this very reason it is becoming to the were impossible without them, but as adding to the glory perfection of the blessed. Since, however, nothing can be of beatitude. Hence they regard the well-being of beati- added to the essential, but what is less than it, the addi- tude and a certain fitness thereto. Even so civic happiness tional reward is called an “aureole.” Now something may is embellished by nobility and bodily beauty and so forth, be added in two ways to this essential reward which we and yet it is possible without them as stated in Ethic. i, 8: call the “aurea.” First, in consequence of a condition at- and thus is the aureole in comparison with the happiness taching to the nature of the one rewarded: thus the glory of heaven. of the body is added to the beatitude of the soul, wherefore Reply to Objection 2. He who keeps the counsels this same glory of the body is sometimes called an “aure- and the commandments always merits more than he who ole.” Thus a gloss of Bede on Ex. 25:25, “Thou. . . shalt keeps the commandments only, if we gather the notion of make another little golden crown,” says that “finally the merit in works from the very genus of those works; but not aureole is added, when it is stated in the Scriptures that a always if we gauge the merit from its root, charity: since higher degree of glory is in store for us when our bodies sometimes a man keeps the commandments alone out of are resumed.” But it is not in this sense that we speak of greater charity than one who keeps both commandments an aureole now. Secondly, in consequence of the nature of and counsels. For the most part, however, the contrary the meritorious act. Now this has the character of merit on happens, because the “proof of love is in the performance two counts, whence also it has the character of good. First, of deeds,” as Gregory says (Hom. xxx in Evang.). Where- to wit, from its root which is charity, since it is referred to fore it is not the more excellent essential reward that is the last end, and thus there is due to it the essential reward, called an aureole, but that which is added to the essen-namely the attainment of the end, and this is the “aurea.” tial reward without reference to the essential reward of Secondly, from the very genus of the act which derives a the possessor of an aureole being greater, or less than, or certain praiseworthiness from its due circumstances, from equal to the essential reward of one who has no aureole. the habit eliciting it and from its proximate end, and thus Reply to Objection 3. Charity is the first principle is due to it a kind of accidental reward which we call an of merit: but our actions are the instruments, so to speak, “aureole”: and it is in this sense that we regard the au- whereby we merit. Now in order to obtain an effect there reole now. Accordingly it must be said that an “aureole” is requisite not only a due disposition in the first mover, denotes something added to the “aurea,” a kind of joy, to but also a right disposition in the instrument. Hence some- wit, in the works one has done, in that they have the char- thing principal results in the effect with reference to the acter of a signal victory: for this joy is distinct from the first mover, and something secondary with reference to the joy in being united to God, which is called the “aurea.” instrument. Wherefore in the reward also there is some- Some, however, affirm that the common reward, which is thing on the part of charity, namely the “aurea,” and some- the “aurea,” receives the name of “aureole,” according as thing on the part of the kind of work, namely the “aure- it is given to virgins, martyrs, or doctors: even as money ole.” receives the name of debt through being due to some one, Reply to Objection 4. All the angels merited their though the money and the debt are altogether the same. beatitude by the same kind of act namely by turning to And that nevertheless this does not imply that the essential God: and consequently no particular reward is found in reward is any greater when it is called an “aureole”; but anyone which another has not in some way. But men merit that it corresponds to a more excellent act, more excellent beatitude by different kinds of acts: and so the comparison not in intensity of merit but in the manner of meriting; so fails. that although two persons may have the Divine vision with Nevertheless among men what one seems to have spe- equal clearness, it is called an “aureole” in one and not in cially, all have in common in some way, in so far as each 3067 one, by charity, deems another’s good his own. Yet this action: just as the end to which charity directs us is more joy whereby one shares another’s joy cannot be called an excellent than the things directed to that end, and with aureole, because it is not given him as a reward for his vic- which our actions are concerned. Wherefore the reward tory, but regards more the victory of another: whereas a corresponding to merit by reason of charity, however lit- crown is awarded the victors themselves and not to those tle it may be, is greater than any reward corresponding to who rejoice with them in the victory. an action by reason of its genus. Hence “aureole” is used Reply to Objection 5. The merit arising from charity as a diminutive in comparison with “aurea.” is more excellent than that which arises from the kind of Whether the aureole differs from the fruit? Suppl. q. 96 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the aureole does not cordingly fruit is taken in a spiritual sense sometimes for differ from the fruit. For different rewards are not due to that which refreshes as being the last end: and according the same merit. Now the aureole and the hundredfold fruit to this signification we are said to enjoy [frui] God per- correspond to the same merit, according to a gloss on Mat. fectly in heaven, and imperfectly on the way. From this 13:8, “Some a hundredfold.” Therefore the aureole is the signification we have fruition which is a dowry: but we same as the fruit. are not speaking of fruit in this sense now. Sometimes Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Virgin xlv) fruit signifies spiritually that which refreshes only, though that the “hundredfold fruit is due to the martyrs, and also it is not the last end; and thus the virtues are called fruits, to virgins.” Therefore the fruit is a reward common to inasmuch as “they refresh the mind with genuine sweet- virgins and martyrs. But the aureole also is due to them. ness,” as Ambrose says∗. In this sense fruit is taken (Gal. Therefore the aureole is the same as the fruit. 6:22): “The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy,” etc. Nor Objection 3. Further, there are only two rewards in again is this the sense in which we speak of fruit now; for beatitude, namely the essential, and the accidental which we have treated of this already†. is added to the essential. Now that which is added to the We may, however, take spiritual fruit in another sense, essential reward is called an aureole, as evidenced by the in likeness to material fruit, inasmuch as material fruit is statement (Ex. 25:25) that the little crown [aureola] is a profit expected from the labor of husbandry: so that we added to the crown. But the fruit is not the essential re- call fruit that reward which man acquires from his labor ward, for in that case it would be due to all the blessed. in this life: and thus every reward which by our labors we Therefore it is the same as the aureole. shall acquire for the future life is called a “fruit.” In this On the contrary, Things which are not divided in the sense fruit is taken (Rom. 6:22): “You have your fruit unto same way are not of the same nature. Now fruit and au- sanctification, and the end life everlasting.” Yet neither in reole are not divided in the same way, since aureole is this sense do we speak of fruit now, but we are treating of divided into the aureole of virgins, of martyrs, and of doc- fruit as being the product of seed: for it is in this sense that tors: whereas fruit is divided into the fruit of the married, our Lord speaks of fruit (Mat. 13:23), where He divides of widows, and of virgins. Therefore fruit and aureole are fruit into thirtyfold, sixtyfold, and hundredfold. Now fruit not the same. is the product of seed in so far as the seed power is ca- Further, if fruit and aureole were the same, the aure- pable of transforming the humors of the soil into its own ole would be due to whomsoever the fruit is due. But this nature; and the more efficient this power, and the better is manifestly untrue, since a fruit is due to widowhood, prepared the soil, the more plentiful fruit will result. Now while an aureole is not. Therefore, etc. the spiritual seed which is sown in us is the Word of God: I answer that, Metaphorical expressions can be taken wherefore the more a person is transformed into a spiri- in various ways, according as we find resemblances to the tual nature by withdrawing from carnal things, the greater various properties of the thing from which the comparison is the fruit of the Word in him. Accordingly the fruit of the is taken. Now since fruit, properly speaking, is applied to Word of God differs from the aurea and the aureole, in that material things born of the earth, we employ it variously the “aurea” consists in the joy one has in God, and the “au- in a spiritual sense, with reference to the various condi- reole” in the joy one has in the perfection of one’s works, tions that obtain in material fruits. For the material fruit whereas the “fruit” consists in the joy that the worker has has sweetness whereby it refreshes so far as it is used by in his own disposition as to his degree of spirituality to man: again it is the last thing to which the operation of na- which he has attained through the seed of God’s Word. ture attains: moreover it is that to which husbandry looks Some, however, distinguish between aureole and fruit, forward as the result of sowing or any other process. Ac- by saying that the aureole is due to the fighter, accord- ∗ De Parad. xiii † Cf. Ia IIae, q. 70, a. 1, ad 2 3068 ing to 2 Tim. 2:5, “He. . . shall not be crowned, except character of a signal victory; and the fruit, in so far as by he strive lawfully”; whereas the fruit is due to the la- virginity a person acquires a certain spirituality by with- borer, according to the saying of Wis. 3:15, “The fruit drawing from carnal things. of good labors is glorious.” Others again say that the “au- Reply to Objection 2. Fruit, according to the proper rea” regards conversion to God, while the “aureole” and acceptation as we are speaking of it now, does not de- the “fruit” regard things directed to the end; yet so that note the reward common to martyrdom and virginity, by the fruit regards the will rather, and the aureole the body. that which corresponds to the three degrees of continency. Since, however, labor and strife are in the same subject This gloss which states that the hundredfold fruit corre- and about the same matter, and since the body’s reward sponds to martyrs takes fruit in a broad sense, according depends on the soul’s, these explanations of the difference as any reward is called a fruit, the hundredfold fruit thus between fruit, aurea and aureole would only imply a log- denoting the reward due to any perfect works whatever. ical difference: and this cannot be, since fruit is assigned Reply to Objection 3. Although the aureole is an ac- to some to whom no aureole is assigned. cidental reward added to the essential reward, nevertheless Reply to Objection 1. There is nothing incongruous not every accidental reward is an aureole, but only that if various rewards correspond to the same merit according which is assigned to works of perfection, whereby man is to the various things contained therein. Wherefore to vir- most conformed to Christ in the achievement of a perfect ginity corresponds the aurea in so far as virginity is kept victory. Hence it is not unfitting that another accidental for God’s sake at the command of charity; the aureole, reward, which is called the fruit, be due sometimes to the in so far as virginity is a work of perfection having the withdrawal from a carnal life. Whether a fruit is due to the virtue of continence alone? Suppl. q. 96 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that a fruit is not due to virginity, widowhood, and conjugal continence, which to the virtue of continence alone. For a gloss on 1 Cor. are parts of continence. 15:41, “One is the glory of the sun,” says that “the worth I answer that, A fruit is a reward due to a person of those who have the hundredfold fruit is compared to the in that he passes from the carnal to the spiritual life. glory of the sun; to the glory of the moon those who have Consequently a fruit corresponds especially to that virtue the sixtyfold fruit; and to the stars those who have the thir- which more than any other frees man from subjection to tyfold fruit.” Now this difference of glory, in the meaning the flesh. Now this is the effect of continence, since it of the Apostle, regards any difference whatever of beat- is by sexual pleasures that the soul is especially subject itude. Therefore the various fruits should correspond to to the flesh; so much so that in the carnal act, accord- none but the virtue of continence. ing to Jerome (Ep. ad Ageruch.), “not even the spirit of Objection 2. Further, fruits are so called from prophecy touches the heart of the prophet,” nor “is it pos- fruition. But fruition belongs to the essential reward sible to understand anything in the midst of that pleasure,” which corresponds to all the virtues. Therefore, etc. as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11). Therefore fruit Objection 3. Further, fruit is due to labor: “The fruit corresponds to continence rather than to another virtue. of good labors is glorious” (Wis. 3:15). Now there is Reply to Objection 1. This gloss takes fruit in a broad greater labor in fortitude than in temperance or conti- sense, according as any reward is called a fruit. nence. Therefore fruit does not correspond to continence Reply to Objection 2. Fruition does not take its name alone. from fruit by reason of any comparison with fruit in the Objection 4. Further, it is more difficult not to exceed sense in which we speak of it now, as evidenced by what the measure in food which is necessary for life, than in has been said. sexual matters without which life can be sustained: and Reply to Objection 3. Fruit, as we speak of it now, thus the labor of frugality is greater than that of conti- corresponds to labor not as resulting in fatigue, but as re- nence. Therefore fruit corresponds to frugality rather than sulting in the production of fruit. Hence a man calls his to continence. crops his labor, inasmuch as he labored for them, or pro- Objection 5. Further, fruit implies delight, and de- duced them by his labor. Now the comparison to fruit, as light regards especially the end. Since then the theological produced from seed, is more adapted to continence than to virtues have the end for their object, namely God Himself, fortitude, because man is not subjected to the flesh by the it would seem that to them especially the fruit should cor- passions of fortitude, as he is by the passions with which respond. continence is concerned. On the contrary, is the statement of the gloss on Mat. Reply to Objection 4. Although the pleasures of the 13:23, “The one a hundredfold,” which assigns the fruits table are more necessary than the pleasures of sex, they 3069 are not so strong: wherefore the soul is not so much sub-sense in which fruition applies to delight in the end; but in jected to the flesh thereby. another sense as stated above (a. 2 ). Hence the argument Reply to Objection 5. Fruit is not taken here in the proves nothing. Whether three fruits are fittingly assigned to the three parts of continence? Suppl. q. 96 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that three fruits are un- by withdrawing from carnal things. Consequently vari- fittingly assigned to the three parts of continence: be- ous fruits are distinguished according to the various man- cause twelve fruits of the Spirit are assigned, “charity, joy, ners of the spirituality resulting from continence. Now peace,” etc. (Gal. 5:22). Therefore seemingly we should there is a certain spirituality which is necessary, and one reckon only three. which is superabundant. The spirituality that is necessary Objection 2. Further, fruit denotes a special reward. consists in the rectitude of the spirit not being disturbed Now the reward assigned to virgins, widows, and married by the pleasures of the flesh: and this obtains when one persons is not a special reward, because all who are to be makes use of carnal pleasures according to the order of saved are comprised under one of these three, since no right reason. This is the spirituality of married persons. one is saved who lacks continence, and continence is ad- Spirituality is superabundant when a man withdraws him- equately divided by these three. Therefore three fruits are self entirely from those carnal pleasures which stifle the unfittingly assigned to the three aforesaid. spirit. This may be done in two ways: either in respect of Objection 3. Further, just as widowhood surpasses all time past, present, and future, and this is the spiritual- conjugal continence, so does virginity surpass widow- ity of virgins; or in respect of a particular time, and this hood. But the excess of sixtyfold over thirtyfold is not is the spirituality of widows. Accordingly to those who as the excess of a hundredfold over sixtyfold; neither keep conjugal continence, the thirtyfold fruit is awarded; in arithmetical proportion, since sixty exceeds thirty by to those who keep the continence of widows, the sixty- thirty, and a hundred exceeds sixty by forty; nor in geo- fold fruit; and to those who keep virginal continence, the metrical proportion, since sixty is twice thirty and a hun- hundredfold fruit: and this for the reason given by Bede dred surpasses sixty as containing the whole and two- quoted above, although another motive may be found in thirds thereof. Therefore the fruits are unfittingly adapted the very nature of the numbers. For 30 is the product of to the degrees of continence. 3 multiplied by 10. Now 3 is the number of everything, Objection 4. Further, the statements contained in as stated in De Coelo et Mundo i, and contains a certain Holy Writ stand for all time: “Heaven and earth shall pass perfection common to all, namely of beginning, middle, away, but My words shall not pass away” (Lk. 21:33): and end. Wherefore the number 30 is fittingly assigned to whereas human institutions are liable to change every day. married persons, in whom no other perfection is added to Therefore human institutions are not to be taken as a cri- the observance of the Decalogue, signified by the number terion of the statements of Holy Writ: and it would seem 10, than the common perfection without which there is in consequence that the explanation of these fruits given no salvation. The number six the multiplication of which by Bede is unfitting. For he says (Expos. in Luc. iii, 8) by 10 amounts to 60 has perfection from its parts, being that “the thirtyfold fruit is assigned to married persons, the aggregate of all its parts taken together; wherefore it because in the signs drawn on the ‘abacus’ the number corresponds fittingly to widowhood, wherein we find per- 30 is denoted by the thumb and index finger touching one fect withdrawal from carnal pleasures as to all its circum- another at the tips as though kissing one another: so that stances (which are the parts so to speak of a virtuous act), the number 30 denotes the embraces of married persons. since widowhood uses no carnal pleasures in connection The number 60 is denoted by the contact of the index fin- with any person, place, or any other circumstance; which ger above the middle joint of the thumb, so that the index was not the case with conjugal continence. The number finger by lying over the thumb and weighing on it, signi- 100 corresponds fittingly to virginity; because the number fies the burden which widows have to bear in this world. 10 of which 100 is a multiple is the limit of numbers: and When, however, in the course of enumeration we come to in like manner virginity occupies the limit of spirituality, the number 100 we pass from the left to the right hand, so since no further spirituality can be added to it. The num- that the number 100 denotes virginity, which has a share ber 100 also being a square number has perfection from its in the angelic excellence; for the angels are on the right figure: for a square figure is prefect through being equal hand, i.e. in glory, while we are on the left on account of on all sides, since all its sides are equal: wherefore it is the imperfection of the present life.” adapted to virginity wherein incorruption is found equally I answer that, By continence, to which the fruit cor- as to all times. responds, man is brought to a kind of spiritual nature, Reply to Objection 1. Fruit is not taken there in the 3070 sense in which we are taking it now. may find an explanation. For the married man abstains Reply to Objection 2. Nothing obliges us to hold that only from one that is not his, the widow from both hers fruit is a reward that is not common to all who will be and not hers, so that in the latter case we find the notion saved. For not only the essential reward is common to all, of double, just as 60 is the double of 30. Again 100 is 60 but also a certain accidental reward, such as joy in those X 40, which latter number is the product of 4 X 10, and works without which one cannot be saved. Yet it may be the number 4 is the first solid and square number. Thus the said that the fruits are not becoming to all who will be addition of this number is fitting to virginity, which adds saved, as is evidently the case with those who repent in perpetual incorruption to the perfection of widowhood. the end after leading an incontinent life, for to such no Reply to Objection 4. Although these numerical fruit is due but only the essential reward. signs are a human institution, they are founded somewhat Reply to Objection 3. The distinction of the fruits on the nature of things, in so far as the numbers are de- is to be taken according to the species and figures of the noted in gradation, according to the order of the aforesaid numbers rather than according to their quantity. Neverthe- joints and contacts. less even if we regard the excess in point of quantity, we Whether an aureole is due on account of virginity? Suppl. q. 96 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that an aureole is not due every man both good and wicked. Therefore an aureole is on account of virginity. For where there is greater diffi- not due to virginity. culty in the work, a greater reward is due. Now widows Objection 6. Further, as widowhood is to the sixty- have greater difficulty than virgins in abstaining from the fold fruit, so is virginity to the hundredfold fruit, and to works of the flesh. For Jerome says (Ep. ad Ageruch.) the aureole. Now the sixtyfold fruit is not due to every that the greater difficulty certain persons experience in ab- widow, but only, as some say, to one who vows to remain staining from the allurements of pleasure, the greater their a widow. Therefore it would seem that neither is the aure- reward, and he is speaking in praise of widows. More- ole due to any kind of virginity, but only to that which is over, the Philosopher says (De Anim. Hist. vii) that observed by vow. “young women who have been deflowered desire sexual Objection 7. Further, reward is not given to that which intercourse the more for the recollection of the pleasure.” is done of necessity, since all merit depends on the will. Therefore the aureole which is the greatest reward is due But some are virgins of necessity, such as those who are to widows more than to virgins. naturally cold-blooded, and eunuchs. Therefore an aure- Objection 2. Further, if an aureole were due to virgin- ole is not always due to virginity. ity, it would be especially found where there is the most On the contrary, A gloss on Ex. 25:25: “Thou perfect virginity. Now the most prefect virginity is in the shalt also make a little golden crown [coronam aureolam]” Blessed Virgin, wherefore she is called the Virgin of vir- says: “This crown denotes the new hymn which the vir- gins: and yet no aureole is due to her because she ex- gins sing in the presence of the Lamb, those, to wit, who perienced no conflict in being continent, for she was not follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth.” Therefore the infected with the corruption of the fomes∗. Therefore an reward due to virginity is called an aureole. aureole is not due to virginity. Further, It is written (Is. 56:4): “Thus saith the Lord Objection 3. Further, a special reward is not due to to the eunuchs”: and the text continues (Is. 56: 5): “I will that which has not been at all times praiseworthy. Now give to them. . . a name better than sons and daughters”: it would not have been praiseworthy to observe virginity and a gloss† says: “This refers to their peculiar and tran- in the state of innocence, since then was it commanded: scendent glory.” Now the eunuchs “who have made them- “Increase and multiply and fill the earth” (Gn. 1:28): nor selves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven” (Mat. 19:12) again during the time of the Law, since the barren were denote virgins. Therefore it would seem that some special accursed. Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity. reward is due to virginity, and this is called the aureole. Objection 4. Further, the same reward is not due to I answer that, Where there is a notable kind of vic- virginity observed, and virginity lost. Yet an aureole is tory, a special crown is due. Wherefore since by virgin- sometimes due to lost virginity; for instance if a maiden ity a person wins a signal victory over the flesh, against be violated unwillingly at the order of a tyrant for confess- which a continuous battle is waged: “The flesh lusteth ing Christ. Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity. against the spirit,” etc. (Gal. 5:17), a special crown called Objection 5. Further, a special reward is not due to the aureole is due to virginity. This indeed is the common that which is in us by nature. But virginity is inborn in opinion of all; but all are not agreed as to the kind of vir- ∗ Cf. IIIa, q. 27, a. 3 † St. Augustine, De Virginit. xxv 3071 ginity to which it is due. For some say that the aureole is that the virgin’s victory is more perfect than the widow’s, due to the act. So that she who actually remains a virgin for the most perfect and most brilliant kind of victory is will have the aureole provided she be of the number of never to have yielded to the foe: and the crown is due, not the saved. But this would seem unreasonable, because in to the battle but to the victory gained by the battle. this case those who have the will to marry and neverthe- Reply to Objection 2. There are two opinions about less die before marrying would have the aureole. Hence this. For some say that the Blessed Virgin has not an au- others hold that the aureole is due to the state and not to reole in reward of her virginity, if we take aureole in the the act: so that those virgins alone merit the aureole who proper sense as referring to a conflict, but that she has by vow have placed themselves in the state of observing something more than an aureole, on account of her most perpetual virginity. But this also seems unreasonable, be- perfect purpose of observing virginity. Others say that she cause it is possible to have the same intention of observ- has an aureole even in its proper signification, and that ing virginity without a vow as with a vow. Hence it may a most transcendent one: for though she experienced no be said otherwise that merit is due to every virtuous act conflict, she had a certain conflict of the flesh, but owing commanded by charity. Now virginity comes under the to the exceeding strength of her virtue, her flesh was so genus of virtue in so far as perpetual incorruption of mind subdued that she did not feel this conflict. This, however, and body is an object of choice, as appears from what has would seem to be said without reason, for since we be- been said above (Sent. iv, D, 33, q. 3, Aa. 1,2)‡. Con- lieve the Blessed Virgin to have been altogether immune sequently the aureole is due to those virgins alone, who from the inclination of the fomes on account of the per- had the purpose of observing perpetual virginity, whether fection of her sanctification, it is wicked to suppose that or no they have confirmed this purpose by vow—and this there was in her any conflict with the flesh, since such like I say with reference to the aureole in its proper significa- conflict is only from the inclination of the fomes, nor can tion of a reward due to merit—although this purpose may temptation from the flesh be without sin, as declared by a at some time have been interrupted, integrity of the flesh gloss∗ on 2 Cor. 12:7, “There was given me a sting of my remaining withal, provided it be found at the end of life, flesh.” Hence we must say that she has an aureole prop- because virginity of the mind may be restored, although erly speaking, so as to be conformed in this to those other virginity of the flesh cannot. If, however, we take the au- members of the Church in whom virginity is found: and reole in its broad sense for any joy added to the essential although she had no conflict by reason of the temptation joy of heaven, the aureole will be applicable even to those which is of the flesh, she had the temptation which is of who are incorrupt in flesh, although they had not the pur- the enemy, who feared not even Christ (Mat. 4). pose of observing perpetual virginity. For without doubt Reply to Objection 3. The aureole is not due to vir- they will rejoice in the incorruption of their body, even as ginity except as adding some excellence to the other de- the innocent will rejoice in having been free from sin, al- grees of continence. If Adam had not sinned, virginity though they had no opportunity of sinning, as in the case would have had no perfection over conjugal continence, of baptized children. But this is not the proper meaning since in that case marriage would have been honorable, of an aureole, although it is very commonly taken in this and the marriage-bed unsullied, for it would not have been sense. dishonored by lust: hence virginity would not then have Reply to Objection 1. In some respects virgins ex- been observed, nor would an aureole have been due to it. perience a greater conflict in remaining continent; and But the condition of human nature being changed, virgin- in other respects, widows, other things being equal. For ity has a special beauty of its own, and consequently a virgins are inflamed by concupiscence, and by the de- special reward is assigned to it. sire of experience, which arises from a certain curiosity During the time of the Mosaic law, when the worship as it were, which makes man more willing to see what of God was to be continued by means of the carnal act, he has never seen. Sometimes, moreover, this concupis- it was not altogether praiseworthy to abstain from carnal cence is increased by their esteeming the pleasure to be intercourse: wherefore no special reward would be given greater than it is in reality, and by their failing to con- for such a purpose unless it came from a Divine inspira- sider the grievances attaching to this pleasure. In these tion, as is believed to have been the case with Jeremias respects widows experience the lesser conflict, yet theirs and Elias, of whose marriage we do not read. is the greater conflict by reason of their recollection of the Reply to Objection 4. If a virgin is violated, she does pleasure. Moreover, in different subjects one motive is not forfeit the aureole, provided she retain unfailingly the stronger than another, according to the various conditions purpose of observing perpetual virginity, and nowise con- and dispositions of the subject, because some are more sent to the act. Nor does she forfeit virginity thereby; and susceptible to one, and others to another. However, what- be this said, whether she be violated for the faith, or for ever we may say of the degree of conflict, this is certain— any other cause whatever. But if she suffer this for the ‡ Cf. IIIa, q. 152, Aa. 1,3 ∗ St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei xix, 4 3072 faith, this will count to her for merit, and will be a kind of remaining widows, even though they do not make it the of martyrdom: wherefore Lucy said: “If thou causest me matter of a vow, even as we have said in regard to virgin- to be violated against my will, my chastity will receive a ity. double crown”†; not that she has two aureoles of virginity, Reply to Objection 7. If cold-blooded persons and but that she will receive a double reward, one for observ- eunuchs have the will to observe perpetual incorruption ing virginity, the other for the outrage she has suffered. even though they were capable of sexual intercourse, they Even supposing that one thus violated should conceive, must be called virgins and merit the aureole: for they she would not for that reason forfeit her virginity: nor make a virtue of necessity. If, on the other hand, they have would she be equal to Christ’s mother, in whom there was the will to marry if they could, they do not merit the aure- integrity of the flesh together with integrity of the mind‡. ole. Hence Augustine says (De Sancta Virgin. xxiv): “For Reply to Objection 5. Virginity is inborn in us as to those like eunuchs whose bodies are so formed that they that which is material in virginity: but the purpose of ob- are unable to beget, it suffices when they become Chris- serving perpetual incorruption, whence virginity derives tians and keep the commandments of God, that they have its merit, is not inborn, but comes from the gift of grace. a mind to have a wife if they could, in order to rank with Reply to Objection 6. The sixtyfold fruit is due, not the faithful who are married.” to every widow, but only to those who retain the purpose Whether an aureole is due to martyrs? Suppl. q. 96 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that an aureole is not tion†: “I should say rightly that the Mother of God was due to martyrs. For an aureole is a reward given for both virgin and martyr, although she ended her days in works of supererogation, wherefore Bede commenting on peace, wherefore: Thine own soul a sword hath pierced— Ex. 25:25, “Thou shalt also make another. . . crown,” says: namely for her Son’s death.” Since then no aureole corre- “This may be rightly referred to the reward of those who sponds to interior sorrow, neither should one correspond by freely choosing a more perfect life go beyond the gen- to outward suffering. eral commandments.” But to die for confessing the faith Objection 5. Further, penance itself is a kind of mar- is sometimes an obligation, and not a work of supereroga- tyrdom, wherefore Gregory says (Hom. iii in Evang.): tion as appears from the words of Rom. 10:10, “With the “Although persecution has ceased to offer the opportunity, heart, we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confes- yet the peace we enjoy is not without its martyrdom; since sion is made unto salvation.” Therefore an aureole is not even if we no longer yield the life of the body to the sword, always due to martyrdom. yet do we slay fleshly desires in the soul with the sword Objection 2. Further, according to Gregory (Moral. of the spirit.” But no aureole is due to penance which con- ix∗) “the freer the service, the more acceptable it is.” Now sists in external works. Neither therefore is an aureole due martyrdom has a minimum of freedom, since it is a pun- to every external martyrdom. ishment inflicted by another person with force. Therefore Objection 6. Further, an aureole is not due to an un- an aureole is not due to martyrdom, since it is accorded to lawful work. Now it is unlawful to lay hands on oneself, surpassing merit. as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei i), and yet the Church Objection 3. Further, martyrdom consists not only celebrates the martyrdom of some who laid hands upon in suffering death externally, but also in the interior act of themselves in order to escape the fury of tyrants, as in the the will: wherefore Bernard in a sermon on the Holy Inno- case of certain women at Antioch (Eusebius, Eccles. Hist. cents distinguishes three kinds of martyr—in will and not viii, 24). Therefore an aureole is not always due to mar- in death, as John; in both will and death, as Stephen; in tyrdom. death and not in will, as the Innocents. Accordingly if an Objection 7. Further, it happens at times that a per- aureole were due to martyrdom, it would be due to volun- son is wounded for the faith, and survives for some time. tary rather than external martyrdom, since merit proceeds Now it is clear that such a one is a martyr, and yet seem- from will. Yet such is not the case. Therefore an aureole ingly an aureole is not due to him, since his conflict did is not due to martyrdom. not last until death. Therefore an aureole is not always Objection 4. Further, bodily suffering is less than due to martyrdom. mental, which consists of internal sorrow and affliction Objection 8. Further, some suffer more from the loss of soul. But internal suffering is also a kind of martyr- of temporal goods than from the affliction even of their dom: wherefore Jerome says in a sermon on the Assump- own body and this is shown by their bearing many afflic- † Office of S. Lucy; lect. vi of Dominican Breviary, December 13th ‡ Cf. IIa IIae, q. 64, a. 3, ad 3; IIa IIae, q. 124, a. 4, ad 2; IIa IIae, q. 152, a. 1 ∗ Cf. St. Augustine, De Adult. Conjug. i, 14 † Ep. ad Paul. et Eustoch. 3073 tions for the sake of gain. Therefore if they be despoiled is considered from the point of view of the motive of con-of their temporal goods for Christ’s sake they would seem flict, when, to wit, a man strives for the most honorable to be martyrs, and yet an aureole is not apparently due to cause; which is Christ Himself. Both these things are to be them. Therefore the same conclusion follows as before. found in martyrdom, which is death suffered for Christ’s Objection 9. Further, a martyr would seem to be no sake: for “it is not the pain but the cause that makes the other than one who dies for the faith, wherefore Isidore martyr,” as Augustine says (Contra Crescon. iii). Con- says (Etym. vii): “They are called martyrs in Greek, wit- sequently an aureole is due to martyrdom as well as to nesses in Latin: because they suffered in order to bear wit- virginity. ness to Christ, and strove unto death for the truth.” Now Reply to Objection 1. To suffer death for Christ’s there are virtues more excellent than faith, such as justice, sake, is absolutely speaking, a work of supererogation; charity, and so forth, since these cannot be without grace, since every one is not bound to confess his faith in the and yet no aureole is due to them. Therefore seemingly face of a persecutor: yet in certain cases it is necessary for neither is an aureole due to martyrdom. salvation, when, to wit, a person is seized by a persecutor Objection 10. Further, even as the truth of faith is and interrogated as to his faith which he is then bound to from God, so is all other truth, as Ambrose∗ declares, confess. Nor does it follow that he does not merit an au- since “every truth by whomsoever uttered is from the Holy reole. For an aureole is due to a work of supererogation, Ghost.” Therefore if an aureole is due to one who suffers not as such, but as having a certain perfection. Where- death for the truth of faith, in like manner it is also due fore so long as this perfection remains, even though the to those who suffer death for any other virtue: and yet supererogation cease, one merits the aureole. apparently this is not the case. Reply to Objection 2. A reward is due to martyr- Objection 11. Further, the common good is greater dom, not in respect of the exterior infliction, but because than the good of the individual. Now if a man die in a just it is suffered voluntarily: since we merit only through that war in order to save his country, an aureole is not due to which is in us. And the more that which one suffers vol- him. Therefore even though he be put to death in order to untarily is difficult and naturally repugnant to the will the keep the faith that is in himself, no aureole is due to him: more is the will that suffers it for Christ’s sake shown to and consequently the same conclusion follows as above. be firmly established in Christ, and consequently a higher Objection 12. Further, all merit proceeds from the reward is due to him. free will. Yet the Church celebrates the martyrdom of Reply to Objection 3. There are certain acts which, some who had not the use of the free will. Therefore they in their very selves, contain intense pleasure or difficulty: did not merit an aureole: and consequently an aureole is and in such the act always adds to the character of merit or not due to all martyrs. demerit, for as much as in the performance of the act the On the contrary, Augustine says (De Sancta Virgin. will, on account of the aforesaid intensity, must needs un- xlvi): “No one, methinks, would dare prefer virginity to dergo an alteration from the state in which it was before. martyrdom.” Now an aureole is due to virginity, and con- Consequently, other things being equal, one who performs sequently also to martyrdom. an act of lust sins more than one who merely consents in Further, the crown is due to one who has striven. the act, because in the very act the will is increased. In But in martyrdom the strife presents a special difficulty. like manner since in the act of suffering martyrdom there Therefore a special aureole is due thereto. is a very great difficulty, the will to suffer martyrdom does I answer that, Just as in the spirit there is a con- not reach the degree of merit due to actual martyrdom by flict with the internal concupiscences, so is there in man reason of its difficulty: although, indeed it may possibly a conflict with the passion that is inflicted from without. attain to a higher reward, if we consider the root of merit Wherefore, just as a special crown, which we call an aure- since the will of one man to suffer martyrdom may pos- ole, is due to the most perfect victory whereby we triumph sibly proceed from a greater charity than another man’s over the concupiscences of the flesh, in a word to virgin- act of martyrdom. Hence one who is willing to be a mar- ity, so too an aureole is due to the most perfect victory that tyr may by his will merit an essential reward equal to or is won against external assaults. Now the most perfect greater than that which is due to an actual martyr. But the victory over passion caused from without is considered aureole is due to the difficulty inherent to the conflict it- from two points of view. First from the greatness of the self of martyrdom: wherefore it is not due to those who passion. Now among all passions inflicted from without, are martyrs only in will. death holds the first place, just as sexual concupiscences Reply to Objection 4. Just as pleasures of touch, are chief among internal passions. Consequently, when a which are the matter of temperance, hold the chief place man conquers death and things directed to death, his is a among all pleasures both internal and external, so pains most perfect victory. Secondly, the perfection of victory of touch surpass all other pains. Consequently an aure- ∗ Spurious work on 1 Cor. 12:3: “No man can say,” etc. 3074 ole is due to the difficulty of suffering pains of touch, for about pleasures of touch as being the principal of all, so instance, from blows and so forth, rather than to the dif- fortitude is about dangers of death as being the greatest ficulty of bearing internal sufferings, by reason of which, of all (Ethic. iii, 6). Consequently the aureole is due to however, one is not properly called a martyr, except by a such injuries only as are inflicted on a person’s own body kind of comparison. It is in this sense that Jerome speaks. and are of a nature to cause death. Accordingly whether Reply to Objection 5. The sufferings of penance are a person lose his temporalities, or his good name, or any- not a martyrdom properly speaking, because they do not thing else of the kind, for Christ’s sake, he does not for consist in things directed to the causing of death, since that reason become a martyr, nor merit the aureole. Nor they are directed merely to the taming of the flesh: and is it possible to love ordinately external things more than if any one go beyond this measure, such afflictions will one’s body; and inordinate love does not help one to merit be deserving of blame. However such afflictions are spo- an aureole: nor again can sorrow for the loss of corporeal ken of as a martyrdom by a kind of comparison. and they things be equal to the sorrow for the slaying of the body surpass the sufferings of martyrdom in duration but not in and other like things†. intensity. Reply to Objection 9. The sufficient motive for mar- Reply to Objection 6. According to Augustine (De tyrdom is not only confession of the faith, but any other Civ. Dei i) it is lawful to no one to lay hands on himself virtue, not civic but infused, that has Christ for its end. For for any reason whatever; unless perchance it be done by one becomes a witness of Christ by any virtuous act, inas- Divine instinct as an example of fortitude that others may much as the works which Christ perfects in us bear wit- despise death. Those to whom the objection refers are ness to His goodness. Hence some virgins were slain for believed to have brought death on themselves by Divine virginity which they desired to keep, for instance blessed instinct, and for this reason the Church celebrates their Agnes and others whose martyrdom is celebrated by the martyrdom∗. Church. Reply to Objection 7. If any one receive a mortal Reply to Objection 10. The truth of faith has Christ wound for the faith and survive, without doubt he merits for end and object; and therefore the confession thereof, if the aureole: as instanced in blessed Cecilia who survived suffering be added thereto, merits an aureole, not only on for three days, and many martyrs who died in prison. But, the part of the end but also on the part of the matter. But even if the wound he receives be not mortal, yet be the the confession of any other truth is not a sufficient motive occasion of his dying, he is believed to merit the aureole: for martyrdom by reason of its matter, but only on the part although some say that he does not merit the aureole if he of the end; for instance if a person were willing to be slain happen to die through his own carelessness or neglect. For for Christ’s sake rather than sin against Him by telling any this neglect would not have occasioned his death, except lie whatever. on the supposition of the wound which he received for the Reply to Objection 11. The uncreated good surpasses faith: and consequently this wound previously received all created good. Hence any created end, whether it be the for the faith is the original occasion of his death, so that common or a private good, cannot confer so great a good- he would not seem to lose. the aureole for that reason, un- ness on an act as can the uncreated end, when, to wit, an less his neglect were such as to involve a mortal sin, which act is done for God’s sake. Hence when a person dies for would deprive him of both aurea and aureole. If, however, the common good without referring it to Christ, he will by some chance or other he were not to die of the mortal not merit the aureole; but if he refer it to Christ he will wound received, or again if the wounds received were not merit the aureole and he will be a martyr; for instance, if mortal, and he were to die while in prison, he would still he defend his country from the attack of an enemy who merit the aureole. Hence the martyrdom of some saints is designs to corrupt the faith of Christ, and suffer death in celebrated in the Church for that they died in prison, hav- that defense. ing been wounded long before, as in the case of Pope Mar- Reply to Objection 12. Some say that the use of rea- cellus. Accordingly in whatever way suffering for Christ’s son was by the Divine power accelerated in the Innocents sake be continued unto death, whether death ensue or not, slain for Christ’s sake, even as in John the Baptist while a man becomes a martyr and merits the aureole. If, how- yet in his mother’s womb: and in that case they were truly ever, it be not continued unto death, this is not a reason martyrs in both act and will, and have the aureole. oth- for calling a person a martyr, as in the case of the blessed ers say, however, that they were martyrs in act only and Sylvester, whose feast the Church does not solemnize as a not in will: and this seems to be the opinion of Bernard, martyr’s, since he ended his days in peace, although pre- who distinguishes three kinds of martyrs, as stated above viously he had undergone certain sufferings. (obj. 3). In this case the Innocents, even as they do not ful- Reply to Objection 8. Even as temperance is not fill all the conditions of martyrdom, and yet are martyrs in about pleasures of money, honors, and the like, but only a sense, in that they died for Christ, so too they have the ∗ Cf. IIa IIae, q. 64, a. 5 † Cf. IIa IIae, q. 124, a. 5 3075 aureole, not in all its perfection, but by a kind of partic-ence to baptized children, that they will have a certain joy ipation, in so far as they rejoice in having. been slain in in their innocence and carnal integrity‡ Christ’s service; thus it was stated above (a. 5) in refer- Whether an aureole is due to doctors? Suppl. q. 96 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that an aureole is not due when a person not only refuses to yield to the devil’s as- to doctors. For every reward to be had in the life to come saults, but also drives him out, not from himself alone, will correspond to some act of virtue. But preaching or but from others also. Now this is done by preaching and teaching is not the act of a virtue. Therefore an aureole is teaching: wherefore an aureole is due to preaching and not due to teaching or preaching. teaching, even as to virginity and martyrdom. Nor can we Objection 2. Further, teaching and preaching are the admit, as some affirm, that it is due to prelates only, who result of studying and being taught. Now the things that are competent to preach and teach by virtue of their office. are rewarded in the future life are not acquired by a man’s but it is due to all whosoever exercise this act lawfully. study, since we merit not by our natural and acquired gifts. Nor is it due to prelates, although they have the office of Therefore no aureole will be merited in the future life for preaching, unless they actually preach, since a crown is teaching and preaching. due not to the habit, but to the actual strife, according to Objection 3. Further, exaltation in the life to come 2 Tim. 2:5, “He. . . shall not be [Vulg.: ‘is not’] crowned, corresponds to humiliation in the present life, because “he except he strive lawfully.” that humbleth himself shall be exalted” (Mat. 23:12). But Reply to Objection 1. Preaching and teaching are acts there is no humiliation in teaching and preaching, in fact of a virtue, namely mercy, wherefore they are reckoned they are occasions of pride; for a gloss on Mat. 4:5, “Then among the spiritual alms deeds∗. the devil took Him up,” says that “the devil deceives many Reply to Objection 2. Although ability to preach and who are puffed up with the honor of the master’s chair.” teach is sometimes the outcome of study, the practice of Therefore it would seem that an aureole is not due to teaching comes from the will, which is informed with preaching and teaching. charity infused by God: and thus its act can be merito- On the contrary, A gloss on Eph. 1:18,19, “That you rious. may know. . . what is the exceeding greatness,” etc. says: Reply to Objection 3. Exaltation in this life does not “The holy doctors will have an increase of glory above lessen the reward of the other life, except for him who that which all have in common.” Therefore, etc. seeks his own glory from that exaltation: whereas he who Further, a gloss on Canticle of Canticles 8:12, “My turns that exaltation to the profit of others acquires thereby vineyard is before me,” says: “He describes the peculiar a reward for himself. Still, when it is stated that an au- reward which He has prepared for His doctors.” There- reole is due to teaching, this is to be understood of the fore doctors will have a peculiar reward: and we call this teaching of things pertaining to salvation, by which teach- an aureole. ing the devil is expelled from men’s hearts, as by a kind I answer that, Just as by virginity and martyrdom a of spiritual weapon, of which it is said (2 Cor. 10:4): person wins a most perfect victory over the flesh and the “The weapons of our warfare are not carnal but spiritual” world, so is a most perfect victory gained over the devil, [Vulg.: ‘but mighty to God’]. Whether an aureole is due to Christ? Suppl. q. 96 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that an aureole is due to emplar of virginity is in God. Therefore it would seem Christ. For an aureole is due to virginity, martyrdom, and that an aureole is due to Christ even as God. teaching. Now these three were pre-eminently in Christ. On the contrary, An aureole is described as “joy in Therefore an aureole is especially due to Him. being conformed to Christ.” Now no one is conformed or Objection 2. Further, whatever is most perfect in hu- likened to himself, as the Philosopher says (Metaph., lib. man things must ne especially ascribed to Christ. Now ix, 3). Therefore an aureole is not due to Christ. an aureole is due as the reward of most excellent merits. Further, Christ’s reward was never increased. Now Therefore it is also due to Christ. Christ had no aureole from the moment of His concep- Objection 3. Further, Cyprian says (De Habit. Virg.) tion, since then He had never fought. Therefore He never that “virginity bears a likeness to God.” Therefore the ex- had an aureole afterwards. ‡ Cf. IIa IIae, q. 124, a. 1, ad 1, where St. Thomas declares that the Holy Innocents were truly martyrs. ∗ Cf. IIa IIae, q. 32, a. 2 3076 I answer that, There are two opinions on this point. throne [Vulg.: ‘With My Father in His throne’].” There- For some say that Christ has an aureole in its strict sense, fore we must say with others that although there is nothing seeing that in Him there is both conflict and victory, and of the nature of an aureole in Christ, there is nevertheless consequently a crown in its proper acceptation. But if we something more excellent than any aureole. consider the question carefully, although the notion of au- Reply to Objection 1. Christ was most truly virgin, rea or crown is becoming to Christ, the notion of aureole martyr, and doctor; yet the corresponding accidental re- is not. For from the very fact that aureole is a diminu- ward in Christ is a negligible quantity in comparison with tive term it follows that it denotes something possessed the greatness of His essential reward. Hence He has not by participation and not in its fulness. Wherefore an au- an aureole in its proper sense. reole is becoming to those who participate in the perfect Reply to Objection 2. Although the aureole is due to victory by imitating Him in Whom the fulness of perfect a most perfect work, yet with regard to us, so far as it is victory is realized. And therefore, since in Christ the no- a diminutive term, it denotes the participation of a perfec- tion of victory is found chiefly and fully, for by His vic- tion derived from one in whom that perfection is found tory others are made victors—as shown by the words of in its fulness. Accordingly it implies a certain inferiority, Jn. 16:33, “Have confidence, I have overcome the world,” and thus it is not found in Christ in Whom is the fulness and Apoc. 5:5, “Behold the lion of the tribe of Juda. . . hath of every perfection. prevailed”—it is not becoming for Christ to have an aure- Reply to Objection 3. Although in some way vir- ole, but to have something from which all aureoles are ginity has its exemplar in God, that exemplar is not ho- derived. Hence it is written (Apoc. 3:21): “To him that mogeneous. For the incorruption of God, which virginity shall overcome, I will give to sit with Me in My throne, imitates is not in God in the same way as in a virgin. as I also have overcome, and am set down in My Father’s Whether an aureole is due to the angels? Suppl. q. 96 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that an aureole is due to of virginity, martyrdom or teaching, if they do not prac- the angels. For Jerome (Serm. de Assump.∗) speaking of tice them outwardly. But angels are incorporeal spirits. virginity says: “To live without the flesh while living in Therefore they have no aureole. the flesh is to live as an angel rather than as a man”: and I answer that, An aureole is not due to the angels. a gloss on 1 Cor. 7:26, “For the present necessity,” says The reason of this is that an aureole, properly speaking, that “virginity is the portion of the angels.” Since then an corresponds to some perfection of surpassing merit. Now aureole corresponds to virginity, it would seem due to the those things which make for perfect merit in man are con- angels. natural to angels, or belong to their state in general, or to Objection 2. Further, incorruption of the spirit is more their essential reward. Wherefore the angels have not an excellent than incorruption of the flesh. Now there is in- aureole in the same sense as an aureole is due to men. corruption of spirit in the angels, since they never sinned. Reply to Objection 1. Virginity is said to be an an- Therefore an aureole is due to them rather than to men gelic life, in so far as virgins imitate by grace what angels incorrupt in the flesh and who have sinned at some time. have by nature. For it is not owing to a virtue that angels Objection 3. Further, an aureole is due to teaching. abstain altogether from pleasures of the flesh, since they Now angels teach us by cleansing, enlightening, and per- are incapable of such pleasures. fecting† us, as Dionysius says (Hier. Eccles. vi). There- Reply to Objection 2. Perpetual incorruption of the fore at least the aureole of doctors is due to them. spirit in the angels merits their essential reward: because On the contrary, It is written (2 Tim. 2:5): it is necessary for their salvation, since in them recovery “He. . . shall not be [Vulg.: ‘is not’] crowned, except he is impossible after they have fallen‡. strive lawfully.” But there is no conflict in the angels. Reply to Objection 3. The acts whereby the angels Therefore an aureole is not due to them. teach us belong to their glory and their common state: Further, an aureole is not due to an act that is not per- wherefore they do not merit an aureole thereby. formed through the body: wherefore it is not due to lovers ∗ Ep. ad Paul. et Eustoch. ix † Cf. Ia, q. 111, a. 1 ‡ Cf. Ia, q. 64, a. 2 3077 Whether an aureole is also due to the body? Suppl. q. 96 a. 10 Objection 1. It would seem that an aureole is also due tyr’s aureole is also in his body; and in like manner the to the body. For the essential reward is greater than the aureoles of others. accidental. But the dowries which belong to the essen- On the contrary, The souls now in heaven have au- tial reward are not only in the soul but also in the body. reoles; and yet they have no body. Therefore the proper Therefore there is also an aureole which pertains to the subject of an aureole is the soul and not the body. accidental reward. Further, all merit is from the soul. Therefore the whole Objection 2. Further, punishment in soul and body reward should be in the soul. corresponds to sin committed through the body. Therefore I answer that, Properly speaking the aureole is in the a reward both in soul and in body is due to merit gained mind: since it is joy in the works to which an aureole is through the body. But the aureole is merited through due. But even as from the joy in the essential reward, works of the body. Therefore an aureole is also due to which is the aurea, there results a certain comeliness in the body. the body, which is the glory of the body, so from the joy Objection 3. Further, a certain fulness of virtue will in the aureole there results a certain bodily comeliness: so shine forth in the bodies of martyrs, and will be seen in that the aureole is chiefly in the mind, but by a kind of their bodily scars: wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei overflow it shines forth in the body. xxii): “We feel an undescribable love for the blessed mar- This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. It must tyrs so as to desire to see in that kingdom the scars of the be observed, however, that the beauty of the scars which wounds in their bodies, which they bore for Christ’s name. will appear in the bodies of the martyrs cannot be called Perchance indeed we shall see them, for this will not make an aureole, since some of the martyrs will have an aureole them less comely, but more glorious. A certain beauty will in which such scars will not appear, for instance those who shine in them, a beauty, though in the body, yet not of the were put to death by drowning, starvation, or the squalor body but of virtue.” Therefore it would seem that the mar- of prison. Whether three aureoles are fittingly assigned, those of virgins, of martyrs, and of Suppl. q. 96 a. 11 doctors? Objection 1. It would seem that the three aureoles by preaching and teaching, so does he by publishing writ- of virgins, martyrs, and doctors are unfittingly assigned. ten works. Therefore a fourth aureole is due to those who For the aureole of martyrs corresponds to their virtue of do this. fortitude, the aureole of virgins to the virtue of temper- I answer that, An aureole is an exceptional reward ance, and the aureole of doctors to the virtue of prudence. corresponding to an exceptional victory: wherefore the Therefore it seems that there should be a fourth aureole three aureoles are assigned in accordance with the excep- corresponding to the virtue of justice. tional victories in the three conflicts which beset every Objection 2. Further, a gloss on Ex. 25:25: “A pol- man. For in the conflict with the flesh, he above all wins ished crown, etc. says that a golden [aurea] crown is the victory who abstains altogether from sexual pleasures added, when the Gospel promises eternal life to those which are the chief of this kind; and such is a virgin. who keep the commandments: ‘If thou wilt enter into life, Wherefore an aureole is due to virginity. In the conflict keep the commandments’ (Mat. 19:17). To this is added with the world, the chief victory is to suffer the world’s the little golden crown [aureola] when it is said: ‘If thou persecution even until death: wherefore the second aure- wilt be perfect, go and sell all that thou hast, and give to ole is due to martyrs who win the victory in this battle. In the poor’ ” (Mat. 19:21). Therefore an aureole is due to the conflict with the devil, the chief victory is to expel the poverty. enemy not only from oneself but also from the hearts of Objection 3. Further, a man subjects himself wholly others: this is done by teaching and preaching, and conse- to God by the vow of obedience: wherefore the greatest quently the third aureole is due to doctors and preachers. perfection consists in the vow of obedience. Therefore it Some, however, distinguish the three aureoles in ac- would seem that an aureole is due thereto. cordance with the three powers of the soul, by saying that Objection 4. Further, there are also many other works the three aureoles correspond to the three chief acts of the of supererogation in which one will rejoice in the life soul’s three highest powers. For the act of the rational to come. Therefore there are many aureoles besides the power is to publish the truth of faith even to others, and aforesaid three. to this act the aureole of doctors is due: the highest act of Objection 5. Further, just as a man spreads the faith the irascible power is to overcome even death for Christ’s 3078 sake, and to this act the aureole of martyrs is due: and the of such an act—or again of wisdom, as directing it. highest act of the concupiscible power is to abstain alto- We may also reply, with others, that justice embraces gether from the greatest carnal pleasures, and to this act all the virtues, wherefore a special aureole is not due to it. the aureole of virgins is due. Reply to Objection 2. Although poverty is a work of Others again, distinguish the three aureoles in accor- perfection, it does not take the highest place in a spiritual dance with those things whereby we are most signally conflict, because the love of temporalities assails a man conformed to Christ. For He was the mediator between less than carnal concupiscence or persecution whereby the Father and the world. Hence He was a doctor, by man- his own body is broken. Hence an aureole is not due to ifesting to the world the truth which He had received from poverty; but judicial power by reason of the humiliation the Father; He was a martyr, by suffering the persecution consequent upon poverty. The gloss quoted takes aure- of the world; and He was a virgin, by His personal purity. ole in the broad sense for any reward given for excellent Wherefore doctors, martyrs and virgins are most perfectly merit. conformed to Him: and for this reason an aureole is due We reply in the same way to the Third and Fourth Ob- to them. jections. Reply to Objection 1. There is no conflict to be ob- Reply to Objection 5. An aureole is due to those who served in the act of justice as in the acts of the other commit the sacred doctrine to writing: but it is not dis- virtues. Nor is it true that to teach is an act of prudence: tinct from the aureole of doctors, since the compiling of in fact rather is it an act of charity or mercy—inasmuch as writing is a way of teaching. it is by such like habits that we are inclined to the practice Whether the virgin’s aureole is the greatest of all? Suppl. q. 96 a. 12 Objection 1. It would seem that the virgin’s aureole point of view of the conflicts, that aureole being consid- is the greatest of all. For it is said of virgins (Apoc. 14:4) ered greater which is due to the more strenuous battle. that they “follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth,” and Looking at it thus the martyr’s aureole takes precedence (Apoc. 14:3) that “no” other “man could say the canticle” of the others in one way, and the virgin’s in another. For which the virgins sang. Therefore virgins have the most the martyr’s battle is more strenuous in itself, and more in- excellent aureole. tensely painful; while the conflict with the flesh is fraught Objection 2. Further, Cyprian (De Habit. Virg.) says with greater danger, inasmuch as it is more lasting and of virgins that they are “the more illustrious portion of threatens us at closer quarters. Secondly, from the point Christ’s flock.” Therefore the greater aureole is due to of view of the things about which the battle is fought: and them. thus the doctor’s aureole takes precedence of all others, Objection 3. Again, it would seem that the martyr’s since this conflict is about intelligible goods. while the aureole is the greatest. For Aymo, commenting on Apoc. other conflicts are about sensible passions. Nevertheless, 14:3, “No man could say the hymn,” says that “virgins the precedence that is considered in view of the conflict is do not all take precedence of married folk; but only those more essential to the aureole; since the aureole, according who in addition to the observance of virginity are by the to its proper character, regards the victory and the battle, tortures of their passion on a par with married persons and the difficulty of fighting which is viewed from the who have suffered martyrdom.” Therefore martyrdom standpoint of the battle is of greater importance than that gives virginity its precedence over other states: and con- which is considered from our standpoint through the con- sequently a greater aureole is due to virginity. flict being at closer quarters. Therefore the martyr’s aure- Objection 4. Again, it would seem that the greatest ole is simply the greatest of all: for which reason a gloss aureole is due to doctors. Because the Church militant is on Mat. 5:10, says that “all the other beatitudes are per- modelled after the Church triumphant. Now in the Church fected in the eighth, which refers to the martyrs,” namely, militant the greatest honor is due to doctors (1 Tim. 5:17): “Blessed are they that suffer persecution.” For this reason, “Let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of dou- too, the Church in enumerating the saints together places ble honor, especially they who labor in the word and doc- the martyrs before the doctors and virgins. Yet nothing trine.” Therefore a greater aureole is due to them in the hinders the other aureoles from being more excellent in Church triumphant. some particular way. And this suffices for the Replies to I answer that, Precedence of one aureole over another the Objections. may be considered from two standpoints. First, from the 3079 Whether one person has an aureole more excellently than another person? Suppl. q. 96 a. 13 Objection 1. It would seem that one person has not may happen to be two persons, one of whom, out of lesser the aureole either of virginity, or of martyrdom, or of doc- charity, suffers greater torments of martyrdom, or is more trine more perfectly than another person. For things which constant in preaching, or again withdraws himself more have reached their term are not subject to intension or re- from carnal pleasures. Accordingly, intension not of the mission. Now the aureole is due to works which have aureole but of the aurea corresponds to the intension of reached their term of perfection. Therefore an aureole is merit derived from its root; while intension of the aureole not subject to intension or remission. corresponds to intension of merit derived from the kind of Objection 2. Further, virginity is not subject to being act. Consequently it is possible for one who merits less in more or less, since it denotes a kind of privation; and pri- martyrdom as to his essential reward, to receive a greater vations are not subject to intension or remission. There- aureole for his martyrdom. fore neither does the reward of virginity, the virgin’s aure- Reply to Objection 1. The merits to which an aureole ole to wit, receive intension or remission. is due do not reach the term of their perfection simply, but On the contrary, The aureole is added to the au- according to their species: even as fire is specifically the rea. But the aurea is more intense in one than in another. most subtle of bodies. Hence nothing hinders one aure- Therefore the aureole is also. ole being more excellent than another, even as one fire is I answer that, Since merit is somewhat the cause of more subtle than another. reward, rewards must needs be diversified, according as Reply to Objection 2. The virginity of one may be merits are diversified: for the intension or remission of a greater than the virginity of another, by reason of a greater thing follows from the intension or remission of its cause. withdrawal from that which is contrary to virginity: so Now the merit of the aureole may be greater or lesser: that virginity is stated to be greater in one who avoids wherefore the aureole may also be greater or lesser. more the occasions of corruption. For in this way pri- We must observe, however, that the merit of an au- vations may increase, as when a man is said to be more reole may be intensified in two ways: first, on the part blind, if he be removed further from the possession of of its cause, secondly on the part of the work. For there sight. 3080 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 97 Of the Punishment of the Damned (In Seven Articles) In due sequence we must consider those things that concern the damned after the judgment: (1) The punishment of the damned, and the fire by which their bodies will be tormented; (2) matters relating to their will and intellect; (3) God’s justice and mercy in regard to the damned. Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry: (1) Whether in hell the damned are tormented with the sole punishment of fire? (2) Whether the worm by which they are tormented is corporeal? (3) Whether their weeping is corporeal? (4) Whether their darkness is material? (5) Whether the fire whereby they are tormented is corporeal? (6) Whether it is of the same species as our fire? (7) Whether this fire is beneath the earth? Whether in hell the damned are tormented by the sole punishment of fire? Suppl. q. 97 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that in hell the damned as every creature will be to the blessed a matter of joy, so are tormented by the sole punishment of fire; because Mat. will all the elements conduce to the torture of the damned, 25:41, where their condemnation is declared, mention is according to Wis. 5:21, “the whole world will fight with made of fire only, in the words: “Depart from Me, you Him against the unwise.” This is also becoming to Divine cursed, into everlasting fire.” justice, that whereas they departed from one by sin, and Objection 2. Further, even as the punishment of pur- placed their end in material things which are many and gatory is due to venial sin, so is the punishment of hell various, so should they be tormented in many ways and due to mortal sin. Now no other punishment but that of from many sources. fire is stated to be in purgatory, as appears from the words Reply to Objection 2. It is because fire is most of 1 Cor. 3:13: “The fire shall try every man’s work, of painful, through its abundance of active force, that the what sort it is.” Therefore neither in hell will there be a name of fire is given to any torment if it be intense. punishment other than of fire. Reply to Objection 2. The punishment of purgatory Objection 3. Further, variety of punishment affords a is not intended chiefly to torment but to cleanse: where- respite, as when one passes from heat to cold. But we can fore it should be inflicted by fire alone which is above all admit no respite in the damned. Therefore there will not possessed of cleansing power. But the punishment of the be various punishments, but that of fire alone. damned is not directed to their cleansing. Consequently On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 10:7): “Fire and the comparison fails. brimstone and storms of winds shall be the portion of their Reply to Objection 3. The damned will pass from cup.” the most intense heat to the most intense cold without this Further, it is written (Job 24:19): “Let him pass from giving them any respite: because they will suffer from the snow waters to excessive heat.” external agencies, not by the transmutation of their body I answer that, According to Basil (Homilia vi in Hex- from its original natural disposition, and the contrary pas- aemeron and Hom. i in Ps. 38), at the final cleansing sion affording a respite by restoring an equable or moder- of the world, there will be a separation of the elements, ate temperature, as happens now, but by a spiritual action, whatever is pure and noble remaining above for the glory in the same way as sensible objects act on the senses be- of the blessed, and whatever is ignoble and sordid being ing perceived by impressing the organ with their forms cast down for the punishment of the damned: so that just according to their spiritual and not their material being. 3081 Whether the worm of the damned is corporeal? Suppl. q. 97 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the worm by which to incorruption∗, nor after that time will there be genera- the damned are tormented is corporeal. Because flesh can- tion or corruption. Consequently the worm ascribed to the not be tormented by a spiritual worm. Now the flesh of damned must be understood to be not of a corporeal but of the damned will be tormented by a worm: “He will give a spiritual nature: and this is the remorse of conscience, fire and worms into their flesh” (Judith 16:21), and: “The which is called a worm because it originates from the cor- vengeance on the flesh of the ungodly is fire and worms” ruption of sin, and torments the soul, as a corporeal worm (Ecclus. 7:19). Therefore that worm will be corporeal. born of corruption torments by gnawing. Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei Reply to Objection 1. The very souls of the damned xxi, 9):. . . “Both, namely fire and worm, will be the pun- are called their flesh for as much as they were subject to ishment of the body.” Therefore, etc. the flesh. Or we may reply that the flesh will be tormented On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, by the spiritual worm, according as the afflictions of the 22): “The unquenchable fire and the restless worm in the soul overflow into the body, both here and hereafter. punishment of the damned are explained in various ways Reply to Objection 2. Augustine speaks by way of by different persons. Some refer both to the body, some, comparison. For he does not wish to assert absolutely that both to the soul: others refer the fire, in the literal sense, this worm is material, but that it is better to say that both to the body, the worm to the soul metaphorically: and this are to be understood materially, than that both should be seems the more probable.” understood only in a spiritual sense: for then the damned I answer that, After the day of judgment, no animal would suffer no bodily pain. This is clear to anyone that or mixed body will remain in the renewed world except examines the context of his words in this passage. only the body of man, because the former are not directed Whether the weeping of the damned will be corporeal? Suppl. q. 97 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the weeping of the poreal weeping. One is the resolution of tears: and as to damned will be corporeal. For a gloss on Lk. 13:28, this corporeal weeping cannot be in the damned, since af- “There will be weeping,” says that “the weeping with ter the day of judgment, the movement of the first movable which our Lord threatens the wicked is a proof of the res- being being at an end, there will be neither generation, nor urrection of the body.” But this would not be the case if corruption, nor bodily alteration: and in the resolution of that weeping were merely spiritual. Therefore, etc. tears that humor needs to be generated which is shed forth Objection 2. Further, the pain of the punishment cor- in the shape of tears. Wherefore in this respect it will responds to the pleasure of the sin, according to Apoc. be impossible for corporeal weeping to be in the damned. 18:7: “As much as she hath glorified herself and lived in The other thing to be observed in corporeal weeping is a delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her.” certain commotion and disturbance of the head and eyes, Now sinners had internal and external pleasure in their and in this respect weeping will be possible in the damned sin. Therefore they will also have external weeping. after the resurrection: for the bodies of the damned will be On the contrary, Corporeal weeping results from dis- tormented not only from without, but also from within, ac- solving into tears. Now there cannot be a continual disso- cording as the body is affected at the instance of the soul’s lution from the bodies of the damned, since nothing is re- passion towards good or evil. In this sense weeping is a stored to them by food; for everything finite is consumed proof of the body’s resurrection, and corresponds to the if something be continually taken from it. Therefore the pleasure of sin, experienced by both soul and body. weeping of the damned will not be corporeal. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. I answer that, Two things are to be observed in cor- Whether the damned are in material darkness? Suppl. q. 97 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that the damned are not it may torment the more it does give light for a purpose, in material darkness. For commenting on Job 10:22, “But for by the light of its flame the wicked will see their fol- everlasting horror dwelleth,” Gregory says (Moral. ix): lowers whom they have drawn thither from the world.” “Although that fire will give no light for comfort, yet, that Therefore the darkness there is not material. ∗ Cf. q. 91, a. 5 3082 Objection 2. Further, the damned see their own pun-Wherefore accordingly both light and darkness are there, ishment, for this increases their punishment. But nothing in so far as they are most conducive to the unhappiness is seen without light. Therefore there is no material dark- of the damned. Now seeing is in itself pleasant for, as ness there. stated in Metaph. i, “the sense of sight is most esteemed, Objection 3. Further, there the damned will have the because thereby many things are known.” power of sight after being reunited to their bodies. But Yet it happens accidentally that seeing is painful, when this power would be useless to them unless they see some- we see things that are hurtful to us, or displeasing to our thing. Therefore, since nothing is seen unless it be in the will. Consequently in hell the place must be so disposed light, it would seem that they are not in absolute darkness. for seeing as regards light and darkness, that nothing be On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 22:13): “Bind seen clearly, and that only such things be dimly seen as his hands and his feet, and cast him into the exterior dark- are able to bring anguish to the heart. Wherefore, sim- ness.” Commenting on these words Gregory says (Moral. ply speaking, the place is dark. Yet by Divine disposition, ix): If this fire gave any light, “he would by no means be there is a certain amount of light, as much as suffices for described as cast into exterior darkness.” seeing those things which are capable of tormenting the Further, Basil says (Hom. i in Ps. 28:7, “The voice of soul. The natural situation of the place is enough for this, the Lord divideth the flame of fire”) that “by God’s might since in the centre of the earth, where hell is said to be, the brightness of the fire will be separated from its power fire cannot be otherwise than thick and cloudy, and reeky of burning, so that its brightness will conduce to the joy as it were. of the blessed, and the heat of the flame to the torment of Some hold that this darkness is caused by the mass- the damned.” Therefore the damned will be in material ing together of the bodies of the damned, which will so darkness. fill the place of hell with their numbers, that no air will Other points relating to the punishment of the damned remain, so that there will be no translucid body that can have been decided above (q. 86). be the subject of light and darkness, except the eyes of the I answer that, The disposition of hell will be such as damned, which will be darkened utterly. to be adapted to the utmost unhappiness of the damned. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. Whether the fire of hell will be corporeal? Suppl. q. 97 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the fire of hell not be corporeal. whereby the bodies of the damned will be tormented will On the contrary, He says (Dial. iv, 29): “I doubt not not be corporeal. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. that the fire of hell is corporeal, since it is certain that bod-iv): The devil, and “demons, and his men”∗, namely An- ies are tortured there.” tichrist, “together with the ungodly and sinners will be Further, it is written (Wis. 5:21): “The. . . world shall cast into everlasting fire, not material fire, such as that fight. . . against the unwise.” But the whole world would which we have, but such as God knoweth.” Now every- not fight against the unwise if they were punished with a thing corporeal is material. Therefore the fire of hell will spiritual and not a corporeal punishment. Therefore they not be corporeal. will be punished with a corporeal fire. Objection 2. Further, the souls of the damned when I answer that, There have been many opinions about severed from their bodies are cast into hell fire. But Au- the fire of hell. For some philosophers, as Avicenna, dis- gustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32): “In my opinion the believing in the resurrection, thought that the soul alone place to which the soul is committed after death is spiri- would be punished after death. And as they considered it tual and not corporeal.” Therefore, etc. impossible for the soul, being incorporeal, to be punished Objection 3. Further, corporeal fire in the mode of with a corporeal fire, they denied that the fire whereby the its action does not follow the mode of guilt in the person wicked are punished is corporeal, and pretended that all who is burned at the stake, rather does it follow the mode statements as to souls being punished in future after death of humid and dry: for in the same corporeal fire we see by any corporeal means are to be taken metaphorically. both good and wicked suffer. But the fire of hell, in its For just as the joy and happiness of good souls will not be mode of torture or action, follows the mode of guilt in the about any corporeal object, but about something spiritual, person punished; wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv, 63): namely the attainment of their end, so will the torment of “There is indeed but one hell fire, but it does not torture the wicked be merely spiritual, in that they will be grieved all sinners equally. For each one will suffer as much pain at being separated from their end, the desire whereof is according as his guilt deserves.” Therefore this fire will in them by nature. Wherefore, just as all descriptions of ∗ Cf. 2 Thess. 2:3: “And the man of sin be revealed, the son of perdition.” 3083 the soul’s delight after death that seem to denote bodily fire that torments the separated souls, we must admit that pleasure—for instance, that they are refreshed, that they the fire which will torment the bodies of the damned after smile, and so forth—must be taken metaphorically, so also the resurrection is corporeal, since one cannot fittingly ap- are all such descriptions of the soul’s suffering as seem to ply a punishment to a body unless that punishment itself imply bodily punishment—for instance, that they burn in be bodily. Wherefore Gregory (Dial. iv) proves the fire of fire, or suffer from the stench, and so forth. For as spiri- hell to be corporeal from the very fact that the wicked will tual pleasure and pain are unknown to the majority, these be cast thither after the resurrection. Again Augustine, as things need to be declared under the figure of corporeal quoted in the text of Sentent. iv, D, 44, clearly admits pleasures and pains, in order that men may be moved the (De Civ. Dei xxi, 10) that the fire by which the bodies are more to the desire or fear thereof. Since, however, in the tormented is corporeal. And this is the point at issue for punishment of the damned there will be not only pain of the present. We have said elsewhere (q. 70, a. 3) how the loss corresponding to the aversion that was in their sin, souls of the damned are punished by this corporeal fire. but also pain of sense corresponding to the conversion, it Reply to Objection 1. Damascene does not abso- follows that it is not enough to hold the above manner of lutely deny that this fire is material, but that it is material punishment. For this reason Avicenna himself (Met. ix) as our fire, since it differs from ours in some of its proper- added another explanation, by saying that the souls of the ties. We may also reply that since that fire does not alter wicked are punished after death, not by bodies but by im- bodies as to their matter, but acts on them for their punish- ages of bodies; just as in a dream it seems to a man that ment by a kind of spiritual action, it is for this reason that he is suffering various pains on account of such like im- it is stated not to be material, not as regards its substance, ages being in his imagination. Even Augustine seems to but as to its punitive effect on bodies and, still more, on hold this kind of punishment (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32), as is souls. clear from the text. But this would seem an unreasonable Reply to Objection 2. The assertion of Augustine statement. For the imagination is a power that makes use may be taken in this way, that the place whither souls are of a bodily organ: so that it is impossible for such visions conveyed after death be described as incorporeal, in so far of the imagination to occur in the soul separated from the as the soul is there, not corporeally, i.e. as bodies are in body, as in the soul of the dreamer. Wherefore Avicenna a place, but in some other spiritual way, as angels are in also that he might avoid this difficulty, said that the soul a place. Or we may reply that Augustine is expressing separated from the body uses as an organ some part of an opinion without deciding the point, as he often does in the heavenly body, to which the human body needs to be those books. conformed, in order to be perfected by the rational soul, Reply to Objection 3. That fire will be the instrument which is like the movers of the heavenly body—thus fol- of Divine justice inflicting punishment. Now an instru- lowing somewhat the opinion of certain philosophers of ment acts not only by its own power and in its own way, old, who maintained that souls return to the stars that are but also by the power of the principal agent, and as di- their compeers. But this is absolutely absurd according to rected thereby. Wherefore although fire is not able, of its the Philosopher’s teaching, since the soul uses a definite own power, to torture certain persons more or less, accord- bodily organ, even as art uses definite instruments, so that ing to the measure of sin, it is able to do so nevertheless in it cannot pass from one body to another, as Pythagoras is so far as its action is regulated by the ordering of Divine stated (De Anima i, text. 53) to have maintained. As to justice: even so the fire of the furnace is regulated by the the statement of Augustine we shall say below how it is to forethought of the smith, according as the effect of his art be answered (ad 2). However, whatever we may say of the requires. Whether the fire of hell is of the same species as ours? Suppl. q. 97 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that this fire is not of the come fire; neither can it be except by being kindled, nor same species as the corporeal fire which we see. For Au- live unless it be renewed. On the other hand the fire of gustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 16): “In my opinion no hell, since it is a bodily fire, and burns in a bodily way man knows of what kind is the everlasting fire, unless the the wicked cast therein, is neither kindled by human en- Spirit of God has revealed it to anyone.” But all or nearly deavor, nor kept alive with fuel, but once created endures all know the nature of this fire of ours. Therefore that fire unquenchably; at one and the same time it needs no kin- is not of the same species as this. dling, and lacks not heat.” Therefore it is not of the same Objection 2. Further, Gregory commenting on Job nature as the fire that we see. 10:26, “A fire that is not kindled shall devour him,” says Objection 3. Further, the everlasting and the corrupt- (Moral. xv): “Bodily fire needs bodily fuel in order to be- ible differ essentially, since they agree not even in genus, 3084 according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x). But this fire know not. And in this way it may differ specifically from of ours is corruptible, whereas the other is everlasting: the fire we have, considered materially. It has, however, “Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire” (Mat. certain properties differing from our fire, for instance that 25:41). Therefore they are not of the same nature. it needs no kindling, nor is kept alive by fuel. But the dif- Objection 4. Further, it belongs to the nature of this ferences do not argue a difference of species as regards fire of ours to give light. But the fire of hell gives no light, the nature of the fire. hence the saying of Job 18:5: “Shall not the light of the Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of that wicked be extinguished?” Therefore. . . as above. fire with regard to its matter, and not with regard to its On the contrary, According to the Philosopher nature. (Topic. i, 6), “every water is of the same species as ev- Reply to Objection 2. This fire of ours is kept alive ery other water.” Therefore in like manner every fire is of with fuel, and is kindled by man, because it is introduced the same species as every other fire. into a foreign matter by art and force. But that other fire Further, it is written (Wis. 11:17): “By what things a needs no fuel to keep it alive, because either it subsists in man sinneth by the same also he is tormented.” Now men its own matter, or is in a foreign matter, not by force but sin by the sensible things of this world. Therefore it is just by nature from an intrinsic principle. Wherefore it is kin- that they should be punished by those same things. dled not by man but by God, Who fashioned its nature. I answer that, As stated in Meteor. iv, 1 fire has other This is the meaning of the words of Isaias (30:33): “The bodies for its matter, for the reason that of all the elements breath of the Lord is as a torrent of brimstone kindling it.” it has the greatest power of action. Hence fire is found un- Reply to Objection 3. Even as the bodies of the der two conditions: in its own matter, as existing in its damned will be of the same species as now, although now own sphere, and in a strange matter, whether of earth, as they are corruptible, whereas then they will be incorrupt- in burning coal, or of air as in the flame. Under whatever ible, both by the ordering of Divine justice, and on ac- conditions however fire be found, it is always of the same count of the cessation of the heavenly movement, so is species, so far as the nature of fire is concerned, but there it with the fire of hell whereby those bodies will be pun- may be a difference of species as to the bodies which are ished. the matter of fire. Wherefore flame and burning coal differ Reply to Objection 4. To give light does not belong specifically, and likewise burning wood and red-hot iron; to fire according to any mode of existence, since in its nor does it signify, as to this particular point, whether they own matter it gives no light; wherefore it does not shine be kindled by force, as in the case of iron, or by a natural in its own sphere according to the philosophers: and in intrinsic principle, as happens with sulphur. Accordingly like manner in certain foreign matters it does not shine, as it is clear that the fire of hell is of the same species as when it is in an opaque earthly substance such as sulphur. the fire we have, so far as the nature of fire is concerned. The same happens also when its brightness is obscured by But whether that fire subsists in its proper matter, or if it thick smoke. Wherefore that the fire of hell gives no light subsists in a strange matter, what that matter may be, we is not sufficient proof of its being of a different species. Whether the fire of hell is beneath the earth? Suppl. q. 97 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that this fire is not beneath seem unreasonable to say that there is so great a hollow the earth. For it is said of the damned (Job 18:18), “And within the earth, since all the parts of the earth naturally God shall remove him out of the globe [Douay: ‘world’].” tend to the center. Therefore that fire will not be beneath Therefore the fire whereby the damned will be punished the earth. is not beneath the earth but outside the globe. Objection 4. Further, “By what things a man sinneth, Objection 2. Further, nothing violent or accidental by the same also he is tormented” (Wis. 11:17). But the can be everlasting. But this fire will be in hell for ever. wicked have sinned on the earth. Therefore the fire that Therefore it will be there, not by force but naturally. Now punishes them should not be under the earth. fire cannot be under the earth save by violence. Therefore On the contrary, It is written (Is. 14:9): “Hell below the fire of hell is not beneath the earth. was in an uproar to meet Thee at Thy coming.” Therefore Objection 3. Further, after the day of judgment the the fire of hell is beneath us. bodies of all the damned will be tormented in hell. Now Further, Gregory says (Dial. iv): “I see not what hin- those bodies will fill a place. Consequently, since the ders us from believing that hell is beneath the earth.” multitude of the damned will be exceeding great, for “the Further, a gloss on Jonah 2:4, “Thou hast cast me number of fools is infinite” (Eccles. 1:15), the space con- forth. . . into the heart of the sea,” says, “i.e. into hell,” taining that fire must also be exceeding great. But it would and in the Gospel (Mat. 12:40) the words “in the heart 3085 of the earth” have the same sense, for as the heart is in should enjoy this light in the midst of their torments.” But the middle of an animal, so is hell supposed to be in the this is no argument, if we assert that hell is under the earth. middle of the earth. We have already stated how these words may be explained I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, (q. 91 , a. 2). 16), “I am of opinion that no one knows in what part of Pythagoras held the place of punishment to be in a the world hell is situated, unless the Spirit of God has re- fiery sphere situated, according to him, in the middle of vealed this to some one.” Wherefore Gregory (Dial. iv) the whole world: and he called it the prison-house of having been questioned on this point answers: “About this Jupiter as Aristotle relates (De Coelo et Mundo ii). It is, matter I dare not give a rash decision. For some have however, more in keeping with Scripture to say that it is deemed hell to be in some part of the earth’s surface; oth- beneath the earth. ers think it to be beneath the earth.” He shows the latter Reply to Objection 1. The words of Job, “God shall opinion to be the more probable for two reasons. First remove him out of the globe,” refer to the surface of the from the very meaning of the word. These are his words: earth†, i.e. from this world. This is how Gregory ex- “If we call it the nether regions (infernus∗), for the rea- pounds it (Moral. xiv) where he says: “He is removed son that it is beneath us [inferius], what earth is in relation from the globe when, at the coming of the heavenly judge, to heaven, such should be hell in relation to earth.” Sec- he is taken away from this world wherein he now prides ondly, from the words of Apoc. 5:3: “No man was able, himself in his wickedness.” Nor does globe here signify neither in heaven, nor on earth, nor under the earth, to the universe, as though the place of punishment were out- open the book”: where the words “in heaven” refer to the side the whole universe. angels, “on earth” to men living in the body, and “under Reply to Objection 2. Fire continues in that place the earth” to souls in hell. Augustine too (Gen. ad lit. xii, for all eternity by the ordering of Divine justice although 34) seems to indicate two reasons for the congruity of hell according to its nature an element cannot last for ever out- being under the earth. One is that “whereas the souls of side its own place, especially if things were to remain the departed sinned through love of the flesh, they should in this state of generation and corruption. The fire there be treated as the dead flesh is wont to be treated, by being will be of the very greatest heat, because its heat will be buried beneath the earth.” The other is that heaviness is all gathered together from all parts, through being sur- to the body what sorrow is to the spirit, and joy (of spirit) rounded on all sides by the cold of the earth. is as lightness (of body). Wherefore “just as in reference Reply to Objection 3. Hell will never lack sufficient to the body, all the heavier things are beneath the others, room to admit the bodies of the damned: since hell is ac- if they be placed in order of gravity, so in reference to the counted one of the three things that “never are satisfied” spirit, the lower place is occupied by whatever is more sor- (Prov. 30:15,16). Nor is it unreasonable that God’s power rowful”; and thus even as the empyrean is a fitting place should maintain within the bowels of the earth a hollow for the joy of the elect, so the lowest part of the earth is a great enough to contain all the bodies of the damned. fitting place for the sorrow of the damned. Nor does it sig- Reply to Objection 4. It does not follow of necessity nify that Augustine (De Civ. Dei xv, 16) says that “hell is that “by what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is stated or believed to be under the earth,” because he with- tormented,” except as regards the principal instruments of draws this (Retract. ii, 29) where he says: “Methinks I sin: for as much as man having sinned in soul and body should have said that hell is beneath the earth, rather than will be punished in both. But it does not follow that a have given the reason why it is stated or believed to be man will be punished in the very place where he sinned, under the earth.” However, some philosophers have main- because the place due to the damned is other from that due tained that hell is situated beneath the terrestrial orb, but to wayfarers. We may also reply that these words refer to above the surface of the earth, on that part which is oppo- the punishments inflicted on man on the way: according site to us. This seems to have been the meaning of Isidore as each sin has its corresponding punishment, since “in- when he asserted that “the sun and the moon will stop ordinate love is its own punishment,” as Augustine states in the place wherein they were created, lest the wicked (Confess. i, 12). ∗ The Latin for ‘hell’ † “De orbe terrarum,” which might be rendered “from the land of the living.” 3086 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 98 Of the Will and Intellect of the Damned (In Nine Articles) We must next consider matters pertaining to the will and intellect of the damned. Under this head there are nine points of inquiry: (1) Whether every act of will in the damned is evil? (2) Whether they ever repent of the evil they have done? (3) Whether they would rather not be than be? (4) Whether they would wish others to be damned? (5) Whether the wicked hate God? (6) Whether they can demerit? (7) Whether they can make use of the knowledge acquired in this life? (8) Whether they ever think of God? (9) Whether they see the glory of the blessed? Whether every act of will in the damned is evil? Suppl. q. 98 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that not every act of will of the Author of nature, Who gave nature this inclination in the damned is evil. For according to Dionysius (Div. which we call the natural will. Wherefore since nature re- Nom. iv), “the demons desire the good and the best, mains in them, it follows that the natural will in them can namely to be, to live, to understand.” Since, then, men be good. But their deliberate will is theirs of themselves, who are damned are not worse off than the demons, it inasmuch as it is in their power to be inclined by their af- would seem that they also can have a good will. fections to this or that. This will is in them always evil: Objection 2. Further, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. and this because they are completely turned away from iv), “evil is altogether involuntary.” Therefore if the the last end of a right will, nor can a will be good except it damned will anything, they will it as something good or be directed to that same end. Hence even though they will apparently good. Now a will that is directly ordered to some good, they do not will it well so that one be able to good is itself good. Therefore the damned can have a good call their will good on that account. will. Reply to Objection 1. The words of Dionysius must Objection 3. Further, some will be damned who, be understood of the natural will, which is nature’s incli- while in this world, acquired certain habits of virtue, for nation to some particular good. And yet this natural incli- instance heathens who had civic virtues. Now a will elicits nation is corrupted by their wickedness, in so far as this praiseworthy acts by reason of virtuous habits. Therefore good which they desire naturally is desired by them under there may be praiseworthy acts of the will in some of the certain evil circumstances†. damned. Reply to Objection 2. Evil, as evil, does not move the On the contrary, An obstinate will can never be in- will, but in so far as it is thought to be good. Yet it comes clined except to evil. Now men who are damned will be of their wickedness that they esteem that which is evil as obstinate even as the demons∗. Further, as the will of the though it were good. Hence their will is evil. damned is in relation to evil, so is the will of the blessed Reply to Objection 3. The habits of civic virtue do in regard to good. But the blessed never have an evil will. not remain in the separated soul, because those virtues Neither therefore have the damned any good will. perfect us only in the civic life which will not remain af- I answer that, A twofold will may be considered in ter this life. Even though they remained, they would never the damned, namely the deliberate will and the natural come into action, being enchained, as it were, by the ob- will. Their natural will is theirs not of themselves but stinacy of the mind. ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 64, a. 2 † Cf. Ia, q. 64, a. 2, ad 5 3087 Whether the damned repent of the evil they have done? Suppl. q. 98 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that the damned never re- Therefore the damned, being most wicked, repent all the pent of the evil they have done. For Bernard says on the more. Canticle∗ that “the damned ever consent to the evil they I answer that, A person may repent of sin in two have done.” Therefore they never repent of the sins they ways: in one way directly, in another way indirectly. He have committed. repents of a sin directly who hates sin as such: and he Objection 2. Further, to wish one had not sinned is repents indirectly who hates it on account of something a good will. But the damned will never have a good will. connected with it, for instance punishment or something Therefore the damned will never wish they had not sinned: of that kind. Accordingly the wicked will not repent of and thus the same conclusion follows as above. their sins directly, because consent in the malice of sin Objection 3. Further, according to Damascene (De will remain in them; but they will repent indirectly, inas- Fide Orth. ii), “death is to man what their fall was to the much as they will suffer from the punishment inflicted on angels.” But the angel’s will is irrevocable after his fall, so them for sin. that he cannot withdraw from the choice whereby he pre- Reply to Objection 1. The damned will wickedness, viously sinned†. Therefore the damned also cannot repent but shun punishment: and thus indirectly they repent of of the sins committed by them. wickedness committed. Objection 4. Further, the wickedness of the damned Reply to Objection 2. To wish one had not sinned on in hell will be greater than that of sinners in the world. account of the shamefulness of vice is a good will: but Now in this world some sinners repent not of the sins this will not be in the wicked. they have committed, either through blindness of mind, Reply to Objection 3. It will be possible for the as heretics, or through obstinacy, as those “who are glad damned to repent of their sins without turning their will when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked away from sin, because in their sins they will shun, not things” (Prov. 2:14). Therefore, etc. what they heretofore desired, but something else, namely On the contrary, It is said of the damned (Wis. 5:3): the punishment. “Repenting within themselves [Vulg.: ‘Saying within Reply to Objection 4. However obstinate men may themselves, repenting’].” be in this world, they repent of the sins indirectly, if they Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that “the be punished for them. Thus Augustine says (Qq. 83, qu. wicked are full of repentance; for afterwards they are 36): “We see the most savage beasts are deterred from the sorry for that in which previously they took pleasure.” greatest pleasures by fear of pain.” Whether the damned by right and deliberate reason would wish not to be? Suppl. q. 98 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem impossible for the them.” damned, by right and deliberate reason, to wish not to be. Further, the unhappiness of the damned surpasses all For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 7): “Consider how unhappiness of this world. Now in order to escape the great a good it is to be; since both the happy and the un- unhappiness of this world, it is desirable to some to die, happy will it; for to be and yet to be unhappy is a greater wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 41:3,4): “O death, thy thing than not to be at all.” sentence is welcome to the man that is in need and to him Objection 2. Further, Augustine argues thus (De Lib. whose strength faileth; who is in a decrepit age, and that Arb. iii, 8): “Preference supposes election.” But “not to is in care about all things, and to the distrustful that los- be” is not eligible; since it has not the appearance of good, eth wisdom [Vulg.: ‘patience’].” Much more, therefore, for it is nothing. Therefore not to be cannot be more de- is “not to be” desirable to the damned according to their sirable to the damned than “to be.” deliberate reason. Objection 3. Further, the greater evil is the more to be I answer that, Not to be may be considered in two shunned. Now “not to be” is the greatest evil, since it re- ways. First, in itself, and thus it can nowise be desirable, moves good altogether, so as to leave nothing. Therefore since it has no aspect of good, but is pure privation of “not to be” is more to be shunned than to be unhappy: and good. Secondly, it may be considered as a relief from a thus the same conclusion follows as above. painful life or from some unhappiness: and thus “not to On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 9:6): “In those be” takes on the aspect of good, since “to lack an evil is days men. . . shall desire to die, and death shall fly from a kind of good” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). In ∗ Cf. De Consideratione v, 12; De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio ix † Cf. Ia, q. 64, a. 2 3088 this way it is better for the damned not to be than to be piness. For when it is stated that “to be” and “to live” are unhappy. Hence it is said (Mat. 26:24): “It were better desired by all naturally, we are not to take this as referable for him, if that man had not been born,” and (Jer. 20:14): to an evil and corrupt life, and a life of unhappiness, as “Cursed be the day wherein I was born,” where a gloss of the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4), but absolutely. Jerome observes: “It is better not to be than to be evilly.” Reply to Objection 2. Non-existence is eligible, not In this sense the damned can prefer “not to be” according in itself, but only accidentally, as stated already. to their deliberate reason‡. Reply to Objection 3. Although “not to be” is very Reply to Objection 1. The saying of Augustine is evil, in so far as it removes being, it is very good, in so far to be understood in the sense that “not to be” is eligible, as it removes unhappiness, which is the greatest of evils, not in itself but accidentally, as putting an end to unhap- and thus it is preferred “not to be.” Whether in hell the damned would wish others were damned who are not damned? Suppl. q. 98 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that in hell the damned Consequently the sight of the happiness of the saints will would not wish others were damned who are not damned. give them very great pain; hence it is written (Is. 26:11): For it is said (Lk. 16:27, 28) of the rich man that he prayed “Let the envious people see and be confounded, and let for his brethren, lest they should come “into the place of fire devour Thy enemies.” Therefore they will wish all the torments.” Therefore in like manner the other damned good were damned. would not wish, at least their friends in the flesh to be Reply to Objection 1. So great will be the envy of damned in hell. the damned that they will envy the glory even of their kin- Objection 2. Further, the damned are not deprived dred, since they themselves are supremely unhappy, for of their inordinate affections. Now some of the damned this happens even in this life, when envy increases. Nev- loved inordinately some who are not damned. Therefore ertheless they will envy their kindred less than others, and they would not desire their evil, i.e. that they should be their punishment would be greater if all their kindred were damned. damned, and others saved, than if some of their kindred Objection 3. Further, the damned do not desire the were saved. For this reason the rich man prayed that his increase of their punishment. Now if more were damned, brethren might be warded from damnation: for he knew their punishment would be greater, even as the joy of the that some are guarded therefrom. Yet he would rather that blessed is increased by an increase in their number. There- his brethren were damned as well as all the rest. fore the damned desire not the damnation of those who are Reply to Objection 2. Love that is not based on virtue saved. is easily voided, especially in evil men as the Philosopher On the contrary, A gloss on Is. 14:9, “are risen up says (Ethic. ix, 4). Hence the damned will not preserve from their thrones,” says: “The wicked are comforted by their friendship for those whom they loved inordinately. having many companions in their punishment.” Yet the will of them will remain perverse, because they Further, envy reigns supreme in the damned. There- will continue to love the cause of their inordinate loving. fore they grieve for the happiness of the blessed, and de- Reply to Objection 3. Although an increase in the sire their damnation. number of the damned results in an increase of each one’s I answer that Even as in the blessed in heaven there punishment, so much the more will their hatred and envy will be most perfect charity, so in the damned there will increase that they will prefer to be more tormented with be the most perfect hate. Wherefore as the saints will re- many rather than less tormented alone. joice in all goods, so will the damned grieve for all goods. Whether the damned hate God? Suppl. q. 98 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the damned do not gether involuntary,” as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). hate God. For, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), Now God is goodness itself. Therefore no one can hate “the beautiful and good that is the cause of all goodness Him. and beauty is beloved of all.” But this is God. Therefore On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 73:23): “The pride God cannot be the object of anyone’s hate. of them that hate Thee ascendeth continually.” Objection 2. Further, no one can hate goodness itself, I answer that, The appetite is moved by good or evil as neither can one will badness itself since “evil is alto- apprehended. Now God is apprehended in two ways, ‡ Cf. Ia, q. 5, a. 2, ad 3 3089 namely in Himself, as by the blessed, who see Him in His punishment, which is the effect of His justice, hate Him, essence; and in His effects, as by us and by the damned. even as they hate the punishment inflicted on them∗. Since, then, He is goodness by His essence, He cannot Reply to Objection 1. The saying of Dionysius refers in Himself be displeasing to any will; wherefore whoever to the natural appetite. and even this is rendered perverse sees Him in His essence cannot hate Him. On the other in the damned, by that which is added thereto by their de- hand, some of His effects are displeasing to the will in liberate will, as stated above (a. 1)∗. so far as they are opposed to any one: and accordingly Reply to Objection 2. This argument would prove if a person may hate God not in Himself, but by reason of the damned saw God in Himself, as being in His essence. His effects. Therefore the damned, perceiving God in His Whether the damned demerit? Suppl. q. 98 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that the damned demerit. have reached their ultimate consummation, so that there For the damned have an evil will, as stated in the last Dis- will be no further addition to good or evil. Consequently, tinction of Sentent. iv. But they demerited by the evil will good will in the blessed will not be a merit but a reward, that they had here. Therefore if they demerit not there, and evil will in the damned will be not a demerit but a their damnation is to their advantage. punishment only. For works of virtue belong especially to Objection 2. Further, the damned are on the same the state of happiness and their contraries to the state of footing as the demons. Now the demons demerit after unhappiness (Ethic. i, 9,10). their fall, wherefore God inflicted a punishment on the On the other hand, some say that, before the judgment serpent, who induced man to sin (Gn. 3:14,15). Therefore day, both the good merit and the damned demerit. But the damned also demerit. this cannot apply to the essential reward or to the prin- Objection 3. Further, an inordinate act that proceeds cipal punishment, since in this respect both have reached from a deliberate will is not excused from demerit, even the term. Possibly, however, this may apply to the acci- though there be necessity of which one is oneself the dental reward, or secondary punishment, which are sub- cause: for the “drunken man deserves a double punish- ject to increase until the day of judgment. Especially may ment” if he commit a crime through being drunk (Ethic. this apply to the demons, or to the good angels, by whose iii). Now the damned were themselves the cause of their activities some are drawn to salvation, whereby the joy of own obstinacy, owing to which they are under a kind of the blessed angels is increased, and some to damnation, necessity of sinning. Therefore since their act proceeds whereby the punishment of the demons is augmented‡. from their free will, they are not excused from demerit. Reply to Objection 1. It is in the highest degree un- On the contrary, Punishment is contradistinguished profitable to have reached the highest degree of evil, the from fault†. Now the perverse will of the damned pro- result being that the damned are incapable of demerit. ceeds from their obstinacy which is their punishment. Hence it is clear that they gain no advantage from their Therefore the perverse will of the damned is not a fault sin. whereby they may demerit. Reply to Objection 2. Men who are damned are not Further, after reaching the last term there is no fur- occupied in drawing others to damnation, as the demons ther movement, or advancement in good or evil. Now are, for which reason the latter demerit as regards their the damned, especially after the judgment day, will have secondary punishment§. reached the last term of their damnation, since then there Reply to Objection 3. The reason why they are not “will cease to be two cities,” according to Augustine excused from demerit is not because they are under the (Enchiridion cxi). Therefore after the judgment day the necessity of sinning, but because they have reached the damned will not demerit by their perverse will, for if they highest of evils. did their damnation would be augmented. However, the necessity of sinning whereof we are our- I answer that, We must draw a distinction between selves the cause, in so far as it is a necessity, excuses from the damned before the judgment day and after. For all are sin, because every sin needs to be voluntary: but it does agreed that after the judgment day there will be neither not excuse, in so far as it proceeds from a previous act of merit nor demerit. The reason for this is because merit or the will: and consequently the whole demerit of the sub- demerit is directed to the attainment of some further good sequent sin would seem to belong to the previous sin. or evil: and after the day of judgment good and evil will ∗ Cf. q. 90, a. 3, ad 2; IIa IIae, q. 34, a. 1 ∗ Cf. IIa IIae, q. 34, a. 1, ad 1 where St. Thomas gives another answer † Cf. Ia, q. 48, a. 5 ‡ Cf. Ia, q. 62, a. 9, ad 3; IIa IIae, q. 13, a. 4, ad 2; where St. Thomas tacitly retracts the opinion expressed here as to merit or demerit. § Cf. Ia, q. 62, a. 9, ad 3; IIa IIae, q. 13 , a. 4, ad 2; where St. Thomas tacitly retracts the opinion expressed here as to merit or demerit 3090 Whether the damned can make use of the knowledge they had in this world? ∗ Suppl. q. 98 a. 7 Objection 1. It would seem that the damned are un- There may also be a reason for sorrow both on the part of able to make use of the knowledge they had in this world. the things known, because they are of a grievous nature, For there is very great pleasure in the consideration of and on the part of the knowledge, if we consider its imper- knowledge. But we must not admit that they have any fection; for instance a person may consider his defective pleasure. Therefore they cannot make use of the knowl- knowledge about a certain thing, which he would desire edge they had heretofore, by applying their consideration to know perfectly. Accordingly, in the damned there will thereto. be actual consideration of the things they knew heretofore Objection 2. Further, the damned suffer greater pains as matters of sorrow, but not as a cause of pleasure. For than any pains of this world. Now in this world, when one they will consider both the evil they have done, and for is in very great pain, it is impossible to consider any intel- which they were damned, and the delightful goods they ligible conclusions, through being distracted by the pains have lost, and on both counts they will suffer torments. that one suffers. Much less therefore can one do so in hell. Likewise they will be tormented with the thought that the Objection 3. Further, the damned are subject to time. knowledge they had of speculative matters was imperfect, But “length of time is the cause of forgetfulness” (Phys. and that they missed its highest degree of perfection which lib. iv, 13). Therefore the damned will forget what they they might have acquired. knew here. Reply to Objection 1. Although the consideration of On the contrary, It is said to the rich man who was knowledge is delightful in itself, it may accidentally be damned (Lk. 16:25): “Remember that thou didst receive the cause of sorrow, as explained above. good things in thy lifetime,” etc. Therefore they will con- Reply to Objection 2. In this world the soul is united sider about the things they knew here. to a corruptible body, wherefore the soul’s consideration Further, the intelligible species remain in the separated is hindered by the suffering of the body. On the other soul, as stated above (q. 70, a. 2, ad 3; Ia, q. 89, Aa. 5,6). hand, in the future life the soul will not be so drawn by Therefore, if they could not use them, these would remain the body, but however much the body may suffer, the soul in them to no purpose. will have a most clear view of those things that can be a I answer that, Even as in the saints on account of the cause of anguish to it. perfection of their glory, there will be nothing but what is Reply to Objection 3. Time causes forgetfulness ac- a matter of joy so there will be nothing in the damned but cidentally, in so far as the movement whereof it is the what is a matter and cause of sorrow; nor will anything measure is the cause of change. But after the judgment that can pertain to sorrow be lacking, so that their unhap- day there will be no movement of the heavens; wherefore piness is consummate. Now the consideration of certain neither will it be possible for forgetfulness to result from things known brings us joy, in some respect, either on the any lapse of time however long. Before the judgment day, part of the things known, because we love them, or on however, the separated soul is not changed from its dispo- the part of the knowledge, because it is fitting and perfect. sition by the heavenly movement. Whether the damned will ever think of God? Suppl. q. 98 a. 8 Objection 1. It would seem that the damned will First, in Himself and according to that which is proper to sometimes think of God. For one cannot hate a thing ac- Him, namely that He is the fount of all goodness: and thus tually, except one think about it. Now the damned will it is altogether impossible to think of Him without delight, hate God, as stated in the text of Sentent. iv, in the last so that the damned will by no means think of Him in this Distinction. Therefore they will think of God sometimes. way. Secondly, according to something accidental as it Objection 2. Further, the damned will have remorse were to Him in His effects, such as His punishments, and of conscience. But the conscience suffers remorse for so forth, and in this respect the thought of God can bring deeds done against God. Therefore they will sometimes sorrow, so that in this way the damned will think of God. think of God. Reply to Objection 1. The damned do not hate God On the contrary, Man’s most perfect thoughts are except because He punishes and forbids what is agreeable those which are about God: whereas the damned will be to their evil will: and consequently they will think of Him in a state of the greatest imperfection. Therefore they will only as punishing and forbidding. This suffices for the not think of God. Reply to the Second Objection, since conscience will not I answer that, one may think of God in two ways. have remorse for sin except as forbidden by the Divine ∗ Cf. Ia, q. 89 3091 commandment. Whether the damned see the glory of the blessed? Suppl. q. 98 a. 9 Objection 1. It would seem that the damned do not both because they will, through envy, grieve for their hap- see the glory of the blessed. For they are more distant piness, and because they have forfeited that glory. Hence from the glory of the blessed than from the happenings of it is written (Wis. 5:2) concerning the wicked: “Seeing this world. But they do not see what happens in regard to it” they “shall be troubled with terrible fear.” After the us: hence Gregory commenting on Job 14:21, “Whether judgment day, however, they will be altogether deprived his children come to honor,” etc. says (Moral. xii): “Even of seeing the blessed: nor will this lessen their punish- as those who still live know not in what place are the souls ment, but will increase it; because they will bear in re- of the dead; so the dead who have lived in the body know membrance the glory of the blessed which they saw at or not the things which regard the life of those who are in the before the judgment: and this will torment them. More- flesh.” Much less, therefore, can they see the glory of the over they will be tormented by finding themselves deemed blessed. unworthy even to see the glory which the saints merit to Objection 2. Further, that which is granted as a great have. favor to the saints in this life is never granted to the Reply to Objection 1. The happenings of this life damned. Now it was granted as a great favor to Paul to would not, if seen, torment the damned in hell as the sight see the life in which the saints live for ever with God (2 of the glory of the saints; wherefore the things which hap- Cor. 12). Therefore the damned will not see the glory of pen here are not shown to the damned in the same way the saints. as the saints’ glory; although also of the things that hap- On the contrary, It is stated (Lk. 16:23) that the rich pen here those are shown to them which are capable of man in the midst of his torments “saw Abraham. . . and causing them sorrow. Lazarus in his bosom.” Reply to Objection 2. Paul looked upon that life I answer that, The damned, before the judgment day, wherein the saints live with God∗, by actual experience will see the blessed in glory, in such a way as to know, not thereof and by hoping to have it more perfectly in the life what that glory is like, but only that they are in a state of to come. Not so the damned; wherefore the comparison glory that surpasses all thought. This will trouble them, fails. ∗ Cf. IIa IIae, q. 185, a. 3, ad 2 3092 SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD PART, QUESTION 99 Of God’s Mercy and Justice Towards the Damned (In Five Articles) We must next consider God’s justice and mercy towards the damned: under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether by Divine justice an eternal punishment is inflicted on sinners? (2) Whether by God’s mercy all punishment both of men and of demons comes to an end? (3) Whether at least the punishment of men comes to an end? (4) Whether at least the punishment of Christians has an end? (5) Whether there is an end to the punishment of those who have performed works of mercy? Whether by Divine justice an eternal punishment is inflicted on sinners? ∗ Suppl. q. 99 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that an eternal punish- ing” itself. Therefore it would seem just that the sinner ment is not inflicted on sinners by Divine justice. For the who has been ungrateful to God should lose his being. punishment should not exceed the fault: “According to the But if sinners be brought to naught, their punishment can- measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be” not be everlasting. Therefore it would seem out of keep- (Dt. 25:2). Now fault is temporal. Therefore the punish- ing with Divine justice that sinners should be punished for ment should not be eternal. ever. Objection 2. Further, of two mortal sins one is greater On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:46): “These,” than the other. and therefore one should receive a greater namely the wicked, “shall go into everlasting punish- punishment than the other. But no punishment is greater ment.” than eternal punishment, since it is infinite. Therefore Further, as reward is to merit, so is punishment to eternal punishment is not due to every sin; and if it is not guilt. Now, according to Divine justice, an eternal reward due to one, it is due to none, since they are not infinitely is due to temporal merit: “Every one who seeth the Son distant from one another. and believeth in Him hath [Vulg.: ‘that everyone. . . may Objection 3. Further, a just judge does not punish ex- have’] life everlasting.” Therefore according to Divine cept in order to correct, wherefore it is stated (Ethic. ii, justice an everlasting punishment is due to temporal guilt. 3) that “punishments are a kind of medicine.” Now, to Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), punish the wicked eternally does not lead to their correc- punishment is meted according to the dignity of the per- tion, nor to that of others, since then there will be no one son sinned against, so that a person who strikes one in au- in future who can be corrected thereby. Therefore eternal thority receives a greater punishment than one who strikes punishment is not inflicted for sins according to Divine anyone else. Now whoever sins mortally sins against God, justice. Whose commandments he breaks, and Whose honor he Objection 4. Further, no one wishes that which is not gives another, by placing his end in some one other than desirable for its own sake, except on account of some ad- God. But God’s majesty is infinite. Therefore whoever vantage. Now God does not wish punishment for its own sins mortally deserves infinite punishment; and conse- sake, for He delights not in punishments†. Since then no quently it seems just that for a mortal sin a man should advantage can result from the perpetuity of punishment, it be punished for ever. would seem that He ought not to inflict such a punishment I answer that, Since punishment is measured in two for sin. ways, namely according to the degree of its severity, and Objection 5. Further, “nothing accidental lasts for according to its length of time, the measure of punishment ever” (De Coelo et Mundo i). But punishment is one of corresponds to the measure of fault, as regards the degree those things that happen accidentally, since it is contrary of severity, so that the more grievously a person sins the to nature. Therefore it cannot be everlasting. more grievously is he punished: “As much as she hath glo- Objection 6. Further, the justice of God would seem rified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and to require that sinners should be brought to naught: be- sorrow give ye to her” (Apoc. 18:7). The duration of the cause on account of ingratitude a person deserves to lose punishment does not, however, correspond with the dura- all benefits. and among other benefits of God there is “be- tion of the fault, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11), ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 87, Aa. 3,4 † The allusion is to Wis. 1:13: “Neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living,” as may be gathered from Ia IIae, q. 87, a. 3, obj. 3 3093 for adultery which is committed in a short space of time cept God help him: wherefore from the very fact that he is not punished with a momentary penalty even according is willing to sin, he is willing to remain in sin for ever. to human laws‡. But the duration of punishment regards For man is “a wind that goeth,” namely to sin, “and retur- the disposition of the sinner: for sometimes a person who neth not by his own power” (Ps. 77:39). Thus if a man commits an offense in a city is rendered by his very of- were to throw himself into a pit whence he could not get fense worthy of being cut off entirely from the fellowship out without help, one might say that he wished to remain of the citizens, either by perpetual exile or even by death: there for ever, whatever else he may have thought himself. whereas sometimes he is not rendered worthy of being cut Another and a better answer is that from the very fact that off entirely from the fellowship of the citizens. wherefore he commits a mortal sin, he places his end in a creature; in order that he may become a fitting member of the State, and since the whole of life is directed to its end, it fol- his punishment is prolonged or curtailed, according as is lows that for this very reason he directs the whole of his expedient for his amendment, so that he may live in the life to that sin, and is willing to remain in sin forever, if city in a becoming and peaceful manner. So too, accord- he could do so with impunity. This is what Gregory says ing to Divine justice, sin renders a person worthy to be al- on Job 41:23, “He shall esteem the deep as growing old” together cut off from the fellowship of God’s city, and this (Moral. xxxiv): “The wicked only put an end to sinning is the effect of every sin committed against charity, which because their life came to an end: they would indeed have is the bond uniting this same city together. Consequently, wished to live for ever, that they might continue in sin for for mortal sin which is contrary to charity a person is ex- ever for they desire rather to sin than to live.” Still an- pelled for ever from the fellowship of the saints and con- other reason may be given why the punishment of mortal demned to everlasting punishment, because as Augustine sin is eternal: because thereby one offends God Who is says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11), “as men are cut off from this infinite. Wherefore since punishment cannot be infinite perishable city by the penalty of the first death, so are they in intensity, because the creature is incapable of an infi- excluded from that imperishable city by the punishment nite quality, it must needs be infinite at least in duration. of the second death.” That the punishment inflicted by the And again there is a fourth reason for the same: because earthly state is not deemed everlasting is accidental, either guilt remains for ever, since it cannot be remitted with- because man endures not for ever, or because the state it- out grace, and men cannot receive grace after death; nor self comes to an end. Wherefore if man lived for ever, the should punishment cease so long as guilt remains. punishment of exile or slavery, which is pronounced by Reply to Objection 1. Punishment has not to be equal human law, would remain in him for ever. On the other to fault as to the amount of duration as is seen to be the hand, as regards those who sin in such a way as not to case also with human laws. We may also reply with Gre- deserve to be entirely cut off from the fellowship of the gory (Dial. xliv) that although sin is temporal in act, it is saints, such as those who sin venially, their punishment eternal in will. will be so much the shorter or longer according as they Reply to Objection 2. The degree of intensity in the are more or less fit to be cleansed, through sin clinging to punishment corresponds to the degree of gravity in the them more or less: this is observed in the punishments of sin; wherefore mortal sins unequal in gravity will receive this world and of purgatory according to Divine justice. a punishment unequal in intensity but equal in duration. We find also other reasons given by the saints why Reply to Objection 3. The punishments inflicted on some are justly condemned to everlasting punishment for those who are not altogether expelled from the society a temporal sin. One is because they sinned against an eter- of their fellow-citizens are intended for their correction: nal good by despising eternal life. This is mentioned by whereas those punishments, whereby certain persons are Augustine (De Civ. Dei. xii, 12): “He is become worthy wholly banished from the society of their fellow-citizens, of eternal evil, who destroyed in himself a good which are not intended for their correction; although they may could be eternal.” Another reason is because man sinned be intended for the correction and tranquillity of the oth- in his own eternity∗; wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv), it ers who remain in the state. Accordingly the damnation belongs to the great justice of the judge that those should of the wicked is for the correction of those who are now in never cease to be punished, who in this life never ceased the Church; for punishments are intended for correction, to desire sin. And if it be objected that some who sin not only when they are being inflicted, but also when they mortally propose to amend their life at some time, and are decreed. that these accordingly are seemingly not deserving of eter- Reply to Objection 4. The everlasting punishment of nal punishment, it must be replied according to some that the wicked will not be altogether useless. For they are Gregory speaks of the will that is made manifest by the useful for two purposes. First, because thereby the Divine deed. For he who falls into mortal sin of his own will justice is safeguarded which is acceptable to God for its puts himself in a state whence he cannot be rescued, ex- own sake. Hence Gregory says (Dial. iv): “Almighty ‡ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 87, a. 3, ad 1 ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 87, a. 3, ad 1 3094 God on account of His loving kindness delights not in its assistance are punished eternally.” the torments of the unhappy, but on account of His jus- Reply to Objection 5. Although the punishment re- tice. He is for ever unappeased by the punishment of the lates to the soul accidentally, it relates essentially to the wicked.” Secondly, they are useful, because the elect re- soul infected with guilt. And since guilt will remain in the joice therein, when they see God’s justice in them, and soul for ever, its punishment also will be everlasting. realize that they have escaped them. Hence it is written Reply to Objection 6. Punishment corresponds to (Ps. 57:12): “The just shall rejoice when he shall see fault, properly speaking, in respect of the inordinateness the revenge,” etc., and (Is. 66:24): “They,” namely the in the fault, and not of the dignity in the person offended: wicked, “shall be a loathsome sight† to all flesh,” namely for if the latter were the case, a punishment of infinite to the saints, as a gloss says. . Gregory expresses him- intensity would correspond to every sin. Accordingly, al- self in the same sense (Dial. iv): “The wicked are all though a man deserves to lose his being from the fact that condemned to eternal punishment, and are punished for he has sinned against God the author of his being, yet, in their own wickedness. Yet they will burn to some pur- view of the inordinateness of the act itself, loss of being pose, namely that the just may all both see in God the is not due to him, since being is presupposed to merit and joys they receive, and perceive in them the torments they demerit, nor is being lost or corrupted by the inordinate- have escaped: for which reason they will acknowledge ness of sin∗: and consequently privation of being cannot themselves for ever the debtors of Divine grace the more be the punishment due to any sin. that they will see how the evils which they overcame by Whether by God’s mercy all punishment of the damned, both men and demons, comes Suppl. q. 99 a. 2 to an end? Objection 1. It would seem that by God’s mercy all I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi) punishment of the damned, both men and demons, comes Origen† “erred in maintaining that the demons will at to an end. For it is written (Wis. 11:24): “Thou hast mercy length, through God’s mercy, be delivered from their pun- upon all, O Lord, because Thou canst do all things.” But ishment.” But this error has been condemned by the among all things the demons also are included, since they Church for two reasons. First because it is clearly contrary are God’s creatures. Therefore also their punishment will to the authority of Holy Writ (Apoc. 20:9,10): “The devil come to an end. who seduced them was cast into the pool of fire and brim- Objection 2. Further, “God hath concluded all in sin stone, where both the beasts and the false prophets‡ shall [Vulg.: ‘unbelief’], that He may have mercy on all” (Rom. be tormented day and night for ever and ever,” which is 11:32). Now God has concluded the demons under sin, the Scriptural expression for eternity. Secondly, because that is to say, He permitted them to be concluded. There- this opinion exaggerated God’s mercy in one direction and fore it would seem that in time He has mercy even on the depreciated it in another. For it would seem equally rea- demons. sonable for the good angels to remain in eternal happi- Objection 3. Further, as Anselm says (Cur Deus ness, and for the wicked angels to be eternally punished. Homo ii), “it is not just that God should permit the utter Wherefore just as he maintained that the demons and the loss of a creature which He made for happiness.” There- souls of the damned are to be delivered at length from fore, since every rational creature was created for happi- their sufferings, so he maintained that the angels and the ness, it would seem unjust for it to be allowed to perish souls of the blessed will at length pass from their happy altogether. state to the unhappiness of this life. On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:41): “Depart Reply to Objection 1. God, for His own part, has from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which is pre- mercy on all. Since, however, His mercy is ruled by the pared for the devil and his angels.” Therefore they will be order of His wisdom, the result is that it does not reach punished eternally. to certain people who render themselves unworthy of that Further, just as the good angels were made happy mercy, as do the demons and the damned who are obsti- through turning to God, so the bad angels were made un- nate in wickedness. And yet we may say that even in them happy through turning away from God. Therefore if the His mercy finds a place, in so far as they are punished less unhappiness of the wicked angels comes at length to an than they deserve condignly, but not that they are entirely end, the happiness of the good will also come to an end, delivered from punishment. which is inadmissible. Reply to Objection 2. In the words quoted the distri- † “Ad satietatem visionis,” which St. Thomas takes to signify being satiated with joy; Cf. q. 94, a. 3 ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 1 † Cf. Ia, q. 64, a. 2 ‡ Vulg.: ‘the beast and false prophet,’ etc. 3095 bution (of the predicate) regards the genera and not the in-goodness that a whole genus of creature fail of the end dividuals: so that the statement applies to men in the state for which it was made: wherefore it is unbecoming for of wayfarer, inasmuch as He had mercy both on Jews and all men or all angels to be damned. But there is no rea- on Gentiles, but not on every Gentile or every Jew. son why some men or some angels should perish for ever, Reply to Objection 3. Anselm means that it is not just because the intention of the Divine will is fulfilled in the in the sense of becoming God’s goodness, and is speaking others who are saved. of the creature generically. For it becomes not the Divine Whether God’s mercy suffers at least men to be punished eternally? Suppl. q. 99 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that God’s mercy does not their fall the angels could not be restored†. Therefore nei- suffer at least men to be punished eternally. For it is writ- ther can man after death: and thus the punishment of the ten (Gn. 6:3): “My spirit shall not remain in man for ever damned will have no end. because he is flesh”; where “spirit” denotes indignation, I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, as a gloss observes. Therefore, since God’s indignation 17,18), some evaded the error of Origen by asserting that is not distinct from His punishment, man will not be pun- the demons are punished everlastingly, while holding that ished eternally. all men, even unbelievers, are at length set free from pun- Objection 2. Further, the charity of the saints in this ishment. But this statement is altogether unreasonable. life makes them pray for their enemies. Now they will For just as the demons are obstinate in wickedness and have more perfect charity in that life. Therefore they will therefore have to be punished for ever, so too are the souls pray then for their enemies who are damned. But the of men who die without charity, since “death is to men prayers of the saints cannot be in vain, since they are most what their fall was to the angels,” as Damascene says. acceptable to God. Therefore at the saints’ prayers the Reply to Objection 1. This saying refers to man Divine mercy will in time deliver the damned from their generically, because God’s indignation was at length re- punishment. moved from the human race by the coming of Christ. But Objection 3. Further, God’s foretelling of the punish- those who were unwilling to be included or to remain in ment of the damned belongs to the prophecy of commi- this reconciliation effected by Christ, perpetuated the Di- nation. Now the prophecy of commination is not always vine anger in themselves, since no other way of reconcil- fulfilled: as appears from what was said of the destruction iation is given to us save that which is through Christ. of Nineve (Jonas 3); and yet it was not destroyed as fore- Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine (De Civ. Dei told by the prophet, who also was troubled for that very xxi, 24) and Gregory (Moral. xxxiv) say, the saints in this reason (Jonah 4:1). Therefore it would seem that much life pray for their enemies, that they may be converted to more will the threat of eternal punishment be commuted God, while it is yet possible for them to be converted. For by God’s mercy for a more lenient punishment, when this if we knew that they were foreknown to death, we should will be able to give sorrow to none but joy to all. no more pray for them than for the demons. And since for Objection 4. Further, the words of Ps. 76:8 are to those who depart this life without grace there will be no the point, where it is said: “Will God then be angry for further time for conversion, no prayer will be offered for ever?∗” But God’s anger is His punishment. Therefore, them, neither by the Church militant, nor by the Church etc. triumphant. For that which we have to pray for them is, Objection 5. Further, a gloss on Is. 14:19, “But thou as the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:25,26), that “God may give art cast out,” etc. says: “Even though all souls shall have them repentance to know the truth, and they may recover rest at last, thou never shalt”: and it refers to the devil. themselves from the snares of the devil.” Therefore it would seem that all human souls shall at Reply to Objection 3. A punishment threatened length have rest from their pains. prophetically is only then commuted when there is a On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:46) of the elect change in the merits of the person threatened. Hence: “I conjointly with the damned: “These shall go into everlast- will suddenly speak against a nation and against a king- ing punishment: but the just, into life everlasting.” But it dom, to root out and to pull down and to destroy it. If that is inadmissible that the life of the just will ever have an nation. . . shall repent of their evil, I also will repent of the end. Therefore it is inadmissible that the punishment of evil that I have thought to do to them” (Jer. 18:7). There- the damned will ever come to an end. fore, since the merits of the damned cannot be changed, Further, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) “death the threatened punishment will ever be fulfilled in them. is to men what their fall was to the angels.” Now after Nevertheless the prophecy of commination is always ful- ∗ Vulg.: ‘Will God then cast off for ever?’ † Cf. Ia, q. 64, a. 2 3096 filled in a certain sense, because as Augustine says (De the right hand of the most High.” We may also reply that Civ. Dei. xxi, 24): “Nineve has been overthrown, that they refer to mercy as granting a relaxation but not setting was evil, and a good Nineve is built up, that was not: for free altogether if it be referred also to the damned. Hence while the walls and the houses remained standing, the city the Psalm does not say: “Will He from His anger shut up was overthrown in its wicked ways.” His mercies?” but “in His anger,” because the punishment Reply to Objection 4. These words of the Psalm re- will not be done away entirely; but His mercy will have fer to the vessels of mercy, which have not made them- effect by diminishing the punishment while it continues. selves unworthy of mercy, because in this life (which may Reply to Objection 5. This gloss is speaking not be called God’s anger on account of its unhappiness) He absolutely but on an impossible supposition in order to changes vessels of mercy into something better. Hence throw into relief the greatness of the devil’s sin, or of the Psalm continues (Ps. 76:11): “This is the change of Nabuchodonosor’s. Whether the punishment of Christians is brought to an end by the mercy of God? Suppl. q. 99 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that at least the punish- fessed the Catholic faith. But against this it would seem ment of Christians is brought to an end by the mercy of to be that at one time some people profess the Catholic God. “For he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved” faith, and afterwards abandon it, and these are deserving (Mk. 16:16). Now this applies to every Christian. There- not of a lesser but of a greater punishment, since accord- fore all Christians will at length be saved. ing to 2 Pet. 2:21, “it had been better for them not to have Objection 2. Further, it is written (Jn. 6:55): “He that known the way of justice than, after they have known it, eateth My body and drinketh My blood hath eternal life.” to turn back.” Moreover it is clear that heresiarchs who Now this is the meat and drink whereof Christians par- renounce the Catholic faith and invent new heresies sin take in common. Therefore all Christians will be saved at more grievously than those who have conformed to some length. heresy from the first. And therefore some have main- Objection 3. Further, “If any man’s work burn, he tained that those alone are exempt from eternal punish- shall suffer loss: but he himself shall be saved, yet so as ment, who persevere to the end in the Catholic faith, how- by fire” (1 Cor. 3:15), where it is a question of those who ever guilty they may have been of other crimes. But this have the foundation of the Christian faith. Therefore all is clearly contrary to Holy Writ, for it is written (James such persons will be saved in the end. 2:20): “Faith without works is dead,” and (Mat. 7:21) On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 6:9): “The un- “Not every one that saith to Me, Lord, Lord, shall enter just shall not possess the kingdom of God.” Now some into the kingdom of heaven: but he that doth the will of Christians are unjust. Therefore Christians will not all My Father Who is in heaven”: and in many other passages come to the kingdom of God, and consequently they will Holy Scripture threatens sinners with eternal punishment. be punished for ever. Consequently those who persevere in the faith unto the Further, it is written (2 Pet. 2:21): “It had been better end will not all be exempt from eternal punishment, un- for them not to have known the way of justice, than after less in the end they prove to be free from other crimes. they have known it, to turn back from that holy command- Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord speaks there of ment which was delivered to them.” Now those who know formed faith∗ “that worketh by love [Vulg.: ‘charity’; Gal. not the way of truth will be punished for ever. Therefore 5:6]”: wherein whosoever dieth shall be saved. But to this Christians who have turned back after knowing it will also faith not only is the error of unbelief opposed, but also any be punished for ever. mortal sin whatsoever. I answer that, According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei Reply to Objection 2. The saying of our Lord refers xxi, 20,21), there have been some who predicted a de- not to those who partake only sacramentally, and who livery from eternal punishment not for all men, but only sometimes by receiving unworthily “eat and drink judg- for Christians. although they stated the matter in different ment” to themselves (1 Cor. 11:29), but to those who ways. For some said that whoever received the sacraments eat spiritually and are incorporated with Him by charity, of faith would be immune from eternal punishment. But which incorporation is the effect of the sacramental eat- this is contrary to the truth, since some receive the sacra- ing, in those who approach worthily†. Wherefore, so far ments of faith, and yet have not faith, without which “it is as the power of the sacrament is concerned, it brings us to impossible to please God” (Heb. 11:6). Wherefore others eternal life, although sin may deprive us of that fruit, even said that those alone will be exempt from eternal punish- after we have received worthily. ment who have received the sacraments of faith, and pro- Reply to Objection 3. In this passage of the Apostle ∗ Cf. IIa IIae, q. 4, a. 3 † Cf. IIIa, q. 80, Aa. 1,2,3 3097 the foundation denotes formed faith, upon which whoso-be saved” in the end “by fire,” either of temporal tribula- ever shall build venial sins‡ “shall suffer loss,” because he tion, or of the punishment of purgatory which will be after will be punished for them by God; yet “he himself shall death. Whether all those who perform works of mercy will be punished eternally? Suppl. q. 99 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that all who perform from eternal punishment, but only those who persevere in works of mercy will not be punished eternally, but only works of mercy, although they be guilty of other crimes. those who neglect those works. For it is written (James But this cannot stand, because without charity nothing can 2:13): “Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done be acceptable to God, nor does anything profit unto eter- mercy”; and (Mat. 5:7): “Blessed are the merciful for they nal life in the absence of charity. Now it happens that cer- shall obtain mercy.” tain persons persevere in works of mercy without having Objection 2. Further, (Mat. 25:35-46) we find a de- charity. Wherefore nothing profits them to the meriting scription of our Lord’s discussion with the damned and the of eternal life, or to exemption from eternal punishment, elect. But this discussion is only about works of mercy. as may be gathered from 1 Cor. 13:3. Most evident is Therefore eternal punishment will be awarded only to this in the case of those who lay hands on other people’s such as have omitted to practice works of mercy: and con- property, for after seizing on many things, they neverthe- sequently the same conclusion follows as before. less spend something in works of mercy. We must there- Objection 3. Further, it is written (Mat. 6:12): “For- fore conclude that all whosoever die in mortal sin, neither give us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors,” and faith nor works of mercy will free them from eternal pun- further on (Mat. 6:14): “For if you will forgive men their ishment, not even after any length of time whatever. offenses, your heavenly Father will forgive you also your Reply to Objection 1. Those will obtain mercy who offenses.” Therefore it would seem that the merciful, who show mercy in an ordinate manner. But those who while forgive others their offenses, will themselves obtain the merciful to others are neglectful of themselves do not forgiveness of their sins, and consequently will not be show mercy ordinately, rather do they strike at themselves punished eternally. by their evil actions. Wherefore such persons will not ob- Objection 4. Further, a gloss of Ambrose on 1 Tim. tain the mercy that sets free altogether, even if they obtain 4:8, “Godliness is profitable to all things,” says: “The sum that mercy which rebates somewhat their due punishment. total of a Christian’s rule of life consists in mercy and god- Reply to Objection 2. The reason why the discussion liness. Let a man follow this, and though he should suffer refers only to the works of mercy is not because eternal from the inconstancy of the flesh, without doubt he will punishment will be inflicted on none but those who omit be scourged, but he will not perish: whereas he who can those works, but because eternal punishment will be re- boast of no other exercise but that of the body will suffer mitted to those who after sinning have obtained forgive- everlasting punishment.” Therefore those who persevere ness by their works of mercy, making unto themselves in works of mercy, though they be shackled with fleshly “friends of the mammon of iniquity” (Lk. 16:9). sins, will not be punished eternally: and thus the same Reply to Objection 3. Our Lord said this to those conclusion follows as before. who ask that their debt be forgiven, but not to those who On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 6:9,10): “Nei- persist in sin. Wherefore the repentant alone will obtain ther fornicators. . . nor adulterers,” etc. “shall possess the by their works of mercy the forgiveness that sets them free kingdom of God.” Yet many are such who practice works altogether. of mercy. Therefore the merciful will not all come to the Reply to Objection 4. The gloss of Ambrose speaks eternal kingdom: and consequently some of them will be of the inconstancy that consists in venial sin, from which punished eternally. a man will be freed through the works of mercy after the Further, it is written (James 2:10): “Whosoever shall punishment of purgatory, which he calls a scourging. Or, keep the whole law, but offend in one point, is become if he speaks of the inconstancy of mortal sin, the sense is guilty of all.” Therefore whoever keeps the law as regards that those who while yet in this life fall into sins of the the works of mercy and omits other works, is guilty of flesh through frailty are disposed to repentance by works transgressing the law, and consequently will be punished of mercy. Wherefore such a one will not perish, that is eternally. to say, he will be disposed by those works not to per- I answer that, As Augustine says in the book quoted ish, through grace bestowed on him by our Lord, Who above (De Civ. Dei xxi, 22), some have maintained that is blessed for evermore. Amen. not all who have professed the Catholic faith will be freed ‡ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 89, a. 2 3098 APPENDIX 1 APPENDIX 1, QUESTION 1 Of the Quality of Those Souls Who Depart This Life with Original Sin Only (In Two Articles) We must next consider the various qualities of souls that are stripped of their bodies, according to their respective states; and first we shall treat of the souls which depart this life with original sin only. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether these souls suffer from a bodily fire, and are inflicted with punishment by fire? (2) Whether these souls suffer from a spiritual torment within themselves? Whether those souls which depart with original sin alone, suffer from a bodily fire, App. 1 q. 1 a. 1 and are punished by fire? Objection 1. It would seem that souls which depart either have the gift of impassibility, and thus will be glo- with none but original sin, suffer from a bodily fire and rious, so that there will be no difference between baptized are punished by fire. For Augustine∗ says: “Hold firmly and non-baptized children, which is heretical, or else they and doubt not that children who depart this life without will have original justice, and thus will be without origi- the sacrament of Baptism will be punished everlastingly.” nal sin, and will not be punished for original sin, which is Now punishment denotes sensible pain. Therefore souls likewise heretical. If, on the other hand, they be passible, which depart this life with original sin alone, suffer from since everything passible suffers of necessity in the pres- a bodily fire and are tormented with the pain of fire. ence of the active, it follows that in the presence of active Objection 2. Further, a greater fault deserves a greater sensible bodies they will suffer sensible punishment. punishment. Now original sin is greater than venial, On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiii) because it contains more aversion, since it deprives its that the mildest punishment of all will be for those who subject of grace, whereas venial sin is compatible with are burdened with original sin only. But this would not grace; and again because original sin is punished eter- be so, if they were tormented with sensible punishment, nally, whereas venial sin is punished temporally. Seeing because the pain of hell fire is most grievous. Therefore then that venial sin is deserving of the punishment of fire, they will not suffer sensible punishment. much more so is original sin. Further, the grief of sensible punishment corresponds Objection 3. Further, sins are more severely punished to the pleasure of sin (Apoc. 18:7): “As much as she hath after this life than during lifetime, for in this life there is glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment room for mercy. Now, sensible punishment corresponds and sorrow give ye to her.” But there is no pleasure in to original sin in this life, for children who have only orig- original sin, as neither is there operation, for pleasure fol- inal sin are justly subject to many sensible punishments. lows operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 4. Therefore punish- Therefore sensible punishment is due to it after this life. ment by fire is not due to original sin. Objection 4. Further, even as in actual sin there is Further, Gregory Nazianzen in his fortieth sermon, aversion and conversion, so in original sin there is some- which is entitled on Holy Baptism, distinguishes three thing corresponding to aversion, namely the privation of classes of unbaptized persons: those namely who refuse original justice, and something corresponding to conver- to be baptized, those who through neglect have put off sion, namely concupiscence. Now the punishment of fire being baptized until the end of life and have been sur- is due to actual sin by reason of the conversion. Therefore prised by sudden death, and those who, like infants, have it is also due to original sin by reason of concupiscence. failed to receive it through no fault of theirs. Of the first Objection 5. Further, after the resurrection the bodies he says that they will be punished not only for their other of children will be either passible or impassible. If they be sins, but also for their contempt of Baptism; of the second, impassible—and no human body can be impassible ex- that they will be punished, though less severely than the cept either on account of the gift of impassibility (as in first, for having neglected it; and of the last he says that “a the blessed) or by reason of original justice (as in the state just and eternal Judge will consign them neither to heav- of innocence)—it follows that the bodies of children will enly glory nor to the eternal pains of hell, for although ∗ Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum, xxvii 3099 they have not been signed with Baptism, they are with-Reply to Objection 2. Of all sins original sin is the out wickedness and malice, and have suffered rather than least, because it is the least voluntary; for it is voluntary caused their loss of Baptism.” He also gives the reason not by the will of the person, but only by the will of the why, although they do not reach the glory of heaven, they origin of our nature. But actual sin, even venial, is vol- do not therefore suffer the eternal punishment suffered by untary by the will of the person in which it is; wherefore the damned: “Because there is a mean between the two, a lighter punishment is due to original than to venial sin. since he who deserves not honor and glory is not for that Nor does it matter that original sin is incompatible with reason worthy of punishment, and on the other hand he grace; because privation of grace has the character, not of who is not deserving of punishment is not for that reason sin, but of punishment, except in so far as it is voluntary: worthy of glory and honor.” for which reason that which is less voluntary is less sinful. I answer that, Punishment should be proportionate to Again it matters not that actual venial sin is deserving of fault, according to the saying of Isaias (27:8), “In mea- temporal punishment, since this is accidental, for as much sure against measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt as he who falls venially has sufficient grace to attenuate judge it.” Now the defect transmitted to us through our the punishment. For if venial sin were in a person without origin, and having the character of a sin does not result grace, it would be punished eternally. from the withdrawal or corruption of a good consequent Reply to Objection 3. There is no parity between upon human nature by virtue of its principles, but from pain of sense before and after death, since before death the the withdrawal or corruption of something that had been pain of sense results from the power of the natural agent, superadded to nature. Nor does this sin belong to this par- whether the pain of sense be interior as fever or the like, ticular man, except in so far as he has such a nature, that or exterior as burning and so forth. Whereas after death is deprived of this good, which in the ordinary course of nothing will act by natural power, but only according to things he would have had and would have been able to the order of divine justice, whether the object of such ac- keep. Wherefore no further punishment is due to him, be- tion be the separate soul, on which it is clear that fire can- sides the privation of that end to which the gift withdrawn not act naturally, or the body after resurrection, since then destined him, which gift human nature is unable of itself all natural action will cease, through the cessation of the to obtain. Now this is the divine vision; and consequently first movable which is the cause of all bodily movement the loss of this vision is the proper and only punishment and alteration. of original sin after death: because, if any other sensible Reply to Objection 4. Sensible pain corresponds to punishment were inflicted after death for original sin, a sensible pleasure, which is in the conversion of actual sin: man would be punished out of proportion to his guilt, for whereas habitual concupiscence, which is in original sin, sensible punishment is inflicted for that which is proper has no pleasure. Hence, sensible pain does not correspond to the person, since a man undergoes sensible punishment thereto as punishment. in so far as he suffers in his person. Hence, as his guilt Reply to Objection 5. The bodies of children will be did not result from an action of his own, even so neither impassible, not through their being unable in themselves should he be punished by suffering himself, but only by to suffer, but through the lack of an external agent to act losing that which his nature was unable to obtain. On the upon them: because, after the resurrection, no body will other hand, those who are under sentence for original sin act on another, least of all so as to induce corruption by will suffer no loss whatever in other kinds of perfection the action of nature, but there will only be action to the and goodness which are consequent upon human nature effect of punishing them by order of the divine justice. by virtue of its principles. Wherefore those bodies to which pain of sense is not due Reply to Objection 1. In the authority quoted punish- by divine justice will not suffer punishment. On the other ment denotes, not pain of sense, but only pain of loss, hand, the bodies of the saints will be impassible, because which is the privation of the divine vision, even as in they will lack the capability of suffering; hence impassi- Scripture the word “fire” is often wont to signify any kind bility in them will be a gift, but not in children. of punishment. Whether these same souls suffer spiritual affliction on account of the state in which App. 1 q. 1 a. 2 they are? Objection 1. It would seem that the souls in question prived of seeing God will be more painful than their be- suffer spiritual affliction on account of the state wherein ing burned in hell fire. Now these souls will be deprived of they are, because as Chrysostom says (Hom. xxiii in seeing God. Therefore they will suffer spiritual affliction Matth.), the punishment of God in that they will be de- thereby. 3100 Objection 2. Further, one cannot, without suffering, natural reason, and know God, and that they are deprived lack what one wishes to have. But these souls would wish of seeing Him, and that they feel some kind of sorrow on to have the divine vision, else their will would be actually this account but that their sorrow will be mitigated, in so perverse. Therefore since they are deprived of it, seem- far as it was not by their will that they incurred the sin for ingly they also suffer. which they are condemned. Yet this again would seem im- Objection 3. Further, if it be said that they do not suf-probable, because this sorrow cannot be little for the loss fer, because they know that through no fault of theirs they of so great a good, especially without the hope of recov- are deprived thereof, on the contrary: Freedom from fault ery: wherefore their punishment would not be the mildest. does not lessen but increases the pain of punishment: for Moreover the very same reason that impugns their being a man does not grieve less for that he is disinherited or de- punished with pain of sense, as afflicting them from with- prived of a limb through no fault of his. Therefore these out, argues against their feeling sorrow within, because souls likewise, albeit deprived of so great a good through the pain of punishment corresponds to the pleasure of sin; no fault of theirs, suffer none the less. wherefore, since original sin is void of pleasure, its pun- Objection 4. Further, as baptized children are in rela- ishment is free of all pain. Consequently others say that tion to the merit of Christ, so are unbaptized children to they will know perfectly things subject to natural knowl- the demerit of Adam. But baptized children receive the edge, and both the fact of their being deprived of eternal reward of eternal life by virtue of Christ’s merit. There- life and the reason for this privation, and that nevertheless fore the unbaptized suffer pain through being deprived of this knowledge will not cause any sorrow in them. How eternal life on account of Adam’s demerit. this may be possible we must explore. Objection 5. Further, separation from what we love Accordingly, it must be observed that if one is guided cannot be without pain. But these children will have nat- by right reason one does not grieve through being de- ural knowledge of God, and for that very reason will love prived of what is beyond one’s power to obtain, but only Him naturally. Therefore since they are separated from through lack of that which, in some way, one is capable Him for ever, seemingly they cannot undergo this separa- of obtaining. Thus no wise man grieves for being unable tion without pain. to fly like a bird, or for that he is not a king or an em- On the contrary, If unbaptized children have interior peror, since these things are not due to him; whereas he sorrow after death, they will grieve either for their sin or would grieve if he lacked that to which he had some kind for their punishment. If for their sin, since they cannot be of claim. I say, then, that every man who has the use of further cleansed from that sin, their sorrow will lead them free-will is adapted to obtain eternal life, because he can to despair. Now sorrow of this kind in the damned is the prepare himself for grace whereby to merit eternal life†; worm of conscience. Therefore these children will have so that if he fail in this, his grief will be very great, since the worm of conscience, and consequently theirs would he has lost what he was able to possess. But children were not be the mildest punishment, as Augustine says it is∗. never adapted to possess eternal life, since neither was this If, on the other hand, they grieve for their punishment, it due to them by virtue of their natural principles, for it sur- follows, since their punishment is justly inflicted by God, passes the entire faculty of nature, nor could they perform that their will opposes itself to divine justice, and thus acts of their own whereby to obtain so great a good. Hence would be actually inordinate, which is not to be granted. they will nowise grieve for being deprived of the divine vi- Therefore they will feel no sorrow. sion; nay, rather will they rejoice for that they will have a Further, right reason does not allow one to be dis- large share of God’s goodness and their own natural per- turbed on account of what one was unable to avoid; hence fections. Nor can it be said that they were adapted to ob- Seneca proves (Ep. lxxxv, and De ira ii, 6) that “a wise tain eternal life, not indeed by their own action, but by man is not disturbed.” Now in these children there is right the actions of others around them, since they could be reason deflected by no actual sin. Therefore they will not baptized by others, like other children of the same con- be disturbed for that they undergo this punishment which dition who have been baptized and obtained eternal life: they could nowise avoid. for this is of superabundant grace that one should be re- I answer that, on this question there are three opin- warded without any act of one’s own. Wherefore the lack ions. Some say that these children will suffer no pain, of such a grace will not cause sorrow in children who die because their reason will be so much in the dark that they without Baptism, any more than the lack of many graces will not know that they lack what they have lost. It, how- accorded to others of the same condition makes a wise ever, seems improbable that the soul freed from its bodily man to grieve. burden should ignore things which, to say the least, reason Reply to Objection 1. In those who, having the use is able to explore, and many more besides. Hence others of free-will, are damned for actual sin, there was aptitude say that they have perfect knowledge of things subject to to obtain eternal life, but not in children, as stated above. ∗ See a. 1, “On the contrary” † Cf. Ia IIae, q. 109, Aa. 5,6 3101 Consequently there is no parity between the two. through his own or another’s fault: hence it is clear that Reply to Objection 2. Although the will may be di- the argument is not based on a true comparison. rected both to the possible and to the impossible as stated Reply to Objection 4. The gift of Christ surpasses the in Ethic. iii, 5, an ordinate and complete will is only of sin of Adam, as stated in Rom. 5:15, seqq. Hence it does things which in some way are proportionate to our capa- not follow that unbaptized children have as much of evil bility; and we grieve if we fail to obtain this will, but not as the baptized have of good. if we fail in the will that is of impossibilities, and which Reply to Objection 5. Although unbaptized children should be called “velleity”∗ rather than “will”; for one are separated from God as regards the union of glory, they does not will such things absolutely, but one would if they are not utterly separated from Him: in fact they are united were possible. to Him by their share of natural goods, and so will also Reply to Objection 3. Everyone has a claim to his be able to rejoice in Him by their natural knowledge and own inheritance or bodily members, wherefore it is not love. strange that he should grieve at their loss, whether this be ∗ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 13, a. 5, ad 1; IIIa, q. 21, a. 4 3102 APPENDIX 1, QUESTION 2 Of the Quality of Souls Who Expiate Actual Sin or Its Punishment in Purgatory (In Six Articles) We must next treat of the souls which after this life expiate the punishment of their actual sins in the fire of Purgatory. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the pain of Purgatory surpasses all the temporal pains of this life? (2) Whether that punishment is voluntary? (3) Whether the souls in Purgatory are punished by the demons? (4) Whether venial sin as regards its guilt is expiated by the pains of Purgatory? (5) Whether the fire of Purgatory frees from the debt of punishment? (6) Whether one is freed from that punishment sooner than another? Whether the pains of Purgatory surpass all the temporal pains of this life? App. 1 q. 2 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that the pains of Purga- pain; one will be the pain of loss, namely the delay of tory do not surpass all the temporal pains of this life. Be- the divine vision, and the pain of sense, namely punish- cause the more passive a thing is the more it suffers if it ment by corporeal fire. With regard to both the least pain has the sense of being hurt. Now the body is more passive of Purgatory surpasses the greatest pain of this life. For than the separate soul, both because it has contrariety to a the more a thing is desired the more painful is its ab- fiery agent, and because it has matter which is susceptive sence. And since after this life the holy souls desire the of the agent’s quality: and this cannot be said of the soul. Sovereign Good with the most intense longing—both be- Therefore the pain which the body suffers in this world cause their longing is not held back by the weight of the is greater than the pain whereby the soul is cleansed after body, and because, had there been no obstacle, they would this life. already have gained the goal of enjoying the Sovereign Objection 2. Further, the pains of Purgatory are di- Good—it follows that they grieve exceedingly for their rectly ordained against venial sins. Now since venial sins delay. Again, since pain is not hurt, but the sense of hurt, are the least grievous, the lightest punishment is due to the more sensitive a thing is, the greater the pain caused by them, if the measure of the stripes is according to the mea- that which hurts it: wherefore hurts inflicted on the more sure of the fault. Therefore the pain of Purgatory is the sensible parts cause the greatest pain. And, because all lightest of all. bodily sensation is from the soul, it follows of necessity Objection 3. Further, since the debt of punishment that the soul feels the greatest pain when a hurt is inflicted is an effect of sin, it does not increase unless the sin in- on the soul itself. That the soul suffers pain from the bod- creases. Now sin cannot increase in one whose sin is al- ily fire is at present taken for granted, for we shall treat of ready remitted. Therefore if a mortal sin has been remitted this matter further on∗. Therefore it follows that the pain in a man who has not fully paid the debt of punishment, of Purgatory, both of loss and of sense, surpasses all the this debt does not increase when he dies. But while he pains of this life. lived he was not in debt to the extent of the most grievous Some, however, prove this from the fact that the whole punishment. Therefore the pain that he will suffer after soul is punished, and not the body. But this is to no pur- this life will not be more grievous to him than all other pose, since in that case the punishment of the damned pains of this life. would be milder after the resurrection than before, which On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon (xli De is false. Sanctis): “This fire of Purgatory will be more severe than Reply to Objection 1. Although the soul is less pas- any pain that can be felt, seen or conceived in this world.” sive than the body, it is more cognizant of actual suffering Further, the more universal a pain is the greater it is. [passionis]: and where the sense of suffering is greater, Now the whole separate soul is punished, since it is sim- there is the greater pain, though the suffering be less. ple: which is not the case with the body. Therefore this, Reply to Objection 2. The severity of that punish- being the punishment of the separate soul, is greater than ment is not so much a consequence of the degree of sin, any pain suffered by the body. as of the disposition of the person punished, because the I answer that, In Purgatory there will be a twofold same sin is more severely punished then than now. Even ∗ Cf. Suppl., q. 70, a. 3 3103 so a person who has a better temperament is punished crimes to the same punishment. more severely by the same sentence than another; and This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection. yet the judge acts justly in condemning both for the same Whether this punishment is voluntary? App. 1 q. 2 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that this punishment is is said to be voluntary by a conditional act of the will: voluntary. For those who are in Purgatory are upright in thus cautery is voluntary for the sake of regaining health. heart. Now uprightness in heart is to conform one’s will Hence a punishment may be voluntary in two ways. First, to God’s, as Augustine says (Serm. i in Ps. 32). There- because by being punished we obtain some good, and thus fore, since it is God’s will that they be punished, they will the will itself undertakes a punishment, as instanced in suffer that punishment voluntarily. satisfaction, or when a man accepts a punishment gladly, Objection 2. Further, every wise man wills that with- and would not have it not to be, as in the case of martyr- out which he cannot obtain the end he has in view. Now dom. Secondly, when, although we gain no good by the those who are in Purgatory know that they cannot obtain punishment, we cannot obtain a good without being pun- glory, unless they be punished first. Therefore they are ished, as in the case of natural death: and then the will punished willingly. does not undertake the punishment, and would be deliv- On the contrary, No one asks to be freed from a pun- ered from it; but it submits to it, and in this respect the ishment that he suffers willingly. Now those who are in punishment is said to be voluntary. In this latter sense the Purgatory ask to be set free, as appears from many in- punishment of Purgatory is said to be voluntary. cidents related in the Dialogue of Gregory (iv, 40,65). Some, however, say that it is not voluntary in any way, Therefore they will not undergo that punishment volun- because the souls in Purgatory are so replete with suffer- tarily. ing, that they know not that they are being cleansed by I answer that, A thing is said to be voluntary in two their pains, and deem themselves damned. But this is ways. First, by an absolute act of the will; and thus no false, for did they not know that they will be set free, they punishment is voluntary, because the very notion of pun- would not ask for prayers, as they often do. ishment is that it be contrary to the will. Secondly, a thing This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. Whether the soul in Purgatory are punished by the demons? App. 1 q. 2 a. 3 Objection 1. It would seem that the souls in Purga- justice will kindle the fire with which the damned will be tory are punished by the demons; for, according to the punished for ever, even so now the elect are cleansed af- Master, “they will have for torturers in their pains, those ter this life by the Divine justice alone, and neither by who were their tempters in sin.” Now the demons tempt the ministry of the demons whom they have vanquished, us to sin, not only mortal, but also venial when they fail in nor by the ministry of the angels who would not inflict the former. Therefore in Purgatory also they will torture such tortures on their fellow-citizens. It is, however, pos- souls on account of venial sins. sible that they take them to the place of punishment: also Objection 2. Further, the just are competent to be that even the demons, who rejoice in the punishment of cleansed from sin both in this life and afterwards. Now, in man, accompany them and stand by while they are being this life, they are cleansed by pains inflicted by the devil, cleansed, both that they may be sated with their pains, and as was the case with Job. Therefore after this life also, that when these leave their bodies, they may find some- those who have to be cleansed will be punished by the thing of their own in them. But in this life, while there is demons. yet time for the combat, men are punished both by the On the contrary, It were unjust that he who has tri- wicked angels as foes, as instanced in Job, and by the umphed over someone, should be subjected to him af- good angels, as instanced in Jacob, the sinew of whose ter victory. Now those who are in Purgatory have tri- thigh shrank at the angel’s touch∗. Moreover, Dionysius umphed over the demons, since they died without mortal says explicitly that the good angels sometimes inflict pun- sin. Therefore they will not be subjected to them through ishment. being punished by them. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. I answer that, As after the Judgment day the Divine ∗ Gn. 32:25 3104 Whether venial sin is expiated by the pains of Purgatory as regards the guilt? App. 1 q. 2 a. 4 Objection 1. It would seem that venial sin is not ex- in one who has his foundation in Christ, which excess re- piated by the pains of Purgatory as regards the guilt. For sults from the corruption of concupiscence. Wherefore if a gloss∗ on 1 Jn. 5:16, “There is a sin unto death,” etc. grace entirely overcome the corruption of concupiscence, says: “It is vain to ask pardon after death for what was not as in the Blessed Virgin, there is no room for venial sin. amended in this life.” Therefore no sin is remitted as to Hence, since this concupiscence is altogether abated and guilt after this life. removed, the powers of the soul are wholly subject to Objection 2. Further, the same subject is freed from grace, and venial sin is cast out. But this opinion is non- sin as falls into sin. But after death the soul cannot sin sensical in itself and in its proof. In itself, because it is venially. Therefore neither can it be loosed from venial opposed to the statements of holy men and of the Gospel, sin. which cannot be expounded as referring to the remission Objection 3. Further, Gregory says† that every man of venial sins as to their punishment, as the Master says in will be at the judgment as he was when he left the body, the text∗∗ because in this way both light and grave sins are because “the tree. . . wheresoever it shall fall, there shall it remitted in the life to come: while Gregory†† declares that be”‡. If, then, a man go forth from this life with venial light sins alone are remitted after this life. Nor does it suf- sin, he will be with venial sin at the judgment: and conse- fice for them to say, that this is said expressly of light sins, quently one does not atone for venial sin in Purgatory. lest we should think that we shall suffer nothing grievous Objection 4. Further, it has been stated ( Suppl., q. 2, on their account: because the remission of sin diminishes a. 3) that actual sin is not blotted out save by contrition. punishment rather than aggravates it. As to the proof, it is But there will be no contrition after this life, because it is shown to be worthless, since bodily defect, such as obtains a meritorious act. For then there will be neither merit nor at the last moment of life, does not remove the corruption demerit since, according to the Damascene§, “death is to of concupiscence; nor does it diminish it in its root but in men what the fall was to the angels.” Therefore, after this its act, as instanced in those who lie dangerously ill; nor life, venial sin is not remitted in Purgatory as to its guilt. again does it calm the powers of the soul, so as to sub- Objection 5. Further, venial sin is not in us except ject them to grace, because tranquillity of the powers, and on account of the fomes. Wherefore in the original state their subjection to grace, is effected when the lower pow- Adam would not have sinned venially, as was stated (Sent. ers obey the higher which delight together in God’s law. ii, D, xxi, 2). Now after this life there will be no sensu- But this cannot happen in that state, since the acts of both ality; because the fomes will cease when the soul is sep- kinds of powers are impeded; unless tranquillity denote arated, since it is called the “law of the flesh” (Rom. 7). the absence of combat, as occurs even in those who are Hence there will be no venial sin then, and consequently asleep; and yet sleep is not said, for this reason, to dimin- it cannot be expiated by the fire of Purgatory. ish concupiscence, or to calm the powers of the soul, or to On the contrary, Gregory¶ and Augustinek say that subject them to grace. Moreover, granted that the afore- certain slight sins will be remitted in the life to come. Nor said defect diminish concupiscence radically, and that it can this be understood of the punishment: because thus subject the powers to grace, it would still be insufficient all sins, however grave they be, are expiated by the fire of to wash away venial sin already committed, although it Purgatory, as regards the debt of punishment. Therefore would suffice in order to avoid it in the future. Because venial sins are cleansed by the fire of Purgatory as to their actual sin, even if it be venial, is not remitted without an guilt. actual movement of contrition, as stated above ( Suppl., Further, wood, hay, stubble (1 Cor. 3:12) denote ve- q. 2, a. 3), however much the latter be in the habitual in- nial sins, as we have said ( Ia IIae, q. 89, a. 2). Now wood, tention. Now it happens sometimes that a man dies in his hay, stubble are consumed in Purgatory. Therefore venial sleep, being in a state of grace and yet having a venial sins are remitted after this life. sin when he went to sleep: and such a man cannot make I answer that, Some have asserted that no sin is re- an act of contrition for his venial sin before he dies. Nor mitted after this life, as regards the guilt: that if a man may we say, as they do, that if he repented neither by act die with mortal sin, he is damned and incapable of being nor by intention, neither in general nor in particular, his forgiven; and that it is not possible for a man to die with venial sin becomes mortal, for that “venial becomes mor- a venial sin and without mortal sin, since the final grace tal when it is an object of complacency”; because not all washes the venial sin away. They assign as reason for complacency in venial sin makes it mortal (else all ve- this that venial sin is excessive love of a temporal thing, nial sin would be mortal, since every venial sin pleases ∗ St. Gregory, Moral. xvi, 28 † Dial. iv, 39 ‡ Eccles. 11:3 § De Fide Orth. ii, 4 ¶ Dial. iv, 39 k De vera et falsa poenit. iv, xviii, by some other author ∗∗ Sentent. iv, D, xxi †† Dial. iv, 39 3105 for as much as it is voluntary), but only that complacency Reply to Objection 2. Venial sin arises from the cor-which amounts to enjoyment, wherein all human wicked- ruption of the fomes, which will no longer be in the sep- ness consists, in that “we enjoy what we should use,” as arate soul that is in Purgatory, wherefore this soul cannot Augustine says‡‡. Hence the complacency which makes sin venially. On the other hand, the remission of venial sin a sin mortal is actual complacency, for every mortal sin proceeds from the will informed by grace, which will be consists in an act. Now it may happen that a man, after in the separate soul in Purgatory. Hence the comparison committing a venial sin, has no actual thought of being fails. forgiven or of remaining in that sin, but thinks perhaps Reply to Objection 3. Venial sins do not alter a man’s about a triangle having its three angles equal to two right state, for they neither destroy nor diminish charity, ac- angles, and while engaged in this thought falls asleep, and cording to which the amount of the soul’s gratuitous good- dies. ness is measured. Hence the soul remains such as it was It is therefore clear that this opinion is utterly unrea- before, notwithstanding the remission or commission of sonable: and consequently we must say with others that venial sins. venial sin in one who dies in a state of grace, is remitted Reply to Objection 4. After this life there can be no after this life by the fire of Purgatory: because this pun- merit in respect of the essential reward, but there can be ishment so far as it is voluntary, will have the power, by in respect of some accidental reward, so long as man re- virtue of grace, to expiate all such guilt as is compatible mains in the state of the way, in a sense. Consequently in with grace.∗ Purgatory there can be a meritorious act in respect of the Reply to Objection 1. The gloss refers to mortal sin. remission of venial sin. Or it may be replied that although, in this life, it is not Reply to Objection 5. Although venial sin arises from amended in itself, it is amended in merits, because a man the proneness of the fomes, sin results in the mind; where- merited here that his punishment should be meritorious to fore even when the fomes is no more, sin can still remain. him there. Whether the fire of Purgatory delivers from the debt of punishment? App. 1 q. 2 a. 5 Objection 1. It would seem that the fire of Purgatory I answer that, Whosoever is another’s debtor, is freed does not deliver from the debt of punishment. For every from his indebtedness by paying the debt. And, since the cleansing is in respect of some uncleanness. But punish- obligation incurred by guilt is nothing else than the debt of ment does not imply uncleanness. Therefore the fire of punishment, a person is freed from that obligation by un- Purgatory does not deliver from punishment. dergoing the punishment which he owed. Accordingly the Objection 2. Further, a contrary is not cleansed save punishment of Purgatory cleanses from the debt of pun- by its contrary. But punishment is not contrary to pun- ishment. ishment. Therefore one is not cleansed from the debt of Reply to Objection 1. Although the debt of punish- punishment by the punishment of Purgatory. ment does not in itself imply uncleanness, it bears a rela- Objection 3. Further, a gloss on 1 Cor. 3:15, “He tion to uncleanness by reason of its cause. shall be saved, yet so,” etc. says: “This fire is the trial Reply to Objection 2. Although punishment is not of tribulation of which it is written (Ecclus. 27:6): The contrary to punishment, it is opposed to the debt of pun- furnace tries the potter’s vessels,” etc. Therefore man ex- ishment, because the obligation to punishment remains piates every punishment by the pains of this world, at least from the fact that one has not undergone the punishment by death, which is the greatest punishment of all, and not that was due. by the fire of Purgatory. Reply to Objection 3. Many meanings underlie the On the contrary, The pains of Purgatory are more same words of Holy Writ. Hence this fire may denote both grievous than all the pains of this world, as stated above the present tribulation and the punishment to come, and (a. 3). Now the satisfactory punishment which one under- venial sins can be cleansed from both of these. That nat- goes in this life atones for the debt of punishment. Much ural death is not sufficient for this, has been stated above more therefore is this effected by the punishment of Pur- (Sent. iv, D, 20). gatory. ‡‡ De Trin. x, 10 ∗ St. Thomas expresses himself differently, De Malo, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9,17: “Guilt is not remitted by punishment, but venial sin as to its guilt is remitted in Purgatory by virtue of grace, not only as existing in the habit, but also as proceeding to the act of charity in detestation of venial sin.” 3106 Whether one person is delivered from this punishment sooner than another? App. 1 q. 2 a. 6 Objection 1. It would seem that one person is not de- inclined to them, and more firmly fixed in them. And livered from this punishment sooner than another. For the since that which clings more persistently is more slowly more grievous the sin, and the greater the debt, the more cleansed, it follows that some are tormented in Purgatory severely is it punished in Purgatory. Now there is the same longer than others, for as much as their affections were proportion between severer punishment and graver fault, steeped in venial sins. as between lighter punishment and less grievous fault. Reply to Objection 1. Severity of punishment corre- Therefore one is delivered from this punishment as soon sponds properly speaking to the amount of guilt: whereas as another. the length corresponds to the firmness with which sin has Objection 2. Further, in point of duration unequal taken root in its subject. Hence it may happen that one merits receive equal retribution both in heaven and in hell. may be delayed longer who is tormented less, and “vice Therefore seemingly it is the same in Purgatory. versa.” On the contrary, is the comparison of the Apostle, Reply to Objection 2. Mortal sin which deserves the who denotes the differences of venial sins by wood, hay, punishment of hell, and charity which deserves the reward and stubble. Now it is clear that wood remains longer in of heaven, will, after this life, be immovably rooted in the fire than hay and stubble. Therefore one venial sin is their subject. Hence as to all there is the same duration in punished longer in Purgatory than another. either case. It is otherwise with venial sin which is pun- I answer that, Some venial sins cling more persis- ished in Purgatory, as stated above (a. 6). tently than others, according as the affections are more 3107 APPENDIX 2 APPENDIX 2, QUESTION 1 Two Articles On Purgatory (In Two Articles) Whether there is a Purgatory after this life? App. 2 q. 1 a. 1 Objection 1. It would seem that there is not a Purga- after this life. tory after this life. For it is said (Apoc. 14:13): “Blessed I answer that, From the conclusions we have drawn are the dead who die in the Lord. From henceforth now, above ( IIIa, q. 86, Aa. 4,5; Suppl., q. 12, a. 1) it is suf- saith the Spirit, that they may rest from their labors.” ficiently clear that there is a Purgatory after this life. For Therefore after this life no cleansing labor awaits those if the debt of punishment is not paid in full after the stain who die in the Lord, nor those who do not die in the Lord, of sin has been washed away by contrition, nor again are since they cannot be cleansed. Therefore there is no Pur- venial sins always removed when mortal sins are remit- gatory after this life. ted, and if justice demands that sin be set in order by due Objection 2. Further, as charity is to an eternal re- punishment, it follows that one who after contrition for ward, so is mortal sin to eternal punishment. Now those his fault and after being absolved, dies before making due who die in mortal sin are forthwith consigned to eter- satisfaction, is punished after this life. Wherefore those nal punishment. Therefore those who die in charity go who deny Purgatory speak against the justice of God: for at once to their reward; and consequently no Purgatory which reason such a statement is erroneous and contrary awaits them after this life. to faith. Hence Gregory of Nyssa, after the words quoted Objection 3. Further, God Who is supremely merciful above, adds: “This we preach, holding to the teaching is more inclined to reward good than to punish evil. Now of truth, and this is our belief; this the universal Church just as those who are in the state of charity, do certain holds, by praying for the dead that they may be loosed evil things which are not deserving of eternal punishment, from sins.” This cannot be understood except as referring so those who are in mortal sin, at times perform actions, to Purgatory: and whosoever resists the authority of the generically good, which are not deserving of an eternal re- Church, incurs the note of heresy. ward. Therefore since these good actions are not rewarded Reply to Objection 1. The authority quoted is speak- after this life in those who will be damned, neither should ing of the labor of working for merit, and not of the labor those evil actions be punished after this life. Hence the of suffering to be cleansed. same conclusion follows. Reply to Objection 2. Evil has not a perfect cause, On the contrary, It is said (2 Macc. 12:46): “It is but results from each single defect: whereas good arises a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead, that from one perfect cause, as Dionysius asserts§. Hence they may be loosed from sins.” Now there is no need to each defect is an obstacle to the perfection of good; while pray for the dead who are in heaven, for they are in no not every good hinders some consummation of evil, since need; nor again for those who are in hell, because they there is never evil without some good. Consequently ve- cannot be loosed from sins. Therefore after this life, there nial sin prevents one who has charity from obtaining the are some not yet loosed from sins, who can be loosed perfect good, namely eternal life, until he be cleansed; therefrom; and the like have charity, without which sins whereas mortal sin cannot be hindered by some conjoined cannot be loosed, for “charity covereth all sins”∗. Hence good from bringing a man forthwith to the extreme of they will not be consigned to everlasting death, since “he evils. that liveth and believeth in Me, shall not die for ever”†: Reply to Objection 3. He that falls into mortal sin, nor will they obtain glory without being cleansed, because deadens all the good he has done before, and what he nothing unclean shall obtain it, as stated in the last chap- does, while in mortal sin, is dead: since by offending God ter of the Apocalypse (verse 14). Therefore some kind of he deserves to lose all the good he has from God. Where- cleansing remains after this life. fore no reward after this life awaits him who dies in mortal Further, Gregory of Nyssa‡ says: “If one who loves sin, whereas sometimes punishment awaits him who dies and believes in Christ,” has failed to wash away his sins in charity, which does not always wash away the sin which in this life, “he is set free after death by the fire of Pur- it finds, but only that which is contrary to it. gatory.” Therefore there remains some kind of cleansing ∗ Prov. 10:12 † Jn. 11:26 ‡ De iis qui in fide dormiunt § Div. Nom. iv, 4 3108 Whether it is the same place where souls are cleansed, and the damned punished? App. 2 q. 1 a. 2 Objection 1. It would seem that it is not the same ble, however, and more in keeping with the statements of place where souls are cleansed and the damned punished. holy men and the revelations made to many, that there is For the punishment of the damned is eternal, according to a twofold place of Purgatory. one, according to the com- Mat. 25:46, “These shall go into everlasting punishment mon law; and thus the place of Purgatory is situated below [Vulg.: ‘fire’].” But the fire of Purgatory is temporary, as and in proximity to hell, so that it is the same fire which the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 21). Therefore the former torments the damned in hell and cleanses the just in Pur- and the latter are not punished together in the same place: gatory; although the damned being lower in merit, are to and consequently these places must needs be distinct. be consigned to a lower place. Another place of Purgatory Objection 2. The punishment of hell is called by vari- is according to dispensation: and thus sometimes, as we ous names, as in Ps. 10:7, “Fire and brimstone, and storms read, some are punished in various places, either that the of winds,” etc., whereas the punishment of Purgatory is living may learn, or that the dead may be succored, seeing called by one name only, namely fire. Therefore they are that their punishment being made known to the living may not punished with the same fire and in the same place. be mitigated through the prayers of the Church. Objection 3. Further, Hugh of St. Victor says (De Some say, however, that according to the common law Sacram. ii, 16): “It is probable that they are punished the place of Purgatory is where man sins. This does not in the very places where they sinned.” And Gregory re- seem probable, since a man may be punished at the same lates (Dial. iv, 40) that Germanus, Bishop of Capua, found time for sins committed in various places. And others say Paschasius being cleansed in the baths. Therefore they are that according to the common law they are punished above not cleansed in the same place as hell, but in this world. us, because they are between us and God, as regards their On the contrary, Gregory says∗: “Even as in the state. But this is of no account, for they are not punished same fire gold glistens and straw smokes, so in the same for being above us, but for that which is lowest in them, fire the sinner burns and the elect is cleansed.” Therefore namely sin. the fire of Purgatory is the same as the fire of hell: and Reply to Objection 1. The fire of Purgatory is eternal hence they are in the same place. in its substance, but temporary in its cleansing effect. Further, the holy fathers; before the coming of Christ, Reply to Objection 2. The punishment of hell is for were in a more worthy place than that wherein souls are the purpose of affliction, wherefore it is called by the now cleansed after death, since there was no pain of sense names of things that are wont to afflict us here. But the there. Yet that place was joined to hell, or the same as hell: chief purpose of the punishment of Purgatory is to cleanse otherwise Christ when descending into Limbo would not us from the remains of sin; and consequently the pain of be said to have descended into hell. Therefore Purgatory fire only is ascribed to Purgatory, because fire cleanses is either close to, or the same place as, hell. and consumes. I answer that, Nothing is clearly stated in Scripture Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the about the situation of Purgatory, nor is it possible to of- point of special dispensation and not that of the common fer convincing arguments on this question. It is proba- law. ∗ The quotation is from St. Augustine (De Civ. Dei i, 8) 3109